Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games.
J ECON THEORY
497 - 519.
In two-player infinite-horizon alternating-move games, a limited forecast(n(1),n(2))-equilibrium is such that (1) player i chooses actions according to his n(1)-length forecasts so as to maximize the average payoff over the forthcoming n(i) periods, and (2) players' equilibrium forecasts are correct. With finite action spaces, (n(1),n(2)-)solutions always exist and are cyclical, and the memory capacity of the players has no influence on the set of solutions. A solution is hyperstable if it is an (n(1),n(2))-solution for all n(1),n(2) sufficiently large. Hyperstable solutions are shown to exist and are characterized for generic repeated alternate-move 2 x 2 games. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
|Title:||Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games|
|UCL classification:||UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences|
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