Bhaskar, V; (1995) On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests. MATH SOC SCI , 30 (3) 273 - 284.
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Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionary stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion of neutral stability. This paper shows that such examples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategy is unstable. We apply our result to the battle of the sexes between males and females over the raising of offspring.
|Title:||On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests|
|Keywords:||evolutionary game theory, instability of mixed strategies, EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES, EXTENSIVE 2-PERSON GAMES|
|UCL classification:||UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics|
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