REPUTATION AND COMMITMENT IN 2-PERSON REPEATED GAMES WITHOUT DISCOUNTING.
1401 - 1419.
Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the type of the players. If there is a possibility that a player is an automaton committed to a particular pure or mixed stage-game action, then this provides a lower bound on the Nash equilibrium payoffs to a normal type of this player. The lower bound is the best available and is robust to the existence of other types. The results are extended to the case of two-sided uncertainty. This work extends Schmidt (1993) who analyzed the restricted class of conflicting interest games.
|Title:||REPUTATION AND COMMITMENT IN 2-PERSON REPEATED GAMES WITHOUT DISCOUNTING|
|Keywords:||REPUTATION, FOLK THEOREM, REPEATED GAMES, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, EQUILIBRIUM|
|UCL classification:||UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences
UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics
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