UCL logo

UCL Discovery

UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery

REPUTATION AND COMMITMENT IN 2-PERSON REPEATED GAMES WITHOUT DISCOUNTING

CRIPPS, MW; THOMAS, JP; (1995) REPUTATION AND COMMITMENT IN 2-PERSON REPEATED GAMES WITHOUT DISCOUNTING. ECONOMETRICA , 63 (6) 1401 - 1419.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the type of the players. If there is a possibility that a player is an automaton committed to a particular pure or mixed stage-game action, then this provides a lower bound on the Nash equilibrium payoffs to a normal type of this player. The lower bound is the best available and is robust to the existence of other types. The results are extended to the case of two-sided uncertainty. This work extends Schmidt (1993) who analyzed the restricted class of conflicting interest games.

Type:Article
Title:REPUTATION AND COMMITMENT IN 2-PERSON REPEATED GAMES WITHOUT DISCOUNTING
Keywords:REPUTATION, FOLK THEOREM, REPEATED GAMES, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, EQUILIBRIUM
UCL classification:UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics

Archive Staff Only: edit this record