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Reputation in perturbed repeated games

Cripps, MW; Schmidt, KM; Thomas, JP; (1996) Reputation in perturbed repeated games. J ECON THEORY , 69 (2) 387 - 410.

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Abstract

The paper analyzes reputation effects in perturbed repeated games with discounting. If there is some positive prior probability that one of the players is committed to play the same (pure) action in every period, then this provides a lower bound for her equilibrium playoff in all Nash equilibria. This bound is tight and independent of what other types have positive probability. It is generally lower than Fudenberg and Levine's bound for games with a long-run player facing a sequence of short-run opponents. The bound cannot be improved by considering types playing finitely complicated history-dependent commitment strategies. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

Type: Article
Title: Reputation in perturbed repeated games
Keywords: INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, EQUILIBRIUM
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of SandHS > Dept of Economics
URI: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/65270
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