

## London Borough of Tower Hamlets Central Stepney SRB: Final Evaluation



The area in about 1992, with the Gas Works site and BMT Houses to the north, Limehouse Fields Estate to the south, before the SRB (LDDC photo)



Perspective of part of the new development, with Waterview House in the background and the Canal to the right (PRP Architects image)

Michael Edwards, The Bartlett School of Planning, University College London  
Simona Florio, School of Planning, Oxford Brookes University  
Nikos Karadimitriou, The Bartlett School of Planning, University College London  
Claudio de Magalhães, The Bartlett School of Planning, University College London  
with assistance from Ziaur Rahman and Jabeada Begum

[m.edwards@ucl.ac.uk](mailto:m.edwards@ucl.ac.uk)

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 The brief

Tower Hamlets Council's invitation to tender (7 May 2002) set out the aims of this evaluation as

- (i) To assess to what extent the SRB [apart from its Borough-wide education components] has met its seven strategic objectives
- (ii) To assess how effectively the decision-making structures and management systems of the SRB, and including the operations of both the Stepney Housing and Development Agency (SHADA) and the Government, have worked effectively to enable the achievement of the SRB's strategic objectives and the Charter.
- (iii) Taking into account variations in the Housing programme agreed during its lifetime, to evaluate the SRB Housing Programme through answering...[14] questions. These questions and some others form the subheadings of this report, in section 2.
- (iv) To evaluate the SRB Environment and Leisure, Health and Community Development, Training and Economic Development programmes through answering...questions. These questions form sub-headings in section 3 below.
- (v) To assess to what extent the actions of major private sector stakeholders, specifically British Gas (Transco), Railtrack and Thames Water, have assisted or held back the achievement of the SRB's strategic objectives and charters.

The invitation also emphasised that the results of the evaluation will be '...relevant to all partners involved in the programme and a much wider audience engaged in regeneration and neighbourhood renewal.' It envisages that the report will go first to SHADA, then on to the Cabinet of the London Borough of Tower Hamlets and then be disseminated widely.

## 1.2 Our approach

Our approach has been to assemble multiple evaluations of the project and its component parts - 'multiple' in the sense that, as we expected, there is a diversity of evidence and views about the SRB's successes and shortcomings reflecting the varied aspirations and experiences of the individuals, groups and organisations involved. The study method has enabled such variations to be identified, while simultaneously satisfying the primary requirement - to evaluate achievement against the originally-specified objectives and later agreed modifications. The study also allows for the fact (not always accepted by government) that any project which is responding to local views should be expected to change its plans as it goes along.

British urban policy in recent decades has seen a succession of national initiatives - and a very wide range of local applications of these policies across the country. New policy regimes have tended to start before the full lessons have been learned from previous ones, and there has been much criticism of this record (Robson 1994, 1995). On the positive side, however, the succession of policy regimes and of local programmes has generated a very rich set of social experiments and for many areas there has been a local learning process from one project to the next - sometimes formalised through research but sometimes simply passed on as practical experience of community leaders, local councillors, regeneration staff and other public servants.

In this light the evaluation aims to

- (i) satisfy the formal requirements for evaluation of the SRB as a whole, notably those set out in the DTLR's *Guidance on Local Evaluation*. It should thus more than satisfy the LDA's new guidance (LDA 2002), which came to our attention while we were working.
- (ii) identify lessons which can be learned for the future (for the Stepney NDC, across London or more widely) from this particular SRB. These are both positive (contributing to the dissemination of 'best practice')

and negative lessons (pitfalls to be avoided, procedures or practices which could be improved next time around).

(iii) cast light on the built-in monitoring and appraisal mechanisms in the SRB system which were supposed to keep programmes on course and enable management and accountable bodies to 'steer' their projects.

### 1.3 Context

Stepney has a specially valuable history as an experiment in urban planning and housing, ever since it was so badly damaged in WW2 and re-planned as a model neighbourhood in Abercombe's and Forshaw's *County of London Plan* (1944) - and the Plan was partly implemented for the Festival of Britain in 1951. Much of the urban fabric and layout dates from that time, and the SRB (followed by the NDC) can be seen as selective retention and selective replacement of the building stock inherited from that period - after 50 years of radical social and economic change and severely limited maintenance and management.

In these 50 years (and especially in the 70s and 80s) the area experienced an almost complete collapse of the dock and manufacturing economy which had sustained its working class community, with many people working locally, strong family networks and a very particular kind of 'community' documented by Young and Willmott (1957) in their classic researches. Redevelopment, along with planned and voluntary migration took many of these residents away from the area in the post-war decades, mainly Eastwards into Essex, weakening some of the strong local links. At the same time the area - always cosmopolitan to some degree - was receiving inward migrations from other parts of the UK and especially from abroad, and most recently with a strong representation of Bengali people. The management of the council housing stock tended to concentrate these migrants in certain areas, including the SRB area. The practices of housing management which concentrated ethnic minorities into the worst available flats was the subject of intense controversy and CRE intervention, after which the practices were changed.

The last three decades have seen massive growth of new kinds of employment in London and especially in the Docklands, ranging from public service activity in the 1970s to the booms of private consumer and producer service activity of the late 1980s and late 90s. As part of this re-structuring the Docklands has been the focus of two massive construction booms, separated by a serious slump. This led to a total physical transformation of the area south of the Commercial Road but negligible private and only very limited Council/GLC investment outside the London Docklands Development Area boundary. Development north of Commercial Road has had to await other sources of public funds which have started to become available during the 90s.

The labour market changes associated with this transformation have engendered greater inequality of incomes than Britain has seen for many decades, making the UK the European country whose income distribution most resembles Brazil's and making Tower Hamlets one of the sites of the starkest inequalities. Relatively few of the employment gains of the East London boom have been accessible to the less-skilled residents in the adjacent areas (Hebbert 1992, Church and Frost 1998, House of Commons 1988), while residents have had to cope with the intense pressures of high-income-people's demand in the housing market including, latterly, upwards pressure on social housing rents and the loss of social housing units through the Right to Buy. The economic position of Tower Hamlets Council, and the constraints set on it by central government, prevented it from undertaking housing investment or maintenance on anything like the necessary scale. For most of those living in Central Stepney, the SRB will have been the first public investment with any chance of benefiting them substantially.

It is in this context that the Central Stepney SRB (CSSRB) was established, even before the LDDC was wound up, as a targeted project to improve housing and living conditions in one of the poorest parts of the Borough, and of the UK, housing a Bangaldeshi and white working class population, with some other ethnic groups and cultures mixed in. The project, in common with other area-based regeneration initiatives, sought to concentrate resources in order to maximise the impact and to

transform the local social and physical environment as well as simply the dwellings. However this carries the risks - well-understood by Tower Hamlets (Scrutiny Committee Report 06.03.01) - that this would be of little help to those outside the SRB boundary and that the costs of living in the improved environment might be so high as to worsen families' economic position.

This particular project has tried to be exemplary in the very close attention it has paid to sensitive local participation and management, minimising the disruption of life and strengthening of neighbourly relationships through the decanting and re-housing process and this ambition is one of the distinctive features evaluated. This aim was especially hard to achieve because SRB projects (especially Round 1) never provided time or money for extensive baseline research or for local consultation to refine the strategy. Central Stepney has had to develop mechanisms as it went along, adapting its pre-determined programme as best it could, without losing momentum. Later rounds of government programmes have learned this lesson to some extent and the New Deal for Communities —represented here in the Ocean Estate NDC— was able to take advantage both of time and money for initial deliberation and of the strengthened community organisations, communicative habits and knowledgeable staff developed through the SRB.

We do not criticise the Council or the SRB for failing to change things over which they had no power. For example, the main forces which generate poverty are features of the wider structure of society which cannot be transformed by local action (as pointed out by Ambrose in his evaluations here in 1996 and 2000). Furthermore the rules set by successive central governments have maintained the Right to Buy and have specified that major council housing renewal would be supported with public money (including SRB and HAG/SHG) only if stock were transferred to RSL ownership. The Council has thus had to work within constraints.

In a wider context, we are conscious that elected local authorities throughout Europe are grappling with reductions in their own direct command over resources and with government policies which cast them

increasingly as facilitators and co-ordinators of actions undertaken with or by others. As part of this process a growing proportion of funding for urban regeneration comes now from special programmes with their own rules and procedures, their own priorities and evaluation mechanisms. In order to have access to these programmes, local authorities are forced to bid and compete for funds in the plethora of policies and programmes devised by regional, national and EU agencies. Within this context the partnership structures used in Britain may or may not be a tool to re-empower localities, and can work either to decentralise or re-centralise decision making. But, whichever is the case, we accept that the regeneration partnership has been the principal —indeed often the only— mechanism available to urban governments to improve their areas.

#### *1.4 Research method*

This evaluation has involved the speedy formulation and answering of a large number of specific research questions about the housing and other features of the Programme.

#### **Gathering information**

To answer the research questions, and to satisfy the multiple objectives set out in the discussion above, we undertook three main types of information gathering: the scrutiny of documents, interviews and group discussions.

Scrutiny of documents - the SRB's (and SHADA's) own files, reports and evaluations, together with others from Tower Hamlets Council and from the other partners. In the event we experienced quite a lot of delay in obtaining all the documents we needed and, as the study ends, we are still learning about information sources to which it might have been useful to have had access.

A large number of interviews (over 40) with individuals who have played roles in the process - Councillors and Board Members, staff, community reps and leaders, professionals engaged in the projects and

others. A list is attached as Appendix B. We are sincerely grateful to all these people who have found time (often a number of hours) to answer our questions and give us their views. Only in a very few cases were people unhelpful or hard to get. Even with this major interview programme we are aware of many other key people whom we have not been able to meet. We were only able to hold a small number of group discussions.

We have also spoken to as many residents as we could, both in English and in Sylheti, and have tried to reflect their views in this report as best we can. While we cannot say what proportions of people hold the various views we are reporting, we have found it very helpful indeed to know at least some of the views that are held in the area.

One shortcoming of this research is the very limited attention which could be paid to those who have been affected by the SRB but live outside the SRB area: notably residents elsewhere who might, under different policies, have benefited from some of the investment and former residents of the SRB area who chose or were forced by eligibility rules to leave or who may have been unable or ineligible to return.

The documents and sources we used caused some problems. In some respects the written records are voluminous, especially those created to satisfy the Government Office for London (GOL) through which the SRB was accountable to government until 2000, and for the London Development Agency (LDA) which took over in that year. Record keeping and internal evaluation in British urban regeneration have become somewhat ritualised, focusing on the standard outputs and outcomes specified by government, at the cost of ignoring the potential of routine administrative and other data to yield highly relevant information about how well the project was achieving some of its fundamental aims. An example is that SHADA holds a mass of detailed data on all the decanted households, gathered and used as part of the management of the decanting process. This data has huge potential as an indicator of whether residents are remaining in the area, where they are going, whether they return and so on, with breakdowns by tenure and many other variables. Some of this data had been extracted as a paper

tabulation at the request of an earlier research project and we were able to make some use of it in our evaluation of the decanting process. But had it been used through the life of the SRB it could have been an invaluable strategic and day-to-day management tool.

We tended to focus too much on SHADA, the agency through which the housing capital programme was delivered and co-ordinated, at the expense of the other aspects of the programme. This tendency resulted partly from the way the project was presented to us, with SHADA's head acting as de-facto client and with the SHADA office (and its endlessly helpful staff) the visible and central focus of the neighbourhood and of much of the work. However it became clear that about £5 million of the SRB money and a lot of the project delivery came via Tower Hamlets through a variety of channels, projects and individuals. Many of these projects and individuals proved difficult to track down and this delayed our work.

We have necessarily assembled a lot of detailed statistical data which we present for the record and to substantiate the conclusions we have drawn. These detailed data are in an Appendix (A) of the report in order that the main text can be as readable as possible.

## 2 The Housing programme

The questions we were asked to address were organised in two groups: housing and the rest. In this report we start by dealing with the housing issues (section 2) and then turn to the rest of the activity (section 3). Because many of the issues involve both areas of work there is a lot of duplication, so issues dealt with in respect of housing are not repeated in detail in the later sections. Instead we tend to refer back from section 3 to section 2 where necessary and vice versa.

We were asked to respond to a series of specific questions in our evaluation, and these questions form the headings in this section.

First, however, the housing programme should be placed in context. When the SRB was launched nationally and Tower Hamlets was invited to bid (in 1994) Labour had just won the local elections and councillors were busy re-structuring and re-centralising the Council's work which, during the previous 8 years (under the Liberal Democrats) had been devolved to 7 local neighbourhoods. In this climate of change, officers were able to prepare the SRB bid independently of political pressures and on the basis of their local expertise. The resulting bid was based on a re-worked version of an earlier, failed, bid for Estate Action funding and was successful in 1996. Government, however, decided to grant a smaller sum than the Council had sought, indicating that the cuts should come from the non-housing elements. Tower Hamlets' bid contemplated the demolition and replacement of some of the worst housing, together with an extensive refurbishment programme. Government, however, indicated that the possibility should be explored of extending the demolition and new build scheme and reducing the emphasis on refurbishment. It also, apparently, suggested that a more detailed plan should be developed through local consultation and with the help of private consultants and that the final programme should be delivered by an 'arm's length' company and not by the Council itself. The Masterplan was the product of the consultants' work and of the participation which they facilitated.

### *2.1 Has the Masterplan been implemented?*

A group of consultants, Capital Action, was commissioned to prepare a Masterplan. The document they produced covers many aspects of the development (in Chapters 3, 8 and 9):

Firstly, the physical elements together with soft, delivery, elements.

Secondly, a series of principles relating to future tenures, planning and urban design, major development sites, land use mix, open space and planning gain.

The document also goes into much detail as far as funding and implementation procedures, such as land assembly, are concerned and recommended a new organisation, which was then set up, as SHADA.

The main and most important element of the MasterPlan is the recommended housebuilding option. The other principles and suggestions are supportive of this main element and had a rather consultative character, many of them being embodied in the Stepney Charter whose implementation we discuss in section 2.5 below.

We have had to strike a delicate balance between, on the one hand, focusing the answer to this question on the physical provisions only, or on the other hand expanding into every possible detail of the Masterplan. The latter would turn this SRB evaluation into a study on the Masterplan implementation. Given our terms of reference we will focus on the physical programme and briefly outline whether there were significant deviations from the principles and procedures of the Masterplan, with many of these wider issues, like consultation, being considered in other sections.

The Masterplan is a consultation document and there is limited scope for examining whether proposed procedures, let alone financial arrangements, were followed up to the last detail, unless of course non-implementation can be linked to adverse effects on the housing

programme. In more detail, the following aspects of the MasterPlan will be examined (see chapter 8 of the MasterPlan document for more details):

The degree of implementation of...

- (i) the preferred housing option.
- (ii) delivery and funding mechanisms.
- ii) the principles on meeting housing need.
- iii) the planning and design principles
- v) the decanting principles.
- vi) collaboration with the private sector.

Other aspects of the Masterplan, like the financial or the managerial arrangements, will be examined in greater depth in later sections of this report. Despite the efforts of the evaluation team, it was very difficult to find maps depicting the sites that were developed, and the Masterplan provisions in general, therefore it is difficult to comment on the spatial aspects of implementation without diverting significant resources into a mapping effort. Our report is thus less well illustrated than we would like.

### **2.1.1 Implementation of the preferred housing option.**

#### *2.1.1.1 Main new build programme (see data in Appendix A)*

This part of the Masterplan became two SRB 'projects', 'Ocean and Limehouse Redevelopment Sites' 'New Build Sites'. Three more projects, also produced new houses as outputs. Of these, one was a refurbishment programme while the other two, 'Phase 1 feeder sites', will be examined shortly.

In the Masterplan, five options were put forward during the consultation process and option number four was selected following community consultation. It involved:

The demolition and redevelopment of most pre-war and post-war blocks and some of the Greaves and Donoghue Cottages.

The refurbishment of two remaining Tower Blocks (132 units) and Cottages (132 units).

Demolition and redevelopment of 220 units from Bothnia, Malacca and Tunis Houses ('BMT') on the Ocean Estate. This was not part of the 'LFE package' under community consultation since it was already under way.

Replacement of the loss of units caused by redeveloping at lower densities by off-site new developments.

A programme set out in 8 implementation phases (1 to 8).

Responsibility for implementation was to be delegated to a new agency, SHADA.

According to the Masterplan baseline survey, LFE comprised 852 units of which 580-590 were proposed for demolition, mostly small flats in pre-war and post-war blocks. Those proposed for refurbishment and retention were larger (3 and 4 bedroom) cottages and the 2-bedroom flats in two tower blocks. (See Appendix table A 2.1.)

The core of the Masterplan—demolition and rebuilding of Bothnia, Malacca and Tunis Houses (BMT) in the Ocean Estate and of the Limehouse Fields Estate (LFE)—will probably be achieved as envisaged when the programme finishes in March 2004, despite the time overrun. However, the total number of replacement units will probably be 81 units short of those envisaged in the Masterplan and 44 units fewer than the properties demolished, though far exceeding the previous stock in numbers of rooms, as we shall see, and no doubt in floor area.

The shortfall of dwelling numbers is due to less development than expected in Council or Private sites. It is clear, however, that the Masterplan was followed in broad terms and that there were significant extra outputs, probably resulting from a slight increase in densities. Details of the numbers involved are in the Appendix tables A2.2-A2.6

*b) Refurbishment programme (Appendix table A2.4)*

The main refurbishment work in the SRB was the upgrading of about 265 dwellings, half in the two retained tower blocks, Darnley and Waterview Houses, and half in cottages.

*c) Feeder sites (see Appendix tables A 2.5 and A 2.6)*

There is only one project in the SRB referring to 'feeder sites' but the term was used generally to refer to a number of sites that were developed in order to decant the residents of BMT and LFE. It is worth noting that many of these developments did not receive SRB funding at all, as far as we can determine.

Most of project H10 as envisaged by the Masterplan has not been carried out. It appears that it proved impossible to develop most of the indicated sites, although this was partially anticipated and these sites were more 'opportunity sites' than anything else. This was partially due to the fact that many of these sites were under private ownership so there was little the SRB delivery agencies could do. However, it is interesting to note that sites under full LBTH ownership that were not developed account for 92 non-developed housing units. The non-development of Harford St gas works, which would have provided at least 150 units, was significant. In any case, part of the programme appears to have depended on risky assumptions, recognised as such by the Masterplan authors themselves (see Capital Action, 1996:97). This strategy appears not to have worked completely. On the other hand, identifying so many potential development sites probably helped the programme's flexibility and ensured that its completion was not jeopardised when the gas works was withheld.

## **2.1.2 Implementation of delivery and funding mechanisms.**

### *2.1.2.1 Delivery mechanisms*

In order to implement the housing programme, the Masterplan suggested setting up a 'dedicated implementation team' namely SHADA. Its goals would be (Capital Action, 1996:108)

to integrate new project management functions with existing estate management activities.

to bring together the joint interests of the Council and the housing associations as providers of social housing plus the tenants.

To allow for a formalised involvement of the tenants within its structure, to safeguard their interests.

Two alternative structures were proposed:

- SHADA as a team of LBTH employees working within the structure of the council.
- SHADA as an 'independently constituted organisation acting as an agent for the Council and the housing associations'.

SHADA's tasks would include:

- Managing decanting.
- Site assembly and preparation.
- Preparing and contracting building and refurbishment programmes in accordance with available funding and the SRB Delivery Plan.
- Drawing up and enforcing the Stepney Charter.
- Establishing effective working relationships with the principal funding bodies.
- Establishing a framework for the long-term management of mixed tenure estates.


SHADA was supposed to replace the Housing Working Group and to have 'a direct contractual link with the Regeneration Committee' to which it would be accountable. Given the provision for tripartite representation of the Council, the Tenants and the Housing Associations in SHADA's management board, the Masterplan proposed the dissolution of the SRB Board as irrelevant. This suggestion is indicative of either an assumption that the SRB was a 'housing only' programme, or a complete disregard for the other elements of the SRB. Whichever was the case, management and delivery of the other elements of the SRB became a major friction point later on because of this oversight. For a comparison with what actually happened with SHADA refer to paragraph 2.10.

2.1.2.2. Funding

With regards to funding, the Masterplan suggested that the scheme should be funded with the use of existing SRB and HIP resources that could be topped up with HAG and Housing Association monies. The Masterplan includes an annex with a detailed cost plan that is summarised in a table in its main report. However, the two plans are slightly different: one estimates the total cost to be £90,081,000 the other £90,353,000 (both allowing for 3% yearly inflation). This should be compared with a total housing programme actual expenditure of £107,957,000 (not £107,778,000 as the Profile says) up to the end of 2001/2. Another £10,432,000 has been spent since then. The following chart provides a comparison between the Masterplan cost estimates and the actual, as reported by Frost Associates (2002).

Since the Masterplan costings incorporated a 3% p.a. inflation allowance, the two values at each year should be broadly comparable because they refer to current prices for that year, as estimated and actual.

Chart 2.1.2.a: Expenditure on the housing programme: Masterplan forecasts and actual spending, including SHADA's costs



For details see Appendix table A 2.7

An important observation is the variety of funding sources which were finally used and were not foreseen in the Masterplan. This might reflect the creative harnessing of previously-unforeseen sources but it could also be an indication of bad preparation. With the help of the chart above (2.1.2.a) it is also possible to make year by year comparisons.

A further look at the chart reveals that the Masterplan was relatively closely followed for the years up to 1999-2000 but then, as the housing programme took off, HC and HA expenditure began to deviate significantly from what had been expected. However, before drawing further conclusions one would have to check the SRB delivery plans to establish a baseline and further determine the causes of the deviation.

### 2.1.3 Implementation of the principles on meeting housing need.

The Masterplan had set out the following basic principles:

- That the demolished stock should be replaced with rented accommodation. This has been implemented.
- That shared ownership should be limited, mainly directed towards development of privately owned sites and the Stifford Estate. The Stifford Estate is not included in the Housing Programme but there were 16 units built for shared ownership in package D, maybe more elsewhere. In general there was no significant change of tenure mix between new and old stock, beyond the large-scale transfer of tenants from Council to Housing Associations. Different forms of tenure were to be sought only after the needs of the decants were covered. This appears to have been the case.
- Special needs housing was supposed to be developed at Harford St. gas works site, Latham House and Sandhurst House. Harford St. has not been developed and we have no record of what took place on the other 2 sites.
- Finally, based on a needs estimate derived from the LBTH waiting list for the wider area, the Masterplan proposed a radical change of unit type mix as far as number of bedrooms are concerned. The proposed change did not reflect the waiting list needs exactly, probably because of an implicit assumption that the target population had more need for units with more bedrooms. As table 2.1.3.a shows, there has been an even more radical change with even fewer 1 bedroom units being provided in favour of larger units particularly 3 bedroom units. It should be noted that there were some 6 bedroom units provided that were not envisaged in the Masterplan, probably because no-one had at that stage been able to research the need for such units in the area. (The wider implications of the mix of dwellings actually built is discussed in section 2.6 below.)

**Table 2.1.3.a: Proposed and final mix of the housing stock: proportion of units by number of bedrooms**

	1 bedroom	2	3	4	5	6
before the SRB	44%	45%	8%	2,5%	0.5%	0%
Waiting List need estimate	40%	30%	15%	10%	5%	0%
Masterplan	33%	30%	19%	12%	6%	0%
Actual	21%	32%	26,5%	14%	6%	1.5%

Source: Capital Action (1996), SHADA

### 2.1.4 Implementation of the Planning and Design principles.

The recommended density in the Masterplan varies from 60 to 150 habitable rooms per acre (hr/a) (150-375 habitable rooms per hectare). According to the planning applications, the density of the BMT replacements is 291 hr/ha (contract package B), which drops down to 255 hr/ha in LFE package C, 253 hr/ha for package D and rises back to 373 hr/ha for package E. We do not have enough data for Package A and the rest of the sites but they were rather fragmented anyway and their development should not have had a major affect on densities, though they could have made a significant contribution to housing in total.

The dwelling mix target of not more than 50% 1 bedroom flats was far more than achieved (see 2.1.3). And generally speaking, design principles (rows of terraced houses with higher buildings in the corners, canal bank 'treatment' and better links to Mile End Park ) were also adhered to, although the new bridge over the canal has not been built. This topic however was regulated by the Stepney Charter in much more detail (see paragraph 2.5).

An approach to design with street-frontage buildings and only on-street parking was acheived - though only with diffuctly (see below).

Provisions for assistance to local business likely to be affected and for mixed-use redevelopment were much less successful: practically none of the proposed sites benefited.

Increased provision of larger playgrounds and larger recreation areas depended heavily upon development of Harford St. Gas Works, which never happened (section 2.16). Furthermore, the Masterplan envisaged that SHADA would negotiate all s.106 agreements in order to achieve the SRB objectives and increase the provision of playgrounds and open space. Durrant Park has been largely a failure (see section 2.8) and a play space in Belgrave Road, adjoining some of the 'feeder site' homes, has been closed down because of maintenance and supervision failures.

### 2.1.5 Implementation of the Decanting principles.

In brief the principles were:

- Decanting to be kept within the area.
- Provide decanting units from the programme itself as much as possible.
- Voids were to be actively managed and maintained specially for the needs of decanting
- Provide permanent council housing for those who expressly wish to remain council tenants.
- Provide incentives to move the elderly into tower blocks.
- The Council should use buy-back of leaseholds (freeholds in the case of cottages only) for decanting, or sub-let properties for the same purpose.

Since a main aim of the SRB was to improve the housing conditions of residents, it seemed essential to evaluate whether the benefits had gone to the intended recipients. We were rather surprised to find that neither SHADA's nor the Council's records had been organised in such a way as to make this easy, let alone routine. While the SRB is required to report voluminously to government about its 'outputs', this core issue of the

impact of benefits did not form any part of the GOL/LDA reporting requirement.

Thanks to the enthusiastic co-operation of some SHADA staff, however, we have been able to make some estimates of the flows of households.

We estimate that the SRB programme was responsible for (or in the case of the BMT blocks, associated with) the demolition of about 850 dwellings and the construction of about 800 new ones. All those demolished had first to be vacated and those living there decanted (if they were eligible) or otherwise evicted.

The SHADA re-housing staff had compiled (at the request of an earlier University research project) a hand-written tabulation of the decanting of about the first 75% of the Limehouse Fields demolitions (54% of all the demolitions) shown with a bold line round them in table 3.1.5a. We are using this data as the basis for estimates of the flow of households in the programme as a whole.

The data which follows relates only to 424 households decanted and for whom we have data. It therefore excludes the households found to be ineligible for decanting who lived alone in their flats (7), other ineligible individuals and families (an unknown number of people) sharing the flats of people who were decanted and at least 6 households which made their own arrangements.

**Table 3.1.5a Decanted households**

area	total flats demolished, of which.....	already vacant	containing decant households	containing only other households	other flats
Bothnia, Malacca, Tunis	220				
Limehouse Fields, earlier stages	460	43	391 flats (424 decant hh)	7	no data 28 other * 19
Limehouse Fields, later stages	136				
other LHF - scattered cottages	43				
<b>Total</b>	<b>596 LHF 859 total</b>				

Notes: The 28 were probably vacant; the 19 comprised 6 housed people who found their own accommodation, 1 evicted for rent arrears and 12 where the tenant died before moving. The later stage blocks excluded are, Hemlington, Hawksmoor, Hearnshaw, Repton, Coltman and Maroon Houses.


It is apparent that Bengalis (and the category includes a few other south Asian tenants) comprised half the households and two thirds of the individuals while white people comprised 42% of households but only a quarter of the individuals. Other ethnic groups made up the remaining 8% of households and 6% of individuals.

The high level of overcrowding among Bengali households will be clear from the last column of table 3.1.5b and from the diagram below.

**Table 3.1.5b Characteristics of decanted households**

	population	households	average size of households	proportion of households	proportion of individuals	average rooms per person
total	1165	391	2.98	100.0%	100.0%	
white	305	164	1.86	41.9%	26.2%	0.72
Bengali +	795	195	4.08	49.9%	68.2%	0.44
black	30	16	1.88	4.1%	2.6%	0.83
other	35	15	2.33	3.8%	3.0%	0.71

The white households were less crowded on average, but the average concealed a wide spread, with some very crowded families and, at the other extreme, some households with spare bedrooms.



Note: households shown as having no bedrooms are those recorded as sharing space with another household. All the bedrooms in the dwelling concerned are attributed to the primary (tenant) household.

Some of these households (55, 15%) moved to temporary housing, and later to permanent homes. All the others moved just once, to housing which they stayed in (even though in some cases they had earlier expressed the wish (or reserved the right) to return. The final destinations were as shown in Table 3.1.5c.

Over one third of households ended up outside the SRB area, but almost all of those stayed within Tower Hamlets. Two thirds of those decanted remained within the SRB area or returned there from temporary housing. The 'feeder sites' —about a hundred houses built on an assortment of available plots in the SRB area, mostly just north of Commercial Road— played a very important role, taking a quarter of these moves.

**Table 3.1.5c Destinations of decanted households**

	pop'n	households, by area of permanent housing - numbers						
		total	feeder sites	other SRB units	rest of SRB area	rest of LBTH	rest of London	other
total	1165	391	97	121	28	136	3	0
white	305	164	39	30	8	80	2	0
Bengali +	795	195	50	84	18	42	1	0
black	30	16	5	5	0	6	0	0
other	35	15	3	2	2	8	0	0
			% moving to permanent housing at					
			feeder sites	other SRB units	rest of SRB area	rest of LBTH	rest of London	other
total		100	25%	31%	7%	35%	1%	0%
white		100	24%	18%	5%	49%	1%	0%
Bengali +		100	26%	43%	9%	22%	1%	0%
black		100	31%	31%	0%	38%	0%	0%
other		100	20%	13%	13%	53%	0%	0%

The four broad ethnic groups seems to have behaved in similar ways except that

- (i) white people were more likely to have moved outside the SRB area, and Bengalis least likely (49% compared with 22% respectively)
- (ii) Bengalis were very much more likely to move into the new houses on Limehouse Fields than white people (43% compared with 18% respectively).

These somewhat different choices have influenced the makeup of the flows to the various destinations, as shown in table 3.1.5.d

**Table 3.1.5d composition of flows to each location**

	feeder sites	other SRB units	rest of SRB area	rest of LBTH
total	100%	100%	100%	100%
white	40%	25%	29%	59%
Bengali +	52%	69%	64%	31%
black	5%	4%	0%	4%
other	3%	2%	7%	6%

It is not clear quite what happened here. The following factors have probably played a part

(i) Bengalis with large families were particularly keen on the new SRB units because the largest dwellings were there. Consultations had largely been concerned with the design and customisation of these houses to the needs of those moving. They may also have been seeking to remain close to each other and / or been reluctant to move across the Borough.

(ii) Those seeking to protect their rights to buy could only do so by remaining council tenants, and this would mean moving to other parts of Tower Hamlets or to the relatively few council flats available in the 'rest of the SRB area'. Income differences would probably have meant that more white and fewer ethnic minority households were pursuing this objective.

Certainly the outcome was that far more of the white households (and of the few 'other' households) remained as council tenants - almost double the proportion found among Bengali and Black households.

**Table 3.1.5e Tenure of households after moving**

	households	% RSL	% Council
	= 100%		
<b>total</b>	382	67%	32%
<b>white</b>	156	56%	43%
<b>Bengali +</b>	195	75%	24%
<b>black</b>	16	75%	25%
<b>other</b>	15	60%	40%

We also have some information on those 55 households which moved twice (Table 3.1.5f).

**Table 3.1.5f Households moving twice**

	pop'n	households, temporarily housed in....			
		total	..blocks to be demolished	rest of SRB area	rest of LBTH
<b>total</b>	181	55	36	13	6
<b>white</b>	35	20	16	3	1
<b>Bengali +</b>	145	34	19	10	5
<b>black</b>	1	1	1	0	0
<b>other</b>	0	0	0	0	0

All of these households except one ended up within the SRB area, mostly in new housing association dwellings but in a very few cases in council flats or houses on the Ocean Estate.

Taking all the 183 households who moved to council housing in which they could have stayed permanently, only 12 chose to move (back) into the new development from flats within the SRB area and 6 from flats in the rest of Tower Hamlets.

It does seem that voids on the estate were actively managed to support decanting (See also discussion of project outputs below).

Permanent council housing was provided for a very large number of people who did wish to remain, council tenants (32% of households), often outside the SRB area.

We do not know whether elderly people were given incentives to move into the towers, nor whether the council bought back leases or freeholds to assist decanting.

These figures are based on analysis of moves generated by the clearing of 460 flats. They do not cover the earlier clearance of the BMT blocks (220 flats) nor of 179 units in Limehouse Fields and elsewhere later in the programme. Our understanding is that in these later stages everyone who wanted to move to the SRB newly-built housing was able to do so without moving twice. But we do not know what proportion of these earlier or later movers ended up there, or in Council housing, inside or outside the SRB area.

If all the movers made choices like those we have analysed, then the SRB would have generated about 250 moves to council dwellings outside the SRB area and to about 45 council dwellings within the SRB area.

### 2.1.6 Working with the private sector

In a chapter entitled 'Working with the Private Sector' the authors of the Masterplan outlined the potential of the private sector to contribute to 'the supply of new housing in the area and to the regeneration objectives of the SRB'. However, they recognise the fact that private interest in re-development has only been expressed by the owners of two sites: the Harford St. Gas works and 24-32 Copperfield Road. The second site was supposed to provide 50 units and it was supposed to have planning permission but in any case it is not included in the latest SHADA funding profile. However not all went well as far as collaboration with the private sector for the provision of housing was concerned. This is hardly surprising, given the un-cared-for condition of the area, the characteristics of the SRB programme itself and the spirit of the times which did not favour this sort of partnership the way it does today.

The gas works however appears to have been much more important to the housing programme. The empty site was rightly viewed by local actors as a source of blight and it was envisaged as the only site capable of providing a substantial amounts of space to be used for re-housing and special needs housing, but also to provide open space and big leisure / recreational areas of importance to the whole area. In the words of the Masterplan authors 'A solution for the future of this site, whether for residential or some other use, is vital if the objectives, outcomes and outputs of the SRB Delivery Plan are not to be put at risk' (Capital Action, 1996:4). Whether this statement was proven right or not is a matter examined later on (in section 2.16).

## ***2.2 Have all the outputs been achieved? (see Appendix A for further details)***

In the following sub-sections we summarise and comment upon the data maintained at the Town Hall in various archives and reports which were essentially compiled as part of the formal accountability requirements for SRBs. These records are often hard to link directly with each other and with the main strands of the housing (and other) actions of the SRB. The commentary here (and in the Appendix) is thus on data which it was impossible to analyse fully, and should be read as such.

### **2.2.1 General observations and establishment of baseline**

The first question to be answered is what the initially-agreed target outputs were. We were not able to locate an official agreement between the GOL and the LBTH regarding the total delivery outputs to be achieved following the GOL approval, other than the yearly delivery plans and the Masterplan.

What we believe happened is that, following the GOL approval of a smaller budget for the programme (£28,405,000 instead of £31,843,400) the SRB output targets had to be re-adjusted. However, we were not able to locate a post-approval list of overall end-of-programme output targets broken down by project, similar to the one included in the bid. The

only end-of-programme outputs in the first year delivery plan are global totals per output indicator, not per project.

Subsequent to the inevitable adjustments that the smaller SRB budget caused, further changes have been made to housing output targets following the directions of the Masterplan. It is also the case that a series of alterations were discussed and agreed in meetings under the auspices of SHADA or the SRB board (for the rest of the programme). These are also very difficult to trace. The resulting estimation problems are explained in detail in Appendix A and C.

### **2.2.2 Project-by-project comparison**

#### ***Decanting H1 (Appendix table A 2.9)***

The decanting did take place and, so far as we could discover, all the blocks were emptied in time for demolition to start. It is almost certain that none of these outputs would have been achieved without the SRB. (The BMT decanting, which was not part of the SRB's work, took place before the SRB and clearly it is perfectly possible for decanting to happen without an SRB programme - but only if the Council is able and willing to divert a sufficient flow of vacancies for the purpose.)

#### ***Demolition and decontamination H2 (Appendix table A 2.10)***

The total project actual cost was £5,910,000.

#### ***Housing Refurbishment H4 (Appendix table A 2.11)***

It has not been possible to verify in all cases whether better-than-forecast outputs are real effectiveness gains or just reflect cautious forecasting. The latter certainly appears to be true in some cases. For example, this project created 327 person-weeks in f.t.e. construction jobs in 1998-99 and the project is not even included in that year's 'Key indicators of performance' in the delivery plan. That outcome was not anticipated in the milestone tables either.

Although it has not been possible here to calculate unit costs from SRB monitoring data, SHADA data show that Waterview House refurbishment cost £2,700,000 for 66 units or £40,910 per unit and Darnley House cost £21,925 per unit.

***Feeder sites: Support for housing H5 (Appendix table A 2.12)***

This programme appears to have performed very well and was very cost-efficient and effective. However, it has only received minimal SRB funding (£2000) and it is very probable that it would have gone ahead anyway since it was an LBTH Housing Programme that was diverted to the SRB to accommodate decanting needs.

***Feeder Sites H6 (Appendix table A 2.13)***

The same applies here as in H5 with the exception that this project received no SRB funding at all.

***Feeder sites: Site Preparation H7 (Appendix table A 2.14)***

This project corresponds to the preparation and decontamination of the various 'feeder sites'. Because of the very flexible nature of the programme and the constant changes in the sites to be included it is rather difficult to guarantee the representativeness of the calculations. High effectiveness and low efficiency have probably been caused by the constant changes in the type and number of sites that were included in this programme. Many of these sites would probably have been developed anyway, and indeed the SRB made negligible financial contributions to them.

***Ocean Demolition & Decontamination H8 (Appendix table A 2.15)***

This appears to be another very effective and efficient programme.

***Ocean & Limehouse Redevelopment Site H9 (Appendix table A 2.16)***

Although it has not been possible to break down costs between the three parts of this project, we have obtained some information on costs from the actual construction contracts. According to those each unit for package B (BMT-Mar98/May00) cost £64,130, or £684.42 per sq. metre, excluding demolition and servicing of the land. Each unit in package C (Jacobs Square- Sep99/Feb02) cost £73,047, or £860.78 per sq. m., excluding demolition and servicing of the land.

***New Build Sites H10 (Appendix table A 2.17)***

Again, all the problems of discrepancies between forecasts and outputs apply. The outputs are not yet complete and there is a good chance that

output forecasts for new HA dwellings have been carried forward to the next years.

***Sandhurst House H13 (Appendix table A 2.18)***

According to SHADA's funding profile, this project actually cost £692,000 while the SRB delivery plan for year 3 estimated its cost at £792,625. It is hard to interpret the records for this project, nor whether and how the programme would have gone on without the SRB.

***Project Management H14 (Appendix table A 2.19)***

Under this heading comes SHADA's own operating budget of almost £9m, including the completion of the Masterplan (£342,000), SHADA's own community projects and consultation work. It also includes some building refurbishment work. SHADA's work is evaluated in subsequent sections of this report.

***Site Acquisitions H15 (Appendix table A 2.20)***

Initially it was expected that 11 sites would be acquired but in the event only 9 were bought, costing just under £300,000 (somewhat below budget). In the absence of records of the areas involved it is not possible to judge whether this was good value for money.

***2.3 Has the programme kept to time and budget?***

The discrepancies between SHADA's funding profile and the SRB delivery plans cast some doubt on what actually happened with costs. The general impression of everyone interviewed is that the BMT and LFE redevelopment and Package A generally kept on budget but were very delayed.

This is supported by the housebuilding contract records which show very limited financial deviations but reveal significant time delays. Indicatively, as far as contractual obligations are concerned, package B was completed about 4 months late, package C was about 5 months late, package D will probably be 10 months late. Package E however, due to finish in May 2004, is going well for the moment

Package A faced delays of 2-3 months but some sites that were added later on added a year to that.

These delays were mainly attributed by respondents to the following factors:

LBTH Highways Department was the source of repeated conflict, raising the same topics for discussion each and every time a new package came up, although the same people were involved. This was a major frustration to most stakeholders and led to 'communication breakdowns'. The source of the dispute was parking space but, according to one interviewee, the 'project would have 30% fewer houses if we followed LBTH Highways Department's ideas.'

LBTH Planning was very persistent in its s.106 negotiations which caused some delays.

Lack of trained labour. The general perception is that the local labour force is untrained in construction work. LBTH was praised for their assistance, but construction skill shortage is a general cyclical problem in the South East of England, accentuated by local conditions. Laing had to bring people in from Essex; however this may have more to do with their recruiting practices than anything else. Both major contractors (Higgins and Laing) faced difficulties with managing the project at one point or another.

Services and statutory undertakers caused delays as usual but there were also some unforeseen servicing works.

Land was not becoming available as fast as required. Delays appear to have been a mixture of bottlenecks in making and confirming CPOs (LBTH and GOL) and other site assembly delays.

#### ***2.4 Have any additional outputs been achieved?***

The main outputs of the housing programmes were the housing outputs already discussed. In addition, however, a number of community development activities were carried out as part of the housing work, or by housing organisations, and these are discussed in section 3.1 below.

#### ***2.5 Has the Stepney Charter been adhered to (including an assessment of the quality of consultation)***

##### **2.5.1. Introduction**

The purpose of the Stepney Charter was to establish a set of common principles for developing and managing the homes which were either built or refurbished under the SRB in Central Stepney.

The ambitions and the significance of the Charter can only be understood in the context of British housing policy and practice in the period. Conservative governments, and the Labour governments which succeeded them after 1997, shared a strong policy preference for reducing the role played by Council housing, and expanding the activities of housing associations - which later came to be known as Registered Social Landlords (RSLs). In addition it was a presumption or theme of government urban policy from the late 70s that it was desirable to diversify the mix of tenures in areas like Tower Hamlets where council housing had become heavily dominant.

As a result of these policies at central government level, local housing authorities found that they could secure government funding (and authorisation to spend from their own limited resources) only where their plans included a diversification of tenure. In general, new house building could only take place if it were undertaken by RSLs. Thus, in the 1990s, many authorities were selling vacant housing, and transferring tenanted housing to the RSLs. This latter process was known as Stock Transfer, and it was deeply controversial among tenants for a number of reasons, principally because of the replacement of politically-accountable landlords by self-governing associations and because of well-founded concerns that rents would be higher (and/or that they would rise faster) for RSL tenants than for council tenants.

In this context the Stepney Charter was designed to be an agreement binding on all the landlords providing housing in the affected SRB area, committing them to good standards of design, development, management and maintenance and to rental policies. It also aimed to

harmonise, and even to unify, the management and maintenance regimes of all three landlords and to do so in the long term, either through the involvement of a Joint Management Agent or through allocating the responsibility for managing the new stock to just one of the landlords (but not to the Council). While, technically, the involvement of RSLs at Stepney was not a case of Stock Transfer (but instead of the transfer of vacant land), the Charter was designed to overcome the main perceived objections to Stock Transfer which had been voiced locally and across the country.

The Charter aimed to achieve these ends by (a) holding extensive consultations with all parties to agree a document before the RSLs were formally selected, so that commitment to the Charter would be one of the criteria for selecting RSLs, and (b) holding further negotiations after the RSLs were chosen to refine and revise the Charter. This is what appears to have happened, though there are conflicting accounts of the stage at which RSLs (and particularly those subsequently selected to become partners in SHADA) first took part: while some of SHADA's staff suggested that the RSLs had not been party to the early drafting prior to SHADA's creation, other respondents—including some members of SHADA's board—insist that they had been involved, and rightly so, as this increased their commitment to the Charter.

### **2.5.2 The Stepney Charter: summary and methodological discussion**

Essentially the Charter comprises 6 sections, each containing recommendations on different aspects of the scheme: (1) the standard of development (2) rents (3) allocation of tenancies (4) provision of rights to tenants (5) housing management services (6) maintenance.

The reason why our analysis refers to some recommendations, but not others is simple: given that the resources available for conducting this final evaluation did not allow for a full investigation (i.e. to assess the extent to which every one of the recommendations had prompted appropriate action) we considered that—by employing an ethnographic approach—we could at least determine the extent to which the Charter succeeded in its overall aims. In particular, we wanted to understand

whether the Charter was mainly treated as a list of practical and/or technical requirements, or whether partners had actually acted in its spirit. In practice, our research method involved asking each interviewee the question which had been put to us, then formulating an answer based on our interpretation of their replies. This approach was successful in enabling us to achieve our main aim. However, as will emerge from the interpretative sections below, questions which had not been specifically formulated to evaluate the effectiveness of the Charter also prompted respondents to provide a substantial body of evidence on whether or not specific recommendations had been followed. Given that this type of information put us in a position to express a more informed overall judgement, we have referred to it in the text. We did not, however, attempt to use such information to attempt a paragraph by paragraph evaluation of the Charter and this is simply because the information which came our way was not sufficient for us to attempt to do so. Incidentally, we discovered that a paragraph-by-paragraph evaluation of this type is being conducted internally by Tower Hamlets; thus we trust that our effort to complement, rather than to duplicate it will be welcome.

### **2.5.3 The Stepney Charter: evaluating its effectiveness through an analysis of the key partners' own assessments**

When asked whether the Stepney Charter has been adhered to, those responsible for delivering the programme replied that, on the whole, it was. In particular, these interviewees pointed out that rents were set in accordance with the Charter and that, across the new estates, standards of development are high. Indeed all three landlords, as well as some members of SHADA, were keen to stress that, in many cases, the new dwellings were produced to standards higher than those specified in the Charter. Respondents explained that this is because the standards specified in the Charter only constituted minimum requirements which it would have been anachronistic not to exceed, especially where standards were rising nationally. Within this context, at least one interviewee remarked that the quality of housing produced under the Central Stepney SRB has more to do with SHADA's commitment to the promotion of good building practices than with the

'rather basic'<sup>1</sup> requirements set out in the Charter. A view consistent with this interpretation was expressed by one of the landlords who reported that SHADA's insistence that standards should be higher than originally envisaged caused planned expenditure to escalate. If this is true, the fact that the Charter was implemented in terms of the development standards it promoted is less of an achievement than the fact that SHADA performed its role in accordance with the spirit which formed the basis of the Charter itself.

Some of the interviewees who expressed the above views admitted that a few departures from the Charter did occur, but argued that these were minor and usually motivated by the best intentions. For instance, we were told that the provision of trees to be planted in the gardens of the new dwellings was eventually discontinued due to the need to contain avoidable costs as the cost of the new-build programme escalated: it was decided that the provision of good quality features inside the new homes should take priority over supplying individual residents with plants. We were also told that, at times, residents had to put up with contractors and subcontractors working during the weekends and/or very early in the mornings, even though the Charter clearly stated that the hours of working and delivery would be confined to 8.00 am – 6.00 pm Mondays to Fridays. Reportedly, the reason why working hours were extended is that contractors engaged in a battle against time in the attempt to meet deadlines and make good the delays experienced at the early stages of the programme and through their problems with labour supply.

Several interviewees also reported that the density of the last phase of the new-build programme (phase E) is not in line with the low densities envisaged in the Charter. The Charter foresaw that the form of the new

development would produce densities ranging from 60 to 150 habitable rooms to the acre (150-375 habitable rooms per hectare), and stated that all new developments would '*normally be limited to three storeys, unless above a shop or commercial frontage*'. These guidelines were not adhered to in phase E where buildings are 4 to 5 storeys high, even though the development does not include shops or commercial frontages of any sort. Reportedly, the reason why the decision to build more storeys was taken is that the problems encountered with developing alternative sites (including the gas works) led partners to try and meet their output targets by increasing density. Several interviewees argued that this decision actually was in line with the aspiration of local residents, some of whom had long been arguing that more families from the area should be given the opportunity to be re-housed within the scheme. Similarly, other interviewees pointed out that partners had been pressing for higher densities from the start, but that they had had to give in to the planning department's requirement that the scheme should adhere to the guideline density of 100 habitable rooms per acre (250 habitable rooms per hectare), which was the established norm in most inner London authorities at the time. Indeed, one interviewee claimed that, even after it became obvious that fewer housing units than originally envisaged would be built, Tower Hamlets' planning department was still reluctant to allow an increase in density of phase E/F.

Although some of the interviewees responsible for delivering the programme provided information which enabled us to form a judgement on whether or not other aspects of the Charter were adhered to, they failed to relate such information to the Charter during interview. So, for instance, one interviewee compared the two housing associations' respective systems for dealing with requests for repairs, without however mentioning that the Charter actually urged landlords to adopt a common procedure for receiving and recording such requests. Similarly, other interviewees supported the above respondent's claim that the landlords failed to set up a common estate-based caretaking and emergency response service, but when asked whether the Stepney Charter was adhered to, they replied that it was. This is remarkable

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<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that, whilst this interviewee's point of view was shared by others, some respondents maintain that the Charter actually envisaged standards well above those which were normally considered 'standard' at the time. Trying to establish which of these two points of view is the most accurate is beyond the scope of our research. However, it is interesting that virtually all key interviewees agreed that the standards promoted by SHADA were higher than those envisaged in the Charter, and it is this which we want to stress.

given that paragraph 6.2.3 of the Charter makes it very clear that the landlords were expected to cooperate in the creation of such a service. Even more remarkably, one key respondent claimed that the Charter was a great success (on the basis that building standards were high), but then went on to criticise SHADA for trying to interfere with the practices of individual landlords by pressing them to *'harmonise'* their practices. The fact that SHADA was in effect pressing for a *'common management regime'* (as advocated in paragraph 5.4 the Charter) did not seem to inform this interviewee's replies.

Although we do not intend to summarise any more responses of this type in this section, we collected enough evidence to conclude that many of the recommendations included in section 5 and 6 of the Charter were not followed. Yet, the very same interviewees who provided information leading us to this conclusion may not be aware that they did so, and this may be due to their lack of familiarity with certain parts of the Charter. When asked whether the Stepney Charter was adhered to, respondents normally started by referring to the Charter's attempt to regulate building standards and rents. This suggests that, whilst the first two sections of the document informed the action of all partners, the last two sections were far less successful and widely known. Similarly, when questioned about the Charter in general, none of the interviewees ever made spontaneous references to the allocation practices it recommended. Yet, respondents who were specifically asked whether or not the partnership implemented a *'community lettings policy'*, as envisaged in section 3 of the Charter, admitted that this part of the Charter was not adhered to, and seemed happy to dwell on the topic at some length. To us this suggested that key partners were not actually reluctant to talk about the least successful parts of their work, but that they naturally found it easier to talk about those aspects of the Charter on which they focused their attention the most.

Our impression, however, is that even sections 1 and 2 of the Charter are not as well known as one might expect. One of the reasons why we formed this impression is that respondents often related stories constituting evidence that several of the requirements included in these first two sections were adhered to, without seemingly realising the relevance of

their reports. So, for instance, interviewees who explained that under the *'home demonstrators' schemes*<sup>2</sup> residents were provided with personal instructions on how to use their heating systems, did not generally seem aware that the provision of such service was envisaged in the Charter. Similarly, several respondents reported that residents moving into the new properties could choose among a number of internal fixtures, but did not point out that residents were granted this privilege under the Charter. It is interesting that virtually all partners agreed that initiatives of this type were important in that they helped residents *'develop a sense of ownership'* while they spoke of the Charter as if it were mainly a contract regulating building standards and design.

A related consideration is that several respondents expressed disappointment that the Joint Management Board failed to take off, without however stressing that such failure actually indicates that the Charter failed in one of its primary aims: establishing a permanent, harmonised and locally-based management system monitored by the tenants of all the three housing providers. Not only was the JMB supposed to ensure that all residents would benefit from the programme equally, irrespective of who their landlord was, but it was also meant to ensure that standards would remain high after SHADA was gone. Although the JMB did initiate some successful activities (such as a *'community chest'* – a pot of money for which community organisations can apply to fund modest activities – and a tool hire scheme), its success on other fronts has been limited. It seems to be lacking a driving force. So there are worries that after SHADA's exit, it will cease to operate.

Although the JMB's key members are all local residents, the Board is rather reliant on the landlords' representatives both to answer residents' questions and to respond to their complaints. This could mean that, with SHADA winding down and the landlords' representatives becoming more involved with initiatives elsewhere (and thus moving

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<sup>2</sup> For details on the *'home demonstrators' scheme'*, please refer to **section 3.5.1**.

away from the Stepney SRB), the JMB will lose its already shaky momentum. It appears to have been a weakness of the Charter that it did not secure the commitment of either the Council or the RSLs to resourcing and sustaining the JMB in the long run.

#### 2.5.4 Consultation

Our conversations with residents and community leaders cast serious doubt on whether the Charter was based upon and/or promoted an appropriate degree of public consultation. Although—as we have already stressed in the introduction to this report—we did not have an opportunity to talk with a representative sample of the community, we are particularly concerned that the great majority of the residents with whom we did manage to talk were not aware that the Charter existed. Further, some of the community leaders we interviewed confirmed our impression that the document was being treated more as a summary of building specifications, than as a document setting out the principles for building a functional and empowered community. In support of this view, one community representative commented that residents are mainly interested in the Charter in that it constitutes a potential weapon to be used against contractors, and the landlords in particular, should their new dwellings develop defects. From our conversations with the residents, however, it emerged that even this view may be optimistic: we found that even residents who appeared to be disgruntled with the building works/and or with their new landlords' repair practices hardly ever referred to the Charter as they talked about their problems.

The same is true of the many residents who expressed discontent with the refurbishment programme. For instance, among the several residents of Darnley House who complained that their furnishing and decorations were damaged by contractors, nobody seemed to have an idea on how to go about claiming compensation. This is disappointing given that section 1.10.4 of the Charter reads: *'There will also be an agreed procedure for making good any damage that occurs to the property, whilst refurbishment works are carried out. [...]*'. It is also very disappointing that the technique employed for recladding the exterior of Darnley

House produced so much grit and dust that, following complaints from residents on the top floors, and inspections by the health authority, an abandonment order had to be served, and works could only recommence after arrangements to use a less disruptive technique were made. The residents of the top floors<sup>3</sup> described the *'filthy'* conditions in which the initial phase of the recladding process left their flats. Again, the fact that these residents complained that it took them weeks to clean up all the grit, and that no compensation was offered to them, confirms that the Charter was not used as a protection against malpractice in that case. The Charter states: *'There will be an agreement about the condition in which the contractor may leave the dwellings at the end of each day'*. Had the residents known that this was the case, they would have been able to demand to see such agreement when lodging their formal complaints. As it is, residents of Darnley House did not even know whether an agreement of this type was ever drafted.

Against this background it is significant to stress that the same community representative who said that residents mainly viewed the Charter as a potential weapon to be used in the case of defects only seemed to be familiar with a rather unrepresentative section of the community: those who had participated in the consultation exercises which were held in conjunction to the drafting of the Masterplan. Indeed he stressed that those who *'had not bothered'* to participate in those exercises had no idea that a great deal of thought went into preparing such a holistic plan: in his view copies of the Masterplan should have been circulated widely so that residents would familiarise themselves with all the aspects of the programme, and not just with the sections on building standards which—in his opinion—are the only part which the Stepney Charter managed to promote successfully. Given this interviewee's involvement with just one section of the community, we can quite safely conclude that his claim that residents have been tending to see the Charter as little more than a potential

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<sup>3</sup> The reason why we are referring to the top floors here is that those are the floors which were re-clad prior to the abandonment notice being served.

weapon against non-compliant landlords and contractors is just an assumption based on his judgement that the Charter constitutes 'a rather bad summary of the Masterplan'. However, the truth probably is that most current residents are not in a position to use the Charter in any way because they are not even aware of its existence. This notwithstanding, it should be noted that this respondents' point of view remains extremely important: his assumption that residents who did not participate in the Masterplanning exercise would not be familiar with the contents of the Charter clearly implies that the Charter was not a document based on comprehensive participation, nor did residents appear to have copies<sup>4</sup>. Had it been more familiar and accessible to people, there would not have been any reason to assume that residents would have had to be involved in the Masterplanning process in order to relate to its contents.

Whatever the extent of consultation at the inception of the Charter (and details are in the Masterplan Appendices), we should comment on the intentions expressed within the Charter about future consultation and participation (Charter sections 5.3.1 - 5.8). The Charter clearly embodies a commitment by all three landlords to a variety of measures to ensure the long-term participation of residents in the organisation(s) which would oversee the management and maintenance of the housing and of the shared facilities (which we take as including parks and play spaces). While the actual form of organisation (Boards, Trusts, Committees, TMOs) is left open for further debate and decision, the commitment to achieve this aim is unequivocal and the landlords undertook to seek special funding to support these moves. In the light of the low commitment to the JMB reported in the previous sub-section, and the problems being experienced with open space supervision and management, we consider that this commitment in the Charter is gradually and alarmingly failing and that all three landlords may find themselves in breach of their undertakings.

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<sup>4</sup> So far as we are aware, the Charter was never translated into Bengali and this, if true, seems a regrettable lapse.

### **2.5.5 Community Lettings Policy**

The Charter envisaged that, after decanting needs were met, the combined estate of the three landlords would be managed according to 'community lettings' principles - broadly giving priority for vacancies to people with a strong connection in the locality. Inevitably this would have altered the normal priorities followed by each of the three landlords in the interests of strengthening local ties. In the event we understand that this approach has not in fact been followed and that vacancies on the estate are being used substantially to assist decanting and re-housing of tenants from the Ocean Estate and perhaps elsewhere in Tower Hamlets.

Two comments should be made on this departure from the Charter. Firstly that we are not clear about the decision-making processes which led to the change of policy and so cannot make any judgement on how democratic it was. Secondly the changed policy seems efficient and just. During the SRB project Tower Hamlets' flow of vacancies was put under extra strain by the need to re-house people decanted as part of the SRB (and larger numbers than expected because of the proportion wishing to remain as Council tenants). Now the Council is benefiting from a replenished supply of vacancies (in refurbished Council dwellings and in nominations to the RSLs) which it can use to meet its normal priorities, including decanting for the next stage of housing improvement.

### **2.6 Has the allocation of homes been discriminatory in any way?**

No. We have not found evidence that the procedures or practices of the SRB or of SHADA were discriminatory between ethnic groups or in any other way.

Although some interviewees close to the white community reported resentments that a disproportionately large percentage of the new housing units were allocated to Bangalis, there is no evidence that allocation practices were discriminatory. The scheme was designed to solve the problems of those experiencing the most acute housing needs

within the SRB area, where the worst estates did indeed house a very high percentage of Bengalis, with high levels of overcrowding and bad physical and health conditions. That situation had arisen because of Tower Hamlets' previous tendency to house this group of newcomers in the borough's worst estates, many of which were located in central Stepney. Indeed some (white) interviewees claimed that this tendency had often amounted to discrimination and that this had even been declared by the Commission for Racial Equality. It could thus be said that the Central Stepney SRB has actually dealt with the consequences of the Council having discriminated against the Bengali community in previous years.

Some of the older Bengali residents with whom we talked reported dissatisfaction with the fact that not all extended families living under the same roof in the old properties were given the opportunity to continue living together after the decant. Whilst these interviewees were aware that Tower Hamlets' borough-wide allocation policy was not to house extended families together, they felt that this policy was based on an ethnocentric concept of family and that it thus discriminates against those who do not share the same concept.

Some vigorous campaigning by BMT residents focused on two related features of the Council's allocation rules: one which denied re-housing rights to 'hidden households' living with the household registered as tenants, and another which requires such hidden households to move out before the tenant household can be re-housed. This campaigning led to a compromise, it being agreed that hidden households, if otherwise eligible, could be re-housed as part of the scheme. The campaigners accepted that they could not always be reposed in the same dwelling as their related households, but sought assurances (which seem to have been carried out) that they would be in close proximity. The SHADA re-housing team were proud of their work in making a success of this compromise - and we note that a number of very large houses were added to the later stages of the programme.

This practice, negotiated locally just for the SRB decanting and not (or not yet) reflected in changes to the rules affecting everyone else,

provoked some people to a wholly natural resentment that some tenants who had breached their tenancy conditions were able to gain re-housing and that, if they had been doing so for long enough, the re-housing benefits were extended to hidden households living with them.


Two wider issues relate to this issue of discrimination: one of demography and the other of geography.

The demographic issue is that the new building in this SRB has added a lot of large housing units in a concentrated area. The chart below (Figure 2.6.a) compares the distribution of dwellings (by number of bedrooms) before and after redevelopment and shows the change very clearly. A calculation of the maximum capacity of these dwellings (i.e. how many people they could house without breaking any of the Tower Hamlets criteria, and thus being over-crowded) shows that the old stock, now demolished, could house just over 3000 people while the slightly smaller number of new dwellings, with its increased number of bedrooms, could house just over 4000 people.

The new stock is a much better match to the current needs of current users: indeed that is exactly what the project set out to achieve. In the long run it raises a number of important issues which merit discussion and thought:

- (i) does this concentration of large units mean that this area is likely to be consolidated as the long-term home of the Bengali community and / or of other communities in which large families are the norm?
- (ii) because large families are often also poor families, does the building stock make it likely that this will always be an area with a concentration of poor people?
- (iii) what are the implications of the fact that the chances for single people and small household to live here are relatively low?

**Figure 2.6.a: Limehouse Fields Estate, comparison of numbers of dwellings and bedrooms before demolition and after new building**



Source: SHADA data

These demographic issues are linked to the 'community lettings policy' which was discussed in section 2.5.5.

In geographical terms, the SRB has focussed substantial resources upon a tightly-defined target group of beneficiaries and this has inevitably been partly at the expense of people elsewhere: in other parts of the SRB area and in other parts of Tower Hamlets. This feature is an inherent part of area-based regeneration programmes and our main conclusion here is that, in the policy context of the time, the Council could not have mobilised the SRB resources, or the other funds which have been levered in, in any other way. It was a decision of practical politics which it is not for us to criticise. It is, however, relevant to comment on the 'down-side': the real and perceived negative effects of this targeting of resources.

This discussion forms part of section 5 below but we should comment here that

(i) within the SRB area there are widespread resentments from those who did not benefit, either from the housing or from the other activities of the SRB, notably among some Ocean tenants and residents and among representatives of people living in Redcoat ward.

(ii) because the decanting programme took up significant numbers of Council vacancies across the Borough, the housing chances of other people in Tower Hamlets were damaged: some hundreds of households had to remain in unsatisfactory accommodation for longer than would otherwise have been the case. As the Stepney SRB nears completion, however, the flow of nominations to the RSLs should have about reinstated the situation, as explained in 2.5.5 above.

**2.7 Has SHADA having a dedicated re-housing team made a difference to the treatment of residents?**

Several partners agreed that the decision that SHADA should have a dedicated re-housing team was taken because there was no other sensible way of going about the decanting programme. Had SHADA not had this team, the decanting would have had to be undertaken by either the Council or by just one of the Housing Associations and this could have generated conflicts. Alternatively each landlord could have taken responsibility for decanting a certain number of households, but this would probably have meant that not all households would have received the same standard of service (and this would have constituted a departure from the Charter). It must also be said that if the decanting had been undertaken by one of the HAs, the Council would have had to make their tenants' files available to them which —one interviewee claimed— would have constituted a breach of confidentiality. All these problems were avoided by allocating the responsibility for decanting to Council officers who were seconded to SHADA. One of these officers —the team leader— had previously been working as a re-housing officer on the BMT site which, as we have mentioned, was decanted by Tower Hamlets before SHADA was even set up. In his

opinion, the fact that the new re-housing team were working for SHADA rather than for the Council allowed team members to be closer to the residents, both because they were based closer to the estate and because they were able to develop a more sympathetic relationship to the tenants. Indeed other interviewees claimed that, had the decanting been undertaken by the Council direct, officers would not have been able to extend the right to be re-housed to certain hidden households living (for at least 12 months prior to the decant status being declared) at the address to be decanted without being accused of discrimination. As mentioned in section 2.6, however, some interviewees felt that the decision to extend the right to be re-housed to hidden households amounted to discrimination in any case.

Other key interviewees claimed that the fact that the re-housing team was based at SHADA –and specialised in dealing with just one estate– meant that they could offer a better service to tenants precisely because they were so familiar with all the features of the programme and the problems peculiar to that estate. In addition, a couple of interviewees claimed that –because they worked for an independent agency– SHADA's re-housing officers were able to disenfranchise from the bureaucratic mentality of Tower Hamlets, and that this led them to display a more personalised approach to service delivery. In practice, this meant that individual officers devoted as much effort as they deemed necessary to helping particularly vulnerable residents. For instance, one officer mentioned driving one tenant to Brighton just because he wished to live there, but had never been before.

At the same time some interviewees felt that, because SRB programmes necessarily have to adhere to strict deadlines, the service provided by the re-housing officers was rushed. For this reason it was suggested that the local housing officers should have been involved in the process too, and allowed to complement the work of the re-housing officers by offering tenants additional advice. Indeed those who offered this advice claimed that the most vulnerable tenants –and the elderly in particular– found it difficult to talk to officers with whom they had had no previous opportunity to establish a personal contact, and that

they would have preferred dealing with the local housing officers whom they had learned to trust over the years.

A further criticism is that SHADA's vested interest in the success of the programme prevented the re-housing officers from playing an impartial role. In particular, some interviewees claimed that residents were not always told about their option to be re-housed outside the scheme and that, in many cases, tenants were not told the full consequences of changing tenure, i.e. that the 'right to acquire' in RSLs is much less subsidised than the 'right to buy' in Council property. Whether or not this allegation is true, we should report that many of the residents with whom we talked did seem confused over the terms of their new contracts, and some did not even know whether they were still entitled to the Right to Buy. Admittedly, the majority of the tenants who seemed confused were re-housed within the last year and came from the Ocean Estate. Unlike other residents, these tenants had not received visits from the SHADA re-housing officers. Their main contact had been the Housing Associations and, although some had been contacted by SHADA's re-housing officers on the phone, most did not know what SHADA was and had never heard of the SRB.

All this confusion among residents does not necessarily signify that SHADA's re-housing officers were at fault. It should be recognised that these officers were indeed operating under considerable pressure: not only did they have to ensure that the blocks to be demolished were vacated on time, but they also had to operate within a policy aimed at keeping the community together. All this whilst facing communication problems and dealing with issues which, understandably, residents found sensitive and difficult to understand. It must also be noted that, thanks to an initiative promoted by the Council, tenants who remained confused were offered additional help. Tower Hamlets' regeneration department approached a local community rights advice centre –mainly catering for Bengalis– and proposed that they should hold weekly advice sessions at LIFRA Hall. The centre accepted and the sessions proved extremely successful with an average of sixteen families being attended to in each session. Indeed, through the good advice

provided on the scheme, the centre was able to raise its standing and it gained the confidence to extend the range of services it provides.

***2.8 Is the programme perceived as a success by residents, the Council, funding agencies, RSL partners and contractors?***

In this section we summarise the perceptions which we have gathered through our interviews with residents, professionals and others involved in execution of the work. Since the housing programme comprised a number of distinct parts we discuss perceptions of each part separately.

First, however, we should report some strongly-held views which relate to the programme as a whole. The staff and councillors we have interviewed share a view that the programme as a whole should be regarded as a great success, for three main reasons. Firstly the fact that it was achieved, in the face of all the problems of site assembly, funding and potential conflict, and completed more-or-less on time and more-or-less on budget. Secondly, the housing programme is viewed as being very much the product of an exemplary research, design and consultation process leading to the Master Plan, to the establishment of a special agency (SHADA) and to the Stepney Charter: this process transformed what had been envisaged in the bid as a largely refurbishment programme into one dominated by demolition and new building, and building likely to satisfy the needs (and ability to pay) of the target population. Thirdly there is great satisfaction among those who worked on the programme about the quality of the delivery: the liaison with households being decanted, the attention to individual requirements, the designs and standards and—at least for Waterview House—the careful liaison with tenants whose flats were refurbished while they were living in them.

The first part of the housing programme was the construction of dwellings (mostly two- and three storey houses) on a collection of sites around the SRB area of which the Council had (or could quickly gain) ownership (the 'feeder sites'). We have heard very few comments on this housing and have not made particular efforts to gather views, mainly because these developments really pre-dated the SRB, or at least pre-

dated the distinctive features of the SRB's approach. Visual inspection shows many of these dwellings to be wearing well, at least externally, although some are laid out in an unsatisfactory double-ended cul-de-sac between Belgrave and Bromley Roads.

The main body of the new housing produced under the SRB comprises dwellings on the site formerly occupied by Bothnia, Malacca and Tunis Houses (BMT), and more dwellings on the site of former walk-up blocks on the Limehouse Fields Estate and a few new dwellings inserted in gaps in the rows of cottages where some previous blocks of bed-sitters were removed.

These houses and flats, the main product of the Master Plan process, are the source of great pride and satisfaction among the officers and professionals involved, and the two housing associations which developed them are proud of their achievements. Although adherence to the Stepney Charter, and the constant pressure from SHADA, had pushed them to spend heavily on these dwellings they now feel they are the owners of some very high quality stock. The scheme has won at least one prize (the ROOM National Partnership Award 2001/2) and is widely regarded as a model project.

It was not part of our brief to undertake full-scale user-satisfaction surveys so we are unable to report confidently on how tenants feel about these new dwellings. A partial survey has been carried out by Bethnal Green and Victoria Park (BGVP, 2000) for Package B and shows that tenants liked and felt safe in their new scheme. We had hoped to hold a series of focus group discussions with residents but it proved impossible to arrange many of these so instead we have done some house calls, speaking to tenants whom we could find, with a Bengali/Sylheti speaker going round with an English speaker. Community leaders report that residents like the homes and our strong impression is that people are enjoying the security, comfort and improved health which their new homes bring.

One tenant, for example, reported that the security of the new home had enabled her and her family to relax and feel more confident about other aspects of life, that they had previously been on benefit

(supplemented with some cash earnings) but the husband was now employed in a formal job and they were off benefit. She reported having less money than before but a much more satisfactory life.

Another resident said that, although she had been living in the area for a long time, she had always felt unsettled and likely to have to move sooner or later. Only now that she had a permanent home did she feel really settled.

On the other hand we heard negative comments. A number of people reported noise problems and poor acoustic separation between homes and between spaces within homes. One reported problems of damp penetration and another suffered from rodent infestation via the openings made for utility connections. In terms of routine management, tenant liaison and progress-chasing on repairs we were told that the procedures operated by Circle 33 were less efficient and responsive than those of BG&VP. Circle's office is much further away and we were told that their call centre and call handling arrangements were harder for tenants to use. There was also widespread agreement among professionals and residents' leaders that the failure of the JMB was a serious shortcoming. This is discussed as an aspect of the Stepney Charter in section 2.5 above.

So far as the refurbished buildings are concerned we have not focussed on the cottages at all, believing that these improvements have been unproblematic. The only adverse comment we heard was that some of those who exercised the right to buy their cottages gained the full benefit of refurbishment (costing about £40,000 in each case) without having to contribute to the cost, and without the value of these refurbishments being reflected in the purchase price they had to pay. This happened in cases where the long slow purchase procedure was still in progress at the time when the list of properties for refurbishment was finalised. It causes injustice and resentment, and was reported to be a systematic national problem in the operation of the procedures.

The other major part of the programme has been the refurbishment of two tower blocks, Darnley House and then Waterview House, by SHADA acting for Tower Hamlets. The tenants, and a few leaseholders, were in

many cases elderly people who had been in the area for a long time and white people appear to be in a majority. On these projects we have to report a divergence of perceptions. The officers and professionals involved are proud of these improvements which they regard as having been excellent value for money, well-managed and carried out with good liaison with the tenants - who remained in residence throughout the works. The combined heat and power installation at Waterview, installed after careful deliberation with the tenants, is regarded as a great innovation which also saves tenants money and drew in a special grant of £86,000 from central government.

We have spoken to a number of tenants and leaseholders in Darnley House who tell a very different story. Their block was the first to be improved and they report some very stressful experiences, including:

- (i) the abandonment of an early proposal from SHADA that tenants might be moved out, floor-by-floor, into a recently-refurbished property in Copperfield Road while their flats were improved;
- (ii) very disruptive external and internal works which caused severe vibration and - until stopped by an environmental health intervention - very serious generation of dust and grit within the flats. Workmen were deemed to need protective equipment, but not tenants - even those suffering from asthma and other breathing problems. At least one premature death and a heart attack were attributed to this by some respondents. In addition a woman claimed that she became deaf due to the noisy works;
- (iii) kitchen cabinets of disappointing quality which were alleged to be factory rejects. This was one of a number of practices which led to the belief by some tenants that there was corruption among some of those involved in the contracts;
- (iv) the uprooting of three rose trees in the communal garden (as part of landscape improvements), together with a plaque commemorating some recently deceased residents, and the failure of those responsible to compensate for this loss by planting replacements and replacing the plaque.

Waterview House was a subsequent project, for which a new contractor was selected and for which SHADA decided to employ directly a Tenant Liaison Officer (instead of having the contractor employ such a person). Perhaps partly for these reasons, and because residents played a more active role in the design of the scheme, the level of tenant stress seems to have been less and credit should be given to SHADA for learning from earlier mistakes. However some people we spoke to still report that the experience had been very disruptive, even with this better management.

We cannot judge the balance of positive and negative reactions among users and consider that a full-scale user-satisfaction study would be a valuable exercise in the next year or two so that the design, process, procurement and management lessons from all segments of the programme can be securely learned.

It was agreed by all that the management, supervision and maintenance of shared / public open space is a cause for concern. This issue was not foreseen explicitly in the Stepney Charter and responsibility has not been taken by any of the 3 landlords nor —in effect— by the LBTH Parks Department which is nominally responsible. The location of the small park among the cottages almost ensures that vandalism and abuse will be endemic because of its tucked-away location, invisible from main routes and from adequate overlooking. In our judgement it was a serious failure of urban design to locate a park (especially an always-open, unsupervised park) in such a position.

This section has focused on the main perceptions of the housing programme, but with only limited references to issues which are considered separately in other sections - on the programme itself, on timing and cost, on the Stepney Charter and on the role of SHADA.

### ***2.9 How do all the partners perceive SHADA's role?***

The Stepney Housing and Development Agency (SHADA) is an unusual kind of organisation in many respects and so it is perhaps no surprise that many people mistakenly thought of it as something other than it was, or were simply confused about its role. Specifically SHADA was  
....not, or not simply, part of 'The Council'  
....not a Housing Association

....not anyone's landlord

....not a developer

....not intended to be a permanent body

but since it played - or provided office space for others to play - all of these roles it was widely seen as being these things. Furthermore the accountability of SHADA lacked transparency and familiarity: it's Board was responsible and answerable to Tower Hamlets Council (and to GOL/LDA) for its spending and achievements. It was also, in effect, accountable to the 2 RSLs active in the area and to the residents' associations through their representation on its Board. For all these reasons we found a great variety of misunderstandings of SHADA's role.

SHADA has been the visible locus of the running of the SRB capital programme and, especially since it moved its offices to the heart of the area in Ben Jonson Road, it has been really at the centre. It is thus no surprise that many people thought that SHADA **was** the SRB: for many they were indistinguishable. Indeed we were affected by this misunderstanding ourselves at first.

Those closest to SHADA's work tended to have the most accurate and often the most positive perceptions of its role. Both the RSLs in particular - Circle 33 and Bethnal Green and Victoria Park - knew in detail what SHADA did and consider it to have been a success, delivering and co-ordinating the programme very well and maintaining high levels of quality and of resources. One considered, however, that SHADA's guardianship of the Stepney Charter had tended to push costs up and that these cost increases had fallen on their Association, at least in part. The other, however, considered SHADA's role to have made the whole project highly cost-effective. Both bodies were pleased to have seconded their own staff to work at SHADA: they consider that this helped give a better service to Stepney people and also one commented that it enabled them to strengthen their approach for future projects with Tower Hamlets or elsewhere.

Council staff and Councillors tended also to be well-informed about SHADA and its role. Here however we found that the variations in perceptions of SHADA related to its level of autonomy relative to the

Council. This was an issue which had clearly been tense at times, with some people in the Council often seeking more control over SHADA while others emphasised (not without envy or mixed feelings, sometimes) the benefits for the locality which had flowed from SHADA's autonomous ability to act vigorously and sequester resources for the area. There was much admiration (and some pride) that the Council had created this organisation which had been so good at pushing everyone along, getting approvals, assembling land and getting the houses up. It was widely reported that the Council wanted SHADA to limit themselves to delivering the housing programme and there are allegations that the Town Hall did not view SHADA's attempt to perform a community development function in a good light. Some Council staff involved with lettings considered that their counterparts in SHADA had sometimes lacked full professional skills (discussed in 2.7 above).

From a strategic point of view, a number of senior people in Tower Hamlets considered that, while the Borough might well have been able to implement the SRB capital programme without establishing an arms-length special agency like SHADA, such a strategy would not have appealed to central government. They suggested that GOL would not have felt able to confirm the SRB funding had SHADA not been set up.

At the other extreme we met workers in voluntary projects in Stepney, and a large number of individual tenants, who were (at least for a while) under the impression that SHADA was a housing association, and by many individuals it was seen as their landlord. The worker in a local rights project considered that SHADA should be regarded as effectively a detached arm of the Council's Housing Department, emphasising that tenants often needed independent help and support on housing and welfare rights in their dealings with the organisation.

Some voluntary and tenant organisations were critical. Those representing localities and people who gained least benefits from the programme tended to regard SHADA in the most negative light: criticising it as 'unresponsive' and for failing to consult. Those closest to the beneficiaries tended to be more positive, emphasising that residents had gained influence on the re-housing process and on the quality and

management of the housing through SHADA's work and their role in it. They remained, however, critical on two main issues: (i) the failure of all concerned to ensure that continuing housing and neighbourhood management was up to standard and (ii) SHADA did not always listen, sometimes omitting criticisms from the records of its meetings.

Undoubtedly the most hostile views of SHADA came from residents in one of the re-habilitated tower blocks, Darnley House, who regarded it as 'dictatorial' and unconcerned about the disruptive and hazardous effects it was inflicting on residents.

Some of the construction personnel we spoke with tended to be bemused by this unfamiliar organisation, in one case wondering 'what all those people were doing sitting there'.

Many respondents reflected on how the SHADA experience would influence the future handling of development in the area, and especially the Ocean Estate New Deal for Communities. Those with a more managerial turn of mind tended to think that the organisation (or at least its staff team) should have been transferred with minimum changes to work on the NDC, conserving and sustaining all its local knowledge and team-building achievements. Others, perhaps more politically inclined, considered that community leaders in the Ocean Estate would be so determined to stamp their ownership on the new project that they would minimise the transfer of SHADA staff and practices. While there was widespread agreement that the Council would seek to exert more control over future local regeneration schemes, there was equally wide agreement that, the Stepney case, the genie of community control was out of the bottle and could not be put back.

### *2.10 Has the partnership approach worked?*

In the case of the Central Stepney SRB, there are clearly two interrelated levels of partnerships that need to be looked at both separately and in their interaction:

The Central Stepney Regeneration Board, overseeing the whole of the SRB programme

- This is the partnership that evolved from the process of putting together the original SRB bid and the formation of the Steering Group later formalised as the Central Stepney Regeneration Board, which has been in charge of overseeing the delivery and monitoring of the programme. This large partnership (33 members after 3 years) is similar to several others in SRB programmes all over the country. It has been supported by a small executive team of staff of the Council and other partners.
- It has been led and dominated by the London Borough of Tower Hamlets through its Regeneration Board (superseded, after a restructuring, by the Policy and Resources Committee). The CSRB had a mainly advisory role and most of the programme components have been managed and implemented through LBTH structures, via working groups and along departmental lines. Indeed, most of the proposed projects included in the original bid appear to have been reactivation of older LBTH proposals.

SHADA, overseeing the delivery of the housing component of the programme

This is the partnership that evolved from the housing working group of CSRB, and was constituted as an arm's length company in the third year of the programme. It includes representatives of LBTH, of council tenants and of the housing associations delivering the housing projects.

- It has worked under a different line of accountability compared to the rest of the programme delivery instruments, with a direct link to LBTH Housing Department, and only indirectly with CSRB.
- Its aims and objectives and modes of operation are framed by the Stepney Charter, which itself is a product of partnership work triggered by the consultants, Capital Action, as part of the master plan work and involving tenants' and residents' representatives, LBTH staff and staff of the housing associations which hoped to take part in the delivery.

In addition, the question about the effectiveness of the partnership approach could also be asked in relation to the relationship between both formal partnership instruments and the Local Authority on the one hand, and central government and the major relevant public sector service/utility providers on the other.

Finally the word 'partnership' can be used in another sense to describe the experimental use of collaborative contracting arrangements for some of the construction projects, designed (following the recommendations of the Egan Committee) to replace disputes and litigation with conciliation and compromise.

The following questions and their answers as formulated on the basis of the research work allow us to assess whether the 'partnership approach' worked in this case. They refer to the extent to which either CSRB or SHADA functioned as, and were perceived to be real partnerships; whether they were instrumental in securing stakeholders participation, fostering trust in their mutual relationships and providing a forum for the discussion of their views; and whether they contributed to improving the quality of the resource base of the programme and the working practices and relationships within the programme and between the programme and outside organisations.

*Was there a clear division of roles and responsibilities between the partnership and LBTH and was the former perceived by the main stakeholders and beneficiaries of the programme as a real entity?*

It appears that in spite of its representation of stakeholders from outside the Council, CSRB worked as, and it was perceived to be, part of LBTH and therefore in this sense it was more a formal than a real partnership. Conversely, SHADA was seen by many as a relatively independent organisation, with an approach to the housing component of the programme that reflected the views of its main partners and was sometimes divergent from that of the Council.

*Was the partnership instrumental in attracting support for the programme and broadening its ownership, was it a vehicle for the*

*incorporation of all relevant stakeholders, and did it manage to maintain support for the duration of the programme?*

From the information available, it appears again that CSRB expressed a loose arrangement of a number of partners, many of which were public or semi-public organisations already involved in the provision of public services (local schools, health and education authorities, the TEC), dominated by the Council. Therefore it is only possible to talk about its role in broadening support for and ownership of the programme in a limited sense. A more instrumental role seems to have been played by GOL and the consultant's report it backed, in the process that led to the creation of SHADA as an arm's length organisation incorporating more prominently non-Council partners. It should be said that both CSRB and SHADA did provide arenas in which active and more vociferous residents could express their views. However, neither was entirely successful in creating a sense of community around the programme, as suggested by a general lack of information among many residents directly affected by it, even after several years into the programme. Moreover it was suggested to us that GOL considered there was insufficient involvement in the programme of either employers or faith communities.

*Was the partnership a real forum for reaching agreement on contentious issues and did LBTH follow partnership advice on these issues?*

Both organisations operated as relatively open fora where stakeholders could put forward their views and have them considered by the Council's decision making structures. The practice adopted by CSRB of making minutes of meetings publicly available made it more accountable as a discussion forum. However, it should be noted the different roles of both partnerships in that regard can also be explained by the fact that SHADA was foremost a delivery organisation, and many of the more contentious issues had already been discussed elsewhere when they reached the level of implementation.

*Did the partnership lead to synergies and lasting relationships between partners (leading e.g. to collaboration in other initiatives)?*

In the case of SHADA, the experience in this regard seems to have been positive, with SHADA's involvement as a delivery partnership in activities not directly related to the SRB housing programme (e.g. the work on canal banks with British Waterways, setting up SureStart, bids for EU for funding; see also HC6 in section 3 below). On the negative side, the lack of involvement of CSRB in the new NDC programme suggests that the relationships between the main partners in the programme were not strong or deep enough to secure an evolution of the partnership beyond the programme itself. It should be added that this situation is not exclusive to the Central Stepney SRB, but instead has been all too common even between different rounds of SRB funding in the same area.

*Did the partnership manage to make effective links with public, private and voluntary/community networks outside the immediate SRB area (including utility providers, statutory agencies, etc.)?*

Apart from some work by SHADA with other organisations outside the area (see above), there is not much evidence that the partnership organisations were active trying to link the regeneration of the area with the interests of outside public, private, voluntary and community networks which could potentially help with achieving regeneration objectives. This might be due to the inward-looking character of this particular SRB programme and its main focus on housing renewal and refurbishment.

*Was the partnership instrumental in leveraging resources from other sources other than LBTH and Central Government?*

Central Stepney SRB was funded almost exclusively through SRB money from Central Government plus the necessary local matching funds, mostly from LBTH, the Housing Corporation, Housing Associations and (via them) from market borrowing. Beyond this there was little or no attempt to use partner's networks and the partnership mechanisms to lever significant shares of funding from other sources. However, the existence of a relatively autonomous partnership organisation (SHADA) was itself a condition for the release of SRB

resources and in this sense the partnership approach was essential even if it was imposed in this instance.

*Did the partnership contribute to joined-up work between LBTH departments and between LBTH and Central Government departments in the delivery of the programme?*

Our research revealed several complaints of departmentalism or 'silo' mentality in the attitudes of LBTH but also of Government departments, especially but not exclusively in the earlier years of the programme. In spite of the existence of partnership structures, the programme was designed and delivered along the lines of Council departments, without significant efforts to join up its different interventions, except through the work of some officers in Housing and in Regeneration. Later activities by SHADA in the field of community development suggest an attempt to cut across departmental boundaries, but seem to have been of limited significance.

*Did the partnership work impact on the speed and efficiency of the programme as a whole through better and smoother relationships with the various public, private and voluntary organisations delivering the programme?*

There is evidence that SHADA played a role in smoothing out potential conflict in the delivery of the housing component of the programme and in facilitating liaisons with the various organisations involved in it. Similarly, the partnership work expressed by the Stepney Charter and its role in the activities of CSRБ helped to improve relationships with potential beneficiaries and therefore might have had a positive impact on the speed and efficiency of the programme.

*Was the partnership important in consolidating exit strategies that can secure the sustainability of the programme's interventions?*

SHADA was instrumental in trying to set up a community development trust and a joint management board including residents, the housing associations and the Council for the management of housing and public spaces. These efforts have not, on the whole, been effective as we have explained above.

The decisions to experiment with a partnership approach to construction contract management is deemed by those involved to have been a success.

**2.11 What added value has SHADA brought to the programme?**

This question has effectively been answered in the preceding section 2.10 and in the discussions in section 3.

**2.12 Has the SHADA been a cost effective method of delivering the programme?**

Yes. So far as we can establish SHADA has been a cost-effective mechanism. A quite separate audit would be necessary to reach a precise answer to this question, and to the next one.

**2.13 How has the programme performed against comparable schemes?**

See comment at 2.12.

**2.14 Was this an optimum density in terms of number housed?**

Exhaustive study would be required to answer this question fully. However we should comment that

(i) Undoubtedly more people could have been housed on the land which was used. This would have involved more 3- and 4-storey houses (at the expense of 2-stories), and/or the development of more flats.

(ii) The final stage of Limehouse Fields has been developed at somewhat higher density than the earlier stages (especially if measured in rooms or floorspace terms, rather than 'dwellings'). There are no adverse comments on this increased density.

(iii) The densities here were regarded as relatively high in the mid-90s when they were selected, and were only achieved after protracted negotiations with the Council to secure lower car-parking standards than the norms then prevailing. In the climate of 2003, however, even

lower car-parking standards—even car-free development— could probably be accepted by planning authorities.

(iv) The supply of land under public ownership or control remains the main determinant of affordable housing supply in London and every scrap will need to be used to maximum effect for the foreseeable future unless the assumptions of the Draft London Plan (Mayor 2002) are radically changed (see for example Edwards 2000, 2002).

### ***2.15 Are higher prospective housing costs perceived by tenants as increasing the 'benefit trap'?***

This topic was the subject of an exhaustive study by Ambrose (2000) and the resources of our study did not enable us to extend, repeat or update that work.

The main issue of this kind which was raised with us was over water charges. Water in the new dwellings is normally metered, resulting in heavy bills for some large families. While they can apply for an alternative tariff based on property value, the procedure is a difficult one, needs to be repeated annually and cannot be undertaken centrally on behalf of a group of tenants. This appears to be poor practice on the part of Thames Water.

One complaint among both those who delivered the programme and those who moved into the new dwellings is that the largest new properties fall into Council Tax band (F) – a band for which Council Tax benefit is not available. This problem and its consequences for the largest families are highlighted in Peter Ambrose's second evaluation and call for action at government level.

### ***2.16 The gas works site***

We were asked to consider to what extent the actions of major private sector stakeholders, specifically British Gas (Transco), assisted or held back the achievement of the SRB's strategic objectives and charters.

The strategic objectives of the SRB programme were finally crystallized in the 1995/96 delivery plan, submitted in the summer of 1995. The major private sector stakeholder in the area was British Gas, owners of the Harford Street Gas Works Site. As we have mentioned already, (paragraph 2.1.6) this site was justifiably viewed as a source of blight both by local residents and the Council. Upon commencement of the SRB, negotiations began between the Council and British Gas regarding the future use of the site. It should be noted here that at that time UDP policies only envisaged employment uses on the site. It has been suggested that BG was motivated to participate fully in the SRB board because the prospect of development for non-employment activity would have been financially attractive to them.

As negotiations continued and the site was included in the Masterplan, the local residents got the impression that this site would become 100% HA housing. It is evident from the Masterplan however that only a contribution of 150 units was expected, clearly only part of the total capacity of the site. It appears that the conditions upon which a 100% social housing scenario was based were not explained properly or perhaps were never fully elaborated in the first place. The major underlying issue was land ownership: BG was reluctant to sell to the Council, which could not use CPO powers because the site was still classified as 'operational' although gas production and storage had ceased a long time ago. Furthermore sources in the Council told us that GOL would not have approved a CPO if there was a chance that the land could be privately developed. Apparently then, those who proposed or nurtured hopes of a 100% social housing project, were not taking into account the fact that without some form of public ownership of the land no exclusively social housing programme could go on and therefore provision of social housing would have to rely on Section 106 agreements alongside a profit-oriented private development.

In any case, BG's stance was described to us by public officials as 'constructive' until they probably realised that LBTH were changing the designated land use of the site from employment to residential as part of the UDP review. It is not known whether BG were having talks with Bellway Homes before 1998, but as soon as the land use

designation was revised they sold an option on the site to Bellway Homes, who submitted a planning application for 475 residential units on 6 November 1998 (later revised to 407 units). This move caused great discontent to the local community and the 'Save Stepney' campaign was launched with main goals the retention of the historic gas holders and proper decontamination of the heavily polluted site.

The Council failed to determine the application, although it was minded to grant permission subject to the resolution of a list of outstanding issues, including decontamination. The developer appealed against non-determination and the planning inspector made a negative recommendation but the SoS granted permission. The case was under judicial review in December 2002.

Judging from the outcome to date and based on the opinions of those interviewed it appears that British Gas were acting under a 'do the best for the shareholders' rationale. The criticism they attract is that they showed no sensitivity to the needs and aspirations of the local community and that they acted without regard for the public interest. However, this behaviour could not be characterised as exceptional given the UK corporate ethos of that time, and it would not be characterised as exceptional for a privatised entity even today. This is not the place to examine whether that corporate ethos, different from the ethos in much of the rest of Europe, is acceptable or not.

On the issue of jeopardising the SRB objectives, it should be noted that, as far as housing numbers are concerned, the site was an important element but not a cornerstone of the programme. The estimated contribution to social housing was 150 units. There are at least 252 key worker bedspaces provided in the proposed scheme and we were informed that an effort is being made to change them into self contained units, from the proposed rooms. But even if this does not prove successful the loss of units is not crucial to the net outcome of the SRB programme.

The extra amount of social housing envisaged would have made things easier as far as decanting is concerned but non-completion did not have the potential to jeopardise the SRB programme. There was much latent capacity in the area that remained unused, including LBTH-owned sites

(see Appendix table A2.6). One of the virtues of the Masterplan is the flexibility with which it provided the delivery mechanism of the SRB as far as potential land assembly is concerned. This flexibility, resulting from the provision of many alternative site options, helped towards 'rescuing' the programme, if it was ever at risk.

There is a stronger point to be made about the under-provision of recreation and leisure facilities. Given the good quality of design in the LFE and BMT redevelopment areas it seems that an opportunity was lost to replace a source of blight with a high quality space with facilities that would cater for the whole area. One has to bear in mind however that the site is now very close to being privately redeveloped on designs made by the same architects who designed the new housing for the LFE and BMT sites. We have not been able to look at Bellway's proposals but it seems far-fetched that they would create a low quality environment. Provision of outdoor leisure and recreation facilities as well as special needs housing still remains an open issue though. On the other hand, one might also argue that more market housing in the area will provide the necessary social mix to support a more sustainable and diverse community and range of local amenities.

It cannot be said with certainty that if it was all done again today, BG would have been working in a more 'partner-like' or socially responsible manner. If they were more willing to sell then perhaps the plan for a 100% social housing development could have gone ahead. However, LBTH's change of the UDP policy without any assurance on the future ownership of the site deprived them of any serious leverage they could have had and provided BG with a very strong incentive to sell-on, thus triggering the 'adverse' sequence of events.

In our opinion it was the combined sequence of actions, starting from the operating criteria governing nationalised industry land holdings (before privatisation), through the terms on which privatisation took place, then the changes in the UDP, that undermined redevelopment of the site in the way it was envisaged by some interested parties (not reflected in the Masterplan however). This site could have been accommodating homes and / or employment for some decades, relieving

the desperate shortage of space in London. The costs of decontamination must be very low compared with the opportunity cost of the site being sterilised for those decades. As so often, we find an outcome which has been neither in the interests of the community, nor of the local authorities, nor yet even of the shareholders in this privatised body.

As things have turned out, provided that redevelopment goes on, then strategic objectives 2, 3 and 6 are not adversely affected in principle while one might argue persuasively that strategic objectives 4 and 7 would have been better served by a development under the auspices of the SRB. Objectives 1 and 8 are rather irrelevant to the issue at hand. In order to answer this question with more certainty we would have to access the proposed development's plans which is not possible at the moment.

British Waterways appears to have co-operated well with SHADA in the refurbishment of the canal banks, which now form a pleasurable and useful eastern edge of the area and an enticing link with Mile End Park - even though the bridge originally envisaged has not been built.

We understand that Railtrack - involved because of their ownership of railway arches and adjacent industrial land - have been fairly inactive partners. We were told by some interviewees that their representatives attended the Board in defence of their interests but not otherwise, and that very little benefit flowed for their 'partnership'.

English Partnerships reportedly 'worked in short term, commercial terms' and did not provide important funding on beneficial terms and conditions which had been sought in the early stages of the SRB.

In order to answer question 2.16 we have contacted most parties involved and they were all willing to talk and provide us with information. The two exceptions were British Gas and LBTH Planning Department. British Gas (now Second Site Properties) could not provide any information because the person who was handling the case in 1995/96 had left and the one who is working on it now 'does not remember' when his involvement started. We also contacted LBTH Planning Department and we received two Committee Reports after several weeks of requests.

It proved impossible to arrange a meeting with Planning and we found it extremely difficult to get access to files on the case, even to documents for which there is an expressed legal requirement that they be available to the public.

### *2.17 To what extent have external partners' and investors' perceptions of the area changed?*

After 20 years in which massive private and government investment had transformed the LDDC area south of the Commercial Road, the SRB constitutes the beginning of some investment to the north, following 40 years or so of dis-investment: the running down of the public housing stock of Stepney. It certainly shows.

The new social housing in the SRB area is every bit as tidy and aspirational as the luxury housing to the south. Private housing within the SRB area is very expensive and no doubt former right-to-buy property has also risen in market value. As and when the gas works site comes to be developed it will be a much more profitable scheme thanks to the SRB's transformation of the area's appearance.

However this is not an area which has yet been on the receiving end of substantial private investment, nor has the SRB sought to secure it, beyond recruiting the input of the two RSLs to the extent of £35 millions of non-public funds. Much of this is the open-market borrowing of the RSLs and it signifies that banks or other commercial lenders now have a substantial stake in the area.

Beyond these observations we have not prioritised the study of external investors' perceptions of the area.

### 3. The Environment & Leisure, Health, Economic and Community Development Programmes

#### 3.1 Progress and achievements of programmes relative to original appraisals and expectations in the Bid

Tower Hamlets' initial bid for SRB funding (para 4.7, p. 8) stressed that, because '[...] housing regeneration alone is not enough [...]' physical works in Stepney would be 'accompanied by complementary training, enterprise and community initiatives'. The stated vision for, and the aims of, such initiatives were summarised in three paragraphs under two headings: 'Environment and Leisure' and 'Health and Community Development'

#### Environment & Leisure, Health and Community Development Programmes:

##### vision and aims in the original bid - see box

Although these aims may appear somewhat unfocused at first sight, they actually reflect the bidders' awareness that poor health, drug addiction and isolation constituted the most wide-spread non-housing problems affecting the population in the target area. In practice, however, the non-housing part of the bid contemplated a broad range of initiatives not all of which bore a close link to these aims.

When central government approved the bid, but granted Tower Hamlets less money than the Council expected, it also determined that any cuts resulting from this financial constraint should not affect the housing budget. The consequence was that many of the environmental and community development initiatives envisaged in the bid were scaled down. Because the bid had already been agreed in principle, however, its contents were never modified. That is, subsequent delivery documents did incorporate the (incremental) changes which were made over the years but, because the text of the initial bid was never modified, the bid

#### *Environment and Leisure*

4.8 The vision for this programme theme is the development of an integrated strategy providing a range of environment and leisure projects to satisfy a variety of needs and support the housing and economic aims of the programme. It will form a comprehensive and holistic 'quality of life' programme. This approach recognises the need for projects which may serve a very localised population or group (i.e. children) as well as other initiatives which may serve a much wider population. An important part of the environmental/leisure vision is the expansion and development of the 'green chain (including Regent's Canal) which lies adjacent to central Stepney. This 'green chain' not only offers more varied and extensive leisure/recreational opportunities to residents, but also provides the link to the sub-regional network of footpaths and sporting facilities up the Lea Valley and down to the Thames.

#### *Health and Community Development*

4.9 This programme aims to increase the quality of life and confidence of the local community and its ability for self organisation and self-help which will out-live the duration of the regeneration programme set out in this bid.

4.10 key components include: focused community development work with tenants and residents on the target estates, to identify needs, on an ongoing basis, assist and facilitate their organisation and enable them to voice their own aspirations and take an active part in the regeneration of the area; a range of projects to promote and improve the health of local people; the use of existing but currently under-used community facilities for SRB funded projects under this and other programme themes; the extension and enhancement of existing youth provision in the area, in particular in relation to drugs and sexual health education and positive conflict resolution.

does not form a valid yardstick against which to evaluate the achievements of the SRB.

The fact that many of the initiatives included in the bid were never pursued should not be viewed in a negative light: it is recognised that the initial bid was prepared without community consultation and there is no reason to assume that the discarded projects would have been in line with the community's priorities. Indeed some of the community representatives with whom we talked stressed that, through the various consultation exercises which were conducted later, it emerged that residents were so preoccupied with their housing conditions that their interest in the possibility of participating in any non-housing activities was very limited. Furthermore, the projects included in the original bid were, as several participants admitted in interviews, a miscellaneous collection of good intentions and available ideas - which had not been grounded in research. (In one interview the phrase *cut and paste* was used.) It was put to us that the bid's authors considered that government would only accept the bid if it contained a detailed list of proposals to back up the ambitious text about the development of a *comprehensive and holistic 'quality of life' programmes* for the area, and that is precisely why such a detailed list of proposals was included. This despite the fact that time did not allow for such proposals to be developed within a truly holistic and participatory framework.

Following the submission of the bid, there was a general consensus that what was later referred to as the Housing Masterplan should be developed, and that this should be done in consultation with the public. Against this background it could be claimed that, albeit housing-focused, the masterplanning exercise constituted the first (and perhaps the most important) community development initiative undertaken in Central Stepney: it was intended to enable residents 'to voice their own aspirations and take an active part in the regeneration of the area', thus contributing to the achievement of the 'health and community development objectives' stated in paragraph 4.10 of the original bid.

It should be stressed that most of the new-build residents with whom we talked supported their community representatives' view that, prior to

settling down in the new dwellings, they would have been unlikely to engage in new projects and/or to develop new interests: coping with poor housing conditions, understanding their options under the SRB, and then dealing with the practicalities of the move, took priority. Within this context, the post-bid decision to initiate a series of housing-related community-building initiatives was particularly appropriate: such initiatives (ranging from an extensive *planning for real* exercise, to the creation of consultative design groups, one just for Bengali women) gave residents the opportunity to exchange views on issues in which they all had a strong interest, while influencing the scheme and developing a sense of ownership. Further housing-related initiatives, such as the *home demonstrators' project* and *meet your neighbours days* also attracted strong interest among tenants.

In 1999 SHADA resolved to embrace a more holistic approach by attempting to develop its own economic and community development programme. According to some interviewees this move was opposed by some Council officers who considered that it would be more efficient for SHADA to continue concentrating on delivering the capital programme. However, Tower Hamlets did agree to second two of its own staff to SHADA where they filled the posts of Community Economic Development Officer and Community Development Officer. In order to devise a programme of work, the Community Economic Development Officer referred to the original SRB bid as well as to the first of the Ambrose reports (*We mustn't laugh too much*, Ambrose, 1996) –which effectively was a baseline study with a strong focus on the clear link between poor housing and poor health. That report confirmed the bid's assumption that an unusually high proportion of residents suffered from poor health, thus lending support to the original idea that health promotion should form an important part of the non-capital activities pursued under the SRB in Central Stepney. Given that Tower Hamlets was already delivering a health promotion programme (*Social Action for Health*) borough-wide and that this was run from within the SRB area, at Dame Colet House, SHADA considered that it would be efficient to start a complementary project, focusing on the SRB area only, and that this would also be run from Dame Colet House. Under

this scheme SHADA's re-housing officers were asked to refer vulnerable residents to a *health advocate* who had been appointed to deal, not only with cases of illness, but also with the problem of isolation affecting so many of the residents. It was believed that elderly tenants and young mothers spending most of their time at home would be less prone to use their GPs as listening ears (and/or to actually fall into depression) if the health visitor helped them identify leisure or other activities which could aid their integration in the community.

In conjunction with *Social Action for Health* SHADA also ran a diabetes story-sharing project aimed at helping the many elderly residents suffering from the disease to acquire more information on how to deal with their condition on a day-to-day basis. The project allowed residents to relay stories and learn from each other's experiences while benefiting from the guidance of facilitators and the advice of a GP. A further health project funded by SHADA, and delivered by the Pathways Trust, provided weekly group taster sessions in alternative therapies such as aromatherapy, acupuncture, Chinese herbal medicine and massage. In addition, the scheme provided subsidy for residents wishing to have further treatment at the Pathways Trust. A related initiative was pursued in conjunction with Tower Hamlets College: a new taster course in Alternative Therapy was set up and this was well attended by local women wishing to acquire new skills.

**It is impossible to separate the contribution to health improvement coming from the improved housing, from advice and health promotion programmes and from the many other initiatives in the health field. To attempt a valid assessment of each of these elements, separately and in combination, would be a specialist and costly exercise and would need to be sustained over a long enough period to capture the longer-term effects. Because of the impossibility of making this detailed evaluation within our study, we do not deal in detail with the separate elements of the health programmes here, though all the detailed data we have are reported either in the text or Appendices.**

SHADA also operated within the spirit of the original bid by trying to widen the horizons of local youth. A small but successful project was run

in conjunction with the Half Moon Young People's Theatre which moved (from Mile End Road) to White Horse Road, in 1994. SHADA provided a small grant which helped the theatre finance outreach work intended to promote their activities on the new estate. The theatre, which had traditionally been running workshops, but which opened as a public venue in 1997, set up a *Family Access Scheme*: families living in SHADA housing could apply for a *Moon Pass* which entitled them to a 75% discount on the full price of tickets to performances. About 20 families adhered to the scheme. In addition the Half Moon brought their work to the estate by staging plays at LIFRA Hall and at several local schools. SHADA, as part of their exit strategy, also provided the theatre with a grant to prepare a performance with pupils from each of the four primary schools in central Stepney. The performance – which was supposed to celebrate the opening of Durrant Park –and which had been themed *Creating New Homes*– involved 150 children parading from LIFRA Hall to the Park. This was regarded as a great success, even though it had to take place at a time (the end of the school year) when the park itself had not yet been completed because of a time over-run.

Another SHADA activity in line with the spirit of the original SRB bid was its involvement in *Sure Start*. The original *Sure Start* board which included the Primary Care Trust and the Council had submitted a preliminary bid to central government, but this had been prepared without the community and voluntary groups having had an opportunity to become involved. After SHADA's Community Economic Development Officer joined *Sure Start*'s board and became chair, SHADA did their best to promote involvement so that the final bid for funding would be more 'participatory'. SHADA's contribution to the project (mostly through staff time) was substantial, although there is disagreement on whether or not it is thanks to SHADA's work that the bid was successful. What is certain is that SHADA invested considerable effort in training and managing *Sure Start*'s staff.

As we have seen, one of the ambitions in the original SRB bid had been to contribute to Mile End Park's *green chain* and specifically to the Regent's Canal which forms the Eastern border of the SRB area. No

action was taken at the outset on this project and there are suggestions that the Council discouraged SHADA from seeking funding for this work. However SHADA's bid to the London Waterways Partnership secured a grant of £247,000 for the first phase of the project (masterplanning through to public consultations). A specialised consultancy (Freeform Art Trust) along with SHADA worked closely with the local community to ascertain their needs and aspirations for the future development of this section of the canal which runs through Stepney, linking the Thames at Limehouse Basin with Victoria Park and, ultimately, with the Lea Valley. Respondents remarked that this consultation exercise (through which residents were involved in mapping the area and producing a video, as well as in other activities) was one of the most valuable community development activities undertaken under the Central Stepney SRB.

The above initiatives were pursued by SHADA during a period in which Tower Hamlets regeneration department was pursuing many others. Tower Hamlets had an active regeneration department but lacked a systematic strategy to guide and co-ordinate its economic development and community development activities. The team enjoyed success in capturing grant funding for a very wide variety of projects through the 1990s and the Central Stepney SRB area alone was affected - to varying degrees - by projects with the following funding sources:

- EU Urban programme (12-15 of which affected Stepney, most with an emphasis on Bengali women, refugees and other excluded groups;
- EU Objective 2 (European Regional Development Fund - ERDF), about 35 projects affecting Stepney)
- New Deal for Communities (NDC) and Sure Start
- Mile End Park
- Health Action Zone
- Employment Zone
- Linking Communities (SRB 5)
- New Beginnings, New Settlements (SRB 6) prioritising black and other ethnic minority beneficiaries.

The area thus suffered from what one Social Exclusion Unit report has termed 'projectitis' - a state of confusion and fatigue flowing from the multiplicity of projects, application, funding and reporting regimes. These conditions led to discontinuities in staffing and work, to incoherence and conflict between projects and sometimes to the very opposite of the 'joined-up thinking' which many of the individual programmes are supposed to encourage.

Much of the time of the LBTH team appears to have been spent on working with applicants to win these bids and on meshing the many projects together. For example the EU projects posed particular problems because (i) the application forms of over 50 pages were specially demanding, (ii) 50-55% matched funding from other sources was required and (iii) EU payments are made in arrears, posing insuperable cash flow problems for many applicants. LBTH failed to secure much help from the Government Office for London (GOL) in overcoming these problems but was able to create a revolving fund to help with matched funding and payments in arrears<sup>5</sup>.

We can conclude our evaluation of the Environment & Leisure, Health and Community Development Programmes relative to the original bid very positively. Some of the elements listed as parts of the original bid were dropped while other actions and projects were added later, especially after 1999. This series of decisions, and the actions which followed, were clearly in keeping with the intention of the bid to deliver forms of regeneration which were both 'holistic' and grounded in the real needs expressed by the community; indeed they were probably much more effective than the assortment of schemes originally proposed.

Before starting on the detailed evaluation of individual projects, it is necessary to refer to some local geographical resentments which we

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<sup>5</sup> LBTH has now reduced the scale of its regeneration department but we have not examined this decision or its effects in Stepney.

found, echoing the feelings about housing already discussed in section 2.6.

It is unfortunate that one of the outcomes of running the *Social Action for Health* project from Dame Colet House is that this created the impression –at least in some minds– that the programme was intended to benefit the users of that centre, rather than the entire community. This erroneous impression was not voiced by individual residents, but by their representatives –some of whom alleged that SHADA committed most of its non-housing resources to community centres and residents' associations south of the Ben Johnson Road, while other centres and associations 'got nothing'. We certainly do not want to suggest that some community groups and associations were discriminated against. However, we did find that very few resources were allocated to the St Dunstan's Bengali Community Resource Centre and that the Ocean Estate TLA obtained less funding than LIFRA. Allegedly, this was partly due to the fact that the St Dunstan's BCRC was only founded in 1995, and was not fully operational during the first few years of the SRB<sup>6</sup>. Furthermore, both the Bengali Community Resource Centre and the Ocean Estate TLA operate outside the core of the intervention area, only serving a minority of the decanted tenants– meaning that it would have been illogical to expect them to deliver community development initiatives aimed at residents of the new housing. The fact that some of those initiatives were located in other community centres and associations did, however, create the impression that resources were allocated along preferential lines, and this is to be regretted. Indeed, we were told that now that the New Deal for Communities is underway on the Ocean Estate, it is likely that the community groups north of the Ben Johnson Road will 'try and get their own back' by preventing associations to the south from having their say. Whilst we do not want to go as far as suggesting that all community centres and associations should have been involved to similar degrees in

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<sup>6</sup> However, when it became operational it did benefit from activities organised by SHADA such as the diabetes story-telling project and, indeed, their annual report states that these initiatives were successful.

delivering SRB programmes, our advice is that, in the future, all community centres should be made aware of the criteria used to allocate resources, so that resentments will be less likely to arise.

### **3.2 What have been each programme's outputs and costs?**

As we have just explained in 3.1, a number of important activities were undertaken as part of, or alongside, the housing work of the SRB: activities designed to produce community or economic development, health or other outcomes. We are not sure whether these actions were defined as 'projects' in the formal accountancy sense and thus whether they were the subject separate budgeting and record-keeping. The wider outcomes of these actions are discussed below in section 3.2z.

The purpose of this section 3.2 is to run through the long list of actions which *were* formally defined as projects and / or programmes and for which at least some data are available. These data were extracted from accounting and reporting documents intended to record outputs in the formats specified for SRB programmes nationally. In some cases we find that this data corresponds fairly clearly with activities which we have discussed in section 3.1. In many cases, however, the data relate to projects of which those currently working on the SRB have no knowledge. This section casts some light on how the resources of the SRB were allocated in terms of accounting categories but not in terms of the logic which was actually guiding actions and expenditures. It is a commentary on data which we do not fully understand and should be read as such.

#### **3.2.1 General observations and establishment of baseline.**

As with the housing projects discussed in section 2, it has been difficult to compare the estimated and actual costs and the expected and actual outputs for each and every programme and project. This is for a whole variety of reasons: plans were revised without all the forecasts and targets being changed, individual projects are often not linked to broader programmes and some projects are still under way as we write.

We have thus had to do our best to make estimates and the details of how we have done this are expanded in the Appendices.

### 3.2.2 Project by project comparison

Estimates of forecast and actual costs are derived from annual delivery plans. Therefore year 7 actual and expected are the same since that year was not complete and no records of actual spending were yet available. In some cases the same applies to year 1 and/or 2.

#### *Administration and Economic Development*

##### **(i): Central Administration and Management (A1) Appendix table A2.21**

This 'project' is the SRB programme's administration budget and the key indicators of performance tables show that usually the only forecast 'outputs' were annual expenditures and the milestones were report submissions to various supervising bodies. The total forecast expenditure was £655,850 and the total actual expenditure was £598,181 (our estimates).

The definition of 'outputs' for central administration is, in any event, a rather unreal notion. The purpose of the administrative activity is to facilitate and support all the work, satisfy accountability to the public and to funding bodies.

We were told, however, that Tower Hamlets staff realised that a much larger proportion of the SRB budget than normal had been allocated for central administration and it was decided to use some hundreds of thousands of pounds for community and social development projects. We assume that it is because these activities were funded from this budget that their 'outputs' are listed here: the publication of 'Stepney Voice' or 'Stepney Outreach and Information' or the very valuable reports commissioned from Professor Peter Ambrose.

##### **(ii): Business Support (ED1) Appendix table A2.22**

Three different schemes were envisaged under this project:

- ED1(1) 'Business Support', which envisaged the establishment of a 1-stop shop and is the only scheme of the project that remained in operation in year 2.
- ED1(2) 'Computer Training', probably for local business employees, which also attracted an extra £14,500 of other/EU funding.
- ED1(3) 'Enterprise Development Fund', a grant-awarding scheme which attracted an extra £10,000 of other/EU funding.

These projects seem to have achieved a lot more than expected in terms of numbers of businesses advised and amounts of grant (though not number of grants) paid out. Since a lot of other funding was attracted, the cost to the SRB was not increased. It seems unlikely that this business support would have happened - or not on this scale anyway - without the SRB. Ethnic minorities formed the majority of the jobs safeguarded and about 10% of those advised, but were not the direct recipients of grants.

##### **(iii): Enterprise Skills (ED2) Appendix table A2.23**

There were 2 schemes:

- ED2(1) 'Enterprise Skills' aimed at assisting people into self-employment. Audit reports and SRB delivery plans give a total estimated SRB expenditure of £34,500 for ED2(1), matched by another £14,500 of other public/EU money, £49,000 in total
- ED2 (2) 'Women's Enterprise' which was allocated £6,000 and attracted another £6,000 of other public/EU money.

This project overlapped with the previous one, providing business training to about 35 people (the majority from ethnic minorities) and advice to start-up firms (about a quarter ethnic minorities). It is not, however, claimed that any new businesses were started as a result during the period. The benefits of this project can be attributed to the SRB since they would not otherwise have been available.

##### **(iv): Commercial Property (ED3) Appendix table A2.24**

The aim of this programme was to set up a Trader's Association. It is not known whether it was successful in that or not. Expected expenditure

was split between year 1 and year 2, with the first year being devoted to feasibility study/consultation and the second to implementation. In fact all the money was spent in year 1.

***(v): Employment & Enterprise Initiative (ED5) Appendix table A2.25***

Under this heading small sums totalling £13,500 were spent in years 1 and 2 on training programmes and childcare subsidy in years 1 and 2.

***(vi): Project Reserve (ED7) Appendix table A2.26***

Under this heading £20,000 was reserved in year 3 for possible new projects and was spent, but the data does not permit evaluation.

***(vii): Community Businesses (ED8) Appendix table A2.27***

This project aimed at establishing Community Businesses through identification of opportunities and appropriate training and was supposed to be the main economic development initiative of the SRB. Starting from year 3, it was allocated a budget of £30,000 for each year thereafter. In the first year of its implementation it attracted £36,000 of other public money. At first sight the expenditure appears to have been efficiently and effectively allocated: more start-ups have been created, with less cost per start-up and less need for training weeks than expected. Most of these benefits seem to be attributable to the SRB. The only failing seems to have been re to create permanent full time jobs, raising questions on the sustainability of the project's outcomes. Maybe for this reason it was discontinued in year 5.

***Health and Community Development***

Under this heading the SRB allocated, and spent, money for a very large number of activities which (like the re-housing itself) contributed to improvements in health and safety for residents. The grouping of activities under budget headings changed from time to time and so did the relationship between activities in Central Stepney and the rest of the Borough. These activities are combined in the discussion in section 3.1 above. In the sections which follow comments are very brief. Those wishing to see all the detailed data on individual expenditure headings should refer to the Appendix.

***(i): Community Health & Development Team (HC1A)***

***Appendix table A2.28***

Under this heading a large number of schemes and actions were paid for, leading to measured 'outputs' ranging from participation in sewing and swimming classes to improvements of a cultural facility and grants to an Eid party to promote Women's Health Day. In many cases these measured outputs were much greater than expected and there were numerous outputs which had not been expected at all.

***(ii) Leisure prescription (HC3) Appendix table A2.29***

This scheme aimed to enable GPs to prescribe appropriate exercise or leisure activities to individuals. It produced a lot of outputs, including all the expected ones, and a lot which had not been planned. The budget of £55,000 (slightly over-spent) came 90% from SRB funds so most of these outputs would not have arisen otherwise.

***(iii) Health gain in housing (HC4) Appendix table A2.30***

This project is part of the in-built evaluation of the whole SRB. This project contributed to the baseline study of the 'Ambrose reports' that highlighted the health benefits new housing brought to the community but also the extra costs that came with it. Total expected SRB expenditure was £90,000 but another £15,000 were attracted from private sources (probably HAs) and £11,000 from other public sources, bringing the total amount to £116,000 all of which was spent.

***(iv) Promoting health in schools (HC5) Appendix table A2.31***

Promoting Health in Schools aimed at increasing health awareness through training courses and other community activities at three local primary schools and the local secondary school. Year 1 was probably plagued by the same difficulties in setting up delivery arrangements that all HC projects faced, hence the reduced effectiveness of the project. The expected expenditure was £32,000, all of which was spent. However half the budget for this programme (£16,000) came from LBTH resources.

***(v) Parents in Primary Schools (HC6) Appendix table A2.32***

Originally, this project was based on the model developed through a Bethnal Green City Challenge project but then it became so successful

itself that it served as a model for a borough-wide *SureStart* initiative. Its aim was simultaneously to improve the English language skills and the Health and Education awareness of the participants through combined training courses. All effectiveness and efficiency measures show the overwhelming success of HC6 and surveys run by the project show that more than 90% of the participants (Bangladeshi women) enjoyed the courses and felt their language skills and health knowledge had improved.

It is rather difficult to estimate what the expected cost was. According to information from the delivery plans it was £150,975 out of which only £51,000 were expected SRB money and the rest was to be LBTH money. However, final expenditure was £122,467 out of which £50,992 were SRB money and only £71,475 were LBTH funds. Although the benefits of the project and its success should not be underestimated, it is likely that less than half of the outputs can be attributed to the SRB and likely that the project would have gone on without the SRB, albeit at a reduced scale. Seen in that light, it cannot be claimed that the project caused displacement or substitution but rather that it enhanced opportunities in the area.

Due to the multiplicity of 'primary' outputs and outputs in general and the great variety of schemes carried out under the project, it is not possible to calculate unit costs.

***(vi) Youth and Health Peer Education (HC7) Appendix table A2.33***

This project aimed to train young people on sexual and drug-related health issues and enable other young people to benefit from the resulting diffusion of advice. It appears to have achieved lower outputs than planned - though this may reflect poor monitoring in year 1. In any event it was discontinued in year 3 and incorporated into *Youth Focus* which is discussed below.

***(vii) Primary interactive project (HC8A) Appendix table A2.34***

The SRB contributed a small sum (£7,500) to a pre-existing Council project on drug education in primary schools. It does not seem, from the output data, to have been very effective.

***(viii) Project Charlie (HC8B) Appendix table A2.35***

The second part of HC8 was aiming at drug education of slightly older children than HC8A. The project was pre-existing and the SRB was seen as an opportunity to extend it to Central Stepney. Delivery was transferred to the Education Authority after the first year and the project ceased to be an SRB project, mainly because it faced problems adapting to the cultural particularities of the target population. Out of the £14,855 spent, only £1,500 were SRB funds.

***(ix) Community capacity building (HC 10) Appendix table A2.36***

Nearly £130,000 was allocated and spent on this activity, just over half of it from SRB funds. In terms of the number of voluntary bodies supported and of local people gaining new opportunities or doing voluntary work it seems to have been much more effective than planned. However after year 3 it was closed down and absorbed into the Community Development Trust programme discussed below.

***(x) Community Health Project (HC12) Appendix table A2.37***

This project took over from earlier health initiatives, making up *SureStart* in the 2 final years of the SRB, combining resources from the SRB (£155,000) and the EU (£90,000). A very wide range of planned and unexpected outputs flowed from the project. Attracting EU money probably ensured that additionality was maximised and substitution and displacement were minimised. In fact, attracting EU money released LBTH funds that were previously channeled to HC6.

*Community Development*

The original bid had a lot to say about community development but not many projects listed specifically as such. There were however some community development schemes taking place within HC projects, like HC10 and HC12. New CD projects appeared after 1997/98 and, as many interviewees said, came as a development of the housing work, as an 'add-on' to the SRB - see section 3.1 above. There is not much mention of the new initiatives in the 1997/98 delivery plan, only the following few words were used to announce the initiation of the projects:

'...it is now widely acknowledged that insufficient resources have so far been put into developing the Central Stepney Community partnership and this will therefore be a priority in Year 3, with 4 new Community Development projects.'

As with all projects that deliver non-physical outputs but have strong impacts it is very difficult to calculate actual benefits based on output indicators and unit costs. Capacity building is a long term process and the full benefits of having community organisations with increased ability to bid for funds or run and manage projects are nearly impossible to quantify. Measurements of efficiency and effectiveness may therefore be misleading as to the actual 'value' of such projects.

***(i) Community Advice and Advocacy Service (CD1)***  
***Appendix table A2.38***

Under this heading advice and advocacy was provided to the local community, through a permanent outlet but also through printed materials and new media. It generated a lot of employment and, in terms its main 'output' - the number of clients advised - seems to have been very efficient. About a quarter of a million pounds were spent, including £85,000 from (unidentified) non-SRB sources. It seems likely that these services would not have been provided at all without the SRB.

***(ii) Development of Community Access/Resource (CD2)***  
***see Appendix table A2.39***

This project envisaged the establishment of a resource centre in a refurbished building and, although this did not happen, a large number of organisations were supported. More than half of the £230,000 budget was contributed from non-SRB sources.

***(iii) Youth Focus (CD4) see Appendix table A2.40***

The largest CD project, in terms of expenditure at least, 'Youth Focus' aimed at providing advice and guidance to youngsters and their parents on a variety of topics (i.e. drugs, computers & the internet) both by itself but also in collaboration with HC projects. Strangely, it appears to have achieved significantly more as far as the 'primary' output is concerned (young people benefitting) while at the same time it provided only one tenth of the training weeks envisaged. Of a total £552,400 that the

project cost, £166,400 came from the LBTH, £22,000 from the EU and £180,000 from other organisations like Bridge House and Hailey Trusts.

***(iv) Stepney Community Development Trust (CD5)***  
***see Appendix table A2.41***

The Community Development Trust was the major element of the whole SRB exit strategy, at least as far as non-housing elements are concerned. The project was supposed to create a Trust, endowed with revenue-creating assets from the LBTH or the SRB, which would act as an umbrella organisation, providing support and funding to voluntary and community organisations in Central Stepney. Although it achieved better than expected results in terms of many 'outputs', it has not yet led to the actual establishment of a Trust and that must be counted a failure. Termination of its operations however would mean that the sustainability of many of the achievements of the SRB would be put at risk.

***Environment and Leisure***

The Environment and Leisure element of the SRB was seriously affected by the budgetary cuts of the SoS and projects EL2-EL6 never materialised. Most of the outcomes of the projects were subject to a greater or lesser degree of vandalism, sometimes in the same year they were completed.

***(i) Shandy Park Improvements (EL1) see Appendix table A2.42***

Improvements of Shandy Park eventually cost £268,000 instead of a forecast £254,000 but only £100,000 was SRB money. The rest came from the LBTH (£64,000) and 'other' un-named sources (£100,000). It would make more sense to be able to calculate unit costs for each individual output, but in any case, even if we take 7B(ii) as 'primary' output then the project appears to have been rather efficient and effective.

***(ii) History Walk (EL7) see Appendix table A2.43***

Problems riddled this little project from year 1. Problems with research and with resistance from property owners whose buildings had signs attached, meant that it had to change focus and finally led to scaling-

down the project. It is not known whether the project would have gone on without the SRB, probably not. An amount of £3,000 was contributed by the LBTH.

*(iii) Ragged School Museum (Phase 1) (EL8) see Appendix table A2.44*  
This project cost £200,000 in total, to which the SRB planned to, and did, contribute £50,000 only. It is quite probable that it would have gone on without the SRB but unfortunately we were not able to find what the total forecast costs were and compare them with the actual. Given the nature of the project, a living museum of the Victorian East End, it would be rather inappropriate to measure efficiency and effectiveness with the use of any of the indicators available. It is a strong focus of voluntary activity and much used by schools and passers-by. The project is a lively note in an otherwise underused canalside and its success and 'value for money' requires a separate study that would be able to estimate a different set of indicators and incorporate a series of qualitative aspects of the project.

*(iv) Trim Trail, Mile End Park (EL9) see Appendix table A2.45*  
Only half of the total cost of this project came from the SRB, which was slightly over budget. It provided a trim trail in Mile End Park, to be used by the Central Stepney community and others. Some local people feel (rather inexplicably to us) that the park is not very accessible to the SRB area. There have also been maintenance and vandalism problems.

### **3.3 What synergy and added value have been secured from linking with other initiatives such as EU Programmes, NDC and other SRBs?**

#### **3.3.1 EU programmes**

The projects that received EU funding according to the delivery plans are shown in detail in Appendix table A2.46. The following projects were involved:

- A1 'Central Administration and Management'
- ED1(2) 'Computer Training',
- ED1(3) 'Enterprise Development Fund'

- ED2(1) 'Enterprise Skills'
- ED2 (2) 'Women's Enterprise'
- HC12 'Community Health Project'
- CD4 'Youth Focus'

In addition to those listed, a number of SHADA initiatives drew in EU funding, including the re-equipment of the LIFRA kitchen, an outreach project on the Ocean Estate and a capacity building project. Comments are included under the headings for the individual projects in Appendix table A2.47.

From the interviews we have held, we have formed the view that LBTH was very effective in securing EU funding alongside SRB activity, both directly and through SHADA. We have, though, commented on the extremely cumbersome application procedures and matched-funding requirements which are involved.

#### **3.3.2 Other Synergies**

Further synergies were achieved by employing resources gained under the section 106 agreements. These are detailed in table A2.48.

#### **3.4 Is there still a need for each programme, and if so how can it be sustained after the SRB has ended?**

Undoubtedly the communities in Stepney will continue to need public funding for community development, community services, health and economic development. It is an open question where these monies should come from: special project bidding, Tower Hamlets mainstream funding or the LDA and its sister bodies (which did not exist until 2000). The new housing is almost all complete and residents settled in their new environment. Many of the special actions which were taken to ease the transition will no longer be needed. In most respects, citizens will be dependent on the general services provided by Tower Hamlets—schools, libraries and other educational services—and by local Colleges. These services appear in many respects to be good.

However we do consider that this SRB (in common with many SRBs up and down the country) has probably not done enough to provide for the sustained operation of the very local services which now exist. Neither SRB funding nor EU or Section 106 resources normally make any durable contribution to maintenance or management. We have drawn attention above to the most glaring failure we can see: the absence or weakness of the Joint Management Board and the Community Trust. These bodies were envisaged as the organisations which would enable residents to ensure that their needs continued to be met in terms of good management and maintenance of their housing (by all three landlords) and of the associated open spaces and playgrounds. The Trust would also have been able to dispose of some autonomous resources in support of local activities and community development. We have drawn attention to the most visible failure to date - of supervision and maintenance of the parks and playgrounds which form part of the new housing environment but for which no organisation seems to be taking effective responsibility. The best means of ensuring sustainability of such facilities is normally to set up a Community Trust or similar organisation, endowed with the ownership of land or other assets which can generate a revenue stream to serve local needs. So far as we are aware, efforts to establish such a Trust here have not yet been successful and this is a serious cause for concern.

So far as economic development is concerned, the Tower Hamlets Council should be working with the LDA to evaluate needs here, along with other parts of the Borough, and to establish the best possible programmes and division of responsibility between the new levels of local government.

### *3.5 What lessons do the community-related programmes pursued in Central Stepney yield in terms in good practice?*

#### **3.5.1 From a transient to a settled community?**

Pursuing community development programmes within a community undergoing deep physical change, and where the life of the majority of residents is deeply and intimately affected by the extent of the changes

taking place, is not an easy task. In the case of the Central Stepney SRB the task was complicated by the fact that those responsible for delivering the programme had to attempt to attend to the needs of a potentially transient community. That is, while their efforts were directed towards those who inhabited the many properties which had been earmarked for demolition, they had no guarantees that the people towards whom their efforts were directed would still be in the area after the completion of the programme. Whilst doing their best to pursue a policy intended to keep the community together, those responsible for delivering the programme remained committed to maximising choice. Residents obviously had to be given the opportunity to be re-housed elsewhere in the borough if they so wished, but they also had to be given the opportunity to maximise their potential locally if they decided to stay. In addition, the possibility that the programme would generate a conspicuous outflow of residents meant that many the new properties could well be allocated to tenants coming from other parts of the borough. This represented a further challenge as these new residents would come to the area with needs and demands, which could not always be identified in advance.

As mentioned in section 3.1, trying to interest the local community in initiatives unrelated to housing at the outset of the programme proved difficult because residents – still living in substandard and/or overcrowded accommodation– were too occupied considering their housing options. In addition, the fact that large proportion of residents were effectively choosing between changing tenure or moving out of the area meant that those opting to move out would be very unlikely to participate in any new economic and/or community development activities in Central Stepney. Within this context the decision to focus on providing residents with housing advice, rather than investing in projects for which there could be very little demand constituted good practice. The work done by the re-housing officers, as well as the advice sessions provided by the Limehouse Project at LIFRA Hall (see section 2.7) were intended to help all residents regardless of whether they would remain in the area or not. In addition, the '*planning for real*' exercise held at the outset of the programme was open to all

residents with the *'right to return'* –and not just to those who had already decided that they would actually return. This meant that all the tenants who would be decanted were able to claim some ownership for the programme and this might have persuaded some of those who had not yet decided where they wanted to live to stay within the locality.

When –in the third year of its life– SHADA decided to embrace a more holistic approach, it also followed good practice. In particular, the idea to ask the re-housing officers to refer residents to the newly appointed health advisor meant that residents who would probably not otherwise have taken advantage of the health project were reached in their homes, and regardless of whether or not they felt inclined to remain within the community. Conversely, one of the main merits of the other non-housing initiatives pursued by SHADA lies in the fact that they were targeted to all the SRB beneficiaries, and not just to the decanted tenants. SHADA's involvement with the *'Half Moon'* theatre and with the redevelopment of Stepney's Waterfront resulted in initiatives in which both old and new residents could take part. Further, SHADA involvement with *'Sure Start'* contributed to the successful development of project which will benefit the community for years to come.

SHADA also demonstrated its commitment to the entire community through the attitude displayed by its Housing Management Advisor who –when appropriate– offered advice to all those who approached her with queries whether these were related to housing or not. When unable to answer such queries, she took the time to refer residents to the relevant services, and this regardless of whether or not the residents who approached her lived within the SRB boundaries. The fact that SHADA became to be regarded as a first point of contact

Both SHADA and the Housing Associations should also be given credit for initiating a number of activities specifically intended to promote a sense of community, such as *'meet your neighbours days,'* the Stepney Green Festival and a number of gardening clubs among the residents of both new and refurbished properties. Although some critical residents claim that many of these events merely provided a leisure opportunity

for residents who had already been living in the area (and/or had already been knowing each other) for years –if not decades– others disagree. In particular, the Housing Associations maintain that such events really helped build a sense of community in Stepney and reported that, whenever possible, they will promote similar activities among the residents of schemes in which they are involved elsewhere. Whilst neither of the Housing Associations has yet quantified the cost of the community building exercises in which they participated, they were both confident that the benefits were considerable. Both Associations maintain that the community events organised in Stepney –including the consultation days held at the outset of the programme– as well as the fact that residents were given the opportunity to influence the design and layout of the new settlements helped the development of *'a sense of local pride in an area in which nobody had previously been proud to live'*. In turn this is believed to have helped reduce the incidence of vandalism across the SRB area, and to have discouraged burglars from targeting the community as (reportedly) residents are more willing to keep a vigilant eye on their surroundings.

The majority of our interviewees also agreed that the home demonstrators' project, by ensuring that tenants would be able to use the equipment contained in their new properties competently, developed their sense of ownership. Similarly, a number of respondents reported that the fact that residents were given the opportunity to choose the layout and the colour-scheme of their new homes, and that they were provided with fruit trees to plant in their private gardens effectively gave tenants more reason to be proud of their new homes. Quite naturally, from the Housing Association's point of view this constitutes an advantage. In the words of one of their employees: *'Central Stepney residents no longer expect us to do everything for them.[...] they take care of their homes properly and they are both willing and able to deal with minor repairs themselves. This is likely to result in lower maintenance costs in the long run'*. Both RSLs claim that the cost involved in providing tenants with as much choice as they were afforded in Stepney as well as the cost of running the *'home demonstrators' scheme'* may well exceed the resulting financial

benefits. Even so, they are considering spreading good practice by launching similar (albeit cheaper and probably less ambitious) schemes elsewhere. In addition both Associations claimed that, through working with SHADA, their staff gained valuable experience which will help them improve their own consultation practices in the future.

It should be noted that some of our interlocutors remarked that new build tenants were offered too much choice: both local authority and private sector tenants seldom are in a position to choose between different types of fixtures (and their colour), and even owner occupiers do not always have the opportunity to determine the layout of their homes. Thus some consider that there was no need to invest resources in consulting households on these matters, especially as –these same interlocutors maintain– the households in question took this preferential treatment for granted. In the view of others, however, the resources were well spent: the consultation exercises held in Stepney mean that most tenants truly feel at home, and part of a community which they helped build. In turn, this means that they are less likely to want to leave it in the short run. In other words, all the consultative activities aimed at producing neighbourhood and dwellings which would reflect the aspirations of tenants should probably be seen as community building exercises in their own right. Indeed, the majority of the new-built tenants with whom we talked –even those complaining about repair procedures and defects– did say that they felt more settled in their new homes than they had felt in their previous accommodation and, in general, expressed content with the area. Given that our impressions are in line with Peter Ambrose’s (2000) finding that, as a result of the SRB neighbourhood satisfaction has improved, and fear of crime has decreased in Central Stepney, we feel that SHADA’s approach should be commended. Whilst not focusing on the delivery of conventional community building programmes, SHADA initiated programmes which are transforming an area which has traditionally been performing a reception function for immigrants and refugees into an area where people want to stay. From an urban regeneration perspective, this is no mean achievement.

### **3.5.2 Lessons from the Masterplanning**

The Masterplan process was itself a powerful exercise in community development, as we have said in section 3.1. A number of lessons can be learned from the Central Stepney experience which should help other projects adopt better practices. The following appear to have been particular strengths.

- (i) The initial decision to allocate time (over a year) and a budget to the Masterplanning, in other words to re-thinking the SRB strategy in a process of community consultation and professional work, aiming at a plan based on community needs. This decision anticipated a reform in British urban policy which was not generally applied until the New Deal for Communities began so, in a way, it was ahead of its time.
- (ii) It was very good practice that the Masterplan process engaged residents whether or not they had, individually, decided to re-locate within the area or move out.
- (iii) Within the Masterplan process it was valuable to present and debate a range of alternatives, some quite different from the scheme on which the original bid had been based, and to bring these choices alive through the use of Planning for Real techniques.
- (iv) Two long all-day sessions of consultation were held, together with a large number of shorter meetings and there was also outreach work aimed at non-participants. These steps must have minimised the number of people who considered that they had not been consulted. It is also noteworthy that some of those local residents who gained skills in this work were able to build a community business (OASIS) and offer their services to other regeneration projects in London subsequently.

To set against these community development strengths of the Masterplan process we should also report some criticisms:

- (i) It was suggested by some residents that a great deal of professional effort was invested by the consultants in working up a preferred option before public consultation got seriously under way and that, with so

much committed to that scheme, the Masterplanners were not really presenting a genuine choice.

(ii) It was also suggested, and by quite a number of respondents, that the Bengali community was not fully represented in the consultations, especially at the outset, mainly because the local representative bodies tended to be dominated by long-standing white residents at that time. The resources devoted to outreach, to translation and interpretation may perhaps not have been enough.

(iv) One Bengali leader considered that the decision to undertake such a high proportion of demolition and new building (and less refurbishment) would not have resulted if effective consultation in the Bengali community taken place at an earlier stage. He argued that, having become used to living in crowded conditions, many families might have expressed other priorities.

### 3.5.3 What is real success, and when can it be seen?

The discussion on outputs in section 3 (and especially 3.2.2 and the Appendix) does not convey the same picture as that painted by our interviewees, some of whom drew attention to very positive outcomes of the non-housing projects pursued under the SRB. To be more precise: the data we have just presented refer to a rather large number of activities and their 'outputs' without giving an idea of whether these were positive in terms of outcomes. As critics of the SRB's accounting mechanism have pointed out in a national context (e.g. Edwards 1998), data of this type are difficult to interpret because programmes which perform well in terms of outputs may not be those which benefit the community the most and, conversely, projects which attract little investment, or which may seem disappointing in terms of outputs, may generate positive, and sometimes unexpected, outcomes. For this reason, we think it is important for us to try and paint a picture of the outcomes reflecting what we were told by our interviewees, at least with a few examples.

As we have mentioned above, SHADA's staff –and others– did not recollect some of the projects we have just discussed even having taken place. Yet they spoke of other activities and sometimes they did so very fondly, actually confirming that outputs are not always the best way to measure success.

Indeed, the fact that outputs are not always the best way to measure success is also confirmed by the contents of Peter Ambrose's report (2000) in which he tracked some of the remarkable early health gains flowing from housing improvement in this SRB.

SHADA and the SRB must be given credit for having stimulated activities which were valuable not for their instantaneous outputs, but which were designed to trigger positive outcomes in the longer run. For instance, in assessing SHADA's work with the Half Moon Community Theatre, thinking of the resulting benefits in terms of the number of 'Moon Passes' sponsored, or performances subsidised misses out the main benefits: interviewees agreed that SHADA's involvement was valuable especially because it initiated a dialogue between the Theatre, LIFRA and other community centres, thus raising the Theatre's profile among residents who had previously had little opportunity to develop their appreciation of the performing arts. It is indicative of SHADA's success that activities organised in conjunction with the community centres attracted satisfactory levels of interest among the population, while the Theatre's previous efforts to market their activities locally (through leaflets and newsletters) had failed. SHADA also proved instrumental in establishing links between the Theatre and four local schools, as well as between the Theatre and the staff of Sure Start –links which are outliving the SRB. Theatre workers reckon that their work with children in Central Stepney is helping them win the support of adults who have hitherto been very difficult to reach. In particular they are proud that one of their projects 'Ocean of Stories' which –being aimed at women and their children– persuaded several Bengali women to share their stories through artistic representations. Within a community where women are strongly discouraged from performing in public, this constituted a valuable

empowering experience for those involved and helped widen the horizons of many who were simply spectators.

More broadly, we should stress that many of our interviewees celebrated the success of the SRB as a means of empowerment to an extent that measures of outputs cannot do. For instance, several of the women who participated in the 'home demonstrators project' were coming from conservative Bengali families and had never even considered looking for employment prior to joining these schemes. Several interviewees maintain that this and other programmes were particularly successful in that they helped these women gain a new perspective of their role in society: the fact that courses they followed also equipped them with job-relevant skills is of lesser importance. Similar empowering outcomes were described as flowing from the Bengali women's design groups and from exercise classes.

This is not to say that some of SHADA's outputs, like training and managing Sure Start's staff, are not worth mentioning. It is just to stress that the SRB's success at promoting life-skills and long-term individual and social changes is not mentioned often enough: as stressed by many interviewees, including several economically active (and successful) Bengali women, challenging cultures which discourage women from joining the labour force is not always possible (or even desired by all concerned). Yet equipping women from all backgrounds with the confidence to apply for training or employment remains important. Such confidence often comes from having had the opportunity to play a more active role outside the home.

## 4 Conclusions

### *4.1 Strengths and weaknesses in SHADA's and the SRB's achievement*

#### **Strengths**

Tower Hamlets Council, SHADA, the Housing Associations and the active citizens who have been involved in this seven-year project are rightly proud of the Central Stepney Single Regeneration Budget project (SRB). Our evaluation is as positive as theirs.

The locality has been transformed from one of the most run-down and over-crowded groups of blocks in the Borough to a sensitively-designed network of streets and houses, highly customised to the preferences and family sizes of residents. The Stepney Charter contributed valuably to this.

Both the physical product and the social process of achieving it have been well-managed in most respects, despite some poor cooperation from planning and highways departments. Some of the housing work will not be completed until nearly a year after the end of the programme but over-runs of time (many attributable to delays in central government approval of un-contested CPOs) have generally been modest and the project has worked within its budget (and agreed extensions of its budget).

The Stepney Housing and Development Agency, SHADA, assembled a strong team through secondment from the Council and direct recruitment. It worked well with other bodies, combining single-minded attention to the project with a degree of continuing responsiveness to local views. The level of support given by the unified re-housing team appears to have been very high.

The Council's Regeneration team were creative and flexible in finding and making the most of opportunities for economic development and gaining European co-funding for a variety of schemes in (or including) the SRB area. This was especially challenging in the rather chaotic

conditions of London economic development before the London Development Agency became established.

Many of the benefits of the SRB will not become apparent or measurable for some time although the immediate improvements in health have been dramatic and the subject of separate research by Ambrose (2000). It will take longer to see changes in the economic position of residents, their increased skill and confidence about individual and collective activity. Most important of all, many people in the area will have replaced a previous stereotyped view of other ethnic or class groups by the real understanding which has come from interacting with others as individuals.

#### **Weaknesses**

The tension between urgent action and continuous debate is always acute. A reasonable balance was struck in Stepney but more might perhaps have been done at the outset to take account of the greater initial strength of representative organisations among the white population than among minorities: more use at the outset of multi-lingual documents and staff for example. Future projects should bear this in mind.

It is inevitable in area-based regeneration that resentments are expressed by those who feel they are not getting any benefits. More should be done in future projects to ensure that the criteria and decisions about resource allocation are clear, widely debated and well-publicised.

The Stepney Charter was a valuable device for securing the commitment of housing organisations to high design and construction standards, decanting and rent policies. It should probably have been more widely circulated, and translated. It should also be routine for independent advice on housing and related welfare rights to be available to all tenants from the outset of such a project, however favourable the housing providers' commitments are.

The most serious criticism we have of the SRB (and of the Charter) is that it has failed to embed any permanent organisation and flow of resources to take unified responsibility for neighbourhood management. Management of the dwellings themselves (including repair and maintenance) has not been effectively harmonised or unified, nor is there a local office to which tenants can refer. More serious is the failure to steward, manage and maintain the common areas, especially the small children's play spaces. These appear to be no-one's effective responsibility; one playground is already closed and another seriously vandalised. Better urban design would have located children's play spaces and other micro-parks where they would have been under natural surveillance by passers-by and by adjacent occupiers and that would have reduced the cost of management somewhat. But such spaces, even if well-located, need active and continuous supervision, management, maintenance and repair. The cost of inaction on this will be high—for residents, especially children, and for all three of the landlords. Substandard supervision, management and maintenance of the space among dwellings has hastened (and may even have started) the decline of many estates in Britain and it would be a shocking waste of resources if this were to happen again in Stepney. We are aware that this is an endemic problem in UK housing and in the short-termism of time-limited funding programmes like SRB and NDC. But it is a problem which should have been addressed for Stepney and still needs to be remedied.

Another endemic problem with UK urban regeneration regimes at the time was the lack of forethought and strategic preparation for the programmes. This led to a couple of early years quite rightly being spent on re-framing the Central Stepney SRB (mainly through the Masterplan). Lack of adequate preparation also led to constant revisions of projects and objectives and the lack of adequate preparatory studies led to a relative disconnection between projects, objectives and needs. Subsequent national regeneration regimes have attempted to correct this failing.

The remaining critical comment we need to make here is to note the waste involved when good teams like SHADA's are dispersed when funding expires. While many of the individuals move on with their knowledge

to other regeneration jobs, and some move back into mainstream Council jobs, the cohesion of the work team is lost. We regard it as very regrettable that the Ocean NDC has taken on the staff only to a limited degree.

#### *4.2 Lessons: what can be done within the rules which applied?*

Tower Hamlets Council set up this SRB bid because, in the national policy context of the time, there was no other effective way of securing the flow of resources necessary to upgrade the area and relieve the degrading and unhealthy housing conditions in the area. Neither tenants nor the Council were free to choose whether the Council or Housing Associations would be the best providers of housing: money would only flow if Housing Associations were used.

The Council was (and still is) operating in the context of the Right to Buy policy. In addition to the overall effects across the Borough, reducing opportunities for the Council, for the homeless and for tenants, this had negative effects in Central Stepney because many tenants decanted from the blocks being demolished (up to a third of those eligible) wished to preserve their Right to Buy and thus chose not to move to the newly-built dwellings within the scheme. This will have reduced the degree to which the former community of Limehouse Fields remained together and has also influenced the ethnic mix since higher proportions of white households chose to remain as council tenants.

The other constraints operating on the project related to property ownership rights. The rights of British Gas and its successors to keep the Harford Street Gas Works site derelict and unused for years and years has been a multiple injury to Central Stepney: it is a blight upon the area and it also inhibited the achievement of many valuable features of the Masterplan, notably the provision of larger-scale recreation space and of more affordable housing, including especially special needs units. The injustice and inefficiency of this history is clear. The only beneficiaries of the delay in bringing this land to fruitful use will be the shareholders because the SRB has now transformed the environment and increased the value of the site. Even

shareholders, however, would probably have benefitted more from an early disposal of the site.

A final small problem caused by the operation of national rules is the way in which acquisition costs are calculated in Right to Buy cases. Because the valuation of the property is fixed as at the date when the acquisition begins, but the acquisition can take a year or more to complete, anyone whose dwelling is declared part of a refurbishment scheme during that period gets the full benefit of the refurbishment without payment. This is a manifestly unjust cash gift to an arbitrary selection of buyers and clearly needs to be changed.

#### *4.3 Could a better job be done in a different context (i.e. with modified rules and policies)?*

There is no inherent reason why Housing Associations should be better landlords than local councils or cooperatives or other locally-accountable organisations. If national policy permitted it, Tower Hamlets might be wise to consider doing such projects without the transfer of properties to associations. This should be better value for money since councils can borrow at least as cheaply as associations.

The capacity of local authorities around the country to do this kind of work, or assemble teams to do it, will, of course, vary. The issue will not simply be about the capacity of councils as housing authorities since good urban regeneration calls for effective integration of housing, planning, highways, education, health, economic development and so on. In the Stepney case it was an important function of SHADA to take a very strong line with relatively un-cooperative planning and highways departments and this is a function which an in-house team might have performed less effectively. On the other hand it is defeatism to accept that Councils should be able to get away with such poor inter-departmental cooperation that only arms-length agencies can overcome it.

The Right to Buy council housing has now clearly been accepted as a policy which is seriously undermining London's capacity to house its

people and government is considering attenuating or suspending it. In a housing regeneration area this would be doubly valuable because the Right to Buy greatly complicates the decanting process and we have seen how it tends to increase ethnic segregation in RSL housing.

More substantial powers of compulsory purchase, on moderate terms, are needed to enable disused privately-owned sites (like the former Gas Works here), crucial to regeneration projects to be swiftly brought back into use, especially where owners are unwilling to compromise in a partnership framework. Uncontested CPOs should be exempt from central government approval, or at least should be approved much more quickly.

Another problem needs changes in national rules: the upper limit on Council Tax Benefit. Since Council Tax banding depends heavily on floorspace, some of the largest dwellings built in Stepney fell in charge bands above the current maximum permitted for CT Benefit and this has contributed to the high costs which large (and often poor) households have to bear in the new development.

Finally we should point out that the need for wholesale demolition of over-crowded estates arises in part from the simple absence of available space on which to build more appropriate-sized dwellings. It may well be that the flats which were demolished in Central Stepney were unsuitable for refurbishment at reasonable cost. But the logic of such projects is likely to lead to a mis-use of resources where small flats could be upgraded for small households while the needs of overcrowded households could be met off-site (in this case perhaps by a more intensive development of the 'feeder sites' and on the gas works land). Such irrationalities are a price London has been paying for its constrained land supply and for the large amounts of land which have remained un-used or under-used.

#### *4.4 Research Questions*

The resources available for this end-of-project evaluation have been a major limitation, even though the research team greatly exceeded its

time budget. We would have liked to be able to mount systematic sample surveys of those individuals, groups and businesses who benefited from the SRB and of those who, for one reason or another, did not. This would have permitted thorough user-satisfaction studies in the new and refurbished dwellings and given us a much more precise grasp of the achievements in community and economic development. Comparative study of other projects would also be invaluable.

These extended areas of research could be, and should be, followed up in the coming years and if graduate students or others reading this seek our help we shall be glad to cooperate.

The work on Central Stepney has been, in large measure, work on British urban regeneration policy generally and many of our criticisms would probably apply to many other projects. We consider there to be an urgent need for a review at a regional or national level of the way in which urban regeneration projects describe and document their work, and of the accounting frameworks which they are required to use. As we have shown throughout this study (and in the Appendices), the present system of objectives, outputs and outcomes is burdensome for those involved without being a good system for decision making, monitoring, accountability or evaluation — especially where projects are responsive to democratic control. It is in many ways a sham and calls for reconsideration.

The other main topic on which we consider research to be urgent is the challenge of embedding the long-term management and care of the public spaces after projects like this are 'completed'.

## Appendix A: Detailed project-by-project data

This Appendix comprises detailed data, and detailed commentary, not appropriate to the main text. It follows the sequence of the main text (sections 2 and 3) and is cross-referenced to it. The notation \*\* in tables means that an entry would be appropriate at this point in the table but is missing because there is no relevant data or because the measure would be meaningless.

A great difficulty arises for detailed evaluation because bids and other documents are structured, ostensibly, as hierarchical lists of

- aims
- strategic objectives
- objectives
- sub-objectives

and then the projects which are designed to achieve these objectives (grouped into programmes) are listed. Sometimes it is explicit and clear that a specific project is designed to help achieve just one specific objective but often a project is designed to contribute to more than one objective, or the relationship is not spelled out at all.

Furthermore, when the whole 7-year plan is revised (as it is, at least annually), projects are dropped and others added without the 'mapping' of projects against objectives being revised. It is thus often impossible to identify which projects and programmes are designed to achieve which objectives, and thus impossible to evaluate them against the expectations held for them. It is also impossible to assess whether the planned activity (the project) was an appropriate way to achieve the objectives which its designers had in mind. We have attempted this 'mapping' for the original SRB bid and also for the year 7 delivery plan but are not presenting the results here. Suffice it to say that neither document emerges as a logical and complete linking of projects with objectives, or of objectives with higher-level goals. Indeed it would be a surprise if they did since the exercise has become more of a ritualised form of accountancy than a real way of presenting the logic of the programme in a transparent way. This is an endemic problem of regeneration projects in Britain and is in no way specific to Stepney. It is discussed in detail in Appendix C.

### *Details for the housing programme*

#### *Main new build programme*

This part of the Masterplan became two SRB 'projects'<sup>7</sup>, H9 'Ocean and Limehouse Redevelopment Sites' and H10 'New Build Sites'. Three more projects, H4, H5 and H6 also produced new houses as outputs. Of these, H4 was a refurbishment programme while the other two, 'Phase 1 feeder sites', will be examined in section 2.1.1.c.

In the Masterplan, five options were put forward during the consultation process and option number four was selected following community consultation. It involved:

The demolition and redevelopment of all pre-war and post-war blocks and some of the Greaves and Donoghue Cottages.

The refurbishment of two remaining Tower Blocks (132 units) and Cottages (132 units).

Demolition and redevelopment of 222 units from Bothnia, Malacca and Tunis Houses on the Ocean Estate. This was not part of the 'LFE package' under community consultation since it was already under way.

Replacement of the loss of units caused by redeveloping at lower densities by off-site new developments.

A programme set out in 8 implementation phases (1 to 8).

Responsibility for implementation was to be delegated to a new agency, SHADA.

A minor problem with this proposal is that the numbers do not add-up<sup>8</sup>. According to the Masterplan baseline survey, LFE comprised 852 units

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<sup>7</sup> The project coding used is the same as in the SRB documentation.

<sup>8</sup> If numbers for pre- and post-war blocks (556) and the Greaves and Donoghue cottages to be demolished (32) are added up, the number derived (588) falls 3 units short of the 591 mentioned in the preferred option outline in the same document (see below). According to SHADA, there were actually 587 units demolished. Furthermore, the preferred option appraisal (Masterplan Ch. 7) states that the output target for the LFE is 873 units, 21 units more than the pre-SRB housing stock of LFE. If we add up the figures in the 'Preferred option outline' then the new built replacements are 846, some 27 less than the number mentioned in the preferred option appraisal.

**Table A 2.1 Limehouse Fields Estate: unit mix by number of bedrooms**

Dwelling mix: whole estate before demolition	1 bedroom	2	3	4	5	Total
Houses and Cottages	16*	4	112*	32	0	164*
Tower Blocks	66	66	0	0	0	132
Pre-War blocks	137	74	45	15	3	274
Post-War blocks	112	170	0	0	0	282
<i>Total</i>	331	314	157	47	3	852

Source: Adapted from Capital Action (1996) p.10.

\* Includes 16 flats and 16 maisonettes in Greaves and Donoghue Cottages.

Eventually the new housebuilding programme was organised into 6 contract phases (A to F). Later on, E was merged with F in order to speed up the programme and because most outputs were deemed to have been achieved. Although it is very difficult to link phases of the Masterplan (1-8) with actual SRB housebuilding contract phases (A-F), it could be said with certainty that Phase 1 does not correspond to any of the phases A-F. Developments included in the Masterplan proposed contract phases 1-8 have been re-arranged in SRB contract packages A-F and there is no direct match between the two.

As far as outputs are concerned, table A2.2 summarises the building / demolition programme of the Masterplan, the Planning permission and what was actually built.

Although the programme is now estimated to last until March 2004, we can reasonably assume that since most of the obstacles that caused those delays have been overcome, the core of the Masterplan—demolition and rebuilding of BMT and LFE (rows 1.1, 1.2 and 3.1 and 3.2)—will probably be achieved as envisaged. The total number of replacement units will probably fall 81 units short of those envisaged in the Masterplan and there will be 44 units fewer than the properties demolished. However, the new housing stock will exceed the previous stock in numbers of rooms and in probably, as we shall see.

The shortfall is due to less development than expected in off-site Council or Private sites. The following table compares Masterplan projects with projects included in SHADA's funding profile (Frost Associates, 2002) and provides a project by project comparison of the Masterplan expectations with the actual outcomes. It has to be said here that the Masterplan's 'Register of Sites for Development' is not always consistent with SHADA's funding profile and both documents are internally inconsistent as well, although the Funding Profile is less so. Therefore, the tables that follow are our own compilation of, hopefully realistic, best estimates.

**Table A 2.2: Comparison of number of units for new-built programme.**

	Masterplan	Planning permission	Actual April 02	Comments
<b>1. Demolition</b>				
1.1 Ocean BMT blocks	222	Not available	222	
1.2 Limehouse Fields	591	Not available	587	Masterplan may have been mistaken
Total	813		809	Actual given by SHADA
<b>2. Replacements Phase 1</b>				
2.1 Turners/ Locksley Streets (Feeder Site)	66	Not available	66	For SRB decanting.
2.2 Musbury Street	6	Not available	?	Not in SHADA funding profile.
2.3 Belgrave/ Bromley Streets	74	Not available	74	For SRB decanting.
Total 2	146		140?	
<b>3. Replacements Phases 2-8</b>				
<b>Replacement Phases A-E (F)</b>				
3.1 BMT site	93	110	110	
3.2 Limehouse Fields	303	294	146(294)	(Completion ? March 2004)
3.3 Other council sites Off-site	254	Not available	221	Project H10 and H4 SRB outputs.
3.4 Private sites Off-site	50	Not available	-	Any output included in previous row.
Total 3	700		477(625)	
Total 2+3	846		617(765)	
<b>4. Additional Capacity (potential)</b>				
4.1 Council Partnerships (indicative)	370	-	-	Not in SHADA funding profile.
4.2 Other Council/Private sites	250	-	-	All outputs included in 3.3
4.3 Gas Works (indicative)	(150)		0	Double-counted in Master plan ? Also in 3.3

Sources: Capital Action (1996), PRP Architects, SRB Monitoring Team Records, SHADA, Walker Management, Frost Associates.

**Table A 2.3: H9 Housebuilding Project Comparison**

Project	Masterplan	Units	SHADA Funding Profile	Units	Comments
H9	Limehouse Fields Estate Redevelopment		Ocean & Limehouse Redevelopment Sites		
H.9.1	BMT site	93	BMT site	110	
H.9.2	Donoghue & Grieves Cottages	26	Donoghue & Grieves Cottages	24	Contract phase A. Used for decanting.
H.9.3	Carr St. Garage site	13	Carr St. Garage site	14	Contract phase A. Used for decanting.
H.9.4	JAWWS Square - Dupont St (see 10.19)	51	JAWWS Square, Carr St West C, Elizabeth Wharf	(103)	
H.9.5	Jacobs Square (incl pt Carr St)	77	Jacobs Square Package C, Carr St. West A, Carr St. West B	(137)	H9.6-H9.7 merged with H9.5. Ongoing project.
H.9.6	Carr St West A (Manning / Didben / Dolland)	37	-	Incl. in H 9.5	Ibid.
H.9.7	Carr St West B (Belloc / Mallon / Reidy)	28	-	Incl. in H 9.5	Ibid.
H.9.8	Carr St West C (Blount / Culpepper / Delmaine)	25	-	Incl. in H 9.4	Merged with H9.4
H.9.9	Repton, Coltman & Maroon	30	Repton, Coltman & Maroon, Three 'H's'	54	H9.9 merged with H9.10. Ongoing project.
H.9.10	Three 'H's'	16	-		
Total		396		(442)	Projection.

Sources: Capital Action (1996), Frost Associates (2002), SHADA, SRB Monitoring Team Records, C33.

Note: figures in brackets include units not yet completed.

It is clear from this table that the Masterplan was followed in broad terms and that there were significant extra outputs, probably resulting from a slight increase in densities.

#### *b) Refurbishment programme*

This programme corresponds to SRB project H4 'Housing Refurbishment'. However it was not the only project that gave refurbishment outputs, H13 'Sandhurst House' also resulted in a refurbished dwelling. Unexpectedly, H4 reported 18 new dwellings constructed, which have been added to housing outputs (i.e. row 3.3 in table A2.2 above). Pre-SRB the Limehouse Fields Estate comprised 852 units. According to the preferred option 591 units (or 588, see previous section) of the LFE were to be demolished and the rest were to be refurbished. The following table compares Masterplan provisions with what actually happened, as far as refurbishment is concerned. The Masterplan made little mention of other SRB refurbishment schemes running simultaneously with the LFE refurbishment. However, Phase 1 included two schemes, that are included in the table below but bear no relevance whatsoever to the Masterplan and will be examined further in H4 project evaluation.

**Table A2.4: Comparison of number of units in refurbishment programme**

	Masterplan	Actual	Comments
1. LFE			
1.1 Tower Blocks	132	132	
1.2 Cottages	132	132	
<i>LFE total not demolished</i>	261	265?	Slight discrepancy
2. Phase 1 Refurbishment			
2.1 Latham House	97		
2.2 Ocean Estate	392		
<i>Total</i>			

Source: Capital Action (1996), SHADA

*c) Feeder sites*

There is only one project in the SRB referring to 'feeder sites' but the term was used generally to refer to the sites that were developed in order to decant the residents of BMT and LFE. These sites were grouped in three projects H5 'Support-LAHAG Programme', H6 'ADP HAG Feeder Sites' and H10 'New Build Sites'. It is worth noting that H6 and H10 did not receive SRB funding at all, as far as we can determine.

**Table A 2.5: H5, H6 house building schemes comparison**

	Master plan	Planning permission	Actual	Comments
1. Replacements Phase 1				
Turners/Locksley Street (H6.1)	66	Not available	66?	Used for SRB decanting but not SRB funded.
Musbury Street (H 6.2)	6	Not available	6?	Not in SHADA funding profile.
Belgrave/Bromley Street (H5)	74	Not available	74?	Used for SRB decanting. SRB contributed £2000.
<i>Total 1</i>	<i>146</i>		<i>140?</i>	

Sources: Capital Action (1996), SRB Monitoring Team Records, Frost Associates.

These two projects were implemented as envisaged in the Masterplan with the exception of Musbury St. That was probably not included in the SRB at all. Project H10 is overleaf.

**Table A 2.6: H10 Housebuilding Schemes Comparison (measured in dwelling units)**

Project	Masterplan	SHADA Funding Profile	Comments
H.10	ADP Main Programme & Private Sector New Build Sites	New Build Sites	
H.10.1	29-31 Callaghan Cottages, Lindley St.	2 29-Callahan Cottages, Lindley St.	1
H.10.2	East London Taimud Torah, Lindley St	5 East London Taimud Torah, 165 Jubilee St.	9
H.10.3	Antill Terrace	1 Antill Terrace	1
H.10.4	Head St.	0 -	Special Needs. LBTH owner.
H.10.5	6-24 Westport St.	6 -	
H.10.6	595-603 Commercial Rd	18 595-603 Commercial Rd	LBTH partial owner.
H.10.7	Garden site, Belgrave St	5 Garden site, Belgrave St	4
H.10.8	Corner of Belgrave Rd & Troon St	3 Miscellaneous Site	0 LBTH owner. Planning appl withdrawn.
H.10.9	Adj 2 Salmon Lane	1 -	LBTH owner.
H.10.10	Asion St / White Horse Rd.	59 -	LBTH owner.
H.10.11	45 White Horse Road	20 -	Special Needs
H.10.12	Durham Row	2 -	
H.10.13	C/o Aston St & Halley St	0 -	LBTH owner.
H.10.14	James Olley Centre, Yorkshire Rd.	0 -	
H.10.15	Adj. Cambria House, Yorkshire Rd.	6 Royal Navy Pub	2 Replacement LBTH owner. Planning appl. withdrawn.
H.10.16	Camdenhurst St / Condor St.	23 Camdenhurst St / Condor St.	23
H.10.17	Blount St / Repton St	42 Blount St / Repton St	?
H.10.18	Blount St / Carr St	3 -	
H.10.19	Maroon St / Dupont St Triangle	15 -	
H.10.20	Carr St / Victory Bridge Site	6 -	
H.10.21	St Paul's Way	0 -	LBTH owner.
H.10.22	Rhodeswell Rd	0 -	LBTH owner.
H.10.23	Essian St	30 Essian St	30
H.10.24	Harford St Gas Works	150 -	-
H.10.25 A	24-32 Copperfield Rd, E3 Building A	38 -	
H.10.25 B	24-32 Copperfield Rd, E3 Building B	12 -	
H.10.26	442-452 Mile End Rd	30 -	
H.10.27	196-206 Mile End Rd & land at rear	40 -	
H.10.28	23-37 Redmans Rd	8 -	
H.10.29	305-309 Commercial Rd	6 -	
H.10.30	321-325 Commercial Rd	4 -	
H.10.31	375-417 Commercial Rd	8 -	LBTH owner.
H.10.32	Adj. Brayford Sq. Commercial Rd	12 -	LBTH owner.
H.10.33A	White Horse Rd / Barnes St	12 -	LBTH owner.
H.10.33B	1-3 Barnes St	4 -	
H.10.34	14 Chaseley St	1 -	
H.10.35	White Horse Lane	7 -	
H.10.36	Charringtons Anchor Brewery	0 -	
H.10.37	37-41 Ravens Row	26 -	
H.10.38	Single plot mixed use properties (no)(228 Mile End Rd, 659 & 663 Commercial Rd)	11 -	

H.10.39	-	-	Fairclough St.	?	
H.10.45	-	-	Searle & Frances House	?	
H.10.50	-	-	Elsa St.	?	
H.10.62	-	-	49-53 Turners Rd.	?	
H.10.63	-	-	2-10 Turners Rd. & 1-3 Clemence St.	?	
H.10.64	-	-	James Olley Centre	20	See H.10.14
H.10.65	-	-	34-42 Blount St.		
TOTAL UNITS		616	90 (203) (SRB output.)		

Source: Capital Action (1996), Frost Associates (2002), SHADA, C33.

Most of project H10 as envisaged by the Masterplan has not been carried out. It appears that it proved impossible to develop most of the indicated sites, although this was partially anticipated and these sites were more 'opportunity sites' than anything else. This was partially due to the fact that many of these sites were under private ownership so there was little the SRB delivery agencies could do. However, it is interesting to note that sites under full LBTH ownership that were not developed account for 92 non-developed housing units. In that respect, non-development of Harford St, which would have provided at least 150 units, was significant. In any case, part of the programme appears to have depended on risky assumptions, recognised as such by the Masterplan authors themselves (see Capital Action, 1996:97). This strategy appears not to have worked completely but the number of alternatives provided also ensured that the programme was never in real danger of reaching a catastrophic dead-end. Identifying so many potential development sites helped the programme's flexibility and ensured that its completion was not jeopardised when the Gas works did not come forward.

### **Implementation of delivery and funding mechanisms.**

#### *Funding*

With regards to funding, the Masterplan suggested that the scheme should be funded with the use of existing SRB and HIP resources that could be topped up with HAG and Housing Association monies. The Masterplan includes an annex with a detailed cost plan that is summarised in a table in the main report. However, the two plans are different: one estimates the total cost to be £90,081,000 the other £90,353,000 (both allowing for 3% yearly inflation). This should be compared with a total housing programme actual expenditure of £107,957,000 (not £107,778,000 as the Profile says) up to the end of 2001/2. Another £10,432,000 has been spent since then. The following table provides a comparison between the Masterplan cost estimates and the actual, as reported by Frost Associates (2002).

Table A 2.7: Cost comparisons, Masterplan (mp) and actual (act) (in £000)

	1995-96		1996-97		1997-98		1998-99		1999-00		2000-01		2001-02		1995-02	
	mp	act	mp	act	mp	act	mp	act	mp	act	mp	act	mp	act	mp	act
SRB	472	449	695	100	3000	3048	4000	2500	3760	2731	1648	3509	1325	2054	14900	14392
SRB SHG	0	0	0	695	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	695
LBTH Land	1270	0	2714	2160	3978	4790	2091	1281	1377	3475	986	2850	782	0	13198	14556
LBTH HIP	1466	444	1545	1710	1463	3621	264	2594	207	3091	179	-510	1178	3580	6302	14530
LBTH HRA	233	153	233	737	0	881	0	551	0	378	0	53	0	166	466	2919
LBTH SHG	0	0	531	157	2882	2008	2322	1256	399	794	0	1283	0	479	6134	5977
HC SHG	4969	2000	275	2303	3864	2775	3760	1038	3428	4038	2817	4091	1625	2651	20738	18896
HA Private	8	700	3998	776	7348	4590	3950	6617	5052	1779	4022	8154	4237	11225	28615	33841
Other Private	0	0	0	0	0	718	0	0	0	86	0	47	0	883	0	1734
Other Public	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-661	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-661
Renov Grant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	179	0	0	0	0	0	179
Private Land	0	0	0	0	0	375	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	375
LBTH Capital	0	0	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	75	0	75	0	75	0	525
<b>Total</b>	<b>8418</b>	<b>3746</b>	<b>9991</b>	<b>8738</b>	<b>22535</b>	<b>22906</b>	<b>16387</b>	<b>15276</b>	<b>14223</b>	<b>16626</b>	<b>9652</b>	<b>19552</b>	<b>9147</b>	<b>21113</b>	<b>90353</b>	<b>107957</b>

Source: Capital Action (1996), Frost Associates (2002)

Since the Masterplan costings incorporated a 3% p.a. inflation allowance, the two values at each year should be broadly comparable because they refer to current prices for that year, as estimated and actual. An important observation is the variety of funding sources which were finally used and were not foreseen in the Masterplan. This might reflect the creative harnessing of previously-unforeseen sources but it could also be an indication of the problems of predicting such flows. With the help of the chart in the text it is also possible to make year by year comparisons.

What the data shows is a surprising difference between expected and actual expenditure for year 1995-96, mainly due to lower Social Housing Grant expenditure. This is surprising because that was the year when the plan was drafted and the amount in question is written down as 'actual' not as 'expected'. This means either that expenditure was counted in for a scheme that was then removed from the SRB or that the SRB Housing Programme accounting system was inefficient at the time.

A further look at the chart reveals that the Masterplan was relatively closely followed for the years up to 1999-2000 but then, as the housing programme took off, HC and HA expenditure began to deviate significantly from what had been expected. However, before drawing further conclusions one would have to check the SRB delivery plans to establish a baseline and further determine the causes of the deviation.

### Implementation of the principles on meeting housing need.

**Table A 2.8: Proposed and final mix of the housing stock: proportion of units by number of bedrooms**

	1 bedroom	2	3	4	5	6
before the SRB	44%	45%	8%	2,5%	0.5%	0%
Waiting List need estimate	40%	30%	15%	10%	5%	0%
Masterplan	33%	30%	19%	12%	6%	0%
Actual	21%	32%	26,5%	14%	6%	1.5%

Source: Capital Action(1996), SHADA

### Have all the outputs been achieved?

#### *General observations and establishment of baseline*

The first question to be answered is what the initially-agreed target outputs were. In the previous paragraph we compared the Masterplan with the actual outputs, thus covering part of the answer. We were not able to locate an official agreement between the GOL and the LBTH regarding the total delivery outputs to be achieved following the GOL approval, other than the yearly delivery plans.

What appears to have happened is that, following the GOL approval of a smaller budget for the programme (£28,405,000 instead of £31,843,400) the SRB output targets had to be re-adjusted. However, we were not able to locate a post-approval list of overall end-of-programme output targets broken down by project, similar to the one included in the bid. The only end-of-programme outputs in the first year delivery plan are global totals per output indicator, not per project.

Subsequent to the inevitable adjustments that the reduced SRB grant caused, further changes have been made to Housing output targets following the directions of the Masterplan. It is also the case that a series of alterations have been discussed and agreed in meetings under the auspices of SHADA or the SRB board (for the rest of the programme). These are also very difficult to trace.

Additional problems arise in answering questions on inputs, outputs and efficiency for the whole SRB programme, not just for the housing activities, include the following:

*The unsatisfactory quality of monitoring during the early years of the programme, especially year 1.* The quality of output monitoring improved dramatically during the lifetime of the SRB, reaching a satisfactory level as early as 1996/97, but the mistakes or oversights of the early years make it difficult to derive total outputs and total costs for the whole programme broken down by project. The housing programme is considerably less affected since most of it started later within the programme and it has also benefited from SHADA's monitoring.

*Inconsistency of cost data.* There are some discrepancies between SHADA's funding profile and the 2001/02 (Year 7) delivery plan figures, especially for years after 1998-99 but also for previous ones<sup>9</sup>. This discrepancy might have affected the validity of certain calculations (i.e. efficiency).

*Difficulty to estimate outcome/result and impact indicators.* Most of the data officially gathered allow for the calculation of output indicators, geared towards satisfying GOL funding criteria. The resources available to us did not allow us to estimate outcome and impact indicators.

*There is no centrally-collected cost information available per scheme and per output.* Both cost and output information are collected per project. This means that the source of outputs attributable to more than one scheme within the same project cannot be traced. The same applies to the costs of separate outputs per project (let alone scheme) therefore certain assumptions have to be made that allow for an estimated allocation of costs per output indicator. It is certainly true that it is conceptually very difficult if not impossible to do the latter however, a scheme-centred administrative monitoring process would certainly have made things easier.

*Lack of a post-approval list of overall end-of-programme output targets broken down by project.* It is very difficult in most cases to find what the expected outputs were per project and thus measure effectiveness. To make things even more difficult it is also not easy to add yearly expected outputs from the delivery plans because there are cases where expected outputs have been carried from one year to the next. In some cases, this is obvious but in some others it is not. However, we tried to compensate for this severe lack of data with a 'best estimate' derived with the method explained below.

The steps we followed in order to estimate the expected outputs were:

We looked at all the projects for the same output.

If the output came only from the project in hand then we used the year 1 delivery plan output grand total as the expected output.

If the output came from more than one project then we tried to trace the indicator year by year and estimate the total expected output by adding the yearly delivery plan forecasts and subtracting any forecasts obviously carried forward.

Deviation from the above method are mentioned in the small comments that follow each table.

It should be noted here that the SRB monitoring team was also recording unforeseen outputs and outputs not belonging to the GOL list. These outputs either do not have a code or have a code greater than 10 (i.e. 11A, 14B etc).

As far as estimated costs are concerned we used SHADA's funding profile for the housing element and SRB year 7 delivery plan for the other schemes. We were not provided with updated 2001-2002 cost data for the non-housing element so we used the year 7 delivery plan forecasts.

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<sup>9</sup> For example, the expenditure for project H1 in 1998/99 has been £748,000 according to the 2001/02 delivery plan but only £604,00 according to SHADA's funding profile. Similar contradictions occurred for various other programmes like H4 for 1999/00 or H5 for 1998/99.

For the time being we are not using inflation-adjusted prices because unfortunately, all cost data that have been given to us were printed, rather than electronic. This made discounting calculations very cumbersome.

Whenever it was not possible to attribute costs to outputs an effort has been made to express efficiency in the form of an 'outputs basket': ' For every X thousand pounds spent there were Y outputs A created and Z outputs B created.'. This calculation is made only where all other attempts to calculate unit costs have proven fruitless. Given our resources it was not possible to accurately calculate additionality as a percentage, however it was possible to determine whether it was high (H), medium (M), low (L) or unclear (U) . High additionality means that most if not all the outputs are a result of the programme, medium means that a significant proportion of outputs are attributable to other factors and low additionality means that the outputs would have happened anyway. Appendix C discusses some of these problems in more detail.

### Project by project comparison

**Table A 2.9: Summary table of H1 'Decant Programme**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
13A(i) No. of Units Decanted	**	934	-	3,699,813	3,335,000		3571			H
13A(ii) No. of Leaseholder buy-backs	**	16	-				0			H
13A(iii) No. of Freeholder buy-backs	**	1	-				0			H
13A(v) Void Units Secured	**	383	-				0			H

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, SHADA, Frost Associates (2002)

This programme's output codes are all not included in the GOL list. Expected outputs can only be calculated by careful examination on a scheme by scheme basis. What is useful to observe is that the method of leasehold and freehold buy-backs as well as an active void policy were followed, though our impression is that buy-back was used to facilitate the emptying of blocks, rather than to create temporary units for decanting.. These methods were proposed in the Masterplan (see paragraph 2.1.5). Most important of all, the decanting did take place and, so far as we could discover, all the blocks were emptied in time for demolition to start. No deadweight has been identified: i.e. it is almost certain that none of these outputs would have been achieved without the SRB. (The BMT decanting, which was not part of the SRB's work, took place before the SRB and clearly it is perfectly possible for decanting to happen without an SRB programme - but only if the Council is able and willing to divert a sufficient flow of vacancies for the purpose.

**Table A 2.10: Summary table of H2 'Limehouse Demolition & Decontamination'**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(iii) No. of f.t.e. construction jobs (expressed as person-weeks)	0	82	30	See text	See text		See text			H
06B Hectares of land improved/reclaimed/serviced for development	3.113	3.749	0						120	H
13A(iv) No. of Units Demolished	587	402	0						68	H

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, SHADA, Frost Associates (2002)

It has not been possible to clarify costs per output indicator; total project actual cost has been £5,910,000 with another £249,000 forecast. This means that for every £100,000 spent there were 1.4 f.t.e. construction jobs created, 0.063 ha of land were improved & serviced and 6.8 units were demolished. Effectiveness numbers should be taken with some caution: demolitions should have been all finished by now, the extra amount of land expected to be improved may be double counting. No deadweight has been identified. It is almost certain that none of these outputs would have been achieved without the SRB. The estimated cost in year 3 was £3,024,030.

**Table A 2.11: Summary table of H4 Housing Refurbishment**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	0	3	0				0			M
01A(iii) No. of f.t.e. construction jobs (expressed as person-weeks)	5	2238	731						44760	M
3A(ii) No. of private sector dwellings improved	42	50	0						119	M
03A(iv) No. of Local Authority dwellings improved	587	432	0	See text	See text				74	M
03A(v) No. of HA dwellings completed	9	18	0						200	M
03A(vi) No. of Housing Association dwellings improved	3	2	0						67	M
05B(i) No. of buildings with upgraded security (Dwellings)	116	112	3						97	M
06B Hectares of land improved/reclaimed/serviced for development	0.13	0.21	0						162	M
15(i) Completion of Public Art installation	1	0	0						0	M

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, SHADA, Frost Associates (2002)

It has not been possible to verify in all cases whether better than forecast outputs are real effectiveness gains. This does not appear to be the case as far as output 01A(iii) is concerned. For example, H4 created 327 person-weeks in f.t.e. construction jobs in 1998-99 and the project is not even included in that year's 'Key indicators of performance' in the delivery plan. That outcome was not anticipated in the milestone tables either. Although it has not been possible to calculate unit costs with the use of SRB monitoring data, SHADA data show that Waterview House refurbishment cost £2,700,000 for 66 units or £40,910 per unit. Similarly Darnley House cost £21,925 per unit. The total cost of the

programme has been £15,774,000 with another £338,000 forecast but against £13,684,000 originally expected. This extra spending will have resulted from (i) the fact that land servicing and the building of new dwellings within this 'refurbishment' programme was much more extensive than planned, (ii) the incorporation of improvements, such as the CHP scheme in Waterview, which raised the quality of the outputs and (iii) any failures of cost control. We have not been able to establish the contribution of each of these factors and thus cannot speak with certainty as far as either efficiency or effectiveness are concerned. For every £100,000 spent there were, amongst other outputs, 14.18 f.t.e. construction jobs (expressed in person-weeks) created, 2.75 dwellings improved, 0.11 new dwellings completed and 0.71 dwellings with updated security. Some interviewees suggested that some refurbishment would have taken place anyway and we were told that some resources were diverted from other programmes to this one.

**Table A 2.12: Summary table of H5 Support for LAHAG Programme**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Effness % (2/1)	Add't y
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	0	8	2							L
01A(iii) No. of f.t.e. construction jobs (expressed as person-weeks)	0	3009	577							L
03A(v) No. of HA dwellings completed	74	74	0	5,760,000	9,230,000	77,837	124,730	62	100	L
06B Hectares of land improved/reclaimed/serviced for development	0	0.705	0							L

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, SHADA, Frost Associates (2002)

In the case of H5 we are faced again with the same forecasting problems in the delivery plan. This programme appears to have performed well. It was effective but the data suggests some inefficiency. However this could be misleading because unexpected outputs (land servicing O6B) were added to the programme. However, it has only received minimal SRB funding (£2000) and it is very probable that it could have gone ahead anyway since it was an LBTH Housing Programme that was diverted to the SRB to accommodate decanting needs.

**Table A 2.13: H6 ADP SHG Feeder Sites**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	0	12	1							L
01A(ii) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs safeguarded	0	22	5							L
01A(iii) No. of f.t.e. construction jobs (expressed as person-weeks)	0	1323	321							L
03A(v) No. of HA dwellings completed	66	66	0	5,935,000	4,970,000	89,924	75,303	119	100	L
06B Hectares of land improved/reclaimed/serviced for development	0	1.076	0							L
Construction Jobs Safeguarded	0	40	0							L

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, SHADA, Frost Associates (2002)

If we consider the completed dwellings as the main output then the programme appears to have been both efficient and effective, more so if we compare with prices per unit from other programmes of the SRB, because we believe that this unit cost includes site preparation. A similar comment on additionality applies here as in H5 with the exception that this project received no SRB funding at all.

**Table A 2.14: H7 Site Preparation & Decontamination**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
06B Hectares of land improved/serviced for development	0.57	0.69	n/a	1,701,000	610,000	2,984,211	884,057	337	121	L
								see text	see text	

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, SHADA, Frost Associates (2002)

This project corresponds to the preparation and decontamination of various 'feeder sites' included in H10. Because of the very flexible nature of the programme and the constant changes in the sites to be included it is rather difficult to guarantee the representativeness of the calculations. Apparently high effectiveness and low efficiency have probably been caused by the constant changes in the type and number of sites that were included in this programme. Furthermore the accounts for this programme have not yet been closed and £150,000 of additional spending is expected, along with some additional outputs. It is thus premature to say much about efficiency. The degree of additionality is rather minimal. Many of these sites would probably have been developed anyway, and indeed the SRB made negligible financial contributions to them.

**Table A 2.15: Ocean Demolition & Decontamination H8**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
06B Hectares of land improved/reclaimed/serviced for development	1.17	1.41	0	1,165,000	1,671,000	995,726	1,185,106	84	121	H
13A(iv) No. of Units Demolished	222	222	0						100	H

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, SHADA, Frost Associates (2002)

This appears to be another very effective and rather efficient programme. However, the additional land output might have been caused by inadequate preparatory studies or bad forecasts. No deadweight has been identified. It is almost certain that none of these outputs would have been achieved without the SRB.

**Table A 2.16: H9 Ocean & Limehouse Redevelopment Site**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	0	10	0			**	0	**		H
01A(iii) No. of f.t.e. construction jobs (person-weeks)	0	3846	848							H
03A(v) No. of HA dwellings completed	393	256	0						65	H
06A Hectares of land improved/reclaimed for open spaces	0.58	1.16	0						200	H
06B Hectares of land improved/reclaimed/serviced for development	0	0.2433	0							H
06D(i) Kilometres of road built	0.5	0	0						0	H

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, SHADA, Frost Associates (2002)

Project H9 is severely delayed hence the low effectiveness level. Both output figures for indicator 03A(v) come from SRB monitoring team data and not from SHADA and represent some intermediate phase of the project. Please refer to paragraph 2.1 for a more detailed overview of the envisaged outputs. There is a chance that output forecasts for new HA dwellings have been carried forward to the next years ('double-forecasted'). The other outputs are plagued by the usual forecasting discrepancies, mostly reflecting sudden additions of sites or tasks to the project. Although it has not been possible to break down costs between 03A(v), 06A and 06B we have obtained some information on costs from the actual construction contracts. According to those each unit for package B (BMT-Mar98/May00) cost £64,130, or £684.42 per sq. meter, excluding demolition and servicing of the land. Each unit in package C (Jacobs Square- Sep99/Feb02) cost £73,047, or £860.78 per sq. m., excluding demolition and servicing of the land. The actual cost so far has been £37,321,000 with another £7,391,000 forecast against a prediction in year 3 of £27,606,000.

**Table A 2.17: H10 New Build Sites**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Benchmark Unit Cost (7)	Effness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	0	19	2	See text	See text	**	0	**		**	H
01A(ii) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs safeguarded	0	17	2								H
01A(iii) No. of f.t.e. construction jobs (person-weeks)	0	4639	917								H
03A(v) No. of HA dwellings completed	299	203	0								H
06B Hectares of land improved/reclaimed/serviced for development	0	1.596	0								H

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, SHADA, Frost Associates (2002)

Again, all the problems of discrepancies between forecasting and outputs apply. The outputs for 03A(v) are intermediate and there is a good chance that output forecasts for new HA dwellings have been carried forward to the next years. The expected cost in year 3 was £23,642,000 but the actual has been £19,110,000 with another £2,55,000 forecast.

**Table A 2.18: H13 Sandhurst House**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Benchmark Unit Cost (7)	Effness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created		0	3			**	0	**		**	U
03A(vi) No. of Housing Association dwellings improved		15	0							0	U
13A(i) No. of Units Decanted		5	5							100	U
13B(xv) Self-build units refurbished		16	1							6	U

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, SHADA, Frost Associates (2002)

According to SHADA's funding profile, this project actually cost £692,000 while the SRB delivery plan for year 3 estimated its cost at £792,625. We are unable to attribute outputs to costs but even without that estimate, this seems to be a rather poor value for money project and very ineffective. We could not find out if and how the programme would have gone on without the SRB.

**Table A 2.19: H14 Project Management**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	3	18	11			0	C	**	600	H
01A(ii) No. of jobs safeguarded	3	6	4				C		200	H
01C(i) No. of people resident in target area who obtain a qualification on completing formal training	1	0	0				**		0	H
01E No. of training weeks	13.8	20	0				C		145	H
01J No. of young people benefiting from projects to promote personal and social development	2	385	104				C		19250	H
02B m sq of new/improved business/commercial floorspace	0	100	0	55700C			557C		**	H
06C No. of building improved and brought back into use	1	1	0				C		100	H
07A(vi) No. of new cultural facilities	1	2	0				C		200	H
08E No. of community enterprise start ups	1	2	0				C		200	H
12A(iv) No. of work experience weeks	55.2	69.6	0				C		126	H
13B(i) Urban Design Strategy and Consultation	0	1	0				C		**	H
13B(ii) Demolition Event	0	3	0				C		**	H
13B(iv) Publication of News Letter	0	5	0				C		**	H
13B(v) Presentation	0	3	0				C		**	H
13B(vi) Public Consultation Meeting	4	60	0				C		1500	H
13B(vii) Consultant Employed	0	3	0				C		**	H
13B(x) Surgeries Taken Place	0	68	0				C		**	H
13B(xi) Open Days	0	7	0				C		**	H
13B(xvi) School Holiday playscheme	1	1	0						100	H

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, SHADA, Frost Associates (2002)

The penultimate project of the housing group of projects is SHADA's budget. Many different expenses have been included in this budget of £8,917,000 (Apr. 02) with another £587,000 forecast. Most importantly all of SHADA's community initiatives, which cost £368,000 and have created the outputs 01J and 08E. There is also a series of additional outputs, including 'Masterplan completed' etc. (cost £342,000) which have been omitted from this table. Further breakdown of the expenditure has not been possible.. It should be mentioned however, that it is a bit paradoxical to analyse SHADA's budget in the same way that the rest of the projects are analysed. We will discuss further the topic of SHADA's effectiveness in paragraphs 2.11 and 2.12. The expected cost in year 3 was £4,689,274.

**Table A 2.20: H15 Site Acquisitions**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Benchmark Unit Cost (7)	Effness % (2/1)	Add'ty
13B(xviii) Site Acquisitions	11	9	n/a	3,587,000	2,997,000	326,091	333,000	98		82	H

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, SHADA, Frost Associates (2002)

Fewer sites than anticipated were acquired but the costs per site were much as expected. The efficiency measure is rather meaningless because the unit of measurement (cost per site) is nonsensical, it should have been combined with an indicator measuring area purchased.

### *Environment & Leisure, Health and Community Development Programmes*

#### **General observations and establishment of baseline.**

The same problems of monitoring and data accuracy apply here as in the housing programme. In this case though, we cannot cross-examine cost and output data from 2 different sources as we did with the housing element. When we asked for raw SRB cost data we were told that all the relevant available information is included in the delivery plans which should be as accurate and up-to-date as possible. As a consequence it was also not possible to get actual expenditure for year 7. The same restrictions on establishing a baseline for the housing programme apply here as well. Given the above constraints, the following tables have been compiled for each project.

#### **Project by project comparison**

Estimates of forecast and actual costs are derived from delivery plans therefore year 7 actual and expected are the same since no data have been provided by LBTH for that year. In some cases (e.g. A1) the same applies to year 1 and/or 2. It was not possible to find valid data for ED outputs per project for year 1, therefore all estimates below should be treated with caution.

*Administration and Economic Development***Table A2.21 A1 Central Administration and Management**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual outputs (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Outputs	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Benchmark Unit Cost (7)	Effness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	0	0.5	0			**	(	**		**	
01J No. of young people benefiting from projects to promote personal and social development	0	500	480							**	
07A(iii) No. of local people given access to new cultural opportunities / facilities	0	1150	808							**	
8A No. of voluntary organisations supported	0	20	18							**	
8A(ii) No. of community groups supported, in part or wholly, from the Challenge Fund	0	30	28							**	
08C No. of individuals employed in voluntary work	0	22	22							**	
08E No. of community enterprise start ups	0	0	0							**	
12A(iii) Temporary Jobs Created	0	2	2							**	
12A(x) Bengali Disability Awareness Day	0	1	0							**	
14A(ii) Mothers & Toddlers Open Day	0	89	70					**		**	

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

It is not known where the 'outputs' of this 'project' came from. This project is the SRB programme's administration budget and the key indicators of performance tables show that usually the only forecast outputs were annual expenditures (not included here) and the milestones were report submissions to various supervising bodies. Towards the end of the lifetime of the programme, other projects came to be included in the milestones, like the publication of 'Stepney Voice' or 'Stepney Outreach and Information' or the very valuable reports commissioned from Professor Peter Ambrose. However, none of the produced outputs appears to have been officially included in the forecasts. The total forecast expenditure was £655,850 (our estimate) and the total actual expenditure was £598,181 (our estimate).

The definition of 'outputs' for central administration is, in any event, a rather unreal notion. The purpose of the administrative activity is to facilitate and support all the work, satisfy accountability to the public and to funding bodies and so on.

We were told, however, that Tower Hamlets staff realised that a much larger proportion of the SRB budget than normal had been allocated for central administration and that it had proved possible to use some hundreds of thousands of pounds for community and social development projects. We assume that it is because these activities were funded from this budget that their 'outputs' are listed here in this slightly arbitrary way.

**Table A2.22 ED1 Business Support**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Benchmark Unit Cost (7)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(ii) No. of jobs safeguarded	9	10	€			0	0	**		111	U
2D No. of businesses advised	51	154	13	69,500	72,548	1363	471	289		302	U
Business Grant Award	21	12	0	15,000	57,450	714	4788	15		57	U

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

Various delivery plans report 3 different schemes under this project:

- ED1(1) 'Business Support', which envisaged the establishment of a 1-stop shop and is the only scheme of the project that remained in operation in year 2.
- ED1(2) 'Computer Training', probably for local business employees, which also attracted an extra £14,500 of other/EU funding.
- ED1(3) 'Enterprise Development Fund', a grant-awarding scheme which attracted an extra £10,000 of other/EU funding.

Outputs were monitored for the whole project only. For year 1 we only have combined ED1/ED2 forecast costs and outputs whereas actual outputs for year 1 are our own estimates based on a handwritten table aggregating all the outputs of year 1 from all Economic Development projects. We split those between projects and schemes based on the ratio of their actual expenditure for the year. We assumed the 'primary' output for ED1(1, 2) was the number of businesses advised whereas the Business Grant Awards were assumed to be the output of ED1(3). Based on those assumptions we estimated that ED1(2,3) were more effective and more efficient than expected, notwithstanding the fact that unexpected other/EU funding has replaced SRB funds hence expected and actual costs almost coincide. ED1(3) has spent much more money than initially forecast and appears to have resulted in less and bigger grants instead of the numerous smaller ones forecasted. It is not known whether this reflects a change in the scope of the scheme.. The source of the extra funding of ED1(3) will determine whether any 'deadweight' occurred. If it is other SRB money then it is almost certain that all three schemes would not have gone on without the SRB, therefore none of the outputs would have resulted. However, displacement might conceivably have occurred, insofar as businesses assisted did gain an advantage against other similar businesses in the area which did not benefit.

**Table A2.23 ED2 Enterprise Skills**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Benchmark Unit Cost (7)	Effness % (2/1)	Add'ty
1E No. of training weeks	18	34	0		**	0	**	**		189	U
1G No. of people entering self employment	3	3	0							100	U
2A No. of new businesses start ups	7	7	0							100	U
2D No. of businesses advised	0	31	7							**	U
People Received Advice & Training	36	36	21					**		100	U

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

This project was combined with ED1 as far as year 1 forecast expenditure and outputs are concerned whereas actual outputs for year 1 are our own estimates based on a handwritten table aggregating all the outputs of year 1 from all Economic Development projects. It included 2 schemes:

- ED2(1) 'Enterprise Skills' aimed at assisting people into self-employment. Audit reports and SRB delivery plans give a total estimated SRB expenditure of £34,500 for ED2(1), matched by another £14,500 of other public/EU money, £49,000 in total
- ED2 (2) 'Women's Enterprise' which was allocated £6,000 and attracted another £6,000 of other public/EU money.

Because of the monitoring methods used it is impossible to allocate outputs to schemes and costs. Total expenditure for ED1 was £59,111 against £40,500 forecast due to the extra funding available. A £1,889 shortfall occurred in ED1(1) for year 1. It is almost certain that all three schemes would not have gone on without the SRB, therefore none of the outputs would have resulted. However, displacement might have occurred, insofar as people assisted did gain an advantage against others in the area or elsewhere who did not benefit.

**Table A2.24 ED3 Commercial Property**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Effness % (2/1)	Add'ty
Trader Associations Supported	1	0	0	15,000	15,000	15,000	**	**	0	I

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

The aim of this programme was to set up a Traders' Association. It is not known whether it was successful in that or not. Expected expenditure was split between year 1 and year 2, with the first year being devoted to feasibility study/consultation and the second to implementation. Actual expenditure comes from year 7 delivery plan and it appears as a sum in year 1 only.

**Table A2.25 ED5 Employment & Enterprise Initiative**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
1E No. of training weeks	24	16	0	10,000	10,000	417	625	67	67	U

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

This project appears as 'Childcare Subsidy' in the milestones table of year 1 delivery plan but is not included in the outputs table for ED programmes. As a result it is not possible to find the allocated budget or measure efficiency or effectiveness. It was supposed to be a grant payment initiative and the actual expenditure is £3,500 but no outputs are recorded for it anywhere. ED5 re-appears in year 2 delivery plan as a training programme for young men and women to assist individuals into self-employment. The budget for this was £10,000 and it appears to have cost more and produced less than anticipated. No deadweight seems likely, but some displacement is likely to the extent that certain individuals who benefited might have done so at the expense of others equally deprived.

**Table A2.26 ED7 Project Reserve**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Benchmark Unit Cost (7)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(ii) No. of jobs safeguarded		2	0				0	**		0	U
1E No. of training weeks		6	0							0	U
2A No. of new businesses start ups		1	0					**		0	U

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

This project appears in year 3 delivery plan and it seems to have been an attempt to identify new projects for future implementation. Its budget was £20,000 and the actual expenditure was £19,450. No outputs were measured by the CSSRB monitoring system and it is not exactly clear what this provision was for.

**Table A2.27 ED8 Community Businesses**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Minority Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	12	0	0						0	U
01A(ii) No. of jobs safeguarded	4	5	3						125	U
1E No. of training weeks	28	8	0						29	U
08E No. of community enterprise start ups	2	4	2	60,000	94,913	30,000	23728	126	200	U

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

This project aimed at establishing Community Businesses through identification of opportunities and appropriate training. Therefore we will consider 08E as the 'primary' indicator and we will allocate all the spending to that in order to measure efficiency and effectiveness. The project was supposed to be the main economic development initiative of the SRB and, starting from year 3, it was allocated a budget of £30,000 for each year. In the first year of its implementation it attracted £36,000 of other public money. At first sight the expenditure appears to have been efficiently and effectively allocated, more start-ups have been created, with less cost per start-up and less need for training weeks than expected. The only failing seems to have been its failure to create permanent full time jobs, raising questions on the sustainability of the project's outcomes. Maybe because of this it was aborted in year 5. The source of extra funding would have to be identified in order to determine whether any of the outputs would have resulted anyway. It seems likely that some displacement has occurred to the extent that certain individuals who benefited might have done so to the expense of others equally deprived particularly if the enterprises that were started-up are now competing with existing businesses in the area.

#### *Health and Community Development*

All the projects in this category suffer from extremely poor monitoring for SRB year1 (1995/96) hence most of the data used are our own estimates or interpretations of disparate pieces of information. For this reason measurements of effectiveness and efficiency should be treated with some caution. In some cases it is not known whether under-performance or over-achievement for that year is caused by problems with the project.

Table A2.28 HC1A Community Health &amp; Development Team

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Effness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	2	4.9	3.8						245	H
01A(ii) No. of jobs safeguarded	4	4.8	3.8						120	H
01C - No. of people trained obtaining qualifications	2	14	14						700	H
01E No. of training weeks	45	310.2	3.5						689	H
01G No. of people entering self-employment	0	1	1						**	H
1I No. from disadvantaged groups being targeted who obtain a job	0	1	1						**	H
1J No. of young people benefiting from projects to promote personal & social development	510	1158	954						227	H
5A(i) Beneficiaries of Comm. Safety Initiatives: Total number of persons	0	120	100						**	H
5C No. of community safety Initiatives	0	1	0						**	H
07A(i) No. of local people given access to new health opportunities / facilities	1845	2842	2018						154	H
07A(ii) No. of local people given access to new sports opportunities / facilities	0	25	25						**	H
07A(iii) No. of local people given access to new cultural opportunities / facilities	0	15	0						**	H
7B(vi) No. of community cultural facilities improved	0	1	1						**	H
8A - No. of voluntary organisations supported	0	17	11						**	H
8C No. of individuals employed in voluntary work	23	76	71						330	H
13(i) - Swimming Class	36	50	0						139	H
13(ii) - Self-help Group Sessions	0	109	79						**	H
13(iii) - Sewing Classes	0	45	0						**	H
13(iv) - No. of hours crèche facilities provided	0	262	24						**	H
13(v) - Case work Referrals	0	110	93						**	H
13(vi) - One stop health shop session	0	41	11						**	H
13(vii) - Referral to ESOL classes	0	11	6						**	H
13(xix) - No. of parents information session	4	23	0						575	H
13(xvii) - No. of women's health sessions	28	45	0						161	H
13(xviii) - No. of men's health sessions	7	12	0						171	H
Start of food co-op	0	1	0						**	H
Start of sewing classes	0	1	0						**	H

Start of women's swimming club	0	1	0	**	H
Numbers Attending summer initiatives	0	330	200	**	H
Ocean Est & Limehouse T.A. Open day	0	55	6	**	H
Dame Colet Open afternoon-women's Health day	0	40	40	**	H
School seminar-Racial Harassment	0	46	46	**	H
No. attending EID Party to promote women's Health day	0	105	105	**	H
No. of participant women Befriending Training Scheme	0	5	5	**	H
Startup of one stop Health shop	0	1	0	**	H
No. of cases Domestic Violence case work	0	2	2	**	H
No. of cases Racial Harassment case work	0	1	1	**	H
Referral case work/ support	0	11	11	**	H
Home Safety Audits	50	5	0	**	10 H

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

This project was planned, at the bid, to be 2 separate programmes HC1 'Local Health Promotion' and HC2 'Accident Prevention'. The amalgamation of the two, named HC1A, was a voluntary sector project which comprised many different schemes and initiatives and whose steering group was chaired by a local authority representative. It combined elements of both original projects in an effort to 'secure health gains for local people'. There was also a conscious attempt to link the resources of this project, particularly staff, with those of other projects: HC3, HC6, HC10, HC8A.

Because of the variety of schemes and the wealth of forecast and unforeseen outputs which are however monitored at an aggregate, project, level it is not possible to calculate unit costs. In total, based on yearly delivery plans, the project had an expected cost of £258,000 and the actual expenditure was £239,342, or 92.8% of the expected. This is mainly due to underspending in year 1, caused by delays in setting up implementation mechanisms and hiring staff. However, with the exception of significantly fewer than expected 'Home Safety Audits' it appears to have achieved much more than expected, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The list of unforeseen outputs, as recorded by the CSSRB monitoring team, is indicative of the project's breadth and ultimately of its success. After 1999/00 it was merged with HC6 to form HC12.

Only £7,000 were allocated from non-SRB, LBTH resources, therefore any substitution is minimal. It is almost certain that none of these outputs would have been produced without the SRB. Displacement however might have occurred insofar as certain individuals whose employability has benefited might have done so at the expense of others equally deprived. The number of those concerned is quite small and the effect would be minimal.

**Table A2.29 HC3 GP Leisure Prescription**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	0	1.3	0.6			**	0	**	**	H
01A(ii) No. of jobs safeguarded	1.6	1.6	1.6						100	H
01E No. of training weeks	2.5	15	0.4						600	H
1J No. of young people benefitting from projects to promote personal & social development	0	171	135						**	H
1G - No. of unemployed people entering self employment	0	2	1						**	H
5A(i) Community Safety Initiatives: total number of persons	0	33	33						**	H
5A(ii) Benefitting from Community Safety Initiatives: of which are aged 60+	0	15	15						**	H
5A(iii) Benefitting from Community Safety Initiatives: of whom are women	0	18	18						**	H
07A(i) No. of local people given access to new health opportunities/ facilities	800	531	125						66	H
07A(ii) No. of local people given access to new sports opportunities/ facilities	0	57	20						**	H
07A(iii) No. of local people given access to new cultural opportunities/ facilities	0	10	8						**	H
7B(i) No.using improved health facilities	0	69	35						**	H
7B(ii) No.using improved sports facilities	0	18	5						**	H
7B(iv) No. of community health facilities improved	3	6	0						200	H
7B(v) No. of community sports facilities improved	3	4	2						133	H
8C No. of individuals employed in voluntary work	0	4	1						**	H
13(viii) - No. of outside referrals made to GP leisure prescriptions	0	4	1						**	H
13(xiv) - Healthy eating and nutrition advice	0	3	3						**	H
13(xv) - Stress counselling and support	0	6	3						**	H
No. of Crèche places provided	0	31	0						**	H
No. of Create provided for exercise classes	0	4	0					**	**	H

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

This scheme originally aimed at enabling GPs to promote healthier lifestyles by prescribing appropriate exercise or leisure activities to individuals. It produced a wealth of outputs, most of them unexpected. The 'key output' is 07A(i) 'Local people given access to new health opportunities' which appears to have been slightly underachieved. To that we should add 07A(ii) and 07A(iii) since these are also instrumental to what the projects was trying to achieve. If those three are added together and compared to the original forecast then effectiveness rises to 74.7%. This shortfall is due to delays in funding allocation and staff appointments in 1995/96 but the programme picked up thereafter.

Forecast cost was £55,500 including £6,000 from LBTH funds. Actual cost was £59,677 particularly due to slight overspending in the last year of the project, 1997/98. Since contribution from the LBTH is only 10%, additionality must be high: without the SRB, most of the outcomes would not have occurred.

**Table A2.30 HC4 Health Gain in Housing**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(ii) No. of jobs safeguarded	0	2	0					**	**	H
01E No. of training weeks	41	3	0						7	H
01F(i) No. of trained people obtaining jobs	0	1	0						**	H
8C No. of individuals employed in voluntary work	0	1	0						**	H
14A(iii) - No. of survey(s)	1	2	0					**	200	H

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

This project is part of the in-built evaluation attempt of the whole SRB. The other part was funded under A1. This project resulted in the baseline study of the 'Ambrose reports' that highlighted the health benefits new housing brought to the community but also the extra costs that came with it. Total expected SRB expenditure was £90,000 but another £15,000 were attracted from private sources (probably HAs) and £11,000 from other public sources, bringing the total amount to £116,000 all of which was spent. There is not much point in discussing outputs further; year 1 outputs have not been added since they are very unreliable, but it is worth comparing the budget of this project to the budget of the current Final Evaluation which costs about one sixth but has to deal with the whole SRB instead of just one element of it.

**Table A2.31 HC5 Promoting Health in Schools**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01E No. of training weeks	15	16	5.4						107	U
1J No. of young people benefitting from projects to promote personal & social development	2110	1870	1253	32,000	31,992	15	17	89	89	U
8A - No. of voluntary organisations supported	21	17	12						81	U

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

Promoting Health in Schools aimed at increasing health awareness through training courses and other community activities at three local primary schools and the local secondary school. Year 1 was probably plagued by the same difficulties in setting up delivery arrangements that all HC projects faced, hence the reduced effectiveness of the project. The expected expenditure was £32,000 and £31,992 was actually spent; however half the budget for this programme (£16,000) came from LBTH resources. This means that displacement and substitution effects are very likely, although it is not certain what the net balance is.

**Table A2.32 HC6 Parents in Primary Schools**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty	
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	2.1	4.1	3				0	0	**	195	U
01A(ii) No. of jobs safeguarded	8.5	20.68	17.4							243	U
01B No. of pupils benefiting from projects designed to enhance/improve attainment	0	196	0							**	U
01E No. of training weeks	719.8	1207.7	35							168	U
01F(i) No. of trained people obtaining jobs	0	1	1							**	U
01F(ii) No. of these who were formerly unemployed	0	1	1							**	U
01H No. of ethnic minority pupils improving ESOL attainment	204	580	113							284	U
07A(i) No. of local people given access to new health opportunities/facilities	465	1433	1350							308	U
7B(i) No.using improved health facilities	0	467	0							**	U
10A No. of childcare places provided	104	236	0							227	U
13(ix) - No. of Children attending parent & toddlers group and visited at home	0	111	111							**	U
13(x) - No. of Children attending toy library facilities	120	501	501							418	U
13(xi) - No. of Crèches set up	0	1	0							**	U
13(xii) - No. of new toy library set up	0	4	0							**	U
13(xiii) - No. of children visited at home	105	235	235							224	U
13(xiv) - No. of parents visited at home	105	218	218							208	U
14A(i) - No. of children attending parent and toddlers group	36	111	111							308	U
New project set up	0	12	0							**	U
Parents book club planning	0	1	0						**	**	U

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

Originally, this project was based on the model developed through a Bethnal Green City Challenge project but then it became so successful itself that it served as a model for a borough-wide *SureStart* initiative. Its aim was to simultaneously improve the English language skills and the Health and Education awareness of the participants through combined training courses. All effectiveness and efficiency measures show the overwhelming success of HC6 and surveys run by the project show that more than 90% of the participants (Bangladeshi women) enjoyed the courses and felt their language skills and health knowledge have improved.

It is rather difficult to estimate what the expected cost was. According to information from the delivery plans it was £150,975 out of which only £51,000 were expected SRB money and the rest was to be LBTH money. However, final expenditure was £122,467 out of which £50,992 were SRB money and only £71,475 were LBTH funds. Although the benefits of the project and its success should not be underestimated, it is

likely that less than half of the outputs can be attributed to the SRB and likely that the project have gone on without the SRB, albeit at a reduced scale. Seen in that light, it cannot be claimed that the project caused displacement or substitution but rather that it enhanced opportunities in the area. Due to the multiplicity of 'primary' outputs and outputs in general and the great variety of schemes carried out under the project, it is not possible to calculate unit costs.

**Table A2.33 HC7 Youth & Health Peer Education (CD4 after yr 3)**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Effness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	0	0.1	0						**	M
01E No. of training weeks	897.2	25.2	0						3	M
01J No. of young people benefitting from projects to promote personal & social development	1446	865	397	22,000	27,432	15	32	48	60	M
08A - No. of voluntary organisations supported	0	4	3						**	M

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

The project was aiming at providing sexual and drug related health education and advice to 15-21 year-olds. We considered 01J as the 'key' output and used it to calculate unit costs. Poor efficiency and effectiveness might be attributable to poor monitoring during the first year of the project (1995/96). Almost a third of the project's expenditure (£11,000 out of £27,432) came from the LBTH. It is not known whether this re-allocation of resources caused problems to other non-SRB projects, it is certainly an indication that some of these outputs would have been achieved anyway under a different scheme. The project was incorporated into CD4 after year 3 (1997/98).

**Table A2.34 HC8A Primary Interactive Project**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Effness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created		0.2	0.2						100	L
01E No. of training weeks		6	6						100	L
01J No. of young people benefitting from projects to promote personal & social development	300	100	80	44,750	48,750	149	488	31	33	L

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

Aiming at drug education of primary school children, this was originally merged with HC8B but appears separately after SRB year 2. No outputs are recorded for year 1, so were based on our own estimates and this may partially account for poor effectiveness and efficiency estimates, although even without our estimates the figures remain very poor. This is another case of allocating SRB resources to a pre-existing

initiative. Of the £48,750 actually spent, only £7,500 came from the SRB. The project would probably have gone on even without the SRB. It is hard to judge whether the SRB money was well spent from the data available.

**Table A2.35 HC8B Project Charlie**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01E No. of training weeks	47.4	30.8	1.2						65	L
1J No. of young people benefitting from projects to promote personal & social development	760	540	160	16,355	14,855	22	28	78	71	L
8A - No. of voluntary organisations supported	8	2	0						25	L
8C No. of individuals employed in voluntary work	8	0	0						0	L

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

The second part of HC8 was aiming at drug education of slightly older children than HC8A. The project was pre-existing and the SRB was seen as an opportunity to extend it to central Stepney. Delivery was transferred to the Education Authority after the first year and the project ceased to be an SRB project, mainly because it faced problems adapting to the cultural particularities of the target population. Out of the £14,855 spent, only £1,500 were SRB funds.

**Table A2.36 HC10 Community Capacity Building**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created		0	0.3						**	M
01A(ii) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs safeguarded		0	0.3						**	M
01D No. of residents of target areas accessing employment through training advice or specifically targeted assistance		6	3						50	M
01E No. of training weeks		0	6.5						**	M
07A(i) No. of local people given access to new health opportunities/ facilities	240	927	268						386	M
07A(ii) No. of local people given access to new sports opportunities/ facilities		0	3						**	M
08A No. of voluntary organisations supported	16	60	12	127,000	129,920	7938	2165	367	375	M
08A(i) - No. of voluntary organisations supported, in part or wholly, from Challenge Fund		0	2						**	M
08C No. of individuals employed in voluntary work	24	42	19						175	M
Special training for tenants around Stepney Charter		0	1						**	M
Creation of Central Stepney Speaks		0	1					**	**	M

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

HC10 intended to increase 'social capital' in the area by providing training to community and voluntary organisations in the area, for that reason it appears to be very strongly linked to the aims of the SRB. There is not much point in measuring unit costs in projects of such nature, neither is there much point in measuring unit costs with such qualitative outputs. However if we use indicator 08A as a measure of efficiency and effectiveness then the project appears to be extremely successful. The total expected cost was £127,000 and the actual £129,920 with £44,600 coming from LBTH and £8,000 from private funding, probably the contractors.

Given the amount of non-SRB funding devoted to this project there is certainly a case to be made for probable substitution whereas displacement might have occurred insofar as voluntary organisations that benefited might have done so to the expense of other organisations in the area who are also in need.

Interestingly, the project was closed down after 'it failed to achieve its objectives' but, compared to the indicators above, that statement from year 3 delivery plan clearly signifies either a lack of appropriate measurement or a lack of proper definition of the objectives of the project. The remaining planned expenditure was transferred to CD5. (Our figures do not reflect that transfer because we are working on per-year forecasts and not on forecasts made at the beginning of the SRB; hence such variations between initial assessments and final expenditure are not taken into account.)

**Table A2.37 HC12 Community Health Project**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	1	3	3			0	0	**	300	H
01A(ii) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs safeguarded	1	5	5						500	H
01C(i) - No. of people resident in target area who obtain a qualification on completing formal training	6	15	15						250	H
01C(ii) - No. of people trained obtaining other qualifications	45	46	37						102	H
01E No. of training weeks	55	72.9	0						133	H
01F(ii) - No. of people trained who obtain permanent jobs who were formerly unemployed	5	5	5						100	H
01J No. of young people benefitting from projects to promote personal & social development	130	246	246						189	H
07A(i) No. of local people given access to new health opportunities/ facilities	660	2243	2194						340	H
08C No. of individuals employed in voluntary work	55	68	68						124	H
13(vi) - One stop Health shop session	0	11	0						**	H
13(xvii) - No. of women's health sessions	0	31	0						**	H
14A(iv) - Math club	0	12	0						**	H
14A(v) - Men's swimming class	0	37	0						**	H
14A(vi) - Women's swimming class	0	56	0						**	H
14A(vii) - Women's empowerment sessions	0	12	0						**	H
14A(x) - Women's support group & toy library	0	50	0						**	H
14A(xi) - No. attended Women's support group & toy library	0	65	65						**	H
14A(xii) - Food co-operative sessions	0	39	0						**	H
14A(xiii) - No. attended Women's empowerment sessions	0	17	17					**	**	H

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

The last health project in the SRB is an amalgamation of HC1A and HC6 after year 5 (1999/00). This probably related to HC6 transforming to 'SureStart' so for all intents and purposes this project should be regarded as the 'SureStart' project for central Stepney. As such it included a great variety of schemes producing various types of outputs, for which is impossible to estimate unit costs since monitoring of costs and outputs is done at the project level. With time HC12 became closely linked to CD1 and CD4 in an attempt to provide a more integrated approach in advising women and youngsters.

Substantial amounts of EU funding were allocated to this project as well. The forecast budget of the project was £270,000 with the EU contributing £115,000. In reality £245,000 were spent because EU contributions for the year 1999/00 were £15,000 instead of £40,000. The comments made for HC1A and HC6 apply here as well as far as additionality, substitution and displacement are concerned. Attracting EU

money probably ensured that additionality was maximised and substitution and displacement were minimised. In fact, attracting EU money released LBTH funds that were previously channeled to HC6.

### *Community Development*

As with all projects that deliver non-physical outputs but have strong impacts it is very difficult to calculate actual benefits based on output indicators and unit costs. Capacity building is a long term process and the full benefits of having community organisations with increased ability to bid for funds or run and manage projects are nearly impossible to quantify. Measurements of efficiency and effectiveness may therefore be misleading as to the actual 'value' of such projects.

**Table A2.38 CD1 Community Advice & Advocacy Service**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(ii) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs safeguarded	7.9	12.4	12.4						157	H
01E No. of training weeks	36	32.5	0						90	H
01F(i) - No. of people who obtain permanent jobs	2	4	4						200	H
01F(ii) - No. of people trained who obtain permanent jobs who were formerly unemployed	2	3	3						150	H
08C No. of individuals employed in voluntary work	52	74.5	74.5						143	H
14(i) - No. of Clients Provided with Advice and Advocacy	18800	20331	19363	213,750	230,594	11	11	100	108	H

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

This programme aimed at providing advice and advocacy to the local community through a permanent outlet but also using printed material, new technologies and community activities. The project appears to be highly effective especially in its, secondary, employment outputs and, if we use indicator 14(i) as the primary output to calculate unit costs, it also appears to be very efficient. It provided advice and advocacy to more people than forecast at exactly the forecast cost, £11 per client advised.

It received £85,000 from 'other' sources of funding which we still have not been able to locate. Depending on where the money came from, there might be some substitution and displacement effects but it is doubtful if those particular outputs would have been produced had the SRB not taken place.

**Table A2.39 CD2 Development of Community Access/Resource**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(ii) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs safeguarded	5	6	3.5						120	U
06C No. of building improved and brought back into use	1	0	0						0	U
8A No. of voluntary organisations supported	28	36	24	230,539	263,472	8234	7319	113	129	U
01E No. of training weeks	3	4.5	0						150	U
08A(ii) No. of community groups supported, in part or wholly, from the Challenge Fund	1	2	1						200	U
08F No. of capacity building initiatives carried out	2	2	0						100	U

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

This project involved the establishment of a 'Community Resource Centre' in a refurbished building to act as a capacity building centre for voluntary organisations. The project did not create the centre but, if we use 08A(ii) as a 'primary' output then this appears to be a highly efficient project that delivered the other outputs it was supposed to deliver and even more. It is not known however what the qualitative outcomes of the project were.

The project received £170,472 from 'other' unspecified sources out of a total of £230,539 spent. Depending on where the money came from, there might be some substitution and displacement effects and no comments can be made on existence of deadweight.

**Table A2.40 CD4 Youth Focus**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	1	3.8	2.8						380	M
01A(ii) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs safeguarded	14.7	13.35	11.85						91	M
01E No. of training weeks	101	11	0						11	M
01J No. of young people benefitting from projects to promote personal and social development	1710	3032	2797	701,700	552,400	410	182	225	177	M
07B(vi) No. of community cultural facilities improved	1	0	0						0	M
12A(iii) Temporary Jobs Created	0	0.6	0.6						**	M
12A(xii) CDA Training Session	0	5	0						**	M

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

The largest CD project, in terms of expenditure at least, 'Youth Focus' aimed at providing advice and guidance to youngsters and their parents on a variety of topics (i.e. drugs, computers & the internet etc.) both standalone but also in collaboration with HC projects. In fact HC7 was

merged with CD4 after 1998/99. Strangely, it appears to have achieved significantly more as far as the 'primary' output is concerned (01J) while at the same time it provided 1/10 of the training weeks envisaged. Of a total £552,400 that the project cost, £166,400 came from the LBTH, £22,000 from the EU and £180,000 from other organisations like Bridge House and Hailey Trusts. Although the SRB probably has to take credit for bringing all these resources together it is hardly the case that this money would not have produced outputs if spent otherwise. It is hard to evaluate this project without deeper study.

**Table A2.41 CD5 Stepney Community Development Trust**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	2	1	1						50	I
01A(ii) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs safeguarded	2	0	0						0	I
01E No. of training weeks	0	0	0						**	I
01J No. of young people benefitting from projects to promote personal and social development	0	0	0						**	I
06A Hectares of land improved / reclaimed for open spaces	0.5	0.25	0						50	I
8A No. of voluntary organisations supported	40	77	42						193	I
08C No. of individuals employed in voluntary work	20	14	6						70	I
12A(iii) Temporary Jobs Created	2	4	2						200	I
12A(xii) CDA Training Session	0	0	0						**	I
13(xvi) - No. of community development trust created	1	0	0	192,500	170,783	192,500	**		0	I
14(iii) Master. /business Plan	1	1	0						100	I
14(iv) Community conference	1	1	0						100	I
14(v) Communication Strategy	1	1	0					**	100	I

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

The Community Development Trust was the major element of the whole SRBs exit strategy, at least as far as non-housing elements are concerned. The project aimed at creating a Trust, endowed with revenue-creating assets, which would act as an umbrella organisation, providing support and funding to voluntary and community organisations in Central Stepney. Although it achieved better than expected results in terms of its secondary outputs, it failed so far to generate an enduring Trust. It has a rather uncertain future given the NDC policy towards it. Termination of its operations however would mean that the sustainability of many of the achievements of the SRB would be put at risk. Additionality is low because the Trust was not established, although some other incidental outputs were recorded.

*Environment and Leisure*

The Environment and Leisure element of the SRB was also a series of projects carried forward into the SRB. It was seriously affected from the budgetary cuts of the SoS and projects EL2-EL6 never materialised. Some of the outcomes of the projects were subject to vandalism from the year they were completed.

**Table A2.42 EL1 Shandy Park Improvements**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
06A Hectares of land improved/reclaimed for open spaces	1.6	1.665	0						104	M
7B(ii) No.using improved sports facilities	15000	15000	6300	254,000	264,000	17	18	96	100	M
7B(v) No. of community sports facilities improved	2	2	0						100	M

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

Improvements of Shandy Park eventually cost £268,000 instead of a forecast £254,000 but only £100,000 were SRB money. The rest came from the LBTH (£64,000) and 'other' un-named sources (£100,000). It would make more sense to be able to calculate unit costs for each individual output, but in any case, even if we take 7B(ii) as a 'primary' output then the project appears to be rather efficient and effective.

**Table A2.43 EL7 History Walk**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
7A(iii) No. of local people given access to new cultural opportunities/facilities	45000	15000	7500	19,000	8,603	0.4	0.6	74	33	M
7A(iv) No. of new health facilities		2	0	0					0	M
7A(vi) No. of new cultural facilities		1	0	0					0	M

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

Problems riddled EL7 from year 1. Problems with research and with property owners whose buildings had signs attached, meant that it had to change focus and finally led to scaling-down the project. It is not known whether the project would have gone on without the SRB, probably it would have at a smaller scale. An amount of £3,000 was contributed by the LBTH.

**Table A2.44 EL 8 'Ragged School Museum (Phase 1)**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
01A(i) No. of f.t.e. permanent jobs created	0.5	0	0			0	**	**	0	L
6C Number of buildings improved and brought back into use	2	1	0						50	L
7B(vi) Number of community cultural facilities improved	2	1	0						50	L

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

This project cost £200,000 in total, to which the SRB planned to, and did, contribute £50,000 only. It is quite probable that it would have gone on without the SRB but unfortunately we were not able to find what the total forecast costs were and compare them with the actual. Given the nature of the project, a living museum of the Victorian East End, it would be rather inappropriate to measure efficiency and effectiveness with the use of any of the indicators available. It is a strong focus of voluntary activity and much used by schools and passers-by. The project is a lively note in an otherwise underused canalside and its success and 'value for money' requires a separate study that would be able to estimate a different set of indicators and incorporate a series of qualitative aspects of the project.

**Table A2.45 EL9 Trim Trail, Mile End Park**

Output description	Expected Outputs (1)	Actual output (2)	Ethnic Actual Output	Expected cost (3)	Actual cost (4)	Expected unit cost (3/1=5)	Actual unit cost (4/2=6)	Internal efficiency (5/6)	Eff'ness % (2/1)	Add'ty
06A Hectares of land improved/reclaimed for open spaces	8	8	0						100	
7A(ii) Number of local people given access to new sport opportunities/ facilities	15000	15000	0	27,000	30,000	1.8	2.0	90	100	
7A(v) Number of new sports facilities	1	1	0						100	

Source: CSSRB Monitoring Archives, SRB Delivery Plans, Own estimates

Only half of the total cost of this project came from the SRB, which was slightly over budget. It provided a trim trail in Mile End Park, to be used by the Central Stepney community and others. Some local people feel (rather inexplicably to us) that the park is not very accessible to the SRB area. There have also been maintenance and vandalism problems.

*What synergy and added value has been secured from linking with other initiatives such as EU Programmes, NDC and other SRBs?*

#### EU programmes

The projects that received EU funding according to the delivery plans are shown in table A2.46. The following projects were involved:

- A1 'Central Administration and Management'
- ED1(2) 'Computer Training',

ED1(3) 'Enterprise Development Fund'  
 ED2(1) 'Enterprise Skills'  
 ED2 (2) 'Women's Enterprise'  
 HC12 'Community Health Project'  
 CD4 'Youth Focus'

**Table A2.46 EU contributions to SRB-supported activities,**

Project	1995/96		1996/97		1997/98		1998/99		1999/00		2000/01		2001/02*	
	forecast	actual												
A1	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	0	0	0	40000	11000	40000	15000	18000	18000
ED1(2)	0	14500	-	-	-	-	-	-						
ED1(3)	0	10000	-	-	-	-	-	-						
ED2(1)	0	14500	-	-	-	-	-	-						
ED2(2)	0	6000	-	-	-	-	-	-						
HC12	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	40000	15000	30000	30000	45000	45000
CD4	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	0	0	0	85000	0	20000	22000	0	0

Source: CSSRB Delivery Plans. Forecast (f) and Actual (a) figures are shown. n/a = not applicable

\*No actual figures for this year, based on delivery plan year 7.

In addition to those listed above, a number of SHADA initiatives drew in EU funding, including the re-equipment of the LIFRA kitchen, an outreach project on the Ocean Estate and a capacity building project.

**Table A2.47 EU funding for SHADA projects**

Name	Ocean Marketing and Development Strategy	Capacity Building	LIFRA Kitchen
<b>capital or revenue</b>	revenue	capital and revenue	capital
<b>description, aims and results</b>	important capacity building exercise for TRA. Employ worker + develop marketing strategy based on outreach. All outputs achieved. Equipped TRA to bid for core NDC funding for other projects. Expenditure less than planned because of slow start	office extension done. 5 comm'ty enterprises helped 1 FTE job created 5 jobs safeguarded (including those of welfare advice workers and a caretaker).	refurbished to professional level, with St Dunstan's Bengali Resource Centre's meals on wheels among users; cafe failed when contractors left
<b>date of completion</b>	practical 31 12 00 financial 31 3 01	practical 31 12 00 financial 31 12 00	- -
<b>outputs</b>	groups helped (5 <sup>10</sup> )> 5 new jobs (1)>1 temp jobs (4)>10	comm'ty enterprises helped (5)>5 new jobs (1)>1 safeguarded jobs (2)>2 new premises (30 m2)>30 m2	new jobs (3)>3 safeguarded jobs (1)>1 temp jobs (3)>3 comm'ty enterprises helped (3)>3 premises (20 m2)>20 m2
<b>grant approved</b>	15,000 (50%)	10,000 (50%)	32,500 (50%)
<b>total spend</b>	17,813	19,614	65,000
<b>grant claimed</b>	8,906	9,807	32,500
<b>matching funds</b>	4407 LA (in kind) 4500 other public (in kind)	9807 LA (money)	25,000 LA (money) 4,117 LA (in kind) (doesn't add up: 3383 missing)

Sources:

- LBTH (2002) European Regional Development Fund: Claim for Grant Payment/Progress Report Project Name: Renovation/Refurbishment of Main Kitchen in Lifra Hall Project Reference: ERDF 99030
- LBTH (2002) European Regional Development Fund: Claim for Grant Payment/Progress Report Project Name: Capacity Building Project/Lifra Project Reference: ERDF 97/414/05
- LBTH (2001) European Regional Development Fund: Claim for Grant Payment/Progress Report Project Name: Ocean Marketing and Development Strategy Project Reference: ERDF 990283.3.2 Other synergy

Further synergies were achieved by employing resources gained under the section 106 agreements. These are detailed in table 3.3.3, below:

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<sup>10</sup> Numbers in brackets across this row are original forecast outputs. The other numbers are outputs achieved.

**Table A2.48 Funding secured under section 106 agreements**

Project	Amount	Administered by/ spent under
Refurbishment of Dame Colet House	£ 150,000	All this money was administered by 'regeneration' under OB2 – Pathways <sup>11</sup> –
Improvements to LIFFRA Hall	£ 35,000	All this money was administered by 'regeneration' under OB2 – Pathways
Improvement of Stepping Stones Farm	£ 35,000	All this money was administered by 'regeneration' under OB2 – Pathways
• Community Economic Development Fund – Central Stepney £	£ 29,000	All this money was administered by 'regeneration' under OB2 – Pathways
Refurbishment of Haileybury Centre (Youth Action Scheme Project)	£ 35,000	All this money was administered by 'regeneration' under OB2 – Pathways
Improvement of Shandy Park	£ 7,894	All this money was administered by 'regeneration' under SRB2
Grant to White Horse Road Adventure Playground	£ 11,256	Administered by Planning Department
Grant to improve St Dunstan's Church	£ 49,151	Administered by Planning Department
Tree-planting	£ 75,000	no data

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<sup>11</sup> This was a ERDF Objective 4 programme

## Appendix B: People interviewed

Special thanks to: Evelyn Williams, SHADA Administrator, Michael Dover and his colleagues who helped with data entry; to Chris Barter, Head of LBTH Regeneration and Patrick Harrison, LBTH Regeneration Projects Manager for the unfettered access they provided to all the CSSRB files and for the workspace and active assistance they made available to the research team.

Apologies to those residents and workers who gave their time for interviews but who are not listed here - either because we never knew their names or because of omissions on our part. Some of those listed as staff of organisations have now moved elsewhere, but they are described here by the names of the jobs they were doing during the SRB.

### SHADA

Ken Bartlett, Board Member  
 Misbaur Khan, Board Member (from SDBCRC)  
 John Gillespie, Board Member (from LIFRA)  
 Jim O'Sullivan, Chief Executive  
 Syed Shuber Ahmed, Re-housing Manager  
 Anne Nelson, Re-housing Visiting Officer  
 Michael Dover, Re-housing Visiting Officer  
 Ezinne Ogbonna, Senior Development Officer  
 John Peters, Tenant Liaison Officer for Waterview House  
 Maher Anjum, Community Economic Development Officer  
 Mark Surtees, Project Manager, Refurbishment  
 Najmin Akhtar, Housing Management Advisor  
 and thanks to Evelyn Williams, Administrator, for all her help.

### Ocean Tenants, Leaseholders and Freeholders Association

Brenda Daley  
 Derek England

### St Dunstan's Bengali Community Resource Centre SDBCRC

Misbaur Khan (above)

### Limehouse Fields Residents' and Leaseholders' Association LIFRA

John Gillespie (above)

### Sure Start

Sabes Suganasabesan

**London Development Agency (LDA)**

Anne Seymour (previously at the Government Office for London, GOL)

**LBTH Council staff and elected members**

Michael Keith, Cabinet Member for Regeneration and Community Partnership

Sheila Robinson and Anita Wales, Estate Officers, LBTH Housing

Anwara Ullah, CSSRB Community Development Project Officer

Mark Adams, Regeneration Officer

Steve Inkpen, Senior Housing Officer

Denise Kent, Acting Manager for Social Housing Group

Jan Bros, Principal Development Officer

Faisal Ahmed, SRB Monitoring Manager

Patrick Harrison, Regeneration Projects Manager

Abdul Muktadir, Finance Department

Paul Grimaldi, Energy Efficiency Unit

**Circle 33**

Jules Bickers, Deputy Director

Alistair Jones, Technical Manager

Frank Pawlowski, Contracts Manager

**Bethnal Green and Victoria Park HA**

Lillalee Wright, Head of Development

Madeleine Glaisher, Deputy Chief Executive

Phil Hissey, Community Development Worker

Shireen Ahmed, Senior Housing Officer

**Second Site Properties**

Keith Johnson

**Laing Partnership**

Yasheen Parkar, Development Manager

**PRP Architects**

Simon Wood, Project Leader for construction

**Frost Associates**

Cliff Moore, Partner

**Half Moon Theatre**

Chris Elwell

**Walker Management**

Peter Smith, Director

**Higgins Construction**

Bryan Sabin, Director

**Bellway Homes**

Roger Bond, Technical Director

**Levitt Bernstein Associates**

Patrick Hammill, Divisional Director for Regeneration

**Limehouse Project**

Farida Yasmin

## Appendix C: Aims and Objectives in SRB evaluation

### *Introduction*

This Appendix specifically deals with aim (i) of our Terms of Reference "To assess to what extent the SRB [apart from its Borough-wide education components] has met its seven strategic objectives". In order to do that literally and precisely, we would firstly need to verify the SRB objectives and projects and their relationship to each other. Secondly, the internal coherence of the SRB programme would have to be checked. Thirdly, the programme inputs (principally the spending of money) would have to be matched with the projects so that we could evaluate the coherence of funding allocation with the objectives.

To do all this completely would have been impossible and/or very costly and this Appendix explains why.


The Central Stepney SRB has a very particular history of changing objectives (i.e. between the bid and the year 1 delivery plan) as well as introducing new projects (i.e. Community Development projects on year 3) or dropping others completely (for example, projects EL2-EL6). As a result of that history it is very difficult to establish a baseline against which the success of the programme could be measured. For our purposes we will briefly analyse the *goals, objectives and projects* (= measures) of the bid then analyse delivery plans (mainly the 2001/02 delivery plan), which incorporate all the changes that have occurred since the bid.

### *SRB bid objectives and programmes.*

The final bid that was submitted to the GOL for approval in 1994 did not include any *strategic objectives* as such in the main document. In Ch. 3 para 3.1 it states as its *mission*, the accomplishment of the schemes' two *major goals* through a series of implicit goal 'statements'. However, in the appendices of the bid each element of the scheme was headed by an '*Objective*' which bears some relation to the statements of para 3.1 and is followed by individual projects serving that objective. There is no formal link between the goals and the objectives of the main text and the objectives and projects in the appendices.

The consistency of the bid is not of primary importance given the significant changes that occurred thereafter, especially under the influence of the Masterplan's recommendations. However, the bid is one of the few official documents that refer to the actual needs of the area. These needs are identified in the bid as follows:

- Severe economic and social deprivation
- Negative perception of the area by the local community and business
- Massive housing need and poor quality housing
- Need to link-up the area with existing adjacent regeneration initiatives, in order to exploit the opportunities it presents.



The two goals of the bid are:

- Comprehensive revitalisation of Central Stepney
- Realise the potential of ethnic minority communities and 'at risk' youth throughout the Borough.

Because the goals are so broad it is quite difficult to see immediately what relation they have to the actual needs identified. Therefore, we have to examine how these goals link up to objectives and projects. Figure C1, in which a dotted line arrow indicates an implicit link, is our attempt to make explicit the implicit links between goals and objectives as they appear in the main text of the bid.

It is apparent that the structure of objectives in the bid has some ill-defined linkages between goals and intermediate objectives while links between measures and objectives are missing altogether. Links between same-level objectives are missing, even quite obvious ones like those between '2.4' and '1.2'. Most importantly there are many cases of 'reverse linkage' for example between '1.6' and '1.7.1', where a higher level objective feeds into a lower level objective.

Measures (individual proposed projects) are linked to a different set of objectives, presented in an Appendix to the bid and Table C1 here, which bear some resemblance to the ones in the main document.

The set of objectives in the bid appendix covers similar areas to the ones in the bid document, but with a few consistency problems :

- Two level A intermediate objectives, 1.2 and 1.5 are not linked to any projects and 1.4 is only weakly linked
- Health and Community Development projects are almost exclusively linked to health and have expanded to a Borough-wide scale.

In the bid, Education was allocated £9,023,000, Training £3,483,000, Economic Development £1,657,000, Environment and Leisure £1,390,000, Health and Community Development £1,167,400 whereas Housing was allocated £14,900,000. It has not been possible to compare pre- and post-approval funding profiles for the whole SRB programme because year 1 delivery plan does not include total allocations for all years. We know, however, that the amount granted by the SoS was approximately £28,4 million as opposed to the £31,7 requested. The allocation of funds was further changed as the programme evolved, it would therefore be more interesting to compare bid allocations with the latest expenditure as it appears in 2001/02 delivery plan.

It is rather clear from the bid allocation however that the two top priorities of the bid were Housing and Education & Training. Evaluating the latter (which was a borough-wide activity) is outside our terms of reference. The heavy representation of Housing expenditure, however, does reflect a common realisation by LBTH and the community that poor housing conditions were the most pressing need in the area and a main cause of the other social ills that were identified (negative perceptions, poor health etc). Addressing housing need was also a more 'tangible' goal compared with tackling unemployment or reversing economic decline. Those goals would require considerable local institutional capacity-building and a long-term commitment to the area from all tiers of government.

**Table C1: CSSRB Bid Appendix; objectives and projects.**

<b>Programme Title</b>	<b>Project</b>	<b>Comments</b>
1) Education, Training and Economic development: "To enhance the employment prospects, education and skills of local people, particularly the young and those in disadvantage and encourage sustainable economic growth through business support and advice"	ED1 Business assistance and training.	Education and Training outside ToR. ED Objective roughly linked to 1.1, 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 in Fig C1. ED Projects only linked to 1.1 and 1.3. ED4, involving Railtrack, never materialised.
	ED2 Promote and facilitate business skills.	
	ED3 Commercial Property enhancement fund.	
	ED4 'Limehouse Curve' rationalisation and refurbishment.	
	ED5 Childcare Subsidy for residents newly entering employment.	
2) Housing: "To improve the housing conditions and choices of those living within the target area"	H1 Decant Programme	Objective linked to 1.6, 1.4.1 and 1.7 in Fig C1. The programme was radically reformulated following the Masterplan.
	H2 Car park demolition	
	H3 Land Disposal	
	H4 Housing Refurbishment.	
	H5 HAG Bidding	
	H6 New Build	
	H7 Gas Board Site	
	H8 Block demolition	
	H9 New build following H8	
	H10 New build on following sites.	
	H11 Security	
	H12 Environmental Improvements; H13 Self Build	
3) Environment and Leisure: "Improve the environment and enhance the quality of life of local people including their health and cultural and sport opportunities"	EL1 Shandy Park	Objective linked to 1.7 and 1.4.1. Projects linked to 1.7.1, 1.7.2 and 1.7.4. EL2 to EL6 and EL10 to EL13 never materialised.
	EL2 Ben Johnson Road	
	EL3 Community Stables	
	EL4 A13 Improvements	
	EL5 A11 Improvements	
	EL6 East London Stadium	
	EL 7 Heritage Trail	
	EL8 Ragged School Museum	
	EL9 Trim Trails	
	EL10 Rhodeswell Road	
	EL11 Limehouse Station	
	EL12 Cinema; EL13 Limehouse Arches Open Space	
	4) Health and Community Development Programme: "To make the Borough a safe and attractive place to live and work"	
HC2 Accident prevention		
HC3 GP Leisure prescriptions		
HC4 Health gains in housing		
HC5 Promoting health in schools		
HC6 Parents-in-the-Primary Schools		
HC7 Youth & Health. Peer education Programme		
HC8 Project Charlie; HC9 Arbour Youth Club		
HC10 Community capacity building		
HC11 Construction of community centre in Ocean Estate		
Source for table: CSSRB bid.		

Our interviews revealed that allocating so many resources to housing left very little money available for other initiatives which were therefore viewed as ‘add-ons’ by many people, rather than as integral elements of the project. A general criticism—which would apply equally to most deprived areas in the UK—is that even though such a significant percentage of the available resources was allocated to the housing element, it was indeed “a drop in the Ocean” compared to the scale of the need. This criticism appears to have been recognised as a major flaw and an attempt was made to address it in the Masterplan. The Masterplan promoted the maximisation of the leverage of the SRB money by combining it with a host of other funding sources in order to achieve a substantial redevelopment project. Although the high leverage achieved enabled the delivery of a much bigger programme than originally envisaged it contributed to ‘dwarfing’ the remaining elements of the SRB even further.

*Delivery plans, objectives and programmes.*

Given the changes the SRB has undergone through its lifetime, a synthetic approach was required, using inputs from all delivery plans, in order to map goals, objectives and funding details. Still, most of our analysis is based on the 2001/02 delivery plan since it is the document that incorporates most if not all the changes. The biggest difference between the bid and the delivery plans is that the latter are based on a set of strategic objectives in accordance with government directives.

The goal or “purpose” of the SRB programme as it appears in the latest delivery plan (LBTH, 2001: 1) is: “to achieve both physical regeneration of Central Stepney, and economic and social regeneration that ensures local residents and businesses benefit fully from opportunities not only within the immediate area but within the Borough and region as a whole.”


This statement incorporates three separate goals: physical regeneration, economic and social revitalisation and benefit from other regeneration opportunities, as seen in Figure C2.

These goals are implicitly served by a set of seven strategic objectives (original numbering kept):

1. To enhance the employment prospects, education and skills of local people, particularly the young and those at a disadvantage, and promote equality of opportunity.
2. To encourage sustainable economic growth and wealth creation by improving the competitiveness of the local economy, including business support.
3. To improve housing through physical improvement, greater choice and better management and maintenance.
4. To promote initiatives of benefit to ethnic minorities.
5. To protect and improve the local environment and infrastructure and promote good design.
6. To enhance the quality of life for local people, including health, cultural and sports opportunity.
7. To harness the talents and resources of the voluntary sector and the community.

Objective 1 can actually be broken down into 3 separate objectives of the same level as seen in Figure C2. Objectives 2 and 3 can be broken down further as well into a lower level objective and a higher level (more abstract) objective.

Figure C2: Reconstruction of the programme's objectives (excluding Education and Training)



The ‘Global Objectives’ level in the diagram represents what in the delivery plans is referred to as ‘purpose of the scheme’. The ‘intermediate objectives’ are the seven ‘strategic objectives’ of the terms of reference, their numbering is the same as in the delivery plans but they have been slightly modified in accordance with the previous paragraph.

It is worth mentioning here that the ‘Charter for agencies involved in regeneration activities in Tower Hamlets’ endorsed by the SRB board on 10/02/1998 and also included in the latest delivery plan (LBTH, 2001c:17) states that:

“The aim of all regeneration activity in Tower Hamlets, whether economic, housing, community, area based or other, should be to build and rebuild the confidence and capacity of local residents so that they can more readily influence the process and outcomes of the activity and ultimately take a greater degree of responsibility for their own lives and the well being of their local community”.

This aim could be better characterised as an overarching ‘goal’ and is accompanied by another eleven statements that could be called the ‘objectives’. In many ways these are compatible with the strategic objectives of the delivery plans but the very fact of their existence is also indicative of fractures and conflicts, or at least a discontinuous policy development, in the goal setting process of regeneration. The goals and objectives appear to have changed more than once, in the attempt to strike a balance between the perceived needs of the community, the priorities of the Local Authority and the directives coming from the GOL and higher tiers of the national government in general.

The goals and objectives went through a transformation period between year 1 and 2 and they crystallised into what the diagram above presents in year 7. The significant changes that occurred reflect factors such as the ad-hoc nature of the initial goals and objectives, the influence of the Masterplan’s proposed changes, the influence of increased community involvement, the refinement of the whole SRB goal-setting process by the GOL together with the increasing capacity of the local strategy-setting bodies to adapt to those changes.

The first thing to note is that, although there are plenty of formally acknowledged links between objectives and projects there are no equally explicit links between objectives and goals. It is therefore difficult to establish whether any accomplishment of the ‘strategic objectives’ affected the accomplishment of the programme’s goals. However, following interviews and based on our own educated guesses we could establish some implicit links between objectives and goals. More important though, given our terms of reference, is to examine the links between objectives and projects (Table C2).

**Table C2: Links between projects and Strategic Objectives.**

Links to	Strategic Objective						
	SO1	SO2	SO3	SO4	SO6	SO7	SO8
Projects	CD2, CD4, CD5, ED1, ED2, ED5, ED7, HC3, HC4, HC5, HC6, HC7, HC8A, HC10, EL1	CD5, ED1, ED2, ED3, ED7, ED8, HC3, HC5, HC6	CD1, CD5, H1, H2, H4, H5, H6 H7, H8, H9, H10, H13, H14, HC3, HC10	HC1A, HC3, HC4, HC5, HC6, HC8A, HC10, HC12, CD1, CD2, CD4, ED1, ED2, ED5, ED8,	H1, H2, H6, H7, H8, H9, H10, H13, H14, HC3, HC4, EL7, CD3	HC1A, HC3, HC4, HC5, HC6, HC7, HC8A, HC10, HC12, CD2, CD5, H1, H4, H6, H10, H13, H14, EL1, EL7	HC1A, HC6, HC10, HC12, CD1, CD2, CD3, CD5, ED7

The process of establishing the links between projects and strategic objectives revealed a few contradictions and oversights. We will only give a few examples here from the 1996/97 delivery plan: H1 links with SO4 but the 2001/2002 Delivery plan links it to SO3, SO6, SO7. Similarly, in 1996/97, H2 is linked to SO3 but in 2001/02 it is also linked to SO6. H6 linked amongst others to SO5 (which does not exist), H4 is linked to no strategic objective. Similar problems can be found in many other delivery plans and they are not necessarily a negative feature in their totality. Regeneration is a dynamic process and there are bound to be re-adjustments in the scope of each project. However some of these oversights and discontinuities seem to suggest that certain skills or the consensus necessary for goal setting were lacking or that no-one in the project or in GOL thought it important that the apparent coherence of projects with objectives should be checked and maintained through these changes.

This conclusion is reinforced by the observation that certain projects (HC8B, EL8, EL9, H12, H15) were never linked to any strategic objective. This oversight is also an indication of the difficulties created by the ad-hoc nature of the SRB bid: the unlinked non-housing projects were pre-SRB initiatives. Again, administration costs were not linked to any objective, which is perfectly logical since administration supports all the objectives. However we know that the Administration budget funded certain community development projects. Although the rationale behind this expenditure was entirely justified (see section 3.2.2(i)), the failure to link those projects to strategic objectives is further confirmation that no-one considered that the logical structure of projects and the objectives they were supposed to support needed to be maintained.

As far as the existing links are concerned it is interesting to note that four strategic objectives, SO1, SO2, SO4 and SO8 are only linked to ED, HC, EL and CD projects. SO3, SO6 and SO7 have a more mixed profile but are mainly linked to H (housing projects). This observation has more significance in the analysis of expenditures. According to the 2001/02 delivery plan the total expenditure on each category of projects, excluding Education and Training, was as shown in Table C3:

**Table C3: SRB and total expenditure per group of projects £**

	EL	CD	HC	A	H	ED
SRB	174,603	587,377	700,963	554,181	14,917,954	251,062
Total	506,603	1,226,249	1,035,435	598,181	115,665,018	352,062

SHADA's latest funding profile shows that total expenditure of the housing element reached £118 million with an SRB element slightly bigger than £15 million. The first impression the table conveys is that SRB spending was strongly allocated to Housing, following GOL's decision, an effect compounded in the 'total' line by the much higher leverage that these funds achieved. Focusing the budget cuts on just two elements in order to leave the highest priority untouched might have made good sense at the time. With hindsight however, the very high leverage that was achieved in housing means that a budget cut in that area instead of Economic Development and Environment and Leisure would have had significantly smaller impact on the programme: the gap would have been easier to cover from other sources.

While the chances of achieving SO3 (Improve Housing), SO6 (Improve local environment and infrastructure) and SO7 (Enhance the quality of life) would not have been affected, the chances of achieving SO1 (Enhance employment prospects), SO2 (Encourage sustainable economic growth) and SO8 (Harness the resources of the community) were given a blow.

This does not necessarily imply that the choice to allocate resources in housing was mistaken. The sheer scale of housing need and the nature of the projects required to tackle it are probably good justification for the decision to put emphasis on housing. Furthermore, the expenditure incurred in Education and Training projects, despite targeting the whole Borough, also contributed towards achieving the 'softer' objectives. However, it is possible that adequate strategic planning (i.e. an extended 'Masterplan'-like exercise) at the outset could have led to an allocation of resources that would have tackled local needs in a better way.

### *Conclusion*

Based on this analysis we can conclude that:

The strategy-formulation process of the SRB programme shows signs of fragmentation between the needs, interests and aspirations of all the actors involved. A succession of consensus plans were hammered out and implemented - though not through a neat and tidy, or explicit, agreement on priorities and on which measures would contribute to each priority.

There are signs that in the beginning, the delivery agency (LBTH) had problems coping with those problems and that it was unable or unwilling to devote resources to the maintenance of these logical and accounting relationships.

It took at least two years for the delivery agency to develop the institutional capacity and the know-how that was required in order to manage the programme from goal-setting to implementation.

Despite these adversities, the whole process retained a certain coherence and focus because, from the outset, the clear priority was to tackle housing need and that remained so until the end.

The importance of the housing element was built in to the CSSRB programme. The SRB was predominantly a physical regeneration programme from the outset. A strong housing regeneration element appears to have been in accordance with most of the most urgent area needs identified at all stages.

Seen in that light, the creation of SHADA as a mediating and managerial body responsible for the housing element was rather crucial in the implementation of the whole SRB.

Economic Development and Environment and Leisure projects appeared to have been much lower priorities than housing; they suffered disproportionately from the budget cuts following the smaller grant allocation by the Secretary of State although this was at the expense of some of the area needs identified in the bid.

It does appear that the language of *goals, objectives* (of various levels) and *projects* was essentially a presentation device: a language which everyone had to speak in order to get the money and (to a limited extent) to account for it and keep it flowing. There is not much evidence that

anyone involved took the whole system (and especially the coherence of projects with objectives) very seriously. Nimble ad-hoc adjustments to community views, practical events and new opportunities seem to have been more influential.

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