Towards a Sociology of the Transition

Rights, Resources and Social Integration in Poland

George Kolankiewicz

School of Slavonic and East European Studies
University College London

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Introduction

There is a sense abroad among those following the relatively ordered progress of the transition in eastern and central Europe, that not much is likely to occur that is sociologically significant or socially meaningful. The proposed date for EU accession is now deemed to be 2005 and the Polish parliament is working in a bi-partisan manner to push through the necessary legislation by the end of 2003. NATO membership has brought the stability in the realm of foreign relations that was anticipated and along with EU convergence continues to exert an internally ordering effect.

Nevertheless 10 years of shock therapy have produced new forms of social inequality at a rate commensurate with the pace of democratisation and privatisation. As the patterns of social stratification begin to take shape, so also do households and social groups become more cognisant of both the causes as well as the consequences of their resultant socio-economic situation. It is possible to argue that as labour market relations begin to work their way through both the privatised and the residual yet large state sector, so class relations will also take shape.

However, this study purposely starts at the distributional end of the class perspective, examining the resources available to individuals and households as they face the emerging market conditions. It is less concerned with employment relations and ownership of wealth since these are of necessity in the process of formation and at best opaque, even for those faced with unemployment and dire poverty. It does not go into the 'why of unemployment' but rather into the manner in which households cope with the consequences of both. As is explained in Chapter 2 the starting point is citizenship and the manner in which class-type inequalities are mitigated and legitimated by the rights embedded in citizenship. Thus it focuses on the extent of homelessness, poverty, crime and personal insecurity (Chapter 3), and how they are dealt with by a system of social assistance which is less about income maintenance than about alleviating distress brought about by a range of causes.

Access to resources is an outcome of both class-like inequalities as well as citizenship rights. Both are connected by the strategies, tactics and coping methods employed by households to deal with the market and are discussed in Chapter 4. Often these distributive citizenship rights are defined at the macro-level of state policy and connected to the micro-level of the family-household by strategies and mediated by local agencies. The interaction of both brings about a form of system consolidation, which is the object of this sociological analysis.

As befits such a bottom-up study, it takes as its datum point the household and seeks to apply elements of social capital theory to understand and explain some of the

social consequences of far reaching transformation. The final chapter moves to the mezzo or group level of analysis and examines the manner in which a larger status group – the intelligentsia – confronts its own nemesis, the market. Such an analysis could likewise be profitably applied to a study of the changing position of the working class and peasant-farmers as there class situation is reconfigured by the privatisation of industry and the opening up of internal and external competition. This project will be included in a subsequent volume.

The underlying discourse of this monograph enters into a dialogue with the recent work of David Lockwood on *civic integration* and *social cohesion*.[1] Although his focus is on the decline in social integration in modern capitalist society there is no reason why the particular argument cannot be applied to the same phenomena in transition societies- this time looking at the growth of social integration. The fact that the discourse of civic integration does not figure highly in Poland, taking place as it does under the civil society label, does not preclude its use in tackling the key sociological question. Namely how does the development of a free market economy influence the simultaneous establishment of a civic order based upon citizenship rights?

All transition societies exhibit symptoms of *social dissolution*, or the absence of social cohesion, such as crime, civil disobedience and family disorganisation. In fact this monograph provides a range of data to point to just how far reaching the breakdown in social cohesion has been. However the extent to which these are symptoms of the reconstitution of a new social order or are brought about by the collapse of the old regime needs to addressed. Crucially it is the macro level of *civic corruption* or the absence of civic integration, which provides a pointer to the likely scale of micro level social dissolution. This in turn refers to the erosion or the absence of rules by which inequalities of rewards are in part legitimated, especially those associated with citizenship, in its civil, political and social dimensions. The elaboration and imposition of these impersonal rules or procedures, universalistic in their orientation, is the basis for the defining transition processes of democratisation and marketisation. High levels of informalisation would be one of the indicators of civic disintegration with clientilism, bribery and nepotism as examples. The importance attached to the Transparency International measures of corruption[2] is one instance of the international importance attached to rule following behaviour for social integration. If wealth is seen as brought about through *nomenklatura* connections or by evading the law then it is both a symptom of low civic integration and its cause.

Countries such as Poland are in the process of *civic construction* developing an administrative order, bureaucracy and civil service as well as a police and judiciary. The creation of adherence to such rules is part of the complex legitimation process involved in state building. It is impossible to overstate the importance attached to accountability, observability and other aspects of transparency in this process. Not only was it part of the Solidarity legacy, the demand for which served to undermine the validity of the communist regime, but it is also the essence of the social trust so necessary to the building of a civic order. Levels of political participation and the informal or grey economy, are all indicators of levels of civic integration although as Lockwood points out and this work confirms the second economy may in the short term contribute to social cohesion through its equalisation tendencies.

Social dissolution whether it be farmers blockades, nurses occupations or youth riots or other forms of disorder has many immediate causes. Such unruliness as Lockwood calls it can be explained by the loss of traditional sources of social control as well as the moral deregulation, which comes with consumerism. Both of these processes have

taken place more intensely in transition societies than in the west. However, the extent to which they pose a threat to a social order more precarious than in capitalist societies is one of the unforeseen aspects to the transition.

This monograph arose out of a series of seminars in the Sociology of Transition delivered at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies and the author must express his gratitude to the students who participated for their patience and contributions. Being published in the SSEES series this monograph is intended to provide access not only to the most recent sociological data but also give an up to date insight into the wealth of Polish publications dealing with the sociology of the transition. Indeed part of the aim of this work has been to give a greater voice to sociologists in Poland some of whose work does not appear in English.

Finally thanks must be extended to colleagues here at SSEES who have made my transition from the University of Essex much less painful than it might have been and of course to my family, Danusia, Kasia and Martyn, who have all been engaged in transitions of their own.

George Kolankiewicz
SSEES 2000

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Chapter 1

The Sociological Starting Point

Social Inequality and the socialist redistributive economy

This introduction is not intended to be an exhaustive account of the system of state socialism. It will identify those features which are most salient to the understanding of the manner in which individuals and households survived within the scarcity economy, cared for and controlled by a protective state and ruled by a party state. In this way the explanation of the strategies adopted during the transition will be more comprehensible, path dependence more clearly marked out and the relationship between macro policies and micro level responses more clearly connected. In particular the aim will be to identify the manner in which inequality was produced and reproduced in these societies since that provides the most efficient vehicle and most convenient point of entry for this transition study.

The model adopted for the nature of inequality under state socialism is that of the *bureaucratic-redistributive order* existing alongside a *market order* both in turn determining the nature of power and privilege within these societies.[1] Firstly this model makes the clearest connection between the rights and privileges accorded to a position within the redistributive order and at the same time how these are modified or compounded by gains from the market order. Although it is not possible to make a direct read-across from the type of rights accorded to employees, citizens and consumers under communism to those under liberal democracies, nevertheless this model provides an insight into the status positions held by individuals. In that way it makes for a more understandable comparison of the life chances under both systems. It is as if the redistributive order rooted in state based allocation provided the assets, embedded in a number of occupational and sectoral collective benefits, which came with socialist citizenship and were in theory egalitarian in focus. Whereas the market – both formal and informal – generated the inequality artificially repressed by the redistributive plan. Both are different mechanisms for the economic integration, which shaped the stratification order but were closely intertwined and parasitic of each other.

Secondly this model provides the axial principle around which distributional conflicts could be envisaged as having been carried out. It moves away from simply

identifying a range of variables such as income, education, type of employment, gender and provides the set of relations through which inequality is produced. By taking the distribution of *surplus product* as the locus of conflict between the redistributors and direct producers, Szelenyi and the Budapest School not only cut through the whole "class debate" under state socialism but also identified and operationalised the organising principle which underpinned a form of cumulative inequality characteristic of communist societies.

Put briefly the original redistributive state thesis argued that the organs of central planning and redistribution – the bureaucratic party-state – claimed to be capable of redistributing the surplus product not only in the most rational manner but also according to the goals and values characteristic of Marxism- Leninism. This represented the teleological legitimation for their power of disposal over the surplus product combining both the *telos* and the *techne* both the ends and the means. It legitimated the drive to increasing bureaucratic co-ordination and for the expanded commodification of labour and its products through the ubiquitous plan. The state could claim to have ideological mastery over both the means and the ends of system development, further it claimed that increasing bureaucratic control through the expansion of collective consumption and the de-monetisation of welfare was in accord with the progress towards the higher stage of development, Finally it could claim that the eradication of market commodification was to be replaced by a more rationalised system of planned redistribution. For our purposes however it is the observation that the redistributive system was the most effective at withholding the surplus product from personal consumption and therefore for committing it to expanding production which is critical.[2] For it was this that demanded personal strategies and tactics on the part of households to re-appropriate some of this surplus for consumption. Thus the driving principle for those in power was the maximisation of the power to redistribute rather than profit maximisation, greed or material privilege. The political limits to the extraction of the surplus were set negatively – the limits being social unrest. The price of meat in Poland, for example, was a symbolic shorthand – a comprehensible limit to redistributive power of extraction. Deep price subsidy within the shortage economy, as well as absenteeism and labour in-discipline alongside over employment were all part of the unwritten social compact between the direct producers and redistributors.

More usual means of defence and means for exerting pressure on the redistributors by the direct producers were the attempts to establish some control over this surplus product through various formal (e.g. self-management and workers' councils) or informal (e.g second economy activities) and thus to limit this power.

This key theoretical axiom was backed up by certain empirical observations. Behind the façade of collective consumption, bureaucratic-redistribution masked a range of social inequalities that the introduction of the market mechanism would reveal. In a range of studies into deep subsidy within the housing, educational and health sectors[3] there was demonstrated to exist a system of cumulative inequality which built on the formal inequality of state controlled wages and payments, the "8 Point scale of bourgeois right".[4]

The functioning of the protective state was demonstrated to be regressive in its effects since pensions, sickness benefits as well as various other transfer payments were closely tied to wage levels. The protective state was from the outset subordinated to the needs of forced industrialisation and the subsequent maximal extraction and control of the surplus product. The location of health and other social facilities at the place of work was as much a device for disciplining labour as was the office of the security

police or the party cell. Care and control went hand in hand as did the forms of redistribution such as factory housing, health sanatoria and subsidised vacations located within the work place. These were inclusionary regimes, which made social rights conditional on the fulfilment of obligations. The right to work was accompanied by anti-parasite legislation, which could be used against those who found themselves outside of gainful employment. This was more than the official figures admitted but in principle it made dissidents all too aware of the need for non-state sources of income. Thus freedom and private property was an equation made early on by oppositionists.

A whole range of small scale privileges such as reduced travel costs, free coal, uniforms, priorities in queues as well rights contained in occupational charters all served to incorporate different socio-occupational groups into a discrete hierarchy of resources. Early retirement for miners, police and the military as well as other branch and sector emoluments provided a complex web of graded incorporation which were to become the basis of status bloc conflicts *vis à vis* the state after 1989.

The endemic shortage of labour that was a feature of extensive rather than intensive growth led to competition between enterprises at the margins of the state system of labour allocation. Factories became patrons for local sport, culture and infra-structural development leading to a semi-feudal paternalism as the state sought to become more arms-length in its control of factories. The socialisation of enterprise activities[5] was in stark contrast to the de-socialisation of community life. It led to a greater inequality of a redistributive nature as social resources were divided between the strong and the weak. This is one of the reasons why under the transition many groups such as the miners, steel and meat processing workers have found it difficult to come to terms with their diminished status.

A second major attribute of the system which Szelenyi introduced later on into his work came under the discussion of socialist embourgeoisement and follows in a direct line of intellectual descent from Max Weber's highly prescient insights into the effects of unifying the public bureaucracy of the state with the hitherto private bureaucracy of the capitalist economy. Weber's account of the resulting "shell of bondage" which would be created by a state bureaucracy incorporating not only political but also economic functions would be even more indestructible than bureaucracy *per se*. For by eliminating capitalism, the one force which had the expert knowledge to challenge the expertise of the bureaucrat – since the consequence for the entrepreneur of a lack of such knowledge was bankruptcy – there would emerge a system of *organic stratification* "which would be as austerely rational as a machine".[6] Such a state bureaucracy would fetter individuals to their job (through fringe benefits), to their occupation (through credentials) and to their class (through control over property distribution). This structure of domination would be all the more permanent if in the social sphere a status order were to be imposed upon the ruled, linked to the bureaucracy. All these factors of organic stratification identified by Weber had a theoretical resonance in the analysis of the nature of power and inequality under communism.

There are however several aspects of the system of bureaucratic domination informed by Weber's metaphysical pathos which do not correlate directly to that of the redistributive bureaucracy of state socialism. Most importantly the technical superiority of administration was not the "ultimate and sole value" in the ordering of affairs. Just as profit maximisation was not the determining value of the communist system neither was efficiency or effectiveness. As stated above it was the urge to control, to regulate and most of all through these means to remain in power. It is possible to argue that the communist bureaucracy was informed neither by the "ethos of office" to be above power and outside

the realm of the struggle for power, nor by the "ethos of responsibility" characteristic of the entrepreneur and for that matter the elected politician.[7] It was permeated by an internal struggle for power and an external determination to maintain power.

The teleological legitimation mentioned above was a consequence of combination within the redistributive state of both *formal* and *substantive* rationality. Weber reserved the former to mean that the economic action of the bureaucracy was oriented to the achievement goals, based on the satisfaction of needs through rational calculation using the technically most adequate available means. Formal rationality was about the maximisation of calculability, which involved quantitative accounting. Substantive economic rationality involved the intervention of "value rationality" such as considerations of social justice and equality, of status or "of the capacity for power, especially the war capacity of a political unit".[8] Thus the outcome of an economic action which maximised the power potential of the communist party would be substantively rational if not formally rational. However Weber was unclear as to what the outcome of combining formal and substantive rationality within a socialistic system would be. Socialism he judged would require a higher degree of formal bureaucratisation than capitalism, not least since it would lose the capacity of capitalism to calculate through the use of money. However he felt this fusion might not be possible due to the inherent conflict and irrationality between formal and substantive rationality.[9]

Expanding on this theme Zygmunt Bauman drew upon Weber's distinction to posit his own view of the sources of inequality and the legitimation of power within communist systems. His description of "partynomial" authority, involved a system of legitimation based on a reference to an ideal future society backed by a loyal party committed to this mobilising vision and underpinned by the teleological plan, The plan is judged successful "the larger the resources which remain under the control of the planning agency".[10] Taking up the problem of the limits of planned activity, Bauman argues that there must be enough of the market i.e. formal rationality to make the action of producers and consumers predictable and therefore controllable. At the same time it cannot have so much formal rationality as to erode the substantive rationality contained within the plan.[11] The co-existence of these two rationalities, one oriented towards the maintenance and indeed maximisation of the substantive rationality of party domination the other concerned with individual economic action and the formal rationality of market calculation, gives rise to two *power structures, namely those of officialdom and class.* The power upon which officialdom rests is the ability to manipulate the distribution of resources and the conditions of access to them – redistributive power. It stemmed from the party, which was defined by its social pervasiveness and was based upon the *nomenklatura* system and the power of co-optation and appointment. The market for its part re-allocates these same resources through supply and demand. Both the structures of inequality are relatively autonomous of each other, they can overlap and although certainly in a form of symbiosis they are antagonistic to each other.

In the public realm the individual is exposed to the rule of value oriented substantive rationality with political power considerations dictating broader policy. In the private domain the individual acts as a market-rational actor, maximising effects and minimising costs, appropriating assets and money. The two power structures elicit different strategies from their members – financial resources face official rationing. Szelenyi identified social groups which could easily inhabit both power structures. *It is this dual power structure which the transition confronted, individuals engaging in both but within a changing macro-economic situation.*

Konrad and Szelenyi in emphasising the interweaving of bureaucracies, deemed to be natural under communism, with economic activity subordinated to political fiat under the guise of the "social interest" provided an extensive definition of officialdom. Political and economic spheres, policy making and execution, were integrated into a vertical and horizontal continuity, the impact of this on the social sphere was to create a state-society wherein " Everyone wherever he works, knows on which level of the state-society he is situated".[12] *This could be called an individual's redistributive situation, namely their position within the system of organic stratification governed by the logic of redistribution.* Of course such self-location had to include position within the secondary market order, which involved second economy contacts and networks of social capital.

This sense of location within an officially defined category was reflected in the ability of individuals to interpret movement and location within these integrated hierarchies with an uncanny precision despite the absence of any matrix. The meaning grids of personal location were embedded within the system and have become part of its longer-term legacy. If there is a sense of security lost then it is as much about a sense of such self-location within organic stratification as it is about unemployment, open-ended consumerism and poverty in the market. Of course the explanation of why such movement occurred was less clear. Political-party promotion, tokenism, clientilism, *nomenklatura* networks, a credential based meritocracy, growing technocratic competence, were just some of the factors for advancement. That there is even less self-evident explanation for success in the transition does not come as a major shock. Individuals are wont to attribute success to luck and providence, contacts and corruption and only latterly to hard work and ingenuity.

The redistributive or in fact rationing power of officialdom was exercised through legal norms largely in the realm of property rights. It created a segmented society, which defined the activities of individuals in consumption and productive activity. It also as an unintended consequence defined the scope of market activity with extra-systemic outcomes.[13] The redistributive order was characterised by a differentiated system of power of disposition over goods, a legally differentiation of the goods subject to this power and a hierarchical differentiation of those disposing of power. Private property was sub-divided into capitalist and petty-commodity forms. Socialist property on the other hand was divided into state and co-operative property with clearly defined objects subject to both. Individual (peasant holdings) and private personal property were more complex and distinct. The former in the Polish case was enshrined in the communist constitution for reasons of *realpolitik.* The latter could be deployed in such a way as to have a real impact on social inequality.

The inter-penetration of officialdom and class was reflected in the legislation on small business (crafts) and private trade. It demonstrated the mutual dependence of both power structures. Both small business and private trade were strictly controlled although were permissible especially where there existed a demand for the goods produced or where a surplus of labour was evident. Officials "could provide permission" for a greater number of persons (up to 15) to be employed by small business other than family members or apprentices. Such prerogative demonstrated the power of officialdom rooted in legislative enactment and its interpretation. If such small business was incorporated into a co-operative it not only provided certain privileges to the business in question but brought it under more rigorous state control. The legislation on small business and petty production quite clearly established it within the socialist economy insofar as it raised the effectiveness of the economy. However limitations were in place

to counteract the accumulation of capital in private hands.[14] Although the transition saw the radical amendment or abolition of legislation on property rights it nonetheless defined the conditions within which certain assets were accumulated under socialism and thus defined the starting point for private sector activity.

Surviving under redistributive scarcity

It was in the realm of the second economy where most individuals and households learned the coping strategies necessary for survival within the scarcity economy but also for the transition. It was also the active interface between the redistributive order and the market-class order. As such it was the terrain within which new forms of economic behaviour, goals and interests, took shape. Whereas it betokened the new market values it also forged the interim interests of liminality, which were to become more apparent as the transition came up against real time constraints (see Chapter 2).

In the formal economy of the plan the economic behaviour of individuals and households was not oriented to *mobilising* capitals or assets but in the main to fulfilling tasks imposed on them by the redistributive state. At the same time sociologists have drawn attention to the extreme consumerism which was fostered paradoxically by the scarcity economy. In the absence of capital, horizons were short and lasted until the consumption of the desired commodity. Every incremental increase in income was immediately spent on consumer goods in part because of the precariousness of money incentives (the absence of a clear connection between effort and reward and the politicisation of work relations) and because of the "consumer hunger" generated by the gaps in state provisioning. State-sponsored egalitarianism only intensified the egoistic and particularistic orientations of envy amongst consumers. A sense of powerlessness against the redistributive state reduced individuals to socially atomised plan executors. However it also created extra-systemic mechanisms for need satisfaction.

As the tension between the redistributive state and the direct producers intensified during the crisis years of the eighties, there were three major channels through which households sought to increase their share of the surplus product.

1. Within the enterprise, employees sought to not only increase their nominal pay but also to maximise their payments in kind, those rationed goods in general short supply provided by the enterprise shops in "closed circulation" and commodities produced by the enterprise and passed on for resale by employees.
2. There was a significant increase in the naturalisation of consumption where goods and services were produced within the household. Of course this was at the expense of free time especially for women.
3. Finally households could participate in the second economy. This term was generally taken to mean the production of legal goods and services not for personal consumption and outside of state control or regulation.[15]

Evidently the locus of such activity could be the household, a private firm as well as a state enterprise. In the first case it could be anything from private trade of foreign goods, private child-care facilities or even agricultural, building or transport activities. Small firms could employ pensioners, sell products outside of accounting procedures or expand production under fictitious names. There were many ways recorded through which the sphere of the market expanded its presence during the eighties. As to the

state enterprise these often harboured groups of workers who produced totally outside the officially registered production profile. Likewise they used company time and resources for private production. Between 1975 and 1985 the share of second economy income in personal incomes rose from 4.7 percent to 10.3 percent.[16]

The causes of such growth were several. The inordinately high social taxation of employment compelled private sector employers to split the difference with their informal employees and also charge lower prices to their customers. Secondly the "inflationary overhang" caused by the absence of sufficient consumer goods needed to soak up high pay purposely increased to buy social peace, led to increased second economy production. Thirdly many poorer or fixed income households were subject to declining real pay and powerful consumer demonstration effects which forced them into second economy activity. Fourthly the interface between state and private enterprises provided opportunities for leakage of subsidised goods from one sector to another. Attempts at regulating the formal private sector contributed to a further growth of the informal sector.

There are many micro and macro effects of this re-privatisation of state economy activity. However at the micro level it is the de-motivation of pay and incentives available to the enterprise that in turn could have an adverse impact on productivity. This in turn increased dissatisfaction amongst those groups without easy access to secondary sources of income. However most importantly in any calculation of the relative benefits of the second economy to household provisioning in the face of declining production of commodities from the state sector, the answer is a relative *loss* in the overall availability of goods. Furthermore the sum of redistributive effects from the existence of the second economy is assumed to be *in-egalitarian* except in the case of very small scale self-help activity.[17]

A consequence of the growth of the second economy is that the state sector became dependent upon it and was drawn into its market rationality. If semi-legal and illegal activities are included then it is generally accepted that during the eighties the whole economy became permeated by such practices. However such behaviour also made individuals less dependent upon the state, especially the less risk averse individuals and households. It challenged the state anti-entrepreneurial ideology by providing examples of wealth albeit generated in semi-legal conditions.

Examples of the activities which were included within the second economy under state redistribution provide an insight into the above analysis:[18]

1. Incomplete new housing provided an excellent source of extra income for building crews. Using materials from the state or co-operative building company an estimated one third of construction employees would earn over 50 percent of their monthly wage packet correcting their own shoddy work.
2. Over 50 percent of repairs to domestic appliances were carried out through the second economy.
3. Car maintenance was the responsibility of "your" mechanic using state time and materials.
4. Education was riddled with private tuition and "assistance" to the school in return for services rendered.
5. Health care at all levels was likewise permeated with payments and a list of tariffs depending on the status of the provider, of the recipient and the nature of the operation.
6. Theft and carrying out of goods from the enterprise were common and generally not condemned, largely because of the perceived nature of state property.

In effect economic relations were a complex network of services and favours, deals and facilitators. The cynical explanation was that the theft of state property was a pathological form of "socialising state property" whereas networks of dependence helped to humanise human relations. However the general societal demoralisation was part of the symptoms of systemic decay.

All the above economic activities were however part of a broader range of *survival strategies.*[19] Attempts to cultivate and inhabit areas of activity that had not been formally closed off were the natural survival strategies both economic and political after martial law in December 1981. Self help for those interned, church based activities, various forms of symbolic rebellion such as boycotts and independent culture were accompanied by escape into the private sector, the conditions for which eased during the eighties. In due course the value basis of this independent economic activity declined to be replaced by the activity itself. The evident demoralisation and endemic anomie created by repression after martial law led to an egoism, where in the absence of both social integration and clear moral regulation the individual and the family became the focus norms and values. Here various strategies to correct the disfunctions of the state structures were too atomised to be able to aggregate and produce a collective outcome. Attempts to set up in business or craft activity, to occupy a niche independent of the state still brought that activity into contact with the regulatory organs of state control. These in turn were often ambiguous and permeated with personal prerogative and therefore corrupting. However it should be noted that the eighties provided the paradigm of civil society, of survival strategies and forms of adaptation for the key generation which were to confront the transition. It was therefore formative and an essential part of the legacy of recombination.

Although the second economy created inequality popular perception still viewed the redistributors as the major beneficiary of systemic privileges. In 1988 66.3 percent of respondents felt that there were groups who had unfair advantages 30 percent pointing to the "authorities", 10 percent to the party, the police and the trade unions. The market order fared better with speculators (8%) the rich (4%) cliques (4%) and small business (4%) facing less odium. Two years later although there had been radical political change, 63.3 percent still felt the authorities were unfairly privileged. Once again the former authorities (19%) the new authorities (6%) and the authorities generally (15%) were seen to be unjustly privileged.[20] This data indicates the depth of feeling against the privileges accorded to the redistributive state, feelings which could carry over into the transition. These privileges in 1988 were defined as "access to scarce goods" (30%), high income (15%) and focused on the distribution mechanisms whereas by 1990 the shift in emphasis had been to mechanisms of obtaining income. They also pointed to the very shallow levels of support (legitimacy would be too strong a term) enjoyed by the elites in 1988. By 1990 the carry over of felt unjustness attributed to the old authorities reflected the perception of *nomenklatura* gains from the systemic change.

The continuity of interaction between the system of state redistribution and the emerging market order is creating a set of socio-economic interests, which are, rooted in the transition itself.

In the work that follows considerable emphasis will be placed on the nature of allocative or redistributive social citizenship, where status groups or blocs make demands on the state for compensation for the costs of transformation to the market. Ewa and Jacek Tarkowski [21] made a seminal contribution by pointing out the connection between the nature of the protective state, the unwritten social compact between the party-state and society, the role of the "Great Redistributor" all culminating in the reaction known

as "amoral familism". In their analysis, patrimonial care and social security provided by the protective state under conditions where risk, innovation and competition is not expected from individuals came in return for political passivity and subordination. At the same time in a scarcity society, redistribution by the state universalised a "redistributive mentality" where it was not work or endeavour but influence and access which were seen as the means to achieve a larger share of a limited pot. Others are treated as competitors for this limited good and the "family" as a resource of connections, access and clientilistic networks. A different set of values and norms are applied to others than to our own hence the "amoral familism". Civil society was also defined by them as the transcendance of the norms of amoral familism and the extension of the sphere of "ours" through various forms of self help and association.

Suffice to say to that an element of *social citizenship* will be the norms and values identified above as they are taken into the transition. If amoral familism is translated into amoral individualism, then social citizenship will not develop the necessary social capital or mutual trust to act as source of abatement for the inequalities created by nascent capitalism.

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8 ibid.Vol. 1 pp. 85–86.

9 ibid. p. 224–225.

10 Zygmunt Bauman "Officialdom and Class: Bases of Inequality in Socialist Society." In Frank Parkin (ed) *The Analysis of Class Structure.* Tavistock 1974.pp.138–139.

11 It is not the aim of this chapter to provide a sociological analysis of social life in a planned society. See W.Narojek *Społeczeństwo planujące.Próba socjologii gospodarki socjalistycznej.* Warsaw.

12 Konrad and Szelenyi Op.cit p.150.

13 Zdisław Morawski "Prawne Instrumenty Segmentacji Społeczeństwa w Okresie Transformacji Systemowej (na przykładzie Polski lat 1989-1992) *Socjologia* XIII Wrocław 1994.

14 Loc. cit Chap 7.

15 Marek Bednarski "Gospodarka "drugiego obiegu" a kryzys lat ośiemdziesiątych" in Mirosława Marody and Antoni Sulek *Rzeczywistość Polska i Sposoby Radzenia Sobie z Nią.* IS Warsaw 1987. p. 225.

16 ibid. p. 230.

17 ibid. 238.

18 Stanislaw Marczuk Kazimeirz Z Sowa "Polska socjologia gospodarki" in Zbigniew Krawczyk and Kazimierz Z Sowa (eds) *Socjologia w Polsce.*Rzeszów 1998 pp.187–190.

19 Jerzy Wertenstein-Zulawski "Strategia przetrwania in jej koszty.Polskie społeczeństwo lat ośiemdziesiątych" in Janusz Mucha et al (eds) *Społeczeństwo Polskie u Progu Przemian.* Wrocław Ossolineum 1991 pp. 322.

20 Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński "Economic Deprivations and Social Transformation" in Władysław W Adamski *Societal Conflict and Systemic Change.The Case of Poland.1980-1992.* IFiS Warsaw 1993 pp. 81–82.

21 E Tarkowska J Tarkowski "Amoral familizm czyli o dezintegracji społecznej w Polsce lat osiemdziesiątych" in E Wnuk-Lipiński *Grupy i Więzi Społeczne w Systemie Monocentrycznym.* Warsaw 1990.

Chapter 2

Making sense of transition

Transition and the legitimation of inequality through citizenship

If two things define the post 1989 transition in Poland, they must be the achievement of personal freedoms and the growth of social inequalities. As such therefore an examination of citizenship and the emergence of social class based on markets is as useful a starting point for the sociology of transition as any other. *More importantly as the market driven inequalities test the limits of a precarious level of social cohesion so the need to legitimate these emerging inequalities becomes all the more critical.*

Citizenship, described famously after T H Marshall as "full membership of a community" comprises of at least three elements. The first are civil rights necessary for individual freedom, namely freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property, if you can get it, to contract and to justice, to movement, to conscience and religious observance, to privacy and the inviolability of the home. Political rights involve the participation in the exercise of power, namely the right to set up and join parties and to vote. Finally social rights which enable citizens to live the life of civilised human beings according to the standards extant in their society. They involve education, health, housing, social insurance and social assistance. There can be little doubt how central all of these rights were both in their negation under communism and in their re-appropriation during the transition. This chapter will take the rights enshrined in the Polish Constitution of April 1997 as the desiderata against which the following discussion will take place.

In a recent essay Piotr Sztompka has noted that for the majority of Poles 1989 was first and foremost liberation, although a liberation "from" and in that sense a negative freedom. Much less clear was how these same citizens saw their positive freedoms the "newly opening horizons of rights and obligations, of opportunities and tasks, of life chances and life's burdens which the new system would bring".[1] In that sense legitimation through rejection was easier than legitimation through affirmation. The new elites were accorded legitimacy *on account*, on the basis of their active opposition to communism rather than any intrinsic message they brought with them. Part of this process of the search for positive legitimacy, of necessity requires an understanding of

how and why the current situation came about. It is recognised that at the time, in 1989/90 the future was unclear and that the subsequent transition paths eventually embarked upon might well have been different. In particular a specifically Polish road to a market economy was seen as a real possibility given the political capital of the Solidarity movement and the extraordinary high level of social consensus. Employee self management which had played a key role in the development of some industrial citizenship rights found some small element of continuity in the employee owned firms after 1989. Popular privatisation although a central part of the Solidarity political platform has never made much impression other than at election times. However no political articulation of such an agenda found the space to emerge in the face of a bi-partisan commitment to a revolution from above. Instead high unemployment, growing inequality, widespread poverty continued high inflation are the most observable and immediate outcomes of the transition ten years down the road from the first days of "shock therapy". The reasons for this and related issues continue to absorb some of the transition's leading actors in the struggle to realise these freedoms in the face of severe constraints and no more so than at a time when Solidarity and Polish society celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the Polish August.[2] In fact there is a sense that the costs of the transition have developed to the point where a qualitatively *new* form of societal opposition may emerge. Rather than becoming used to the market led inequalities public opinion has become more rather than less impatient with the social fallout. In order to head off this possibility some commentators believe that ten years after the collapse of communism new social policies can now be safely aired without being branded as returning to "real socialism". A point has been reached where the market is now well ensconced and more attention, it is being said, should be paid to the serious problems it has brought in its wake. The continuing electoral fortunes and predicted outcomes point to a social democratic ethos emerging grouped around the ex communists who have successfully transformed and re-identified themselves.[3] This monograph will try and present the current calculus of social costs and some of the underlying policy responses that abate or irritate the sense of crisis.

For the purposes of this analysis it can be noted that a specifically Polish form of *social welfare state* which would enact social rights, was also loosely envisaged, one which would have incorporated the self-governing, social movement legacy of Solidarity. The philanthropic, self organising and self help ethos which emerged out of the economic and political crises of the late eighties, provided a major legacy of social activism and civil society which could have been harnessed to the post-1989 reforms. Social organisations which had blossomed after 1989 were seen as synonymous with the "self-governing republic", which in turn had grown out of the second or alternative society and which in fact during the early nineties outstripped the lagging reform of the protective state. Initially social organisations and associations were included in this vision as vehicles of social reform and the possibility that alongside decentralised local governments, to which power was quickly devolved in 1989–1990, they would become the foci of social programmes.

Except for the case of social assistance that part of the vision was also not fulfilled. That priority was accorded to a devolved and in some sense autonomous form of social assistance within the social security system in general, as it picked up the consequences of shock therapy in the immediate aftermath of 1990 was not surprising. It merged with the ad hoc approach to social assistance symbolised by the nomination of the popular and trusted figure of Jacek Kuron to keep in touch with the people with his SOS programme and soup kitchens. Dealing with homelessness for example was to fall to

local councils assisted by an array of secular and religious associations. But by early 1990 the battle for a social market economy and a specific related form of politics was lost.[4] The fact that Kuron remained one of the most highly regarded figures even after he had left front line politics confirms the symbolism of a caring revolution – although it was not sufficient to catapult him into the presidency.[5] Of course there had also been a reaction against the compulsory "self-organisation" of society under the auspices of the party – PZPR – and all aggregated under the Front for National Unity (FJN). In the mid nineties 65 percent of Poles did not belong to any organisation compared to the ideal type of civil society, referred to by de Tocqueville, namely the USA where 82 percent of citizens declared some organisational membership. To some extent after 1989 there had been a trivialising of association formation with everything from the Clubs of Tall People, Association for the Unification of Terminological Neologisms as well lovers of beer, whiskey and video recorders. Every issue appeared to have an association. More serious international elite groups such as the Lions, Round Tablers and Rotarians quickly formed chapters as well as the re emergence of indigenous groups for businessmen (sic) which had existed from the thirteenth century.

Historians were quick to point out that Poland had a tradition of voluntary help going back to the mid nineteenth century which was commensurate with the intelligentsia mission of service, progress and national liberation. This had been replaced by state sponsored activity under communism aimed at the working class rather than the intelligentsia. The notion of "czyn społeczny" or "voluntary" social action was artificially exploited in order to mobilise, control and provide a veneer of state sponsored solidarity in the building of roads, schools and in the work place. It therefore contributed to the above mentioned distaste for voluntary social activity which was always viewed with suspicion or worse. Of course the economics of scarcity in the family did nothing to bolster such voluntary activity where most families had insufficient resources for everyday life spent in queues, interestingly themselves the scenes for self-organisation activity.

The return of the market is considered to have re-valued work and individual initiative as shown by the 2 million or so private enterprises that have sprung up in the last ten years (although many of them fictitious or dormant). Between 1990 and 1992 for example the proportion of those working for themselves had risen from 6.6 percent to 11.2 percent. Over 75 percent did not employ more than 3 persons and a third depended upon their family.[6] The market now had to re-value non employed work, voluntary activity oriented to non material or post materialistic value. Here western influence contributed to the growth of NGOs and voluntary work and it also very quickly entered into the practise of the new elites, both political and commercial. The emerging political culture eagerly incorporated these principles, often for instrumental reasons, as an antidote to the growing harshness of everyday life and the burgeoning inequality of condition. Caring credentials were important to soften the image painted by tough economic policies. Further impetus was given to "voluntary" work by the increasing financial benefits that began to accrue to those involved in such work.[7] There is a gradual recognition of the need to instil this new form of voluntary ethos at an early age in the schools and universities and Poles are lectured on their uncaring nature. Over 30 percent of respondents had not offered assistance to anyone over the previous year and 32 percent only to family members and of the help that was proffered the bulk was financial or work related.[8] Whereas it can build on the ethos created under Solidarity and can draw upon traditional forms it is particularly related to the needs of modern social citizenship as it confronts the market, not the unmediated association of

citizens facing scarcity and repression. As with everything novel in the new tapestry of Polish everyday life, the charity reflex which has been nurtured has also been undermined by the numerous cases of organisers disappearing with the proceeds and the good cause and sponsors being left with unpaid bills.[9]

However this type of self help activity was quickly marginalised by the etatist direction of social reforms. Soon the initial direction of reform changed from a vision and ethos which was more compatible with the "continental" indeed German model of social security towards the Anglo-Saxon (welfare pluralist) and US model. It tended to focus on pragmatic solutions to problems as they emerged rather than one over arching target model. No clear set of value consensus informed the model of social security, which was not helped by the continuing rivalry and growing polarisation between the Solidarity and the ex-communist parties and their respective constituencies and which tended to make social welfare into part of the legitimation process and obstructed consensus formation. There was no attempt to enact legal codes that would govern the system of social security within a broader socio-economic order. Instead flexibility was the order of the day in dealing with the unexpected. Corporatist negotiations between unions, employers and the state although often signalled as a possible Polish solution[10] and in fact in place as part of the Tri-Partite Commission were always secondary to interest group conflict, which in turn encouraged a more individualist approach to social policy.[11] Currently the espousal of pro market elements in social programmes is counterbalanced to some extent by EU accession conditionalities. Nevertheless the internal markets in the health service, the reform of social insurance and the contracting out of services to non-governmental organisations points to a strong pro market emphasis in social policy.

Why this direction appears to have become ascendant is ascribed to several reasons. Firstly an over fascination with the liberal model and the belief that the market could resolve those intractable problems for the state which three sided negotiations could not. This is now changing as a social democratic political option is being shaped out of the ex communist SLD and where the proportion of the population declaring themselves to be left wing is 37 percent, higher than at any time since 1989. However it may not signal any fundamental shift in direction as there appears to be a bi-partisan commitment to an etatistic model of social security.[12] Secondly and allied to this has been the global tendency towards neo-liberal reforms and the influence of organisations such as the World Bank in the adoption of various models of social insurance. Thirdly and most importantly the contradictory claims-making and re-vindicationary nature of social demands made by various social categories as they underwent the trauma of transition contributed to the institutional decomposition of the social security system.[13] Finally it is difficult to formulate a positive social programme on the basis of a negative definition of freedom. Although the "Round Table" Agreement of 5 April 1989 contained, for example, a section on health policy, this was spelled out in the broadest of terms. Apart from flexible organisational forms, local, occupational and employee self management it demanded that "the guarantee of the correct functioning of the health service was its supervision by society and Solidarity" so that the various pathologies of the state system could not be repeated.[14] Whereas such social involvement and control could have pointed to the role of social organisations this was never clearly adopted. The rejection of the protective state of communism coupled with a liberal myth of the market found it more convenient to take on a social welfare system which was redistributive and ameliatory of the inevitable inequalities which would follow on the transition.

Social Assistance. Local and voluntary

This being said it is still not possible to locate Poland either in the Anglo-Saxon or in the "continental "model to use Esping-Andersen's typology. Firstly post communist countries are undergoing a twin process of "commodification" of labour as the market mechanism and privatisation envelopes more of the economy and labour comes to be treated as a commodity. This occurs concomitantly within the context of "de-commodification" as their social rights are re-shaped to deal with the conditions of unemployment, poverty, social inequality and social exclusion. These may move in the direction of needs based citizenship rooted in a residual welfare state, sensitive to work incentives and based on tests of eligibility. Alternatively the legacy of the protective state, based on high expectations of welfare rights coupled with a strongly decentralised even weak state could move Poland in the direction of the "full citizenship" model. Under this model citizenship entitles individuals to the full range of services, freeing them from dependency on the market or the family.[15]

The verdict for many is that despite entries into the constitution of 1997 which guaranteed the existence of foundations and associations as well as trade unions and the supportive (pomocniczosci) principle of strengthening "citizenship rights", Poles are now faced by a fait accompli. It has come too late for social organisations to become the vehicles for a social services system based on the principle of subsidiarity. By 1999 and the introduction of the key reforms in health, pensions and local and regional government it was clear that social organisations based upon active citizenship had been relegated to dealing with the consequences of poverty and marginalisation. It was held that despite the Solidarity legacy mentioned above, the liberal-etatist model based on internal markets, managerialism and the contracting of services had succeeded over the continental model, whereas commercialisation of the public social sphere had won out over self-government. The considerable societal resource of self-help and good-will had been side-lined.[16] Nevertheless as will shown below a form of *local citizenship* based upon rights and duties and articulated at the level of local government, especially the gmina or municipality has emerged. Up until 1991 social care came under legislation dating back to 1923 and functioned within the orbit of health care. New legislation passed on 29 November 1990 sub divided duties for social assistance between central and local government. Social assistance can be accorded in kind or in cash and either at the place of work or in the locality. Duties devolved to local government include care for the homeless, home care, payment for health care, cash payments for specific needs, general social work and burials. Other obligations are de-concentrated rather than decentralised such as certain payments, self help care homes, various central assistance programmes. The local authorities can and do co-operate with social and religious organisations and can sub contract certain tasks to these bodies. The middle tier powiat introduced in 1999 also has devolved and de-concentrated tasks as do the 17 regions.[17] If as will be argued below the transitional state will not be in a position to respond to the redistributive demands placed upon it, by default it will voluntarily devolve and decentralise to the gmina. Not least because this is one of the most important resources for political legitimacy in the transition system.

In 1999 the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy assisted 709,000 unemployed households, 706,000 households in poverty, 428,000 who were helpless, 370,000 with long term illness, 332,000 families with disabled, 122,000 alcoholic households, 20,000 families of ex convicts, 17,000 homeless and 9,000 effected by disasters.

Recently social assistance payments have been cut quite substantially as have funds to the local centres for social assistance despite the continuing high level of unemployment at 13.7 percent. This is an attempt to counteract the growth of what is seen as a group of long term unemployed who are viewed as only been interested in various forms of social assistance and not employment, the "career unemployed". One way or the other the scope for NGO activity has substantially increased. Although local authorities often view NGOs as competition for both their field of activity as well as for limited funding, it is the case that such associations can often act where municipalities are excluded by statutory obligations and in a manner which is less bureaucratic and more effectively targeted. Certain duties such as help for the homeless and the destitute that have been devolved to the local municipality, because of shortcomings in the legislation can however limit the scope of assistance available and therefore contribute to the process of social exclusion. This is where associations can and do step in to provide a parallel source of social assistance.

From civil society to a civic society

The above discussion on social organisations, the so-called "third sector" which comprised some 47000 entities, of which 5230 were foundations existing under a law enacted in 1984 and the remainder as associations, raises the issue of the *discourse* of civil society and citizenship.

The concept of "citizenship society" or *społeczeństwo obywatelskie* which is better encapsulated in the notion of "civic society" and which is regularly encountered in Polish political writings is used interchangeably with civil society. However there are certain essential differences. Under communism, civil society came to mean any anti-state, second society, activity, which undermined party-state authority and carved out spheres of autonomy. Self management, self government self defence and self accounting were all parts of both opposition and even government discourse under communism. It was a catch-all concept which referred to unmediated association that was horizontal rather than hierarchical, spontaneous and therefore authentic, rather than managed and artificial, self-managed rather than bureaucratically administered, transparent rather than opaque. It was mezzo-level in that it provided the missing middle, a sociological gap, between the privatised amoral familism of the household and the nation-state. It glorified collective and solidary opposition based upon direct trust and conspiracy, and created *community* in the face of the social atomisation of the state. In some ways it was the harbinger of the nepotism, clientilism and other forms of political pathology based on networks which characterised both the Solidarity opposition as well as the ex-communists in power. There is an individualist strand to a notion of civil society that is based on private property ownership and which connects to the experience of opposition under the totalising state. Private ownership guarantees independence from the state and is therefore the necessary condition for autonomy. This argument rarely makes an appearance except when populist privatisation measures are on the agenda.

Its successor under conditions of democracy is best grasped in the notion of citizen's social activity or activism and popular participation. In the west known as active citizenship, it involved the common conscious articulation, realisation and eventual defence of interests, needs and aspirations of a social group by its members. Its supporters presented themselves as an early warning system for problems as well as a source for the formulation of alternative solutions to problems. However they differed from political

action in the focus of their activity. Civic activism was presented as widening democracy by allowing a vehicle for the minority to escape the tyranny of the majority.

Glinski and Palska [18] identified four types of activism that contributed to the growth of civic society:

1. Verbal activism which is concerned to comment, advise, appeal and complain. According to the materials gathered it appears that such vocal activism has changed qualitatively in that it is oriented to understanding and therefore overcoming the insecurity created by these rapid transformations rather than simply acting as a form of tension management.
2. Potential activism is concerned with highlighting the absence of organisations that represent citizens' interests, a deficit felt by 55 percent of the population. It is an indicator of the considerable frustration evoked during this phase of democratic consolidation and signifies the need for greater representation of less articulate minorities and "others". Any felt democratic deficit relates to the almost bi-partisan nature of the main political parties and their policy agenda and it is only recently that the ex communist SLD and the peasant party the PSL has shifted clearly in programme terms to dealing with the losers in the transition. Now poverty, equality of opportunity and social justice is to be found in most parties' manifestos, the left re-discovering its proletarian origins, the right homing in on its pro- family policies. There is a sense in which political elites are re-making their connections to society and accepting that because the social agenda is far less clear than the economic and political they may need to be guided by key constituencies.
3. Enclave activism refers to the intensive social activity in certain isolated areas of social life, so-called niche activities. This is the most visible area of activism and is replicated in countries such as Hungary and the Czech Republic. The laws on foundations and associations (although not as yet on NGOs) gave a considerable impulse to the growth of the so-called third sector which has witnessed dynamic growth, The NGOs differ in their levels of autonomy, especially funding sources, fields of activism and types of activism.
4. "Actual" activism tries to examine the extent of real participation by individuals in non-governmental types of activity and discovers that during 1990–1995 it grew from 5.5 percent to 13.7 percent. This represents a concern that NGO activity may have become routinised and not carried large sections of society with it into greater activism.

Obstacles to the growth of such social activism include the lack of interest by individuals in the problems of everyday life by comparison to the exotic events in the political sphere. The tradition of activism was always generally confined to the educated elites and it is only gradually being accepted as a useful tool for other sections of society. The culture of "learned helplessness" inculcated by the paternalistic state which undermined the belief in the ability to achieve anything through such group activity is a more deeply rooted shortcoming. Finally the authors point to the absence of a middle class, and accompanying ethos as well as limited assistance by the state in encouraging the growth of this type of activism.

Civic society as opposed to popular versions of civil society need not, in fact could not, be independent of the state but had rather to inform its re-construction with this sense of identification and membership, rather than rejection and exclusion. In combining these two related concepts it is possible to argue that civil society represented

the values and ideals borne out of the struggle with the party-state, its dynamic dimension. These values and indeed priorities could and would then come to inform the rights of citizenship and in this way to *strengthen* the state. A state which is weak, for example in its regulative functions, undermines not only the outcomes of the market and therefore the legitimacy of the emerging economic order buts also erodes the nature of social relations – the stock of social capital – understood as mutual trust- or the non-contractual element in contract.

The extensive debate over the preamble to the 1997 Constitution revolved around the extent to which it should include the legacy, the inheritance of the Solidarity ethos, namely civil society. T. H. Marshall made clear that there was no universal principle upon which the rights and duties that constitute the status of citizenship should be based rather:

> " Societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed."[19]

If civil society was about the negation of totalitarian rule then citizenship is the positive establishment of rights and duties. But it is also sensitive to, and indeed dependent upon, the type of political rule that accompanies the institutionalisation of citizenship. Whether Poland and other transition societies become oligarchic or civic democracies will have different consequences for them than for mature western democracies.[20] As the creation of the market and private property release far reaching social processes such as social mobility and class formation, there exists the real risk that large swathes of society, both urban and rural will become excluded from the means to participate *effectively* in this transformation. The effects of this exclusion would stretch across generations and create not so much an underclass but a divided, segmented society where some existed alongside rather than within civic society.

Citizenship in transition is about the *simultaneous* development of political and social rights, not to mention civil rights, rather than their linear development as in the Marshall paradigm. To this end it needs a participative democracy more so than do stable democracies. Although it is claimed that post communist oligarchies if they emerge as the political format, could still retain democratic mechanisms and procedures that marked them out as western, they would be based on a narrow group of those with large -scale private ownership and state control. Relative social closure with elite rule and self-recruitment and nothing like a sizeable middle-class would shape the social structure. More to the point these elites might even hi-jack the language of civil society to their own purposes. Civic democracy however stimulates indeed takes as given initiative and mobilisation, responsibility and resourcefulness and guarantees the kind of sovereignty that a country faced with the *triple transition* to the domestic, EU and global market requires.

Ferenc Miszlevitz has drawn attention to the integral role of social movements and associations in keeping social and human rights issues on the agenda, through initiating critical discourse and extending social democratisation beyond the political realm i.e through the socialisation of democracy. Quoting Jeffrey Alexander he states that civil society is both a normative and real concept. It is the discourse of civil society that is all important, emphasising openness, activity and rationality. If civil society is also a network of understandings and expectations which informs and indeed inspires citizenship, then it will be rooted in the experience of communism as

well as in its rejection, as a socially constructed conscience.[21] In chapter 5 on the intelligentsia a thesis will be examined that it is the self defined mission of service by the intelligentsia to stimulate civic democracy and in this manner to establish citizenship rights commensurate with the needs of these societies. Their task is to cultivate a form of citizenship that is as specific as the other path dependent elements of the transition. In achieving this the intelligentsia as a social elite will abolish the need for itself by transferring leadership back to society

However the manner in which the market-citizenship couple,[22] of social inequality and equal rights will play out in the transition is as yet unknown. It involves rapid, indeed traumatic change where western political and economic institutions and practises, including the whole gamut of rights, are being grafted, transplanted and replaced wholesale onto the remains of the party-state redistributive order. There is as much "path dependence" in the re-construction of citizenship as there is in the building of a market economy. The formulation of citizenship rights will borrow and build on the practise and experience of the transition countries as much as they will incorporate western ideals. This form of "re-combination" is now well discussed in the literature on transition however at the level of social citizenship it is a much more complex exercise.[23]

It is generally accepted that for countries such as Poland, well under way to democracy and the market, the challenge hinges on the ability of these societies to overcome what Sztompka calls "bloc culture". This was best understood as a juxtaposition of the "discourse of real socialism" with the "discourse of embryonic capitalism" and which were conveniently summarised in a set of antinomies. These included collectivism as opposed to individualism, a deep divide between the personal, private and therefore authentic and the public, state and therefore artificial, a glorified and mythologised past of heroic achievements as opposed to a need to shape a future as subjects rather than objects of history.[24]

How social citizenship interacts with growing inequality will depend on how society can overcome distrust and social atomisation, the fear of the future, nostalgia for the past, political apathy and divisions rooted in the communist past. At present Poles tend to value freedom (57%) over equality (35%) and the latter is espoused by those in particular who hanker after the communist period.[25] The picture is not that simple however since 39 percent think that there is too much freedom and, reflecting *growing* egalitarianism, 73 percent argue that there is too little equality. Ten years after the collapse of the communist redistributive state in Poland, pro market attitudes could hardly be said to be universal. Although 41 percent of the population agreed that the free market was the best economic system only 38 percent felt that its functioning largely outside of state control was beneficial for the country's future. Likewise only some 20 percent were happy with the way the market operated compared to 67 percent who were very or fairly unhappy. Most tellingly when asked to compare the current economic situation of the country with that of the late eighties, there was an even split at 36 percent between those who thought it was better and those who saw it as worse.[26] Of course the social psychology of this nostalgia requires serious consideration since simple economic reasoning is insufficient. As one commentator observed:

> "In the old days we were nearly all poor together and there was great joy when something briefly dragged us out of this poverty. I shall never be so happy again as I was from my first single room apartment with its windowless kitchen, my first furniture bought "from a queuing list" after a month's wait, and my first small Fiat."[27]

Thus the shift from equality in scarcity to inequality in abundance requires an exercise in legitimation which is made all the more difficult by the grip that incipient egalitarianism coupled to a politics of keeping your head below the parapet still holds on the older population.

From inequality to citizenship

In a powerful essay David Lockwood argued for the inversion of the usual approach to class formation. Rather than looking at economic position, the conditions of class formation and the subsequent emergence or otherwise of social cohesion, he chose to start with the other part of the couple which traditionally is seen to mitigate the consequences of inequality generated by the market, namely social citizenship. Here the question posed of citizenship is "how in practice inequalities of class and status modify its institutionalisation and thereby its integrative function".[28] This approach is all the more apt in that although in Poland inequalities and citizenship appear to be being shaped concomitantly over a compressed real time scale, in fact both rights and inequalities are being as much *converted* as they are being articulated *ab initio*.

An interesting example concerns the not inconsiderable economic and occupational rights accorded to the teaching profession under the Teachers Charter which goes back to the communist period. Attempts to rationalise the situation, to provide more pay for better quality input, to create a transparent career structure are essential in producing a profession which can carry through the government's much needed educational reforms. These are necessary in order to raise the level of human capital not least to meet the needs of the market economy and EU accession. However both the ex communist opposition and the teachers' union opposed such rationalisation and preferred to keep to their low paid but "peaceful existence".[29] Hence the interplay is more complex involving past, present and future interpretation of rights and experiences of inequalities.

There is a real urgency for introducing and substantiating citizenship rights which is allied to the difficulty in building or embedding citizenship and is all the greater in transition societies for another set of reasons. As has been pointed out, the experience after 1989 has been one of reverse incorporation, where the social rights residual to the re-distributive order were the first to be removed or limited alongside the granting of political and civil rights. With those societies undergoing shock therapy whether it is the first stage based around stabilisation programmes or its later privatisation and subsequent social welfare reforms the potentially mitigating function of social citizenship had a major part of its armoury removed.[30] The dismantling of the protective state at first appeared to be peaceful, pointing to the legitimating power of the market project at the time and the widespread and credible belief in the debilitating effect of the welfare state on the nurturing of enterprise and initiative. However it was not until the late nineties when a concerted effort was made in Poland to reform the health, pensions, educational and local government sectors that ingrained opposition materialised albeit also rather peaceful in tenor. This third stage in the transformation is the most difficult as seen in the level of vocal opposition to the introduction of what were in general seen as necessary albeit demanding reforms. It is this part of the transformation that is the subject of this particular analysis since it focuses on the potential sources of social integration and social cohesion, as well as conflict. Lockwood's assumption as to centrality of citizenship for social cohesion is

particularly pertinent to transition societies for yet another reason. With the collapse of Marxism-Leninism as the programmatic ideology in society and the adoption of liberal-market oriented trajectories, citizenship closely tied to the notion of civil society came to be seen as the only legitmating ideology for the emerging market based inequalities. Although "rejoining Europe" and leaving the bloc allied to the conditionalities of NATO membership acted as a shorthand ideology, it is now necessary to articulate ideologies which are more inward looking and based on endogenous sources of solidarity. Keeping to T H Marshall's metaphor, if citizenship is the "architect of legitimate social inequality" then this is especially the case in transition societies where citizenship is overseeing the conversion of the bungalow of socialist equality into a skyscraper of capitalist inequality rather than vice versa.[31] Furthermore it is difficult to present class abatement as the aim of social rights in post communist societies since the process of transition is about the creation of social classes out of the artificial social atomisation of the state redistributive order. A further need to dismantle the system of social citizenship developed under communism stems from the fact that it had come to serve, first and foremost, the need to buy societal order under the guise of the "social compact" and secondly that it institutionalised a regime of inequality based on the party state and the command economy. In their turn therefore new social rights are there to serve the re-emergence of a market order inculcating a sense of responsibility for one's own health and future, tying future reward to current income and frugal lifestyle and ensuring that "society lives within its means". Their aim is to cut the umbilical cord to the protective state.

The majority of the Polish population in 1997 were convinced of the urgent need to carry through reforms of pensions (66%), health (77%) and education (61%) systems if not quite in the manner embarked upon by the government.[32] Some two years later the statistics tell a story of disenchantment.

Health reforms in particular were harshly criticised whereas for the other reforms the consequences were often too early to call. Half of all patients could not afford to buy their prescriptions. The physical co-existence of a public service with queues and a private service for same day access comes as a shock.[34] The key point nonetheless is that central social rights, to health, education and a secure old age, were creating *discontent* through their conversion as suitable couples to the market and could not be expected to act in an abating manner. However if citizenship fails in its function this leaves the way open to other forms of political legitimation. The twin threats of populism, particularly its nationalist variant and authoritarianism were remarked upon quite early on in the "revolutions from above".[35] This populism is often aimed at opposing the introduction of new social rights alongside the removal of previous entitlements, as part of the generalised opposition to the transformation. Thus the *conversion* of social

Table 1 How would assess the functioning of the following four reforms?[33]

	Much better	Little better	Neither	Little worse	Much worse	Difficult to say
Health	2	10	18	28	38	4
Local gov.	1	19	35	15	8	22
Education	1	15	23	22	13	26
Pensions	3	16	21	18	13	29

citizenship rights is hindered and new rights are not seen as extending participation in society but of creating new social divisions. Likewise authoritarianism feeds on the underdeveloped "active citizen" and searches for direct and imposed solutions when faced with difficult or intractable problems. *Thus the extension of citizenship creates the conditions for opposition to it and thus hinders the self-same articulation and application of rights.*

It has been noted that freedom of speech, the right to protest and the toleration of radical groups is unacceptable to the majority of Poles if it threatens law and order. Over 44 percent accepted the view that it is better to live in a disciplined society rather than to concede too many freedoms which could ultimately prove to be destructive. However modifying this only 33 percent agreed that freedom of expression in Poland had gone too far and there was a generalised support for legal demonstrations (88%). Strikes (72%) and street demonstrations and road blocks (52%) were seen as most effective. Hunger strikes (29 percent), petitions (29%) and posters (20%) were all seen as less so leading to the conclusion that Poles require a new culture of protest which allows for a difference of opinion.[36] Nevertheless direct action such as occupying government buildings (24%) a favourite tactic for nurses, farmers, miners and other groups and wildcat strikes (12%) had less support. Interestingly, it was felt that those who did disturb social order through illegal activities should not be too harshly treated by the police and the courts.[37]

Many of the class and interest group struggles which underpin strikes and demonstrations are less about the extension of social citizenship and more about the retention of a particular variant of *socialist* citizenship and so-called "revindication" struggles revolve around these two types of rights.[38] Here various groups are seeking compensation through state redistribution for the transformation costs imposed upon them and as such are specific to the post communist order.

If social integration is to be achieved through the spread of civilised and cultured life throughout society and embedded in material enjoyment rather than sentiment or patriotism as Marshall put it, then social citizenship needs to be repackaged for the transition. Part of the solution is to be found in the writings of Marshall himself who was keenly aware that citizenship moulds and permits inequalities as much as it limits them. But if citizenship is to be the architect of inequality it is only where that inequality is *legitimate* either in terms of social justice or economic necessity. Revindication claims by definition are not legitimate in themselves but emerge out of the locus of power. Miners, peasants and even health workers as they face restructuring all press their claim. Although citizenship expectations have to strike a balance between the collective elements in rights of "society" and individual claims[39] the rights to be conferred generally possess a greater weight of legitimacy than those being dismantled. The "Welfare Society" should have inequalities that were "explicable and defensible in terms of legitimate claims"[40] but most of all should change with the times.

However as Runciman has noted "social rights can *generate* social inequalities" [41] and this is no more so than in a society moving from a state redistributive to a market order. *This is because social rights when faced with a market order are by their nature enabling, in the sense of emancipatory and therefore the tools for material success, whereas rights within the socialist system were allocative and therefore disabling and constraining.* As will be shown below the development of a housing market essential to a functioning labour market and therefore to a market per se, intensifies the processes which produce homelessness whilst at the same time creating housing classes, differentiated life styles and status distinctions. These in turn provide greater impetus

to the type of consumer behaviour upon which market societies are based. Marshall when he writes of the planning authority which decides it needs a larger middle-class (in microcosm what Polish society is seeking to create today) it does so as the responsible, therefore legitimate, organ of a community of citizens. Namely if you want to have a middle class then they must be accorded the status they feel is "their due as of right to the kind of citizen I am". The inequality produced by the social rights must be *legitimated* in terms of some other goals and values, in this case the construction of a civic democracy which is founded upon a middle class. Another example taken from Marshall concerns education where " in its relations with occupational structure, citizenship operates as an instrument of social stratification". The status provided by education carries the stamp of legitimacy and that status and the attendant legitimacy are then confronted with what the market offers.[42] The debate in the UK and Poland over access and funding to higher education is an example of this complex validation process between substantive social rights, in this case education, the attendant inequality produced and whether that education has moved from a right to a resource.

As it stands there is no great analytical problem created by Barbalet's distinction as to the enabling nature of social rights by comparison to civil and political rights. Insofar as they enable participation in a national community through the more effective exercise of political and civil rights, social rights are means and not ends in themselves.[43] But the substantive content of these social rights, will in turn be an outcome of the political process, which *legitimates* those social policies that in turn comprise the *operationalisation* of these social rights. It is the interplay between these sets of rights which is highlighted by the post communist transition as is the dual-enabling role of social citizenship, stretching across the citizenship-market divide and which could not have been anticipated by T H Marshall. It follows therefore that social citizenship also creates the unsuccessful who cannot participate in their new found opportunities. Thus a dilemma emerges for governments

> "Those who succeed are likely to feel that if they have done so fairly as a result of their own effort, they have no less right to the rewards of their success than to the initial opportunity to pursue it… as equality of opportunity becomes more and more of a reality for the previously underprivileged, the principles inherent in the concept of citizenship will increasingly find expression in conflict over resources and priorities between citizens who are fellow members of the same class".[44]

This conflict over resources and priorities is part of the political struggle involving reference to civil rights as well. This is what Lockwood below refers to as *civic expansion* but given that citizenship in Poland is defined de facto by what "citizens could yet become" it is part of this process of establishment as much as of pushing or testing the frontiers of citizenship.

Citizenship as will be demonstrated below is about the institutionalised access by various groups to resources, whether from a previous system of socialist redistribution or from an emerging market based welfare state. It is about their categorisation according to these assets which allow citizens to "exercise these rights, their social categorisation by the rights themselves and by their motivation to extend and enlarge them".[45]

Of course this recognition of the societal pre-requisites for success standing alongside a perceived need to care for the "losers" is reflected in popular opinion. Over 82 percent of the population accepted that if affluence was to be achieved in the future,

considerable rewards should go to those who work well. The same proportion of respondents believed that it was the obligation of the state to intervene and lessen the differences between the well off and the poor. Likewise 58 percent believed that energetic entrepreneurs should also be well paid. However these opinions had moderated in force since 1994 where today large differences of income were only acceptable to 19 percent of respondents compared to almost double that level five years ago.[46]

Conditional citizenship

The Solidarity experience of the 1980s had served to instil a high threshold of felt deprivation concerning political and civil citizenship. In 1983/84 over 70 percent of both workers and engineers felt that citizenship rights were important to them and between 82–85 percent felt they were deprived of such rights as freedom of speech, criticism of authorities. This compared to the 12–37 percent who felt deprived in their social, family or work life.[47] Thus granting such political rights was in all likelihood in the first stage of transition sufficient to make market reform palatable and deflect criticism and even allow for some removal of social rights. This was particularly so since the practise of the welfare state and its delivery had come under severe criticism during the late eighties as part of the popular opposition movement.[48] Likewise early retirement, a continued subsidy to smokestack industry and the dispersed and slow nature of welfare reform took some of the pressure off the erosion of social rights. However there was a growing popular perception that successive governments and not just of the liberal right had no blueprint for welfare reform and that alongside the vexed rural question it posed the greatest social challenge of the transformation.

It is however the impact of unemployment and the abolition of the "right to be employed" which according to public opinion has come to be the major problem facing society (72%) alongside growing fears over crime (49%) and drugs (26%) and all of which have intensified demands for state intervention. In fact the prevalence of protection rackets in small business has led to claims that there exists a dual state. Paradoxically whereas small businesses could evade paying tax they could not avoid handing over protection money which was less expensive and more efficient than either the police or security firms. With over 300 gangs and an estimated 300,000 members living off organised crime, they cost the state over US$4 billion or a tenth of its budget. Recent legislation to make possession of any amount of drugs illegal whereas previously for "personal use" was permitted is a recognition of official concerns at the scale of the drugs problem and the crime which follows it.[49] In the last five years the proportion of final year school children who have used amphetamines at least once has nearly doubled to 22.9 percent and those using marihuana to 39.7 percent. Serious questions have been asked as to the manner in which citizen's *identification with the already weak state* is undermined by the inability of the state to deliver security.[50] In the re-negotiation of the new social compact with the state as part of the transition, dealing with the experience of unemployment and personal insecurity perform central functions in the legitimation process.

Outright hunger (6%), low pay and high prices (dropping from 59 percent in 92 to 41 percent in 99) as well as the consequences of privatisation (10%) have gradually disappeared from popular consciousness or been moderated.[51] It is the new concerns, far outstripping the receding problems in gravity which have all served to intensify the

already existing attachment to the *protective state.* In fact expectations towards the state on all fronts have grown considerably which may be as much due to the nature of a *weak state* as it is to a growing raft of transition problems. Given that political and civil rights appear not to be under threat the emphasis has shifted therefore to social rights.

Not surprisingly support for guaranteed employment has risen from 76 percent to 85 percent over the last three years. As might be expected this is less prevalent amongst the higher socio-occupational groups (65%) than it is amongst the unskilled (95%). [52] Thus social citizenship is being converted within the context of an extremely high threshold of expectations of the role of the state and alongside continued passivity on the part of civil society. The latter is generally confined to *enclave* concerns and chiefly addresses issues of education, trade unionism and parish activities and involve at best 5 percent of the population. Although a quarter of the population claim to engage in some kind of activity they are usually confined to representatives of the management or intelligentsia. The impact of the socialist legacy mentioned above where activism was enforced and state sponsored rather encouraged and autonomous, is compounded by the felt inability of 52 percent of respondents to influence events through such social activity.[53]

However the increasing demands on the state are still balanced by a powerful legacy of felt obligations towards the state. Defence of state reputation, co-operation with the police in dealing with criminals, payment of income tax, participation in elections and military service all garner over 80 percent of popular support. Curiously perhaps there is considerably less support for informing on those who do not pay their taxes (34%) which is considered not to lie within the ambit of citizens' duties and indeed smacks too much of the practise of informing which existed under the previous communist order.

However over the last few years, various hot-lines and media for informing the authorities have seen a gradual legitimation of such activity. Especially where it concerns the "helpless" such as children or direct involvement such as "illegal letting" and noisy neighbours then there is an increase in citizen's sensitivity. However the abuse of informing is still common where it is used for revenge by sacked employees, competitors and envious acquaintances.[54]

Whereas in the communist period the system as such could not be criticised and fault was found with the individual, under the transition fault is deflected onto the anonymous system and if necessary onto the ministers and politicians at its head, but personal and individual responsibility is largely evaded. Nevertheless a gradual change is taking place whereby individuals are being held to account for failures and shortcomings in their professional responsibilities – doctors and nurses, prosecutors and judges, police and local authorities. However, it is still easier for the latter to allow for evasion of rules and regulations rather than to erode the tacit agreements which make their work easier.[55]

A case in point refers to the newly devolved powers to the middle-level of local government – the *powiat* – to carry out inspections of employers to check whether they are employing persons in receipt of unemployment benefit. As is made clear below this is generally perceived to be a far from reprehensible activity given the low level of benefit received. However the local council may have to inspect a place of work where the owner is a councillor and who has also contributed to reducing the unemployment statistics in the locality. Thus local employers will often help to improve Employment Office statistics by taking on subsidised intervention jobs for six months

or until such a time as the employee becomes eligible for unemployment benefit. The fact that inspections have halved over the last year from 36000 and that inspectors were only able to find 3600 persons working whilst on benefit provides evidence of how rights and responsibilities are still subject to dependence networks. Furthermore they demonstrate how new rights activities (employment policy) can be subverted by traditional practises as well as existing networks of dependence.

Disconcertingly the prevalence of a sense of *reciprocity and conditionality* between rights and obligations towards the state point to a low level of embeddedness of individual citizenship rights. Guaranteeing rights only to those who fulfil their obligations (51%) and only fulfilling your obligations if the state cares for your interests (53%) is clearly a form of rights consciousness. Both can be traced and indeed identified in Poland's communist constitution of 1973 as well as in the notion of the *social compact* which was said to exist between the party-state and society respectively. In a sense the social compact was the basis of citizenship under communism such as it was. Rights, whether industrial or social were limited and conditional in exchange for the "obligation" of political passivity. In the words of one sociologist:

> "citizens transferred to the state the fullness of their individual and collective rights, and the state guaranteed them full employment at an average wage with a minimal input and personal initiative".[56]

The economic crises of the mid-seventies were the first indication that the state was not fulfilling its side of the bargain. It is also not a coincidence that the origins of the opposition movement amongst the intelligentsia which were aimed at the Helsinki Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the demand for the inclusion of citizenship rights into the Constitution also came at this time. Nevertheless the increasing hardships of everyday life eroded this new compact along with the overt opposition of the free trade union movement, the role of the Church, demographic turnover of generations, workers' discontent, all of which demonstrated the need for some kind of change to the system.

Given the collectivist nature of the opposition it is not surprising that this "conditional" mentality currently reflects the collectivist notion of rights rather than rights as individual attributes. This however is not the case with the 1997 Constitution which contains only five articles out of 243 dealing specifically with the question of citizens' obligations. Apart from loyalty and concern for the public good, it includes conscription, taxation, and the protection of the environment. Thus the weight of rights against obligations may in some sense be out of touch with popular consciousness which in turn will have an effect on the legislation enacting these rights. In a society where political capitalism has brought corrupt benefits to the political class and where social groups keep a practised eye on each other in terms of privileges distributed by the state, it will be difficult to instil a sense of universal, unconditional and impersonal, individual rights without greater mutual trust.

Solidarity and the Church have thrown their weight into this debate by publishing a Charter of Human Duties in Gdansk on the 20th anniversary of the Gdansk Agreement and the 21 Points to which this directly alludes. The declaration argues that individuals are the subject of rights as well as duties, and that involves respecting the rights of others. T H Marshall had stressed the need to respect the duties of citizenship and the sense of responsibility for the welfare of the community. However as a critical element for the basis of social integration, rights always took precedence over duties except

perhaps in the context of industrial rights, and the duty to work.[57] Although individuals cannot be compelled by a code of ethics to fulfil these duties they represented a moral impulse to social solidarity.[58] These duties involve working for the common good, respect for justice in work, opposing corruption, the search for truth and respect for the word. This last states that freedom of speech demands speaking the truth but also respecting the privacy of others. The limits of the freedom of speech , as spelled out by conscience is the good name of others. As could be expected it is also a duty to respect life in all its natural forms. Finally the obligation of parents is not only to transmit life but also the maintenance of the dignity of the family. All generations are responsible for the ethos of the family, an ethos that should look outwards and care for those in crisis or who have lost their capabilities. The duties outlined above are not so much to the state but to society, to the community and as in Marshall's theory are amorphous, non-binding and more in the way of the social glue that allows rights to be exercised responsibly. This is not to hint of conditionality but grows out of a recognition that rights and the market need to be reined in by the *duty* to respect the rights of others which may require a certain self limitation of one's own rights. In that sense they are collectivist in nature.

Church based as well as secular social doctrine identifies a particular role for the family and household in the development of citizenship. This does not refer to rights and responsibilities either stated or implied *within* the family. Nor does it relate to the way in which public policies *assume* certain obligations are to be taken on by the family either in extreme circumstance or on a daily basis. Nor for that matter does it refer to the right not to depend upon the family.[59] The family in Poland as a transition society is seen as an *active subject* in the reconstruction of civilisation or in other words of civic culture. Only the family survived relatively unscathed as one of the sole sources of authenticity. The di-morphism between public lies and private truths, gave primacy to the family as the natural source of *trust*, of the ties and bonds which should underpin social relations. In a way the amoral familism, the defensive, exclusive family, often mentioned as the characteristic of the atomised communist society is now being replaced by a view that the family is now the source for a form of *civic familism.* The type of individualism necessary for civil society can only be fostered by a strong sense of family auto-identification. The family it is claimed is the only source of values and morality necessary for civic culture and for the re making of citizenship.[60]

Janet Finch has noted the complex nature of rights and duties within the family, how there are no clear cut norms of what a family member should do or what assistance they might impart in a particular set of circumstances. It is possible to argue and the discussion on the family below will support this, that such rules in Polish families are much more clear cut. They have become so because of the political and economic vagaries of life under communism and in turn have been re-affirmed due to the demands of the transition. In short the family could provide the essential resource or template for citizenship in transition Poland.

This is especially so in that there appears to be a need for a moral imperative to the sense of obligation, of duty that can temper the instrumental and conditional nature of citizenship. When the legitimacy of the order is still being established, a moral grounding is all the more important than under consolidated citizenship.

Although there is widespread support for equality before the law (92 percent), equality of opportunity (88%) and indeed equality of living standards (56%) only 25 percent affirm that there is de facto equality before the law, and 16 percent that there is equality of opportunity. This gap between expectations and reality provides telling

evidence of how precarious conditional citizenship is in Poland.[61] Likewise 61 percent of respondents believe that the state does not represent their interests or indeed is even looking after them and over 80 percent feel that they possess little or no influence over national or indeed regional affairs. The matter is somewhat improved at local municipality level where 47 percent claim that their interests are taken on board.[62] This level of disaffection from the state is all the more problematic in the light of the scale of expectations to which it is subject.

The impersonality and inherent individualism of formal citizenship go against the grain of initial transition legitimation where the emphasis has been on charismatic personalities and collectivist struggle. Legitimation on-account for the dissident counter-elites required a particular emphasis upon trust and good-faith, moral probity and accountability. This was not consistent with the nature of formal citizenship with its emphasis upon procedures, legalism and constitutionality. Legitimation through rejection and distancing from the previous order was less likely to focus on the inherent value of specific rights than the extent to which they contradicted those of the communist order. The complexity of the strands running through the full gamut of transition legitimation were everything except rooted in the tradition of liberal rights.[63] Thus the conversion of citizenship rights must not only individualise these rights but at the same time alter the nature of collective behaviour. This it must do by simultaneously demobilising the tendency towards self-organisation prevalent within the communist system, based upon a particular type of networks and group loyalties – social capital – but oriented to defensive adjustments to the socialist state. Rights conversion simultaneously requires the *positive institutionalisation of collective behaviour* as mentioned to achieve positive rights.[64] At the same time it requires an acceptance that citizenship rights are to be applied impersonally and through procedural rules.

Research on individualism and collectivism in Poland in 1988 identified a hybrid orientation which is similar to the revindication stance identified above. On the one hand democratic-individualism was seen to include the individual as autonomous subject, given freedom of speech, real participation through election in running the state and local control. Juxtaposed to this was a collective-authoritarian orientation demanding concern for others, respect for tradition and the opinion of elders, give of oneself in work all towards a harmonious working of the collective. However in the best traditions of the dialectic a pathological synthesis emerged under the practise of real socialism that combined a belief in minimum input coupled to maximum gain. Likewise there was a strong conviction in the obligation of the state or collective organs such as the family (amoral or otherwise) to provide for the individual and defend their redistributive privileges such as they were. This orientation came to be called egoistic-claim making.[65] More to the point individualist and collectivist value orientations did not need to be mutually exclusive and under state socialism were held simultaneously with no sense of dissonance.

Social Groups and the Re-negotiation of Social Citizenship

In assessing the relationship between rights, resources and social inequalities it is useful to examine them in the context of specific social groups or categories of citizens, such as women, pensioners and the poor. Their internal differentiation and varying trajectories of change in terms of their economic position, employment relations, life chances, resources and assets and changing *habitus* are all significant determinants of

successful or failed life strategies. Secondly this approach analyses the capacities which these groups, either extant or emergent, have to exercise various citizenship rights, and most usefully their social categorisation in terms of civic deficit or gain, exclusion or integration.

Returning to Lockwood's seminal piece, *civic exclusion* refers to the case where social categories are denied full citizenship rights, when these rights are abrogated and in the case of transition societies when rights established under the conditions of real socialism have different effects in the context of the market. The most likely candidates for exclusion of the first kind would be groups such as the Roma, certain new migrants and illegal immigrants. Although in Poland the 1997 Constitution guarantees multicultural development, forbids racist organisations, supports equality before the law and freedom of conscience and demands access to public services on equal terms, the practise of the above rights may leave a lot to be desired.[66]

Certain rights of socialist "citizenship" are under changing conditions quite clearly discrimination. A recent ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal that sending women teachers into retirement at 60 or five years ahead of their male counterparts was discrimination can only be understood in the context of the extremely low pensions on offer by comparison to pay. In other cases those who have already reached retirement age are the first to be laid off during restructuring as indeed are those five years prior to retirement and this is cheaper than expensive redundancy payments. This discrimination effects women over 50 who come under the previous pensions system. The reformed three tier or pillar system will likewise discriminate against women. It will send them into earlier retirement, giving them less time to earn higher pensions and a longer time span based on better life expectancy to survive on these lower pensions calculated as they are upon life expectancy figures Furthermore they are likely to live as poor widows.[67] However the vast majority of men and women would still prefer to see women retire at 55 (only 3 percent felt it was unfair to women) seeing it as a privilege.[68]

Despite the fact that Poland has had gender equality in political franchise since 1918, over 69 percent of women claim that they are discriminated against and life is more difficult for them than for men.[69] Over 87 percent declared the wish that their husbands spent as much time on domestic obligations as they and only 38 percent would give up work if their partner earned sufficient to support them all.

What is more likely to occur is *civic deficit* where the lack of resources such as education, networks and information make certain groups unable to either exercise or more importantly *participate in the re-definition of these rights in the conversion process.* This is more likely to be the case where *civic culture* is only gradually being disseminated and internalised and where sections of the population although formally entitled to rights can do little to realise them. The power of the Polish miners to dictate pension, retraining and severance payments by comparison to textile workers or indeed ex state farm employees is a case in point. For example their ability to be present in the parliament when matters relating to coal restructuring were being voted on by their representatives makes the case.[70]

At the other end of the continuum of civic resources, the ex collective farmer is usually identified as the prime candidate for underclass membership within the emerging long-term unemployed. Recognition of this fact comes in the declaration by President Kwasniewski in his re-election campaign that this group of workers would probably never be able to be re-trained. In recognition of the fact that they were not likely to be re-incorporated into main stream society, de facto civic exclusion, and given that they were too young to retire they should be provided with a social benefit or pension in

order to improve their standard of living.[71] Although state socialism if it did anything it was to include in order to control, and thus pre-empted some of the classical pre-requisites for underclass formation, ex state farmers in other post communist countries, such as Latvia and Lithuania, have encountered similar difficulties of re-integration.[72] Therefore as mentioned the transition may deny to some groups the resources to effectively locate themselves within the market order. It may also remove certain individuals from contact with social institutions. Their vulnerability will be all the more difficult to identify due to their structural amorphousness rather than common identity or social ties. The social atomisation experienced under communism removed a key resource for individuals and households to make their voices heard during the transition. It may take some time for this to be remedied. In the meantime such civic deficit will then be re-produced either through the class structure or through other status differences.

More recently as the pension system has undergone its most thorough reform[73] certain groups have been able not only to negotiate better interim conditions until the new system takes effect in 2006 but also have been able to impose better conditions for early retirement under the new universal pension system. The government through its Medical Expert Commission had to designate occupations which either were undertaken under arduous conditions *which could not be improved by the employer* or which involved high levels of psycho-physical tension which deteriorated with age. Thus as could be expected certain categories of miners, steel workers as well air traffic controllers, pilots and marine navigators were high on the list. After further negotiations with the trades unions the list was slightly extended to 43 and 18 respectively but many groups such as rail workers and journalists were still excluded. The argument was put that if all the previously included special category occupations were to be recognised then the pension contribution would rise from 37 percent to 50 percent per head.[74] The pension system was not to be viewed as a compensation for the bad conditions of work which employers could improve nor indeed for mental or physical exhaustion for which medical pensions and early retirement existed. However it was the first attempt to dismantle the system of branch "privileges" which the communist system had put in place and to spell out the priorities and criteria of the new state.

Likewise collective political rights have been exploited by the German minority but less so by the Belarus or Ukrainian communities through their ability to organise and unite its vote. A more generalised case concerns the private sector employees whose industrial citizenship rights have been abrogated on the privatisation of state enterprises and the abolition of trade unions and employee councils. Currently only 18 percent of occupationally active Poles belong to a trade union and these are mainly middle aged i.e. those most effected by the restructuring and unemployment. The absence of trade union representation in a society which had universal albeit near compulsory membership and where the myth of union power is still prevalent, removes a powerful instrument for defending not only industrial rights but also social rights, especially as these latter are divested by foreign owned companies and privatised state firms and dispersed to local authorities who are often in no financial position to provide them.

Even more generally there is the case of those who have become dependent upon state social security, some one third of the population, as a consequence of 14 percent unemployment, poverty and growing social exclusion. Over six million Poles are recipients of formal social assistance and a whole of raft of charitable organisations also participate in informal social mitigation measures.

What level of stigma or second class citizenship this dependence bestows is difficult to say since the most powerful sentiment evoked is that such assistance is a "right".[75] Thus the nature of *civic dependence* in post communist societies is heavily coloured by the impact of unemployment, systemic change and therefore by what are presented as largely largely objective factors. Fate and luck are seen as major determinants of life chances alongside good connections and hard work. Thus popular opinion sees poverty as caused first and foremost by unemployment, then by ill chance disability, illness, thirdly by low pay and only 14 to 16 percent through the persons own fault. Alcoholism, drug addiction and laziness also figure at the bottom of the list.[76] Of course the opinion that most of the unemployed work whilst taking benefit is widespread and nearly two thirds believe that it should be praiseworthy or at least accepted as necessary. [77]

Likewise the existence of nine million pensioners and retirees in Poland has not only allowed a pensioners' party to figure in most party rankings at about 5 percent popular support but also has provided a higher level of satisfaction amongst the old than would have been expected.

Whereas pensioners may have suffered less in material terms from the transition, it is worthwhile pondering some of the socio-cultural consequences of rapid system change on identity and memory.

- There has been a major disruption to the collective memory and therefore the sense of identity for the older generation. This has been caused partly by the closure of mines, shipyards and factories to which workers were attached as pensioners and which removed a key point of reference in their lives. More generally the negation of the previous system undermined their sense of achievement and generational identity. Pride is replaced by guilt and there is no escape into legitimate memories when dealing with present difficulties. Political mobilisation through pensioners political parties is one of the means for regaining this identity and making their case in the public arena.
- Another set of negative consequences of accelerated and compressed cultural change and the growth in insecurity through crime is that the present becomes less transparent and its discourse too complicated. Thus pensioners are caught between an unacceptable past and an incomprehensible present.
- The transition is ageist either because it makes the cultural capital of this group redundant and unconvertible or because reforms such as pensions must exclude those who are to old to participate in its future.
- Finally the premature retirement of many Poles at 58.7 for men and 55.2 for women has fostered a perception that they are living at some one else's expense. Whereas early retirement was more or less imposed in the first days of the Polish transition for fear of even higher unemployment, it removed a whole raft of the population from economic life and with them their experience and collective memory.
- Thus although pensioners are not an underclass, they are more than just excluded from the labour market. In many ways they exist alongside the reforms rather than within them.[78]

Lockwood has noted in this context that where there are no corresponding duties attached to the social security rights, then such one-sided and passive relationship could lead eventually to stigmatisation. The sheer scale and immediacy of unemployment and poverty however can override the above mentioned conditional citizenship and replace it by a strong enough sense of right so as to deflect stigmatisation.

An interesting point of discussion emerges with Lockwood's notion of *civic gain* where legal, formally universal entitlements confer unequal benefits on citizens according to their ability to make use of them. It is likely that many of the forms of popular privatisation or re-appropriation especially in housing will come under this heading. The attempt at the wholesale transfer of municipal and co-operative housing to tenants and members coupled to similar moves for ex collective and state farm employees not to mention unsuccessful attempts to include allotment holders is an interesting example of civic gain. The aim was to provide some share in the national wealth to those who had not benefited from the variety of privatisations carried out to date especially employee share ownership schemes whereby 15 percent of shares were distributed free to employees often in exchange for agreement on privatisation. What was seen by most of society as an example of pork barrel politics on the part of the Solidarity government (AWS) backed by the peasant party (PSL) was presented by its supporters as a form of just redistribution. In the words of one supporter of the measures, first the *nomenklatura* took their share now it was the turn of the rest of society. Other slogans such as "no democracy without property ownership" were intended to give this measure a modicum of legitimacy. Differences in the values of goods distributed would be compensated for by privatisation vouchers or bonds and other measures envisaged to ensure social justice.

However the buildings to be handed over required maintenance work and the costs would be greater than could be borne by the majority of beneficiaries. Likewise those who had access to prime municipal properties, often located in the city centres, would be persons who had power and position under the old regime and could fully exploit this redistribution.[79]

The final dimension of citizenship referred to by Lockwood deals with *civic expansion* where the frontiers of citizenship are extended into "fuller " citizenship. In transition societies civic expansion is still secondary to civic conversion and re-negotiation, however given that these are both "catch-up" as well as "imitative" transformations they are likely to overlap along the dimension of citizenship rights with those of more advanced western societies.

Thus although Poland has only just begun its transmogrification into a consumer society, it is already required to develop consumer protection legislation by EU convergence criteria. Its freedom of information laws are a curious meld of anti-censorship and anti-invigilation reflexes combined with the demands for secrecy imposed by increased economic competition and NATO membership. The recent case of Poland's judges who resent having a system of positive vetting carried out prior to their access to secret materials is granted is a further case in point. Despite everyone from the president downwards being subject to such activity, judges believe it violates their independence, despite a history of political subservience.[80] The 1997 law on the Defence of Personal Details [81] has led to bizarre situations where the Polish Telecommunications company refuses to provide the telephone numbers of its subscribers and in fact had also refused to publish a telephone directory. The situation is partly caused by an asymmetry between the privacy act and the absence of a freedom of information act. Freedom of information has been compromised by the excessive emphasis on scandals, both moral, political and economic aimed at all sections of the population. The concern for privacy is all the stronger given the heritage of an intrusive state, growing crimes against property and the continued lack of social trust.

Therefore although companies and state agencies refuse to provide information to the public, they on the other hand demand an excessive level of detail from their clients without safeguarding against the eventual use or misuse of this data.[82] Article

54 of the Constitution provides the right to everyone not only to express their views but also to "obtain and disseminate information". It also forbids preventive censorship. A self-censorship culture acquired under communism and the existence of taboo topics is of course another matter. The church is seen as the last bastion of taboo subjects for open criticism as are questions related to sexuality, the private lives of political figures and business-politics links.[83] The church is also relieved of the constraints of the personal data laws and is known to hold a rich information source on the religious life of its members. The Caritas organisation in view of its charitable work possesses an intelligence base and monitoring service concerning the needs of local people which would be the envy of sociologists and indeed the police.

They in turn hold files on one in eight Poles and special "blue" files on families in which violence has been used as well as the usual information collected during investigations where witnesses details continue to be held well after the case has ended. Even information on those who are held in custody and then released without charge can be kept for up to fifty years – ostensibly for pension records purposes – although all of these matters are now under legislative scrutiny. The railways recorded 483 000 cases of non-payment of fares – largely by the homeless, the unemployed and ex convicts, and which it can hold for up to 10 years. Such indirect data on the effects of poverty such as non payment of fares is quite significant. Local governments hold a whole range of registers and data bases in order to fulfil their statutory duties but access to central files such as information on companies is made physically difficult if not actually impossible by the shortage of personnel and limited space.[84]

Civil liberties are challenged by the popular support for the lustration of secret, willing and useful collaborators to the old security police and applied to those who now hold high public office. Yet the perpetrators of the communist system against whom lustration or de-communisation was invoked find overwhelming support in both general election and presidential polls. Thus lustration is about the right to know about the past of its elite whereas electoral support is about present and future prosperity and who can best manage its achievement.

Finally having to manage illegal immigration across its eastern borders, where an estimated half million potential migrants wait to move into the EU waiting room, is combined with the need to exercise civic tolerance. The demands of exclusionary borders and inclusionary politics so prevalent in the west are having to be learned quickly in Poland.

There are unexpected new phenomena such as an estimated one million migrants working illegally in a country with a major unemployment problem compared to 40,000 legally registered. This is now an international labour market made up of Russians, Vietnamese, Chinese as well as Belarusians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians. In order to skirt around existing employment legislation, local firms have been to apply for labour specifying qualifications such as elementary education but speaking fluent Chinese. Once told that there is no person on the unemployment register in the region with these qualifications, the employers are free to take on their foreign labour. Local authorities neither have the means or the will it seems to tackle the problem of illegal labour which has been devolved down to the middle tier authorities and the police are likewise too busy with other matters. Poles tend to accept the economic (and cultural) value of foreign labour but see them as a source of crime. [85]

Illegal work is coupled with mass organised begging by new arrivals from other transition countries. In the first case the Poles have 13000 border police and 14500 customs officer who with massive EU assistance have made the eastern border a major

obstacle to illegal migrants.[86] However about 27 million persons crossed Poland's eastern border in 1998 in a total of 282 million crossings. Whereas the bulk of this is cross border trade much of it was also short term and seasonal labour. There is also an increasing group of persons seeking asylum in Poland, all of which underlines the interstitial status of a country which still feeds the labour markets of western Europe.

The existence of an estimated 300,000 full time beggars in Poland is a result of liberal legislation which had not foreseen such activity, and where only aggressive begging could lead to police intervention and deportation.[87] However in the case of indigenous beggars the assessment of why there has been such a growth during the transition ties in with the thesis of the re-negotiation of citizenship. Begging it is claimed responds to the growth in public anonymity , especially in the larger cities, and when coupled to the decline in the traditional forms of social solidarity permits an individualisation of problems. This in turn allows those begging to address increasingly anonymous audience. Furthermore:

> "The stability of structural and cultural features of a the social system are important. Where there is a reconstruction of the principles upon which the state functions, where the system of norms and values and their allied rules of social life undergo frequent change, the phenomenon of begging intensifies."[88]

The inability of certain marginal groups to adjust to the rules of behaviour leads to begging, and as will be shown to homelessness, as a solution and although it is ultimately an individual decision both the cultural as well as institutional context also apply.

Although the incidence of begging is an extreme example of social marginalisation it does raise the issue flagged in the introduction, as to what are the principles, values and norms which inform the role of welfare provision, indeed of social citizenship in Poland. Given that some element of choice existed in 1989–90, the liberal-etatist direction chosen carries with it certain consequences. Especially the extent to which social cohesion is undermined by such a system. Begging and homelessness are just two of the outcomes of such a model of dealing with such transition problems.

It is to be hoped that the type of analysis as presented above is a step in the direction of providing a calculus for such social cohesion in societies undergoing transformation and which provides not only an insight into the loci of emerging inequalities but also the foci for social conflict. It seeks to make complimentary the simultaneous processes of class formation, understood as the structuring of inequalities in life chances on the one hand and that of citizenship implementation or rights enactment on the other.

If there is popular discontent it is more about the process of *re-negotiation* of social citizenship than about direct exclusion. Such re-negotiation will encode inequalities into individual's personal trajectories for the foreseeable future whether in the form of pensions provision, access to education and health facilities or indeed rights associated with local citizenship based on far-reaching de-centralisation. The work of the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman and the National Administrative Court in interpreting legislation and overseeing its constitutionality will provide the major arena for the rights struggle. No area of everyday life is exempt, even the constitutionality of progressive taxation. Here Article 32 paragraphs. 1 and 2 which speaks of everyone being equal before the law, of having the right to equal treatment by the public authorities and not being discriminated against in political, social as well as economic life,[89] has led to a challenge that tax thresholds are unconstitutional.

Allocative and Integrative Citizenship

There are two major intellectual and indeed policy challenges posed by the transition. Firstly as has been noted the legitimation of the transformations underway is becoming a matter of increasing urgency. This is due to the fact that the time factors constraining the tasks of transition are now becoming more real and limiting. These real time constraints are being expressed through a range of problems such as elite crises and growing social dissatisfaction which is coupled to the growth in the power of constituencies which have an increasing interest in the interim status of the transition. This process is exacerbated by the erosion of short- term legitimacy rooted in the European idea and the rhetorical status of "transition as ideology". The former in particular may go into legitimacy deficit as the time line for EU accession is extended or indeed where membership becomes diluted to some peripheral or second class status. The continued indeterminacy of the transformation where immanent processes reflect conflict between rationalities and strategies rooted in systemic legacies as well as in projected future, creates new forms of legitimacy which may not be synonymous with uni-linear transition. The EC's social exclusion and anti poverty strategies could become as important a part of the "European dream" or return to Europe for transition societies and those committed to enlargement as any of the economic and political benefits.

Secondly although class – formation is a process rooted in a long-term historical trajectory, that of citizenship is less so. Social citizenship under conditions of transition is as much about the *allocative* or re-distributive functions of citizenship as it is about its *integrative* nature. The re-distributive role of citizenship by providing access to scarce resources outside of the market, such as housing, health, education and pensions was intended to protect citizens. The integrative role was to provide identities and statuses which would legitimate the social inequalities of the market order and provide for social cohesion. Understood in this way it is unsurprising that conflicts around the allocative functions of citizenship under the guise of "social justice" are more likely to occur than those around old, and to some extent discredited class identities or in new and emerging identities of "otherness" rooted in ethnicity, life style and sexualities.

In fact the considerable growth in the demand for state intervention for the alleviation of social differences between rich and poor since 1994, rising from 71 percent to 82 percent of respondents, is evidence of this increasing redistributive orientation. Alongside this after a brief dip the level of egalitarian attitudes is also rising.[90] Although there has been a gradual increase in the level of desired income inequalities from 1:4.9 in 1994 to 1:7.3 in 1999 this remains half of the perceived levels of income inequality. In particular the incomes of those in politics, local government and in charge of state companies were perceived as being particularly high. Nurses, teachers and farmers along with university professors and manual workers were judged to be the most underpaid.[91]

There are still nearly 2500 state enterprises in Poland which are at best only partially privatised. They include the extractive, energy, rail, postal service, fuel sectors which still exercise considerable power over the Treasury which is their nominal owner. They in fact represent a power base as well as a means for dispensing clientilistic patronage. At the factory level many have not disposed of their assets, such as housing, the rents for which are also subsidised indirectly by the tax payer. Thus state firms support both central and local political activity thus making it even more difficult to push through radical restructuring.[92] Thus there are many forms of state intervention in its allocative role.

On the other hand these egalitarian and interventionist sentiments are further spurred on by clear examples of the irrationality of remuneration and regularly highlighted by the press which have little or nothing to do with meritocracy or market efficiency. The Supreme Control Chamber recently drew attention to the pay of directors in state enterprises who it appeared carried no financial responsibility for the economic results of their enterprises. It found that 80 percent of management salaries was made up of basic pay consisting of a factor of the average pay within the enterprise. In extreme cases so-called "management contracts" which were meant to raise the productivity and profitability of public sector enterprises included large severance payments in effect for the poor results achieved, the chief example of which was pre-privatisation Polish Copper. In one case directors of the Polish Postal Service were allocated a car and driver for three months after they had been sacked. The businesses which were most profligate in exceeding their wage bill were also those which were most in deficit.[93]

It was therefore not surprising that the more populist parties in the Sejm successfully led to a cut in the so-called "income funnels". As from September 2000 there was a pay limit imposed on all public sector pay bodies. It will effect members of various newly established sickness funds, those on supervisory boards and in the management of state firms. It is intended to cover various payments in kind and will tie their pay to the average in the enterprise sector of the economy.[94] This is a bold move against the public sector as a whole which is seen as positively privileged and sheltered from the toughest reforms.

But it is not just management which benefits from these anomalies. Although many state enterprises are driving up their wages in anticipation of privatisation and therefore in order to extract a better social package, nonetheless the power of steel and coal lobby to not only maintain but to increase its wage differential compared to other profitable sectors does not go unnoticed. [95] Here a further example of the complex interplay between politics, social rights and the market is apparent.

Thus it is the role of the state as the re-distributor of valued goods and indeed not so much a moderator of the market but a player, that is foremost. This tendency has witnessed a convergence between the dynamic of a state committed to the equality of condition in the west under the pressure of substantive citizenship demands, and that of the post-communist acceptance of such a role for the state in the transition committed to a legacy of egalitarianism. In both types of societies single issue groups springing from different origins are seeking to either abolish or maintain the type of social differences inevitable in market type societies. In this they lead to or continue bureaucratic interventionism, that undermines the essence of civil society and autonomous social space.[96] However in the Polish case this self-same bureaucracy is also under fire for being inefficient, too large and corrupt. The growing perception that the central bureaucracy has benefited most from the transition after private entrepreneurs and priests is indicative of their key location between the public and the private institutions. However bureaucracy is also an essential feature of citizenship.

After Solidarity came to power in 1989 it politicised personnel policy in public administration in order to remove or supervise those who had exercised mono-party power. Naturally when the ex communists returned to power in 1993, they did likewise and over the period of their incumbency re-staffed the public administration. Simultaneously all sides continued to demand an a-political civil service with a clear distinction between political appointees and staff.[97]

Just before it lost power in 1997 the SLD-PSL ex communist government appointed, with little regard to the substance of formal procedure, its nominees to the "a-political

civil service" by manipulating the conditions of appointment that effectively excluded anyone other than the ex nomenklatura, understood generally, from those posts. Inevitably the AWS-UW government when it took the reins of power sought to undo these appointments and thus compromised the whole system once again. The effect is pernicious since given the expected majority that the SLD is likely to achieve in the 2001 general elections, the exercise of administration in key parts of the civil service has effectively been paralysed with those who are able watching their backs or preparing their credentials for a "soft landing".[98] The increase in the size of the central state administration by 30,000 between 1995 and 1998 must in part be an outcome of this process and of growing bureaucratic intervention.[99]

Furthermore the incompetence of the state is demonstrated by the loss of control of a variety of state agencies which functioned at the public-private interface and which passed into private ownership through the collaboration of state officials and private business interests. Kaminski asserts that the state is not able to represent itself as defending the "public interest". *This bolsters the perception of the state as the terrain for furthering private interests and thus compounds the view of the state as allocator which provides under re-vindicatory pressure.* In fact after passing the legislation limiting the pay of managers of state enterprises, a special list of 420 enterprises which were "of special significance to the state" is being drawn up with no apparent logic allowing their directors to earn 50 percent more than envisaged. Thus every egalitarian measure is always seen to have an opt-out clause confirming the importance of special pleading and access. The other side of the coin is that failing state firms will not now be able to attract the kind of management needed to push through restructuring.[100]

In summary, if the realisation of citizenship is to legitimate the emerging market order in transition societies, it will not be with reference to its *inclusionary* function through the extension of civil and political community status, but through its mitigating and *allocative* function or its social rights. This allocative or redistributive dimension of citizenship has by all accounts already acquired a populist tinge where the concept of "social justice" is transmitted and transmuted from real socialism. Here the inequalities gained on the market by the winners are to be compensated for by the state to the losers.[101]

Transformative values and interests

This approach necessarily must address the key question of how access to the material and non-material resources, assets or "capitals" is *institutionalised* as power through systems of rights and obligations. *Rights are the means that provide access to resources which involve goods, services and infrastructure.* Bryan Turner identified this nexus between Bourdieu-type capitals and Marshall's citizenship rights as one which needs explication.[102] An examination of social change in transition societies is as usefully set in terms of the re-formulation of status rights as it is in terms of emerging life chances. This is particularly so where status is understood as a "bundle of socio-political claims against society" which gives to (or maintains for) an individual or group certain benefits and privileges marking them out from other individuals or groups. These are claims to scarce and re-valued resources such as educational-cultural, symbolic but also, it is possible to maintain, to financial and social capital. Thus status can be both socio-cultural in definition referring to life style or politico-legal, referring to a set of entitlements normally understood as citizenship. The emphasis on the latter stems from

the specific nature of the transition from a re-distributive order where status is understood as a position within this order, through the transition where position in this order is a focus of struggle, as the order itself is being reconstituted. Finally to a market order where economic situation broadly understood will eventually determine life chances and where status understood as citizenship will co-exist with class.

It is through the prism of status conflicts that it is possible to better grasp the basis of group competition in such a transition.[103] State socialism produced what Turner after Max Weber calls status blocs or columns rather than status communities that during the transition are then articulated in conflicts, re-vindication struggles, around the retention of rights and privileges in the form of various more or less definite occupational charters or group rights. The nature of lobbying and group interest conflict in the decaying days of state socialism were based upon regime incorporation through gradated privileges backed by informal group pressure and elite prerogative. The reconstruction of citizenship will involve the dismantling of one system of incorporative "rights" based upon status blocs and its replacement by another system of rights connected to newly emerging status columns. The point is that the social citizenship struggles underway during transition involve status blocs or columns, based on instrumental forms of solidarity, engaged in status politics which involve the assertion of claims for social rights or entitlements against a state.

One final point. It is generally accepted that the concept of social citizenship is not well developed in Poland and where it is understood it arouses opposition from liberals and socialists alike but for different reasons. Whereas civil and political rights were seen as clear gains from the "revolutions" of 1989, social rights are the outcome of conflict and negotiation and are more contractual. As such they are more ambiguous involving arguments about the role of the state in the welfare of citizens.[104] They involve a re-examination of the role and indeed achievements of the "protective" state under real socialism in the transition to communism. Juxtaposed to this is the need for a "protective state" in the transition to capitalism. In all likelihood the concept of social citizenship will take on a different meaning in such transition societies than in those societies closer to T H Marshall's paradigm, largely because of the nature of the state. This is a state that is the focus of the unrelenting redistributive demands from status blocs and democracy is the means for articulating these demands. In an incomplete market of unclear lines of division between public and private capital with a weak rule of law and politicised state apparatus, with strong parties and weak regions, the state will compound the tendency toward allocative citizenship at the expense of integrative identity.[105]

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Chapter 3

Transition and capital conversion

A defining feature of transition sociology has been its concern with the winner vs loser perspective. Understanding who emerges as a successful entrepreneur, high flying executive or media personality and why, has characterised popular as well as more scholarly commentary. More importantly it has also sought to understand the processes by which families and households were able to adapt to the unknown rigours of the market. It has tried also to explain why despite macro economic improvement, the levels of satisfaction with the reform of the system remains remarkably low. A major intellectual tool for understanding these and related social phenomena has been the concept of social capital, with its attendant capitals, cultural and economic and the associated capitals, symbolic and political. A specific case is that of human capital which will be dealt with below.

Social capital, usually denotes networks, connectedness, social ties, either horizontal or vertical, which can be deployed to achieve goals. Of course it had an intellectual affinity with both the notion of civil society and latterly citizenship. Social capital provides *access* to other resources and indeed other capitals and for that reason is pre-eminent. However it has at least three major levels or senses in which it is used all of which are useful but each is problematic:

1. Social capital is utilised in the analysis of livelihoods which focuses upon the assets which people deploy in order to maintain or enhance their life chances. It is useful to refer to this as micro-capitals since it is most productive in explaining tactics (responses of the powerless) and strategies adopted by individuals and households as they respond to endogenous and exogenous shock and stress. It of course functions within a broader institutional framework such as labour, financial and commodities markets and also must take into account such institutions as social assistance and social insurance. It must look at how assets provide options and strategies to maximise the security of livelihoods. It looks at where assets come from, how access to them is governed through broadly understood citizenship rights and what factors contribute to their accumulation or conversion.

Social capital functions within social space and is comprised of social relations. Formal ties within institutions such as the family and associational relationships, just as the informal ties of networks can be used to achieve goals which might not otherwise be feasible and provide the bases for social capital creation. Rights and obligations

around "gift-relationships" which underpin such ties, access to information, social norms and sanctions as well power relations have all been identified as assets or resources which can be "capitalised".[1] Factors that enhance social capital formation include the stability and closure of a given collectivity, consensus over social values and the prevalence of certain individual attributes. Most importantly, the existence of effective state structures that make social capital resource mobilisation expensive may counteract the need for social capital by making it redundant. In the transition societies social capital which existed alongside state structures and made life tolerable is now being transformed into social capital that should supplant and replace a rolled-back state. Whereas under communism it was more expensive to demand your rights than to seek out informal ties to achieve access to a resource, today other resources such as information and income can be mobilised in order to achieve entitlements formally through the system.

Certain types of social relations are conducive to capitalisation: blood and family ties, caste and clan, ties of neighbourliness and of course those rooted in formal organisations and institutions where social capital is a bi-product. Under conditions of transformation when decentralisation is a characteristic feature of both political and administrative reform, local ties are very important. The existence of political clans drawn from Gdansk, Silesia or Lodz point to the continuing importance of localism and social capital formation. In the case of membership of institutions and associations, where corruption and clientilism permeated the functioning of the state-organisations under communism, more transparency and accountability has been introduced through the market and various control agencies. However it is likely that particularistic solidarity based on institutional affiliation will remain before a civil service ethos is established.

Other forms of social capital can be mobilised amongst the members of the increasing number of minority and life style groups that have emerged with the de-homogenisation of communist society. "Otherness" especially if it is oriented to achieving citizenship rights can be a powerful impetus towards social capital formation. Finally those whose life chances both positive and negative have been effected by the transition are likely to create informal ties. It is readily observable how recourse to social capital has been carried over into the transition as a form of reflex. But the question which needs to be asked is to what extent is social capital a substitute for the institutional system and its shortcomings and to what extent is it an indication of the emergence of a participative civic democracy discussed above? In this context social capital, as the ability to create and mobilise collective action is essential not just at the micro-level but also at the level of civic democracy.

A further distinction needs to be made, namely that between *assets*, which can be education, material goods, friendships and *capital*. Although often used interchangeably, Polish sociologists have reserved the notion of capital for those assets that can be mobilised and exploited to produce profit to the individual in the form of market opportunities. What is capital under communism would revert to assets or resources within the market and vice versa. Of course this involves a process of recognition of what assets could be capitalised . Underpinning all these types of capital is "human capital" namely "life cycle phase" particularly as it structures domestic and kinship obligations, education and trained skills, personal health, motivation understood as individualism and inter-personal skills. [2]

2. An approach which can be termed mezzo-social capital is applied to analysis of larger groups, such as elites, classes or social strata and categories. It is concerned specifically with such processes as the co-optation, circulation and reproduction of

various elites. More broadly this approach can be used to study the manner in which such groups as the petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia whether technocratic or cultural, the peasantry and indeed the working class use their capitals to locate themselves within a particular set of fields or an economic order. It looks specifically at economic, cultural or symbolic, political and social capitals and the manner in which they acquire, accumulate and invest, consolidate and reproduce, convert or exchange, divest and alienate, and importantly institutionalise these capitals.[3] Of course in a transition situation capital developed according to one set of institutional rules has to be deployed within another. This brings the focus on to the concept of *path dependence* where the influence of the past in all its legacies has a considerable impact on the present and future. The conversion of such capitals under changing rules is a locus of power struggle, Although capitals especially cultural and economic are sources of power their deployment and use depends on a complex interplay between the volume and composition of these capitals, their legitimation and institutionalisation, and social embededness.[4]

3. A third form of the use of social capital, in its macro-social sense is that used in the work of such writers as Fukuyama. Here social capital is defined simply "as a set of informal values and norms shared among members of a group that permits co-operation among them".[5] These norms such as truth telling, meeting obligations, reciprocity ensure that social capital is underpinned by *trust*[6] which is an outcome or bi-product of honest reliable cooperation. Social capital cuts down on transaction costs and is therefore essential for market transactions. However the underlying theme of the work is concerned with a noted disruption in social values, as evidenced by increased crime, broken trust, reduced educational outcomes. The "moral miniaturisation" of group life has led to a smaller radius of trust and therefore fewer macro-level shared values. Neigbourhood watch for example is defensive integration based upon general mistrust and local civil society. That the basis of the social order will be remade is never in doubt the question is how? The growth in social dysfunctionality is put down to a lack of social capital, or more tellingly a depletion in society's stock of shared values. However the new shared norms will emerge because we are biologically social and committed by need and reason to social co-operation. The vehicle for both is the growth of the network society which is inherently a trust society. A network is defined as "a group of individuals who share *informal (author's italics)* norms or values beyond those necessary for ordinary market transaction". The lack of a moral imperative to trust and co-operation in the workings of the market is conveniently countered by the inherent trust and co-operation present in a network since it is by definition based on shared norms and values. Post-Fordism requires flat or networked organisations and "modern post industrial capitalist economies will generate a continuing demand for social capital" and therefore despite some deficiencies both the state and corporations will co-operate in producing sufficient amounts. However where the shared norms and values i.e. trust will come from is still a problem. Although there is no question that trust will emerge there is a problem as to how the "re-norming" of society to be achieved. Cultural diversity and moral relativism combined with rapid technological change all appear to be working against social order understood as moral order or authoritative values. But the "powerful innate human capacities for reconstituting social order" is the only reason for hope.

Fukuyama's study alerts transition theorists to the many uses that the ubiquitous concept of trust can be put. Whether it is part of the solution or part of the problem is never clear. Whether it extends beyond the Durkheimian concern for the "non-contractual element in contract" is also doubtful.

Household strategies and micro-capitals

There is an obvious intellectual fit between the strategies and tactics adopted by *households* as they seek to make sense of the emerging market order and the manner in which social capital is used in livelihoods analysis. Standing alongside financial, human, natural and physical capital, it ordered the way in which livelihoods could be maintained under conditions of stress and *shock*. Quite specifically social capital here means the networks, relationships of trust which individuals and households could draw upon and mobilise in any eventuality.[7] Policy makers could model the distribution of capitals within a community and thus assess the vulnerability or otherwise of that community. When combined with a participatory study of aspirations and objectives, constraints and concerns it should be relatively straightforward to target assistance at a range of capital enhancement activities.

Vulnerability factors

What were the vulnerability factors confronting households in 1989? Macro economic stabilisation brought about an observable increase in access to goods and services as well as price rises brought about by the gradual removal of subsidies, the fixing of a real exchange rate and the adaptation of energy prices to near world levels. Inflation was reduced, the relative price of goods changed with food, clothing and cultural goods rising least, whereas energy and heating rose the most. Between 1989 and 1993 the nominal price of foodstuffs rose by 17 times, of health and hygiene products by 34 times and gas and energy by 122 times.[8]

The psychological impact of such rises was enormous since real wages did not begin to increase on a year on year basis until 1992/3. As it was retail sales did not really pick up until 1991 by which time retail outlets had doubled from 152 071 in 1989 to 310 966 in 1991 and the number of persons per shop had halved. Unemployment grew from 6.5 percent in 1990 to 16.4 in 1993 from which it has gradually declined but remains at 13.9 percent in 2000 an increase from 11.9 percent in mid-1999. Of these 58.5 percent are female and 60 percent under 34 years of age. By 1998 over 69 percent of the employees were in the private sector compared to 47.9 in 1990 with the attendant growth in work discipline and often a decline in conditions fo employment. There was a considerable growth in employers and self employed to nearly over 1.5 million in 1998 with an increase in the agricultural population from 3.7 million in 1990 to 4.07 million in 1998. The latter was caused by a return to agriculture by certain categories of peasant-workers often the first to be made unemployed through restructuring.

Households experienced a change in consumption patterns with employee households spending 37 percent of income on food in 1995 compared to 45.8 percent in 1989 after which time the figure has remained static. At the same time expenditure on heating a particularly sensitive area for a country such as Poland which continues to believe in its coal industry has risen from 4.3 percent in 1990 to 10.7 percent in 1996 and 11.2 percent in 1997. By comparison in Ireland the figure is 4 percent. However expenditure on rents is less than a quarter of EU levels.[9]

However a comparison of what a monthly wage could purchase in 1995 compared to 1985 puts the case of relative deprivation more clearly.

Apart from the case of Romania, wages could purchase as much if not more than they could in 1985 without taking into account the drudgery of a "scarcity society".

Table 2 Relation of one months wage expressed as the price of a consumer article- ratio 1985/ 1995[10]

Country	Flour kg	Beef kg	250g butter	Dozen eggs	Kg sugar	100g tea
Czech	605/905	79.4/76.3	301/364	245/381	362/361	158/341
Estonia	194/429	30.1/70.8	100/244	90.7/218	68.3/282	96.9/368
Lithuania	234/274	31.1/39.0	129/162	84.0/127	69.8/147	93.7/143
Latvia	203/301	41.0/50.2	203/191	95.5/148	114/212	130/321
Poland	466/671	58.9/68.2	187/381	123/217	267/375	286/602
Romania	551/222	64.1/18.5	201/124	164/69.1	197/118	251/91.6
Hungary	747/971	60.9/56.2	307/352	178/282	239/436	409/287

Thus the negative assessment of the transition is as much about the shock of transition associated with changing price structures as it is about real purchasing power.

In the face of these changes the most important perceived factors contributing to a successful life remains good health (64 percent) with money(40.6 percent) work (32.7 percent) Divine Providence (16.1 percent) as secondary features. But that a successful marriage (59.8 percent) and children (45.5 percent) should be a key determinant of satisfaction requires a closer examination of the role of family in the transition.[11] In fact since 1994 work satisfaction as a contributory factor to a general sense of well-being has markedly declined whereas satisfaction from marriage and children as well as with growing income are now key determinants.[12]

The Family as Resource.

Any study of household coping and adaptation strategies has to be based upon an understanding of the impact of transition upon the structure of the family and household. The first effects of the transition on the family was to introduce the discipline of money as hard budget constraints confronted families before they did factories. Many of the safety measures were lost overnight including savings and the value of informal contacts. Time, non working relatives, friends in queues and shops, the access to rationed resources such as housing and kindergartens were all de-capitalised as were nepotistic dependencies.

But first it is necessary to elaborate a definition of strategies. They can be either individual or collective and which is chosen will of course be in some sense determined by the relative costs of each and the type of assets at their disposal. Strategies can seek to maximise household capital by expanding already considerable capital. It was found that those with highest levels of human capital also supported their families more intensively. Secondly there are corrective strategies where negative outcomes for one part of the family are balanced by positive values for others. So that parents of better educated children find that they in turn are supported in the attainments of certain services in the public sphere. Thirdly there is the re-distribution of poverty where both generations have few resources and some parity is achieved through distributing assistance, goods and services in kind amongst themselves. As mentioned strategies can be individual, collective-social or legalistic. The goal to be achieved will influence the choice of strategy, as will the relative costs, and other factors such as location in the life cycle.

Here young people are more likely to engage in individualistic solutions given that they have fewer social ties.

Family resources are accepted as being especially important determinants of individual socio-economic success as well as in the formation of socio-political attitudes. Bogdan Mach[13] is one of the sociologists who identifies the family as the key actor and unit of analysis during transformation processes for the following reasons;

1. The instrumental exploitation of family resources increases under transformation. Harsh reality demands the maximum mobilisation of resources, both material and non material. These resources are the cheapest and often the only ones available since often it is unclear what the relevant assets are within the rules of the unfolding transformation scenario, and how they should be obtained. In such a situation family assets are there and do not need to be generated. It is likely that although the transformation is strongly *individualising* in the initial stages it will increase the emotional and organisational cohesion of the family unit. This is in fact the case as is shown by other research mentioned below.
2. Mach also believes that the family becomes a more effective unit of assistance under transition since the development of mezzo institutions reduces the gap between micro structures and the state and thus the family is relieved of many of its covert functions as the refuge before this totalising state. It can now provide effective support in the development of the individual life trajectories of its members. Simon Clarke has however expounded the view that survival in the transition is not the "result of the realisation of a household survival strategy, but is the contingent result of more or less independent decisions of individual household members who have seized the opportunities presented to them".[14] This was as much due to the absence of co-ordinated decision making as to the limited number of opportunities open to the household. Whether this is a specific of the Russian transition is unclear, but it does usefully modify the over rationalised and integrated image of the family as the focus and indeed repository of assets and resources. However it is important to note that Mach is referring to "habitual, often unstructured life practises, during which individuals and families use all the means available to them... and individual and family identity conditions this practise in a symbiotic manner".[15]
3. During the transition the relevance of certain mental resources associated with family identity increases. The social dimorphism and distortions associated with the gap between the public and private moralities can be overcome on the terrain of intra-familial discourse much more easily than in public life. Thus macro level citizenship initiatives can be more easily debated and internalised within the family before being confronted within the new civic society.
4. Given that new public identities take longer to construct that private ones, the family as a readily available resource for identity formation explains some of its continuing popularity as an indicator of social and personal success.

Giza Poleszczuk and her colleagues have argued strongly for the role of the family as a particularly effective and valuable basis for the construction of social capital. Group support has they claim lost none of the significance it possessed under the "economics of scarcity" and is just as applicable to adaptations to the emerging new economic order. The nature of support activity within the family is generally either material support of parents towards children, and where there is support for parents it is generally

Table 3 Could you depend on family help if you needed to...?[16]

	Yes	No	Difficult to say
Find a job.	37.0	57.2	5.8
Loans to start a business.	34.9	60.0	5.1
Difficult situation and needed money.	68.8	25.5	5.7
Ill and needed care.	82.1	15.6	2.4
Assistance in official matters.	64.0	33.0	3.0
Information on a complex matter e.g. tax.	49.7	43.7	6.6

of a non-material, public sphere, variety. This is important since it permits the older generation to find their way through the new system. As such social capital is essential to the embedding of citizenship, since it allows for the socialisation of those who are less well informed into the new civic culture.

Various forms of kinship ties carry with them different types of support, be it dowries, child care or money. Also it is apparent that during the transition certain factors such as private sector employment, education and income have become more important than factors such as time (for standing in queues or looking after children) or more generally the ability to compensate for the shortcomings of the market. Thus investment in human capital, i.e. ones childrens and ones own education has replaced the production of those goods and services which should be provided by the public sphere.

With reference to the discussion of social norms concerning rights and duties within the family, the small percentage of "difficult to say" answers seem to point to a relatively well defined set of duties within the family. This greater sense of determinacy points to a more formally developed set of rights within the family by comparison to western families. The impact of this familistic rights culture on the growth of wider norms of reciprocity and indeed social capital cannot be assumed.

A second form of resource identified is that of neighbourliness and close spatial proximity. Poleszczuk discovered that whereas there were very few conflicts with neighbours, there was also a general impression that joint activity with neighbours was an underused resource (55 percent).Where there is mention of co-operation, either real or potential, it is either for purposes of mutual protection from the outside – a growing threat – and a shift towards what Fukuyama termed "smaller radius groups".[17] Thus the trust that underpins social capital could be stimulated by a growing mistrust, attendant upon declining faith in law and order.

If the development of citizenship stops at the miniaturised society, at the local community level or housing block, which given the need to catch up and create new housing stock is possible, then the growth of the generalised trust necessary for civic democracy might be stunted. In fact there is evidence that a certain culture of solidarity, criminality and social exclusion is already growing within the inhabitants of the run down housing estates or "bloks" . These so called "blokers" are generally young males who are poorly integrated into the wider society and although they conform to their own code of ethics are beyond institutional assistance. To a considerable extent their life styles are determined by the socio-spatial enclosure of their housing estates, the lack of opportunity for interaction and the poverty of amenities which is part of the legacy of incomplete urbanisation under communism.[18] In her account of crime and communities Beatrix Campbell describes the struggle for spatial control engaged in by

unemployed young men. It refers to the "work" of petty crime that these young men take up as apart of problematic masculinity and based on a culture of separateness. Nonetheless they depend on women- mothers and wives- to make homes in which they "nest". All have a clear resonance with the description of youth crime in Poland.[19]

Also if as has been shown, mutual support and co-operation is a strategy adopted by those with plentiful access to other resources, then this could compound the tendency towards closure and exclusion.

Family structures

It is generally accepted that under communism the family inflated into a broad structure of ties including siblings and in-laws in extended relations. This family was the basis of social solidarity whereas other groups were treated instrumentally or excluded from the radius of trust. This was the basis of the "amoral familism" thesis and reflected the needs for family based social capital under conditions of scarcity. During the nineties, the family has once again changed shape especially in the towns, which account for 63 percent of all families, with ties limited to close relatives but with new links developed to include friends and work colleagues. Thus researchers tend to identify four groups based on their orientations to micro structures:

- Individualists – who are least embedded in micro structures and who most often orient to formal institutions and organisations,
- familistic – for whom the family is the key life orientation,
- friendship oriented-which involve the most dynamic and far reaching ties,
- colleagues – generally work based.

However the pressure on time caused by broader sets of relationships as much as by the changing work patterns, has led to a decline in the time available to exchange views and emotions in horizontal space. Thus family meetings are more likely to revolve around problem solving rather than affective ties. Commensality for example includes one shared meal a day for 39.7 percent of respondents.[20] The role of the family remains a mixture of the affective and economic-protective, a declining emphasis on social control and a melding of sociability and extension from the public sphere.

A whole range of transition factors have had a fundamental impact on the family. Income inequality has extended the categories and variety of family life style. Decentralisation in politics has brought family-related issues closer to the local polity – in terms of adapting local resources to emerging family needs. As families become more adept and trained in dealing with the stress of uncertainty so new values begin to inform family life especially material success and related status signifiers.[21] Nevertheless the burdens of transition remain. In a recent study carried out for the Polish government:[22]

- Over 20 percent of families do not pay their rent on time,18 percent are behind with gas bills, and 10 percent on credit payments for their accommodation.
- Nearly 30 percent could not satisfy foodstuffs requirements in meat, fruit and processed products.
- Over 80 percent have no savings, over 58 percent have debts.
- Over 35 percent families over the past year have given up some form of cultural activity

- Nearly 51 percent did not send children on holiday and over 64 percent of adults did not take a break.

Of course the resources of a family depend upon its structure. In Poland there were 10, 533 428 families at the 1995 census of which 60 percent were married couples and children. A further 25 percent were married couples without children which included independent children. Another 16.8 percent were single parent families, an increase from 9 percent in 1988, of which 89 percent were headed by women. Of these latter 46.6 percent were widows, one in four were divorced and one in twelve were unmarried mothers. Amongst men it was largely widowers (59.6%) and divorcees (19.2%) only 1.9 percent being bachelor fathers. It is worth noting that one in five single parent families were married but separated.

By 1999 however 19.7 percent of all households were single person, made up of the unmarried, widows and widowers and the divorced. However they are generally men and women under 24 and women over 60. The latter category is to be found in larger towns and cities and they fare worse materially and psychologically than those with partners. Under socialism single persons were often viewed with suspicion and in the workplace were less likely to be promoted, were lower paid and generally compelled to do un-social hours. In the modern global economy young single persons highlight their availability, especially for women employees where employers are loathe to become involved in the costs of maternity leave. Older single employees are more likely to be made redundant with an easier conscience when any discriminating reason that can be used is deployed.

Nurses, teachers and clerical workers who still make up the bulk of single women are a force with which service industries in Poland have yet to come to terms with. However dating agencies have boomed as have the personal columns of the major papers. These now also serve the time-poor who as in the west require agencies to organise their lives.[23]

There has been an 11 percent increase between 1988–1995 in the number of births to single parents and it has grown from 15.4 percent to 16.8 percent of the total births. Importantly for the analysis of poverty, single parents supported 1,507.000 children up to the age of 24, which constituted 12.8 percent of the total population of young people, and the average single parent mother would have 1.52 children. With the decline in births generally from 547,700 in 1990 to 395 600 in 1998 and a further 382 000 in 1999 where for the first time since the war the number of deaths exceeded the number of births and the population of Poland declined. Although life expectancy (69 for men and 77 years for women)has increased a dramatic rise in the number of deaths in the first quarter of 1999 contributed to the above figures. Of course politicians were quick to blame the health reforms for contributing to these incidences of mortality although it was impossible to say since doctors as part of an on going protest have been refusing to enter causes of death into death certificates.

At the same time there has been a simultaneous increase in births outside of marriage from 6.2 percent in 1990 to 10.1 percent in 1996 and 12 percent in 1999. This is in part caused by the restrictions on abortions for whereas in 1993 nearly 60 percent were to women under 24 and usually less educated,13 percent were to mothers over 35. Similar increases of extra marital births have been witnessed in other transition countries such as Lithuania where they rose from 7 percent in 1990 to 18 percent in 1998.[24] In Poland the rise in such extra-marital births in part could be put down to the lifting in 1989 of

the obligation to have a civil ceremony prior to the a church wedding, so that children from such unions might be classed as extra-marital.

Poland is a young society with half the female population under 36 and half of men under 33 years of age so that it is not surprising that 8 percent of all births are to women under 19. However it does indicate that value changes associated with marriage and the family would have a considerable impact in a short period of time. The massive increase in higher education intake has clearly had an effect on such value changes. Women now marry at 24 compared to 22 ten years ago and tend to give birth between 25–29 and not 20–24. Now 20 percent of women do not marry compared to 5 percent ten years ago. However it is unemployment and the informal pressures on women in a tight labour market which is seen as the main culprit given that over 60 percent of unemployed women are under 34 years of age.[25]

Rural families continued to be extended in nature across several generations – generally including in laws, which indicated that rural heads of household would be from the middle generation, whereas urban households would be headed by the eldest members.

As for co-habitation, some 200 000 informal families, or 2 percent of all family relationships put Poland well down the European league, where in Denmark 13 percent of all unions are non marital and 5 percent in the UK. The need for social capital formation, the combination of resources from both sides of the family, which probably accentuates formal over informal ties, could be one of the reasons. Equally significant , since 1995 the number of contracted marriages has been overtaken by those dissolved through death or divorce, whereas divorce in urban areas has increased from 6.0 per 1000 existing marriages to 6.7 in 1998.[26] This relatively slow rate of increase, where divorces rose from 27 900 in 1993 to 45 200 in 1998 and have since dropped to an estimated 40 000 in 2000 is explained by many factors. Chief of these are the difficulties associated with pursuing complicated divorce procedures, subsequent access to separate housing and the real costs, financial and emotional of such decisions.[27] However the moral pressures not to divorce come not only from the local community in the small towns, but also from the extended kin network for whom a family is very much a resource, a "strategic capital".[28] Poland was ranked 32 of the 39 European countries in 1993 in terms of divorce.[29] The fact that women principally obtain custody of children after divorce (only 3.5 percent of fathers received custody in 1993) and that paternal contacts tend to be few, increases the scale of child poverty. Unemployment in single parent families immediately plunges those families into poverty. However over the last ten years the major increase has been in divorces in families without children and those where is only one child and children are under 18 divorce has fallen from 50 900 in 1987 to 28 996 in 1997.

It is estimated that in 1998 1 in 3 of those in extreme poverty were children under the age of 14.The costs of the transformation have changed the constituencies from which children find themselves in orphanages. The new poor, those in employment but on low wages now present 34 percent of such children. The most recent research reports that every second person in extreme poverty is under 19. Over 50 percent of families with 2+ children live below the social minimum as do 55 percent of single mothers. *In a political move which recognised the fact that 40 percent of all children are in families of 3 or more children and 95 percent of these live in difficult circumstances, the government in September 2000 resolved to pay a one off sum of 145 zloty for each third child and above.*

Child poverty implies that an increasing group of people will miss out on the investment in human capital referred to above. Furthermore child poverty in a rapidly growing consumer society involves a form of stigma that was highlighted by the rationalisation and closure of village schools that compelled village children to integrate with powiat or town based pupils. The protests that ensued were as much about the fact that it would expose rural children's poverty to their more affluent peers as it was about the closure of local facility and the need for travel.[30] The situation is made all the more poignant since rural schools have been condemned for creating a whole range of problems for their pupils, physical, mental, social and cultural but at the same time palpably providing a hiding place for their poverty.[31]

The other factor is that in the countryside unemployment is most common amongst peasant-worker families, that is those with fewest possibilities for maintaining a decent standard of living from their small holdings and whose ties with the village community and rural traditions are weakest. Here local social capital is denied to a social group who carried the burdens of under-urbanisation under communism, through long hours commuting in intolerable conditions to factories where they were always a second class "proletariat".[32]

As mentioned above this situation is all the worse in the ex state farm regions whose work-forces due to the process of recruitment being drawn from the displaced and the unwanted, were the least educated and most pathological. When the 1409 state farms were restructured and privatised at the end of 1991[33] they made over 300 000 farm workers unemployed out of 450 000 and in some cases 90 percent of people of working age in these groups of villages are still without work.

The attendant poverty for the 2 million or so family members was heightened by the withdrawal of both formal and informal support provided by the state farm. Whatever its economic and indeed political role, for its members who were drawn from the least educated and most marginal members of society, the state farm provided a secure habitat. Those who remain, some half a million people now live in a limbo, remembering the golden days when they had housing, an allotment, milk and grain allocations, pigs to rear. Opportunities for casual work are few and far between, and they do not even look for work. Life is based on credit at the local shop and illegal spirit production.[34] Most of the active labour market policies introduced are beyond the human capital capacities of these farm labourers who for generations have left school early for work on the farm. As in other post Soviet states few (6 percent) have an interest in running their own farms. They lived in housing blocks in the middle of the fields which were mini-societies providing all their social, educational and cultural needs. The collapse of communism came as a greater shock to them than to any other group. State paternalism had meant that 50 percent of all investment was directed towards state farms which at best covered 20 percent of arable land. The suggestion by some politicians that they in effect be "paid off" points to the hopelessness of the situation where even World Bank Loans for rural activation programmes miss the mark.[35] Attempts to break the cycle of poverty include grants paid to secondary schools by the Agency for Agricultural Property (AWR) which disposes of the ex-state farm land. Such grants will help to ensure that children from deprived backgrounds can progress beyond elementary education.

Other enclaves of child poverty have been encountered in industrial cities such as Lodz where child abuse and violence are the natural outcome of neglect by schools and parents. Suicides amongst the under 14s have increased from 37 in 1990 to 100 in 1998 alongside a levelling out in the population in general. However the growing

scale of violence against the child[36] is accompanied by a doubling in youth crime since 1990 especially violence (including homicides) which rose from 419 to 2897.[37]

In trying to connect the growth of crime, not just youth crime, and the attempts to introduce forms of community policing or Neighbourhood Watch type of activities, it is important to note how the legacy of communism interferes with local initiatives. Local communities see any attempt to revive community policing or any type of voluntary policing activity as a reconstruction of the police reserve (ORMO) which was held in particularly low esteem. In fact the lack of confidence in the competence of the police, due largely to the large scale turn-over since 1989, as well as its low standing, has witnessed the emergence of "neighbourhood security" but which has little to do with the police proper. On the other hand the attributes of learned helplessness deprives many communities of the initiative of dealing with these problems, looking to increased punitive measures from the police. This strangely is accompanied by the view held by three quarters of respondents that the police are often helpless in the face of criminal activity. The socio-spatial and architectural lay out of many communities conspires to instil a fortress mentality that likewise obstructs the growth of civic culture and indeed the old housing estates foster a culture of crime.

Returning to crime statistics, the general impression that problems of law and order in Poland are greater than elsewhere is not confirmed by the statistics. Poland has less than half the crime per 100 000 head of population compared to France, a third compared to Germany and is less than Greece and Spain but on par with Estonia and Slovakia. However between 1985 and 1995 it was mainly youth crime, committed and sentenced, for those between 17–20 which grew by 237.8 percent. For other older age groups, i.e. those 25–34 years there was actually a decline brought about partly by demographic factors.[38]

Thus the change in the distribution and the type of crime has given the impression of a crime wave. This in turn influences the perceptions of danger which are drawn from the mass media, and stimulate a low grade and diffuse moral panic drawing on public opinion rather than rational argument. It is also possible that the new "openess" of everyday life is partly responsible for the feelings of danger and insecurity, the loss of the comforts of being a prisoner. Thus where as in 1987 over 74 percent of Poles felt it was a safe country by 1998 the figure had dropped to 22 percent. However the level of apprehension far exceeds the probability of crime with some 67 percent of respondents expressing a fear of break-in when they are away from home.[39] This sense of being overwhelmed compounds this reluctance to engage in dealing with crime that builds on the original learned helplessness.[40] The result is passivity. However it requires a certain level of local solidarity in order to produce genuine victim studies on which to build realistic projects, hence a vicious circle is joined.

Part of the re-construction of citizenship involves a remaking of social ties of informal social control and overcoming the centralised model of state imposed order. *Security*, both personal and of property, is a social enabling right par excellence. An absence of security can severely limit equality before the law through widespread intimidation, the right to obtain and hold property, through protection rackets and robbery and the right to political association. It is only recently that legislation has removed some of the anti-private property bias from the criminal code which allowed car theft to be explained by "temporary property annexation" or borrowing. If an essential element of the transition has been the shift of the loci of everyday life from the work place to the neighbourhood, then part of the re-construction of neighbourliness is the rebuilding of trust within the community as well as towards the police.

As in the West crime has been associated with single parent families or the lack of traditional families. This and the declining birth rates have led to calls for pro-family policies which in Poland coincided with the return of conservative parties to power in September 1997. Article 71 of the Constitution commits the state when formulating its social and economic policies to take into account the good of the family. Single parent and multi-child families in difficult circumstances should receive special assistance from the state. Such policies are as much driven by ideology as they are by pro-natalist concerns. In general there has been a growing acceptance that women need not sacrifice their careers for the their husband's success although there is some considerable dissonance between men and women on what their role ought to be in the family. Thus although a rejection of communism initially provided an impetus for the rejection of the socialist model of women at work, the impact of the transition hardships has provided a more rational response. Research indicates that women have carried the brunt of unemployment and borne the status degradation brought about through occupational change with greater equanimity than men. This has been accompanied by a growing affirmation by women that they feel discriminated against (37 percent).[41]

For whatever reason live births per 1000 population have declined from 14.3 in 1990 to 10.2 in 1998,with a decline from 17.2 to 12.2 in the countryside being the most noteworthy. Natural increase in the towns is now negative at –0.2 per 1000 population with the reproduction rate dropping from 2.04 in 1990 to 1.43 in 1998 and 1.25 in the urban areas.[42] There are a range of causes proffered for such a decline but the increasing need to invest in human capital mentioned must be a factor. The production of "high quality" children as they are called has become genuinely expensive as education, health, foodstuffs and leisure all have real costs imposed upon them.[43] Other reasons are the fear of job loss amongst mothers despite protective legislation, However poor housing especially for young couples and general impoverishment limits projected child bearing, both ideal and planned, which combined with the fall in marriages must contradict the idealisation of family life mentioned above and indicate that behaviour is changing faster than values.[44] Over 76 percent of the population believe that the low birth rate is due to poor housing, 55 percent add lack of state support and 52 percent fear of job loss by women. Further factors identified were concerns over a drop in living standards (50 percent) the impossibility of combining work and family obligations, women's professional ambitions (19 percent) and the lure of a comfortable life style.[45] Over the last ten years material conditions are seen to have deteriorated by 76 percent of the population and over two thirds state social assistance for child care has worsened.

Nursery places have halved since 1990 partly due to a decline in the birth rate, high female unemployment amongst the under 30 age group and an increase in the cost of keeping a child in nursery or kindergarten.

Even in the case of pre-school education, the proportion of those attending remains at about one third, which given the increasing competitiveness in education must discriminate against those unable to attend.

Table 4 Children in nurseries and pre-school (3-6).[46]

	1989	1995	1998
Children in nurseries (thous)	150 600	69 300	61 600
Children in nurseries per 1000 under 3 yrs	44	51	50
Pre-school	921 000	773 200	739 300
Per 1000 3–6 yrs	340	356	384

However although the majority believe that the state should improve living conditions, counteract unemployment and poverty, the general view is that the family and child birth is now a private matter and not a national duty. Thus 58 percent maintained that the state should not encourage higher birth rates through policy.

However in social capital terms, pro-family policies tend to support human capital formation and accumulation and encourage enterprise as well provide shock absorbers for the costs of transition. The image of the family with 2+ children is still held by over 70 percent of the population but alongside this only 33 percent of men and 42 percent of women support a "partner" view of family relations, and 47 and 38 percent respectively the more traditional arrangement. The latter is less conducive to the effective deployment of social capital although it should be remembered that informal ties based around the family were largely the preserve of women.

Housing: Resource or Right?

The existence of poor housing provision has been mentioned as a cause of the diminished birth rate in Poland and deferred marriage decisions. Homelessness on the other hand is taken as a major indicator of the inability of certain social categories to adapt to the rigours imposed by the transition. Housing is implicated in educational achievement and the growth of cultural capital, in levels of morbidity and therefore in employability, However the home is also a physical *resource* in the transition and sets limits on the kinds of strategies which can be adopted.

It is generally accepted that the household is also an independent economic unit which is comprised not only of its members but also of its assets namely time, knowledge or human capital as well as skills, money and household goods within the physical confines of the home. The home could become the source of a minor cottage industry, either for business start up or simply to generate extra income in the face of hardship. It could provide income to women whose husbands are unemployed or in other ways incapacitated as well as mopping up the capacities generated in the scarcity society. A large cellar became a workshop, outhouses were transformed into small shops, as well as the myriad cases of where rooms became offices. In passing it should be noted that the rental cost of office space in Warsaw was higher than in Brussels, Berlin and Amsterdam at 378 euro per square metre per annum.[47]

The household connects, both as a producer and consumer, with the local infrastructure and markets, through employment, services and other institutions such as schools and health. The transformation has brought this aspect of the household under particular scrutiny as it is pared to the bone in the search for assets and capitals. But above all else the home became a valuable asset providing a big leg up on the ladder of the new stratification order.

At one end of the scale members of the elite over the last ten years have been able to appropriate in various ways high quality accommodation in locations which have recently acquired real market values.

> "It is possible to provide a list of politicians and administrators who thanks to friendships and actions on the borderline of the law have bought attractive accommodation at ridiculous prices".[48]

Ridiculous can mean one fifth or less of the market price. The fact that high officials have it within their gift the right to allocate a small pool of housing to "essential"

personnel does little to raise the standing of the political class in popular perception. There can be little doubt that the home is very much an asset in the process of capital conversion where immediate political as well as economic capital is converted either into another form of capital or into a sub category of capital. Where housing in Warsaw for example is worth up to 8000 zloty per square metre and the minimum monthly wage is a tenth of that then paying 20–40 percent of the real value of such property is a major windfall.

> "There is no party whose activists are not mixed up in one of Warsaw's housing scandals. A certain balance of power has developed. An inter-party agreement for a system of doing deals."[49]

On the other hand some politicians will make a virtue of remaining ostensibly in the housing they inhabited when they came into office, recognising the symbolic and political capital housing has attached to it. Thus the non-conversion of capital can serve to *accumulate* existing capital. Of course many politicians are only formally registered in their old communist blocks, whereas they own villas of course in the names of relatives. The life style of politicians and especially their homes are often the subject of public speculation when formal incomes and property values are compared, indicating the continued deficit in trust.[50] It does not need to be underlined that access to privatised or restituted housing is probably one of the single most important determinants of life chances for individuals and households as they start into the transition. Hence the proposed legislation on communal and co-operative housing privatisation is particularly controversial.

However as with many other aspects of the privatisation process it could be highly unequal in its outcomes as it usually capitalises assets as they were constituted at a particular point in time.

There have been three forms of popular privatisation in Poland:

1. The free distribution of 15 percent shares to employees of companies privatised by the Treasury.
2. Priority and subsidised purchase of shares in employee owned companies.[51]
3. The distribution and sale of National Investment Funds certificates which were exchangeable for shares.

Whether a person worked for a privatised bank, for a telephone company, a paper company as opposed to a mine, steel works, textile mill, determined the level of share ownership realised. The employees of TPSA the Polish telephone company were entitled by the law on commercialisation and privatisation to 15 percent of the shares, free, of the company, which could amount to 2 years salary or more. After protest this included post office workers who had previously belonged to a single state concern. Over 1 million employees benefited from this first type of privatisation. The infamous case of the Silesian Bank saw shares rise by 13 times at the first offering on the Stock Exchange. Others were less lucky and could proverbially use them as wallpaper.[52]

As it is only 2 percent of Poles however admit to owning shares. The largest privatisations such as Polish Telecom had only 132 000 applicants (compared to 2 million in France) for shares against the expected half a million. Although stockbrokers have nearly 1.2 million accounts open only some tens of thousands are active. The stock exchange as an investment for the average citizen is low down on the list largely

due to a lack of share owning culture, ignorance of the rules and a shortage of money. The stock exchange is now much more complex with over two hundred quoted stocks a futures market and other more sophisticated dealings. This has made for lesser transparency and when there is public interest aroused it is usually for the wrong reasons and over some machinations. The collapse to one third of their value of the 25 million certificates in the National Investment Funds emitted in 1998 has further undermined the credibility of share ownership. Finally until the consumer boom based on household credits eases then the interest in savings and share ownership will remain token.[53] There are suggestions that small investors could form associations on the Swedish, French or German model which would educate as well as organise them in the workings of the market.

It is a salutory fact that few individuals could have built their life plans on the assumption of restitution or privatisation even as late as 1989. However wealth is no more conspicuous than in housing. Enclaves for the wealthy have sprung up in every major city where the price of housing per meter can be four times that of the average and where there is no shortage of takers.[54]

At the other end of the extreme there are various calculations as to how many individuals are homeless at any one time although the upper limit would be half a million. It is does little to mitigate this statistic to learn that there are almost as many in Germany and a considerable number in the more developed countries of the world. But it was only when the number of those found frozen to death went well into double figures in 1998 that this became a public issue and questions were asked about why, who and where?

More recently the proposal mentioned above that current incumbents of municipal and co-operative housing as well as state farm peasants should receive them as part of a privatisation programme has served to focus attention on the quality of housing stock and on the nature and extent of the housing market.

Housing has seen the withdrawal of the state from direct involvement in housing provision and the emergence of municipalities, foreign and domestic investors and construction companies, previous owners and their organisations, the banks and other mortgage lenders as well as a new public of buyers. Enterprises have shed their company stock of housing in favour of local authorities, whereas various owners of garden allotments or co-operative housing bodies sit on land and speculate. There has taken place in effect a *re-commodification* of housing, very much as happened in the UK in the 1980s spurred on by a vision of get rich quick possibilities.

The enormous prices paid to farmers for suburban plots sold to large hypermarkets and other out of town stores such as in the Warsaw suburb of Janki, has whetted the often unrealistic appetite of those with proved title to land against which there is no claim outstanding. A combination of the above mentioned protest culture, ad hoc registering of associations and the hi-jacking of legitimate ecological concerns have combined to make urban development chaotic. Opposition to infrastructure development projects whether they be local roads or gas pipe-lines[55] is as much driven by spurious "ecological" concerns as it is by the desire for a "market" price for their land. Here protesters and their associations are accused of being manipulated by owners of land and that the development of key cities has been put back by seven years. Roads may have odd shapes where local councils have resorted to skirting a property rather than paying inflated prices.[56] Since the costs to the protesters are minimal such forms of activity have taken on their own routines and developed interests amongst lawyers, various associations which live off protests and citizens who see in every property

development an opportunity to change their windows, refurbish their house or have a nursery built.[57]

However the key factor concerns the tendency for owners or landlords to seek market prices from their tenants or purchasers. This will make some contribution to rationalising the density of home occupancy, but only at the margins. More probably by making housing into a commodity it will contribute to the above mentioned development of housing classes and eventually into socio-spatial segregation. It could lead to what has been called in the UK the *residualisation* of housing where social housing cares for the needs of those on low incomes and benefits rather than as a generally available resource. This is an important constituent in the process of social exclusion since Polish housing legislation requires that buildings assigned for social housing should be of lower quality and of poorer technical finish.[58] As it is local authorities have been loathe to assign their municipal stock of housing to social housing since they receive only a fraction of the rent. The waiting list for communal housing is currently 137 000 and for social housing 37 500 of which there are only 22 500 in total. If municipal housing of which there are 1.5 million units were to be privatised to their sitting tenants then the rights of groups such as adult orphans leaving orphanages and those suffering disaster will be undermined. More importantly what would happen to those considerable numbers on the housing waiting lists. How the local councils apportion municipal housing has been left up to them and has therefore been a source of controversy.

However the Constitutional Tribunal has already had to rule that the legislature cannot obstruct the property rights of the newly restituted owners of apartment blocks previously under the control of the local authority. It is expected therefore that rents will be partially de-controlled by 11 July 2001 although there will be an upper limit set on what can be charged, set at 4.5 percent of the capital costs of rebuilding. Although full market rents could not be charged to the 600 000 tenants of private landlords as they had hoped, the delay for a staged transition cannot be as long as envisaged by the parliament.[59] Associations of landlords confront associations of tenants (of whom there are some 600 000). The former claim they need to cover the costs of repairing the dilapidated state of the properties (estimated at 60 percent exploitation) whereas the latter point to pensioners stuck in large apartments which landlords will not allow them to exchange for ones of a smaller area and which would in turn entitle them to rent support. The communist government in Poland passed 16 pieces of nationalisation legislation relating to land, buildings and commercial property, *although it did not nationalise housing but only removed it from the control of landlords*. Many of these laws were also broken in their application and are therefore the basis of restitution procedures. Lagging behind other ex communist countries, by mid 2000 the Polish government had not yet passed re-privatisation and restitution legislation although EU accession demands it to do so.[60]

On the other hand the inhabitants of the old communist blocks, be they co-operative or municipally owned, particularly those from the seventies, even if they obtain ownership rights will not be able to afford their upkeep. Payments for marketised local services let alone their renovation, given the low standards of these poorly constructed buildings will be beyond their means. It is pointed out that many of the prospective recipients of "free" housing allocation are unable at present to pay their rents (in some areas of high unemployment, a third have not paid for three months or more). They will become prime candidates for slums and in certain areas such as the old mining communities potential "sociological time-bombs".[61] For example it was estimated that

at the beginning of the nineties, 35 percent of the housing stock in Katowice needed immediate renovation and one fifth should be demolished immediately. Other reports insist that 1 million largely pre WWI housing needs to be demolished immediately and 2 million by 2020.[62] One third of all apartments in Poland were built using the large prefabricated concrete technology and a third of these contained major faults from the day they were built. Over 4 million people live in such accommodation which are large anonymous estates comprising 11 storey buildings. These in turn have already begun to witness problems of crime and vandalism as mentioned above and a flight of those who can from the troublesome estates.

Social segregation is limited for the present since many poorly paid white-collar groups cannot leave and in the words of one commentator paradoxically halt the formation of sink estates.[63] A further factor slowing the inevitable social segregation is the low level of housing mobility, wherein only 450 000 people (or 1.1 percent) change their place of residence per year. On current estimates therefore three quarters of Poles will move home once during their life time.[64] If the housing privatisation bill is introduced then it will create 4 million new owners, those who take over municipal and factory housing as well as co-operative tenants and owners who will receive full property rights. (This process of registration of property could itself take 10 years to complete). The first group will not have to pay anything regardless of whether they are in rent arrears or not. Of these one million have already bought their property leaving a further 2 million recipients of local government largesse. Co-operative tenants will pay 5 percent of its market value on average some 5 000 zloty. The losers will be those who have already bought their property from the co-operative about two thirds of the total, since they will receive bonds to make up what they have lost.[65]

Public opinion as usual reflects the unpredictable outcomes of such policies of privatisation. Some 35 percent believe it will bring more losses than gains, 22 percent are of the opposite opinion, 17 percent think that it will even out and 26 percent are unsure. What is likely, is that a whole new group of homeless will be created when economic as well as social pressures compel some families who are unable to manage, to sell their newly acquired properties.[66] New housing is currently too little and too expensive. *At time of going to press the parliament had passed the legislation which had therefore gone to the president for signature. Exercising his presidential veto powers, Aleksander Kwasniewski vetoed the bill, which in turn could not be overturned by the required 3/5 of the parliamentary vote.*

In an interesting commentary on the politics of interest representation the left wing and liberal parties opposed the legislation for different reasons whereas the right-nationalist and peasant grouping supported the transfer of property to tenants and farmers.

There are a whole raft of obstacles to the emergence of a vibrant housing market which is seen as a major engine of economic development:

- The productivity of the building sector is a quarter of that in the US especially since the vast bulk of new housing over last ten years has been in the family home sector, rather than in the more innovative multi story developments. Of the 675 800 units under construction in January, 640 100 were family homes. The likely cubic capacity to be produced is double that of the larger housing estates. This has social as well as economic implications given that social spatial segregation is more likely with individual housing.

- Municipalities have the land but not the resources to stimulate further development through preparing infrastructure. If they also lose a considerable part of their potential earnings through the redistribution of communal housing to sitting tenants then this situation will worsen. Even the very existence of proposed legislation concerning free housing distribution has seen an immediate downturn in municipal incomes in turn effecting their abilities to deal with the existing homeless. The proposed introduction of a property tax may well alter this situation and provide local authorities with a new income stream.
- The number and amount of mortgage lending increased fourfold from 21 500 in 1996 to 96 000 in 1999 and six-fold respectively.[67] There are strong home ownership values in Poland which will continue to drive the housing market, which saw 60 percent more housing under construction than last year. Continuing high levels of inflation at 11.9 percent in mid 2000 brings with it high interest rates which acts in turn as a disincentive to new home ownership.

However the type of home ownership and the density of occupancy are powerful push factors towards a housing market as are changes in life style of the young.

In the rural areas it is apparent that farmers either have their own houses or they live with their parents. Many of the early credits accorded to the farmers at the end of eighties at what were then low interest rates were spent on housing. The subsequent rise in interest rates and their continuing levels have continued to fuel political and social unrest in the countryside. Those who do not have their own housing tend to be the youngest groups (18–24) who are either skilled workers (58%) who live with their parents or the unemployed (67%). In the towns on the other hand housing status is more varied with apartment ownership, municipal or council tenant as well as co-operative tenancy being more popular. Thus 64 percent of rural dwellers have housing ownership rights and 38 percent of urban inhabitants.

Of these one third of rural and one quarter of urban dwellers share their accommodation with family or others. although over the last two years the percentage of rural dwellers living with some one has declined by 10 percent which has been brought about by a 30 percent increase in young rural dwellers (18–24 years) able to live separately (74%) although those 25–34 are less fortunate (53%). In the towns only one fifth of those with higher education have to share their accommodation compared with one third of those with elementary education only. Young people in particular find it difficult to find independent accommodation. Often parents will live with

Table 5 The type of housing status (percent) urban and rural.[68]

	Total	Total	Rural	Rural	Urban	Urban
	97	99	97	99	97	99
Private house	32	31	56	59	18	15
Private flat	14	16	4	5	20	23
Coop tenant	12	13	2	2	18	20
Council	17	14	5	6	25	19
With parents	20	23	29	27	15	20
Rented	2	2	1	1	3	3
Other	2	0	3	0	1	0

grandparents in order to release a flat for young married offspring. Of course multi generational occupancy has a different meaning in the countryside and thus is not a good indicator of housing pressure.

Over the last thirty years the average area of accommodation has risen from 51 to 70 sq m. However the average number of persons per unit has hardly changed over the years and is 4.35 (rural) and 3.53 (urban). Nonetheless in terms in of area per head it has risen from 13 to 22 sq m. The unfortunate ex state farm workers tend to be clustered amongst those who have less than 10 sq m per head. Thus over two fifths of Poles live in accommodation which accords with western norms of occupation density although as expected they tend to be the more affluent and over 55 years of age. Also two fifths live one person to a room. As for the level of sanitation and utilities, only two thirds of rural families have both running water, a toilet and bathroom and one sixth do not have any of these amenities. Although the situation in the countryside has improved since 1990 when less than 50 percent had an internal toilet, there are still only 14 percent of households who receive mains gas compared to 76 percent in the towns.[69] It should be noted that as a consequence of both previous ideology and current values, expectations concerning the quality of housing are very high.

Poland will soon witness a demographic high entering into adulthood. The pressure for independent accommodation of European standards will grow. Housing construction at an affordable level is not anticipated at present to satisfy predicted demand. By 2010 it is estimated that 5.5 million young people will join the labour market and 4.1 million will retire. Added to this is the growing life expectancy of the older generation which is releasing fewer properties on to market. The current rate of construction at 80 000 units cannot satisfy this anticipated demand. One of the consequences of such a shortfall is the increase in the problem of homelessness.

Homelessness and poverty

Housing policy as much as personal attributes and misfortune contributes to the existence of homelessness and indeed to its expansion. Although the introduction of the market is generally blamed for the growth of homelessness, it is clear that under communism there existed a "concealed" form of homelessness. Since everyone appeared to be registered somewhere therefore it followed that everyone had somewhere to live. The reality was that thousands of people lived in barracks and workers' hostels, moving from one site to another and never really having their own home. Very often today's homeless are those selfsame workers who represent another extreme example of the dependency and learned helplessness which the state engendered.

It is true that the deregulation of rents has led to evictions. In 1999 over 41 000 applications for eviction came to the courts- leaving a total of 58 000 cases. Of these 21 557 eviction notices were granted and 9302 served. Of these 3803 had the right to social housing but only 1751 obtained it whereas 5120 families were evicted on to the streets, of which nearly a 1000 were in Warsaw alone. The largest growth in evictions is from privately owned housing. In the previous three years there had been 12 000 evictions of which 6656 were onto the street.[70] In a society where housing tenure was almost cast iron, the growth in insecurity caused through housing privatisation must be second only to unemployment.

Notice to quit may be served for a number of reasons such as using the premises in an unacceptable manner, making life difficult for others, non-payment of rent and sub

letting without permission. On eviction the court may require that the municipality provide social housing. Most evictions occur because of non-payment of rent which a hard pressed social assistance office can barely cover. A second cause is where the home is left to one of the parties after a divorce and only lastly due to devastation. All political parties believe that the right to eviction is necessary. Evictions cannot occur in the months between the 1 November and 31 March save where the eviction has been caused by the "abuse of one's family".[71] Access to social housing depends on the resources of the local community. However even the housing statistics show that only 4200 rooms of social housing were handed over in 1998, compared to 205 800 in the private sector and 29 000 in the sale or rent sector.[72] Where there is little accommodation graded to suit the needs of lower income families, the transition from non-payment of rent to social housing is made all the more likely. Various local authorities and housing co-operatives have set up data banks to try and match housing need to family income and size and assist in the exchange process, which is far from easy. If the privatisation bill goes through this function will be performed by the burgeoning estate agents.

One of the more surprising contributory factors to the creation and maintenance of homelessness is the system of registration – *meldowanie* – which dates back to communist period legislation in 1974 and 1984. The absence of an entry in an ID card performs a similar function to that of the appellation "of no fixed abode" in the west. Similar to the soviet *propiska* and internal passport or ID card, whereas it was formally abolished before the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russians were given the freedom to move and live where they wished within the Federation, it has paradoxically survived in Poland.

Without going into the implications for the civil and political rights of the need to carry an ID with various forms of information included in it, registration or lack of some documented place of residence carries with it real implications. Since the place of registration does not always square with place of actual residence, this particular piece of bureaucracy has come under frequent criticism.[73]

An individual may be de-registered by their family if they have been absent for 6 months or more and of unknown whereabouts. Cases include older people returning from hospital to find that their rented apartment has been sold and they no longer have registration. Aggressive parents, in laws, ex-wives or husbands, all can invoke de-registration which sets in course a train of events which may end in homelessness. There are endless case studies which include loss of registration as a key part in the trajectory to homelessness. Persons who are evicted, who leave a workers' hostel or a reform school lose their registration. It is impossible to obtain a new propiska without the permission of the new landlord. Finally the biggest obstacle to access to social housing is that it is generally reserved by local authorities for those who have registration in their municipality. Further problems with finding a job follow on from having no fixed abode.[74]

As mentioned the pool of the homeless was enlarged by the closure of the communist system of workers' hostels which dispersed some 270 000 manual workers into housing market. The closure of large investment projects and unproductive industries released these unskilled workers into the labour market in large numbers, who whilst they had cut their ties with the countryside were far from integrated into urban life. They were the product of the vast rural-urban social mobility of the 50s and 60s. Many had not acquired the life skills necessary to adapt to the new conditions since the hostel had provided them with a semblance of a home, a roof over their heads, but with few of the responsibilities of a household. Others could not return to a countryside where they had few remaining links and even fewer chances of work. They were lost in a world

which was fast changing and were the personification of redundant labour. Those who were socially inept were the first to become homeless.

Other candidates for homeless status were young people who left orphanages, foster homes and other care centres. In many ways the care centres were themselves unable to prepare their charges for the new conditions which ruled. Often if they did get into some form of vocational training it was generally into a defunct trade or skill and led quickly into unemployment. The other category which is reproduced in all transition countries are ex convicts who on release find that their family situation has altered and they have nowhere left to return.

Alcoholism and narcotic addiction as well as psychological and personality problems, as well as HIV/AIDS are also additional factors which contribute to eventual homeless status. It is estimated that 80 percent of the homeless are addicted drinkers although the chain of causality is less easy to establish. Both work and family life now require a more sustained input and greater responsibility than under the communist social compact when excessive drinking could be combined with some form of employment. Modern work discipline, technology, growing customer care and the tight labour market have altered the social context of drink.

This has been accompanied by a change in popular attitudes towards drunkenness, from being a permissible almost acceptable consequence of the communist system to an unacceptable character trait. This in turn has not helped in the understanding and treatment of the plight of the 2.5 million Poles who are either addicted or excessive users of alcohol. With their families the figure is closer to 6 million and contributes to domestic violence with 75 percent of wives admitting to physical force being used against them. In truth Poles drink less alcohol and differently than 10 years ago, with wine and beer now almost equal to spirit when calculated in terms of pure alcohol. The large cities drink less vodka and more wine. But the countryside and Poland B or the poorer "eastern wall" consume more than the cities and in these regions one third of all alcohol, generally spirit, is smuggled in from the east. More women and young people now reach for the bottle than even four years ago. Over 300 000 persons are detained in sobering up points each year, which in turn have been challenged for their restriction on freedom, but found acceptable by the European Human Rights Tribunal.[75] Before 1982 the state would impose compulsory detoxification which proved unsuccessful, with at best a 5 percent success rate, whereas since then anyone committed by the Municipality Commission for Resolving Alcohol Problems or by the courts can discharge themselves when they wish. It is now claimed that a new, more liberal approach has encouraged alcoholics to seek help although the recent health service reform will probably cut back already tight funding since Sickness Funds are not willing to sign contracts with alcohol dependency advisory and treatment centres. Although over 130 000 patients are registered in such centres there is barely funding for 20 to 25 percent of them. The homeless come well down on this growing list.

There are accusations that a highly centralised state run programme, the State Agency for the Solution to the Alcohol Problem, sponsoring a "Polish model of treatment" is not suited to the introduction of western techniques. The so-called Minnesota model which would depend less on professionals and more on the resources of the AA and volunteer therapists who had been alcoholics, is another example of the etatist vs NGO tension mentioned above.[76] In the struggle to find the funds to cover their obligation to provide treatment for alcoholics local authorities have the right to impose a charge for granting licenses to sell alcohol. The temptation to use these funds for other more urgent matters is often too great.

Alcohol continues to blight peoples lives and contributes to the slide into homelessness. In 1998 of the 997 homicides committed, 544 were carried out by intoxicated perpetrators whereas for other crimes such as bodily harm and assault the proportion was about one quarter.[77] Since 1990 the total persons sentenced has risen from 81 170 to 142 149 in 1998 although the proportion of those with suspended sentences has risen from 52 030 to 116 263. The prison population has increased from 33 965 to 42 130 in the same time. Ex-prisoners are also prime candidates for homeless status. Rape has nearly doubled as have crimes against private property and economic crimes. It is generally accepted that by international standards the absolute and relative rates are not high, but the rate of increase has been part of the trauma of transformation.

Various measures exist to deal with the homeless such as shelters and over night accommodation (which cover about 20 000).These facilities are often used on a regular basis by individuals who know their rights and by definition are more industrious. They are provided one hot meal a day and stay for free provided you have income of less than the lowest pension. Longer stays are granted by a special commission that can also decide to provide treatment for addictions. Special social hostels are provided for those who have longer connections with the community and where stays are limited to six months with the aim of putting the individuals back on their feet. These shelters also develop their own cultures, very much like prisons, and effective control passes from the over stretched social workers involved, to small mafias. In the words of one care worker "from each night shelter you come out more homeless than when you went in".[78]

Various secular and religious NGOs provide support which is combined with rehabilitation and training and which involves accepting everyone in need regardless of income, life situation, place of last residence or registration. In that sense they are free to help where the local authorities must have proof of extreme destitution.[79]

Homelessness among women especially with children or who are pregnant is dealt with by a growing range of shelters. These provide not only overnight accommodation but also psychological and legal counselling, nursing assistance and are a combination of social assistance, religious and parish activities, as well as the Red Cross. Research appears to indicate that the majority of women who seek help are divorced or in the process of divorcing their husbands. They tended to be working class, from difficult family backgrounds with histories of mental and physical abuse and who themselves had lived in over-crowded housing. They had little or no help from their families. Alcoholism and physical violence were the major reasons for their divorces and were often coupled with an aversion to men in general.

Homelessness in transition society is a good example of the manner in which social citizenship and the market interact in a dynamic manner, the tension between the right to housing and the needs of the market. In this case social rights do not abate the market but ease its introduction. Homelessness is an extreme case of civic exclusion, all the more so during transition when life chances are in the balance.

Social workers recognise that homelessness is a *process* and intervention early enough can help to influence individuals away from this particular solution to their crises. The re-commodification of housing coupled with the changes in social and economic structure relocates individuals and households from a certain set of social relations and ties them into a narrower or even non-existent milieu. The loss of a home, rather than being simply roofless is about dis-connectedness from the community and common biography, from tradition and memory, from life style and values. All of these are mediated through the physical environment of the home.

Over time, the homeless acquire a "homeless syndrome", where they lose self criticism, the will to fight, and a gradual acceptance of their minimal existence pervades their thinking. Those who are able enough quickly socialise into the search for the resources available in this alternative existence, and spend their time and energy moving from shelter to hand out provided by NGOs and the local authority. The homeless are drawn to the larger cities, almost with the blessing of the hard-pressed local authorities, which contributes to the culture. Increasingly they include migrant workers from the areas of high unemployment drawn to the relative construction boom in the cities who save on accommodation costs by sleeping rough. However only a quarter or so of the homeless stay in shelters, with railway stations being the most popular, followed by stairways and with friends.

Micro-strategies and macro policies

Homelessness is the extreme case of an adaptation strategy or tactic adopted by those with few resources, and the combination of the individual's attempt to rationally control a traumatic situation within the context of state housing and social policies. *It is an example of an effect or outcome of social citizenship (or absence of it) being pressed into the service of the market, in this case of a housing market as well as a labour market. For whatever reason housing provision does not figure highly in the legitimation discourse of social rights.*

Before examining the manner in which households learned to live with the trauma of transition, embracing the market and coping with the newly imposed disciplines, it is important to have some conception of how these strategies articulate with macro economic and social policies. These are above all else elite led transformations in which institutions and organisations provide both a set of resources as well as constraints i.e. are both means and conditions, for households. There is a sense of the construction of citizenship from above and below, with the "Round Table Agreement" being symbolic of the former and the myriad NGOs and active decentralised local municipalities being characteristic of the latter.[80] Social capital theory of necessity focuses on institutionalisation from below. As Poleszczuk and others claim, to the extent that "institutionalisation from above creates uncertainty, new institutions built from below, generate certain models of local social order, certain "islands" of structural order, and represent a factor in the reduction of system uncertainty".[81]

Such responses often could be in contradiction to the general direction of macro policies since they reflected micro level responses and given that they would be oriented to the maximalization of opportunities would reflect their own household rationality. This could include using resources presented by both the pre and post transition social reality. As a consequence the incomplete transformation from above might combine with ad hoc responses from below to produce what they call "premature systemic consolidation". This in turn is the social basis for the emergence of interests and on top of that values and norms that are rooted in the transformation itself, in its liminal stages, rather than in the past or in the future order. Re-vindication struggles can often be seen to be not simply conflicts over past branch or occupational privileges but also conflicts over the interim rights produced by incoherent macro-level policies and micro level responses.

For example the existence of a private higher education sector in Poland has contributed to the explosion in the number of students in higher education which has

risen from 403 800 in 1990–1991 to 1 274 000 in 1998–99, providing places for 331 483 students in 1998–99. During that time the number of students receiving grants has only grown from 162 100 to 193 500.[82] Thus 29 percent of the age cohort is now in higher education. However access to higher education is still dependent upon social origins. Startlingly only one to two percent of students in full time higher education came from small town and rural backgrounds and the total is half that before the war. Instead they tended to go into part-time education where fees are paid but where travel costs, payment for tuition and short term stays in the university town are lower than full time residence in urban student accommodation. A system of means-tested loans was introduced in 1998, however this does not alter the fact that state higher education is dominated by the wealthier sections of the population who therefore benefit from state subsidy. Where they cannot fulfil the rigorous demands of the university entrance exams they can count on the private sector. Thus the co-existence of the old system of free state education (in fact guaranteed by the constitution of 1997) alongside a burgeoning and differentiated private and semi-private sector, allows certain groups to maximise their opportunities for the education of their children and thus to exploit the incoherence of the educational system.[83]

The situation is further aggravated by the growing rate of graduate unemployment which has inevitably perhaps followed on after the golden years of recruitment and which has risen from two to twelve percent in the last two years. Given the costs involved this could further discourage those with fewer resources and thus widen the gap between those able to adapt to the transition and the rest.

It is therefore more sociologically valid to examine such strategies and responses within their own rational setting than to be driven by a transition agenda. The desire to impose order and control on a rapidly changing situation is a sociological axiom and the interaction of micro life goals and macro-systemic projects likewise. The latter acts as backdrop to the manner in which families seek to utilise their assets accumulated under state socialism and which defines the value of the assets and resources at the disposal of the family.

Strategies also imply interests and connect the socio-economic activity which is the focus of this study with the broader political process. It is now accepted that the myriad informal adaptations to communism rooted that system in society and generated real interests in the continuation of at least some of its aspects. Similarly the aspirations of various social groups were shaped as well as frustrated by communism. This cultural lag is not surprising given that this was initially a non-transformative rebellion, i.e. it did not produce an alternative epistemology or ways of thinking.[84] Nevertheless households discovered that the market was determining their life chances whether they supported the transformation or not. To sum up the discussion thus far it is possible to possible to categorise these interests, broadly understood, as those :

1. Rooted in the past and oriented to maintaining the advantages of the state redistributive order of real socialism.[85] Striving to maintain the currency of old skills and resources or else to raising their conversion values, such interests focus around the protective state which allows for them to influence this process of conversion through various re-vindicative claims making. Thus miners and steelworkers can negotiate social packages with high levels of severance payments for redundancy and early retirement, while at the same time using their political capital to slow down the restructuring of the industry. Pensioners and retirees, who are a classical example of those with few if any assets to convert, can set up political

parties based around pension rights. Even if they do not achieve the threshold for entry into the Sejm nevertheless they ensure that their interests are kept on the political agenda. Thus the state becomes the chosen vehicle for establishing the conversion of human capital and related resources rather than the market.

2. Secondly there are interests as mentioned above which are formed and maintained by the process of "pre-mature systemic consolidation". They are often lodged at the interface between public and private capital where access to state funds can be used to generate market gains. The slow down in the privatisation of the remaining public sector in Poland is evidence of the existence of such interests. However the "grey sector" or the informal economy also benefits from such incomplete transition. Legislation enacted in 1991 to help to integrate disabled people into the market economy was used selectively and sometimes illegally by employers. The Fund for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled was also the subject of controversy when it was used by politicians for other purposes.
3. Thirdly there exist interests which are oriented to the future market economy. In what has been called an "imitative" transformation, these interests anticipate changes and seek to maximise gains by exploiting future consumer and cultural trends. Of course these are only analytical distinctions since specific groups and households will hold a range of such interests.

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Chapter 4

Responding to change

How households responded to the systemic shocks and coped with their vulnerability factors has been examined through a study of the form of multiple economies which households draw upon during transition.[1] Seeking extra work, selling off home produced articles went along with assistance from family and friends, loans and social assistance. A major general point is that the number of households living off one source of income declines significantly so that whereas in 1986, 59 percent of households lived off one source of income i.e. employment in state sector or agricultural work or social insurance by 1995 over 56 percent lived off two or more sources of income. However more people now live off only a pension and the mixed households of state and private sector employment accounts for seven percent of the total.[2]

The following table provides a description of the type of coping strategies adopted by households especially during the early years of the transition.

Thus these strategies could be passive, namely cutting back on needs and expenditure or borrowing money, or active, working harder, re-training or finding a new job. In the first years of the transition from 1988 up until 1993 the passive forms were more common as households became socialised into the transition. However Rychard and his colleagues discovered that during this time 35 percent of respondents changed jobs and 36 percent claimed that they had been looking for another job. This indicates that passive tactics gradually evolved into active strategies.[3] The choice of one or other type of strategy was correlated with the stock of cultural capital, especially education, supplementary courses and work experience in the private sector. They identified what they called an "enforced activeness" namely an ability to capitalise on the transformational experience, through calculation and skillful game playing. Looking at the data more closely they concluded that sectoral differences, ie private vs state sector were less important in attitudes to the transformation than employee or owner/ employer status.

The last point inevitably raises the general question as to the fate of the working class after 1989. Firstly it is clear that the position of manual workers in both income, prestige and ideological terms has deteriorated dramatically in comparison to non manual and service class personnel. Nearly 90 percent of respondents believe that unskilled manual workers are worse off now then in 1989 and 53 percent think this

Table 6 Modes of household coping strategies. % (1997)

Mode of adaptation	Poland	Hungary	Slovakia	Czechs	East Germany
Extra work	34.4	31.9	24.8	25.5	30 8
Sale of home produced goods	19.0	6.1	4.4	3.7	9.5
Work at home	80.9	65.9	47.3	60.4	60.6
Purchase at cheap outlets	64.6	69.0	40.5	46.2	57.6
Repair old objects	74.2	69.9	44.1	54.5	69.4
Limit spending	82.1	74.6	45.1	60.8	76.4
Bank loans	24.8	20.2	13.6	10.3	6.4
Loans from friends and relatives	28.4	17.4	15.2	12.2	2.7
Pawnshop	0.6	2.2	1.0	0.3	–
Sale of home objects	3.0	2.2	2.0	2.9	2.0
Social Assistance	5.1	7.0	2.3	2.2	7.3
Average strategies	4.17	3.66	2.40	2.79	3.23
No strategies	7.6	15.1	45.6	30.9	14.6
>6 strategies	23.9	16.3	12.3	8.6	9.3

applies to skilled workers as well. A real fragmentation both mentally and socio-spatially has taken place and workers are more likely to identify narrowly with their enterprise than ten years ago. Strike activity has plummeted from 250 involving 115 687 employees in 1990 to 37 and 16 907 in 1998. The majority of these strikes were in transport and communication and manufacturing and generally narrow in scope.[4] The possibility of strike action on a more general scale appears remote and difficult and deteriorating work conditions have been accompanied by a *growing* satisfaction with relations at work with colleagues. This form of internal solidarity has replaced the inter factory solidarity of the communist period. Their dispersal among the small and medium enterprises has put them at the mercy of face to face relations with owner employers. There is little chance for promotion, with the constant threat of unemployment and little in the way of trade union support.[5] This fragmentation is mirrored in the fact that there are 330 national unions in Poland and mining for example has 26 organisations representing workers interests.

Over the last few years therefore a sustained campaign has sought to diminish the role and need for unionisation. Trade unions are regularly accused of losing Poland its comparative advantage by keeping up labour costs. Given that at best 18 percent of the employed belong to a trade union , the view is that they defend their own interests rather than that of a declining membership and that they are conduits into political careers. Article 100 of the Constitution states clearly that only political parties and electors can nominate candidates for election, which is intended to put a stop to the political role of both Solidarity and the ex communist unions, the OPZZ.[6] However as mentioned in those areas where there exists a felt need for union organisation, ie the emerging private sector, the unions lack the skill and the presence and therefore limit the voice of the new working class.

Barriers to upward social mobility across the manual – non-manual divide which were hardening in the late eighties have remained in place and the transition has

Table 7 Frequenting libraries, museums, opera, theatre-going, serious book reading. Synthetic mean of cultural participation.

Category	Czech	Hungary	Poland
Higher professionals	165	195	188
Semi-professionals	158	185	174
Routine non manual	125	124	127
Owners with employees	97	161	143
Owners without employees	102	111	117
Lower technicians	98	123	105
Skilled workers	69	76	74
Unskilled workers	61	60	61
Agricultural workers	36	28	35
Farmers	88	57	40

apparently done little to open up the social structure to manual workers. The greatest inflows have been into the new class of owners where the most amount of social space to be occupied had been freed up. However whereas during the 80s, the highest inflows had been into lower non manual jobs this had almost stopped by 1993 closing off one of the major routes for upward mobility into the white-collar occupations.[7] The socio-political consequences of such closure could be very significant since upward mobility expectations instilled under real socialism even if they were not recognised in practise could be an important part of worker mentality.

The deployment of cultural capital amongst different social strata when allied to educational policy indicates further obstacles to social mobility. (Table 7).

The observed levels of cultural participation are also strongly correlated to occupational prestige which was a powerful factor of social stratification even under communism. Although other indicators such as book ownership showed up similar levels of differentiation one important fact emerges out of Domanski's research for Poland. The level of cultural consumption is as much due to current educational (years of schooling) and occupational status as it is to the inheritance of such capital from one's parents. Namely parental influence is indirect but important. Thus the openness or otherwise of the educational system in terms of stimulating cultural consumption will be more critical in Poland (and Hungary) than in other transition societies. This factor is made all the more important since cultural capital is strongly correlated with the ability and readiness to undertake supplementary education and training, a key factor in transition adaptation strategies. Thus one in three Poles spends part of their week-end on supplementing their education, generally those who are already educated. There has been an inflation in the number of training centres (over 2000) and an insatiable demand for certificates, licenses or special qualifications. Marketing and sales has boomed as have language courses and human resources management. The sociologist's message is getting through that education is the key factor in transition success. "Soft" training in terms of inter-personal skills is growing most rapidly whereas the government through its Employment Offices constantly stresses that the most successful element in its active labour market policies are various training courses. These are aimed at up grading existing skills, social-psychological re-orientation courses

Table 8 Synthetic index of motor vehicle ownership, deep freeze, microwave oven PC satellite receiver, telephone.

Category	Czech	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Higher professional	35.0	40.3	33.8	37.3
Semi-professionals	29.0	34.9	28.2	31.0
Routine non manual	27.0	27.9	23.1	27.4
Owners with employees	43.3	45.5	42.7	43.5
Owners without employees	35.4	34.9	31.9	33.2
Lower technicians	28.3	28.8	24.7	30.8
Skilled workers	23.0	22.1	18.1	22.9
Unskilled workers	20.5	16.6	16.4	19.9
Agricultural labourers	18.4	12.4	12.0	16.8
Farmers	32.3	23.2	17.7	29.7

in how to sell yourself to an employer, including CV writing or acquiring new skills ranging from check out assistants to fork-lift truck drivers. Hobbies have been recognised as not only allowing for personal development but also for providing occasions to do business.[8]

Finally it is necessary to get some idea of the material differentiation between social groups as they engaged in adaptation strategies. This can help to make some sense of the different strategies adopted by various households. (Table 8).

There is an obvious consistency in the ownership index between the three countries presented by Domanski. Entrepreneurs especially stand out in all these countries whereas for Poland manual workers are less well endowed in consumer durables than some of their counterparts elsewhere.

Shopping around

The introduction of a variety of retail outlets allowed two thirds of Poles and Hungarians to shop cheaply or even frequent used clothes stores. Looking for a deal replaced the search for goods in short supply and even affluent households sought savings in order to buy luxuries. It took some time for consumers to realise however that "you only got what you paid for" and in the early years of the consumer boom the level of consumer fraud was high. Although consumer protection legislation is on the books and NGOs seeking to protect consumer rights were actually in place under communism, shopping whether direct sales, catalogue or even Internet sales represents a steep earning curve with many pitfalls. A major problem for those who do find themselves mis-sold is the interminable length of legal proceedings. The growth in the army of door-to-door sales personnel was half a million by the end of 1998 comprising chiefly people who were unemployed, low paid white-collar staff and students. The main companies were Amway, Orifalme and Herbalife. The major purchases are cosmetics, cleaning materials and books and cassettes. [9]

By the end of 1997 about 20 percent of Warsaw's inhabitants, mainly young and educated did their shopping in supermarkets and 25 percent, mainly older and poorer preferred to shop in the bazaars serviced by the traders from the east.[10] Further east

in places such as Białystok the local markets were used in the main by those from Belarus. Foreign customers returned home with over 2 billion dollars worth of goods in 1997 replacing the declining trade from western Germany and shoring up Poland's growing balance of payments deficit. Since it was mainly based on the informal economy and therefore did not pay taxes and duty, it was able to provide employment as well as goods for the poorer sections of society. Thus pensioners, teachers, nurses and other low paid groups could supplement their earnings through trading in the bazaars as well as providing services to the 13 million or so east and central Europeans who crossed Poland's borders in 1997. The unemployed shuttled several times a day ferrying goods in short supply across borders, the so-called "ants" or *mrówki*. They however represented at best 5 percent of the illegal cross border trade and tended to be organised by wholesalers who specified what they should buy as well as bank-rolling their purchases. Thus the poor profited from the poor and the bazaars provided a living it was estimated to some 2 million Poles.

To put the above in context, every third bottle of alcohol, every third packet of cigarettes, every other pair of jeans, every second bottle of deoderant was illegally imported or produced from smuggled raw materials. The state loses 5 billion zloty a year on the smuggling of goods either in the form of "fictitious" exports or illegal imports.

Restrictions on cross border travel introduced in January 1998 as part of Poland's EU pre accession cut back severely on this form of trade and thus effected the standard of living on people on both sides of Poland's borders. The central bazaars such as the 10 Anniversary stadium, which at its peak had 7 thousand traders and employed 27 000 individuals and was one of the top five export earners in the country, provided outlets for small scale producers in Poland, largely in the grey economy, selling to large scale and small traders from the east.[11]

In the west of Poland, cross border trade is now much more even as prices and labour costs not to mention the pressure of unemployment level out and the picture of who buys what and where is more complex. In Zgorzelec/Gorlitz Germans come to German-owned supermarkets in Poland whereas Poles travel in special buses to buy specific items in Germany. Cross border co-operation has assisted in the development of such trading links.

Ten years after the transition began and with the massive growth in supermarkets (Poland has 95 hypermarkets, 730 supermarkets and has witnessed the loss of eight and five percent of small and medium grocery shops in the year since 1998) the majority of Poles, Czechs and Hungarians still buy food from local shops.[12] For them price is more important than quality and shopping is still a chore despite the range and novelty of consumer goods. An exception which could be price related is that 81 percent of Poles

Table 9 Where do Poles do their shopping? (percent)

	Never	Sometimes	Often
Food self service	15	32	53
Shop assistant serves	4	12	84
Supermarkets	31	47	22
Hypermarkets	47	46	7
Markets/bazaars	17	43	40

in one study preferred to buy domestically produced foodstuffs and accentuated more than other countries the need for fresh unprocessed foods. Over 60 percent of Poles, 34 percent Czechs and 50 percent of Hungarians shop for food everyday compared to seven percent of Belgians and indeed 19 percent of Dutch of whom 34 percent shop by bike! Contrary to expectations the shops on the large housing estates still attract a disproportionate share of customers due to the low level of shopping motorisation. There continues to be considerable political conflict between small shop keepers and the large stores which are usually foreign owned (French, German, Portuguese and British) ostensibly over loss of custom, with the local councils fighting losing battles in the courts.[13] However in Poland there are still only 22 sq m of shopping area per inhabitant in large centres compared to 25 and 48 in Czech and Hungary and 220 in the UK.[14] Furthermore the number of retail outlets has risen from 237 400 in 1990 to 451 800 in 1998 or from one shop per 161 inhabitants to one per 86. The lowest growth has been in the countryside, from 97 462 to 101 894 which confirms the growing divide between country and town.

The lower Czech and Slovak use of the strategy of shopping around presented in Table 9 reflected the less differentiated retail market of the time. Thus the market provided partial solutions to some of its own problems but the legacy of the scarcity society maintains its impact on shopping behaviour. The changing pattern of retail outlets could stratify the population at a key point in time, excluding rural inhabitants and small towns not only from modern consumer choice and therefore depressing their quality of life as well as life chances, but also from the lower prices and better quality goods which the supermarkets impose on their sub-contractors. Supermarkets have gone some considerable way to soaking up female unemployment in certain areas and also to have given access to computers and some PC literacy to those they employ.

The supermarket has also done more to change the social geography of towns and the daily routines of Poles than any other innovation. The manner in which the church had to accommodate itself to Sunday opening was indicative of the power of these competing cathedrals of consumption. The fact that if families went shopping after church seemed to increase the size of the collection was mentioned by those who believed that both God and Mammon could be served simultaneously. The shopping proselytes are introduced into the selling ploys of supermarkets. The buying of books by the kilo was redolent of the days under communism when old newspapers containing the censored word (makalatura) were exchanged for coupons which allowed the purchase of toilet paper for ever in short supply. It was only in early 1998 that January sales came into the picture and again Poles had learn the rules of buying something that really was cheaper although not always what you wanted.[15]

The way to work?

To the extent that this was an "imitative" transformation occurring at the global, European, national and local level simultaneously and combining both pre-modern, modern and post modern dimensions to social choice and behaviour, then the picture of the post communist consumer is complex. However the pressures on the new employee facing the labour market are every bit as demanding as those on the commodity market.

The macro-economic picture against which households were making their labour market decisions remained optimistic. Growth in per capita GDP in 1998 compared to 1989 was 116 percent whereas for the Czechs it was 95 percent and Hungary 93 percent.

Table 10 Foreign Direct Investment between 1994-1999.[16]

Country	Million US $	US$ per capita
Hungary	12 530	1253
Czech Republic	12 425	1206
Latvia	1915	766
Estonia	1033	688
Croatia	2869	637
Slovenia	1260	630
Poland	19 923	515
Lithuania	1627	440
Romania	5638	253
Bulgaria	1762	212

The Polish economy is expected to grow at 4.5 percent in 2000 and five percent in 2001 in line with its key comparator countries Hungary and the Czech Republic. Foreign direct investment which for transition populations is seen as both a source of possible buying-out of the national silver and therefore xenophobia, but is also an important indicator of confidence in the country, is high.

Over ten years in excess of $39 billion of FDI has come into the country fuelling the consumer boom. However the total GDP of the 13 candidate countries to the EU with 180 million inhabitants, is less than that of Spain and only 6.6 percent of the EU total. In this sense GDP per capita at Purchasing Power Parity compared to the EU average was 37 percent for Poland, 51 percent for Hungary and 59 percent for the Czechs. As if to put the scale of their economies in place, the Poles are constantly reminded of their position within a global economy dominated by multinationals. That their GDP is lower than the revenue of General Motors, whereas Boeing is bigger than the Czech economy and Hewlett Packard comes in front of Hungary seems to make the point of limited economic sovereignty even before EU accession.[17] Although the trade deficit has been cut slightly during 2000 with stronger exports, it stands at 7.6 percent of GDP or $11,628 million most of it with the EU. Much of this represents investment goods that should generate export earnings in the future although the purchase of electrical goods and other durables has been subsidised by a credit boom.

Opinion polls indicate that 80 percent of respondents are happy with their lives to date, of whom 14 percent are very happy, these being chiefly younger better educated persons. Of course the fact that in 1988 67 percent declared that they were content with their lives, may put this sentiment into perspective.[18]

Such contentment may be due to the fact that Poles pay themselves relatively more than they earn. Thus whereas they have higher per capita pay that their Czech and Hungarian counterparts, their per capita GDP is half that of the Hungarians. Added to this non wage costs which are the highest in the transition countries and which it is claimed is quickly making the Polish economy un-competitive, mean that for every 100 zloty net in the employees pocket a further 100 zloty must go to the state in one form or another.[19] Although they may work the same number of hours as some of their western counterparts, the added value per employee is less than an fifth of that of the UK and a sixth of that in the USA.[20]

Employers also complain that since they are responsible for paying the first 35 days of sickness benefit, which is 80 percent of pay, and that 90 percent of all leave falls into this category, they are unfairly burdened. Likewise the excessive number of holidays and long week-ends all make employers believe that social and industrial rights have been unfairly weighted towards the employee. Unofficially it is claimed that Poles work less than other countries, have a shorter working day and working week. Officially the Poles work for 235 days per year and that 69 percent of them work 40-49 hours per week, and only every ninth works over 60 hours. A 42 hour week is still the statutory norm (under pressure from the unions) although state bureaucracies work 40 and those in injurious conditions 26 hours. Official statistics show that those in the state sector work longer hours than the private sector, which raises some doubts. However it is clear that certain occupations in the new conditions are demanding, or indeed permitting, long hours of work in atypical formats. For small shop keepers and self employed businesses as well as small farmers the well-established self-exploitation apparent in western societies is also being introduced. Growing ranks of sales personnel, professionals with several jobs as well as the new professions such as stock brokering also push the limits of the working day.[21] The threat of unemployment and attendant insecurity is a major contributor to not only longer hours at work but it also determines the type of labour based strategies that households can choose to undertake.

Unemployment and Human Capital

In communist societies communities were structured by the nature of the employment available, either in a single industry town such as the arms sector, in mining communities or villages dependent upon long distance commuting by their peasant-workers. There were no formal labour markets as such, although high levels of labour turnover and labour shortages for example, brought about by hoarding, gave the appearance of a labour market. The working of the second economy also provided a sub-labour market for skills and services in short supply. Government policies of labour allocation were based upon political as well as economic priorities and a range of incentives as well as sanctions were applied to ensure that key sectors received adequate supplies of labour.

After 1989 the full gamut of labour markets have emerged, both official and informal. The former includes employees with sub-contractor self employed status designed in order to by-pass high social insurance contributions. The informal economy is serviced by the unemployed as well as those seeking additional employment not to mention pensioners. The fate of local labour markets which are dominated by large public sector or indeed privatised enterprises is of special concern, with the setting up of enterprise zones aimed at attracting inward investment presented as one of the solutions. A certain segmentation between the privatised and the public sector labour markets has emerged and also between primary and secondary labour markets.

As is clear from the above discussion the quantity as well as the quality of labour has changed more drastically than anywhere in the west as has the institutional context. The fundamental shift in the focus of individual's lives from the work place to the home coupled to a shedding of the social functions of the work place, has led to the re-construction and re-definition of both. Needless to say the distinction between the public and the private spheres of work and family life has been effected by all of these. Personal identity, rooted in occupation more so in such societies as well as the structure to every day life all have required configuration. Unemployment is also implicated in

the growing visible poverty and social exclusion as well as with crime, homelessness and suicides.

The policy reaction to unemployment in 1990–1991 was initially one of providing a social safety net whilst allowing unemployment to carry out its task of "creating a new work ethic". There appeared to be little idea of what the broader consequences of mass unemployment might be and the general attitudes to the unemployed were set in the first few years. Initially the unemployed were not those who lost jobs through restructuring or lay off but chiefly groups that had functioned in the grey economy or had never worked. Thus the attitude of the Employment Offices was negative and suspicious. During the early nineties the ALMP was highly bureaucratic and demobilising only allowing a worker to choose re-training if they could guarantee themselves a job at the end of the course. Otherwise they would have to respond to the Labour Offices offers of retraining or risk losing their benefit. Compulsion bred disaffection. Furthermore it took a long time before the Ministry of Labour came to recognise that investing in human capital was more effective than public works or subsidising jobs with local employers. However critics believe that most of these ALMP measures were less concerned with putting people back into work than they were "programmes of social control" which artificially integrated these groups, even the long-term unemployed, at least temporarily into society. However at the same time it reproduced their dependence upon the state.[22] In fact there is a sense of collusion between Employment Offices which find temporary jobs, for the statutory 6 months, in order for their clients to then be able to come back and claim benefit and get on with their "lives" for another year.

Unemployment in Poland is characterised by the following:

1. A relatively high but stable level of unemployment pointing to a weak absorptive capacity for labour by those sectors of the economy undergoing restructuring. However those sectors which have not been restructured continue to have high levels of employment which adds to the stability of the employment picture.
2. Much of the decline in unemployment has been caused by people leaving the labour market and not by a growth in employment. This non-employment level cannot however continue to contribute to the cut in unemployment .
3. There has been a stabilisation in the proportion of the long term unemployed, at about 48 percent, so that any decline in unemployment is largely brought about by those in transitional unemployment. Likewise the proportion of long term unemployed oscillates with the general changes in the rate of unemployment. A consequence of the stability of long term unemployment is a de capitalisation of human capital which could influence future chances for employment.
4. There are certain permanent group differences in the labour market which indicate the absence of mechanisms for evening out differences associated especially with education and occupation. Thus differences of sex, education and region were implicated in the maintenance of long term unemployed although not age. This it is claimed points to the structural rather than frictional nature of the unemployment and to the failure of institutions rather than of fit.[23]

The continuing and future high levels of unemployment in Poland are attributed to several factors :

1. The demographic high that is releasing school leavers and higher education graduates in unprecedented numbers onto the labour market. Between 2000–02,

over 620 00 young people will be looking for a job which represents 40 percent of the European total. Over the next 6 years it will be 1 180 00.

2. The restructuring of the coal, steel, armaments, energy and chemicals industries of which the coal industry alone will shed 105 000 over four years. It is of concern to the policy makers that apart from the 2.5 million unemployed there are probably some 1–2 million hidden unemployed in the countryside and a further 2 million or so over-employed in the un-restructured public sector.
3. The reforms of the health, education and local government sectors have meant nurses, teachers and town hall staff have had to find new employment often at the expense of new entries.
4. Statistically unemployment has increased since it is a condition of free health care that individuals are registered and hence many who had existed in the "grey economy" had to make their presence known.

Although economic growth is high it is not fast enough to generate the level of new jobs required. Exports led growth at six percent or more is considered to be necessary to provide the new jobs required and keep unemployment at 10.6 percent whereas current growth levels will retain a high of 12.4 percent. However even with seven percent annual growth in GDP and 4.9 percent increases in productivity producing 2.1 percent growth in employment then by 2010 there would still be a rate of 9.4 percent unemployment, 7.3 percent registered and 2.1 percent hidden.[24]

In all likelihood the level of unemployment could grow from 2.5 to 3 million over the next few years with an increase in the level of long term unemployed and those who have retired early. Critics believe that Poland has chosen the European high unemployment model rather than the more deregulated labour markets of the USA, the UK and Ireland. Of course the labour market will need to become more fluid with greater spatial mobility which in turn focuses back on the housing market especially if it is to involve migration from the countryside to smaller towns and suburbs. An improvement in the transport network is also an alternative increasing regional labour mobility. However the Poles are seriously behind in the development of their transport infrastructure.[25]

Of the accession countries only Romania lags behind Poland in the development of modern highways. Apart from the fact that transit east-west traffic may start to move through Slovakia and the Czech Republic, the regional development that follows on such routes will also be foregone. Rail prices have also increased and state firms have

Table 11 Highways and Roads

	Highways (km)	National roads	Density of road network in km/kmsq
Poland	258	45 417	1.20
Germany	11 300	41,660	1.77
France	9500	28 000	1.62
Italy	9500	46 900	1.05
Czech Rep.	423	6410	0.70
Romania	113	14,470	0.64
Hungary	420	29 653	1.71

abolished their transport facilities which were an integral part of employees routes to work. As a consequence some peripheral and outlying rural areas have been cut off from employment opportunities, especially those that serviced the dual occupational peasant workers. Any rural development policy will have to address the question of affordable transport.

Spain, which halved its agricultural population in the space of 10 years from 18 percent to 10 percent of the total after EU accession, also raised unemployment to 23 percent. Greece on the other hand still maintains a high level of rural over-employment in a fragmented agricultural system, with average holdings of 4.3 ha per household less than the 7.8ha in Poland. Eastern Germany also cut its agricultural labour force by half at the cost of 15 percent unemployment and as in Poland a large proportion of it kombinat employees are still unemployed.[26] In September 2000 the Polish government signed into effect a "Contract for the Countryside" which will include structural pensions intended to deal with rural unemployment.

The costs of continued unemployment include the drain on the state budget, social costs of marginalisation and social pathology and the shortfall in GDP caused by the exclusion of the productive labour force.

The range of macro economic measures available to to counteract unemployment are now well rehearsed. The stimulation of demand especially consumer and investment provided it does not suck in imports, measures to foster the exploitation of existing capital as well as the use of redundant land are often mentioned. SME development, housing and infrastructure expansion and in particular an end to non-negotiated restrictions on job and labour turnover all contribute to the armoury of measures for dealing with unemployment. Educational policies and a review of curricula especially in vocational training are also key measures.

However the Polish government in looking to active labour market policies is building on some of the EC action lines spelled out under the Amsterdam Treaty, fostering entrepreneurship, raising employability, increasing the adaptability of enterprises and employees to the changing market and ensuring equal opportunities. Its stated aim is to raise the employment indicator from the current 58.8 percent of 15–64 in employment, not just to the EU level of 60.5 percent but to 62 to 64 percent by 2006 and closer to the US level of 74 percent.

Raising employability is first of all achieved by educational reform which is intended to raise the quality of human capital. The aim is to introduce a broader more flexibly profiled programme of secondary education replacing the current narrow vocational focus and building in competencies based upon modules relating to particular vocations. Educating young people in economic life and the nature of active job search may seem obvious but where the outside stock of such experience in the home for example may be limited it needs to be addressed as a form of civic education. Work experience and various forms of job placement can assist in this. Alongside such measures a professional system of career counselling has to be introduced since the previous system left little room for choice or imagination.

An important feature of this programme will be the putting in place of quality control mechanisms based on ISO 9000 norms and national qualifications standards that in turn will require partnerships with employers and unions. A specific feature will be the focus on the education of the "socially unadjusted" youth whose educational careers have been ignored. Here the OHP or Volunteer Worker system going back to the communist days will be pressed into service after itself being overhauled. Keeping a look out for early dropouts and those who do not progress through the system is a

priority in order to counteract marginalisation and the growth of a culture of social exclusion.

Between 2000 and 2006, nearly 4.4 million young people will leave education and only a certain proportion will have been educated for change. A special interim programme therefore will monitor this group and intervene with a system of grants, motivation payments, subsidies to training centres and NGOs in order to ensure either the continuation of education or the adaptation of school leavers to the rapidly changing needs of the market.

As was mentioned nearly eight to 10 percent of the employed population or 1.2 to 1.5 million persons obtain some supplementary training which is some way off from the EU average of 20 percent and well down in terms of hours per year. Incentives for employers, distance learning, tax breaks are just some of the measures aimed at raising the skills of the employed.

Active labour market policies aim to re-train the unemployed where it is suitable although to date 80 percent of all state Work Fund spending is on passive, benefits payments. A major move has been to bring employment centres under the control of the local authorities which is itself a great institutional unknown since it has no western precedents. This should assist in the individualisation of the process of job search plans based upon counselling and job information. (Table 12).

Allied to this there are fundamental changes proposed to the system of social assistance. Not only will the role of voluntary help be extended and encouraged in all areas of social assistance but new occupations such as foster parents-contract families-and assistants to disabled persons will also be developed. Long-term unemployment and early retirement will be tackled by specialist counselling, so that individuals and households do not become dependent upon social assistance. The primacy of paid work over benefits will be emphasised especially in the existing system of public works. Such forms of job creation are chiefly aimed at counteracting social exclusion rather than counteracting unemployment.

Many local governments who have the responsibility to set up intervention or publicly subsidised jobs are now in debt to the employers with whom they have placed labour. This is because employers who take on an unemployed person for six months have the right to a refund on some of the employment costs. This refund cannot exceed the sum of the employment benefit and social insurance (although not health care

Table 12 Breakdown of expenditure by National Employment Fund[27]

Expenditure-total in 1999 (thous.zloty)	5 647 000
Unemployment benefits	3 929 100
School leavers programme	369 200
Intervention jobs	345 700
Payments for youth without school leaver status	343 200
Public works	197 100
Training	122 500
Business loans	110 000
Discounted loans	22 000
Special programmes	20 300
Other expenditure	297 900

contributions). Local employment offices can adjust the proportion they pay depending on the state of the local labour market. If the employee is then offered a permanent job then the employer has the right to a bonus equivalent to a maximum of 150 percent of one months average pay.[28]

Unemployment and gender

A key factor in how households adapt to the transformation concerns the role of women in the labour market. Fodor has examined three major theses, which could usefully inform this discussion.

1. Women provide the reserve army of labour and are drawn into employment during booms and return into the home at other times.
2. They had greater labour market vulnerability in that maternity limited their careers, second economy supplementary activity was largely male and they did not have the networks to counteract unemployment.
3. Job segregation and sex typing could be seen as both an asset and a disadvantage.[29]

At the end of 1997 12 percent of women and 8.7 percent of men in Poland were unemployed. By early 1999 women constituted 57.1 percent of the unemployed. Despite the fact that they are better educated at both secondary and higher levels the number of women laid off by their employers at this time was double that of men[30] Women were also overwhelmingly employed in the low wage sectors, 83.1 percent of the health services were feminised, 68.3 percent of hotels and gastronomy sector and 75.3 percent of financial intermediaries.

Within each sector women earned from 6 percent to 35 percent less than their male counterparts and 75 percent of women as opposed to 54 percent of men received below the national average wage. They constitute only 23 percent of higher management personnel and only two percent of the plum political placements on supervisory boards of companies. Although Polish law forbids discrimination 45 percent of job adverts were aimed at men, 25 percent at women and 30 percent were neutral.[31]

Table 13 Female unemployment between 1990–1998

Years	Thousands	% of unemployed
1990	573.7	50.9
1991	1,134,1	52.6
1992	1,338,8	53.4
1993	1,507,3	52.2
1994	1,495,0	52.7
1995	1,448,6	55.1
1996	1,375,6	58.3
1997	1,103,2	60.4
1998	1,071,3	58.5

Another essential element of female unemployment is that a half of unemployed women are long term unemployed and 60 percent of these are aged 18–34 with 30 percent having completed secondary education.

As women sought to combine their domestic and occupational roles they tended to move out of the labour market a move which was likely to lead to their unemployment. That is, women had more difficulty in returning to the labour market than those who were entering it for the first time. Women who moved out of the labour market experienced a rapid erosion in their human capital, since they tended to be absent for longer either through child care leave or unemployment.[32]

Between 1988–1994 the proportion of women taking child care leave after maternity leave dropped from 83.4 percent to 60.6 percent. Whereas previously the difference in take up between white collar and manual worker women was 4 percent by 1994 it had risen to 23 percent with 55 percent of white collar women choosing to go back to work. In this case it was those had better educational qualifications as well as better paid jobs before maternity leave and who could afford to pay for child care, who returned to work thus raising the level of household income. On the other hand the less well qualified were then likely to join the long term unemployed as their already low skills were further de-capitalised. It is interesting to note that women more than men claim to feel less useful if they are unemployed and also claim that work is important to their sense of respect within the family. This accords with other findings which show that 78.5 percent of women believe that they should work and be financially independent and 60 percent who said it would be better to be a successful woman than a housewife.

Interestingly, the private sector which currently employs 70.8 percent of all employees, saw a larger proportion of white collar women taking child care leave, similar to the levels among their manual worker sisters.[33] This was despite the fact that the private sector is more likely to offer part-time work (20 percent women and 10 percent men) than the public sector (less than five percent). Women were 40 percent of all those employed in the private sector. There appears to be a reluctance on the part of many private sector employers to take on women with examples of female employees being asked to sign declarations that they have domestic support to care for their children.[34] However the private sector tends to take on labour from the unemployed and difficult labour markets. They are prepared to tolerate the conditions of labour in the private sector and may have less incentive to return to their private sector jobs after childbirth.

The type of education that women acquire also seems to have made them less employable. The government's "school leaver" programme is aimed at providing work experience and training for young people who find themselves without a marketable skill. The high level of female unemployment in the 18–24 age group is partly explained by the general secondary education they complete (lyceum) at which the school leaver programme is aimed. Under the terms of the programme if an employer takes on an unemployed school leaver for 12–18 months, the Employment Office reimburses part of the costs of job creation. Likewise providing work experience is covered by similar funding. As an incentive if the school leavers come from an area of high unemployment they are provided with a grant if they continue their education or take up the above options.

Long term unemployed figures are also bolstered by the 45 plus age group of women who often have lower levels of education and as in the textile or related industries find it easier to move into the informal economy rather than re-train. In some cases such as the chemical industry many have left on pre-retirement packages extended to those with five years or less until formal retirement. This is made possible given the extra

weighting to years of service granted to employees from difficult or harmful employment conditions.

There is evidence that women and young people (often the same) form the bulk of the structurally unemployed, especially from small towns in the less developed parts of Poland and who have elementary education. Men have moved into the female labour market which makes it more difficult for women returning to work to find jobs. Likewise in 1997 over 70 percent of those who signed on as unemployed had previously been unemployed. This could be the effect of short term subsidised jobs or public works or the prevalence of an "outsiders" or secondary labour market.

Doing business

The appearance of small business incubators funded by the World bank's TOR# 10 programme as well as by bi-lateral donors, of "office simulators" and other means for promoting SME development, has been accompanied by a veritable growth industry in the writing of business plans and consultancy firms. Some 1000 or more are offering their services to those wishing to escape the vagaries of the labour market. Incubators have generally been located in disused factory buildings, office blocks and even run down hotels. Providing three years of technical assistance and low rents, they are as much a statement of intention by local authorities as a real contribution to business development. Run by NGOs they tend to be self financing and sometimes produce revenues which allow the NGO to expand its services. On a bigger scale are the special economic zones the first of which was set up in Mielec in 1996 and which provide attractive conditions for inward investors both national and foreign in order to ease the unemployment caused by the restructuring of, in the case of Mielec, the arms industry. Not only do the Employment Offices provide public works in order to develop the site but they also train would be employees for incoming firms.[35]

Something like 700 new firms a day are added to above list. Of the above only one and a half million are functioning entities. The average firm employs 4.4 persons and in reality only 4000 employ over 250 persons. Some 11 000 employ between 51–250 and these do not tend to grow. Many of these "firms" are individuals seeking to escape punitive social and tax measures and often asked by their employers to go onto a self-employed basis thus the total could soon exceed 3 million. Of the 60 percent of the firms that are single person businesses, 50 percent are in trade, generally small shops which in the future could be threatened by the growth of supermarkets.

To put the above into perspective, there are 295 777 companies in the national register of which 136 497 are limited liability or joint stock companies of one sort or another and 2906 are state owned.[37] In 1999 in the regional courts there were 6000

Table 14 The number of firms in Poland (thousands)[36]

	1991	1993	1998
SME sector	494 200	1 980 700	2 546 400
Small firms (<50 employees)	469 400	1 957 200	2 521 800
Medium firms (51-250 employees)	24 700	23 500	24 600
SMEs as share of total firms (percent)	98 400	99 600	99 800
Total	502 200	1 988 100	2 552 600

cases concerning bankruptcy being heard, an increase of 20 percent on the previous year. Under bankruptcy law, property must be made over to a partner in marriage at least two years before the declaration of bankruptcy. This tactic has been used creatively and the range of reasons provided to the courts have been equally ingenious. However this is still only four percent of the total number of companies and given that under Polish law imprisonment for debt is not an option, a whole range of debt collecting companies and innovative solutions have emerged instead. The publication of debtors to companies on an Internet site is one method which seemingly has brought results.[38] The above figures do not relate to the two million or so private companies where bankruptcies and closures run into several thousand a month.

One of the major ALMP instruments has been access to small loans for business start up. Those who took business start-up loans from the labour office were 57 percent male, of middle age (35–44 years 49 percent) from large towns (87%) and had generally worked in state enterprises (60%) and industry (30%) when they had lost their job through closure. They set up businesses mainly to provide for their family rather than to have independence and the chance to put some idea into fruition. They tended to depend upon their own capital and to be one-person operations. During 1990–94 such state loans helped to create 109 808 jobs which was 3.8 percent of the total unemployed. However over time their incidence was reduced as the Employment Offices resources were cut back and directed into benefits payments.

It may be the case that the 43 percent of women who took out loans in order to start up their businesses did so due to greater difficulties in finding employment.[39] Renata Sieminska likewise felt that the 30 to 40 percent of either self employed or employers in 1994 who were women was an optimistic sign.[40] It could reflect the growth of businesses in the services sector, especially real estate, and in retail and gastronomy in particular.

In fact private businesswomen as a proportion of all women in work has risen from 3.7 percent in 1989 to 22 percent in 1995 and as a proportion of all owners to 39 percent in 1995.There is a general societal acceptance of women as entrepreneurs and only seven percent of people would discourage their daughter or son from going into business for themselves. Whereas over 50 percent believed that family obligations were an obstacle and interfered in women's running a business, business women saw *neglec*t of the family as a major difficulty, almost a mirror image.[41]

Given that local authorities are seen to assist those from their networks in running businesses (58%) more than those who have money (19%) or who can bribe, and that women tend not to be in these networks, the above figure is quite revealing. This is not to overlook the fact that women are now also setting up their own exclusive clubs and networks.

Looking at the source of financing for small businesses other than from the Employment Fund, the importance of informal contacts becomes evident. This requirement for self funding or help from family and friends has been the basis of much of the social capital theory input into SME development and reflects a real credit deficit (Table 15).

Recently Polish banks have begun to provide more credit however this is made difficult since many of the firms require credits for goods with which to trade rather than investment for production. There is not enough government assistance encouraging small businesses to build on the Emilia-Romagna model and develop joint marketing, accounts and information services.

The existence of such firms is also highly precarious and for whatever reason in 1998 24 percent did not declare a profit. However in 1997 SMEs employed 61.6 percent of

Table 15 Sources of funding for small firms. (%)

Own resources	97.8
Zloty credits	25.7
Loans from other sources than a bank	9.0
Leasing	4.4
Foreign currency credit	1.6
Special assistance funds	1.4
Other	0.6

the employed population and despite the crisis in the eastern markets in 1998 their investment grew by 20 percent. They contributed to 21.9 percent of exports with over 60 percent going to the EU in vegetables, textiles, foodstuffs as well as machines. It is estimated that 32.7 percent of the SMEs are in the trade and services sector, especially repairs, 28.7 percent in production, 12.4 percent in construction and 5.3 percent in transport. They tend to be concentrated in Warsaw, Lodz and the Katowice region.

The Grey Economy and Grey Morality

The grey economy is shaped by the fiscal system namely the payment of taxes and duties, and through its avoidance. Acceptance by society of the manner of distribution of this tax income is a factor which contributes to the level of tax culture or morality. On the one hand a tradition of anti-state mentality on the part of small business which was reciprocated by anti-entrepreneurial ideology on the part of the state, left a significant legacy of avoidance. Social capital networks were often easier to mobilise than financial resources and the former were by definition informal. Social policy and rights also contribute to the grey economy through the setting of the level of minimum pay, the maximum length of the working day and working conditions, Citizenship, involves duties to pay which contribute to the maintenance of certain rights i.e. tax and education, insurance contributions and health, so that the existence of a widespread culture and practise of evasion erodes citizenship.

In transition societies weak regulatory institutions coincide with the redistributive goals of the state alongside market policies. Thus a large scale regulatory shortfall or vacuum contributes to the growth of informal economic activity.

Specifically, barriers to market entry for small business in form of bureaucratic procedures and corrupt officialdom consigns SMEs to the informal sector. Weak Treasury practises encourage tax avoidance. Both the public and private sectors of the economy are replete with avoidance practises.[42]

It has been calculated that in 1998 the informal or grey sector of the economy accounted for 11 percent of trade and for over eight percent of the building sector. In 1999 the grey economy illegally employed 1.4 million people, or over nine percent of the population. Nearly every generation and socio-occupational group was implicated and in the main it consisted of additional work due to financial hardship (60.3 percent) or lack of jobs (41.7%). In the last four years the number has apparently declined by 768 000 due to the growth in legal employment opportunities. Only about 4 percent of respondents were regualrly engaged in such work so that although work in the informal

Table 16 Attitudes to types of behaviour

What is your attitude to the following	Disapprove	Ambivalent	Nothing against it
Driving a car while tipsy	95	2	3
Drinking at work	92	5	3
Criticising someone behind their backs	89	6	4
Hitting children	87	8	5
Dodging fare paying	77	12	10
Fictional gift making in order to avoid tax	67	12	17
Listening to loud music in a public place	67	12	20
Watching pornographic films	56	15	28
Working while receiving unemployment benefit	42	16	39
Sex before marriage	31	16	49
Cheating in your final school exams	28	16	52

economy is widespread it is relatively "shallow". It provides work for the low skilled and is therefore poorly paid involving mainly men, over 45 percent of whom were under 34 years of age.[43]

However whatever the scale and scope of the informal economy it is the accompanying norms and values that are of particular interest in understanding not only the available and legitimate household strategies but also the broader implications for what T H Marshall referred as to as "a lively sense of responsibility towards the welfare of the community".[44]

An insight into what individuals considered to be unacceptable behaviour provides some insight into this sense of responsibility.[45] (Table 16).

There are interesting riders to above scale of norms. Young people living in large towns and who were not churchgoers not unsurprisingly were less concerned about free riding on buses (22 percent disapproved). Certain traditional stereotypes are being altered such as those concerning sex outside of marriage and to some extent viewing pornography. The explosion in massage parlours and escort agencies has highlighted the gap between publicly high moral concerns and private practise.[46]

Legal consciousness is likewise being reshaped under the impact of an excess of ad hoc legislation which seeks to control the minutae of everyday life. Smoking in a car within the city limits, advertising aimed at children, and similar activities have eroded respect for the law. In another recent study 62 percent of respondents believed that the law should be obeyed if it is just and 34 percent in every situation.[47]

The high place accorded to not being drunk but even tipsy when driving is in part explained by the fact that Poland is second after Greece in the number of dead on the roads per 100 000 inhabitants, coming above the USA, Germany and being nearly three times as high as the UK.[48] Less inspiring is the fact that five to seven percent of drivers are in possession of false driving licenses and a similar number bought their driving test resulting in two million drivers on the roads without proper qualifications. There appears to be a going rate for bribing driving test examiners equivalent to a least the minimum monthly wage.[49]

Corruption or the use of public office for private gain through bribes, pressure, informal links and nepotism in Poland is widely held to be on the increase. Over 86 percent of a national representative sample admitted that corruption was a big problem and 46 percent that it was a very big problem.[50] The latter figure has risen from 33 percent in 1991 and there appears to be a consensus across social groups and political persuasions. Nearly 60 percent believe that many higher state officials draw unlawful benefit from their office, a view held especially by the self employed and the unemployed. The most frequent form of corruption appears to be placing friends and family in various posts (87%) a view which has grown significantly since 1997, followed by taking bribes to push through a deal or contract. Local government is not immune to corruption in the popular opinion, although it is urban residents more than the rural population that support this view.

There were three main causes of corruption attributable to state inaction after 1989:

1. The erosion of boundaries between the public and private sphere. Setting up independent organisations, agencies, foundations and other seemingly "civil society" type bodies, into which resources were siphoned out of the public body was a common occurrence.
2. The lack of competition on the commodity market allows these quasi- state bodies to extract payments from the private sector to the benefit of political parties.
3. Placement of political nominees onto the supervisory boards of companies with partial state share holding is a continuing source of corruption.[51]

Interestingly, the author of the above report claims that the chief cause of the growth of inequality in Poland over the last few years is not the introduction of the market economy, but the presence of the state in the economy. Furthermore the opportunity to make large fortunes at the interface between public and private capital provides little incentive to carry through the necessary market reforms. This represents an example of the growing economic and political interests in the indeterminacy of transition, or in what was called above the "premature consolidation" of the system.

At the level of everyday life there exists a moral impasse, in a sense inherited from the previous regime in that although 83 percent believe that bribery is morally unacceptable over two thirds believe the current situation forces a person to give bribes. Over a half saw a present as a sign of respect and friendliness. Interestingly bribes are seen to be as much because the bribe giver wishes to have their matter dealt with properly as because it is expected, although the latter opinion has intensified over the last ten years. Over the last year nearly 20 percent of respondents admitted to giving a bribe of some kind i.e. present, money etc and a further 5 percent preferred not to answer. The level has not changed over the last three years.

Every second respondent who admitted some bribe giving(that is one in ten adult Poles) did so in the context of the health service. Dealing with officials recorded 15 percent bribery and education (4 percent) and housing (2 percent). Informal payments in the health service made under a variety of guises is now criticised more openly since the introduction of Sickness Funds, which make a close connection between patient's contributions and the services they received from their newly introduced family practitioner or local hospital. In general the emergence of private health care covering employee schemes in many larger cities as well as private practise in hospitals and medical practises should see the gradual disappearance of private under the counter payments.

The Right to Time

An important adaptation strategy which ran alongside the grey economy was carrying out domestic and household repairs. D-I-Y became more necessary as households combined work and free time into a single entity. It is calculated that the level of so-called "prosumption" – the satisfaction of domestic needs outside of the market – at the beginning of the 90s in Poland had reached 60–70 percent.[52] Inevitably this placed great pressure on free-time which had been cut back by the demands of new work discipline.

The growth of "time-poor" households was witnessed at both ends of the scale, both the affluent dual-occupational household with jobs in the new economy and the poorer households employed in the state sector retreating into naturalised production and multiple jobs. This has thrown up time as an important resource or asset, a form of "temporal capital". Not so much time itself but quality time. Some transition slaves worked 90 hours or more per week and a third worked more than the standard day.[53] In fact time deficit has achieved symbolic status in Poland, a society where for a variety of reasons no great store was placed on the management of time. It is now fashionable to be in a hurry, and by comparison to ostentatious leisure there is now conspicuous work best characterised by the ubiquitous mobile phone.[54] There is now a snobbishness about not having the time to read amongst both entrepreneurs and more disconcertingly writers and journalists.[55]

Simultaneously there was considerable surprise when a 1994 CBOS study discovered that contrary to the popular stereotype of workaholics and time pressure, over one third of respondents declared they had too much time- the new time burdened pensioners, unemployed rural youth and disabled people. Within the scarcity economy based on a repressed inflation concealed by queues, the time burdened could monetise or capitalise their time surplus by standing in queues. Market abundance has removed this opportunity.

The beginnings of a "caring deficit", the erosion of private time and also the effect that insecurity has upon social cohesion are all now well-versed for Western societies.[56] All of these factors are intensified in transition societies where 44 percent of Poles, largely managers, entrepreneurs and the intelligentsia have seen free time been cut back in the last two years. It is the social-psychological consequences of time burdened households and individuals, with the growth in depression, isolation, alcoholism and suicidal tendencies who cannot engage in adaptive strategies through their total absence of resources or assets that has drawn the attention of policy makers. In the new consumer society, modern or post modern, where identity is increasingly being linked in with consumption rather than with production, including leisure, the marginalised unemployed cannot afford to fill their time with either production or consumption.

There therefore appears to be a "time polarisation" which accords with the above thesis. Only one quarter of Poles feel that they lack time for other than essential tasks whereas nearly 40 percent have more than they require. This would accord with the fact that retirees and the unemployed make up over 40 percent of respondents, amongst whom three quarters and two thirds respectively admit to time burdens. Of the employed some 38 percent were time pressured especially occupations such as conductors, postal delivery, shop managers and of course the self employed, managers and the intelligentsia with special intensification over the last couple of years. Of course it is necessary to distinguish between those committed to their work and the 13 percent or so who have to do more than one job to make ends meet. Those who experienced time

deficit complained of a whole range of needs which were unfilled, family life including sexual intercourse, or chats with their children especially homework oversight with Sunday as the only free day. Cultural deprivation grows and leisure and social life all go by the board. The change in tempo of life, with greater and new obligations, both occupational and domestic have all increased time pressures.[57]

Credit to Consumers

It was mainly Poles and Hungarians who took loans from friends and relatives indicating a differentiated attitude to social capital since[58] the banking system with real interest rates above inflation made borrowing prohibitively expensive and demanded the mobilisation of social capital in the absence of finances.

Of course it is at this time that the Poles in particular, more so than their Czech or Hungarian counterparts caught onto consumer credit, which considerably increased household indebtedness and of course time pressures. In 1993 credit grew by 30 percent whereas during 1997 alone the value of credit grew by 58 percent. Household debts as opposed to commercial borrowing represents six percent of GDP which while it is deemed to be too high is seen as a reflection of consumer optimism. Over 16 percent of this debt is for housing purchase rather than consumer luxuries. Furthermore many items purchased on credit terms contribute to entrepreneurial activities such as PCs and cars.[59]

Whereas Hungary comes close to the western European average, the other countries show a level of internal differentiation that brings some households closer to this mark. Thus in Poland 26 percent of white collar households possessed a PC compared to nine percent of manual worker households.[61] This represented a far higher level of cultural as well as economic capital that could be deployed as part of a household strategy.

The latter in particular led to a surge in the purchase of station wagons since they could be set off against income tax by those running small businesses. Over 11 percent of loans went on car purchase which during 1999 made Poland one of the leading European nations for new car purchase stoked up by new and imaginative lending facilities. Polish consumers bought 642 000 new cars in that year, placing them 12th in the world ranking.

Borrowing money is not only for the purposes of joining the consumer society as the table 17 shows.

Table 17 Computers per 100 inhabitants. (1999)[60]

Central European average	12
Romania	3
Bulgaria	4
Lithuania	6
Latvia	9
Czech Republic	11
Poland	14
Slovenia	25
Hungary	26

Table 18 Expenditure of credits and loans (%)

Household equipment	22
Education	15
Clothes and shoes	12
Food	11
Regular payments (rent, utilities)	11
Car	11
Furniture	11
Health	9
Radio and TV equipment	7

Lenders very quickly came to recognise that the credit worthiness of the new borrowers was very high and only some seven percent of lending is seen as in any way threatened by no payment. Pensioners in particular were seen as solid customers.

However apart from the increase in debt collecting and the sharing of information about borrowers, good and bad, between banks more informal types of borrowing also responded to the need for quick access to money and the need to capitalise personal property. There are over 10 000 pawnbrokers in Poland and nothing indicates that they will decline in popularity. Although they were meant to provide loans for the deposits of items they have also now become of interest to organised crime as a means for laundering money. Fictitious borrowings at astronomical interest rates allow a considerable amount of money to pass into circulation. Their legitimate clients are students, owners of businesses, pensioners anyone who needs short term access to funding at 10 to 30 percent per month depending on the time and the place. They have less bureaucracy than the bank and pay immediately.[62]

Therefore the use of multiple strategies and resources helped to reduce the risk of relying on one type of economy.

Transition types

Social psychologists have identified three major categories of adaptation, entitled the "fox", the "hedgehog" and the "lemming". The first involves the active adaptation of external conditions to a consumer's own needs and preferences and includes increased efforts aimed at maintaining at least the previous level of consumption. Extra work, home based production and in some cases bank loans come into this category. For Poles and Hungarians especially, lending was a means of using social capital in the absence of finance capital in order to provide business start-ups. Of course this response is not as active as in western societies where changing one's place of work, up-skilling or re-training are the normal reaction. A hedgehog strategy is largely passive and defensive aimed at maintaining a budgetary balance i.e. limit expenditure, extending the life of goods and cheap shopping. Finally crisis situations evoke lemming strategies, like selling off household goods, use of pawnbrokers and the dependence on social assistance. The overwhelming condition is one which assumes that staying with the mass will eventually lead to some solution.

Which of the above groups a household belongs to depends upon the interplay of a range of social and socio-psychological attributes. Not least of these is the need to make a more *individualised* assessment without the help of a more socially filtered evaluation of the current economic situation of the household, as to what actions need to be taken and what resources or assets a household can bring into play. This means that information not only of a macro economic type but local and indeed employment based, is at a premium in deciding on strategies. What impact do changing conditions have on a particular household not on the whole range.

A further differentiation of the outcome of household adaptation strategies sees winners as adapters – both those who have gained from the transition or expect to, as well as the stable group who have kept their living standards. These generally include those seeking to transfer their social status from the previous economic order with minimal loss and no great expectation of gain. In this case there is either a profitable conversion of assets on the capital market or one where values have just been maintained. The second group is still adapting – either dynamically therefore optimistic but *poor* in

terms of assets necessary to make successful transition, or the disenchanted who whilst objectively well-off believe they have lost out. The latter refers to groups such as those with vocational education who have seen their skills gradually being made redundant. The final group are the un-adapted who feel they are losing out, such as peasant farmers and the poorly educated or those who have palpably lost out on the transition. This final group can include those with general secondary education who could have previously expected a reasonable position in routine white-collar work but the lack of transferable skills precludes this option. Over 60 percent of this group constitutes the unemployed and non-employed.[63] All three are either adapted, adapting or un-adapted but seen in a dynamic perspective, using references in the past present and future.

An important aspect of resource strategy deployment in transition economies is that the three major assets, per capita income, household goods and housing status had become de-crystallised under state socialism. However the market quickly brought about greater congruence between these and other attributes although it allowed those with good housing but faced by unemployment and poverty to utilise this asset in the interim through de-capitalisation.[64] A form of "monetarised consciousness" has accompanied these changes, where the social meaning of income and its relationship to higher education and prestige provides increasing satisfaction to the well-to-do and a sense of failure to others.

As for self-help which is generally given the short-hand of "social capital" in the livelihoods approach some interesting results emerged. Although some 36 percent of Polish households provided and received help from friends and family in 1982 and that this rose to 40 percent in 1992 by 1995 this had fallen to 18 percent despite the same levels of poverty. This was in part a consequence of the increasing institutionalisation of charity and NGO activity with more private donations.

However as could be expected when examining the social redistributional outcomes of private assistance and mutual support white collar self help was greater than that of manual worker households. More to the point mutual support served to increase the differences between households since not only was a family three times as likely to come to the assistance of family or related households than to non family households but also white collar workers are five times as likely to assist each other than they were to assist manual workers. This was regardless of the nature of assistance given either financial, household work or access to deficit goods.[65] State assistance was more egalitarian in outcome although white collar families continued to make greater benefits from private assistance in 1995.

There is however a general belief that the growth of a "bad" individualism has accompanied the transition. This is characterised by a loosening of social ties which brings an unfeeling and lack of response to other peoples' needs such as homelessness, crime and violence. Civil society is seen to be long in the making and citizens prefer to support gala occasions for charity rather than engage in day to day activity oriented to dealing with local problems. (Table 19).

Table 19 In the last year did you give help without having an interest in it? percent[66]

I did not assist anyone	30
Only family	32
Family and people outside family	32
Only strangers	6

Summarising, a national sample survey in Poland (1995) on the social consequences of the economic reforms identified a range of variables which help to explain the initial winner-loser outcomes and which are not really surprising. People of success (33 percent of the survey) tended to work above average (over 51 hours per week) and half of them in a second job, believed in themselves and their future. They were highly individualistic, independent and unafraid of taking on new tasks with a strong commitment to their own achievement. Any spare income they invested in the business rather than leisure. They tend to be younger, more highly educated, have a liberal orientation, and a strong conviction as to the positive attributes of this system. At the other end of the scale were the retreatist and marginalised (34 percent). Over 90 percent were fearful of new tasks, low on individualism, low self-worth and highly fatalistic. Low internal values were compounded by poor material circumstances being either non-employed due to age or ill-health, or unemployed, dependent on social security. Interestingly they would invest any surplus income should they have it on consumption or on their children's education. This latter orientation was found among such groups as unemployed miners who felt that their life chances were now foreclosed.[67] An intermediary group (15 percent) which is successful but less satisfied with its own achievements as well as with the general trend in the transformation are individualists with a strong collectivist conscience- such as the intelligentsia especially engineers, white collar employees and some peasants and workers. They see a greater role for the state in dealing with the casualties of the market and are more likely to be left-oriented. In general the transformation did not allow them to convert their cultural or other capitals successfully and hence do not believe that the system supports hard work and initiative. Another intermediate group (18 percent) also identifies a syndrome of values generally to be encountered in lower administrative functionaries. Here we see a score of 100 percent on fatalism, low aspirations and very little belief in the future. They could also include right wing collectivists and with the above group are the most likely repositories of the old system.[68]

In order to make sense of some of the above outcomes some indication of the changes in household income by socio-occupational is useful:

Table 20 Per capita income by type of household. 1989-1995[69]

Type of household	1989	1995
Total	100 (average)	(average)
Private non-agricultural producer	143.6	152.9
Management	124.9	260.9
Technical specialist	112.7	143.5
Non-technical specialist	102.6	185.4
Clerical-admin.staff	110.6	115.5
Skilled worker	101.2	81.5
Unskilled worker	82.6	77.5
Agricultural worker	80.2	58.6
Farmer	119.9	72.5
Pensioner and retiree	92.1	106.8
Unemployed	–	55.8

The greatest losers in the transition in Poland have been farmers who after a brief period of income growth in the late 80s suffered considerably from the opening up to foreign imports and the downturn in food consumption. Workers have also born the costs of transformation although the above does not make a necessary internal distinction between public and private sector employees

There is little doubt that in the calculus of success, high levels of individualism carry a special premium. Polish research indicates that individualism is scored highly according to social origins, i.e intelligentsia family capital regardless of the level of education, occupational position and other related attributes as well as through high levels of education per se. An interesting finding was that mothers more than fathers through their educational level contributed to the determining attribute of "individualism" largely through their greater contact with the child during its upbringing. Gender was not implicated in any significant way in the presence of individualistic attitudes.[70]

The various strategic or tactical responses[71] adopted by households are differentiated according to the personal make-up of the unit, family structure, material and temporal assets which can deployed for employed work or home-based production. Unemployment and early retirement have been important new factors shaping household structures. Whereas in 1980 there were 100 employed for 35 non-employed pensioners or housewives and children. By 1994 it had risen to 79 per 100 including the now unemployed Between 1990–92 there was a 25 percent increase in early retirees and pensioners or over 1.8 million since 1990. Leszek Balcerowicz is on record as admitting that a major mistake in the first years of the transition was the wholesale early retirements which sent a whole army of able bodies onto social assistance.[72] Likewise as mentioned above giving unemployment benefit to people who had never worked also undermined the system.

In Poland pensions and related benefits absorb 60 percent of tax income and over 21 percent of GDP which is a world record. With male life expectancy up by 2 years during that time and declining birth rates, by 2020 over 16 percent of the population will be over 65 percent of whom it is calculated 55 percent will be disabled in one way or another putting pressure on the health service. The perceived political clout of pensioners has seen their minimum payments raised by successive governments to 39 percent of the average wage , with one of the highest state guaranteed pensions in Europe. The penchant for Poles to use occupational rights, part of the legacy of socialist incorporation, to go into early retirement means that the average Pole retires at 57.[73]

Poverty and social exclusion

The success or failure of adaptation strategies can be judged through the incidence of poverty and social inequality as well as by the feelings of control over the situation.

With the gradual removal of non-market access to goods and the introduction of a more transparent connection between input and consumption, social class factors have increasingly come to determine consumption levels. Highly visible differences between highest and lowest levels life styles were backed by increasing social inequality.

However the growing inequalities were to some extent concealed by increased access to consumer durables.

Poland, with one of the highest levels of inequality among the transition countries brought with it increased unemployment and long term poverty. Given that of the over

Table 21 Gini coefficients by selected countries.[74]

Czech Republic	0.239
Slovenia	0.252
Hungary	0.254
Poland	0.334
Estonia	0.361

2.5 million unemployed over 70 percent do not have a right to unemployment benefit and 40 percent of these have not had a job for over two years, an increase in poverty has been inevitable. The presence of an unemployed person in the family increases the chance of extreme poverty by three. Pauperisation is strongly correlated to low education regardless of the measure of poverty and higher education almost totally excludes the chance of falling into poverty. Likewise the rural urban continuum is implicated in poverty, declining down to one to three percent in large towns and cities but rising to nine percent below the existence minimum in villages.

In the first few years of the transition up until 1994 the sphere of poverty expanded. After that there was a stabilisation or even a slight fall in relative and subjective poverty and the proportion in extreme poverty or below existence minimum fell from 6.4 percent to 4.3 percent in 1996. Those below the social minimum, which could be said to be the most relevant for our purposes fell from 58 percent in 1995 to 47 percent in 1996. The improvement in the average standard of living in 1997 was due to a growth in higher incomes and therefore led to a greater differentiation of household incomes. Thus relative poverty, which is linked to half the average household incomes grew to 15.8 percent and is about one third higher than the minimum existence measure which included five percent of individuals in the latter 90s.

By 1998 half the population lived in households whose expenditures were below the social minimum. This is not a measure of poverty per se but of scarcity prior to poverty. It includes values not only for housing and foodstuffs but also education, health, culture, leisure and transport. It therefore refers to the means necessary to participate in society i.e. citizenship. Alongside this there has been a steady 30 percent or so of persons who fall below the subjective limits to poverty (40 percent in 1993) or what households believe to be the necessary minimum.

Certain internal changes to the distribution of poverty took place between 1997 and 1998. There was a decline in poverty amongst pensioners and those on benefit and an increase in poverty amongst those working in agriculture.

A fifth of all families with four or more children lived in extreme poverty and over a third where state social assistance measures were required.

Table 22 The extent of poverty in Poland 19–98. (%) [75]

Poverty boundary	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Relative	12.0	13.5	12.8	14.0	15.3	15.8
Legal	–	–	–	–	13.3	12.1
Minimum existence	–	6.4	–	4.3	5.4	5.6
Subjective	40.0	33.0	30.8	30.5	30.8	30.8

Other opinion surveys seem to indicate that about 40 percent of the population live at the margins of poverty (37 percent for Hungary and 28 percent for Czech Republic) and four to eight percent below the extreme poverty boundary. In all these countries about one third do not fear poverty despite not feeling economically secure. Another third is concerned about poverty but believe they can handle it whereas 12 to 18 percent feel helpless in the face of impending poverty.[76]

Conclusion

In the most recent studies of poverty in Poland, the proportion of Poles who both fear the advent of poverty and declare a sense of helplessness in dealing with poverty has increased. The gap between those who are reasonably content with their material welfare and those who say that it is bad has grown steadily from 26 percent to 37 percent. Those living at the average level are now fewer than those who believe that they are below some subjective mean.[77] The picture is one of both subjective perceptions and objective statistics on social polarisation. Although unemployment is overwhelmingly seen as the prime cause of poverty (79%), a further 35 percent attribute poverty to low educational levels. Furthermore 34 percent see it as caused by a lack of support from the state.

On the one hand this is optimistic since it highlights the need for increasing access to cultural capital but at the same time it also points to continued demands on the state for dealing with poverty generally. Therefore both an increase in the level of human resources as well as a continuing allocative role for the state are signalled. Not surprisingly the more prescient of political parties such as the UW of Leszek Balcerowicz despite declining electoral fortunes remain committed to their liberal policies but with an increased emphasis of providing the means to combat the sense of helplessness. Other parties such as the ex communist SLD now well established as a social democratic party are more committed to consolidation of the reforms along with the defence of social security.[78] In point of fact it is seen by some commentators that it is the role of the SLD or post communist parties to act as socio-psychological stabilisers after a period of rapid change especially in the area of social policy. This follows the established pattern set in 1993 when the SLD-PSL left alliance did little more than occupy and extend their power base until the advent of the 1997 Solidarity and UW government and the radical four reforms of health, pensions, education and local government.[79]

Thus despite the macro economic figures pointing to high levels of economic growth, increased borrowing and consumer confidence the perception is that the level of frustration and social discontent in Polish society is increasing. Whether the forces of *civic integration* based around the extension of citizenship rights especially those of social citizenship are strong enough to legitimate and mitigate the impact of these changes remains to be seen.

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Chapter 5

Redefining Cultural Capital: The Role of the Transition Intelligentsia

In the preceding chapters, the focus of attention was on the manner in which what were largely micro capitals and assets were deployed by households as they faced the transition. Although these connected with macro policies and to some extent were also articulated by mezzo level organisations and associations, they were largely confined to the locality and the family.

Social capital theory however can also be applied at the mezzo level in its own right, in the analysis of how social groups comprising of more than status blocs, seek to re-locate themselves within the emerging market order. Such groups include the working class, the peasant farmers and the intelligentsia.

Following the trajectory of the "role" of the Polish intelligentsia from the soul of the nation under partition, to engineers of the soul under state socialism to transition intermediaries in an enlarging Europe and globalising modern world is more than an exercise in the historical narrative of a peculiar social stratum. It is an insight into the attempted self-redefinition by a key group in the transition process which because of its impact not just upon democratic politics and economic life but also upon the socio-cultural legitimation of that process demands attention. Whereas the case of Poland is relatively specific the conclusions which can be drawn from this study are less limited.

Relevant social context and sociological issues.

It is necessary to identify some of the determining contexts within which social change is occurring in Poland and its relevance to the changing role of the intelligentsia under conditions of transformation.[1]

The coexistence of a variety of property forms ranging from the rural individual ownership, the smoke stack legacies of state socialism alongside the emergent indigenous and foreign capitalism do not simply suggest the signposts of path dependence. These transformations provide the new *roles* for the various sections of the intelligentsia, as either professionals or specialists and for those who move into the new entrepreneurial fraction or middle-class as well as into the new global service class. By the same token

the slow down in privatisation, the vanguard of transformation provides security for budget sector employees as well as bureaucrats and functionaries and the continuation of an alternative model of the intelligentsia formed under communism. Likewise an unreformed individual and highly fragmented agriculture provides for co-ordinating bodies and institutions which could contribute to the embedding of a rural based intelligentsia. In fact a halfway house situation which multiplies opaque and mutually contradictory regulations corresponds to the new interests of those who benefit, for example from complex taxation systems, such as the new financial and taxation advisors or from the overlap between public and private capital. It also maintains the currency of the cultural capital of the old bureaucracies and the non-adapted intelligentsia.

The well-documented conversions of a variety of individual and group capitals and assets are interwoven into these changing property rights.[2] Alongside, there emerge a variety of strategies for the powerful and asset endowed and responsive tactics engaged in by those less well equipped. Values orientations, goals and interests are formed around the extent to which an individual or group is located within market-determined situations, within state-dominated arenas or is the object of social welfare provision. This is a more useful breakdown than a simple attitudinal assessment that shows a faith in privatisation coupled to negative assessment of its immediate benefits. Although half of all Poles in 2000 believe that the further development of the private sector is the best solution to the country's economic problems only 15 percent declare that they have benefited from the economic transformation and 28 percent that they neither gained nor lost.[3] Increasingly apparent elite and constituency interests in both the acceleration as well as the stalling of the pace of real-time transition compete alongside the struggles over the rates of capital conversion which allow for the most beneficial gain to be made from incomplete transitions and future situations. All of these particular interests are couched in the language of national interest.[4]

Economic capital has been slower in its institutionalisation than expected and cultural capital is both more central and at the same time more in deficit than anticipated. The above mentioned conflicts which increase the level of *indeterminacy* provide key roles for the transition mediators namely the intelligentsia as both specialist arbiters and as the public interest interlocutors of the continuing liminality.[5] Nevertheless the logic of life within the *limen* as Bauman terms it, the intermediate stage between the old and the new situation, is less underdetermined when seen in terms of the goals and interests of key transition actors. In this context Marek Ziolkowski has identified firstly values and interests which are carried over from the past, secondly so-called "transgressional " values and interests which are based on the super-session of the past and the intimations of the future, positive positions and gains to be made within the developing situation. Finally there are those interests emerging out of the continuing present based upon the interaction between public power and purse and private capital. Given the complexity of the task involved in the production and re-production of not only key transgressional values (which are largely imitative) at once early modern, late modern and post modern and which at the same time have to be married to national-religious values, the role of the intelligentsia is daunting.[6] Nevertheless what may happen and what can be done is now far more apparent than in the early nineties. *Fixity* has been imposed upon the "quicksand" of the liminal stage itself. What is also clear is that the intelligentsia is crucially involved in providing this fixity. Not least of the reasons for this role is the fact there is no political party in Poland which either fosters the growth of a western style "middle class" or represents its potential, theoretical interests.[7] In fact as will be shown the alternative is the case with the emergence of a

party representing the interests of the intelligentsia which fills the temporary gap in interest articulation.

The subsequent ascendance however temporary of cultural capital in its broadest sense[8] is realised through the expansion of new market/consumption related occupations whether in financial services, management and marketing or through the new emancipation of the professions achieved by institutional reform in health, law and education or through political lustration. It is now clear that the salience of education as a key determinant of successful adaptation to transition places the intelligentsia at the core of transition. In the transition countries higher education has been shown to improve earnings by more than 50 percent above the average during 1993–94 and each additional level of education achieved further improved earnings.[9] This was suggestive of an emerging meritocracy especially for Poland and it was evidence of the winner status of those with higher education namely the intelligentsia. The non-alignment of Russia appears to suggest the slower rate of reform and the greater disproportion between the incomes of the lower paid intelligentsia and private entrepreneurs. In Russia the former have for a variety of reasons been unable to exploit the possibilities opened up by the market.

The correlation between education and occupational prestige has remained as high as it was under communism whereas the correlation between occupational prestige and earnings has doubled and is nearly at western levels.[10] This further bolstered the position of the intelligentsia releasing it from the artificial constraints of state redistribution wage policies. Occupational prestige rooted in educational position is now being reflected in higher earnings. Not only has the overall prestige hierarchy become less integrated since 1987 but the prestige hierarchies held by different social groups have become less *internally* integrated than they were pre-1989 despite the fact that the constituent indicators of prestige are now more highly consolidated. This indicates a loosening of the normative standards of behaviour and attitudes within groups as would be expected. It should be noted that differences *between* the groups have not changed much over the last ten years so no new indicators of prestige have been established.

Of the eight socio-occupational categories the intelligentsia retains the most highly integrated prestige scale as would be expected indicating a higher level of normative consensus and more importantly reflecting their greater gain from and therefore satisfaction with the direction of the transformation. Compared to 1987 there has been an internal differentiation of hierarchy criteria reflecting the fact that certain parts of the intelligentsia cannot or do not wish to adapt to the marketisation of cultural capital. They may wish to retain the traditional and therefore more comfortable definition of the

Table 23. Monthly income above or below the national average according to educational categories. (percent)

%	Bulgaria	Czech R	Poland	Russia	Slovakia	Hungary
Higher	28.7	34.8	57.2	9.3	28.3	40.7
Incomplete higher	5.8	3.6	-1.8	24.4	9.3	10.1
Secondary	-1.7	3.1	5.6	10.4	-8.7	-1.7
Vocational	-8.9	-9.0	-18.7	-17.3	-7.0	-13.9
Elementary	-6.9	-11.4	-20.8	-17.0	-2.0	-16.3

intelligentsia. This in turn could point to competing models of the future of the intelligentsia such as those loosely termed the Anglo-Saxon versus the French model or even a continuation of that developed under communism.[11]

The growing materialism and attendant social inequality of the transition societies puts pressure on the legitimating ideology of citizenship. The critical connection between forms of capital- economic, cultural and social- and their articulation through social citizenship rights in transition societies is as yet under-developed. It must be stated that the transformation *is not simply about the trajectories of reproduction and re-conversion of assets and capitals by individuals and groups with differing habitus in rapidly changing fields. It is also about how access to these resources and assets is then institutionalised as power through systems of rights and obligations.* Citizenship performs an integrative function by incorporating individuals around shared statuses and identities. But as has been suggested above it also has an allocative function through which it intervenes in the market-generated inequalities by means of redistribution. Social citizenship in its allocative function is clearly a continuation of the socialist redistributive state. Since it is this dimension of citizenship that provides its mitigating function then it is more likely to be object of conflict. Various occupational rights that were associated with industrial citizenship under communism are a case in point. What is clear is that the tension between the integrative and the allocative function of social citizenship will continue with popular pressure seeking a continuation of the latter and broader political imperatives forcing through the former.[12] The intelligentsia will in the process have to compromise on its traditional adherence to collectivist values and embrace the individualistic tenets of citizenship rights albeit in their more socially protective version. The new liberalism, the natural discourse of the modernising intelligentsia is neither embedded in everyday practise nor understood in its implications. An example of the need to find a compromise between the demands of individualism and the hold of collectivism is to be encountered in the powerful argument being advanced for a form of communitarianism as the most suitable form of legitimation for the transitional state. It is argued that firstly since citizens are rarely in a position to calculate individually their own economic interests they are more likely to abide by collective evaluations of their situation. These collective economic sentiments could then be transferred into the political realm. Secondly, individuals within the transition are unlikely to be able to achieve to achieve their life goals without the assistance of associations, social movements and state agencies. Individual political rights rooted in the citizenship of a liberal state cannot guarantee their translation into acceptable living standards.[13]

Of course the intelligentsia is centrally involved in the whole gamut of political debates which provide the axes of confrontation in Poland. The religious-secular divide is a peculiarly sensitive example of the difficulty in dealing with taboo subjects and self-censorship in a post-censorship society.[14] The role of the Roman Catholic Church in the transition is examined in terms of its relationship to democracy, to the challenge of freedom, to the practise of liberal politics and to values rooted in humanity rather than in the idea of God. Is an "integral Church" whose mission is to be present in the contemporary world through dialogue "with the liberal intelligentsia and ideas close to humanism, rationalism and tolerance" more likely than a Church separated from a neutral state.[15] A legacy of communism is to be encountered in the way in which the Christian values held by the vast mass of the Polish intelligentsia especially in the provinces were demoted in their public recognition. This value framework is now being re-examined in order to understand the hold of traditional values during the transition.[16]

A further tension in intelligentsia roles exists as it becomes involved in the shaping of life styles in the new consumer societies. On the one hand the manner in which increasing affluence and consumerism allows for the development of a status order built on differences in life style[17] whilst on the other this cultural elite is faced for the first time by makings of a fully democratic popular culture. The nature of a mass media-led consumerism initially broadly inclusive does not appear to accept the intelligentsia as a consumption authority and this could undermine a key feature of status distinction.[18] Furthermore mass consumerism is based around the projection of a shallow version of traditional national values with the aim of creating a community of consumer alikeness rather than social distinctiveness. Consumer advertising largely carried by TV (nearly 60 percent in 1998)[19] apart from emphasising the transition to an unavoidable modernity also focuses on the consumers' ability to control this emerging reality. A reality that although it appears western is in fact portrayed as immanent to Polish society. What are presented as being changed are not traditional values themselves but the manner in which they are to be realised.[20] Where these values are presented by reference to the literary canons of high culture, the natural domain of the intelligentsia, this is carried out carefully since as stated the advert must unite rather than divide its audience. The meaning has to be multi-layered so that enjoyment of the motif provides satisfaction to various audiences. It also reflects and draws inspiration from a given culture hence the frequent use of the bible as a vehicle for promoting goods such as beer. [21] Advertising has to perform many functions in the new consumer societies and consumers have become more cynical over the last ten years. It is generally accepted that they inform about new products and finance their mass media. Nearly 70 percent now believe (by comparison to 22 percent in 1991) that they also help to sell those articles that are not really necessary. A similar level of change has taken place amongst those who express annoyance at adverts.[22] Advertising also addresses referents in a tradition being created by television itself and therefore depends on a growing television viewing competence. The espousal of traditional values such as the family, feastdays and holidays and rural life style is however more an aesthetic experience than value experience, it is more a common nostalgia than a guide to future action. *However the point is that Polish consumer society is from the outset a "medialised consumer society" and the intelligentsia as the new cultural intermediaries are all the more powerful for that reason.* Their role is all the more central since echoing Ziolkowski, Krajewski claims that Polish media culture has a heightened liminality since through it the audience tries to reconcile at once the past, present and future, and that which is traditional, modern and post-modern resulting in a suspension and uncertainty of the key features of life.[23]

Socio-cultural differentiation based on the articulation and the need to include "otherness" is confronting the relatively easy "us-them" categories. Interpretations of lifestyle whether addressed in TV "soaps" or in academic discourse are about *socialisation into difference* and tolerance but most importantly into *choice*. Collective life style based on the emerging norms and values as well patterns of everyday actions of individuals and groups and rooted in their economic situation is usually a predictor of emerging class structuration. It is also the process by which identity and difference are shaped in the transition and is built on existing legacies and new life chances. Shaped largely through consumption patterns-both material and cultural- life style is closely tied to income, education and other factors such as age and gender but is increasingly free of them.

The new "individualism" of choice based action is intensified in transformation societies and made more chaotic by the removal of previous social sources of patterning

of choice. In transition societies the major problem is to learn to choose and the freedom not to choose as Bauman notes has been removed. Consumers, citizens and employees now face choices over myriad articles and products, insurance policies, holidays and homes, over political parties and associations, over jobs and training. The high percentage of Poles who believe in luck as a determinant of life outcomes and are fatalistic in their orientations compounds the difficulty in the transition to choice making. This is not to imply that there was no choice over life-style under communism. It was however "negative choice" based upon what a person in the scarcity society could most dispense with. In its own way it did point to a hierarchy of values and methodologically at least required the acceptance of what Andrzej Sicinski referred to as *homo eligens* or a choosing individual.[24]

Alongside this there is a compressed process of *socialisation into consumerism* where self is being constructed through the symbolic language of consumption within a context which is increasingly open to "glocalisation" and early post-modernism.[25] The transition from a producer to a consumer society is more intense, since the producer society of communism was more producer-based in that identity was firmly rooted in production and the enterprise, and the consumer society is more obviously consumption oriented given the transition from scarcity to plenitude. The growth of supermarkets,[26] credit indebtedness, one of the highest indicators of new car purchase in the world all point to a situation where life style mediators or in fact "shock-absorbers" are more in demand than in western bottom-up life-style experimentation. Bauman argues that this shift from a producer to a consumer based society is a shift in emphasis and priorities but that it makes an enormous difference to almost every aspect of social life[27] How much more so in transition societies. In the context of such a society the intelligentsia project of how to re-invent itself, to re-interpret and manipulate its myth of legitimation within the new symbolic universe and thus insert itself within the new social order is much more difficult.

The constant crises of the intelligentsia

An examination of the discourse surrounding the question of the intelligentsia is as much about understanding processes of social mobility, class formation and restructuration as it is about a general societal reflection on recent history, present processes and future orientations. The debate around the intelligentsia can be interrogated for what it reveals about changing or indeed emerging societal values and consciousness which emanate not only from within this *milieu* but which are also mediated by it. Despite the fact that the "intelligentsia debate" is now a well known historical phenomenon cropping up during partition, revolution, liberation and liberalisation and most recently with the events of 1989 it demands re-examination[28] For each re-run of the debate adds another layer of meaning to the intelligentsia phenomenon and embeds the myth even more solidly in national tradition. At the same time the existence of this stratum in any sociological sense becomes ever more contested. But there is a belief that this time around the question is being asked that assuming that the intelligentsia has survived the 150 or so years since its inception what role if any it has to play in the transformation, in the movement towards the west and the EU where it is an alien category. More importantly will it survive the processes of its own internal differentiation and polarisation, fragmentation and professionalisation and belated transmutation into a modern middle class.

Thus any reading of the sociology of the intelligentsia provides eloquent testimony that from its birth in the mid 19th century it has been in seeming crisis[29], brought about as much through its own in-built reflexivity as through its autonomous, supra-class position and near mythological status. The question as to why in some societies the intelligentsia existed whereas in very similar societies at the same level of development it was absent has been regularly addressed in an established literature.[30] Questions of definition relating to when the term was first used, intelligentsia origins and aetiology, generations and recruitment patterns, the mix of gentry life style and democratic, patriotic ethos, its endless categorisation into functional sub-groups based on educational qualifications and economic sector and lastly its seeming ability to rise from the ashes – all these questions were active even throughout the communist period.[31] Is it likely now that just as it emerged as the embodiment of a set of values so it will now be dis-embodied and remain simply a cultural reference point for those self-same values and ideas?

The career of a concept

There are three main theses relating to the intelligentsia:

(a) We are witnessing the final stage in the long-overdue exit of this social stratum from the social structure. [32]
(b) We are likely once again to see its self-transformation and re-invention into the social and cultural implementers of a new civil society or some other related role oriented to future tasks such as EU integration although rooted in past traditions.[33]
(c) With the return of normal society the intelligentsia will be absorbed into a new middle class of entrepreneurs and professionals.

All three theses have been presented recently with renewed vigour.[34]

The first thesis states that the intelligentsia is now redundant given the re-establishment of an independent nation-state with gold-plated NATO security guarantees and EU modernity beckoning. It has no natural heirs and that its cultural role if any is sidelined to marking out life style patterns and brushing up historical tradition. The intelligentsia it is claimed, if it existed at all has been diluted into meaninglessness by mass recruitment and the working through of the processes of modernisation during the communist era. Evidence of this comes from the fact that at the beginning of the 1990s some 20 percent of the population claimed intelligentsia status eloquently supporting the view that it had lost much of its historical stature and social exclusivity. Part of this loss is explained by its perceived conciliation with communism, which may explain why for one third of Poles the term carries a negative connotation. A normal society it is claimed no longer has need of a political class drawn from poets, academics and dissidents.

Over 50 percent of the political elite in Poland in 1993 were drawn from specialists and 93 percent had higher education of some kind. The intelligentsia effect even drew lower white-collar workers into the elite in Poland. More to the point over a third of the political elite had fathers with higher education and nearly a fifth with graduate grandfathers.[35] The proponents of this view contend that the sooner career politicians take responsibility for politics the sooner some of the artificial divides and value based symbolic conflict rooted in the recent past will be finished with.

On another tack an elitist, intellectual otherworldliness rooted in civilised and largely anachronistic behaviour, informed by an anti-bourgeois even anti-capitalist ethos, a dilettante approach to work and occupation and an aversion to conspicuous consumption is not likely to carry the kind of authority required to embed a liberal market democracy.

What kind of modern resonance is there in a stereotype that often borrowed from and interacted with its Russian counterpart and created the image so poignantly expressed by Joseph Brodsky

> "Poorly dressed but somehow still elegant, shuffled by the dumb hands of their immediate masters, running like rabbits from the ubiquitous state hounds... they retained their love for the non-existent. thing called *civilisation*... As I write this I close my eyes and almost see them standing in their dilapidated kitchens, holding glasses in their hands with ironic grimaces across their faces. 'There, there' they grin '*Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite.* Why does nobody add Culture?'"[36]

Characterised by a sense of mission and indeed service to a nation partitioned and persecuted, by heightened sensibility to national values, they were tied by a spiritual bond and carried a special burden of conscience, They possessed what Peter Nettle termed that "subtle increase in exacerbation over the intellectual" and although they could be more or less alienated or engaged they were as closely connected to action as to thought. They were in communion with symbols, with the sacred and retained a sensitivity to the past.

They quickly passed from being defined as Pollard calls it by a "quality of mind" through to habitués of aristocratic literary artistic salons,[37] where the manners of the landed nobility became syncretised with the educational credentialism of cultural capital and given direction by its sense of mission committed to national survival. An outcome of the failed November uprising and subsequent repression the salon was borrowed late from its French counterpart but served to consolidate and articulate a new role for a new historical actor, an aristocratic vehicle for a democratic audience. One should not over-emphasise the gentry culture at the expense of the emerging bourgeois input into intelligentsia culture and worldview, although no doubt it did predominate. Interestingly these literary salons made a re-appearance in post-1989 Polish society as in the conditions of cultural freedom and pluralisation the intelligentsia sought once again to take stock of its situation.

However the predominance of a messianic romanticism rooted in the concern for a partitioned Poland meant that it did not engage in the technological -civilisational development of its western counterparts and postivism always took a back seat to the romantic ideal.

In summary the Polish intelligentsia of the time was made up of persons with different world views, moral viewpoints and other attributes who were held together by education and non-manual employment which in turn committed it to the cultural defence and development of its society. Its relatively open inclusionary membership and national liberation aims gave it a popular democratic mandate and a legitimacy that it was able to deploy to considerable effect over the next hundred years.

This was despite the fact that over the next half century, according to its critics, the intelligentsia came to form a closed coterie, wherein the cultural, creative function was inextricably linked to the cultural life style role. Furthermore in his quite swingeing

indictment of their social closure Jozef Chalasinski noted that for the typical member of the déclassé gentry who has lost wealth, power and social standing

> "Social manners were the only form of wealth with which he was left, in any case a very important part of the capital of social superiority over which he disposed".[38]

They became inward looking, conservative and self-affirming, constituting in effect an "intelligentsia ghetto". Being well brought up and of good manners took on an excessive significance alongside the social ritualisation that allowed them to maintain social distance. Although highlighting non-material aspects of social hierarchy was understandable for an impoverished stratum one's "position in good society" became an autonomised determinant of social status. In the Hungary of 1900 maintaining a style of life for the intelligentsia drove many into serious debt, bred corruption and led to a situation where "13.6 percent of the intelligentsia had a second job".[39] Many of these social attributes and the deployment of parts of this cultural capital survive to the present day. Whereas an inordinate concern for good reputation, dignity and respectability was as much a part of the intelligentsia legacy bequeathed to and nurtured under communism so also was the fear of being too different and their respect for order and hierarchy. These latter attributes along with their anti-capitalism made it was claimed a convenient fit with the communist order.

Nevertheless the intelligentsia's role as mass educators and more importantly as the legitimators of rational redistribution[40] under state socialism eroded this self-image, blurred their social distinction and difference and undermined popular support. As state employees albeit working as artists, doctors and scientists they undoubtedly benefited from state redistribution.[41] By 1996 there were 2 180 000 persons with higher education in Poland or 7.3 percent of the population (compared to 219 000 in 1958) split evenly by gender.[42]

The key point is that the intelligentsia as with most other socio-occupational categories was produced initially by mass social mobility from the countryside, wherein 40 to 47 percent of grandfathers of current white collar employees of various levels were peasants and a further 25 percent or so manual workers.[44] This single factor raises

Table 24 Students in higher education at the beginning of the academic year.[43]

Country	1990/91 (in thousands)	1996/7 (in thousands)	1990/91 (per 10,000 pop.)	1996/7t (per 10,000 pop.)
Belarus	335	329	327	318
Czech Rep.	118	192	115	187
Lithuania	88.7	83.6	248	224
Russia	5100	4458	344	300
Romania	193	412	83	182
Slovenia	33.6	51.0	175	276
Hungary	102	195	99	192
Poland	512	1110	134	287
United Kingdom	1258	1821	219	314

the biggest question mark amongst those who query the significance of their gentry origins and indeed many of the other ascribed attributes of the intelligentsia. This peasantisation has led to predictions of the development of a "culture of suburbia", an urban peripheral rather than a middle class ethos, where local bonds have been transferred and reproduced within an urban setting without first being rendered by the mill of mass society.[45] The new influx of students into an expanded higher education system of varying quality can only further the social dilution process.

Finally it is claimed as they fill the ranks of the entrepreneurial middle class or the newly liberated professions and join the new financial and services occupations so they will cease to have any specific position within Polish social structure. The departure of the best and the brightest it is further claimed will undermine the reproduction of the core intelligentsia, its necessary generational change, further diminishing its social standing until it finally disappears. Thus the heirs to the intelligentsia must re-legitimate themselves within the conditions of the transformation if they are to re-establish the value of, and re-embody its waning cultural capital.

The re-invention of the intelligentsia mission

Turning now to the second thesis – the elaboration and re-production of a new role for the intelligentsia in the transition, research indicates that amongst this group itself there is a belief that they, the intelligentsia traditionally understood, rather than politicians, youth or intellectuals as such, should take on an opinion-forming, educational and leading social role in the transition process. A sense of mission still pervades their thinking.[46]

> "In order to effectively implement (zagospodarować) the sovereignty regained and as a consequence to create the "future civilisation", Poland needs clever, enlightened and non-egoistic people. In my opinion such a group exists, which in creating the scenario of transformation, indicating optimal solutions, overseeing their achievement at all levels, approximates to the model of leading creators of the new civilisation... it is the Polish intelligentsia".[47]

A clearer exposition of "new mission" sociological thinking is more difficult to script. It is in the spirit and the letter of elite led transitions placing a heavy emphasis on the cultural capital necessary to carry out the longer project.

Furthermore the *very pace of the transformation* more than anything else in the context of growing national particularism, European integration, and cultural globalisation provides a ready made role even a mission for a national intelligentsia. In this they may function as trans-national intermediaries, the purveyors of robust national identity and ensure that Poland is not relegated to the periphery.

Similarly the outlines of early post modernism within a society coming to terms with rampant consumerism make cultural mediation and identity formation a real challenge. When put like this, the perceived intelligentsia role of managing, organising and indeed "cultivating" the transformation of society has revealed an alarming intelligentsia "transformation deficit" rather than redundancy. This, the argument goes stems from the fact that its new role is even more difficult than that of the oppositional or old intelligentsia under communism who did not have to establish or embed social citizenship and civil society but simply to facilitate the conditions for its emergence.[48]

The fear then is that although a role exists for the intelligentsia, they in turn have been siphoned off, culturally degraded or marginalised to the point where they cannot fulfil this new historical mission.

Implementing the transition

The intelligentsia project then is to represent itself as the implementers of the transition. Although visible in and indeed central to the "negotiated revolutions" the intelligentsia as a second level of the transition elites faces a complex task focused around its own re-legitimation and re-definition. It is involved in what Bourdieu would call a classification struggle over the schemes and systems which are the basis of representations of groups and therefore of mobilisation and demobilisation; representations based on the evocative power of utterances, schemes of perception etc.

> "The fate of groups is bound up with the words that designate them – the power to impose recognition depends upon the capacity to mobilise around a name".[49]

In this struggle the intelligentsia can deploy "social power over time" collected in a powerful habitus and embodied in a broad ranging cultural capital which provides it with the means to seek or impose such recognition. *The struggle over the intelligentsia classification is a power struggle carried out primarily by those that cannot or do not wish to engage either in the horizontal re-conversion or the substitution of capitals.* The imposition or in this case the retention of a name is a recognition of social existence and therefore of the power and privileges which come with it. The intelligentsia is engaging in the political work required to shift from a theoretical group that it had become under communism to a practical group.[50]

The intelligentsia is also an example of the "hysteresis of habitus" which causes "previously appropriate categories of perception and appreciation to be applied to a new state of the qualification market".[51] This collective mis-recognition is not illusory since it orients action towards the revaluation of traditional intelligentsia attributes albeit within new conditions. It is therefore about defining the field within which cultural capital can be deployed and invested. Although applied to the world of French diplomas the argument is valid for broader credentials such as intelligentsia status.

But their own classification struggle is no less important than their key role in deploying symbolic mastery[52] for others which in turn enhances their own power. Bourdieu notes how cultural capital is especially important when moving from one embedded economic order to another. Here symbolic mastery can not only serve to legitimate the new order but it also provides the intellectual resources to allow one particular meaning of a trajectory (which will benefit a particular group or stratum) to be represented as optimal and in the national interest. If there is any doubt on this score then an examination of the symbolic conflict between the SLD and AWS-UW parties in Poland over what is still a relatively bi-partisan transition trajectory and where policy difference is more about meaning than content should make it plain. Likewise the ability of the ex-communist SLD to be able to shed that label and become accepted as "social democrats" is eloquent testimony to the importance of classification struggles.

Bourdieu's definition of the role of the petite bourgeoisie is resonant of that of the intelligentsia in Eastern Europe. His discussion of the struggle between agents over the representation of their position in the social world and consequently of that world

itself is clearly pertinent. As an intermediary between emerging classes the intelligentsia is the arena for conflicts that are not just about culture but about the legitimate principle of domination-between economic, cultural or social capital.[53]

Although not exclusively so it is therefore in the cultural "field" that the intelligentsia is most active in its own interest and where it will deploy its cultural capital as symbolic competence. Here it faces a major task in legitimating its hoped-for intermediary role. Seen as being closer to Veblen's "leisure class" in their anti-industry ethos and associated more with cultural than conspicuous consumption, more with education and leisure than with Franklinism and hard work they do not fit the modern ethos of workaholics and frantic business making. However insofar as Simmel's analysis of fashion signifies inclusion into a group and indeed requires the activity of teleological individuals to instigate fashion change to create social distinction, then the intelligentsia has the cultural assets and the habitus dispositions to function in the making of social difference.[54] Of course Bourdieu's view would be that the intelligentsia would simply emerge as those who impose the social power of the new economic elites through cultural consumption, making and maintaining social distinctions in order to secure and then legitimate the new power. This need not be the case in a transition society where cultural capital can establish greater autonomy for itself and where cultural domination is seen as in some way ab initio polycentric and post modern.[55]

However the intelligentsia faces further problems in its cultural re-legitimation. In a society where the masses have been "nationalised" and national consciousness democratised, where strong local identity has been replaced by weak national identity, where national memory has become short-term and shallow, the role of the intelligentsia as the intermediary for national identity, consciousness and national memory loses its traditional legitimacy. Where the vast majority of teenagers know as little about 1980 and Solidarity as they do about the January insurrection of 1863 then a major part of the cultural capital of the intelligentsia has become redundant.[56] How the intelligentsia will negotiate the new cultural terrain or work within a changing cultural field remains to be seen.

Changes in cultural organisation

Fundamental changes to the organisation and production of culture have accompanied the transition and provide a backdrop to the intelligentsia transition project:

1. The withdrawal of censorship was only a starting condition to the re-definition of the role of the intelligentsia and to some extent the most manageable. The de-statisation and socialisation of culture now organised through the market and governed by decentralised financial decision-making meant the withdrawal of central state funding and the oversight for state sponsored culture to local government. This has led to an enormous differentiation in the provision of everyday culture between the regions and between town and country. Thus far tradition is used to explain why areas such as Krakow "play with culture" and folk dance continues in areas where it was always strong whereas other municipalities and regions devote a fraction of the expenditure on culture compared to that of their neighbours. State local provision of culture under communism set a high albeit false standard but in turn has left a passive audience of recipients rather than makers of culture. At the same time the forces of globalisation have penetrated into

Polish villages and in some cases is shaping a youthful population who are familiar with a world they rarely encounter but are unfamiliar with one which they encounter every day, names without objects, objects without names.[57]

The hard-nosed conditions of the market where the state contributes approximately 0.33 percent of GDP or one dollar per capita to cultural expenditure ($10 in the UK) has served to bring producers of culture closer to consumers, released a range of new self-help initiatives and democratised culture. High and popular culture are now in closer partnership although the theatre, opera and orchestras have been unscathed by comparison to clubs, cinemas (one fifth the number of ten years ago and to which 70 percent of Poles never go), museums and libraries.[58] However the energy released by marketisation has seen the publication of 1380 national publications of which only 40 are state owned. The case where supermarkets sold books by the kilo in the face of a chronic decline in book production (one half of 1990 levels) and readership (17 percent of Poles did not read a book per year) made the point although it was seen as scandalous "for people of books".[59] The market has also served to remove the artificial culture produced by state ideology and culture is now opened to global influences and oriented to transnational audiences. The "creative" intelligentsia as it was known under communism when confronted with the market has responded creatively. Copywriters for Poland's burgeoning advertising industry now earn more from three lines on a fruit juice label than for an article or short story and famous names now record cassette classics in order to reach the non-reading public.[60] The commercialisation of culture has been accompanied by an intensification of TV viewing[61] that has replaced institutionalised cultural life.[62]

2. The pluralisation of culture brought about by giving voice to suppressed groups and opinion centres has given various minorities and "others" greater visibility. Popular culture achieves civil society values by providing such a voice. However such pluralisation economises culture by introducing income differentiation in cultural consumption which reflects and compounds social inequality.
3. Deep value changes bringing with it shifts in social orientations and life strategies come at a time where consensus over values indeed value consistency is no longer the norm. Values no longer programme one's life. As mentioned above the post-modern self is about choice, change and experimentation with identity. This is no more so than in the penetration of new consumer values and identities into Polish society. This compounds the insecurity which unemployment and de-regulation have introduced.
4. The cultural legitimation of the transformation that creates real costs the longer it takes is part of the broader problem of the legitimation of the transition itself. The intelligentsia, with the highest level of approbation for EU accession and global culture are the natural vehicle for making up an increasing legitimacy deficit.[63] Whereas support for EU membership currently stands at 54 percent it is much higher amongst those with higher education.
5. The process of re-interpreting the past in a new symbolic language is as important as the lustration process itself. The strategies whereby a new symbolic universe was introduced under Stalinism in Poland in 1948 have been examined.[64] Part of the role of the intelligentsia is to de-construct the cognitive structures inherited from the communist system. The very definition of the transformation itself is made more difficult by the immanent phenomena which although initiated by the transition, through the interplay of both new market rationality and irrational

reactions have unintended outcomes *which are not directly attributable to the legacy of state socialism* i.e. liminality creates problems of definition for the further stage.

6. Transnational social space and their related communities which Beck sees as cancelling out local associations of communities[65] is particularly pertinent to societies where dialogue with emigration is an important part of national identity and has always been part of the intelligentsia discourse. It is also central for societies where a range of human rights conditionalities for access to Europe and membership of the world community requires intellectual mediation. Various examples of discrimination and racism are now dealt with through the media in discourses that are often new and untried, requiring mediation for their indigenous populations.[66]

The making of the middle-class

The third thesis claims that the intelligentsia will become the basis of some type of middle or service class rooted first and foremost in business and the professions. An examination of occupational mobility after 1989 may shed some light on to the recruitment flows into this new middle class. A brief discussion of class formation related to voting behaviour might further elucidate the making of class in an era of the end of class. It should be noted at the outset however that whereas pre-1989 hardly anyone for obvious political-ideological reasons claimed to belong to the middle class, by 1992 over 41 percent of the Polish population claimed such membership. Included amongst these were 80 percent of the intelligentsia and managers, 74 percent of clerical workers and 60 percent of entrepreneurs as well as 53 percent of the unemployed and 70 percent of students. The relatively low proportion by comparison with white-collar employees of entrepreneurs provides food for thought. Whereas this mass identification indicated a change of consciousness, new aspirations as well as the suggestive power of the transitional elite which demanded a middle class to embed the transition it was aimed above all at this group.[67]

Between 1988–1994 the percentage of business proprietors amongst working men and women grew from 4.3 percent to 10.4 percent. An analysis of occupational career change during the key years 1983–93 indicated that 23.6 percent of Czech males and 22.3 percent of Czech women found themselves in a different socio-occupational category. In Slovakia, Poland and Hungary occupational mobility was only slightly less intense with women being less mobile in all cases.

Table 25 Persons who changed their occupational category during 1983-88 and 1988-93 (percent)

	Men 1983–88	Men 1988–93	Women 1983–88	Women 1988–93
Bulgaria	12.2	17.2	13.1	14.6
Czech Rep.	8.1	23.6	12.1	22.3
Poland	9.7	20.0	11.5	14.6
Russia	11.2	15.1	12.2	11.6
Slovakia	8.8	19.7	8.4	12.9
Hungary	13.4	19.5	16.1	16.3

Source H Domanski fn 50

Although the social structure became no more open there was considerable movement within the various categories as new jobs developed. Small business recruited the largest percentage from outside its own ranks as could be expected. In the Czech Republic only 10 percent of male proprietors in 1993 had their own firm five years earlier. In Poland it was 50 percent indicating a greater level of self-recruitment from the existing private sector although in absolute terms it would be considerably higher. The growth in new entrepreneurs was not at the cost of old business but due to new opportunities. At the same time the percentage of higher management and intelligentsia (those with higher education) positions increased from 11.7 percent to 14.2 percent of males between 1983 and 1994.[68]

Other factors which determined the membership of the category of business owners, was business ownership by grandfather (especially for Poland but not for Hungary) indicating the significance of a business tradition which could be resurrected as capital. This single factor was more important than education, gender, age or residence, nomenklatura position in 1988 (especially for Poland) and of course education, which is not unrelated to the latter.[69] Studies of Czech, Slovak and Polish life goals in 1995 indicated that whereas there existed a broad consensus on the need for higher education amongst one's children, only 58.7 percent and 56.3 percent of the first two saw establishing a business as a recommended strategy compared to 80.4 percent of Poles.[70]

Looking more closely at entry into the business class, it is possible to see that in 1994, some 16 percent of business owners had been intelligentsia or experts[71] in 1988, 41 percent had owned a business and 17 percent and 21 percent had been skilled and unskilled workers. The inflow of intelligentsia and workers was commensurate with their proportions within the socio-occupational structure as a whole. This indicates a relatively homogeneous class of business owners where intelligentsia influence is low. By comparison 88 percent of intelligentsia position holders in 1994 had held the same position in 1988 pointing to a high level of self-recruitment and hardly indicative of a group in crisis.[72]

Examining the voting behaviour of the intelligentsia is another means for identifying whether they are not only conscious of their own interests, but which party best represents those interests and whether as a group they are coalescing or disintegrating.

In the 1991 elections the Union of Democrats was the predominant representative of non-technical intelligentsia gaining 42.5 percent of the votes from this group. They also obtained 28.8 percent of the votes from business owners. At this stage engineers (21%) and higher management (13.4%) tended to vote for the post-communist SLD indicating an interesting but not unexpected cleavage in the intelligentsia vote. In the 1997 elections the UW became even more strongly the party of the non-technical intelligentsia and higher managers. For its part the SLD saw its vote among engineers, technicians, routine white collar remaining solid. *This points to a cleavage between the political and therefore class loyalties of the technical and non-technical intelligentsia which could explain some of the factors mentioned above.* Given that the UW was marginalised politically it is not surprising that business went to the dominant AWS and SLD whereas the peasant party also strengthened its class appeal.

The UW became the vehicle for cultural capital and the correlation between party preference and class membership based on occupation increased during this time for the UW and PSL significantly. However when looking at the social origins of UW voters it became apparent that they came largely from intelligentsia and white-collar backgrounds. Even if the children of the intelligentsia ceased to belong to that category they would still support UW. More significantly whereas 30.4 percent of intelligentsia

from intelligentsia origins voted for the UW, it was the 40 percent of intelligentsia with fathers in business who voted for the UW which provided the highest level of support based on social origins and where the causal explanation is most difficult. The intelligentsia whose fathers were skilled workers or peasants provided 25 percent and 15 percent respectively of their group.[73]

There is a clear indication that the UW is a party committed to thoroughgoing liberal market policies which coincide with the new opportunities provided for this group of the intelligentsia. It has also attracted the loyalty of this generational intelligentsia as much through its ethos as through its policies.

Bourdieu notes that one of the determining characteristics of political choices lies "in the fact that more than all other choices ... they involve the more or less explicit and systematic representation an agent has of the social world, of his position within it and of the position he ought to occupy."[74] This is clearly true of the "generational" intelligentsia vote concentrated around a party such as the UW which being a small party attracts an identity-based and therefore symbolic vote. That the technical intelligentsia whose cultural capital is more threatened with redundancy vote with the SLD is also not surprising, expressing an interest in slower transformation.

Conclusion

There are likely to be many intelligentsia projects that will compete and draw on the cultural capital of this group. They will be defined by internal conflict over the nature of citizenship, as between its integrative and allocative functions. They will have a reference to the international/globalisation processes affecting the country. Finally they will address the role of the new consumer society in the shaping of life style and identity. More importantly the intelligentsia rather than disappearing is re-inventing its sense of mission providing a re-legitimation of the continuing role of this stratum in social and political life. This was clearly put in the most recent example of the debate around the intelligentsia in search of an identity and mission. The key value was summed up in the notion of "service", by a group who were at once loyal to the old myths and values of the intelligentsia and who were needed by Poland now more than ever. Those interested in making money would leave this milieu to become the middle class but a small proportion would remain, the authentic intelligentsia, conscious of its moral identity, conscious of what differentiates from the newly affluent, they would once again be the "people of service".[75] Thus there would be both a middle class and an intelligentsia.

However there is one role the intelligentsia may play over which it may have little control. The emerging elites , both economic and political, as they come to establish and legitimate their rule will need to elaborate an legitmatory myth, an ideology of authority, which will have to draw on elements of Poland's past as well as its present and future. Of course the discourse of citizenship will in all likelihood play a major part in this legitimation project. However in the realm of life style and social status, as the new middle or service class moves along the continuum from domination on the basis of market location to legitimate authority rooted in the myth of superiority, then it will have to draw on the one outgoing elite which is accessible namely the intelligentsia. Calling upon its historical achievements, the new middle class will by a process of cultural syncretism incorporate some of the ethos and values of the intelligentsia to establish its own credentials as the representative of the social interest and the societal

good. It will humanise Polish capitalism and provide some continuity to the intelligentsia mission.

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