Apatheia in the Teachings of Evagrius Ponticus

Monica Tobon

UCL

PhD in Classics
I, Monica Tobon confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
This thesis is to my knowledge the first full-length examination of Evagrian *apatheia*.

Chapter One contextualises Evagrian *apatheia* by outlining Evagrius’ cosmology and anthropology. Attention is drawn to the centrality within them of the distinction between unstable and stable movement and to Evagrius’ characterisation of *apatheia* and *empatheia* in these terms. *Apatheia*, as the stable movement of the soul, is noted to be the foundation for the transformative contemplation by means of which the fallen *nous* re-ascends to union with God. The anthropology section describes Evagrius’ understanding of the *nous*, soul, body and heart.

Chapter Two examines the psychology and phenomenology of *empatheia*. Section One focuses upon the *logismoi*, discussing what Evagrius means by the term *logismos*, noting the inherence of *pathos* to the *logismoi*, explaining his concept of the ‘matter’ of the *logismoi* and discussing his eightfold classification of ‘most generic *logismoi*’. Section Two focuses upon *pathos*, discussing the meaning of the term within Greek philosophy, how Origen understands it and how Evagrius himself understands it. It then discusses the cognitive ‘building blocks’ of the *logismoi*, the *empathē noēmata* and the arousal of *pathos*. Section Three describes the phenomenology of *empatheia*.

Chapter Three establishes that the subject of *apatheia* is the tripartite soul in its entirety, then adduces evidence for *apatheia*’s being the stable movement of the soul. It then discusses Evagrius’ spiritual characterisations of *apatheia* – first as death and resurrection and then as love and knowledge, the latter including practical moral knowledge as well as knowledge of transcendent realities. The holistic, embodied nature of spiritual knowledge as understood by Evagrius is emphasised, as is the inseparability of knowledge from love. His understanding of *apatheia* is shown to be profoundly Christian, and in particular Pauline. Following a discussion of how *apatheia* is attained, the chapter concludes with a summary description of *apatheia* as understood by Evagrius.
Contents

Introduction ........................................................................................................... 6

Chapter One: Cosmology and Anthropology ........................................... 14
  1.1 Cosmology ............................................................................................... 14
      1.1.1 The creation and fall of the logikoi ........................................... 15
      1.1.2 Corporeal creation ........................................................................... 20
      1.1.3 The therapeutic nature of corporeal creation ....... 32
      1.1.4 Summary ....................................................................................... 39
  1.2 Anthropology .......................................................................................... 40
      1.2.1 The nous ......................................................................................... 40
          1.2.1.1 The epistemic passibility of the nous ....................... 42
          1.2.1.2 The metaphysical passibility of the nous 49
          1.2.1.3 The true nature of the nous ........................................... 50
          1.2.1.4 Summary .............................................................................. 54
      1.2.2 The soul .......................................................................................... 56
      1.2.3 The body ........................................................................................ 64
      1.2.4 The heart ....................................................................................... 81
      1.2.5 Summary ....................................................................................... 86

Chapter Two: Empatheia .............................................................................. 90
  2.1 The logismoi ........................................................................................... 90
      2.1.1 What is a logismos? ..................................................................... 92
      2.1.2 The ‘matter’ of the logismoi ....................................................... 105
      2.1.3 The eightfold classification of generic logismoi ..107
          2.1.3.1 Gluttony ......................................................................... 108
          2.1.3.2 Fornication ....................................................................... 111
          2.1.3.3 Avarice ............................................................................. 113
          2.1.3.4 Distress ............................................................................. 115
          2.1.3.5 Anger ............................................................................... 116
          2.1.3.6 Acedia .............................................................................. 117
          2.1.3.7 Vainglory ......................................................................... 119

Page 4 of 268
2.1.3.8 Pride........................................120
2.1.3.9 Summary................................121

2.1.4 The sequence of the eightfold classification
of most generic logismoi.......................122
2.1.4.1 The derivation of the logismoi from
the parts of the soul.........................122
2.1.4.2 The relation between the sequence of
the eightfold classification of most
generic logismoi and how they
logismoi are experienced....................128

2.1.5 Summary........................................133

2.2 Pathos..................................................134
2.2.1 A preliminary understanding of pathos..........134
2.2.2 Evagrius’ understanding of pathos.............140
2.2.3 Empathē noēmata...............................147
2.2.4 The arousal of pathos.........................152
2.2.5 Summary............................................167

2.3 The empathēs nous...............................168

Chapter Three: Apatheia.................................175
3.1 Apatheia as stability..............................178
3.2 Apatheia as death and resurrection.............186
3.3 Apatheia as love and knowledge...............207
3.4 Becoming apathēs................................232
3.5 Summary: apatheia in the teachings of Evagrius
Ponticus.............................................252

Conclusion..................................................255

Abbreviations.............................................259

Bibliography..............................................261
Introduction

(i) Overview of thesis

Apatheia is central to Evagrius’ anthropology and so to his understanding of the human condition and the economy of salvation. Accordingly, in order fully to appreciate what he means by it, it is necessary to examine it not only from a psychological perspective but also in relation to his overall spiritual vision, and this is what this thesis aims to do.

Chapter One contextualises apatheia by outlining Evagrius’ cosmology and anthropology. The cosmology section draws attention to the significance of movement within Evagrius’ schema, and in particular to the centrality of the distinction between unstable and stable movement, unstable movement being movement away from God, and stable movement, movement toward him. It argues that the Fall was - and continues to be - an unstable movement precipitated by the initial movement of the rational beings’ self-determination away from God, while the re-ascent to God is a progressive stabilisation of the movements of the soul and nous effected by means of transformative contemplation. It is noted that apatheia is the stable movement of the soul, and the foundation for, and a necessary condition of, the contemplative ascent. The anthropology section begins by focusing on the nous, discussing its intrinsic passibility in both epistemic and metaphysical contexts (these being causally interdependent), and its true nature. It then describes the three parts of the soul by describing their action according to nature. Since apatheia is, for Evagrius, the natural state of the human being, this amounts to a description of the apathēs soul. There follows an account of Evagrius’ understanding of the body in which it is argued that apatheia has a physical foundation in the form of the elimination of excess vital heat by means of dietary restriction, and that, accordingly, a distinction between ‘spiritual’ and ‘profane’ understandings of physical health is implicit in Evagrius’ thought. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what Evagrius means by the term ‘heart’, since one of the ways in which he characterises apatheia is in terms of purity of heart.
Chapter Two turns to the psychology and phenomenology of *empathēia* on the basis that Evagrian *apatheia* is best understood by reference to his analysis of the condition that it replaces. The first section focuses upon the *logismoi*, the cognitive activity characteristic of *empathēia*. It begins by discussing what Evagrius means by the term *logismos*, then explains his concept of the ‘matter’ of the *logismoi*. It then turns to his eight-fold classification of ‘most generic *logismoi*’, considering each *logismos* in turn and the rationale for the sequence. The second part of the chapter focuses upon his understanding of *pathos*. It begins with an overview of how *pathos* was understood by Greek philosophy, and also by Origen, before analysing Evagrius’ own understanding of it, from which it emerges that his concept of a *pathos* has a far broader extension than the modern concept of an emotion or passion and that the fundamental spiritual significance with which he invests it derives from his understanding of *pathos* as a *de facto* valuation of something other than God over God himself; that is, as idolatry. It then looks at the cognitive ‘building blocks’ of the *logismoi*, the *empathē noēmata*: what they consist in, how they come into existence, and how they are both symptoms of the immersion of the *nous* in sensible reality and contributors to its continuing immersion. The following section focuses upon the arousal of *pathos* and shows that Evagrius believes that even when the agent is in the throes of fresh *pathos* she retains the capacity to refrain from acting it out and so committing a sin. It is shown how, in responding to temptation, the agent either reverses or repeats, on the microcosmic level, her primordial deflection from God, since a choice to resist temptation is a movement of her self-determination toward God and brings her incrementally closer to him, while a choice to succumb to it is a movement of her self-determination away from God, resulting in a ‘fall’ into *pathos* which further distances her from him and in so doing both echoes and continues the pre-cosmic Fall. The chapter concludes by summarising the phenomenology of *empathēia*, the soul’s unstable movement and consequently its pathology.

The first two chapters having laid the groundwork necessary for understanding *apatheia* in terms of the different contexts within which it is situated, Chapter Three focuses upon *apatheia* itself. It begins by asking which part of the human person is its real subject, given that Evagrius predicates it of various anthropological entities, and concludes that it is the tripartite soul as a whole. It then argues for the proposition that *apatheia* is the soul’s stable movement. The following two sections discuss the principal
ways in which Evagrius characterises *apatheia* in spiritual terms: first, as death and resurrection, and second, as love and knowledge, the latter including practical moral knowledge as well as knowledge of transcendent realities. The holistic, embodied nature of spiritual knowledge as understood by Evagrius is emphasised, as is the inseparability of knowledge from love. His understanding of *apatheia* is revealed to be profoundly Christian, and in particular Pauline. These two sections also show how Evagrius uses a variety of biblical expressions and concepts to refer to *apatheia* and thereby highlight its different dimensions, and how he exploits implicit allusions to biblical texts to expand upon the explicit content of his writings. The final section of the chapter completes the picture of *apatheia* by discussing how it is attained, with particular attention to the cultivation of inner watchfulness and discernment. Then Evagrius’ distinction between ‘imperfect’ and ‘perfect’ *apatheia* is discussed, and finally it is noted that as well as being a manifestation of *apatheia* love is essential to its attainment. The chapter concludes with a summary description of Evagrian *apatheia*.

In the conclusion to the thesis as a whole it is noted that far from devaluing the physical body, Evagrius values it extremely highly, as evidenced by the fundamental role his spirituality assigns to the training of the *epithumētikon*, and that the expectations he has of the body and the nature of the transformations his *askēsis* seeks to elicit from it reflect the difficulties inherent in seeking to reconcile a positive valuation of physicality with a Platonic anthropology. It is noted that the demands placed upon the body by Evagrian *apatheia* are not essential to it but arise from the attempt to include within the remit of the ‘spiritual body’ the physical body understood in terms of a metaphysics that posits the material as fundamentally other than, and inferior to, the spiritual, and that accordingly the essential features of Evagrian *apatheia* could in principle be preserved while situating it within a more benign anthropology. Finally, the profound optimism of Evagrius’ anthropology is noted, and also the fact that the emphasis placed by this thesis upon love as intrinsic both to spiritual knowledge and *apatheia* is aimed as a corrective to the view of some commentators that Evagrius prioritises knowledge over love.¹

---

¹ See below, 3.3, n.231; also n.228.
This thesis is, to my knowledge, the first full length examination of Evagrian *apatheia*, and as such builds upon the excellent introductory surveys by Guillaumont.² It analyses what precisely Evagrius means by *apatheia* by situating it within its broader cosmological and anthropological context, by examining his anthropology and how he construes *pathos* and its relationship in the soul to reason, and also by taking account not only of Evagrian *apatheia*’s unproblematic aspect as ‘emotional integration’ and ‘freedom from [control by] the passions’,³ but its problematic aspects in the form of what exactly is entailed by the establishment of virtue in the *pathētikon* part of the soul.⁴ This thesis is also, to my knowledge, the first examination of Evagrius’ metaphysics explicitly to take account of his methodology as a writer and therefore of how he should be read.⁵ Finally, both in situating *apatheia* in its various contexts and in taking account of how Evagrius should be read, it demonstrates the thoroughgoing unity and coherence of his thought.⁶

This thesis does not attempt to situate Evagrian *apatheia* within its broader theological context, nor does it include any consideration of his orthodoxy or the anathemas against him, although I note in passing my view that the question remains open as to whether it is correct to interpret any of his teachings as doctrinal.⁷ Again, apart from certain specific points, no attempt has been made to note the philosophical or theological antecedents of Evagrius’ ascetic teachings since this has already been done to an exemplary standard by Antoine and Claire Guillaumont and Paul Géhin in the introductions to, and commentaries upon, their critical editions. Nor has any attempt been made to situate either Evagrius himself or his contemplative teachings within their historical context, these questions having recently received careful attention from Konstantinovsky. Finally, I do not include any biographical details for Evagrius as again this material is covered by several recent studies.⁸

³ Stewart (2001: 178), brackets his.
⁵ See below, section (ii).
⁶ Pace, for example, Bamberger (1981: lxxii), in whose view Evagrius ‘made no successful attempt to integrate into a single whole the various traditions by which he was formed.’
⁷ See below, 1.1.1, n.19, 34.
⁸ Most notably Guillaumont (2004); Casiday (2006); Dysinger (2005); Sinkewicz (2003).
(ii) Reading Evagrius

Evagrius is a careful and talented pedagogue who takes seriously the need to tailor instruction to the capacity of its recipient, thus in the Gnostikos, his manual for the spiritual teacher, he defines the remit of the contemplative form of justice as follows:

δικαιοσύνης δὲ πάλιν, τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἐκάστῳ τοὺς λόγους ἀποδιδόναι, τὰ μὲν σκοτεινῶς ἀπαγγέλλουσαν, τὰ δὲ δὴ ἀινιγμάτων σημαίνουσαν, τινὰ δὲ καὶ φανεροῦσαν πρὸς ὑφέλειαν τῶν ἀπλουστέρων.\(^9\)

And as for justice, its role is to expound the logoi to each according to his worthiness, relating some things obscurely and indicating others by riddles, and revealing some things clearly for the benefit of the more simple.

Again, in the Prologue to the trilogy Praktikos-Gnostikos-Kephalaia Gnostika he describes his methodology in composing it as follows:

καὶ τὰ μὲν ἑπικρυψαντες, τὰ δὲ συσκώσαντες, ἵνα μὴ δώμεν τὰ ἄγια τοῖς κυσὶ μὴ δὲ βάλωμεν τοὺς μαργαρίτας ἐμπρόσθεν τῶν χοίρων. Ἕσται δὲ ταύτα ἐμφανῆ τοῖς τὸ ἑαυτῷ ἔχνος αὐτοῖς ἐμβεβηκόσιν.\(^10\)

We have kept some things hidden and have obscured others, so as ‘not to give what is holy to dogs nor throw pearls before swine.’\(^11\) But these things will be clear to those who have embarked upon the same trail.\(^12\)

What this means in practice is that while Evagrius does indeed ‘reveal some things clearly’, he tends not to present his teachings in the form of straightforward narrative expositions, although there are exceptions to this, most notably the treatises On the

\(^{9}\) Gnost. 44.9-13.
\(^{10}\) Prakt. Prol. 9.
\(^{11}\) Matt. 7:6. Cf. Origen, Dialogue with Heraclides 12.20-15.24, where Origen wrestles with the dilemma of how to address an audience that includes both the ‘worthy’ and the ‘unworthy’.
\(^{12}\) As Casiday (2006: 32-3) points out, this claim ‘effectively indicates that Evagrius does not believe that some people are intrinsically unable to attain to the “secret teachings”; nor does he believe that scholarly research is required in order to understand the “secret teachings.” In principle, the “secret teachings” are available to anyone who undertakes the Christian life with diligence, attentiveness and understanding. Furthermore, we are not to seek the veiled and obscured teachings from some other source; rather, we are to follow Evagrius’ ascetic instructions so that, setting out on the same path, we may come to understand the fullness that is veiled and obscured in the concise form of the chapters. For those with eyes to see, then, the trilogy of Praktikos, Gnostikos and Gnostic chapters contains all that is required for a full description of the ascetic and gnostic teachings of the desert fathers.’
Foundations of the Monastic Life: A Presentation of the Practice of Stillness, To Eulogios: On the Confession of Thoughts and Counsel in their Regard, and On Thoughts. Instead, he generally favours the form of the proverb that characterises biblical wisdom literature and which he defines as as follows:

Παρομία ἐστὲν λόγος ὑ’ αἰσθητῶν πραγμάτων σημαίνων πράγματα νοητά.\(^{13}\)

A proverb is a sentence that symbolises intelligible realities by means of sensible realities.

This means that in reading Evagrius it is necessary to bear in mind that much of what he says can be presumed to have several layers of meaning, some or most of it accessible only through sustained meditation, along with, perhaps, recognition of implicit connections with Scripture, with other parts of the same text or with other Evagrian texts. Thus in the words of McGinn,\(^{14}\)

[Evagrius’ aphorisms are] like the tips of mystical icebergs, revealing their true size and configuration only after prolonged meditation and extensive exploration beneath the surface.\(^{14}\)

Returning to the passage quoted above from the Prologue to Evagrius’ great trilogy, the meanings of the word ἱρλνο include ‘track, footprint, trace, trail, track or route in the desert’, such that it suggests, as Dysinger notes, ‘a hunt for prey which leaves traces on a track or path, which are only visible to those who know what to look for’\(^{15}\), but also Evagrius’ own footsteps, both literal and metaphorical, through a desert both physical and spiritual. Evagrius thus cautions his readers that his meanings will be most fully disclosed to those who are prepared to follow their trail through his writings and who have in some sense followed in his footsteps through the desert. While he is referring specifically to the trilogy, this methodology can be discerned throughout his writings, as Driscoll’s study of the Ad Monachos, to which my own hermeneutic is indebted,

\(^{13}\) Sch. 1 on Prov. 1:1.

\(^{14}\) McGinn (1991:146). Cf., e.g., Driscoll (2003: 171): ‘the proverbs of Ad Monachos were meant to be meditated on very slowly, perhaps a day at a time, a week at a time, even longer. It is in this kind of situation that we must take account of that reasoning by analogy which Ad Monachos employs.’

\(^{15}\) Dysinger (2005: 205).
demonstrates in relation to that particular text. By this method Evagrius aims to elicit from, and guide his reader in, the practice of contemplation and, like Socrates with Meno’s slave boy, to stimulate us in the recollection of what we already know but have forgotten - in this case God, knowledge of whom we originally possessed in virtue of our creation in his image. Consequently, when it comes to reading Evagrius one must be prepared to follow trails throughout his writings and into Scripture, and, as far as possible, allow them to reveal their meanings in their own time. It follows that it is prudent to remain circumspect in assuming how much of his meaning one might have accessed at any one time and in expecting how much one might be able to access, and accordingly I note this caveat with regard to the present work.

(iii) Additional notes

I have chosen to leave a number of Greek terms untranslated since I do not consider them to have satisfactory English equivalents. I use these terms in transliterated form. Three are worthy of particular note at this point. The first is apatheia itself. This is normally translated in terms of freedom from emotion or passion, but Evagrian apatheia is partly constituted by love in the sense both of agapē and spiritual erōs, and its attainment enables the full manifestation in the soul of agapē, so it includes both emotion and passion as we understand them. The second term is nous. This is normally translated as ‘mind’ or ‘intellect’, but the latter fails to convey the affectivity intrinsic to the Evagrian nous, while although ‘mind’ can be understood as including emotion, it remains for us weighted with post-Cartesian connotations. The third term is thumos. This is generally translated as ‘irascibility’, but for Evagrius it has a much wider scope, the thumos being, for example, the source within the soul of agapē.

For the works of Evagrius included in Sinkewicz (2003) the translations I have used are his, sometimes with minor amendments, with the exception of the Ad Monachos, for

17 Cf. Plato, Meno 82b5 ff.
18 See below, 1.1.1.
19 See below, 1.2.2, 3.3, 4.
20 See below, 3.3.
21 See below, 1.2.2.
which I have used that of Driscoll (2003). For Evagrius’ Scholia on Psalms I have relied on a text kindly made available to me by Luke Dysinger, OSB, reconstructed according to the key of M-J Rondeau,\textsuperscript{22} based on the MS Vaticanus Graecus 754, and for the Kephalaia Gnostika I have relied almost exclusively on Dysinger’s translation,\textsuperscript{23} although occasionally I have used those of Sinkewicz or Driscoll, in which case this is noted. For the Antirrhētikos I have used the translation of Brakke (2009), and am grateful to him for making it available to me prior to publication. My thanks also to Robert Sinkewicz for supplying me with his working translation of the Antirrhētikos. Translations of the Gnostikos are mine from the Greek where available, and otherwise from the French of Guillaumont. Those of the Scholia on Proverbs and Ecclesiastes and the Chapters of the Disciples of Evagrius are my own. Translations of the Great Letter and Epistula Fidei are those of Casiday (2006), and those of other letters are credited in the footnotes. Translations of the Bible are from the New Revised Standard Version, usually with amendments, and those of other primary sources are either from the editions listed in the Bibliography or are credited in the footnotes.

Some of Evagrius’ works, most notably the majority of the Kephalaia Gnostika, along with the Antirrhētikos and Letters, survive only in Syriac. Since my linguistic competence does not at present extend this far, I quote these in translation only.

I have referenced Evagrius’ biblical scholia by the somewhat cumbersome device of Sch. (n) on (Book n:n) in order to indicate both the numbering of the scholion according to Géhin’s edition and the biblical text which it concerns. In referring to the Book of Psalms I have used the Septuagint numbering.

Regrettably, Kevin Corrigan’s perceptive study of Evagrian anthropology, Evagrius and Gregory: Mind, Soul and Body in the 4th Century (London: 2009) was published too late for consideration in this thesis.


\textsuperscript{23} At www.ldysinger.com/Evagrius/02_Gno-Keph/.
Chapter 1

Cosmology and Anthropology

In order to understand the nature and significance of Evagrian apatheia it is necessary to start with his cosmology and anthropology. This chapter begins by describing his vision of the creation and fall of the logikoi and the nature and redemptive purpose of corporeal creation. It then considers in turn the principal components of the human being: the nous, the soul, the body and the heart.

1.1 Cosmology

The principal source for Evagrius’ cosmology and some key aspects of his anthropology are the Kephalaia Gnostika, the study of which involves a number of serious hermeneutical and textual difficulties. Regarding the former, one is faced with the question of how far, as a twenty-first century layperson, one might hope to understand a text aimed at advanced contemplatives within a particular strand of fourth century desert monasticism, the author of which took care in its composition to ‘keep some things hidden and obscure others, so as ―not to give what is holy to dogs and throw pearls before swine‖’.\(^1\)

The textual problems associated with the Kephalaia derive from their having been taken to contain doctrines condemned as heretical, as a result of which they do not survive in Greek, meaning that one is at the mercy of a translator and that consequently it is impossible to determine with any certainty what technical vocabulary Evagrius used or how he used it.\(^2\) Because of these considerations what follows must be considered tentative.

Evagrius’ use of two terms in the Kephalaia Gnostika, logikos and nous, needs some preliminary explanation.\(^3\) Logikos, ‘rational’, used as a substantive and almost always in

---

\(^1\) Prakt. Prol. 58-60. ‘These things’, he continues, ‘will be clear to those who have embarked upon the same path.’

\(^2\) Cf. Ousley (1979: 142-3).

\(^3\) The following remarks are based upon Ousley (1979: 146-8).
the plural, is the term by which the *Kephalaia* generally denote the rational creatures who were God’s first creation. It is common in the *Kephalaia* but rare elsewhere in Evagrius’ works.\(^4\) It emphasises the rational creatures as part of pre-lapsarian creation - as they were before the Fall\(^5\) and will be following the *apokatastasis*.\(^6\) It is also sometimes used ‘as a generic term for the rational creatures in whatever condition or state they may be’\(^7\) in which case it emphasises their identity as ‘essentially rational creatures of the first creation.’\(^8\) Before the Fall a *nous* was identical with a *logikos*, but it is the *nous* that falls, becomes part of corporeal creation and is eventually restored to union with God in the *apokatastasis*. Thus the term *nous*, rather than *logikos*, is generally used to refer to the fallen rational creatures.

1.1.1 The creation and fall of the *logikoi*

Evagrius’ vision of the origin of humankind owes much to Origen,\(^9\) but what in Origen is tentative and speculative becomes with Evagrius a thoroughgoing and highly integrated vision of reality. According to it, God’s first creation\(^10\) was of incorporeal\(^11\) *logikoi*, rational beings, created in his own image\(^12\) to exist in knowledge of him:

Πᾶσα φύσις λογικὴ κτίσις νοερὰ ἐστὶ, θεὸς δὲ μόνος νοητὸς ἔστιν.\(^13\)

Every rational nature is a knowing creation,\(^14\) and God alone is knowable.

---

\(^4\) The *Thesaurus Linguae Grecae* records only two occurrences in works attributed to Evagrius - Sch. 33 on Prov. 3:19-20 and Sch. 275 on Prov. 24:22 - both of which use it in the plural and in the same sense as the *Kephalaia Gnostika*. The Scholia on Psalms contain a further four occurrences in the plural and used in this same sense.

\(^5\) Cf., e.g. *KG* 2.19, 66; 6.75.

\(^6\) Cf., e.g. *KG* 3.40.

\(^7\) Ousley (1979: 146).

\(^8\) Ousley (1979: 147).

\(^9\) Evagrius is not, however, an uncritical disciple of Origen. For example, he amends Origen’s Christology in an attempt to bring it into line with Nicene orthodoxy - cf. Kline (1985) – and adopts the Platonic theory of the tripartite soul, rejected by Origen; see below, 1.2.

\(^10\) See below, n.21.

\(^11\) E.g. *KG* 1.46; 2.61; 6.9, 20, 73. Cf. *DP* 1.7.1 (R).

\(^12\) Cf. *KG* 3.32; 6.73.

\(^13\) *KG* 1.3. Cf. *KG* 1.50, ‘Everything that has been created, has been created for the knowledge of God’; *KG* 1.87: ‘All beings exist for the knowledge of God, but everything that exists for another is less than that for which it exists. Because of this, the knowledge of God is superior to all.

\(^14\) That is, created to know, apprehend or conceptualise.
For Evagrius, for \( x \) to know \( y \) entails the participation of \( x \) in \( y \), and in the case of God, participation becomes union since the image of God consists in the receptivity of the logikoi to knowledge of God:

The image of God is not that which is susceptible of his wisdom, for corporeal nature would thus be the image of God. Rather, that which has become susceptible of the Unity – this is the Image of God.\(^{15}\)

Since rational nature was created to exist in knowledge of God, the desire for knowledge is intrinsic to it and can only truly be satisfied by knowledge of God:

All rational nature was naturally made in order to exist and to know,\(^{16}\) and God is essential knowledge.\(^{17}\)

God created the logikoi self-determining (autexousioi),\(^{18}\) and at some point (although the language of temporality is not, properly speaking, applicable since time did not yet

\(^{15}\) KG 3.32; cf. also Gi.Let. 16: ‘The mind is alone amongst all the creatures and orders in being ‘the true form that is receptive to the knowledge of the Father, for it is “being renewed in knowledge according to the image of its creator.”’ (cf. Col. 3:10).

\(^{16}\) Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 980a21: ‘All men by nature desire to know’ (πάληεο ἄλζξσπνη ηνῦ εἰδέλαη οξέγνληαη θύζεη).

\(^{17}\) KG 1.89.1-2. Stewart (2001: 191) glosses ‘essential knowledge’ as ‘knowledge without an object exterior to the self. Although God is knowable, it does not follow that he can be understood, nor the nous made in his image; cf. KG 2.11: ‘Only our nous is incomprehensible for us, as well as God, its author. Indeed, it is not possible for us to understand what is a nature susceptible of the Blessed Trinity, nor to understand the Unity, essential knowledge.’ Nor can God be known completely; cf. KG 1.71: ‘The end of natural knowledge is the holy Unity, but ignorance has no end, for as it is said, there is no limit to his greatness’; cf. Ps. 144:3. Cf. also Prakt. 87: ‘The person making progress in praktikê diminishes the pathê; the one progressing in contemplation diminishes ignorance. For the pathê there will one day be complete destruction, but in the case of ignorance they say one form will have an end, the other will not’ (὇ κὲλ πξνθόπησλ ἐλ πξαθηηθῆ ηὰ πάζε κεηνῖ, ὁ δὲ ἐλ ζεσξίᾳ ηὴλ ἀγλσζίαλ· θαὶ η῵λ κὲλ παζ῵λ ἔζηαη πνηὲ θζνξὰ παληειήο, ἡ῅ο δὲ ἀγλσζίαο η῅ο κὲλ εἶλαη πέξαο, ἡ῅ο δὲ κὴ εἶλαί θαζη). Sinkewicz (2003: 259, n.88) notes that ‘the two forms of ignorance correspond to the two forms of knowledge, namely, knowledge of beings and knowledge of God or theology. Full knowledge of beings is obtained with perfect impassibility, but the knowledge of God is without limit and can never be exhausted.’ Cf. Sch. 2 on Ps. 144:3 (‘Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised, and of his greatness there is no limit’): ‘The contemplation of beings is limited; only the knowledge of the Holy Trinity is without limit, for it is essential wisdom.’ See also below, 1.1.3.

\(^{18}\) This is not stated explicitly but is implied by, e.g., Sch. 52.8-13 on Eccl. 6-10; Gi.Let. 26; KG 1.63. Cf. DP 2.9.2 (R), 6 (R).
exist), their union with God was disturbed by a movement arising among them in which they turned away from him. The movement was an exercise of their power of self-determination; that is, a choice or decision: in his Scholia on Ecclesiastes Evagrius defines ‘choice’ as ‘a certain movement of the nous’ (ἡ…προοιμίσεις ἐστὶ ποιὰ νοῦ κίνησις) and in his Scholia on Proverbs he defines ‘decision’ in the same way (ἡ βουλὴ ποιὰ νοῦ κίνησις). To all intents and purposes this movement was the Fall – or so it would seem. Certainly this is how Evagrius has often been understood. But I

19 Driscoll (2003: 5-6) draws attention to the question of how Evagrius’ doctrine of the creation of the logikoi should be interpreted. Referring to remarks by Bunge (1985: 156, n.19; 396: 52), he notes: ‘In general it is presumed that the Origenist theory of pre-existence of souls is shared by Evagrius and that this is to be understood as occurring within the temporal order [so Guillaumont, 1962: 103-4]. Bunge points out that the application of temporal sequence to the relation of mind, soul and body risks a serious misunderstanding of Evagrius, who, he claims, is attempting to speak of metahistorical realities with the language of space and time, that is, with the only language available to speak of such realities. Evagrius was aware of this difficulty and cautions that the mind in its relation to God admits in the strict sense the language of neither place nor names [the allusion is to G.Let. 26]. Bunge would want a more sympathetic, because less obviously heterodox, reading of Evagrius on these questions to which later generations (and many contemporaries) applied too literally the categories of space and time.’ The publication in 2007 of the Chapters of the Disciples of Evagrius lends support to Bunge’s view. The Chapters often seem to state directly doctrines which in Evagrius’ own writings are merely implicit, and Chapter 25 reads: ‘Simple bodies are prior to composites, and the nous is not composite since it is not from matter, therefore it pre-exists the body, but not in time because time pertains to corporeal nature’ (Τὰ ἀπλὰ σώματα πρότερά εἰσὶ τῶν συνήθετων, ὃ δὲ νοοὶ ἀπόσυνθετοί ἐστίν, ἔπει μὴ ἔστιν ἐξ ὑλῆς, ἀρα προσφέρει τοῦ σώματος, οὐ μὴν χρόνον ὃ γὰρ χρόνος τῆς συματικῆς φύσεως ἐστὶν). Cf. KG 2.87: ‘Temporal is the movement of bodies, but timeless the transformation of the incorporeals.’ See also Dysinger (2005: 31-32, n.98). In addition, it is my view that the question remains open as to whether it is correct to interpret any of Evagrius’ teachings as speculative or doctrinal. As Dysinger (2005: 206-7) notes, ‘The Kephalaia Gnostica is above all else a workbook for meditation…one would need to exercise great care in using texts from [it] to assess the orthodoxy of Evagrius’ dogmatic theology. Nevertheless, this is precisely what theologians from Justinian down to the present have attempted to do.’


21 Sch. 23.1 on Prov. 2:17.

22 So, for example, Ousley, who speaks (1979: 118-19) of ‘the movement of the fall’ and states that ‘movement can be used as a term for the fall itself’; Sinkewicz (2003: xxxviii): ‘As a result of an original negligence, a movement arose among them, distancing them from substantial knowledge and creating a disparity among them, for not all fell away from knowledge to the same degree’; Dysinger (2005: 31): ‘Evagrius believed that history and time began with the ‘movement’ (κίνησις) or fall from primordial union with God of the intellects (νοῦ).’ Balthasar (1965: 184), maintains the distinction between ‘movement’ and ‘fall’ - ‘These spirits out of satiety (Origen) and carelessness (Evagrius) turned away in varying degrees from the unity that is God, and so “fell out of unity”’, as does Driscoll (2003: 6): ‘By use of their free will these minds grew lax in their contemplation of essential knowledge, producing a rupture in the original unity and causing the minds to fall away from the essential knowledge or unity’ - but neither draws out its implications. Kline (1985: 162-3) equates the movement with the Fall. O’Laughlin (1987: 123 ff) does not use the word ‘fall’ in this context, but he translates κίνησις as ‘disturbance’, so losing sight of the rich metaphysical connotations of the word ‘movement’. Stewart (2001: 176) speaks of the ‘disruption of [the] primordial unity through distracted “movement” away from contemplation, a possibility inherent in rational creatures endowed with free will’, but does not (at least explicitly) equate the
think there is an important distinction between the two. Consider, first, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 3.28:

> The soul is the *nous* which, through negligence, has fallen from the Unity; and through its carelessness has descended to the rank of *praktikē*.\(^{23}\)

The fall of the soul was the result of negligence or carelessness. But what did it do negligently or carelessly that caused it to fall?

The Monad was not moved in itself: rather, it is moved by the receptivity of the *nous* which through inattentiveness turns its face away, and which through this deprivation begets ignorance.\(^{24}\)

The ‘inattentiveness of the *nous*’ is, I suggest, the same thing as the ‘negligence’ or ‘carelessness’ of the soul, and what the *nous* or soul did thus was choose to turn away from God.\(^{25}\) This inattentive, negligent and/or careless movement was the cause of the

---

\(^{23}\) *KG* 3.28. Cf. *Gt.Let*. 26: the mind, ‘falling at some point from its former rank through its free will, was called a soul’; see below, 1.1.2.

\(^{24}\) *KG* 1.49.

\(^{25}\) There are similarities in Origen’s description of the Fall but he does not seem to use the word ‘movement’ in this context in the same way that Evagrius does. At 1.3.8 (R) and 1.4.1(R) he speaks of a ‘loss or falling away’ rather than of a ‘movement’. At 2.9.2 (R) he uses the word ‘movement’, but more loosely than Evagrius: ‘The cause of the withdrawal will lie in this, that the movements of their minds are not rightly and worthily directed. For the Creator granted to the minds created by him the power of free and voluntary movement, in order that the good that was in them might become their own, since it was preserved by their own free will; but sloth and weariness of taking trouble to preserve the good, coupled with disregard and neglect of better things, began the process of withdrawal from the good...And so each mind, neglecting the good either more or less in proportion to its own movements, was drawn to the opposite of good’. *DP* 3.1.1-4 discusses the *autexousion* in terms of its being a movement of the *hegemonikon* but does not apply this to what at 2.9.2 is called the ‘withdrawal’. Thus while all the elements for Evagrius’ understanding of the movement are present in Origen, to understand it as a specific choice or decision, defined as a movement of the *nous*, to turn away from God, would seem to be uniquely Evagrian.
Fall. Accordingly, when Evagrius refers to the primal deflection of the *logikoi* from God he speaks in terms of the ‘movement’ rather than of ‘the Fall’, reserving the word ‘fall’ for the consequences of the movement. These consequences might be in the form of the cosmic Fall, as in *Kephalaia Gnostika* 3.28, and, again the following:

The ‘demon’ is the reasoning nature which, because of an abundance of *thumos*, has fallen from the service of God.26  

But they might also be in the form of the consequences of wrong moral choice - a misuse of our self-determination which itself echoes the primordial movement- namely a ‘fall’ into either *pathos* or sin:

οὐκ ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐμπεσαίν εἰς χείρας πνεύματος πορνείας, μὴ ὑπὸ τῆς γαστριμαργίας καταπεσόντα.27

The demon of pride helps the soul to the harshest fall.28

It is not possible to fall into the hands of the spirit of fornication, unless one has fallen under the influence of gluttony.

For Evagrius, then, there is a substantive difference between a ‘movement’ and a ‘fall’ on both the cosmic and the psychological scales, such that a movement away from God, within either the cosmic or the psychological domain, causes a fall.30

---

26 *KG* 3.34.  
27 *Prakt.* 14.  
28 Evagrius goes on to describe this ‘fall’ as follows: ‘[The demon of pride] induces the soul to refuse to acknowledge that God is its helper and to think that it is itself the cause of its good actions, and to take a haughty view of its brothers as being unintelligent (ἔνοικον) because they do not all hold the same opinion of it. Anger and sadness follow closely upon this as well as the ultimate evil, derangement of mind (ἐθνάτας ἀφενόν), madness, and the vision of a multitude of demons in the air.’  
29 *Th.* 1.6-8.  
30 For more uses by Evagrius of ‘fall’, cf., e.g., *Found.* 6: ‘Fear for a fall (τὸ πτώσμα) and be steadfast in your cell’; *Eul.* 17.18: ‘Let him who has stumbled (ὁ πτώσας) not attempt to blame others or cause them to stumble (πτώσας μὴ ἐπιχειρήσετο) in order that he might not be the only one to fall into evil (συμπεσόν τῷ κακῷ): this was also the work at the origin of the devil’s fall (ὁ ἔκπτωσες τοῦ διαβόλου)’ *AM* 42: ‘one who hates his brother will fall a mighty fall (ὁ…μισῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ πεσέται πτώμα ἔξαίσθαι)’, *AM* 104: ‘Do not trip up (μὴ ὑποσκελίσης) your brother and do not rejoice over a fall (πτώσα) of his’; *KG* 4.10: ‘Among writers of true doctrines, some have plunged from the first contemplation of nature, others from the second, and still others are fallen from the Blessed Trinity.’
Since the movement sundered the primal unity an initial expression of the Fall was the introduction of duality, and hence opposition, within the created order:

And while opposed to reasoning nature there is non-existence, and [opposed] to knowledge there is evil and ignorance, there is in these no opposition to God.31

Thus arose the dualities of good and evil, knowledge and ignorance and non-existence, with good, knowledge and existence being properties of God,32 and evil, ignorance and non-existence their deprivation among the fallen creatures.33

1.1.2 Corporeal creation

Following the movement God created,34 through Christ, according to his manifold wisdom,35 a hierarchy of worlds characterised by increasing degrees of corporeality to

31 KG 1.89.2-4; cf. KG 1.1.
32 For God as essentially good, cf. KG 1.1; as essential knowledge, KG 1.89.
33 Although it is only ignorance that Evagrius states explicitly to be a deprivatio; cf. KG 1.49. For the movement as the cause of evil, cf. KG 1.51. That the origin of evil is the misuse by the logikoi of their self-determination is reiterated in the Chapters of the Disciples. Chapter 36 states, ‘And again: God has entrusted objects to us and asked us to use them with reason. It is therefore as a result of a use contrary to reason that we have made evil exist. Evil does not, therefore, exist naturally but through usage’ (Καὶ πάλιν πράγμα ἐνεπάτησεν ἡμῖν ὁ θεὸς καὶ χρῆσθαι εὐλογον αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς ἀπαιτεῖ παρὰ τὴν ἄλογον οὖν χρῆσθαι ὑφιστάται οὖν ὁ κακία ὁυ φυσικῶς ἄλλα παρὰ τὴν χρήσιν). Again, Chapter 118: ‘If noēmata of objects are evil, whoever created the nous in a certain way is responsible, and if objects were evil, whoever created them would be responsible himself. But plainly neither noēmata nor objects are evil, but it is the movement of our self-determination toward the worst.’ (Εἴ τά νοήματα τῶν πραγμάτων κακία εἰσίν, ὁ τοιοῦτον τὸν νόου κατασκευάσας αἴτιος, καὶ εἰ τά πράγματα κακία ἦσαν, ὁ δημιουργήσας αὐτὰ αἴτιος δὴ εἶ ἄιτιος· ἄλλ’ οὔτε τά νοήματα οὔτε τά πράγματα κακία εἰσὶ δηλονότι, ἄλλ’ ἢ κίνησις τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου ἢ πρὸς τά χέρινται.)
34 Evagrius does not state directly that this was a second creation but it can be inferred from, e.g., KG 1.65 (quoted below, 3.3) and 4.58: ‘God, when he created the logikoi, was not in anything; but, when he creates the corporeal nature and the worlds which arise from it, he is in his Christ’. However, although I implicitly refer here to two creations and explicitly referred above to ‘God’s first creation’ (see n.3), my intention is not to commit myself to a particular interpretation of this difficult aspect of Evagrius’ thought. Dysinger (2005: 32, n.100) notes that ‘the question has been raised whether Evagrius can properly be said to have described the creation of the material world as a “second creation”’ and briefly summarises the arguments against such a view.
35 Cf. KG 1.43; 2.2, 21, 70; 3.11, 81; 4.7; 5.84; Eph. 3.10; also KG 1.14; 2.70; Ps. 103:24; also KG 1.14. Briefly put, the difference, for Evagrius, between knowledge and wisdom is that knowledge relates to unity and wisdom to multiplicity, thus knowledge to God and wisdom to corporeal creation and therefore to Christ; cf., e.g., KG 1.14: ‘Our Lord made everything with wisdom (Ps. 103:24)’; KG 2.2: ‘In second
function as a ladder\textsuperscript{36} by which, through putting their power of self-determination at the service of the re-ascent to God, the logikoi might make good their original misuse of that power – since they were created for union with God their choice to turn away from him was a misuse of it - and play an active role in their redemption.

Corporeal creation comprises bodies and souls for the logikoi, worlds associated with the bodies,\textsuperscript{37} and ages across which the process of redemption unfolds\textsuperscript{38} until the apokatastasis or final consummation. Although created equal among themselves,\textsuperscript{39} each logikos differed in the extent of its inattentiveness, negligence or carelessness, consequently of its movement and consequently of its fall, and accordingly differentiation arose among them. The hierarchical structure of corporeal creation and its diversity of worlds, ages, souls and bodies reflect this differentiation.

Corporeal creation, is, accordingly, characterised by multiplicity, movement and change, in contrast to the simplicity and stillness of the primal Unity.\textsuperscript{40} Its multiplicity, movement and mutability express both the Fall and the wisdom of God. But how can this be? How can they be both results of the Fall and aspects of God’s providential design for the redemption of the logikoi?\textsuperscript{41} The answer, I think, lies in the distinction between different kinds of movement. Underlying the Fall and, therefore, corporeal creation is the introduction, by the logikoi, of movement into the created order; in the first instance it is the noes themselves that move, but as they fall they become souls and movement becomes intrinsic to soul.\textsuperscript{42} Movement, though, can be either stable or unstable. As we shall see, one of the principal ways in which Evagrius characterises apatheia and its opposite, empatheia, is in terms of the contrast between stable and unstable movement, apatheia being the stable movement of the soul. His doing so is, I suggest, an instance of two working principles that we can safely impute to him: first, that movement is part of the nature

natural contemplation we see the manifold wisdom (Eph. 3:10) of Christ’; KG 3.11: ‘Corporeal nature has received the manifold wisdom of Christ.’

\textsuperscript{36} Cf. KG 4.43.

\textsuperscript{37} Cf. KG 2.85; 3.26, 36, 78; 4.58; 5.4, 7.

\textsuperscript{38} Cf. KG 1.11; 3.51.

\textsuperscript{39} Cf. Gt.Let. 29; DP 2.9.6 (R).

\textsuperscript{40} Cf., e.g., KG 1.65, quoted below, 3.3.

\textsuperscript{41} For the same thing being at once the result of evil and the remedy for it, cf. KG. 1.51: ‘The movement is the cause of evil but virtue is destructive of evil. However, virtue is the daughter of names and modes and the cause of these is the movement.’

\textsuperscript{42} See below, this section.
of soul, and, second, that stable movement is associated with proximity to God and unstable movement with distance from him. The primal movement of the logikoi was, as a deflection from God, unstable. It was also a change from a better state to a worse state. The change took the form of the introduction of opposition within the created order and differentiation among the logikoi, the twin bases for the multiplicity of corporeal creation. The primal movement in turn precipitated the further unstable movement in which the logikoi fell away from God. Then God intervened by creating the corporeal worlds, an imposition of stability upon chaos. Because stillness is found only in union with God, this means stability of movement rather than cessation of movement and is reflected in the ensoulment of the fallen logikoi. So the logikoi are the source of unstable movement, while God is the source of stable movement and stillness. Corporeal creation is God’s stabilisation of the instability that was initiated by the logikoi, and it establishes a basis upon which they can progressively stabilise themselves and, in so doing, re-ascent to the stillness of union with him.

In proposing this interpretation of Evagrian cosmology I am going beyond anything he says directly and so a brief digression to explain my grounds for doing so is in order. What he says directly is that (i) a choice or decision is a movement of the nous; 43 (ii) before the primordial movement the condition of the logikoi in union with God was one of peace; 44 (iii) pathos is a kind of movement; 45 (iv) empatheia is characterised by unstable movement; 46 (v) apatheia is characterised by stability and peace, 47 and (vi) the apathēs soul or nous moves toward God. 48 Also relevant is his reserving of the term ‘fall’ for the consequence of a movement away from God. 49 These are the principal ‘lines’ I am ‘reading between’ in my interpretation of the Fall as the unstable movement of the noes and corporeal creation as God’s stabilisation of it. If correct, it has strong echoes of parts of Plato’s Timaeus and Phaedrus. From the Timaeus comes the idea of the creation of

43 See above, this section.
44 See below, n.47.
45 See below, 2.2.2, 4.
46 See below, 2.3, 3.1.
47 See below, 3.1.
48 See below, 3.1.
49 See above, 1.1.1.
the world (κόσμος)\textsuperscript{50} as the imposition of order upon a universe characterised by disorderly motion:

\begin{quote}
βουληθεῖς...ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα...οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὅρατὸν παραλαβόν

υἱὸς ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ὡλλὰ κινοῦμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἦγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

God...wishing that all things should be good...and finding the visible universe in a state not of rest but of inharmonious and disorderly motion, reduced it to order from disorder.\textsuperscript{52}

The word ἴσωχία can be noted: ‘peace’ is, for Evagrius, in cosmological terms a characteristic of the pre-lapsarian unity and in psychological terms a characteristic of apatheia.\textsuperscript{53} The association between movement and soul is found in both the \textit{Timaeus} and the \textit{Phaedrus},\textsuperscript{54} and the association of unstable movement with distance from God in the \textit{Phaedrus}.\textsuperscript{55} According to the \textit{Timaeus} each of the three parts of the soul has its own movements (κινήσεις),\textsuperscript{56} and ‘the movements that are akin to the divine in us [sc. the rational part of the soul] are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe’ (τῷ δ’ ἐν ἡμῖν θείῳ συγγενεῖς εἰσὶν κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ παντὸς διανοήσεις καὶ περιφοραί)\textsuperscript{57} – that is, the movements proper to the rational part of the soul resemble the orderly and harmonious movements of the stars and planets, embodiments of cosmic \textit{nous}.\textsuperscript{58} Consequently, by observing and studying these we might learn to

\begin{quote}
μιμοῦμενοι τὰς τοῦ θεοῦ πάντως ἀπλανεῖς ὀὖσας, τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν πεπλανημένας καταστησαίμεθα.\textsuperscript{59}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Tim.} 29e4.
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Tim.} 30a2-5.
\textsuperscript{52} Translations of the \textit{Timaeus} are those of Lee, amended. Cf. also the discussion, at \textit{Philebus} 23c1ff, of the unlimited (ἄπειρον) and limit (πέρας).
\textsuperscript{53} E.g. \textit{KG} 1.65, quoted below, 3.3; \textit{Prakt.} 64, quoted below, 3.1.
\textsuperscript{54} E.g. \textit{Tim.} 37a5 ff; \textit{Phdr.} 245c6 ff. However, there is a difference in that while the \textit{Phaedrus} derives all movement from soul, the \textit{Timaeus} appears to make chaotic, disorderly movement independent of soul; I am grateful to Bob Sharples for pointing this out to me.
\textsuperscript{55} In the form of the contrast between the movement of the gods through the heavens and the movement of the other souls who, because their wings are broken, are unable to rise aloft and follow the gods; cf. \textit{Phdr.} 246e5 ff; see below, 2.3.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Tim.} 89d5.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Tim.} 90c7-d1.
\textsuperscript{58} Cf. \textit{Tim.} 47b7: ‘the revolutions of \textit{nous} in the heavens’ (τὰς ἐν οὐρανῷ τοῦ νοῦ κατιδόντες περιόδους).
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Tim.} 47c2-4.
correct the disorder of our own revolutions by imitating the invariability of those of God.

A person will only find respite from change and suffering when he helps the ‘motion of the Same and Uniform’ (τῇ ταὐτῷ καὶ ὁμοίῳ περιόδῳ) within the soul to

συνεπισπώμενος τὸν πολὺν ὀχλόν καὶ ὑστερον προσφύνα ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἁέρος καὶ γῆς, θορυβώδη καὶ ἄλογον ὄντω.  


draw in its train all that multitude of riotous and irrational [feelings] which have clung to it as a result of its association with fire, water, air and earth.

until, having subdued them by reason (λόγῳ κρατήσας), he might return to the form of his first and best state (εἰς τὸ τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀριστῆς ἀφίκοιτο εἶδος ὑξεως.).  

In the Timaeus, then, the type of movement proper to the rational part of the soul is orderly, harmonious and stable, like the orbits of the heavenly bodies. It is, however, disrupted by embodiment and must be re-established by giving the rational part of the soul its ‘proper nourishment and movements’ (τὰς οἰκείας...τροφὰς καὶ κινήσεις), which means by living a rational life (κατὰ λόγον ζῆν) rather than a life centred upon the lower parts of the soul. This ‘return of the rational soul-part to its own original nature’ is the homoiōsis theï, ‘likeness to God’, under its cosmological description. So for both Plato and Evagrius we have within us something that resembles the divine. The natural condition of that ‘something’ is stability but it suffers destabilisation in relation to embodiment, as a result of which its resemblance to the divine is damaged. It must be re-stabilised by living in the right sort of way, and this restores its resemblance to the divine. This structural similarity in their respective accounts of the loss and restoration of our ‘likeness to God’, along with the six points listed above, makes it likely, I sug-

---

60 Tim. 42 c5-d1.  
61 Tim. 42 d1.  
62 Tim. 90c7.  
63 Tim. 89d4.  
64 Cf. Tim. 90b1 ff.  
66 Although of course the Christian imago Dei is construed in fundamentally different terms from the Platonic homoiōsis theï.
gest, that Evagrius understands the Fall as unstable movement and the corporeal worlds as God’s re-introduction of stability to the created order. However, in proposing that something like Plato’s understanding of the cosmological and psychological role of movement underlies his thinking I am not relying on the possibility that he was actually working from the *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus* or even that he had necessarily read them - although given his erudition and his intellectual milieu prior to his move to the desert there seems no reason to doubt that he had – but rather on the fact (as I take it to be) that this sort of view would have been part and parcel of philosophical cosmology and psychology in Late Antiquity.

The creation of the *logikoi* in the image of God means, for Evagrius, in the image of the Triune God, such that the *nous* is itself triune. As it falls it fragments into its aspects, the sundering of its unity with God being *ipso facto* that of its internal unity:

The first movement of the *logikoi* is the separation of the *nous* from the Unity that is in it.

[The mind] is one in nature, person and rank. Falling at some point from its former rank through its free will, it was called a soul. And it descended again and was named a body.

In the second of these passages there are again echoes of the *Timaeus*, where the Demiurge is said, ‘in fashioning the universe’ (τὸ πᾶν συνεκταίνετο) to have ‘implanted *nous* in soul and soul in body’ (νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχῇ δ’ ἐν σῶματι συνιστάξει). But

---

67 See above, Introduction.
68 Driscoll, following Bunge, prefers the term ‘disintegration’, explaining (2003: 7, n.20), ‘Disintegration is a word that Bunge prefers to use in an attempt to avoid words with strong temporal overtones. It has the advantage of showing the continuity of mind as the fundamental reality while at the same time showing that the present human condition does not represent a perfect manifestation of God’s intentions in creation’s regard.’ Cf. Bunge (1986: 118). My own use of the present tense here is, likewise, an attempt to avoid temporal overtones.
69 *KG* 3.22.
70 *Gl.Let.* 26. Cf. also *DP* 2.7.3 (R): ‘Mind when it fell was made soul.’ Regarding man’s constitution of *nous*, soul and body, cf. I Thess. 5:23: ‘May your spirit (πνεῦμα) and soul (ψυχή) and body (σῶμα) be kept sound’. In anthropological terms Evagrius equates the *nous* with spirit.
71 *Tim.* 30b4-5.
although the *nous* in falling from God becomes colder and heavier,\textsuperscript{72} Evagrius’ assertion that it was first ‘called a soul’ and then ‘named a body’ should not be understood as meaning simply that ‘the actual “substance” of both body and soul is mind’.\textsuperscript{73} On the contrary, Evagrius acknowledges the existence of matter independently of the *nous* and soul, and, in the form of the four elements, constitutive of bodies.\textsuperscript{74} So he should, rather, be understood as meaning that in becoming colder and heavier the *nous* becomes a soul which is then joined to a material body\textsuperscript{75} whose elemental constitution depends on how far that *nous* has fallen.\textsuperscript{76} Nonetheless there is a real sense in which the embodied *nous* has, indeed, become corporeal, hence Evagrius’ speaking of its being ‘named a body’; as Konstantinovskvsky notes, Evagrius ‘appears to uphold a Cratylean theory of referential language whereby, far from being purely conventional…names reveal what things truly are’.\textsuperscript{77} The *nous* ‘becomes a body’ in virtue of its thoroughgoing immersion in, and attachment to, the sensible world; an immersion and attachment that result from the distancing of the *nous* from God and include the ‘excessive love’ of the *nous* for the body.\textsuperscript{78} Corporeality is, however, unnatural to the *nous* and inimical to knowledge of God,\textsuperscript{79} and so a fundamental part of *praktikē* is the attempt, through diet, to modify the body’s *krasis*, its physiological constitution,\textsuperscript{80} in order to render it, and *ipso facto* the *nous*, in effect less corporeal, in a process that Evagrius speaks of as ‘liberating the body from its attributes’\textsuperscript{81} and equates with metaphorical death and that involves the

\textsuperscript{72} That the *nous* becomes colder in falling from God recalls Origen’s suggestion (*DP* 2.8.3 (R)) of an etymological relationship between *psychēsthai*, ‘to cool’, and *psyche*, ‘soul’. However Evagrius does not take this up.

\textsuperscript{73} Rasmussen (2005: 149). Thus Balthasar is incorrect when, having proposed (1965: 189) that ‘[w]e must take quite literally the statement that bodies are themselves only a fallen condition of souls, quite as soul is merely the fallen condition of spirit’, he goes on to state that ‘Evagrius comes to formulate a radical idealism’ (ibid.); see below, n.56.

\textsuperscript{74} E.g. *KG* 1.29: ‘Also as with bodies go colours, forms and numbers, thus also among the four elements matter is destroyed; for with them it possesses this, that it did not exist and it was made’; *KG* 1.47: ‘Nothing in power in the soul is able to leave it through action and then to subsist independently, for [the soul] was by its nature made to exist in bodies’; *KG* 1.48: ‘Everything attached to bodies accompanies those by whom they are engendered, but nothing of this is attached to soul’. Also *KG* 2.18, which contrasts ‘the nature of bodies’ with ‘the reasoning nature’.

\textsuperscript{75} E.g. *KG* 1.58: “Mortal” [means] one who is by nature made to be freed from the body to which he is joined...All who have been joined to bodies will necessarily be liberated from them.’

\textsuperscript{76} See below, this section.

\textsuperscript{77} Konstantinovsky (2009: 131).

\textsuperscript{78} Cf. *Disc.* 130.

\textsuperscript{79} See below, 1.2.1.3.

\textsuperscript{80} Cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 281, n.49).

\textsuperscript{81} Cf. *Gl. Let.* 46.
progressive detachment of the _nous_ from the sensible world.⁸² So the body, for Evagrius, is functionally part of the _nous_ even though it is distinct in terms of its physical constitution.⁸³ Because his interest lies with the functional relation of the body to the _nous_ I shall follow his example in speaking of the body as being an aspect of the _nous_.

The soul in turn fragments into three parts, the Platonic triad of _logistikon, thumos_ and _epithumētikon_.⁸⁴ The _logistikon_ is the least fallen and so highest, while in humans at least, the _epithumētikon_ is the part of the soul most closely related to the body and therefore the lowest and most fallen.⁸⁵ However, although all three parts of the soul were in this sense latent in the pre-lapsarian _nous_, what became the _thumos_ and _epithumētikon_ only took that form as a result of the Fall:

> If all the powers that we and the beasts have in common belong to corporeal nature, it is evident that _thumos_ and _epithumia_ do not seem to have been created with the rational nature before the movement.⁸⁶

Evagrius understands the process by which part of the _nous_ becomes _thumos_ and _epithumētikon_, as its renouncing the image of God and willingly becoming the image of animals’,⁸⁷ and elsewhere he speaks of the _thumos_ and _epithumētikon_ being ‘yoked’ (συζύγα) to the human person.⁸⁸

---

⁸² See below, 1.2.3; 2.1.3.1; 3.2.
⁸³ Apposite here is Burnyeat’s point that only when Descartes ‘put subjective knowledge at the centre of epistemology – and thereby made idealism a possible position for a modern philosopher to take’ did it become possible to ask whether anything other than mind exists, and, accordingly, for ‘one’s own body [to] become for philosophy a part of the external world’. In particular he cautions that ‘Platonic soul-body dualism is not to the point here since it puts no epistemological barrier between soul and body. The body is part of the material or sensible world, which is not at all the same as being part of “the external world” in the modern sense’; cf. Burnyeat (1982: 33, 32; 30, n.39). For Evagrius the point at issue is precisely the lack of an epistemological barrier between the body and the soul, the body’s claims upon our awareness competing directly with God’s claim. It is in virtue of the strength of the epistemological connection between body and soul and its consequences for the _nous_ that the body can be said to be functionally part of the _nous_, or, alternatively, the _nous_ to be ‘named a body’.
⁸⁴ Cf., e.g., _Prakt._ 86, 89. Evagrius differs from Origen in accepting the Platonic tripartition of the soul, the validity of which Origen doubts on the grounds that it lacks scriptural authority; cf. _DP_ 3.4.1 (R).
⁸⁵ There are grounds for supposing that in demons the _thumos_ is the most fallen part of the soul; see below, n.102.
⁸⁶ _KG_ 6.85.
⁸⁷ Cf. _Gt.Let._ 46; Rom. 1:23; see below, 1.2.2.
⁸⁸ Cf. _Th._ 17.4.
It follows from Evagrius’ view of the soul and body as fallen *nous* that, strictly speaking, the term *nous* does not refer to any single aspect of the human person, but, rather, encompasses within its scope the person in her entirety. Moreover, it refers not only to the human person but, equally, to angels and demons. Concomitantly, the part of the human person (or angel or demon) that we would normally think of as its mind is the *logistikon*. In practice, however, Evagrius almost always uses the term *nous* in preference to *logistikon*, and as a result *nous* in his usage, and consequently in mine, must be understood as having two main senses, that in which it refers to the human person as a whole and that in which it refers specifically to the human *logistikon* or mind.\(^{89}\)

At the *apokatastasis* fall and fragmentation will be reversed as body and soul are re-assimilated to the incorporeal *nous*, thereby restoring the image of God and with it both the internal unity of the *noes* and the unity of the *noes* with God:

Now it will happen that the names and numbers of ‘body’, ‘soul’ and ‘mind’ will pass away since they will be raised to the order of the mind...The mind’s nature will be united to the nature of the Father in that it is his body; likewise, the names ‘soul’ and ‘body’ will be absorbed into the hypostases of the Son and the Spirit, and the one nature, three persons of God and of his image will endlessly remain.\(^{90}\)

Although allowing in principle for an open-ended number of worlds,\(^{91}\) Evagrius focuses on three, and accordingly on three orders of beings: angels, humans and demons. What determines which world and order of being a given *nous* is assigned to is the extent of its fall: angels are those who fell the least, demon those who fell the most and humans those in between.\(^{92}\) The order of demons is in turn subdivided into terrestrial and infernal de-

---

\(^{89}\) Other senses being those relating to angels or demons or to the rational beings generically.

\(^{90}\) *Gi.Let.* 22-3. Cf. *DP* 2.7.3 (R): ‘Mind when it fell was made soul, and soul in its turn when furnished with the virtues will become mind.’ It can be noted that in view of the relation between the psychological triad of *epithumētikon*, *thumos* and *logistikon* and the anthropological triad of body, soul and mind, and of the relation between the latter and the Persons of the Trinity, we can surmise (a) that the body in some way corresponds to the Holy Spirit, the *thumos* to the Son and the *logistikon* to the Father, and (b) that the internal relations of both the psychological and the anthropological triad in some way mirror – and so in turn might shed light upon – the relations between the Persons of the Trinity.

\(^{91}\) Particularly at *KG* 2.65, where he speaks of ‘a multitude of worlds’, but cf. also, e.g., *KG* 1.11, 65, 75; 2.85; 4.39; 5.7, 81; 6.67, 77.

\(^{92}\) Cf. Sch. 16 on Prov. 1:32; *KG* 4.13.
mons,⁹³ while above the angels are the archangels.⁹⁴ The constitution of the bodies and souls assigned to the noes is matched to their epistemic, spiritual and ontological, condition – for Evagrius these amount to the same thing - in a process that he identifies with the judgment of God.⁹⁵ In the case of bodies spiritual condition determines which of the four elements – fire, air, water or earth – predominates.

Ψυχὴ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς ὑμοούσιον καὶ σῶμα σώματι, ἡ δὲ κράσις οὐκ ἢ αὐτή, τούτο δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν πρὸς τοῦ ὅμοιου ἑγόμεν· ἡ γὰρ κράσις κατὰ πλεονασμὸν τῶν στοιχείων ἢ κατ᾽ ἔλλειψιν γίνεται, τῆς δὲ τῆς ἁρετῆς· διὸ καὶ πολλοὶ μακαρισμοί, ἐπεὶ καὶ πολλαὶ καταστάσεις· μακάριοι οὐν ὁι τοιαῦτα κατάστασιν ἐχοντες, ὅτι τοιαῦτα χάρισμα ἢ τοιαῦτα χάριν λήψονται.⁹⁶

A soul is consubstantial with a soul and a body with a body, but the constitution is not the same: for that has come from the Creator as a result of our self-determination. For krasis varies according to the abundance or lack of elements, of this or that virtue. That is why there are many beatitudes:⁹⁷ because there are many states. Blessed are those who have a such-and-such a state, because they will receive that charism or that grace.

In the case of the soul, the spiritual condition of the nous again determines which part predominates:

The judgment of God is the creation of the world, in which he provides, proportionately measured for each one of the logikoi, a body.⁹⁸

In angels nous and fire predominate, but in human beings epithumia and earth, and among demons thumos and air.⁹⁹

The souls of angels consist primarily of nous and their bodies of fire; the souls of humans consist primarily of epithumia, and their bodies of earth, and the souls of de-

---

⁹³ Cf. Sch. 2 on Ps. 134:6; 9 on Ps. 70:20; 13 on Ps. 76:17; 1 on Ps. 55:3, 5 on Ps. 61:11; KG 3.79; Géhin (1987: 129).
⁹⁴ Cf. KG 2.68; 5.4; also 5.11.
⁹⁵ See below, 1.1.3.
⁹⁶ Disc. 113.9
⁹⁷ Cf. Matt. 5:3-10.
⁹⁸ KG 3.38.
⁹⁹ KG 1.68.
¹⁰⁰ So Plato, who at Rep. 442a5-6 declares the epithumêtikon to be ‘the greater part of each person’s soul’ (πλείωτον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ).
mons consist primarily of *thumos* and their bodies of air. I take it that the reason why Evagrius speaks of *nous* rather than the *logistikon* predominating in angels is that their fall is so slight that they are barely ensouled. Also, it should be noted that although angels are embodied, Evagrius speaks of ‘incorporeal beings’ in a way that suggests he is referring to angels; for example he speaks of the *apathês nous* ‘[attaining] the company of incorporeal [beings] who fulfil all its spiritual desires.’\(^{101}\) So I take it that he refers to them as incorporeal because their bodies are so much more rarefied than our own.\(^{102}\) Humans are dominated by the *epithumêtikon* and demons by the *thumos*.\(^{103}\)

As the *nous* falls from God it becomes progressively heavier:

> It is said that they are on high those who possess light bodies, and below (those who possess) heavy (bodies); and above the first those who are lighter than they; but below the second those who are heavier than they.\(^{104}\)

I take this to mean that angels have light bodies and archangels even lighter ones; demons heavy bodies and infernal demons even heavier ones. Distance from God also causes the *noes* to become colder: demons’ bodies are ‘very cold, similar to ice’.\(^{105}\) ‘Heaviness’ and ‘coldness’ seem to relate to bodies alone; although that it is a consequence of this account that bodies comprised of air are ‘heavier’ and ‘thicker’ than bodies comprised of earth, demons being more fallen than humans, indicates that their reference is not necessarily physical in any obvious sense. Two additional properties, also indexed to distance from God, can relate to body, soul or *nous*, namely ‘thickness’ and

\(^{101}\) *KG* 1.85; cf. *KG* 1.27, 45, 70; 4.62; 5.32; 6.5.

\(^{102}\) Cf. Dysinger (2005: 41): ‘In certain texts [Evagrius] makes it clear that by “incorporeals” he means angels and perhaps other celestial beings such as stars. Yet he also teaches that all the *logikoi* have been united to bodies since the fall, and that none are therefore fully incorporeal. Thus in regard to the contemplation of angels Evagrius often uses the term “incorporeals” in a rather loose way to refer to beings whose bodies are less coarse and material than our own.’

\(^{103}\) Cf. *KG* 3.34: ‘The demon is the rational nature which, because of an abundance of *thumos*, has fallen from the service of God’; also *KG* 5.11: ‘a demon is that which, because of an abundance of *thumos*, has fallen from the *praktikê*.’ Since demons are lower in the spiritual hierarchy than humans this implies a departure from the traditional, Platonic evaluation of the three parts of the soul according to which the *epithumêtikon* is the lowest part and the *thumos* the middle.

\(^{104}\) *KG* 2.68.

\(^{105}\) *KG* 6.25.
‗darkness‘, thus Evagrius speaks of ‗thickened body‘,\(^{106}\) of ‗bodies that are very heavy and darkened‘\(^{107}\) and of the nous being thickened\(^{108}\) and the soul darkened.\(^{109}\)

The question arises of how the constitutions of the souls and bodies of the noes, along with the other properties considered above, relate to the understanding of corporeal creation as the stabilisation of the Fall. Are heaviness, coldness, thickness and darkness, or a psychic predominance of, say, epithumia and physical predominance of earth, inherent in the instability of the noes or do they pertain instead to stability? The answer of course must be the latter since all of them relate to form and it is only with corporeal creation that the instability of the noes is given form. So in the case of humans, for example, a psychic preponderance of epithumia and a physical preponderance of earth are the most potentially effective form of stabilisation. In other words, my psychic and physical constitution were not inherent in the degree of fall or instability of the nous that is my essence, but, rather, are God’s response to it.

Finally, it can be noted that the fact that the three parts of the soul are aspects of the nous distinguishes Evagrius‘ psychology from its philosophical antecedents. For both Platonists and Aristotelians reason and pathos are distinct and pathos is non-rational.\(^{110}\) The orthodox Stoics, on the other hand, regard the human soul as wholly rational and understand pathos in terms of impaired rationality (that is, as irrational in the sense of contrary to right reason). Accordingly, they do not partition the soul. Evagrius‘ view, according to which the soul is partitioned into areas of more or less impaired rationality, therefore effectively combines Platonic tripartition with Stoic monism, while his view of pathos resembles that of the Stoics. The implications of his view in terms of empa-
Theia and apatheia are examined below.\textsuperscript{111} Meanwhile it should be borne in mind when interpreting his and my references to the nous, soul, body or pathētikon part of the soul.

\subsection*{1.1.3 The therapeutic nature of corporeal creation}

At the heart of Evagrius’ understanding of the process of redemption is the graded ascent of the fallen noes back to union with God. This ascent is effected through contemplation: corresponding to each world is a level of contemplation, mastery of which brings participation in that world and the possibility of proceeding to the next.

Evagrius defines ‘contemplation’ as follows:

\begin{quote}
Contemplation is spiritual knowledge of things which have been and will be, which causes the nous to ascend to its first rank.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

The contemplation relating to a world consists in the acquisition of spiritual understanding concerning it; understanding, that is, of the aspect of God’s wisdom that it embodies. This understanding is, however, no mere detached intellectual exercise but involves, as Dysinger points out, ‘participation in the realities perceived’.\textsuperscript{113} It ‘causes the nous to ascend to its first rank’ because it leads to knowledge of God and so to a return to union with him.

God in his love has fashioned creation as an intermediary [between himself and the fallen logikoi]. It exists like a letter: through his power and his wisdom (that is, by his Son and his Spirit),\textsuperscript{114} he made known abroad his love for them so that they might be aware of it and drawn near. Through creation, they become aware

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{111} See below, section 2.2.4. For an excellent discussion of how emotions can be states of reason see Nussbaum (1994: 366-86).
\textsuperscript{112} KG 3.42.
\textsuperscript{113} Dysinger (2005: 37).
\textsuperscript{114} Evagrius adduces scriptural support for the comparison on the basis of an identification of the ‘hand’ and ‘finger’ of God – hand and finger being among the things used for writing – with the power and wisdom of God, and thus his Son and Spirit; cf. Gt.Let. 7 ff. It can be noted that he appears here to relate power and wisdom to Son and Spirit interchangeably, for example in paragraph 7 he asks ‘How can the hand and finger stand for the wisdom and power – or rather, the Son and the Spirit?’, suggesting that it is wisdom that equates with the Son, but then he says ‘the “power” [is] the Son’ and ‘the “wisdom [is] the Spirit of God’. Then in paragraph 12, ‘Just as the Wisdom and Power (that is, the Son and the Spirit)...’
\end{footnotes}
not only of God the Father’s love for them, but also of his power and wisdom. In reading a letter, one becomes aware through its beauty of the power and intelligence of the hand and finger that wrote it, as well as of the intention of the writer; likewise, one who contemplates creation with understanding becomes aware of the Creator’s hand and finger, as well as of his intention – that is, his love.¹¹⁵

The visible and material creation is the sign of intelligible and immaterial creation, and visible things are types of invisible things.¹¹⁶ Thus corporeal creation points beyond itself, directing the contemplative nous to the spiritual realities that lie behind and above it. Signification and typification obtain across all metaphysical levels, culminating in, and so pointing toward, God himself:

The body by its actions reveals the soul that inhabits it, and in turn the soul by its movements proclaims the mind – which is its head; it is just the same with the mind – which is the body of the Spirit and the Word. Like the body with the soul, [the mind] reveals the one inhabiting it [that is, the mind’s soul]; [the mind’s] soul in turn reveals its mind – which is the Father.¹¹⁷

Because the knowability of God to the nous derives from the image of God, it is compromised by the loss of it:

It is clear that there are some things that ink and paper cannot relate – and likewise creation, which is like a letter, may be unable to convey its Author’s complete intention ... to those who are far away, since they are not all according to his image.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ *Gt. Let.* 5-6. *Cf. Prakt.* 92: ‘One of the sages of that time came to Antony the just and said: Father, how can you endure being deprived of the comfort of books? And he said: My book, philosopher, is the nature of beings (ἡ φύσις τῶν γεγονότων), and it is there when I want to read the logoi of God.’ Also Sch. 8 on Ps. 138:16: ‘The book of God is the contemplation of corporeals and incorporeals in which the pure nous comes to be written through knowledge (βιβλίον Θεοῦ ἐστὶν ή θεωρία σωμάτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων ἐν ὧ πάρουσι διὰ τῆς γνώσεως γράφεσθαι νοῦς καθαρός). For in this book are written the logoi of providence and judgment, through which too, God is known as creator, wise, provident and judging: creator through things that have come from non-being into being; wise through his concealed logoi, provident through what is accomplished for our virtue and knowledge; and again judge through the various bodies of the logikoi and through the multiform (ποικίλοις) worlds and the ages they contain.’

¹¹⁶ *Gt. Let.* 12.

¹¹⁷ *Gt. Let.* 15.

¹¹⁸ *Gt. Let.* 18.
However, by ‘reading the letter’ of corporeal creation the nous can regain both knowledge, and image, of God\textsuperscript{119} since because of the interconnectedness of the epistemic and the ontological, or, to put it another way, because contemplation involves participation in the realities perceived, contemplation changes the nous:

\begin{quote}
 asyncio ái aíσθήσεις ἀλλοιωθένται διαφόρων ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι ποιοτήτων, οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἀλλοιωθένται ποικίλαις θεώριαις ἀναπενίζον ἄει.\textsuperscript{120}
\end{quote}

Just as the senses are changed through being receptive of different qualities, so also the nous is changed through constantly gazing in diverse contemplations.

Contemplative ascent is thus a process of transformation effected on the ‘ladder’ of corporeal creation.\textsuperscript{121} Since the soul and body are aspects of the nous they are included in this process, with participation in a world leading in due course to the acquisition of a soul and body belonging to that world, such that associated with epistemic transformation and ascent of the intelligible hierarchy is physical transformation and ascent of the corporeal hierarchy,\textsuperscript{122} these changes being progressive stabilisations of the movements of the body, soul and nous.

Contemplation requires detachment from the sensible world, which Evagrius calls separating the soul from the body\textsuperscript{123} and equates with apatheia.\textsuperscript{124} Accordingly, apatheia is the foundation for, and a necessary condition of, the contemplative ascent. Attaining it is the goal of asceticism, praktikē. Angels are sufficiently pure for contemplation to be their characteristic state and so do not need to practice asceticism, while demons are so impure that they cannot as yet practice it but are instead subject to an even harsher form of purification:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} Cf. Gt.Let. 16, quoted above, n.21.
\item \textsuperscript{120} KG 2.83.
\item \textsuperscript{121} KG 4.43 expresses the ubiquity of the symbol of the ladder in relation to this ascent: the ladder symbolises corporeal creation as a whole, being ‘the symbol of all worlds’, but also ‘the path of praktikē’, that is, the spiritual labours and experiences of the monk making the ascent. Cf. Gen. 28:12-13.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Cf. KG 3.20: ‘The change of the organa is the passage from bodies to bodies, according to the degree of the order of those who are joined to them.’
\item \textsuperscript{123} Cf. Prakt. 52.
\item \textsuperscript{124} See below, 3.2, 3.
\end{itemize}
Two among the worlds purify the passible part of the soul, one of them by \textit{praktikē}, and the other by cruel torment.\footnote{KG 5.5. Cf. KG 3.18: ‘Torment is the fiery suffering which purifies the passible part of the soul.’}

Consequently the practice of asceticism is specific to the human condition, leading Evagrius to refer to the human body as a \textit{praktikē} body.\footnote{Cf. KG 3.48, 50; Sch. 8 on Ps. 1:5; all quoted below in this section.}

Both angels and demons take an interest in human salvation, angels seeking to assist, and demons to hinder, it:

From the rational nature that is “beneath heaven”,\footnote{Eccl. 1:13.} part of it fights; part assists the one who fights; and part contends with the one who fights, strenuously rising up and making war against him. The fighters are human beings; those assisting them are God’s angels; and their opponents are the foul demons.\footnote{Ant. Prol. 1.}

Movement upon the ‘ladder’ of corporeal creation can be in either direction:

That which advances to knowledge approaches the excellent change of bodies; but that which [advances] to ignorance advances to the bad change.\footnote{KG 2.79; cf. also KG 2.73; 3.48; 3.50; 5.11; 6.57.1-3.}

Accordingly, humans can become demons as well as angels. Likewise demons can ascend, and angels fall, to the human estate. All of the \textit{logikoi} – demons and angels as well as humans - are involved in the ascent since all are capable of salvation; the demons are not intrinsically evil since none of the \textit{logikoi} were created vicious:

When we were created in the beginning, the seeds of virtue were found naturally in us, but of vice not.\footnote{KG 1.39. Cf. Th. 31; Disc. 128, 149, 171, 178. Also KG 1.40: ‘There was a time when evil did not exist, and there will be a time when it no longer exists; but there was never a time when virtue did not exist and there will never be a time when it does not exist: for the seeds of virtue are indestructible. And I am convinced by the rich man who was condemned to hell because of his evil and who felt pity for his brothers (Luke 16:19-31). For to have pity is a very beautiful seed of virtue.’ Dysinger, at Wiles and Yarnold (2001: 467-8) notes the uniqueness of this exegesis of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, which Evagrius repeats at Th. 31, Let. 43, Let. 59 and Sch. 62 on Prov. 5:14. He adds: ‘Evagrius suggests in this text that it is possible for the sufferings of hell to bring to fruition the imperishable “seeds of virtue” which were originally implanted within the soul at its creation. He was aware that this exegesis of the}
Evagrius assigns great importance to what he calls ‘the logoi of providence and judgment’ as providing the key by which the redemptive nature of corporeal creation can be understood and so consciously participated in:

\[\text{Τὸὺς περὶ προνοίας καὶ κρίσεως κατὰ σαυτὸν ἀεὶ γύμναξε λόγους, φησὶν ὁ μέγας καὶ γνωστικὸς διδάσκαλος Δίδυμος, καὶ τούτων τὰς ὕλας διὰ μνήμης φέρειν πειράθηκε ἰἀπάντες γὰρ σχεδὸν ἐν τούτοις προσπαίθεσι. Καὶ τοὺς μὲν περὶ κρίσεως λόγους ἐν τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν κόσμων εὐρήσεις τοὺς δὲ περὶ προνοίας ἐν τοῖς τρόποις τοῖς ἀπὸ κακίας καὶ ἀγνωσίας ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἐπὶ γνώσιν ἡμᾶς ἐπανάγουσι.}^{131}

‘Exercise yourself continuously in the logoi of providence and judgment’ said the great and gnostikos teacher Didymus, ‘and strive to bear in your memory their material [expressions]; for nearly all are brought to stumbling through this. And you will discover the logoi of judgment in the diversity of worlds and bodies, and those of providence in the means by which we return from vice and ignorance to virtue or knowledge.’^{132}

The first knowledge that is in the logikoi is that of the Blessed Trinity: then there took place the movement of freedom, the beneficial providence and the non-abandonment, and then the judgment, and again the movement of freedom, providence, the judgment, and that up to the Blessed Trinity. Thus a judgment is interposed between the movement of freedom and the providence of God.^{133}

God’s first judgment is his creation of the corporeal worlds and subsequent judgments occur at the end of each age:

---

131 Gnost. 48.
132 Trans. Dysinger (2005: 175), who notes that although Evagrius attributes the formula ‘the logoi of providence and judgment’ to Didymus the Blind, it is not found in any of Didymus’ extant writings, and the phrase seems to be unique to Evagrius, to the extent that Balthasar regarded its appearance in a text as a reliable indication of Evagrian authorship. Dysinger notes (ibid.) that it is also found in ten chapters of the Kephalaia Gnostica, in Evagrius’ first, sixth and seventh Letters, and in his scholia on Psalms, Proverbs and Ecclesiastes.
133 KG 6.75.
Ὅσπερ τὰ νήπια μεταξύ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἐστίν, οὕτως καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι μεταξύ ἄγγελων τε καὶ δαίμονων εἰσίν, μήτε δαίμονες ὄντες, μήτε ἄγγελοι χρηματίζοντες μέχρι τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος.¹³⁴

Just as infants are between justice and injustice, so all humans are between the angels and the demons, neither being demons, nor having the name of angels until the completion of the age.

Κρίσις ἐστὶ δικαίων μὲν ἢ ἀπὸ πρακτικοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ ἄγγελικα μετάβασις· ἀσεβῶν δὲ ἀπὸ πρακτικοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ σκοτεινὰ καὶ ξυρετὰ μετάθεσις σώματα.¹³⁵

Judgment is for the just the passage from a praktikê body to angelic things: but for the ungodly it is the change from a praktikê body to darkened and gloomy bodies.¹³⁶

Just as the body and soul are transformed when the nous is transformed, so changing their constitution changes that of the nous. That of the body is changed by the physical disciplines of asceticism, and in particular, as we shall see, by dietary restriction;¹³⁷ that of the soul, by the cultivation of virtue. Both of these aspects of praktikê stabilise the movements of their respective objects and consequently those of the nous, or, to express it another way, both contribute to the freeing of the nous from the thraldom to external things that is empatheia. Given that the body and soul not only express the spiritual state of the nous but are means for changing it, they amount to remedial devices calibrated to its spiritual needs, such that the judgment of God is an exact prescription for each nous. Accordingly I think that Dysinger is correct to discern the medical sense of krisis in this aspect of Evagrius’ use of the term:

Throughout his writings Evagrius makes extensive use of medical-therapeutic analogies to explain his model of spiritual progress; and it is possible that his use of the term krisis, “judgment”, reflects the ancient medical understanding of this term, rather than its legal use...The term krisis was used in classical medicine to describe a “critical period” which precedes or accompanies a significant turning

¹³⁵ Sch. 8 on Ps. 1:5. Cf. KG 2.59: “The just judgment” (2 Th. 1:5) of our Christ, is known by the fact of the transformation of bodies, of regions and of worlds; his forbearance, (makes known) those who struggle against virtue, and his mercy, especially those who are objects of his providence, without their being deserving.’
¹³⁶ Trans. Dysinger.
¹³⁷ See below, 1.6; 2.1.3.1.
point in an illness. The *krisis* heralds a change in the patient’s condition; a “critical moment” of transformation in the patient’s course which necessarily leads either to improvement or deterioration in the patient’s condition. Evagrius similarly employs the term *krisis* to describe a fundamental transformation which facilitates the soul’s movement either upwards towards virtue or downwards into vice and ignorance.¹³⁸

When, at the *apokatatastasis*, the *nous* re-attains to its ‘first rank’, the soul is reabsorbed into it as, regaining its pre-lapsarian unity, it becomes once more triune *nous* rather tripartite soul, but what happens to the body? How can an embodied *nous* be fully reunited to an incorporeal God? In fact Evagrius appears to leave open the question of the ultimate fate of the physical body;¹³⁹ what is, however, certain is that the experience by the incarnate *nous* of knowledge of God involves the experience of incorporeality:¹⁴⁰

If the perfection of the *nous* is immaterial knowledge, as it is said, and if immaterial knowledge is the Trinity only, it is evident that in perfection there will not remain anything of matter. And if that is so, the *nous*, henceforth naked, will become a seer of the Trinity.¹⁴¹

What is certain is that if the final consummation involves any sort of body, it will have none of the features that we associate with corporeality, body and soul being ‘raised to the order of the *nous*’ and the *nous* being once more the undamaged image of the incorporeal God.

¹³⁹ Cf. *KG* 6.58: ‘Of those bodies that have been stable in the series of changes it is said that they will depart spiritual bodies. But whether that will happen at the end from matter or from *organa* which will have come to be – you, too, [should] examine [this].’ Dysinger questions whether this means ‘at the end by separation from matter. Thus it is difficult to know what to make of aphorisms such as *KG* 1.26: ‘If the human body is a part of this world, but the form of this world is passing, it is also evident that the form of the body will pass’ (cf. 1 Cor. 7:31); *KG* 1.58: ‘all who have been joined to bodies will necessarily be liberated from them’; *KG* 2.77: ‘In the last judgment it is not the transformation of bodies that will be made manifest; rather , it will make known their destruction.’ Cf. also *KG* 2.17; 3.15, 38, 40, 66; *Prakt.* 49.
¹⁴⁰ See below, 3.2.
¹⁴¹ *KG* 3.15. Cf. 2.62: ‘When the *noes* will have received the contemplation that concerns them, then also the entire nature of the body will be withdrawn”; 4.86: ‘The *nous* that possesses a body does not see the incorporeals, and when it will be incorporeal it will not see the bodies’. However, at *KG* 6.58 he appears to allow that spiritual bodies might come into existence not by separation from matter but ‘from *organa* which will have come to be.’ Cf. also n.138 above.
1.1.4 Summary

Human beings, along with angels and demons, were originally created as undifferentiated *logikoi* to exist in contemplative union with God. This primal condition was ruptured by a movement of their self-determination in which they chose to turn away from him. As a deflection from God this movement was unstable. It initiated the further unstable movement of the Fall and brought opposition into the created order. It also engendered differentiation among the *logikoi* based on the degree of movement exercised by each one.

God’s response was to create, through Christ, the corporeal worlds, in order to re-introduce stability to creation and provide the *logikoi* with a means of re-ascent. This involved furnishing the *logikoi* with souls and bodies whose constitution depends on extent of movement and consequent fall and therefore on spiritual state. In that way the three orders of angels, humans and demons came into being.

Created in the image of the triune God the *nous*, which prior to the Fall was identical with the *logikos*, is itself triune. As a result of the Fall it fragmented into its three aspects, becoming, in a process of progressive condensation as it fell ever further from God, the trichotomy of *nous*, soul and body. The soul comprises the Platonic triad of *logistikos*, *thumos* and *epithumētikon*. In humans these are the progressive stages of the ensoulment of the *nous*, the *logistikos* being the least fallen part and the *epithumētikon* the most fallen and so closest to the body. In angels the *logistikos* predominates, in demons the *thumos* and in humans *epithumia*.

In contrast to the simplicity and stillness of the primal Unity, corporeal creation is characterised by multiplicity, movement and change. Stable movement is associated with proximity to God, unstable movement with distance from him. In epistemological terms corporeal creation is a ‘letter’ from God to the fallen *logikoi*, by ‘reading’ which they are able to re-attain to knowledge of him. In metaphysical terms it is a ‘ladder’, by ascending which they can return to union with him. ‘Reading’ and ‘ascent’ are effected by contemplation, which, due to the interconnectedness of the epistemic and the ontological, transforms the *nous*, soul and body and culminates, at the *apokatastasis*, with soul
and body being once more ‘raised to the order of mind’ as the unity of the *nous* with God and *ipso facto* its internal unity is restored.

### 1.2 Anthropology

In the hierarchy of corporeal creation humankind occupies a place intermediate between the angels and the demons. The spiritual task distinctive to the human condition is to overcome our vulnerability to demonic influence. Success in it is marked by the attainment of *apatheia*, the state natural to human beings,\(^{142}\) and achieved by means of *praktikē*, asceticism. Thus both *praktikē* and *apatheia* are central to Evagrius’ understanding of what it is to be human: the human body is a body for *praktikē*\(^{143}\) and *apatheia* the health of the soul.\(^{144}\)

#### 1.2.1 The *nous*

The importance that Evagrius attaches to the *nous* is evident from the frequency with which he uses the term.\(^{145}\) As already noted, it has two distinct senses in his usage.\(^{146}\) In its primary sense it refers to the person in her entirety, and also to the other rational beings, since soul and body are but the progressively fallen aspects of the fragmented triune *nous*. This is the sense in which, prior to the movement, a given *nous* was identical with a given *logikos*, and in which it is the bearer of the image of God and the constant term in the successive transformations that will lead it back to union with God:

> Only the *nous*, the image of God and the core of personal identity, persists throughout successive judgments: everything else compounded of the four elements – body, emotions, aptitudes, and the world in which these gifts are exercised – reflects the most recent judgment received by each reasoning being.\(^{147}\)

---

\(^{142}\) Cf. *Th.* 8, *Disc.* 140; see below, 2.2.1.

\(^{143}\) Cf. *KG* 3.48, 50; Sch. 8 on Ps. 1:5; all quoted above, 1.1.3.

\(^{144}\) Cf. *Prakt.* 56.

\(^{145}\) According to the *TLG* and including the *Epistula Fidei* there are three hundred and twenty-three occurrences of the word *nous* in Evagrius’ Greek corpus.

\(^{146}\) See above, 1.1.2.

\(^{147}\) Dysinger (2005: 177-8).
In its second sense the word *nous* refers to the part of the fallen rational being that we would normally think of as its mind. Strictly speaking this is the *logistikon*, but in practice Evagrius prefers the term *nous*, thereby keeping his focus upon our true nature, prior to, above and beyond our present, ensouled condition.

The idea of the *nous* as subject to change and passible is central to Evagrius’ anthropology and constitutes a radical departure from the Neoplatonism so evident in his thought. For the Neoplatonists, that the *nous* could in any way be subject to *pathos* was unthinkable, and Plotinus in particular goes to considerable lengths to insulate not only the *nous* but the soul from any suggestion of passibility. Aristotle allows the *nous* to be passible in relation to cognition, but Evagrius goes much further in the mutability that he ascribes to the *nous*.

First and foremost the Evagrian *nous*, both pre- and post-lapsarian, is receptive to the essential knowledge that is God, and it is in this receptivity that the image of God consists. It is also receptive in relation to contemplation, ‘the knowledge that comes from men’ and sense-perception. In addition, the power of self-determination is, for Evagrius, a form of receptivity - presumably because the ability to turn away from God is a receptivity to that which is other than God – and it is this aspect of the receptivity of the *nous* that occasioned the movement and Fall:

The Monad was not moved in itself: rather, it is moved by the receptivity of the *nous* which through inattentiveness turns its face away, and which through this deprivation begets ignorance.

Because of the interconnectedness of the epistemic and metaphysical, the epistemic receptivity of the *nous* is reflected in a sweeping metaphysical passibility in virtue of which the *nous* is changed by whatever it receives. In the case of God the change in the

---

149 Cf. in particular Enn. 3.5, “On the apatheia of things without body”.
150 And alludes specifically - albeit only once, at the end of DA 3.5 - to *nous pathētikos*, but this is by implication in opposition to the active *nous* or *nous poiētikos*; Aristotle never actually uses the latter term but, as Blumenthal (1991: 192) notes, ‘its derivation from De anim. 430a11-12 is an easy step.’
151 See above, 1.1.1.
152 Cf. Gnost. 45.
153 KG 1.49; see above, 1.1.1.
nous is a return to its own true nature of simplicity and incorporeality. In relation to contemplation it involves progression toward these. In relation to sense-perception, conversely, it involves the ‘imprinting’ of the nous by the noēmata it receives and consequently the perpetuation of its immersion in corporeality.

The following sections will discuss the possibility of the Evagrian nous in relation to sense-perception, its ability to range between incorporeality and corporeality and its true nature as apathēs and ‘the place of God’.  

1.2.1.1 The epistemic passibility of the Evagrian nous

The susceptibility of the Evagrian nous to imprinting by certain sorts of noēmata is central to Evagrius’ spirituality and to the importance he attaches to apatheia. In this section I shall outline its nature and significance, then in Chapter Two I shall explain how pathos becomes implicated in it and to what effect.

Noēmata are the basic elements of cognition; they are ‘the way the mind functions... its currency’. They are not intrinsic to the nous but are received by it:

Τέσσαρες τρόποι εἰσίν δι’ ὅν ὁ νοῦς λαμβάνει νοήματα: καὶ πρῶτος μὲν τρόπος, ὁ διὰ τὸν ὄρθολμόν· δεύτερος, ὁ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς· τρίτος, ὁ διὰ τῆς μνήμης· καὶ τέταρτος, ὁ διὰ τῆς κράσεως.

There are four ways by which the nous grasps noēmata: the first way is through the eyes, the second through hearing, the third through memory, and the fourth through krasis.

---

154 Th. 39.4; 40.9; Rfl. 25; Let. 39.
155 See below, 2.2.3.
156 Guillaumont (1998: 24) notes that the term noēma is of Aristotelian provenance, but that Evagrius’ use of it corresponds to the Stoic concept of a phantasia insofar as he uses it to denote “pour designer l’image provoquée par la perception d’un object sensible.” Inwood (1985: 56-7) describes a Stoic phantasia as an imprint or alteration of the hēgemonikon; ‘a representational image in the mind... which resembles as an eikōn its correlate in the world and refers to it’; as we shall see, this corresponds exactly to an Evagrian noēma, although the understanding of the hēgemonikon would differ in each case.
158 Rfl. 17.
Although this seems to exclude sensory modalities other than sight and hearing, Evagrius elsewhere allows that the other senses also give rise to noēmata.\(^{159}\) Krasis, the body’s physiological constitution,\(^{160}\) can be manipulated by the demons to introduce noēmata to the nous; Evagrius gives the example of a demon who, by touching a place in the brain and causing palpitations in the blood vessels,\(^{161}\) ‘alters the light around the nous’, thereby giving rise to ‘some form associated with the senses’ or causing a logosmos to form in the nous.\(^{162}\)

Noēmata can be of either sensible or intelligible objects and can be divided into those that ‘leave a form’ upon the nous and those that do not:

καὶ διὰ μὲν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, μορφοῦντα μόνον λαμβάνει νοηματα· διὰ δὲ τῆς ἀκοῆς, καὶ μορφοῦντα καὶ μὴ μορφοῦντα, τῶ τῶν λόγων σημαίνειν καὶ πράγματα αἰσθητὰ καὶ θεωρητὰ· ἢ δὲ μνήμη καὶ ἡ κράσις ἀκολουθοῦσι τῇ ἀκοῇ· ἐκάτερα γὰρ μορφοῦσι τὸν νοῦν καὶ οὐ μορφοῦσι μμοιώμενα τὴν ἀκοῆν.\(^{163}\)

Through the eyes the nous grasps only noēmata that leave a form; through hearing it grasps both those that leave a form and those that do not, since speech signifies both sensible and intelligible objects; memory and temperament follow upon hearing, for both leave a form or do not leave a form upon the nous in imitation of hearing.

What Evagrius here calls ‘leaving a form’ he elsewhere calls ‘imprinting the nous’.

Only noēmata of sensible objects imprint the nous:

ὁ νοῦς πάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν πραγμάτων πέρπυκε δέχεσθαι τὰ νοηματα καὶ τυποῦσθαι κατ’ αὐτὰ διὰ τοῦ ὀργανικοῦ σώματος τούτου· ὅποια γὰρ ἐν εἴη τοῦ πράγματος ἡ μορφή, τοιαύτην ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν νοῦν δέξασθαι τὴν εἰκόνα· ὅθεν καὶ ὀμοιώματα λέγεται τὰ νοηματα τῶν πραγμάτων τῷ τὴν αὐτὴν ἑκείνους διασοῦξειν μορφῆν.\(^{164}\)

---

\(^{159}\) Cf. Rfl. 55; Th. 4.4; Pry. 61; also the discussion below of whether ‘images’ are necessarily visual.


\(^{161}\) Cf. Pry. 72.

\(^{162}\) Pry. 73; cf. Pry. 63: demons who ‘through alteration in the body instil in the nous (διὰ τῆς ἀλλοιωσεos τοῦ σώματος ἄμυνοσ τῷ νῦ) logosmos or noēmata or contemplations (θεωρήματα).

\(^{163}\) Rfl. 17.

\(^{164}\) Thoughts 25.8-14. Cf. Disc. 77: ‘The nous can receive only noēmata, and it takes the form of each noema, like the eye when it sees itself in mirrors’ (ὁ νοῦς μόνον νοημάτων ἐστί δεκτικός καὶ μορφοῦται πρὸς ἐκαστὸν νόημα ὡς μορφοῦται ὀφθαλμὸς ἐν ἐσόπτροις ὀπτανόμονος); also Disc. 85.

Page 43 of 268
The *nous* receives naturally the *noēmata* of all sensible objects and an imprint\(^{165}\) conforming to them through this instrumental body.\(^{166}\) Whatever may be the form of the object, such is necessarily the image that the *nous* receives, whence the *noēmata* are called likenesses of objects\(^ {167}\) because they preserve the same form as them.

The perception of a sensible object, then, gives rise to the presence in the *nous* of a *noēma* which is a likeness of that object, and which imprints the *nous* with its form. This imprinting, it should be noted, is not related to the storage of the *noēma* in memory, since *noēmata* of intelligibles, which leave no imprint, are nonetheless stored in memory. Rather, when Evagrius speaks of *noēmata* imprinting the *nous* with a form, what he is referring to is simply the formation of mental images.\(^ {168}\)

\(^{165}\) The term is of Stoic origin; cf. Guillaumont (1998: 24-5).

\(^{166}\) Cf. Aristotle, *DA* 412b5-6, where the soul is defined as ‘the first actuality of a natural instrumental body (σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ)’; Guillaumont (1998: 240, n.2).

\(^{167}\) Cf. Aristotle, *De Interpretatione* 16a5-8, where affections (παθήματα) of the soul are described as ὀμοιόματα of πράγματα; also Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis* 8:8.23.1, where *noēmata* are defined as likenesses (ὄμοιομάτα) and imprints (ἐκτυπώματα) of objects (πράγματα); Guillaumont (1998: 241).

\(^{168}\) That Evagrius speaks of such *noēmata* as ‘images’ or ‘likenesses’ of their objects raises anew the question of which sensory modalities can give rise to them since it suggests that they must be visual in nature - that is, mental pictures - and so derive from visible objects. Indeed, at *Rfl.* 55 Evagrius himself says as much: ‘Among λογισμοὶ, some give form to the διάνοια, some do not give form. Those that derive from sight give form, while those that come upon us from the remaining senses do not give form’ (Τῶν λογισμῶν οἱ μὲν μορφοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ οὐ μορφοῦσι καὶ μορφοῦσι μὲν, ὅσοι εἴ ὀρθάνος οὐ μορφοῦσι δὲ, ὅσοι ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀιθήσεων ἦμεν ἐπιστημονικοὶ). But does he really mean to deny that *noēmata* of non-visible sensibles imprint the *νοῦς* with their likeness? Would he consider the *noēma* comprising my memory of the scent of a rose to be an imprint or form (at *Th.* 41 he uses these terms synonymously) and a likeness of the original, and accordingly an image, or only the visual image of the rose that my memory of the scent evokes? *Th.* 4.3-4 suggests that he would indeed regard the *noēma* of the scent as an imprint or form, a likeness and an image. Imprints and forms, he says there, ‘appear to occur in the *nous* either when it sees through the eyes, or hears through hearing, or through whatever sense faculty’ (δουκε συμβαίνει τῷ νόῳ ἢ δὲ ὀρθαζόμεν ὀργάνῳ ἢ δὲ ἀιθήσεις ἀκούντι ἢ δὲ ἀιθήσεως ποιός). This seems to contradict *Rfl.* 25, so what are we to make of it? Does the apparent inconsistency represent an oversight, equivocation, change of mind, or simply an emphasis upon the visual so overarching that it threatens to become exclusive? The latter, I suggest, is the answer. There can be no doubt that Evagrius is above all concerned with visual images, first and foremost because of the Second Commandment: ‘Do not make for yourself an idol, nor likeness of anything, whatever are in the heaven above, and whatever are in the earth below, and whatever are in the waters underneath the earth’ (Οὐ ποιήσῃς σαυτοῦ ἐδώλον, οὐδὲ παντὸς ὄμοιομα, δὲ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἄνοι, καὶ δὲ ἐν τῇ γῇ κάτω, καὶ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασιν ὑποκάτω τῆς γῆς - Exod. 20:4; cf. Deut. 5:8). That for him *noēmata* of sensible objects can fall within the scope of this proscription is suggested by the fact that he sometimes refers to them as *eidōla* (e.g. at *Th.* 4.16, 16.28, 25.55, 36.17; *Prakt.* 23.6, 55.2), and also by *Th.* 37:23-5: ‘you troubled the *nous* at the time of prayer by constantly imagining the face of your enemy and deifying him, for certainly what the *nous* sees while praying is worthy of being called a god.’ (τὸν νοῦν κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς προσευχῆς ἐξετάρασος, τοῦ ἐξήρου συ τὸ πρόσωπον ἀλήθεαμόνος καὶ τοῦτο θεοποιήν ὁ γὰρ βλέπει πάντως ὁ νοῦς προσευχόμενος, τούτω καὶ θεόν ἄξων ἐστίν ὄμολογεν). This passage strikes to the heart of Eva-
Sometimes the scriptures use sensible imagery to convey spiritual truths. Evagrius discusses such cases using the example of the following phrase from Isa. 6:1:

εἶδον τὸν κύριον καθήμενον ἐπὶ θρόνου ὑψηλοῦ καὶ ἐπιρρέμένου.

I saw the Lord seated on a high and lofty throne.

He begins by splitting it into two parts. The first, ‘I saw the Lord’, seems to imprint the nous but in fact does not since, because God is incorporeal, no expression that signifies him can imprint the nous. On the other hand the predicate, ‘seated on a high and lofty throne’ could, since it describes a sensible object, imprint the nous. However its spiritual significance, which is its true meaning, does not imprint it: ‘the key is to move beyond a literal reading of the text, for there was no physical throne in Isaiah’s vision.’

In other words, if understood as referring to a physical throne then the noēma of a physical ‘high and lofty throne’ will imprint the nous, whereas if it is understood that the whole phrase is in fact a noēma of God, since ‘God is said to be seated there where he is known; for this reason the pure nous is called a throne of God’ (ἐθεῖ γὰξ ιέγεηαη γρίους’ interest in noēmata that imprint the nous. They lead it far away from God (cf. Pry. 56) for three reasons. First, they distract it (this can be providential when it is the demons that they distract it from; cf. Sch. 15 on Eccl. 10-13). Second, they focus the nous toward the sensible world. And third, the fact that they imprint the nous makes them hard to expunge from it. It is easy to see why Evagrius would regard such noēmata as falling within the scope of Exod. 20:4: they are likenesses of sensible things and, because of their capacity to occupy the nous, are liable to appear before it while it is trying to pray, therefore becoming in effect de facto idols (cf. Let. 7.1). But his preoccupation with the visual does not rest solely upon a literal reading of Scripture. Not only does he hold sight to be more powerful (κρατίστου) than any of the other senses (cf. Prayer 150; Gt.Let. 4; also Casiday (2006: 213, n.7)); it is also clear that his own experience of troublesome noēmata is dominated by visual images. Nor should we forget the possibility of philosophical influences at work here; for example, his assimilation of sensible objects to visible ones and his contrast between the visible and the intelligible echoes Plato’s distinction at Rep. 507b9-10 between objects of sight and objects of intelligence, while the priority of sight in relation to the other senses is affirmed by both Plato and Aristotle (cf. Phdr. 250d3-4; DA 429a2-3). Thus Evagrius has compelling theological, philosophical and psychological reasons for emphasising the visual in his discussions of noēmata of sensible objects. Nonetheless he seems to allow that such noēmata can be non-visual, and so while his primary concern is undoubtedly with the visual image of the rose, he would, I think, consider the noēma of the scent to be an image too. So noēmata of sensible objects imprint the nous with an image of that object which is its likeness, and depending on the sensory modality involved this ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ can be either visual or non-visual in nature. Either way, it has the potential to impinge upon the nous at the time of prayer and as such to be a de facto idol.

καθέξεσθαι ὁ θεός ἔνθα γινώσκεται· διό καὶ θρόνος λέγεται θεοῦ νοῦς καθαρός, then the nous will not be imprinted.  

Generalising from this example, when a sensible object is presented to the nous through the medium of language and in a context where the expression in which it appears is susceptible of either literal or spiritual interpretation, the noēma to which it gives rise will only imprint the nous if the expression is understood literally. So rather than being a mechanistic process, the imprinting of the nous depends upon the attribution of significance and thus upon the agent.

What about expressions involving sensible imagery not susceptible of spiritual interpretation, and what about sensible objects themselves? Is the imprinting of the nous agent-dependent in either of these cases? I shall begin with the latter. In the case of objects, what is at issue is the distinction between the objects themselves and what Evagrius calls their logoi. Objects have no intrinsic value; rather, their value resides in their role as intermediaries between the contemplative and God:

οὐκ ἔστι τὰ πράγματα ἁγαθά, ἄλλ᾽ οἱ λόγοι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐφ᾽ οίς καὶ εὐφραίνεσθαι πέφυκεν ἡ φύσις ἡ λογική καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι τὸ ἁγαθὸν· οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτω τρέφει καὶ ποτίζει τὸν νοῦν ὡς ἀρετὴ καὶ γνώσις θεοῦ.  

it is not objects that are good, but the logoi of objects, by which rational nature is gladdened and does good, for nothing so nourishes and refreshes the nous as virtue and the knowledge of God.

On the basis of Evagrius’ exegesis of Isa. 6:1 we might suppose that if the objects themselves are the focus of attention then their noēmata will imprint the nous, whereas if the focus is upon their logoi then the noēmata of the objects will not imprint the nous (nor of course will the noēmata of the logoi, being noēmata of intelligibles). This, I take it, is what Evagrius has in mind when, in his fifteenth scholion on Ecclesiastes, he distinguishes between ‘perceiving in a sensible manner by means of the senses that which is sensible’ (τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιβάλλων αἰσθητός) and the ‘observation of objects by means of the senses’ (ἡ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων κατανόησις τῶν πραγμάτων).

---

170 Th. 41.13-15.
171 Sch. 15.22-5 on Eccl. 10-13.
affirming that while the former imprints the *nous*, the latter can be practised by the pure as well as by the impure. However, *Prayer 56* complicates this picture:

Οὐκ ἂν ὄτε μὴ ἐγχρονίζῃ ὁ νοῦς ἐν τοῖς ψυλοὶς νοήμασι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἢδη καὶ προσευχής κατεύθυνε τόπον· δύναται γὰρ ἐν τῷ θεωρίῳ εἶναι τὸν πραγμάτων, καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν ἀδιάλειπτον, ἀπερ, καὶ εἰ ψιλά ρήματα εἰσίν, ἀλλ’ ὡς πραγμάτων ὄντα θεωρήματα, τυποῦσι τόν νοῦν, καὶ μακράν ἀπάγουσιν ἀπὸ Θεοῦ.

Even when the *nous* does not delay among the simple *noēmata* of objects, it has not yet attained the place of prayer; for it can remain in the contemplation of objects and be engaged in meditation on their *logoi*, which, even though they involve simple expressions, nevertheless, insofar as they are contemplations of objects, imprint the *nous* and lead it far from God.

Does this mean that, after all, contemplation also involves the imprinting of the *nous*? Dysinger reads *Kephalaia Gnostika* 2.83\(^{172}\) to mean that the change effected in the *nous* by contemplation is the result of its being imprinted,\(^{173}\) but I don’t think this is correct since, as I understand Evagrius, the imprinting of the *nous* makes it increasingly corporeal whereas contemplation involves a move away from corporeality; accordingly, I understand the change effected in the *nous* by contemplation to be in the order of a dissolving of existing imprints rather than the acquisition of new ones. Consequently I think that the above passage is most naturally read as meaning that, while in theory attention can be focused either on objects *qua* sensible or on their *logoi*, in practice some part of the person’s attention is likely to remain focused on the objects *qua* sensible even if the greater part is focused on their *logoi*. Indeed, I shall argue below that the extent to which she can focus her attention on *logoi* to the exclusion of the sensible world depends upon the extent to which she has attained *apatheia*.

All sensible objects, then, have *logoi* and are therefore susceptible of spiritual interpretation; they are the individual characters of the ‘letter from God’ that is corporeal creation. In order to ‘read’ this ‘letter’ it is necessary to abstract from the objects to their spiritual significance, and insofar as this is done their *noēmata* will not imprint the *nous*.

\(^{172}\) Quoted above, 1.1.3.
The ability to discern such *logoi* is sometimes referred to by Evagrius, following Origen, as a spiritual sense, and requires that the *nous* be *apatēs*:

Just as each of the arts has need of a sharpened sense that conforms to its matter, so also the *nous* needs a spiritual sense in order to distinguish spiritual things.  

μετὰ γὰρ τὴν κάθαρσιν οὐκ ἔτι ὡς περιπατῶντα τὸν νοῦν αὐτοῦ μόνον ὁ καθαρὸς τὰ αἰσθητὰ πράγματα καθορᾶ, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐγκείμενα αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν πνευματικὴν θεωρίαν.

after purification the one who has been purified no longer considers sensible objects only as diversions for his *nous* but as means placed in him to bring him to spiritual contemplation.

Spiritual sensation is *apatheia* of the reasoning soul, produced by the grace of God.

With sensible objects, then, as with sensible imagery, it is possible to avoid the imprinting of the *nous*. What about expressions involving sensible imagery not susceptible of spiritual interpretation? Here it would seem that the only way to avoid imprinting of the *nous* is to withhold attention from them, and indeed this is what Evagrius recommends that a person does when faced with demonic suggestion.

In sum, all cognition of objects external to the *nous* – that is, all cognition other than knowledge of God - involves the reception by the *nous* of *noēmata*. If these are of sen-

---

174 Cf. *DP* 1.1.9 (R).
175 Katz (2000: 132) notes, ‘As far as scholars can determine, the creation of the doctrine of the spiritual senses originated with Origen. Although there is some anticipation of the doctrine in the ideas of Philo, of Clement of Alexandria, and of Tertullian, Origen’s development of the doctrine of the spiritual senses flows out of his interest in psychology and principally out of his monumental work in scripture and in a special way from his own mystical interpretation of the Song of Songs.’ Cf., e.g., Origen, *C.Cant.*, Prol. 2; *DP* 1.1.9 (R); *Dialogue with Heraclides* 16 ff.
176 *KG* 1.33; cf. *KG* 2.35: ‘The *nous* also possesses five spiritual senses, with which it senses the substances presented to it. Vision shows it intelligible objects [hazily? heavenly?] ; with hearing it receives the *logoi* which concern them; the odour that is a stranger to deceit delights the nose, and the mouth receives the flavour of the latter; by the manner of touching it is confirmed, by grasping the exact demonstration of objects.’
177 Sch. 15.4-7 on Eccl. 10-13.
178 *KG* 1.37.
179 To be precise, Evagrius warns against allowing demonic *logismoi* to linger in one’s awareness; cf. *Prakt.* 6; see below, 2.2.4.
sible objects or imagery perceived without regard for their spiritual significance then they imprint the *nous*, but if, although the perception is through the senses, the focus of attention is the *logoi* of the objects or imagery, then the resulting *noēmata* will not imprint the *nous*. Evagrius refers to the latter mode of cognition as ‘spiritual sensation’ and a prerequisite of it is *apathēia*.

1.2.1.2 The metaphysical passibility of the Evagrian *nous*

In metaphysical terms the changeability of the Evagrian *nous* is rooted in its power of self-determination, an exercise of which – that is, a choice or decision - is a movement of the *nous* (νοὸς κινητὸς).\(^{180}\) That movement is susceptible of degree and can be either toward or away from God and, accordingly, stable or unstable. If stable it tends toward stillness in the sense that movement toward God would, if uninterrupted, culminate in union with him. If unstable this, along with its distance from God, will tend to increase, since any stability must come from God. In other words, the *nous*, in virtue of its power of self-determination, is intrinsically capable of, and potentially susceptible to, infinite instability, and once it has turned away from God only his intervention can prevent it from spinning off into chaos.

By means of the corporeal worlds God re-introduced stability to the created order and made it possible for the *noes* to re-ascent to him. In virtue of the movement and Fall they had already undergone change, but so far the form this took, namely increasingly unstable movement, happened without further input from God. Their assumption of souls and bodies, on the other hand, although the actualisation of a potential already in them,\(^{181}\) did require such input and so a further creation.\(^{182}\)

Embodiment contains, but does not eliminate, the instability of the *nous*. The human *nous* experiences its instability through its susceptibility to imprinting by *noēmata* of sensible objects and to the changing emotions and mental states characteristic of our daily lives, most – but not all - of which are unstable movements and affections of the

\(^{180}\) Cf. Sch. 10 on Eccl. 2:11; Sch. 23 on Prov. 2:17; see above, 1.1.2.

\(^{181}\) Cf. *KG* 2.29: ‘Just as fire potentially possesses its body, so also the *nous* potentially possesses the soul, when it is entirely mixed with the light of the Blessed Trinity.’

\(^{182}\) But see above, n.34.
nous; in other words, pathē. The two - the imprinting of the nous and the experience of pathos - are connected: ‘appetite’, Evagrius tells us, ‘is the source of every pleasure, and sensation gives birth to appetite.’ Conversely, apatheia is the initial stabilisation of the nous that enables it to contemplate and thereby increase its stability and move closer to God. Contemplation does not involve the imprinting of the nous but nonetheless changes it as much as pathos. But whereas the changes wrought in the nous by pathos are a sickening, those wrought by contemplation are healing. They are reflected in changes to the constitution of the body - that is, to the aspect of the nous that is ‘named a body’ - in the gradual process whereby it, along with the soul, is ‘raised to the order of the mind.’

1.2.1.3 The true nature of the nous

Just as God is beyond all representation and sense perception (ὑπὲξ πᾶσαν ἔννοιαν καὶ αἰσθησιν); immaterial (ἄιδλος) and without quantity or shape (ἀπνο θαὶ ἀσχημάτιστος) or form (μορφή), so the true nature of the nous is to be without form or matter. That which was created to be receptive to the immaterial, formless God is itself immaterial and formless. God’s response to the Fall was to provide the noes with souls and bodies to enable them to re-ascent to him, and that in the first instance means overcoming their susceptibility to pathos; in other words, attaining apatheia. But although apatheia is part of the true nature of the nous, it is not the whole story and its attainment does not yet suffice for the nous fully to realise its true nature:

183 Not all emotions, desires and so forth are unstable movements, only those that lead us away from God. For discussion of unstable affects – that is, pathē – see Chapter Two, and for stable affects, Chapter Three.
184 Chapter Two focuses in detail upon Evagrius’ understanding of pathos and its effect upon us.
185 Prakt. 4.2-3; see below, 2.2.2.
186 See above, 1.1.3.
187 The body and its transformations are discussed below, 1.4.
188 Gt.Let. 26; see above, 1.1.2.
189 Gt.Let. 22; see above, 1.1.2.
190 Pry. 4.
191 Pry. 66.
192 Pry. 67.
193 Cf. Pry. 114.
194 Cf. KG 3.31: ‘Of the unity of the nous it is possible to speak, but its nature cannot be described because it has been constituted neither of form nor of matter (such that) there is no knowledge of quality.’
Οὐθ ὁ ἀπαζείαο ηεηπρεθὼο, ἢδε θαὶ πξνζεύρεηαη ἀιεζ῵ο· δύλαηαη γὰξ ἐλ ηνῖο
ςηινῖο λνήκαζη εἶλαη θαὶ ἐλ ηαῖο ἱζηνξίαηο αὐη῵λ

By ‘simple intellections’ Evagrius means the *logoi* of bodies and incorporeals and
judgment and providence. These relate to the various levels of contemplation and of
the metaphysical hierarchy by means of which the *nous* ascends to God, but while an inte-
gral part of the ascent they too must be transcended if it is to be receptive to God him-
self. ‘True prayer’, which Evagrius also calls ‘pure prayer’, is the highest level of
contemplation.

It is both the immediate goal of the spiritual life and the route to its
ultimate goal, the eschatological restoration of the *logikoi* to God, for which the *nous*
must become naked, not only of *noēmata* but of soul and body:

The naked *nous* is that which, by the contemplation which concerns it, is united
to knowledge of the Trinity.

Being without form or matter, the *nous* has no qualities and so its nature cannot be d-
scribed. It does, however, have a light associated with it, and Evagrius journeyed to
John of Lycopolis to ask him about this:

---

195 *Pry.* 55; cf. *Pry.* 57: ‘Even if the *nous* has transcended the contemplation of corporeal nature, it has not
yet beheld perfectly the place of God, for it can be occupied with the knowledge of intelligible objects
and so be involved with its multiplicity’ (Κἂν ὑπὲξ τὴν θεωρίαν τῆς σοματικῆς φύσεως ὁ νοῦς γένηται,
ob̂πω τέλεον τόν τοῦ Θεοῦ τόπον ἐθεάσατο· δύναται γὰρ ἐν τῇ τῶν νοητῶν εἴναι γνώσει, καὶ
ποικίλεσθαι πρὸς αὐτῆν); also *Let.* 58.4: ‘When the mind has attained [knowledge of the Holy Trinity], it
leaves all the intellections associated with objects.’ Trans. Sinkewicz (2003: 285,n.3).
196 Cf., e.g., *Pry.* 70, 72.
197 For ‘true prayer’ cf., e.g., *Pry.* 53, 55, 59, 60, 64; for ‘pure prayer’, e.g. *Pry.* 70, 72.
198 *KG* 3.6; cf. *KG* 1.65; 3.15.
200 Cf., e.g., *Prakt.* 64, quoted below, 3.1; *Disc.* 78, quoted below, 3.3; *KG* 1.74: ‘The light of the *nous* is
divided into three: knowledge of the adorable and holy Trinity, of the incorporeal nature that has been
created by it, and of the contemplation of beings. This light can be manipulated by both demons and an-
gels; at *Pry.* 73 Evagrius speaks of “the light around the *nous*’ being manipulated by the demon of vain-
glory, and at *Pry.* 74 of “the angel of God [moving] the light of the *nous* to an unerring activity.”
201 Palladius (*HL* 35.4) reports that it took him, Palladius, eighteen days to make the same journey, ‘partly
on foot, partly by sailing along the river’.

Page 51 of 268
Concerning [the holy light in the eyes of the mind at the time of prayer], I and God’s servant Ammonius wanted to know where it comes from, and we asked the holy John, the seer of Thebes, whether it is the nature of the mind to be luminous and thus it pours forth the light from itself or whether [the light] appears from something else outside and illumines [the mind]; but he answered us and said, “No human being is able to explain this, and indeed, apart from the grace of God the mind cannot be illumined in prayer by being set free from the many cruel enemies that are endeavouring to destroy it.”

Evagrius evidently concluded that as well as having a light of its own the nous can be illuminated from without:

Εἴ τις βούλοιτο ἵδεῖν τὴν τοῦ νοῦ κατάστασιν, στερησάτω ἕαντὸν πάντων τῶν νοημάτων, καὶ τότε ὄψεται αὐτὸν σαφεῖρω ἢ οὐρανίῳ χρώματι παρεμφερή· τούτο ποίησαι ἄνευ ἀπαθείας, τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶν. Θεοῦ γὰρ χρεία συνεργοῦντος τοῦ ἀναπνέοντος αὐτῶ τὸ συγγενὲς φῶς.

If someone should want to behold the state of his nous, let him deprive himself of all noēmata and then he shall behold himself resembling sapphire or the colour of heaven. It is impossible to achieve this without apatheia, for he will need God to collaborate with him and breathe into him the connatural light.

This is ‘that light which at the time of prayer leaves an imprint of the place of God (τοῦ φωτὸς ἐκείνου τοῦ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς προσευχῆς ἐκτυποῦντος τὸν τόπον τοῦ θεοῦ).’ But if only noēmata of sensible objects imprint the nous and if, moreover, such imprinting is inimical to prayer, what does Evagrius mean by this? In the very next chapter he states explicitly, in relation to Isa. 6:1, that the noēma of God does not imprint the nous.

The answer, I suggest, is that it is partly deliberate oxymoron and partly metaphor, both intended to emphasise the singular and ineffable nature of the experience in question. As metaphor it compares it to our ordinary experience of the sensible world and declares it to be no less vivid; as oxymoron it reminds us that, unlike cog-

\[\text{\textsuperscript{202} Ant. 6.16; cf. HL 35.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{203} Rfl. 2.9.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{204} Cf. Exod. 24:9-11.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{205} Cf. Rfl. 23: ‘[The nous] will lay aside the pathē through the virtues, and simple thoughts through spiritual contemplation; and this in turn it will lay aside when there appears to it the light;’ Rfl. 27: ‘Prayer is a state (katastasis) of the nous that arises under the influence of the unique light of the Holy Trinity.’}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{206} Th. 40.8-9.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{207} Cf. Th. 41.17-19.}\]
nition of sensible objects, that of God does not rely for its vividness upon the imprinting of the nous.

Evagrius understands the expression ‘the throne of God’ in Isa. 6:1 as referring to the pure nous, since ‘God is said to be seated there where he is known’. He also speaks of the nous as ‘the place of God’, as in the following:

"Ὅταν ὁ νοῦς τὸν παλαίαν ἀνθρωπον ἀποδοσάμενος τὸν ἐκ χάριτος ἐπενδύσηται, τότε καὶ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ κατάστασιν ὃγεται κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς προσευχῆς σαπειρίῳ ἢ οὐρανῶ χρώματι παρεμφερῆ, ἢντινα καὶ τόπον θεοῦ ἢ γραφὴ ὄνομάζει ὑπὸ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ὄφθαλμα ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄρους Σινᾶ.

When the nous has put off the old self and shall put on the one born of grace, then it will see its own state in the time of prayer resembling sapphire or the colour of heaven; this state scripture calls the place of God that was seen by the elders on Mount Sinai.

For Evagrius it is the nous that is the object of Paul’s injunction and the subject of the transformation from ‘old’ to ‘new’ self; as we shall see, he identifies the Pauline ‘new self’ with the person who has attained apatheia. The nous is the ‘place of God’ because it was created to know him.

The nous, then, is naturally incorporeal and has its own light. What about its relationship to movement? Is the true nature of the nous to be in stillness or in motion? I said above that stillness is found only in union with God and that corporeal creation is char-

---

208 Th. 41.14-15; see above, 1.2.1.1.
209 Th. 39, repeated almost verbatim in Let 39; cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 273, n.61). Cf. also Rfl. 2.9, quoted above; Th. 40.
212 That the ‘place of God’ is said to be located on a mountain reflects, for Evagrius, the fact that the return to God is an ascent; cf. Let. 58: “[T]he intelligible mountain is the knowledge of the Holy Trinity erected on a height difficult of access” (trans. Sinkewicz (2003: 285, n.3)); also cf. KG 5.40: ‘The intelligible mountain is spiritual contemplation which is placed at a great height which it is difficult to approach; when the nous will have reached it, it will become a seer of all the noēmata of the objects below.’ Cf. Rfl. 25.3-6: “[T]he place of God is the rational soul, and his dwelling the luminous nous that has renounced worldly appetites and been taught to observe the logoi of (that which is on) the earth’ (τόπος ὅσιοι τούν Θεού, πνεῦ ἀτροπή ἀκούσεσθαι ἑκάτερον δὲ, νῦν φορουμένης τὰς κοσμικὰς ἐπιθύμιας ἀρνησμένος, τοὺς τῆς πνεύμης λόγους ἀποκοπεῖαν διδασκαλιών); Sch. 2 on Ps. 75:3: ‘Place of God, the pure soul; dwelling of God, the contemplating nous’ (τόπος Θεοῦ πνεῦμα κάθαρα. κατοικητήριον Θεοῦ, νῦν θεωρητικός).
acterised by stability of movement as opposed to its cessation.\textsuperscript{213} But at \textit{Praktikos} 48 Evagrius describes the \textit{nous} as ‘a thing easily set in motion and difficult to check in its tendencies towards unlawful fantasies (εὐκίνητον γάρ τι πράγμα ὁ νοῦς καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀνόμους φαντασίας δοκικάθεκτον).\textsuperscript{214} So what exactly does he mean by this? Clearly he means that the \textit{nous} is easily destabilised, since he is referring in particular to its ‘tendency towards unlawful fantasies’. But should we take this to mean that the natural state of the \textit{nous} is stillness? Given that stillness was, along with incorporeality, the pre-lapsarian condition of the \textit{logikoi}, the answer is clearly yes. What about the \textit{nous} in corporeal creation? Can it ever experience stillness? I think the answer again is yes: that when, during prayer, it attains to knowledge of God, it enjoys stillness, along with effective incorporeality,\textsuperscript{215} but as soon as it begins to descend it is once more identical with the \textit{logistikon} and so, as part of corporeal creation, in motion, although insofar as it remains \textit{apathēs} that motion will be stable.\textsuperscript{216}

\textbf{1.2.1.4 Summary}

The mutability and passibility of the \textit{nous} are central to Evagrius’ anthropology. The receptivity of the \textit{nous} spans the entire cognitive spectrum from God to the sensible world. The image of God consists in its receptivity to knowledge of God.

Cognition of objects external to the \textit{nous} involves the reception by it of \textit{noēmata} of those objects. \textit{Noēmata} of sensible objects imprint the \textit{nous} but those of intelligibles do not. Whether or not imprinting occurs is agent-dependent: if scriptural passages that use sensible imagery to convey spiritual truths are understood in terms of their literal meaning then the \textit{noēmata} of that imagery will imprint the \textit{nous}, but if they are understood in terms of their spiritual meaning then the \textit{nous} will not be imprinted. Similarly, if perception of sensible objects focuses upon the objects themselves then their \textit{noēmata} will imprint the \textit{nous}, but if the focus is upon the objects’ \textit{logoi} – that is, if it is contemplative - then the \textit{nous} will not be imprinted. Evagrius refers to this as ‘spiritual sensation’ and a prerequisite of it is \textit{apatheia}.

\textsuperscript{213} See above, 1.1.2.
\textsuperscript{214} \textit{Prakt.} 48.7-8.
\textsuperscript{215} See below, 3.3.
\textsuperscript{216} \textit{Apathēia} is normally experienced as a temporary condition; see below, 3.4.
Just as the epistemic changeability of the *nous* is rooted in its receptivity to knowledge of God, so its metaphysical changeability is rooted in its power of self-determination, an exercise of which is a movement of the *nous*. If that movement is away from God it is unstable, if toward him, stable, since stability comes from God. In turning away from God the *logikoi* introduced instability to the created order, and God responded by re-introducing stability by means of corporeal creation. The furnishing of the *noes* with souls and bodies was the actualisation of a potential already present within them. It contains but does not eliminate the instability of the *noes*. As humans we experience that instability in the plasticity of the *nous* in relation to the sensible world and in our related vulnerability to *pathos*. Acquiring *apatheia* stabilises the *nous* and enables it to shift its cognitive focus from sensible objects to their spiritual significance. Like *pathos*, the practice of contemplation or spiritual sensation changes the *nous* (including the soul and body) but whereas the changes effected by *pathos* increase its sickliness, those effected by contemplation restore it to health.

Attainment of *apatheia* is the starting point for the restoration of the *nous* to its true nature of formlessness, incorporeality and stillness but it is not sufficient for it. The *apathēs nous* has lost its susceptibility to imprinting by *noēmata* of sensible objects but remains subject to multiplicity, which, although now of intelligibles rather than sensibles is nonetheless, *qua* multiplicity, ‘far from God’. To be receptive to God as essential knowledge rather than as mediated through corporeal creation it must transcend the corporeal worlds, becoming naked of body and soul and also of all *noēmata*. As it does so, ‘putting off the old self and putting on the one born of grace’, it will become aware of its light and of itself as the ‘place of God’.

### 1.2.2 The soul

Evagrius uses the word ‘soul’ even more frequently than the word *nous*.\(^{217}\) The reason, I suspect, lies in the therapeutic focus of his writings, for while the *nous* is the agent and

---

\(^{217}\) According to the *TLG* and including the *Epistula Fidei* there are four-hundred and ninety-one occurrences of the word ‘soul’ in Evagrius’ Greek corpus.
subject of redemption, the soul is the form it assumes as a result of the Fall and in which it must act to achieve redemption.

To begin with, a point of clarification. Evagrius sometimes speaks as if the soul comprised only the thumos and epithumêton, so implying the identity of nous and logistikôn.218 His doing so follows naturally from his tendency to assimilate the logistikôn to the nous and preference for speaking in terms of the latter. Accordingly it should be borne in mind that just as the term nous can refer either to the triune entity or the rational part of the soul, so ‘soul’ might denote either the fallen entity in its entirety or its pathêton part alone.

This section will focus upon the nature of the three parts of the soul, and this can best be gleaned from Evagrius’ assignment of virtues to them. But first, from a modern perspective the fact that a discussion of the virtues should fall within a chapter on anthropology rather than ethics bears a word of explanation. Whereas we think of ethics and psychology as necessarily distinct, the one prescriptive, the other descriptive, in antiquity the assumption was rather of their connectedness and mutual coherence. As Brennan notes, ancient theories of ethics are rooted in naturalism; that is, they start from considerations of what is natural for a human being. Consequently, unlike modern theories they ‘tend to begin their ethical theorizing along with their psychology, not prior to it’,219 and to suppose that ‘the perfectly representative human psyche belongs to the perfectly ethical human agent. Violations of ethical standards always reflect lapses in psychological hygiene.’220 Evagrius’ anthropology fits this pattern exactly, being premised upon our creation in God’s image and loss of it through our own choice. For Evagrius the perfectly virtuous human agent would indeed have the perfectly healthy soul, and the purpose of praktikê is to regain and, as far as possible, preserve that health. To the objection that a person cannot be obliged to do anything that she is unable to do, that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, Evagrius would reply that any gap between what we can do and what we ought to do is itself a result of poor psychological health and, as such, something that in principle we can, with God’s help, remedy.

218 Cf., e.g., Sch. 2 on Ps. 107:3, Sch. 230 on Prov. 21:23, Sch. 258 on Prov. 23.22.
Evagrius distinguishes between the ‘practical’ and the ‘contemplative’ virtues. The former are constitutive of apatheia and are cultivated by means of praktikē, while the latter are the preserve of the gnostikos and are cultivated following attainment of apatheia. Concise descriptions of the virtuous, and so apathēs, soul are given in both the Praktikos and the Kephalaia Gnostika. Praktikos 86 reads:

Κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργεῖ ψυχή λογικὴ ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμητικὸν αὐτῆς μέρος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἑρίεται, τὸ δὲ θυμικὸν ὕπὲρ αὐτῆς ἀγωνίζεται, τὸ δὲ λογιστικὸν ἐπιβάλλει τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν γεγονότων. 221

The rational soul acts according to nature when the epithumetic part of it longs for virtue, the thumos struggles on (the soul’s) behalf, and the logistikon attains the contemplation of beings.

Kephalaia Gnostika 4.73 describes the virtuous – and so apathēs - person as

one in whom the nous always attends to the Lord, in whom the thumikos is full of humility following the memory of God, and in whom epithumia is completely oriented toward the Lord. 222

While both of these chapters assume the ability, bestowed by apatheia, to practise contemplation, the fact that Praktikos 86 focuses upon the role of the thumos in the ‘warfare of the pathē’, 223 while in Kephalaia Gnostika 4.73 all three parts of the soul are directly attentive to God, reveals that they deal with less and more advanced levels of spiritual attainment respectively. We see this too in the degree of unity that each attributes to the soul: in the Praktikos her three parts are operating in harmony with one another but their respective functions are quite distinct, whereas in the Kephalaia Gnostika, although the differentiation remains they are unified not just by mutual concord but by direct orientation toward God. 224 The contrasting functions that these two chapters assign to the thumos will be considered below.

221 Prakt. 86; cf. Disc. 96.
222 KG 4.73.
223 Cf. Prakt. 83.
224 Cf. Sch. 293 on Prov. 24:31. It is worth noting the contrast with Plotinus’ understanding of the ‘civic’ and ‘purificatory’ virtues. For Plotinus, the civic virtues involve all three parts of the soul and bestow metriopatheia, while apatheia is acquired by means of the purificatory virtues, which concern the separation of the rational part of the soul from the body and do not involve the epithumētikon or thumos; cf. Enn. 1.2; also Baltzly (2004: 301-3). For Evagrius, both the practical and the contemplative virtues in-
Praktikos 89 comprises a more detailed assignment of virtues to the parts of the soul:

Since the rational soul is tripartite according to our wise teacher,225 when virtue (ἀρετή) arises in the logistikōn it is called prudence (φρονησις), understanding (σύνεσις), and wisdom (σοφία); when in the epithumētikon it is called temperance (σωφροσύνη), love (ἀγάπη), and self-control (ἐγκράτεια);226 when in the thumos it is called courage (ἀνδρεία) and perseverance (ὑπομονή); and when in the entire soul it is called justice (δικαιοσύνη).227 The work (ἔργον) of prudence is to lead in the war against the opposing powers (τὸ στρατηγεῖν πρὸς τὰς ἀντικειμένας δυνάμεις) and to defend the virtues (τῶν ἀρετῶν ὑπερασπίζειν) and to draw the battle lines against the vices (πρὸς τὰς κακίας παρατάττεσθαι) and to manage indifferent matters according to the circumstances (τὰ μέσα πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς διοικεῖν). The work of understanding involves the harmonious arrangement of all things that contribute to the attainment of our goal (τὸ πάντα τὰ συντελοῦντα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν ἀρμοδίως οἰκονομεῖν). The work of wisdom is contemplation of the logoi of bodies and incorporeals (τὸ θεωρεῖν λόγους σομάτων καὶ ἁσμάτων). The work of temperance is to look without pathos upon objects that set in motion its irrational fantasies (βλέπειν ἀπαθῶς τὰ πράγματα τὰ κινοῦντα ἐν ἡμῖν φαντασίας ἀλόγους). The work of love is to conduct itself towards every image of God in much the same way as it would towards the archetype (τὸ πᾶσῃ εἰκόνι τοῦ θεοῦ τιμιάζειν ἑαυτῇ ἐμπαρέχειν οὕναι καὶ τὸ πρωτότοκο σχεδόν), even when the demons attempt to defile it (μιᾶνειν αὐτὰς ἐπιχειρῶσιν οἱ δαίμονες). The work of self-control is to throw off joyfully every pleasure of the gullet (τὸ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν τοῦ φάρυγγος μετὰ χαρὰς ἀποσείεσθαι). It belongs to perseverance and courage to be unafraid of enemies (μὴ δεδιέναι δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους) and to hold out vauntily in the midst of dangers

---

225 Guillaumont (1971: 683) notes that the expression ‘our wise teacher’, which Evagrius has substituted for the name of Plato, designates Gregory of Nazianzus. Likewise, Sinkewicz (2003: 260, n.91) notes that ‘the teacher in question is most likely Gregory Nazianzen’.

226 Guillaumont and Sinkewicz translate ἐγκράτεια as ‘abstinence’, but while I agree that abstinence is the form that ἐγκράτεια takes as regards the epithumētikon, I prefer the translation ‘self-control’ because in addition to being a more literal rendering of ἐγκράτεια, it more clearly suggests the cognitive aspect of abstinence in its Evagrian sense and therefore makes more explicit its link with the inner watchfulness that is so central to praktikē (for discussion of inner watchfulness, see below, 3.4).

227 In speaking of virtue as a single entity that assumes different forms Evagrius evokes the doctrine, Stoic in origin, of the unity of the virtues. Cf., e.g., Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 440e, LS 61B: ‘Menedemus of Eretria eliminated the plurality and differentiation of the virtues, holding that there is a single one, called by many names; for it is the same thing that is called moderation and courage and justice ... Aristo of Chios also made virtue essentially one thing, which he called “health”.’ Cf. also Prakt. 98, quoted below, this section.
The role of justice is to cultivate concord and harmony between the parts of the soul (τὸ συμφωνίαν τινὰ καὶ ἁμονίαν τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν κατεργάζεσθαι). 228

These virtues are a mixture of the practical and the contemplative: prudence and understanding are primarily practical, while wisdom is certainly a contemplative virtue. That Evagrius speaks of it rather than knowledge in relation to the logistikōn is worth remarking. Since wisdom relates to corporeal creation and knowledge to God himself, 229 it reflects the status of the logistikōn as the ensouled nous; that is, the nous in relation to corporeal creation. In turn it makes more noteworthy Evagrius’ references to knowledge of God being attainable by the nous during human life since it highlights the ability of the embodied nous to transcend the corporeal worlds. Self-control is a practical virtue, but temperance as described here is contemplative, and we know from the Prologue to the Praktikos that love (agapē) only truly becomes possible with the attainment of apatheia, 230 making it, too, a contemplative virtue. On the other hand, the virtues here ascribed to the thumos, perseverance and courage, are above all practical. The role assigned to justice, which we can take to be both practical and contemplative, recalls that assigned to it in Plato’s Republic, where it is the condition of the soul in all of whose parts virtue has been realised, 231 but whereas for Plato it emerges from the correct operation of the parts of the soul, 232 Evagrius makes it active in the cultivation of ‘concord and harmony’ between them. 233

Praktikos 86 and 89, on the one hand, and Kephalaia Gnostika 4.73 on the other, assign very different functions to the thumos, the former that of struggling on behalf of the

---

228 As Sinkewicz (2003: 260, n.91) notes, Evagrius here draws upon a school text such as the anonymous On the Virtues and the Vices 1-2, which names Plato as the source of the teaching, but adapts it to his own teaching and adds virtues with strong scriptural associations: understanding and wisdom (cf. Col. 1:9); charity and self-control (cf. I Tim. 2:15; 2 Pet. 1:6), and perseverance (e.g. Rom. 5:23). Cf. also Guillarmont (1971: 681 ff).
229 See above, n.35.
230 Cf. Prakt. Prol. 49-50; also Prakt. 81, 84.
232 Ibid.
233 If he was working from On the Virtues and the Vices (see above, n.187), this is one of the respects in which he departs from it, since it defines justice as ‘the virtue of the soul that distributes proportionately’, a view associated with Aristotle and the Stoics as opposed to Plato. Evagrius himself evokes the latter sense of justice in his description of the contemplative virtues at Gnost. 44 (quoted above in part 2 of the Introduction). Cf. Disc. 7, quoted below, 3.3, at n.258.
soul; the latter, observation of humility in memory of God. Unlike the other parts of the soul, the *thumos* is the source of two contrasting sets of virtues, detailed by Evagrius in the following passage from the *Eulogios*:

The usage of *thumos* lies in this, namely, in fighting against the serpent with enmity, but with gentleness and mildness exercising patience with love (κατὰ τὸ πρᾶον καὶ ἐπιεικὲς κατὰ τὴν ἄγαπην μακροθυμεῖν) toward one’s brother while doing battle with the *logismos*. Let the gentle person then be a fighter (ὁ πρᾶος οὖν ἔστω μαχητῆς), with his gentleness divorced from murderous *logismoi*, just as his fighting is separated from those of his natural kindred (τῆς μάχης ἐκ τῶν τῆς φύσεως ὁμογενῶν). Do not turn the usage of *thumos* instead to one that is contrary to nature (μὴ ἀντιστρέψῃς τοῦ θυμοῦ τὴν χρήσιν εἰς τὴν παρὰ φύσιν), so as to use *thumos* with your brother by becoming like the serpent on the one hand and on the other hand to form a friendship with the serpent by consenting to *logismoi*. The gentle person, even if he suffers terrible things, does not abandon love, for it is because of this that he exercises patience and forbearance, kindness and perseverance (κἂν πάσης τὰ δεινά, τῆς ἄγαπης οὖν ἐξίσταται, ἐνεκεν γὰρ ταύτης μακροθυμεῖ καὶ στέγει, χρηστεύεται τε καὶ ὑπομένει). If indeed the exercise of patience belongs to love (τῆς ἄγαπης τὸ μακροθυμεῖν), contention arising from the *thumos* has nothing to do with love, for *thumos* rouses hatred, jealousy and wrath (κῖζει καὶ θαλαλεῖ καὶ καλλιείρει), but love hates the three of them (ἀγάπη δὲ τὰ τρία μισεῖ). If you have a firm foundation in love, pay more attention to this than to the person who trips you up (Ἐὰ παγία ἔχεις ἐν τῇ ἄγαπῃ τὴν βάσιν, μᾶλλον πρόσεχε ταύτη, ἤπερ τῷ πταίηντί σε).

As this description makes clear, the *thumos* is the source not only of the virtues relating to aggression, such as anger towards the demons and courage in the face of demonic attack, but of the virtues opposed to it, for example patience, perseverance, gentleness and mildness; it is, accordingly, the psychic locus of restraint, tolerance and empathy as well as of combativeness.

It will have been noticed that this passage appears to assign love in the sense of *agapē* to the *thumos*, whereas *Praktikos* 89 assigned it to the *epithumētikon*. The latter would appear to be the exception. To begin with, *Praktikos* 38, although not explicitly assigning it to the *thumos*, is most naturally read as doing so:

---

234 Cf. Gen. 3:15.
235 Cf. I Cor. 13:3-7.
236 Eul. 11.10.
237 At *Eul.* 13.12 *agapē* is again linked with perseverance and patience.
Ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πέφυκε κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάθη· καὶ παρούσης μὲν ἀγάπης καὶ ἐγκατελείμενη, πάντως δὲ κινεῖσται· πλειώνου δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὁ θυμὸς δὲιται φαρμάκων, καὶ διὰ τούτου μεγάλη λέγεται ἡ ἀγάπη ὅτι χαλινώς ἐστὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ. 238

The pathē are naturally set in motion by the senses. When love and self-control are present they will not be set in motion; when they are absent, they will be set in motion. The thumos requires more remedies than the epithumētikon, and for this reason love is said to be great, for it is the bridle of anger.

The Kephalaia Gnostika also implies the derivation of agapē from the thumos:

Knowledge and ignorance are united in the nous, while epithumia is receptive of self-control and luxury and love and hate normally occur to thumos. 239

Knowledge heals the nous, love thumos and chastity epithumia. 240

We have, then, one explicit assignment of agapē to the epithumētikon (Praktikos 89); one very strongly implied assignment of it to the thumos (Eulogios 11.10), and three strongly implied assignments of it to the thumos, one of which is in the Praktikos. It is difficult to know what to make of this apparent inconsistency, but it seems clear that for the most part Evagrius associates agapē with the thumos rather than the epithumētikon, as would make sense given that agapē does not involve desire. 241

Conversely, there can be no doubt that erōs in its spiritual as well as its physical sense derives, like desire in general, from the epithumētikon. Erōs is not a word Evagrius uses often: whereas agapē and its cognates occur one hundred and four times in his Greek corpus, erōs occurs only seven times. Of these, two, both in the Eulogios, are negative in tone. In one, Evagrius speaks of the person who has a desire (ἔρηξεν) for, and is in

238 Prakt. 1-5.
239 KG 1.84. My assumption that the love in question here is agapē is based upon Frankenberg’s Greek retroversion of the Syriac manuscript S1.
240 KG 3.35. In this case a Greek fragment survives that confirms the use of agapē.
241 Were it not for this consideration, which seems to me decisive, Rfl. 37 - ‘Desire (epithumia) is a power of the soul that is destructive of anger’ – could be taken as additional grounds for attributing agapē to the epithumētikon, given that agapē heals anger.
love with (ἐρῶν), honour.\textsuperscript{242} In the other he declares that the person who slanders and the person who listens to slander are ‘in love with one another for the ruin of the heart’ (ἔρωσιν ἄλληλων εἰς λόμην καρδίας).\textsuperscript{243}

His other five positive uses of erôs are all in the \textit{Chapters on Prayer}; the first two in the Prologue. Evagrius tells his correspondent:\textsuperscript{244}

θαυμάζω δὲ σε, καὶ λίαν ἐξήλω τῆς ἀρίστης προθέσεως τῶν περὶ προσευχῆς ἔρωντα κεφαλαίουν. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς τούτων ἔρας τῶν ὑπὸ χειρῶν, καὶ ἐν χάρτῃ διὰ μέλανος τὸ εἶναι εὐχόντων, ἄλλα τῶν ἐν τῷ ἱδρυμένῳ δι’ ἀγάπης καὶ ἁμησερκακίας.\textsuperscript{245}

I hold you in admiration and envy greatly your excellent intention expressed in your desire for the chapters on prayer. For you desire to have them not only in hand and in ink upon the page, but established in your \textit{nous} through love and freedom from resentment.

This shows how Evagrius distinguishes between erôs and agapê, and also exemplifies some of the virtues of the \textit{pathētik} part of the soul in action: desire – specifically characterised as loving – for the good, on the part of the \textit{epithumētikon}; on that of the \textit{thumos}, love and freedom from resentment. It is also a thumbnail sketch of the \textit{apathēs} soul or \textit{nous}, not only because the virtuous soul is \textit{apathēs} by definition but because Evagrius acknowledges his correspondent as having not only received Leah – that is, completed the work of \textit{praktikē} – but performed his seven years’ further service for Rachel, who for Evagrius symbolises the fruits of contemplation.\textsuperscript{246}

The other three references to erôs are in the treatise itself: Evagrius speaks of the Holy Spirit urging the \textit{nous} on to love for spiritual prayer (προτερεπάμενον [τὸν νοῦν] εἰς ἔρων πνευματικῆς προσευχῆς),\textsuperscript{247} and of the person who loves (ἐρῶν) true prayer,\textsuperscript{248} and, at \textit{Prayer} 52, expresses even more directly than in the Prologue the compatibility

\textsuperscript{242} Cf. Eul. 3.3.
\textsuperscript{243} Eul. 16.16.
\textsuperscript{244} Probably Rufinus; cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 184).
\textsuperscript{245} Pry. Prol. 23-27.
\textsuperscript{247} Pry. 62, according to the text used by Sinkewicz (that of the \textit{Philokalia}, supplemented by other manuscripts) and Stewart (2001: 192); Migne has ἔργα instead of ἔρων.
\textsuperscript{248} Pry. 64.
of spiritual erōs with apatheia, recalling Plato’s definition of Eros as a daimōn who mediates between the divine and the human.\textsuperscript{249}

κατάστασις ἐστὶ προσευχής ἔξις ἀπαθής, ἔρωτι ἀκροτάτω εἰς ὑψὸς νοητὸν ἀρπάζουσα τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ πνευματικὸν νοῦν.\textsuperscript{250}

The state of prayer is an apathēs habit, which by means of a supreme love carries off to the intelligible height the nous which loves wisdom and is spiritual.

Finally, it was noted above that although all three parts of the soul were in this sense latent in the pre-lapsarian nous, what became the thumos and epíthumētikon only took that form as a result of it, and that Evagrius understands this as the nous renouncing the image of God and willingly becoming the image of animals’,\textsuperscript{251} and as the thumos and epíthumētikon being ‘yoked’ (συζέωςας) to the human person.\textsuperscript{252} It is now possible to clarify how these two parts of the soul can be aspects of the fallen nous and so, ultimately, of the image of God, and at the same time ‘powers that we and the beasts have in common’ that ‘belong to corporeal nature’ and therefore were evidently not ‘created with the rational nature before the movement.’\textsuperscript{253} In the soul of the praktikos, the epíthumētikon ‘longs for virtue’, the thumos ‘struggles on the soul’s behalf’ and the logistikōn ‘perceives the contemplation of beings’\textsuperscript{254} (this state of affairs being constitutive of apatheia), while Kephalaia Gnostika 4.73 describes the soul of the contemplative as that in which the nous ‘always attends to the Lord’, the thumos is ‘full of humility following the memory of God’ and epíthumia is ‘completely oriented toward the Lord.’ Thus there is a progression in the unity of function among the three parts of the soul from the level of the praktikos to that of the contemplative. In the unified nous virtue will itself be unitary:

\begin{quote}
μίαν μὲν εἰναι τῇ φύσει τὴν ἀρετὴν, εἰδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ γὰρ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἥλιακὸν ἀσχημάτιστον μὲν ἔστι...ταῖς δὲ δὴ ὁ ἐν εἰσβάλλει θυρίσα συσχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν.\textsuperscript{255}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{249} Cf. Symp. 202d ff.
\textsuperscript{250} Pry. 52.
\textsuperscript{251} See above, 1.1.2.
\textsuperscript{252} Cf. Th. 17.4; see above, 1.1.2.
\textsuperscript{253} Cf. KG 6.85.
\textsuperscript{254} Cf. Prakt. 86.
\textsuperscript{255} Prakt. 98.7-10.
Virtue is by nature unitary, but it takes specific forms in the powers of the soul, for the light of the sun…is without form but naturally takes the form of the windows through which it enters.

Nonetheless, that which becomes the _thumos_ will contain the seeds of ‘humility following the memory of God’ and ‘struggling on the soul’s behalf’, and that which becomes the _epithumētikon_, the seeds of ‘complete orientation toward the Lord’ and ‘longing for virtue’. These are the movements of these aspects of the soul toward God, but if they move away from him the longing for virtue becomes simply a longing for the sustenance, furtherance and pleasure of the entity experienced as isolated from God and therefore unable to draw them from him. Likewise, the impetus to struggle on the soul’s behalf becomes aggression in relation to other creatures of its kind. These are ‘the powers that we and the beasts have in common’ that, ‘belonging to corporeal nature’, were not created with rational nature before the movement.

In sum, the _logistikon_ is the locus of the soul’s rational functions: on the one hand contemplation, and on the other, the management of practical affairs so as to facilitate it. The _thumos_ is the source of anger to be used against the demons and of the martial virtues of courage and perseverance, as well virtues such as love, patience, gentleness, mildness and humility. The _epithumētikon_ is the source of desire, including spiritual _erōs_. It is assigned control of the bodily appetites through the practical virtues of self-control and chastity, and, in temperance, the preservation of _apatheia_ in the face of objects that would otherwise move the soul to irrational fantasies and _pathos_. Insofar as the virtues are manifested, they indicate the presence of _apatheia_.

### 1.2.3 The body

The body is the most fallen, thickened part of the _nous_ and in humans is constituted primarily of earth. The part of the soul most closely associated with it in humans is the _epithumētikon_, meaning that we experience the body above all as a source of desires.

---

256 Since according to _KG_ 1.39 ‘we had the seeds of virtue [within us] when we were made’.
257 E.g. _Eul._ 11.10; see above, 1.2.2.
258 Attainment of _apatheia_ is gradual; see below, 3.4.
The *epithumētikon* is also the dominant part of our soul, meaning that we experience ourselves primarily as embodied, desiring beings.

Despite Evagrius’ belief that the body is a fallen condition of the *nous*, a condition that is not part of our true nature and will not survive the *apokatastasis*, he has a high estimation of its value and is clear that it is not evil:

> "Τῆ πξαθηηθῆ ὑπόθεηλαη ὗιαη πξάγκαηα πέληε, σόμα, ἄνθρωποι, βρώματα, χρήματα, κτίματας πάντων δὲ τιμώτατον τὸ σώμα διό καὶ οἱ τοῦτον καταφρονήσαντες μάρτυρες εἶσιν. Ἐλεγεν οὖν ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο ὁ διάβολος καὶ οἱ κατ’ αὐτὸν ὑποβάλλουσι πονηροὺς λογισμοὺς ἡμῖν καὶ κινοῦσιν ἡμᾶς πρὸς γαστρομαχίαν καὶ πορνείαν, ἵνα ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ καὶ τιμωτάτῳ δοθέντι ἡμῖν παρὰ θεοῦ μιανθόμενν."

Five objects serve as the material substratum of *praktikē*: the body, men, food, riches, goods, but the body is the most precious of all; this is why those who have despised it are martyrs. [Evagrius] said that the devil and those under him suggest evil thoughts to us and move us toward gluttony and fornication so that we might be defiled in the first and most precious of God’s gifts to us.

Whoever has become receptive of the knowledge of God [but] honours ignorance more than this knowledge – he is said to be evil. Now there is no corporeal nature receptive of knowledge. None of the bodies can, therefore, properly be said to be bad.

The body plays an essential role in the healing of the fallen *nous*. During this process the constitution of the body is progressively refined such that it becomes less ‘thick’:

> Ἄσπερ τῷ πάσχοντι ὠφθαλμῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ τὸ κολλύριον <μᾶλλον> ἤπερ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι οὕτως τῇ ψυχῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα αἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ τῆς μονάδος οὕσαι υγείᾳ ταῦτης τῆς ὑλόδους παχύτητος οὐ χρείαιν ἔχοσιν.

Just as for someone who suffers in the eyes an eye-salve is more natural than for a healthy person, so the body is natural for the soul, but [the souls] who are in the health of unity have no need of this thick material.

---

259 Disc. 15.
260 KG 3.53.
261 Disc. 8.
The soul for which the body is ‘natural’ is the fallen, fragmented soul: just as, on the cosmic scale, corporeal creation is the remedy for the Fall, so for each nous its body is the means by which it can, with God’s help, remedy its spiritual sickness. ‘The souls in the health of unity’ are those that have attained apatheia.

The therapeutic utility of the body has three aspects. First the body is required for certain sorts of contemplation; a requirement that is, however, eventually transcended:

It is necessary for the nous to be instructed concerning incorporeal [beings], concerning bodies, or even simply to see objects: for there, indeed, is its life. But it will not see incorporeal [beings] if it be impure in its will, nor bodies, if it should be deprived of the organon that shows it sensible things. What, then, will they give to the dead soul for contemplation, those who despise the Creator and also malign our body here?\(^{262}\)

It is not said to all, *Flee from prison, my soul*,\(^ {263}\) but to those empowered by purity of soul to give themselves over, apart from this body, to the contemplation of what has come to be.\(^ {264}\)

Second, the body can serve as a refuge from the demons:

To those who blaspheme against the Creator and speak badly of this body of our soul, who will show the grace which they have received, although they are passible, in having been joined to such an organon? They bear witness in favour of my words, those who in the hallucinations of dreams are terrified by the demons and escape to wakefulness as though to the side of the angels when the body awakens suddenly.\(^ {265}\)

\(^{262}\) KG 4.62.

\(^{263}\) Ps. 141:8.

\(^{264}\) KG 4.70.

\(^{265}\) KG 4.60. Cf. KG 4.73: ‘One in whom the nous always attends to the Lord, in whom the thumikos is full of humility following the memory of God, and in whom epithumia is completely oriented toward the Lord – is it appropriate for him not to fear our adversaries who circle outside our bodies?’ Also KG 4.82: ‘The refuge (cf. Joshua 20:2-3) is the praktikê body of the passible soul, which delivers her from the demons who surround her.’
The ‘thickness’ associated with corporeality can, then, work to our advantage by shielding us from troubling spiritual phenomena. Here we see in action the stabilising effect of corporeal creation: terror, as a pathos, is an unstable movement of the nous, while a return to awareness of the body gives a sense of restored stability.

Related to the body’s stabilising effect upon the nous is the third aspect of its therapeutic utility, namely its role in healing the soul of pathos, a process to which it is fundamental:

ἐκεῖνα μὲν τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπεύοντα καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἕμων εἰς τὴν ἔργασιαν προσδέεται.267

Those things which heal the pathētikon part of the soul require also our body to put them into practice.

One who is passible and prays to quickly depart [the body] resembles a sick man who asks the carpenter to quickly break up his bed.268

The key to the therapeutic value of the body resides in the fact that pathos has a physiological basis. At the beginning of the treatise addressed to him Evagrius enjoins the monk Eulogios as follows:

tὴ τῶν ὑπερτάτων λαμπηδόνι τὴν νοερὰν οὕσιαν ἐκτρεφόμενος, ταῖς συναγωγαῖς τῶν λογισμῶν τὸν ὄγκον τῶν σαρκῶν ἀπόδύσαι, εἴδος ὅτι ὠλὴ σαρκῶν τροφῆ λογισμῶν καθίσταται.269

in nourishing your intelligible substance on the brilliance of the supreme realities, strip off the weight of the flesh by collecting your logismoi, for you know that the matter of the flesh constitutes the nourishment of logismoi.270

When Evagrius speaks of ‘stripping off the weight of the flesh’ he will expect Eulogios to think of Paul’s reference at Col. 3:9 to ‘stripping off (ἀπεκδοσάμενοι) the old self

266 It is however abundantly clear from elsewhere in Evagrius’ writings - most obviously the fifth chapter of the Antirrhētikos with its catalogue of physical traumas inflicted by the demons – that this is not always the case.
267 Prakt. 49.3-5.
268 KG 4.76.
269 Eul. 1.1.
270 Evagrius’ understanding of the logismoi is discussed in section 2.1 below.
with its practices’, and at 1 Cor. 15: 43-4 to the sôma psychikon which, sown in dishonour and weakness, is raised in glory and power.\(^{271}\) The idea of ‘stripping off the weight of the flesh’ also evokes the athlete who strips before a contest in order not to be ‘hindered by his tunic and easily dragged about’;\(^{272}\) the ‘contest’ here being that of praktikē itself - the contest against the demons and the logismoi. But the importance of this ‘stripping off’ does not reside merely in its metaphorical associations; when Evagrius says that the ‘matter of the flesh constitutes the nourishment of the logismoi’ he means it literally. Peter Brown explains:

The ascetics of late antiquity tended to view the human body as an ‘autarkic’ system. In ideal conditions, it was thought capable of running on its own ‘heat’; it would need only enough nourishment to keep that heat alive. In its ‘natural’ state – a state with which the ascetics tended to identify the bodies of Adam and Eve – the body had acted like a finely tuned engine, capable of ‘idling’ indefinitely. It was only the twisted will of fallen men that had crammed the body with unnecessary food, thereby generating in it the dire surplus of energy that showed itself in physical appetite, in anger, and in the sexual urge. In reducing the intake to which he had become accustomed, the ascetic slowly remade his body...Its drastic physical changes, after years of ascetic discipline, registered with satisfying precision the essential, preliminary stages of the long return of the human person, body and soul together, to an original, natural and uncorrupted state.\(^{273}\)

This, I believe, accurately describes Evagrius’ understanding of the body and its relation to pathos. Consider first the following:

Μέηξνλ αὔ ηαξθεο ἐπιήξσζελ ἀγγεῖλ, γαζηὴξ δὲ ῥεγλπκέλε νὐ ιέγεη, Ἀξθεῖ.\(^{274}\)

A sufficient measure fills a vessel; a full stomach\(^{275}\) does not say ‘Enough!’

This assumes that the appetite for food, expressed through the body but deriving from the epithumētikon, is inherently insatiable.\(^{276}\) But this can only be true of the unhealthy

---

\(^{271}\) See below, 3.2, 3.

\(^{272}\) Th. 6.28-9.


\(^{274}\) 8Th. 1.28.

\(^{275}\) Sinkewicz (2003: 244, n.15) notes that some manuscripts read ‘a bursting stomach’.

\(^{276}\) The idea that the epithumētikon is inherently insatiable can be traced at least to the Myth of the Water-carriers in Plato’s Gorgias (493a2-c3), where Socrates, in recounting the Myth, refers to ‘the part of the soul where the appetites are’ (τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ ἀν ἐπιθυμία εἰσὶ) as ‘intemperate and insatiable’
epithumêtikon since when the epithumêtikon acts according to nature it longs for virtue\(^{277}\) and is characterised by temperance and self-control.\(^{278}\) And if the appetites of the healthy epithumêtikon are not insatiable, it must follow that the body associated with it is ‘filled by a sufficient measure.’ This does not yet tell us that such a body would function as an ‘autarkic system’. But now consider the following:

\[ζύλα \, \text{πολλά} \, \text{μεγάλην} \, \text{ἐγείρει φλόγα}, \, \text{πλήθος} \, \text{δὲ} \, \text{βρωμάτων} \, \text{τρέφει ἐπιθυμίαν.}\]  

A lot of wood raises a large flame; an abundance of food nourishes epithumia.

\[Φλῶξ \, \text{άμωροῦται ἐπιλειπούσης ὕλης}, \, \text{καὶ} \, \text{βρωμάτων} \, \text{ἐνδει λαμαίνει ἐπιθυμίαν.}\]  

A flame grows dim when matter is wanting; a lack of food extinguishes epithumia.

\[Ἐὰν \, \text{δῶς} \, \text{σαυτόν} \, \text{ἐπιθυμία βρωμάτων}, \, \text{oὐδὲν} \, \text{ἀρκέσει} \, \text{πρὸς} \, \text{τὸ} \, \text{πληρώσαι} \, \text{τὴν} \, \text{ἡδονήν} \, \text{πῦρ} \, \text{γὰρ} \, \text{ἐστὶν} \, \text{ἐπιθυμία} \, \text{βρωμάτων}, \, \text{ἀεὶ} \, \text{δεχομένη}, \, \text{καὶ} \, \text{ἀεὶ} \, \text{φλεγομένη.}\]  

If you give yourself over to the epithumia for food, nothing will ever suffice to fulfil your pleasure, for the epithumia for food is a fire that ever takes in and is ever in flames.

\[Μαρανθείσα \, \text{φλῶξ} \, \text{ἀναλάμπει ἐπιλαβομένη φρυγάνων}, \, \text{καὶ} \, \text{ἡδονή} \, \text{σβεσθείσα} \, \text{ἀναξωπυροῦται ἐν κόρῳ βρωμάτων.}\]  

\((
\text{ἀκόλουστον ... καὶ} \, \text{o} \, \text{στεγανόν). It is generally accepted that the Gorgias predates the Republic, meaning that ‘the part of the soul where the appetites are’ anticipates, rather than equates with, the epithumêtikon of the tripartite soul. According to the Myth, in foolish people this part of the soul is like a leaking jar because it can’t be filled; however, because the Myth states that it is intemperate and insatiable in non-foolish as well as foolish people, the implication is that the leakiness derives not from its insatiability but from the attempts of the foolish to fill it. Plato has Socrates say that he was told the story by ‘a subtle man, perhaps some Sicilian or Italian’; Dodds (1959: 296-8) provides a detailed discussion of the extensive scholarship devoted to both the source of this myth and its original meaning. Cf. also Rep. 442a6-7 where, having declared the epithumêtikon to form the greater part of the human soul (see above, n.100), Plato adds that it is naturally insatiable (φύσει ἀσπληστῶτατον).\}

\(^{277}\) Cf. Prakt. 86.  
\(^{278}\) Cf. Prakt. 89.  
\(^{279}\) 8Th. 1.5.  
\(^{280}\) 8Th. 1.6.  
\(^{281}\) 8Th. 1.27. Cf. also, e.g., 8Th. 1.4, 5, 6, 31, 33; Prakt. 15.  
\(^{282}\) 8Th. 1.33.
An extinguished flame lights again if it is given firewood; and a pleasure that has been extinguished is rekindled in a satiety of food.

Δὲ ἀοῦ βρόμωτα πολλὰ τῷ σώματί σου, καὶ οὐ μὴ ἴδῃς καὶ ἔνους φαντασίας κακάς. ὃν τρόπον γὰρ φλόξ κατανάλισκει δριμόν, οὐτὸ φαντασίας αἰσχράς σβέννυσι πείνα. 283

Do not give much food to your body and you will not see bad visions in your sleep. For in the way that a flame destroys a forest so does hunger quench shameful visions.

The above compare epithumia to fire. Evagrius also uses metaphors of fire to describe sexual arousal, most notably at Eulogios 21.22 and 13.12. 284 I think these comparisons are significant. The final chapter of Gregory of Nyssa’s De opificio hominis is devoted to a discussion of human physiology which appears to assume autarky as the ideal state of the body. Intended as a sequel to the Hexaëmeron of Basil of Caesarea, 285 it was probably written in the period following Basil’s death in 373. 286 Given Evagrius’ interest in medical theory he might well have read it, 287 and in any case there is no reason to suppose that the view it expresses would have been unusual among educated Christians of the time. It assumes the physiological theory whereby the element of fire in the form of the vital heat is one of the necessary constituents of life, 288 with its source in the heart. 289 As Gregory explains, ‘some nourishment must needs ... be provided by nature for the element of heat – for it is not possible that fire should last by itself, without being nourished by its proper food.’ 290 The vital heat is nourished by blood from the liver, 291 which in turn is nourished by the food a person eats. 292 He continues:

283 AM 11. Bob Sharples has pointed out to me that σβέννυμι is the vox propria for putting out a fire.
284 Both quoted below, 2.2.4.
287 See above, 1.1.3, n.137.
288 Cf. Aristotle, DA 416a10-14: ‘By some the element of fire is held to be the cause of nutrition and growth, for it alone of the bodies or elements is observed to feed and increase itself. Hence the suggestion that in both plants and animals it is it which is the operative force. A concurrent cause in a sense it certainly is, but not without the principal cause; that is rather the soul’. Also Gregory of Nyssa, De Opf. 30.11.
289 Cf. De Opf. 30.17.
291 De Opf. 30.12.
292 De Opf. 30.14.
Now the fiery element is naturally inclined to seek for the material which serves as fuel, and this necessarily happens with regard to the receptacle of nourishment; for the more it becomes penetrated by fire through the neighbouring warmth, the more it draws to itself what nourishes the heat. And this sort of impulse we call appetite (ὄξεμη). But if the organ which contains the food should obtain sufficient material, not even so does the activity of the fire become quiescent: but it produces a sort of melting of the material just as in a foundry, and, dissolving the solids, pours them out and transfers them, as it were from a funnel, to the neighbouring passages: then separating the coarser from the pure substance, it passes the fine part through certain channels to the entrance of the liver, and expels the sedimentary matter of the food to the wider passages of the bowels, and by turning it over in their manifold windings retains the food for a time in the intestines, lest if it were easily got rid of by a straight passage it might at once excite the animal again to appetite (πρὸς ὄξεμην), and man, like the race of irrational animals (κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων φύσιν), might never cease from this sort of occupation.\(^{293}\)

The fiery element within the body, then, shares the natural insatiability of its external counterpart, and since its need for fuel is what gives rise to appetite, it imparts its insatiability to the latter. Like ordinary fire, physiological fire does not simply calm down when it has sufficient fuel. Instead, it continues to act upon the ingested food, separating the purer part of it from the coarser and sending the former to the liver to further sustain itself and the latter to the bowel for excretion. Consequently the presence of excrement is an indication that an excess of food has been ingested,\(^{294}\) as are seminal emissions.\(^{295}\)

Assuming, as I think we can, that Evagrius subscribes to something like this theory, to restrict one’s intake of food is not only to train the epithumētikon via the body but in addition to act directly on the body’s vital heat, reducing the fuel available to the fire that burns in the heart and therefore reducing that fire and ipso facto winding down the various physiological and psychological functions that turn powers. Conversely, to allow one’s eating to accord with appetite is to feed and so augment the fire that burns in

---

\(^{293}\) *De Opf.* 30.20-21.

\(^{294}\) Brown (1988: 223, n.36) notes that ‘excrement was always linked with luxury: it was the clear measure of overeating – e.g. John Chrysostom, *Hom. 13 in I Tim.*’ He also notes that Clement of Alexandria cites with approval Valentinus’ assumption that since Christ’s body was an a state of perfect equilibrium, he did not defecate (cf. *Strom.* 3.7.59); since we know that Evagrius read Clement, it is likely that he was familiar with this.

the heart since, like elemental fire, the more fuel that is added to it, the bigger it will get, the fiercer it will burn and so the more fuel it will in turn demand. Moreover, insatiability is instability, so in virtue of their inherent insatiability the movement of both external, ‘literal’ fire and physiological fire is inherently unstable. Because of the insatiability of physiological fire, to eat in accordance with appetite will necessarily result in an excess of vital heat, a surplus over and above what is needed to maintain the body’s vital functions. That surplus of the unstable physiological element of fire will in turn express itself as the unstable movement of the soul that is pathos, hence

Ὁ κρατῶν γαστρός, ἠλαττῶν πάθη, ἡπτώμενος δὲ βρώμασιν αὐξεῖ τὰς ἱδρυάς.296

He who controls the stomach diminishes the pathē; he who is overcome by food gives increase to pleasures.297

It follows that the healthy epithumêtikon has as its correlate a body whose vital heat has been reduced to a level where there is no longer any excess over and above that needed to keep the body alive. Such a body will not be healthy in Hippocratic terms; on the contrary it will be weak and will look sickly:

Μὴ ἐιεήζῃο ζ῵κα ἀηνλίαλ ἀπνδπξόκελνλ, κεδὲ πηάλῃο αὐηὸ πνιπηείᾳ βξσκάησλ· ἐὰλ γὰξ ἰζρύζῃ ἐπαλαζηήζεηαί ζνη, θαὶ πόιεκνλ ἄζπνλδνλ θηλήζεη θαηὰ ζνῦ, ἕσο ἂλ αἰρκαισηεύζῃ ζὴλ ςπρὴλ, θαὶ δνῦινλ παξαδώζεη ζε ηῶ ηสนับสนุนοο πνξλείαο πάζεη.298

296 8Th. 1.2.
297 Such a view was evidently common currency among the desert monks. Cf., e.g., The Bohairic Life of Pachomius, 89: ‘One day our father Pachomius…questioned Theodore on the faith of those who lived as anchorites in Alexandria, and about their ascēsis. He replied, “Thanks to your holy prayers, my lord father, they are quite firm in the orthodox faith of the holy catholic Church of Christ…As regards their food, there are plenty of good things on their table, they eat and drink well, walking in accordance with what is written, These things God has provided for the faithful that they might partake of them with thanksgiving (1 Tim. 4:4).” Then our father Pachomius said, “Is it possible for them to eat and drink without measure and for all that still keep their purity?” Theodore replied, “In everything their purity is great, and their knowledge is a match for anyone.” Our father Pachomius had in his hand at the moment a small stick. He struck the ground with it twice, saying, “If this ground is watered and if it is manured, will it not produce plants? It is the same with the body; if we gladden it with an abundance of dishes, of drinks, and of rest, it will not be possible for it to keep its purity. For, holy Scripture says, Those who are of Jesus the Christ have crucified their flesh with its passions and desires (cf. Gal. 5:24).’
298 8Th. 1.34.
Do not pity a body that laments its debility, nor fatten it up with rich foods, for if it gains strength it will rebel against you and wage unrelenting war upon you, until it takes your soul captive and delivers you as a slave to the *pathos* of fornication.

Ἡ οἰκτείρουσα πελιόνουμένους τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τηκομένας τὰς σάρκας αὐτῆς, οὐκ εὐφρανθήσεται ἐπὶ ἄπαθεία ψυχῆς.²⁹⁹

She who pities her blackened eyes and languished flesh will not rejoice in *apatheia* of soul.

On the other hand, the following suggests that Evagrius was not altogether reckless of physical health:

Ἔεγε δὲ ὁ ἅγιος καὶ πρακτικότατος ἡμῶν διδάσκαλος· οὕτω δεῖ ἄει παρασκευάζεσθαι τὸν μοναχὸν ὡς ἀθηριον τεθηγξίμενον, καὶ οὕτω πάλιν τῷ σώματι κεχρήσθαι ὡς ἐν πόλιοις ἅττσει συγξίμενον. Τὸ μὲν γάρ, φησί, τοὺς τῆς ἀκηδίας λογισμοῦς περικόπτει καὶ σπουδαίτερον παρασκευάζει τὸν μοναχόν· τὸ δὲ σῶον διαφυλάττει τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἵσην αὐτοῦ ἄει συντηρεῖ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν.³⁰⁰

Our saintly teacher³⁰¹ with his great experience in the practical life used to say: The monk must ever hold himself ready as though he were to die tomorrow, and in turn must treat the body as though he would have to live with it for many years. The first practice, he would say, cuts off the thoughts of acedia and makes the monk more zealous; the latter keeps the body healthy and always maintains its self-control in balance.

What I suggest is that he recognised two indices of bodily health, one profane, as exemplified by medical science, and one spiritual.³⁰² While he would have believed that, as Dysinger notes, ‘medical science provides valuable metaphors and insights for *phusikê*, the contemplation of God in nature’,³⁰³ he would have believed that it failed in not addressing the insatiability that the *epithumêtikon* derives from the unchecked fire of the body and in valuing the apparent wellbeing of the body more than the health of the soul.

---
²⁹⁹ AV 51.
³⁰⁰ Prakt. 29.
³⁰¹ According to Guillaumont (1971: 566 ff), Makarios the Egyptian.
³⁰² This is a slightly different point from that of Dysinger (2005: 123, see above, n.272) in that where Dysinger imputes to Evagrius a distinction between physical health as understood from a Hippocratic perspective and the (spiritual) health of the whole person, I am suggesting that Evagrius equates the latter with true physical health as opposed to the Hippocratic doctors’ false understanding of it.
³⁰³ Dysinger (2005: 122).
and salvation of the *nous*. I say ‘apparent wellbeing’ because I think it unlikely that, given the value that Evagrius assigned to the body, he would have believed it to lack its own form of health, concomitant with that of the soul and *nous*. What is more probable is that he believed true physical health to be the state of the body that accompanies a healthy *epithumētikon*. To have supposed otherwise would have been to suppose the health of the body to be based upon excess and also to be excluded from the health of the person as a whole, neither of which is plausible.\(^{304}\)

As proof that a body maintained on such minimal levels of vital heat could be considered healthy in any meaningful sense, he would have had Athanasius’ description of Antony’s physical condition on emerging from twenty years’ solitude:

\\begin{quote}\\’Εκείνοι μὲν οὖν, ὡς εἶδον, ἔθαμμαζον ἵρόντες αὐτοῦ τὸ τε σῶμα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔξων ἔχον, καὶ μήτε πιανῦν, ὡς ἀγήμαστον, μήτε ἰσχυρῶν ὡς ἀπὸ νηστείαν καὶ μέχρις δαμόνων· τοιοῦτος γὰρ ἦν, οἶνον καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἀναχορήσεως ἤδεισαν αὐτὸν.\\end{quote}

\(^{305}\)

And they, when they saw him, wondered at the sight, for he had the same habit of body as before, and was neither fat, like a man without exercise, nor lean from fasting and striving with the demons, but he was just the same as they had known him before his retirement.

Antony reputedly lived to be over a hundred.\(^{306}\) Closer to home Evagrius had the examples of Makarios of Alexandria, his ‘instructor in asceticism’,\(^{307}\) who became a centenarian\(^{308}\) ‘eating his bread by weight’ and ‘drinking his water by measure’,\(^{309}\) and Makarios the Egyptian, his ‘spiritual father’,\(^{310}\) who lived to around ninety.\(^{311}\) There would have been others too among the ‘old men’ whose constitutions enabled them to live long lives of extreme physical privation. So Evagrius would have had ample reason to believe that

\(^{304}\) Thus it is the profane understanding of physical health that Evagrius has in mind when he says, at *Th.* 6.1, that ‘what is food to a well-conditioned body constitutes a temptation for the noble soul (ὁπεξ γάρ ἐστι τροφὴ εὐδεκτοῦντι σῶματι, τοιῷτο ἐστὶ πειραμᾶς γενναίας ψυχῆς).’

\(^{305}\) VA 14.


\(^{308}\) Cf. Chitty (1977: 208-10).

\(^{309}\) Cf. *Prakt.* 94, quoted below, this section, at n.328.


\(^{311}\) Chitty (1977: 208-10) gives his dates as c.300-c.390.
in principle a healthy soul would find expression in a body that was truly healthy because its health depended on that of the soul:

The body ascends from its nature through the health and strength of the soul.\textsuperscript{312}

To live according to the nature of the body would mean enslavement to its unending appetite for food, in reality the insatiable demand of the vital heat for fuel. But if, through the health of the soul in desiring virtue and its strength in struggling to attain it,\textsuperscript{313} the vital heat were to be regulated, the body would be raised above its own nature\textsuperscript{314} to the acquisition of a health derivative from that of the soul. Only this would truly constitute its health, not that apparent physical health which, taking its lead from the nature of the body, would be predicated upon excess and enslavement to insatiability.\textsuperscript{315} Moreover, I suspect that for Evagrius the restoration of the body, by means of dietary discipline, to ‘an original, natural and uncorrupted state’\textsuperscript{316} would involve the alteration of its krasis, such that, as the epithumétikon was brought under control and its fire cooled, the amount of the ‘thick’ earthy element in the body would be reduced, and the monk’s increasing practice of contemplation would be reflected in an increasingly rarefied physical constitution;\textsuperscript{317} Rubenson notes that Antony, ‘like Origen…thought of ascesis as a matter of refining and transforming the body, ultimately making it less material and more spiri-

\textsuperscript{312} \textit{Gt.Let.} 49.
\textsuperscript{313} Cf. \textit{Prakt.} 86.
\textsuperscript{314} Cf. \textit{Gt.Let.} 47.
\textsuperscript{315} Thus I believe that Dysinger (2005: 122-3) is only partly correct when he rejects the possibility that Evagrius believed the physical changes wrought by rigorous asceticism to have been anything but destructive. While it is true that Evagrius does not claim that the demons who suggest worries such as those described at \textit{Praktikos} 7 ‘are presenting a false picture’; that ‘he vividly anticipates the recriminations which will naturally result when the devout monk compares his own physical state with that which Hippocratic medicine considered to be “in accordance with nature” ’; that he ‘was aware of scepticism concerning the physiological effects of vigorous asceticism, and that he does not claim that the respective philosophies of medicine and monastic ascesis are wholly compatible’, I believe that he recognised an alternative, spiritual index of bodily health whose exemplars were men such as Antony and his own teachers in the desert, Makarios the Alexandrian and Makarios the Egyptian. Therefore, while Dysinger is correct to say that ‘it is not hippocratic theory which guides the monastic superior or the gnostikos’, it does not follow that there is a conflict between ‘physical healing …and the restoration of the whole person to union with God’, only between a profane understanding (and so our understanding!) of physical healing and such restoration. Although the body is eventually superseded, it is not in the meantime excluded from the person’s health.
\textsuperscript{317} That is, a \textit{krasis} beginning to resemble that of the angels’ bodies of \textit{nous} and fire; see above, 1.1.2.
so it is highly likely that Evagrius shared this view and would have seen it as entailing transformation of bodily *krasis*.

The fact that physical health would be achievable only through the acquisition of virtue would mean that any temptation to seek it by means of a direct focus upon the body would be clearly identifiable as demonic. Evagrius would have realised that this sort of physical health was not achievable by everyone, but would have attributed this to the intrinsic weakness of the body, a weakness deriving from its being the most fallen aspect of the person:

"ἐκεῖνα μὲν τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπεύοντα...τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν εἰς τὴν ἐργασίαν προσδείται, ὅπερ δὲ οἶκείαν ἀσθενείαν πρὸς τοὺς πόνους οὐκ ἔπαρκεν."

Those things which heal the *pathētikon* part of the soul require...the body to put them into practice, and the latter because of its weakness is not sufficient for these labours.

Consider now the following:

"Οἱ οὖν τάρκτα κακῶς διατρέφοντες καὶ πρόνοιαν αὐτής εἰς ἐπιθυμίας ποιούμενοι, ἐαυτοὺς μὴ ταύτῃν καταμεμφέσθωσαν ἵσαι γάρ τὴν χάριν τοῦ Δημιουργοῦ οί τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπάθεσαν διὰ τοῦ σώματος τούτου κτησάμενοι καὶ τῇ τῶν ὀντῶν θεωρίᾳ ποσῶς ἐπιβάλλοντες."

Those who in their wickedness nourish the flesh and ‘make provision for it to gratify its desires’ – let them blame themselves and not the flesh. For they know the grace of the Creator, those who have attained *apatheia* of the soul through this body and apply themselves to some extent to the contemplation of beings.

It can now be seen that the injunction against ‘nourishing the flesh’ is not simply making a metaphorical point about valuing the body more than the soul. Rather, it is talking spe-

---

319 Prakt. 49.3-6.
320 On the weakness of the body, cf. Th. 35.9-10.
321 Prakt. 53.
cifically about allowing an excess of vital heat to obtain in the body. It suggests that doing so results not just in a susceptibility to pathos but in a body that is nourished according to a profane understanding, that is nourished beyond the level required to keep it alive; the sort of body, in other words, considered healthy by profane medicine. Putting these together, the implication is that a body which in virtue of its nourishment is considered healthy by profane medicine is, from a spiritual viewpoint, unhealthy because of its susceptibility to pathos. Likewise, the force of the injunction against ‘making provision for [the flesh] to gratify its desires’ can now be appreciated. The desire of the flesh for food is dictated by the natural insatiability of the vital heat, while its other desires are expressions of the excess of vital heat that results from eating in accordance with that desire. So to ‘make provision for it to satisfy its desires’ is to embroil oneself in the futile endeavour to satisfy the insatiable.\textsuperscript{323} It is also to seek the health of the body via the body rather than via the true source of physical health, the soul, and as such a fundamentally flawed undertaking; the quest for an illusion - the apparent health of the body – whose pursuit, again, leads only to the futile bid to satisfy the insatiable. On the other hand, the body has a key role to play in the attainment of apatheia because to reduce the vital heat to the level at which there is no excess to find expression in pathos is to establish a physical foundation for apatheia. This will be reflected in the epithumêtikon’s no longer being directed toward the objects of pathos but instead ‘completely oriented toward the Lord’.\textsuperscript{324}

The disciplining of the epithumêtikon via the body therefore constitutes the first stage of praktikê and the foundation for all subsequent spiritual progress, hence Evagrius’ reference to the human body as a praktikê body.\textsuperscript{325} This has significant consequences for Evagrius’ view of how the body should be treated:

\begin{quote}
’Ο δουλαγωγών σάρκας αὐτοῦ ἀπαθῆς ἔσται, ὁ δὲ ἐκτρέφων αὐτὰς ὀδυνηθήσεται ἐπ’ αὐτὰς.\textsuperscript{326}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{323} And thereby emulate the foolish people in the Myth of the Watercarriers, whose attempts to satisfy the insatiable causes ‘the part of the soul where the appetite are ... the intemperate and insatiable of it’ (Gorg. 493b1-2) to resemble a leaky jar; see above, n.276.
\textsuperscript{324} KG 4.73.
\textsuperscript{325} Cf. KG 3.50; Sch. Ps. 1:5.
\textsuperscript{326} AM 6.
The one who enslaves his flesh, *apathēs* shall he be; the one who feeds it, on account of it will he be pained.

"Ἰππος εὐήληνος, ἐνδείξει σῶμα, καὶ οὐ μή καταβαλεῖ τὸν ἀναβάτην ποτὲ, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐίκει ἀγχόμενος χαλινῷ, καὶ τῇ χειρὶ πεῖθεται τοῦ ἦνιόχου, σῶμα δὲ διαμάζεται ἐν λιμῷ, καὶ ἀγχώπην, καὶ οὐκ ἄποσκιρτά τοῦ ἐπιβατοῦντος λογισμοῦ, οὐδὲ χρεμεῖσαι κινοῦνεν ὑπὸ ὄρμης ἐμπαθοῦς.\(^{327}\)

A docile horse, lean in body, never throws its rider, for being throttled it yields to the bit and obeys the hand of the one holding the reins; the body is subdued with hunger and vigil and does not jump when a *logismos* mounts upon it, nor does it snort when it is moved by an *empathēs* impulse.

Our relationship to the body, then, should be that of a master to his slave or a rider to his horse, and the body itself can be likened to a horse: in its undisciplined state it is volatile, turbulent, unyielding and disobedient. On the other hand, the disciplined body is like a well-trained horse: docile, yielding and obedient. Such a body, lean and subdued, is not easily aroused to *pathos*. Whether or not Evagrius was familiar with the simile of the Charioteer in Plato’s *Phaedrus*, his description of the disciplined body and implied description of the undisciplined one certainly bear some resemblance to its descriptions of the good and bad horses,\(^{328}\) and although he warns of the dangers of excessive asceticism,\(^{329}\) his ‘moderate’ asceticism was not far, in its physical depredations, from the treatment meted out by Plato’s charioteer to the bad horse. In the *Praktikos* he relates the following anecdote:

Παρέβαλον κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν σταθερὰν μεσημβρίαν τῷ ἄγιῳ πατρὶ Μακαρίῳ καὶ λίαι ὑπὸ τῆς δίψης φλεγόμενος ἥτοιν ὕδωρ πείνω· ὁ δὲ φησίν· ἀρκέσθητι τῇ σκιᾷ· πολλοὶ γὰρ τὴν ὑδατορούντες ἢ πλέοντες καὶ ταύτης ἑστέρηνται. Εἶτα λόγους μου πρὸς αὐτὸν περὶ ἐγκρατείας γυμναζόντες· θάρσει, φησίν, ὁ τέκνον, ἐν ὀλοίς ἐτεσίν εἴκοσι οὐτῃ ἄρτῳ, οὐτε ὑδατος, οὐτε ὑπνοι κόρον ἐηθεία· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἄρτον μου ἦσθον σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ ὑδωρ ἐπινο μέτρῳ, τοῖς τοίχοις δὲ ἐμαυτὸν παρακλίνουν μικρὸν τι τοῦ ὑπνοι μέρος ἄφηρπαζον.\(^{330}\)

\(^{327}\) *8Th.* 1.35.

\(^{328}\) *Cf.* *Phdr.* 253d1 ff.

\(^{329}\) *Cf.*, e.g., *Prakt.* 15, 29; *Th.* 35.

\(^{330}\) *Prakt.* 94.
I went to visit the holy father Makarios\textsuperscript{331} at full midday and I asked for water to drink because I was burning with extreme thirst. But he said: Be satisfied with the shade, for many are at this moment travelling or sailing and are without even this. Then as I was discoursing with him about self-control he said: Take courage, my child! For all of twenty years I have not taken my fill of either bread or water or sleep. I ate my bread by weight, drank water by measure, and I have snatched some little portion of sleep by leaning against the wall.

Such a regime accustomed the body to minimal levels of food, water and sleep, and thereby enforced continence upon the \textit{epithumētikon}:

\begin{quote}
'Οπηνικά διαφόρων βρωμάτων ἐφίεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή, τὸ τηνικάθτα ἐν ἄρτῳ στενούσθω καὶ ὑδάτι ἅν' εὐχάριστος γένηται καὶ ἔπ' αὐτῷ ψυλῷ τῷ ψυμῷ' κόρος γὰρ ποικύλων ἐδεσμάτων ἐπιθυμεῖ, λιμὸς δὲ τὸν κόρον τοῦ ἄρτου μακαριότητα εἶναι νομίζει.\textsuperscript{332}
\end{quote}

When our soul yearns for a variety of foods, then let it reduce its ration of bread and water that it may be grateful for even a small morsel. For satiety desires foods of all sorts, while hunger thinks of satiety of bread as beatitude.

The body was to be maintained on a frugal and measly diet (τροφῶν βραχῶν ἀντέχου καὶ ἐκαταφρόνητον)\textsuperscript{333} punctuated by fasts in order to kill the ‘pleasure of \textit{epithumia}’ (ἡδονῆς ἐπιθυμίας).\textsuperscript{334} Evagrius’ own adherence to this advice probably shortened his life considerably. Palladius quotes him as follows:

\begin{quote}
Ἀθ' νῦν θελέαθαν νῦν ζευδαθίνπ ἔχακελ, νῦν ἑηέξνπ ιαράλνπ ηηλὸο ρισξνῦ, νῦθ ὀπώξαο, νῦ ζηαθπι῅ο, νῦ θξε῵λ.\textsuperscript{335}
\end{quote}

From the time that I took to the desert, I have not touched lettuce nor any other green vegetable, nor any fruit, nor grapes, nor meat.\textsuperscript{336}

The \textit{History} continues:

\textsuperscript{332} Prakt. 16.
\textsuperscript{333} Found. 3.
\textsuperscript{334} 8Th. 1.31.
\textsuperscript{335} HL 38.12.
\textsuperscript{336} Trans. Lowther Clarke.
And later, in the sixteenth year of his life without cooked food, his flesh felt a need, owing to the weakness of the stomach, to partake of (something that had been) on the fire; he did not however take bread even now, but having fed on herbs or gruel or pulse for two years, in this regime he died, after communicating in church at Epiphany. Shortly before his death he told us:

‗For three years I have not been troubled by fleshly desire, after so long a life and toil and labour and ceaseless prayer.‘

This discussion of the body can now be summarised as follows: for Evagrius the purpose of the human body is to be devoted to asceticism, hence he refers to it as a *praktikê* body. It is like a horse that must be ‘subdued with hunger and vigil’ to render it docile. The root physiological cause of the unruliness which otherwise characterises it is the inherent insatiability of the element of fire, which in the form of the vital heat continues to seek fuel even when it has sufficient to keep the body alive. It is this continual, insatiable quest of the vital heat to augment itself that we experience as the appetite for food over and above what is necessary to the body’s survival. The excess of vital heat that results from gratifying that appetite finds expression in the unstable movements of the soul that are the *pathē*, movements whose instability reflect that of fire itself. True physical health derives from a healthy soul and is characterised by the body’s having no excess of vital heat. Thus the first step toward healing the soul of *pathos* is to resist succumbing to the body’s appetite for food, instead restricting intake of food to the amount needed to maintain the vital heat at the level necessary to keep the body alive. The consequence of this understanding of the body is that any appetite for food over and above this subsistence level counts as *pathos*. Concomitantly, *apatheia* will include freedom from any such appetite.

---

337 HL 38.13.
338 Lowther Clarke notes that Palladius was present at Evagrius’ death, at Kellia in 399 or 400, and that while there are variants to the text at this point, ἄμιν is ‘reasonably well attested’.
339 Trans. Lowther Clarke.
1.2.4 The heart

Another anthropological term of which Evagrius makes frequent use is ‘heart’. The meaning of this term, both in general and in Evagrius, is much harder to pin down than that of either nous or ‘soul’. Evagrius defines it in two places. Commenting on Prov. 25:26, he includes ‘heart’ among the ‘many names that Scripture applies to the soul and her noēmata’ (πολλὰ...ονόματα τίθησιν ἢ γραφὴ κατὰ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῶν νοημάτων αὐτῆς), and commenting on Ps. 15:9 he notes that ‘it is a habit of the divine Scripture to say “heart” in place of nous’ (ἔζνο γὰρ τῇ θείᾳ Γραφῇ ἀντὶ τοῦ νοοῦ τῆς καρδίας λαμβάνειν). The fact that ‘soul’ and nous are not synonymous for him suggests that ‘heart’ must mean something distinct from either yet common to both. To get a sense of what that might be it would be instructive to look briefly at the use of the word in classical and biblical tradition.

Raasch notes that although the metaphorical use of the word ‘heart’ (kardia) is rare in classical Greek, ‘the theoretical importance assigned to the heart by the Stoics and by a school of Greek medicine…while not reflected in the ordinary use of language, had some influence on the monastic concept of purity of heart.’ For the Stoics the heart is the seat of the ruling faculty of the soul, the hēgemonikon (a term sometimes used by Evagrius to denote the nous) and as such the spiritual centre of the human being, and they developed a notion of ‘custody of the heart’ by means of which the soul might attain apatheia that was ‘strikingly similar to the monastic concept’. Evagrius would certainly have been familiar with this aspect of Stoic thought, but it clear from the way he uses the word ‘heart’ that his primary influence was the Bible. Raasch summarises biblical tradition regarding the heart as follows:

---

340 According to the TLG and including the Epistula Fidei, there are two hundred and twenty occurrences of the word ‘heart’ in Evagrius’ Greek corpus.
342 Sch. 1 on Ps. 15:9.
343 Cf. Raasch (1966: 9). She does not name the school of medicine but describes it as having arisen in Sicily in the third century BC and, like the Stoics, locating the soul’s ruling faculty in the heart.
344 Raasch (1966: 10) describes this ‘custody of the heart’ as consisting in ‘carefully scrutinising each phantasia or ennoia before accepting it and in combating false thoughts and imaginings by sound thinking and reflection’.
345 Raasch (1966: 10).
‘With closest custody guard your heart’, warns the Wise Man, ‘for in it are the sources of life’ (Prov. 4:23). [The heart] was not only, as for us, the centre of the emotions, which were said to arise from the bowels, kidneys, or liver as well, but also of the will. It was the source of direction: ‘The heart of a man disposes his way…’ (Prov. 16:9). Primarily and especially, it was the source of the mental activities of thinking, planning and remembering, which God alone can see. It was, in fact, “the source of the whole personal life, in which thought, volition, feelings merge as one”; the centre of personal life, and also of the interior life, the inner man.346

Purity of heart thus symbolised moral purity; interior cleanliness as opposed to the mere absence of ritual or legal defilement. Raasch notes that ‘it was especially the mission of the prophets to call for [this] deeper notion of purity’;347 so, for example, Jeremiah: ‘Cleanse your heart of evil, O Jerusalem, that you may be saved.’348

It is this idea of the heart as the inner self that Jesus invokes when, in response to Pharisaic questioning as to why his disciples failed to observe the tradition of washing their hands before eating, he declares that it is not what goes into a person’s mouth that defiles him, but what comes out of his heart:

ἐθ γὰξ η῅ο θαξδίαο ἐμέξρνληαη δηαινγηζκνὶ πνλεξνί, θόλνη, κνηρεῖαη, πνξλεῖαη, θινπαί, ςεπδνκαξηπξίαη, βιαζθεκίαη…349

for out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murder, adultery, fornication, theft, false witness, blasphemies...

By thus disregarding the laws of ritual cleanliness in favour of purity of heart Jesus goes even further than the prophets in the importance he attaches to the latter;350 ‘blessed’, he declares, ‘are the pure in heart, for they will see God (μακάριοι οἱ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τὸν θεὸν ὄψονται).’351

---

346 Raasch (1966: 13).
347 Raasch (1966: 12).
348 Jer. 4:14; cf. Raasch, ibid.
351 Matth. 5:8.
Jesus characterises impurity of the heart in terms of evil thoughts [dia]logismoi, and the association of the logismoi with the heart is a recurrent theme in Evagrius. For example, he speaks of a battle of logismoi in your heart (μάχην λογισμών ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου) \(^{352}\) and of ‘the sons and daughters born in the heart, that is, logismoi and desires of the flesh (τῶν ἐν καρδίᾳ αὐτῶν γεννομένων υἱῶν καὶ θυγατέρων, τούτεστι σαρκικῶν λογισμῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν)\(^{353}\) since the demons are the ultimate source of the logismoi, \(^{354}\) the latter should be understood as referring to secondary logismoi that we devise on the basis of initial ones suggested by them. Again, Evagrius warns that ‘logismoi trouble the hearts of the negligent (ἀμελοῦντος δὲ καρδίαν ἐκταράσσουσι λογισμοί)\(^{355}\) here we can see an allusion to the connection between the cosmic Fall and particular falls into pathos. An example of such negligence would be eating to satiety - ‘fornication is a conception of gluttony, that which softens the heart in advance (πορνεία, λαμαργίας κόμη, προμαλακτήρ καρδίας)\(^{356}\) – as would any relaxation of vigilance.\(^{357}\)

tὸ δὲ τῆς ἐγκρατείας χαυνωθέντι κολακείᾳ ἠδονῶν τὸ κατ’ ὀλίγον ἐπιβουλεῖ [ὁ τῆς ἀσελγείας δαίμων] συνομίλειν τῇ καρδίᾳ, ήν’ ἐξαφθείσα ταῖς κακίαις διαλογικὲς ἄχμαλωτισθῇ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀμαρτίας μύσος εἰς πέρας ἀγάγῃ.\(^{358}\)

little by little the [demon of lust] plots against the person who has relaxed his vigilance due to the flattery of pleasures, in order to become the familiar of his heart, so that once ignited by converse with vice it may be captured and its hatred of sin come to an end.

In some of these cases the word nous or ‘soul’ could be substituted for ‘heart’; for example either could be said to be the arena in which the ‘warfare in thought’\(^{359}\) is waged, and Evagrius states several times that logismoi arise from the pathētikon part of the soul.\(^{360}\) Again, one could coherently speak of the demons troubling the nous or soul of the negligent person, and of the nous or soul having a hatred for sin. But such a substitu-

---

352 Eul. 5.5.
353 Found. 1. Cf. AM 59: ‘Do not fail to kill the offspring of serpents, and you will not go into labour with the logismoi of their heart.’
354 See below, 2.1.
355 AM 37.
356 Vices 2.
357 See below, 3.4.
358 Eul. 21.22.
359 Cf. Prakt. 48.
360 See below, 2.1.4.1, 2.2.4.
tion would change the sense of what Evagrius is saying, making it more impersonal, less intimate. In other cases substitution would be less coherent – it does not really make sense to speak of the *nous* or soul being softened and thereby rendered vulnerable to vice, or of the demons seeking familiarity with the *nous* or soul. Again, when Evagrius describes sadness as ‘a worm in the heart (σκόληξ ἐστι καρδίας λύπη)’ or declares that ‘the *logismoi* of the irascible person…consume the heart that gave them birth (λογισμοὶ θυμόδους …κατεσθίουσι τὴν τεκούσαν καρδίαν)’ or that ‘temptations test the heart of a monk (καρδίαν μοναξοῦ ἐνκαλοῦσαν πειρασμοῖ)’, it is clearly not simply the *nous* or soul that is being referred to. Rather, in all these cases the referent of ‘heart’ is the person’s deepest sense of herself as a person, as ‘me’. It is this inner self that is purified by ‘αναχώρησις in love’ (ἀναχώρησις ἐν ἀγάπῃ καθαίρει καρδίαν); that in the holy, will be filled with knowledge (καρδία τε ὁσίων πληρωθήσεται γνώσεωι); that is adorned by knowledge of God (κόσμος…καρδίας γνώσις θεοῦ) and that, when gentle, is a resting place for wisdom (ἐν καρδίᾳ πραιὰ ἀναπαύσεται σοφία). The idea of keeping watch over one’s heart has an especially direct and personal feel to it. Again, it would make no sense to speak of the *nous* or soul being expanded by contemplations; yet when Evagrius says that ‘contemplations of the world expand the heart; the *logoi* of providence and judgement exalt it (κόσμον θεωρίᾳ πλατύνουσι καρδίαν, λόγοι δὲ προνοίας καὶ κρίσεως ὑψοῦσιν αὐτήν)’ we can understand that it is the person himself, his inner being, that is transformed and uplifted.

These examples give some indication of the meaning and scope of the word ‘heart’ for Evagrius. Driscoll notes that while Evagrius ‘philosophical framework allows him to penetrate the biblical text more deeply…the biblical language is itself decisive, enabling

---

361 *8Th.* 5.3.
362 *8Th.* 4.16.
363 *AM* 60.
364 *AM* 8.
365 *AM* 24.
366 *AM* 27.
367 *AM* 31.
369 *AM* 135.
him to make connections and shape insights that would not be possible to him if left to the philosophical tradition alone.’ He continues,

[Evagrius] does not use [the word ‘heart’] as a simple biblical code word for one or another part of the soul, as this is conceived by Greek philosophy. Instead, we shall find him using it across all three parts and beyond. With this term he is able to show the dynamic and inextricable interconnections that exist between the various dimensions of the inner life...[It allows him] to move fluidly across various dimensions of the inner life. With it he sometimes refers to [the epithumëtikon and thumos], at other times to all three parts [of the soul], then to one part only, but also to the mind, or the mind as it is united with the soul. Heart is certainly the object of purification in the work of praktikê, but it is also the instrument of contemplation.

The word ‘heart’ allows Evagrius to show the interconnections between, and to ‘move fluidly across the various dimensions of the human life’ because for him the heart is not simply the seat of the soul’s ruling faculty; it is, rather, ‘the centre of the personal life and of the interior life’; that which the person feels to be ‘me’, and it is this sense of ‘me’ that constitutes those interconnections and unites those dimensions. When he

---

371 Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999: 157). We must, however, be careful in our understanding of this distinction between ‘philosophical’ and ‘biblical’ language. It is certainly the case that they comprise two different idioms. Driscoll further explains (1999: 145-6): ‘When the language is taken from the philosophical tradition, it allows for a clear and precise articulation of the various dimensions of the spiritual journey. In Evagrius and most others who function in similar theological traditions, this philosophical language does not contaminate the Christian content but makes it possible to think about it more profoundly. Thus, the distinction of the rational, irascible, and concupiscible parts of the soul, together with apatheia as a term describing health in the latter two parts, all enable a clear understanding of particular issues that must be dealt with in order to reach the ultimate goal of contemplative knowledge of the Holy Trinity.’ But while there is a real and substantive difference in idiom between philosophical and biblical tradition we should beware of regarding the two discourses as essentially different in kind since to do so would be anachronistic. On the one hand, Greek philosophy had, ever since Plato, tended to acquire a theological hue, whether in the form of Platonism itself, Aristotle’s ‘first philosophy’ or the Zeus of the Stoics; even the Epicureans, despite their notoriety as atheists among both pagans and Christians, accepted the existence of the gods - and, as Bob Sharples has reminded me, regarded them as examples to us of the best form of (tranquil) life - merely denying their interest in or relevance to human affairs; only in Scepticism is the element of philosophical religion absent. On the other hand, there was by Evagrius’ time a well-established tradition of regarding Christianity as the ‘true philosophy’. Thus Driscoll (1999: 15) notes that the naturalness with which Evagrius moves from ‘what may first seem a more philosophical term, “mind” (νοῦς) to what may seem the more biblical term, “heart”...only shows that the sharp distinction between philosophical and biblical is not made by Evagrius. It tends to be more our problem, not that of these ancients.’ Cf. Jaeger (1961: 31); also, e.g., Long (1986: 100-101); Dihle (1994: 278); Sharples (1996: 56); Clement, Strom. 1.1.1.2; Ruether (1969: 169). Ruether notes, ibid., n.1, that the designation of the Christian as the ‘true philosopher’ is first found in Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, 8.
speaks of the *nous* or ‘soul’ he is discussing the human person objectively, as one rational being among others, but when he speaks of the ‘heart’ he is referring to, and addressing himself to, the person in terms of their subjectivity; their inner sense of selfhood. In doing so he is evoking that special intimacy upon which the force of Christ being *kardiognōstēs*³⁷² relies, as also that of the injunction to keep watch over the heart. The *nous* is the metaphysical core of personhood; the heart its phenomenological core.

Two final points remain to be noted. First, as Guillaumont point out, Evagrius is mindful of stylistic issues when he writes. In particular, when, as is often the case, he uses parallelism, he tends to employ the rhetorical device of *variatio* whereby repetition of a word is avoided by replacing its second occurrence with a synonym.³⁷³ Some of his uses of ‘heart’ certainly seem to fall into this category.³⁷⁴ However, I think he is too aware of linguistic subtlety to regard apparent synonyms as no more than that, and that instead he would see such occasions as opportunities to reinforce or otherwise inflect his meaning. Second, at least some of Evagrius’ uses of ‘heart’ are clearly intended to call to mind specific scriptural passages; thus for example Driscoll shows how *Ad Monachos* 31, which begins, ‘In the gentle heart, wisdom will rest’, draws for both its vocabulary and the idea it expresses upon Jesus’ words at Matt. 11:28-29.³⁷⁵ This Christological reference is, accordingly, part of the proverb’s intended meaning: ‘The monk will learn to have a gentle heart by learning from the Lord.’³⁷⁶

### 1.2.5 Summary

The human estate is intermediate between the angelic and the demonic. The health of the human soul and the natural condition for human beings is *apatheia*, the means to achieving which is *praktikē*, asceticism.

³⁷² Cf. Acts 1:24, 15:8; Th. 37.2-3; AM 104; also *Prakt*. 47.
³⁷³ Cf. Guillaumont (1970: 436). He is referring specifically to the *Praktikos*, but his remarks apply equally to many of Evagrius’ writings.
³⁷⁴ E.g. *AM* 31, 44.
³⁷⁵ Cf. Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999: 150); see below, 3.2, for discussion of this aphorism.
Like the other rational beings, the human being is in reality a triune nous, fragmented as a result of the Fall into nous, soul and body. The soul is in turn tripartite, comprising logistikon, thumos and epithumētikon. The latter predominates in humans. Strictly speaking the word nous encompasses the human being in her entirety, but in practice Evagrius also uses it as a synonym for logistikon.

Central to Evagrius’ anthropology is the idea of the nous as subject to change in both epistemic and metaphysical terms. The image of God consists in the receptivity of the nous to knowledge of God, but the nous is also receptive to objects of contemplation and of the senses. In addition, its power of self-determination is a form of receptivity, and it was this, in the form of receptivity to that which is other than God, that occasioned the primordial movement and Fall. The epistemic receptivity of the nous is reflected in metaphysical passibility in virtue of which the nous is changed by whatever it receives. In relation to God this means a return to its true nature of simplicity, incorporeality and stillness, and in relation to contemplation, progress toward these. In relation to sense-perception, it means the imprinting of the nous by the noēmata it receives. However, such imprinting is agent-dependent, only taking place if cognition is of the objects qua sensibles; if instead the focus of the nous is upon their logoi or spiritual significance then the noēmata concerned will not imprint the nous; Evagrius refers to this as ‘spiritual sensation’. The metaphysical changeability of the nous is rooted in its power of self-determination in that a choice or decision is a movement of the nous. This movement can be either stable or unstable; if it is stable it is toward God and tends ultimately toward stillness; if unstable it is away from God and tends to ever-increasing instability. Corporeal creation contains, but does not eliminate, the instability of the nous, which the human being experiences as empatheia. Apatheia is the stabilisation of the nous that enables contemplation and thereby the transformations of the nous (including both soul and body) whereby it re-ascends to God.

The true nature of the nous is to be without form, matter or movement, a condition realised only in union with God. A nous thus naked is ‘the place of God.’ The nous has a light associated with it which becomes visible upon attainment of apatheia.
Just as the term *nous* can refer either to the person in her entirety or to the rational part of the soul, so the word ‘soul’ can refer either to the fallen entity in its entirety or to its *pathētikon* part alone. The nature of the three parts of the soul is best understood by reference to the virtues that define its healthy state. Evagrius recognises both practical and contemplative virtues, the former constitutive of *apatheia*, the latter its fruit. At the practical level the healthy condition of the soul can be summarised as the *epithumētikon* longing for virtue, the *thumos* struggling on behalf of the soul and the *logistikon* managing practical affairs so as to facilitate contemplation and perceiving the contemplation of beings, and at the contemplative level, as the *epithumētikon* being completely oriented toward God, the *thumos* humble in memory of him and the *logistikon* always attending to him.

In humans the body, the most fallen part of the *nous*, is constituted primarily of earth, and the part of the soul most closely associated with it is the *epithumētikon*. The body is valuable and good, but its value is purely instrumental: it is necessary for certain sorts of contemplation, can serve as a refuge from troubling spiritual phenomena and is essential to the process of healing the soul of its vulnerability to *pathos*.

The necessity of the body to the attainment of *apatheia* is due to the fact that *pathos* has a physiological basis in an excess of vital heat. Such excess is the result of the *epithumētikon* being unhealthy since in this case its desires, including the appetite for food, the source of the vital heat, are insatiable. If the *epithumētikon* is healthy then, since it is directed toward virtue, its desires are not insatiable and it does not crave more food than that needed to maintain just enough vital heat to keep the body alive.

A body maintained on such minimal levels of vital heat would not be considered healthy in Hippocratic terms but I have argued that Evagrius recognised two indices of bodily health, one profane and the other spiritual, with the latter representing the true health of the body and involving the refinement of the body’s *krasis*. In spiritual terms the health of the body depends upon that of the soul, meaning that physical health can only be achieved through the pursuit of virtue, and its ‘own’ desires – that is, those of the unhealthy *epithumētikon* – are to be disregarded. Consequently the body must be subjected
to rigorous discipline and ‘subdued by hunger and vigil’, and *apatheia* will include freedom from any desire for food over and above that needed to keep the body alive.

Evagrius’ use of the word ‘heart’ is biblical rather than Greek in its inspiration. The heart is the centre of the personal life and of the interior life; it is the person’s sense of themselves as a ‘me’. As such it is not identical with the *nous* or with any part of the soul but can refer to any of these since, as the person’s deepest sense of themselves, it both moves across and unites the various dimensions of the inner life. It is both the object of purification and the instrument of contemplation. It is the phenomenological core of personhood as opposed to the metaphysical core.
Chapter 2

Empatheia

The focus of this chapter is upon the psychology and phenomenology of *empatheia*, the sickly condition of the soul which, according to Evagrius, is our lot until, by means of *askēsis*, we restore it to *apatheia*, its health and our natural state. In the *Praktikos* he asserts a direct connection between *pathos* and the *logismoi* in that it is through allowing a *logismos* to linger that *pathos* is aroused. Accordingly this chapter looks at both, starting with the *logismoi*. It concludes with a description of *empatheia* as it is experienced.

### 2.1 The *logismoi*

The human being is a fallen *nous* and the human state a temporary one, ultimately to be superseded by a return to the union with God which was the first condition of the *logikoi*. The return is via a contemplative ascent whose foundation is *apatheia*, which, constituted by the practical virtues,¹ is cultivated by exercising our self-determination in favour of virtue.

The primary domain of moral choice differs according to whether a person is a secular or a monk. For secular people it is the external world, their moral choices being exercised above all in relation to things and circumstances outside of themselves. Evagrius refers to these as *pragmata*, ‘objects’. The external focus of such people’s moral choice reflects that of their attention and both are signs of their relative immersion in the external world and, correspondingly, in the thickness of corporeality. In the case of monks, however, the emphasis has shifted to the internal, a shift both initiated and marked symbolically by their renunciation of the world. Consequently their moral choices are exercised primarily in relation not to things outside of themselves but to the contents of their own minds; in particular, what Evagrius calls the *logismoi*:

---

¹ Cf. Sch. 293 on Prov. 24:31.
The demons war with seculars more through objects, but with monks they do so especially through *logismoi*, for they are deprived of objects because of the solitude. Further, to the extent that it is easier to sin *kata dianoian* than in action, so is the warfare *kata dianoian* more difficult than that which is conducted through objects. For the *nous* is a thing easily set in motion and difficult to check in its tendency towards unlawful fantasies.

The monk seeking *apatheia* must bring the unruly *nous* that is his true essence under control, and this means mastering his responses to the *logismoi*.

The idea that evil thoughts are deployed by the demons against monks did not originate with Evagrius. It is to be found in the *Vita Antonii*:

When [the demons] see all Christians, but especially monks, labouring diligently and making progress, first they attack them and tempt them, placing stumbling blocks in their path, and their snares are the evil *logismoi*.

The devil, seeking to entice Antony away from his *askēsis*, suggests impure (*ῥυθαροῦς*) *logismoi* to him, and accordingly Antony enjoins his disciples above all to guard (*φυλάττειν*; *τηρεῖν*) themselves or their soul against such *logismoi*. Although in

---

2 *Prakt*. 48.
3 See above, 1.2.1.3.
4 VA 23; Guillaumont (1971: 57).
5 Trans. mine.
6 VA 5.
7 VA 20; 55, 89.
8 VA 55.
9 VA 20, 55.
10 VA 89.
these examples the word logismos is qualified by an adjective making explicit its pejorative sense, it also appears five times in the Vita with pejorative sense but minus adjective.\textsuperscript{11}

Evagrius’ understanding of the logismoi concurs with that of the Vita, with which he was certainly familiar, and also with that of Origen,\textsuperscript{12} for whom

Πηγὴ οὖν καὶ ἁρχὴ πάσης ἁμαρτίας διάλογησμοί ποιηροί: μὴ γὰρ ἐπικρατησάντων τούτων, οὐτε φόνοι οὐτε μοιχεῖς οὐτ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἔσονται...τὸ πηγὴν εἶναι πάντων τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων τοὺς ποιηροὺς διάλογησιμούς, δυναμένους μολὼν καὶ τά, εἰ χωρὶς αὐτῶν πράττοιτο, δικαιώσαντα ἄν τὸν ποιήσαντα.\textsuperscript{13}

The spring and source, then, of every sin are evil thoughts; for, unless these gained the mastery, neither murders nor adulteries nor any other such thing would exist...Evil thoughts are the spring of all sins, and can pollute even those actions which, if they were done apart from evil thoughts, would have justified the man who did them.\textsuperscript{14}

However, despite the moral and spiritual significance that both Origen and the Vita assign to evil thoughts, it is Evagrius who undertakes the first systematic treatment of the subject.

2.1.1 What is a logismos?

For Evagrius, the demons suggest logismoi to the monks in the hope of inciting them to sin kata dianoian. The word logismos means ‘thought’, ‘reasoning’ or ‘calculation’. In the Septuagint and New Testament, however, it is used in a broader sense, as is its cognate dialogismos:

\textsuperscript{11} Cf. VA 5, 6, 23, 87, 88; Guillaumont (1971: 58). The idea of evil thoughts that beset the monk is also to be found in the Life of Pachomius; cf., e.g., The Bohairic Life of Pachomius 91, 94, 101.

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 58). However, since many of Origen’s writings survive only in Rufinus’ Latin translation, there is no way of knowing whether any particular instance of the noun cogitatio translates διάλογησιμός, λογισμός or some other term.

\textsuperscript{13} C.Matt. 11:15.12-51.

\textsuperscript{14} See below, 3.4.7, for the latter theme in Evagrius.
‘To think (hashab) is to devise, to conceive, to bring something into being in the heart’.\textsuperscript{15} Although there is a conceptual element in the biblical use of the word ‘thoughts’, the term includes the meaning of impulses, dispositions and plans as well.\textsuperscript{16}

As we shall see, Evagrius’ use of the word logismos belongs, in virtue of the breadth of meaning with which he endows it, to biblical rather than Greek tradition.

Strictly speaking, logismoi can, for Evagrius, include within their scope thoughts of angelic and human provenance as well as those that come from demons. In this he takes up a theme from Origen’s De Principiis:

We find that the ‘thoughts which proceed out of the heart’ (‘cognitiones’, quae ‘de corde nostro procedunt’),\textsuperscript{17} whether they are a memory of deeds we have done or a contemplation of any things or causes whatsoever, proceed sometimes from ourselves, sometimes are aroused by the opposing powers, and occasionally also are implanted in us by God or the holy angels.\textsuperscript{18}

In Chapter 8 of On Thoughts Evagrius describes the three types of logismos:

\begin{verbatim}
Τὸν λογισμὸν τῶν ἀγγελικῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν ἐκ δαιμόνων, ταῦτην τὴν διαφορὰν μετὰ πολλῆς τῆς παρατηρήσεως ἐγνώκαμεν εἶναι, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ ἀγγελικὸς τὰς φύσεις τῶν πραγμάτων περιεργάζεται καὶ τοὺς πνευματικοὺς αὐτῶν ἑξευχαίρισος λόγους, οἶον· τίνος χάριν γεγένηται ὁ χρυσός καὶ διὰ τὶ σαμμαθώς κάτω που τοὺς μορίους τῆς γῆς ἐγκατέσταται καὶ μετὰ πολλοῦ καμάτου καὶ πόνου εὑρίσκεται· πάς δὲ εὐρεθεὶς οὔδατι πλῦνεται καὶ πυρὶ παραδίδοται καὶ οὕτως εἰς τεχνιτῶν ἐμβάλλεται χεῖρας τῶν ποιοῦντων τῆς σκηνῆς τῆς λογίας καὶ τὸ θυματήριον καὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς φιάλας, ἐν αἰῶνα οὕκετι νῦν πίνει διὰ τὴν χάριν τοῦ σωτήρος ἡμῶν ὁ Βαβυλλόνιος βασιλεὺς, Κλεοπάτρα δὲ <ὁ> φέρει καρδίαν καιομένην ύπὸ τοῦτον τῶν μυστηρίων. Ὁ δὲ δαιμονιώδης λογισμὸς ταῦτα οὕτε οἴδαν οὔτε ἐπισταταί· μόνην δὲ τὴν κτίσιν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ χρυσόν ἀναιδῶς ὑποβάλλει καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦτον τρυφήν τε καὶ δόξαν ἑσομένην προλέγει. Ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπινος λογισμὸς οὐδὲ τὴν κτίσιν ἐπιζήτητε οὐδὲ τίνος ἐστὶ περιεργάζεται σύμβολον ὁ χρυσὸς, ἀλλὰ μόνον εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ χρυσοῦ τὴν μορφήν εἰσφέρει ψυλῆν, πάθους πλεονεξίας κεχωρισμένην. Ὁ δὲ
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{16} Raasch (1966: 14).
\textsuperscript{17} Cf. Matt. 15:19; Mark 7:21.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{DP} 3:2.4 (R).
After lengthy observation we have learned to recognize the difference between angelic and human logismoi, and those that come from the demons. Firstly, angelic [logismoi] are concerned with the investigation of the natures of things and search out their spiritual principles. For example, the reason why gold was made and why it is sand-like and scattered through the lower regions of the earth, and is discovered with much labour and toil; how when it is discovered it is washed and delivered to the fire and then placed in the hands of the artisans who make the lampstand of the tabernacle, the incense burner, the censers and the vessels\(^{19}\) from which by the grace of the Saviour the king of Babylon no longer drinks,\(^{20}\) but it is Cleopas who brings a heart burning with these mysteries.\(^{21}\) The demonic logismos neither knows nor understands these things, but without shame it suggests only the acquisition of sensible gold and predicts the enjoyment and esteem that will come from this. The human logismos neither seeks the acquisition of gold nor is concerned with investigating what gold symbolises; rather, it merely introduces in the intellect the simple form of gold separate from any pathos of greed. The same principle can be applied to other matters by mystically engaging the exercise of this rule.

Whereas Origen clearly states that some thoughts are implanted in us by angels, Evagrius speaks simply of ‘angelic logismoi’, a formulation which in view of his understanding of contemplative ascent could be understood as denoting not just thoughts inspired by angels but also thoughts characteristic of angels but enjoyed by humans. There can be no doubt that the latter denotation is intended, but is the former? It is: some thoughts, he tells us, are inspired in us (ἡμῖν ἐμβαλλομένοις) by angels,\(^{22}\) and angels fill us with spiritual contemplation (πνευματικῆς θεωρίας ἡμᾶς πληροῦσιν).\(^{23}\) So the train of thought regarding the spiritual significance of gold might arise in a person’s nous in virtue of their success in the practice of contemplation or it might be inspired by an angel. In its details we see an example of the type of contemplation which, taking its starting point from the cognition, via the physical body, of sensible objects, investigates the logoi of those objects; an example, that is, of how to read the ‘letter from God’ that

---

\(^{22}\) Prakt. 80.
\(^{23}\) Prakt. 76.
is corporeal creation. In addition, this investigation of the spiritual significance of gold has, for Evagrius, a further, more profound level of meaning, as Sinkewicz notes:

The gold scattered through the earth and subsequently rediscovered, refined, and refashioned for a holy purpose is for Evagrius a symbol of the fall of the intellects from the realm of the pre-existence and their dispersal through different worlds along with their joining to souls and bodies; subsequently, by the practice of the virtues, they are purified and delivered from the captivity of the devil (‘the king of Babylon’), ultimately regaining spiritual knowledge and restoration to their original state.  

When gold is thought about in this way, its noêma will not imprint the nous, and so although this contemplation is rooted in the body as ‘the organon that shows (the nous) sensible things’, it ascends from the corporeal to the intelligible and so brings the nous closer to God.

By contrast, the logismos which comes from the demons sees only the sensible gold and its worldly significance. Failing to look beyond these to what gold symbolises in spiritual terms and thereby to use the noêma of sensible gold as a stepping-stone to the acquisition of wisdom, such logismoi instead arouse pathê associated with that worldly significance, such as the desire to acquire gold and to enjoy the goods and esteem afforded by its possession. Because the nous is focused upon the sensible gold, it is imprinted by their noêmata. And, as we shall see, the aroused pathê then ‘bind’ the nous to these and associated noêmata, leading the nous to become increasingly fixated upon their objects, which in turn exacerbates the pathê. In this way demonic logismoi embroil the nous in a vicious circle of immersion in the sensible world.

While the angelic logismos elevates the nous from the sensible to the intelligible and the demonic logismos immerses it in the sensible, the human logismos is characterised by neutrality: it involves no pathos in relation to the gold but nor does it look beyond it for its spiritual significance. This neutrality reflects the position of humans, situated be-

---

25 See above, 1.2.1.1.
26 KG 4.62. Cf. KG 2.61: ‘The contemplation of the incorporeals which we knew in the beginning without matter, we now know linked to matter, but that which concerns bodies we have never seen without bodies.’
tween the angels and the demons. It is noteworthy that although the human constitution has a predominance of epithumia, Evagrius considers logismoi involving a desire for gold to be of demonic rather than human origin. This suggests that he identifies the truly human not with our pathological state but with our healthy state - that is, apatheia. This is confirmed in the Chapters of the Disciples, which states directly that the human logismos is apathês. Being apathês, it is the starting point for the cultivation of angelic logismoi.

For Evagrius, then, logismoi can in principle come to us from the angels, from ourselves or from the demons. However, he most often uses the term in the latter sense such that, as Guillaumont notes, even in the absence of any qualifying adjective such as πνευμός or δαμονιώδης, the word logismos itself suffices to denote an evil thought. And what is distinctive of such thoughts is that, as Chapter 8 of On Thoughts makes plain ‘[they present] reality to us simply in terms of its desirability in order to gain pleasure or power’, thereby absorbing the actual world ‘into the self’s desire for pleasure or control’ and leading us to see and relate to the material world and other people solely in terms of our own narrowly-understood self-interest.

Evagrius offers three definitions of logismos. The first two are almost identical:

Definition 1:

Λογισμὸς γὰρ δαμονιώδης ἦστιν εἴκων τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἀνθρώπου συνισταμένη κατὰ διάνοιαν, ἀτελής, μεθ’ ἡς ὁ νοῦς κινούμενος ἐμπαθῶς λέγει τι ἣ πράττει ἀνόμως ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ πρός τὸ μορφουμένον ἐκ διαδοχῆς εἰδωλόν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ.

27 Cf. Disc. 140.1; also Disc. 139: ‘All the things that the nous thinks by itself (ὅσα ἄφ’ ἑαυτοῦ λογιζεταλ ὁ νοῦς) are called apathê; all those that it thinks when it is being troubled by the body (ἐν συνέλοιμον ὀκτοὶ σώματος) are called empathê in respect of the nous (ὅς πρὸς τὸν νοῦν), and all those that do not contribute to the sustasis of the body (ὅσα δὲ μὴ συντελούνται πρὸς σῶματι τοῦ σώματος) are called empathê and vices of the nous, in which the demons are sometimes also involved (ἐσθ’ ὅτε καὶ προσπιθεμένον τῶν δαμιόνων).’

28 Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 56). He notes (1971: 57-8) that the pejorative use of the word logismos to denote thoughts suggested by demons is already to be found in the Vita Antonii; Cf. VA 5, Migne PG 26, 848A; 6, 849A; 23, 877B; 87, 88, 965B.

29 Williams, R, ‘‘Tempted as we are’: Christology and the Analysis of the Passion’, p.4.

30 Ibid., p.5.

31 Th. 25.52-6.
Demonic logismos is an image of the sensible person constituted kata dianoian, incomplete, with which the nous, moved by pathos, speaks or acts unlawfully in secret with regard to the phantoms it forms in turn.

Definition 2:

Λογισμὸς δαμονιώδης ἐστὶν εἰκὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἀνθρώπου, συνισταμένη κατὰ διάνοιαν, μεθ’ ἡς ὁ νοῦς κινοῦμενος ἐμπαθῶς, λέγει τι ἢ πραττεῖ ἀνόμως, ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ, πρὸς τὸ παρεμπεσὸν εἰδωλὸν ἐκ διαδοχῆς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ.32

Demonic logismos is an image of the sensible person constituted kata dianoian, with which the nous, moved by pathos, speaks or acts unlawfully, in secret, with regard to the idol that has in turn crept in.

The differences between Definitions 1 and 2 are of emphasis rather than substance. Definition 1 appears in Chapter 25 of On Thoughts, at the end of an extended discussion of the psychological processes involved in the experience of the logismoi. Evagrius explains how the nous receives noēmata of sensible objects, then continues:

Ὥσπερ οὖν πάντων ὁ νοῦς τῶν αἰσθητῶν πραγμάτων δέχεται τὰ νοήματα, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἱδίου ὄργανον - αἰσθητὸν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο - χωρὶς δὲ πάντως τῆς ὄψεως· ταύτην γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ μορφώσας ἄδυνατεῖ, μηδέποτε θεασάμενος. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτου λοιπὸν ἐνδὸν τοῦ σχήματος ὁ νοῦς ἠμῶν πάντα πράττει καὶ καθέκτει καὶ βαδίζει καὶ δίδωσι καὶ λαμβάνει κατὰ διάνοιαν· καὶ ταύτα ποιεῖ καὶ λέγει ὅσα καὶ βούλεται τά τάχει τῶν νοημάτων, ποτὲ μὲν τοῦ ἱδίου σῶματος ἀναλαμβάνει τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν χείρα ἐκτείνον ἐπὶ τὸ δέξασθαι τι τῶν διδομένων, ποτὲ δὲ τοῦτ’ ἀποβαλὼν τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν τοῦ πλησίον ἐν τάχει μορφῆν ἐνδυσάμενος ώς ἄν διδόσι τι ταῖς ἱδίαις χερσίν ... Δεί οὖν τὸν ἀναχωροῦντα τηρεῖν τῶν ἱδίων νοῦν κατὰ τὸν καρόν τῶν πειρασμῶν· μέλεια γὰρ ἀρπάζεις εὐθὺς ἐπίσταντος τοῦ δαίμονος σῶματος τοῦ ἱδίου τὸ σχῆμα καὶ συμπλέκειν ἐνδὸν πρὸς μάχην τῷ ἀδέλφῳ ἢ ἀπετεθαί γυναικῶς... χωρὶς δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ σχήματος οὐκ ἄν νοὺς μοιχεύσοι ποτὲ, ἀνάμονας ὃν καὶ ἄνευ τοιούτων νοημάτων ἐγγίσαι πράγματι αἰσθητῷ μη δυνάμενος· καὶ ταύτα ἐστὶ τὰ παραπτῶματα.33

So just as the nous receives the noēmata of all sensible objects, in this way it receives also that of its own organism – for this too is sensible – but of course with the exception of one’s face, for it is incapable of creating a form of this within itself since it has never seen itself. With this figure then our nous does everything

32 Rfl. 13.
33 Th. 25.14-38.
interiorly – it sits and walks, gives and receives *kata dianoian*. It does and says all that it wishes due to the quickness of its *noēmata*: sometimes it assumes the figure of its own body and extends its hand to receive something it is given, sometimes after casting off this figure it quickly puts on the form of its neighbour as if it were giving something with its own hands...The anchorite must therefore keep watch over his own *nous* in the time of temptations, for he will seize the figure of his own body, as soon as the demon presents himself, and engage interiorly in a fight with a brother or join with a woman...But without this form a *dianoia* could never commit adultery, since it is incorporeal and incapable of approaching a sensible object without such *noēmata* and this constitutes the transgression.

Evagrius is here analysing the process of what we would call doing something in one’s imagination. When a person experiences a *logismos*, his *nous* creates *kata dianoian*, on the basis of its store of remembered *noēmata* of sensible objects, an image or ‘form’ of his body. Evagrius refers to this as the *nous* ‘creating a form [of its own organism]’, ‘assuming the figure of its own body’ or ‘seizing the figure of his body’. With this created form, or assumed or seized figure, the person then performs, *kata dianoian*, whatever the *logismos* enjoins. So if the *logismos* is tempting him to fight with a brother then with this form or figure he will fight with that brother *kata dianoian*; we would say that he imagines himself fighting with him or that he fights with him in his imagination. It is not only his own body that he can ‘put on’ in this way; he can also ‘assume the figure’ of someone else in order to act *kata dianoian* as that person. So he could, for example, assume the figure of the brother in question in order to speak, in his person, in his – the brother’s - defence. If it is the figure of his own body that he assumes, then, Evagrius says, it will lack a face because he has never seen his own face.34

Definition 1 concludes this analysis. ‘Motivated by this contemplation,’ continues Evagrius, ‘we have presented the rationale of impure *logismos* (ἐκ ταύτης δὲ τῆς θεωρίας κινηθέντες, καὶ τὸν ἀκαθάρτου λογισμοῦ παρεθήκαμεν λόγον).’35 The *logismos* is the “image of the sensible person”, which in turn is the created form, or assumed or

34 This would seem to suggest that when he imagines himself acting he does so in the third rather than the first person; that is, rather than imagining himself acting ‘from the inside’, he visualises himself acting. If he were imagining himself acting in the first person – from the inside – then he would not see his face (unless of course he were imagining himself looking at his reflection), just as I do not see my face when I act in the flesh.

35 Th. 25.50-1.
seized figure, of the person’s body. The image is incomplete because it lacks a face. The involvement of *pathos* has not been stated explicitly but is implicit in the examples Evagrius has given, since both fighting with a brother and joining with a woman result from *pathos* – anger and fornication respectively. The speech or action are secret because internal to the agent. The reference to “the phantoms [the *nous*] forms in turn” acknowledges the fact, again not explicitly stated, that the form of its own body is not the only form that the *nous* creates *kata dianoian* in the process of experiencing a *logismos* since it must also create those of whoever or whatever else the *logismos* involves.

Williams, in discussing *Thoughts* 25, draws attention to the fact that in the scenario that Evagrius describes, the *nous*, in ‘seizing upon material images of possible actions, [creates] a fictional world and fictional relationships’. The *logismoi*, as well as leading us to construe the world solely in terms of our own desires, induce us to construct, on the basis of our desires, fictional counterparts of the world, populated by phantoms, in which those desires can be satisfied. In short, on the basis of our desires for pleasure or control the *logismoi* deflect us from the real world into a false world of our own construction.

Definition 2, which appears in *Reflections*, differs from Definition 1 in two respects. First, it omits to mention that the image of the sensible person is incomplete. This, I suggest, is in keeping with its presentation as an aphorism rather than as the conclusion of an extended analysis. As an aphorism it is intended to stand alone for the purposes of memorisation and meditation, and since the reason for the incompleteness is not obvious without reference to other material it would be inappropriate to include it. The second difference is the substitution of the expression ‘idol that has ... crept in’ for ‘phantoms [the *nous*] forms’. What Evagrius is doing is substituting an ethical description for a metaphysical one. In metaphysical terms the ‘phantoms’ are, like the image of the person’s own body, forms created by the *nous* on the basis of remembered *noëmata*, whereas in ethical terms, as *empathē noëmata* they fall within the scope of the Second

---

36 Williams (2007: 5).
Commandment. Consequently a phantom formed by the nous is at the same time an idol that has crept in.

The third of Evagrius’ definitions of *logismos*, from the *Chapters of the Disciples*, is rather simpler:

Definition 3:

Λογισμός ... ἄστι νόημα ἐμπαθές.38

A *logismos* is an *empathēs noēma*.

This definition makes explicit two features of the *logismoi* that are not explicit in Definitions 1 and 2 but it obscures two others. The first of the features that it makes explicit is the involvement of *pathos* with the *logismoi*: as we shall see, an *empathēs noēma* is a *noēma* of a sensible object that is charged with *pathos* due to the person having been in a state of *pathos* in respect of its object when the *noēma* imprinted his *nous*.39 The relation between *pathos* and the *logismoi* is rooted in the orientation toward sensible objects that the latter express. Sensible objects, it will be recalled, are susceptible of spiritual interpretation in terms of their *logoi*, and the first stage of the re-ascent to God consists in discerning these.40 This means engaging with such objects solely in terms of their *logoi*. By contrast, the *logismoi* betray an attachment to the external world and so to sensible objects qua sensible. The medium of this attachment is *pathos* and so the *logismoi* will always involve *empathē noēmata*.41 The second feature of the *logismoi* that Definition 3 makes explicit follows from the definition of an *empathēs noēma* and is that they always involve *noēmata* of sensible objects42 (Definitions 1 and 2, it will be recalled, specify only ‘the sensible person’.)

The features of the *logismoi* that Definition 3 obscures are, firstly, their *de facto* possession of agency, and, secondly, their fictional and therefore delusory nature. The former,

37 See above, 1.2.1.1, n.167.
38 Disc. 65.2.
39 See below, 2.2.3.
40 See above, 1.2.1.1.
41 Cf. Disc. 138.1: ‘Every *empathēs logismos* is demonic (Πᾶο ἐκπαζὴο ινγηζκὸο δαηκνληώδεο ἐζηί)’.
42 Cf., e.g., Th. 2.1-2.
but not the latter, in fact needs modifying in the light of Definition 3 such that, rather than defining all *logismoi* as exercising agency it should now be noted that although many do, some do not – an example being the *noëma* of ‘the face of a person who has done me harm or dishonoured me’ mentioned at Th. 2.6-7, although this *noëma* will, if allowed to, give rise to *logismoi* which do possess agency, namely fantasies of revenge. So what determines whether or not a *logismos* possesses agency is, as we would expect, whether or not the *nous* has assumed agency within it.

As this consideration about agency suggests, to define a *logismos* as an *empathēs noêma* is to speak in very simplified terms. That Evagrius is deliberately doing so is clear from the context since this is one of several equally schematic definitions in the first sentence of a short chapter on the virtues that heal the *thumos* and *epithumētikon*:

Πάθος ἐστὶ θυμὸς, ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὰ ἐξής, νόημα δὲ ἐστὶ μνήμη ψυλῆ, λογισμὸς δὲ ἐστὶ νόημα ἐπαθές.\(^43\)

*Pathos* is *thumos*, *epithumia* and so forth; a *noëma* is a simple memory, and a *logismos* is an *empathēs noêma*.

These are in fact approximations rather than definitions: they serve only to convey a general impression. In the case of the *logismoi*, while a *logismos* might indeed happen to consist of a single *empathēs noêma*, it will more often be complex and is likely to involve verbal content. Nonetheless, the terms *logismos* and *empathēs noêma*, can, if both are understood in a simplified way, be coherently understood as equivalent.

So far we have considered what a *logismos* is by means of Evagrius’ definitions, but the best evidence for how, in practical, everyday terms, he construes the *logismoi* is the *Antirrhētikos*. His presentation therein of the content of *logismoi* can be divided into two types: direct statement of the form ‘the *logismos* that says *x*’, where *x* is a proposition or imperative, and, far more frequently, indirect statement of the form ‘the *logismos* that *x*’, where *x* is a verb phrase. For example:

---

\(^{43}\) Disc. 65.1-2.
Against the *logismos* that says to me, ‘Do not torment your soul with a lot of fasting that gains you nothing and does not purify your *nous*.’

Against the *logismos* that says to me, ‘The command to fast is burdensome.’

Against the thoughts that seek without the labour of fasting to cultivate the rational land.

Against the *logismos* that compels me to eat at the ninth hour.

Both types involve the assignment of agency to the *logismoi* themselves. It might be supposed that this is no more than an accident of grammar, or is at most metaphor, but although I do believe there to be a metaphorical sense at play, Definitions 1 and 2 suggest that there is also something more going on. Both define a *logismos* as an image of the sensible person which is constructed *kata dianoian* by the *nous*, with which the person acts *kata dianoian*. Both, in other words, define the *logismos* as having agency *kata dianoian*. So taking them at face value, which, although there might well be additional levels to Evagrius’ meaning, there is no reason not to, the agent that tells the monk not to torment his soul with so much fasting that gains him nothing and does not purify his *nous*, or that the command to fast is burdensome, or that seeks without the labour of fasting to cultivate the rational land, or that compels him to eat at the ninth hour, is the part of him that activates the image of his body that his *nous* has created *kata dianoian* and in virtue of which that image is said to exercise agency – to give and receive, fight with a brother or join with a woman, and so forth. In such cases the *nous* effectively splits into two parts, one of which animates the image and through it exercises agency while the other remains detached, an observer and agent of resistance. That Evagrius would see it this way is indicated by his advice to combat the demon of acedia by dividing the soul so that one part offers consolation and the other receives it.

This is the literal interpretation of Evagrius’ assignment of agency to the *logismoi*. But I believe it is also susceptible of a metaphorical reading according to which it emphasises the fact that although we allow ourselves to act out *logismoi* in the sense described

---

44 Ant. 1.2.  
45 Ant. 1.5.  
46 Ant. 1.1.  
47 Ant. 1.7.  
48 Cf. Prakt. 27.
above, they do not originate with us and are fundamentally alien to us. Because we were
created with the seeds of virtue but not of vice,\textsuperscript{49} human nature is essentially good and
it is only through misuse of our self-determination that we become capable of vice:

\begin{quote}
\textgreek{Ek de tis phuseos oudeis exerchetai logosmos pneumatos oú gar ap' arxhís
gegonamen pneumai, eúper kalon spérama éspereven ó kúrios en tò ídios ágrió.}\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

No evil \textit{logismos} derives from our nature, for we were not created evil from the
beginning, if indeed the Lord sowed a good seed in his field.\textsuperscript{51}

It is from demons rather than from us that the \textit{logismoi} originate, and for Evagrius the
line between the \textit{logismos} and the demon that suggests it is for practical purposes so
close that, as Guillaumont notes, he refers indifferently to ‘the demon’ or ‘the \textit{logismos}’
of a given vice, using one or the other terms as shorthand for the complete expression,
‘the \textit{logismos} suggested by the demon’ of that vice.\textsuperscript{52} When he speaks of a \textit{logismos} as
though it were an agent he is, therefore, emphasising its otherness; the fact that it does
not originate in the person who thinks it and is therefore alien to his true nature. In the
case of the \textit{logismos} that ‘compels [the monk] to eat at the ninth hour’ the metaphorical
agency of the \textit{logismos} is to all intents and purposes identical with the actual agency of
the demon: the demon compels the monk to eat by means of a \textit{logismos} that compels
him to do so. Likewise, the metaphorical voice of the \textit{logismos} that says ‘Do not tor-
ment your soul with a lot of fasting that gains you nothing and does not purify your
\textit{nous}’ or ‘The command to fast is burdensome’ or that the rational land can be cultivated
without the labour of fasting, is the vehicle for the non-metaphorical voice of the de-
mon. So although the monk will be thinking these thoughts, and although they might
correspond with the contra-natural desires of his \textit{epithumétikon}, they are not his, and it
is this fundamental independence of \textit{logismos} from thinker that Evagrius affirms
through the ascription of metaphorical agency to the \textit{logismoi}. Sometimes though a
metaphorical reading seems strained:

\textsuperscript{49} Cf. \textit{KG} 1.39; see above, 1.4.
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Th.} 31.9-11.
\textsuperscript{52} Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 57).
Against the *logismos* of *acedia* that is eager to find another cell for its dwelling place on the pretext that the first one that it had was very foul and full of moisture so that it got all kinds of diseases from it.\(^53\)

This makes sense if the agent is understood to be an aspect of the *nous* and therefore of the person himself since then it is the person who got the diseases. In this case the attribution of concern to the *logismos* indicates that it is suggesting a false understanding of these circumstances (although what it is saying might be true from a profane point of view); presumably they are either spiritually irrelevant or ordeals to be endured. This *logismos* can however also be understood in another way, according to which the diseases are not real, but as we would say ‘all in the mind’. In this case it is telling the monk that he gets diseases that in reality he does not get, from properties of the cell that perhaps it does not possess, and the whole story is a pretext to induce him to vacate the cell. On this reading, since no-one really gets the diseases the agency of the *logismos* can, after all, be understood metaphorically.

The example of the *logismoi* that seek without the labour of fasting to cultivate the rational land suggests that *logismoi* can consist as much in sequences of thoughts and ways of thinking as in individual *logismoi*, and indeed Evagrius sometimes speaks in terms of ‘thinking’ rather than specifying a *logismos* or *logismoi*, for example:

Against the thinking that is diligent about food and neglects compassion for the needy.\(^54\)

That an Evagrian *logismos* can be a sequence of thoughts related more or less closely to one another is plain from examples such as the following:

Against the *logismos* that, in the absence of serious illness, coaxes us to drink wine and prophesies to us about pain in the stomach and the entire digestive system.\(^55\)

Against the *logismos* that arouses compassion in us, persuades us to give to the poor, and afterwards makes us sad and annoyed about what we gave.\(^56\)

\(^{53}\) *Ant.* 6.26.  
\(^{54}\) *Ant.* 1.66.  
\(^{55}\) *Ant.* 1.26.
The first in particular also reveals a further aspect of the ascription to the logismoi of metaphorical agency, one that concerns the workings of temptation. The logismos is tempting the monk to drink wine, but it does not do so simply by, for example, presenting him with a noêma of wine and a corresponding imperative ‘Drink wine!’, to which he might either give or withhold assent from a position of affective neutrality. Rather, it uses complex tactics that involve the arousal of both desire and fear. The second example, rather than employing two component logismoi roughly simultaneously, employs a sequence of them such that one paves the way for the next. In both cases the different elements work together to secure the monk’s assent.

The relation between the logismoi and pathos will be discussed more fully in section 2.2.4. Meanwhile, the word logismos in Evagrius’ usage can be defined as follows:

A logismos is the cognitive cause, correlate or result of a pathos. It can be an image of the person’s body, created by the nous kata dianoian and animated by an aspect of it, with which it speaks and acts unlawfully kata dianoian in relation to other images it creates kata dianoian, or it can be a single empathês noêma or thought, sequence of thoughts or way of thinking. Logismoi frequently possess agency and always involve noêmata of sensible objects.

2.1.2 The ‘matter’ of the logismoi

Evagrius speaks of the logismoi having ‘matter’ (hulê). In other contexts where he refers to the ‘matter’ of something he means that which fuels it; for example,

"Ὑλὴ πυρὸς ξύλα, ὥλη δὲ γαστρὸς βρόματα.⁵⁷"

Wood is the matter used by fire, and food is the matter used by gluttony.

Likewise, the matter of the logismoi is what inspires and feeds them. For example,

---

⁵⁶ Ant. 1.58.
⁵⁷ 8Th. 1.4.
Mόλος τῶν λογισμῶν ὁ τῆς κενοδόξιας ἐστὶ πολύλος καὶ ὅλην σχεδὸν περιλαμβάνων τὴν οίκουμενήν καὶ πάσι τοῖς δαίμοσιν ὑπανοίγων τὰς θύρας, ὥσπερ τις προδότης πονηρός γενόμενος πόλεως· διὸ καὶ πάνο ταπεινοὶ τοῦ ἀναχωροῦντος τὸν νοῦν πολλῶν λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων αὐτῶν πληρῶν...

Alone among the logismoi that of vainglory has an abundance of matter; embracing nearly the whole inhabited world, it opens the gates to all the demons, like some evil betrayer of a city. That is why it greatly humiliates the nous of the anchorite, filling it with numerous words and objects...

The reason why the logismos of vainglory has ‘an abundance of matter’ is that any success, large or small, spiritual or otherwise, can arouse it, and this is why, too, ‘it opens the gates to all the demons’ and ‘fills the nous with numerous words and objects.’ In other words, there are a great many things that can occasion and augment it. But while logismoi of vainglory are especially well-provided for in terms of possible matter, all logismoi find much to feed upon in our dealings with one another and in the world at large:

Οἱ κὲλ ἀθάζαξησλ ινγηζκ῵λ ὕιαο πξνζδέρνληαη θαὶ πνιινῖο ζπκπαξεθηείλνληαη πξάγκαζη.

Impure thoughts receive for their increase numerous materials and extend themselves to many objects.

Whereas logismoi with an abundance of matter will flourish, those with a paucity of it will lack staying power and accordingly be easy to banish:

Ὅταν τινὲς τῶν ἀκαθάρτων λογισμῶν ταχέως φυγαδευθῶσι, ἡξησώμεν τὴν αἰτίαν, πόθεν τοῦτο συμβέβηκε, πότερον διὰ τὴν σπάνιν τοῦ πράγματος, τὸ δυσπάριστον εἶναι τὴν ὅλην, ἢ διὰ τὴν προσούσαν ἡμῖν ἀπάθειαν οὐκ ἤσχυσε καθ’ ἡμῖν ὁ ἐχθρὸς, οでしょうね εἰ τῶν ἄναχωρούντων ἐνθημενεὶ ὑπὸ δαίμονος ἐνοχλούμενος τῆς πρῶτης πόλεως πνευματικῆς κυβέρνησιν πιστευθῆναι, οὕτως δηλοῦντο οὐ χρονίζει τοῦτον τὸν λογισμὸν φανταξόμενος...εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ πάσης πόλεως καὶ τῆς τυχοῦσης γίνεται καὶ ὁμοίως λογίζεται, οὕτως μακάριος τῆς ἀπαθείας ἐστίν.

59 Th. 36.1-2.
60 Th. 20.1-11.
Whenever certain impure logismoi are chased away quickly, let us search out the cause. Whence has this occurred? Is it for want of the object, the matter being hard to acquire, or because of the apatheia present in us did the enemy have no strength against us? For example, if an anchorite who is tormented by a demon imagines himself being entrusted with the spiritual governance of the First City, he clearly does not dwell for long on imagining this logismos ... But if it is a case of just any city taken at random and he works it out in the same way, he is blessed with apatheia.

In sum, the matter of the logismoi comprises anything that they can derive inspiration and plausibility from and so feed upon, or, to put it another way, it is what invigorates the fictional worlds that we create on the basis of our desires.

2.1.3 The eightfold classification of most generic logismoi

Evagrius divides all demonic logismoi into eight categories, a schema which in the hands of subsequent thinkers went on to form the basis for the doctrine of the seven cardinal sins. He introduces it at the beginning of the Praktikos:

Ὅκτω εἰσὶ πάντες οἱ γενικῶτατοι λογισμοὶ ἐν ὠίς περιέχεται πᾶς λογισμός. Πρῶτος ὁ γαστριμαργής, καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸν ὁ τῆς πορνείας; τρίτος ὁ τῆς φυλαγρυφίας; τέταρτος ὁ τῆς λύπης; πέμπτος ὁ τῆς ὀργής; ἐκτὸς ὁ τῆς ἀθεδίας; ἕβδομος ὁ τῆς κενοδοξίας; ἑγόρας ὁ τῆς ὑπερηφανίας.

Eight are all the most generic logismoi in which are encompassed every logismos. First that of gluttony, and after it that of fornication; third, that of avarice; fourth, that of distress; fifth, that of anger; sixth, that of acedia; seventh, that of vainglory; eighth, that of pride.

The entire struggle of the monks, according to Evagrius, takes place through these eight logismoi. This section will consider each in turn. First though it can be noted that the eightfold classification is not the only system employed by Evagrius, nor is it fully comprehensive, omitting self-love (φιλαυτία) which in Reflections he declares to be

---

61 Prakt. 6.
‘first of all [the logismoi],’ wandering (πλάνος) and insensitivity (ἀναισθησία), both of which have chapters to themselves in On Thoughts, and jealousy (φθόνος), which appears in Vices. That said, it is the principal one and the most familiar, as well as the one that provides the structure for several of his works, most notably the Praktikos, Antirrhētikos, and Eight Thoughts. Second, it is not only the terms ‘logismos’ and ‘demon’ that Evagrius uses interchangeably, but along with them the terms pathos and ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα). So, for example, in the Praktikos he speaks of the thought of gluttony (ὁ τῆς γαστρομαργίας λογισμὸς), the demon of fornication (ὁ τῆς πορνείας δαίμων) and the pathos of anger (ἡ ὀργή πάθος) as well as simply using the name of the generic logismos, for example ἡ φλαργυρία γῆρας μακρὸν ὑποβάλλει, while in On Thoughts he refers to the spirit of fornication (τὸ πνεῦμα πορνείας). Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Evagrius considers the logismos, the pathos and the demon or spirit to be distinct entities.

In discussing the eight generic logismoi I shall focus not upon Evagrius’ justly famous descriptions of them in the Praktikos but upon the Antirrhētikos listings for them, since my purpose to convey not so much the particular character of each type of logismos as a sense of the mental and emotional turmoil that the logismoi betoken.

2.1.3.1 Gluttony

The Praktikos definition of gluttony appears to focus not upon an excessive desire for food but upon worries about the physical consequences of asceticism. In fact, though, these worries arise out of an excessive desire for food, namely the desire to accord one’s eating to the insatiable demand of the body’s vital heat for fuel. At the same time they invite the monk to privilege the profane understanding of physical health over the spiritual understanding of it and accordingly to sacrifice the true health of the body for what is only its apparent health. But the significance of gluttony extends far beyond the body.

63 Rfl. 53.
64 Chapters 9 and 11 respectively.
65 Cf. Prakt. 7.
66 Cf. Prakt. 8.
67 Cf. Prakt. 11.
68 Cf. Prakt. 9.
This demon is, along with those of avarice and vainglory, one of those ranged first in battle (πρῶτοι κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον συνίστανται)\textsuperscript{70} against those engaged in \textit{praktikē}, hence Christ’s temptation by these three vices.\textsuperscript{71} If gluttony is succumbed to then other temptations follow in its stead, first and foremost that to fornication,\textsuperscript{72} but ultimately all the other \textit{pathē} too. This is partly due to a ‘surplus’ of physical vitality, but partly too because ‘the direct absorption of matter in order to please the stomach’ is, along with avarice and vainglory, one of the most fundamental ways of construing the world in terms of our own desires.\textsuperscript{73} But the significance of gluttony for Evagrius also reflects the body’s integral role in the process of redemption. As we have seen, he declares that to control the stomach is to diminish the \textit{pathē},\textsuperscript{74} and I have argued that this is because he believes that any vital heat over and above that needed to keep the body alive finds expression in \textit{pathos}, and that accordingly his many references to fire in relation to \textit{epithumia}, pleasure and so forth are not simply metaphors. It follows that the importance that he assigns to dietary restraint is due not just to its intrinsic value but to its consequences. In the first place, it establishes a foundation for \textit{apatheia} in the body itself. This is reflected in the \textit{epithumētikon}’s no longer being directed toward the objects of \textit{pathos} but instead longing for virtue.\textsuperscript{75} Again, if a person ceases to care for food then one of the causes for disturbance of the \textit{thumos} is removed, as is a cause for distress.\textsuperscript{76} More generally, a fixation upon food is distracting and undermining,\textsuperscript{77} and excessive consumption of food dulls the mind.\textsuperscript{78} For all these reasons a correct approach to food is fundamental and reflects the interconnectedness of the spiritual and the corporeal:

\begin{quote}
'Επιθυμία βρώσεως ἔτεκε παρακοήν, καὶ γεύσις ἥδεια ἐξέβαλε παραδείσου.'\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}

Desire for food gave birth to disobedience and a sweet taste expelled from paradise.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Th}. 1.1-6.
\textsuperscript{72} See below, 2.1.3.2.
\textsuperscript{73} Cf. Williams (2007: 4).
\textsuperscript{74} Cf. \textit{8Th}. 1.2; see above, 1.2.3.
\textsuperscript{75} Cf. \textit{Prakt}. 86.
\textsuperscript{76} Cf. \textit{Th}. 1.8-10.
\textsuperscript{77} E.g. \textit{8Th}. 1.12, 20.
\textsuperscript{78} \textit{8Th}. 1.1, 17.
\textsuperscript{79} \textit{8Th}. 1.10.
\textsuperscript{80} Cf. Gen. 3:6, 23.
Eve’s desire for the apple led her to disobey God and so to expulsion from the Garden. Likewise, a desire for food is a desire for something other than God. It is an orientation toward the sensible and away from the spiritual, and a preference for pleasure over the good. The ‘sweet taste’ of food ‘expels from paradise’ for at least three reasons. First, a focus upon food distracts the nous from the pursuit of knowledge. Second, it leads to a privileging of the profane understanding of health over the spiritual understanding of it, and thereby threatens to undermine the very foundation of the ascent to God. Third, to succumb to gluttony, whether from desire for the food itself or out of misplaced concern about the body’s health, is to induce in both soul and body a state inimical to the practice of contemplation and prayer. All of these are ways in which it cuts the person off from spiritual joy; that is, from paradise.

The Antirrhêtikos entries for gluttony include: the thoughts that seek without the labour of fasting to cultivate the rational land;\textsuperscript{81} the thought that says to me, “Do not torment your soul with a lot of fasting that gains you nothing and does not purify your intellect”.\textsuperscript{82} The thought that suggests to me, “Keeping vigil does not benefit you at all; rather, it gathers many thoughts against you”.\textsuperscript{83} The thoughts that hinder us from our way of life by instilling fear in us and saying, “A miserable death results from austere fasting”.\textsuperscript{84} The thought that recalls delicacies of the past and remembers pleasant wines and the cups that we would hold in our hands when we used to recline at table and drink.\textsuperscript{85} The demon that persuades me through its flattery and says to me with promises, “You will no longer suffer any harm from food and drink because your body is weak and dry from prolonged fasting”.\textsuperscript{86} The thought that travels to its corporeal kinfolk and finds a table filled with all kinds of foods.\textsuperscript{87} The thoughts that entice us to be comforted with a little treat of vegetables;\textsuperscript{88} the thought that at harvest time casts into us the desire for fruits.\textsuperscript{89} The thought that says that the monastic discipline is difficult and extremely

\textsuperscript{81} Cf. Ant. 1.1; cf. also 1.9.
\textsuperscript{82} Cf. Ant. 1.2; cf. 1.1, 4, 6, 9.
\textsuperscript{83} Cf. Ant. 1.17; cf. 1.20.
\textsuperscript{84} Cf. Ant. 1.19.
\textsuperscript{85} Cf. Ant. 1.30; also 1.36, 38.
\textsuperscript{86} Cf. Ant. 1.33.
\textsuperscript{87} Cf. Ant. 1.39; also 1.41.
\textsuperscript{88} Cf. Ant. 1.53; also 1.45.
\textsuperscript{89} Cf. Ant. 1.54.
burdensome, that through affliction it cruelly lays waste to our body, and that it does not profit the soul.90

2.1.3.2 Fornication

The demon of fornication, Evagrius tells us in the Praktikos, ‘compels one to desire various bodies’ (σομάτων καταναγκάζει διαφόρων ἐπιθυμεῖν).91 The principal characteristics of its logismoi are the vivid fantasies that they involve, both in waking consciousness and in dreams.92 This demon endeavours to persuade the monk that he lacks the strength to overcome his bodily nature.93 It is one of the swiftest (ὀξύτατος), suddenly hurling its filth94 and able almost to overtake the movement of the nous (σχέδον τήν κίνησιν τοῦ νοὸς ἕμων παρατρέχοντας),95 that is, to overwhelm the nous before it realises it is under attack so that it has no opportunity to defend itself;96 in reality, the demon cannot overwhelm the nous; as we shall see, Evagrius maintains that even in the throes of pathos it is possible to refrain from sin.97

Eulogios 21.22 includes an eloquent description of temptation by logismoi of fornication.98 Allusions to fire are central to it, and as in the case of logismoi of gluttony, these allusions and others like them99 are, I suggest, not simply metaphors but references to the body’s vital heat. The monk experiences a surplus of this as ‘the fire of his nature’,100 a ‘fire’ which finds expression in the pathos of sexual desire, of which this passage identifies three components: a general sensation of pleasurable warmth; the ‘burning’ which is ‘ignited in the flesh’ – that is, the specific physical expressions of sexual arousal, and ‘burning images of error’ - that is, mental images charged with the

---

90 Cf. Ant. 1.66.
91 Prakt. 8.1-2.
92 Cf. Th. 29. For Evagrius’ attribution of agency to us in dreams, see below, 3.1.
93 Cf. Eul. 21.22.
94 Cf. Eul. 21.22.
95 Cf. Prakt. 51. For other references to the ‘quickness’ of the demon of fornication, Pry. 90:
97 See below, 2.2.4.
98 Quoted below, 2.2.4.
99 E.g. Ant. 2.14: ‘To the angel of the Lord that suddenly appeared in my intellect, cooled the thought of fornication, and drove out from it (my intellect) all the thoughts that besieged it’; Ant. 2.47: ‘For the soul that does not know from where these burning thoughts are sent against us’.
100 Cf. Eul. 21.22.
pathos. The demon of fornication exploits the body’s nature, specifically any surplus of vital heat. Sometimes it suggests logismoi, sometimes it touches the body directly, and sometimes it exploits an inclination toward sexual pleasure. If the monk allows the logismoi and feelings of arousal to linger then it suggests secondary logismoi which justify his continuing to do so. It also uses its ability to tempt the monk as ammunition against him, endeavouring to persuade him of the futility of trying to remain chaste - and it should be recalled that Evagrius’ understanding of chastity encompassed all expressions of sexual function. It is easy to see then why, given the theory of physiology that I have imputed to him, he considers dietary self-control to be a precondition of chastity:

὇ πιεξ῵λ γαζηέξα, θαὶ ἐπαγγειιόκελνο ζσθξνλεῖλ, ὅκνηόο ἐζηη ηῶ ιέγνληη, ραιηλνῦλ ππξὸο ἐλέξγε ἐλ θαιάκῃ. Ὁλ ηξόπνλ γὰξ ππξὸο ῥνπὴλ ἐλ θαιάκῃ ηξέρνπζαλ ἀδύλαηνλ ἐπηζρεῖλ, νὕησο ὁξκὴλ ἀθόιαζηνλ θιεγνκέλελ ἐλ θόξῳ παῦζαη ἀδύλαηνλ.

The one who fills his stomach and then announces that he is chaste is like one who says he can hold in check the action of fire in a reed. In the same way that it is impossible to restrain the momentum of a fire rushing through a reed, so it is impossible to stop the licentious impulse that is fired by satiety.

The Antirrhêtikos entries for fornication include: the thoughts that compel us to linger in conversation with a married woman on the pretext that she has visited us frequently or that she will benefit spiritually from us. The demon of fornication that imitates the form of a beautiful naked woman, luxurious in her gait, her entire body obscenely dissipated, (a woman) who seizes the intellect of many persons and makes them forget the better things. The demons of fornication that take for themselves pretexts from the Scriptures and from the topics that are written in them. The thought of sadness that arises in us due to the many temptations of fornication that come upon us and cut off

101 Cf., e.g., Th. 16.12-14; Ant. 2.45; Disc. 152.
102 Cf. Eul. 21.22; see below, 2.2.4.
103 See above, 1.2.3.
104 E.g. 8Th. 2.11. Cf. Th. 1.6-8.
105 Cf. Ant. 2.35; cf. also 2.1, 36.
106 Cf. Ant. 2.32.
107 Cf. Ant. 2.50.
our hope by saying to us, “What beautiful thing do you expect after all this labour?” 108

The thought that says, “Youth is neither guilty nor culpable if it fornicates or if it gladly receives unclean thoughts”. 109 The thought of the soul that is oppressed by thoughts of fornication, which divide the evil passion of fornication into diverse images, collect impure thoughts, put them in rotation, (then) cleave to one of these enslaving thoughts and make it persist upon the weak soul. 110 The thought that reminds us of the house in which we gave many fruits to Satan. 111 The demon that advised me in my intellect that I should marry a woman and become the father of sons and so not resist with hunger the thoughts of fornication. 112

2.1.3.3 Avarice

Logismoi of avarice consist partly in worries about a future shaped by the privations of asceticism, but also encompass more general attachments, for example to material comforts or the prestige associated with wealth. To worry about such basic necessities as clothes or food is to defy Jesus’ injunction against anxiety about such things 113 and, since ‘two sparrows sold for a penny’ are under the administration of the holy angels’, 114 to lack faith in Providence. Finally, avarice is a species of idolatry:

Ἐπικατάρατος ὁ ποιῶν εἰδώλων, καὶ τιθέως ἐν ἀποκρύφῳ, ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ ἔχων φιλαργυρίας πάθος; ὁ μὲν γὰρ προσκομιεὶ κῆβδηλον ἄνωφελεύς, ὁ δὲ ἀγαλματοφορεῖ φαντασίαν πλούτου. 115

‘Cursed be the one who makes an image and puts it in hiding.’ 116 The same is true for one who has the pathos of avarice, for the former worships a useless piece of base metal; the latter carries around in his nous the fantasy of wealth. 117

---

108 Cf. Ant. 2.1; also 2.31, 64.
109 Cf. Ant. 2.5; also 2.4.
110 Cf. Ant. 2.9; also 2.11, 12, 21, 24, 54, 56.
111 Cf. Ant. 2.40.
112 Cf. Ant. 2.49.
114 Th. 6.1-10; cf. Matt. 10:29.
115 Th. 3.14.
116 Cf. Deut. 27:15. At Col. 3:5 Paul declares that greed (πιπερεμία) is idolatry.
117 Cf. Ant. 3.51.
The *Antirrhētikos* entries for avarice can be roughly summarised as the desire to acquire money;\textsuperscript{118} the desire to retain money;\textsuperscript{119} the desire to retain money and yet attain the death of Jesus;\textsuperscript{120} the desire to spend money how one wants;\textsuperscript{121} meditating upon riches and giving no thought to the pain of wealth;\textsuperscript{122} anxiety about poverty;\textsuperscript{123} resentment at not being given money;\textsuperscript{124} the desire to keep resources for oneself;\textsuperscript{125} the desire to rely on charity;\textsuperscript{126} meanness;\textsuperscript{127} lack of compassion;\textsuperscript{128} the desire to file a lawsuit;\textsuperscript{129} making a brother work hard for the sake of money rather than do something of greater spiritual value;\textsuperscript{130} demanding too much manual labour from a brother;\textsuperscript{131} regret about having given money to the poor;\textsuperscript{132} self-satisfaction at giving up inheritance;\textsuperscript{133} regret about renouncing money;\textsuperscript{134} doubt about vocation;\textsuperscript{135} the desire to acquire resources or possessions;\textsuperscript{136} the desire to preserve resources or possessions;\textsuperscript{137} the desire to take advantage of others;\textsuperscript{138} the tendency to judge for the sake of temporal goods;\textsuperscript{139} self-pity over one’s neediness;\textsuperscript{140} desire for the worldly esteem attendant upon wealth;\textsuperscript{141} desire for worldly possessions;\textsuperscript{142} nostalgia for past comforts;\textsuperscript{143} admiration for wealth;\textsuperscript{144} justifications for love of money.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{120} Cf. *Ant*. 3:30.  
\textsuperscript{121} Cf. *Ant*. 3:15, 19.  
\textsuperscript{123} Cf. *Ant*. 3:2, 26, 36, 56.  
\textsuperscript{124} Cf. *Ant*. 3:3.  
\textsuperscript{125} Cf. *Ant*. 3:5, 10, 37.  
\textsuperscript{126} Cf. *Ant*. 3:43.  
\textsuperscript{127} Cf. *Ant*. 3:9, 10, 14, 28, 40, 43, 44, 47, 57.  
\textsuperscript{129} Cf. *Ant*. 3:39.  
\textsuperscript{131} Cf. *Ant*. 3:4, 8.  
\textsuperscript{132} Cf. *Ant*. 3:12, 33.  
\textsuperscript{133} Cf. *Ant*. 3:16.  
\textsuperscript{136} Cf. *Ant*. 3:35, 37, 49, 50, 52, 53.  
\textsuperscript{137} Cf. *Ant*. 3:24, 35, 49.  
\textsuperscript{139} Cf. *Ant*. 3:25.  
\textsuperscript{140} Cf. *Ant*. 3:17.  
\textsuperscript{141} Cf. *Ant*. 3:18, 32.  
\textsuperscript{142} Cf. *Ant*. 3:20.  
\textsuperscript{143} Cf. *Ant*. 3:21, 34, 50.  
\textsuperscript{144} Cf. *Ant*. 3:46.  
2.1.3.4 Distress

Distress, according to the Praktikos definition, ‘sometimes occurs through the frustration of one’s desires [or sometimes] follows closely upon anger’ (ἡ λύπη ποτὲ μὲν ἐπισυμβαίνει κατὰ στέρησιν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ παρέπεται τῇ ὀργῇ). This demon cuts off and dries up every pleasure of the soul (πᾶσαν ἡδονήν τῆς ψυχῆς περικόπτων καὶ ἔρημων). Its Antirrhētikos entries include feelings of despair and abandonment by God or the angels in the face of trials, fear of the demons, nocturnal attacks by demons, physical attacks by demons, and vivid and frightening hallucinations. They also include ignorance of the role of the demons in the spiritual life or of how the demons operate, or attempts by the demons to persuade the monk of the futility of his struggle or to make him fearful of the rigours of the monastic life. Some logismoi of distress threaten him with shame or dishonour, some try to induce distress by evoking memories of one’s past sins and some afflict the nous with distress concerning transitory affairs. One threatens him with madness and one entry warns of the demon who ‘alters the nous and impresses it with a single concept that is filled with severe grief—this is an indication of great madness.’

---

146 Prakt. 10.1-2.
147 Th. 4-5. Cf. Disc. 69.5-6: ‘Only the logismos of distress does not involve pleasure.’
148 Cf. Ant. 4.1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 16, 27, 44, 51.
149 Cf. Ant. 4.8, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 28, 38, 39, 53, 54, 62, 65, 70, 71, 76.
150 Cf. Ant. 4.8, 11, 18, 19, 21, 29, 31, 33, 38, 53.
152 Cf. Ant. 4.13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 23, 24, 26, 29, 32, 34, 38, 45, 47, 48, 53, 58, 62, 63.
153 Cf. Ant. 4.3, 7, 17, 52.
154 Cf. Ant. 4.6, 46, 66.
155 Cf. Ant. 4.12, 30.
156 Cf. Ant. 4.50, 69, 70, 71.
157 Ant. 4.25 has a particularly personal ring in relation to Evagrius: ‘Against the demon that threatens me with curses and said, “I will make you an object of laughter and reproach among all the monks because you have investigated and made known all the kinds of all the unclean thoughts.”’. Cf. also Ant. 4.43, 64, 68.
158 Cf. Ant. 4.55, 73.
159 Cf. Ant. 4.74.
160 Cf. Ant. 4.43.
161 Cf. Ant. 4.37.
2.1.3.5 Anger

The *Praktikos* defines anger, in terms borrowed from Aristotle, as ‘a boiling over of the *thumos* and a movement directed against one who has done injury or is thought to have done so’ (θυμοῦ...ζέσεις καὶ κίνησις κατὰ τοῦ ἡδικηκότος ἤ δοκοῦντος ἡδικηκέναι).\(^{162}\) Evagrius notes that it ‘renders the soul furious all day long, but especially during prayers it seizes the *nous* and represents to it the face of one who has distressed it’ (πανημέριον μὲν ἐξεγριώμεΤο τὴν ψυχήν, μάλιστα δὲ ἐν ταῖς προσευχαῖς συναρπάζει τὸν νοῦν, τὸ τοῦ λέκυπνοντος πρόσωπον ἐσοπτρίζουσα),\(^{163}\) and that ‘sometimes when this goes on for a while and turns into resentment, it provokes disturbances at night accompanied by wasting and pallor of the body, as well as the attacks of venomous wild beasts’ (ὀτε χρονίζουσα καὶ μεταβαλλομένη εἰς μήνιν, ταραχὰς νόκτωρ παρέχει, τῇξὶν τε τοῦ σώματος καὶ ώρατοτητα, καὶ θηρίων ιοβόλων ἐπιδρομάζ).\(^{164}\) He also notes that these ‘four signs that follow upon resentment’ can be found accompanying (παρακολουθοῦντα) numerous *logismoi*.\(^{165}\)

The *Antirrhētikos* entries for anger include the thought that advised us to love angry people and words of wrath;\(^{166}\) desire for vengeance.\(^{167}\) The thought that is quickly enflamed with anger and swiftly embittered against the brothers.\(^{168}\) The thoughts that cast us into grief over brothers’ failings.\(^{169}\) Thinking that perfect humility is beyond human nature;\(^{170}\) not accepting chastisement with humility.\(^{171}\) Not understanding that being reviled by other people is a test sanctioned by God.\(^{172}\) Resentment.\(^{173}\) Agitation due to

\(^{162}\) *Prakt*. 11.1-2. Cf. *DA* 403a29-b1: ‘A physician would define an affection of the soul differently from a dialectician: the latter would define e.g. anger as the desire (δρέξες) for returning distress for distress (ἀντιλυπήσεως), or something like that, while the former would define it as a boiling of the blood or warm substance around the heart.’

\(^{163}\) *Prakt*. 11.3-5.

\(^{164}\) *Prakt*. 11.5-7.

\(^{165}\) *Prakt*. 11.8-9.


\(^{168}\) Cf. *Ant*. 5.29, 46.

\(^{169}\) Cf. *Ant*. 5.47.

\(^{170}\) Cf. *Ant*. 5.7.

\(^{171}\) Cf. *Ant*. 5.23.

\(^{172}\) Cf. *Ant*. 5.8.

\(^{173}\) Cf. *Ant*. 5.21, 49.
acedia.\textsuperscript{174} The thoughts that provoke us to hate and curse our enemies;\textsuperscript{175} that advise us to take advantage and to defraud;\textsuperscript{176} that are embittered against love;\textsuperscript{177} the thought that depicted in the intellect a brother who in hatred said something wicked or listened to something hateful;\textsuperscript{178} that is set in motion by the slander of the brothers and that obscures the soul with a cloud of rage;\textsuperscript{179} that thinks up treachery against a brother;\textsuperscript{180} that provokes us to strife with the brothers and prevents us from cutting off arguments.\textsuperscript{181} Wanting to repay evil for evil or abuse for abuse and not wanting, through blessings, to forget abusive and slanderous thoughts.\textsuperscript{182}

2.1.3.6 Acedia

The logismos of acedia is especially pernicious and complex, being able to include within itself other logismoi.\textsuperscript{183} Lengthy though the \textit{Praktikos} definition is, it merits quoting in full:

The demon of acedia, also called the noonday demon,\textsuperscript{184} is the most oppressive of all the demons. He attacks the monk about the fourth hour,\textsuperscript{185} and besieges the soul until the eighth hour. First of all, he makes it appear that the sun moves slowly or not at all, and that the day seems to be fifty hours long. Then he compels the monk to look constantly towards the windows, to leap out of the cell, to watch the sun to see how far it is from the ninth hour, to look this way and that in case one of the brothers....\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{174} Cf. \textit{Ant}. 5.35.
\textsuperscript{175} Cf. \textit{Ant}. 5.37.
\textsuperscript{176} Cf. \textit{Ant}. 5.43.
\textsuperscript{177} Cf. \textit{Ant}. 5.40.
\textsuperscript{178} Cf. \textit{Ant}. 5.6.
\textsuperscript{179} Cf. \textit{Ant}. 5.11.
\textsuperscript{180} Cf. \textit{Ant}. 5.20.
\textsuperscript{181} Cf. \textit{Ant}. 5.24.
\textsuperscript{182} Cf. \textit{Ant}. 5.61.
\textsuperscript{183} Cf. Sch. 1 on Ps. 139:3, PG 12.1664B.
\textsuperscript{184} Cf. Ps. 90: 6; Sinkewicz (2003: 99).
\textsuperscript{185} According to Sinkewicz (2003: 99), this would have been 10am.
\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Prakt}. 12.1-9.
Guillaumont points out that Evagrius deliberately leaves this last phrase dangling, to indicate that, whoever the brother and whatever his business, the distraction would be welcome.\(^{187}\) The definition continues:

And further, he instils in him a dislike for the place and for his state of life itself, for manual labour, and also the idea that love has disappeared from among the brothers and there is no one to console him. And should there be someone during those days who has offended the monk, this too the demon uses to add further to his dislike. He leads him on to a desire (ἄγει δὲ αὐηὸλ θαὶ εἰο ἐπηζπκίαλ) for other places where he can easily find the wherewithal to meet his needs and pursue a trade that is easier and more productive; he adds that pleasing the Lord is not a question of being in a particular place: for scripture says that the divinity can be worshipped everywhere.\(^{188}\) He joins to these suggestions the memory of his close relations and of his former life; he depicts for him the long course of his lifetime, while bringing the burdens of asceticism (τοῦς τῆς ἀσκήσεως πόλινπο) before his eyes; and, as the saying has it, he deploys every device in order to have the monk leave his cell and flee the stadium. No other demon follows immediately after this one: a state of peace and ineffable joy ensues in the soul after this struggle.\(^{189}\)

The *Antirrhētikos* entries for acedia include the thought of the demon of acedia that hates the manual labour of the skill it knows and wants to learn another by which one will be better supported and which will not be so arduous.\(^{190}\) The thought that complains about the brothers on the pretext that there is no love in them and they do not want to console those who are sad and weary.\(^{191}\) Impatiently expecting to be filled with the fruits of knowledge of truth.\(^{192}\) Loving the world and its affairs.\(^{193}\) The thought that deprives us of reading and instruction in spiritual words, leading us astray as it says, “Look, such-and-such holy old man knew only twelve Psalms, and he pleased God”.\(^{194}\) The thought that wants its family and the people of its household and thinks, “The demon of acedia is stronger than we are, and I cannot defeat the thoughts that come forth from it and oppose me.”\(^{195}\)


\(^{189}\) *Prakt*. 12.9-25.

\(^{190}\) Cf. Ant. 6.1.

\(^{191}\) Cf. Ant. 6.30.

\(^{192}\) Cf. Ant. 6.3.

\(^{193}\) Cf. Ant. 6.4; cf. also 6.23, 35.

\(^{194}\) Cf. Ant. 6.5; cf. 6.8.

\(^{195}\) Cf. Ant. 6.7, 39, 43, 44, 45, 53.
place on the pretext that the first one that it had was very foul and full of moisture so that it got all kinds of diseases from it. The soul’s thoughts that have been set in motion by acedia and want to abandon the holy path of the illustrious ones and its dwelling place. Thoughts that reject manual labour and lean the body in sleep against the wall. The thought that said that a person can acquire purity and stability apart from the monastic life; The thoughts of acedia that are in us on the pretext, “Look, our relatives are saying about us that it is not on account of God that we have left the world and embraced monasticism, but on account of our sins or our weakness, because we could not excel in the affairs of the world.”

2.1.3.7 Vainglory

Vainglory consists, in essence, in valuing human esteem and has the ability to attach itself to and thereby corrupt virtuous actions, making it particularly tenacious:

Χαιεπὸλ διαφυγείν τὸν τῆς κενοδοξίας λογισμὸν· ὃ γὰρ ποιεῖς εἰς καθαίρεσιν αὐτοῦ τὸτο ἀρχὴ σοι κενοδοξίας ἐτέρας καθίσταται.

It is difficult to escape the logismos of vainglory, for what you do to rid yourself of it becomes for you a new source of vainglory.

The Antirrhètikos entries for vainglory include the desire for the priesthood without awareness of the danger it brings; the thought that arouses in me jealousy toward the brothers who have received from the Lord the gift of knowledge; performing righteousness for the sake of human esteem. The thought that incites us to teach the broth-

---

196 Cf. Ant. 6.26; cf. also 6.15, 24, 33, 39, 44, 52, 53.
197 Cf. Ant. 6.52.
198 Cf. Ant. 6.28.
199 Cf. Ant. 6.41.
200 Cf. Ant. 6.46.
201 E.g. 8Th. 7.1-7, 16, 17; Th. 3, 30.
202 Πρακτ. 30.1-3. Cf. Πρακτ. 31: ‘I have noticed that the demon of vainglory is pursued by almost all the demons and with the fall of its pursuers it shamelessly comes forward and displays for the monk the grandeur of his virtues.’
203 Cf. Ant. 7.3; cf. 7.8, 26, 36, 40.
204 Cf. Ant. 7.2.
205 Cf. Ant. 7.4; cf. 7.24, 30, 43..
ers and the worldly people when we have not yet acquired health of the soul. The thought that compels us to talk a lot about superfluous things; that advises me sternly to withdraw from the brotherhood and cloister myself from the brothers, supposing that they lead me astray. The temptation to tell the secrets of the monastic life to worldly people. The thoughts that entice us to go into the world in order to benefit those who see us. The demon that says, “you are proficient with the gift of healing that you have received”; the vainglorious desire to learn the wisdom of the Greeks; The thought that encourages us to persuade our relatives that if we live justly in the monastic life we will be worthy of the soul’s health and knowledge of the truth. The thoughts that request gifts of healing or knowledge of God; the thoughts that endeavour through a sad appearance to reveal our fasting, as if the nous had been set free and released from thoughts of gluttony, in order that it may be bound and held captive by the thought of vainglory.

2.1.3.8 Pride

Whereas vainglory consists in valuing and desiring the esteem of other people, pride consists in an excess of self-esteem, which at its most extreme leads to the denial of God. Presumably because of its reliance upon empty self-esteem and its association with the denial of God, pride – evidently alone among the logismoi – has no matter.

The Antirrhētikos entries under pride include the following: the thought that says to me, “Look, you have become a perfect monk”; the blasphemous thought that denies God and rejects the angel that assists me; the thought that glorifies me on the pretext that

\[\text{References:}\]

206 Cf. Ant. 7.9; cf. 7.1,13, 29, 41..
207 Cf. Ant. 7.12; cf. 7.33
208 Cf. Ant. 7.11.
209 Cf. Ant. 7.17.
210 Cf. Ant. 7.18; cf. 7.20.
211 Cf. Ant. 7.35
212 Cf. Ant. 7.37.
213 Cf. Ant. 7.39.
214 Cf. Ant. 7.42.
215 Cf. Ant. 7.32; cf. 7.38.
217 Cf. Disc. 33.
218 Cf. Ant. 8.39; also 8.1, 35, 45, 58, 59.
219 Cf. Ant. 8.3; also 8.5, 7, 9, 10, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 29, 35, 41, 47, 49, 49a, 49d.
by my great strength I have cast down demons;\textsuperscript{220} the thought that advises scorn of the holy fathers on the pretext that they have not laboured in their way of life any more than we have.\textsuperscript{221} The demon that said to me that all people bless me and that I am the progenitor of sages.\textsuperscript{222} The blasphemous thought that denied the free will that is in us and said that we sin and are justified not by our own will and therefore condemnation is not decreed justly;\textsuperscript{223} the thought that denied God’s grace.\textsuperscript{224} The demon that promises to interpret the Scriptures for us.\textsuperscript{225} The thought of pride that glorifies me on the pretext that I edify souls with a stable way of life and knowledge of God;\textsuperscript{226} the thought that at a time of severe and prolonged temptation prevents me from entreating the Lord through the brothers.\textsuperscript{227} The thoughts that are puffed up against the brothers because of our fleshly birth and suppose that it is glorious.\textsuperscript{228} The demons that ‘heal’ the mature person of humility (and bring it) to the pride of the sick.\textsuperscript{229} The thought that despises a brother who does not eat and considers him to be weak on the pretext, “He is not able to stand in the battle when eating, and therefore he has given himself to fasting”;\textsuperscript{230} the thought that passed judgment on the one who eats on the pretext, “It is because he cannot control himself”;\textsuperscript{231} the thought that glorifies me on the pretext, “I am able not only not to be enslaved to the belly, but also to conquer anger”;\textsuperscript{232} the thought that exalts me on the pretext that I have attained perfection in the service of the commandments.\textsuperscript{233}

\textit{2.1.3.9 Summary}\n
The foregoing consideration of how the eight generic logismoi manifest has, in addition to revealing much about the way in which Evagrius construes the logismoi, made two

\textsuperscript{220} Cf. \textit{Ant.} 8.6, 13, 14, 22, 25, 48.
\textsuperscript{221} Cf. \textit{Ant.} 8.8.
\textsuperscript{222} Cf. \textit{Ant.} 8.15.
\textsuperscript{223} Cf. \textit{Ant.} 8.16.
\textsuperscript{224} Cf. \textit{Ant.} 8.18.
\textsuperscript{225} Cf. \textit{Ant.} 8.26.
\textsuperscript{226} Cf. \textit{Ant.} 8.30.
\textsuperscript{227} Cf. \textit{Ant.} 8.34.
\textsuperscript{228} Cf. \textit{Ant.} 8.37.
\textsuperscript{229} Cf. \textit{Ant.} 8.40.
\textsuperscript{230} Cf. \textit{Ant.} 8.53.
\textsuperscript{231} Cf. \textit{Ant.} 8.54.
\textsuperscript{232} Cf. \textit{Ant.} 8.55.
\textsuperscript{233} Cf. \textit{Ant.} 8.58; cf. also 8.59.
things plain. The first is that, as already noted, to experience a *logismos* is to experience *pathos*. Second and relatedly, the *logismoi* destabilise the movements of the *nous* and soul. This destabilisation is the psychological correlate of the instability of fire and the psychological expression of an excess of vital heat.

### 2.1.4 The sequence of the eightfold classification of most generic *logismoi*

The eightfold classification of generic *logismoi* appears in the foregoing sequence in the *Praktikos*, *Antirrhētikos* and *Vices*, although in the latter jealousy is inserted between vainglory and pride. In *Eight Thoughts*, the positions of anger and distress are reversed but otherwise the sequence remains the same. So what is its rationale? Does it relate to the derivation of the *logismoi* from the parts of the soul or to the way in which the *logismoi* are experienced? Evagrius does not tell us, but his disciple, John Cassian,\(^{235}\) lists the eight principal vices in terms which are simply a translation, with glosses, of *Praktikos* 6,\(^{236}\) then later in the same work relates a similar, although more extensive, list of vices to the three parts of the soul.\(^{237}\) In itself this might constitute grounds for attributing a similar view to Evagrius.\(^{238}\) However, the evidence reveals that while there might be some connection between the sequence and both the derivation of the *logismoi* from the parts of the soul and the way in which the *logismoi* are experienced, in both cases the connection is somewhat flexible.

#### 2.1.4.1 The derivation of the logismoi from the parts of the soul

For reasons which will become clearer in section 2.2.4, all *logismoi* would seem basically to derive from the *pathētikon* part of the soul. However, Evagrius is unclear about their specific attributions. The following list, which is not intended to be exhaustive, conveys a general sense of what he says on this subject:

\(^{234}\) See above, 2.1.1.

\(^{235}\) For discussion of the influence exercised by Evagrius upon Cassian see Marsili, S, “Giovanni Cassiano ed Evagrio Pontico”, *Studia Anselmiana* 5, Rome 1936.

\(^{236}\) Cf. *Conf.* 5:2.

\(^{237}\) *Conf.* 24: 15.

\(^{238}\) Ware, at Lubheid and Russell (1982: 63), citing Cassian, *Conf.* 24: 15, takes it to do so.
(i) Gluttony derives from the *epithumêtikon*;  
(ii) Fornication derives from the *epithumêtikon*;  
(iii) Fornication does not derive from the *epithumêtikon*;  
(iv) Avarice derives from the *epithumêtikon*;  
(v) Distress derives from the *thumos*;  
(vi) Distress affects only rational beings;  
(vii) Anger derives from the *thumos*;  
(viii) Acedia derives from the *epithumêtikon* and *thumos*;  
(ix) Acedia affects only rational beings;  
(x) Vainglory derives from the *epithumêtikon*;  
(xi) Vainglory affects only rational beings;  
(xii) Pride affects only rational beings;  
(xiii) All *logismoi* derive from the *pathêtikon* part of the soul;  
(xiv) Almost all *logismoi* derive from the *pathêtikon* part of the soul.

Propositions (i), (ii) and (iv) are what we would expect, but (iii) is not, and contradicts (ii). It comes from *Disciples 69*:

Τρεῖς εἰσιν ὁι γενικότατοι λογισμοί οἱ ἕκ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ γινόμενοι, γαστρομαργίας καὶ φιλαργυρίας καὶ κεφαλοδυίας· ἦ γὰρ βρόματα ἢ χρήματα ἢ δόξην τις ἐπιθυμεῖ.
The most generic logismoi that come from the epithumêton are three: gluttony, avarice and vainglory, for one desires food and money and esteem.

These three logismoi are those whose demons stand in the front line against the prak-tikoi.\textsuperscript{254} Thus the omission of fornication need not be taken as a denial of its epithumetic origin but as an affirmation of its dependence upon gluttony.\textsuperscript{255} Proposition (v) is again what we would expect, but seems to be contradicted by (vi). This, however, assumes that the parts of the soul that we share with animals take the same form in them as in us, and we have already seen that this is not the case since in humans the thumos and epithumêton are rational whereas in animals they are not.\textsuperscript{256} This means that there is no difficulty with either (vi) or (viii). So far there has appeared to be a straightforward correspondence between the sequence of the logismoi and the parts of the soul, but (x) dispels this impression. It does however make sense, given that vainglory is in essence the desire for esteem. Again, granting that in humans the pathêtikon part of the soul is rational, there is no difficulty with (xi). What about (xii)? Alone among the logismoi pride is nowhere assigned by Evagrius to a part of the soul. I believe however that its natural home is the logistikôn, first because it does not seem to involve, at least in any direct way, either epithumia or thumos, and second, because it seems reducible to delusion (about one’s own abilities and one’s dependence upon God), which in turn seems naturally to connect it with the ‘contemplative vice’ of false knowledge.\textsuperscript{257}

It would seem, then, that gluttony, fornication, avarice, and vainglory derive from the epithumêton; distress and anger from the thumos; acedia from both epithumêton and thumos and pride from the logistikôn. But there are passages that cast doubt on this scheme, or at least upon its rigidity. Consider first the following:

\begin{verbatim}
Τὸν λογισμὸν οἱ μὲν, ὡς ζώοις ἡμῖν ἐπισυμβαίνουσιν· οἱ δὲ ὡς ἀνθρώποις· καὶ ὡς ζώοις μὲν, ὃσοι ἀπὸ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶ καὶ θυμῷ· ὡς ἀνθρώποις δὲ, ὃσοι ἀπὸ
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{254} Cf. Th. 1.1-6; these are the logismoi with which the devil tempted Jesus in the desert; cf. Luke 4:2-13; Matt. 4:3-11.
\textsuperscript{255} E.g. Th. 1.6-7.
\textsuperscript{256} See above, 2.2.1.
\textsuperscript{257} AM 43, 124-6, 134.
λόσπης εἰς καὶ κενοδοξίας καὶ ὑπερηφανίας· οὶ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀκηδίας, καὶ ὡς ζώοις καὶ ὡς ἀνθρώποις μικτοὶ ὄντες. 258

Among logismoi, some come to us as animals, others as human beings. [Those that come] as animals are all those that derive from epithumia and thumos; [those that come to us] as human beings are all those that derive from distress, vainglory and pride; those that derive from acedia are mixed, coming to us both as animals and as human beings.

This implies that distress does not derive from the thumos nor vainglory from the epithumētikon. Disciples 177 confirms the derivation from the rational part of the soul of acedia, vainglory and pride, but omits distress:

Τριττὸν εἶδος λογισμῶν ἐκ τοῦ λογικοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τουτέστιν ἀκηδία, κενοδοξία καὶ ὑπερηφανία· ἐπισυμβάνουσι δὲ ἔπαι τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ νικήσῃ τις λογισμοῦ. 259

Three kinds of logismoi come from rational man, namely acedia, vainglory and pride, and they supervene when he has triumphed over the logismoi that come from epithumia or the thumos.

According to On Thoughts 18 it is vainglory, pride, envy and censoriousness that affect humans alone:

Among the impure demons some tempt the human person as a human being; others trouble the human person as an irrational animal. The first, when they visit us, instil within us noēmata of vainglory or pride or envy or censoriousness – these do not touch (ἄπτεται) any irrational beings. When the second class of demons draws near (προσεγγίζοντες), they move (κινοῦσι) our thumos or epithumia in a manner contrary to nature (παρὰ φύσιν). These are the pathē which we have in common with irrational animals (κοινὰ ήμῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων). 260

On Thoughts 28 confirms the association of vainglory with the logistikōn:

Ὅταν θυμον ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν νύκτωρ συνταράξαι μὴ δυνηθόσιν οἱ δαιμόνες, τὸ τηνικαύτα κενοδοξίας ἐνύπνια πλάττουσι. 261
When the demons have not been able to trouble the *thumos* or *epithumêtikon* at night, they then fabricate dreams of vainglory.

On the other hand, *Disciples* 130 associates vainglory with the *epithumêtikon*, but with some uncertainty:

Vainglory, if it is from the *epithumêtikon*, is at least the last of the [pathē] of the *epithumêtikon*, but the cause of *epithumia* in general – gluttony and fornication, avarice and vainglory, and the like – is an excess of the natural attachment God has given the soul for the body (ὁ πλεονασμός ἐστι τοῦ φυσικοῦ φύλτρου οὗ ἔδωκεν ὁ θεὸς τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα); and through not enduring want and suffering according to nature, but greatly loving oneself, love of pleasure ensues (διὰ τὸ μὴ καρτέρειν ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἐνδείᾳ καὶ πόνῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ φιλαυτεῖν, ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ φιληδονεῖν). 262

It would seem then that Evagrius was uncertain regarding the source of some of the *logismoi*. There is no doubt that he associates gluttony and fornication with the *epithumêtikon* and anger with the *thumos* and that all three affect both humans and animals. Avarice is associated with the *epithumêtikon* and distress with the *thumos*, but both affect only humans. Acedia involves the *epithumêtikon* and *thumos* and perhaps the *logistikion* too, and again affects humans alone. Vainglory and pride also affect humans alone. Evagrius says nothing about the source of pride and seems uncertain as to whether or not vainglory derives from the *epithumêtikon*. Finally, the following suggest that all logismoi derive from the *pathêtikon* part of the soul:

Πειρασμός ἐστι μοναχοῦ λογισμὸς διὰ τοῦ παθητικοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναβάς καὶ σκοτίζων τὸν νοῦν. 263

The temptation of a monk is a *logismos* that rises through the *pathêtikon* part of the soul and darkens the *nous*.

Ὑπόθεσαι τὸ πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐξ οὗ γεννᾶται ὁ ἐμπαθῆς λογισμὸς. 264

*Pathos* lies below in the soul and from it comes the *empathês logismos*.

262 *Disc.* 130; cf. *Disc.* 41: ‘The one who has put away (ἀποθέμενος) pathos for the body, that is, that of self-love, will easily put away the other pathê as well, such as anger, sadness and so forth.’

263 *Prakt.* 75.

264 *Disc.* 49.3-4. See below, 4.5.
The intelligible arrow is the evil *logismos*, which is constituted by the *pathētikon* part of the soul.\(^{265}\)

It is when the *nous* approaches the intelligible that it is no longer united to the *logismos* that comes from the *pathētikon* part of the soul.\(^{266}\)

It is said that the *nous* sees things that it knows and that it does not see things that it does not know; and because of this it is not all thoughts that the knowledge of God forbids it, but those which assail it from *thumos* and *epithumia* and those which are against nature.\(^{267}\)

But chapter 3 of *On Thoughts* suggests otherwise with its use of ‘almost’ (σχεδὸν):

> Ἐκ γὰρ τῶν δύο τούτων παθῶν πάντες οἱ δαιμονιώδεις σχεδὸν συνίστανται λογισμοὶ οί τὸν νοῦν ἐμβάλλοντες «εἰς δλέθρον καὶ ἀπώλειαν».\(^{268}\)

From [the *epithumētikon* and *thumos*] are constituted almost all the demonic *logismoi* that cast the *nous* ‘into ruin and destruction.’\(^{269}\)

In sum, it would seem that although Evagrius generally imputes the *logismoi* to the *pathētikon* part of the soul, some – the possible candidates being avarice, distress, acedia, vainglory and pride - derive either wholly or partly from the *logistikôn*. The inconsistencies in Evagrius’ associations of the *logismoi* with the parts of the soul perhaps represent inconsistencies or developments in his thought. But it is possible too that they reflect the nature of the subject-matter as he sees it, in particular the lack of any clear boundary between the cognitive and the affective in his psychology given that the three parts of the soul are but progressively more fallen aspects of the *nous*, such that he is seeking only the degree of precision that discourse about the *logismoi* admits of. Also, while he clearly values rigour and consistency, his final appeal is always to experience.\(^{270}\) Consequently his use of classificatory schemata retains a degree of flexibility,

\(^{265}\) *KG* 6.53; cf. *KG* 4.32: ‘The lobe of the liver (Ex. 29:13) is the first thought that is constituted by the concupiscient part of the soul’.

\(^{266}\) *KG* 6.55.

\(^{267}\) *KG* 6.83.

\(^{268}\) *Th*. 3.5-7.

\(^{269}\) 1 Tim. 6:9.

such that while he will have reason to assign a given logismos to a given part of the soul, his doing so should not be taken as either fixed or exclusive.

2.1.4.2 The relation between the sequence of the eightfold classification of most generic logismoi and how they are experienced

Broadly speaking, there are two timescales over which a person will experience the logismoi: the local one of his daily experience and the global one of his lifetime. Evagrius’ focus is upon the former; that is, upon the causal relations between the logismoi as experienced day to day. He follows the account of Jesus’ temptation in the desert in assigning priority to three:

Among the demons who set themselves in opposition to praktikê, the ones ranged first in battle are those entrusted with the appetites of gluttony, those who make suggestions of avarice to us and those who entice us to seek human esteem (τῶν ἀντικειμένων δαμόνων τῇ πρακτικῇ, πρῶτοι κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον συνίστανται οἱ τάς γαστριμαργίας ὀρέξεις πεπιστευμένοι καὶ οἱ τὴν φιλαργυρίαν ἡμῖν ὑποβάλλοντες καὶ οἱ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαλούμενοι). All the other demons march along behind these and in their turn take up the people wounded by them (οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι πάντες κατόπιν τούτων βαδίζουσιν τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων ταραχομένους διαδεχόμενοι). For example, it is not possible to fall into the hands of the spirit of fornication unless one has fallen under the influence of gluttony; nor is it possible to trouble (παράξει) the thumos, unless one is fighting for food or wealth or esteem. And it is not possible to escape the demon of distress, if one is deprived of all these things, or is unable to attain them. Nor will one escape pride...if one has not banished avarice, the root of all evils...To put it briefly, no one can fall into a demon’s power, unless he has first been wounded by those in the front line.

On the causal priority of gluttony, avarice and vainglory, Williams notes that

[these three passions] are the three fundamental ways in which we can misjudge our relation with the material world, three forms of seeing physical reality in terms of pleasure or power – the direct absorption of matter in order to please the stomach, the accumulation of wealth of whatever kind to create false security, re-

---

271 Cf. Disc. 97.
272 1 Tim. 6:10.
273 Th. 1.1-17.
liance on worldly rather than heavenly strength, and the use of other people’s opinions to guarantee our own sense of worth.\(^{274}\)

Some of these causal dependences that Evagrius here specifies are familiar: to succumb to \textit{logismoi} of gluttony is to invite those of fornication.\(^{275}\) \textit{Logismoi} of distress often result from the frustration of desires, including those related to anger. Others are new: anger – a troubled \textit{thumos} – relates to the desire for food, wealth or esteem,\(^{276}\) while pride has roots in avarice.\(^{277}\) And some connections are omitted, for example the fact that \textit{logismoi} of distress can lead to those of acedia,\(^{278}\) those of avarice to those of vainglory and the latter to those of pride,\(^{279}\) distress or fornication.

The causal relations among the \textit{logismoi} are also the subject of a chain of three aphorisms in \textit{Reflections}; that these refer to the everyday experience of the \textit{logismoi} is indicated by the quotation from the Book of Proverbs in the third:

\begin{quote}
Τὸν λογισμὸν οἱ μὲν ἠγοῦνται, οἱ δὲ ἔπονται· καὶ ἠγοῦνται μὲν οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ἐπονται δὲ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ θυμοῦ.
\end{quote}

Among \textit{logismoi}, there are some that lead and there are some that follow: those that derive from \textit{epithumia} are in the lead and those that derive from \textit{thumos} follow after.

\(^{274}\) Williams (2007: 4).

\(^{275}\) See above, 2.4; 3.4.1, 2.

\(^{276}\) Cf. \textit{Pry.} 27: ‘Desire provides material for anger, and the latter in turn troubles the intellectual eye, spoiling the state of prayer’. \textit{Also Disc.} 166: ‘\textit{Logismoi} that derive from \textit{epithumia} are in the forefront, those that derive from the \textit{thumos} follow after. And so all \textit{logismoi} that produce in us love of the world and the things in it (cf. 1 John 2:15) derive from \textit{epithumia}, but with the privation of these things [the \textit{logismoi} from the \textit{thumos} naturally supervene, so that if we neither loved nor desired [the things in the world] we would never become angry through being deprived of them. If therefore you see someone angry or resentful or distressed or jealous, find out by which of the \textit{pathē} of \textit{epithumia} he has previously been overpowered.’ (Οἱ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας λογισμοὶ προηγοῦμενόι ἐστιν, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ θυμικοῦ ἐκόμισον. Ὁςοι οὖν λογισμοὶ ἐγάπησαν ἐμπιστευθέντες ἦν πρὸς τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν· καὶ ἐκ τῶν περικοπῶν τῶν ἐπιθυμικῶν ἐπιστασθήσονται, ἢ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιθυμικῶν ἐπιπονηθήσονται, οὗτος ἀν ὀργιζομένου ποτε, στερησθήσονται τοῦτον. Ἐὰν οὖν ἤδη ταῦτα ὀργιζομένοι ἢ μυρισκακοῦντα ἢ λυποῦμενοι ἢ φθονοῦντα, γίνοσθε ποιοῦ τῶν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παθῶν προηγηθῆσθε.)


\(^{278}\) See above, 3.4.4. Interestingly, acedia is not mentioned in \textit{On Thoughts}.

\(^{279}\) Cf. \textit{Th.} 21.

\(^{280}\) Some manuscripts read ὑπεξεθαλίας, but the reading ἐπιθυμίας is supported by two Greek manuscripts and the Syriac version, and I agree with Sinkewicz as to its greater plausibility; cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 278, n.26; 304).

\(^{281}\) \textit{Rfl.} 41.
Among the *logismoi* that lead, some in turn are in the forefront, while others follow on: those in the forefront come from gluttony and those that follow derive from fornication.

Among the *logismoi* that follow the first, some lead and some follow: those of distress lead and those of anger follow, according to the Proverb, ‘A hurtful word rouses anger’.

The second aphorism’s subdivision of the *logismoi* that lead into those in the forefront and those that follow on is new, as is the idea of *logismoi* that derive from fornication. Both appear to be unique to it. The third is inconsistent with Evagrius’ claim that distress is constituted from *logismoi* of anger and results from the frustration of a desire for revenge, although consistent with the sequence of the *logismoi* in the *Praktikos, Vices* and *Antirrhētikos*. All three confirm the causal priority of epithumetic *logismoi* over those deriving from the *thumos*.

Just as gluttony forms the natural beginning of the sequence in experiential terms, so vainglory and pride form its natural conclusion:

Alone among the *logismoi*, the *logismoi* of vainglory and pride supervene upon the defeat of the remaining *logismoi*.

---

282 Rfl. 42.
283 Rfl. 43.
284 Prov. 15.1.
285 Cf. 8Th. 5.1.
286 Rfl. 57.
Chapter 21 of *On Thoughts* gives an example of how one *logismos* can lead to another, in this case avarice into vainglory and the latter into pride. In doing so it underlines the independence of such trains of thought from the eightfold sequence.

It appears to me that the demon of avarice is the most varied and ingenious in deceit (πάνω ποικιλος...πρός ἀπάτην ἐνμήχανος). Often constrained by the most severe renunciation, he immediately pretend to be the administrator and the friend of the poor; he generously receives guests who are not yet there; he sends assistance to others who are in need; he visits the city’s prisons and he buys those who are being sold; he attaches himself (κολλάται) to wealthy women and indicates to them who should be treated well; and those who have acquired an ample purse he advises to renounce it. And deceiving the soul little by little in this way, he encompasses it (αὐτὴν...περιβάλλει) with the *logismoi* of avarice and hands it over (παξαδίδει) to the demon of vainglory. This demon introduces a crowd of people who glorify the Lord for these arrangements and certain people who gradually speak among themselves about the priesthood; he then predicts the death of the incumbent priest and adds that he should not flee after accomplishing so many things. In this way, the wretched *nous*, now bound (ἐλευθερών) by these *logismoi* attacks those people opposed (to his priesthood), but those offering acceptance he readily lavishes with gifts and approves their good sense; but those who are rivals he hands over to the magistrates and demands that they be expelled from the city.287

Here Evagrius exposes the hidden motivations behind apparently philanthropic fantasies. What we would call self-deception is in the first instance, the demons’ deception of us; only if we fail to recognise it do we then fall prey to self-deception. Here they exploit the monk’s philanthropic concerns to seduce him into daydreams in which he begins by acting upon them and thereby benefits their objects but ends up in daydreams of self-aggrandizement and skulduggery. Nor is this the end of it:

Then as these *logismoi* are present and churning around within (ἔνδον ὄντων...καὶ στρεφομένων), immediately the demon of pride appears, forming continual lightning flashes in the air of the cell and sending forth winged dragons, and finally provoking the loss of reason (στέρηται φρενῶν).288

In terms of how the *logismoi* are experienced day to day, then, gluttony is the most fundamental in that succumbing to it causes vulnerability to all the other *logismoi*: to con-

trol the stomach is to diminish the pathē whereas to accede to its demands is to give in-
crease to pleasures. At the other end of the sequence, defeat of the preceding logismoi
paves the way for vainglory and pride. So there are certain predictable causal connec-
tions among the logismoi but they do not always correspond to the sequence of the
eightfold classification. In particular the priority of gluttony, avarice and vainglory
bears no obvious relation to it.

What about the way in which the logismoi are experienced over a lifetime? Will a per-
son have to begin by overcoming those of gluttony, then deal with those of fornication,
then avarice, and so forth, until finally he is confronted with pride? Both Guillaumont
and Ware note that the sequence of the eightfold classification reflects in a general way
the monk’s spiritual development. As Ware puts it, ‘beginners contend against the
grosser and more materialistic sins...those in the middle of the journey are confronted
by the more inward temptations of discouragement and irritability...the more advanced,
already initiated into contemplation, still need to guard themselves against the most sub-
tle and “spiritual” of the vices, vainglory and pride. Both however stress the general-
ity of this schema, Guillaumont noting that although the sequence has to some extent an
empirical basis it is also largely a matter of convention since for Evagrius the reality is
ultimately not susceptible of such systematic representation. Both of these interpret-
atations are, in my view, correct, as is Williams’ observation that for Evagrius as for Cas-
sian, ‘the logismoi...are not a disconnected assemblage of regrettable tendencies, but a
complex pattern of moral vulnerability. The list of the eight passions or thoughts is less
of a catalogue than a genealogy, beginning from the most elementary impulse to misuse
the material world we inhabit, and traced through to the most sophisticated of self-
delusions.”

289 Cf. 8Th. 1.2.
290 Ware (1982: 62-3). Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 93);
291 Ibid.
2.1.5 Summary

What Evagrius calls the *logismoi* play a key role in his anthropology and psychology. This section has sought to reconstruct and explain the theory implicit in his use of the term. It began by noting that *apatheia*, being constituted by the practical virtues,\(^{293}\) is cultivated by choosing virtue in preference to vice and that for a monk this means mastering his responses to the *logismoi*. It then examined Evagrius’ use of the term *logismos*. It noted that, following Origen, he recognises that *logismoi* can be of angelic or human provenance as well as demonic, but that in practice he reserves the term for the latter type. It was noted that (demonic) *logismoi* are always associated with *pathos*, always involve *noēmata* of sensible objects, frequently exercise *de facto* agency, and induce us to construct on the basis of our desires fictional worlds, populated by phantoms, in which those desires can be satisfied. Evagrius’ concept of the ‘matter’ of *logismoi* was discussed and identified as that which inspires and gives plausibility to the *logismoi* and thereby invigorates the fictional worlds that they lead us to construct. Then his eightfold classification of generic *logismoi* was examined, including consideration of its immediate precedents and of the individual *logismoi*. Because of the close association between the *logismoi* and *pathos*, this revealed the sort of phenomena that Evagrius regards as *pathē* and how the *logismoi* destabilise the movements of the *nous* and soul, this destabilisation being the psychological expression of excessive vital heat. Finally, the rationale for the eightfold classification of generic *logismoi* was discussed, first in terms of the derivation of the *logismoi* from the parts of the soul, it being concluded that for the most part there is no straightforward relation between them and that this reflects the lack of a clear-cut boundary between the cognitive and the affective in Evagrius’ psychology;\(^{294}\) and, second, in terms of the relation between the sequence and the way in which the *logismoi* are experienced, both day-to-day and across a person’s lifetime. It was noted that while the sequence is largely a matter of convention, it is also a genealogy that maps the progression from the most primitive ways of erring in our interaction with the external world to the most sophisticated.

\(^{293}\) Cf. Sch. 293 on Prov. 24:31.
\(^{294}\) See below, 2.2.4.
2.2  

**Pathos**

*Pathos* involves the directedness of the *nous* toward the sensible world and so away from God. Each time a person succumbs to it he mirrors the primordial fall of the *logikos* that is his essence. The cognitive instigators and correlates of *pathos* are the *logismoi*, consideration of which has, accordingly, comprehensively illustrated the sort of phenomena that Evagrius regards as *pathē*. This section looks at how *pathos* was understood by some earlier thinkers before considering how Evagrius construes it in theoretical terms. Then the association between *pathos* and *noēmata* is examined. The section concludes with an analysis of how *pathos* is aroused.

2.2.1  

**A preliminary understanding of *pathos***

The sense of the term *pathos* assumed in pagan philosophical discussions of *apatheia* and *metriopatheia* tends to be treated by modern commentators as roughly coextensive with that of our ‘emotion’ or ‘passion’. But in fact *pathos* has a far wider range of connotations and the fit between it and these modern terms is poor. Long and Sedley draw attention to this in the case of the Stoics, noting that for them *pathos* is ‘an unhealthy state of mind, not synonymous with emotion in ordinary language.’\(^{295}\) This is equally true of Evagrius, for whom, as we have seen, the *pathē* include not just occurrent emotions such as anger, sadness and anxiety, but moods such as boredom and listlessness; dispositions such as irascibility; all desires associated with food, sex and money, and vices such as avarice and spiritual pride.

So what did the term *pathos* mean to the ancient Greeks? As Konstan notes, the word *pathos* derives from the verb *paschô*, meaning “to suffer” or “to experience”, and, like the Latin *patior*, to which it is related, derives from a prehistoric stem *pa* which has the basic sense of “suffer”. Via *patior* it is related to the English words “passion” and “passive.”\(^{296}\) Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen note that

---


\(^{296}\) Konstan (2006: 3).
The basic meaning of the term *pathos* is not ‘emotion’; *pathos* stands for a much more general notion which covers all accidental and contingent changes that happen to somebody in contrast to what he or she actively does. The broad sense of *pathos*, familiar from Aristotle’s *Categories* and *Metaphysics*, comes out in translations such as ‘affection’, ‘experience’, ‘undergoing’ or ‘attribute’ as opposed to ‘emotion’ or even ‘passion’.\(^{297}\)

But in addition it can, as Aristotle makes clear, have a distinctively negative timbre: the third of the four definitions of it that he offers in the *Metaphysics* reads, ‘especially, injurious alterations and movements, and, above all, painful injuries’ (ἐτι τούτων μᾶλλον αἵ βλαβθαὶ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ κινήσεις, καὶ μάλιστα αἱ λυπηραὶ βλάβαι).\(^{298}\) Konstan summarises its meaning as follows:

In classical Greek, *pathos* may refer more generally to what befalls a person, often in the negative sense of an accident or misfortune, although it may also bear the neutral significance of a condition or state of affairs. In philosophical language *pathos* sometimes signifies a secondary quality as opposed to the essence of a thing (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1022b15-21; Urmson 1990: 126-7).\(^{299}\) Psychologically, it may denote a mental activity or phenomenon such as remembering (Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscencia*, 449b4-7; cf. 449b24-5 for memory as the *pathos* of formerly perceived or contemplated things).\(^{300}\)

So *pathos* carries connotations of passivity and suffering; of being a contingent or accidental state which arises in reaction to an external stimulus toward which it is consequently directed and which is likely to be injurious to the person concerned, and which is something that befalls him rather than something he actually does. And this in essence is how philosophers construe it in relation to *apatheia* and *metriopatheia*. Regardless of which of these they consider the proper goal for man, and regardless too of the other issues which became embroiled in the associated controversies, it would seem that these basic characteristics of *pathos* are agreed upon.

There is however one key point at which this philosophical understanding of *pathos* departs from its more general cluster of meanings: as evidenced by the fact that philoso-

---

300 Konstan (2006: 3-4).
phers debated whether man’s goal should be *apatheia* or *metriopatheia*, they maintained that our susceptibility to *pathos* could be modified and denied that it is something that simply befalls us as opposed to something that we do. The philosophical view, although variously developed, is that the *pathē* are in principle, if not always in practice, under our control. The bridge between what is actually possible and what is possible in theory is formed by the training of the soul, of which more below.\(^{301}\) This being the case, the association of *pathos* with passivity needs to be qualified: the soul can be trained not to succumb to *pathos* and a soul thus trained can avoid passivity in respect of it. So although *pathos* in this context retains its connotations of passivity and suffering; of being a contingent or accidental state which arises in reaction to an external stimulus toward which it is consequently directed, and of likely being injurious to the person concerned, the proposition that it is something that befalls a person as opposed to something he does is rejected.

All of these features of *pathos* are to be found in Evagrius’ understanding of it. A brief consideration of its principal antecedents - the views of the Stoics, Clement of Alexandria and Origen - will set it in context.

According to Stobaeus,

\[
\text{πάθος δ’ εἶναι φασίν ὄρμην πλεονάζονσαν καὶ ἀπεειθῇ τῷ αἰρούντι λόγῳ ἡ κύνησιν ψυχής <ἄλογον> παρὰ φύσιν (εἶναι δὲ πάθη πάντα τοῦ ἣγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς).}^{302} 
\]

[The Stoics] say that *pathos* is impulse which is excessive and disobedient to the dictates of reason, or a movement of the soul which is irrational and contrary to nature; and that all *pathē* belong to the soul’s *hēgemonikon*.\(^{303}\)

What does this mean? For the Stoics a *pathos* is a movement of the soul in virtue of being an impulse. It is characterised by excess. As an impulse it is generated by assent to a proposition and can therefore be identified with a judgement ascribing a truth value to it. In this sense, a *pathos* is a value judgement. It is however a false one since it ascribes positive or negative value to things whose value is indifferent. As false judgements

---

\(^{301}\) See below, 4.6.


\(^{303}\) By ‘the Stoics’ here and below is meant ‘orthodox Stoics’.
pathē are irrational in the sense of being disobedient to right reason,\textsuperscript{304} and are contrary to nature because it is natural for man, as a rational animal, to follow right reason.\textsuperscript{305} The association of pathos with excess is closely connected with its irrationality. Galen reports the following elucidation by Chrysippus of what is meant by saying that the impulse constituting a pathos is excessive:

When someone walks in accordance with his impulse, the movement of his legs is not excessive but commensurate with the impulse, so that he can stop or change whenever he wants to. But when people run in accordance with their impulse, this sort of thing no longer happens. The movement of their legs exceeds their impulse, so that they are carried away and unable to change obediently, as soon as they have started to do so. Something similar, I think, takes place with impulses, owing to their going beyond the rational proportion. The result is that when someone has the impulse he is not obedient to reason. The excess in running is called ‘contrary to the impulse’, but the excess in the impulse is called ‘contrary to reason’. For the proportion of a natural impulse is what accords with reason and goes only so far as reason itself thinks right.\textsuperscript{307}

Impulses have a ‘proper and natural proportion’ (καθ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ φυσικὴν τῶν ὀρμῶν συμμετρίαν).\textsuperscript{308} An impulse that accords with this will be perfectly obedient to reason whereas one that exceeds it will not. Chrysippus illustrates this with reference to the actions of walking and running. When a person walks, the movement of his body is fully under his control. But when he runs his control over his movement is compromised such that there will be an interval between his decision to stop running and his actually doing so. An impulse of ‘proper and natural proportion’ is like the

\textsuperscript{304} Cf. Inwood (1985: 157).
\textsuperscript{305} Cf. Galen, \textit{PHP} 4:2.10ff, \textit{SVF} 3: 462, \textit{LS} 65J.
\textsuperscript{306} \textit{PHP} 4:2.10-18, \textit{SVF} 3.463, part; \textit{LS} 65J.
\textsuperscript{307} Trans. Long and Sedley.
\textsuperscript{308} Ibid.
action of walking, wholly and immediately obedient to reason, whereas an excessive impulse is like the action of running, beyond the agent’s immediate control.

Proneness to pathē arises from poor condition of the soul; specifically, poor pneumatic tension of the hegemonikon.309 This, together with the irrationality and excessiveness of the impulses which constitute pathē is why they are regarded as ailments (ἀρρωστήματα). Chrysippus cites in this connection the case of Menelaus who had resolved that it would be correct to kill Helen when he confronted her at Troy, but when the time came was overcome by her beauty so that he failed to act in accordance with his resolve.310 “Menelaus acted on what he saw to be a bad reason because his whole character was weak; an impulse was excessive in him which a stronger character might have resisted.”311 The false opinion that possessions, for example, are a good is not yet an ailment, but it becomes so when it becomes love of property (φιλοχρηματία) and money (φιλαργυρία), that is, when it acquires an affective charge,312 people with unhealthy souls being disposed to this happening. Thus Galen reports Chrysippus as comparing the souls of inferior men with bodies which are especially prone to illness.313

The Stoic understanding of pathos is taken up by both Clement of Alexandria and Origen. Clement defines it as follows:

ὁξκὴ κὲλ νὖλ θνξὰ δηαλνίαο ἐπί ηὴ ἠ ἀπό ηνπ· πάζνο δὲ πιενλάδνπζα ὁξκὴ ἠ ὑπεξηείλνπζα ηὰ θαηὰ ηὸλ ιόγνλ κέηξα , ἠ ὁξκὴ ἐθθεξνκέλε θαὶ ἀπεηζὴο ιόγῳ· παξὰ θύζηλ νὖλ θίλεζηο ςπρ῅ο θαηὰ ηὴλ πξὸο ηὸλ ιόγνλ ἀπείζεηαλ ηὰ πάζε .314

Impulse is the motion of the dianoia to or from something. Pathos is an excessive impulse that overreaches the measures of reason, or impulse unbridled and disobedient to reason. Pathê, then, are a movement of the soul contrary to nature, in disobedience to reason.

Origen commences the third book of the De Principiis with an account of the Stoic theory of action, of which their theory of pathos is an aspect. So although he does not say

312 PHP 4:5, SVF 3.480, part; LS 65L.
313 PHP 5:2, Posidonius fr. 163, part; LS 65R. Cf. Stobaeus 2.93 (SVF 3.421); LS 65S.
314 Strom. 2.13.59.6.
so directly, it can be assumed that he too would regard *pathos* as excessive impulse; he certainly associates it with excess. Arguing that even in the absence of demonic influence we are capable of exceeding due measure and moderation in our appetites for food, drink and sex, he notes that

My own opinion is that the same process of reasoning can be applied to the rest of the natural movements (*naturalibus motibus*), such as covetousness, anger, sorrow or any others whatever, which by the fault of intemperance exceed the limits of their natural measure (*per intemperantiae vitium modum mensurae naturalis excedunt*).315

He continues:

*Initia quidem et velut quaedam semina peccatorum ab his rebus, quae in usu naturaliter habentur, accipimus; cum vero indulserimus ultra quam satis est et non resitterimus adversum primos intemperantiae motus, tunc primi huius delicii accipiens locum virtus inimica instigat et perurget omni modo studens profusius dilatatere peccata, nobis quidem hominibus occasiones et initia praebentibus peccatorum, inimicis autem potestatibus latius ea et longius et si fieri potest absque ullo fine propagantibus. Ita denique in avaritiam lapsus efficitur, cum primo homines parum quid pecuniae desiderant, deinde augescente vitio cupiditas increscit. Post haec iam etiam cum caecitas menti ex passione successerit, inimicis virtutibus suggerentibus ac perurgentibus, pecunia iam non desideratur, sed rapitur et vi aut etiam sanguinis humani profusione conquiritur.*316

We derive the beginnings and what we may call the seeds of sin from those desires which are given to us naturally for our own use. But when we indulge these to excess and offer no resistance to the first movements towards intemperance, then the hostile power, seizing the opportunity of this first offence, incites and urges us on in every way, striving to extend the sins over a larger field; so that while we men supply the occasions and beginnings of our sins, the hostile powers spread them far and wide and if possible endlessly. It is thus that the fall into avarice at last takes place, men first longing for a little money and then increasing in greed as the vice grows. Afterwards their *pathos* is succeeded by a mental blindness and, with the hostile powers stimulating and urging them on, money is now not merely longed for but even seized by force or acquired through the shedding of human blood.

---

315 *DP* 3.2.2 (R).
316 Ibid.
It can be noted that here Origen uses Seneca’s term for the first stage in the arousal of anger, namely ‘first movements’ (*primi motus*).^{317}

### 2.2.2 Evagrius’ understanding of *pathos*

*Prima facie* Evagrius’ understanding of *pathos* would seem to have much in common with that of the Stoics. He would agree that a *pathos* is excessive and disobedient to reason, irrational and contrary to nature, and that in a sense all *pathē* belong to the *hêgemonikon*. Like the Stoics he regards a *pathos* as a movement of the soul; indeed, for him the association of *pathos* with movement is fundamental, firstly because each episode of *pathos* mirrors the primordial fall of the *logikoi* from God, and secondly because *pathos* is intrinsically destabilising in respect of the *nous*. Unlike them, however, he does not speak of *pathos* as an impulse.^{318} Nor does he speak of it as generated by an assent to a proposition or as a judgement, although he might agree that it could in principle be analysed in this way due to his belief that the *pathêtikon* part of the soul is simply thickened *nous*, meaning that for him as for the Stoics the human soul is – in principle at least - entirely rational. Like the Stoics, Evagrius believes the quality of human rationality to be variable; for them this is due to the *tonos* of the *pneuma*; for him, to the ‘thickening’ of the *nous*. Evagrius would certainly agree that the judgement giving rise to a *pathos* represents a false evaluation, but he would understand this as a tacit preference for the sensible world over God. Because he holds the three parts of the soul to be aspects of the *nous*, and because he identifies the *hêgemonikon* with the *nous*, he could agree that all *pathē* belong to the *hêgemonikon*. Both Evagrius and the Stoics view human irrationality as a change to rationality rather than its absence, although, unlike Evagrius, orthodox Stoicism rejects the theory of psychic partition, and both regard human irrationality, and therefore *pathos*, as contrary to nature and as a malady of the soul.^{319}

---

^{317} *De Ira* 2.4.1.

^{318} The word *hormê* occurs only five times in his Greek corpus: in the expressions ‘impassioned impulse’ (ὄρμης ἐμπαθοῦς; *8Th*. 1.35) and ‘licentious impulse’ (ὀρμήν ἄκολαστον; *8Th*. 2.11); to denote the onrush of fire (ὄρμη πυρός; *AV*. 37); assaults by the demons (τὰς τῶν δαμόνων ὀρμάς; *Prakt*. 77.1) and attacks by the impious (ὀρμὰς ἀσεβῶν ἐπερχομένας; *Th*. 27.31).

^{319} E.g. *PHP* 4.5.21-5 (*SVF* 3.480, part); *LS* 65L.
Evagrius nowhere defines *pathos* but attention to his writings reveals that for him it retains its traditional associations with excess, passivity and changeability in respect of an external influence, directedness to a causative external stimulus and injuriousness to the agent, and for him too the agent is responsible for his *pathê*. The passivity and changeability in respect of an external influence characteristic of *pathos* are properties of the *empathêes nous* in relation to the sensible world. *Pathos* renders the *nous* passive and changeable in relation to the external world by ‘binding’ it to it.\(^{320}\) *Disciples* 112 reports the following teaching:

> Οὐ ηὸ ἔρεηλ πξάγαηα βιάπηεη ἟κᾶο, ἀιὰ ηὸ ἐκπαζ῵ο ἔρεηλ· πιενλάζαζα γὰξ ἕηνῦ ἀγξνῦ κέξηκλα θαὶ ἕ πξὸο ηὴλ γπλαῖθα ἀιινηξίνπο η῅ο γλώζεσο ἕκᾶο πνηεῖ. Ὁἱ νὖλ ἅγηνη γπλαῖθαο ἔρνληεο θαὶ πινῦηνλ νὐδὲλ ἐβιάβεζαλ, θαὶ γὰξ ὁ Ἰὼβ ἑὰ ηέθλα ἀπνιέζαο ἐθηινζόθεη θαὶ ηνὺο θίινπο δησξζνῦην, ἅηε πάζε κὴ ἔρσλ.

It is not the possession of objects that harms us, but their impassioned possession, because when the worry of a farmer\(^{322}\) or love for a wife\(^{323}\) have become excessive, they render us strangers to knowledge. The saints who had wives and wealth did not suffer any harm, so Job, when he had lost his children, philosophized and corrected his friends since he did not have *pathê*.

This echoes the Stoic view according to which virtue is good, vice is evil and all else is indifferent. Things themselves do not have the capacity to harm us; what causes the damage is our attitude toward them.\(^{324}\) The ‘worry of a farmer’ and ‘love for a wife’ allude to the Parable of the Banquet at Luke 14:16-24. The first guest invited to the banquet declines the invitation because he has to go to his field, the second because of his oxen and the third because of his wife. The banquet symbolises the Kingdom of God,\(^{325}\) and the point being made is that in order to follow Jesus a person must be prepared to renounce all else.\(^{326}\) Evagrius’ point is that a person’s feelings for a thing become a *pathos* when that thing takes precedence for him over the Kingdom of God; that is, when those feelings have become excessive. The Kingdom of God, for him, is

\(^{320}\) Cf. *Thoughts* 40.3-5; *Rfl.* 23; see below, 2.2.3.

\(^{321}\) *Disc.* 112.


\(^{324}\) Cf., e.g., Epictetus, *Ench.* 5: ‘It is not things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about them.’


knowledge of the Holy Trinity,\textsuperscript{327} hence the pathē ‘render us strangers to knowledge.’ He invokes the example of Job to illustrate the correct attitude, one that finds echoes in both Epictetus and Origen.\textsuperscript{328} It should however be noted that, given his emphasis on the warfare \textit{kata dianoian},\textsuperscript{329} the excessiveness of \textit{pathos} finds expression not only in the decision, say, to go to the theatre instead of to church, or in a person’s loss of faith in the face of adversity. It is at play in every instance of temptation. Given the necessity of \textit{apatheia} to the practice of contemplation and, ultimately, to redemption, the very fact that a person has to struggle to resist the temptation to eat when hungry, or the temptation to allow \textit{logismoi} of fornication to linger, shows that his love for God must compete for his attention with the pleasures of food and sex.

While \textit{Disciples} 112 defines \textit{pathos} in terms of excess, \textit{Disciples} 130 locates its origin in excess:

\begin{quote}
Τὸ δὲ αἴηηνλ η῅ο θαζόινπ ἐπηζπκίαο, γαζηξηκαξγίαο ηε θαὶ πνξλείαο, θηιαξγπξίαο ηε θαὶ θελνδνμίαο, ὁ πιενλαζκόο ἐζηη ηνῦ θπζηθνῦ θίιηξνπ νὗ ἔδσθελ ὁ ζεὸο ηῆ ςπρῆ πξὸο ηὸ ζ hakkα.
\end{quote}

The cause of \textit{epithumia} in general – gluttony and fornication, avarice and vanity and so forth – is an excess of the natural love that God has given the soul for the body.\textsuperscript{331}

Like the \textit{logismoi}, \textit{pathos} has its physiological source in an excess of the body’s vital heat, the result of conforming one’s intake of food to the body’s insatiable desire for

\textsuperscript{327} Cf. \textit{Prakt.} 3.
\textsuperscript{328} Cf. Epictetus, \textit{Ench.} 3: ‘If you kiss your own child or wife, say to yourself that you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be disturbed (οὐ ταραχθῆσθαι)’. At \textit{C.Matt.} 10:24.1-26 Origen, discussing sicknesses of the soul (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρρωστήματα), interprets Paul’s reference to the ‘sickly’ (ἄρρωστοι) at 1 Cor. 11:30 as meaning those who ‘instead of loving God “with all their soul and all their heart and all their mind,” love money, or a little glory, or wife, or children’ (ἅντι τοῦ τῶν Θεοῦ ἀγαπῶν, ἀγαπῶντες ἀρρώστα ἢ δοξάζωντες ἢ γόνωμα ἢ παῖδας). He alludes to the Parable of the Banquet at \textit{Ex.Mart.} 37 in urging Ambrose and Protecetus not to shrink from martyrdom.
\textsuperscript{329} Cf. \textit{Prakt.} 48; see above, 3.0.
\textsuperscript{330} \textit{Disc.} 130.2-6.
\textsuperscript{331} At \textit{Disc.} 41 Evagrius identifies ὁ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα πάθος with self-love (φιλωστία). If ‘an excess of the natural love that God has given the soul for the body’ is self-love then this passage echoes \textit{Reflections} 53: ‘First of all [the \textit{logismoi}] is the \textit{logismos} of self-love, after which come the eight.’ However, at \textit{Disc.} 57 Evagrius distinguishes between self-love as ‘the mother of all [the \textit{logismoi}]’ and ‘the enemy of the soul, the flesh (τῆς ἐγκαθίσθης τῆς ψυχῆς, τουτέστι τῆς σαρκός)’; cf. Rom. 8:7.
food. So Evagrius could mean one or both of two things here. He could be saying that an excessive love for the body makes us want to conform our eating to its desire for food, blinding us to the fact that the body’s true welfare lies in the health of the soul and leading us to fuel the *epithumétiemon*. Or he could be making the more general point that an excessive love for the body spills over into an excessive attachment to external things, making them seem more important than God. In both cases *pathos* retains its traditional association with excess.

For Evagrius, then, *pathos* involves an attachment to corporeal creation which amounts to a *de facto* preference for it over God and which is therefore excessive. This attachment can be seen as the distorted image of the natural love of the *nous* for God. Likewise, the passivity of the *empathês nous* in relation to the sensible world can be seen as the distorted image of its natural receptivity to God. The changeability in relation to the sensible world that *pathos* represents for the *nous* is, like the passivity, a consequence of the attachment to corporeal creation that it constitutes, since that attachment subjects the *nous* to corporeal creation’s changeability. And the attachment of the *nous* to the sensible world, along with its passivity and changeability in relation to it, comprises the directedness to a causative external stimulus characteristic of *pathos*. This directedness is reflected at the psychological level by the facts that the *pathê* are naturally set in motion by the senses (*ὑπὸ ηῴλαῖζεται πεττείζεται ηὰ πάζε*). And that a desire is joined to every *pathos* (*ὄξεμηο δὲ παληὶ πάζεη ζπλέδεπθηαη*), and in general by the close association of *pathos* with sensation, desire and pleasure:

Πάσης μὲν ἠδονῆς ἐπιθυμία κατάρχει, ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ τίκτει ἀϊσθήσις τὸ γάρ ἀϊσθῆσεως ἁμορον καὶ πάθους ἐλεύθερον.

Desire is the source of every pleasure, and sensation gives birth to appetite. For that which has no part in sensation is also free from *pathos*.

332 See above, section 2.4, 3.4.1.
333 However, it is only in the two chapters of *Disciples* quoted above that he speaks of excess (*πλεονάσασα, πλεονασμός*) in relation to the *pathê* in general, his uses of the word *pleonexia*, both in his own writings and elsewhere in *Disciples*, relating to greed in the context of avarice. Cf. *Prakt.* Prol. 41; *Th.* 4.20-1, 8.21, 17.21, 22.6, 30.11; Sch. 157.3 on Prov. 17:9; Sch. 38.8 on Eccl. 5:7-11; *Disc.* 42.5, 69.4, 82.1.
334 *Prakt.* 38. However, the *pathê* can also be set in motion by memory or by the demons; cf. *Rfl.* 59.
335 *8Th.* 5.10.
336 *Prakt.* 4.2-4.
The *pathē* of the body take their origin from the natural [desires] of the flesh, against which self-control [is effective]; the *pathē* of the soul have their conception from the [desires] of the soul, against which love [is effective].

The *pathē* of the soul have their origin in human beings; those of the body have their origin in the body. Self-control cuts away the *pathē* of the body; spiritual love cuts away those of the soul.

The injuriousness to the agent that characterises *pathos* arises from its distancing him from God, as a result of which the person in thrall to *pathos* is ‘sickly’ (ἄξξσζηνο). Finally, our responsibility for our *pathē* is stated in *Praktikos* 6, and again in *Disciples*:

Vice is not the *nous* nor the object nor the *noêma* of the object, but the *pathos* that is yoked together with the object, and I am the cause of its existence, since also of its destruction.

We are responsible for our *pathē* both in the cosmological sense, in that *pathos* came into existence through our choosing to turn away from God, and in the moral and psychological sense, in that each time we succumb to *pathos* we do so by choice. This reflection of the cosmological by the moral and psychological is the reason why whenever

---

337 Eul. 21.23.
338 Prakt. 35.
339 Disc. 203.7; cf. Origen, C.Matt. 10:24. At Prakt. 54.5-6 Evagrius associates our becoming sick (υοςομίκνον) in a given part of the soul with the *pathē* of that part growing in strength (ιζρύεη).
340 Cf. Prakt. 6.7-8; see above, 3.4.
341 Disc. 165.
342 The meaning of this will be discussed in the following section.
we allow ourselves to succumb to *pathos* we effectively repeat our primordial deflection from God and consequent fall into corporeality.

It might be supposed that, because we are responsible for our *pathē*, to succumb to an episode of *pathos* counts as a sin, but this is not the case. Although *pathos* is something we choose, it is not, according to *Disciples* 157, yet a sin but only its herald:

Πρὶν ἡ τὴν κατὰ διάνοιαν τελεσθῆναι ἁμαρτίαν, δύο ἔλεγεν εἶναι τεκμήρια καὶ οἴονεὶ προοίμια: αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος καὶ οἱ περὶ αὐτὸ λογισμοὶ.

Before the accomplishment of a sin *kata dianoian*, [Evagrius] said, there are two signs and two as it were preliminaries: the *pathos* itself and the *logismoi* around it.

In maintaining that to succumb to *pathos* is not yet to sin, Evagrius extends the range of both our self-control and our moral responsibility. Even though a person might be in the throes of *pathos*, it is still possible for him to extricate himself rather than allow himself to be carried to sin *kata dianoian* or *kat’ energeian*. How this might work in practice is discussed in Section 2.2.4.

It has been stated that *pathos* involves an attachment to the sensible world, but given the range of phenomena that Evagrius regards as *pathē* this might seem rather strange. Certainly there is nothing problematic about the idea of a desire for gold or human esteem involving such attachment, nor many cases of distress, anger and so forth. But how can hunger or thirst *per se*, or the fatigue characteristic of acedia, be said to involve such an attachment? The answer lies in Evagrius’ anthropology. Since the *nous* is by nature contemplative, any activity or state other than that of contemplation is unnatural to it. The prerequisite for contemplation is *apatheia*. Since any awareness of physical affectivity distracts the *nous* from contemplation, this must include *apatheia* in respect of the body:

343 *Disc.* 157.1-3.
344 An example of how *pathos* can lead to sin *kat’ energeian* occurs at *Th.* 24.26-29. There Evagrius warns that if the *nous* refuses to move on (μὴ μεταβαίνει) from the *poëma* of an object for which it has a *pathos* – that is, if it clings (περιεξόμενος) to that *poëma* as its immediate focus of awareness – then it is submerged in the *pathos* (τῷ πάθει βεβαίτετοι) and in danger of making its way towards sin in act (κινδυνεύει πρὸς τὴν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἁμαρτίαν ὀδόνων).
二手房 3个卧室

价格：120万

位置：市中心

描述：

- 3室2厅，总面积100平方米
- 简约风格，装修全新
- 带有阳台，采光良好
- 带有独立卫生间，方便居住

联系方式：

电话：13800000000

邮箱：house@realty.com

具体位置：

- 地址：XXX路123号
- 地铁：XXX号线XXX站
- 公交：XXX路XXX站

经纪人：小张

房源编号：123456

有效期：2023年3月31日
thos also encompasses phenomena such as fatigue, drowsiness, lethargy, weakness, anxiety, irritability, agitation, boredom, listlessness, self-satisfaction and what we would regard as depression.

2.2.3 Empathê noêmata

Although pathos always involves the body – through the vital heat if not directly - for Evagrius it also involves the nous, to which it finds ingress through its association with noëmata, the basic components of our mental content. Evagrius characterises this association terms of ‘yoking together’ and refers to noëmata that have pathos ‘yoked together with’ (συνεξεγεγένητα) them as empathê noêmata. The closest he comes to directly explaining their origin is the following:

Ὅταν τὰς μνήμας ἐξομεν ἐμπαθειζ, τούτων καὶ τὰ πράγματα πρῶτον μετὰ πάθους ὑπεδεξάμεθα· καὶ ὅσα τῶν πραγμάτων πάλιν μετὰ πάθους ὑπεδεχόμεθα, τούτων καὶ τὰς μνήμας ἐξομεν ἐμπαθείζ.6 358

When we have empathês memories, it is because we previously ὑπεδεξάμεθα the objects with pathê; and again, in so far as we ὑπεδεχόμεθα objects with πάθη, we will have empatheis memories of them.

Τὸ ὑποδέχεσθαι an object with pathos results in the formation of an empathês memory, that is, a memory composed of empathê noêmata. But what is it to ὑποδέχεσθαι an object with pathos? In speaking of how the nous acquires noëmata Evagrius normally uses either δέχομαι or λαμβάνω. The meaning of ὑποδέχομαι is similar to that of these verbs used in this way, but the prefix ὑπό adds emphasis, indicating that the reception is somehow more forceful. This sense of extra force is perhaps best captured

353 Cf., e.g., Eul. 7.6-7.
354 Cf., e.g., Prakt. 24.
355 Cf. Disc. 64.2. Cf. Disc. 165.1-2; see below.
356 Disc. 64.2. Cf. Disc. 165.1-2.
357 Cf. Pry. 4, 53, 54, 71; Rfl. 7; Sch. 93 on Prov. 7:12, 166 on Prov. 17:23, 344 on Prov. 28:7; Sch. 2 on Ps. 145:8.
358 Prakt. 34.1-4.
359 Cf. Th. 24, 25; Sch. 263 on Prov. 23:33.
360 Cf. Rfl. 16, 17; Sch. 166 on Prov. 17:23; Sch. 35 on Eccl. 5:1-2.
by translations such as ‘to take up’, ‘to welcome’ or ‘to entertain’. The fact that ὑπόδεχομαι is qualified by μετὰ πάθους makes it clear that this extra force derives from the involvement of pathos, and the fact that Evagrius speaks of the νοῦς taking up πράγματα rather than νοήματα emphasises that the pathos is directed toward an external object.

An empathēs noēma, then, is a noēma that the nous has taken up with pathos. An example of such a noēma would be ‘the face of someone who has caused me loss or someone who has dishonoured me’ referred to at Thoughts 2.5-6. Reflection upon it provides further clarification of the nature of empathē noēmata and how they harm the nous. If someone injures me and I respond with resentment, I will ‘take up their face with resentment’; that is, internalise an image of their face suffused with the pathos I am feeling. As a result, the pathos will be associated with the image and I will have formed an empathēs noēma. This ‘resentful noēma’ will then be stored as an empathēs memory and recollection of the person’s face will include recollection of the resentment. In addition, the extra force with which pathos imbues the ‘taking up’ of a noēma will carry over into its imprinting of the nous and storage in memory: if I harbour a strong emotion in respect of something or someone, my memory and noēma of them will be characterised by a special vividness and tenacity. This can make both memory and image especially liable to intrude into consciousness and reawaken in me the pathos concerned – in this case the emotion of resentment – something which can happen whether I am awake or, via dreams, while I sleep. All of these things – the particular vividness, tenacity and intrusiveness of such noēmata – are aspects of the thickening of the nous – that is, its immersion in corporeality.

361 Sinkewicz translates ὑπόδεχομαι as ‘to entertain’, but to me this suggests a temporal dimension that need not be involved in the formation of empathēs, or indeed any, memories. Although, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, one of the meanings of ‘entertain’ is ‘admit to consideration; receive (an idea)’, most of its meanings involve a temporal dimension, and it can also mean to ‘keep or maintain in the mind; harbour, cherish, experience (a feeling). Consequently, although it perhaps need not imply a temporal dimension, it can easily be read as meaning that the formation of an empathēs memory requires, in addition to the empathēs reception of the noēma of the object of the pathos, that the noēma in question be held in mind over a period of time. In fact, though, it surely does not, our formation of memories of perceived events being, in general, simultaneous with the perception. 362 Quoted above, 3.1. 363 Cf. Th. 4.
Like all \textit{noêmata} of sensible objects, \textit{empathê noêmata} can be taken up not only from
the senses or from memory but from the \textit{krasis} of the body:\footnote{See above, 1.2.1.1.}

\begin{verbatim}

\end{verbatim}

Whenever the jealous demon is unable to move the \textit{nous} by means of the mem-
ory in prayer, he then forces the \textit{krasis} of the body to produce some strange fan-
tasy in the \textit{nous} and endow [the \textit{nous}] with form.

Evagrius cites as an example the demonic suggestion of an image that purports to repre-
sent God. This induces the \textit{nous} to think that it has attained the goal of prayer, and ac-
cording to ‘a man experienced in the gnostic life’,\footnote{Sinkewicz (2003: 281, n.52) notes, ‘The MSS tradition is evenly divided between the two readings ‘practical’ and ‘gnostic’. Hausherr, [Les leçons d’un contemplatif. Le Traité de l’Oraison d’Évagre le Pontique, Paris 1960], 106, has suggested that the individual in question may be John of Lykopolis.’}

\begin{verbatim}

\end{verbatim}

happens under the influence of the \textit{pathos} of vainglory and that of the demon
who touches a place in the brain and causes palpitations in the blood vessels.\footnote{Cf. \textit{Pry}. 72.}

The fact that demons can cause fantasies to arise by manipulating the \textit{krasis} of the body
shows that they can be responsible for the production of \textit{noêmata} that, although invol-
vling sensible objects and therefore being ultimately grounded in sense perception, do not
themselves have a sensory origin. This mechanism perhaps explains the origin of all
\textit{empathê noêmata} that are not the direct product of the senses or of memory, and hence
the origin of all fantasies and hallucinations associated with the \textit{logismoi}. Those associ-
ated with \textit{logismoi} of fornication would certainly seem to involve manipulation of the
\textit{krasis} of the body, since the demon of fornication sometimes touches the body di-

\footnote{\textit{Pry}. 68.}

\footnote{\textit{Pry}. 72.}

\footnote{\textit{Pry}. 72.}
rectly, but since all pathē, and hence all the logismoi, have a physiological basis in excess vital heat, this explanation would seem to extend naturally to them as well.

It has been stated that empathê noêmata harm the nous by immersing it in corporeality and thereby thickening it, and that they do so because the pathos ‘yoked together with’ them makes them particularly vivid, tenacious and intrusive. Evagrius refers to this as pathos ‘binding the nous, through noêmata, to sensible objects’ (τὰ πάθη ... τὰ συνδέσμοιντα [τὸν νοὸν] διὰ τῶν νοημάτων τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς).

Neither do objects bind the nous nor do their noêmata, but rather the empathê noêmata of objects. For the Lord created gold and he made woman, but none of the beings created by God are opposed to people’s salvation, but rather fornication and greed bind the nous and force the noêmata of objects to linger in the heart. For objects hold the nous in check by means of empathê noêmata, just as water holds the thirsty person by means of thirst, and bread the hungry person by means of hunger.

In the absence of pathos the nous, being naturally contemplative, would not linger upon sensible objects:
Ἀδύλαην ληὸν λνῦλ ρξνλίζαη <ἐλ> πξάγκαηη εἰ κὴ πάζνο ἔρεη πξὸο αὐηό, οἰον ἐπιθομίας ἦ ὁργής ἦ κενοδοξίας ἦ λύπης.373

It is impossible for the nous to linger on an object if it doesn’t have pathos for it, for example that of epithumia or anger or vainglory or distress.

But pathos compels it to dwell upon them:

Ἐν ὦς πράγμασιν ἦ νοήμασιν ἔχει πάθος ὦ νοῦς, ἐν τούτως περικαθέζεται ἐκ δὲ τούτων δυσέκπαστός ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ ἔχρονίσσεν.374

The nous installs itself among objects or noēmata for which it has a pathos, and it is difficult to withdraw it when it lingers.375

When pathos is implicated in the reception of noēmata it reinforces their imprinting of the nous and also the corresponding memory formation. The resulting memories are particularly vivid and tenacious, and liable to intrude into both waking consciousness and dreams. As the pathos associated with a memory fades so too will the memory and its intrusiveness, but while it endures it binds the nous through the noêma to the sensible object it represents.376

373 Disc. 39.1-3.
374 Disc. 162.
375 Cf. Rfl. 36: ‘The impure nous is one that dallies among sensible objects with blameworthy pathos (νοῦς ἀκαθαρτός ἐστιν, ὁ ἐγχρονίζων μετὰ πάθους φεκτὸ τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς αἰθήτων)’.
376 For Evagrius pathos intensifies the memory of any object with which it is associated. But Aristotle takes a very different view of the effect of pathos upon memory formation. At De Memoria 450a30-b3 he notes that ‘The movement which occurs stamps a sort of imprint of the percept, just like the people who make impressions with seals. This is why, in those subject to great movement through πάζνο or through time of life, no memory is created, just as if the movement of the seal were to fall into running water’ (ἡ γὰρ γεγομένη κίνησις ἔνεσμανεται οὖν τόπον τινὰ τοῦ αἰθήματος, καθάπερ οἱ σφραγιζόμενοι τοῖς δακτυλοῖς, δώδε καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐν κινήσει πολλῆ διὰ πάθος ὦ δι’ ἡλικίαν ὦσιν οὐ γίνεται μνήμη, καθάπερ ἄν εἰς ἄξιον τόου ἐμπεποτοσίας τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς σφραγίδος; Trans. mine, based on Beare, in Barnes, 1984). Unlike Evagrius, Aristotle speaks of the formation of memories as a kind of imprinting, and he claims that extremes of pathos put the soul into a state of flux so that the imprints effectively get washed away. This directly contradicts Evagrius’ view of pathos as a binding force in relation to noêmata and memories. So how might the disparity between their respective observations be explained? A provisional answer, supported by what is now known about traumatic memory, might be that in some cases extremes of pathos result in amnesia of the event concerned, while in others they severely disrupt the memory of it; cf., e.g., Shay (1995: 172). Neither phenomenon would contradict what Evagrius says about the effect of pathos on memory: amnesia, because he is only interested in cases where pathos reinforces a memory, and disruption of memory, because his concern is not with the accuracy of the memory but with its intensity, tenacity and intrusiveness.
To summarise: if the nous has a pathos in respect of an object, then every noêma of that object that it receives has the pathos in question ‘yoked together with’ it. In so far as a person is subject to pathos, his nous is continually being populated with these empathê noêmata. Through them, pathos binds the nous to sensible objects, keeping it anchored in the thickness of corporeality.

2.2.4 The arousal of pathos

According to Praktikos 6, it is when a logismos is allowed to linger that pathos is aroused:

παρενοχλεῖν μὲν τῇ ψυχῇ ἢ μὴ παρενοχλεῖν [οἱ λογισμοὶ], τὸν οὐχ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστιν
tὸ δὲ χρονιζεῖν αὐτοῦ ἢ μὴ χρονιζεῖν, ἢ πάθη κινεῖν ἢ μὴ κινεῖν, τὸν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.377

Whether [the logismoi] trouble the soul or do not trouble it is not one of the things that are up to us, but whether they linger or do not linger, arouse pathê or do not arouse them, is one of the things that are up to us.378

It seems clear from this that logismoi occur before, and cause, pathos. Yet we saw from our consideration of the logismoi that in fact they always have pathos built into them. We have also seen that Evagrius almost always locates the origin of the logismoi in the pathêtikon part of the soul and that, in particular, Disciples 49 reports him as teaching that the empathês logismos comes from pathos.379 So in fact the logismoi both cause pathos and have their source in it. What is at issue here is the distinction between dispositional and occurrent pathos, but before turning to this, a point of clarification.

377 Prakt. 6.
378 Trans. mine. The question of whether or not we are responsible either for the stimuli we experience or for our reactions to them had been long debated. Gorgias, in his Defence of Helen, had argued that she was not culpable for her actions because the force of the stimuli, which she could neither control nor resist, was such as to compel them. Aristotle refers to a view that men have no control over phantasiai, which appear to each in a form answering to his character, and rejects it on the grounds that man is responsible for his character and consequently for the phantasiai (EN 1114a32). In other words, he holds the agent responsible for the way in which he sees things. The Stoics hold a person responsible for the way in which he responds to phantasiai, that is, whether or not he assents to them, and they assign his character a determining role in this; cf. Inwood (1985: 58). See below, 2.2.4, for discussion of the scope of our self-determination in relation to temptation.
379 See above, 2.1.4.1.
It was noted above that although Evagrius thinks in terms of the Platonic tripartition of the soul, and, by extension, contrasts her *pathētikon* part with her rational part, he regards all three parts of the soul as essentially rational, all being aspects of the fallen triune *nous*. Accordingly he understands *pathos* not as something other than reason but as a compromised version of it. It follows that the line dividing *logismoi* from *pathē* is at best a blurred one, and not only do *logismoi* always involve *empathē noēmata* but Evagrius frequently defines *logismoi* in affective terms. In terms of their psychic origin I suggest, therefore, that both the affective aspects of a *logismos* and certain of its cognitive aspects - mental pictures, fantasies and so forth - derive from the *pathētikon* part of the soul, and that the point at which the rational part becomes involved is, in the first instance, when it assents – explicitly or implicitly – to the *logismos* by allowing it to linger and, ultimately, when it animates, and thereby endows with agency, an image of the person’s body ‘with which it speaks and acts unlawfully *kata dianoian* in relation to other images it creates *kata dianoian*’. So when Praktikos 6 speaks of its being up to us whether or not *logismoi* linger and arouse *pathos* it is referring specifically to the engagement of the rational part of the soul with the *logismoi* and the consequent arousal of fresh *pathos*. The *logismoi* themselves will, however, originate in the *pathētikon* part of the soul and include both affective and cognitive aspects. Likewise, although temptation (*peirasmos*) as described by Praktikos 6 is experienced as a contest between desire and reason, to characterise it as such would be metaphysically inaccurate; the contestants are, rather, the relatively fallen and compromised reason constitutive of the *pathētikon* part of the soul on the one hand, and, on the other, the relatively unfallen and uncompromised reason constitutive of her rational part.

The distinction between dispositional and occurrent *pathos* is succinctly described at Disciples 49, and with it, the psychological dynamics of *empathēia*:

> ὑπόθεσαν ἡ ὁ πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἡς οὖν γεννᾶται ὁ ἐμπαθής λογισμός· πρὸ δὲ τοῦτο συνότσταται οἱ λογισμοί ἵνα κατὰ διάνοιαν ἀμάρτητον ὁμοῖος καὶ πρὸ τῆς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἀμάρτιάς συνότσταται πολλὰ πράγματα· ἐπὰν δὲ τελεσθῇ ἡ ἀμάρτια, τὰ μέσα ἀφίσταται, μόνον δὲ τὸ εἴδωλον τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἐμμένει ἐν τῷ νῷ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ πάθος τὸ γεννῶν τὸν λογισμόν. 381

380 See above, 1.2.
381 Disc. 49.3-10. For the ‘image of the sin’ (τὸ εἴδωλον τῆς ἀμαρτίας), cf. Th. 36.17.
Pathos lies below in the soul and from it comes the empathês logismos. Before (the pathos manifests) the logismoi coalesce so that there might be sin kata dianoian. Likewise, before a sin kat’ energeian (is committed) many objects coalesce. But once a sin has been committed, the intermediaries disappear and only the image of the sin remains in the nous of the soul, and the pathos that engendered the logismos.

I understand this as follows: a disposition to pathos subsists in the soul. This disposition comprises the physiological ‘matter’ of the logismoi in the form of excess vital heat, and the psychological ‘matter’ of the logismoi in the form of the ‘natural desires of the flesh’ and the ‘desires of the soul’, and empathês memories. In response to circumstances – demonic suggestion or other internal or external stimuli – these give rise to the logismoi; since the logismoi always involve pathos the qualifier empathês emphasises this rather than defining a subset of logismoi. In saying that before the pathos manifests the logismoi coalesce, Evagrius distinguishes between dispositional pathos and the fresh episode of occurring pathos that the logismoi arising from dispositional pathos arouse if allowed to linger in conscious awareness. The coalescing is that of the logismoi understood as discrete entities into sequences, and it happens before the pathos manifests ‘so that there might be sin kata dianoian’. The occurrent pathos that the logismoi arouse is to be distinguished not only from the underlying dispositional pathos but from the sin itself since the pathos, like the logismos is merely the ‘sign and, as it were, preliminary’ (τακμήσια καὶ οἴονει προοίμια) of sin. Although Evagrius specifies sin kata dianoian, there is in this context no relevant distinction between it and sin kat’ energeian, his focus upon the former simply reflecting his greater interest in the warfare kata dianoian. The description of logismoi, objects and sin as intermediaries emphasises the spiritual significance of dispositional pathos on the one hand, and the ‘image of the sin’ on the other. According to Disciples 49, then, the following cycle is enacted:

dispositional pathos => logismoi => occurrent pathos => sin kata dianoian or kat’ energeian => dispositional pathos

382 Eul. 21.23; see above, 3.2.
383 Cf. Prakt. 34; see above, 3.3.
384 Disc. 157.2; see above.
385 Cf. Prakt. 48; see above.
Two aspects of dispositional pathos can now be identified. The first is the general sickness of the soul, and the second, the pathos associated with particular memories. As we have seen, the latter makes such memories especially liable to intrude into awareness, and this intrusion, I suggest, is part of what Evagrius has in mind when he says that from the pathos that lies below in the soul comes the empathês logismos. But part too will be logismoi that have a somatic origin, for example thoughts of food triggered by hunger or sexual fantasies triggered by physical arousal, both hunger and sexual desire being part of our disposition to pathos.

At Eulogios 13.12 Evagrius describes in detail the process by which logismoi engender pathos:

Ὁ τῆς ἀσελγείας δαίμον, πῇ μὲν τῷ παρθένῳ κατὰ διάνοιαν τὰς ἀκολύστους συμπλοκὰς ὑπεισοφερεῖ, πῇ δὲ τούτων νεάνισιν δι’ ὀνειράτων συμπλέκεσθαι φαντάζει, ὅπως εἰ μὲν τῇ μνήμῃ τοῦ φαντασθέντος κλίνοιτο πρὸς ἡδονήν, τότες λογισμοῖς χρῆσιτο πρὸς πόλεμον ἐὰν δὲ οὐ κλίνοιτο ἄλλ’ ἄνταγονζισε, κἂν τῆς ἀισθήσει τὸ πάθος τῇ φύσει μεμενηκός, οὐ πρῶτον συγκροτοῦσι πόλεμον οἱ τῆς ἀισχύνης λογισμοὶ, πρὶν ή χώραν ἐξοσμεῖ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς συνομιλεῖν: οὐδ’ αὖ πάλιν κινηθεῖ πρὸς τὸ πόλεμειν ἡ ψυχή, πρὶν ἡ μάθῃ ἄντιπαρτάττεσθαι τοῖς ἀντιπάλοις λογισμοῖς. ὅταν οἱ δαίμονες τὴν ἐννοιαν τὰς αἰσχρὰς ἡδονὰς πειρῶνται σαλεύειν, τότε καὶ τὸν τῆς λαμμαργίας πόλεμον προσάγουσι, ὅπως τοῖς ὠλαίς τὴν γαστέρα προπυρώσαντες, ἀκοπωτέρως τὴν ψυχὴν τῇ ἀσελγείᾳ βαραθρόσωσιν. ἐν τῇ ραθυμίᾳ τῆς ψυχῆς περιδράσονται ἡμῶν οἱ δαίμονες τοῦ λογιστικοῦ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμοῖς ἀπερεύγονται τὰς τῆς κακίας ἡδονὰς. 386

The demon of lust sometimes smuggles in kata dianoia licentious intertwinings with a virgin, and sometimes through dreams it depicts him being intertwinied with young girls, so that if one should incline towards pleasure at the memory of what was fantasized, the demon could make use of the logismoi for warfare; but if one should not so incline but rather fight back, even when one feels the pathos which has remained in one’s nature, the logismoi of shame cannot join battle before they gain a place to converse with the soul; nor in turn would the soul be moved to engage in warfare before it learns that it is ranging itself against the opposing logismoi. Whenever the demons try to destabilise one’s thinking [or intent, good sense or better judgment; ἐννοια can mean all of these] with shameful pleasures, then they lead in the warfare of gluttony, so that once they have fired the matters of the stomach beforehand they can the more effortlessly cast the soul

386 Eul. 13.12. Sinkewicz (2003: 239, n.28) notes that this paragraph is unique to recension B of To Eulogios, as found in the MSS Lavra Γ’93.
into the pit of lust. In the laziness of the soul the demons are able to grasp our logistikon and in the logismoi they disgorge the pleasures of vice.

In the situation described here the disposition to pathos is exploited by the demon of fornication who causes the monk to recall sexual fantasies and dreams that it had suggested to him previously. Evagrius warns him not to incline towards pleasure but instead to fight back. Both aspects of dispositional pathos are at play here, one in the pathos associated with the memories; the other - the general sickness of his soul - in his inclination toward pleasure. But I think a third aspect can also be identified, that which Evagrius calls ‘the pathos which has remained in one’s nature’ and which I take to be the pathos specific to the situation – in this case, sexual desire. To the extent that the monk inclines toward pleasure the demon can make use of the logismoi for warfare - I take these to be both the remembered fantasies and further logismoi that the demons will suggest. If, on the other hand, he fights back then the logismoi will be unable to ‘join battle’ since their ability to do so depends upon his allowing them a ‘place to converse’ with his soul. Fighting back consists in mustering the logistikon to resist the inclination of the pathētikon part of the soul to pleasure, but in order for the monk to do so he must first recognise his situation as one of temptation, since ‘the soul will not be moved to engage in warfare before it learns that it is ranging itself against the opposing logismoi.’ How quickly he does so will depend upon how vigilant he is, the demon of fornication in particular being able to seem swifter than the movement and vigilance of the nous (TEMPL ... τῆς κινήσεως καὶ νήψεως τοῦ νοὸς), meaning that arousal can be so sudden that he feels powerless to resist. Evagrius affirms the role of gluttony in temptation by the demon of fornication, then reminds his readers of the perils of laziness – this will mean laziness both in succumbing to gluttony and in failing in vigilance. He concludes by stating that sometimes the logismoi attract the pathē and sometimes the pathē the logismoi but that either way it is through the pathē that the logismoi ‘make war upon the soul.’ Since logismoi are always wholly or partly constituted by empathē nōmata the pathos he is referring to here must be other than that already built into the logismos. So what does he mean? The key is to be found in a closer look at both the disposition to, and arousal of, pathos.

387 Cf. Pry. 90. 388 Cf. Prakt. 51; 8Th. 2.11. The demon associated with blasphemy is also particularly swift in its attacks; cf. Prakt. 43, 51.
Three aspects of the disposition to *pathos* have now been identified:

D1 The fire of one’s nature; that is, the general sickliness of the soul.

D2 The *pathos* which has remained in one’s nature; that is, the *pathos* specific to the present situation.

D3 The *pathos* associated with particular *noēmata* and memories.

These three aspects correspond to levels of increasing differentiation. The first, D1, is the most fundamental and general. At the level of D2 it differentiates into the dispositions to particular *pathē*, and at the level of D3 these further differentiate into the dispositions to particular manifestations of a *pathos* via the *pathē* associated with particular *noēmata* or *logismoi*. The arising of a *logismos* involves all three aspects: D1 is the underlying condition which makes it possible; D2 determines which particular *pathos* a given movement of the soul instantiates, and D3 gives that *pathos* its specific manifestation and is therefore the point at which the *logismos* takes form.

Now consider the following passage from *Eulogios* 21.22, which again describes temptation by the demon of fornication. In it Evagrius tracks each stage of the cycle identified in *Disciples* 49, leading from dispositional *pathos* through the arising of the *logismoi* and fresh *pathos* to the committing of sin and consequent strengthening of dispositional *pathos*:

Χαλεπότατον ἦστι συνηθεῖα ἧδονῶν συνάπτεσθαι τὴν καρδίαν καὶ πολλῶν χρείαν κόπων τὴν νομὴν κακῶν εἰς ἄκρον ἐκκόψαται. Μὴ οὖν ταῖς ἦδοναῖς τῶν λογισμῶν συνομιλέων ἐδίσης, ἐν γὰρ συλλόγῳ κακῶν ἐκκαίεται πῦρ. Οὕτω γὰρ ἐκθερμαίοντες σε, λογίζεσθαι ποιούσι κόπων εἶναι τὴν πυρὰν τῆς φύσεως κρατῆσαι, καὶ ὅτι πολὺς ὁ τῆς καρδερίας χρόνος καὶ βαρὺς ὁ τῆς ἐγκρατείας βίος ἀναφέροις δὲ σοι καὶ μνήμας ὅν σε νόκτωρ φαντάζοισιν αἰσχρῶν, μορφάζοντές σοι πυρετικὰ τῆς πλάνης εἴδωλα. Ἐτὰ καὶ σφοδρῶτερον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἐξάγαντες τὸν πυρετὸν, τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἀμαρτίας γνωμοδοτοῦσι σοι ἐνδόν, ὅτι ὅσον οὐκ ἰσχύεις κατασχεῖν τὴν τῆς φύσεως βίαν, κἂν σήμερον ἀμαρτήσῃς ὃς ἀνάγκην, ἀλλ’ ἀφίησιν μετανοήσεις διὰ τὴν ἐντολὴν φιλάνθρωπος γὰρ ὁ
It is a very serious matter for the heart to be tied to a habit of pleasures, and much effort is needed to cut off completely the spread of evils. Therefore, do not become accustomed to associating with the pleasures of the logismoi, for in the assemblage of evils there burns a fire. Giving you warmth in this way, they have you reckon that it is an effort to master the fire of one’s own nature, and the time of perseverance is lengthy and the life of self-control burdensome; and they bring back to you memories of the shameful fantasies that they suggested during the night, forming before you burning images of error. Then, having ignited in your flesh an even more intense burning, they introduce within you by means of the law of sin the notion that so far as you do not have the strength to restrain the force of your nature, even if you sin today by necessity, tomorrow you will repent for the sake of the commandment, for the law is humanitarian and forgives the iniquities of those who repent...Thus, after restoring the soul by a reverse repentance, they make the temple of chastity into a place of fornication.

Since all of the logismoi involve pleasure, the arousal of pathos always involves an inclination toward pleasure: either a pleasure directly promised by the logismoi or – as is the case with distress - one whose unavailability is their focus. Consequently, for the heart to be ‘tied to a habit of pleasures’ is to be disposed to the arousal of pathos.

Whereas Eulogios 13.12 emphasises the cognitive aspect of the logismoi, in the form of remembered fantasies, as the first term in the process of temptation, this passage emphasises their affective aspect: the initial object of awareness is not a mental image but a sensation of pleasurable warmth. This sensation is part of the ‘pleasures of the logismoi’. These pleasures have two aspects. The first is any pleasure already associated with a logismos through association with its constituent noêma or noêmata, and is therefore part of the disposition to pathos. This pleasure is experienced prior to the engagement of the rational part of the soul, and when it is engaged incline it to allow the logismoi to linger. In the case of Eulogios 13.12 it is the pleasure associated with the remembered fantasies and is recalled, and therefore passively relived, as part of recalling the fantasies. The second aspect of the pleasures of the logismoi is the new,
occurrent pleasure that entertaining them affords. In the case of logismoi involving memories of pleasant experiences this will arise straightforwardly out of the pleasure attaching to those memories and will involve reliving the experience and fantasising about repeating it. In other cases it might be less obvious. For example, the pleasure associated with logismoi of gluttony could be that of imagined eating, but it could also be that of allowing oneself to indulge in worries about one’s health. The pleasure associated with resentment might include that of indulgence in self-pity at the memory of what precipitated the resentment and of imagining ways of avenging oneself, but in addition anger can of itself be ‘sweeter… than the dripping of honey’.\textsuperscript{392} The pleasure involved in acedia might be that of allowing oneself to give up trying to read and instead to fall asleep\textsuperscript{393} or of imagining the approach of a visitor.\textsuperscript{394} In their second aspect, then, the pleasures of the logismoi are those of allowing them to linger and anticipating the further pleasures to be afforded by succumbing to the pathos and perhaps committing the sin to which they relate. The logismoi and their pleasures are the ‘assemblage of evils’, and the ‘fire’ that burns in them, like all of the references to fire in this passage, can be understood in two senses, both metaphorical: the physiological ‘fire’ of excessive vital heat and the psychological ‘fire’ of passion.

In this example logismoi of fornication arise from the disposition to pathos. Intrinsic to them is the first aspect of the pleasures of the logismoi, part of that disposition. In virtue of their having arisen the person cannot help but experience this pleasure, but at first he does so only passively, as part of becoming aware of the logismoi. If he is sufficiently vigilant and self-disciplined he will banish them immediately, but if not, he will start actively to enjoy them. This active enjoyment is the second aspect of the pleasure of the logismoi, the beginnings of occurrent pathos, and the first taste of the ‘fire’ that burns within them. The stronger his disposition to pathos – the more his heart is ‘tied to a habit of pleasures’ – the stronger will be his temptation to allow the logismoi to linger. And every moment that he does so sees the increase of the pathos and of its destabilising effect upon his thinking, intent, good sense and better judgement. Progressively more influenced by, and reluctant to relinquish, the pleasure and warmth he is feeling – the ‘fire burning’ in the ‘assemblage of evils’ – he starts putting less

\textsuperscript{392} Cf. Iliad. 18.109-10.
\textsuperscript{393} Cf. 8Th. 6.15.
\textsuperscript{394} Cf. Prakt. 12.
effort into resisting and more effort into thinking of excuses not to. In the language of *Disciples* 49 this thinking is part of the coalescing of the *logismoi*. As *pathos* and destabilisation continue to grow he recalls the pleasurable fantasies he experienced the previous night and begins to think of reasons to allow himself to succumb. The *pathos* that began with the first small stirrings of enjoyment of the initial *logismoi* is now full-blown. But even at this point sin is not a *fait accompli*, as Evagrius is at pains to make clear:

Μὴ προφάσει πάλιν μετανοίας δελεάξου ἐλπίσεων ἀδήλως, πολλοὶ γὰρ πεσόντες εὐθὺς ἀνηρπάσθησαν, ἓτεροι δὲ ἀναστήναι οὐκ ἰσχύσαν τῇ τῶν ἡδονῶν συνηθείᾳ ὡς ὑπὸ νόμον δεθέντες.395

Do not get hooked on the bait of uncertain hopes under the pretext of a new repentance, for many have fallen and were immediately snatched away, and others were unable to recover, for they were bound by the habit of pleasures as though they were under a law.

Although now fully in the throes of *pathos*, he could still muster his self-control and refrain from sinning. But if, unwilling to ‘extinguish the feverish mind of the flesh’, 396 he fails to do so then afterwards the *pathos* will subside and the *logismoi* vanish, leaving him with only the ‘image of the sin’ – that is, the *empathês* memory of it - and his disposition to *pathos* reinforced through indulgence.

So far we have seen how the *logismoi* arise out of the disposition to *pathos* and how the initial object of awareness in an episode of temptation might be either the cognitive aspect of a *logismos* or its affective aspect. Now some further clarification is needed. According to *Praktikos* 6 it is up to us whether or not the *logismoi* linger and, as a result of the engagement with them of the rational part of the soul, arouse fresh *pathos*. But what about cases where, as with *Eulogios* 21.22, temptation begins with a *pathos* that, experienced prior to the involvement of the rational part of the soul, inclines it to engage with the *logismoi*? Does this not pose a serious problem for the attainment of *apatheia* since the ability to resist *pathos* is itself undermined by *pathos*? A brief consideration of what

the Stoics and Origen had to say about the arousal of *pathos* will give a clearer sense of Evagrius’ solution to this problem.

Orthodox Stoicism regards a *pathos* as a species of action, meaning that it depends upon the agent’s assent and is therefore under his control. But this has the effect of excluding a set of phenomena which, while apparently *pathē*, cannot be said to result from either explicit or implicit assent, namely the involuntary arousals which occur in response to stimuli prior to the engagement of the rational mind. Later Stoics addressed this problem, denoting these arousals *propatheiai* or ‘first movements’. Seneca notes that the impression of having received an injury is followed by a mental shock (*ictus animi ... qui nos post opinionem iniuriae movet*). But while this shock might appear to be anger it is not, since it occurs prior to assent and is something the mind suffers rather than causes (*patitur magis animus quam facit*). He distinguishes between the involuntary prompting that is a preparation for anger, anger itself, and the brutishness that originates from anger but pursues cruelty for its own sake. Epictetus acknowledges the existence of *phantasiai* which jolt the human mind at the first appearance of a thing, which ‘do not belong to the will and are not chosen’, but rather ‘infiltrate themselves by a certain force of their own’. Given, for example ‘the sudden announcement of some danger ... it is inevitable that for a brief time even the mind of the sage is moved and contracts and grows pale (*sapientis quoque animum paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere necessum est*)’, not because he believes that something bad is happening but due to ‘certain rapid and unsolicited movements (*motus*) which pre-empt the functions of the mind and reason.’ Both Seneca and Epictetus, then, maintain a clear distinction between the initial shock that follows an *opinio* or *phantasia* but precedes assent, and the *pathos* that it heralds.

---

397 According to Inwood (1985: 180 and 308, n.256), although the term may originate with Posidonius, the doctrine does not; cf. Inwood.
398 The term originates with Seneca, *De Ira* 2:4.1.
399 *De Ira* 2:2.2-3.
400 *De Ira* 2:3.1.
Origen uses the expression ‘first movements’ at De Principiis 3.2.2, although it is not clear whether he intends it to be understood in its strict Senecan sense. Earlier he discusses the arousal of pathos in the course of defining the scope of the autexousion:

Εἰ δὲ τις αὐτῶ τὸ ἔξωθεν λέγοι εἶναι τοιώνδε, ὡστε ἀδυνάτως ἔχειν ἀντιβλέψαι αὐτῷ τοιώδε γενομένῳ, οὕτως ἐπιστησάτω τοὺς ἰδίους πάθεις καὶ κινήμασιν, εἰ μὴ εὐδοκήσεις γίνεται καὶ συγκατάθεσις καὶ ῥοπῆ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπὶ τόδε τι διὰ τάσις πιθανότητας, ἢ γυνὴ τῷ κρίναντι ἐγκρατεύεσθαι καὶ ἀνέχειν ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ μίξεων, ἐπιφανεία καὶ προκαλεσμένη ἐπὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι τι παρὰ πρόθεσιν, αὐτοτελῆς αἰτία γίνεται τοῦ τὴν πρόθεσιν ἀδετήσαι πάντως γὰρ εὐδοκήσας τῷ γαργαλισμῷ καὶ τῷ λείῳ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἀντιβλέψαι αὐτῷ μὴ βεβουλημένος μηδὲ τὸ κεκριμένον κυρώσαι, πράττε τὸ ἀκόλαστον. ὃ δὲ τὶς ἔμπαλιν, τῶν αὐτῶν συμβεβηκότων τῷ πλείονα μαθήματα ἀνειλήφθη καὶ ἡσυχάστη ἐν μὲν γαργαλίσμοι καὶ ἐν ἐρεθίσμοι συμβαίνουσιν, ὃ λόγος δὲ, ἦτε ἐπὶ πλείον ἰσχυροποιηθές καὶ τραφές τῇ μελέτῃ καὶ βεβαιωθές τοῖς δόγμασι πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἢ ἄγας γε τοῦ βεβαιωθῆναι γεγενημένος, ἀνακρόσει τοῦ ἐρεθίσμου καὶ ὄπεκλεῖτο τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.

But if anyone should say that [an] impression from without is of such a sort that it is impossible to resist it whatever it may be, let him turn his attention to his own pathē and movements, whether there is not an approval, assent and inclination of the hēgemonikon towards a particular action on account of some specious attractions. For instance, when a woman shows herself to a man who has resolved to remain chaste and to abstain from sexual intercourse and invites him to act contrary to his purpose, she does not become the complete cause of the abandonment of that purpose. For he is wholly delighted at the titillation and the smoothness of the pleasure and wishes neither to resist it nor to confirm his resolution, and then he commits the licentious act. On the other hand, the same things might happen to a man who has undergone more instruction and training, and while the titillations and arousals are present, his reason, having been further strengthened and cultivated by diligence and confirmed by right doctrines towards the good, or being near to such confirmation, repels the arousals and weakens the force of the epithumia.

According to the Stoic theory of action a pathos is a movement of the hēgemonikon, so it can be presumed that by ‘inclination of the hēgemonikon’ Origen means pathos. But

403 Quoted above, 2.2.1.
404 It is clear from the context that there should be a negative here, but it is missing from the text (that of Görgemanns and Karpp).
405 DP 3:1.4.
406 Trans. mine.
it is unclear whether by ‘movements’ he intends us to understand ‘first movements’ in the Senecan sense, or, rather, the *pathos* itself. So while his overall meaning is clear, he effectively downplays the distinction between Senecan first movements and *pathos* proper by not clearly distinguishing between them. The reason for this becomes apparent in what follows. The man experiences titillation, smooth pleasure⁴⁰⁷ and delight that undermine his resolve. All are first movements because all precede his decision whether or not to confirm it. Accordingly, Origen does not confine first movements to the initial shocks characteristic of arousal to anger or fear but recognises them as potentially more complex and even able to include second-order affects – in this case, delight at the first-order affects of titillation and smooth pleasure. Rather than there being a clearly defined point at which the man is able to resist the *phantasiai* giving rise to a first movement, the erosion of his resolve is gradual. With every moment that he allows himself to delight in the titillations and pleasure his resolve weakens. Delight gives way to approval and approval to assent. Consequently there is no longer a clear distinction between first movements, assent and *pathos*, but instead a gradual progression from the first stirrings of *pathos* to its full manifestation.

The similarity to the situation of the person in *Eulogios* 21.22 is clear. Unlike Seneca and Epictetus, Origen allows considerable affective complexity to precede assent, and viewing his example through an Evagrian lens it becomes plain that the man’s *pathē* (or first movements) both start from a *logismos* - an *empathēs noēma* of the woman – and constitute matter for further *logismoi*, meaning that instead of a simple picture in which the cognitive precedes the affective, a more complicated view emerges in which the two are interwoven and causally effective in respect of one another. The cognitive and the affective start to look less like two distinct things and more like two aspects of a single thing. And this of course is how Evagrius sees it. His notion of a *logismos* subverts the distinction between cognition and affectivity, a subversion reflected in his anthropology by the fact that the three parts of the soul are but the fallen expression of the triune *nous*. *Logismoi* arise from the *pathētikon* part of the soul but have cognitive as well as affective aspects. The cognitive aspect of a *logismos* consists in mental images that themselves derive from the *pathētikon* part of the soul. Its affective aspect comprises both the dispositional *pathos* associated with it and any fresh, occurrent *pathos* to which it con-

⁴⁰⁷ I understand this to be the pleasure of anticipation rather than commission.
tributes. The initial object of awareness might be either the cognitive aspect of a logismos or the affective aspect. Hence,

Πότεροι ή ἐννοια τὰ πάθη κινεῖ, ἢ τὰ πάθη τὴν ἐννοιαν προσεκτέον.\(^\text{408}\)

One should attend to whether it is the representation that arouses the pathē or the pathē that arouse the representation.

This picture has the advantage over that of the Stoics in being truer to the messiness of real life: however much we might like to suppose that things are as clear cut as Seneca and Epictetus affirm, sooner or later attention to our own experience will disabuse us. And although Origen presents a more complex analysis he too locates the inception of pathos in a cognitive event. It is left to Evagrius to address the fact that some pathē begin with the physical – the promptings of hunger or thirst or the touch of the demon of fornication upon the body. But this surely makes the question of how pathos can be resisted even more urgent: how can I resist the pathē that originate in my body? Evagrius has an answer – one in fact already alluded to by Origen in the passage discussed above. The way to resist such pathē is ultimately through training the soul in virtue while reducing the body’s susceptibility to pathos through a program of physical practices including dietary restriction. For Evagrius, episodes of temptation never occur in a vacuum but are embedded in the monk’s life and ascetic practice. In particular cases the

\(^{408}\) Prakt. 37. It continues, ‘Some people have held the first opinion, others the second’ (τις μὲν γὰρ ἔδοξε τὸ πρότερον, τις δὲ τὸ δεύτερον). Guillaumont (1971: 584 ff) notes that the first view would appear to be that of the Stoics but that it is harder to attribute the second; he suggests it refers to Aristotle’s observation at DA 403a19-23, that ‘while sometimes on the occasion of violent and striking occurrences there is no excitement or fear felt, on others faint and feeble stimulations produce these emotions, viz. when the body is already in a state of tension resembling its condition when we are angry’ (ποτὲ μὲν ἵσχυρόν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων συμβαίνων μηδὲν παραξύνεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐνώπιο τ᾽ ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἁμαρτῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀργῇ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὀυτοὶς ἐχῇ ἀσπέρ ὅταν ὀργίζομαι, trans. Nussbaum).

However, DM 702a16-19, like the Stoics, assigns causal priority to cognition: ‘For the pathē suitably prepare the organic parts, desire the pathē, and phantasias the desire; and phantasias comes about either through thought or through sense-perception’ (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδεῖος τὰ πάθη, ἢ δ᾽ ὄρεξις τὰ πάθη, τὴν δὲ ὄρεξιν ἡ φαντασία αὐτὴ δὲ γίνεται ἢ διὰ νοσήσεως ἢ διὰ αἰσθήσεως). Guillaumont also draws attention to Plotinus’ discussion at Enn. 3.6.4 of the respective causal priority of pathē and opinions: ‘Some of the pathē arise as the result of opinions, as when someone, being of the opinion that he will die, feels fear, or, thinking that some good is going to come to him, is pleased…but some of them are of a sort to take the lead and, without any act of choice, to produce the opinion in the part of the soul whose natural function it is to have opinions’ (Τῶν δὲ παθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ δόξας συνίσταται, ὡς ὅταν δοξάσας τις μέλλειν τελεύτατον ἰσχρὸν φόβον, ἢ ὁμόθελος ἁγάθων αὐτῷ τε ἐκεῖσθαι ἡσθῇ…τὰ δὲ ἑστίν ὡς ἡγίασόμενα αὐτὰ ἀπροκαρδῶς ἐμπούν ἐν τῷ περικοτῷ δοξάζειν τὴν δόξαν). Plotinus, however, sees this issue in terms of a radically different anthropology from that of Evagrius.
close interconnection of the cognitive and the affective means that it makes no real difference which aspect of a logismos is experienced first since the other is certain to follow close behind, and either way it is likely that pathos will make itself felt before the decision is made whether or not to allow it to linger and will accordingly exert its influence upon that decision. What then of Praktikos 6 with its clear assertion that it is up to us whether or not a logismos lingers and arouses pathos? The fact that pathos can make itself felt in an episode of temptation prior to the involvement of the rational part of the soul in no way diminishes the power of the latter to resist pathos, even though it might feel to the agent as if it does. This is clear from Eulogios 21.22 where Evagrius treats him as capable of holding back from sin even in the throes of fresh pathos. Thus the assertion in Praktikos 6 of our power to resist the progression from logismoi to pathos is to be understood not as an aetiology of pathos analogous to that of the Stoics whereby a cognitive stimulus is followed by assent and only then by pathos, but instead as a reminder to the rational part of the soul that however beleaguered by pathos it might be, it still has the power to arrest the further augmentation of that pathos and its progression to sin.

Eulogios 13.12 and 21.22 reveal the close interaction between the cognitive and the affective in temptation by logismoi of fornication, but how do they relate in other kinds of temptation? Consider now the example from Thoughts 2 referred to in section 2.2.3 above:

εἰ τοῦ ζημιώσαντος με ἣ ἀτυμάσαντος ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ μου τὸ πρόσωπον γένοιτο, ἐλεγχθήσεται ὁ τῆς μνησικακίας παραβιαλῶν λογισμός.409

If the face of a person who has caused me loss or dishonoured me should arise in my dianoia this will be proof of the approach of the logismos of resentment.

The face in question is an empathês noêma constituting an empathês memory of an event, the subsequent recollection of which will tempt me to succumb to fresh resentment in a process that can be schematised as follows:

409 Th. 2.5-7.
(1a) The empathès noëmallogismos of the person’s face arises into my awareness from my disposition to pathos and as it does so I begin to feel stirrings of resentment.

or

(1b) I begin to feel stirrings of resentment and then the empathès noëmallogismos of the person’s face arises into my awareness from my disposition to pathos

(2) Whether or not I am aware of these stirrings they start influencing my current mental and emotional state by inclining me to dwell anew on the injury she did to me.

(3) Although the originating event – her injuring me – was not pleasant, there was a certain pleasure associated with resentment I felt and so that pleasure is part of the pathos associated with the noëma of her face.

(4) That pleasure draws my attention toward itself and the noëma and my attention amplifies the pleasure and the resentment.

(5) At first the only pleasure I feel is that associated with the noëma, which I experience passively as part of it. But as soon as my attention inclines toward that passively experienced pleasure I start actively to enjoy that re-experiencing. This active enjoyment is the beginning of new, occurrent pleasure: the ‘pleasure of the logismoi’.

(6) This new pleasure is part of the fresh pathos that I am now experiencing. The other part is fresh resentment.

(7) The arousal of fresh pathos is accompanied by the arising of fresh logismoi (or additional aspects of the overarching logismos of resentment), some of which might be further memories of the originating event. These in turn augment the
pathos, resulting in more logismoi which further augment the pathos, and so forth.

(8) I imagine myself somehow acting out my resentment. This imaginary acting out is the sin kata dianoian referred to at Disciples 49.

(9) By allowing myself to succumb to a fresh episode of resentment, and additionally by acting out that resentment in my imagination, I have strengthened my disposition to pathos in general and resentment in particular, making this cycle of events more liable to repetition.

It can be seen from this that temptation involving resentment follows the same pattern as that involving fornication, and it can, I suggest, safely be inferred that the same applies to temptation involving other logismoi. One caveat must, however, be noted. Evagrius notes that two of the demons can be especially swift in their attacks, the demon of fornication and the demon ‘that snatches us away into blasphemy.’ In cases of such rapid assaults the process of temptation described in steps 1-9 and at Eulogios 13.12 and 21.22 will be accelerated, or even perhaps overridden, by an onrush of pathos. But Evagrius maintains that even under such circumstances the agent has the power to resist; this is evident not only from his treatment, at Eulogios 21.22, of agent responsibility in the throes of pathos, but from Praktikos 51, where he notes that a swift attack by the demon of fornication poses no hindrance to the knowledge of God unless it should set the logismoi in motion with pathos.

2.2.5 Summary

This section began by looking at the philosophical understanding of pathos and then at Evagrius’ view of it. We saw that for Evagrius pathos involves an attachment to the sensible world that is excessive and idolatrous; makes the nous passive in relation to the sensible world; is injurious because it distances us from God, and falls within the scope of our self-determination. Most of what we would consider emotions count as Evagrian

410 Cf. Prakt. 51; also Pry. 90.
pathē, as do various moods and other physical and psychological affects. Although for Evagrius pathos always involves the body, it is also present in the nous through association with noēmata of sensible objects. Through these empathē noēmata it binds the nous to the sensible world. It was noted that logismoi originate in the pathētikon part of the soul and include both affective and cognitive aspects. The distinction between dispositional and occurrent pathos was discussed and three aspects of dispositional pathos were seen to be identifiable in Evagrius’ writings. The process of temptation was examined in detail in relation first to logismoi of fornication and then to logismoi of resentment. It emerged that the logismoi always involve pleasure which is experienced before the rational part of the soul becomes involved in an episode of temptation and which makes it harder to resist them, but that even when a person is in the throes of fresh pathos the rational part of her soul retains the power to prevent it from increasing further or progressing to sin.

2.3 The empathēs nous

This chapter has examined the psychological components of empatheia, namely the logismoi and pathos. The logismoi have been seen to comprise both cognitive and affective aspects. The former can be of two types: first, mental images arising from the compromised rationality of the pathētikon part of the soul, and, second, agency deriving from the involvement of the rational part of the soul. The affective aspects of the logismoi include both dispositional and occurrent pathos. Now it remains to summarise the experiential effects of empatheia upon a person. How do the excess, the directedness toward the external world and consequent passivity and changeability in respect of it, and the injuriousness to the agent characteristic of pathos find expression in our lives? The excess, it will be recalled, consists in our allowing external things to command more of our attention than God and what conduces to knowledge of him, and this in turn is what the directedness toward the external world amounts to. So if my desire to eat competes for my allegiance with my desire to obey the dietary restrictions that I know to be in the interests of virtue then my desire to eat is excessive and therefore a pathos. It is in this deflection of the agent from the good that the injuriousness to her of pathos consists.
The combined effects of all these things in a person’s life, along with the passivity and changeability in respect of the external world that they involve, are instability and epistemic distortion. In binding the nous to the external world pathos binds it to its multiplicity and mutability, and this is reflected in pathos itself being a kind of movement. The understanding of pathos in terms of movement was by Evagrius’ time traditional. Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, as we saw, includes as a definition of it ‘injurious alterations and movements’ (αἱ βιαβεξαὶ ἀιινηώζεηο θαὶ θηλήζεηο), and the *De Anima* defines becoming angry as ‘a certain mode of movement of such and such a body’ (τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ τοιουτοῦ σώματος). Pathos is defined as a movement of the soul by the Stoics, and, following them, Clement of Alexandria, and understood as such by Origen. Evagrius himself consistently speaks of pathos in terms of kinēsis and for him its association with movement underscores its connection with the Fall, the vulnerability of the nous to pathos being both the direct consequence of its primordial deflection from God, and, in everyday terms, the ongoing consequence and cause of its inability to sustain a continual focus upon him.

Now, though, some clarification is necessary: it is not so much movement per se that specifically characterises pathos but, rather, chaotic and disorderly movement. A particularly eloquent source for this idea, and one with which Evagrius would have been familiar, is Plato’s metaphor, at *Phaedrus* 246a ff, of the soul as a winged team of horses and their charioteer. Following on from an affirmation of the intrinsic mobility and immortality of the soul, it includes descriptions of the type of movement characteristic of the gods on the one hand and mortals on the other. The gods travel easily through the heavens and the region above, their chariots being ‘well-balanced and easily controlled’ (ἰσορρόπος εὐθήνα ὄντα ράξιος πορεύετα) since their horses are good

---

413 Cf. Stobaeus 2:88, SVF 3.378; LS 65A; see above, 2.2.1.
414 Cf. *Strom*. 2.13.59.6; see above, 2.2.1.
415 I take this to be implied by the allusion at *DP* 3:1.4 to ‘pathē and movements’; see above, 2.2.4.
416 E.g. at *Prakt*. 6, 37, 38 and 47. For a discussion of Evagrius’ association of pathos with movement and, consequently, of apathēia with immobility, see Rasmussen (2005: 153-5).
417 *Phdr*. 245c8-9: ‘All soul is immortal. For that which is always in movement is immortal’ (ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἄθανατος, τὸ γὰρ ἄκακύνητον ἄθανατον). This and the following translations are those of Rowe.
418 *Phdr*. 247b2.
and of good stock (καλὸς τε καὶ ἅγαθὸς καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων).

In the case of mortals, however, one horse is good but the other bad, making driving difficult and troublesome (χαλέπι...καὶ δύσκολος) and confining them to the region below the heavens. These souls follow after the gods.

In the case of mortals, however, one horse is good but the other bad, making driving difficult and troublesome (ραιεπὴ...θαὶ δύζθνι) and confining them to the region below the heavens. These souls follow after the gods, ἅπαζαη ηνῦ ἄλσ ἕπνληαη, ἀδπλαηνῦ ζαη...ζπκπεξηθέξνληαη, παηνῦζαη ἀιιήιαο θαὶ ἐπηβάιινπζαη, ἑηέξα πξὸ η῅ο ἑηέξαο πεηξσκέλε γελέζζαη. ζόξπβνο νὖλ θαὶ ἅκηιια θαὶ ἱδξὼο ἐζραηνο γίγλεηαη, νὗ δὴ θαθίαο πνιιαὶ κὲλ ρσιεύνληαη, πνιιαὶ δὲ πνιιὰ πηεξὰ ζξαύνληαη.

all of them eager to rise up, but unable to do, and are carried round together... trampling and jostling one another, each trying to overtake the next. So there ensues the greatest confusion, competition and sweated exertion, in which through incompetent driving many souls are maimed, and many have their wings all broken.

A soul unable to follow in the train of a god and thereby glimpse ‘part of what is true’ (τι τῶν ἄληθῶν) becomes

λήθης τε καὶ κακίας πληθεῖσα βαρυνηθῇ, βαρυνθεῖσα δὲ πτεροπρφήση τε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πέση... weighed down by being filled with forgetfulness and incompetence, and because of the weight loses its wings and falls to the earth...

This description is strongly redolent of Evagrius’ vision of the fall of the logikoi, due to inattentiveness, negligence or carelessness, into the thickness of corporeality and bondage by pathos to the sensible world, and the resulting plight of the nous, whereby it is ‘entangled in material things and agitated by continuous concerns (πράγμασι συμπλεκόμενος ύλικὸς, καὶ φροντίσι συνεχέσι δονούμενος):

---

419 Phdr. 246b2-3.
420 Cf. Phdr. 246c ff.
421 More precisely, after the soul ‘which follows a god best and has come to resemble him most’ – 248a2.
422 Phdr. 248a7-b4.
423 Phdr. 248c2-3.
424 Phdr. 248c7-8.
425 Cf. KG 1.49.
426 Cf. KG 3.28; also DP 1.5.5 (R); 1.3.8 (R).
427 Cf. KG 3.28.
428 Pry. 70; cf. 2 Tim. 2:4.
The *nous* goes round and round when it is caught in the *pathē* and is hard to restrain when it visits matter conducive to pleasures.

It is not possible to run while tied up, nor can a mind that is a slave to the *pathē* behold the place of spiritual prayer, for it is dragged and spun round by *empathēs noēma* and it cannot achieve a stable state.

The *empathēs nous*, at the mercy of externals, can be seized by anger, dragged about by thoughts of worry, strangled by the noonday demon or carried away into blasphemy. It is subject to wandering and easily moved, having difficulty checking forbidden fantasies. It is darkened by *logismoi* rising through the *pathētikon* part of the soul, by our being dragged towards worldly desires and by our *thumos* being compelled contrary to nature. It is defiled by *logismoi* of anger or fornication and thickened by the company of secular people. It has a strong tendency to be plundered by memory at the time of prayer. In short, it is prey to all the turbulence, physical as well as psychological, associated with the *logismoi* and the *pathē* they arouse - and it should be remembered that this means not only particular episodes of mental and emotional turmoil and physical suffering but the ongoing process of cycling through the *logismoi* and their attendant *pathē* in one sequence or another as we ricochet through the

---

430 Pry. 71.
431 Prakt. 11.
432 Th. 6.
433 Cf. Prakt. 36. The ‘noonday demon’ is that of *akēdia*; cf. Prakt. 12.1.
434 Prakt. 43, 46.
435 Prakt. 15.
436 Prakt. 48.
437 Prakt. 74.
438 Prakt. 24.
439 Prakt. 23.
440 Prakt. 41.
441 Pry. 44.
‘complex pattern of moral vulnerability’\(^{442}\) that Evagrius’ eightfold classification of generic \textit{logismoi} represents.

For the soul that, due to the thoughts of sloth and \textit{acedia} that have persisted in it, has become weak, has been brought low, and has dissipated in the miseries of its soul; whose strength has been consumed by its great fatigue; whose hope has nearly been destroyed by this demon’s force; that has become mad and childish with passionate and doleful tears; and that has no relief from anywhere.\(^{443}\)

Now consider the following:

Τί βούλεται τοῖς δαίμοσι ἐνεργεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν γαστρομαργίαν, πυρείαν, φυλαγώγιαν, ὀργήν τε καὶ μνησικακίαν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάθη; ἢν παραύθεσις ὁ νοῦς ἐξ αὐτῶν, μὴ δυνηθῆ ώς δεί προσεύχησθαι τὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους πάθη ἄρξαντα οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν λογικῶς κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον ἐπιζητεῖν.\(^{444}\)

Why do the demons want to produce in us gluttony, fornication, avarice, anger, and resentment, and the other \textit{pathē}? So that the \textit{nous} becomes thickened by them and unable to pray as it ought; for when the \textit{pathē} of the irrational part have arisen, they do not allow it to be moved rationally and to seek the Word of God.

This reminds us that although the \textit{pathē} have their origin in the human body and soul - in our senses, appetites and desires\(^{445}\) - the \textit{logismoi} do not originate with us but with the demons; as we have seen, Evagrius regards the \textit{logismoi} as fundamentally alien to us since human nature is essentially good.\(^{446}\) Thus \textit{empathia} is not the natural human condition\(^{447}\) but a state of collusion with the demons into which we enter by allowing ourselves to be seduced by pleasure into letting the \textit{logismoi} linger and arouse (further) \textit{pathos} in us. The attractiveness to us of pleasure can be traced to the predominance of \textit{epithumia} in the human constitution,\(^{448}\) since the satisfaction of appetite always involves pleasure and so in a sense all appetite is directed toward pleasure. Therefore in suggesting the \textit{logismoi} – which, it will be recalled, always involve pleasure\(^{449}\) - the

\(^{442}\) Williams (2007:7); see above, 2.1.4.2.
\(^{443}\) Ant. 6.38.
\(^{444}\) Pry. 50.
\(^{445}\) E.g. Prakt. 4, 35; Eul. 21.23; see above, 2.2.2.
\(^{446}\) See above, 2.1.1.
\(^{447}\) Cf. Th. 8; see above, 2.1.1.
\(^{448}\) KG 1.68; see above, 1.2.
\(^{449}\) See above, 2.2.4.
demons are playing to the particular weakness of human beings, and just as apatheia is the natural human condition,\textsuperscript{450} empatheia is our especial pathology. Pathos thickens the nous by binding it to the sensible world and in so doing prevents it from being moved rationally; that is, in a stable and orderly manner. And so to look ahead, apatheia will be characterised not by immovability on the part of the soul but by its rational movement,\textsuperscript{451} that is, a kind of movement appropriate to contemplation.

This idea of stable and orderly movement replacing the chaotic and disorderly movement characteristic of pathos connects the instability of empatheia with the epistemic distortion noted to be its second defining feature. The fundamental reason for that distortion is simple: since God is both the source of knowledge and its only true object the fall from union with him was a fall from knowledge into ignorance.\textsuperscript{452} This is reflected in the fact that empatheia, mediated through the logismoi, leads us to construe the world solely in terms of our desires and to construct on their basis fictional counterparts of it, populated by phantoms, in which they can be satisfied. Thus in so far as we are prey to it the world of which we are aware and in which we act is not the real world peopled by real human beings but a false one of our own making in which real human beings are reduced to being ‘matter’ for our fantasies.\textsuperscript{453} The instigator of this desire-based fictional world is the pathētikon part of the soul, the impaired rationality of which is directed not toward truth, the proper object of reason, but what we desire to be true. But it is when the rational part of the soul assents to, and assumes agency within it that it derives from us such reality as we can give it. And so we isolate ourselves in subjective worlds of our own creation, cut off not only from God but from other human beings and the rest of creation, and in so doing perpetuate the instability and fragmentation of the Fall. In this condition we are unable to read the ‘letter from God’ that is corporeal creation. Instead of being able to appreciate the spiritual significance of created things or even engage with them neutrally, we are trapped in a self-referential perspective in which nothing has meaning except in terms of its utility in respect of what we mistakenly suppose to be our self-interest. And, as we go about our lives in this pathos-driven way, the noēmata that the nous takes up will have pathos ‘yoked together’ with them

\textsuperscript{450} Cf. Th. 8; see above, 2.1.1.
\textsuperscript{451} Pace Rasmussen (2005: 153-55), whose discussion of movement and immovability in relation to pathos and apatheia does not distinguish between soul and nous in terms of the effects of apatheia.
\textsuperscript{452} See above, 1.1.
\textsuperscript{453} See above, 2.1.1.
and so imprint the *nous*, further thickening it and, by forming *empathēs* memories, augmenting our disposition to *pathos* and perpetuating our predicament.

So much for the pathology of the human soul; now to its health.
Chapter 3

Apatheia

The essence of the human being is a formless and incorporeal *nous*, the ‘place of God’, created to exist in the stillness and ‘unspeakable peace’ of union with him. The *nous* is, however, capable of movement because it has the power of self-determination. Since the first condition of the *nous* was union with God, its first exercise of self-determination was a deflection from him, and since God is unmoving, this meant a transition into movement and, consequently, changeability. Because the movement was away from God, it was unstable and, as such, precipitated the Fall. God’s response was to undertake corporeal creation to reintroduce stability to the created order and provide the *noes* with a way of re-ascending to him. The foundation for this ascent is *apatheia*, the ‘health of the soul’ (*ὑγεία ψυχῆς*).3

Before proceeding it would be appropriate to clarify which part of the human person is the proper subject of *apatheia*, since Evagrius variously predicates it of the *nous*,4 the soul,5 the *pathētikon* part of the soul,6 the *epithumētikon*7 and the heart.8 The answer is in principle simple: the *nous* is the proper subject of *apatheia*, where *nous* is understood not as effectively synonymous with *logistikon* but as denoting the whole entity. But despite this, and the fact that, as we have seen, Evagrius often speaks of the *nous* rather than the soul in order to maintain a focus upon our true nature, prior to, above and beyond our present, ensouled condition,9 he also associates *apatheia* with the soul in contrast to the *nous*, as in the following:

δόξα καὶ φῶς τοῦ νοὸς ἐστὶν ἡ πνευματικὴ γνώσις; δόξα καὶ φῶς τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ ἀπάθεια.10

1 See above, 1.2.1.3.
2 Cf. *KG* 1.65.
3 *Prakt*. 56.3.
4 *E.g.* *Prakt*. 83; *Th*. 15, 26.
5 *E.g.* *Prakt*. 2, 56, 60, 67; *Rfl*. 3; *Th*. 22.
6 *Gnost*. 2.
7 *Th*. 16.
8 *Th*. 43.
9 See above, 1.2.1.
10 *KG* 1.81.
The glory and light of the *nous* is spiritual knowledge; the glory and light of the soul is *apatheia*.

Here Evagrius is speaking of the *nous* as synonymous with the *logistik*on and ‘soul’ as denoting the *pathētik*on part of the soul and so associating *apatheia* with the latter. In any case, to speak of *apatheia* as pertaining to the *nous*, if the latter is understood to encompass the body, would be misleading inasmuch as *apatheia* does not, properly speaking, attach to the body since its affections derive not from itself but from the soul, specifically its *pathētik*on part. For both these reasons it would seem more correct to say that *apatheia* attaches to the latter. But although the *pathētik*on part of the soul is certainly the principal locus of pathos in the soul, there is reason to believe that the *logistik*on is also vulnerable to pathos in its own right and not just *via* the *thumos* or *epithumētik*on. In the first place there is Evagrius’ reference to *apatheia* of the *pathētik*on part of the soul to account for. In it he defines the *praktik*os as ‘he who has only acquired *apatheia* of the *pathētik*on part of the soul’ (ὁ τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς μόνον ἀπαθὲς κακτημένως).\(^{11}\) If, as this implies, there can be, in addition to an *apatheia* of the *pathētik*on part of the soul, an *apatheia* of the rational part, there must be *pathē* of the rational part. We have already seen that, despite Evagrius’ usual attribution of the *logismoi* to the *pathētik*on part of the soul, several apparently derive at least in part from the *logistik*on.\(^{12}\) We have also seen that in practice the boundary between *logismoi* and *pathē* is blurred since *logismoi* always have dispositional pathos associated with them.\(^{13}\) In addition, the three parts of the soul are not, it will be recalled, absolutely distinct entities but successive stages in the descent of the *nous*.\(^{14}\) Finally, we have seen that the entire *nous*, even in its pre-lapsarian state, is intrinsically possible.\(^{15}\) For all these reasons it seems likely that the *logistik*on has its own pathē; indeed, this seems far more plausible than its being somehow immune to the passibility of the other parts of the soul and of the *nous* as a whole. But this raises the question of why the *pathētik*on part of the soul, if it is not the only source of pathos, should be singled out as *pathētik*on at all.\(^{16}\)

---

\(^{11}\) *Gnost.* 2.

\(^{12}\) See above, 2.1.4.1.

\(^{13}\) See above, 2.1.1, 2.2.4.

\(^{14}\) See above, 1.1.2.

\(^{15}\) See above, 1.2.1.

\(^{16}\) Cf., e.g., *Prakt.* 49; 74; 78; 84.
pathos, being more closely associated with the body and the external world than the rational part of the soul. In particular, it is the source of the appetite for food, in turn the source of vulnerability to all the other pathē.\textsuperscript{17} Second, the capacity to resist pathos is intrinsic to, and resides in, the logistikon alone. Consequently the pathētikon part of the soul depends upon something other than, and outside of, itself to free it from pathos.\textsuperscript{18} Therefore it can be concluded that although the pathētikon part of the soul is the primary and most fundamental intra-psychic source of pathos, the logistikon too is passible, and, accordingly, the entire soul is the proper subject of apatheia.

What, then, are we to make of Evagrius’ references to apatheia of the pathētikon part of the soul, the epithumētikon and the heart? The former two can now be explained easily: both refer to a specific kind of apatheia, ‘imperfect apatheia’, discussed below in Section 3.4. Evagrius’ reference to apatheia of the heart requires slightly more explanation. The heart, as we have seen, is the centre of a person’s interior life; that which they experience as ‘me’.\textsuperscript{19} To speak of apatheia of the heart, therefore, is to shift the focus onto this uniquely intimate domain; to raise the question of apatheia in relation to my most personal and immediate sense of myself. I suggested above that when Evagrius speaks of the nous or ‘soul’ he is discussing the human person objectively but when he speaks of the ‘heart’ he is invoking their subjectivity,\textsuperscript{20} and I think the extreme infrequency with which he predicates apatheia of the heart – I am only aware of the instance cited above – testifies to his sensitivity to the two different vocabularies he uses. When he uses the term apatheia he does so in conjunction with other philosophical terms whereas when he wants to speak of apatheia in relation to the heart he does so by reference to purity, or, more often, by allusion.\textsuperscript{21}

In sum, Evagrius speaks of apatheia in relation to the nous, the soul, the pathētikon part of the soul, the epithumētikon and the heart, but its proper object is the soul understood as the entire tripartite entity, or, speaking in a different sense, the heart. The assignment of apatheia to the soul needs to be qualified in that, while it is true in the case of the fallen nous (that is, the soul) that the soul is the subject of apatheia, the pre-lapsarian

\textsuperscript{17} See above, 1.2.3, 2.1.3.1.
\textsuperscript{18} Cf. Prakt. 86.
\textsuperscript{19} See above, 1.2.4.
\textsuperscript{20} See above, 1.2.4.
\textsuperscript{21} See below, 3.2.
nous would also have been apathēs, as will the post-restoration nous. However, since Evagrius’ discussions of apatheia always concern the incarnate nous (that is, the soul), I shall from now on speak of the soul as the subject of apatheia unless the context requires use of another term.

3.1 Apatheia as stability

The pre-lapsarian nous in discarnate union with God existed in stillness, but the fallen nous, although capable under certain circumstances of experiencing stillness, is highly mobile: Evagrius speaks of it wandering (πλανώμενον),\(^{22}\) describes it as easily moved (εὐθύλεην)\(^{23}\) and likens it to a potter’s wheel in the very great rapidity of its movement (ὅς ὅτατος...κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν ἠμῶν ὁ νοῦς).\(^{24}\) The more distant from God the nous is, the more unstable its movement is; the closer to him, the more stable. Apatheia, as freedom from the turbulence of the pathē is the stable condition of the nous that enables its return to God. We can see an allusion to the stability afforded by apatheia, to the reward of attaining it and to Evagrius’ association with it in the following entry from the Antirrhētikos:

[Against] the thought of pride that glorifies me on the pretext that I edify souls with a stable way of life and knowledge of God;\(^{25}\)

Since pathos is the unstable movement of the nous, apatheia is by definition its stable movement. Or is it? Rasmussen has argued that Evagrius associates apatheia with immovability:

If movement characterises the passions, the opposite is the case regarding apatheia. Apatheia is a condition which is characterised by peacefulness (Prakt. 12 and 57), where the mind is calm and still (Prakt. 64) and untroubled (Prakt. 67). This condition is identical with the original state of the rational beings before the fall, which, we remember, was characterised by movement... Perhaps it is possi-

---

\(^{22}\) Cf. Prakt. 15.1; also KG I.85: ‘The nous wanders when impassioned and is uncontrolled when it attains the elements of its desire.’

\(^{23}\) Prakt. 48.6.

\(^{24}\) Th. 24.6-7.

\(^{25}\) Cf. Ant. 8.30; see above, 2.1.3.8.
ble to say that the monastic struggle against thoughts, demons and passions is really about the struggle for immovability.26

To begin with, there is a double ambiguity to be unpacked from the notion of ‘immovability’. The first ambiguity is semantic and is that immovability can be either absolute or relative. That is, to say ‘x is immovable’ can either mean ‘x is immobile’, in the sense of ‘x is not moving at all’27 or it can mean ‘x is immovable in relation to y’, as in, ‘x cannot be moved from y’, where y could, for example, be a state of stable movement. That Rasmussen understands immovability as immobility is clear from her identification of it with the pre-lapsarian state of the logikoi (an identification which is misplaced since although the pre-lapsarian logikoi were immobile they were not immovable). The second ambiguity is logical and concerns the distinction between the metaphysical and the phenomenological; that is between, (a), my nous being actually – that is, metaphysically immovable, and, (b), my experiencing my nous as immovable. It would be possible for (a) but not (b) to be the case; for (b) but not (a) to be the case, or for both or neither (a) and (b) to be the case. Rasmussen does not acknowledge either of these ambiguities but her claim appears to be that apatheia is characterised by immobility that is both metaphysical and phenomenological, both actual and experienced. My claim, by contrast, is that apatheia is characterised by actual - that is, metaphysical - movement that is experienced as stillness. So far the only support I have adduced for it is the Platonic association of movement with soul, since although I have also inferred from the premiss that pathos is unstable movement to the conclusion that apatheia is stable movement, it would be equally valid to infer from it, as Rasmussen seems to have, that apatheia is immobility. I shall now explain (i) why metaphysical immovability can never be a property of the Evagrian nous; (ii) under what circumstances the nous can be (metaphysically) immobile, and, (iii), when (metaphysical) movement can be experienced as stillness.

The reason for (i) is simple: metaphysical immovability can never be a property of the nous as far as Evagrius is concerned because movability is inseparable from the power of self-determination, an exercise of which is, as we have seen, a movement of the

27 Although ‘immobile’ can also be synonymous with ‘immovable’, I shall not intend it to be understood in that sense here.
Again, with (ii) things are straightforward: God is immobile but movement is intrinsic to corporeal creation, so the *nous* is immobile when, and only when, it is in discarnate union with God. The *nous* was immobile - although not of course immovable - in its pre-lapsarian existence, and will again be immobile, although not immovable, following the *apokatastasis*. The incarnate *nous* can never be immobile because movement is intrinsic to corporeal creation. With (iii) things become more complicated. With the unstable movement of the soul or *nous* – that is, *pathos* - the phenomenological is a reliable guide to the metaphysical since *pathos* will always be experienced as unstable movement. To see this, we need only think back to Evagrius’ descriptions of the *logismoi* and their associated *pathē*: to be tempted by a *logismos*, which means already to be experiencing its built-in *pathos*, is to experience a mental and emotional instability that impels us toward the even greater instability of a fresh episode of *pathos*. The stable movement of the soul or *nous* can, however, be experienced as stillness. This can happen in two ways. The first relates to the *nous* which, although *apathēs* and perhaps contemplating, is not yet enjoying the experiential union with God that is pure prayer. In this case, its experience will be one of concurrent stillness and movement, the movement being its orientation toward God, and the stillness, the serenity that enables it. Evagrius’ account at *On Thoughts* 8 of investigating the spiritual *logoi* of gold describes a series of movements of the *apathēs nous*: from the question of ‘why gold was made’, to ‘why it is sand-like and scattered through through the lower regions of the earth, to why it is ‘discovered with much labour and toil’, and so forth. Again, the following describes a stable movement of the *nous*, the experience of which would involve both movement and stillness:

"Ὅταν ὁ νοῦς σου τῷ πολλῷ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν πόθῳ κατὰ μικρὸν ὑπαναχωρεῖ τῆς σαρκὸς, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐξ αἰσθήσεως ἤ μνήμης ἢ κράσεως νοήματα ἀποστρέφοντα, εὐλαβείας ὁμοῦ καὶ χαρᾶς ἐμπλέως γενόμενος, τότε νόμιζε ἣγγικέναι ὅροις προσευχής."

When the *nous* out of a great longing for God gradually withdraws, as it were, from the flesh and turns aside all *noēmata* deriving from the senses or from

---

28 Cf. Sch. 10.1-2 on Eccl. 2:11; Sch. 23.1 on Prov. 2:17; see above, 1.1.1.
29 Cf. Th. 8.5-14; see above, 2.1.1.
30 Pry. 61.
memory or from *krasis*, being filled with both reverence and joy, then consider yourself to be near the frontiers of prayer.

‘Great longing’, ‘gradually withdrawing’, ‘turning aside’, ‘being filled with reverence and joy’ – all are movements of the *nous* that would be experienced as such. But they are predicated upon *apatheia*: we know the *nous* here described is *apatheîs* from the fact that its *epithumêtikon* is acting according to nature in longing for God and from its ability to ‘withdraw from the flesh’ and ‘turn aside all *noêmata* deriving from the senses or memory or *krasis*’. This *apatheia* would be experienced as the serenity and detachment underlying and enabling these movements toward ‘the frontiers of prayer’. When, however, the *nous* reaches and crosses those frontiers it will no longer experience any movement, but will instead feel itself caught up in the stillness of union with God. Now phenomenology comes apart from metaphysics because while the *nous* will experience only stillness it will remain subject to the movements intrinsic to corporeality – the flows of blood and breath in the body; the continuing orientation of the three parts of the soul towards God, and also the existence of body and soul in time, existence in time being itself a form of movement since it entails change. So while *apatheia* is always experienced as stillness, it is constituted by the stable movement of the *nous*, and, except in the union with God that is pure prayer, will be accompanied by the experience of that movement.

That said, although I have argued that the *apatheîs nous* is in motion I have not yet adduced any direct evidence for this being Evagrius’ view. So does such evidence exist? It does. For example, at *Kephalaia Gnostika* 6.46 he speaks of ‘the *praktikê* soul moved by the commandments of Christ’. Here as elsewhere he uses the adjective *praktikê* as a synonym for *apathêsis*: the soul that is moved by the commandments of Christ is the *apathêsis* soul, in contrast to the soul which is moved by *pathos*. Again, in *On Prayer* 50 he declares that when the *pathê* of the irrational part of the soul have arisen, they do not allow the *nous* to ‘be moved in a rational manner (ινγηθWithData/31) and to seek the word of God’, from which it follows that when the soul is *apathêsis* the *nous* can be ‘moved in a rational manner.’ The ‘rational movement’ of the *nous* is of course contemplation, hence for example Evagrius speaks of ‘the pure *nous* which is moved by spiri-
tual knowledge’,³³ of the nous ‘eagerly [hastening] on towards immaterial and formless knowledge (πρὸς ἀὐλον καὶ ἀνείδον γνώσιν ἐπειγόμενος)³⁴ and of the angel of God ‘[moving] the light of the nous to an unerring activity’ (κινεῖ τὸ φῶς τοῦ νοῦ ἀπλανός ἐναργεῖν).³⁵

Because apatheia is the natural state of the human soul,³⁶ Evagrius refers to it as ‘our own state’ (τῆς οἰκείας καταστάσεως).³⁷ Insofar as the nous possesses apatheia it is emancipated from the turbulence associated with the logismoi. It is no longer bound by pathos to sensible objects,³⁸ is free of entanglement in material things and of agitation by continuous concerns³⁹ and is no longer ‘dragged and spun round by empathē noēmata and unable to achieve a stable state’:⁴⁰

Ἀπάθεια ἐστι κατάστασις ἡρέμεα ψυχῆς λογικῆς, ἐκ πραύτητος καὶ σωφροσύνης συνισταμένη.⁴¹

Apatheia is the tranquil state of the rational soul,⁴² constituted by gentleness and chastity.

Rasmussen suggests that allusions to the immovability that she associates with apatheia should be read into Evagrius’ uses in the Praktikos of cognates of the verb histēmi, ‘to stand’, such that references to standing, whether metaphorical or literal,⁴³ should be understood as implicit allusions to apatheia, and that in particular a symbolic connection obtains between the monastic practice of standing while praying and ‘the ideal, transcendent “stand” before God.’⁴⁴ In other words, when Evagrius speaks of the nous

---

³³ KG 6.48. At KG 3.42 Evagrius defines contemplation as spiritual knowledge; see below, 1.1.3
³⁴ Pry. 68.
³⁵ Pry. 74.
³⁶ Cf. Th. 8, Disc. 140; see above, 1.2, 2.2.1.
³⁷ Prakt. 43.8.
³⁸ Cf. Th. 40-3-5; Rfl. 23; Sch. 2 on Ps. 145:8; also Th. 22.1-8. See above, 2.2.3.
³⁹ Cf. Pry. 70; see above, 2.3.
⁴⁰ Cf. Pry. 71; see above, 2.3.
⁴¹ Rfl. 3.
⁴² Cf. Sch. Ps. 36:11: ‘an abundance of peace is apatheia of the soul with true knowledge of beings’ (πλῆθος δὲ πάρνης ἐστίν ἀπάθεια ψυχῆς μετὰ γνώσεως τῶν θεῶν ἀληθοὺς).
⁴³ She cites as examples Prakt. 15, ‘When the nous wanders, reading, vigils and prayer bring it to a standstill’ (νοῦν μὲν παλινόμενον ἱστησάθην…) and Prakt. 46, ‘This demon’s goal is to stop us from praying so that we may not stand (μὴ στῶμεν) before God’.
standing before God he is evoking both the monk’s physical posture during prayer and the stability and experiential stillness of *apatheia*, the former being in turn a symbol of the latter. With the foregoing caveats about ‘immovability’, I think this is often correct,\(^{45}\) and in particular we shall see in the following section that the ‘stand of the *nous* before God’ is indeed symbolic of *apatheia*. Meanwhile it can be noted how, in the second part of this aphorism, Evagrius uses the verb *sunistamai*, a cognate of *histēmi* and also of *sustasis*, to implicitly reinforce the association of *apatheia* with stability that is made explicit in the first part of it. Again,

\[
καθαρθείσα ψυχή τῆς τῶν ἀρετῶν πληρότητος ἀκλόνητον τὴν τάξιν τοῦ νοοῦ κατασκευάζει, δεκτικὸν αὐτὸν ποιοῦσα τῆς ζητομένης καταστάσεως.\(^{46}\)
\]

When the soul has been purified by the full complement of the virtues, it stabilises\(^{47}\) the attitude of the *nous* and prepares it to receive the desired state.

The soul that has been ‘purified by the full complement of the virtues’ is the *apathēs* soul, and the ‘desired state’ that it prepares the soul to receive is that of pure prayer.\(^{48}\)

Commenting on Prov. 18:16, ‘A man’s gift enlarges him, and seats him among princes’, Evagrius understands a ‘man’s gift’ to be the right life (*βίος ὀρθός*) that enlarges him and makes him worthy of the fullness of God,\(^{49}\) and the verb ‘seats’ as referring to ‘the seat of the *nous*…the excellent state which keeps that which is sitting there difficult to move or immovable’\(^{50}\) (νοῦ γὰρ καθέδρα ἐστὶν ἔξις ἀρίστη δυσκόνητον ἢ ἀκλόνητον

\(^{45}\)An obvious exception being his use of the word *katastasis*, ‘state’. The meaning of this word is simply too broad for it to be associated only with stability, and Evagrius uses it of both stable and unstable states, as, for example, in the following: Sch. 23 on Prov. 2:17: ‘the former (πρότερον) *katastasis* [of the logikoi]’; Sch. 91.1-2 on Prov. 7:6-10, ‘the impure (ἀκάθαρτος) *katastasis* of the soul’; Sch.153.4-6 on Prov. 17:2, ‘he gives to each brother knowledge according to his *katastasis*’; Sch. 240.1 on Prov. 22:10, ‘the worst (χειρίστη) *katastasis*’; Prakt. 80.3-5, ‘A peaceful (εἰρηνική) *katastasis* follows upon the former *logismoi*, but a troubled (τεταραγμένη) one follows upon the latter.’

\(^{46}\)Pry. 2.

\(^{47}\)Rasmussen (2005: 155) translates *aklonētos* as ‘immovable’ and interprets this chapter as clear evidence for the connection between *apatheia* and immovability that she proposes. ‘Stabilises’ is Sinkewicz’ translation. Liddell and Scott give the meanings of *aklonētos* as ‘unshaken, unmoved.’

\(^{48}\)Pace Rasmussen, who takes the ‘desired state’ to be *apatheia* itself.

\(^{49}\)Cf. Eph. 3:19.

\(^{50}\)Sinkewicz translates *akinēton* here as ‘immobile’, but because of the ambiguity of this term – see above, n.26 – it is unclear how he intends it to be understood. Liddell and Scott give both ‘immobile’ and ‘immovable’ as meanings of *akinēton*, but I feel that the latter is, in the context, a more suitable translation since it is unambiguous and in the sense of ‘immovable’ logically related to the predicate ‘difficult to
διατηροῦσα τὸν καθεξόμενον); that is, *apatheia*. ‘Difficult to move’ means ‘difficult to dislodge from stable movement’ and should be understood both metaphysically and phenomenologically. For the reasons given above, however, ‘immovable’ must be understood in phenomenological terms alone; that is, as meaning that the *nous* feels immovable. The following makes the same point, bearing in mind that *apatheia* is synonymous with the establishment of virtue in the soul:

Virtue is that state of the reasoning soul in which it is difficult to move it towards evil.

In his gentleness, tranquility and stability the Evagrian *apathēs* resembles the Stoic sage, described by Stobaeus as follow:

[They say that] the good man...is gentle, his gentleness being a state by which he brings gentleness to bear upon acting appropriately in everything and never being carried away to anger against anyone. He is also tranquil and orderly, his orderliness being knowledge of fitting movements and his tranquility the good discipline of the natural movements and rests of his soul and body.

For Evagrius, the tranquillity afforded by *apatheia* derives in large part from the neutrality it affords in relation to our thoughts and occurrent sense-perception. We have seen that ‘the human [that is, *apathēs*] logismos neither seeks the acquisition of gold nor is concerned with investigating what gold symbolises; rather, it merely introduces in the intellect the simple form of gold separate from any *pathos* of greed’, and this neutrality also characterises sense perception, meaning that although the *noēmata* of sensible

---

51 Sch. 184.3-5 on Prov. 18:16.
52 See above, 1.2.2.
53 *KG* 6.21.
54 Stobaeus 2:115.5-17, *SVF* 3:564, 632; *LS* 65W.
55 Translation mine.
56 *Th*. 8.18-21; see above, 2.1.1.
objects will imprint the *nous* insofar as we focus upon the objects themselves rather than their *logoi*, the imprinting will not have the force that it would were *pathos* involved. But it is not only to our thoughts and perceptions of objects that *apatheia* brings tranquility, but to our memories of them:

ἀπάθειαν ἔχει ψυχή, οὐχ ἢ μὴ πάσχοισα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλ’ ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰς μνήμας αὐτῶν ἀτάραχος διαμένουσα.\(^{57}\)

The soul possesses *apatheia*, not by virtue of its experiencing no *pathos* with respect to objects, but because it remains untroubled even with regard to memories of them.

Evagrius also includes our dream life within the domain of *apatheia*:

ἀπαθείας τεκμήριον, νοῦς ἀρεξάμενος τὸ οίκεῖον φέγγος ὀράν, καὶ πρὸς τὰ καθ’ ὑπὸν φάσματα διαμένους ἡσυχος, καὶ λείος βλέπον τὰ πράγματα.\(^{58}\)

It is a proof of *apatheia* when the *nous* has begun to see its own light\(^{59}\) and remains still before the phantasms occurring during sleep and looks upon objects with serenity.

It is probable that in extending *apatheia* to our dream life Evagrius is not simply treating the latter as an adjunct of our waking life, the character of which reflects the overall health of the soul, but as morally and spiritually relevant in a more substantive and direct way. His departure from Constantinople\(^{60}\) was precipitated, so Palladius tells us, by his swearing an oath in a dream to ‘leave this city and care for [his] soul’ (ἀλαρσξεῖο ἐκεῖο πόιεσο ἐκείο θαὶ θξνληίδεηο ζνπ ἐκτῆς ψυχής);\(^{61}\) upon waking he questioned the validity of such an oath, but reasoned, ‘even if the oath was in a trance, nevertheless I did take it’ (ἐι καὶ ἐν ἐκστάσει γέγονεν ὦ ὦρκος ἀλλ’ ὦμως ὦμοσῶ).\(^{62}\) It would seem, then, that he regards us as capable in principle of full agency in our dreams, a belief which, in

---

\(^{57}\) Prakt. 67.

\(^{58}\) Prakt. 64.

\(^{59}\) At Gnost. 45 Evagrius attributes to Basil of Caesarea the view that the *nous* has a light of its own that is only visible to those who have attained *apatheia*.

\(^{60}\) Prior to settling in the desert Evagrius had been in Constantinople, first in the retinue of Gregory Nazianzus and then in that of his successor as bishop, Nektarios. He left the city in order to extricate himself from a potentially disastrous romantic entanglement; cf. HL 38.2-7.

\(^{61}\) HL 38.6.

\(^{62}\) HL 38.7.
assigning agency to us under circumstances to which it might be supposed not to extend, would accord with his imputing to the person in the throes of pathos the ability nonetheless to refrain from sin.\textsuperscript{63}

In this section I have explained how Evagrius can speak of apatheia both as being characterised by stillness and associated with movement. It has been noted that apatheia bestows stillness (that is, stable movement experienced as stillness) not only in respect of our thoughts and occurrent sense-perception but in respect of our memories, and not only in our waking life but in our dreams. From the latter it has been further noted that Evagrius imputes full agency to the nous not only in the throes of pathos but in the dream state. Finally, it has been noted that Evagrius’ references to the nous standing before God allude to apatheia as well as to the physical stand of the monk in prayer.

3.2 Apatheia as death and resurrection

Apatheia is the purified state of the soul, and for Evagrius its attainment amounts to a kind of death:

\[ \text{σῶμα μὲν χωρίζει ψυχῆς, μόνου ἐστὶ τοῦ συνδήσαντος· ψυχὴν δὲ ἀπὸ σῶματος, καὶ τοῦ ἐφικμένου τῆς ἁρετῆς. τὴν γὰρ ἀναχώρησιν μελέτην θανάτου καὶ φυγὴν τοῦ σώματος οἱ Πατέρες ἠμῶν ὄνομάξουσιν.}^{64} \]

Separating body from soul belongs solely to the one who joined them together; but separating soul from body belongs also to one who longs for virtue. Our Fathers called anachoresis a meditation on death and a flight from the body.

Although Evagrius attributes this teaching to ‘the Fathers’, its \textit{locus classicus} is Plato’s \textit{Phaedo},\textsuperscript{65} where Plato has Socrates define ‘purification’ (κάθαρσις) as ‘the separation of the soul from the body as far as possible’ (τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος

\textsuperscript{63} Cf. \textit{Eul.} 21.23; see above, 2.2.4.
\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Prakt.} 52.
\textsuperscript{65} Cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 256, n.59) who notes that ‘the meditation on death had become a common notion by the end of the fourth century’ and points to its presence at, e.g., \textit{VA} 19. It is also, of course, a Pauline theme; e.g. 1 Cor. 15:31, ‘I die daily’ (καθ’ ἠμέραν ἀποθνήσκω).
The correct practice of philosophy as consisting in ‘a release and separation of soul from body’ (λύος καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σῶματος). But while the theme of purification as death has pagan origins, Paul gives it an added dimension by construing that death in terms of sharing in the death of Christ in order to share in his resurrection, and it is in this sense that Evagrius’ adoption of it is to be understood. Explaining, in the Prologue to the Praktikos, the symbolism of the habit worn by the Egyptian monks, he declares,

They wear the sheepskin who ‘always carry in the body the death of Jesus’ in muzzling all the irrational pathē of the body and in cutting off the evils of the soul by participation in the good.

The praktikos ‘always carries in his body the death of Jesus so that the life of Jesus may also be manifested in [his] body (ἵλα θαὶ ἡ διὰ ηνῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐλ ζώκαη θαλαξσζῆ)’ - the reader is left to complete the quote for herself – and, as Driscoll notes, Evagrius consistently ‘understands death to apply to praktikē and resurrection to knowledge’. Praktikē is a kind of death because it involves dying to the world by renouncing all our attachments to it. But the real death suffered by the nous is not that in which it turns away from the external world, but that in which it turned away from God, and its ‘death’ to the external world is but the precursor to its ‘resurrection’ in knowledge of God; ‘through praktikē the Lord saves one from death’ (διὰ...πρακτικῆς ῥύεται τινα ἀπὸ θανάτου ὁ κύριος):
The rational nature that was put to death by evil, Christ raises up through the contemplation of all the ages; the soul that has died the death of Christ, his Father raises up through knowledge of himself. And this is what was said by the Apostle: ‘If we have died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him.’

To ‘die with Christ’ is to ‘die’, by means of praktikē, to immersion in pathos and the straitened perspective that sees objects solely in terms of their relevance to our desires. To be empathēs is to be locked in this narrow perspective, our minds surrendered to the logismoi and so to the construction of fictional worlds that cut us off from the real world, the world of objects ‘as they were created’. Thus Disciples 58:

Just as with the exterior self the soul sins by acting through the body, so the interior self - that is the nous - [sins by acting] through the empathē noēmata. And just as the exterior self has the virtues for education in order that he might become chaste, so the nous becomes chaste when, with purity and apatheia, it sees objects as they were created; it is in [such a nous] that, according to Paul, Christ dwells, and for which, it is written, he suffered the shame of the cross. And just as the exterior self separates himself from the world by dying, so the interior self, by dying kata dianoian, separates himself from noēmata.

Again we can presume that Evagrius deliberately leaves his reader to complete a quote: according to Heb. 12:2 Jesus endured the shame of the cross ‘for the sake of the joy that was set before him’ (τῆς προκειμένης αὐτῶ χαρᾶς). One dies the death of praktikē for the sake of the joy of the ‘resurrection’:

---

74 Th. 38.
75 Rom. 6:8.
76 Cf. Eph. 3:17.
ἐὰν εξηλώσῃς Χριστόν, γενήσῃ μακαριστός,
τὸν δὲ θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἀποθανεῖται ἢ ψυχή σου,
καὶ οὐ μὴ ἐπιστάσηται ἀπὸ σάρκις αὐτῆς κακίαν,
ἀλλὰ ἔσται ἡ ἐξοδός σου ὡς ἐξοδὸς ἀστέρος,
καὶ ἡ ἀναστασίας σου ὀψερ ὁ ἡλιος ἐκλάμψει. 78

If you imitate Christ, you will become blessed.
Your soul will die his death, 79
and it will not derive evil from its flesh.
Instead, your exodus will be like the exodus of a star,
and your resurrection will glow like the sun.

The soul that by means of practikē imitates Christ ‘will not derive evil from its flesh’
because rather than ‘nourishing it and making provision for it to gratify its desires’ 80 it
‘subdues it with hunger and vigil’ so that the body ‘does not jump when a logismos
mounts upon it nor snort when moved by an empathēs impulse’ 81 but instead becomes
the means by which the soul attains apatheia. 82 Thus Ad Monachos 118:

σάρκες Χριστοῦ πρακτἰκαὶ ἁρέταί,
ο δὲ ἐσθίων αὐτάς γενήσεται ἀπαθής.

Flesh of Christ: virtues of practikē;
he who eats it, apathēs shall he be.

Driscoll notes that the word ‘exodus’ is used by Evagrius to denote the passage from
praktikē to knowledge and so ‘describes the death that the monk dies with Christ’, 83
while the star symbolises ‘a soul making progress’ and its degree of brightness its de-
gree of progress; 84 when a person attains apatheia of the heart then during prayer they
will see their nous shine like a star (νοοῦ ἀστεροειδή). 85 He also notes that Evagrius’
thinking about resurrection seems in particular to draw upon Paul’s distinction, at I Cor.

78 AM 21.
79 Cf. 2 Cor. 4:10-11; 2 Tim. 2:11.
80 Cf. Prakt. 53; Rom. 13:14.
81 Cf. 8Th. 1.35.
82 Cf. Prakt. 53; see above, 1.2.3.
83 Driscoll (2003: 241); cf. Sch. 12 on Prov. 1:20-21: ‘Here he calls “exodus” the soul’s exit from evil and
ignorance ‘ (ἐξοδὸν νῦν ὄνομάζει τὴν ἐξελθούσαν ψυχήν ἀπὸ κακίας καὶ ἄγνοιας).
84 Driscoll (2003: 242); cf. KG 3.84: ‘The whole of second natural contemplation bears the sign of the
stars, and the stars are those to whom it has been entrusted to illuminate those who are in the night.’
85 Th. 43.
15:44, between a sôma psuchikon and a sôma pneumatikon, and that Evagrius uses the Pauline expression ‘spiritual body’, along with ‘resurrection’, to describe ‘a return to original unity of those elements into which the mind “disintegrated” (i.e. into soul, into a body) in falling from essential knowledge.’

It is, accordingly, instructive to look at what Paul says about the ‘spiritual body’:

ζὺ ὅ ζπείξεηο, νὐ δωνπνηεῖηαη ἐὰλ κὴ ἀπνζάλῃ …ζπείξεηαη ἐλ θζνξᾷ, ἐγείξεηαη ἐλ ἀθζαξζίᾳ· ζπείξεηαη ἐλ ἀηηκίᾳ, ἐγείξεηαη ἐλ δόμε· ζπείξεηαη ζ῵κα ςπρηθόλ, ἐγεηξεηαη ζ῵κα πλεπκαηηθόλ … ἔζηηλ ζ῵κα ςπρηθόλ, ἔζηηλ θαὶ πλεπκαηηθόλ …

What you sow does not come to life unless it dies…What is sown is corruptible, what is raised is incorruptible. It is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power. It is sown an animal body, it is raised a spiritual body. If there is an animal body, there is also a spiritual body…Flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, nor does the corruptible inherit the incorruptible…The [last] trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised incorruptible, and we will all be changed. For this corruptible body must put in incorruptibility, and this mortal body must put on immortality. When this corruptible body puts on incorruptibility, and this mortal body puts on immortality, then the saying that is written will be fulfilled: ‘Death has been swallowed up in victory.’

It is clear that Evagrius understands ‘animal body’ (σώμα ψυχικόν) as referring to what, in the Great Letter, he calls the body’s nature or attributes88 – that is, the nature and attributes it shares with corporeal creation. In the Great Letter he discusses the possibility of our rising above ‘the movements we have in common with the wild animals’. The movements he cites are ‘hunger, sleep, lust, rage, fear, distress, enmity, sloth, disquiet, cunning, savagery, pride, mournfulness, lamentation and wickedness’, and their ‘opposite movements’, namely ‘satisfaction, vigilance, loathing, serenity, fortitude, gladness,

87 1 Cor. 15:36-54.
88 Cf. Gt.Let. 46.
love, diligence, quiet, simplicity, meekness, humility, joy, consolation and goodness.\footnote{89} He also lists the senses – ‘seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and feeling.’ Of all of these, ‘and whatever else may be like them that has not been noted’, he says:

In accordance with…the body’s subjugation to the soul (since the latter is able to do everything like God, in whose image it is), it might be thought that even while the body lives certain of the movements we mentioned can be renounced. Again, it might be thought…that if it were perfectly in the likeness of God as it was created, it could even elevate itself above all the movements; but since it renounced being the image of God and willingly became the image of animals, it is subjugated to all those movements of the body which it has in common with the beasts and wild animals. When it is beneath its nature by its actions, it is not possible for it to make its body above its nature by its movements. Fire cannot extinguish a fire, nor can water dry water; likewise, the soul that is in the body by its works…cannot liberate the body from its own attributes.

We partake of corporeal nature because we chose to renounce the image of God and assume the image of animals:

\[\text{διότι γνώντες τὸν θεὸν οὐχ ὡς θεὸν ἔδόξασαν ἢ ἡχαρίστησαν, ἀλλ’ ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ἢ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία. φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ ἐμοράνθησαν καὶ ἠλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος φθάρτου ἀνθρώπου καὶ πετειών καὶ τετραπόδων καὶ ἑρπτών. διὸ παρέδωκεν αὐτοῦς ὁ θεὸς ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν καρδιῶν αὐτῶν εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν.}\footnote{90}

Though they knew God, they did not honour him as God or give thanks to him, but they became vain in their thoughts and their uncomprehending heart was darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools; and they exchanged the glory of the incorruptible God for an image in the likeness of a corruptible human being or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles. Therefore God gave them up in the desires of their hearts to impurity.

The pre-lapsarian logikoi knew God, but in turning away from him failed to honour or give thanks to him. Likewise human beings, since we are essentially noes created in the

\footnote{89} Ibid.  
\footnote{90} Rom. 1:21-4. In using the expression ‘an image in the likeness’ (ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος) Paul alludes to Genesis 1:26: “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness…” (ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ’ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ’ ὁμοιωσίν); both passages use the same word, eikôn, for ‘image’, and the word Paul uses for ‘likeness’, homoiôma, is a close cognate of homoiôsis.
image of God and therefore receptive to knowledge of God, can be said to know him, but we too fail to honour or thank him. Instead, like the guests invited to the banquet, we care more for our possessions, relationships and so forth, not realising that all that is good comes from God. Because our thoughts – our [dia]logismoi – are not directed toward God they are vain, and because our hearts are full of such thoughts there is no room in them for God, meaning that they are darkened and their desires impure. In this condition we repeatedly choose to ‘exchange the glory of the incorruptible God’ for the image of that which is corruptible, a choice that both arises from and reinforces the ‘impurity of the desires of our hearts.’ This impurity is manifest in the pathētikon part of the soul being given over to the movements that we ‘have in common with the wild animals.’ All of these things are part of the ‘dishonour’ that Paul speaks of in relation to the sôma psuchikon.

The ‘attributes of the body’ are, properly speaking, those of the pathētikon part of the soul, but ‘the things that heal the pathētikon part of the soul require the body to put them into practice’ (ἐκεῖνα μὲν τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπεύοντα...τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν εἰς τὴν ἐργασίαν προσδείται), a task for which ‘the latter, because of its weakness, is not sufficient’ (ὅπερ δὴ οἰκεῖαν ἀσθένειαν πρὸς τοὺς πόνους οὐκ ἐπαρκεῖ). This is the ‘weakness’ of the sôma psuchikon to which Paul refers at 1 Cor. 15:43, and because of it the body must ‘ascend from its nature through the health and strength of the soul’, this of course being apatheia. That the soul can, although not ‘perfectly in the likeness of God as it was created’, nonetheless effect this purification derives from the efficacy that the image of God, although damaged, yet retains: ‘the soul ascends through the strength and wisdom of God according to his nature.’

---

91 Cf. Luke 14:16-24; see above, 2.2.2.  
92 Cf. Pry. 33: ‘What good is there besides God? Therefore, let us give back to him all that is ours and it will go well for us. For the one who is good is certainly also the provider of good gifts’ (Τί ἄγαθόν ἂλλο ἡ Ἰηθῶς; οὐκοῦν αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦμεν πάντα τὰ καθ’ ἡμᾶς, καὶ εἰ ἡμῶν ἐσταν ὁ γὰρ ἄγαθός πάντως, καὶ ἄγαθόν ἐστι παροχεῖς δοριεῖς): also 8Thh. 8:12: ‘You have nothing good which you have not received from God’ (οὐδὲν ἐγεῖς, δὴ μὴ παρά Θεοῦ ἐλαβεῖς); cf. 1 Cor. 4:7: ‘What do you have that you did not receive?’  
93 Gi.Let. 41.  
94 Prakt. 49.3-6; cf. Th. 35.9-10.  
95 Gi.Let. 49.  
96 Gi.Let. 49.
What exactly it means in practice for the soul to raise itself and the body above the movements they share with corporeal nature – that is, for the nous to attain apatheia - can be appreciated by reference to the previous chapter’s discussion of the logismoi and of pathos and its arousal. In the first place it means that the monk will feel neither hunger or thirst. He will, without any effort of self-discipline, conform his intake of food and liquid to the level required to keep his body alive, and will experience no desire to eat or drink in excess of this, either in terms of quantity or variety:

\[ \text{ὁ τέλειος οὐκ ἔγκρατεῦεται, καὶ ὁ ἀπαθής οὐχ ὑπομένει, εἰπέρ τοῦ πάσχοντος ἡ ὑπομονή, καὶ τοῦ ὄχλουμένου ἡ ἐγκράτεια}. \] 97

The one who is perfect does not practise self-control and the one who is apathēs does not practise perseverance, since perseverance is for the person subject to the pathē and self-control for the person who is troubled.

On the other hand, although he will experience no desire to vary his dietary regime, he will be content to do so when appropriate, for example for the sake of hospitality or because of physical sickness.98 Since he will avoid eating or drinking to excess his apatheia will have a firm foundation in his body, there being no surplus of vital heat to manifest as pathos. Nor will there be any surplus of food or drink to be excreted as waste products. He will not be distracted by dreams or fantasies about food and drink, nor by worries about the effect of his regime upon his health. His thinking will be vigilant (νηφάλιον φρένημα),99 his prayer ‘like a young eagle soaring upwards’ (νεοσσὸς ἄετοῦ ἀνπατάμενος)100 and his nous ‘like a radiant star in the clear night air’ (ἀστήρ ἐν αἰθήρι ἔλαιμπρός).101 He will not experience sexual desire, movements, fantasies or dreams; the above passage from Great Letter 46 continues by noting that when the movements of the body occur ‘in a natural and orderly way, they are a sign of some small portion of health for the soul; but when there are none, it is a sign of perfection.’102 The sight of a woman will move him not to pleasure but to offer glory to God

---

97 Prakt. 68.
98 Ibid.
99 8Th. 1.13. Νηφάλιος is one of a family of terms whose primary meaning relates to an absence of wine, hence its sense of ‘vigilant’ derives from ‘sober, self-controlled, wary.’
100 8Th. 1.14.
101 8Th. 1.15.
102 Gt.Let. 47. Cf. Prakt. 55: ‘When the natural movements of the body during sleep are free of images, they reveal that the soul is healthy to a certain extent. The formation of images is an indication of ill-
Thus even when exposed to the ‘matter’ of logismoi he will remain apathēs. Not hankering after possessions, he will be a well-prepared traveller who finds shelter in any place (ὁδοιπόρος εὐσταλής, καὶ ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ εὐφρίσκον κατάλυμα), and like an athlete who cannot be thrown and a light runner who speedily attains ‘the prize of his higher calling’ (ἀθλητὴς ἀμεσολάβητος, καὶ ὀρμενὺς κοῦφος, ταχέως φθάνον ἐπὶ τὸ βραβεῖον τῆς ἄνω κλήσεως). He will no more be wounded by distress (πτηνόσκεται ἀπὸ λύπης) than a person wearing armour is affected by an arrow (ὁ τεθωρακισμένος οὐ δέχεται βέλος). He will be gentle and patient with his fellows and humble before God, reserving his anger for the demons alone. He will not fall prey to acedia, will be careless of human esteem and will never lose sight of his dependence upon God.

All this does not mean that he will no longer have the experience of logismoi being suggested to him; Evagrius states that it is not in our power whether or not the logismoi trouble the soul, only whether or not they linger and arouse fresh pathos in us. The difference between him and the person who is empathēs, rather, is that the apathēs will not find the logismoi tempting:

Αἱ ἀξεηαὶ νῦ ἄι ηἄλ δαηκόλσλ ὁξκ ἀ ο ἀλαθόπηνπζηλ, ἀιι Ἐκᾶο ἀζῶνπο δηαθπιάηηνπζηλ.

The virtues do not check the assaults of the demons, but they preserve us unharmed.

He will look upon objects with serenity (λεῖος βλέπων τὰ πράγματα) and will remain untroubled by memories of them (πρὸς τὰς μνήμας ἀὐτῶν ἀτάραχος διαμένουσα) and
still before the apparitions occurring during sleep (πρὸς τὰ καθ' ὦπνον φάσματα διαμένον ἡσύχος). In short, he lives in tranquillity without fear of any evil logismos (ὁ ἀπαθῆς ἑσυχάζει ἀφόβως ἀπὸ παντὸς κακοῦ λογισμοῦ); Evagrius affirms the protective nature of apatheia in the following scholia:

ownership of the rational soul constituted by the practical virtues.

Whoever loves the law practises the law, and whoever practises the law acquires apatheia and knowledge of God. And if “those who love the law fortify themselves with a wall”, now the wall designates apatheia and knowledge of God, which alone naturally protect rational nature.

So far we have seen that the purification of the soul that is the attainment of apatheia amounts to a kind of death, in that it involves ‘dying’ to our attachments to the external world. These attachments are the result of our choice to exchange the image of God for the ‘image of animals’. Their media are the movements of the pathētikon part of the soul, movements that ‘we have in common with the beasts and wild animals.’ They make our thoughts vain, our hearts dark and our desires impure. For Evagrius the mem-

111 Cf. Prakt. 64, 67; see above, 3.1.
112 Sch. 17 on Prov. 1:33: ‘He that hearkens to me shall dwell in confidence and shall rest securely from all evil.’
113 Sch. 12 on Prov. 1:20-21: ‘Wisdom sings aloud in passages, and in the broad places speaks boldly. And she makes proclamation on the top of the walls, and sits by the gates of princes’; cf. Prov. 28:4.
114 Sch. 293 on Prov. 24:31: ‘If thou let him alone, he will altogether remain barren and covered with weeds; and he becomes destitute and his stone walls are broken down.’
115 Prov. 28:4.
116 Sch. 343 on Prov. 28:4: ‘They that forsake the law practise ungodliness; but they that love the law fortify themselves with a wall.’
bers of this triad are intimately connected with one another and find expression in the *logismoi* which, as we have seen, have *pathos* built into them. The body is too weak to purify itself, but it can be raised from its nature through the health and strength of the soul – that is, through *apatheia*; although the image of God is damaged it retains sufficient efficacy to heal the soul, and through it, the body. For the soul to raise the body above its nature and itself above its vicious movements is for the monk to become immune to temptation by the *logismoi*, although *logismoi* will still be suggested to him. Consequently *apatheia* is like a protective wall or fence. His thoughts will no longer be vain since they will no longer be directed away from God. Likewise, his heart will not be darkened nor his desires impure. Hence *apatheia*, as ‘death’ to our attachment to corporeal nature, is the purity and chastity of the soul.

It will by now have become apparent that Evagrius uses different ways of talking about the same thing to clarify different aspects of it and, by doing so, to describe as fully as possible the thing itself. In doing so he is following what he understands to be the example of Scripture in using ‘many names to name’ (πολλοὶς ὄνόμασιν ὄνομάζειν), among other things, virtue and knowledge. Before returning to Evagrius’ use of the Pauline idea of the ‘spiritual body’, therefore, I want to mention two other ways in which he talks about the *apatheia* in its sense of being purity and chastity of the soul and, as such, a kind of death. The first of these is *apatheia* as purity of heart. In his scholion on Prov. 19:17 Evagrius explicitly equates the two:

\[ \text{Δόμαι νῦν τὴν καθαρότητα τῆς καρδίας ὁμόμοιαν καὶ ἀναλογίαν γὰρ τῆς ἀπαθείας καταξιοῦμεθα γνώσεως.} \]

Here he calls ‘gift’ purity of heart, for it is in proportion to our *apatheia* that we are judged worthy of knowledge.

More usually, though, their equivalence is implicit rather than explicit. For example, at *Letter* 56 Evagrius, discussing the beatitude ‘blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall

---

117 Sch. 7.4 on Prov. 1:9; cf. Sch. 317 on Prov. 25:26.
118 For discussion of Evagrius’ use of the expression ‘purity of heart’ as an alternative to *apatheia*, see Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999), pp. 141-159.
119 Sch. 199 on Prov. 19:17: ‘He that has pity on the poor lends to the Lord; and he will recompense him according to his gift.’
see God’, 120 states that ‘purity is *apatheia* of the reasonable soul’. 121 Consider now the following proverb, *Ad Monachos* 31:

἖λ θαξδίᾳ πξαείᾳ ἀλαπαύζεηαη ζνθία, θρόνος δὲ ἀπαθείας ψυχή πρακτική. 122

In the gentle heart, wisdom will rest; a throne of *apatheia*, a soul accomplished in *praktikē*.

As Driscoll points out, both its vocabulary and the general idea it expresses are derived from Jesus’ words at Matt. 11:28-29:

Γεῦηε πξόο κε πάληεο νἱ θνπη῵ληεο θαὶ πεθνξηηζκέλνη, θἀγὼ ἀλαπαύζσ ὑκαο ηὴε ηζεζεηε ἀλάπαπζηλ ηαῖο ςπραῖο ὑκ῵λ.

Come to me, all you that are weary and heavy-laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn from me; for I am gentle and humble in heart, and you will find rest for your souls.

It is also replete with Evagrian associations. We have already seen that *apatheia* is associated with gentleness, being ‘the tranquil state of the rational soul, constituted by gentleness and chastity’ (ἐκ πραότητος και σωφροσύνης συνισταμένη), 123 so the gentle heart is the *apathēs* heart. By speaking of *apatheia* as a ‘throne’ Evagrius alludes to the stability it bestows, and also, for those familiar with his scholion on Proverbs 18:16, to his exegesis of the verb ‘seats’ as referring to *apatheia* as ‘the seat (καθέδρα) of the *nous*…the excellent state which keeps that which is sitting there difficult to move or immovable’. 124 *Apatheia* is the flower (ἀνθος) of *praktikē*, 125 and rest is yoked together with wisdom (ἀνάπαυσις μὲν τῇ σοφίᾳ…συνέζευγκται). 126 We also know that for Evagrius Christ is associated with wisdom, 127 that *apatheia* is a necessary condition for

---

120 Matt. 5:8.
122 *AM* 31.
123 *Rfl.* 3; see above, 3.1.
124 Sch. 184.3-5 on Prov. 18:16; see above, 3.1.
125 *Prakt.* 81.1-2.
126 *Prakt.* 73.1. Evagrius also uses the verb συζευγνόνα to denote the relation between the *pathos* and the *noēma* in an *empathēs noēma*; *cf.* *Disc.* 64.1; 165.1-2; see above, 2.2.3.
127 See above, I.1.2, n.34.
the contemplation that bestows wisdom, and that Evagrius associates *praktikē* with
dying with Christ and resurrection with knowledge.

With all this in mind we can begin with a straightforward reading of the proverb. As
noted above, when Evagrius uses parallelism he tends to do so in conjunction with the
rhetorical device of *variatio* whereby repetition of a word is avoided by replacing its
second occurrence with a synonym.\(^{128}\) In this case the ‘gentle heart in which wisdom
will rest’ is the ‘throne of *apatheia*, the soul accomplished in *praktikê*.’ So the proverb
is referring to *apatheia* in two different ways, each alluding to the stability it bestows,
the first by the word ‘rest’, the second by the word ‘throne’. Second, the implied refe-
rance to Matt. 11:28-29 means that the proverb is an invitation to the ‘weary and heavy-
laden’ to come to Christ, who will give them rest; to take his yoke upon them and learn
from him. The way to do so is to imitate him by ‘dying with him’ in becoming ‘accom-
plished in *praktikê*’. The person who does so will be resurrected with him, *apathēs*, and,
like him, gentle and humble and therefore able to learn from him; thus the heart be-
comes a resting place for wisdom, that is, for Christ. For those familiar with Evagrius’
use of the verb *συζευγνύναι* at Praktikos 73 to refer to the association between wisdom
and rest, and at Disciples 64 and 165 to refer to the association between *pathos* and
*noēmata* (and doubtless used in the same ways in his oral teachings) there will also be
the message that to die the death of Chri-

\(^{128}\) Cf. Guillaumont (1970: 436); see above, 1.2.4.

\(^{129}\) Matt. 11:30.
The other way in which Evagrius talks about *apatheia* that I want to mention before returning to the ‘spiritual body’ relates to his exegesis, in chapter 22 of *On Thoughts*, of the Parable of the Wedding Banquet at Matthew 22:1-14:

Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ νοῦν πνιγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιοῦτων νοημάτων παραστήναι θεῷ καὶ τὸν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἀναδήσασθαι στέφανον. Ἐκ τούτων γὰρ τῶν λογισμῶν κατασπάμενος καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἐυαγγελίοις ἐκεῖνος ὁ τρισάθλιος νοῦς τὸ τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρίστου παρητήσατο· καὶ πάλιν ὁ δεσμούμενος χεῖρας καὶ πόδας καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐξότερον σκότος βαλλόμενος ἐκ τούτων τῶν λογισμῶν εἶχε καθυφασμένον τὸ ἔνδυμα, ὅπερ οὐκ ἀξίων τῶν τοιοῦτων γάμων ὁ καλέσας ἀπερήματο ἐίναι· διὸ ἔνδυμά ἐστι γαμικὸν ἀπάθεια ψυχῆς λογικῆς κοσμικὰς ἀρνησαμένης ἑπιθυμίας. 130

It is not possible for the *nous* strangled by such [sc. empathē] *noēmata* to stand before God and wear the crown of righteousness. 131 Dragged down by these *logismoi* that thrice-wretched *nous* mentioned in the Gospels refused the feast of the knowledge of God; 132 or again the one who was cast into the outer darkness, bound hand and foot, had a garment woven of these *logismoi*, and the one who invited him declared he was not worthy to attend such a wedding. 133 Wherefore, the wedding garment is the *apatheia* of the rational soul that has renounced worldly desires. 134

In the previous chapter we saw how Evagrius uses the Parable of the Banquet at Luke 14:16-24 to illustrate the nature of *pathos*. It is not, he is reported as teaching, the possession of objects that harms us but their impassioned possession, and he cites as examples the concern of the farmer for his land and the love of the husband for his wife that leads them to decline their invitations to the banquet. 135 The banquet symbolises the Kingdom of God, to gain entry to which a person must be prepared to sacrifice all else. Anything that she is not prepared to sacrifice is revealed thereby to be an object of *pathos*, excessive attachment. To put it another way, anything that she values more highly than God is an object of idolatry. Here his focus is not directly upon the person’s attachments but upon their correlate, the *empathē noēmata* that crowd his *nous*. The attitude toward God of someone thus preoccupied is like that of the guests who make light

---

130 *Th.* 22.10-20.
131 2 Tim. 4:8.
134 Cf. Titus 2:12.
135 Cf. *Disc.* 112; see above, 2.2.2.
of or simply ignore their invitation or who seize and kill the host’s slaves, or like that of
the guest who presumes to attend the banquet inappropriately dressed. Evagrius’ point
is that if, as we would put it, a person’s head is full of other concerns – or as we and
Evagrius could both put it, their heart is full of other concerns - then they have no room
for God; their nous cannot function as the ‘place of God’ because it is otherwise occu-
pied. In order for the nous to be able to approach God it must first orientate itself toward
him, and it is this orientation toward God that Evagrius calls ‘standing before God’. As
this passage makes clear, it consists in apatheia. Nonetheless apatheia is not a sufficient
condition for knowledge of God since, as noted above, it is possible to ‘be among sim-
ple noēmata and be distracted by the information they provide and so be far from
God.\textsuperscript{136} It is, however, a necessary condition for knowledge of God, and clearly a suffi-
cient condition for the nous to be able to ‘stand before God’ since Evagrius equates it
with the ‘wedding garment’. It follows that the ‘stand’, like the ‘wedding garment’, is
symbolic of apatheia. The ‘stand of the nous before God’ requires that the nous be free
of what Evagrius here refers to as empathē noēmata, which are equivalent to the logis-
moi\textsuperscript{137} and therefore equate with both the ‘vain thoughts’ of Rom. 1:21 and the ‘impure
desires’ of Rom. 1:24. Freedom from them is, accordingly, both purity and chastity of
the soul/nous and ‘death’ to the values and preoccupations that they express.

Back now to the ‘spiritual’ or ‘resurrection’ body. According to Paul this ‘body’ is
characterised by ‘incorruptibility’, along with ‘immortality’. So what is it for a thing to
be incorruptible? Essentially of course it is for it to be unchanging, which means for it
to be apathēs. But this does not mean that apatheia can, without further remark, be
equated with incorruptibility. In the first place, apatheia can be imperfect and tempo-
rary,\textsuperscript{138} meaning that the apathēs is only incorruptible insofar as she remains apathēs.
Second, while the nous or soul might become incorruptible, the body cannot. The latter,
however, needs qualifying, since the ‘liberation’ of the body from its ‘attributes’ and the
refinement of its krasis\textsuperscript{139} would certainly have been seen as reducing its corruptibility,
meaning that the body’s intrinsic corruptibility would have been regarded not as some-

\textsuperscript{136} Pry. 55; see above, 1.2.1.3.
\textsuperscript{137} See above, 2.1.1.
\textsuperscript{138} See below, 3.4.
\textsuperscript{139} See above, 1.2.3.
thing simply to be accepted but as something to be overcome as far as possible.140 In other words, that the body could never be wholly incorruptible would not prevent it from participating to some degree in incorruptibility. Moreover, there were profoundly important reasons for it to do so. First, given that the body is effectively an aspect of the nous, the extension to it of at least partial incorruptibility would have been part of the restoration of the nous per se to a condition of incorruptibility. Second, and more specifically, the body’s being the most fallen aspect of the nous would have given its participation in incorruptibility particular significance since even the most fallen aspect of the nous would be showing signs of the ascent of the whole. In Brown’s words, the body’s ‘drastic physical changes, after years of ascetic discipline, registered with satisfying precision the essential, preliminary stages of the long return of the human person, body and soul together, to an original, natural and uncorrupted state.’141

Something of Evagrius’ understanding of incorruptibility, along with immortality, the other property that Paul associates with the spiritual body, can be gleaned from Kephalaia Gnostika 3.33:

The name of ‘immortality’ makes known the natural unity of the nous and the fact that it is eternal makes known its ‘incorruptibility’. The first name - the knowledge of the Trinity accompanies it; and the second – the first contemplation of nature.142

While Evagrius is not altogether clear in the terminology he uses to describe the different levels of contemplation, the ‘first contemplation of nature’ seems to be an intermediate stage between second natural contemplation and knowledge of God:143

Virtues cause the nous to see second natural contemplation; and the latter causes it to see first [natural contemplation]; and the first in its turn [makes it see] the Blessed Unity.144

140 See above, 1.2.3, n.291-2.
142 KG 3.33.
144 KG 3.61.
So Evagrius associates incorruptibility with the transition from contemplation of corporeal creation to knowledge of God, and immortality with knowledge of God, in which the unity of the *nous* is restored. But that the incorruptible *nous*, has, as we would expect, also transcended corporeality even though not yet in unity is indicated by its association with eternity, which, according to the *Timaeus*, cannot be part of the created order.¹⁴⁵ For Evagrius, then, both immortality and incorruptibility involve the transcendence of corporeal nature. Incorruptibility can perhaps be achieved to some extent by means of the refinement of the body’s *krasis* through fasting, but in any case both it and immortality can be achieved experientially by the incarnate *nous* through *apatheia*, hence the *praktikos* is ‘the servant of separation’.¹⁴⁶

Ψυχὴ δὲ ἡ τὴν πρακτικὴν σὺν Θεῷ κατορθώσασα καὶ λυθείσα τοῦ σώματος, ἐν ἑκείνῳ γίνεται τοῖς τῆς γνώσεως τόποις, ἐν οἷς αὐτὴν τὸ τῆς ἀπαθείας πτερὸν καταπαθεῖ.¹⁴⁷

The soul which with God has triumphed in *praktikē* and been loosened from the body will be in the regions of knowledge where the wings of *apatheia* will set it down.

Even though the incarnate *nous* does not become fully, metaphysically incorporeal, it nonetheless becomes incorporeal in terms of its awareness, and because of the interconnectedness of the epistemic and the metaphysical this must after all mean that in some sense it really does become incorporeal, despite the fact that part of it yet remains joined to ‘thickened body’.¹⁴⁸ That the incarnate *nous* can become functionally incorruptible – sufficiently incorruptible, that is, to become, albeit temporarily, the ‘place of God’ – underlines this. Again,

When the *noes* will have received the contemplation that concerns them, then also the entire nature of the body will be withdrawn; and thus the contemplation that concerns it will become immaterial.¹⁴⁹

---

¹⁴⁵ Cf. *Tim.* 37d.
¹⁴⁶ *KG* 5.65.
¹⁴⁷ *KG* 2.6.
¹⁴⁸ Cf. *KG* 3.68.
¹⁴⁹ *KG* 3.62.
In other words, *apatheia* and contemplation work together to enable the *nous* to be ‘carried off to the intelligible height’,\textsuperscript{150} *apatheia* makes contemplation possible, then contemplation in turn further ‘loosens’ the *nous* from the body, given that the contemplating *nous* is transformed by the participation in the realities perceived.\textsuperscript{151}

The second and third chapters of the *Praktikos* shed further light on the relation between *apatheia* and incorruptibility:

\begin{quote}
Βασιλεία οὐρανόν ἐστιν ἀπάθεια ψυχῆς μετὰ γνώσεως τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθῶς.\textsuperscript{152}
\end{quote}

*Apatheia* of the soul, accompanied by true knowledge of beings, is the kingdom of heaven.\textsuperscript{153}

\begin{quote}
Βασιλεία Θεοῦ ἐστι γνώσις τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος συμπαρεκτεινομένη τῇ συστάσει τοῦ νοὸς, καὶ ὑπεξβάλλουσα τὴν ἀθανασίαν αὐτοῦ.\textsuperscript{154}
\end{quote}

The kingdom of God is knowledge of the Holy Trinity co-extensive with the *sustasis* of the *nous* and surpassing its incorruptibility.\textsuperscript{155}

*Apatheia* enables the *nous* to contemplate created natures, such contemplation being the ‘kingdom of heaven’ and in turn enabling the *nous* to ascend to knowledge of the Holy Trinity, the ‘kingdom of God.’ By affirming the latter to be co-extensive with the *sustasis* of the *nous* Evagrius affirms it to be the most complete knowledge of which the *nous* is capable, able to involve the whole of its being because in virtue of being the image of God the pure *nous* is entirely receptive to God. In saying that knowledge of the Holy Trinity surpasses the incorruptibility of the *nous* he affirms that although the *nous* that is pure enough to enjoy such knowledge must therefore be incorruptible, it must always retain the potential for corruptibility in virtue of its self-determination.

\textsuperscript{150} Cf. *Pry.* 52.
\textsuperscript{151} See above, 1.1.3.
\textsuperscript{152} *Prakt.* 2.
\textsuperscript{153} Cf. Sch. Ps. 1:2: ‘Blessedness is *apatheia* of the soul together with true knowledge of beings’ ( μακαρίωσι δὲ, ψυχῆς ἀπάθεια μετὰ γνώσεως τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθῶς).
\textsuperscript{154} *Prakt.* 3.
\textsuperscript{155} Cf. *KG* 4.49: ‘Among all pleasures, there is one co-extensive with the *sustasis* of the *nous*, namely the [pleasure] accompanying knowledge, for all will pass away in the world to come’.
Before leaving the topic of incorruptibility, it will recalled that at *Great Letter* 46 Evagrius gives two lists of movements which we share with corporeal nature and which, accordingly, the soul might raise itself above. The transcending of those in the first list corresponds to the attainment of *apatheia*, but what of the second list, namely ‘satisfaction, vigilance, loathing, serenity, fortitude, gladness, love, diligence, quiet, simplicity, meekness, humility, joy, consolation and goodness’? Clearly these are the virtues or stable movements corresponding to the vices or ‘unstable movements’ of the first list, but some of its entries are especially surprising. Vigilance, loathing and fortitude are plainly only necessary at the level of *praktikē*, but what of serenity and diligence, quiet, simplicity, meekness and humility and joy – all, surely, contemplative virtues? Or love, ‘the progeny of *apatheia*’ (*ἀπαθεία ἐγγένετο*), or, most surprising of all, ‘goodness’? That Evagrius includes all of these among the movements that we share with the wild animals is surprising and perhaps simply reflects their source in the *pathētikon* part of the soul. Apparently even more surprising is that they are to be transcended, along with hunger, sleep, lust and so forth; after all, in the *Praktikos* Evagrius declares that ‘the virtues both purify the soul and remain with it once it has been purified’ (*αἱ … ἀξεηαὶ ὁκνῦ ηε θαζαίξνπζη ηὴλ ςπρὴλ θαὶ θαζαξζείζῃ ζπκπαξακέλνπζηλ*). The reason for their inclusion is, however, straightforward: as movements they are all part of corporeal creation, to be transcended along with it in the process of restoring the *nous* to incorruptibility. The ‘world to come’ is clearly to be identified with the ‘kingdom of God’ since all that remains in it is knowledge and the pleasure accompanying it. Lest this ‘passing away of all pleasures’, with even joy, love and goodness being transcended, seem to paint a bleak picture, it should be remembered that this transcendence is not a matter of moving beyond these things *per se*, but of moving beyond them as individually differentiated; the virtues regain their unity as the *nous* regains its unity in becoming progressively re-unified with God. Therefore the transcendence is not one

---

156 E.g. at Rfl. 3 *apatheia* is said to be a state of tranquility (*katastasis hēremea*); according to *KG* 4.73 the contemplative virtue of the *thumos* is humility; *Eul.* 6.6 speaks of the ‘joy (chara) that enlightens the eye of the *dianoia* for the contemplation of the superior goods’.

157 *Prakt.* 81.

158 *Prakt.* 85.

159 Cf., e.g., *KG* 4.49, quoted above, n.155.

160 *Prakt.* 98.7-10; see above, 1.2.2.
of exclusion but of inclusion; as Evagrius might have said, it is like the transcendence of the individual colours of the rainbow in the pure light that contains them all.\textsuperscript{161}

It should by now be clear that Evagrius equates the Pauline sôma psuchikon with the nous that chose to exchange the image of God for the image of animals and became in consequence ‘vain in its thinking, darkened in its heart and impure in its desires’. This is the ‘flesh’ from which the ‘soul derives evil’; the empathês nous that, continually beset by logismoi and ‘entangled in material concerns’, finds them more interesting than the ‘banquet’ that is knowledge of God; the corruptible, ‘flesh and blood’ nous that cannot inherit the Kingdom of God. For it to be able to do so it must die with Christ through praktikē, that it might be resurrected with him. In being resurrected it will be ‘raised a spiritual body (sôma pneumatikon), having ‘put on incorruptibility’, and the ‘death’ of praktikē will have been ‘swallowed up in victory.’ So now what is the ‘spiritual body’? It is the re-unified nous, in which ‘body’ and ‘soul’ have been ‘raised to the order of the nous.’\textsuperscript{162} For the incarnate nous this happens in three clearly identifiable stages.\textsuperscript{163} The first is the attainment of apatheia, which bestows the first level of unity upon the soul, constituted by each of her three parts acting according to nature as described at Praktikos 86. The second is achieved by means of the further transformation of the nous effected by the interplay of apatheia and contemplation and results in the further unification of the soul described at Kephalaia Gnostika 4.73.\textsuperscript{164} The third is the return to the fuller unity that, transcending corporeal nature, bestows incorruptibility.

Returning now to the concluding line of Ad Monachos 21, ‘your resurrection will glow like the sun’, it has already been noted that ‘resurrection’ is associated by Evagrius with knowledge, specifically the knowledge to which the ‘death’ of praktikē makes the nous

\textsuperscript{161} Bob Sharples has pointed out to me that this image appears in stanza 52 of Shelley’s Adonais (Shelley having been a pagan Platonist), and that in Meteorology 3.4 Aristotle attributes the colours of the rainbow to differential reflection (not refraction) and is aware that sprinkling water in a semi-darkened room can have the same effect as Newton’s prism.

\textsuperscript{162} Cf. Driscoll (2003: 245).

\textsuperscript{163} According to KG 2.4 there are more than three: ‘While the transformations are numerous, we have received knowledge of only four: the first, the second, the last and that which precedes it. The first, it is said, is the passage from vice to virtue; the second is that from apatheia to second natural contemplation; the third is from the former to the knowledge that concerns the logikoi, and the fourth is the passage of all to knowledge of the Blessed Trinity.’

\textsuperscript{164} For discussion of these two levels of psychological unity, see above, 1.2.2.
receptive. That knowledge is, of course, of God. Consider the following chain of aphorisms from the *Kephalaia Gnostika*:

The resurrection of the body is the passage from the bad quality to the superior quality.\(^{165}\)

The resurrection of the soul is the return from the order of *empatheia* to the *apathēs* state.\(^{166}\)

The resurrection of the *nous* is the passage from ignorance to true knowledge.\(^{167}\)

These three aphorisms can be interpreted with reference both to the final restoration of the *nous* to unity – in other words, the realisation of the ‘spiritual body’ - and to the foretastes of it experienced by the incarnate *nous* in prayer. In both of these contexts ‘the names and numbers of “body”, “soul” and “mind”…pass away’ as they are ‘raised to the order of the mind’, and in both contexts each of the three undergoes ‘death’ and ‘resurrection’ in its own way, jointly constituting the ‘death’ and ‘resurrection’ of the whole person. It is unclear what the resurrection of the body might mean in eschatological terms,\(^{168}\) but the ‘death’ and ‘resurrection’ of the living, earthly body consist in its passage to ‘health’ understood in spiritual terms and reflected in a refinement of its *kra-\(\alpha\)-\(s\)is*\(^{169}\) this change ‘from the bad quality to the superior quality’ being an anticipation of its eschatological transformation. In both eschatological terms and for the living person the ‘death’ and ‘resurrection’ of soul and *nous* take the same form, namely the passage from *empatheia* to *apatheia* and from ignorance to knowledge, respectively.

Now, though, it must be remembered that although in one sense the *nous* is equivalent to the *logistikon*, and so the rational part of the person in contrast with the *pathētikon* part of the soul on the one hand and the body on the other, it is also much more than this. In its fuller sense, the *nous* is the entire person, including *thumos*, *epithumētikon* and body. So the resurrection of the *nous* must be understood in both these senses. In the first it is the same kind of logical entity as ‘body’ and ‘soul’, meaning that these

\(^{165}\) *KG* 5.19.

\(^{166}\) *KG* 5.22.

\(^{167}\) *KG* 5.25.

\(^{168}\) Cf. *KG* 6.58, quoted at 1.1.3, 1.38.

\(^{169}\) See above, 1.2.3.
three aphorisms can be read sequentially as above. But in the second sense of nous the third aphorism is not simply the third member of a linear sequence but includes the other two. In other words, the transformation of the body and soul are not only preconditions for the passage from ignorance to knowledge; they are themselves part of that transition. Knowledge and ignorance do not pertain to the logistikōn alone, but to the body and the pathētikon part of the soul as well: knowledge is embodied and ensouled and consequently is a property of body and soul as well as of nous. So the passage of the body ‘from the bad quality to the superior quality’ is the passage of the body from ignorance to knowledge, and the return of the soul ‘from the order of empatheia to the apathēs state’ is the return of the soul from ignorance to knowledge. Both are partly constitutive of the passage of the nous ‘from ignorance to true knowledge’, and both are completed when body and soul are ‘raised to the order of mind.’ Just as the whole person is a nous, so knowledge involves the whole person.

To imitate Christ by dying his death is to exodus ‘like a star’ the life of empatheia, ignorance, impurity and sin and be resurrected ‘glowing like the sun’. The ‘sun’ is Christ, the ‘sun of righteousness’.170 But also, ‘the intelligible sun is the rational nature which contains in itself the first and blessed light’, so for the resurrected nous to ‘glow like the sun’ is for its ‘own light’ to be revealed, this being the light that, by my analogy, contains all the ‘colours’ of the virtues.

3.3 Apatheia as love and knowledge

The ‘spiritual body’ comes into being through the resurrections of body, soul and nous. Another way in which Evagrius describes this is with reference to the ‘bond of peace’ of Eph. 4:3:

---

170 Mal. 3:20. Cf. Sch. Ps. 18:5: ‘In the sun he has set his tabernacle’: ‘Our Lord is the Sun of Justice in whom the Father dwells, as he said, “I am in the Father and the Father is in me” (John 14:10). And again, “The Father who dwells in me does his works” (John 14:10). And the Apostle, “God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself” (2 Cor. 5:19).’ Also Sch. Ps. 26:4: ‘For in the day of mine afflictions he hid me in his tabernacle: he sheltered me in the secret of his tabernacle; he set me up on a rock’: ‘Christ is a tabernacle in whom God dwells. For he said, “In the sun he placed his tabernacle” (Ps. 18:5). And the Sun of Justice is the Lord’; trans. Driscoll. Cf. Driscoll (2003: 247); Sinkewicz (2003: 262, n.4).

171 KG 3.44.

172 Cf. Prakt. 64.1-2. On the light of the nous, see above, 1.2.1.3.
Ἀλλὰ ὁ ἐν τῷ σώματι σου καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι σου καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. ὅταν γὰρ τῆς σῆς τριάδος τῶν σύνδεσμων ἐνώσης τῇ εἰρήνῃ, τότε ὡς τῆς θείας τριάδος ἐντολὴ ἐνωθεῖς ἀκούσεις: «Μαθάξην οἱ εἰρήνοι, ὅτι αὐτοὶ νῦν ἰδοὺ κληθῆσονται».173

But it is not only among people that the bond of peace174 is to be sought, but also in your body and in your spirit and in your soul. When you unify the bond of this trinity of yours by means of peace, then, unified by the commandment of the divine Trinity, you will hear: ‘Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called sons of God’.175

For the noes the Fall was from a state of peace into one of inner turmoil as the rupture of the Unity and consequent fragmentation of the created order was reflected within their own experience:

In the knowledge of those who are second by their creation various worlds are constituted and indescribable battles take place. But in the Unity nothing like this occurs: it is unspeakable peace, and there are only the naked noes that constantly quench their insatiability.176

The ‘various worlds constituted within the knowledge’ of the fallen noes I take to be the subjective worlds, based upon the external world, that we construct and act within, as referred to by Evagrius in the following:

Ἀλαρσξεηήο ἐζηηλ, ὁ ἐλ ηῶ θαηὰ δηάλνηαλ θόζκῳ ζπληζηακέλῳ, εὐζεβ῵ο θαὶ δηθαίσο ἀλαζηξεθώκελνο.177

An anchorite is one who conducts himself piously and justly in the world constituted by his dianoia.

To conduct oneself piously and justly within these inner worlds is to engage with external objects, and therefore their internal correlates, without pathos. In this case peace will obtain within them, a reflection of its establishment within the body, soul and spirit and

173 Eul. 6.5-6.
174 Eph. 4:3.
175 Matt. 5:9.
176 KG 1.65; John 5:22.
177 Rfl. 14; cf. Rfl. 38, 39, KG 5.12, quoted below, 3.3.
an anticipation of the peace to be enjoyed when our unity with God is restored. Conversely, insofar as we are subject to pathos our inner worlds are those of the logismoi, constructed in obedience to the imperatives of the pathētikon part of the soul and characterised by conflict and turbulence. Some of the ‘indescribable battles’ that take place will be with demons, some between different parts of the soul, and some will be imaginary conflicts with other human beings, as when the nous, ‘seizes the figure of its own body…[and gets] involved interiorly in a fight with a brother.’

That the ‘bond of peace’ is to be sought in the body (ἐν τῷ σώματί), in the spirit (ἐν τῷ πνεύματί) and in the soul (ἐν τῷ ψυχή) as well as among all three testifies, as does Evagrius’ notion of the three resurrections, to the necessity of the integrity of each to that of the whole, a necessity deriving from all three being, equally, the constituent aspects of the nous that is the image of the triune God. To ‘unify the bond’ of the anthropological trinity is, therefore, to establish unity within each of its members, and this is to establish virtue within each. The body will, if allowed to gain strength, ‘rebel and wage unrelenting war’ upon the soul, so to seek the ‘bond of peace’ in the body is to render it ‘docile’ such that it ‘yields to the bit and is compelled by the hand of the one holding the reins’.

The ‘soul’ here should be understood as her pathētikon part, since ‘spirit’ must be understood as synonymous with nous in the latter’s sense of logistikōn. While the epithumētikon wages its warfare through the body, the thumos does so through inciting us to direct its aggression toward our ‘natural kindred’, meaning that to seek the ‘bond of peace’ in it is to ‘fight against the serpent…but with gentleness and mildness exercise patience with love toward one’s brother.’ Finally, the warfare of the logistikōn or ‘spirit’ is waged through ignorance, so here the ‘bond of peace’ is to be found in knowledge. In sum, to ‘unify the bond’ of the anthropological trinity is to establish virtue in the soul, which means to cultivate the ‘spiritual body’ through the respective resurrections of its three aspects, which means to attain apatheia.

Just as Evagrius’ use of συζευγνόνα at Praktikos 73 in relation to the ‘yoking together’ of wisdom and rest, and at Disciples 64 and 165 in relation to the ‘yoking together’ of

178 Cf. Th. 25.30-32; see above, 2.1.1.
179 8Th. 1.34, 35; see above, 1.2.3.
180 Eul. 11.10; see above, 1.2.2.
Pathos and noēmata, allows implicit reference to the yoke (ζυγός) of Jesus,\(^{181}\) so it now becomes apparent that his use of συνδέσμευσις at On Thoughts 40 and Reflections 23 and of δεσμεύομαι in his second scholion on Ps. 145:8 to refer to the binding of the nous, through noēmata, to sensible objects’, allows reference to Paul’s ‘bond of peace’ (ὁ τῆς εἰρήνης σύνδεσμος). In both cases our attention is drawn to a stark contrast - the yoking of pathos to our mental content as opposed to the yoke of Jesus, and our bondage to the world as opposed to the bond of our internal unity and, accordingly, unity with God – and the two are closely connected. It is through the yoking of pathos to noēmata that it is able, through them, to bind us to their objects and thus to the sensible world.\(^{182}\) It is with these noēmata that we are ‘heavy-laden’ and therefore because of them that we are weary. The result of this bondage is continual fragmentation, instability and the ‘indescribable battles’ that are waged both within and among us. Conversely, those who, ‘weary and heavy-laden’, seek the rest to be found in the yoke of Jesus, will find the ‘bond of peace’ and ‘will hear, “Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called sons of God”.’\(^{183}\)

In the third chapter of On Thoughts Evagrius describes the attainment of apatheia in terms of Pauline universalism:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{ὁ ἱατρός τῶν ψυχῶν...διὰ μὲν τῆς ἐλεημοσύνης τὸν θυμὸν θεραπεύει, διὰ δὲ τῆς προσευχῆς τὸν νοῦν καθαρίζει, καὶ πάλιν διὰ τῆς νηστείας τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καταμαραίνει, ἐξ ὧν συνέστησα τὸ νέος ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀνακαινομένος «κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτὸν», ἐν ὧν «οὐκ ἔνι» διὰ τὴν ἀγάπην ἀπάθειαν «ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ», οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν μίαν πίστιν καὶ ἀγάπην «Ἐλλην καὶ Ἰουδαῖος, περιτομή καὶ ἀκροβυστία, βάρβαρος, Σκύθης, δοῦλος καὶ ἐλεύθερος, ἄλλα τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐν πάσι Χριστῷ».\end{align*}\]

\(^{181}\) Cf. Matt. 11:28-29; see above, 3.2.

\(^{182}\) See above, 2.2.3.

\(^{183}\) Matt. 5:9. Evagrius provides further material for meditation on ‘bonds’ in his third scholion on Ps. 149:8, ‘to bind their kings (τοῦ δῆσαι τοὺς βασιλέας αὐτῶν) with fetters, and their nobles with manacles of iron’: ‘The noetic bond is apatheia of the rational soul. The noetic bond is fear of the Lord turning from evil. The noetic bond is spiritual teaching not allowing the nous to go to evil. The noetic bond is spiritual love honouring nothing before knowledge of God. The noetic bond is desire’ (δεσμός ἐστι νοητὸς ἀπάθεια λογικῆς ψυχῆς. δεσμός ἐστι νοητὸς φόβος Κυρίου ἐκκλήσεων ἀπὸ καιροῦ. δεσμός ἐστι νοητὸς διάδοσα λογικῆς γνώσεως τῶν νοῶν ἐπὶ τὴν κακίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ. δεσμός ἐστι νοητὸς ἀγάπην λογικῆς γνώσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ. δεσμός ἐστι νοητὸς ἀπάθειαν). The last of these clearly refers to the epithumētikon acting according to nature, the bond being noetic.'\(^{184}\)

\(^{184}\) Th. 3.35-40.
The physician of souls\textsuperscript{185} heals the thumos through almsgiving, purifies the nous through prayer and in turn withers the epithumia through fasting. In this way the new self is constituted, renewed ‘according to the image of its Creator’,\textsuperscript{186} in whom, on account of the holy apatheia, ‘there is no male and female’; in whom, on account of the one faith and love, there is ‘neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian nor Scythian, slave nor freeman, but Christ is all in all.’\textsuperscript{187}

Again we see the triple resurrection, now characterised as the healing of the three parts of the soul under the auspices of Christ, giving rise to the ‘spiritual body’. This is now identified with the ‘new self’ and the latter with the apatheis. The ‘new self’ is brought into being by the healing of the soul, apatheia being ‘the health of the soul.’\textsuperscript{188} Evagrius’ use of σωνίσταται, ‘constituted’, can be noted: σωνίστασις is cognate with histēmi and so has its connotations of stability, and it is also the word that Evagrius uses to describe the constitution of apatheia from gentleness and chastity.\textsuperscript{189} The ‘new self’ is said to be renewed ‘according to the image of its Creator’; Evagrius will expect his readers to be familiar with the Pauline text to which he is alluding, Col. 3:9-11:

\begin{quote}
ἀπεθεδπζάκελνη ηὸλ παιαηὸλ ἄλζξσπνλ ζὺλ ηαῖο πξά μεζηλ αὐηνῦ θαὶ ἐλδπζάκελνη ἐἰο ἐπίγλσζηλ θαη ἐἰθόλα ηνῦ θηίζαληνο αὐηόλ, ἕπνπ νὐθ ἔλη Ἕιιελ θαὶ Ἰνπδαῖνο 
\end{quote}

you have stripped off the old self with its practices and have clothed yourselves with the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge according to the image of its Creator. In that renewal there is neither Greek and Jew...

The ‘stripping off of the old self’ is to be equated with praktikē, the means by which the ‘physician of souls’ heals us. To be ‘clothed in the new self’ is to become apatheis, and apatheia enables the nous to engage in contemplation. This, it will be recalled, is defined by Evagrius as ‘spiritual knowledge of things…which causes the nous to ascend to its first rank’ and consists in the progressive re-acquisition of knowledge of God, leading the nous ultimately back to union with him by means of successive transforma-

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{185} I.e. Christ.
\item\textsuperscript{186} Cf. Col. 3: 10.
\item\textsuperscript{187} Col. 3:11; Gal. 3:28. Cf. Th. 39 – ‘When the nous has put off the old self and shall put on the one born of grace’ – quoted in full above, 1.2.1.3.
\item\textsuperscript{188} Prakt. 56.3.
\item\textsuperscript{189} Cf. Rfl. 3; see above, 3.1.
\end{itemize}
tions resulting from participation in the realities perceived. Thus *apatheia* enables the *nous* to be ‘renewed in knowledge’. The ‘renewal in knowledge’ is ‘according to the image of its creator’ because the receptivity of the *nous* to knowledge of God is the image of God, and just as the image, although damaged, retains sufficient efficacy to enable the soul to attain *apatheia*, so it retains sufficient efficacy to enable the *apathēs nous* to re-acquire knowledge of God and by the same token continue the healing of the image begun with the attainment of *apatheia*; in other words, ‘according to’ means both ‘through the efficacy of’ and ‘following the pattern of’. Evagrius would also expect his readers to think of Rom. 12:2:

μὴ συσχηματίζεσθε τῷ αἴωνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοὸς.

Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your *nous*.

Likewise, Eph. 4:22-24, which speaks of putting away the old self, ‘which is being corrupted according to its treacherous desires’ (τὸν φθειρόμενον κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ἀπάτης) in order to be ‘renewed in the spirit (ἀνανεώσθαι δὲ τῷ πνεύματι) of your *nous*, and to clothe yourselves with the new self, created by God’s will in true righteousness and holiness (κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ὁσιότητι τῆς ἀληθείας). The desires of the sickly *epithumētikon* are treacherous because they seek the sustenance, furtherance and pleasure of the entity from somewhere other than God whereas in reality they can only come from him. Also to be recalled is chapter 39 of *On Thoughts*, where Evagrius declares that ‘when the *nous* has put off the old self and shall put on the new one born of grace’, it will at the time of prayer experience itself as the ‘place of God’. That it can do so is a consequence of its ‘renewal in knowledge according to the image of its Creator’, since its being the ‘place of God’ is due to its being in his image, but requires that the image be - to some extent at least - renewed.

According to *On Thoughts* 3, the ‘new self’ comes into being both ‘on account of the holy *apatheia*’ and ‘on account of the one faith and love.’ So how do the ‘one faith and

190 See above, 1.1.3.
191 Literally ‘created according to God.’
192 See above, 1.2.1.3.
love’ relate to the ‘holy apatheia’? In the Prologue to the Praktikos Evagrius describes the stages of humanity’s return to God as follows:

The fear of God...strengthens faith, and self-control in turn strengthens fear of God, and perseverance and hope render self-control unwavering, and from these is born apatheia the offspring of which is love; love is the door to natural knowledge, which is followed by theology and ultimate blessedness.

And towards the end of the Praktikos Evagrius describes the stages of praktikē:

Love is the offspring of apatheia, and apatheia is the flower of praktikē. The observance of the commandments establishes praktikē; and their guardian is the fear of God, which is a product of upright faith; and faith is an inherent good, which exists naturally in those who do not yet believe in God.

Faith, then, is the initial term in the recovery by the nous of knowledge of God. By ‘those who do not yet believe in God’ Evagrius means pagans, since in having some form of religious belief they show themselves to have the concept of God even though they yet to find its true object. Faith exists in such people inherently or implicitly (ἐλδηάζεηνο), in contrast to Christians, whose faith in God, since they believe in the true God, is explicit. A similar definition is found at Kephalaia Gnostika 3.83:

193 Prakt. Prol. 8.
194 Prakt. 81.
195 Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 671), who notes that the equivalent of ‘explicit’ would be προσφορικός, the contrast between it and ἐνδιάθετος part of Stoic terminology. If by ‘those who do not yet believe in God’ Evagrius means pagans rather than atheists or agnostics then, given Evagrius’ evident belief in universal salvation (e.g., KG 1.40, quoted above, 1.1.3, n.129) the question arises as to how how such people might come to a belief in God and so to salvation. In other words, is there some ‘inherent good’ that exists in the soul prior to faith and can develop into it, just as ‘implicit faith’ develops into ‘explicit faith’? The Oxford Classical Dictionary notes (1999: 201) that ‘radical atheism is hard to detect [in the
Faith is an inherent good which guides us towards the blessedness to come.

Evagrius’ scholion on Ps. 115:10 gives a different definition: ‘faith is the rational assent of the self-determining soul’ (πίστεως ἐστὶ ψυχῆς αὐτεξουσίας λογικὴ συγκατάθεσις).\(^{197}\) I take this to mean that faith is assent to the proposition that God exists, such assent being ‘rational’ in the sense of ‘according to right reason’, in which case what this definition adds to that of \textit{Praktikos} 81 is the emphasis on faith being an exercise of right reason by the soul whose very existence as such derives from its primordial misuse of its self-determination. Faith ‘guides us towards the blessedness to come’ because it potentially contains knowledge of God (ἡ...γνώσις τοῦ θεοῦ [κατὰ δόναμιν] ἐν τῇ πίστει ἑστίν),\(^{198}\) and is the first step toward the restoration of the \textit{nous} to its pre-lapsarian condition:

Πίστεως δεῖται ὁ νοῦς ἣν ἐπ᾽ ἐλπίδι ἀγαθὴ τὸν θεοῦ δέχεται νόμον εἰς κάθαρσιν τελείαν τῆς ἐναρέτου πολιτείας, ὅπως καταλάβῃ τὴν πρὸ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν, ἐν ἧ διὰ τῆς τελείας ἀγάπης ἐνωθήσεται τῷ ἀρχετόπῳ ἑγίσχυμα, ὅπου συνάφεια ὑποστάσεων καὶ ἐξαλοφίη ἀρίθμου καὶ ἀποδρασμοῦ τροπῆς καὶ πάθεις ἐναντιάσεως καὶ... μειώσεως καὶ πλήρωμα προκοπῆς τῶν πάθων καὶ ἀγάπης τριάδος ἐν δυνάμει γνώσεως καὶ ἀγάπης μονάδος αὐτῆς ἀπολέμητος καὶ εἰρηνικὴ βασιλεία.\(^{199}\)

The \textit{nous} needs faith in order to receive with good hope the divine law for the complete purification of its virtuous constitution, and was never an influential position’, so Evagrius would have had reason not to address this question directly. But I think his answer would be that even those who lack any sort of faith have an inherent sense of good and evil and right and wrong, along with an inclination towards, and disposition to, assent to good/right, and an inclination away from, and disposition to reject, evil/wrong, and that this is the ‘seed’ out of which faith arises. His belief that everyone has good in them is underlined by his exegesis of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus; see above, 1.1.3, n.129.

\(^{196}\) The Syriac word is \textit{šebyānāitā}, ‘voluntary’, but Guillaumont (1971: 670) takes it as translating ἐνδιάθετος.

\(^{197}\) Sch. Ps. 115:1: ‘I believed (ἐπιστεύσα), wherefore I have spoken; but I was greatly afflicted.’ Cf. \textit{Strom.} 5.13.86.1: ‘Faith, if it is the voluntary assent of the soul, is still the doer of good things, the foundation of right conduct’ (ἡδὲ δὲ ἡ πίστες εἰ καὶ ἐκούσιος τῆς ψυχῆς συγκατάθεσις, ἀλλὰ ἑγιατίς ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαιοπραγίας θεμέλιος).

\(^{198}\) \textit{Disc.} 18. Cf. \textit{Strom.} 7.10.55.2-3: ‘Faith is a certain inherent good, which, without searching for God, confesses that he exists and glorifies him for existing. And after the believer increases in faith by the grace of God, he must ascend to grasp the knowledge of God, inssofar as this is possible’ (πίστες...ἐνδιάθετον τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν, καὶ ἀνευ τοῦ ζητεῖν τὸν θεοῦ ὁμολογοῦσα εἶναι τούτον καὶ δοξάζονσα ὡς ὄντα. ὅδε χρή, ἀπὸ τούτως ἀναγέμνων τῆς πίστεως καὶ ἀσφαλέντα ἐν αὐτῇ χάριτι τοῦ θεοῦ, τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ κομίσασθαι ὡς οἷον τέ ἐστιν γνώσιν).

\(^{199}\) \textit{Disc.} 198.
state prior to the movement, in which, through perfect love, it will be united with its archetype in the Holy Spirit, in which there is a union of hypostases, suppression of numbers, escape from change, cessation of opposition and deficiency, completion of the progress of children and knowledge of the Holy Trinity in power and the reign of the holy Unity itself, without war, in peace.

Since faith enables even non-Christians to come to a belief in (the true) God, and so, perhaps, to knowledge of him, it is clearly one of the ‘seeds of virtue’ implanted in us at our creation. And since it potentially contains knowledge of God it must potentially contain love, love being a prerequisite for the knowledge of God. The following proverb, Ad Monachos 3, confirms this to be the case:

Πίστις ἀρχή ἀγάπης,  
τέλος δὲ ἄγαπης γνώσις θεοῦ. 202

Faith is the beginning of love.  
The end of love: knowledge of God.

The position of this proverb at the beginning of the Ad Monachos, a treatise whose overall structure reflects that of the return journey of the nous to knowledge of the Holy Trinity, reaffirms the role of faith as the starting point of that journey. In addition, as Driscoll notes,

The first line of this proverb describes the whole of the life of praktikē, whose beginning is faith and whose goal is love. The second line describes the whole of

200 Cf. 1 John 4:18.
201 Cf. KG 1.39; see above, 1.1.3. It is as part of this process that faith gives rise to, and is in turn strengthened by, fear of God; cf. Prakt. 81: ‘Fear of God is a product of upright faith’; AM 69: ‘Faith in Christ bestows the fear of God’; as with apatheia and contemplation, dynamic interaction takes place between the two and furthers each. In the context of praktikē faith finds a symbol in the monk’s habit in the form of the analabos, according to Sinkewicz (2003: 248, n.4), ‘a band of woollen cloth worn round the neck and crossing at the chest. Its purpose was to keep the tunic out of the way and leave the arms to move freely. According to Prakt. Prol. 4: ‘The analabos, which is in the form of a cross and is folded over their shoulders is a symbol of faith in Christ which upholds the gentle (cf. Ps. 146:6) and ever restrains what hinders them and provides them with an activity that is free of obstacles.’ Faith is not, however, an infallible guide to ‘the blessedness to come’ since Evagrius refers at Eul. 31.34 to ‘those who having received the faith missed the mark regarding the truth and became mentally deranged’ (ὧν τινές τὴν πίστιν δεξάμενοι περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀπόκρυσαν καὶ φρενοβλαβεῖς ἑγενῆσθαι) 202 AM 3.
202 AM 3.
knowledge, whose beginning is love and whose goal is the knowledge of God himself.\textsuperscript{204}

So it is not only love that faith potentially contains as a consequence of potentially containing knowledge of God, but all the virtues, \textit{apatheia} and the various levels of contemplation; in other words, the whole of the ascent to God.

Faith, then, relates to ‘the holy \textit{apatheia}’ by being the beginning of the journey that leads to it. What about love? As we have seen, in the Prologue to the \textit{Praktikos} Evagrius describes love as the offspring of \textit{apatheia}; in other words, \textit{apatheia} is a prerequisite for love. The reason for the dependence of love upon \textit{apatheia} is well described by Linge:

The free reign of the passions…cuts one off from both God and one’s fellow human beings, thus making disinterested love – \textit{agapē} – impossible. In Evagrius’ teaching \textit{apatheia} is precisely the capacity to experience things \textit{as they are} and not simply as they affect us by advancing or thwarting our desires and interests. Thus \textit{apatheia} leads the ascetic \textit{towards} love…The purpose of ascetic discipline and the modes of reflection that are peculiar to it must be understood as the transcendence of the ego and the partiality of perspective out of which the ego experiences and acts so that one can become genuinely open to others.\textsuperscript{205}

What Linge describes here in terms of the ‘ego’ is what Evagrius characterises in terms of bondage to \textit{pathos} and the \textit{logismoi}; a self-referential perspective in which the only meaning we see in things is their utility to our supposed self-interest and in which, consequently, we are isolated from both God and the rest of creation. It is the superseding of this blinkered outlook – as Linge puts it, ‘the transcendence of the ego’ - that enables the universalism that Paul identifies with the new creation and Evagrius with \textit{apatheia}, in which categories such as ‘male or female, Greek or Jew, circumcision or uncircumcision, barbarian or Scythian, slave or freeman’ dissolve, along with all the other ways in which we erect barriers between ourselves and others and thereby obscure or

\textsuperscript{205} Linge (2000: 564-5); italics in text his. It should, however, be noted that \textit{agapē} is not the only form of disinterested love. Spiritual \textit{erōs} as Evagrius understands it (see above, 1.2.2) is also ‘disinterested’ in that it presupposes \textit{apatheia}, and Osborne (1994) argues that Platonic \textit{erōs} is disinterested.
deny our common humanity. Evagrius expresses this even more directly in the following teaching from Disciples 163:

οὐ…ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὸ δὲ τοῦ πράγματος οὐκ ὡργίσθης οὔδὲ ἐλυπήθης οὔδὲ ἐκενοδόξησας, ἢ ὡργίσθης καὶ ἀληθὸς καὶ ἀδόξος γέγονας, οὔδὲ εἰ πρὸς τὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ δὲ ἢ πρὸς τὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν οὐκ ἐσχες, ἢ ὡργίσθης καὶ πάσης ἐπιθυμίας γέγονας ὑπεράνω, ἀλλ’ ὅταν πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὡς ἀγγέλους θεοῦ βλέπης καὶ ὡς σεαυτόν ἀγαπᾶς, τότε ὑπεράνω πάντων τῶν παθῶν γέγονας.206

It is not when you do not become angry or sad or vain about some object that you have become free from anger or distress or vainglory, nor is it when you do not desire such and such an object or such and such a woman that you have risen above all desire, but it is when you see all people as messengers of God207 and love them like yourself208 that you have overcome all the pathē.

As this makes clear, apatheia has not truly been attained until it finds expression in love; thus Raasch is correct in saying that agapē is the ‘positive aspect’ of ‘apatheia.’209 So when Evagrius affirms universalism ‘on account of the holy apatheia’ and ‘on account of the one faith and love’ he is affirming the effective synonymy of apatheia and love and the roots of both in faith.

The apathēs, then, is a ‘peacemaker’ twice over – first, in transcending the causes of conflict both within the soul and in our relations with others, and second, in thereby becoming free to love others as herself. The ‘bond of peace’ is love; apatheia is what allows it to come into being within us. And here, as elsewhere, Evagrius would have expected his readers’ knowledge of the scriptures first to suggest, and then to reaffirm, this to them. Paul’s reference to the ‘bond of peace’ comes at Eph. 4:3. Just a few verses before, at Eph. 3:17-19, he says

κατοικήσαι τὸν Χριστὸν διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν, ἐν ἀγάπῃ ἐρρεξομένου καὶ τεθεμελιωμένου, ἵνα ἐξισχύσῃ καταλαβέσθαι σὺν πάσι τοῖς ἁγίοις τῇ τὸ πλάτος καὶ μήκος καὶ ὄψις καὶ βάθος, γνώναι τῇ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῆς γνώσεως ἀγάπην τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἵνα πληρωθήτε εἰς πάν τὸ πλῆρωμα τοῦ θεοῦ.

206 Disc. 163.3-10.
207 Cf. Gal. 4:14.
(17) [I pray] that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith, as you are being rooted and grounded in love. (18) I pray that you may have the power to comprehend, with all the saints, what is the breadth and length and height and depth, (19) and to know the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge, so that you may be filled with the fullness of God.²¹⁰

On an Evagrian reading this amounts to an expansion of Ad Monachos 3 – ‘faith is the beginning of love. The end of love: knowledge of God’ – since Evagrius would have understood verses 18 and 19 as referring to successive levels of contemplation. He refers to verse 18 in his scholion on Prov. 3:19-20:

(ὁ θεὸς τῇ σοφίᾳ ἐθεμελίωσεν τὴν γῆν· ἠτοίμασεν δὲ οὐράνιον ἐν φρονήσει· ἐν αἰσθήσει ἄβυσσοι ἑρράγησαν· νέφω δὲ ἐρρύσαν δρόσους.

God by wisdom founded the earth, and by prudence he prepared the heavens. By perception were the abysses broken up, and the clouds dropped water.)

"Ἠν ἐνταῦθα γῆν ἐπεν, Παύλος ὁ ἄγιος πλάτος ὄνόμασεν καὶ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα οὐρανοὺς λεγομένους ὕψος ἐκείνου ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἑφεσίους καλέι καὶ τὰς λεγομένας τροπικός ἄβυσσος ὄνομαξεν βάθος καὶ τὰ δεδροσωμένα νέφη μήκος καλέι. Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα λογικῶν ἔστι φύσεων σύμβολα διαφορομένων κόσμως καὶ σύμμασι κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν τῆς καταστάσεως."²¹¹

That which here he has called ‘earth’, the holy Paul names ‘breadth’, and what are here called the ‘heavens’, that (writer) in his letter to the Ephesians calls ‘height’ and that which he figuratively calls ‘abysses’ (Paul) names ‘depth’ and the ‘clouds dropping water’ he calls ‘length’. All these symbolise the rational natures distributed in worlds and bodies according to their state.

The principles underlying the ‘distribution of rational natures in worlds and bodies according to their state’ are what Evagrius calls ‘the logoi of judgment’,²¹² so when he wrote this scholion that is what he took Paul to be referring to. Without knowing the relative dating of the treatise to Eulogios and the scholia on Proverbs there is, of course, no way of knowing whether this was Evagrius’ interpretation of Eph. 3:18 at the time that he composed the Eulogios, but in any case it exemplifies the sort of contemplative

²¹⁰ The words ‘I pray’ are not in the Greek, this passage falling within the scope of the phrase ‘I bow my knees before the Father’ (κάμπτω τὰ γόνατά μου πρὸς τὸν πατέρα) at Eph. 3:14.
²¹¹ Sch. 33 on Prov. 3:19-20.
²¹² Cf. Gnost. 48, ‘you will discover the logoi of judgment in the diversity of worlds and bodies’ (τούς μὲν περὶ κρίσεως λόγους ἐν τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν κόσμων εὑρήσετε); see above, 1.1.3.
insight to which attainment of *apatheia* and hence of love, the ‘door to natural knowledge’, could be expected to make Eulogios receptive. Likewise there is no way of knowing how, at the time Evagrius wrote the *Eulogios*, he construed the relations between the different levels of contemplation. In the *Kephalaia Gnostika*, however, he lists them as follows:

Five are the principal contemplations under which all contemplation is placed. It is said that the first is contemplation of the adorable and holy Trinity; the second and third are the contemplations of incorporeal beings and bodies; the fourth and fifth are the contemplation of judgment and of providence.\(^\text{213}\)

Clearly the third term of Paul’s ‘contemplative progression’, ‘being filled with the fullness of God’, corresponds to ‘contemplation of the adorable and holy Trinity’, or, in terms of the stages of the graded ascent as stated in the Prologue to the *Praktikos*, to ‘theology and ultimate blessedness’. This leaves the second term, ‘knowing the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge’ to correspond somehow with the contemplations of incorporeals, bodies and providence, and indeed it does so in an unproblematic way. Since love is the ‘door to natural knowledge’, which pertains to the corporeal worlds, which in turn were created through the mediation of Christ through his ‘manifold wisdom’,\(^\text{214}\) and since ‘Christ leads the reasoning nature by [means of] varied worlds to the union of the Holy Unity’,\(^\text{215}\) to know the love of Christ is to be vouchsafed the contemplations corresponding to the corporeal worlds. These would encompass ‘incorporeals’ – taken to refer to beings, such as angels, with more refined bodies than ours;\(^\text{216}\) bodies and providence, the contemplation of providence being prior to that of bodies since providence is the underlying rationale of corporeal creation; according to *Kephalaia Gnostika* 6.75 the ‘movement of freedom’ was followed by the ‘beneficial providence and the non-abandonment (that is, corporeal creation)’, and only then by the judgment.\(^\text{217}\) Again,

\(^{213}\) *KG* 1.27.  
\(^{214}\) See above, 1.1.2, n.35.  
\(^{215}\) *KG* 4.89.  
\(^{216}\) See above, 1.1.2.  
\(^{217}\) Quoted in full above, 1.2.3.
The *logoi* which concern judgment are secondary…in relation to the *logoi* that concern the movement and providence.²¹⁸

So far, then, the attentive reader of the *Eulogios* passage concerning the ‘bond of peace’ will have found in three verses of Paul’s letter to the Ephesians closely preceding his reference to it a concise overview of the entire ascent to God, beginning with faith and proceeding, through love (and so *apatheia*), to being led by Christ through successive levels of contemplation to knowledge of God. He then finds, in the ‘bond of peace’ passage itself, a description of *apatheia* itself, the goal of the first part of the ascent and foundation for the second:

παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ ὁ δεσμὸς ἐν κυρίῳ ἀξίως περιπατῆσαι τῆς κλήσεως ἃς ἐκλήθητε, μετὰ πάσης ταπεινοφροσύνης καὶ πράσητος, μετὰ μακροθυμίας, ἀνεχόμενοι ἄλληλοι ἐν ἀγάπῃ, σπουδάζοντες τηρεῖν τὴν ἐνότητα τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν τῷ συνδέσμῳ τῆς εἰρήνης.²¹⁹

And so I, a prisoner (in bonds) in the Lord,²²⁰ beg you to lead a life worthy of the calling to which you have been called, with all humility and gentleness, with patience, bearing with one another in love, making every effort to preserve the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.

Paul’s description of himself as a ‘prisoner (in bonds) in the Lord’, as well as referring to his literal imprisonment, affirms his participation in the ‘bond of peace’ and, reinforces, from an Evagrian standpoint, the contrast between this ‘spiritual bondage’ and the bondage to the world effected by *pathos* and mediated by *empathē noēmata*; *apatheia* is a condition of being ‘in bonds to the Lord’, and is characterised by humility, gentleness, patience, love and unity. It also reinforces the parallel between this passage and Matt. 11:28-29, where Jesus invites the ‘weary and heavy-laden’ to ‘take his yoke upon them’, and, by extension, it references *Ad Monachos* 31. Taken together, then, these passages supply a whole list of descriptors for *apatheia* which in identifying different aspects of it jointly comprise a far more complete definition than any single term ever could. To be a ‘throne of *apatheia*’ is to be ‘a soul accomplished in *praktikē*, which is to be ‘bonded to the Lord’, which is to ‘bear the yoke of Jesus’, which is to

²¹⁸ KG 5.24.
²¹⁹ Eph. 4:1-3.
²²⁰ There is in fact an ambiguity of scope – I presume deliberate – at play here, in that *ἐν κυρίῳ* can also go with *παρακαλῶ*, thus ‘I beg you in the Lord’.
have humility and gentleness, which is to be ‘rooted and grounded in love’, which is to be a peacemaker, which is to ‘unify the bond of one’s own trinity’ of body, soul and spirit, which is to be able to be led by Christ ‘by means of varied worlds’ to ‘the union of the Holy Unity’. To this list could be added that to attain apatheia is to have been healed by the ‘physician of souls’ and so enabled to ‘put off the old self’ and ‘put on the new self’, ‘renewed according to the image of its Creator’, in whom there is ‘no male and female’, ‘neither Greek nor Jew’. It is to be cultivating the ‘spiritual body’, to have a pure heart and a nous which is chaste, in which ‘Christ dwells’ and ‘for which he suffered the shame of the cross’ ‘for the sake of the joy that was set before him.’ It is to ‘see all people as angels of God and love them like oneself’, and to have ‘imitated Christ’ by ‘dying his death, having an exodus like a star and a resurrection that glows like the sun.’ Apatheia is the ‘wedding garment’ of the ‘rational soul that has renounced worldly desires’ and so become worthy of the knowledge of God.

Eph. 4:3 makes a further addition to this list in virtue of Paul’s use of the verb τηρεῖν. Here it means ‘to preserve’, but it is also the verb used in Prov. 4:23: ‘Keep watch over your heart with all vigilance’ (πάζῃ θπιαθῆ ηεξεῖλ ηὴλ θαξδίαλ), an injunction dear to Evagrius and, as we shall see in the following section, highly significant in terms of praktikē since it is by keeping watch over the heart that apatheia is first attained and then preserved. So from an Evagrian standpoint Paul’s use of τηρεῖν in this passage gives it an added dimension in that as well as describing apatheia it alludes to the conditions for its attainment and maintenance.

Paul speaks of the apathēs (as Evagrius would understand him) as being ‘rooted and grounded in love’, and the importance of love in Evagrius’ spirituality cannot be overstated, although it has often been understated; thus Gendle notes that ‘the frequent dismissal of Evagrius as a mere “noetic”’ for whom the ascent to knowledge of God is ‘a merely intellectual process’ must be qualified by recognition of the fact that for Eva-

---

221 Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 ff.  
222 E.g. Sch. 199 on Prov. 19:17.  
223 Disc. 58.  
224 Cf. Disc. 163.  
225 AM 31.  
227 Cf. Th. 27.24, 36.11; KG 6:52.
grius love is the *sine qua non* of knowledge of God. In terms that echo Eph. 4:3, Evagrius describes the role of love as follows:

> ἡ ἀγάπη ἀπαθείας ἐστὶ συνάφεια, παθῶν δὲ ἀπαλειψθῇ, τὴν μακροθυμίαν προφέρουσα καὶ τὸν ζέοντα θυμὸν κακαψύχουσα, τὴν ταπείνωσιν προβάλλουσα καὶ τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν καταφέρουσα. ἡ ἀγάπη ἔχει μὲν ἔνδον οὐδὲν πλὴν τοῦ θεοῦ· αὐτή γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ θεός.

Love is the unifying of *apatheia* and the expunging of the *pathē*; it brings patience to the fore and it has a cooling effect on boiling *thumos*; it promotes humility and topples pride. Love possesses nothing of its own apart from God, for God is love itself.

The final sentence of this passage states directly why love is the *sine qua non* of knowledge of God: it is because God is love, so to love is to know God and to know God is to love, hence *Disciples* 198, quoted above, describes the pre-lapsarian state of the *nous* as one of unity, ‘through perfect love, with its archetype in the Holy Spirit’. As 1 John 4:8, quoted in full, expresses it (and recalling that Evagrius would have expected his readers to complete the quote for themselves),

> ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν οὐκ ἔγνω τὸν θεόν, ὅτι ὁ θεός ἀγάπη ἔστιν.

Whoever does not love does not know God, for God is love.

Consequently, to suppose that because the ultimate term in Evagrius’ spirituality is knowledge rather than love, and that accordingly he values knowledge more highly than love, is to overlook the fact that the knowledge in question is of a God who is love, and is therefore knowledge of love; that is, it is love consciously recognised, acknowledged and embraced. It is love that, by way of *apatheia*, the disentangling of the *nous*

---

229 *Eul.* 21.23.
230 1 John 4:8.
231 So, for example, McGinn (1991: 156); Chitty (1966: 50). While not explicitly stating that Evagrius values knowledge more highly than love, both Balthasar (1965: 193) and Konstantinovsky (2009) also exemplify this tendency, Balthasar likening Evagrius’ ‘mystical teaching’ to the ‘subtle idealism of Mahayana Buddhism [according to which] knowledge is the highest aim of life’, and Konstantinovsky only mentioning the word ‘love’ once in her monograph on Evagrius’ spirituality (in order to note, on p.31, that ‘love crowns the life of praxis and opens the door to contemplative knowledge of the universe’).
from the external world, unifies the three parts of the soul and, accordingly, the anthropological triad and, in so doing, restores the image of God such that the *nous* can once more become what it was created to be: ‘the place of God.’²³³ Linge continues:

With *apatheia*…comes the love that dispels our separation from other creatures and the knowledge that dispels our ignorance of ourselves and of the finite world. Beyond this restored relation to world and self, *apatheia* opens the way to the life of pure prayer, which dispels our separation from God.²³⁴

Since God is love and the *nous* is the image of God, love is integral to the *nous*. To be precise, as we saw above, it derives as *agapē* from the healthy *thumos* and as spiritual *erōs* – an integral part of pure prayer²³⁵ - from the healthy *epithumētikon*.²³⁶ Thus,

Love is the excellent state of the reasoning soul, for in it one cannot love anything among corruptible things more than the knowledge of God.²³⁷

There is a good love that is eternal, namely that which true knowledge chooses for itself and which is said to be inseparable from the *nous*.²³⁸

Love, then, is for Evagrius integral both to the *nous* and to knowledge – where there is love there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge, love – and this must be borne in mind when considering what he has to say about contemplation and knowledge, in terms both of their nature and content:

He who has to see written things has need of the light; and he who has to learn the wisdom of beings has need of spiritual love.²³⁹

So, for example, his cosmological teachings such as the assignment of the fallen *noes* to bodies and worlds ‘according to their state’ (κατ’ ἀνάλογον τῆς καταστάσεως)²⁴⁰ must be understood not as the products of abstract intellectual speculation but as insights born

---

²³³ *Th.* 39.4; 40.9; *Rfl.* 25; *Let.* 39; see above, 1.2.1; 1.2.1.3.
²³⁵ Cf. *Pry.* 52, quoted above, 1.2.2, n.249.
²³⁶ See above, 1.2.2; it will however be recalled that in one place – *Prakt.* 89 – Evagrius assigns *agapē* to the *epithumētikon*.
²³⁷ *KG* 1.86.
²³⁸ *KG* 4.50.
²³⁹ *KG* 3.58.
²⁴⁰ E.g. Sch. 33 on Prov. 3:19-20.
of spiritual love from the context of a life of devotion and prayer, and from ‘the grace of God’:

The pillar of truth, Basil the Cappadocian, said that while the understanding which comes from men strengthens through study and assiduous exercise, that which comes from the grace of God strengthens through justice, freedom from anger, and mercy. And while it is possible for the empatheis to receive the first, only the apatheis can receive the second, those who at the time of prayer contemplate the nous’ own light which illumines them.

To put it another way, knowledge, as we saw in relation to the ‘three resurrections’, is not the sole prerogative of the logistikon but involves the entire anthropological triad; it is not simply believed intellectually but is embodied in a way of life and presupposes apatheia - virtue and love – and this is part of Evagrius’ meaning when he speaks of things ‘being clear to those who have embarked upon the same trail.’

This holistic knowledge that arises from apatheia, as well as involving spiritual insights, is immensely practical, as Praktikos 70 shows:

'Ο τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐν ἀυτῷ καθιδρύσας, καὶ ταύταις ὅλος ἀνακραθείς, οὐκ ἔτι μέμνηται νόμου ἡ ἐντολῶν ἡ κολάσεως, ἄλλα ταύτα λέγει καὶ πράττει ὑπὸ ἀρίστη ἔξος ἑρεμείς ὑπαγορεύει.'

241 Gnost. 45.
242 Cf. Gnost. 4: ‘The knowledge which comes to us from outside tries to reveal matters by way of their logoi. But that which is born of the grace of God presents objects to the eye of thought, and the nous, gazing upon them, approaches their logoi. To the first is opposed error, to the second, anger and thumos and those things which follow along with them.’ (‘Ἡ μὲν ἡμὰς ἐξωθηθεῖ ημὴν συμβαίνουσα γνώσεις, διὰ τῶν λόγων ύποδεικνύοις περίπτεται τὰς ὑλὰς, ἀλλὰ ἐκ θεοῦ χάριτος ἐγγυμνάνη, αὐτοῖς εἶναι δὲ δεινοὶ παράστησι τὰ πράγματα, πρὸς ὅ βλέπων ὁ νόμος, τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους προσέτεται, ἀντίκειται δὲ τῇ μὲν προτέρῃ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀριστή ὑπαγορεύει.’
243 See above, Introduction.
244 Prakt. 70.
The person who has established the virtues within himself and has become wholly mixed with them no longer remembers the law or the commandments or punishment, but says and does those things which this excellent state dictates to him.

First, a couple of points about language. The participle καθιδρύσας comes from the verb καθίδρω, the causal of καθέζομαι, ‘to make to sit down’, so in meaning ‘to establish’, it does so with strong connotations of ‘seating’ something ‘in’, and so establishing it in a particularly thoroughgoing and stable way. This use of it echoes Evagrius’ description of ‘a soul accomplished in praktikē’ as a ‘throne of apatheia’, and his reading of the verb ‘seats’ in Prov. 18:16 as ‘the seat (καθόδρω) of the nous…the excellent state which keeps that which is sitting there difficult to move or immovable’. The participle ἀνακραθείς comes from ἀνακραθάναι and is therefore cognate with the verb κραθάναι, source of the noun krasis, so bearing in mind Evagrius’ project of refining the physical krasis of the body I think the idea of becoming ‘wholly mixed with the virtues’ has a literal dimension in addition to its more obvious metaphorical sense, since the person who has achieved this ‘mixing’ has done so partly through having weaned her epithumētikon away from its attachments to food, drink and so forth such that its sole desire is for the good, with the consequence that her body has become less ‘thick’ and ‘earthy’; the virtuous soul has as its correlate a body that is itself becoming progressively more ‘spiritualised’ by becoming progressively ‘less corporeal’.

When Evagrius says that this person, the apathēs, ‘no longer remembers the law or the commandments or punishment, but says and does those things which this excellent state dictates to him’ echoes can be detected of the Stoic sage, described by Long, on the basis of Cicero’s De Finibus 3.20-1, as follows:

The good man is ‘in complete agreement with Nature’…Virtue [is defined by] a pattern of behaviour that follows necessarily from a disposition perfectly in tune with Nature’s rationality…The right thing to do is that which accords with virtue, and this is equivalent to saying that it accords with the nature of a perfectly rational being.

---

245 Cf. AM 31; see above, 3.2.
246 See above, 3.1.
Evagrius equates observance of the commandments with the cultivation of virtue:

"Ὡ παρὰ φύσιν βιῶν, ὦ τῆρεὶ ἑντολάς Θεοῦ."248

One who lives contrary to nature does not keep the commandments of God.

Apatheia is constituted by the practical virtues (ἐκ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν συνεστῶσα),249 and observance of the commandments constitutes πρακτικῆ (πρακτικὴν δὲ συνόστισιν ἢ τήρησις τῶν ἑντολῶν).250 It follows that observance of the commandments is essential to the attainment of ἀπαθεία; ἀπαθεία, ‘is potentially in the commandments’ (κατὰ δόναμιν <ἐν ταῖς> ἑντολαῖς),251 and in the process of attaining it a person will have thoroughly internalised the commandments; in other words, he will have ‘established them within his soul and become wholly mixed with them’. He does not need to remember them because they have become part of him and will, accordingly, determine his behaviour without any conscious effort on his part.

Such a person is ‘in complete agreement with Nature’ because his soul is acting according to nature, which, for Evagrius as for the Stoics, means ‘according to rational nature’. But here Evagrius’ view diverges radically from that of the Stoics since for him the rational nature in question is that of the pre-lapsarian incorporeal nous created in the image of God. And as will already have become apparent, whatever superficial similarities might obtain between the Evagrian apathēs and the Stoic apathēs or sage, Evagrius’ understanding of ἀπαθεία is first and foremost Pauline, and it is his reading of Paul that above all underlies Praktikos 70, in particular, I think, Rom. 7:4-6 and Gal. 3:23-9:

ὑμεῖς ἐθανατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι ὑμᾶς ἐτέρω, τῷ ἐκ νεκρῶν ἐγερθέντι, ἵνα καρποφόρησομεν τῷ θεῷ. ὅτε γὰρ ἤμεν ἐν τῇ σαρκί, τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου ἐνπρεπέτω ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἠμῶν, εἰς τὸ καρποφόρησαι τῷ θεῷ· γὰρ δὲ κατηγρήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἀποθανόντες εἰς ὑ κατείχεμεθα, ὅστε δουλεύην ἠμᾶς ἐν κατάστημι πνεύματος καὶ οὐ παλαιότητι γράμματος.252

248 Exh. 2.37.
250 Prakt. 81.2. Regarding the role of the ‘law’ in the attainment of ἀπαθεία, cf. Sch. 12 on Prov. 1:20-21 and Sch. 343 on Prov. 28:4, both quoted above, 3.2, n.113 and 116 respectively.
251 Disc. 18.1.
252 Rom. 7:4-6.
You have died to the law through the body of Christ, so that you may belong to another, to him who has been raised from the dead in order that we may bear fruit for God. While we were living in the flesh, our sinful affections, aroused by the law, were at work in our members to bear fruit for death. But now we are awakened, dead to the law which held us captive, so that we are slaves not to the old written code but in the new life of the spirit.

Now before faith came, we were imprisoned and guarded under the law until faith would be revealed. Therefore the law was our instructor until Christ came, so that we might be justified by faith. But now that faith has come, we are no longer subject to an instructor, for in Christ Jesus you are all children of God. As many of you as were baptised into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. There is no longer Jew nor Greek…for you are all one in Christ Jesus.

Both of these passages relate the ‘law’ to what Paul elsewhere calls the ‘old self’ and associates with life in the σῶμα ψυχικόν, and what Evagrius calls the life of thraldom to pathos; in his scholion on Prov. 25:10a Evagrius quotes Gal. 3:13, ‘Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law’ (Χριστὸς ἡμᾶς ἠλευθέρωσεν ἓκ τῆς κατάρας τοῦ νόμου). In ‘dying with Christ’ to the life of ἐμπαθεία and being resurrected with him into ‘the new life of the spirit’ the ἀπαθής has in effect outgrown the law.’ This is made explicit in the Chapters of the Disciples:

Τὴν δικαιοσύνην οἱ ἥξιοι περιεκτικὴν πασῶν τῶν ἄρετῶν προέκριναν ἀπονεμητικὴ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν κατ’ ἁξίαν, τὸ συμφορότερον παιδέουσα τὰς γὰρ

---

254 Col. 3:9;
255 Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 ff; see above, 3.2.
256 ‘Favour and friendship set a man free, which do thou keep for thyself, lest thou be made liable to reproach; but take heed to thy ways peaceably’ (χάρις καὶ φιλία ἠλευθερία, ἄξιος τῆς πατρίδος, ἵνα μὴ ἐπονειδίστος γένη, ἄλλος φύλαξας τὰς ὁδοὺς τοῦ εὐσυναλλάκτου). This is how Evagrius quotes Gal. 3:13; my edition of the Greek New Testament has ἠλευθέρωσεν instead of ἠλευθέρωσεν.

257 This is how Evagrius quotes Gal. 3:13; my edition of the Greek New Testament has ἠλευθέρωσεν instead of ἠλευθέρωσεν.
κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἁμαρτίας περιματεί, ταύτην καὶ ὁ νόμος προστάσσει. Κατὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ διδασκαλίαν ἢ ἀγάπη πασῶν τῶν ἁρετῶν ἐστὶ περιεκτική· καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἐσώ ἀνθρώπουν καθαρίζει, τὰς κατὰ διάνοιαν ἁμαρτίας ἐκκόπτουσα.\(^{258}\)

The pagans put justice first as embracing all the virtues, for it is the distribution to each according to worth, teaching what is more expedient. This eliminates sins κατ’ ἐνέργειαν and is what the law prescribes. But according to the teachings of Christ it is love that embraces all the virtues and purifies the inner self in cutting out sins κατὰ διάνοιαν.

Evagrius, then, understands the Pauline sense of ‘law’ to concern the regulation of our conduct in the world, and ἀπαθεία as going beyond this by ensuring inner purity:\(^{259}\)

Πρακτικὸς ἐστιν, ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ διάνοιαν κόσμον συνισταμένος, εὐσεβῶς καὶ δικαιῶς πολιτεύομενος.\(^{260}\)

The praktikos is one who conducts himself piously and justly in the world constituted κατὰ διάνοιαν.

Θεωρητικὸς ἐστιν, ὁ πλάττων τὸν ἁιδοθὴν κόσμον κατὰ διάνοιαν τῆς αὐτοῦ μόνον γνώσεως ἐνεκεν.\(^{261}\)

The contemplative is one who forms the sensible world κατὰ διάνοιαν solely for the sake of knowledge of it.

The ἀπαθής has internalised the prescriptions of the commandments and law, whose purpose is to prevent sin κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, and in doing purified her actions in both the external world and in the worlds she constitutes κατὰ διάνοιαν. Freed from ‘domestic disturbance’ (ἵ…ταραχὴ τῶν οἰκείων) her nous is able to ‘make that noble emigration

\(^{258}\) Disc. 7. Evagrius would equate the ‘cutting out’ of sins κατὰ διάνοιαν with the ‘circumcision of the heart’ (περιοται καρδίας) of Rom. 2:29.

\(^{259}\) Cf. Sch. 27 on Prov. 3:1: ‘My son, forget not my laws; but let thine heart keep my words’ (ὑιό, ἐμῶν νομίμων μὴ ἐπιλανθάνου· τὰ δὲ ῥήματα μον τυρεῖνα σῇ καρδίᾳ): ‘If a person who does not live by the law forgets the law, a person who remembers the law lives by it. And if the one who performs them observes the words of God, the one who does not wish to practise them loses them, for it is said, “for it is not the hearers of the law who are righteous in God’s sight, but the doers of the law who will be justified’ (Rom. 2:13).

\(^{260}\) Rfl. 38.

\(^{261}\) Rfl. 39.
and arrive in the land of the incorporeals’ (ἀποδημήσει τὴν καλὴν ἐκείνην ἀποδημίαν, καὶ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γένοιτο τῶν ἀσωμάτων).\(^{262}\)

Νοῦς σὸν Θεῶ πρακτικὴν κατορθώσας καὶ προσπέλασας τῇ γνώσει ὅλιγον ἡ οὐδ’ ὅλος τὸν ὅλον μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπαισθάνεται, τῆς γνώσεως αὐτῶν ἀρπαξούσης μετάρρισον καὶ χωριζούσης τῶν αἰσθητῶν.\(^{263}\)

The *nous* that has completed the work of *praktikē* with the help of God and has approached knowledge possesses little or no awareness of the irrational part of the soul, for knowledge has carried it off to the heights and separated it from sensible things.

This separation of the *nous* from the world of the senses and from the physical body is, as we have seen the aim of *praktikē*: ‘separating soul from body belongs to one who longs for virtue’,\(^{264}\) ‘for that which has no part in sensation is also free from *pathos*’,\(^{265}\) hence the *praktikos* is ‘the servant of separation’\(^{266}\) and the *praktikē* soul becomes ‘loosened from the body’ and carried on the ‘wings of *apatheia*’ to the ‘regions of knowledge’.\(^{267}\)

The *nous* that is divested of the *pathē* and sees the *logoi* of beings does not henceforth truly receive the *eidola* that (arrive) through the senses; but it is as if another world is created by its knowledge, attracting to it its thought and rejecting far from it the sensible world.\(^{268}\)

This separation is a metaphorical ‘death’ in which ‘the entire nature of the body is withdrawn’.\(^{269}\) Evagrius, it will be recalled, enjoins Eulogios to ‘strip off the weight of the flesh (τὸν ὃγκον τῶν σαρκῶν ἀπόδοσαι),’\(^{270}\) thus calling to mind Paul’s reference at Col. 3:9 to ‘stripping off (ἀπεκδοσάμενοι) the old self with its practices’, and at 1 Cor. 15: 43-4 to the *sôma psychikon* which, sown in dishonour and weakness, is raised in glory.

---

\(^{262}\) Prakt. 61; cf. Sch. 377 on Prov. 31:21.

\(^{263}\) Prakt. 66.

\(^{264}\) Prakt. 52; see above, 3.2.

\(^{265}\) Prakt. 4.3-4; see above, 3.2.

\(^{266}\) KG 5.65; see above, 3.2.

\(^{267}\) KG 2.6; see above, 3.2.

\(^{268}\) KG 5.12.

\(^{269}\) KG 3.62; see above, 3.2.

\(^{270}\) Eul. 1.1; see above, 1.2.3.
and power. As a result the *nous*, although still incarnate, can experience itself as incorporeal and thereby effectively become so, able to participate, through ‘immaterial contemplation’, in the incorporeal worlds.

The stripping off by the *nous* of corporeality is, as we have seen, a return to its true nature, in the process of which it becomes ever more aware of its own light:

Προκόπτον ὁ νοῦς ἐν τῇ πρακτικῇ, κοῦφα ἔχει τὰ νοηματα τῶν αἰσθητῶν προκόπτων δὲ ἐν τῇ γνώσει, ποικίλα ἔχει τὰ θεωρήματα προκόπτων δὲ ἐν τῇ προσευχῇ, λαμπρότερον καὶ φαινότερον ὄντα τὸ Ἴδιον φῶς.

As the *nous* progresses in *praktikê*, its *noēmata* of sensible objects become insubstantial; when it is progressing in knowledge its contemplations will be diverse; when it is progressing in prayer, it will see its own light become brighter and more radiant.

The *nous* that is divested of the *pathê* becomes completely like light because it is illuminated by the contemplation of beings.

The progressive detachment from the sensible world for the sake of which the labours of *praktikê* are endured and *apatheia* attained is succinctly described in terms of its ultimate purpose in the following:

Οὐκ ἂν ἴδιο τόν τοῦ θεοῦ τόπον ἐν ἑαυτῷ, μὴ πάντων τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν <νοημάτων> ψυχλότερος γεγονός· οὐ γενήσεται δὲ ψυχιλότερος, μὴ τὰ πάθη ἀπεκδυσάμενος τὰ συνδεσμούντα αὐτόν διὰ τῶν νοημάτων τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς. Καὶ τὰ μὲν πάθη ἀποθησάμεθα διὰ τῶν ἁρετῶν, τοὺς δὲ ψυχιλὸς λογισμοῦ διὰ τῆς πνευματικῆς θεωρίας, καὶ τούτην πάλιν ἐπιφανείντος αὐτῷ φωτὸς ἐκείνου τοῦ κατὰ τόν καιρόν τῆς προσευχῆς ἐκτυποῦντος τὸν τόπον τοῦ θεοῦ.

---

271 See above, 3.2.
272 KG 3.62; see above, this section and 3.2 respectively.
273 See above, 1.2.1.3.
274 Disc. 78.
275 Cf. KG 1.74: ‘The light of the *nous* is divided into three: knowledge of the adorable and holy Trinity, of the incorporeal nature that has been created by it, and of the contemplation of beings’.
276 KG 5.15.
277 Th. 40.
The *nous* could not see the place of God within itself, unless it has transcended all the *noëmata* associated with objects. Nor will it transcend them, if it has not put off the *pathē* that bind it to sensible objects through *noëmata*. And it will lay aside the *pathē* through the virtues, and simple thoughts through spiritual contemplation; and this in turn it will lay aside when there appears to it that light which at the time of prayer leaves an impress of the place of God.

*Apatheia*, then, is the means by which the *nous* is enabled to experience itself as incorporeal while it is still incarnate, and, accordingly, an anticipation of its eschatological return to metaphysical incorporeality. This is an understanding of humanity’s spiritual goal which has roots in Plato’s *Theaetetus*:

> Ἀλλ’ οὔτ’ ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδορε· ὑπεναντίον γὰρ τῷ ἄγαθῷ
> ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη· οὔτ’ ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ θυτήν φύσιν καὶ τὸν τὸν
> τόπον περιπολεῖ εἷς ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειράσθαι χρῆ ἑνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι
> τάχιστα. φυγή δὲ ὡμοίωσις θεῶ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.\(^{278}\)

It is impossible that evils should be done away with, Theodorus, for there must always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth. Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible.\(^{279}\)

Evagrius would not agree that evils cannot be done away with, although evil will only cease to exist, along with the corporeal worlds, at the *apokatastasis*, when the *noes* are fully restored to union with God. Nor would he associate all evils with proximity to the earth; as we have seen, while humans are characterised by *epithumia* and earth, demons, who are further from God than we are, are characterised by *thumos* and air.\(^{280}\) He does, however, associate evil with distance from God, and he certainly believes that it is only by escaping from the earth that we can regain our knowledge of God, and that doing so means regaining the image of God and in this sense becoming like God, although it is a likeness based upon reflection as opposed to natural kinship.

\(^{278}\) *Theaet*. 176a6-b2.  
\(^{280}\) See above, 1.1.2.
But Evagrian *apatheia* is more than just experiential detachment from the physical body and the world of the senses; it is also love, understood not simply in relational terms but as a state of being that is the natural condition of the *nous* as the image of a God who is love. According to *Kephalaia Gnostika* 5:14,

> Just as, when the sun rises, things which are elevated a little from the ground cast a shadow, so also to the *nous* which begins to approach the *logoi* of beings, objects appear obscurely.\(^{281}\)

This describes the experience of the *nous*, as it becomes progressively more detached from the sensible world, in epistemic terms. Spiritual knowledge is like the light of the sun, so as the epistemic receptivity of the *nous* becomes gradually re-oriented away from the sensible world and back toward God – as, that is, the *nous* gradually recovers his image – so knowledge of him, at first in the form of the *logoi* of beings, begins to shed its light, like the rays of the rising sun, and in so doing makes sensible objects appear as shadows in relation to spiritual reality. But since love is inseparable from knowledge this aphorism can, and should, be read equally in terms of love. The rising sun of spiritual knowledge is the rising sun of love, the door to natural knowledge, knowledge of God and ultimate blessedness.\(^{282}\)

### 3.4 Becoming *apathēs*

*Apatheia* is the health of the soul, the natural state of the human being and the spiritual foundation for the recovery by the *nous* of knowledge of God, culminating in its eschatological restoration to union with him. It is constituted by the practical virtues and characterised by stability and love, enables the *nous* to become receptive to spiritual knowledge and bestows an inner purity that regulates our conduct in the ‘worlds constituted kata dianoian’ as well as in the external world. In order to complete this picture it remains to discuss how *apatheia* is attained.

\(^{281}\) *KG* 5.14.

At the heart of the quest for *apatheia* is the struggle against the *logismoi*. Our susceptibility to these resides in the disposition to *pathos*, and accordingly the disciplines of *praktikê* aim to reduce, and eventually eliminate, this disposition by healing all three parts of the soul:

Νῦν μὲν πλανώμενον ἵστησιν ἄνάγνωσις καὶ ἀγροπνία καὶ προσενεχὶ ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ ἐκφλογούμενην μαραίνει πέινα καὶ κόπος καὶ ἀναπαύσις: θυμὸν δὲ καταπαυτει κυκώμενον ψαλιμῳδία καὶ μακροθυμία καὶ ἔλεος.

When the *nous* wanders, reading, vigils and prayer bring it to a standstill. When desire bursts into flame, hunger, toil and anachoresis extinguish it. When the *thumos* becomes agitated, psalmody, patience and mercy calm it.

tὰ μὲν τοῦ σῶματος πάθη περικόπτει ἐγκράτεια, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγάπη πνευματικῆ.

Self-control cuts away the *pathê* of the body; spiritual love cuts away those of the soul.

As we saw, the disposition to *pathos* comprises the physiological ‘matter’ of the *logismoi* in the form of excess vital heat, and their psychological ‘matter’ in the form of the ‘natural desires of the flesh’, the ‘desires of the soul’, and *empathēs* memories. By cultivating, for example, patience, mercy, compassion and gentleness to heal the disposition to anger; self-control to heal the disposition to gluttony and fornication and perseverance to heal the disposition to acedia, the monk gradually brings his soul to health. *Praktikê*, then, comprises the cultivation of the practical virtues, along with manual labour, the keeping of vigils, the reading of scripture and the practice of psalmody and prayer, all of which are indispensable to the attainment of *apatheia*. Dietary self-control has already been discussed at length in relation to Evagrius’ understanding of the body, and the nature of the virtues has been discussed in relation to the nature of

---

283 See above, 2.1.
284 *Prakt*. 15.
285 *Prakt*. 35; see above, 3.2.
286 See above, 3.4.
287 *Eul*. 21.23; see above, 3.2.
288 Cf. *Prakt*. 34; see above, 3.3.
289 Cf., e.g., *Prakt*. 15, 20.
290 Cf., e.g., *Prakt*. 15; *8Th*. 1,4, 6, 33; 2.1.
291 Cf., e.g., *Prakt*. 28.
the tripartite soul. The nature of prayer, as Evagrius understands it, has to some extent been implicit in discussion of the contemplative ascent, the true nature of the nous and apatheia as love and knowledge, and is also the subject, along with Evagrius’ understanding of psalmody, of an excellent recent monograph by Luke Dysinger. The following, however, is particularly worth noting here:

Ἐργάζεσθαι μὲν δὲ παντὸς καὶ ἀγρυπνεῖν καὶ νηστεύειν οὐ προστετάγμεθα, προσεύχεσθαι δὲ ἢμῖν ἀδιαλείπτως νενομοθέτεται· διότι ἐκείνα μὲν τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπεύοντα καὶ τοῦ σῶματος ἡμῶν εἰς τὴν ἐργασίαν προσδέιται, ὡσερ δὲ οἰκείων ἀσθένειαν πρὸς τοὺς πόνους οὐκ ἐπαρκεῖ· ὥ δὲ προσεύχη τὸν νοῦν ἐφρομένον καὶ καθαρὸν πρὸς τὴν πάλιν παρασκευάζει, περικότα προσεύχεσθαι καὶ δίχα τοῦτο τοῦ σῶματος καὶ ὑπὲρ πασῶν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων τοῖς δαίμοσι μάχεσθαι.

We have not been commanded to work, to keep vigil, and to fast at all times, but the law of unceasing prayer has been handed down to us. In fact, those things which heal the pathētikon part of the soul require also the body to put them into practice, and the latter because of its weakness is not sufficient for these labours. Prayer, on the other hand, invigorates and purifies the nous for the struggle, since it is naturally constituted for prayer, even without this body, and for fighting the demons on behalf of all the powers of the soul.

In this passage Evagrius affirms the primacy of prayer within praktikē: important as the various ascetic labours are, prayer is more so – more important, even, than the dietary self-control that keeps the vital heat at bay and in doing so deprives the pathē of their physiological matter. Prayer nourishes the nous by answering directly to its true nature, and also - although Evagrius does not spell this out here - increases the receptivity of the nous to grace, without which all of its labours would be in vain.

292 See above, 1.2.2.
293 See above, 1.1.3.
294 See above, 1.2.1.3.
295 See above, 3.3.
296 Dysinger (2005).
297 Prakt. 49.
298 1 Thess. 5:17.
299 See above, 1.2.3.
300 Cf. Eul. 1.1; see above, 1.2.3.
301 E.g. Eul. 8.8, 14.15, 27.29, 28.39, 29.31; Vices Prol.; 8Th. 8.12; Prakt. Prol. 2; 53; Epil.; AV 25; Th. 8, 26, 39; Pry. Prol.; 75.
There remains one element of *praktikē* which, although it is of central importance to the attainment and preservation of *apatheia*, and, as such, partly constitutive of it, I have not yet mentioned directly, and upon which, I shall, accordingly, now focus. Virtues such as self-control, patience, mercy, compassion and gentleness correspond to the *pathētikon* part of the soul, but integral to their cultivation are the more purely rational disciplines of vigilance and discernment. The importance within Evagrius’ spirituality of an attitude of continual introspective watchfulness cannot be overstated and informs all of his writings; as Rich notes, ‘the discernment of spirits, *logismoi* and of spiritual and practical matters is at the centre of [Evagrius’] teaching’.\(^{302}\) Just as the exercise by the *nous* of its self-determination in order to return to God makes good the primal misuse of it by which it fell, so the cultivation of inner watchfulness is the means by which it remedies the tendency to negligence, inattentiveness or carelessness due to which it first turned from God. This watchfulness consists largely in the development of ever deeper degrees of a self-awareness, but also involves becoming familiar with the demons, learning to recognise different types of thought, and monitoring, analysing and exercising care in respect of one’s mental content. It is, in other words, the application of reason to the cultivation and preservation of purity of heart. Before looking at it in more detail, however, a word is in order about the sort of self-awareness it involves.

Sometime during the final years of Evagrius’ life, Augustine of Hippo wrote his *Confessions*.\(^{303}\) From his understanding of the will and of its centrality to our being it follows that our motivations are constitutive of our spiritual condition, any action not ultimately rooted in love of God being therefore sinful. The confession of sin comes, accordingly, to involve a relentless quest to uncover one’s motivations,\(^{304}\) and, in the process, gives rise to self-knowledge as the ‘fruit’ of ‘an activity that centrally involves the drawing forth of [the] past through memory’.\(^{305}\) It is this understanding that underlies the *Confessions*:

> [In aula ingenti memoriae meae] caelum et terra et mare praesto sunt cum omnibus quae in eis sentire potui, praeter illa quae oblitus sum. Ibi mihi et ipse oc-

\(^{303}\) Chadwick (1991), dates the *Confessions* to the years 397-400.
\(^{304}\) Cf. *Confess*. 2.9 ff.
\(^{305}\) Nussbaum, at Matthews (1999: 68).
curro meque recolo, quid, quando et ubi egerim quoque modo, cum agerem, affectus fuerim.\textsuperscript{306}

[In the vast hall of my memory] sky, land, and sea are available to me together with all the sensations I have been able to experience in them, except for those which I have forgotten. There also I meet myself and recall what I am, what I have done, and when and where and how I was affected when I did it.

Evagrius would agree that any action not ultimately rooted in love of God is therefore sinful, and, as we have seen, he understands a \textit{pathos} to be any affection that comes between us and our love of God. He would certainly agree with Augustine that, as Nussbaum puts it, ‘one can never correct oneself fully enough, watch one’s impulses carefully enough.’\textsuperscript{307} But whereas for Augustine these propositions lead to a focus on the person as a particular, unique creature, an ‘I’ in intimate dialogue with God, for Evagrius they lead in the opposite direction; away from the uniquely personal, which for him is solely a source of attachments to things other than God; away, even, from the human, to awareness of the ‘self’ as a pure \textit{nous}. Consequently, although Evagrius’ writings are full of rich personal detail, much of which can only be autobiographical, and of searingly honest reports of personal experience, none is owned; Evagrius is unwavering in his self-effacement. And while some of his writings are far more ‘personal’ than the \textit{Confessions} in terms of the experiences that they lay bare, those experiences are presented not as constitutive of their subject, but, on the contrary, as detached from him; objects to be observed, examined, learned from and then transcended as obstacles to the union of the \textit{nous} with God. So for Evagrius ‘self-awareness’, is not awareness of a particular individual with a particular history who, as such, engages with God, but, rather, a means of diagnosing the current condition and needs of the fragmented \textit{nous}.

Although discernment is integral to the inner watchfulness prescribed by Evagrius, he rarely, as Rich notes, ‘uses the \textit{διώκτησις} word group’.\textsuperscript{308} Instead, his preferred way of referring to that watchfulness is by the verb \textit{τηρειν}, the use of which, as noted above, recalls not only Prov. 4:23, ‘keep watch over thine heart with all vigilance’ (πάσῃ φυλακῇ τήρει σὴν καρδίαν), but Eph. 4:3.\textsuperscript{309} The following passage, which concludes

\textsuperscript{306} \textit{Conf.} 10.14.
\textsuperscript{307} Nussbaum, at Matthews (1999: 66).
\textsuperscript{308} Rich (2007: 41).
\textsuperscript{309} See above, 3.3.
the treatise To Eulogios, plays on its different meanings and on its association, as in Prov. 4:23, with the verb φυλάσσω, as well as giving one example of why such watchfulness is a necessary component of asceticism:

Σὺ οὖν, ὦ ἁγία ηξηάδνο ἱθέηα, εἰδὼο ηαῦηα ἐλ νἷο θηινπνῖο, πάζῃ θπιαθῆ ζὴλ θαξδία, κήπσο ηνῖο ἔμσζελ πόλνηο, ηνῖο ἔζσζελ δειέαζη βξνρηζζῆο, νἱ ἐκνὶ ιόγνη εἴξεληαη πξὸο ζέ, ηὰ δὲ ῥήκαηά κνπ ηεξείησ ζὴ θαξδία· κέκλεζν Χξηζηνῦ ηνῦ θπιάμαληνο ζε θαὶ κὴ ἐπηιάζῃ η῅ο πξνζθπλεη῅ο θαὶ ἁγίαο ηξηάδνο. 310

As for you then, suppliant of the Holy Trinity, as you know these matters for which you make painstaking efforts, keep watch over your heart with all vigilance for fear that in attending to outward ascetic efforts alone you may choke on interior baits. My words were therefore addressed to you, and may your heart preserve what I said. Remember Christ who has kept guard over you and do not forget the worshipful and Holy Trinity.

The following, again from the Eulogios, describes one sort of ‘interior bait’:

Μὴ στόμα μόνον, ἄλλα καὶ καρδία τηρείσθω. τότε γάρ ἀμαιροῦται τὴς ψυχῆς τὸ ὁμμα τῷ τῆς ἄρεσκείας πνεύματι, τοῦ νοῦ πασσομένου. 311

Let not only the mouth but also the heart maintain its guard. For the eye of the soul is blinded by the spirit of complaisance at the moment when the nous is sprinkled with dust.

As Burton-Christie notes, the desert monks were acutely aware of the power of words; the Apophthegmata Patrum report Makarios the Great as saying that ‘one evil word makes even the good evil, while one good word makes even the evil good’, while at Matt: 12:36 we are told that on the day of judgment we will have to give account for every careless word we utter (πᾶν ῥῆμα ἀργὸν δ λαλήσουσιν…Ἀποδόσουσιν). 314 Thus inner watchfulness includes guarding the tongue and so the mouth. But in addition, Evagrius notes in his scholion on Prov. 25:26 that the

310 Eul. 32.34.
311 Eul. 18.19.
314 Cf. also James 3:5 ff.
word ‘tongue’ is used by Scripture to mean ‘soul’,\textsuperscript{315} meaning that, as Driscoll notes, a reference to guarding the tongue ‘can suggest to the monk familiar with this use of biblical language that the whole soul is to be guarded.’\textsuperscript{316} So Evagrius’ warning to Eulogios is amplified by this secondary meaning of ‘mouth’: the literal mouth is to be guarded lest a careless word ‘make the good evil’, and in addition the heart and the soul are to be guarded lest the ‘eye’ of the latter be blinded. By ‘dust’ Evagrius means the logismoi, which, thrown in the ‘eye of the soul’, obscure its ‘vision’;\textsuperscript{317} his reference is to the capacity of the pathos associated with the logismoi to undermine our watchfulness, discernment and resolve. A particularly clear example is the temptation by logismoi of fornication described at \textit{Eul.} 21.22 and discussed above,\textsuperscript{318} which begins by warning that ‘it is a very serious matter for the heart to be tied to a habit of pleasures’ and then proceeds to detail how the pleasures in question enlist the monk’s reason to justify their indulgence; this is precisely the sort of undermining of reason by pathos that Evagrius has in mind in speaking of the nous being ‘sprinkled with dust.’ He attributes the capacity of pleasure to erode our resolve to ‘the spirit of complaisance’, but it is ourselves and the demons that we choose to please rather than God, and in choosing thus we repeat the primordial choice of the nous to turn away from God, and reinforce our disposition to pathos and immersion in corporeality.

While lapses in watchfulness imperil the heart, soul and nous, its maintenance conduces to spiritual advancement:

\begin{quote}
ʻΟ φυλάσσων γλώσσαν αὐτοῦ ὅρθοτομε ὁ δ σώ χ αὐτοῦ, \\
καὶ ὁ πρῶν καρδίαν αὐτοῦ πλησθήσεται γνώσεως.\textsuperscript{319}
\end{quote}

He who guards his tongue cuts his ways rightly, \\
And he who keeps watch over his heart will be filled with knowledge.

The following describes another sort of ‘interior bait’ upon which one might ‘choke’:

\textsuperscript{315} Sch. 317.8-14 on Prov. 24:26. \\
\textsuperscript{316} Driscoll (2003: 118-9). \\
\textsuperscript{317} Cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 240, n.31). \\
\textsuperscript{318} See above, 2.2.4. \\
\textsuperscript{319} AM 94.
Many pathē are hidden in our souls, which are revealed by the sharpness of the temptations when these pathē slip out of us. So, it is necessary ‘to keep watch over the heart with all vigilance’ lest when the object [for which we have pathos] appears, we be won over to the pathos, carried off suddenly by demons and do something abhorrent to God.  

What Evagrius is referring to here is the level of dispositional pathos that I denoted D3; that is, the pathos associated with particular noēmata and memories. Everyone has a general disposition to pathos – the level that I denoted D1, and, at the level that I denoted D2, the dispositions to particular pathē such as hunger, sexual desire, anger or distress. But each of us differs in our innate vulnerability to particular pathē, and, in addition, each of us, as we go through life, becomes primed by our experiences to respond to stimuli in particular ways. Something happens to us and, as Evagrius would put it, we form an empathēs memory of it, which is then stored in our nous, waiting to be recalled to our awareness by some new circumstance. That recollection might simply take the form of the resurfacing of the memory, but the stronger the pathos associated with it, the more likely it is that the recollection will take the form of an arousal of a fresh episode of that pathos, together, as likely as not, with an acting out of it. So to go back to the example discussed in section 2.2.3, if someone injures me and I respond with resentment then I will form an empathēs memory of their face. Supposing I don’t see them again for a long time, I might forget all about both them and the injury. But then suppose I do see them again: before I know what is happening - perhaps before I’ve even consciously recognised them, let alone remembered the nature of our past dealings – resentment surges up within me, flooding my awareness and overwhelming my thought processes. At this point my nous has been ‘sprinkled with the dust’ of the logismoi, but the pathos has yet to win me over, meaning that I can still refrain from acting it out; it will be recalled in relation to Eulogios 21.22-3, that even when a person is in the throes of fresh pathos she still has the power to refrain from sinning. But should the ‘spirit of complaisance blind the eye of my soul’ I will proceed to sin, if not kat’ energeian then at least kata dianoian; having allowed myself to be ‘carried off by the demons to do something.

321 See above, 2.2.4.
322 See above, 3.4.
abhorrent to God’ I have, again, turned away from God and reinforced my disposition to *pathos*.

The *praktikos*, then, must continually monitor his responses, both cognitive and affective, to the circumstances in which he finds himself. He must be constantly on the lookout for unexpected thoughts or images appearing in his mind, however fleetingly; and for the smallest twinges of unexpected emotion, especially if it seems unwarranted. This is what it is needed to guard against the ‘*pathē* that are hidden in his soul’ from ‘slipping out’ in response to ‘the sharpness of temptation.’ The *pathē* in question, as noted above, are those specific to him personally, corresponding to D3, the most differentiated level of his disposition to *pathos*, and they arise in response to cognitive triggers. But we can also find ourselves suddenly overwhelmed by *pathē* from D2, which are less personally specific. The following is an example:

Κἂν μετὰ Θεοῦ δοκῆς εἶναι, φυλάττων τῆς πορνείας δαίμονα. Λίγον γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπατεών, καὶ φθονερῶτατος, καὶ βούλεται ὀξυτερὸς εἶναι τῆς κινήσεως καὶ νήψως τοῦ νοὸς σου, καὶ ἀπὸ Θεοῦ ἀποσπάν αὐτὸν παρεστῶτα αὐτῷ μετ’ εὐλαβείας καὶ φόβου.\(^{323}\)

Even when you seem to be with God, keep guard against the demon of fornication, for he is very deceitful and most jealous. He pretends to be swifter than the sobriety and movement of your *nous* so as to distance it from God while it is standing before him with reverence and fear.

The ‘deceitfulness’ of this demon consists, as noted above, in its pretence of being able to overwhelm the *nous* before it realises that it is under attack,\(^ {324}\) while in saying that it is ‘jealous’ Evagrius presumably means that it has a tendency to attack the monk regardless of what he is doing. In this case inner watchfulness means maintaining a continual awareness that this demon could attack at any time, and, as a result of this awareness, being ready to intercept and banish it as soon as it does. It also means continually monitoring one’s state, as different factors can make one more or less susceptible to the demons. For example, the *thumos* is very rapidly tempted when it has been troubled the night before, and the *epithumētikon* readily welcomes thoughts of fornication when it

---

\(^{323}\) *Pry*. 90.

\(^{324}\) See above, 2.1.3.2.
has been agitated in the fantasies of sleep.\textsuperscript{325} The monk must never abandon his cell during times of temptation since fleeing and circumventing such struggles teaches the \textit{nous} to be unskilled, cowardly and evasive,\textsuperscript{326} meaning that in future he would be even less able to cope.

The sort of watchfulness described above is a special case of a more general approach that Evagrius describes at \textit{Praktikos 50}:

\begin{quote}
Εἴ τις βούλειτο τῶν μοναχῶν ἀγρίων πειραθῆναι δαμόνων καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν τέχνης ἐξὶν λαβεῖν, τηρεῖτο τοὺς λογισμοὺς, καὶ τὰς ἐπιτάσεις σημειοῦσθοι τούτων, καὶ τὰς ἀνέσεις, καὶ τὰς μετεμπλοκάς, καὶ τοὺς χρόνους, καὶ τίνες τῶν δαμόνων οἱ τούτο ποιοῦντες, καὶ ποῖος ποίῳ δαίμονι ἀκολουθεῖ, καὶ τίς τίνι οὐχ ἔπεται· καὶ ξητεῖτο παρὰ Ἑρατόν τούτων τοὺς λόγους.\textsuperscript{327}
\end{quote}

If one of the monks should wish to acquire experience with the cruel demons and become familiar with their skill, let him observe the \textit{logismoi} and note their intensity and their relaxation, their inter-relationships, their occasions, which of the demons do this or that particular thing, what sort of demon follows upon another and which does not follow upon another; and let him seek from Christ the reason for these things.

Evagrius gives a detailed example of this kind of observation in chapter 9 of \textit{On Thoughts}, in relation to the demon of wandering (πλώνος) who, as the name suggests, induces the \textit{nous} to wander at length and thereby ‘distances it little by little from the knowledge of God and from virtue while it forgets even its profession’ (μακρὰν γινόμενον κατ᾽ ὀλίγον τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῆς ἄρετῆς καὶ τοῦ ἐπαγγέλματος λήθης λαμβάνοντα).\textsuperscript{328} Evagrius advises:

\begin{quote}
Δεῖ οὖν τὸν ἀναχωροῦντα τούτου τηρεῖν πόθεν τε ἄρχεται καὶ ποῦ καταλήγει: οὖ γάρ εἰκῇ οὐδὲ ὡς ἔτυχε τὸν μακρὸν ἐκεῖνον κῶλον ἐργάζεται, ἀλλὰ τὴν κατάστασιν τοῦ ἀναχωροῦντος διαφημεῖραι βουλόμενος ταύτα ποιεῖ...Ἀλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς, εἰπέρ ἔχομεν σκοπὸν τοῦ γνώναι σαφῶς τὴν τούτου πανοργίαν, μὴ ταχέως φλεγξομέθα πρὸς αὐτὸν μηδὲ μηνύσωμεν τὰ γινόμενα...Ἀλλὰ ἄλλην μίαν ἡμέραν ἢ καὶ δευτέραν συγχωρήσωμεν αὐτῷ τέλειόσθαι τὸ δράμα, ἵνα ἀκριβῶς
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{325} Cf. \textit{Th. 27}.  
\textsuperscript{326} Cf. \textit{Prakt. 28}.  
\textsuperscript{327} \textit{Prakt. 50.1-7}.  
\textsuperscript{328} \textit{Th. 9.7-9}.  

Page 241 of 268
The anchorite must observe this demon, where he starts from and where he ends up, for he does not make this long circuit by chance or at random, but rather it is with the intention of destroying the anchorite’s state that he does this…But if we make it our goal to know clearly the cunning of this demon, let us not be quick to speak to him or make known what is happening…Rather, let us allow him, for another day or two, to bring his game to completion, so that having learned about his deceitfulness in detail, we may put him to flight by exposing him with a word.

Rather than simply banish the demon as quickly as possible, Evagrius recommends allowing it to linger in order to learn about it, although clearly this strategy will only be available to those who are capable of maintaining, at least to some extent, their observation of the demon while being tempted by it, and Evagrius acknowledges that there will be limits to their ability to do so:

But since in time of temptation the nous may happen to be muddled and not see accurately what is happening, one should do the following after the withdrawal of the demon. Sit down and recall for yourself the things that happened to you…Examine these events carefully and commit them to memory so that you may be able to expose him when he approaches.

The mental and emotional stability that allow the monk to observe a demon while being tempted by it is apatheia; to be precise, a monk in this situation has attained what Evagrius calls ‘imperfect apatheia’. The fact that he can possess sufficient apatheia to be able to allow a demon to linger in order to observe it, but that he might nonetheless find that his nous becomes muddled such that he needs to reflect upon his experiences afterwards, reveals much about Evagrius’ understanding of apatheia, as will be dis-
cussed below. The epistemic clarity that apatheia bestows in relation to the warfare with the demons is summarised at Praktikos 83:

"Ὁ νοῦς τὸν ἐμπαθὴ πόλεμον πολεμῶν οὗ θεωρήσει τοὺς λόγους τοῦ πολέμου· τῷ γὰρ ἐν νυκτὶ μαχομένῳ ἐδοκεῖν ἀπάθειαν δὲ κτησάμενος, ῥαδίως ἐπιγνώσεται τὰς μεθοδείας τῶν πολεμίων." 332

When the nous is engaged in the warfare of the pathē it cannot contemplate the logoi of the warfare, for it is like one who fights in the night. But when it has acquired apatheia, it will easily recognise the artifices of the enemy.333

The treatise On Thoughts consists almost entirely of extended discussions of different applications of observation and inner watchfulness. Several examples have already been discussed: Chapter 1, which describes the relationship between the demons, 334 Chapter 8, which describes how to distinguish between thoughts of angelic, human and demonic provenance; 335 Chapter 21, which describes how one sort of logismos can lead to another; 336 Chapter 25, which describes how the nous receives noēmata and how it assumes agency within the logismoi, 337 and Chapter 41, which discusses the imprinting of the nous by noēmata and describes how to discern the spiritual significance of biblical imagery. 338 In the latter, as elsewhere, Evagrius makes explicit his reader’s role as a fellow investigator:

"ζητήσεις εἴπερ ώς ἔχει ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων καὶ τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν· καὶ ἄλλος μὲν τυπωθήσεται ὁ νοῦς ὀρών νοῦν, καὶ ἄλλος διατεθήσεται ὀρών τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ." 339

you shall investigate whether it is indeed the same for incorporeals and their logoi as it is for bodies and their logoi, and whether the nous will receive impres-

332 Prakt. 83.
333 Cf. Eph. 6:11; Sch. 372 on Prov. 31:11, ‘such a one shall stand in no need of fine spoils’: ‘When we have vanquished the opposing power we ‘despoil’ her in learning her logoi’ (νικήσαντες τὴν ἀντικειμένην δύναμιν σκολεόσουν αὐὴν τοὺς περὶ αὐτῆς λόγους μανθάνοντες).
334 See above, 2.1.4.1, 2.
335 See above, 2.1.1.
336 See above, 2.1.4.2.
337 See above, 2.1.1.
338 See above, 1.2.1.1.
339 Th. 41. 20-4; cf., e.g., Th. 25.3-5: ‘My own proof in most cases is the heart of my reader, especially if it possesses understanding and experience in the monastic life’ (ἐμὴ… ἀπόδειξις ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῦ ἀναγνώσκοντός ἡστι καρδία, καὶ τοῦτο εἰ συνετὴ ἐμὴ καὶ τοῦ μοναδικοῦ βίου πεπεραμένη).
Chapter 19 of On Thoughts includes a detailed description of the cultivation and application of discernment in relation to experiences of logismoi:

When one of the enemies approaches and wounds you and you want to ‘turn his own sword back against his heart’, according to the scripture text, then do as we tell you. Distinguish within yourself the logismos that he has launched against you, as to what it is, how many elements it consists of, and among these what sort of thing it is that most affects the nous. This is an example of what I am talking about. Suppose the logismos of avarice is sent by him; distinguish within this logismos the nous that received it, the noēma of gold, the gold itself, and the pathos of avarice; then ask which of these elements is a sin. Is it the nous? But how? It is the image of God. But how can it be the noēma of gold? And who in his right mind would ever say this? Does the gold itself constitute a sin? Then for what purpose was it created? It follows therefore that the fourth element is the cause of the sin, namely, that which is not an object with substantial subsistence, nor the noēma of an object, nor even the incorporeal nous, but a pleasure hostile to humanity, born of self-determination, and compelling the nous to make improper use of the creatures of God: it is the law of God that has been entrusted with circumcising this pleasure. As you engage in this careful examination, the

340 Th. 19.1-23.
logismos will be destroyed and dissipate in its own consideration, and the demon will flee from you when your dianoia has been raised to the heights by this knowledge.

This passage comprises a set of clear, step-by-step instructions by which a temptation can be dissolved through using reason to deconstruct its constituent logismoi. Instructions like this can make it possible, even when the nous is ‘sprinkled with dust’, to muster the resources of the logistikon to drive back the encroaching pathos. The monk to whom this passage is addressed will, again, already have some experience in dealing with the logismoi, and, realising that he is being tempted by a logismos of avarice, will wish not merely to banish it but to dissolve it altogether by disentangling its different elements and thereby isolating its affective component and revealing it for what it is – an illusion, an ‘object without substantial subsistence’ – that depends for its appearance of reality upon his collaboration; specifically, upon his assent to the pleasure that it evokes in him. If this promise of pleasure is subtracted from the logismos then, the logismos having been defused, the remaining elements – the nous, the noëma of gold and gold itself – freed from its obfuscating effects, can, as objects of apathēs cognition, be seen for what they are. As Linge explains,

The purpose of discernment is to recognise the temptations and weaken their influence by means of an analytical understanding of what is happening to one…detached observation of one’s mental processes enables one to remain tranquil and focused, so that the passions are no longer aroused and one is no longer “drawn into” one’s thoughts as they arise. The ascetic who cultivates the art of discernment is thus learning to break the affective power of his mental content.\footnote{Linge (2000: 556).}

The examples considered so far have focused upon the application of watchfulness and discernment to situations of actual or potential temptation, but basing himself upon John 10:1-18 he also recommends that we assume the role of shepherd in relation to our noëmata in general:

Τὰ νοήματα τοῦ αἰώνος τούτου ὁ κύριος καθάπερ πρόβατά τινα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ποιμένι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ παρέδωκε ... συζεῦξας αὐτῷ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν πρὸς βοήθειαν, ἵνα διὰ μὲν τοῦ θυμοῦ φυγαδεύῃ τὰ τῶν λύκων νοήματα, διὰ δὲ τῆς

\footnote{Linge (2000: 556).}
The Lord has confided to the human person the noēmata of this age, like sheep to a good shepherd... For assistance he has yoked to him thumos and epithumia so that through the thumos he may put to flight the noēmata that are the wolves and through the epithumia he may love the sheep, even if he is often cast about by the rains and the winds. In addition to these things he has also given him ‘a pasturage’ so that he may pasture the sheep, and ‘a verdant place and water for refreshment’, ‘a harp and a lyre’, and ‘a rod and staff’ in order that from this flock he may have nourishment and clothing and that ‘he may gather the mountain grass’, for scripture says, ‘Who pastures a flock and does not feed on its milk?’ Therefore the anchorite must guard this little flock night and day, lest any of the noēmata be taken by a wild beast or fall prey to thieves; and if ever something like this should happen in the wooded glen, he must immediately snatch it from the mouth of the lion and the bear.

Recalling the distinctions of On Thoughts 8, the noēmata that are ‘sheep’ will comprise, firstly, ‘angelic’ noēmata – namely noēmata of logoi, and, secondly, ‘human’ noēmata – namely, noēmata of objects that, being free of pathos, can form the basis for spiritual investigation. The ‘wolves’ correspond to ‘demonic’ noēmata, meaning that they are empathê, having pathos ‘yoked together with’ (συνεζευγμένα) them. We are to assume active responsibility for our ‘flock’ – that is, for our mental content – using discernment to identify different noēmata and then treating them accordingly. Those that are ‘sheep’ can provide us with nourishment, whether directly, as with angelic noēmata,
or indirectly, as the basis for spiritual investigation, as with human noēmata. By means of epithumia we are to love the ‘sheep’, and by means of thumos, to drive away the ‘wolves’. But while this will be the action according to nature of these parts of the soul, they will not always maintain it but will sometimes slip back into pathos and so become sources of ‘rains and winds’. The ‘grass and water’ symbolise praktikē and knowledge, the ‘food’ for the ‘sheep’. The lyre again symbolises praktikē, and the harp, ‘the pure nous moved by spiritual knowledge.’ The ‘rod and staff’ are the chastisements that guide the sinner back to goodness, and the mountain grass ‘knowledge of the holy powers that correspond to the irrational state of souls’ (ἁξκόδνπζα ηῆ ἀινγσηέξαη ἡ῵λ ςπρ῵λ θαηαζηάζεη)

353 Cf. Sch. 2 on Ps. 32:2; Sch. 2 on Ps. 91:4; Sinkewicz (2003: 269, n.24). Note that the pure – that is, apathēs nous – is said to be ‘moved’; see above, 1.1.2; 3.1.
355 Sch. 341 on Prov. 27:25.

This discussion has revealed the centrality to, and ubiquity within, Evagrius’ spirituality of inner watchfulness, and in particular, its relation to apatheia: as noted above, and for reasons which should now be clear, continual vigilance is essential to both the attainment and the preservation of apatheia.

It was noted in connection with Evagrius’ advice regarding the demon of wandering that the mental and emotional stability that allow someone to observe a demon while being tempted by it is apatheia. So far so good – we know from Praktikos 6 that it is not up to us (ἐθ’ ἟κῖλ) whether or not the logismoi trouble the soul but only whether or not they linger and arouse pathos. The monk who feels able to allow a demon to linger in order to observe it must have some confidence in his ability to resist the arousal of pathos, from which it follows that he has to some extent attained apatheia. But the fact that his nous might become ‘muddled’ under the influence of the demon, such that he is unable to ‘see accurately what is happening’ reveals that to some extent he remains vulnerable to pathos. I stated above that this shows that he has attained what Evagrius calls ‘imperfect apatheia’. This is something he only refers to once, in Chapter 60 of the Praktikos:

Page 247 of 268
Perfect apathēia emerges in the soul after the victory over all the demons that oppose praktikē. Imperfect apathēia refers to the relative strength of the demon still fighting against it.

To be imperfectly apathēs, then, is to have a degree of apatheia, measurable by the extent to which one remains vulnerable to pathos. If one recalls that apatheia involves not just emotional stability, cognitive acuity and complete freedom from sexual desire, but also freedom from the desire for food or drink, it becomes clear that perfect apatheia will, normally at least, be more or less short-lived, and that accordingly talk about apatheia in a dispositional rather than occurrent sense will tend to be about imperfect or partial apatheia.

---

356 Prakt. 60.
357 This will, however, be at least partially dependent upon the physiology of fasting.
358 Evagrius occasionally uses the term metriopatheia; to be precise, it occurs five times in his writings: four in the Scholia on Psalms (Sch. 4 on Ps. 2:12; 8 on Ps. 49:17; 5 on Ps. 93:12; 29 on Ps. 118:65-6) and one in the Scholia on Proverbs (Sch. 3 on Prov. 1:2); cf. Géhin (1987: 93). The evidence suggests that he associates it with the process of training the soul to become apathēs. To begin with, in each of his uses of the term metriopatheia it is modified by pathōn and the resulting expression, metriopatheia pathōn, equated with instruction, paideia, or to instruct, paideōein; Géhin (1987: 93), supposes the association of metriopatheia with paideia, which is also found at Strom. 2:8.39.4-5, to have been traditional. This formula is also implied by his sole use of the finite verb metriopatheōn, where it is associated with paideōein; cf. Sch. 3 on Ps. 22:4. The modification of metriopatheia by pathōn implies its co-existence with pathos; meaning that to be metriopathēs must be still to have pathē. In addition, the process of training the soul to become apathēs consists in the gradual acquisition of control over the pathē. This means that it is a process of modifying them under the influence of reason: in other words, of acquiring metriopatheia pathōn. There are, therefore, a priori grounds for supposing that for Evagrius metriopatheia is the incomplete mastery of the pathē that constitutes an interim stage on the way to attaining apatheia; cf. Géhin (1987: 93). That Evagrius regards metriopatheia and apatheia as distinct concepts - pace Suzuki (2009: 605) - is clear from the fact that in two places he refers to them both, namely Sch. 5 on Ps. 93:12 and 29 on Ps. 118:65-6. Both are most naturally read as indicating that metriopatheia pathōn relates to the process that leads to apatheia. Sch. 5 on Ps. 93:12 reads: 'Whoever the Lord loves, he instructs, says the Apostle; and if whoever he instructs, he blesses, every person instructed by him will become apathēs, for the Lord loves him, for metriopatheia pathōn is instruction.' («Ὁ θεὸς δὲ ἐστιν ἐκ τῆς ἀπάθειας γυνῆς λογικῆς, διὰ τοῦ πνευματικοῦ νόμου προσγειωμένης χρηστότητι δὲ ἐστιν γεώς ἀληθῆς τού γεγονότοιν ὑπὸ Θεοῦ· παιδεία δὲ μετριοπάθεια παθῶν· γνώσεις δὲ ἐστιν ἡ θεωρία τῆς Τριάδος). At Sch. 8 on Ps. 49:17 we read simply, 'But you hated instruction...instruction is metriopatheia pathōn (Σὺ δὲ ἐμήσησας παιδείαν, κ. τ. ἐ. Παιδεία ἐστι μετριοπάθεια παθῶν), and at Sch. 4 on Ps. 2:12: 'Paideia is
Attainment of apatheia, then, is a gradual process, and this makes sense if we recall that it consists in replacing the disposition to pathos with the disposition to be free from pathos. This replacement will be cumulative, in that the stronger the disposition to apatheia becomes, the less likely the person will be to succumb to fresh pathos, meaning that the disposition to apatheia will in turn be further strengthened. During this process, apatheia will be attained and lost again countless times, hence Evagrius warns that ‘those who have been deemed worthy of apatheia’ remain vulnerable to the ‘spite of the devil’ whereby they can fall. This explains his reference in relation to our ‘shepherd-herding’ of our noēmata to our using our epithumia and thumos to love the ‘sheep’ and drive away the ‘wolves’ respectively, but their also being often a source of ‘rains and winds’. When they are loving the ‘sheep’ and driving away the ‘wolves’, they are acting according to nature, meaning that the soul is apathēs, but when they are a source of ‘rains and winds’ then it has fallen back into empatheia.

From the fact that apatheia is for all intents and purposes usually imperfect – in other words, that apatheia admits of degrees – it follows that the various conditions that are in

metriopathēs, which tends naturally to result from the praktikē. For the praktikē is spiritual teaching purifying the pathētikon part of the soul’ (Παιδεία ἐζηηλ μετριοπάθεια παθῶν ὅτι συμβάλλεται πόρους ἐκ τῆς πρακτικῆς ἢ γι' ἀναλογούμενος πνευματική, το παθητικόν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαρίζεται). Finally, at Sch. 3 on Prov. 1:2 we read: ‘And wisdom is knowledge of corporeals and incorporeals and the contemplation in them of judgment and providence; instruction is metriopathēs pathôn seen around the pathētikon and irrational part of the soul. (Ḳαὶ σοφία μὲν ἐτούτῳ γνώνοις σωμάτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐν τούτῳ θεορούμενης κρίσεως καὶ προνοίας: παιδεία ἐστὶν μετριοπάθεια παθῶν περὶ το παθητικὸν ἢ ἂλογον τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος θεορουμένη). Although the latter two (indeed, three) could be understood as making metriopathēs synonymous with apatheia, they can also be read as supporting the two-stage picture. Therefore the most plausible interpretation of the evidence is that for Evagrius as for Philo, and also Plotinus, metriopathēs is an interim stage on the way to apatheia, wherein the tendency to pathos is being brought under control but has yet to be fully overcome; cf. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation 3.129-44, ed. L. Cohn, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 1 (Berlin,1896); Clement, Strom. 2:8.39.4-5; 6:9.74.2-5; Plotinus, Enn. 1.2.2-6, ed. P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer, Plotini opera, vol. 1 (Leiden, 1951). In this case metriopathēs is, for Evagrius, the same thing as ‘imperfect apatheia’. However, his reason for preferring the term apatheia to metriopathēs becomes clear if we recall that the latter term was used by the Platonists and Peripatetics (cf. Diogenes Laertius 5.31; Albinus, Isagoge, p.184, 24) with the sense that ‘at least some of the pathē are natural and appropriate’ (Frede, 1986: 93), such that the aim of the wise man was to ‘moderate his pathē’ so that he had only those that it was reasonable to have; in other words, to become metriopathēs. As we have seen, Evagrius regards all pathē as symptoms of the soul’s fallen estate and distance from God and therefore as unnatural and inappropriate by definition, hence a term which could be taken to imply something less would have been unacceptable to him.

359 Cf. Wis. 2:24.
360 Sch. 46 on Eccl. 6:1-6.
dependency relations to it, for example empatheia, psychological health, virtue and love – also admit of degrees. So just as a person can be more or less apathēs, she can be more or less empathēs, psychologically healthy, virtuous and in a condition of love. In turn, it follows that she will be more or less capable of contemplation and knowledge of God. On a good day she will be more apathēs, with everything that follows from that, and on a bad day, less so. Apatheia and empatheia are, accordingly, best understood as termini of a continuum of affectivity, along which one’s position can change, perhaps on a daily basis, perhaps on an hourly one, perhaps less, perhaps more. We can imagine a middle point on that continuum, to one side of which are the many degrees of apatheia, starting with the most imperfect and leading to the most perfect, and, on the other side, the corresponding degrees of empatheia. That there is a point at which apatheia and empatheia merge into one another, that both are matters of degree and that we can move between them any number of times, are all expressions of the mutability and movement that characterise corporeal creation. In particular, since apatheia and empatheia are properties of the soul, their fluidity in relation to one another, and the fluidity of our experience of them, reflects the fact that movement and change are intrinsic to soul.

So can perfect apatheia ever be attained during earthly life; that is, can a person ever find herself right at the apatheia end of the continuum of affectivity? I see no reason to suppose that it cannot,\(^361\) nor, pace Rasmussen, that in earthly life it can only be attained during prayer.\(^362\) Nor is there any logical reason why it cannot become permanent during earthly life. There is, however, overwhelming metaphysical reason, in that sooner or later the body is bound to recall our attention.\(^363\) In any case, it could never be assumed that a state of apatheia currently being enjoyed would endure permanently. At the apokatastasis, however, perfect apatheia will be permanent, because for the pathē there will one day be complete destruction.\(^364\) It follows that imperfect apatheia can never be permanent.\(^365\)

\(^{361}\) Hence I am in agreement with Bunge (1986: 125); Linge (2000: 563), and Rasmussen (2005: 159), pace Guillaumont (1989: 27).


\(^{363}\) Although again this would depend upon the physiology of fasting.

\(^{364}\) Cf. Prakt. 87.

\(^{365}\) Pace Rasmussen (2005: 159).
There remains one last aspect to discuss of the gradual nature of the attainment of apatheia. We have seen that in both the Prologue to the Praktikos and at Praktikos 81 Evagrius describes love as the ‘offspring’ of apatheia. Yet elsewhere he speaks of love as preceding apatheia:

\[
\'Αναχώρησις ἐν ἀγάπῃ καθαίρει καρδίαν, \\
\'Αναχώρησις δὲ μετὰ μίσους ἐκπαράσσει αὐτήν.\]

Anachoresis in love purifies the heart; anachoresis in hate agitates it.

Since purity of heart is apatheia, if love purifies the heart then love must come before apatheia, so how can it also be its ‘offspring’? The answer should by now be clear. As apatheia is gradually attained, so too is love, and just as the attainment of apatheia is cumulative, so too is that of love. So the more the anchorite progresses in apatheia, the more his anachoresis will be informed by love, which in turn will help him progress further in apatheia – in other words, a virtuous circle will operate. The question of whether love or apatheia ultimately comes first in the chronology of the spiritual ascent is moot, and they are probably best thought of as going hand in hand:

The following passage summarises the relation of love to the virtues and to apatheia and reminds us that joy as well as love is intrinsic to Evagrian apatheia. The ‘intelligible sun’, it will be recalled, is ‘the rational nature which contains in itself the first and blessed light’ in which are encompassed knowledge, love and all of the virtues, while the sun is also a symbol of Christ, the ‘sun of righteousness’. The ‘light that shines into the heavens’ is that of the pure nous, the image of God:

\[
Πιστοὶ οὖν εἶναι τῇ ἠλπείᾳ σπουδάσωμεν, ἵνα καὶ εἰς τὴν μητρόπολιν τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀγάπην προκόπτωμεν, ὡς ἡμίος ταῖς χρυσανγέσιν ἀκτίνι γάτῃ προσμεινὰ θῇ γῇ, οὕτως ἀγάπη ταῖς φωταγέσι προάσιν ἀπάσῃ προσχάρει ψυχή ἤπειρ ἐὰν κατάσχωμεν, τὰ πάθη ἐσβέσαμεν καὶ εἰς οὐρανοῦς ἐλάμψαμεν.\]

366 AM 8.
367 KG 3.44; see above, 3.2.
368 Mal. 3:20; see above, 3.2.
369 Eul. 30.32.
Let us hasten then to be faithful in the truth that we may advance to love, the metropolis of the virtues. As the sun smiles upon the entire earth with its gleaming golden rays, so love with its luminescent actions gives joy to the entire soul. If we have indeed acquired love, we have extinguished the pathē and have let our light shine into the heavens.

3.5 Summary: *apatheia* in the teachings of Evagrius Ponticus

This chapter began by establishing that, strictly speaking, the subject of *apatheia* is the tripartite soul considered as a whole. Section 3.1 then argued for the proposition, first noted in Chapter One, that *apatheia* is the stable movement of the soul,\(^\text{370}\) that is, its movement toward God, and also noted several proofs of *apatheia* mentioned by Evagrius.

Section 3.2 considered *apatheia* as ‘death and resurrection.’ As virtue and purity of soul *apatheia* is the ‘death’ of the ‘old self’ with its immersion in sensible reality and impure desires. Since the purification of the soul involves rising above the body’s ‘nature’, ‘movements’ and ‘attributes’ *apatheia* is also the ‘death’ of the ‘corruptible body’, the *sōma psuchikon*. As the ‘death’ of the ‘old self’ and ‘corruptible body’ *apatheia* functions as a fortification by protecting its possessor from the assaults of the *logismoi*, since although she will still experience them, insofar as she is *apathēs* she will be immune to their potential attractions; in other words, the soul of the *apathēs* will ‘derive no evil from its flesh.’ As the ‘death’ of the ‘corruptible body’ *apatheia* is the basis for its ‘resurrection’ in the form of the ‘spiritual body’, the *sōma pneumatikon*, and so of incorruptibility. This ‘resurrection’ is jointly constituted by the ‘resurrections’ of the body, the soul and the *nous* as ‘body and soul are raised to the order of the *nous*’ and the *nous* is thereby re-unified. The re-unified *nous* or ‘spiritual body’ ‘glows like the sun’ since it ‘contains in itself the first and blessed light.’

Section 3.3 began by noting Evagrius’ characterisation of this ‘triple resurrection’ with reference to the ‘bond of peace’ which is *apatheia* in the form of its ‘positive aspect’, love. The *apathēs* was seen to be the ‘new self’ in whom the healing of the internal di-

\(^{370}\) See above, 1.1.2.
visions of the *nous* by the ‘physician of souls’ is matched by the healing of external di-
visions, and that accordingly true *apatheia* consists not in the absence of desire but in
seeing all people as ‘messengers of God’ and loving them like oneself. It was then noted
that through love *apatheia* makes knowledge possible, not only that of transcendent re-
alities but also practical moral knowledge, the exercise of which extends to our interior
worlds such that, no longer seeing the world solely in terms of her desires and on their
basis constituting *kata dianoian* fictional worlds in which they can be satisfied, the
*apathēs* conducts herself virtuously within as well as without. This means that her *nous*
becomes freed from ‘domestic disturbance’ and so enabled to ascend, by means of con-
templation and prayer, the ‘ladder’ of corporeal creation back to union with God, in
which process it becomes ‘completely like light.’

To this description of *apatheia* can now be added the findings of Section 1.2.2 regard-
ing the action according to nature of the three parts of the soul, which, it was noted at
the time, amounted to a description of the *apathēs* soul. In the *apathēs* – that is, healthy
– soul, the function of the rational part was seen to be contemplation, along with the
management of practical affairs so as to facilitate it, which can now be seen to include
the practical moral knowledge bestowed by *apatheia*, and also inner watchfulness and
the ‘shepherding’ of the *noēmata*. The *thumos* likewise has a dual function: on the one
hand to struggle on the soul’s behalf against the demons using anger along with virtues
such as courage and perseverance, and on the other hand, to be a source of love, gentles-
ness, patience, mildness and humility. The preserve of the *epithumētikon* was seen to be
spiritual desire, together with temperance, self-control and chastity.

Section 3.4 completed the picture of *apatheia* by summarising how it is attained, noting
that some aspects of this had already been covered in the course of previous discussions,
while others would be passed over. It then focused on the cultivation of inner watchful-
ness and discernment, which was seen to be essential both to the attainment of *apatheia*
and to its preservation. It noted that this consists not only in various forms of vigilance
in respect of demonic attack or predispositions to particular *pathē*, but also in the need
for the rational part of the soul to assume the role of the ‘good shepherd’ in respect of
the *noēmata*, aided by the *epithumētikon* and *thumos*. After this Evagrius’ distinction
between ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ *apatheia* was discussed and it was noted that perfect
apathēia will tend to be relatively short-lived and that consequently talk about apathēia in a dispositional rather than occurrent sense will normally be about imperfect apathēia. Then the gradual and cumulative nature of attainment of apathēia was discussed. Finally it was noted that as well as being a consequence and proof of the attainment of apathēia, love is also essential to the process of attaining it, a dual role that reflects the gradual nature of that process.

In sum, Evagrian apathēia is, in spiritual terms, the orientation of the soul toward God, and in psychological terms, stability. It endows its possessor with peace, spiritual pleasure and joy; is constituted by the virtues, and is manifested above all as spiritual love and knowledge.
The concept of *apatheia* is central to the teachings of Evagrius Ponticus. This thesis has examined that concept by situating it within its cosmological context as well as by analysing it in anthropological, psychological and spiritual terms.

The first section focused upon Evagrius’ cosmology. It began by outlining his vision of the creation and fall of the *logikoi* and of the hierarchical structure and therapeutic nature of corporeal creation. The centrality of movement to his schema was remarked, stable movement being movement toward God, and unstable movement, movement away from him, and it was noted that he construes *apatheia* as the stable movement of the soul. His understanding of corporeal creation as a ‘ladder’ upon which the fallen *noes* can, by means of transformative contemplation, ascend back to union with God, was described, along with his likening of corporeal creation to a ‘letter’ from God to the fallen *noes*, which is ‘read’ by means of contemplation. It was noted that *apatheia* is the stable movement of the soul, and the foundation for, and a necessary condition of, the contemplative ascent. The anthropology section began by focusing on the *nous*. It discussed the origin and scope of its passibility, seeing how this is manifested in both epistemic and metaphysical contexts, the causal interdependence of which were noted, and also the true nature of the *nous* as the incorporeal image of the incorporeal God. The following section described the three parts of the soul in terms of their action according to nature and thereby comprised a *de facto* description of the *apatheis* soul. Next Evagrius’ understanding of the body was examined and it was argued that he believes *pathos* to have a physical foundation in the form of excessive vital heat, and that accordingly the elimination of this by dietary restriction constitutes the physical foundation of *apatheia* and also the means by which the *krasis* of the body, and so the body itself, is transformed, a transformation which is both the foundation for and the correlate of the contemplative transformation of the soul. It was remarked that because of the effects of this upon the body a distinction between ‘spiritual’ and ‘profane’ understandings of physical health is implicit in Evagrius’ thought. The chapter concluded by considering what Evagrius means by the term ‘heart’, since ‘purity of heart’ is one of his characterisations of *apatheia*.
Chapter Two focused upon the psychology and phenomenology of *empathēia*, the sickly condition of the soul which, on Evagrius’ analysis, is our lot until we restore it to *apatheia*, its health and our natural state. It began by looking at the *logismoi*, asking what Evagrius means by this term, noting the broad scope with which he endows it but that *logismoi* always have *pathos* embedded in them, and proposing a definition of the term *logismos* in his usage, before explaining Evagrius’ concept of the ‘matter’ of the *logismoi*. Next came a consideration of his eightfold classification of ‘most generic *logismoi*’. First each *logismos* was considered in turn, and a number of examples cited from the *Antirrhētikos*. This revealed the sort of phenomena that Evagrius regards as *pathē* and, and also how the *logismoi* destabilise the movements of the soul, this destabilisation being the psychological expression of excessive vital heat. Then Evagrius’ rationale for the sequence of the eightfold classification was examined, first in terms of the derivation of the *logismoi* from the parts of the soul, it being concluded that for the most part there is no straightforward relation between them and that this reflects the lack of a clear boundary between the cognitive and the affective in Evagrius’ psychology; and, second, in terms of the way in which the *logismoi* are experienced, both day-to-day and through a person’s lifetime, it being concluded that although the sequence is largely conventional, it also maps the progression from the most primitive ways of erring in our interaction with the external world to the most sophisticated. The second part of the chapter focused upon *pathos*. It began with an overview of how *pathos* was understood within Greek philosophy, in particular orthodox Stoicism, and also by Origen, before turning to Evagrius’ understanding of it. It was seen that for him *pathos* is the psychological expression of an excess of vital heat. It involves an attachment to the external world that is excessive and therefore idolatrous and makes the *nous* prey to the multiplicity and changeability of the external world, in consequence of which it is the unstable movement of the soul. It is injurious because it distances us from God, but falls within the scope of our self-determination, hence the possibility of our attaining *apatheia*. The wide range of desires, emotions, moods and other phenomena that Evagrius considers to be *pathē* was noted. It then turned to the cognitive ‘building blocks’ of the *logismoi*, the *empathē noēmata*, examining what they are, how they are formed and how they ‘bind’ the *nous* to the sensible world. The following section focused upon Evagrius’ analysis of the arousal of *pathos*. It was noted that the *logismoi* arise from a disposition to *pathos*, of which three levels were identified, and that the longer a person
allows a logismos to linger in his awareness the more likely it is to arouse a fresh epi-
sode of pathos, but that even if it does so he still retains the capacity to abstain from act-
ing it out; that is, from sin, whether kata dianoian or kat' energeian. The final section of
Chapter Two described the empathēs nous from an experiential standpoint, noting the
affective and cognitive instability and epistemic distortion that characterise empatheia.

The first two chapters having established the cosmological, anthropological and psycho-
logical contexts of apatheia, Chapter Three focused upon apatheia itself. It began by
establishing that, strictly speaking, the subject of apatheia is the tripartite soul consid-
ered in its entirety. It then established that, as noted in the first chapter, apatheia is the
stable movement of the nous and as such is characterised by gentleness and tranquillity.
It also noted some of the proofs of apatheia mentioned by Evagrius. The second section
then considered apatheia as ‘death’ and ‘resurrection’, starting from its consisting in the
separation of the soul from the body. For Evagrius this means the soul’s raising itself
and the body above the attributes of the latter, such that the person ‘dies’ in respect of
the corruptible sôma psuchikon - her attachments to the external world and the ‘impure
desires’ arising from them; accordingly, apatheia is ‘purity of heart’. Apatheia was seen
to protect its possessor from the logismoi, not because she no longer experiences them
but because they no longer hold any attraction for her. It was also seen to be the starting
point for the cultivation of the ‘spiritual body’; since this is the re-unified nous this is in
fact another way of saying that it is the foundation of the contemplative ascent. Apat-
theia was also seen to bestow phenomenological incorruptibility and immortality – that
is, detachment from the body – and perhaps also a measure of physical incorruptibility
through the alteration of the body’s krasis by means of fasting. Finally, it was noted that
for Evagrius the cultivation of the ‘spiritual body’ is constituted by a ‘triple resurrec-
tion’, namely that of the body, the soul and the nous itself. The third section of Chapter
Three considered apatheia as love and knowledge. It began by noting that another way
in which Evagrius characterises the re-unification of the nous is with reference to the
‘bond of peace’ of Eph. 4:3, that bond being love, the ‘positive aspect’ of apatheia. As a
consequence of love the apathēs was seen to be the “new self” who no longer sees other
people in terms of social categorisations but as ‘angels of God’ whom she ‘loves as her-
self’. The role of faith in the attainment of apatheia was noted. Via love, apatheia was
seen to endow its possessor both with knowledge of transcendent realities and with
practical moral knowledge. The holistic nature of spiritual knowledge as understood by Evagrius was emphasised, a holism consisting partly in love’s being intrinsic to it and partly in its profoundly embodied nature, given that Evagrius’ talk of detaching the soul from the body refers not to the physical body per se but to its corruptible form. The final section of the chapter focused on how apatheia is attained, and in particular on the cultivation of inner watchfulness and discernment. These were seen to be necessary not only in relation to resisting temptation and warding off demonic attack but also in the ‘shepherding’ of the contents of the nous. Then Evagrius’ distinction between ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ apatheia was discussed and the gradual nature of the acquisition of apatheia noted. Finally, it was noted that as well as being an expression of apatheia, love is essential to its attainment.

In sum, Evagrian apatheia involves the whole person - body, soul and nous - in a process of transformation in which psychological and spiritual instability, fragmentation and isolation are replaced by stability and unity, effected by, and manifesting in, love, which in turn both enables, and is partly constitutive of, spiritual knowledge. Despite the deprivations Evagrian askēsis inflicts upon the physical body, he does not devalue the latter; he does, though, construe it in terms of a Platonising metaphysics and anthropology according to which incorporeality is superior to corporeality, and because of this he aims to make the body less ‘corporeal’. However, since what is essential to Evagrian apatheia in respect of the body is the latter’s ‘spiritualisation’ through ‘purification’ rather than the specific form of that purification, it should in principle be possible to reinterpret Evagrian apatheia in terms of a more benign anthropology and a different account of the relation between physiology and psychology without sacrificing anything essential to it. Finally, the profound optimism of Evagrius’ anthropology, given that he believes apatheia to be the natural state of the human being and to be in principle attainable – with God’s help – by anyone, is worthy of note.
Abbreviations

Works by Evagrius

8Th. On the Eight Thoughts
33Ch. Thirty-Three Ordered Chapters
AM To Monks in Monasteries and Communities (Ad Monachos)
AV Exhortation to a Virgin (Ad Virginem)
Ant. Antirrhêtikos
Disc. The Chapters of the Disciples of Evagrius
Ep.Fid. Epistula Fidei
Eul. To Eulogios: On the Confession of Thoughts and Counsel in their Regard
Exh. Exhortations to Monks
Found. Foundations of the Monastic Life: A Presentation of the Practice of Stillness
Gnost. Gnostikos
Gt.Let. Great Letter (Letter to Melania)
KG Kephalaia Gnostika
Let. Letters 1-64
Prakt. Praktikos
Pry. Chapters on Prayer
Rfl. Reflections
Sch. n on Eccl. n:n Scholion (number in Géhin) on Ecclesiastes (chapter: verse)
Sch. n on Prov. n:n Scholion (number in Géhin) on Proverbs (chapter: verse)
Sch. n on Ps. n:n Scholion (number) on Psalms (chapter: verse)
Th. On Thoughts
Vices [To Eulogios] On the Vices opposed to the Virtues

Other Abbreviations

C.Cant. Origen, Commentary on the Song of Songs (Commentarium in Cant. Canticorum)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Author/Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.Matt.</td>
<td>Origen, <em>Commentary on Matthew</em> (<em>Commentarium in evangeliwm Matthaei</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf.</td>
<td>Cassian, <em>Conferences</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confess.</td>
<td>Augustine, <em>Confessions</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Aristotle, <em>De Anima</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Aristotle, <em>On the Movement of Animals</em> (<em>De Motu Animalium</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Origen, <em>On First Principles</em> (<em>De Principiis</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Opf.</td>
<td>Gregory of Nyssa, <em>De opificio hominis</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>Aristotle, <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em> (<em>Ethica Nicomachea</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ench.</td>
<td>Epictetus, <em>Enchiridion</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enn.</td>
<td>Plotinus, <em>Enneads 1-9</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorg.</td>
<td>Plato, <em>Gorgias</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL</td>
<td>Palladius, <em>Historia Lausiaca</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS</td>
<td>Long &amp; Sedley, <em>The Hellenistic Philosophers</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Met.</td>
<td>Aristotle, <em>Metaphysics</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phd.</td>
<td>Plato, <em>Phaedo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phdr.</td>
<td>Plato, <em>Phaedrus</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHP</td>
<td>Galen, <em>On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato</em> (<em>De placentis Hippocratis et Platonis</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>Plato, <em>Republic</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strom.</td>
<td>Clement of Alexandria, <em>Stromateis</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVF</td>
<td>H von Arnim, <em>Stoicorum veterum fragmenta</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symp.</td>
<td>Plato, <em>Symposium</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theaet.</td>
<td>Plato, <em>Theaetetus</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tim.</td>
<td>Plato, <em>Timaeus</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLG</td>
<td><em>Thesaurus Linguae Grecae</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Athanasius, <em>Life of Antony</em> (<em>Vita Antonii</em>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works of Evagrius
Bamberger, J E, Evagrius Ponticus: The Praktikos, Chapters on Prayer, Kalamazoo 1981


Bunge, G, Evagrios Pontikos: Briefe aus der Wüste, Trier 1985

Casiday, A M, Evagrius Ponticus, London 2006

Driscoll, J, OSB, Evagrius Ponticus: Ad Monachos, New York 2003

Dysinger, L, OSB, Kephalaia Gnostika, also selected letters, at www.ldysinger.com/Evagrius/


- Évagre le Pontique: Le gnostique, Paris 1989


Muyldermans, J, Evagriana Syriaca: Tests inédits du British Museum et de la Vaticane, Louvain 1952

Sinkewicz, R, Evagrius of Pontus: The Greek Ascetic Corpus, Oxford 2003

Other works cited or consulted

Annas, J E, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, Berkeley 1992

Arnin, H von, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, Leipzig 1903-5

- (ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1970


- Satlow, M L, and Weitzman, S (edd.), *Religion and the Self in Antiquity*, Bloomington 2005


Brenton, S C L, *The Septuagint with Apocrypha: Greek and English*, London 1986


- *The Theaetetus of Plato*, Indianapolis 1990


- *Origen: On First Principles*, Gloucester 1973
Chitty, D J, *The Desert a City: An Introduction to the Study of Egyptian and Palestinian Monasticism under the Christian Empire*, Crestwood 1977
Clarke, E, *The Origenist Controversy*, Princeton 1992
De Lacy, P, *Corpus medicorum Graecorum*, vol. 4.1-80
- *Steps to Spiritual Perfection: Studies on Spiritual Progress in Evagrius Ponticus*, Mahwah 2005
Dysinger, L, OSB, *Psalmody and Prayer in the Writings of Evagrius Ponticus*, Oxford 2005


Greer, R A (trans.), *Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer, First Principles: Book IV, Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Homily XXVII on Numbers*, Mahwah, New Jersey, 1979


- *Un philosophe au désert: Évagre le Pontique*, Paris 2004


- *Plotinus, or Simplicity of Vision*, Chicago 1998


- *What is Ancient Philosophy?*, Harvard 2004


- *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*, Oxford 1969
  Kannengiesser, C, and Peterson, W L (edd.), *Origen of Alexandria: His World and His Legacy*, Notre Dame 1988
  Knuuttila, S, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford 2004
  Layton, R A, *Didymus the Blind and His Circle in Late-Antique Alexandria*, Urbana 2004
  Luckman, H A, and Kulzer, L (edd.), *Purity of Heart in Early Ascetic and Monastic Literature*, Collegeville 1999
  - *Gregory of Nyssa*, London 1999

Page 265 of 268


- “New Questions concerning the Origenism of Evagrius” in Daly, R J (ed.), *Origeniana Quinta*, Leuven 1992


Ramsussen, M S B, “Like a Rock or like God? The Concept of *apatheia* in the Monastic Theology of Evagrius of Pontus”, *Studia Theologica* 59 (2005), pp.147-162

Reydams-Schils, G J, *Plato’s Timaeus as Cultural Icon*, Notre Dame 2003


Rowe, C J (ed.), *Plato: Phaedo*, Cambridge 1993


- Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy, London 1996
Shay, J, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character, New York 1995
Sihvola, J & Engberg-Pederson, T (edds.), The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, Dordrecht 1998
Stead, C, Philosophy in Christian Antiquity, Cambridge 1994
Trigg, J W, Origen, London 1998
“‘Tempted as we are’: Christology and the Analysis of the Passions”, Opening Lecture at the Fifteenth Oxford International Conference on Patristic Studies, to be published in *Studia Patristica*, vols. 44-49 (2010)

Wimbush, V L (ed.), *Ascetic Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity: A Sourcebook*, Minneapolis 1990