THE PRODUCTION OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN PARTNERSHIP WITH COMMUNITIES: DOES PARTICIPATION MAKE OWNERS?

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DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS IS SUBMITTED:
PHD IN PLANNING STUDIES
Declaration: I, (Paivi) Inkeri Auramaa, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own.

Where information is derived from other sources, I confirm that this is indicated in the thesis

Signature: [Signature]

Inkeri Auramaa
THE PRODUCTION OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN PARTNERSHIP WITH COMMUNITIES: DOES PARTICIPATION MAKE OWNERS?

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

The thesis analyses power relations between local government, CSOs and communities in partnerships for service production. It studies community members’ agency in a temporal dimension and identifies those structures that constrain their interaction. It focuses on community members’ own interpretations of the impact of those structures with the intention of informing development practice on how potential changes in partnership relationships can influence sustainability, expressed through community members’ sense of ownership.

The thesis surveys analytical factors influencing partnership dynamics applying a conceptual model. The model helps to understand the interface between partners as well as the character and transformation of the interventions over time. Second, it studies individual community members’ agency: their capacity to exercise power through participation and the manner in which marginalizing structures prevailing in the community enable and constrain residents’ agency. The consequent implications of the transformation of their agency on the outcome are analysed by employing the theory ‘dialectic of control’ from Anthony Giddens’ ‘Structuration Theory’ and tested by field research carried out in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The research was grounded on qualitative methodology.

The empirical research revealed that partnerships were successful in improving living conditions. However, accountability and power relations tended to transform and social, political and financial constraints circumscribed community members’ agency. Their narratives provided evidence that confining their agency during implementation reduces their social distance to the outcome perceived as a sense of ownership, even though they had fully participated during planning. Partnership itself was governed by the conflicting underpinnings of neo-liberal cost-sharing and neo-populist participation. In addition, the field research suggested that community members disassociated themselves from CBOs, questioning the assumed geographically-based definition of communities, CBO’s legitimacy and imposed representative role that they saw as part of an external hegemonic structure. This led to the division of communities and reduction of social capital.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This PhD research has been a lengthy process, which not only culminated in this thesis but also shaped considerably my life. My decision to interrupt a successful professional career and invest in PhD research might not have been very rational but in retrospect it has been amazing and stimulating time. I got to learn so much and got to know countless wonderful people, many of whom have contributed to the production of this thesis.

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Inkeri Auramaa

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<tr>
<td>ACHR</td>
<td>Asian Coalition for Community Action (CSO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BESSIP</td>
<td>Basic Education Sector Support Programme, Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bongo</td>
<td>Dar es Salaam (a nickname)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>An international NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCI</td>
<td>Centre for Community Initiatives (CSO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi (political party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Christian Council of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>The Ha(n)na Na(s)sif Community Development Association (CBO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>The Ha(n)na Na(s)sif Community Development Committee (CBO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIP</td>
<td>Community Infrastructure Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIUP</td>
<td>Community Infrastructure Upgrading Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>Community</td>
</tr>
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<td>COSTECH</td>
<td>Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daladala</td>
<td>local minibus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diwani</td>
<td>councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCC</td>
<td>Dar es Salaam City Council; Dar es Salaam City Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPU</td>
<td>Development Planning Unit, UCL</td>
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<td>DSM</td>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-by-D</td>
<td>decentralization by devolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPM</td>
<td>Environmental Planning and Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESAF</td>
<td>Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESSP</td>
<td>Education Sector Support Programme, Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>etc</td>
<td>et cetera (and so on)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONGO</td>
<td>Governmental non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOV</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harambee</td>
<td>(Kenya) joint efforts, to work together, literally: pull together</td>
</tr>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative</td>
</tr>
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<td>IFPRI</td>
<td>the International Food Policy Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>the United Nations International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>KEPA</td>
<td>An international NGO</td>
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<td>KIJICO</td>
<td>Kijitonyama Community Organization (CBO)</td>
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<td>Kijico</td>
<td>Partnership project in Kijitonyama</td>
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<td>KTR</td>
<td>A CBO in Kijitonyama</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least-developed country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG(A)</td>
<td>Local Government Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGCDG</td>
<td>Local government capital development grant</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mfundi/wafundi (pl)</td>
<td>skilled craftsman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mjumbe/Wajumbe(pl)</td>
<td>(local) representative, such as TCLs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKUKUTA</td>
<td>National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLHSD</td>
<td>Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mtaa/mitaa (pl)</td>
<td>sub-ward; literally street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwenyekiti</td>
<td>chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mzee/wazee (pl)</td>
<td>a respected old man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mzungu/wazungu (pl)</td>
<td>(light-skinned) foreigner, white person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIE</td>
<td>New Institutional Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGP</td>
<td>National Income Generation Programme</td>
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<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
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<td>NSGRP</td>
<td>National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty</td>
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<td>O&amp;OD</td>
<td>Opportunities and obstacles to development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Participatory Action Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEDP</td>
<td>Primary Education Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAN Intl</td>
<td>an international NGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>People’s organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMORALG</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORALG</td>
<td>President’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government</td>
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<td>pages</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public Private Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Sector Contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parent-teacher-association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;AWG</td>
<td>Research and Analysis Working Group</td>
</tr>
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<td>RIPS</td>
<td>Rural Integrated Project Support, Mtwara-Lindi</td>
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<td>SACCO</td>
<td>Savings and Credit Co-operative Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shamba</td>
<td>cultivation, field</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
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<td>SDI</td>
<td>Shack/Slum Dwellers International (NGO)</td>
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<td>SDP</td>
<td>Sustainable Dar es Salaam Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serikali ya mtaa/</td>
<td>subward level local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serikali za mitaa (pl)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanzanian/Tanganyika African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>TASAF</td>
<td>Tanzania Social Action Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCL</td>
<td>Ten Cell Leader, Nuymba kumi-kumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Tanzania Episcopal Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSh</td>
<td>Tanzanian Shilling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TzPPA</td>
<td>Tanzania Participatory Poverty Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ujamaa</td>
<td>forced villagisation programme; Tanzanian socialism; literally familyhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLAS</td>
<td>University College of Lands and Architectural Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>Urban Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDSM</td>
<td>University of Dar es Salaam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>the United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCHS</td>
<td>United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (“Habitat”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCAP</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upato</td>
<td>(women’s) savings ring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URT</td>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VO</td>
<td>Voluntary organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waliosoma</td>
<td>educated people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasiosoma</td>
<td>non-educated people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>the World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDO</td>
<td>Ward Development Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEO</td>
<td>Ward Executive Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAMSIF</td>
<td>the Social Investment Fund for Zambia</td>
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The production of infrastructure in partnership with communities: does participation make owners? case study Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to: present the contextual background to the thesis by tracing the historical and political path leading to current compelling problems in service delivery in developing countries; render an overview to the claims that partnerships are a solution to these problems; introduce discourses and theories related to partnership; explain the purpose and objective of the research as well as the way it was conducted; and to describe the theoretical, empirical and methodological contribution of the thesis. At the end, there is an annotated list of chapters to indicate the structure of the thesis and to outline the content of each chapter.

1.2 CONTEXT
This thesis examines partnership as a solution to a lack of basic services in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), particularly in urban areas. At present, many elements contributing to poverty, in particular inadequate service provision, are connected to the weak capacity or even failure of local government (Satterthwaite 2002: 9). A good part of these problems was inherited as a colonial legacy (Chazan et al. 1999; Roberts 1982; Turner and Hulme 1997). Colonial powers left an immense bureaucracy but few skilled technocrats and little capacity to municipal authorities for the construction and maintenance of infrastructure (Hyden 1983). Furthermore, basic services such as water supply networks in colonial cities and towns were constructed mostly in better-off central areas only.

In the 1980s-90s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) following the neo-liberal agenda imposed drastic Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) on developing countries. Their aim was to increase exports by devaluation and deregulation and to cut public spending. Measures such as privatisation, retrenchment of civil servants, cost-recovery of public services and reduction of government social expenditure eased budget constraints but caused “serious deterioration of the living conditions of the poor” (Burgess et al. 1997: 25).

Concomitantly, there was a growing pressure for further democratization and the consolidation of local democracy and decentralisation to reinforce democracy (Pierre and Peters 2000). Civil society organisations (CSOs) were presented as a solution for the increase of local democracy through community participation and for the enhancement of local level performance through the cost-sharing of production of infrastructure (Turner and Hulme 1997). But in practice the relationship between the public sector and CSOs at local level has been antagonistic. Therefore,
new mechanisms have been necessary to bring them closer to each other into a productive and more equal relationship.

Co-operation and in particular partnerships could be conceived as an antidote against the antagonistic relationship. Similarly, they could bridge between local communities and CSOs, municipalities and central government and donors as well as between local government and communities (see for example Johnson and Wilson, 2000; G. White and Robinson, 1998; Elander, 2002). A joint action to increase the capabilities of local governments would produce more and better results than solitary efforts, and create synergy by complementing resources (Otiso 2003). Thus it would increase the capacity to produce urban basic infrastructure in spite of reduced public budgets (for example Polidano et al. 1998). The purpose of this research is to investigate partnership as a solution to dilemmas in service delivery and the aim is to inform development practice about the impact of community members’ agency in partnership on their acquired sense of ownership analysed in a temporal dimension.

1.3 OBJECTIVES, THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH

The concept of partnership has several even contradictory definitions. It is like participation: value-laden, and applied for diverse purposes with different motives (Harrison 2002; Harriss 2000; Peters 1998; Riley and Wakely 2005). It has commonly and misleadingly been used to disguise the real character of the relationship for example when sub-contracting NGOs for the production of services. Recently, a serious concern has emerged about the lax use of the concept of partnership in this sense, which has led to attempts to conceptualize more precisely ‘authentic partnership’ (Riley and Wakely 2005) or ‘genuine partnership’ (this study). This research defines ‘genuine partnership’ which is an ideal; it is an objective towards which partners should endeavour. Partnership should embrace enduring, continuing relationships. In partnership each participant is a principal bargaining on its own behalf.

Partnership is typically established between divergent organisations. Therefore, to enable smooth collaboration, a consensus about partnership mechanisms and agenda need to be reached. Trust and mutualism can help to achieve a consensus, even if and evidently when the original power relationships are not symmetrical. Since partnership does not wipe out the original power relationship between the partners, some partners might try to influence the agendas or priorities of the others (Johnson, and Wilson 2000). Therefore, to aim at genuine partnership, communities’ ability to exercise agency remains a critical issue.
Partnership is a dynamic process that alters in the transition from planning to implementation. The literature review revealed concerns about how communities’ positions can become vulnerable in a time dimension. Partnership is expected to enable community participation, and consequently a sense of ownership has been identified as one of the major benefits of community participation. Hence there is a concern as to how variations in their agency affect their sense of ownership, their social distance from the social process governing partnership and the jointly produced outcome. This leads to the theoretical proposition (hypothesis) that

- Limiting the participation, and thus the agency, of the community members of a partnership for the production of a public good during the implementation stages undermines their (acquired) sense of ownership of the outcome.

Thus, the following research questions are defined:

- To what extent do community agents claim that they had power through participation in the partnership during the planning phase of the infrastructure?
- To what extent do community agents claim that they had power through participation in the partnership during the production of the infrastructure?
- To what extent do community agents demonstrate a ‘sense of ownership’ and how do they perceive that it correlates to the extent of their interpretation of having experienced agency during the production of the infrastructure?

Few models to analyze partnership have been developed. For example, urban regime theory, originally created by Stone (Stone 1989) studied partnership as urban regime in a Western context. White and Robinson (G. White and Robinson 1998: 97) identified diverse partnerships as relationships between the state and CSOs in service provision by analysing their roles. Smith and Beazley (Smith and Beazley 2000) reversed the approach of the analysis and explored the extent of community involvement using the concepts of power, participation and partnership. The problem that arises in this approach is that participation and partnership, two of the studied components are actually dimensions of a third component, power. Thus, partnership still remains insufficiently conceptualized; therefore a conceptual model is developed. It forms the first part of the theoretical framework.

This model synthesises existing models and theories by identifying analytical factors which influence partnerships during their life cycle. Thus, the model depicts inter-relational factors of synergy; trust and reciprocity; accountability and legitimacy; and power which delineate the basis of a partnership. These conceptual variables compel supplementary research questions:
- Do community members claim CBOs representing them enjoyed legitimacy and demonstrated accountability in partnership?
- What kind of synergy was existent in partnership?
- To what extent do community members claim there was trust and reciprocity between them, CBOs and other partners in the partnership?

The main point of departure for the analytical definition of partnership factors and corresponding empirical exploration is the understanding of partnership as a socially constructed process, which allows investigation of the interface between communities, local government and civil society organisations based on social interaction and social interpretation. Consequently, the myth of a community as a homogenous, geographically defined entity is deconstructed (see Cleaver 1999); community based organisations’ (CBOs) legitimacy is interpreted as socially constructed and instead of studying power through collective agency, it is conceptualised as individual community members’ agencies.

The second-part of the theoretical framework explores these individual agencies in relation to the social processes defining the partnership. It investigates the transformation of individual agencies and their relationship with the acquired sense of ownership towards the outcome, thus testing the hypothesis. Giddens’ Structuration Theory and its dialectic of control (1986) are applied to investigate community members’ agency, the degree of their participation in decision making in a partnership intervention. Dialectic of control postulates that agents and structures are in constant reproductive interaction where they reciprocally influence each other. Agents never lose power, since if their agency is limited they resort to counter power in different forms: from silent refusal to active resistance.

Thus, the thesis investigates individual community members’ agency to understand the structures enabling and constraining them, as well as how agents themselves participate in social reproduction and affect structures. Subsequently, through their discourses and auto-interpretation it studies alterations in their agency and consequent impact on their social distance, their sense of ownership, from the outcome of the partnership intervention. The crucial issue is to consider time-local dimensions, giving importance to different locale where partnerships are implemented and the treatment of partnership factors and agency in a temporal dimension.

The analysis is carried out based on the above mentioned variables which then construct agent profiles. Though the profiles are still rather general, profiling proves to be a useful, perhaps a novel way to treat and to inform the development practice about community heterogeneity, thus
avoiding the well-known impasse of postmodernist theoretical critique of the conventional development paradigm.

1.4 FIELD RESEARCH
Tanzania and specifically Dar es Salaam is selected as the case location. Together with traditional self-help schemes, partnership in Tanzania and Dar es Salaam constitutes one of the core implementation mechanisms for service delivery in development strategies and policies; thus, it is a relevant topic. Ongoing local government reforms are increasingly improving the competencies of local governments in order to produce and work in collaboration for service delivery, so the operational environment is becoming more auspicious for cross-sectoral collaboration. In addition, partnership as an implementation mechanism in Tanzania has not been studied extensively.

The hypothesis is tested in four different partnership ‘projects’. Altogether, almost 90% of those community agents who experienced the limitation of their agency, as the hypothesis defines, turned into counterpower and their sense of ownership is diminished as the hypothesis postulates.

The methodology employed in the field research is qualitative: community agents’ discourses are analysed through ideas and concepts connected to the research variables. A total of 94 community residents are interviewed in poor, unplanned settlements using semi-structured questions, in addition to over 50 key informants.

1.5 CONTRIBUTION TO EXISTING KNOWLEDGE
This thesis contributes to the understanding of social power processes in partnerships between communities, CSOs and local governments which still remains a relatively modestly researched area, particularly in a development perspective. Research so far has mainly concentrated on studying partnerships in a Western context (with some exceptions eg Krishna 2003; Lyons and Smuts 1999; Lyons et al. 2001a; G. White and Robinson 1998). Though an increasingly important mechanism for enhancing service production in Tanzania and elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, partnerships have not been critically investigated deploying a qualitative methodology, particularly from a grassroots’ standpoint. Hence, the research responds to general suggestions to explore partnerships (Cleaver 1999; Joshi and Moore 2002); to study partnership power processes (Elander 2002; Lister 2000); to study partnership in service delivery (Cornwall et al. 2000) and finally to study partnerships with communities (Smith and Beazley 2001).

Moreover, the ontology of partnership and the employment of the concept ‘partnership’ have been ambiguous (see for example Fowler 2000; Harrison 2002; Mercer 2003; Riley and Wakely
2005). Therefore, the **theoretical contribution** of this research is to the debate regarding the conceptualization of partnership and its analysis by the development of a conceptual model depicting the analytical factors of partnership. Another theoretical contribution is the employment of Structuration Theory (for example Giddens 1986), less employed in urban research (Mbiba and Huchzermeier 2002). Structuration Theory is believed to advance the understanding of communities’ power space, community members’ agency and the significance of local contexts. Thus, Structuration Theory could be considered a fresh approach for the investigation of partnerships in urban development.

The **empirical contribution** of the thesis is to build knowledge about communities in partnerships and community members’ agency in a time-space context. In particular, communities’ position and power in partnerships have been less investigated as well as how partnership responds to expectations in reality. Another empirical contribution is the application of agent profiling to visualise community heterogeneity.

The **methodological contribution** of the thesis is the application of a qualitative approach, which was called for by the theoretical framework. Frequently, quantitative approaches are deployed when construction projects are investigated.

1.6 **STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE THESIS**

**Chapter 1 Introduction** has presented an overview to the whole thesis, indicating the main issues related to the context of service delivery, and to the discussion related to partnership; the purpose and objectives of the research; methodology and conclusions of the thesis.

**Chapter 2 The context and research problem** renders a focused analysis to the context of service production. Historical, political, managerial and societal reasons leading to the inadequacy in provision of basic services are examined. This is directed to the identification of the research problem of how to produce sustainable basic infrastructure in collaboration with organised civil society and poor communities themselves.

**Chapter 3 Governance, service delivery and partnerships: literature review** revisits the literature on local governance and partnership as a tool for service delivery. The literature regarding local governance is analysed from the point of view of different actors; then the development of local governance and decentralisation, different modes of service delivery are also investigated. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of civil society organisations in governance. Similarly, the importance of decentralisation and the underpinning subsidiarity principle for service delivery are discussed.
Different implementation models of service delivery are analysed, and the focus is turned to partnership, propped up by the current neo-liberalist management culture as a solution to the weak resource base of service delivery. The concept of ‘genuine partnership’ is defined. It is revealed that there is a gap in the research exploring partnership with communities as an implementation tool, analysing how well partnership works, to what extent the subsequent results correspond to the initial aspirations and whether there are temporal transformations.

Partnership where a heterogeneous community is one of the partners is identified as a dynamic social process (Norman Long and van_der_Ploeg 1994). It is acknowledged that there are social and political practices that shape partnership. Community members’ discover opportunities that enable or face constraints that shrink their agency. Thus, the literature review ends by defining research questions that investigate community agents’ ability to exercise their power in a temporal dimension and its consequent impact on their sense of ownership and their social distance to the produced infrastructure.

Chapter 4 Partnership: theoretical framework introduces and analyses different theoretical approaches to partnership. A conceptual model depicting analytical factors affecting partnership is developed. The model assists in determining the character of partnership interventions. Structuration Theory is applied as a theoretical framework to investigate the transformation of community members’ agency; consequently, a hypothesis is elaborated.

Chapter 5 Research Methodology describes the research methodology as well as the autodidactic research process. The general research approach and strategy are justified, and different methods employed are presented and described. Then, the way how the field research was carried out is depicted. The latter includes aspects such as justification for the selection of study population, sampling, decisions on different methods, ethical issues as well as the limitations and difficulties of the field research.

Chapter 6 Field research: Tanzania discusses the situation of service delivery in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In particular it concentrates on the production of basic services to the urban poor; on the situation of available resources and different stakeholders influencing service delivery. The general context of decentralisation and local governance, local level activities in general, community participation and civil society is illustrated. Service production, stakeholders and the use of collaborative patterns such as partnership and contracting are then presented.

Chapter 7 Field research: findings, analysis and discussion on partnerships contains the field findings; and analysis of field data collected during field research. All four case projects are
presented, and their different contexts as well as very divergent findings are analysed. Based on the research variables explored in a time dimension, several agent profiles emerged in the case projects. These profiles are then analysed and explained in relation to the participation paradigm\(^1\) and hypothesis of this research.

The latter section contains a discussion which examines field findings in relation to the research variables and hypothesis. It discusses and analyses the implications of the findings in terms of community agents’ ability to exercise their agency and corresponding structures framing it, as well as their reproductive character in partnership as a social process. Similarly, this section explores the sense of ownership, its different dimensions and complexity.

The field analysis proves that through synergy, partnerships managed to bring together different societal actors and produce relatively impressive results. They were initially also ascribed other targets such as empowerment which they did not meet. In reality they reinforce social patterns and sometimes even cause friction within a community. Individual agency depends on agents’ social and power spaces; on structures enabling and constraining them. For many, the social space is limited. Thus, all these different agents’ experiences form different agent profiles, consisting of their agency during the planning phase and the implementation phase, as well as their sense of ownership. The hypothesis is then confirmed through agent profiles.

**Chapter 8 Conclusion** draws together the research arguments and discusses their implications. It also discusses the relevance of the research in relation to other research, gives recommendations for future research and policy recommendations for development practice. Finally, it identifies the contribution of this research.

At the end, there is the annex and a list of **bibliographical references**.

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\(^1\) A paradigm is defined as a scientific theory, a different conceptual framework, which does not have alternative candidates as defined in Thomas S. Kuhn, 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Excerpt)', (1962).
2 THE CONTEXT AND RESEARCH PROBLEM

2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the analysis of the contextual background which points to current problems in service production and consequently limited access to services. Colonial legacy, erroneous policies, power struggles between different levels, international economic paradigms as well as other Western influences; these all have hitherto scrambled the provision and production of basic services at local level. In much of Sub-Saharan Africa, the historical, political, managerial, financial and societal reasons inducing prevailing inadequacy in provision of basic services are explained. Further on, this leads to the elaboration of the research problem and how to produce sustainable basic infrastructure in collaboration with communities and civil society. Finally, the main research problem is defined.

2.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Urban poverty in developing countries, differentiated and multifaceted by nature, still remains a somewhat understudied and misunderstood phenomenon (Amis 1995; Satterthwaite 2002). Poverty is commonly measured by monetary income though increasingly it is acknowledged that other dimensions of living conditions such as access to basic services, public infrastructure and opportunities to choose have even more impact on the quality of people’s lives (Birmingham 2001; Sen 1992).

As the World Bank opens its World Development Report 2004: “Too often, services fail poor people-in access, in quantity, in quality.” (The World Bank 2003: 1). In practice this means that shortcomings such as inadequate quantity of the services in developing countries are various. Poorly motivated teachers, inadequate materials and equipment in health centres or contaminated water contribute to the poor quality of services. Common development objectives such as Millennium Development Goals (MDG) target indicators concentrate only on access to services. For example, in terms of water supply they do not reflect sufficiently the quality or price of water supplied (Satterthwaite 2003).

Accelerated urbanization in developing countries means that by 2020 the urban population will count for more than half of their total population (Kessides 1997: 1). In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), cities are growing despite the stagnation of available resources and continuous poor macro-economic performance (B. Cohen 2004: 46). The lack of good quality infrastructure has therefore deteriorated service delivery and caused environmental problems. A good part of the
urban population is forced to reside in inferior, informal areas: places which are risky or dangerous to their health, and reduce productivity. As informal settlements often have a hazy status, municipalities are reluctant to develop those areas. For instance in Kenya, though the official emphasis and rhetoric has been on egalitarian issues, there is a discrepancy between operative policies and official strategies; the poor are expected to partially fund their services (Oyugi 1995: 132-33). As Grindle proclaims: “…the poor are generally at the end of the queue. They are the least likely to benefit from public services and the least likely to be able to make demands on government for improvements in coverage of quality.” (Grindle 2002: 2). Even when the poor have access to basic services, they pay more than wealthier citizens (Kessides 1997).

Different factors have influenced the inadequate performance and low quality of service provision\(^2\) in SSA. A municipal government, such as urban government may be responsible for an urban area, but it might not have full control over it, for example city boundaries might not correspond to the urban area which has grown over to rural municipalities (Devas 1999: 5-6). The division of work between different agencies involved in service provision can be complicated between the state and private enterprises, or the ones responsible for the implementation of an investment, typically central government, and those ones responsible for operation and maintenance, typically the local government (Kessides 1997). Local level service providers still lack skilled technical staff and resources as well as autonomy and legitimacy (Mattingly 1995). In general, there is little accountability in service delivery as citizens have lacked voice and service providers have lacked responsiveness (Narayan 2000 in Devas and Grant 2003). Even constitutive issues such as the values and motivations of the service providers have been questioned (Semboja and Therkildsen 1995: 19). But many of Africa’s current structural political problems have actually their roots in the past when European explorers and colonialists exploited and governed their territories in Africa.

\(^2\) Service provision refers to the decisions on how public goods and services will be produced, what is their type, quantity and quality as well as how they will be financed, and how the production will be monitored (Ostrom et al 1993: 74) Similarly, production is defined as how a product will be made or service rendered, “...the technical transformation of resources into the delivery of these goods and services” (Olowu, 2001: 7); thus producers actually construct or repair the goods (Ostrom 1990: 31).
2.3 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

2.3.1 Colonial rule and service delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa

At the Europeans’ arrival in Africa, many African states were well structured or well-organized, segmented societies. Chiefs had most leadership positions in administrative, judicial, legislative, military and cultural functions. Communities were ordered prior to individuals, all the parts of society were interconnected; civil society and political spheres were mixed (Chabal 1994: 87). This all changed when Europeans drew new boundaries in Africa by dividing existing states and forcing groups to relate with hitherto unknown groups or even enemies (Chazan et al. 1999: 27).

Administration in most African colonial countries had common features. As they were extensions of their mother countries and created to extract resources, the systems back at home were reflected in the structures set up in Africa (Chabal 1994: 75; Hyden 1983: 18). General administrators (‘bureaucrats’) were exercising administrative, political and judicial powers. Their role was emphasised, compared to technical experts, though there was also ambiguity about their roles and relationships vis-à-vis politicians’ roles, as in colonial government “the bureaucrat was king” (Chabal 1994: 172).

Since colonial states were generally not created around existing nations, civil and military components of the bureaucracy were overdeveloped compared to other societal, democratic and political structures (Chazan et al. 1999; Martinussen 1997). Power was centralised and it was usually supported by strong coercive control (Turner and Hulme 1997: 86). The colonial state was a Weberian bureaucratic state, coercive, created to control and manage the colonial lands (Chabal 1994: 75).

Colonial administration machinery and corresponding power was in the hands of colonial rulers. In particular in the Anglophone countries, all the officials in more important positions were non-indigenous and ‘non-Africans’. Africans never held real power, even those who were assimilated or affiliated to the system understood that they would not hold real power (Hyden 1983: 17-18). Colonialists used other African agents or they were assisted by obedient traditional chiefs or other rulers, nominated by the colonialists themselves (Iliffe 2007: 201). For example in Gold Coast (current Ghana), chiefs were involved in administratory tasks such as law and order, collection of taxes and dispute settling (Asibuo 1992 in Gough and Yankson 2001: 131).

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3 I am aware of the differences between the countries in a vast continent, though there are also some quite common similarities and analogies within them. However, most of the referred material deals with Anglophone and/or Eastern/Southern Africa. The concept ‘Africa’ here is used in the same form as in the original source.
Basically, colonialists tried to modernize the traditional African society, separating political spheres from civil society (Chabal 1994: 87).

Colonial economies were dually divided: the countryside was primarily based on the subsistence economy of local people, in addition to the production of cash crops and export commodities for the colonial powers. Rural areas were also the ‘conservatory’ of local traditions (Roberts 1982: 370), rural areas represented the native authority whereas urban areas were modern and governed by the colonialists (Mamdani 1996). Urban places were created either to ensure services along the export routes or they were created around production areas, such as mining townships in Zambia (Roberts 1982: 368).

Colonial service provision was geographically and socially unbalanced. It left indigenous Africans often without any basic services as services tended to concentrate in urban areas and were commonly focused to others than the indigenous population. Between the World Wars, for example in all French-ruled territories including Madagascar there were only four secondary schools (Young 1988: 51). In 1960 nearly two thirds of eligible Africans were not enrolled in primary education (Chazan et al. 1999: 292). At independence, Tanzania and Cameroon did not have any universities (Ayoade 1988: 107). Where services were provided, colonial rulers gave privileges to certain segments of society, promoting segregated development and separating development opportunities and services based on the race, tribe or class: expatriate rulers or Asians who were doing business all had separate schools. For example in Tanzania, there was even a school for the children of chiefs (Munishi 1995: 142). The delivery of basic services thus functioned as institutionalized class and racial policy.

Modernized African countries under colonial rulers did not render opportunities for Africans to properly educate themselves. Religious organisations such as churches and missionaries therefore had to fill in the gap; basically they were largely responsible for education and health care for the oppressed majority (Korten 1990: 116). Similarly there were volunteer organisations, buttressed by the indigenous self-help spirit, which provided education opportunities for Africans (Hyden 1995: 38). Since political movements were prohibited, African volunteer organisations also nurtured nationalism.

Only when colonial powers started realizing the threat of growing nationalist thinking, they embarked on providing services, using service provision as a means for legitimation of their own rule (Semboja and Therkildsen 1995: 20-21). During the late colonial period some development efforts were carried out: infrastructure was produced and enterprises were established. For example by 1959, Belgian Congo had a school network to cater 70% of the children in primary
school age and the best quality tropical health care (Young 1988: 55). But this all was too little and too late.

Thus, colonial powers left a legacy of increased production, money economy, segmented society such as developed urban areas with limited and targeted services but underdeveloped and underserviced rural areas (Chazan et al. 1999; Hyden 1995: 37-38). All these disparities reflected on the huge tasks and complications in state administration and service delivery during the post-independence period, which are explored in the following sections.

2.3.2 **Post-Independence in Sub-Saharan African states**

Newly independent states and their indigenous administration encountered several problems which derived mostly from the arbitrarily drawn boundaries and colonial set-ups with exploitative resource base. As the state preceded the nation in post-colonial Africa, the creation of the nation-state demanded strong homogenisation (Chabal 1994: 134). Fundamentally, they were facing a dilemma how to unify ethnically and socio-economically fragmented and disintegrated societies (Semboja and Therkildsen 1995: 20-21). As a consequence of the lack of congruence between the state and nation, a strong, authoritarian government was called for (Clapham 1985 in Chabal 1994: 65-67; Martinussen 1997: 322).

Therefore, to ensure national cohesion administration was geared towards control and punishment (Young 1988). Power continued to be allocated with the administrative government officials, often backed up by military and police forces. Many countries entered a heavily centralized administration system, which was necessary for various reasons (Turner and Hulme 1997: 165). They simply believed in socialist systems, centralist planning and single party system (Olowu 2001: 5), where state was considered as the principal agent for economic development (Healey and Robinson 1992: 23). Due to very limited local resources, support from the central level was necessary. Moreover, donors endorsed partially deliberately, partially accidentally the reinforcement of centralized governance. They believed that the post-colonial states had widely representative governments; according to the Keynesian thinking dominating in that era distributing funds to the centralized public sector would have a trickle-down effect of development on local economies and communities (Hyden 1995: 41-42). Some states such as post-independence Uganda rejected completely regional level of administration, leading to a very centralized state, concomitantly minimising the power and autonomy of local leaders (Chazan et al. 1999: 48).

Nationalist movements had promised African populations better services under the new democratic indigenous governments, increasing the expectations for independence (Korten 1990:
The post-independent African states turned into populist thinking “the state as the instrument of the ‘masses’…” (Hyden 1995: 40) thus gaining popular support and raising high hopes. Indeed they invested heavily on better services, such as education and health care, multiplying the access to these from colonial times (Iliffe 2007: 263). But it was impossible to achieve these promised assets and improvements (Chazan 1988). The investments on the production of rural infrastructure and social services in the countryside were not sufficient in many countries, which then caused severe inadequacies in rural production and welfare (Ayoade 1988; Chazan et al. 1999: 287; Korten 1990: 48-49; Mamdani 1996).

The number and experience of civil servants was not adequate. Fresh leaders had few skills and tools with which to lead in this novel environment since Africans had earlier been discouraged from political activities and there was no political culture. In contrast, many of them had excelled in anti-colonial combats and protests (Chazan et al. 1999). This led to a situation of vulnerable state structures, identified as a soft state (Myrdal in Martinussen 1997: 226). Policies and rules existed, but the soft state was not able to impose them, and the governed were unwilling to obey the state as it was seen to be detached from society, in particular from productive activities (Hyden 1983: 7). Political systems endorsed networks and patron-client relationships to accommodate local demands (Chabal 1994: 138-43).

Overtly strong central government resulted in a changed relationship between the state and civil society as the state tried to dominate civil society and acquire hegemony over it (Chabal 1994: 90; Korten 1990: 50) The state was powerful; it enabled only the most modern parts of civil society to survive thus leading to diminished political space. Traditional self-help groups and others were replaced by state and party machines. Some CSOs such as churches in Tanzania had to surrender their schools to the government (Hyden 1995: 41-42). Donors subscribed to these changes, and imprudently participated in the weakening of indigenous and traditional structures, which had wide-ranging implications and repercussions later on:

“… donors from the Eastern and Western blocs proceeded, or as was the case with the former imperial powers, continued to back the destruction of indigenous institutional infrastructure in least-developed countries (LDCs) and the replacement of this social infrastructure with institutional arrangements that were familiar to the donors.” (Ostrom et al. 1993: 7).

Both this unlimited funding of donors to centralised government and overlooking private and local voluntary sector left Africa with a legacy with which it is still struggling today (Hyden 1995: 41-42; Korten 1990: 50).
2.3.3 Neo-liberal responses to service delivery dilemmas: SAPs and NPM

**Structural Adjustment Programmes**

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many African states suffered from a severe economic crisis: international economics and domestic policy errors caused adverse consequences in developing countries in addition to natural catastrophes such as drought. Later on it became clear that there were also many endogenous causes: dysfunctional institutions such as badly performing administration, corruption and dilapidating basic infrastructure resulting from a lack of maintenance and repair (Chazan et al. 1999; Sandbrook 2000).

To correct economic malfunctioning, Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), and thereafter Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) were designed in resonance of neo-liberal principles, were designed in the middle of the 1980s and functioned until the end of 1990s (Burgess et al. 1997; Simon 2002). Public spending was cut through privatisation, cost-recovery of public services such as introducing user fees and reduction of government social expenditure in general (Simon 2002). One main feature was to enhance decentralization as a means to decrease costs at central level. The responsibilities for service production at local level were increased but necessary resources were rarely devolved to local level which lead to a situation where central governments continued keeping the fundamental responsibility for service provision (Olowu 2001: 6-7). Thus, they caused or at least aggravated serious budgetary constraints (Chazan et al. 1999: 296). To resolve the problem of inadequate resources at local level, civil society organisations in countries like Tanzania were invited to take back the responsibility to supply services as it had been before the independence, resulting to CSOs increasingly complementing public sector in service delivery (Munishi 1995: 150).

There are divergent views about SAPs’ impact and successfulness in general. On the one hand, critics of SAPs argue that those measures were not appropriate for African economies. The underpinning assumptions in the neo-liberally induced SAPs were based on occidental societies of market capitalism, and the competencies of their institutions (Fowler 1995: 52). SAPs were accused of creating social inequality because of growth-centred vision; particularly the poor and the urban poor suffered notably (Burgess et al. 1997: 25; Craig 1995; Oyugi 1995; Simon 2002). SAPs neglected issues of justice “…it encourages, or at least reinforces, individualism and opportunism rather than solidarity and co-operation.” (Hyden 1995: 43) and neglected sustainability or inclusiveness (Korten 1990: 53). Thus, they increased poverty in particular among the poor. Nederveen Pieterse claimed that neo-liberalism fundamentally denied development as market forces were the ones to make decisions (Nederveen Pieterse 2001: 6). On
the other hand, it has been acknowledged that in many countries the implementation of structural adjustment programmes was not complete and many African countries did not fully apply the principles of SAPs (Chazan et al. 1999: 338). Also, since the problems had accumulated during decades, they needed a long-term solution and could not be resolved with first aid (Sandbrook 2000: 16). Hyden among others viewed that SAPs were correct in the long term, and they had been successful elsewhere for example in Asia and Latin America (Hyden 1995: 43). Other researchers claim that SAPs caused social inequality but were effective as macro-economic tools though it has been difficult to distinguish which were the effects of SAPs, which were due to other government actions and which to the economic crisis in general since SAPs were implemented during the decades of a major financial crisis (see for example Chazan et al. 1999; Minujin 1995; Veltmeyer 1993). However, they have had a major impact on the societies in developing countries since they were implemented for over 15 years, when consequently societies’ structures were drastically remodelled, through mainly reducing the public sector. Thus, though most probably SAPs contained some necessary ideas, the complete implementation was too drastic, ignored the environment and local conditions and took place during difficult economic times in general.

**New Public Management**

One of the most influential neo-liberalist tools for service delivery was New Public Management (NPM). It was developed in the 1990s by Osborne and Gaebler to respond to the perceived failures of the traditional public bureaucracy (Minogue 1998: 18). NPM was presented as a new model for effective public policy and service provision, and has since been implemented in particular in the UK, the US and New Zealand but introduced in developing countries as well.

According to NPM, public sector should be managed like private sector (Pierre and Peters 2000). Ideologically, it responded to the requirements to reduce state importance (Minogue et al. 1998: 19-20). NPM was justified by its capacity to reduce costs through competition; to improve the governments’ low quality, efficiency and performance. As a result, it forced a drastic restructuring of the public sector and new models in order to work (Wallis and Dollery 2002: 77). Service delivery was to be provided through privatization and competition between agencies; public and private organisations assuming purchaser and provider roles respectively (Minogue et al. 1998; Turner and Hulme 1997). Policy was detached from provision of services as politicians should only set the objectives. Thus, NPM was expected to response to the government failure, helping the government to perform its functions and supply services (Wallis and Dollery 2001: 259-60).
Though NPM was originally perceived successful in countries such as New Zealand, critical accounts have emerged even there (see for example Dollery and Wallis 2001). NPM has had an impact on the democratic virtues of society: allegedly, it has eroded social capital and spoilt the voluntary sector through contracting; thus it promoted opportunistic behaviour such as corruption and self-interest through privatization (Dollery and Wallis 2001; Dunleavy and Hood 1994 in Turner and Hulme 1997: 233-35). The public sector has been divided into smaller units often with limited objectives. Emphasis on short term cost reduction by contracting public services out to private companies has shrunk the long term capacity (Clapton et al. 2000). NPM policies such as contracting and relying on private suppliers have been argued to decrease democratic principles, such as accountability, control and transparency (Ackerman 2004: 447; Minogue et al. 1998: 5) or to increase transaction costs: “In the weak institutional settings of many developing countries, New Public Management reforms may impose high transaction costs that may outweigh efficiency gains.” (The World Bank 2003: 194). Though contracting increases accountability towards upper levels of government, it decreases the emphasis on equity, democracy and community (Minogue et al. 1998: 30), as citizens can let their opinions heard only through selecting “exit” (Ackerman 2004: 447).

In developing countries, NPM has had mixed results. Increasingly, NPM has been seen to be another culturally failed tentative, assumption of Western type bureaucracy and values (Common 1998: 70) and short term changes in public management instead of a long-term evolutionary process (Turner and Hulme 1997: 230). Despite theoretical advantages, in practice SAPs and NPM have not been able to provide solutions. New strategies and approaches are necessary to respond to the dilemmas in service delivery and to improve citizens’ access to services.

2.3.4 Development strategies to improve service delivery
When economic reform programmes and NPM mainly circumscribed poor people’s access to basic services, new development approaches were needed to alleviate the elusive poverty in developing countries. The years of SAPs had been marked by poverty alleviation efforts, the rhetoric of poverty alleviation implying that the aim was to through social action make the situation of the poor better but not necessarily to reduce poverty or structural reasons for poverty (Cornwall and Brock 2005a). At the end of 1990s the rhetoric of combating poverty changed from poverty alleviation towards poverty reduction, lessening comprehensively poverty through measurable actions and incorporating more attention to empowerment (Cornwall and Brock 2005a: 1046-47; Narayan 2002). Therefore, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and the
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) were produced setting targets for, among others, the provision of basic services.

Instigated by the IMF, the preparation of PRSPs started in 1999, as the basis for concessional lending and HIPC debt relief to replace SAPs (The World Bank 2003: 184). The target countries themselves led PRSPs which were based on a macro-economic programme (IMF 2009). They were intended to be participatory, to guide in the provision and planning of basic services. Hence they can work as a link between service delivery and the poor, thus reaching them and strengthening their voice (The World Bank 2003). Their emphasis was allocated on growth and poverty reduction, thus linking macro-economic tools and participation of society’s other actors such as civil society into their implementation.

The United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) incorporate targets such as the achievement of universal primary education and halving the proportion of people without access to potable water by 2015 (Satterthwaite 2003). These targets were supposed to be achieved through systematic wide reforms, to ensure sustainability and continuation of the achievements (The World Bank 2003: 2).

However, there have been critical voices about the MDGs and despite extensive participatory rhetoric, the top-down processes by which many PRSPs were prepared, and consequently how much they reflect actual needs at the grassroots’ level (Satterthwaite 2003; Simon 2002). A target-based definition of needs is not a sufficient policy basis on which to tackle issues that require far wider societal transformations such as more effective local governance (Satterthwaite 2003). Therefore, the problem of poverty reduction is political. However, in these strategies as it has been treated as a neutral, technical problem (Nustad 2001). The poverty reduction policies and practices are not responsive and they are often disconnected from the real needs of the poor people, and these disconnections are disguised behind the language of participation and development (Brock et al. 2003: 41). The critical views suggest that there is a need to analyse the political framework of the poverty, citizens’ participation and access to basic services, how they are interrelated and how poverty is produced in to order to improve poor people’s access to basic services.

2.4 RESEARCH PROBLEM

In Sub-Saharan Africa, there is an increased need for basic services. Historical, geographical, organisational and political causes have all had an impact on the poor people’s access to services and on the state of poverty in general. Existing infrastructure is insufficient and it has become
inferior, even dysfunctional due to lack of care and maintenance when fast growing urban populations have created a huge demand for services.

Both local governments’ limited capacity and inadequate basic infrastructure have generated a huge dilemma: how to deliver basic services and subsequently reduce poverty for example in unplanned settlements where the poor live and where service delivery fails. The implicit consequence of dominating neo-liberal policies is that civil society needs to participate in service delivery since government resources are insufficient (Desai 1996: 217), and the service production efforts of local governments in concert with civil society and communities are expected to improve the access to basic services in otherwise non- or little-serviced settlements (Mehrotra and Jarrett 2002; Otiso 2003). Infrastructure investment has an instrumental impact for collaborative production as it has been proved that the poor appreciate investments and are ready to contribute for them (Mitlin 2003). In addition, improved infrastructure can have a wider positive impact on the lives of the poor:

“… the provision of infrastructure and tenure security was also found to yield broader benefits in terms of stimulating private investments, regularizing the status of communities in the eyes of municipal and other authorities, empowering residents to seek other services from their local government, and generally contributing to local civic pride. In other words, such projects have the capability to build communities, not just infrastructure.” (Kessides 1997: 32).

Hence, the research problem is how to improve poor people’s access to basic services within current governance and administrative frameworks in SSA by the collaborative production of basic infrastructure, which is responsive, equal and sustainable in terms of communities’ sense of ownership.
3 GOVERNANCE, SERVICE DELIVERY AND PARTNERSHIPS: literature review

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Democracy constitutes the underpinning ideological framework for functioning states in most countries. Democratic principles are embodied in the system of governance which determines the way decisions are made and polity is performing its functions.

During the last decades, the structure of governance has gone through transformation from traditional government towards contemporary ‘new’ governance. Changes have taken place in central approaches and practices to governance; particularly how governance in general is understood; new definitions for vertical power relations and international networking. Inclusion of the whole spectrum of new actors has compelled restructuring efforts of governance systems. The local level has emerged as a more reinforced actor; therefore, there have been demands for the reappropriation of resources and power sharing through decentralization.

Hence, this chapter encompasses an overview of the contemporary political environment to understand the basic framework where these changes have taken place, and the way in which they have influenced -both enabled and confined- governance mechanisms. The emphasis of the analysis is on the Eastern African perspective. In sections 3.2-3.3 the concept of democracy is looked into and the evolution of governance systems is discussed. In section 3.4 the background and current state of decentralization reforms are presented. The relationship and mutual position of different actors in governance are discussed in 3.5-3.7; and the nature of civil society is analysed more thoroughly in 3.8. Good governance as a normative concept is examined in section 3.9, concentrating on accountability and participation. The development of participatory approaches is presented, analysing their roots and underlying philosophies; and its changing role in the context of governance and development ideology. Subsequently, in section 3.10 different modes to deliver services are examined and finally, in section 3.11 partnership as a promising model for service provision and production is investigated in more detail. Community as a partner, participation and power in community interventions and temporal dimension of an intervention are examined, leading to focusing on the research and the definition of research questions.

3.2 DEMOCRACY

Democracy can be understood from different perspectives (Bealey 1999; Martinussen 1997: 196). The most traditional way to interpret it is to treat it as a norm for decision making, by the
same token as it functioned in the Antique Athens\(^4\). Further on, it can be taken as an attitude, articulating virtues such as tolerance and participation, drawing from the spirit of Enlightenment and Western revolutions (Bealey 1999). These virtues and principles of democracy are deployed in the normative notion of good governance. Lastly, democracy can be construed as a political system, a certain type of regime where all people are free and equal, having access to power. Though many states claim to be democratic, their interpretation of democracy or democratic values seems to be different one from each other (Held 1993: 13).

As evident as democracy currently is, it is not a one-off creation but has evolved over a long time. The first decades of the 20\(^{th}\) century was the period for a boom in consolidation of democratic governments (Pierre and Peters 2000: 2). Democratic principles such as everybody being equal and free were formalized, and democratic institutions were established in Western countries which were based on nation-states. The state’s role was sovereign, clearly defined by legal and constitutional frameworks, and the governments were seen as value-free and monolithic, where Weberian\(^5\) bureaucracy was a significant element of government (Pierre and Peters 2000).

Essentially, democracy means “… the process of collective decision-making” (Beetham 1996: 26), confined by rules and policies setting boundaries for individual action. The basic element in current democratic thinking is equality and citizens’ participation (eg in Dahl 1998; Held 1996); what differs between individual views and various democratic movements are the means to achieve them. Similarly, the role of civil society varies. In pluralism power is shared and individuals are represented by groups; whereas liberal democracy calls attention to the importance of civil society, but also to the separation of civil society from the state (Bealey 1999: 98; Held 1993: 14).

Democracy as a model of regime dominates mainstream thinking though democratic values are largely Western products, based on Western cultures (Kasfir 1998a), and current ideas about state and society are related to the Western context (Wood 1997: 81). In Africa, conventional theories of democracy allegedly represent more a “cultural import” than the evolutionary product of their

\(^4\) However, it has to be noted that in Antique Athens, decision-making and voting rights were granted only to certain groups of society (see Held 1996)

\(^5\) The traditional view of the administration structure of a public entity is based on Max Weber’s theories of social organisation (Weber 1947). According to Weber, bureaucracy is the key form of a social organisation. Ideal bureaucracy typifies a hierarchy with a clear and efficient division of labour, valuing professionalism and impersonality. Administration is separated from the governing body of politics. It has rationalised collective activities and accepted goals, its functions are based on rules which are obeyed as well. Though it is an idealistic analysis of social-political organisation, today, it is still widely considered to be the basis of the administration of a Western public organisation and it offers a valid starting point for the development of any current bureaucracy (Kooiman 2003:74).
own societies’ history, hence democracy cannot “strengthen the underlying bonds of political association” (Harbeson 2001: 92); “[the multiparty discourse of so called prodemocracy movements] has turned a concrete historical experience – of civil society in the West -into the basis of a general and prescriptive theory… a turnkey institutional import” (Mamdani 1996: 295). In addition, basic postulations of Western democratic theory are based on the liberal notion of an individual, which is not directly transferable to African conditions and fits ill with indigenous knowledge systems (Chabal 1994: 30), therefore from an African perspective multiparty government can be seen as divisive (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999).

Democracies’ ability to promote development has also been questioned, as there is “no necessary relationship between democracy and development nor, more generally, between any regime type and economic performance” (Leftwich 1995: 432). Nevertheless, these democratic ideas have been imposed on developing countries, and democratic values and democracy as a regime have strongly been endorsed in current development policies and co-operation principles by donors. Still, currently there are few if no alternatives to democracy (Hyden 1992: 4).

### 3.3 EVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE

#### 3.3.1 Traditional government

After World War II, governments expanded their political influence and regulation to the strengthening of their role (Pierre and Peters 2000: 2). Traditionally, government systems were conceptualized as hierarchies of vertical structures (Pierre and Peters 2000: 15-24) that matched the dominating philosophy of Fordism at that time. Government systems were based on Weberian ideas and vertical links, on bureaucratic structures with clear roles, responsibilities and monitoring mechanisms, the state being separate from society. The government was considered as a solution and a major actor responsible for social and economic development. It was responsible for the welfare of the citizens achieved through services produced effectively by public sector organisations (The World Bank 2003: 54). However, in the 1980s, governance failure was palpable: the governments were not able to supply adequately services and welfare states consequently suffered a defeat. Subsequently, this failure left space for other actors in the governance system. Often, governments also failed to coordinate among these new actors who had infiltrated into political, economic and administrative systems (Myllyla 2001: 199).

#### 3.3.2 The rise of the market

Arrived the era of neo-liberalism, Thatcherism and Reaganism, labelling governments as the cause for the problems. Neo-liberalism presented a complete paradigm shift: the state’s earlier
role had been to trigger development; now it was seen as an obstacle to development (Mohan and Stokke 2000).

Government failure legitimised the neo-liberal agenda for example through NPM to assign a major role to the private sector, helping to shrink the state by partially replacing and partially just complementing it in service delivery. This was believed to empower citizens who were able to choose from different alternatives by making their own decisions (Pierre and Peters 2000). The diminished role of the state could also purportedly be interpreted as reinforcement of the role of the market or increasing citizens’ voice, to have more say (David Hulme and Edwards 1997b: 9). Critics of neo-liberalism claimed that in developing countries the process of “marketization” actually led away from a socially just, democratic state that had been the aim of freshly decolonized states (Sandbrook 2000).

Thus, the balance in the governance system shifted gradually from the government towards both the profit and non-profit private sectors, leading to the emergence of organised civil society as a powerful actor in governance. A need for basic reform and reorientation in the governance system surfaced.

### 3.3.3 Contemporary governance

The change from government to governance indicated evolving interdependency between the state and other societal actors. The altered role of the state was reflected in rhetoric, too (Pierre and Peters 2000). Government implies that the power is vested in the institutions of the state, whereas governance as an old term has a generic meaning of “running a government or any other appropriate entity, for example an organisation” (Hyden 1992: 5). Thus, in ‘governance’ the government functions as a coordinating and facilitating actor to enable other actors in society to perform their functions related to governance. Conveniently, governance does not define the locus of decision making (Hyden 1992: 6).

The shift from government to governance was triggered by several changes at local, national and global level. Societies responded to new modes of production and consumption as hierarchical production society was changing to a networking, consumption society (Wallis and Dollery 2002: 76). A wide array of other actors appeared: in addition to the above mentioned market and civil society also regional and global organisations were growing in influence; and cities were becoming more autonomous (Pierre and Peters 2000: 17). Accordingly, societies were evolving more horizontally through networks and coalitions. Co-operation and coordination were particularly indispensable when governance influenced by NPM consisted of specialized organisations (Kooiman 2003: 72; D. Robinson et al. 2000). Instead of viewing society as a
battlefield of several actors trying to get hold of power, as traditional elitists and pluralists viewed; new governance regarded collaboration and governing through interactions essential, “linking the political system to its environment” (Pierre and Peters 2000: 1), even conceptualizing governance as ‘self-organising inter-organisational networks’ (Rhodes 1997: 53).

Thus, new governance in an urban context was defined as “a process through which local political institutions implement their programmes in concert with civil society actors and interests, and within which these actors and interests gain (potential) influence over urban politics.” (Pierre 1998: 5). It has become an umbrella concept for policy networks; for public management; for coordination of sectors of the economy; for public-private partnerships; and corporate governance (Pierre and Peters 2000: 14). It responds to post-Fordism6 by enabling all the actors to work in a dynamic manner in a society which is complex and changing fast (Stoker 1998: 39). New governance suggests a redistribution of power: upwards through international organisational cooperation, outwards to other organisations and downwards to the local government level through decentralisation.

3.4 DECENTRALISATION

3.4.1 The concept of decentralization

Decentralisation in general and reinforcement of local democracy in particular have been seen as crucial steps for the consolidation of democracy at local level. Fundamentally, decentralisation is

“…the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of central government ministries or agencies, subordinate units or level of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or nongovernmental private or voluntary organizations.” (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986: 5).

Hence, decentralisation addresses the access to resources and power: who is able to use them and at what level?

Decentralisation can encompass an intergovernmental activity where power, resources or responsibilities are delegated to different parts of government on a territorial or functional basis; or decentralisation can delegate them out of government through privatisation. Territorial

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6 Post-Fordism is not a completely explicit concept, as there is an ongoing debate whether we have arrived to post-Fordism, or are we just facing an after-Fordist period (for example Colin Hay, 'Re-Stating the Problem of Regulation and Re-Regulating the Local State', Economy and society, 24/3 August (1995), 387-407, Martin Jones, 'Restructuring the Local State: Economic Governance or Social Regulation?' Political Geography, 17/8 (1998), 959-88.)
decentralisation can be classified as deconcentration, devolution (Wunsch 1998) or federation (Olowu 2001). In deconcentration, responsibility and authority are delegated to the field units of the same department or level of government and the local level acts as an agent for central authorities (Olowu 2001: 2). Devolution, a comprehensive way of decentralisation, comprises of the transfer of both full responsibilities and authority “…the central government confers self-governing capacities on local communities…” (Olowu 2001: 2). In terms of the degree of independence, federation goes furthest, as it consists of independent units which can collaborate (Olowu 2001: 2-3).

Privatisation can also be called market decentralisation where government divests the responsibility for service delivery to the private sector, that is CSOs or pro-profit private sector (Smith 1985 in Turner and Hulme 1997: 154). Hence, the rhetoric of decentralisation can disguise neo-liberalist intentions to confine a minimalist role to the state and to increase the role of the private commercial sector (D. Robinson 2000; Turner and Hulme 1997).

3.4.2 Rationale for decentralisation
Decentralisation was pushed forward due to numerous global and local motives, both of political and economic nature (Dillinger 1994; Olowu 2001, 2003; Pierre 1998; Turner and Hulme 1997). Foremost, it was seen as a vehicle for improving local economies to respond to the changes in the modes of economic production and the growth of cities, which all required strong local government (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 250-52). In many Sub-Saharan African countries, economic and fiscal crises, and consequent SAPs entailed changes in the administration and management systems; in the redistribution of economic resources and particularly in appropriation of more resources at local level (Ribot 2002: 8-16). Decentralisation offered improved integration and synergy, presenting opportunities for inter-institutional relations within the public sector and society (Dillinger 1994). Decentralisation and strong local government were considered instrumental for increasing democratisation by ensuring political stability and equality for instance through good governance (Olowu 2001; Pierre and Peters 2000). They were also considered important for improving efficiency, expertise, and responsiveness of local development (Pickvance and Pretceille 1991).

3.4.3 Subsidiarity principle and dilemmas of decentralisation
Basically, local government has had two, quite distinctively different roles: first, to enhance local democracy and, second, to provide and produce services (Pierre 1998: 3); the World Bank though claims that service delivery is a “by-product” (The World Bank 2003: 186). Nevertheless, the subsidiarity principle underpins the ideas of decentralised local level service delivery.
Subsidiarity means that activities should be undertaken at the local level, as close to beneficiaries as possible unless a higher level would ensure higher effectiveness or efficiency (Follesdal 1998). Activities assumed at the local level would be more efficient and effective, and most probably they would contribute to improved sustainability. Yet, subsidiarity excludes national level policy principles and standards based on inter-jurisdictional equity (The World Bank 2003: 189). A more detailed criterion capturing appropriateness and capability would be “… The smaller the level of aggregation at which any activity is appropriately organised, the lower it should be pushed down in terms of distance from the centre” and “… service decision and expenditures should be devolved to the lowest tier of government that can internalize the costs and benefits of the services ” (Krishna 2003: 363). Thus, services delivery functions should be carried out as close as possible to citizens, at maximum they could be confined to citizens themselves, which requires the powers and resources granted by decentralisation.

There are reasons to have confidence in improved effectiveness of locally produced public services (Crook and Sverrisson 2001; Grindle 2002). Since local level government is institutionally more flexible, it can be more responsive, and accommodate local preferences and social needs (Devas 1999; Devas and Grant 2003; Pierre 1998). In effect, decentralised decision making has proved to be more accountable, participatory and responsive and adapted to local demands. For instance in Bolivia, decentralisation impelled changes in municipality investment patterns, which were “strongly and positively related to real local needs.” (Faguet 2004). Smallest and poorest municipalities invested available funds to those projects which were prioritized and high in demand. In Uganda, through decentralisation more resources were allocated at local level (Devas and Grant 2003).

Nevertheless, decentralisation does not necessarily always improve service delivery. In practice the local level might be overburdened with responsibilities, but have little capacity or resources (Ahmad et al. 2005: 1-2). Though the local level has been the target of capacity building efforts, there are still serious concerns about the actual capacity to perform (Devas 1999: 4). Ribot claims that there is weak evidence that decentralization improves service delivery as causality is difficult to prove: there might be problems with responsiveness and typically resources at local level do not match the responsibilities (Ribot 2002: 8-16). There is always the question which should come first: decentralisation or building local capacity, when ideally the solution is “…local capacities expand best as decentralised systems mature.” (Olowu 2001: 12-13).

Though decentralisation and devolution might reduce the distance between government and citizens, the idea that decentralisation would function as an antidote to the problems, which are
caused by society’s structural imbalances, is questionable. For example, decentralized local government actually did less to enhance empowerment, equity or responsiveness to the poor though it encouraged participation, increased representation and improved government performance (Blair 2000; Crook and Manor 1995 in Devas and Grant 2003). Moreover, dominance of the local elite can lead to rent-seeking, opportunistic behaviour and decreased accountability, indicating that the local level is not necessarily more pro-poor than the national level (Ahmad et al. 2005). Neither is there any general link between decentralisation and poverty; decentralisation alone would not enhance development of more pro-poor policies (Crook and Sverrisson 2001: 52)

Local grassroots communities comprise of various interests, which might be difficult to reflect and respond to. Participatory community structures need to be integrated to formal governance structures to identify local level needs and priorities and to ensure equal distribution of benefits (eg Ackerman 2004; Blair 2000; Charlick 2001; Devas 1999; Devas and Grant 2003; Olowu 2001; The World Bank 2003). In Southern Tanzania, institutionalized collaborative planning and partnerships between local government and poor rural communities for service delivery have successfully been practised for a few years (RIPS 1998). However, decentralisation in SSA is still facing difficulties.

3.4.4 Decentralisation in Africa

Even before independence, political changes and pressures compelled colonial powers to implement limited decentralisation (for instance Hyden 1983). Local councils were introduced to and involved with service provision. Nevertheless, former colonies were still highly centralised when they gained independence. Actually, African countries had dual characteristics as they were both centralized and decentralized: centralized according to the administration structure and decentralized because the state was weak (Hyden 1983; Olowu 2001: 4-5).

Since then, decentralization has been a slow and painful process. Until the 1980s, decentralization efforts in Africa were based on deconcentration (Olowu 2001; Ribot 2002). The relationship between central government political leaders and the local level was often perverse: centralized structures were “inherently incapable of responsive administration” (Dillinger 1994: 8), information about local conditions was often distorted, and there was a lack of responsiveness. New rulers wanted to fulfil the promises of rapid development and efficient service provision and simultaneously to keep the frail nation states together. Therefore, during the first years administration was more centralized than decentralized, local administrations were

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7 See footnote 2.
just extensions of central governments for maintaining order and delivering services (Olowu 2001: 2-6). Then, decentralisation efforts under SAPS were largely decentralisation of service delivery to the private sector, real devolution was not implemented (Olowu 2001: 8-9).

Only towards the end of the 1990s, African states were forced to endorse more devolution due to the pressures of macro-economic policies and neo-liberalism. Donors’ quests for democracy was to be achieved by strengthening local government (Olowu 2001: 2-3). Emphasis was placed on measures to improve local democracy through community participation and empowerment which was thought to improve living conditions.

Broadly speaking, proper decentralisation has not hitherto been reached, since there are still several political, economic and managerial problems (Olowu 2001: 8-9). Political problems are related to the question of power, in particular to the vertical sharing of power. Power-holders fear devolutionary decentralisation could risk national unity; similarly, there are concerns that devolutionary decentralisation could create an unequal situation of service delivery between different areas (Olowu 2001: 12-13; Wunsch 2001). The power struggle of individuals at central and local levels, and shortcomings in key changes such as appropriation of resources are the roots of unsatisfactory results (Wunsch 2001). Often, more power and responsibilities have been transferred to local government but resource allocation and fiscal revenue have not been transferred accordingly. It can be called ‘recentralisation’ since real power does not reach local level (Wunsch 2001). In Uganda, the governance system during the last twenty years has actually been centralised during the process of institutionalisation of decentralisation (Brock et al. 2003).

In Mozambique, a research carried out in 1999 after the first local elections, which was a step to decentralisation, indicated that citizens felt political responsiveness had improved, but not effectiveness as delivery of public services had not improved at the local level (Braathen 2003).

According to the research of Crook and Sverrisson, in countries such as Nigeria and Kenya resources were allocated to the local level but they were not used in an accountable manner (Crook and Sverrisson 2001). Most successful decentralisation attempts had occurred when central government had been actively involved in the implementation of pro-poor politics at the local level, challenging the local elite (Crook and Sverrisson 2001: 48). Tendler claims that strong government at all levels is necessary: an active central government is equally essential for improvement in local government (Tendler 1997: 145).

Decentralisation is not yet a fait accompli. In countries such as Tanzania and Mozambique, the local government reform process is still too recent and too limited; therefore it might be too early to evaluate decentralisation success (Charlick 2001: 149). It is believed that “[e]ffective local
governance requires deconcentration (of resources and personnel), devolution (of authority) and
development of a viable local political process” (Wunsch 1998). Decentralisation also requires
political organisations, information channels, adequate literacy skills, a solid middle class and
equality at the local level (Olowu 2001: 10-11). In addition, local government in Africa was built
on a rather empty base, without safety nets or an active civil society (Schuurman 2000), which is
evident in places where communities simply do not even understand the role of local council,
how it gets funding and how it produces infrastructure and what is a community’s own potential
capacity, “in turn, how a community does or does not benefit from the system” (Frayne et al.

3.4.5 Decentralisation within local knowledge systems
According to the institutional approach, one reason for faulty institutional development is the
struggle for power: those who design policy and institutions resist changes since they have a
stake in the framework they created and these changes may divest them of power or property
(Shirley 2003: 26). The central level fears that decentralization is a zero-sum power game where
their power decreases when the other part, the local level, gains more power (Olowu 2003: 44).

Actually, the whole point of departure of decentralisation is questionable, since democracy and
local government, as they are currently advocated, are culturally biased, “the idea of local
government is a decidedly Western notion” (Schuurman 2000: 18). New Institutional Economics
(NIE) emphasizes that those institutional changes that are advocated by external actors and based
on exogenous institutions, will not perform in the new country the same way as in the country of
source because the local contexts in these countries such as informal norms and the enforcement
characteristics are not the same (North n.d.: 7). Actually, local institutions for instance in
Western Europe have been developed and shaped through a long time (Putnam 1993: 8).
Therefore, adopted formal rules would require an evolution process and alterations in local
beliefs; they will not be successful in the new contexts unless they are engineered by insiders
(Shirley 2003).

A still similar ethos is posed by the epistemic community of indigenous knowledge systems
(IKS), but their approach is different: when institutionalists examine cultures and institutions
from outside, IKS protagonists make indigenous institutions the starting point. They attest that
traditional African governance systems, African values and indigenous institutions which still
continue to be intrinsic in particular in rural areas have been neglected (see eg D. W. Chambers
and Gillespie 2000; Hoppers 2002). Traditional rulers are a visible reminder of indigenous
institutions which have mostly been deliberately ignored in the development of political systems
since they were not consistent with democratic government\(^8\) (Ostrom et al. 1993: 191). In some cases such as Buganda in Uganda they have been uncomfortably approved, in others they have been annexed informally to the formal systems such as the traditional chiefs in Zambia.

There are similarly latent societal structures in African societies, such as an informal and invisible system of ‘economy of affection’, in other words patronage or clientelism which beneath the surface affects political systems and behaviour (see Chazan et al. 1999: 329; Hyden 1983; Kasfir 1998a\(^9\)). Clientelism means that there is a need to produce benefits to own constituencies; it also interlaces with traditional ruling, based on ethnic and kinship relations (Chazan et al. 1999: 329; Healey and Robinson 1992). It functions as a safety net for social support but can lead to reluctance in interaction among different groups based on kinship or religion, and further on to tribalism and nepotism. Clientelism is related to citizens associating with the state, wanting to share resources and regarding the state as a channel to distribute resources (Azarya 1988). Typically, it leads to power concentration and power being personalized, causing state weakness. For example, in Uganda, the role of the decentralised local governance was changed since it was seen “… as opening a new arena of competition for the benefits of existing patronage…” (Brock et al. 2003: 13).

Institutions based on indigenous knowledge systems and modern Westernized political systems continue their troubled co-existence, affecting the performance of decentralisation process and good governance. While acknowledging the erroneous point of departure, there might not be any feasible alternatives to these Western inspired models. However, strong acknowledgement of local culture and knowledge systems should be part of any successful development attempts, though much of current development activities are still based on Western institutions as it is outlined in the following sections.

### 3.5 The Rise of Organised Civil Society: Government Failure

In the late 1970s, CSOs, particularly NGOs started thriving both in volume and importance in development and governance in general. Donors commenced buttressing their role in poverty reduction and social welfare, occasionally even partially replacing government (Turner and Hulme 1997: 164).

The reasons for boosting civil society organisations were many (see for example Comaroff and Comaroff 1999). First, dominating neo-liberalism created an environment which was conducive for the involvement of other actors (Nederveen Pieterse 2001). Civil society organisations’ role

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\(^8\) As explained earlier, the fragile post-independence state demanded extreme efforts for national unification.

\(^9\) Economy of affection (Hyden 1983) and social capital incorporate similar focus and motives.
was interpreted as “complementary, and occasionally competitive” vis-à-vis the government’s role (Pierre and Peters 2000). They could implement public programmes and furnish expertise which was often missing at local level; and fill in the gaps which public sector agencies left in service provision (Kessides 1997; M. Robinson 1997), thus offering alternatives both to the market and to government (Dolley and Wallis 2003). Their activities in service delivery are still instrumental in some countries, for example in Kenya CSOs are currently the biggest health service producer (Hakkarainen et al. 2002).

In developing countries, CSOs were also capable of improving community participation in cost-sharing, thereby reducing pressure on public funding (Cornwall c.a. 2000). Even in Western countries such as the UK where NPM and neo-liberalist frameworks have influenced public policies, there has been a growing tendency to rely on volunteerism and charities to supply some social services (Economist 2005). NGOs were considered as a part of non-profit private sector, to form counterforce to the commercial sector (Newell and Bellour 2002: 13). This phenomenon was aptly labelled as the “less-radical interpretation of neo-liberal economic theory” (Turner and Hulme 1997: 209).

Second, Fowler argues that the rise of NGOs began when development was seen as a political project (Fowler 2000: 639). In the late 1980s, the progress of decentralisation and local democracy in developing countries was lagging behind. Pluralism was embedded in the agenda of democratisation when CSOs were seen as appropriate organisations to enhance more democratic approaches by increasing participation and accountability (Kanyinga 1995: 83; Ndegwa 1996). CSOs could serve as vehicles for donors’ agendas to boost neo-liberalism by weakening the state, CSOs’ influence epitomizing “…a new form of imperialism and trusteeship” (Mohan 2002a: 131). Organised civil society was construed to be virtuous, consisting of “democratic self-reliant, poverty–oriented and efficient organizations in contrast to the authoritarian, donor-dependent and inefficient state organizations” (Semboja and Therkildsen 1995: 26-27). CSOs would consolidate democracy and good governance through advocacy and pressure against the state, and as independent institutions they were even believed to confront the state (Mohan 2002a: 128; Tostensen et al. 2001: 13). Civil society would counteract the concentration of power and become an alternative, autonomous locus of empowerment (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 259; Pearce 1997: 268), hence, with the help of donors CSOs would become political representatives of the poor (David Hulme 1994: 261).

CSOs actually had a long history in the provision of welfare services in developing countries, so this was nothing new, but this time the move for NGOs to substitute the government was
deliberate (David Hulme and Edwards 1997b). The phenomenon under which these organisations boomed has been called as ‘Associational Revolution’ (Cornwall c.a. 2000; David Hulme and Edwards 1997b), ‘Associational Pluralism’ (Tostensen et al. 2001: 13) or as “New Policy Agenda” (Edwards and Hulme 1996: 961). Since then, CSOs have been assigned different tasks in governance (Pierre and Peters 2000: 31-32; Satterthwaite 2002), and they have gained an aura of quasi-redeemers.

A fresh arena for CSOs is in global networking governance. International and major local NGOs have started influencing through strong international networks, learning mutually and propping each other up. They are creating data banks over borders, and collaborating in environmental and natural resources protection, human rights, improved housing and land and tenure policies to improve the living conditions of the poor. Particularly, in Asia strong urban CSOs such as Asian Coalition for Community Action (ACHR) and Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) have grown and started working with urban poor (ACHR 2008; SDI 2008a). SDI is working in several African countries, for example in South Africa a SDI collaborating organisation has fostered asset-based community development, working in land and housing issues (Pieterse 2008). In Tanzania, SDI started in 2004 collaborating with Centre for Community Initiatives (CCI) in Dar-es-Salaam and Arusha (SDI 2008b).

NGOs’ rise and reinforcement has contributed to the dichotomy, distrust and jealousy between the state\(^\text{10}\) and organized civil society which has been one of the major obstacles for their further collaboration (Clark 1997: 47). This dichotomy and in particular the impact of external forces have lead to a paradoxical situation, a “self-fulfilling prophecy” (Bebbington and Riddel 1997: 114). As a result of increased funding to non-governmental organisations’ (NGOs) activities, NGOs have been appreciated more than the public sector: “In a parallel to their [donors’] market philosophy, it is better to have inefficient NGOs than inefficient states” (Mohan 2002a: 128). In developing countries both NGOs and donors have at times by-passed government institutions either deliberatively or inadvertently (Jalal 2002). Government institutions may have been perceived as oppressive, or just weak but if donors continue funding NGOs excessively, governments would continue getting weaker (Bebbington and Riddel 1997; D. Lewis 2002). Governments need support and thus need to be guided into the direction of responsive and effective service delivery through a healthy and productive relation with civil society (Bebbington 1991 in Pretty 1995: 163; Satterthwaite 2002). Indeed, the success of some Asian countries is a reminder of the potential of a strong state (Korten 1990). As the World Bank

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\(^{10}\) Hyden though claims the division actually is between the public realm and society, as the whole public realm often is weak, not only the state (Hyden 1992:6).
postulates that “whatever the short-term or even medium-term delivery vehicle, aid should contribute in the longer term to rebuilding an effective service delivery system and public sector” (The World Bank 2003: 215).

Thus, in spite of widening participation of other actors in governance and changing relationships between the state and society, the state remains a crucial agent, holding notable political power (Pierre and Peters 2000). Collaboration with the state is necessary for improving the living conditions of the poor (Friedmann 1992). The state has legitimate power for coercion which can be used for the reallocation of the use and distribution of resources, or equalizing the access to services (Fowler 1995: 52). Its role is to embody collective interest, to interpret needs and aspirations of all members of society into policies, and define targets for governing. One of the constitutive tenets of democracy is that the state is accountable for its actions to citizens (Held 1996: 88). The state is the only actor in society that can play all the necessary roles of governance, coordination and facilitation, strong co-ordination being one of its most important roles (Kooiman 2003: 72). Therefore, a strong state and able government still continues to be a crucial factor in modern societies (Ashman 2001: 1108).

3.6 STRONG GOVERNMENT REVISITED: VOLUNTARY SECTOR FAILURE

As CSOs have been assigned a variety of roles in local governance, their influence has grown constantly. The current climate dominated by neo-liberalism awards them with mandates such as acting as watch-dogs of local government, complementing and filling in those gaps in service provision let by local governments. Yet, to consolidate advocacy and service provision is challenging since their ideological bases differ from each other. Becoming merely contracting agents might endanger CSOs’ development mission (Clapton et al. 2000: iii).

CSOs’ more significant role in governance has required a reassessment of their performance. Though they have been hailed for their performance and complementary capabilities as compared to the inflexible and stiff state machinery, they and their activities have equally been criticized. Voluntary sector deficiencies have been identified as ‘Voluntary sector failure’ or ‘non-market failure’ (Salamon in Dollery and Wallis 2003). According to the neo-liberal liturgy, CSOs were assumed to be economically more effective, but there is inadequate proof about NGO effectiveness (Turner and Hulme 1997: 206). Based on her extensive empirical research in Brazil, Tendler postulates that there is no evidence that CSOs’ comparative advantage is better than the public sector or that CSOs reach the poor more effectively than government (Tendler 1997). Palpably, NGOs have not been more cost-effective than government; neither could they always reach the poorest though they target poor people better than government (Edwards and Hulme
1996: 963; Lister 2003: 175). For instance, many CSOs operate with subsidies when supplying services whereas these subsidies are not granted to the public sector (The World Bank 2003; Turner and Hulme 1997). Even their efficiency and outputs are sometimes hard or not at all possible to monitor and evaluate compared to the private sector as competition is lacking; the technology they have employed is not conventionally assessed (Dollery and Wallis 2003).

In addition, CSOs’ positive aura and connotation, inherent democratic approach and philanthropic motives have been questioned. For example, in former centrally planned developing countries Western induced CSOs have been created during a very short period. Therefore, their assumed ability to strengthen democracy is questionable (David Hulme and Edwards 1997a). CSOs’ relationship with communities is a stirring issue, and their growing influence has also raised political questions of their legitimacy and accountability (Mbilinyi 2005: 9; Turner and Hulme 1997: 212)\textsuperscript{11}. CSOs are facing a risk of becoming “detached from their popular base” (Tostensen et al. 2001: 22); or through dependence on funding to become co-opted to follow donors’ agendas (Edwards and Hulme 1996: 966). Nabuguzi claims CSOs in Uganda have increased inequality and undermined social justice by “perverting” national policies and “manipulating” government service provision (Nabuguzi 1995: 205-07).

Though often civil society carries a normative connotation of being civil, it is not patently civil, or inherently virtuous (Cameron 2000: 631; Newell and Bellour 2002: 13). Equally there have been concerns about the internal democracy of CSOs, and about the male-dominance inside them (Tostensen et al. 2001: 22). They are frequently led by local influential persons with political connections and might even lack democratic management and decision making structures (Andreasen 2001: 275). For example, in Egypt most of the NGOs were accused of elitism as they had been founded by professionals and the educated elite (Myllyla 2001: 213).

Hence, CSOs were anticipated to fulfil an impressive record of social achievements; they were considered to be promoters of civil liberties and citizen participation and the empowerment of beneficiaries (Newell and Bellour 2002: 13; Semboja and Therkildsen 1995: 24-25; Watts 1995). This has led to paradoxical situation where NGOs claimed they were non-political but simultaneously they were explicitly promoting empowerment at grassroots level, unavoidably a political activity (Korten 1990: 144-45; Turner and Hulme 1997: 204).

\textsuperscript{11} See chapter 3.9.1 for more thorough discussion.
3.7 **COLLABORATION BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS AND GOVERNMENT**

Collaboration between CSOs and government institutions has been marred with aversion and battle about resources. The government easily considers CSOs as treacherous, fearing them of subversion (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999: 12). But there is also a clear demand for collaboration. Working together with the government, CSOs can fulfil a societal mission to bridge different parts of society in many African countries, where the state is seen as an institution controlling resources but to be treated with suspicion (Wood 1997: 81). Citizens still often perceive the government to be very remote both geographically and psychologically. As CSOs do not collect local taxes, they are able to keep a better rapport with local communities (Fowler 1995). For example, in Uganda even the government views civil society as a bridge between the government and society (Brock et al. 2002: 15).

Collaboration between CSOs and government institutions can, nevertheless, engender risks. If CSOs become too close partners with the government, they might become co-opted (Cameron 2000; David Hulme 1994). Closeness could contradict CSOs’ critical and counterbalancing position towards government (Smit 2001: 247). Subsequently the state might take advantage and to reduce political opposition, by making “…the public sector appear less intrusive” (Pierre and Peters 2000: 32). While including oppositional civil society to governance, it also risks losing discursive actors, facing less protests, thus reducing pressure for greater democracy (Dryzek 2000: 87). An excessively close relationship to government or to the main party might erode CSO’s credibility since it would give an impression of the association to be connected to party politics (Andreasen 2001: 278). However, occasionally, CSOs might need tight connections and affiliations to organisations which have access to resources. In Zimbabwe, housing co-operatives and most CBOs established ties with influential persons with resources at their disposal (Kamete 2001: 172).

As a conclusion, CSOs should find their own distinctive agenda and mission without losing their roots. They cannot invade governments’ territory; stay too close to donors or too far away from their own constituency. A strong government can create a conducive environment for CSOs to work, and governments’ coordination is indispensable for collaboration between different societal actors (Bebbington and Riddel 1997: 110; Fischer 1998). Hence, there is a need for a more thorough understanding of the relation and collaboration between the government and civil society in governance, particularly in service delivery. Equally the character, motivations and typology of civil society organisations in different contexts requires investigation.
3.8 THE NOTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

3.8.1 A very short history of civil society

Though in Western philosophy, the concept of civil society has evolved over a long period from the Ancient Greek times, there is still enough ambiguity about its definition and its relationship with the state. The concept of civil society as clearly distinct from the state re-emerged vigorously during the Scottish Enlightenment. Philosophers such as Thomas Hobbe, John Locke and Adam Ferguson each emanated views on it. Ferguson defined civil society as civilized, as a “socially desirable alternative both to the state of nature and the heightened individualism of emergent capitalism” (Ferguson 1767 in D. Lewis 2002: 570). For Hobbes, fear was reigning in society, but a strong state supported civil society which symbolized the relationship between people (Pietrzyk 2001). Locke defended the freedom of individuals; social life was civil but had to be guaranteed by the state (Pietrzyk 2001).

In the 19th century, Hegel laid the basis for liberal thinking. He divided modern society into the spheres of family, civil society and the state. In civil society, people were emancipated from family bonds; it was the realm of selfish action and transactions. Civil society was both protected and controlled by the state but still separate (Knuttila and Kubik 2000).

When Hegel preferred that the state controlled civil society, Gramsci observed the dialectical relationship between the state and society, attesting civil society should resist the state (Fischer 1998; Knuttila and Kubik 2000). Both Marx and Gramsci claimed civil society was just a transitory phase in the class struggle. Civil society was separate from the state and market, consisting of a variety of organisations, which can challenge the hegemony of the dominant groups to exercise and command. Thus, civil society was specific to its historical and political context.

For a long time, the concept of civil society was forgotten in a Western context until its political renaissance when dissidents in Eastern Europe struck in upheaval against their totalitarian states (Hakkarainen et al. 2002; Pietrzyk 2001). The Gramscian concept was employed in Latin America to resist the oppressing colonial and post-colonial states (Knuttila and Kubik 2000; D. Lewis 2002).

Civil society’s economic renaissance was engendered by the dominating neo-liberalist approaches, as depicted in chapter 3.5. These lead to a modern view of civil society falling into two general categories: first, the neo-liberal and pluralistic approach considering civil society as a

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12 A period of evolvement of Western thinking and philosophy around the 18th century, during which a basis for modern ideologies and concepts were formed.
counterforce to the state, complementing and opposing it and second, the neo-popular approach, seeing civil society as a realm for solidarity and for supporting individuals (J. Cohen and Arato 1994).

3.8.2 Definition of civil society and a civil society organisation

There is no single definition to cover the plethora of civil society in different countries and cultures. Comaroff and Comaroff call it an “imprecise, unspecified idea” (1999:2). Actually, the current concept of polyvalent civil society is a cultural construct; contemporary narratives of civil society have arisen in European contexts, defined with Western terms and having roots in Western philosophy and cultures. Basically, as the previous section demonstrates, the concept of civil society has been translated through its relation to other actors in society, and it has some universal relevance as a description of the relation between the state and society. But it is questionable though whether civil society could be transferred from the original locus of conceptualization of Western societies to elsewhere where the social and historical context is different (Hakkarainen et al. 2002). For example, in many African societies the question of civil society in relation to the state and civil society’s role in the polity is a variable which should be seen through their own historical perspective and through changing power relations between the state and civil society (Chabal 1994: 93). Civil society’s role in Africa could hardly be considered as a constant variable through time as the discussion in the following section demonstrates.

However, divorcing from different political adaptations of civil society, there are still common basic elements characterizing it. Schmitter brought together four issues that have widely been subscribed to civil society as being independent, civil, aiming at collective action but not governing the polity (in Kasfir 1998a: 126). UNDP defines civil society as:

“…together with state and market, one of the three ‘spheres’ that interface in the making of democratic societies. Civil society is the sphere in which social movements become organised. The organisations of civil society, which stand for many diverse and sometimes contradictory social interests are shaped to fit their social base, constituency, thematic orientations (eg environment, gender, human rights) and types of activity.” (UNDP 1993 in Bebbington and Riddel 1997: 109).

LSE Centre of Civil Society draws attention to the dynamism of real life:

“Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state,
family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power.” (LSE 2004).

What is elementary is the locus of civil society in relation to other society members and their interface rather than its activities. Based on these postulations a core definition of a civil society organisation can be defined:

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<th>A core definition</th>
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<td>Here a civil society organisation is defined as a collective, non-profit making organisation with a public objective located between the state and families.</td>
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This core definition is relative; it is contextually free without political, social or cultural attachments; and it still leaves plenty of unclear space around the porous boundaries with polity’s other members. For instance, questions such as whether political organisations belong to civil society seem to be difficult. Blair claims that political parties should not be included into civil society because they aim at usurpation of state power, not influencing it (Blair 1997). Comparatively it would be justified to say it hinges on the social and cultural contexts, chiefly due to different political history and culture political parties have. As a result, it is imperative to investigate the adaptation of the concept of civil society in Eastern African and in Tanzanian context.

3.8.3 Civil Society and civil society organisations in Africa

Ontological questions

What is civil society in Africa, or more essentially whether the notion of civil society is relevant at all to Africa, has been under active discussion (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Karlstrom 1999; D. Lewis 2002; Mamdani 1996). Since the concept of civil society has its strong cultural and historical roots in Europe, it has cast doubt on the use of civil society in Africa (see eg Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Hakkarainen et al. 2002). In Africa civil society is not merely a question about the role of the state and other actors, what is their interface and how they relate to each other, it boils down to a deeply ontological dilemma (D. Lewis 2002). Lewis (2002) has presented an excellent analysis of the discourses based on four different approaches.
First, the most radical one which Lewis presents, questions the use of the notion of civil society arguing that it is not at all relevant as it was employed for oppression, and it is completely embedded in a European cultural framework. Thus, it cannot be used in an African environment which is historically and culturally so different. In contrast, associations in Africa have been connected to domination, racism and segregation. Civil society in colonial time aimed at institutionalization of the divergent, unfair treatment of different citizens (D. Lewis 2002). These associations were used to justify buttressing privileges and colonial exclusions based on race, which was not a very civil practice. Consequently Mamdani (1996) argues that the application of civil society to African context is ethnocentric or historically insensitive.

Indeed, many associations and organisations in Africa emerged from colonial oppression. Nevertheless, this viewpoint is still at variance with current reality. There are many other organisations and social movements of different origins such as very common savings groups, which could hardly be seen as products of the colonial rule. Moreover, notable transformation has also taken place, transgressing many organisations further from their original mandate.

Second, another less radical approach would be to conclude that as civil society is a European concept, it is not congruent with the complexities of African societies for different reasons. First, civil society is not essential to counterbalance the state as contended earlier since the real power is actually exercised by other entities than the government, for instance by earlier colonial powers, thereafter replaced by the ascendency of international donors (Ferguson 1998 in D. Lewis 2002, see also Ferguson (1994) for an analysis of the hegemonic use of power by international development machinery). Then, public and private are not clearly separated in many African contexts; thus African associational life does not comply with the above mentioned basic elements of civil society definition (see Kasfir 1998a; Kasfir 1998b for a discussion). Kasfir vigorously argues that this African “primordial public realm” as defined by Peter Ekeh could be more meaningful and satisfactory for Africans than the Western induced, formal civil society (Kasfir 1998a: 6; see also Tripp 1997: 11).

However, while concurring with the arguments of Kasfir, this would be a very narrow, untenable interpretation of a civil society. For a long time, there have been local groups active in self-help, and in service delivery in many African countries. Their mission is less political and counterbalancing government is not a pertinent issue but rather to serve their constituency.

Lewis’ third approach, which is currently the dominant paradigm, is to understand civil society in Africa as a Western notion (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999: 16). In that positivist and ethnocentric form it chimes with Western ideological positions, defines the relationship with the state, and
through its existence it also legitimizes the state. Civil society represents virtues which the state cannot demonstrate, and CSOs are seen paragons as compared to the flawed governments. Consequently, participation of CSOs to development interventions has become a kind of precondition, believed to enhance democracy. This view of civil society as a political saviour is further echoed in the notion of good governance; see section 03.5 for discussion.

These modern organisations, mostly NGOs alike which correspond to this approach, are urban based, with elements from both domestic and foreign sources. They may not always be politically attuned but inevitably there has been a role and a space for them in the polity. However, this interpretation of civil society can be questioned on empirical terms. In some countries, these imported organisations, CBOs and mainly NGOs, have affected the structures of the remaining polity. Illustrative is how civic associations in Ovambo, Namibia were externally initiated and sponsored. Other indigenous common-interest associations were rare, since the traditional authoritarian and hierarchical structure and oppressive history did not allow space for them (Frayne et al. 2001: 282-83). Though the modern organisations might have replaced traditional African groupings, their hands are still tied as long as latent ethnic structures such as the culture of patronage continue to be practiced (Kasfir 1998a).

NGOs have proliferated due to the impetus of external funding agencies, while they also have been dependant on this funding (Fowler 1995: 58-61; Kasfir 1998a; Tostensen et al. 2001: 22). For instance, in Mozambique and Tanzania the post-independence socialist states initially did not recognize and permit NGOs; now they are reluctantly accepted (Fischer 1998; Lange et al. 2000). NGOs were created without any constituency, only instigated by available funding, which then led to the phenomenon of so called “briefcase NGOs” which as chameleons change colours depending on the required conditions. Communities have hard times relating to these briefcase NGOs, which they see as opportunistic and remote or ganisations as a study in Uganda revealed (Barr et al. 2003). Thus, NGOs’ impact on the promotion of democracy (as assumed by external partners) can be questioned, which would make this approach a very inadequate interpretation of civil society in Africa.

Lastly, the fourth approach, identified by Lewis, looking for associations and organisations in Africa similar to those back at home, creates in vain an illusion about weak civil society. Yet, the scarcity of CSOs according to the Western definition of the concept does not necessarily mean that civil society is weak (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999: 31; Karlstrom 1999). There might be completely different manifestations of civil society organizations in different contexts. They might actually exist but disguised in vernacular forms which are not familiar or relevant to the
European context, or they can have a closer connection to the public sector than in Western
countries. In post-independence Kenya in the 1960s and 1970s, government promoted the
national harambee self-help movement to mobilize communities to support construction of basic
infrastructure (Kanyinga 1995). Though nationally it was linked to the government, locally it
provided a mechanism for people’s participation and helped people to pool their resources, thus
as a precursor paving the way to the proliferation of CSOs later in the 1980s (Hakkarainen et al.
2002). Likewise, the national Ujamaa villagisation movement in Tanzania was embodied locally
in self help action. Moreover, some organisations such as those based on ethnic relations might
appear both in public and private realms (Karlstrom 1999: 108; D. Lewis 2002: 574-82). During
the colonial rule, traditional kingdoms were transferred from the public sphere to the current
private sphere and modern civil society emerged with the traditional one (Chabal 1994: 89).
Tripp therefore claims political space in Africa, for example in Tanzania has been defined in a
restricted way, such as the treatment of traditional ruling and kinship which has features both of
the public and private realm or a gendered ignorance of private and political space (Tripp 1998).
Karlstrom infers that the ‘mainstream’ view of civil society which is between the public and
private realm is culturally and historically constructed (Karlstrom 1999), therefore it needs to be
analysed contextually, identifying those forms between state and society which exist there, not to
identify “an absence” (Karlstrom 1999). Hence, the importance to understanding different
manifestations of civil society reflected in African knowledge systems and historical contexts.

This research takes the position that in order to identify more thoroughly social actors and their
power space, coalescence between the last two views is indispensible: while acknowledging the
indispensable existence of modern implanted formal organisations, it is necessary to abandon the
curbing ethnocentric normative treatment of civil society in favour of a contextual interpretation.
As Bayart (1993 quoted in Martinussen 1997: 180) claims the analysis of the African state should
incorporate the cultural and historical contexts as well as cultural construction of politics,
likewise the analysis and definition of African civil society should be carried out in a similar
framework. As Comaroff and Comaroff (1999: 23) declare that “…until we address such
historical and cultural specificities, until we leave behind stereotypic, idealized Euro-concepts,
we foreclose the possibility of looking critically African or European civil society”. Therefore,
the only way to understand African CSOs’ character and mission is to apply a contextually
relativistic approach to the investigation of contemporary African civil society, but to
acknowledge Western influence particularly in urban areas. Based on these viewpoints, after an
exploration of general typologies and African associations, a definition for the concept of civil
society in Tanzania to be applied in this research is developed.
3.8.4 General typologies of CSOs

Undoubtedly, civil society consists of a plethora of versatile organisations of different motives, backgrounds and constituencies. These organisations are incoherent and not homogenous. Consequently, there are numerous different typologies to classify CSOs by their ideology, strategy, and interface with other societal actors, type of activities and so on. One typology based on a combination of CSOs’ functions, ideologies and values they convey was developed by Korten (Korten 1990). He divided CSOs into voluntary organisations (VOs), public sector contractors (PSCs), people’s organisations (Pos) and governmental non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) (Korten 1990: 2).

Voluntary organisations (VOs) have a social mission, as their existence is based on the political and economic values they stand for. They are independent, and can make a significant contribution to democracy by channelling citizens’ views and acting as a watchdog. VOs’ constituency is the poor and “disenfranchised” rather than consumers or citizens. Their role should be to focus on people’s development movements in a critical and responsible way (Korten 1990: 206).

Fast increasing public sector contractors (PSCs) can provide non-profit services to the public sector. Donors appreciate their technical competence, cost-efficiency and good management systems. By employing PSCs, they hope to combine the benefits of the private and voluntary sector such as competence and flexibility (M. Robinson 1997: 63). PSCs are seen to have first a pragmatic mission, then an ideological one. They follow the funding trends of governments and donors, expressing the interests of the powerful but nonetheless they can also demonstrate social commitment and high ethics (Turner and Hulme 1997: 216). There are limitations though, since the poorest are not automatically served and there are inadequacies in accountability and control (The World Bank 2003).

The existence of People’s Organisations (POs) such as CBOs and informal community groups is rooted in the interests of the members themselves. Their legitimacy is based both on their ability to serve these interests; on their democratic structures and being independent. They have been important vehicles for householders to improve their living conditions, by joining together their own resources and taking collective action (Tati 2001: 195).

Finally, there are governmental non-governmental organisations GONGOs, which are a typical phenomenon for instance in the UK. They have been created by the government for public purposes, though they are not a part of public sector. GONGOs are hybrid organisations, they
look like VOs and PSCs but they are loosely linked to and respond to the governments at least to some degree (Korten 1990: 104).

The boundaries between different types of organisations are not always clear and not stable since transformation takes place all the time. PSCs and GONGO.s blur the distinction between civil society and other sectors: the former with the pro-profit private sector and the latter with the public sector, sharing the characteristics of both. Occasionally donor sponsorship has created imbalances in civil society (Bebbington and Riddel 1997: 111). For example, donor funding to VOs has co-opted them and treated them as contractors, whereupon VOs have tended to move away from their original agenda towards that of the donors (Korten 1990: 105), to say nothing about some organisations who are equivocal or indecisive about their own primary character: whether they are value or market driven (Korten 1990). It is evident that lately CSOs have shifted from service delivery to more political realms such as policy issues and “rights-based approach to social development” (Hakkarainen et al. 2002).

In addition to CSOs’ increasingly transforming character, the above mentioned typologies are still very Eurocentric. They have been influenced by cultural and historical contexts; by societies’ key elements such as structures and norms which have evolved over the years (David Hulme and Edwards 1997a: 277), see for instance Tostensen et al. (2001:12-16) for further discussion. Therefore, for a typology in another context such as Africa, it is indispensable to analyse the associational sector in Africa, beginning from local social and historical contexts.

**Taxonomy of CSOs in Africa**

A classical division of associations in Africa is based on either ascribed or voluntary membership (Chazan et al. 1999). Ascribed groups are part of indigenous African civil society, but often not treated as civil society organisations when analysed with Western definitions, see previous section 3.8.3 for discussion. An individual is attached to them when born, thus individuals are followers rather than members. Ascribed groups have their roots in indigenous institutions such as kinship (extended family, inclusive clan); locality in geographical terms; and traditional political affiliation such as traditional states and kingdoms (Chazan et al. 1999). They might be used for channelling philanthropic articulations which in Africa is not traditionally done via intermediate NGO type of formal organisations, unlike Western practices (Fowler 1995: 58-61). Thus, it is not rare that the activities of African ascribed groups can be analogical to NGO and CBO activities in Western context.

Social and economic organisations are based on voluntary participation. For example, in Eastern Africa member service organisations have very complex origins based on traditional self-help
groups. Ethnic welfare associations and political associations were mostly prohibited by post-colonial regimes. Member service organisations catered for the needs of their members and enabled participation and interaction with economic, social and political structures (Chazan et al. 1999: 78). Religious organisations, sports associations, trade unions and self-help association were used as a channel for nationalist movements (Fowler 1995: 58-59; Hyden 1995: 37-38). Then later on, they formed the basis for national movements, trade unions and political parties. In rural areas, Western influenced associations such as farmer organisations proliferated. In urban context, trade unions, savings groups, religious associations, burial societies and sports associations have flourished during the last years, being used as vehicles for collective action (Chazan et al. 1999: 97).

Civil society and the state can be firmly entwined (Markovitz 1998: 28). Particularly at micro-level, the boundaries between civil society and the state are not clear but porous when individuals are moving from one to another (Brock et al. 2003: 27; Chabal 1994: 229; Mohan 2002a: 135). Held asserts that despite Gramscian thinking of considering them polarized, civil society can never be completely separate from the state (Held 1996: 314). Tendler likewise attests how the relationship between local government and civil society is far more complex than believed (Tendler 1997). Moreover, there is overlapping between civil society and the market. For example, in Kenya some NGOs resemble commercial organisations whereas in Namibia some CSOs work in very close collaboration with government, bordering subcontracting (Hakkarainen et al. 2002).

Inclusion of political and religious organisations to civil society is another contextual dilemma. Religious organizations have had a very strong foothold in African life, since colonial times they have provided services to underprivileged sections of society: "church is the only formal organisation besides the ruling party that can claim any mass following in African countries" (Hyden 1983: 118). In addition, religious organizations hold notable financial power and societal influence, occasionally they even challenge the government (Chazan et al. 1999). Thus, their role has been very similar to CSOs, and it would be difficult to ignore them as not being a part of civil society.

In a European multi-party country, sections of a political party such as political youth groups might fall well under the definition of civil society, whereas in some African countries for example in Mozambique the separation between the ruling party and the state is evanescent or
even obfuscated\textsuperscript{13}. Even in Tanzania, the ruling party (CCM) to some degree is synonymous to the government. For instance, ten cell leaders are CCM members and still greatly employed to connect citizens and local government, though their status is informal. By contrast, in Uganda, where until 2005 political parties were not allowed, donors saw civil society as a replacement for the absent political opposition (Brock et al. 2002: 15). Moreover, even political life in Africa has a different meaning in people’s lives than in Western countries, since in Africa, people first identify with cultural groups only then with political groups (Sandbrook 1985 in Martinussen 1997: 189).

Conclusively, the character and objectives of the organisations which form civil society vary according to the context. The core definition needs to be reapplied, considering the specific, indigenous features of each society.

**Contextual definition of a civil society organisation in Tanzania:**

Here a civil society organisation is defined as a non-political, non-profit making organisation with public objectives located between the state and families. However, it is acknowledged that the boundaries between civil society and other polity members, particularly with the state and the private sphere are dynamic and porous, thus at grassroots level the interface is dynamic.

The main focus in this research will be on those CSOs which are involved with service delivery and serving their constituencies such as CBOs. CBOs are CSOs which mobilize “constituents to improve the conditions of a neighbourhood or other physically-delimited community” (Dill and Longhofer 2006: 18)

### 3.9 GOOD GOVERNANCE

The concept of good governance has appeared increasingly in connection to discourses related to local government. Good governance stipulates the governance relationship between citizens and the state (Leftwich 1995), aiming at increasing democracy making governments more accountable, legitimate and transparent. Thus, it introduces normative characteristics as an ideal to be aimed at rather than to be achieved (UNESCAP 2009).

Donors such as UNDP, DFID and the World Bank have all set their own definitions including different elements: UNDP emphasises participation, transparency and accountability (UNDP 1997); DFID’s main tenets are accountability, state capability and responsiveness (DFID 2007) and the World Bank (WB) places more importance on good administration, efficiency and

\textsuperscript{13} In Mozambique, the liberation movement first turned into the first post-independence government and then into a political party, FRELIMO. However, the transformation has not been complete, and there is considerable ambiguity between the state and the dominating political party.
accountability, thus stressing more financial and management aspects (Santiso 2001). Altogether, the principal, cross-cutting elements of good governance are accountability and participation which contribute to responsiveness. Therefore, the following sections endeavour to examine local level accountability and participation in decentralised governance.

3.9.1 Accountability

3.9.1.1 Definition and dimensions
Accountability is indispensable for fair and effective decentralisation; equally it is necessary for successful service provision and fair resource allocation (Uphoff and Krishna 2004). Accountability can be viewed from a citizens’ perspective as “…effectiveness with which the governed can exercise influence over their governors” (Hyden 1992: 13) or from the reciprocal relation between citizens and government as “…the willingness of politicians and policymakers to justify their actions and to accept electoral, legal or administrative penalties if their justification is found lacking” (The World Bank 2003: 51) or basically implying underlying issues related to power, defined thus as “…the sharing of the control and purposes of political power…” (Healey and Robinson 1992: 160).

Accountability has different directions and dimensions. Vertical accountability upwards refers to local government’s accountability to central government through regulation and downwards, for instance when elected officials give citizens and their constituencies accounts about their performance (Newell and Bellour 2002: 12). Vertical accountability from grassroots level upwards is often very limited, and citizen voice tends to remain at local level (Goetz et al. 2001). Horizontally, different government institutions are accountable to other government institutions or to elected representatives. Decentralisation and horizontal accountability at local level are strongly linked, as horizontal accountability is often weak due to the weak capacity of local government officials and incomplete decentralisation (Crook and Sverrisson 2001; Devas and Grant 2003). Thus, decentralisation through improved accountability is expected to reinforce good governance locally.

3.9.1.2 Accountability mechanisms
Good governance can be achieved only by institutionalizing powerful accountability mechanisms to enable societal actors to compel governments to be responsible for their actions and non-actions (Ackerman 2004: 448). A classic mechanism to exercise political accountability is ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ (Hirschman 1970). The background of ‘exit’ is in the field of economics where a

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14 Blair (1997) considers these even to be linked profoundly to a functioning democracy.
dissatisfied customer “sets in motion market forces which may induce recovery on the part of the firm that has declined in comparative performance” (Hirschman 1970: 15). Exit means the customer finishes the relationship with the firm but not necessarily communicating about it. It is impersonal and indirect, where success and failure are communicated through statistics, therefore not always effective. Due to this indirect expression, exit functions slowly. A loud way to express critical opinion is voice which extends from complaints to protesting (Hirschman 1970). Voice is political action. One example of voice is voting which is a mechanism to exercise pressure towards service suppliers and to receive better service, to demand for accountability (Hirschman 1970).

The usefulness of exit and voice depends on the context, but in practice voice and exit - mechanisms do not work in a satisfactory manner, since citizens do not have enough channels to influence decisions; often representative democracy is not sufficient and bureaucratic accountability does not work if there is no proper devolution (Newell and Bellour 2002). Weak voice and accountability loom behind the dissatisfaction of the poor towards public service institutions, as they do not have confidence in accountability (Goetz et al. 2001: 2). User participation such as participatory budgeting, service delivery surveys, civil society media and public meetings could improve responsiveness and provider’s accountability towards users (Blair 2000: 27; Goetz et al. 2001: 57; Kessides 1993: 17; Olowu 2003: 48). Thus, the weak exit and voice mechanisms reveal the importance of citizens’ participation and sharing information in citizens’ participation is the key element in all accountability mechanisms.

Modern governance also poses also new types of challenge for accountability. As governance has become a complex network of diverse public and private entities participating for example in service delivery at different levels, proper accountability structures have not automatically been accessible. Particularly in developing countries new partners such as the growing private sector and CSOs have not been involved in satisfactory accountability measures and requirements. For instance, global NGOs are blamed for creating “accountability gaps”, since they are not clear to which constituencies they are answerable (Newell and Bellour 2002). As Bebbington reminds “…governments are to some extent popularly elected whilst NGOs are not…” (Bebbington 1991 in Pretty 1995: 163)

Governments undeniably have legitimate reasons to demand NGOs to account for resources as they benefit from charitable status (David Hulme and Edwards 1997b: 5-6; Turner and Hulme 1997: 212). There is a risk of “inconsistent standards and expectations regarding the conduct and degree of answerability of public and private actors.” (Newell and Bellour 2002: 4). Donors’
stronger demands for CSO accountability towards them has diminished CSOs’ accountability to their own constituencies, undermining many organisations’ legitimacy (Nowland-Foreman 1998: 117). As Newell and Bellour (2002: 17) state regarding NGO accountability: “While a great deal of NGO rhetoric speaks of local participation as a way for NGOs to be accountable to clients, most poor communities are without the means to hold NGOs accountable...”. Even grassroots organisations are not so accountable and representative as it has been claimed (Bebbington and Riddel 1997: 110). These lacunae in accountability mechanisms require a re-evaluation of institutionalized governance tools; particularly it calls for a strong element of participation.

3.9.2 Participation

Participation ideology arose well before the discourse of good governance, but it soon became an essential element in it. Enhancement of local level participation, implicitly associated with civil society, was expected to guarantee responsiveness of governance along with the endorsement of decentralisation and local democracy (Ackerman 2004: 447; Mercer 2003) (Mohan 2002b).

Fundamentally participation defines the political relationship between communities and the government (Desai 1996: 218). But participation is not such a static concept, as dissimilar interpretations under various paradigms have influenced meanings assigned to it and consequently its changing roles (Mosse 2001). Participation has been seen as a cost-reduction method; as positive masking, or as a means for empowerment (R. Chambers 1995: 30). It has been a good mantra, applied wishfully to ensure interventions are equal, just and pro-poor, and responsive by enhancing citizens’ voice (Blair 2000; Cornwall c.a. 2000; Rakodi 2002).

Originally, the rhetoric of popular participation, the radical form of community participation, in the 1970s was based on Freirean (see Freire 1972) ideas of conscientization for example in ‘Pedagogy of the Oppressed’ (Cleaver 2001; Schönhuth 2002). Popular participation such as alternative development or Popular Action Research (PAR) meant communities had some access to and control over resources and decision-making (Desai 1996: 219). Popular participation aimed at dialogue and interaction through four functions (Rahnema 2001: 121-22). The cognitive function represented people’s own knowledge system, to counter the dominating ethnocentric view about development. Its political function was to legitimize development via empowerment (see also Mosse 2001). Instrumentally it offered new options for development strategies and new tools for empowerment and development. Finally, its social function was to fulfil people’s needs, and to enable development.

Then, under modernisation’s influence in the late 1970s and early 1980s, community participation was mainly employed as a cost-sharing means (Paul 1987). Cost-sharing and co-
production of services surfaced as dominant modes of participation; it was stripped of any association with the transfer of power and control. Instead, people needed to contribute in cash or kind by providing materials and labour to support these processes (Cornwall and Brock 2005b; Riley and Wakely 2005: 41). Less attention was paid to communities’ aspirations, involvement or knowledge.

After a while it became evident that there were problems with sustainability or actual failures in many development attempts. Clearly more attention had to be paid to communities as beneficiaries and future users of the intervention outcome, services and facilities. In contrast to thinking of participation as a means, it was again considered as an end, converting from a pragmatic cost-related term to a politically connotated term ‘empowerment’, where power was reckoned to be the underpinning force (Mohan 2002b). Community members would fully participate in decision making regarding issues related to their lives. Participation was intended to be inclusive: everyone, also the deprived should be recognized and respected for their contributions (Korten 1990: 4-5). This meant returning to the auspices of Freire and borrowing from the ideas of earlier populist movements (Nederveen Pieterse 2001).

When this neo-populist paradigm\(^{15}\) gained more space, in rhetoric it entailed resolution for issues about power and the control of resources but often in practice it was just ‘classic development’ approach in new clothes (P. Blaikie 2000: 1044). The objectives of democracy were imposed on people “in a socially coercive manner” (Frayne et al. 2001: 298), and the input of residents was rarely tangible and concrete. Participation was buried into unequal power relations, with its objectives often defined by outsiders. Similarly, participation was used in connection with decentralisation to hide the continued centralisation such as aid agencies’ top-down approaches to promote local capacity for participation (Nelson and Wright 1995: 16). For instance, the World Bank’s participation strategy was based on ideological notions of stakeholder and transformation (Nelson and Wright 1995: 6), advocating for grassroots’ participation while in practice it was still very much a top-down approach based on neo-liberal agenda (P. Blaikie 2000; Kessides 1997: 15).

In addition, to the above mentioned more established approaches; there have been critical accounts about development concepts, which have produced challenging alternatives. Postmodern development deconstructs the concept of power and questions the general understanding and treatment of community in mainstream development discourses. Post-

\(^{15}\) Blaikie (2000) classifies development approaches as neo-populist (grassroots-based), classic (modernist) and post-modernist.
developmentalists present still more radical views, since they consider development as a power play at the same time negating the need for development interventions. However, in practice these ideological movements can put forward less coherent concrete ideas for the agenda (Nederveen Pieterse 2000).

Nowadays participation has become a normative idea, that is to say the only right way to practice development activities (Cornwall 2003). New rhetoric under mainstream development such as livelihoods and rights based approaches have emerged, but it remains to be seen whether they can spawn transformative changes. However, power is the key issue to be embraced. If mainstream community development continues ignoring issues of power, it will not be able to produce effective outcomes (Curtis 1995: 118).

3.9.3 Good governance in local context
Generally, good governance is advocated mostly at appropriate macroeconomic policy levels (Turner and Hulme 1997). However, this implies a conundrum as it is considered elementary for poverty reduction, but local governance has more impact on the lives of the poor (Clark 1997: 45). Therefore, local governance should also be the locus for measures of good governance. One of the main problems hampering good governance is the lack of structures and concrete mechanisms (Wood 1997: 82). Participation as an essential element for governance lacks institutionalization to gain more impetus (Mohan and Stokke 2000; Schönhuth 2002). Different agendas of political participation through decentralization and good governance as well as social participation at local levels are still working in different realms, which need to be merged into one (Cornwall c.a. 2000).

As with democracy, good governance has been accused of representing culturally doubtful, imported ideas, ignoring indigenous knowledge systems “...a revival of ethnocentric, modernising ideology, attempting to make the myths of one society reality in another” (Wood 1997: 79-80). Similarly, promotion and implementation of the participation paradigm (about participation and development paradigm, see for instance Stiglitz 2003) have often been processed under an ethnocentric approach where indigenous knowledge systems have been overlooked. Distinct state and society are related more to a Western context. They are not in complete harmony with the current reality of Sub-Saharan Africa which is blurred with a post-colonial legacy and indigenous, traditional structures still having a strong influence. For example, participation as it is currently practised, is an unfamiliar idea in many traditional societies (Rahnema 2001). Therefore, the compatibility of Western originated ideas of dominating good governance paradigm with indigenous institutions and cultures elsewhere is questionable.
Without considering local contexts and knowledge systems, it will be difficult to achieve the targets of good governance and fair and responsive service delivery. This emphasis on local knowledge systems needs to be incorporated in the understanding of communities’ membership in partnership as much as possible as it is a seminal underlying feature of power in Africa (see Chabal 1994).

3.10 DELIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES

3.10.1 Introduction

Service delivery in developing countries, in particular in poor areas in Sub-Saharan Africa is a complicated business. Available resources do not match with the growing demand; knowledge, skills and competence in general are still below required levels and general capacity is low. Moreover, a number of service producers can have divergent roles, which makes the picture complex.

Basically, service delivery can be covered by four different kind of institutions: public sector, pro-profit private sector, non-profit private sector (civil society) and communities, the beneficiaries or customers themselves who can have complementary roles (Korten 1990: 98-99).

To maximize effectiveness and responsiveness, public and both pro- and non-profit private sectors should participate in service delivery as “…excessive emphasis on any one to the exclusion of the others will seriously limit authentic development… “ (Korten 1990: 98).

Conventional institutional arrangements based on producers’ relation and functions can be classified into the following four categories (Joshi and Moore 2002): public sector provision; completely privatized services delivered by CSOs or commercial companies; CSO and pro-profit private sector produced services contracted by government; and self-help activities, where the outputs are contributed by communities themselves. During recent years, a fifth model, a hybrid form of service delivery combining self-help with public or private provision such as co-production or partnership has gained a foothold in developing countries, too. In Figure 1 the typology of basic service delivery options is presented.
To understand different modes of service production, the following sections first identify and then discuss the different organisations involved in service delivery and mechanisms how they participate. Social capital as a necessary element in collective action is examined. Then, the focus is on partnerships in service delivery particularly with communities. This includes investigation into key issues such as the understanding of community, CBO legitimacy, community participation and agency, sense of ownership and community contribution drawing from vast experiences in participatory projects as partnership with communities in the production of infrastructure still remains less studied empirically.

3.10.2 Public sector provision and production
Traditionally, the responsibility for both provision and production has been with the public sector, boosted by the post-war Keynesian paradigm. Thereafter, came the so called “government failure” when the emphasis in service production was transferred from the government more onto the private sector (Dollery and Wallis 2003).
Government failure was caused by shortcomings in the interpretations of public interest and conflicts between private and public interests (Kessides 1993: 15). Currently, mainstream views are that the government should be less involved in production but more in provision such as undertaking policy preparation and sectoral planning (Kessides 1993; Ostrom et al. 1993: 106). In effect, in developing countries the role of the government has changed from earlier emphasis on production to become more developmental, to regulate and coordinate (Korten 1990).

Despite all, a strong government is still preferred to enable frontline service providers to exercise professional autonomy and to ensure accountability between different actors (The World Bank 2003: 52). Actually, a weak government and public sector can complicate the work of the private sector due to inadequacies in national policies or standards (The World Bank 2003: 215). Kessides lists several reasons why the government should get involved in service delivery for example due to coordination requirements of externalities such as environmental impact or to distributional objectives such as equity and poverty reduction (Kessides 1993), to address the unmet needs but it should be facilitated by public sector reforms (Grindle 2002: 4-5).

Nevertheless, citizens continue to endorse the public sector as a service producer due to the mixed experience of private sector and “… even those prepared to pay more have genuine concerns about the implications of higher costs for those poorer than themselves.” (Rakodi 2002: 19-20).

3.10.3 Privatized services
The increasing role of the private sector in general and privatized services in particular corresponds to the basic principles of the dominating neo-liberalism and NPM. Privatizing basic service delivery in developing countries has not been much of a domestic idea, but rather it has predominantly been endorsed by international funding agencies and banks, IMF at the forefront (Semboja and Therkildsen 1995).

The concept of privatization has ample usages and definitions. For example, Savas defines privatization less as a concrete transfer action but as “a philosophical position” which governs relationships, roles and responsibilities between private and public sector (Savas 2006). Its basic idea is to shrink the role of the public sector transferring the ownership to private organisations. In some cases outsourcing and public-private partnerships could be interpreted as privatization (Savas 2006: 1). Privatization can be implemented partially, in a continuous action through delegation such as franchising or public-private partnerships; fully as a divestment, a one-time action of selling; or completely by surrendering the functions (Savas 2006). Yet, the ultimate
responsibility for service provision can still remain with the government (Semboja and Therkildsen 1995: 2-3).

There are several arguments for the involvement of the private sector in service delivery. The pro-profit private sector was anticipated to produce services more efficiently (Korten 1990). Politically, it has been essential to separate policymakers from service providers (The World Bank 2003: 165). Technically, for example in water, sanitation and electricity sectors, private companies have offered specific knowledge such as management expertise.

Increasingly, there are dilemmas related to the involvement of profit making companies in the provision and production of basic services. First, the feasibility of privatization hinges also on the type of services and technological solutions required. For example, commercial companies might not be able or willing to produce simple enough infrastructure which would be responsive, adequate and feasible to maintain in poorer urban areas or rural conditions (Ostrom et al. 1993: 230-31).

Second, private commercial companies honour only purchasing power; they have a limited niche and do not respect equitable distribution which is society’s collective objective (The World Bank 2003: 52). Thus, they cannot bring out solutions to service problems in socially deprived areas where communities, in particular the poor, are often not even able or willing to pay for privatised or upgraded services (Semboja and Therkildsen 1995: 8-9). In Uganda, privatized water cost up to twice as much as the subsidised water supplied by the national water company; the poor were not able to pay for it (Anon. 2004: 37). Even if some households could afford paying for better services, the exclusion of the rest could provoke negative consequences as they would opt for free riding or exit (Crook 2002: 1). This indicates that privatization might be ill-suited to the delivery of basic services to the poorer segments of society considering the capabilities and preferences of the poor themselves.

3.10.4 Outsourcing services from CSO and pro-profit private sector
Outsourcing (or contracting out) of service production or delivery means that the public sector pays a fee for the services provided by pro-profit private companies or CSOs. When contracting out, the role of the government changes from the earlier role of service provision to contract management, monitoring, and planning to ensure strategic vision and policy objectives (Crook 2002: 2).

The general perception is that contracting out services to specialized companies is more efficient and competitive than provision by the public sector itself (Hewitt 2000; Kessides 1993; Wallis
and Dollery 2002: 77). A widened resource base has proven to be valuable, as SAPs have required the governments to reduce their budget for social services therefore other entities have been welcomed to fill in the gaps in service provision (Mohan 2002a: 144; Nowland-Foreman 1998: 108). Private entities can bring in benefits such as increased available resources, efficiency and improved management skills, which consequently can improve the accountability to customers. Contracting out similarly diminishes the power of government officials and increases the power of politicians and contractors (Crook 2002).

Contracting out to CSOs has been prompted by different motives. CSOs have mostly been used as a supplementary or complementary producer, to provide resources and competencies when the public sector has not been able to. For instance, CSOs’ ability to work with communities, with the underprivileged or understanding of people’s evolving values can contribute to sustainability or improved ownership (Korten 1990; Nowland-Foreman 1998: 116; Plummer 2002).

In developing countries, contracting out does not necessarily mean that the role of the state is decreased, as generally the division of labour between private and public sectors is different from that in Western countries. Public resources might be used for privately managed activities such as health centres run by civil society organisations or schools taken care of by Parent-teacher-associations (PTAs). In addition, governments are generally assumed to grant funding in the long run for recurrent operation and maintenance costs (Semboja and Therkildsen 1995: 2-12).

As economical and effective the involvement of CSOs as (sub-)contractors appears it is not without perils. The contractual mode may contradict many of the fundamental principles and virtues of civil society organisations, creating pressure to transform its nature and purpose for instance by losing their voluntary character as a consequence of contract terms and conditions (Dollery and Wallis 2003). Contracting out jeopardizes its own original motives: in the heart there is a contradiction between the demands for efficiency and participatory approach: “…NGOs involved in project implementation on contractual terms, especially in construction projects, may face a trade-off between low costs and adhering to a participatory approach…” (M. Robinson 1997: 66). As a result, contracting can threaten the confidential relationship CSOs have built with communities, shifting CSOs’ position vis-à-vis communities closer to the government (Riley and Wakely 2005: 129). Even their legitimacy can diminish if it is not any more based on values but on contracts. Furthermore, in the long term, contractual culture can erode the formed social capital as managerial and voluntary cultures may clash (Wallis and Dollery 2002: 82). CSOs risk turning more into businesses, to view the government as their business partner and
thus to reduce their activities as the watchdog over government (Anon. 2004: 77), or the government can actually seize more control of civil society (Nowland-Foreman 1998: 113).

The leverage of outsourcing services from CSOs has led to situations where parallel structures have been created and where most activities undertaken by for instance NGOs are the same as the state does (Fowler 1995: 58-61). If this tendency continues, state operations are gradually transferred and franchised to NGOs (Wood 1997). In Kampala, Uganda, when the local government did not have capacity for service delivery, both private companies and NGOs were contracted to carry out solid waste management (Golooba-Mutebi 2003). There were conflicts and lack of trust between different levels of local government regarding supervision and management of the contracts. The result was a cleaner city, in particular in well-off areas, but lack of equity. Nonetheless, when the volume of the required services increases, the real advantage of this institutional arrangement compared to the traditional government centred model is questionable (Wood 1997: 79-80).

3.10.5 Self-help and provision through community contribution

When by the 1980s cost-sharing became necessary, self help or community provision of labour and materials were believed to answer to the perceived failure of the top-down approaches of the public sector and to contribute to cost-effectiveness (Cornwall 2002). Community self-financing would allocate part of the costs on the shoulders of community members though governments in some cases pay a good part of the capital costs (The World Bank 2003: 172).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, self-help has its roots in local traditions. There are several examples of self-help projects such as Kenyan harambee movement and Tanzanian village shambas\(^{16}\) which were formed in the post-independence period but they were grounded on traditional institutions. Self-help projects functioned primarily in areas where there was a solid economic base, strong social cohesion and consequently large amounts of social capital (Oyugi 1995; Semboja and Therkildsen 1995).

Even currently rural self-help projects are a constitutive means for remote communities to create social infrastructure and have access to basic services. In Zambia, education programmes such as ZAMSF (using WB Social Investment Funds), Basic-Education Sub-Sector Programme (BESSIP) and Education Sector Support Programme (ESSP)\(^{17}\) offered mechanisms for underprivileged rural communities to produce their own educational infrastructure, thus

\(^{16}\) Communal village fields

\(^{17}\) I was attached to BESSIP and ESSP in 2000-2002 while working in the Ministry of Education of Zambia as the Sectoral Building Advisor in the School Infrastructure Section.
improving their chances for example to improve the quality of teaching facilities and to accommodate qualified teachers. These self-help interventions were practically their only opportunity to upgrade the infrastructure, so vast is the gap between the need and supply. Without any self-help attempts many remote communities would otherwise remain poorly serviced.

Self-help interventions are not self-evidently fair, egalitarian and superior ways to provide services to a community. First, the poor might not be the target population inside the community. Actually, to reach the poorest the interventions have to be very narrowly targeted, as the elite, corrupt and unprincipled leaders can also manipulate the project (The World Bank 2003: 93). In Kenya and Zambia, community financed health experiment ‘Bamako Initiative’ did not manage to give preference to the poorest (Gilson et al. 2001). Poor accountability and lack of internal democracy, in particular towards minorities and the underprivileged can cause a risk of intrinsic conflicts.

Second, neither is self-help always voluntary. Despite universal rhetoric, the burden for self-help might be allocated easily to the poor. Traditionally, villagers for example in Uganda were compelled by traditional leaders to participate in collective action, though current elected leaders do not have the same powers (Golooba-Mutebi 2004).

Third, small-scale self-help interventions might not be able to take advantage of efficient technologies. Poor technical quality can result from problems in balancing between the community control and technical quality, as few residents have the required knowledge and skills (The World Bank 2003: 93).

Fourth, self-help and community contribution represent unfair, unjust approach to service production. Community contributions are recognized as a tax, communities might pay double for social provision: both through taxes and through their own resources (Johnson and Wilson 2000). However, a community contribution is more easily acceptable than conventional taxes since communities themselves pay to receive public services and see the benefits, paying ordinary taxes would not necessarily result in a concrete outcome (Fowler 1995: 64; Hyden 1983: 95).

Though inevitable and necessary, self-help projects and community contribution-systems are indeed products of intrinsically unequal and unfair policy application (Curtis 1995; Mohan 2002a: 149). Cost sharing principles presume that the poor are able to continue paying that “…there is residual capacity on the part of the poor to continue taxing themselves beyond what they
have managed so far! “ (Oyugi 1995: 132-33). Therefore, self-help’s feasibility and benefits by and large depend on the context, place and time18.

3.10.6 Hybrid forms of co-operative service production

As claimed earlier, the relation between civil society and the state in service production in developing countries has become ever more instrumental. An intensive complementary collaboration between government, CSOs and citizens is necessary for the production of public goods19, as collaborative collective action is argued to be the most important and most feasible approach to deliver services for the majority of the population (Lam 1996: 1039-40; Ostrom 1996). It would avoid the problems of earlier mentioned production modes, and enable the appropriation of different kinds of resources (money, labour, creativity) coming from a range of sources, such as communities, civil society, the government and donors (Wunsch 1998). The promotion of collaborative production modes in service delivery began with the launch of the concept co-production. Co-production20 was coined by Ostrom in the late 1970s in response to the perceived ineffectiveness of highly centralized service production (Ostrom et al. 1993; Ostrom 1996). Based on empirical research, she reasoned that production of services required beneficiaries’ active participation (Ostrom 1996: 1079). Co-production was defined as “a process through which inputs used to produce a good or services are contributed by individuals who are not in the same organisation” (Ostrom 1996: 1073). It can be seen also as a continuous relationship: “The provision of public services (broadly defined, to include regulation) through an institutionalised, long term relationship between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contribution” (Joshi and Moore 2002: 11).

Co-production between governments and citizens combines the efforts and resources what they can make available to produce for instance a public good or basic services. Beneficiaries need to be willing to pay a portion for example of the capital costs, invest some resources as up-front and commit to undertake maintenance to ensure sustainability. Most significantly, beneficiaries must be able to participate in the intervention, to the design and monitoring of the provision of services (The World Bank 2003).

The idea of co-production influenced the relationship between the public sector and civil society. It gained importance since the public sector had fewer means to supply basic services, relying

18 Interview Mr Kenny Manara, KEPA Policy Officer in Morogoro on 24.4.2006
19 A public good can be enjoyed by everybody regardless their contribution, and an individual’s consumption does not reduce others’ access to it (page 163 in Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
20 The theoretical underpinnings of institutional approach to co-production are dealt with in the theoretical chapter 4.
increasingly on the resources of other actors. The partners were also otherwise interdependent: public sector possessed scientific knowledge and beneficiaries themselves possessed time-specific and place-specific knowledge, both necessary for effective operation and maintenance (Lam 1996: 1041).

There is a distinction between co-production and partnership. When users contribute to the production; the role of service providers and service users and, furthermore, their power positions and authority are not defined along conventional lines between the public sector and citizens. But the idea of co-production is largely based on complementary resources, it does not deal with power and therefore does not imply any equal decision-making, whereas partnership encompasses such cardinal issues as power, participation and trust between the partners (Joshi and Moore 2002). Thus, partnership attempts to bring forth a platform to improve the institutionalization of participation within inter-organisational co-operation.

3.10.7 Social capital
Collective action is an evident and necessary element for both self-help and co-production. The underlying driving force of collective action is social capital. Basically, social capital is argued to be the most important resource communities can offer in successful community based service delivery (Pinto: 13). However, it is also a much contested concept.

Social capital is perceived to be the essential cultural component of modern societies (Fukuyama 2003), a crucial ingredient for the sustainable improvement of living conditions in developing countries (Evans 1996a: 1034). It has various definitions such as “… the sociocultural ‘glue’ which binds communities together and ensures both political and economic progress” (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 255); “…an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals” (Fukuyama 2003: 3) or finally “… features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions…” (Putnam 1993: 167).

To produce strong civil society, which is considered a condition for modern liberal democracy, a notable amount of social capital is necessary (Fukuyama 2003: 7). Social capital is a mechanism or force that contributes to the collaboration of members of a certain group. It has been theorized via game theory and prisoners’ dilemma. In collective production of public good, social capital can be seen as “the body of shared knowledge about how to organize people in a productive manner” (Ostrom et al. 1993: 191) “for forming effective non-central (or polycentric), public-private, institutional arrangements within which sustainable infrastructure can be
developed” (Ostrom et al. 1993: 209). Thus, local organisations using social capital can make physical capital operational and enable its sustainability.

Social capital is not an overwhelmingly positive phenomenon. It does not essentially need to be associated with an affirmative, constructive action since for example criminal gangs can exemplify social capital. In South Africa, a common enemy (apartheid) was the “social glue” that held communities together (Smit 2001: 242). Nederveen Pieterse claims that by forming a power locus of the elite, social capital can exclude others, hence connecting some and excluding others from social power (Nederveen Pieterse 2001: 125).

The concept of social capital has been the target of numerous individual studies and research programmes. It has also been widely criticised overlooking contextual issues, see for instance Ben Fine’s extensive critic of it (Fine 2001). Social capital’s lack of proper quantification tools have been criticised, though McAslan claims they could potentially be surpassed by considering social capital as a metaphor (McAslan 2002). Ideas that social capital is a manifestation of civicness have been attributed to being a ethnocentric, for instance prisoners’ dilemma is not applicable to the African context since it does not consider the ‘economy of affection’ (Hyden 2001: 161-63). Social capital has been ascribed to a “reductionist approach” which omits anything related to power (Mohan and Stokke 2000), dissolving social and political issues into economic perspective and serving as a tool to legitimize and enhance neo-liberal regime (Mayer 2003: 125-26). Indeed, treating social capital as a metaphor to depict the phenomenon of interest and commitment to mutuality or collective action would offer an exit from the impasse.

Social capital is analogous to the school of commonly pooled resources which explores the problems of collective action. They concentrate on mechanisms of how to avoid opportunism and free-riders, to create a successful collective action (see for instance Ostrom 1995). The problem with commonly pooled resources is the omission of social processes and individuals’ agency, thus, basically power relations, not aiming at understanding the underlying reasons and factors as to why opportunism and free-riders occur, and ultimately why some people defect. Putnam claims free-riders appear when mutual commitment is lacking (Putnam 1993: 164), but it would be important to understand why the commitment is lacking, and ultimately how people interpret a collective action such as partnership as tentative. Therefore, the employment of social capital should require an exploration of the social and cultural context including an understanding of the practices influencing agents’ different attitudes to collective action.

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21 See also section 3.4.4.
3.11 PARTNERSHIP WITH CIVIL SOCIETY

3.11.1 Background
The underpinning keynotes in partnership are the same ones as in co-production, but through the embrace of power relations between partners, partnerships arise over the production objective into a more equitable relationship.

Partnership was launched in the context of urban governance and service delivery in developing countries during Habitat II in 1996. Urban Partnership was then marketed as a politically suitable and feasible solution to underlying problems in service provision in developing countries. In development practice and particularly in rhetoric, partnership has been popular for quite some time but it was eventually advanced by neo-liberalist framework. Currently, it frequently surfaces in policy documents, good governance, poverty reduction strategy papers and in local governance papers for both the enhancement of local democracy and implementation of service delivery. That is a tall order indeed.

The experience in partnerships is longest in Europe, where it has widely been adopted as a governance tool for all kinds of activities: area regeneration, service delivery, etc (see eg Elander 2002; Stoker 1998). For example, in the UK the first tentative initiatives for partnerships were introduced in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Baloch and Taylor 2001: 2-3). The 1980s was the era of bilateral partnerships, in the 1990s multilateral partnerships started mushrooming and public-private partnerships (PPP) were firmly buttressed as a governance tool (Baloch and Taylor 2001: 2-3; Lowndes et al. 1997: 334).

The main thrust for Western partnerships has been financial motives, underpinned by neo-liberalism and subsequently NPM policies. In the UK, partnerships were established under the strong influence of the privatisation ethos, instigated either for local reasons or as a prerequisite for funding (Lowndes et al. 1997: 333). For example, urban development corporations (UDCs) formed a partnership between central government and private interests (Hastings 1996: 253-54). Though the market was the main partner, inclusion of civil society has since then improved sustainability and the quality of the services for example in neighbourhood upgrading (Kooiman 2003: 100).

3.11.2 Concept of partnership
Partnership as a concept is positively value-laden, referring to different practices under wide-ranging purposes and motives (Harrison 2002; Johnson and Wilson 2000: 1891-92). There is no stipulative definition for partnership but several open definitions and even more ample use of
them (eg Crawford 2003; Harriss 2000; Peters 1998). Even in the Habitat Agenda 1996 partnership has been devoted a gamut of different definitions (UNCHS 1997).

In the context of regeneration projects, which are common in the UK, partnership can be perceived as “a coalition of interests drawn from more than one sector in order to prepare and oversee an agreed strategy for the regeneration of a defined area” (Elander 2002: 191). Partnerships can be viewed through network thinking, partnerships consisting of “networks of such diverse actors as people from businesses, foundations, labour unions, academic research institutes and NGOs” (Rhodes 1986 quoted in Elander 2002: 192). However, a partnership can also be a short-term intervention “an ad hoc bargain for one particular occasion (an issue network), in addition to “an element of long-term strategy for a set of actors (a policy community)” (Rhodes 1986 quoted in Elander 2002: 192). To distinguish networks and partnerships, Lowndes et al attest that networks and partnerships are basically different (Lowndes et al. 1997: 336-37). Networks are dynamic and not formally constituted, and partnerships are formal arrangements between organisations (see Table 1). However, as organisational partnerships can build up on personal networks, they finally do not exclude each other.

Table 1. The features of Networks and Partnerships

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<thead>
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<th>Network</th>
<th>Partnership</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Focus</strong></td>
<td>Individual relationships</td>
<td>Organisational relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motivation</strong></td>
<td>Voluntaristic</td>
<td>Voluntaristic or imposed</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Boundary</strong></td>
<td>Indistinct</td>
<td>Clear</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Composition</strong></td>
<td>Fluid</td>
<td>Stable</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Membership</strong></td>
<td>Defined by self and/or others</td>
<td>Defined by formal agreement</td>
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<td><strong>Formalisation</strong></td>
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In political sciences a universal criterion for partnership is that it is a continuous relationship, not just a one-off deal, where at least one partner out of two or more partners represents public sector see for example Peters (1998). All partners have power to negotiate and participate in the decision making, bargaining on their own behalf. However, this does not necessarily mean that power relations are symmetrical. Moreover, partners should assume mutual shared responsibility for the outcomes and share the risks. In comparison with co-production, there is an agreement basis in partnership; partnership encompassing the power base of the relationship (Joshi and Moore 2002: 11). Crawford (2003: 143) defines genuine partnership between international and national organisations being equitable and meaningful; based on mutual goals and co-operation; respect for sovereignty partners having time and commitment to maintain it.
Along with the increase in the number of partnerships, the meaning has also become even more obscure. At state level collaboration, for example in bi- and multi-lateral development cooperation the notion of partnership is currently used by International Financing Institutions (IFIs) and other donors in a misleading and obfuscating connection (Mercer 2003: 746). Attributing a funding relationship in development collaboration as partnership alludes the fact that the funding agency and client would be treated as equal partners, when actually there are veiled conditionalities, for instance in fiscal policies (Mercer 2003).

Similarly within other development collaboration, partnership is used to describe collaboration between practically any organisations: donors, northern NGOs with their southern counterparts, governments, NGOs etc, leading to an extensive criticism of the concept of ‘partnership’ being murky (see for instance Mercer 2003). In addition, partnership has become a mechanism to be applied widely in key policies. Citizens’ participation as a means, in other words communities contributing resources for service production is often tagged as partnership in national strategies and policies, see chapter 3.11.5.3 for more discussion.

Pulling all this together, the prevailing misconception is “to call any initiative that involves more than one sector a partnership”, partnership thus losing its genuine meaning and becoming devalued (Riley and Wakely 2005: 1). Alas, the concept of partnership is often used, when it actually involves contracting or “contractual arrangements that describe themselves as partnerships” (Riley and Wakely 2005: 24). Contracting can be close to partnership, but then again contracting might not be based on balanced power or on trust, legitimacy or respect as partnership should be. Once more partnership is used to disguise the real power in a relationship (Harrison 2002). Therefore, Riley and Wakely define an ‘authentic partnership’, which is based on shared ideas, trust, mutualism, interdependence and respect to “…build confidence and skills, generate new social relationships and give power to the weakest groups in society.” (Riley and Wakely 2005: 11).

Partnership within the governance framework actually creates space for more complex relationships and new types of interfaces, where issues such as legitimacy, agency and voice intersect and need to be renegotiated “Inequities in terms of power, resources and influence aside, what partnership does imply is a degree of negotiation and mutual agreement on paths of action.” (Loewenson quoted in chapter 5.1 in Cornwall c.a. 2000). Hence, genuine partnership still remains far away from the reality. The ambiguous treatment of the concept reflects that it is more an ideal, a target at the end of the continuum. Rather than a noun, partnership is an attribute.
In this study, the definition of partnership, which is a combination of the definition applied in political sciences and ‘authentic partnership’ (Riley and Wakely 2005). Thus,

The definition of a genuine partnership

A genuine partnership is an ideal of a continuous relationship which is based on trust, mutualism and interdependence and where at least one partner represents the public sector. All partners have the power to negotiate and participate in the decision making, bargaining on their own behalf or legitimately for others. Genuine partnership is not absolute, but an optimum towards which partners target.

3.11.3 Motivations for and benefits of partnership

There are many direct and indirect rationales and motives for partnership, the main underpinning one is synergy. Synergy is the mutual benefit partners obtain when they join their complementary resources and take action together, thus they are obtaining more than they would obtain alone with their own resources (Elander 2002: 193). Synergy is vital and essential for partnership; widely agreed to be one of the “gluing” factors when forming a partnership with a divergent partner (Smith and Beazley 2000: 863-68).

Modern governance is founded on specialized organizations. Similarly, organizations are not any more omnipotent but interdependent; and they need supportive and complementary actions from other organisations. In synergy, organisations acting together for a common goal can combine different resources and powers to respond to these governance demands. Partnership might for example enhance the performance of local governments with weak capacities, who can improve effectiveness by outsourcing capacity to CSOs (see also Evans 1996b; Pierre 1998). Alternatively, partnership is seen as a positive way for an organisation to pursue and to increase legitimacy, such as much criticized oil companies seeking legitimation through collaboration with NGOs. Partnership also helps to spread risks between the partners. Thus, a joint action would bring more results than fragmented efforts, and partnership between completely different institutions such as local government and CSOs would create a win-win situation for all the stakeholders. In Eastern Africa, where decentralisation is still ‘young’ and consequently local governments have limited capacities and competence; collaboration with other partners is considered to be salient for providing basic services for the masses (Tostensen et al. 2001: 1).

Partnership evidently causes changes in partners. Synergy transformation occurs when partners try to influence others’ views, agendas or priorities. Transformation might take place when a partner adopts a more comprehensive approach, for example by becoming more efficient or a
business-oriented partner socially more aware. Thus, partners might be able to influence changes in other partners for a policy process that otherwise would suffer from obstacles (Stone 1989). Partnership with local government introduces a platform where there are increased possibilities to influence constructively and positively other agencies. For example, NGOs might endeavour to get into partnership with government in order to enhance local government’s participatory work (Clark 1997: 47), contributing to governmental development and aiming at changing “the state rather than simply criticise it” (Bebbington 1991 in Pretty 1995: 164).

Budget enlargement can take place when a joint action might persuade donors to grant more funding (Elander 2002). As a consequence to the reduced public budgets “…multi-organisational partnerships can enable local bodies to gain access to grant regimes that require financial and in-kind contributions from the private and voluntary/community actors” (Wallis and Dollery 2002: 77). Partnerships thus increase credibility and open new doors.

There are various concrete benefits that partnerships are anticipated to engender (Ballock and Taylor 2001; Elander 2002; Johnson and Wilson 2000; G. White and Robinson 1998). Government organisations might gain more influence when acting in partnership than through state power solely as a partnership can bring “institutional empowerment” and “effective leverage”(Pierre and Peters 2000: 78). Institutionally, partnership can be more sustainable and through increased trust cause less transaction costs than collaboration based on a conventional contract (Dollery and Wallis 2001; Ostrom et al. 1993). Partnership could equally bridge the antagonistic relationship between civil society and the government, contrary to the independent activities of CSOs in service provision. Likewise, partnership as an institutional framework can serve as a tool for the state to indirectly ensure that altruistic intentions are coordinated and public interests are protected (Baldwin and Cave 1999: 17).

Putatively, partnership can have a positive impact on good governance. As an inclusive practice, it is claimed to offer a mechanism to empower communities and offer them more social power, to increase inclusiveness and participation (Johnson and Wilson 2000: 1891-92). Partnership can improve responsiveness to citizens’ service needs (Otiso 2003). Consensus building in partnership is an opportunity for the weaker partners to become empowered and to increase partners’ understanding of each other (Riley and Wakely 2005: 17). CSOs’ as partners in service delivery presumptively improves efficiency and enhances participation and empowerment of ordinary people in decision making (Manor 2002: 1-2; Plummer 2002: 37).

Ordinary residents/people in this research refer to people who do not hold any specific position of social or political power in the community.
In conclusion, partnership plausibly can extend several advantages, which range from technical and financial gains to political and social benefits. It can provide a suitable interaction tool for modern governance to enhance democracy and good governance. Through synergy and complementing assets, it can improve effectiveness and efficiency of the interventions as well as sustainability of service delivery. Partnerships can similarly create opportunities for community participation. Yet, despite all these manifold benefits there are equally potentially detrimental issues.

3.11.4 Constraints and risks of partnership

Many of the perceived problems of a partnership are conspicuous, whereas some are implicit but still might have an intrusive impact in the long run. A partnership typically involves different organisations which have dissimilar structures, management cultures, possibly even priorities with little convergence. Therefore, to enter into a partnership arrangement, these divergences need to be smoothened out and a consensus about the agendas is required; or, at least the divergences need to be mutually understood and respected (Balloch and Taylor 2001: 9; Penrose 2000: 251-52). To connect different organisations for collaboration requires a lot of patience and flexibility from the partners.

Since partnership does not wipe out the original power relations between partners, positive transformation can become manipulation. Partnership is expected to enable a consensus between the state and civil society but a forced consensus, “consultation”, can frame the space for discussion of alternatives (Mohan 2002a: 128). They might try to influence each others’ agendas, values or priorities too excessively, which could lead to co-option or politicisation, deflecting from their original aspirations (Johnson and Wilson 2000: 1891-92). Co-option might lead to repressive transformation of the organisation, undetectable at first glance; it can even blur the boundaries between the government and civil society. As a result, government might exploit civil society deliberatively which they ordinarily would not manage to do (Morison 2000: 131).

In partnerships between donors and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) with other CSOs, too often the aim of the partnership is just to improve the management of CSOs (Harrison 2002: 591). For example, Harris and Lister make a reference to a partnership23 between NGOs, where asymmetrical power relationships were based on unequal financial positions. It led to a situation where more powerful and resourceful Northern partners regarded the collaboration as partnership whereas the Southern ones did not consider it as ‘partnership’, since they were feeling they were holding little power (Harris 2008; Lister 2000). Thus, partnership easily

23 Though strictly speaking not a partnership according to the definition of this study.
disguises and maintains actual asymmetrical power relationships (Nederveen Pieterse 2001: 145), and serves for legitimising current development approaches (Lister 2000).

The rhetoric of partnership with the private sector is easily just an effort to disguise a purely commercial contract, a relationship between a client and a contractor. Often, the partnership takes place hierarchically at different levels; in Tanzania the higher level local government subcontracted private providers for rubbish clearance, expected a lower level of local government to monitor their work, beneficiaries were not involved in the process but were expected to pay service providers for the services (Kaare 2002).

Although partnership can nurture good governance, it can equally have an adverse impact on it. Even the suitability of PPPs’ in governance has been questioned since PPPs might take the public power too close to the interests of private companies (Pierre 1998). Government policies such as poverty reduction strategies should define the main objectives for service provision, but a partnership arrangement which is based on consensus about priorities might divert resources. Local government might be attracted to channel resources and participate in activities which are not of the highest priority but which generate external funding (Elander 2002; Peters 1998; Stoker 1998). External resources can “help to determine the ways in which ‘problems’ are constructed”, thus dependency on other partner’s resources constitutes a risk to the sustainability (D. J. Lewis 1998: 113). In Cameroon a local NGO launched a successful refuse removal programme but after entering into partnership with the city council, it started moving to elite areas. At the end, the activities became highly politicised: “Community action, which in the initial stages was orientated towards servicing the common interests of city residents, became with the backing of the World Bank and the government, an employer organisation by profit considerations -both political and monetary.” (Tati 2001: 187-88). Consequently, the politicisation of CSOs can become more institutionalised, thus leading CSOs to diminish their voluntary character (G. White and Robinson 1998). According to Manor (Manor 2002: 1-6) good governance loses as CSOs become tame and their hands tied in a partnership. They may miss opportunities to curb corruption and risk becoming politically co-opted. In particular, CSOs may be tempted to interrelate increasingly with political structures, facing the risk of “…corruption, reduced independence, and financial dependency.” (Clark 1997: 47).

Moreover, partnership represents one of the loci where potential accountability gaps may surge (Lyons and Smuts 1998; Newell and Bellour 2002; Riley and Wakely 2005). The nature of partnership being between organisations and their original accountability mechanisms, somewhere in the interface between the public and private sectors, muddles up the tools for
democratic supervision and accountability. When service delivery is distributed to a wide range of different organisations, also the voice is fragmented and accountability is diminished (Newell and Bellour 2002). One of the questions raised is how and by whom the achievements and actions of partnership are assessed (Elander 2002; Peters 1998; Pierre 1998; Stoker 1998). Due to ‘quiet’ negotiations, there can be a relative lack of visibility and reduced transparency in front of actors and stakeholders who are outside of the partnership (Pierre 1998). In addition, partnerships yield power to non-elected bodies while they fill democratic gaps (Lowndes et al. 1997: 342).

On the whole, partnership interventions where too asymmetrical and unequal power relations exist can be difficult to manage and, particularly, it can be complicated to seek and reach for consensus. The least powerful may not be visible and not able to articulate their interests (Mayo and Taylor 2001: 39). For instance, prevailing deep imbalance in partnership between a government organisation and a grassroots organisation might present fewer opportunities for local people to communicate their aspirations.

The following section peruses the complicated relationship between communities, CSOs and local government both in partnership and in relation to participation and use of power, drawing form the long term experience in participatory community programmes.

3.11.5 Partnership with communities

3.11.5.1 Partnership as a platform for participation

Though partnership has had currency in development policies and strategies for some time, there is still little research and empirical evidence about partnerships with communities in connection to the production of social goods in developing countries. Instead of being considered a social process (Norman Long and van der Ploeg 1994: 78), production process easily remains considered as a technical or economic exercise. Social and political interaction between partners and the surrounding environment remain relatively unexplored terrain.

Partnerships have several implications for communities. On the one hand, partnerships would ostensibly bring communities closer to implementation (e.g. Johnson and Wilson 2000; Otiso 2003). Inclusion of underprivileged groups in partnerships has been claimed to contribute to the formation of social capital, “…to open up their political opportunity structure and establish relations of trust with previously excluded groups and organisations in order to contribute positively to the formation of social capital within their communities.” (Wallis and Dollery 2002: 83). On the other hand, if the mechanisms of accountability are already inadequate and ineffective, partnerships as more complex co-operation arrangements can further reduce them.
Partnerships can perpetuate the existing power relations (Lyons et al. 2002), which might increase the social stratification in society as “partnerships may legitimise policies that favour actors and interests in society who are already among the winners” (Elander 2002: 202). Participatory experiences have demonstrated how excluded parts of communities can easily be at a cognitive disadvantage. For example, in participatory Tanzanian village planning experiments there were several susceptible mechanisms in the local power processes such as information delivery and the way meetings were conducted, which ultimately benefited the local elite (Mihanjo 2005: 42-43).

Partnership is treated as a platform for community participation; where participation by implication is a seminal element (Smith and Beazley 2001). Yet, partnership represents a more established long term arrangement than a sole participatory project. But participation and empowerment are not simple concepts, their value bases, rhetoric and role in social power processes have been widely critically reviewed (Cleaver 1999; Cornwall and Brock 2005b; Rahnema 2001). Therefore, participatory projects are explored herewith to deconstruct both the notions of community and participation, in order to understand how community participation and empowerment ideas are translated into praxis.

3.11.5.2 Community and disenfranchised citizens revisited

There are several myths about communities which need to be deconstructed (Cleaver 1999), as a community “…carries connotations of consensus and ‘needs’ determined within parameters set by outsiders” (Nelson and Wright 1995: 15). For example, communities might have been pre-defined geographically, identified over a geographical space or per administrative unit (Cleaver 1999; Moore 2001). This disguises local economic and social structures: ”What is labelled a community is often an endogenous construct… by the nature of administrative or identity boundaries rather than an organic form.” (Mansuri 2004).

Equally, communities are believed to be homogeneous and consensual entities (Cornwall c.a. 2000; Crewe 1998; Mohan and Stokke 2000; Mohan 2001; Caroline Moser 1989), ”... homogenous and collectivist uses and producers of ’knowledge’” (Green 2001: 73). But communities24 might consider themselves to be socially stratified or socio-economically divergent, not uniformly composed as outsiders interpret them (Jalal 2002; Smit 2001: 237). Even if post-modernism has tried to criticize the reductionist approach of conventional development approaches, common socio-economic diversity still goes unnoticed or rather

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24 Following the previous argumentation, community here refers to a meta-community; ‘community’ as it is commonly defined but in reality consisting of micro-communities.
unacknowledged (Schuurman 2002). As a result, a homogenous, coherent community is created instead of analyzing it through communities’ social structures that are highly context specific (Lyons and Smuts 1999; Meikle et al. 2001).

At best diversification is discussed through simple dichotomy based on binary ontology, such as men and women, the poor and non-poor which disguises complex heterogeneity (Mohan 2001). Gender, for example, is socially constructed; therefore women cannot be lumped into one group. There are still several other different characteristics such as political views, age, ethnic differences; there are even several differences within the common segment of ‘the poor’ (Cornwall c.a. 2000).

Power relations inside a community remain an enigma for outsiders, which has resulted in overlooking or omitting the question of power (Mosse 1995). Local context, local politics or structures influencing people’s agency have been ignored (Cleaver 1999; Lyons and Smuts 1999; Mosse 1995). Therefore, too often, communities are believed to be blessed with omnipotence or a power vacuum. In essence, Mohan and Stokke claim that ‘local’ has been “romanticised” (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 249). For example, it has been forgotten or not acknowledged that local has boundaries and links to outside (Mohan 2002a: 134). This disregard has caused discrepancy between the objectives and conceptualization of participatory policy and local reality. A synthesis is missing between socially interpreted local-level democratization including grassroots development, and national politically constituted macro-economic policies (Harbeson 2001; Nederveen Pieterse 2001; see also the discussion on good governance in section 3.9). Therefore, acknowledging and understanding power dynamics in particular at local level is essential for successful priority definition and resource allocation (LGA 2002; Mohan 2001).

A common view of self-evident collective action is based on an idealistic and misinformed view of community reality, people being inherently altruist citizens (Green 2001). Kelsall claims collective action plausibly requires collective identity (Kelsall 2004). In reality, communities might not even have a communal interest (Cleaver 2001; Moore 2001); might not want to be together and work for the benefit of the community (Cornwall c.a. 2000) and not to be pro-participation (Crook and Sverrisson 2001: 8). Many traditional societies were not based on participation (Rahnema 2001), as well as many African cultures inherently are not democratic in Western sense (Crook and Sverrisson 2001: 8). In Tanzania, widely practiced participatory mechanisms are against local traditions (Cleaver 1999), so there they offer less opportunities for genuine decision making: "Political ignorance also makes possible the construction of an imagined community of participants, who can, and will, act collectively.” (Green 2001). In fact,
there can be a strong individual rationale behind collective action (Eyben 1995: 194). People in general and those living in poverty in particular naturally first strive for individual development and benefits. When the participatory approach of a drainage project in Guyana was misconceptualised, community members abandoned collective action and resorted into individual coping strategies by cleaning only that part of the drainage which led to their own property (Pelling 1998). Similarly, a rural development intervention in Tanzania faced a lack of support as community members felt collective action was prioritized on the expense of their individual needs (Green 2001).

A common interpretation of a community is to understand it as people with similar, collective aspirations or living in the same area, thus, treating them as a homogenous unit. However, collectivities should be treated like a unit (an individual) only if they share certain qualities such as companies which work for profits or hospitals for which there is a common mission such as curing (Giddens and Pierson 1998). For example, in South Africa, a water department uses an individual-based approach in urban areas and a community-based approach in rural areas where there is more social cohesion (Burger 2005). Therefore, Paul defined community as people who can act in concert (Paul 1987: 2).

Knowledge can describe relationships between community members, it can influence their social position, enable their genuine participation or prevent it (Cuthill 2005; S. White 1996), as information and knowledge are essential elements for controlling and negotiating participation and the use of power:

“Knowledge is culturally, socially and politically produced and is continuously reformulated as a powerful normative construct. Knowledge is thus an accumulation of social norms, rituals and practices that far from being constructed in isolation from power relations, is embedded in them (or against them).” (Kothari 2001: 141).

Communication and knowledge can help building trust, to endure the exposure to risk (Riley and Wakely 2005: 33). Subsequently, the political nature of knowledge shapes how it is gained and interpreted (Desai 1996). A lack of it can become a liability to community members (Pelling 1998). Since the local elite can control information, and thus influence development processes, elite capture is a risk (Eyben 1995; LGA 2002; Lyons and Smuts 1999). There can be monopolizing families and participation discourses can conflict with the domination of power elites (Blackburn et al. 2000; Cooksey and Kikula 2005). Similarly, there can be excluded groups such as different religious cliques or underprivileged people like the neglected elderly (S. White 1996: 12-13). Due to this social stratification which largely goes unnoticed, particularly
vulnerable sections of the community are still excluded from participation and decision-making (Cornwall 2003; Pelling 1998; Rose 2003).

Correspondingly, there are limited tools to analyse this stratification in practice (S. White 1996). Both neo-populism and post-modernism have tried to call attention to local diversity though they are grounded on completely different ideological roots. Post-modernism offers a very weakly studied interpretation of “local”, ignoring the local elite and power struggles (P. Blaikie 2000: 1038-39). Neo-populism has influenced mainstream classical development approaches in rhetoric, but in practice mainstream approaches have been harnessed by neo-liberalism. Therefore, it remains incapable to translate its rhetoric properly into practice.

The acknowledgement of diversity has an impact on the complexity of legitimacy of CSOs. These presupposedly homogeneous communities are similarly presupposedly to be represented by local CBOs or NGOs. Consistently, these singular CSOs are believed to enjoy automatic legitimacy in front of communities which, as discussed above, consist of dissimilar individuals (Kessides 1993: 41). Even though these CSOs should only “convey” communities’ interests, and not formally represent them (Bebbington and Riddel 1997), they might necessarily not at all serve the interests of their supposed constituencies but those of the elite (Charlick 2001). This raises a concern about social justice, as Mohan proclaims: “Rather than reflecting social differences the uneven promotion of civil society covertly strengthens social divisions, promotes factionalism and deepens the marginalisation of some groups” (Mohan 2002a: 148).

Therefore, both in a project and in a partnership, a participatory process aiming at consensus–building and controlling information but based on a false interpretation of community can backfire. The aim of participation turns around: instead of supporting the disenfranchised, the elite is reinforced (Kothari 2001: 142). Heterogeneous community will not be united or homogenised through participation, but it perpetuates divided and the elites can take advantage of the services over the disenfranchised (Mehrotra and Jarrett 2002: 1689).

The excluded might feel they have less power, and consequently they can only exercise power through resistance in public or private. Grassroots’ resistance can be expressed through different forms from silence as an indication of a refusal to participate up to sheer vandalism (Ni Laoire 1997 quoted in Pelling 1998). For instance, when a hillside community cooperative in the Philippines felt their agency and discursive power constrained, they simply refused to participate in the intervention (White 1996). Similarly, in societies where most women do not have a say through formal decision making institutions, they can embark on counterpower. For instance, in an Indian Forestry project, women applied counterpower when they experienced exclusion from
the decision-making, which was practised via the public realm (Sarin 1998 in Cornwall 2003). Hence, all these complex social processes might consequently obstruct the collective action, which is necessary for partnership (Allison 2002).

3.11.5.3 Participation as a means: community contribution

Partnership has thus become a vehicle to extract resources from communities to complement other funding (Rose 2003). The role assigned for community level actors is to be a beneficiary of external assistance and contributor of local resources (Pelling 1998). This stems from the neoliberal underpinnings in contemporary governance which have invigorated partnership as a mechanism for cost-sharing. The partnership liturgy preaches about participation but the practice reveals how resource synergy is crucial in many mainstream participation projects. There are several examples within projects based on community participation, where it and empowerment as policy synergies tend to be used as euphemisms (Rose 2003). For instance, an evaluation carried out in Tanzania discovered that community participation was largely interpreted as community contribution in labour and cash (Government of the Netherlands 1994 quoted in Cooksey and Kikula 2005: 29). Even in a partnership between international Northern and Southern NGOs, empowerment was buried under the power issues about financial management (Lister 2000).

On the one hand, community contribution is widely considered to be beneficial for sustainability (see eg Cleaver 1999; Cornwall and Brock 2005b; Rakodi 2002), though empirical evidence is still limited. For instance, Prokopy found out that both community participation in decision making and in cost contribution were important for the water project incomes and potentially for their sustainability (Prokopy 2005). On the other hand, critical accounts of community contribution focus on its unfair ethical basis, claiming that development agencies’ demands for community contribution are being based ”...on the international supremacy of free-market ideology...” (S. White 1996: 13). Since those who have more means can pay their share in cash or use a representative, the hard labour falls on poor people in particular.

3.11.5.4 Participation, empowerment and partnerships

The production of public goods does not necessarily entail empowerment or participation (Lyons et al. 2001b), though they are widely seen as beneficial, since they are attested to improve production efficiency and effectiveness to some degree (Cleaver 1999; Hardina 2003; Mansuri 2004; Caroline Moser 1989; Rahnema 2001). For example, rural water supply projects were more effective, when women and ‘clients’ in general participated in them (Kessides 1993). Similarly,
in Kenya, participation improved people’s willingness to pay for the services (Chege 2006), though Platteu (2003) claims there is no explicit empirical evidence of efficiency.

Furthermore, the literature widely attributes participatory approaches in service production to contributing to their responsiveness and sustainability (Chege 2006; Cleaver 2001; Green 2001; Kothari 2001; Lyons et al. 2001b; Pelling 1998; Pinto; Smit 2001; Smith and Beazley 2001; Turner and Hulme 1997). Community’s participation would facilitate implementation, yield more appropriate end product and as being more responsive it would ensure greater acceptance (Kessides 1997: 20); though most probably participation would also cause delays (Lyons et al. 2001b; Smit 2001). Creating partnership with local organisations such as CBOs is expected to improve sustainability through their acquired sense of ownership (Dill and Longhofer 2006). Grindle claims that the poor need to be fully considered and participate in the design and implementation of service delivery, in particular when they are also required to make a contribution (Grindle 2002: 7). Some view, though, there is little evidence that participation would guarantee better responsiveness by the poor (Burger 2005; Cleaver 1999; Tendler 1997). Actually, Mosse fears participation can become “a self-validating theory”, just to justify the intervention (Mosse 2001: 30), as it masks the perpetuating unequal approach of so called participatory development (Cornwall 2003).

Historically, power used to be a modernist concept which was correlated to the ownership and use of resources (James 1999: 13). Then, by the mid 1990s empowerment was incorporated into mainstream development discourses (Parpart 2002: 338), indicating that power was considered to be conveyed through processes of participation and empowerment where empowerment signified transferring power to a different level, “participation as an empowering process implies loss of central control and proliferation of local diversity” (R. Chambers 1995: 33-34). Empowerment thus was to challenge political hegemony through political action, resulting into transformative action (Parpart 2002). But the employment of the concepts of participation and empowerment has become more rhetoric; they have then become empty buzzwords; diluted, technical terms used for legitimizing development actions (Cleaver 1999; Cornwall and Brock 2005b: 15; Ferguson 1994). Mainstream empowerment has palpably become depoliticized (Cleaver 1999:599), and transformed from radical to something neutral suggesting equity rather than gaining more power (Cornwall and Brock 2005b: 5); a generic term for development activities influencing people’s lives, used more in the sense of people getting involved in project activities or income-generating

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25 Sustainability here refers to the continuity of the benefits of the development interventions, emphasizing the production aspect “maintaining or fostering the development of the systemic contexts that produce the goods, services, and amenities that people need or value, at an acceptable cost, for as long as they are needed or valued.” T. E. Allen et al., Supply-Side Sustainability (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) at 25-26.
activities (Cornwall c.a. 2000). Thus, political empowerment has returned to the generic economic mission for community contribution schemes. Power has been reduced to something which is delegated from above; taking part in the management becomes empowerment. “… the contemporary sense of the word does not seem to entail any direct control of resources or scope to join with others at the same level in the structure to pursue collective bargaining with the centre.” (James 1999: 13).

Rahnema asserts participation and empowerment are at best regarded as part of development jargon or co-option, and at worst disguising even oppressive or manipulative actions, actually discarding local indigenous forms of power (Rahnema 2001: 123). Desai concluded in Mumbai that in participatory projects “…most slum-dwellers are not becoming involved in decisions affecting their communities through this supposedly participatory system of representative institutions” (Desai 1996: 240), because there was a clear contradiction between the discourses, the practice and predominating attitudes (Desai 1996: 227).

Partnerships allegedly empower and improve the say of disenfranchised citizens in political life. There are few means how such interactions empower community members widely in society (Mansuri 2004), when they can only enhance the capability to use power within the partnership. (Lowndes et al. 1997: 324). Considering the above mentioned reservations regarding participation and empowerment, there is little space in partnership to influence the redistribution of the power, which has to come from major power clusters (Cleaver 1999). Actually, empowerment in a partnership should equip the disenfranchised to claim power outside the realm of partnership.

3.11.5.5 Participation, partnership and perceived community sense of ownership
A sense of ownership is a complex notion of different dimensions. It is rarely defined, but often thrown into participation discussions as a self-evident concept. The organisational behaviour – school links a sense of ownership with having positive attitudes and feeling responsibility towards the target, consisting thus of affective and cognitive elements, where the former transcends the latter (Dyne and Pierce 2004). Rather than the actual action of owning in a legal sense, a sense of ownership is an emotional relation toward the object, agents’ social distance from the object.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition of a sense of ownership</th>
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<tr>
<td>In this research, a sense of ownership is defined as the social distance to the object; a positive attitude including assuming responsibility toward the object.</td>
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Partnership is social interaction; a process based on social relationships, which develops over time. Partnership processes shape the outcome throughout. Thus, the outcome is an interim part of the process and similarly a sense of ownership is closely connected to the whole partnership process. For example, Ostrom et al defined four dimensions of a sense of ownership: to decide what is necessary and how resources are mobilised; to make contributions, and also communicate preferences during provision, during production and later on, to decide whether to continue using the good or not (Ostrom et al. 2001: 15). Thus, sense of ownership has its roots both in the planning and production phases, being related to genuine and legitimate decision-making it is developed throughout the whole process.

In the literature, a sense of ownership is referred to as a collective state of mind, a community’s sense of ownership. Correspondingly, bearing in mind the issues about community heterogeneity; about different social political and financial structures that constrain individual community members differently; it is questionable whether there is something like a collective sense of ownership. Likewise, current discourses about partnerships between organisations should be focused more on personal relationships as it is at a personal level where the collaboration gets its force (Lister 2000). Since people make individual decisions, based on different life experiences and different hermeneutic resources; sense of ownership is an individual state of mind rather than a collective sentiment. This entails an analysis of the process between partnership and community experiences at an individual level which would be achieved through exploring how community agents experience partnership interventions, how they exercise their agency during it and how their interpretations of their agency affect their perceptions of the produced outcome.

In addition to the claimed benefits of community participation to partnership mentioned above, community participation and empowerment (genuine involvement in decision-making) are also anticipated to improve and ensure a community’s sense of ownership, which then should contribute to sustainability: “[a sense of] ownership is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for aid sustainability” (Ostrom et al. 2001: 16). Platteau claims that a sense of ownership is acquired through community empowerment when communities are considered as “genuine actors of their own development” (Platteau 2003). Indeed, long term experience in Southern Tanzania confirms that a sense of ownership and corresponding sense of responsibility can emerge only through a process of empowerment (RIPS 1998: 104).

In the process of infrastructure development, maintenance is sustained by community’s acquired sense of ownership (Platteau 2003), which is believed to be engendered through a participatory
process. Participation enables them to channel their preferences, for example in Guyana "the experience of community participation has shown that it generates a feeling of ownership by the community which has a direct bearing on the upkeep and maintenance of the facility and on capital costs.” (Pelling 1998). Mansuri claims that there is no research evidence about the correlation between participatory approaches and project outcomes. In contrast, he claims other essential factors have more bearing and enabling institutional environment such as government commitment and accountability would count more for the sustainability of a community-based outcome (Mansuri 2004). In some WB projects, community participation indeed improved maintenance, but there are more necessary variables such as technical knowledge, and resources which contribute to maintenance and sustainability (Paul 1987). Yet, mere participation in work does not guarantee ownership as self-help experiences in Ghana have demonstrated (Mohan 2002a: 147). Thus, it can be concluded that both a sense of ownership and maintenance are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for sustainability.

3.11.5.6 Temporal exploration of development interaction and participation
Actions take place in a time-space dimension; its parts perpetually changing and reproducing themselves, never being the same again (Giddens 1986). The world where the intervention is located, transforms constantly, similarly the interaction itself and the relations between actors alter in different situations, under mutual influence. As Long asserts: “Intervention is an ongoing transformational process that is constantly reshaped by its own internal organizational and political dynamic and by the specific conditions it encounters or itself creates” (Norman Long 1992: 36).

Yet, when exploring participatory interventions and partnerships, much research still anticipates something static; participation and partnership as one-off situations; assuming that the basic setting such as the share and use of power remain the same throughout the interventions. Less attention is devoted to participation, the dynamics of using power and decision making, which tends to transform or even deplete over the time (Lowndes et al. 1997; Lyons and Smuts 1999; S. White 1996).

There are several reasons to compel the understanding of the temporal transformation of the intervention. Participation has different stages: the intensity of participation may vary from information sharing to decision making (Paul 1987). Apparently, since both participation as well as partnerships are generally conceptualized in planning; more emphasis is placed there as well (Kikula et a 1999, quoted in Cooksey and Kikula 2005: 25). In practice there are issues which infiltrate into the agenda in far more concrete terms during the later phases of the intervention.
Ostrom et al claim that for example a sustainable small infrastructure project should have beneficiaries participating in the design, quality monitoring, examining accounts and even being able to hold contractors accountable when the intervention is in use (Ostrom et al. 1993: 225). Thus, the implementation phase affects strongly the sustainability of the intervention.

Still, concerns during the planning practice evanesce easily after the initial interaction: “Too often, participatory planning is an ideal that exists in speeches rather than in reality. Aid agents initiate a process of analysis within the target community that ends up as soon as posters reporting the ‘agreed on’ objectives and methods have been taken to the agency to form the basis of its project intervention.” (Platteau 2003: 6). Even if attention is paid to participation later on, implicitly it is mostly understood only as a means, as a community contribution during the implementation and maintenance phases (Caroline Moser 1989). This has led to a situation where participation loses its final socio-cultural basis and becomes a part of resources (Rahnema 2001: 120).

In a partnership, a community can claim its power through resources it furnishes. Initially, holding resources might give communities leverage at the negotiation table, and furnish them with power which they can exercise through the media (Giddens 1986). However, if partnership lacks trust or reciprocity, power-sharing can be jeopardized after yielding their resources. Communities’ power mechanisms can diminish and agency will be restricted. Therefore, it is essential to deconstruct participation in a time dimension and to understand how power relations mutate.

3.12 CONCLUSIONS OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW

There is still a tremendous lack of service delivery capacity in developing countries, in particular in Africa. This affects directly and indirectly the welfare of ordinary people, and particularly that of the poor. Many of the goals to alleviate poverty designed for example in Millennium Development Goals are directly or indirectly linked to the improved delivery of public services and the enhancement of the basic infrastructure.

However, the attainment of the objectives is not easy as there are both external and internal forces affecting service delivery. The colonial legacy still generates repercussions in governance systems, particularly in terms of a lack of skilled staff and resources at local level. Prevailing paradigms such as neo-liberalist principles have a strong influence on the environment where services are provided and produced. These policies advocate a major role for the third sector, pro-profit and non-profit private agencies such as CSOs in service delivery. Consequently, enhancement of the third sector is assumed to bring in more capacity and resources; and to
alleviate the mistakes made during the excessively centralised governance system after independence. Thus, CSOs, communities and local governments should try to overcome their hostile, apprehensive and solitary positions, and try to enter a constructive and co-operative relationship such as partnership.

Hybrid forms of production such as co-production and partnership have been deemed effective tools for service production. Partnerships can spawn financial, social and political advantages which can overcome the complex difficulties in service provision in developing countries. In certain circumstances such as governance crisis, partnership and co-production can be an effective manner and the best option to deliver certain services. They can respond to state imperfections in case of complex environments and reduced capacity at local level (Joshi and Moore 2002: 11-16).

Partnership has been hailed as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution for the problems prevailing in service delivery. In partnership, a meagre resource base can be strengthened and the efforts of different societal actors can be joined together. Partnership can bridge the rift between government and civil society organisations; it can harness unfocussed/rambling NGOs towards national strategies and policies (Fischer 1998). Also, it is an opportunity for communities to participate in decision-making. As a result, partnership is believed to improve their sense of ownership and furthermore have a positive impact on sustainability. In addition community members’ improved sense of ownership, their ability and opportunities to influence the process through community participation in decision making has been deemed to be an important factor to ensure the responsiveness and appropriateness of the outcome. Therefore, the advantages of partnership arrangements are usually visible, easily perceived and accepted as they fall under the prevailing neo-liberal and development paradigms.

Yet, glorification of partnerships has frequently ignored their risks and problems. Partnerships continue to be very loosely understood and interpreted. In terms of democratic principles, it is unclear how partnership interventions with their potentially unclear monitoring and evaluation processes and indistinct interface with government structures can comply with the democratic principles of legitimacy and accountability. Often partnership as such does not have accountability mechanisms, as it is formed in the grey area between formal organisations and structures. Thus, it might reduce the accountability of organisations to their constituency, might divert their original agendas and strategies, values and priorities or tempt for co-option or politicization.
Above all partnerships with communities in service delivery remain under-studied, and therefore more data is necessary (Cleaver 1999: 609; Lyons et al. 2001a: 286). There is little field evidence to back up the claims of the alleged positive impact of partnerships. What is community members’ ability to participate as full members in the process and consequently the impact of this process on their relation with the outcome? There have been serious calls for empirical studies to determine issues such as “under what conditions are such arrangements sustainable, how is accountability for use of public resources maintained in these arrangements, what are the long term prospects for their sustainability, and what is the impact of these arrangements on the poor” (Joshi and Moore 2002). Since communities are perceived as vulnerable partners, the focus should be on the interface between communities and other partners, how intersected power is negotiated, and consequently what is the social space of communities to exercise their agency; and finally how partnership affects social practices (Tostensen et al. 2001: 1). As Satterthwaite writes: “…one of the critical determinants of the success of poverty reduction is the quality of the relationship between “the poor” and the organizations of agencies that have resources of power…” (Satterthwaite 2002: 11).

As ‘genuine partnership’ remains an idealistic objective at which interventions aim, it is clear that flexibility is necessary when identifying and studying partnerships. Participation is identified as one of the essential elements embedded in partnership; therefore experience in participatory projects offers some views about the communities’ role in decision-making. Still, the interfaces between partners, particularly that between communities and the state remain less studied (Desai 2002). Particularly in Tanzania, Ngware (Suleiman Ngware 1996) calls for more research on the relations of different actors in urban governance and their social political and economic space in urban development.

There are two important dimensions which should be considered when exploring development interventions: the temporal dimension and the individual dimension. Partnership is a dynamic interaction which evolves over time (Lyons and Smuts 1999). Mostly participation continues to be conceptualised and studied during the planning phase, however, when important decisions are made discarding communities’ role during the later phases this can have implications on their attitudes and views.

The general meaning of participation acknowledges the importance of people’s agency: “…even poor people have agency, that is, are knowledgeable about their situation and can influence it” (Galjart 1995: 12) and the role of individuals as agents needs to be recognized. Since agents act in a society where there are structures which enable and constrain them (Giddens 1979, 1986), it
would also be necessary to consider participation and participatory processes in a partnership through the framework of structures and individual agents (see also Cleaver 2001; Lister 2000).

Therefore, the complex reality behind both communities and participation gets easily overlooked when excessive and unequal roles in participation mask the differences inside the community (Cornwall 2003; The World Bank 2003: 49). Community participation and decisions made as collective actions easily reflect the aspirations of more powerful and privileged persons: “… the actions based on consensus may actually empower the powerful’s vested interests…” (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 253). If there is a rush for project implementation and a community’s diversity is ignored, inclusiveness and community participation will easily become a top-down exercise for the local elite (Pelling 1998). For instance, the need for a gender perspective has become widely acknowledged but often in practice it is simply understood as an antagonistic view between uniform groups of men and women when for example in Africa kinship might be a more seminal factor to determine how women stand in relation to each other (Cornwall 2003: 1330). Hence, the importance of understanding community dynamics and diversity at agent level.

Individual experiences and private realm reflect factors related to partnerships, as partnerships are social processes consisting of social interactions defined through discourses. Socially constructed analytical factors determine the nature of partnership. Therefore, although partnerships as well as participation are commonly conceptualized at institutional level, they are affected in the private realm. Accordingly, it is essential to analyse partnership in a more detailed manner (Cleaver 1999) and communities’ role in it, to determine the nature of interactions, power relations and community members’ agency in a time dimension, in particular during the implementation phase, and the impact of these factors on the produced outcome.

The next chapter unfolds a theoretical framework for analyzing partnerships as collective action both through an approach at the institutional level and the individual level, where community members (agents) deconstruct partnerships and their role in participation through a set of analytical factors; interpret and present their own interpretations on constraining and enabling structures in decision-making as well as the impact of their agency on their sense of ownership. This all leads to the research questions presented in the introduction chapter 1.
4 PARTNERSHIP: theoretical framework

4.1 INTRODUCTION

A few partnership taxonomies and models have been conceptualized within different theoretical frameworks; some of them are examined in the following subchapters. Not all of them are labelled as ‘partnership’, but their main features are essentially the same: different organisations including the public sector collaborating for collective purposes in a public realm. The pros and cons of these models are then investigated.

Culled from the most pertinent approaches identified in the literature view, a conceptual model is developed to comprehend more deeply the analytical factors influencing the interface between the partners, particularly when a community is involved. The research takes an approach that partnership is a social process, and the outcome produced through partnership is an interim part of it. Similarly, the analytical factors defining partnership interfaces are socially constructed.

Confirming the initial philosophical proposition of the research and the findings of the literature review, the main point of departure for this theoretical approach is the understanding that communities are not monolithic units but are comprised of individuals with individual lifeworlds and cognitive resources, which evidently have an impact on their actions, capabilities and perceptions. The theoretical framework will investigate propositions as to how community members as individual agents perceive their agency, structures constraining their agency in interactions, and how ultimately all these individual experiences influence their relation to and attitude towards the outcome.

The theoretical framework consists of two parts: first, through the conceptual model each partnership will be investigated employing the analytical factors and then through individual agents’ agencies, identifying structures affecting them and subsequently exploring community members’ relationships to the outcome, which are believed to have an impact on their sense of ownership.

Structuration Theory (for example Giddens 1986) offers an understanding how interventions as transformational processes are influenced by individuals (and vice versa), and how individuals are connected to the social and power spaces (Norman Long and van der Ploeg 1994). More specifically its element ‘the dialectic of control’ provides a necessary theory, which enables scrutiny of how power was exercised during the partnership, thus focusing on the relationship and dynamics of power between the agent and structure. The dialectic of control posits duality,
agent’s repercussions and interactions with structural constraints as well as employment of counterpower in situations where agent’s agency is restricted.

4.2 Governance Approach to Partnership

There are several approaches where partnership-type interventions have been conceptualized as a tool for governance, democratization and policy processes. Only a few samples are presented in Table 2 below. Some of them were originally not labelled as partnerships, but essentially fall within the definition of partnership. For example, networking governance such as Rhodes’ presentation of self-organising inter-organisational networks could be considered as partnership (Rhodes 1997: 53). Similarly, Kooiman’s notion of co-governance has partnership characteristics. He differentiates between self-governance, hierarchical governance (such as traditional government) and co-governance. Partnership as co-governance is a socio-political process where governance takes place through “interactions, in which public as well as private actors participate, aimed at solving societal programmes or creating societal opportunities; attending to the institutions a context for these governing interactions; and establishing a normative foundation for all those activities” (Kooiman 2003: 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership model as a tool for governance</th>
<th>Example of Proponents</th>
<th>Framework, main features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban Regime</td>
<td>Stone, Dowding etc</td>
<td>Pluralism, motivation of the partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Networks</td>
<td>For example Rhodes</td>
<td>Network approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-governance</td>
<td>Kooiman</td>
<td>Interaction of organizations, responses to government failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking governance</td>
<td>Dollery and Wallis</td>
<td>New Institutional Economy/ Political Economy, attention to transaction costs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>Partnership model as a production tool</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-production</td>
<td>Ostrom</td>
<td>Institutional approach, Collective action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synergy</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>Institutional approach, social capital crosses between public and private sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Market and network based governance models of New Institutional Economy (Dollery and Wallis 2001) can equally be considered the conceptualization of partnerships, see Table 3. The market governance model corresponds to collaboration which is based on contracting26. For instance, through a contractual arrangement, government may assign an NGO to provide services. Yet, it can also dictate the conditions and even if it is carried out in collaboration,

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26 For further discussion about the implications of the different approaches of partnerships and contracting, see chapter 3.10.4.
government may participate less in it. This is commonly deduced as partnership (Kaare 2002; Plummer 2002), though deeper inspection might reveal it rather could be considered as market based contracting (see paragraph 3.11.2 for discussion of the differences). Institutional approaches accordingly distinguish between partnership and contracting, since their fundamental value bases as well as mechanisms how they are defined and maintained are different.

Table 3. Modes of governance: market, hierarchy and network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models of governance</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
<th>Network</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normative basis</td>
<td>Contract property rights</td>
<td>Employment relationship</td>
<td>Complementary strengths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means of communication</td>
<td>Prices</td>
<td>Routines</td>
<td>Relational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods of conflict resolution</td>
<td>Haggling resort to courts</td>
<td>Administrative fiat supervision</td>
<td>Norm of reciprocity</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reputational concerns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree of flexibility</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of commitment</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tone of climate</td>
<td>Precision and/of suspicious</td>
<td>Formal, bureaucratic</td>
<td>Open-ended mutual benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor preferences or choices</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>Interdependent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Dollery and Wallis, 2001:25)

Contractual mode of governance is based on hierarchy, on the traditional views of government, which is rigid, based on formalities and bureaucratic routines. Considering direct values, the contractual mode of governance appears more efficient than the conventional hierarchical one. However, transaction costs of contracting are different due to complexities which are caused by information asymmetries or a lack of trust. Similarly, contingencies or other qualities such as judgement and initiative that would be difficult to specify and define in contractual terms make a difference in transaction costs (Dollery and Wallis 2001). Thus, the efficiency might be more illusionary than the reality.

In contrast, in network based governance, trust is not exercised through formal institutions but grounded on confidence in an informal environment (Dollery and Wallis 2001). Governance actors are highly committed and they expect mutual benefits from actions. The model based on networking emphasises some analytical factors of a partnership: synergy and reciprocity. Hence, transaction costs are low. Actually, network based governance is characterized by shared values and priorities; by tacit understanding and mutually agreed formal definitions of the behaviour of the organisation (Peters 1998: 19). Similarly, because partnership as networking governance is based on trust and requires less enforcement of the formal or informal conditions of the contract, it causes less transaction costs.

Though a partnership is an example of networking governance, networking governance does not necessarily need to be partnership. Networking governance does not define the power relations between partners and is not concerned about mutual power relations and decision-making.
**Urban regime theory** defines different typologies of urban regimes based on the underpinning motivations of partnerships in urban governance. It studies motivations and congruence of the interests of partners such as elected, market and other organisations to help to understand why these urban regimes were established and, for example, what mechanisms they apply to overcome collective action problems (Peters 1998: 45). In Table 4 there is a presentation of different descriptive regime types.

Regime refers to a formal and informal organization of actors which holds power, a set of fundamental rules, and the organization’s relations with those who do not hold power (Hyden 1992: 6). Stone defined urban regime as “an informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions” (Stone 1989: 4). It can essentially be viewed as one type of partnership - an enduring partnership for urban governance (Elander 2002: 192) or “…the institutional structures through which economic and extra-economic power is wielded locally…” (Gibbs and Jonas 2000: 300). The emphasis is on long-term interaction, access to resources and more importantly participation in decision-making, thus partners sharing power in urban governance.

The main tenet of urban regime theory is the interdependency between different actors, how the effectiveness of local government builds on the co-operation with non-governmental actors. Typical characteristics of a regime are a distinctive long-term policy agenda. A regime is not personalized, the agenda does not hinge on personalities but it endures changes in personnel. Similarly, a regime is capable of mobilizing external resources, has strong leadership and it links institutions and community interests (Devas 1999; Dowding 2001: 14). Due to networking and interdependency, power in an urban regime is ‘power to’

27 See section 4.4.5 for a discussion on power
Table 4 Different Types of Urban Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime type</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Described by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>To maintain routine service delivery, preserve status quo</td>
<td>Stone (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class progressive</td>
<td>To manage growth and protect environment</td>
<td>Stone (1993) \ Schneider et al (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(managed growth machine)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass mobilisation</td>
<td>To expand opportunities for the working classes</td>
<td>Stone (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralist</td>
<td></td>
<td>Savitch and Thomas (1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyperpluralist (or no regime)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Savitch and Thomas (1991)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: applied from Dowding (2001:13)

Originally, urban regime theory was presented to describe and analyse different regime types in the USA (Stone 1989), where political and institutional dependency between private and public spheres in particular at local level led to an upsurge of urban regimes. It was then amended and expanded for example by DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993), Stoker and Mossberger (1994) and Dowding (2001).

As the classification of regimes was chiefly developed in the pluralist USA environment, urban regime theory and the concept of urban regime in general have been criticized as being very environment specific (Dowding 2001; Pierre 2005). Pierre notes that “Urban regime theory is to a large extent an abstraction of U.S. urban political economy…” (Pierre 2005: 47). Urban regime theory also over-emphasises economic interests, which makes it less feasible to developing countries (Gibbs and Jonas 2000: 301-07), particularly to SSA where the market does not participate in governance to the same extent. In contrast, in countries like Tanzania, power in governance is considered to be more in the hands of the national government and the dominant international financier institutions of global governance than local regimes (Mercer 2003). Urban regime theory is more concerned with the analysis at regime level, in particular about the directions of policy steering than analysing social relations and forces such as community participation in local governance which is of the interest in this research. Actually, in many developing countries such as Tanzania partnerships have been created in the absence of working market mechanisms or stronger public sector in service provision; therefore, instead of regime the focus required here should be in local, urban governance. In addition, the approach of urban regime theory is normative not analytical which reduces its value in terms of this research and the intention to analyse partnerships. The understanding of power in urban regime theory (defined mostly as ‘power to’) is similarly static, not dynamic whereas this research is more interested in the transformation of power relations. Moreover, there is less concern over the changes in local
agency, how they are constrained or enabled, see Davies for an extensive analysis on these points (Davies 2002). This has thus diminished its relevance for exploring local level partnerships formed particularly for service production and analysing power relations between the partners of the partnership.

As a conclusion, all the above models concentrate on investigating partnerships as part of governance structures but possess some analytical inadequacies when scrutinizing partnerships at local level, particularly in service production. Establishing partnerships with communities for the production of public services requires a deeper analysis of the forces and relations between partners and in particular of social interactions, power relations and the structures influencing them.

4.3 ANALYTICAL TOOLS FOR PRODUCTION PARTNERSHIPS

4.3.1 Pre-partnership theorization
Institutional approaches constituted the framework for “pre-partnership” models applicable to service delivery. Both co-production (Ostrom et al. 1993) and synergy, coined by Evans (see chapter 3.10.6), have been used to analyse joint efforts for production of public goods in collective action.

As an institutional approach articulates, there are culturally and historically derived institutions or rather institutional procedures, principles and norms that influence individuals and institutional arrangements such as economic and contractual interactions (Baldwin and Cave 1999; Ostrom et al. 1993; Williamson 1996). Thus, the institutional structure of a society is more than the aggregate of the agents and consequently institutional arrangements cause an impact in the form of transaction costs.

Transaction costs are like friction (Williamson 1986: 139). They are influenced by several institutional factors, such as availability of information, communication, institutional transformation, coordination, strategic factors, kinship relations and social capital (Ostrom et al. 1993). Transaction costs are divided into ex ante and ex post transaction costs basing on when the transaction costs are borne. Ex ante transaction costs are mainly coordination costs which occur when relevant information is obtained, agreements are negotiated among participants, and subsidies are paid to win support from opposition. Ex post transaction costs are caused by the need for monitoring of the performance of participants, sanctioning and governance or renegotiations when resolution is essential (Ostrom et al. 1993).
Transaction costs are largely determined by the social context (Williamson 1986), by the attributes of the individuals involved, the type of infrastructure and by the institutional arrangements for decision-making (Ostrom et al. 1993: 68). Production of infrastructure through contracting bears higher transaction costs than self-help (Ostrom et al. 1993: 60) since a lack of confidence and a lack of social capital, which are prevalent in self-help activities, increase the need for the monitoring and control of performance. Construction typically requires careful monitoring as it is difficult to measure the quality of performance, and there is a strong incentive to shirk (Ostrom et al. 1993: 94)

**Co-production** emphasizes predominantly the input side of production, actually paying little attention to the relationship between different partners and inevitable inequalities in power relations. Thus, it relies more on the contribution to resource pool than contributing to an actually enabling collaborative relationship.

Another similar term, **synergy**28 “reintroduced” the active state and recognized the potential of the central role of state bureaucracies, which were necessary for steering and coordination in modern governance (Evans 1996b). According to Evans, synergy can be distinguished in two different forms: synergy as conventionally understood complementary actions carried out by the government and citizens; and synergy as embedded ties crossing the public and private spheres (Evans 1996b). Therefore social capital, based on the norms of trust and reciprocity and sustained by the networks of interactions, is crucial for synergy. Complementary synergy is the prerequisite of co-production (Evans 1996b: 1123). It is based on the division of labour, on complementing inputs from the public and private sectors resulting in more than each one alone, whereas embedded synergy suggests that networks which pass the public and private realms contain social capital. Embedded synergy linking different sectors improves sustainability and by enhancing collaboration it also enables mutual gain.

Synergy reasoning postulates that effective states can increase the efficiency of local institutions when providing “rule-governed environments”; and the government and communities together can boost development (Evans 1996b: 1120). At a local level, the relation between government institutions and civil society is significant as local government can boost social capital and facilitate collective action (Dollery and Wallis 2003: 97). Thus, synergy gives credit to the state’s role in development and contribution to the formation of social capital. Equally, synergy between the state and civil society bespeaks collective community action. It can, at best, increase the power of the state, thus the roles of both the state and civil society are essential (Evans 1996a:

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28 The synergy defined by Evans is wider reaching than policy and resource synergy dealt with in section 3.11.5.3.
However, the state’s positive impact and synergy is not evident as state interventions can destroy social networks as well (Evans 1996b: 1119-20).

Both co-production and synergy offer feasible service delivery mechanisms for governance, but they have been criticised as still being incomplete. Their scope is limited since they are related to the implementation phase only, missing the “legal institutionalization of participatory mechanisms” (Ackerman 2004: 450), not encompassing power relations or decision-making mechanisms. They do not probe the relation and interface between the partners, particularly the issues of power and participation. In addition, the picture is far more complicated than synergy and co-production suggest as there are several other factors and variables which influence the relationship established for production. Therefore, other models of partnership are presented below which analyse partnership either as a production tool or delve deeper to the analysis of internal factors within the interface between partners.

4.3.2 Partnership models and taxonomies

Krishna’s model of partnership feasibility analyses two main independent variables closely related to society and the intervention environment, which then can shape partnership (Krishna 2003). They are the magnitude of required collective action and effectiveness as per subsidiarity which indicate the occasions when partnership is a feasible production tool. There is a certain zone more suitable for partnership which depends on the nature of the required intervention and other factors. The magnitude of subsidiarity hinges on the nature of the planned partnership intervention: what is the effective scale of production, appropriate service area, degree of technical expertise required, timeframe and the array of interests? Those interventions which are typically implemented at lower local level; which require less technical expertise and have ample timeframe are better suited for partnership with communities. Similarly, collective action depends on the nature of the intervention and the need for community mobilisation. Partnership is more feasible in those areas where technical requirements are lower, there is more need for community participation and where a community can be a full partner. Thus, Krishna’s model is useful, when planning the actual intervention one needs to determine what kind of arrangement is suitable for that specific intervention. However, it does not yet reach into partnership’s internal factors.

There are two other partnership models, which have some similarities in their approach but they use different terminology. First model of Lowndes and Skelcher (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998) proposes that a partnership has a life cycle, and each stage, is limited to different modes of governance. Thus, in each phase of its life cycle, different processes are necessary. During Pre-
**partnership collaboration**, networking is critical. It incorporates a process of mobilisation: either a top-down initiative of the government or action of non-public agencies or a mixture of them. The **partnership creation and consolidation** stage is based on hierarchy, when the agenda for contract negotiations and the contract itself is settled. It includes concurrence on management and accountability mechanisms as well as monitoring, evaluation and intervention processes. **Partnership programme delivery** is based on contract governance, and during the last phase, **Partnership termination or succession**, networking is necessary to ensure partners’ commitment and stakeholder involvement (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998: 320).

The second **model was developed by White and Robinson** (G. White and Robinson 1998: 97-98); who classify partnerships or collaboration models between the government and CSOs in service provision by evaluating their roles in terms of decision-making, funding and implementation. Comparing who is more dominant in decision-making, funding and implementation, there are nine different partnership categories (see Table 5). Three options, co-determination, co-financing and co-production together can be depicted as steps towards a genuine partnership. The model shows how domination of one partner over the other one, may pose a risk to the real nature of the partnership, for instance contracting or co-option can already imply certain power relations.

**Table 5. Partnership classification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Society’s role</th>
<th>Government’s role Determination</th>
<th>Financing</th>
<th>Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Determination</td>
<td>Co-Determination</td>
<td>Devolution</td>
<td>Pressured provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td>Enforced provision</td>
<td>Co-Financing</td>
<td>Fee for service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Delegation or co-option</td>
<td>Contracting</td>
<td>Co-Production</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: corrected from White and Robinson (1998:97-98)*

These partnership taxonomies respond to the question what is a community’s role in a partnership and analyse partnership dynamics, but not further internal dimensions and issues such as constraints affecting partners.

Lastly, there is an interesting **model of Smith and Beazley** (Smith and Beazley 2000). It identifies internal factors influencing a partnership with communities, digging deeper into the dynamics between different partners, specifically to the dynamics between partners with power asymmetries. The model assesses the nature of the partnership and the effectiveness of community involvement (Smith and Beazley 2000: 863-68). According to their model, the criteria to evaluate community involvement are the distribution of power, access to resources and the question of empowerment, using variables of power, partnership and participation.

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29 Or rather collaborative arrangements as not all are ‘genuine partnerships’
They use regime theory’s classification to different types of power which can be identified in a partnership (Smith and Beazley 2000: 857): systemic power, based on socio-economic structures; command or social control to gain domination; coalition or bargaining power from a position of strength and pre-emptive power (power of social production) to assemble the capacity to achieve ‘attractive’ and ‘non-routine’ goals.

The use of power in a partnership is evaluated using elements of the distribution of power, access to resources and empowerment by comparing between community objectives and partnership objectives to understand whose agenda is under implementation... “to delineate community objectives from partnership objectives and monitor the impact of partnerships on community objectives” (Mc Arthur 1995, Hastings and McArthur 1995 quoted in (Smith and Beazley 2000: 864). In the first place, this determines whether the intervention is equal at all but also who makes decisions and finally, who holds the ultimate power.

Due to partners’ different characters, power distribution easily becomes asymmetrical when the public sector collaborates with for instance disadvantaged communities. Still, if communities hold very little power and their genuine role in decision making is circumscribed, it can lead to rhetoric, “legitimation of agency decision” (Smith and Beazley 2000: 363) rather than genuine participation in a genuine partnership.

Participation is assessed via elements of legitimacy such as representativeness, accountability towards stakeholders and openness\(^{30}\) for example in terms of disadvantaged groups. Values of partnership are measured against synergy, mutual transformation and goal alignment.

This model of Smith and Beazley gets to the core issues in partnership. Indeed it is beneficial to understand how participation is practised and what kind of power is utilized. However, there is one conceptual difficulty. The main independent variables defined are power, partnership and participation, which essentially are all connected at their roots. Actually, participation is the embodiment of power; basically participation for communities means the access to power through decision making; participation “requires devolution of power” (Johnson and Wilson 2000: 864), as it is an element of community empowerment. Thus having power enables participation which leads to empowerment. Moreover, their concept of partnership (analyzed in a partnership), considering the usual definition of partnership and in particular the definition of genuine partnership applied in this study, is rather ambiguous. Instead, the model’s ‘partnership’ could possibly be called as reciprocity in addition to its power dimension, indicating the potentiality of community members to genuinely participate in partnership decision-making.

\(^{30}\) Perhaps it rather should read inclusiveness.
Thus, it is a useful, though not sufficient approach to analyse core issues in partnerships, and serves as a point of departure for the development of a conceptual model which explores more widely the interface between communities and other partners, canvassing the main analytical factors identified in partnership literature.

4.4 CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR PARTNERSHIP AS AN IMPLEMENTATION TOOL

4.4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a conceptual model is generated to encompass analytical factors defining a partnership. An analysis of these factors helps to understand the interface between partners, to determine and visualize the nature of the partnership as much as contesting claims related to partnerships and their ontology.

In the literature review, the main factors affecting partners and consequently partnership and its outcome were identified by studying existing partnership models. In this section, they are further reflected upon and deconstructed, and then structured into a conceptual framework. The concepts derived from the existing partnership models were: synergy; legitimacy and accountability; trust and reciprocity. The concepts are explored first generally, and then operationalised in relation to partnerships, to determine how they are epitomized in partnership.

4.4.2 Synergy
Synergy, an essential condition for partnership, means that the outcome exceeds the sum of the separate inputs (D. J. Lewis 1998: 110). As said earlier, synergy is the “gluing” factor, the main motivation and stimulus for establishing partnership. Thus, it is not a variable but rather a constant condition: without synergy partnership would not exist since partnership fundamentally endeavours to achieve more than the sum of its aggregates, and to increase the value of the joint intervention.

In partnership, synergy can be divided into resource synergy and policy synergy (Hastings 1996; Macintosh 1992), see Table 6. Resource synergy refers largely to value added gained through efficiency or effectiveness when pooling resources. Policy synergy refers to the widened perspectives which can be encountered when different partners with dissimilar objectives or partners of diverse background and cultures start collaborating and developing a mutually acceptable approach. Policy synergy typically has an inclusive nature since it values different partners (Hastings 1996: 260). The value of synergy exceeds potential problems and complications from adjusting by different social actors.
In a partnership with communities, resource synergy is typically obtained through cost-sharing responding to the requirements of a neo-liberal paradigm. Analogically resource synergy translates to the modernisation view of community participation as a means, as the contribution of resources. Policy synergy is achieved when participation and the voice of those partners who are perceived weak is improved; for instance when a community gains access to decision-making with more powerful partners because they can offer valuable local knowledge, or a community’s participatory contribution is anticipated to improve sustainability. Similarly, policy synergy corresponds to a neo-populist and alternative development view of participation as an end, as an empowering activity. This analogy also reveals the disguised risk of unbalanced emphasis on resource synergy to diminish the benefits of policy synergy, which can weaken the empowering impact of community participation (Mansuri 2004; Caroline Moser 1989).

4.4.3 Legitimacy and accountability

Legitimacy as a normative concept should be the primary underpinning precondition in a partnership. Legitimacy defines the relationship partners have with their own constituencies. Particularly it is pertinent in the relation between communities and those NGOs/CBOs which act on their behalf in partnerships. Though it has been applied in various contexts, as a concept it is rarely defined and often treated as rather self-evident and when is has been defined, the attempts have been based on a rather technical approach (Lister 2003). It has largely been conceptualized through the dimensions of representativeness (Pearce 1997), accountability to all directions, performance, organisational and inclusive legitimacy. Lister argues that legitimacy, though, should be socially constructed and defined through discourses (Lister 2003).

Smith and Beazley’s construction for legitimacy responds to these concerns to some degree. It is defined through the variables of community representatives being legitimate and accountable towards their constituencies, retaining trust and confidence, and acting as representatives granted by the authority of the community, stakeholder participation being the underpinning force (Smith and Beazley 2000: 863-68). Thus, CBOs’ actions should be appropriate. They should be authorized to represent the community by community members, be accountable and continue to enjoy trust and confidence which are all defined subjectively at agent level.
Lister herself specifies legitimacy through the elements of *regulatory, pragmatic* and *normative/cognitive legitimacy* (Lister 2003). The first *regulatory element* responds to legal requirements to maintain order for example through registration and financial accountability. In a partnership with communities, this would refer to the organisation’s legal status and whether they have been given the authority to represent the community in partnership. Similarly, it should capture their accountability to the community. Accountability alludes to the identification of power relationships between the actors; how to control the use of power, how to check, oversee and constrain the use of power (Newell and Bellour 2002: 1-2). In practice it would translate to the statement of goals, transparency in decision-making, monitoring and reporting (Edwards and Hulme 1996).

The *second pragmatic element* is related to the performance; it derives from the promises and demands made to the community, which the organisation, the representing partner should then deliver to the community. The last element is a *combination of normative and cognitive symbols*. Though Lister first presents them separately, she later admits they can be joined as they could be difficult to distinguish from each other. This element corresponds to those shared values, ideas and ideologies supported by the community, and which organisations seeking legitimacy should respect. It would include, for instance, policies which these organisations promote, whether they are as consultative, empowering or equal as communities expect them to be. These symbols might not be shared by a community as a unity but they are articulated in discourses. The last elements are justifiably interlinked. The former pragmatic element which practically refers to CBOs’ performance needs also to encompass the latter elements of values and ideologies to be responsive and appropriate.

4.4.4  *Trust and reciprocity*

*Reciprocity* refers to the “quality of the social interaction among members of political community” (Hyden 1992: 12-13). Reciprocity involves an understanding of a continuous exchange and mutual benefits, and of those benefits that should be compensated or reimbursed in the future (Putnam 1993: 172). Putnam distinguishes two different types of reciprocity: balanced and generalized. Balanced reciprocity is based on simultaneous exchange, whereas generalized reciprocity is grounded on continuous relationship and mutual expectations of repayment such as friendship. It thus helps to avoid opportunism, which is the main concern in collective action.

Reciprocity can also cause transformation. In partnership, mutual understanding could settle the impact of asymmetrical power relations to reduce differences between them (Smith and Beazley 2000: 863-68). Hence, partners have an opportunity to reciprocally influence each other, leading
to mutual cohesive adaptation and approximation. They can seek to incline each others’ aims and operational cultures, thus they become subject to transformation. If there is no reciprocity and one/some partners use coercive power, uni-directional partnership turns into a coercive arrangement (Hastings 1996: 262), see Table 7. Reciprocal interaction becomes an issue when power relations are unequal, and when they are unilaterally coerced. Hence, it goes back to the underlying question of power positions and mutual power relations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7 Implications of uni-directional and reciprocal transformation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Process</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uni-directional transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual transformation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Hastings, 1996:263)

*Trust*, another reciprocal factor that is essential to distinguish from contractual arrangements since a lack of trust can obstruct the generation of authentic partnerships (Riley and Wakely 2005: 131). Trust can generally be defined as a “normative consensus on the limits of action” (Hyden 1992: 12) or the “expectation by one person, group, or firm of ethical behaviour- that is, morally correct decisions and actions based upon ethical principles of analysis – on the part of the other person, group, or firm in a joint endeavour or economic exchange” (Hosmer 1995 quoted in Kasper-Fuehrer and Ashkanasy 2001: 238) or being willing to be exposed “… to the risk of opportunistic action by another…” (Harris 2000: 236).

Trust describes the mutuality of a relationship: it is mutual confidence; it brings about mutual respect and adaptation; it is subject to dynamics with regards to the partners, power structures and rules of the game (Harris 2000). Trust is connected to the reliability and adherence to rules.

Giddens separates between interpersonal (facework) trust and intersystems (faceless) trust (Kapersen 2000). Intersystems or institutional trust is produced through a process, it is based on mutual history (Kasper-Fuehrer and Ashkanasy 2001) (Zucker 1986 in Harris 2000: 238). It can be built on small developments, repeated positive experiences and contract renewals (Williamson 1986: 107). One, even risky experience with a positive outcome can lead to another trial, which then, if successfully carried out, can increase the trust and security between the organisations (Zucker 1986 quoted in Harris 2000: 238), validating partnerships’ long-term characteristics.

When partnership is less based on trust and mutual respect, it will be more governed by contracts, leading consequently to additional transaction costs. Diminished trust might also require more
accountability. Equally, a lack of trust and respect might also affect power-sharing and lead to coercion, particularly in case of initial asymmetrical power positions.

Trust and reciprocity together form the basic, essential elements of social capital, since the key components of social capital are: “networks of civic engagement”, “norms of generalised reciprocity” and “relations of social trust” (Putnam 1993: 167-76). Social capital both requires and recreates trust and networks (Fukuyama 2003: 3). Employing game theory, through a replicated ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ it can be verified that social capital as successful cooperation brings about benefits to players and consequently more cooperation (Fukuyama 2003: 13), thus verifying that as a moral resource its supply increases by its use, leading to mutual confidence (Putnam 1993). Many actions which form social practices are bound by relations of trust (Kaspersen 2000), and trust as a crucial factor in an interorganizational relationship has a notable bearing on the outcome (Zaheer et al. 1998).

In partnership, trust and reciprocity, the elements of social capital, thus exist also between the organisations, not only inside civil society as commonly defined (see chapter 3.10.7). As previously mentioned, the synergy-concept has been developed as ‘synergy’ between public sector and civil society (Evans 1996b), or as ‘public capital’ (G. White and Robinson 1998: 106).

### 4.4.5 Power, empowerment and participation

#### Classic definitions of power

As in any interaction, power is a crucial underlying factor in a partnership since “power is a description of a relation” (Nelson and Wright 1995: 8), see also Nederveen Pieterse (2001:66). Still, the question of power is often disguised in partnership (Harrison 2002), where it is productive power, not coercive power (Nelson and Wright 1995: 8). Partnership is presumed to enable partners to influence each other or open opportunities to influence others outside the partnership (Balloch and Taylor 2001: 2). When more powerful partners use coercive power and dictate decisions, it precludes the partnership from not being a genuine partnership, becoming mere rhetoric (Harrison 2002; Mayo and Taylor 2001: 39-40). Therefore, it is imperative to investigate power relations in partnership.

In general, power has been subject to immense discussion; for excellent presentations see Hindess (1996) or Lukes (2005). Ideologically and historically different schools have divergent views about the embodiment and media of power as well as the locus of power: whether power is located within structures or whether it is employed by agents themselves.

A traditional definition for power, based on the dual dimensions of conflict and compulsion is “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his
own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests“ (Weber 1964: 152). A similar classic view of power has been employed by several philosophers such as Hobbes who claimed that those who have more power want to reinforce their own aspirations over the ones who have less power. “Power, in this sense, may be used as an instrument of domination” (Hindess 1996: 137). Another type of power defined by Hobbes was that power can be considered as a right; sovereign power, where the subjects have granted the power to the holder of sovereign power and transferred to him the right to govern (Hindess 1996: 139).

Structuralists, including structural Marxists believe that instead of agents, power is derived from society’s structures such as social classes and exercised through them (Walsh 1998), a structure being understood as “… any recurring pattern of social behaviour…” (Walsh 1998: 33). Power is determined by structures, and individual agency does not exist, thus leading to an antagonism between the views of the origins of power (Lukes 2005).

Giddens in his Structuration Theory resolves the issue whether power is derived from structures or exercised by agents by claiming a dualistic treatment: an agent influences the structure and the structure influences an agent, see section 4.5 for a more thorough discussion of this. Structuration Theory claims power is exercised through resources which can reproduce structures of domination (Giddens 1979, 1984). According to this theory, all agents have power and exercise their power and use control in every action, to avoid oppression (Moos and Dear 1986: 236). Power can either have a transformative capacity, an ability to engender changes or an ability to maintain a status quo, to continue domination (Giddens 1986: 15).

One of the dilemmas in the treatment of power is whether power can be used by a group, or whether it is always based on the individual use of power (see Lukes 2005 for a comprehensive discussion on this). Long and van der Ploeg accord with Hindess’ criticism that the concept of ‘actor’ cannot be applied to collectivities in general, only for social actors such as political parties and enterprises who obviously have a way to elaborate decisions (Hindess 1986 in Norman Long and van_der_Ploeg 1994: 68). Lukes questions whether a group exercising power is actually a structure instead of a group of agents (Lukes 2005: 54).

Post-structuralists/postmodernists view that power is exercised through knowledge and discourses, for example Foucault claims “discipline and power in modern society segregate, differentiate, hierarchialize, marginalize and exclude people in it…” (Walsh 1998: 31). Power is omnipresent, because it is produced everywhere in interactions and relations. It is intentional, relations of power being productive. Power and resistance are interlinked, they both have to co-exist (Foucault 1990: 93-96).
A well-known classification of the three dimensions of power was postulated by Lukes (Lukes 2005). He argued that the first-dimensional, classic view of power is decision-making power over somebody, when there is a conflict of interests to force somebody to do something (Lukes 2005: 19). The second type, a two-dimensional view of power can be both decision-making and non-decision making power. For instance, the elite can be able to limit the range of alternatives to be considered, preventing issues to be taken to decision-making and exclude others from the political system (Lukes 2005: 25). Hegemony is an example of the third, three-dimensional type of power which goes beyond behavioural focus into institutional aspects. It is practiced when people’s real interests are kept off the agenda; people’s desires are shaped as the terms circumscribe public debates. It can be latent without any visible conflicts; exercised consciously or exercised through any action (Lukes 2005).

**Power in development: participation and empowerment**

By implication, participation is an embodiment of power. It enables partners who normally would have little power or say in common matters to derive power through the set access mechanisms to decision-making: “…citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power” (Arnstein 1969). However, since participation is a dynamic, predominantly political activity, it has both negative and positive implications: while it can reshape power positions and redistribute power, it can also reproduce power relations (S. White 1996). Thus, participation can lead to a situation where people’s ability to exercise their agency is constrained or enabled.

Fundamentally, empowerment is a political tool, embracing the redistribution of power “any process by which people’s control (collective or individual) over their lives is increased.” (Somerville 1998 in Lyons et al. 2001b: 1234). Alternative developmentalist Friedmann regards empowerment to consist of different elements: social power as having access to information and participation; political power as having voice in decision-making; and psychological power as “an individual sense of potency” (Friedmann 1992: 33). Neo-populists claim poverty is a “condition of political powerlessness”, thus empowerment or in Freirian terms conscientization is considered the solution to poverty (David Hulme 1994: 253). Communitarian Etzioni defines resources as latent energy “…power refers to what is made out of the assets in the energizing of societal action.” (Etzioni 1968: 322), thus societal power can enable development (Etzioni 1968: 319).

Nelson and Wright (1995) classify three models of power used to understand power, participation and empowerment. First is ‘power to’, ability to “…act on others to give them power or enable them to realize their own potential” (Nelson and Wright 1995: 8). This is the power which
enables the growth of capabilities, which is generative and transformative like empowerment. The second one, ‘power over’ is access to political decision-making; it is practised in public fora, distributed in society through social relations. This one corresponds to Lukes’ three-dimensional power. The third one is ‘power which is subjectless’, which is embodied in discourses as delineated in Foucault’s philosophy (see for instance Foucault 1990).

Analysing specifically partnerships, Himmelman’s citizen participation framework moves along a continuum from betterment to empowerment. In betterment the communities are not in control.
The majority of partnerships, according to him are betterment, designed and controlled by other institutions. Himmelman defines empowerment as “the capacity to set priorities and control resources that are essential for increasing community self-determination.” (Himmelman 1996 quoted in LGA 2002: 74). Thus, empowerment indicates having autonomy in decision-making.

Another theory related to analysing participation is Arnstein’s ladder, which was developed in the US in the 1960s but it is still relevant (Arnstein 1969). She defined the level of citizen participation into eight different rungs, which can then be grouped into non-participation, tokenism and citizen power.

*Non participation* including ‘therapy’ and ‘manipulation’ disguise the lack of real participation. The aim is to influence communities, instead of allowing communities to have a say. Communities can for example be invited into committees, which at the end do not hold any legitimate power.

*Tokenism* means people can have access to information and they have a say but they lack the power to influence. Having access to information can be important, as it is definitely the first step to any meaningful citizen activity but if the information flow is one-way or if the information is passed on too late communities do not have an opportunity to influence anything.

*Citizen power* consists of different levels of decision-making: ‘partnership’ refers to equal decision-making powers to be used through negotiations whereas in ‘delegated power’ and ‘citizen control’ communities have the majority or full decision-making powers. In ‘partnership’, power is redistributed by negotiating, decision-making is not unilateral but planning and decisions are done through sharing responsibility. In ‘delegated power’ and ‘citizen control’, citizens are retaining part or full responsibility, being in charge of running the activities.

Arnstein’s model offers a useful basic analytical tool for elucidating community participation and the use of power. However, there is one major limitation in the model: the people in a community are not a homogenous group: there are power-holders and have-nots within any one group. In
addition, their might be power struggles within the group, for instance the power holders might try to co-opt poor people (Arnstein 1969).

4.4.6 Application of the conceptual model
The conceptual model presented above was compounded in an attempt to understand and define a collaborative arrangement based on the analytical concepts which have been deduced crucial for a partnership. It has defined synergy as the main prerequisite; the main elements are legitimacy and accountability; trust and reciprocity; and power through its embodiment of participation. Power is classified as per the levels in Arnstein’s model. All these concepts are interconnected to some degree, eventually there is no clear conceptual separation between them as they influence each other mutually.

In Table 8, the model is presented in the form of an assessment table. It is divided into two parts: first it shows synergy, the prerequisite for partnership, defined by Boolean variables yes/no, and then it shows analytical factors. The analytical factors are assessed through narratives as socially constructed concepts. To facilitate visualisation and presentation, each concept variable based on these verbal analyses is assessed as to the extent to which the arrangement is closer to a genuine partnership. It follows a simplified Likert scale (Bernard 2002): none- to some extent –full, expressed in a three numbered scale as -1, 0 and 1. At the end, an index number is defined to see where the partnership intervention as a whole could be classified. However, as said earlier, these indices are only indicative of the global picture, verbal descriptions remain more profound

Synergy is considered as a prerequisite for the existence of partnership. Without synergy partnership would lose its motivation, thus the intervention would not be classified as partnership at all. On the one hand, resource synergy is not necessary for a genuine partnership. On the other hand, if there is no policy synergy, meaning that the partnership is based solely on resource synergy (community contribution), it could hardly be defined as genuine partnership but a contractual arrangement, as a community would have less opportunity to influence decisions.

31 The Likert scale has been criticized because normally the values assessing for instance attitudes are not on the same scale; neither are they here. However, here it is used only for visualization of tendencies and transformations in partnership, to enable drawing coordinate systems. See for example Bernard (2002) for critical presentation of the Likert scale.
Table 8 Operationalisation of analytical factors in the Conceptual Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Prerequisite Synergy</th>
<th>Partnership Exempt</th>
<th>Tentative Partnership</th>
<th>Genuine Partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No/yes</td>
<td>No/yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Synergy</td>
<td>No policy synergy motivation for collaboration</td>
<td>Partnership based on policy synergy for collaboration</td>
<td>Partnership based on policy synergy for collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Synergy</td>
<td>No/yes resource synergy motivation for collaboration</td>
<td>No/yes resource synergy motivation for collaboration</td>
<td>Partnership based on resource synergy for collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Efficiency</td>
<td>- Efficiency</td>
<td>- Efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Effectiveness</td>
<td>- Effectiveness</td>
<td>- Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concept variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimacy and accountability</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>+1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBO -&gt; Community</td>
<td>Community does not recognize representative CBO’s legitimacy: does not agree with CBO’s performance, values or CBO/NGO is not accountable to the community</td>
<td>Community recognizes representative CBO’s legitimacy to some extent, approves their performance, values, and CBO/NGO shares at least some information with them</td>
<td>Community recognizes representative CBO’s legitimacy; there is a bi-directional relation. CBO/NGO shares information with and is accountable to the community; goals and values are shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust and reciprocity</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between community and other partners</td>
<td>Community does trust neither NGO nor local government (LG)</td>
<td>Community trusts NGO or LG to some extent; there is some friendship, reliability or exchange</td>
<td>Community trusts NGO and LG; there is friendship, reliability and exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power and participation</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community’s ability to participate in decision-making</td>
<td>Community members do not hold any power, they do not have an opportunity to express their views</td>
<td>Some power, tokenism, possibly not full partner, based on agents’ own interpretations</td>
<td>Full partner in decision making and power-sharing (Citizen Power); based on agents’ own interpretations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL INDEX

| All summed up | -3...-2 | All summed up | -1...-1 | All summed up | +2...+3 |

Description of partnership characteristics

| This collaborative arrangement is contracting or using community for provision of resources without any real balanced collaboration | This arrangement is perhaps described as partnership and has potential for developing that direction, but it still lacks elements of genuine partnership | This is close to genuine partnership, indicating community has been granted a prominent role in the decision-making and management of the intervention |

4.4.7 Conclusions

Participation and the ability to use power are crucial for community members’ involvement and commitment to the production process. Therefore, to carry out an analysis of partnerships through the conceptual model, the theoretical framework should treat power and participation in partnership from the community members’ perspective; explore the issues of power and agency as socially constructed as well as analysing the factors influencing them. Thus, it is necessary to descend from the vague level of ‘community’ to the level of individuals, to study communities’ social space; to dissect different power relations at an individual level as well as community
agents’ ability to exercise their agency; and to understand and identify constraints limiting and enabling their agency. Cleaver (2001:54) recommended that participation and participatory processes could be analysed through the framework of structure and agent. Hence, Giddens’ Structuration Theory addresses these preoccupations.

4.5 PARTNERSHIP AS EXPERIENCED BY COMMUNITY AGENTS

4.5.1 Individual agency within a community

Though partnership is established through formal agreements between institutions, communities’ social relations shape the way community members as individual actors experience their agency in it. The fundamental ethos is that the role of human actors or agents needs to be recognized (Norman Long 1992). Without acknowledging the individual level, private aspirations and experiences of power, communities’ diversity easily confines community members to predetermined groups or dichotomies, when agencies of these community members depend on their own specific lifeworlds, on their own experiences and the structures which affect their lives.

Within one group there are power-holders and have-nots, the poor and the wealthy, selfish and altruistic individuals, etc. In addition, there are internal power struggles; the powerful could embark on an attempt to co-opt the disenfranchised. As Norman Long declares: “... the individual is, as it were, transmuted metaphorically into the social actor, which signifies the fact that social actor is a social construction rather than simply a synonym for the individual or a member of homo sapiens.” (Norman Long 1992: 25).

According to Structuration Theory, there are elements in the surrounding society which constrain and enable individual agents. Similarly, these agents can cause changes through their actions. For example, elite members can constrain or enable the agency of more vulnerable members of the population. Equally, agents themselves can through their own agency have an impact on the factors affecting their agency. Poor communities and citizens might look powerless but they do have resources and mechanisms to draw upon and influence matters, as the success of grassroots movements such as the shack-dwellers’ movement, SDI, demonstrate. Thus, the need for a theoretical framework at agent level which enables recursive handling of the relation between agents and society.

Similarly it is imperative to understand partnership as a dynamic interaction as a social process determined by social practices within the local space and a temporal context. Thus, the intention here is to find a theoretical approach which allows the understanding of a mutual relationship

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52 Chapter 4.5 draws mainly on Giddens 1986.
between agents and structures in a temporal context, thus responding to the concerns about individual actors’ agency in partnership. Therefore, for this second part, Giddens’ Theory of Structuration is believed to offer a useful theoretical framework.

First, it is imperative to analyse the ontology and main tenets of Structuration Theory including critical views on it, whereupon how it could be applied into this research is assessed considering the research problem and consequent research questions.

4.5.2 Main tenets of Structuration Theory

In Structuration Theory, Giddens sets out to create a fundamental framework for social analysis grounded by and large on a redefined ontology (N. Blaikie 1993). Re-elaboration of the basic ontology and new conceptualization was necessary since, according to Giddens, either widely deployed concepts such as individual and society used to be “unelaborated” (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 75) or social theories were based on divergent ontologies (Giddens 1986: 17).

Structuration theory discusses the interaction of human actors with social systems, and the consequent reproduction of social life. Its constitutional cornerstone is duality, the view of the relationship between an individual and society being what Giddens calls recursive. The act of production is also reproduction; thus it has a recursive character, passing through the whole society (Thompson 1989: 58). Hence, social life is dynamic; it is more than its core elements (activities and practices); it is their continuous reproduction (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 76).

In social theory, the debate about agents and structures is based on dualism; whether society is produced and reproduced by individual actors who shape society through their relations as for instance phenomenologists claim; or whether, as functionalists-structuralists promulgate, it is created by structures where society is a system of relationships and its structures then define social outcomes, individuals being considered as objects (Moos and Dear 1986). Giddens intends to contend with this general bifurcation of social sciences. According to him, the objectivist view has been emphasized over the role of the social entity over individuals, whereas in the subjectivist one, individual experience has formed the basis for the understanding of social ontology though it has been disconnected from the impersonal world outside (Giddens 1986: 17). Thus, the need for resolution.

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33 Both ones, Structuration Theory and the Theory of Structuration are used.
34 Terms of human/social actor, agent and individual are interchangeable here.
35 Giddens makes a difference between power in duality, which is a recursive action and power in dualism, where according to for instance Lukes’ concepts of power, power processes are affecting either way (D. Layder, ‘Power, Structure and Agency’, in Christopher G.A. Bryant and David Jary (eds.), Anthony Giddens: Critical Assessments, Vol II (London: Routledge, Taylor& Francis, 1997).
Structuration Theory distinguishes between those two main differing approaches in social theory. In Structuration theory the basic realm is neither the subject, the individual nor the other end, societal totality over the object but social practices mediating between the agent and structures, “…ordered across space and time” (Giddens 1986: 12). Social practice is an action which is oriented towards others (Moos and Dear 1986).

Structuration is defined as conditions governing the continuity or transmutation of a structure, and therefore the reproduction of social systems (Giddens 1986: 25). In structuration, the whole society, systems and agents are reproduced through the social praxis shaped by time and location. Each social act produces something new; actors reproducing structures influence them either by sustaining or counteracting them which then generate rules and resources for social interaction. Praxis is repeated over time but always differently.

The importance of the spatial and temporal contexts is emphasized in Structuration theory, “account of time and space is essential to social theory” (Held and Thompson 1989: 7). Temporal interpretation is strongly linked to the recursive character of the space. Spatial dimension, locale as Giddens defines it, refers to the place where social practices happen and are undertaken, which is not necessarily geographically defined (Kaspersen 2000).

4.5.3 Structures, systems, rules and resources
Actors and societies are linked by structures. There is a duality in social structures: they are constituted by agents and simultaneously they are the medium for the constitution of social systems. Individuals’ action as agents shape structures in society which then enables them to act or constrains them from acting. There are several conditions affecting action, some are conscious and some unacknowledged conditions. Similarly, the actions have consequences which could be intended or unintended; consequently they affect the conditions where agents operate. Thus, the basic character of all interactions is duality. Social interactions are “…continually recreated by them [social actors] via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors. In and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible.” (Giddens 1986: 2). Thus, social actors are historically located (N. Blaikie 1993: 72), and structures cannot be analysed separately from individuals’ action or from the changes caused to them.

Rules and resources enable and constrain actions of agents, they are “embed…within the agent” (Kaspersen 2000: 43). Rules are ”... procedures of action, aspects of praxis.” (Giddens 1986: 21). Resources are “structured properties of social systems, drawn upon and reproduced by knowledgeable agents in the course of interaction.” (Giddens 1986: 15). They are both the means
and the ends of the duality of the system as "...rules and resources drawn upon in the production and reproduction of social action are at the same time the means of system reproduction (the duality of structure)" (Giddens 1986: 19) or in other words rules and resources as "...the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize." (Giddens 1986: 25).

Structures are “virtual orders of rules and resources”; produced through the flow of interactions (Bryant and Jary 2001: 56). They are virtual sets of transformation relations, organized as properties of social systems (Giddens 1986: 25). Structures exist in practices not in systems, but “systems exhibit structural properties” (Giddens 1986: 17). Structures are classified as signification structures (such as communication), legitimation structures representing rules and allocative domination structure (resources) and authoritative domination structure which are used for exercising power. Domination structure can be either authoritative or allocative, it is the medium of power (Moos and Dear 1986: 236).

Time allows agents to influence changes in social structures, to reproduce them. Structures recursively shape actors during social interactions. They are thus considered dynamic rather than being conceptualized as a skeleton of a framework (Held and Thompson 1989: 12) or a lifeless framework (N. Blaikie 1993: 73).

Consequently, social systems are reproduced in relations between actors and collectivities, organised as regular social practices (Giddens 1986: 25). Social actions constitute the systems which then produce the space where the actions take place (Kaspersen 2000: 47). Rules and resources allow "...the 'binding' of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them 'systemic' form." (Giddens 1986: 17). For example, society is “a politically and territorially constituted system” (Giddens 1989: 300), a product of production and reproduction of the social actors or “…a complex of recurrent practices which form institutions” (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 77).

4.5.4 Agency and dialectic of control
Agency is more than being an individual; it is a self-conscious process, a flow of actions (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 76); it is a continuously reflexive, monitoring and rationalising action (Giddens 1986: 3). Giddens recognises agents’ knowledge and ability: agents can deploy power, act or refuse to act (Giddens 1986: 14). An agent is an active social actor; an agent knows, sometimes tacitly, sometimes discursively how to analyse and talk about their actions (Kaspersen 2000: 35). Reasoning activities and expressing them defines a human being who is "a purposive
agent” (Giddens 1986: 3). Agents’ knowledge is practical, they are aware and knowledgeable about the systems where they participate in reproduction (Giddens 1979: 73).

The ability of agents to cause changes is based on this praxis. Because this knowledge is often pragmatic and because agents cannot always render what they do and why, people’s knowledgeable might be underrated (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 83). Though agents are knowledgeable, sometimes they do not realize it. In addition, agents’ intended actions can produce unintended consequences. This appreciation of the skilfulness and knowledgeable of agents is one of the main tenets of Structuration Theory.

Agency connotes an actor who has power, and agency actually entails power “social agency depends solely upon the capability of actors to ‘make a difference’ in the production of definite outcomes, regardless of whether or not they intend (are aware) that these outcomes occur” (I. Cohen 1987: 284). It is the capability that matters, not intentions, which is the reason why agency alludes power (Giddens 1986: 9). If an agent does not have the capability to exercise power and pursue it any more, an agent is not any more an agent. Even coercive, remunerative or normative powers cannot completely eliminate people’s agency. Only when a human being becomes less a human agent, a human being becomes alienated, “an appendage of a machine”, not an agent anymore (Giddens 1982: 212).

There are two different types of power: power as the capability of agents to cause change and transformation, and power as ‘mobilization of bias’, the ability of institutions to maintain domination (Giddens 1986: 15). Action always involves transformative power (Giddens 1986: 15). Power is exercised through resources which are both media and “structural elements of social systems” (Giddens 1982: 39).

Though power in a relationship can be asymmetrical, an agent is always able to control and avoid subjugation (Moos and Dear 1986: 236). Power and domination do not stay inside institutions, but subordinates who are dependent on that institution can also use power and influence that institution (Giddens 1986: 16). Even the marginalised possess some knowledge about the social systems which suppress them. Therefore, power can be a source of constraint as well as an enablement (Giddens 1986: 175).

A structure connects agents, power and the dialectic of control (Bryant and Jary 2001: 56). The dialectic of control is present in every power struggle, denoting that “all power relations are reciprocal” (Giddens 1979: 149). In every action, there is autonomy and dependence (Kaspersen 2000: 41), and the dialectic of control means that even in a situation of dependence, an agent
can counteract by exercising counterpower. In interaction, agents are never fully autonomous “…[T]here is a dialectic of control involving the asymmetrical access to and manipulation of the media (resources)…” (I. Cohen 1987: 285). Counteracting takes place through the two-way character of the distributive aspect of power (power as control); the less powerful manage resources in such a way as to exert control over the more powerful in established power relationships (Giddens 1986: 374), “…the capability of the weak, in the regularised relations of autonomy and dependence that constitute social systems, to turn their weakness back against the powerful” (Giddens 1982: 3).

The idea of dialectic of control is that human agents can always exercise their agency, even when dependent. In practice this means that even when it seems that an agent is not able to exercise power, an agent can use counterpower, to oppose the action. Subordinates still command power over the others. They can convert resources to “some degree of control over the reproduction of those social systems.” (Giddens, 1979: 6). Counterpower can be located in “informal networks of resistance” to oppose “the prevailing power apparatuses” (Rahnema 2001: 123). It can be manifested for example in evasion, refusal to pay, or diversion of resources. When agents act at their own discretion, if they so wish, they can also use their power to act against the “beneficiary action”: they can take parts they wish and deconstruct the initiative (Galjart 1995).

4.5.5 Critiques of Structuration Theory and empirical research
Structuration Theory is a vast attempt to explain society, which inevitably has faced criticism (see Kaspersen 2000 for an overview). For example, Held and Thompson attest that though Structuration Theory is believed to bridge the gap between the divisions in social theory, too much emphasis is allocated on the role of the agent (Held and Thompson 1989). Bryant and Jary (in Kaspersen 2000) claim that the structure definition is unclear. Confusingly the structure as Giddens defines it is not similar to the structure in social theory in general; Giddens also separates structures and systems.

Relevant to this research is criticism about the lack of culture. Structuration Theory does not elaborate the concept of culture, it is not addressed there. Similarly, the concept locale is not specified in detail. For example Kaspersen suggests that culture comes through signification structure, as it is linked to cultural production (Kaspersen 2000: 163). Therefore, in this research the dilemma of culture and locale have been resolved by widening locale to understand social locality with its specific cultural features and rules to comprise of cultural traditions as well. Since this thesis concentrates on agency and the use of power, understanding the influence of culture through the domination structure and rules as a cultural norm is an applicable approach.
Structuration Theory has been accused of concentrating more on ontology than epistemology, and therefore providing few resources for empirical research (N. Blaikie 1993; Gregson 1989). Thus, it is claimed that excessive emphasis is placed on conceptual deliberation rather than providing a theoretical framework which would give actual tools for empirical research. Moos and Dear claim this missing emphasis on epistemology means Structuration Theory lacks rules of interpretation (Moos and Dear 1986).

Thus, the aim is to employ Structuration Theory as a tool to analyse and understand agents’ use of power. Nevertheless, Giddens says that Structuration Theory was not formed as a methodological approach (Giddens 1989: 294-97), but “…structuration theory is a ‘theoretical perspective’…” (N. Blaikie 1993: 119-20), “a broad perspective upon the study of action, structure and institutions.” (Giddens 1989: 297) and that there is always a gap between theory and empirical research, a “relative autonomy” (Giddens 1989: 294-97). Therefore, field research is contextually oriented and methods should be selected accordingly; there are no strict guidelines (N. Blaikie 1993).

Giddens himself gives comments and advice on empirical research, believing it is important indeed (N. Blaikie 1993: 119-20) “…individuals’ knowledge and understanding is not just alluded to but elucidated in the course of empirical research projects.” (Gregson 1989: 240). Agents’ experiences illuminate their life worlds. The main emphasis of this research lies in this aspect: giving value to community agents’ discourses, enriching and refocusing the research with issues which were emphasized in community narratives but did not emerge strongly in the literature review. Thus, agents’ knowledgeability is again emphasized, as Giddens claims how their explanations might be well known and obvious to themselves but reveal something new to the researcher. The fundamental philosophy and understanding of both parties is based on completely different conceptual frameworks: “…the mutual [between the researcher and the informant] unintelligibility of divergent frames of meaning…” (Giddens 1986: 328). Informants do not find this kind of research very illuminating but it is instrumental to identify “…the bounds of agents’ knowledgeability in the shifting contexts of time and space…” (Giddens 1986: 328). He admits though their unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences might be difficult to discover.

Furthermore, researchers should use only two or three basic concepts from Structuration Theory; it should not be applied ‘en bloc’ (Bryant and Giddens 2001: 230). For instance Blaikie interprets the concepts of the structuration theory as “sensitizing devices”, to be used for interpreting findings (N. Blaikie 1993: 121). The impact of time-space, the historical development and the
context, and knowledgeability of agents and their skills are important. Different levels of *locale* can be investigated separately through “bracketing”. For instance at an individual level this means studying how agents draw upon societal elements (Moos and Dear 1986: 242). The main point is to remain sensitive to the key notions, a small field research can also reveal much about institutional reproduction (Giddens 1989: 294-97). This advice has guided this research.

4.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK CONNECTED TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS

4.6.1 Findings of literature review in the light of theoretical framework

The literature review (chapter 3) revealed the significance of partnership as a way to address current dilemmas in service delivery. In addition, it revealed that there are gaps both in terms of the conceptual analysis of partnerships and empirical research regarding service delivery partnerships with communities. There are ontological questions, like what is a community, when a partnership with a community actually is partnership; and questions related to the legitimacy and representativeness of the partners: who are the people and organisations representing communities and with what mandate. Consequently, there are epistemological questions of how partnerships and community participation have been examined and how alternative research strategies and methods (as compared to those ones commonly deployed) could contribute to the stock of knowledge.

Thus, the two-part theoretical approach binds together these concerns by first providing a conceptual framework for the main analytical factors influencing the interface between the partners in partnership as a tool to analyse the ontology of partnership. The analytical concepts are socially constructed. Since it is acknowledged that in reality a genuine partnership as defined here might not be reachable, the conceptual tool makes up an estimation scale defining to what extent the analytical factors influence the intervention and by summing up; to what extent the intervention can be regarded as a genuine partnership. When the conceptual framework is applied in different phases, it reveals the transformation of partnerships in a temporal dimension.

Second, *Structuration Theory* and particularly dialectic of control present an analytical argument to deconstruct social practices and examine power relations. It suggests analysing community members as agents instead of the mainstream treatment of an unknown, indefinite group called ‘community’, commonly employed in development studies and collective action school. Similarly, studies on collective action concentrate on issues of opportunism, free-riders and their avoidance (Ostrom 1995; Putnam 1993). Instead, this research attempts to understand the motives behind the drivers and constraints which cause some people to become free-riders.
either deliberatively or because they are constrained; and to analyse further consequences of the manner a collective action was planned and implemented. Structuration Theory also defines a critical framework of the structural factors which have an impact on community actors’ agency both enabling and constraining them.

Third, Structuration Theory entails a two level analysis: \textit{strategic conduct} carried out at agent level and \textit{institutional analysis}. In this research agents’ strategic conduct has been selected as the starting point, and institutional analysis will be in “methodological brackets” (Kaspersen 2000: 48). The analysis of strategic conduct emphasizes social action, investigating how agents draw upon rules and resources. Through dialectic double-hermeneutics, the institutional level is investigated mainly via the recursive linkage with structural rules and resources.

Structuration Theory challenges the idea of empowerment which by definition refers to the transferral of power to the powerless. If in resonance to the ‘participation paradigm’ parts of society need to be empowered, by implication it is assumed that they are powerless when they actually are never powerless (Giddens 1986). Dialectic of control does not accord with the idea of empowerment as articulated in contemporary development discourses, since dialectic of control postulates that power is located in the relationship between the agent and structure. Community members’ choices to participate in partnership can be circumscribed or enabled by structural constraints; or they can affect the options on how to participate (Giddens 1986: 175). Similarly, structural constraints are affected via duality, for instance by agents’ actions in partnership.

The time-space context is important. In practice it means employing a historical and developmental perspective, that is sensitivity to the context (Giddens 1989: 289). Social practices affect the use of power in partnerships which takes place in different contexts. Frequently, development projects are seen as isolated interventions, delinking them from their space and time contexts; consequently not considering evident dynamism. As Long and van der Ploeg claim

“... conceptualising intervention as a discrete and clearly localised activity (i.e. as a ‘project’) obscures the theoretically important point that intervention is never a ‘project’ with sharp boundaries in space and time... Interventions are always part of the chain or flow of events located within the broader framework of the activities of the state and the activities of different interest groups operative in civil society…” (Long and van der Ploeg quoted in Cornwall c.a. 2000).
In a partnership, considering transformations in a time-space dimension, there is a clear distinction before and after surrendering resources. Resources are the medium for power. Thus, in partnership the resources through which communities can exercise power are their local knowledge and their material or labour contribution. Therefore, agents’ ability to exercise their agency is not the same in the beginning and at the end as resources are the medium for power. In this research, awareness of partnership dynamics in a time dimension was considered by carrying out the research by distinguishing between the planning and implementation phases, when the resource based was different.

Similarly, the thesis attempts to explore the context by choosing different case projects as locale and acknowledging their diverse partnership dimensions, cultural environment and different local actors, institutions and collectivities.

Therefore, this theoretical framework applied in relation to community members as agents in partnership will study their own interpretation of their agency in a partnership, how partnerships affected their agency, which structural constraints affected their agency as identified in their discourses. Consequently, it will identify their expressions of counterpower through different embodiments of resistance such as silence or pure rejection towards the social process of partnership. Understanding partnership as a social process indicates that the outcome is an interim element of the process. Counterpower can then diminish their attachment to the intervention and their linkage to the outcome. In a partnership for production of a public good it implies that limiting citizens’ agency and consequently their turning to counterpower could reduce their sense of ownership. Drawing on the main concerns of the literature review, these theoretical propositions lead to hypothesis that:

- Limiting the participation, and thus the agency, of the community members of a partnership for the production of a public good during the implementation stages undermines their (acquired) sense of ownership of the outcome.

4.6.2 Definition of research questions
The resolution of the following research questions that are derived from the conceptual framework which emerged from the literature review form the basis for substantiating the hypothesis:

- Do community members claim that the CBOs representing them enjoyed legitimacy and demonstrated accountability in the partnership?

- What kind of synergy was existent in the partnership?
- To what extent do community members claim there was trust and reciprocity between them, CBOs and other partners in the partnership?

The independent variables are legitimacy and accountability, synergy, trust and reciprocity, and power through participation. Their analysis is mainly done from communities’ perspective only, since the interpretivist research approach concentrates on the interpretation of their own experiences. The view on partnerships is complemented by narratives from other partners as far as possible, though unfortunately most of the key persons are not in Dar es Salaam any more.

Below there are further research questions which correspond to the questions related to the linkage of power, agency and a sense of ownership, first identified in the conceptual framework, and then defined through Structuration Theory and dialectic of control:

- To what extent do community agents claim that they had power through participation in the partnership during the planning phase of the infrastructure?
- To what extent do community agents claim that they had power through participation in the partnership during the production of the infrastructure?
- To what extent do community agents demonstrate ‘a sense of ownership’ and how do they perceive that it correlates to the extent of their interpretation of having experienced agency during the production of the infrastructure?

Independent variables here are community agents’ power exercised through participation during the planning and production phases, thus exploring the temporal context. The dependent variable is the acquired sense of ownership. Community members’ agency is explored through their interpretations of the structural constraints; that is rules and resources limiting and enabling them to exercise power.

The intention of the hypothesis was not only to produce a new theoretical contribution and answer to research questions, but also to guide the research to produce a richer and more polyvalent picture of community members’ agency in a partnership, as well as factors which have a bearing on it and which will be affected by it.

Analysis at agent level generates sub-groups or generic profiles of individuals, who participate in different manners and use power to different extents, but through the categories of applied variables, it is expected that the profiles will emerge representing generically similar experiences and claims.
5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter reflects the methodological trail of the thesis. It incorporates a justification of the research process and tries to cast light on the choices made during its progress, while describing the personal learning curve of carrying out qualitative research largely as an auto-didactic. I learned research methodology and philosophy from research literature, whilst during the field research my understanding of how to approach and conduct research developed and matured.

After the literature review, I embarked on field research. Changing the case country from Uganda as originally planned to Tanzania and my growing understanding of research approaches and methodology urged a refocus in my research, which was then refined during the first leg of field research and pilot case study. The pilot case also suggested a revision of the theoretical part as well as the methodology.

My approach was interdisciplinary in nature. The focus moved from the initial institutional level of investigation deploying political sciences more towards the agent level where development and social theories offered frames of interpretation to the dilemmas that I was interested in.

Below, there is a description of my research approach, strategy and the research methods that I employed. In addition, the research population, sampling reliability and validity are reflected on later on in this chapter.

5.2 RESEARCH APPROACH: ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISODEMEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS
One of the first questions when planning this research methodology was what would be the research approach, that is to say what would be my relation to the material I will collect. The topic and general research problem was clear in my head all the time, but regularly reviewing the research process led to refocusing of my approach to it.

In the beginning, before the first leg of my field research in Tanzania my hypothesis was causal. I believed I could prove it by comparing different cases, considering data through a positivist approach. This positivist approach would indicate that my epistemology, the way “…I gain knowledge of this reality, whatever it is understood to be; claims about how what exists may be known” (N. Blaikie 1993: 7); the way data is collected and used is objective (Devine 2002). In practice I would work in a kind of vacuum where, for instance, the data were absolute and my own views and experiences would not influence them.

Then I realised that I would not only be unable to prove the hypothesis, but also that a positivist approach was not consonant with the research questions I had defined (Read and Marsh 2002).
For me, it was essential to understand the impact and consequences of people’s actions and their ability to use power in that specific context, which required a far richer understanding of the research context than a positivist approach would have enabled.

Another revelation was that it would be practically impossible to detach my personal experience from the way I defined the concepts; the way I was conducting interviews; the way I was interpreting the findings. Indeed, it is difficult to avoid being biased (Bell 2005: 95), but at least my growing awareness helped to diminish its impact on the research. Still, through my choices, I would leave my fingerprint on the information to be collected. Thus, it was time to reflect and reassess more thoroughly as to what kind of data I actually was looking for, and consider it when choosing the research approach.

Several other aspects influenced the selection of the research approach. First, I had to understand and consider the local context: the case country, Tanzania, was living in a post-socialist era, her administration and governance structures were still under transformation towards a multi-party system, all strongly influenced by global neo-liberalist policies. The role and character of civil society was contested and perpetually developing. After the first leg, I already had investigated secondary data, interviewed key persons such as government officials and researchers. The pilot case convinced me that I also needed to understand far deeper ordinary citizens’ own perceptions about the context and society in general, and how they experienced their agency.

An elementary ontological problem was how to understand and define a community. In the documents of the pilot case the target area was defined as one community, but field research revealed that the supposedly one community actually consisted of a number of sub-communities. Therefore, I decided to use the term community in the meaning of a meta-community, which in reality consisted of several communities. Subsequently, there seemed to be a difference between the formal, often Western originated interpretation of civil society and the way in which ordinary citizens viewed the role and status of civil society organisations as discussed in the literature review. This suggested the main issue: the reality was socially constructed, and this affected the selection of my research approach.

The research approach should give space for people’s own discourses, their own perceptions and interpretations. I was relying on linkages based on people’s analysis of their use of power, the structures influencing it and finally, their social distance to the produced outcome. Therefore, there should be a strong emphasis on interpretivism (see for example N. Blaikie 1993), with some emphasis on feminism. Using interpretivism meant I would make sense of people’s experiences

36 Ordinary here refers to people who do not hold any power position inside the community.
and social reality. People are subjects, who have multiple realities. Interpretivism focuses “on the process and context of social change” (Wilson 2003) and tries to understand social context rather than describing it only, considering it socially constructed. Interpretivism would be also fully convergent with the theoretical framework. Feminism offers a critical approach; it claims that male bias has distorted the way interventions have been designed or human experiences have been understood. Thus, it focuses on the way women construct experiences (N. Blaikie 1993: 78).

At the beginning of this field research, most of the initial gaps were caused either by my incomplete understanding of the situation at local level such as the importance of political conflicts; or giving less emphasis to local issues such as community contributions which I initially had discarded as less pertinent for this research. This reveals the importance of understanding that there are two agendas: the researcher’s and the interviewees’; hence sensitivity is important to arrive at interviewees’ concepts and issues. When the themes began emerging in narratives, I started to understand the meaning and importance of some of the communications and consequently the gaps diminished. When I gained more information, particularly during and after the pilot case, I had to refocus my research process and refine the methodology. Thus the need for considering a qualitative methodology as an iterative process, working in loops to revisit research questions and methodology.

5.3 Research Strategy
A research strategy needs to be selected based on the context of the research, such as the target of the research and the resources available (Hammersley 2004: 243). At the onset, I began with a literature review. The literature review helped to identify discussions and determine the focus of the research problem related to partnership and service delivery which I had already had in mind for a long time. Then, I discovered gaps in the literature which led to further scanning of the area of investigation. Thereafter, I developed a conceptual model based on the literature review. This conceptual model served as an analytical tool for determining different factors affecting a collaborative relationship, and subsequently for analysing to what extent a collaborative relationship could be labelled as partnership. The model’s concepts helped to distinguish and visualize to what degree the partnership had attributes of an ideal, a genuine partnership. Its application in a temporal dimension revealed how agency and relationships changed during the implementation phase as compared to the planning phase.

The main research strategy was based on hypothetico-deductive view. The developed hypothesis was tested in four case projects, representing different institutional combinations to implement
infrastructure projects in different contexts. Testing meant the statements of the hypothesis developed on theoretical reflections were verified by juxtaposing them against the real world (Punch 2000; Rosenberg 2004).

I did two pre-pilot trips; one to Zambia in 2003, just after commencing the PhD studies, and another to Uganda in 2004, see Figure 2 for the timing of field research. The former served as training in interviewing and understanding potential pitfalls both in terms of methodology and interview technique. In the latter, I got ideas how to refocus my research questions. Then I had to change the case country from Uganda to Tanzania due to Uganda’s upcoming general and local elections. The first leg of field research with the background study lasted from January until May 2006. It began with a wide-ranging background study of basic services, community-based construction, local governance, civil society, national poverty reduction strategies etc. It was a combination of a desk study topped up with extensive interviews of professionals in the area and other key informants. The idea of these interviews was firstly, to understand the local context where local government, CSOs and communities live, work and produce infrastructure; and secondly, in relation to the literature review, to help refine the focus of the research and the operationalisation of the research questions. These data were mostly qualitative, gathered from versatile primary and secondary sources: project evaluations and other research, existing surveys, government and other documents, plans and strategies and other data sources such as statistical abstracts. Government and local government development plans, work plans, strategies etc constituted essential background information about government priorities, decentralisation and local needs for service delivery as well as the framework where infrastructure was operated and maintained at the local level. Additionally, I gathered background information throughout the period I lived in Dar es Salaam. I participated in discussion forums, engaged in discussions across all social strata of citizens in different locations and walked around in case areas. On all those occasions I used semi-structured or open interview questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIMELINE OF CONDUCTING FIELD RESEARCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zambia pre-pilot</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K Kijitonyama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B, MB, HN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2 Timeline of field research**
The conceptual model was employed and the hypothesis was tested by using a case study strategy. Generally, a case study can reveal a deeper and more complicated reality, which helps to understand better rather than generalize, “…one case (or perhaps a small number of cases) will be studied in detail, using whatever methods seem appropriate. While there may be a variety of specific purposes and research questions, the general objective is to develop as full an understanding of that case as possible.” (Punch 1998 quoted in Silverman 2005).

At the beginning of May 2006, I embarked on a pilot case in Kijitonyama which equipped me with a deeper understanding for refining the methodology. During the pilot case, the salient role of research assistants and the potential risks related to their using their own interpretation became evident. This prompted me to pose higher quality requirements on research assistants and their work (see section 5.8 for further discussion). During the latter phase from October to December 2006 I explored three other case areas with a better understanding of the methodological framework and then completed the field research.

5.4 DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH METHODS

Research issues
The focus during this in-depth field research was placed on discourses how the partnership project had run in general; on what the community understood by partnership and what was their role in partnership; on understanding who the community was and who were community members, on the community’s and partnership’s internal dynamics, interpreted through the concept variables of the model. Thereafter, the intention was to explore the degree of exercising agency through participation in a temporal dimension, and the sense of ownership as perceived by the community and/or CBO members themselves, based on their own interpretations about exercising power and their discourses related to the sense of ownership and potentially about the corresponding linkages. Surveying participation during two different phases attempted to answer calls for a time-dimension approach to the research (see eg Giddens 1986). Here agency through participation during the planning and production phases is the independent variable and the sense of ownership is the dependable variable (see eg. Bernard 2002: 32). Resonating with the participation paradigm and dialectic of control from Structuration Theory, the ability or limitations to exercise agency were believed to have implications on the sense of ownership which was reflected through two different sources: first in people’s discourses in terms of their relationship with and secondly through social connection to the outcome and of their attitudes.
towards maintenance, reflected practically in the maintenance of infrastructure or the lack of it, verified though observation.

The research methods used for collecting background field information are defined in Table 9. In the first section, pertinent survey issues related to the general context of service delivery are defined. This was basically covered during the first leg of my field research by interviewing key informants, professionals and other resource persons in the field. Then, the literature review together with information gained during the pilot trips and the background field study led to the definition of the research questions presented in Table 10, where information required per each research question and variables is presented. Though, the information related to different research questions is presented logically separately, in the field some of the information was found out in a single session. These more detailed survey questions form the basis for interview topics, where I used the interview guide. The topics were defined, but the semi-structured interview itself was allowed to flow rather freely.

*Semi-structured interviewing*

Thus, aiming at understanding informants’ context in relation to their partnerships, semi-structured interviews formed the core method. Semi-structured interviews are an interactive learning process. They are actually based on negotiation between the researcher and interviewees: what the researcher wants to hear and what the interviewee wants to tell, whereas structured interviews concentrate more on researcher’s perspective (Fontana and Frey 2003). Thus, in the case of the researcher having an idea of interview topics, but desiring to leave space for other emerging issues, semi-structured interviews enable data produced in collaboration (Richards 2005: 42).

Semi-structured questions permitted ordinary residents to articulate their views on aspects and issues important for them. These allowed people to respond freely, with only minimum guidance from me. As Bernard describes semi-structured interviewing follows a “script” to cover an agenda when the interviewer does not control the replies (Bernard 2002: 203-05). They permitted listening views of the interviewees which have been subjectively formed, while trying to document them and the process objectively (Miller and Glassner 2005). However, the drawback is that topics covered with semi-structured interviews are thus covered differently; they are not fully comparable. Some interviewees were willing or happy to share their views, some were less receptive (see also Tripp 1997: 206).
Other methods
Sense of ownership was studied through different methods: both as the thematic content of discourses and through observations as reflected in concrete actions of maintenance or the willingness for it. However, this requires caution, as there are several other prerequisites necessary for maintenance. Maintenance can also be coerced, thus not being voluntary. Therefore, treating maintenance as an indication of sense of ownership requires deeper contextual information.

The focus group-method was used only spontaneously where it felt natural; for instance, people felt they could speak out without any threats and they were used to communicate between themselves. Therefore, they were conducted with only a few self-determined groups such as CBOs (see Figure 3), with the exception of one focus group of community members in Mburahati^37. In those selected cases focus group discussions were useful, since they revealed attitudes and encouraged free discussion, thus deepening my understanding (Kitzinger 2004). Focus groups discussion served also a triangulation for the findings of individual interviews.

Otherwise, in Eastern African societies it is customary to consider social norms and hierarchy before speaking up; more vulnerable people speak through representatives, so it would be difficult to get personal accounts (other than those of leaders) and views using focus groups. On those very few occasions where there were already more than one person gathered together, and I interviewed them together, there was always one person who was more dominant (e.g., older, higher in the local hierarchy, politician, or male), so the interview had to be repeated later with the less dominant people.

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^37 Men, including several wazee usually gather in the central area regularly, I took advantage of this situation to hold a focus group discussion with them.
Data analysis
I analysed the qualitative data gained in the pilot case research in Kijitonyama (see section 7.2) partly qualitatively and quantitatively, reducing some answers either to numbers or scales. However, I quite soon realised I was concentrating on the replies to my survey questions, but I was missing a much more comprehensive picture of community dynamics. There were themes that emerged in interviews that alerted me to revisit my methodological decisions. As Morse and Richards assert that a research project should be data driven, allowing adjustments during the research process, reflecting the increasing understanding of the setting, context and people (Morse and Richards 2002). Therefore, I decided to use qualitative analysis in the remaining three cases.

Thus, I took detailed notes, searched for different patterns, and then analysed them categorizing data and linking it to ideas, “…putting an interpretative structure on the data” (Morse and Richards 2002: 124). The topics were first derived from variables, and then from analysis, so they developed from the discourse content. I analysed the narratives searching for certain units: words, phrases or themes about their ideas, concepts and beliefs, or topics which are either descriptive, talking about something concrete; interpretive concepts, “… a common thread that runs through the data…” (Morse and Richards 2002: 120). They were either defined beforehand
for example in research questions or started to emerge in interviewees’ accounts (Wilkinson 2004).

Basically, the intention was to understand others’ categories (Silverman 1993). For instance two case study interventions included a cost-sharing element which is elementary in most national strategies. Initially, I did not emphasise it in the interviews, but it emerged strongly during the first discourses, therefore, I reviewed my survey questions and included cost-sharing there (Strauss and Corbin 2004).

To link different variables connected to the hypothesis, agency and sense of ownership, the heuristic approach introduced profiling (Richards 2005: 36). Based on the survey variables, the field data began to generate profiles of different agents. The profiles were grounded on the variables, community members’ divergent experiences within the partnership intervention and their divergent attitudes and social distance to the outcome. Profiling helped me to understand the heterogeneous nature of the community to be applied in the testing of the hypothesis, but similar profiles were repeated in different cases.

Probes
During the interviews, my research assistants and I used different probes as prompts. Typically, probes are utilized “to stimulate a respondent to produce more information”, probes are means to encourage the respondent to continue communication (Bernard 2002: 210). Probes were very useful, in particular in the beginning when collecting background information and when I did not have a complete understanding of the local aspects related to the main themes. Thus, probes also helped to find interesting issues behind the official rhetoric and policy framework. In addition, people in this region may typically share the requested information, but not touch other issues without being asked directly due to several reasons (Becker and Geer 2004). Thus, probing served as a tool to unearth formerly unfamiliar views. Also probes such as the long question probe eased the situation and interviewees were more relaxed in answering. A silence probe was valuable, as it fits well with the local way of communication: it is customary to allow silence in the conversation, instead of embarking on small talk. Other probes used were the uh-huh (agreeing with “I see”, “right”), echo (repeating what the respondent just said) and tell-me more probes, asking the respondent to amend and/or extend the reply (Bernard 2002).

Deferece effect
Another indispensable issue to be considered was the deference effect: people reply with what they believe the interviewer wants to hear (Devine 2002) (Bernard 2002: 232); what is pleasant

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38 I was already aware of it through my long professional experience in this region.
and possibly follows official policy lines (Marsh 2004: 172-74). The first time I came across this was during my first pilot trip to Zambia. I asked an NGO coordinator about their collaboration with the City Council. He responded they had an excellent relationship; they were working in a partnership with the City Council. Later, I lead the conversation back to the issue of collaboration with the City Council, asking how they collaborate in practice. To my great surprise he explained that they drive to the City Council, pay the officers daily allowances and drive them to the project area and then back to the office. If they did not do this, City Council officers would not appear on the site. This interview revealed to me how cautious one needs to be with concepts, to cross-check and triangulate the data and how patient when conducting interviews. It was another confirmation of the need to conduct semi-structured interviews using triangulation and probes.

**Ethics**

Ethics had a significant emphasis. First, I had to protect the identity of the interviewees. I did this by not taking notes of their name, only their gender and something descriptive identifiable only to me, in my own language (“lady in a red dress” or similar). Second, I clarified the objectives and terms of my research. Initially, many had anticipated some personal profit from interviews, but I made it clear it is only for my personal dissertation and personal use. Third, I sought permission through a stipulated hierarchical order: first I got a research permit from Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH), and then contacted my appointed focal point in University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM), then Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC), and Ilala and Kinondoni municipalities, where I got written permissions to interview their personnel. In municipalities I worked in a hierarchical order, starting from directors down to the *Mtaa* level.

I also considered the use of a voice recorder. However, in the beginning recording interviews proved to be difficult and intimidating, as for most of the people it was a clear turn-off. These research topics were related to power, and to community and local governance, which in some areas had become relatively sensitive and contested issues. Pelling describes how in Guyana recording deflected interviewees from fully expressing their views about community leaders (Pelling 1998). Research experience in Dar es Salaam reveals ordinary citizens’ reluctance to discuss freely similar issues which they experience as too sensitive (Mulengeki 2002; Sliuzas 2004; Victor and Makalle 2003). This reinforced my decision to take detailed notes and accounts which in retrospect was completely adequate and suitable method for this research (see Richards 2005:53). Both Tripp (1997) and Flynn (2005) used the same work mechanism when they carried out their ethnographic studies in urban areas of Tanzania.

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39 By the nature of my research UCLAS would have been more pertinent to my research.
Table 9 Methods used for acquiring contextual data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information required:</th>
<th>Data sources and methods applied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General understanding about the context for collaborative production of basic infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What kind of general strategies and plans related to service delivery, poverty reduction, urban development etc are there?</td>
<td>Existing documents, plans etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Current situation of devolution, what are the resources/powers at local level, structure of local government</td>
<td>Interviews with local professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the most common collaboration modes for the production of basic infrastructure? How is partnership envisioned in discourses, policies and in practice?</td>
<td>Existing research, surveys, evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What is the situation of CSOs in the country?</td>
<td>National plans, strategies and policies such as PRSP, decentralisation and LGRP, NGO/CSO involvement strategies, urban development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How do CSOs collaborate with local government?</td>
<td>Interviews with civil servants in the local government and line Ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How do communities participate in the planning and production of service delivery?</td>
<td>Interviews with other researchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interviews with NGO umbrella organisations, with major NGOs, CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation in development discussion forums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General understanding about the community itself and the construction project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How was the construction project carried out in general? What was planned, what was achieved?</td>
<td>Focus group discussions with personnel in eg schools, CBOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Basic demographics: Who belongs to the community/communities, how they define it, who lives in the area, what are their livelihoods?</td>
<td>Individual interviews with community members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How was the sensitization and mobilization of the partnership project organized during the planning and production phases?</td>
<td>Field observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How was the community organised during implementation and how was the project managed?</td>
<td>Interviews with local government (ward, mtom, ten-cell units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How was the community represented there? What was the CBO’s role in relation to the community?</td>
<td>Interviews with other CSOs, NGOs, etc active in the area</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 10 Research questions, respective methods and data sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Respective methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What kind of synergy existed in the partnership during planning and production phases?</td>
<td>Individual interviews with community members (ordinary residents and key informants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Was there effectiveness, efficiency in partnership due to resources from different partners?</td>
<td>Focus group discussions with personnel in eg schools, CBOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Were there new policy perspectives, could community partners express their views and desires?</td>
<td>Field observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do community agents claim that CBOs enjoyed legitimacy and accountability in partnership during the planning and production phases?</td>
<td>Individual interviews with community members (ordinary residents and key informants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How well did communities know the CBOs and their mandates? What do community members say about the role of the CBOs?</td>
<td>Focus group discussions with personnel in eg schools, CBOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do communities claim that CBOs represented them?</td>
<td>Field observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Were CBOs pursuing actions desired by community members? Were they acting in the way desired by communities?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Did they feel there was transparency and did they get all the information about the partnership and other partners and their role as they needed?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do community agents claim there was trust between</td>
<td>Individual interviews with community members (ordinary residents and key</td>
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<tr>
<td>partners in partnership during the planning and production phases?</td>
<td>informants)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Focus group discussions with personnel in eg schools, CBOs</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>How do community members describe the relationship with them and the</td>
<td>Individual interviews with community members (ordinary residents and key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership in general? Was there friendship, respect both between</td>
<td>informants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community actors and CBOs and other partners in partnership?</td>
<td>Focus group discussions with personnel in eg schools, CBOs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do community members describe the other partners and the relationship</td>
<td>Individual interviews with community members (ordinary residents and key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with them? Were the other partners reliable? How well did community</td>
<td>informants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>members know the partnership and what kind of knowledge did they have?</td>
<td>Focus group discussions with personnel in eg schools, CBOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Field observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do communities feel there was reciprocity between them</td>
<td>Individual interviews with community members (ordinary residents and key</td>
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<tr>
<td>and other partners in partnership during the planning and production</td>
<td>informants)</td>
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<tr>
<td>phases?</td>
<td>Focus group discussions with personnel in eg schools, CBOs</td>
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<td>and other partners in partnership during the planning and production</td>
<td>informants)</td>
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<td>phases?</td>
<td>Focus group discussions with personnel in eg schools, CBOs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Field observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do community agents claim they could or could not</td>
<td>Individual interviews with community members (ordinary residents and key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exercise their agency in the partnership during the planning phase?</td>
<td>informants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do community agents claim they could or could not</td>
<td>Field observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exercise their agency in the partnership during the production of the</td>
<td>Interviews with local government</td>
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<tr>
<td>infrastructure?</td>
<td>Interviews with other CSOs, NGOs, etc active in the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Focus group discussions with personnel in eg schools, CBOs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the project considered successful? Is it responsive, does the outcome</td>
<td>Individual interviews with community members (ordinary residents and key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reflect their needs and views? Is it appropriate?</td>
<td>informants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Field observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did they participate in the project? Were they invited to make</td>
<td>Interviews with local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decisions eg in the meetings? Were they excluded from meetings? Did they</td>
<td>Interviews with other CSOs, NGOs, etc active in the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>go to the meetings? Did they air their views there?</td>
<td>Focus group discussions with personnel in eg schools, CBOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Were they able to express their needs? Were their views considered? Do</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>they feel that they could influence the decisions made?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Were they expected to contribute to project resources? Did they</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>contribute? If yes, what did they contribute?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did they work? Were they volunteering? Were they paid?</td>
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<tr>
<td>To what extent do community agents demonstrate ‘a sense of ownership’</td>
<td>Individual interviews with community members (ordinary residents and key</td>
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<tr>
<td>and how do they perceive it correlates to their ability to have exercised</td>
<td>informants)</td>
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<tr>
<td>their agency during the production of infrastructure?</td>
<td>Field observations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Focus group discussions with personnel in eg schools, CBOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>What is beneficiaries’ perception of the outcome? Do they feel it is</td>
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<tr>
<td>theirs? Do they feel responsibility for it? Interest, affection or</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>proximity to it?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What are the attitudes and perceptions of the community about duties</td>
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<td>for maintenance?</td>
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<td>Do they feel their sense of ownership is linked to their role and use</td>
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<td>of power during the implementation process?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How do we observe their feelings towards the outcome and their sense of</td>
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<td>ownership? To indicate sense of ownership, are there any signs of</td>
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<tr>
<td>maintenance or willingness to maintain?</td>
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<td>Are there other inputs for maintenance, is maintenance voluntary or it</td>
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<tr>
<td>is it coerced?</td>
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</table>

5.5 **JUSTIFICATION OF RESEARCH METHODS**

By and large, methodological decisions have to derive from the objectives, approach and context of the research. The aim was a rigorous process, based on critical analysis and evaluation where decisions on methodology took place both before and during the research process. The intention
was to aim at strict abidance by research standards to ensure reliability and validity, adhering to the philosophical approach.

As described earlier, prior to field work, I pondered the choice between a quantitative or qualitative methodology. Quantitative data can be measured, and expressed precisely, whereas qualitative data is not measurable but “…can best be thought of as frequencies in discrete categories…” (Oppenheim 2004: 146-47). Qualitative data are records of observation or interaction that are complex and contexted (Richards 2005). Lincoln and Guba (1985, quoted in Payne 1997) identify fundamental issues to be considered when deciding between quantitative and qualitative research: the nature of reality, the role of the research and researcher, treatment of population (eg significance of the context), causality and interaction and finally the nature of research, what is the influence of the researcher’s own perceptions and ideas. Research on construction projects is usually carried out by deploying quantitative methods; however, I suspected they would not render adequate replies for this research topic.

First, the choice built largely on the research questions and the selected approach. Clearly, a majority of the methods had to be qualitative, as the epistemology was based on understanding reality as socially constructed (Miller and Glassner 2005). Particularly after the pilot survey I understood that I was not covering one community and one reality, but issues were contextually bounded. I was interested in people’s own views, their own perceptions and interpretations. Quantitative methods convey more the researcher’s interests, whereas qualitative corresponds to subjects’ perspectives (Bryman 2004) which suited the aim of this research where the intention was to let interviewees analyse and interpret their own experiences through their narratives, thus linking their local knowledge into ‘scientific’ knowledge.

Then, my role as a researcher would unavoidably influence the material, and qualitative methods would enable me to reduce the role of my own subjectivity in the interpretation. Qualitative methods are suitable, among others, when the existing knowledge is thin (Geertz 1973) or situations are complex, “… if the purpose is to learn form the participants in a setting or process the way they experience it, the meanings they put on it, and how they interpret what they experience…” (Morse and Richards 2002: 27-28). However, there are also drawbacks related to qualitative data. Qualitative data can be “… highly varied in origin and style, uneven in detail and unalike in source and reliability” (Richards 2005:35).

Furthermore, the type of research and the context significantly influenced the choice of methods. For example, questionnaires would have required structured questions. Questionnaires are not always considered a suitable method to study attitudes or meanings (Claus Moser and Kalton
The cultural context also determines which methods are more suitable. In a Western context, structured questions are assumed to render clear, precise replies. In Sub-Saharan Africa, however, a lot more time, confidentiality and a softer approach are necessary as ordinary people are more circumspect or sometimes even reluctant in communicating their own views as individuals. Therefore the researcher needs to build a rapport with the informants. Ultimately, data received would be based on the confidence created with me as the researcher (Fontana and Frey 2003).

Finally, themes related to local administration, power and participation can be considered sensitive topics, which would require more free space and less control from the interviewer (Bernard 2002).

Therefore, I decided to use mostly semi-structured and open-ended questions as my principal method topped up with a few structured interviews/questions, group discussions and observation. Structured questions complemented semi-structured questions for triangulation, and they can be used to strengthen data. For example, Bryman (Bryman 2004) sees that combining quantitative and qualitative methods as a basis for triangulation or for getting a general picture is suitable.

5.6 SELECTION OF CASE STUDIES AND INTERVIEWEES

5.6.1 Population and case studies to be studied
Deriving the criteria from the research problem, the basic population to be studied consisted of partnership projects in low and middle income urban and peri-urban areas in Dar es Salaam, where basic infrastructure related to services such as roads, drainage, sanitation and education facilities had been produced in partnership between local government, civil society organisations and communities (see Table 11). As sustainability was a relevant factor and a sense of ownership one of the variables, the projects needed to have been completed at least two years before the field research to reveal people’s relation to and interest in the outcome and its sustainability in particular with regard to maintenance, reflecting their potential sense of ownership.

In a very early phase, I decided to concentrate geographically and leave one of Dar es Salaam’s three municipalities out. I left Temeke out, as it is a predominantly semi-rural area. Similarly, in the remaining two municipalities, Kinondoni and Ilala, I wanted to select less-serviced areas, excluding the elite residential areas and business centre (‘town’).

Initially, I identified a typology based on identified partnership projects, or rather projects labelled as partnerships which had been posited by informants (see Annex 1). I decided to select a few case studies from the group of study population. Selecting four divergent cases, not only
one, enabled a more comprehensive picture of partnership practices in different contexts. Thus, I did not choose several case studies to compare them, but to look at each case as a unique case, studying it in its own specific local context and environment. As Long attests, “it is important, therefore, to focus upon intervention practices as shaped by the interaction among the various participants, rather than simply on intervention models, by which we mean the idea-typical constructions that planners or their clients have about the process” (Norman Long 1992: 35). With hindsight, it was a wise decision, as each case study revealed some issues of the general picture, which were endemic in that specific context, but less evident in other areas.

In practice, it was cumbersome to identify potential projects, since I could not find any concentrated source. There are some lists such as NGOs registered in Dar es Salaam, one about NGOs active within Kinondoni municipality, but none of them included any annotated information to identify the characteristics of the NGOs and their interventions. So I used these lists as a base but relied more on the additional information received via personal communication: interviewed contact persons both within civil society organisations and in local government organisations, as well as key informants in private and public sector, ministries and universities.

Thereafter, I scrutinized partnership projects which were considered successful (meaning having achieved the major part of the targets, and not having suffered for instance from misuse of funds which would have influenced people’s view of the partnership. Actually, all the selected case projects were considered at least to some extent successful, some very successful such as Buguruni and Kijitonyama (see also Dill and Longhofer 2006).40

Table 11 Selection criteria for case projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selection criteria for case projects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• low and middle income urban and peri-urban areas in Dar es Salaam municipalities of Kinondoni and Ilala</td>
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<td>• less-serviced areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>• partnership between local government, civil society organisations and communities</td>
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<td>• the aim of the partnership had been the production of basic infrastructure such as education, sanitation, drainage, roads, bridges</td>
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<tr>
<td>• completed at least two years before the field research</td>
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<td>• partnership considered as successful, not having suffered from any known malpractices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Partners ready to collaborate and to provide data and information for the research</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

40 In all case projects, people raised discussion of the use of funds, but basically this matter did not dominate or distort the discussions. Contrarily, in another PEDP school construction intervention at Sinza School in Kinondoni it formed a notable problem. I had carried out substantial amount of field interviews before excluding it for not being successful and for not being a clearly limited project, activities overlapping over the years. In their narratives, most of the informants concentrated on complaining about misuse of funds and internal problems in the school which distracted the discourses from the partnership framework.
Using these criteria, the number of potential projects was circumscribed significantly. Very few partnerships involved a construction component. Water projects were left out, since currently water is a very complicated issue in Dar es Salaam: most families use water from two or three different sources eg water could be acquired from a communal source and private vendors at the same time; the quality and prices vary and supply might be seasonal. In addition, I left health out, as I came across with very few health projects, and because I realised Kinondoni Municipality health department were reluctant to allow me to carry out field research concerning their projects. After visiting five different Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP)-funded projects, they all turned out to be continuous interventions where it would have been difficult to distinguish their planning, management and implementation from other activities taking place in the school.

Tanzania Social Action Funds (TASAF) and Local Government Capital Development Grant (LGCDG) had not got off the ground in Dar es Salaam yet, and in other cities its experience was still fresh, so it would not comply with the condition of sustainability.

In general, analyzing according to the typology I had developed, I realised many pertinent projects were either instigated by international NGOS or they were actually different components of the same main funding framework project eg Community Infrastructure Programme (CIP)/Community Infrastructure Upgrading Programme (CIUP) of the WB funds or CIP forerunner in Hana Nasif41 neighbourhood, see Figure 4.

There were two completed CIP projects in Dar es Salaam, Kijitonyama and Tabata. CIP Kijico42 Kijitonyama was referred to by many sources. Interestingly, Kijico project had even won an international prize, and it was mentioned often as a good example of partnership, but it had not been subject to any research. Thus, I chose it as my pilot case over Tabata.

Then, there was a CIP forerunner, a Sustainable Dar es Salaam Programme (SDP) project in Hana Nasif, which had been carried out in a wide-ranging partnership between a local CBO, the City Council, several other international donors and national organisations, the second phase managed by the UCLAS, a Tanzanian university. Hana Nasif was an expeditious choice, as it had been surveyed to exhaustion; there were several dissertations and other surveys available. Hence, it offered secondary data material to compare and contrast with my research.

Only four international NGOS were identified as active in Dar es Salaam in these sectors: Water-Aid mostly in the water sector in Temeke; Care International, Concern and Plan International in multi-sectoral interventions. Care International’s partnership activities under the concept of

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41 Also Hanna Nassif, Hananasif
42 Kijico refers to the project, KIJICO to the CBO
Hujakwama consisted mainly of water projects and capacity building for the enhancement of livelihoods, so it was left out. Care officers were not extremely collaborative, whereas Plan International officers were highly interested as they themselves had discussed their own expectations and rhetoric compared to the reality within their partnership interventions, particularly communities’ actual role and power. Plan International’s project in Buguruni, was considered to be a good example of a partnership project between an international NGO and the municipality. Concern’s project propped up improvement of the environment and livelihoods in Mburahati. Concern also assisted in the creation and development of Mbadeco; together they carried out several interventions in Barafu, including the construction of a footbridge and drainage which I selected as my case project. Again, to my knowledge, neither Plan International’s nor Concern’s project had been evaluated or otherwise studied.

Figure 4 Dar es Salaam map and the selected partnership projects

5.6.2 Sampling
The hypothesis was tested through individual interviews with community members. Information was also gathered via individual interviews with local government at different levels, members of school committees and NGO/CBO representatives where applicable. Local government in Tanzania at grassroots’ level (mtaa) has an indeterminate status; it is a hybrid of both of government institutions and close linkage to the community. Therefore, the mtaa interviewees fell into two different categories: either there were treated as the representatives of the
government at local level or as representatives of the community (eg Mtaa members who are elected by the community), when they identified themselves as such.

The basic criteria for interviewees were that they should have been residents in that specific area, during both the planning and construction time (in Buguruni over two years, in other areas more than five years). They should be either house owners or long term tenants, but in that capacity informed about and interested in the intervention. This criterion was added when I started field research and realised that tenants generally were not interested in the area or its development, and usually refused to say or know anything about the intervention.

Typically, ordinary residents knew less about the partnership relations: they were aware of the targets, how much they had been expected to contribute and roughly what they could have anticipated for that. Therefore, to get a wider picture about the partnership, I decided to distinguish between ordinary residents and key informants who knew far more about the partnership through their position. Key informants were typically residents of the community who were respected, who in general held better access to information than ordinary citizens, and who had been involved in community development earlier. This had equipped them with an improved capacity to gain insider information and fewer inhibitions in sharing their views. Typically they were members of lower levels of local government (mtaa), members of CBOs or elderly men (wazee) who are venerable members of Tanzanian communities. This stratification also reflects the Tanzanian context where society has been centrally organised and people on the lower rungs of the ladder of social hierarchy are accustomed to defer to more respected members of the community in decision-making.

As the exact number, location and characteristics (eg tenant or landlord, when they had moved in) of the residents in the target areas were not known; and as the target areas were relatively large, each consisting of thousands of inhabitants; and as I was more interested in individual discourses, I used non-probability sampling (Richards 2005: 136). With limited resources, it was also a feasible option. There are some disadvantages attached to non-probability sampling, such as samples not being representative and whether the findings can be generalized due to biases and subjectivity in sampling (Burton 2000: 316). Being aware of the potential pitfalls here, I tried to confine the impact of my underlying dispositions by identifying them and being conscious of them.

There are different strategies for non-probability sampling (see eg Burton 2000: 312-15), the use of which depends largely on the context of the research. Therefore, interviewee selection built
upon different sampling techniques was based on the characteristics of the area or on the project. The research was carried out in following four different areas:

- a road and drainage rehabilitation project in Kijitonyama, which is a middle-class planned area;
- a school construction project in Buguruni Kisiwani, which is a slum;
- construction of a footbridge and storm water drains in Mburahati Barafu which is a slum in most parts and
- a project to construct roads and drainage in Hana Nasif which is mostly an unplanned area

In slums, such as Buguruni Kisiwani where all houses or shacks are located haphazardly, snowballing was used (Burton 2000; Devine 2002). Snowballing is also suitable for delicate issues. Snowballing needs to begin both from different kinds of people and in different parts of the area to minimize the potential interconnection, interviewing only the same type of persons who are interconnected (Devine 2002). In Buguruni, four starting points around the school were selected, the first interviewee then pointed out a neighbour who fulfilled the basic criteria. In addition to snowballing, some people who were living close to the infrastructure were selected for interviews. In Buguruni, three persons living around the school were interviewed, as their lives had been affected by its construction.

In Mburahati, snowballing was used from two starting points, one from Santos and one in the low-lying area close to the bridge, were selected. Otherwise, residents who lived nearby the drainage were selected: three living next to the drainage on the slope, three residents who were close but not next to the drainage on the slope, three next to the drainage at the bottom and three at the outlet of the drainage (see figure)\(^4\).

In Kijitonyama, which is a planned area and Hana Nasif, a semi-planned area, I attempted at first to use random sampling which enables better reliability. However, it soon became clear that random sampling was not feasible. Many residents encountered in Kijitonyama did not fulfil the basic criteria, since resident landlords were absent, working outside of the area. The Hana Nasif project soon turned out to be very controversial, and many residents refused to be interviewed. Some resistance started emerging in the refusals of interviews. Interviewees did not want to be interviewed but they wanted to recount quite thoroughly what they thought about the partnership

\(^4\) The ones on the slope benefit usually most, whereas the ones at the bottom and particularly at the outlet experience mainly negative impact.
project and the CBO. This revealed more about the structures and power struggles. In addition, some hostility could be observed in the area, also reported by Nguluma (Nguluma 2003). Thus I had to use convenience sampling, and interviewing all those who fulfilled the basic criteria and were available (Burton 2000; Punch 2000).

In both areas, I first selected divergent parts where roads and drainage had been rehabilitated. In Kijitonyama, the research was carried out in Makumbusho, the prime area where the plots are bigger and with easier access, in Saiansi near the main roads and in the interior area of Saiansi. In the Hana Nasif central area, where Mtua and Hana Nasif Community Development Association (CDA) offices are located, and which usually is shown to visitors; I selected some less visited areas such as where the drainage is very deep and one area down in the valley near the outlet where garbage is dumped.

In Kijitonyama, altogether 26 residents were interviewed individually, 10 men and 16 women. Six of them happened to be KIJICO members, one of whom also in the Mtua and two were ten-cell leaders (TCLs). KIJICO had managed to acquire a high membership ratio in Kijitonyama. In addition, the chairman and five other KIJICO committee members were interviewed individually and in focus groups, Ward Executive and Development Officers were interviewed as well. When requested for interviews, 17 children, tenants or servants at the gate said landlords (adults) were not at home, however, it is impossible to verify whether or not they were there, but did not want to be interviewed.

In Buguruni Kiswani, a total of 16 men and 5 women were interviewed, including three key informants (from Mtua or wazee). Nobody refused to be interviewed and five were not at home. In addition, three officials in Plan Intl’s Malapa field office and the Ward Executive Officer were interviewed individually and eight leading members of Plan Intl’s partner, a local CBO Chama Buma, participated in a focus groups discussion.

In Mburahati Barafu, 11 men and 13 women, total 24 were interviewed individually. This included four wazee or TCLs. Additionally, three leading members of the local CBO and 14 ordinary men and one woman were interviewed in a group interview. Four persons did not want to be interviewed, and all but two were available (at home).

In Hana Nasif, altogether 12 men and 11 women were individually interviewed, out of these 4 key informants (local leaders or TCLs). The number (11) of plain refusals in Hana Nasif was the highest, three were not at home. Four CBO or Mtua members were interviewed. Outside the project area the former Project Manager from UCLAS was interviewed.
In addition to the residents and government representatives in project areas, over 50 key persons such as technical officers and coordinators within DCC; Ilala and Kinondoni municipalities, funders, INGOs, national NGOs, universities and line Ministry representatives were interviewed. In municipalities interviewees included both those who had been directly involved with the partnership and those who represented line expertise (community development, construction of infrastructure, support to the education sector). For a compilation of the statistics regarding the interviewees, see Table 12.

Tentative field research was carried out in Mashujaa School in Sinza, and preparatory visits taken to Mwananyamala B, Tandale Magharibi and Kunduchi Primary Schools but these projects did not fulfil the basic selection criteria.

**Table 12 The number and sex of residents interviewed in the case areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key informants</th>
<th>Community members</th>
<th>Community members</th>
<th>Focus groups</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All (M, F)</td>
<td>Mtaa, TCL (M, F)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTAAB (Mzwe, Mtat, Mtaa)</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18</td>
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5.7 ‘Reliability and Validity’

The reliability and validity of research describe its quality, to what extent the research can be trusted. Reliability can basically be measured by the replicability of the research: if the research were repeated, would the results be the same (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 296). Validity asks whether the research responds to the research questions, whether there is a linkage between variables and whether the concepts represent the phenomenon. Devine summarizes validity as the ability “…to make the interpretation of the data as explicit as possible in the development of an argument using systematically gathered data” (Devine 2002: 207).

Reliability can be affected through sampling and non-sampling errors in the research. Sampling errors can be caused by biases or sample sizes that are too small (Burton 2000). I tried to avoid
biases by analysing and acknowledging my own biases beforehand, as well as studying and
learning about recognised sampling techniques. As the project areas and project contents
differed, I also used different sampling strategies. Choosing different sampling strategies does
not affect the reliability of the research as the data from different partnerships were not
compared. These different sampling strategies were all non-probable, based on the same
theoretical underpinnings where the intention was to identify interviewees who were relevant in
terms of covering data on these social practices (Mays and Pope 1995).

Similarly, there are tools to improve reliability. My personal knowledge of the region and sector;
understanding the target of the research, but still being an outsider reduced biases and contributed
to the commitment: I was able to build a rapport with interviewees based on trust and respect
(Miller and Glassner 2005) and giving them voice to describe their experiences (Denzin and
Lincoln 2003: 16). Being a foreigner diminished interviewees’ fears of me being attached to
power establishments (see also Tripp 1997: 213). At least in Hana Nasif I managed to escape
sampling errors caused by the ‘official screening’ and to get to interview ‘dissidents’ (the
negative cases) by using suitable sampling methods. Some complemented that I was the first to
select ordinary community members to be interviewed, not to interview those selected by the
local CBO.

Non-sampling errors are due to ‘wrong’ answers, mistakes in interviews or non-responses
(Burton 2000). Initially, I was concerned whether the data was consistent and sufficient to argue
my point. After gaining a deeper understanding on the crucial issues related to the topic area
particularly during the pilot case, the quality of the interviews (and consequently my notes)
increased. The lapse of several years from the time of the project planning and implementation
also caused inaccuracies and limitations to the reliability of data, as stories communicated might
not be accurate, and respective project officers were not in the country or at least not in the office
any more.

Issues affecting reliability can be avoided by triangulation. Triangulation is carried out using
multiple perspectives using the same research question, and applying different ways to conduct
the research “…through a different question, method, setting, and data to gain a different
perspective…..” (Morse and Richards 2002: 76). Others see it vary even in terms of investigator
or theory (Denzin 1990 quoted in Payne 1997), though there are disagreeing views (Richards
2005). In Morse and Richards’s opinion (2002), if triangulation is based on a different
epistemology it cannot validate the previous data, it can only complement it. When the

44 Putatively, local CBO frequently selects suitable persons to be interviewed for outside researchers.
epistemology is completely different, such as comparing positivist data and interpretivist, articulated narratives, then the account is analysed to understand better but it is not verified (Payne 1997: 108-09). In particular, when applying an interpretive approach, for example triangulation based on different researcher can be difficult to justify, as the context (time and space) where the investigation is carried out, is different.

The most common method used in this entire research was semi-structured interviews. For triangulation, I used focus groups, structured interviewing, sometimes open interviewing or observation. Sometimes, my research assistant repeated my question and vice versa. In practice triangulation was essential because of different meanings attached to concepts. A few times, interviewees gave clear answers under topics which seemed to be very clear. Later on when using other methods, or approaches, they told different stories, not because of deliberate lying but more due to conceptual misunderstandings or to the deference effect, mentioned earlier.

5.8 REFLECTIONS ON FIELD WORK

Qualitative methodology
At the hindsight, qualitative methodology offered a far richer picture on communities and their role within partnerships than conventionally applied semi-structured interview questions would have provided. It was definitely more demanding for me and the research assistants but it offered a deeper understanding of the diversity inside the community and of the issues influencing community members’ position in the power processes of the partnerships. Kelsall’s account on accountability and local governance in Aremeru in Tanzania could work as a sample and inspiration in this sense, though it was conducted at a completely different scale and level (Kelsall 2004).

Research language and research assistants
Swahili (kiSwahili) is the official language of Tanzania, though English is widely used in professional and academic circles. Ordinary citizens even those who have gained a university education in English tend to use Swahili more comfortably than English. In addition, some official project documents were available only in Swahili. Therefore I decided to learn Swahili as far as possible. In practice, I gained a passable understanding. I could follow and control interviews, present myself, and pose questions; though I could not lead an interview convincingly. I could also read documents with the help of a dictionary. As the aim was to use the terms and expressions of the language which are familiar to the respondents as much as possible (Claus Moser and Kalton 2004), and still be precise, I needed research assistants.
During my pilot research\(^4\), I tried to work through an interpreter. However, I realised interpretation was not a feasible manner to extract the maximum information using semi-structured questions, as the intensity of discussion dropped during the interpretation and the interview time doubled. Therefore, I decided to use research assistants whose mother tongue was Kiswahili (Flynn 2005; Tripp 1997). I trained them beforehand, prepared handouts, explained my approach, main concepts and research questions. I discussed the research and survey questions, and the aim of the research, because I believed the more they knew about the objectives and methods, the better they could perform their tasks. I also taught them probes and interviewing technique.

The remaining interviews were carried out in Swahili. I had general control over the interview. I posed general open interview questions but left the research assistants to carry out main discussion in direct contact with the interviewee. At the end of the interview (not to cut the flow of the discussion), they translated answers and I put further questions if necessary. We both took separate notes which we then compared; this also served for triangulation.

It was very difficult to find suitable research assistants\(^6\). I worked mostly with two persons, but made attempts to work with three others, and also interviewed several more. One research assistant had a BA degree in social sciences, the other one was a student of social work. The third one, who was employed only for few interviews, also had a BA degree in social sciences, and field experience in quantitative research. However her quantitative experience proved to be a hindrance for her to engage in qualitative interviewing.

Admittedly, I might have had high criteria for selection, but for a reason. It was an extremely difficult job, and it took a while for us to learn and develop a feasible way to collaborate in terms of both language and content. Indeed, I learned to understand and value the work they were doing. One of my research assistants carried out 16 interviews alone mostly in Hana Nasif. His advantage was to get closer contact and to ease the problem of interview refusals. They could extract excellent information and interpret some cultural issues to me, such as those related to local beliefs and attitudes which emerged in the interviews (see similar experience in Mwanza by Flynn, 2005).

\(^{4}\) Pilot research was carried out in Kijitonyama. Fortunately there were many individuals there who actually insisted on using English.

\(^{6}\) I inquired both at UDSM and UCLAS. The former provided a few candidates who were either not available, not suitable for semi-structured interviewing at grassroots’ level or did not have sufficient understanding on conducting research. The latter could not provide any suitable candidates. Finally, I found suitable persons through my personal contacts.
There were a few unforeseen problems in the interviews related to concepts, owing to the differences between English and Swahili vocabularies. For example, the English language distinguishes between participation and collaboration; and in this research participation refers to the process through which power is conveyed, for example full participation in decision making. In Swahili, participation does not have its own word, ‘ushiriki’ means both participation and collaboration, and so there is less, if any reference to sharing power, as ‘kushiriki’ means basically participate by working and ‘kushirikiana’ working together. As the word ‘participation’ was difficult to translate to Swahili, sometimes when asked about it, people referred to contribution (‘kuchangia’ to contribute, to give materials or money). This also refers to the interpretation of contribution as a synonym for participation, where participation is understood as a means. These meanings could be interpreted as reflecting the hegemonic definition of participation, as reinforcing the power of the powerful and resources through which power is exercised.

The question about “sense of ownership” was a major headache, as it required a lot of planning and thinking. There is no exact equivalent in Swahili for “sense of ownership”, the nearest being through the term ownership (‘miliki’ or sense of ownership ‘namna ya kumiliki’) or public property (‘mali umma’). They both bear a more factual value of possessing whereas English employs the term ‘a sense of ownership’, describing more an attitude, a relationship or social distance. I found direct questions would lead nowhere or there would be a strong deterrence effect, merely getting replies that it was generally assumed I was looking for and which could not be considered reliable. Thus, the whole issue had to be conducted by using broad questions surrounding people’s attitude to and relations with the object, within the language they normally use (‘community’s school’, ‘our school’, etc) and further on the contents of their stories when talking about their participation, or non participation, their views, attitudes and sentiments in general.

**Interviewing**

When gathering basic information, though people were friendly and it was relatively easy to book meetings, in the beginning many were hesitant as to whether they could be of any assistance, if they were the right persons, or some were plainly reluctant to be interviewed. Some required persuasion to acknowledge that their opinions had a value. As few municipality and NGO officers were distrustful of me in the beginning, the semi-structured interview method was necessary to open up the situation, to create a rapport and to get the interviews going. My time was limited and interviewees’ time was limited which is detrimental for semi-structured
interviews, in particular when interviewing people who were not accustomed of being interviewed and having their personal opinion valued or even listened to.

Everybody was informed in advance about the broad lines of interest to be discussed. Some interviewees wanted to have questions beforehand, and some asked whether I would use a questionnaire, so to these I sent a very short description of the objectives of the thesis and a list of “issues of interest to be discussed”. Those people who requested an e-mail beforehand were usually experienced and well educated. Equally, their answers were well informed, and more in the auspices of the official policy than actually their own views. Thus, in retrospect, informing interviewees in writing beforehand did not improve the data obtained; on the contrary, sometimes the interview was merely a reiteration of policy issues.

Conditions during the field research
During all my time in Dar es Salaam (DSM), I tried to live and move like ordinary Bongo residents: for instance, I commuted by walking and using daladala, ate in local cafes and bars, had chai on the street and stayed in a Tanzanian household. This enabled me to engage in discussions with other residents and widen my understanding of life in DSM. The daladala network is surprisingly good, and it covered all the places sufficiently. Though they take time, are crowded, and sometimes dangerous, I always felt safe and well taken care of. The weather was, as usual, very hot and humid, temperatures rose close to +40°C nearly everyday.

Two of the research areas, Buguruni and Mburahati are slums. In general, they are considered relatively unsafe but despite being attacked in Mburahati (see section 7.4.1); I did not feel any threat there. Cholera was rife and there were casualties in Buguruni at that time, but we did not experience any problems either.

5.9 LIMITATIONS OF FIELD RESEARCH
As always, there are several restrictions in the field research. Geographically I could cover only a restricted area and a few case projects in two out of three municipalities in Dar es Salaam. Also the number and depth of interviewees were limited, both due to my and the interviewees’ time constraints.

Survey research always poses errors in responses, documentation or sampling (Burton 2000: 317). I believe the most risky areas are whether we really got the right answers, as the line between the right and ‘wrong’ is so subtle, and the deference effect was strong. In addition, I relied to some degree on the skills and commitment of my research assistants. In the beginning in

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47 Bongo is DSM’s nickname, meaning smart.
48 Local minibus
Kijitonyama pilot case, the collaboration with the interpreter was not successful, which was reflected in slightly thin material.

In general, there was a wealth of relevant documents and research papers and other data sources available, but it was also relatively cumbersome or even difficult to obtain some old project specific documents, not an uncommon problem (see Desai 1996). Some projects had not had final evaluations carried out, and in most cases the documents were lost, or allegedly somewhere in the ‘archives’ or otherwise unavailable. Time tended to have run out after the project implementation, respective officials had moved on, and there was no information about the whereabouts of the documents. In addition, nearly all of the general academic research documents were not publicly available, but kept by individuals (see similar comments in Sliuzas 2004). Even none of the items that I checked in the UCLAS Library Catalogue were ever on the shelf as they should have been.

Finally, I am well aware that some key informants, in particular university staff members, were not at all eager to share their contacts and material unless through a trade-off. If I could offer barter such as relevant documents, I would also receive some material from them. It was rather disappointing, but not prohibitive as I managed obtain adequate data by other means. However, this as well as numerous meetings which were severely delayed or cancelled completely without any notification all meant losing time in a city with long distances and transport problems.

5.10 CONCLUSIONS
This section has described the long journey I undertook in learning to pursue qualitative field research. It was very demanding considering all the limitations and complications I encountered and I was practically a self-trained researcher relying on the literature on research methods. On the other hand, it was also very rewarding. Though qualitative methodology requires rigour and meticulous planning, it proved to be the right choice for this research. The scope of the research, the theoretical framework and the methodology went all hand in hand, and most importantly, I obtained valuable information through a qualitative approach where normally structured questions and questionnaires would have been used. Listening to the disenfranchised, such as women without a voice in public and the poor, gave a completely different dimension and interesting nuances to understanding of the research problem and its context.

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49 Possibly due to the lack of institutional linkage between my unit and UCLAS, the researchers of which had previously carried out several research consultancies with DPU staff. My counterpart institution, appointed by the Tanzanian Scientific Committee was the Institute of Development Studies in UDSM.
6 FIELD RESEARCH: TANZANIA

6.1 INTRODUCTION
The situation of service delivery in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania is discussed in this chapter. The focus is on the production of basic services to the urban poor; identification of available resources and different stakeholders involved in service delivery. The current situation of decentralisation and local governance, community participation approaches and the organisation of civil society is outlined and finally the use of collaborative patterns such as partnership in service delivery is presented.

6.2 DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

6.2.1 Service delivery and local governance in Tanzania: From socialist ideas to neo-liberalist pressures
During the colonial time, there was no local government in Tanganyika and all powers and responsibilities were concentrated in the hands of the central government (Kironde 1999). The municipal council of Dar es Salaam was created in 1946, and allocated responsibilities for urban management such as solid waste management and sanitary services. The local government ordinance of 1953 allowed the formation of lower tiers of local government: town councils, county councils and district councils (Kironde 1999).

Post-independent Tanzania, from 1961 onwards, abolished the colonial structures and established new local councils. She turned into a one-party system where the state, the ruling party and government institutions were all closely linked. In 1967, the Arusha Declaration gave the right to the government to nationalize services, indicating the adoption of socialism and Tanzania turning into a self-reliant country (Olorunsola and Muhwezi 1988: 190). Social services and hard work were the underpinnings of government’s policies (Swantz 1997). Emphasis was on migration and investment to rural areas, first through invitations and then through forced removals to villages under the Ujamaa villagisation programme which, however, did not generate the desired results (Olorunsola and Muhwezi 1988: 191; Semboja and Therkildsen 1995: 22). In rural areas, village assemblies were established as the local level authority, whereas village councils had an executive role, responsible for basic services. However, they turned out to be inefficient and corrupt (Olorunsola and Muhwezi 1988: 192-93). Urban councils similarly faced major problems such as councillors’ weak capacity and inability to understand their responsibilities, low-skilled employees and inadequate funds (Kironde 1999). Originally, the aim had been to give power to the local level, however, in practice the opposite happened, as participation schemes did not
surrender real power to villagers. In the 1970s local governments were abolished and replaced by the central authority, resulting in infrastructure and services deteriorating (Kironde 1999: 8; PORALG 2005a: 4-5).

In the health sector, in 1977, a law was passed according to which health care was the obligation of the public sector and only authorized organisations could provide non-public health services. Earlier, religious organisations had been major players in the production of health services. Now, the state was seen as the focal point for development. Service delivery was thus used as a means of political penetration, for political recognition and for gaining legitimacy (Munishi 1995: 144). This resulted in the restriction of CSO activities and in the reduction of the role of religious organisations in service deliver (Munishi 1995: 147).

In the 1980s, local governments were established again (PORALG 2005a; Swantz 1997). The Local Government Act 1982 stipulated that urban authorities were governed by councils and operations led by city directors (Kironde 1999: 9). By that time, they had lost many competent staff, and their resources in general were inadequate. The control of resources remained with the ministries. As a result, local governments were not capable of delivering services as required, and residential areas were developed without basic services (Mulengeki 2002). Both external pressure and the state’s own inability pressured for opening up political space (Tripp 1992: 221), leading to the introduction of multiparty-system in 1992 (PMORALG 2005a).

A period of major reforms started in the 1980s: both neo-liberalist macro-economic structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and since the beginning of the 1990s political reforms involving major structural changes such as Public Service Reform Programme (PRSP) and Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) (Chaligha 2005; PMORALG 2005a; Rugumyamheto 2004; Sliuzas 2004). SAPs caused many changes in the way services were delivered, since they restricted the funds available. Cost-sharing was introduced which was a major shift in service delivery policy since until then services had been free or at subsidized price (Swantz 1997: 16), for instance water had been considered as a social good (DPU n.d.: 41). However, at the same time, the government was not able to fulfil its obligations. Self-help had to be mobilized to assist government in service provision but it was considered only as a transitional measure (Munishi 1995: 144-45). Consequently, civil society groups, particularly churches were encouraged to restart to participate in service provision during the worst repercussions of SAPs (Rugumyamheto 2004; Semboja and Therkildsen 1995: 22). As a result, in the 1990s, CSOs were in large measure responsible for service provision (Munishi 1995: 150). Protestant and Catholic Churches under the Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT) and Tanzania Episcopal Conference
(TEC) respectively counted for more than 50% of country’s secondary education and health services (Kilaini 1998). Bakwata, the corresponding Muslim umbrella organisation, and Aga Khan Education Services also ran several primary and secondary schools.

Tanzania has always emphasized the right of all citizens to enjoy basic social services, education as a priority but in spite of major efforts including self-help, the government has not been able to deliver them (Swantz 1997: 1-6). Currently, poverty in Tanzania is still wide-spread, over one third of the population is below the national basic needs poverty line according to the Household Budget Survey in 2000/2001 (Chaligha 2005: 2). Particularly, non-income poverty is wide-spread: health services are far away, water expensive and poor drainage causes flooding (URT 2005: 11-14). Grassroots’ needs have not been sufficiently considered and responded to: “Democratic systems of governance are lacking at the grassroots level, rendering people politically marginalized in decision-making, powerless in accessing quality services and generally insecure.” (Research and Analysis Working Group 2004: 83).

A large number of people still suffers from inadequate services both in urban and rural areas: for instance, more than 2 million people live at distances greater than 6 km to the nearest primary school and for nearly half a million people, the nearest dispensary or health centre is further than 20 km away. Moreover, these figures reflect only the access, not the quality of the services (Research and Analysis Working Group 2004: 26). School Mapping in Kisarawe district in 1997 found out that one classroom accommodated 98 pupils, 15% of classes were held under trees and there was one toilet per 215 pupils, whereas the recommended standard was one per 25 pupils (Kuleana 1997). Thus, inadequate infrastructure has a severe impact on the quality of education such as a lack of water and sanitation facilities decreases girls’ attendance (Kuleana 1997).

In 2005, a survey of people’s attitudes to governance and democracy was carried out. The neoliberalist approach seemed to have sunk poorly into population. Interviewees preferred wide-ranging, accessible basic services, even at lower standards. Over half of the population (55.7%) surveyed preferred free schooling instead of cost-sharing but getting education of higher standards, as they were even struggling to feed themselves (Chaligha 2005: 5). This reflects the devastating effect cost-sharing has on the poorest segment of population. The desire of 60% of the people is to have “…some amount of public intervention, a sort of welfare oriented government policies…” (Chaligha 2005: 6).
6.2.2 Basic services in Dar es Salaam

Urban planning in DSM was initially carried out based on racial segregation. The business centre and core, prime areas with wide streets and large plots were allocated to colonial settlers and some Asian residents. Basic services were supplied mainly in these areas (Mulengeki 2002; Sliuzas 2004: 72). Asians were directed to live in Upanga and Chan’gombé, and Europeans took the best parts such as Kurasini and Oysterbay close to the seaside. The indigenous population was supposed to live largely outside the urban part, confined to unplanned, informal settlements (Sliuzas 2004). Since their housing areas had little public service provision, Africans had to rely on other suppliers for basic services such as religious organisations which traditionally have had a dominant position in education and health service delivery.

After independence in 1971, more areas were planned and more houses were constructed for the indigenous population in areas such as Sinza, Mwenge, Kinondoni etc, where sites and services projects and squatter upgrading initiatives funded by the WB were implemented (Nguluma 2003: 22). Their implementation was discontinued when the WB discovered they were not sustainable and well managed (The World Bank 2002). Since then, during the last 30 years little has happened in these areas. The urban population has grown fast but the government has not been able to provide adequate basic services, let alone to maintain the existing infrastructure.

Currently, DSM consists of the municipalities of Kinondoni, Ilala and Temeke, established in 1999 (DPU n.d.). The coordinating metropolitan organ Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC) was replaced by Dar es Salaam City Commission (DCC) between 1996 and 2000, when the City Council was not able to perform properly (Mruma 2005). At present, DSM population is unofficially estimated at over 3 million (Brennan and Burton 2007: 65), and during the daytime it increases to 5 million (Water-Aid-Tanzania 2003: 9). Kinondoni was estimated to have 1.3 million and Ilala 0.8 million inhabitants in 2007 (DSM 2004). DSM is growing fast: the annual population growth was estimated at 9-10% (DAWASA 2000: 1), and already about 1/3 of Tanzania’s population live in an urban environment (IFPRI).

Poverty and basic services

Urban poverty is rampant in DSM. About 60% (1.8 million) of the population live in poor, underserviced, unplanned areas50 (DAWASA 2000: 2). Urban poverty has a young face, half of the poor people in DSM are less than 20 years old and child malnutrition51 is approximately 20-

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50 Though not all residents in unplanned areas are poor, some are middle-income.
51 Proportion of stunted children, less than 5 years old
25% (source IFPRI/CARE Tanzania Urban Livelihood Survey 1998, quoted in IFPRI). Many aspects of poverty are not directly linked to a low income but rather to lacking or bad quality services (URT 2005: 11-14). As the National Strategy of Growth and Reduction of Poverty states “Urban poverty has brought to the spotlight stress on urban public facilities and services.” (URT 2005: 7).

For example, education is one of the priority sectors, but schools are overcrowded, educational infrastructure is dilapidated and schools lack water and sanitation facilities. In 2005, there were on average 88.4 pupils per classroom in Kinondoni Municipality and the schools had only a half of the required latrines (Kinondoni 2006). To complement lacking public services, private schools, health centres and hospitals, often run by religious organisations, have been available for a long time. For example in Kinondoni in 2005 out of 177 primary schools there were 46 private schools (Kinondoni 2006), in Ilala out of 130 primary schools 29 private schools52.

Otherwise, the quality and availability of infrastructure and services differs area by area. In planned53, wealthier areas such as the central business area, 60% of the residents have electricity and 85% piped water, though the supply of which might occasionally be cut off. However, in the whole city, 170 km of sewage pipe network covers less than 8% of population. The data on the access of DSM population to improved water and sanitation services is presented in Table 13 and then compared to other cities in the region54.

The situation is far worse in the unplanned areas between the main roads. DSM was built on a creek system, where the development, until the 1980s, concentrated first linearly along the main roads (Briggs and Mwamfupe 2000: 802). When the main areas were occupied, the bulk of the population started densifying the older settlements and then settling in between those roads where there are now large unplanned and unserviced residential areas55 (DAWASA 2000: 12; DPU n.d.; Lupala 1997: 2).

52 Interview Ms Kajigiri, Statistics and Logistics Officer, Ilala Municipality Education Office on 27.3.2006
53 A planned area refers to a surveyed area which has been divided into plots.
54 However, the statistics in this table should be taken with a pinch of salt. Firstly, the data in the section of improved sanitation includes septic tanks but in practice there might not be any means to empty them properly. For instance, in Kijitonyama in DSM septic tanks were emptied onto the street. Secondly, the access to improved water does not mean water actually is available all the time.
55 Most parts of these areas are not even marked in common maps.
Table 13 Access to services in selected East African cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% of the population has access to improved water</th>
<th>% of the population has access to improved sanitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Abeba</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampala</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from Global Urban Observatory, UN-HABITAT (UN-HABITAT 2008)

Unplanned areas
Urban poverty is increasing and the number of these unplanned areas has risen in 10 years from 40 to 100 in 1990 (Kironde 2006). However, 70-80% of the housing stock in these areas is constructed of permanent materials (Ramadhani 2007; The World Bank 2002). As most of them are located in the valleys near the rivers, they get easily flooded during the rainy season. Houses are crowded; rivers polluted (IFPRI); uncollected solid waste is piling up all around due to the lack of access roads (Water-Aid-Tanzania 2003: 16); the water table is high so it easily gets contaminated; often expensive elevated latrines are necessary (Water-Aid-Tanzania 2003: 19). In addition, many households have to share communal latrines.

Figure 5 A typical view of a low-lying unplanned area (Mburahati Barafu)
The policy is to acknowledge unplanned areas and their need for services. For instance, the National Housing Policy in 1982 granted a recognition to informal neighbourhoods in Dar es Salaam (Nguluma 2003); “…being legal or illegal or unplanned cannot prevent an area from being connected to urban social services such as water and/or electricity provided the primary infrastructure is accessible.” (DAWASA 2000: 12). Despite upgrading plans, very few settlements have been supplied with basic services. Even if they have access to water or sanitation, they usually pay more than the affluent residents living within the reach of conventional water and sanitation network (Lugalla 1995: 108). Over a half of the inhabitants do not have access to the sewer system (IFPRI), and 20% of the city’s population do not have any means of sanitation (Victor and Makalle 2003).

Congestion in houses in unplanned areas is horrendous. For example, a WaterAid study of living conditions in Temeke revealed that an average of 6-10 people lived under the same roof. Over 10% of the houses had more than 15 persons. There were families with up to five family members living in the same room (Water-Aid-Tanzania 2003: 28). Kironde claims over a half of the DSM households lives in one bedroom (Kironde 2006). Moreover, Water-Aid found out that washing water was received from shallow wells, the depth of which was a few meters, and drinking water was bought either in the water kiosks, from water vendors or from neighbours who had piped connections. Three quarters of the target population did not benefit from any system for rubbish disposal. In a nutshell, the living conditions in unplanned areas were miserable: and their “…environmental situation can be classified as tragic.” (DAWASA 2000: 12).

**Outsourcing services**
Traditionally, it has been common to have private health and education services. However, the growing demand has put pressure to include private service providers in other sectors as well. During the last years, two other basic services have been under privatization or outsourcing schemes: water and waste collection. DAWASA used to be responsible for sourcing, treatment, transportation and distribution of water but since it performed badly piped water supply and sewerage services were transferred to private water and sanitation companies in 2003 (DPU n.d.). DAWASA’s role is now to monitor private operators and implement community projects in the areas where private operators are not working (DPU n.d.).

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56 More information about the living conditions in unplanned areas such as design, house sizes, facilities, etc in Dar es Salaam can be found in Nguluma (2003)
These new arrangements have achieved a higher service coverage; nevertheless accountability and quality have been compromised. In community based domestic water supply schemes, stakeholders should in principle participate in their planning, construction and operation, but often they are not involved. Their involvement has been seen as a hampering factor. Since they have not been involved, their interests have not been represented:

“Because projects are between governments and contractors (communities are typically not a party in the contract), the supposed beneficiaries are in no position to seek redress for sub-standard work. Accountability is lost in the commercial contractual, quick-fix arrangements of private sector involvement.” (Water-Aid-Tanzania 2003: 4-5).

In 1992 the waste collection rate was 5%. Two years later the outsourcing of the waste collection was initiated. Before 1996 there was only one private company collecting waste, in 1998 there were already 68 companies (URT 2001b: 9). In 2004, the waste collection rate was 40%, which was collected by private contractors. Residents pay a service fee, which is defined in the contracts between the contractors and DCC; the payments are collected by the contractors (Chinamo and Bubegwa 2005: 5-7). However, DCC does not monitor and supervise the performance of contractors properly. Low performance and accountability and the lack of residents’ proper involvement in the process have turned them against the contractors and created free-riders in many areas (Kaare 2002).

6.3 ACTORS IN SERVICE DELIVERY

6.3.1 Local government in Dar es Salaam

Local government and district leadership is represented at ward level by Ward Executive Officers (WEO, Mtendaji wa Kata), who are appointed by the government. A Ward office accommodates several officers. The Ward Development Committee oversees development planning in the wards, and the Ward Development Officer (WDO) is responsible for scrutinising development project proposals before they are submitted to the council (DPU n.d.: 5-6). WDO also oversees implementation of national programmes such as Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP).

Currently, the lowest level of local government is Mtaa57. Mtaa are weak, and as they do not have a corporate form, they are not able to receive funding from councils (DPU n.d.). Their members are elected by the residents and who are led by their chairperson (Mwenyeikiti wa Serikali ya Mtaa). They are answerable to the WEOs, and the chairperson of the Mtaa is a Member in Ward Development Committee, thus participating in the work of local government at

57 Street, Mitaa in plural
formal level. Their work is mostly administrative, keeping records, etc, but they also oversee development initiatives and mobilize communities in their area. Though Mtaa offices lack resources, their work as the lowest level of local government is meaningful (Sliuzas 2004). Moreover, Mtaa members also often participate in the establishment and operation of CBOs in the area (Sliuzas 2004). Sometimes they mobilize communities for CBOs, sometimes even they themselves are members of CBOs thus mixing the boundaries between public sector and civil society (UCLAS 1999: 40-41).

Ten cell units used to be the lowest level of local government, but they lost their official status when Tanzania changed to a multi-party system (Sliuzas 2004), since ten cell leaders (TCLs, Wajumbe) are seen to be connected to the ruling party (DPU n.d.: 4). Usually ten cell units are comprised of between 8-15 houses (DPU n.d.: 4). However, TCLs still have a notable position in reaching people, disseminating information etc, and they are often used in those development interventions which require mobilization, sensitization or participatory approaches⁵⁸.

6.3.2 Organised civil society and communities

During the colonial time, the number of CSOs was limited and controlled but ethnically based urban groups were allowed. They attracted members through social welfare and cultural programmes, for instance people migrating to urban centres formed organisations for funerals, etc (Brennan and Burton 2007: 49). In rural areas, the cooperative movement got a strong foothold (Lange et al. 2000). Despite limitations, voluntary associations during the colonial times also managed to nurture independence movements (Tripp 1992: 224).

After independence, the fragile nation state was afraid of ethnic uprising, therefore ethnicity as a basis for associational activities was denied as well as the traditional authorities (Tripp 1992: 226-27). The state tried to extinguish voluntary community level action; local organisations were eliminated, or merged to the state for example by giving rebirth under the auspices of the party (Suleiman Ngware 1999; Tripp 1992: 221). Mobilization for community participation was supposed to be carried out through the party only, not via any independent grassroots initiatives (Lange et al. 2000; Tripp 1992: 229). Lugalla (Lugalla 1995: 85-86) reports how later in the 1980s there were only few civil society organisations in DSM: in addition to rare tribal associations, the youth were organised for football, women for beer making and savings through a mutual credit group, upato, and men were organized for drinking beer!

⁵⁸ Field Notes 2006
Service delivery has notably benefited from the work of CSOs, particularly that of religious organisations such as Christian missions which have been involved in the provision of health care and education since colonial times (Tripp 1992: 224). Later in the 1970s, their role in service delivery was strongly restricted, but when the public service delivery collapsed; people resorted to CSOs and started relying more on them (Lange et al. 2000: 6). In the late 1980s the government concluded it could not restrict anymore civil society organisations in service delivery, therefore it called churches and other organisations to come up to provide health and education (Tripp 1992: 239). Western type CSOs started proliferating also when donors begun channelling money to them, linking local level development vectors with top level “…through the transfer of resources and cultural models“ (Dill and Longhofer 2006:10). In practice, donors prioritised these CSOs and regularly bypassed government structures which they considered inefficient and corrupt.

Legislation regarding CSOs was lacking for a long time. Finally in 2001, a National Policy for NGOs was created. It offered basic definitions for NGOs and stipulated their relations with the government. It stated that

“an NGO is a voluntary grouping of individuals or organizations which is autonomous and not-for profit sharing; organised locally at the grassroots level, nationally or internationally for the purpose of enhancing the legitimate economic, social and /or cultural development of lobbying or advocating on issues of public interest of a group of individuals or organizations.” (URT 2001a: 10).

However, there is no legislation regarding CBOs. Though CBOs have a strong role in development activities such as service delivery, they additionally participate rarely in formal development planning (IBRD 2005: 83).

In practice, Western types of CSOs, NGOs and CBOs, are still an inchoate idea in Tanzania. Both NGOs and CBOs exist mostly in middle or high income areas (Mulengeki 2002). In general, NGOs are considered to be top-down, elitist and urban, and they do not have constituency-membership in the community as a whole, but usually their constituency is a family or small group of people (Mulengeki 2002). They use donor funding whereas traditional organisations based their activities largely on their members’ contribution (UCLAS 1999). Shivji claims NGOs have been privileged on the cost of traditional people’s organisations (Shivji 2004: 689). Therefore, NGOs’ developmental role is often contested, as they are considered internally disputed organisations (Mhamba and Colman 2001), with a lot of personal agendas “there is...
nothing inherently pro-poor or pro-development about civic participation in development in general and in welfare provision in particular.” (S. S. Ngware 2001: 16).

Lately, the change in CSOs’ character is also reflected in their mission. There is an ongoing debate on what the role of CSOs is and what it should be, as for instance the government claims they should concentrate more in service delivery whereas, particularly Western funders see that they should embark more on advocacy and form a critical force in society. Therefore, financially dependent NGOs are increasingly working in advocacy and concentrating more on sectors where funding is available (URT 2003: 5): “NGOs are not engaged as much with service delivery activities as they used to be and instead focus on advocacy activities connected to the promotion of democracy and civil society as defined in the donor narrative” (Kukkamaa 2007).

But there are still some organizations such as district development trusts in rural areas and religious organisations as well as most unregistered societies in urban areas which are active in traditional service delivery (Lange et al. 2000). In Dar es Salaam, the City Council commenced establishing Community Development Associations for self help in response to demands for better services but these have remained weak or not active (Mhamba and Colman 2001: 227).

There are concerns about NGOs’ independence and their role in governance. When earlier voluntary organisations had offered some pressure points towards the government, the legalization of NGOs in Tanzania meant government could now also control them more easily (Tripp 1992: 231-39). Some funding to NGO development activities is channelled via government budgets, which has caused worries about co-option: “To enhance and sustain this [government-NGO] partnership, it is proposed that the government should provide a direct grant set aside in the development budget to NGOs under the terms and conditions which will not undermine or compromise their freedom and autonomy.” (Mogella 1999: 22). NGOs are also given the role of partners for example in the policy dialogues to enhance good governance, though this is seen more to legitimize policies and possibly it would also undermine the self-determination of the government (Shivji 2004: 690-91).

Collaboration is necessary for the implementation of service delivery. The National Human Settlements Policy acknowledges that public resources are limited so communities will need to capture local resources. Therefore, a huge burden still rests on individual efforts, particularly on communities themselves, the government’s role will be to facilitate the provision and improvement of services: “NGOs and CBOs will have a big role to play in harnessing individual resources for human settlements development.” (URT 2000: 53). In unserviced settlements, CSOs are seen as essential to connect with communities for service delivery (URT 2000: 26).
Though there are calls for a re-distribution of power and for genuine empowerment of communities (Suleiman Ngware 1999), the communities’ task still continues to be mostly cost-sharing and contribution of resources for service delivery.

6.4 Partnerships

6.4.1 Legal and policy framework for local governance and delivery of basic services

The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty MKUKUTA emphasizes “growth and reduction of income poverty, improvement of quality of life and social well-being; and governance and accountability” (PORALG 2005b: 6). The priority sectors are related to basic services, such as “improved access to education, health services… and clean and affordable water… and access to quality and affordable services”. In Cluster II Improvement of Quality of Life and Social Well-Being, the targets are “access to clean, affordable and safe water, sanitation, decent shelter and a safe and sustainable environment and thereby, reduced vulnerability from environmental risk;…effective systems to ensure universal access to quality and affordable public services”; in cluster III Governance and accountability the target is “to put in place an affective public service framework as a foundation for service delivery improvements and poverty reduction.” (URT 2005: 35). Improved services require functioning public facilities “increased provision of essential infrastructure, planned and serviced human settlements and skilled personnel” (URT 2005: 49). Therefore, to address these issues, more resources and capacity are required at the local level, for which the reinforcement of local governments through local government reform programmes has been one of the essential mechanisms.

Local government reform policy defines tools for the implementation of MKUKUTA. The basic document for decentralisation and local government reform was the 1998 Policy Paper on Local Government Reform (Government 2005; PORALG 2005a) which defined political, financial, and administrative decentralisation and redefined the relationship between the central and local level government. In the Local Government Laws (Amendments) act 1999 it is indicated local governments should enable people’s participation in decision making with collaboration of other civil society (PACT n.d). In addition, the Local Government Agenda 1996-2000 was developed to address the development needs of local government, basing clearly on decentralization by devolution (D-by-D), which “…is expected to contribute to the national drive to reduce poverty by improving service delivery in key areas such as health and education.” (URT 2003: 2).

Through the reform, the competence and role of local government in service delivery have been reinforced; in practice central government still continues to hold some control over local
authorities and there is little “progress on the fundamentals required to implement the decentralisation policy…” (Joint Government Donor Review 2004 quoted in URT 2003: 7-8). A major problem regarding the quality of service delivery is a lack of accountability and corresponding mechanisms by local officials (Research and Analysis Working Group 2004: 73). Districts are very big, and huge distances complicate field work. Local civil society organisations still continue to be weak, rendering local participation and accountability difficult to implement (PORALG 2005a). Therefore, local governance reform will remain hollow until the field level (Mitaa and TCLs) are reinforced and given manpower (DPU n.d.).

To support local level development activities, the Local Government Capital Development Grant (LGCDG) system was envisioned as the main cornerstone of Government of Tanzania’s strategy to develop and produce local infrastructure (PORALG 2005b, 2005a). The objective of LGCDG, which started operating in the fiscal year of 2005-2006, is to channel development funds to Local Government Authorities (LGAs) for projects such as water supply schemes, septic tanks, classrooms, health centres, rehabilitation of access roads etc. Half of the grants should be implemented at lower LGA level (PORALG 2005b, 2005a). LGCDG is parallel to TASAF (see section 0), but the idea is that they complement each other: LGCDG channels funds to LGAs, whereas TASAF works directly with local communities.

Both the value basis and practical aspects of LGRP and MKUKUTA have also been criticized. In the field stakeholders such as CSOs lack adequate knowledge of national policies and how to link them to their activities (Concern 2005). LGRP does not deal with how to translate MKUKUTA into activities and operations at community level⁵⁹. In addition, MKUKUTA itself leaves many questions open, as it does not reflect how the targets were to be achieved in practice. When MKUKUTA was designed, the costing was not done, that is to say the targets were defined but not how they would be funded or what were the available resources⁶⁰. Basically, they are seen to represent “the donor-led agenda of poverty reduction, good governance and democracy” (Kukkamaa 2007). In general, MKUKUTA is not considered to be a sufficient mechanism for urban poverty alleviation (Victor and Makalle 2003). Though it targets at tackling wide social and political causes to poverty, the means and actions are defined at the project level (Gould and Ojanen 2003: 88). Additionally, it is largely based on cost-sharing, which in practice means allocating the funding burden on the poor, whose poverty is should alleviate⁶¹.

⁵⁹ Interview Mr Kasege, Good governance LGRP in DSM on 24.3. 2006.
⁶¹ Interview Mr Kenny Manara KEPA Policy Officer in Morogoro on 24.4.2006.
6.4.2 Policy framework governing participation and partnerships

Participation has well established roots in decision-making processes in Tanzania. Already Nyerere defined in his famous speech in 1968 how “development was “of the people, by the people and for the people”, through democracy in decision-making” (Manzo 2001: 243). What has changed are the methods to practice participation (Adkins and Wembah-Rashid 2005: 165), as historically participation in Tanzania has not been related to the organised civil society but incorporated in the government and the party (TANU) programmes (Swantz 1997: 19).

Peoples’ ability to participate in governance, for example in the planning and implementation of development programmes, was believed to be improved through the reinforcement and reform of local government (URT 2003: 3). Currently, nearly all the major policy documents have endorsed community participation and the participation of other actors as an instrument to achieve their targets. CSOs are anticipated to have a crucial role both in LGRP and MKUKUTA to improve service delivery and local democracy (Lange et al. 2000). For instance, the policy framework paper of the Social Sector Reform Programme stated that there is a need for the “…iii) enhancement and promotion of the participation of the private sector, NGOs, local authorities and local communities in social service sectors” (Mogella 1999: 6). The Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) endeavoured to enhance “…the involvement and participation of NGOs and the private sector in the economy, as well as in the delivery of goods and social services, and expanding and strengthening democratic institutions and promoting good governance” (Mogella 1999: 5).

In addition, partnership has become a very valuable mechanism for contemporary Tanzanian governance since local government should “foster partnerships with civic groups.” (URT 2003: 3). In practice this means a major role for communities, civil society and the pro-profit private sector in the form of “community-based initiatives and partnership with civil society organisations…” as well as PPP “…consultation mechanisms in promoting the participation of the private sector in business particularly in the provision of public services.” (URT 2005: 25).

In MKUKUTA, partnership with CSOs has been mentioned as a means for achieving the targets. In the simplified (“layman’s”) version of MKUKUTA the communities’ role has been defined as, among others, to “participate in defining problems, planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating community activities some of which could be supported by the government and other actors” (Hakikazi Catalyst and Dissemination 2005: 14). CSOs are labelled as key actors, their role should be to assist communities through: “building local capacity and empowering communities; participating in monitoring and evaluation at national and community levels;
mobilizing and enhancing community participation; and mobilizing community resources for poverty reduction.” (URT 2005: 25). Actually, a dual role has been reserved for CSOs: on the one hand, in MKUKUTA’s planning and policy section they have been allocated a strong advocacy role in accountability for good governance. CSOs are assumed to work closely with the government to ensure cross-cutting issues are incorporated in planning and implementation. This highlights their role in the enhancement of democracy. On the other hand, in the budget section CSOs are assumed to work as contractors and implementers of extensive service delivery programmes. However, the rationale is more on the side of efficiency and the pooling of resources, in the improvement of the capacity base for service delivery: “to supplement capacity; create financial sustainability and promote efficient and cost-effective service delivery” (URT 2003: 4). CSOs are also supposed to contribute financially “Other sources of financing will involve contributions from the private sector and CSOs (mainly in service provision), communities and households.” (URT 2005: 69).

The National Policy on NGOs offers an obvious example of the dilemma related to the role of CSOs in partnership. Basically, it emphasizes clearly the imperative of collaboration: “The government of Tanzania recognizes the need to work together with NGOs and the need for such cooperation to extend to other key players, including funders, disadvantaged people themselves, other sectors of civil society and the wider public.”(URT 2001a: 3). In particular it envisions the role of NGOs in service delivery: “The Government encourages partnership with the private sector to complement government efforts and therefore NGOs have a role to play in the provision of social and economic services.”(URT 2001a: 6). However, later on in the policy document, partnership is translated to subcontracting: “The Government shall work in partnership with NGOs in the delivery of public services and programmes. That is, the government shall be free to subcontract NGOS to undertake programmes, where NGOs have comparative advantages and have expressed interest.” (URT 2001a: 17), in other words CSOs are “to make the paradigm shift to becoming local government service delivery agents” (URT 2003: 5). This also corresponds to the concern that despite donor intentions NGOs are not making a fundamental impact on the issues influencing poverty: “In spite of the increased role accorded to NGOs, their current work is not affecting the existing power structures of the state nor increasing the involvement of new groups in these central processes, important objectives of the donor narrative” (Kukkamaa 2007).

In practice, community participation and the creation of partnerships have faced numerous problems. Local governments’ regulation and monitoring capacity is weak (URT 2003: 5). Even the work environment for both local governments and CSOs is not always conducive. In order to
work in partnership, all the partners need capacity building and awareness to work and share power with communities (Lupala 1997: 3). On the one hand, relationship between local governments and CSOs is not easy either. Communities do not trust local governments which still seem remote both to CSOs and communities (Swantz 1997: 65). On the other hand, local governments lack proper knowledge of alternative strategies for service delivery as well as suitable attitudes to work supportively with communities: “Most district staff are not trained in community mobilization and facilitation and tend to look at communities as a hindrance rather than a resource.” (Kikula 2004 quoted in Cooksey and Kikula 2005: x).

Though NGOs’ status has now been regularized, their existence is also controlled, and there are still considerable suspicions towards them: “NGOs and civil society are given only so much room for manoeuvre within the parameters defined by donors and the state that is deemed necessary” (Kukkamaa 2007). In Table 14 the opportunity space regarding local governments and civil society is depicted by IBRD in the beginning of 2000s’. However, their definition for CBOs’ functional space as ‘enabled’ could be contested, as there are still several constraints affecting their functionality.

Table 14 Tanzania Opportunity Space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>LGs</th>
<th>CBOs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>Partly enabled</td>
<td>Partly enabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functional</strong></td>
<td>Partly constrained</td>
<td>Enabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiscal</strong></td>
<td>Constrained</td>
<td>Constrained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative and capacity</strong></td>
<td>Constrained</td>
<td>Partly enabled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: IBRD 2005)

6.4.3 Typology of current partnership programmes and projects

To map partnership interventions, a typology for partnerships in Dar es Salaam and Tanzania was developed based on key informants’ views and other background information gathered in Dar es Salaam (annex 1). The typology was divided into the following categories; see section 5.6.1 for more analysis:

1. International donor-partner;
2. Projects with an international NGO;
3. Municipality directly with communities or with local CSOs;
4. National development plans and funding schemes for partnership interventions such as TASAF, LGRP and PEDP School construction;
5. Outsourcing and PPP: CSOs acting as contractors such as waste collection contracts with municipalities; or external funding channelled through the government

An example of the first category is the planning framework of Environmental Planning and Monitoring (EPM) which is one of the attempts under Sustainable Dar es Salaam Program (SDP), part of Sustainable Cities Programme (joint facility of UN-HABITAT/UNEP), to improve the inadequacies of traditional policy frameworks (SCP 2001). Under EMP, partnership forms the basic mechanism to work with different actors, and it has introduced various partnerships such as SDP-Kijico and CIP-Hana Nasif as tools for implementation (SCP 1999, 2001). It endeavours “to employ a bottom up planning approach” to respond to the shortage of basic services and environmental degradation. EMP forms a forum for all the stakeholders to identify problems and suggest partnership strategies for sustainable development (MLHSD 2001: 3).

In the second category, there are a few international NGOs in Dar es Salaam who are applying partnership with communities. Most of them are active in the field of income generation or in social sector such as HIV/AIDS prevention and sensitization, less so in producing public services or infrastructure. Major international NGOs in this field are Care International, Concern, Plan International and Water-Aid, a brief reference to their activities is presented in section 5.6.1.

Within the third category, municipalities in Dar es Salaam have had only very nominal interventions directly with communities. Under the Safer Cities Programme (part of SDP), municipalities formed partnerships directly with communities but they did not produce public services or infrastructure. One programme, which has attempted to promote partnership between local government and CSOs, is RIPS (Rural Integrated Project Support Programme 1988-2005) in Southern Tanzania. RIPS explored the application of partnership between different actors for local government which delivered changes “…in the willingness of citizens, village leadership and CSOs to demand accountability in the provision of public services.” (Adkins and Wembah-Rashid 2005: 167). It improved the collaboration between councils (municipalities) and CSOs by establishing partnerships, though there was a limited understanding of the relationship and prospective roles of the partners.

In the health sector there have been mixed results of people participating in the operation and monitoring of health services at grassroots level. Community Health Service boards were established, in principle they should have enabled community members to participate in decision-making and monitoring. But the mechanisms were not clear, and community members did not have enough information. They were afraid to participate in ‘governance’ structures and thought that it is not their right, and participation was pointless. They also considered participation was
very time-consuming, therefore they did not believe it would have any real impact (M. Mamdani and Bangser 2004: 17-18).

Religious organisations have lately attempted to enter into collaboration with the public sector, though traditionally they have worked rather independently. Currently, the collaboration between them could be considered good, but perhaps not yet partnership.62

The fourth category is based on traditional self-help but has emerged with partnership features where there is close collaboration with the public sector for instance in the form of technical assistance. These programs are usually nationwide, though implemented with international funding, administered and managed by national institutions. TASAF (Tanzania Social Action Fund) is funded with WB Social Investment Funds, which are an effort to respond government failure in service delivery, based on a community-driven approach (see Tendler 2000 for a review of Social Funds). TASAF has various components; its Community Development Initiative aims at co-financing necessary infrastructure initiatives based on communities’ demand and then working in partnership with communities. It requires a 20% portion of communities’ self-financing, which leaves out the poor and disorganized communities. Another feature of TASAF is that it is not integrated into local government structures63.

During the initial phase in 2003-2005, 40 of 86 districts received TASAF funds. The initial phase of TASAF suffered from political favouritism, which potentially created a conflict between TASAF organisations and political councillors (Braathen ca 2005). During the second phase since 2006, the problems of the first phase were rectified. All the districts have got TASAF funding, Dar es Salaam amongst the last of them.

Local government programmes under LGRP also employ participatory approaches with partnership features in their collaboration with communities which is called ‘opportunities and obstacles to development’ (O&OD), which “builds relationships and also helps LGs understand community-level dynamics” (IBRD 2005: 33). The O&OD -approach based on community participation is intended to propose suitable projects to be funded with LGCDG funds (PMORALG 2005c)64. To plan with O&OD approach, the mitaa in urban areas should be “grouped into zonal teams for planning purposes”, and civil society should be involved during planning prior to the beginning. An inclusive planning process should be facilitated by the Ward and District facilitation teams (PORALG 2005b: 26). Since available LGCDG resources are still

62 Interview with Mr Mpeta, Christian Social Services Council on 17.3.2006
63 Interview Ms Julie Adkins SNV Local Governance Adviser in Dar es Salaam on 3.3.2006
64 LGCDG funding was only commencing in Dar es Salaam in 2006 when this field research was carried out.
very modest and local governments’ capacity to handle them is limited, LGCDC funds are not yet a solution to the shortcomings of basic infrastructure.

The national education sector development programme, Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP) envisages a role for NGOs and CBOs in planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of education activities (Rajani 2003). Funds for the construction of school facilities are channelled via LGs to school committees (PMORALG 2005b), and LG provide technical assistance. This PEDP funding offers opportunities for communities to get involved in the planning and implementation of primary education activities in partnership with LGs. Partnership here is though loosely understood, as it largely depends on the persons and institution which kind of relationship dominates the collaboration. Mostly, the role of local governments as partners to communities’ has been rather sporadic. In addition, PEDP funded activities have not been clear projects but mostly long term programmes, and they have taken a rather lengthy time to become completed.

The fifth category involves activities, which might be beneficial for the economy but they concentrate on transforming CSOs into small enterprises such as CSOs getting involved with rubbish collection in Dar es Salaam. Alternatively, it includes potential activities where for instance local government hires CSOs to carry out specific projects such as construction projects or provide services. In this category CSOs are used in place of commercial companies, mostly to curb expenses. CSOs have also edge in some places, particularly in distant rural areas where commercial contractors are not so willing to function. This category has been excluded from this research since outsourcing and external funding of CSOs via the government are not considered partnerships in harmony with the definition of this research (see 3.11).

6.5 CONCLUSIONS
Despite intensive rhetoric and long-term reform programmes, the operational environment is only partially conducive to collaboration such as partnership. Central government is still harnessing much power; and local governments are still lacking resources and capacity as well as proper attitudes for successful collaboration with communities and CSOs. As a consequence, partnership comes out very strongly in policies but practical resources and mechanisms to implement these policies have not been adequately provided. There are some promising experiments and tentative successes but how well the implemented initiatives have succeeded, is subject to further scrutinization in the field.

File Notes 2006, visits to several schools which had benefited from PEDP funding.
7 FIELD RESEARCH: FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION ON PARTNERSHIPS

7.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, first each case project and the corresponding areas are described. Information about different settlements is based on available documents, field observation and personal communication from interviews with key informants such as Dar es Salaam City Council, Ilala and Kinondoni municipality officers, local government officers at ward and mtaa level, and some acknowledged local residents such as wazee who know the areas and residents.

A crosscutting analysis of variables is presented as linking them to emerging profiles, attempting to analyse similarities between agents’ experiences about their agency and their sense of ownership. The hypothesis was tested against agent profiles emerging in narratives in relation to the variables of community members’ access to power and their sense of ownership.

The final section of this chapter discusses research findings and provides an analytical synthesis. First it covers the role of partnerships in service delivery within the current framework of local governance. Second, it investigates analytical factors determining partnership. Finally, it studies community members’ agency; constraining and enabling structures determining their agency are investigated and analysed. Constrained agents embracing counterpower as well as implications on their social distance from the outcome of the partnership process are investigated.

7.2 CIP-KIJICO PARTNERSHIP PROJECT IN KIJITONYAMA

7.2.1 The area and the infrastructure upgrading project
Kijitonyama ward is located in Kinondoni municipality about 6km from the centre; between Mwananyamala and Shekilango roads, Makumbusho and Magomeni areas (Figure 6). It consists of about 2700 plots and 14-16,000 people (ILO 1998). Nearly all, that is to say 90-95%, of the area of 14km² is planned but underserviced (DCC 1998: 1; JFK School of Government).

In general there are mainly middle and low income residents in Kijitonyama, including current and retired government officers as well as businessmen (SCP 2001). In Makumbusho where the plots are bigger, residents are mostly house-owners themselves, of middle-income and well-educated, some very well positioned with deeper attachment to the area and sincere interests in its development. Saiansi area has smaller plots, where the residents are older, mostly businessmen and retired civil servants. In these two areas mostly house owners themselves live there. Recently, many permanent residents have altered their houses or service huts in the

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66 During the field research, for instance an MP, former and current university staff members were encountered.
backyard to accommodate tenants (Nguluma 2003). Thus, several households could be living in one plot.

![Figure 6 Kijico project area in Kijitonyama](image)

The project in Kijitonyama emerged in the beginning of 1990s when residents gathered to seek solutions to numerous problems in the area. Residents in the interior started upgrading initiatives, but later in the mid-1990s other areas of Kijitonyama got involved. Kijitonyama had been subject to the WB funded sites and services in the 1970s (Kironde 2000), but there was still no secondary school, there was a lack of feeder roads of decent quality and adequate solid waste services, as well as a lack of both storm water drainage and sewerage causing flooding and health hazards (Programme 1998: 2). Though there was no sewage system, 40% of the population had a flushing toilet (Lupala 1995 in ILO 1998). During the rains, septic tanks were emptied to the streets as hiring tank trucks was considered too expensive. Residents had already identified the road next to Saiansi from Bagamoyo road to Ali Maua area to be of great importance but realised soon having the 2.6 km of road paved was financially out of their reach. Thus, they needed more resources for road rehabilitation and sanitation than they could raise locally.

There were already 3-4 small CBOS active in the area, but in 1991 a CBO called KIJICO (Kijitonyama Development Community) was established to look for solutions to insufficient

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67 Interview KIJICO board members Mr Kessi, Mr Munga, Mr Libana in Kijitonyama on 4.5.2006.
68 “Kutapisha”, filled latrines can be emptied to another pit (Ramadhani 2007). Literally: to make vomit.
69 Interview Mr Mshanga, Kijico Committee member and zone5 member of Mtaa in Saiansi, in October 2006
70 Area near the junction of Ali Hassan Mwinyi road where COSTECH (“Science Commission”) is located
basic services. Their strong and determined leaders were trying to locate funding for the proposed activities, while at the same time DCC (the Dar es Salaam City Commission at that time) was also trying to identify community partners for demand-driven community-based construction under the CIP programme. So, it was a perfect match.

The underpinning idea of CIP was to bring together different organisations to work in partnership, trying to answer the problems related to basic infrastructure in a sustainable way (Anon. n.d.). The overall objective of the programme was to improve living conditions and alleviate poverty “…to involve both women and men in decision making, problem identification, planning and implementation of the community development activities” (Programme 1998: 2-3). CIP was believed to “enhance their capacity to participate and contribute in their development programmes” (SCP 2001: 18), community participation thus contributing to the creation of trust and sense of ownership (DCC 1998).

The demand-driven approach of CIP was based on communities’ initiative, their active involvement in the form of participation and community contribution, and using local CBOs for connecting communities with other partners. Communities were expected to surrender any land required, pay 5% of the total costs and 100% of the operation and maintenance costs annually. The 5% cost-share was allocated on the basis of WB policy on cost sharing “…to maintain the spirit of community ownership” (UNHABITAT 2005). For a private sewage house connection each house needed to pay TSh 90000 (USD143)\(^73\) to the water company, the trunk line was provided by the project funds, resident only carried out the excavation. For the rehabilitation of roads, each house was supposed to pay TSh24000 (USD38). There were also other components, such as a local water stand posts organisational support to KIJICO, etc. If the area did not pay at least a half of the required community contribution, there were no project activities\(^72\).

The main partners in the partnership were the Dar es Salaam City Commission (DCC), Irish Aid, the Government of Tanzania, the World Bank and the CBO KIJICO representing the target community in Kijitonyama. The coordinating partner, DCC, demanded that only one CBO should represent the community, therefore KIJICO, mainly originating from Makumbusho area\(^73\), was selected to represent all the other CBOs and all the residents in Kijitonyama and to coordinate between them. As there were many highly educated people living in Makumbusho, KIJICO was also able to draft a project proposal for the road including the technical design (Programme 1998: 19).

\(^71\) Exchange rate 1US$ = TSh 630 in 1998

\(^72\) Interview KIJICO board members Mr Kessi, Mr Munga, Mr Libana in Kijitonyama on 4.5.2006.

\(^73\) Located opposite to the National Museum.
1). A Memorandum of Understanding between the City Council and KIJICO was signed in 1996 (Anon. n.d.).

The ward was initially divided into five areas. Each had their representatives in the sectoral committees comprising of local professional and ordinary residents, which then drafted action plans based their identified “priority needs” (Programme 1998: 2-5; UNHABITAT 2005). KIJICO then established a massive book keeping system for collecting community contribution. Project funds were released when the CBO had transferred the funds. Before embarking on construction, KIJICO could also recommend if the work was to be done using labour-intensive methods or by a contractor (Anon. n.d.).

In total, the project managed to rehabilitate 10 km of gravel road, 18 km of side drains and 6 km of trunk lines for conventional sewerage (JFK School of Government). The WB decided to fund the paving of the access road in Saiansi which was completed in 2001 (UNHABITAT 2005). Though some houses were demolished to enable the construction of wider roads, they were still constructed narrow74. All this development sparked more enterprises in the area, and improved sanitation and transport in the area (KIJICO n.d.). At the end the infrastructure was handed over to the CBO, who was considered responsible for its operation and maintenance.

Residents in Kijitonyama had waited over a decade for basic services in this area, for instance many had even attempted to construct their own storm water drainage. This partnership intervention was founded on strong community interest, and it responded widely to the needs of the community. Without partnership collaboration, the municipality would not have had resources to implement these activities. The field research revealed the project was considered rather successful by the residents themselves and very successful internationally (UNHABITAT 2005).

In general, community residents found the project satisfactory, 73% of the interviewees were somewhat or very satisfied75. The main reason for not being fully satisfied was the fact that not all the targets were accomplished; therefore community members did not consider the project completed. When the project funds finished, only three main access roads were selected to be rehabilitated. In addition, a community run and owned water system was constructed, however, due to technical problems (saline water) it is used only in emergencies, not as a source of income for the CBO as was envisioned.

74 Interview Mr Kessi; Mr Munga and Mr Libana, KIJICO Committee members in Kijitonyama on 4.5.2006
75 Field Notes May 2006
7.2.2 Synergy

Partnership rhetoric emphasized policy synergy, how the partnership project’s participatory approach enabled community residents to participate in decision making, planning, etc (DCC 1998). In the planning phase, the community indeed was included to the management structures to identify and provide local knowledge and views. Later the resource synergy or community contribution became a crucial driver for the CIP-Kijico project. As identified in section 3.11.5.3, in general there are two main arguments for community contribution and cost-sharing: they ease budget constraints and ensure project’s sustainability. These arguments were evident in Kijico rhetoric as the purpose of community contribution was:

“…to complement community participation. It is envisaged that this is the only way for the community to have the sense of ownership of the project and it will make the community think and be responsible for the operation and maintenance of these infrastructures hence the sustainability of the project.” (Anon. n.d.).

Community contribution (typically 5% of the project costs) was expected to enlarge the budget. However, in Kijitonyama as well as in Hana Nasif, the level of the actual community contribution was notably less than budgeted. In Kijitonyama, community members contributed to the house sewage connections directly to the water company but the collection of other contributions was far behind schedule. Later, it has been acknowledged that many residents were not able or willing to contribute financially (SCP 2001). Additionally, to collect and account funds was an enormous work load that took a lot of time. If all the overhead and running expenses of this protracted implementation were compared to the funds received, the community contribution’s efficiency could be strongly questioned.

The system of community contribution as it was practised vis-à-vis the actual upgrading was highly unequal. As the payments were too low, two areas out of five were left completely out of the activities and in the remaining areas not all the targets were accomplished. There were many who contributed but got nothing in return; some had even contributed in the fear of ostracisation. Those residents who had contributed were not returned their contribution even if the roads and drainage in their areas were not upgraded. A touching case was a sick elderly woman, taking care of five of her orphaned grandchildren. She had paid about half of the demanded contribution, but roads and drainages in her vicinity were not even touched. Now, some years after the official

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76 In CIP, the actual effected payment level was less than 1% of the total expenses (around 10-20% of the budgeted 5%). In CIUP, the following phase of CIP, DCC decided to allocate their own funds straight away to complement lacking community contribution in the budget. This would fulfil the World Bank’s requirements for fulfilled upfront contribution, so that they would not delay payment due to lacking community cost-sharing contribution.

77 Interview woman2, on 13.05.2006 in Kijitonyama
completion of project activities, she was pondering whether she should pay more to finally get them rehabilitated, whether her non-compliance of the payment was the reason she did not benefit from the project as others did. Another resident, an educated, well-positioned lady refused an interview, she explained only hastily how she was satisfied with the project. Later on it came out off the record that she was one of the beneficiaries, the road in the area where she lived was rehabilitated, but she had stopped attending the meetings when the idea of community contribution was introduced and, at the end, she did not contribute anything77.

7.2.3 **CBO legitimacy and accountability**

Though the ward of Kijitonyama consists of socio-economically very different areas, for this project they were lumped together as a “community”. Finally, improvements concentrated primarily in only two areas of five, called Makumbusho and Saiansi (where this research was also carried out), as the other areas did not manage to contribute as much as required. They are located close to Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road, had three gravel roads rehabilitated, drainage and sewage lines constructed. The poorer interior areas benefited from the improved access of the tar road only.

‘Kijitonyama community’ in practice was comprised of many communities and CBOs but only KIJICO was taken aboard. KIJICO received a lot of assistance, for example a rehabilitated office which was funded by Irish Aid. But KIJICO’s role created frictions in Kijitonyama. The chairman of one of the local CBOs virtually imputed KIJICO of hijacking their project79. Another CBO had been asked to join KIJICO by the WB80. Though these internal conflicts were acknowledged by DCC (SCP 2001), their nature has been attributed as something passing, there being conflicts due to vested interests of community members or CBOs themselves not due to inherent community heterogeneity.

The CBO KIJICO was very well known and acknowledged to be the motor of the activities in the area, every interviewee knew KIJICO and could describe KIJICO’s role for example in project planning and mobilization. At grassroots’ level, KIJICO seemed to be identified as being responsible for the core management and accomplishment of the project, whereas the City Council’s or donors’ role was widely unknown or unclear.

Nevertheless, the fundamental nature of a CSO was relatively unknown. KIJICO was not seen to be representing the community itself, its values or ideas to a great degree. Some approved it,

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77 Field Notes 2006
79 Interview in Kijitonyama-Saiansi on 17.5.2006 CBO KTR Chairman, Mr Chambusho
80 Kijitonyama Mpakani Community Development Trust. Interview with KIJICO board members Mr Mshanga, Mr Mgota on 4.5.2006
some were completely unaware of the supposed representative role of the CBO, and some
everently denied it. Ostensibly, donors and the City Commission defined KIJICO’s
representativeness when they insisted on only one CBO to represent ‘the community’. As a
consequence, KIJICO was simultaneously treated as a People’s Organisation (PO) to represent
the people and as a Public Sector Contractor (PSC) to take a major stake in implementation and
particularly in maintenance (see section 3.8.4 for the general typology). This double role
confused many. For example, though KIJICO was known, mostly it was referred to as ‘a
company’. One interviewee\textsuperscript{81} mentioned that if he wants to know something about KIJICO, he
would go to ask his ten cell leader (not to ask KIJICO representatives themselves), indicating
indirectly the remoteness of the supposed representative organisation.

KIJICO fund-management was also a mystery. KIJICO as a CBO was granted a notable
international prize of USD 20,000 for their community participation approach (Dubai 1998).
However, the money never reached the CBO, as the prize money was said to be allocated to DCC
to compensate the lacking community contribution\textsuperscript{82}, without consulting respective KIJICO
decision making structures. In addition, during the last years, KIJICO has not managed to
produce any approved accounts or to hold any annual meetings. Accusations of embezzlement of
funds have arisen both amongst ordinary community members, KIJICO members and some
KIJICO board members against the highest leaders in KIJICO.

Thus, despite the community participation approach based on a great number of meetings and
committees, KIJICO apparently had not managed to engender legitimacy and create a trustful
relationship with many community members particularly in Saiansi area.

7.2.4 Trust and reciprocity

In the beginning, there was friction in the partnership due to political hostility since the KIJICO
chair was from the opposition. Thereafter, when the project actually took off everything ran
relatively smoothly. The collaboration with Mtaa officers was good and based on mutuality, but
higher levels of the municipality remained rather distant\textsuperscript{83}.

Nearly all the ordinary community members interviewed were aware about the project and its
intended objectives; their share of contribution and who the partners were, though the roles and
responsibilities of the partners were not so clear. Decisions were made jointly, community

\textsuperscript{81} Interview man1, on 17.5.2006

\textsuperscript{82} Allegedly, this was a decision made by the chairman of KIJICO and the Coordinator in the DCC, never discussed in
KIJICO official management organs.

\textsuperscript{83} Interviews with several KIJICO Committee members in Kijitonyama in May 2006
members were even allowed to pronounce their preference for contractors. Hence, information was flowing in both directions and the relationship between partners was trustful.

Then, during the construction time, hardly any information was shared between KIJICO and community or between KIJICO and DCC. For example, though the community members were expected to participate in cost-sharing, neither they nor KIJICO were informed about global expenses. When the project expenses increased, DCC decided unilaterally without holding any meetings to raise the contribution requirements. Still, funds for construction were allegedly not sufficient and DCC decided to cut the targets and to rehabilitate only three main roads, instead of all of them as planned, regardless whether and where residents had contributed. This led to strong discontentment and resentment both within the community and within active KIJICO members, who are long term residents and “devoted” to the development of the area. They refused to take the responsibility for its upkeep and maintenance. Since then, they are still attempting to pursue the completion of the project through correspondence to politicians and government officers, insisting on finalizing the rest of the planned and promised targets and rectify evident planning mistakes. For example, some houses were demolished to enable wider roads but the roads constructed were narrow; the covers of manholes are at a higher level than the surrounding road surface implying the levelling was not done according to the plans and the capacity of the drainage system is not sufficient. Therefore, Kijitonyama residents and KIJICO activists feel betrayed. DCC refuses to discuss the completion of the project, since they bluntly consider it completed while concentrating on new areas within CIUP project. Hence, KIJICO lost contact with community members, trust and reciprocity disappeared, and the accountability was obscured.

In practice this has caused different reactions inside the community. On the one hand, many ordinary residents were perplexed; they did not understand what happened to the project and to KIJICO, as the project clearly was not completed but activities discontinued. The ones who had contributed money but who were living in sections where no roads and drainage were rehabilitated thought that KIJICO had misused the funds. On the other hand, there has been no communication from KIJICO. Some KIJICO board members are desperate; they have not managed to persuade their chairman to prepare financial accounts and to hold annual meetings. Therefore, they felt they were not able to communicate the state of the project to community

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84 December 2006
85 Interview in November, DCC/CIUP Coordinator Ms Mazwile
86 In the field interviews, 34% considered the non-completion or no benefits at all the main reasons why they were not satisfied with the project.
residents, aggravating the emerging suspicions and lack of trust. All this confusion about the project completion has badly eroded social cohesion and created rifts inside the community.

7.2.5 Participation and agency
Right from the beginning, the project epitomized genuine participatory partnership: “KIJICO’s innovation as a CBO is in promoting good governance through its participatory, democratic, accountable and transparent approach in decision making, managing and implementing its activities.” (JFK School of Government). Participation mechanisms were formally institutionalized but organized parallel to existing local government structures. Regular, wide-based community meetings were held to enable community members to express themselves.

But the heavy participation machine took its toll; allegedly the community became passive and unwilling to attend the meetings, mostly due to them being fairly occupied. In the participatory element, there was also a lack of sensitivity to constraining structures, which was described in individual discourses. Over half of the interviewees claimed to not have participated in meetings. Some were constrained, poverty being the main reason for the poor, time for the educated ones; some were generally not interested; some had dropped out due to conflicts or dissatisfaction with KIJICO’s performance. 40%⁷ of the interviewees neither contributed nor participated in the project meetings; there was no linkage between them and the partnership process.

At the latter stage, when construction started DCC began dominating the partnership: initially a tentative model for a genuine partnership project was reduced to a project where the community was only a contributor. The community and its leaders were sidelined and in large measure left in the darkness and their agency was reduced. DCC’s attitude exemplified a ”power over” approach. Even the World Bank complained it “had to work through the government, causing delays, and the council has tended to hijack decision-making.” (UNHABITAT 2005). Community members mainly expressed their strong disapproval of KIJICO whom they considered responsible for the non-completion of the promised targets. Residents became alienated from KIJICO, whereas active KIJICO members and community leaders themselves felt their agency had been jeopardized and the only type of power they possessed was to officially reject the outcome, and refuse to maintain it.

7.2.6 Sense of ownership
There was little evidence of a sense of ownership either in rhetoric or in practice. In their narratives, not a single interviewee identified drainage or roads or the corresponding maintenance

⁷ 10 out of 26 interviewees, which is statistically not valid, but gives an impression of the magnitude of non-participation inside the community.
as something belonging to the community; on the contrary, residents mainly attributed the infrastructure straight to the municipality. Their discourses reflected social distance and little concern about its condition, even if the drainage passed straight in front of their house. In practice, there has been very limited maintenance. In Makumbusho the drainage was not taken care of; instead, heaps of garbage had been disposed of there. In some areas of Saiansi, the Mtaa office had ordered residents to clean their respective part of the drainage, but in their minds and action, the drainage hardly belonged to the community. KIJICO area leaders expressed their indifference to maintenance, they felt the drainage constructed is not what they had dreamed, paid and worked for.

7.2.7 Partnership assessment
Based on community narratives and other interviews, a compilation of partnership attributes by employing the developed conceptual model is presented in Figure 7. It reveals how an intervention which was a good attempt at a genuine partnership during planning, during implementation slid towards a conventional neo-liberalist project where the community was a payer, not a decision-maker or a partner.

Figure 7 Assessment of CIP-Kijico partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership factors</th>
<th>During the planning phase</th>
<th>During the production phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Synergy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>policy and resource synergy</td>
<td>resource synergy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy and accountability</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust and reciprocity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation and agency</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of partnership</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessment of partnership: CIP-KIJICO

Temporal dimension

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88 Rubbish collection was not working properly in the area.
89 Interviews in October 2006 in Kijitonyama
7.3 MOTO MPYA*: PLAN INTL WITH ILALA MUNICIPALITY AND BUGURUNI-KISIWANI COMMUNITY

7.3.1 The area and the school construction project
Buguruni area, 5km from the centre, used to be a plantation where former plantation workers of mostly Zaramo tribe settled and embarked on constructing houses (Tripp 1997:35). Ten years ago Zaramos still formed about half of the population. In 1995, there were about 73000 predominantly Muslim inhabitants (ILO 1998), but during the last 15 years, the population has more than doubled (Nguluma 2003). Though Buguruni is an unplanned area, over 70% of the housing stock is constructed of permanent materials.

Buguruni ward is divided into four mitaa. Buguruni-Kisiwani is completely unplanned; the only access road so to speak is the road from the pavement next to Ilala Street (see Figure 8). It is located between Uhuru Street and Nelson Mandela Road. The central area is slightly elevated, and in the middle there is a large open space where the primary school buildings and a small market are located. Many residents are either self employed or doing petty trading (Tripp 1997:31). Buguruni Kisiwani has a considerable representation of opposition, and the Mtaa chairman is from the opposition party. Inside the community there seems to be less political friction, as party politics did not come out strongly in community narratives.

Figure 8 Buguruni-Kisiwani high street

* Plan Intl’s long term partnership programme in Buguruni consisted of various different activities. This is the current name of the constructed school, as the school construction partnership did not have any specific name.
Through its office in Buguruni-Malapa, Plan Intl has been working in three Buguruni Mitaa since 1992. They have a strong emphasis on work with children, ‘Children come first’ as their motto. They usually work in sectors which have an impact on children’s well-being such as education, support to small business to raise family incomes, sanitation and health. In Buguruni Kisiwani, Plan Intl had assisted for example in education, vulnerable kids, they funded the construction of latrines for poor families and supported a women’s association (Amani). Funds have been raised mainly through international “foster child” schemes. Nearby in Buguruni Mnyamani they have constructed an impressive hospital.

In a poor, unplanned settlement like Buguruni Kisiwani without Plan Intl little if any progress would have taken place. Partnership activities with Plan Intl in general as well as this specific school construction project have been important in improving living conditions. Plan Intl’s long term scope and partnership approach was also much appreciated by Ilala Municipality. In these collaboration attempts, Plan Intl was the driving force; Ilala Municipality participated in the partnership intervention in sectoral issues such as education planning and land allocation. At community level, the Mtaa office was fully collaborating with Plan Intl and the community: Mtaa members and TCLs were actively involved in community mobilization and meetings.

The school construction project started in 2003 when Plan Intl was requested to provide funding and assistance in development activities in Buguruni. The primary school was constructed in the prime area (see map in Figure 9), in the central space of Buguruni Kiswa, next to the existing school buildings. There are now three primary schools there, an old makeshift and an old dilapidated one next to each other and this new school separated from the others by a solid fence. The new school was planned to very high standards (including electricity, library, and three floors etc).

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91 Watoto Kwanza
92 Interview with Ms Zainab, Ilala Municipality Community Officer on 2.3.2006; Mr Renatus Kihongo, Economic Department Ilala Municipal Council on 17.3.2006
There were competing discourses regarding the project target. Inside the community there were cliques that had preferred a secondary school and others a primary school. One interviewee mentioned they had “won the fight” about the primary school. One mzee noted that indeed they had wanted to have a primary school as the existing ones were dilapidated and overcrowded but they never had the opportunity to say what kind of school building. Another mzee asserted that after seeing the size and high standards of the school building, he regretted it should have been a secondary school. Some were still attempting to get the school transformed into a secondary school, which had been ranked higher in the initial assessment for community’s needs (Plan International ca 2002). Plan Intl emphasized their intention had been to assist in decongesting the primary schools to get space and to improve the quality of education.

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93 Interview woman1 in Buguruni-Kisiwani on 9.11.2006
94 Interview Mzee in Buguruni-Kisiwani on 8.11.2006
95 Interview Mzee in Buguruni-Kisiwani on 20.11.2006
96 There is no secondary school in Buguruni-Kisiwani. In general, there is a fierce fight for places in secondary schools in DSM. However, required resources for a secondary school are far higher than those for primary schools which might not have been clear to community residents.
97 Interview Project Officer Maximilian, in Plan Intl on 21.11.2006
7.3.2 Synergy
Policy synergy provided the major driver for partnership intervention, which was grounded on classic community development approaches. The community was quite strongly involved and expected to express their views and local knowledge. They discussed and prioritised their needs, which then in principle formed the basis for development planning. They agreed about providing land for construction, and decided jointly on the plots to be surrendered against compensation. However, there was a discrepancy between Plan Intl’s policy principles and community needs. Apparently the decision about a new primary school building was important but not taken at such a high level. It rather followed Plan Intl’s interests since issues such as drainage, roads and a secondary school were considered of higher priority by community residents themselves (Plan International ca 2002).

7.3.3 Trust and reciprocity
Basically, Plan Intl and their activities were appreciated in Buguruni. Plan Intl had managed to build up a trustful long-term relationship, there was a lot of respect and confidence towards them. Nonetheless, this intervention also sparked different views. During the construction of the school, communication between Plan Intl and the community decreased, and decisions were merely disseminated rather than discussed as earlier. Seems like the closeness disappeared and ruptures developed between Plan Intl and the community, possibly caused by the unilateral actions of Plan Intl Country Office. Since then, Plan Intl has also little by little wound down their activities which has contributed to the generation of negative sentiments as well.

Ilala Municipality fulfilled its role as a representative of the public sector, but all the time, remained relatively distant from the partnership. The ward level was not much involved but the collaboration with mtaa office was good. Still, residents’ discourses reflected a strong distrust towards local political leaders.

7.3.4 Legitimacy and accountability
The partnership in Buguruni Kisiwani was formed directly with the residents in Buguruni Kisiwani without any intermediary CBO. In the neighbouring Buguruni Mnyamani, a local CBO called Chama cha Maendeleo Buguruni Mnyamani (CHAMABUMA) was established in

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98 The community here refers to the residents in Buguruni Kisiwani as in the project plans. Though it had been geographically defined, no sub-communities could be detected through the narratives.
99 Interview Ms Juliana John, Plan Intl Community Development Facilitator on 18.5.2006
100 The CBO Amani worked with women. During the school construction, the CBO Amani members ran catering services and some other site related services for the contractor’s staff.
1996 with the assistance of Plan Intl, but it was not active in Kisiwani\textsuperscript{101}. The residents living in Buguruni Kisiwani were defined as the community for Plan Intl project. This research follows the same definition.

Though trust governed the partnership during the planning phase, there was a lack of accountability which culminated in the implementation phase. The community was informed about the project and its contents but not about funding. Therefore, they considered that Plan Intl was working partially covertly. Both the local field office of Plan Intl and the community were sidelined from information during construction, as many decisions were made by Plan Intl country/procurement office. Lack of transparency raised suspicions. Some community members interpreted the exclusion from decision-making with the need to keep ordinary residents at bay due to corruption\textsuperscript{102}, as allegedly some ‘leaders’ were misusing funds. They claimed everybody ‘wanted to eat’ from the project\textsuperscript{103} or they were suspicious about leaders’ integrity in general.

The design standards were another contentious issue. The design that had been demonstrated and discussed earlier had not been followed. Despite the impressive school building, some interviewees remarked that the school constructed was not the same as the one in the design\textsuperscript{104}. For example interviewees pointed out the lack of ceiling boards or a proper play ground. Somehow they felt that the construction phase had been carried out in secrecy for a reason.

\subsection*{7.3.5 Participation and agency}

During the planning phase, this partnership project was a good attempt at a genuine partnership. Plan had decided to use TCLs as the vehicles for community participation, for the convocation of meetings and for the dissemination of other information. TCLs being political figures, some interviewees mentioned this might have influenced participation in general, since the project was considered "CCM project"\textsuperscript{105}.

The majority of the sample population argued they could participate in the initial decision-making. There was an open and transparent planning process. Their views were then formulated into a needs assessment document, the location and general design of the school were discussed

\textsuperscript{101} A focus group interview with Chama Buma proved to be fruitful and gave a lot of insights into community participation, community contribution and the ways they themselves analysed community members’ experiences in participation. Their analysis confirmed the field findings. They had worked with Plan Intl first as volunteers, and then they formed a CBO. Then later they were ‘employed’ by CIUP to ensure the community contribution in Buguruni Mnyamani.

\textsuperscript{102} Kwa hiyo sielewi kwa kweli kwa sababu nawaona Plan na baadhi ya viongozi wa CCM na kamati ya shule wanafuatana. Interview man1 in Buguruni-Kisiwani on 22.11.2006

\textsuperscript{103} Kwenye huu mradi kila mtu alitaka ale ndio hawa viongozi hawakutaka kutushirikisha. Interview man3 in Buguruni Kisiwani on 22.11.2006

\textsuperscript{104} Interview man2 in Buguruni-Kisiwani on 20.11.2006

\textsuperscript{105} Interview man2 in Buguruni-Kisiwani on 22.11.2006
with the community. Nonetheless, many still described how some community members would have preferred local leaders to represent them, which was considered as a customary way of decision-making. Some people referred to the real decisions being made by smaller groups of the local elite who with Plan Intl had dominated meetings. For example, one interviewee initially claimed he had a say in the meetings, as he is very vocal and speaks for other people as well\textsuperscript{106}. Later, when this was checked through triangulation, he was more precise saying that though he himself was vocal, he was not able to influence anything, as matters were decided by a small group of people and most of the matters during the latter phase were not at all discussed in the meetings.

In retrospect, Plan Intl officers themselves had carried out self-assessment and had already acknowledged that despite partnership rhetoric they had not managed to enable the community to participate fully as they had wished. In their own view, Plan Intl’s approach had been slightly patronizing and they wanted to refine their approach to enable more genuine power-sharing with community by learning from this experience\textsuperscript{107}.

During construction, Plan Headquarters started acting surreptitiously, they excluded others from the construction process, and even Plan Intl Malapa field office was kept out of core decision-making. Many interviewees sounded disappointed when they explained that when the construction started, there were no more meetings. Only few meetings were held and with selected representatives, information was supposed to reach community members through snowballing. TCLs who did not belong to this group did not receive any information. Therefore, when they received less information, and the information flow was one-way, they felt their opportunities to exercise their agency were restrained. One community member interpreted this practice, as Plan Intl first (during planning) worked with community, then (during construction) they decided to work with CCM\textsuperscript{108}. Though construction of a new primary school building had responded to community’s needs and they acknowledged the practical benefits (a better school building) they gained through the project; they now resorted to opposition by ignoring the school and thus turning against the project.

In addition to these passively opposing community agents there were those who, when the construction started, began opposing it completely. After the planning phase they were not able to participate, and their views and claims were not listened to or respected. Therefore, they felt marginalized, or disenfranchised, employed negative discourse to express their disappointment.

\textsuperscript{106} Interview on 20.11.2006, man2 in Buguruni-Kisiwani
\textsuperscript{107} They had already discussed the issue before this research.
\textsuperscript{108} Interview man1 in Buguruni-Kisiwani on 23.11.2006
and defamed the project by revealing its deviations. Different factors constrained their agency. Either their personal claims had not been met such as small contractors who had had business expectations, or they suffered concrete prejudice like the immediate neighbours whose privacy was disturbed. They thus turned against the project, in their discourses raising suspicions about the lack of integrity of the responsible people. For example one neighbour, who suffers a lot of discomfort for being close to the school, claimed having witnessed a major diversion of construction material. He just boasted at having valuable information but not having divulged it since his views had been ignored\textsuperscript{109}. Thus, he set himself above the project. Some people expressed their disgruntlement through general accusations about Plan Intl’s betrayal. They were not satisfied even though they benefited from the school.

There were also directly, completely positive experiences of agency. Some felt they could exercise their agency throughout the intervention, they were positive both about the intervention process and the outcome. Most of them had received personal benefit, either through business opportunities or had been employed by the project.

7.3.6 Sense of ownership

After the building was finished, Ilala Municipality’s Education Department appointed a new headmaster to the school, and when a new school committee was selected, they made little contact with community members. Thus, the school as an institution remained distant: “the school belongs to a group of people”\textsuperscript{110}. Though a majority of interviewees claimed that they had indeed needed a proper primary school building, their expressions alluded to a distance between them and the school. Even related to the size of the school\textsuperscript{111} many people complained that the school was now accommodating more pupils from outside the neighbourhood but the Headteacher of Moto Mpya denied this claim\textsuperscript{112}. Among the Kisiwani residents, there was a feeling that secondary school would have benefited the area more.

Mostly the school was seen as a government school or as a Plan Intl school. One person mentioned “the original [makeshift] school was constructed by the community; this one is now a government school”\textsuperscript{113}. A local leader explained that there had been certain issues that they had wanted to discuss before the handing over, but since these issues had not been discussed he deduced it was not their school\textsuperscript{114}. When asked about the maintenance, people said “if there are

\textsuperscript{109} Interview man1 in Buguruni-Kisiwani on 9.11.2006
\textsuperscript{110} Interview man2 in Buguruni-Kisiwani on 20.11.2006
\textsuperscript{111} There were 863 pupils in the school in May 2006
\textsuperscript{112} Interview Headteacher Dafrosa Assenga at Moto Mpya in Buguruni. on 20.11.2006
\textsuperscript{113} Interview man3 in Buguruni-Kisiwani on 8.11.2006
\textsuperscript{114} Interview man2 in Buguruni-Kisiwani on 20.11.2006
any problems in the building, I do not know to whom the building belongs”\textsuperscript{115} or “the school is owned by Plan”\textsuperscript{116}. Actually, the community had decided to name the school as Plan, but on Plan Intl’s own request the name was changed to Moto Mpya. They had received an impressive, fully equipped school with furniture and electricity, but they were disappointed and disillusioned.

7.3.7 Partnership assessment

The initial approach had elements of a genuine partnership, though it was slightly insensitive to social and political constraints. There was limited reciprocity in the relationship later on similarly mistrust increased, when the community was sidelined from information and decision-making. This caused transformation in community members’ perceptions of their agency, and alienated them from the outcome. Their sense of ownership was reduced drastically.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{assessment_table.png}
\caption{Assessment of Moto Mpya partnership}
\end{figure}

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
Partnership factors & During the planning phase & During the production phase \\
\hline
Synergy & policy synergy & 0 \\
\hline
Legitimacy and accountability & 1 & 0 \\
\hline
Trust and reciprocity & 1 & -1 \\
\hline
Participation and agency & 0 & -1 \\
\hline
Degree of partnership & 2 & -2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{115} Interview mzee in Buguruni-Kisiwani on 8.11.2006
\textsuperscript{116} Interview man1 in Buguruni-Kisiwani on 20.11.2006
7.4 CONCERN WITH KINONDONI MUNICIPALITY, MBADECO AND MBURAHATI-BARAFU COMMUNITY

7.4.1 The area and the slum upgrading project

Barafu mtaa in Mburahati is partially planned but mostly a low-lying unplanned area between Morogoro and Nyerere roads in the north and south and Kawawa and Nelson Mandela highways in the east and west, see the map in Figure 11. In the 1960s, Barafu mtaa used to be a plantation\(^\text{117}\). It is reputed to have been a wild, unsafe area, more like a jungle offering a hideout for criminals. There was no infrastructure and no roads, but still some residents moved in and settled down there. Then the central higher lying area (‘Santos’) was planned and an access road was constructed. Currently, at the centre, there is the mtaa office, some shops and bars as well as a sports field, which seems to be in very active use. Its existence as a sports facility is threatened as there are plans to construct a secondary school on the site.

Over the last decades, vigorous unplanned habitation has spread down to the slopes surrounding the elevated central area and the low-lying area in the valley. The slopes and low areas suffer from flooding due to seasonal storms and consequent erosion. In the valley environmental conditions are alarming: due to the high water table, latrines need to be elevated, drainage and trash from the higher areas are dumped there and both the standing and running waters are seriously polluted.

\[^{117}\text{Interview, Old CCM secretary Katibu wa Tawi la Mburahati, Mzee Kassim on 6.12.2006}\]

Figure 11 Mburahati Barafu project area
Barafu is considered to offer poor living conditions and have high congestion of population (Kaare 2002: 15). Unemployment is high in Barafu\textsuperscript{118}; otherwise the population consists of employees, office workers, business people and sports people. Many original Santos residents have moved away and let their houses. In contrast to other case study areas, where people seemed to be occupied with small business etc, in Barafu there seemed to be many without any occupation at all, many young people just loitering around.

Barafu is predominantly CCM territory, but opposition parties, which are considered rather weak\textsuperscript{119}, do have their representation and support there. The CSOs in Mburahati concentrate on social welfare or HIV/AIDS prevention, mostly instigated by foreign funders: Friends of Tanzania, which is active in childcare, Mother Teresa’s home based care, Mburahati youth groups, Women of Tanzania and local savings groups (SACCOs).

\textit{Partnership project in general}

The beginning of the project is slightly anecdotal. Earlier, there was only a small stream in the valley between Mburahati and Magomeni. Magomeni is very close to the Morogoro road, which is one of the main access roads to the Dar es Salaam city centre. When a major highway (Kawawa road) was constructed, it partially blocked and slowed down the flow of the seasonal rain water. The stream started flooding and widening upstream turning into a seasonal river. A coconut tree trunk, which had served as a bridge connecting between Mburahati and Magomeni and further on to Morogoro road, was not sufficient anymore.

A long time before the actual project, the need of the bridge was recognized and its construction was planned by local government (\textit{Mtaa}). The \textit{Mtaa} office collected funds and materials for the construction of the bridge, many interviewees mentioned how they had contributed to it. However, local funding, organisation and efforts were not sufficient, and the \textit{Mtaa} did not manage to get it initiated, also allegedly due to the abuse of funds. Then some expatriate staff members of the Irish NGO Concern visited the site, and one of them saw how a woman carrying a baby nearly fell off the tree trunk into river. As a result, Concern and Barafu \textit{Mtaa} entered into partnership to construct the bridge. The \textit{Mtaa} office was very active in project implementation; the municipality gave technical assistance and monitored the project. Concern asked Barafu residents to get together and organize themselves to create an organisation to represent them in

\textsuperscript{118} Perhaps related to the poverty and high youth unemployment, there was an attempt to assault me and my research assistant but we managed to escape without any injuries or loss.

\textsuperscript{119} Interview Old CCM secretary Katibu wa Tawi la Mburahati, Mzee Kassim on 6.12.2006
partnership. So, CBO Mbadeco was established through a participatory process and democratic voting.

The bridge is very solid, practically maintenance-free, see Figure 12. Interviewees widely and unanimously considered it a good and responsive project. The partnership project started with the bridge, but later several other activities were added for the development of the area: assistance to Mbadeco, construction of drainage and school buildings and a borehole, as well as support for income generation activities, etc.

![The footbridge between Magomeni and Mburahati](image)

Figure 12 The footbridge between Magomeni and Mburahati

After the bridge, a storm water drainage system was constructed channelling torrential waters down to the valley area. One branch starts from the school in Santos area, other branches from the edge of Santos down to the same main drain. One branch is not completed but finishes before connecting to the main drain spilling all the running water towards one unfortunate house. The drains are open and require constant cleaning and some repair. The drainage system has benefited many residents, it has reduced flooding and erosion in some yards, but it has also seriously harmed the residents near the outlet, where the water flows slowly so liquids mainly remain standing. Furthermore, some people are illegally discharging sewage water to the rain water drainage which aggravates the discomfort and health hazards to the people living downstream.
The neighbouring *mtaa*, MHC Mburahati was not involved in the project, and some residents from there have connected their pipes to the open drainage.

People had been positive about the initiative to construct the bridge, as related above; they had contributed money even before Concern entered the partnership. The partnership with Concern spawned a solid implementation organisation and helped to realise and finalize the initiative. Concern introduced meetings for community members to participate instead of the more authoritarian way local government had applied earlier. Thus, partnership helped to realise an important infrastructure project, which again would not have been possible without joint efforts.

7.4.2 Synergy

In this partnership, policy synergy was a strong factor. The community participated in the partnership to identify their needs, give their views and local knowledge. Their role was crucial for the responsiveness of the partnership; it also ensured their closeness to the outcome. Some community members also participated voluntarily in the construction work as unskilled labourers, carrying material, and guarding the construction site. It was not an obligatory contribution, as happened with the initial bridge construction tentative.

Resource synergy was not an imperative for the realization of the project, but it emerged in residents’ narratives. Essentially, for many participation was synonymous with contribution (*kuchangia*). An inherent spirit to contribute is conceivably a product of Tanzania’s self-help traditions and Ujamaa induced activities but there were different reactions to it. Some thought demands for community contributions were completely natural and legitimized if they got some improvements in their community, some were more reluctant and had actually been pressurized to contribute.

7.4.3 CBO legitimacy and accountability

In this project, as in other studied projects, the community in the partnership project had originally been defined geographically, in other words the residents in Mburahati-Barafu *mtaa* formed the community. This research follows the same definition, though acknowledging that actually it could be a meta-community. The interviews revealed some social schisms and divisions between the old, original residents from the high ‘Santos’ area[120] and new comers, who live in shacks in the low-lying unplanned area.

[120] In Santos, the oldest area the residents seem to be wealthier, some also had moved to other towns and let out their houses in Santos.
The CBO Mbadeco’s role was seen as linking the Mtaa and the community. They both also collaborated in mobilization and the identification of people’s needs. In reality, there was an apparent blurring between the Mtaa and Mbadeco: the same people worked both with Mbadeco and the Mtaa office.

During the initial phase, Mbadeco was considered to be legitimately elected as a representative of the community, to have been formed in an equal manner by all the residents. It was also considered, though not uniformly, to represent the community’s interest in the partnership. But in 2001, when they had new elections to select a new board, the association purportedly was ‘hijacked’ by a family linked to the ruling party. Mbadeco continued to work in the community for some years, but it gradually lost its legitimacy. Currently, Mbadeco still exists, but it is practically dormant. Mbadeco has its office, but no activities. They claimed they cannot get any funding since they have not been able to present any financial reports from earlier years. At the moment, nobody considers them a legitimate representative of the community; on the contrary, Mbadeco seemed to suffer from a lot of mistrust. Some were too disgruntled with the ‘new’ Mbadeco, and used the term NGO for Mbadeco, stressing Mbadeco was not community based. Mbadeco was referred as a company, or an organisation more attached to white people than to actual community members (“Mbadeco are mzungu people” or “a group from Santos”).

Even Mbadeco’s legacy was in question; the former chairman of Mbadeco claimed that in reality Mbadeco had created rivalry inside the community. Two ex-Mbadeco board members formed another CBO, working through social projects but focusing their activities according to available funding. Their CBO also tried to carry out solid waste removal but residents were not willing to pay for their services. Another mzee, whose wife had been one of Mbadeco’s original board members, was also considering establishing his own NGO.

7.4.4 Trust and reciprocity
Towards the end of the partnership intervention, Mbadeco became an object of wide mistrust. A trustee of Mbadeco, a close friend of the chairman falsified the chairman’s signature and withdrew money from their bank account. The money was returned but the chairman had to step down. This seemed to be the beginning of the downhill for Mbadeco, as the new board did not manage gain trust and legitimacy in front of the residents.

121 Focus group interview in Santos on 22.11.2006
122 Focus group interview in Santos on 22.11.2006
123 For example interview woman2 in Mburahati-Barafu on 29.11.2006
124 Interview woman2 in Mburahati-Barafu on 1.12.2006
125 Interview woman1 in Mburahati-Barafu on 1.12.2006
126 Interview Mzee Mbukuzi on 4.12.2006
DCC appeared to be remote, mostly providing technical support; their involvement was unknown to most people. Concern’s role seemed to be appreciated, though not as close as Plan Intl was in Buguruni. Concern staff was mostly referred to as wazungu from Concern. Concern supported Mbadeco’s formation and its activities but still left Mbadeco to work rather undisturbed without patronizing them, which indicates respect and reciprocity in their relationship.

7.4.5 Participation and agency

In general, people’s presence in planning meetings was considered to have been relatively wide-ranging: Mbadeco and Mtaa members claimed all residents had been convened at planning meetings using megaphones, still some residents denied they had known anything about the meetings, potentially to avoid any contribution obligations.

Some people simply chose not to attend the meetings. Many, in particular women, were often represented by others. If they went, they did not even assume to have a direct opportunity to speak or to participate in public decision-making. Former Mbadeco leaders attested that women can participate in small meetings, but even if they come to big meetings, they do not say anything. As they “do not appreciate themselves”, others ignore them. Therefore, for women it was customary that a man from the family went to the meetings and conveyed their views. They considered this as participation. Similarly, also many men suggested TCLs can represent respective residents’ views. A former Mbadeco leader, an educated person himself, said that in his opinion ordinary people should not be involved directly, as they would not understand issues. In his opinion they can be represented by more educated people.

Not all who went to meetings felt that they could exercise their power. The meetings were big, with a lot of participants, leaders dominating the podium. Several mentioned that not everybody could speak there. The project was seen to be linked to the ruling party at that time, due to the CCM originated birth of the construction activities. People who did not support CCM did not attend (“I do not like CCM”), though these expressions were not very strong in Mburahati Barafu. Some people said that they found local government leaders intimidating. Others claimed some people were simply not interested in community matters or development, though

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128 Often, the educated people “waliosoma” would rather that the non-educated, “wasiosoma” have less say, reflecting a common dichotomy in Tanzania between those who have not gone to school and those who are educated (Field Notes 2006)
129 “kuogopa viongozi wa serikali”. Interview on 27.11.2996, woman1 in Mburahati-Barafu
nobody personally admitted to lacking community interest. They were not interested in the intervention (“did not have any feelings for it”\textsuperscript{130} or “do not have faith in themselves”\textsuperscript{131}).

But the looming idea of payment for contribution had negative repercussions, even when obligatory community contribution was not part of the actual partnership project concept. It surfaced in people’s reactions to convocations to meetings. People wanted to avoid situations where community contributions were discussed, as one lady analysed it: "if we know that we should participate in the meetings, that our TCL is not enough, then we know it is about contribution\textsuperscript{132} [and we don’t go there as we do not want to contribute]. The same example was given regarding church meetings, if the church announces that in the next meeting community contributions would be discussed; many people would choose not to go to that following meeting\textsuperscript{133}. Also the poor (or people living with “great difficulties”\textsuperscript{134}) were afraid of coming to meetings, in case community contribution was insisted on. One lady reported about peer pressure to participate in labour in the initial attempt, she had to take a risk and pretend to be sick to be absent from her salaried work and participate in carrying bridge construction materials, which her employer would not otherwise have allowed\textsuperscript{135}. Thus for some community agents, the demands for community contributions formed a clear constraint, causing people to exclude themselves from potential occasions to participate.

During the construction of the drainage, meetings were smaller and organized locally, thus residents felt less intimidated about participating in decision-making. Community members felt that they were more informed, and they could influence the outcome. They felt they had improved opportunities to exercise their agency, either personally or through their respective TCLs.

7.4.6 Sense of ownership

Interviewees’ accounts revealed that there was a strong sense of ownership of the bridge and drainage projects. When some dubious “elements” of the community broke the handrail of the bridge, a big meeting was convened and the matter was discussed seriously, community members showing their concern about the bridge and disapproval of the action. Even during the field

\textsuperscript{130} “hawaijiihi”, interview 27.11.2006 Woman1 in Mburahati-Barafu
\textsuperscript{131} “hawaijiamini”, interview 27.11.2006 Man2 in Mburahati-Barafu
\textsuperscript{132} Interview on 29.11.2006, woman1 in Mburahati-Barafu. TCLs can express residents’ opinions, but for contributions residents have to be present.
\textsuperscript{133} Interview on 29.11.2006, man4 in Mburahati-Barafu
\textsuperscript{134} “Mashaka”
\textsuperscript{135} Interview on 1.12.2006, woman1 in Mburahati-Barafu
research, when visiting the bridge residents came to the Mtaa members to explain how they were taking care of the bridge.

In the interviews community residents used expressions to describe closeness and care about the bridge and drainage: “the bridge is our property”\textsuperscript{136}, “it helps us”\textsuperscript{137} or “we can feel it”\textsuperscript{138}. In a focus group interview (around 12-15 individuals) the spontaneous reaction was that the bridge and drainage as a rule belonged to the community, not to Mbadeco, and the maintenance and care is the community’s responsibility, though a few thought that they belong to the government. When one mzee was asked what would guarantee people feeling responsible and having a sense of ownership, he noted that it does not concern only contributions, but the people have to make their thoughts known to the leaders\textsuperscript{139}. With this he referred to community participation; that ordinary residents should express their opinions to their leaders who then will take the ideas further.

Mtaa and CBO representatives insisted that community members were cleaning the drainage, and the Mtaa furnishes tools for it (see Figure 13). Yet, community members claimed they were cleaning and maintaining it because of the authoritarian orders of the Mtaa. They might have done the cleaning spontaneously without any orders, but at that moment it was lead by the officers from the Mtaa office. Therefore, the existence of maintenance activities cannot be interpreted as an indication of community’s sense of ownership.

\textsuperscript{136} “Mali yetu daraja”, interview on 2.12.2006, mzee in Mburahati-Barafu
\textsuperscript{137} “Inatusaidia”, interview on 27.11.2006, woman2 in Mburahati-Barafu
\textsuperscript{138} “Tunajishikishi”, interview on 27.11.2006, man2 in Mburahati-Barafu
\textsuperscript{139} Interview on 22.11.2006, Mzee in Mburahati-Barafu
Figure 13 Well-maintained drainage in Mburahati Barafu

7.4.7 Partnership assessment
The partnership in Barafu did not transform and lose partnership values drastically when moving into implementation phase (see Figure 14). Participation actually increased and community members’ agency was reinforced when the construction started. Transparency and trust governed the relationship between partners. They disappeared only during the last years when Mbadeco got a new board which lost its legitimacy in front of the community.

Table 14 Assessment of Concern Mbadeco Mburahati partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership factors</th>
<th>During the planning phase</th>
<th>During the production phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Synergy</td>
<td>policy synergy</td>
<td>Policy synergy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legitimacy and accountability</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust and reciprocity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation and agency</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of partnership</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.5 **HANA NASIF PARTNERSHIP UNDER SDP**

7.5.1 **The area and the slum upgrading project**

Hana Nasif is located 4km from the city centre, on the eastern side of Kawawa road, between a planned settlement and Mzimbazi Valley (ILO 1998; Mulengeki 2002), see Figure 15. The area was a coconut plantation until 1965, when former workers of the plantation divided the land into plots linearly along the coconut tree rows. Later, they sub-divided the plots into smaller and smaller ones (Kombe 2000). Thirty years later, Hana Nasif had become a crowded area. In 1994, there were 19,000 inhabitants (ILO 1998). A baseline study carried out in 1998 revealed that on average there were over 11 people per house, 60% of which did not have access to a road (Mulengeki 2002; Nguluma 2003: 32-40). Despite being an unplanned area, a majority (60%) of the housing stock is permanent (Lupala 1995 in ILO 1998) and 90% have secure tenure (The World Bank 2002). The area is considered a CCM stronghold, but through interviews it became apparent that there is also a vocal political opposition and some political tension. Religious views do not divide the people; the mixed population of half Christian, half Muslim live peacefully together.\(^{140}\)

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\(^{140}\) Interview Mzee in Hana Nasif on 15.12.2006; Field Notes 2006
Before 1994, Hana Nasif lacked basic infrastructure completely. The major problem in the area was severe flooding due to torrential rains, as the central areas were low-lying (Nguluma 2003) and there were no drains or roads (ILO 1998), see Figure 16. To tackle this hazard, a two-phased partnership programme to upgrade the area was started: the first phase from 1994 to 1997, and the second one from 1997 to 2000. A CBO was established to pull people together: first, it was called Hana Nasif Development Committee (CDC), then later it was changed to Hana Nasif Development Association (CDA). The main focus was on the construction of main and lateral drainage, as well as on the upgrading of the main roads and improving of the water supply by providing standpipes as well as training for micro-enterprises. The intervention drew together the community in Hana Nasif, Kinondoni Municipality and UCLAS as well as a wide array of international partners such as ILO, UNDP, Ford Foundation among others (Nguluma 2003: 37) and national partners such as the Presidential Trust and National Income Generation Programme NIGP (Meshack 2004).
The highest organ in the project management was a steering committee, which was widely representative from the Mitaa to the donors. Then there was the technical support team which consisted of project manager, consultants, engineers and the representatives of local government (Mulengeki 2002). The project area was divided into 12 different zones, each with a CBO representative. Zonal meetings were the vehicle for participation, to where people were widely and publicly convened.

Both community based contracting and management were applied (MLHSD 2001: 5), giving an incentive and training for the establishment of small enterprises in the area\textsuperscript{41}. Community based contracting was implemented using labour intensive methods, which offered valuable cash incomes to many poor residents.

The project constructed 750m of main and 6 km of secondary drains; 1.5 km of road 2.5 km of water pipes and 8 water kiosks were also constructed (ILO 2009). With these achievements, the project managed to stop the storm water flooding in the area, to improve the general accessibility and to enhance the water supply (MLHSD 2001: 5), see Figure 17. Improved water supply and water kiosks became very important for the area, and it has been a good business for CDA. The partnership project also had an extensive training component in different areas for example in project management and vocational skills, which gave a positive enhancement to community

\textsuperscript{41} Interview in UCLAS, former Project Leader, Professor Kombe on 30.11.2006
members’ livelihoods\textsuperscript{142}. Nonetheless, some technical problems were discovered. Evaluation of the first phase (Lupala 1997: 22) revealed that the project had high unit costs; technical quality had suffered due to unclear definitions and a lack of technical expertise and experience. During the second phase, technical standards were improved, though some problems eg the reduced width of the roads were not yet tackled. Still, even the fiercest critics of the project acknowledged it had been a good project: it achieved tangible results in improving living conditions in the area\textsuperscript{143}. The drawback was that the housing prices rose due to improved infrastructure and forced the poorer strata of population out of the area (Mulengeki 2002; Nguluma 2003).

![Figure 17 The impact of Hana Nasif project: photos of Hana Nasif in 1994 and 1995](Photo\_s by Dr Huba Nguluma in Mulengeki 2002:41, permission for reprinting sought)

7.5.2 Synergy

Project rhetoric emphasised both policy and resource synergies. Policy synergy was to be achieved with communities expressing their needs through community participation in meetings, but community participation also referred to labour contributions (Mulengeki 2002). Actually, partnership was more a euphemism to disguise the necessary cost-sharing, for community members to provide funds and labour for implementation.

Donors demanded a community contribution of 5% of the budget (The World Bank 2002). However, only about USD 800, equivalent to 6% of the required contribution level (corresponding to 0.3% of the total expenses) was paid during phase 1 (Lupala 1997). The Mt\_aa office\textsuperscript{144} asserted that community members could not pay the demanded cash mostly because of

\textsuperscript{142} Interview Ms Lucy Kimoi, CIUP Coordinator on 28.4.2006; Professor Kombe on 30.11.2006
\textsuperscript{143} Field notes 2006
\textsuperscript{144} Interview in Hana Nasif with Christine Luambano and Juma Millao on 7.12.2006
poverty, but also due to a lack of trust and sensitization. Furthermore, the World Bank claims that even the idea of community contribution was not at all known and understood by the residents (The World Bank 2002).

As the community failed to pay the required amount of community contribution, it was concurred that community members would work for the project as unskilled labour against reduced cash payment. The deduction would then serve as the community contribution. Though the cash pay was reduced to meagre levels, the arrangement was acceptable to most people, as in any case they would have been without a cash income. According to the CDA\textsuperscript{145}, about 30\% of community members mainly women and the youth as well as local skilled labour\textsuperscript{146} worked for the project. Community residents mentioned that also lowly-esteemed unskilled labour, ‘wamakonde’ were hired for the project\textsuperscript{147}.

Some people argued that most of the people participating in the work were CCM and CDA members and supporters, referring implicitly that it was actually a privilege to work and earn cash. This infers that many people were cash strapped and even a little cash for them was important. Therefore it also implies that demands for cash contributions did not seem to take into account the prevailing poverty within some segments of the population.

7.5.3 \textit{CBO legitimacy and accountability}

Residents living in Hana Nasif project area formed the community of the partnership project. Within interviewed residents there were some minor socio-economic differences and a major political division between the followers of the ruling party and opposition supporters; otherwise it was not possible to detect any clear sub-communities.

The Community Development Committee, CDC, later CDA, was established to collect community contribution, organise participation for planning and ensure maintenance (Meshack 2004; Mulengeki 2002; Van Esch 2001). The CDC/A was mainly expected to improve both community sensitization and their sense of ownership. Similarly, it was created to represent the residents in the area: “… community participation through the democratically elected Community Development Association…” (MLHSD 2001: 5). Though the impulse for the creation of one entity to represent a heterogeneous community like Hana Nasif came from outside, the CDC/A was automatically supposed to represent the whole community: “It was

\textsuperscript{145} Interview in Hana Nasif CDA Mwenyekiti Nestory on 8.12.2006
\textsuperscript{146} Wafundi
\textsuperscript{147} People who work for low payment, mostly from the makonde tribe
assumed that the CDA would work on behalf of all the residents of Hanna Nassif in a consultative way.” (Meshack 2004: 72).

Nonetheless, several issues contest the idea of CDA’s representativeness. First, its history was marred by several conflicts inside the community, which were still conspicuous. Some leaders of the CDA had left it and formed a competing CBO Hana Nasif Development Trust. Mhamba and Titus (2001) even report the establishment of a third one. Second, membership of CDA is based on payment of the annual fee. It has 840 members at the moment, out of which 480 have paid their membership and are eligible to vote148. In an area of 2000 houses (Mulengeki 2002: 92), 480 members can barely be considered representative. Third, the leadership of the CDA was alleged to have many active CCM members, which tarnished the CDA with a political connotation, and it became rejected by opposition supporters. Fourth, interviewed people were equally ignorant about its status as a CBO and its supposed representativeness, let alone willing to accept its mandate149. Not a single person said that the CDA actually represents the community. Some knew that the CDA was supposed to represent the community, but in their opinion it had turned to serve selected people, it had become an “elite group”150, as discovered also by Kyessi (Kyessi 2002). Even CDA members themselves, did not exactly know what it was. A lady who had worked with the CDA for several years was not sure, like many others, whether the CDA was linked to the main party (CCM) or if it was “a government company”151. Another person said: “CDA on behalf of the government constructed the drainage”152. Some respondents remarked that the CDA was created for maintenance, as they saw it maintaining the drainage occasionally. Some noted that the CDA was externally instigated: “one NGO from Europe made a local community based organisation CDA”153. In addition, there were accusations of the CDA being led by less educated people (The World Bank 2002)154. Thus, in short for outsiders the CDA represented the community, for community members it represented the government, the party or the elite155.

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148 Interview in Hana Nasif CDA Mwenyekiti Nestory on 8.12.2006
150 Interview woman1 in Hana Nasif on 7.12.2006,
151 Interview on 8.12.2006, woman1 in Hana Nasif
152 Interview on 13.12.2006, man1 in Hana Nasif
153 Interview on 14.12.2006, man2 in Hana Nasif
154 Wasiosoma, thus referring to their supposed inferior competence for CBO management and leadership position
155 Elite does not necessarily mean educated people, but here it refers to the decision-making elite, aka mostly the political leaders.
7.5.4 Trust and reciprocity
By and large, there was very little trust or reciprocity in the partnership. First, the partnership project started very hastily, so the community had an impression right from the beginning that the project had already been contemplated and concurred (see also Mulengeki 2002: 70). One informant claimed they “discussed a lot the projects but the main project was drainage as it was already funded". They felt that decisions had been made and were being made behind the curtains by other partners. Subsequently, suspicions and anger arose when requirements for contributions were not discussed in the first meeting but they were presented only later on by a local organisation (CDC at that time). One elderly person explained how people were glad when they heard about the funding, but when they were asked for community contributions by the CDC, they thought that this contribution was money to the CBO “I think that funds from wazungu was enough but you know CCM people, how they are” (see also Mulengeki 2002:55). A man, who refused to be interviewed, exclaimed straight away how CCM people “founded their small company to cheat wazungu”.

Lack of knowledge about the partnership arrangement and the partners reflects a lack of reciprocity between the community and other partners, and it further reflected in the lack of accountability they felt. There were over ten partners, including international donors, national institutions and government entities. Expatriate experts were referred only as ‘wazungu’, none was mentioned by the name of the organisation, though a few times the title ‘engineers’ were mentioned. UCLAS was the only organisation well known and frequently mentioned, seen neutrally or positively. Their work was considered as some kind of voluntary work (“they were paid some amount”). Other Tanzanian entities were not even mentioned once. The City Council was relatively distant, only the lower levels of the local government (the Mtaa and TCLs) were active in the project implementation.

7.5.5 Participation and agency
Though Hana Nasif was part of the same SDP/CIP approach as Kijico, community residents experienced their agency and access to participation in a different way. In the beginning, they never felt as a partner, but their participation was largely conceptualized first as a labour contribution, then as working for reduced cash payments (Mulengeki 2002:55-70). On the one hand, a strong element in Hana Nasif discourses was the marginalization of some community

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156 Interview, man2 in Hana Nasif on 14.12.2006
157 Interview on 14.12.2006, woman3 in Hana Nasif
158 (Light-skinned) foreigners, ‘white people’
159 Interview man1 in Hana Nasif on 9.12.2006
members due to structural constraints. Though community members were widely invited to the meetings, ordinary and vulnerable community members felt that the meetings were spurious, not an arena for real decision-making. Many discourses described how the meetings were big and ordinary citizens felt intimidated to talk there or they felt they were not listened to. On the other hand, mostly elite and active CDA members said they indeed could influence decisions.

Equally, demands for community contributions also exposed how poverty constrained people’s participation. Financially constrained, poor people turned away from the project, and from opportunities to influence it. Another group who similarly did not want to pay or even attend the meetings were free-riders; those with means but unwilling to contribute for a public good. One informant told that indeed many people came to the meetings initially but immediately after the topic of community contributions was raised they dropped out. One person confessed “I myself did not contribute any money because I did not have any to contribute that is why I did not go the second meeting”. Even the perception of the possibility of contribution requests was a sufficient motive to ordinary, cash strapped citizens not to attend public meetings.

Particularly political structures constrained participation, since they circumscribed social power space and engendered counterpower right from the beginning (see also Meshack 2004). Invitations to the zonal meetings were made by the TCLs and the CDC/A, who were both perceived to represent the ruling party. Politically marginalized residents mentioned how they had been deterred, since they had disliked those persons convening to the meetings or they had disliked the fact that people from CCM were leading the CBO. They conveyed very strongly their disappointment and frustration due to their limited access to power by refusing any kind of collaboration. In the end, they also vilified the project by emphasizing the technical mistakes (e.g. the drainage cuts off the access to some houses) or reviled the CDA by suggesting their having embezzled funds.

Since in the partnership rhetoric participation in work was interpreted as community participation, women were considered as having had a good opportunity to participate, as most of the people working were women (see also IBRD 2005). But ordinary non-influential women did not have much access to real decision-making structures. They felt big meetings to be intimidating. Some opted for channelling their participation through a representative for instance

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160 The number residents with positive attitudes is proportionately more notable in the interviews as many ostensibly negative residents refused interviews.
161 None of the interviewed confessed to belong to this group.
162 Interview on 14.12.2006, man2 in Hana Nasif
164 Interview on 8.12.2006 Hana Nasif CDA Mwenyekiti Nestory; Interview on 30.11.2006 Professor Kombe (UCLAS)
a male family member or the respective TCL\textsuperscript{165}. A women’s ‘spokesperson’ explained how women like discussing, but their opinions are discarded in public meetings. She herself represented other female residents, so in the meetings she was not speaking as an individual, but for many other women\textsuperscript{166}. Representativeness was extended to religious groups as well. A 	extit{mzee} from a mosque claimed that in meetings he represented all the Muslims in his area\textsuperscript{167}.

Another group who self-excluded themselves were those who usually never participate in any community activity. Others view them ignorant, or “witches”\textsuperscript{168}, “people who are bad and do not have interest in development or common good”\textsuperscript{169}.

All these expressions of counterpower, from silence, what Cornwall called “self-exclusion” (Cornwall c.a. 2000), to vocal opposition had an impact on the social space as counterpower. The culture of resistance created fractions inside the community, which led to a partial erosion of social cohesion.

Participation mechanisms changed during the construction phase. There were several smaller meetings, which were inclusive and where the community was consulted about its views regarding the planning of the drainage, such as deciding where the drainage should pass. Once a dispute arose when local leaders wanted to construct the drainage straight and demolish houses and ordinary residents wanted re-aligning to avoid demolition. At the end, ‘\textit{wazungu}’ engineers supported ordinary residents and managed to design the drainage in such a way that no demolition was necessary\textsuperscript{170}.

The narratives revealed how the implementation phase had a positive impact on the perceptions about the project; people felt that they could exercise their agency. They gained a positive experience from working and collaborating together, they referred to it as “it was a nice project”\textsuperscript{171}. There was a strong collective action; they had been a part of something bigger, contributing positively to the development of their own environment. Even many residents, who had initially been negative about the project, begun appreciating it indicating they would be willing to participate in a similar project in the future.

\textsuperscript{165} Even, when ordinary residents were requested to be interviewed, quite a few asked could we not discuss with their respective TCL instead.
\textsuperscript{166} Interview on 7.12.2006 woman1 in Hana Nasif
\textsuperscript{167} Interview man1 in Hana Nasif on 15.12.2006
\textsuperscript{168} “Wachawi”, people who practice witchcraft are considered to be selfish and uninterested in development and society in general; this is also used as a pejorative term for those ones considered backwards and who do not participate in the development of their community.
\textsuperscript{169} “Ni wachawi, wasiokuwa na maendeleo”
\textsuperscript{170} This incident also points out the risks of elite capture, if the ‘participation’ relies only on leaders as representing ordinary residents.
\textsuperscript{171} Interview man2 in Hana Nasif on 15.12.2006
7.5.6 Maintenance and sense of ownership

The contribution of labour was believed to be essential for developing a sense of ownership, as it is claimed if community members pay for something, they also value it\(^\text{172}\) (Sliuzas 2004). But it was not sufficient, as a lack of maintenance in Hana Nasif has been a widely acknowledged problem\(^\text{173}\) (IBRD 2005). It is mainly attributed to the lack of sensitization and inadequate mobilization\(^\text{174}\) which resulted in the supposedly lacking sense of ownership and responsibility over the drainage (MLHSD 2001: 8). Lupala claims this was also because the nature of the settlement was new and ad-hoc and there was insufficient support from the City Council (Lupala 1997). However, field narratives revealed other attitudes and motives for refusal to maintain the drainage.

Actually, few discussions reflected no sense of ownership or interest in the outcome. Mainly, they were those ones who had vehemently opposed the CDA and the intervention from the beginning. Politically active interviewees, who chiefly represented opposition, felt they could not exercise their agency due to political constraints. They accused the CDA of the misuse of funds and not taking care of the maintenance of the drainage though being paid for it. Otherwise, residents in general demonstrated a strong sense of ownership, “we clean the drainage, it is our drainage\(^\text{175}\)”, said even some youngish men. It was mostly formulated in utilitarian terms, like one informant said they should take care of the drainage since they are the ones who are using it, not the wazungu who built it\(^\text{176}\). Many asserted that the drainage belongs to them as it helps them\(^\text{177}\).

As the drainage runs in front of many houses, residents get the immediate benefits and they would also suffer, if cleaning and maintenance is neglected. Even those who had not participated in the project and who had been against it clearly acknowledged the benefit it had brought to the area.

The practical maintenance was undermined by the CDA’s erratic actions. The CDA considers maintenance as their responsibility\(^\text{178}\). Others were not even allowed to clean it; they had to ask for permission from the CDA. It was paid for the maintenance, but as soon as the funds finished, maintenance stopped. Many interviewees sulkily remarked that the CDA carried out maintenance when the big shots came to visit the area\(^\text{179}\). In addition, the CDA was seen to be exaggerating the

\(^{172}\) Interview man 1 in Hana Nasif on 9.12.2006, Interview Professor Kombe on 30.11.2006
\(^{173}\) Interview EMP Coordinator Julius Maira, DCC, on 3.2.2006
\(^{174}\) Interview Town Planner, Coordinator for EMP, Mr Maira in DCC on 3.2.2006
\(^{175}\) Interview three men in Hana Nasif on 13.12.2006
\(^{176}\) Interview man 2 in Hana Nasif on 15.12.2006
\(^{178}\) Interview Mwenyekiti Nestor on 8.12.2006
\(^{179}\) During the field research, the drainage in the central area, it was so clean it was ‘shining’; it came out former US State Secretary Madeleine Albright had paid a visit to the area in the previous week.
environmental problems in order to extract more funds. Many people remarked that the CDA should not take care of the maintenance but in the meantime they felt inhibited by the CDA.

Actually, the CDA’s erratic actions in maintenance had obfuscated residents’ understanding of the maintenance arrangements. One person told they were informed that they should maintain and clean the drainage since the CDA was in a bad situation and could not take care of the cleaning; however they could see the CDA doing other projects. What had surprised many informants was that when the CDA had been paid for doing maintenance but when residents were supposed to carry out maintenance, they would not be paid for it.

There are now serious efforts to transfer the responsibility for maintenance to community residents. The Mtaa is sensitizing residents in the area to change their attitudes and to involve more people in the cleaning of the drainage. Actually, a few are either cleaning themselves or paying money to local boys to clean as they commented that the CDA and local government (Mtaa) were not coming to clean the drainage as they used to.

Thus, a lack of maintenance does not necessarily reflect a lack of a sense of ownership. The field findings revealed that most people in Hana Nasif actually felt a sense of ownership, but whether this can be translated into practical maintenance is another question which depends on the context and the other actors.

7.5.7 Partnership assessment
In conclusion, the interviewees considered the partnership project a positive intervention: the outcome was regarded as responsive and useful, environmental conditions had improved in the area. This partnership project for the construction of drainages indeed bore some partnership characteristics but the partnership was not constructed by the community. There was some policy synergy during the production phase, but mostly the partnership was motivated by resource synergy that is to say community contribution such as labour and money. Residents were not contented with the accountability and transparency of the project, there was not much trust or reciprocity, and they could not exercise their agency during planning. Therefore, one can hardly say there was any power balance between the partners. During construction, smaller meetings were organized, which also accommodated ordinary people. Thus, the partnership transformed from an elite dominating intervention into a joint collective action (see Figure 18).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership factors</th>
<th>During the planning phase</th>
<th>During the production phase</th>
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</thead>
</table>

\[180\] Other components could render different results, this research concentrated only on the concreted infrastructure components of partnerships project.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Synergy</th>
<th>resource synergy</th>
<th>resource synergy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>policy synergy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy and accountability</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust and reciprocity</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation and agency</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of partnership</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.6 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PARTNERSHIPS

As described in chapter 6, decentralization in Tanzania as elsewhere in SSA, is still a rather new process. Decentralisation being mainly about power and resource sharing (Olowu 2001; Wunsch 2001), power struggles at all levels and in all directions are quite common. As the changes affected by decentralisation reforms such as new working methods, participation as a tool for power sharing and partnership approaches are relatively recent introductions, there has been still a lot of rhetoric but less concrete action and working mechanisms. Current plans also include the conceptualization of CSOs as “agents of government”, and channelling funding to CSOs via the government\footnote{Interview Mr Renatus Kihongo, Economic Department, Ilala Municipal Council on 17.3.2006}, which evidently will have an impact on their relationship.

By and large, power tended to remain at higher or even at central levels, considered fairly remote from local level. For example, some partnerships were agreed and signed at the national or City Council (DCC) level, which means that decision making and real power for example in the allocation of funding was located relatively high in local government or even within the donors. Actual cooperation took then place at community level at a distance from the nucleus of power.

Within local government, there is some drive and knowledge but less resources and open attitudes. Its role has changed, but the organisational set-up less so (Adkins et al. 2004: 26).
higher management levels, officers were fully conversant with the ‘ideology’ of partnership whereas at the operational level partnership ethos and concrete mechanisms had not fully entered into work practices. Few technical officers seemed to be ready or adapted to work in partnership. In practice, authoritarian, top-down approaches still prevailed in many sections, which as a result had an impact on the way partnerships functioned: some officers took either a passive role or excessive control in management or coordination. Occasionally, hostility and suspicion towards CSOs reign among municipal officers; they also find the amount of documentation required by NGOs quite daunting (Adkins et al. 2004: 191). A very illustrative example is a community development officer in one of the municipal councils who explained the motivation for partnerships as: “There was an order from the local government zonal team to work in partnership [with NGOs]”.

In the field, Ward officers had been involved quite closely in the preparation of partnerships, but in some wards their general knowledge and guidance of development activities was rather inconsistent. Mtaa offices at the lowest level of local government are close to the community, and very much involved in the development activities in their area, even naturally intermingling with civil society. Their role in partnerships was elementary, as they were responsible for sensitisation and mobilisation in many partnerships. They have many tasks and seem to be the most receptive level for collaboration in local government, but due to their undefined legal status they have been apportioned practically no powers or resources.

7.7 TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS
The hypothesis was concerned about the temporal transformation of community members’ agency:

- **Limiting the participation, and thus the agency, of the community members of a partnership for the production of a public good during the implementation stages undermines their (acquired) sense of ownership of the outcome.**

This proposition was based on agents’ interpretations of their positive agency, having power to influence decisions during planning. It contests that in a temporal dimension, if community residents’ agency is limited they embark on employing counterpower, turn against the process of partnership, and consequently develop a social distance from the outcome.

Individuals’ interpretations of their agency during partnership and their sense of ownership were analysed as the variables of the hypothesis. The data was then interconnected within similar
patterns of profiles which emerged in discussions. This profiling was developed as the way to understand differences at agent level.

This approach is qualitative, it is neither statistically valid nor do the results correspond exactly to the proportion of the agent profiles. Sampling was not done randomly and there were a number of agents who refused to be interviewed either directly (for example declaring their disappointment with the CBO) or who possibly veiled their refusal indirectly by indicating not being available (as happened mostly in Kijitonyama)\textsuperscript{182}.

Six different basic agent profiles were identified during the field research (see Table 15); though within a singular profile different nuances could be detected in their individual experiences. The profiles are explained below. Each profile and its variables of participation and sense of ownership; number of interviewed belonging to the profile and their percentage of total number of interviewees is presented on each row. The variables of participation and sense of ownership have values + (yes/positive) or – (no/negative), and profiles are formed by different compositions of variable values. The number of interviewees, representing different profiles is summed up in the penultimate column.

\textsuperscript{182} To make a conjecture, possibly this was due to their lack of contribution or disinterest in the project, thus speculatively they could be presumed to represent either “Negative participation” or “Hypothesis” cases.
The field research supported the hypothesis. There were 26 agents (respectively 28% of all the interviewees) who experienced transformation of agency (participation) as conditioned by the hypothesis (the first two rows), that is to say they could exercise their agency during planning (value +) but during implementation their agency was limited (value -). Of those 26 agents, 23 (89%) had a reduced sense of ownership (variable -) in concert with the hypothesis. They experienced their participation in temporal dimension as postulated in the hypothesis: they turned into counterpower and their sense of ownership was reduced. The remaining 3 of 26 (11%) still demonstrated sense of ownership (variable +), contrary to the hypothesis. They were correspondingly called as “Antithesis” -cases.

The project had typically responded to the needs of the “Hypothesis” agents–profiles. They had neither been prejudiced nor got any benefit. The temporal treatment of agency revealed that their positive attitude towards the outcome that was acquired during project planning was diminished during implementation as they experienced aversion or structures constraining their agency. Sometimes their power was diminished due to power struggles at a higher level. They felt they could not exert power as they had wished; they consequently turned into silent, passive resistance or they articulated their counterpower through more vocal rhetoric, complying with the dialectic of control (Giddens 1979, 1986), finally leading to their diminished social distance from the partnership process and the outcome. Their sense of ownership decreased, sometimes they themselves elucidated that the reason for their lack of sense of ownership was due to their limited agency during the latter phase as they were denied information or excluded from decision-making. They were mainly encountered in two partnerships (CIP-Kijico and Moto Mpya).

“Antithesis” cases had experienced transformation of agency as conditioned by the hypothesis, their agency transforming from positive to constrained, leading them to employ counterpower.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 15 Agent profiles and the hypothesis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation Planning</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antithesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive (participation paradigm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative (participation paradigm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial suspicion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Despite all odds, final sense of ownership cases</td>
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Though their agency experiences were similar to those postulated in the hypothesis, their sense of ownership did not respond to the proposition of the hypothesis; on the contrary, they continued to demonstrate a sense of ownership.

Not surprisingly, the field research yielded notable evidence of the participation paradigm, which contends that participation has a positive impact on the development intervention and contributes to an increased sense of ownership and sustainability (Stiglitz 2003), whereas non-participation would contribute to a diminished sense of ownership or sustainability. “Positive participation” and “Negative participation” cases represented 23% and 27% respectively, altogether a half of the interviewees. When community members were able to participate fully and throughout the intervention, they acquired a positive attitude towards the outcome and these positive experiences of their agency contributed to their favourable sense of ownership. Their narratives were in resonance with the rhetoric of the project and in general they felt their voice had been heard which then reflected in their feeling of responsibility and having a positive attitude. Particularly those who had been personally involved, or who had gained personal benefit through employment, small business or a position of responsibility within the project were usually positive throughout the intervention.

The interpretation of participation mechanisms was different than the mainstream understanding, since participation was filtered through local knowledge systems. Many agents accepted exercising their agency through representative decision-making mechanisms such as grassroots leaders for instance wajumbe presenting their views; elders or male family members representing women. Though the ideas of representative participation and decision-making would perhaps not comply with the Western understanding of the concept of community participation, these community members felt that they actually had had the opportunity to channel their views.

“Negative Participation” agents, who did not participate at all, confirmed the negative participation paradigm. They did not or were not able to participate in any decision making either because they were directly constrained, for instance their voice was not heard in meetings or they deliberately self-excluded (excluded themselves) from decision-making opportunities. This consequently led to counterpower, opposing action and a reduced sense of ownership. They ended being either vocally negative or passively indifferent about the whole process. Disappointments with “representative” CBOs turned some into forceful resistance.

Reasons for the negativity lay in the structural constraints that agents were confronting. Political, social or financial structures constrained people’s agency. Though the partnership possibly yielded them benefits such as improved environmental conditions or a new school building, in
particular politically constrained agents were perpetually negative about the intervention, turning into vocal counterpower. Their discursive knowledge about the intervention and their own agency was evident. Financially marginalized people had avoided meetings where they could have had possibilities to exercise their agency because they feared the obligation to contribute.

The socially constrained were the disenfranchised for example some women (but not all) who knew they would not be listened to; therefore, they often stayed away from interventions and meetings. When they could not participate, many felt alienated and did not demonstrate a sense of ownership. Other socially constrained agents were those who were directly and concretely prejudiced by the project; they were overly negative about it and did not recognize the benefits it had brought to them and the community.

A small but a very vocal group of negative agents were those whose personal benefits had been negated, for instance who had anticipated a business opportunity which did not materialise. They were overwhelmingly negative about the partnership, demonstrating counterpower throughout. It became clear how well individual benefits (or lack of them) dominate people’s perceptions, though current mainstream development approaches are based on assumptions of universal altruism (Green 2001).

After “Hypothesis”, “Antithesis” and “Negative” and “Positive Participation Paradigm” profiles there were still residual groups, the existence of which demonstrates how complicated the issues of participation and sense of ownership are. The fifth profile “Initially suspicious, but then positive” were those agents who initially were suspicious about the intervention, possibly due to former failed attempts. Therefore, they excluded themselves from the initial planning. Further on when they gained more confidence with the intervention, they became more positive about it and participated fully in decision making during implementation, in the end demonstrating a positive sense of ownership. Their number was considerable as altogether they represented 14% of all interviewees. This confirmed also the importance of gaining repeatedly positive experiences to create trust as stated for instance by Williamson (1986).

Finally, there were few agents who had been constrained in all participation opportunities, but still at the end they were positive about the outcome thus contradicting the participation paradigm (and the hypothesis). These ”Despite all odds, final sense of ownership” –agents might not have had a full opportunity to express themselves but some of them did not even expect it since they were confined within their social power space. Their attitude may have been rooted in their social role and status, being humble persons who did not expect much. They considered improvements in their areas important, were grateful for development efforts, and satisfied with the outcome.
They benefited from improved services after suffering from the dilapidated infrastructure and harmful environmental conditions for a long time. Basically, they cared about the initiative not about the manner in which it was procured. Responsiveness and a beneficial outcome such as a cleaner environment and the fact that their community had been a target for some development in general contributed to a positive sense of ownership, as they claimed the outcome was “theirs”.

Thus, as the hypothesis claimed, limited agency during implementation can lead to the practice of counterpower and diminish an acquired sense of ownership. However, a sense of ownership is a complex notion which is affected by many factors, starting from people’s personality and life experience, so participation (agency) is not a sufficient condition to acquiring a sense of ownership. Testing the hypothesis also contested the ideas of partnership as inherently empowering and participatory. Partnerships are functioning in divergent locale, the framework where structures enable or constrain agents, and partnerships as social processes are defined by different social and political practices. While similar profiles emerged in nearly all partnerships, the combination of profile types was different from one project to another due to dissimilar partnerships and their locale. The number of profiles within one partnership reflects the richness of individual lifeworlds and the heterogeneity of the communities; that not all community members experience an intervention in a similar manner. Social interactions can create propitious conditions for partnerships but there is nothing to guarantee that a sense of ownership is acquired. This clearly contests the ideas of partnership or even participation ensuring a sense of ownership. They can contribute towards a positive environment, but in addition to personality traits, a sense of ownership is affected by many factors both within the intervention process and within the locale.

7.8 DISCUSSION

7.8.1 Partnerships surveyed
Partnerships have been identified as a feasible vehicle for the procurement of services in Tanzania, both through their drivers of policy and resource synergy. In development strategies and local governance policy documents, such as PRSP and LGRP/LGDF, partnership has been envisioned as an important vehicle to address the inadequate service production within the currently constrained resource basis.

Local governments in Tanzania still continue with meagre resources, though the decentralisation reform programme and other internationally funded programmes are introducing more funding at local level. Local government reform programmes have also attempted to improve the normative
framework in which municipalities work, supporting the development of accountability and participatory governance mechanisms. The increased resource base, more effective and conducive operational environment mean municipalities are now able to enhance service delivery in practice, including the production and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure. Thus, in principle local governments should be better able to enter into partnerships as competent partners, to give an impetus to service delivery.

Still, the theory and practice of partnerships did not always meet. Partnership was not yet fully understood, in particular it is eminently misconceptualised as outsourcing such as sub-contracting NGOs and CBOs for rubbish collection in Dar es Salaam. Similarly, as a work mechanism it was not yet fully incorporated into municipal operations, and partnership as a productive pattern was not always sustained within the local government machinery.

In all four partnerships, the local contexts and communities were dissimilar. Consequently the roles and practices of partner organisations were divergent, which then further shaped the interventions, see Figure 19. Partnerships differed in their structures and compositions both vertically and horizontally. Even within the local government machinery, the interest and approach varied in practice. When there was an international NGO providing and managing funds, municipal officers easily took a rather remote facilitator role. But in these case partnerships, when there was multilateral funding such as CIP funding, DCC took a more vigorous role.

![Assessment of all partnerships](image)

Figure 19 Transformation of partnerships in temporal dimension
The understanding of partnership at an operational level was very weak, despite having been included into the mainstream leadership, development and strategic rhetoric. Officers and communities did not always understand the nature and objectives of partnership, as partnerships were imposed rather than established voluntarily. Some officers were reluctant to enter genuine collaboration and corresponding power sharing with CBOs which they considered to be competing entities\(^\text{183}\); or with communities which they treat with condescendence.

The field research identified the main advantage that through partnerships service production was possible in areas that earlier had been practically deprived of basic infrastructure. Partnerships opened doors to resource-constrained local governments to obtain funding for the production of infrastructure in these underserviced or poorer areas, enabling the construction of new facilities and the rehabilitation of the old ones. In addition, partnerships acted as a medium to the dialectic between local government and organised civil society, consequently enabling collective action and collaboration between them and new opportunities for urban development. Mainly through other components, community members’ project management and professional skills were also enhanced. Hence, the partnerships fulfilled the expectations in service production in difficult areas, such as unplanned neighbourhoods.

### 7.8.2 Partnership synergy

The major driving forces underpinning the partnerships were resource and policy synergy. Different synergies provided incentives to coalescence, to join their resources, knowledge and capacity. In all the partnerships the combinations of synergies and their attributes were different: some were based on policy synergy, some on strong resource synergy.

Both resource and policy synergies are actually connected to the exercise of power. Policy synergy implicitly translates to the power that communities can exercise, being analogous to participation, which offers communities opportunities to share their views, “new perspectives” as defined by Hastings (1996) and to influence partnership decisions. Resources, in practice community contribution or cost-sharing, were a medium for exercising power as conceptualised for example by Giddens (1986). When resources were surrendered, the media for exercising power were diminished.

Synergy rhetoric in partnership translates mostly to community participation or empowerment, while in practice communities’ participatory role was mostly only a means for achieving efficiency. As Cleaver (1999) notes in many participatory projects participation inherently (per

\(^{183}\) Interview with Ms Julie Adkins, Local governance adviser SNV, in Dar es Salaam on 3.3.2006
se) is viewed as empowering. Similarly, partnerships are presumed to empower (Johnson and Wilson 2000; Manor 2002; Plummer 2002), when actually many, though not all, of the case partnerships, were targeted at the production process through the extraction of resources.

In two case studies (SDP-Hana Nasif and CIP-Kijitonyama) despite rhetoric partnership, synergy was principally driven by resource synergy. Combined resources from different sources were expected to improve effectiveness, enabling the realization of the intervention. However, the assumed effectiveness remains a mystery. For example in Hana Nasif phase 1, the actual contribution remained less than 1% of total costs. In current CIUP projects, municipalities pay communities’ stipulated amount of contribution to avoid delays in the implementation. Thus, the municipalities pay the community contribution upfront, as a ‘loan’ to the communities since they know of community members’ reluctance and possible inability to contribute. This ultimately raises doubts about the benefits of the policy on obligatory monetary contributions considering the social impact it has (see section 8.6). Altogether, extremely low levels of contribution, unfair treatment of community members and the creation of fractions inside the community, give a very patchy picture of cost-sharing in practice, its cost-effectiveness and how it affects equality. In two other cases (NGO led Moto Mpya and Mbadeco partnerships) planning was strongly based on policy synergy enabling communities’ to better articulate their views, though later on Moto Mpya lost that momentum.

A partnership functions as a platform to exercise agency; through policy and resource synergies a community can gain more leverage. Nonetheless, time dynamics altered synergy positions. In CIP-Kijico and Moto Mpya policy synergy depleted. In CIP-Kijico policy synergy was existent during planning but later on, the main driving force was resource synergy. After allocating resources, community members were in a vulnerable position, as there was less synergy and their agency was limited. Thus, analytically when community contributions and the surrender of their resources become more important than community participation (communities’ ability to use power and participate in decision-making), resource synergy may contradict the objectives of policy synergy, as claimed for instance by Moser 1989. Nederveen Pieterse similarly asserted that if partnerships interventions aimed essentially at cost-sharing through resource synergy, they overlook any political aspects or opportunities for positive transformation, providing an uncritical approach (Nederveen Pieterse 2001: 145). This dichotomy in synergy can jeopardize community

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184 Some case partnerships had other components aiming at improving communities’ skills, which potentially could have contributed more to communities’ capacity, particularly in Hana Nasif where there was a strong training component.

185 Interviews with respective municipal officers.
members’ agency, as the underpinning theoretical framework is based on different ideologies, see Table 16.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of synergy</th>
<th>Resource synergy</th>
<th>Policy synergy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paradigm</td>
<td>Neo-liberalism</td>
<td>Neo-Populist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Cost-sharing</td>
<td>Participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.8.3 CBO legitimacy, trust and reciprocity

Partnership configurations varied as some partnerships included CBOs representing communities, and some included international NGOs. Traditionally, in Tanzania there has been aversion and suspicion between the state and citizens, and between the state and organised civil society. Often local government is suspected to be more inclined to demand money from citizens than to provide them with services. This is reflected also in their relationship with communities in partnerships, as international NGOs managed to create relations which were more based on trust than the partnerships between national partners (local government with communities).

CBOs were introduced to partnerships to constitute a legitimate channel for citizens’ voice, to convey ideas and values and to connect with other partners. Therefore, their legitimacy was a prerequisite for partnership, as it affects their position, accountability and representativeness in front of communities.

However, the existence of CBOs and the understanding of their role as a vehicle for development is largely based on imported development models, as Dill and Longhofer contend (2006). The ontology of CSOs in Tanzania which is commonly employed in development strategies and policies does not consider local knowledge systems; an enigma analysed by Lewis (2002). In these partnerships, considerable attention was paid to those visible CSOs which, as Cleaver (1999; 2001) has pointed out, are easily perceived to represent development to outsiders. Yet, modern CSOs are in general a relatively new phenomenon in Tanzania and their concept was still quite cryptic to ordinary citizens in Dar es Salaam.

In these partnerships CBO legitimacy was mostly an external assumption. It was not based on local people’s interpretations. Other partners, donors and LGs had required one new CBO to be established to represent communities and facilitate them in decision-making in each community. Only Mbadeco in Mburahati could claim to have been legitimately established and representative of community members, the constituency of the CBO. CBOs were established mainly by the

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106 Within CIUP project in Buguruni, communities rejected the local CBOs and NGOs straight away, as they did not consider them at all representative. Interview CIUP- City Alliance Coordinator Anna Mchacha in Dar es Salaam on 28.3.2006.
local educated elite or they were usurped by the political elite. Gould and Ojanen discovered in Masasi, Southern Tanzania how civil society, which was supported by an INGO, was only “an appendix of CCM” (Gould and Ojanen 2003: 82). Considering community heterogeneity or rather that each community was comprised of many communities, internal conflicts and power struggles between elites and disenfranchised community members, this oversimplification already raises doubts about CBOs’ assumed legitimacy.

Therefore, there were conflicting accounts on the CSOs’ nature and role. Rhetorically, the CBOs’ role was to represent the community but in practice their mission became different: they were employed either as a parallel system to local government such as the one in Kijitonyama, which was responsible for sensitization, community mobilization and participation or they were transformed into a local water and maintenance company, which made profit and employed several people as in Hana Nasif (see also the critical accounts of Dill and Longhofer 2006). At the end, these tasks reflected their position in the eyes of the community members, which would further explain why residents would not perceive them as empowering or legitimate. Community members largely considered them as private or government companies, managing and planning project activities, not representing communities. The perception of their representing the profit making sector is also grounded on the benefits that they brought to their own personnel. The lack of accountability between them and the community did not improve their legitimacy. As a consequence, their weak legitimacy contributed to the emergence of fractions inside the communities and finally diminished social capital.

Hence, the field research confirmed that legitimacy is a social construction as Lister has asserted (Lister 2003). CBOs’ constituencies did not know or at least did not agree what CBOs were supposed to be; analogically CBOs were not what outsiders thought they were. For instance, in Hana Nasif, the interpretation of the nature of the CBO varied depending who defined it: for outsiders it represented the community, for community members it represented either the government or the main party.

7.8.4 Power, participation and agency

Partnership has been marketed as an inclusive practice, ensuring community members’ voice through participation. Yet, there are questions about communities’ role and actual power in a partnership, in particular whether partnership indeed constitutes a platform for community members to practice their agency as it is believed: the research questions treated the transformation of their agency in a temporal dimension and finally how the dialectic of control is embodied in partnership interactions.
The question of community is not only a semantic issue, but has a bearing on community members’ agency as well. Communities were commonly attributed unanimous collective actions and sentiments, though in particular in the urban context a local level voice is not necessarily single and collective (Bebbington and Bebbington 2001). There might be collective agency or collective agencies within the community, but without a properly legitimized channel to voice it, the potential collective agency remains unheard or unacknowledged. Thus, the importance of the legitimacy of CBOs.

Most partnerships in Dar es Salaam did not manage to achieve perpetuate wide-ranging, equal participation opportunities to exercise power as envisioned. The concepts of participation and partnership were more cosmetic, aiming at creating an illusion of equal power relations and reinforcing the existing hegemony of power structures (Taylor 2001). Through ‘partnership rhetoric’ they disguised dominating use of power between partners, which became evident at some point in the intervention.

In each partnership, there were different sub-groups whose configuration depended on structures and locale. Social cohesion, or internal conflicts, power struggles were all very context specific features, influencing communities’ social and political space, community interactions consequently shaping the development interventions. Partnerships had infiltrated to agents’ lifeworlds and shaped them in different ways, thus, agents had divergent interpretations and discourses about partnership. Where political realities and social power relations were divergent; a disregard of heterogeneity masked power inequalities and the constraints that different agents confronted. This created space for dominating power processes and contributed to exclusive practices and disparities in power space inside the communities, by maintaining or reinforcing existing power imbalances. Thus, partnership power processes reproduced social relations. Partnerships left particularly clear rifts inside communities between the ‘powerful’ and the disenfranchised, entrenching power asymmetries and the hegemonic use of power inside the community. Therefore, in the absence of collective community agency, the assessment of community actions and attitudes should be based on individual agent’s life world, experiences and ability to exercise agency.

Partnerships were dynamic in time and there were notable transformations between the planning and implementation phases in all but one partnership. Participatory partnerships CIP-Kijico and Moto Mpya-Buguruni transformed to project interventions where communities were spectators. CIP-Kijico was firmly in DCC’s clutches; even the World Bank had to struggle with them whereas Plan International’s Dar es Salaam headquarters usurped the project management during
construction in Moto Mpya-Buguruni and left the local office and community partially in darkness. These unbalanced power relations then reflected on the diminished trust and accountability between partners.

As Structuration Theory posits, agents draw on structures, and their agency can be constrained or enabled through different structural constraints. Therefore, individual narratives were analysed to identify and understand structures that constrained or enabled those individuals to exercise their agency. Similarly, the recursive nature of these social processes was recognized; how agents’ participation in interactions then influences structures.

7.8.5 Structural constraints and agency
Several structural constraints restrict ordinary community residents’ life, and on the other hand, enable others’ agency. The field research discovered signification structures which here refer to local social and cultural elements; authoritative domination structures which function through the political domain; and allocative domination structures referring particularly to monetary resources. Below the impact of these pivotal structures on community members’ agencies is discussed.

7.8.5.1 Signification structures
Local knowledge systems influenced the way in which participation was perceived and practised. As discussed in the literature review participation in a Sub-Saharan African context is interpreted differently than in the Western context. Project conceptualization and participation approaches were borrowed from the dominating international practices which are based on Western concepts and knowledge systems. Yet, traditional views of participation and cultural forms of social power did not necessarily coincide with these common mainstream partnership and participatory project practices (Bebbington and Bebbington 2001). There is a clash between the conceptualization of hierarchical participation and representativeness prevailing in the Tanzanian context, and the commonly proclaimed Western induced understanding of participation as everybody’s self-evident right and responsibility, which is practised in the public realm. Since Western division of the public and private spheres is “…culturally, socially, juridically and politically constructed” (Tripp 1998: 86), an opportunity to raise a voice in a public meeting did not necessarily mean having an opportunity to influence issues. Conceptualizing participation through public meetings ignored the local context as Desai (1996:602) claimed “…more participation (representative institutions) means less participation (involvement in decisions)”. 
These practices commonly impinged on women’s access to power. Tacit rules determined collective, representative ideas about their participation which is, as Cleaver (1999) has claimed, is neither a public nor an individual action. Thus, ordinary women in general were not expected to speak up in meetings, or sometimes not even necessarily to participate in them, confirming the findings of Lyons and Smuts (1999) in South African partnerships. Rather, men in a meeting spoke as individuals whereas for example vulnerable women channelled their opinions through representatives. Even if the more vulnerable ones, particularly disenfranchised women and the poorer strata participated in meetings and used their voice, retention of their lack of voice in the public realm was still prevalent (see Figure 20 for the visualization of the vicious circle of structural constraints that women encounter). Even if they spoke there, their discourses would not have been acknowledged. However, though most women are pliable, there are for example women with more resources who can have more opportunities to influence, as Giddens said: “Gender is structured by rules and resources” (Giddens 1989: 299). Therefore, vulnerable women preferred referring to these assertive, leading women or a male family member or ten cell leaders to transmit their views.

![Figure 20 Constraints on women's participation](image)

**Figure 20 Constraints on women's participation**

Within these partnerships, participation channels were captured by the community elite, and the disenfranchised were obstructed by the constraints that this created. Public meetings were
considered an arena for elite and venerable people such as *wazee*, which then reinforced their social prerogatives to exercise their agency. Sometimes actual power was claimed to have been exercised in different platforms outside the formal meetings. As a consequence, there was a clear disjuncture between intentions and implementation; as a result participation attempts remained more rhetoric.

There are constant internal power struggles in society which the participation frames did not manage to surpass. By and large, there are antagonisms such as tribalism; and certain aversion between the educated and the non-educated people\(^{187}\) which have different dimensions for instance between the older and younger generations. The older ones tend to have less education than the younger generation, see Brennan and Burton’s account from the late colonial period reflecting the same conflict (Brennan and Burton 2007: 36). Similarly, the educated elite and development leaders attempt to perpetuate their decision-making powers by emphasising the need for development processes to be led by the educated\(^ {188}\). However, in Hana Nasif the leadership of the CDA was scorned, because they were considered political persons, but “not educated” (IBRD 2005). Thus, the power-holding elite consist of people with diverse backgrounds.

As a result, the participation approach, which was grounded on Western knowledge systems, reproduced somewhat exclusive patterns. Ethnocentric mainstream participation practices were not in resonance with these deeply embedded rules and people’s cognitive actions. Artificially imposed opportunities for decision making would not make change as long as traditional perceptions dominate, since development needs to find its cultural roots as claimed by Nederveen Pieterse (Nederveen Pieterse 2001: 28).

7.8.5.2 *Allocative domination structures*

Cost-sharing principles continue to be embraced as a project strategy. Interviewed development professionals and managers\(^{189}\) as well as leaders in the community institutions considered it a necessary element to ensure a sense of ownership. However, already 20 years ago it was proved to be a problematic approach (Paul 1987). It was attested to undermine participation opportunities as Moser wrote: “In WB funded projects, there is a tendency to lose empowerment to the objectives of cost-sharing” (Caroline Moser 1989: 119).

\(^{187}\) Interview Ms Julie Adkins Local Governance Adviser SNV on 3.3.2006

\(^{188}\) Interview Professor Kombe on 30.11.2006; Interview Mzee Mbukuzi on 4.12.2006

\(^{189}\) For instance interview Professor Kombe on 30.11.2006; Interview Mr Msenduki WEO Ilala on 23.5.2006; Interview CIUP Coordinator Ms Margaret Mazwile in November 2006.
Inkeri Auramaa

January 2010

In two of the studied partnerships community members were expected to contribute to the construction and rehabilitation expenses. These obligations formed a major financial impeding factor, constraining many community members who were not willing to contribute. Those who were not willing or not in a position to contribute and who feared contribution obligations, found it easier to shun away from the meetings. Thus, the fear of contribution impeded attendance in meetings, and thus belied the assumed benefits of participation.

Though everybody was expected to contribute, the majority did not for a variety of reasons. Some were not able to contribute, as Precht found regarding landlords’ financial capacity when he studied the impact of Hana Nasif upgrading project on rental markets and landlords’ actions (Precht 2005), some did not trust the project organisation; some felt that there was no need to contribute for a public good as their personal needs had not yet been responded to, confirming Green’s views as she criticises the prevailing participation paradigm’s ethos of prioritizing collective action over individual benefits (Green 2001). A lack of sensitization, mobilisation, moral or simple personal preference as to whether to contribute or not for community development were other seminal reasons. Some were considered anti-development; their reprobate behaviour was silently disproved of. The pressure to pay was easily put on the more vulnerable when wealthy and powerful could easily refuse payment; their actions were not publicly questioned if not acquiesced to. In some places, local leaders created social pressure and forced community members to contribute.

Despite their vulnerability, women were discursively conscious about both their constraints and their power: how to influence or to employ discourses of counterpower to reject the social process. For instance, many women were clearly knowledgeable both about their own mechanisms to influence decision making and about others’ intentions. Their interpretation of the role of these different participation channels was that basically their views could be transmitted via ten cell leaders. If their opinion, which was expressed by TCLs, would not be sufficient and their presence was still insisted on, it would mean that the meeting concerned about obligations to contribute money or labour, not about residents’ views or opinions. This also explains why some women were not willing to go to meetings.

Thus, even when community contribution was not enforced, it was a highly inhibiting factor for people’s participation. Non enforcement of uniform contributions resulted in bolder and more

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Most of the people interviewed claimed to have contributed at least something, though the integrity of these statements was not verified. Only few who admitted not having contributed were willing to share their views. Therefore, the motives identified here are not personal accounts, but based on the assessment of other interviewees and confirmed by the CBO Chama Buma in Buguruni who also provided an excellent analysis of the motives for community contribution.
courageous people shunning away from contribution as free-riders, considered as a major problem in collective action school.

7.8.5.3 Authoritative domination structures

Political constraints affecting project implementation are not unknown in Africa (Lyons and Smuts 1999) or in Tanzania in recent years (Mulengeki 2002; Nguluma 2003). Tanzania only entered a multi-party system in the 1990s. This has created an increasing political awareness with unexpected consequences. Earlier, discontent with the (CCM) party was disguised (see Tripp 1997:152), now it has public channels. In addition to enabling multitude voice and opening democratic participation, the multiparty system is claimed to be engendering conflicts and fractions along party lines which is a new phenomenon as traditionally the attachment has basically been via kinship, or also according to faith.

However, constraints due to political domination are often overlooked as it happened in these partnerships. Meetings were often convened by TCLs who are CCM members. This is understandable as they are the lowest established institution at grassroots level, but there was no provision for neutral, apolitically connotated harbingers.

In Hana Nasif, opposition supporters took a strong position, they contended politically active people had overtaken (‘hijacked’) the leadership in local organisations, and favoured their political allies. As a protest, they excluded themselves from project meetings or activities, also from these interviews, embarking on counterpower. Thus, political structures had a major constraining impact on those agents who did not belong to politically privileged groups. This was similarly strongly expressed in some otherwise rather neutral accounts where CCM was held in contempt.

7.8.5.4 Reproduction of social action

Social praxis has a recursive character where social actions affect changes in structures which correspondingly have an effect on agents (the main tenet of Structuration Theory formulated by Kaspersen 2000). Though agents present practical and discursive consciousness of their actions, their unintended consequences simultaneously reproduce the basis for new actions.

Vulnerable women acknowledged their diminished opportunities to influence decision-making. They often stayed away from the meetings, only trying to express their voice through representatives. This reinforced public perception of women’s lack of self-expression, as a result leading to expectations that they would neither want to raise their voice nor participate in a meeting, as discussed in section 7.8.5.1. Consequently, these social practices reinforced
oppressive structures as depicted in Figure 20. Though many women passively accepted their ascribed lack of interest in participation, in reality they demonstrated practical and discursive consciousness about both their agency and partnership, retaining their genuine interest in common matters and community development. However, sometimes diminishing their agency did not seem to lead to any active opposition but to self-exclusion, merely desisting from public decision-making passively. Nevertheless, they still demonstrated a sense of ownership and interest towards the outcome.

Particularly in Hana Nasif the poor who had self-excluded themselves from meetings for the fear of contribution demands, deeply regretted it later when they realised that as an unintended consequence they had lost the opportunity to get paid work. Affiliation with the CDA would potentially have constituted a long term benefit as they could have acquired CDA membership and got long-term paid work like others for example at water kiosks. The counterpower of the poor through withdrawal from partnership activities thus contributed further to the reproduction of their own marginalization. Hence, the agency of the poor perpetuates exclusion from social opportunities and the powerful continue to have more opportunities to exercise their agency. Similarly, agents facing political constraints were excluded further from the decision-making apparatus.

Through recursion counterpower also had unintended repercussions at community level. In three partnerships, constraints engendered opportunism and backfired by diminishing social cohesion thus contributing to further division inside the community. In Hana Nasif, other research stated that rehabilitation of the infrastructure encouraged some gentrification and the improvement of rental facilities and consequently increased house prices and rents (Precht 2005), which then had forced the poorer strata out of the area. Consequently, this could cause more counterpower towards participation as poor tenants could interpret any development initiative as a risk to their tenancy.

7.8.6 Counterpower and temporal transformation
Most of agents who after the onset of the partnership, started experiencing constraints refused later to participate in meetings and in decision-making. The politically constrained sometimes rather vocally opposed participation practices. Some also used their discursive power to embark on contravention against the partnership in particular and against the political structures in general. But their critical accounts demonstrated their discursive consciousness. For example, in Hana Nasif they hinted at corruption and accused the ruling party of cheating donors and making business through the CBO. Very consciously, they attempted to undermine the intervention and
authority of political structures, while retaining their own autonomy, for example they refused any participation opportunities, even paid work though in other circumstances it would have been considered a privilege. Still, their actions contributed to their further financial marginalization both financially and from the decision making arena.

Interestingly, those community agents who initially refused to be interviewed rather lengthily expressed their views about the intervention. They turned out to be very negative about the intervention and rebuked it. Through initial refusal to be interviewed they continued to employ their counterpower, but they revealed knowledgeability, discursive and practical consciousness, and rather well analysed information about the intervention. This confirmed Giddens’s claim that there is a need: “to avoid impoverished descriptions of agents’ knowledgeability; a sophisticated account of motivation; and an interpretation of the dialectic of control” (Giddens 1986: 289)

Negative outcomes such as the motives for refusing participation, a lack of maintenance or a lack of sense of ownership have remained largely misinterpreted, or neglected outside these communities. In Hana Nasif, lacking initiatives for maintenance was largely caused by political and financial constrains and by resistance to political power when the local CBO confused the maintenance scene with erratic activities and rules. Yet, it has been interpreted as a consequence of inadequate community sensitisation. In Buguruni, there was counterpower expressed as reluctance and distance towards the school caused by the perceived mystery surrounding the decision-making during the later phase. This is not a dissimilar reaction to the reluctance to participate in partnership due to objecting hegemonic power relations inside a South African community, as reported by Lyons et al. (2002).

In Kijitonyama, the non-completion of the promised project targets left residents feeling betrayed, angry and powerless in front of the other partners. Thus, some were acting against DCC, some against the CBO and others (mainly CBO board members) against the CBO leadership. Their diminished agency led them to strong resentment about the intervention, which then reflected in the rejection of the outcome and negligence of maintenance. Hence, the reactions and behaviour of the community members led to adverse attitudes and prejudicial counterpower. Counterpower motivated community members’ to activities which were seemingly not very rational and different to what outsiders expected.

7.8.7 Sense of ownership
In these partnerships, particularly in SDP Hana Nasif, participation, which was conceptualized as labour contribution was expected to contribute to the creation of a sense of ownership (Sliuzas 2004:1989). In the literature, partnership is attributed to improving sustainability through
participation in decision-making. Participation is widely translated as emancipation, which contributes to the sense of ownership and thus consequently to the sustainability (see critical discussion for example in Cleaver 1999). This mechanism is expected to be effected at community level. Thus, by implication a community as a unity participates in collective action and then all share collective attitudes and sense of ownership. Yet, unless well unified with similar motives, communities, in particular urban communities are rarely so homogeneous that their members could be attributed with collective experiences of agency. Otherwise, diversity inside a community through different experiences and lifeworlds consequently shapes their attitudes and translates to divergent positions. A community can undertake and express public collective resentment through a CBO as the Kijitonyama example proves, however, inside the community there might still be fractions with diverse reactions.

A sense of ownership is a complex concept which is based very much on individual experiences. Inside a community, some individuals are able to participate, some not. Some choose not to participate, for example by opposing the intervention in general from the beginning. Similarly, different choices led to different experiences and different attitudes. There are a multitude of factors influencing a sense of ownership, and this field research revealed that there are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for ensuring community agents’ sense of ownership.

Some patterns could be detected through narratives. A sense of ownership was generated or at least contributed to when there was a certain positive attachment to the process. For instance, interviewees indicated how they participated in planning or participated in the work, sacrificing their efforts and sweat which created a bond between them and the outcome; how important it is and how well it serves community members. This all indicated how they were involved at all levels during the whole process; how they participated in developing something which is good and which belongs to the community. Thus, participation both in decision-making and labour is beneficial, but not a sufficient factor for obtaining a sense of ownership. Participation in work does not need to be an unpaid contribution; it could be also paid work when it just physically creates the linkage. Non-participation easily but not necessarily led to a diminished sense of ownership; constrained agency expressed through counterpower also often led to a limited sense of ownership. During the field research, it also came out clearly that there are individuals who are just not at all interested in development; they do not express interest in participation and as a result do not demonstrate any sense of ownership or even share their experiences in interviews. The existence of individuals who are not altruistic or who are directly against any communal
development activities without any possibility of social pressure already undermines claims about a communal sense of ownership and treatment of participation at community level.

7.9 CONCLUSION

Partnership as a social process is shaped by the social interaction between the partners, where the outcome produced through the partnership process is an interim part of it. Each partnership was temporally dynamic; relationships and power interfaces inside the partnerships transformed in some cases drastically. Since community agents’ experiences such as the personal benefits they obtained or constraints they encountered were dissimilar, they exercised their agency and ultimately, acquired and demonstrated their sense of ownership in a different way. Thus, it was important to treat community members’ agency at an individual level.

The temporal treatment of agents’ ability to exercise their agency was an underpinning factor of the hypothesis. It suggested that the sense of ownership acquired through participation during planning can be jeopardized if the intervention later moves away from the ideal of a genuine partnership. Consequently community members’ agency would be circumscribed in the implementation phase of partnership. This a priori reasoning was supported by the evidence in the field by how community members’ collective aspirations channelled through CBOs and individual agency were challenged during the partnerships’ lifetime.

Over 80% of those agents whose previously positive participation had been denied during the latter phase of partnership turned into counterpower. They were either actively critical about the partnership intervention and its outcome or merely remote and disinterested but clearly distancing themselves from any responsibility or affection related to the outcome, though it was beneficial for them.

Moreover, field findings revealed that partnership neither guarantees a sense of ownership, nor is community members’ ability to exercise their agency at any phase of the intervention a sufficient condition for acquiring a sense of ownership. A partnership can enable, and a genuine partnership would indeed enable community participation, thus contributing to acquiring and maintaining a sense of ownership. However, strong structural constraints may contribute to obvious power asymmetries; thus clogging the potential of community members’ agency.

Mainly to support neo-liberal underpinnings, there are claims that when communities provide resources, it leads to an improved sense of ownership “people value things more if they pay for them” (Cornwall 2002 quoted in Mulengeki 2002). Labour contribution, participation in manual work, could improve their sense of ownership, as people explained how through doing labour
they felt having given something from themselves. Yet, this research could not reveal any evidence that the contribution of money (cost sharing in cash) could be associated with community members’ sense of ownership. On the contrary, demands for contribution constrained the participation of cash strapped community members. In addition, due to common misuse of funds, people did not trust that monetary contributions would benefit the common good.

Conclusively, partnership provided a platform to genuine participation and thus contributed towards acquiring a positive sense of ownership. However, partnership *per se* is not a sufficient condition, since a sense of ownership is a complex notion which is interconnected to many factors engendered in social practices within the partnership. Contribution to the development of a sense of ownership would require an understanding of these social practices and consequently structural constraints affecting community members’ agency.
8 CONCLUSION

8.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter first revisits the research context and problem and then presents summary conclusions from the literature review. Thereafter, it reflects on and assesses the methodological and theoretical propositions of this research. Core findings and conclusions are presented with the policy implications that they raise. Further topics and approaches for investigation are suggested and finally the limitations and contributions of this research are identified.

8.2 DEBATE ON SERVICE DELIVERY AND PARTNERSHIP
The colonial legacy, erroneous policies and years of governance in a resource-constrained environment have left vast segments of the population in Sub Saharan Africa without basic services. In contemporary discourses of local governance, partnership has been encompassed as a suitable implementation tool for service provision. Adopted by neo-liberalism, partnership between local government, communities and civil society is believed to alleviate poverty and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of service production, presenting a feasible alternative to conventional state led approaches.

Similarly, partnership responds to neo-populist calls to give more voice to the disenfranchised. At its best, partnership could institutionalize participation and increase the empowerment of grassroots communities. Thus, it epitomizes the marriage of these two paradigms: it responds to the current dominant neoliberal requisites through resource synergy and concomitantly creates opportunities for the less powerful to participate in decision making, giving new perspectives through policy synergy.

There are a gamut of definitions of partnership, but in practice it has been loosely conceptualized and little understood. At most, it can border co-option or contracting, leaving grey areas in accountability and governance. This thesis does not accept the definition of sub-contracting as a form of partnership. Instead, partnership is posited as a continuous relationship between the public sector and other partners which is basically grounded on trust, mutualism and interdependence and in which all the partners have the power to participate in decision-making. This is essentially an ideal of genuine partnership at which the collaboration aims. Therefore, this thesis accepts it can be rarely, if ever, reached.

Responding to calls to investigate more partnerships in a development context, this research attempts to look behind the surmises of partnership and to discuss selected viewpoints related to
partnership as a tool for service delivery, particularly for the production of infrastructure. This research attempts to understand the analytical factors determining the social process of partnership which frames the outcome; to investigate the intersections of communities’ power space with other partners; subsequently structures that enable and constrain citizens’ agency and finally citizens’ relationship and social distance to the outcome, which constitutes their sense of ownership. Earlier research has largely concentrated in treating a production project such as production of physical infrastructure as an engineering issue. However, here partnership for the production of a social good is explored as a socially constructed process where partners influence the process and get influenced through the social interaction underpinning the partnership. The aim is to understand how partnership and participation discourses have been translated to practice and how this practice through altering social and power relations affected the partnership outcome. Therefore, the question is not only about different implementation models but about reproduction within partnership and the wider repercussions partnership has on partners themselves and on the surrounding society.

The thesis takes a critical position to many of current development dictates, which have widely been questioned. Yet, their criticism has been less adopted in praxis. Therefore, first, partnership is treated in a temporal dimension, not as a static intervention. Emphasis on temporal dynamics follows the conclusions of the literature and Structuration Theory’s postulations about the importance of social interaction in time and space dimensions (for instance Giddens 1986).

Second, the research challenges the treatment of a community as a homogenous collective unity, contesting the ‘community myths’ about communities’ power space, altruism and equality as pointed out by Cleaver 1999. This is a widely accepted position in rhetoric, but has not found much space in development practice. Thus, a community here is defined as a meta-community, a conglomeration of different groups and individuals with ideas, experiences and features with little convergence at times. In addition, communities are commonly attributed collective agencies and expressions such as a community participating as an entity or a community’s collective sense of ownership. This would require homogeneity and uniform voice from the community whereas for example urban communities are typically heterogeneous and divided. Therefore, an individual perspective is indispensable.

Third, as a consequence of this heterogeneity, the research approach questions the understanding of CBOs' legitimacy as an automatic value, based on CBOs’ geographic location or external validation rather than treating legitimacy as socially constructed. If a CBO does not hold legitimacy in front of the community, any channels for collective voice and agency might not be
attainable. Therefore, this research investigates community agency as individual voices, how individuals employ their agency, and their interpretation of CBOs’ legitimacy in partnership.

Finally, from the beginning, one of the guiding notes in defining the research problem and approach has been the link to the real world (Bebbington 1994): the research attempts to respond to a problem in the real world, drawing both from the researcher’s long professional experience as well as from the vast literature. This enabled a translation of academic frameworks into pragmatic approaches. It also helped understand better the context and community residents as agents, to produce a thesis which potentially could feed research results back to development practice.

8.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A conceptual model was developed to define and investigate the ontology of partnerships; to determine its analytical dimensions, to what extent a partnership is genuine, and the factors influencing partners and their partnership relationships. The model constitutes a useful frame of interpretation, emphasizing that much boils down to power relations. Similarly, it provides tools to reflect on the development and transformation of an intervention implemented in partnership.

Giddens’ Structuration Theory and its dialectic of control constitute a relevant and useful theoretical framework for investigating agency. Giddens’ starting point is that agency is in recursive relation with structures. Agents are always able to exercise power otherwise they cease to be agents. According to the dialectic of control, if agents feel their power limited they resort to exercising counterpower. This informs the hypothesis which argues that if community agents’ agency is limited during the implementation phase, they turn to employing counterpower against the social processes defining the partnership, consequently leading to alienation and a social distance from the outcome, which is an interim part of the partnership process. As mentioned earlier in section 4.5.5, Giddens’ lays considerable emphasis on agents’ knowledgeability which during the empirical field research raised some doubts. In addition, the lack of treatment of culture in Structuration Theory is a shortcoming, which could have enriched the picture of the linkages between cultural practices and power processes.

8.4 METHODODOLOGY
Since the research adopted an approach that partnership is a socially constructed process, and it constitutes social practices; a qualitative research methodology is imperative. The emphasis was to tease out the narratives of community agents and their own interpretations of their agency within the partnership process in a temporal dimension (as suggested by Structuration Theory by
Giddens 1986) as well as their consequent sense of ownership, their social distance from the produced outcome. The intention was to grasp comprehension about community agents’ knowledge. This requires extensive qualitative interviews as this research attempts, in Giddens’ words, to answer to “why-questions that stem from the mutual unintelligibility of divergent frames of meaning” (Giddens 1986: 328). Similarly, despite not being a proper ethnographic study, the research attempts to understand different lifeworlds and experiences as well as basic characteristics of diverse communities (locale as Giddens defines it) which then frames community members’ understanding and interpretations of partnership’s analytical factors.

A ‘case study’ approach was embraced as the research strategy; it was carried out in relation to four different projects in Dar es Salaam. The selection of several different cases aimed at exposing contextual differences as locale. This was important since in the beginning it was not known whether all partnerships really were partnerships or whether they would fulfil the transformation process where the hypothesis was to be tested. Ultimately, all the case partnership projects had gone through different processes. The research methodology consisted of 94 semi-structured individual interviews, in addition to interviews of over 50 key informants in different institutions.

8.5 Main Conclusion

Conclusion 1: Partnership is a feasible mechanism for the production of basic infrastructure in under-services settlements.

Partnership between local governments, communities and civil society organisations stands out as an important mechanism in Tanzanian development policies and strategies. Local government reforms have gradually allocated more, though not yet sufficient, resources and competencies to local governments to respond to service delivery demands. Improvements in service delivery also enable them to work in partnership, but local governments are, still, learning these approaches.

Local governments are performing fledgling attempts to collaborate with entities previously labelled as enemies or competitors. However, the relationship between local government and other partners is not monolithic, as stated by Mohan (2002). Characteristics and competencies of local governments are different at different levels: at a high level there is more rhetoric and self-sufficiency whereas at lower levels there is an intermingling with civil society. However, perceptions of civil society organisations are still equivocal. Partially, their role is not clear, partially they are seen with hostility, but still their important contribution in service delivery is recognized, though occasionally reluctantly.
Therefore, partnership creates propitious circumstances for enhanced service delivery in underserviced areas. Owing to an attractive and credible implementation mechanism instigated by neo-liberalist underpinnings, partnerships enable the injection of new funds as for example in NGO led and funded partnerships complemented with technical assistance from municipalities. Alternatively, they enable the procurement of complementary funds from programmes funded by the WB and other donors. As an implementation tool, partnership can be concluded to be a feasible solution for service delivery in unplanned or underserviced areas which otherwise would not be granted any attention.

There are several discourses through which partnership as a social process is defined. Discourses are related to the themes of agency, participation and sense of ownership, local knowledge systems and community structures and constraining structures such as financial, political and social structures, which are presented below.

Conclusion 2: Partnership is a social process in which partners’ agency is subject to temporal transformation that consequently has an impact on their sense of ownership

The hypothesis indicates that partnership is a dynamic intervention, a social process where power relations and community agency change in a temporal dimension. These changes then affect future interactions. The literature review revealed how little attention is paid to the later phases of partnership. Communities as vulnerable partners are easily compromised when resource synergy diminishes; the ascendancy of more powerful agents such as donors, NGOs and local governments can limit communities’ agency. Thus participation as an access to decision-making transforms into normative participation.

In principle partnership constitutes a platform for community participation and subsequently for more opportunities for community members to exercise their agency both as individuals and potentially as a collective. Nonetheless, the praxis and ethos of participation in partnership does not necessarily meet, since constraints both at the institutional and individual levels affect community members’ ability to exercise agency. At the institutional level there are competing attitudes, power struggles particularly within local government as well as hostility between the public and private sectors which can enable some and constrain others. At the individual level, participation remains largely rhetoric in which issues of power are not incorporated. Constraining structures are not recognized or tackled right from the start of the project. For example, issues such as social and financial marginalization were wiped out and political divergences were not acknowledged. Therefore, for instance one partnership which was initially innocently attributed as service delivery was gradually re-constructed as a political exercise. Similarly, decision
making in the public realm reinforces local elites, omits others and reduces the potential of some vulnerable groups to express themselves, as attested by both Crewe and Blaikie (P. Blaikie 2000: 1046; Crewe 1998: 174). Views about women’s aversion to participation in public decision-making are partially preconceived, as their social position is also a product of social reproduction in structuration.

All interventions called partnerships therefore are not inherently participatory, but community members’ ability to exercise their agency hinges on the original power relations between partners and how the use of power is negotiated; on the locale and on the constraining structures. Partnerships become enabling processes and provide resources to some community members, but constrain others. Hence, community heterogeneity is evident in the exploration of agency. Not only are community members heterogeneous but also their lifeworlds, experiences, consequent embodiment of agency and relationships to the outcome. This reflection of different lifeworlds, agencies and social relationships has been visualized in this research through profiling to test the hypothesis.

The research supports the hypothesis to a large extent. Constrained community agents do not encounter their supposed powerlessness but instead employ counterpower (as postulated by Giddens 1986). They employ counterpower in the form of passive resistance, negation or active rejection. Sometimes this gradually leads to a situation where community agents deliberately negate any linkage with the social processes that constitute the project or they act against their own benefit. All this resistance leads to an increased social distance from the social processes and its outcome, resulting in a reduced sense of ownership.

By and large, partnership through enhanced opportunities to participate is assumed to improve sustainability, and in particular communities’ sense of ownership. However, field narratives reveal how sense of ownership is a complex issue. A sense of ownership is not a technical issue, and it is not a rational issue. Negating agency during the later phase of a project supports the hypothesis by reducing the sense of ownership but otherwise there are several factors such as labour contributions, the utility value of the outcome, and expectations for personal benefits which can all contribute towards it; albeit none of them is a sufficient condition. For example the positive utility value of the outcome would not guarantee residents demonstrating a sense of ownership. Therefore, partnership alone as an implementation framework can not be attributed to community agents’ sense of ownership; on the contrary, partnership can disguise continuously unequal power positions which can impair the sense of ownership.
The research studied how non-participation during the later phase affected the sense of ownership, not how a sense of ownership is acquired which evidently would require a proper thick ethnographic research (Geertz 1973). However, field interviews indicate that there might be a weak but not direct connection between participation and a sense of ownership which leads to an understanding that participation could be considered as a propitious (but not sufficient) approach for acquiring a sense of ownership.

Conclusion 3: Indigenous knowledge systems and local power space play a crucial role in the construction of a partnership.

The research reveals many concerns about partnerships. Ethnocentrism in the planning of partnerships is a highly compromising factor. Through the participation paradigm which is grounded in rational Western knowledge systems, formal Western decision-making institutions have been installed for participatory interventions instead of studying local or traditional ones, which could be more difficult to process and possibly are not even concurrent with Western governance models as Mohan has asserted (2001). Local knowledge systems, and political and social dynamics have a strong bearing on how individuals perceive decision making elements such as participation through committees or public meetings, but these views have not been incorporated in partnership formulation. This contributes to the reinforcement of structural constraints and circumscribes the opportunities of the disenfranchised to express their voice.

As a rule, a community is addressed as a unity which practices collective participation, agency and demonstrates a sense of ownership. However, the field research indicates that there are notable divergences inside any single community. Since the internal diversity and power relations are not considered, it prevents the formulation of a fair uniform voice. The voice of disenfranchised community members remains unheard while the voice of the elite with prerogatives dominates. Similarly, inside a community there are individuals with different personal expectations, and individuals who are not at all interested in altruistic community development; these agents all demonstrate different accounts about their agency or sense of ownership. Thus, this research confirms the questions that several critical academics such as Mohan (2001), Cleaver (1999), and Green (2001) have already revealed: who constitute the community; whose is the community voice and how is it channelled?

Artificially created or elite steered CSOs which are believed to empower and represent local communities, actually block community members’ access to decision making. As Dill and Longhofer (2006) assert, they represent international imports of development practices, and their relentless promotion has actually reinforced the proliferation of distorted participation.
mechanisms. Similarly, CBOs’ political connotation or their mismanagement leads them to losing legitimacy in the eyes of communities, as their ideas, values or agendas diverge from that of the communities. The field interviews reveal clearly what Mohan (2002) and Lyons and Smuts (1999) claimed: local elites such as CBO leadership do not represent “local people”; on the contrary, they can be patronising, and employ dominating discourses. Hence, this research shows that a questionable CBO legitimacy turns into a constraining factor, impedes community members from exercising their agency as documented for example by Shivji (Shivji 2002 in Mbilinyi 2005).

**Conclusion 4: Mainstream arguments for cost-sharing and resource synergy are questionable**

The assumed benefits of community contributions are not substantiated despite buttressing much neo-liberalist rhetoric. These partnerships verify that the demands for cost sharing frame people’s participation and bolster the impeding impact of financially constraining structures. Contribution demands prevent poorer people from participating in meetings, thus constraining their agency and perpetuating their marginalization. Simultaneously, community contribution creates free-riders as contribution demands are not enforced uniformly. Thus, these neo-liberalist development practices blight communities with inequality as Rose (2003) revealed in Malawi.

Considering the delays in implementation (which inevitably cost money); the fractions it causes inside the community (free-riders and opposing individuals); how it destroys social cohesion and impedes the participation of many people; community contribution would be difficult to justify. There is no proof that a cost-sharing component (in monetary terms) improves the sense of ownership as commonly claimed; on the contrary, by diminishing agency it reduces the attachment to the process and consequently the acquired sense of ownership.

**Conclusion 5: Like any development intervention, partnership can cause negative social changes within the community**

Though partnership has been envisioned in rhetoric as a positively transformative process, enabling communities to become empowered and enhancing their opportunities for participation, it offers little, if any space for improving the social and political spaces of community members. Essentially, this research reveals that few positive transformations and movements had taken place; initially, there were moments but they were lost mainly due to the lack of attention to structural constraints. However, some of these partnerships involved other components aiming at the capacity building and training of community members, which might have had a positive impact on selected community member’s life. But if partnership is delinked from social and
political power practices, ignoring constraining structures affecting community agents as Green claimed (2001); it would not bring about social or political changes. Hence, partnerships as currently practiced can foster negative transformation inside the communities, such as divisions between community members and the erosion of social capital.

There is no indication that the erosion of social capital or dominating discourses of the elite are consequences of partnership as a social practice, but they were mainly caused by inattention to the social and political relations between community members in project formulation; of the indigenous knowledge systems, misinterpretations and coercive practices regarding CBOs representing communities that lead to the questioning of their legitimacy. This is analogous to Nnkya’s accounts on participatory planning exercises in Mwanza, where he attests that the problem of failed planning was not in the approach of participatory planning itself but in the way it was conducted (Nnkya 2006).

In conclusion, partnership can deliver infrastructure and services. When communities can genuinely participate, partnership can lead them to feel a sense of ownership and responsibility for the outcome. Partnership which employs ethnocentric approaches in participation institutions and which ignore social and power spaces cannot change much inherent power asymmetries and related reduced agency; at worst it can reproduce inequality patterns in society.

8.6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The research generates various policy implications. Indigenous knowledge systems should be given more upfront attention in understanding local participation mechanisms. Currently, modern Western decision-making structures have been practically imposed on African societies, where indigenous cultures and social structures have been and still are different from European ones. Local culture, values and institutions have not changed at the same pace; therefore, these imposed practices are at variance with local ones. For example, there are various channels, which ordinary community members can use for representing their opinions: via more respected kin members, local political structures, more assertive community members and church elders. It would be necessary to consider how these mechanisms to raise voice could be incorporated in the frames of participation to be applied in “participatory” interventions.

Similarly, this implies that the involvement of CBOs should rise inherently from the community and it should be considered critically. As CBO legitimacy is socially constructed, CBO legitimacy should begin with the community. Development practices should study ways to give more attention to the invisible but crucial parts of civil society and the potential inclusion of local groups such as savings rings which represent strong social capital.
Current research and development operations concentrate widely on studying participation, how people participate, but less attention is paid to people who do not participate, why they are not able or willing to exercise their agency and what are the constraining structures. Therefore, understanding constraints, social and political relations in each locale would be a necessary step to include into policy and plan measures to mitigate the impact of constraining structures and elite capture, as suggested by Lyons and Smuts (1999).

Partnerships should be implemented in a smaller form, at a more local scale. As this research indicated, local government is not a monolithic actor, neither are communities homogenous, therefore partnerships in a smaller dimension should be the starting point, particularly when partnership is a novel idea and a model for development.

Compulsory community contribution — approaches should be studied carefully. Based on this research, cash contribution does not justify the time and resources its collection requires; and it leaves a community divided. Compulsory community contribution approaches also require transparency, communities have to have access to global expenses to justify their part of payment. Thus, for example the WB policies on imposed community level cost-sharing should be reviewed critically. If currently in DSM local governments themselves pay the upfront as “community contribution”, it reveals how little faith they have in the system and how false the basis is. Instead, cash contributions should be used only for provision of personal goods such as house connections.

The areas where tenants form a notable part of the population form a conundrum. Tenants usually are not willing to participate in any improvement initiatives. Since their landlords themselves do not live there, neither are they interested to pay or invest efforts on improved living conditions unless they can raise rent. As a result, improved conditions might force tenants out if rents are increased. Therefore, in these areas policies should consider how to deal directly with landlords; how to ensure that tenants have an incentive to support development projects and that they draw positive experiences from area upgrading instead of facing losses.

8.7 CONTRIBUTION TO EXISTING KNOWLEDGE

The study attempted to advance knowledge about social power processes related to partnership at ordinary people’s level. In general, this thesis addressed gaps in current research of partnership and other collaborative relationships. Though partnerships are already fairly widely contemplated in policy papers and there is some experience of partnerships in the production of basic infrastructure in developing countries, they have mostly been studied either from the western point of view such as PPPs in the UK (see eg Hastings 1996; Plummer 2002), which are
theoretically situated closer to contracting than to genuine partnerships, or the focus has been on partnership as a tool for democratisation mostly in a Western context, in particular for improvement of local democracy such as urban regime (Stoker and Mossberger 1994; Stone 1989). In health care, communities’ roles in partnership have been given notable attention (for instance Cornwall et al. 2000), but those interventions are more a part of continuous health care practice, which usually does not include the production of infrastructure.

In Tanzanian development strategies and policies partnership has been strongly advocated as a policy and implementation tool, but existing partnerships have not been critically examined, particularly by deploying qualitative methodology. Elsewhere, there have been some suggestions to look for creative co-production solution for service production with the poor (Joshi and Moore 2002); to study partnership interfaces and power processes (Elander 2002; Lister 2000), partnership in service delivery (Cornwall et al. 2000) and in particular partnerships with communities (Cleaver 1999; Smith and Beazley 2001). Research in general and particularly regarding services delivery in urban Tanzania, and in Dar es Salaam neighbourhoods has been based either on quantitative approaches or the qualitative approach has been targeted mainly at key informants, not ordinary residents (Kyessi 2002; Mulengeki 2002).

Moreover, there has been ontological inconclusiveness regarding the interpretation and deployment of the concept of partnership (Fowler 2000; Harrison 2002; Mercer 2003). Therefore, as a theoretical contribution, this research also attempted to create a conceptual model of partnership-like collaborative relationships in service production. The model could be applied in the identification of factors influencing the relationship and interfaces between partners, in particular in relation to communities.

Another theoretical contribution of this thesis was the employment of Structuration Theory. Structuration Theory has been applied in management, accounting (Bryant and Jary 2001), nursing studies, etc but not in relation to partnerships. It has been applied few times in the analysis of participatory projects (Norman Long and van der Ploeg 1994) or in urban development context (Moos and Dear 1986; Roitman 2008). Thus, the study attempted to employ Structuration Theory in the exploration of partnerships, particularly in urban contexts.

In addition, little empirical evidence has been acquired about communities’ position and power in partnerships. First, the literature review encouraged, and then the theoretical submerging into the concept of community guided this research into understanding partnership as a socially constructed process; deployment of community agents as a point of departure; and studying their agency and the structural constraints framing it and reproducing the process.
Another empirical contribution of the thesis is to build knowledge about partnerships with communities in a time-space dimension, investigating four contextually and institutionally different partnership interventions in two phases each, acknowledging the transformation from the planning phase to the implementation phase. The temporal dynamics is an aspect which is rarely touched on in empirical research both regarding partnerships and participation in general.

To understand community heterogeneity, profiling of community agents grounded in their experienced agency and expressed sense of ownerships was a methodological contribution. This research experience also encourages further study of the feasibility of agent profiling in planning and implementation, not only in research.

8.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
As stated in the methodological chapter, the study is limited by time and other resources to an area in one Sub-Saharan African capital, Dar es Salaam.

Available resources also limited the depth of the qualitative research. These areas are complex in terms of their institutions, structures, and the relationships between different actors.

The partnerships investigated had been implemented several years ago. Therefore, many persons involved were not available for interviews, particularly expatriate staff who had moved away.

Being a foreigner, non-native speaker of Swahili and not having been resident in the city limited the understanding of some issues related to local cultures, attitudes and customs, though living with Tanzanians, extensive field experience elsewhere in the neighbouring countries and the experience of other Bantu cultures helped in getting acquainted with the cultural context of ‘Bongo’.

8.9 FURTHER KEY FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION
By and large, partnership as a tool for service delivery deserves more field research in development contexts. This research undeniably whetted the appetite to learn more about the internal dynamics of partnerships and it revealed several fields of knowledge which need further research, particularly empirical research.

There are several issues affecting partnership’s feasibility and sustainability which require a deeper inspection, in particular when partnership is established with communities, often deemed to be the weaker partners at least in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, it is suggested that a mixed methodology of both quantitative methodology with sufficient sampling and qualitative methods including ethnography is needed in order to understand even deeper social practices in defining
partnership and the consequent impact on diverse community residents; understand what partnership actually means to them.

Another focus would be to further explore the heterogeneity of urban communities, and their connection with partnerships as well as the complex inter-linkages of livelihood issues as suggested by Cleaver (2001).

Community (cash) contribution remains a controversial, contested idea, and deserves far more attention than it has been granted. For instance, there is an urgent need to explore the issues related to compulsory contributions. The employment of quantitative methodology would be beneficial to discover the actual magnitude of effected contributions, their impact on individual households as well as the potential which might exist.

As this research revealed, a sense of ownership and its linkage to the production process is a very complicated issue. To achieve a more comprehensive picture it is therefore suggested that ethnographic methods need to be applied to arrive into a thick description on sense of ownership and its connection with different analytical factors of community members’ agency, in different interventions and contexts.

The idea of a CBO automatically being legitimate and responsive to a community has been highly contested. How urban and rural communities are organised now, how they would like the organisational form to be in the future needs further study instead of imposing exogenous ideas about geographically defined CBOs (Dill and Longhofer 2006). For example it could reveal if there are any indigenous groupings within the community which might offer a pertinent, legitimate and representative starting point for development activities.

Similarly, further studies are needed on the understanding of what would be the way to mitigate the impact of constraining structures on the disenfranchised. For example, Lyons and Smuts (1999) suggested using stronger outside management to prevent elite capture which could be one of the potential ideas to be investigated.

Finally, MDGs and many PRSPs’ development targets have been criticised for being isolated from the real world and from the societal structures which should be the channels to deliver answers to the development of MDGs (Satterthwaite 2003). Therefore, more attention should be given to understanding the resources and actors which participate in service delivery, how much communities are able to participate in cost-sharing and what kind of implementation mechanisms, tools and resources are necessary. Linking to the framework of local governance,
civil society and partnerships is imperative to getting a realistic perspective, since the question is not only about outcome, but also about inputs.
Annex 1

Field research: Typology of partnership interventions in DSM (partnership widely defined) in 2006

1. Partnership between donors, LGs, CSOs and communities (partnership defined by the donor)
   - SDP, CIP (WB, etc) partnership with local CBOs in Hana Nasif, Kijitonyama, Tabata
   - CIUP (WB)
     - only few CSOs as communities rejected most of the CBOs, NGOs not being representative.
   - Safer cities (Habitat) same, directly with communities
   *Verdict: included to study population*

2. Partnerships with INGOs
   - INGO such as Concern International creating a partnership with local CBO/NGO and municipality, based on a tripartite agreement
   - Plan Intl provided buildings, municipality provided plot and compensated resettlement
   - Water-Aid (water supply), Care (income generation), Oxfam (education, livelihoods etc), Save the children (healthcare, schooling for children)
   *Verdict: included to study population*

3. Municipalities directly with communities or local CSOs
   - only in small activities such as a municipality asked communities to control land use
   - religious organisations working in collaboration, but still rather independently
   *Verdict: no suitable projects including basic infrastructure*

4. Partnership directly with communities for example evolved self-help schemes such as WB funded social action funds (TASAF) and Primary education funds (PEDP)
   - communities participate in the definition of the activities and they provide labour (in TASAF they get a compensation, but less than normal wages, in PEDP labour is their contribution)
   - TASAF administration is attached to the functioning of municipalities, but it is not an integrated part of them, it is more networking between LG officers, TASAF and communities
   - PEDP is centralised, but funds planned and administered by LGs who provide technical assistance
   *Verdict: included, if potential projects found*

5. Contracting/ outsourcing with CSOs, PPP, partnership features:
   - municipality contracts out waste collection to CSOs and private companies. In the beginning of re-organizing waste management, municipality lent equipment to private companies and CBOs, and gave them grant to buy own equipment, so they got their activities started
   - thus, CBOs transform themselves to enterprises with the assistance of LG
   - little space for community participation (Kaare 2000)
   - Government channels funding to private sector such as LGCDF: municipality contracts out construction of different facilities, using mainly local government capital development funds LGCDF. Implementation done by local service providers, that is to say private companies and CSOs (this is not yet clear)
   - funds released only recently in Ilala, not yet in Kinondoni
   *Verdict: not partnership as per definition of this study*
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