Constructing Ionian Identities:

The Ionian Islands in British Official Discourses: 1815-1864

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

to

University College London

2009
I, Maria Paschalidi, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
Abstract

Utilising material such as colonial correspondence, private papers, parliamentary debates and the press, this thesis examines how the Ionian Islands were defined by British politicians and how this influenced various forms of rule in the Islands between 1815 and 1864. It explores the articulation of particular forms of colonial subjectivities for the Ionian people by colonial governors and officials. This is set in the context of political reforms that occurred in Britain and the Empire during the first half of the nineteenth-century, especially in the white settler colonies, such as Canada and Australia. It reveals how British understandings of Ionian peoples led to complex negotiations of otherness, informing the development of varieties of colonial rule. Britain suggested a variety of forms of government for the Ionians ranging from authoritarian (during the governorships of T. Maitland, H. Douglas, H. Ward, J. Young, H. Storks) to representative (under Lord Nugent, and Lord Seaton), to responsible government (under W. Gladstone’s tenure in office). All these attempted solutions (over fifty years) failed to make the Ionian Islands governable for Britain. The Ionian Protectorate was a failed colonial experiment in Europe, highlighting the difficulties of governing white, Christian Europeans within a colonial framework.
Acknowledgements

I owe many thanks to the UCL Graduate School and the Royal Historical Society, which have supported my research trips throughout this project.

I want to thank the librarians, archivists, and staff especially at the British Library, University of London libraries, and the National Archives for their help. Many thanks, in particular, to Jonathan Bush at the University of Durham, who arranged to send me the Grey Papers. Thanks, too, to Andreas Papadatos, the ‘soul’ of the Reading Society of Corfu, for his wealth of knowledge and unfailing assistance with my last minute requests in sending material for me.

I also want to thank the Curcumeli-Rodostamo family, particularly Piero and Mischel, for allowing access to their private archive, and especially Irene Curcumeli-Rodostamo for her time in helping me decipher the difficult handwriting of Henry Ward’s letters.

I am indebted to my supervisor, Catherine Hall, for her interest, advice and assistance in guiding my work. In a very difficult personal time she offered me invaluable support, and encouragement to carry on with this thesis, which is much appreciated.

I am grateful to my second supervisor, Dr. Axel Korner, for his valuable suggestions and comments for the revision of this thesis and for recommending the Marie Currie Eurodoctorate programme in Social History of Europe and the Mediterranean to me.
I owe a great debt to Alison Kitson, Adrian Berger and Mairi Hendry at the Institute of Education. In my greatest time of need they offered me a huge amount of support and advice.

Being in the University of Venice for the Eurodoctorate was beneficial in many ways, intellectually and socially. There, I have been assisted in different ways by Stuart Woolf, Mario Infelise, Luca Pess and Lisa Cardin.

Venice would have been a different, and lesser, experience if I had not met another colleague, Fiorentina Canstantin, whose optimism and intelligence inspired life (and continues to do so) beyond the books and libraries.

I am also indebted to Efi Avdela, my undergraduate supervisor, who encouraged me to pursue postgraduate studies in history in Britain and whose wonderful friendship, generosity of spirit and intellect has been inspirational in ways that an acknowledgement cannot really express. I also thank her for critical comments, ideas and suggestions in earlier drafts of the thesis, and for always being there for me.

There are a number of people whose support, advice, assistance, good humour, I have relied on over many years and to whom I owe many thanks. These include: Stuart Cocks, Katerina Datseri, Noura and Keti Apazidou, Andriana Zotou, Paris Papamixos-Xronakis, Elias Tsakanikos, Kevin Jones, John Marrill, Kate Quinn, Joanna Bourke, Maureen Randall. Thanks also to Argyris Papasyriopoulos for his valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of the thesis. I owe a special thanks to Alexandra Athanasiou for her love and belief in me.
I own an enormous debt of gratitude to my friend Arlene Hui. She not only generously gave me her time, to edit the whole thesis and correct my English, but also offered her boundless support, warmth and friendship which has meant more to me and my family than we can say and has sustained us all, especially throughout the revision process.

Special thanks also are due to my immediate and extended family for their incalculable love, material and moral support. To my mother Fotini Paschalidi, my nephew Kyriakos, and my parents in-law Anne and Alec Simms, I also owe particular gratitude for their immense time in childcare. I can not properly acknowledge the debt I own to my husband Paul. His love, understanding and unflagging support, as well as his computer skills, made everything possible. Lastly, but not least, I want to thank my son Alexi, for being the most wonderful distraction to the completion of the thesis. It is dedicated to both of them for being the joys of my life.
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Introduction.

The history of the Ionian Islands has been one of foreign occupations and this is reflected in the architecture and the culture of the Islands. Corfu is a perfect example of where East meets West with aspects of both ancient and modern, classical and exotic. “The city was Venetian until 1780… nearest the sea there is the most beautiful esplanade in the world”, wrote Edward Lear in 1848.1 Growing up in Corfu, and crossing the Esplanade daily to go to school, I was always surrounded by reminders of the Island's colonial past. To the east of the Esplanade, Byzantine Greece is represented by the mighty old Fortress, whose Venetian walls stand on Corinthian foundations. The Esplanade’s open nature resulted from the clearing of the medieval town in front of the fortress, built by the Venetians. Its western edge, framed by the arcaded Liston, was a French tribute to the Parisian Rue de Rivoli. At the northern edge of the Esplanade stands the Palace of St. Michael and St. George, a symbol of British neo-classicism, and the most striking relic of the British presence on Corfu that lasted for fifty years. This overlooks the wide green space used for cricket matches, another legacy of Corfu’s last rulers, the British, who also left a taste for tsin tsin birra- ginger beer.

Local history has always been close to my heart. My first substantial work on Ionian history was my undergraduate degree’s final year dissertation, in which I

1Lear E., *Views in the Seven Ionian Islands*, (London, 1863).
examined the establishment of the Ionian education system during British rule. The absence of contemporary research on gender and education in nineteenth-century Greek historiography made this subject especially interesting. My research indicated education in the Ionian Islands in the first half of the nineteenth-century was structured by gender and class differences, as indeed was the case for educational establishments in Britain at that time. Education for Ionian males of the middle and higher ranks was based on science, classics, and maths, aimed at preparing male youth for professional careers in law, medicine, and the civil service. Meanwhile the education of Ionian females of similar ranks was based on ‘ornamental’ subjects such as basic literary and arithmetical skills, music, drawing and languages, aimed at developing lady-like behaviour and seen as preparation for the roles of good wives and mothers. The colonial setting of the Ionian Islands at the time of the establishment and systematic organisation of education for both sexes meant a link to metropolitan needs and was connected with the value of the Septinsula for the Empire. Rural agricultural schools for boys, for instance, were established in Corfu to create efficient farmers since the production of oil, olives and currants gave Britain a prominent position for trading in the Levant. City schools were established to create efficient public servants for legal and administrative duties.

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4 When the term Septinsula is used, it refers collectively to the seven Ionian Islands, (Corfu, Paxos, Zante, Cephalonia, Ithaca, Santa Maura, and Cerigo).
Having moved to the UK to pursue postgraduate studies, my MA in Women’s and Gender History at the University of York gave me a broad understanding of theoretical and methodological approaches associated with feminist, post-colonial and post-structuralist approaches to historical research. My interests shifted towards questions of ‘difference’ associated with ethnicity, culture and empire. I began to think about Corfu in a colonial context and how the British articulated a particular form of colonial subjectivity for the Ionian people. Who were the Ionians? How and why did they emerge in British thinking as a distinctive people? How did British discussions impact on the shaping of colonial rule in the Ionian Islands? What significance, if any, did British discourses on the Ionian Islands have on British foreign policy in Europe? What was “the rule of colonial difference,” the marking of the distinction between coloniser and colonised? These are the research questions that have shaped my investigation in the Ionian Islands.

This thesis considers how Ionian people were imagined in British official discourses. It describes and examines the language employed by British officials, governors, parliamentarians, journalists and travellers, paying particular attention to ‘official’ definitions and representations of Ionian peoples. Using political sources, my thesis explores the ways in which British officials constructed Ionian identity. Their perspectives were never singular but rather multiple, sometimes contradictory, sometimes complementary. Colonial power, however, was always central to the definitions of difference.

Hall C., (ed.), Cultures of Empire: A Reader - Colonisers in Britain and the Empire of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, (Manchester, 2000), p. 7.
This thesis examines the processes of British colonial government in the Ionian Islands. It explores the ongoing discussion throughout the period of the British Protectorate between the governors and the Colonial Office regarding the nature of Ionian peoples and what constituted appropriate forms of rule for them. It explores how British understandings of the Ionian population led to complex negotiations concerning the construction and development of colonial rule. It questions the articulation of Ionian people as “colonial subjects” by colonial officials, and places debates about Ionian rule alongside those about other white settler colonies, in particular Canada, in order to determine the Ionian Islands’ liminal place in British consciousness and the British Empire. It demonstrates that Britain offered Ionians a variety of forms of rule ranging from authoritarian, to semi-representative, to responsible government. For almost fifty years, all these attempts failed to make the Ionian Islands governable for Britain. The Ionian example could be considered a failed “colonial” experiment in Europe. My focus is on colonial perceptions and how the British conceptualised white European subjects. Thus, I only marginally address the Ionians’ responses and counter-arguments to British discourses. But the Ionian voices penetrated and reshuffled, to some extent, the perceptions of the British.

The thesis is structured chronologically around the governorships of eight of the eleven British High Commissioners in the Septinsula. The policies of Sir Thomas Maitland (1815-1823), Lord Nugent of Carlanstown (1832-1835), Howard Douglas (1835-1840), Lord Seaton (1843-1849), Sir Henry Ward (1849-1855), Sir John Young (1855-1859), William Gladstone (1859) and Sir Henry Storks (1859-1864)
are explored, from the establishment of the Ionian Protectorate in 1815 to its annexation to Greece in 1864. This chronological narrative of personnel and events provides the structure to guide the reader through the debates that shaped colonial policies in the Ionian Islands and demonstrates both breaks and continuities.

The governorships of Sir Frederic Adam (1823-1832), Alexander Woodford (1832) and James Mackenzie (1840-1843) are not investigated. Having served under Maitland, Adam maintained his policies and did not merit separate examination. Furthermore, after the Greek War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire had erupted in 1821, Adam’s efforts centred on imposing and enforcing the neutrality of the Ionian government to isolate the Islands from events in Greece. Woodford’s and Mackenzie’s governorships were brief and had little significance for inaugurating changes of colonial policy in the Septinsula and the questions the thesis poses.

The British governors claimed to ‘know’ the Ionians and felt they represented the Ionians ‘accurately’ to colonial officials. That ‘knowledge’ enabled comparisons with ‘others’ under British rule, particularly Europeans such as the Irish and Maltese. As Doreen Massey notes, “arriving in a new place means joining up with, somehow linking into, the collection of interwoven stories of which that place is made”.\(^6\) The policies of the governors in the Septinsula must be understood in the context of “their life histories, and indeed their life geographies”. As David Lambert and Alan Lester have argued, these men made connections across the Empire and their

journeys facilitated “the continual reformulation of imperial discourses, practises and culture”. The thesis utilises, where possible, material on the governors’ imperial careers to trace how imperial perspectives were shaped by multiple factors. Some governors, such as Thomas Maitland, arrived with fixed ideas of colonial rule. Others, like Lord Nugent, employed political or constitutional ideas reactively and pragmatically rather than allowing them to shape their actions. The governors played key roles and the analysis of them, alongside other individuals, helps provide an understanding of the forms of colonial rule practiced in the Septinsula.

**Literature review:**

Very few studies have been produced in Greece or Britain exploring the British colonial administration of the Ionian Islands. In Greek historiography, Panayotis Hiotis’s *I Istoria tou Ioniou Kratous* (History of the Ionian State), Spyros Verykios’s, *I Istoria ton Inomenon Kraton ton Ionion Nison*, (The History of the United States of the Ionian Islands, 1815-1864) and Andreas Idromenos’s, *Politiki Istoria tis Eptanisou* (Political History of the Septinsula) have been standard authorities for academics and students alike for over a century and continue to influence current historiography. Hiotis and Verykios wrote in the late 1870s and Idromenos in 1895,

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periods when Greek historiography was examined in a nationalist light. Like Greek historiography, the history of the Ionian Islands was written from a nationalist angle as a struggle by the Septinsula for union with Greece, presenting groups such as the Risospasti in a favourable light while opponents of union were presented in a negative way. These historians also viewed Ionian society as ethnically and religiously homogenous and, consequently, neglected an examination of the various minority ethnic and religious groups that also inhabited the Islands, thus neglecting questions of power, authority and race/ethnicity. More importantly, neither made connections to or comparisons between British and Ionian administrative, constitutional, or social problems.

While the works of Idromenos, Hiotis, and Verykios presented a bias which has influenced many contemporary Greek historians, there are recent works which have enabled a wider consideration of Greek and Ionian history. Antonis Liakos has offered a trans-European representation of Ionian/Greek nationalism by analysing the links between Ionian and Greek politicians and their Italian counterparts. A number of articles based on conferences and seminars on the Ionian Islands, which take place every few years, have enriched Septinsula history by offering fresh

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approaches and interpretations to political, social and economic issues, with the majority of these works revising traditional views.  Although there has been an increase in research and publications regarding the Protectorate, these works also are hampered by several limitations. One concerns the availability of colonial sources. Some archival material was destroyed as a result of World War II, other material is still in private possession and other papers are scattered throughout the world, making accessibility difficult. For years, many Greek researchers also had limited research funding to view materials in archives in Europe and around the world that would enable a revision of the old monolithic and nationalist Ionian historiography. While there is increasing awareness of new approaches and methodologies in examining imperial and national history, such as engagement with post-modernism, post-structuralism and literary criticism, there should be greater employment of these perspectives to challenge views from the nineteenth century which still dominate Greek historiography.


13 During World War II, the bombing of Corfu and Zante destroyed a large number of archival materials including numerous nineteenth-century Ionian writings on political, economic, and social issues. While Colonial Office correspondence and British Parliamentary debates are located in archives in London, materials of some governors are located elsewhere. For example, the papers of Howard Douglas are in Canada.
More recently, Eleni Calligas’s thesis, “The Rizospastai (Radical Unionist): politics and nationalism in the British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, 1815-1864”, discussed the rise of radical parliamentary opposition to British rule during the 1840s, known as Risospastis, which challenged the legitimacy of British protection and favoured major internal socio-political changes on the basis of the right of “national self-determination and the principle of popular sovereignty”. It is a high quality study of Ionian politics during the British Protectorate. Its focus, however, is exclusively Ionian and there is no concern with the wider politics of Empire. So for example, when it highlights the policies employed by the British governors to eradicate radicalism in the Islands, it fails to make connections between the ideas and techniques employed in Britain during Chartist unrest or with related activities in other parts of the Empire.

Margarita Miliori’s thesis “The Greek Nation in British Eyes 1821-1864: Aspects of a British Discourse on Nationality, Politics, and History and Europe” examines some of the political and cultural influences on British philhellenism, noting in particular the significance of the Greek revolution in 1821. Using sources including travel literature, parliamentary papers, and the periodical press, Miliori examines the impact of contemporary events, including the Don Pacifico affair and the Crimean War, on British opinions that challenged the idealisations based on romantic notions of Greek antiquity. She examined the theories held by Jakob

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Fallmerayer and George Finlay about the racial origins of the Greeks and claims that
the old Greek race had disappeared and was replaced by a mixture of Turks, Albanians and Slavs. These theories influenced ideas of Greek modernity amongst
the British public between 1821 and 1864. Although she does not examine the
various British perceptions of the Ionians, her examination of the ambiguous nature
of contemporary Greek identity influenced the way this thesis has considered the
ambiguous nature of the Ionians’ identity.

Debate, 1862-1881” starts where Miliori’s thesis ends by examining British political
and literary commentary on the Greek state from 1862 to 1881 using travel literature,
parliamentary papers, periodicals, the press, and private correspondence. Hionidis
examines five events: the overthrow of King Otho and the cession of the Septinsula
to Greece (1882-1864), the Cretan insurrection (1866-1869), the “Dilessi murders”
incident (1870), the Eastern crisis (1875-1878), and the final settlement of the Greek
question (1879-1881). Using these events he explores Victorian England’s image of
Greece, examining both individual and collective views of the Greek nation and
“race” as well as the nature of British philhellenism through involvement in social,
political, and charitable groups, learned societies, and examinations of well-known
philhellenes, such as Gladstone. Hionidis emphasises the interrelation between these
various groups and the wider objectives of the philhellenic cause.

In Hionidis’s examination of the cession, he demonstrates the increased attention to representations of Greece in the public British discourse, resulting from the Greeks’ nomination of Prince Alfred to replace the deposed King Otho and the possibilities this presented for adopting a British political and economic system in Greece. Hionidis also examines British perceptions of the Greek character, showing the variety of Greek stereotypes in British literature, periodicals and newspapers, but does not consider the idea of “difference” between Greeks and Britons based on ideas of ethnicity or race. Hionidis analyses the cession from a public point of view but does not take into account the complexities with which colonial officials viewed the Islands and the cession of the political maneuverings by Britain and the European Powers. In the case of the Ionians, Hionidis regards them as Greeks, unlike the Colonial Office, which refrained from unanimously identifying this ethnically diverse population as Greek.

Hionidis also notes the British press “disengaged the case of the Ionian Islands from the debate about colonial policy, consenting to and endorsing the use of the Islands as a dowry to Otho’s successor.”17 Hionidis seems to adopt the view that the Ionian Islands were not considered a colony and does not examine the sense of ownership Britain had over them. The complexity of the Islands’ ambiguous official placement in the Empire, as a protectorate but in reality governed as a colony, is not examined in his thesis. Hionidis claims that in the Septinsula “colonial theories were not applicable, British liberal principles of national self-determination did emerge

17 Ibid., p. 82.
during the examination of the Ionian question”. The papers of Grey, Russell, and Gladstone indicate, however, liberal principles of national self-determination had little to no impact on how British officials viewed the Ionian question. Grey and Russell considered ceding the Islands to Austria in the 1850s to minimise imperial costs, not as a response to the burgeoning Ionian nationalist movement or their own support for other European nationalist movements, such as Italian unification. Gladstone, despite his growing liberalism in the 1850s, did not support the cession of the Islands to Greece until 1862, when Britain found a suitable candidate for the Greek throne. He believed the Greek kingdom was too weak to rule the Islands and was more concerned with the stability of the European order. While some of the press Hionidis examined was critical of Britain’s treatment in “oppress[ing] the national will of the Ionians”, which was compared with the struggles for national independence from Austria by the Italians and Hungarians, Hionidis disregards the official considerations of the Islands by politicians and the Colonial Office. Although some Ionians and British, mainly radical, parliamentarians used the language of nationalism to promote Ionian radical-unionist aspirations, the British government’s response employed the language of colonialism in attending to those claims and disregarded comparisons of British rule in the Septinsula with autocratic Austrian rule in Italy and Hungary. Many British and some Ionian officials, throughout the period of the protectorate, also believed the cry for union with Greece

18 Ibid., p. 83.
19 Ibid., p. 85.
20 Storks to Newcastle, 1 November 1859, CO 136/166; Newcastle to Storks confidential, 10 November 1859, CO 136/195; Storks to Newcastle, confidential, 11 March 1861, CO 136/173.
was, in reality, a cry for constitutional reforms rather than a genuine desire of the Ionians to be united with Greece. This thesis, in considering the official British government discussion of the cession has analysed the complexity, diversity and multiple voices regarding this issue. Ideally, the context and purpose of each voice should be examined to gain an idea of the multiple agendas which existed regarding the Islands and their place in the Empire, a task impossible to do within the scope of this thesis.

James Tumelty’s “The Ionian Islands under British administration, 1815-1864” makes use of rich archival material. However, it presents British authoritarian administration as a just and benevolent policy appropriate to the child-like behaviour of the Ionians. In *Imperial Meridian*, Chris Bayly provides a short account of British rule in the Ionian Islands, discussing the despotic powers of the first governor Thomas Maitland, and placing it in the context of policies across Britain and its Empire. His analysis, however, was confined to this initial period of the Protectorate.

Thomas Gallant’s *Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identity and Power in the British Mediterranean*, reflects the impact of postcolonial and poststructuralist forms of analysis, a similar approach to the one adopted by this thesis. Coming from an anthropological background, he focuses on “the shared interaction between colonisers and colonised … emphasizing contingency and historical agency, to

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examine internationality, to explore the processes of accommodation, and when warranted, resistance”.

Gallant argues the British formation of Ionian identity was complex with Ionians represented as, among others things, “European Savages”, “Oriental Nobles” or “the Mediterranean Irish”, characterised by their violence, decadence, laziness, irrationality, untrustworthiness and propensity to lie. Gallant’s analysis relies exclusively on travel literature, with little information concerning ‘official’ views. Thus he does not perceive the scale and complexity of the shifting language of those involved in colonial policy-making. Rather than replicate stereotypical characteristics, this investigation will present a more multi-dimensional picture of the Ionian population and their similarities or differences with their rulers. Although many images recurred during the Protectorate, the reasons for their endurance may differ. Gallant’s narrative also lacks historical context and conjunctions; he downplays the contradictions in his sources, thus disproportionately privileging the continuities. To support his evidence for the British construction of Ionian identities, Gallant used comparisons with anthropological research conducted during the 1950s and the 1960s in northern and central Greece. While helpful for identifying similarities with other places, explaining the attitudes and practices of nineteenth-century Ionians with comparisons from twentieth-century Greeks leads to misleading conclusions.

24 Ibid., chapter 2, pp. 15-57.
Moreover, Gallant’s use of material explaining the interplay between nationhood and religion in the Septinsula is misleading as he focuses on the predominant Greek Orthodox Church but makes little reference to the ethnically and culturally diverse mosaic which included Venetian, Italian, Catholic, Jewish, Albanian, Maltese and Turkish elements.\(^2\) The coexistence of these various groups created tensions that required continual balancing by the British in order to maintain their rule in the Septinsula. There is a tendency among historians dealing with the Ionian Islands, like Calligas, Gallant, Holland and Markides to promote a hellenocentric historiography. However, not all Ionians perceived themselves to be Greeks and not all the British believed they were.\(^3\) The governors and colonial officials had different perceptions of the Ionians: Nugent, Gladstone and some British parliamentarians, including Hume and Bright, considered the Ionians to be Greek; Merivale and Douglas considered them to be a fusion of Greek and Italian; Maitland did not consider them to be Greek at all; and Storks considered them Oriental. This ambiguity was connected to the geographical position of the Islands. Many colonial officials were not sure whether Ionians should be considered European. In addition, with the geographical boundaries of East and West blurred, as well as what East and West meant for notions of civilisation, so the Ionian Islands’ position as an Eastern or Western territory was ambiguous and understandings of it varied between individuals. In this thesis, the term ‘Ionian’ characterises the

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\(^3\) The issue of Ionians’ nationality took different connotations throughout the British rule in the islands, depending on who, and in what, context they were speaking.
‘nationality’ of the inhabitants of the Islands and was used by British governors and colonial officials alike.

Bruce Knox’s “British Policy and the Ionian Islands, 1847-1864” examines the policies of George Bowen, colonial secretary to the governor, in the Islands and his influence on both governors and colonial officials about the appropriate forms of rule for the Ionians.27 By examining Bowen’s relationships with various officials in the Ionian Islands, including Ward, Young, Gladstone and officials within the Colonial Office, he highlights the connections and relationships between individuals who helped form colonial policy for the Islands and the complex discourse regarding British rule. Beginning with Bowen, Knox briefly expands his discussion to Young and Gladstone’s rule. However, Knox’s examination of the Islands within the Empire is only over a brief span of time, unlike this thesis’s examination of the entire period of the Protectorate. Knox also incorrectly claims that Gladstone offered responsible government to the Islands to reconcile “hellenic nationalism with British protection, subject to safeguards.”28 Knox does not examine the constitutional reforms suggested by Gladstone, nor does he reflect on Gladstone’s support for responsible government in the Islands that white settler colonies like Australia, New Zealand, and Canada already enjoyed. This thesis’s detailed examination of Gladstone’s suggested constitutional reforms, argues that Gladstone offered the responsible government enjoyed by the white settler colonies to the Ionian Islands. Knox also fails to note the

illegal methods employed by Ward and Young, with support from the Colonial Office, to subvert the constitutional reforms enacted by Seaton and strengthen British authority over the Islands. The debate about the Ionian character, so important in the discussions of Gladstone, as well as the governors and officials within the Colonial Office throughout the period of the protectorate, is not considered by Knox. There is no indication in his work of the constant comparisons between the Ionians and British that occurred during the whole period of the protectorate, comparisons which were often used by officials when considering the fitness or unfitness of the Ionians for free rule.

Robert Holland and Diana Markides’s *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960* offers a wider examination of Anglo-Hellenic interactions. For the purposes of this thesis, the book has been most useful in its first three chapters, which focus on Gladstone’s mission and the cession of the Islands. In their examination of Gladstone’s mission, Holland and Markides trace in great detail Gladstone’s movements and travels in the Islands and his encounters with different authorities, which they believe introduced Gladstone to nationalist sentiment throughout the Islands. They discuss the expectations of the mission from both the British and Ionian viewpoints and the background diplomacy and politics that occurred, providing an interesting and thorough picture of Gladstone’s overall presence in the Islands. They examine Gladstone’s reports, drawing conclusions regarding Gladstone’s opinions about constitutional reforms.

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Holland and Markides's focus on Gladstone and limited background on previous governors of the Septinsula cause them to base their analysis of the Ionian situation on more traditional historiography, such as Willis Dixon’s *The Colonial Administrations of Sir Thomas Maitland* and Michael Pratt’s *Britain’s Greek Empire*. This historiography does not tend to treat ideas of race and ethnicity as important. As a result, Holland and Markides tend to generalise the nature of British rule in the Islands prior to Gladstone’s mission. In their examination, Holland and Markides automatically consider all Ionians to be Greeks, discounting the multiple identities on the Islands after centuries of foreign colonisation as well as official British uncertainties regarding the race and ethnicity of the Ionians. Because Holland and Markides's interest is in examining the Ionian protectorate in the “morphology of Anglo-Hellenic relationships”, their examination of Gladstone and his ideas is only within Ionian/Greek nationality, with no consideration of Gladstone’s ideas of the wider colonial framework. They ignore the multiple voices which existed in Britain and in the Septinsula regarding reforms and forms of rule in the Islands. Although Holland and Markides make the point that Gladstone advocated responsible government for the Islands based on his involvement in drafting the constitutions of Australia and New Zealand, they do not analyse Gladstone’s proposal about the nature of responsible government in the Septinsula or Gladstone’s views of responsible government in the empire at large.

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30 Ibid., p. 15.
Holland and Markides's examination of the cession places it within the wider European, and particularly Greek, context. They examine the diplomacy which occurred between Britain and Greece, with a thorough analysis of the moves and strategies devised by the Foreign Office and Greece and how Britain ensured its influence in choosing their candidate for the Greek throne. They also connect the debates about cession with Balkan issues and Eastern question policies, providing new perspectives on the geopolitical importance of the cession. Holland and Markides's examination adds more contextual depth to the already existing historiography on the issue, but they do not view the cession as “purely British policy”. Their examination of Storks’s tenure is viewed as a reaction to nationalist radicals and they do not analyse Storks’s colonial background and policies. Holland and Markides maintain that Storks approved the cession, but discount his attempts to prevent it from occurring or to create policies that would maintain authoritarian colonial rule in the Septinsula. Although Holland and Markides's examination provides an in depth and detailed analysis of the diplomatic discourse surrounding the cession, in their consideration of the Islands they ignore the Colonial Office and its continual attempts, even amidst the diplomacy, to look for solutions in making the Islands governable for Britain.

Susan Farnsworth’s The Evolution of British Imperial Policy During the Mid-Nineteenth Century: A Study of the Peelite Contribution 1846-1874 explores the contribution of the Peelites to British imperial policy during the mid-nineteenth
Her work demonstrates that Peelites believed free trade and empire were not incompatible. Peelites were committed to responsible government which served the maintenance of settlement colonies within the empire and they introduced acts to strengthen the capacity for self-government in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. At the same time, Farnsworth shows that Peelites believed such freedoms could only be accompanied by responsibility from the colonies for their own defense, examining the conflicts and problems regarding the withdrawal of imperial troops from these self-governing colonies. This work is especially enlightening in its examination of the imperial ideas of Gladstone and Newcastle. Farnsworth’s analysis of Gladstone highlights his attitudes and policies regarding responsible government throughout the empire. Although the examination of the Islands itself is brief her wider investigation of Gladstone’s views indicates his suggestion for responsible government in the Septinsula was not to pacify nationalist sentiments, as advocated by the more traditional views expressed by Knox, Holland and Markides, but was in keeping with his hope for a free and voluntary connection between Britain and the Islands, similar to the relationship Britain had with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

David Bebbington’s examination of the impact of classics, particularly Homer, on Gladstone’s views and political growth, are the main features in both his book *The Mind of Gladstone* and his essay “Gladstone and Homer”. Bebbington’s *The Evolution of British Imperial Policy During the Mid-Nineteenth Century: A Study of the Peelite Contribution 1846-1874* (New York, 1992).

Mind of Gladstone focuses on the influence classical works by Homer, Aristotle, and Plato had on Gladstone’s intellectual career and ideas, noting the evolution in his thoughts on religion and politics and how they were intertwined.\textsuperscript{33} Bebbington believes Gladstone’s classical studies influenced his progression from a conservatism where he opposed reform movements to a more mature liberalism where Gladstone developed ideas of morally-based commitment to the family, local community, the nation, the international community and humanity itself. In “Gladstone and Homer” Bebbington explores the reasons Gladstone devoted himself to Homeric studies in the 1840s and 1850s, his understanding of Homeric religion, his development of Homer’s theo-mythology, and the controversy with other scholars on the subject.\textsuperscript{34} Bebbington believes Gladstone’s “labour on Homer” was not just a hobby but was important in the evolution of his politics.\textsuperscript{35} Gladstone’s study of Homer and his consideration of Greek ethnology is important in considering his mission on the Ionian Islands. He was one of the few politicians analysed in this thesis to view the Ionians as Greeks and, as such, to be Europeans.\textsuperscript{36} This was in opposition to most other colonial officials and governors, such as Merivale and Ward, who questioned the fitness of the Ionians for reforms and responsible government, and associated this with their ethnicity.

Recent work on national identity and belonging has been critical to this thesis, as has literature on the relation between metropole and colony. Orientalism, the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{33} Bebbington D., The Mind of Gladstone, p. vii.
\bibitem{34} Bebbington D., “Gladstone and Homer”, p. 64.
\bibitem{35} Ibid., p. 71.
\bibitem{36} Ibid., pp. 65-68.
\end{thebibliography}
“foundational text” of postcolonial theory and colonial discourse, drew on post-structuralist theory to argue the West defined itself against the ‘Orient’ as “one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other”.Edward Said’s analysis of the relationship between the West and the Orient revealed questions regarding the ways Britain “managed and even produced” Ionians “politically … and imaginatively”. Possession of an empire complicated the question where the boundaries of the “imagined community” lay. Frederick Cooper and Anne Stoler argue that “colonial projects were fundamentally predicated on a tension between notions of incorporation and differentiation”, apparent in the contradictions “between a universalistic western rhetoric of citizenship, and its particularistic application in the colonies, and between the notion of universal rights and the militaristic and coercive strategies of racial rule”. The danger that “African rebels or Creole nationalists might seek to opt out of European civilization, [provoked for example, by the Saint Domingue revolution] … raised profound questions about the universality of citizenship and civil rights” within Europe itself.

Imperial historians have attempted to reassess the effects of the colonisers on the colonised, rebuffing the justifications of Empire by highlighting its negative impact, and developing an analysis of the colonies as a “domain of exploitation”, of a masculine (sexual) self-indulgence, or as “laboratories of modernity” where

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38 Said E., *Orientalism*, p. 3.
“missionaries, educators, and doctors could carry out experiments in social engineering without confronting popular resistances and bourgeois rigidities”.

Others point to the “cultural domination, racial exclusivity and violence” and the patterns of “domination and subordination which are always inscribed in the relations between coloniser and colonized”. Historians have also recognised the “planned epistemic violence of the imperialist project was also backed up by the planned institutional violence of armies and law courts, prisons and state machinery”. The above historiography, using the analytical approaches of post-colonialist, post-structuralist, feminist and critical race theory, all focussed on deconstructing, decentring and making connections, exploring the ambiguities and complex relations of power among and between rulers and have been useful for thinking about the ways the British constructed colonial relations with the Ionian people. Neither the British nation nor the Ionian Islands were fixed entities. Rather this work explores the shifting discourses of the colonisers on these categories.

Benedict Anderson’s work on the construction of nations, the ways in which national belongings were forged as people imagined themselves into communities through shared languages or forms of religious belonging, has also been critical to considerations in this thesis. In Britons: Forging the nation 1707-1837, Linda Colley built on some of Anderson’s insight and explored the making of British

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41 Ibid., pp. 5,15.
national identity. She argued it was forged against the Catholicism of continental Europe, and France in particular, through a series of violent engagements and wars. She subsequently developed her arguments, pointing out Britishness was also constructed in relation to its overseas empire. The construction of the Empire as ‘other’, she argues, was possible particularly after the loss of the “overwhelmingly English” colonies in America. This meant the “majority of Britain’s colonial population” was now viewed as non-Western, non-Christian, non-English speaking and non-white, indicating how the ‘other’ is constructed as the negation of the ‘self’. This sense of difference against “which Britishness could emerge with far greater clarity” was also a sense of superiority, contrasting “their law, their standard of living, their treatment of women, their political stability and above all their collective power” against the “alien empire”.

An older established imperial historiography has also been critical to this work. By the 1820s Britain ruled 26 per cent of the world’s total population. However, there was not a singular system of colonial rule as the Empire was widely differentiated. There were dependencies such as India, colonies of settlement such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and protectorates such as the Ionian Islands. Although by the mid nineteenth-century white settler colonies were given representative institutions and the right to control their internal affairs, the

47 Ibid., pp. 316-325.
48 Hall C., (ed.), *Cultures of Empire*, p. 7.
dependencies were governed directly by the Crown. Bernard Porter’s description of systems of colonial rule century reveals:

There was no single language covering the whole empire, no one religion, no one code of laws. In their forms of government the disparities between colonies were immense: between the Gold Coast of Africa, for example ruled despotically by foreign officials and Canada with self-government in everything except her foreign policy...in between Nigeria was ruled by a commercial company, the states of Australia by their own prime minister, Sierra Leone by a governor, Sarawak by a hereditary English rajah... Ascension Island by a captain as if it were a ship... there was no kind of overall logic...

Catherine Hall notes, however, that

the variety of forms of rule was underpinned by a logic of rule - colonial governmentality, what Partha Chatterjee calls ‘the rule of colonial difference’. This distinguished the colonizers from the colonized and was predicated on the power of the metropole over its subject peoples.

This logic of colonial governmentality was complex and contradictory processes were apparent in British rule, as occurred in the Ionian Islands. The confusion of where the Ionian Islands fit within the British Empire never disappeared from British official thinking between 1815-1864. While the Ionian Islands were officially a British protectorate, they were treated as a British colony but without any of the political and economic benefits official British colonies enjoyed.

Helen Manning’s British Colonial Government after the American Revolution, 1782-1820 describes the machinery of government in Britain and the colonies and

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50 Hall C., (ed.), Cultures of Empire, p. 7.
remains an important contribution to the administrative history of the Empire.\textsuperscript{51} It has been particularly useful in relation to ideas about the development of responsible government. Similarly William Morrell’s \textit{British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell} remains an essential work on the motives and characteristics of British policy in the early and mid Victorian era.\textsuperscript{52} This was helpful in understanding the transformation of British colonial policy in the twenty years after the Reform Act (1832) and the role of the colonial ministries of Lord John Russell and Earl Grey in advancing the processes of responsible government.\textsuperscript{53} Several works were very helpful in providing insight on workings of the Colonial Office. Ralph Pugh’s “The Colonial Office 1801-1925” highlighted the changing characteristics of the office.\textsuperscript{54} Douglas Young’s, \textit{The Colonial Office in the Early Nineteenth Century}, covering the period 1801-1830, described the structure, functions and development of the office and should be read as supplementary to Manning and Pugh.\textsuperscript{55} These works provided accounts of the Colonial Office as at the heart of British colonial institutions. They also offered brief backgrounds to colonial officials and their general beliefs and attitudes towards the colonies. These attitudes were reflected in the correspondence

\textsuperscript{51} Manning H. T., \textit{British Colonial Government after the American Revolution, 1782-1820}, (Yale, 1966).
\textsuperscript{52} Morrell W. P., \textit{British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell}, (London, 1930).
\textsuperscript{53} Referencing yet critiquing Morrell’s work - despite it being written “in the decade of dictators” and excused “for his partisanship” when extolling for example the praises of specific colonial governors and officials. Francis M., \textit{Governors and Settlers: Images of Authority in the British Colonies, 1820-60}, (Hong Kong, 1992), p. 242.
between the governors and the Colonial Office, texts which have been central to the thesis.

Imperial historiography of the 1970s, such as John Manning Ward’s *Colonial Self-Government, The British Experience 1759-1856*, John Cell’s *British Colonial Administration*, and Peter Burroughs “Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire” have been standard works in British colonial administration and were extremely helpful for an overall understanding of the evolution and establishment of white settler colonies’ constitutions, and the implications and justifications of imperial rule in general. More recently, Mark Francis’s *Governors and Settlers: Images of Authority in the British Colonies, 1820-60* examines the rationale and ritual structures of colonial authorities, the role of governors and political elites, their place within the colonial communities and the changing patterns of authority. It studies the political culture of British settler colonies and demonstrates how British governors and officials, along with politically active settlers, managed to “turn their new societies into intellectual laboratories in which every item of conventional constitutional belief, party doctrine, and social custom was challenged and modified”. As this thesis questions British debates about appropriate forms of colonial rule for the Ionian people, the case studies in Francis’s book were helpful in offering more plausible accounts of governors’ intentions and behaviour, challenging

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57 Francis M., *Governors and Settlers*.
58 Ibid., p. 1.
prevailing historiographical myths of colonial political culture in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Zoë Laidlaw’s *Colonial Connections, 1815-45: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial Government* is a notable example of recent historiography about imperial governance, “tracing it between metropolitan and colonial spheres and across time”. The book offers an illuminating comparison between London, the Cape and New South Wales, exploring how domestic and colonial policies were closely intertwined and ‘pushed forward into new dispensations’. Laidlaw’s examination of the relationship between the Colonial Office, the governors, and the various military, professional, scientific, evangelical and settler networks which attempted to exercise influence and advance their own agenda offers an important new interpretation of British rule. This approach was helpful in examining similar relationships within the Ionian Islands, where individuals and groups relied on similar ties of patronage to advance their own agenda on the political, social and economic developments of the Islands. The essays in Lambert and Lester’s *Colonial Lives across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century*, especially the chapters by Laidlaw, Brown, Lambert and Howell where colonial governance is examined, has demonstrated that the discourse of colonial govermentality was, in part, a product of the mobility of the governors themselves. This argument has helped in this work’s consideration of the British governors in the

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Ionian Islands, particularly Maitland and Seaton, and how their experiences in other areas of the empire shaped their attitudes to colonial governance.

Hall’s *Civilising Subjects* has also been a guide through this work. The book brings colony and periphery into a single analytical frame. It links Jamaica and England in the first half of the nineteenth century and analyses the construction of Englishness as a product of racialised imaginings, setting civilisation against barbarism, whiteness against blackness. *Civilising Subjects* shows identities were not fixed but constantly constructed and deconstructed. It explores the ways black Jamaicans, in the period after emancipation, were increasingly defined as in need of civilisation before they could become full subjects of the British Empire and hope for political rights. The book helped frame the considerations concerning British views of Ionian people’s fitness for responsible government discussed in this work.\(^6\)

**Constructions of character and race: Britons and Ionians**

The wider aim in this thesis has been to explore British representations of the Ionians and what forms of rule were fit for them. But first there must be an examination of how the British viewed and used the idea of character in order to justify colonisation and rule over other lands and peoples. Stefan Collini has argued key considerations in British character formation were linked to Enlightenment ideas of moral virtue, reason, independence, and hard work. These factors provided the main explanatory framework of civilisation at home and abroad.\(^6\) Political theorists

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such as John Stuart Mill argued “the problem of character is the determining issue in the question of government” and highlighted the importance of national character to English political stability. Key elements associated with an ideal character were “self-restraint, perseverance, strenuous effort, effort in the face of adversity and duty”. These characteristics were necessary virtues that contributed to the moral and social development of the individual and, consequently, of the society. Character constituted a vital part in the vocabulary of political analysis among educated peoples in post-Napoleonic Britain “which insisted on the inadequacy of merely constitutional or legal changes when not being accompanied by the necessary qualities and habits of the people”. Moral character constituted a recurring leitmotif in the writings of Victorian intellectuals; the moral qualities, manners and habits of British citizens were “the prime recruitment for the health of the body politic”, and “fear of corruption” was the main threat to the vitality and prosperity of a stable civic society. This view was relayed into public service, which “was not the pursuit of an individualistic self-interest, but a sense of duty and strenuous effort and an altruistic disregard of private interests”.

Stuart Hall argues “biological racism and cultural differentialism, constitute not two different systems, but racism’s two registers”. This way of understanding

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63 Ibid., p. 36.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 42.
racism as inflected either by notions of cultural or physical differences, has been of vital importance in exploring the meanings of Ionians’ identities, as Ionians’ whiteness meant there were no “clear racial marks”. Thus “colonial discourse had to work differently with a different cultural logic from that which relied on black-white distinction”.\(^6\) Terms such as “barbarism” or, in extreme cases, “savagery” were occasionally used by British writers and officials in representing Ionians and served to highlight the inequalities and the racial (biological and cultural) distinctions between the colonised and the British. They also allowed the British to justify their rule as a way to help these countries emerge from their “state of absolute barbarism”.\(^6\) In the case of the Ionian Islands, Britain could act as a mentor or tutor and oversee their cultural, social, and political development and maturation, and encourage them to emulate the most civilised race in the world, thus utilising “categories and classifications that legitimated inequalities of power”.

Peter Mandler’s *The English National Character*, based on a variety of sources including lectures, sermons, political speeches, books, and cartoons, traces the ideas among the British about their own national character.\(^7\) Mandler argues the British spirit of moral independence was derived from an understanding of Anglo-Saxon society in which each man was “Kaiser and Pope” in his own home.\(^7\) Respect for law, individuality, domesticity, industry, wit and humour, assertions of the moral

\(^6\) Hall C., (ed.), *Cultures of Empire*, p. 27.
\(^6\) Quoted in De Nie M., *The Eternal Paddy*, p. 12
\(^7\) Hall C. and Rose S., “Introduction: being at home with the Empire” in Hall C. and Rose S., (eds.), *At home with the Empire*, p. 20.
\(^7\) Ibid., p. 38.
qualities of women and instilling these principles in children were important traits of English national character in the first half of the nineteenth century and, along with climate and geography, made participation in political institutions and self-government possible. Mandler, unlike historians influenced by postcolonial theory, does not accept racial and biological theorising was central to the intellectual life of the period, arguing race had less influence on British people’s behaviour towards others than Enlightenment approaches to laws, institutions, religion. Mandler noted many “used ‘race’ to distinguish between people of colour and white European but not between Europeans”. However, this was not the case in the Ionian Islands, where race and nationality played vital roles in the hierarchical relationship between Britons and Ionians. Race, as many historians have argued, “was not a ‘fixed’, ‘stable’ and objective category and essential natural category” but had meanings which “changed historically … during the heyday of the British Empire and its aftermath, race in its many guises, ‘naturalises difference’ and re-inscribes the always unstable distinction between coloniser and colonised”. In the Ionian Islands the British encountered a complex, sophisticated, white, Christian indigenous culture. Therefore, the process of identity formation and cultural categorisation differed from other parts of the Empire where skin colour provided an obvious marker of difference and inferiority.

73 Ibid., p. 55-64.
74 Ibid., pp. 72-86.
75 Ibid., p. 85.
Dominant racial discourse at the turn of the nineteenth century was monogenist. Monogenists argued different racial groups were of common origin, which appealed to humanitarians and abolitionists yet did not rule out European ethnocentrism or beliefs in natural hierarchies. Indeed, the most convinced humanitarians assumed there were civilisational hierarchies. Polygenists believed different races were so dissimilar mentally, morally and physically that they constituted distinct and unalterable species, thus justifying white superiority over non-white cultures. Until the mid-century monogenists provided the orthodoxy within British society, though by the 1840s polygenists’ arguments were circulating and gaining ground. This “so called scientific racism” evolving in nineteenth-century Europe, developed from pre-existing conceptions of other nationalities or ethnic groups in comparison with white Europeans themselves. According to Michael De Nie this, alongside the growth of the British Empire, “fed the compulsion to rank cultures and people”. The official correspondence between British officials and the Colonial Office works within a monogenist framework. Ionians were “children”, “corrupt”, “immoral”, “dirty”, descriptions which justified British imperial rule. Ionians were often racialised, cultural differences were naturalised. A racial and cultural chain resulted, with Britons at the top, Ionians at the bottom of the European hierarchy and African and Aboriginal Australians at the end of the line. Within the

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77 Other biological sciences such as cranialogy (the science of skull shapes) and phrenology (the study of the relation between mental abilities and character traits and the structure of the skull and brain size) were closely connected with polygenism in attempts to provide further justification for the “scientific” study of race. See Stepan N., *The Idea of Race in Science: Great Britain, 1800-1960*, (London, 1982); Hall C., *Civilising Subjects*.

context of the Empire, this placed European countries “colonised” by the British, such as Malta, Ireland and the Ionian Islands, in a unique, ambivalent situation.\textsuperscript{79} They were European, yet they were also racially and culturally separate from the British.

As Bayly argued, Britain established an autocratic government in the Ionian Islands between 1816 and 1824 based on “hierarchy and racial superiority”.\textsuperscript{80} The British considered themselves different from other nationalities, including fellow Europeans, comparing and ranking themselves against France, Germany and other nations on numerous levels. Britain’s pre-eminent position in the world, with its wealth, empire, and achievements in representative government, were attributed to its distinct ethnic identity and the collection of hereditary character traits passed down from the original Anglo-Saxon settlers.\textsuperscript{81} Protestantism was compared with, and deemed superior to, other religions such as Catholicism and Judaism. The British had a genius for self-government, industry, justice, honesty, and fair play. Other European countries might share some of these characteristics, but never in the same way as the British.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{79} For example, in Irish historiography there is a debate about whether Ireland was a colony and whether the Irish were racially treated by British. Some scholars reject the notion that Ireland was a colony and the existence of anti-Irish racism in Britain. See, Foster R. F., “History and the Irish Question” in Foster R. F., \textit{Paddy and Mr. Punch: Connections in English and Irish History}, (London, 1993), pp. 1-20; Howe S., \textit{Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture} (Oxford, 2002). Others held opposite views, see, Kinealy C., “At home with the Empire: the example of Ireland” in Hall C., and Rose S.,(eds.) \textit{At home with the Empire}, pp. 77-100; Curtis L. P. \textit{Apes and Angels: the Irishman in Victorian Caricature}, (Washington and London, 1971); Hall C., “The nation within and without” in Hall C., McClelland K., Rendall J., \textit{Defining the Victorian Nation}.


\textsuperscript{81} De Nie M., \textit{The Eternal Paddy}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., pp. 9-10.
Travellers who visited the Ionian Islands assumed the pre-eminence of English culture, often comparing aspects of the Islands’ peoples and culture negatively to their own. While the Ionian Islands were idealised and romanticised by some because of their links to classical Greek culture, at the same time it was a land that had been colonised for centuries by different peoples (Venetians, French, Turkish, and Russians). The Islands, whose resources were exploited by their colonisers, were seen as poor, with little social infrastructure, few modern luxuries, and no distinct modern culture of their own. In travel writer Thomas Ansted’s view for instance, the ideals of the classical Greek civilisation had been appropriated by the British who, he felt, would leave behind on the Islands commercial prosperity and a civilised culture of ball games, dinners, and picnics. ¹³

The travel texts of Tertius Kendrick, William Goodison, Frances Maclellan, Edward Lear, Thomas Ansted and Viscount Kirkwall were published between 1822 and 1864 and provided a cultural and historical background to the Islands. They also contributed to a broader understanding of the place of the Islands in British public opinion, complementing the focus on official discourse. The travellers were unable to reconstruct Ionian culture in its totality and, like travellers elsewhere, they selected details in Ionian culture and used them to represent the culture as a whole. ¹⁴ Their stories were shaped by ethnic differences: they visited many places and entered people’s homes to see, define, categorise and evaluate their stage of ‘civilisation’.

This focus on difference, which included considerations of culture, morality, religion, temperament, and political ability, was critical to British thinking about themselves as compared with other nations and peoples. British travel writing about the Ionian Islands, as with other parts of the world, exhibits this framework of thinking. Though Ionians might have claimed membership of the so called “civilised” world (for they were European), they were denigrated simply because they were not British. Comparisons between the British and the Ionians played an important part in the way that British and Ionian identities were understood by travellers. For some writers, these differences also increased the ambiguity regarding the identity and ethnicity of the Ionians. Dean MacCannell argues that “Ethnicity” occupies the “conceptual space between bio-genetic ideas of race and sociogenetic ideas of culture. This accounts for nineteenth century efforts to fill this space with observations of physical traits, genetic constitution, social behaviour and moral character”.

Foreign travel became a national pastime for many Britons in the nineteenth century and visiting the Italian peninsula and Greek territories became especially desirable as part of the effort to seek a classical and political education. Maura O’Connor argues keeping diaries and correspondence in which travellers “chronicled their experiences became as important as travelling itself”. Upon their return to Britain, these diaries were often published and read by an audience mainly from the

86 O’Connor M., The Romance of Italy and the English Political Imagination, p14
middle and upper classes, who demanded both novelty and authenticity in travel accounts. Travellers’ writings could also influence how their readers might view an area or peoples, but these representations were fluid and representations could be influenced by political circumstances. At the start of the nineteenth century, Greece, apart from her antiquities, the remains of her glorious past, was viewed by many as an impoverished ugly land, full of thieves and superstitious clergy, administered by corrupt Ottomans. But through the poetry of Lord Byron, a supporter of Greek independence, the beauty of the country’s landscape was rediscovered and native Greeks were admired as he lent them a romantic glory in their struggle for independence. They were “the heirs of an antique Grecian world, classical figures in a classical landscape.”

Yet Jenkyns notes that by the 1830s the Greeks had lost much of their glamour and in the 1850s Greek discontent at the British alliance with Turkey in the Crimean War made them “unpopular” with many Britons.

During the first few decades of the nineteenth century, many Britons became fascinated by ancient Greek culture, promoted by the Dilettante society, as evidenced in literature, architecture, furniture and even dress. The fascination with classical Greek cultural artefacts was rooted in the British need “to recognise itself and to find the right location for new and different intellectual dimensions... organising itself around words such as civilisation”. As a result, many writers visiting the Septinsula initially had a romanticised idealisation of the Islands based upon classical Greek

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literature, particularly Homeric texts, and viewed the Islands and landscape with these expectations. Ansted found “the island of Ulysses” the perfect place because the Ithaca of the present was, in his mind, the Ithaca of the past. The houses were remarkably “well built”, “neat” and the roads in “good condition”. Frances Maclellan believed Corfu’s popularity owed much to its ancient history and her English party often engaged in historical studies of Corfu: “With Homer in hand we went on, step by step comparing his description with the scenes around us... this description is correct.”

The reality of life in the Septinsula and of the Ionian peoples was intermixed with myth, history, imaginative and literary constructs of the Islands. Many writers emphasised the double mirror between past and present perceptions of the Islands, which created an unresolved and unfinished process in their formulation and reformulation of Ionian identities. The travellers’ observations about the classical “ruins” also enabled them to “reduce current societies to vestiges of a glorious past”. The stereotypes produced by travel writers concerning the Ionian Islands were not simply an argument about ‘others’, but were characteristic of travel literature as colonial rhetoric, an attempt to convince their readers to adopt a

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93 Maclellan F. Sketches of Corfu, pp. 77.

particular perspective towards a place and its inhabitants.⁹⁵ To some writers, present day Ionians were contradictions of their Homeric forebears and the travellers’ observations provided complex and, at times, contradictory views. Ansted felt the Ithacans were distinctly “better looking, better dressed… more active and laborious… the men are busy … the women are also active and homely and clean … in comparison to their neighbours.”⁹⁶ Yet Kirkwall felt “honest and respectable men like the ancient hero Mitaides were not to be found in the islands” while Kendrick believed the Ionian character and culture was “now altogether as bad as their worth in ancient times was great”.⁹⁷ The middle and upper-class Ionians, as well as the peasantry, were seen mainly as corrupt, immoral, and with degrading living standards. They were portrayed as idlers, reckless and wild, half-civilised, and simply unrespectable, thus unfit to govern themselves. Kendrick believed the Ionians were “lazy” and not taking advantage of the Islands’ rich resources. He felt the Cephalonian cotton production, if “more cultivated”, would prove “superior to [that of] Indies”.⁹⁸ Lear considered the Corfiot villani “filthy, muffy, huzzly, bussly creatures” who seem as “thick as the olives themselves”; they were “idiots”.⁹⁹ Although Ansted found the peasantry “hospitable” and “good natured” and was

⁹⁸ Kendrick T.C., *The Ionian Islands* p. 104.
⁹⁹ Sherrard P., *Edward Lear: The Corfu Years*, p. 31, 92, 124, 125.
fascinated by their local festivals, pilgrimages, dress and folkloric custom, they were also “noisy”, “filthy” “useless” and “ignorant”, with inefficient methods of farming. Their songs and stories, artefacts and tools appeared primitive, surviving from a previous stage of social evolution. In Kendrick’s, Goodison’s and Ansted’s texts, the Septinsula was not only constructed as a place with social disorders (dishonesty, superstition, ignorance), but also suffering from biological disorders, disease and contamination. Popular attractions for the Britons, such as the Lake of Calichiopulo, Lake Corissio and Govino, contained malaria and threatened fever and death. Maclellan, after two years residence in Corfu, summarised the capital of the Ionian state and its people as “removed but one degree from donkeys”. Ansted felt the deterioration of the modern Ionian character was in part due to the mixture from other races noting, “with the Albanians on the one hand, the Venetians on the other and the Turks over-riding both, there is little chance of finding even among the mountaineers much ancient blood of the island.”

Many travellers noted cultural differences of temperament, culture, morality, gender, religion and political ability and interpreted them as differences between East and West, Southern and Northern Europe. Ansted noted the Turkish influence on the Ionians and their culture. Ionians received payment for giving information.

100 Ansted D.T. The Ionian Islands in the year 1863, p. 35, 36; Goodison W., Historical and Topographical Essay, p. 195.
102 Ansted D.T., The Ionian Islands in the year 1863, pp. 111, 112; Goodison W., Historical and Topographical Essay, p. 60.
103 Maclellan F., Sketches of Corfu, p. 297.
104 Ansted D.T., The Ionian Islands in the year 1863, p86.
(baksheesh), drank coffee rather than tea, had different musical sounds, treated their women cruelly and had different systems of inheritance, education patterns and architecture from the British. Kirkwall felt the hot Southern Mediterranean climate produced indolent, passionate and rebellious characters who differed from the disciplined, self-controlled and hard working Anglo-Saxon men born in the harsher Northern European climate. The Ionians were “heaven born songsters... who were sleeping for half the day and walked and sang during the greater part of the night”, boisterous and inconsiderate, driving all the visitors and British officials “crazy” to such a degree that many saw their services in “this vile and abominable place” as a kind of “punishment” by the British government. By his English standards, proper entertainment for gentlemen was provided by clean and comfortable clubs. Kirkwall also felt corruption and acts of violence, especially murder, signified the Ionians’ lack of morals and principles. He found himself “in a land of savages”. Some Ionian groups were seen as possessing ‘British’ virtues. Those possessing the civilised manners, good taste and intellectual ability that Lear appreciated so much were in the upper classes of Corfu. However, Ionian society’s

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108 Ibid., p. 138.  
theatre, opera houses and religious festivals were poor substitutes for the British social life of balls, parties, dinners, picnics and sports.\textsuperscript{110}

As a woman travelling alone in the 1830s, Maclellan challenged Victorian gender ideology whilst noting the restrictions imposed on Ionian women. Their lack of education and seclusion from male society and public places were deficiencies of the ideals required to be a lady.\textsuperscript{111} Their social status was similar to that of Oriental women in their complete subordination to men and lack of control over their own lives.\textsuperscript{112} For example, her landlord’s daughter, Rabina, was destined “to take the veil” while her sister, Glycera, was “betrothed to a man whom she has never seen”.\textsuperscript{113} No Ionian lady could ever dine under the trees in male company, laugh, flirt, talk and enjoy her party as she, an Englishwoman, did.\textsuperscript{114} Maclellan felt superior, an enlightened, modern and independent woman able to travel alone to a foreign country, have unsupervised walks in public, attend dinner parties and picnics, read novels and ride in open carriages; she was enjoying her freedom in contrast to the ‘victimised’ Ionian women. “Thank heaven... that I was born an English woman and not a Greek” she stated. Her transformation from the “modern Babylon... to this little obscure speck in the Mediterranean where the natives were at least three centuries behind us in the march of intellect... and civilisation” was shocking indeed.\textsuperscript{115}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[110] Sherrard P. ed., \textit{Edward Lear}, pp. 62, 212,  
\item[111] Maclellan F., \textit{Sketches of Corfu}, p. 152  
\item[114] Ibid., p. 115.  
\item[115] Ibid., p. 6.  
\end{footnotes}
Kirkwall considered the dreadful treatment of Ionian women as the difference between civilisation and barbarism. He praised the beauty of both noblewomen and peasant women but criticised their subordinate position.\textsuperscript{116} Dinner parties where “social intercourse is raised to the highest pinnacle of human protection” were lacking in Ionian culture.\textsuperscript{117} Colonial society in Corfu “suffered materially from the absence of any lady to do the honours at the palace” and could not satisfy the garrison’s demands for social intercourse.\textsuperscript{118} Ionian wives were not only socially repressed but were also poorly treated in private, the worst sign of an uncivilised society.\textsuperscript{119} He believed such brutality was not solely rooted in poor education but also resulted from the Greek Orthodox religion where, in the marriage ceremony, the religious testaments stressed “let the wife fear her husband”.\textsuperscript{120} Kirkwall, as well as other travellers, believed Ionians could not reach their full potential and political maturity under Orthodox dogmas because of the perceived ignorance and superstition of the church.\textsuperscript{121}

While there were sizable Jewish and Catholic communities, the vast majority of Ionians were Christian Orthodox.\textsuperscript{122} Most travellers did not understand Orthodoxy

\textsuperscript{116} Kirkwall V., \textit{Four Years in the Ionian Islands}, pp. 8, 126, 155.  
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p. 6.  
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 23.  
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., pp. 17, 87, 108.  
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p. 123.  
\textsuperscript{121} Kirkwall V., \textit{Four years in the Ionian Islands} pp. 193-194, 197-198; Maclellan, F., \textit{Sketches of Corfu}, p. 119-134.  
\textsuperscript{122} With this mixture of beliefs on the Islands, there was also a great deal of religious tension, with conflicts between Orthodoxy and Catholocism and Orthodoxy and Judaism. For instance, Kirkwall blamed Orthodoxy, misled by an “ignorant, bigoted and unscrupulous” priesthood, for the mistreatment of Jews in the Septinsul.a. Kirkwall V., \textit{Four Years in the Ionian Islands}, pp. 33, 45-59.
but used it to explain elements of Ionian behaviour. Religious ceremonies encouraged the indolence of the natives and carnival events did nothing to advance Ionian society. At the heart of Orthodoxy was the Ionian priesthood, powerful figures blamed for blocking social and political reforms. Kirkwall felt the priests were responsible for undermining order and encouraging anarchy in the Islands; they not only instigated the uprising of the peasantry in Cephalonia in 1848 and 1849 but also acted as its leaders. Orthodox threatened human individuality and encouraged a static, unchanging Ionian society which believed in absolutism and dogmatism. In contrast, British Protestantism, a crucial feature in the formation of British identity, encouraged individual judgments in religious and social life. It was seen as responsible for the moral reclamation of the falling masses. Evangelical campaigners in Britain targeted the ‘social evils’ of crime, drunkenness and ignorance. The majority of the British governors did not challenge the Orthodox Church directly, except for Howard Douglas. Ultimately, Orthodoxy was too deeply embedded in Ionian society and the British government officially followed a policy of non-interference in religion as they did in India.

By making comparisons between Ionian and British cultures and societies, travellers often emphasised the binary between Southern Europe (Ionians) and Northern Europe (British), East and West, primitive and modern, darkness and

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123 Maclellan viewed Greek Orthodoxy as “a strange mixture of feast and fast, or ringing of bells and muttering jargon”. Maclellan F., Sketches of Corfu, p. 119, 128-130.
125 Sherrard P., Edward Lear p. 32, 89, 90.
126 Maclellan F., Sketches of Corfu, pp. 119-134.
127 See Chapter 3 and the examination of Douglas’s policies for reforming the church for further details.
civilisation. Hence they dualised and hierchialised “others” while also defining themselves and Britishness. The travel writers used common techniques to categorise and define what it meant to be Ionian. Ansted and Kirkwall portrayed Ionians as “children”, a standard colonial trope distancing the colonised from the adult British.\textsuperscript{128} Maclellan and Kendrick did not present them as individuals like ordinary Englishmen but focused on separate body parts, such as overlarge noses and heads.\textsuperscript{129} Travellers also referred to their abhorrent smell and filthiness (also used to describe the British rural poor and Irish).\textsuperscript{130} Ionians of all classes were corrupt and immoral, unfit to govern themselves.

Most travellers felt the solution to the Ionian problem was the maintenance and exercise of authoritarian colonial power in the Septinsula. Ansted criticised High Commissioners who granted liberties to Ionians.\textsuperscript{131} He treated Ionian demands for responsible government with irony and sarcasm, believing despotic rule was most appropriate for them.\textsuperscript{132} Kirkwall held similar views, writing “constitutions must be fitted to those who are intended for, and are not, as some Englishmen appear to imagine, like the ready made garments of certain Hebrews warranted to fit anybody”.\textsuperscript{133} He further asserted that “constitutional ideas as cherished by English men are simply absurd when applied to modern Greeks in their present state of incomplete civilisation… [the] best form of government for them, for at least fifty

\textsuperscript{128} For example see Ansted D.T., The Ionian Islands in the year 1863, p. 451.

\textsuperscript{129} Maclellan F., Sketches of Corfu, pp. 208, 451; Kendrick T.C., The Ionian Islands, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{130} Ansted D.T., The Ionian Islands in the year 1863, p. 208. Also see Mills S., Discourses of Difference, p. 90.

\textsuperscript{131} Ansted D.T., The Ionian Islands in the year 1863, pp. 462-64.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., p. 451.

\textsuperscript{133} Kirkwall V., Four Years in the Ionian, p 259.
years would be, I am convinced an enlightened and popular despotism.” For Maclellan, the right of the British to rule others was based on a notion of power. She used the following parable: “Did you ever heard the story of cuckoo crab, who forces the poor quiet periwinkle out of his house, and then takes possession of it himself? According to the good old rule the simple plan. That they should take who have the power, and they should keep who can”.

Travel writers did not operate in an informational vacuum and most quoted from official records or other literary sources to give credence to their opinions. Maclellan quoted from Thomas Maitland, whose views were catalytic in the formation of a despotic colonial administration for the Ionian Islands, whereas Lear quoted Bowen and acted as unofficial advisor to his friend Chichester Fortescue, an Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office (1857-58 and 1859-65). Ansted quoted Davy, Mure, Goodison and Murray, while Kirkwall quoted Napier, the American traveller Taylor and Ansted. Many travel texts were found in the ‘Colonial Library’, which was open for consultation by politicians in the House of Commons and Lords and colonial officials. The attitudes the travel writers produced formed part of the colonial discourses which shaped and informed policies in the Ionian Islands. While

this material is important in a discussion about overall British views of the Septinsula, it was not a central focus for this thesis. This dissertation analyses the formation and implementation of forms of British rule in the Islands. While some of the writers were members of the political elite or were politically well-connected, such as Lear, there was no evidence in either the Colonial Office papers, the collections of private papers examined for this thesis or parliamentary debates that the travellers were involved in formulating policies, which is the focus of this work.

**Methods and sources:**

This thesis is based on archival research and close reading of primary sources. It is informed by post-structuralism in the sense that it utilises the method of discursive analysis. All the sources, colonial and parliamentary papers and the press, were aspects of British discourses about the Ionian people, where the power to occupy and administer ‘others’ facilitated assumptions about ‘us’ and ‘them’. These discourses both perpetuated and altered various images of Ionian character, morals and customs, which were often utilised by the ruling government as justification for colonial rule. Working from the supposition that categories such as race and ethnicity are culturally constructed, this work uses post-colonial discourse analysis to explore

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British ambiguities in their representations of Ionians throughout the period of British rule, focussing on the shifting terminology associated with colonial subjects. This form of analysis examines the cultural, intellectual, or political processes utilized to create, perpetuate, or dismantle constructions of colonies and their peoples.\textsuperscript{138}

With the ‘traditional historians’ concept of change over time, “comes a belief in the validity of human experience and the idea that we can tell a story”.\textsuperscript{139} The story in this thesis is the chronology of the Protectorate, how its ambiguous nature led to the ambiguous and, occasionally, contradictory nature of British rule. This thesis is structured chronologically, examining the governors’ tenure individually. Each governor had his own unique experience in various areas of colonial and civil administration. The structure utilized in this thesis enables an examination of how their professional experiences shaped their rule on the Islands and were also reflective of current political views, particularly those in the Colonial Office, about the Empire. The governors often, but not always, reflected similar opinions about colonial rule as their superiors in the Colonial Office and the government. They corresponded frequently with London about events in the Islands and sought advice about appropriate action necessary for the Islands.

This thesis is predominantly based on colonial correspondence and utilises the British governors’ correspondence with the Colonial Office (the department

responsible for supervising the governmental and financial affairs of British overseas possessions) along with the analysis of parliamentary papers. These sources provide the official discussion of the definition, representation and classification of Ionian peoples. They show how the discourses surrounding the Ionian Islands evolved as the British government itself changed. Shifts in political power and government between Whigs and Tories occurred throughout the period of the protectorate, with administrators from both parties governing simultaneously, in both the Colonial Office and in the Islands. They reflect the variety of official opinions and the use of different languages to describe the Ionians and their character, as well as their place within the wider context of the British Empire. The governors’ correspondence enable a thorough examination of the, at times, contradictory and contestatory relationships between the various Colonial Secretaries and Colonial Governors. They also show how officialdom dealt with the realities of governing the Islands with their unique status as a Protectorate. They reveal the economic and social effects of British rule on the Islands, and the increasingly vocal Ionian demands for self-government and unification with Greece. The correspondence also enables an examination of uncensored discussions between the Governors and Secretaries, which were not always provided to the British Parliament when they debated Ionian issues.

In addition to the correspondence with the Colonial Office, several collections of private papers have been examined. These include the papers of Thomas Maitland, Lord John Russell, Sir Henry George Grey, John Young and
William Gladstone. Collectively these papers revealed the politicians' perceptions of the Protectorate and its form of rule. Most also revealed the networks within which these men operated, providing an insight into the contacts, patronage and negotiating that occurred within the Colonial Office, thus adding greater complexity and depth to the way in which colonial power and governance was perceived. These letters also reveal the complex attitudes of those who held colonial power and how perceptions of colonial rule were not consistent. While some officials came to the Septinsula with concrete ideas about the Islands' place in the Empire and the forms of rule necessary, others exhibited greater flexibility regarding British colonial power.

Maitland's papers contain correspondence with William A'Court, the British Envoy in Naples and Lord Henry Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary. Maitland's correspondence with A'Court presents a more complex portrait of Maitland's character. It also reveals discussions over politics in the Mediterranean and the various forms of rule seen as necessary to maintain Britain's predominance in the region. Maitland's correspondence with Bathurst contained in the Colonial Office papers do not shed any further information about Maitland's rule in the Septinsula. It does, however, reveal the strategic importance Maitland placed on the Mediterranean and an alliance with the Ottoman Empire to maintain Britain's imperial aspirations.

The papers of Russell and Grey are focused on the period when Ward was High Commissioner of the Septinsula. Their papers reveal the complex political networks, relationships and system of patronage that existed between Russell, Grey, Ward, and Benjamin Hawes, the Under-Colonial Secretary. Ward's letters to Russell
and Grey reflect his friendship with them and his benefit from their patronage. They also reveal his attempts to advance his political ideas about rule in the Septinsula and to safeguard their support. Although Russell's and Grey's replies are not included in either collection, Ward's letters hint at their responses. The letters between Russell and Grey continue the discussion about the place of the Islands in the Empire. In Grey's collection, the correspondence between Ward and Hawes sheds light on the complexities Ward experienced as governor. While these issues are thoroughly covered in the Colonial Office papers, this private correspondence further indicates the frustration felt by Ward and Hawes's attempts to mediate a conflict between Ward and Grey.

Young's papers consist of his correspondence with the Colonial Office. While Young's papers, on the whole, are not dissimilar to the material in the Colonial Office papers, they do present in greater depth his considerations of possible forms of government for the Islands. They also reveal his patronage of George Bowen, Secretary to the Governor, who would become an advisor to Gladstone and Storks. The examination of Gladstone's papers is focused between 1858 and 1859, covering the period when he was High Commissioner including the months before and after his term of office. They indicate the expectations about his mission. They present a variety of perspectives regarding British rule in the Septinsula from both British and Ionian correspondents. These letters are a mixture of requests for Gladstone's patronage in the Islands and other parts of the Empire and reveal a variety of opinions regarding British rule and perceptions of the Ionians' character.
The British Parliamentary Papers provide multiple points-of-view as they dealt with major debates about the Islands, often triggered by parliamentary radicals who were critical of the forms of British rule. These debates dealt with more specific issues concerning the Ionian Islands and allowed an examination of the varying opinions on the Islands and their forms of rule.

The *Times* and the *Daily News*, both of which published parliamentary debates and colonial dispatches, have been utilised to explore aspects of press coverage and the formation of public opinion on the Ionian question. While there are a limited number of articles which examined the debates on the Ionian question, the papers do offer a conservative (*Times*) and a liberal (*Daily News*) view. They both also provided a platform for the Ionians by publishing their articles and letters, allowing them to express the Ionian point-of-view on various issues directly to the British public.

Before investigating the administrative strategies regarding the Ionian Islands and their inhabitants, it is necessary to examine the geographical, social and economic background of the Islands, from their years of colonisation by the Venetians until their years as a British protectorate. Britain inherited intact an Ionian society the Venetians had played a significant part in creating, and this colonial history was important in how the British would view the Islands.
Geographical, social-economic and political background to the Ionian Islands

The Ionian Islands, known also as the “Seven Islands” or “Septinsula” are situated off the Western coast of Greece, stretching south-east from Corfu to Paxos, Zante, Cephalonia, Ithaca, Santa Maura, and Cerigo. During the classical and Byzantine era, the Islands’ unique geographical position had served as stepping-stones between Western Europe and Greece. As a result, from the fourteenth century the Islands were under the influence of a series of colonisers, most notably the Venetians. From 1386 Venice began its occupation of the Islands starting with Corfu and Paxo. By 1684 it had also acquired Zante, Cephalonia, Ithaca, Cerigo, and Santa Maura. After the loss of Crete to the Ottomans (1669), the Ionian Islands obtained greater importance as Venice’s military foothold in the Levant, and became a base from which Venice could defend its position and mount any attacks.\textsuperscript{140} The Septinsula was also a lucrative location on the trading route to the Levant for Venice.

Under the Venetians, the Ionian Islands were organized into feudal fields in existence since Byzantine times. The Venetians appointed a governor, “Provedittore-Generale”, to administer both civil and criminal matters.\textsuperscript{141} He was assisted by an appointed staff of advisors, translators and bursars who carried out bureaucratic services, and by military officers who supervised the local authorities of each Island. Local councils were legislative assemblies consisting exclusively of aristocratic members who also served as magistrates, assessors and clerks in the municipal

\textsuperscript{140} Calligas E., “The Rizospastai (Radicals-Unionists)”, p. 8.
governments. Politically, Venice organised the Islands in its own image, establishing two basic social classes, the cittadini (citizens) and the popolari (commoners), vesting all political rights and power exclusively to the former. To safeguard their privileges and power, the Corfiot cittadini constituted themselves in a separate social class of signori (nobles), mainly landowners residing in townships and restricted from commercial enterprises or professions such as law and medicine. The Libro d’Oro, introduced in 1572, limited the families allowed to participate in the local Assembly. Ionian aristocrats, descendents of Italian or Greek families who had settled during the Byzantine era, made up only three per cent of the Ionians by the end of the nineteenth century. Differences of origin, language and religious dogma produced cultural, economic and political rifts among the Ionians, although common interests gradually forged class identity and unity, enhanced by intermarriage. Ionian aristocrats bought bureaucratic privileges from corrupt Venetian political authorities, ensuring profits for themselves but leading to the exploitation of local inhabitants. Local businesses and Venetian goods were taxed at preferential rates compared to those from other nations. In the meantime, Ionian exports, such as olive oil, currants and wine, had duties levied on them.

By 1800, the middle classes of Ionian society were involved in commerce, usury, small-scale manufacture and land acquisition. During the British Protectorate

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144 Lunzi E., Della Condizione Politica della Isole Jonie sotto il Domino Veneto, (Venice, 1858), pp. 240-480.
145 Ibid.
they adopted British models of business organisation by investing in joint-stock companies, such as maritime insurance.\textsuperscript{146} The commercial bourgeoisie rose up the social ladder by marrying into impoverished noble households, allowing them to obtain political power and secure their own participation in government. However, they continued to believe in the distinctions of class in many social and economic matters and became both supporters of the Protectorate and challengers of its supremacy.\textsuperscript{147}

The contadini, urban commoners or artisans, occupied a place between the commercial bourgeoisie and the peasantry. These popolari lived alongside the signori within the city walls but were politically excluded and economically deprived. The largest populace in the Islands, the native peasantry or villani, were the most economically deprived, socially oppressed and politically excluded group in the feudal, socio-economic structure of Ionian society.\textsuperscript{148} They spoke only Greek in a state where Italian was the official language and retained their customs and religion. Although their situation improved under the British, they remained “a distinct, self-sufficient popular culture…originally directing their protest not so much at the government or the British, as at their local landlords and moneylenders - until the political message of the radical-unionists led them to identify the two sources of power”.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{147} Yannopoulos G., “State and Society”, p. 49; Gekas A. E., “The Commercial Bourgeoisie of the Ionian Islands Under British Rule”.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., p. 15.
Economically, the Ionian Islands suffered during the Venetian era. Venice had encouraged local mono-cultures by enforcing the exclusive cultivation of olives in Corfu and currants in Zante and Cephalonia, creating many risks associated with local soil and climatic conditions, with harvests being unpredictable for olives and easily ruined for currants. Annual grain crop rarely exceeded three or four months consumption and the rest had to be imported. Venetian protectionist policies, which included conducting all shipping through its own ports, resulted in additional import and export taxes on Ionian goods, hampering the Ionian economy as a whole.\(^{150}\)

It has been asserted “the great triumph of Venice’s colonial rule was that, although it seldom governed by popular consent, it brilliantly maintained the illusion of doing so”.\(^{151}\) As Calligas noted, Venice “utilized the local power of the nobility to impose her rule, both parties co-operated in sustaining a system that preserved their rule”.\(^{152}\) After the end of the Venetian occupation, when the rising commercial bourgeoisie challenged the authority of the nobility, the British were more interested in maintaining their own control than identifying closely with the nobility. As Laidlaw has shown, British policy throughout the Empire was to forge political allegiance though governmental patronage.\(^{153}\) After 1848, Britain’s problems may

\(^{150}\) For example prices were kept low due to the existence of a single market, contraband trade and piracy grew, and transit trade that had proved successful in the past, ceased. Indirect taxation “seemed unjust and injurious to trade” but the “Ionians loathed direct taxation, a lesson the British learned in their turn”, see Pratt M., *Britain’s Greek Empire. Reflections on the history of the Ionian Islands from the fall of Byzantium*, (London, 1978), p. 25.
\(^{151}\) Pratt M., *Britain’s Greek Empire*, p. 23
\(^{152}\) Calligas E., “The Rizospastai (Radicals-Unionists)”, p. 17.
\(^{153}\) See Laidlaw Z., *Colonial Connections, 1815-1845*. 
have been enhanced because it failed to secure the support of an entire social class, as Venice had done.

Although the Venetians collected high taxes, they spent little on public works in the Islands. Fear of the plague that had devastated medieval Europe motivated Venetian authorities to regulate quarantine and to establish local hospitals, orphanages and charitable institutions, supervising the health of the populari. However, no educational system was established in the Septinsula. The sons of the nobility were tutored privately at home and then sent to Italian universities, mainly in Padua and Pisa, where they were exposed to western knowledge and progress. They returned to the Islands with western practices, reflected in their language, manner and dress. As a result, music, theatre, literature, poetry and scholarship flourished in the Islands by the end of the eighteenth century, forming an Ionian Enlightenment.

Venetian colonisation lasted for approximately four hundred years before it ended in 1797, when Venice fell to Napoleon’s armies. After several centuries of political stability, the Islands underwent three successive military occupations: the French (1797-1799), the Russian-Turkish (1800-1807), followed again by the French (1807-1809). These occupations in a twenty year period were an indication of the Islands’ geo-political importance during this period of political instability in Europe. This instability also saw political and social changes in the Islands that, while not

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permanent, ultimately had a long-term effect on the Ionians’ thoughts about the government of their Islands.

Napoleon realized the strategic and commercial importance of the Islands and instituted some reforms during the first French occupation. Trees of Liberty were planted and the Libro d’Oro, along with titles, deeds, and heraldic arms, were burnt. The centuries-long domination of the Ionian nobility in the administration was broken. In conformity with the French constitution of 1795, local provisional councils were established in each island, securing the participation of the middle classes, artisans and peasants. Greek became the official language of government, public schools and a library were established and a printing press was even brought to Corfu. However, the financial burden of sustaining both the costly administration and French forces led to increased taxation in the Islands. In addition, displays of French anti-clericalism and atheism threatened the Catholic and Orthodox churches, provoking hostility and condemnation from the Ionian populace.

Russo-Turkish forces, angered by the French invasion of Egypt in July 1798, retaliated by capturing the Septinsula in 1799. The Ionian Islands now constituted a free and independent state under Russian protection and Turkish sovereignty. The new regime restored the Venetian status quo, returning old privileges to the nobles. The Constitution of 1800, called “Byzantine”, was created. The central government,

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known as the Senate, consisted of fourteen elected representatives from all the Islands and resided in Corfu. Social unrest, particularly from the middle class, led to the re-drafting of the Constitution in 1803. This constitution still favoured a restrictive electorate, but created “a constitutional aristocracy based on individual rights and wealth as opposed to hereditary privilege and incorporated enough of the discontented middle classes to stabilize the Islands”.\footnote{Calligas E., “The Rizospastai (Radicals-Unionists)”, p. 26.} A second appeal from the Ionian nobility to Russia for reinstating full power to the Ionian nobility led to the introduction of the 1806 constitution. It did not, however, materialize because Russia broke the strategic neutrality of 1803 and declared war on France. The Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 returned the Ionian Islands to France, and the Islands were administered as part of her Empire.

By the start of the nineteenth century, the social-economic and cultural system of the Islands was a combination of an archaic feudal system of land tenure with strict social categorization and an authoritarian political system that was developed, and sporadically altered, by various European and Greek influences. The Islands also had an ancient historical tradition, a Christian family system, an independent government, European laws and institutions, literature and language. The Ionian Islands were, as Calligas notes, “harbouring explosive contradictions within the confines of their boundaries”.\footnote{Ibid., p. 22.} It was into an area of such multitude and diversity of influences that Britain would arrive in 1809, as their new protector.
Summary of the chapters.

Chapter one explains how and why the Islands formed part of the British Empire, becoming a British protectorate under the exclusive military control of the Crown. It analyses the abstract language employed in the Treaty of Paris regarding the Islands’ position in the Empire. This provided the space for different interpretations by British and Ionians alike and marked their troublesome relationship throughout the “protection”. The British Colonial Office, under the leadership of Lord Bathurst, was determined to make the Islands a ‘colony’ subject to the crown. Thomas Maitland, (1816-1824) the ‘formidable governor’ of Malta, was supported as the first Lord High Commissioner of the Islands. Bathurst and Maitland co-designed and imposed an authoritarian regime in the Islands, under the disguise of the Constitutional Charter of 1817. The chapter explores the making of Maitland as an imperial man and the ways in which he articulated, developed and practised strategies to secure British power from East to West. One site for this was the Ionian Islands and his articulation of Ionians as unfit for self-rule due to the lack of an appropriate political ethos provided the basis for his legitimisation of an authoritarian rule.

Chapter two examines the critics (parliamentarians, journalists, individuals) of this form of rule within the Islands and in Britain. They praised the European characteristics of Ionians either because of an affiliation to the place, or on the basis of a liberal disposition, and they saw the culture of the Islands as Western, renouncing Maitland’s arbitrary powers and authoritative rule. This marked the
beginning of a multiplicity of voices in British debates in the early nineteenth century regarding the ways in which Britain should rule her European territories.

Chapter three describes the contrasting policies, attitudes and treatment of the Ionians of two British governors, the liberal and philhellene Lord Nugent (1832-1835) and the conservative Sir Howard Douglas (1835-1841). In the 1830s Ionian opposition was mostly confined to demands for liberal constitutional reform expressed by the Ionian Liberali. In 1839 Douglas’s persistent refusal to listen to Ionian demands for representative institutions, such as the freedom of the press, and the system of elections, led to Andreas Mustoxidi’s (a Deputy of Ionian Parliament), mission to London. The Colonial Office under Lord John Russell’s leadership rejected Mustoxidi’s requests, but briefly considered more liberal forms of government without any effect.

Chapter four explores the administration of John Colborne - Lord Seaton - (1843-1849), a Canadian veteran of the Empire. Seaton expressed a new liberal line in British policy in the Ionian Islands allowing, for example, the establishment of political clubhouses, political gatherings and printsing houses. In May 1848 he reformed the Ionian constitution, allowing a free press and the control of the finances by the Ionian Assembly. Existing historiography has explained Seaton’s liberal policies as reactions to the revolutionary movements of 1848 that took place in Europe. It does not consider how he carried the Canadian reform agenda for representative government with him to the Ionian Islands, and from his arrival in the Islands in 1843 advocated devolution of authority rather than centralised colonial
power as the most effective way to safeguard British interests in the European portion of the Empire. It was during Seaton's tenure that Russell and Lord Henry Grey first considered cession of the Islands to Austria as a way to minimise Imperial finances.

Chapter five examines the reactive policies of Sir Henry Ward (1849-1854) to his predecessor’s reforms, which he saw as a threat to the continuance of a British presence in the Islands. He believed in Maitland’s ‘old well established status’. Ward wanted to reverse the changes achieved by Seaton, reinstating colonial control over the internal affairs of the state. During this period, the influence of the radicals grew, particularly in the southern islands of Cephalonia and Zante. With their gains in parliamentary seats in 1850 they demanded further constitutional reforms, such as vote by ballot and free elections, as well as challenging the legitimacy of British protection, campaigning for its dissolution and the cession of the Islands to the independent kingdom of Greece. This chapter explores Ward’s efforts to silence radical discontent towards British rule and to eradicate critics from the Ionian Parliament by constant prorogations of the Ionian Assembly. It also explores the networks that existed in the British government and the relationships between Ward, Russell, Hawes and Grey and their private discussions about various policies and what they believed was best for both the Islands and the Empire.

Chapter six illustrates the contrasting policies of Sir John Young (1855 - January 1859) and William Gladstone (January 1859 - April 1859). As a reaction to Ward's policies, the Ionians had become ‘unmanageable’ and ‘troublesome’ and new
forms of rule were being explored by Young and the Colonial Office. Young, having inherited Ward’s policies and a deadlocked system of administration, maintained authoritarian rule. Although he was able to work with the eleventh Assembly and pass some legislation, the publication of his stolen dispatches, in which he advocated cession of the southern islands to Greece and making Corfu a colony, led to his recall. Gladstone replaced Young and was asked to find solutions for governing the Islands that did not include cession. Gladstone, who had been involved in colonial matters, suggested Britain offer the Ionians responsible government. This chapter analyses Gladstone’s vision as to how the Islands could remain in the Empire and be reconnected with Britain.

Chapter seven describes the authoritarian policies of the last Lord High Commissioner, Sir Henry Storks (1859-1864). After Gladstone’s failed mission, Storks resisted vocal discontent from the radicals about the continuance of the Protectorate. He opposed Ionian and British designs for the cession of the Islands to Greece, believing the demand for union was unconstitutional and that he could find a way to govern the Islands. He believed authoritarian rule and material advancement safeguarded the Islands for the Empire. In Britain, both houses of Parliament continued their discussions about the Islands, including the idea of union with Greece as part of British foreign policy. Britain, after having found a suitable candidate for the Greek throne with the consensus of the European Powers, then allowed cession of the Islands to occur.
The conclusion reiterates the complexity of British official opinions regarding the appropriate political institutions for the Ionian Islands and the varied attitudes regarding the Ionian character during the fifty years of the Protectorate. The ambiguous nature of the Protectorate allowed Britain to experiment with different forms of rule on the Islands, from authoritarian to representative government and then to offers of responsible government. The geopolitical importance of the Islands became a factor in Britain's foreign policy. It also highlights areas in need of further research, including further examination into comparative British colonial governmentality for white Europeans.
Chapter 1: The establishment of the British Protectorate in the Ionian Islands: Thomas Maitland and the Constitution of 1817.

Introduction

This chapter will describe how and why the Ionian Islands came to be part of the British Empire. The Treaty of Paris (1815), which placed the Ionian Islands under British Protection, will be examined. It was understood and interpreted differently by both British and Ionians and shaped their complicated relationship. The first British administration in the Ionian Islands, under the governorship of Thomas Maitland, will also be explored. The constitutional settlement of the Ionian Islands and its construction and implementation according to British foreign and colonial policy at the time, will be analysed.

Britain in the early nineteenth century; politics and Empire

By the end of the eighteenth century Britain had lost the American colonies. The infant empire in Asia was characterised by turmoil, warfare, and mismanagement. The French in the Caribbean and Eastern Mediterranean had outperformed English trade. But Britain’s influence and power began to increase at the start of the nineteenth century. Utilising the Indian army, Britain expelled the French from North Africa in 1801 and, in 1809, underwrote the independence of Iran in the Middle East. By 1815 the imperial deficit had recovered and Britain gathered a coalition of European states to oppose French power within Europe. British land campaigns secured great victories against Napoleon in Iberia, while the British navy

destroyed and occupied lucrative French territories in the West Indies. Britain’s Indian Empire challenged Russian expansion in the East. Redefining the balance in Europe and the World, in the West and East, Britain became the predominant power on land and sea. Britain’s European and Asiatic expansion saw the acquisition of territories, and increased wealth for the British crown, and commercial and merchant classes.

A new imperial ethos was created, associated with the marginalisation and exclusion of ‘native corruption’ from positions of power in the government, while attitudes hardened towards subject races. Asians, Eurasians, and Africans, were seen “as inferior either because of climate, despotic government, or ignorance of Christian virtue”.2 It was the beginning of the British “system of authoritative rule”, the building of “overseas despotisms”.3 Britain’s imperial policy in the first quarter of the nineteenth century was “characterised by a form of aristocratic military government supporting a vice-regal autocracy, by a well developed imperial style which emphasised hierarchy and racial subordination, and by the patronage of indigenous landed elites”.4

At home in the early nineteenth century, Britain was governed by parties which represented landed wealth. Ministerial positions in the government were held by the landed aristocracy. Between 1812 and 1827 Lord Liverpool’s conservative policy concentrated on dextrous administrative and “economical reform”, cutting costs and

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2 Ibid., p. 7.
3 Ibid., p. 8.
4 Ibid., p. 9.
avoiding internal conflict by increasing state regulation on trade. Catholic emancipation was blocked and dissenting Protestants were excluded from holding office.\textsuperscript{5}

**The place of the Islands in the British Empire**

When the Ionian Islands came under British protection, colonial and foreign policy was masterminded by Lord Bathurst, Colonial Secretary from 1812-1827 and founder of the modern Colonial Office, and Lord Castlereagh, the Foreign Secretary from 1812-1822. Bathurst was a Tory minister and protégé of William Pitt. From 1807-1830 Bathurst was a competent cabinet minister, serving four prime ministers. He had a reputation for good judgement, amiability, commitment, efficiency, dependability, and conciliatory manners, earning him many friends and supporters and easing any dealings with his more fractious colleagues.\textsuperscript{6} His family background and personality secured him the patronage of every British monarch from George III to William IV.\textsuperscript{7} Under his tenure the Colonial Department became a distinct branch of government. Bathurst improved the administrative routine and recruited and trained staff who provided a continuity of direction through ministerial changes.


\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., p. viii.
Fifteen years of vigorous devotion and energy to his post made Bathurst the dominant British authority on the Empire.8

Bathurst was sceptical of change but did not resist it when the need arose. For example, he recognised the “benefit of acknowledging the independence of the colonies of Britain’s allies, Spain and Portugal, came to accept the wisdom of removing political restrictions on Catholics, and took a leading part in practical humanitarian efforts to improve the lot of the slaves and pave the way for freedom”.9 His biographer represented Bathurst as “far from being authoritarian in the administration of the empire”.10 Bathurst’s polices regarding the Ionian Islands, however, will reveal a very different picture.

Bathurst’s conservative view that Britain should keep her Empire under tight control was the result of past lessons. The loss of the American colonies was recent, as were the long and costly Napoleonic wars. Bathurst connected Francophobia with the outcome of the French Revolution and Jacobin ideas. He feared either a French invasion or an English revolution. Post 1815, Bathurst was a staunch supporter of the conservative and reactionary ideologies of the Holy Alliance. So much so that he advised the future governor-general of India, Lord William Bentinck, against his proposed constitutional reforms while serving in Piedmont, on the grounds that he should not interfere in the internal politics of Britain’s allies. This statement is a testimony of his conservative ideas when it came to popular freedoms in ‘colonised’

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8 Ibid., p. vii.
9 Ibid., p. viii.
10 Ibid., p. viii.
territories: “the formation of a constitution is a very arduous task and what is good for one country will be bad for another. The only thing we may be sure of, is that a constitution given in the lump, must be bad in practice, however fair it may be in theory”."11

Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh became a critic of the new French constitution while visiting Paris in 1791. He returned prepared to tolerate any government, even an Irish one, as long as it avoided revolution. He favoured Catholic relief but was against any parliamentary reform.12 Liverpool, Bathurst and Castlereagh controlled all domestic, colonial and foreign policy of Britain between them with little reference to their colleagues.13

Like other European powers, British foreign policy through the 1810s was built around an opposition to nationalist movements, especially in nations under the sphere of Britain’s influence.14 For example, Catholic Irish nationalism was suppressed by Castlereagh. However, his successor George Canning (1822-1827) did not always maintain this policy during his tenure. For example, Greek historiography notes his support for the Greek war of Independence in 1821.15 Outside Europe, Canning reluctantly supported rebellious Spanish American colonies in 1823, hoping

to avoid the kind of slave revolt in British Caribbean colonies that had taken place in Demerara.\textsuperscript{16}

**British opinion divided.**

British occupation of the Ionian Islands began in 1809 and a sketch of the ways in which they acquired the Islands is critical to explaining their peculiar and anomalous position in the Empire. In official language they were a protectorate; in reality they were treated as a crown colony.

In 1809 the Royal Navy responded to appeals from the Islanders and took all the Islands from the French except Corfu and Paxo, which came into British hands in 1814. The British soon began issuing declarations stressing their aim was to aid Ionians, “to enable them to expel their present oppressors, and to re-establish a free and independent government with the uncontrolled exercise of their religious, civil, and commercial rights”.\textsuperscript{17} However, what British authorities offered as an act of benevolent grace was, in reality, occupation. From 1809-1814, the administrative organisation of the Islands consisted of a British military commander assisted by a Council of the “most respectful inhabitants” of the Islands. Oswald and Campbell, British commanders in the Septinsula, defined Ionians as not ready for self government under any shape or modification.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{17}Temperley, H., *The Foreign Policy of Canning*, p. 9; Proclamation of J. Campbell to Government of the Ionian Islands, 30 April 1813, in British parliamentary papers, \textbf{XVII} (132): *Constitution of 1817*.
\textsuperscript{18}Proclamation of J. Campbell to Government of the Ionian Islands, 30 April 1813, in British parliamentary papers, \textbf{XVII} (132): *Constitution of 1817*. 
By 1814, after five years of occupation and analysis of the Islands’ value, the political fate of the Ionian Islands remained unclear. The British government was divided over policy. A number of different and contesting views regarding the Ionian question were voiced. For colonial officials Bathurst and Bunbury, and commander of the British army in the Mediterranean, Campbell, the Septinsula ought to be annexed to the British Empire. Sir Richard Church, the philhellene and soldier, entertained another opinion. Having distinguished himself in the capture of the Islands and, later, in raising a regiment of Greek light infantry for the Islands’ defence, Church presented a report to the Congress of Vienna where he advocated the Septinsula should form an independent republic under a “shadowy” British protection.19

There were great benefits at stake over which direction to take in the Islands. These included safeguarding British commerce in the Levant.20 The Mediterranean possessions were expected to contribute to the Empire by expanding trade in British manufactures, Maltese cotton, and currants from the Greek islands and securing economic advantages for the British Government. A further benefit was their strategic position and proximity to Greece, the weak point of the Ottoman Empire in Europe.21 For these reasons the Islands were also desired by Russia, who could inflame the situation in the Morea, thus endangering the security of the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean and peace in Europe.22 British foreign policy was aimed

20 Ibid., p. 104.
22 Bayly C. A., Imperial Meridian, p. 103.
at preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, ensuring Russia’s exclusion from Europe, and safeguarding Britain’s passage to her India territories.

Bathurst’s attempts in 1814 to convince the British government that it was in Britain's best interest to colonise the Islands met with disapproval from other ministries. Neither Castlereagh nor Liverpool considered this idea wise. On the eve of the Congress of Vienna, tasked with settling the European territories after the Napoleonic wars, the British cabinet failed to form a unanimous view about the fate of the Islands. By the end of March 1815, Castlereagh planned to place the Ionian Islands under Austria’s protection. Austria, however, desired full sovereignty over the Islands. Having already occupied Northern Italian territories Austria wanted to expand her Empire in the Mediterranean and rejected Britain’s proposal. Russia’s foreign minister, Ioannis Capodistria, a native Ionian, opposed the colonisation of the Islands by Austria or Britain and preferred to secure their independence. His compromise would place the Islands under the protection of one of the Allies, preferably Britain if Ionian independence, promised in 1809, was impossible. At the close of the Congress of Vienna, however, the Ionian question remained unresolved.

In Britain, Bathurst hated Capodistria’s idea, believing it would leave Britain’s position “uncertain”. He supported annexation of the Septinsula into the Empire as part of a comprehensive colonial Mediterranean policy (with Malta and Gibraltar).

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23 Tumelty J. J., “The Ionian Islands under British Administration”, p. 16.
24 Capodistria believed it was the legal and moral responsibility of Britain to undertake this because of the promise of independence in 1809.
Castlereagh was hesitant to claim complete sovereignty over the Septinsula. If British proclamations in 1809 for securing Ionian independence proved untrue, it would be detrimental for Britain’s relationship with her European counterparts, especially Russia. Castlereagh favoured Capodistria’s proposal for the Septinsula to become a British protectorate. But he misunderstood the language of “protection” employed by Capodistria, believing it was a “dressing… so as to consult the dignity of his Islanders, but… he means that they should for all practical purposes belong to Great Britain”.

On Castlereagh’s advice, the British government agreed to Russia’s proposals and the Treaty was signed in Paris on 5 November 1815. This marked the beginning of a tumultuous and uncertain relationship between Britain and the Ionian Islands which was to last for almost fifty years.

**The Treaty of Paris.**

The first article of the Treaty of Paris stated the Ionian Islands “shall form a single, free, and independent State”… placed “under the immediate and exclusive protection” of the British Crown, which would “with the approbation of the protecting power, regulate their internal organization”. The third article noted the British Monarch “will employ a particular solicitude with regard to their legislation and the general administration of those States,…[he] will therefore appoint a Lord High Commissioner to reside there, invested with all the necessary power and

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The Lord High Commissioner was to “regulate the forms of the convocation of a Legislative Assembly, of which he shall direct the proceedings, in order to draw up a new Constitutional Charter for the States” with the ratification of the British Crown. Until then, the existing constitutions would remain in force open only to alterations by the King in Council. Britain also had the right to occupy and garrison the fortresses on all the Islands, with the Ionians liable for the military costs. The Ionian flag would be recognised as that of a free and independent state, but commercial agents or consuls could operate in the Islands.

As Bathurst saw it, the Islands were placed “on a tenure much less desirable” for the British, who wanted “…the direct dominion of the Islands”. The meanings of “approbation”, “solicitude” and “regulation” were twisted in the struggle for control. The document was skilfully and diplomatically constructed. The language was vague and obscure, full of complexities and contradictions, allowing varied interpretations concerning the actual position of the Islands. For example, the Treaty did not clarify the extent to which the Crown’s authority extended into the internal affairs of the Ionian state. Furthermore, according to the Treaty, the Lord High Commissioner ought to provide the convocation of a Legislative Assembly and compose a new Constitutional Charter for the state. The Treaty, however, did not clarify which body would draw up the constitution nor which would vote on it.

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27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Bathurst to Maitland, 2 December 1815, CO 136/300; Bunbury to Maitland, Private, Enclosing the Treaty of Paris document, 26 November 1815, CO 136/ 300.  
was stated that until the new constitution was drawn up and ratified “the existing constitutions shall remain in force in the different islands, and no alteration shall be made in them except by his Britannic Majesty in Council”.  

The existing bodies in the Septinsula that had previously formed the constitution were not authorised by the Treaty to continue in the future. This was the greatest paradox of the Treaty and this anomaly would create significant consequences in the understanding and acceptance of the new order imposed on the British and Ionians. The Great Powers, by refusing to accept Ionian representatives in the convention of Paris and by retaining the existing political form of rule in the Islands, had “detracted from the existing constitutional form of government of the Ionian Islands every legitimacy, when at the same time they recognised the need of its continuance”. The Treaty of Paris established a new void in power that could only be covered by the Lord High Commissioner. This ultimately enabled the establishment of the despotic Constitutional Charter of 1817.

In November 1815, after Napoleon’s return and the dramatic events of Waterloo, the Great Powers aimed to create and maintain a military and political balance in Europe, informed by their highly conservative and reactionary ideologies. As Calligas stated, it was “impossible to let a small and politically fragile state such as the Ionian Islands, that were at the time on the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire become a free and independent state”. Moreover, the instability of the Ionian

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31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.
political situation following the move from Venetian to French Republican rule resulted in civil war, which lasted until 1815. This led the Great Powers to reject complete independence for the Ionians. The Islands were not only unfit to govern themselves but were also incapable of securing their territorial boundaries. Maitland used the ‘unstable’ and ‘immature’ political behaviour of the Ionians under the different regimes to justify the authoritarian nature of the Constitutional Charter of 1817.\textsuperscript{34}

**Reactions to the settlement**

The Treaty of Paris was debated in the House of Commons in 1816, despite not requiring ratification there. It was introduced by the radical Whig, Charles Monck. The Tory MP, Leslie Foster, defended the government’s position. Monck favoured Parliamentary reform in principle and almost always voted alongside the opposition throughout his parliamentary career.\textsuperscript{35} The independence of the Ionian Islands became his major campaign in the House of Commons. His interest in the Septinsula came from a personal affiliation with the place and a love for everything Greek. He was an enthusiastic classical scholar who honeymooned in the Islands. Monck requested the papers from the occupation of the Islands to the present day from Lord Castlereagh in February 1816 to prepare for the debate.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34} This same argument was used in the House of Commons by the government every time there were radical protests about the construction of the Treaty of Paris.\textsuperscript{35} Kilburn M., “Sir Charles Miles Lambert Monck”, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Oxford, 2004).\textsuperscript{36} Hansard T. C., *Parliamentary debates*, 1st Series, **XXXII**, 14 February 1816, pp. 540-41.
Deeply concerned about British administration of the Ionian Islands, he requested a Commission of Inquiry be established to investigate the Islands’ “present political condition” and report to the House the Ionians’ feelings concerning their political arrangement with Britain. He argued the original proclamations issued at the beginning of the British occupation in 1809 had portrayed the British as the liberators of the Ionian people from the “French Yoke” and not as oppressors. He strongly believed Britain had “violated” their original promises of “liberty and independence” towards the Ionian people. He accused the British establishment from 1809-1814 of exercising a “considerable degree of tyranny” by imposing heavy taxation and practising the “most arbitrary power” in preventing the Ionians from sending their own representatives to the Congress of Vienna. The Great Powers, in their battle for “the extent of territory or the possession of power”, had betrayed the trust of the Ionian people.  

The political instability and civil disputes in the Islands, following the establishment of French rule after the Venetians, were regularly used as an argument against granting them political independence. This was strongly rejected by Monck, who argued the Ionians “had their own taste in legislation and government; they would be proud of their independence and of the power of managing their own concerns”. He maintained they had satisfactorily managed their own affairs in the

\[38\] Ibid., p. 637.
centuries under Venetian and Russian-Turkish occupation and, in his eyes, had proved their fitness for government.\textsuperscript{39}

To Monck, the Treaty of Paris made a mockery of British promises about Ionian independence. “They were told that they enjoyed an independence; but it was the will of a power that was appointed their protector. Their legislature was declared free; but there was a British commissioner, who was empowered to regulate its proceedings;” this was a state in which “no legislature, even of a West Indian island was placed” he argued. There the assemblies had more freedom, ruling with the cooperation of the British governors, than the Ionians had been granted.\textsuperscript{40} He urged the House not to diminish the importance of granting political independence to the Ionians, following the official British promises.

Monck failed to convince the Irish judge, John Leslie Foster. Foster was a protégé of both Peel and Liverpool and through them he enjoyed government support in important Irish appointments. He argued Britain acted with the best of intentions in the Septinsula. “What we understand by national independence was not really desirable for them” he stated. For four centuries the Islands had been under a succession of foreign rulers. Something [national independence] unknown to them could not be appreciated by them. The “inhabitants being people of heated imaginations and lively tempers...” had also demonstrated a greed for power that had resulted in civil war.\textsuperscript{41} The inhabitants of Zante had invited Britain to take possession

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p. 638.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p. 639.
of their island; proof, to Foster, that Ionian people could not be trusted with any degree of autonomy regarding their own administration. Only under the strong hand of British protection could the Islands prosper.

These two British politicians represented two opposing views regarding the position of the Islands and their form of rule under the British Empire. Monck argued colonial rule ought to vary according to the needs of different peoples and places. Not all colonial territories were the same and, therefore, differing policies should be applied. The Islands’ location determined they belonged within the scope of Europe’s civilised nations and, thus, required representative forms of rule. Geography was also a major argument for Foster, but it was their strategic position that was critical to him. The government wanted political and military control of the Southern Mediterranean under one comprehensive policy.

Monck’s voice was marginal; his motion of inquiry was opposed without division. His argument that Britain had violated her promises of independence to the Ionians failed to convince his parliamentary colleagues. Parliament found nothing absurd or disturbing about the anomalous position in which the Islands were placed. They were under British protection, an independent yet not quite independent state. The view entertained by the government’s spokesman Foster was accepted by the House of Commons, thus paving the way for British rule.

The following analysis of the colonial correspondence reveals the constant British dialogue between various parties concerning the appropriate form of rule for
the Septinsula, which led to the development of the Constitutional Charter of 1817. But before that, a few words about the British governor in the Ionian Islands are necessary.

Sir Thomas Maitland, an imperial man.

If Castlereagh had failed to enforce the colonisation of the Islands for the Empire, then Bathurst was determined to correct this diplomatic failure and exploit any obscurity in the language of the Treaty to succeed. The creation of the Constitution for the Ionian state provided this opportunity.

Bathurst wanted a comprehensive colonial policy for Britain’s Mediterranean possessions. He could not have chosen a more appropriate person as the first Lord High Commissioner of the Islands than Sir Thomas Maitland, the “formidable” governor of Malta since 1813. He had chosen Maitland for that post even before the Treaty of Paris was signed.42 Although the Under Secretary, Bunbury, doubted Maitland would accept the position, Bathurst wanted to combine British governments in the Mediterranean (Malta, Ionian Islands, and the Consuls of the North African coast, except Gibraltar) under one military support on the grounds of ‘economy’.43 As an “impartial” observer, he noted the integration of Malta and the Ionian Islands under one governor would “preserve the unity of British interests in the Mediterranean”.44

42 Thompson N., Earl Bathurst, p. 129.
43 Maitland first proposed this to the Colonial Office. Ibid., pp. 129-130.
44 Maitland to Bathurst, 16 April 1815, CO 158/26.
On 16 February 1816, Maitland arrived at Corfu’s harbour to undertake his duty in the Ionian Islands. He was fifty seven years old and already had a remarkable career. Born in 1759 in an aristocratic Scottish household, he was the second son of James Maitland, Earl of Lauderdale. As the younger son, he was not entitled to inherit the title or estate. Maitland went to India to make money and establish his reputation and career, in a similar manner to many men of his class and time. As Linda Colley noted, whatever the internal differences between the English, Scottish, and Irish, their involvement in the imperial project to forge a new “British identity” encouraged them to view themselves as “distinct, special, superior”. Maitland was proud of his national identity and retained his Scottish accent all his life.

Maitland served in Calcutta in 1785 and then in Madras in 1790, where he distinguished himself against Haidar Ali and Tipu the Sultan of Mysore. Authoritative attitudes of many British colonial administrators were shaped in Madras, where racial attitudes towards the indigenous population formed and reinforced notions of British superiority. In India, Maitland acquired skills for ruling others, learning how to organise a “proper society” and to civilise others. Thomas Metcalf believes India featured as “a land fitted for despotic rule” for many British people in the latter half of the eighteenth century. From India, Maitland travelled to St Dominique (later Haiti) in 1797, formerly the most lucrative French colony in the Caribbean through sugar and coffee exports but politically unstable after a slave

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revolt in 1791 led by Toussaint l’Ouverture.\(^{47}\) In September 1793, British forces landed at St. Dominigue in co-operation with the royalist colonists and faced L’Ouverture’s French republican, ex-slave, and mulatto forces.\(^{48}\) In 1798 Maitland negotiated the British surrender of the western part of the island with l’Ouverture, whom he considered cunning.\(^{49}\) Maitland secured an agreement for safe British evacuation, a guarantee for the French colonists remaining, and a future non-aggression pact which ensured the protection of trade. Although surrendering to a black man was a humiliating defeat for Maitland, he was praised by his contemporaries “for supreme strength and courage”. His initiative “plucked England from the awful morass of confusion…. death and disaster”.\(^{50}\)

In 1800 Maitland returned to England to pursue a political career. Supported by his radical Whig brother, he became an M.P. In the House of Commons he supported parliamentary reform, and contributed to debates on the conduct of British war campaigns in India and Europe. But Westminster politics was not Maitland’s forte. He was a man of action rather than words.\(^{51}\) He chose service in the front line and was appointed governor of Ceylon in 1805, moving, as many others did, from a position of military command to a position of colonial governance. When Maitland took up office, Ceylon was a troublesome colony for Britain. Maitland’s appointment was a statement the Colonial Office believed in his ability, especially after the failed

\(^{48}\) Ibid.
\(^{51}\) Lord W. F. *Sir Thomas Maitland*, p. 8.
colonial administrations of his predecessors, Major David Wemyss Douglas and Lord Frederick North. Both had been incompetent, extravagant and practiced lax controls over the finances. Maitland’s arrival also came at a critical moment, in the aftermath of the British disasters in Kandy. He was determined to recover and maintain Britain’s supremacy in Ceylon. For the first six months he investigated the situation and identified the problems before formulating and instigating his solutions. Maitland received little help from the War and Colonial departments, which were weighed down with the burden of the Napoleonic wars, leaving little time or knowledge to direct the island’s affairs from London. Indeed, the method of ruling in Ceylon relied on Maitland’s initiatives.

Firstly he took control of his council. He re-organised the central and provincial administration (civil service), keeping appointments of commissioners and collectors of revenue under his exclusive control to end embezzlement and corruption, allowing him to balance the budget. Realising the government lacked the resources necessary to succeed in Kandy, he attempted to make peace, thus reducing military expenditure and subordinating the military into his civil authority. He encouraged agriculture and strengthened commercial trade. However, by the autumn of 1810 the Ceylon climate had weakened his health and he returned to Britain in March 1811. Nevertheless, his short governorship in Ceylon had made favourable impressions on the government, who would adopt similar policies in Mauritius when it fell into British hands in 1810. The Ceylonese historian Colvin de Silva stated

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53 Ibid., p. 114.
Maitland’s administration “was an outstanding success…..five years of sound and efficient government”. 54

After his recuperation and promotion to lieutenant-general, he became governor of Malta in 1813, but only after demanding the “free and unfettered power of the Governor”. 55 For Bathurst, newly appointed as Colonial Secretary in 1812, Maitland was an efficient colonial administrator who excelled himself in furthering British interests, good enough reason to accept Maitland’s demands. Faced with plague in Malta, Maitland imposed isolation, quarantine and disinfections of buildings to fight it. He again demonstrated an immense capacity in a time of crisis. In Malta, Maitland repeated the same pattern of policies that had succeeded in Ceylon, placing the finances under his control, reforming local administration and reducing corruption. 56 Maitland’s friend and confidante, A’Court, believed Maitland’s success in carrying colonial government in Malta had earned him respect and trust from his superiors and made him the ideal person to administer the Ionian Islands. 57

As a colonial administrator, Maitland exported aspects of British aristocratic governance and hierarchical principles, including the system of honours. 58 His chosen form of rule in the Empire, associated with his pragmatism, was authoritarian. Although Maitland admired various political and economic theories aimed at advancing British governance in the colonies and enriching the Empire,

55 Dixon C. W., The Colonial Administration, p. 137.
56 Ibid., p. 146.
57 A’Court to Maitland, 27 March 1816, Heytesbury Papers, XIX Add. MS 41529.
such as the theories of Adam Smith, he felt “everything is good or bad as it locally applies and I firmly believe that the more we judge from locality and the less we have to do with theory the better.”

For Maitland, maintaining British authority was the essence of his colonial policies. When he eventually became Lord High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands, he had reached the pinnacle in his accumulation of colonial experience and knowledge and had developed strong ideas about how the Islands should be ruled.

When Bathurst appointed Maitland Lord High Commissioner, bestowing additional British troops under his exclusive command, the excuse was to ‘economise’ by consolidating civil and military governance costs in the Mediterranean. In reality, Bathurst’s aim was for Britain to dominate the Mediterranean under Maitland’s leadership. Indeed, Maitland “bestrode the Mediterranean like a Colossus”.

Thomas Maitland’s nickname “King Tom”

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58 The system of honours were rewards granted to members of the colonial service, which became more prestigious as administrators progressed in the professional hierarchy. In the Colonial Office, the most prestigious honour was the Most Distinguished Order of St Michael and St George. While the honours were initially limited to members in colonial service, they were gradually granted to native elites. Cannadine D. _Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire_ (London, 2001), pp. 86-88. While adopting these honours in the Ionian Islands and arranging their design, Maitland was at the same time openly critical of “Foreign Titles” and honours like the Order of St Michael and St George. For his views on honours, see Maitland to A’Court, 2 November 1818; Maitland to A’Court, 3 November 1818, Heytesbury Papers, XIX, Add. MS 41529.

59 Maitland to A’Court, 23 November 1818, Heytesbury Papers, XIX, Add. MS 41529.

60 Maitland was paid £5,000 as governor of Malta, £3,500 as commander in chief in the Mediterranean, £1000 as Lord High Commissioner, £1000 pension as governor of Ceylon, besides a number of other allowances, putting him in receipt of £13,000 a year. “A most moderate computation” for a single man, Radical Joseph Hume ironically declared in the House of Commons in 1822, when he criticised Maitland’s financial policy in the Septinsula. Hansard T. C., _Parliamentary debates_, New Series, VII, 14 May 1822, p. 567.

61 Lord W. F., _Sir Thomas Maitland_, p. 24. Maitland and his friend, A’Court, kept a close eye on events in the Mediterranean, with their correspondence including such concerns as warnings about suspicious vessels and the state of affairs in the Kingdom of Two Sicilies. For examples, see Maitland to A’Court, 27 June 1817; A’Court to Maitland, 13 May 1818, Heytesbury Papers, XIX, Add. MS 41529.
effectively summarised his character. Charles Napier, the British Regent of Cephalonia (1809-1816) who served under Maitland’s command described him as a “rough old despot”.\textsuperscript{62} Maitland was, according to his first biographer Walter Lord, “dirty and coarse, rude in manner and violent in temper”.\textsuperscript{63} Jervis, an English scholar and historian of the Ionian Islands, described Maitland as “born an autocrat”, admitting “no one more uncongenial to the Ionians could have been found”.\textsuperscript{64} Contemporary historical accounts observed that “in both Malta and the Ionian Islands the form of colonial despotism was most robustly illustrated during the rule of ‘King Tom’ Maitland”.\textsuperscript{65} Maitland practised one form of rule at home, as a supporter of Parliamentary reform in Britain, and another in the colonies, where he was a “despot”.\textsuperscript{66}

\textbf{“Our power rests solely in others belief in our superiority”: the Constitutional Charter}

In December 1815 Bathurst instructed Maitland “to go… and collect information... which will enable [him] to act when [his] authority shall be more regularly established”. It was the intention of the British government to learn as much as possible about “the habits of the inhabitants” before constructing their Constitutional Charter. After all, Ionians should not imagine “they can make a constitution as they would make a pudding according to the British or French

\textsuperscript{63} Lord W. F. \textit{Sir Thomas Maitland}, p. 286.
\textsuperscript{65} Bayly C. A., \textit{Imperial Meridian}, p. 198.
receipt.” 67 Bathurst advised Maitland to “get them to slide into a constitution” 68. He was convinced, even before receiving Maitland’s report, “that a system of popular representation, and public discussion …should not be so stated to them for many years to come”. 69 Prior to taking the appointment, Maitland was already considering the challenge of turning the Islands “into productive British colonies”. 70 He was critical of having the Islands as a Protectorate, feeling “if they do not give them in sovereignty we are certainly better without them at all”. 71 Bathurst, in agreement with Maitland, was determined to take advantage of any ambiguous passages of the Treaty of Paris and treat the Islands not as an independent state under protection, but as a colony. 72

Maitland welcomed Bathurst’s recommendations and general instructions, “perfectly convinced” he held the “full” trust and support of his government. He shared Bathurst’s view that Ionians “were not going to administer in these islands any wild or speculative theory of government”. 73 Instead the constitution would be the product of “thorough consideration” by the Ionian Legislative Assembly, which “demands in itself the fullest consideration of the most perfect knowledge and the habits and the character of the people”. He swamped the Colonial Office with reports

67 Bathurst to Maitland, 2 December 1815, CO 136/300.
68 Ibid. The emphasis was Bathurst’s.
69 Ibid.
70 Maitland to A’Court, 4 October 1815, Heytesbury Papers. XIX, Add. MS 41529.
71 Maitland to A’Court, 16 October 1815, Heytesbury Papers. XIX, Add. MS 41529.
72 Bunbury to Maitland, 26 November 1815, CO 136/300.
73 Ibid.
on the state, character, and condition of the Ionian population for the next two years in an attempt to represent them “fairly” as they were.  

Even before arriving on the Islands, Maitland entertained little hope of successfully co-operating with local political parties over defining the Constitution. A few days after his arrival, he described the Ionian representatives “not as tending to give security at all, but as tending to consist themselves, and in fact consider and look at nothing else but a personal aggrandisement at the expense of the interests of the rest of the community”. He described the Ionian character as “considering one body- looking undoubtedly different ways- tending both distinctly at the same ends… forwarding their individual interests at the expense of the liberty, the prosperity and the happiness of their fellow subjects”. He constructed Ionian people as aggressive, corrupt individualists with a total lack of communitarian spirit. His sweeping generalisation went even further, encompassing the inhabitants of the whole Greek and Italian peninsulas. His “experience and knowledge” of the Mediterranean race made him, in his mind, the expert in judging their character. He noted to Bunbury it might seem a surprise, especially to a “British mind… that people exist with principles so degrading… as mark the character of these having lived both in Italy and Greece”. He was convinced “their only object is the possession of power for corrupt ends; and the only principle of action they recognise

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74 Bunbury to Maitland, 26 November 1815, CO 136/300; Maitland to A’Court, 4 October 1815, Heytesbury Papers. XIX, Add. MS 41529.  
75 Bunbury to Maitland, 26 November 1815, CO 136/300.  
76 Maitland to Bathurst, 27 February 1816, CO 136/5.  
77 Maitland to Bunbury, 18 February 1816, CO 136/5.  
78 Maitland to A’Court, 14 March 1816, Heytesbury Papers, XIX, Add. MS 41529.
is the impression made upon them by the strong hand of power”. Since he had never intended to share power with a Maltese council, he was unprepared to do so with the Ionians.

Rather, Maitland proposed the only way to secure admittance to the proceedings of the Constitution was to establish a provisional government which annihilated the present constitutions, appoint new British officers in the various departments, and form an Ionian Assembly consisting solely of Ionians who favoured the British administration. Maitland was certain his proposals would be a success from the British perspective. After studying the character of the Ionians he knew “what they are looking at is, who has the power of giving Employment and administering to their personal interest, and as for their liberty and independence, [it] only means the independence from all judicial proceedings- and the liberty of plundering their country”. Maitland did not expect any opposition in his attempt to enforce authoritarian government, believing the Ionians “detest an honest and upright government” as “foreign to their practice and even to their conceptions- they can deal, with low cunning and intrigue of all kinds, and in sophistry; but they neither understand nor appreciate a fair open and manly part”.80

When Maitland published his views on Ionian character, the Senate protested his official statements about the unfitness of the Ionian people for representative government. In response, he dismissed four Senators.81 He argued the Ionians’

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79 Maitland to Bunbury, 18 February 1816, CO 136/5.
80 Ibid.
81 Maitland to the Primary Council of Corfu, 3 February 1817, CO 136/7.
political behaviour under their previous rulers demonstrated the “real evils” of their character. The study of the recent constitutional history of the Islands, “shows their incompetence to govern themselves”. Interpreting Venetian rule, he argued the Ionians were “in the most abject state of slavery and ignorance”; when given the chance for improvement, “considerable and incredible evils arose… the multiplicity of public functionaries… erected the heaviest inconvenience both in the financial and political point of view”. Under French rule, the Septinsula’s administration “has been a system of control whenever it was judged necessary by the French authorities and a passive obedience on the part of the constituted authorities in the Islands”.

He continued using and interpreting history to demonstrate the Ionians’ incapacity for self-rule. Under Russia-Ottoman rule, Russia’s war with France left the Ionian Islands to rule themselves, leading to “bloodshed and revolt … showing the incapacity of the inhabitants to govern themselves”. When Russia’s plenipotentiary in the Mediterranean, Count Mocenigo, was asked by the Russian Privy Council in 1806 to modify the Constitution of 1803 to create a representative government, he noted there was “no class of men who were capable, or had any right to merit the confidence of the nation”. When the French and Russians allowed Ionians to handle their own affairs, Maitland believed they [French and Russians] did “not add to the happiness or liberty” of the Ionians but instead destroyed “any vestige of moral character or of a real attachment” to the Ionian Islands.

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82 Maitland to Bathurst, 27 February 1816, CO 136/5.
83 Ibid.
84 Maitland to Bathurst, 3 May 1817, CO 136/187.
85 Maitland to Bathurst, 27 February 1816, CO 136/5.
For Maitland, the ‘civil war’ and ‘anarchy’ in the Septinsula was a ‘class war’ related to the redistribution of power and the overthrow of social hierarchies. It was proof the Ionians were inherently incapable of being free citizens. His rhetorical usage of Ionian ‘character’ served as a critique of various groups of Ionian nobles who wished to share power with him. In his regime, any Ionian noble willing to accept Maitland’s authority without question was welcome. For Maitland, British policy had to achieve the consolidation of the status quo. The supposed unruliness of the Ionians acted as an ideal prerequisite for a firm hand.

Maitland did not constrain his search for lessons to the previous occupiers of the Islands, Venice, France, or Russia, but also looked to a more familiar place for him: the British Empire. Firstly he looked to the “old [American] colonies” and secondly to Malta. He reminded Bathurst that Britain lost the American colonies due to a lack of tight control of power and authority, allowing considerable freedom to local Assemblies with disastrous results for the mother country. Maitland promised Bathurst under his administration, they would “be surer of [Ionians] Assembly than [he was] of all the assemblies abroad”. His intention was to fill the government with British officers, arguing “…nothing is clearer than that the government that we set up will succeed just after as it is administered by Englishmen and no further”. He compared his methods of ruling to those of his colleague, the Governor of Madras Lord William Bentinck, to demonstrate his methods of governing bore successful results.

86 Ibid.
In Madras, Bentinck held more liberal beliefs concerning the native Indian population, which he demonstrated by employing Indians in the administration and more senior positions of the government.\textsuperscript{87} Maitland felt Bentinck’s system was “of perfect inefficiency and imbecility. Every ensign thinks himself a commander in chief; every writer talks as if he were the head of government. They all write far too much, spending hours of time and reams of paper over matters that could easily be settled in an interview of ten minutes”. Maitland’s rule in Ceylon was fashioned in accordance with the state of its society which he perceived as that of the “Middle Ages”. He believed the inhabitants of Ceylon were “idle, assuming and indolent coxcombs” who would not work if not compelled to do so. “Very different” he writes “is my government…there [was] nothing to be seen in Ceylon but results…” \textsuperscript{88} “Our power” he argued “rests solely in [others’] belief in our superiority”. \textsuperscript{89}

The parallel between the Ionian Islands and Malta was clear to him. There were many social, financial, and political similarities in the two societies, especially in their commercial benefits for Britain.\textsuperscript{90} Malta provided a model of financial control he could transfer to the Ionian Islands.\textsuperscript{91} It was the same policy that was also successful in Ceylon. Moreover, identifying that “temper, violence, murder” were “common evils” among Mediterranean people, Malta offered Maitland a model for

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p. 84.
\textsuperscript{91} Maitland to Bathurst, 1 April 1816, CO 136/5.
“making a new code of civil and criminal law,” establishing a supreme court of appeals to keep the Judicial department in some kind of order.\textsuperscript{92}

Maitland believed the only way the British government could secure an appropriate form of rule was to ensure the power of the High Commissioner extended over all government departments: Legislative, Judicial and Executive.\textsuperscript{93} He totally rejected the notion Britain should comply with the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris by granting “anything like a representative government” in the Islands. “We tried that experiment in Sicily” he argued “and it was certainly a most unfortunate one”.\textsuperscript{94}

After Madras, Bentinck joined the British army in the Peninsula and, in 1811, was appointed governor of the Two Sicilies, which the British viewed as the ideal base for their operations in the Mediterranean due to her resources and proximity to France, Spain, and Italy. Bentinck wanted to create an independent and united Italy, working from Sicily.\textsuperscript{95} Sicily was ruled by the Bourbon dynasty, which had been expelled from Naples. Playing on the aristocracy’s Sicilian nationalist feelings, he tried to get their support by offering constitutional reform. Despite warnings and opposition from London, Bentinck drafted and modelled a constitution on Britain’s for the Sicilians. However, his vision failed, along with a similar plan he previously instigated in Austria’s Piedmont. Subsequently he was recalled to Britain in disgrace.

\textsuperscript{92} Maitland to Bathurst. 1 March 1817, CO 136/7.
\textsuperscript{93} Maitland to Bathurst, 27 February 1816, CO 136/5.
\textsuperscript{94} Lord W. F., \textit{Sir Thomas Maitland}, p. 168.
Castlereagh complained of Bentinck to Prime Minister Lord Liverpool, stating “how intolerably prone he is to Whig revolutions everywhere”.  

For Maitland the experiment in Sicily highlighted “that a free government is incompatible with a strong one… the fault lay not with the government, but with the persons who administer it”. In the Ionian Islands his authority “should be that of standing forth as a real protector of the people against the vices of their own rule”. He decided the best way to fulfil the Treaty of Paris and grant the Ionians constitutional government was “by strengthening the hands of the representative of a foreign government”. Maitland increasingly relied on the argument of the ‘King’s service’ to justify what were seen as unpopular or arbitrary decisions. Ultimately he thought “definite power however extensive, is a lesser evil in any state than power alike uncontrolled and undefined”.

The freedom and independence of any country, placed under the exclusive protection of another, was itself problematic to Maitland. He continued his work on the Constitutional Charter of the Islands, aiming to exclude the Ionian people from active participation. Demonstrating his power as a man who knew what was best for ‘others’, Maitland declined “discussion of every kind” with Ionians who did not share his doctrine and protested his views. While he presented himself as a benevolent patron willing to offer ‘childish’ immature Ionians the seeds of their

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98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Maitland to Bathurst, 27 February 1816, CO 136/5.
101 Maitland’s Address to Primary council, 3 February 1817, CO 136/7.
emancipation, Maitland was an autocrat who treated them as voiceless subjects. He believed direct interference was “absolutely and indispensably necessary”. He stated interference was perfectly legitimate according to the Treaty, compared with the Ionians’ previous rulers. He explained the principles which guided him in defining the Constitutional Charter in his address to the Ionian Primary Council. “Simplicity and clearness are... the great objects that ought to be attended to” he pointed out: for him this meant absolute administrative control over the machinery of the Ionian state.¹⁰²

The Constitution of 1817: Maitland’s powers defined

In winter 1816 Maitland drafted the Ionian constitution and submitted it for consideration to a subservient Ionian Assembly, bound to Maitland by patronage and distribution of honours.¹⁰³ The Constituent Assembly met in April 1817 and unanimously approved the Constitution. When Maitland sent it to London, it was approved by the Colonial Office and ratified by the Crown in December 1817. Maitland ensured he was at the centre of power, controlling public appointments, the Assembly, the police, the treasury, the justice system and the press.¹⁰⁴

The Constitution of 1817 was an extensive document divided into seven chapters covering the general organisation of the state, the Senate, the Legislative Assembly, local governments, the ecclesiastical establishment, the judicial authority

¹⁰² Ibid.
¹⁰³ Bayly C. A., Imperial Meridian, p. 198; Cannadine D., Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire, p. 86.
¹⁰⁴ Bathurst to Maitland, 19 February 1817, CO 136/301.
and miscellaneous subjects. The chapter of general organisation established Orthodox Greek as the religion of the Islands and Greek their established language. It was not until 1859 that Greek became the official language of the Ionian State over Italian and English. A press was to be established in the Islands under the exclusive control of the Lord High Commissioner for the government’s purposes. An essential provision in the same chapter focused on education, with Parliament adopting measures to establish primary schools and, subsequently, a University.

The Legislative Assembly would consist of forty members. Eleven were Primary Council members, comprised of Senators and Regents, mainly British local governors of the Islands nominated by Maitland. The remaining twenty-nine Assembly members were elected from a shortlist the Primary Council produced. This list was submitted to the electors (Synclite), one per cent of the Ionian population, who chose their candidate from the two names inscribed for each district in an open vote (double list). The number of members corresponded with the Islands’ populations, with the larger islands of Corfu, Cephalonia and Zante having seven members each, Santa Maura four members, and the smaller islands of Ithaca, Paxo and Cerigo returning only one or two members each. Maitland described the Primary Council, as “a great engine, upon which, by their double lists the elections are

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106 Regents headed each Island’s administration, controlling the Municipalities as Maitland controlled the central government. Local government consisted of a five-member municipal administration but the Regent could make laws without their assistance. The system was so well constructed that seven widely separated islands were centrally controlled and forms of local government were “more for show than substance”. See Maitland’s notes in the Constitutional Charter, CO 136/7.
107 The Synclite were allowed to vote if they had certain privileges, such as residency in the town or a fixed income, $18l per annum in the larger islands or a proportional sum in the smaller ones.
secured in favour of government”. The Assembly sat for five years and elected its president subject to the double veto of the governor.

The Upper House of the Ionian Parliament was a Senate consisting of six members, five of whom were elected by the Legislative Assembly, subject to the double veto by Maitland. The Senate was divided into three departments: general, political and financial. It was an executive council and Maitland’s right hand in government. The Secretary of the Senate was an Englishman appointed by Maitland to ensure “nothing can be done from day to day without it being reported to the Lord High Commissioner”. The President of the Senate was appointed for a term of two and a half years and possessed the title “His Highness” because “title in this country is everything, but the substance comparatively nothing”. All the proceedings and acts of the Senate were laid before the Lord High Commissioner.

It was intended every member of the Legislative Assembly would be elected indirectly by the Lord High Commissioner, whose control would be guaranteed by the veto and who sanctioned motions by the Assembly in cooperation with the Senate. The Assembly controlled the ordinary expenses of the Islands, with the Civil List controlled by the Senate and the expenditure by Maitland. Sessions of Parliament were biennial and lasted for three months. When the Assembly was in recess the Senate could make provisional laws (Atti di Governo). Indeed, the

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108 Maitland’s notes in the Constitutional Charter, CO 136/7.
109 Ibid.
majority of laws passed during the Protectorate occurred while the Assembly was in recess.

There are two other noteworthy points regarding the Constitution of 1817. No article in the Constitutional Charter could be altered except by Order of the King in Council. Furthermore, the British Privy Council could dissolve the Ionian Parliament at any time. Those were safeguards for British authorities both at home and in the periphery and were utilised when they faced Ionian resistance. As Calligas stated, these provisions demonstrated the paternalistic elements of an authoritarian constitutional system which, in theory, included representative elements but, in practice, imposed a tight control on them.\textsuperscript{110}

Conclusion

The idea of Ionian national character was used by Maitland to declare the Ionian people’s unfitness for representative government. According to Maitland their history from Venetian to Russian rule demonstrated the Ionians possessed vices rather than virtues. They were weak and could not resist temptations or greed. They pursued individual interests at the expense of the public good and could not to be trusted with ‘public duty’. They possessed no self-restraint, courage or capacity for strenuous effort in the face of adversity. Their ‘nobility’ was in name only. They were degraded and could not safeguard even their own lands. Maitland was the man

\textsuperscript{110} Calligas E., “To Sintagma tou Maitland gia ta Eptanissa (1817)”, pp. 118-120.
who possessed integrity, honour and the morality capable of leading the Ionians towards civilisation.

From Asia and the Caribbean to Europe, Maitland seemed unstoppable in his efforts to secure British power in the East and West. From the lands of ‘exoticism,’ ‘adventure,’ and ‘darkness’ to the lands of ‘romanticism’ and the ‘classics’, Maitland articulated, developed and practiced strategies to secure British control and authority. Maitland’s Constitution of 1817 was in line with developments elsewhere in the Empire. For example, Bathurst rejected the governor of New South Wales, Brisbane’s, claim the colony was ready for free institutions such as Trial by Jury and a Legislative Assembly. Through the 1820s, Bathurst’s policies in white settler colonies indicated he did not believe in representative institutions.

The Ionian Constitution was the result of Britain’s interpretation of the Treaty of Paris to suit British interests in the Mediterranean. Mastery of the Islands was part of a geopolitical attempt to re-address the balance of power within Europe and to secure Britain’s route to the East. The Constitution of 1817 marked the beginning of an authoritarian rule in the Islands, giving the Lord High Commissioner absolute Executive, Legislative and Judicial power over the affairs of the Ionian State. It was the creation of two men, Maitland and Bathurst, who were in agreement over the role

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111 Bathurst to Hay, 2 August 1826, B.M 57/58. Bathurst’s attitude derived in part from the belief that New South Wales was “distant Colony of Convicts” and a “rascally Community”, “a place of Punishment and Reform”. Bathurst to Hay, 7 November 1825, B.M. 57/57; Bathurst to Murray 11 November 1822, B.M. 57/64.

112 Bathurst to Somerset, Private and Confidential, 18 October 1824, B.M 57/66. For example, when Lord Charles Somerset, governor of the Cape, seized the press of a colonist and expelled him, Bathurst worried about opposition to this action in Parliament, but supported Somerset’s decision.
and direction of European territories within the scope of the British Empire. However, as the next chapter will demonstrate, the Constitution and Maitland’s colonial rule had its critics both in Britain and the Septinsula.

Introduction

Reactions to the Ionian constitution were varied in the years that followed. Three reactions stood out: the British parliamentary debates on the Ionian Constitution four years after it was adopted; criticisms of Maitland’s conduct of government in the Islands made by a senior British official William Henry in 1820; and the sustained challenge from a native Ionian, Ioannis Capodistria, between 1818-1820. These critics challenged Maitland’s administrative competence, power and responsibility, authority and legitimacy over the Ionian people.

British Parliamentary reactions to Maitland’s rule in the Islands (1818-1824)

Between 1816-1824 the House of Commons held five debates about the Ionian Islands. Three of these were instigated by the Radical MP Joseph Hume.¹ An analysis

¹ There were several debates over the issue. Radicalism in Britain was a multi faced phenomenon, but many Radicals in the first half of the nineteenth century held common adversaries and temperament such as a dislike for landed aristocracy and Church and their privileges and a sense of urgency on the need for parliamentary reform, such as manhood suffrage, the secret ballot, annual parliamentary elections, equal electoral districts, and free trade. In the 1830s and 1840s Radicalism centred around the activities of the Anti-Corn Law League, the Owenites, and Chartism. On foreign policy some supported a non-intervention policy, while others supported intervention and war for idealistic reasons. The majority of Radicals also supported the Empire, arguing for concessions on constitutional liberties, and reducing the military costs for British taxpayers. Thompson D., The Early Chartists, (London, 1971); Royle E., Radical Politics 1790-1900: Religion and Unbelief, (London, 1971). On Radicals and British foreign policy, see Taylor J. P., The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy 1792-1939, (Bloomington, 1958); Brock P., “Polish Democrats and English Radicals 1832-1862: A Chapter in the History of Anglo-Polish Relations” in Journal of Modern History, 25, (1953), pp. 139-156. On radical support for the European national movements in Hungary, Poland and Italy, see Finn M., After Chartist: Class and Nation in English Radical Politics 1848-1874, (Cambridge, 1993); O’Connor M., The Romance of Italy. On Radicals and Empire see Taylor M., The Decline of British Radicalism, 1847-1860, (Oxford, 1995); Burroughs P., “Parliamentary Radicals and the Reduction of Imperial Expenditure in British North America, 1827-1834”, Historical Journal, 11, (1968), pp. 446-461.
of these debates on 23 February 1821, 7 June 1821, and 14 May 1822 provides a clear sense of the key arguments deployed.2

Hume was well known for his radical policies on economic retrenchment, Catholic emancipation, parliamentary reform, and free trade.3 He consistently advocated responsible government for the West Indies, the Ionian Islands and Canada. When Maitland returned to Britain to discuss the reform of the Ionian Judicial system with the government, Hume took this opportunity to raise several issues in Parliament.4 For the 7 June debate, he asked the Commons to send a Committee of Inquiry to investigate Maitland’s “misrule” of the Septinsula. He had lived in the Islands and claimed personal knowledge of the Ionians’ character (as Maitland also claimed), and believed they should handle their own affairs. He rejected Maitland’s notion that Ionians’ national character rendered them unfit for representative government.

Hume believed Maitland should be questioned about his authoritarian forms of rule. He argued the case of the Ionian Islands was not a unique example of Maitland demonstrating his arbitrary powers: indeed “complaints had been made against him for arbitrary acts in different parts of the world”.5 He criticised Maitland’s conduct from the moment of his arrival in the Islands, detailing his actions to demonstrate

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3 Huch R. K., Joseph Hume, the people’s M.P., (Philadelphia, 1985); Chancellor V., The Political Life of Joseph Hume 1777-1855: The Scot who was for over 30 years a radical leader in the British House of Commons, (London, 1986).
4 Hansard T. C., Parliamentary debates, New Series, V, 7 June 1821, p. 1148.
5 Ibid., p. 1149.
Maitland had ignored the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Paris and had intended to impose a “despotic” regime of government in the Islands. This was in contrast to the stipulation of the Treaty of Paris that Ionians were allowed, under the guarantee of the British governor, to retain their existing form of government until a new constitutional charter was drafted. Maitland’s first action, he noted, was to disband the Senators who had assembled in Corfu to draft the Ionian constitution. His actions violated a fundamental part of an international agreement.\(^6\)

The second line of Hume’s argument concerned powers given to Maitland under the Constitution of 1817, which he characterised as “a mockery of freedom…. devolving the whole power into the hands” of Maitland.\(^7\) Focusing on the mode of election of members of the Ionian Parliament, the Assembly and the Senate, Hume believed Maitland’s control over the list of all electoral candidates was a “farce of representation…. nothing could be worse but the system of a Scotch borough”. Hume criticised other powers the Constitution gave Maitland. The Lord High Commissioner had the right to reject every measure the Legislature adopted. He argued Maitland’s right to be present at any time the Assembly was in session imposed an intimidating presence over a “supposedly” free legislature. Maitland had the power to veto all decisions taken in the administration of the Ionian state as well as the right to all appointments and dismissals. Maitland “was nothing less than a Roman proconsul” Hume argued, and the Constitution of 1817 “was a complete

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\(^6\) Ibid., p. 1129.
\(^7\) Ibid., p. 1132.
despotism under the disguise of a representative government, it was more odious than the tyranny of Turkey or Persia and was a disgrace to England”.

Hume’s third argument was against Maitland’s rule in the Islands after the ratification of the Constitution. According to the Constitution, petitions provided the Ionian people with a way of addressing wrongs to the British Parliament. Yet when Ionians signed petitions requesting the British government investigate Maitland’s conduct, many inhabitants were arrested and imprisoned. Moreover, Maitland’s “ill government” in the Islands resulted in heavy taxation for the construction of public works and the employment of foreigners in public offices. For Hume, Maitland’s despotic rule in the Islands was a “grave case against the colonial department of this country who had permitted the name of Great Britain to be coupled with such acts of tyranny and injustice”.

Cases of individuals mistreated under Maitland came next in Hume’s catalogue of attacks on Maitland’s despotic rule in the Islands. These included instances of illegal seizure of lands and prosecution of his critics. For Hume, both cases demonstrated Maitland was not a capable governor for the British Crown. Although Maitland had served in India, Hume believed he had not taken seriously the responsibility “to protect the natives from any wanton attack upon the rights of property or upon their habits or religious principles”. Hume had served in India himself and knew first hand how British authorities negotiated their presence

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8 Ibid., p. 1133.
9 Ibid., p. 1134.
regarding local issues of land and religion. Referring to these policies, Hume argued the “same proper and politic delicacy” ought to have marked Maitland’s conduct to the inhabitants of the Ionian Islands. Instead, his actions were “contrary to the spirit of the British constitution, in open violence of those equitable rules which ought to have regulated his conduct towards the people over whom he had been appointed to preside”.

A number of radical MPs agreed with Hume’s criticisms regarding Maitland’s construction of the Ionian Constitution of 1817. Henry Bennet, Hume’s close associate who was also a supporter of civil liberties and parliamentary reform, agreed the Constitution given to the Islands, was a “mere mockery, a trick, a juggle”. He believed it was “high sounding, and pompous indeed; something to the ear; a little to the eyes, but in fact, -in substance- nothing”. It resembled a constitution the “French were in the habit of giving”, in appearance democratic but in reality despotic. Maitland controlled everything behind the scenes, “the master Punchinello, who worked the puppets within just as he pleased, and directed all their movements”.

‘Protection’ was not a requisite “stripping of all rights, of all constitutional security and of all legal defence”, notions in direct opposition to British spirit and principles.

Bennet blamed the British presence for depriving Ionian youth of all places and offices in the military and civil service of their state, which were instead filled

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10 Ibid., p. 1136.
11 Ibid., p. 1145.
with “young men from England, … ignorant of the dispositions of the people, and the language of the country”, and Sicilians directed by Maitland. Bennet predicted the current despotic system of government prevailing in the Islands would soon mean British authorities in the periphery and at home would face unrest and anarchy. Peace in the Septinsula could not occur without the promotion of the interests of the inhabitants by “giving the people an authority and influence over their own affairs”. He proposed “something like the British constitution” as the best form of rule for the Islands. Thomas Evans, a radical Whig, believed “the power of Sir T. Maitland over the islands was too great for any man to be entrusted with: it was not defined, it was not limited”. T. B. Lennard, another radical MP, expressed a similar opinion, believing the Septinsula was given “the mockery of a constitution”.12

Henry Brougham, advocate of parliamentary reform, also defended the Islands.13 For him, the Ionian issue was not just about personal disagreement regarding Maitland’s despotic rule but was a question of principles. He had personal knowledge and experience of the Ionian Islands and considered the Ionians fit to handle their own affairs, thus arguing Maitland’s powers were abusive and despotic. He was convinced “the subjects of that country lived under a dispensation of law, which he thanked God, no other part of the empire lived under”.14

Henry Goulburn, the Under Colonial Secretary, defended both Maitland and his governmental department.15 Goulburn denied “the object or intention” of the

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12 Ibid., p. 1145.
14 Hansard T. C., Parliamentary debates, New Series, V, 7 June 1821, p. 1145.
Treaty was to “confer on those states a perfectly free government such as that enjoyed by Great Britain”. The Ionian Islands were not British, he argued. Goulburn did not believe it “would be advantageous to the people of the Ionian states to transplant thither the pure British constitution”.\textsuperscript{16} It was a “vulgar error” to see systems which did not resemble the British as tyrannical. Different systems suited different peoples. Ionians’ character, he suggested, was “such as would not allow of the introduction of a free government to be entirely administered by themselves”.\textsuperscript{17}

The turbulent political history of the Septinsula indicated the Islanders were not qualified to enjoy “perfect liberty”. Goulburn used a paternalistic metaphor to compare the development of states with the development of men. “In youth a human being must necessarily be subject to some restraint and guidance; and it was only when a state had become mature that it could safely be trusted with unlimited liberty”. Goulburn believed the Ionians had not yet reached that stage of development necessary for representative government.

Maitland, Goulburn felt, had not used the Ionian constitution to invest himself with “any undue power”; he also did not use the British government at home to arrogate more powers. Goulburn dismissed Hume’s accusation that Maitland had interfered in the election of the Ionian Parliament or had “bought” the members of the Senate by promising high salaries or granting titles of honours like the Order of St. Michael and St. George. He argued the selection of the Ionian MPs was based on rank, property, influence and other qualities. He also denied Maitland mistreated

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 1132.
Ionian individuals. Goulburn interpreted the radicals’ criticism as both an attack on Maitland’s character and on the government. The charges against Maitland were completely “groundless”, he insisted. The British government had chosen the best person to govern the European territories and entertained complete faith and trust in Maitland’s administration of the Islands.

Sir Robert Wilson, a radical Whig who supported parliamentary reform and opposed the government’s repressive legislation at home, defended Maitland, dismissing the notion the Ionian government was an “arbitrary” one. Similarly John Peter Grant, a Whig politician and judge who opposed repressive legislation in Britain, did not believe the accusations of Maitland’s “misconduct” towards the Ionian people. He believed Maitland had acted according to the principles of the Ionian Constitution. Grant did not accept the Constitution’s despotic nature, noting it had been ratified by the Ionian Assembly. The support for Maitland by these two radical Whigs indicates the divisive and contradictory nature of the Ionian issue. Wilson, Grant and other radical MPs might support liberal policies at home but they could support despotic and conservative rule within the Empire.

The Foreign Secretary, Castlereagh, reminded MPs the Ionian Islands were not officially a colony. As a protectorate, Britain had undertaken a “superintending care over them, which ought not be withdrawn”. He made two points, one which dismissed the idea of adopting a British constitution in the Islands, arguing it “would

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18 Ibid., p. 1147.
19 Ibid., p. 1146.
not be a benefit to them”. Secondly, he recommended the Ionian constitution be left in operation for a little longer before “subverting it”. Castlereagh’s warnings had satisfactory effects for the British government. In the vote, the House was against the Commission of Inquiry: Ayes 27, Noes 97. Although Maitland enjoyed the confidence of the majority of MPs, the 27 people who did not trust Maitland represented significant opposition. Among those who favoured a Commission of Inquiry was Lord John Russell, who would later deal with the Ionian question as Colonial Secretary between 1839 and 1841.

A year later, Hume again called attention to “the highly improper manner in which the government of the Ionian Islands has been conducted” under British protection. This time he hoped the cost of Maitland’s administration to the British taxpayer would catch the MPs’ attention. From 1817 to 1822, Britain had spent “above one million sterling, every shilling of which might and ought to have been left in the pockets of people of England”. Hume argued much of this expense was due to Maitland’s “profuse and extravagant government”, designed to “deprive the Islanders of their rights and liberties”. Hume again requested a Commission of Inquiry be sent to the Islands and the House was again divided: Ayes 67, Noes 152. Again, the opposition was not insignificant. It had more than doubled since the previous vote in June 1821, showing Hume’s tireless campaigning was gaining support.

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20 Ibid., p. 1148.
22 Ibid., p. 566.
23 Ibid., p. 567.
“…We [are their] Guardians rather than [their] Masters”: The case of William Henry (1820)

Maitland’s comparison of his government in Ceylon with Bentinck’s in Madras revealed how important he believed it was for a successful colonial administration to keep government power exclusively in British hands. When he established the Ionian government in 1816, Maitland recruited British officers who could guarantee successful administration, especially in the departments of Military, Finances, and Justice. William Henry, one of the first British officials to serve in the Septinsula, was a member of the Supreme Court of Justice.24 Henry was recommended by Goulburn, who considered him a hard working person, possessing “strict integrity” and “much legal knowledge”. Prior to his appointment to the Ionian Islands, Henry had been the “president of the Courts of Justice in Demerara”, in British Guiana. There, despite “the greatest difficulties”, he managed to establish an “administration of the laws”. Goulburn, however, entertained reservations about the extent of cooperation between Maitland and Henry, warning Maitland Henry would not blindly follow his commands, a warning which became reality in 1820.25

For Henry, the dispute with Maitland was initially personal. When Henry resigned from his post in 1820, he asked the Colonial Office for an inquiry into his resignation. Bathurst rejected a full investigation since Henry was not dismissed by Maitland, putting his resignation down to personal reasons and accepting Maitland’s interpretation of their dispute. Henry turned to Goulburn, a man who knew his

24 The Supreme Court of Justice in the Ionian Islands consisted of four members, two of them British and two others Ionians.
25 Goulburn to Maitland, 14 September 1817, CO 136/301.
character, in an attempt to set the record straight about the reasons for his resignation. On the question of dismissal by Maitland, Henry noted:

I shall say no more than that I think it quite sufficient misfortune to have served under him after what I have witnessed at Corfu, and I therefore feel happy that I have by my resignation spared his Lordship this trouble…. My real motives for wishing to cease to serve under Sir Thomas Maitland, will to all those who are acquainted with the character of that gentleman, and the real state of the Ionian Islands be sufficiently obvious.27

Henry claimed Maitland was obsessed with holding absolute authority over the Ionian state and acted as a law unto himself, endangering the institutions of law, finance, legislature and religion. He criticised the Executive (Maitland and the Senate) for the rapid creation of “unjust” and “foolish” laws and was dismayed by the Judges’ lack of power. The Ionian Government’s experiments were out of control. Henry believed the wrong people were in the wrong positions, having devastating effects on the welfare of the society, using as an example Maitland’s promotion of the Deputy Paymaster to Judge to decide questions of appeal.28 Henry believed the independence of the judges was a prerequisite for good government. Britain had failed to transfer institutions promoting general welfare and stability to the Islands since the judicial system was under Maitland’s control and he meddled with its opinion and verdicts. A civilised society recognised common law. But Maitland did not and, thus, could not represent the interests of society.

26 Henry to Goulburn, 25 May 1820, CO 136/304.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
Henry argued Maitland’s obsession in securing British employees as public functionaries had disastrous effects on the finances of the Ionian state. The exclusion of the natives from commercial positions they had held for decades and their replacement by Maitland’s chosen commercial agents and merchants resulted in “unwise monopolies … doubling taxation and bad revenue”.\textsuperscript{29} Furthermore, Maitland’s policies affected the religious establishment. The supposedly free ecclesiastical establishment ought to “be exercised … by its professors, in the fullest manner and with the fullest Liberty”.\textsuperscript{30} Maitland, however, had put many “regulations” and controls on the Orthodox Ionian Bishop, turning him into “a mere officer of the Executive”.\textsuperscript{31}

Maitland played with the feelings and expectations of the Ionian people. They saw Maitland as an experienced British soldier and colonial administrator, a man “of Talents” who they trusted to deliver representative government in accordance with the Treaty of Paris. But they were now aware of Maitland’s manipulative and authoritarian character and manners. But Henry doubted Maitland could continue his rule without provoking general resistance from the Ionian population. He warned the Colonial Office Maitland was unpopular because he exercised power with no right, strangling the “voice of the people” by buying the votes of the Ionian Parliament and cutting off those who dared challenge him, such as Henry himself. Ionians “had already seen and felt the Mockery of our Institution”.\textsuperscript{32} Henry requested his superiors

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Henry to Coulburn, 25 May 1820, CO 136/304.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
not to blindly accept Maitland’s view of the Ionians as the “only true” view. Henry entertained a different view, portraying them as “already too enlightened”.

Henry believed a successful governor not only displayed administrative competence but also possessed personal qualities that showed he was a moral exemplar, a true representative of the Crown. Maitland was not amiable or honourable, lacking an able head and a willingness to co-operate with the Ionians. The Ionian Islands were a protectorate and should be treated as such. Maitland was entrusted with the peace and happiness of the Septinsula. But Maitland, and Britain, had pursued a very different system, viewing the Ionians “with jealousy, suspicion and dishonest[y], the finest way to create the defects in their character we assure them of, or continue them, if they really exist”.  

Henry cited his views on how the Protectorate should be governed. Constructions of the Ionians as unfit and creating an authoritarian constitution was “a very unwise experiment”. Henry’s ideal scheme was a form of representative government, with different governmental departments placed under the authority of competent Ionians while the governor presided over the whole without power to interfere in any department. Henry’s critique resembled that of some British radicals in Parliament, except Henry’s was based on his own direct experience. Henry believed Maitland had stepped over the boundaries of his title and office and the Constitution of 1817 was a façade designed to mask Maitland’s despotism. The man

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
authorised to correct the abuses and corruption of the judiciary in the Islands had himself become corrupt.

The Colonial Office kept the dispute between Henry and Maitland hidden from Parliament. Henry’s critique of Maitland’s abuse of authority in the Ionian Islands fell on deaf ears. The British Government approved the constitutional settlement of the Septinsula and continued to support Maitland’s handling of the Septinsula even after 1821, when Maitland provoked a nationalist reaction.

“The Lord High Commissioner governs the Ionian Islands absolutely and without responsibility”: The case of Ioannis Capodistria (1818-1820)

Criticisms of Maitland’s rule were not confined to the British and a powerful critique was produced by Ioannis Capodistria. Capodistria was from one of the wealthiest and most respected families among Corfu’s nobility. He served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Russian Government from 1816-1822.35 His family and associates had long enjoyed Russian patronage and since the establishment of the Ionian Republic 1800-1808 under ‘Russian protection’, they had retained powerful positions and authority within the Ionian government.

Although he lived thousands of miles away, Capodistria was well-informed of events in the Islands through his family and extended network of friends. He was

35 Woodhouse C. M., Capodistria: The founder of Greek Independence, (London, 1973); Koukou E., Istoria ton Eptanison apo to 1791 mehri tin Agglokratia. [The history of the Ionian Islands from 1797 until English rule], (Athens, 1963); Koukou E., O Kapodistrias ke i paidieia. 1803-1832 [Capodistria’s and Education, 1803-1832], (Athens, 1958). See also the selection of essays on Capodistria’s administrative, educational, economic, foreign and military policies, as well as on local government and on constitutional issues in Petrides P.,(ed.) O Ioannis Capodistria’s ke i singrotisi tou ellinikou kratous [Ioannis Capodistria’s and the Formation of the Greek State], (Thessaloniki, 1983).
shocked by the information he received. He believed the new British political arrangement had deprived the better class of the Ionian citizens of many rights they had enjoyed under their previous rulers. Capodistria believed traditional aristocratic government was the best protector of the people’s interest, not government by outsiders. The governor, his Regents and officials were agents of Britain, responsible to the mother country. Maitland had supplanted the aristocrats previously involved in governing the Septinsula under Russian ‘protection’ from his inner-circle. He did not know where their loyalties lay and feared ‘Russian influences’ would interfere with ‘British obligations’. Among those in the firing line were the Capodistria family and their associates.36

On 3 July 1818 Capodistria sent a Memorandum to the Colonial Office documenting his concerns.37 Capodistria maintained the Treaty of Paris gave political independence to the Ionian States.38 Yet through the Lord High Commissioner, Britain had created the Constitutional Charter according to her own interests. Capodistria revealed Maitland’s despotic character when he noted to Bathurst Maitland’s interpretation of the Treaty in an address to the Primary Council and his suppression of debate on the issue. Capodistria was convinced this indicated the absolutist character of British rule and constituted an abuse of the Treaty.

36 Maitland to A’Court, 31 October 1819, Heytesbury Papers, XIX, Add. MS 41530.
37 The memorandum, Capodistria to Bathurst, 3 July 1818, CO 136/11, was written in French. A copy of the memorandum, translated in English on 19 February 1820 by the Colonial Office, is included in correspondence between Maitland to A’Court, 19 April 1820, Heytesbury Papers, XIX, Add. MS 41530. See also Prevelaki E., “I Egekia epistoloi tou Ioanni Kapodistria tis 6/18 Apriliou 1819” [The Capodistria’s memorial of 6/18 April 1819], Praktika Tritou Panioniou Synedriou [Proceedings of the 3rd Pan-Ionian Conference], (23-29 September 1965), 1, (Athens, 1967), pp. 298-328.
38 Capodistria to Bathurst, 3 July 1818, CO 136/111.
“The Lord High Commissioner governs the Ionian Islands absolutely and without responsibility”, he asserted. No Constitutional amendment put any limits on his authority. Furthermore, he was not responsible to the Ionian people, because the public functionaries who supposedly guaranteed of their rights were his chosen agents. Capodistria proposed a representative form of government. He suggested depriving the Lord High Commissioner of powers the Treaty did not authorise and conferring them on a Constituted Body of the Ionian States. This would be freely elected by the Electoral Assembly and consist of seven representatives (one from each Island) to govern the Septinsula without interference in judicial matters and civil legislation from the British representative.39

In 1819 Capodistria visited Corfu, a journey closely monitored by Maitland and close friends and allies in Britain and continental Europe.40 Capodistria was appalled by what he saw of Maitland’s regime. Before returning to Russia, Capodistria stopped in London to discuss Ionian grievances with the British government. He first saw the Duke of Wellington, a close friend of Bathurst and the Master General of the Ordinance from 1819-1827.41 Wellington, having no knowledge about the situation, suggested a meeting with Castlereagh. Castlereagh saw Capodistria and the Russian ambassador in Britain, Count Lieven. He had little knowledge of the Ionian situation but defended Maitland as a skilful and capable

39 Ibid.
40 A’Court to Maitland, 29 December 1819 Heytesbury Papers, XIX, Add. MS 41529; Guilford to Maitland, Very Secret, Private and Confidential, 3 November 1818; Guilford to Maitland, 24 November 1819, Heytesbury Papers, XIX, Add. MS 41530.
administrator trusted by his superiors. When Castlereagh read the written complaints supplied by Capodistria, he wanted Bathurst to settle the matter. Britain’s reputation would suffer significantly if Capodistria’s accusations were not investigated. Charging Britain with abuse of the Treaty could mean Russian or Austrian interference. Most importantly, Castlereagh wanted to keep this matter “unofficial” and prevent it from reaching the House of Commons, where suspicions about the Islands’ government were “already inconveniently strong and would be augmented by an avowed difference with Russia”.42

Bathurst invited Capodistria and Lieven to his country home where he exercised his diplomatic skills and lavishly entertained his guests.43 In the relaxed and unofficial atmosphere, Capodistria became much less ‘vehement’. When his guests departed, Bathurst asked Wellington to remind Tsar Alexander I the Treaty of Paris was made and sealed, and the time for Russia to interfere was past. It would be better to avoid interference as an international disagreement would entail many risks.

Meanwhile, Bathurst wrote to Capodistria, defending the British government’s position.44 He argued there was no violation of the Treaty of Paris and Capodistria’s interpretations on the ‘facts’ were wrong.45 Key to this dispute was Bathurst’s and Capodistria’s different interpretations of the Treaty’s text. Bathurst argued the 4th article in the Treaty did not refer specifically to the Constitution of 1803 as the

43 Ibid.
44 Bathurst to Capodistria, 19 February 1820, CO 136/304 (approximately half the length of Capodistria’s memorandum).
45 Maitland to A’Court, 19 April 1820, Heytesbury Papers, XIX, Add. MS 41530.
existing constitution of the Ionian Islands but to “existing constitutions”. When Maitland examined whether “there was any … Constitution to which the Ionian people were … peculiarly attached” he found it impossible to conclude.46 The political changes over time had thrown them into utter confusion regarding “any prevailing attachment to any particular form of government”. This absence of “attachment” meant justification for Britain to unreservedly exercise interventionist authority. Bathurst argued the Constitution of 1803 was given to the Ionians “by blind resignation…from the hand of Alexander”.47 This was the Ionians’ acceptance of, and submission to, a barbaric and despotic Russian regime that was different to the freedom and independence Britain afforded its dependencies.48 Bathurst added:

Your Excellency’s sagacity, beautiful perhaps in the eye of a solitary philosopher, but not adopted to answer the views of a father of numerous but indocile and uneducated family.49

Bathurst’s paternalistic rhetoric consistently presented the Ionians as immature, ignorant and confused children who needed a stern and watchful father to guide them along the road to progress and civilisation. The stereotypical figure of the child helped shape an enduring ideology of “difference” between the British and Ionian people that marked the Ionians fit only to be colonial subjects and not for public service. Bathurst believed the Ionians needed a long process of tutorship before they could participate in the governance of their country.

46 Bathurst to Capodistria, 19 February 1820, CO 136/304.
47 Ibid.
48 Maitland to A’Court, 19 April 1820, Heytesbury Papers, XIX, Add. MS 41530.
49 Bathurst to Capodistria, 19 February 1820, CO 136/304.
Bathurst rejected all the criticisms and accusations Capodistria made against British governance. He rejected Capodistria’s accusation that the election of members to the Ionian Legislative Assembly was fixed by Maitland. He disagreed with Capodistria that Maitland’s power was too extensive and that he had acted without control from his superiors, noting Maitland was responsible to the Crown and Parliament for the ways he exercised power. Bathurst rejected the accusation Maitland forbade discussion in the Ionian Parliament about the Constitution of 1817, remarking “it was not the duty of the LHC to enter into contentions, discussions, and personal altercations with every individual in Corfu, who might chose to give his own interpretation of it”.  

Bathurst especially rejected accusations of British misgovernment, stating Britain had “found the Administration of Justice dilatory, irregular, and corrupt”, and under British rule improvements had been made in overcoming these issues. Bathurst entirely rejected Capodistria’s demand to alter the Ionian constitution. He did not see the need for that and argued changing the charter would only “serve to unsettle men’s minds and give encouragement to that love of change which it is to be feared is making a solid progress in every part of Europe and may ultimately disturb its peace and tranquillity”. In a last attempt to gain some power for Ionians within the government, Capodistria suggested the appointment of an Ionian agent in the government, Bathurst to Capodistria, 30 July 1820, CO 136/304.

50 Ibid.
51 Bathurst to Capodistria, 30 July 1820, CO 136/304.
52 Ibid., Referring to the “mysterious unions” much like the Carbonari in Italy and to the secret societies which have been formed in Greece and “that attempts have been made to introduce it into the Ionian Islands” could succeed Bathurst noted if “the British government were wavering and resolute in the maintenance of what has been established”. On secret societies and Italian national movements, see Liakos A., I Italiki Enopiisi ke i Megali Idea [Italian Unification and the Great Idea].
Islands to deal with Ionian complaints “as representative of the Prince Regent”. This idea was totally dismissed by Bathurst.\textsuperscript{53}

Capodistria and Bathurst each produced his (in all cases masculine discourse) own interpretation of the ‘truth’. But Britain, confident in its position of power and as the authority over the Islands, believed it was the ‘sole’ and ‘correct’ interpreter of the Treaty of Paris. Everyone else, including Capodistria, was confined within a labyrinthine set of ‘incorrect representations’ or ‘erroneous and insidious’ quotations. In this case, only the official interpreter, Britain, possessed the truth.

Capodistria had been defeated. The Ionians who protested against Maitland had lost the only important international supporter in their battle against Maitland’s regime. British authorities at home and in the periphery rejoiced in their victory, feeling secure they had put the matter behind them. The Ionian question took a dramatic turn, however, when the war for Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire broke out in 1821.\textsuperscript{54} The Islands required the undivided attention of the British ministers, especially Bathurst. Questions of colonial and national identity erupted in new ways.

**The Greek War of Independence (1821) and Maitland’s rule.**

For many years, a great number of the Ionian population, in accordance with other Greek populations, cherished the myth of a Greek nation, advocating the reunion of the Greek race in a restored Greek Empire. Throughout the four centuries

\textsuperscript{53} Bathurst to Capodistria, 30 July 1820, CO 136/304.
\textsuperscript{54} Wrigley W. D., *The Diplomatic Significance of Ionian Neutrality*. 
of Venetian rule, the Ionians had come in contact with Western ideas which played a vital part in the revival of the Hellenikos Diafotismos (Hellenic Enlightenment) and culture. The Philike Hetairia (Greek Society) was founded in 1814 as an instrument of Greek regeneration in which leading members of Ionian society participated.

When news of the Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire broke in April 1821, the Ionian people shared feelings of great excitement. Maitland anxiously remarked how “all feeling relative to any point connected with the Ionian Government lapsed into the general enthusiastic desire of giving support to that revolution”. Maitland was not surprised many Ionians displayed “the strongest sympathy in favour of the insurgents, who were of the same religious persuasion with themselves, with similar habits, language, and manners”. In the following months Ionians assisted the Greek insurrection with manpower, money, military equipment and public prayers.

Prior to the Greek War of Independence, Maitland had supported the interests of the Ottoman Empire in order to defend the interests of the British Empire. In 1819

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59 Maitland’s Address to the Ionian Legislative Assembly on 4 March 1822, published in the Times, 25 March 1823.
he ceded the territory of Parga, a former Venetian colony inherited by the British in the Treaty of Paris, to the Ottomans. Maitland argued Britain could not afford the military cost of sustaining Parga, but in reality the cession would guarantee a permanent alliance with the Ottomans. Although Maitland did not agree with the Ottomans’ political system or values, he believed the cession was necessary to safeguard Britain’s interests in the Mediterranean and secure safe passage to British “possessions in the East”. When the Greek War of Independence broke out, Maitland kept the Ionian Islands neutral, closely monitoring the influx of refugees to the Islands to prevent political instability and events in the region to safeguard British interests.

British authorities in London were also anxious and fearful. Bathurst was concerned simultaneously with problems in Canada and European stability. Since taking office, his attention had been divided between British resistance to the American invasion of Canada and British campaigns against the French. Although British sovereignty in Canada was secured by the Peace of Ghent, Bathurst feared another invasion, a concern which influenced his colonial policy making. His fear of France was connected with a lifelong fear of an English revolution or a French invasion. He consistently supported Wellington’s demands for money for the campaigns in the Mediterranean while facing a growing opposition demanding cuts.

60 Maitland to Bathurst, 24 November 1819, Heytesbury Papers, XIX, Add. MS 41530.
61 Maitland to A’Court, 30 November 1821; Maitland to A’Court, 9 January 1822, Heytesbury Papers, XIX, Add. MS 41530.
62 McLachlan N. D., “Bathurst at the Colonial Office 1812-1827”.
63 Ibid., p. 483.
in the costs of the Napoleonic Wars.\textsuperscript{64} Bathurst was against any sacrifice of British conquests. While protecting Britain’s interests in Africa in the 1820s, Bathurst turned his attention to another European aggressor, Russia, who was looking for an opportunity to expand her empire in the Southern Mediterranean.

Russophobia affected Bathurst’s attitude and policies concerning Britain’s Mediterranean possessions.\textsuperscript{65} When the Greek War of Independence broke out, Bathurst suspected Imperial Russia would get involved in the revolt as the self-proclaimed protector of Greek independence. Russia saw itself as “successor to the Ottoman Empire, and ruler of the Orthodox Greek populations of the Balkans and Levant”.\textsuperscript{66} However, Bathurst, Castlereagh and Canning favoured the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as a balance between the Great Powers and warned the Tsar to restrain from supporting the revolt.\textsuperscript{67}

It was not surprising Maitland, with Bathurst’s blessings, had excluded those close to Capodistria’s family from the administration of the Ionian state. Officially, they were removed because they were corrupt. Unofficially, the British believed those families were ‘poisoned’ by Russian influences.\textsuperscript{68} Bathurst’s solution for keeping Ionians out of the Greek struggle and protecting Britain’s presence in the Islands was to institute a policy of neutrality and non-interference, punishing those

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Gleason J. H., \textit{The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain}, (Cambridge, 1950).
\item Bayly C. A., \textit{Imperial Meridian}, p. 103.
\item Thompson N., \textit{Earl Bathurst}, p. 150.
\item Maitland to Bathurst, 23 February 1817, CO 136/186; Maitland to Bathurst 21 October 1819, CO 136/12.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
who did not obey with exile and confiscation of property. The greatest worry, however, was a rebellious outbreak of the population against British rule. Frederick Adam, the Chief Commander of the British forces in the Mediterranean, acting as Maitland’s right hand man, [he later succeeded Maitland as Lord High Commissioner (1824-1832)] clearly highlighted this fear in a number of reports. He demanded additional British navy personnel be sent to the Septinsula to “preserve the tranquillity of those states” and to demonstrate British “naval superiority” while protecting their possessions against the “irritable fancies and feelings of a Greek population”.  

For Adam, the ‘enemies within’ were powerful families acting as leaders of the ‘ignorant’ masses in their effort “to undermine British interests” based on “doctrines of Ionian Nationality”. Adam believed their main purpose was to combine the success of the Greek revolution with the overthrow of the British Protectorate. Adam believed it was difficult for many Ionians to ignore the “mistaken notion of [their] national dignity” even though they knew their interests lay with British protection. In the few months following the outbreak of the Greek insurrection, British officials

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69 Message of the LHC to the Ionian Senate, 3 June 1821, CO 136/1085.
70 Adam to Bathurst, 26 June 1821, CO 136/1085.
71 Those “persons of influence” were members of the Capodistria family. Adam to Bathurst, 6 June 1821, CO 136/1085. See also Woodhouse C. M., “Kapodistrias and the Philiki Etairia 1814-21” in Clogg R., The Struggle for Greek Independence, (London, 1973), pp. 103-134. This split was a feature internal to Corfiot society but became stronger in relation to the conditions prevailing in the different Islands. For example, in Cephalonia, the largest and the poorest of the Islands, “many acts have been used to inflame the minds of the peasantry and to raise … enthusiasm in favour of the insurrection of the main land”.
72 Adam to Bathurst, 26 June 1821, CO 136/1085.
in the Islands and Colonial Office alike found themselves engaged in preventing
Ionian assistance to the Greeks whilst sustaining peace and order in the Septinsula.  

However, Ionian hostility to the policy of neutrality was widespread, extending
into the administrative machine of government. For Adam, only the display of power
by the British garrison could restrain the Ionian people from reacting violently
against government policy. But this failed to prevent two incidents in 1821. On 26
September, forty Turkish men, women and children who had fled Greece for
Cerigo, one of the smallest Islands, to seek refuge and the protection of British
forces, were massacred by the Islanders. Although most of the inhabitants were
appalled by the massacre, Captain Henry Heathcote, Regent of Ithaca and Cerigo,
felt he could not rely on their “good principles and regret”. This lack of trust
extended to the judiciary, which Heathcote believed “incapable of awarding the
Sentences merited”. He declared martial law and ordered the execution of five
Ionians involved in the massacre. At the same time in Zante, one of the largest and
wealthiest Islands, British troops and the local population directly clashed after a
Turkish brig ran aground and people in the crowd watching these events fired on the
brig’s crew and the British troops aiding them. During the clash, one British soldier

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73 Strangford to Adam, Private and Confidential, 16 July 1821, Co 136/1085. Lord Strangford, British
Ambassador in Constantinople, openly supported the integrity of the Ottoman Empire while Maitland
and Adam believed Strangford’s views were destabilising British, and Ionian, neutrality. Adam to
Strangford, 5 August 1821, CO136/1085.
74 Quoted in Tumelty J. J., “The Ionian Islands under British Administration”, p. 127.
75 Proclamation from Captain Heathcote to residents of Cerigo, 12 October 1821, CO 136/1085.
was killed and three were wounded.\textsuperscript{76} Martial law was declared and five individuals were executed.\textsuperscript{77}

Maitland felt things were out of hand and, to prevent clashes similar to Zante’s, proclaimed martial law in all the Islands between October and the end of the year.\textsuperscript{78} It was “the proper measure” to ensure the British policy of neutrality.\textsuperscript{79} He defended his policy on the grounds that, in Zante, the population demonstrated “revolutionary behaviour”. Maitland proclaimed any future Ionian assistance to the Greek War of Independence was paramount to an “act of rebellion”. Martial law was a measure of protection to “prohibit … all connection between them [Ionians] and the Insurgents [Greeks]”.\textsuperscript{80} In addition to the imposition of martial law, the whole of the Ionian population was disarmed, “for the peace and happiness of the barbarous, misinformed, and bigoted population”, and severe penalties were introduced that strengthen governmental policies.\textsuperscript{81} Maitland criticised the “mildness with which this

\textsuperscript{76} Duffy to Hankey, 13 October 1821, CO 136/1085.
\textsuperscript{77} Martial law is not written law but arises out of necessity on the orders of the executive and based on the justification that a state has a right to protect itself against those who would destroy it. It applies to all persons, both civil and military, unlike military law, which comprises only the armed forces. Gupte S. V., \textit{Martial Law: theory and practice}, (New Delhi, 1979).
\textsuperscript{78} Maitland to Adam, 15 October 1821, CO 136/1085.
\textsuperscript{79} This shows the British Government’s definition of Martial Law, first implemented in 1817 at Cuttack (India), by virtue of Regulation X of 1804, which stated: “it may be expedient … the Governor-General in Council should declare and establish Martial Law for the safety of the British Possessions … by the \textit{immediate} punishment of persons owing allegiance to the British Government, who may be \textit{taken} in arms in \textit{open hostility} to the said Government, or in the actual commission of any overt act of rebellion against the authority of the same, or in the \textit{act of openly aiding andabetting} the enemies of the British Government within any part of the territories above specified”. Mohan P. P., \textit{Imaginary Rebellion and How it was Suppressed: The Punjab Rebellion of 1919 and how it was suppressed, an account of the Punjab disorders and the workings of Martial Law}, (New Delhi, 1999), p. 468.
\textsuperscript{80} Maitland to Adam, 15 October 1821, CO 136/1085.
\textsuperscript{81} Maitland to Bathurst, 12 November 1821, CO 136/1085; Maitland to Bathurst, 21 October 1821, CO 136/1085.
government has been hitherto administered”, advocating a hardening of policies in
the Septinsula more suited “to the character of the people under our rule”.82

The events in Zante allowed Maitland to reinforce his autocratic rule in the
Septinsula. Maitland kept reminding Bathurst that the Ionian atrocities were not
solely focused against the enemy (Ottomans), but also towards the protectors
(British). Murdering Turks was one thing, murdering “His Majesty’s Troops” was
quite another. It illustrated a total lack of respect and connection with the protectors
and, more worrying for Maitland, demonstrated a lack of fear against the world’s
most powerful army and the threat of its defeat.83 “Three thousand five hundred men,
and our own Greek subjects upwards of one hundred and thirty thousand all armed”
meant, for Maitland, no “vestige of Salvation left for us”.84

The incidents in 1821 demonstrated how many Ionians’ sympathy with the
Greek cause undermined British colonial policy-making for the Septinsula; the
aftermath demonstrated how determined Maitland was to reclaim it. Britain should
set “a severe example” against those who expressed sympathy to the “Greek cause”
and violated “every principle of allegiance and obedience” to the British
Protectorate. Maitland wanted Ionians to feel the “full difference between the mild
government which has hitherto existed” and the new regime.85 Maitland knew where
British lives were at risk, the British government would not oppose his measures. He
also knew Bathurst had no objections to the imposition of permanent authoritarian

82 Maitland to Bathurst, 12 October 1821, CO 136/1085.
83 Address of Maitland to the Senate, 16 October 1821, CO 136/1085.
84 Maitland to Bathurst, 16 October 1821, CO 136/1085.
85 Maitland to Adam, 21 October 1821, CO 136/1085.
rule in the Islands.\textsuperscript{86} What mattered for the British authorities at home was to keep the Ionian question out of the House of Commons, which did not happen.

\textbf{Reactions in the House of Commons}

As the atrocities escalated between the Turks and Greeks in 1821, the British government had plentiful accounts of the “barbarities” committed between the two parties. Despite British understanding of Ionian’ “empathy” towards Greek suffering, British officials in the Septinsula, Colonial Office, Parliament and some sectors of the press focused their portrayals on the Greeks’ “most violent enthusiasm”, describing them as “murderers” and “barbarians”.\textsuperscript{87} Intelligence came from the Islands, which had become the “eyes and ears” detailing the revolt, as well as British consuls and individuals from the Greek territories and Constantinople.

The British public, however, had limited information about the war. Classically educated Britons identified with ancient Greek civilisation, especially those of a liberal disposition, saw only the slaughter, rape, and forced slavery of the descendants of classical and Christian Greeks, who fought a ‘Noble Cause’ to achieve their freedom.\textsuperscript{88} Committees were organised in Britain to raise funds for the Greek cause, with Joseph Hume being one of the organisers of the London Greek Committee.

\textsuperscript{86} Maitland to Bathurst, 16 October 1821, CO 136/1085.
\textsuperscript{87} Maitland to Bathurst, 22 July 1821, CO 136/1085.
Bathurst did not entertain such sensibilities. For him Greeks were anything but ‘Nobles’. In attempts to persuade close friends and colleagues otherwise, Bathurst shared information regarding the ‘real’ Greeks. Writing to Lord Aberdeen, who had made a major financial contribution to the Greek cause, he enclosed an account of the Greek atrocities following the surrender of Tripolitsa, in which 3,000 Turkish women and children were killed: “pregnant women had their bellies ripped open, and their severed heads exchanged with those of dogs, and the large Jewish population had been tortured to reveal its wealth, after which many of them had been buried alive”. Bathurst also noted “the Greek cause is supported by every Jacobin in France and England … it is impossible for Government to do anything but remain neutral”.\(^{89}\) Aberdeen withdrew his support on moral and diplomatic grounds. Not all, however, acted in the same way.

Like Bathurst, Maitland also regarded Philhellenes as “misguided romantics” who were “full of classic imaginings … instead of studying the actual character of the people are satisfied with attributing to them all the virtues of the ancient Grecian population … without the smallest foundation or reality”.\(^{90}\) When Bathurst requested a report on the Greek war at the end of 1823, Maitland suggested the Greeks might win the war but believed “any victory would be destroyed … by jealousy and love of plunder”.\(^{91}\) Maitland believed direct knowledge and experience of the places and people affected the forms of rule adopted by colonisers. If the Ottoman Empire

\(^{90}\) Maitland to Bathurst, 6 May 1816, CO 136/7.  
believed authoritarian government was the best form of colonial rule for the Greek character, for Maitland that was a good enough argument to accept.

The British government, knowing the “Ionian sensibilities” towards their Greek counterparts, were convinced any political feelings of resistance to British authority should be put down by “exemplary punishment” of the offenders. The discussions in the House of Commons in May 1822, however, allowed the expression of differing opinions. The application of martial law in the Septinsula was criticised by the radicals. Hume characterised it as an arbitrary act, a humiliating process that had no place in British rule, which should advocate humanity, justice, equality. Hume believed Maitland used martial law to get rid of the “enemies within” on the one hand and to “fill up to the brim the measure of that despotism and oppression” on the other.

The martial law policy formed only part of a lengthy discussion instigated by Hume. Expressing his philhellenic sympathies, Hume argued Britain should support the Greek cause, not only because of the affiliation with Ionian Greeks, but also to aid “fellow Christians, struggling to throw off the yoke of infidel Turks”. He accused the government of having a double standard in their foreign policy, noting the events in Zante resulted from favouritism by British officials in the Islands and

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93 Ibid., p. 582.
94 Ibid., p. 562.
mainland Greece towards the Ottoman Turks. He felt the act of disarming the whole Ionian population was symbolically disregarding the freedom and independence they were guaranteed in the Treaty of Paris. It was also significant because their weapons were a part of their traditional dress and cultural identity. Disarming the population was an intrusion and diminution of their identity by foreigners. An anonymous Ionian writer in the Times described it as “the last decree of dishonour to which they can be exposed”.

The Under-secretary of the Colonial Department, Wilmot-Horton, a Liberal Tory, defended the government. He defended martial law, reproducing Maitland’s arguments and maintaining “no cruelty was exercised towards those who were subjected to its operation”. His assertion that these measures protected the Ionians from themselves expressed the paternalistic attitude of the government. He also supported British and Ionian neutrality. He wanted to diminish the perception the Greeks (Christian) were fighting a noble cause to overthrow the Ottoman (Muslim) tyrannical regime. He understood sympathies existed between Ionians and Greeks because of their “common origin”. But both Greeks and Ottomans had committed “atrocities” and neither deserved British or Ionian support. Wilmot-Horton tried to convince his colleagues the actions in the Islands were due to the careful

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97 Ibid., p. 563.
98 The Times, 28 December 1821.
99 The Times, 3 January 1822.
100 Hansard T. C., Parliamentary debates, New Series, VII, 14 May 1822, p. 590.
101 Ibid., p. 592.
consideration and benevolent thinking of a country which responded to its duty: to act as a protector for the security of the Ionians themselves.

The events in the Islands and the Commons debate were reported in the *Times*. Thomas Barnes, editor of the *Times* since 1817, was a Whig and close friend of Henry Brougham. He favoured Parliamentary reform in Britain and he fought for the freedom of the newspaper to procure overseas news. He also believed anonymous journalism was a good way to promote objective journalism. The *Times*’s coverage of events in the Islands detailed both Ionian and British atrocities. On the one hand, Ionians were “treacherous people” with no regard for human life. Their behaviour was “most atrocious”, and the *Times* graphically described both their mutilation of a dead soldier and the massacre in Cerigo. “The natives enticed them [Turks] ashore”, it was reported, “and then shot them one by one, and tying the children to the dead bodies of their parents, threw them into the sea before the British could get down to prevent it”.102 On the other hand, the *Times* reported equally barbarous acts perpetrated by the British. An anonymous letter from Zante described the Islands under martial law, noting the “scenes of horror and terror” ordered by Maitland surpassed any imagination, as the bodies of the Ionians executed “were thrown into cages of iron, in which they are still exposed on the summits of hills, as if by way of menacing the rest of the people with a similar fate”.103

102 *The Times*, 11 January 1823.
103 Ibid.
A year after the debates, the *Times* published a proclamation by Frederick Hankey, Maitland’s secretary in the Septinsula, this time supporting the Government. The proclamation described the satisfaction the authorities in the Islands felt after the imposition of martial law and the disarming of the population. To Maitland, who co-wrote the proclamation, and the British government that approved its implementation, martial law meant protection of British sovereignty of the Islands over “people who have shown so little control over their passions … renounced every principle of prudence … every sense of gratitude, and even the semblance of obedience to their own government”. Ionians were, again, “turbulent”, “misguided”, and “evil-disposed” and deserved an authoritarian mode of government and rule.¹⁰⁴

The debates in the Commons and coverage of the 1821 events in the *Times* indicate the different views about Britain’s rule in the Islands. Unlike Maitland and the Colonial Office, Hume was sympathetic to the Ionians’ concerns and was critical of Maitland’s representation of them. He considered the Ionians Greek, supporting their political independence according to the terms in the Treaty of Paris. The *Times* portrayal of the events in Zante and Cerigo was contradictory and sensationalist. It did not consistently support the Government’s actions in the Islands and its fluctuating coverage of the events in 1821 and 1822 indicates the different opinions about the Islands and their rule, even in the early years of the Protectorate.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.
Conclusion.

The Constitution of 1817 defined British supremacy, authority, control and power over the Ionian people. This chapter has explored British debates on Ionian peoples, depicting many different voices and positions. Stereotypes were used by the British as the bases of their policies, however these were not always negative. While Maitland always maintained the Ionians’ lack of civilisation meant incapacity for self-government, others were critical of this view. For radical reformers like Hume and Brougham, Ionian history (being the Homeric Lands) and geography interlinked in producing a romanticised Western identity for the Ionian people. They constructed the Islanders as “lively with shining qualities” and praised their Europeanness, language, traditions, and western culture while criticising Maitland’s arbitrary powers and authoritarian rule. Adopting a liberal stance on British rule, they spoke against British injustice and cruelty, against the imposition of a despotic regime and the abuse of the Treaty of Paris. They supported the Islands’ independence and advocated representative institutions for them, believing they were placed “in a worst position than a West Indian island”. The Times sometimes adopted a view similar to the radicals, and its editor associated despotic Austrian rule in the Italian Peninsula with the British arbitrary regime in the Septinsula. Meanwhile Ioannis Capodistria complained about Maitland’s authority to the highest levels of government, but was unsuccessful in his attempt to restore aristocratic rule to the Islands.
From 1821 British authorities in the Islands and in London were faced with the rise of Greek nationalism. They shifted the language of Ionian character from “the individual local Ionian” to a national one (Ionian/Greek). In 1817 Ionians who wanted control were ‘corrupt’; by 1821 Ionians who supported the Greek cause were “savages, violent, animals, murderers”. As a result, tightening control in the hands of British authorities was legitimised, and the emphasis on neutrality strengthened as British officials attempted to distance the Ionians from the Greeks. This corresponded with overall British foreign and colonial policy opposing nationalist movements when they threatened Britain’s interests. Had the Ionians become involved in the Greek War of Independence and united with them in the newly created Greek state, the protection to the Septinsula provided by the British Crown would become unnecessary. During the 1830s, debates over British rule would become more vociferous and intense as the next chapter reveals.
Chapter 3: Debating the reform of the Ionian Constitution of 1817 in Septinsula during Nugent’s and Douglas’s administrations 1832-1841.

Introduction.

After Maitland’s death in 1824, it was important to entrust Britain’s Mediterranean territories to a suitable successor. The seventy year old Lord Hastings, protégé of George IV and former governor of India, became governor of Malta.¹ Maitland’s commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, Sir Frederick Adam, was appointed Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands on 17 January 1824. Adam, a Scottish aristocrat, had distinguished himself in the Peninsula campaigns and at Waterloo. He was assisted by his former commander, Wellington, in obtaining the post in the Ionian Islands.² As Maitland’s commander-in-chief, Adam was familiar with his predecessor’s vision of Ionian government. 1824 was a critical year in the war between the mainland Greek territories and the Ottoman Empire and there were fears an international war might ignite at any moment. The Colonial Office felt Adam had the necessary experience to protect Britain’s interests in the Mediterranean.

Adam became Britain’s eyes and ears in the Mediterranean.³ He employed agents, collected information and circulated dispatches reporting on the warfare between Greeks and Ottomans. Married to an Ionian aristocrat, Nina Palatianou, he

³ On Adam, see Reumont A., Sir Frederick Adam.
was sympathetic to the Greek cause. However, he did not break the strict neutrality imposed by his government.\(^4\)

On civil matters, Adam fought corruption in the public and private sector and his wife helped establish educational institutions for both sexes at all levels.\(^5\) During his tenure, Adam maintained Maitland’s policies and the Ionian constitution remained unchanged.\(^6\) He remained in the Islands until 1832, when he left for Madras, where many of Maitland’s former assistants had gone. Their departure signalled a moment of change in the style of government, coinciding with reform ‘at home’.

In 1827 Bathurst retired from office. He was succeeded by the brief tenures of William Huskisson, Lord Goderich, Sir George Murray, Lord Stanley, Thomas Spring Rice and Lord Aberdeen until 1835, when Lord Glenelg became Colonial Secretary for four years. In the meantime, the Tory Government was succeeded by the Whigs who, in 1832, passed the Reform Act which restricted the power of the landed aristocracy. Parliament now contained reformers who attacked the system of sinecures, the high cost of imperial government, the trading monopoly of the East India Company and the Elizabethan Poor Law.\(^7\) Many changes and reforms

\(^4\) Wrigley W. D., *The Diplomatic Significance of Ionian Neutrality*.
\(^5\) Paschalidi M., “The Education in the Ionian Islands under British Rule 1815-1864”.
\(^6\) Hioti, P., _I Istoria tou Ioniou Kratous [the history of the Ionian State]_, pp. 1-33.
followed: an improved criminal code, an effective police system, modifications of customs and trade regulations, the abolition of slavery and a more liberal foreign policy. A new emigration policy was introduced in the 1830s, after Edward Wakefield’s essay *Letter from Sydney* was published, to remedy poverty, low wages, and unemployment at home and while strengthening the union between Britain and her colonies. Wakefield’s scheme of selling colonial lands at a fixed price and emphasis on the careful selection of emigrants was adopted by Lord Grey’s government.

A spirit of reform also entered the Colonial Office when Lord Howick, the son of the Prime Minister became Parliamentary Under-Secretary and “exercised …all power and authority of a Secretary of State”. Howick resigned in 1833 after the new Colonial Secretary, E. G. Stanley, rejected his plan for emancipation in the West Indies. Stanley, later the fourteenth Earl of Derby, came from a powerful Whig family. He favoured Catholic emancipation and gradual and limited parliamentary reform both in England and Ireland.

This chapter examines the debates and tensions regarding constitutional reform in the Septinsula during the administrations of Lord Nugent and Sir Howard Douglas. It will analyse the shifts, fluctuations and contradictions in Nugent’s, Douglas’s and the British officials’ language concerning colonial policy-making in general and Ionian fitness for representative institutions in particular. Nugent’s

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policies conflicted with Maitland’s, marking a change in the Islands associated with Whig policies on the Empire. He discarded Maitland’s views on sovereignty and the preservation of the prerogative. His liberal attitudes later encouraged Ionians to openly question his successor, Douglas, and the nature of British rule in the Islands. Douglas advocated social and economic policies to improve the Ionians. Yet he was determined to retain his authority and control over Ionian affairs and safeguard Britain’s influence and strategic interests in the Mediterranean. He believed his was a civilising mission that would take many years for the British authorities to achieve.

Lord George Nugent: a new spirit of liberalism.

Lord George Nugent Grenville succeeded Adam in 1832. Nugent was a classical scholar and historian. He entered the army and became lieutenant-colonel in 1813. He represented the Grenville pocket borough of Buckingham and Aylesbury but made few parliamentary appearances due to ill-health. As an MP, he was identified with liberal policies and civil liberties. When the Grenvilles, led by his brother Richard, split from the Whigs in 1817, Nugent did not join them. Throughout his career he advocated parliamentary reform, abolition, religious liberty and free trade. He was a member of both the London Spanish and Greek committees. In Grey’s government, Nugent was appointed Lord of the Treasury in 1830, but in 1832, due to financial difficulties, he accepted the position of Lord High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands.¹⁰

Nugent’s policy in the Islands differed from his predecessors. Shortly after arriving in the Islands, Nugent made unannounced inspections of the Custom-house, prison, police and other state institutions to make his own conclusions about their status and be less reliant on the views of British officials.\(^\text{11}\) He published a proclamation expressing his understanding of the Ionian people and outlining his political intentions. Unlike Maitland, he paid tribute to Greece as the founder of free institutions, acknowledging the legitimacy of Ionian patriotism.\(^\text{12}\) He aimed to eradicate any difference associated with ethnicity and articulated a western identity for the Ionians based on classical ideals. A philhellene, Nugent recognised Ionians as Greeks in his addresses to the Ionian Parliament and to the Colonial Office. He believed the Ionians’ legacy determined their fitness for representative government. Criticising Maitland’s administrative system, he argued the Ionians’ “faults” belonged to their past rulers, whilst their “virtues” were their own.\(^\text{13}\)

Nugent’s proclamation raised Ionians’ hopes and expectations for a liberal governance. Reform of the Constitution was anticipated along with fair distribution of patronage for the Ionians in the public and military sectors of government, patronage already offered to the Maltese and Sicilians. He supported capital investment for the advancement of marine industry in the Islands and planned to convert Adam’s country house “into a seminary”. “The country already smiles, at these works, that give promise of so bright a future”. Nugent’s next step was to

\(^{11}\) Ibid. He has adopted this practice on the Grenville family estate at Kilmainham, Dublin.

\(^{12}\) Nugent proclamation, 1 December 1832, CO 136/64.

\(^{13}\) Ibid.
promise Ionian people constitutional reforms, stating “regulations in themselves wise and good may … be found to require improvement in order to make them keep pace with the improving character of the people”.  

His promise was tested in the 1833 elections for the Fourth Parliament when he altered the electoral system for the new Assembly, weakening the local patronage vote by replacing the double lists of candidates with triple ones. The new lists included many liberal and well educated Ionians such as Mustoxidi, Roma, Dandolo, Plessa and Flamburiari, who now saw an opportunity to hold public office. Nugent also informed the Ionian people of parliamentary debates through the official government *Gazette*. When he met the newly elected Assembly in 1833, he reminded them of their proud Greek origin. He declared his admiration of their improved character, and stated his faith in their fitness to represent the Ionian population as a mature political body. He wanted to cooperate with them, seeing himself as an equal partner with the Ionians in government. Nugent’s actions marked a new direction in the form of rule for the Ionian Islands. He tried to position the Septinsula as a protectorate rather than as a colony and adhere more closely to the tenets of the Treaty of Paris.

However, Nugent’s electoral reforms led him to clash with his colonial superiors and created a fragile and tense relationship between the two. His actions raised questions about the governor’s power to initiate any kind of constitutional

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14 Anonymous extract of a letter, probably written by Ionians, printed in the *Times*, 7 January 1833.
15 Calligas E., “The Rizospastai (Radicals-Unionists)”, p. 54.
16 Nugent speech to the Assembly, 7 March 1833, CO 126/65.
17 Ibid.
reform without the Colonial Office’s authorisation. Nugent’s addresses to the Ionian people disturbed the Colonial Office, which saw Maitland’s policies jeopardised by Nugent’s political views and actions, and they disapproved of his reforms.\(^\text{18}\) The electoral reforms gave “rise to a fresh blood of Ionian liberals sitting in the Parliament as leading spokesmen of a new spirit of independence”.\(^\text{19}\) They demanded the alteration of the Constitutional Charter of 1817 and the political independence of the Ionians the Treaty of Paris guaranteed, along with the freedom of the press.\(^\text{20}\)

Nugent directed and supported the passage of 42 new laws that improved economic conditions, promoted education, the fiscal system and commerce, and encouraged an agricultural loan scheme which paved the way for the establishment of the Ionian Bank.\(^\text{21}\) Confiscation of property belonging to Ionians involved in the Greek War of Independence was nullified.\(^\text{22}\) Greek was established as the official language in the Law Courts, allowing more Ionians, especially the peasantry, to understand proceedings. But Italian remained the official language of the Ionian state.\(^\text{23}\)

While Nugent gained popularity in the Islands due to his reforms, the Colonial Office rejected his policies, believing he could not formulate Ionian policy, which

\(^{18}\) Nugent to Stanley, 5 May 1833, CO 136/65.


\(^{21}\) Verykios S., I Istoria ton Inomenon Kraton ton Ionion Nison, [The History of the United States of the Ionian Islands], p. 227. See also Nugent to Goderich, 2 January 1833, CO 136/65; Nugent to Goderich, 28 March 1833, CO 136/65; Nugent to Hay 8 June 1833, CO 136/66; Alexander Woodford to Aberdeen, 23 March 1835, CO 136/74; Nugent’s speech to the Ionian Senate, 23 February 1835, CO 136/74.

\(^{22}\) Hiotis P., I Istoria tou Ioniou Kratous, [History of the Ionian State], pp. 72-95.

\(^{23}\) Nugent to Goderich, 20 March 1833, CO 136/65.
was the responsibility of the British government, but could only make minor improvements within the Islands. The British government would not grant representative institutions to the Ionian people, arguing the inhabitants were still not fit for political representation despite Nugent’s attempts to convince them otherwise. As a result, Nugent resigned in December 1834, after first dissolving Parliament in March 1834 and proclaiming new elections. This time the lists were carefully drawn up, ensuring most opposition members were excluded from the fifth Parliament. When Nugent returned to Britain, he learned his policies in the Septinsula had been attacked in the British press.24

In practice Nugent’s brief administration had little effect on constitutional change. However, his legacy was significant in Ionian politics. He initiated a new liberal spirit and encouraged Ionian demands for constitutional reform. British officials in the Islands were disturbed by Nugent’s liberal policies and observed “people here are bringing forward pretensions they never dreamed of before”. Baynes, the secretary of the Senate for twenty years and Maitland’s close associate, remarked “the spirit of the times was making rapid headway in the islands, … the temper of the Assembly reflected the prevailing dissatisfaction with Maitland’s system” and advised “immediate changes to avoid future embarrassments”. Fraser, secretary to Nugent from 1834, predicted catastrophic consequences after allowing the “uneducated and ignorant” public to attend the debates of the Ionian Parliament.25

24 The Morning Chronicle, 22 October 1832; Courier, 26 November 1835, 24 and 26 November 1836. 25 Quoted in Tumelty J. J., “The Ionian Islands under British Administration”, pp. 148-149.
To Kirkpatrick, a member of the Supreme Council of Justice, Nugent’s governance undermined Maitland’s established order. However, his successor, Sir Howard Douglas, would restore autocracy.

**Sir Howard Douglas: an autocrat.**

On 29 April 1835 Sir Howard Douglas arrived in the Ionian Islands, a safe option for the Colonial Office after Nugent’s impulsiveness. Douglas was born in Gosport in 1776 and was raised by his aunt in Edinburgh before entering the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. He was a distinguished British soldier, a lieutenant general of the British army, who served in the Canadian colonies of Nova Scotia, Quebec and Kingston. In Kingston, Douglas lived among the Native Americans and learned the art of observing and hunting. His experience helped him develop an understanding of the parameters of colonial rule. From North America Douglas moved to Europe.

In Britain he trained a new generation of officers at the Royal Military College and other academies. He was interested in naval warfare, studying navigation and developing various techniques for marine surveying. He participated in the Peninsula campaigns and was sent on special missions during the Napoleonic wars. Afterwards he published several military treatises: *Essay on the Principles and Construction of Military Bridges* was first published in 1816 and *Observations on the Motives, Errors, and Tendency of M. Carnots System of Defense* in 1819; his

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26 Kirkpatrick to Hay, 10 September 1834, CO 136/323.
28 Ibid., chapters 12, 13, 16-23
A treatise on *Naval Gunnery* in 1820 became the basis of military training and study until the late 1840s. *Naval Gunnery* also encompassed key points of a national strategy associated with the development of new weapons and tactics for the bombardment of foreign naval bases. He became an undisputed authority in his field.

A protégé of Bathurst, Douglas was governor of New Brunswick between 1823-1831. During his tenure, he devoted himself to its development, constructing the new Government House, advancing municipal and county government and re-organizing the local militia. He favoured the settlement of British Protestants only. He promoted rural schools, agricultural societies and fairs, and constructed roads and lighthouses. He advocated education for Native American children in their family environment while discouraging their assimilation in the colony. He founded Fredericton College, whose loyal pupils kept him informed of American policies. He believed the Canadian colonies were a source of strategic and commercial strength to Britain and urged the British government to continue its financial support of New Brunswick. In February 1831 he resigned as governor of New Brunswick and campaigned publicly for continued protective tariffs for British-Canadian timber against the ascendant free-traders.

In Britain he was not supported by the Whig government because of his opposition to the Reform Bill and emancipation. He unsuccessfully ran as the Tory

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29 The city of Bathurst, in North-eastern New Brunswick was named in honour of the Colonial Secretary Earl Bathurst.
31 Ibid., chapters 28-31.
32 Ibid., chapter 29.
candidate in Liverpool in 1832 and 1835. Although his Parliamentary career was not advancing, he was able to continue his colonial career when he was appointed governor of the Ionian Islands just before Lord Stanley left the Colonial Office. There, his liberal and reformist social policies were in contradiction with his conservative attitude to political reform.

**Douglas’s reform agenda in the Septinsula: health, religion, education and law.**

Douglas did not have a romanticised view of the Islands, although he did admire their classical associations, which aroused “all the high and noble sympathies” of a great European past. He blamed the selfish Venetian occupation, with its mismanagement and misrule, for the moral, social and political degradation of Ionian society. The Ionians could again “become a great Head of civilisation” but only under the guiding hand of Britain’s enlightened protection. As a result, Douglas transferred his experiments with colonial policies in the Canadian colonies to the Ionian Islands. Douglas, like his predecessors, attempted to improve the social and physical infrastructure of the Islands. He also instituted reforms in the areas of education, religion and law and fought for a more equitable trade agreement for the Septinsula within the Empire. He believed his was a long-term civilising mission for the Islands. He believed it was the duty of the protectors to teach Ionian people the essential skills of survival and civilisation. For example, he believed the heavily fortified Corfu Town, capital of the British administration, was dangerous to the

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33 Douglas to Glenelg, Private and Separate, 21 June 1838, CO 136/88.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
health of both British residents and the people of Corfu because there was no room for growth and expansion.\textsuperscript{37} Douglas restructured the city and introduced sanitary legislation to keep the city free of filth and disease.\textsuperscript{38} His campaign benefited the future growth of the city. At the same time, it also maintained the image of the Islands as a “land apart” and demonstrated the Ionians were not yet ready for representative government.

Douglas was also concerned about the moral risks in Corfu Town, influenced by his concerns with local weather.\textsuperscript{39} The Septinsula did not have a tropical climate like the Caribbean or India. Nevertheless it was hot during summer, resulting in general discomfort and lack of productivity. To Douglas, this contributed to a degeneration of mind and body. He believed the cold northern climate encouraged industry in Britain and even among the British settlers in the Canadian colonies. Drawing on contemporary theories about climate he believed heat brought indolence,

\textsuperscript{36} Dondi, resident of the Municipal Council to Douglas Corfu, 19 February 1836, CO 136/80; Thomas to Douglas, General Health Office, Corfu 13 February 1836, CO 136/80. (Leontsinis G. N. “O thesmos tis aggaraias ke ta dimosia erga sta nisia tou Ioniou kata tin perioko tis “Bretnikis Prostasias”’’ [The institution of force labour and public works in the Septinsula during the “British protection”]).


\textsuperscript{39} Douglas to Glenelg, 21 April 1836, CO 136/80.
passion, lack of self-control and resulted in disorder and crime, “evils” he identified in the Ionian character.  

Douglas was convinced the Ionian character could be transformed through improved education and legal reform. In 1830s Britain, the educational needs of the working classes were largely dealt with by the philanthropic endeavours of various Christian denominations aimed at moral training. This differed from the Academies for upper class boys, which focused on classical literature and science in preparation for public service in Britain and colonies. In India the education system instigated by Macaulay was organised along similar lines, with neo-classical and English literature central to the government curriculum, aimed at transforming the character and the morality of Indian people, remaking India “in England’s image”.  

In the Ionian Islands the first endeavours towards establishing an education system (primary, secondary and higher) in the Septinsula were made by Lord Guilford early in the Protectorate. By 1830 there were 126 primary schools in the Septinsula which, because of fees and agricultural demands on the rural population,

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40 Douglas to Glenelg, 6 June 1835, CO 136/75.  
reduced to 35 in 1835. Douglas was determined to change this situation. Unlike his predecessors, he devoted money from public funds for the construction of schools and partial payment of teachers. The urban primary schools’ curricula consisted of Greek, mathematics, drawing, religion, and English, which extended to subjects related to agriculture and farming in rural areas. The number of schools had increased to 102 in 1837, yet had again declined to 93 in 1839, which Douglas blamed on the lack of funds and the inability of the rural population to pay one-third of the teachers’ salary.

Secondary schools in the four larger islands, Corfu, Zante, Santa Maura, and Cephalonia operated as vehicles to prepare pupils for university. Until 1828 the curricula included ancient Greek literature, Latin, mathematics, and geometry, and incorporated ancient Greek and Roman history, geography, drawing, English and philosophy during Douglas’s tenure. Costs of six pounds for day students and twenty pounds for boarders limited accessibility to the upper ranks of Ionian society. In 1839 Douglas established the Ionian Gymnasium, which resembled an English college, and featured an expanded curricula of Greek language and literature, mathematics, geometry, English, Italian, French, Latin, physics, chemistry, Greek and Roman history, philosophy, archaeology, drawing, architecture, music, and fencing, designed to make its pupils “proper gentlemen”. It fulfilled the intellectual needs of young Ionians between secondary school and university while sparing

44 Paschalidi M., “The education of boys and girls in the Ionian Islands 1818-1864”. I could further analyse education in the Septinsula, but the intention here is to provide an account of Douglas’s organization and maintenance of an educational system for Ionian youths.
45 Douglas to Russell 27 October 1839 and 30 June 1840, CO 136/101.
46 Gazzetta Jonie, No 529, 1 February 1841.
Ionian families the economic burden of sending their children to foreign universities. It also distanced Ionian youths from the revolutionary and radical ideas in the universities of Italy and France, which Douglas later blamed on teaching Ionians “to hate England and the English connection”, and attendance was a precondition for university education.\(^{47}\)

In the Septinsula Douglas argued he found “many peculiarities and strong prejudices” hard to understand and even harder to accept, particularly in the area of religion.\(^{48}\) Traditionally, British administrators both in London and the Islands had followed a policy of non-interference in religion. However, Douglas believed the Greek Orthodox religion, the predominant denomination in the Islands, failed to civilise the Ionian population, and he sought to free them from bondage to the Greek Orthodox priesthood. As in New Brunswick, where he founded the Fredericton College and fought for the admission of dissenters, Douglas believed the Ionian Gymnasium would eradicate the “enemy within” associated with the high church authorities and their teachings, which he felt led to superstition, prejudice and passivity among the Ionian people.

He criticised the codes of matrimony and legitimisation of natural children in the Islands. He criticised the system of dowry, which had negative effects on Ionian society because of the difficulty of the brides’ families in raising the agreed funds. It also gave couples the social status of marriage without the legal endorsement,

\(^{47}\) Douglas to Glenelg, 29 July 1835, CO 136/75; Douglas to Glenelg, Private and Separate, 21 June 1838, CO 136/88; Douglas to Russell 27 October 1839, CO 136/95. See also Gazzeta Jonie, no 476, 27 January 1840.

\(^{48}\) Douglas to Glenelg, 29 August 1836, CO 136/81.
ultimately leaving many Ionian women with illegitimate children and broken engagements, occasionally reduced to the status of a prostitute. Furthermore, the social practice remaining from the Venetian era of elites “keeping a concubine” and the resulting illegitimate children was harmful in constructing a respectable and moral society. It marked a cultural difference between Britons and Ionians for Douglas. There was an emphasis on “private and public virtue”, which ensured the sanctity of moral behaviour.\textsuperscript{49} The British upper classes felt it was their duty to provide positive examples of sexual morality and domesticity, thus legitimising their privileges. The failure of Ionian elites to uphold the virtues of sexual morality seemed to legitimise Britain’s rule and confirmed the Ionians’ uncivilised nature.\textsuperscript{50}

The Orthodox Church in Constantinople rejected Douglas’s proposed codes of civil law, which reduced their power on issues of matrimony and divorce in the Septinsula. Douglas publicly disputed the authority of the Church in civil government, arguing it was blind to anything other than old traditions and was inferior to a free-thinking Protestant one.\textsuperscript{51} Douglas enlisted the aid of Lord Palmerston, head of the Foreign Office, and Lord Ponsonby, British ambassador in Constantinople, who pressured the Ottomans, utilizing a commercial treaty signed between their two countries, to influence the head of the Greek Orthodox Church in

\textsuperscript{49} Douglas to Glenelg, 15 December 1836, CO 136/82.
\textsuperscript{50} Douglas to Hay 28 July 1834, CO 136/75. It was ironic that Douglas criticised the moral behaviour of the Ionians since he fathered a daughter while in Quebec City in 1796. Rather than marry the child’s mother, he wed Anne Dundas, daughter of James Dundas of Edinburgh, a member of the East India Company’s marine service, see Chichester H. M., “Douglas, Sir Howard, third baronet (1776-1861), rev. Roger T. Stearn”, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, (Oxford, 2004).
\textsuperscript{51} Douglas to Glenelg, 15 December 1836, CO 136/82; Douglas to Glenelg 31 October 1838, CO 136/89.
Constantinople and win assent to the alterations in the civil code. Douglas advocated the creation of an ‘independent’ Ionian church (in reality under his control), that encouraged Ionians to think as separate individuals and pursued public good. Replacing the Orthodox Church with Protestant Christianity would remedy the lack of civilisation in Ionian society. The proposal was rejected by London, but the establishment of a synod of bishops with full ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the Ionian Islands was acceptable to both the Colonial and Foreign offices. Douglas’s bestowal of Protestant Christianity and civilisation upon Ionians was ‘cultural’ rather than ‘biological’ racism and the idea of equal potential for all men corresponded with the monogenic belief that all humans were descended from Adam.

In addition to the education system and church, Douglas was also determined to reform the law and tackle the increase of crime in the Septinsula. The “rule of law” was being tackled elsewhere in the Empire. In India, Macaulay’s law commission proposed codes of civil and criminal procedure which were eventually enacted in the 1860s and considered an essential part of Britain’s civilising mission in India. As Metcalf argued, “the British colonial status found its legitimacy in the

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52 Backhouse to Douglas, Confidential, 3 January 1839, CO 136/89; Normanby to Douglas, 5 January 1839, CO 136/89. When the Church continued to resist, Douglas accused them of being “Russian agents” aiming to “subvert the British influence in the Septinsula”. Douglas to Normanby, 8 May 1839, CO 136/93.

53 Douglas to Russell, 28 October 1839, CO 136/95.

54 Normanby to Douglas, 6 July 1839, CO 136/93; Russell to Backhouse, 3 December 1839, CO 136/95; Russell to Douglas, 9 April 1840, CO 136/100.

55 Hall C., Civilising Subjects, p. 17

56 Douglas to Glenelg, 8 July 1835, CO 136/75; Douglass to Glenelg, 15 August 1835 CO 136/76; Douglas to Glenelg, 28 August 1835, CO 136/76; Douglas to Glenelg, 28 August 1835, CO136/76; Douglas to Glenelg, 30 November 1835, CO 136/76.
moralisation of law”. Douglas believed legal reform in the Septinsula was necessary to end the “horrors” of the old Venetian system, which he considered inhumane and uncivilised. His new codes offered the “same right as every civilised people has to be under the protection of certain and equal laws; in accordance with right and equity” and were supported by colonial officials. The permanent Under Secretary, James Stephen, believed Douglas’s new codes provided a solid basis for further evolution, regarding his “measures as a kind of happy accident, a fortunate daring”. Douglas’s codes were based on the Greek model and were ratified in 1841, although he faced resistance in the Ionian Assembly, which opposed the new codes partly because of Douglas’s resistance to constitutional reform.

Douglas believed his civilising mission should not only advance the morality of the Ionian people, but also their material condition and welfare. He fought for economic changes that would improve Ionian society. For example, he disapproved of the £35,000 per annum military contribution Ionians paid Britain towards the expense of protection and campaigned for its remission so public works awaiting funds could be finished. He argued the Islands were treated unfairly compared to other crown colonies, with only Malta and Gibraltar making contributions, limited to

57 Metcalf T., Ideologies of the Raj., p. 39. Douglas felt raising moral standards in the Septinsula also meant controlling British officers and making them “public examples” society could imitate. For example, when he heard rumours his Regents in Paxo, Captain Mawderley, “continued upon his establishment with a woman with whom he had been living for many years” Douglas removed him from office. See Douglas to Hay, Confidential, 28 July 1835, CO 136/75
58 Douglas to Glenelg, 8 July 1835, CO 136/75. He also cited the opinion of advocate general of the islands, Cippiotti. Cippiotti to Giplin,10 August 1836 enclosed in Douglas to Glenelg, 15 August 1835, CO136/76.
59 Ibid.
60 Stephen to Stanley, 4 March 1842, CO 136/117.
their surplus revenue. Moreover, all colonies enjoyed preferential commercial privileges due to their relationship with Britain, except the Ionian Islands which were not officially a colony but a protectorate. The Colonial Office was sympathetic to this plight: Stephen thought it was so serious the “publicity of it can hardly fail to bring on us serious reproach”. The Treasury declined to discuss it until 1844, and it was reduced so Ionians paid one-fifth of its annual revenue. Promoting general economic improvement, Douglas set up the Ionian Bank in 1839 along with other state related financial institutions, which allowed new business opportunities for merchants and other commercial groups.

Douglas’s civilising mission in the Septinsula included the construction of roads, erection of public buildings, prisons, Foundling Home for abandoned infants, mental institutions and other charitable organisations for the “sick and needy”. These were liberal attempts to modernise the Islands, but they were also attempts to respond to concerns of civil unrest. The increase of professionally qualified Ionian

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61 Douglas to Glenelg, 12 June 1835, CO 136/75; Douglas to Glenelg, 14 January 1836, CO 136/80; Douglas to Glenelg, 16 April 1835, CO 136/80; Douglas to Glenelg, 31 January 1837, CO 136/84; Douglas to Glenelg, 20 July 1838, CO 136/88; Douglas to Normanby, 7 June 1839, CO 136/94; Douglas to Russell, 31 January 1840, CO 136/100; Douglas to Russell, 12 March 1840, CO 136/100; Douglas to Glenelg, 20 July 1838, CO 136/88; Douglas to Glenelg, Private and Separate, 21 June 1838, CO 136/88.
63 Stephens’ minutes in Douglas to Normanby, 7 June 1839, CO 136/94; Stanley to Seaton, 24 February 1844, CO 136/336. This campaign went hand in hand with others, for the advancement of the commerce and trade in the islands, and the reduction of duties on oil and wine, for export to the British markets and commercial shipping privileges see Douglas to Glenelg, 29 January 1836, CO 136/80; Douglas to Glenelg, 21 June 1838, CO136/88; Douglas to Normanby, 25 April 1839, CO 136/93; Douglas to Normanby, 7 June 1839, CO 136/94.
64 Douglas to Normanby, 15 May 1839,CO 136/93. See also Gekas A. E., “The Commercial Bourgeoisie of the Ionian Islands Under British Rule”.
65 Douglas to Glenelg, 6 June 1835, CO 136/75; Douglas to Glenelg, 12 June 1835, CO 136/75; Douglas to Glenelg, 29 July 1835, CO 136/75; Douglas to Glenelg, 26 January 1836, CO 136/80; Douglas to Glenelg, 21 June 1838, CO 136/88; Douglas to Glenelg, 7 December 1838, CO 136/89.
youth without employment led to dissatisfaction and mounting grievances against Britain. Douglas’s reforms were also an admission that, after 20 years of British administration, the Islands were not as advanced as they should have been. It was a call for a new moral order under his management and control. In the Islands, Douglas could cultivate his image as a public philanthropist, a warm hearted and caring superintendent of a harmonious and ordered society. He believed Britain’s role was to introduce reforms that would protect Britain’s vested interests and privileges whilst spreading new interests and privileges to disenfranchised groups. He believed if he ensured security and improved the physical environment, he would be able to govern without formal consent or advice. He would defend both his power and authority at all costs to British and Ionian alike.

Douglas did not believe in the division of power. For example, control of the education system, during Nugent’s tenure, was transferred to the Ionian Legislative Assembly. Douglas, who argued their control reverted the educational establishments to a “backward state”, campaigned for and regained the governor’s authority over education. Douglas also fiercely protected the governor’s authority in the Septinsula because of their strategic importance to Britain’s military control of the

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66 Douglas to Glenelg 29 July 1835, CO 136/75; Douglas to Glenelg, Private and Separate, 21 June 1838, CO 136/88.
67 Douglas to Glenelg, 29 July 1835, CO 136/75.
69 When for example, the newly appointed member of the Supreme Council of Justice in the islands, Blair and his predecessor Kirkpatrick questioned his local government policies such as the executive’s right to pass penal laws during the recess of parliament, thus ruling them unconstitutional, it was evident that constitutional distinctions between parts of the government were of practical rather than of theoretical interest to him. Douglas reacted furiously, threatening to suspend Blair and suggested his recall, see Blair to Douglas, 8 May 1835, CO 136/74; Douglas to Glenelg, 27 May 1836, CO 136/74; Douglas to Glenelg, 8 July 1835, CO 136/75.
Mediterranean. They were important anchorages for the defence and maintenance of the naval stations supporting Britain’s operations and policing role in the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, Britain had benefited commercially from the connection with the Islands, with imports from Britain more than doubling between 1817 and 1838.71 Douglas was convinced the Islands’ vital strategic geographical position and commercial possibilities became a focus of attraction for Britain’s enemies:

I need only advert to Algiers with its dependencies and to Ancona; to Austria which though only an infant naval power is most effective in extending her relations and whose flag is seen more frequently than any other in the Adriatic, and passing in these islands displays no less actively in Archipelago; the Levant and Black Sea; to the unsettled state of Greece and the intrigues of France and Russia, to subvert our influence in that country, and to gain supremacy in the Royal Closet. To the precarious existence of the Ottoman Empire in Europe; to the ambition of, and encroachments making up by Russia, to the combinations which consequent, upon any change at Constantinople must take place in Egypt and in Syria, and in the continent opposite to this island; to the unsettled state of Spain and the temptation which the possession of the Balearic Isles holds out to those who evidently desirous of acquiring a naval station in the Mediterranean.72

As a respected colonial administrator and military expert, Douglas’s opinion on the value and importance of the Ionian Islands had significant influence on British policy. Throughout his tenure he argued that only by ruling the Islanders with an iron hand could Britain maintain the Islands in the Empire.73 Furthermore, Douglas felt

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70 Douglas to Glenelg, 4 June 1835, CO 136/75; Douglas to Russell, 30 June 1840, CO 136/101; Douglas to Glenelg, 4 June 1835, CO 136/75; Douglas to Glenelg, 6 June 1835, CO 136/75. See the marginal notes on Douglas to Glenelg, 4 June 1835, CO 136/75; Glenelg to Douglas, 29 July 1835, CO 136/75; Glenelg to Douglas, 30 July 136, CO 136/190; Douglas to Glenelg, 2 October 1835, CO 136/76; Douglas to Russell, 30 June 1836, CO 136/101.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
the Septinsula was the “ugly duckling” of the Empire and attributed the problems to the confusing and contradictory terms of the Treaty of Paris, which placed the Islands in an anomalous political condition “hitherto unknown in the history of nations”, “a middle state between a colony and a perfectly independent country without … possessing the advantages of both”. His remedy was to “make the islands a colony”. Although Douglas attempted to “improve the character and the state of the Ionian society”, his reforms stopped short of the Constitution. Douglas was committed to the preservation of his authority as governor. This was especially demonstrated in his attitude towards the Ionian Assembly. Not surprisingly, his policies generated significant opposition.

The reform of the Constitution of 1817:

i) Freedom of the press

Douglas faced Ionian demands for constitutional reform as early as 1836 and freedom of the press figured prominently. Freedom of the press was not allowed on the Ionian Islands and the printing press was under the governor’s exclusive control and was authorised to print only authorised government news. In 1835 Ionian politicians were enraged when Douglas permitted the establishment of a printing house by an English clergyman, Lawndress, to print books solely for the London Missionary Society. Ionians argued for the right to establish private printing offices with no restrictions on the subject (religious, literary, political) they could print.

Douglas to Glenelg, 30 September 1836, CO 136/82.
Douglas’s view of the “very backward condition of these states” made it impossible for him to consider press freedom.\textsuperscript{77} He argued reading rooms established in the Islands allowed the circulation of various periodicals and books of every kind without any restriction or interference from the Ionian government; Douglas saw no need for any alteration of the Constitution of 1817. Moreover, it was unlikely that there would be discussions on literary, scientific and nature topics due to the “limited proportion of Individuals capable of comprehending or taking interest in such discussions”. Douglas believed the main reason behind Ionian demands for free press was to criticise British colonial policies and it thus constituted a legal basis for censorship. Ionians could not be trusted and Douglas warned the Colonial Office he entertained no doubt they “would find their own resource and emolument… in administering to vulgar prejudice and passion by becoming the organs of private scandal and personal abuse”. Freedom of the press would also be disastrous due to the refugees from the Austrian occupied Italian peninsula and the Ottoman occupied Greek territories gaining political asylum in the Septinsula. These asylum seekers would unleash criticism of their governments, thus jeopardising Britain’s relationship with other nations. Only “mischief”, “misrepresentation”, and “falsehood” would result if freedom of the press was granted in the Islands, given such an “easily excited and ignorant community”.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{76} Douglas to Glenelg, 21 May 1835, CO 136/74; Glenelg to Douglas, 1 July 1835, CO 136/190. For the activities of the various Missionaries societies in the Septinsula see, Metallinos G., “I Aggliki Prostasia ke i “Greek Protestants”, [The British Protection and the “Greek Protestants”]”, pp. 189-218.

\textsuperscript{77} Douglas to Glenelg, 15 May 1839, CO 136/93.

\textsuperscript{78} Douglas to Glenelg, 30 September 1836, CO 136/82.
Douglas provided the Colonial Office with the opinion of the President of the Ionian Senate, Count Bulgari, a Corfiot aristocrat advocating the unfitness of Ionians to enjoy a free press. Douglas and Bulgari both feared excessive criticism of British rule in the Islands: “Every end and object of Government will become null”, because “neither the Senate nor the Lord High Commissioner could count longer upon the support of any members of the Assembly”. There were Ionian lobbyists inside the Assembly, “unquiet spirits” Bulgari stated, who would attract the “weaker side” of the Ionian Assembly and unbalance the political status quo of the Ionian state. An informed Assembly would, for Bulgari, “institute … a mode of expounding and interpreting the present Constitution such as to render it impossible under it to conciliate longer the powers of the state”.\(^79\) The exclusive and absolute authority of Britain in conducting colonial policy for the Septinsula was at stake.

Bulgari’s opinions served Douglas’s interests, demonstrating the Ionians’ incapacity to handle responsibly the freedom of the press and subduing any possibility of alterations to the Ionian constitution. Although Douglas appeared to ask the Colonial Office for instructions on how to deal with this issue, in reality he had already decided against granting a free press, even if the British government favoured alterations to the Constitution of 1817 on the issue. Douglas’s dispatch was a gentle warning to the Colonial Office against overruling his own or his Executive Council’s opinion.\(^80\)

\(^79\) Ibid.
\(^80\) Glenelg to Douglas, 7 November 1836, CO 136/82.
Charles Grant, Lord Glenelg, was a liberal Tory, supporter of free trade and Catholic emancipation, and was appointed Colonial Secretary in 1835 during Melbourne’s administration. However, not all prominent Whigs, especially the Home Secretary, Lord John Russell, supported Glenelg’s participation in the cabinet as Glenelg had not voted for the Great Reform Act. Glenelg was considered liberal and a humanitarian in the treatment of indigenous peoples in the Empire. In December 1835, Glenelg forbade Sir Benjamin D’Urban, governor of the Cape, to annex the Queen Adelaide Province, a region predominantly settled by the indigenous Xhosa population but coveted by white settlers.\footnote{Lester A., \textit{Imperial Networks: Creating identities in nineteenth century South Africa and Britain}, (London and New York, 2001), chapters 2, 5.} Glenelg also opposed the influx of British settlers into New Zealand partly because of his concern for the fate of the Maoris and persisted in his policy until 1837.\footnote{Adams P., \textit{Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand 1830-1847}, (Auckland, 1977), p. 101.}

In the Ionian Islands, however, Glenelg presented his authoritarian side and was against altering the Ionian Constitution of 1817. It was one thing to be humanitarian and liberal to the depredations of settlers against native peoples, but it was quite another to relinquish imperial control over a European territory important geopolitically and strategically for Britain’s policies in the Mediterranean. Glenelg supported Douglas and believed “…the abolition of the existing restrictions would rather be an injury, than a good to the Ionian people”.\footnote{Ibid.} But the Ionians’ cultural and educational deficiencies were not the reasons Glenelg rejected their right to freedom

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of the press. Rather, he was more interested in securing British supremacy in the Mediterranean.

**ii) Financial control**

Ionians also demanded control over state finances, which was controlled by the Governor under the Constitution of 1817. During Nugent’s administration, two Acts were passed by the fourth and fifth Parliaments in 1833 and 1834, “recognising the right of the Assembly to regulate and sanction the finance of these states”, which contradicted the governor’s financial control over the Septinsula. Until 1836, the Ionian Assembly regulated only the “extraordinary expenses” of the Civil List but they also wanted control over the “ordinary expenses”, which included the salaries and expenses of the governor and public servants. While Douglas did not object to Assembly control over “extraordinary expenses” such as “Military Protection, Public Instruction, Ecclesiastical Establishment, the Flotilla, and the Hire of Buildings or offices from the extraordinary to ordinary expenditure”, he was adamant his power over the ordinary expenses remain undiminished. He agreed with Maitland’s opinion that British control of the Ionian state’s finances was the most important point of the Ionian Constitution, contradictory though it was with the Treaty of Paris which stipulated the right of Ionian people to manage their state’s finances.  

With his superiors’ approval, Douglas rejected the Ionians’ motions about freedom of the press and control over finances when the Assembly met in 1837. The

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84 Douglas to Glenelg, 26 May 1836, CO 136/81.
Assembly retaliated by systematically opposing Douglas’s measures regarding new codes of law and the rights of naturalised subjects. His relationship with Ionian politicians had reached breaking point and he characterised their motives and views as “unreasonable”. Tensions intensified when petitions against the Ionian government circulated in the Ionian Parliament demanding real constitutional reform: not only freedom of the press and the control of the finances but also the revision of the elective law and vote by ballot.

The Colonial Office was concerned and unwilling to instigate constitutional change in the Islands. Glenelg was confident that Douglas’s “watchfulness and prudence to redress as far as possible, by all proper means any excitements of the public mind in the Ionian states” would succeed. Douglas convinced his superiors in the Colonial Office not to be concerned, believing the opposition would not obtain sufficient signatures for the reform of the Constitutional Charter. He had already, with the British government’s approval, used the High Police Powers against Ionian agitators, and had dissolved the Assembly to suppress further discussion about constitutional reform.

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86 Douglas to Glenelg, Confidential, 4 July 1837, CO 136/85.
87 Ibid.
88 Douglas to Glenelg, Confidential, 14 September 1837, CO 136/85; Douglas to Glenelg, Confidential, 25 November 1837, CO 136/85.
89 Glenelg to Douglas, Confidential, 27 October 1837, CO 136/190.
90 Douglas to Glenelg, Confidential, 25 November 1837, CO 136/85.
91 Douglas to Glenelg, 20 September 1837, CO 136/85; Glenelg to Douglas 21 August 1837, CO 136/85.
iii) The Franchise and Elective Law

Douglas contemplated changes in the Septinsula’s elective law to benefit society, reform the defective franchise and promote British interests in the Islands. He supported a wider and more inclusive franchise in the Islands and wanted to create a “class of persons, who rendering themselves independent by their honest industry, might acquire political consideration and introduce both better principles and a sounder way of thinking among the older families”. Douglas did not believe the aristocratic elites were the “natural” leaders of the people. Instead, he supported extending the franchise to professionals and tradesmen, hungry for power and representation, active and responsible successors to the corrupt aristocrats and who he believed would welcome British rule. Douglas, a Tory, was influenced by the Whig reform of the elective system in Britain in 1832, which expanded the franchise to the aspiring middle classes while keeping the privileges of the aristocracy predominantly intact, believing the future would be best served if gentlemen - people of intelligence and property - guided society.

The Colonial Office urged caution and vigilance because “alterations of this kind exercise a powerful influence over the whole internal policy of the Ionian States”. Aware, from Douglas’s despatches, of the Ionians’ “state of public mind”, Glenelg was reluctant to extend the franchise. Examining Douglas’s proposal that it should depend on age and property, Glenelg did not object to the age requirement but

92 Douglas to Glenelg, Confidential, 15 May 1836, CO 136/81.
was sceptical of the property regulation. He wanted a determination of “the amount and the nature” of property regulation before allowing the British government to consider reform of the Ionian elective law.\textsuperscript{94} This followed the process the Whigs had undertaken in England of knowing where the line could be drawn.\textsuperscript{95} In the Septinsula Douglas’s plans for revising the electoral law never materialised after he failed to implement Glenelg’s requirements due to his lack of understanding about the Ionian property system.

Douglas believed in the primacy of executive power and felt any constitutional reforms should be initiated by British authorities and not by the Ionians. He reminded his superiors the Ionian Constitution in its present form invested the British authorities with considerable controlling powers which, if surrendered, could not maintain authoritarian rule in the islands. Ionians could not be granted the liberties possessed by a British parliament because they were unlike the British. Although they were “tolerably, advanced in education and refinement”, Douglas also listed the “evils” of their character, highlighting their unfitness for self-government.\textsuperscript{96}

The “jealousy which subsists collectively between the islands and rivalry and want of confidence which prevail, individually between families and persons”, he argued, combined with

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  \item their vanity, ignorance and inaptitude for public business;
  \item the immorality and corruption which are but common;
  \item the propensity to craft and intrigue;
  \item the excitability of these People do not admit at
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\textsuperscript{94} Glenelg to Douglas, 29 September 1836, CO 136/190.


\textsuperscript{96} Douglas to Glenelg, Private and Separate, 21 June 1838, CO 136/88.
surrendering at present any portion of the controlling and regulating power vested in us by the charter.\textsuperscript{97}

He supported modification and improvement to the Ionian Constitution only when “the People of these States shall have attained to such a degree of improvement”. It was no coincidence Douglas made these arguments in 1838.\textsuperscript{98} At this time prominent Whig colonial reformers, such as Lord Durham, Howick (Grey) and Russell, were committed to settling the Anglo-French Canadian differences and were moving towards granting responsible government to Canadian colonies to eradicate legitimate grievances and preserve the imperial connection between Britain and Canada.\textsuperscript{99}

Monitoring events in the Canadian colonies to assess how any changes would impact the Septinsula, Douglas advised the British government to abstain from any discussions regarding alterations to the Ionian Constitution, which would “excite the Public mind and [create] much mischief” in the Islands.\textsuperscript{100} He received no response from Glenelg whose position was under threat. Russell lobbied for Glenelg’s removal from the Colonial Office on grounds of inefficiency and he resigned in February 1839.\textsuperscript{101} He was succeeded by the Irish Lord Lieutenant, Constantine Henry Phipps, Lord Normanby.\textsuperscript{102} Normanby was from a Tory family, but he had supported Catholic emancipation and parliamentary reform and had joined the Whigs in 1819.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{100} Douglas to Glenelg, Private and Separate, 21 June 1838, CO 136/88.
He was familiar with imperial politics, having been governor of Jamaica in 1831 and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in 1835.

In the Septinsula, Ionians continued to confront Douglas with petitions to reform the Constitution, which he dismissed and refused to forward to London.\(^{103}\) Normanby found “no sufficient reason for concurring in the proposed departure from the Constitution of 1817”.\(^{104}\) Despite Douglas’s efforts, liberal Ionians were elected to the sixth Parliament when it reconvened in March 1839. Of the forty members in the House, fifteen were in opposition, forming a powerful dissenting voice.\(^{105}\) Douglas dismissed further discussion of constitutional changes as unconstitutional unless initiated by the Crown, but the “embarrassing question” of constitutional reform did not fade away despite his manipulations.\(^{106}\) Defending his administration to his new superior, Douglas argued the difficulties he faced ruling the Islands were due to the “excitement” around constitutional reforms instigated by Nugent’s policies, along with the Ionians’ false conviction that Normanby favoured representative government in the colonies.\(^{107}\)

Douglas believed constitutional privileges enjoyed by Englishmen were “blessings” for men like Englishmen “born and bred in the land of freedom” who

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\(^{103}\) Douglas to Normanby, 14 September 1838, CO 136/88; Douglas to Normanby, 26 September 1838, CO 136/88.

\(^{104}\) Normanby to Douglas, 16 January 1839, CO 136/89.

\(^{105}\) See Constitutional Charter of the United States of the Ionian Islands, 1\(^{\text{st}}\) article, 7\(^{\text{th}}\) section of the 7\(^{\text{th}}\) chapter.

\(^{106}\) Douglas to Normanby, 25 April 1839, CO 136/93. This answer was located in the margins of the letter Douglas to Normanby, 25 April 1839, CO 136/93 dated 24 May 1839, and signed, probably, by the under secretary James Stephen.

\(^{107}\) Douglas to Normanby, Separate, 26 April 1839, CO 136/93.
would “use them and not abuse them”. The Ionians “neither rightly understand, really appreciate, nor [were] in a state to enjoy…the privileges and prerogatives of the free institutions”. Douglas believed there were fundamental differences between British and Ionian people. The former were sufficiently civilised and capable of governing themselves, the latter were destined to be governed by others. Douglas reminded Normanby “the population here are not of British Origin”. Constitutional reform meant the reestablishment of a “corrupt and profligated system of rule…to perpetuate in their own persons, and for their own benefit, an exclusive and impossible management of public affairs”. By constructing the Ionian nobles as unfit to share power, Douglas cultivated the impression he was the only person capable of ruling the Islands.

Normanby advised Douglas to act with “temper and firmness and to neglect no law or humble means of removing any misconception” when dealing with Ionian opponents. Douglas prohibited the circulation of foreign journals in the Septinsula, viewing them as propaganda circulated by the opposition “misrepresenting the actual state of things and defaming the government”. However, Douglas’s policies were severely criticised in London, especially by James Stephen, as unconstitutional and

108 Douglas to Normanby, 26 April 1839, CO 136/93.
110 Normanby to Douglas, 6 June 1839, CO 136/93.
111 Douglas to Normanby, 30 April 1839, CO 136/93. Douglas considered specific Greek newspapers, like the “Age”, were “the vehicle of series of malicious falsehoods … and of calumnious tirades against the government” and declared the editors and contributors “Russian Agents” who encouraged domestic and foreign conspiracies against the government, see Douglas to Normanby, 10 May 1839, CO 136/93; Douglas to Normanby, 23 May 1839, CO 136/93; Douglas to Normanby, 24 May 1839, CO 136/93.
unlawful.\footnote{112} Stephen’s opinion was influential in the Colonial Office, since he was considered an authority on “everything connected with the Constitution, Charters and laws of some fourty colonies”.\footnote{113} His views were valued by all colonial secretaries, particularly Normanby “who relied on him in decision-taking”.\footnote{114} Stephen’s criticism demonstrated there were limits on the governor’s power.\footnote{115}

An Ionian mission to London; the Mustoxidi memorial

Ionians were tired of battling with Douglas inside and outside the Assembly. Douglas had encountered them with ridicule, anger, and contempt and dismissed their demands with an arrogance that stunned them. As Laidlaw noted, “governors retained their power by delaying sending correspondence, complaints and grievances even for years”.\footnote{116} The Ionians decided to take their grievances directly to London. In August 1839, Andrea Mustoxidi arrived in London with a memorial for the Secretary of State criticising British colonial policy in the Septinsula in general and Douglas’s administration in particular. He also demanded constitutional reforms for the Islands.\footnote{117}

Mustoxidi was a noble from Corfu who had studied law in Padua University and, in 1806, wrote the history of the Septinsula. When Ioannis Capodistria became President of the newly founded Greek State in 1828, Mustoxidi organised and managed the education system until Capodistria’s assassination in 1831. Mustoxidi returned to Corfu, gained a seat in the Ionian Assembly and became involved in reforming the political affairs in the Ionian Islands. During Nugent’s administration he became Director of the Education System in the Septinsula, a position which he held until Douglas’s arrival. Mustoxidi, was a founding member of the Liberali Club, where many prominent intellectuals such as Flamburiari, Roma, Plessa and Dandolo gathered, advocating reforms for the Septinsula. Douglas had constructed Mustoxidi as one of the leading opposition figures.

Mustoxidi’s memorial began as a historical account, praising the political independence of the Septinsula under Venetian and French occupations and the Constitution of 1803, which contained “more liberal and equitable principles” than the one given by Britain. He was critical of the Constitution of 1817, of Maitland’s assumption, interpretation, and violation of the Treaty of Paris and his failure to respect the Ionians’ right to establish an independent government. He criticised the governor’s excessive authority in all areas of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial organisation. He criticised Douglas’s despotic campaign to increase the governor’s power and subdue protest. Never were the Ionian Islands so depressed, argued

119 Ibid., p. 54.
Mustoxidi. As European peoples with a western language, history, institutions and traditions, they had a right to handle their own political affairs. He highlighted four Ionian demands for reform of the Constitution: freedom of the press, free elections, vote by ballot, and financial control of the state. Britain, concluded Mustoxidi, had no reason to refuse these demands.

In his apologia, Douglas defended the establishment of the Constitution of 1817 on the same grounds as Maitland, noting the history and character of the Ionian people indicated they were “utterly unfit to be entrusted with one iota of power”. After years of residence among the natives and information from British residents in the Septinsula, Douglas concluded “the people of the Ionian States have not made such advances as would qualify them for any material enlargement for the existing franchise… and free institutions”. The Constitution was a “very imperfect instrument” but it was designed for a “very imperfect state of society”. Defending his own administration, Douglas provided records showing his improvements in the Islands.  

Normanby received Mustoxidi for reasons of “propriety” but would not discuss alterations to the Constitution of 1817 and offered no official response. He was replaced in September 1839 by Lord John Russell, who would respond to Mustoxidi’s criticisms. Russell came from a prominent Whig family.  

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121 Douglas to Russell, 10 April 1840, CO 136/99.
122 Normanby to Douglas, 13 June 1839, CO 136/93.
1820s he supported Catholic Emancipation, parliamentary reform and helped draft the Reform Act of 1832. During Melbourne’s administration (1835-1841), Russell was Home Secretary and instigated a number of liberal reforms in Ireland and Britain. In 1837 Russell opposed the radicals’ call to reconsider the Parliamentary Reform Act of 1832. In 1838, however, when the economy slid into recession and the Chartist movement was established, Russell refused to contemplate emergency legislation against Chartist leaders.\textsuperscript{124}

As Colonial Secretary, Russell exercised liberal imperial policies. In New South Wales he contemplated ending the convict system, while he decided to annex New Zealand to forestall French occupation and to save the indigenous population from uncontrolled British settlement.\textsuperscript{125} He appointed Poulett Thomson to oversee the union of Upper and Lower Canada and resolve the issues over land reservations for clergy of different denominations.\textsuperscript{126}

In the Ionian Islands, Douglas, aware of Russell’s liberal reputation, was concerned about changes in the Colonial Office. Although Russell was impressed by Mustoxidi’s memorial, he dismissed the claim of misgovernment, arguing the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[124] Ibid. Melbourne reluctantly supported parliamentary reform, hoping it would prevent disorder. His administrative reforms included the Municipal Corporations Act (1835), which replaced 178 closed boroughs with a network of elected borough corporations and increased the power and influence of nonconformists, and Civil Registration of Births, Marriages and Deaths (1837). However, the economic policies of his Chancellors of the Exchequer, Thomas Spring Rice and Francis Baring, led to a £3 million government deficit. In May 1841 the government was forced out after losing a no-confidence motion. Melbourne tried to ensure the Whigs remained in office after their long period in opposition from 1807-1830 by cultivating a close relationship with Queen Victoria during his tenure as prime minister and afterwards, acting as her mentor and advisor. On Melbourne see, Marshall D., \textit{Lord Melbourne}, (London 1975), Newbound I., \textit{Whiggery and Reform, 1830-41: The Politics of Government}, (London 1990).
\item[125] Morrell W. P., \textit{British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell}.
\end{footnotes}
material improvements in the Islands were evidence of Douglas’s interest in its financial and social welfare.127 But he agreed with Mustoxidi on the need for constitutional reform and the unfair treatment of the Ionians by British authorities. He was sympathetic to their demands for change, and understood the Islands’ ambiguous and anomalous placing in the Empire.

Contrary to Douglas, Russell suggested Ionians “should enjoy the benefits usually attending a representative system of government”. He believed the tensions between the British governor and the Islands’ political representatives would cease if Britain followed the Treaty of Paris to the letter. He recommended increasing the freedom of periodical and literary publications as “a preparation for the freedom of the political press”, a measure that would pave the way to representative institutions in the Islands.128 With no first hand knowledge of the Ionian situation, Russell was reluctant to ignore Douglas’s belief that reform would “destroy British influence in these states, lead to vast and pernicious changes here, cause simultaneous disorders in Greece”.129 Nevertheless, he instructed Douglas “to consider further any measures which may practically fit the Ionian people for the enjoyment of a more free system of government”.130

Douglas believed Russell’s liberal views were destabilising. When he requested authorisation to dissolve the sixth Ionian Parliament in order to remove Ionian MPs opposed to his judicial reforms, the Colonial Office rejected the request.

127 Russell to Douglas, Separate, 4 June 1840, CO 136/331.
128 Ibid.
129 Douglas to Russell, 10 April 1840, CO 136/99.
130 Russell to Douglas, Separate, 4 June 1840, CO 136/331.
Russell realised support from his predecessors made Douglas expect approval for his conduct.\textsuperscript{131} Douglas’s manipulative tone and attitudes did not impress the parliamentary Under Secretary Vernon Smith who criticised Douglas’s “illiberal views”.\textsuperscript{132} Although Russell reluctantly allowed Douglas to dissolve the sixth Parliament, he and his secretaries, including Smith and Stephen, became increasingly critical of Douglas’s authoritarian policies after Parliament’s dissolution.\textsuperscript{133} Douglas’s behaviour shifted the colonial officials’ view of him. He was no longer seen as a first rate officer and gentleman but had lost the dignity of his office. His behaviour could impact British control over the Mediterranean possessions.

In London, the Ionian case was again debated in the House of Commons. Lord Fitzroy, Lord Holland, Hume, and even Peel, asked the House of Lords to send a commission to the Septinsula “to inquire and report upon all grievances against the government of those islands”. Russell defended Douglas and refused to comply with their request, referring to Douglas’s view that the Ionian character was “exceedingly uninformed and ill-prepared for the exercise of the constitutional powers of a free Government” and reiterating Douglas’s view of the strategic importance of the Septinsula for the Empire. Russell, however, did argue the best way to govern Ionian people was “in the first place to keep the finances and the government free from

\textsuperscript{131} Russell’s remark was drafted in the margin of Douglas to Russell, 6 November 1839, CO 136/96.
\textsuperscript{132} Douglas to Russell, 15 July 1840, CO 136/104.
\textsuperscript{133} Russell to Douglas, 9 November 1839, CO 136/95; Russell to Douglas, 24 September 1839 and 28 September 1839, CO 136/330. After Parliament’s dissolution, Douglas used his High Police Power to arrest and jail Ionian individuals opposed to his measures and he refused to appoint Ionians in the government. He also prevented the circulation of journals and petitions for constitutional reform using police interference, see Douglas to Russell, 13 February 1840, CO 136/100, Russell’s draft answer in the same dispatch and in Russell to Douglas, 23 November 1840, CO 136/105.
corruption, and in the next place, to give the native population a due share in the
advantages of office and to give them an education which will prepare them for a
better form of government”.

Mustoxidi’s memorial focused public attention again on British rule in the
Ionian Islands, and on Douglas in particular, who saw his reputation tarnished by the
criticism. Although Russell was a liberal colonial reformer and advocated
representative institutions in the Septinsula, under the pressure of opposition in the
Commons, he defended Douglas’s rule and would do so throughout his tenure. In the
Islands, Douglas campaigned against the Ionian opposition and managed to exclude
them from the seventh Parliament. Ionians complained to Russell about the
“violation of individual rights… given by the constitution… and the insult given to
the electoral body as a serious offence against the public…” and criticised the
“illegal” procedure Douglas instigated for the election of the new Assembly. These
criticisms further tarnished Douglas’s reputation when they were published in the
Times. Despite his efforts to silence the Ionian opposition, they were able to
maintain the debates over the Ionian question in the British public eye.

**Conclusion**

Just as Douglas’s North American policies were contrived for the benefits of
British settlers and the Empire, so his polices in the Ionian Islands were directed

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135 Despite his criticism of Douglas, Russell supported his governor, eventually refusing Ionian
petitions to the Colonial Office on the grounds they were not first passed through the Lord High
Commissioner and, thus, unconstitutional.
136 The *Times*, 13 April 1841.
towards British supremacy in the Mediterranean. Douglas was convinced of his personal responsibility as a governor and shared a notion of civilisation which had informed governors in British North America and Eastern Australia since the early 19th century. As governor, he instituted liberal reforms and improvements in religion, education, law, and the physical infrastructure of the Islands in the hopes of improving the Ionian peoples. Many of his actions corresponded with the reform agenda shaped by the ideals of liberalism and evangelicalism enacted both in Britain and other parts of the Empire in the 1830s and 1840s. But despite these reforms, he remained conservative in his rule, refusing to contemplate any changes to the Constitution that would weaken the Lord High Commissioner’s, or Britain’s, supreme authority in the Islands.

When critics in the Ionian Assembly, the House of Commons, pamphleteers, and newspaper writers questioned Douglas’s government, he adamantly maintained there was no need to legitimise colonial authority: it was natural Britain should exercise it. Unlike Nugent, whose views, behaviour and policies encouraged power sharing, Douglas’s rigid and inflexible view of authority reinforced the traditional preserve of the governor as the fount of honour and upholder of the Crown’s prerogative.

Both Glenelg and Normanby, who protected the rights of the indigenous populations from white settlers in Canada and New Zealand, were less liberal on the issue of representative government for the European subjects of the Empire.137 They

supported Douglas’s argument that the backward agrarian society and institutions of the Septinsula contrasted with the commercial enterprise, industrialisation and progress of Anglo-Saxon colonists in settlement colonies. As a result, Ionians did not have the appropriate foundations for representative government. As Douglas put it, the best course of British policy in Septinsula was the “maintenance of tight British management and control”. Although Russell initially believed the timing and conditions were suitable for transferring power to the Ionians, his inexperience with the Ionian question led him to defer to Douglas’s opinions. Douglas’s persistent arguments about the Septinsula’s strategic importance to Britain in the Mediterranean and the East and his concerns about rebellions and unrest in capitals throughout Europe if self-government was granted to the Ionians, convinced Russell to reassess the Ionian situation and Britain’s foreign policy in the region.

Douglas’s rule left its legacy in the Islands for years to come. The appointment of a liberal like Mackenzie in July 1841 failed to alter Douglas’s well established status quo. Russell instructed Mackenzie “not to introduce any change of any kind”. When the Tory Minister Lord Stanley replaced Russell as head of the Colonial Office in the summer of 1841, he referred Mackenzie to Douglas’s opinions, stating great weight must be paid to his views because of his six years experience. He cautioned Mackenzie against correcting what seemed in theory a

139 Quoted in Tumelty J. J., “The Ionian Islands under British Administration”, p. 166.
“defective system of rule but whose modification might produce no positive good, if not serious evil”.  

140 Ibid.
Chapter 4: Seaton’s reform programme in the Septinsula: 1843-1849

Introduction

After James Stewart-Mackenzie’s brief tenure in the Septinsula between 1841-1843, the Colonial Office appointed another of Wellington’s generals, Sir John Colborne, first Baron Seaton, as Lord High Commissioner of the Septinsula. Seaton instituted a number of fundamental constitutional reforms in the Ionian Islands from 1843-1849, his attempt to “reform not only Ionian politics but also the Ionian politeia in the broadest sense”.¹

As Calligas has argued, Greek historiography claimed Seaton was initially unwilling to instigate constitutional concessions and the reform of the Ionian constitution of 1848 was influenced by the “revolution in Greece” in 1843 and the 1848 revolutions in Europe.² Calligas challenged these claims, showing Seaton’s reform agenda for the Septinsula began in 1843 and “was specifically designed to withstand such pressures by providing a constitutional form of government that could be defended by the British and by the Ionian supporters of the Protectorate”.³ This provided the context for a more liberal policy, led by men such as Stanley and Grey, who approved Seaton’s colonial policies for the Septinsula.

This chapter examines Seaton’s constitutional reforms in the Septinsula. Rather than analyse the Ionian constitutional changes as the result of the 1848 European revolutions or as Seaton’s project supporting Ionian demands, it argues that he transferred the campaign for responsible government that had begun in Canada in 1839 into the European segment of the Empire. Seaton’s constitutional reform was aided by the support of Lord Grey, Colonial Secretary from 1846-1849. Despite opposition from his staff, Grey did not believe ruling the Ionian Islands with an iron hand was the correct approach. Rather, the British government’s policies for the Septinsula should correspond with the colonial theories developing in white settler colonies where devolution of authority, rather than centralised colonial power, was the most effective approach to safeguarding British interests.

John Colborne, Lord Seaton and imperial service

Colborne, like many other top colonial officials, came from the military and was, as were so many, associated with Wellington. He received a commission as ensign when he was sixteen years old.\(^4\) Colborne served in numerous military campaigns and in the Mediterranean in Egypt, Malta, Sicily and, in 1812, the Peninsula under Wellington. He distinguished himself in several campaigns and gained patronage from, among others, John Moore and the Duke of Wellington.\(^5\) His service in the Mediterranean provided Colborne with the opportunity to advance his education. He took the grand tour when his duties permitted, studied classics and

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learned European languages.\textsuperscript{6} His letters to his family were full of descriptions of the social customs and religious traditions of the European societies he encountered.\textsuperscript{7} Colborne was fascinated by the Mediterranean surroundings with its warm climate, picturesque landscape and historical ruins, writing to his stepsister while living in Tuscany “…I prefer this place to England”.\textsuperscript{8}

His service in the Mediterranean and his reputation as “a devout Anglican of spartan habits and studious disposition, simplicity of manner, integrity and devotion to duty” led to service in Britain’s colonial possessions.\textsuperscript{9} Colborne became Lieutenant Governor of Guernsey in 1821 and was a “reasonable conservative, anxious to preserve institutions worth maintaining but not afraid of reforming those that were not”.\textsuperscript{10} He improved communications, agriculture, public works and education and supported the restoration of the Elizabeth College, one of the island’s oldest and richest foundations.\textsuperscript{11} He became Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada in 1828, arriving at York (modern day Toronto) “shortly after an election which had returned a sizeable ‘reforming’ majority to the provincial Assembly” that was highly critical of the administration.\textsuperscript{12} Although Colborne disliked the unconstitutional proceedings of the Assembly, he exercised tact, conciliatory policies and strict impartiality in dealing with them.\textsuperscript{13} As in Guernsey, he initiated extensive public

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{6} Moore Smith G. C., \textit{The Life of John Colborne}, pp. 16, 39, 77.
  \item \textsuperscript{7} Ibid., p. 24.
  \item \textsuperscript{8} Ibid., p. 23.
  \item \textsuperscript{9} Seymour A. D., “Colborne, John, first Baron Seaton”.
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Moore Smith G. C., \textit{Life of John Colborne}, p. 341.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 250.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Seymour A. D., “Colborne John first Baron Seaton”, p. 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Moore Smith G. C., \textit{Life of John Colborne}, pp. 254-6.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
works, improved communications and promoted educational institutions, such as the Upper Canada College, for the material and financial improvement of the colony.\textsuperscript{14} He was “pragmatic” on religious issues, providing land as an endowment to Anglican rectories. Fearing American influence and settlement in the colony, he encouraged emigration from Britain.\textsuperscript{15} Unlike Douglas, he established good relationships with Native Americans, whom “he treated … on terms of perfect equality” and encouraged cooperation and co-existence between them and white settlers through education, land grants, and agriculture.\textsuperscript{16} His policies on Native Americans were not about social control or the benefit to the government but were aimed at civilisation and integration.\textsuperscript{17}

Colborne’s animosity towards the Legislature led to conflicts over policy and was exaggerated by the provincial press and William Lyon Mackenzie.\textsuperscript{18} Visiting London in 1832, Mackenzie accused Colborne of rejecting bills introducing real institutional changes. Colborne’s efforts to represent Mackenzie as a demagogue were ignored by colonial officials and politicians, like Hume, who believed he was an “outstanding representative of colonial opinion”.\textsuperscript{19} As a result, Colborne was recalled in 1835. Glenelg then offered him command of the British forces in Canada. Colborne’s arrival in Montreal coincided with a long-running fiscal dispute between the Executive and French-dominated Assembly, who were contemptuous of their

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp. 257, 262.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., pp. 262-3.
\textsuperscript{16} Francis M., Governors and Settlers, p. 126; Moore Smith G. C., Life of John Colborne, pp. 264-5.
\textsuperscript{17} Francis M., Governors and Settlers, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{19} Moore Smith G. C., Life of John Colborne, pp. 216-7, 226-7.
political institutions and sought more democratic forms of government, drawing on the American model. Ongoing economic distress increased tensions and animosities between the French and British settlers leading to rebellions in 1837, which Colborne successfully suppressed.\textsuperscript{20} On his return to Britain in 1839 he was granted the peerage of Lord Seaton of Devonshire and a generous pension for securing Lower Canada for the Empire.\textsuperscript{21}

As Francis has argued, Colborne’s service in Canada has had mixed interpretations by historians. Some considered him “an intelligent, urbane and the most able of Upper Canadian governors … expected to work well within the provisional Assembly but this was not the case because he was not a politician”.\textsuperscript{22} For others he was “more at home in military than civilian tasks… yet by nature was more sympathetic and [more ready] to conciliate … capable of making shrewd political moves … less dogmatic … courageous, simple and straightforward”.\textsuperscript{23} But Francis convincingly argues, “he did possess constant reform goals and political principles regardless of which colony he was administering, and this constancy indicates that it is worthwhile to recover or reconstruct these goals and principles”.\textsuperscript{24}

Colborne’s colonial policies reinforced “civilization and British principles… feeling and attachment to the institutions of the mother country”.\textsuperscript{25} He felt officials

\textsuperscript{22} Francis M., \textit{Governors and Settlers}, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., pp. 114, 115, 121.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 115.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., pp. 126, 129.
should be independent and “above party politics”. In Canada, Colborne marked the beginning of a new notion of government in the province, favouring freedom of the press and trial by jury, without the governor interfering in the decisions of judges. His governing ideal meant “one should encourage but not guide”. He refused to use patronage appointments to reward government supporters. His beliefs and polices went with him to the Septinsula.

Colborne requested a position in the Septinsula in 1843 on the grounds the Mediterranean climate would benefit his health. Believing Ionians were civilised enough for representative institutions, he offered reforms consistent with those he offered to white settlers and Native Americans in the Canadian colony. His mode of operation in the Islands was practical: he was planning and organising the Ionian financial and political institutions to prepare the inhabitants for responsible government. Although Colborne’s aim was to provide responsible government he was only able to succeed in giving Ionians representative institutions (e.g. freedom of the press and control of finances by the Assembly) and representative government (e.g. Municipal government) by the end of his tenure. Self-government was also

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26 Ibid., p. 130.
27 Ibid., pp. 132,134.
28 Ibid., p. 136.
30 Colborne was influenced by Durham's idea for “responsible government”, discussed later in this chapter, which would remain the example adopted in other parts of the Empire until the mid-1850s. Then the Australian and New Zealand model, which saw the transition from representative legislatures to responsible ministries, would be defined as responsible government and Durham's idea for Canada would be what is now considered “representative government”. See Ged Martin's works mid-century Canadian government to clarify the issue. Martin G., The Durham Report and British Policy (Cambridge, 1972).
suggested by Gladstone during his mission in the late 1850s as the appropriate form
of government for the Islands.

**Lord Seaton: A friend of Ionians**

Soon after his arrival, Seaton introduced a six year reform program. Drawing
on his Canadian experience, he promoted a new spirit of co-operation with Ionian
politicians, befriending the liberals, listening to their complaints about British rule
and their proposals to remedy the long-standing socio-political problems in the
Islands. With the help of his wife he hosted numerous parties, using these social
occasions as a political strategy to gain adherents, persuade, conciliate, manipulate,
and disarm. Unlike Douglas, Seaton believed Ionian society had able politicians
with extensive political experience who could provide good local leadership. From
these associations, Seaton became convinced the Constitution of 1817 required
alteration and responsible government should be established in the Septinsula. Only
then would Britain’s interests in the Mediterranean be successfully served.

He found the political and administrative affairs in the Islands in disarray.
Mackenzie, although “mild and charitable”, had no remarkable administrative talents
and had antagonised many prominent Ionians. Furthermore the Islands suffered
economic hardships after repeated crop failures and revived commercial competition
from Greece. Seaton focused on the economic condition of the Islands to win the

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Istoria ton Inomenon Kraton ton Ionion Nison*, [The History of the United States of the Ionian
Islands], p. 245.
support of the Ionian people and prepare the ground for constitutional reforms. He tried to balance the Ionian budget by limiting expenditure and organising resources more efficiently, such as allocating municipal funds to local councils for public works. However, he understood the poor state of the Septinsula’s finances was because of their anomalous position in the Empire. He felt the Septinsula could not be treated as a colony when it was to their disadvantage, and as an independent state when it was forced to bear economic problems alone. He proposed the reduction of their annual military payment to Britain, lowering the amount from £35,000 and making it a fixed percentage based on Ionian revenue, a plan accepted by the Treasury in 1844 which limited the contribution to one-fifth of their revenue. He also requested preferential treatment for Ionian products in British markets.

These reforms boosted Seaton’s popularity within the Islands. Seaton also cultivated relationships with the liberal intelligentsia in Corfu, learning from his Canadian experience. Prominent liberals like Mustoxidi and Valsamachi, dismissed from government positions by Douglas, were reinstated under Seaton. Many became his advisers and he spoke highly of them. He became convinced of the justice of their demands and he relayed their concerns to London, in stark contrast to Douglas. This relationship also gave Seaton first hand knowledge about how the

34 Seaton to Stanley, 8 May 1843 CO 136/120; Seaton to Stanley, 22 May 1843, CO 136/120; Stanley to Seaton, 26 January 1844, CO 136/192; Seaton to Stanley, 22 March 1844, CO 136/122.
35 Seaton to Stanley, 22 April 1843, CO 136/120; Seaton to Stanley, 8 May 1843, CO 136/120; Seaton to Stanley, 22 March 1844, CO 136/122; Stanley to Seaton, Private, 30 April 1844, CO 136/336; Stanley to Seaton, 2 May 1844, CO 136/336; Stanley to Seaton, 28 May 1844, CO 136/336.
37 Private and Confidential, Seaton to Stanley, 30 January 1845, CO 136/123.
British administration ruled the Islands. The *Liberali* hoped Seaton understood the political deadlock of the last decade and would champion alterations to the political status quo in the Septinsula.

Seaton’s vision of social and material reform in the Septinsula was to decentralise power and give more responsibility to municipal authorities. His confidence in the Ionian people, compared to Douglas’s pessimism, was exhibited in his plans to transfer his and his Regents’ powers in the control of local affairs to the Ionians. He allowed municipal authorities to handle their own revenue, although the Executive government retained control over all public expenditure. He allowed village Primates to freely elect the Chief Primates and increased and regulated their powers.\(^{38}\) He introduced Tribunal Courts of Justice and remodelled the High Police Powers at the executive and municipal level.\(^{39}\) He placed charitable organisations, like the Foundling Home in Cephalonia, under the direction of municipal authorities. Concerned about safety, he improved conditions in the prisons and abolished forced labour on the high roads. He also initiated educational improvements, establishing seminaries and minor colleges and introducing measures regulating the Ionian University. Seaton developed “model schools” in rural areas and filled teaching positions with young, well educated graduates of the Corfu seminary.

Seaton’s reforms anticipated his alterations to the Constitution of 1817. He made recommendations based on his sense of justice and in accordance with British

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\(^{38}\) Seaton to Stanley, 10 October 1843, CO 136/120.

\(^{39}\) Calligas E. “Lord Seaton’s Reforms in the Ionian Islands”, pp. 7-29.
promises since 1818. The Ionian character was central to his claims and he made a calculated attempt to undermine and alter the image so vividly portrayed by his predecessors and long circulating in the Colonial Office. He constructed Ionians as calm, reasonable and mature, who resorted to reason, not violence, to overcome difficulties. Seaton, as Russell had done in 1839, rejected the language of ‘degenerated’ Ionians as outdated. He also rejected the notion that most Ionians desired union with Greece. Local families who aided Greece in its struggle for independence were, he believed, seeking its “more liberal and permanently established institutions”. To sustain British presence in the Septinsula it was necessary to grant Ionians liberal institutions. Although some in Ionian society resisted political changes that affected their power, Seaton was confident he could manipulate them to his advantage. He was convinced public feeling in the Islands wanted representative institutions.\textsuperscript{40} The Ionian Islands were ready, but needed London’s commitment for political reform.\textsuperscript{41}

Moore-Smith has argued Seaton “hardly departed from the method of government established by his predecessors” during his first five years.\textsuperscript{42} Yet it is clear he was experimenting with preparations for constitutional reform early in his rule. Few of his predecessors considered sharing power on either a local or national level with the Ionians. The Colonial Office welcomed Seaton’s proposals and characterised them as “highly judicious”.\textsuperscript{43} Seaton and the colonial officials believed

\textsuperscript{40} Seaton to Stanley, Private and Confidential, 10 August 1844, CO 136/122.
\textsuperscript{42} Moore Smith G. C., \textit{The Life of John Colborne}, p. 334.
\textsuperscript{43} Stanley to Seaton, 15 November 1843, CO 136/120.
societies failed politically unless they had proper institutions in place. Britain’s continuously advancing institutions accounted for its success. White settler colonies adopted similar institutions. The neglect of these institutions in colonies or countries not of British origin had been disastrous. The introduction of municipal institutions, district courts, and local management of affairs were the first steps towards introducing representative government in the Islands.

**Seaton’s proposed changes to the Constitution**

Seaton’s goal for the Septinsula was a “properly representative government, known and practically in force in other states”. Alterations needed to be meaningful to change the authoritarian nature of the Constitution and “not in appearance only”. For example, removing the direct interference of the Primary Council in selecting members for the Legislative Assembly was the only way to guarantee the fair and legitimate elective franchise. Seaton argued change could not occur by altering how the Primary Council selected the Assembly, but by abolishing the Council itself. Until there was the political will in London for such drastic action, Seaton negotiated other amendments to the present Constitution, such as allowing a free press.

Seaton believed a free press promoted knowledge, removed prejudices, and fostered unity between Britain and the Septinsula. He proposed the printing of individual books and articles be allowed. Anticipating objections to his proposals, he argued this was also “necessary” for facilitating commercial business. The governor

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44 Francis M., *Governors and Settlers*, p. 177.
45 Seaton to Stanley, Private and Confidential, 10 August 1844, CO 136/122.
could censor controversial religious topics and suppress publications of a political nature and was responsible for the “editions in … which the interest of Foreign powers might be attacked”.

In the Colonial Office, Stephen accepted the provision establishing a regulated censorship but noted the paradox that Ionians could buy radical religious and political publications but were prohibited from printing such works themselves. But Stephen and other officials were apprehensive since censorship could prevent attacks on the political behaviour of foreign powers, such as Austria, whose policies in Italy attracted opposition. However, Seaton’s arguments convinced Lord Stanley, in accordance with the Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, to authorise the necessary steps to implement Seaton’s plan. A few months later Seaton happily announced the establishment of a private printing press.

Seaton’s victory paved the way for further constitutional reform and he next focused on transferring control of the finances to the Legislative Assembly. He knew this proposal “was an innovation of much importance in the Constitution”. Maitland had believed only executive control of Ionian finances would enable Britain to rule the Septinsula effectively, a view unchallenged until now. Seaton

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46 Seaton to Stanley, Confidential, 7 November 1844, CO 136/122.
47 See minutes in Seaton to Stanley, 7 November 1844, CO 136/122.
48 Liakos A., I Italiki Enopiisi ke i Megali Idea [Italian Unification and the Great Idea]. Many Ionians who studied at Italian universities came into contact with revolutionary ideas, which returned with them to the Septinsula. There were also Italian refugees who found political asylum in the Islands and organised expeditions against Austrian occupation in Italy. One expedition occurred during Seaton’s tenure but was successfully suppressed. Hansard T. C., Parliamentary debates, 3rd Series, LXXVII, 27 February 1845, pp. 31-46.
49 Stanley to Seaton, 14 January 1844, CO 136/122.
50 Seaton to Stanley, 21 July 1845, CO 136/123.
51 Seaton to Stanley, Private and Confidential, 10 August 1844, CO 136/122.
promised there would be no misuse or abuse by the Legislative Assembly if they were given the right to regulate and amend their extraordinary estimates.\(^{52}\) Seaton, drawing on his experiences in Lower Canada, believed the granting of liberal concessions by the British government rather than their forced concession due to circumstances were vital in accelerating reforms in the Septinsula.

Colonial officials, particularly Stephen, were concerned Britain might lose control over affairs in the Ionian Islands. The Civil List expenditure was not guaranteed and Stephen feared the Assembly would “[cut] down salaries instead of increasing them, and so [bring] the government into subservience to themselves”, thus placing “the Ionian government … in complete dependence on the Ionian Assembly”.\(^{53}\) He wanted assurances protecting the Civil List expenditure before allowing the Assembly to control the Islands’ finances, especially in light of Britain’s depressed economic state in the 1840s. He was also concerned the Assembly could not handle the additional responsibilities, fearing they were “guided by a most corrupt and necessitous people … amongst whom intrigue, in all its forms, whether insinuating or menacing flourishes luxuriantly”. The language employed by Stephen echoed Maitland’s and Douglas’s representations of the Ionian people and highlighted the difficulty Seaton faced in altering colonial views of the Ionians. Stanley reiterated Stephen’s argument to Seaton’s proposals and wanted Seaton to secure payment of the Civil List, the “mode practiced … in Colonies having

\(^{52}\) Seaton to Stanley, 30 January 1845, CO 136/123.

\(^{53}\) See Stephen’s minute in Seaton to Stanley, 7 November 1844, CO 136/122.
Representative Constitutions” and Britain.\textsuperscript{54} Stanley saw the influence of the Canadian experience on Seaton’s Constitutional reforms in the Septinsula.

After the negative response from the Colonial Office, Seaton momentarily let the matter rest. The following year, leadership in the Colonial Office changed, with Gladstone becoming Colonial Secretary from December 1845 to June 1846. Seaton focused his reports on the economic, moral and educational improvements his reforms had achieved. He explicitly represented rural and urban Islanders as active and industrious, lively and secure, gaining in intelligence, continuing his campaign to improve perceptions of the Ionian character.\textsuperscript{55}

The \textit{theory of responsible government and the Ionian Islands.}

In June 1846 Henry George Grey, the third Earl Grey, became Colonial Secretary. A liberal Whig, he had championed Catholic emancipation and parliamentary reform. During his six years as Colonial Secretary, Grey’s liberal colonial principles would change Britain’s relationship with the Empire. He advocated local control of municipal government, which he believed was a necessary step towards responsible government. He was familiar with the workings of the Colonial Office, having been appointed parliamentary Under-Secretary in 1830 during his father’s ministry. As Under-Secretary, Grey exercised considerable influence and pursued his own reformist initiatives.\textsuperscript{56} He resigned in 1832 after a dispute with Lord Stanley over the system of apprenticeship for slaves in the West

\textsuperscript{54} See minutes in Seaton to Stanley, 1 January 1845, CO 136/123.
\textsuperscript{55} Seaton to Gladstone, 14 April 1846, CO 136/124.
Indies. In Lord Melbourne’s ministry Grey became Secretary for War in 1835 but was critical over how the ministry conducted colonial policies.  

During the Canadian crisis, he was frustrated by the cabinet’s refusal to allow Lord Gosford’s Commission of Inquiry to negotiate a resolution over the constitutional deadlock in Lower Canada. When the Canadian rebellions broke out in 1837, Grey’s irritation with the British response of coercive legislation rather than a constructive policy of reconciliation led him to resign in 1839. Britain’s governance of Canada was widely debated in the late 1830s. New proposals were introduced to reconcile Canadian colonists’ (and later other white settler colonies’) aspirations for greater autonomy while preserving the unity of the Empire. Lord Durham’s theory of “responsible government” was recommended as a solution in removing the existing national animosities and political discontent between English and French Canadians.

Durham proposed the Colonial Governor adopt a role equivalent to the Crown in Britain and remain above politics. The power of the Executive in all internal administration would be transferred to a cabinet possessing the confidence of the Assembly. Durham further proposed London not rule directly but should safeguard the imperial veto over a list of subjects important for Britain and the colonies, such

57 Manning H. T., “Who runs the British Empire 1830-1850?”
as the form of the colonial constitution, foreign relations, tariff policy and land legislation. It could be argued “the autonomy of a colony was to be limited to affairs within its own boundaries, leaving all matters outside those boundaries to the control of the imperial government”. It was not until 1846 when Durham’s brother-in-law, Lord Grey, became Colonial Secretary that the principle of responsible government was formally conceded in Canada. Colonial Officials knew once demands for such concessions were granted it was only a matter of time before other white settler colonies would follow. For colonial reformers such as Russell and Grey the “urgent question was not “whether” to grant self-government: it was “how much” and “how soon”.

In 1846 the question of Australia’s representative government was controversial and linked to protests against Grey’s avocation of maintaining imperial control over crown lands and Britain’s continuing use of Australia to exile British convicts. Early steps were made to extend representative government through Tasmania, South Australia and Victoria. Grey proposed municipal councils and a federal tier of government to minimise internal political rivalry. The constitutions introduced in Australia in 1855-1856 stemmed from Grey’s framework. However, doubts over the requirements for ‘responsible government’ led to short lived ministries and constitutional stalemates. Similar constitutional difficulties existed in

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62 Cell J. W., British Colonial Administration, p. 118.
New Zealand, where Grey proposed a pyramid structure for municipal, provincial and federal government to 20,000 Europeans. Sir George Grey, the British governor, warned the Colonial Secretary of growing unrest with the Maori over increasing numbers of settlers and their demands for land and urged the constitution be disbanded. Grey followed this advice and, after internal warfare erupted in the northern island in 1846-1847, he suspended the constitution.

Ethnic conflict also occurred in Southern Africa, where Boer farmers clashed with local tribes over land ownership. Headstrong administrators, such as Sir Harry Smith, responded by extending British jurisdiction to these regions. In 1849 Grey planned to introduce representative government, which included an elective upper chamber to restrain the Assembly. Renewed conflicts in the Orange River region and in British Kaffraria, along with Smith’s recall meant the constitution was not adopted until 1852, a year which also saw the resignation of Russell’s ministry.

While advancing representative government to white settler colonies throughout the Empire, Grey also became acquainted with the Ionian situation. In early 1847, realising Grey’s appointment provided an opportunity for further reform, Seaton explained the changes he had initiated, the principles guiding his policies and their effects. His actions were intended to “perpetuate the attachment of the Ionians to British rule”. Seaton felt Britain ought “to promote the future welfare and progressive improvement of the islands” and advocated representative government

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65 Ibid.
similar to Canada’s, and under consideration for other white settler colonies, for the Septinsula.⁶⁶ Seaton wanted Britain to treat the Islands as a military protectorate, with no political power over the internal affairs of the Ionian State, a position supported by many Liberali members of the reformist party, including Petro Vraila-Armeni, Seaton’s closest associate in the Islands.⁶⁷

Seaton renewed his proposal to give the Legislative Assembly the power to regulate state finances, believing this constitutional modification “would … be advancing one step toward a more free form of government”. He assured his superiors the latest proposal “will be both popular and useful”, noting the support of the principal officers of his government, including the President and members of the Senate.⁶⁸ Grey reacted positively to Seaton’s proposal, yet this was contested by conservative officials on the Islands, such as Seaton’s secretary Gisborne, who criticised Seaton’s program to Stephen in the Colonial Office.⁶⁹

The issue over free press again presented itself when a memorial circulating through the Septinsula criticised the “existing restrictions on the Ionian press”. The petitioners argued the Executive’s control over private printing presses in the Septinsula was unjust when the Greek and Italian press was regularly circulated in the Islands. Seaton conceded the Executive’s censorship was no longer applicable since Ionian grievances could be printed in Malta and read in Corfu a few days later. Seaton felt a free press would enable supporters of British rule to respond to their

⁶⁶ Seaton to Grey, 26 January 1847, CO 136/125.
⁶⁷ Ibid.
⁶⁸ Seaton to Grey, Private and Confidential, 22 March 1847, CO 136/125.
critics. Believing the issue would eventually be brought before the Ionian Parliament, he advised Grey that any concessions should “originate with Her Majesty’s Government”. 70

This time, Seaton’s arguments convinced officials in the Colonial Office, which was itself in the midst of change. Stephen, a proponent of censorship, had retired and was replaced by Herman Merivale, a political economist at Oxford University who published his Lectures on Colonization and Colonies in 1841, a significant work that led to his appointment in November 1847 as Under-Secretary. Merivale advocated responsible government only for colonies of white settlement, evolved under the aegis of British sovereignty and not by the transplantation of British parliaments. 71 Convinced by Seaton’s representation of the civilised and educated Ionian character, Merivale approved plans to lift the restrictions on the Ionian press, despite concerns over “whether the removal…. makes the relaxations safe”. 72 Grey had no such concerns and concurred with Seaton that this measure should originate with the British Government. 73

Seaton proposed another radical change to the Constitution of 1817: free municipal elections “without the interference of the Lord High Commissioner or Executive Government” that would directly elect the five candidates with the most votes to be councillors. 74 Seaton again felt the British government should introduce

70 Seaton to Grey, 21 February 1848, CO 136/128.
71 Francis M., Governors and Settlers, p. 179.
72 See minutes in Seaton to Grey, 21 February 1848, CO 136/128.
73 Grey to Seaton, Private and Confidential, 24 March 1848, CO 136/128.
74 Seaton to Grey, 21 March 1848, CO 136/128; Grey to Seaton, Private and Confidential, 24 March 1848, CO 136/128; Seaton to Grey, 29 March 1848, CO 136/128.
these changes rather than be seen to act under the pressure of “petitions now in circulation”. Radical Ionians, like Antonio Gaeta, were already circulating a memorial expressing impatience at the slow progress of constitutional reform and requesting reforms including freedom of the press, trial by jury, universal suffrage for literate inhabitants, vote by ballot, and annual parliament.

Grey allowed the Legislative Assembly to administer the finances of the Ionian state and sanctioned a free press, with an added provision against publications of a “libellous, seditious character”. Before allowing free municipal elections, Grey needed to know exactly “what effects may be anticipated from the proposed changes”. Not all colonial officials approved of Seaton's reforms. James Stephens was critical of them, believing it was not the right time to adopt any constitutional reforms in the Mediterranean possessions. Although Grey supported Seaton’s reforms and representative government in the Islands, he also wanted to preserve British colonial power. Like Canada, Grey wanted these reforms to keep the Islands close to the Empire rather than allow their independence. Seaton, rather than considering Grey’s concerns, proposed a more radical Ionian request: free parliamentary elections, which would abolish the Primary Council and the Double lists that controlled the Assembly’s seats. This proposal was at the heart of Seaton’s

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75 Grey to Seaton, Private and Confidential, 24 March 1848, CO 136/128.
76 Seaton to Grey, 31 March 1848, CO 136/128.
77 Grey to Seaton, 24 April 1848, CO 136/128; Grey to Seaton, 19 July 1848, CO 136/128.
78 Grey to Seaton, 24 April 1848, CO 136/128.
79 Grey to Stephen, Private, 23 March 1848, Grey Papers, GRE/B126/13/47. Grey also wanted to grant a representative constitution to Malta.
80 See minutes in Seaton to Grey, 8 June 1848, CO 136/128; Grey to Stephen, Private, 23 March 1848, Grey Papers, GRE/B126/13/47.
81 Seaton to Grey, Confidential, 22 July 1848, CO 136/128.
policy to prepare the Ionians for responsible government. Their representatives, both at the local and national levels, would not be chosen by British authorities but by Ionians themselves.

Practising an informal kind of representative government, Seaton again reassured the Colonial Office that the demand for free parliamentary elections resulted from his communication with “many of the best informed and most influential persons of this community”.\(^82\) Seaton was drawing on lessons from the past. In his insistence on Ionian support for his proposals, he avoided the accusations of lack of knowledge about party politics in the Protectorate, an accusation which led to his removal from Canada by Glenelg. Furthermore, he did not want to jeopardise his close affiliation with Corfiot liberals, on whom he depended for information regarding Ionian conservative or radical opposition and whom he considered reliable guides on the specific reforms he introduced.

1848 and representative government on the Septinsula

There was anxiety in the Septinsula over the slow pace of constitutional reforms and Seaton reported a state of excitement among some Islanders, particularly in Cephalonia and Zante, on the anniversary of the 1821 Greek revolution.\(^83\) Although Seaton diminished British concerns over Ionians wanting unity with Greece, he nevertheless admitted the presence of “many young educated

\(^82\) Ibid.
\(^83\) Seaton to Grey, 12 April 1848, CO 136/128; Seaton to Grey, Confidential, 9 May 1848, CO 136/128.
“nationality and attachment of race” could be overcome if Britain conceded further constitutional reforms that would help secure her position in the Islands. Seaton encouraged Britain to grant reforms before a crisis developed, pressure and intrigue mounted, and a deadlock played into the hands of demagogues and extremists, as had happened in Upper and Lower Canada with William Mackenzie and Louis Papineau. Moreover the revolutionary events in Europe in 1848 stressed the need for just and rapid reforms in the Islands.

In 1848 Europe was convulsed by revolutions that shook the political and social order to its foundations. They were triggered by a series of economic, social and political crises. The pace of the revolts and political change in Europe were as varied as the societies themselves, from national climate and geography to economic and social structures of ownership, agriculture, and industry to forms of culture, language and political systems from constitutional monarchy (France) to absolutism (Eastern and central Europe). Similarly the causes of the revolutions varied from economic distress to desires for political change. However, they shared a “general malaise”. Their objectives were the end of arbitrary governments, the reduction of

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84 Seaton to Grey, 21 April 1848, W.O 1/500.
85 Seaton to Grey, 4 January 1849, CO 136/130; Seaton to Grey, 21 April 1849, CO 136/130; Seaton to Grey, 10 May 1849, CO 136/130; Seaton to Grey, 8 August 1849, CO 136/130.
86 Grey to Seaton, Private and Confidential, 24 March 1848, CO 136/128.
the power of traditional institutions (monarchy, church), electoral reforms leading to wider sharing of political power, individual freedoms and the rule of law. In France, the revolution was about creating a new, more open political regime, a democratic republic that would guarantee key liberties to all citizens and provide humanitarian reforms. The revolutions in the Habsburg Empire challenged the oppressive totalitarian regime and helped define national aspirations in parts of its Empire, such as its German and Italian states. The aim was to create a new political structure accompanied by a new society and social order. However, other European powers, like Denmark and the Netherlands did not experience revolutions as they relied on the introduction of liberal constitutions.

Britain relied on preventive measures such as reformist legislation and a large police force of special constables. Although domestically Chartist protest had risen in the late 1840s, it failed to transform into a revolution after the failure of Kennington Common in 1848 and marked the beginning of the end for the movement. Margot Finn notes shared enthusiasm by both Chartists and Irish Nationalists over the February revolution in France, which united them and posed a threat to the government. In the spring and summer of 1848 the British press was alarmed at what appeared to be an increase in civil unrest and a universal arming of Ireland, linked to concerns about rising Irish Nationalist sentiment. Within the Empire itself, July 1848 also saw peasant riots over a new heavy tax system which

resulted in the rebellion in Ceylon. While the rebellion was quashed, the martial law policy introduced by Lord Torrington, was “considered to be so contrary to British constitutional practice that they were roundly condemned, to the point where Torrington’s ignominious recall from Ceylon almost led to the Whigs losing office in 1850”.\(^{93}\) As Miles Taylor has argued, Britain “may have emerged unscathed from 1848, [however] considered as an imperial state it did not emerge unchanged”.\(^{94}\) After 1848, political changes were introduced throughout British dependencies and colonies and reforms, like the extension of the franchise, were granted to white settler colonies decades before they were bestowed on Britons and Irishmen.\(^{95}\)

Taylor argued in Britain’s Mediterranean dependencies like Malta and the Ionian Islands “there was an unavoidable overspill from the European Revolutions….in both places during 1848 British governors sought to quell radical opposition through extending the powers of the legislature and lifting press censorship”.\(^{96}\) However, in the Septinsula, Seaton did not construct a knee-jerk “panicky reform policy” after the 1848 Revolutions. Indeed, freedom of the press and control of the finances by the Ionian Assembly were proposed from Seaton’s arrival in the Septinsula. Seaton’s aim was to limit Britain’s colonial power to


\(^{94}\) Ibid., p. 153.

\(^{95}\) Ibid., pp. 152-53.

\(^{96}\) Ibid., p. 171.
military ports and harbours and to give the Ionian people representative government, based on the Canadian model. Grey, an advocate of responsible government since the 1830s, had sanctioned representative institutions in the Septinsula before the outbreak of revolutionary events in 1848. Regarding the issue of free elections, Grey reserved the right to consider the proposal.

In the Colonial Office, neither Grey nor Merivale were sufficiently acquainted with the Ionian Constitution.\textsuperscript{97} The office turned to William Strachey, a former official of the East India Company thought to be familiar with the Ionian question. Strachey believed the free press and control over state finances were sufficient British concessions and criticised Seaton’s proposal to make Parliamentary elections free before implementing municipal elections first. Seaton’s proposals were of a “very sweeping nature” and left the Crown without “the least compensation, influence, or power of any kind”. The Primary Council and the parliamentary Double Lists, if abolished, would lead the “whole [Constitutional] structure assuredly [falling] to pieces”. Strachey adopted Douglas’s view against allowing parliamentary elections, fearing “total anarchy” in the Islands and insisted the Crown retain legal authority to suspend the Constitution and take over “in the event of the experiment working ill”. Unlike Seaton and Grey, Strachey did not trust Ionians to handle power. Nor did he believe the 1848 revolutions should influence colonial officials to concede “premature” constitutional reforms.\textsuperscript{98} Grey advised Seaton to proceed with

\textsuperscript{97} See minutes in Seaton to Grey, 29 March 1848, CO 136/128. Grey’s lack of knowledge over colonial constitutional details was not unusual since permanent officials in the Colonial Office usually dealt with such issues. Laidlaw Z., “Networks, Patronage and Information in Colonial Governance”, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{98} See minutes in Seaton to Grey, 5 July 1848, CO 136/128.
caution and “induce the Ionians to wait with patience for more popular form of
government”.\footnote{Ibid.} A peasant uprising in Cephalonia in September 1848 would test
Grey’s enthusiasm for further reforms.

Throughout the Septinsula the peasantry was disenfranchised, mostly illiterate
and heavily indebted.\footnote{Calligas E., “The Rizospastai (Radicals-Unionists)”, pp. 14-15.}
The form of land tenure in the Islands had existed since the
Venetian era and created class divisions and tensions within Ionian society. Called
\textit{contracto colonio}, it was a contract between proprietor and cultivator where produce
was divided in stated proportions and the cultivator paid a portion of produce to the
proprietor in lieu of rent. In times of agricultural depression, Ionian peasants were
evicted or forced to borrow, leading to tensions between landlord and tenant as
increasing numbers of peasants were prosecuted for non-payment of debt. British
authorities made efforts to elevate the peasantry by employing some in public works
and encouraging different forms of cultivation but did little else.\footnote{Hannell D. “The
Ionian Islands under British Protectorate: Social and Economic Problems”
geoprosodos stin Kerkira tin periodo tis Venetokratias” (Feudal revenue and land revenue in Corfu
during the period of Venetian rule), in Asdrahas S., \textit{Oikonomia ke nootropies (Economy and Mentalities)}, (Athens, 1988).}

In September, 200 armed peasants walked towards the capital of Cephalonia,
“the biggest and poorest” of the Islands, intent on destroying the records and judicial
documents in the court house related to their tenures and debts and “probably [to
plunder] the Houses of some of the principal Proprietors”.\footnote{Seaton to Grey, 2 October 1848, CO 136/128.} British soldiers, aiding
the landowners, clashed with the peasantry, resulting in one soldier dead, three
wounded and several casualties for the peasantry. Seaton immediately went to Cephalonia to investigate the causes of the outbreak. He reported the “movement of the peasantry” had been “managed by the intrigues and exertions…. of few individuals” who wanted to “injure the protective government and to show… the Ionians are generally discontented”. The uprising in Cephalonia was a clash of local class differences and the peasantry were not associated with “any political or national considerations”, with Seaton emphasising British rule was not a target of the rebellion.\footnote{Seaton to Grey, 3 October 1848, CO 136/128.}

Seaton carefully selected the language utilised in his reports to protect his portrayal of Ionians as “cultivated”, “responsible”, “quiet” and “civilised”.\footnote{Grey to Seaton, Confidential, 8 November 1848, CO 136/128.} He noted improvements in education and believed “the unrestricted introduction into Acts and societies for several years of every description of publication from France, Germany, Italy, Malta and Athens, have much contributed to produce a material change in these islands with regard to political opinions and to prepare certain classes for improvement in their Institutions”.\footnote{Seaton to Grey, Confidential, 4 January 1849, CO 136/130.} This, along with the swift establishment of order after the uprising, secured by the co-operation of troops and Islanders, was proof of Ionians’ fitness to handle their affairs.

He again pressed Grey to sanction free elections, this time basing his argument on class aspirations. He recommended reducing the income required for electors, halving it from 300 to 150 dollars per annum while reducing the age qualification
from 25 to 21, doubling the electorate. Future MPs were required to have the support of one-fourth of the electorate. The three secretaries of the Senate, the prosecutor general and advocate fiscal would lose their votes, effectively stripping them of their Legislative power. Seaton wanted to encourage “free representation” in an Assembly which would more accurately reflect the social and class structure of Ionian society. His proposals would decrease the influence of the aristocracy and increase the participation of professionals and small proprietors in government. Seaton’s attitude was not surprising since he was closely associated with the Liberali, which included professionals involved in trade and commerce. In his new proposal, Seaton also ensured the military contribution and civil list payments were based on permanent Constitutional acts and not annual votes by the Assembly. He felt acceding to Ionian demands for reforms would create an Ionian/British political alliance in the Islands and help secure Britain’s presence in the Septinsula.

Strachey was critical of Seaton’s “experiment of giving the people more power and the Lord High Commissioner less”. He believed Seaton’s suggested amendments to the franchise would not work. He felt the Lord High Commissioner’s veto and right to prorogue the Assembly were not effective powers against a freely elected Assembly which controlled the state finances. He anticipated a collision between the two on issues like military protection and the Civil List, even if those were constitutionally set. Members in the existing Ionian Parliament were wealthy and patronage ensured they were obedient servants to the Lord High Commissioner. Strachey believed only men of property were fit to govern. He held low opinions of
Ionians, especially those without property, and believed Seaton’s reforms would undermine this “tradition” in the Islands. The removal of the Primary Council and Double lists would transfer power from the Crown’s representatives to heterogeneous class groups. Drawing on familiar tropes of the inequalities of Ionian people, both in their society and compared with the British, and the “barbarism from which the Ionians have but first emerged”, he doubted the “fitness of these Ionians for representative government”.106

Strachey devised a plan similar to one implemented in New South Wales.107 Direct nominees of the Lord High Commissioner would be substituted for the existing Primary Council, with the rest of the Assembly elected by a wider franchise. The Senate would be abolished and replaced by an Executive Council, composed of Heads of Departments, with the power to vote on bills and changeable on address by the Assembly. In addition, British payments should be made “a prior charge upon the revenue”.108 Although Strachey’s plan allowed an extended franchise for the Assembly, the Executive Council’s replacement of the Senate allowed the Lord High Commissioner to retain control over the Legislative. He advised Grey against sanctioning Seaton’s plan and to adopt his own instead. But that contradicted Grey’s liberal inclinations to grant representative government in the Islands.

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106 See minutes in Seaton to Grey, Confidential, 4 January 1849, CO 136/130.
107 In New South Wales, one-third of the council was nominated by the Crown or Governor while two-thirds were elected by a franchise meeting specific property obligations. The Civil List was fixed in the Constitution. The Governor had the power to veto bills and to prorogue the council and held sole power to recommend appropriations of revenue the council nominally controlled. Ward J. M. Colonial Self-Government, pp. 168-171.
108 See minutes in Seaton to Grey, Confidential, 4 January 1849, CO 136/130.
Merivale thought Seaton’s scheme was not a “very radical one” compared with the forms of government established in Britain. While the Ionians “may have constitutional or democratic government” he believed the Ionians’ historical and cultural differences meant “self-government in the English sense, I do not believe they will or are fit for”. Ionians, as “Italians and semi-Italians … are more accustomed to the notions of a second chamber, (a Senate or a Council)… than to the government of a single house, for which their inferiority as well as their want of duration seems to qualify them but indifferently”. Their inferiority to the British, and unfitness for British Parliamentary government, was due to their Italian, not Greek, nature. Merivale’s comment indicated some uncertainty over Ionians’ Greekness, not surprising since the language of the state was Italian and many Ionians in the government were, by education and culture, more Italian than Greek. Merivale’s comments, written several months after the Cephalonian uprising, indicate he did not consider the problems of government to be related to any Greek nationalist sentiments nor did he consider the reforms a threat to the British presence on the Islands, a view which would change under Seaton’s successor, Henry Ward. At this time, he preferred Seaton’s plan for an expanded franchise across the class spectrum, believing it offered more social balance than Strachey’s plan.

Grey agreed with Merivale and dismissed Strachey’s plan. Despite lacking personal knowledge of Ionian society and the present system of government, he authorised the discussion of the proposed constitutional changes in the Ionian

109 Ibid.
Parliament, trusting Seaton’s assurances of “their safety and probable good effect”.¹¹⁰ However, there was an associated cost in sanctioning parliamentary free elections: the Ionians would pay the Treasury delayed payments of military protection before ratification to reforms would be granted. Grey attempted to reduce forces in several colonies and increase reserves in Britain in case of an attack at home from the continent. As such, Grey did not want to keep a large British force immobilised in the Septinsula and favoured the establishment of an Ionian militia.¹¹¹ Russell, who noted the Septinsula's ambiguous position within the British Empire, where “the Treaty of Vienna meant us only to be Protecting Power, whereas we have made these Islands a colony”, also considered cession of the Islands in March 1848 as a way of reducing military costs.¹¹² Cession of the Islands was considered from 1848 until the end of the Protectorate. However, discussions in 1848 and 1849, were not related to the nationalist revolutions in Europe in 1848, but were more concerned with the balance of power in Europe. Britain did not want to cede the Islands to Greece out of fear they would sell them to Russia or France. If Corfu was ceded to Greece, it would alienate the Ottoman Empire because of its close proximity to Albania, and in fact the only nation they considered ceding any, or all, of the Islands to was Austria.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Grey to Seaton, 20 March 1849, CO 136/130.
¹¹² Russell to Grey, 16 March 1848, Grey Papers, GRE/B122/4/25. The italics are mine.
¹¹³ Grey to Russell, 9 May 1848, Grey Papers, GRE/B122/4/36; Russell to Grey, 9 May 1848, Grey Papers, GRE/B122/4/35; Russell to Grey, 15 May 1848, Grey Papers, GRE/B122/4/37. Later discussions about the cession were different and reflected more the difficulties of the governors in their dealings with the Assembly and Ionian radicals. See Chapters 5 and 6.
Seaton presented his scheme regarding the free elections to the Assembly at the end of April and they were adopted in two resolutions on 8th May 1849. In early May, Seaton proposed the introduction of the secret ballot in elections to “complete the representative system proposed in the resolutions”.\textsuperscript{114} A Royal Address by the Ionian Assembly was enclosed in Seaton’s dispatch where the Ionians warned the British government elections without secret ballot would became “a source of discord, hatred, and corruption” and were not an independent reliable procedure.\textsuperscript{115} Senior staff of the Colonial Office felt Seaton had overstretched the boundaries of concessions.\textsuperscript{116} Grey again dismissed their concerns and authorised Seaton’s proposal for “the welfare of the Ionian people”.\textsuperscript{117} He believed the latest modification was “rational” and consistent with the overall package of reforms. Seaton’s changes, however, went further than the Colonial Office had authorised. Seaton had ignored the Treasury’s instructions and the required guarantees concerning military protection and the Civil List were only vaguely implied.

Under the new plan, Seaton retained the veto regarding the election of the Senate. Strachey was pleased and believed the Constitution would “closely resemble that of Jamaica and some other West Indies Colonies, in which the same persons constitute the Legislative and Executive”.\textsuperscript{118} However, inaccurate translations from Italian to English contributed to ambiguities in the resolutions, a significant issue since most of the colonial staff did not speak or read Italian. Although corrections

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\textsuperscript{114} Seaton to Grey, 10 May 1849, CO 136/130.
\textsuperscript{115} Grey to Seaton, 8 October 1849, CO 136/130.
\textsuperscript{116} See minutes in Seaton to Grey, 10 May 1849, CO 136/130.
\textsuperscript{117} Grey to Seaton, 8 October 1849, CO 136/130.
\textsuperscript{118} See minutes in Seaton to Grey, Confidential, 10 May 1849, CO 136/130.
\end{footnotesize}
were marked in the margin of the text by the Ionian government, because these were not official translations, colonial officials paid them no attention. In addition, Strachey did not trust Seaton and was concerned the text would be ratified without sufficient time for the British government to comprehend the real scope of the alterations. It was hoped the new Lord High Commissioner, Sir Henry Ward, who would replace Seaton in the summer of 1849, would present his opinions on the alterations to the Colonial Office prior to the reforms’ ratification. Strachey, who believed Seaton had manipulated Grey, wanted assurances that Britain, even in granting all Seaton’s reforms, would have final say over Ionian affairs. Seaton was also criticised by colonial officials in the Septinsula. G. F. Bowen, the rector of the Ionian University and Seaton’s secretary, felt Seaton gave the Ionians more political changes than was granted the English over three hundred years.119 “On the first May 1849 the Lord High Commissioner had more power than Queen Elizabeth” Bowen wrote, “on the 10th of the same May he was left with less power than Queen Victoria”.120

Conclusion

British alterations to the Ionian constitution were the result of Seaton’s tireless efforts to overturn the language of “corruption”, “ignorance”, “immorality”,

119 To see more about Bowen's career in the Islands and his influence on several governors see Knox B.A., “British Policy in the Ionian Islands, 1847-1864: Nationalism and Imperial Administration”, English Historical Review 99 (1984), pp. 506-29.
120 Bowen G. F., The Ionian Islands under British Protection, p. 49. This pamphlet was published by Bowen during Ward's tenure and Bowen himself was influenced by Ward in his views. Ward proudly notes to Hawes he “induced him [Bowen] to modify many of his views. He is bitter against Lord Seaton … since the consequences of his reforms have borne most cruelly upon them.” Ward to Hawes, 22 January 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/22.
“superstitious” his predecessors had employed and replace it with a new language of
“responsibility” “capability” and “maturity”. By stressing the Ionians’
enlightenment, civilisation and western institutions and origin, Seaton convinced
Grey that while Ionians may not be Englishmen, they still qualified for the right to
representative government. Influenced by his experiences in Canada, he led by
example, befriending distinguished Ionian politicians and listening to their
recommendations about how the Islands should be governed. As a result, Seaton
exercised an unofficial form of representative government in the Ionian Islands in the
1840s. When constitutional changes were introduced in 1848, they did not result
from panic related to wider European events but from Seaton’s well-planned reform
campaign. The Colonial Office, under the leadership of Lord Grey, advocated
responsible government and believed relinquishing supervision over a colony’s
internal affairs did not mean the surrender of imperial control. In spite of opposition
from his senior advisers, Grey became convinced the Ionian people, slowly but
gradually through a political apprenticeship during Seaton’s administration, earned
the privilege of representative government.

Both Seaton and Grey, as proponents of Durham’s theory of responsible
government, pushed through significant reforms and were willing to sacrifice a
degree of British power in the Islands. They maintained an idyllic vision of how their
reforms would work on the ground whilst preserving British predominance over the
Septinsula. In their attempts to find the appropriate form of government for the
Ionian Islands, they, along with other colonial officials, considered models of
government practised in other parts of the Empire, including Canada, Australia, and Jamaica. However, as the next chapter will demonstrate, Seaton’s reform agenda was challenged by his successor, Ward, who saw deadlock in relation to Britain’s governance of the Islands and who would fight to win back for Britain what Seaton had surrendered.
Chapter 5: Sir Henry Ward’s colonial administration in the Ionian Islands

Introduction

As Seaton’s tenure as Lord High Commissioner was coming to an end, Grey began to search for a successor with specific political experience to take over from Seaton. Although Seaton, like several other governors before him, had a military background and experience as an administrator in other parts of the empire, Grey was committed to carrying through the constitutional reforms begun by Seaton and now sought for the Ionian Islands someone with “Parliamentary experience and of having been used to consider political questions of the kind which the contemplated alterations in the constitution of the Ionian State will give rise to”.¹ Grey chose as Lord High Commissioner Sir Henry Ward based on Russell’s recommendations.²

The only son of Robert Plumer Ward, a novelist and politician, Henry Ward began his career in the diplomatic service working in Sweden, the Hague and Spain. He became joint-commissioner in Mexico in 1823 and was promoted to chargé d’affairs in 1825. After completing his service he published an account of the country. Ward entered Parliament in 1833 as a Liberal, had joined the Whigs by 1839

¹ Grey to Wellington, Private, 25 January 1849, Grey Papers, GRE/B131/6/20. Grey’s correspondence with the Duke of Wellington reveals the discussions over commands of various colonies, including the Ionian Islands, and the different needs of each colony. While Grey was seeking a Parliamentarian for the Septinsula, he sought Wellington’s advice for the military leader for the garrisons in Malta and the Ionian Islands, separating the civil and military commands in the Mediterranean. In contrast, ex-slave colonies, such as Mauritius, required military commands. For discussion about the Ionian Islands and military command in the Mediterranean see Wellington to Grey, 5 February 1849, Grey Papers, GRE/B131/2/23; Grey to Wellington, Private, 30 April 1849, Grey Papers, GRE/B131/6/23; Wellington to Grey, 4 May 1849, Grey Papers, GRE/B131/2/26. For discussion about Mauritius, see Wellington to Grey, 19 January 1849, Grey Papers, GRE/B131/2/21; Wellington to Grey, 6 February 1849, Grey Papers, GRE/B131/2/24.
² Ward to Russell, Private, 23 March 1849 Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/7F.
and was considered a “radical leader” by a biographer. As an MP for St. Albans and then Sheffield, he was an advocate of free trade, the ballot and franchise extension. He became political editor of the *Weekly Chronicle* in 1836, which he used to promote his ideas and, like many Parliamentary “radicals”, to criticise Chartism.

During his Parliamentary career, Ward became a close friend and political ally of Russell, even rejecting an early offer of colonial service “to remain in England, and to be ranked amongst your Parliamentary followers.” This friendship between Ward and Russell benefited Ward in many ways. Russell advanced Ward’s colonial career and during his tenure in the Ionian Islands, Ward used his friendship with Russell to gain Russell’s support for his policies in the Islands and also to vent any of his criticisms about Grey. Ward continually reminded Russell of their old friendship and his own support for Russell in the House of Commons. Although Ward discussed his policies with Grey, he was more open with Russell about his concerns in “making a larger concession of Political rights to a People differing from us in Faith, and Race, and totally unaccustomed to wield the powers, which they are now exercising”. The correspondence between Ward and Russell also revealed

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4 Ward to Russell, Private, 23 March 1849 Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/7F. For further information regarding Ward’s Parliamentary support for Russell see Ward to Russell, undated 1845, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/4D; Ward to Russell, 30 March 1845, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/4D; Ward to Russell, 29 November 1845, PRO 30/22/4D.
5 Ward to Russell, 6 January 1850, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8C; Ward to Russell, Private, 20 October 1851, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/9G2; Ward to Russell, Private, 6 February 1852, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/10B; Ward to Russell, 20 March 1852, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/10C; Ward to Russell, 19 September 1852, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/10E; Ward to Russell, Private, 10 November 1854, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/11F.
6 Ward to Russell, 22 February 1850, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8C; Ward to Russell, 7 September 1850, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8E; Ward to Russell, Private, 20 March 1852, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/10C.
Ward’s innate conservatism, particularly after 1848, when the Chartist movement and “Continental Revolutions” changed his perspectives on various issues, such as the franchise. While Ward maintained his commitment to Russell, he also admitted he was unwilling to support him if Russell went too far to the left. Their correspondence also reveals how Russell's liberal principles were tested in his friendship with Ward given Ward's authoritarian measures. For example, Russell criticised Douglas's use of the High Police Powers in 1839 but advocated Ward's use of this power in 1852 and 1854.

Prior to his appointment in the Septinsula, Ward also exhibited interested in the Empire. He was a member of the Colonial Society and was active in the South Australian Association and the New Zealand Company. He supported Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s colonisation scheme and supported Durham’s scheme for representative government in Canada. In June 1846 he became Secretary to the Admiralty under Lord Auckland but was unhappy that he was granted little responsibility in the position. Although Ward had refused colonial offices earlier in his career, when offered the position as Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, he accepted the post for both public and private reasons. Publicly, he felt he could no longer work in the Admiralty and with Lord Auckland. He also did not feel his candidacy for Parliament was viable because his constituency felt he had gone

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7 Ward to Russell, 23 March 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/7F.
8 Ward to Russell, 29 November (undated), Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/4D. On Ward’s criticism of Bright and Cobden see Ward to Russell, 24 April 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/7F.
9 Ward to Russell, 19 September 1852, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/10E; Ward to Russell, Private, 10 November 1854, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/11F.
10 Leader R. E., Chapters in the Political History of Sheffield 1832-1849, (Sheffield, 1884), pp. 31-38.
11 Ward to Russell, 23 March 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/7F.
too far on the franchise. Privately, Ward was in debt and needed the salary offered by the position. His election campaigns had drained the resources of the family estate in Hertfordshire and he suffered further financial losses in 1846 from ill-judged railway speculations. He also hoped the climate in the Septinsula would improve the health of his wife and improve his self-worth after his recent setbacks. Ward could also take advantage of his connections in the Colonial Office, including his close friend Hawes, the Colonial Under-Secretary, who acted as Ward's confidante about both personal and political issues during his tenure in the Islands.

Ward used his friendship with Hawes to try to gain support for his agenda in the Islands. Ward was also open in his letters about his criticism of Grey when Grey did not support him, attempting to place the blame for any problems or failures of policy in the Islands on Grey rather than himself.

Grey had hoped Ward, with his Parliamentary experience and reputation as a radical, would continue Seaton’s work in the Islands. Seaton worked closely with other politicians in the Ionian Islands to introduce reforms. Ward, however, had a very different relationship with local politicians as well as a different attitude to the way the Islands should be governed. Ward disagreed with Seaton’s reforms and was

12 Ward to Russell, Private, 23 March 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/7F.
13 Ward to Russell, Private, 23 March 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/7F; Ward to Russell, 24 April 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/7F.
14 Ward's close relationship with Hawes can be evidenced in the following letters: Ward to Hawes, 22 January 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/22; Ward to Hawes, Private, 8 March 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/34; Ward to Hawes, 20 March 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/37; Ward to Hawes, Private, 5 June 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/41; Ward to Hawes, 24 April 1852, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/53. For Ward's criticisms of Grey, see Ward to Hawes, Private, 6 January 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/21; Ward to Hawes, 22 January 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/22; Ward to Hawes, Private, 8 March 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/34; Ward to Hawes, Private, 23 April 1852, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/53.
forced to maintain his interpretation of the Governor’s authority within the framework of the reformed Constitution, resulting in numerous conflicts with the Ionian Assembly. Ward reacted sharply to agrarian uprisings in Cephalonia in August 1849, manipulating the events to defend his policies. In addition, Ward also dealt with the rise of radical activists within the Septinsula, particularly after 1849, an issue Seaton himself did not have to contend with.

“Lord Seaton’s Constitution is not to be worked by any human power”

Immediately after his arrival, Ward’s dispatches to Grey indicated a return to the negative perceptions of Ionians prevalent in colonial discourse and which Seaton had attempted to reverse. Although Ionians had undergone material and cultural changes preparing them for representative institutions, they were still “calculating”, “disinterested” in the mechanism of government, “seeking re-election and popularity” at the “expense of their duties”.15 Ward considered the Septinsula to be a place of crime and disorder compared to law-abiding Britain.16 Ward's view of the Ionians was similar to that of many travel writers. He occasionally recognised heroic ancient Greek counterparts in the modern Ionians, but at the same time used negative stereotypes to describe them as modern Greeks, and thus unfit for constitutional liberties.17 He also noted the Venetian influence in the Ionian political system, such

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15 Ward to Grey, 8 June 1849, CO 136/131.
16 Ward to Hawes, Private, 5 November 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/51.
17 Ward to Russell, Private, 20 December 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/70; Ward to Grey, Private, 8 February 1852, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/5/56. For more about British stereotypes of modern Greeks, see Miliori, M., The Greek Nation in British Eyes, 1821-64; Hionidis P. L., “The Greek Kingdom in British Public Debate”.

as the use of patronage, which he believed had corrupted political behaviour.\textsuperscript{18} With the exception of the few who supported his policies, he tended to view the Ionians in an ambiguous, but often negative manner, using stereotypical language to describe them as it suited his interests. While Seaton emphasised Ionian society’s many similarities with Britain, Ward emphasised the differences, marking them as reasons Ionians were unsuited to the representative government granted white settler colonies, such as Canada.\textsuperscript{19}

When Ward arrived in the Septinsula, Grey had already sanctioned the reforms regarding free elections and vote by ballot. Seaton had trusted the Ionians and Grey trusted Seaton, supporting his reform programme for the Septinsula. However, Ward’s opinion was sought by Colonial Officials prior to the ratification of Seaton’s constitutional changes.\textsuperscript{20} Grey was unhappy at the omission of a compulsory law safeguarding Ionian payment for military protection in the Islands and the Senators’ vote and responsibilities of the Executive during Parliament’s recess on the issue of free Parliamentary elections. Grey urged Ward to investigate the proposals before he decided whether he would proceed with its final ratification.\textsuperscript{21}

Prior to his departure, Seaton briefed Ward on the Islands’ political condition. Ward became aware of the Ionians’ political demands and expectations for the continuation of the reform programme. He agreed reforms were necessary but

\textsuperscript{18} Ward to Grey, Private, 19 October 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/5/5.
\textsuperscript{19} Ward also argued against representative government because there were no “British Colonists bound to the mother country by ties of blood, language and religion” in the Septinsula. Ward to Grey, Private and Confidential, 27 December 1849, CO 136/133.
\textsuperscript{20} See minutes in the Confidential, dispatch Seaton to Grey, 10 May 1848, CO 136/130.
\textsuperscript{21} Ward to Grey, 22 August 1849, CO 136/131; Ward to Grey, 4 October 1849, CO 136/132.
disagreed on their nature and extent. \textsuperscript{22} Seaton’s reforms left British power in the Islands undefined; they were naïve, based on his “confidence” in the nature and character of the Ionians. \textsuperscript{23} Ward believed Seaton was hasty in granting the reforms and was influenced by Ionian politicians through personal friendships with them. \textsuperscript{24} He considered Seaton a modern liberal and populist when dealing with the Ionians and distanced himself from Seaton’s plans. He wanted Russell’s support for his proposals to alter Seaton’s reforms to render them “safe and practicable” for British rule in the Ionian Islands. \textsuperscript{25} The Ionians, Ward claimed, were forced by Seaton to vote for his reforms so they could be seen as liberal by their countrymen. According to Ward, they preferred Maitland’s Constitution. \textsuperscript{26} Ward believed Maitland’s Constitution “was a Masterpiece and might have been made to last for 50 years longer” as it was “practical” and worked “smoothly”. \textsuperscript{27} He felt “England ought not put herself in the position of trying an experiment, which must lead in three years to an absolute deadlock in government, the Queen’s representative being left without power for good, or for evil”. \textsuperscript{28} Ward intended to secure British predominance in the Mediterranean and did not believe Ionians deserved British liberties.

\textsuperscript{22} Hawes to Ward, Private, 21 May 1852, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/61. Both Grey and Ward had similar ideas regarding the reforms necessary but Hawes notes they disagreed on the extent and the time to which they should be applied.
\textsuperscript{23} Ward to Grey, 8 June 1849, CO 136/131.
\textsuperscript{24} For example, Ward believed Seaton had suppressed evidence regarding the 1848 disturbances in Cephalonia and hidden his son’s, James Colborne’s, involvement in the ensuing investigation. See Ward to Hawes, 7 October 1850, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/5; Ward to Russell, 6 January 1850, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8C.
\textsuperscript{25} Ward to Russell, 29 June 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/7F; Russell to Grey, 24 September 1849,Grey Papers, GRE/B122/5/55.
\textsuperscript{26} W ard to Russell, 6 January 1850, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8C.
\textsuperscript{27} Ward to Russell, Private, 7 September 1850, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8E; Ward to Grey, 8 June 1849, CO 136/131. See also Ward to Russell, 6 January 1850, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8C.
\textsuperscript{28} Ward to Russell, 29 June 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/7F.
Ward believed Ionians ought to exercise control of local government before being granted representative government. Ward opposed the new elective law, which allowed the Assembly, not the Commissioner, to choose the members of the Senate. Like Strachey, he believed it would lead to the formation of an uncontrolled and unpredictable Legislative and diminish Britain’s authority over the Ionian people and in the Mediterranean, making government impossible if the Executive came into conflict with the legislature. Other British officials in the Islands such as Fraser, Secretary to the Commissioner’s Office, his successor George Bowen and Sir James Reid, a British judge on the Supreme Court of Justice, supported Ward.

Ward believed a “balance of power” with the Senate independent “from popular control” was required for the British administration to function satisfactorily. His proposal allowed the Commissioner to select two of the five of the Senators from outside the Assembly, ensuring a harmonious relationship between the Executive and Legislature. Ward’s plan seemed to resemble the New South Wales model but in reality he resurrected Maitland’s old system and gave the Lord High Commissioner and Senate both Executive and Legislative control. Ward advised Grey to act firmly with the Ionians when dealing with political questions that undermined British interests. He admitted the current system was “inconvenient and undesirable”, but it was preferable to Seaton’s “unworkable constitution”, which would “end by placing H. M. government in the position of being forced to decide either to retain possession of Corfu… by military means or to abandon the

29 Ward to Grey, 8 June 1849, CO 136/131.
Protectorate altogether”.

Ward believed so strongly that his own amendments were right for the Septinsula that, privately to Russell, he threatened to prorogue the Assembly if his proposals were not adopted.

Seaton argued the Ionians’ advancement enabled the modifications of the “deplorable” Constitution of 1817, which were necessary for Britain’s continued presence in the Islands. Representative government would produce a more “efficient class of men” than the previous system based on patronage, honours and awards. Ward’s proposals would be opposed by the “most talented and influential members” as a “departure from the democratic spirit and system”. Seaton’s proposal to elect Senators subject to the veto of the British governor was “justice, conciliation and common sense” in comparison to Ward’s proposal of “menace and ostentation”. If Ward retained the status quo in the Septinsula, Seaton feared Britain’s moral influence and strategic role in the Mediterranean and the East would be diminished.

Colonial officials assessed these two different views and had two different conclusions. Strachey believed Ward’s plan would result in conflict between the Executive and Legislative powers and Seaton’s plan weakened the governor. He proposed the inclusion of the veto in the double vote and nominations, similar to the Jamaican and West Indies models, ensuring the governor’s authority and allowing London to retain final say in colonial policies. This corresponded with Strachey’s belief in a hierarchy of difference between nations. Britain, the wealthiest and most

30 Ibid.
31 Ward to Russell, 29 June 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/7F.
32 Seaton to Grey, 8 August 1849, CO 136/130.
33 See Strachey’s memo in Seaton to Grey, Confidential, 21 March 1849, CO 136/130.
civilised nation, was fit to govern others and the Ionians were “of a very doubtful competency for self-government” and required guidance. Thus the Jamaican and West Indies, not the Canadian, model was more appropriate for Ionians. Strachey’s comparison of the Septinsula with colonies of black majority populations rather than with colonies of white settlement indicated his hierarchical thinking.

However, Grey doubted Ward’s reservations and preferred Seaton’s plan, as long as the British government’s requirements concerning military protection and the double veto were integrated into its text. Grey wanted to remain faithful to his support of representative government in the Islands, but did not want to cede all of Britain’s power. He believed Seaton’s plan would ensure harmony between the Executive and legislature. Ionians needed to learn from their own mistakes on their journey to mature representative government. This was a defining moment and there was no “middle line” option. The British governor had to accept his reduced powers and find new ways of influencing the parliamentary parties and public opinion. A “prudent” British governor had to protect the rights of the minority as well as the majority and prevent “unjust measures” on either side.

As a result of the differing advice and opinions he received from Ward, Seaton and Strachey, Grey was unsure of what action to take over the Islands. Ward felt Grey did not understand how reforms would actually work in the Islands. Ward strongly believed Seaton’s proposals would guarantee the breakdown of British

34 See minutes in Seaton to Grey, Confidential, 10 May 1849, CO 136/130.
35 Ward to Grey, 8 June 1849, CO 136/131.
36 Ward to Grey, Confidential, 22 August 1848, CO 136/131
government and lead to anarchy in the Islands. His concerns appeared justified with the outbreak of the Cephalonian rebellions.

**Uprising in Cephalonia**

Soon after his arrival, Ward began to construct Ionians as the enemies of British presence on the Islands. Despite Seaton’s political alliances, support for the British was dwindling by 1849.37 “Friends of the Protectorate”, known as Retrogrates, were Ionian aristocrats who had monopolised offices in the colonial administration for many years and supported the administration regardless of who the governor was and what policies he enforced. They were “protectionists” trying to preserve their power and the preservation of the old status quo despite diminishing popular support.38 The moderates, the majority of whom were the Liberali, were Seaton’s closest allies and advocated reforms within the colonial context. But they saw their support erode due to British delays in ratifying Seaton’s reforms. Radical activists emerged in Cephalonia, Zante, and Santa Maura, demanding a more extensive reform programme and union of the Islands with Greece. Calligas notes

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38 Papadatou G., “To kinima ton Rizospaston ke to Ionio kratos” [The Risospasti movement and the Ionian State], p. 541.
that at this time, they were not yet a “unified, homogenous and organised body, far less a political party”.³⁹ The free press now allowed the various political groups in the Septinsula to clarify their positions and create distinct political identities, leading to the dominance of two parties: the reformist and the radical.⁴⁰

Colonial officials viewed Cephalonia as a hotbed of dissent. The radical press there advocated unionist ideas which concerned Ward, who placed any gatherings of the natives in political clubs and public spaces under British surveillance, sharpening political tensions on the island. Ward used the uprising during Seaton’s tenure to dismiss his proposals for representative government, noting the “excited state” of Cephalonia, and the “outrages” committed. He was concerned if another uprising occurred, the Senators of Cephalonia would vote against the use of martial law and the British governor would be powerless to act.⁴¹

Seaton believed the 1848 uprisings had been over the peasantry’s economically depressed state, but little had been done since then to ameliorate their position. Between 25 and 27 August 1849, a group of armed peasants from the southern part of Cephalonia attacked a police detachment and killed its constable. The next day they moved to Scala where they burned down the house of a landowner, Metaxa,

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⁴⁰ Calligas E., “The Rizospastai (Radicals-Unionists)”, p. 103.

⁴¹ Ward to Grey, 8 June 1849, CO 136/131.
who died with his four servants in the blaze.\textsuperscript{42} The peasants finally moved to the capital of the island, Argostoli, where their aim was to destroy all evidence that kept them tied to their landlord creditors. Along their four day journey to Argostoli, the group increased to four hundred and committed other violent attacks.\textsuperscript{43}

Ward reacted to the events by proclaiming martial law, a step rarely taken by British colonial administrators in the Empire but which Ward felt was essential in restoring order in the Islands.\textsuperscript{44} He sent 900 British troops to Cephalonia, who did not distinguish between insurgents and the wider population.\textsuperscript{45} They conducted house to house searches prior to burning them and nearby fields; some people were executed and many others arrested and flogged in public squares as punishment.\textsuperscript{46} The uprising ended on 5 September, but martial law continued until the end of October. Martial law courts were established and 44 people were sentenced to death, of whom only 21 were actually executed.\textsuperscript{47} The Colonial Office and local Ionian authorities, including the local government in Cephalonia and that island’s Archbishop, supported Ward’s actions. Ward received numerous petitions from Ionians thanking him for restoring law and order.\textsuperscript{48}

Ward’s explanation regarding the reasons for the uprising changed over time. Initially Ward, like Seaton in 1848, represented the latest uprisings as a “class issue”,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Ward to Grey, 30 August 1849, CO 136/132.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} Ward to Grey, 1 September 1849, CO 136/132.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} Ward to Lord FitzRoy Somerset, 31 August 1849, Grey Papers, GRE/B131/2/54.
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Paximadopoulou-Stavrinou M., \textit{Oi eksegerseis tis Kefallinias kata ta eti 1848 ke 1849 [The rebellions of Kefalonia during the years 1848 and 1849]}, (Athens, 1980).
  \item \textsuperscript{46} Ward to Grey, 7 September 1849, CO 136/132.
  \item \textsuperscript{47} Ward to Grey, 17 September 1849, CO 136/132.
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Ward to Grey, 16 September 1849, CO 136/132.
\end{itemize}
a rural struggle against the ruling elites of the Islands. He blamed Britain for ignoring the rural population and the economic depression that was the result of an “unfair” system of land distribution. He promised to establish a Committee of Inquiry to review the issue, a move Grey welcomed.\(^{49}\) Grey, with the support of the British government, proposed the transportation of the rebels to Australia and the West Indies, an opportunity for Ionian authorities to remove the ‘criminal classes’.\(^{50}\)

However, as details of the trials emerged, Ward began to blame the uprising on Seaton’s reforms, particularly freedom of the press.\(^{51}\) He criticised Seaton for allowing a free press without some degree of censorship. While Seaton had “confidence in the sense and moderations of the people”, Ward believed Ionians could not be trusted with the “most liberal law in Europe”. Their inferior society could not cope with such “liberties” and “proper regulations” should be imposed. A free press was a “worthless” exercise, a propaganda tool used by radicals to conspire against the Ionian government.\(^{52}\) Furthermore, foreign residents in the Islands used the press to publicise their own personal grievances which would encourage the creation of “secret societies”.\(^{53}\) Ward also argued the uprising was politically motivated against the British, claiming the radicals had used the press to advocate

\(^{49}\) Ward to Curcumelli, Palace (Corfu), 4 August 1853, in Letters of Ward and Young to D. P. Curcumelli (Regent of Corfu), Curcumelli-Rodostamo P., Private family collection, Afra, Corfu. For similarities with the Irish case, see De Nie M., *The Eternal Paddy*, pp. 108-118.

\(^{50}\) Ward to Grey, 8 August 1849, CO 136/193.

\(^{51}\) Ward to Grey, 9 September 1849, CO 136/132; Ward to Russell, 8 September 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8A; Ward to Russell, 9 October 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8B.

\(^{52}\) Ward to Grey, 9 September 1849, CO 136/132.

the overthrow of the British “by appealing to feelings of Nationality and Religion” amongst an “ignorant peasantry”.\textsuperscript{54} Claiming he had support from the “church, the property, and the intelligence of the country” he asked the British government to annul freedom of the press.\textsuperscript{55}

Crown law officers and Merivale understood annulment or modification of the press law needed support from the Ionian parliament, which they were unlikely to give, or an order from the Crown, for which there were too many technicalities. Grey, who did not wish to annul the law, thought Ward meant to censor the press.\textsuperscript{56}

Grey, like Seaton and Russell, believed a free press would be a civilising force that would unite the British and Ionians and strengthen the government in the Septinsula. Ward amended his proposal to annul the law and instead suggested freedom of the press “under proper restriction” and exercised “within reasonable limits” for at least “ten years”.\textsuperscript{57}

Ward also defended his policy of martial law, which was coming under increasing criticism by both Ionians and Britons. Martial law was a response to the Ionian radicals who were testing his leadership.\textsuperscript{58} The Ionians were “murderers and robbers”.\textsuperscript{59} They had committed “atrocities” and “crimes” including the decapitation
and dismembering of some victims. He compared them to wild beasts, calling them “semi-savages”. Lawlessness was rampant and there was little security in the Islands. He needed the martial law courts to obtain convictions and even hinted at the abolition of the Judicial system.

He also claimed that, without martial law, a civil and religious war might have occurred in Cephalonia. Although he disagreed with Colonel Trollope, one of his military advisors who was against the imposition of martial law, he justified his decision, noting he had “seen a good many of the same breed in Spain and Mexico and felt satisfied that nothing but the most rigorous measures would do”. He argued his presence in Cephalonia had reassured the natives and claimed many Ionians supported his policies and praised the actions of the British troops. He compared the uprising and its aftermath to one of the “Spanish Romances” Russell read when he took his breaks from politics.

Ward’s reaction to the riots revealed his increasingly conservative political nature. Although he had been considered a radical at home in his Parliamentary

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60 Hansard T. C., Parliamentary debates, 3rd Series, CXIII, 9 August 1850, p. 981. Hawes was quoting from Ward's dispatches.
61 Ward to Grey, Confidential, 30 August 1849, CO 136/131; Ward to Grey, 1 September 1849, CO 136/132; Ward to Russell, 22 October 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/V8B. Ward's views about the Cephalonians did not change. When referring to a cholera outbreak in the Islands in 1850, Ward believed “the only thing, that rouses a Cephalonian to any effort, is money, and all classes, high and low, are abusing the liberal aide” of the government; Ionians lacked the “moral courage” and “generous feeling” of the British. Ward capitalised on a medical emergency to make a political point about Ionian, particularly Cephalonian, unfitness. See Ward to Hawes, 18 October 1850, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/1; Ward to Hawes, 7 October 1850, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/5.
62 Ward to Russell, 22 October 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8B.
63 Ward to Russell, 8 September 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8A.
64 Ward to Grey, 30 October 1849, CO 136/132; Ward to Grey, 30 September 1849, CO 136/132; Ward to Russell, 22 October 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8B.
65 Ward to Russell, 22 October 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8B.
career, where he had supported electoral reforms and himself benefited from a free press as editor of a journal, by the time he arrived in the Septinsula, he was already regretting his support for increased franchise at home and mindful of the events in 1848. He also brought with him to the Islands his experience in Spain and Mexico and his contempt for them, and considered the Ionians to be of the same “breed”. From his arrival in the Islands, he was critical of Grey's liberalism and Seaton’s reforms. In advocating the annulment of the free press and instituting a repressive martial law policy, Ward was attempting to reinstate an authoritarian form of government in the Septinsula.

Ward’s implementation of martial law and his attempt to resurrect authoritarian rule provoked outrage among many Ionians. The moderates, many of whom worked closely with Seaton to introduce reforms, split into two distinct groups in the aftermath of the Cephalonian uprisings: the radicals (Risospasti-Unionists) and reformers, which became the dominant parties in the Assembly. Prior to Ward, most radicals and reformers looked for constitutional improvements within the framework of the Protectorate. After the Cephalonian uprisings and antagonised by Ward's policies, the reformers again split and became distinct political parties. Ward attempted, but failed, to work with some of the reformers, who continued to advocate constitutional reforms within the Protectorate. Other parties, angered by Ward's “tyranny” and obsession with maintaining the Governor's power, increasingly

66 Ward to Russell, 23 March 1849, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/7F.
67 Ward to Russell, Private, 1 February 1850, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8C.
68 Ward to Hawes, 19 July 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/50.
69 Ward to Grey, Private, 19 October 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/5/5.
joined the Risospasti and expressed Greek unionist sentiments. They worked more actively in the Assembly and through the press towards the annexation of the Islands with Greece.

**Debates in the Press and the House of Commons**

As news about the riots and Ward’s martial law policy began arriving in London, the British public could read opposing views in articles published in the *Times* and the *Daily News*. Martial law was rarely administered in the colonies and Ward’s policies, following so soon after Torrington’s policy in Ceylon, focused public attention on the forms of rule in the Ionian Islands. The *Times* supported Ward’s actions in Cephalonia while the *Daily News* provided a platform for Ionian voices to be heard in Britain, publishing (mainly anonymous) articles by native Ionians and their supporters. These two papers provide a rare indication of public opinion which, like the British government, did not agree on the form of rule necessary in the Septinsula. These articles, especially Fitzroy’s publications and criticism of the government, made the issues in the Septinsula important to the British Parliament and the debates which would occur there. They also had wider diplomatic implications for Britain in Europe, as radicals compared Ward’s actions with Austria’s despotic policies in Hungary and Italy.

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70 Ward to Hawes, Private, 21 July 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/29.
The *Times* criticised the British government for proposing representative government for the Ionians. The Septinsula were vital possessions that retained Britain’s “prestige in the Mediterranean”. Britain had provided the Ionians with “security of life and property” but they refused to recognise British magnanimity and the paper had little patience with Ionian complaints about British repression. It believed British liberties were not suited to the Ionians and described them in hierarchical and negative terms as “subtle as Orientals and corrupt as Italians”, a “half-civilised” people. They “who had never known freedom of opinion or expression, who combined Italian crime with Greek cunning; who were strangers to private honesty or public virtue; who were remarkable for strong passions, dark superstition, ignorance and laziness...” were not deserving of a free press. The *Times* supported a more authoritarian constitution which would allow Britain to rule with “efficiency” and “punish and prevent outbreaks at once silly, selfish and sanguinary”. This mirrored the negative portrayals in Ward’s dispatches, extracts of which the *Times* published.

Among the fiercest critics of Ward and British rule were Lord Charles Fitzroy, a former MP, military officer and Resident in the Islands, and Georgios Dracatos Papanicolas, an Ionian merchant permanently resident in London. Fitzroy and Papanicolas collaborated on a number of books, pamphlets and articles about Ionian

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72 The *Times*, 17 September 1849.
73 Ward described atrocities of the “most diabolical character” and riots akin to a “system of terrorism”. The *Times* 21 September 1849.
74 Fitzroy had been a local governor in Zante from 1828-1839; The *Times*, 4 October 1853. Fitzroy and Papanicolas wrote several letters to leading newspapers and politicians. Fitzroy’s letters can be found in his own work, Fitzroy C., *Letters showing the Anomalous Political and Financial Condition of the Ionian Islands*, (London, 1850).
and Cephalonian affairs. Papanicolas wrote under the pseudonym “An Ionian” but his identity was widely known.\textsuperscript{75} Fitzroy believed England should remove from service all persons who exercised arbitrary power and wanted Russell to apologise for supporting Ward, who had treated the Cephalonians as “brute beasts”.\textsuperscript{76} Ward’s “severity towards the Ionians” and the use of High Police Powers to capture the ringleaders was “illegal” and similar to the abuse of civil liberties in the courts of James the Second.\textsuperscript{77}

Fitzroy demanded a Commission of Inquiry to make the British public aware of Ionians’ “deep grievances” arising “from tyrannical abuse of power in the islands”.\textsuperscript{78} He challenged the representations in the \textit{Times}, “the government paper”, of Ionians as dangerous people and believed it should apologise for its justification of the government’s approval of Ward’s conduct.\textsuperscript{79} He compared Ward’s actions with the Austrian General Haynau, whose heavy handed policies in the Hungarian uprisings had been condemned by Russell.\textsuperscript{80} British rule in the Septinsula was no more liberal than the authoritarian regimes in Austria and Russia. Indeed, Britain had “misgoverned” the Septinsula for thirty four years.\textsuperscript{81} The Ionians were a protectorate, not a colony and should be governed according to the “true spirit of the British

\textsuperscript{75} Examples of his campaign can be found in the colonial archives, such as his letter to Newcastle 2 February 1853, CO 136/150. His own books included Papanicolas G. D., \textit{The Ionian Islands: What they have lost and suffered under the thirty years of administration of the Lord High Commissioner send to govern them}, (London, 1851).
\textsuperscript{76} Fitzroy C., \textit{Letters showing the Anomalous Political}, pp. 34 and X.
\textsuperscript{78} Also in the \textit{Examiner}.
\textsuperscript{79} Fitzroy C., \textit{Letters showing the Anomalous Political}, p. iii.
\textsuperscript{80} The \textit{Daily News} 23 July 1850. See also his book Fitzroy C., \textit{Letters showing the Anomalous Political}, p. v.
\textsuperscript{81} Fitzroy C., \textit{Letters showing the Anomalous Political}, p. 9.
constitution”. Ward’s “barbarous and despotic rule” was in opposition to the Whiggish principles of Russell and Grey, who had written extensively on “liberal government” and “extension of principles” in the Ionian Islands. By treating Ionians as “inferior” Britain made them “morally, mentally if not physically ill”. Fitzroy also worried colonial reformers like Russell and Grey were only advocates of reforms for the “sake of obtaining power themselves”.

Papanicolas also demanded a Commission of Inquiry into British misgovernment in the Septinsula. Ward had inflated his language about the riots initially constructing them as a “little revolt”, then “magnifying it to a rebellion” and finally a “political outbreak”, implying the Ionians “opened a war” against the British. Papanicolas believed this was a calculated strategy to reverse Seaton’s programme of reforms. Britons had represented the Ionians as inferior in the same ways as they characterised black Caribbeans as “slaves or children”. Ionians were white Europeans who had, like other European nations, “produced a long and noted series of divines, philosophers, orators, professors, warriors”. Reflecting Ionian reformist ideology, Papanicolas claimed Ionians did not want to overthrow British

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82 Ibid., p. 3.
83 Ibid., p. 4.
84 Ibid., p. 3.
86 Fitzroy C., Letters showing the Anomalous Political, p. 12; The Daily News, 7 December 1849.
87 Fitzroy C., Letters showing the Anomalous Political, pp. 13-14, 24. Ward also believed Seaton’s son, James Colborne, was assisting Papanicolas and the Daily News in representing the 1849 events as an agrarian disturbance rather than adopt his (Ward’s) interpretations of the uprising. Ward to Hawes, 7 October 1850, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/5.
88 The Daily News, 15 July 1850
89 The Daily News, 28 August 1849 and 15 May 1850
protection in favour of union with Greece, but advocated constitutional reforms and administrative improvements.

The *Times*, Fitzroy and Papanicolas presented differing voices about Ward, his actions, and governance in the Ionian Islands. The *Times* provided a voice for the conservative, authoritarian segment of the public who believed Britain’s government and liberal values were only applicable for Britons. Sympathisers with the Ionians, like Fitzroy and Papanicolas, criticised the negative representations Ward and his allies portrayed of the Ionians and the events in Cephalonia, believing they were justifications for authoritarian rule. They advocated enlightened colonial policies for the European Ionians. While these were the voices the public read, differing political voices were represented in debates on the uprisings in the House of Commons.

On 19 September 1850, a year after the riots, governance of the Islands was debated in the British Parliament. The debates were an official examination of British government in the Septinsula and in Britain, making the Colonial Office and its governors accountable for their actions by investigating the checks and balances on the rule Britain imposed. Social harmony was important for rule and good government. The political viability of the colonies was not only dependent on the character of the people who were governed but also on the character of those governing.\(^90\) The Cephalonian uprising raised questions concerning British ideas of liberty and justice and Ward’s martial law policies. Both the British radicals and the

Government relied on Ward’s correspondence with the Colonial Office during the debate to make their points.

Hume noted the riots started after the murder of Metaxa and his family by a group of peasant employees on his estate. But rather than deal with this crime separately, Ward panicked and imposed martial law, a “violation of liberties and civil rights” of all Cephalonians. His reaction was exaggerated and a disgrace to Britain for which he should be prosecuted and punished. The maintenance of martial law for six weeks was a demonstration of Ward’s despotism. Lord Dudley Stuart considered Ward’s offer of rewards for certain criminals brought to him “dead or alive” was a “direct violation of the principle of the British law”; a man was “considered innocent until he had proven to be guilty…Shame to the Governor who had issued such a proclamation and shame to the government at home that had not passed any reprehension upon the act”. Ward’s “brutal absolutism and ferocious tyranny” were compared with Torrington’s governance of Ceylon and to Austrian General Haynau’s actions in Hungary. Hume and John Bright, like Fitzroy and Papanicolas, demanded a Commission of Inquiry, claiming the British government and public did not possess “the real truth as to the state of these islands” and their “misgovernment”. Radicals who considered Ward a reformer were disappointed he did not act on his liberal principles in governing the Ionian Islands. Hume mused

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92 Bright believed Ward’s martial law policy was a “ridiculous and childish” reaction derived from fear. Ibid., p. 992.
93 Ibid., p. 998.
there “was something in the possession of power which seemed entirely to change men”.

Russell and the Colonial Office defended Ward's policies against the criticisms of the radicals. Hawes supported Ward’s martial law policy, as he had Torrington's in Ceylon, arguing it helped Britain sustain law and government. Using Ward’s dispatches, Hawes described Cephalonia as a place of anarchy where the “most atrocious and horrible” acts were committed by a peasantry driven by “passions and temptations”. They committed “murders, rapes, robberies, house burnings” and threatened “to rip up women big with child, and to kill children, if their husbands and fathers refused to join the banditti”. The situation had been so dangerous that “within a week that island would have been a desert” had the Government failed in “applying the promptest and most stringent remedy”. Ionians were criminals and “semi-barbarians” and deserved to be “treated” as such, respecting “nothing but actual force”. The British government noted Ionian authorities also supported his

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95 Hansard T. C., *Parliamentary debates*, 3rd Series, CXIII, 9 August 1850, p. 976. There was never a Commission of Inquiry into Ward’s actions. At the time, Russell and Grey had the inquiry into Torrington’s martial law policy in Ceylon to contend with and the British government did not desire the additional burden of an inquiry into the Ionian Islands. There was also concern another inquiry would weaken the government further and lead to its collapse. Hannell D., “A case of bad publicity: Britain and the Ionian Islands, 1848-1851”, *European History Quarterly*, 17, 1, 1987, pp. 131-43. For Torrington's thanks to Grey for his support of martial law in Ceylon, see Torrington to Grey, Private, 13 December 1848, Grey Papers, GRE/B128/8/26.


97 Hansard T. C., *Parliamentary debates*, 3rd Series, CXIII, 9 August 1850, p. 985. Ward criticised some of his “old friends” in the House of Commons for their lack of support regarding his and Torrington's implementation of martial law. See Ward to Hawes, Private, 5 June 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/41; Ward to Russell, Private, 7 September 1850, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8E.


99 Similar language was used in describing the Indian Mutiny of 1857. See Metcalf T., *Ideologies of the Raj*. 
actions and Russell felt Ward had secured their lives and property. Colonel Dunne, who knew the nature and geography of Cephalonia after military service there, thought a Commission of Inquiry would fail due to the language barrier between the British committee and Greek population. Moreover, the inquiry would not be valid since the Ionian Islands were still governed under the Venetians laws, which prohibited the people attacked during the uprising from giving evidence. He suggested the abandonment of the Islands, with the exception of Corfu, a proposal already contemplated by Russell and Grey.

Ward’s negative and hostile portrayal of the Ionians during the riots increasingly worried Grey, who still advocated reforms but also urged careful attention to the smallest details of their operation, particularly in the upcoming election of the Assembly. In the aftermath of the Cephalonian uprising, he approved Ward’s proposals for reform over Seaton’s. Grey recommended the Maltese model of the vote by ballot, which subdivided the Islands into electoral districts and excluded the candidates from the polling stations. The military contribution was fixed on the Ionian revenue at £25,000 per year and the Commissioner’s Civil List was fixed at £15,000 per year, with alterations to either requiring Crown approval.

100 Hansard T. C., Parliamentary debates, 3rd Series, CXIII, 9 August 1850, p. 994. See also Ward to Russell, Private, 7 September 1850, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8E.
101 Hansard T. C., Parliamentary debates, 3rd Series, CXIII, 9 August 1850, pp. 998-99. See also Grey to Russell, 13 August 1851, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/9E.
Although Ward privately opposed constitutional reforms, he recommended against delaying the secret vote and the election of Senators and Regents.\textsuperscript{103} This was partly a reaction to the uprising and an attempt to prevent further conflict. This may also have been a response to the criticism of his policies at home and to show he supported civil liberties. He hoped the introduction of “large and popular changes” would benefit “men of property and intelligence” who wished “to retain British protection”. Grey ratified the measure, maintaining “the constitution established by the Ionian Legislature rests on the solid foundation of a free representation of the people”. Ward stated that as an “old advocate of the ballot in the British Parliament I shall watch with the deepest interest, the progress of the experiment about to be tried here”.\textsuperscript{104}

“Annoyed and distressed beyond measure”: Ward’s relationship with the Ionian Assembly: 1850-1853.

Ward had reluctantly conceded to reforms because he could not convince Grey otherwise, but was uneasy about giving the right of free elections to the Ionian people, an “untrustworthy” population who did not know what representative government meant.\textsuperscript{105} He believed the Ionians thought the governor made the Executive and Legislature work in harmony and hoped they would obey his instructions and not challenge his authority.\textsuperscript{106} Between 1850-1853, Ward would

\textsuperscript{103} Ward to Grey, 15 September 1849, CO 136/132.
\textsuperscript{104} Grey to Ward, 16 January 1850, CO 136/193; Grey to Ward, 18 January 1850, CO 136/193.
\textsuperscript{105} Ward to Grey, 6 February 1850, CO 136/135.
\textsuperscript{106} Ward to Grey, Confidential, 4 October 1849, CO 136/132.
learn the Ionians knew exactly what representative government was and he could not prevent the rise of radical opposition in the Assembly.\textsuperscript{107}

In his address to the Ionian Parliament in 1850, Ward optimistically hoped for a successful session that would be “honourable to the Ionian People”.\textsuperscript{108} However, the Assembly elected under the new Constitution did not meet Ward’s expectations.\textsuperscript{109} Only four previous members had returned and the remaining majority had “no Parliamentary experience whatsoever”.\textsuperscript{110} After the first meeting between the Executive and Legislature, he wrote Grey his relationship with the Assembly was not “very smooth, or very agreeable”.\textsuperscript{111} Over the next two years, he would repeatedly clash with them over numerous issues in his attempt to preserve British dominance, beginning with the Oath taken at the start of Parliament.

On the 26 March twenty seven MPs, including “four Cephalonian Republicans” and “Greek unionists”, Monferrato, Zervo, Livada, and Pillarino, refused to take the oath traditionally taken before the creation of a new government by every member of Parliament since 1818. The oath, framed by Maitland, referred to an “indissoluble union” with the protecting power, which the MPs felt had no reference “to present circumstances, or to the present Government”.\textsuperscript{112} Although the oath was not obligatory, Ward argued it should be taken since they were still under

\textsuperscript{107} Ward to Russell, Private, 7 September 1850, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8E.
\textsuperscript{108} See enclosure of Ward’s speech to the Ionian Assembly 1 January 1850 in Ward to Grey, 5 January 1850, CO 136/134.
\textsuperscript{109} Ward to Russell, 22 February 1850, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8C.
\textsuperscript{110} Ward to Grey, 27 March 1850, CO 136/135.
\textsuperscript{111} Ward to Russell, 6 January 1850, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8C; Ward to Grey, 27 March 1850, CO 136/135.
\textsuperscript{112} Ward to Grey, 27 March 1850, CO 136/135.
British protection and the administration of their affairs was still in his hands. He failed to convince the Ionians, who understood the reformed Constitution had diminished British control over them, to compromise on the matter. Ward asked Grey to dissolve “Parliament by order in Council”. The Assembly reconsidered its position and accepted a modified oath “for the sake of peace”. Ward believed “many good men” in the Assembly “allowed themselves to be misled”. But he argued granting constitutional liberties to an “inexperienced” and “easily led” people was premature. Ionians were “clever, impressionable, easily excited, but unaccustomed to political power, and always disposed to construe as weakness that respect for Constitutional rights which habit and education implant in every Englishman’s mind”.

Conflicts between Ward and the Assembly intensified when the Assembly presented a “Bill of indictment against British protection for the last thirty years”, accusing Britain of abusing the Treaty of Paris and ruling the Islands as colonial possessions for three decades. They complained about the financial deprivation of the Islands, the decay of the mercantile marine, the bad condition of agriculture, British support of foreigners over Ionians as public officers and the failure to

113 See enclosures 3,5 in Ward to Grey, 27 March 1850, CO 136/135.
114 The oath was defined as “I swear conscientiously and faithfully to perform the duties of Representative, and to obey the laws, using every effort to defend the rights and interests of the Ionian People. (see enclosure no 1, in Ward to Grey, 27 March 1850, CO 136/135; Ward to Grey, Private and Confidential, 7 April 1850, CO 136/135.
115 See enclosures 3, 5 in Ward to Grey, 27 March 1850, CO 136/135. See also Ward to Hawes, 22 January 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/22; Ward to Grey, Private, 18 February 1852, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/5/58.
117 Ward to Grey, 20 April 1850, CO 136/135.
introduce Greek as the official language. They were unhappy they had representative
government in name only, without the power to enact change themselves. This could
only be remedied by the introduction of “Radical Reform”, which would advance
their right to govern themselves and enable the future union to the Greek family,
whose “origin, language, religion, recollections and hopes” they shared.\textsuperscript{118}

Ward promised the British government would promote marine, agriculture and
trade, and general material and educational advancement of the Islands. It would be
difficult to introduce the Greek language because of the difficulties finding people to
teach in the University or translate codes of law.\textsuperscript{119} Ward was not dissimilar to
previous governors, all of whom had attempted to improve the financial
advancement of the Islands. But Ward’s rejection of the inclusion of the Greek
language in official areas like administration and education was a calculated strategy
to undermine nationalist aspirations for a union with Greece. As Ward later wrote to
Corfiot, Demitrios Curcumelli, “I am not to have that nationality thrust at every step
in my face”.\textsuperscript{120} Confident with its new powers, the Assembly continued its conflict
with Ward. They denied the government the right to have a spokesman in
Parliament.\textsuperscript{121} They objected to the appointment of an Englishman as a secretary and

\textsuperscript{118} See enclosure no 1, Speech of the President of the Ionian Assembly Candiano Roma to Ward, 11 April 1850, in Ward to Grey, 20 April 1850, CO 136/135.
\textsuperscript{119} See enclosure no 2, Speech of Ward to Assembly, 13 April 1850, in Ward to Grey, 20 April 1850 CO 136/135.
\textsuperscript{120} Ward to Curcumelli, 22 June 1851, in Letters of L.H.C. Ward to D. P. Curcumelli, Regent of Corfu, Curcumelli-Rodostamo P., Private family collection, Afra, Corfù.
\textsuperscript{121} Ward to Grey, Confidential, 21 April 1850, CO 136/135.
revised their regulations to make it easier for the public to attend Assembly proceedings, though Ward vetoed this latter issue.\textsuperscript{122}

The fragile relationship between the Executive and Legislature deteriorated further after the election of Corfiot philosopher and historian, Petro Braila-Armeni, who was a member of the \textit{Liberali} club, edited the \textit{Patris} newspaper and was a member of the moderate Patris Party. The dispute over the legalities of his election illustrated the weakness of the new Electoral law. It also highlighted the ill-defined relationship between the Senate and Assembly over their rights and powers and strengthened Ward’s and Stratchey’s view that Ionians were not ready for representative government.

Braila-Armeni was the son of a foreigner, born before his father’s naturalisation and, according to Electoral law provisions, not eligible for candidacy. Presenting certificates regarding his age and property, he argued his certificate of birth was not essential and he should be allowed to stand. Although the British Regent rejected his argument, Braila entered the election in Corfu, was successful and afterwards the Assembly passed a Resolution forcing Regents to accept all candidates. However, the Senate refused the Assembly’s resolution, arguing it violated existing law and needed the concurrence of the Senate and the Lord High Commissioner.\textsuperscript{123} Ward thought highly of Braila and considered him “a man of strong, and clear, mind” and wanted to gratify “his ambition legitimately” but felt his

\textsuperscript{122} Ward to Grey, 19 April 1850, CO 136/135.
\textsuperscript{123} Ward to Grey, Private and Confidential, 7 April 1850, CO 136/135.
election was illegitimate under the reformed constitution. The Assembly, however, believed matters of jurisdiction, including the validity of elections, were its exclusive and unquestionable right, using England and France as examples. Ward believed the electoral laws in the three countries were “dissimilar” and considered the Ionians “half-informed men” imagining themselves adopting the sophisticated political systems of England and France. He praised the Senate’s “firmness, ability and moderation” and blamed Braila and his radical friends for the “legislative rebellion”, proof Ionians had constitutional liberties they could not handle. The Septinsula, to Ward, was “a country, where there are no leaders, no principles, and no Parties” in comparison to Britain.

Ward offered a compromise. The Senate would admit Braila’s candidacy in return for a bill amending the electoral law to protect against future similar disputes, a move rejected by the Assembly. Ward prorogued the Assembly in June 1850 and

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124 Ward to Grey, Private, 7 August 1850, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/5/2. Ward, anticipating Braila would enter the Assembly eventually, suggested he would “use him” to influence members of the moderate and radical parties in compromises with Ward over his constitutional reforms. See Ward to Hawes, 18 October 1850, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/1.
125 The President of the Assembly, Candiano Roma, noted in England, where the law excluded non-members of the Church of England from the House of Commons, “neither the Government nor any other authority prevented the Roman-Catholic O’Connell from repeatedly presenting himself as a candidate”. Nor was there any dispute over the right of the House of Commons “to decide whether in 1828, O’Connell, or in 1848, Rothschild had or had not the necessary qualifications”. In France in 1816 when the qualification of Benjamin Constant was disputed, “the Chamber of Deputies, and no other authorities, whether administrative or judiciary, verified his election, and decided the point”. See the enclosure no 2, Roma to Ward, 5 April 1850, in Ward to Grey, Private and Confidential, 7 April 1850, CO 136/135.
126 See the enclosure no 2, Roma to Ward, 5 April 1850, in Ward to Grey, Private and Confidential, 7 April 1850, CO 136/135.
127 Ward to Grey, Private, 7 August 1850, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/5/2. See also, Ward to Hawes, 20 March 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/37; Ward to Hawes, 11 April 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/39
128 Ward to Grey, Private, 7 August 1850, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/5/2; Ward to Hawes, 19 October 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/50.
the Senate took the recess of Parliament to enact an Atto di Governo requiring the annual publication and revision of lists of not only electors, but those entitled to become candidates. Although rejected by the Assembly in December 1850, the Senate eventually utilised the force of law to pass it.\textsuperscript{129} Ward hoped Grey would support him, but was disappointed in Grey's refusal to offer official support regarding all his actions.\textsuperscript{130}

Russell and Grey viewed Ward's actions with uneasiness. Although Russell would normally trust Ward's decisions, “supported as he is by his Senate”, he was concerned that Ward's actions were heavy-handed and questioned their “legality”.\textsuperscript{131} Yet Russell was uncertain about what course of action should be taken and examined the consequences of attempting to maintain the current law, of attempting to adopt a new law or returning to the old law. Russell's main concern, however, was that Ward was suppressing the new constitutional powers of the Assembly. He believed the Atto di Governo was “a course clearly unconstitutional” and suppression of the Assembly amounted to a “coup d'etat”.\textsuperscript{132}

Ward, however, expressed satisfaction over his handling of the issue to his superiors in London.\textsuperscript{133} He had predicted the unfitness of the Ionian character to self-government soon after he arrived on the Islands, but now he knew he had been right,

\textsuperscript{129} Ward to Grey, 20 May 1850, CO 136/136
\textsuperscript{130} Ward to Hawes, Private, 6 January 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/21. Ward's frustration with Grey on multiple issues would be exhibited in much of his correspondence with Hawes.
\textsuperscript{131} Russell to Grey, 19 December 1850, Grey Papers, GRE/B122/6/56.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} Ward to Grey 20 April 1850, CO 136/135 For the exchange between the Senate and the Assembly see the numerous enclosures in Ward to Grey, Confidential, 7 May 1850, CO 136/136; Ward to Grey, 6 September 1850, CO 136/137; Ward to Grey, 16 May 1851, CO 136/140.
convinced that “we have already conferred upon this people an amount of ‘liberty’ for which they were wholly unfitted”.  

The Ionians should be grateful for the reforms and not use them as a “stepping stone to further political changes”, such as proposals for annual sessions of Parliament, which Ward rejected believing they could “only lead to fruitless irritation”. Free press was useless in the Septinsula since it did not produce an informed public opinion, which was “still in a very crude and undigested state”. Rather, it was monopolised by the radicals to propagandise and make alliances against the government. He was determined not to surrender any remaining powers to the Ionians, such as the High Police Powers, derived from Maitland’s old constitution. He believed “each concession leads to fresh demands, and those demands, if met by concession again, will end by making the Government impossible”. After further disputes including one over the salaries of the Civil List Ward prorogued the House until December 1851.

With such views on Ionian society, it was not surprising Ward did not socialise with the Islanders as Seaton had done. Although Ward noted the “charms” and opportunities for “complete relaxation” on the Islands, which allowed him to practise pursuits, like shooting, enjoyed by “well-regulated, English minds”, throughout his tenure he maintained his separation from and his own sense of superiority to the Ionians. “I hardly know a practical man in any department, except the few who

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134 Ward to Grey, Confidential, 21 April 1850, CO 136/135.
135 Ward to Grey, Private and Confidential, 7 April 1850, CO 136/135.
138 Ward to Hawes, 7 October 1850, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/5. The emphasis on “English” is Ward's.
have been formed in the English school”\textsuperscript{139}. He expressed frustration to his superiors, accusing Ionians MPs of being uncooperative, behaving like small children due to personal rivalries and uninterested in practical solutions, making constitutional government impossible.\textsuperscript{140} Proroguing the Assembly, he attempted to govern with the Senate using emergency powers of legislation and hoped the Ionians would elect a more cooperative Legislature.\textsuperscript{141} He attempted to undermine the activities of the radicals and eradicate them from the tenth Assembly. He closed radical clubs in Cephalonia and Zante and levied a £100 fine on those circulating propagandist material.\textsuperscript{142} Using the High Police Powers, Ward exiled four leading radicals from Cephalonia and the radical unionists from Zante.\textsuperscript{143} He attempted to build a relationship with the moderate party suggesting “a mild programme of reform” that included annual sessions of the Assembly, internal reorganisation of the Senate, abandonment of the Executive powers in the Supreme Council of Justice, and limited extension of the powers of the municipal government.\textsuperscript{144}

Hawes had little confidence the concessions Ward introduced would produce a transformation of the government, a reservation Grey shared.\textsuperscript{145} Grey, however, saw no alternative but to allow “Ward to play out the game in his own way”.\textsuperscript{146} He was concerned by Ward's actions and told Russell he believed “Ward's 'Atto di Governo'

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Ward to Grey, 20 December 1850, CO 136/138.
\textsuperscript{141} Ward to Grey, 27 May 1850, CO 136/138.
\textsuperscript{142} Ward to Symonds 9 January 1851, CO 136/140; Ward to Symonds, 4 April 1851, CO 136/140.
\textsuperscript{143} Ward to Grey, Confidential, 11 March 1851 CO 136/140; Ward to Grey 18 October 1851, CO 136/141.
\textsuperscript{144} Ward to Grey, Confidential, 2 June 1851, CO 136/140.
\textsuperscript{145} Tumelty J. J., “The Ionian Islands under British Administration”, p. 231.
\textsuperscript{146} Grey to Russell, 3 August 1851, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/9E.
Grey realised Ward was unwilling to work with the Assembly and was increasingly frustrated that Ward ignored his advice and ruled in an authoritarian manner. Grey feared the reaction of the Ionian Assembly once it met again, suggested to Russell again the abandonment of the Septinsula, writing “I am more and more persuaded that the wise course would be to get rid of all the Islands but Corfu”. Grey, influenced by Bowen, believed Corfu wanted to become a British colony like Malta and enjoy “the privileges of British subjects”. In addition, Corfu was the capital of British administration in the Septinsula and had “a large proportion of the population being of Venetian instead of Greek descent”, making it appear to be the most loyal of the Islands to British rule. This was compared to Cephalonia, which desired union with Greece and preferred to be “ill governed by themselves than well by strangers”. Ward noted the geo-political importance of Corfu for the Empire because of its naval base. He also felt the Islands were an important deterrent to Russian expansion in the Mediterranean and “to the maintenance of the balance of powers in the East”. This discussion of the fate of the Protectorate within the Empire was focused more on the benefit for Britain, rather than the benefit for the Islands. Cession would relieve Britain of the imperial cost of maintaining the garrison on the Islands. In addition, Ward's increasingly critical dispatches made the Islands appear ungovernable. By ceding most of the

147 Grey to Russell, 13 August 1851, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/9E.
148 Grey to Russell, 13 August 1851, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/9E; Grey to Russell, 6 July 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B123/6/40.
149 Grey to Russell, 6 July 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B123/6/40.
150 Grey to Russell, 6 July 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B123/6/40.
151 Ward to Hawes, 5 November 1850, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/7; Grey to Russell, 6 July 1851, Grey Papers, GRE/B123/6/40; Ward to Grey, Private and Confidential, 6 January 1852, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/5/44.
Islands and making Corfu a colony, Britain would have an undisputed legal right to form colonial policies. By undertaking this discussion unilaterally and without consultation from any Ionian groups, Russell, Grey and Ward treated the Septinsula more as a possession than as a Protectorate.

Ward ordered his Regents to do anything in their power to exclude radical elements from entering the electoral contests while easing the way for candidates favourable to the government.\footnote{Ward’s Circular to Regents, 24 December 1851, CO 136/1138.} When the tenth parliament assembled on 26th February, he was content all the islands, except Zante, secured a majority of government supporters.\footnote{Ward blamed the issues in Zante on “the intrigues, the personalities, the plots, and the mistakes and rivalries” between the prominent local families of Count Roma and Solomo. Ward to Curcumelli, 22 and 23 June 1851, in Letters of LHC Ward to D. P. Curcumelli, Curcumelli-Rodostamo P., Private family collection, Afra, Corfu. See also Ward to Russell, 6 February 1852, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/10B; Ward to Hawes, 9 December 1850, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/13. Ward was critical of Grey, who did not let him change Seaton's electoral law or include a property qualification in his revision of electoral law. Ward to Hawes, 16 December 1850, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/17.} This was short lived as several government supporters resigned on health grounds and the nominations of six members to official appointments, notably the Senate, weakened government support on the ground, where it was most needed. Personal alliances among Assembly members altered its composition, leading to confusion over which members were government supporters.\footnote{Some members from Santa Maura, “went into frantic opposition” when their leader was not appointed to the Senate, while radical-unionist elements of the Assembly convinced two representatives of Cerigo to join the opposition. Ward to Russell, 20 March 1852, \textit{British Parliamentary Papers}, \textbf{LXII} (226): Correspondence, (1852-1853).}

Trouble flared again between Ward and the Assembly when the latter delayed proceedings by debating the reply to Ward’s address. 16 March was the deadline for
a final vote, but the opposition resorted to a loophole and abstained from attending the House. The attendance of twenty members was required for the House to function, but supporters of the government fell short of this. Ward issued an ultimatum as the formation of the government was at stake. On 17 March the opposition appeared but left the house before the Assembly formally sat and did not vote for the reply. Ward expressed his disgust to the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Pakington. This was an example of the reciprocal game Ward and the opposition continually played with each other as each attempted to assert authority over the government throughout Ward’s tenure.

Ward continued to entertain the idea he could govern effectively after winning a majority in the by-election results. Believing he was in control, he insisted the Assembly vote for a loyal Address and a “reasonable” Civil List. He also requested the Assembly amend the electoral law and enact a new press law in return for his abandonment of the High Police Power. Only when these occurred would he introduce further reforms. The Assembly accepted his proposals on amendments to the electoral law and he introduced the reform proposals agreed in 1851. But he imposed new conditions, including a new press law which stipulated a deposit of £100 as security against libel by newspapers or journals, the abandonment of trial by jury in cases of political writing, and penalties for indirect provocation in addition to

155 Ward to Pakington, 19 March 1852, British Parliamentary Papers, LXII (226): Correspondence.
156 Ibid., 4 April 1852 and 10 April 1852.
157 Ibid., 20 April 1852 and 21 April 1852.
the existing penalties for direct provocation. In return, Ward promised the abandonment of his powers over administrative exile.\textsuperscript{158}

The Ionian Assembly appointed a special committee to investigate Ward’s proposals and added several requests. Firstly, it wanted a representative Assembly, which Ward rejected arguing “he had neither the wish nor the power to convert the government of these states into a pure democracy”.\textsuperscript{159} Secondly, they revived the old system for concurrent powers in a state of emergency (High Police Powers), which Ward promised to review in the future. Thirdly, the Assembly suggested they control the Supreme Council through the Civil List.\textsuperscript{160} Ward, who believed his Press Law was under threat, accused radical Assembly members of stirring up trouble. As in previous proceedings, the conflict between the Executive and the Legislature led to breakdown after the Assembly rejected Ward’s proposals “by a majority of one”.\textsuperscript{161} In retaliation, Ward prorogued the Assembly and ruled with the powers he still derived from the old system of government.\textsuperscript{162}

Ward regretted agreeing to Seaton’s reforms and noted those “ill-timed” reforms were to blame for all his humiliating defeats in the Assembly. He wanted to revert back to the old Constitution.\textsuperscript{163} Ward did not believe in the division of central

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{159} Ward to Pakington, 1 September 1852, CO 136/145.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{161} Ward to Pakington, 13 September 1852, CO 136/145; Ward to Pakington, 14 September 1852, CO 136/145; Ward to Pakington, 16 September 1852, CO 136/145; Ward to Russell, Confidential 19 September 1852, CO 136/145.
\textsuperscript{162} Ward to Russell, 6 January 1853, CO 136/14; Ward to Pakington, 16 September 1852, CO 136/145; Ward to Russell, 19 September 1852, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/10E.
\textsuperscript{163} Ward to Pakington, 22 April 1852, \textit{British Parliamentary Papers}, \textbf{LXII} (226): Correspondence.
power nor did he want a completely elected Assembly.\textsuperscript{164} Ionians ought to have a partially appointed legislature until the principle of elected representative government was tried and established. He did not want, nor could he work with, a reformed upper house imposing checks and balances on the British governor. His recommendations for representative government in the Islands meant measures that increased the power of the governor. Seaton’s proposals had created a powerful legislature, but Ward wanted a powerful governor.

Ward praised Maitland’s authoritarian policy and maintained Britain was mistaken in granting concessions to the Islands simply because concessions were being granted to white settler colonies. He believed Grey was applying “the same principles to the Ionian Islands” as he was for white settler colonies “in drawing up Constitutions for Australia and New Zealand”.\textsuperscript{165} Ward felt that

We are trying to work … an unworkable system. I understand the motives that induced Lord Grey … to suppose that you could engraft the ballot and free representation and a free press … upon Maitland’s Constitution and yet continue to maintain here British protection. But Lord Grey was wrong. You cannot govern Greeks like Anglo-Saxons, I told him so in 1849. I repeat it now after trying the experiment for 3 1/3 years… The time is come when you must seriously think if a remedy for its application be still practicable.\textsuperscript{166}

Ward’s words epitomised his perceptions, attitudes, and policy-making in the Septinsula. He compared his situation in the Assembly, where he believed he could

\textsuperscript{164} Ward to Russell, 20 March 1852, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/10C. Ward believed politics in the Ionian Islands were worsened after the “arrival of… ignorant Contadini” within the Assembly, which he blamed on the extended franchise in the Islands. Ward’s opposition to extension of the vote to non-propertied people may perhaps be linked to his opposition to Chartism and his regret that he had previously supported an extension of the franchise in Britain.

\textsuperscript{165} Ward to Hawes, Private, 23 April 1852, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/53.

\textsuperscript{166} Ward to Russell, 6 January 1853, CO 136/147.
only get support if he offered patronage to the Ionian legislators, to that of Russell, who resigned his ministry after his conflicts with Palmerston and his government's defeat regarding an amendment to its Militia Bill. To Ward, there was a clear difference between the British, who had clear political principles, and the Ionians, who pursued their individual interests over the public good. He believed the Ionians lacked both the fit character for representative institutions and an informed public opinion as the driving force behind politics.\textsuperscript{167} He believed the only way to rule in the Septinsula was in an authoritarian manner, hoping in 1854 that Newcastle, the new Colonial Secretary, would not object to him using the High Police Power, a power “peculiarly adapted to this People and one, which … never ought to be given up”.\textsuperscript{168}

Prior to 1848 there were mechanisms to ensure British authoritarian rule in the Septinsula. After 1848, when the Assembly was given greater powers, these mechanisms ceased to exist and British governors found themselves acting more like ministers in Britain. Ward was no longer the chief executive but subject to Ionians’ demands. His failed measures in the Assembly and the paralysis of the government ultimately led to questions of whether Ionians would be reconciled to British rule. Ward's attempt to reinstate authoritarian rule contradicted the British government's policy to maintain and advance Seaton's reforms and made governing in the Islands almost impossible. Ward's consistent representation of all Ionians, regardless of class, as uneducated, corrupt, violent and lacking all qualities abundant in

\textsuperscript{167} Ward to Russell, Private, 20 March 1852, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/10C; Ward to Russell, 19 September 1852, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/10E.

\textsuperscript{168} Ward to Russell, Private, 10 November 1854, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/11F. This quote is attributed by Ward to Russell, who encouraged him to use the High Police Power as a way of ruling the Islands.
Englishmen were attempts to justify their unfitness and incapacity for representative government. His repeated clashes with the Assembly over many of Seaton's reforms were used to justify his prorogations of the Assembly and use of the High Police Power to rule in an authoritarian manner that was questionable in its legality and widely unpopular in the Septinsula.

Ward also had a complex relationship with Grey. While Grey initially hoped Ward would advance Seaton's reforms, he was disappointed Ward dismissed these reforms outright and instead proposed his own reforms that would bring a return of authoritarian rule. Ward, too, was disappointed Grey did not back his own reform proposals and was frustrated by Grey's lack of support regarding many of his policies in the Islands. Ward used his friendships with Russell and Hawes to advance his own policies while speaking openly, and often critically, of Grey on many issues. He considered Grey's liberal views obstacles to his own vision as to how the Islands would be governed and blamed much of the deadlock of government in the Islands on Grey. Yet neither Russell, nor Hawes, despite their friendship with Ward, wholly supported his actions. Russell was sympathetic to his friend's troubles in the Islands but his correspondence with Grey also questioned the legality and constitutionality of some of Ward's actions. Hawes, meanwhile, attempted to act as mediator between Ward and Grey, commenting on the strengths and weaknesses of both men, as well

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169 Hawes to Ward, Private, 21 May 1852, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/61. Hawes noted Grey had supported many of Ward's amendments to Seaton's reformed Constitution, but would not allow Ward to enable a return of Maitland's more authoritarian measures. Hawes, who did not agree with all of Grey's decisions, noted Grey's views regarding reform in the Ionian Islands was a part of his attempts to reform Colonial governance throughout the Empire and introduce representative government to more colonies.
as his opinions regarding Ward's failure of policy-making in the Islands. Towards the end of his tenure Grey, openly frustrated with Ward and his actions, appears to have given up on him and the possibility of moving forward with reforms.

Conclusion

From the start of his tenure, Ward was critical of Seaton’s reforms. His criticisms only hardened after the Cephalonian uprisings, the causes of which he manipulated to further his own political agenda to resurrect authoritarian rule to the Islands. His hardening authoritarian attitude was illustrated in his relationship with the Ionian Assembly, where they repeatedly sparred as each attempted to define the extent of his/their power. Ward repeatedly depicted the Ionians as violent, disloyal, disorderly, even savage and barbaric, language normally preserved for depictions of Africans and Pacific Islanders and echoed to the British public in the Times. He continually tried to build the case they were unfit for representative government.

The experiment in the Islands and his difficulties with the Assembly led Ward to conclude the races were different and, within Europe, not all were equal. Ward believed only British dependencies peopled by Britons were worthy of political independence. Only Anglo-Saxons, the most culturally and ethnically superior, had the right to liberty. All other dependencies, from black Africans in the Caribbean and brown Indians to white Europeans such as the Irish and, as argued, the Ionians, were

\[170\] Hawes to Ward, Private, 21 May 1852, Grey Papers, GRE/B130/6/61. Hawes believed Ward was too critical of Grey and needed to take more responsibility for his own failings in the Islands rather than blame Grey for them all.
not ready for representative government and should be tightly controlled. In addition, the Ionians were less worthy of representative institutions because when granted in good faith, they were not administered and managed by the people in an effective way. Britain considered cession of the Islands, but before any decision was made and action was taken, Russell's ministry fell. The Crimean War would also make it difficult for the Government to consider cession.

Drawing on his Canadian experience, Seaton developed a strategy where the governor was above party politics and acted as an independent statesman in the Islands. As a politician, Ward was expected to work within the Ionian Assembly. But rather than remain above party politics he attempted various deals with different political parties to get their support and reinforce his position in the government. He also used his relationships with Russell and Hawes to promote his own political agenda for the Septinsula and to blame Grey's policies for the failure of his rule in the Islands, rather than acknowledge the contribution of his own actions. Ward's tenure saw the breakdown of the moderates in the Islands and the emergence of a new radical leadership which advocated union with Greece based on national self-determination. In addition, Ward's authoritarian policies divided opinions within the Ionian Assembly. His contentious relationship with the Assembly had serious consequences in safeguarding Ionian support for the continuance of the British presence in the Islands and created difficulties that existed throughout his

171 Ward drew lessons from his experience in the Ionian Islands when he became governor of Ceylon, where he was not prepared to give either freedom of the press or a legislature “with the right of free discussion” to the Ceylonese. Ward to Russell, Private, 16 August 1855, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/12F.
successor's, Sir John Young's, tenure. Ward's actions would later be examined and criticised by Gladstone when he examined British rule in the Septinsula.
Chapter 6: Young and Gladstone: Colonial Policies in the Ionian Islands

Introduction

Ward’s failure to agree on the extent and nature of constitutional reforms led to the paralysis of the Ionian government and left British power hanging in the balance, not only in the Islands but also in the Mediterranean. The outbreak of the Crimean War resulted in further conflicts between the British and Ionians as they took opposing sides. Ward’s successor, Sir John Young, would have to deal with these tensions along with the growing desire of many Ionians for union with Greece. Young, like Ward, was considered to have liberal views on domestic issues, but he was critical of Seaton’s reforms in the Islands and wanted a return to authoritarian government. In his relationship with the Assembly, he shared the same obstacles and conflicts which had plagued Ward. When his policies failed and he could not continue working with the Assembly, he suggested a variety of solutions, some of them contradictory, in an attempt to safeguard British interests and to find forms of rule that would work for the Islands. These included considerations of abandoning the Islands altogether, or abandoning the Southern Islands while making Corfu a colony.

This chapter will also explore William Gladstone’s official mission to Septinsula as he searched for ways to make the Islands governable for Britain. Gladstone’s mission occurred at a critical point in British/Ionian relations, when Ionians were extremely critical of Young and the British forms of rule. Gladstone
offered a critical view of British administration throughout the forty years of the Protectorate and offered his own proposals for the amelioration of the situation and to make the Islands governable. Gladstone believed responsible government was the best form of government for the Islands, the British, and the existence of the Protectorate. Although Young and Gladstone had different views about the form of rule appropriate for the Islands, both men sought new policies for ensuring the political union between Britain and the Islands. Their recommendations would test whether conservative or liberal treatment of the Septinsula was beneficial for this union.

“There is not any branch of the public administration which can with greater safety be entrusted to Ionian hands”. The administration of Sir John Young 1855-1858

When Ward left the Ionian Islands in 13 April 1855 he was replaced by John Young. Young, whose father was a director and shareholder in the East India Company, was born in Bombay on 31 August 1807. Educated at Eton and Oxford, he was elected in 1831 as a Tory MP for Cavan and held the seat until 1855. Young was closely associated with Peel, under whose first ministry in 1841 he was appointed a Lord of the Treasury. In 1844 he became a secretary of the Treasury but resigned in 1846 when Peel’s ministry fell.

From 1846-1852 Young focused his energies on representing Peel’s views. The Peelites included Gladstone, Sidney Herbert, Lord Lincoln (later Duke of

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2 Ibid.
Newcastle), Lord Dalhousie and Edward Cardwell, who shared “common characteristics” such as “proven exceptional ability, high moral integrity, marked seriousness of purpose”. Peelites, believed the “status quo could only be conserved by an enlightened policy that took fully into consideration the claims of natural justice and political economy”. If people were treated fairly and intelligently they would accept the rule of their betters. The object of the Peelites was to strike a balance between the extremities of the Manchester school and the Whigs, and to make institutions work more efficiently. Although not all Peelites promoted reforms, a juncture of this group, with the younger Whigs and Radicals, helped to revive a metamorphosis of the old Whig-Liberal party. The formation of the Peelite-Liberal coalition under Lord Aberdeen in December 1852 was testimony to this and Young became Chief Secretary for Ireland and a privy councillor. He retained his office until 1855 when he was appointed Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands.

Young assumed his office in the Ionian Islands on the 13 April 1855 during the Crimean War, during which most Ionians were sympathetic to the Greek kingdom, which was allied to Russia. Hostilities between Russia and the Ottoman Empire

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5 Ibid., p. 178.
6 I was unable to find Secondary material regarding Young’s policies on Ireland that allowed me to draw comparisons with Ionians. This included Farnsworth S., *The Evolution of British Imperial Policy*. Ireland, however, figured prominently in many of his examinations of the Ionians’ character and political behaviour. For example, on his failed Land legislation in the Septinsula, Young noted the differences between the Irish and the Ionian Assemblies, of which the latter reverted to old Venetian laws that kept “property in the hands of the present possessors”. See Young to Labouchere, 22 July 1857, CO 136/159.
7 Pratt M. L., *Britain’s Greek Empire*, p. 141; Young was concerned about the safety of his communications with Britain during the course of the war. See Young to Labouchere, 22 March 1856, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940.
began in November 1853 following Russia’s attempts to impose a Christian Protectorate on the Sultan’s Christian subjects. Britain and France believed their interests in the Eastern Mediterranean were at stake. Britain was concerned about communications with India should the Russians capture the Dardanelles and the Ottoman Empire collapse. Their concerns led Britain and France to declare war on Russia in March 1854.\textsuperscript{8} British policy, however, was in complete opposition to Ionian sympathies, many of whom supported Greek insurgent activities in the Ottoman territories with men and equipment.\textsuperscript{9} In the Ionian Assembly, the Risospasti members of the House (the same 10\textsuperscript{th} Assembly from Ward’s era) attacked Britain as the defender of the Ottoman, rejecting all Ward’s interim legislation.\textsuperscript{10} Colonial officials hoped Young’s appointment would dissipate the troubles associated with Ward’s dealings with the Ionian Parliament and lead to a new consensus between Britain and the Protectorate. This would not materialise as the Assembly were immediately hostile to any of Young’s proposals. This was apparent in Young's first dealings with the Assembly and the debate over the expenses of the public functionaries and High Police Powers.\textsuperscript{11}

Young, like Ward, did not trust the Assembly to control the government finances. In a test of their powers against the new governor, Ionian MPs deliberately delayed voting for the extraordinary expenses of the Ionian State to exclude Young

\textsuperscript{9} Tumelty J. J., “The Ionian Islands under British Administration”, p. 265.
\textsuperscript{10} Young to Russell 14 July 1855, CO 136/156; Young to Molesworth, 5 September 1855, CO 136/156; Young to Labouchere 5 February 1856, CO 136/158.
\textsuperscript{11} Young to Russell 12 May 1855, CO 136/156.
from participating in the debate over the expenses of the governmental departments.\textsuperscript{12} When the budget was delivered halving the salaries of “carpenters and skilled handicraftsmen” Young, with the support of the Senate, tried but failed to overturn the Assembly’s decision. He retaliated by rejecting the Assembly’s motion for the governor to abandon the High Police Power, arguing the powers were necessary “for the preservation of peace and order” against the licence and hostility of the radical press.\textsuperscript{13}

He refused to meet the Assembly, saying they were unfit to perform their duties, citing personal and family rivalries, jealousies and bickering. Moreover, twenty three members of the Assembly, the Risospasti and their associates, formed a consistently negative majority.\textsuperscript{14} He compared their presence and actions to the Irish party in the House of Commons. The Irish party was “negative”, objecting “on all subjects and occasion to every political formation that was not ready to admit and second their views”. The Risospasti were

\begin{quote}
men who refuse altogether to acknowledge the British protection and…vote against every proposition emanating from the Executive, even against those the necessity of which they admit and of the principles of which they approve.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

But unlike the Irish party, which was relatively weak, the Risospasti were a powerful force in the Assembly and Ionian society who “worked upon the political and religious susceptibilities of a very poor, a very ignorant, and a very excitable

\textsuperscript{12} Young to Russell, 14 July 1854, CO 136/156.
\textsuperscript{13} Young to Labouchere, 7 November 1857, CO 136/157.
\textsuperscript{14} Young to Russell, 14 July 1856, CO 136/156.
\textsuperscript{15} Young to Molesworth, 5 September 1855, CO 136/156.
The Risospasti used the lower ranks of the priesthood, whom Young considered “bigoted, superstitious and prejudiced”, to “excite peasantry’s passions… with sentiments of nationality”. The Risospasti lacked rationality and self-control, qualities that rendered them incapable to “work representative institutions”. 17

Young believed representative government was a Whig panacea, unworkable for the Islands. He grew increasingly frustrated as all his proposals, even those of minor importance, were rejected by the Assembly and felt it was the intention of the opposition “to embarrass the government and to discredit it”. The key ingredient of a “good, working constitutional government”, an informed public opinion, was absent from the Septinsula. This was due to their scattered geographical position, which meant there were diverse interests among the Islands. Using Britain’s model, a party “in the sense of continuous combination founded upon principle” was absent. 18 But this diversity led some Ionians to advocate a federal government as a model for the Islands, where the Assembly would be disbanded, each island would regulate its own affairs and finances, and the municipal bodies would be freely elected and controlled by a central Senate, like the one already in existence. 19 This model, however, went far beyond what the British would ever allow.

Young wanted to show he was an able administrator trained in the art of government in a responsible and mature political system. Despite the difficulties, he had exercised an effective opposition against the Assembly through “effort and

16 Young to Russell, 5 May 1855, CO 136/156.
17 Young to Labouchere, 7 November 1857, CO 136/159.
18 Young to Molesworth, 5 September 1855, CO 136/156.
19 Young to Labouchere, 1 December 1855, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940.
unwearied patience, daily watchfulness and vigilance” and maintained the rights of the Crown. Representative institutions, such as freedom of the press, should not be given to “a Semi-Eastern population” who used it to discredit Britain and “alienate the feelings of the people from the protection”. Responsible forms of government ought to apply only to colonists of British “blood and character”. There was, he stated

an impassable gulf between these states and lands peopled by British immigrants, who look back fondly to the old Country and the institution of their fathers, the sentiment of loyalty to the Crown, the pride of descent from and the feeling of community with England of which such splendid and gratifying proofs have been given, in all other British Dependencies have no existence here; neither do the energy and the self-reliance, from which they spring and which in turn they cherish.

Granting Ionians representative government was a “serious and lasting disservice” to them. Most importantly, the 1848 reforms, particularly freedom of the press, had weakened British power and authority in the Septinsula.

Colonial officials, under the leadership of Labouchere, were disappointed after Young’s “disparaging account” of the tenth Assembly indicated there was “no hope of amendment for the future”. British authorities in the Islands and at home disliked their dependence on the Assembly. Labouchere instructed Young to “surrender no portion of the authority” he possessed, but instead lay “down a competent authority”

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20 Young to Stanley Confidential, 11 May 1858, CO 136/161; Young to Labouchere, 7 November 1857, CO 136/159; Young to Stanley, 10 March 1858, CO 136/161.
21 Young to Russell 14 July 1856, CO 136/156.
22 Ibid.
23 Young to Labouchere, 22 March 1856, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940.
24 See minutes in Young to Molesworth, 5 September 1855, CO 136/156.
when dealing with the Assembly.25 Strachey, however, having seen previous governors struggle with the Assembly over the issue of their authority, recommended a review of British policy in the Islands: “The inconvenience of our present position is every year more apparent” and “no real progress towards a more satisfactory state of things seems to be made”.26

While Young was frustrated by the “unreasonable pretensions” of some of the radical Ionians, he believed they were not responsible for all the problems in the Islands. Assessing the situation after several months in the Islands, Young believed the anomalous position of the Islands was a major factor of the discontent against the British.27 The fact the Islanders have “neither the advantages of a free country of their own, nor yet of British subjects” widened the separation and bad feeling between Britain and the Ionians. Young suggested the only remedy to the British and Ionian relationship was to make “the Islands integral portions for the British empire and admitting the Islands to ask the advantages of the British subjects”.28 Until then, he believed other changes to British policy would improve “relations in the Islands”.29 Young suggested that £5000 of the military contribution should be set aside for public works in the Islands. He also suggested the military contribution be reduced. Educated Ionian youth returning from foreign universities, qualified as solicitors and doctors, found themselves unemployed with British service closed to them, which led some to feel hostility towards the British. Young recommended a

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25 Labouchere to Young, 10 March 1856, CO 136/194.
26 See minutes Young to Molesworth, 9 October 1855, CO 136/156.
27 Young to Molesworth, 4 August 1855, CO 136/156.
28 Young to Labouchere, 1 December 1855, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940.
29 Ibid.
policy change where the professions of medicine and law were opened further to employ these youths and military, naval and diplomatic services could be opened up to include Ionians. He believed this gesture of good will would be beneficial for the Ionian/British relationship. Although Young had suggested various reforms in 1855, few passed. As a result, during most of his tenure, Young continually searched for solutions to make British rule in the Islands possible. He sought advice from numerous colonial officials and experienced British and Ionian administrators in the Islands.

As British policies in the Islands failed, colonial officials considered examples from other sites of Empire. India was predominant in Strachey’s thinking when he advocated adopting “a closer and more intimate” relationship between the British and Ionians by “attaching to the British government young [Ionian] men of education and of a position to exercise influence”, an echo of Macaulay’s ‘brown Englishmen’. Strachey recommended the British civil, military and naval service

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30 Young to Labouchere, 1 December 1855, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940. Young’s proposal was not new. Douglas had first proposed it in 1838, Seaton and Ward followed with similar recommendations. During Young’s tenure, senior colonial officials, like Ball, responded warmly to this proposal and the British government passed an act enabling Ionians to hold military, naval, and medical commissions under the Crown. Britain, however, did not respect its obligations under the act, as demonstrated in May 1857 when Constandino Zavisiano, a Corfiot doctor who applied for a military medical appointment, was rejected on the grounds Britain was “too spoilt” for choice to appoint an Ionian. See minutes in Young to Molesworth, 4 August 1855, CO 136/156; Young to Labouchere, 28 April 1857, CO 136/159; Young to Labouchere, 28 April 1857, CO 136/159; Labouchere to Young, 20 May 1857, CO 136/194.

31 Among those Young sought advice from were Bowen and Reid among the British and Braila and Curcumelli among the Ionians. Young to Labouchere, 20 January 1856, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940; Young to Labouchere, 4 February 1856, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940; Young to Labouchere, 20 April 1856, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940; Young to Labouchere, 13 May 1856, Add. MS 62940; Young to Labouchere, Private, 20 May 1856, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940.

32 See minutes in Young to Molesworth, 9 October 1855, CO 136/156. See also Metcalf T., The Ideologies of the Raj. On Macaulay, history, nation and Empire, see Hall C., “At home with history: Macaulay and the History of England”, in Hall C., and Rose S., (eds.), At home with the Empire.
accept Ionian candidates. Excluding Ionians from British service created discontent within the higher ranks of Ionian society. More importantly, educated Ionian youth found employment in the Russian service, creating new ties of affiliation and sympathy. That many Ionians participated and died in the Crimean War alongside Russians had created widespread sympathy in the Islands for the Russian cause. Celebrations every time the Russian army was victorious against British allies made the problem painfully acute for the British authorities at home and in the Islands.33

“*The protecting power ought to govern as well as reign…*”; Proposed solutions to the problem of rule.

Young had grown tired of playing games with an Assembly that neither “understand nor value the principle of Representation in the least”.34 Young compared the situation with the Irish party in the House of Commons when, in the 1840s, Britain made clear it was “wrong for Ireland to rule themselves, without British interference”, so now the experiment of granting representative institutions to the Ionians had failed completely from the municipal to the central levels. Up to 30 per cent of local revenues were not collected from rented properties and the corruption of Ionian municipal officials was higher than “among an Irish Grand Jury”.35 Rather than meet with an assembly which would “only pass resolutions and seek topics hostile to the protection in order to embroil the government and gain popularity with a view to the general election”, he prorogued the “useless”

33 Young to Stanley, 10 March 1858, CO 136/161.
34 Young to Labouchere, 5 February 1856, CO 136/158.
35 Young to Labouchere, 1 March 1856, CO 136/158. See also Tumelty J. J., “The Ionian Islands under British Administration”, p. 282.
Assembly, demonstrating his ‘competent authority’.\(^{36}\) Young also dressed the prorogation as a necessary measure to relieve cost in the Islands.\(^{37}\) One issue for Young was that he was not sure what kind of government the British wanted for the Islands, whether it was “to have the Ionians governing themselves or managing their own affairs”. Whatever the case, he believed “it is an impossible and unattainable object” with the “present single legislative Assembly constituted and dated as it is”.\(^{38}\)

After the prorogation, Young advocated a radical policy. On 13 April 1856 he proposed the entire abolition of the Constitution by Order in Council, suppressed the Senate and the Assembly, and concentrated sole powers into the governor’s hands. This “Coup d’Etat”, as he called it, was a “great advantage to all concerned”. Fearing reprisals, Young claimed this was in accordance with the “educated”, intellectual” and “well informed [Ionian] persons” who wanted stability and economic prosperity, local and social improvements and changes to the laws of the land, which the present status quo could not deliver. The garrison of two or three thousand soldiers, along with the navy, could guarantee “public peace”. Modification of the Islands’ legal status required agreement from France, Austria and Russia, which Young believed could be obtained if Britain stated to the Treaty of Paris partners the Islands, in their existing constitutional situation, were simply ungovernable. Young expected his

\(^{36}\) Young to Labouchere, 1 December 1855, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940; Young to Labouchere 5 February 1856, CO 136/158; Young to Labouchere, Confidential, 18 June 1856, CO 136/158; Labouchere to Young, 8, 10 March 1856, CO 136/158.

\(^{37}\) Young to Labouchere, 1 December 1855, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940.

\(^{38}\) Young to Labouchere, 20 January 1856, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940.
superiors to be apprehensive of his actions, because “the prevailing sentiments of Englishmen cannot be favourable to such a course”.  

Colonial officials considered Young's suggestion to overthrow the Ionian constitution and establish a military government in the Septinsula. Ball regarded the idea favourably; Merivale agreed with Young this was the “only way in which the constitution can be altered”. Young’s proposal was taken to the cabinet for consideration. Young was adamant the British government find a new and effective way to govern the Islands and believed his proposal was the solution. Labouchère’s successor, Edward Bulwer-Lytton, a Tory and distinguished literary and classical scholar, rejected Young’s proposal, considering it the “joint production of a pupil of Machiavelli and the Man in the Moon”; the Constitution could not be withdrawn and Young needed to work within its framework: “Freedom prematurely given may be bad, but Freedom once given must cure its own evils”.

While they were digesting his proposal, Young suggested another solution: the abandonment of the Southern Islands (Cephalonia, Zante, Ithaca, Santa Maura, Cerigo) and the adoption of Corfu as a colony. Young's reasoning for this was that it would produce a “tranquil and effective” government that met all Britain’s “moral requirements”. Young's considerations of cession, which were linked to the increased nationalist and unionist sentiment in the Islands and the conflicts this created in

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39 Young to Labouchere, 13 April 1856 CO 136/158; Young to Labouchere, 30 March 1856, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940.
40 Labouchere to Young, Confidential, 2 June 1856, CO 136/194.
41 See minutes in Young to Labouchere 13 April 1856 CO 136/158.
42 Young to Labouchere 24 August 1857, CO 136/159.
43 Lytton to Young 8 December 1858, CO 136/194; Lytton to Gladstone 5 October 1858, CO 136/161.
British governance, contrasted with Russell and Grey's views of cession, which were related to cutting imperial costs.\footnote{Young to Labouchere 20 May 1856, CO 136/158.} Young, unlike Russell and Grey, did not limit the discussion to colonial officials but had sought, and won, the support of “intelligent Ionians” with “moderate views” such as Georgio Marcoran, Cavalier Mustoxidi, Damaschino, and Curcumelli, who believed the “present system was a farce” and the conflict between the Legislative and Executive “made the state of affairs ‘deplorable’”.\footnote{Marcoran was a member of the Supreme Court of Justice; Mustoxidi, held various seats in departments such as Education; Damaschino, a member of the reforming party and Senator for Corfu, and Curcumelli, the Attorney General for the Islands. Young to Labouchere, 20 May 1856, CO 136/158.} Young’s secretary, Bowen, who had advised Ward about cession, also supported his proposal.\footnote{Bowen to Merivale, 25 August 1858 CO 136/161. Bowen, who was married to an Ionian, the daughter of Count Roma, the President of the Senate, believed he understood what the Ionians wanted. See Young to Labouchere, 13 May 1856, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940; Young to Labouchere, 28 January 1857, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940.}

The Southern Islands, mainly Cephalonia and Zante, had been constructed as the ‘enemy within’ over the past two decades. The people on these islands were “corrupt” and “troublesome”. They were geographically and culturally closer to mainland Greece and felt an affiliation in “race, sentiment”, manners and traditions to the Greeks. The uprising in Cephalonia and Ward’s martial law policies had increased hostility to British rule. Cephalonia and Zante gave birth to the Risospasti movement, whose ideology and attitude changed from the 1840s when, under the leadership of Zervo and Momferrato, they advocated reform within the British Protectorate, to 1857 when, under the leadership of Lombardo, they openly
advocated the union of the Islands with Greece.47 During the eleventh Assembly in 1857, these notions were publicly professed and Young felt they disrupted the running of government.48 Young believed any difficulties he experienced with the Assembly were “Parliamentary” and required “delicate handling” but would not lead to an armed mutiny, like the one that occurred in India.49 Young was able to work successfully with the eleventh Assembly and pass twenty two acts.50

Corfu, the capital of the British administration, and Paxo had the qualities of a colony and seemed to have a connection to Britain. Corfu was a valuable strategic location, “the key to the Adriatic” and important for the “security and convenience” of the route to Egypt and India. Corfu was valuable from a “European point of view”, central to Britain’s Eastern and Mediterranean policies. Its annexation to Greece would destabilise the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in Albania and Epirus.51 It served as an “effectual check” to any Austrian and Russian encroachments into the Ottoman Empire in the same way Malta, Gozo and Gibraltar prevented France from conquering Spain and Sicily. Financially, Corfu and Paxo had a large surplus revenue and were self-sufficient. The Islands were beautiful, their landscape picturesque and their climate pleasant. They were perfect for “British

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48 Young to Labouchere, 22 July 1857, CO 136/159; Young to Labouchere, 3 August 1857, CO 136/159; Young to Labouchere, 7 November 1857, CO 136/159; Young to Labouchere, Confidential, 19 June 1857, CO 136/159.
49 Young to Labouchere, Confidential, 25 June 1857, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940.
50 Young to Labouchere, 28 July 1857, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940; Young to Labouchere, 3 August 1857, CO 136/159.
capital and enterprise” and would flourish under the British, with the Islands becoming “a garden” and its port the “centre of commerce”. 52 Young estimated Corfu would be “completely Anglicised” in a few years. Labouchere resisted Young’s romanticised picture of the Islands and wanted to give the Assembly another opportunity to prove “the advantages of constitutional freedom” could succeed. 53 Within the British cabinet opinion on the cession was split as Palmerston, the Prime Minister, rejected the idea while Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, supported it. 54

In 1858, the British government was embarrassed and politically compromised both in Europe and the Septinsula after Young’s dispatches detailing his proposal to annex the Southern Islands to Greece and make Corfu and Paxo Crown colonies were stolen and published in the Daily News. The European Powers questioned Britain about its rule in the Septinsula and there was complete government deadlock in the Islands after the Assembly refused to cooperate with Young. As a result, Young, who was no longer able to govern the Islands at all, was recalled by the Colonial Office, which had come to the conclusion that they were not going to cede the Islands, would keep them as a Protectorate, and would seek the form of rule that would work. It was within this context that Gladstone’s mission to examine the

52 Young to Labouchere, Confidential, 19 June 1857, CO 136/159.
53 Labouchere to Young, 30 September 1857, CO 136/194.
54 Palmerston believed the Ionian Islands did not belong to Britain and their fate needed to be decided by the other signatory powers of the Treaty of Paris. See enclosures in Young to Labouchere, 17 February 1858, Young Papers, Add. MS 62940. Holland and Markides believe “any suggestion” of having any of the Islands as a colony was rejected by the Cabinet, without considering the division that actually existed. See Holland R., and Markides D., The British and the Hellenes, p. 17.
problems of British rule in the Islands and to suggest solutions began.\textsuperscript{55} Gladstone, who arrived in the Septinsula before Young’s recall, was one of the severest critics of Young’s proposal for cession and rejected it on the grounds of “great offence against the law of Europe”.\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{William Ewart Gladstone: Lord High Commissioner extraordinary for the Ionian Islands.}

William Ewart Gladstone was born into an evangelical family in Liverpool in 1809. His father, John Gladstone, was part of the Scottish commercial community in Liverpool and the family’s fortune was based in the transatlantic corn and tobacco trades and on the slave-labour sugar plantations they owned in the West Indies. Following his father’s desire he enter the political world, Gladstone studied at Eton and Oxford where he learned public speaking and excelled in classics and mathematics.

Classical literature became a lifelong interest. Three classical authors who shaped Gladstone’s intellectual development were Aristotle, Plato and Homer. Aristotle provided Gladstone with an analysis of family, the local community, the state, and an understanding of human society as a natural organism: man is a political animal and society and government are natural institutions. Gladstone followed Aristotle’s belief that authority must be restricted to those with a

\textsuperscript{55} Carnarvon to Gladstone, 15 January 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391.
\textsuperscript{56} Quoted in Tumelty J. J., “The Ionian Islands under British Administration”, p. 296.
disposition towards justice. In the ‘natural law of humanity’, a stable society was one in which all knew their ‘natural’ place and performed their social and political duty.\textsuperscript{57}

Aristotle was an enduring conservative element to Gladstone’s social philosophy, stressing duty, community and subordination. His works also encouraged Gladstone to stabilise the aristocratic order by offering carefully judged concessions to the people. Plato supplemented Aristotle through his “notion of the perfectibility of society - utopian conservatism” which, in the late 1830s would “become central to Gladstone’s view of a Christian Kingdom”.\textsuperscript{58} From Homer, \textit{The Iliad} provided the ideal of a religious aristocratic society sustained by values of chivalry, generosity and friendship. Gladstone saw in it a mirror of his youthful romantic Toryism: a constitutional monarchy limited by a parliament led by noblemen in which the popular voice was considered.\textsuperscript{59} Earlier philosophers such as Joseph Butler and Edmund Burke also influenced Gladstone’s political development. From Butler, Gladstone derived an “elaborate doctrine of Providence, and a method of inquiry and decision-making”.\textsuperscript{60} From Burke, he derived “a historicist approach to constitutional conservation through reform, a ‘restorative conservatism’ which was to inspire his attitude to both home and abroad”\textsuperscript{61}.

\textsuperscript{59} Biagini E. F., \textit{Gladstone}, p. 11. For more on Homer’s influence on Gladstone see Bebbington D., “Gladstone and Homer”, pp. 57-74; Bebbington D., \textit{The Mind of Gladstone}, pp., 173-77, 186-89.
\textsuperscript{60} Biagini E. F., \textit{Gladstone}, p. 12
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p. 13
Gladstone entered politics as a Tory MP for Newark in 1832. His writings and speeches in the late 1820s and early 1830s portrayed him as a “hard-nosed Tory”. Like his father, he was a Canningite, supporting Catholic Emancipation and opposing Whiggish and radical causes such as parliamentary reform, church reform, abolition of Jewish and civil disabilities, and abolition of flogging and hanging. In the House of Commons Gladstone became a prominent spokesman for the interests of the white plantocracy in the West Indies although he did not defend slavery. In Peel’s short minority government in 1834-1835 he was briefly Commissioner of Treasury and then Under-Secretary for War and the Colonies. Gladstone became a member of the cabinet in Peel’s government in 1843, moving from the vice-presidency to President of the Board of Trade to master of the Royal Mint, becoming a central figure in fiscal policy. He provided the figures and arguments for the tariff-reform budgets of 1842 and 1845. From his position at the Board of Trade, Gladstone believed the future of conservatism lay in supporting commercial and industrial progress in a free market. It was also during this time that his “innate sympathy for the colonies and his desire to preserve their union with Britain grew” and he began to argue that “political liberalization should accompany the commercial legislation establishing free trade”.

Gladstone succeeded Stanley as Colonial Secretary in 1846. Understanding nationality as organic, he became interested in the transplantation of the British

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63 Ibid., p. 25.
64 Farnsworth S., British Imperial Policy, pp. 3-4.
65 Ibid., p. 4.
nation. He believed the object of colonisation was “the creation of so many happy Englands” and became involved in constitution-making in white settler colonies, particularly Canada and New Zealand and encouraged the development and exercise of local opinion. Drawing analogies from Greece’s history of colonisation, Gladstone believed local independence and responsible government were of vital importance to a colony. He left the Colonial Office after a few months as Colonial Secretary in June 1846, when Peel’s government resigned and the Conservative party split over the Corn Laws and the ministry was defeated on Ireland.

From 1846-1852 Gladstone was in opposition. His participation in Peel’s government had shown Gladstone experience rather than abstract theory was the basis of action and he moved away from traditional conservatism in many arenas. In December 1847 he supported the removal of Jewish civil disabilities. Between 1849 and 1852, Gladstone was also developing his ideas regarding colonial policy. He supported self-government in all Anglo-Saxon colonies, but also believed that “racially mixed colonies” should be prepared for “greater privileges” so that if they were to separate from Britain they would be “fitted for independence and could remain a community linked in laws, institutions and affection”. Gladstone, like Grey, supported reducing imperial costs and believed the colonies should pay for their defence to “encourage their sense of responsibility”. Britain needed to retain its influence in the colonies but should reduce its power and allow the colonists to take

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67 Ibid., p. 74. For details about his involvement in the development of responsible government in New Zealand, see Knaplund P., Gladstone and Britain’s Imperial Policy, (London, 1966), chapter IV.
68 Matthew H. C. G., Gladstone 1809-1874.
69 Farnsworth S., British Imperial Policy, pp. 26-27.
greater responsibility over their own governance. Once a colony had shown its ability for self-government, Gladstone, influenced by the examples of ancient Greek colonies, believed Britain “should prepare for a peaceful transfer of power in order to promote its general progress and prosperity and to ensure its continued association with the Empire in independence”.

With other Peelites he refused to join Derby’s government in 1852 and denounced Disraeli’s budget as irresponsible and socially divisive. After the defeat of the Tory government Gladstone joined Aberdeen’s Peelite-Whig-Liberal coalition, which united the various progressive forces in British politics. Gladstone shared many political and economic views with members of the coalition, affiliating with Liberal economists on fiscal policy, with Whigs on civil liberties and Radicals on colonial affairs. As Colin Matthew has argued, this affiliation allowed Gladstone to promote himself “only partly self-consciously- as the champion of liberal causes”.

In Aberdeen’s government Gladstone became Chancellor of the Exchequer and the success of his first budget in April 1853 was vital for the survival of the coalition. The Crimean War, however, was a set-back to Gladstone’s financial plans and he paid for the war by raising income tax and indirect taxes. Gladstone’s mentor, Aberdeen, and his closest friend, the fifth Duke of Newcastle, were blamed for mishandling the war. The Radical J. A. Roebuck brought a hostile motion against the

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70 Ibid., pp. 29-32.
government that led to the resignation of Aberdeen and his ministers on 30 January 1855. Between 1855-1859, Gladstone was uneasy with the Tory party on domestic and foreign issues. He moved closer to the Manchester School Radicals and desired a return to strict retrenchment, rationalisation of the bureaucracy and a compromise settlement with Russia when peace was offered in the spring of 1855. Gladstone felt Russia had been punished and continuing the war encouraged jingoism and Russophobia in Britain.74

Between 1846 to 1852, the Peelites believed the colonies could handle the “privileges of freedom and would also be willing to accept its connected burdens, such as self-defense”.75 Gladstone, since 1846, had advocated the colonies should be given greater control over their local affairs but the Crown should still maintain its veto and the adoption of free trade throughout the Empire. Between 1855 and 1859 Gladstone, drawing on themes from Greek literature and early American history, highlighted the need to allow colonies to run their own governments. He believed that if Britain would enable greater political independence and freedom to the colonies, it would stimulate their growth and enable the colonies to gain respect for making their own decisions in matters regarding the Empire. By “avoiding interference and coercion, with their attendant risks of resentment or bloodshed, Britain and her colonies could remain united by their cultural and historic ties”.76 Gladstone's mission to the Ionian Islands was one where he wanted to keep the

74 Biagini *Gladstone*, pp. 35-37.
75 Farnsworth S., *British Imperial Policy*, p. 50.
76 Ibid., p. 98.
Islands connected to Britain. Like his view about the colonies, he believed that greater freedom would prepare them to handle responsible government. Gladstone's views about responsible government were not just limited to white settler and European colonies, but applied to non-white colonies, such as India and Jamaica. For example, in 1857 Gladstone noted “India is to be governed for India and as far as may be found practicable it is to be governed by India”.

Gladstone has also long held a reputation among many of his biographers for supporting nationalist causes. But Keith Sandiford notes Gladstone's support of nationalist causes was far more complex than many biographers have suggested. Gladstone was heavily influenced by, among others, Aquinas, Burke, Butler and Peel, resulting in a great respect for law, order and tradition. Gladstone believed national freedom “was never really a natural right” but needed to be earned; Gladstone valued “efficiency and order”, stability and good government above national independence. As a result, while Gladstone was critical of authoritarian nations like Austria and Russia, he advised better governance of occupied territories, like Italy and Poland, rather than supporting nationalist and independence

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77 Quoted in Ibid., p. 104.
80 Ibid., pp. 29, 42.
movements and radicals like Mazzini and Garibaldi. Gladstone advocated constructive government reforms; he put great store on the “Concert of Europe” and believed the “public law” of Europe and the continent’s stability over-ruled all other issues.\textsuperscript{81} He wanted “to preserve the European order by inducing the continental rulers to follow the British example”.\textsuperscript{82} In the case of Italy, in 1859 Gladstone was not convinced that a unified Italy was the best solution because of his suspicions of French and Sardinian ambitions and a reluctance to disturb the traditional Italian order. His acceptance of Italian unification only came after it had occurred and the new state had proven it could govern “in an orderly and efficient manner”. By 1866 he considered it “one of the noblest” works of recent times.\textsuperscript{83}

In late 1858, colonial officials were desperately seeking a solution to the Ionian question. Lord Carnarvon, the colonial under-secretary, and Lytton agreed Gladstone should be sent as a commissioner to the Ionian Islands. Gladstone was chosen for his “eminence”; he was already one of the most well-known British statesmen among the Ionian people and was considered a philhellene, which he could use to his advantage if necessary.\textsuperscript{84} In 1858 he published \textit{Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age}, arguing Homer offered the “best ideals of our European and British ancestry”, a view many Victorians, who looked to Britain’s Anglo-Saxon origins, may not have

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{81} Sandiford K.A.P., “W.E. Gladstone and Liberal-Nationalist Movements”, pp. 29-30; Biagini \textit{Gladstone}, p. 28.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Sandiford K.A.P., “W.E. Gladstone and Liberal-Nationalist Movements”, p. 30.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Ibid., p. 30.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Lytton to Young, Confidential, 19 November 1858, CO 136/194; Bowen to Gladstone, 25 September 1858, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44390. Although Gladstone was well known as a classical scholar and admired the Greeks, he did not consider himself to be a philhellene. See Gladstone to Lytton, 27 December 1858, CO 136/165.
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shared.\textsuperscript{85} Gladstone was also an outspoken advocate of responsible government, an option the Colonial Office was already leaning towards for the Islands.\textsuperscript{86}

Gladstone's mandate from the Colonial Office, and his own goals during this mission, was to search for appropriate reforms that would make the Islands governable.\textsuperscript{87} Lytton recognised Young's difficulties and with Gladstone considered 1852, during Ward's tenure, the turning point when Ionians' sentiments “turned from the consideration of improvement in the Constitution … towards annexation to a foreign state”.\textsuperscript{88} He believed Gladstone's mission would offer a “policy of conciliation” and restore communication between Britain and the Ionians.\textsuperscript{89} It would also allow the British government to understand the “defects in the working of the Constitution under which the Government of the Ionian Islands is carried on which require reform”.\textsuperscript{90} Gladstone could not “consider the abrogation of the Treaty of 1815” nor the “cession of the Ionian Islands to any state in Europe”; his powers were “to inform himself of existing imperfections and their causes and to recommend such measures of improvement as may render the practical working of the Ionian Constitution more harmonious with the natural results of Self Government”.\textsuperscript{91} Lytton

\textsuperscript{85} Quoted in Matthew H. C. G., \textit{Gladstone, 1809-1874}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{86} Farnsworth S., \textit{British Imperial Policy}, Chapters 1-3.
\textsuperscript{87} Carnarvon to Gladstone, 15 January 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391.
\textsuperscript{88} Lytton to Gladstone, 18 January 1859, CO 136/194. Other historians, such as Holland and Markides and Knox, have suggested Gladstone's mission was the result of Young's disputes with the Assembly over municipal conflicts. However, Gladstone's mission resulted from the deadlock with the Assembly that both Ward and Young experienced and which Britain was attempting to rectify, the discussion of which these historians have not noticed. For their interpretations of Gladstone's mission see Holland R., and Markides D., \textit{The British and the Hellenes}, pp. 18-20; Knox B., “British Policy in the Ionian Islands”, pp. 515-19.
\textsuperscript{89} Lytton to Young, Private, 7 January 1859, CO 136/194.
\textsuperscript{90} Lytton to Young, 8 January 1859, CO 136/194.
\textsuperscript{91} Lytton to Young, 8 December 1858, CO 136/194. The italics are mine.
believed the mission needed to encourage “harmony between the Ionian Legislature and the Protecting Power”. With regards to cession, he believed “any idea which may still exist as to the possibility or probability of their annexation to Greece should be conclusively dispelled”.92

Gladstone deliberated whether he should accept the invitation.93 The mission removed him from the Commons during the crucial discussions of the Reform Bill and could expose him to “mockery for being such a great man stopping to so petty shore” as the Septinsula.94 However, because he did not hold a cabinet seat, he had no ulterior motive “at variance with the interests of the Islands”. His prominence might also encourage the Assembly to accept his remedies, “a favour they have not acceded to the Ordinary Executive”.95 He also saw the mission as an extended family holiday where the pleasant southern climate could help his wife, Catherine, recuperate after the death of her sister.96 Most importantly Gladstone, who had developed views on how Britain should rule her dependencies, now had an opportunity “to govern men rather than packages and currencies”.97

Gladstone accepted Lytton’s invitation, against advice from his closest friends and associates, such as Lord Aberdeen. He prepared for the journey to Corfu by taking topographical extracts from the *Odyssey* and examining material regarding the

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92 Lytton to Young, 8 January 1859, CO 136/194.
95 Lytton to Young, Confidential, 29 November 1858, CO 136/194.
Ionian Protectorate in the Colonial Office.\textsuperscript{98} Young provided Gladstone with documents detailing the administration of the Islands and assisted him in his enquiries.\textsuperscript{99} Gladstone enlisted the services of James Lacaita, a secretary who dealt with the Greco-Italian population. Lacaita’s appointment showed how seriously Gladstone took his task in the Ionian Islands. Lacaita had been legal adviser to the British legation in Naples before 1850 and had helped Gladstone in Naples seven years before.

In addition to examining material from the Colonial Office, Gladstone was also inundated with correspondence from numerous people, both British and Ionian, who gave him their opinions about what needed to be done in the Islands. These opinions varied from the return to authoritarian rule, to introduction of responsible government, or cession of the Islands to Greece.\textsuperscript{100} Gladstone, however, considered his mission an opportunity to enact practicable change that would ensure their connection to Britain, based on ideas regarding responsible government he had developed since the late 1840s. Indeed, before he went to the Islands, Gladstone

\textsuperscript{98} Lytton to Young, 6 November 1858, CO 136/194.
\textsuperscript{100} For a return to authoritarian rule in the Islands see Bowen to Gladstone, 25 September 1858, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44390. For examples of Ionian views supporting cession see Valaoritis Aristotelis to Gladstone, 8 November 1858, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44390; Mantzavinos to Gladstone, 20 December 1858, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44390. For examples of Britons and Ionians who supported reforms within the framework of the Protectorate see Papanicolas to Gladstone, 26 November 1858, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44390; Portlock to Gladstone, 14 November 1858, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44390; Talbot to Gladstone, 4 November 1858, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44390. Major General Portlock and Colonel Talbot had previously served in the Septinsula as an engineer under Seaton and as regent of Cephalonia respectively.
considered “that our Policy ought to be to mind our own business and to let them mismanage their own affairs as they please”. 101

Accompanied by his wife, daughter and Arthur Gordon (the younger son of Lord Aberdeen) as his private secretary, Gladstone travelled to the Ionian Islands via Dresden, Prague and Vienna. In Vienna, Gladstone learned Young’s confidential dispatch had been stolen and published in the Daily News. Gladstone was forced to reassure the Austrian authorities the British government had no plans to transfer the Septinsula to Greece. The publication of the dispatches overshadowed his arrival in Corfu on 24 November 1858. In its welcome to Gladstone, the Ionian Senate spoke of the Treaty of Paris and the Constitution of 1817 and admitted, after forty years of British administration in the Islands, a new direction was urgently needed to break the administrative deadlock. It placed its confidence in Gladstone’s abilities to propose suitable solutions. 102

Gladstone believed Young’s views on abolishing the constitution and ceding the southern islands and making Corfu a colony had become an obstacle for an Ionian/British solution. 103 Gladstone had been with Young at Eton and Oxford, and sat with him in Parliament. Young was a fellow Peelite whose liberal dispositions on domestic policies Gladstone respected. But Young’s position in the Septinsula was now compromised. Gladstone felt Young should be recalled and he himself should

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101 Quoted as Gladstone's comment in a meeting between Gladstone and Talbot. See Talbot to Gladstone, 4 November 1858, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44390.
102 See enclosures I, II, in Gladstone to Lytton, 26 November 1858, CO 136/165.
103 Gladstone to Lytton, 20 November 1858, CO 136/165.
serve as Lord High Commissioner for the necessary time if the mission were to succeed, a proposal supported by Lytton.\textsuperscript{104}

Gladstone was warmly received as he toured the Septinsula as the new Lord High Commissioner, even in the Southern Islands, which misunderstood his mission and believed he would annex them to Greece. In Cephalonia, a thousand people greeted him and threw papers in his carriage arguing for the abandonment of the Protectorate and Union with Greece.\textsuperscript{105} He had a similar reception in Zante where thousands of people carried Greek flags and shouted “Long live Gladstone the Philhellene, hurrah for union with Greece”.\textsuperscript{106} In Ithaca he traced the topographical reality of the Homeric texts and danced at a ball held in his honour.\textsuperscript{107} Gladstone visited all the Islands except Cerigo, and encouraged governmental officials, Senators, representatives of the Assembly, ecclesiastical dignitaries, and people from all social sectors of Ionian society to communicate their ideas of what reforms were necessary.\textsuperscript{108} He held numerous conferences, listened to advice, delivered speeches and was respectful to civil and ecclesiastical authorities. He wanted to demonstrate

\textsuperscript{104} Lytton to Young, 8 December 1858, CO 136/194; Lytton to Young, Private, 7 January 1859, CO 136/194; Lytton to Young, 8 January 1859, CO 136/194; Carnarvon to Gladstone, 15 January 1859, MS Add. 33491; Lytton to Gladstone, 17 January 1859, CO 136/165.
\textsuperscript{105} Gladstone to Lytton 11 December 1859, CO 136/165.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., p. 603.
\textsuperscript{108} Gladstone to Lytton 28 December 1858, enclosure no. 11, CO 136/165. Gladstone may have encouraged communication from the Ionian people on advice from Colonel Talbot, who had advised him to “go beyond opinions, and the palace walls if you want to arrive at the Truth”. Talbot also suggested Gladstone not share these opinions so he could come to his own conclusions without being influenced by others. Talbot to Gladstone, 4 November 1858, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44390.
he had included a multiplicity of voices in his investigation, thus providing an objective basis to his conclusions.\textsuperscript{109}

There was speculation regarding his true role in the Islands and there were various interpretations of his mission based on Gladstone's affinity or non-affinity with the Greeks. Gladstone's classical interests gave Ionians the false impression he was a philhellene. Part of the Italianised Ionian aristocracy believed Gladstone came to prepare the ground for the annexation of the Islands to Britain. Ionian Greeks distrusted Gladstone as an opponent of the annexation to Greece. The Islands’ British community distrusted him as pro-Greek, with J. D. Gardner criticising the “great scholars, poets, novelists, philhellenes, professors, philanthropists, philosophers, fine speakers, and enthusiasts, or any men with fanciful ways of thinking”.\textsuperscript{110} When he was ready to announce his proposals for reform, Gladstone stated to Lytton they would have a chance of success if he were permitted to announce them in the Ionian Parliament, since he had obtained the reputation he loved the Greeks.\textsuperscript{111}

Gladstone’s proposed constitutional reforms for the Ionian Islands: the making of responsible government.

Gladstone began his analysis by criticising the form of rule Britain adopted in the Septinsula, notably the Constitution of 1817. The political question of the Islands

\textsuperscript{110} Gardner J. D., The Ionian Islands in relation to Greece, with suggestions for advancing our trade with the Turkish counties, of the Adriatic and the Danube, (London, 1859), p. 62.
“presents at once the symptoms of a chronic disease, and of sudden access of fever; and no mode of treatment that can be adopted would appear to offer any certain or early prospect of success”. Given the special trust conferred upon him he felt obliged to deliver his verdict of what should be the “guides of the British policy in the Islands”.

Gladstone began by outlining the history of British rule in the Ionian Islands. According to the 1815 Treaty of Paris, the Islands should enjoy independence, freedom and prosperity under British protection, excluding any right of domination or sovereignty. However, the Constitution of 1817 placed “power nearly absolute… in the hands of the Lord High Commissioner”, who chose the members of the Legislature that accepted, rather than prepared, legislation for the Islands. Thus, Britain exercised rights of sovereignty, not protection, over the Septinsula and endorsed a Constitution which created a privileged and “demoralised” class of Ionians with special rights of election and representation. Although Gladstone excused the Constitution as a product of its time, he criticised Maitland and other governors for not adhering more strongly to the tenets of the Treaty of Paris. In spite of its many defects, he believed the Constitution safeguarded principles of “equality before the law, strict administration of justice between man and man, and an effective security of life and property”, ingredients he considered essential for a civilised society and which were lacking in Ionian society prior to the establishment of the Protectorate.

112 Gladstone to Lytton 28 December 1858, enclosure no.11, CO 136/165. 
113 Ibid.
Gladstone criticised the negative colonial stereotypes which hindered the development of free institutions in the Septinsula. “Vanity, mutability in purpose, liability to excitements” were traits apparent in human nature, not just among the Ionians, and should not disqualify them from responsible government.\textsuperscript{114} The behaviour of the Ionian Legislature after the reforms was “liberal and forbearing”, since it was able to express itself with “truth and directness” for the first time since the creation of the Protectorate. Ionians were “gifted with great delicacy of feeling; eminently alive to kindly treatment, and well disposed to trust until they have been deceived”.\textsuperscript{115} He also criticised Britain for failing to create “social justice” or adopting a consistent and co-ordinated program to remedy the abuses of usury and debt many peasants suffered.\textsuperscript{116} Gladstone’s analysis of the Ionian land system may have helped familiarise him with issues he would later encounter in Ireland.\textsuperscript{117}

When Gladstone examined the Constitutional reforms of 1848, he believed they were introduced due to mounting political discontent exacerbated by disturbances in Cephalonia, missing the fact reforms began soon after Seaton’s arrival in 1843. Gladstone felt the 1849 Cephalonian uprisings were a “properly agrarian” class conflict with “a political element … partially infused into it”.\textsuperscript{118} Ward’s panicked imposition of martial law left wider political repercussions,

\textsuperscript{114} Gladstone to Lytton Confidential, 27 December 1858, CO 136/165.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Gladstone to Lytton, 16 February 1859, CO 136/165.
\textsuperscript{117} The Land Act of 1870, for example, was an attempt by Gladstone’s government to protect tenants against unreasonable eviction although it failed. Vincent J., “Gladstone and Ireland”, Raleigh Lecture on History, Proceedings of the British Academy, LXIII, 1977.
\textsuperscript{118} Gladstone to Lytton 28 December 1858, enclosure no. 11, CO 136/165.
resulting in the rise of a radical nationalist movement advocating union of the Islands with Greece on the grounds of national self-determination.

Gladstone believed the reforms of 1848-1849 did not improve the immature Ionian political and administrative system, did not consider public opinion, nor display responsibility in its dealings with the Executive body. The limited nature of the electoral system made it selective, unjust, and counter to public opinion. Gladstone criticised Britain for failing to abolish military forces from the polls, making secret voting impossible and violating the principle of free elections.\textsuperscript{119} While electoral reforms gave more inhabitants the right to vote, the administration had not changed. Since Ionians could not exercise executive power or determine public expenditure, they pursued private advancement and had no sense of public duty or responsibility. Gladstone felt Britain was responsible for the sense of “mistrust”, “discontent”, “dissatisfaction” and “despondency”, deeply-rooted in Ionian behaviour and resulting in “much mischief” and “uneasiness”.\textsuperscript{120}

Gladstone also believed the lack of a sound administrative system resulted from the merging of the Constitution of 1817 and its reform in 1848-1849, which were in “constant” and “hopeless” contradiction. Choosing the Senate should be the sole responsibility of a representative Assembly, not the Lord High Commissioner, who protected the Senate when there was a collision of power. Furthermore, “Atti di

\textsuperscript{119} In 1859 Gladstone abstained from discussions on the government’s Reform Bill to extend the franchise in England because the proposals were not as extensive as he wanted them to be. It was during his first government (1868-74) that secret suffrage was established in Britain through the Ballot Act, see Shannon R., \textit{Gladstone 1809-1865}, pp. 362-363.

\textsuperscript{120} Gladstone to Lytton, 28 December 1858, enclosure no. 11, CO 136/165.
“Governo” was meant for cases of emergency and “not as means of suspending the established functions of Assembly”.\textsuperscript{121} To Gladstone a major problem was the impossibility of reconciling “popular election with the existence of an irresponsible Executive”.\textsuperscript{122} He advised the abolition of both the 1817 and 1849 Constitutions and urged the British government to learn from “twelve years colonial experience” and to grant free institutions in the Islands as it had to Canada and Australia.

As Paul Knaplund argued, Gladstone understood “Britain held only a trusteeship over dependencies beyond the seas”.\textsuperscript{123} Gladstone knew the colonies were destined for independence and realised Britain must train them for their future status. He “sincerely believed that the best training school for self-government was self-government”.\textsuperscript{124} The exceptions were possessions that were “purely military”, in “mere infancy” or those “too critically divided between dominant and subject races”. Furthermore, he did not believe only the British race had a “peculiar aptitude for popular institutions”, citing the example of the newly established Greek state. Most importantly, Gladstone argued for free institutions in the Ionian Islands because he firmly believed the Ionian people were fit for self-government, stating “fitness is nowhere to be found perfect, but exists only amidst various grades of imperfection”.\textsuperscript{125} Initially Ionians might experience some difficulty exercising responsible government, like Canada thirty years ago. But Gladstone was certain

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Lytton intervened and changed Gladstone’s term “election” with “franchises and representation”. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid. For more on Gladstone’s views on responsible government in the Empire see Farnsworth S., \textit{British Imperial Policy}, pp. 28-32, 38-45, 61-68, 76-91, 95-111.
\textsuperscript{125} Gladstone to Lytton, Confidential, 27 December 1858, CO 136/165.
that, with time, the Ionians would become sufficiently politically mature to govern themselves properly.

He suggested substantial constitutional, administrative and economic reforms, but still believed Britain should retain some kind of imperial control. The Senate would only have a legislative function, with its executive powers given to a “Council of Ministry” appointed by the Lord High Commissioner, whose members were removable by the Legislature to prevent the Executive from violating popular institutions.\textsuperscript{126} The Assembly would regulate taxation and expenditure on the Islands, though the Senate and the Lord High Commissioner would retain the right to veto measures such as money bills. The authority of the Lord High Commissioner would be restricted to military protection and all government acts would be approved by the counter signature of a Minister. The arbitrary powers of the High Police would be abolished but there would not be any reduction in the Lord High Commissioner’s Civil List.

Gladstone also recommended certain critical changes to the Constitution. He advised the creation of a second Legislative Chamber that would exercise the legislative responsibilities of the Senate and function as a Tribunal to try the cases of civil servants accused of delinquency. It would also act as a bridge between the aristocracy and other social classes, bringing the aristocracy into closer touch with public affairs and, hopefully, alleviating class divisions within Ionian society.\textsuperscript{127} The

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid. Also in Gladstone to Lytton 11 January 1859, CO 136/159.
second Chamber drew on the Australian example, where New South Wales was granted responsible government in 1855. Their Constitution Act of 1855 established a bicameral parliament, with the Legislative Assembly elected from a broad property franchise and an appointed Legislative Council. Parliament was given wide powers over domestic issues including raising of revenue, though Britain still retained power to veto colonial legislation. In the Ionian Islands, each island would be represented as a separate unit, allowing localised expression of class interests in the towns and villages of each island.

Gladstone, who was in the Cabinet when Australia was granted responsible government, noted “important distinctions” between the Australian and Ionian plans. For example, he believed the system in New South Wales was “doomed to failure” due to “the two extremes placed in sharp antagonism between the upper and lower houses” which would prevent harmony and cooperation in the Chamber. Gladstone’s proposed upper chamber in the Septinsula was not exclusively hereditary, like the House of Lords in Britain, nor solely elective, like the American Senate. It was a blended council where aristocratic and democratic parties were to work together. The chamber would consist of twelve members, with an elected representative from each island for the duration of two parliaments, and the five

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128 Although Australia had requested responsible government after it was granted to Canada in the 1840s, it was initially rejected by Grey because it was a convict colony. However, increased immigration to the Australian colonies after the discovery of gold led to an increased free population and greater wealth. New South Wales was considered sufficiently stable and politically mature by Newcastle for responsible government. Soon after, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania also received responsible government. Ward J. M., Colonial Self-Government, chapter 9, pp. 291-329.
129 Gladstone to Lytton, Confidential, 18 January 1859, CO 136/165.
130 Ibid.
remaining members nominated by the Lord High Commissioner either for two parliaments or for life. The qualifications for those elected were based on property and education, while those nominated had previous experience of public service.\(^\text{132}\)

By combining election and nomination, Gladstone wanted to form a body that was not too weak or too strong and could act as a guardian to the Legislature whilst having an equally important role influencing the formation of laws. It aimed to bring equity among the Ionians and ensure power was not transferred to a section or clique. However, the fact that each chamber could elect its own President, subject to the consent of the British government, clearly meant Gladstone wanted to continue Britain’s rule of the Islands by exercising steady yet discreet control over both chambers. If Britain had no executive prerogative to safeguard her interests, the Ionian Islands would be better independent than nominally linked with Britain, even as a military protectorate.\(^\text{133}\) This model was “cut and fit” for the Ionian Islands and had the potential, if implemented, to succeed in comparison with the Australian model.\(^\text{134}\)

Gladstone did not believe those in government should be paid for their services, which Maitland sanctioned in the Constitution of 1817. Under his new proposals, members of the Legislative Chambers would receive an estimated daily allowance while they stayed in Corfu during session and Municipal councillors would not be paid for their services. This would avoid corruption on local and

\(^{132}\) Gladstone to Lytton, Confidential, 18 January 1859, CO 136/165; Gladstone to Lytton 11 January 1859, CO 136/165.

\(^{133}\) Gladstone to Lytton, Confidential, 27 December 1858, CO 136/165.

\(^{134}\) Gladstone to Lytton, Confidential, 18 January 1859, CO 136/165.
national levels and Ionian candidates would be prevented from rewarding the people who helped them get elected from their allowances. Gladstone wanted to create a sense of “public ethos” to bring the Ionians closer to political freedom. As a result, Gladstone believed, Ionians of better character and high qualifications would exercise local and centralised power.

Gladstone hoped his reform proposals would “extend the sphere of public liberties so that they shall be complete, and self-adjusted, instead of being partial, fragmentary and unbalanced”. He advised the British government to act within the limits of the Treaty of Paris and to distance itself from views like those entertained by Young regarding complete sovereignty of the Islands. The solution to the Ionian question was the granting of responsible government and “any delay in the attempt to effect satisfactory change in the constitution could destroy any remaining chances of success”.\(^\text{135}\) Gladstone did not come to this decision lightly. Giving a “small and feeble state” like the Septinsula the privileges only the larger white settler colonies enjoyed was a gamble but a risk worth taking.

He used Jamaica as an example. The Jamaica House of Assembly had demanded, and received in 1782, the right to legislate the laws and privileges for the Island in exchange for an annual revenue bill.\(^\text{136}\) The governor of Jamaica had “considerable powers” over the Executive, Legislative and Judicial departments of the government.\(^\text{137}\) After the emancipation of slavery in 1838, the governor’s

\(^{135}\) Ibid.  
\(^{136}\) Hall C., *Civilising Subjects*, p. 74.  
relationship with a “quarrelsome” Assembly was pressured by declining prosperity and growing social disorder, including racial animosity, which led to labour and financial quarrels in the Island. The governor’s attempt to suspend the Constitution in 1839 led to the resignation of the government.\(^\text{138}\) In 1848-1849, Sir Charles Grey and Lord Grey considered granting Jamaica responsible government to reduce political collisions but hesitated doing so where politics were “poisoned by colour, class, indebtedness and the damnosa hereditas of slavery”.\(^\text{139}\) Its Act of 1854, however, gave it a very limited form of representative government.\(^\text{140}\)

There were major differences between Jamaica and the Ionian Islands. Jamaica had a strictly limited franchise which enabled the maintenance of white rule, contrary to the Ionian Islands’ extended franchise. Another concerned the issue of race. In Jamaica, the British were ruling over a majority black population while in the Septinsula they were ruling fellow white Europeans. Yet Gladstone saw interesting parallels between Jamaica and the Ionian Islands in the British failure to deal satisfactorily with constitutional questions. When Gladstone was Prime Minister with a large liberal majority (1880-1885), he asked his friend Arthur Gordon in 1881 to accept the governorship of Jamaica, which had been a Crown colony since 1866. Gladstone hoped Gordon would successfully handle Jamaica by “getting rid of … the despotic principle by which it is now governed”, reminding Gordon “the


condition of Jamaica is a sore reproach to us. It is, what the Ionian Islands were, a confession of failure and a discredit to our political genius”.  

Gladstone supported the establishment of responsible government in the Ionian Islands despite the odds. The inclusion of the veto was an attempt to cover all possible scenarios for both the British and Ionians. Although the Islands were not inhabited by British settlers and the population were not Anglo-Saxons, Gladstone urged the British government to trust the Ionians were ready to govern themselves, the only option not yet tried. Nevertheless Gladstone acknowledged one major difficulty was the desire of a large number of Ionians for union with Greece. The Ionian Assembly had been prorogued numerous times under Ward and Young to prevent a vote on that issue. Gladstone criticised Britain’s repression of this discussion, which directly opposed the Ionians’ constitutional rights. If they argued British protection was not in accordance with European law, they had the right to express their desire for Union. They had never been consulted by the European Powers regarding their political fate in 1815 and had never given their consent to British protection. Gladstone warned against silencing the Ionian people, believing “the attempt to repress by strong measures everything that is inconvenient is often found productive of inconveniences greater than those which it aims at curing”.  

Although Gladstone did not state it explicitly, he seemed to be referring to the ‘Indian Mutiny’ of 1857 when warning London against returning to conservative  

142 Gladstone to Lytton, Confidential, 18 January 1859, CO 136/165.
autocratic measures in ruling the Empire.\textsuperscript{143} In the aftermath of the ‘Mutiny’, Gladstone was unhappy with ministers’ proposals for recasting the government of India, doubting the “efficacy of our Parliamentary institutions in defending the interests and the institutions of the people of India”.\textsuperscript{144} He was wary of the dangers of unconstitutional exercise of power by the Executive through the Indian finances and the Indian army and wanted to prevent this from occurring in the Septinsula.\textsuperscript{145} Gladstone supported the right of Ionians to express their criticisms of the Protectorate or their desire for union with Greece on the grounds of national self-determination. He did not, however, believe they should be united with Greece. He feared Greece, which had financial and political difficulties, would not be able to provide a stable government for the Islands. In addition, he considered the Protectorate a British responsibility and a symbol of Britain’s commitment to Europe. Gladstone also was not sure whether the Greeks really wanted to rule the Ionian Islands or felt there was a close connection between the two states.\textsuperscript{146}

Gladstone believed many Ionians considered themselves Greeks. What bonded them with the Greek nation was “blood”, “religion”, “language”, and “vicinity”, what he considered a very “Hellenic feeling”.\textsuperscript{147} However, not all Ionians wanted political union with Greece nor did everyone in the Greek State want to annex the Islands, which Gladstone tried to prove by forwarding translated examples from the

\textsuperscript{144} Shannon R., \textit{Gladstone 1809-1865}, p. 351; Farnsworth S., \textit{British Imperial Policy}, pp. 102-110.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{147} Hansard T. C., \textit{Parliamentary debates}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Series, CLXII, 7 May 1861, pp. 1682, 1683.
Greek press to London.\(^{148}\) Some Ionians believed immediate union with Greece was premature. Greece was poor and weak; there were fundamental differences in law, finance, and social structure between the Greek State and the Septinsula. In addition, some Greeks feared union would be “an annexation of Greece to the Islands, not of the Islands to Greece”.\(^{149}\) He compared the British example with the Ionian case. The union of Scotland, England, Ireland and Wales, where fundamental differences of law and class relations existed, into one country were “achievements” that required “the greatest effort of powerful and highly organised societies to effect”. Ionians and Greeks were not mature enough for such an experiment to succeed. The “most intelligent” inhabitants, moderates with whom Gladstone associated, believed union would not benefit the Ionian people.\(^{150}\) Gladstone thought the demands for union were actually a demand for reforms from Britain. If new and better constitutional reforms were introduced, Ionian dissatisfaction would cease to exist and enable the continuation of the Protectorate. Gladstone also advised Britain to show respect for Ionian feelings, customs and nationality, which would be helpful in governing the Ionian people.

Gladstone advised the British government to accept petitions from the Assembly requesting Union and demonstrate its aptitude to listen to and negotiate with its imperial wards. Its reply, however, should reject unification with Greece. Gladstone argued the political circumstances in Eastern Europe made union

\(^{148}\) Gladstone to Lytton, 13 January 1859, CO 136/165.

\(^{149}\) Quoted in Holland R., and Markides D., *The British and the Hellenes*, p. 32.

\(^{150}\) Gladstone to Lytton, 13 January 1859, CO 136/165.
impossible. The geographical position of the Islands was of fundamental importance to peace and order in Europe; cession to Greece meant the Islands would become a constant threat to neighbouring Albania, while other Greek occupied territories such as Crete, Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Aegean Islands would rebel against Ottoman rule. This would mark the ‘reconstruction of all political society in South-Eastern Europe’.\footnote{Hansard T. C., \textit{Parliamentary debates}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Series, CLXII, 7 May 1861, pp. 1686-1689.} In a paternalistic statement Gladstone did not exclude the unification of all unredeemed Greeks to one Greek State. But a unified Greek State would become possible only if the Greek race firstly obtained local liberty. Only then might the Greek State receive the recognition and the respect of other countries.

**The response of the British government to Gladstone’s constitutional reforms.**

The “popular demand” for union of the Islands with Greece was simply dismissed by the British government in London. They were convinced by Gladstone’s arguments regarding its origin and progress and believed only constitutional improvements would counteract it. Lytton characterised Gladstone’s proposed constitutional reforms as “liberally conceived and beneficially intended”.\footnote{Lytton to Gladstone, 18 January 1859, CO 136/165.} The government trusted his analysis and agreed political changes towards a more “perfectly free government” could only be obtained by legal means.

The granting of responsible government to the “Englishmen” of Canada, Australia, New Zealand had “always been carried into execution with the assent and on the urgent application of the colonies themselves”. The Ionian people, Lytton
maintained, “have neither endeavoured to secure nor appeared ostensibly to desire this kind of progress” but explicitly wanted annexation to the Greek State. Lytton either ignored or was unaware of the Ionians’ numerous requests for running their own internal affairs throughout the British Protectorate, most notably in 1839 through the Mustoxidi memorial.

Because the Ionian Islands were not a colony and there were no ties of blood with the mother country, there was no “sympathy with British interests” nor “attachment to a British nation”; they were “wholly independent” of the British Parliament. Lytton argued against Gladstone’s proposals to abolish the powers of the Senate, believing it would endanger the retention of British authority in the Islands. The Senate was the “tie” and the “means of mutual control” between the protecting power and the Protectorate. If the Executive was formed by a party that did not recognise the authority of the Crown, the continuance of government would be impossible. Lytton wanted the amended constitution to contain provisions that allowed the British Parliament some legislative sway, similar to the white settler colonies.

The replacement of the Senate with a second upper chamber partly nominated and partly elected hardly worked well in British colonies, where the Executive ultimately had only the appearance of, not actual, authority. Lytton wanted the upper chamber nominated, but was unsure whether Gladstone had clarified whether the

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153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
nominations were by the Lord High Commissioner or by the ministers, which was the case in colonies practising responsible government. Moreover, Lytton was against the abolition of the High Police Powers even if they were incompatible with the principles of constitutional freedom, questioning the fitness of Ionian society for their immediate removal. It was a “well established institution” that protected public order and against “insurrection” and “dangerous agitators”. Lytton believed Gladstone’s proposals for responsible government were not easily “reconciled with the necessities of a Protectorate”.

In Britain, responsible government had evolved over centuries as the way the power of the Commons and the electorate grew at the expense of the power of the Crown and the Lords. In white settler colonies, responsible government increased the power of the colony to govern itself, as heads of departments were run by colonial ministers, and the colonial legislature controlled the colonial Executive. British policy towards colonial self-government not only varied according to local circumstances and colonial status but according to evolving political ideas in Britain itself. The Canadian, in the 1840s and the Australian, in the 1850s, colonies were granted responsible government only if British authority was preserved. The same policies were apparent in the Ionian Islands. The British cabinet urged “caution in establishing responsible government” within the “definite and practical... rights of the Protectorate”.

155 Ibid.
Gladstone’s resolutions were delivered and considered by the Assembly and he lobbied tirelessly to promote their success.\textsuperscript{158} He feared they would be rejected, and they were.\textsuperscript{159} Members of the Assembly who promised Gladstone support for his proposals voted in unison with the radicals to reject the constitutional reforms from fear of public discontent or being labelled unpatriotic. Others reaffirmed the Ionian people’s national desire was union with the Greek State. It was clear British patronage had ceased to work in the Ionian State.

Gladstone left the Islands when elections at home put his seat in jeopardy but before the vote occurred.\textsuperscript{160} Ward, writing from Ceylon, predicted Gladstone’s proposals would fail if he were not there to push them through, a view shared by Gladstone and others in the Colonial Office. Ward felt “any English corporal who is the dispenser of all honors and patronage for six years has more influence than the first statesman of Europe whose stay was limited to six weeks”.\textsuperscript{161} Tumelty, however, argues Gladstone's presence would have made no difference based on the majority of the votes.\textsuperscript{162} Despite the failure to adopt his reforms Gladstone remained convinced of the value of his mission labouring for “truth and justice”. He wrote to his close

\textsuperscript{157} Lytton to Gladstone, 18 January 1859, 15 February 1859, CO 136/165. Although the Cabinet believed Britain should proceed with caution, Talbot and Portlock both supported Gladstone's report on granting responsible government, believing it would safeguard the Islands and clarify their positions within the Empire. Talbot to Gladstone, 17 January 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391; Portlock to Gladstone, 25 January 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391.

\textsuperscript{158} Bowen to Gladstone, 23 January 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391.

\textsuperscript{159} Gladstone to Lytton, 8 February 1859, CO 136/165; Gladstone to Lytton 17 February 1859, CO 136/165.

\textsuperscript{160} Carnarvon to Gladstone, Private, 12 January 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391; Carnarvon to Gladstone, Private, 1 February 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391.

\textsuperscript{161} Carnarvon to Gladstone, 8 February 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391; Bowen to Gladstone, 1 March 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391.

\textsuperscript{162} Tumelty J. J., “The Ionian Islands under British Administration”, p. 321.
friend Sidney Herbert that his constitutional reforms for the Ionian Islands held “real importance” for Britain because for the “first time a perfectly honourable and tenable position in the face of the islands was made”.

Others, such as Major General Joseph Ellison Portlock, were regretful the reforms did not pass. Portlock expressed his approval that Gladstone's suggestions went further than Seaton's reforms and believed they revealed the “real position and duties of Great Britain in respect to the Ionians”. He regretted British misrule in the Islands over the past forty years, especially after Seaton's tenure, caused them to lose the hearts and minds of the Ionians.

Conclusion

Both Young and Gladstone, as Peelites, had similar liberal views about policies at home, but were opposite in their views of rule in the Empire. Young had a separatist view regarding the Islands, believing if they were not made a colony they should be ceded to Greece. Young inherited the problems of Ward, which affected his ability to govern the Islands and how he viewed them as a political entity. Like Ward, he believed in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon British and their culture, seeing them as uniquely qualified for free political institutions. His belief that the Ionians were unfit to exercise both central and municipal affairs reinforced the departure from the Whig’s reformist and more liberal language of the late 1840s. What Young saw in the Septinsula was a political society which, under the influence of radical

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164 Portlock to Gladstone, 8 September 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44392; Portlock to Gladstone, 5 December 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44392.
campaigns and demagogues, was going in the wrong direction. Although he and colonial officials ratified reforms for the material amelioration of the Islands through schemes of employment for disaffected Ionian youth, in reality they never fully materialised because the British did not support these schemes practically. Although Young attempted to clarify the positions of the Islands within the Empire he failed to achieve this. His failure resulted in a worsening relationship between Britain and the Septinsula.

Gladstone drew from his experience as Colonial Secretary and his experience with colonial affairs, in his mission in the Septinsula. He was convinced that granting representative institutions would strengthen, not weaken, the connections between Britain and her territories. In the Septinsula he proposed a constitution that represented both the aristocratic and democratic principles that governed a society like Britain. Although Gladstone was criticised by the Colonial Office for harming British interests in the Mediterranean and his proposals were rejected by the Ionian Assembly, he nevertheless believed in the importance of granting responsible government in the Septinsula and reconciling British and Ionian interests.\textsuperscript{165} Gladstone’s understanding of the complex issues surrounding the Islands from both the British and Ionian perspectives and his proposed solutions also indicate his emerging liberalism. Nevertheless, the appointment of another military officer, Sir Henry Storks, in the Septinsula marked the salvaging of British authoritarian rule.

\textsuperscript{165} The \textit{Times}, 29 January 1859.
and imperial supremacy. In the end of the fourth decade of the British Protectorate, the search by Britain to find appropriate forms of rule for the Islands continued.
Chapter 7: The policies of “firmness and forbearance” during Henry Stork’s administration in the Ionian Islands 1859-1864

Introduction

Throughout Gladstone’s temporary tenure of office in the Septinsula, the Colonial Office had been searching for a replacement. However, all “distinguished men had declined” since the Ionians were seen as “politically troublesome people”.1 After Gladstone’s urgent departure from the Islands, Sir Henry Storks took up the post.2

Storks was born in London in 1811, the eldest son of a county judge. Following his education, he joined the military and was commissioned an ensign in 1828. He rapidly climbed the ranks, becoming a lieutenant in 1832 and captain in 1835. He served with his regiment in the Ionian Islands in the late 1830s and early 1840s, during Douglas’s tenure as Lord High Commissioner, before becoming assistant adjutant-general in the Cape Frontier War 1846-1847. In Mauritius he was assistant military secretary from 1849-1854, then promoted to colonel. During the Crimean War, Storks was in charge of British establishments in Turkey and promoted to major-general in 1855. He supervised the final withdrawal of British forces from Turkey at the end of the war and was afterwards employed at the War Office as Secretary for Military Correspondence from 1857-1859. His successful military record and familiarity with the Ionian Islands were among the reasons he was chosen

2 Carnarvon to Gladstone, Private, 1 February 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391.
for the post. After the fall of Derby’s ministry in 1859, Palmerston’s new government decided to keep Storks on a permanent basis since having “three Lords High Commissioners in as many months a fourth change would look like vacillation”. ³

Storks, the last Lord High Commissioner in the Septinsula, arrived in the Islands on 16 February 1859, the day the Assembly voted against adopting Gladstone's reforms. ⁴ Like Ward and Young, Storks believed the Ionians were unfit for responsible government and during his tenure he tried to retain the Ionian Islands in the Empire by returning to old forms of authoritarian rule. Since he could not change the Ionian Constitution of 1848-1849, Storks became determined to manipulate it and find ways to maintain his exclusive control of the Islands. One method was prorogation of the Assembly, a power the Governor retained after the 1848 reforms and used by Ward and Young when they did not want to deal with the Assembly. Storks prorogued the Ionian Assembly for most of 1859 and again from March 1861-1862. In addition to ensuring his complete control over power in the Islands, prorogation was a way to punish the Assembly and embarrass his political enemies in the Septinsula. He also helped establish the government’s own newspaper in an attempt to overcome the radicals’ dominance of the press. The maintenance and preservation of his authority was a recurring theme throughout Storks’s governance and his controversial style of rule led to questions about his fitness in the British Parliament. Like Ward and Young, Storks also had to deal with the issue of

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⁴ Lytton to Gladstone, 1 February 1859, CO 136/194; Gladstone to Lytton, 17 February 1859, CO 136/165. For more on the Assembly's vote see Tumelty J. J., “The Ionian Islands under British Administration”, p. 321.
nationalism and union of the Islands with Greece. During his tenure, the Ionians’ constant demands for union with Greece initiated more debates in Britain about the place of the Ionian Islands within the Empire and whether the Islands should be ceded or not. Storks’s tenure saw these unresolved issues repeatedly erupting. To Storks, decisive action was not just needed, it was mandatory.

Storks had no illusions about Ionians’ feelings towards their protectors and felt “the difficulty of the post to which I am appointed”. He claimed he knew how to handle the Islanders from his previous experience there and believed his task was to re-establish British supremacy and “sovereignty”: the sole power of the Crown to rule her colony with little competition from the body politic. To Storks, sovereignty was an absolute for Ionians while constitutional government was a birth-right of Englishmen. Storks reinforced British presence in the Islands utilising various methods, from hanging portraits of the Queen in the palace and other public buildings to repeated prorogations of the Ionian Parliament. He wanted to constantly remind Ionians who was in charge. “Highly impressionable imaginative and more acted upon by external influences and visible objects than the natives of a colder clime”, they could not be trusted. They acted on emotions, not reason and intellect.

Storks’s relationship with the Assembly

Storks and the Assembly were in conflict from the moment of Storks’s first address to the Ionian Parliament. Although he opened his address in a conciliatory

5 Storks to Gladstone, 2 February 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391.
6 Francis M., Governors and Settlers, p. 236.
7 Storks to Lytton, 23 February 1859, CO 136/165.
tone, claiming “the greatest object of [his] life” was to “secure the welfare and happiness” of the Islands, he also criticised the Assembly for rejecting Gladstone’s proposals for constitutional reform. Storks criticised the behaviour of Assembly members, who acted like “small children”, fighting internally, resigning their seats if not heard and applauded. They displayed “a gross ignorance of the first principles of free government” and he was infuriated when the Assembly treated his address with “sarcasm” and without “respect”.

He felt their behaviour challenged British colonial power in the Islands. The Assembly reacted angrily to Storks’s authoritarian behaviour and refused to co-operate with him. By a majority of twenty two to three, legislators rejected the resolution on the Lord High Commissioner’s right to deliver opening speeches to the Assembly, a custom for forty years but which the legislators now claimed for the “President of the State”. Storks, angered the Assembly had “insult[ed] the Protectorate with impunity”, retaliated by proroguing the Assembly for six months to demonstrate his power and control over Ionian affairs. He was supported by some Assembly members, including Flamburiari, who urged Storks not only to prorogue but to dissolve the Assembly and pronounce new elections, a move Storks rejected fearing it would benefit the Risospasti and “revive the past political excitement”.

3 Storks to Lytton, 19 February 1859, CO 136/165; Storks to Lytton, 24 February 1859, CO 136/165.  
4 Storks to Gladstone, Private, 28 February 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391.  
10 Storks to Gladstone, 7 March 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391.  
11 Storks to Lytton, 10 March 1859, CO 136/165; Storks to Gladstone, 10 March 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391.  
12 Storks to Lytton, 20 March 1859, CO 136/165. Bowen supported Storks's action and believed he “is particularly well adopted for this place” and had “great administrative talents”. Bowen to Gladstone, 15 March 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391.
Storks hoped the prorogation would allow “repose” after the political excitement and a change in public opinion. He also hoped it would teach the Assembly a lesson and, after its “punishment”, the Assembly would resume its duties and make “useful legislation”. Storks wanted to use prorogation to publicly discredit the Risospasti and expose them as “noisy demagogues” who rendered government impossible. Storks considered their conduct in the Assembly a “Reign of Terror” and believed they intimidated government supporters and moderates.\textsuperscript{13} Prorogation succeeded; Storks reported on the “tranquillity prevailing in the Septinsula State”.\textsuperscript{14} At the celebrations for the Queen’s birthday, “respect and defence” of the Protectorate was exhibited by municipal and church authorities, who “attended in full dress and offered up prayers for Her Majesty and the general government”. Public opinion was “becoming more and more moderate and reasonable”.\textsuperscript{15}

London received Storks’s news with great enthusiasm and believed he would make the Ionian Islands governable again.\textsuperscript{16} To the new Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Newcastle, Storks argued practical administrative measures in the Islands could only be achieved if he ruled alone. Newcastle had served in Peel’s administration as Lord of the Treasury from 1834-1835, the first Commissioner of Woods and Forests from 1841-1846 and Chief Secretary of Ireland in 1846.\textsuperscript{17} He was, like Gladstone

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid. Holland and Markides believe the majority of Ionians supported the Risopasti and wanted union with Greece. This conflicts with Storks's views, and those of the Colonial Office, which believed the supporters for the British outnumbered the Risopasti. Storks believed the support for the Risospasti appeared larger because the Risospasti were much more vocal in their complaints than government supporters. Holland R., and Markides D., \textit{The British and the Hellenes}, pp. 48-53.
\textsuperscript{14} Storks to Lytton, 12 May 1859, CO 136/165.
\textsuperscript{15} Storks to Lytton, 28 May 1859, CO 136/165.
\textsuperscript{16} Lytton to Storks, 6 April 1859, CO 136/165; Lytton to Storks, 26 May 1859, CO 136/165.
\textsuperscript{17} For more on Newcastle's imperial policies see Farnsworth, S., \textit{British Imperial Policy}, Chap. 4.
and other Peelites, “dedicated to the preservation of a British Empire in which the mutual interests of both colonies and Mother Country would be served”. Newcastle believed responsible government meant the transfer of the local, economic, political and defensive responsibilities to the colonies as they matured. They were not cast off by the Mother Country but would be helped when trouble threatened to ensure the strength and prosperity of the Empire. Gladstone believed responsible government was coupled with freedom and responsibility, but Newcastle believed it was based on mutual sympathy and obligation. While responsible government was appropriate for British white settler colonies, it was not for Ionians: “mild despotism is alone suited to such a people”. Newcastle’s philosophy of “Firmness and Forbearance” became the fundamental principles of British rule in the Septinsula.

Storks reported Ionian representatives seemed to regret the “foolish and insensate courses” they had pursued. In addition, the suspension of public works and funds caused by the prorogation was creating dissatisfaction in Ionian constituencies and was blamed, Storks believed, on the Risospasti. Like Young, he also requested the power of the “dormant order in Council” which would allow him to dissolve Parliament, arguing it was the only effective course to follow when dealing with a “people Oriental rather than European in their impressions and influences”.

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18 Ibid., p. 182.
19 Ibid., p. 182
21 Storks to Lytton, 28 March 1859, CO 136/165.
22 Storks to Newcastle, Most Confidential, 14 July 1859, CO 136/166. Storks was not the only one to have this opinion. Bowen had similar views and believed responsible government was not fit for a “semi-Oriental country” like the Ionian Islands, but was only made for the “credit of England”. Bowen to Gladstone, 10 June 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391.
Storks wanted to be prepared to “act vigorously” and assert his control in the Islands. He did not consider the Assembly an independent part of the government. When his measures failed, rather than adopt the practice of conciliation, he dissolved it. His representation of Ionians as incapable of self-rule and requiring a strong and able hand, resembled the language of some of his predecessors, Maitland, Douglas, and Ward. But unlike these governors, who had primarily noted the Ionians’ European nature, Storks described them as Oriental rather than European. Storks’s military career had taken him to Turkey and Asia and he saw more similarities in Ionian culture with Eastern countries than with Europe. Previous governors were uncertain what form of rule was needed since they could not place Ionians in the East or the West (Europe). For Storks, there was no ambiguity as to where Ionians belonged and, because they were oriental, authoritarian rule was permissible for them. Bowen felt Storks was “a good despot”, managing everything himself and giving the Ionians “as little as possible to self-government”. Bowen, who had assisted every Lord High Commissioner since Ward, reflected on the difficulties they faced in ruling the Islands and laid the blame for problems on the Assembly. He noted

All new commissioners are popular at first but then the personal jealousies, dislikes and patronage for office, change the situation for the governors as new expectations arise from the community for the governors to fulfill. It is difficult for the governors to device what temper the new Parliament will work on.

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23 Storks to Newcastle, Most Confidential, 14 July 1859, CO 136/166.
24 Bowen to Gladstone, 10 June 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44391.
25 Ibid.
Prorogation of the Assembly continued until December 1859. Storks believed it had been positive and his impressions from touring the Islands were satisfactory; he was received everywhere, including Cephalonia, in a “cordial manner”. Ruling without the Assembly produced “the happiest results” and “public tranquillity”, meaning order and obedience, social and political stability, was a dominant feature in his reports. Although many Ionians wanted “to return good new men for the new Parliament”, Storks had “small expectation” the Assembly would conduct their parliamentary duties when recalled, believing there was a “total want of moral and political courage” and “an absence of all public spirit” amongst them.26 He also planned, with Newcastle’s support, to challenge the Assembly by opening the session with a speech.27 When Storks opened the Assembly “in the customary manner” on 10 December 1859, only five radical members protested.28 The majority accepted the opening and the issue was “successfully terminated”.

Storks raised the threat of another prorogation if radical Assembly members attempted to initiate discussion over union with Greece. Views advocating the “national right” of the Ionians to be included in a “revived Greek Empire” had featured in the radical press and Storks, concerned with the increasingly polemical tone of these articles, sent extracts to the Colonial Office.29 Their authors noted the political agitation and unrest occurring in Europe, especially Italy, and advocated a similar course of action by the Ionians against the Protectorate. Support for these

26 Wolff to Gladstone, 23 August 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44392; Storks to Newcastle, 4 October 1859, CO 136/166.
27 Newcastle to Storks, 10 November 1859, CO 136/195.
28 Storks to Newcastle, 19 December 1859, CO 136/166.
29 Storks to Newcastle, 1 November 1859, CO 136/166.
causes was not unknown in Britain where, throughout the 1850s, British liberals and radicals had shown moral, material and political assistance for the Polish, Hungarian, and Italian nationalists. In August 1859 a dispatch from Foreign Secretary Russell was published in which he argued “the people of Tuscany… have the right which belongs to the people of every independent State, to regulate their own internal government”. From 1859, British politicians and diplomats began to work towards the formation of a unified Italian state which supported Britain's foreign and diplomatic interests in the region. There were increased expectations concerning the issue of annexation to Greece after another dispatch from Russell to Sir James Hudson, Britain’s representative in Turin, was published in October 1860 in which Russell advocated British support for the ongoing process of Italian unification, arguing Italians were the “best judges of their own interests”. 

Despite his support for Italian unification, Russell argued this doctrine did not extend to the Ionian Islands, a Protectorate “imposed” on Britain “in the interest not only of England but of Europe”. He feared unification between the Ionians “to that section of the race which forms the present Kingdom of Greece” would cause a “disturbance of the Political arrangements of all South-Eastern Europe, without

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30 O'Connor M., *The Romance of Italy*, Chap. 3; Brock, P. “Polish Democrats and English Radicals, 1832-1862: A Chapter in the History of Anglo-Polish Relations”, in *Journal of Modern History*, 25 (June 1953), pp. 139-56; Finn, M. *After Chartism*, Chapters 4 and 5.
32 Russell, Palmerston, and James Hudson were particularly active in promoting a unified Italy. O'Connor M., *The Romance of Italy*, pp. 127-36.
providing for the substitution of any safe or satisfactory system in their stead”.

In addition, Russell did not believe all Ionians wanted unification. In Italy people were “abstaining en masse from any public ceremony which partook of an Austrian element” while in the Septinsula “all classes unite with pleasure in any amusement undertaken by the English Community”. Even Dandolo, an Ionian radical, noted while Poland, Venice, Hungary and Rome held dangerous demonstrations against the Austrians, in the Islands it was possible for the British to remain “indolent, when for a certainty no one sees the slightest danger”. Groups like the Society of the Friends of Italy organised lectures and public meetings while the Foreign Office leaked information to the British press in support of the Italian cause. The British Mediterranean fleet even protected Garibaldi’s men when they moved from Sicily to the mainland. Few groups in Britain advocated union between the Septinsula and Greece. The Philhellenic Committee, organised in 1863 to promote Prince Alfred to the Greek throne, was significantly smaller than the Italian groups and had little significance in influencing public opinion.

Worried the Ionian radicals would gain support from other European powers, the Foreign Office attempted to pressure the French government into suppressing the publication and distribution of journals such as *The Patrie*, which criticised the British double-standard on the Italian and Ionian questions. This double-standard was criticised by the Radical MP Maguire, who

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34 Newcastle to Storks, Confidential, 19 February 1861, CO 136/195.
35 Storks to Newcastle, 9 May 1861, CO 136/174.
36 Extract from no. 155 of *Nea Epohi*, enclosed in Storks to Newcastle, Confidential, 14 April 1861, CO 136/173. This excerpt Storks sent was published in French “to cause foreign journals to write of Ionian Affairs”.
37 O’Connor M., *The Romance of Italy*, pp. 128-42.
39 Storks to Newcastle, 7 May 1861, CO 136/174.
focused on the dispatches from Hudson and Russell in the House of Commons, with Gladstone defending the Government position.\textsuperscript{40}

In the Islands, Storks requested, and was granted, the right to prorogue the Assembly if the question of union came up. When the radicals M. Baccomi and Lombardo re-opened the question of the union of the Islands with Greece, Storks tried to prevent the Assembly “from carrying any factious or seditious motion on a question of nationality” and reminded them of the technicalities of the Treaty of Paris.\textsuperscript{41} Newcastle hoped Ionian representatives had “good sense” in exercising “those rights of self-government that [they] so largely enjoy”, claiming the British government wanted to promote practical and useful legislation as well as the continuance of representative government in the Islands.\textsuperscript{42} He instructed Storks to carry “forbearance to the utmost limits” and to try to avoid prorogation of the Assembly. However, not all Colonial Officials approved this course. Strachey believed Storks should have been granted the right of exclusive rule in the Islands, arguing “the only practical way of governing the Islands with their present Constitution, would seem to be periodical prorogations, a legislation by Atti Di Governo”.\textsuperscript{43}

When the Assembly met again in 1861, Baccomi’s and Lombardo’s papers were still on the agenda. Storks, who found the papers “offensive and insulting”,

\textsuperscript{40} Hansard, \textbf{CLXII}, 19 March-17 May 1861, pp. 1667-70, 1673-76, 1681-89.
\textsuperscript{41} See message of Storks to the Ionian Legislative Assembly, in Storks to Newcastle, 19 December 1859, CO 136/166.
\textsuperscript{42} Newcastle to Storks, Confidential, 19 February 1861, CO 136/195.
\textsuperscript{43} See minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 19 December 1859, CO 136/166.
prorogued the Assembly for six months after members refused to remove the papers from the order of the day, complaining about the lack of “moral courage” amongAssembly members who were “much afraid” of being proclaimed unpatriotic and losing elections.44

While prorogation had previously been used to augment his authority, it was now utilised to stifle debate about union with Greece. Ionian radicals believed Russell’s despatch exposed the hypocrisy of British attitudes. Radical Assembly members like Dandolo and Padova criticised Storks’s prorogation in articles and pamphlets printed in the Ionian and foreign press, accusing Britain of imposing despotic forms of rule and Storks for proroguing the Assembly before receiving the Legislature’s decision on the removal of Lombardo’s and Baccomi’s papers from the agenda.45 Storks pleaded with his superiors to consider the “character and the credibility of the person” making these accusations, believing his honest, credible English character overshadowed those of troublesome and irrational agitators.46 Newcastle, bitterly disappointed in the Assembly’s conduct, believed the Assembly’s call for union with Greece and their appeals for European support were “illegal” and “unconstitutional”. Although he continued to maintain British authorities at home and in the Islands, were “ready and anxious to co-operate” with the Ionian Legislature, it was obvious the latter were not. He agreed with Storks the presence of “an enlightened public opinion” to control the Assembly was lacking in the Islands.

44 Storks to Newcastle, Confidential, 11 March 1861, CO 136/173.
45 Storks to Newcastle, 26 March 1861, CO 136/173; Storks to Newcastle, 1 April 1861, CO 136/173; Storks to Newcastle, 5 April 1861, CO 136/173; Storks to Newcastle, 6 April 1861 CO 136/173; Storks to Newcastle, 10 April 1861, CO 136/173.
46 Storks to Newcastle, 6 April 1861, CO 136/173.
Ultimately, he approved prorogation “while the British government fully adhere to that policy of forbearance”.47

Storks believed reassembling the Ionian legislature was not “advantageous to the interests of the Country” and requested the prorogation of the Assembly until December 1861 and then its dissolution. He predicted “great trouble” in continuing the current system, and anticipated the re-election of members from the current Assembly.48 Storks highlighted the failures of the Ionian political system and openly questioned the Ionians’ fitness for their liberties as Ward and Young had done. His consistent disparagement of Ionians’ abilities strengthened his case for authoritarian rule and justified the continued British presence. “Parties as understood in England founded on principles and opinions do not exist in the Ionian Islands” he argued, believing the “Risospastis, Reformers, Retrogates are ropes of sand without discipline or cohesion”.49 The electoral system was riddled with “bribery and corruption” where the pursuit of a Legislative seat was “an investment” for the “sole advantage of £120”, public opinion was disregarded and electors sold their vote to the highest bidder, all consequences of the “system of secret voting” introduced by Seaton’s reforms.50 What bothered Storks most was that vote by ballot did not elect supporters of the Ionian government. Unlike Gladstone, Storks had no moral reservations about promising patronage to safeguard local support.51 What frustrated

47 Newcastle to Storks, 5 April 1861, CO 136/194.
48 Storks to Newcastle, 5 July 1861, CO 136/174.
49 Storks to Newcastle, Private and Confidential, 5 March 1861, CO 136/173.
50 Storks to Newcastle, 27 June 1860, CO 136/170; Storks to Newcastle, Private and Confidential, 5 March 1861, CO 136/173.
him was that even the most trusted supporters of the government now voted against it.

Furthermore, the rights and powers of the Ionian government were lost “under the travestied form of Constitutional government”. The Lord High Commissioner was under-represented because secretaries of the Senate who explained the acts and defended its measure were not members of the House and the Ionian government could only be heard by “Council at the Bar”. Storks believed the Constitution of 1817 was “logical and effective”, a “cleverly devised despotism under constitutional forms” suited to the Ionians. While constitutional reforms were appropriate for white settler colonies, they were “hastily” granted to the Islands. “Too much was conceded”, rendering “government almost impossible, and administration impracticable”.52 He saw no improvement and no progress in representative government in the Septinsula.

He also criticised the free press, arguing it was used by Ionian Radicals to “subvert the British Protectorate, to invite rebellion, among the subjects of a neighbouring and friendly power and to indulge in much personal abuse”, none of which he could prevent or censor.53 Any action taken had to be publicly justified before a public tribunal, which Storks felt was unworkable since an Ionian jury, often

51 In the Mediterranean the order of St Michael and St George was used to rank and classify military and civilian service to the state in addition to honouring and rewarding it. Cannadine D., *Ornamentalism*, p. 86.
52 Storks to Newcastle, Private and Confidential, 5 March 1861, CO 136/173.
53 Storks to Newcastle, 11 April 1861, CO 136/173.
unwilling to convict a newspaper editor of any crime, was required.\textsuperscript{54} In an effort to win Ionian public opinion and refute critical articles printed in the Risospasti newspapers, Storks requested, and received, permission to establish a “semi-official newspaper” in the Islands to try to break the Risospasti monopoly on printed material and explain issues misrepresented in the Risospasti press.\textsuperscript{55}

Ionians’ exercise of state affairs failed not only on a national level but also on a local level. Municipal officers were corrupt and could not be trusted to raise money from municipal rented property. A great amount of revenue that would have benefited much needed public works, such as the construction of roads, was lost every year.\textsuperscript{56} On the political future of the Islands, Storks concluded he hoped “in time self-government will be possible in these islands, and the first step to be taken is to endeavour to convince the educated and upper classes that Honesty is the best policy”.\textsuperscript{57}

Colonial officials did not learn anything new from Storks’s report which, Strachey noted, “corroborated all that his predecessors have stated in regard to Ionians”.\textsuperscript{58} Nevertheless Newcastle had a clear vision as to how Britain should proceed in the Islands. Since the British could not change the “miserable constitution”, he hoped improvements to the Ionians’ economic and material

\textsuperscript{54} Storks to Newcastle, 11 April 1861, CO 136/173; Storks to Newcastle, 6 January 1862, CO 136/177.
\textsuperscript{55} Storks to Lytton, Private and Confidential, 14 March 1859, CO 136/165.
\textsuperscript{56} Storks to Newcastle, 17 April 1861, CO 136/173.
\textsuperscript{57} Storks to Newcastle, Private and Confidential, 5 March 1861, CO 136/173.
\textsuperscript{58} See minutes in Storks to Newcastle, Private and Confidential, 5 March 1861, CO 136/173; Storks to Newcastle, 17 April 1861, CO 136/173; minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 11 April 1861, CO 136/173.
condition would move them away from “visionary political schemes”. Such improvements would take time, but he believed it was better for the Ionians and the British than continued inaction.  

Rendering “protection popular”: Attempts to improve commercial prosperity in the Septinsula

The cultivation of material advancement in the Islands had always been one of Storks’s fundamental principles of rule. Although he was authoritarian and did not want to share power with the Ionians, he showed strength when he tried to advance the Islands’ economic prosperity. Like all previous commissioners, Storks argued for preferential treatment of Ionian products in the British market. But for Storks, it was also a policy of benevolence, aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the Ionians towards their protectors. He understood he would not be able to improve the relationship between Britain and the Septinsula through constitutional reforms, but he hoped to do so by improving their commercial position within the Empire.

Storks’s lobbying for economic improvements for the Septinsula began soon after his arrival, beginning with his proposal in July 1859 for reduced duties on the import of currants. The Septinsula’s trade in wine and currants had suffered after the creation of the Greek kingdom, their main competitor, and was exacerbated by a prolonged vine disease which led to a disastrous decline of the volume and quality of the wine crop. Storks’s proposal for a reduction on duties for Ionian wines was based on his belief that the high quality of Ionian wine would lead to further development

59 See minutes in Storks to Newcastle, Private and Confidential, 5 March 1861, CO 136/173.
of the wine industry in the Islands and he requested the wines be “placed on the same footing as those imported in England from the Cape Colony”.  

Storks believed the hostility of many Ionians to the British was rooted in these commercial issues and hoped “some favour may be shown to these states which are placed specially by a Treaty under the protection of Britain”.  

In addition, the Islanders were looking “for positive and real benefits at the hands of the protection” and Storks felt reducing currant and wine duties was the only way British authorities could “disarm” the Ionian opposition. Almost all previous appeals of a similar nature had received a negative answer from the British Treasury, which argued the Ionian Islands, as a free and independent state and not a colony, was subject to the same rules on trade and commerce as other European countries. Storks, believing the current financial distress in the Islands reinforced Risospasti propaganda, felt preferential treatment to Ionian trade, which received a heavier import duty on currants than “any other country of the world”, was more important than at any previous time.

Newcastle agreed the “material advantages of commerce would be more conciliatory than political reforms”. Agreeing with Storks that only commercial reforms could improve the relationship between the Islands and Britain, he entered a long and difficult debate with the Treasury about the reduction on import duties but failed to convince them on the issue.

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60 Storks to Newcastle, 23 August 1859, CO 136/166.
61 See minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 22 October 1859, CO 136/166.
62 Storks to Newcastle, 15 July 1859, CO 136/166.
63 See minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 15 July 1859, CO 136/166; Hamilton to Storks, 12 August 1859, CO 136/166.
64 See minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 15 July 1859, CO 136/166; Storks to Newcastle, 5 October 1859, CO 136/166.
conclusive and Storks’s request was not “practicable on the account of the necessities of the British Exchequer”. Elliot and Fortescue, however, were sympathetic to Storks’s argument, and believed the problem was the Treasury Department’s and Board of Trade’s uncertainty about the position of the Islands in the Empire and, consequently, the financial responsibilities and obligations to them. Newcastle would request the Legal Department’s view on the issue, agreeing the Islands’ position in the Empire “was most anomalous and in some respect a very hard one”.

Colonial officials could not overturn the decision of the Treasury. Putting pressure on the Treasury only created more tension between two departments. The Treasury, Merivale noted, as “the strongest” in the government was victorious. Storks thought the Ionian Protectorate’s position in the Empire was a paradox. As Merivale said: “the truth is we are in a false position mutually… The islanders and Storks say if you will keep us in a state of dependence give us the advantages by other dependencies. We say, if you will not submit to be treated as dependants, do not claim the privilege of dependents”. Merivale’s view also pointed to another contradiction in British rule of the Islands. White settler colonies had been granted responsible government while maintaining their colonial “dependent” status. Yet the Ionian Islands were ruled in an authoritarian manner by most governors, including

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65 See minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 1 November 1859, CO 136/166. Storks hoped Gladstone, when he became Chancellor of the Exchequer, would “not forget the Ionian Islands”, Storks to Gladstone, 3 July 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44392.
66 See minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 1 November 1859, CO 136/166.
67 See minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 5 October 1859, CO 136/166.
Storks, while having “protectorate” status forced on them by a European treaty neither they nor Britain could change.

Storks tried to place the Ionian Islands in the same position as a colony. Working with his secretary, Drummond Wolff, they collated a selection of objects, including hand made art crafts and agricultural products, to show in London’s International Exhibition, hoping this display of Ionian products would have “a beneficial effect on their future prosperity”.  

The Colonial Office were pleased they had received “anything bright from the Ionian Islands”, and believed the focus on promoting Ionian industry was a “move in the right direction” towards retaining the Islands in the Empire and proof “of the good will of the Protecting states”.

Storks experimented with other policies to strengthen the Ionian/British relationship. One of his first actions as Governor was to establish a Commission of Inquiry into the Islands’ public services to correct the inefficiencies and abuses in the Ionian administrative machine and “infuse a healthier and more vigorous action” in all public departments. When the Committee concluded there were limited public vacancies and great numbers of educated Ionian youth seeking them, Storks supported proposals for their absorption into Ionian and British public service.

Storks advocated their admission into British military service, the appointment of Ionians in the medical department of British services and, late in his tenure, the

68 Storks to Newcastle, 14 February 1862, CO 136/177.
69 See minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 14 February 1862, CO 136/177; Newcastle to Storks, 20 February 1862, CO 136/177.
70 Storks to Lytton, 14 March 1859, CO 136/165; Storks to Lytton, 11 April 1859, CO 136/165; Wolff to Gladstone, 23 August 1859, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44392.
71 Storks to Lytton, 11 April 1859, CO 136/165.
inclusion of Ionians in examinations for civil service in India and naval and military appointments.\textsuperscript{72} He believed these proposals would help Britain gain popularity and support at a time when her position was increasingly challenged, though the Colonial Office rejected his proposal for inclusion in the civil service since Ionians were not “natural born subjects or a British subject at all” and Frederic Rogers, the permanent under-secretary, doubted locally educated Ionians could pass the exams.\textsuperscript{73} Storks also requested the sons of Ionian civilians be allowed to receive a military education in British regimental schools in Cephalonia and Zante. Since places were limited and applications were made through the Lord High Commissioner, it might help ‘buy’ some Ionian support for the protecting sovereign. His policy was approved.\textsuperscript{74}

Storks, like previous governors, tried to improve the economic situation on the Ionian Islands. But he pursued commercial and civil reforms more tenaciously than other governors because he realised constitutional reforms, of which he was already critical, would not make the Islands governable. Yet the ambiguous position of the Islands within the Empire made it impossible for Storks to achieve much within the machinery of the British Government. His attempts to ameliorate the Islands indicate he clearly saw their situation was neither sustainable nor tenable. The ambiguity of “protectorate” was creating numerous complications in the Islands’ governance and finances, which only worsened as nationalist sentiment and Ionian discontent with the Protectorate became stronger.

\textsuperscript{72} Storks to Lytton, 11 March 1859, CO 136/165; Storks to Newcastle, 13 July 1859, CO 136/166; Storks to Newcastle, 11 November 1861, CO 136/175.
\textsuperscript{73} See minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 11 November 1861, CO 136/175.
\textsuperscript{74} See minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 15 July 1862, CO 136/178.
Storks’s understanding of Greek Unionist sentiment and attempts at reform

In the autumn of 1861, amidst the criticism over his prorogations of the Assembly, Storks toured the Islands to preview the political sentiment in advance of the upcoming elections. Storks toured the Islands more than any of his predecessors. While this was one of Gladstone’s recommendations to demonstrate to the Ionians Britain cared for their well-being, for Storks it was an attempt to stem the influence of the Risospasti and to win the Ionians’ support. While the Risospasti travelled the country to campaign for union with Greece, Storks travelled the country “to cultivate as much as possible good relations with the Ionian peasantry”.

Storks, however, painted a bleak picture of Ionian society. Criminality was caused by “a moment of passion” and the police were hindered by religious superstitions and traditions of hospitality which gave asylum to the culprits. Sanctity of marriage was unknown to Ionians of all classes: the gentry kept mistresses and dumped illegitimate children in the Foundling Home in Cephalonia while lower class wives became mistresses to their husband’s relations. Unlike Englishmen, who were pillars of the community and moral examples to the poor, the Signiori were viewed by most Ionians with “hostility and contempt”. The clergy were “poor, ignorant and superstitious” with no “moral influence” on the masses. These people, he noted, were granted “institutions more liberal than those granted to the people of England”;

75 During his trips, Storks met with Ionians from every class and different political opinions. While he tried to use his meetings and exchanges of gifts with locals to show the Colonial Office the Ionians displayed “much loyalty and good feeling” towards himself and the British presence, Newcastle and Rogers were more doubtful and distrusting of them and did believe constitutional government would be a reality in the Islands. Storks to Lytton, 28 February 1859, CO 136/165; Storks to Newcastle, 22 October 1859, CO 136/166; see minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 22 October 1859, CO 136/166; minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 28 May 1862, CO 136/178.
they were not suited for “self-government” but “wanted … the strong hand of authority”.

Colonial officials were shocked by Storks’s representation of the “deplorable state of the Ionian society” under British protection. Strachey did not believe the “evils” could be remedied with the present constitution. Rogers felt Storks portrayed a “sad picture” of the Ionian community, which needed “a vigorous hand to change”, while Fortescue saw it as a “regrettable” account of Ionian society. Newcastle considered improving the situation by imposing a police system similar to that in Ireland, which Strachey believed would fail because Ionian police were too closely associated with the municipal authority.

Throughout his tour Storks also noted the peace and “tranquillity” in the Islands under his exclusive control, which he believed confirmed the soundness of his governance and meant the Islands wish to remain under British protection. He maintained not all Ionians desired union with Greece although some hoped “to see the scattered portions of the Greek Kingdom united into one powerful monarchy, Greek in its origin, national in its policy, independent in its constitution”. Unionist sentiment appealed primarily to the “enthusiastic and impressionable” lower classes, rural people who were “intensely bitter” against their feudal rulers. At the same time they “honoured and respected the English character” and appreciated the “prompt justice they had always received at the hands of British authorities”.

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76 Storks to Newcastle, 11 November 1861, CO 136/175.
77 See minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 11 November 1861, CO 136/175.
78 See minutes in Newcastle to Storks, 30 November 1861, CO 136/175.
79 Storks to Lytton, 21 April 1859, CO 136/165; Storks to Newcastle, 1 November 1859, CO 136/166.
80 Storks to Lytton, 21 April 1859, CO 136/165; Storks to Newcastle, Private and Confidential, 5 March 1861, CO 136/173.
Ionian gentry believed British protection offered social stability and order in the Septinsula and prevented riots and bloodshed between the Signiori and peasantry.

Storks claimed the Risospastì did not “represent the wishes of the Ionian people who have really little desire for Union with Greece” but were “ultra demagogues” who manipulated the ‘lower orders’ with promises of land redistribution after union to secure elections and salaries. The Risospastì claimed they channelled the peasantry’s popular voice and used their control of the press to influence moderate supporters of the Protectorate. They disrupted the Assembly's attempts to pass useful legislation for the Islands with their protests. However, if any Risospastì were appointed Senators or Regents, they switched their allegiances to support the Protectorate, like Professor Guardano, who was imprisoned under Ward for belonging to a secret society but advanced the government line “since he obtained a situation under government”. Storks believed the Risospastì were not supported by mainland Greeks. Naturalised Greeks or Epirots within the Islands sincerely desired union, but only if Greece could guarantee “good government and security”.

The tour reinforced Storks's opinion the political status quo in the Assembly would not change; the Risospastì party was in “possession of the field” and no other

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81 Storks to Newcastle, 4 July 1859, CO 136/166; Storks to Newcastle, Private and Confidential, 5 March 1861, CO 136/173.
82 Storks to Newcastle, Most Confidential, 14 July 1859, CO 136/166.
83 Storks to Newcastle, 17 April 1861, CO 136/173; Storks to Newcastle, 13 July 1861, CO 136/174. Russell noted the Risospastì's desire for patronage, and their abuse of it, within the Greek Government after the cession of the Islands. Russell to Paget, 21 December 1864, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/102.
84 Storks to Newcastle, 1 November 1859, CO 136/166.
85 Storks to Lytton, 21 April 1859, CO 136/165; Storks to Newcastle, Private and Confidential, 5 March 1861, CO 136/173; Storks to Newcastle, 5 April 1863, CO 136/177.
candidates had the “moral courage” to contest them. He believed England had “done her duty … by pursuing without success the reform of existing institutions and an expression of the system of self-government” for a people “unfit at present for free institutions”. Storks and colonial officials were pessimistic about the elections for the new Assembly, concerns which were confirmed by the results. Nineteen old members were returned, including the Risospasti Padova, Zervo, Lombardo, Curi, Valaoriti and Marino. Of twenty three new members, a large majority declared themselves “Risospasti”. With the Risospasti so dominant, Storks believed none of the members would have the “moral courage to vote in favour of British protection” and “against the Union with Greece”.87

After the Assembly began its session, Storks continued to argue his sole rule was the most appropriate approach for governing the Islands. He criticised the lack of “useful legislation”; laws fixing export duty on currants and abolishing the tax on grain were urgently required rather than the “childish and useless discussion” over union occurring in the Assembly.88 Moreover, infighting within the Risospasti party rendered parliamentary business “impossible”.89 “Organised mobs” were brought into the public galleries, transforming the Assembly into an “opera house … for theatrical amusement”.90 Storks felt the session was “wasted in idle discussions” and argued prorogation was “expected” by all and “most sincerely desire it”.91

86 Storks to Newcastle, 11 November 1861, CO 136/175.
87 Storks to Newcastle, 14 February 1862, CO 136/177.
88 Storks to Newcastle, 25 March 1862, CO 136/177; Storks to Newcastle, 8 April 1862, CO 136/177.
89 Storks to Newcastle, 25 March 1862, CO 136/177.
90 Storks to Newcastle, 1 April 1862, CO 136/177.
91 Storks to Newcastle, 1 April 1862, CO 136/177; Storks to Newcastle, 28 May 1862, CO 136/178.
believed there was “little or no chance of the Legislative Assembly proceeding to any real business” and Newcastle supported prorogation if the Assembly was an “obstacle to all useful legislation”.\textsuperscript{92} He felt “constitutional government may yet become a reality in the islands, but there is no doubt that at present the existing institutions were unfitted for the country”.\textsuperscript{93}

To minimise protest over prorogation, Storks, between 1859-1864, initiated numerous policies to improve public relations and to develop the resources of the Ionian state. He granted free pardon to nine inhabitants involved in the 1848 Cephalonian outbreaks, allowing them to return to the Islands.\textsuperscript{94} He supported greater transparency in government since secrecy “concealed motives prejudicial to the interests and welfare of the people”. He proposed, with the support of the Colonial Office, the publication of public acts and criticised his predecessors for the secrecy of their policies and for supporting a particular party, which under the present Constitution would be “a delusion and a failure”.\textsuperscript{95} He issued several commissions, such as the 1860 Commission of Inquiry into the financial system of the Septinsula. He tried to bring the protectors and protectorate closer by improving civic institutions, such as investing in the Ionian agricultural industry and promoting Ionian produce in the English markets. Storks was “always sought by high and low; by rich and poor by the declared opponents of the protection and by its friends to settle their differences and protect their interests”.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{92} See minutes in Storks to Newcastle, 1 April 1862, CO 136/177.
\textsuperscript{93} Storks to Newcastle, 28 May 1862, CO 136/178.
\textsuperscript{94} Storks to Newcastle, 5 October 1861, CO 136/175.
\textsuperscript{95} Storks to Lytton, 21 April 1859, CO 136/165.
\textsuperscript{96} Storks to Newcastle, 2 March 1861, CO 136/173.
Unlike his predecessors, Storks did not get involved in personal disputes with the radical-Unionist members of the Assembly. Nor did he use High Police Powers to intimidate the Islanders. Storks learned his colonialism from Howard Douglas, under whom he served in the Islands. He believed he could save the Islands for the Empire and make them governable again. ‘Liberating’ Ionians from the ‘evils’ of their own rule and standing as ‘a real protector’ for their benefit meant the entire dismantlement of the Ionian Legislature and ruling the Islands through repeated prorogations of the Assembly. Yet this style of rule, and its efficacy, would come under debate in the Houses of Parliament.

**Parliamentary debates in 1861 and 1863 about British rule**

Several debates were held in Parliament about British rule between 1861-1863 which illustrated differing views about the nature of Britain's, and Storks’s, rule. The first debate, in 1861, examined Gladstone’s mission and its failure, with Gladstone reiterated his solution for governing the Islands. Several debates in 1863 examined circumstances in the Islands and authoritarian rule, with particular reference to the removal of two Ionian judges by Storks.

In the midst of Storks’s prorogation of the Assembly in 1861, Parliament held its first significant debate about the Ionian Islands since 1850, during Ward’s governorship. This time, they discussed the place of the Islands within the Empire and the rule appropriate for them, a question the Colonial Office had struggled with since 1817. The debate was initiated by Radicals who wished to examine why
Gladstone, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, had failed to bring about a fair and reformed government in the Islands.97

Gladstone believed Britain should not abandon the Protectorate but should offer “a really free Legislature and really free institutions” to the Islands with a “large and ultimately a commanding influence over the composition of the Executive government, personal liberty, and with the adequate means of bringing public functionaries, to justice in case of malversation”.98 Gladstone publicly contradicted Storks’s belief that the Ionians had been “given more liberties than England”. He noted the political situation in the Islands was “a strange and extraordinary mixture of incongruous elements that are … hopelessly in conflict with one another”.99 Although it was claimed the Islands enjoyed freedom of the press, Gladstone noted the editors of radical newspapers were arrested and exiled for printing their political views.100 Nor did the Ionians have an extended franchise; while the population numbered around 250,000, the electorate did not exceed 8,000 because of property and education restrictions.101 In addition, the Lord High Commissioner was still granted the “despotic” power of the High Police.102 As for the Assembly, it did not have free initiatives concerning financial and legislative matters and a “free government as we understand it, does not exist in the Ionian Islands”.103

97 Hansard T. C., Parliamentary debates, 3rd Series, CLXII, 7 May 1861, p. 1681.
98 Ibid., p. 1694.
99 Ibid., p. 1690.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., p. 1691.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
The Colonial Office defended Storks’s, authoritarian rule on the Islands. For Layard, the failure of British rule was the fault of the Ionians, who did not make good use of their liberal institutions.\textsuperscript{104} Fortescue claimed Storks’s prorogation of the Assembly “was necessary” and Storks did not rule alone but in cooperation with the Senate, “an eminent Ionians council” elected by the people and drawn from the Assembly.\textsuperscript{105}

Debaters in 1863 were again critical of Storks but focused on his early removal of two Ionian judges, Sir Georgio Marcoras and Sir Typaldo Xydras, who he believed were radicals and could influence the decisions of other judges. Derby argued Storks acted illegally and unconstitutionally regarding both the Ionian constitution and British principles on the impartiality of judges.\textsuperscript{106} Removing judges of different political opinions could affect the impartiality of the judiciary and lead Ionians to believe outcomes would always favour the government, causing further conflict between the Ionians and their protectors. Derby believed Storks was a worse despot than Maitland. In the Commons, the radical MP Roebuck accused Storks of “bringing this country contempt and disgrace”: his policies and conduct were “not to the honour of England”.\textsuperscript{107} The Colonial Office defended Storks, describing him as an able administrator duped by his Senate, a claim rejected by Stanley as “an excuse”.\textsuperscript{108} General Peel also defended Storks and believed it was hard to decide whether he had performed his duties in the Islands with “greater advantage to the

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 1694.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., pp. 1708-1709.
\textsuperscript{106} Hansard T. C., \textit{Parliamentary debates}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Series, CLXX, 17 April 1863, pp. 290-296.
\textsuperscript{107} Hansard T. C., \textit{Parliamentary debates}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Series, CLXX, 12 May 1863, p. 1610.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., p. 1600.
public or greater credit to himself”.\footnote{Ibid., p. 1598.} For Evans, Storks “was a most distinguished officer, and a right-minded man”.\footnote{Ibid., p. 1602.}

The debates revealed the difference between the theory of rule in the Islands proposed by Gladstone and the reality of rule by Storks. Gladstone’s criticisms of liberal institutions, albeit limited, without responsible government highlighted the problem of British governance in the Septinsula. Storks’s authoritarian rule clashed with Gladstone’s support for “free government”. Kirkwall, an Englishman who resided in the Septinsula during Storks’s tenure, supported “enlightened despotism” in the Islands. But even he concluded “Storks was disliked both by the English and the Ionians”. He was a “despot and overconfident coldly regardless of the feelings of others he recklessly raised for himself a host of enemies”. He was devoid of the wisdom, foresight and conciliatory qualities “necessary in order to govern men successfully”.\footnote{Kirkwall V., \textit{Four Year in the Ionian Islands}, pp. 287-88.}

**Britain’s decision to cede the Ionian Islands to Greece**

Political troubles in Greece in the summer and autumn of 1862 affected the fate of the Ionian Protectorate in the Empire. The creation of the independent Greek state in 1832 did not encompass vast areas where Greeks predominated. The Greeks entertained the “Great Idea”, hopes of extending their boundaries from a declining Ottoman Empire and re-establishing the Byzantine Empire with Constantinople as its
capital. However, such desires were not workable in the mid-nineteenth century Balkans due to the nationalist feelings among other Balkan groups and the conflicting interests of Russia, Austria, France, and Britain in the Mediterranean and the East. These powers sought the support of the Greek State for their respective policies in the East. Their representatives in Athens became the hidden heads of rival Greek parties and British, French and Russian intervention varied from advice to the government and King, to threats, financial pressure and blockades.

The Greeks co-operated with any power likely to support the realisation of their Great Idea. But the internal policy of King Otho was unsuccessful and unconstitutional. The dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies in 1860, and the subsequent election and appointment of several Senators to neutralise opposition in the Senate contributed to the view that Otho was unfit to rule Greece. His popularity declined further after the victories of Magenta and Solferino and Garibaldi’s achievements in the Austro-Franco-Italian war. Many Greeks believed Garibaldi would extend his activities into the Balkans to support the Christians against the Ottomans, although they felt Otho’s favouritism towards Austria was an obstacle to achieving the national desire.

115 Moschonas N., “To Ionian Kratos” [The Ionian State], in Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous [History of the Greek Nation]. See also Hionidis P. L., “The Greek Kingdom in British Public Debate”, p. 64. Hionidis examines how British newspapers championed the Greeks' right to expel Otho and to choose his successor.
During Palmerston’s second ministry, a coalition of Liberals and Peelites with Russell as Foreign Secretary and Gladstone as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Britain continued to protect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire over concern about Otho’s plans to revive the Greek empire. Palmerston’s attitude to the Eastern Question was overshadowed by his fear Russia would threaten Britain’s communication with India and his concern over their influence in the Balkans and Near East. Palmerston, a conservative in domestic affairs, supported liberalism and nationalism on foreign issues beneficial to British interests. For instance, he favoured constitutionalism in Portugal, Spain and Naples, but not in Serbia where the constitutionalists sided with Russia. When Russia presented its own candidate, Leuchtenberg, to succeed a childless Otho, Britain supported Otho.

In Athens the royal succession mobilised the parties, each of whom suggested a candidate for the Greek crown. British supporters recommended Prince Alfred, the second son of Queen Victoria, also suggested by the British Star, a Greek newspaper published in London by Stefanos Xenos which “aimed to make the people of Greece, acquainted with the workings of free institutions in a constitutional country”. As a midshipman in the British Navy, Alfred had visited Greece in 1859 and created a

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117 Moschonas N., “To Ionian Kratos” [The Ionian State], in Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous [History of the Greek Nation].
120 Moschonas N., “To Ionian Kratos” [The Ionian State], in Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous [History of the Greek Nation].
good impression “with his simplicity of manners”. In the pursuit of the ‘Great Idea’, some felt Alfred should not only succeed Otho but also be given a separate Greek kingdom in Crete, the Ionian Islands, or Thessaly and Epirus, a settlement that would eventually lead to the union of two Greek states. The Ionian scheme was proposed by supporters of the British Protectorate to counter the radicals’ efforts for union with Greece. However, the Queen, referring to the Convention of London in 1832, rejected the idea Alfred, or any royal heir of the Protecting powers, should get the Greek crown.

During 1862, the political situation in Greece deteriorated rapidly and a coup deposed Otho on 23 October and established a provisional government. The royal family fled Athens and were greeted by Storks when they arrived in Corfu three days later. When the Queen was asked about the causes of the revolution, she said “everybody wants to be a minister and everybody can’t be a minister, everybody

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123 Prevelakis E., *British Policy Towards the Change*, p. 17.

124 Hiotis P., *I Istoria tou Ioniou Kratous, [History of the Ionian State]*, pp. 504-5. For the British government's considerations about ceding the Ionians see Russell to Cowley, 26 November 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/105; Russell to Cowley, 4 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/105.

125 The Convention established none of the heirs of Britain, France, Austria, or Russia should become monarchs of an independent Greek state. *History of the Greek State*, p. 222. Prince Alfred was also considered too young and inexperienced. See Hionidis P. L., “The Greek Kingdom in British Public Debate”, p. 66.

wants a place and everybody can not get a place, therefore there was a constant discontent which we were unable to satisfy”.

For Storks it was a familiar complaint. His secretary, Wolff, wrote Fortescue noted: “there are 1600 places [public offices] in the Islands. So long as you cannot give a place to every adult male, you will have an opposition working up this cause if not for office, at any rate for re-election. Even amongst the employees there are several intriguing with the Risospasti”.

Storks believed Greek and Ionian political behaviour was the same.

Holland and Markides thoroughly analysed the diplomacy regarding the cession. They argue it was a natural progression and influenced by the Risospasti movement in the Septinsula without considering the cession as a complex and divisive issue amongst the Ionians. Hionidis, using Knox's article and various newspapers as his sources, argues the cession of the Islands was “in the context of British sympathy for national movements” in Europe, such as Italy and Hungary, and the colonial administration was “unequal to the effects of implacable nationalism” in the Islands. However, these views conflict with the material in the Russell and Colonial Office Papers, where cession was viewed as a European issue, introduced, debated and finalised amongst the major European Powers and excluded any involvement or debate from the Ionian people through the prorogation of the Assembly by Storks in 1863.

127 Ibid., pp. 374-378.
128 Ibid., p. 374.
In 1862, Palmerston found a solution for the vacant Greek throne and offered it to Prince William George of Denmark, the brother of Princess Alexandra, wife of the Prince of Wales. Palmerston believed the choice of William, with his connection to Britain through Alexandra, would be advantageous for Britain. His appointment would enable the continued safe passage to the East and would provide an element of stability in the Balkans and for the Ottoman Empire.132 The British negotiations with the Danes led Russell to realise it was the appropriate time for “union to Greece of the Ionian Islands”, which was “a measure of purely British policy”.133 William, like Otho, would have a civil list from Greece, a guarantee facilitated in the act of the cession of the Ionian Islands. The British government stipulated he receive a sum of £15,000-£20,000 a year from the revenue of the Islands, leaving Greece to find

131 For the European Powers’ considerations of candidates to the Greek throne and the positive and negative aspects for each of the candidates for theirs and British interests. See Russell to Wyse, 7 June 1861, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/108; Elliot to Russell, 10 May 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/64; Russell to Cowley, 12 November 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/105; Russell to Cowley, 17 November 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/105; Russell to Cowley, 19 November 1862, Russell Papers, 19 November 1862, PRO 30/22/105; Russell to Cowley, Russell Papers, 26 November 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/105; Russell to Cowley, 29 November 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/105; Russell to Cowley, 4 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/105; Cowley to Russell, Private, 5 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/58; Napier to Russell, Private, 7 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/83; Cowley to Russell, Private, 7 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/58; Russell to Cowley, 8 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/105; Palmerston to Russell, 14 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/22; Palmerston to Russell, 12 January 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/22; Bloomfield to Russell, Private, 18 June 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/42; Palmerston to Russell, 21 November 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/22; Russell to Cowley, 12 March 1864, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/106. For the debate among the European Powers about the cession see Russell to Cowley, 13 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/105; Napier to Russell, Private, 13 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/83; Palmerston to Russell, 20 June 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/22; Palmerston to Russell, 23 June 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/22; Russell to Paget, 11 August 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/102; Russell to Scarlett, 28 January 1864, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/108. For Ionian opposition to the cession and Greek and British concerns about it see Scarlett to Russell, Private, 13 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/64; Bloomfield to Russell, 18 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/41; Palmerston to Russell, 21 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/22; Elliot to Russell, 26 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/64; Newcastle to Russell, 19 August 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/26.

132 Moschonas N., “To Ionian Kratos” [The Ionian State], in Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous [History of the Greek Nation], pp. 233-235.

133 Russell to Paget, 11 August 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/102.
£30,000. The British insisted the cession was dependent upon both the Ionians’ wishes and the consent of Austria, Russia and France, all of whom agreed after extensive negotiation. The Danes accepted the Greek throne and the provision of the Islands.

Palmerston and Russell ceded the Ionian Islands to Greece on 8 December 1862. On 11 December, Russell officially informed Tricoupis, the Greek minister in London, of the decision. The news soon became public and was discussed in Parliament early in 1863. In the treaty, two provisions were imposed by Britain and the European Powers. Firstly, the demolition of fortifications on Corfu and secondly, the obligation of the Greek government to pay pensions to former British officials of the Ionian State. On the issue of fortifications, Russell maintained the British government was not “insensible of the value of Corfu as military and naval position” and wanted to prevent Greece from using Corfu as a military base in any action against the Ottoman Empire and to protect British Mediterranean interests from the French. Austria only agreed to the union if the fortifications in Corfu were destroyed.

Storks heard rumours about the negotiations for the Greek crown and the union of the Septinsula with Greece through publications in foreign and Athenian papers.

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134 Prevelakis E., *British Policy Towards the Change*, p. 142-49. See also Cowley to Russell, 3 May 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/59; Scarlett to Russell, Private, 15 August 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/65.

135 Moschonas N., “To Ionian Kratos” [The Ionian State], in *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous* [History of the Greek Nation], pp. 233-235.

At the time of the rumours the Colonial Office was still uncertain whether
annexation would occur. 138 Newcastle and Russell did not inform Storks of the
events until after the decision was made for the union. Neither Storks nor any
Ionians were involved in the negotiations, although the Assembly had to approve the
Treaty after it was drafted. 139 During the negotiations, to prevent any protest from the
Assembly regarding the demolition of the fortifications and the Ionians' contribution
to the King's civil list, Newcastle and Russell asked Storks to prorogue the Assembly
until the Treaty was ready for their vote. 140 Many Ionians were angry about the
demolition of the fortifications and the contribution to the civil list and Newcastle
and Russell were concerned that debates in the Assembly over these issues would
have risked Parliamentary support for the union. 141 So concerned were Newcastle
and Russell over Ionian sentiment that they asked Storks to send them drafts of his

137 Hansard T. C., Parliamentary debates, 3rd Series, CLXXII, 10 July 1863, p. 387, and 27 July 1864,
pp. 1444-6. There was much debate regarding the demolition of the fortifications, their advantages for
the various European Powers and how they could help stabilise the Greek government and neutralise
the Ionian Islands. For the general discourse see Russell to Elliot, 18 December 1862, Russell Papers,
PRO 30/22/108; Russell to Newcastle, 22 July 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/31. For the
demolition neutralising the Islands see Palmerston to Russell, 23 November 1863, Russell Papers,
PRO 30/22/22. For the British interest in demolition see Newcastle to Russell, 11 December 1862,
Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/25; Russell to Scarlett, 26 November 1863, Russell Papers, PRO
30/22/108. For the Austrian and Turkish interests in demolition see Russell to Scarlett, 19 August
1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/108; Russell to Scarlett, 12 November 1863, Russell Papers, PRO
30/22/108. For the effects of demolition on the new Greek government see Scarlett to Russell, 28
August 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/65; Scarlett to Russell, Private, 21 November 1863, Russell
Papers, PRO 30/22/65.
138 Storks to Newcastle, 26 December 1862, CO 136/179; Storks to Newcastle, 23 January 1863, CO
136/181.
139 On the government informing Storks about the cession see Russell to Newcastle, 11 December
1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/31; Newcastle to Elliot, 26 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO
30/22/25; Newcastle to Russell, 1 January 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/26; Newcastle to
Russell, 22 July 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/26; Russell to Newcastle, 13 August 1863, Russell
Papers, PRO 30/22/31.
140 For the debate about proroguing the Ionian Assembly in 1863 see Newcastle to Russell, 22 July
1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/26; Russell to Newcastle, 25 July 1863, Russell Papers, PRO
30/22/31; Russell to Paget, 29 July 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/102; Russell to Newcastle, 15
August 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/31.
141 Newcastle to Russell, 3 September 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/26.
speeches so they could suggest alterations to make the Treaty seem more palatable to the Ionians.\footnote{Newcastle to Russell, 13 August 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/26; Russell to Newcastle, 15 August 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/31.} The Treaty of London was signed in July 1863 by the co-signatories of the Treaty of Paris and Greece. In October 1863, the Assembly was recalled by Storks, voted unanimously for union with Greece and then Storks prorogued the Assembly again, at Russell's request, so the European Powers could finalise the cession.\footnote{Russell to Newcastle, 15 August 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/31.} On 29 March 1864 William of Denmark accepted the Greek throne as King George I.

Storks believed the union was received in the Islands with “mixed feelings of satisfaction and apprehension”.\footnote{Storks to Newcastle, 7 April 1863, CO 136/181. Although Storks believed many Ionians had mixed feelings about union, Greek historiography contends union was received with excitement and exuberance, with the exception of a few Retrograde supporters of the Protectorate. See Hiotis P., \textit{I Istoria tou Ioniou Kratous, [History of the Ionian State]}, pp. 387-588.} He believed there were many Ionians who did not support or want union with Greece and who were concerned about their safety if the British left the Islands. He claimed women, in particular, were “universally opposed to the cessation of British protection”.\footnote{Storks to Newcastle, 7 May 1863, CO 136/181; As Thomas Gallant argued “the British-devised legal system opened a realm of public space that women quickly incorporated in unexpected ways into their daily social discourse”, in Gallant T. W., \textit{Experiencing Dominion, Culture, Identity, and Power}, p. 151.} Only the youths, “unrestrained by paternal authority, and ardent in their love for change”, were enthusiastic for the union. He attributed it to their hope the new state would employ them, otherwise he anticipated trouble. Storks, throughout his tenure, believed he would be able to find a way to govern the Islands. For him, the union meant Ionians would trade the “solid
advantages of personal security and perfect liberty of speech and actions” for a “doubtful protection by a weak power, like Greece”.

In Britain the annexation was debated in both Houses of Parliament and aroused much passion and controversy. In the Lords there was great scepticism. Some were concerned about Britain’s security in Europe, noting the Islands’, especially Corfu’s, strategic importance if there was “war in the Mediterranean”. In the Commons, Derby and Disraeli also noted the Islands’ military value in their denunciation of the cession of the Islands as “most impolitic”. A seventeen year old King like George I could not rule a disorganised country like Greece nor could he guarantee the maintenance of a non-aggressive policy in the Balkans. While the strategic importance of the Septinsula was echoed by military experts, others argued the Ionian Islands were surplus if Britain held Malta and Gibraltar. Several MPs, including Maguire, Monckton Milnes and Monsell, believed the cession of the Islands was justified in the name of common nationality. Within the Colonial Office, long-existing constructions of inhabitants as difficult, troublesome and unmanageable reinforced arguments for the abandonment of the Protectorate, with Newcastle noting he had wanted “for some years” to get rid of it.

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146 Storks to Newcastle, 7 May 1863, CO 136/181.
148 Ibid., p. 1451.
149 Ibid., p. 1452.
150 Hansard T. C., Parliamentary debates, 3rd Series, CLXII, 7 May 1861, p. 1675; Hansard T. C., Parliamentary debates, 3rd Series, CLXXXV, 3 June 1864, p. 5, and 7 June 1864, p. 5.
151 Hansard T. C., Parliamentary debates, 3rd Series, CLXXI, 30 June 1863, p. 1719 and Wolff H. D., Rambling Recollections, 1, p. 3.
On 28 May 1864 the protocol relinquishing the Ionian Islands to Greece was signed by Storks and Zaimi, the Commissioner Extraordinary of the Greek government. Britain's withdrawal from the Islands included all their guns and military equipment, bar material that was outdated, and excepted “palace furnishings” for the reception of the King.\textsuperscript{152} The \textit{Times} covered the annexation of Ionian Islands to Greece; their correspondent described the last scenes of farewell between the Ionians and their protectors in an emotional tone.\textsuperscript{153} The \textit{Daily News} also highlighted the takeover of the Islands by Greece in its column.\textsuperscript{154}

Greek historiography has long treated the union with Greece as the triumphant achievement of a long Risospasti campaign while habitually marginalising the voices of Ionians opposed to the union, utilising language that treated them as unpatriotic or as ‘the enemies within’.\textsuperscript{155} Most historiography has underestimated the political motivations of Britain and the other European Powers when they finally effectuated union. The cession of the Septinsula was a masterpiece of diplomacy aimed to promote British interests in the Mediterranean and Near East. In giving up a small protectorate, Britain ultimately obtained a bigger one.

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\textsuperscript{152} Russell to Trikoupi, 1 March 1864, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/108; Russell to de Grey, 24 March 1864, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/31; de Grey to Russell, 31 March 1864, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/26.
\textsuperscript{153} The \textit{Times}, 9 May 1864, 13 June 1864, 14 June 1864.
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Daily News}, 2 July 1863, 14 August 1863, 5 January 1864, 3 June 1864, 7 June 1864.
\end{flushleft}
Conclusion

In the aftermath of Gladstone's failed attempt to grant the Islands responsible government, Storks's tenure as Lord High Commissioner intensified the need of the British to search for appropriate forms of rule in the Islands. The failure of the Assembly to accept the proposal for responsible government, which Gladstone, the Colonial Office and the British government had thrown their support behind, and an increasingly hostile radical presence in the Assembly led Storks to believe the authoritarian rule he had witnessed under Douglas would be the most appropriate form of rule. He believed his authoritarian powers would be a guard against the unwise and mischievous exercise of power by a vocal, uneducated population. Only after the Ionian population was cultivated would public opinion be effective. Until then, the Ionian constitution should respond to an absolute sovereign, not to the rights of the citizens.

His descriptions of the Ionians complemented the negative depictions of them relayed by the majority of previous Governors. Unlike them, he did not focus on the Ionians' Europeanness but outrightly called them Oriental, and as such people who would only respond to authoritarian rule. Rather than work with the Ionians within the framework allowed by the Constitution, he continually prorogued the Assembly to ensure his position and stifle debate. His reports of an unworkable, radical-dominated Assembly, desiring unification with Greece belied his view the Ionian people wanted continuation of the Protectorate.\textsuperscript{156} His prorogations of the Assembly

\textsuperscript{156} Storks to Lytton, 19 February 1859, CO 136/165.
made public works for the Islands almost impossible to achieve and complete while concurrently he and Newcastle attempted to improve the Islands' finances by renegotiating trade rights and duties with the Treasury, which failed because of the ambiguous nature of the Protectorate. Even during the negotiations concerning cession of the Islands, Storks believed he could make the Islands governable. Throughout his tenure he was considered by many Ionians, and even his own peers, to be as despotic as Maitland.

When the Islands were ceded to Greece in 1863, it was Britain who determined the new Greek monarch in order to strengthen her supremacy in the Mediterranean. Britain negotiated the terms of cession with the other European Powers, marginalising Storks and the Ionians. While cession to Greece had long been desired by some Ionians, particularly the Risospasti, Storks was ordered to prorogue the Assembly to suppress debate and possible opposition to the practicalities of the union; his voice was also suppressed by Russell and Newcastle, who amended his speeches to the Assembly. Had the right political opportunity not presented itself, Storks and Britain would most likely have continued their experiment with forms of rule for the Islands.
Conclusion

During their years as a protectorate, there was a constant uncertainty about the status of the Islands and how they fitted into the Empire. Under the terms of the Treaty of 1815, the Islands were to be a free and independent state under British protection. But they were a Protectorate, established as a consequence of the complex military and diplomatic situation in post-Napoleonic Europe to help stabilise the continent. For the British, the Islands were important for the Empire as part of a comprehensive colonial Mediterranean policy with Malta and Gibraltar and because they ensured a safe passage to India. Despite British attempts to impose a form of colonial rule, they were never a colony nor were they granted the economic and commercial privileges other colonies enjoyed. This ambiguity of the place of the Islands within the Empire provided the key to the many failed attempts to rule.

This ambiguity connected with the history of the Islands, which were real links to an imagined and literary classical past. Some governors came to the Islands with their Homeric texts and romanticised views of the people and geography. Yet the Islands had also been, for over four hundred years, a colony of another European power, Venice, and later the French, Russian-Turkish allies, and British, all of whom introduced aspects of their own laws, forms of government, language and culture to the Islands. The Islands’ themselves had strong historical, cultural, and linguistic ties to Greece, yet many inhabitants were not Greeks. As a result, the Islands were indeed hybrid: a mixture of numerous influences and contradictions.
The contradictions extended into the political realm with the Protectorate. The formation of the Protectorate was a compromise suggested by native Ionian Ioannis Capodistria, who helped draft the Treaty of Paris while in the diplomatic service of Imperial Russia and suggested the Islands be placed under the Protection of one of the European Powers since their independence would not be immediately granted. He favoured Britain’s protection, the more liberal of the Powers, believing it would respect a promise for Ionian independence made in 1809. However, the vague language of the Treaty of Paris led to various interpretations concerning the extent of British rule and the actual position of the Islands under British rule. Throughout the period of the Protectorate, the British were experimenting with different models of colonial administration for the Islands which fluctuated and were inconsistent as each Lord High Commissioner and Colonial Secretary made decisions based on the consequences of their predecessors’ policies and the reactions of the Ionians to these policies.

During the Protectorate, numerous governors and officials implied it was the hybrid nature of the Ionians that marked them as different from the British. They were inhabitants of the past and present, and of the East and West. The uncertainty over who the Ionians were, was reflected in the confusion over the form of rule necessary for them. There was no uniform policy regarding British colonial forms of government. Governance in the Empire varied and was based not only on pressures from the colonies but also British notions of what was permitted and required.¹

Correspondence between the Lord High Commissioners and Colonial Secretaries and officials, as well as private correspondence between government ministers and various colonial officials, reveal the different perceptions each correspondent felt regarding the Ionian people and the rule necessary for them. Their perceptions also altered over time, especially among more long-term colonial officials, such as Strachey, Stephen, and Merivale, whose views adjusted as they received different interpretations on the social, political and economic conditions of the Islands and the character of the Ionians and as domestic imperatives shifted and changed. Differing perceptions of the Islands and their inhabitants were also presented in the several debates held in the House of Commons during the period of the Protectorate and among British citizens themselves, through reports in the press, such as the *Times* and the *Daily News*.

The character traits and values that defined the Ionians were seemingly the opposite of those that accounted for Britain’s success. Thus, in the British narrative, Ionians’ superstition, ignorance, duplicity, violence, excitability and subservience to demagogues were the opposite of industrious and upright Anglo-Saxons who possessed self-control, reason, honesty, love for order and freedom, manliness, domesticity, and respect for the law and sobriety. These latter characteristics qualified Britain to protect the half-civilised and unstable Ionians from themselves, an argument that was made in relation to many other parts of the Empire. Because of their alleged absence of a British national character, the Ionian people were not

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2 Hall., *Civilising Subjects*. 
ready to control their own affairs. The free-born British, on the other hand, possessed an inherited genius for political order, justice, and commerce that allowed Britain to become a first rate commercial and imperial power, and thus a mentor, and custodian for less developed territories such as the Ionian Islands. While similar language was repeatedly used by officials to specify Ionian unfitness for government, these same detractors ignored the large proportion of the British population who lived in rural and urban poverty and backwardness and other examples that argued against British superiority.\(^3\) For some governors, such as Maitland and Douglas, the failings of Ionian culture and civilisation justified authoritarian forms of rule for them.

Yet there were also widespread belief among some colonial officials and MPs of the nobility of the Ionian character. Some placed emphasis on their classical heritage and held romantic notions about the Islands’ literary and historical past. Ionians were respectable, sincere, possessed moral virtue, property, capital, skill and independence of mind. British radical MPs, such as Hume, Bright, and Fitzroy were critical of British policies and forms of rule in the Ionian Islands, advocating responsible government and even the abandonment of the Protectorate. Such beliefs were based on their own Philhellenic leanings, their conviction as to the civilised nature of Ionian character, and concerns over public expenditure and the burden of the Protectorate on the British economy. Governors such as Nugent, Seaton and Gladstone believed the Ionians were enlightened and cosmopolitan and, as a result,

\(^3\) Sections of the working classes were seen as respectable and valuable part of the wider British political nation, especially after the 1867 Reform act. McClelland K., “England’s greatness, the working man” in Hall C., McClelland K., Rendall J., *Defining the Victorian Nation: Class, Race, Gender and the Reform Act of 1867*, (Cambridge, 2000).
deserved either representative or responsible government. Liberal constitutional and political reforms in Britain during the Protectorate, such as the Reform Act (1832) and the transition from representative legislatures to responsible ministries in white settler colonies such as Canada and Australia, also encouraged new attitudes towards colonisation and the colonies. Changes in government sometimes had significant effect, though as we have seen there was no simple connection between party allegiance and colonial politics.

It was not only the British who debated the forms of rule needed for the Septinsula, but Ionians themselves were equally divided. The Liberali, such as Mustoxidi, advocated constitutional reforms in the Islands, but within the framework of the Protectorate. Others, like Bulgari, believed the Ionians were unfit for such reforms and supported firmness in British rule. The Radicals/Risospasti, who initially advocated reforms within the framework of the Protectorate, became more vociferous in their demands for unification with Greece, on the grounds of national self-determination, during the last decade of British rule. In their correspondence with the Colonial Office and friends such as Russell, Hawes, Grey and Gladstone, Ward, Young and Storks not only described their disagreements with the Risospasti in the Assembly, they also indicated other Ionian voices which supported the continuance of the Protectorate and led colonial officials to believe there was the need to continue to search for appropriate institutions, a point rarely emphasised in Greek/Ionian historiography.
Maitland’s tenure as governor set important precedents and influenced how future governors would consider the place of the Protectorate within the Empire. Maitland was an experienced colonial administrator. Throughout his tenure, he constructed an image of the Ionians as unfit to govern themselves, needing his (Britain’s) firm hand to guide them. He, in conjunction with Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary, exploited loopholes in the Treaty of Paris to impose authoritarian rule on the Islands. As a result, Maitland laid the foundations for authoritarian rule over the Islands and strengthened the ambiguous position of the Islands by attempting to make them a Crown Colony instead of allowing them to be a free and independent state.

Maitland’s Constitution, although ratified, was not without its critics, many of whom challenged his competence, his authority and the legitimacy of his rule. They spoke out against British injustice and cruelty toward the Ionians, disparaging the imposition of Maitland’s despotic regime and his abuse of the Treaty of Paris. From 1821 the rise of Greek nationalism in the Islands, which encouraged many Ionians to view themselves as Ionian/Greeks, was, not surprisingly, considered a threat to British presence.

The appointment of Nugent, a Whig, marked a new era of liberal policy in the Islands. He introduced the notion of power-sharing with the Ionians and prepared the ground for them to question British rule. Douglas, in contrast, believed in the long-term civilising mission of the British authorities. Although Douglas supported Maitland’s brand of authoritarian rule and, despite Ionian pressure, resisted
constitutional reforms, he introduced reforms to education, health and legal institutions.

Seaton, the most liberal of the Island’s governors, introduced reforms which fundamentally altered the relationship between Britain and her Protectorate. He believed the Ionians were responsible and mature and capable of handling their own affairs and attempted to alter negative perceptions of the Islands. Influenced by his tenure as governor in Canada he brought with him the Canadian model of representative government and argued devolution of authority was more effective than centralised colonial power in safeguarding British imperial interests. His reform agenda, which began in 1843, led to constitutional reforms in 1848, such as freedom of the press, Ionian control of the state finances, free elections and vote by ballot.

Ward’s tenure as governor was shaped by Seaton’s reforms. Although he had been considered a radical in British politics, by the time he was in the Ionian Islands Ward was regretting his earlier radicalism, especially on the issue of the franchise, and this would influence his views regarding Seaton's reforms. Ward was critical of them and of Grey, who had approved them, and attempted to reinstate authoritarian rule in the Islands, especially after the Cephalonian uprisings in 1849. Frustrated by his antagonistic relationship with the Assembly and the growth of radical-unionists in the Islands, he returned to the harsh language of Maitland’s era to describe the Ionians. Parliamentary debates about Ward’s rule indicated the continuing ambiguity amongst the political class as to the nature of the Ionians and the model of colonial administration appropriate for them. Throughout his tenure, Ward operated in a
political network where he tried to exploit personal friendships to gain support for himself and advance his ideas about how the Islands should be ruled.

Young and Gladstone, both Peelites, came to very different conclusions when they each attempted to find solutions for rule in the Islands. Young had numerous difficulties working with the Assembly elected during Ward's tenure and suggested a variety of resolutions for the Islands. These included the abolition of the Constitution and the cession of the Southern Islands to Greece and the incorporation of Corfu as a Crown colony, ideas rejected by the British government as illegal under the Treaty of Paris. Gladstone advocated a return to the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Paris, in which the Ionian Islands would be a free and independent state. While he advocated the right for nationalist groups to express their political opinions, he downplayed their influence in affecting policy within the Islands. He did not support cession of the Islands to Greece, believing it important for them to retain their connection to Britain and the Empire. He suggested granting Ionians responsible government and criticised forty years of colonial rule.

Storks, the last governor, arrived after the Assembly rejected Gladstone's offer of responsible government and supported a return to authoritarian rule. Although forced to work within the limitations of the reformed Constitution, he used the loophole of prorogation of Parliament consistently during his tenure to rule the Islands himself rather than work with the Assembly. He strongly believed the progress of civilisation depended on British supreme government in the Islands. While other governors used the ambiguity of the Islands’ Eastern/Western culture to
justify Ionian unfitness for responsible rule, Storks was the only governor to describe them as “Oriental”. Although the Islands were ceded to Greece during his tenure, Storks was not involved in the negotiations, which were conducted by Palmerston and Russell as part of Britain's foreign policy, and opposed the decision, believing until the end he could make them governable.

The differing practices and views of each governor were indicative of the lack of a consistent policy regarding the Islands and reflected British confusion governing a protectorate they treated more as a colony. While the histories of these individuals have all helped explain their particular positions, with many coming from military backgrounds, some with Whig and others Tory allegiances, each individual has necessarily been placed within a national, international and imperial context. The issues of Ionian character and what forms of rule were appropriate based on character and the opinions on colonial governance of British officials have provided the narrative thread throughout these fifty years.

Examining the Ionian Islands under British rule has allowed an exploration of the debates about Ionian character and the British belief, underpinning all policies, that they acted as a protector, guardian and mentor to lead ‘others’, whether defined as inferior, backward, or lost in history, to social, cultural and, eventually, political maturation. This thesis traced a number of trends, opinions and beliefs that did not articulate a dominant “British” view but rather numerous complex, ambiguous and, occasionally, contradictory processes in the construction of Ionian identities and considerations of forms of rule by the British. As such, it has contributed to an
examination of colonial governance and the considerations involved in ruling people of a “white European” heritage and ethnicity. It has also expanded knowledge regarding issues around the self-governing of white Europeans. British representative political institutions and responsible government were not only offered to Anglo-Saxons in white settler colonies, as has been the prevalent view of existing Imperial historiography, but were also offered, albeit too late and unsuccessfully, to the Ionians. This thesis has also shown it is questionable to link the rise of the Risospasti and cession of the Islands to Greece within the wider European nationalist movements, like those that occurred in Italy, Hungary and Poland, as many British and Greek historians have done. Although the Risospasti were vocal in their criticisms of the Protectorate and desired union with Greece, utilising the language of nationalism, they neither had the wider official European support enjoyed by other nationalist groups, such as the Italians, nor were they strong enough to advance political or military unification with Greece. This decision was ultimately made by Britain and the other European Powers at the right time for them and on terms beneficial for their foreign policies.

Yet there are further questions that arise which future researchers should examine. Research into the comparisons between Malta and the Ionian Islands, as well as comparisons with the white settler colonies, would be valuable and enable a broader understanding of British colonial governmentality in Europe and the Empire currently lacking in the historiography. There is also need for a comparison of the British and Venetian systems of colonial rule in the Ionian Islands and the ways they
constructed binary oppositions and representations between themselves and the Ionian people. This research would provide a rich insight into particular colonial constructions of self and other across the Mediterranean. As the history of the Ionian Islands was closely interlinked with Venice for four centuries, British articulations of a new Ionian colonial society contested the old Venetian one, creating tensions between each country’s forms of colonial administration and control. A comparative examination of these two different instances of European empire building, their patterns of politics and how their complex histories of inclusion and exclusion were constituted, defined and maintained, would broaden our understanding of modern European imperial histories.
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