Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

submitted by

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at

UCL

for the degree of

PhD
I, Edward Mark Sanders, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Signed ………………………………..

Date ………………………………..
Abstract

Emotions differ between cultures, especially in their eliciting conditions, social acceptability, forms of expression, and co-extent of terminology. This thesis examines the psychological sensation and social expression of envy and jealousy in Classical Athens. Previous scholarship on envy and jealousy (Walcot 1978, Konstan and Rutter 2003) has primarily taken a lexical approach, focusing on usage of the Greek words *phthonos* (envy, begrudging spite, possessive jealousy) and *zêlos* (emulative rivalry).

This lexical approach has value, especially in dealing with texts and civilizations from the past, but also limitations. These are particularly apparent with envy and jealousy in ancient Greece as: a) overt expression of *phthonos* is taboo; b) there is no Classical Greek label for sexual jealousy. Accordingly a different, complementary approach is required, which reads the expressed values and actions of entire situations.

Building on recent developments in the reading of emotion episodes in classical texts, this thesis applies to Athenian culture and literature insights on the contexts, conscious and subconscious motivations, subjective manifestations, and indicative behaviours of envy and jealousy, derived from modern (post-1950) philosophical, psychological, psychoanalytical, sociological and anthropological scholarship. This enables the exploration of both the explicit theorisation and evaluation of envy and jealousy, and also more oblique ways in which they find expression across different genres.

Topics examined include: 1. Aristotle’s analysis of the nature of *phthonos* and its relationship to other emotions; 2. the persuasion or manipulation of audiences using *phthonos*, both overt and masked, in Attic oratory; 3. the arousal of envy and moral indignation (as a ‘safe’ form of transmuted envy) by ‘Old’ Comedy; 4. *phthonos* scenarios and their destructive outcome in tragedy; 5. the nature of Greek sexual jealousy, especially as a gendered emotion in tragedy, and the use of tragic themes in other genres to manipulate audiences’ expectations.
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**Abbreviations**


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<td>Nauck</td>
<td>Nauck, A. (ed.) (1889) <em>Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta</em> (Leipzig)</td>
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<td>OCT</td>
<td>Oxford Classical Text</td>
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<td>Snell</td>
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Notes

1. All dates are BCE unless otherwise stated.

2. Greek text has been copied from the online *Thesaurus Linguae Grecae*. References to Greek texts are to the most recent Oxford Classical Text (OCT); where no OCT exists (primarily Attic orators, with the exception of Demosthenes and Lysias, and some minor treatises of Xenophon), I use the current Loeb. For fragments, see Abbreviations.

3. All translations are my own except where otherwise indicated.

4. I have directly transliterated most Greek names (e.g. Perikles, Timarkhos, Euphiletos). However I have used the Roman spelling for some authors, literary works and heroes where it is so much more familiar that a straight transliteration would appear pedantic (e.g. Thucydides, *Trachiniae*, Achilles, rather than Thoukydides, *Trakhiniai*, Akhilleus).
Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis examines the psychological sensation, social expression and literary representation of envy and jealousy in Athens during the Classical period (479-322). It is primarily a contribution to the increasing body of research into the emotions of the ancient Greeks and Romans that has been published in the last two decades.\(^1\) It also develops a methodological approach which contributes to the ongoing debate as to how research on ancient emotions should be conducted. Finally, since (for reasons given below) my main source is literary texts, I also aim to shed light on a number of literary issues relating especially to the genres of tragedy, comedy and oratory, including thematic and rhetorical issues, and the dynamics of the text-‘reader’ (or more properly text-audience) relationship.

1.1 Methodological approach

Emotion studies is a highly multidisciplinary field. There has been a large amount of research into the nature of emotions (both specific emotions and emotions in general) across a variety of disciplines,\(^2\) especially since the cognitivist ‘revolution’ of the 1970s.\(^3\) Within this body of research, many psychologists have noted that it often makes more sense

\(^1\) Major works include: Cairns (1993); Williams (1993); Nussbaum (1994); Braund and Gill (1997); Konstan (1997); Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (1998); Konstan (2001); W.V. Harris (2001); Nussbaum (2001); Braund and Most (2003); Kaster (2005); Sternberg (2005); Konstan (2006); Graver (2007); J.T. Fitzgerald (2007).

\(^2\) E.g. cognitive and evolutionary psychology, neurobiology, physiology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy and history. For a useful summary by a Classicist of the major approaches, see Konstan (2006) 7-27; see also Cairns (2003a) 11-20, Cairns (2008). Among non-Classical scholarship, Rorty (1980a), Lewis and Haviland-Jones (2000) and Solomon (2004) are excellent edited volumes that demonstrate a variety of disciplinary approaches to the emotions. Griffiths (1997) provides an useful critique of what the major schools have to offer before (less persuasively) attempting a synthesis.

\(^3\) Cognitivists argue that an emotion arises from a sensory perception that is evaluated by our brains (this is a cognition), automatically arousing certain physiological and psychological responses. Strict cognitivists – e.g. Solomon (1993), Lazarus (1991), Nussbaum (2001) – believe cognition is the only important element in emotion, and most emotionologists currently ascribe it a major, if not primary, role. Set against the cognitivists are ‘neo-Darwinists’ such as Paul Ekman, who are most interested in the physiological and neurobiological effects of an emotion (in Ekman’s case, facial changes – e.g. Ekman (1980a)). Their approach dates back to Darwin (1872) and James (1884), who argue that physiological changes are the initial emotional response, and thinking comes later. The cognitivist approach has similarities to Aristotle’s view of the emotions (see ch.4), though Aristotle was more concerned with the sociological aspect of cognition than some of his latter-day successors.
to speak of an emotional episode (or scenario), than an emotion *per se*.\(^4\) Emotional episodes begin with cognitions – perceptions of (or thoughts about) a situation – and our interpretations of them, frequently called the ‘antecedent conditions’.\(^5\) These arouse psychological and physiological feelings, the ‘emotion’ itself. Attempts to regulate or cope with the emotion may follow;\(^6\) then verbal expressions and/or physical actions resulting from the emotion; and eventually resolution. Griffiths refers to the antecedent conditions (or ‘stimuli’) as the ‘input’ part of an emotion, and the rest as the ‘output’.\(^7\)

Elements of some emotions, especially on the output side, are often considered to be ‘universal’ or ‘pan-cultural’: for example, the set of so-called ‘basic’ or ‘primary’ emotions (anger, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise, disgust) which have been identified in very young children, and which have associated facial expressions that appear to be present in all cultures (albeit occasionally repressed).\(^8\) However, even for these emotions, many aspects will vary between cultures. Cairns notes these include their eliciting conditions, social acceptability of the emotion, socially accepted forms of expression (which may vary not just between societies, but also within them, e.g. between classes and genders), and the co-extent of their terminology.\(^9\) Other emotions (including envy and jealousy), frequently called ‘non-basic’ or ‘secondary’, are thought to be more socially complex and therefore develop later as the child learns the social rules of his culture. They may involve blends of

\(^4\) Parrott (1991) 4: “… an emotional episode is the story of an emotional event, and it seems a natural unit of analysis for understanding human emotions.”


\(^6\) Psychoanalysts term these ‘defences’.

\(^7\) Griffiths (1997) 55.

\(^8\) Lewis (2000) 275-8 argues that neonates can show general distress and pleasure; by the age of three months joy, sadness, surprise and disgust can be identified, and anger and fear shortly after – cf. Bates (2000) 384-5, Wierzbicka (1999) 24-5. Griffiths (1997) 44-99 describes Darwin’s work on these emotions and more modern research on the so-called ‘affect programs’ based on them. Ekman (1980b) believes there are up to nine universal emotions observable even in babies: six certainly (anger, fear, sadness, happiness, surprise, and disgust) and perhaps three others (interest, shame, and contempt). Envy and jealousy are not found on any list of primary or basic emotions, with the exception of Klein (1957/1975), who associates envy with the frustration a baby directs at his mother’s breast when it withholds the milk (s)he wants. Joffe (1969) 539-42 takes issue with Kleinian primary envy from a variety of perspectives; see Roth and Lemma (2008) and H.F. Smith (2008) for recent research dealing with Klein (1957/1975). Lewis (2000) 277 argues that envy emerges in the latter half of the second year of life, along with embarrassment and empathy. Frankel and Sherick (1977) report that while a very young child will desire and take a toy, (s)he will have no awareness that it belongs to another child; only later will (s)he develop that awareness and an attendant hostility characteristic of envy – see ch.2.2.2; cf. Rosenblatt (1988) 57-8.

\(^9\) Cairns (2003a) 12-13. There are also personal differences between individuals who are homologous within their society.
more basic elements (e.g. guilt may include fear and sadness, jealousy may include fear and anger).\(^{10}\) Non-basic emotions can vary even more widely between cultures than basic ones. Constructionists argue that the elements of emotions that differ between cultures are so vast that each emotion should be considered as entirely unique to that culture, and cite culture-specific emotions such as Japanese *amae* in support.\(^{11}\) However, such emotions are exceptions. While there may be major differences in many aspects (such as those mentioned above), other cultures’ emotions are usually identifiable, and relatable to our own emotions.\(^{12}\)

Research into classical emotions has so far largely focused on emotions that are freely and frequently expressed in ancient literature – anger, shame, pity, grief etc. It has primarily taken a lexical approach, focusing on Greek emotion words and the contexts in which they are used (by a particular author or more generally), and comparing them with the nearest equivalents in our own lexicon. Previous scholarship on envy and jealousy has, for instance, mostly concentrated on usage of the Greek words *phthonos* (envy, begrudging spite, possessive jealousy – see ch.3) and *zêlos* (emulative rivalry).\(^{13}\) Such a lexical approach has value, particularly in dealing with texts and civilisations from the past, and this thesis will not neglect lexical issues. However a purely lexical approach has limitations. First, it encourages too great a dependence on the labels our own language


\(^{11}\) A kind of “pleasure at being dependent” – see Morsbach and Tyler (1986). Griffiths (1997) 141 gives the south-east Asian *amok*, or “being a wild pig”, as another example – see Newman (1964) for more details. For constructionist approaches to emotions see Harré (1986), Harré and Parrott (1996).

\(^{12}\) For instance, ancient Greek *orgê* is clearly related to English “anger”, and *aidôs* to English “shame”, even if the boundaries of these ancient Greek terms are not co-terminous with their English equivalents.

\(^{13}\) I refer principally to Walcot (1978) and Konstan and Rutter (2003). Walcot (1978) provides an overview of Greek envy over the thirteen centuries from Homer to Boethius, from a comparative-ethnological perspective. He makes some false generalisations (e.g. that *zêlos* should be translated “jealousy”, and *phthonos* “envy”, their use being in “much the same way as their English equivalents” (2); or dividing envy into “‘professional envy’, ‘sibling envy’ and ‘sexual envy’” (3), passing over the many instances of class or wealth envy in fourth-century oratory, and the *phthonos* of the gods – though he later devotes two chapters to this, undermining his own tripartite division); however the book is still highly relevant and contains many useful insights. Very little else was published on Greek envy (with the exception of Pindar’s poetics – see Bulman (1992); Kurke (1991) 195-224) until Konstan and Rutter (2003). This collection of essays has begun the modern psychological investigation into the ‘rivalrous’ emotions in ancient Greece. However, most of the chapters limit themselves to an examination of *phthonos* (and *zêlos*) in one author or genre, and many appear to do so without any wider insight into investigations into these emotions in fields other than Classics. Despite the many strides made by Konstan and Rutter (2003), no comprehensive socio-psychological analysis of ancient Greek envy and jealousy exists prior to this thesis.
uses, in trying to understand those of another language/culture. \footnote{Konstan (2006) shows too great a tendency to look for one-to-one equivalents. For instance, he runs into difficulties trying to argue (77-90), somewhat unpersuasively, that Aristotle’s *praoiê* (*Rh.* 2.3) should be translated into English as “satisfaction” rather than “calming down”. This misses the point that *praoiê* is neither equivalent to “satisfaction” nor to “calming down”: *praoiê* is *praoiê* is *praoiê*, an ancient Greek phenomenon, and translation of any particular instance of the word is secondary to understanding that phenomenon. Kaster (2005) 7 makes a similar point about translating Latin *fastidium*.
} Second, our own emotion labels can hide from our conscious minds the emotional scenarios they imply – which may not, in part or in total, be applicable to those of another culture. \footnote{Cairns (2008) 46 makes similar points.} A further problem with a lexical approach to envy and jealousy in ancient Greece, is that (unlike anger, shame etc.) these emotions are not freely and frequently expressed in Greek. This is for two reasons: first, because overt, first-person expression of *phthonos* (i.e. “I feel envy”) is taboo; \footnote{While Greeks frequently admit anger, shame, pity, grief etc., they almost never admit envy – see pp.57-8.} second, because there is no Classical Greek word for sexual jealousy. \footnote{*Zêlotypia* is normally translated “jealousy”, but this is controversial, at least in the Classical period (see ch.8, esp. p.201-3). Further, the first surviving instance of the term dates from the 380s, more than halfway through the period covered by this thesis.} Such problems are not limited to these two emotions. \footnote{Other emotions (e.g. arrogance) are morally problematic and unsuited to first-person expression; other emotions (e.g. ‘positive’ pride) lack an ancient Greek label.}

While a lexical approach is useful, therefore, it cannot be the sole – or even the primary – methodology for a detailed investigation of the emotion concepts of another culture, and particularly cannot be the sole approach of this thesis. A complementary approach is required, which reads the expressed values and actions of entire situations. Accordingly I adopt the approach of emotion ‘scripts’ advocated and used to great effect by Kaster. \footnote{Kaster (2005) 8-9, 85 describes these as “narrative processes” or “dramatic scripts”. Cairns (2008) 46 also argues for the use of scripts – see also his references to further scholarship (59 n.17). Wierzbicka (1999) makes the case for meta-language (instead of English language) scripts, though this has attracted criticism – see e.g. Cairns (2008) 49-50.} ‘Scripts’ are essentially similar to the emotion scenarios discussed above, and allow us to get behind the terms “envy” and “jealousy” to achieve a greater understanding of what actually happens in prototypical envy and jealousy scenarios. \footnote{We can note that psychology can be obscured not just by the lexicon, but by the fact that people can react to situations with a mixture of emotions, only some of which they may be conscious of, or choose to express.} In this way I apply to Athenian culture and literature insights on the contexts, conscious and subconscious motivations, subjective manifestations, and indicative behaviours of what we truly understand by the terms “envy” and “jealousy”, derived from modern research into these
emotions in a variety of fields. An approach derived from modern social scientific research does potentially have limitations, for instance the extent to which the phenomena are real within Athenian society, or how to avoid the circularity inherent in comparative studies where evidence is limited. In this thesis I get around these limitations by using Aristotle’s examination of the socio-psychology of phthonos as a control. This enables me to explore not merely the explicit theorisation and evaluation of envy and jealousy in ancient Greece, but also the more oblique ways in which they find expression across a variety of genres – including texts where the role of these emotions is currently under-appreciated.

1.2 The scope of the thesis

Envy and jealousy are major topics (especially the former), and one could spend ten years investigating all their aspects in Greek culture. Of necessity, this thesis must limit its investigations. In choosing to concentrate on Classical Athens, I am mindful of the concept of an ‘emotional community’, posited by Rosenwein. Emotional communities are generally the same as social communities, in which members “have a common stake [and] interests” and are “tied together by fundamental assumptions, values, goals, feeling rules, and accepted modes of expression”. At the highest level this could be a nation, a tribe or a polis. Within this overarching community, though, will be subordinate emotional communities, such as the family, Assembly members, tavern goers, celebrants at a sacrifice etc.; and as people move from one community to another they will adjust their cognitive judgments and emotional displays accordingly.

A large majority of surviving (BCE) Greek texts come from Athens during the Classical period (479-322) and, while our evidence is still unsatisfactorily low, we have a relatively

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21 The fields I draw on most particularly are philosophy, psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology and anthropology – see ch.2. Despite the multidisciplinary nature of emotion studies, it is surprising how little interdisciplinary work there is in the field.
23 Rosenwein (2006) 24, who gives a crowded street as an example of a group that is not an emotional community; emotional communities are also not generally co-terminous with a genre. However, they may be textual communities, e.g. those throughout the Roman Empire who try to live by the writings of Stoic philosophers.
24 Rosenwein (2002) 842. E.g. contemplative awe would be unusual in a pub, as raucous hilarity would in a church, while sexual desire might be best expressed in the privacy of the home – the same person might feel all three, but social rules govern what can be expressed where.
greater volume and range of evidence (both in kind and chronologically) about democratic Athenian society and values. For this reason I have chosen to concentrate on this society. That is not to say that Classical Athenian values would necessarily have differed in every respect from those of other *poleis* at the time, or of Athens at different times, but there is no guarantee of a total commonality of outlook. Even leaving aside such a literary construct as Homeric society, arousal and appropriate expression of envy might well differ between democratic Athens and oligarchies of the fifth and fourth centuries, or between the oratory of fourth-century Athens and that of the first-/second-century CE Dio of Prusa; again, sexual jealousy might be constructed differently in the literary genres of fifth-century tragedy and the second-/third-century CE Greek novel. It makes sense therefore to concentrate on one society, after which one can branch out to see how envy and jealousy compare in other periods and places of ancient Greece.

In this thesis, then, I have concentrated on the literature of Classical Athens, by which I mean literature written either for performance in Athens (e.g. tragedy, comedy, oratory), or written in the Athenian intellectual milieu. I therefore include Aristotle, who lived and worked in Athens, and e.g. whose *Rhetoric* must clearly have taken account of the development of oratory there.\(^{25}\) However, I avoid Xenophon, who spent most of his adult life abroad, and mostly did not write for an Athenian audience;\(^{26}\) likewise authors who are not Athenian (e.g. Herodotus), Classical (e.g. Solon), or either (e.g. Pindar). This is not to say that these authors have nothing to contribute on the subject of envy – it will be immediately apparent that all three do, and I do not ignore them entirely; however, I treat them delicately (some more so than others), and avoid building any assumptions based on them into my analysis of Classical Athenian texts.\(^{27}\)

Because the socio-psychological approach is particularly well suited to cultural history, to ideas expressed in literature or philosophy, it is this that I focus on. I therefore ignore

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\(^{25}\) Similarly Plato in his analysis of comedy in the *Philebus*.

\(^{26}\) In general, I avoid envy in inter-*polis* or international relations. While this would make a fascinating topic for an article, the extra-community nature of such texts means that rules of arousal and expression are likely to differ from more Athenocentric texts.

\(^{27}\) I take a little more licence with Menander in my chapter on sexual jealousy, (chronologically) as he came to maturity in the Classical period and his intellectual background is Aristotelian, (geographically) as his plays were written for performance at Athens even if set elsewhere, and (generally) because the construction of jealousy in his comedies appears to conform to that in Classical Athenian texts.
material evidence such as decrees, epitaphs and curses: the body of inscriptive evidence is vast and disparate, it is not immediately obvious that such texts will give insight into an emotional episode as such (antecedent conditions, psychological feelings etc.), and it may be hard to control the results since (at least in some of the material) imputation of motivation will often be conjectural; there are also questions of methodology, as inclusion of material evidence would require a significant adjustment of the hermeneutic approach. Finally, it is socio-psychological aspects that I focus on in literary and philosophical texts, rather than political or economic issues: leaving aside the question of how much institutions such as ostracism really owe to envy, economic-political envy has in any case already been well treated by Ober, as a by-product of his investigation of mass (i.e. non-elite) and elite relations.

1.3 Outline of the thesis

The thesis is divided into four parts, between which the argument develops linearly. Some parts have more than one chapter, which can be considered side by side. Part I (chapter 2) surveys and analyses the insights of modern (post-1950) philosophical, psychological, psychoanalytical, sociological and anthropological research into envy and jealousy. The two emotions are examined separately, and then compared for their differences and what they have in common. I show that, while many cognitive psychologists prefer to separate envy (felt when I lack something I want) from jealousy (felt when I want to retain or regain something I have developed an exclusive bond with), others prefer to concentrate on the situational aspects of rivalry between two people for a mutually desired object or person. Both approaches have analytical value, but also limitations: the former position tends to draw a dividing line between envy and all types of jealousy (including sexual), ignoring the

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28 Eidinow (2007) briefly refers to envy and jealousy in relation to curses in general (230-1), as well as envy tied specifically to curses relating to commercial competition (204-5) and the institution of the khorégia (160, 296 n.17). Also on material evidence, see Dunbabin and Dickie (1983) on Greco-Roman iconography of phthonos.
29 Such evidence may be the subject of future studies, by myself or another.
30 Some, e.g. Ranulf (1933) 1.134-5 and ff., Walcot (1978) 53-61, have seen the institution of ostracism as a licensed outlet for envy against a prominent individual (perhaps instituted to dissuade the poor from attacking the rich as a class). However most of the evidence for this is provided by Plutarch, who is hardly contemporary. Cairns (2003b) 243-4 summarises the evidence, and is rightly sceptical of this “reductive explanation”; see also Elster (1999) 187-9, Fisher (2003) 188. See Brenne (1994) for examples of what ostraka actually say.
31 Ober (1989); see also Cairns (2003b).
fact that laypersons frequently conflate “envy” and “jealousy” in speech, and that envy is inextricably part of the jealousy scenario; the latter position draws a helpful distinction between social comparison and sexual scenarios, but occasionally downplays genuine differences between prototypical envy and (possessive) jealousy scripts. Following this examination of envy and jealousy, I compare these emotions with a number of others that overlap with them, such as emulation, greed and covetousness, spite and Schadenfreude. Finally, I consider a number of emotions that envy and jealousy tend to be (consciously) misrepresented as or (unconsciously) transmuted into, including anger, indignation, and a desire for justice. These insights arm us well for an in-depth exploration of envy and jealousy in other cultures, here Classical Athens.

Part II (chapters 3-4) takes two complementary approaches to the Greek vocabulary of envy and jealousy, in order to map the phenomena we are dealing with in Greek culture. Chapter 3 involves a thorough lexical examination of *phthonos* and *zêlos* (and their cognates) in the literature of the Archaic and Classical periods. I show that (outside Hesiod) *zêlos* is sharply distinguished from both envy and jealousy (though the circumstances which call it into play may overlap in some particulars),\(^{32}\) and is instead more closely related to English “emulative rivalry”; its main correlation with English envy is in such phrases as “I envy you”, which generally express an attitude of emulation or admiration, rather than (invidious) envy. *Phthonos*, however, covers similar ground to both English “envy” and (possessive, though not sexual) “jealousy” – correlating with the views of those modern psychologists who take a situational approach to these emotions. Unlike English envy, however, *phthonos* can also imply a sense of moral censure, particularly when someone is transgressing socially acceptable boundaries relating to the (ab)use of money or political power.

In chapter 4 I turn to the first detailed, socio-psychological examination of *phthonos*, that of Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* and (both) *Ethics* treatises, both to make use of his insights in their own right, and to compare his phenomenology with that of modern social scientific research, allowing us to utilise the latter with confidence. I first consider how Aristotle sites *phthonos* within a group of emotions concerned with response to someone else’s good

\(^{32}\) *Contra* Walcot – see n.13 above.
or bad fortune. I discuss how envy (phthonos) is related to spite (epikhairekakia) in his thought, and how as ‘bad’ emotions these are opposed to such ‘good’ emotions as indignation (to nemesan), justified pleasure in another’s misfortune (unnamed in Greek), emulation (zélos) and disdain (kataphronēsis). I go on to show how this distinction survives, with minor alterations, the intellectual shift to the ‘doctrine of the mean’ in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. Next I turn to Aristotle’s views on phthonos itself, as described in the Rhetoric, where he discusses the socio-psychological situations in which phthonos arises, before showing how Aristotle’s ethical training (as outlined in the Nicomachean Ethics) can remove vices such as phthonos from one’s character. Finally, I compare Aristotle’s thought on envy (and related emotions) with the findings of modern scholarship.

Part III (chapters 5-7) extends the focus on phthonos, as I examine the use of this emotion in three genres of literature written for performance in front of mass (i.e. non-elite) audiences. Chapter 5 focuses on oratory, a genre which makes frequent use of phthonos words. I begin not with oratory, however, but with Aristotle. Picking up on chapter 4, I demonstrate how phthonos’ badness prevents the use to which Aristotle would like to put emotions in rhetoric – namely, persuading an audience. I explore alternative reasons why Aristotle should still have discussed this emotion in his Rhetoric, and argue that its only acceptable use consistent with his philosophy is to accuse one’s opponent of being motivated by it. Turning to oratory proper, I show that this is largely the case, first through a survey of all instances of phthonos words in the genre, and secondly by in-depth analyses of several speeches in which accusations of phthonos form a crucial part of the speaker’s strategy (Isae. 2; Lys. 24; Aeschin. 2; Dem. 18 and Epist. 3). In fact, phthonos words are not once used in the genre to arouse an audience’s envy. We do find several calls for an audience’s phthonos, but (evidenced by a detailed discussion of Dem. 20 and 21) this is crucially a call for moral censure. This undermines the strict division Aristotle makes between phthonos (by which he clearly means envy) and to nemesan (indignation), and in fact nemesis roots barely survive in the Classical period, their function in the Archaic period being mostly subsumed in the Classical by phthonos – which I recognise by using the hypothetical analytical constructs of envy-phthonos and indignation-phthonos where
necessary for clarity. I end the chapter by considering how an orator might attempt to arouse an audience’s envy—phthonos. Because of the negative associations of the term and the concept, an orator must do so without using the word itself, and I examine three speeches (Lys. 28 and 29; Dem. 3) which attempt to do just this.

In chapter 6 I continue to focus on arousal of phthonos in an audience, but this time in Old Comedy. In the Philebus, Plato argues that one goes to a comedy in order to laugh at the misfortunes of one’s friends, and he calls this phthonos. This emotion bears a close similarity to Aristotle’s epikhairekakia and to modern Schadenfreude. For all the difference in emphasis, this reading has certain affinities in common with the ‘carnival’ approach to understanding Old Comedy, and particularly its predilection for onomastikômôidein (abuse of named individuals), as I explain there. I focus in particular on phthonos against politicians, both named and as a class, in Aristophanes’ political plays of the 420s, as providing the clearest and most coherent body of evidence for phthonos arousal in the genre. I first consider arguments against the behaviour of ambassadors in Acharnians, and then against that of demagogues and generals in Wasps. The arguments advanced ostensibly play to the audience’s moral censure (i.e. indignation) at the excesses of these groups, but in fact appeal as much if not more to their (transmuted) envy. These, however, are English emotions and, as I demonstrate in chapter 5, both fall under the purview of phthonos in Greek. I conclude the chapter with an examination of the case against Paphlagon (i.e. Kleon) in Knights.

In chapter 7 I turn away from the audience, to look at phthonos scripts onstage in tragedy. While this emotion is not one of those regularly seen motivating characters, it is not completely absent. I examine primarily two scenarios: Ajax’s response to the Arms of Achilles being awarded to Odysseus (Soph. Aj.); and Phaidra’s response to her rejection by Hippolytos (Eur. Hipp.). Both characters exhibit psychological, verbal, and physical reactions highly typical of English envy/jealousy scenarios, and clearly describable as phthonos by what has been revealed of the nature of that emotion in part II. Notable, however, is that the word itself is not prominent in these plays, and this is true of the genre as a whole. An unusual type of phthonos is that felt by the gods (phthonos theôn), and this

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33 Constructs which would not, of course, have been recognised by Greeks – see Kaster (2005) 7 on fastidium.
is prominent in tragedy. While my focus on human psychology places divine \textit{phthonos} generally beyond the scope of this thesis, Aphrodite’s (Eur. \textit{Hipp.}) \textit{phthonos} for Hippolytos is accompanied by sibling rivalry for her half-sister Artemis, and in the final section of this chapter, I show that the psychology of this \textit{phthonos} between two gods is a reflection of \textit{phthonos} between mortals.

In Part IV (chapter 8) I turn away from \textit{phthonos} and consider sexual jealousy. The existence of this emotion in ancient Greece has been questioned,\textsuperscript{34} and a minor concern of this chapter is to prove that an emotion related to our sexual jealousy does indeed exist in Greek literature. The major focus, however, is on how this emotion is constructed, and its vocabulary. I begin with Medea (Eur. \textit{Med.}), who is normally portrayed as suffering from heroic pride or rage. While accepting the presence of these emotions as motivators, I argue that it is overly reductive to interpret Medea’s psychology solely in these terms, and that sexual jealousy should be rehabilitated as one of her motivations. \textit{Erôs} and sex play a major role in Medea’s marriage, and her entire self-conception is bound up with being a wife, a mother, and a (sexual) woman. Jason’s abandonment of her wrongs her in all three roles. I show how Medea’s subsequent emotions (rage, hatred, grief, pride and begrudging envy) are all traceable directly back to this wrong, and how her desire for “justice” (which typically masks envy) and the form of the revenge itself, fit in well with both the English sexual jealousy prototype and Aristotle’s ideas on \textit{phthonos}, \textit{orgê} (anger) and \textit{to misein} (hatred). The main elements of this Greek jealousy script appear in two other tragedies (Soph. \textit{Trach.} and Eur. \textit{Andr.}), which I explore in similar level of detail. I conclude that Greek sexual jealousy requires three components: \textit{erôs}, an exclusive relationship, and a desire to protect the integrity of that exclusivity by beating, damaging or destroying the rival or partner. This destructive element shows that \textit{phthonos}, like \textit{erôs}, is perhaps inextricably part of the Greek sexual jealousy prototype. Finally, I turn to philosophy, oratory and comedy, and briefly examine a number of texts in which elements of the jealousy prototype recur (Plat. \textit{Symp.}; Lys. 3 and 4; Aeschin. 1; [Dem.] 59; Men. \textit{Epit.} and \textit{Pk.}).\textsuperscript{35} By considering this wide variety of texts, I show how the jealousy script changes when the patient is a man, how male-male relationships differ from male-female, and the effect of genre on the use of the jealousy script to manipulate an audience.

\textsuperscript{34} Konstan (2003b); Konstan (2006) 219-43.

\textsuperscript{35} Including the meaning of \textit{zêlotypia} in the Classical period – see n.17 above.
Part I
Chapter 2: The Phenomenology of Envy, Jealousy and Related Emotions

2.1 Introduction

To understand fully the workings of envy and jealousy scripts in Greek literature, in this chapter I explore how envy and jealousy scenarios unfold in our own society.¹ The major academic fields which have contributed to modern discussions of envy and jealousy are philosophy, psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology and anthropology. This chapter provides a survey, and partial synthesis,² of modern research in these fields on the phenomenology of envy, jealousy and related emotions, and provides the theoretical underpinning of my reading of Greek texts in subsequent chapters.

2.2 Envy

2.2.1 Etymology

“Envy” is derived from the Latin noun invidia, which corresponds with English “envy; jealousy; grudge; ill-will; hatred; odium; unpopularity”; that in turn is derived from the verb invidere, which means “to look askance at; to look maliciously or spitefully at; to cast an evil eye on; to be prejudiced against; to envy, grudge; to be unwilling; to aspire to rival; to prevent, refuse or deny”.³ Dictionary definitions for envy include:⁴ (noun) ill-will, malice, enmity, harm; emulation, desire; a longing for another’s advantages; mortification and ill-will occasioned by the contemplation of another’s superior advantages; (verb) to feel envy at the superior advantages of; to regard with discontent another’s possession of (some superior advantage); to wish oneself on a level with (another) in some respect, or possessed of (something which another has); to feel a grudge against, to begrudge, to treat grudgingly;

¹ The large majority of the research discussed in this chapter is Anglo-American, and/or published in English.
² The approaches of these various disciplines are heterogeneous (both between and within disciplines), and my aim is not primarily to weld them into a homogeneous whole. My primary concern is to explore the range of research on the phenomena of envy and jealousy and their relationship with other emotions, so as to give the broadest possible understanding. It is worth noting that no academic study considering the full variety of disciplinary approaches to envy has appeared since Schoeck (1966/1969).
³ Lewis & Short; cf. Spielman (1971) 61. Klein (1957/1975) 181 n.2 notes this accords with her view that envy is projective; see Cairns (forthcoming) on the envious gaze in Greek literature.
⁴ Shorter Oxford English Dictionary for the remainder of the paragraph, which is abridged direct quotation.
to have envious, grudging or malevolent feelings; to vie with, seek to challenge. There are three related adjectives: enviable, envious and invidious. “Enviable” means: to be envied. “Envious” means: full of envy, affected or actuated by envy, vexed at the good fortune or qualities of another; full of ill-will; malicious; full of emulation; grudging, excessively careful; enviable; invidious; odious. “Invidious” means: tending to excite ill-will or envy; looking with an evil eye; envious, grudging, jealous.

2.2.2 Envy scenarios

Envy is a complex (or ‘blended’) emotion, and occurs in complex situations of social comparison.\(^5\) Its antecedent conditions involve three perceptions: (1) that someone else (the object/agent) has some object or quality; (2) that I (the subject/patient) do not have it;\(^6\) (3) that this situation is wrong.\(^7\) A number of factors influence this third perception. One is self-esteem: the higher one’s self-esteem, the more likely one is to feel a sense of entitlement;\(^8\) contrarily though, the higher one’s sense of self-worth, the less likely one is to care that one is lacking something.\(^9\) Secondly, we are more likely to feel envy of our peers

\(^5\) Foster (1972) 168-70; Silver and Sabini (1978a) 107; Parrott (1991) 7; R.H. Smith et al. (1996) 158-9; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 284-5; R.H. Smith (2004) 43. Social comparison theory is a very important area of psychology, concerned in (surprisingly small) part with envy (or indeed with any other emotion until recently – Salovey (1991b) 261). Festinger (1954) is seminal for social comparison theory. Salovey has been greatly interested in social comparison theory in relation to envy and jealousy: see pp.32-3 for a fuller discussion. It should be noted that within this literature envy is often (confusingly) termed ‘social comparison jealousy’. Early psychoanalysts did not believe envy to be a social phenomenon, but rather that it is rooted in infant psychosexual development (whose phases are labelled ‘oral’, ‘anal’, ‘phallic’, ‘Oedipus complex’), a theory first laid out in Freud (1905) 173-206; cf. Freud (1908) 215-9, Freud (1931) 228, Kahn (2002) 35-54. Freud believed envy was rooted in the ‘Oedipus complex’ as ‘penis envy’ – Freud (1925) 248-58; cf. Burke (1998) 4-6; Laverde-Rubio (2004) 406; other psychoanalysts link it to the anal (e.g. Jones – see Joffe (1969) 535-6) or oral (e.g. Abraham – see Spielman (1971) 67) phases; Klein (1957/1975) 176 dates it from birth – see ch.1 n.8.

\(^6\) I shall in this chapter consistently use ‘patient’ to refer to the person feeling the emotion, and ‘agent’ to refer to the person arousing it.

\(^7\) Rosenblatt (1988) 63 calls the third perception “a sense of entitlement”; Elster (1999) 169 agrees, labelling the perception “it could have been me”; Wierzbicka (1999) 98 prefers the weaker “this is bad”. Klein (1957/1975) 198-9, 203 notes some specific examples of envy triggers, including: ambition; “the relative absence of envy … in others”; those who grudge others’ happiness; and those who in old age cannot resign themselves to the fact “that youth cannot be regained” and cannot “take pleasure and interest in the lives of young people … without undue bitterness”.


\(^9\) Rawls (1999) 469. Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 286-7 states that “psychological research has failed to reveal a significant positive correlation between envy and jealousy and a person’s low self-esteem.” This is clearly disputed by psychologists – see pp.25-6, p.30 below.
than non-peers: we might feel entitled to the promotion our colleague has just been awarded, but we are less likely to feel entitled to be king. Finally there are what Parrott calls “personal variables” (i.e. character): some people are just more likely to feel envy than others.

The feeling of envy itself is generally seen by psychologists and psychoanalysts as ‘blended’: a number of simpler affects are simultaneously aroused, with all or most needing to be present for envy to result. While modern scholars agree it is blended, there is considerable diversity on the number and nature of its components. Spielman notes four components: emulation, a ‘narcissistic wound’, covetousness, and anger; emulation involves admiration for what the other person is or has, with consequent (healthy) rivalry; the ‘narcissistic wound’ implies “feelings of inferiority, smallness, or injured self-esteem” which can be mild (disappointment) or severe (mortification, humiliation), or “a sense of inadequacy at not being able to realise one’s ambition”; covetousness is directed at what the Other is or has, seen as desirable; anger is directed against the current possessor, and can be mild (chagrin, discontent), moderate (resentment, ill-will) or severe (spite, maliciousness, malevolence, hatred, a wish to harm). Joffe sees six elements to envy: aggression, hate, resentment, admiration, covetousness and narcissism (a desire to boost one’s self-image).

Ben-Ze’ev notes envy involves both hostility and admiration, and occasionally self-pity, hope or despair. Parrott believes it can involve (though not all have to be present): a longing or frustrated desire, a feeling of inferiority (which may manifest as sadness, anxiety or despair), resentment (generalised or agent-specific, manifesting as displeasure, anger or hatred), guilt at feeling these affects, and admiration or emulation. Rosenblatt notes feelings of helplessness to acquire the desired good, “inadequacy and inferiority”, and

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10 Parrott (1991) 7; cf. Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 287: “envy is … concerned with … specific inferiority regarding people who are emotionally significant to us.” Foster (1972) 170 notes one can feel envy for equals and for non-equals, by which he means those society deems eligible for competition and those not. See also n.114 below. There is some overlap with Aristotle’s view that envy (or rather phthonos) is felt for those similar and equal to us – see p.86.
11 Elster (1999) 169-70, who further notes that in a hierarchy we are most likely to envy the person immediately above us on the ladder, which he terms “neighbourhood envy”; cf. Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 305-6.
12 Parrott (1991) 8; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 317. Aristotle would say that this is because they have a base character – see ch.4.
13 Spielman (1971) 76-7 for the part paragraph from his name to this point, including quotes. Shengold (1994) 628, 639 believes that envy proper is “wanting what the other has [or] is”, but that it can regress to the “primitive, regressive, murderous manifestation” of infancy, which he calls “malignant envy”.
agent-directed anger.\textsuperscript{17} Clearly any synthesis will be contentious; however, a number of affects command sufficient (if not universal) approval as part of the blend to allow us to operate with them as an irreducible minimum, and these are: emulation, covetousness, anger/aggression, resentment, hostility/hatred, and a feeling of inferiority or damaged self-esteem.

Envious feelings lead to a variety of actions. Elster notes that primarily “the action tendency of envy is to destroy the envied object or its possessor”;\textsuperscript{18} Wurmser and Jarass agree, saying envy “wants the humiliation, disempowerment, and destruction of the envied one”.\textsuperscript{19} This is true even if such destructive action is to our own detriment also.\textsuperscript{20} This action tendency is the most fundamental, and verbal and physical actions prompted by envy will frequently act towards this goal. However, we should note that destruction does not have to be total; damage also helps relieve envious feelings – e.g. we are more likely to be driven to scratch our neighbour’s new car than destroy it completely.\textsuperscript{21} Alongside direct destructive or damaging actions, anthropologists also tell us about indirect expressions of invidious hostility found in all sorts of cultures, including: “gossip, backbiting, and defamation”,\textsuperscript{22} invocations of (or wards against) the Evil Eye, curses and other types of spells.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{17} Rosenblatt (1988) 63-4 actually says envy has six components, confusing these three affects with the three antecedent conditions referred to above (see also n.7 above).
\textsuperscript{18} Elster (1999) 171. This destructive urge is one of the primary factors that distinguish envy from other emotions such as greed or emulative rivalry (see pp.35-6).
\textsuperscript{19} Wurmser and Jarass (2008b) xii.
\textsuperscript{20} Rawls (1999) 466-7, 469; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 283.
\textsuperscript{21} This suggests that envy is not an all-consuming emotion, as it does not blind us to such considerations as “will the police care enough to investigate?”, “will we be caught?”, and “what will be our punishment?”.
\textsuperscript{22} Foster (1972) 172.
2.2.3 Transmutation of envy

Like all painful emotions, the feeling of envy is subject to a number of coping mechanisms, or ‘defences’. These attempt (consciously or sub-consciously) to amend one of the three perceptions that has given rise to the envious feelings.24 Such defences include e.g.: devaluation of the desired good (so as not to want it); idealisation of the good, or devaluation of the self (to convince myself I am not worthy of it); convincing myself the other person deserves it more; devaluing other aspects of my rival; turning my attention to other goods; “stirring up envy in others by one’s own success, possessions, and a good fortune”;25 intensifying the feeling of hatred (easier to bear, as less guilt-ridden, than envy – see below); redoubling my efforts to succeed too; trying to think about other things; choosing friends that I will not be envious of; etc.

While all painful emotions are subject to defences, they are particularly necessary for envy because of our cultural taboo surrounding expression of that emotion.26 Envy – one of the Seven Deadly Sins, and (as a prohibition of covetousness) one of the Ten Commandments – is deemed both morally wrong and socially disruptive, and therefore, as Jon Elster notes, “it is the only emotion we do not want to admit to others or to ourselves”.27 Accordingly we seek to ‘veil’ or ‘mask’ it – the difference being “between hiding an emotion one feels and showing an emotion one does not feel. // [A] mask can also serve as a veil.”28 Elster elaborates by noting that, when one envies, one feels the primary pain of lacking something another has; however, if aware that our feeling is envy, we feel a second pain, which is shame or guilt at feeling a morally taboo emotion.29 The primary pain of envy can cause us to act (destructively) against the other person or the desired object/attribute, or can cause the sort of psychological adjustments (suppression or pre-emption of the emotion,

27 Elster (1999) 164; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 321; R.H. Smith (1991) 85 says this is because it “betrays … inappropriate hostility” and undermines the envious person’s claims of injustice. It should be noted that the Seven Deadly Sins and Ten Commandments relate directly to Judaeo-Christian culture, and indirectly to Muslim; it is conceivable that envy is not considered morally wrong in other cultures.
29 *Ibid*; La Caze (2001) 34 also notes this pain-enhancing guilt. Recent psychoanalytical research into envy has also noted the overlap between envy and shame: Rosenberger (2005); Kilborne (2008); Jarass and Wurmser (2008); Morrison and Lansky (2008).
i.e. defences) discussed above. However, the secondary pain of the shame or guilt attached also causes psychological adjustments. As Elster puts it: “I can tell myself a story in which the other obtained the envied object by illegitimate and immoral means, and perhaps at my expense, thus transmuting the envy into indignation or anger…”.

The processes of ‘transmutation’ (which unconsciously hides envy both from oneself and others) and ‘misrepresentation’ (which consciously tries to hide it from others) are of enormous importance for a scholarly exploration of the emotion, because one must examine not just speech and behaviour that is caused by overt envy, but also speech and behaviour ostensibly caused by such motivations as: a desire for equality (or “justice” or “fairness”), moral (or “righteous”) indignation; resentment; anger; and hatred. As Elster points out, such a transmutation can be very “difficult to document”, though it might not be: disinterested observers often correctly spot envy, and say so, even if the patient cannot. Reading an entire situation, through an understanding of the phenomena, can be very informative – especially when language points in a different direction. In this section I have shown the significant insights modern research has given us into the phenomenology of envy scenarios. Careful attention to such details allows us to read envy scripts in many situations in which the emotion itself is not mentioned, or is mentioned only to be denied.

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30 Elster (1999) 97-8, 169. Parrott (1991) 5-6 and Etchegoyen et al. (1987) 50 also note that envy is prone to disguise itself, and can be hard to distinguish from jealousy, greed and frustration. Rawls (1999) 473-4 specifically states that “… the appeal to justice is often a mask for envy”, “envy often masquerades as resentment”, and “What is said to be resentment may really be rancor.” See also R.H. Smith (2004).

31 See Elster (1999) 341-402 for a detailed discussion of transmutation and misrepresentation, between interest, reason and passion.

32 Elster (1999) 97-8; Parrott (1991) 6; Etchegoyen et al. (1987) 52; Rawls (1999) 471-4. Parrott (1991) 10-11 notes that the key difference between envy and anger is whether the hostility is justified; that is something often easier for an outsider to spot than for protagonists. We will find an understanding of envy’s tendency to masquerade as other emotions invaluable to an exploration of the emotion in Greek literature/culture.

33 Elster (1999) 165; cf. Parrott (1991) 6: “it is easy to imagine situations in which an envious or jealous person is the last person to know that envy or jealousy motivates his or her actions.” Whether envy is or is not objectively present will be frequently of less interest to me than whether it can be portrayed as present, and how.

34 Silver and Sabini (1978a) 109: “Envy is not identifiable with a particular behavior, but emerges out of specific contexts.”
2.3 Jealousy

2.3.1 Etymology

“Jealousy” derives from the Greek ζῆλος, meaning “eager rivalry, zealous imitation, emulation, jealousy, zeal; (used passively as) the object of emulation or desire, happiness, bliss, honour, glory; extravagance of style; fierceness.”\(^{35}\) Dictionary definitions for “jealousy” include:\(^{36}\) anger, wrath, indignation; devotion, eagerness, anxiety to serve; the state of mind arising from the suspicion, apprehension, or knowledge of rivalry; suspicion, mistrust. The related adjective is “jealous”, which means: vehement in wrath, desire, or devotion; vigilant in guarding, suspiciously careful or watchful; troubled by the belief, suspicion, or fear that the good which one desires to gain or keep for oneself has been or may be diverted to another; resentful towards another on account of known or suspected rivalry; suspicious, fearful.

2.3.2 Jealousy scenarios

Jealousy is often believed by laypersons to be similar to envy.\(^ {37}\) Like envy, jealousy has three antecedent perceptions: (1) I have an exclusive relationship with someone (a “partner”) or something (a “possession”); (2) I am in danger of losing that exclusivity or the entire relationship with them/it; (3) because I have a rival for their affection/possession.\(^ {38}\) The prototypical jealousy scenario is sexual jealousy;\(^ {39}\) however one can feel jealous when the rival is a thing (my husband’s car or prized rose bushes), or non-love rival (the friends my wife ignores me for); and one can feel jealous at the potential or actual loss of an object/attribute (jealous of one’s status or privileges). Unlike envy, which is rooted in social comparison, jealousy is based on personal rivalry and fear of loss. It involves a unique bond with a unique individual or item, exclusivity, and (imagined, potential or

\(^{35}\) LSJ. The English word “zealous” is also derived from ζῆλος.

\(^{36}\) Shorter Oxford English Dictionary for the remainder of the paragraph, which is abridged direct quotation.

\(^{37}\) Indeed they are often used, incorrectly, as partial synonyms – Cairns (2008) 50. I discuss this further below.


actual) alienation of affection or ownership.\textsuperscript{40} Parrott argues that the partner or possession must be formative to our own self-concept for jealousy to be possible: what we fear to lose is not so much a beloved partner or valued possession, but actually a part of ourselves.\textsuperscript{41}

Like envy, jealousy is generally considered a blended emotion, but again scholars differ considerably on the number and nature of its components. Freud believes it compounds four affects: grief, a narcissistic wound, enmity against the rival, and (perhaps) self-criticism.\textsuperscript{42} Shengold more vaguely says it is an individually varying mixture of hate and love.\textsuperscript{43} Spielman believes it has a similar mix to envy ( emulation, narcissistic wound, covetousness, anger) with less emulation and more anger, combined with an unconscious homosexuality, and suspicion or mistrust (or paranoia).\textsuperscript{44} Sharpsteen argues for a blend principally of anger, fear and sadness.\textsuperscript{45} Parrott argues for fear of loss, anger, and insecurity.\textsuperscript{46} Kristjánsson plumps for envy, anger and indignation.\textsuperscript{47} Ben-Ze’ev gives a particularly generous list: anger, hostility, resentment and suspicion, as well as love, admiration, and distrust.\textsuperscript{48} As with envy we find no consensus; but affects that would command widespread (if not universal) approval, as an irreducible minimum to operate with, are: anger, envy, hostility, fear of / grief at loss, and damaged self-esteem.\textsuperscript{49} It is perhaps surprising that love is rarely included; possibly it is taken for granted, but perhaps it is simply not necessary: what matters is not that I love the person/object, but that they are mine.\textsuperscript{50}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 289-90; Parrott (1991) 15-16.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Parrott (1991) 16-17; cf. Tov-Ruach (1980) 466-8.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Freud (1922) 223.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Shengold (1994) 619.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Spielman (1971) 78-9. Freud (1922) also argues for a connection between homosexuality and extreme jealousy.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Parrott (1991) 4; Neu (1980) 433 agrees with fear of loss and insecurity.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Kristjánsson (2002) 141-2, 144; Kristjánsson (2006) 17-8.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 301.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Parrott (1991) 18-21 draws attention to the difference between ‘suspicious’ jealousy (when the partner’s infidelity is merely suspected), and ‘fait accompli’ jealousy (when the partner is known to have been unfaithful, or has already left the subject for the rival). In suspicious jealousy, suspicion and fear of loss will be a large part of the jealousy blend. In fait accompli jealousy these are no longer present; however grief will be heightened, as will envy and associated feelings (hostility, aggressiveness, destructive hatred). Parrott notes that since ‘suspicious’ approximates to ‘fait accompli’ jealousy as the patient’s suspicions move from doubt to certainty, the subjective perception of loss is more important than the objective fact.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Wurmser and Jarass (2008c) 15-19 discuss the conflict between love and jealousy: love is theoretically unconditional and about the individuality and unconditional acceptance of the other, while jealousy is about my sexual desires, my loss, my humiliation, my aggression; however love seems almost inherently to contain the capacity to be overpowered by jealousy when sexual desire is frustrated.
\end{itemize}
Hupka argues that jealousy is more properly a type of anger, distinguished by the situations in which it occurs (these situations being culturally determined); thus when societies do not value romantic or monogamous attachments, and when the group is more important than the family or known paternity, jealousy as we know it is not observed. However, as Elster argues: “If a person is unaware of his emotion, it may be because he lives in a society that does not provide a unifying cognitive label for the behavioural and physiological expressions of that particular emotion.” I.e. jealousy may not be commonly observed simply because there is no convenient label for it – it does not necessarily mean that it does not exist in that society.

Like envy, jealousy can be disguised, though as it is more socially acceptable the complexity and variety of disguise is much reduced. However Parrott notes that, while an outside person would perceive jealousy, the patient themselves will most likely experience, or believe they are experiencing, anxious insecurity (in the case of ‘suspicious’ jealousy) or indignant anger (with ‘fait accompli’ jealousy). This may lead to revenge against either the partner (if love turns to hatred) or the rival (if there is a strong admixture of envy). In the absence of such closure, a natural path would be a period of recriminations, followed by some measure of acceptance.

### 2.3.3 Comparison of envy and jealousy

The above analyses concentrate on prototypical envy and jealousy scenarios. By nature such analyses highlight (and exacerbate) differences between the two emotions. Differences so far noted are: (1) envy is a desire for what someone else has, while jealousy is a desire to retain or regain something we see as ours; (2) jealousy involves an exclusive bond with a particular object/person, while envy does not; (3) envy involves social comparison, while jealousy involves personal rivalry; (4) envy is always destructive, while jealousy aims at possession, and only becomes destructive whenfait accompli (which

53 Kristjánsson (2002) 21 makes the same point for other emotions. As mentioned in chapter 1, and as will become clear in chapter 8, Classical Greek exhibits exactly this lack of label.
54 Parrott (1991) 5-6, 18; see n.49 above for these terms.
involves a strong admixture of envy);\textsuperscript{56} (5) envy has relatively more tendency to hatred, while jealousy has relatively more tendency to anger; (6) jealousy is more socially sanctioned than envy, so defences are fewer, while (7) envy tends, both consciously and unconsciously, towards disguise.\textsuperscript{57} Further distinctions have been noted. For instance, envy normally involves two people while jealousy must involve three (or at least a triangular relationship, if one of the three is not a person).\textsuperscript{58} Foster notes that we envy a person, and the possession is only a trigger; however we are jealous of a possession/partner, and perception of a rival is the trigger.\textsuperscript{59} And finally, R.H. Smith \textit{et al.} have found that envy tends to be associated with such affective states as longing, inferiority and self-awareness, while jealousy is more concerned with suspiciousness, anxiety, hurt, and fear of loss.\textsuperscript{60}

While I believe it can be analytically helpful to separate envy from jealousy conceptually so as to understand both better, such sharp distinction over-emphasises their differences at the expense of their similarities. First, in real life people tend to conflate the two: while “envy” is rarely used for a jealousy situation, “jealousy” is frequently used for an envy situation.\textsuperscript{61} Second, many situations (especially three-person situations) involve both envy and jealousy.\textsuperscript{62} Peter Salovey and others have argued that, instead of trying to separate envy

\textsuperscript{56} We might think suspicious jealousy is also destructive, but this is only the case when it leads to extreme anxiety, and the jealous person has become almost convinced of the loss of the loved one/possession – i.e. when suspicious jealousy is \textit{fait accompli}.


\textsuperscript{58} Klein (1957/1975) 181; Spielman (1971) 80; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 289-90; Kristjánsson (2002) 139-40, who notes three-person situations that involve envy rather than jealousy. The two-person/three-person distinction may be too simplistic: Sandell (1993) 1216 argues that in envy, by identifying a despised person in possession of a desired object/attribute, we split a whole-object into two part-objects thus setting up a three-object situation: “Thus, envy turns out to be as much a triangular situation as jealousy, albeit with part-objects where jealousy involves whole-objects.” Laverde-Rubio (2004) also disagrees, for more complex reasons.


\textsuperscript{60} Smith, Kim and Parrott (1988); cf. Parrott and Smith (1993). R.H. Smith and Parrott are prominent among scholars arguing for a sharp distinction between envy and jealousy.

\textsuperscript{61} Smith, Kim and Parrott (1988); Parrott (1991) 24; Parrott and Smith (1993) 906; Salovey and Rodin (1984) 780. Note that the dictionary definition of “jealousy” above does not include “envy” as a synonym, while the definition of “envy” does include “jealousy”. Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 281-2 argues that the one-way confusion of envy and jealousy arises because of the frequency of situations in which these emotions co-occur, and because of the social unacceptability of envy.

\textsuperscript{62} Kristjánsson (2002) 147-8 delivers a strongly worded denunciation of any attempt to distinguish envy from jealousy in the way I have done in this chapter. Kristjánsson’s criticism of (principally) Parrott and R.H. Smith is primarily that their methodologies presuppose their conclusions, and thus the experiments designed merely reinforce those presuppositions; this is not unfounded, though I believe Kristjánsson overstates the case in arguing that envy and jealousy are never distinguishable.
from jealousy as distinct emotions, one should look at situations that combine them.\textsuperscript{63} This ‘situational’ approach sees two rivals O and P, and an object (or person) X: in envy, O has X, while P desires it; in jealousy, P has X, and fears to lose it to O; in rivalry, neither O nor P have X, but both try to possess it.\textsuperscript{64} Instead of focusing on the distinction between envy and jealousy (conflating possessive and sexual jealousy in the latter), this approach therefore distinguishes between social comparison situations and sexual ones, both of which might involve any combination of envy and jealousy.\textsuperscript{65} This situational approach is a more helpful analytical tool. It is a rare situation that will clearly involve either envy or jealousy alone (and the sharp distinction is undermined even further if we consider that envy is generally seen as part of the jealousy complex). More useful is to recognise that there are many situations that will involve some combination of envy and jealousy, and the prototypical scenarios above can help us pinpoint where these occur.\textsuperscript{66} As will become clear later, Greek \textit{phthonos} covers both English envy and possessive jealousy (see chs.3-4), while Greek sexual jealousy seems necessarily to involve \textit{phthonos} (see ch.8). While the envy and jealousy prototypes will therefore be useful as an analytical tool for reading Greek ‘scripts’, we should be wary therefore of concentrating on one English emotion to the complete exclusion of the other. \textit{Phthonos} scripts may involve both envy and (possessive) jealousy; and sexual jealousy scripts in Greek (as in English) can involve envy.

\section*{2.4 Emotions that overlap with envy and jealousy}

To achieve a full understanding of the psychological make-up of envy and jealousy, and to ensure that we have the tools to identify them properly, we must first compare and contrast them with a number of other related emotions.\textsuperscript{67} In this section I consider emotions that have similarities to envy and jealousy.

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\textsuperscript{64} Salovey (1991b) 265-6; cf. Salovey and Rodin (1986) 1111: “Envy may merely be jealousy in a social-comparison context.”
\textsuperscript{65} Salovey and Rodin (1986). However, it is clear that even the ‘situational’ approach does not totally elide the difference between envy and jealousy.
\textsuperscript{66} Rather than being used primarily to distinguish envy from jealousy.
\textsuperscript{67} Kristjánsson (2002) 137 makes the same point regarding jealousy. In general the psychological literature distinguishes other emotions only from envy; however I footnote my own deductions as to how they will relate to jealousy (see n.78, n.81, n.84, n.90, n.96, n.107 below).
2.4.1 Emulation and admiration

It has often been pointed out that there are two possible responses to the three perceptions listed as antecedent conditions for envy (or at least similar perceptions): malicious envy, and another emotion. Envy will cause the patient to balance things out by depriving the agent of whatever has caused the envy; the other emotion accepts the merit of the agent, and will instead cause the patient to focus on his own shortcomings. This second emotion is termed “non-malicious envy” by Parrott, “admiring envy” by Jerome Neu, and connected to (if not identified with) admiration by Ben-Ze’ev and Sandell.

However, admiration differs from this second emotion, which I term “emulation”, due to the lack or presence of a desire to improve myself. Ben-Ze’ev says “admiration” requires that, when I consider another person with an object/attribute I desire, my feelings are entirely directed towards him and are entirely positive. This will only happen when I consider him to be outside my reference group (e.g. because he is not similar to myself, or is not nearby). If I want to be rich, I might admire Bill Gates, but envy my neighbour on a slightly higher salary than me: my neighbour is within my reference group; Bill Gates is not. Sandell takes a slightly different view. He notes, perceptively, that in admiration we do not separate the desired object/attribute from the agent (the agent effectively becomes a “trait-object”) – for instance, we may think we admire Bill Gates for being a successful businessman, but what we really admire is Bill-Gates-the-successful-businessman; we might know nothing else about him, and so do not separate the individual from the admired quality. However, in envy, we do separate the agent (whom we despise) from the object/attribute (which we desire). It is admiration, not envy, that is properly a two-object emotion. However looked at, though, admiration does not necessarily drive us to take any action.

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68 “Something good happened to them; it didn’t happen to me; this is bad”, to use the weak version in Wierzbicka (1999) 98; however see n.69 below.
69 Parrott (1991) 9; Neu (1980) 433-4; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 304; Sandell (1993) 1213. Wierzbicka (1999) 98 refuses to distinguish between the two, hence her softer version of the three antecedent perceptions. La Caze (2001) 32 also does not appear to distinguish them, merely referring to “other forms of envy” including a “mild response to a friend’s good fortune”.
70 “Emulation” is both less cumbersome and less susceptible of ambiguity than “admiring envy” or “non-malicious envy”; cf. Kristjánsson (2002) 139.
71 Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 304. In this view, if he is inside my reference group I will not simply feel admiration.
“Emulation”, though, requires that when I see someone with that vital object/attribute, I am motivated to improve myself.\textsuperscript{73} I decide to work hard so as to gain a promotion to a similar salary-band as my colleague, or to be able to buy the same type of sports car or take holidays in similarly fashionable resorts. However, this is different from envy, which might motivate me to circulate malicious rumours about him at work, scratch his car, or break his legs just before his skiing trip (i.e. destructive, agent-focused actions). It is a matter of controversy whether emulation is a type of envy.\textsuperscript{74} There is no doubt that many see it as a benign form of envy, a view that is strengthened by the first-person comment “I envy you”.\textsuperscript{75} However, my view is that properly it is not a type of envy. While the antecedent perceptions may be similar, they are not identical: envy notes “You have something, but you should not”; emulation notes “You have something, and I want it too”.\textsuperscript{76} When it comes to the third antecedent condition (“This is wrong”), envy focuses primarily on the agent losing the good, but emulation on the patient acquiring such a good too. Envy expresses itself in the language of rights (“should”),\textsuperscript{77} emulation in the language of desires (“want”). These differences may be a matter of self-esteem; they may have a psychological basis (e.g. a tendency to introspection compared to a resentment of Fate); they may be culture driven (some cultures prize equality of outcome, some hard work and appropriate remuneration, more than others); or they may be due to personal distinctions (i.e. ‘character’). For whatever reasons, there is a difference in an antecedent condition, which drives differences in both affective response and resulting action tendency. It is clear, therefore, that at every stage of the emotional episode emulation works differently

\textsuperscript{73} Silver and Sabini (1978b).
\textsuperscript{74} Parrott (1991) 10, with references; Parrott inconsistently includes non-malicious envy within envy because laypersons use “envy” to mean both, while separating envy and jealousy despite laypersons often using “jealousy” to mean “envy”.
\textsuperscript{75} If someone says “I envy you”, they are not expressing malicious hostility, but rather a kind of admiration or emulation. Schoeck (1966/1969) 14 argues that this is because it is taboo to express genuine malicious envy; accordingly the phrase “I envy you” is deemed non-malicious. An alternative interpretation can be explained by the view of Parrott and Harré (1996) 42 that stating that we feel an emotion is often a socially sanctioned way of saying something different (e.g. they see a first-person statement of anger as a “ritual rebuke rather than an expression of genuine anger”, and similarly a first-person statement of embarrassment is “a ritual opening for presenting an apology”). In a similar way, Silver and Sabini (1978a) 106 believe the phrase “I envy you” expresses a compliment – i.e. the first-person statement of envy is part of the hyperbole of the compliment. Conversely, Foster (1972) 172-3 links compliments to envy proper, and Elster (1999) 77 argues that “damning by faint praise may ... be an indirect behavioural effect of envy”.
\textsuperscript{76} Kristjánsson (2002) 139. Clearly this cannot operate in zero-sum situations, or where the nature of the good does not allow possession by more than one person.
\textsuperscript{77} Though, as we saw above (pp.27-8), this is a transmutation to a publicly acceptable rationale.
from envy. At best they are kindred reactions to similar situations; one is not a subset of the other. As with jealousy and envy, we can note the philological overlap between (the layperson’s) envy and emulation, but should be wary of confusing the phenomena.78

2.4.2 Greed and covetousness

There has not been much research published on the connection of envy and jealousy with these two emotions. Klein notes the similarity between envy and greed, as both are “impetuous and insatiable craving[s], exceeding what the subject needs and what the object is able and willing to give”.79 However, she distinguishes them by noting that greed is merely introjective, envy also projective:80 greed makes us desire someone else’s good, but that other person is largely irrelevant; envy will accompany our desire for the good with a stronger one to deprive the other person of it. If the good cannot be acquired, envy will try to destroy it (or the rival), while greed will merely remain frustrated.81 We can see that, as with emulation, there has been a change to the antecedent conditions, this time to the first condition: instead of “Someone else has a good”, greed says “There is a good” (both being followed in the same way by “I do not have it” and “This is bad”). The absence of a reference to another person explains why other affects are not triggered ( emulation, anger, hostility etc.), and the different action tendency.

Covetousness is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as inordinate desire or lust for another’s possessions. Ben-Ze’ev notes that it involves desiring what someone else possesses with “an excessive or culpable desire”; however, where envy is a two-person emotion, covetousness is really a one-person emotion – it is “concerned with having something”, while envy is “concerned with someone who has something”.82 Covetousness, then, sounds very similar to greed. A possible distinction may lie in the emphasis placed

78 There is no connection between emulation and jealousy: emulation only operates when not in possession of the desired good; it makes no comment about the other person’s continued possession as well; and it does not involve either an exclusive bond or a unique object.
80 Klein (1957/1975) 181.
81 Greed can also operate when we already possess an object (we can be greedy to keep it), so by analogy it can be related to jealousy in the same way: greed wants to hold on to everything we have, but with no reference to who else might possess it, while jealousy necessarily perceives a rival.
82 Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 303; Kristjánsson (2002) 138-9 makes the same point. Frankel and Sherick (1977) (see ch.1 n.8) suggest that covetousness (and greed) is developmentally prior to envy in young children.
on getting more than one needs: I might covet my neighbour’s ass because I need an ass,\textsuperscript{83} but I am less likely to do so if I do not; I might, however, still be greedy for it as a possession. A stronger distinction is that covetousness does seem in fact to involve some reference to a current possessor. This may only be suggested by the familiarity of the aforementioned biblical injunction; however it is hard to think of “coveting” (as opposed to merely desiring) something that belongs to no one. It is possible then that we should put coveting somewhere between emulation and envy: emulation wants what someone else has, without a desire to deprive them; coveting wants what someone else has, with a desire to deprive them;\textsuperscript{84} envy wants to deprive them, but is less concerned with obtaining it.\textsuperscript{85} Greed would then differ from coveting by not referring to a current possessor.\textsuperscript{86}

2.4.3 Schadenfreude, spite and malice

R.H. Smith \textit{et al.} note that envy, a painful feeling, is linked to \textit{Schadenfreude}, a pleasurable one. They argue that this is because envy involves a feeling of inadequacy and a sense of injustice, leading to hostility and dislike of the envied person. When the latter suffers a misfortune, the patient’s invidious dislike makes him feel his misfortune has somehow been earned, which gives him pleasure.\textsuperscript{87} This pleasure in another’s misfortune, a misfortune that is subjectively seen as deserved, has no English name – the German word \textit{Schadenfreude} (\textit{Schaden} meaning “harm, damage, injury”, \textit{Freude} meaning “joy”) is generally used. This misfortune need not directly “right the wrong” (or counter the perception) that led to the envy;\textsuperscript{88} for instance, we can feel \textit{Schadenfreude} at our rich (hence envied) neighbour’s car being damaged – he is no less rich, but we feel that on some level he “deserves” it. This feeling that someone “deserves” the misfortune, a feeling that derives from the invidious comparison, is important – Anna Wierzbicka points out that sadism is also a pleasure taken in another’s misfortune, but it lacks this element (among

\textsuperscript{83} Referring to \textit{Exodus} 20.17.
\textsuperscript{84} Coveting has fewer differences from jealousy than emulation does (n.78 above), as it does refer to an alternative possessor, and does involve an exclusive bond; however it is still incompatible with jealousy since it does not involve a unique object (any ass will do), nor can it operate when we are in possession of the good.
\textsuperscript{85} On this interpretation, covetousness and envy are very close to each other; one could make a case for seeing covetousness as a subset of envy.
\textsuperscript{86} Unless one defines greed as wanting more than your fair share, as this would also bring in a reference to other possessors or potential possessors, though in the plural and perhaps less clearly identifiable.
\textsuperscript{88} R.H. Smith \textit{et al.} (1996) 159.
Experiments have shown that invidious comparison is necessary for *Schadenfreude* to be felt. Like envy, *Schadenfreude* is based on the subjective perceptions of the interested party: the misfortune may, or may not, be seen by disinterested parties (i.e. those with no personal desire for the envied good) as deserved.

*Schadenfreude* is seen as a shameful emotion, like envy, and similarly it tends to be concealed in public – a certain guilt attaches. However, as with envy, an alternative to concealment is a mask: the envious person, when he feels *Schadenfreude*, might consciously (through misrepresentation) or unconsciously (through transmutation) attempt to show that the agent’s misfortune was objectively deserved. This is analogous to an envious person attempting to show that someone’s good fortune is objectively undeserved, concealing their envy with the mask of indignation. This suggests that *Schadenfreude* (like envy) is bivalent, that it can be felt both when the misfortune is subjectively, but also objectively, deserved: i.e. I would not, in fact, need to envy someone to think they “got their comeuppance”. However, when invidious comparison is not present, we may believe someone has “got their comeuppance”, but we will not feel pleasure at it, merely satisfaction – the pleasurable element is solely derived from our prior envy. The mask of *Schadenfreude*, then, lies in persuading others that we have not taken pleasure in another’s misfortune, merely that we feel satisfied that a wrong has been righted, that someone undeserving of his good fortune has been “taken down a peg or two”.

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89 Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 356, 369 and Wierzbicka (1999) 103-4 note this distinction, and that the misfortune should not be serious in *Schadenfreude*, but it might be in sadism. Other differences include that sadism takes an active part in the misfortune while *Schadenfreude* does not, sadism is narrower in focus and less discriminate in object, and it is linked to sex, physical pain, humiliation and notions of control – none of which are applicable to *Schadenfreude*. Klein (1957/1975) 176 believes that sadism is an element of envy.

90 R.H. Smith *et al.* (1996) 159, 167; Brigham *et al.* (1997) 364-5. As jealousy can involve envy in its blend (see p.30), a jealous person can also feel *Schadenfreude* for his rival.

91 Brigham *et al.* (1997) 375-6. For misfortune that is seen as deserved even by disinterested parties, see ch.2.5.1.

92 Brigham *et al.* (1997) 365; Parrott (1991) 13-4 notes guilt can be part of envy too; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 367-8 compares the desires to conceal envy and *Schadenfreude* (which he terms “pleasure-in-others’-misfortune”). See n.29 above.


94 By which I mean, from the point of view of the patient, and that of personally disinterested observers – see n.100 below.

95 Kristjánsson (2006) 96 refers to this feeling, which stands in the same relation to indignation as *Schadenfreude* does to envy, as “satisfied indignation”. We could say that envy and *Schadenfreude* both seek to hide one’s subjective involvement behind a veneer of disinterestedness.
Spite and malice (the two words seem to imply the same phenomenon, and differ merely in their idiomatic usage) are similar to Schadenfreude inasmuch as they are invidious: we act to spite someone to whom we have an invidious hostility, and “malice” likewise involves an active hostility. However they differ in that spite and malice in some way involve action by the patient against the agent; Schadenfreude, however, does not.

2.5 Emotions that envy and jealousy masquerade as

Having considered how to distinguish envy and jealousy from a range of related emotions, I now turn to those they overtly masquerade as, through either transmutation (unconscious masking/veiling), or through misrepresentation (conscious masking/veiling).

2.5.1 Indignation and anger

Ben-Ze’ev has noted that envy appears to have two concerns: first, with our own inferiority; second, with someone else’s undeserved superiority. He has argued, persuasively, that it is in fact the former that is properly envy, while the latter is indignation or (as he terms it) resentment. There are two issues here: perceived inferiority/superiority, and desert. Envy often positions itself as a moral emotion (“He shouldn’t have that”, “It’s not right”); however this is a mask – envy can never be moral. If a disinterested observer would also see the difference in outcome as unfair or morally wrong, then the agent will not deserve his superiority, and so the patient’s moral outrage will be justified – this is indignation. However, if the patient argues that an agent’s possession of a good is wrong or not fair, while disinterested observers believe the patient’s

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96 Rawls (1999) 467-8. This invidious hostility means we can act to spite someone we are jealous of too.
97 See pp.27-8 on the transmutation of envy, p.31 on that of jealousy.
98 Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 282-4, 287-8; cf. Rawls (1999) 467, R.H. Smith (1991) 81ff. I generally prefer to use ‘indignation’, as ‘resentment’ has occasionally been used when the moral emotion ‘indignation’ and the immoral one ‘envy’ have been conflated (as I intentionally sometimes use ‘resentment’ in ch.5, ch.6, for reasons that will become clear there) – e.g. La Caze (2001); cf. see Van Hooft (2002) 146. Even more confusingly, the French ressentiment has (particularly because of Scheler’s tract of the same name) been used widely in the literature on envy – Scheler (1915/2007) 25 described ressentiment as including “revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to detract, and spite.”
99 Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 283-5; Parrott (1991) 10-11; Rawls (1999) 467. R.H. Smith (1991) 81ff. for a contrary view, though he confuses the personal sense of moral outrage that is often part of envy with disinterested indignation. La Caze (2001) 35 also seems to believe that envy can be moral, but that is because she distinguishes indignation concerning a good we want for ourselves from indignation concerning a good we do not, and calls the former ‘moral envy’ – I cannot see any justification for this distinction; Ben-Ze’ev (2002) also argues that La Caze is mistaken.
inferiority is deserved, then while the patient may think he feels indignation, observers will correctly perceive him to be experiencing envy.\textsuperscript{100} As Parrott points out: “The distinction between resentment and malicious envy is one that is made using the objective facts of the social world…”\textsuperscript{101} Parrott notes that the patient may realise that his resentment is not justified, that his indignation is not so righteous after all. When he does, he may not give over his resentment, but may shift its focus from the agent to a more generalised dissatisfaction with “the unfairness of life itself”.\textsuperscript{102} While envy tends to mask itself, true indignation, being personally disinterested and hence socially sanctioned, has no need of a mask. Similarly, while envy seeks the destruction of the envied person or desired (but unattainable) object, indignation, being a less personally-interested emotion directed at someone breaching collective boundaries, merely seeks appropriate punishment. Because of the high frequency of transmutation or masking of envy, the ‘outsider’s’ evaluation of the facts can be crucial in determining whether expressed indignation is truly indignation, or really envy in disguise: indignation will only properly be felt at someone who does not deserve the object/attribute in question; envy masquerading as indignation will be felt irrespective of whether he deserves it or not.

Both Parrott and Ben-Ze’ev note that indignation/resentment is more akin to anger than to envy.\textsuperscript{103} But is there a qualitative difference between indignation and anger, or is it merely a matter of degree? The psychological/psychoanalytical literature on envy tends to conflate the two.\textsuperscript{104} However, Wierzbicka says that anger is agent-specific, while indignation is more generalised,\textsuperscript{105} and Ben-Ze’ev similarly suggests that indignation is a response to a transgression of societal norms, while anger is a response to a more personal

\textsuperscript{100} When I talk about disinterested observers here, I am not referring to some objective ‘truth’, rather I mean personally disinterested; they may still be interested from a societal point of view. Thus possession of the good may appear wrong to the individual but be socially sanctioned (envy transmuted into indignation), or appear wrong both to the individual and the observer (genuine indignation). Objective ‘truths’ are an irrelevance: they are of necessity independent of observers, and it is only observers (whether personally or only socially involved) who can have emotions. We can note that different people in different societies, or even within the one society, may agree with the individual personally involved, while others do not: i.e. what some refer to as “fair”, others may call “the politics of envy” – see Cairns (2003b) 235-8. This suggests that in practice an attribution of envy will depend on one’s point of view, and in later chapters I demonstrate how Athenians manipulated listeners’ points of view, so as to portray an opponent as motivated by envy (see especially ch.5.2).

\textsuperscript{101} Parrott (1991) 11.

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Ibid}.


\textsuperscript{104} And, incidentally, also conflates anger with hatred in an ambiguous “hostility”.

\textsuperscript{105} Wierzbicka (1999) 87-90; she also says that it contains some element of surprise.
transgression. This is plausible, and if true suggests that a patient will misrepresent or transmute his envy sometimes into one, and sometimes into the other.

2.5.2 Desire for justice, and desire for equality

A related emotion that envy is also frequently transmuted into or misrepresented as, is a desire for “justice” or “equality”. Those who are envious often express themselves with such comments as, “You’re no better than the rest of us!”, or “Why should he have that, we haven’t?”, or “That’s an obscene amount to earn!”. There are similarities here to moral indignation, but whereas that emotion is aroused by someone stepping outside of socially agreed norms of behaviour, the desire for justice appeals to a more universal abstraction.

It initially seems somewhat controversial as to whether there is a justice element to envy: Ben-Ze’ev and Rawls, for instance, argue that there is not, R.H. Smith that there is. However, the two camps miss each other’s points. Ben-Ze’ev and Rawls argue from a personally disinterested, R.H. Smith from a personally interested, standpoint. Just as with indignation/resentment, someone who is envious might think he is motivated by a sense of injustice – this would, after all, merely mean his invidious hostility has been transmuted rather than misrepresented. In that sense, the sense of injustice is indeed often central to envy, as R.H. Smith asserts. However, even R.H. Smith does not believe that a disinterested observer will corroborate that personally interested sense of injustice.

106 Ben-Ze’ev (2002) 152-3, who goes on to argue that anger is more transient than indignation (or ‘resentment’, as he terms it), and that it is more inclined to seek redress.
107 It also suggests that envy will be relatively more likely to masquerade as indignation, while jealousy will be relatively more likely to masquerade as anger.
108 Elster (1999) 350 describes “rewriting the triggering situation as a violation of some impartial standard of fairness, justice, or entitlement” as a transmutation of passion into reason, or “passion into passion, mediated by reason”. Considering n.100 above, we might say that indignation refers to expected norms, while desire for justice refers (incorrectly) to an objective truth.
109 See n.99 above. La Caze (2001) 35-6 too makes the same error with a sense of injustice as she does with ‘moral envy’.
110 R.H. Smith does not appear to be aware of the distinction between transmutation and misrepresentation. He seems to argue that the envious person will always be aware that his feeling of injustice is partial, and will therefore always be aware that he should keep his (invidious) hostility to himself; when he knows his hostility (i.e. sense of injustice) is shared, that is when he will speak out – R.H. Smith (1991) 85-6. However R.H. Smith then immediately cites a literary example (most of his examples are taken from literature) who is unaware that his hostility is partial (Cassius in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, who appears to persuade an audience that he was right to kill Caesar, until Mark Antony persuades them he is motivated by envy (86-7)), thus undermining his own argument.
A desire for equality is related to the desire for justice, and like the latter can be argued for as a ‘just’ end in itself: some societies will aim to redistribute goods,\textsuperscript{111} not to manage a specific instance of envy, but in an attempt to lessen the level of envy in society more generally.\textsuperscript{112} Rawls argues that there are three conditions required for general envy: 1) that people feel undervalued, and do not think they can do anything about it; 2) this is felt as “painful and humiliating”, and social conditions are such that this painful and humiliating situation is constantly brought to one’s attention; 3) their social position gives no alternative to trying to pull down the rich, even at some loss to themselves. Societies that try to manage envy (or, from Rawls’ point of view, societies that set out to create just institutions) will aim to ameliorate one or more of these conditions – for instance by forbidding ostentatious displays of wealth, by placing burdens on wealthier citizens, or by enshrining citizen rights that enhance the status even of the lowliest.\textsuperscript{113} This may well not do any good, however: many psychologists believe that reduced inequality is at least as likely to lead to a rise as a fall in envy, due to the oft-noted tendency of envy to be directed at one’s peers.\textsuperscript{114} Ben-Ze’ev notes two distinctions between envy and a genuine desire for equality: the former will only call for equality when it favours the envious person, while the latter will call for it when it disadvantages them as well; second, envy will also occur in respect of goods which cannot be equal by their very nature – e.g. beauty or intelligence.\textsuperscript{115}

\section*{2.6 Conclusion}

Envy is a hostile emotion, usually felt for our peers, when they have some object or attribute we want. It is characterised by a stronger desire for them to be deprived of the object/attribute than for us to acquire it ourselves, and motivates us to act even if depriving them means losing something ourselves as well. Its action tendency is highly destructive, both to the desired good and its current possessor, and operates through such expression as

\textsuperscript{111} At least, alienable goods such as money or property; inalienable goods such as beauty cannot be apportioned evenly.
\textsuperscript{112} Rawls (1999) 468-9 distinguishes between particular, and general, envy.
\textsuperscript{113} Rawls (1999) 469-71. Rawls argues (471) that some, e.g. Schoeck (1966/1969), see all “tendency to equality … [as] the expression of envy”; Neu (1980) 437-9 disagrees strongly with Schoeck. Kristjánsson (2006) 83 notes that we have a concept of justice-based emotions from early childhood, and since we are not aware of legal institutions at that stage, our innate sense of ’what justice is’ is essentially pre-institutional.
\textsuperscript{114} Silver and Sabini (1978a) 107; Parrott (1991) 7; Elster (1999) 170; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 316; Ben-Ze’ev (2002) 151; see also my comment on Aristotle in n.10 above. None of these studies, however, quote any experiential evidence for decreased equality leading to a rise in envy.
physical aggression, gossip and slander, compliments designed to arouse the Evil Eye or invidious feelings in others, and curses or other types of black magic. Envy has a tendency to disguise itself as moral indignation, or some disinterested desire for justice or equality, but in fact it is never a moral emotion as the invidious hostility blinds the patient to the agent’s true deserts.

Jealousy differs from envy in a number of respects, but has many similarities too. It is principally felt when there is some object/person with which/whom we see ourselves as having an exclusive bond. It frequently includes envy in its blend, along with anger, hostility, and potentially suspicion, fear of loss, or grief. It necessarily takes place in a three-person scenario (unless possessive rather than sexual jealousy, when one person can be replaced by an object), whereas envy can (and usually does) occur in a two-person scenario; three-person scenarios tend to contain various mixtures of rivalry, envy and jealousy. Jealousy carries less of a social stigma than envy, and so has less tendency to disguise itself; when it does, righteous anger is the usual mask.

Envy overlaps with, has similarities to, or can coexist with a large variety of other emotions: jealousy, emulation, covetousness and greed, spite and malice, and Schadenfreude. Of these we should particularly note that envy can be mislabelled as jealousy, though this does not occur in reverse. Emulation is sometimes mislabelled as envy, especially in first-person attributions such as “I envy you” – however true envy is such a socially taboo emotion that it is in fact almost never claimed. Spite, malice and (particularly) Schadenfreude are contingent on envy: without invidious comparison they cannot be felt.
Part II
Chapter 3: The Vocabulary of Greek Envy and Jealousy

3.1 Introduction

The two Greek words most closely related to envy/jealousy are phthonos and zêlos,¹ and this chapter accordingly concentrates on these and their cognates.² While my focus in this thesis is on the Classical period, I begin my lexical survey by examining the evidence for phthonos and zêlos in the Archaic period. Given the somewhat sketchy nature of the Archaic evidence, it is not totally clear if differences of meaning reflect diachronic development or generic differences (the evidence suggests the latter); certainly by the fifth century both terms had developed the meanings they later held more or less unchanged. Zêlos having been shown to be of limited relevance to envy/jealousy, I cover its Classical usage as an addendum to my Archaic survey, before moving on to a detailed survey of phthonos in the Classical period.

3.2 The Archaic background

Before considering phthonos and zêlos separately, I want first to look at the earliest passage in Greek literature where they are placed side by side. In a famous passage in Works and Days, Hesiod links both phthonos and zêlos to rivalry:

Οὐκ ἂρα μοῦνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλὰ ἔπὶ γαῖαν
eioi δύω· τὴν μέν κεν ἐπαινήσει νοῆσας,
ἡ δ’ ἐπισκόμμητ’· διὰ δ’ ἀνδίχα θυμόν ἔχουσιν.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμον τε κακὸν καὶ δὴριν ὀφέλλει,
σχετλίη· οὗ τῆς γε φιλεῖ βροτός, ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκη
ἀθανάτων βουλήσαν ἔριν τιμώσας βαρείαν.
τὴν δ’ έτέρην προτέρην μὲν ἐγείνατο Νῦξ ἐρεβενή,
θήκε δὲ μιν Κρονίδης ψυίζυγος, αἰθέρι ναίων,
γαῖης [τ’] ἐν ῥίζῃσι καὶ ἀνδράσι πολλῶν ἀμεινώ.
ἡ τε καὶ ἀπάλαμον περ ὁμώς ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρειν,
εἰς ἐτερον γὰρ τίς τε ἰδεῖν ἐργοῖο χατίζων
Pλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει μὲν ἀρόμεναι ἡδὲ φυτεύειν

¹ See Walcot (1978). ² (whose claim that phthonos should be always translated as envy and zêlos as jealousy I disagree with, as will become clear), and the individual contributions to Konstan and Rutter (2003), which mostly focus on these two words.

² Other words can occasionally imply the idea of begrudging envy or resentment (e.g. agaasthai and megairein – see ch.7 n.33), but too infrequently to be of interest to the phenomenology.
Not only one Strife was born, but upon the earth there are two: those who know her praise the one, the other is blamed; and this is because they have a different spirit. For the one is cruel, tending to war, evil, and contest; no mortal loves her, but only under compulsion of the will of the immortals do they honour heavy Strife. The other, dark Night bore first, and high-throned Zeus, dwelling in the air, placed her in the roots of the earth – and she is much kinder to men. She rouses even the good-for-nothing to work: for someone in need of work saw another getting wealthy, and so hastens to plough and nurture, and put his house in order; and neighbour emulates neighbour, hastening to wealth; for this Strife is good for mortals. And potter grudges potter and carpenter, carpenter; and beggar envies beggar and bard, bard. O Perses, put this by in your heart, and do not let evil-loving Strife keep your heart from work, watching a wrangle, and being attentive to the market place.

Hesiod identifies two types of Eris (Strife), conventionally labelled Bad Strife and Good Strife – though perhaps better reflected in the difference between English “strife” and “striving”. Bad Strife (or “strife”) is “cruel, tending to war, evil, and contest”. This is destructive rivalry, which Hesiod had already depicted as a daughter of Night in Theogony, and which is itself the parent of painful Toil, Forgetfulness, Famine, tearful Pains, Battles, Murders, Quarrels etc. (Theog. 223ff.), and this Strife is briefly revisited at Op. 14-16. However Hesiod now introduces Good Strife (or “striving”), on which he prefers to concentrate. Good Strife is emulative rivalry: we see someone else doing well, and we are encouraged to emulate them, to work to achieve the same ends, and both we and they end up better off for the rivalry. In English this is clearly what we call “ emulation” (see p.35), and we will later see that this matches Aristotle’s definition of zêlos in Greek (see p.72).

3 West, (1978) 142, 144.
4 We should note that both Bad and Good Strife are respectively bad and good in terms of their result, not of their psychology.
Hesiod too uses the verb *zêloô*, saying “neighbour emulates neighbour”. However, *contra* Bulman’s suggestion that *zêlos* and *phthonos* are related respectively by Hesiod to Good and Bad Strife,⁵ Hesiod goes on immediately to say “And potter grudges (*koteei*) potter and carpenter, carpenter; and beggar envies (*phthoneei*) beggar and bard, bard.” (Op. 25-6), the initial “and” showing that both *kotos* and *phthonos* also relate to Good Strife. This conclusion has been regularly rejected by scholars, on the grounds that what Hesiod says contradicts our usual understanding of *phthonos* (and *kotos*),⁶ but it is an inescapable conclusion from the καί: *phthonos* and *zêlos* are more or less equivalents here, and both relate to professional, emulative rivalry between neighbours.⁷ This suggests that the later sharp division between *phthonos* and *zêlos* (which will become clear later in this section, and to which Aristotle refers – see p.72) might not yet have developed by Hesiod’s time,⁸ and this should be borne in mind when considering the rest of the Archaic evidence.

### 3.2.1 The development of *phthonos* in the Archaic period

*Phthonos*, or rather the verb *phthoneô*, occurs ten times in Homer. In all instances bar one (*Il. 4.55, 4.56, Od. 1.346, 6.68, 11.381, 17.400, 18.16, 19.348; and *epiphthoneô* at *Od. 11.149*) the word is used of gods or heroes, and means “refuse” or “begrudge”.⁹ The one exception is when it is used of the beggar Iros (*Od. 18.18*), where it means “resent” or “envy”: “Stranger, I neither do nor say anything bad to you, nor do I begrudge someone taking even a lot and giving it to you. This threshold will hold us both, and you should not resent/envy things which belong to others.” (*Od. 18.15-18: δαιµόνι', ὅτε τί σε ἄρεξο ω κακόν οὔτ' ἀγορεύω, οὔτε τινὰ φθονέω δόμεναι καὶ πόλλ' ἀνέλοντα. οὔδ' ἀμφοτέρους ὄδε χείσται, οὔδε τί σε χρῆ ἀλλοτρίων φθονέειν·*). It seems that in Homer *phthoneô* could refer to envy, but generally did not. Most suggests, plausibly, that the

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⁵ Bulman (1992) 7.
⁶ West (1978) 147: “κότος and φθόνος are not in the spirit of the good Eris, *but* [my italics] the idea of rivalry makes the lines relevant enough for Hesiod…”, cf. Duran Lopez (1996) 387. Most (2003) 130-2 does not directly contradict Hesiod, but does conflate *phthonos* and *zêlos* when talking about Hesiod’s good and bad envy, the bad relating to *Op. 195 – see p.52 below.
⁷ In sociological terms, they have a shared origin in status distinctions in a peer group. Walcot (1978) 3 highlights “three basic categories of [Greek mortal] envy, … ‘professional envy’, ‘sibling envy’ and ‘sexual envy’.”
⁸ It is possible that Hesiod’s could merely be an idiosyncratic usage, though the nature of our evidence makes it hard to track the idiosyncratic.
⁹ Most (2003) 129 – he prefers the translation “to wish to forbid”, though I find this cumbersome; it also overlooks the continuity that *phthonos* can imply begrudging from Homer through to Aristotle and beyond.
reason for envy’s near absence from Homer is that it is unheroic; this is supported by the fact that we do see it (i.e. it was not a meaning that developed later), but only in an unheroic character. Envy could appear much more readily in Hesiod’s Works & Days then,\(^\text{10}\) because of the mortal and unheroic subject of the poem.\(^\text{11}\)

In lyric poetry, which is frequently concerned with the relationship between prominent individuals in the real (i.e. non-heroic) world, we find *phthonos* taking on more of a tone of envy – and particularly of destructive envy. Mimnermos contrasts feeling envy for a live man of great fame with praising a dead one (fr.25(West)1-2: δεινοὶ ἵνα ἀνδρὶ πάντες ἐσµὲν εὐκλεεῖ / ζῶντι φθονῆσαι, κατθανόντα δ’ αἰνέσαι.).\(^\text{12}\) A number of sayings are recorded under the heading of the ‘Seven Sages’.\(^\text{13}\) “Envy no one” (*Apophth.* fr.7.3(Mullach): μηδενὶ φθόνει). “Do not feel envy for mortal goods” (*Sent.* fr.1.31 p.216(Mullach): μὴ φθόνει θυτά). “Flee the envy of all, and guard against the plots of those who hate you” (*Apophth.* fr.1.7(Mullach): φεῦγε μὲν τὸν φθόνον τῶν πολλῶν, φυλάσσου δὲ τὰς ἐπιβουλὰς τῶν μισοῦντων). “As the red blight is a disease peculiar to food, so envy is a sickness of friendship” (*Apophth.* fr.7.4(Mullach): ὠσπερ ἢ ἐρυσίβη ἰδιὸν ἐστι τοῦ σίτου νόσημα, οὐτω φθόνος φιλίας ἐστιν ἀῤῥώστημα).\(^\text{14}\) “As rust attaches to iron, so *phthonos* does to the possessing soul itself” (*Apophth.* fr.7.5(Mullach): ὠσπερ ὁ ἴδος σίδηρον, οὐτως ὁ φθόνος τὴν ἐξουσιν αὐτὸν ψυχήν ἐξαναψήχει). “For however much you might envy, so much do you become a patron of greater goods to the envied” (*Apophth.* fr.7.6(Mullach): ὅσω γὰρ ἀν φθονῆσ, τοσούτω μειζόνων γίνη πρόξενος ἁγαθῶν τῷ φθονουμένῳ). “Having been shot in a hunt by a brother, he dies saying he was saved outside Greece by his repute, but destroyed in his house out of envy” (*Apophth.* fr.10.30.3-5(Mullach): τοξευθεὶς ἐν κυνηγεσίῳ πρὸς τάδελφον τελευτά εἰπών, διὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος σωθῆναι, διὰ δὲ τὸν φθόνον ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀπολέσθαι). Begrudging is still a possible meaning, however, e.g. in Theognis: “The servant and messenger of the Muses must, if he knows something uncommon, not be

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\(^\text{10}\) Whether as *phthonos* or *zêlos*, which Hesiod uses as equivalents (see p.47, p.52).

\(^\text{11}\) Most (2003) 132. In Archaic epic, the only other uses of *phthonos*-words are four instances of ἄφθονος (Hes. *Op.* 118; *Hom. Hymn.* 3.536, 30.8, 30.16), a word meaning “abundant, plentiful, generous” – etymologically formed *a-phthonos*, this is again closer in meaning to “ungrudging” than “unenvious”.

\(^\text{12}\) Arist. *Rh.* 2.10.1388a9-11 notes that one does not feel rivalry, and hence envy, for the dead. The opposition of envy and praise occurs again in Pindar – see p.50.

\(^\text{13}\) These are Archaic if genuine, though some may be later mis-attributions.

\(^\text{14}\) This rather strange (to us) idea that *phthonos* is only felt for friends finds its echo in Pl. *Phlb.* 48a8-50a9 – see p.126-8.
grudging of his wisdom” (769-770: ἵνα Μουσῶν θεράποντα καὶ ἄγγελον, εἶ τι περισσόν / εἰδείη, σοφίς μὴ φθονερὸν τελέθειν). In Lyric then, it is clear that *phthonos* is used in its expected (i.e. Classical) sense of (be)grudging or destructive envy: *phthonos* is felt against someone who has desired possessions; it is linked with hatred; and it leads to destructive actions.\(^{15}\) Finally, it is something that can be felt even against a friend or a brother. It is also felt against neighbours, i.e. our peers, as Pindar notes: “Then one of the envious neighbours straightaway secretly told the tale” (*Ol*. 1.47: ἔννεπε κρυφὰ τις αὐτίκα φθονερῶν γειτόνων);\(^{16}\) the casual juxtaposition of the two words indicating that his audience would not find this an unusual idea.

When one moves from the individual to the group within the larger society of the *polis*, similar feelings occur. We see this particularly in the epinician poetry of Pindar, where *phthonos* words occur twenty-five times in surviving odes and fragments.\(^{17}\) A group of these relate to *phthonos* within a community, aimed at those who have (athletic or political) success,\(^{18}\) happiness, nobility, or virtue. “Censure from envious others hangs over those men who drive first in the twelfth race, [and on whom] august Grace let fall well-famed beauty” (*Ol*. 6.74-6: μῶµος εξ ἀλλῶν κρέµαται φθονεόντων τοῖς, οἷς ποτε πρώτοις περὶ δωδέκατον δρόµον ἐλαυνόντεσσιν αἰδοία ποτιστάξῃ Χάρις εὐκλέα μορφάν). “I rejoice somewhat at this new happiness; but I am pained too, that envy answers fine deeds. Indeed they say thus for man, that steadfast, blooming happiness brings both one and the other” (*Pyth*. 7.14-18: νέα δ’ εὐπραγία χαίρω τι· τὸ δ’ ἀχνυμαι, φθόνον ἀμειβόμενον τὰ καλὰ ἔργα. φαντὶ γε μὰν ὄµω ἐκ’ ἀνδρὶ παρμονίαν θάλλοισαν εὐδαιμονίαν τὰ καὶ τὰ φέρεσθαι). “For happiness brings with it no lesser envy” (*Pyth*. 11.29: ἰσχεὶ τε γὰρ ὅλβος

\(^{15}\) All these aspects of *phthonos* are also important to English envy (see p.24-6).

\(^{16}\) An insight shared by several later Greeks (see p.63), especially Aristotle (see p.86), and also by modern scholars (see ch.2 n.10, n.114). In this Pindar fragment we see the connection of gossip with neighbours (see V. Hunter (1990) 301 for this connection more generally, especially in the Attic orators), and see ch.7 n.32 for the connection of gossip with *phthonos*.

\(^{17}\) Nearly twice as many as in the surviving passages of all other Archaic poets put together. On envy in Pindar, see especially Kirkwood (1984), Vallozza (1989), Kurke (1991) 195-224, Bulman (1992), Most (2003). We should note that epinician texts are not transparent sources: there is a rhetoric of praise, which may involve elements of hyperbole; however for the rhetoric to work it must be rooted in agreed perceptions. This rhetoric of praise incorporates *phthonos* as something both to be desired (as an indicator of success) and shunned (as potentially destructive).

\(^{18}\) Kurke (1991) 195: “That the victor’s fellow citizens feel *phthonos* at his good fortune is an epinician commonplace.” Most (2003) 134 argues that envy of anyone successful was so prevalent in such a competitive society as ancient Greece, that “the epinician poet had no choice but to attempt to confront and defeat it.” This applies not just to Pindar; Bacchylides appears to have a similar, if less subtle, approach to confronting and defeating *phthonos* in the handful of instances in his surviving poetry – see Most (2003) 137.
οὐ μείονα φθόνου). “Words are relish for envy, which attaches itself always to the noble, and does not quartel with the inferior” (Nem. 8.21-2: ὁφοιν δὲ λόγοι φθονεροῖσιν, ἀπτεται δὲ ἑσλῶν αἰτί, χειρόνεσσα δ' οὐκ ἐρίζει). “If he lays down all his rage at virtue, both with expenditure and with toil, we must give noble praise to those who have found it, and not bear it with envious thoughts” (Isthm. 1.41-5: εἰ δ' ἀρετὰ κατάκειται πάσαιν ὄργαν, ἀμφότερον δαπάναις τε καὶ πόνοις, χρή νυν εὐρόντεσσαν ἀγάνορα κόμπου μή φθονεραϊσι φέρειν γνώμαις). “Because envious hopes hang around the thoughts of mortals, let him now not ever keep silent his father’s virtue, nor these songs” (Isthm. 2.43-5: μὴ νῦν, ὅτι φθονεραὶ θνατῶν φρένας ἀμφικρέμανται ἐλπίδες, μὴτ’ ἀρετάν ποτε σιγάτω πατρῶν, μηδὲ τούσδ' ὑμνοῖς). “But envy hangs over every man for virtue, while the one who has nothing hides his head under black silence” (fr.94a.8-10(Maehler): παντὶ δ' ἐπὶ φθόνος ἀνδρὶ κεῖται ἀρετᾶς, ὡ δὲ μηδὲν ἔχων ὑπὸ σιγὰ μελαίνα κάρα κέκρυπται). Pindar seems to see phthonos from one’s fellow man as an automatic concomitant of these good things in life (success, happiness, nobility, and virtue) – they are two sides of the same coin, inescapable companions.19

These good things are particularly likely to arouse phthonos when praised. Human phthonos is linked to praise or hymns for the victor four times. “If a man were an Olympian victor, a steward for the oracular altar in Pisa, and fellow-colonist in famous Syracuse, what hymn might that man avoid, to fall in with unenvious fellow-townsmen in longed-for songs?” (Ol. 6.4-7: εἰ δ' εἴη η μὲν Ὀλυμπιονίκαις, βωµῷ τε μαντείῳ ταµίας Διὸς ἐν Πίσᾳ, συνοικιστήρ τε τὰν κλειδων Συρακοσσάν, τίνα κεν φύγοι ύμνον κεῖνος ἀνήρ, ἐπικύρσαι ἀφθόνων ἀστῶν ἐν ἰμερταῖς ἀοιδαῖς;). “Unbegrudging, this praise is dedicated to Olympic victors. This our tongue wants to cherish…” (Ol. 11.7-9: ἀφθόνητος δ' αἰνὸς Ὀλυμπιονίκαις οὔτος ἀγκειται. τὰ μὲν ἀμετέρα γλῶσσα ποιμαίειν ἐθέλει); also Isthm. 1.44 and 2.43 (see above).

19 Most (2003) 139. Kurke (1991) 195-224 and Most (2003) 135-41 argue that the emphasis on envy of the athletic victor was most apparent where there was a concern that the victor might seek to set himself up as a tyrant; or (if he were a tyrant already) that he would change from ruling benevolently and seeking to minimise the differences between himself and the rest of the polis, to acting arrogantly and self-aggrandisingly. On this view, then, envy is something that must either be managed by the encomiast, or confronted directly and shown to be baseless.
But *phthonos* also comes from the gods. 20 “I pray, Xenarkes, for the unenvying gaze of the gods on your fortunes” (*Pyth.* 8.71-2: θεών δ’ ὄπιν ἀφθόνον αἰτ<έω>, Ζέναρκες, ύμετέραις τύχαις). “Of the delightful things in Greece they have obtained not a small gift; may they not fall in with envious changes of fortune from the gods” (*Pyth.* 10.19-21: τῶν δ’ ἐν Ἑλλάδι τερπνῶν λαχόντες οὐκ ὄλιγαν δόσιν, μὴ φθονεραῖς ἐκ θεῶν μετατροπίαις ἐπικύρσαιεν). “Highest far-reaching ruler of Olympia, may you be unbegrudging of our words for all time, father Zeus” (*Ol.* 13.24-6: ὑπάτ’ εὐρὺ ἀνάσσων Ὀλυµπίας, ἀφθόνητος ἐπεσσιν γένοιο χρόνον ἀπαντα, Ζεῦ πάτερ). “Fitting a garland to my hair I shall sing. And may the *phthonos* of the gods not cause reversal” (*Isthm.* 7.39-39b: άείσοµαι χαίταν στεφάνοισιν ἁρµόζων. ὦ δ’ ἄθανάτων μὴ θρασσέτω φθόνος). 21

Differences in Archaic authors, then, are best explained by the requirements of genre. Homer’s poetry focuses on gods and heroes, and envy is too unheroic to play much part beyond some limited grudging. Hesiod, whose *Works & Days* is concerned with a farmer and his peers, matter-of-factly sees envy as an integral part of daily life. Lyric, focusing on interpersonal relations (primarily within an aristocratic group), is the earliest genre that explicitly problematises envy as a destructive emotion even (or especially) towards those closest to one. Finally, the *polis* context of Epinician ensures that envy becomes ever more central, and attached to the success of the athlete and the praise lavished upon him. It is possible that some aspects of *phthonos* grew over the Archaic period, i.e. that its scope changed between the late eighth and early fifth centuries – and in particular that it became more destructive – but the evidence is too limited for any firm conclusions. However we should note that *phthonos* clearly means envy for someone else’s property even at Hom. *Od.* 18.18, and so we should not look too hard for diachronic changes in its scope over the Archaic period.

I have concentrated on the Archaic evidence for *phthonos* to such an extent primarily to show the literary background and thus intellectual understanding of the term by educated Greeks on the threshold of the Classical era, which I consider in depth in ch.3.3. The focus on Pindar also reflects the fact that he is our best Archaic source.

20 Bulman (1992) 1, 11-2, who notes its similarity to nemesis in Homer. On *phthonos theôn*, see ch.7 n.33.

21 Bulman (1992) 2 sees the gods’ *phthonos* as directed at the poet in the last two examples; see also Goldhill (1991) 138-41. However it is the poet’s praise for the success gained by the victor that draws the *phthonos*, not the poet qua poet who is the target.
3.2.2 Zêlos in the Archaic and Classical periods

I noted above (see pp.46-7) that Hesiod does not distinguish at *Op*. 23/26 between emulative zêlos and destructive phthonos; rather both are emulative. The picture becomes more complicated, since Hesiod later says that at the end of the race of men, “zêlos will walk with all wretched men, discordant, rejoicing in ills, horrible” (*Op*. 195-6: ζῆλος δὲ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀιζυροῖσιν ἁπασὶ δυσκέλαδος κακόχαρτος οἰμαρτήσει στυγερώπης).\(^{22}\) Zêlos here sounds much more like the destructive phthonos we see in Archaic lyric and epinician poetry (and later), rather than the emulative rivalry referred to earlier, and that we see again in the one other place it is used in *Works & Days*, where the non-working person will feel zêlos for the working one as he grows richer (*Op*. 312-13: εἰ δε κεν ἔργαξῃ, τάχα σε ξηλώσει ἀεργός πλούτῳ δ’ ἄρετή καὶ κύδος ὀπηδεί). If I am right that (as suggested earlier) phthonos and zêlos are near-equivalents in Hesiod, a possible explanation may be that both terms can cover destructive as well as emulative envy, and it is zêlos that fits metrically into the line.

Hesiod is not the only one for whom zêlos implies more than emulative rivalry. The verb zêloô occurs twice in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter: Kallidike says that if the disguised Demeter were to bring up her brother, her mother would give her [Demeter] such gifts that anyone would feel envy for her (*Hom. Hymn* 2.166-8: εἰ τὸν γ’ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἥβης μέτρου ἱκώτο ρεῖ κέ τίς σε ἰδούσσα γυναικῶν θηλυτράων ξηλώσαι· τόσα κέν τοι ἀπὸ θεπτήρια δοίη), repeated more or less word for word by the mother (2.221-3). A handful of cognates and compounds are also informative. Kalypso says the gods are cruel and jealous, and resent (agaaasthe – see ch.7 n.33) a goddess sleeping with a mortal and making him her husband (*Hom. Od*. 5.118-20: σχέτλιοί ἐστε, θεοί, ξηλήμονες ἐξοχον ἄλλων, οἳ τε θεαῖσ’ ἀγάασθαι παρ’ ἀνδρᾶς εὐνάζεσθαι ἀμφαδήν, ἂν τις τε φίλον ποιήσετ’ ἀκοίτην). Odysseus expected Alkinoos, as men are, to be jealous if he saw him with his daughter (*Od*. 7.307: δύσζηλοι γὰρ τ’ εἰμὲν ἐπὶ χθονὶ ἀνθρώπων). Hera feels jealousy at Leto giving birth to a perfect son (*Hom. Hymn* 3.98-101: ἦστο γὰρ ἀκρων Ἄθλετης ὶλιμπήπω ύπὸ χρυσέοις νέφεσσιν Ἄρης φραδίμοσύνης λευκωλένου, ἦ μιν ἐρυκε

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\(^{22}\) Most (2003) 130-1 – his translation (“evil-sounding, gloating, hideous-faced”) is even harsher.
In early Archaic lyric poetry, there remains some ambiguity as to whether zêlos represents emulative or destructive envy,\textsuperscript{23} where Arkhilokhos says he does not feel zêlos for Gyges’ gold (fr.19(West).1-2: οὔ μοι τὰ Γύγεω τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει, οὔδ’ εἰλέ πώ με ζήλος), and tells a conquering queen that many will feel zêlos for her glory (fr.23(West).21: πολλοίσι θην ζηλωτὸς ἀνθρώπων ἔσεαι).\textsuperscript{24} However, a century later Theognis can say without ambiguity that someone with intelligence and sense would be admired (453-6: ὶνθρωπ’, ἰεἰ ἱγνώμης ἰἔλαχες ἵμερος ἵὡσπερ ἵἀνοίης ἵκαὶ ἵσώφρων ἱἐγένου, πολλοίσι’ ἀν ζηλωτὸς ἑφαίνεο ἰτῶν δεὶ πολιτῶν ἰἄστο ἰἔφασθ’ ἵων ἱοὐδενὸς ἱἀξιος ἱεἰ.), and this is clearly emulative. Neither of the Arkhilokhos fragments portray envy as obviously and solely destructive, and both they and the Theognis fragment could be paraphrased by the English “I envy you for [some good]”, which is at best a weak form of envy (see p.35). This is essentially what zêlos has become by the end of the Archaic period: emulative envy (which I term emulation – see p.34), or admiration. We see something that someone has, and we would like to have that good too, but we do not wish to take the good away from them, and we do not hate them or desire to destroy them – the salient features of phthonos, and sometimes zêlos, in most Archaic literature.

Emulation, admiration, or “I envy you”, also account for the vast majority of instances of zêlos-words in the Classical period.\textsuperscript{25} We often find it used to mean “imitate”, either directly or linked to a word with this meaning such as mimeisthai (e.g. Isoc. 1.11.7, 1.36.3,

\textsuperscript{23} The meaning of jealousy, seen in compounds, is not common again till the coining of zêlotypia, another compound, in the fourth century – though see p.201-3.

\textsuperscript{24} He may be saying he does not want Gyges’ gold, or making a stronger ou phthonô type comment; similarly people may merely admire the queen, but could envy her glory.

\textsuperscript{25} It would be tedious, not to mention unnecessary for this thesis, to go through a large number of examples.

In the remainder of the paragraph I merely concentrate on where zêlos does not have this meaning in the Classical period. Analysed instances of zêlos-words include 56 in tragedy (Aesch. 9, Soph. 14, Eur. 33), 16 in Aristophanes, 5 in Thucydides, 34 in Plato, and 101 in the oratorical corpus (Lys. 9, Isoc. 36, Aeschin. 14, Dem. 38, others 4); a total of 212 instances.
2.38.4, 8.142.10, 12.16.3), and frequently in connection with the dead, especially the war-dead or ancestors. Occasionally it can mean zeal, as when Tekmessa believes people will say of her: “Look at the partner of Ajax, who was the greatest in strength in the army; such servitude is the return for her zeal” (Soph. Aj. 501-3: ἰδετε τὴν ὀμευνέτιν Ἀἴαντος, ὃς μέγιστον ἱσχυσε στρατοῦ, οἷας λατρείας ἀνθ' ὀσοῦ ζῆλου τρέφει).

The links and differences between *phthonos* and *zêlos* are most notable when the two words are juxtaposed. Clytemnestra incites Agamemnon by saying that the unenvied person is also not admired (Aesch. Ag. 939: ο δ' ἀφθόνητος γ' οὐκ ἐπίξηλος πέλει). Oedipus laments that the good things he has (wealth, power, skill surpassing skill) make Kreon feel so much (*poly-*) *zêlos* that it turns to *phthonos* (Soph. OT 380-4: ὥ πλουτε καὶ τυράννη καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ὑπερφέρουσα τῷ πολυξῆλῳ βίῳ, ὃς παρ' ὑμῖν ὁ φθόνος φυλάσσεται, εἰ τῆσδέε γ' ἄρχης οὔνεχ', ἦν ὡμοί πόλις δωρητόν). Pelops, who was so admired by men that he invited retribution (*phthonos*) from the gods and ill-willed murderousness from his citizens (Eur. Or. 972-5: γέννα Πέλοπος ὁ τ' ἐπὶ μακαρίοις ζῆλος ὃν ποτ' οἴκοις φθόνος νῦν εἶλε θεόθεν ἀ τὶς δυσμενῆς φοινία ψῆφος ἐν πολίταις). Perikles says that those who wish to do as Athens has will emulate her, but if they do not succeed in gaining overseas possessions, will envy her (Thuc. 2.64.4.2-5.1: ο δὲ δρᾶν τι καὶ αὐτὸς βουλόμενος ζηλώσει· ὃ δὲ ἐκεῖς ἐκ τῶν ζηλούσις φθόνοις, ἀπὸ τῆς ζῆλου δὲ φθόνοις). The Athenian says when there is neither wealth nor poverty in a city, there will be neither *hybris* nor injustice, nor would emulation nor envy occur (Pl. Leg. 679b7-c2: ἤ δ' ἄν ποτε συνοικία μήτε πλοῦτος συνοικία μήτε πενία, σχεδὸν ἐν ταύτῃ γενναιότατα ἤθη γίγνοντ' ἄν· οὕτε γὰρ ὑβρίς οὕτε ἀδικία, ζήλοι τε αὖ καὶ φθόνοι οὖκ ἐγγίγνονται.; cf. Ar. Eccl. 565: μὴ φθονεῖν τοῖς πλησίοις). And Demosthenes says that funeral orations should inspire emulation for the courage of the dead, not envy for their honours (Dem. 20.141.5-6: καίτοι τοῦτο ἐστὶ τοῦπιτήδευμα ζηλούντων ἀρετήν, οὐ τοῖς ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τιμωμένοις φθονοῦντων). While at the border, then, *phthonos* and *zêlos* might shade into one another, they are clearly (at least after Homer/Hesiod) distinguished in both

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26 For instance all 9 instances in Lys., both in Hyp., and 2/5 in Thuc. occur in funeral speeches.
their related affects and their action tendencies. Sometimes one is the evil twin of the other, sometimes one is caused by a superfluity of the other – and juxtaposition highlights these distinctions.

While exact uses of (particularly phthonos) terminology were therefore not unchanging between Hesiod’s time and the beginning (or indeed the end) of the Classical period, the post-Hesiodic distinction between destructive, begrudging, envious phthonos and admiring, emulative zêlos remained germane throughout the Classical period and beyond. Zêlos will crop up occasionally in this thesis; but it generally does not cover the ground of English envy (except the conventional “I envy you”) or jealousy (except in the compound zêlotypia), and will therefore appear mainly as a foil for phthonos.

### 3.3 Phthonos in the Classical period

Throughout the Classical period, phthonos generally covers the ground of English envy, begrudging and (possessive) jealousy; there are some minor additions, such as spite/malice and (conceptually most divergent from English) moral censure. Common uses of phthonos, phthonëô, phthoneros and epiphthonos are to accuse others of phthonos, to instruct others not to feel it, or to deny feeling it oneself. Accusations can be specific,
and are frequently made by orators against their opponents; there are similar agonistic accusations in plays, and (in oratory) against other cities vis à vis Athens. Prohibitions are, of course, another form of accusation – instead of saying merely “you are envious”, the prohibition adds “but you shouldn’t be”. A particular type of prohibition craves the audience’s indulgence before speaking (i.e. “Don’t begrudge me for speaking”); and Isocrates in particular occasionally comments that phthonos is what any speaker can expect for offering good advice. Denials of feeling phthonos are also not uncommon. Logically, denials will only be made where one might be expected to feel phthonos; one must wonder, therefore, whether any denial of phthonos should be taken as an indicator of its presence. Certainly they should be treated sceptically: a speaker will be keen to show that they are not acting under this basest of emotions, and so will hasten to justify themselves by ‘explaining’ the true cause of their actions.

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30 This occurs most notably in Demosthenes’ and Aeschines’ defence speeches against each other: Dem. 18 (§§ 13.3, 121.5, 279.6, 303.2, with similar accusations of baskania (looking maliciously at someone – see pp.105-6) at §§ 108.8, 119.6, 132.4, 139.7, 189.6, 242.2, 252.2, 307.5, 317.7), and Aeschin. 2 (§§ 10.6, 22.9, 51.3, 54.3, 139.3 – though at §139.9 Demosthenes allegedly does not feel phthonos that Aeschines is on a capital charge!). As well as these many accusations of phthonos and baskania, Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of using diabolê against him fourteen times (§§ 2.2, 10.6, 11.4, 44.2, 69.5, 81.2, 89.2, 109.1, 113.6, 121.1, 145.3(xx), 145.10, 153.17), and sykophantia against him ten times (§§ 5.12, 39.3, 66.2, 99.8, 145.2, 145.4, 145.7, 145.11, 170.5/6, 183.4), and we shall see below that these might be typically destructive action tendencies occasioned by phthonos (pp.66-7). Accusations of phthonos also occur several times in Lys. 24 (§§ 1.6, 1.8, 2.1, 3.2) and Isae. 2 (§§ 23.4, 24.8, 27.5), and also at Isoc. 15.259.4 and Dem. 9.54.5, 19.343.5, 25.52.10, 39.34.8, 45.35.1, Epist. 3.41.3 – see ch.5.2.2 for further discussion.

31 E.g. Eur. IT 503; Ar. Eq. 880, 1051, Thesm. 252, 757, Eccl. 1043.

32 E.g. Lys. 2.48.2, 2.67.4; Isoc. 4.48.2, 14.20.5; Dem 15.15.8. Isocrates denies Athens felt phthonos of rivals at 4.29.4, 4.104.2, in line with the usual positionality of phthonos (“our city doesn’t feel it, yours does”) – see main text below.

33 Prohibitions occur at e.g. Aesch. Sept. 480, PV 584; Soph. OT 310; Eur. Med. 63, Rhes. 193, fr.703.1(Nauck), fr.1064.5(Nauck); Eupolis fr.316(Kock), fr.358(Kock); Ar. Ach. 497, Eq. 580, Lys. 649, Eccl. 900; Pl. Symp. 223a1, Euthydem. 297b6, Prt. 320e1, Grg. 489a4, Meno 71d6, H.min. 372e7; Resp. 338a3, 528a2; Xen. Cyr. 8.5.24.5; Andoc. 2.6.8; Lys. 21.15.4; Isoc. 3.60.1, 15.302.8, 19.23.8; Isae. 6.61.1; Dem. 59.15.4.


35 E.g. Isoc. 9.39.2, 10.30.6, 15.8.4; and he says he specifically is envied at 12.15.8, 12.21.5, 12.23.3, 15.4.10, 15.13.6, 15.62.5, 15.163.6, Epist. 2.22.6, Epist. 9.15.11. See Saïd (2003) on phthonos in Isocrates.

36 Denials occur at e.g. Aesch. Sept. 236, PV 628; Soph. Ant. 553; Eur. Med. 312, Hipp. 20, Hec. 238, HF 333, Bacch. 1005; Ar. Lys. 1192, Thesm. 252; Pl. Ap. 33a8, La. 200b7, Prot. 361e1, H.maj. 283e8; Xen. Cyrop. 8.4.16.3; Lys. 20.15.1; Isoc. 4.29.4, 4.104.2, 8.124.8, 14.47.3; Dem. 23.188.5, 35.40.3, 42.22.6, Epist. 3.32.2. A particular type occurs several times in Plato: φθόνος οὐδεὶς … λέγω implying that “I speak willingly” (Phd. 61d10, Soph. 217a10, 217b1, Ti. 23d4, Leg. 641d8, 664a8), and οὐδεὶς φθόνος ἐκλέγω (“I willingly select”) at Leg. 802a8; Xenophon uses the similar οὐ φθονήσω εἰπεῖν at Symp. 3.5.3.
Between them, direct accusations, prohibitions and denials make up around a quarter of all instances of *phthonos*-words in the Classical period.\(^{37}\) This positionality, that *phthonos* is something YOU do, but I do not, is extremely important.\(^{38}\) There are only a handful of instances where the speaker claims the emotion for himself, or a group of which he is part, and these are worth individual consideration. Isocrates notes that “we” envy all those who are foremost in intelligence or anything else (Isoc. 10.56.1-3: Καὶ τοῖς μὲν κατὰ οὐνεσιν ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο τι προεχοῦσιν φθονοῦμεν), and that all men suffer from feeling envy, as well as ignorance, confusion and disorder, none of these things being irrational or foreign to human nature (Isoc. 15.130.5-10: ἢν δ’ ἀναλογίσησθε τὴν ἀγνοιαν ὡςν ἔχομεν πάντες ἀνθρώποι, καὶ τοὺς φθόνους τοὺς ἐγγιγνομένους ἡμῖν, ἐτι δὲ τὰς ταραχὰς καὶ τὴν τύρβην ἐν ᾗ ζώμεν, οὔδεν τούτων ἀλόγως οὔδ’ ἔξω τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως εὑρεθήσεται γεγενηµένον). Pseudo-Demosthenes rhetorically asks why Greek cities do not help less fortunate cities but sit on their hands, concluding it is because of envy (Dem. 10.39.1-4: τί οὖν µαθόντες τούτ’ ὀνειδίζοµεν ἀλλήλοις καὶ προφάσει χρώµεθα τοῦ µηδὲν ποιεῖν, πλὴν εἰ τῇ παρὰ τῆς τύχης βοηθείᾳ γεγονυίᾳ αὑτοῖς φθονοῦµεν;), and says that all Greek states contend to be first, and envy and mistrust one another, which they should not (Dem. 10.52.4-6: καὶ τοῦ πρωτεύειν ἀντιποιούνται µὲν πάντες, ἀφεστᾶσι δ’ ἔργῳ, καὶ φθονοῦσι καὶ ἀπιστοῦσιν αὑτοῖς, οὕχ οἷς ἔδει). In all these instances, the speaker is saying *phthonos* is something “we” do, but “we” should not, i.e. he is generalising about the human condition; this positioning is a rhetorical device to palliate his criticism by removing a suggestion of superiority.\(^{39}\) In the whole Classical corpus, there are only two cases where someone explicitly says “I” feel *phthonos*: one is spoken by the insane Pentheus, who begrudges Dionysus his time (Eur. *Bacch.* 820: ἄγ’ ἐσ

\(^{37}\) Indirect accusations, where an individual other than an opponent, or a part or the whole of a group, is accused of being envious, account for many more – 52 within the oratorical corpus alone: Lys. 3.9.7, 12.66.5; Isoc. 5.68.8, 5.73.2, 5.131.3, 6.61.8, 8.13.7, 9.6.6, 12.81.9, 12.158.5, 12.172.5, 12.241.10, 12.251.11, 13.19.9, 15.142.1 and 8, 15.316.7, *Epist.* 2.21.3, *Epist.* 4.4.4 (plus those in n.35 above); Dem. 4.8.3, 19.22.8, 19.228.3, 20.10.10, 20.56.6, 20.139.8, 20.151.8, 20.157.2, 20.164.10, 23.164.4, 25.75.7, 47.70.7, 57.6.6, 59.97.1, *Epist.* 2.4.3, *Epist.* 3.6.4, *Epist.* 3.10.7, *Epist.* 3.20.6, *Epist.* 3.28.2; Aeschin. 2.111.3/4; Lycurg. 1.69.2.


\(^{39}\) It is also revealing of an underlying perception that *phthonos* is ‘normal’ as an initial reaction, and not simply a symptom of bad character – though bad character might be suspected if the initial envious response remains unmodified.
The large majority of instances of *phthonos*-words are translatable as “envy” or “(be)grudging”, or some combination thereof. While *phthonos* does include jealous possession, this crops up considerably less frequently than envy. Paphlagon is jealous of his position in the household (Ar. *Eq*. 879-80: Κοῦκ ἠσθ’ ὑμείς ἐκείνους οὐχὶ φθονῶν ἔπαυσας, ἵνα μὴ ῥήτορες γένοιτο). Odysseus jealously protects his reputation for being the wisest, by destroying Palamedes (Xen. *Mem*. 4.2.33.11: Τὰ δὲ Παλαµήδους οὐκ ἁκήκοας πάθ; τὸ τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ πάντες υμνοῦσιν ὡς διὰ σοφίαν φθονηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ἀπόλλυται). Someone is so jealous of sharing his good fortune that he will not make friends (Pl. *Leg*. 730e5: τὸν δὲ φθονοῦτα καὶ ἐκόντα μηδενὶ κοινωνὸν διὰ φιλίας γιγνόμενον ἀγαθῶν τινων αὐτὸν μὲν ψέγειν). Spurious Platonic comments about those who are jealous of sharing their virtue (Pl. *Spur*. 376d5: ἂλλ’ ἄρα μὴ ἐφθόνονε μεταδιδόναι τῆς ἀρετῆς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις;) or their professional skills (Pl. *Spur*. 376d8: Ἀρα ἵνα μὴ ἀντίτεχνοι αὐτοῖς γίγνοιτο, ὡσπερ οἱ μάγειροι τε καὶ ἰατροὶ καὶ τέκτονες φθονοοῦσιν.). Athens does not begrudge its goods to other Greeks (Isoc. 4.29.4: οὔτως ἢ πόλις ἡμῶν οὐ μόνον θεοφιλῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλανθρώπως ἔσχεν, ὡστε κυρία γενομένη τουσοῦνων ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐφθόνησεν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀλλ’ οὐ ἔλαβεν ἄπασιν μετέδωκεν). A running Platonic conceit that the wise man will not begrudge sharing his wisdom; Aristotle mentions this too in his analysis of *phthonos*, as well as noting that people who do great deeds and have good fortune (including being honoured for a distinction, or especially having wisdom or happiness) can feel *phthonos* at thinking that others will try to take something away from them (see pp.86-7). Why jealous possession
occurs less frequently than envy is something that can only be guessed at. A likely reason is that, notwithstanding the shared term, the Greeks could tell the two emotions apart psychologically and were much more concerned about the latter. It is envy, far more than possessive jealousy, that has the power to shatter society (consider Thucydides’ comment about participants in civil strife begrudging that anyone might survive unscathed – 3.82.8.21-3: τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ’ ἄμφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ξυνηγωνίζοντο ἢ φθόνω τοῦ περιείναι διερθέροντο); and indeed Classical Athens did not generally have a problem with possessive jealousy, with the ‘haves’ falling over themselves to assure the ‘have nots’ that they used their possessions liberally for the benefit of all, so as to give the latter’s potential envy no excuse to take hold.\footnote{\textsuperscript{44} Fisher (2003); see also Ober (1989) 192-247, Cairns (2003b) 244-7.}

In the vast majority of its uses, \textit{aphthonos} (or cognates \textit{aphthonôs}, \textit{aphthonia}) means “plentiful”, “generous”, “abundant” (see n.11 above). Extremely rarely, it takes its etymological meaning of “lack of envy”: the Argive Chorus choosing unenvied prosperity (as opposed to glory that will be envied by Zeus – Aesch. \textit{Ag.} 471: κρίνω δ’ ἄφθονον ὦλβον); an unbegrudging willingness to teach the \textit{aulos} (Pl. \textit{Prt.} 327b5: οἴ οὖν οὔτω καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει πᾶσαν προθυµίαν καὶ ἄφθονιαν εἴχομεν ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν); wondering whether someone [sc. naturally] unenvious and easygoing, will be harsh to someone not harsh, and envious to someone not envious (Pl. \textit{Resp.} 500a5: η οἰει τινὰ χαλεπαίνειν τῷ μή χαλεπῷ ἢ φθονεῖν τῷ μή φθονερῷ ἄφθονόν τε καὶ πρᾶον ὄντα.;) The related, but very rare, \textit{aphthonêtos} can similarly imply a lack of envy/jealously: “Highest far-reaching ruler of Olympia, may you be unbegrudging of our words for all time, father Zeus” (Pind. \textit{Ol.} 13.24-6: ὑπατ’ εὐρὺ ἀνάσσων Ὀλυµπίας, ἄφθονιτος ἔπεσσιν γένοιο χρόνον ἀπαντα, Ζεῦ πάτερτ; “for the unenvied person is also not admired” (Aesch. \textit{Ag.} 939: ὁ δ’ ἄφθονιτός γ’ οὐκ ἑπίζηλος πέλει).\footnote{\textsuperscript{44} Fisher (2003); see also Ober (1989) 192-247, Cairns (2003b) 244-7.}

The Spartans are worthy of their empire because of their past zeal, will and ability, and did not acquire it by force but by invitation, and so they should not be hated (Thuc. 1.75.1.1-2.5: Ἄρ’ ἄξιοί εἰσιν, ὦ Λακεδαίμονι, καὶ προθυµίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώµης ξυνέσεως ἀρχῆς γε ἦσαν τοῖς Ἐλλησι μὴ οὕτως ἄγαν ἐπίφθονως διακεῖσθαι; καὶ γὰρ αὐτήν τὴν ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ’ … ἐπὶ ὀρθῶς ἐπιφθόνως καὶ αὐτῶν δειθέντων ἥγειμόνας καταστήσει). Perikles draws a parallel with misos (hated), saying that those who try to rule others are hated (miseisthai), but it is worth being thought hateful (epiphthonon) for great ends, and that hatred (misos) does not last for long (Thuc. 2.64.5.2-5: τὸ δὲ μισεῖσθαι καὶ λυπηρός εἶναι ἐν τῷ παρόντι πάσι μὲν ὑπῆρξε δὴ ὅσοι ἔτεροι ἔτερων ἥξισαν ἀρχεῖν· οὕτως δὲ ἐπὶ μεγίστοισ τὸ ἐπίφθονον λαμβάνει, ὅρθως βουλεύεται. μῖσος μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντέχει). Socrates says his conversation and words have become rather heavy and hateful, so that Athens desires to be free of them (Pl. Ap. 37d1-2: ἀλλ’ ὑµῖν βαρύτεραι γεγονασιν καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖ τοὺς νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι). The Athenians hate moneylenders, and so Nikoboulos is hateful (Dem. 37.52.2-3: µισοῦσι, φησίν, Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς δανείζοντας· Νικόβουλος δ’ ἐπίφθονος ἐστι).

In two of the above examples (Thuc. 2.64.5.2-5, Dem. 37.52.2-3), phthonos is actually juxtaposed to, and hence linked with, misos; other examples include: Cyrus says he will be envied and hated for his treasures (Xen. Cyr. 8.2.19.3/4: φθονεῖσθαι τε δι’ αὐτῶν καὶ μισεῖσθαι). A loser envies the winner and hates the judge (Xen. Cyr. 8.2.27.6-7: ὁ δὲ µὴ νικῶν τοῖς µὲν νικῶσιν ἐφίβωνε, τοὺς δὲ µὴ ἐαυτὸν κρίνοντας ἐμίσει). Being envied and hated for one’s superiority (Xen. Cyr. 8.8.12.7: φθονοῦντες αὐτοῖς δὴλοι ἤσαν καὶ ὡς βελτίωνας αὐτῶν ἐμίσουν). Isocrates’ opponent aims to arouse envy against him by talking about his wealth, and anger and hatred by talking about his legal practice (Isoc. 15.31.2-7: ἠγούμενος ἐκ µὲν ὄν καταλαβοῦνεται περὶ µου καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ
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τοῦ πλήθους τῶν μαθητῶν φθόνον ἀπασὶ τοῖς ἁκούουσιν ἐμποιήσειν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια πραγματείας εἰς ὀργήν καὶ μίσος ύμᾶς καταστήσειν). Hatred, envy (or rather resentment – see p.117) and anger are appropriate responses to Meidias (Dem. 21.196.5-6: ἀλλὰ τούναντίον μῖσος καὶ φθόνος καὶ ὀργή· τούτων γὰρ ἄξια ποιεῖς).

We might conclude from this that Greek _phthonos_ contains hatred or hostility within its mixture of affects, or at least is often associated with it, in just the same way as English envy (see pp.25-6).

_Anepiphthonos/-ός_, the contrary of _epiphthonos_, can imply that one is not arousing these feelings; but it also frequently takes the meaning of “without blame/reproach”. Heracles tells his son to kill him without blame (Soph. _Trach_. 1031-3: ἰὼ παί, τὸν φῦτορ’ οἰκτίρας, ἀνεπίφθονον ἐάρυσον ἐγχος, παίσον ἐμᾶς ὑπὸ κλῆδος). The Spartans should take both Greeks and barbarians into their alliance, and since they are being undermined by the Athenians, this is not censurable (Thuc. 1.82.1.4-9: κάν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερ’ αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι ἐμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἕλληνων καὶ βαρβάρων… (ἀνεπίφθονον δὲ, ὡσοὶ ὡστερ καὶ ἤμεις ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλεύσεσθαι, μὴ Ἕλληνας μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι). The tyrant Hipparkhos generally exercised power in such a way as not to invite others’ censure (Thuc. 6.54.5.1-2: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλην ἀρχήν ἐπαχθής ἦν ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἀλλ’ ἀνεπίφθονως κατεστήσατο). The Athenians are not blameworthy for invading Sicily in support of their own security (Thuc. 6.83.2.4-5: πάσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὴν προσήκουσαν σωτηρίαν ἐκφυγεσθεία). It would irreproachable to speak (Pl. _Soph_. 243a4: ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον ἀποφήνασθαι; cf. _Resp_. 612b7-8: Ὀρ’ οὖν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὡ Γλαύκων, νῦν ἦδη ἀνεπίφθονον ἔστιν…).

We can see that many instances of (an)epiphthonos imply blame or reproach, and indeed _phthonos_ is sometimes linked to the verb _epitimaô_ (I censure). A challenger to a will censures someone for adopting and not dying childless, this being hateful and unjust because the censurer has children (Isae. 2.23.1-6: Ἀλλὰ νῦν οὗτος ἐπιτιµῶν αὐτῷ φαίνεται οὐχ ὅτι τὸν υὸν οὐκ ἐποιήσατο τὸν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὸ παράπαν ἐποιήσατο καὶ οὐκ ἐπελεύσθην ἅπας· τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὁ ἐπιτιµα, ἐπίφθονον πράγμα καὶ οὐ δικαιον ποιῶν· οὗτων γὰρ αὐτῷ παῖδων ἐκεῖνω ὑντὶ ἅπαιδι καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι φαίνεται ἐπιτιµῶν). Isocrates will not give way to those who habitually censure and envy all
speakers (Isoc. 10.30.4-7: ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι συντομώτατα διελθεῖν, ἵνα τὰ μὲν ἑκέινοι, τὰ δὲ ἐμαυτῷ χαρίσωμαι καὶ μὴ παντάπασιν ἐπτηθῶ τῶν εἰθισμένων φθονεῖν καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀπασιν ἐπιτιμᾶν). Those who cannot write well themselves will censure and envy (baskainein) Isocrates’ words,\(^{45}\) and grudge (phthonésousin) him saying them (Isoc. 15.62.1-5: φανήσονταί ἵτινες ἵτων ἐφερεῖν μὲν οὐδεν οὐδ’ εἰπεῖν ἄξιον ἰ λόγου δυναμένων, ἐπιτιμᾶν δὲ καὶ βασκαίνειν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μεμελετήκτων, οἳ χαριέντως μὲν εἰρήσθαι ταῦτα φήσουσιν, – τὸ γὰρ εὖ φθονήσουσιν εἰπεῖν). A speaker who says he has never begrudged or censured anyone spending money on Isocrates (Dem. 35.40.1-5: ἡ ἐγὼ δὲ … οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα οὐδ’ ἐπετίμησα, ἦ μ’ ὁ ἄνδρες ἰ δικασταί, εἰ τις βούλεται σοφιστής εἶναι καὶ Ἰσοκράτει ἀργύριον ἀναλίσκειν). Phthonos is not just linked to censure through the verb epitimaō though: sometimes it actually implies (moral) censure itself, with no hint of (malicious) envy. In ch.5.3.2 I will discuss a number of passages in the Attic oratorical corpus (Lys. 27.11.1-2; Isoc. 4.184.1-6, 18.51.1-3; Isae. 6.61.1-3; Aeschin. 3.42.1-6; Dem. 21.29.3-5, 21.196.4-6, 28.18.2-3, 37.52.1-3), in which orators openly call on their audience to feel phthonos (meaning censure) for their opponents’ inappropriate behaviour.\(^{46}\)

In the Classical period, phthonos can often be understood to involve malicious or spiteful action, so as to provide some sort of pleasure to the person feeling it.\(^{47}\) Electra keeps her voice down, lest someone maliciously decide to spread rumours (love of gossip-mongering being the assumed pleasure; Soph. El. 638-42: οὐ γὰρ ἐν φίλοις ὁ μύθος, οὐδὲ πάν ἀναπτύξαι πρέπει πρὸς φῶς παροῦσις τής πλησίας ἐμοί, μὴ σὺν φθόνῳ τε καὶ πολυγλώσσῳ βοὴ σπείρῃ ματαίαν βάξιν εἰς πᾶσαν πόλιν). Some maliciously sabotage a hunt (Xen. Cyn. 3.10.5-7: αἱ δὲ πεπλασμένως, φθονερῶς δὲ ἀλλαὶ ἐκκυνοῦσι παρὰ τὸ ἱχνος διὰ τέλους συμπεριφερόμεναι). Some gossip maliciously about Socrates, leading to general bad-feeling against him, and his subsequent conviction (Pl. Ap. 18d2-3: ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον; Ap. 28a7-9: καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὦ ἐμὲ αἱρεῖ, ἐάνπερ αἱρῆ, ὦ Μέλητος οὔδε Ἀνυτος ἀλλ’ ἢ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος).

\(^{45}\) On baskania, see pp.105-6, esp. n.40.

\(^{46}\) This ‘censure’ aspect of real-life usage of phthonos, is the only one that is significantly divergent from Aristotle’s understanding of the emotion (see ch.4, ch.5.3.1).

\(^{47}\) In the same way that English envy is connected to Schadenfreude. This malicious phthonos is not necessarily felt towards those particularly fortunate, nor is it necessarily due to personal animosity – rather its primary motive usually seems to be pleasure-seeking, with no care that the pleasure involves someone else’s hurt (Pl. Phdr. 240a5-6, mentioned below, being an exception).
The jealous lover who feels envy when his beloved possesses something, and rejoices when he loses it (Pl. Phdr. 240a5-6: ἐὰν πάσα ἀνάγκη ἔραστήν παῖδικοῖς φθονεῖν μὲν οὐσίαν κεκτημένοις, ἀπολλυμένης δὲ χαίρειν). And the comic playwright Alexis links epikhairekakia (spite) to phthonos in how someone views their neighbours (fr.51.1(Kock): ἐπιχαιρέκακος εἰ καὶ φθονεῖς τοῖς πλησίον) – note once again the connection of neighbours with phthonos, a connection we saw in Pind. Ol. 1.47, and which appears again when Praxagora says that the abolition of private property will lead to an end to envying the neighbours (Ar. Eccl. 565: μὴ φθονεῖν τοῖς πλησίον). The clearest link of all between phthonos, neighbours, and pleasure in their misfortunes, is given by Plato, who argues that one goes to see comic plays in order to enjoy the misfortunes of one’s friends (he initially says neighbours, then changes this to friends), and that this is phthonos (Pl. Phlb. 48a8-50a9 – see pp.126-9 for a detailed discussion).

We have seen that phthonos can be contrasted with zêlos (see ch.3.2.2), and linked to hatred (misos) and spite (epikhairekakia). Other emotions it is linked to include orgê and thymos (Pl. Euthydem. 3d1; Isoc. 12.81.9, 15.31.4; Dem. 21.196.6), dyskolia or dysmeneia (Pl. Phdr. 241c2, Prt. 316d2, Resp. 500c1, 586c3, Leg. 844c7; Isoc. 5.68.7), baskania (Isoc. 15.62.5), and zêlotypia (Pl. Symp. 213d2 – see p.201-3). Plato several times includes it in long lists of emotions and desires, mostly painful ones (Pl. Phlb. 47e2, 50c1, 50c5, Leg. 863e7). It is further linked to to phaulon (the word Aristotle uses – see p.72), kakia, poneria and to aiskhron (Dem. 20.140.3 and 6, 20.164.10, 20.165.8; Aeschin. 2.51.3), and a treacherous and untrustworthy character (Aeschin. 2.54.3: τὸ ἦθος ως ἑπίβουλον καὶ ἄπιστον). Isocrates describes it as a disease (Isoc. 15.13.6: τούς δὲ φθονοῦντας ἐτὶ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου ταύτης λυπεῖσθαι).

Phthonos is also commonly linked with philonikia (love of victory, eager rivalry, contentiousness – implies love of strife) and philotimia (love of distinction, ambitious rivalry). Socrates, commenting on the Hesiod “potter envies potter” passage (Op. 25-6) says that things most similar are filled with envy and rivalry and hatred, while those unalike feel friendship (Pl. Ly. 215d2-4: μάλιστα τά ὁμοιότατα <πρὸς> ἄλληλα φθόνου τε καὶ φιλονικίας καὶ ἔχθρας ἐμπίμπλασθαι, τά δ’ ἀνομοιότατα φιλίας). One disputant

48 See n.16 above.
believes the other criticises his argument out of grudging and contentiousness, rather than in a desire to find the right solution (Pl. Grg. 457d2-5: ἀλλ' ἐὰν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητήσωσιν καὶ μὴ φῇ ὦ ἄτορος τὸν ἄτορον ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσι τε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον οἴονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, ἐπιθυμητικὸν τὰς ἀλλ' οὐ ζητούντας τὸ προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ). The person seeking to satisfy the spirited part of his soul will become envious due to his ambitious rivalry, violent due to his contentiousness, and angry due to his bad temper (Pl. Resp. 586a7-9: περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐχ ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ὥσ ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαπράττηται ἢ φθόνῳ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἢ βίᾳ διὰ φιλονικίαν ἢ θυμῷ διὰ δυσκολίαν)...

An ambitious soul breeds envy, which is hard to live with, especially for the person feeling it (Pl. Leg. 870c5-7: δεύτερον δὲ φιλοτιμίου ψυχῆς ἔχοντες εὐκτίκτουσα, χαλεποὺς συνοίκους μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ τῷ κεκτημένῳ τὸν φθόνον).

Cyprus saw that many soldiers, being rivalrous in competition, felt envy for each other (Xen. Cyr. 3.3.10.1-3: ἐτι δ' ὀργῆς ὧν φιλοτιμίως ἔχοντες ἐν οἷς ἀντηγωνίζοντο πολλοὶ καὶ ἐπιφθόνως εἶχον πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν στρατιωτῶν). Agamemnon’s soldiers were filled with anger and rage and envy and ambitious rivalry (sc. yet he kept them together; Isoc. 12.81.8-9: ἀλλ' ὀργῆς καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ φθόνου καὶ φιλοτιμίας μεστοὺς). Demosthenes says a law is shameful and vicious, and similar to envy and contention (Dem. 20.157.1-3: Αἰσχρός, ὦ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, καὶ κακῶς ἔχων ὁ νόμος, καὶ ὁμοίοις φθόνῳ τινὶ καὶ φιλονικίᾳ καὶ—τὸ λοιπὸν ἐώς).

Athenians allowed legal appeals, knowing that there would be occasional unjust results due to contention, envy, hatred and other reasons (Dem. 57.6.3-8: εἰ γὰρ πάντες ἐνομίζετε τὰ δίκαια δυνῆσεσθαι τοὺς δημότας διακρίναι, οὐκ ἂν ἐδώκατε τὴν εἰς ύμᾶς ἐφεσιν· νῦν δὲ καὶ διὰ φιλονικίαν καὶ διὰ φθόνου καὶ δι' ἑχθρῶν καὶ δι' ἄλλας προφάσεις ἑσσεσθαι τι τοιοῦτον ἠγούμενοι). Sometimes philotimia on its own represents envy/jealousy, e.g.: Dionysus argues it was Heracles’ jealousy that Dionysus might copy him in bringing someone back from Hades that led him to exaggerate the dangers of attempting it (Ar. Ran. 280-1: Ἡλαξουεῦθ' ἵνα φοβηθείν εἴγω, εἴδως με μάχιμον ὅντα, φιλοτιμούμενος); Isocrates, repeating his own topos that others envy him, uses philotimôs to mean phthonerôs (Isoc. 15.244.2-4: ἠγούμας πάντας τοὺς φιλοτίμους διακειμένους, ἐπιθυμητικῶς ἔχοντας τοῦ φρονεῖν εὗ καὶ λέγειν).

49 See n.35 above.
The examples given in the previous paragraph show many of the same status relationships breeding *phthonos* that Aristotle discusses in the *Rhetoric* (2.10 – see ch.4.4.2), and his analysis confirms many other points that we find elsewhere about the nature of *phthonos*. Gnomic utterances confirm that *phthonos* is felt for kin (Aesch. fr.610.1-3(Mette)), the rich (Eur. *Supp*. 241; Xen. *Cyr*. 7.5.77.4, 8.2.19.3/4), or by the base for the worthy (Soph. fr.188.1(Radt); Eur. fr.295.2(Nauck), fr.334.1(Nauck); Ar. *Eq*. 1274; Lys. 3.9.7), and that one envies the wise (Agathon fr.25.1(Snell); Anaxandrides fr.54.5(Kock); Isoc. 2.46.3; this *phthonos* works both ways – cf. n.43 above). *Phthonos* is felt against tyrants who abuse their powers, but not against benevolent ones or monarchs (Xen. *Lac*. 15.8.4; Pl. *Resp*. 579c1, 580a3; Isoc. 3.18.11); it is felt for political rivals (Xen. *Hell*. 2.4.29.7, 3.2.13.6, 3.4.8.3, *Mem*. 2.6.20.6); and it is regularly contrasted with pity (mostly *eleos*, occasionally *oiktos* or *(to) synakhthesthai*: Andoc. 2.6.8; Lys. 20.15.1, 21.15.4; Isae. 11.38.2; Isoc. 1.26.7; Dem. 21.196.4, 28.18.3, 29.2.4). All these points are made by Aristotle (see ch.4). One passage of Xenophon is particularly instructive about the nature of *phthonos*, where Socrates argues that true friendship is sufficient to conquer it:

φύσει ἐγὼ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἵνα ἄνθρωποι τά μὲν φιλικά· δέονται τε γὰρ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συνεργότατες ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται καὶ διαχογνωμονοῦντες ἑναντιοῦνται· πολεμικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔρις καὶ ὀργή· καὶ δυσμενεῖς μὲν ὁ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως, ἀλλὰ ὄμως διὰ τούτων πάντων ἢ φιλία διαδομένη συνάπτει τοὺς καλούς τὸν πάνω, διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐρετήν αἱροῦνται μὲν ἀνευρόντες μὲν ἀδύνατον τὰ μέτρια κεκτῆσθαι· πολέμιον καὶ πολέμιον καὶ ὀργήν· καὶ δυσμενεῖς μὲν ὁ ἄνθρωπος συνεργότατες, καὶ συνεργότατες ἀλλήλων διατίθεσθαι καὶ τὴν ὀργήν κωλύειν εἰς τὸ μεταμελησόμενον προϊέναι· τὸν δὲ ὀργήν παντάπασιν ἀφαιροῦσι, τὰ μὲν ἐαυτῶν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις οἰκεῖα παρέχοντες, τὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων ἐαυτῶν νομίζοντες.

*Mem*. 2.6.21.2-23.7

For by nature men are friendly: for they need each other, and pity and benefit from cooperating, and understanding this have gratitude for each other. But they are also hostile: for thinking the same things fine and sweet, they fight over them and, differing, are opposed; both strife and anger tend to hostility; and a desire to be greedy leads to ill will, and envy to hatred. But nevertheless friendship evades all these things and unites gentlemen. For due to their virtue they choose to possess a moderate amount without difficulty, rather than to rule everyone through war, and they can, even when hungry and thirsty, painlessly share their food and drink and staunch
their pleasure in sexual attractions to youthful beauty, so as not to pain those who have nothing to do with the matter. And they can settle strife with each other not only painlessly, but also in a useful way, and check anger so as to go forward without ruing anything; and they totally set aside envy, giving their own goods to their friends as possessions, and using those of their friends as their own.

This passage is fascinating for its discussion of how envy arises, showing that it is not just modern scholars who have noticed that emotions occur in episodes, following situational antecedents with psychological affects. It also accords with Gill’s analysis of Aristotle, when he shows that a perfect friend will not feel envy.\(^{50}\)

We also find frequent mention in Greek texts of situations where *phthonos* leads to destruction. Heracles asks how anyone could worship Hera who, envying the amount of extramarital sex Zeus has, destroys the innocent benefactors of Greece (Eur. *HF* 1307-10: τοιαύτης θεώ τίς ἐν προσεύξομαι; ἣ γυναικὸς οὐνεκα λέκτρων φθονοῦσα Ζηνί τοὺς εὔεργέτας Ἑλλάδος ἀπώλεσ’ οὐδὲν ὄντας αἰτίους). Envy, in destroying the minds of many people, will kill both “him” and “me” (Eur. fr.551.1-2(Nauck): φθόνος δ’ ὁ πολλῶν φρένα διαφθείρων βροτῶν ἀπώλεσ’ αὐτὸν καὶ με συνδιώλεσεν). A wish for someone to destroy all those who have something, envying their goods (Agathon fr.23.1(Snell): ἐλοιθ’ ὁ τοῖς ἔχουσι τά γαθὰ φθονῶν). Mnesilokhos stabs a wineskin out of *phthonos* that someone else has it (Ar. *Thesm*. 757: Κακῶς ἀπόλλοι. ὥς φθονερὸς εἰ καὶ δυσμενῆς). Parties in civil strife destroy those not taking part, out of envy that they should survive (Thuc. 3.82.8.21-3: τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ἔννηγωγίζοντο ἢ φθόνω τοῦ περείναι διαφθείροντο). Odysseus destroys Palamedes, sensing a challenge to his reputation as wisest (Xen. *Mem*. 4.2.33.10-12: Τὰ δὲ Παλαμήδους οὐκ ἄκηκος πάθη; τοῦτον γάρ δὴ πάντες ὑμοῦσιν ώς διὰ σοφίαν φθονηθεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ἀπόλλυται). The son of Gobryas is murdered by a prince jealous of his hunting prowess (Xen. *Cyr*. 4.6.4.5-8: ἐν τούτῳ δὴ οὐκέτι κατίσχει ὁ ἀνόσιος τὸν φθόνου, ἀλλ’ αἰχμὴν παρά τινος τῶν ἐπομένων ἀρπάσας, παίσας εἰς τὰ στέρνα τὸν μόνον μοι καὶ φίλον παϊδα ἀφείλετο τὴν ψυχήν). Socrates is destroyed by the slander and envy of the many, not the prosecution of one man (Pl. *Ap*. 28a7-9: καὶ τούτ’ ἐστιν ὁ ἐμὲ αἰρεί, ἐὰν περ αἰρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὔδε Ἀνυτος ἀλλ’ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος). The lover

\(^{50}\) Gill (2003) 36-7 – see p.91 below.
jealous of his beloved, and therefore wanting him to be less attractive to rival suitors, will be harmful to his beloved’s property, the state of his body, and most of all to the development of his soul (Pl. *Phdr*. 241c1-5: εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀναγκαῖον εἰὴ ἐνδοῦναι αὐτὸν ἀπίστῳ, δυσκόλῳ, φθονερῷ, ἀπεδεί, βλαβερῷ μὲν πρὸς οὐσίαν, βλαβερῷ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἐξίν, πολὺ δὲ βλαβερωτάτῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς παίδευσιν). Envy tends to level down, so when there is neither wealth nor poverty in a community, envy will disappear (Pl. *Leg*. 679b9-c1: ἣ δ’ ἂν ποτὲ συνοικία μῆτε πλούτος συνοικίκη μῆτε πενία, σχεδὸν ἐν ταύτῃ γενναίοτατα ἢθη γίγνοιτ’ ἂν· οὔτε γὰρ ὑβρίς οὔτ’ ἀδικία, ξῆλοι τε αὖ καὶ φθόνοι οὐκ ἐγγίγνονται; cf. Ar. *Ek*. 565). Some people destroy others out of envy (Isoc. 15.142.8: οἷς δ’ ἂν φθονήσωσιν ἀπολλύουσιν ἄνπερ ἰδυνηθῶσιν). That we find so many instances where phthonos leads to destruction, again ties in well with modern research on envy.

A particularly common way of damaging/destroying someone is to slander them, and phthonos is frequently linked to diabolê (slander – e.g. Pl. *Ap*. 18d2, 28a9, *Leg*. 731a3, 731a5, *Epist*. 3.316e1; Xen. *Hell*. 3.4.8.3; Isoc. 5.73.2, 12.21.5, 12.251.11, 15.30.1-31.5, 15.163.6, 15.258.1-259.4; Aeschin. 2.10.6).51 Further evidence for the connection of phthonos with diabolê occurs at Arist. *Rh*. 1.1, where Aristotle says it is not right to lead the juror astray using orgê or phthonos or eleos (1.1.1354a24-5: οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς όργήν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον), having previously talked about diabolê and eleos and orgê and other passions of the soul as not being anything to do with the facts of the case, but an appeal to the juror (1.1.1354a16-18: διαβολῆ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργή καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστὴν). By juxtaposing these lists so closely, Aristotle seems to be suggesting that diabolê is how one ‘does phthonos’. The idea that slandering someone is how one puts one’s phthonos into effect, accords with the findings of anthropologists that “gossip, backbiting, and defamation” are natural action tendencies of envy,52 and we saw above that the pleasure of gossip and rumour-mongering is occasionally linked with the malicious pleasure phthonos brings (n.16; cf. ch.7 n.32).

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51 This is already present in Pind. *Ol*. 1.47: ἔννεπε κρυφὰ τις αὐτίκα φθονερῶν γειτόνων; see also n.30 above. See ch.6 n.70 for various other references to this connection in Greek literature.

52 Foster (1972) 172 – see p.26. See also my discussions of Phaidra (p.155) and Hermione (p.188), with respect to gossip.
3.4. Conclusions: a comparison of *phthonos* usage with modern theory

It can therefore be seen from this survey of *phthonos* in Classical Athenians texts, that Greek *phthonos* covers approximately the same ground as both English envy and (possessive) jealousy. However, it is not completely coterminous with these two English emotions; indeed there are a number of noteworthy differences. First, we should note the ubiquitous strong sense of begrudging in *phthonos*. Second, the ability of *phthonos* to imply moral censure,\(^{53}\) which neither envy nor jealousy can do in English. Third, the exclusion of sexual jealousy from *phthonos*: i.e. sexual and possessive jealousy are definitely not two branches of the same emotion in Greek, separated merely by a desired person rather than object.\(^{54}\) Fourth, the idiomatic use of “I envy you” to show emulation, which falls within the purview of *zêlos* rather than *phthonos* in Greek.\(^{55}\)

In terms of its phenomenology (and leaving aside moral censure for now), *phthonos* does appear to work quite similarly to envy and (possessive) jealousy. First, it is either aroused by someone having something I do not, or by a desire to retain or regain something I want to keep to myself. Second, related affects appear to be similar, especially for envy: it is frequently tied to hostility, hatred, rivalry (and a desire to beat one’s rival), spite, and taking pleasure in the rival’s misfortunes. Finally, it frequently leads to damaging or destructive action, often slander. Such similarity in the phenomenology is strong indication that we are justified in using a phenomenological approach to understand situations where *phthonos* is present but not mentioned by name (or named only to be denied).\(^{56}\) For fuller justification, for further insights into the socio-psychology of *phthonos*, and finally for the most

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\(^{53}\) Discussed in greater detail in ch.5.3.

\(^{54}\) The ‘situational’ approach of Salovey and others (see pp.32-3) is therefore particularly helpful for understanding *phthonos*. I discuss Greek sexual jealousy in ch.8, and we will see that *phthonos* does in fact have some part to play.

\(^{55}\) Greek draws its lexical boundaries differently, but also its experiential boundaries: *zêlos* is contrasted with *phthonos*, it is not a continuum.

\(^{56}\) No tendency to transmutation has been noted from this lexical survey; however, by definition a lexical survey would be unlikely to show this. We should consider, though, that the prevalence of accusations of *phthonos* in Greek texts – when the accused would almost certainly be denying the accusation – does suggest a) that *phthonos* might well have been transmuted or misrepresented in the same way envy is, and b) that there would have been a similar first-person attribution of indignation or desire for justice, where there was a second-person attribution of envy. See ch.5.3, ch.6 on transmutation and *phthonos.*
sustained attempt in the ancient world to explore the complex nexus of emotions aroused by others’ good fortune, I now turn to Aristotle.
Chapter 4: Aristotle on Phthonos

4.1 Introduction

We have looked at the socio-psychology of envy and jealousy from a modern perspective. However, in the mid-fourth century, Aristotle developed his own socio-psychological theory of the emotions, the first person ever to analyse them systematically in this way. Aristotle’s theory is laid out in The Art of Rhetoric. In this treatise Aristotle argues that an orator, in trying to persuade an audience, has three modes of persuasion available to him: logical argument (logos), the speaker’s own character (éthos), and “putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind” (1.2.1356a1-4: ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀκροατῶν διαθεῖναί πώς). He elaborates: “[The orator persuades] through his hearers, when they are led to emotion by his speech” (1.2.1356a14-15: διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προσέχθωσιν). The third mode of persuasion is thus emotion (pathos), which can legitimately be used as part of an orator’s armoury of rhetorical weapons to influence his listeners.

1 A version of this chapter, plus ch.5.2.1, has been published as Sanders (2008).
2 There has been a large amount of scholarship on the Rhetoric in recent years, beginning with Grimaldi’s commentaries on Rh. Books I (1980) and II (1988), the first since Cope (1877). Furley and Nehamas (1994), Garver (1994), Rorty (1996), and Gross and Walzer (2000) are all collections entirely on the Rh. Three articles in Konstan and Rutter (2003) also deal with this treatise: Gill (2003), Viano (2003) and Ben-Ze’ev (2003). Excepting Grimaldi’s commentary on Book 2, this scholarship has tended to treat Aristotle’s account of the emotions as a whole – or at best successively, with minimal commentary on each individual emotion. One notable exception is Konstan. (2003a): ‘Aristotle on Anger and the Emotions: the Strategies of Status’. As Konstan shows, Aristotle believed anger to be appropriate in certain situations, and only morally problematic in excess. This is axiomatic to his approach to the emotions, and explains why for him they are an acceptable tool in oratory. More recently, Konstan (2006) examines in significant detail the philological phenomenology of most of the emotions treated in the Rhetoric, comparing them with literary use especially in Homer, tragedy, oratory and Hellenistic philosophy.
3 Note: all references in this chapter are to Arist. Rh. unless otherwise stated.
4 Leighton (1996) 223-30 shows that, while Aristotle generally (e.g. NE 2.5.1105b21-23) includes both emotions and epithymia (appetite – e.g. hunger, thirst, sex drive) within the pathê, in the Rhetoric he excludes epithymia. Leighton argues convincingly that this is because Aristotle is only interested here in pathê that affect judgment (i.e. emotions), and appetites do not do so, or at least not cognitively – Viano (2003) 94 agrees; see also Grimaldi (1988) 14-5, who reviews the various meanings of pathos in the Aristotelian corpus. Several other pathê mentioned at Eth. Nic. 2.5.1105b21-23 (confidence, joy, longing) are also not included in the Rhetoric, probably because Aristotle did not believe they affected judgment either. Aristotle himself notes in the Rhetoric that he has discussed the pathê that relate to persuasive argument (2.11.1388b29-30).
5 Rh. 1.2 appears to contradict 1.1, in which Aristotle said that “slander, pity, anger and such emotions of the soul have nothing to do with the facts, but are merely an appeal to the juror” (1.1.1354a16-18: διὰ βολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιάτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν), and again “one should not lead the juror into anger, envy or pity – it is like warping a carpenter’s
Aristotle discusses emotions in Book 2 of the *Rhetoric*, defining them as feelings that affect judgment and are accompanied by pain and pleasure (2.1.1378a19-21: ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὀσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οίς ἐπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή). This definition sees emotions as cognitive: we perceive something (consciously or subconsciously, through any of our senses); that perception makes us feel something; and this feeling alters our judgment, which in turn can affect our actions. In *Rh.* 2.2-11, Aristotle analyses fifteen named (and several unnamed) emotions, stating the general psychological condition under which each arises, and who might feel each emotion, for whom, and in what circumstances. One of these emotions is *phthonos*.

### 4.2 The placement of *phthonos* in the *Rhetoric*

#### 4.2.1 Pain and pleasure at the fortunes of others

Aristotle generally treats the emotions in named pairs – anger and calmness, friendship and hate, etc. However, he treats as a group emotions (some unnamed) relating to the fortunes of others. In *Rh.* 2.8 he begins with *eleos* (pity), which he describes as pain at someone’s undeserved bad fortune (1385b13-14: ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φανομένῳ κακῷ ... τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν). In 2.9, Aristotle discusses the relationship between pity and a number of other emotions. He begins by stating that to *nemesan* (indignation) lies most

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6 Frede (1996) discusses whether each emotion involves both pain and pleasure (pleasure in anticipating an action to alleviate pain), or just one or the other. She argues that Aristotle tends towards the former view in *Rh.* Book 1, and the latter in Book 2.

7 Aristotle was the first scholar to highlight the role of cognition in emotion, an approach that has regained much currency in the last thirty years, decreasing emphasis on physiological explanations – see ch.1 n.3.

8 While Greeks had long understood the role of emotion in decision making – e.g. Agamemnon acknowledging he had acted under the influence of *ató* (Hom. *Il.* 19.86-9) – it was Aristotle who first presented it as a normal phenomenon, and not inherently problematic; cf. Grimaldi (1988) 12.

9 Aristotle goes on to say that we must believe we could suffer the same bad fortune in order to pity. Kristjánsson (2006) 89-92 argues that *eleos* is more properly translated ‘compassion’, and that *pity* should be reserved for pain at *deserved* bad fortune – his attempt to show that Aristotle implies this as a separate emotion when he talks of putative pain (or lack of it) at parricides and murderers being punished (2.9.1386b28-29), is highly unconvincing.
Chapter 4: Aristotle

opposed to pity in being pain at someone’s undeserved good fortune, both emotions being felt by someone of good character (1386b8-12: ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἑλεείν μάλιστα μὲν ὁ καλοῦσι νεμεσάν· τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαί ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις ἀντικείμενον ἦστι τρόπον τινά καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἠθοῦς τὸ λυπεῖσθαί ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις. καὶ ἀμφω τὰ πάθη ἠθοῦς χρηστοῦ). Phthonos (envy) appears to be similarly opposed to pity, and perhaps even the same thing as indignation, but in fact it is a pain excited by the perceived good fortune, not of someone undeserving, but of those like us (2.9.1386b16-20: δῶξει δ’ ἂν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἑλεείν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντικείσθατι τρόπον, ὡς σύνεγγυς ὡν καὶ ταύτων τῷ νεμεσάν, ἔστι δ’ ἔτερον· λύπη μὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστίν καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ᾑσοῦ καὶ ὦμοίου). He goes on to say that these feelings will be accompanied by their opposite emotions (2.9.1386b25-26: φανερὸν ἄδικολοβηθείς καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις), which will be pleasurable or at least not painful (2.9.1386b27: ἦσθησεται ἢ ἄλυπος ἔσται). Finally, in 2.11, Aristotle discusses zêlos (emulation). This is, like envy, a pain at someone else’s good fortune (2.11.1388a32-33: εἰ γάρ ἔστιν ζῆλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φανομένῃ παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων), though not because they have something, but because we do not: emulation (as Aristotle parenthetically explains) is a good emotion felt by good people, whereas envy is a bad emotion felt by bad people; emulation makes us act to acquire goods ourselves, envy to deprive someone else of them (2.11.1388a34-38: οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτῷ ἔστιν (διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικῆς ἔστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν φαύλον καὶ φαύλων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν παρασκευάζει διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίου μὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον)). The opposite of emulation is

10 See p.86 for a discussion of the phrase τοῦ ἱσοῦ καὶ ὦμοίου.
11 Aristotle clarifies “accompanied”, saying that the type of person who feels indignation is the same type of person who feels its opposite in a contrary situation (not that each individual episode of indignation will be accompanied by its opposite).
12 Aristotle often finds his desire to schematise restrictive. Here, for instance, if something is opposite to painful, it should be pleasurable, but in some situations might not be. For instance, any good person will be pained by a criminal escaping justice, but one’s response to a convicted murderer being hanged will depend partly on one’s attitude to the death penalty. Aristotle is aware of this difficulty, and gets round it by saying that if one does not feel pleasure, one at least will not feel pain. A modern ethicist might disagree, arguing that such a situation tests one’s opposition to the death penalty.
13 I do not see why a bad person might not emulate another bad person (e.g. a mugger emulating a bank robber), but Aristotle does not seem to envisage this possibility. Perhaps his desire to schematise, to present emotions as either “good” or “bad”, has led him to ignore such situations.
14 This self-improvement vs. other-deprivation dichotomy reflects that between envy and emulation in English – see p.35.
kataphronēsis (disdain) (2.11.1388b22-3: ἐναντίον γὰρ ζῆλῳ καταφρόνησίς ἐστι, καὶ τῷ ζηλοῦν τὸ καταφρονεῖν).\textsuperscript{15}

This collection of emotions, and their relationship to each other, is on first reading rather bewildering. Ben-Ze’ev has proposed a categorisation based on two factors: whether the subject is better or worse off than the object; and whether the situation is deserved.\textsuperscript{16} Ben-Ze’ev maps his reading of Aristotle as in Fig. 4.1 below.

![Fig. 4.1: Source: Ben-Ze’ev (2003) 104](image)

As Ben-Ze’ev shows, pity is an emotion triggered by seeing someone worse off in an undeserved situation, while indignation, envy and emulation are all emotions triggered by

\textsuperscript{15} Kataphronēsis is difficult to translate, as no English word does it full justice. Barnes (1984) uses “contempt”, but this does not capture the self-satisfaction and desire to avoid similar misfortune implied by Aristotle (I discuss this in more detail at p.76). I believe “dismain” does so better, but these aspects should be borne in mind wherever “disdain” occurs below.

\textsuperscript{16} Ben-Ze’ev (2003) 102-4. He notes that Aristotle likewise ignores other determinants of emotional response, such as culture (i.e. whether an emotion was acceptable and how intensely it was felt). I would add individual personality traits to the list: some people are more disposed to a particular emotional response than others – however we should note that Aristotle is interested in mass audiences, and while intensity of response might differ across an audience, one would expect some sort of normal distribution centred on the effect Aristotle predicts, with crowd mentality doing the rest.
seeing someone better off in an undeserved situation. These emotions lie across an axis from, and so are opposed to (antikeisthai), pity. We cannot believe someone to be simultaneously better-off and worse-off than ourselves in relation to some desert, which is why Aristotle argues that if you envy or are indignant at someone, you cannot pity them. Emotions in the top left quadrant are also directed at someone worse off than ourselves, like pity, but they differ in being felt in a deserved situation. They are also therefore opposed (antikeisthai) to pity, if in a different way to indignation, envy and emulation, and similarly cannot co-exist with it. Emotions in diagonally opposite quadrants are true contraries (enantia), opposed both in the subject-object relation and in the deservingness of the situation. A painful emotion felt in an undeserved situation is indeed most directly contrary to a pleasurable emotion felt in a deserved situation, and again one cannot feel both sorts of emotion for the same person simultaneously. We can also note with Ben-Ze’ev that emotions on the left of the diagram are pleasurable, while those on the right are painful.

Ben-Ze’ev’s diagrammatic representation is very useful, but in a number of points it does not reflect Aristotle. First, it should not include either admiration or compassion: Ben-Ze’ev has been influenced by his own research as a philosopher into reading these without warrant in Aristotle’s discussion. Second, Ben-Ze’ev has ignored disdain, which clearly should be on the map somewhere, and probably (since it is enantion to emulation) in the

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17 Note it is the entire situation (including our lack of goods) that we perceive as undeserved, not necessarily the object’s possession of goods – this allows emulation to appear in this quadrant, though (as I argue below) deservingness is still not that important to emulation.

18 2.9.1387a3-5; 2.9.1387b17-21; 2.10.1388a27-30. We could of course believe them better-off and worse-off for different deserts, e.g. I could envy someone’s wealth but also pity them for having cancer. However at any instant one emotion or the other would predominate, depending on which thought was uppermost.

19 Arist. Cat. 10 notes that there are four ways in which something can be opposed (ἀντικεῖσθαι): as relatives (τὰ πρὸς τί – e.g. double and half); as contraries (τὰ ἐναντία – e.g. good and bad; black and white); as privation and state (στέρησις καὶ ἔξεσις – e.g. blindness and sight); as affirmation and negation (κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις – e.g. he is sitting, and he is not sitting). Metaph. 5.10.1018a25 notes that contraries are the most strongly opposed.


21 Ben-Ze’ev (2000) discusses a number of emotions felt at others’ fortunes which do not occur in Aristotle, and his binary categorisation comes from this work and is imposed onto Aristotle. In general it works well. Ben-Ze’ev (2003) 113, however, believes Aristotle’s discussion of kindness in Rh. 2.7 is the same as our compassion – Konstan (2006) 156-68 argues, in my view correctly, that the emotion Aristotle treats is not kharis (kindness), but kharin ekhein (gratitude) – but Aristotle does not relate this emotion to any of those in 2.8-11. Similarly, Aristotle’s comments on admiration quoted by Ben-Ze’ev (2003) 118 are that we emulate those we admire (2.11.1388b20), which does not amount to another emotion, merely a descriptive verb applied to the emulator. Ben-Ze’ev goes on to argue “that admiration, rather than emulation, is the opposite of contempt” (118), and proceeds to put admiration in a different quadrant from emulation; none of this is justified by Aristotle’s text.
Aristotle.

Third, Ben-Ze’ev has included spite, but his evidence for this emotion comes from the *Nicomachean Ethics* and, as I will show, these treatises cannot simply supplement each other. Finally, I believe he has mis-positioned some of his emotions, partly because his analysis does not take account of something crucial: character.

4.2.2 *A three-way categorisation*

To go back a stage, Aristotle discusses three emotions in the *Rhetoric* that are pains we (the subject) feel on perceiving that someone else (the object) has some good. These emotions are indignation, envy and emulation, and in a number of short passages Aristotle tells us how to distinguish them.\(^{22}\) We feel indignation because the other person does not deserve the good (1386b10-11: τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις), but this is explicitly contrasted with envy, where it is not a concern (2.9.1386b18-20: λύπη μὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁμοίου), nor is the other’s deservingness mentioned in connection with emulation.\(^{23}\) We feel emulation because we want the same good as someone else, though we have no desire to deprive them of theirs (2.11.1388a34-37: οὐχ ὃτι ἄλλῳ ἀλλ’ ὃτι οὐχί καὶ αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ... ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτόν παρασκευάζει διὰ τὸν ξῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν ἄγαθῶν), but in both indignation and envy our concern is with someone else owning the good, not with our own lack (2.9.1386b20-21: τὸ δὲ μὴ ὃτι αὐτῷ τι συμβῆσαι ἔτερον, ἀλλὰ δι’ αὐτόν τὸν πλησίον, ἀπασιν ὁμοίως δεὶ ὑπάρχειν; 2.11.1388a37-38: ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον μὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον). Finally, Aristotle states it is bad to feel envy,\(^{24}\) but good to feel

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\(^{22}\) He characterises each emotion according to who feels it, when, and against whom (2.1.1378a23-26); but this is not how he distinguishes one emotion from another.

\(^{23}\) The object’s desert is not relevant to emulation, but the subject’s (i.e. our own) perceived desert is: the more we feel we deserve similar goods now, the more we will feel pain. However, if we assess our self-worth as currently low, but potentially high (if we work hard / study ethics / raise a large family etc.), we might anticipate attaining a greater allocation of goods only once we deserve them, so such minimal pain as we feel now will merely be at the thought that we might not fulfil our potential.

\(^{24}\) It is perhaps odd that Aristotle does not mention envy’s badness in the chapter he nominally devotes to that emotion (2.10). However, its badness is irrelevant to the “Who feels it? When? Against whom?” questions that are the main focus of each chapter; the point most logically belongs where he compares one emotion with another. He has already told us at 2.9.1386b33-1837a1 that the *phthoneros* (and the *epikhairekakos*) is of a contrary character to the *khrēstos* who feels indignation (and various other emotions), so it would be unnecessary to repeat it until he compares *phthonos* with another emotion, which he does not do till 2.11.1388a34-38 (after which follow a number of situations inspiring *zêlos* that contrast directly with individual situations inspiring *phthonos* – see n.55 below). In the *Eth. Nic.* too, envy is one of only a handful of bad emotions, along with spite and shamelessness (*Eth. Nic.* 2.6.1107a9-11). These remarks are all consistent, so we should not take the absence of a statement of envy’s badness in 2.10 as problematic.
emulation (2.11.1388a35-36: διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικὲς ἐστὶν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν φαύλον καὶ φαύλων), and indignation is also associated with good character (2.9.1386b11-12: καὶ ἄμφω ὑπὸ πάθη [to eleein and to nemesan] ἰθὸς χρηστοῦ; 2.9.1386b33-1387a1: καὶ ἐστὶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἰθὸς ἀπαντα ταῦτα [to nemesan and others (see below)], τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου· ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαίρετερα καὶ φθονερός). We can see, therefore, that Aristotle describes how these emotions differ from each other by reference to three, not two, factors: whether the subject’s character is good or bad; whether the object’s deservingness is important; and whether the good itself is specifically desired. Each factor shows one emotion differing markedly from the other two.

Turning to pleasurable emotions at someone else’s bad fortune, Aristotle has provided one, disdain, and stated that it is the opposite of emulation (2.11.1388b22-23: ἐναντίον γὰρ ζῆλῳ καταφρόνησις ἐστι, καὶ τῷ ζηλοῦν τὸ καταφρονεῖν): if we emulate those who have certain goods, we disdain those who do not; if we wish to copy someone in achieving something positive, we do not wish to copy them in achieving something negative (2.11.1388b23-26: ἀνάγκη δὲ τοὺς οὔτως ἔχοντας ἐχωντας ὅστε ζηλώσαι τινας ἢ ζηλοῦσαι καταφρονητικοὺς εἶναι τούτων τε καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ὅσοι τὰ ἐναντία κακὰ ἔχουσι τῶν ἄγαθῶν τῶν ζηλωτῶν). Just as in emulation we feel a pain at not having the same goods as someone else, so in disdain we feel pleasure that we are not suffering such evils ourselves, what Grimaldi calls “the pleasure which comes with self-satisfaction”.

The opposites of indignation and envy are more complicated, not least because it is not immediately clear whether there are two feelings or one. Having compared indignation

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25 Grimaldi (1988) 56 cites Vahlen, J. (1914) Beiträge zu Aristoteles’ Poetik (Berlin) 266-8, on “the similarity, if not the identity, in the Poetics of ἐπιεικής, χρῆστος (sic), σπουδάζως to denote the morally good”. Bonitz (1870) 813b37-8 notes that ἐπιεικής and χρῆστος are opposite to φαύλος.

26 We should note that Aristotle is not overly interested in mixed motives here, but presumably one can feel both indignation and emulation simultaneously, if one both wants what someone else has and thinks the other person shouldn’t have it. However, since one cannot be both morally good and morally bad, for Aristotle feeling envy precludes feeling either of the other two emotions as well (though see n.13 above).

27 Aristotle goes on to say that we can also feel kataphronēsis for those with good fortune, when it does not come with the right sort of goods (2.11.1388b26-28: διὸ πολλάκις καταφρονοῦν τῶν ἐυτυχῶν, ὅταν ἀνευ τῶν ἐντιμῶν ἄγαθῶν ὑπάρχη αὐτοῖς ἢ τώχη) – equivalent, in the modern world, to our contemptuous feeling for those we know will squander their lottery winnings, or for the nouveaux riches who buy vulgar status symbols.

with envy (see above), Aristotle goes on to talk about the opposite emotions accompanying the ones to which he has just referred, and I quote the passage in full for clarity:

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φανερὸν δ' ὅτι ἄκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λυποῦμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακοπραγοῦσιν ἡσθήσεται ἢ ἄλυπος ἐσται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν, οίον τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μισιφόνους, ὅταν τύχωσι τιμωρίας, οὔδεις ἂν λυπηθείη χρηστός· δεῖ γὰρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς δ' αὐτώς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὗ πράττουσι κατ' ἄξιόν· ἄμφω γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξειν ἢ ἄλυπος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν, ἦταν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός· ἐφ' ᾧ γάρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνοµένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου χαίρειν.

Rh. 2.9.1386b25-1387a3
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And clearly the opposite emotions will accompany these ones. For whoever is pained by someone suffering bad fortune undeservedly, will be pleased or at least not pained by those who suffer bad fortune oppositely [i.e. deservedly]. For instance, no good person (khreóstos) would be pained at parricides or murderers being punished; one must rejoice at such things, just as at people having good fortune deservedly. For both things are just, and make the good person (epieikêς) rejoice, since he must expect the same thing to happen to him as to someone like him. And all these emotions are felt by the same character (êthos); and contrary feelings are felt by the contrary character: for the same person is spiteful (epikhairekakos) and envious (phthoneros), as someone pained by something’s existence or genesis will necessarily rejoice at its absence or destruction.

Where Aristotle says “And clearly the opposite emotions will accompany these ones”, he initially appears to be talking about indignation and envy, the emotions he has been contrasting in the immediately preceding paragraph. In fact, in the following sentence, Aristotle talks about being pained by undeserved misfortune, which is not indignation but pity. “These ones” therefore refers to all the emotions so far discussed, pity as well as indignation and envy, and Aristotle deals with these three emotions one after another.29

First, Aristotle says that the man pained by undeserved misfortune (i.e. the person who feels pity), already identified with the person who feels indignation, will also feel joy at deserved misfortune (2.9.1386b26-28 and 30) and deserved good fortune (2.9.1386b30-

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29 Ibid. 155.
We therefore have four emotions: pity; indignation; pleasure at deserved misfortune (a sort of satisfaction at someone “getting their comeuppance”); and pleasure at deserved good fortune (for which I shall use Ben-Ze’ev’s ‘happy for’). All these emotions will be felt by people of the same, i.e. good, character (the epieikês or khrêstos) – people who can diagnose others’ deserts correctly and feel appropriate pain or joy. Aristotle goes on to state that contrary feelings will be felt by the contrary, i.e. bad, character (the phaulos) – that the phthoneros (the envious man) is also epikhairekakos (spiteful). Aristotle says later that this joy is roused similarly to envy (2.10.1388a24-27: δῆλον δὲ ἐκαὶ ἔφ’ οἷς χαίρουσιν οἱ τοιούτοι καὶ ἐπὶ τίς καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες: ὡς γὰρ ἔχοντες λυποῦνται, οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔναντίοις ἥσθησονται), which must mean: by the misfortunes of equals, rather than the deserving. This is appropriate, as someone morally bad will be unable to diagnose deserts correctly. He will feel envy and spite whether the object deserves it or not.

Ben-Ze’ev’s diagram would therefore be more in tune with Aristotle’s thinking if it looked something like Fig. 4.2 below. There are three pleasurable emotions – pleasure at deserved misfortune, spite and disdain – respectively opposite to indignation, envy and emulation. Pity also has an opposite: ‘happy for’. Each pair of emotions is aroused in the same individual in directly contrary circumstances, which is why each emotion is linked to its direct opposite.

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30 Cf. 2.9.1387b16-18; see J.M. Cooper (1996) 242, who draws attention to this unnamed good contrary to indignation.
31 Kristjánsson (2006) 96-99 refers to this emotion as ‘satisfied indignation’ (see ch.2 n.95), on the basis that it can only be felt after some injustice causing righteous indignation has been remedied; cf. p.38, where I argue that satisfied indignation is in fact not pleasurable, merely satisfying (though I am using ‘pleasurable’ in the everyday, rather than Aristotelian, sense).
32 Ben-Ze’ev (2003) 118.
33 Kristjánsson (2006) 94-100 insists on translating this emotion as ‘Schadenfreude’, by explicit contrast with ‘spite’ or ‘malice’. I prefer ‘spite’ because in Schadenfreude the patient does not usually take part in the action causing the pleasurable feelings, whereas if epikhairekakia is to be a true opposite to phthonos (and, indeed, be included in the Rh.) it must be able to motivate action.
34 Aristotle devotes almost the entirety of one chapter to each painful emotion, with no more than a few lines for each contrary pleasurable emotion (cf. Ben-Ze’ev (2003) 103), a scanty treatment similarly applied to shamelessness (2.6.1385a14-15) and ingratitude (2.7.1385b7-10).
I would mention three qualifications to this diagram. First, I am following Ben-Ze’ev in excluding a character axis (which would be in a third dimension perpendicular to the page), though for clarity rather than oversight – it is this that makes envy and spite appear close to the centre, since (bad) character is the only significant factor in these emotions. Second, emotions will not always be felt to the same degree, so a response will be somewhere along a line rather than at a fixed point. Finally, the exact emotional response will vary between individuals and in different situations, so each emotion could perhaps best be represented by a teardrop centred on the origin, the line being an average response. While this representation is therefore not quite as exact as it might be, I believe its extra clarity makes up for these minor imperfections so long as they are borne in mind. The diagram is perhaps overly schematising, but no more than Aristotle’s thought in the *Rhetoric*.35

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35 See n.12, n.13, n.26 above.
4.3 The placement of phthonos in the Ethics

In saying in the Rhetoric that ‘good’ (epieikês or khrêstos) people feel indignation and emulation, while bad (phaulos) people feel envy, Aristotle appears to suggest there are only two types of character (êthos): good, and bad. The former would then feel a number of emotions related to others’ fortunes (pity and ‘happy for’, indignation and ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune’, emulation and disdain); the latter only envy and spite, depending whether the fortune is bad or good. Good people would not be able to feel envy and spite at all; bad people would feel nothing else. If this interpretation were valid, an orator’s audience could consist only of people whose characters were either good or bad. People whose characters were somewhere in the middle, or who were sometimes good and sometimes bad, would not be envisaged. Anticipating slightly the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle argues that to be morally virtuous requires an ethical education, this would imply that those without such moral virtue (i.e. virtually everyone) are bad.36

Is Aristotle really arguing that the vast majority of his orator’s audience will be morally bad individuals, capable of feeling only envy and spite? It seems inherently unlikely. If nothing else, why would Aristotle then devote 186 lines to good people (66 lines to pity, 82 to indignation and 38 to emulation) and only 44 to bad (envy)? Indeed, if the vast majority of the audience could only feel envy and spite, why even bother teaching an orator about pity and indignation? Such an interpretation would place Aristotle at odds with oratorical practice, where appeals to an audience’s pity and indignation (or righteous anger) are commonplace.37

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36 We should note that there are two ways in which the terms good (ἐπιεικής or χρηστός) and bad (φαῦλος) can be used: morally and socially. For an Archaic aristocrat such as Theognis, the two senses are identical, ‘the good’ being synonymous with aristocracy and ‘the base’ with commoners. In democratic Athens, with its strong demotic ideology, the two become separated, so Euripides can talk about an honest poor man (φαῦλος ἰχρηστός), contrasted with a bad cleverer one (κακός ἰσοφώτερος) – Ion 834-5. While Aristotle’s aristocratic audience in his Ethics lectures might well think of themselves as both socially and morally good, for Aristotle himself these two senses are not identical, though it should be noted that to become morally good (through studying ethics), social “goodness” (i.e. wealth and leisure) would be a pre-requisite – Hutchinson (1995) 203; Nussbaum (1994) 55-6. It is possible Aristotle adopts a lower standard of ‘goodness’ for the mass audience his orator (in the Rhetoric) will address, but there is no reason to suppose this is necessarily so. 37 Carey (1996) 402-5 discusses righteous anger and pity, among other emotions roused; Dover (1974) 195-6 notes that orators often attempted to rouse a jury’s pity, sometimes by bringing their children into court; Allen (2003) 80-6 argues that juries were roused to controlled righteous anger (orgê), in an amount appropriate to the crime, an emotion Aristotle separates off as τὸ νεόσθεν; Webb (1997) 120-5 shows that Roman oratory likewise attempted to arouse misericordia (pity) and indignatio (indignation). Note it is possible that appeals to indignation are equally/instead appeals to transmuted envy – see ch.5.3, ch.6.
However, we should realise that the Greek words *phaulos*, *epieikês* and *khrêstos* are much more flexible, and have a broader application both socially and morally (see n.36 above), than the English words ‘bad’ and ‘good’, and in both interpretations (social and moral) moving from one to the other is possible. It is likely that Aristotle intends they should be understood in this way (even in the *Rhetoric*), i.e. as “characteristic of moral goodness” and “characteristic of moral badness”, which is suggestive of a continuum. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* it is much clearer that Aristotle does not believe most people to be either uniformly bad or uniformly good, but somewhere in the middle. Most people’s characters have been partially educated, partially encouraged towards moral goodness (I discuss how in ch.4.4.3). Much of the time people will not feel emotions that are either *phaulon* or *epieikes*. There will be instances where they feel one or the other, but with no reliability, and it is the orator’s job to try to tug them towards one end of the spectrum or the other, to try to awake an indignant or envious emotional response by appealing to their moral education or lack of it.

Aristotle (unlike the Stoics) does not believe that emotions are inimical to reason, and should therefore be eliminated as far as possible. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he argues that a proper measure of emotion is the morally desirable response, and he calls that proper measure the mean (μεσότης). Aristotle goes so far as to define virtue in relation to feeling appropriate emotion. However, one might not feel the proper amount of emotion: one might feel an excess or a deficiency (both are opposed to the mean and to each other), and both these extremes are vices (*Eth. Nic.* 2.6.1107a2-3: μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ’ ύπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ’ ἔλλειψιν; 2.8.1108b11-12: τριῶν δὲ ἄρετας ὑπερβολὴν, καθ’ ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς τριῶν ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινται πως). For instance: feeling a lack of fear when proper (the mean) is bravery, a virtue; feeling a lack of fear even when one should feel fear (the excessive vice) is rashness; feeling fear too often (the defective vice) is cowardice.

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38 As these formulations are clumsy in English, I shall continue using the designations ‘bad’ and ‘good’, but the broader interpretation of these words should be borne in mind.
41 As Nussbaum (1996) 316-17 points out, this means that even a correct action is not virtuous unless it has been motivated by morally appropriate emotions.
Chapter 4: Aristotle

(Eth. Nic. 3.7.1115b11-1116a9). Aristotle argues (Eth. Nic. 2.6.1106a25-1106b3) that the location of the mean will vary, not just from situation to situation, but from person to person. For instance, if eating two measures of food would be too little for all and ten too much, the right amount (the mean) will not necessarily be six measures: this would be too little for a champion athlete, but too much for a beginner. Thus six measures might be an excess, a deficiency, or a mean. Means are therefore relative to us, not to the object. It is for this reason that a proper emotional response might be part-way along a line in Fig. 4.2 above, rather than at the line’s end.

In the Eudemian Ethics, νέμεσις is a mean, and covers four emotions: pain at undeserved good or bad fortune (indignation and pity), and pleasure at deserved good or bad fortune (‘happy for’ and ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune’). The excessive vice is φθόνος, which is described as a pain felt at deserved good fortune (envy); the defective vice is unnamed, but is felt by the ἐπιχαιρέκακος, and is a joy at undeserved misfortune (spite) (Eth. Eud. 3.7.1233b19-25: ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ’ ἄξιαν εὐ πράττουσιν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχαιρέκακου πάθος ἐπὶ τὸ αὕτω ἀνώνυμον, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἔχων δήλος, ἐπὶ τὸ χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις. μέσος δὲ τούτων ὁ νεμεσητικός, καὶ ὁ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δ’ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις).

In the Nicomachean Ethics, νέμεσις is again the mean, and thus a morally acceptable emotion, providing it is felt only when the object’s good fortune is undeserved (righteous indignation, what Aristotle calls τὸ νεμεσάν in the Rhetoric; the other three good emotions

42 While this definition is idiosyncratic (to say the least), these are the same four emotions that Aristotle treats together at Rh. 2.9.1386b25-33 where he argues they are all the product of the same good character, so there is at least some logic here. One of the four emotions (pain at undeserved good fortune) is the same as to nemesan in the Rh. (and nemesis in the Eth. Nic.). See Coker (1992) 70.

43 Kristjánsson (2006) 95 disputes phthonos’ equation with envy, as he believes that would imply that we want the good ourselves, which we would not necessarily if we merely felt indignation (nemesis) on too many occasions; he prefers ‘begrudging spite’ as a translation. While noting in passing that (as I show in ch.3) the scope of phthonos is wider than English ‘envy’ and includes such ideas as ‘begrudging spite’, I would disagree with Kristjánsson: first, he seems to have overlooked the (earlier – see n.45, n.47) Rhetoric’s discussion of phthonos, where it is very plainly ‘envy’ (as well as ‘jealousy’, ‘begrudging spite’ etc); second, like phthonos (see Aristotle’s definition – p.85), envy also does not show a strong desire for the good, rather a desire that the other person not have it (see p.26, p.35). The problem with the phthonos-nemesis-epikhairekakos triad is not that phthonos has changed its meaning; rather it is that Aristotle is trying to fit into his doctrine of the mean, three emotions that do not really work as an excessive vice-virtuous mean-deficient vice triad in the way he would like. See also Coker (1992) 65-8.
are dropped from the definition).\textsuperscript{44} φθόνος is once again identified with an excess of indignation, feeling pain even when good fortune is deserved (envy); and this time the defective vice, being so far short of pain that one feels joy (presumably at undeserved bad fortune), is named as ἐπιχαιρεκακία (spite)\textsuperscript{45} (Eth. Nic. 2.7.1108b1-5: νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἠδονήν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινοµένας: ὁ µὲν γὰρ νεµεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ύπερβάλλων τούτον ἐπὶ πάσι λυπεῖται, ὃ δ’ ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν).\textsuperscript{46} In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle seems to have replaced four emotions identified in the Rhetoric with only three, having lost ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune’, the second virtuous emotion. However, let us look closer. In suggesting that, in moving from indignation to envy, one moves from virtue to vice and ceases to concern oneself with desert, Aristotle is paralleling what he said in the Rhetoric, albeit in the language of his newly developed doctrine of the mean.\textsuperscript{47} It is by no means so obvious why spite should be the defective vice: one would expect the defect to be an inability to be indignant even when appropriate.\textsuperscript{48} M.J. Mills notes that the triad envy – indignation – spite is the only one in the Ethics in which there are two excesses, and he has suggested that really there ought to be two triads, corresponding

\textsuperscript{44} Kristjánsson (2006) 102 believes that the definition given for nemesis in Eth. Eud. is correct, and that is why he chooses a different term from that used in the Rh. (to nemesan), which refers only to ‘indignation’; however his subsequent attempt to explain the difference in meaning of nemesis between Eth. Eud. and Eth. Nic. is not persuasive.

\textsuperscript{45} While the adjective ἐπιχαιρέκακος is used in the Rh. (2.9.1386b34), Eth. Eud. (3.7.1233b19 and 21) and NE (2.7.1108b5), the abstract noun ἐπιχαιρεκακία is only used in the Eth. Nic. (2.7.1107a10 and 1108b1). Neither word appears in surviving Greek literature before the fourth century. ἐπιχαιρέκακος is used by the comic poets Anaxandrides, Alexis and Timokles (the last as a title to a play!), all of whom were contemporaries of Aristotle, per W. Smith (1867). It is unlikely that comic poets would use a word coined in a philosophical treatise and familiar only to philosophy students, hence ἐπιχαιρέκακος was very likely in common parlance when first used by Aristotle. ἐπιχαιρεκακία makes its first appearance (in surviving literature) in the Eth. Nic., and continues to be used only in philosophical circles, so it is likely Aristotle coined the abstraction himself to address the noted lack in the Eth. Eud. This suggests Eth. Nic. postdates Rh. and Eth. Eud. in composition (cf. n.47 below) – contra Kenny (1978) 215-39, who argues that the Eth. Eud. might have been written after the Eth. Nic. Both words appear once in the Mag. mor. (27.1 and 27.2), which is consistent, if my argument is correct, with this treatise postdating the other three works.

\textsuperscript{46} φθόνος and ἐπιχαιρεκακία are not equivalent to other emotions treated in the ethical works, as they are not means that can be morally good in some measure, but are always vicious (Eth. Nic. 2.6.1107a9-12) – M.J. Mills (1985) 10; Broadie (1991) 102; Garver (2000) 66.

\textsuperscript{47} I believe the development of the doctrine of the mean, and hence the composition of both Eth. Eud. and Eth. Nic., must postdate the Rh. (or at least the part of Book 2 that is concerned with the emotions), as Aristotle is very unlikely to have avoided all mention of it in the Rh. if that were a later work; see Irwin (1996) 161-2 for a different view. Taken with n.45 above, I therefore believe the order of composition was Rh., Eth. Eud., Eth. Nic., Mag. mor., an order of composition I occasionally assume in the argument in the main text.

respectively to pain at good fortune and joy at bad fortune, which he shows as in Fig. 4.3 below.

![Diagram of emotions]

**Fig. 4.3: Source: M.J. Mills (1985) 10**

The virtuous mean in each triad is the ability to diagnose desert correctly and feel an appropriate amount of pain or pleasure at it, while the excess in each triad is the lack of this ability coupled with feeling pain or pleasure indiscriminately. Ignoring the deficient extremes, which are merely a lack of feeling, we can see in Fig. 4.4 below that this formulation gives four emotions that are the envy, indignation, spite, and ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune’ (PaDM) of the *Rhetoric*:

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envy ------ indignation ------ apathy
spite ------ PaDM ------ apathy
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**Fig. 4.4: The ‘corrected’ triads**

As M.J. Mills points out, Aristotle has tried to show how his “doctrine of the mean” covers rivalrous emotions but, perhaps led astray by so many unnamed emotions, he mistakenly included one triad too few.⁴⁹

In the *Rhetoric*, envy and spite were depicted as emotions that afflict bad people in certain situations. In the *Ethics*, however, they have become paradigms of badness: excessive feelings by the ethically uneducated of emotions that an ethically aware person would feel more judiciously, and which in that judiciousness would be perfectly acceptable.

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4.4 Envy and enviers

4.4.1 What goods excite envy?

Envy is defined as a pain we feel when we see those like ourselves having good fortune concerning their goods, not because we want their goods, but purely because they have them (2.10.1387b22-25: ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγία φαινομένη τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους, μὴ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἐκείνους). This definition is largely Platonic in origin.\(^{50}\)

Aristotle says in 2.10 that he has already spoken about the good things in life that incite envy. These are discussed in \textit{Rh}. 1.5, which deals with the external and bodily goods that bring happiness: good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, bodily excellences (such as health, beauty, strength, height, athletic prowess), fame, honour, good luck, and virtue (1.5.1360b18-22). Aristotle says all these things are the product of good fortune, and as such incite envy (1.5.1362a5-6: ὅλως δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τύχης ἐφ’ ὧν ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος).

Aristotle goes on to talk in \textit{Rh}. 1.6 about the good (τὸ ἀγαθὸν) and the useful (τὸ συμφέρον). These are goods that should be chosen for their own sake, and not for the sake of something else (1.6.1362a21-23). They include pleasure, happiness, goods of the soul (such as justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity and magnificence), health, wealth, friends and friendship, honour and reputation, good memory, the ability to learn, and more (1.6.1362b5-28).

Two points should be noted here. First, there is some considerable overlap between goods desirable for their own sake (1.6), and those that bring happiness (1.5). Second, there is no mention in 1.6 that the goods listed are the product of good fortune (on the contrary, as the

\(^{50}\) The various elements of this definition can be extracted from Pl. \textit{Phlb}. 49c8-50a10, though he talks about friends and neighbours rather than equals. The definition is repeated in the pseudo-Platonic \textit{Definitiones} (416a13): Φθόνος λύπη ἐπὶ φίλων ἀγαθοὶ ἢ οὕς ἢ γεγενηµένος. Xenophon records a similar Socratic formulation, that envy is a pain, and consists in being grieved at the good fortune of friends (\textit{Mem} 3.9.8.1-4): Φθόνον δὲ σκοπῶν, ὃ τι εἶπ, λύπην μὲν τινα ἐξηρίσκοντα αὐτὸν δύτα, οὔτε μὲντοι τὴν ἐπὶ φίλων ἀτυχεῖας οὔτε τὴν ἐπ’ ἐχθρῶν εὐτυχεῖας γινοµένην, ἀλλὰ μόνους ἡφι φθονεῖν τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων εὐπραξίαις ἀνιωµένους.
Nicomachean Ethics shows, many of them are virtues that must be developed by hard work over many years), nor that they incite envy. If Aristotle is saying that goods appearing in both lists - wealth, friends, honour - incite envy when judged to be the product of good fortune rather than hard work, that is tantamount to saying they incite envy when they are seen as undeserved. Aristotle is throwing into doubt his own distinction between indignation (to do with desert) and envy (to do with the bad character of the observer) discussed above. We shall see that in other authors the distinction between indignation and envy is not nearly so clear-cut as Aristotle would like (see ch.5.3). Aristotle has, perhaps inadvertently, given an insight here into a more popular socio-psychology.

4.4.2 Who feels envy, and when?

Aristotle elaborates on “those like ourselves” (2.10.1387b24: τοὺς ὁμοίους), elsewhere referred to as equals (2.9.1386b19-20: τοῦ ἰσού καὶ ὁμοίου). People will feel envy towards those who are or appear similar to them in birth, relationship, age, disposition, distinction, or wealth (2.10.1387b25-7: φθονήσουσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οἴς εἰσὶ τινες ὤμοιοι ἢ φαίνονται: ὤμοιοι δὲ λέγω κατὰ γένος, κατὰ συγγένειαν, καθ’ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἐξεις, κατὰ δόξαν, κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα), and near them in time, place, age and reputation (2.10.1388a6: τοῖς γὰρ ἐγγὺς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικία καὶ δόξη φθονοῦσιν). Additionally people feel envy for kin (e.g. sibling rivalry) and anyone else they are in rivalry with, which will include people who are contemporaries, who live near them, who are not too far above or below them, and who compete for the same things both in sport and in love – and presumably occupation: he quotes the famous line from Hesiod that “potter envies potter” (2.10.1388a7-16).

People will feel envy when they fall a little short of having all the good things in life (2.10.1387b26). People who do great deeds and have good fortune can also feel phthonos (this is possessive jealousy), as they think others will try to take something away from them – this includes those honoured for a distinction, especially wisdom or happiness (29-30). Ambitious people are more envious than unambitious ones (though this implies the

51 A number of modern scholars agree that envy is felt most for equals – see ch.2 n.10, n.114.
53 As we saw at pp.58-9, phthonos can mean possessive jealousy – cf. Cairns (2003b) 239.
unambitious can be envious too), as are those with a reputation for wisdom, who are ambitious as regards wisdom (possessive jealousy again).\textsuperscript{54} In general, anyone wishing to be distinguished in anything can be envious (or jealous) in regard to that thing (31-33). The small-minded (\textit{µικρόψυχοι}) are also envious, because everything seems great to them (34). People envy those whose possessions or successes they feel to be a reproach to them (1388a18-21). Those who have lost something, or who never had it, envy those that do have it, as do those who have not got it yet; this includes youth, so older men envy younger, and money, so those who have spent much envy those who have spent little (1388a21-24).\textsuperscript{55}

Three other envious situations occur in the \textit{Politics}: (1) the rich are prone to treat the poor as masters do their slaves – they feel \textit{kataphronēsis} for them, and the poor will feel \textit{phthonos} for the rich in return (\textit{Pol}. 4.11.1295b19-23: \textit{ὡσθ’ ὦι μὲν ἄρχειν οὐκ ἐπίστανται, ἀλλ’ ἄρχεσθαι δουλικὴν ἄρχην, οὶ δ’ ἄρχεσθαι μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἄρχην, ἄρχειν δὲ δεσποτικὴν ἄρχην. γίνεται οὖν δούλων καὶ δεσποτῶν πόλις, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐλευθέρων, καὶ τῶν μὲν φθονοῦντων τῶν δὲ καταφρονοῦντων);\textsuperscript{56} (2) anyone great in a city is apt to cause civil strife, either through being envied or because they get ‘too big for their boots’ (\textit{Pol}. 5.4.1304a34-8: \textit{οἱ δυνάμεως αἴτιοι γενόµενοι, καὶ ιδιῶται καὶ αρχαὶ καὶ φυλαὶ καὶ ὅλως μέρος καὶ πλῆθος ὁποιονόν, στάσιν κινοῦσιν: ἤ γὰρ οἱ τούτοις φθονοῦντες τιµωµένοις ἐπὶ τῶν ἰσών); and (3) kings unrestricted by law are more despotic, so more envied, than those more restricted (\textit{Pol}. 5.11.1313a20-23: \textit{ὁσοῦ γὰρ ἐν ἐλαττόνων ὠσι κύριοι, πλεῖος χρόνου ἄναγκαιον μένειν πάσαν τὴν ἄρχην αὐτοὶ τε γὰρ ἦττον γίγνονται

\textsuperscript{54} Presumably as regards their reputation for wisdom, that no one else match it – while competition for wisdom is not a zero-sum game, competition for \textit{a reputation} for wisdom can be.

\textsuperscript{55} There are some instructive contrasts with \textit{zêlos}. While the small-minded (\textit{µικρόψυχοι}) and the old are prone to \textit{phthonos} (2.10.1387b, 2.10.1388a21), the high-minded (\textit{µεγαλόψυχοι}) and the young will feel emulation (2.11.1388a38-b3). Both \textit{phthonos} (2.10.1387b26) and \textit{zêlos} (2.11.1388b3-7) can be felt for those who fall short of having all the goods mentioned at pp.85-6; however the one must be felt by bad people, and the other by good.

\textsuperscript{56} In \textit{Pol}. 1.6 Aristotle argues that, with the exception of (Greek) slaves captured in inter-polis strife, in general slaves are so by nature and they recognise the fact. Because they accept their slavery and are properly obedient, the slave and his master are bound together by common interest and will be friends. However, slaves by convention (i.e. Greeks enslaved contrary to nature) will not have the same interest as their masters – their interest will be to regain their natural freedom – and so friendship with their masters is ruled out (\textit{Pol}. 1.6.1255b5-15). In \textit{Pol}. 4.11 Aristotle is presumably drawing an analogy, not between masters and slaves by nature, but between masters and slaves by convention – it is these, who should properly be political equals of their masters, who will feel envy for them.
δεσποτικοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἱθεσιν ἵσοι μᾶλλον, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων φθονοῦνται ἢττον). These situations do not on the face of it appear in the Rhetoric. However that treatise presupposes the context of a polis, and it is in that context that envy is described as being felt for equals (τοὺ ἵσου καὶ ὠμοίου). As Schofield points out, for Aristotle “a polis is an association of free and equal persons”.

In a polis, a man’s homoioi and isoi are his fellow citizens. Sparta indeed called its citizens Homoioi, while in Athens and elsewhere isonomia (equality before the law) implied democracy. The idea was the same in both cases: that all (male) citizens were equals, both politically and legally. In the examples of envy given in the Politics, someone or some class is seeking to surpass his/their natural homoioi and isoi; the rest of his/their society responds with phthonos. Phthonos as moral censure plays no part in Aristotle’s thinking in the Rhetoric or Ethics, in these brief remarks in the Politics he is (once again) showing some reflection of a more popular morality.

4.4.3 Who does not feel envy?

In reading the above, it can seem as if almost anyone can envy nearly anyone else for just about anything at all. However, there are some situations given even in the Rhetoric that exclude envy. People who are not similar or equal in any of the ways listed will not feel envy for each other. Even being dissimilar in only one respect can preclude envy: e.g. people who live a century apart, or at opposite ends of the Mediterranean, or those far above or below us (2.10.1388a9-12). But for a more detailed analysis of those who will not feel envy, we must turn to Aristotle’s discussion of virtue and ethical education in the Ethics.

59 Hdt. 3.80.26 (Athens), 3.142.15 (Samos), 5.37.2 (Miletus); Thuc. 3.82.8 (in general).
60 See Ober (1989) 7, 70, 197, 240 etc. for the ideology of political and legal equality underpinning the Athenian democracy. Dem. 51.11 (τὸ πάντας ἐχεῖν ἴσον καὶ ἰδιοκρατεῖσθαι) shows the link between equality and democracy being invoked in fourth-century oratory.
61 See ch.5.3.
62 I am not convinced that one does need this similarity to feel envy as such. There is no reason, for example, why someone might not burn to surpass the deeds of someone long dead. Cope (1877), commenting on 2.10.2, argues that one “may envy a baby its innocence, its health, its rosy cheeks,” and that any involuntary comparison can give rise to an unsatisfied desire, bringing painful feelings. However Aristotle is not necessarily excluding such situations from inspiring envy. The Rhetoric is concerned with oratory, and therefore deals with instances where oratory is important, i.e. where envy motivates action (2.11.1388a36-38). Since envy of a baby’s innocence does not lead to action, it is irrelevant in the context of a speech, and so to Aristotle’s argument.
We have already seen that morally good people cannot feel envy, but how does one become morally good? Aristotle believes the human soul is divided into an alogical half and a logical half (Eth. Nic. 1.13.1102a26-32). The alogical half is the passionate, desiderative part of the soul, the seat of the emotions and bodily desires. However, since emotions are cognitive (i.e. they involve judgment), it is possible for them to be controlled by the logical half of the soul: the alogical half of the soul is (potentially) subordinate to the logical half. Ethics involves training both halves of the soul. As Sarah Broadie notes: “human virtue, when achieved, is precisely an excellence of reason and feeling in partnership.” Training of the logical half of the soul aims at practical wisdom (φρόνησις) (Eth. Nic. 6.5.1140b25-9). Training of the alogical half aims at moral excellence (ἀρετὴἰἠθική), which is brought about by the character (ἦθος) developing the habit (ἔθος) of acting in a certain way. One cannot truly have either moral excellence or practical wisdom without both being present (Eth. Nic. 6.13.1144b30-2).

In order to eliminate envy and spite, one must habituate the alogical half of the soul, which feels emotions based on its training, only to feel pain or pleasure at someone’s perceived good or bad fortune when it ought to be felt. This habituation is brought about by many influences: e.g. parental upbringing, the influence of society’s norms and laws, the scrutiny of peers, etc. By habituation one builds up a kind of mental database of situations in which one has been taught that indignation is a proper response, or that someone has ‘got their comeuppance’ deservedly. When someone so trained perceives an instance of good or bad fortune, his cognitive response will recognise this fortune and say “deserved” or “not deserved” correctly, causing him to feel (or not) pain or pleasure accordingly. This ability is moral excellence, and is the training that a well-brought up child might have, or an adult man before starting on a course of ethics.

Fortenbaugh believes that perfecting the alogical side of the soul is sufficient: since deliberation is not necessary for every individual virtuous response (sometimes there isn’t

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64 Broadie (1991) 64.
65 Ibid. 72; see also Kosman (1980). Aristotle notes the close similarity in the Greek words (Eth. Nic. 2.1.1103a14-b25); LSJ confirms ἔθος is a lengthened form of ἤθος.
66 A.D. Smith (1996) 60 notes that, for Aristotle, education in habit must come before education in reason.
Chapter 4: Aristotle

sufficient time), practical wisdom is not necessary for a virtuous response to be guaranteed.\(^{67}\) Sorabji rightly disagrees (see Eth. Nic. 6.13.1144b30-2), but in my view goes too far in the other direction, by arguing that deliberation (by the logical half of the soul) is required to find the mean in every instance of ethical emotional response, even if only subconsciously.\(^{68}\) Fortenbaugh focuses too much on habituation, Sorabji too much on deliberation;\(^{69}\) the truth is somewhere between the two. Aristotle makes plain that excellence is built through habituation: “we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.” (Eth. Nic. 2.1.1103b1-2: οὕτωι δὴ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνα σωφρόνες, τὰ δὲ ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι).\(^{70}\) A good upbringing should habituate one to be properly indignant but avoid envy, to feel proper pleasure at others’ misfortunes but avoid spite. However, while someone with a good upbringing might hit on the morally correct response repeatedly, there is no guarantee that they will hit on it invariably, since for that to happen they must have true knowledge of where the mean lies, and that requires practical wisdom and (sometimes) deliberation.

The man who has perfected both his moral excellence and his practical wisdom is megalopsykhos – the virtue is megalopsykhia\(^{71}\) – and such a man will not be able to feel envy. Gill has argued that the megalopsykhos should not feel any of the rivalrous emotions covered by chapters 2.9-11, since he has a goodly measure of all appropriate goods, and knows that what he does not have is unimportant.\(^{72}\) However, while this might preclude emulation and disdain, and his virtue stops him feeling envy and spite, I see no reason why the megalopsykhos might not feel indignation or ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune’. Indeed, if he were unable to feel these, he would be practising the defective vice.

\(^{67}\) Fortenbaugh (2002) 73-5.
\(^{68}\) Sorabji (1980) 210-11.
\(^{69}\) A.D. Smith (1996) argues that Fortenbaugh takes a Humean approach, pitting himself against the “intellectualists”, each side stressing either character or intellect has priority in “determining good moral ends” (58).
\(^{70}\) Translation from Barnes (1984).
\(^{71}\) Megalopsykhos is normally translated “magnanimous” (Barnes (1984) uses “properly proud”), while megalopsykhia is “magnanimity”. In n.55 above I translated it “high-minded”, to highlight the comparison with “small-minded” (for mikropsykhos).
One other context Gill identifies as precluding rivalry for the many goods of life is (perfect) friendship: a friend will only compete with his friend in virtue, and will willingly lose all his possessions, and his life itself if need be, for his friend’s sake. However, Gill does not show why a friend will not emulate his friend, and indeed Aristotle states that we wish someone to be our friend if we want them to emulate but not envy us (2.4.1381b21-3: ύφ’ ὅν ζηλοῦσθαι βούλονται καὶ μὴ φθονεῖσθαι, τούτους ἢ φιλούσιν ἢ βούλονται φίλοι εἶναι).

4.5 Conclusions: a comparison of Aristotelian phthonos with modern theory

It will be fairly obvious that again there is considerable overlap between Aristotle’s views on phthonos and modern scholarship on envious emotions. Aristotle says phthonos is an emotion aimed at those similar to us; consensus opinion in modern scholarship says envy is most strongly felt for peers, and the more like someone you are, the stronger your envy is likely to be. Aristotle says phthonos is primarily felt when we see someone in possession of some good; modern scholarship talks about social comparison when someone has some object or attribute that we desire. Aristotle says that the primary drive of phthonos is that the other person should not have (i.e. should be deprived of) the good; modern scholarship notes envy’s tendency to deprive the other of the envied object/attribute, even if that involves some loss for ourselves. Phthonos is connected with its spiteful opposite, in the same way that envy is required for Schadenfreude or spite/malice to be felt. It is clear that envy and phthonos are very similar emotions, and that Aristotle’s understanding of how the latter works is very similar to modern scholarship’s understanding of the former.

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73 Ibid.; this might suggest a zero-sum element to rivalry, which I do not believe Aristotle intends.
74 At least one reason for this is that, since the cognitive approach has become so ubiquitous from the 1970s, modern scholars are much more receptive to absorbing points from Aristotle’s analysis than pre-cognitivists. Also important is the sociological dimension of at least some of the modern studies, a perspective shared with Aristotle.
75 2.10.1387b22-5: ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις … περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους – see p.86.
76 See ch.2 n.10, n.114; I note there that the assertion is not backed up with experiential proof, but it is widely held by scholars in a variety of disciplines, and is not strongly challenged.
77 2.10.1387b22-5: ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ φαινοµένη τῶν εἰρηµένων ἁγαθῶν – see p.85.
78 See pp.24-5.
79 2.11.1388a37-8: ὁ δὲ τῶν πλησίου μὴ ἔχειν διὰ τοῦ φθόνου – see p.75.
80 See p.20, p.35.
81 2.9.1386b34-1387a1: ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαίρεκακος καὶ φθονερός – see pp.76-8.
This is important because it means that we can (and I will) often use Aristotle’s work on *phthonos* to explain, in Greek terms, our reading of envy scenarios in Greek literature.

There are some significant differences between (Aristotle’s understanding of) *phthonos* and envy however. The most obvious (and noted in my conclusions to ch.3) is that *phthonos* includes the emotion we call possessive jealousy. In relation to Aristotle’s socio-psychology, Salovey’s ‘situational’ approach, which considers three-person rivalry situations that may involve any combination of envy and jealousy, is therefore more helpful for understanding how *phthonos* works than the rigid envy/jealousy separation of Parrott and R.H. Smith. Second, admiring envy (as in “I really envy you”) is philologically not a part of *phthonos* (also noted in my conclusions to ch.3) – *zêlos* words are used instead for this type of first-person claim, and *zêlos* is a perfectly acceptable emotion. A third difference is that Aristotle does not draw out the action tendencies of *phthonos*, except in his comment that we want our neighbour not to have the good; modern scholarship is much more interested in both the destructive tendency of envy, and ‘defences’ against it (i.e. ‘coping’ mechanisms designed to lessen the pain we feel on experiencing envy, and the secondary pain of guilt at feeling a taboo emotion). Fourth, Aristotle does not mention any tendency of *phthonos* to disguise itself (whether advertently or inadvertently), which modern scholarship does note for envy; however he does say that *to nemesan* (which is pretty much like our righteous indignation) is easily confused with *phthonos*, and that the former is ‘good’ while the latter is ‘bad’. Fifth, there is the moral aspect: Aristotle makes clear, both in the *Rhetoric* and the *Ethics*, that *phthonos* is a morally base emotion felt by

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83 Note Aristotle does not highlight the requirement for an exclusive bond.
84 See pp.32-3.
85 2.11.1388a35: διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικὲς ἐστὶν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶς – see p.76.
86 See n.79 above.
87 As indeed are pre-Aristotelian sources – see pp.66-7.
88 See pp.27-8.
89 See ch.2.2.3, ch.2.5.
90 2.9.1386b11-12: καὶ ἄμφω ἄλλα πάθη [to eleēin and to nemesan] ἔστι δ’ ἐτερον – see p.72.
91 2.11.1388a35-6: τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν φαύλων καὶ φαύλων; 2.9.1386b11-12: καὶ ἄμφω ἄλλα πάθη [to eleēin and to nemesan] ἔστι δ’ ἐτερον – see pp.75-6. Aristotle’s separation of *phthonos* from the rather spurious *to nemesan* / *nemesis* (see ch.5.3.1, where I argue the latter was an idiosyncratic reinvention), and his examination of the phenomenology solely from a supposedly objective standpoint (i.e. ignoring the first-person experience of either the subject or personally disinterested observers) militated against his noticing this tendency.
morally base people;\textsuperscript{92} despite envy being socially taboo, modern scholarship does not focus on the characters of those who feel it.\textsuperscript{93} Ben-Ze’ev comes closest by saying that any moral pretensions envy has are false, that envy can never be moral no matter how it cloaks itself; Kristjánsson will not even go that far, questioning whether envy should even be classed as a ‘negative emotion’ at all.\textsuperscript{94}

These differences are instructive for a variety of reasons. First, they confirm (as we saw in ch.3) that the parameters of ancient Greek \textit{phthonos} and modern envy (or even envy-plus-(possessive)-jealousy) are not coterminous. This means at a basic level that translation of \textit{phthonos} will always require thought; more subtly it requires us to be wary of assumptions we might make on seeing \textit{phthonos} terminology. Second, we should not assume that \textit{phthonos} will dissipate in the way envy does when the person feeling \textit{phthonos} has gained whatever it was they wanted, or the target of their emotion has been brought low; the bivalent (envy/jealousy) aspect of \textit{phthonos} combines with the competitive nature of Greek life to ensure that \textit{phthonos} may remain even after its apparent aim (to bring low) has been achieved. Finally, the fact that \textit{phthonos} is not so much reified as a bad emotion (as is ‘envy’), but rather reflects back on the character of the person feeling it, requires us to consider the motivations of an accusation of \textit{phthonos}: unlike an accusation of ‘envy’, it will not merely be questioning the moral motivation of someone at a particular moment, but will be branding them as someone morally base at all times and in all aspects – it is a statement about their character.

\textsuperscript{92} 2.11.1388a35-6: τὸ δὲ ἐὰ φθονεῖν ἑαυtóν καὶ ἑαυτόν – see pp.75-6; cf. Eth. Eud. 3.7.1233b19-25, Eth. Nic. 2.7.1108b1-5, Eth. Nic. 2.6.1107a9-11 – see n.24 above.
\textsuperscript{93} Pre-Aristotelian sources are also unclear on this.
Part III
Chapter 5: Phthonos in the Attic Oratorical Corpus

5.1 Introduction

Armed now with the fullest information on the phenomenology of phthonos, the range and spread of its correlation with a variety of English emotions (envy, possessive jealousy, begrudging spite etc.), and the phenomenology of episodes of those English emotions, we are now in a position to move beyond surveys and Aristotle’s personal (if insightful) analysis, to a detailed examination of phthonos scenarios in the three mass-audience literary genres of Classical Athens: oratory, Old Comedy and tragedy. Each genre presents its own challenges, and accordingly I consider them in three separate chapters.

It may seem more appropriate to proceed through the genres in more or less chronological sequence (i.e. tragedy, Old Comedy, oratory). However, phthonos changes little during the Classical period, and therefore these genres can to large extent be treated isochronically. In fact I treat these genres in reverse chronological order, because it is the order in which my arguments can most easily be presented: first, oratory involves direct use and real life (despite elements of fabrication and distortion), making it easier to recognise there the dynamics of the emotions simulated, stimulated and denied than in dramatic fiction; second, Old Comedy’s arousal of audience phthonos cannot be fully appreciated without the in-depth discussion of phthonos as moral censure that I undertake in ch.5.3; third, as this chapter moves from accusations of phthonos within speeches, to explicit and then covert arousal of audience phthonos, so I continue with covert arousal of audience phthonos in Old Comedy before coming back to direct portrayal of phthonos onstage in tragedy; finally, finishing with phthonos in tragedy ensures the most appropriate lead in to my discussion of sexual jealousy in Part IV, which begins with an in-depth analysis of three tragedies before moving full circle back to oratory.
5.2 Phthonos accusations in oratory

5.2.1 Phthonos and the Aristotelian orator

Picking up on the closing point of the previous chapter, clearly those with sufficient virtue never to feel envy (megalopsykhi and perfect friends) will be few and far between, and accordingly the vast majority of an orator’s listeners will be susceptible to envy. However, the morally bad nature of phthonos raises problems that do not apply to other emotions.

Emotion arousal is useful as an oratorical tool because emotions, by application of pain or pleasure through rational argument, affect judgment. In an insightful article, Leighton has discussed exactly how judgment can be affected by the emotions:¹ this will either be as the consequence of emotion, or as a constituent of emotion. Judgement alteration as a consequence of emotion can come about in four ways. The first is by allowing our reason to be overruled (e.g. if we pity someone, we let them off for a crime we know they have committed). Secondly, if we can be brought to favour or disfavour someone, we will be better or worse disposed towards giving them the benefit of the doubt when the situation is ambiguous. Thirdly, through perception: for instance, our strong support for one of two tennis players will affect whether we think a ball she hit is in or out. The final way is through strong emotion causing us to give more attention to an issue. Alteration of judgment as a constituent of emotion is more complex. It is not that one emotion rules out another, rather that the “emotions are complexes involving judgments, each complex excluding certain other emotion complexes, their judgments, and certain other judgments as well.”² Aristotle gives one, and only one, effect of envy: he says that if an orator can put the jury into an envious state of mind, then his opponent will not be able to win pity from them (see ch.4 n.18, and pp.97-8 below). In Leighton’s words: “It is not that envy brings about a change of judgments such that one does not show or feel pity; rather, to be moved to envy involves being moved to a particular set of judgments that excludes those of pity.”³

¹ The remainder of the paragraph summarises Leighton (1996) 206-17 – these are his own views, not his interpretation of Aristotle’s views, on emotion arousal.
³ Ibid.
But can an Aristotelian orator make use of this? Another of the three modes of persuasion (see p.70) is the orator’s character (ἦθος): an orator must make his argument in a way that makes him appear worthy of trust, and it is good men that we trust; a good man’s character is demonstrated by what he says, and it is pretty much the most effective means of persuasion available to him (Arist. Rh. 1.2.1356a4-13: διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἢθους, ἀταν οὔτω λεχθῆ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἄξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θάττων…. δεὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου… σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἐξει πίστιν τὸ ἢθος). However, since Aristotle specifically says that envy is a bad (φαῦλον) emotion (see pp.75-6), if an orator presents himself as envious of his opponent in trying to rouse similar envy in his audience, he will show his own character to be base. If his character is “pretty much the most effective means of persuasion” available to him, displaying envy is not worth that sacrifice. Second, he cannot present himself as not envious, but still explicitly attempt to rouse envy in his audience: they will either believe he shares that envy, or that he does not and is merely spinning sophisms. Worse, by appearing to imitate bad character to his audience, he may alienate them.

A third, and more complex, possibility is that the orator might seek to rouse envy in the audience while seeming not to. However, I do not believe this is possible either. First, the audience might spot it, which leads to the problems already mentioned – though this merely makes it risky, not impossible. A more serious objection is that, although rhetoric (like dialectic) is a skill that can be used to argue anything, an Aristotelian student must pursue a life of moral excellence and practical wisdom, and politics is an extension of this ethical life; accordingly an Aristotelian orator must not use unethical arguments, even if they might be rhetorically effective. A fourth explanation also fails: Aristotle cannot be instructing his orator how to deal with envy if it is used against him, because he does not

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5 Hesk (2000) 219 says Aristotle believes that rhetoric without moral purpose is merely sophistry. Garver (1994) 8 argues that for Aristotle, rhetoric is an “integration of thought and character in an art of practical reason”, and Fortenbaugh (1991) 97-8 notes that the alliance of excellences of thought and of character, assimilated respectively to the rational and irrational halves of the soul, is what makes someone virtuous (Eth. Nic. 1.13.1103a3-10, 2.1.1103a14-15, 6.1.1138b35-1139a1). It should be noted that this argument does not rely on support from within the Rhetoric. The balance of scholarly opinion is that the Rhetoric itself does contain injunctions to behave ethically: Irwin (1996) argues that 1.1.1355a29ff should be read in this way; Grimaldi (1972) 19-21 agrees; see also Halliwell (1994); however Engberg-Pedersen (1996) for an alternative view.
6 Irwin (1996) 144 says Aristotle (Rh. 1.1.1355a29ff) believes that an orator needs to be able to recognise illegitimate arguments when his opponent uses them against him, even if he should not use them himself.
tell him how to counter envy, only that envy can be used to counter pity (Rh. 2.10.1388a27-30). There are therefore problems with any use the orator might wish to make of envy within the purposes of Rh. 2.1 – i.e. arousing it in an audience to affect their judgement.

So what use can an Aristotelian orator make of the chapter on envy? Well, first, it has a negative role. This chapter has didactic purpose: if there were no discussion of what envy is and how it differs from indignation and emulation, how could an Aristotelian orator avoid straying from these acceptable emotions to envy? This, I believe, is why Aristotle devotes so much space to telling his orator exactly how one distinguishes these emotions from each other, and why he makes such a point of saying how acceptable and worthy indignation and emulation are, when envy is so immoral (see pp.75-6). If envy did not exist, Aristotle would have had to invent it.

However, there is something more an Aristotelian student might extract from the Rhetoric. There is a second type of rhetorical use for the emotions, more acceptable for envy than manipulating an audience, and this is to explain one’s opponent’s motivation (Rh. 1.10.1369a15-19). Prosecutors must consider all the motives that can affect defendants, and how many apply to their opponent, while defendants must consider how many do not apply to them (Rh. 1.10.1368b30-32). Aristotle argues (Rh. 1.10.1368b33-1369a6) that all of a person’s actions are caused either by the person himself (δι’ αὐτούς), or something external to him. The latter comprises things done out of chance or necessity (which itself subdivides into compulsion and nature); the former out of habit or desire (ὀρεξίς). Desire subdivides into rational desire, or will (βούλησις), and irrational desire, which further subdivides into appetite (ἐπιθυµία) and anger (ὀργή). In fitting the emotions into these, it would seem that at least all pleasurable emotions are subsumed within appetite: appetite is a desire for what is pleasant (Rh. 1.11.1370a18: ἡ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀργῆ). For painful emotions, it is helpful if we recall that anger (ὀργή) is a pain accompanied by a desire for revenge, and that revenge brings pleasure.

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7 Cf. Rh. 2.9.1387a3-5 and 2.9.1387b17-21, where he makes a similar comment about indignation.
8 It should be noted that Aristotle does not say phthonos should be used in this way (let alone only in this way). Striker (1996) 288 notes that the idea of emotions being motivational is Platonic.
9 Leighton (1996) 222-3 notes that in De an. 414b2, De motu an. 700b22, and Eth. Eud. 1223a25-27, this subdivision of desire is thymos, or spirit, a name less likely, in the context of the subsequent discussion, to cause confusion with orgê as the emotion discussed in Rh. 2.2.
In fact in general, painful emotions are accompanied by a desire to escape from pain, and that desire will be pleasant (Rh. 1.10.1369b26-8): hatred is attended by a desire to harm, pity by a desire to aid, envy by a desire to bring low, emulation by a desire to succeed. Thus pleasant feelings are aroused by a desire to act in certain ways, and painful feelings by a desire to act in other ways.

This then is the second use an Aristotelian orator can make of the emotions, and, if the first use is ruled out of court, the only use he can make of envy: he can show that his opponent is motivated by it. The association of this negative emotion with his opponent allows the speaker to alienate the listeners from the opponent, making them less inclined to vote for him, and reducing his credibility. If Aristotle (on this reading) is right, then we should expect phthónos’ use in oratory to be confined to positioning statements, i.e. as to the opponent’s phthónos, and/or the speaker’s lack of it (countering his opponent’s explicit accusation, or the audience’s potential perception).

5.2.2 Phthónos accusations in the Attic oratorical corpus

I do not intend to make a comprehensive review of the theme of phthónos in oratory. Such a major study would require far more space than one chapter, and in any event the topic has already been well examined. My interest in this section is more selective, and will focus on two specific aspects: first to confirm whether my analysis of Aristotle’s views, to the effect that phthónos can only be used effectively to explain one’s opponent’s motivation, is reflected in actual oratorical practice or not; second, to consider how overt cases for an opponent’s phthónos are built up, beyond direct accusation – i.e. the situational and behavioural indicators highlighted to make their supposed phthónos obvious to the audience. In the remainder of the chapter I shall move on to consider arousal of phthónos in the audience.

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10 Viano (2003) also locates pleasures within the epithymia and anger within the thymos; she argues that the thymos is probably also the seat of the competitive emotions. Elster (1999) 60-1 has some interesting comments on emotions and action tendencies in Aristotle.

11 Strictly, Aristotle says that hatred, unlike anger, is not painful (Rh. 2.4.1382a12-13); see J.M. Cooper (1996) 247-9 and Leighton (1996) 232-3, n.14 for discussion of this point.


13 This, contra Aristotle, does happen. In the conclusion to this chapter I consider why Aristotle got it wrong.
The first issue can be quickly dealt with. Out of 170 instances of *phthonos* cognates in the oratorical corpus, *aphthon*-words (implying something being plentiful or abundant) account for 31; of the remaining 139, we have already listed in ch.3.3 a total of 98 accusations (against the opponent or another), prohibitions and denials – which I argued were merely variants on accusations.\(^\text{14}\) We can add to this four statements that the opponent wants to arouse the audience’s envy against the speaker (Isoc. 15.31.4; Isae. 11.38.2; Dem. 21.29.4, 29.2.4), and five that the speaker is not blameworthy or is seeking to avoid the audience’s *phthonos* (Isoc.15.100.2; Dem. 18.305.6, 18.321.3, *Epist*. 2.24.4; Aeschin. 2.167.4) – both of these being unusual types of accusation. Of the remainder: twelve are gnomic statements about *phthonos* and, often, whom it is directed against (Isoc. 1.26.5, 1.26.7, 2.46.3, 3.18.11, 11.49.2/3; Dem. 3.24.9, 18.315.3, 19.99.5, 19.313.7, 20.140.3, 20.140.6, 60.23.6); eight are statements that someone does not, or will not, feel *phthonos* (Isoc. 7.31.7 (the poor); Dem. 8.71.8, 20.141.6, 20.141.9, 20.165.8 (the audience); 25.97.6 (ancestors); Isoc. 19.45.6, Aeschin. 2.139.9 (ironically, against the opponent)); and we have already seen (p.57) that in four cases the speaker appears to claim envy for a group of which he is part, but as a necessary rhetorical prelude to advising his listeners not to feel the emotion (Isoc. 10.56.3, 15.130.7; Dem. 10.39.4, 10.52.5) – i.e. his ‘admission’ is required for him to finesse telling his audience they feel *phthonos* without alienating them. It can be seen therefore that *Rh*. Book 2-style arousal of *phthonos* to influence decision making, does not in any way account for 131/139 instances of *phthon*-words in the oratorical corpus.\(^\text{15}\)

Rather, as my analysis of Aristotle (see ch.5.2.1) would seem to indicate, these are *Rh*. Book 1-style positioning statements about who does (normally the opponent, sometimes another person) or does not (normally the speaker) feel *phthonos*. In the remaining eight instances of *phthon*-words in the oratorical corpus (Lys. 27.11.2; Isoc. 4.184.1, 18.51.3; Aeschin. 3.42.1; Dem. 21.196.4, 21.196.6, 28.18.3, 37.52.3),\(^\text{16}\) the speaker does try to rouse *phthonos* in his audience. Crucially, however, this *phthonos* does not relate to the emotion we call envy; rather it is a type of moral censure.\(^\text{17}\) Never once, in the whole oratorical

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\(^{14}\) 170 *phthonos* words in the oratorical corpus (ch.3 n.27). *Aphthon*-words occur 18 times in Dem., 6 times in Aeschin., 5 in Isoc., and twice in Lys. 28 direct accusations (ch.3 n.30, n.32); 52 indirect accusations (ch.3 n.37, n.35); 9 prohibitions (ch.3 n.33, n.34); 9 denials (ch.3 n.36); total: 98.

\(^{15}\) Though of course the sociological insights of Aristotle’s analysis in *Rh*. 2.10 will be germane.

\(^{16}\) We can perhaps add Lys. 18.16.1 to this list (see n.77 below).

\(^{17}\) I deal with this in ch.5.3, where I introduce the hypothetical analytical constructs of envy-*phthonos* and indignation-*phthonos*, highlighting the fact that *phthonos* can relate both to the morally bad English envy, and to the morally good English indignation.
corpus, does a speaker attempt to arouse the emotion we call envy, by explicitly calling for *phthonos*.\(^{18}\)

I now turn to speeches in which accusations of *phthonos* occur. In Isae. 2, *On the Estate of Menekles*, Menekles’ brother disputes the will in which Menekles leaves what he owns to his adopted son, by challenging the legality of the adoption. As the speaker says that nearly all the family money and property was already in the hands of the brother, and the estate under dispute actually amounted to very little (2.40-41), one might expect that it would be hard for him to maintain an accusation that his uncle’s prosecution was motivated by envy. But the brothers had fallen out over money, and this partly happened because Menekles divorced the sister of the man he later adopted (i.e. the sister of the speaker) and had to repay her dowry; according to which there was a history of bad blood between Menekles’ brother and the speaker’s family.\(^{19}\) The speaker argues, therefore, that his uncle blames Menekles for adopting at all, having wanted him to die childless, and since the uncle himself has a son, his censure of Menekles is *epiphthonos* (2.23.4-6: τοῦτ’ ἐστιν ὁ ἐπιτιµᾶ, ἐπίφθονον πράγμα καὶ οὐ δίκαιον ποιῶν ὄντων γὰρ αὐτῷ παιδῶν ἐκεῖνῳ ὄντι ἀπαιδὶ καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι φαίνεται ἐπιτιµῶν). One does not begrudge the right to adopt even to a non-relative and try to steal it from them, but the uncle does to his own brother (2.24.5-8: ὁ δὲ θείος οὐτοσὶ οὐκ αἰσχύνεται τὸν αὐτοῦ ἀδελφὸν ταύτης τῆς ἐξουσίας ἀποστερῶν νῦν, τοῦ ποιήσασθαι, ἢς οὐδὲ τοῖς οὐδὲν γένει προσήκουσιν οὐδεὶς πέσποτε ἐφθόνησεν). Since, he says, there is almost no money or property remaining, this must be *phthonos* (2.27.5-8: πῶς οὐ φθονερός ἐστιν; Εἰ δὲ περὶ χρημάτων ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος αὐτῆς, ἐπιδειξάτω ύμῖν ὁ ποιῶν χωρίον ἢ συνοικίαν ἢ οἰκίαι κατέλιπεν ἐκεῖνος, ἢ ἐγὼ ἔχω νῦν). Based on our theoretical understanding, we can say that the speaker is trying to rule out mere greed or coveting as a motivation, in order to pin *phthonos*, that basest of motives, on his uncle.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{18}\) Speakers do, however, sometimes attempt to arouse envy covertly, and I discuss this in more detail in ch.5.3.3.

\(^{19}\) See Edwards (2007) 27-32 for the background to the speech, and explanation of the structure of the argument.

\(^{20}\) From an Aristotelian point of view, we might see the case for the uncle’s baseness being augmented by οὐκ αἰσχύνεται (24.4), *anaiskhyntia* being one of three emotional *phaulotêtes*, alongside *phthonos* and *epikhairekaxia* (NE 2.6.1107a9-11) – see ch.4 n.24.
Another accusation of *phthonos* is found in Lysias 24, *On the Invalid*. The speaker, who is in receipt of the meagre dole handed out to those whose property was less than three minae and who were too disabled to earn a decent wage, is being prosecuted on the twin grounds that his property is above this minimum threshold and that he is not too disabled to work in any case. He responds to these accusations, which are probably well founded, not with logical argument but with evasion and irreverence, presumably (as Todd says) trying to get the case laughed out of court.\(^{21}\) He begins by saying that his opponent is a liar, and that he deserves praise not envy (24.1.4-6: καὶ πειράσομαι τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτον μὲν ἐπιδείξαι ψευδόμενον, ἐμαυτὸν δὲ βεβιωκότα μέχρι τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπαινὸν μᾶλλον ἄξιον ἢ φθόνου). He then says his opponent is motivated by nothing except envy (24.1.6-8: διὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄλλο μοι δοκεῖ παρασκευάσαι τόνδε μοι τὸν κίνδυνον οὕτως ἢ διὰ φθόνον), and that he envies where others pity (24.2.1: καίτοι ὅστις τούτοις φθονεῖ ὧς οἱ ἄλλοι ἔλεοῦσι).\(^{22}\) He jokingly suggests his opponent might be prosecuting him maliciously for money;\(^{23}\) at any rate he cannot be prosecuting him out of enmity to gain revenge\(^{24}\) – because of his baseness (*poneria*) the speaker has never had any dealings with him before – and so clearly his opponent feels *phthonos* for him as a better citizen (24.2.2-3.3: εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕνεκα χρηµάτων µε συκοφαντεῖ— εἰ δ᾽ ὡς ἐχθρὸν ἑαυτοῦ µε τιµωρεῖται, ψεύδεται: διὰ γὰρ τὴν πονηρίαν αὐτοῦ ὠυτὲ φίλῳ ὠυτὲ ἐχθρῷ πώποτε ἐχρησάµην αὐτῷ. ἥδη τοίνυν, ὁ µουλή, δήλος ἕστι φθονῶν, ὅτι τοιαύτη κεχρηµένος συµφορᾶ τούτου βελτίων εἰµὶ πολίτης).\(^{25}\) The opponent’s case is that the speaker is in possession of something (the dole) that he does not deserve, which is indignation;\(^{26}\) the speaker’s response, that his opponent’s prosecution is really motivated by envy, implicitly recognises

\(^{21}\) Todd (2000) 254. See also Edwards and Usher (1985) 263ff. and Carey (1990) on the speaker’s strategy, which includes elements of parody. Usher (1999) 106-10 suggests that the whole speech is in fact a parody, an exercise or “jeu d’esprit” (106), rather than a speech written for a real case.\(^{22}\) Where others see the speaker as worse off, his opponent sees him as better off (see ch.4 n.18).\(^{23}\) See my comments on the practice of *sykophantia* and the *sykophantos* as a bad citizen, with bibliography, in ch.6 n.30.\(^{24}\) Rhodes (1998) argues that this is frequently a motivation for prosecution; Kurihara (2003) for a more nuanced assessment, where he denies its acceptability in public suits. Cohen (1995) 82-3 argues for the mutual exclusivity of enmity and envy in motivating prosecutions.\(^{25}\) See Lys. 3.9.7 for another case where a speaker claims that some people envy anyone who is good (*khěrēstos* – a word that also suggests the speaker is politically active (Todd (2000) 43, Carey (1989) 98), though if this is implied by the speaker in Lys. 24 it will be as part of the parody). Note also Pl. *Menex.* 242a3-4: ὃ δὴ φιλεῖ ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῖς εὐ πράττοισι προσπίπτειν, πρῶτον µὲν ξῆλος, ἀπὸ ξῆλου δὲ φθόνος.\(^{26}\) *To nemesan* rather than *phthonos*, in Aristotelian parlance.
that \textit{phthonos} (like envy) can be masked as indignation.\footnote{The situation is slightly complicated because, as I show in ch.5.3, this sort of indignation is in the real world (i.e. not in Aristotle) also covered by the word \textit{phthonos} in Greek; this creates an ambiguity not found in English. See also Cairns (2003b) on the difficulty, even in English, of distinguishing genuine indignation from transmuted envy.} Whether it is actually indignation (dole not deserved) or envy (dole deserved) is immaterial for our purposes, though; what matters is the rhetorical strategy, and the transmutation (real or imagined).

I now turn from money to politics, the other major issue that we frequently see (ostensibly) arousing \textit{phthonos} in Athenian oratory, to consider one of the longest-running and most famous political grudge matches in Classical Athens, that between Aeschines and Demosthenes. In 343, when Aeschines 2 (\textit{On the Embassy}) was delivered, Aeschines was 47 years old and a well connected politician.\footnote{Carey (2000).88 for date of speech, and 9 for Aeschines’ birthdate of 390BC. Carey notes that “Aeschines had arrayed some of the biggest names in Athenian politics in his defense” (89).} Demosthenes was six years younger and,\footnote{Yunis (2005).9 for his birthdate of 384BC. Demosthenes and Aeschines both entered public life (i.e. began making political speeches) in the late 350s: Demosthenes with the \textit{First Philippic}, dated 351BC (Yunis (2005) 14 n.15); it is not known precisely when Aeschines entered politics, but he had two other careers first (Carey (2000) 9) and so despite being several years older than Demosthenes he may not have begun his political career till around the same time.} while he still must have been considered a major, if up and coming, player in Athenian politics (he had been included in the ten man embassy to Philip headed by Philokrates in 346), was less well connected. Nevertheless he may broadly speaking be considered a political contemporary of Aeschines, and certainly a political rival.\footnote{Buckler (2000).113; Yunis (2005).117R8.} Let us consider how Aeschines characterises Demosthenes’ motivations and rhetorical strategy. He begins by stating that Demosthenes does not feel \textit{orgê} for him, and the jurors can be sure of this because of his many lies and slanders about Aeschines (2.2.1R3: Καὶ ταῦτ’ εἶπεν οὐ δι’ ὀργήν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν ψευδομένων τοῖς ἁδίκως διαβαλλομένοις ὁργίζεται),\footnote{I.e. if Demosthenes were telling the truth, he could understandably be angry, but since what he is saying is not true, any anger will be synthetic.} yet he aims to rouse \textit{orgê} among the jurors through those slanders (2.3.3-4: ἄλλα τὴν ὑμετέραν ὀργὴν ἀκκαλέσασθαι βεβούληται).\footnote{Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of slander fourteen times in this speech (ch.3 n.30). It is interesting to note that, of 200 instances of \textit{diabolê} (and cognates) in Attic oratory, these occur most frequently in Isoc. 15 (22 instances), Aeschin. 2 (14 instances) and Dem. 18 (9 instances), in all three speeches as part of sustained accusations of \textit{phthonos} – it is in fact \textit{phthonos}, rather than \textit{orgê}, that is most usually associated with \textit{diabolê} (see p.67). The theme of \textit{phthonos} in Isoc. 15 has been well discussed – see Saïd (2003) 226-9, Fisher (2003) 185-7, Cairns (2003b) 244-5, Walcot (1978) 72-3. I discuss Dem. 18 at pp.105-6.} As Allen argues, \textit{orgê} is the most common retributive (or, more correctly, justicial) emotion an orator tries to arouse against his
opponent,\textsuperscript{33} and it will clearly be detrimental to his case if it can be shown that he himself does not genuinely share in that emotion. Aeschines goes on to accuse Demosthenes of *hybris*, lies and abuse (2.8.8-10: διατετέλεκε γὰρ εἰς ἡμᾶς ὑβριζών, καὶ λοιδορίας ψευδεῖς οὐκ ἐμοὶ μόνον λοιδορούμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις), themes that recur throughout the speech.\textsuperscript{34} He says that Demosthenes envies him and uses slanders against him (2.10.6: ἐφθόνησέ μου ταῖς διαβολαῖς), and is prosecuting him out of excessive envy, terrible cowardice, and bad character (2.22.9-10: φθόνον ὑπερβάλλοντα καὶ δεινὴν δειλίαν ἀμα καὶ κακοήθειαν). Having thus lodged Demosthenes’ alleged *phthonos* in his audience’s minds, Aeschines explains how these alleged motivations arose: despite boasting that his arguments would easily persuade Philip (2.21), Demosthenes apparently suffered stage fright and ‘corpsed’ (2.34-35); his arguments were treated disdainfully by Philip, who instead treated Aeschines’ own remarks with most respect. These, Aeschines implies, were the situational antecedents which, coupled with Demosthenes’ *kakoētheia*, caused his excessive *phthonos* (2.22 – see above); and it is because of this *phthonos* that Demosthenes is prosecuting him (rather than any of the other ambassadors) now. Aeschines next describes Demosthenes betraying his fellow ambassadors while reporting back to the Assembly, thus causing uproar in the audience who themselves called Demosthenes base and malicious (2.51.2-3: πονηρὸς καὶ φθονερός); this alleged treachery, Aeschines implies, was the result of Demosthenes’ rivalrous envy against the other ambassadors. Shortly after, Aeschines again lists Demosthenes’ bad points: his inconsistency, his envy, his collusion with the traitor Philokrates, and his treacherous and untrustworthy character (2.54.3-5: καὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν φθόνον, καὶ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων μετὰ Φιλοκράτους κοινωνίαν, καὶ τὸ ἢθος ὡς ἐπίβουλον καὶ ἅπιστον), and finally towards the end of the speech Aeschines reminds us of Demosthenes’ cowardice and *phthonos* once more (2.139.2-3: τὴν σὴν ἀνανδρίαν καὶ ἅμα φθόνον). We see that Aeschines can very plausibly make the case for his rival’s enmity being driven by envy; and in light of Aristotle’s description of *phthonos* as *phaulon*

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Allen (2003). \textit{Orgê} in this context is best translated “indignant/justicial/retributive anger”, rather than “rage”. Allen argues that \textit{orgê} is measurable, and should be dispensed in an amount appropriate to the crime. In reality orators did not generally seek to quantify the amount of \textit{orgê} they were trying to arouse. See Rubenstein (2004) for the types of cases in which orators might call for \textit{orgê}.}
\footnote{λοιδορ- words appears five times (and accusations of \textit{blasphēmein} a further two), ὑβρ- words six times, and ψευδ- or ψευς- words no fewer than 26 times in the speech. None of this is uncommon for Greek oratory – see Hesk (2000) 207-13 for the oratorical \textit{topos} of describing your opponent as a master of deceptive word-spinning.}
\end{footnotes}
phaulôn ("a base feeling of base men"), it is interesting and noteworthy that Aeschines couples it with kakoêteia – a term Demosthenes will himself use about Aeschines (see n.63 below).

In 330 Demosthenes had his chance for revenge. As Carey notes, “[b]y the time Aeschines and Demosthenes faced each other in court again, their positions had to a large extent been reversed. Demosthenes’ influence had increased...”\(^{35}\) and Aeschines’ had declined. Accordingly, when Aeschines attacked Ktesiphon for illegally proposing a crown be awarded to Demosthenes,\(^{36}\) Demosthenes defended Ktesiphon (in *On The Crown*) by making the most sustained case in surviving Greek oratory for his opponent being motivated by envy.\(^{37}\) He begins in the proem, by stating that Aeschines mostly told lies about him (18.9.4: καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατεψεύσατό µου) and abusive slanders (18.10.1-2: λοιδορούµενος βεβλασφήµηκεν περὶ ἐµοῦ); he says that Aeschines has bad character (18.11.1-2: κακοήθης δ’ ὤν, Αἰσχίνη,),\(^{38}\) that he spoke abusively (18.11.4: τὰς λοιδορίας τὰς παρὰ σοῦ τρέψεσθαι), and that he lied and slandered (18.11.6: κατεψεύδου καὶ διέβαλλες); that the case shows the spite, insult, abuse, and contumely of an enemy (18.12.3-4: ἐχθροῦ μὲν ἐπηρείαν ἔχει καὶ ὑβρίν καὶ λοιδορίαν καὶ προπηλακισµόν); and that Aeschines is acting out of spite and malice (18.13.2-3: ἐν ἐπηρείας τάξει καὶ φθόνου τοῦτο ποιεῖν). This list of motivations is notably similar, indeed almost identical, to those Aeschines attributes to Demosthenes in *On The Embassy*, and they are repeated throughout the speech.\(^{39}\) A further word-group that recurs frequently is *baskanos / baskania / baskainein*, which refers to putting the evil eye on someone, and is related to envy (possibly here aroused by the nature of the prosecution: i.e. the voting of an honour).\(^{40}\) We might

\(^{35}\) Carey (2000) 159.

\(^{36}\) See Hansen (1974) on the *graphê paranomôn*, esp. 37-8, 54-7 relating to this case.

\(^{37}\) E.M. Harris (1995) 147 argues, very plausibly, that Aeschines’ main motivation in bringing this case was revenge – this would be an indication of enmity (Aristotle would see it as an indicator of orgê – see pp.172-3). I agree with Cohen (1995) 77-81, who believes Demosthenes argues for both Aeschines’ enmity and his envy – though this conflicts with Cohen’s own views on their mutual exclusivity (see n.24 above).

\(^{38}\) Usher (1993) 174 notes that he hammers home the emphasis on ἔθος with a succession of homophones (18.11.2: εὔηθες ῥηθης).

\(^{39}\) The λοιδορ-root appears 15 times in the speech, the βλασφήµ-root appears eight times, ψευδ- or ψευσ-roots 20 times, and accusations of διαβόλε nine times. The ἔχθρ-root occurs no fewer than 46 times (see n.37 above). Accusations of ἐπερεία (modern psychological research connects spite with envy) occur four times (18.12.3, 18.13.2, 18.138.4, 18.320.6); and explicit accusations of *phthonos* also four times (18.13.3, 18.121.5, 18.279.6, 18.303.2).

\(^{40}\) See Walcott (1978) 75, Aquaro (2004) 15-8, Cairns (forthcoming) 9 on the relationship between *baskania* and envy; see Jahn (1855) on the Evil Eye more generally in Greek literature; also Dunbabin and Dickie
draw the inference that, while hostility is to be expected between major political rivals, *phthonos* (it can at least be claimed, however disingenuously) is not a natural result of political rivalry but rather the mark of a vicious character (*kakoêtheia*). Phenomenologically, we can infer that only the *kakoêthês* will feel *phthonos*, and seek to give effect to it by abusing, slandering, lying, and otherwise being spiteful about his political rival – these *phthonos* action effects aiming to destroy the rival’s career.

It is not just rivals, however, who might envy major political figures: they can also be envied by the *dêmos*. However the case must be made very carefully: accusing someone of envy directly is highly antagonistic, and when that ‘someone’ is the *dêmos*, politically potentially suicidal. We have already seen one way for an orator to do this: assign envy to “us” as a group, and then say that “we” should not feel it (see p.57). In his third Letter, *Concerning the Sons of Lykourgos*, Demosthenes negotiates these tricky waters in an altogether more subtle way, building up very gradually towards an accusation. He begins by stating that Lykourgos was prosecuted many times by those who envied him, yet the *dêmos* always acquitted him (*Epist.* 3.6.3-4: καὶ πολλῶν αἰτίων ἐπευνεχθεισῶν ὑπὸ τῶν φθονοῦντων αὐτῶ οὐδεμίαν ὑρέτ’ ἀληθὴ) – by implication, they did not as a rule share the accusers’ *phthonos*. Moving from the general prosecution to the particular one in which the fine against Lykourgos was imposed, Demosthenes says that this came about due to gossip and envy (by persons unstated), and if the *dêmos* hesitate to overturn it, then they are in a state of confusion regarding what is democratic (*Epist.* 3.10.7-9: τίµηµα δ’ ὁρῶν ὀκνοῦντας ἀφεῖναι, ἵ ὁ λόγῳ καὶ φθόνῳ γέγονεν, οὑκ ἔχω τί καταγνῶ, εἰ μὴ ὀλῶς πικρῶς καὶ ταραχώδως ἔχειν πρὸς τοὺς δημοτικοὺς ὄρμηκατε). He goes on to

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(1983) on iconographic representations; see Foster (1972) on envy and the Evil Eye in other cultures. These *baska*-root words first occur in surviving literature toward the end of the fifth century, in a handful of fragments of Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes. Demosthenes has a particular fondness for this word, using it 17 times (by contrast, only 25 instances survive prior to Demosthenes), more than half of these occurring in this one speech (18.108.8, 18.119.6, 18.132.4, 18.139.7, 18.189.6, 18.242.2, 18.252.2, 18.307.5, 18.317.7), and all others occurring in deliberative speeches, or forensic speeches with a political background (8.19.3, 8.22.2, 16.19.4, 19.24.7, 20.24.7, 21.209.9, 25.80.3, 25.83.4). One wonders why this might be. It is possible that, being (probably) the wealthiest of the logographers with surviving speeches delivered *in propria persona*, Demosthenes had need to be even more than usually alert to where his fellow-citizens’ envious gaze might fall.

41 Goldstein (1968) considers the authenticity of this letter; he notes arguments against its authenticity (4-5), but following a detailed study concludes that there should be “a strong presumption in favor of authenticity” (181). The evidentiary value may not be diminished by a decision against authenticity, however, since it would still be informed by an understanding of the nature of the political process and the psychology of the participants.
talk more generally of those whom envy keeps from their just rewards (Epist. 3.20.4-6: καὶ ταῖς προσηκούσαις αὐτῶν τιμαῖς ὁ φθόνος ἀντιστῇ), and says that the whole dēmos is blameworthy if envy is more influential among them than gratitude (Epist. 3.28.1-3: ὅλως δὲ κοινῶν ἐστιν ὑμετέρων, ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, ... τὸν φθόνον δοκεῖν μείζον ἵσχυειν παρ’ ὑμῖν ἢ τάς τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν χάριτας).  We should note that he still avoids accusing any individual of envy. Before finally reaching his direct accusation, Demosthenes plays still further with the opposition of gratitude and envy: he says he feels goodwill and friendship (Epist. 3.37.1: ἐπ’ εὐνοίᾳ καὶ φιλίᾳ) towards the dēmos, and (he is now talking about his own exile, rather than Lykourgos’ children’s) he has hoped for their gratitude and magnanimity (Epist. 3.39.1-2: βουλομένου δὲ μου ἐν μὲν ὑμετέρας χάριτος καὶ μεγαλοψυχίας) and goodwill (Epist. 3.40.6: μετὰ μὲν τῆς ὑμετέρας εὐνοίας) in return – but, he goes on, they begrudge (phthonountes) him words and benevolence (Epist. 3.41.2-3: ὑμεῖς ... ῶν τάς τοῖς καὶ φιλανθρωπίας φθονοῦντες). We can see how gradually he has built up to this moment, and how, even now, his accusation is phrased as tactfully as possible.

5.3 Arousal of envy and indignation in the audience

5.3.1 Aristotle’s to nemesan

In considering the relationship between Greek envy and indignation, it is helpful once again to begin with Aristotle. As we saw in ch.4.2, Aristotle posits in his Rhetoric an emotion which he calls to nemesan, and which is generally (and reasonably) translated as indignation. To nemesan is felt at someone having some good fortune that they do not deserve, whereas phthonos is felt at good fortune whether it is deserved or not (Rh. 2.9.1386b8-12, b16-20). However it is not acquisition or possession of any good thing that arouses to nemesan (e.g. virtues of character such as justice or courage), but rather of undeserved wealth, power and other such things that worthy people should get (Rh. 2.9.1387a8-13: εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ νεμεσᾶν λυπεῖσθαι ἐπί τῷ φανομένῳ ἀναξίως ἐυπραγεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν δήλου ὡς οὐχ οἶδα τῷ ἐπί πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς νεμεσᾶν· οὐ γάρ εἰ δίκαιος ἢ ἀνδρεῖος, ἢ εἰ ἄρετὴν λήψεται, νεμεσῆςι τούτῳ (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔλεοι ἐπὶ τοῖς

42. See Fisher (2003) on these two opposite responses to a politician by the dēmos; also ch.5.3.2 below.
ᴇναντίοις τούτων εἰσίν), ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ πλοῦτῳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις – i.e. the same goods that arouse phthonos when deserved.

Aristotle is out of step with contemporary usage, however.\(^{43}\) First, the phrase to nemesan appears nowhere outside Aristotle (nemesis is the usual substantive, though the verb nemesao is seen, if not in articular infinitive form). Second, while nemesis and its cognates occur 78 times in Archaic epic (68 times in Homer, 10 times in Hesiod) and 39 times in Aristotle, there are only 55 surviving occurrences (including fragmentary texts) in other authors in the entire Archaic and Classical periods.\(^{44}\) Classical occurrences sometimes relate to the cult goddess Nemesis or her festival,\(^{45}\) and frequently to retribution from, or something being offensive to, the gods.\(^{46}\) This narrowing of focus is striking. Fewer than fifteen times is it used in the Classical period to mean something close to “indignant” (active form) or “censurable” (passive form) in a way unrelated to gods, and it will be instructive to consider what arouses it.\(^{47}\) A lover behaving in an unloving way is censurable (Aesch. fr.228c.3(Mette): καὶ κατηγοροῦσα τοῦ ἐρώτος ὡς ἀνέραστα πολλὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ νεµεσητὰ ποιοῦντος). Philoktetes should not be blamed for speaking intemperately when he is out of his mind with pain (Soph. Phil. 1193-5: οὐτοὶ νεµεσητὸν ἀλύοντα ἐχειµερίῳ ἱλυπᾷ ἀλὰ ἤ θνεὶ τοῦ ἐρωτοῦ ἐνοῦν). It is not disgraceful for a man brought up in freedom and leisure to balk at menial tasks (Pl. Tht. 175d8-e3: ἤ μὲν τῷ ὁντὶ ἐν ἑλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, ὄν δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, ὃ θοµέσιτον εὐθεῖοι δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἰναι ὅταν ἐς δουλικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα). Someone should not be censured for becoming a slave to his lover in a search for wisdom (Pl. Euthydem. 282b.4-6: οὐδὲ νεµεσητὸν ἐνεκα τοῦτον ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ δουλεύειν καὶ ἑραστῇ καὶ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι οὐν ἐθέλετο ὑπηρετεῖν τῶν καλῶν ὑπηρετηµάτων, προθυµοµένου

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\(^{43}\) See Konstan (2003c) 76-7, whose analysis covers not dissimilar ground to my own in this paragraph, though with different emphasis.

\(^{44}\) Nemesis cognates occur in various Lyric poets / sayings of the Seven Sages / Aesopica (12), Pindar (3), Aeschylus (3), Sophocles (6), Euripides (3), various other fifth century (5), Plato (12), the oratorical corpus (7), various other fourth century (4).

\(^{45}\) Aesch. fr.244.6(Mette); Soph. El. 792; Pl. Leg. 717d3; Isoc. 10.59.7; Dem. 41.11.8; Men. Sententiae 520, fr.321.2(Kock).

\(^{46}\) Aesch. Sept. 235; Soph. El. 1467, Phil. 518, 602, OC 1753; Eur. Ph. 182, Or. 1362, fr.1040.4(Nauck); Pl. Cra. 401a6, Symp. 195a6, Minos 319a3; Dem. 20.161.4; Plato Com. fr.173.14(Kock). We might also include here the fragmentary titles of two comic plays: Kratinos fr.107/20.1(Kock); Men. fr.169.1(Austin). Aristotle only briefly mentions to nemesan’s association with the gods (Rh. 2.9.1386b15).

\(^{47}\) I range outside oratory to include other Classical genres, as there are too few examples in oratory: of six instances, three relate to Nemesis or phthonos theor (see n.45, n.46 above), and one (Lycurg. 1.107.36) is a quote from Tyrtaios so well outside the period.
σοφὸν γενέσθαι). It is not blameworthy when legislating to consider that a citizen might be stubborn (Pl. Leg. 853c6-d2: ἄλλ’ ἀνθρωποί τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων σπέρμαιν νομοθετοῦμεν τὰ νῦν, ἀνεμέσητον δὴ φοβεῖσθαι μὴ τις ἐγγίγνηται τῶν πολιτῶν ἡµῖν οἶκον κερασβόλοσ). [Old men] will be exceedingly indignant at those who commit hybris against orphans and foundlings (Pl. Leg. 927c1-2: νεμεσώσιν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὠρφανά καὶ ἁγιώ σπέρµατος). A lie is offensive by its nature to both shame and justice (Pl. Leg. 943e2-3: ψεῦδος δὲ ἀιδοῖ καὶ δῖκη νεµεσητὸν κατὰ φύσιν). It is not blameworthy for a buyer to act in his own interests before oaths have been exchanged and a contract exists (Aeschin. 3.66.1-3: Καὶ ταῦθ’ ὁ µὲν ἐξωνοµεῖ τοῦτον ὡς αἰδοῖ ἐστερηµένους ἢ µὴν τοῖς µὴν τυγχάνοντας). It is right to be indignant at what Phormio has done in putting someone forward as a witness who has a shameless way of life and is ungrateful (Dem. 45.71.1-3: Ἀξίον τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, καὶ Φορµίων παρασκευάζω τοῦτον νεµεσητόν τοῖς πεπραχότας τὴν ἀναίδειαν τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τὴν ἀχαριστίαν ἤδοντας).

It can quickly be seen that none of these in fact has anything to do with “undeserved wealth, power and other such things that worthy people should get” (pace Rh. 2.9.1387a8-13 above). In fact, the emotion that is aroused by such things in (non-Aristotelian) Greek is phthonos. The (probably contemporary) pseudo-Aristotelian Rhetoric to Alexander demonstrates this by saying that the orator can arouse phthonos against: a) those who can be shown to have had, be having, or be going to have undeserved good fortune; b) those who have never been, are not being, or will never be deprived of some good; or c) those who have never suffered, are not suffering, and will never suffer some misfortune (Rh. Al. 34.1440a35-39: φθόνον δὲ παρασκευάσοµεν συλλήβδην πρὸς τούτους, οὐς ἀποφαίνοµεν ἀναξίως εὐ πεπραχότας ἢ πράττοντας ἢ πράξοντας, ἢ ἀγαθοῦ µηδέποτε ἐστερηµένους ἢ <µὴ> στερηµένους ἢ µὴ στερηµόµενους, ἢ κακοῦ µηδέποτε τετυχηκότας ἢ µὴ τυγχάνοντας ἢ µὴ τευξοµένους). The emotion aroused in a) is

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48 Other examples occur at Pl. Leg. 684e4, 853c7/d1, 876c8/d1, Epin. 980a7.
49 And a brief survey of the 130-odd instances of aganakteô (another word frequently translated “I am indignant”) in the oratorical corpus shows that that word likewise is not used for undeserved wealth, power and the like, but rather describes a similar emotion to orgê.
51 The Rh. Al. is dated by Chiron (2002) as written after 344/333 BCE (xl – from an event mentioned in the treatise), and probably in the second half of the fourth century (cvii). This would make its composition contemporary with, or at most a few decades later than, Arist. Rh.
indignation, and that is made clear by the reference to desert (anaxiōs), making this emotion identical to that Aristotle calls to nemesan;\(^{52}\) the emotions in b) and c) are respectively envy and Schadenfreude (the emotion Aristotle calls epikhairekakia). The author of this treatise demonstrates that a contemporary Greek could include all three emotions in the one word phthonos, and (as importantly) recognise phthonos as occurring in these three distinct scenarios. He goes on to say:

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\text{διαβαλοῦμεν δὲ τοὺς ἀντιδίκους καὶ φθονεῖσθαι ποιῆσομεν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτων, ἀποφαίνοντες ὑπὸ τούτων ἢ τῶν τούτων φίλων τοὺς ἀκούοντας αὐτοὺς ἢ ὅν κηδοῦνται, κακῶς πεπονθότας ἢ πάσχοντας ἢ πεισομένους παρὰ τὸ προσήκον, ἐκ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ μίσους καὶ ὀργῆν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔξουσιν. ἃν δὲ μὴ ταῦτα ἐνδεχὴται, συνάξομεν, εἴ ὃν φόνον τοῖς ἀκούοντος ἀντιδίκας ἐναντίας ἐργασόμεθα· τὸ γὰρ φθονεῖν πλησίον τοῦ μισεῖν ἔστι. φθονήσομεν δὲ συλλήβδην, ἐὰν ἀναξίως αὐτοὺς εὐ πράττοντας ἀποφαίνομεν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἀλλοτρίως ἔχοντας, διεξιόντες ὡς ἀγαθὰ πολλὰ πεπόνθαις ἢ πάσχονται ἢ ἀκούοντες κακῶς ἢ πεισομένους, ἢ ἀγαθοῦ οὐδέποτε ἐστερήθησαν ἢ νῦν οὐ στερίσκονται ἢ νῦν ὧν κήδονται, ἢ ὧν πάσχονται, ἢ ὧν πεισομένου, ἢ μὴ νῦν αὐτοὺς οὐ κρίνοι πολλὰ πεπόνθασιν ἀδίκως ἢ πάσχουσιν ἢ μέλλουσι πείσεσθαι, ἢ ἀγαθοῦ οὐδέποτε ἐστερήθησαν ἢ νῦν οὐ στερίσομεν, ἢ κακοῦ οὐδέποτε ἐστερήθησαν ἢ νῦν οὐ στερίσομεν, ἢ νῦν οὐτε τευξόμενοι, ἢ μὴ νῦν αὐτοὺς οὐ κρίνοι πολλὰ πεπόνθασιν.

\[Rh.\ Al. 36.1445a12-26\]

And we shall slander and create phthonos for our opponents from the opposite methods to these,\(^{53}\) by showing that our hearers themselves or those for whom they care have suffered, are suffering, or will suffer badly at their hands or at the hands of their friends, contrary to what is fitting. For from such arguments they will be put in a state of hatred or anger at them. And if this proves impossible, we shall collect together all the arguments from which we can create phthonos for our opponents in the audience: for phthonos is very near to hatred. And, in short, they will feel phthonos if we can show them to be doing well undeservedly and that they are unfavourably disposed to the audience, going in detail through a) how many good things they have received, or are receiving, or are likely to receive unjustly, or b) that they have never before been deprived, are not being deprived now, or will never be deprived of some good, or c) that they have never suffered, are not suffering now, or will never suffer some misfortune – unless the judges punish them now.

The latter half of this passage repeats the one above; however some important points are added: first, that an orator can be recommended to attempt to arouse phthonos in his audience (even phthonos as envy); second, that phthonos is a useful adjunct to hatred and anger; and third, that the opponent should be portrayed as unfavourably disposed to the

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\(^{52}\) Cairns (2003b) 247.

\(^{53}\) Note again the connection of diabolê with phthonos – see n.32, n.39 above.
Chapter 5: Oratory

audience. However, it is not just this Greek rhetorician who saw phthonos as potentially morally responsive and useful to the orator in these ways, and this is evidenced by several passages in fourth century oratory.\(^{54}\)

At pp.61-2 I showed that a number of instances of phthonos in Classical literature are linked to (or even imply) resentment, censure or reproach. In the next section I explore this aspect of phthonos in the oratorical corpus in greater depth.\(^{55}\) Where necessary for clarity, I shall refer to this positive aspect of phthonos (i.e. moral censure) as indignation-phthonos, and the negative aspect (envy, begrudging, possessive jealousy etc.) as envy-phthonos. It should constantly be borne in mind though that these are purely hypothetical constructs adopted for analytical purposes only: for the Greeks, there was only phthonos (as in Rh. Al.). There is always, therefore, some ambiguity inherent in the meaning of phthonos, i.e. whether it refers to the morally positive or negative type – though the sense would normally have been abundantly clear to the Greeks due to the social acceptability or otherwise of what was described.\(^{56}\)

5.3.2 Explicit suppression and arousal of audience phthonos

Demosthenes provides excellent evidence, for both the undesirability of envy-phthonos and the appropriateness of indignation-phthonos, and shows how the former should be explicitly suppressed and the latter explicitly aroused in his audience. I first look at explicit suppression of envy-phthonos. In 356, a certain Leptines had proposed a law to the effect that the small number of wealthy individuals exempt from liturgies for past services rendered to Athens (either by themselves or their ancestors) would no longer be exempt, and this law had been enacted.\(^{57}\) Demosthenes’ speech Against Leptines was in support of

\(^{54}\) For instance, we shall see below Demosthenes explicitly calling for phthonos alongside hatred and anger in Against Meidias, and attempting to persuade the audience that his opponent is unfavourably disposed to all of them, not just to him personally (pp.114-17).

\(^{55}\) Phthonos theôn bears some similarity to this idea of phthonos as indignation or censure, though the relationship is slightly different – see ch.7. n.33.

\(^{56}\) I.e. it would have been obvious to the Greeks when they were referring to phthonos as something socially divisive and destructive (e.g. in gnomic statements, or in accusations/prohibitions/denials), or when they were talking about it as something censuring or corrective (i.e. in stating that it was appropriate to feel phthonos). As a parallel, consider our word “light”: we have no difficulty in correctly interpreting it as meaning not-heavy or not-dark, depending on context.

\(^{57}\) See E.M. Harris (2008) 16-17.
an attempt to repeal this law – an attempt that was probably successful.\textsuperscript{58} Demosthenes says Leptines’ law is a disgrace to the city, unworthy either of their ancestors or of the audience themselves, as it makes them seem envious, untrustworthy and ungrateful (20.10.7-11: \textit{νῦν τοῖνυν οὖτος ὁ νόμος ταύτην ἀντὶ καλῆς αἰσχρὰν τῇ πόλει περιάπτει, καὶ οὐτὲ τῶν προγόνων οὖθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἁξίαν. τρία γάρ τα μέγιστ᾽ ὑπείδη κτάται, φθονεροὺς ἀπίστους ἀχαρίστους εἶναι δοκεῖν}). This association of envy with ingratitude, i.e. the binary opposition of envy and gratitude,\textsuperscript{59} underpins the argument of the entire speech.\textsuperscript{60} Demosthenes says that the city cares more about honour than money (20.13.1-4: \textit{τὸ μὲν τοῖνυν τῆς πόλεως ἡδος, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὄν εἰπον ἵδοι τις τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἄγευδες καὶ χρηστον, οὐ τὸ λυσιτελέστατον πρὸς ἁργύριου σκοποῦν, ἀλλὰ τί καὶ καλὸν πράξαι}), i.e. it is grateful rather than envious as a rule; this law, though, is outside its character (20.13.6: \textit{ἐκ δὲ τοῦ νόμου εὐρίσκω πολὺ τούτου κεχωρισμένου}). If someone has a lot of money but has not done wrong to the city, one should not envy (\textit{baskainein}) him, he says; if he has a lot of money unlawfully, however, he may be punished by law (20.24.5-8: \textit{εἰ μὲν γάρ τις ἔχει πολλὰ μὴν ὑμᾶς ἀδικῶν, οὐχὶ δὲ δηποῦ τούτῳ βασκαίνει· εἰ δ᾽ ὑφῃρηµένον φήσουσιν ἢ τιν᾽ ἄλλον οὐχ ὑπετελέστατον πρὸς αὐτὸν καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς καθέναν κολάζειν}). Demosthenes argues that an observer of the Athenian political scene might condemn the moral viciousness (\textit{kakia}) of the authors of this law; when the city no longer needs someone who was previously a benefactor, “we” are so ungrateful (\textit{akharistoi}) and base (\textit{kakoi}) as to take away their rewards (2.55). Taking away something that has been given is spiteful, and “you” must not appear to be in the grip of that emotion (20.56.5-7: \textit{τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἠγοραστὰς ἀσέβεις διὰ φθονούντων, τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐ δεῖ δοκεῖν ὑμᾶς πεπονθέναι}).\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Ibid}. 20-1.

\textsuperscript{59} Klein (1957/1975) argues, in a book-length paper from the psychoanalytical perspective, for the binary opposition of envy and gratitude.

\textsuperscript{60} See Fisher (2003) 193-200, Cairns (2003b) 246-7 and Hesk (2000) 40-50 on Demosthenes’ strategy. The association of \textit{phthonos} and ingratitude can be considered to go back (at least) to the poetry of Solon. Solon fr.5-6, 34, 36-7(West) describes how he went out of his way to balance the claims of both the wealthy and the poor (although Solon does not use the word, the latter can be seen as \textit{phthonos}, i.e. envy of the wealth of the rich – cf. Arist. \textit{Pol}. 5.4.1304a36 on \textit{phthonos} as the driving force of the \textit{demos} in \textit{stasis}); the \textit{demos}, however, was furious with him for not distributing the wealth of the rich, rather than grateful for his relieving them from debt bondage and instituting the rule of law.

\textsuperscript{61} Initially Demosthenes goes out of his way to say he knows nothing of Leptines’ character and has nothing bad to say about it (20.13; cf. 20.102); it is the city that the law attributes a bad character to, not its proposer. However when we read 20.55-6, we might take this with a large pinch of salt. Hesk (2000) 43-4 says that Demosthenes draws a distinction between Leptines’ character and that of the city (i.e. that he is base while the city is honourable), though he later suggests that Demosthenes does not treat him harshly at all (50). E.M.
This law will introduce a base habit into the body politic (20.124.5-6: ὑπὲρ τοῦ πονηρὸν ἔθος τὸν νόμον εἰσάγειν). If you make this law operative, you will seem begrudging (20.139.7-8: εἰ δὲ ... τὸν νόμον ποιήσετε κύριον, δὸξετε φθονήσαντες). Phthonos is a sign of a base nature (20.140.3: ὅτι παντάπασι φύσεως κακίας σημεῖόν ἐστιν ὁ φθόνος).62 There is no greater reproach than that our city should seem phthoneros, as it avoids all shameful conduct (20.140.5-7: εἴτα καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐστιν οὐνείδος ὑπὸ πορρώτερὸν ἔθος ἡμῶν ἡ πόλις δικαιοῦσα εἰναι, ἀπάντων ἀπέχουσα τῶν αἰσχρῶν). Better men seek honours for themselves, rather than try to take away other people’s through envy (20.151.6-8: πολὺ γὰρ βελτίων ἄνδρος ἐστιν ἐφ’ οἷς αὐτὸς εὖ πεποίηκεν ἄξιον τιμᾶσθαι ἡ ἡμῶν ἡ πόλις ἢ εἰ αἰσχρὰ δοκεῖν ἀπέχει τῶν αἰσχρῶν). The law is shameful and base, and can be likened to spite and contention (20.157.1-2: Αἰσχρός, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ κακῶς ἔχων ὁ νόμος, καὶ ὑμοί φθόνῳ τινὶ καὶ φιλονικίᾳ). Retaining the law will give the city the reputation of being untrustworthy, spiteful, and base (20.164.6-10: ἐὰν δὲ ἀποψηφίσῃσθε, ..., ἢ δὲ πόλις τάναντι ἡμῶν εἶπον ἀρτίως, δὸξει ἀπιστος, φθονερὰ, φαύλη παρὰ πᾶσιν εἶναι). Demosthenes ends the speech by appealing to the better nature of the jurors: their generosity over their envy, their sense of justice over vice, and all worthy things over all very base ones (20.165.6-9: ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑμῶν καθημένων ύμῶν ἐνὸς ἐκάστου γυνώμη φιλανθρωπία πρὸς φθόνον καὶ δικαιοσύνη πρὸς κακίαν καὶ πάντα τὰ χρηστὰ πρὸς τὰ πονηρότατα ἀντιτάττεται).63 In a sustained way, spanning the entire speech, Demosthenes argues that Leptines’ law makes Athens seem as if it is responding to its benefactors with phthonos, when it should be responding with kharis. Since, from an objective point of view (and Demosthenes frequently asks what a named outsider or group will think), these individuals really do deserve their exemptions, indignation-phthonos is not a possibility; the only phthonos that might be felt, then, is envy.

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62 Compare Aeschin. 2.22.10 (kakoêtheia; p.104), Dem. 18.11.1 (kakoêthês; p.105), Arist. Rh. 2.11.1388a36 (phaulon ... phaulon; pp.75-6).
63 In total χαρι- words appears 20 times in the speech, and φθον- words 13 times (only Isoc. 15, with 15 instances, has more in the entire oratorical corpus); we can also note that αἰσχρ- words appears 14 times in the speech, πονηρ- words 13 times, κακ- words (excepting kakourgos) 11 times, φαύλ- words nine times, and ὄνειδ- words three times.
Leptines’ law makes the city appear begrudging (phthoneros) and ungrateful (akharistos), and this will put off future potential benefactors. It must therefore be overturned.

A different, and much more personally abusive, approach is taken in the speech Against Meidias, in which Demosthenes prosecutes Meidias for a punch the latter threw at him while he (Demosthenes) was acting as khorègos at a civic festival, and for which he had already received a vote against Meidias in a probolê trial. Demosthenes’ aim in this speech is to arouse the audience’s orgê, misos, and indignation-phthonos against his opponent, and he finally calls for these explicitly in 21.196 (see below). Rubinstein has shown that appeals to orgê and misos were generally unacceptable in private disputes, unless the opponent had exhibited behaviour that was particularly antisocial, e.g. hybris. Demosthenes chose to bring the case as a graphê hybreôs, a public case, rather than e.g. as a private dikê for battery, possibly in order to make these very appeals. Athenians believed there was a corrupting risk inherent in wealth that might cause the wealthy person to behave in certain ways that were unacceptable in a democracy: an ostentatious lifestyle (big house, expensive clothes), arrogance, frequent loud boasting, scorn for the democracy, and most of all a propensity to (often drunken) violence (hybris) towards those less wealthy than themselves. Demosthenes takes this line, arguing that Meidias’ one punch at him was symptomatic of the man’s much wider hybris towards all Athenians, evidenced by his lifestyle and habits. Demosthenes begins his case by stating that Meidias treats everyone with aselgeia – the word normally means licentiousness, but MacDowell argues for a translation of ‘aggressiveness’ and ‘bullying’ here, and notes that the word is often linked with hybris in Greek. In the earlier probolê the Assembly was enraged (21.2.2: ὠργίσθη; 21.6.3: ἄγανακτήσας καὶ συνοργισθείς) at Meidias’ blow against Demosthenes, thinking

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64 In Against Meidias, Demosthenes is attacking a man, not a law, and so it is much easier to personalise this case than Against Leptines – see n.61 above.
65 See MacDowell (1978) 195-7 on the probolê procedure; see E.M. Harris (2008) 75-81 on the earlier history of this case.
66 Rubinstein (2004) 194; see also Kurihara (2003) 476. This is reflected in the fact that the procedure for hybris was a graphê (a public indictment) rather than merely a dikê idia (a private indictment) – see MacDowell (1978) 57-9 on the difference between graphai and dikai.
67 See MacDowell (1978) 57-9 on the types of cases available, and 129-31 on the choice in this case. I follow E.M. Harris (2008) 79, who believes it was probably a graphê hybreôs; he disagrees (80-1 n. 20) with Rowe’s (1994) suggestion that it might be a graphê for asebeia rather than hybris. MacDowell (1978) 131 also appears to believe this is a graphê hybreôs.
70 MacDowell (1990) 220.
he was over-bold, brutal and unrestrainable (21.2.13: θρασύν ... καὶ βδελυρόν καὶ οὔδὲ καθεκτόν). Demosthenes has received blows and wanton violence (21.6.1: οὕτως πληγάς εἰληφὼς καὶ υβρισμένος). Meidias has committed violence against “me”, “you”, the laws, and everyone else (21.7.3-5: Μειδίαν τουτού μὴ μόνον εἰς ἡμᾶς καὶ εἰς ὑμᾶς καὶ εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπαντάς υβρικότα). The speech continues in this vein. Demosthenes begins his call for an emotional response by saying he will not tell them about the various instances of epêreasmos and hybris he has suffered and which have angered him when he does not think the jurors would be similarly enraged, but only those where they should be equally angry (21.15.4-9: οὐ γὰρ ἀγνοῶ τοῦτ' ὅτι τῶ μὲν ἐπηρεαζομένῳ τότ' ἐμοὶ καὶ υβριζομένῳ τὴν αὐτὴν ὀργὴν ἔκαστον τούτων ἴπτπερ ἀλλ' ὀτίον τῶν δεινοτάτων παρίστη, ὑμῖν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐξω τοῦ πράγματος οὐσιν, οὐκ ἂν ἴσως ἄξιοι ταῦτα καθ' αὑτ' ἀγώνοις φανείν ἀλλ' ἃ πάντες ὁμοίως ἀγανακτήσετε, ταῦτ' ἔρω). He continues his calls for orgê. If Meidias has committed hybris against a khorêgos undertaking his public duties, then he deserves the people’s anger and punishment (21.34.1-4: εἰ δὲ χορηγὸν ὄνθ' ὑµέτερον ἱεροµηνίας οὖσης πάνθ' ὅσς ἠδίκηκεν ὑβρίσας φαίνεται, δηµοσίας ὀργῆς καὶ τιµωρίας δίκαιός ἐστι τυγχάνει). Meidias thinks that if he can show that lots of people have suffered a similar blow but not prosecuted, the jurors will feel less orgê (21.36.8-9: ἕττον ὑµᾶς ἐφ' ἰ τοῖς ὑµῶν ὀργιουµένου), and by implication they should not. The laws require a greater amount of anger and punishment for those committing acts willingly and with hybris (21.42.4-5: καὶ θεωρεῖθ' ὅσῳ μείζονος ὀργῆς καὶ ξιµίας ἁξιοῦσι τοὺς ἑκοσίως καὶ δι' υβρίν πληµµελούντας). Any Athenian who does not feel orgê at Meidias is wrong (21.70.1-3: Εἴ τοῖνυν τις ὑµῶν, ὃ ἀνδρείς Αθηναίοι, ἀλλῶς πῶς ἔχει τὴν ὀργὴν ἐπὶ Μειδίαν ἢ ὡς δέον αὐτὸν τεθνάναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει). [All the various things Meidias has done] are not things that Demosthenes should be angry at and take hard but the démos can look aside from, but far from this they should all feel just as angry (21.123.3-5: οὔκ ἐμοὶ μὲν ἄξιον ἐστιν ἀγανακτείν καὶ βαρέως φέρειν, ὑμῖν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις παριδεῖν, πολλού γε καὶ δεῖ, ἀλλὰ πάσιν ὁμοίως ὀργιστέον). Aristotle notes that orgê is produced by offences against oneself, while hatred does not require this: one can hate a class of people (Rh. 2.4.1382a3-

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71 In all, ἀσελγ- words occur 18 times, υπερηφασία (disdain, contempt) five times, θρασ- words nine times, accusations of atimia 18 times, and ὑβρ- words a staggering 131 times, almost once per section.

72 We can note that epêreasmos and hybris are two of the three types of belittling (the other being kataphronêsis) that Aristotle says arouse orgê (Rh. 2.2.1378b14-15) – see pp.172-3.
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7: ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἐχθρὰ δὲ καὶ ἀνευ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν· ἂν γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνωμεν εἶναι τοιοῦτο, μισοῦμεν. καὶ ἂν ὡς ὀργὴ ἂει περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστὰ, οἶον Καλλία ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη); Rubinstein makes the same point, and agrees this is common in the oratorical corpus. Up to this point, Demosthenes has only talked in detail about Meidias’ actions and particularly his hybris, not just against Demosthenes himself but against other members of the démos, and so far he has only therefore been able to call for the jurors’ orgê. However, markers of his future intentions have been laid down. He has said that, since Meidias is bullying and disgusting, he should be hated (21.98.3-5: ὅτι νὴ Δί’ ἀσελγής ἐστι καὶ βδελυρός· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι τἀληθῆ· ἀλλὰ ἐὰν ὑπολαμβάνωμεν ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἠμένοι, ἰδήπου ἢ τοῖς τοιούτους μᾶλλον ἢ σφέειν). He has also mentioned Meidias’ (and his friends’) wealth and linked it with his arrogance (thrasos, hyperêphania, hybris) and other inappropriate behaviour at a number of places, and several times he has made general comments to the effect that bad behaviour resulting from wealth deserves punishment. After putting down all these markers, he next brings Meidias’ inappropriate use of his wealth centre-stage in a long section (§§151-74), deriding

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73 Rubinstein (2004) 192-3: “The judges are told to display that sentiment [misos] towards an undesirable type of person of which the speaker’s opponent is but one example.” (193).

74 “[They] were afraid of him, his reckless behavior, his cronies, their wealth, and all the other advantages this man possesses” (21.20.2-4: καταδείσαντες τούτον καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον θράσος καὶ τοὺς προτέες τοῦ θράσους πλοῦτον καὶ πλαύτον καὶ ταῦτα ὅσα δὴ πρόσερε τοιοῦτον). “If I have so-and-so as an enemy, whether Meidias or some other man equally arrogant and wealthy” (21.66.7-8: ὅτι ἂν δὲ ἐχθρὸς ἢ μοι, Μειδίας ἢ τοῖς ἄλλος θράσους οὕτω καὶ πλούσιος). “This is what he suffered at the hands of Meidias and Meidias’ wealth and arrogance because of his poverty and isolation, one man in a crowd” (21.96.1-2: καὶ τοῖς πολλῶν ἢς ἐἶναι). “Or because he is wealthy? But I dare say you will find that this is the very reason for his insolence” (21.98.5-6: ἀλλ' ὅτι πλούσιος ἐστίν ἄλλα τοῦτο γε τῆς ύβρας αὐτοῦ σχεδὸν αἴτιον εὑρήσετ'. δν). “[A]nd to use his wealth … in ways that make him congratulate himself for his superiority in driving someone unjustly into exile and vilifying him?” (21.109.5-9: καὶ χρῆτο τῷ πλουτεῖν … ἐν οἷς ἀδίκους ἐκβάλλων τινὰ καὶ προπηλακίσεως αὐτοῦ εὑρήσετ’ ὅν). “When a man’s evil and abusive nature is supported by power and wealth, this acts as a bulwark protecting against sudden attack” (21.138.1-2: τὸ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐξουσίας καὶ πλούτου πονηρὸν ἐῖναι καὶ υβριστὴν τείχος ἐστὶ). Translations from E.M. Harris (2008).

75 “[I]t is more appropriate therefore for you to take away the assets that make him abusive rather than to save him because of them. If you allow this sort of bold and disgusting person to retain control of such a large sum of money, you are giving him assets to be used against you” (21.98.6-10: ὥστε ἀφελεῖν τὴν ἀφορµήν, δὲ ἢν ὑβρίζει, προσῆκε μᾶλλον ἢ ὃσοι διὰ ταὐτὴν τὸ γὰρ χρήματος πολλῶν ἤρθεν καὶ μὲν ἐτέρων καὶ τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον οὐδ' ἐνιαῖν κύριον, ἀφορµήν ἐστιν ἐφ' ὑµᾶς ἑαυτοὺς διεδωκέναι). “But will the majority of you do if you do not publicly deter everyone from misusing his wealth for these purposes?” (21.124.7-8: οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τί ποιήσετε, ἢν µὴ δηµοσίᾳ σάντον φοβηθεὶς καταστήσῃ τὸ εἰς ταῦτ' ἀποχρῆσθαν τῷ πλουτεῖν). “but so that you know, men of Athens, and understand that there is not, nor will there be anything, not family, not wealth, not poverty, not power, that you, the majority, ought to tolerate if insolence is added to it” (21.143.7-10: ἀλλ' ἢν εἰδῆθ' ὑµέας, ἢ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, καὶ γνῶθ' ὅτι όλουν οὗτ' ἐστίν οὗτ' ἔσται, οὐ γένου, οὐ πλούτου, οὐ δύνασθον, ὃ οἱ τοῖς πολλοὶς ἤσθεν, ἢν υβρις προσῆ, προσῆκει φέρειν). Translations from E.M. Harris (2008).
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the small number of liturgies he has performed, and explaining why such liturgies as he has done should not be taken into account. Only after this long build-up does Demosthenes finally draw on his earlier allusions to the appropriate response, and call for the audience’s *phthonos* (resentment, at Meidias’ lifestyle and conduct) and *misos*, without any trace of pity, to accompany their *orgê* (21.196.4-6: φθόνου εξ ὧν ζῆς, καὶ ἐφ’ ὅις ἕξαπατάς ἔλεου. οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδαμόθεν σοι προσήκων ἔλεους οὐδὲ καθ’ ἐν, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον μῖσος καὶ φθόνος καὶ ὅργη).76

*Against Meidias* is by far and away the most sustained oratorical case for the appropriateness of juror *phthonos* against the opponent, but not the only one. In former times the Athenians resented those misusing their patrimonies (Lys. 27.11.1-2: καίτοι ἐτέροις ὑμεῖς ἔστιν ὅτε τὰ πατρῶα κεκτηµένοις ταῦτα ποιούσιν ἐφθονεῖτε). It is reasonable for those who behave moderately to resent worthless people who have aimed at more power than is proper for mortals (Isoc. 4.184.1-6: τίσιν δὲ φθονεῖν εἰκός ἐστιν τοὺς ... μετρίως τούτω τῷ πράγµατι χρωµένους; οὐ τοὺς µείζους µὲν τὰς δυναστείας ἢ κατ’ ἀνθρώπους περιβεβληµένους, ἐλάττονος δ’ ἄξιος τῶν παρ’ ἡµῖν δυστυχούντων:). If jurors knew the speaker’s opponent as well as he, they would not feel grief at his loss, but resentment at what he has left (Isoc. 18.51.1-3: ἑβουλόµην δ’ ἂν άνθρωποι ὑµᾶς ἐµοὶ γιγνώσκειν ἵνα τῶν ἀπολλωσιαν συνίχθησθε ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπολοίπων ἐφθονεῖτε). Jurors should not feel resentment for the true heirs to an estate, but rather for those contesting the will if they get what they do not deserve (Isae. 6.61.1-3: ὥστε οú φθονεῖσθαι εἰσίν ἄξιοι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ µᾶλλον, νη τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα, οὔτοι, εἰ λήψονται ἀ µὴ προσήκει αὐτοῖς). *Proxenoi* deserve *phthonos* if they announce in the theatre that they were awarded crowns by other *poleis* (Aeschin. 3.42.1-6: οὖ δ’ ἂν ἐπιφθονοῦσιν προεξεῖδεν εὐρηµέοις πόλεις ἐν ταῖς ἔξω πόλεις, διεπράττοντο ἀναγορεύεσθαι ὀτι στεφανοὶ αὐτοῖς ὁ δήµος, εἰ οὕτω τῦχοι, ὁ τῶν Ῥοδίων ἢ Χίων ἢ καὶ ἄλλης τινὸς πόλεως ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας). Demosthenes’ guardian, in squandering his inheritance, should be resented, while Demosthenes himself should be

76 Demosthenes further links Meidias’ wealth with his conduct after this solitary overt call for *phthonos*. “This man is unbearable; he alone is rich; he alone is eloquent; in his eyes all people are scum, or beggars, and not even human beings” (21.198.5-8: οὐ γάρ ἐστι φορήτος ἀνθρώπως, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτεῖ µόνος καὶ λέγει δύναται µόνος, καὶ πάντες εἰσὶ τούτως καθάριστα καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ οὐδ’ ἄνθρωποι). “[He is] rich, arrogant, full of himself, boisterous, violent, shameless” (21.201.4-5: πλούσιος, θρασύς, µέγα φρονών, µέγα φθηγγόµενος, βίαιος, ἀναιδής). Translations from E.M. Harris (2008).
pitted (Dem. 28.18.2-3: τίς δ’ οὐκ ἄν ὑμῶν τούτῳ μὲν φθονήσει δικαιῶς, ἡμᾶς δ’ ἐλεήσειεν). Nikoboulos’ opponent says he should be hated as a money-lender, and deserves *phthonos* because he walks quickly, speaks loudly, and carries a stick (suggesting he is getting too big for his boots; Dem. 37.52.1-3: Ἐπειδὰν τοίς πρὸς Νικόβουλου' μισοῦσι, φησίν, ἂθηναίοι τοὺς δανειζοντας· Νικόβουλος δ’ ἐπίφθονός ἐστι, καὶ ταχέως βαδίζει, καὶ μέγα φθέγγεται, καὶ βακτηρίαν φορεῖ). And Demosthenes says Meidias himself might try to arouse resentment in the audience, on the pretext that Demosthenes should not be prosecuting him for a private quarrel (Dem. 21.29.3-5: ὅτι τούτῳ πολεµῶ, διὰ τοῦτο μ’ ἀναιρήσετε; τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλάκις οἶδ’ ὅτι φθέγξεται, βουλόμενος φθόνον τιν’ ἐμοὶ διὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων συνάγειν).

We can see that the majority of these instances have something to do with money, and particularly the misuse of it: not performing liturgies; squandering patrimonies; a democratically-imposed fine not being large enough; money-lending. The other instances involve the abuse of democratically voted honours, undemocratic behaviour, or undemocratic levels of political power. Money, honours, power – exactly the issues that Aristotle said aroused *to nemesan* (see pp.107-8), and also the issues that we have seen arouse envy-*phthonos*.Despite these examples, though, it is striking that the attested cases of *phthonos* as (morally acceptable) resentment are so few in number, while those that imply (morally unacceptable) envy are so numerous. It may be that the social unacceptability of *phthonos* (as envy) is so strong, that orators feel uncomfortable using the word even to mean (morally acceptable) resentment. This leaves a terminological lacuna regarding indignation/resentment of abuse of money and political power, which the word *phthonos* only goes part of the way to fill. It may be that *aganaktein* serves in part to fill the need for an indignation verb; but the fact that Aristotle has to resort to *to nemesan*

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77 We can probably add Lys. 18.16.1 to this list: that one should be indignant that those who manage the city’s affairs behave in such a way that orators do not propose what is best for the city, but what is most likely to profit them (Lys. 18.16.1-4: ἄξιον δὲ μάλιστ’ φθονῆσαι ὃτι οὕτως ἢ ἡ τὰς πόλεις πράττοντες διάκεινται, ἔστ’ οὐχ δ’ τι ἄγαν τῷ πόλει βέλτιστῳ ἢ τούτῳ ἢ ῥήτορες λέγουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂ

78 I suggest at n.81 below one way in which this terminological lacuna might be filled.
indicates that it is either too self-regarding, or lacks an unambiguous implication of lack of desert.

5.3.3 Covert arousal of audience envy

We have seen how a speaker can make use of the distinction between indignation-\textit{phthonos} (i.e. \textit{phthonos} when it is appropriate) and envy-\textit{phthonos} (i.e. \textit{phthonos} when it is inappropriate), in order to call for the former or paint his opponent with the latter. However, sometimes the speaker will actually want to make use of the ambiguity inherent in \textit{phthonos} (i.e. between indignation-\textit{phthonos} and envy-\textit{phthonos}) to arouse envy in his audience, and before leaving oratory I want to take a tentative look at how this might be done. While a speaker cannot explicitly call for envy-\textit{phthonos} (\textit{pace} Aristotle, and confirmed by surviving oratory), a clever logographer would know that by pulling on the right ideological strings with sufficient subtlety, he might be able to awaken feelings of envy in his audience – i.e. he could create an envy scenario.

I shall briefly explore two speeches which play with democratic ideology in just this way. Lysias’ \textit{Against Ergokles} is the peroration of a speech for the prosecution in a case of embezzlement and bribe-taking.\footnote{Todd (2000) 286-7.} The speaker begins by saying that Ergokles has become wealthy from poverty at “your” expense (Lys. 28.1.6-7: \καὶ ἐκ ἐκπένητος ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων πλούσιος γεγενηµένος). The phrase \textit{plousios ek penétôn} (or similar) appears a number of times in the oratorical corpus,\footnote{Isoc. 5.89.7, 8.124.7; Lys. 1.4.6, 25.27.1, 25.30.4, 27.9.6, 28.1.6; Dem. 24.124.7, 57.45.10; see also n.85 below.} and, as Aristotle notes in his description of \textit{to nemesan}, while those who have been wealthy for a long time seem to be so justly, those lately wealthy do not (Arist. \textit{Rh.} 2.9.1387a24-26: \αἵτινον δ’ ὅτι οἱ μὲν [ἀρχαιόπλουτοι] δικοῦσι τὰ αὐτῶν ἔχειν οἱ δ’ [νεόπλουτοι] οὐ; τὸ γὰρ ἰδίον οὔτω φανόμενον ἔχειν ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ, ὡστε οἱ ἐτεροι οὐ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔχειν). ‘Correcting’ Aristotle in accordance with actual usage, we might always expect the phrase \textit{plousios ek penétôn} to (aim to) inspire indignation-\textit{phthonos}.\footnote{One way in which the terminological lacuna noted at the end of the previous section could be filled, without explicitly using the word \textit{phthonos}.} However, by stating that Ergokles’ becoming rich was “at your expense”, the speaker seems to be trying to turn this from general social disapprobation of
the *nouveau riche* to a more personalised emotion. Whether in English we would say it was envy or possessive jealousy he was trying to awaken (clearly “this used to be yours” aims at more than mere greed), in Greek it seems clear that it is what I have for convenience termed envy-*phthonos*. By avoiding the exhortation “you should feel *phthonos*” – explicitly stating the word itself would mean indignation-*phthonos* – the speaker is able covertly to awaken feelings of *phthonos* proper, in all its ambiguity. Having put down this marker at the start of the speech, he continues to play on the opposition between the impoverished jurors and his enriched opponent. The jurors are weighed down by the war tax (*eisphora*), so should not forgive embezzlers and bribe-takers (28.3.1-3: καὶ γὰρ δὴ δεινὸν ἄν εἴη, εἰ νῦν μὲν οὕτως αὐτοὶ πιεζόμενοι ταῖς εἰσφοραῖς συγγυώμην τοῖς κλέπτουσι καὶ τοῖς δωροδοκοῦσιν ἐχοίτε). “You” would be rendered poor because of the *eisphora*, while Ergokles and Thrasyboulos’ other flatterers became the most wealthy citizens (28.4.5-7: καὶ υἱὰς μὲν διὰ τὰς εἰσφορὰς πενεστέρους ἀποδείξειν, Ἐργοκλέα δὲ καὶ τοὺς κόλακας τοὺς αὐτοῦ πλουσιωτάτους τῶν πολιτῶν ποιήσει). As soon as they had filled themselves up and enjoyed your possessions, they thought themselves apart from the city (28.6.4-6: ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα ἐνέπληντο καὶ τῶν υἱῶν ἀπέλαυσαν, ἀλλοτρίους τῆς πόλεως ἰ ἰ αὑτοὺς ἡγῆσαντο). Now the speaker changes tack: having already called for *orgê* (28.2.5-6: ὑμέτερον τοίνυν ἔργον ἐστίν, ως ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ὀργίζεσθαι), he now says that these newly rich people will hate “you” (28.7.1-2: ἂν γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ύμᾶς μισοῦσι) – and enmity being reciprocal thereby encourages reciprocated hatred as well. Finally he plays on the *dēmos’* fear of oligarchic revolution, saying that now Ergokles and his friends are rich and hate (*misousi*) the *dēmos*, they want to rule over it; fearing to lose what they have embezzled, they need to turn Athens into an oligarchy (28.7.2-5: ἂν γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ύμᾶς μισοῦσι, καὶ οὐκέτι ως ἄρξόμενοι παρασκευάζονται ἀλλ’ ως ύμῶν ἄρξοντες, καὶ δεδιότες ύπερ ὧν ψήρησαι ἐτοιμοί εἰς καὶ χωρία καταλαμβάνειν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστάναι). *Phthonos, orgê, and misos* – the same three emotions called for at Dem. 21.196.6; only here, the lack of explicit mention of *phthonos* ensures it will also be (transmuted) envy, not just indignation, that is aroused.

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82 Thrasyboulos was an Athenian general who had incurred huge military losses; Ergokles was one of his subordinate generals – Todd (2000) 286-7.
83 Usher (1999) 99. Konstan (2003c) 82 argues that *phthonos* is “an emotional response based on the judgment that … an equal … is getting above himself” – and members of the *dēmos* conspiring to form an oligarchy would certainly fall into that category (though more than *phthonos* is at work here).
Similar themes can be found in the follow-up prosecution of Philokrates, one of Ergokles’ friends (Lys. 29.3). Ergokles was convicted and executed (29.2), but since no money had been found, the prosecutor alleges that he must have deposited it with the man he was most close to, Philokrates; Philokrates must now be convicted similarly for the money to be recouped. The speaker calls Philokrates one of those who possess the city’s property (29.8.3: τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐχοντας), and says that on conviction he would not be losing any of his own property, but would be giving “yours” back to “you” (29.8.4-5: οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτοῦ καταθήσει, ἀλλὰ τὰ υἱότερα αὐτῶν υμῖν ἀποδώσει). He refers a couple more times to “your” property (29.9.3-4: τοὺς δὲ τὰ υἱότερα αὐτῶν ἐχοντας; 29.10.1: τὰ ὑἱότερα ἐχοντες), before saying that Philokrates was an accomplice of Ergokles in stealing “your” property (29.11.5-6: οὗτος δὲ τὰ τῆς πόλεως Ἐργοκλεῖ συνειδῶς κλέπτοντι), and that they should grant no amnesty to those who steal “your” property (29.13.5-6: καὶ μηδεμιάν αὐτοῖς ἀδείαν δώσετε τὰ ὑἱότερα αὐτῶν διαρπάζουσι καὶ κλέπτουσιν). Finally, he concludes that if the dêmos is wise, they will take back their property (29.14.3-4: ἕαν οὖν σωφρονήτε, τὰ υἱότερ’ αὐτῶν κομίεσθε). While, like in Lys. 28, there is an explicit call for orgê (29.11.8-9: ἄξιοι δ’ ἐσιν ὀργῆς), and mention is made of the defendant’s enmity towards the city (29.9.5-6: τούτοις χαλεπωτέρους ἐχθροὺς ἐχοίτε; 29.10.2: οὐδέποτε υμῖν παύσονται κακοποιῆσθε), it is the constant focus on “your property” that is striking. Although the phrase plousios ek penētôn does not appear, the much-repeated reminder that the defendant is wrongfully in possession of “your property” seems calculated to awaken the jurors’ phthonos (transmuted envy as well as indignation).84

Finally, and as a lead-in to the next chapter, I want to look at one more speech, at a passage dealing with demagogues in Demosthenes’ Third Olynthiac. After extolling Athens’ political leaders of previous generations (such as Aristides and Miltiades), Demosthenes castigates the current crop of politicians (3.29.7: πολιτευοµένους), whose policies have led to Athens’ impotence in the face of Philip’s attack on Olynthos. He begins by saying that some of these politicians have gone from being beggars to being wealthy (3.29.7-8: οὐν οἱ

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84 Many of the same themes that appear in Lys. 28 and 29, appear also in Lys. 27, Against Epikrates, including the phrases “they are stealing your property” (27.6.1-2: νῦν δ’ ἄσφαλῶς αὐτοῖς ἐχει τὰ υἱότερα κλέπτειν.) and “they have become wealthy from poverty out of your property” (27.95-7: οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἔκ πενητῶν πλουσιὸι γεγόνασιν ἐκ τῶν υἱότερων, ἵναι γὰρ δία τούτους πένητες.). See Usher (1999) 98-9, Todd (2000) 282.
µὲν ἐκ πτωχῶν πλούσιοι γεγόνασι.⁸⁵ He continues by saying they have become eminent from obscurity (3.29.8: οἱ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀδόξων ἐντιμοί), some of their private houses are grander than public buildings (3.29.9-10: ἔνιοι δὲ τὰς ἱδίας ὁικίας τῶν δημοσίων οἰκοδομήματων σεμιντέρας εἰσὶ κατεσκευασμένοι), and their personal fortunes have risen as much as the city’s have fallen (3.29.10: ὦσῳ δὲ τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐλάττω γέγονεν, τοσοῦτῳ τὰ τούτων ἰδέα).⁸⁶ He goes on to say that today’s politicians are in charge because they control the city’s property and manage everything (3.31.1-2: νῦν δὲ τούναντίον κύριοι μὲν οἱ πολιτευόμενοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ διὰ τούτων ἅπαντα πράττεται). “You”, the dêmos, have been robbed of all your money and have become mere servants and hangers-on, and are happy to be given a little something from the Theoric Fund or a procession, and are grateful to them for bribing you with your own possessions (3.31.2-7: υµεῖς δ᾽ ὁ δήµος, ἐκνενευρισµένοι καὶ περιῃρηµένοι χρήµατα, συµµάχους, ἐν ὑπηρέτου καὶ προσθήκης µέρει γεγένησθε, ἄγαπῶντες ἡν καταδιδῶσι θεωρικῶν υµῖν ἢ Βοηδρόµια πέµψωσιν οὕτω, καὶ τὸ πάντων ἀνδρειότατον, τῶν ύµετέρων αὐτῶν χάριν προσοφείλετε). They keep you here in the city and dole this money out to you in dribs and drabs, so as to keep you tame and under their thumb (3.31.7-9: οἱ δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει καθείρξαντες υµᾶς ἐπάγουσι ἐπὶ ταύτα καὶ τιβασεύουσι χειροθεῖς αὐτοῖς ποιοῦντες).⁸⁷ In the next chapter, I shall demonstrate that such arguments are designed to play to latent phthonos towards politicians in the dêmos, Demosthenes’ motivation being to discredit more established politicians and position himself rhetorically as being on the side of the dêmos against them, in order that his own advice might be more likely to be listened to.⁸⁸

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⁸⁵ Compare ek πτωχῶν plousioi here to plousios ek penétôn above (p.119 and n.80 above).
⁸⁶ Compare “he is in possession of your money” above (main text).
⁸⁷ We shall find very similar arguments advanced for comic purposes at Ar. Vesp. 655-712 (see pp.138-9); however the presence of such similar arguments in a public speech proves that the prejudices Aristophanes/Bdelykleon plays to are very real.
⁸⁸ Thucydidies has Diodoros say in the Mytilenean debate that if someone gives the best advice but is suspected of being influenced even slightly by private profit, then we feel censorious of his profit and refuse to take his good advice (3.43.1.4: ὃν ἤµεις τάναντα δραµεῖν, καὶ προσεί ἐὰν τις καὶ ὑποπτεύηται κέρδους μὲν ἕνεκα τὰ βέλτιστα δὲ ὄμως λέγειν, φησώντως τῆς οὐ βεβαιοῦ δοκίσεως τῶν κερδῶν τῆς φανερὰν ὑφελίαν τῆς πόλεως ἀφαιρούμεθα.). See also Lys. 18.16.1-4, per n.77 above.
5.4 Conclusion

We have seen that there is one use for *phthonos* by an orator that is consistent with Aristotle’s philosophy: accusing one’s opponent of being motivated by it. In practice this can be extended to any positional statement which loosely falls into the twin categories of “you (or some other person/people) feel *phthonos*” and “I do not feel *phthonos*”. However, Aristotle’s analysis of the role of *phthonos* in oratory is limited by an unresolved paradox between two positions he takes: first, that an orator’s most effective weapon is his good character; second, that *phthonos* is (always) base; thus in explicitly arousing *phthonos* the orator risks demonstrating his own character to be base, removing his most effective weapon. Although Aristotle does not resolve this paradox (and indeed may not even have been aware of it), nevertheless his analysis does raise the valid question: what role, if any, is there for *phthonos* in oratory (beyond positionality)?

It is certainly the case that Athenian orators do not present themselves as *phthoneros* (meaning envious), nor do they attempt explicitly to arouse *phthonos* in their audience when it would be considered inappropriate by their fellow-citizens (i.e. the circumstances in which *phthonos* would be what I term envy-*phthonos*); that type of *phthonos* they only attribute to their opponents. However Aristotle has created problems for himself by separating off moral *phthonos*, *phthonos* when it would be considered appropriate by their fellow-citizens (i.e. the circumstances in which *phthonos* would be what I term indignation-*phthonos*), under the separate label of *to nemesan* – a separation that I have shown to be unjustified by reference to the minimal non-philosophical usage of *nemesis* vocabulary. His less idealistic contemporary comes closer to everyday usage by including such moral resentment as part of *phthonos*, a usage we find several times in fourth century oratory. The rhetorician does not stop at advocating that orators arouse moral *phthonos*, however, but also advocates arousing envy and *Schadenfreude*. It does seem that the badness associated with these emotions prevents them from being aroused explicitly (all surviving explicit calls for *phthonos* being for the moral version); however orators can sometimes arouse envy-*phthonos* covertly alongside indignation-*phthonos*, through manipulation of common civic values, while leaving unstated the exact point on the envy-indignation continuum that they are aiming for.
Chapter 6: Audience Phthonos in Old Comedy

6.1 Introduction

In ch.5.3.3, we saw prosecutors exploiting certain words and ideas in order covertly to awaken jurors’ phthonos. This is infrequent in surviving oratory. In this chapter I explore the same practice in Old Comedy, where it is more common. Comedy shares some key features with oratory. Its pronounced metatheatricality keeps its communicative relationship with its audience overtly in view (unlike tragedy), and both explicitly and implicitly it claims the desire and the ability to influence its audience on important issues of public concern. However, the audience at a comedy was different from that in the Assembly or courtroom, not necessarily in its social make-up, but certainly in their expectations of what would be put in front of them, and the emotional reactions they might expect to have as they listened. I will not be concentrating primarily in this chapter on representations of phthonos on stage (except in Knights – see ch.6.3.4 below), though these do occur, but rather representations which invite or utilise it in the audience. Though this effect is by no means confined to political contexts, I focus specifically on passages relating to politicians (ambassadors, demagogues and generals), for a variety of reasons: first, because it allows us to see political phthonos (which plays a significant role in oratory, as

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1 There has been a long-running debate about the ‘seriousness’ of comedy, i.e. the intent of comic playwrights in giving advice to the audience – see e.g. Heath (1987), Henderson (1990), Silk (2000) 301-49. I am less interested in the intent than in the fact that comedy explicitly places itself within a civic discourse with its audience (unlike tragedy, which only does so indirectly – see e.g. Goldhill (1987), and n.36 below for further discussion and contrary viewpoints), and the dynamics of how it does so – see pp.132-3.

2 We see the usual accusations of phthonos where the other party is arguing on the grounds of what is right. In Assemblywomen the young girl tells the old woman not to envy the young having lots of sex when the old are only fit to marry Death (Ar. Eccl. 900-5: μὴ φθόνει ταῖσιν νέαισι· τὸ τρυφερὸν γὰρ ἐμπέφυκε τοῖς ἀπαλοίσι μπροίς, κάτι τοῖς μήλοις ἐπανεθεί· σὺ δ’, ὃ γραφαί, παραλέλεξαι καντέτριψαι τῷ θανάτῳ μέλημα). The old woman later responds that the young girl is jealous (sc. that the new law has given her priority in sleeping with the young man) and she’ll have her revenge (Ar. Eccl. 1043-4: ὃ παμβδελυρά, φθονοῦσα τόδε τὸν λόγον ἐξηῦρες· ἀλλ’ ἔγω γε ἐν τιμωρήσωμει). Both believe they have a right to sleep with the young man, the young girl by nature, the old woman by law; both argue that the other’s expressed indignation is really phthonos, thus making the same intuitive leap that modern psychologists have recognised about the tendency of expressed indignation to be transmuted envy.

3 In using the word ‘politician’, I do not, of course, seek to imply that politicians in Classical Athens’ direct democracy were similar to those in our modern representative democracy (i.e. who follow politics as a profession, and are paid a salary accordingly). Rather I mean those who regularly and voluntarily attempted to direct the political life of the Athenian democracy, principally through advocating policy in the Assembly, by prosecuting (or defending) those elected or appointed by lot to fill political or civic posts, or by putting themselves forward for elected posts such as the generalship.
discussed in ch.5) in another civic and generic context; second, the prominence of political *phthonos* in Old Comedy is a result of the visibility of politicians, and thus demonstrates the importance of political *phthonos* in Classical Athens; and finally, because the sheer volume of political abuse in Aristophanes’ plays (and indeed its persistence over time from *Acharnians* to *Wealth* – though in this chapter I concentrate on the plays of the 420s) makes it a good test-bed and adds to confidence in the outcome, compared e.g. with an examination of the fewer and shorter passages playing to *phthonos* at luxurious lifestyles. Perforce I rely on Aristophanes, as the only Old Comic playwright whose plays survive in their entirety, to explore this cultural phenomenon; however, as Wilkins points out, Aristophanes was not writing in a vacuum, and such themes will almost certainly be traceable in the surviving fragments of other Old Comic playwrights. The approach I adopt in this chapter is not intended as a comprehensive interpretation of the pragmatics and psychology of Old Comedy (even if such were possible on present evidence), but rather an exploration of one important aspect of the role of comic theatre and its relationship with its audience that has a particular relevance to my theme. Having outlined this approach in ch.6.2, I turn in ch.6.3 to Aristophanes.

6.2 An approach to Old Comedy

At p.62 we saw Socrates talking about those spreading malicious gossip about him, which led to general bad-feeling against him and his consequent conviction; Socrates is unable to name an individual involved except perhaps “some comic playwright”. The connection of malicious *phthonos* with comic pleasure occurs in a number of other places too. But it is

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4 Wilkins (2000) xv. Though see Bakola (forthcoming) 6-8 on the pitfalls inherent in assuming conclusions from Aristophanes can be extrapolated to all Old Comic poets.
5 The increasing interest in the fragments of other Old Comedians (in particular Eupolis and Kratinos) can be seen in the growing scholarship on these playwrights: e.g. Dobrov (1995), Harvey and Wilkins (2000), Storey (2003), Olson (2007), Bakola (forthcoming); this research has to huge degree been rendered possible by Kassel & Austin.
6 Pl. *Ap.* 18c8-d3: δτι οὐδὲ τά ὀνόματα οἶδ᾽ τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἰ τίς κωμῳδοποιοῖς τυγχάνει ὧν. δόσι δὲ φθόνω καὶ διαβολῆ χρώμενοι υμᾶς ἀνέπειθον; Laches says that pretension to skill at arms invites resentment, and is liable to ridicule unless the claimant is outstanding (Pl. *La.* 184c1-4: ἐπίφθονος γὰρ ἢ προστοίχις τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιστήμης, ὡστε ἐὰν τὴν ἀρετὴν τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἐσθ᾽ ἀντὶ λίστων τῆς φύγος τό καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι φάσκων ἐξεῖν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην). Socrates says that a lover will necessarily envy his boys when they have property, but rejoice when they lose it (Pl. *Phdr.* 240a5-6: ἐξ ὧν πάσα ἀνάγκη ἐραστήν παιδικοῦ φθονεῖν μὲν χαίρειν δὲ χαίρειν). Demosthenes chastises the Athenians that due to some motive he cannot divine, which might be envy, they ask Philip’s ‘hired men’ among the population to speak, and laugh at their abuse (Dem. 9.54.2-8: ἄλλ᾽ εἰς τοῦτ᾽ ἀφίξθε μωρίας ἢ παρανοίας...
Plato’s *Philebus* that has the most extended treatment of this link, and this will be the starting point for my theoretical approach.

In the *Philebus*, Plato discusses comedy as an example of ‘false pleasures’ of the soul. I give relevant excerpts from this extended, but important, passage:

So: Now, look at our state of mind in comedy. Don’t you realize that it also involves a mixture of pleasure and pain?

So: Since we just mentioned the word “envy”: do you treat envy as a pain of the soul, or what?

Pro: I do.

So: On the other hand, will not the envious person display pleasure at his neighbour’s misfortunes?

Pro: Very much so.

[Socrates digresses on the nature of those who are ridiculous. He argues they are: 1. ignorant about the extent of their (a) wealth, (b) physical attributes, or (c) virtues, especially wisdom; and 2. too weak to avenge themselves when laughed at.]

Pro: You are right about this division. But I am still not quite clear that there is a mixture of pleasure and pain in these cases.

So: Take first the nature of malice.

Pro: Please explain.

So: It contains a kind of unjust pain and pleasure.

Pro: Necessarily.

So: Now, if you rejoice about evils that

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8 The *Philebus* is one of the ‘Late period’ dialogues; Frede (1993) lxii speculates that it would have been written some time after the visit of Eudoxos to Athens circa 360, and clearly before Plato’s death in 347; the passage on comedy would therefore have related to Old and perhaps Middle Comedy, but not to New Comedy.

9 I.e. pleasures mixed with pain – see Frede (1993) xlv-xlvi, l-ii.

10 Translation from Frede (1993) 56-9, slightly adapted.

11 During this digression, Socrates refers to παιδικὸν … φθόνον (49a8), which Frede (1993) 57 translates “comic malice”). Benardete (1993) rightly 205 prefers “playful or childlike resentment”, and suggests this contrasts with a serious form that would be found in tragedy; he further suggests it might be playful because the audience do not take this resentment seriously.
Plato started by talking about *phthonos* being felt for the misfortunes of neighbours, but from here he changes this to the misfortunes of friends (cf. the pseudo-Platonic *Definitions* 416a13 – see ch.4 n.50). This pushes the Greek binary division of the world into friends and enemies beyond breaking point. Perhaps Plato is concerned to separate out people against whom we have a personal animosity from the rest, i.e. that our animosity can only be *phthonos* when it is not enmity (though this ignores the fact that *phthonos* is often felt against *ekthroi* – e.g. Aeschines’ and Demosthenes’ mutual accusations of *phthonos* – see also ch.5 n.37), but he goes too far in labelling them friends. It would not have been normal, in Classical Athens any more than today, to take pleasure in the misfortunes of friends (and see p.91 on Aristotelian ‘perfect friends’ being unable to feel *phthonos*). Certainly other Greek passages also talk about *phthonos* being felt for neighbours: ἔννεπε κρυφά τις αὐτίκα φθονερῶν γειτόνων (Pind. *Ol*. 1.47); μὴ φθονεῖν τοῖς πλησίον (Ar. *Eccl*. 565); ἐπιχαιρέκακος εἰ καὶ φθονεῖν τοῖς πλησίον (Alexis fr.51.1(Kock)).

12 Plato started by talking about *phthonos* being felt for the misfortunes of neighbours, but from here he changes this to the misfortunes of friends (cf. the pseudo-Platonic *Definitions* 416a13 – see ch.4 n.50). This pushes the Greek binary division of the world into friends and enemies beyond breaking point. Perhaps Plato is concerned to separate out people against whom we have a personal animosity from the rest, i.e. that our animosity can only be *phthonos* when it is not enmity (though this ignores the fact that *phthonos* is often felt against *ekthroi* – e.g. Aeschines’ and Demosthenes’ mutual accusations of *phthonos* – see also ch.5 n.37), but he goes too far in labelling them friends. It would not have been normal, in Classical Athens any more than today, to take pleasure in the misfortunes of friends (and see p.91 on Aristotelian ‘perfect friends’ being unable to feel *phthonos*). Certainly other Greek passages also talk about *phthonos* being felt for neighbours: ἔννεπε κρυφά τις αὐτίκα φθονερῶν γειτόνων (Pind. *Ol*. 1.47); μὴ φθονεῖν τοῖς πλησίον (Ar. *Eccl*. 565); ἐπιχαιρέκακος εἰ καὶ φθονεῖν τοῖς πλησίον (Alexis fr.51.1(Kock)).
There are a number of points that can be drawn out of Plato’s analysis. First, that *phthonos* includes the idea of malice or *Schadenfreude*. As we saw in ch.4 (see p.78), Aristotle separates *phthonos* as a painful feeling from its opposite pleasure, *epikhairekakia*, saying that the same character will feel them in opposite circumstances. Plato however conflates both feelings in the word *phthonos*, and as we have seen, this is not the only Classical Greek passage that seems to show *phthonos* encompassing a malicious pleasure. The second important point in the *Philebus* passage is the idea that we feel some sort of animus against characters in a comedy. Third, that those who are funny are those made to seem ridiculous. Fourth, Plato is right that we do not laugh at those who have the ability to harm us in return – and a vast crowd can laugh at someone with impunity who might be able to target them if they mocked him individually. Finally, and most importantly, Plato’s main claim: that *phthonos* (envy, malice, *Schadenfreude*) is the basis of comic pleasure. It is not clear if he means that it is publicly acknowledged as such; if he does that is implausible. We have seen that envy-*phthonos* was socially taboo: Greeks did not admit to *phthonos* out loud, and surely they would have been almost as uncomfortable admitting it to themselves; accordingly it is inherently implausible that a popular pleasurable art form could be founded explicitly on such an emotion, especially when the activity was organised and funded by or through the state. However, we should distinguish between the overt basis for an activity and the actual basis, and it is perfectly possible for

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15 See n.7 above; also the [Arist.] *Rh. Al.* passages quoted at pp.109-10.

16 Aristotle seems to agree with this: Arist. *Poet.* 5.1449a32-4: ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ... μίμησις φαυλό-τέρων ... κατὰ ... τὸ γελοῖον... ; *Tract. Coislin.* [10th century AD epitome of Peripatetic views on comedy, possibly reflecting Aristotle] 4: κωμῳδία ἐστὶ μίμησις πράξεως γελοίας. – see n.19 below for further discussion and bibliography on this treatise.

17 I think for this reason Plato is wrong to exclude enemies from the list of those we can laugh at while safely hidden in a crowd.

18 Freud (1905/2002) 218-19 says that one type of comedy relies on an unconscious comparison with the pleasure we took as children in various situations, e.g. somebody falling in the street, which gives us a pleasurable feeling of *Schadenfreude*. 
phthonos to be a significant covert element in comic pleasure, while masquerading overtly as indignation (by whatever Greek label).19

For all the difference in emphasis, Plato’s analysis of comedy in terms of phthonos has certain underlying tendencies in common with one of the major modern models for understanding Old Comedy, the Bakhtinian theory of ‘carnival’. Goldhill and others argue that the notions of ‘inversion’, ‘transgression’ or ‘reversal’, where the usual rules of society (e.g. respect for those in authority, laws against certain forms of abuse) are abandoned or turned on their head for some defined duration, match well the ribald, almost anarchic aspects of Dionysiac worship which are in some degree reflected in Old Comedy’s (probable) origins – songs performed at the kômos, or revel – and its licence.20 Carnival ‘inversion’ is often not truly anarchic, but rather follows a different set of rules that would be considered unacceptable outside of the carnival context, generally involving a “reversal of norms”.21 One aspect of Old Comedy, which the carnival approach is especially helpful for understanding, is satires, or lampoons, in which well-known people (public figures, frequently politicians) are represented on stage in such a way as to make them appear ridiculous. This ridicule might arise from the representation itself (e.g. a physical caricature, or character satire)22 or, and this is common for lampoons involving those against whom society feels some animus (e.g. someone hated or feared), from the character

19 E.g. nêmesis, aganaktêsis, phthonos. Golden (1992) 91-5, in an attempted reconstruction of Aristotle’s views on comedy in the putative Poet. 2, argues for indignation as the comic emotion by analogy with pity as the tragic emotion – indignation being described as opposed to pity in the Rhetoric (see pp.71-2), and both becoming fear when we perceive the other’s good/bad fortune as harmful to ourselves; cf. Golden (1984). If indignation is indeed the emotion aroused by comedy, then (as we saw in ch.5.3) at least as regards politics and money it would not be to nêmēsan in Greek (as Golden argues), since that is merely an Aristotelian construct, but indignation-phthonos. Bergson (1900/1911), while generally denying emotion a place in comedy (4), says laughter contains “an unavowed intention to humiliate, and consequently to correct our neighbour” (136); the former is the action tendency of envy-phthonos, the latter of indignation-phthonos. In my view Golden’s is the most plausible suggestion for the Aristotelian comic emotion, being based on genuinely Aristotelian texts. Other suggestions include: L. Cooper (1922) 66-7, anger and envy, with little reasoning; Sutton (1994) 14-15, 24-30, aggressiveness, hostility, fear and anxiety (his preferred translation of eleos); Janko (1984), pleasure and laughter, taking Tract. Coislin. 4: κωµῳδίαἰ…, ἰδι’ ἰηδονῆς ἵκαναι τῶν ἰτῶν ἱτωτῶν παθηµάτων κἄθαρσιν (see n.16 above) as genuinely Aristotelian (contra L. Cooper (1922) 15-17, Halliwell (1986) 266, (2008) 393 n.11, Golden (1992) 98-102).


21 Carey (1994) 72, who refers to this as “controlled dysfunction, a calculated subversion of the norms of society in a festival context which offers a controlled outlet for disruptive behaviour and vicarious satisfaction of the impulse to disobey” (73). See Silk (2000) 76, who quotes Bakhtin on carnival inversion in Rabelais, on what inversion might include.

suffering some misfortune. This bears more than a passing resemblance to Plato’s comic malice.

As well as those actually represented on stage, Old Comedy often lampoons contemporaries by name – a process known as onomasti komöidein. Sommerstein has shown that over 50% of these so-called komöidoumenoi (who must have been well-known for the joke to work) were politically active. He further notes that politicians were normally named in a derogatory context. However, it is not only named politicians who are criticised in Old Comedy: several passages criticise politicians as a class (see ch.6.3). The abuse and ridicule at these festivals of those who are well known, as well as the abuse of certain privileged classes of citizens (such as politicians), can be seen as part of the ‘carnival’ licence. When Athenians went to the comic theatre, they enjoyed seeing abuse heaped on such people, and Aristophanes and his contemporaries provided what they wanted.

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23 Sutton (1994) 42-6 talks about a comic ‘surrogate’ for the intended ‘target’ (e.g. Paphlagon for Kleon); this surrogate is sufficiently similar to the target to remain recognisable, but sufficiently different to avoid arousing the same feelings (e.g. hatred, fear) in the audience that the original arouses. Inasmuch as the surrogate is perceived as ridiculous, the audience can transfer such perceptions back to the original target, thus altering their emotional approach (hatred, fear) towards him. Sutton argues that this is both educative and purgative – i.e. cathartic; cf. Golden (1992) 5-32, Lear (1992) on comic katharsis. We should note that Greek laughter was often aggressive, or ‘consequential’, in nature: laughing at, rather than laughing with – Halliwell (1991), Halliwell (2008) 19-38.

24 Allegations made as part of onomasti komöidein may or may not have been true – see Halliwell (1984).

25 Sommerstein (1996) 327-31 compares the list of 224 komöidoumenoi we know about in the period 432/1-405/4, and the 176 people who either held elective office or proposed Assembly resolutions in this period. He finds that 37% (65/176) of the politicians are mentioned by name in comedy, including 26% (32/122) of those who “took a prominent role in politics only on one occasion”, but 61% (33/54) of those who did so on more than one occasion. As well as the 65 mentioned who were elected or who proposed Assembly resolutions, another 50 komöidoumenoi are known to have been politically active outside this period, to have been unelected military or religious officials in the period, or are called sykophtontai (showing they were probably politically active despite not appearing on other lists). This means 115 of the 224 komöidoumenoi were active in some way politically. These statistics are compelling, and we should recall that we only have a fraction of the full Old Comedy output of that period. Of the other 109 komöidoumenoi whom we do not know as being politicians, 45 were connected with the theatre, 13 are known from the agora (mainly prominent tradesmen), and 15 for their gluttonous or sexual appetites; some of the remaining 36 were known e.g. through the patronyms of their prominent sons, or for some topical court case; for a few we know of no reason for their mention. Of the thirteen people known to have been satirised throughout a comedy, rather than just in one passage, six were politicians – Ibid. 334.

26 Ibid. 334: he says that only five politicians are named in a favourable context while they are alive; see also Carey (1994) 69-71. Rosen (1988) argues that abuse (psogos) in Old Comedy derived from that in the Iambic tradition of Archilokhos and Hipponax. Zanetto (2001) 66, however, notes some major distinctions between the genres (not least their settings and audiences); this suggests they are related but independent traditions.
But why were politicians so singled out for abuse? Athens’ strong democracy may have been the cause: ideologically, all Athenian citizens were equal; however, as Ober and Strauss argue, the wealthy remained “functionally more powerful” than the poor, whether in seeking to advance themselves politically, or in the lawcourt where their education would help them speak or their money buy a good speech-writer. This is equally true of politicians (of all social backgrounds), who as a class in Athens (as in many subsequent systems) were frequently viewed as willing to do anything to gain and secure their position with the dèmos. In the course of his career, a politician would expect to attract philoi amongst other politicians, and these might help each other out to ensure mutual political advancement and monetary advantage – perhaps by supporting each other’s policies in the Assembly, or perhaps through initiating or supporting each others’ sometimes spurious prosecutions (an unpopular pursuit, which is strongly associated with the sykophantos). A general feeling seems to have developed that politicians, while necessary in the democracy (which paradoxically needed people to lead in a system of tens of thousands of nominal equals), did rather well out of the system. This would have led to a popular

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28 Many politicians (especially the generals, who were still elected) came from the wealthiest and best educated class, even in the later fifth century – see Ober (1989) 112-8. Even the ‘new’ politicians from the 420s onwards tended to be drawn from the wealthy urban commercial or industrial classes – see Connor (1971) 151-63.
30 We see the operation of such activities clearly in the major legal trials of the mid fourth century – e.g. Aeschin. 1-3, Dem. 18-19. On ‘the badness’ of sykophants see Christ (1998) 48-71, Christ (2008) 170-4, Fisher (2008) 297-9; for a different view see Osborne (1990). Successful prosecutors often gained a personal monetary reward, and even when they did not they could gain gratitude from the dèmos for enriching the public treasury, which might help a political career. Sycophants crop up several times as comic butts in Aristophanes (Ach. 818ff., Av. 1410ff., Plut. 850ff.).
31 Sinclair (1988) details the rewards available to politicians, including “crowns, immunities, free maintenance, and similar grants” (176), as well as material rewards: notably through bribery (by foreign allies, or to avoid sykophant-ic prosecution), corruption (fees, i.e. kick-backs) and embezzlement (179-86). Harvey (1985) 89-102 argues for a widespread perception at Athens, reflected in surviving sources, that bribery of, and embezzlement by, public figures was endemic (though he argues it was perhaps less so than our sources would have us believe, as many of the allegations may have been baseless). The prevailing assumption at Athens that all politicians made money out of the system is underlined by Perikles’ pointed commendation of himself to the dèmos as incorruptible (Thuc. 2.60.5-6 – see Hornblower (1991) 333-4), and Harvey (1985) 98 notes that only four Athenian public figures are so described in literary sources, three of them from the mid-fifth century (a different picture to that painted by Dem. 19.273-5). Hyp. 5.24-5 suggests that it was both expected and acceptable for public figures and generals to make significant personal profits, provided the money was used in the interests of Athens, not against them. This cannot have been the generally accepted view: Hansen (1975) notes that in surviving sources we have record of 144 Athenians prosecuted by eisangelia (11), 70 of whom were politicians (58), and the true figure (including those we have no record of) must have been much higher; Hansen rightly says this is “astonishingly high” for a city of 20,000-40,000 citizens (11). Politicians were also prosecuted for bribery, corruption or embezzlement under a variety of other procedures, notably scrutiny for office (dokimasia), removal from office (apokheirorotonia, generally followed by eisangelia), audit at the end of a period of office (euthyna), and a dedicated procedure.
animus against them, which could be exploited by comic playwrights looking for targets. I propose therefore that one important aspect of Old Comedy – its attacks on politicians (individually and collectively) – appeals to the audience’s latent *phthonos* at the profit they make, and the advantages they take, from their position. It is possible too that the ‘new’, demagogic, politicians may have attracted even more animus than their aristocratic forebears: Aristotle argues that the newly rich are more likely than the long-time rich to attract *to nemesan* (or rather indignation- *phthonos*), as newly-acquired wealth seems less validly theirs, and in the same way, ‘new’ politicians were probably seen to profit more conspicuously from the system than aristocratic ones. The *Schadenfreude* aroused in the audience at seeing politicians taken down a peg during this sacred time of licensed transgression, would have acted as a safety valve for the *phthonos* that was naturally aroused against politicians, but which was dangerous if left untreated in a democratic system that relied on politicians to function properly, since unchecked public hostility might lead to the destruction of all politicians to the ultimate impoverishment of the state.

Goldhill has argued forcefully that Athenian drama cannot be divorced from its setting in, and constant interaction with, the democratic *polis*; he has further noted that while drama might not have the intention of promoting questioning of democratic values and ideology, one of its functions is to do precisely that. However, although he notes that this applies to all drama, Goldhill’s interest then moves firmly towards an engagement with tragedy; my interest here is in comedy, where (as I noted earlier – see n.1 above) the dynamics of the engagement are different due to comedy’s metatheatrical practice of explicit recovery of state property (*apographê*) – see Hansen (1975) 9, Hansen (1991) 203-24, Bauman (1990) 82-94, MacDowell (1978) 58, 62.

32 Carey (1994) 73-4 also argues that comedy “offers an outlet for *phthonos*”.


34 And hence the ‘rags to riches’ (*penēs ek penētōn*) cliché referred to at p.119 (main text and n.81).

35 Carey (1994) 82. Jokes lampooning the political class in Old Comedy act as a channel for hostility that could find more damaging outlets, thus allowing citizens to come to terms with inequalities over which they have no power.

36 Goldhill (2000), *contra* Griffin (1998). See also: Goldhill (1987), where he first argues for the connection between tragedy and its democratic setting; Friedrich (1996) and Seaford (1996), who like Griffin are dismissive of this connection; Griffith (1995), who is closer to Goldhill’s view, but sees other ideologies competing with the democratic, e.g. aristocratic (Goldhill (2000) disagrees, arguing that democratic ideology, unusually, allows for the free expression of e.g. aristocratic criticism); Rhodes (2004), who questions the extent to which the link is with democratic, as opposed to civic, ideology.


38 *Ibid.* 37 notes that this is relevant to comedy too – I would argue it is even more relevant to comedy than to tragedy.
communication with the audience. I believe that, while comedy as a genre was not created intentionally as an institutional outlet for \textit{phthonos}, one of its functions was to allow \textit{phthonos} to find expression in non-destructive ways,\(^{39}\) thus helping police the boundaries and manage tensions between ideologically equal, but in practice frequently unequal, citizens in the democratic \textit{polis}. One important strand of this comic promotion of questioning served to hold the lifestyle and practices of politicians up to public scrutiny, reminding them that they were permanently on display, and militating against egregious misbehaviour that could ultimately lead to dangerous levels of mistrust and hostility building up between the political class and the rest, thus risking the stability of the democratic system.

\textbf{6.3 Politicians in Aristophanes}

\textit{6.3.1 Ambassadors}

There are three passages in \textit{Acharnians} that deal with ambassadors. The first (61-90) is a splendidly unselfconscious report back to the Assembly by the Athenian ambassadors to the Persian king, followed by a second in similar vein by the ambassador to Thrace (136-54), both critiqued by Dikaiopolis.\(^{40}\) The third (593-619) is an argument between Dikaiopolis and the general (and \textit{komöidoumenos}) Lamakhos. In all cases the purportedly sensible, clear-sighted opinion of the common man is focalised through Dikaiopolis. Ambassadors (to other Greek \textit{poleis}, or to non-Greek powers such as Persia) were generally senior and experienced politicians, who were entrusted by the \textit{demos} to negotiate on Athens’ behalf. It is intriguing that, of all types of politician, they appear to be satirised more than any other.\(^{41}\) Aristophanes makes a number of ‘charges’ against them. If my surmise as to the comic point of such passages – that they play to popular animus by making such characters look ridiculous – is correct, there would seem to be a persistent

\(^{39}\) In this respect it has a similar function to ostracism – see ch.1 n.30.

\(^{40}\) This passage serving to characterise him as a demotic hero.

\(^{41}\) Sommerstein (1996) 328: “of thirty-six known ambassadors of the Peloponnesian War period, twenty-two or 61\% are mentioned in comedy.”
undercurrent of popular resentment against the (supposedly) cushy life ambassadors led while in post.\textsuperscript{42}

Six specific ‘charges’, if we can call them that, are alluded to in these passages. The first is that ambassadors are paid large amounts: the ambassadors’ spokesman reminds the Assembly that they set his pay at two drachmas per day (65-6), and Dikaiopolis rhetorically castigates ambassadors for being paid three drachmas a day on a mission to Thrace (602); this compares with no pay for attending the Assembly, and two or three obols a day for jury service.\textsuperscript{43} The second charge is that the ambassadors draw out their negotiations, thus ensuring they are paid for as long as possible: the ambassadors to Persia have been gone since Euthymenes was archon eleven year ago (66-7);\textsuperscript{44} they say they were wandering about in the Causter valley (68-9); they took three years to get to the Persian capital, and then had to wait eight months until the Persian king returned (80-2); Theoros’ embassy to Thrace was likewise delayed by freezing weather (136-9). The third charge is that ambassadors are plied with good food and drink and other forms of luxury: when wandering the Causter, they were reclining on soft cushions in covered carriages (69-70); their hosts “forced” them to drink undiluted sweet wine from golden and crystal goblets (73-5), the quantity consumed being supposedly the way men behave among the barbarians (77-8); the Persian king entertained them by serving up oxen whole in the pan (85-6), followed by a bird three times the size of (the politician) Kleonymos (88-9) – which Aristophanes names a \textit{phenax}, to allow a joke about cheating (90: ἐφενάκιζες);\textsuperscript{45} Theoros likewise is plied with wine (141). The fourth charge is that ambassadors avoid fighting by being sent on diplomatic missions: Dikaiopolis berates Lamakhos, saying that while he himself has spent the war as a worthy citizen and fighting in the army, Lamakhos has been running for office and in the pay queue (595-7). The fifth charge is that only young men get to be ambassadors, while the old have to go to fight: Dikaiopolis hates seeing venerable men in the ranks, while (supposedly) young men like Lamakhos run away far away (as

\textsuperscript{42} It is worth noting that a significant number of ambassadors were prosecuted – see Hansen (1975) 58 n.6, Bauman (1990) 84-94.

\textsuperscript{43} Pay for jury service was raised from 2 to 3 obols around the time of this play – Powell (1988) 302, 331 n.294; MacDowell (1995). Pay for attending the Assembly was introduced around 403/402 at one obol, and rapidly raised to three obols – Rhodes (1984) 146; Ober (1989) 98, 133). See also Markle (1985) 265 n.1.

\textsuperscript{44} Sommerstein (1973) 239 n.9 notes this was some years before the Peloponnesian War started.

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ibid.} 240 n.12.
The final charge is that the same people always get to be ambassadors: “you” (a list of ambassadors just recited) are always getting paid posts, but none of “them” (the audience) do (607-9) – Lamakhos is named (614) as one who does.

Let us examine these charges one by one. First, that ambassadors are overpaid. This cannot be valid: pay for ambassadors was set by the assembly, and the level must have been considered appropriate for the job. This was considerably more than jurors were paid; but the work was more specialist, went on for longer, and was potentially more dangerous – not just because of the rigours of travelling in the ancient world, but because ambassadors were not always treated well (and were occasionally even executed) by those they were sent to – or by those who sent them. Resentment among the démos cannot therefore be based on objective criteria, and can only be aroused by the fact that ambassadors are well paid compared with the average citizen – i.e. this is at least as much envious as indignant resentment. Second, that ambassadors drag out the journey and negotiations, so as to draw more pay. If this allegation is valid, then it would certainly be an objective criticism, and so grounds for indignation; however, ambassadors (like all officials) had to submit accounts and defend them at audit, and if this type of misconduct were a regular phenomenon we would expect it to crop up much more frequently in the oratorical corpus than it does. Resentment is likely to arise firstly because ambassadors conducted their

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46 See Rothfield (1999) 77-8. In reality, this is part of the young/old antithesis which permeates Old Comedy – see MacDowell (1995) 350-1. Lamakhos could not have been too young if he was a general; Aristophanes’ point is aimed more at ambassadors in general. Demosthenes, for instance was about thirty-seven when he was sent on the embassy to Philip in 346. Alkibiades was elected general in 419/8 (Thuc. 5.52) in his early thirties – Thucydides comments that he came to prominence unusually young, because of his family connections (5.43). We should note that ‘young’ and ‘old’ here are in any case relative terms.

47 See Westermann (1910) on the voting of pay and the amounts paid, which were to cover expenses and were not high given the expenses that could be incurred. See also Perlman (1976) 224-5, Harvey (1985) 203.

48 Being sent as ambassador was a high risk activity, since ambassadors who disappointed the démos could pay a very high price (death, or exile with confiscation of all property) – see Bauman (1990) 84-94, Hansen (1975) 58 n.6. Philokrates in 343 is the most high profile – see Hansen (1975) 102.

49 I use “objective” and “subjective” in this chapter from the point of view of the démos. If the démos contracts to cover a certain level of expenditure, there will be a shared understanding of the importance of the task, and a recognition of the potential expenses and the need not to allow these expenses to disincentive people of the required calibre. Citizens could not then believe that they had paid over the odds; accordingly any resentment they feel must primarily be envy. Aristophanes plays to this envy, albeit (through comic exaggeration) in the language of indignation (“they don’t deserve it”) – see main text below.

50 I do not mean to imply in this chapter that genuine indignation is completely absent. Situations can arouse mixed emotions in people, and just as a situation may not be obviously completely moral or immoral (especially in a joke which takes its humour from a variety of real-life situations), so the emotion it arouses will not be entirely indignation or (transmuted) envy. I believe the jokes in Aristophanes would have aroused a mixture of indignation and envy (the exact mixture perhaps varying considerably from joke to joke). Cf. ch.1 n.20, and ch.8.2, where I argue that Medea’s emotional motivations include jealousy alongside, rather than instead of, anger and pride.
business out of sight of the démos, and secondly because relatively high daily wages were paid, and (human nature being what it is) Athenians may have expected ambassadors to employ some creative accounting. Third, that ambassadors are treated luxuriously by their hosts. This was likely true, especially when they visited a rich kingdom such as Persia. However, ambassadors could not diplomatically turn down hospitality – to do so would insult their hosts; so again resentment would owe far more to envy that someone else (indeed someone already better off than the average citizen) was getting what the general citizen could not, than to indignation that they were (objectively) acting inappropriately.\footnote{It is worth noting, though, that both the ambassadors to Persia and to Thrace employ braggadocio – there may have been a tendency to bring back anecdotes of splendour, and the souvenirs on occasion may have added to this (even if not a general feature) – see Olson (2002) 90, Sommerstein (1980) 160 on Pyrilampes’ peacocks, probably a gift from the king of Persia.}

Fourth, that ambassadors avoid fighting, which all other citizens have to take part in, by being sent on diplomatic missions. Again it is true that ambassadors would not be fighting, or subject to call-up, for the duration of their embassy; but once again this would validly be in the nature of the job, and so again the allegation plays to envy more than indignation. Fifth, the age issue. This may be merely embroidery; there may also be an element of Old Comedy’s habitual prejudice that the younger generation put upon the older.\footnote{E.g. Pheidippides’ mistreatment of Strepsiades in Clouds, or the chorus of poor, old men in Wasps. See n.46 above.} But presumably ambassadors would be chosen who were right for the job, irrespective of their ages, so there is unlikely to be much objective validity to the allegation. Finally, that the same people are always chosen to be ambassadors. Clearly this would make sense, as a) politicians tended to be good speakers, a useful skill on an embassy,\footnote{Consider the account of the various politicians’ speeches to Philip at Aeschin. 2.22-39.} and b) negotiations would benefit from expertise; they must also be well known to be elected by the Assembly.\footnote{This ensured there would be some inevitable recycling of the same candidates in all jobs filled by kheirotónia rather than klērósis. See Ober (1989), Connor (1992) on the role of the elite in Athenian politics.} Once again, any resentment cannot be objectively supported, so must be at least as much (transmuted) envy as indignation. Considering the allegations then, both individually and as a whole, they are made in the language of indignation: i.e. “You are acting inappropriately. You do not deserve your benefits.” However in reality, most ambassadors probably did not act inappropriately, and any benefits they got (whether expenses or perks) would objectively have been earned; accordingly any generalised resentment in the audience against ambassadors as a class would owe far more to envy than to indignation. Whether or not these allegations were a valid reflection of popular hostility...
to ambassadors, clearly such an attitude could be represented in front of them in a comedy, and the laughs sought were based on the animus of (perhaps secret) *phthonos*.

We should note that it is not just ambassadors in general who are castigated, but many are by name. This of course includes Lamakhos (595-619), but also Teisamenos, Phainippos, Hipparkhides, Khares and his friends, Geres, Theodoros, Diomeialazon, others sent to various towns in Sicily (603-6), and Koisyra’s son (614). The *phthonos* played to, then, is not just towards ambassadors in general, but towards many named individuals who (presumably) could have been sent on these specific named embassies around this time. At a time of war and hardship, Athenians may have seen the need to send out ambassadors; but Aristophanes seems to be playing to a deep-seated resentment that they had to spend their dwindling cash supplies paying famous and probably reasonably well-off politicians to have time off from the difficult and dangerous life of the average Athenian citizen/soldier.

### 6.3.2 Politicians

Like *Acharnians*, *Wasps* is also largely a comedy of political satire, and in the next two sections I focus on this play. Here I am concerned with two passages that discuss politicians in general (i.e. demagogues). Aristophanes introduces the subject by having Philokleon extol the source of his pleasure as a juror: no living creature, he says, is happier, more blessed, more in the lap of luxury or more terrible than a juror; great tall men wait for him at the entrance to the court, and one puts his hand in Philokleon’s, a soft hand that has stolen things from the *dēmos*, and they all plead: “Pity me, father, I beg you, if you yourself have ever filched anything, when holding a magistracy, or when in the army, going shopping for the common mess.” – all of them talk this way (Ar. *Vesp.* 550-8). Underlying Philokleon’s words is the belief that abusing one’s power for private gain through theft is absolutely standard for public officials.

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55 It comes close to surfacing when Dikaiopolis turns to members of the audience and asks “Have you ever been an ambassador?” (609ff.).

56 Possibly including a pun on lazomai = I grasp. Aristophanes runs several of the names together, as if all these ambassadorial candidates are really indistinguishable.

57 Compare the ambassador to Persia lying down in covered coaches, while Dikaiopolis has to sleep among the rubbish by the city battlements (70-72).
This foreshadows a later, lengthy section (655-712), devoted to the crimes of the political class. With some internal plot inconsistency, Philokleon must now be instructed in these by Bdelykleon. As with ambassadors in Acharnians, a number of ‘charges’ are made. The first is that little of the city’s income goes to jurors: while the city makes nearly 12,000,000 drachmas (2,000 talents) a year – from tribute from the Empire, other taxes, many percentages, lawsuit deposits, the mines, market taxes, harbour charges, rewards, and confiscated goods – jurors’ pay accounts for only 900,000 drachmas (150 talents), somewhat less than 10% (656-65). The second charge, in reply to Philokleon’s question, is that the rest goes to politicians: Bdelykleon satirizes how politicians talk to the dēmos, who are taken in by such speeches and elect them (665-8). Thirdly, that politicians take bribes: Bdelykleon says politicians intimidate the subject cities by threatening to destroy them through a speech, unless the cities bribe them 300,000 drachmas a time not to (669-71). Fourthly, that politicians collude to defraud the dēmos: they share each others’ bribes then support each others’ cases, and get away with it because Philokleon (as the average Athenian) keeps gaping at the jury paymaster (692-5).

Having made these charges, Bdelykleon then compares charge one to charges two and three in more depth, playing on a politicians versus non-politicians dichotomy: the subject cities give politicians bribes, but Philokleon is content gnawing at the offal of the empire, and the subject cities see the rabble starving at the ballot-box and wolfing down nothing, and think they are worthless because of it (672-5); politicians are bribed – with pickles, wine, carpets, cheese, honey, sesame seeds, cushions, bowls, shawls, crowns, necklaces, drinking cups, anything to keep them healthy and wealthy – but from all the land he rules from his naval duties, no one gives Philokleon even a garlic head for his boiled fish (675-9); all those men are in powerful positions themselves, and paying out all sorts to their toadies; but if someone gives Philokleon just three obols, which he gained for the city himself by marching and fighting and besieging and many other toils, he is content – and this is slavery (682-5); Philokleon is ordered to be in the jury box at first light else he will lose his three obols, by some bullying stripling who will get his drachma however late he turns up.

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58 We might consider Kleon’s speech in the second Mytilenean debate (Thuc. 3.37-40).
59 See Rhodes (2004) 228-9 on the ease with which demagogues could fool and flatter the Assembly.
Philokleon rules over an Empire from the Black Sea to Sardinia, but gets almost nothing out of it at all – and that little is dribbled out like olive oil, just enough to keep him alive. The contrast here could not be clearer: Philokleon and other normal Athenians do all the work of running the empire, while the political class reaps the rewards. Politicians are rolling in every kind of luxury, and splurging money on their favourites, but those who do an honest day’s work for the city get merely a pittance.

In the above passages, Aristophanes alludes three times to the military service elderly jurors will have done to win and keep the Empire. In contrasting this with the politicians who swan off to the subject cities to be bribed, he paints a similar picture to that in *Acharnians*, where young politicians avoid the fighting the average (and older) citizen must do, by procuring lucrative and luxurious postings as ambassadors. As there, we might ask how much validity there was in these assertions; once again it is hard to be certain. However, the possibility of abuse was always present; certainly the Athenians were constantly aware of the possibility and took great pains to prevent it. Anyone caught with their hand in the till, or taking bribes, could expect serious sanctions from the *dēmos*: in Lys. 28 and 29 we saw officials prosecuted for alleged bribe-taking and embezzlement (see pp.119-21), and this was almost certainly the norm. Politicians could not be corrupt as a rule therefore (albeit in a gift-giving culture the grey area was large), but certainly Aristophanes seems to be playing to a general resentment that the political class as a whole did rather well out of the system. It is notable to what extent the fictional ‘charges’ in *Wasps* foreshadow those actually laid against Ergokles and Philokrates: they started their term in office poor, they ended it rich, so they have embezzled and taken bribes from “your” money. And in *Wasps* these accusations presage Bdelykleon’s final charge: “They want you to be poor,” he says, drawing a parallel to underfeeding a dog to make it more savage against enemies; “if they wanted to provide a living wage to the *dēmos*, they could do it easily.”

Not only are politicians feathering their own nests, then, but they are purposely keeping everyone

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60 Where *Knights* distils the *dēmos* into a collective allegorical figure, *Wasps* takes a representative individual (though Philokleon is more than just a single ordinary Athenian, and sometimes plays incompatible parts: e.g. a man who loves to wield power over thieving politicians, but who has to be instructed in how politicians steal; a poor juror who needs his three obols, but rich enough to choose the lifestyle of an aristocrat).

61 See n.31 above.

62 Again, this argument is not just comic satire: this charge, and indeed all charges in this passage in *Wasps*, are very similar to those made seventy years later in real life by Demosthenes (Dem. 3.29-32 – see pp.121-2). When Athens was awash with money from the Empire, as it was when *Wasps* was produced in 422, they may well have been even more plausible.
else poor so as to control them better. Behind their backs, the political class is wilfully enslaving the \textit{demos}, and training them to be ever more fierce against enemies, so as to win ever greater Empire for them to exploit. And Bdelykleon proposes the solution: get rid of the politicians. “If you were not constantly being confined in some way by the cheats, think how rich you and all these men would be” (698-9: \(\sigmaκ\epsilon\psi\alphaι\ το\ι\υ\nu\nu\ ω\zeta\ ε\ˈ\xi\ˈ\nu\ ς\ι\ πλουτε\ι\υ\ κα\ι\ το\ι\ς\ι\ α\π\α\ς\ι\ υ\π\o\ τ\o\υ\ ι\d\e\ δη\μι\ξ\ο\ν\τ\o\υ\ ω\υ\κ\ ο\i\d\i\ ω\p\i\ έ\γ\k\ε\κ\ύ\κ\λ\η\ς\a\i\)). “They’ve cheated you,” he says. “They have it, and you don’t. Get rid of them, and then you will.” The language is that of indignation; but with little objective to support it, we can see that the emotion primarily played to is envy.

6.3.3 Generals

Along with ambassadors, another prominent special class of politician was generals.\(^63\) \textit{Wasps}, written nine years into a major war when generals will have been especially prominent, lays into them too. The unfortunate \textit{k\om\o\i\dou\menos} is Lakhes,\(^64\) a general who had been leading operations in Sicily since 427.\(^65\) Early in the play Philokleon says he is off to see the trial of Lakhes, whom everyone says has a hoard of money, and against whom Kleon has enjoined them to turn up with three days’ worth of anger, so as to punish him for all his misdeeds (240-4: \(\w\zeta\ έ\ς\ τ\o\i\ς\ι\ νυ\nu\ι\ να\δ\ι\ θ\i\mu\β\λ\o\υ\ ν\e\ δ\e\ φ\a\ς\i\ χρ\e\μ\i\m\α\τ\o\υ\ ν\e\χ\e\ι\ν\ α\p\a\ν\τ\e\ς\ α\υ\t\o\ν\ χ\h\e\ς\ ο\u\n\ ν\e\κ\l\e\w\o\n\ ο\k\i\δ\e\μ\i\w\o\u\n\ ή\μ\i\n\ έ\f\e\i\τ\i\ έ\ν\ ΄\o\r\a\ ή\k\e\i\n\ έ\x\o\v\u\n\ta\s\ ή\m\e\r\o\w\o\n\ ή\r\e\g\h\i\ν\ τ\i\ρ\i\w\o\n\ π\o\u\n\h\r\a\n\ ε\p\t\ α\u\t\o\ν\, \w\z\e\ς\ κο\l\o\w\m\e\n\o\w\u\n\ ο\u\n\ ή\d\i\k\i\k\h\e\n\s\e\n\)). Deprived of his

\(^63\) At this stage in Athens’ history, it was the norm for prominent generals also to be politicians – see Connor (1992) 144. Perikles is the most renowned in this period, but others include Nikias and Alkibiades, and even Kleon had his success on the battlefield at Pylos (albeit reaping the rewards of work done by Demosthenes – see pp.142-3 and n.73), though unusually after rather than before his prominence in the Assembly. Unlike most posts in Athens, generals were elected (Arist. \textit{Ath. Pol.} 22.2, 44.4), and only one person would be general from each tribe. For someone to be chosen, he would therefore have to be well known, which biased the selection in favour of those rich enough to buy votes, or famous because of their political career or family connections.

\(^64\) Though Kleon is the more prominent target of \textit{Wasps}. Another general we see targeted is Lamakhos in \textit{Acharnians}, who is used to exploit the ‘same people’ theme (see p.136), and is presented as someone who gains from the war by exploiting an apathetical political system.

\(^65\) Thucydides briefly mentions Lakhes commanding in Sicily for around 18 months, from late summer 427/6 to winter 426/5 (3.86, 3.90, 3.103), but then ignores him until the one-year armistice agreed in spring 423 (4.18). For him to command in an important arena, propose an armistice, and then be one of the oath takers for Athens in the Peace of Nikias (5.19), he must have been a senior and respected commander, so Thucydides’ silence about what he was up to after early 425 is probably unwarranted. D. Barrett (1964) 216 n.17 believes he achieved little in Sicily, and that this play contains enough inferences to indicate that Kleon accused him of taking bribes from Sicilian cities. Plato (\textit{La.}) portrays Lakhes as brave and loyal, but not overly intelligent – not dissimilar characteristics to Aristophanes’ dog \textit{Labes} (see below).
chance to be a juror in that trial, Philokleon later gets to adjudicate in the trial of the dog Labes, prosecuted by the dog Kyon, for stealing a Sicilian cheese. Labes (“Thief”) and Kyon (“Dog”) fill well the role of comic surrogates, as defined by Sutton.66

One of the household slaves from the prologue first tells us that the dog Labes has run past him into the kitchen, stolen a fresh Sicilian cheese, and eaten it all (836-8). The second dog (Kyon) wants to prosecute him if there is a trial (841-2). When he gets the opportunity, he makes his charge: Labes has committed the most terrible acts, not just against him but against all the rowers in the fleet, by running off into the corner with a large cheese and gorging himself wolfing it down in the dark (908-11); he sailed all the way round the plaster and ate the casing from all the cities (924-5).67 Whether or not the charge reflects a real prosecution of Lakhes by Kleon (see n.65 above), it would seem to be playing to an Athenian fear that their generals might take bribes from an enemy instead of fighting them as the dêmos wished. If any evidence came to light, this would certainly be a prosecutable offence; and the Athenian dêmos was in any case in the habit of convicting unsuccessful generals,68 without needing other reasons for their failures. However, given their evident suspicions about all politicians being on the take, bribery by the enemy must have been more than an occasional rumour.69 We saw in ch.5.3.3 a latent phthonos of the entire political class and, as we have seen, slander was a good way to fan phthonos.70

66 See n.23 above. The dogs’ names are sufficiently similar to Lakhes and Kleon that no one would be in any doubt who was being lampooned. D. Barrett (1964) 217 n.32 notes that Kleon even had the nickname Kyon (though that may be a circular inference from this play), and that his deme was Kydathenaion; in the indictment, Kyon’s deme is given as Kydathenaion, and Labes shares Lakhes’ deme of Aixone (895). That Labes and Kyon are both their political alter-egos and dogs, and speak/act sometimes like one, sometimes like the other, is essential to the parody in this scene. See MacDowell (1995) 167-70 for further discussion.

67 The verb κατασικελίζω is a portmanteau of κατασιτέοµαι (I feed on) and Σικελία (Sicily); cheeses were cased in plaster – D. Barrett (1964) 217 n.33. OCT (F.W. Hall and W.M. Geldart (1906)) has these charges spoken by one of the slaves, but that does not fit with Kyon’s request to prosecute. In any case, the joke works far better with Kyon prosecuting Labes, paralleling Kleon’s prosecution of Lakhes that very day (see above), and I follow most editors in having the lines spoken by Kyon.

68 A habit to which we owe Thucydides’ history. Dem. 4.47.5-7 says that all generals are tried two or three times. Hansen (1975) 58-65 demonstrates that an astonishingly high percentage of generals were tried and convicted: by extrapolation from known eisangelia trials, he infers that on average two generals out of every board of ten might have been put on trial, and the vast majority of eisangelia trials ended in death for the defendant (unless he fled into exile) – e.g. Ergokles, as we saw at pp.119-20. Like ambassadors, generals operated out of sight of the Assembly, and so were difficult to control; we should therefore not be surprised that generals were particularly prone to prosecution.

69 See p.67 on diabolé as a tool of phthonos; pp.103-6 (esp. n.32, n.39) on slander as part of Demosthenes’ and Aeschines’ mutual phthonos accusation strategies; see also pp.154-5 for Phaidra’s spiteful slander against Hippolytos, and p.190 (esp. n.108) for Orestes’ jealous slandering of Neoptolemos, both having fatal effect.
But this is not all. Kyon has a second charge: that Labes kept all the cheese for himself and refused to give Kyon his share. He could not have been serving the interests of “you” (the ‘court’ onstage, and the audience) if he did not give a share to Kyon when asked (914-16: कοῦ μετέδωκ’ αίτούντι μοι. καίτοι τίς ύμᾶς εὖ ποιεῖν δυνήσεται, ἢν μή τι κάμοι τις προβάλλῃ, τῷ κυνί;). Labes should not be freed, as he is the most eat-it-yourself man of all dogs (922-3). He must be punished, as one kitchen cannot support two thieves (927-8). Kyon’s (Kleon’s) main gripe then, is not that Labes (Lakhes) stole all the cheese (took bribes) himself, but that he would not share them with him. A real prosecutor would not of course have made this charge; but with Kleon being both a politician and a general, it serves to fan the audience’s phthonos still further (i.e. politicians always have to have their cut, and they will destroy you if they do not get it), while allowing Aristophanes to have a dig at his old nemesis.71

7.3.4 Kleon / Paphlagon, a case study

Phthonos is an especially significant force in Knights, not just because the play attempts to arouse that emotion in the audience, but because there is plenty on-stage as well – and it does not occur in one or two isolated sections but throughout the entire play. Onstage we see it first in the attitudes of the two slaves Nikias and Demosthenes towards Paphlagon.72 Nikias and Demosthenes have been slaves to Demos for longer, but Paphlagon has usurped their place in the house. Several ‘charges’ are presented by Demosthenes. First, that Paphlagon flatters Demos grossly: he immediately got to know the ways of their master, and falling at his feet he wheedled, fawned upon, flattered and beguiled him with the highest scraps of phrasery (46R9); he pours Demos’ bath, and says he will cook food for him to gobble down greedily (50R1). The second charge is that Paphlagon presents what others have done for Demos as his own work: he grabs food one of the others has cooked for Demos and offers it, to make Demos grateful to him – he did this only the other day

71 Aristophanes’ and Kleon’s quarrel dated back to the performance of Banqueters in 427, through a possible indictment of Aristophanes by Kleon (see the parabasis of Acharnians), and Aristophanes’ viciousness about Kleon in Knights (see below); cf. MacDowell (1995) 111-12, 170.
72 I agree with most commentators that the two slaves are meant as parodies of Nikias and Demosthenes specifically, rather than two other generic politicians – see e.g. MacDowell (1995) 87-8, Sommerstein and Barrett (1978) 33; see Henderson (2003) for a contrary view. (I take it as read that Paphlagon and Demos are respectively parodies of Kleon and of a personification of the Athenian démos.)
with a Spartan cake Demosthenes had baked in Pylos (52-7).\footnote{The theme of Kleon stealing Demosthenes’ victory at Pylos crops up again at 392, 744-5 and 1201.} Third, he drives the other slaves off from Demos: he will not let them care for him, and during dinner he stands behind him with a leather thong, driving the other orators away (58-60). Fourth, he makes prophecies and tells lies to Demos to get the other slaves/orators punished: he plays the Sibyl to the old man, and when he sees it has made him sufficiently stupid, he turns it to his advantage (61-3); he openly slanders the other slaves with lies indoors, so then they are whipped (63-5). Finally, he blackmails the other slaves/orators: he goes round the other slaves and demands, stirs up, and takes bribes saying, “You saw Hylas was flogged because of me? If you don’t persuade me then today you’ll die;” and they give it to him, else they shit eight times as hard when trampled on by the old man (65-70).

The first charge (flattery and fawning) makes it sound as if Nikias and Demosthenes feel \textit{phthonos} (envy) for Paphlagon, as he has become Demos’ favourite despite being the newest slave.\footnote{Attacking the new favourite of the \textit{dēmos} might well have been a feature of political rivalry – e.g. consider the charges laid against Alkibiades in 415, which Thucydides says were fanned by those he had supplanted in the \textit{dēmos’} affections (Thuc. 6.28).} However they make it clear that he has gained this position through flattery, not deservedly, and this brings other emotions to mind, such as indignation and anger. They bolster a case for their resentment being indignation (i.e. that Paphlagon is objectively acting unjustly), with the following charge: as he has stolen their cakes to present as his own, he does not deserve the favouritism shown him.\footnote{Aristotle makes clear that undeserved good fortune is the criterion for \textit{to nemesan} – or rather indignation-\textit{phthonos}.} The three subsequent charges show Paphlagon treating the other slaves hubristically, and Aristotle tells us that this arouses \textit{orgê}.\footnote{Arist. \textit{Rh.} 2.2.1378a30-31 (\textit{orgê} is a desire for revenge for a belittlement), 1378b14-15 (there are three types of belittlement, including \textit{hybris}) – see pp.172-3 for a more thorough discussion. However until the two slaves hatch their plan, revenge seems elusive. Hatred of Paphlagon because of his unprovoked enmity, and fear of his power, are two other emotions clearly present in this scene.} We have seen though that indignation and anger can easily be presented as envy by an opponent, and in the second \textit{agôn} we find Paphlagon accusing his opponents of envious cawing (1051: \textit{μὴ ἐν τοῖς Φθονηραῖς ἐπικρωζοῦσι κορωναί}). Such accusations, however, can cut both ways, and Demosthenes’ charges effectively accuse Paphlagon of \textit{phthonos} (jealousy) to retain his own position as Demos’ favourite slave: his insisting on being the one to serve Demos and beating off the other slaves; and
especially his slandering of them.\textsuperscript{77} We saw in ch.5 that orators bolster a charge of \textit{phthonos} with accusations of \textit{diabolē}, supported by a battery of other offences (\textit{pseudeis}, \textit{loidoria}, \textit{blasphemia}).\textsuperscript{78} It is Nikias who first accuses Paphlagon of slander (6-7: κάκιστα δὴ οὕτως γε πρῶτος Παφλαγόνων αὐταῖς διαβολαίς), and Demosthenes agrees he is a very great slanderer (44-45: Παφλαγόνα, πανουργότατον καὶ διαβολώτατον τινα) before delivering the detailed accusation above; he refers to Paphlagon’s slanders three times later in the play (486, 491, 496), and Paphlagon himself admits he will slander Sausage-Seller (288) – an admission that would not happen outside comedy. Demosthenes’ accusation of lying (charge four above) is repeated by Sausage-Seller (630: ψευδατραφάξυος) and admitted by Paphlagon (694-5: εἰ μή σε ἀπολέσαιµ’, εἰ τι τῶν αὐτῶν ἐμοὶ ψευδών ἐνείη, διαπέσοιµι πανταχῇ). Demosthenes also calls Paphlagon a \textit{baskanos} (103) – implying he has an envious eye.\textsuperscript{79} Sausage-Seller eventually explicitly accuses Paphlagon of being jealous of his position: he put a stop to buggery out of jealousy that any other orators might emerge (878-80: οὐκουν σε δὴτα ταῦτα δεινόν ἐστι πρωκτηρεῖν παῦσαι τε τοὺς κινουμένους; κόψκ ἔσθ’ ὃπως ἐκεῖνους οὐχὶ φθονῶν ἔπαυσας, ἵνα μὴ ρήτορες γένοιτο).\textsuperscript{80}

These slurs in themselves will appeal to the audience’s \textit{phthonos} (Schadenfreude) against politicians: as well as being given almost free license to engage in this illicit emotion by its onstage presence, the accusations will work with the grain of the audience’s own prejudices against politicians that we saw Aristophanes playing to in \textit{Acharnians} and \textit{Wasps}. They will also relish the anticipation of Aristophanes taking such overt swipes at the biggest politician of the day.\textsuperscript{81} Their anticipation is soon gratified. First, however, Demosthenes explains to Sausage-Seller that he has all the qualifications for being a politician in Athens: he is knavish, brazen, and from the market-place (181); he is not in any way noble (183-5); politics is right for him as he is uneducated and loathsome (191-3), though it may harm him

\textsuperscript{77} See n.70 above.
\textsuperscript{78} See ch.5 n.32, also n.34, n.39.
\textsuperscript{79} Ironically a slur the logographer Demosthenes later makes his own – see ch.5 n.40.
\textsuperscript{80} Probably a reference partly to the prevalence of homosexual relationships in the upper classes from which politicians traditionally came, partly to the initially educative and later patronage aspects of many of these relationships, which helped an aspiring politician’s rise; it may also be a simple slur that Paphlagon does not want anyone to get bugged except by him.
\textsuperscript{81} A relish that did not (as has been frequently noted) stop them re-electing him as general a few weeks later. Comic poets were in the habit of picking out the leading political figure for humiliation: e.g. Perikles in Kratinos’ \textit{Dionysalexandros}, or Hyperbolos in Eupolis’ \textit{Marikas} – see Sommerstein (1996) 335.
that he can read a little (190); politics is a very base art, like making a sausage – he can stir up and make mincemeat of all the city’s affairs, and win over the dèmos by sweetening them with words like a cook seasons a sausage (213-16); he has a foul voice and a base lineage, and is market-born (218).\textsuperscript{82} In other words, Demosthenes says that politicians are the lowest of the low and the vilest of the vile. If this were so, we might infer, they should never have reached the top; and if their position were totally unmerited, indignation-\textit{phthonos} would be appropriate. However, Demosthenes’ description is a comic distortion. From outside the play, while the audience may see some (even much) truth in his caricature, they will know the description is only partly merited – and so the animus Aristophanes plays to is \textit{phthonos} proper, with all the nuances of this Greek term (i.e. both envy-\textit{phthonos} and indignation-\textit{phthonos}).

Turning to the two \textit{agônes}, much of the raillery is general insulting,\textsuperscript{83} or other types of shamelessness,\textsuperscript{84} and I shall pass over these as irrelevant to my topic. However, several accusations are important to an examination of \textit{phthonos}. First, that Paphlagon has been bribed by a foreign power: the Potidaians gave him ten talents (438) – Paphlagon immediately offers one talent to Sausage-Seller for his silence (439). We have seen that the accusation that politicians take bribes from foreign powers recurs in \textit{Wasps}, as does the idea that they share the spoils between them (both in one of the general accusations against politicians, and in Kyon’s desire to prosecute Labes because he would not share his gains). A second charge also appears in \textit{Wasps}: that Paphlagon has been cheating Demos of his due, while only paying him a salary (presumably the three obols made so much of in \textit{Wasps}) – in fact, says Sausage-Seller, he is intentionally prolonging the war so the dèmos does not notice him plundering and bribe-taking his way round Greece (801-7). The third charge is that Paphlagon bribes Demos (first levelled by Demosthenes in the prologue – charge three above), and Paphlagon himself boasts that he knows how to feed the dèmos (715). He and Sausage-Seller compete as to how much they can do for Demos/dèmos: first they try to bribe them with huge sacrifices (652-64), from which public meat will be

\textsuperscript{82} For the view that Aristophanes expresses views on politics and politicians typical of his class, and works these serious views into his jokes wherever possible, see De Ste. Croix (1972). Gomme (1938) argues the opposite: that Aristophanes’ views were irrelevant to his writing, his only goal being to produce good comedy. See Heath (1987) for a more balanced approach.

\textsuperscript{83} See Rosen (1988) on the iambic nature of much of the comedy of this play.

\textsuperscript{84} Accusations of shamelessness, mostly against Paphlagon, occur eight times: at 277, 325, 385 (twice), 397/8, 409, 638 and 1206.
distributed; Paphlagon later says he has filled the common Treasury with money, has
racked and choked and extorted on their behalf, and cared nothing for the individual in his
aim to please (773-6); Sausage-Seller replies that he will offer him bread, and put a cushion
under him, which Paphlagon never did (777-85); he even gives him new shoes (871-2) and
a tunic (881-3).

The final accusation (related to the second) is that Paphlagon has abused his position for
personal gain. The Chorus first makes the charge: Paphlagon devours the goods obtained
in common (258); he examines those submitting their accounts like someone squeezing
figs, to see if it is unripe or ripening or juicy, and if he knows one is inexperienced and
gawping, he drags him back from the Chersonese, throws him down with slander, twists his
arm round and gulps him down (259-63); and if he finds any citizen who is a simpleton,
rich and not base and trembling at public affairs, he does the same (264-5). Demosthenes
adds that whenever Paphlagon goes into the public dining-hall, he not only comes out full,
but carrying away broken off hunks of bread and meat and slices of fish (282-3). Sausage-
Seller says later that for every bite he gives the démos, he devours three times as much
(717-18). Indeed Paphlagon’s embezzlement is comically all about food, and the charge is
proved when Sausage-Seller opens Paphlagon’s box to find all the food he has embezzled
(1218-20). Sausage-Seller explains: Paphlagon has always carried out his role in this way;
he gives Demos a small part of his takings, and sets aside the greater part for himself
(1221-3: τοιαῦταὶ μέντοι καὶ πρότερον σ’ ἠργάζετο· σοὶ μὲν προσεδίδου μικρὸν ὃν ἐλάμβανεν,
 αὐτὸς δ’ ἐαυτῷ παρετίθει τὰ μείζονα). Again this is similar to the charge
made in Wasps, that less than a tenth of the profits of the city go to the démos in pay, the
remainder being stolen by the politicians. Paphlagon, true to the nature of politicians in
Aristophanes, staunchly maintains that his theft was for the city’s good (1226: ἐγὼ δ’
ἐκλεπτον ἐπ’ ἀγάθῳ γε τῇ πόλει);85 but Demos rightly runs him out of town. With the
exception of the competition to bribe Demos, which Paphlagon and Sausage-Seller engage
in completely unselfconsciously, all accusations are couched in the language of indignation,
and Paphlagon’s eventual unmasking shows that in the play the animus is truly merited.

But, as I have argued throughout this chapter, it is unlikely that the political class as a
whole embezzled wholesale from the démos; and without this objective corroboration, the

85 Compare Hyp. 5.24-5, discussed at n.31 above.
emotion aimed at must be (transmuted) envy as much as, if not more than, indignation. Aristophanes counts on his audience’s *phthonos* that politicians seem to do “quite nicely, thank you”, so as to rouse their laughter through *Schadenfreude* at Kleon’s discomfiture and Paphlagon’s comeuppance.

### 6.4 Conclusion

Plato is, then, probably exaggerating when he says that the root of all comedy is malice. However, this approach to Aristophanes shows that his political comedies do indeed play extensively to audience *phthonos* for the political class.\(^{86}\) While *kômôidoumenoi* are abused, at least with political *kômôidoumenoi* it is not just simple abuse, but rather the poet substitutes socially acceptable bases for his criticism, i.e. accusations of wrongdoing — allegations that seem sometimes meant to be serious. These accusations can, when looked at objectively, be shown as having little to support them in the majority of cases; but the fact that they can be, and regularly are, made shows one way in which the Athenian system evolved institutions that had a symbiotic relationship with the democracy — in the case of political abuse in comedy, helping to keep the majority of politicians reasonably honest, and thus reinforcing the stability of the democratic system.\(^{87}\)

As I have shown, the language of these accusations is that of indignation (“they do wrong”, “they don’t deserve…”); however the emotion played to is *phthonos*. As is generally the case for *phthonos*, this cannot be admitted to; but a skilled dramatist like Aristophanes knew just how far he could go in touching this nerve, without his audience realising that *phthonos* was indeed the emotion he was playing to — a realisation that, due to *phthonos*’ unacceptability, would have made the humour too uncomfortable for the laughter that would gain him his prize.

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\(^{86}\) And it is not just Aristophanes: Kratinos, Eupolis and other Old Comic playwrights do this too – see n.81 above.

\(^{87}\) See pp.132-3. It is a nice paradox that Athenians (and other Greeks) both disapproved of *phthonos*, and spent large sums on a festival that utilised *phthonos* constantly to negotiate the relationship between the democratic *polis*, its citizens, and its public figures.
Chapter 7: Onstage *Phthonos* in Tragedy

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter I move from a focus on emotions aroused in the audience, to look instead at onstage *phthonos* narratives.¹ These are comparatively rare in Old Comedy (Kleon’s relationship with other characters in *Knights* being an obvious exception), but more common in tragedy. However, *phthonos* words tend not to be associated with these episodes, or are raised briefly only to be denied.² Accordingly, reading these *phthonos* narratives requires to the fullest degree both our knowledge of the socio-psychological phenomenology of envy and jealousy (from ch.2), to which I shall regularly refer, and (in order to place our analysis into Greek terms) what we have learned of *phthonos* to date: the full range of its linguistic meanings (from ch.3); its socio-psychology (from ch.3, ch.4); and the tendency of envy-*phthonos* (i.e. envy, possessive jealousy, grudging, spite etc.) to masquerade as indignation-*phthonos* (i.e. indignation, desire for justice etc.; ch.5.3, ch.6).

I look here at two plays in which *phthonos* plays a significant part in the plot – Sophocles’ *Ajax* (ch.7.2) and Euripides’ *Hippolytus* (ch.7.3, 7.4). Goldhill has argued that “[t]ragedy … resists the ‘rivalrous emotions’ of ‘envy, spite and jealousy’, except as brief tokens in rhetorical battles”.³ While accepting that these emotions are perhaps less frequently prevalent in tragedy than some others (e.g. rage, grief), I shall demonstrate that ‘envy, spite and jealousy’ do in fact have more than a bit-part to play.⁴

¹ Following a much more detailed exploration in ch.8.2-8.4 of onstage sexual jealousy scenarios in tragedy, I show in ch.8.5 how these could be deployed in other genres, especially in oratory to manipulate audiences.
² This tendency to accusation and/or denial is not dissimilar to usage of *phthonos* words in oratory. Aesch. *Ag.* is a notable exception, where *phthonos* of both gods and humans is explicitly a major concern, especially in the tapestries scene (*Ag.* 810-974).
⁴ In this chapter I will show *phthonos* as a significant plot element in two tragedies; in ch.8 I show sexual jealousy as a major plot driver in three more; this totals some 15% of the thirty-two surviving tragedies. In each case, a phenomenological (emotion script) approach demonstrates that these go far beyond “rhetorical battles”.
7.2 Ajax (Ajax)

The action of Sophocles’ Ajax revolves around two decisions taken by Ajax: first, to kill the Atreidai, and torture and kill Odysseus; second, to commit suicide. The motivation for the second decision is generally given as shame or loss of face (atimia) – at having killed farm animals, at being unable to revenge himself, at being unable to take a great prize home to prove himself worthy to be his father’s son; the only possible way he can salvage some timê now is to kill himself. The motivation for his first decision is more controversial: some argue it is also shame, or at least atimia and an attempt to regain face; others that he is motivated by anger and a desire for revenge. I do not intend to argue against these motivations; but people can do things for more than one reason, and a phenomenological approach indicates that jealousy is an additional, or underlying, motivation for Ajax’s decision to torture Odysseus and to kill him and the other Greek leaders.

The key to understanding Ajax’s emotional motivation is the Judgment of Arms, which takes place before the play begins. Although the Arms have been awarded to Odysseus, Ajax believes this is wrong. It is notable that he says in his first speech that the Arms that have been taken from him are “mine” (10: τἄµ’ ἀφαιρείσθων ἐὸν ὀπλα), and this sense of prior possession is crucial. Homeric tradition held that Ajax was second only in arms to Achilles (Hom. Il. 2.768-9), a tradition that had remained intact through to the fifth century (e.g. Pind. Nem. 7.27), and which confirmed that the Judgment should automatically have awarded the Arms to Ajax. With no prior indication in the play that Sophocles intended

6 Lansky (1996); Hesk (2003) 43; Simpson (1969) 88; Winnington-Ingram (1980) 18-19. Konstan (2006) 105-6 explicitly disagrees with shame as a motive, as Ajax never says he is shamed – this may be true, but he certainly talks about his atimia (e.g. line 98), and Kamerbeek (1953) 37 notes it is not accidental that Ajax’s first words are kompos paresti (“boasting, talking big”).
8 All the commentators have noted this as significant: Jebb (1896) 26 notes that with Achilles dead, Ajax considered the Arms belonged to him by right; cf. Garvie (1998) 133, Stanford (1963) 70. Kamerbeek (1953) 38 notes Ajax says they are “mine”, and not “due to me” – i.e. they are already “mine”.
10 Ibid. 36-7.
11 Their value to Ajax is not so much intrinsic as symbolic.
to alter this aspect of the myth, the audience would have approached the play in the traditional expectation that the Arms would more fairly have gone to Ajax, and had been withheld from him unjustly. This interpretation, fed by Ajax’s reference to “my” Arms, is upheld through the play. Ajax believes Achilles himself, had he lived, would have awarded him his armour as the prize for excellence (442–4: εἰ ζῶν Ἀχιλλέως τῶν ὀπλῶν τῶν ζῶν πέρι κρίνειν ἐμελλέ μοί κράτος ἀριστείας τινί, οὐκ ἀν τις αὐτ’ ἔιμαρψεν ἄλλος ἄντ’ ἐμοῦ), and says that the Atreidai procured them dishonestly for Odysseus (445–6: νῦν δ’ αὐτ’ Ἀτρείδαι φωτὶ παντουργῷ φρένας ἐπραξεν). Later Teukros says Menelaus has been discovered to be a thief who fixed the voting (1135: κλέπτης γὰρ αὐτοῦ ψηφοποιὸς ηὐρέθης). And Menelaus tries speciously to place the blame instead on unnamed judges (1136: ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς, οὐκ ἔμοι, τόδ’ ἐσφάλη), but does not deny that there has been some error in the outcome of the voting, and thus implicitly recognises Ajax’s entitlement to the Arms. It is clear then that Ajax believed that the Arms should have been awarded to him, indeed that they were already his by right and had been taken from him illegitimately, and he was probably right to do so. By considering the phenomenology we can therefore see that the appropriate situation for a jealousy scenario has been created: Ajax has an exclusive relationship with ‘his’ Arms (i.e. possession), but has lost them to a rival (Odysseus).

What emotions are aroused in Ajax by this loss? First, anger. Ajax does not talk about his anger – perhaps surprisingly for an emotion that is supposed to motivate him. However others do attribute anger to him. Athena says Ajax was made heavy with kholos on account of the Arms (41: χόλῳ βαρυνθεὶς τῶν Ἀχιλλείων ὀπλῶν). The Chorus (his subjects, who know him well) say they hope Ajax has been converted from his thymos against the Atreidai (717–18: Αἴας μετανεγνώσθη ἀρείδαις μεγάλων τε νεικέων), and later that Ajax wished to be reconciled with the gods after his kholos (744: θεοῖσιν ὡς καταλλαχθῇ χόλου). And Teukros knows that Ajax could be portrayed as a bad-

12 Garvie (1998) 166 notes that the verb πράσσω implies a “secret or underhand transaction”; cf. Stanford (1963) 117, Jebb (1896) 76.
13 Though in fact the rightness of his belief is irrelevant: jealousy (and envy) is a subjective response, and so it is not strictly relevant that Ajax’s viewpoint is validated by a friend, an enemy, and the heroic tradition; but these confirm that the audience will objectively (i.e. disinterestedly) agree that Ajax has been wronged, and will have no trouble understanding his emotional motivation(s).
14 See pp.29–31 on the phenomenology of jealousy scenarios.
15 The affects aroused in a jealousy scenario where the possession has already been lost are typically: anger, envy, hostility, grief at loss, and wounded pride (see p.30).
tempered man, whose *thymos* was roused to strife over nothing (1017-18: τοιαύτ’ ἀνήρ δύσοργος ... ἐρεῖ, πρὸς οὐδὲν εἰς ἔριν θυμούμενος). A second very important emotion is hatred; but once again Ajax does not express hatred as an emotion (*misos, stygos, ekhthos*) for his enemies, but rather enmity as a cultural value (*ekhthros*). Menelaus says he and Ajax hated each other (1134: μισοῦντ’ ἐµίσει), though other comments by him (1054), Agamemnon (1373), and Odysseus (1336, 1347) testify only to their hatred for Ajax, not Ajax’s for them. Ajax does however describe Odysseus as his *ekhthros* (389: ἔχθρον ἄλημα – Athena too notes the enmity (2) as does Odysseus (78), who states that it dates from the Judgment of Arms (1337)), and more generally talks about “my enemies” (557, 653, 772, 829), by which it is clear from context that he means Odysseus and the Atreidai – the Chorus (196, 1042) and Tekmessa (495, 924) also talk about these three as “enemies”. A third emotion Ajax expresses is wounded pride: he does not use the words *aidôs* or *aiskhunê*, but he does say he has been dishonoured (426-7: τανῦν δ’ ἀτιµὸς ὀδὲ πρόκειµαι; 440: ἀτιµὸς Ἀργείοισιν ὧδ’ ἀπόλλυµαι) and that the Atreidai will not dishonour him again (98: ὡστ’ οὐποτ’ Ἀἴανθ’ ὦδ’ ἀτιµάσουσ’ ἐτι), implying they have in the past; and he expresses a concern that his enemies are laughing at him (367: οἴµοι γέλωτος; 382: ἦ ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς ἅγεις – the Chorus (383, 957-8, 1043) and Tekmessa (961) think this is true).  

From this survey, it is clear that Ajax does not talk about his emotions much. However, there are strong indications that he feels the affects listed above, and all stem from the decision to award the Arms to Odysseus. Perhaps unsurprisingly for such a truly Homeric hero, the language he uses is predominantly that of the Homeric value system (honour and dishonour, friendship and enmity); however what one feels is not bounded entirely by what one says one feels, and we should not ignore these strong indications for Ajax’s emotional state. Anger, hatred, and wounded pride, all directly aroused by these situational antecedents, are a strong indication that a jealousy scenario is taking place. But the clincher is the final emotion Ajax feels: envy. In English, envy is one of the affects

16 He says, in a beautifully rhetorical tricolon, that he is hated by the gods, the Greek army, and the whole Trojan plain (457-9: θεοῖς ἔχθαρμουσι, μισεὶ δὲ μ’ Ἑλλήνων στρατός, ἔχθει δὲ Τροία πᾶσα καὶ πεδία τάδε); but he expresses his own hatred only for the long-dead Hector (817-8, cf. 665), and makes a general comment (in his deception speech) as to the amount one should hate enemies (678-80: ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ ἁρτίως ὡς τ’ ἐχθρὸς ἢμῖν ἢς τοιοῦτ’ ἐχθαρτεός, ὡς καὶ φιλήσων αὖθις).

included in the possessive jealousy blend (see n.15 above); but in Greek we have seen that both words are covered by *phthonos*, and we can understand Ajax’s situation most clearly through the ‘situational’ approach to envy, jealousy and rivalry (see pp.32-3). Ajax’s *phthonos* in this play is not stated, but we know from ch.3 that one never admits to *phthonos* in Greek; however Ajax’s *phthonos* becomes clear if we consider the actions his emotional state impels: to kill the Atreidai, and to torture and kill Odysseus.

Of the affects discussed above, it is clear that Ajax’s anger and hatred are directed at, and wounded pride aroused by, all three of his enemies; however it is only Odysseus who possesses ‘his’ Arms, and this explains why Odysseus’ punishment differs from that of the Atreidai. The latter have dishonoured him (98, 100), proved to be his enemies (557, 653, 772, 829), and are believed to be revelling in his humiliation (367) – the appropriate response for any (heroic) Greek is to kill them: “Help your friends, but harm your enemies.”

But if he envies Odysseus, we should expect to see something more destructive, more ‘spoiling’, and we do. Ajax will kill Odysseus and take back his Arms, but first he wishes to humiliate him: he does not want Odysseus to die yet (106: θανεῖν ἰγὰρ ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰτί ἰtauologies described at pp.29-31, and we should therefore recognise that one of Ajax’s underlying motivations is *phthonos*.

\[19\] The only mention of *phthonos* in the play is the Chorus’ description of the *phthonos* of Ajax’s enemies (157).
\[20\] Knox (1961) 3-4 lists where this well-known aphorism can be found in the Lyric corpus.
\[21\] We can note that Odysseus is Ajax’s direct peer; cf. Aristotle’s comment that one feels *phthonos* for one’s equals (see p.86).
\[22\] For real-life parallels of tying to a pillar and whipping, see Aeschin. 1.59 on Hagesandros’ and Timarkhos’ humiliation of Pittaklos – see Fisher (2001) 197 on this treatment being indicative of servile status, and for further bibliography; cf. Lys. fr.2b.4 on Teisis’ humiliation of Arkhippos – Todd (2000) 348, 350.
\[23\] I.e. we have a *phthonos* scenario.
7.3 Phaidra (Hippolytos)

It is beyond doubt that the main emotion Phaidra labours under, apart from erôs, is shame (aidôs), and it is aidôs that is the primary motivation of her suicide and accusation of rape: only by neutralising Hippolytos’ credibility with Theseus can she guarantee the preservation of her own, and her children’s, reputations. However, there is a trail of evidence that Phaidra also feels phthonos for Hippolytos, from her first appearance on stage, and that this phthonos contributes to the reasons for leaving her suicide note. Shortly after Phaidra is carried on stage, in her starvation-induced delirium she speaks three passages of fantasy: in the first she says she wishes to draw water from the spring, and lie beneath the poplar-tree in the lush meadow (208-11); in the second she wants to go to the mountain, and hunt wild animals in the pine-wood with dogs, while she shouts at the hounds and casts Thracian spears (215-22); in the third she prays to Artemis that she can train horses in the exercise-ground on her sacred precinct (228-31). It seems no accident that all these are aspects of Hippolytos’ care-free life: he worships Artemis, and in her company hunts wild animals with hounds in the green pine-woods (15-19; cf. 52-56); he goes to the virgin meadow watered by rivers (73-4, 76-8); and he exercises horses (110-12); as the son of an Amazon, the Thracian reference could even apply to him. It has been frequently noted that this is Phaidra’s means of expressing her passion for Hippolytos. But as Goldhill points out, it is also an expression of her transgressive desire to break out of the cloistered female world, and run free with Hippolytos – not just to be with him, but to enjoy the pastimes themselves with him. Even at this early stage, while she is besotted with Hippolytos but before his rejection, Phaidra envies Hippolytos his lifestyle – even if at present that would be the emulative envy of zêlos rather than the destructive envy of phthonos.

This all changes however after his conversation with the Nurse, with his diatribe against women in general, his violent rejection and denunciation of Phaidra in particular, and his

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25 Goldhill (1986) 124-5. Goldhill describes Phaidra as wanting the life of a Bacchant, and once again Hippolytos has prefigured this Dionysiac desire in returning with his friends from a kômos (55).
threat to reveal all to Theseus.\textsuperscript{26} The “No” to incestuous adultery by itself would not be surprising, and neither would a shocked response – the Nurse and the Chorus, who are on Phaidra’s side, have already responded in just this way (353-61, 362-72).\textsuperscript{27} Rather, Phaidra reacts to Hippolytos’ high-handedness on the one hand, and the threat to expose her on the other. The high-handedness of his rejection is a blow to her pride;\textsuperscript{28} and the threat to expose her, to destroy her, turns him into an enemy – it turns her erotic love to anger, which must be assuaged.\textsuperscript{29} We can see that Phaidra now feels for Hippolytos not just \textit{erôs} (sexual desire for, and covetousness of, him as an individual), but also emulation for his lifestyle, wounded pride (a “narcissistic wound” in psychologists’ terminology), hatred (enmity), and rage. These are the elements of envy – and the last three were all roused by the manner of his rejection and his planned exposure of her to Theseus (the two things she mentions in her exit speech), and it is those that have turned her emulous envy to destructive envy.

Phaidra gives effect to her \textit{phthonos}, and carries out her revenge, by means of slander.\textsuperscript{30} This slander serves two purposes: first, it causes Theseus to punish Hippolytos – Phaidra uses her husband to mete out the punishment she cannot on her own; second, and even more important, it serves to deprive Hippolytos of the carefree wild existence that Phaidra

\textsuperscript{26} There has been some discussion as to whether Phaidra is on stage for the denunciation. Kovacs (1987) 54 argues that she leaves after line 600, returning before line 680. Halleran (1995) 200-1 cites the main scholarship for and against this view. I am unconvinced by Kovacs’ arguments, agreeing with Halleran that the scene is dramatically much stronger with her present. As W.S. Barrett (1964/2001) 284-5 notes, Hippolytos’ “complete and studied ignoring” of her, except for one contemptuous throw-away comment immediately before he leaves the stage, is dramatically very powerful. More tellingly, if Phaidra merely knew Hippolytos did not want to accept her love, but had not heard his violent denunciation and his threat to inform Theseus, why would she resort to the revenge she does, rather than going back to her plan to starve herself to death? Why would she utter her final comment: “But in dying I shall make myself a cause of harm (\textit{kakon}) to another, so he might learn not to be haughty (\textit{hypsêlos}) at my misfortunes; by sharing in my sickness, he will learn to be discreet (\textit{sôphronein})” (728-31: ἀτὰρ κακὸν γε χατέρω χενήσομαι θανοῦσ’, ἵν’ εἰδῆι μή ‘τι τοῖς ἐμοῖς κακοὶς ύμηλὸς εἴναι: τῆς νόσου δὲ τηδὲ μοι κοινὴ μετασχων σοφρονεῖν μαθήσεται)? The haughty remark only makes sense if she has heard Hippolytos’ virulent denunciation, and the discretion remark only if she has heard his threat to reveal all to Theseus.

\textsuperscript{27} Kovacs (1987) 27-8, 46, 56.

\textsuperscript{28} Blomqvist (1982) 403. S. Mills (2002) 64-5 makes the point that moderns, in a world conditioned by Christianity’s ‘sex-phobia’, are inclined to focus on Hippolytos’ desire for virginity, and see his downfall purely in that light; a Greek, though, would have focused on his arrogance in thinking he was better than everyone else, including Aphrodite – the excessive desire for virginity merely being the aspect of this fault that upsets Aphrodite, and causes her to seek revenge on him. See Kovacs (1987) 27 also on Hippolytos’ ‘puritanism’. Goldhill (1986) 118 focuses on Hippolytos’ rejection of the values of the \textit{oikos} (sex, marriage, and children).

\textsuperscript{29} Kovacs (1987) 30, 59-60, 63 on Phaidra’s enmity, and her desire for revenge as part of traditional heroic pride. See also Willink (1968) 30 and S. Mills (2002) 75-6 on Phaidra’s enmity for Hippolytos, and the manner of her suicide as her revenge.

\textsuperscript{30} See ch.6 n.70 \textit{re} slander as a means of giving effect to one’s \textit{phthonos}; strictly, this instance is not slander but libel.
has now realised she will never attain. An important element of *phthonos* is the desire to level down, the “If I can’t have it, no one will” urge. So Phaidra’s slander serves these twin purposes (punishment, and levelling down) of the begrudging envy she directs at Hippolytus. But it achieves a third result for Phaidra herself: in life, she enjoyed the guilty female pleasures of gossip (384: *leskhat*); but only in death, by choosing instead masculine slander, has she finally been able to break out into the male outside world she was so desperate for in life.

### 7.4 Aphrodite (*Hippolytus*)

One type of *phthonos* which has (conspicuously and calculatedly) not featured in this study is that of the gods (*phthonos*O*theôn*), since my concern here is with the human dynamics of *phthonos*. Though it has phenomenological, psychological, and (to a lesser extent) sociological resemblances to its mortal cousin, it is sufficiently distinctive to require separate treatment (and I would like to return to it at a later date), especially since it takes us into complex issues of Greek religion which would require more space than is available to me. However, occasionally the divine *phthonos* for mortals of a traditional kind is

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31 This appears in other places in Greek literature, e.g.: the beflagging of survival by those involved in *stasis* to those who sit it out (Thuc. 3.82.8.23 – ἦ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιείναι διεφθέροντο; or the Thirty’s desire that as many people as possible be implicated in their own crimes (Pl. Ap. 32c7-8: ὅσα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοι ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτίων).

32 For gossip as the female equivalent of male slander, operating in the *oikos* (the domain of women) where slander operates in the *polis* (the domain of men), see McClure (1999) esp. 160, 199R200. On the connection between slander and *phthonos*, see ch.6 n.70.

33 Walcot (1978) 25-6 notes that *phthonos*O*theôn* in Homer involves the anger of a specific god at a failure by mortal, e.g. not performing a sacrifice (e.g. Poseidon at Hom. II. 7.446-53; Artemis at II. 9.533-36; Apollo at II. 23.863ff); Homer does not use the word *phthonos*, however, but the verbs *agaasthai* or *megairein* (both roots imply someone getting too big for themselves); other terminology for the Homeric phenomenon includes *kotos* (a grudge) and *nemesis* (resentment, indignation – see pp.107-9). In the fifth century, *phthonos theôn* changes to the striking down by god or gods unnamed of someone excessively fortunate – principally associated with Pindar (e.g. *Pyth* 8.71-2, *Pyth*. 10.19-21, *Ol.* 13.24-6, *Isthm.* 7.39-39b – see p.51), Aeschylus (e.g. the fate of Agamemnon, esp. the tapestries scene (Ag. 810-974)), and Herodotus (e.g. the stories of Croesus (Hdt. 1.32.1, 1.34.1) and Polykrates (Hdt. 3.40.2); see Harrison (2003) on *phthonos* as a motivation of the gods in Herodotus); see also Aristophanes’ comic suggestion that Zeus made Wealth blind out of *phthonos* for worthy men (Ar. *Plut*. 87-92). Sophocles and Euripides revert to a more Homeric view of *phthonos theôn*, where a specific god punishes a specific mortal for a lack of respect (and again, as in Homer, the word *phthonos* rarely appears): Walcot (1978) 25 gives Athena in *Ajax* as an example; Knox (1989) 66 (cf. 72-3) cites Aphrodite in *Hippolytus*, Dionysus in *Bacchae*, and Athena in *Troades*; Zeitlin (1985) 61 also for Dionysus and Aphrodite, cf. W.S. Barrett (1964/2001) 156 who adds Death in *Alcestis* to the list. Walcot’s view is slightly different from, but not fundamentally at odds with, Ranulf (1933) 90, who explicitly distinguishes three types of *phthonos theôn*: “1) disasters caused by the gods in punishment of wrongs committed, 2) disasters caused by the gods merely from capriciousness or for their own convenience, 3) disasters caused by the gods out of jealousy.” It is noteworthy that all types of *phthonos theôn* bear some
coupled with a more familiar type of *phthonos*: *phthonos* between two gods – a relationship that is a reflection of that between two humans. The instance I wish to look at here is Aphrodite’s sibling rivalry with her half-sister Artemis. Freud says of sibling rivalry that: “The elder child ill-treats the younger, maligns him and robs him of his toys; while the younger is consumed with impotent rage against the elder, envies and fears him, or meets his oppressor with the first stirrings of a love of liberty and a sense of justice.” Even in Homer, the children of Zeus compete for his attention; we have seen brother shooting brother through envy in the sayings of the Seven Sages (*Apophth* fr.10.30.3-5(Mullach) – see p.48); and perhaps Polynikes feels the careless destructiveness of *phthonos*, when he reportedly accepts death so long as he can kill his brother (Aesch. *Sept* 636). Sibling rivalry is not uncommon then in Greek literature, and with this in mind let us consider Aphrodite’s words.

Aphrodite begins by saying she brings down those who φρονοῦσιν…μέγα against her (a phrase which LSJ defines not so much as “think big”, as “presumptuous, conceited, priding oneself”), and this is the nature of gods (6-8). He has called her the vilest of the gods (κακίστην ὀνειδίσκην), and will take part in neither sex (λέκτρα) nor marriage (γάμων) (13-16) – the two main things Aphrodite is the god of. She says that for these ways in which Hippolytos has transgressed against her, she will take revenge (τιμωρήσοµαι) (21-2). So far, this looks like standard Euripidean (or Homeric) *phthonos* theón, and resemblance to *phthonos* as censure (i.e. indignation-*phthonos*) of human behaviour, though the divine-mortal relationship differs from the mortal-mortal.

Knox (1989) 72-3: “Euripides’ gods, Aphrodite, Artemis, Athena, Hera, Dionysus, are just like Homer’s – which is to say, just like us. Torn by the same passions, pride and the vindictiveness of pride insulted, revengeful anger, jealousy and desire, they are huge and awesome images of everything that is violent and uncontrollable in man…”. This one instance is sufficient for my purposes in this thesis. However, a *phthonos* reading might also be rewarding for Dionysus’ speech and behaviour towards his cousin Pentheus in *Bacchae*. Although this relationship is divine-human rather than inter-divine, Dionysus’s concern with his mother’s treatment by her sisters (26ff.) ensures his reactions are as much driven by his familial relationship to Pentheus and his aunts, as by divine anger at their failure to acknowledge him, and accordingly the psychology might also be interpreted partly in terms of ‘sibling’ (or cousinly) rivalry.

Freud (1900) 250. He unconsciously notes how envy transmutes itself into a desire for justice – see pp.41-2.

For instance in *Il*. 5, where Athena proposes to Ares they do not compete before Zeus by supporting their preferred side (31-4); Athena reneges on the agreement by intervening on behalf of Diomedes (121ff.), and Ares then follows at Apollo’s urging (454ff.); Zeus then sends Athena to punish Ares (764ff.).

Walcot (1978) 25 notes the connection to the Homeric *megaira*in. W.S. Barrett (1964/2001) 156 notes similar comments by Dionysus (Bacch. 321) and Death (*Alc*. 53).

S. Mills (2002) 68-9 comments that this is merely the most egregious example of Hippolytos’ main character trait, his arrogance – see n.28 above. It is the high-handedness of his dismissal of Phaidra that changes the latter’s *erôs* to enmity (see p.154).
combines several aspects of phthonos already seen: begrudging, jealousy of one’s prerogatives, (transmuted) righteous indignation. But one more aspect of phthonos appears here: envy. Aphrodite complains not just that Hippolytos is not honouring her, but also that he spends all his time honouring Artemis, hunting with her in the green woods – and he counts her the greatest of the gods (μεγίστην δαίμονων), where Aphrodite was the vilest (15-19). Artemis confirms at the end of the play that the sibling rivalry exists, saying she will take her vengeance (τιμωρήσοµαι) on a favourite of Aphrodite’s in turn (1416-22). Aphrodite herself implies that her putative phthonos is felt against both Hippolytos and Artemis, as she refers to them in the plural (20: τούτοισι). She herself denies that she feels phthonos (20: οὐ ἐφθονῶ); but as we have already seen both in modern theory (where envy is veiled or masked: pp.27-8) and in ancient Greece (p.56, esp. n.36), such denial is typical. “Qui s’excuse, s’accuse,” as Kovacs notes, and G.J. Fitzgerald points out that all major characters in this play (Aphrodite included) profess their motivations falsely. Aphrodite transmutes (or misrepresents) her emotion as righteous anger – it is after all orgê that Aristotle notes demands revenge (see n.40), and Artemis too describes Aphrodite’s emotion as ὀργαί (1418). Halleran refers to Aphrodite’s “anger at his slighting her”; however Kovacs translates Artemis’ ὀργαί (1418) as “hatred”, and he is closer to the true emotion Aphrodite feels. But hatred does not explain Aphrodite’s begrudging of Hippolytos’ impertinence, her jealousy of her prerogatives, or her envy of Artemis. These tell us that Aphrodite’s principal emotion is indeed phthonos, deny it though she might; and phthonos too principally aims to destroy the rival (here impossible, Artemis being immortal) or the desired possession – Hippolytos.

40 Though orgê is also a pertinent emotion – Arist. Rh. 2.2.1378a30-32 suggesting it as the usual emotional response to a slight.

41 W.S. Barrett (1964/2001) 158 argues this must be masculine (“against them”) rather than neuter (“for these things”) as phthonô normally carries the dative of the person; and although there are neuters to come (20: τί γάρ µε δεῖ; = for what is that to me? // 21: ἐν δέ ἔστιν ἡ ὁµόφρατης = for the ways in which he has transgressed against me), the audience would not know to expect them on hearing toutoioi, and would naturally assume it meant “against them”.

42 Kovacs (1987) 34 makes his comment of Aphrodite, though in the context of her excusing taking revenge on her enemies, and the death of an innocent woman in pursuit of that goal.


45 Aristotle explains that orgê demands that the revenge be perceived (Rh. 2.2.1378a30: phainomenêς), and that cannot happen if you are dead; however hatred aims for the death of an enemy – Konstan (2006) 47 draws attention to this distinction. Aristotle’s systematising may not be supported by other contemporary evidence – e.g. in oratory anger and hatred words are frequently used side by side.
7.5 Conclusion

Tragedy (unlike oratory) almost never focuses on *phthonos* terminology.\(^{46}\) However, in the full variety of its aspects (envy, jealousy, spite, and censure) we have seen *phthonos* does in fact occur in tragedy, if not with the regularity of some other emotions. Because of the philological tendency of Greeks to avoid the language of *phthonos*,\(^{47}\) its presence in these plays has previously been by and large overlooked, and this oversight is, and can only be, both revealed and corrected through the phenomenological approach I have taken in this thesis.

This is important for two reasons. First, on the level of interpretation: this phenomenological approach has helped us to appreciate a fuller range of motivations for tragic characters, and in particular to provide a fuller explanation for why they act in exactly the way that they do. But secondly, methodologically: the success of the ‘emotion script’ approach in exploring texts demonstrates its efficacy, and argues for its application across a much broader range of texts, for a much greater range of emotions. In the bulk of the final chapter of this thesis, I shall continue to use this technique to probe tragedy; but now I turn away from *phthonos* proper, to examine an underexplored emotion of which *phthonos* is an important constituent part: sexual jealousy.

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\(^{46}\) The tapestries scene in Aesch. *Ag.* is an exception.

\(^{47}\) Particularly the case in a genre that deals with heroes who, as in Homeric epic, tend to be associated explicitly with grander passions – see Goldhill (2003) 178, Most (2003) 129.
Part IV
Chapter 8: Sexual Jealousy

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter I set out to answer four questions: (1) Does sexual jealousy exist in ancient Greek literature?¹ (2) How does the ancient Greek sexual jealousy phenomenon compare (in the situations in which it arises, and the socio-psychology involved) with its modern English equivalent? (3) How is ancient Greek sexual jealousy expressed, verbally and in actions? (4) To what extent does Greek sexual jealousy overlap with phthonos? Classical Greek had no label for sexual jealousy,² and so (even more than for phthonos) a lexical approach is not possible. In this chapter I will demonstrate the full potential of a phenomenologically-based script approach to answer the sorts of questions posed above.

I shall mostly be concerned with tragedy in this chapter. My primary focus will be on Euripides’ Medea, from which I shall provide initial answers to the above questions. I shall support and modify these answers by reference first to two other tragedies, Sophocles’ Trachiniae and Euripides’ Andromache, before turning to a wide-ranging (if necessarily less profound) overview of the sexual jealousy phenomenon in a variety of other Classical Greek genres.

My concern in reading the three tragedies will not be with how the characters reflect real-life sexual jealousy in the democratic polis. Rather, I will focus on the phenomenology of the jealousy scenario itself, and demonstrate how these tragedies can be more richly understood by appreciating sexual jealousy as one important plot element. In the final section of this chapter, I shall show first how jealousy narratives derived from tragedy could be exploited in other genres (in particular oratory) to manipulate audiences, and secondly demonstrate how genre itself limits what scenarios can be presented.

¹ Konstan (2003b) and (2006) 219-43 argues that probably sexual jealousy as we understand it did not exist in ancient Greece. It will quickly become clear that I disagree.
² ζηλοτυπία, first recorded in the 380s, is generally translated ‘jealousy’. However, Konstan (2006) 222-32 argues against this translation, and I broadly agree with his arguments – see pp.201-3, esp. n.148 below.
8.2 Medea

Euripides’ *Medea* is about a woman who, abandoned by her husband for another woman, avenges herself by killing the other woman (and the latter’s father, who arranged the match), as well as her own children by her ex-husband. To moderns this story seems a straightforward tale of sexual jealousy, albeit carried to an unusual degree, and a few scholars (such as Mastronararde and Friedrich) agree that the Greeks likewise saw sexual jealousy as an important part of the plot.\(^3\) However, this is a minority view. The major current school of thought, first put forward by Knox and Easterling in the 1970s, sees Medea as a Sophoclean, or even epic hero: an Ajax, or an Achilles; she is driven, they argue, by a heroic pride.\(^4\) Others, such as W.V. Harris, Goldhill or Konstan, see her driven by a terrible wrath, that has nothing of (in Konstan’s words) “petty jealousy” in it.\(^5\) I do not intend to argue against pride or wrath as motivations. Medea is clearly enraged – anger words abound in the play; and arguments for her heroic pride can point to repeated claims that she has been dishonoured, a repeated insistence that she cannot allow her enemies to laugh at her, and her clearly articulated choice to allow her passion to overrule her reason (1078-80). However, Euripides’ Medea is an immensely complex character, and reducing her emotional state to a monolithic pride or anger is too simplistic. Using the insights of modern psychology into prototypical jealousy episodes, I wish to rehabilitate sexual jealousy as a significant element in her motivation.

I shall begin by considering the ‘situational antecedents’ of the jealousy prototype. The Nurse informs us in the prologue that Medea lived with Jason as her husband (11: ξυν ἀνδρί, assisting (13: ξυµφέρουσ’) him with all matters – an unusually close, and equal, partnership in the Greek world.\(^6\) But Jason has left Medea and married (18-19: γάµοις ἵ...ἱγήµας, ἱγήµας) Kreon’s daughter, Glaueke. By line 19 we know we have an abandoned

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\(^3\) Freidrich (1993); Mastronararde (2002) 16; also McHardy (2008).


\(^6\) Mastronararde (2002) comments that the ambiguity of mood (middle/passive) leads to ambiguity about her equality or subordination to Jason. He sees their partnership as equal though (9). Page (1938/2001) believes equality would require the prefix be homo- rather than xym-.
woman, her ex-partner, and a rival. The Nurse tells us too about the strength of their relationship: from the first moment Medea met Jason, she says, her heart was struck with love (erôs) for him (8: ἔρωτι θυμὸν ἐκπλαγείσ’), and this was the foundation of their partnership. The Chorus too are well aware of the strength, and violence, of Medea’s passion for Jason. From the time she fled Iolkos with him, they say, she had mad passion in her heart (433: μαινοµένᾳ ἐκραδίᾳ). Following her first confrontation with Jason, they talk of love that comes too excessively (627R8: ἔρωτες ὑπὲρ µὲν ἀγαν ἐλθόντες) and sing not one, but two hymns to the power of Aphrodite (627R42, 824R45). Jason too asserts that Medea feels erôs for him (530: ὡς Ἔρως σ’ ἠνάγκασε), though Medea herself only speaks of it in the abstract (330: βροτοῖς ἔρωτες ὡς κακὸν µέγα). We are never explicitly told that Jason felt erôs for her in return. However we do know that Jason and Medea’s relationship had a strong sexual element, and this is made clear by the extraordinary frequency with which Greek words for “the bed” (lekhos, lektron, eunê, and koitê) occur: twenty times as a euphemism for their old relationship, and twelve for his new one. Indeed Medea has the highest number of bed words (at thirty-six) of any extant tragedy.

In Greek “the bed” can be a euphemism for sex (and again Medea has by far the highest number with this meaning), or marriage. The bed motif is first introduced by the Nurse and Tutor in the prologue, and the Chorus in the parodos, where it appears several times referring to Jason’s new marriage to Glauke (18: ἐυνάζεται, 88: εὐνῆς, 140: λέκτρα),...

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7 Mastronarde (2002) 16 notes that the chorus also refer to Medea’s strong feelings for Jason directly at 433 (κραδίας), and indirectly in the second stasimon (627-44).
8 Medea does say she knows Jason now feels erôs elsewhere (491), though to Aigeus (698, perhaps dissembling to avoid showing her true feelings) she says his erôs is for political advancement, not for her rival Glauke. The only other time the word is used is (perhaps revealingly) of Aigeus’ desire for children (714).
9 Medea and Jason’s relationship (lekhos 41, 207, 555, 568, 571, 591, 641, 697, 999, 1338, 1354; lektron 286, 436, 443, 639; eunê 265, 570, 640, 1338; koitê 436); Jason and Glauke’s (lekhos 156, 380, 491, 887, 1367; lektron 140, 594, 1348; eunê 18, 88, 1027). [Here and in n.10, n.11 I exclude cognates that always mean spouse/bed-sharer (e.g. xuneuminetês, akoitis).] These words particularly abound during Medea’s first and final scenes with Jason (446-626, 1317-1414).
10 Large numbers of bed words also occur in several other Euripides plays: 33 in Helen, 28 in Andromache, and 23 in Hippolytus; the highest for Aeschylus is 17 in Agamemnon, and for Sophocles is 19 in Trachiniae – we can note that all these plays have plots that involve (potential) rivals for a legitimate spouse.
11 Greek “bed” words (lekhos, lektron, eunê, and koitê) had always potentially been euphemisms for sex (though they can also mean bed, bedding, sleep, death, marriage or spouse). For instance, if we compare Book 23 of the Odyssey (which focuses on Odysseus’ marriage with Penelope, centring round a very physical bed) with Book 10 (which focuses on Odysseus’ sexual relationship with Kirke), we find that in Book 23 “bed” words are used 21 times, 15 meaning bed/bedding (ten lekh-/lektr-, five eun-), three meaning sex (219, 254, 346; two eun-, one lektr-), and three implying both (257, 294, 354; two eun-, one lekhs-); in Book 10 there are ten “bed” words, two meaning bed (both lekh-), and eight meaning sex (all eun-). This suggests that eun-, at least in origin, has a stronger implication of sex than lekh-/lektr-; we should also note that the latter roots only give us an object (lekhos, lektron), while the eun- root gives us both an object (eunê) and an activity (eunazô).
Chapter 8: Sexual Jealousy

156: λέχη). Medea is at this point said merely to have erōs for the bed of death (151-2: τὰς ἀπλάτου κοίτας ἔρως), since Jason has betrayed their marriage (207: ἐν λέχει προδόταν). The bed is here placed at the centre of their marriage, and it is the bed as concrete symbol (rather than e.g. the abstract γάμος) that Jason betrays. However, it is not just a metonym for their marriage, but also for what is performed on it, i.e. sex. Medea first draws attention to this herself, when she talks about going into the palace to kill Jason and his new bride as they lie on their bed (380: ἵν' ἔστρωται λέχος). The verb στορέννυμι can mean “to make a bed”, but as a perfect it also means “strewn”, and it conjures up the image of Jason and Glauke sprawled on the bed in post-coital slumber. The Chorus alludes to how Medea has lost this: she has lost her marriage now her bed is manless (435-6: τὰς ἀνάνδρου κοίτας ὀλέσασα λέκτρον), and another queen now rules over her marriage-bed (443: τῶν λέκτρων ἄλλα βασίλεια κρείσσων δόμοισιν ἐπέστα) – both comments having strong sexual overtones. In Medea’s diatribe against Jason in their ἀγών, she complains he has made a new marriage (489: καινὰ δ’ ἐκτήσω λέχη); if she had been barren, then she could understand him feeling erōs for someone else’s bed (491: τούθ’ ἔρασθηναι λέχους); as things are, he has betrayed the oaths they swore to each other. In response, Jason draws attention to her erōs, saying it would be invidious to point out that Medea is besotted with him (529-30: ἐπίφθονος λόγος διελθεῖν ὡς Ἕρως σ’ ἴνάγκασε), doing it anyway. Jason constantly alludes to the sexual use of the marriage-bed: he says he did not leave her because he hated having sex with her, nor through longing for a new bride (555-6: οὐχ ... σῶν μὲν ἔχθαϊρων λέχος, καινῆς δὲ νύμφης ἰμέρω πεπληγµένος). ἰμέρος means sexual desire, and its juxtaposition with λέχος in the previous line indicates we should read the latter as “sex” not “bed” or “marriage”; νύμφη here also draws attention to Medea and Glauke’s relative ages, a reason for Glauke being more sexually attractive. Jason argues that it is Medea who is chafed by matters sexual: “Honestly”, he says, “all you women care about is sex. If sex is going well, you think you have everything; if there’s a problem with your sex life, even the finest things are totally

12 Medea’s bed is also referred to in the Nurse’s opening speech (41: λέχος), but this line is almost certainly an interpolation, copied from 380 – see Page (1938/2001) 68.
14 Burnett (1998) 194-5 denies that the stress on Medea’s bed has anything to do with her sexual pleasure, but a focus on pleasure misses the point: for Medea, sex with her husband is both an end in itself, and also a sign of the continuing health of her marriage, in which is bound up everything she holds dear (see pp.164-6 below); cf. n.59, n.94.
15 Presumably the marriage-oaths. Easterling (1977) 180-1, Allan (2002) 50-1 for the argument that Jason and Medea were legitimately married, despite her being a barbarian, and the Corinthian Women agree.
Medea’s womanhood, and her wifely duties for Jason, also loom large in her rhetoric. In her opening speech she says that everything in the world for her, as Jason himself knew, was embodied in one person: her husband (228-9: ἐν οίῳ γὰρ ἦν μοι πάντα, γιγνώσκει καλῶς, ... οὐμὸς πόσις). This point is crucial. She goes on to lament the lot of women (230-51): a woman must pay a dowry, take a husband (233: πόσιν), and provide him with sex – he becomes a master to her inheritance, her house and her body (233: δεσπότην τε σώματος). Women must leave aside their own habits and customs (238: ἡθη καὶ νόμους), and work hard at taking on those of their husband (240: ξυνευνέτα). She goes on to say that men have life easy: the hardest thing they have to do is fight in battle, but that is more than three times preferable to the danger of childbirth (250-1). Having established the general hard lot of wives, and all they have to suffer as women, as home-makers, and as mothers, Medea moves on to talk about how she has personally suffered more even than

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16 De Wet (1983) 218-19 notes that by the fourth century Aphrodite had replaced Hera as the goddess of marriage, and contemporaneously it was being accepted that sexual desire had an important part to play in marriage: “Sophokles, like Euripides, is very much at the beginning of this new thinking, openly recognising the emotional needs and rights of a woman as an individual in the partnership of marriage where passionate love is transcending the traditional role of the wife as mistress of the home. He recognises that not only the man but also the woman has emotional needs and the right to seek sexual satisfaction in marriage.”

17 See Goldhill (1986) 115-17 on the engagement of this speech with Athenian ideology.

other women, in the cause of being Jason’s wife. Unlike her audience (the Chorus of Greek women), she does not have anywhere to turn to: she has no city, no father, no friends, no mother, no brother, no relatives (252-8). This is because of all the things she did in her passion for Jason when she was first struck with erôs (8), before he took her from her home: she betrayed her father and her homeland, and murdered her brother; and later she killed Jason’s uncle, Pelias (32, 483, 503; cf. 1332). In forging their partnership she cut herself off from, and made enemies of, all those who should naturally be her philoi, and now she has nowhere to turn. In bloodily severing herself from her roles as daughter, sister, citizen and princess, she has made being Jason’s wife, mistress of his house, and mother of his children, even more formative to her self-conception than is normal in ancient Greek society.\footnote{Friedrich (1993) 227; see also Gabriel (1992) 351-2. Burnett (1998) 195 also notes that Medea’s marriage-bed symbolises these three roles: Jason’s wife, mother of Jason’s genos, mistress of Jason’s oikos.} Abandoned for another woman, and on the verge of having her children taken away from her, Medea has at a stroke lost everything in her life. Her entire self-conception is now formed by being a wife and a mother, and losing it all in this way creates exactly the antecedent situational conditions for a sexual jealousy scenario. That is why Jason’s behaviour has been such an outrage (255-6: ύβριζοµαι ἑπρὸς ἱἀνδρός), and Medea feels fully justified in seeking revenge, or justice, against her husband (261: πόσιν ἔδικην τῶν δ’ ἀντιτείσασθαι κακῶν).\footnote{I agree with Page (1938/2001) that line 262, in which Medea extends her planned revenge to Glauke and Kreon, must (for narrative reasons) be an interpolation.} She concludes her introductory speech: “Whenever a woman is wronged in the marriage-bed, then no other heart is more murderous” (265-6: ὅταν δ’ ἐς ἐυνήν ἠδικηµένη κυρῇ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη φρὴν μιαίφονωτέρα). It is hard to overstate the importance of this comment. This is Medea speaking, not others attempting to understand her. To the obvious objection that Medea manipulates and deceives everyone she encounters in the play, I would reply first that the context is one in which she is explicitly expressing her intention to take revenge (though the full extent of that revenge is at this stage unclear), and second that she does not conceal her motives from the Chorus anywhere else. There is therefore no reason not to take this passage seriously. Though it would be a mistake to regard it as the clue to her psychology, it is an important indicator of just how we should understand the rest of the play. In her opening speech, Medea tells us it is as a wife and woman that she feels wronged, and the rest of the play must be read with this in mind. “Jason has abandoned me,” she is saying, “and in doing so he has hit me
where it hurts most, in our marriage, in our bed, in our sex-life, in the thing that makes us women more murderous than any other; and I will take revenge on my husband.”

The revenge taken, then, is an organic development arising out of Medea’s abandonment as a wife and a woman, in favour of another. From the beginning Medea says she will seek revenge, and initially Kreon says he knows that will be against the newly-weds and the man who gave Glauke away (288: τὸν δόντα καὶ γῆμαντα καὶ γαμουμένην), i.e. Jason, Glauke and Kreon. But Medea later conceives of a worse punishment for Jason. She talks successively with three men (Kreon, Jason and Aigeus), and each one mentions the importance of children to them. Kreon orders Medea out the country, lest she do some evil to his daughter (282-3). He continually mentions how he loves his family, how his children are more dear to him than his country (327, 329). With delicious dramatic irony, in his exit speech (348-56) Kreon manages to mention resolve (λῆµα, a quality he denies but Medea has – 176-7), the death of Medea’s children, and his fear (356: φόβος, cf. δέδοικα (282), ὰρρωδία (317)) that something might happen to his own. At this stage Medea still intends her revenge to be to kill the newly-weds and those who had arranged the alliance (366-7: ἔτ’ εἰς’ ἄγωνες τοῖς νεωτί νυμφίοις καὶ τοῖς κηδεύοσαν οὐ σμικροὶ πόνοι) – tying her revenge firmly to Jason’s re-marriage, before reconfirming Kreon, Glauke, and Jason as her intended victims (374-5: τρεῖς τῶν ἔμων ἐχθρῶν νεκροὺς θῆσο, πατέρα τε καὶ κόρην πόσιν τ’ ἐμὼν).21 However, repeatedly expressed concern with children changes her mind. In her first scene with Jason, he says his abandonment of her was because a new marriage would bring advantages to their children, through alliance with the royal family and influential brothers. Finally, Aigeus enters, explaining he is on his way home from Delphi, where he went for advice to relieve his childlessness (670-1: ἄπαις). By this point Medea has fully grasped the importance men place on having children.22 In begging Aigeus’ help, she says she will cure his childlessness. With dramatic irony for her intended revenge, she says she will help Aigeus go from being childless (apais) to having paides (a journey she will first make Jason take in reverse), before mentioning her potions (which, in death- rather than life-giving form, she will first use on Glauke) (717-18: παύσω ἰδέισ’ ὰντ’...
ἀπαίδα καὶ παίδων γονάς σπειραί σε θήσω· τοιάδ’ οίδα φάρµακα)
When Aigeus leaves the stage she spells out her revised revenge in detail:

she will use her paides to kill the pais of the king with trickery and with potions;

then she will kill her own children, thus destroying Jason’s entire (i.e. past and future) house (774-94) – something she had impotently wished for in the prologue (112-14: ὃ κατάρατοι παῖδες ὀλοισθε στυγερᾶς

ματρός σὺν πατρί, καὶ πᾶς δόμος ἔρροι), before attaining the means to bring it about.23

Jason will neither see his paides alive again, she says, nor have more from his newly-yoked bride thanks to her potions (803-6: οὔτ’ έξ ἐμοῦ γὰρ παῖδας ὄψεται ποτε ζῶντας τὸ

λοιπὸν οὔτε τῆς νυμφῆς τεκνώσει παῖδ’, ἐπεὶ κακὴν κακῶς θανεῖν σφ’ ἀνάγκη ἐμοῖσι φαρµάκοις).

She will kill not just Glauke, but her own children too, as that is the best way for her husband to be hurt (817). The Chorus now remind us that Medea is seeking revenge for the sake of her bridal bed (999: νυµφίδιων ἐνεκεν)

and because her husband abandoned her to make an oikos with another bedfellow (1001: ἄλλᾳ ξυνοικεῖ πόσις συνεύνῳ), and this foreshadows the final scene. After her revenge has been carried out, Medea has a final showdown with Jason, and once again “bed” words and Medea’s role as wife and woman recur repeatedly, with both the marriage and Medea’s revenge (in killing the children) being linked directly to sex. Jason says that after their marriage (1336: νυµφευθεῖσα – when she was a sexually-ripe νύµφη) Medea bore him children, and now has killed them because of sex and the marriage-bed (1338: εὐνῆς ἐκατι καὶ λέχους σφ’ ἀπῳλεσας).

Medea responds that she could not allow him to dishonour her marriage-bed (1354: σὺ δ’ οὐκ ἔµελλες ἀτιµάσας λέχη); she killed them because of his hybris and because of his newly-built marriage (1366), and to bring him pain and grief (1370: δήξεται; 1398: πῆµαινουσ’).

Jason cannot believe she did all this because of his re-marriage (1367: λέχους ... οὖνεκα), but Medea says that such a disaster is no small thing for a woman (1368). For her that is as full an answer as need be given, and takes us back to the end of her first speech, that “Women are never more murderous than when wronged in sexual matters” (265-6).

I now turn to the emotions aroused in Medea by Jason’s betrayal of her, and how these are described. The first emotion introduced is grief, and once again it is the Nurse who first informs us that Medea lies in bed, not eating, surrendering her body to tears (24-5). As

23 Cf. Mastronarde (2002) to these lines.
Mastronarde points out: “loss of appetite and inactivity, such as staying in bed, are signs of severe psychic turmoil (from grief or love).” But her grief is really hammered home to us in lines 131-206; the Chorus, the Nurse, and Medea (from inside the house) all use a plethora of suffering and grieving words: cries (132, 135: βοάν); wretched (133, 149: δυστάνου/ος); griefs (136: ἄλγεσιν); she pines (141: τάκει); alas (146: φεύ φεύ); wail (149: ἀχάν); grieving (159: δυρομένα); I suffer (161: πάσχω); sorrow (184: πένθος); and finally, in case we have not got the message, “I heard the loud-groaning wail of her mourning, as she cries her wailing and wretched griefs” (205-6: ἀχὰν ἄιον πολύστονον γόων, λιγυρὰ δ’ ἄχεα μογερὰ βοᾶ).

Two other strong emotions that Medea expresses are anger and hatred. Again from the Nurse in the prologue we learn that Medea’s love has turned to hatred (16: ἐχθρά). Her eyes glare bull-like (92), and her rage (94: χόλον) will last till she rushes down on someone. She is stirring up her heart and her wrath (99: κινεῖ κραδίαν, κινεῖ δὲ χόλον), and the children should be on guard against her wild character and hating nature (102-3: φυλοσσεθ’ ἄγριον ἦθος στυγεράν τε φύσιν); her thymos is enlarged (108: µείζονι θυµῷ), and her spleen (109: µεγαλόσπλαγχνος µεταβάστος) is hard to check. The Nurse says Medea will only give over her anger (121: χαλεπῶς ὀργὰς ἐµεταβάλλουσιν) with difficulty. The Chorus tell Medea not to sharpen her anger (157: µὴ χαράσσου), despite Jason’s and Glaucce’s initial injustice (165: πρόσθεν… ἀδικεῖν). She will be feeling λυπῆ (pain, distress, weariness) and the temper in her breast (176-7: βαρύθυµον ὀργὰν καὶ λήµα φρενῶν). After Medea’s first great monologue (discussed above), Kreon enters, and acknowledges Medea’s thymos is roused at her husband (271: πόσει θυµουµένην). She will be feeling λυπῆ (pain, distress,

24 Mastronarde (2002) 168 – this is a symptomatology of betrayed love.
25 The word used here, κατασκῆψαι, is generally used of storms or divine wrath (LSJ).
26 Note the active voice of κινεῖ: this is not something that is just happening to Medea, she is actively perpetuating it.
27 Arist. Rh. 2.2.1378a30-32: ὀργὲ is a desire for revenge for an injury. Jason and Glaucce committed the original (πρόσθεν) injury, hence their action was unjust. Konstan (2006) 61-5 argues that in Trojan Women Hecuba unwillingly accepts the Greeks’ slaying of her daughter, since revenge is impossible; however when Polyestee slays her son she has a means of revenge, so feels kholos. By analogy, in Medea the Chorus believe she (a foreign woman) must just accept the injury; revenge is out of the question, so anger is pointless; Medea herself (as we find out) knows she can take revenge, so she spurs on (κινεῖ, 99) her rage.
grief) at being robbed of her husband’s bed (286: λέκτρων ἀνδρὸς). He has heard she has made threats against the newly-weds and against himself. Medea dissembles: Kreon has done nothing wrong, she says; it is merely her husband she hates (310-1: ἀλλ’ ἐμὸν πόσιν μισῶ); she does not begrudge Kreon’s good fortune (312: οὐ φθονῶ). Her next interview is with Jason, who, after some general comments about people who feel orgê, turns specifically to Medea: she hates him (463: στυγεῖς), he says; Medea agrees (467: ἔχθιστος). The Chorus observe that orgê is terrible (520: δεινὴ τίς ὀργῆ) whenever philoi join in strife (521: ἔριν). Medea says Jason has committed hybris against her (603).

Jason continues to refer to her anger: the great kholos in her heart (590), her orgê (615), and her inability to let it go (621: αὐθαδίᾳ, cf. 103). In all, Medea’s anger is referred to twenty-one times throughout the play, by orgê (at 121, 176, 447, 520, 615, 870, 909), kholos (at 94, 99, 172, 590, 898, 1266) and thymos (at 108, 176, 271, 865, 879, 883, 1056, 1079); and her hatred is referred to twelve times, by misos (at 311), stygos (at 36, 103, 113, 463, 1374), ekhthos (at 117, 290, 467, 1374) and ekhthra (at 16, 45). These feelings are almost invariably aimed at Jason (who by the final scene has learned to hate her in return: misos (1323), ekhthos (1323, 1375)), though in the prologue a few times at their children (36, 103, 113, 117), whose presence or existence highlights what she has lost. In addition, Kreon and Glauke are referred to on no fewer than thirteen occasions as Medea’s enemies (ekhthroi 45, 95, 278, 374, 383, 744, 750, 765, 767, 809, 897, 1050, 1060; and she theirs twice – 734, 875), though she does not use other hating words about them.

A fourth emotion expressed regularly, if less frequently, is pride. This is behind Medea’s claims that Jason dishonoured her (696, 1354; the Nurse agrees: 20, 33) and that he committed hybris against her (255, 603, 1366). Her pride is further shown by her concern, expressed six times, that her enemies might laugh at her (383, 404, 797, 1049, 1355, 1362): she could not bear to be an object of Schadenfreude to them.22 The laughter of her enemies would be intolerable (797: οὐ γὰρ γελᾶσθαι ἐξ ἐχθρῶν; cf. 383, 404), she says;

28 Lypê is the word Aristotle uses, in conjunction with a desire for revenge, to describe the emotion orgê (Rh. 2.2.1378a30: ὀργῆ ὀρεξὶς μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας…).
29 The denial of phthonos: exhibit A for the prosecution! Begrudging, of course, is exactly what she does.
30 For a discussion of ἔρις and its relation to Greek jealousy, see pp.185-8 on Andromache; cf. comments on eris in Hesiod at pp.45-7.
31 Arist. Rh. 2.2.1378b14-15 gives hybris as one of the three causes of orgê.
32 In the end she avoids her misfortunes giving her enemies pleasure, and takes pleasure in their own misfortunes herself (1133-5) – Allan (2002) 74-5, 83-4, 93 notes that she wishes to feel Schadenfreude so they cannot.
no one must think her low, feeble or meek (807-8: μηδείς με φαύλην κάσθενή νομίζετω μηδ’ ἠσοφαύλην ἵκσθεναίαν); rather she wants supreme kleos (810 – heroic renown). It is for such reasons that Medea is often portrayed as acting from heroic pride, but this pride is not unconnected to her jealousy. She will be mocked by the people who have taken away what defined her in life: her husband. And it is her husband himself who first begins to mock her: in his first agôn with her, he belittles her feelings – he says she is merely chafed (555: κνίζῃ) that he left her for reasons entirely unconnected with her, merely irked (568: κνίζοι) by feelings of sexual inconsequentiality. Medea fears her enemies will not take her seriously, and will just laugh at and degrade her; and here Jason, the very person who should respect her most, is the one leading the way in belittling her.

Medea’s emotions, her anger, hatred, grief and wounded pride, are not stand-alone emotions, but part of a jealousy complex: they are all tied up with the destruction of Medea’s marriage, a marriage she believed was inviolate, by Jason’s abandonment of her, by his forsaking of her bed and her sexual favours, for the bed and favours of a rival, and in general by his scorning and belittling her as a wife and a woman. Modern psychologists tell us that those who feel jealous typically (through masking) talk about anger and betrayal, and try to take some measure of revenge (see p.31). In English we do not expect a jilted woman to say “I am so jealous”; rather she might scream “I can’t believe you cheated on me with that slut”, and run a nail down the side of his car. Medea essentially does the same, though this being Greek tragedy her revenge is more murderous (μιαίφονοτέρα – 266).

The form and extent of Medea’s revenge make us aware that a fifth emotion pervades the play, and that is φθόνος, or begrudging envy. This φθόνος lacks the frequent expression of the other four emotions, but there is a reason for this, and that is the same reason we found in ch.7: the taboo on expressing phthonos. Just as modern theory tells us that fait accompli jealousy gives rise to envy, so it does for Medea in this play. Envy’s most

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33 Contra Konstan (2003b) 23-4: “… we must allow for the possibility that where we perceive the emotion jealousy, the Greeks may have felt distinct sentiments, including anger, envy, sadness and emulousness, without assembling these several responses into a single compound.” Cairns (2008) 53-6 also disputes Konstan’s rejection of sexual jealousy as a motivation for Medea.


35 See p.27 for this taboo in English, p.57-8 for the handful of first-person claims of phthonos in Greek.

36 I.e. when one has already lost the partner (see ch.2 n.49).
salient characteristic is a malicious hostility and ill-will, which drives acts of deep destructiveness. Both modern English envy, and (according to Aristotle) ancient Greek φθόνος,

\[\text{37}\]

are characterised by a stronger desire for the other person not to enjoy something that the patient does not have, than a desire to obtain it too – and it is this levelling-down urge (“if I cannot have it, then no one will”) which drives envy’s destructiveness. It is characteristic of our emotion envy that it is frequently misrepresented as, or transmuted into, righteous indignation.\[\text{38}\] Similarly in Greek culture, Aristotle talks about how easily envy (φθόνος) can be confused with indignation (which he calls τὸ νεμεσάν),\[\text{39}\] and in non-Aristotelian usage we have seen that envy is often expressed in Greek literature as righteous indignation (see ch.5.3.3, ch.6), helped by the fact that phthonos can imply both (see ch.5.3.1). And this is what we see here: Medea talks many times about being wronged, and even more often about justice, almost from her very first words (dike: 165, 219, 221, 261, 265, 309, 314, 580, 582, 692, 764, 767, 802).\[\text{40}\] This emotion is valid (the Nurse and Chorus agree she has been wronged – 26, 158, 208, 267, 411, 578, 1232); but Medea’s genuine and justified indignation comes inseparably bound with transmuted envy.\[\text{41}\] She has been deprived of her marriage, and is to be deprived likewise of her children. Begrudging envy, aroused by jealousy, ensures she will not let Jason or Glauke keep them. It is this that drives her destructiveness against Jason’s new marriage, and against his children’s lives.

But what about the emotional vocabulary used? As I mentioned earlier (n.2 above), ζηλοτυπία is the word typically translated ‘jealousy’ from the 380s, but when Medea was written in 431 the word had not yet been coined. The primary word used in the play to imply sexual passion is ἔρως. ἔρως is more than a desire to acquire a sexual object; for instance Thucydides writes that the Athenians felt ἔρως for embarking on the conquest of

\[\text{37}\] Cf. p.26, p.75.

\[\text{38}\] See pp.27-8.

\[\text{39}\] Arist. Rh. 2.9.1386b17: ὡς σύνεγγυς ὅν καὶ ταύτων τῷ νεμεσάν – see p.72.

\[\text{40}\] Gentili (1972) and (2000), and Giacomoni (2000) argue that Jason’s injustice is in not sharing his wife’s bed; Medea wants him in her bed not because she is sexually insatiable, but because that is the proper place for a Greek husband to be: he should be fulfilling his conjugal duties.

\[\text{41}\] It is possible to read Greeks rationalising jealous revenge through the language of justice, honour and anger all the way back to Menelaus in the Iliad – see below p.192 and n.114 re Bonanno (1973); Pizzocaro (1994) 21-5 on Menelaus’ jealousy. Goldhill (2003) 167 has argued, in the context of Medea, that: “The language of phthonos (which is sometimes translated as ‘jealousy’) is linked, and subordinate, to the language of ‘honour’ (τιμῆ) and ‘wrong’ (adikein).” I believe he has got this precisely the wrong way round: it is the language of honour and wrong that have been subordinated to the theme of jealousy.
Sicily (Thuc. 6.24.3) – here it implies a desire to acquire, enjoy and retain (though Thucydides is, of course, employing a metaphor for sexual yearning). This is certainly applicable to Medea, whose ἔρως for Jason demands exclusive possession, 42 but it cannot be the whole story as (after her revenge and destruction of the rival) Medea is happy to end the play without possessing her husband. Our best evidence for ancient Greek emotions comes from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 43 but Aristotle ignores both ἔρως and ζηλοτυπία (even though, as we shall see in ch.8.5, both play their part in oratory). He does deal with ζῆλος, etymologically the parent emotion, but ζῆλος is merely emulation for goods and qualities we do not possess (see p.72). φθόνος however, unlike ζῆλος, is bivalent: it is principally felt when we are lacking something we want (English envy), but also when we wish to hold on to something we have (English jealousy). This is most clearly seen when φθόνος is directed at someone who has something we have lost (Rh. 2.10.1388a21-22: [φθονοῦσιν] τοῖς ἢ ἔχουσι ταύτα ἢ κεκτηµένοις ὅσα αὐτοῖς ... ἐκέκτηντόι ποτε). Aristotle is not speaking here of sexual jealousy, rather of possessive jealousy more generally; but he goes on to note that, among other cases, we feel φθόνος most especially against our rivals in love (Rh. 2.10.1388a15-16: πρὸς τοὺς ... ἀντεραστὰς ... ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τούτοις φθονεῖν). It is clear therefore that Medea’s emotions can at least partly be described as φθόνος; however there are two other emotions we must consider: anger (ὄργη) and hatred (τὸ μισεῖν).

όργη, according to Aristotle, is a desire for revenge in return for a slight (ὅλιγωρία). An ὅλιγωρία (cognate to ὅλίγος) is something that belittles you. For ὀργή, it is necessary to actually perceive that you have been belittled; and similarly ὀργή requires the belittler perceive the revenge. There are three types of ὅλιγωρία: καταφρόνησις τε καὶ ἐπηρεασµὸς καὶ ὃβρις (Rh. 2.2.1378b14-15). καταφρόνησις here involves more than the contemptuous desire not to be like someone else (see p.76); here it is when you show you believe the other person to be of no importance (1378b15-17). ἐπηρεασµός is a disinterested slighting, thwarting someone’s wishes with no benefit to yourself (1378b18-

42 She does not require monogamy, or at least does not say so (and indeed in Greece it would have been unusual if she had – see Kovacs (1980a) 15-16), but she does not accept Jason having any other wife but her.

43 Aristotle is not of course commenting specifically on Eur. Med., and his treatise was written nearly a century later; likewise Euripides is not a philosopher, and is not bound to be consistent in his terms as would a philosopher. But (as will be seen) the remarkable degree to which Aristotle’s thinking explains Medea’s language is a testament to how well both men understood the philological phenomenology of Greek emotions.
20. ὑβρίς involves taking pleasure in shaming someone (1378b23-25); it is an insult, an insolent arrogance. Medea several times says that Jason has treated her with *hybris* (255, 603, 1366); she does not include Glauke and Kreon⁴⁴ – however they are certainly included in the list of people who might laugh at her, behaviour Aristotle considers *hybris* (1379a30-32). It is also fairly clear that Jason has considered Medea of no account in assuming he can pension her off at will, and in persistently considering her emotions merely petty. It is clear then that ὀργή has an important part to play.

τὸ ὑμισεῖν differs from ὀργή. In Greek terms, it is the emotion one feels for one’s *ekhthroi* (personal enemies), people who harm you without provocation. Kreon is in this position: he is peripheral to the jealousy triangle, but has abetted Medea’s abandonment; but although he has harmed her, he has not belittled her – on the contrary, he wants her out the country precisely because he fears how formidable an *ekhthros* she might be. Medea’s feelings towards Kreon are thus well labelled τὸ ὑμισεῖν. Her feelings towards Glauke are best described (in Greek terms) as hostile envy, a blend of τὸ ὑμισεῖν and φθόνος, both of which can lead to destruction of their target. In accordance with Greek values, Medea cannot admit to φθόνος, so she can but talk of her hatred. Self-presentationally, she avoids the charge of φθόνος by lumping Glauke in with Kreon as jointly “my *ekhthroi*”, and she does so frequently (see p.169). Although she could potentially feel ὀργή for them if they were to mock her, this has not yet happened. The appropriate action to take towards one’s *ekhthroi* is to wish them harm – Aristotle describes τὸ ὑμισεῖν as a desire to harm (1382a8) – and killing someone is the most harm you can do them.

Medea’s feelings for Jason, however, are best described as a mixture of φθόνος, not so much with τὸ ὑμισεῖν (which, though present, is less important), but rather with ὀργή. Since once again Greek cultural taboos ensure that φθόνος is not mentioned, all that is left for Medea to talk about is her response to her belittlement and her injury by Jason, her ὀργή. David Konstan argues that:

The object of anger … is to cause pain to the other. A slight makes one feel small, and the only way to get even is to induce a similar feeling in the other. It follows that, for an angry person to get revenge, the original offender must be aware of it (*aisthesthai*), since there is no such thing as

⁴⁴ She does, however, believe they would treat her children with *hybris* if she left them behind (782), and the Corinthians would too after the children were made complicit in the royal deaths (1061, 1380).
unperceived pain (hence the stipulation in the definition of anger that the revenge, like the slight itself, must be perceived), whereas to one who hates it is a matter of indifference whether an enemy is aware or not of the damage done to him. That is why we may wish that people whom we hate should die, but when we are angry, what we desire is that the other person feel in return (antipathein) the kind of diminishment that provoked our anger in the first place (2.4, 1382a14-15). The death of the other would render that impossible.45

Kreon and Glauke wantonly inflicted harm on Medea; it is for that reason she wanted them dead. At first, she believes this is what she wants for Jason too (hence τὸ μοεῖν is present); however, as she reflects, she realises that is not sufficient punishment: his was not the injuring of an ekthros, but a deeply painful belittling; her anger is stronger than her hatred, and accordingly Jason must remain alive to perceive her revenge. This is why Medea, having determined that her revenge will be to kill Jason alongside Kreon and Glauke (373-5), eventually changes her mind: Kreon and Glauke will still die, but Jason must be left alive to know that his children are dead because of his treatment of Medea (774-96).

Sexual jealousy has suffered in the interpretation of this play partly because, like envy, its expression was taboo to the Greeks, but partly also because it does not have a convenient prototypical label in Greek, such as our word “jealousy”. Greeks could recognise the scenario (as the Nurse, the Tutor, the Chorus of Corinthian Women, Jason – and by inference the audience – all do),46 but labelling it was more difficult. Semantically it fell somewhere between ἔρως, φθόνος and ὀργή. We should also note that Medea emphasises certain elements of the jealousy prototype more than we might expect from modern theory, especially the narcissistic wound (the hybris and the potential mocking laughter), her rage and her hatred. It is possible that the status-conscious Greeks were more sensitive to these aspects of the jealousy complex than we, and therefore their vocabulary was better adapted to express these rather than the complex as a whole.47

45 Konstan (2006) 47.
46 Cf. Cairns (2008) 55. Parrott (1991) 6 notes: “… it is easy to imagine situations in which an envious or jealous person is the last person to know that envy or jealousy motivates his or her actions.”
47 Konstan (2003a) 117 and (2006) 259-61 highlights the status-consciousness and competitiveness of the Greek emotional lexicon. I should reiterate, for clarity, that I see sexual jealousy as a motive alongside anger (and pride) for Medea, not instead of.
8.3 *Trachiniae*

Deianeira’s sexual jealousy at the imminent introduction of Iole into her house is less controversial than Medea’s. While many authors refer to her sexual jealousy in passing though, they do not elaborate on it, and it is generally agreed that it does not play a major part in her motivation. While I agree that Deianeira – at least as Sophocles portrays her – is no Medea, many of the elements I have identified in my discussion of Medea’s jealousy can be seen likewise in *Trachiniae*, and a closer examination will illuminate both Deianeira, and our understanding of Greek jealousy.

Deianeira has been Heracles’ wife for many years; she has born him children, has kept his house, has woven at his loom – all the attributes of the ‘good’ Greek wife. The tragic action is precipitated by her learning that Heracles intends to set up Iole as some sort of permanent lover (whether as a wife or concubine) within the household – it is unclear what Heracles’ intentions are concerning herself, but Deianeira believes the worst. She thinks that if only Heracles could come to love her again, this would all be avoided, and she accordingly practises a piece of ‘love magic’ on him which ends up killing him.

In *Medea*, erôs was clearly very much part of the plot, and loomed large in Medea and Jason’s relationship. In *Trachiniae*, Sophocles uses a much lighter brush to paint Deianeira and Heracles’ marriage, to the extent that some have even questioned whether their relationship was an erotic one at all. It is notable that all four instances of erôs-words in

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49 E.g. Goldhill (2003) 167: “Yet for all that Erôs is thematised in this drama, and for all that erotically motivated revenge and intrigue are central to the plotting, it would be misplaced to describe the *Trachiniae* as a drama of jealousy or even spite. Deianeira is carefully figured as especially generous of spirit particularly in relation to Iole, for whom she expresses sympathy and care. The tragedy of her doom-laden and disastrous expression of desire is set off by her very commitment to a nobility and propriety of character.”
50 Errandonea (1927) notes that previous versions of the Deianeira myth had shown her as being as vengeful as Medea, and argues Sophocles had initially intended his Deianeira to follow this pattern. See also Levett (2004) 30ff., Davies (1989) 469.
51 Wender (1974) 1-2 highlights some similarities, and differences, in the plots of the two plays.
52 Easterling (1982) 126, 130 argues that such words as δάµαρτ’ (428) and ἔγηµε (460) do not have any legal significance.
the play (354, 433, 441, 489) refer to Heracles’ feelings for Iole, as does the sole instance of *himeros* (476), and two of the instances of *pothos* (368, 431) – the first of which is described as “heated-up” (ἐντεθέρµανται). However Deianeira does note that, like the gods, she has been conquered by the power of Eros (444), without naming him. Further, *pothos*-words occur nine times in all, and five of these relate to Deianeira: the Chorus note that her heart is beset with longing for Heracles (103: ποθουµέναι) in his absence she can never put to bed the longing (107: πόθον) of her eyelids without weeping; Deianeira herself says she fears Likhas might tell Heracles of her desire (631: πόθον) for him, before she knows if she is desired in return (632: ποθούµεθα, sc. after the spell has had its effect); finally Hyllos tells Heracles that Deianeira’s spell was designed to awaken his desire (1142: πόθον).

In *Medea* we saw that much of the eroticism of the play comes from the repeated use of “bed”-words, many of which meant “sex”. It is at least worth noting that at nineteen instances (excluding words always meaning spouse/bedmate) there are more “bed”-words in *Trachiniae* than in any other Sophocles play (unsurprisingly perhaps, since this play involves a rival for a legitimate spouse). However, unlike in *Medea*, only one of these instances unambiguously means “sex” (360: λέχος), and that refers to what Heracles wanted to do to Iole out of wedlock, before her father refused. Closer examination of other usages does however present a subtle picture of the role of the (metaphorical) bed in Heracles’ and Deianeira’s relationship. Recounting the story of Heracles’ battle with Akheloos for her, when (presumably) Heracles did feel *erôs* for her, Deianeira says he chose her for his bed (27: λέχος). In the parados, the Chorus note that as the sun goes to bed (95: κατευνάζει), so does Deianeira, unable to put to bed (106: εὐνάζειν) her *pothos* for Heracles, go to her husbandless bed (109: εὐναῖςἰἀνανδρώτοισι).

While Deianeira is preparing the treated robe, the Chorus sing a hymn to Aphrodite (497ff.) in which they recount the Heracles-Akheloos battle. Both are said to be eager for her bed (514: ἵεµενοι λεχέων), and Aphrodite (with the appropriate epithet εὐλεκτρος – 515) stands between them as judge. The bed, with all its significance, plays such a central role in Deianeira’s conception of her marriage, that when she thinks of Heracles and Iole she imagines herself and Iole waiting under one blanket for him (539-40: μίµνοµεν μιᾶς ὑπὸ χλαίνης): even

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55 LSJ: ἵεµαι (Med.) + genitive = “eager for”. 

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while he is screwing someone else, there she is in bed with him.  

Finally, and most tellingly, is her suicide. The Nurse recounts a most vivid image: Deianeira preparing the bed (918: εὐνατηρίοις) as she would for sex, clambering onto it, crying out “O bed and my bridal-chamber, goodbye forever. Never again will you receive me in this bed as his bedmate” (920-2: ὥ λέχη τε καὶ νυμφεῖ ἔμα, τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὴ χαίρεθ’, ὡς ἐμ’ οὕποτε δέξεσθ’ ἐτ’ ἐν κοίταισι ταῖσδ’ εὐνάτριαν), then stabbing herself through the stomach with a sword. It is hard to imagine a suicide scene more laden with erotic imagery. Here and earlier, the play insists on bringing Deianeira’s erôs for her husband to our attention. But what is stressed is not the frequency or nature of the sex, but rather the fact of it (the sex act itself), and all that sex with her husband on their marriage bed conveys in terms of exclusivity, and its implication for Deianeira’s value (as wife, as woman, as mistress of the house) to her husband.

Turning to the other basic emotions in the jealousy prototype we can see that, at least at first sight, hatred and anger do not play much part in the play. Hatred, certainly is absent, but is anger? On hearing of Heracles’ erôs for Iole, Deianeira imagines getting to grips with the god Eros as with a boxer (441-2), and protests to Likhas that she would be raving mad to blame Heracles (446-7), nor is it shameful for the woman who shares in the responsibility (i.e. Iole, 447-8). She does not sound like someone who is not angry, but rather like someone who is trying to convince herself not to be angry: she states that anger is not a good response (οὐκαλῶς – 442).

At the start of the second episode, Deianeira describes how she has been forced to take in this girl (this “no longer girl”, as she corrects herself), as a ship is loaded with cargo, and calls this treatment λωβητόν (538):

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56 See Easterling (1968) 63-4.
59 Cf. n.14, n.94. Levett (2004) 54-7 argues, rightly, that we should not assume that our modern conception of love was a necessary component of Greek erôs; he also points out that, while our conception of love is self-sacrificing rather than driven by self-interest, in Greece erôs and self-interest were not necessarily in conflict. See further my discussion of love, erôs and jealousy at pp.188-9.
60 She cannot be trying to convince Likhas (except incidentally), as she continues in the same vein at 531ff. when alone (with the Chorus – traditionally not a bar to self-expression in tragedy). Holt (1981) 68 believes “her pride and her noble intentions will [not] allow her to admit” her anger. I believe rather that her good nature will not allow her anger to take hold.
61 Jebb (1902) describes λωβητόν as a “word of contumely”. He also suggests an equation between λωβητόν εἰμίλημα and βλάβη ("harm"). See also Cairns (1993) 55 on lôbê (which he translates “disfigurement”).
outrageous, insulting, despicable. She vividly imagines herself crouching under a blanket with Iole, waiting together for Heracles to come to bed,\(^{62}\) and bitterly calls these her wages (542: οἰκούρι') from her “so-called faithful and good” (541: ὁ πιστὸς ... κἀγαθὸς καλούμενος) husband. But then she says, “I cannot be angry (543: θυμοῦσθαι) with him”, because he is often sick with this disease (i.e. erōs). She then falls to bitter contemplation once again: to share a house and a husband in this way, “what woman could do it?” she demands. She imagines Iole’s bloom ripening as her own dies, and dreads Heracles being known as her husband (550: πόσις), but Iole’s man (551: ἀνήρ).\(^{63}\) But still she resists her bitterness: “it is not a good thing for a woman to keep on being angry (aryawanūναι)”, she says (552-3). In this whole passage we are presented with a series of vivid images (the boat, the blanket, the flowers), each presented in emotive rhetoric, laden with bitterness. She knows that unchecked these musings might lead to anger (thymos, orgê), but she is determined they will not.\(^{64}\) Deianeira may not be presented in the egregious manner of Medea – she is a much more understated character than Medea in every way – but we should be in no doubt that anger is there, struggling to break through. However, unlike Medea she does not wallow in it; rather she tries to see things from her husband’s point of view. In (proto-)Aristotelian language, she works to change her perceptions, to convince herself she has not been slighted – hence her arguments that it is not really Heracles’ fault because it is his nature (or “sickness”), and that a man has a right to treat his wife in this way. It is because she does not allow orgê to take hold, that she does not seek revenge.

Continuing our survey of emotions, we see that grief too does not play nearly so great a role in Trachiniae as in Medea. Largely that is because Medea knew of her husband’s desertion for some time before putting her revenge into action. Deianeira no sooner learns of Heracles’ plans than she implements her own. She is stunned, and there is little time for

\(^{62}\) Compare Clytemnestra, saying Agamemnon intended Cassandra as additional spice for her bed (Aesch. Ag. 1447: εὐνής παροψώνημα τῆς ἐμῆς χλιδῆ).  
\(^{63}\) Jason is similarly referred to almost invariably as Medea’s πόσις. In fact, of twenty-one instances of the word in Medea, sixteen refer to Medea’s husband (three are generalised, the final two to Glauke’s husband — one qualified by ἀρτίως, one used rhetorically by Jason to mollify Glauke). Jason is referred to as Medea’s πόσις even by Kreon (271) and Jason (910). Several times this is juxtaposed with a word referring to Glauke, either as ἢν ... ἐγήματο (262), γάμους ... ἄλλοις (910) or συνεύνῳ (1001). Only once is Jason referred to as Medea’s bedmate (159: εὐνάταν). Clearly Deianeira’s concerns are not mere hyperbole.  
\(^{64}\) Holt (1981) 69: “Deianeira’s repeated assertions that she cannot be angry, or at least that she should not be angry, do not erase the suspicion that she is angry. Rather, they give the impression that she has to keep reminding herself of how she ought to feel.” Cf. W.V. Harris (2001) 266.
grief, yet still we see the odd expression: to be suspicious but not to know for certain would grieve her (458: ἀλγύνειεν ἄν); and knowing the truth she must bewail with the Chorus how much she suffers (535: τὰ δὲ οἶα πάσχω συγκατοικτιομένη). Similarly, pride is less prominent in this play, though part of Deianeira’s horror is at Heracles’ potentially being called (550: φοβοῦμαι, μή ... καλῆται) her husband but Iole’s man – concern for her reputation is therefore not entirely absent, but Deianeira is not a ‘masculine’ hero in the way Medea is, and does not have the same obsession with ‘face’.

The emotion that dominates this play is Deianeira’s fear, and from line 7 (νυμφείων ὀκνον) onwards it is connected to her marriage. She is fearful of marriage; she is terrified of her suitor Akheloos. Since her marriage to Heracles she has still known nothing but fear (28: ἀεὶ τιν’ ἐκ φόβου φόβον τρέφω), but until now for her husband’s safety. Now her fear is for the future with Iole in her house, but still it is not entirely this that causes the tragedy of the play. Deianeira has been riven with fear all her life without ever being driven by it to do anything. She lived with the fear her father would marry her to a monster, and the fear that the monster would prevail; since her marriage she has lived with fear for Heracles’ safety. Fear has never been a strong enough emotion for her to act; rather she has always been paralysed into passivity, and one must infer that fear of being displaced would likewise, by itself, be insufficient for her to shake off her passivity.

It is not therefore the fear, but the fact that she is about to be displaced – from her bed, from her marriage, from her home – that finally galvanises her into acting. And the emotion this fact triggers above all, the emotion that finally motivates Deianeira to act, is jealousy. The situational antecedents are all in place. Deianeira has an exclusive and unique relationship with her husband (while his love affairs have been legion, he has only ever sought sex from them, and a Greek wife could expect no better). Her whole self-concept is (like Medea) bound up with her roles as wife, housekeeper, mother; and it is that self-concept that is now under threat, with Heracles bringing Iole into the house as a permanent rival. She does not imagine Heracles in the servant’s quarters with Iole, but rather Iole is in the marriage bed itself crouching under the same blanket with her (539); she believes

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66 Despite the presence of fear this is not suspicious jealousy. Deianeira no sooner becomes aware of the possibility that Heracles might replace her with Iole, than she becomes certain (perhaps too certain) of the fact of it: Heracles’ intentions are a fait accompli. See ch.2 n.49 for suspicious and fait accompli jealousy.
she will lose her position as mistress of the house to become a drudge (542: οἰκούρι'); she
copies her own beauty fading as Iole’s ripens. As bedmate, as mistress of the household,
as a desirable woman – Iole threatens her in every aspect of her self-conception. And
Deianeira cries out in her helplessness, “Living together in the house with her, and sharing
the marriage – what woman could do it?” (545-6: τὸ δ’ αὖ ξυνοικεῖν τῇδ’ ὁμοῦ τίς άν
γυνή δύνατο, κοινωνούσα τῶν αὐτῶν γάμων), an expression of womanly jealousy
comparable with (if less hyperbolic than) Medea’s “Whenever a woman is wronged in the
marriage-bed, then no other heart is more murderous” (265-6). It is Heracles’ bringing Iole
to live in her house that triggers Deianeira’s incipient anger, grief and pride.

And it triggers one more emotion. Deianeira believes she is to be usurped from her
position as bedmate and wife by another woman – a rival. This rival is younger, prettier –
and Heracles is in love with her in a way he was once, but is no longer, in love with
Deianeira. In her soliloquy (531ff.) Deianeira starts by thinking of them side by side,
comparable (“two under one blanket”). She then uses harsh, belittling words to describe
Iole and the situation – φόρτον (537: freight, a heavy burden, but also implying something
low or vulgar), λυβητόν (538: outrageous, insulting, despicable), ἐμπόληµα
(538: merchandise). Next she expresses a refusal to share the house (545: ξυνοικεῖν) and
Heracles (546: κοινωνοῦσα τῶν αὐτῶν γάμων). Next her dread that Iole will shine in
comparison to her, that Iole’s youthful bloom will ripen (547: ἔρπουσαν) as her own fades
(548: φθίνουσαν). And finally her horror at the outcome: that to others Heracles will be
merely her πόσις, but Iole’s ἀνήρ (550-1). This sense of personal rivalry, this comparison
between oneself and another with a strong desire to beat the other, to win, is phthonos – and
this can be particularly seen if we consider Aristotle’s words on the emotion. In every way,
Iole stands to become an equal (Rh. 2.9.1386b19-20: τοῦ ἰσου καὶ ὁμοίου) to Deianeira,
and it is Deianeira who will fall short (Rh. 2.10.1387b28: ἠλλεῖπε) of having everything
Iole has (i.e. youthful bloom, sexual allure). Aristotle notes that older people feel phthonos
for younger (Rh. 2.10.1388a22-23: πρεσβύτεροι τε νεωτέροις); but most strikingly he
says one feels phthonos for one’s rivals in love beyond anyone else (Rh. 2.10.1388a14-16:

67 The language here is very significant in relation to her earlier references to Iole. There is a very substantial
change of tone. The objectification (φόρτον, ἐμπόληµα) exculpates Iole (she is the passive object of
Heracles’ passion, not an agent, and Deianeira recognises a kindred spirit), but the pejorative terminology
reflects at least her fear and also suggests an admixture of hostility, for all that she avoids letting it lead to
aggressive action.
πρὸς τοὺς ... ἀντεραστὰς ..., ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τούτοις φθονεῖν). An Aristotelian might argue that Deianeira is not a ‘bad’ person, in the way envisaged of the phthoneros in the Rhetoric (though Medea may be), but she is morally uneducated in the way envisaged in the Ethics, and as such will be susceptible to φαυλότητες such as phthonos. Deianeira does not wish to destroy Iole or even to damage her (as might be expected from English envy), but she does recognise her as a rival she has to beat— and it is this that makes her willing to adopt such unorthodox, and potentially dangerous, methods.

8.4 Andromache

A third play in which jealousy is a major feature is Euripides’ Andromache. In the prologue, Andromache sets the scene. She was apportioned to Neoptolemos in the division of the spoils of Troy, and as his slave has had a sexual relationship with him for many years, a relationship that has produced a son. Recently Neoptolemos has married Hermione, a young Spartan princess, but Hermione has not since become pregnant. Neoptolemos is currently away on an extended visit to Delphi, and Hermione and her father Menelaus (who has come from Sparta specially) intend to kill Andromache and her son in his absence. That Hermione is jealous of Andromache, and that her jealousy is behind the murder attempt, is widely accepted by scholars, and it will be instructive to see how her jealousy episode compares with those of Medea and Deianeira.

It is already clear that there are some similarities in the situations, but also some differences: Medea and Deianeira were the original wives jealous of usurpers, while Hermione is the new (legitimate) wife jealous of her (concubine) predecessor; the father of the younger rival is actively involved here as in Medea; both ‘wives’ are living in the same

68 The importance of competition in Greek culture explains this difference between phthonos and envy.
69 Faraone (1994) argues that love potions were resorted to by some Greek wives, and involved administering a dose of poison to their husbands. This dose would need to be more than negligible to be effective, but it was hard to hit the right balance between effective and fatal, and Faraone provides some evidence of ‘real life’ uses of such love potions and their occasional fatal effects – see pp.191-3 on Antiphon’s Against the Stepmother.
70 It is notable that Bacchylides, in his version of the myth, attributes Deianeira’s action to “widely powerful phthonos” when she heard Heracles was sending “white-armed Iole to his house as a bride (λοχον)” (16.23-31) – cf. Walcott (1978) 23. Levett (2004) 33-4 believes the phthonos is aimed at Heracles; but we know from Aristotle that phthonos focuses on the rival (here Iole) rather than the object of competition (Heracles), so Sophocles’ version of the myth is fully consistent with Bacchylides’.
house in Andromache, as they were destined to in Trachinia, though never did in Medea; the husband is away from home (again as in Trachinia) leaving the women to their own devices. Other, more important connections will become clear.

Andromache tells us in the prologue that since Neoptolemos married Hermione, the latter has persecuted her, saying that Andromache is using secret drugs (32: φαρµάκοις κεκρυµµένοις) to make her childless (33: ἀπαιδὰ) and hateful to her husband (33: πόσει µισουµένην), in order to supplant her as mistress of the house (34-5: ναείν οίκον ... τόνδʹ) and cast her out from her marriage-bed (35: λέκτρα) by force.\(^{72}\) Hermione later confirms all these points of contention: Andromache wishes to cast her out of her house and take it over (156-7: δόµους κατασχεῖν ... ἰτόσδε); she is hated by her husband (157: στυγοῦµαι δʹ ἀνδρί) because of Andromache’s drugs (157: φαρµάκοις), and it is Andromache’s fault her womb is barren (158: νηδὺς ἰδʹ ἀκύµων).

Kovacs argues that one should not assume either that Hermione really believes she is being administered drugs by Andromache, or that it is those drugs that are making her barren; rather it is a plausible excuse, and if anything the drugs would be a love philtrum administered to Neoptolemos to ensure he remains uninterested in sex with Hermione, that being the reason she remains barren;\(^{73}\) he adduces as evidence that no one in the play takes Hermione’s charge seriously,\(^{74}\) yet the secret administration of love philtrums is not alien to the Greek way of thinking,\(^{75}\) so it is a plausible charge for Hermione to make. However, there is no suggestion in the play that Hermione is simply making this up, as a plausible excuse to attack Andromache; rather, such an accusation speaks to her state of mind: her jealousy and paranoid fear (of being set aside) have made her believe a fantasy.

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\(^{72}\) Stevens (1971) 95-6 for commentary on individual words, especially for this translation of ναείν (line 34).\(^{73}\) Kovacs (1980a) 18-20; Faraone (1999) 7 allows for either possibility. We may note that Andromache says her drugs are supposedly making Hermione childless \emph{and} hateful to her husband – the strong καὶ (33) implying these are separate and equal results of the drugs, and that neither has caused the other – while perhaps Hermione’s use of δʹ as a link followed by διὰ αἰ (158) implies the barrenness is a result of her being hateful to her husband, i.e. because he is not having sex with her. However νηδὺς δʹ ἀκύµων ... διϊλλυται (158) is a fairly striking phrase for a mere corollary, so perhaps I am reading too much into their alternative formulations.\(^{74}\) The Chorus do not pick up on this charge, nor does Menelaus repeat it. Andromache herself only mentions it in passing, as Kovacs puts it: “The only φιλτρα involved, she says in 207, are the wifely virtues Hermione so conspicuously lacks...” (\emph{ibid}. 20). McClure (1999) 170 suggests that the false accusation is an example of the character flaws that have kept Neoptolemos from her bed.\(^{75}\) As Faraone (1994), Faraone (1999) 116-19 shows, and as I discuss above for Trachinia.
Andromache dismisses the allegation (205), and addresses instead the understandable fear behind it: that because Hermione continues barren while Andromache has successfully borne him a son, Neoptolemos will (through desire for a legitimate heir) make Andromache his actual wife and mistress of his house, throwing Hermione out (156-7) or relegating her to a subordinate position (927-8).76 Andromache knows that this is Hermione’s secret fear (34-5), and it is this she explicitly argues against at length in the first agôn. With ironic questions she makes these points (192-202): Hermione’s marriage is legitimate (and by implication her own relationship with Neoptolemos is not),77 her city is destroyed, while Hermione’s is powerful (i.e. a useful marriage alliance); she is a slave (while Hermione is a princess); she is ageing while Hermione is youthful; if she bears more children they will be slaves like her current one; and as illegitimate slave children of a slave mother, the people of Phthia would never accept them as kings (whatever Neoptolemos might wish). Goebel agrees with Andromache’s line of argument, especially with this last point; he points out that Neoptolemos has already had to contract one marriage to obtain legitimate children, so if Hermione were sent away, he would only have to contract another: Andromache’s son could not inherit.78 This would be true in classical Athens, where a barbarian pallakê certainly could not replace a wife, nor the issue be legitimated,79 but tragic social norms should not be presumed to match Classical Athenian ones.80 As far as this play is concerned, clearly Neoptolemos has not yet shown any signs of trying to legitimate Andromache’s son, but is it (from Hermione’s perspective) so far fetched? Certainly Peleus is far more protective of Andromache and her son than one might expect from a Greek of his grandson’s slaves, as Andromache knows he will be (hence her repeated efforts to get a message to him (81)), and in his argument with Menelaus he explicitly lays claim to the boy as part of his family (714: ἄπαιδας ἡμᾶς ἱ δεῖ καταστῆναι τέκνων;). Further, he says he will raise the boy to be a great enemy to “these people” (724: μέγαν τοῖσδ’ ἔχθρόν) – presumably Menelaus’ family or the Spartans in general – and this is unlikely for a common slave, but perfectly plausible for an illegitimate prince. We saw in

76 In all three plays I have looked at, the rival can provide the male with something the patient cannot: Kreon’s daughter offers power and status; Iole offers youth and sexual allure; Andromache a male offspring.
77 She is in the position of pallakê – she stresses her slave status in her opening speech.
78 Goebel (1989) 34.
79 MacDowell (1978) 89-90. (As MacDowell notes, the extraordinary legitimation of Perikles’ son by Aspasia required a special decree be passed to approve it.) See also the famous distinction between concubines (pallakas) and wives (gynaikas) at Dem. 59.122.
*Medea* that Jason argues that, even if his sons are considered illegitimate to his new marriage, yet they would still have high status as half-brothers to kings. Clearly Peleus envisages Andromache’s son having some similar status, and he implicitly portrays him as a potential war-leader. As Kovacs asks, is Hermione really so wrong to be concerned at the implications of the boy being Neoptolemos’ only heir?\(^{81}\) If she remains barren, the whole reason for Neoptolemos keeping her as his wife will disappear, and he is unlikely to retain her out of affection. It is without dispute that Neoptolemos hates his wife: aside from the two brief statements noted above (33, 157), Andromache later elaborates that Hermione’s husband hates her (205: στυγεῖσε πόσις) (not because of her drugs but) because she is unpleasant to live with, and it is virtue that delights bedfellows (208: ξυνευνέτας). Further, when Orestes asks Hermione if her *posis* instead cherishes (907: στέργει) some other lover (907: εὐνήν), she replies that Andromache is his bedmate (908: ξυνευνέτιν) – and by implication the one he cherishes.

This brings us to Hermione’s other charge against Andromache: that she is still sleeping with her husband, even after his marriage. Kovacs advances strong arguments that this accusation is true.\(^{82}\) He has to explain away two awkward comments from Andromache. The first is that Neoptolemos ceased coming to Andromache’s bed after the marriage (30: τούμῳν παρόσας ... λέξος); Kovacs plausibly argues that παρόσας need not imply a permanent renunciation (though one might expect some indication of the temporary nature of the rejection). The second is νῦν δ’ ἐκλέλοιπα (38), which he argues cannot mean that Andromache chose to abandon Neoptolemos’ bed, as a slave did not have that freedom of choice, so can only apply to her recent abandoning of the palace to take refuge at the shrine of Thetis. However, the verb ἐκλείπω need not mean “abandon” in the sense of motion away from – it can also mean “leave off” or “cease”, and it is perfectly plausible for Andromache to say “I have ceased that now” without meaning that it was she who made the decision, especially as she has already attributed the initiative to Neoptolemos (30). However, for my present purposes (as with Hermione’s accusation that Andromache is using potions against her) it does not actually matter whether Andromache *is* still sleeping

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\(^{81}\) Kovacs (1980a) 22.  
\(^{82}\) Ibid. 15-8. See e.g. Storey (1993) 182 for an alternative view.
with Neoptolemos: the key point is that Hermione believes she is,\textsuperscript{83} and as Kovacs points out, Andromache never argues against this – on the contrary, her argument that a wife should accept her husband having lots of concubines (215-8) tacitly admits that Neoptolemos has at least one.\textsuperscript{84} Thus not only as a provider of children, but also as bedmate, Andromache has succeeded where Hermione has failed, and it is at least plausible she could take on the third task of a wife, as keeper of the home. Hermione is surely right then to fear her as a potential rival wife. Though her account of Andromache’s actions and intentions is the distorted product of her own fears, and though her reaction to those fears is both excessive and violent, those fears remain intelligible within the world of the play.

In \textit{Trachiniae} we saw a vivid, but brief, image of Deianeira and Iole crouching in bed together awaiting their man; in \textit{Andromache} “two wives” is a running theme.\textsuperscript{85} Hermione introduces it first, saying it is not acceptable for one man to hold the bridle-reins for two women (178: δυοῖν γυναικοῖν); rather the man who wishes not to live poorly should be content to see just one woman in his bed. The Chorus’ immediate reaction is to refer to Hermione and Andromache as “rival wives” (182: ξυγγάµοισι). Orestes later agrees, sententiously (if not entirely altruistically) opining that it is bad for one man to have two wives (909: δίσσ’ ἱ λέχη). But it is the Chorus who argues this most fully, devoting the entire second stasimon to the theme. They begin by saying they will never praise a man with two wives (465: δίδυµα ἱ λέκτρ’), and go on to compare this with a kingdom with two kings, a song written by two poets, two tillermen on a boat, and a crowd of experts – each leads to strife, and likewise two wives lead to strife in the house (467: ἔριδας ἱ οἴκων).\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Eris} (“strife”) is a major theme of the play,\textsuperscript{87} with the word occurring no fewer than nine times. Four of these describe as \textit{eris} the situation in the house between Hermione and Andromache (122, 490, 573, 960 – two spoken by the Chorus, one each by Andromache and Orestes), one is the Chorus’ comparison with strife between two craftsmen (477), and two more are gnomic utterances by the Chorus deploiring strife between rival wives in

\textsuperscript{83} As Kovacs (\textit{ibid.}) argues, the Chorus share that belief, and indeed it would be perfectly natural for a Greek man to continue having sex with a slave after marriage.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Ibid.} 17-18. Storey (1993) 182 notes that “neither \textit{gamos} nor \textit{posis} is used in connexion with this [Neoptolemos’ and Andromache’s] union.”

\textsuperscript{85} See Storey (1993) 183ff.

\textsuperscript{86} Stevens (1971) 153 argues that the first syllable should be long, so ἔριδας is probably corrupt. He mentions, without comment, Schroeder (1928) \textit{Eur. Cantica}, 215, who suggests δήρισ, an Ionic accusative of δῆρις (= contest) as an alternative.

Chapter 8: Sexual Jealous

Clearly the Chorus agree with Hermione that Andromache’s status in the house is problematic.

Does Hermione feel *erōs* for Neoptolemos? The word does not appear in the play at all, and neither does *himeros*; *pothos* appears only once, and refers to Hermione desiring death (824); and the verb *stergō* appears four times, but only once refers to love, and that is Neoptolemos’ (907: Orestes asking Hermione if her husband cherishes some other lover). At no point in the play does Hermione express any affection for Neoptolemos. However she is highly sexualised, though her *erōs* is expressed differently from that in *Medea* and *Trachiniae*, and makes much play with both her parental heritage (i.e. as the daughter of Helen and of Menelaus), and the connected and antecedent story of the beauty contest between Hera, Athena and Aphrodite. The word *Kypris* occurs five times in the play, and in each case is either used to refer to Aphrodite as the bringer of sexual desire, or as an adjective meaning “sexual”. Hermione is the first to use the word, perhaps inadvertently showing how much sex preys on her mind, when she says a good husband should be content with one sexual partner (179: εὐναίαν Κύπριν). Andromache picks up on this, first mentioning how she suckled Hektor’s bastards when sexual desire (223: Κύπρις) caused him to stray, then warning Hermione not to outdo her mother in man-loving (229: φιλανδρίᾳ), and finally directly admonishing her to keep silent about her sexual problems (240: Κύπριδος ἀλγήσεις). The Chorus picks up the ball and runs with it, devoting the first stasimon (274-308) to a recapitulation of the beauty contest between the three goddesses, which Aphrodite won by delighting Paris with deceptive words (289: δολίοις ἔλει Κύπρις λόγοις, τερπνοῖς μὲν ἀκοῦσαι), Helen’s failure to reject him, and the ten years of war that followed. Hermione’s sexual appetites have now been firmly linked to her mother’s, but Peleus takes things a stage further by drawing attention to her father’s sexual incontinence too: in his *agôn* with Menelaus, he says that when the latter

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88 See pp.187-8 for discussion of the other two instances.
89 Two of the other three instances (180, 468) refer to a husband being content with one wife; the final one (214) refers to a wife putting up with a bad husband.
90 See pp.188-9 on love and jealousy.
91 Pagani (1968) 203 notes that Hermione “ha una concezione dell’amore puramente erotica e sessuale”. McClure (1999) 179-81 discusses Hermione’s sexual licence; she also notes that: “At Pl. Symp. 191e, φιλανδρία [a quality of Hermione, see main text below] is explicitly connected with adultery: “promiscuous and adulterous women” (γυναικεῖς φιλανδροῦ τε καὶ μοιχεύτριαι)” (181n.60).
92 Allan (2000) 100 suggests Hermione has tried to over-compensate for her inherited lust by “demanding too strict a form of monogamy from her husband”; cf. McClure (1999) 180-1.
recaptured Helen after ten years of war he should have killed her, but instead on seeing her breast he dropped his sword (i.e. was “unmanned”) and welcomed her kiss, being conquered by lust (631: ἥσσων πεφυκὼς Κύπριδος). This scene is evoked again later, when Hermione, lamenting her earlier conduct, emerges from the house, tears off her veil, and bares her breast in public (830-5), an act of licentiousness that appals the Chorus.93 Finally, her sexual incontinence is shown by her willingness to elope with Orestes. While Hermione displays no affection for Neoptolemos at any point in the play, her highly sexualised nature ensures that she will lust for him, the only man she is allowed to sleep with – at least until she abandons her marriage and makes Orestes the object of her lust instead.94 No less than for Medea or Deianeira then, does erôs play a part in Hermione’s jealousy of her “rival wife”.

What of the other feelings we have seen as part of the Greek jealousy prototype? Hermione does not exhibit grief, but then (unlike Medea) she does not feel affection for her husband, nor has he left her yet – and her attempted murder of Andromache is intended to ensure he never does. She also does not express rage,95 though some bitterness comes out – e.g. her comments to Andromache that she is hateful to her husband (157), and to Orestes that some of her misfortunes were caused by her husband (902), who avoids her bed in favour of someone else’s (908). Hermione clearly considers Andromache a personal enemy, but again she does not talk about it; rather her hatred is manifested more in insults and in her intended murderous actions.96 The emotion that most dominates the play, if (typically) rarely named, is phthonos. Having referred to the situation between Hermione and Andromache as “hateful strife” (122: ἕριδι στυγερᾶι) in the parodos, in their very next interjection (after Hermione’s diatribe against Andromache) the Chorus opines that “a female heart is liable to phthonos and always exceedingly full of ill-will to rival wives.” (181-2: ἐπίφθονον τοι χρῆμα θῆλείας φρενὸς καὶ ξυγγάμοισι δυσµενὲς μάλιστ’ ἀεί).

94 As with Deianeira (cf. n.59 above), Hermione’s erôs and self-interest go hand in hand: she could feel erôs for Neoptolemos (without being “in love” with him in the modern sense) because sex with him would give her what she most wanted. Sex is both an end in itself, and also a means to, and a measure of, other things (here status, worth) – see also n.76 above.
95 Khlos does not appear in the play. Three of the four instances of thymos (689, 728, 742 – the fourth (1072) just means “heart”) and the single instance of orgê (688) apply to Peleus and Menelaus.
96 It is left to Menelaus to describe Andromache and her son as enemies – he calls them ekthroi twice (515, 520), and “most hated” (659: ἐχθίστοις) once.
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*Eris* is traditionally connected with *phthonos*, and aside from the seven instances of *eris* that refer to Andromache and Hermione or comparative situations (see above), it is notable that the final two instances also refer to envy/jealousy scenarios: the beauty competition between Hera, Athena and Aphrodite (279), and the subsequent strife between Menelaus and Paris over Helen (362). Given the focus on inheritance to explain Hermione’s rampant sexuality, it is no accident that Euripides has brought up these two episodes from Hermione’s family’s past – he clearly intends *eris*, and by extension *phthonos*, to be an obvious theme of the play. As Hermione explains in a lengthy attempt to shift the blame, this *phthonos* was fostered by gossip from her female friends (930-53); and its result is as we have come to expect: (attempted) destruction of the envied person. *Phthonos* has a tendency to drag its object down to the level of the patient, and Peleus has already noted that Hermione and Menelaus wished to destroy Andromache’s son to make Neoptolemos’ line as barren as theirs (711-4). And in her first speech Hermione insists that if she cannot kill Andromache she will ensure she ends her days as Hermione’s own personal drudge, cowering at her knees (164-5) – the desire to beat the rival, and make that victory manifest, is another common tendency of *phthonos* (cf. 927-8: Hermione’s belief that Andromache will treat her beaten rival likewise).

Many similarities are now apparent from these three plays, and give us insights into the phenomenology of this ancient Greek jealousy-type emotion. In all three plays, legitimate wives are (actually, potentially or supposedly) abandoned for rivals, and their three roles as Greek wives – as housekeeper, as bedmate, and (except for Deianeira) as bearer of children – are threatened. All three women feel *erôs* for their partners, though what we might term “being in love” with them is not an obvious part of this (especially for Hermione). All three are concerned about the exclusivity of their position as wife. All three are concerned with their status, and that the rival can give their husband something they cannot (see n.76 above). In two cases, the wife’s jealousy is caused or increased by her rival (potentially or actually) living under her own roof; and in the third by the husband

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98 For gossip as the female equivalent of male slander, see ch.7 n.32.
99 For other examples of ‘dragging down’, see ch.7 n.31.
100 Arist. *Rh*. 1.5 includes having children as one of the goods subject to good fortune that can excite envy in those who lack them (see p.85).
101 I will use the word jealous(y) for convenience, though of course it should not be assumed that ancient Greek jealousy is identical to modern English in every respect – see ch.1.1.
abandoning his own *oikos* to go live under the rival’s roof. The situational antecedents are, in all three cases, remarkably uniform. There is a little more variety in the emotions aroused, both in the precise affects and their intensity, but there are some obvious similarities: anger (in differing degrees) is felt for the partner who should have kept his marriage relationship exclusive (if not monogamous); hostility (ranging from hatred to mild hostility in the case of Deianeira) and *phthonos* are felt for the rival; and grief at least appears as part of the mix in *Medea* and (to a lesser extent) in *Trachiniae*. In two cases the *phthonos* against the rival causes the jealous wife to seek the rival’s death, and in all cases there is a distinctly expressed desire to *beat* the rival.

Konstan argues that the absence, or at least the lack of explicit expression, of love or affection means that jealousy as we understand it did not exist in ancient Greece.\(^{102}\) This position is open to two objections. First, this contradicts Konstan’s own (valid) contention that there are cultural variations in emotions.\(^{103}\) If these still allow us to use the obvious label for other emotions, why should jealousy be different? Second, it is by no means the case that modern English jealousy need involve love: people from whose relationship love has long since vanished can still be jealous when their partner goes off with someone new.\(^{104}\) What matters, even in modern English jealousy, is exclusivity (if not monogamy), not affection – what is important is that they are *mine*. The phenomenology summarised above is very clear, and its uniformity across the three plays I have examined should demonstrate beyond doubt the existence of a jealousy-type emotion in ancient Greece, notwithstanding a supposed lack of emphasis on personal affection. It is perhaps more germane to read this latter as merely an indication of the difference in the role of “love” (in a modern sense), as opposed to sexual desire (*erōs*), between ancient Greek and modern marriages – or at least a distinction in terminology and semantic boundaries.

It is notable that all three plays involve jealous women, and Goldhill’s contention that jealousy is not a heroic enough emotion for tragedy,\(^{105}\) though mistaken as a general

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102 Konstan (2006) 219-43. Cohen (1991) 167-8 disagrees that the Greek marriage was necessarily devoid of either passion or emotional attachment, and provides a number of examples – see 168 n.131 for his examples of “women’s resentment at men’s infidelity”.

103 The case is made for individual emotions throughout his book, but the Introduction (*ibid. 3-40*) especially makes the general case that emotions should be considered to be socially and culturally conditioned.

104 See p.30 on the absence of love from most scholars’ lists of affects in the jealousy complex.

principle,\textsuperscript{106} does at least more generally seem to be borne out for men. However, before turning to other genres, to see how our Greek jealousy prototype survives outside of exclusive (and heterosexual) marriage relationships, it is worth considering one other character in the Andromache who could be labelled “jealous”: Orestes.

Orestes narrates (957-86) how Hermione had been promised to him in marriage, but that Menelaus reneged on the agreement and gave her to Neoptolemos. Later Orestes came to Neoptolemos and begged him to give Hermione to him instead. He is aware of Hermione’s attempt to kill Andromache, and its failure, and has arrived with the intention of taking her away from Neoptolemos’ house, if she wants to leave. His early questioning of her, supposedly to learn what has happened, is therefore clearly disingenuous.\textsuperscript{107} As far as Hermione is concerned, he is pushing at an open door, and he departs with her. However, it is not enough for him merely to beat Neoptolemos by persuading his wife to elope with him. His hatred (1006-7: ἔχθραν ἐµήν ἐµηὴν. ἔδραν γὰρ ἀνδρῶν...), aroused by his sexual rivalry with Neoptolemos (and the latter’s insults of him – 977), requires that he must kill him too – and this he achieves, again through duplicity: he slanders (1005: διαβολαῖς ἑι ἐµαῖς... Neoptolemos to the Delphians, who, believing the slanders (1092-5 for their content), then kill Neoptolemos.\textsuperscript{108} McClure and Allan are surely right to see the link between the two halves of the play: that Orestes’ sexual jealousy of Neoptolemos reflects Hermione’s of Andromache.\textsuperscript{109} Clearly Orestes does not want the wifely roles, but he does want the husband/protector role, indeed admits to begging for it (972-3). Interestingly, for Orestes again the question of his promised bride appears to relate to issues of status, in his case his status as an outcast,\textsuperscript{110} and the insult to his status by Neoptolemos’ withholding of ‘his’ woman. We are not told whether he feels erôs for Hermione – but we should note the following: he once chose her for his wife; he tried to persuade, indeed begged,

\textsuperscript{106} It is a major plot element in at least three of the thirty-two surviving tragedies – and if that ratio is reflective of lost tragedies, then by inference we can assume a jealousy plot was staged in Athens around twice a year (on average approximately one at each Lenaia and City Dionysia – not to mention other, local festivals).

\textsuperscript{107} Allan (2000) 73.

\textsuperscript{108} On slander and phthonos, see ch.6 n.70. The language of phthonos is not present, but as will be clear from ch.3, the necessary conditions and phenomenology are consistent with a phthonos analysis: Orestes has a rival for the possession of a desired wife, he has been beaten by his rival in the past, but now has the opportunity to take the possession; he hates his rival; and he uses slander to destroy him.

\textsuperscript{109} McClure (1999) 160-2, 199-200; Allan (2000) 74. Kovacs (1980a) 5 does not see any link between the two halves.

\textsuperscript{110} This status deters those who are not his philoi from offering him a wife (974-6); by returning Andromache to Menelaus, he will make Menelaus his philos, and thus obtain Hermione as his wife (985-6).
Neoptolemos (a marriage rival, hence already a personal enemy) to give up a woman already married, rather than picking any other eligible princess; and he is pursuing her still. The main difference between Hermione’s jealousy episode and Orestes’, is that Orestes succeeds in murdering his target where Hermione fails. Euripides has been able to depict Orestes’ jealousy with such economy, precisely because the example of Hermione is by this point so vividly in our minds.

8.5 Sexual jealousy outside tragedy

In this final section of the chapter I explore how well the closely portrayed tragic ‘type’ of the jealous woman is a model for jealousy in other genres, in particular in oratory and New Comedy. The most detailed portrayal of a jealous woman outside tragedy occurs in Antiphon 1, Against the Stepmother, which portrays a woman who allegedly caused the death of her husband, by the administration of a poison she claimed was a love potion (1.9: ἐπὶ φιλτροῖς; 1.19: φάρµακον). She makes use of another woman to administer the drug, the mistress (1.14: παλλακή) of her husband’s friend Philoneus, whom Philoneus was about to put away into a brothel. The stepmother describes the pallake’s treatment by Philoneus as injustice (1.15: ἀδικεῖσθαι), and uses the same verb (1.15: ἀδικοῖτο) to describe her own treatment by her husband, thus appealing to the pallake’s fellow-feeling (1.15: καὶ ἰαὐτή). Though the text is not explicit about the fiction allegedly used by the stepmother to manipulate the unfortunate pallakê, the language used is highly suggestive.

111 As Carey (1997) 41 notes, there is “a striking lack of evidence to incriminate her”. Gagarin (2002) 149 notes that the speaker himself does not concentrate on either the issue of intention to kill, or whether she knew the drug was actually a poison. The argument is much more along the lines of: “Is slipping us these potions something we men want our womenfolk to do to us with impunity?” – cf. Gagarin (2002) 150. It is highly possible this case and the one cited at Arist. MM 1188b29-38, where the woman was acquitted on the grounds that she had no intention to kill, are one and the same – see Gagarin (1997) 140, Gagarin (2002) 149, Faraone (1994) 118. I am much less concerned here with whether the stepmother actually intended to kill her husband, than with the means by which she supposedly persuaded the pallake to administer the drug, and the speaker’s presentation of his stepmother’s actions to the court.

112 This was allegedly the woman’s second attempt involving poison (§9 – and §3 suggests frequent previous attempts, possibly by other means). Gagarin (1997) 111-2 notes the probable difficulty in antiquity of judging a dosage, and speculates that the failure of the first attempt may have led her to increase it the second time, with fatal results; cf. Faraone (1994) 119.

113 This mistress was almost certainly a slave – Gagarin (1998) 12, n.6; cf. Gagarin (1997) 114, where he notes that that she could be put into a porneion (1.14), and that she could be tortured and executed without trial (1.20). Gagarin (1998) 14, n.8 argues that the torture would have been part of her punishment; if she had been tortured for information, anything she said would have been cited in the speech; cf. Carey (1997) 41-2. Dillon (2004) 23 notes that if she had accused the stepmother, the latter would probably have been prosecuted immediately (which she was not).
As Bonanno has shown, the language of dikê is frequently used to express the reciprocal expectations of amorous relationships in Greece – both that the one feeling philia should have her philia returned, and that both lover and beloved should behave in a certain way towards each other – and from Sappho onwards ‘adikia’ asserts that those expectations are not being met: that one party no longer feels philia for the other. On its own the language of adikia could be open to a number of readings, but combined with the love philtre it becomes more specific. This use of adikeisthai by the stepmother then, in respect of both her and the pallakê’s relationships, must be designed to play on the latter’s sensibilities. Though clearly the stepmother’s husband would not be placing a legitimate wife in a porneion, the connection is presumably with them both being put aside for rivals. The stepmother wins the pallakê over by presenting herself likewise as a jilted wife, and by playing on the pallakê’s insecurity, to persuade her of a commonality of interest. She tells her the potion will recapture their respective men’s affections (1.15: φίλονἰποιῆσαι), something the pallakê believes she has lost.

This is in fact the only case in surviving sources outside tragedy where a (portrayed) jealousy scenario actually leads to the death of either the loved one or the rival – but despite its uniqueness, it shows that an audience would be expected to believe such scenarios could happen as plausibly off-stage as on. Gagarin argues, rightly in my view, that the

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114 Bonanno (1973). The language of adikia was also seen in Medea (see n.41 above).
115 The exact relationships between the speaker, the stepmother, the father, and his ‘other woman’ are hard to pin down. Gagarin (1997) 114-15 suggests that, as the speaker was a minor when his father died, the father might have been having an affair with the speaker’s own mother, and the wife/stepmother felt herself in danger of being replaced by a younger model; this is unlikely, first as unmarried citizen women were not free to sleep around, and second as mēruia (like “stepmother” in English) would normally refer to a later wife. Carey (1997) 41 refers in passing to the stepmother being a second marriage; however the opening of the speech makes clear the speaker has only just reached his majority, and as he is being opposed by his stepbrothers he is clearly younger than them, so this does not seem possible either; cf. Dillon (2004) 20-1. Three possible solutions can be suggested. 1. That the speaker’s mother was a citizen, but never married to his father (MacDowell (1978) 68 argues that to be a citizen one merely needed two citizen parents, but they did not need to be married) – unlikely as it is also predicated on an unmarried citizen woman having an affair. 2. That neither the speaker nor his mother were citizens, and this type of case could be brought by an alien – MacDowell (1978) 76 notes some types could. 3. That the speaker was not strictly a citizen, but was accepted as one – MacDowell (1978) 67 notes that in the latter half of the Peloponnesian war the citizenship law was not strictly enforced (evidenced by it being reaffirmed in 403/2, but not applying to those born before that date), and Gagarin (1998) 10 suggests the speech is dated 420-410. Either 2. or 3. would imply that the father’s relationship with the speaker’s mother was of some duration – also suggested by the alleged previous attempts on his life (see n.112 above).
116 Faraone (1999) 119 notes that pharmaka and philtra were generally used to make husbands care more for their spouses, rather than desire them sexually – the words used are typically philtein, stergein, or agapan, rather than eran. (This is not, of course, to say that the wife might not feel erōs – see n.94 above).
speaker’s “vivid story of the women seeking desperate remedies when they fear they are losing their men’s love would fit comfortably into the (all-male) jurors’ preconceptions about the kinds of steps desperate women take for the sake of love.” However, the speaker does not concentrate on the jealousy angle – indeed he cannot, without risking creating sympathy for her. Jealousy is used as a mask assumed by the wife, but then kept implicit. Instead the speaker melodramatically, but effectively, refers to his stepmother as “that Clytemnestra” (1.17: τῆς Κλυταιµνήστρας ταύτης). We might think from the stepmother’s own arguments to the pallakê that Deianeira would be a more appropriate role-model. However the speaker does not want his stepmother compared with a rather pathetic woman, a victim, who (as Sophocles presents her) merely wished to retain her husband’s affections and only killed him by mistake. He wants to link her to an unambiguous husband-killer, the sort of woman every right-thinking Athenian would dread to have at home. Aeschylus’ (the most famous tragic) Clytemnestra is also, among her multifarious motivations for killing her husband, driven by jealousy at his bringing Cassandra home to live as a mistress under her roof. The speaker in Antiphon 1 then, by using the single name “Clytemnestra”, is calling to mind a whole battery of imagery against his stepmother. He rejects the ‘jealous wife’ story she spins to the pallakê – it would not help his case to focalise from her perspective. He needs a monster, not a woman with a scrap of justification, hence “that Clytemnestra”.

There are a number of other situations referred to in the oratorical corpus where a wife is very upset at her husband bringing a mistress into their house. At Andoc. 1.124-5, the speaker mentions a certain Kallias who married a woman, then brought her mother into the house as a sexual partner, at which point the daughter tried to hang herself, then ran away (Kallias later has an affair with the granddaughter). At Andoc. 4.14-15, Alkibiades is...
said to bring free and slave mistresses (plural) into the house, leading his wife to apply for a divorce. She at least has somewhere to go (to her brother Kallias’, ironically the person who allegedly mistreated his wife in the same way in 1.124-5); Deianeira in Trachiniae does not, which might explain her more drastic measures to retain her husband’s affection. Similarly the stepmother in Antiphon 1 would be concerned for her position and status as wife, should her husband leave her for the other woman.121 Such a scenario does occur in Isaeus 6, where the old man Euktemon moves first himself, then all his furniture and possessions to the house of his pallakê Alke, leaving the legitimate wife and children destitute – however, at least he had the decency to put his mistress up in a different house (Isae. 6.21), as did Lysias with Metaneira (Dem. 59.22).122

Most of the jealous characters we have seen so far have been women. For the remainder of this chapter I turn to jealous men. We have already seen one such character – Orestes in Andromache – and saw that his jealousy episode, unique in surviving tragedy, contained many of the same situational antecedents (with appropriate alterations for a putative husband’s status rather than a wife’s), affective states, and resulting (destructive) action as the women’s. Menander’s surviving comedies contain two portrayals of jealous men. The first is in Perikeiromenê. The soldier Polemon has fallen in love (128: ἐραστοῦ γενοµένου; cf. 494: ἐρᾷς, 499: ἐρῶντι) with Glykera, an adopted girl of unknown origin; and the adoptive mother gave her to him as if she were her real daughter (130: δίδωσι τὴν κόρην ὡς θυγατέρα αὐτῆς ἔχειν).123 The couple have since moved next door to the house in which lives Moschion, her real brother, though this family relationship is unknown to anyone except Glykera. Moschion, ignorant, takes a fancy to her; in Polemon’s absence, he seizes an appropriate moment and rushes up to Glykera, throws his arms around her and kisses her (155-6: προδραµῶν ἐφίλει, περιέβ[α]λλ’). Polemon’s servant Sosias sees this, and reports it to Polemon, who is goaded into a rage (163: εἰς ὀργήν) by the goddess

123 The formulation used is that of a legal marriage, but since the girl is of unknown parentage, and hence not a citizen, she would not have been a candidate for a legitimate wife (at least at Athens – it is possible that Corinth, where the play is set, had different citizenship rules to Athens; though since the play premiered in Athens, Corinthian law would probably not be relevant). Glykera then would be living with Polemon as his concubine (pallakê). However Polemon later says he has regarded Glykera as his wife (489: ἡ γαµετὴν νενόµικα ταύτην), and Sosias twice describes the rival as a moikhos (357, 370 – Polemon uses the same word at 986), a word that refers to an adulterer, or possibly someone having illicit sex with a close family member – Dover (1974) 209; see Cohen (1991) 98-109 for an argument against this extension; see also Traill (2008) 40-45 on Polemon’s confusion of Glykera’s status between wife, concubine and hetaira.
Agnoia (whose aim is to bring about a reconciliation of the siblings). In his mind, there is a ‘love triangle’ (himself, his wife/mistress, and his rival); he already feels erôs for her, and now also orgê and, as we shortly learn, grief (he lies on his bed weeping (174: κλάει κατακλινείς) – as Medea did at the start of Euripides’ play) at her supposed betrayal of their exclusive relationship. As we have by now come to expect, this combination of circumstances and affects rouses his phthonos, causing him to carry out a destructive action: he cuts off the long hair that makes Glykera beautiful (173), before throwing her out of the house.124 This scenario, in situational antecedents, affective states, and resulting action, is very much in line with the cases we have examined so far (with the obvious rider that in comedy, rather than tragedy, even sharp emotion is not going to make a character kill another), and it is clear that Polemon is jealous. The word Polemon himself uses (after the event) to describe his emotion and explain his action, is zêlotypos (987); and this word, first appearing in our sources in Aristophanes’ Wealth (dated 388), is traditionally translated “jealous” (I discuss this further below).125

The other Menander play in which a character exhibits jealousy is Samia. Uniquely in surviving Greek New Comedy, Demeas is a mature man in a loving, exclusive relationship; however his relationship is not with a citizen woman (i.e. a marriage), but with a Samian ex-hetaira (a kept woman), called Chrysis;126 the third member of the ‘family’ is Moschion, Demeas’ adopted son.127 In the usual complicated way of New Comedy, Demeas comes to

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124 As with Orestes, although the language of phthonos is not present, it is clear that the necessary conditions and phenomenology are consistent with a phthonos analysis: Polemon has a rival for the possession of a desired wife/mistress, she appears to have gone off with the rival, and so he damages her beauty so his rival cannot enjoy it.

125 Polemon’s jealousy is widely recognised by scholars – see e.g. Goldberg (1980) 45, R.L. Hunter (1985) 67, 150, Zagagi (1994) 18, 30, 49, 150, Lape (2004) 173. Konstan (2006) 234-5 disagrees, but his argument that zêlotypos never means ‘jealous’ in Classical literature becomes strained here. He writes (235): “Here, zêlotypos seems to indicate not jealousy so much as an unwarranted or excessive reaction to perfectly legitimate behaviour.” As Polemon ‘knew’ Glykera had no male family members, her being embraced and kissed by another man was certainly not legitimate behaviour; his reaction was therefore neither unwarranted nor (judging by other cases of jealousy already seen, and those discussed below) particularly excessive. Konstan’s explanation also goes against the etymology of the term – zêlos suggesting an element of measuring oneself against another. I discuss this, and Konstan’s argument against zêlotypia meaning jealousy, further at pp.201-3, esp. n.148 below.

126 As a mature man in a loving relationship, Demeas is unique not just to Greek, but also to Roman New Comedy, per Lape (2004) 139, who also notes that he is the only old man to be living permanently with a hetaira, and that a man of his age would have been expected to be married (or remarried). Chrysis, for her part, behaves not like the usual hetaira of New Comedy, but as a respectable Greek wife and mother – Lape (2004) 141, Zagagi (1994) 55.

127 As a citizen, Moschion’s adoption renders him the legitimate son of the oikos under Athenian law, notwithstanding his adoption – see Zagagi (1994) 116-7.
believe that Chrysis has slept with Moschion and had a child by him (the baby is actually Moschion’s by a different girl). We learn from the prologue that Demeas feels erôs for Chrysis (21: εἰς ἐπὶ θυμίαν; 81: ἐρᾷ),\(^{128}\) and is concerned about younger love-rivals (26: ὤ[π]ιτεραστῶν μειρακίων).\(^{129}\) When he ‘discovers’ the supposed affair, he is furious (447: τὴν χολήν), but he immediately exonerates Moschion (his ‘rival’), while placing all the blame on Chrysis (326ff.), in both cases on grounds of previous character. He heaps imprecations on Chrysis, calling her a whore and a plague (348), and labels her as his Helen (336-7 – a woman who ran off with a younger man who was then staying in her husband’s house).\(^{130}\) He tells himself that he must leave behind his yearning and his erôs for her (350: ἐπιλαθοῦτοῦ ἐπόθου, ἐπέπαυσ’ ἐρῶν), and he throws Chrysis (and the baby) out of the house, knowing she has nowhere else to go,\(^{131}\) and spitefully tells her that he will find some other girl to love (385: ἄγαστήσει) him. It should be clear by now that Demeas’ reaction at least owes something to jealousy. We have already seen with jealous women that part of the Greek jealousy complex is a concern about status; Demeas too might be expected to have such a concern: Moschion mentions in the prologue Demeas’ shame (23: ἄσχυνετ’; 27: αἰσχύνεται) at living with Chrysis in a quasi-marriage state at an age when he should be married, so totally at odds with the values of Athenian society;\(^{132}\) how much more will he have been shamed at continuing the relationship after her (supposed) adultery with Moschion?

Two other literary representations of old men cuckolded by their wives survive – one in tragedy, one in oratory. Many scholars have pointed out the similarity of the Samia situation to that in Euripides’ Hippolytos.\(^{133}\) Theseus returns from a long trip away from home to find his wife Phaidra dead. He laments extensively, referring to her as his lekhos (858) and alokhos (801). He soon learns that his wife has left a suicide note, saying his son

\(^{128}\) There seems to be a convergence of *epithymia* with erôs – see also Lysias 3.5, 3.39, 3.44, discussed below.

\(^{129}\) Cf. Deianeira in *Trachiniae*. We should note that comedy presents a situation for men that tragedy portrays only for women.

\(^{130}\) See Goldberg (1980) 97-102 on this scene; also Lape (2004) 159-60. Note that labelling with the name of a famous literary character is an easy way to make the audience tell the story for you (see p.193 and n.120 above).


\(^{132}\) See Lape (2004) 139-40. Lysias 3, discussed below, also portrays a mature man ashamed of a sexual passion inappropriate to his time of life (see n.142 below).

(her stepson) Hippolytos had made sexual advances to her, and she killed herself in consequence. Theseus immediate denounces and curses Hippolytos with death, and at this moment of sharp anguish refers to Phaidra as his *eunê* (885). It is hard to determine Theseus’ emotional motivation – he does not spend much time saying why he’s doing what he’s doing, mostly he just acts – but there are some indications. *Eunê* is a more sexualised word than *lekhos*,135 and it is interesting that he uses it uniquely at this point; later he returns to *lektra* (944) and *lekhos* (1266). We should also note that his immediate response is to curse Hippolytos with death, implying hatred or jealousy.136 He calls Hippolytos *µὴ φίλος* (927), implying he is his *ekhthros*. He then comes up with the secondary punishment of banishment: he wants Hippolytos either to die (887-90) or to be banished (893-8), but he later rejects a quick death for him, so his suffering can be long drawn-out (1045-9). This is reminiscent of Medea’s changing of Jason’s punishment: Theseus wants Hippolytos to have time to perceive his (Theseus') revenge. He also talks twice of Hippolytos dishonouring, first Zeus (886), then himself (1040), and also says he attacked Phaidra with violence (886: βίαι; cf. 1073: ὑβρίζειν) – Aristotle tells us that *orgê* is the correct response both to disrespect and to *hybris*.137 Euripides seems to be portraying Theseus’ response to Hippolytos’ supposed semi-incestuous rape as shocked *orgê* and *misis*.138 The situational and affective aspects of the scenario are consistent with a jealous response, and the audience will understand it as implicitly present, but Euripides shies away from developing this aspect more fully. Could it be that jealousy is inappropriate for men (as opposed to women) in tragedy,139 while it can comfortably be presented in comedy?

It is notable that the two jealous men we have seen in comedy are jealous over concubines, not citizen wives, and (as we shall see) this is more generally a pattern for jealous men in Greek literature. But in Lysias 1, *On the Murder of Eratosthenes*, we might wonder whether the speaker Euphiletos is trying to hide his jealousy at being cuckolded by his wife.

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134 W.S. Barrett (1964/2001) 187 notes the speed and violence of his public denunciation of Hippolytos on reading Phaidra’s suicide tablet; I prefer to note the speed and violence of the curse.
135 See n.11 above.
136 See comments on Medea’s, Hermione’s and Orestes’ desires for their rivals’ deaths earlier in this chapter, and why Medea ‘commutes’ Jason’s sentence (see pp.173-4, p.187, p.190).
137 Arist. Rh. 2.2.1378a30-b25.
138 The element of shock (without other attendant emotions) is similar to the response of Hippolytos, the Nurse, and the Chorus on finding out whom Phaidra’s passion is for.
139 Except Orestes of course, but Orestes is an extreme and unique figure in (especially Euripidean) tragedy in many ways. It may be relevant that Theseus is the Athenians’ hero par excellence.
As he relates the story, dispassionately, he finds out that his young, demure wife has been having an affair with a young man (Eratosthenes) she met at a religious festival, assisted by her maid. He forces the maid to tell him the next time Eratosthenes is in the house with his wife; and when she does, he quietly goes out, gathers a group of his friends, returns to surprise the couple in flagrante, and kills Eratosthenes. He is tried for murder, but he argues that the ancient laws of Athens permit a husband to kill a moikhos caught in the act – indeed, the way he presents the case is that they almost demand it. However those laws, while still on the statute book, were no longer considered comme il faut, and Euphiletos faces an uphill struggle to give the prosecution no handle for claiming that he was motivated by anything other than a dispassionate desire to uphold the law to the fullest – should they prove otherwise, then they will be able to argue much more convincingly that he was guilty of entrapment, while the defence rests on everything happening spontaneously. Euphiletos is on shaky ground, because he has (by his own admission) known about the affair for several days before catching his wife and Eratosthenes in the act, and many will struggle to believe he went about his life completely as normal, not in any disquiet of mind, nor making any effort to stage-manage the showdown. Jealousy is the obvious construction for the audience to put on his actions, the ‘elephant in the living-room’, and Euphiletos needs to avoid any hint that he was motivated by it. Accordingly, in one of Lysias’s best character sketches, Euphiletos presents himself from the beginning as a simple, credulous, law-abiding man, who does everything because it is the right thing to do. He betrays no emotion for his young wife, neither eròs (despite their mutual flirting – 1.12-13), nor orgê on hearing the maid’s story or even on finding Eratosthenes in bed with his wife. In his self-presentation, he moves from gullible old man to austere defender of the law without a bridge, leaving no time for the audience to dwell on his likely true response.

Mature men are not only portrayed as jealous (or not) in domestic cases. In two other speeches by Lysias we find them coming to blows over young lovers. In Lysias 3, Against

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140 Carey (1989) 60-1.
Simon, the speaker, a man of advanced years,\textsuperscript{142} portrays his opponent Simon’s jealousy at his lover,\textsuperscript{143} a young Plataian boy called Theodotos, with whom they were both enamoured (3.5: ἐπεθυµήσαµεν), leaving him for the speaker.\textsuperscript{144} Simon is presented as responding with violence against both the speaker (and his family) and the boy on two occasions, both times while under the influence of alcohol (3.6-8, 12-18). However, despite the speaker’s first assertion that initially Simon was impassioned about the boy too (3.5: ἐπεθυµήσαµεν), he later says his behaviour (in waiting four years to prosecute) shows he was not really “in love” (3.39: ἔρωσι, ἐπιθυµοῦσι; 3.44: ἔρᾱν) – presumably he was using the pretence as a front for his then \textit{hybris}, and present sycophancy (3.44). As for his own role in the brawling, the speaker attempts to generalise the dispute, labelling it “rivalry over a boy” (3.40: περὶ παιδικῶν ἐρονικήσαµεν ἡμεῖς πρὸς ἅλληλους), and then assimilating it to fighting over female \textit{hetairai}, or through drunken rivalry or games or insults (3.43: ἐκ µέθης καὶ φιλονικίας ἢ ἐκ παιδιὼν ἢ ἐκ λοιδορίας ἢ περὶ ἑταίρας µαχόµενοι).\textsuperscript{145} While clearly trying to downplay the quarrel, he draws on the audience’s underlying assumption that sexual desire leads to a range of predictable consequences, irrespective of its object, and of the age of the subject.

Two other cases show similar features. The first is Lysias 4, \textit{On a Premeditated Wounding}, which presents a fairly similar situation to Lysias 3, the differences being that the love object is a girl, the speaker is of indeterminate age, and the two litigants originally contracted to share in her favours (4.1). The slave-girl/prostitute, at least as presented by the speaker, clearly relishes the situation, twisting both men round her little finger (4.8, \textit{On a Premeditated Wounding}).

\textsuperscript{142} Todd (2007) 278 notes the speaker “appears to be unmarried at an age when this was evidently unusual”. He expresses embarrassment at his erotic relationship with a young lad at his advanced age (3.4: ἀλλως δὲ ὑμῖν φαίνωµεν παρὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐµαυτοῦ ἀνοητότερον πρὸς τὸ µειράκιον διατιθείς) – just as Demeas in \textit{Samia} was ashamed of a relationship inappropriate to a mature man (see p.196 and n.132 above).

\textsuperscript{143} Carey (1997) 82 agrees that the portrayal is of Simon’s “vindictive jealousy”.

\textsuperscript{144} It is controversial whether Theodotos was a slave or free – see Carey (1989) 87, 90, Todd (2007) 279-81 (with copious references to previous scholarship). Simon apparently presented evidence that he had made a contract with Theodotos for the (probably exclusive – implied by the word ἑταιρήσοντα (3.24)) right to have sex with him for a period of time, before the end of which he went off with the speaker (3.22-26); and a legally binding contract could not be made with a slave. However, on the speaker’s return from a trip with Theodotos, he goes to live in Piraeus while Theodotos lodges with a certain Lysimakhos. The speaker skates over who this individual is, but it is possible that he owned a brothel in which Theodotos was a slave prostitute, and that the contract Simon refers to was made with Lysimakhos, not with Theodotos. If this were the case, the speaker would naturally not want to draw attention to Lysimakhos’/Theodotos’ statuses, as that would support the existence of a contract. Carey (1989) 87 thinks that on balance Theodotos was probably a slave, Todd (2000) 43, (2007) 81 that he was not.

Chapter 8: Sexual Jealousy

17), and the opponent is presented as sick with love for her (4.8: δύσερως ἔστι) and, spurred on by this, liable to drunken violence (4.8: παρωξυμμένος ὀξύχεω λίαν καὶ πάροινὸς ἔστιν) – and indeed a violent brawl results (4.5-7). Another example is seen in Aeschines 1, Against Timarkhos, where the defendant is alleged as a young man to have moved in with Misgolas, an older man, to allow the latter to indulge his sexual practices (no erōs or epithymia is mentioned, though Misgolas did seek Timarkhos out and persuade him to leave another man for him, so some passion might be presumed). Effectively Timarkhos was to be his companion, and exclusively so: Misgolas had allegedly paid in advance for the right to have sex with him exclusively (1.41: ἀργύριόν ἔπροαναλώσας – the phrase is one we might expect to see used for relationship with a hetaira). Aeschines mentions an occasion when Timarkhos neglected to turn up to accompany Misgolas at a procession: Misgolas was angered (1.43: παρωξυμμένος) by this and, on searching, by finding Timarkhos “lunching” (1.43: συναριστῶντα) with foreigners. Despite Aeschines’ circumlocution, one can read between the lines that more than food was intended to be shared at this lunch: Misgolas threatens them with prison for corrupting a free youth (1.43: ὅτι ἐλεύθερον ἑιδέφθειραν) – the phrase must allude to passive anal sex, the only inappropriate activity for a citizen, and one which Aeschines has already said Timarkhos liked to indulge in (1.41). Once again, a speaker is relying on his audience’s recognition of a scenario, together with its likely affects and outcomes. What is interesting about this case is the stimulus: most cases of male jealousy we have seen are provoked, not by imminent loss of status as with women, but by the beloved’s sexual acts with another. What these acts are, however, are normally not specified (e.g. Lysias 3, Lysias 4), or are unremarkable (a hug and kiss in Perikeiromenê, vaginal intercourse resulting in pregnancy in Samia). The cause of Misgolas’ jealousy – being stood up on a date because his beloved is dining with other men – has a nice element of phenomenological precision to it.

Later in the same speech, Timarkhos is “lodging” with Pittalakos, a public slave. Hegesandros, a citizen, forms a desire (1.57: ἐπεθύµεσε) for Timarkhos, asks Pittalakos to give him up, and when he refuses, personally persuades Timarkhos to move in with him.

146 There is a disparity between the girl’s slave status and the power her sexuality gives her over the two men, which turns what was supposed to be a simple sexual arrangement into something else. Greek literature tends to treat sex with slaves as an objective process, even in plays such as Samia where the other partner is in love with them. This speech is more frank about the complexities of ‘real life’.
Pittalakos is then described as feeling *zêlotypia* (1.58: ἐζηλοτύπει), a word (as noted above) normally translated as ‘jealousy’; however his only action is to make a nuisance of himself by hanging around (1.58: ἐφοίτα) Hegasandros’ house. The scenario is one where we might expect jealousy, and despite our not being told we might assume (as with Misgolas) that Pittalakos felt *erôs* for Timarkhos, but we have not heard that he is in any way angered at Timarkhos’ conduct, nor that he takes any violent or destructive action – on the contrary, it is Hegasandros and Timarkhos who end up committing *hybris* against him.

It is possible that the financial aspects of the situation provide the clue: Misgolas is said to have paid Timarkhos a sum of money in advance,¹⁴⁷ and so would have expected the right to have sex with him on an ongoing and exclusive basis (such arrangements can be shared by agreement, as in Lysias 4, but are not open more widely); Pittalakos is merely said to have cash (1.54: εὐπορῶν ἀργυρίου), and to be able to fund Timarkhos’ debauched lifestyle (1.54: χορηγὸν ἐμῇ ἔμελυρῳ ἐσῳ τῆς), an exchange that is exclusive while it lasts, but which neither side is obliged to continue. However, Pittalakos is loathe to lose Timarkhos’ favours as a live-in lover, hence his hanging around Hegasandros’ house: he is trying to win Timarkhos back. This is in fact the same behaviour we see Polemon practising in *Perikeiromenê*: having begrudged sharing Glykera’s favours with another man, and having cut off her hair and kicked her out in jealous rage, he later repents and hangs around Moschion’s house in an attempt to win her back. His attempts are certainly more violent than Pittalakos’ (he tries to storm Moschion’s house), but that is merely indicative of his being a soldier rather than a public slave.

Konstan has analysed in detail usage of the word *zêlotypia* and its cognates.¹⁴⁸ They seem to be used in two types of scenario: either when someone possesses something that they do not want to share; or when they wish to share in something they currently do not. The first type is evidenced by the first two datable occurrences of the word: in Aristophanes’ *Wealth* (388 BC), and Plato’s *Symposium* (380s BC). In *Wealth* an impecunious gigolo, who sleeps with an old woman in return for her spending money on him, beats her up when

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¹⁴⁷ We cannot be certain this is true, it is merely an allegation, but I am more concerned with the fact that such a scenario can plausibly be put before an audience than with the truth of the allegation.

¹⁴⁸ Konstan (2006) 222-32, who disputes the accepted and usual translation of ζηλοτυπία as ‘jealousy’ (LSJ), arguing for a whole range of alternatives including: one of the “competitive emotions”, “covetous resentment”, “invidious contention”, “surliness”, and “unwarranted insistence on exclusive possession” of a person. See also Fantham (1986), who especially notes the tendency of the *zêlotypos* to violence.
another man looks at her; the old woman explains, “That’s how zêlotypos he was.” (1016: οὐτω σφόδρα ζηλότυπος ὁ νεανίσκος ἦν). Similarly, in Symposium, when Socrates is describing his (sex-free) love affair with Alkibiades, he says, “And from the time that I became his lover (213d1: ἠράσθην), I cannot look at or converse with another handsome man without him feeling zêlotypia and phthonos (213d2: ζηλοτυπῶν μὲ καὶ φθονῶν), and he does all kind of strange things and shouts abuse and can scarcely keep his hands off me.” What zêlotypia seems to imply in all four of the above cases (Wealth 1016, Symposium 213d2, Aeschines 1.58, Perikeiromenê 987) is possessive, rather than sexual, jealousy – though, as Konstan himself notes, there is no intrinsic reason why this cannot include sexual jealousy – i.e. possessive jealousy of a sexual object – as indeed I have argued (contra Konstan) that it does in Perikeiromenê (see pp.194-5 and n.125 above).

The other usage of zêlotypia cognates is when one is not currently (or formerly) in possession of some person, object or quality, and feels zêlotypia for those who are. This usage of the word is seen twice in Aeschines 3, Against Ctesiphon: first, Demosthenes is said to be motivated by zêlotypia to match the openness to bribes (3.81: ὑπὲρ τῆς δωροδοκίας ζηλοτυπίας) of one Philokrates; second, his apparently virtuous oration is mocked as polluted refuse feeling zêlotypia for virtue (3.211: κάθαρμα ζηλοτυποῦν ἀρετήν). The most vivid usage comes in Isocrates 15, Antidosis, where the author talks about those who feel envy towards him, feeling a passion to share his ability in speaking (15.244: πάντας τοὺς φιλοτίµως διακειµένους, ἐπιθυµητικῶς ἔχοντας τοῦ φρονεῖν εὗ καὶ λέγειν), but who are too lazy to apply themselves. He talks about their attitude towards others who do apply themselves and work hard to gain those same ends, describing them as being malicious and feeling zêlotypia and being agitated in their minds, and suffering almost as if they felt erôs (15.245: δυσκόλως ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοτυπεῖν καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τεταραγµένως διακεῖσθαι καὶ πεπονθέναι παραπλήσια τοῖς ἐρώσιν). Isocrates is explicitly giving a sexual simile. However, this is not the jealous possessiveness of those who are already in an exclusive erotic relationship, but the grudging, malicious envy that people who have a passion for those they will never attain, feel against those more successful than themselves – the feeling of the spotty, geeky teenager for the jock who gets all the girls. Zêlotypia, then, in this aspect is a close cousin to Greek jealousy, but not

\(^{149}\) Ibid. 226.
identical to it (at least in the Classical period).\footnote{It also overlaps with English ‘jealousy’, though is by no means coterminous with it.} It is actually not dissimilar to phthonos, both in its grudging, malicious nature, and in being able to be felt both by those who possess and do not want to lose, and those who do not possess but wish to; however the sexual nature of zêlotypia, whether sexual in actuality or metaphorically (as in Aeschin. 3), moves it rather closer to jealousy than mere phthonos. Greek has a penchant for coupling words with similar meanings, and it is notable that zêlotypia is coupled with phthonos at Symposium 213d2. It also has a flavour of greed about it: a desire to have part of what one has none of (or a greater part of what one has a small part of), and retain all of what one has to the exclusion of all others.

### 8.6 Conclusion

We have seen that there is both a degree of convergence and a degree of divergence in representations of jealousy in men and women, and across different genres. In general, a jealousy scenario requires three people: two currently or formerly in a sexual relationship, and a rival. The jealous person will feel erôs for the partner, and this erôs, or at least a softer affection (philein, stergein, agapan), will normally have once been returned.\footnote{Off all the cases we have seen, the only one-sided attraction was on the part of Hermione; however as a wedded wife she at least had the right to expect some affection from her husband, even though it had never materialised.} On learning of a rival, other affects are simultaneously aroused: typically orgê, misos and phthonos, with grief and pride occasionally part of the mix. Generally some sort of destructive action follows, in tragedy (and occasionally elsewhere) typically murder, in other genres some attempt either to make the disputed partner unattractive (e.g. shearing Glykera’s hair in Perikeiromenê, beating up the old woman in Wealth – the emotion in such situations being sometimes described as zêlotypia), or to harm the rival (e.g. beating each other up in Lysias 3 and 4, Theseus’ curse in Hippolytos, a threat of legal action in Aeschines 1). Phenomenologically, if not etymologically, this is all very similar to modern English ‘jealousy’.

However the social imbalance in ancient Greek (male-female, and free-slave) relationships creates some notable differences too. Women, especially wives or concubines in pseudo-marriage situations (who will generally be older and have lost their looks), lack the ability
to choose partners. Sex, status and stability therefore go hand in hand. Wives and long-term concubines exhibit jealousy when their status or the stability of their relationship is threatened, whether that is because they think they are about to be put aside for someone else, or because a mistress is being moved into their house; however they do not generally exhibit jealousy when their husbands merely have sex with someone else (albeit they may not be totally indifferent). Women in Greece, unlike men, do not generally have the freedom to leave their spouse for someone else, and are expected to be sexually faithful – it is therefore being cuckolded that arouses husbands’ jealousy. Outside of the marriage bond, whether in homoerotic passion for a youth or desire for a slave-woman, men operate in a context of unrestricted competition; they are sometimes (though not always) happy even to share the sexual favours of the beloved, but cannot accept being thrown over entirely, and they compete or struggle more overtly for possession.

As well as these striking gender differences, there are also differences between genres. The most obvious is that surviving tragedy contains several, clear, play-length portrayals of jealous women, while providing only two, brief, ambiguous portrayals of jealous men. In surviving New Comedy, however, we generally find jealousy associated with men, and in oratory even when we get the woman’s point of view it is focalised through the male speaker, who can choose motifs to play with or avoid as the circumstances demand.\textsuperscript{152} We should therefore see the almost complete lack of jealous men in tragedy as a strategic omission. Good tragedians (or indeed comedians or logographers) edit situations and reactions: there is a divergence between tragedy and real life, which comedy and oratory can approximate much more closely. Zeitlin has argued that tragedy is mainly preoccupied with men, and that women are ‘the Other’ who exist to define men and probe masculine values.\textsuperscript{153} Perhaps this indicates that jealous women in tragedy reify ‘the Other’ within men, the potential vice of destructive jealousy in the hearts of all Greeks, which in the ‘Othering’ ideology of tragedy can only safely be portrayed in women.\textsuperscript{154} New Comedy, however, allows the portrayal of jealous men (though at least in surviving plays stops short of portraying it within conventional marriage), and the two examples we have portray scenarios much more similar to those represented in the oratorical corpus.

\textsuperscript{152} New Comedy too tends to use male focalisers.
\textsuperscript{153} Zeitlin (1990) 68-71.
\textsuperscript{154} Possibly for the same reason, Homer does not portray Menelaus as motivated by jealousy in pressing his brother to war.
Conclusions

In the absence of direct access to the emotional experiences of Greeks of the Archaic and Classical period in Athens and elsewhere, and given our dependence on written texts, it is perhaps unsurprising that so much effort has been devoted to lexical study. There are, as was observed in the Introduction, significant advantages to such an approach, especially when we wish to chart the semantic range and the conceptual boundaries between emotions as defined by ancient writers. However, an elusive emotion like envy/phthonos, which is bounded by taboos, can properly be explored only in the abstract by such an approach. I hope to have demonstrated that a methodological approach such as that adopted in this thesis – which focuses less on specific terminology than on identifying and examining envy and jealousy scenarios (or, more properly, phthonos and Greek sexual jealousy scenarios) – can be fruitful in illuminating the emotions as experience beyond the possibilities permitted by a purely lexical approach. On a phenomenological level, the modern, multidisciplinary research into envy and jealousy and related emotions has helped to illuminate the Greek phenomena, allowing me first to explore the socio-psychological extent of phthonos itself, and second to show how phthonos can be paired with (or differentiated from) other emotions. The use of constructs derived from modern social sciences as a means of exploring ancient phenomena inevitably raises questions, but the validity of the use of modern phenomenological readings of emotion is in this case confirmed by a close examination of Aristotle’s theorisation of phthonos.

The application of this approach to different Classical Athenian genres produced differing results, which shed new light on discrete aspects of those genres, in turn reflecting back on aspects of Classical Athenian society. I have shown that phthonos can be, and indeed frequently is, used by speakers in oratory to discredit their opponents; it can also be aroused in the audience, either explicitly by name when it applies to (justified) resentment over the misuse of money or political power, or more covertly through manipulation of ideology when (malicious) envy is the desired emotion. I have argued that the arousal of phthonos against politicians, ostensibly as moral resentment but also as a cover for malicious envy, in the audience of Old Comedy ensures that one function of this genre is to allow a non-
Conclusions

destructive outlet for *phthonos*. In this case it can be argued plausibly that the appeal to *phthonos*, though it was never (fully) theorised in this way by the Athenians themselves, has a politically useful role in helping to stabilise the democratic system; and I have demonstrated how Aristophanes does this repeatedly in his political comedies of the 420s. The fullest socio-psychological exploration of Greek *phthonos* and sexual jealousy scenarios *qua* scenarios came from an exploration of tragedy; and due to the absence of *phthonos* words (or indeed even the existence of a label for sexual jealousy), this was rendered possible only by my theoretical approach.

Finally, it is worth drawing attention to two more general points that have emerged from this thesis. First that *phthonos* has a somewhat broader purview (including as it does a sense of moral resentment), and a much wider prevalence in Classical Athenian genres, than is generally appreciated. Second, that sexual jealousy does exist in Classical Athens despite the lack of a prototypical label; it is almost certainly not the only such emotion (‘positive’ pride is another that springs to mind), and it is instructive to consider just how thoroughly a theoretical approach can illuminate such phenomena when Greek and English lexica do not match.

I have suggested at various points in this thesis directions in which this research could be taken forward. Two avenues for potential research were suggested by the limits I set in my Introduction. The first would be to use the model I have created to investigate envy and/or jealousy in works or genres I have not touched (e.g. onstage *phthonos* in comedy; or *phthonos* in speeches in Thucydides), or other periods (e.g. *phthonos* in the speeches of Dio of Prusa; or sexual jealousy in the Greek novel – see p.16), or in other societies (e.g. *phthonos* within the courts of Hellenistic kings; or sexual jealousy in a society such as Sparta, where women’s lives were less closeted, and a citizen could allow another to have sex with his wife to produce children). The second avenue suggested would be to stay with Classical Athens, but change the model to allow investigation of material culture, for instance decrees (which would involve a greater comparative study of political and legislative theory), or curse tablets (which would require much greater exploration of comparative anthropological scholarship on magic).
Conclusions

A third avenue for research, and potentially the most exciting, would be to investigate other emotions via similar models: either emotions that have not yet been the subject of much research (e.g. hope, regret, positive pride); or ones on which research has been done, but so far primarily from a lexical point of view (e.g. anger, pity, grief). With the amount of scholarship that has been, and is being, published on individual emotions across a large variety of disciplines, I believe that Classicists should be much more open to using this rich trove to inform future research across a wide range of emotions – an intellectual cross-fertilisation that in due course might become mutual.
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