Bounding the efficiency of road pricing.
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
This paper deals with the following question associated with congestion pricing in a general network with either fixed or elastic travel demand: what is the maximum efficiency loss of a general second-best pricing scheme due to inexact marginal-cost pricing in comparison with the first-best pricing or system optimum case? A formal answer to this question is provided by establishing an inefficiency bound associated with a given road pricing scheme. An application of the methods is provided for the practical trial-and-error implementation of marginal-cost pricing with unknown demand functions.
|Title:||Bounding the efficiency of road pricing|
|Open access status:||An open access version is available from UCL Discovery|
|Keywords:||Nash game, inefficiency, congestion pricing, traffic equilibria|
|UCL classification:||UCL > School of BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > Civil, Environmental and Geomatic Engineering|
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