American Foundations and the ‘Scientific Study’ of International Relations in Europe, 1910-1940

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

by
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2009
Declaration

I, Katharina Elisabeth Rietzler, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

19 July 2009
Abstract
This thesis deals with the role of American philanthropic foundations in promoting an expert-led approach to international politics in Europe between the two world wars. Harking back to earlier forms of transatlantic elite internationalism, American foundations financed a number of institutions for the ‘scientific’ study of international relations, and constructed a transnational network of international relations specialists.

The organisations at the heart of this study, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, funded a variety of think tanks, academies and research institutes, some of which had international and some of which had national constituencies. Institutions supported by the foundations included the Hague Academy of International Law, the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik. Efforts to promote the cooperation between these institutions culminated in the funding of the International Studies Conference, a federation of institutes for the study of international relations organised under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1928.

The philanthropic project to promote a ‘scientific’ approach to international relations turned the foundations into actors in a new international politics which they sought to rationalise at the same time. This new international politics was marked by the post-1919 intertwining of governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernmental structures. Adopting a transnational approach which avoids conventional bilateral perspectives, this dissertation explores foundation activity in a variety of contexts. It analyses the foundations’ role as promoters of international expert exchange and internationalist education; as protagonists of American cultural diplomacy and targets of the cultural diplomacy of other countries; and finally, as nongovernmental organisations which undermined intergovernmental structures.

Ultimately, this thesis contributes to the transnational history of American philanthropic foundations and sheds light on the role of nongovernmental organisations as actors in 20th century international politics.
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Acknowledgments

First, I would like to thank my supervisors, Kathleen Burk and Adam Smith. They have been unflinching in their kindness, provided encouragement and advice when I needed it but also gave me as much intellectual freedom as possible. It has been a pleasure and a privilege to work under them.

Several institutions have supported the research on which this dissertation is based. The UCL Graduate School awarded a generous scholarship that ensured my financial independence for three years and provided additional material assistance for research trips and conference attendance. The UCL History Department helped with several travel bursaries and, most of all, a supportive and stimulating institutional setting. Further grants were provided by the German Historical Institute in Washington, D.C., the Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History and the Rockefeller Archive Center. Librarians and archivists make history writing possible and I certainly would not have been able to complete my research without their aid. Jane Gorjevsky at Columbia University’s Rare Book and Manuscript Library and Erwin Levold at the Rockefeller Archive Center have been particularly helpful over several years.

I was fortunate to be able to discuss my research at several scholarly gatherings in Britain and abroad, and I have benefited greatly from the comments and suggestions that I received. I would especially like to thank Helge Pharo of the Forum for Contemporary History at the University of Oslo who made it possible for me to come to Norway as a visiting scholar. Many people have freely given their advice, criticism and good cheer. I cannot mention them all here but I would like to single out those who have commented on parts of the dissertation in draft form: Daniel Laqua, John A. Thompson, Bjørn Arne Steine, Hanne Vik and Waqar Zaidi. I have much appreciated their thoughtful advice. I would also like to thank Mark and Susan Kaminsky who have been very gracious hosts on several occasions.

Throughout my graduate studies my family and friends have provided tremendous material and emotional support for which I am very grateful. Above all, special thanks go to Ananyo Bhattacharya.
## Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in the body of the thesis and the appendix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>AJIL</td>
<td>American Journal of International Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIL</td>
<td>American Society for International Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEIP</td>
<td>Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPE</td>
<td>Centre d’études de politique étrangère</td>
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<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Commonwealth Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRPS</td>
<td>Foreign Research and Press Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICIC</td>
<td>International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDI</td>
<td>Institut de droit international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHEI</td>
<td>Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales/Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIC</td>
<td>International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPR</td>
<td>Institute of Pacific Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Relations Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISC</td>
<td>International Studies Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSE</td>
<td>London School of Economics and Political Science</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSRM</td>
<td>Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Rockefeller Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIIA</td>
<td>Royal Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>YMCA</td>
<td>Young Men’s Christian Association</td>
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Introduction

On 26 April 1917, twenty days after the American declaration of war against Imperial Germany, Elihu Root, the President of the American Society of International Law, addressed his peers at their 11th annual meeting. In an attempt to rouse enthusiasm for the United States’ war against autocracy and Prussian militarism, Root chose the effect of democracy on international relations as the theme of his address. Echoing Woodrow Wilson’s ‘democratic peace theory’, Root claimed that autocratic regimes were inherently warlike, due to “the deep and settled purpose of a ruling family or a ruling aristocratic class to enlarge its power”, whereas democracies held no such “sinister policies of ambition” because of their aversion to secret diplomacy and large military spending. Of course, Root admitted, a democratically controlled foreign policy had its own pitfalls: “The peoples who govern themselves frequently misunderstand their international rights, and ignore their international duties. They are often swayed by prejudice, and blinded by passion. They are swift to decide in their own favor the most difficult questions upon which they are totally ignorant.” Here, Root stayed true to his conservative convictions and his patrician suspicion of popular participation in government. But he also claimed that the defects of a democratic foreign policy could be cured “by reason, by appeal to better instincts, by public discussion, by the ascertainment and dissemination of the true facts”, which were all practices that were honed in democratically governed polities.

Root’s address represented an attempt to spell out the conditions for a modern foreign policy fit for an age of mass democracy. Like many other liberal theorists of

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2 Root, “Effect of Democracy”: 161, 162, 163.
international relations, Root assumed that a well-thought-out framework for the conduct of the foreign relations of democratic states would lead to harmonious international relations and the absence of conflict. Democracy alone was not enough. Certain processes had to underpin the making of foreign policy, certain institutions had to be in place to “reason” and ascertain “the true facts”. Root did not spell out the exact shape of these processes and institutions but implied that a democracy needed to have a forum in which international relations could be rationally discussed.

A successful Wall Street lawyer, Elihu Root was not just the president of the American Society of International Law but shuttled between his private practice in New York City and high political offices in Washington D.C. which included Secretary of War, Secretary of State and United States Senator. But next to his corporate and his public duties, Root also made space in his life for a third kind of career, that of philanthropic leader. As the first president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Root presided over just the kind of organisation that, in his opinion, would fulfil the function of mediator, educator and voice of reason in the creation of a democratic foreign policy. The Carnegie Endowment was one of several American philanthropic foundations that took a strong interest in international relations, starting from the 1910s. In the course of the 20th century, these transnationally operating foundations were instrumental in shaping debates on international relations in several countries, both on the level of academic discourse and among foreign policy-making elites. They enjoyed intimate links with government officials, international organisations, and both local and international nongovernmental organisations. They were also involved in humanitarian missions and fostered the transfer of technologies, research practices and ideas in many disciplines. Most importantly, they were key players in a ‘politics of knowledge’ that determined which fields and approaches would become most relevant to policy making,
how knowledge-creating elites would be constituted and what the relationship between experts and non-experts would look like.³

This dissertation investigates the attempt of American philanthropic foundations to create a modern, scientific model for the formation of foreign policy and to promote it in Europe during the 1920s and the 1930s. This they did by supporting the study of international relations which was, at least before the Second World War, a multidisciplinary field of inquiry. The organisations at the heart of the dissertation, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, fostered a network of international affairs institutes in Europe with the aim of shaping a transatlantic expert elite capable of generating foreign policy ideas and transporting them into the political sphere.⁴ Strengthening international and national institutes in Europe, for example the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik in Berlin, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, the foundations hoped that scientific exchange would depoliticise international conflicts. Their efforts culminated in the funding of the International Studies Conferences, organised under the auspices of the League of Nations between 1928 and 1940. American philanthropic foundations aimed at a reform of the international system, based on a belief in the possibility of progressive change in international relations. Therefore, their attempts to shape the emerging discipline of international relations deserve special attention.

The chronological scope of this study ranges from the creation of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1910 to the wartime closure of the Paris offices

⁴ A note on terminology: this dissertation is chiefly concerned with ‘experts’ and not ‘intellectuals’, although quite a few of the individuals under discussion could be described as intellectuals. Alfred Zimmern, an interwar international relations specialist discussed in this study, defined experts as those who put specialist knowledge to practical use, while intellectuals deal in abstract thought. Alfred Zimmern, “Democracy and the Expert”, Political Quarterly 1, no. 1 (1930): 24; for a concise and systematic discussion of recent literature on intellectuals see Gangolf Hübinger, Gelehrte, Politik und Öffentlichkeit: Eine Intellektuellengeschichte (Göttingen: 2006), chapter 1.
of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment in 1940. While an attempt has been made to emphasise continuities that linked the periods before and after the Great War, the focus of this study rests on the years between the First and the Second World War, for several reasons. First, relatively little has been published on the nexus between foundation philanthropy and foreign policy during the interwar years, at least in comparison to the post-1945 period. Second, the interwar years saw fundamental but gradual shifts in state-society relations. It was during this period that the large corporate foundation came of age in the United States and funding practices and patterns were established, especially with regard to overseas programmes. But the ways in which the American nation and the American state related to the rest of the world also underwent a transformation between the wars. Before 1914, as has been argued by Ian Tyrrell, Americans maintained close private ties with the rest of the world, mainly due to the salience of the immigration experience, but the American state remained detached from the international community. By the mid-20th century, however, the American people had become more insular, while their state had integrated much more closely with global structures. This larger shift is mirrored in developments that affected the relations between philanthropic foundations on the one hand and theorists and practitioners in the field of international relations on the other. In the early 20th century, American foundations were intent on building private networks across national boundaries. Towards the late 1930s, foundation officers increasingly coordinated their policies with governmental agencies, and finally cooperated with the State Department during the Second World War.

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6 Ian Tyrrell, Transnational Nation: United States History in Global Perspective since 1789 (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 185-186.
Third, the 1920s and 1930s also provided a specific environment for
transnationally operating non-governmental organisations, harbingers of what may be
called a global civil society.\(^7\) Structures established through the League of Nations gave
those groups a novel prominence and expanded field of action. Some, including the
foundations, became key nongovernmental players in the milieu around the League. The
borders between an official sphere, dominated by states, and the nongovernmental
sector were not as robust, however, as they became after World War II. Careers such as
that of Elihu Root, who moved freely between the spheres of market, state and ‘third
sector’, were not uncommon.\(^8\) The relationship of NGOs to the international community
of states changed when it was, for the first time, formally set out in Article 71 of the UN
Charter in 1945. A clear definition of nongovernmental organisations was put forward
which spelled out the conditions under which they could acquire consultative status and
thereby participate in the UN system. This, however, implied more governmental
control.\(^9\) Philanthropic foundations form a distinct sub-group of third sector or non-
governmental organisations and can be defined as independent non-profit organisations
which have financial endowments and primarily make grants to other organisations.\(^10\) In
the interwar years, American foundations were unique in their global remit and
broadness of vision and did not have equivalents outside the United States.

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\(^8\) The concept of the ‘third sector’ was first formulated by U.S. sociologist Amitai Etzioni in the 1970s. Third sector organisations are rooted in civil society, are non-governmental and do not pursue profit-driven interests. Etzioni regarded the third sector as instrumental in bringing about social reform. For an overview of the third sector see Helmut K. Anheier and Wolfgang Seibel, eds., *The Third Sector: Comparative Studies of Nonprofit Organizations* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990).

\(^9\) The inclusion of NGOs in the UN can be interpreted both as a recognition of their work during the interwar years and the attempt of governments to control and use those organisations. Christy Jo Snider, “The Influence of Transnational Peace Groups on U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Makers during the 1930s: Incorporating NGOs into the UN”, *Diplomatic History* 27, no. 3 (2003); for a recent assessment of NGOs in the UN see Kerstin Martens, *NGOs and the United Nations: Institutionalization, Professionalization and Adaptation* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

Fourth, the interwar years were also a formative period for the study of international relations. This was a time when the discipline began to be institutionalised at universities but scientific discourses on international topics were not yet monopolised by academia. Nongovernmental organisations and think tanks played an important role in defining what the scientific study of international relations would look like. Only after 1945 did international relations become a rather narrow subfield of political science, and historians of the discipline have only started to inquire why this came about.\textsuperscript{11}

Maybe more than other nongovernmental organisations, foundations face a complex relationship with democratic accountability. Political scientist Robert Arnove even asserts that “foundations like Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford have a corrosive influence on a democratic society”.\textsuperscript{12} Therefore, examining their vision for the conduct of international politics in democratic states might shed light on what is, in Matthew Connelly’s words, “[o]ne of the key problems of contemporary history”, namely “to understand how world politics is becoming more pluralistic without becoming more democratic”.\textsuperscript{13} This study contributes to the existing historiography on American philanthropic foundations which has for more than twenty years engaged with the question of how foundations shape national societies but also the international sphere. However, this dissertation tries to reformulate these questions by introducing new methodological tools, perspectives and archival resources to the study of the subject. In the following, recent trends in the literature on American foundations will be reviewed and different methodological approaches will be evaluated. A final section is dedicated


\textsuperscript{13} C.A. Bayly et al., “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History”, \textit{American Historical Review} 111, no. 5 (2006): 1461; on the relevance of NGOs see also Akira Iriye, “A Century of NGOs”, \textit{Diplomatic History} 23, no. 3 (1999).
to current debates on the history of international relations as a discipline, as they also
influence the design of this study.

The Historiography of Foundation Philanthropy: Institutional Histories, Peace History
and the Debate on Hegemony

The first institutional histories of American foundations were produced by members of
the close-knit philanthropic circles made up of former staff and trustees. Although these
accounts remain valuable and offer an insider’s perspective, they generally lack
scholarly rigour.14 In the 1980s, the systematic study of philanthropy and the third
sector in general took off in the United States. Specialized interdisciplinary research
centres and networks were set up, such as the Independent Research Sector Committee,
the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action, the
International Society for Third Sector Research, or the Center on Philanthropy at
Indiana University. During that time, philanthropic foundations also started to ask
professional historians to write scholarly histories of their institutions and thereby
opened the way for an assessment of foundation philanthropy from a broader historical
perspective. Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, the author of monographs on the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and the Carnegie Corporation, chose to
put foundation activity in the context of the development of social policy in the United
States. A similar approach was taken in two influential essays by Barry Karl and
Stanley Katz. Recently, Judith Sealander’s work on ‘scientific philanthropy’, which has
the merit of analysing lesser-known organizations such as the Commonwealth Fund, has
also investigated philanthropic contributions to the making of American social policy.15

14 Examples include Raymond B. Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation (New York: Harper,
1952); Robert H. Bremner, American Philanthropy, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988
15 Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, Private Power for the Public Good: A History of the Carnegie Foundation
for the Advancement of Teaching (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1983); Lagemann,
It is noteworthy that all these authors restricted themselves to the domestic history of American philanthropy. Lagemann explained this limited focus by claiming that foundations’ overseas programmes were simply “extensions of domestic programs and program rationales”. However, Lagemann’s own study of the Carnegie Corporation suggests that such a view of foundation activity might be too reductive. In a chapter on the Carnegie Corporation’s grant to Gunnar Myrdal for the writing of *An American Dilemma*, one of the most influential book on U.S. race relations in the 20th century, Lagemann herself makes the point that foundation officers regarded former colonial administrators in Africa as experts on race relations. However, she does not enquire how the Carnegie Corporation’s previous educational programmes in Africa or its sponsoring of an African Survey compiled by the Royal Institute of International Affairs shaped the foundation’s actions and expectations when it commissioned *An American Dilemma*. By assuming that foundations simply copied domestic templates when they went abroad, Lagemann precludes the possibility of a different dynamic, namely policy being shaped at home and abroad at the same time. This example suggests that by blanking out either the foreign or the domestic dimension of philanthropic policies historians risk leaving out large parts of the story. Nevertheless, foundation history continues to be written with these biases.

This is not to say that there is a dearth of histories dealing with the overseas programmes of American philanthropic foundations. Merle Curti’s ground-breaking monograph on U.S. philanthropy abroad remains a standard account, although it makes scant conceptual distinction between foundation philanthropy, charity, humanitarian

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*Lagermann, Politics of Knowledge*, 329.


organisations such as the Red Cross, and individual fundraising. Nor is there much source material on the reception of American philanthropy abroad. Curti speculates that overseas recipients in general showed gratitude for American help, but he has little to say about specific forms of cooperation between American philanthropic groups and local beneficiaries. Studies on foundation philanthropy which were published in the 1980s and 1990s have generally tried to analyse in greater detail how programmes were received abroad. Much of this more recent work has focused on Rockefeller-funded organisations and their activities in Latin America, South-East Asia and the Far East, with a special focus on medicine and agriculture. Mary Brown Bullock, for example, assessed the local impact of the Rockefeller Foundation’s support for Peking Union Medical College by tracing the careers of the College’s Chinese alumni, and by chronicling the successes, failures and unintended outcomes of the Rockefeller Foundation’s policies. Crucially, she also used Chinese primary sources. An insightful article by Steven Palmer captured the complexity of ‘philanthropic encounters’ in an analysis of the Rockefeller Foundation’s public health programme in Costa Rica. Underlining the importance of local dynamics, Palmer argued that foundation officers were “double agents”, furthering the interests of American “imperial medicine” but also taking the side of certain groups within the host country. In addition, foundation officers, who were often trained in the sciences they promoted abroad, felt an allegiance to a transnational scientific community.

In the late 1980s, European historians also started to use systematically the archives of the Rockefeller Foundation in studies on the development of academic institutions and disciplines. Pioneering work was published by Giuliana Gemelli and Brigitte Mazon, who both focused on French academia before and after World War II. Mazon in particular concluded that success or failure of Rockefeller social science projects in France was determined by local institutional structures and not by the intentions of the American donors.\(^{22}\)

The impact of foundation philanthropy in a number of European countries has been explored further in several collections of articles, edited or co-edited by Gemelli. These studies have covered the disciplines of economics, philosophy, sociology and political science—though not specifically international relations.\(^{23}\) Some of these articles developed alternative ways of conceptualising the complex donor-recipient relationships created by foundation philanthropy, emphasising the importance of foundation officers’ perceptions of prospective donors instead of outside factors.\(^{24}\) However, many studies collected in the volumes mentioned above rely on foundation archives and focus narrowly on particular scholars and institutions. More recently, scholars have adopted prosopographical approaches to assess the impact of foundation philanthropy in a number of European countries.

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support. Several ongoing or recently completed research projects on American foundations in Europe also seek to connect foundation history with general debates on the European-American relationship in the 20th century. Nevertheless, the specifics of American philanthropic work in Europe are rarely connected to themes within U.S. history and American foreign relations. Also, there remains a strong bias towards Rockefeller and Ford philanthropy. This can be partly explained by the Rockefeller Foundation’s pre-eminence in overseas philanthropy due to its financial prowess, geographical reach and disciplinary diversity. This role was taken over by the Ford Foundation after 1945.

Historical accounts of the Carnegie Endowment have often been written from a very different theoretical perspective. Founded in 1910, the Carnegie Endowment was created as a grant-giving institution for peace groups. Thus, in the scholarly literature, the Endowment received systematic treatment first by historians of the American peace movement, notably David S. Patterson, Michael Lutzker and C. Roland Marchand, whose research questions were shaped by the then emerging field of peace history. Despite the occasional exploring of transnational links to peace movements abroad, the focus of these studies remained firmly on the United States and on the years between

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26 In October 2008, the French historian Ludovic Tournès completed a habilitation à diriger des recherches on American foundations and the Americanisation of Europe in the 20th century, entitled “La philanthropie américaine et l’Europe: contribution à une histoire transnationale de l’américanisation”. While it has not been possible to consult this work for this dissertation, several of Tournès’s articles on the topic have been taken into account. Helke Rausch, based at the University of Leipzig, is working on a German Habilitation on American foundations and the social sciences in Britain, France and Germany between the First World War and the 1960s. An outline of her approach, which is based on the history of cultural transfers and comparative history, can be gleaned from a recently published article. Helke Rausch, “US-amerikanische “Scientific Philanthropy” in Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien zwischen den Weltkriegen”, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 33, no. 1 (2007).

27 See, however, a recent article on the Rockefeller Foundation and German émigré scholars which links their role in U.S. intelligence work during World War II to the intellectual foundations of the New Left. Tim B. Müller, “Die gelehrten Krieger und die Rockefeller-Revolution: Intellektuelle zwischen Geheimdienst, Neuer Linken und dem Entwurf einer neuen Ideengeschichte”, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 33 (2007).
the Endowment’s foundation and the end of the Great War.\textsuperscript{28} Two dissertations on the Endowment, one of which has been completed recently, analyse the 1920s and 1930s. While both are valuable and succeed in sifting through the expansive institutional archives, they also focus narrowly on the Endowment, in particular on its propaganda division under Nicholas Murray Butler, and do not explore its links with other American foundations. Neither do they consult archival material housed outside the United States. Foreign-language literature is generally not discussed.\textsuperscript{29}

This can lead to misplaced emphases. John Greco, for example, organises an entire chapter around the so-called Chatham House Conference that the Endowment organised at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1935 to promote economic internationalism. Nicholas Murray Butler, the Endowment’s president at the time, termed the conference a “brilliant success”, and Greco does not significantly challenge this assessment.\textsuperscript{30} However, as British archival records reveal, the conference led to bad feelings between the Endowment and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The British Institute was so “embarrassed” by the propagandistic character of the conference that it sought to distance itself from it.\textsuperscript{31} Given the importance of Chatham House as the premier British foreign policy think tank in the interwar years, this episode was a severe set-back in the context of the Endowment’s plan to promote closer Anglo-American


\textsuperscript{31} Ivison Macadam to Malcolm Davis, 5 February 1936, Royal Institute of International Affairs Registry Files, Chatham House Library and Archive, London (hereafter RIIA), 10/1.5a
relations, even if the conference received much publicity in the press. Greco ultimately makes external circumstances responsible for the limited impact of the ideas promoted at the Chatham House Conference—the nations of the world were not ready for the Endowment’s message. But possibly the reasons for the Endowment’s failures can be found more locally, and not in vague circumstantial evidence.

For almost thirty years one constant feature in the writing on American philanthropic foundations has been the debate on their role in promoting the hegemony of ruling elites in a capitalist system. Building on Antonio Gramsci’s Marxist methodology, which proposes that ruling classes achieve domination not by coercion but by convincing the rest of society that they deserve to rule, one side of this debate argues that the foundations’ programmes were designed to maintain an unequal and unjust status quo. Accordingly, as Donald Fisher has claimed, the foundations promoted empirical research designed to facilitate “social control” in its practical applications. Other scholars, notably Edward Berman, surveyed the international programmes of American foundations after 1945 and came to the conclusion that they supported U.S. foreign policy and global capitalism by “encouraging certain ideals congruent with their objectives and by supporting those educational institutions which specialize in the production and dissemination of these ideas”. The Gramscian literature on foundations frequently cites two arguments, first, that foundation trustees and staff come from a small and powerful section of society which seeks to defend its vested interests, and

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second, that foundations are very adept at controlling ideas and culture, thereby perpetuating structures of domination in the United States and abroad.

Scholars sceptical of such an approach have generally tried to undermine these arguments. Martin Bulmer, whose exchange with Donald Fisher in the pages of Sociology sums up the fault lines in the debate on foundations in the 1980s, claimed that the links between founder families such as the Rockefellers and foundation staff were vastly exaggerated, and that there was no conclusive proof that foundation funding, and not internal developments, determined scholarly trends within the social sciences.34 Some of Bulmer’s criticism was justified, especially regarding the claim that foundation policies were drawn up by a hermetically shielded, close-knit elite in New York City. Considering the numerous and varied inputs into foundation policies, also those of potential grant recipients with whom foundation staff often forged a cooperative relationship, this seems indeed misleading.35 Another outcome of this early debate between scholars favouring a Gramscian analysis and those who did not was a shift in focus from the founders of philanthropic organisations to foundation officers who were in charge of the day-to-day running of grant programmes.36

But the question of whether the relationship between foundations and grant recipients was one marked by control or autonomy remains a valid one. Some scholars in the United States have shown a tendency to evade this question, mostly by taking issue with the use of a Gramscian framework. Barry Karl and Stanley Katz argued that

36 However, it must be said that founder intervention did happen and has to be acknowledged, which is why the Rockefeller Family Archives have also been examined for this dissertation. For a discussion of the intertwining of Rockefeller Foundation policies and the personal philanthropy of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., see next chapter.
“the application of European theories such as Gramsci’s” to American politics was “problematic”, due to the uniqueness of the American political system.³⁷ Judith Sealander equally dismissed the content of the Bulmer-Fisher debate: “Gramsci exaggerated the influence exercised by upper classes, but the most interesting question is not “Is Gramsci right?” It is Why has the debate about the policy-making role of early-twentieth-century foundations remained so static?”³⁸

This focus on methodology, however, obscures important issues that are at stake in the study of the history of foundations. Defining them as ‘American’ phenomena, despite their transnational entanglements, and claiming that they cannot be captured by ‘European’ theories is inadequate. Besides, the debate on foundations and hegemony has recently been reinvigorated and expanded, in the context of discussions on the role of American philanthropy in the ‘Cultural Cold War’. During the 1940s and 1950s the previously tenuous alliances between foundation philanthropy and the American government solidified into what Volker Berghahn has termed a “symbiotic relationship”.³⁹ For many historians, the most salient example of this relationship remains the Congress for Cultural Freedom which was publicly supported by the Ford Foundation and covertly financed by the CIA.⁴⁰ Again, those writing on the topic


generally fall into two camps: some claim that European scholars and intellectuals who accepted American funding had a large degree of autonomy in what they thought and wrote. The CIA may have paid for publications and meetings but that did not mean that it was able to control cultural messages. Others, often using a Gramscian framework, deny this and argue that the Ford Foundation became an effective vehicle for CIA propaganda, lending its own reputation to the compromised enterprise that was the Congress for Cultural Freedom. As the Cold War was waged on all fronts, so this argument goes, philanthropic foundations disregarded the ideal of intellectual freedom and acted in the interest of the American state.  

This point of view has recently received a nuanced reinterpretation, in a monograph by John Krige which examines the nexus between American philanthropy, Cold War foreign policy in Europe and the natural sciences. Krige uses the concept of “consensual hegemony”, a term coined by Charles Maier, to analyse how American foreign policy makers and foundations rebuilt European science to reflect American concerns. This they did not through coercion but with the help of European partners who shared core values and, by accepting American leadership, were able to further their own personal and political goals. Interpreting the relationship between the American government, foundations and European scientists as hegemonic but consensual has the advantage that the term allows for a certain openness of outcomes. It emphasises that collaboration was brought about by negotiation but still underlines that there were differentials in power. The disadvantage of this concept is that it is firmly rooted in a Cold War framework. Krige is not the only scholar to claim that cultural

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41 For an overview on different interpretations of the Congress for Cultural Freedom see Hans Krabbendam and Giles Scott-Smith, eds., The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960, Special Issue of Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 18, no. 2 (2003).
influence, broadly defined, is a function of military and economic power. As the United States emerged as the leader of the ‘West’ in a bipolar world, it naturally sought to build a transatlantic community of values, norms and beliefs, modelled on those it possessed itself.

But how did these dynamics play out before the Cultural Cold War? What was the relationship between the American government and civil society groups that engaged in cross-border cultural and scientific activities in the interwar years? During that time the United States may have maintained an informal empire in the Western hemisphere but its relations with European states, notably Britain, were marked by competition and collaboration. Moreover, the United States was a relative latecomer in terms of establishing a formal infrastructure for the conduct of cultural diplomacy. The French Service des œuvres françaises à l’étranger and the Kulturabteilung of the German Auswärtige Amt were both established in 1920, and both had pre-war roots. Even in Britain where, similar to the United States, private initiatives dominated the field of cultural relations, the Foreign Office set up the British Council as a vehicle for cultural propaganda in 1934 and integrated it fully into British foreign policy. Once the State Department created its Division of Cultural Relations in 1938, it still relied heavily on the ideas and personnel of those agencies that had unofficially steered American cultural relations before. These included professional academic associations such as the American Council of Learned Societies and the American Library

Association, think tanks, notably the Council on Foreign Relations and, most importantly, some of the large philanthropic foundations.47

Only during the Second World War were the foundations actively and systematically encouraged to coordinate their programmes with official U.S. foreign policy and in turn the collaboration between foundations officers and the State Department became close. For example, Malcolm Davis, acting director of the Carnegie Endowment’s education department, worked for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) from 1941, dedicating his mornings to philanthropy and his afternoons to affairs of state.48 But does the late onset of governmental management of international cultural relations in the United States automatically mean that “The US was a newcomer to culture wars” in the Cold War, as Tony Judt has implied?49

For most of the 1920s and 1930s the relationship between foreign policy makers and foundations was marked by ambivalence, as foundation staff simply could not be sure whether having the official backing of their government would be an asset or a liability abroad. The following letter from George E. Vincent, then president of the Rockefeller Foundation, to Alanson B. Houghton, U.S. ambassador to Germany, illustrates this dilemma:

We desire to avoid undue publicity. We work with many countries and it is our policy to keep the Foundation and its personnel in the background. It would seriously interfere with our work if it were regarded as a form of nationalistic propaganda. We shall count, therefore, upon your co-operation in helping us to avoid anything which might seem to involve us in international politics or might prove embarrassing to our work throughout the world.

In effect, in this letter Vincent is asking for governmental cooperation to produce the appearance of non-cooperation. The unspoken assumption is that some level of state-

48 The Reminiscences of Malcolm Davis (1950), in the Oral History Collection of Columbia University (hereafter Davis Oral History), iii, 342.
private coordination is expected. This is underlined by Vincent’s promise to keep Houghton informed: “Our representatives when they go to Berlin will make a point of calling upon you and letting you know how things are going.”

Foreign governments also regarded American foundations as an important factor in transatlantic diplomatic relations. The Carnegie Endowment, for example, paid a number of foreign “correspondents” to furnish its trustees with confidential reports from abroad. Its German correspondents were outspoken pacifists who criticised the Weimar government in their missives. In a letter to the Auswärtige Amt, a German diplomat posted in Washington complained about their impact: “You cannot imagine the effect of these reports. One carries them to the President, to Congress, to the Administration, and takes them to be the gospel.” Thus, foundations certainly were players in the international ‘culture wars’, if they can be called that, of the interwar years, even if the collaboration with American government agencies took on a different quality than in later periods. Moreover, it seems that foundation activity as cultural diplomacy should also be viewed from the receiving end in order to be adequately assessed.

Three broad conclusions can be drawn from a review of the existing literature on American foundations. First, the international activities of American foundations should be traced using multi-archival research, possibly including governmental archives and those of international organisations. Only then can conclusions on the creation and outcomes of particular policies be drawn. Second, there are several imbalances in the current scholarship: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has been neglected, more systematic accounts of the interwar years are required, and little is known about foundation activity on the margins of, or outside of, academia. The

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50 12 Dec 1922, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (hereafter NARA), Record Group 59, Decimal File 862.1281 R59/-.  
51 “Sie machen sich von der Wirkung dieser Berichte keine Vorstellung; man trägt sie beim Präsidenten, im Kongress und in der Administration herum und hält sie für ein Evangelium.” Dieckhoff to Bülow, 16 October 1925, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin (hereafter PA AA), R 53703, VM 4065.
study of international relations is especially interesting with regard to the latter point as it was pioneered in independent think tanks and research institutes. Finally, writing the history of American foundations purely as part of American social, cultural or political history entails the risks of omission and distortion. Writing it from a purely disciplinary perspective, as historians of science tend to do, results in narrow studies that contribute little to our understanding of how nongovernmental organisations function in international politics. Writing this history as international history risks clinging too much to a Cold War framework. In the following section, possible methodological approaches will be discussed.

Methodological Considerations: Transnational History and Cultural Diplomacy

The history of American foundations cannot be written as national history. These organisations were deeply involved with local academic milieus outside the United States which they shaped through the active building of institutions and the furthering of individual careers. Professional biographies which included foundation patronage often spanned several countries—especially in the interwar years which were marked by the large-scale phenomenon of refugee scholars. Jewish and left-wing intellectuals fleeing fascism often received foundation aid, which helped them to find university appointments in the democratic states of Europe and, increasingly, in the United States. But the links established by philanthropic foundations also had repercussions in the United States. In fact, it has long been acknowledged that the “American” discipline of international relations was heavily influenced by the pre-1945 influx of

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52 See the articles, both on individual scholars and the refugee problem as such, in Giuliana Gemelli, ed., The “Unacceptables”: American Foundations and Refugee Scholars between the Two Wars and After (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press - Peter Lang, 2000).
scholars and ideas from Europe. Arnold Wolfers is only one example of a foundation protégé who went on to become an influential IR scholar in the United States.\textsuperscript{53}

Not just academic milieus were shaped, the foundations themselves were transnational organisations moulded by the way they operated. Both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment maintained European branch offices. Policies and funding practices were not developed remotely in American headquarters but in discussions with potential or former grant recipients or other advisers to the foundations. Moreover, the foundations cooperated among themselves, sharing expertise but also engaging in conflict and competition. Apart from academic and philanthropic milieus, governmental agencies, both in the United States and abroad, played a role in the making, executing and sometimes the breaking of philanthropic programmes. It is important to note that these different milieus were not strictly separated—far from it. A ‘foundation insider’ could also be an academic and a government advisor.\textsuperscript{54} American foundations also participated in the shaping of intergovernmental structures, notably in their dealings with the League of Nations. In the field of international relations, they were involved with the League milieu through major projects, first by founding the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies and then by bankrolling much of the League’s Intellectual Cooperation Organisation.\textsuperscript{55} Finally, the foundations created transnational spaces for scholarly discussion, even


\textsuperscript{54} Two examples may be instructive here. William Rappard (1883-1958), a Swiss jurist, economic historian and politician, co-founded the Graduate Institute for International Studies in Geneva with the help of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, but also headed the League of Nations’ Mandates Section between 1920 and 1925. Rappard took part in several non-official international meetings on foreign policy in Williamstown, Mass., and Europe. Ernst Jäckh (1875-1959), co-founder of the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, was a protégé of both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment and in the course of his career advised both the German and the British government.

\textsuperscript{55} See chapters 2 and 4.
though national loyalties could and frequently did interfere with intellectual universalism.\textsuperscript{56}

Foundation activity in the interwar years can only be captured adequately if these different levels and the resulting dynamics are taken into account. This necessitates a transnational approach. Due to their multiple entanglements abroad, American foundations can be interpreted as transnational nongovernmental organisations, the agendas and behaviours of which were shaped in numerous places in different parts of the world.\textsuperscript{57} Political scientists have defined transnational relations as “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent”.\textsuperscript{58} This definition is useful as a starting point, though one may ask whether analytical divisions between state and non-state actors and correspondingly between international relations, i.e. state-to-state relations, and transnational relations can be so neatly upheld on the empirical level. After all, ‘public’ and ‘private’ are socially constructed categories and historical variables that do not remain stable over time. In many domestic arenas in which foundations were active, public and private intersected. As social historians have long pointed out, the modern welfare state has always relied on a mixed economy of state and private, not just in the United States but also in Europe.\textsuperscript{59}

Historians have, for several years now, attempted to come to terms with these complexities and engaged in substantial reflection on the significance of transnational

\textsuperscript{56} See the ground-breaking article by Brigitte Schroeder-Gudehus, “Challenge to Transnational Loyalties: International Scientific Organizations after the First World War”, \textit{Science Studies} 3, no. 2 (1973).
\textsuperscript{57} They do not entirely fit the definition of international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) which have formal membership organisations in several countries. See John Boli and George M. Thomas, “INGOs and the Organization of World Culture”, in \textit{Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875}, ed. John Boli and George M. Thomas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 20.
approaches to the writing of history.\textsuperscript{60} This debate has stimulated research agendas in
different subfields: in social and cultural history it has drawn attention to the role of
networks and transmission processes and shifted the emphasis from structure to agency.
In the area of international history, it has highlighted the role of non-state actors.\textsuperscript{61} More
recently, and somewhat paradoxically, transnational perspectives have informed the
writing of national history, as seen in the work of Thomas Bender and Ian Tyrrell. Both
writers build on established methodological tools: comparative history, employed by
Bender, and the history of transfers, in the case of Tyrrell.\textsuperscript{62}

But the ‘transnational turn’ has not just effected a shift in perspective, subject
matters and interpretation, it has also inspired methodological innovation. One such
novel approach is \textit{histoire croisée}. Formulated by Michael Werner and Bénédicte
Zimmermann, it is the result of a methodological critique of comparative history as well
as of the history of cultural transfers. Werner and Zimmermann argue that historical
comparisons tend to be overly abstract. They construct stable analytical categories of
comparison, for example ‘secondary education’, and then proceed to apply them to
different national settings. This, however, denies the historicity of such categories.
Moreover, relations between the objects of comparison are generally neglected. The
history of transfers does take such links into account but also relies on fixed starting


points which are often located in stable national references such as ‘the American system of higher education’. *Histoire croisée* represents the attempt to view national categories as essentially fluid by considering the objects of historical research in relation to one another, emphasising how they are transformed in processes of interrelation, mutual constitution, influence or rejection. On the empirical level, *histoire croisée* traces actors, objects and interactions and their intertwining in multiple and often contradictory dynamics, attempting to ‘cross’ multiple perspectives and scales.63 For an analysis of the activities of American foundations in the field of international relations, this approach seems useful. It certainly fits the empirical basis and may be able to elucidate how a multiplicity of synchronic and interwoven processes structured discourses on international relations in the interwar years. More importantly, this way of writing history offers an opportunity to move the study of foundation activity overseas away from ‘bilateral’ approaches which are necessarily reductive.64 But how does *histoire croisée* stand up to criticisms that have been levelled at the transnational history project in general? How does it differ from the approaches that international historians have commonly adopted when analysing culture and the activities of non-state actors across national borders?

Like other transnational approaches, *histoire croisée* attempts to deprive the nation of its privileged status as the driving force of historical narratives. American historians in particular see these new ways of writing history as a probate measure to counter exceptionalism. But not all contributors to the debate on transnational history have been optimistic. Critics have pointedly asked whether transnational history will not

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64 A classic example of the bilateral approach is Linda Killen, “The Rockefeller Foundation in the First Yugoslavia”, *East European Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (1990); even comparative projects run the risk of framing foundation activity abroad as the sum of a number of bilateral relationships with specific countries, see e.g. Rausch, “US-amerikanische Scientific Philanthropy”.
just provide an apologia of globalisation, writing master narratives of global, U.S.-
dominated capitalism instead of the nation. Louis Pérez warns against consigning “the
nation … to the dustbin” if only because “[t]he success of the New World Order may be
measured in global terms, but its failures are experienced in national settings”.65
Moreover, Pérez makes clear that not all nations are the same, especially with regard to
the power they are able to exert on others:

People on the periphery of history, most of whom arrived at the condition of
nation as a function of their determination to cast off domination, are conscious
of the global context of their collective well-being. Indeed, their struggle to
sustain claims of self-determination and sovereignty has been most commonly
registered by way of the nation … On the contrary, the United States is the
premier nation among nations, possessed of the means to flout international law,
abrogate or ignore international agreements, and enact legislation with
extraterritorial reach—all in defense of sovereignty and national interests. The
call to enrich the history of the United States by transcending borders—
presumably including the borders of others—is to subsume the global into the
national. The United States thus becomes the world.66

Pérez’s critique of what he sees as a new historiographical imperialism basks the
transnational history project in a more ambiguous light. He reminds transnational
historians not to disregard the role of state power, and it is the sovereign nation-state
that Pérez is talking about.67

International history has always emphasised the role of power in relations
between nation-states. While international history has traditionally focussed on state-to-
state relations, the field has been remarkably open to change for some time. Categories
and concepts borrowed from cultural and social history have been incorporated into the

65 Louis A. Pérez, Jr., “We Are the World: Internationalizing the National, Nationalizing the
International”, review of Thomas Bender, ed., Rethinking American History in a Global Age, Journal of
66 Ibid.: 561, 564.
67 However, Pérez could have gone further and reflected why nationhood still remains pivotal to quests
for political emancipation. This issue is explored in Glenda Sluga, The Nation, Psychology, and
international historian’s toolkit, and non-state actors have received more attention.\textsuperscript{68} Postcolonial and subaltern studies, and the analysis of relationships between imperial centres and peripheries have also received consideration, albeit more reluctantly.\textsuperscript{69} Nevertheless, state power and state bureaucracies form the focal point of most international history. Likewise, rarely do international historians differentiate between state and nation. Transnational approaches, however, do make such distinctions, but do not necessarily ignore state power.\textsuperscript{70} Thus, the approach of \textit{histoire croisée} can pay sufficient attention to questions of state power and cultural diplomacy, even if these are interpreted as only one determinant of foundation activity, in conjunction with a variety of other dynamics. Nevertheless, Pérez’s critique may be a much-needed call to transnational historians to be more reflective and wary of the political implications of the kind of history they are writing. Pérez perceives a danger of transnational history turning into a celebratory history of globalisation and neo-liberalism, inheritors of the liberal internationalism of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Indeed, at times historians betray their normative biases, for example Matthew Connelly, in a panel discussion on transnational history:

\begin{quote}
If transnational phenomena are transforming an international system premised on the principle of state sovereignty, then we might begin to discern what sort of system could take its place. This approach would help us to identify both the underlying causes of conflict as well as the norms, institutions, and practices that may yet bring more stability, if not justice.\textsuperscript{71}
\end{quote}

These hopes connected with the transnational history project, uttered by an historian, could equally be taken as a description of the normative dimension of liberal international relations theory. The parallels are indeed surprising, in particular to the

\textsuperscript{68} A state of affairs demonstrated by the variety of approaches presented in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., \textit{Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
\textsuperscript{71} Bayly et al., “On Transnational History”: 1461, italics added.
political thought of Woodrow Wilson, arguably the most politically influential expression of liberal ideas on international order in the 20th century. Wilsonianism aims for both stability and justice, transformation and the creation of rigid rules at the same time. But these demands are difficult to reconcile. How can self-determination be granted to nations or ethnic groups when to do so might threaten the stability of the international system? In other words, how can a normative imperative for change in the interest of justice be accommodated with rigid rules that are necessary for the maintenance of the status quo? In a multipolar world, these remain vexing questions indeed.

The Historiography of International Relations: Re-evaluating Liberal IR Theory

Undoubtedly there has been a renewed interest in the history of international relations as an academic discipline in recent years. This is partly due to the end of the Cold War which forced a discipline that seemed stuck in bipolar paradigms and had completely failed to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union to take a critical look at its own pedigree. Another incentive has been the interventionist foreign policy of George W. Bush which prompted scholars to reinvestigate the genealogy of the ideas and ideologies that shape American foreign policy. Some authors have drawn parallels between Bush and Woodrow Wilson in the process, often resorting to somewhat Manichaean metaphors. Wilsonianism has been the subject of critical re-evaluation for some time, especially with regards to its alleged claim that democracies are inherently

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72 For an insightful account of Wilsonianism’s history and its in-built tensions see John A. Thompson, Wilsonianism: The History of a Conflicted Concept, unpublished manuscript, on file with the author.
peaceful (the so-called democratic peace theory)\textsuperscript{74} and, most recently, from the perspective of its relation with race and Empire.\textsuperscript{75}

Conventional histories of international relations theory still identify Woodrow Wilson as the dominant figure in the interwar years, whose Enlightenment-derived ideals shaped the discipline at its birth in the aftermath of World War I.\textsuperscript{76} This view has been much challenged since the mid-1990s when Anglo-American IR scholars started to revise the history of their discipline. Until that time, the received wisdom was that international relations emerged as a field after the First World War and was then for 20 years dominated by ‘idealism’, a utopian set of prescriptions for the conduct of international relations which relied heavily on the League of Nations and international law, until the new paradigm, ‘realism’, first coherently formulated in 1939 by E.H. Carr, sent “the spent corpse tumbling into the grave”, as one political scientist has put it.\textsuperscript{77}

Realism, so this story goes, must be considered the true founding paradigm of international relations because it was “the first ‘scientific’ treatment of modern world politics”, as Stanley Hoffman has claimed in his much-quoted article on the discipline.\textsuperscript{78}

Revisionist scholars of the history of international relations have criticised this account on three major points. First, they argue, the discipline was not born in 1939, or even in 1919, but had earlier roots. Second, “idealism” is a made-up term and an inappropriate label for a diverse array of thinkers who wrote on international politics in

\textsuperscript{74} See the classic articles by Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs”, \textit{Philosophy and Public Affairs} 12, no. 3 and 4 (1983); more recently, see Gat Azar, “The Democratic Peace Theory Reframed: The Impact of Modernity”, \textit{World Politics} 58, no. 1 (2005).
\textsuperscript{76} Torbjørn L. Knutsen, \textit{A History of International Relations Theory}, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 208.
the interwar years. Third, E.H. Carr was not the founding father of IR who, in a Protean
effort, successfully refuted everything else that was written on the subject at the time,
but engaged with other scholars whose views he distorted in his classic Twenty Years’
Crisis.79

The first argument of the revisionists attacks what is in their view an invented,
post-hoc history of the discipline of international relations that likes to cite Thucydides
and Machiavelli as its forefathers. While it is true that international relations was only
institutionalised in the interwar years—the first university chair of international
relations was founded in Aberystwyth in 1919—it did exist as a distinct field of
intellectual enquiry beforehand, drawing on several disciplines such as political science,
international law and public administration. Different authors have emphasised different
intellectual currents that structured this field. Brian C. Schmidt has identified a
discourse about the problem of international anarchy as a constituting principle, while
Lucian Ashworth has highlighted the spread of liberalism beyond national borders as a
central theme.80 Revisionist authors also agree that studies on imperialism, colonial
administration and subjugation of “backward peoples” belong to the analytical tradition
of international relations. Race, not just the nation, was a distinct category of analysis
for scholars writing on world politics in the first half of the 20th century.81

79 The seminal works of this school are, for Britain, David Long and Peter Wilson, eds., Thinkers of the
Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Lucian M.
Ashworth, Creating International Studies: Angell, Mitrany and the Liberal Tradition (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 1999); Peter Wilson, The International Theory of Leonard Woolf: A Study in Twentieth-Century
Idealism (New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); on the history of international relations in
the U.S. see Brian Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International
80 Schmidt, Political Discourse of Anarchy, 39-42; Ashworth, Creating International Studies, 4-6.
81 Schmidt, Political Discourse of Anarchy, 72-75, 123-149; Robert Vitalis, “Birth of a Discipline”, in
Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations, ed. David Long and Brian
Secondly, the revisionists have argued that the term “idealism” is “intellectually worthless”.\textsuperscript{82} In the interwar years themselves, there was no general meaning attached to it. It has been used retrospectively as a catch-all phrase, obscuring the true discursive fault lines within international relations and lumping together a diverse group of theorists whose actual writings, so the revisionists argue, deserve re-examination. This has led to the reclaiming of a number of authors who were active roughly between 1900 and 1945, among them David Mitrany, Norman Angell, Alfred Zimmern, and Leonard Woolf. On the American side they include Paul S. Reinsch, Pitman B. Potter, Raymond Leslie Buell and Quincy Wright. It is noteworthy that Elihu Root, Nicholas Murray Butler and James Brown Scott, the interwar leaders of the Carnegie Endowment, are also among the early international relations theorists analysed in Schmidt’s study.\textsuperscript{83}

The third point of attack that the revisionists have brought to bear against conventional histories of international relations centres on the authority of E.H. Carr, whose \textit{Twenty Years’ Crisis} is still cited as a secondary source in the scholarly literature.\textsuperscript{84} Carr’s book was as much a polemic as it was an attempt to map out the discipline of international relations. As several revisionists have pointed out, Carr had a political axe to grind, which motivated him to caricature the work of others. His main point of disagreement with the majority of British international relations theorists was their opposition to Chamberlain’s appeasement policy which he supported. His actual concept of international relations as a science that should be based on empirical realities while striving for positive change was not revolutionary but already there in the works of others.\textsuperscript{85}


\textsuperscript{84} See, for example, Knutsen, \textit{History of International Relations Theory}, 211, 215.

The revisionist work on the history of international relations has certainly proved to be a much-needed corrective to previous accounts. In their insistence that the interwar idealists produced works of intellectual substance, the revisionists have been vindicated, for example by the renewed interest in the phenomenon of economic nationalism, a much-discussed topic in the 1930s. It was long neglected in studies of nationalism until the 1990s, when it started to receive more attention as a possible policy response to the challenges of globalisation. Yet, much work remains to be done. Idealism has not been replaced with an alternative label, though sometimes it is used interchangeably with “liberal internationalism”. There have been attempts at formulating a classification of interwar idealist thought but they remain tentative. Furthermore, there is an Anglo-American bias to this new literature, and we know little about continental theorists of international relations in the interwar years. They did exist—Peter Wilson alludes to them but decided to focus on the British scene. Moreover, much of the current scholarship is based on intellectual biographies of individuals, often treated in isolation. It is now necessary to situate them in concrete institutional settings, and to trace their arguments. Most importantly, those whom the ‘interwar idealists’ were arguing against, namely those on the extreme right and on the extreme left, also have to be identified. Some progress has already been made in this direction by jurists of the Critical Legal

2007), 21-22; Michael Cox has pointed out that changes in the second edition of the book indicate that Carr was later embarrassed by his own enthusiasm for the Munich Agreement. Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 2nd [1946], with a new introduction and additional material by Michael Cox ed. (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), lxxii-lxxx.

86 See e.g. George T. Crane, “Economic Nationalism: Bringing the Nation Back In”, Millenium 27, no. 1 (1998); Eric Helleiner and Andreas Pickel, eds., Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). Helleiner and Pickel, however, make the point that economic nationalism and neoliberal policies are not mutually exclusive.


88 Ibid., 18; recently, some work on French liberal internationalism has been published, see Klaus-Peter Sick, “A New Idea of Europe: The Liberal Internationalism of the Nouvelle Revue Française (1919-1925)”, European Political Economy Review 1, no. 1 (2003).

89 One such case, that of the Nazi jurist Friedrich Berber, will be discussed in chapter 4.
Studies school who have written on the history of International Law, a discipline that was the training ground for many IR scholars. Foundation activity is part of the hidden story of the discipline of international relations in the interwar years, and it is by examining support of institutions and scholars in this field that this thesis aims, complementing recent work, to contribute to current debates. In particular, it aims to shed light on the transnational exchange between IR scholars that took place and that has hitherto been neglected.

Organisation of Chapters and Sources

The chapters in this study follow a loosely chronological order but the material is principally arranged according to different perspectives on foundation activity. Chapter 1 is an investigation into the transatlantic origins of philanthropic internationalism and analyses the beginnings and early years of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Carnegie Endowment. Chapter 2 explores one strategy developed by the foundations for the field of international relations in the 1920s, namely the internationalisation of discussions on international politics and the creation of international hubs in cities such as The Hague, Paris and Geneva. Moreover, the question of which disciplines were prominent in the field of international relations will be discussed. Switching the perspective to national contexts in chapter 3, the question as to what extent the foundations’ international relations programmes were


91 Two recent theses treat this topic to some extent: Paolo J. B. Ramos, “The Role of the Yale Institute of International Studies in the Construction of the United States National Security Ideology, 1935-1951” (PhD, University of Manchester, 2003), which focuses on the United States; Heather C. Fabrikant, “Power and Knowledge in the Social Sciences: The Rockefeller Foundation and the Study of International Relations between the Two Wars” (Diplôme d’études, University of Geneva, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2004), which uncritically identifies the Rockefeller Foundation as realist and European recipients, mostly the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, as idealist, a characterisation that does not make much sense in the interwar period; on the Rockefeller Foundation and the development of American IR after 1945 see Guilhot, “Realist Gambit”.
relevant to national politics and cultural diplomacy is discussed. This chapter relies mostly on a case study of Weimar Germany. The demise of the Weimar Republic and the increasing attractiveness of ideologies that were competing with liberal internationalism motivated the foundations to adapt their strategies. The support of the International Studies Conference was the outcome, covered in chapter 4, which analyses foundation activity in the context of multilateral intergovernmental structures. Chapter 5, finally, analyses the rupture of funding networks in the era of World War II but also points out the continuities that shaped the foundations’ international relations programmes in the 1940s and 1950s.

The main archival sources for this study are the records of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. However, where appropriate, this source base has been supplemented by material from the archives of other philanthropic foundations, namely the Carnegie Corporation and the Commonwealth Fund, as well as material found in the private papers and oral histories of foundation officers and key interlocutors. I have also consulted the archives of recipient institutions, notably those of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Social Science Research Council, the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. To cover the cultural diplomacy aspect, I have examined the archives of the U.S. State Department as well as those of the German Ministry of External Affairs. These form the empirical basis for my conclusions on the role of American foundations in the conduct of bilateral cultural diplomacy, whereas the archives of international organisations, notably those of the League of Nations and of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, have yielded material which sheds light on the foundations’ role in multilateral cultural diplomacy and transnational cultural relations. Some documents in the British Foreign Office archives were also
consulted. Due to the unforeseen closure of the archives of the Quai d’Orsay in Paris for more than an entire year, starting in summer 2008, I was not able to investigate the relevant records there and my conclusions on the official French attitude towards American philanthropy in the interwar years remain tentative.
Philanthropic foundations have always faced public scrutiny. Their attempts to brand themselves, and to find a space they could occupy in the public imagination, tell us as much about the attacks they sought to ward off as about the aims and values that founders and staff held. Anticipating accusations of a deficiency in patriotism, the Carnegie Endowment printed the motto *pro patria et orbis concordiam* on its publications and letterheads.¹ It self-consciously implied that allegiance to the nation and the national interest would always come before obligations to worldwide harmony. The Rockefeller Foundation’s mission statement was a pleonastic exercise in universal humanism: nothing could be less offensive than *For the Well-Being of Mankind Throughout the World*. This was a rebuke to allegations that the foundation had been created for the well-being of the Rockefeller family rather than humanity but it also underlined the global reach of its ambitions. Having attracted much less attention than its sister institutions at its creation in October 1918, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial started out as a traditional charity, with a focus on the welfare of women and children in New York City. However, after the arrival of Beardsley Ruml, the Memorial’s new director, in May 1922, the programme changed dramatically until it resembled that of the Rockefeller Foundation in scope and outlook but with an emphasis on the social sciences. In the 1920s, the Memorial quietly went about its business of transforming the institutional landscape of American and European social science. Although the foundation lacked a slogan of its own, it came to share the outlook and sense of mission that was expressed in the motto of the Carnegie Endowment and the

¹ For homeland and harmony of the world.
Rockefeller Foundation. This outlook was marked by a commitment to international intellectual exchange and the extension of national reform movements.

The aim of this chapter is to trace the connections between foundation philanthropy and internationalism from the 1900s to the 1920s. This requires analyzing the origins of the foundations’ internationalist commitment and placing it within a broader context, which is not entirely American but transnational. Soma Hewa and Darwin Stapleton are among several scholars who hint at the role of internationalism with regard to foundation policies when they claim that “philanthropic leaders … recognized the importance of building social and cultural links among nations … to overcome the distrust, prejudice and political conflicts which had marked previous centuries of international relations”. However, this claim remains rather vague and needs to be fleshed out. How exactly were these social and cultural links to be established? How much importance was attached to national boundaries? Can we go so far as to claim that the foundations aimed to create a transnational civil society? Finally, exactly which goals did interwar foundation philanthropy share with internationalism? Certainly, scientific philanthropy and the large foundations that were its institutional manifestation emerged during the heyday of internationalism as a transatlantic social movement. Both the Rockefeller and the Carnegie philanthropies were connected to this thriving transnational movement, the roots of which lay in political, technological and social transformations that took place during the late 19th century. There were numerous personal and financial links between American foundations and organised internationalism in the United States in the interwar years. Warren Kuehl and Lynn Dunn have shown that America’s philanthropic elite overlapped and was interwoven with that of the internationalist movement, to the extent that it is almost impossible to

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examine one without at least having a look at the other.\(^3\) The Carnegie Endowment participated in pre-1914 bourgeois internationalism by virtue of its direct association with the transatlantic peace movement. In the case of the Rockefeller philanthropies the connection is less explicit before 1918 but a commitment to border-transcending social reform can be detected from the 1910s. Four factors influenced the emergence of ‘philanthropic internationalism’: the transatlantic bourgeois internationalism of the fin-de-siècle, the invention of scientific foundation philanthropy in the 1900s, the domestic and international consequences of the Great War, and developments within the social sciences and the discipline of international law in the United States.

What is Internationalism?

Internationalism as a term has been used in a variety of contexts and the broadest definition so far has been offered by Akira Iriye. He takes into account the different manifestations of internationalism when he defines it as “an idea, a movement, or an institution that seeks to reformulate the nature of relations among nations through cross-national cooperation and interchange”. In Iriye’s understanding, this can encompass traditional diplomacy in the form of treaties and alliances, attempts to create an international legal order through the extension of international law and arbitration, the promotion of international trade and economic exchange, efforts to bring about solidarity among the world’s working classes, and the encouragement of cross-national cultural activities.\(^4\) Although this definition seems too broad to serve as more than a starting point, Iriye makes the important claim that the internationalist impulse is fundamentally to create networks, links and bonds where there were none before, be these links of an economic, social, political or cultural nature. A belief in the possibility


\(^4\) Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, 3.
of progressive change in international relations is common to all variants of internationalism, even if they differ in the changes they seek to effect and the means employed to reach their aims.\(^5\)

Richard Cobden, the British liberal and champion of free trade, first used the term ‘internationalism’ in the 1860s in his writings on the federation of states. Marx also employed the term in connection with the free traders but chiefly to describe material relations between states, in the form of trade, travel or technical agreements. Socialists only started to attribute an ideological component to ‘internationalism’ from the 1890s, meaning the border-transcending consciousness of the proletariat.\(^6\) But socialist internationalism had a bourgeois counterpart, which, under the leadership of middle-class activists, transformed European and American peace advocacy in the second half of the 19\(^{th}\) century and emancipated it from its earlier religious origins. Informed by liberal economics and emerging social science paradigms, bourgeois internationalists on both sides of the Atlantic constructed a citizen-led, secular, humanistic response to the increased economic, political and cultural interdependence among nation states. The International Postal Union was an oft-cited example of the growing importance of international agreements and institutions during that time.\(^7\) Publicists such as the Austrian Alfred Fried, the American Paul Reinsch and Norman Angell, a popular English writer, interpreted the growing interdependence among nations as a result of technological innovations and drew from it the imperative to campaign for international cooperation and the promotion of peace.\(^8\)


\(^6\) {Friedemann, 1982 #139@392-5; Kuehl, 1986 #128@1}


\(^8\) Schmidt, *Political Discourse of Anarchy*, 118-119; Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, 63.
The narrative of modern man living in an interconnected world made smaller by technology was accepted by most middle-class internationalists but the responses to it differed in emphasis. Warren Kuehl distinguishes three strands of bourgeois internationalism: community internationalism, the effort to achieve social reforms on a national level that would then lead to universal brotherhood and peace in an interdependent world; polity internationalism, which represents the attempt to establish an international organisation within the ramifications of the existing system of nation states; and liberal internationalism, which emphasised practical measures such as armaments control and arbitration and after 1919 became associated with the global proliferation of democracy and world organisation.\(^9\) Of course Kuehl’s classification is open to the contention that polity and liberal internationalism were not mutually exclusive. Ultimately, the distinction between internationalists who focused on social reform and those primarily concerned with political and institutional change is more meaningful, even if the latter ranged from very ambitious endeavours, such as world government or a world police force, to rather cautious and traditional projects like arbitration. In the American context, community internationalists included social reformers like Jane Addams and Thorstein Veblen while the men who led the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace were representative of polity internationalism.\(^{10}\)

Some political scientists have proposed that nationalism and internationalism should be conceptualised as two opposite political forces.\(^{11}\) However, this notion has been strongly questioned by historians who argue that internationalism served as a political strategy to enhance national prestige.\(^{12}\) Internationalism provided states with

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\(^{10}\) Herman, Eleven Against War.
\(^{11}\) Carsten Holbraad, Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 2.
\(^{12}\) This is implied in Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism; The opposition between nationalism and internationalism has also been dissolved by Madeleine Herren, Hintertüren zur Macht: Internationalismus und modernisierungsorientierte Aussenpolitik in Belgien, der Schweiz und den USA, 1865-1914 (Munich:
the opportunity to compensate for a lack of economic and political power by, for example, hosting international conferences or providing the site for the headquarters of international organisations. Thereby, smaller powers could create a distinct national profile, claim a space on the international scene and exercise moral leadership. The comparative studies conducted by international organisations also challenged existing hierarchies. By focusing on fields like social policy, lesser powers were able to occupy roles of leadership that were denied to them in power-political terms. Speaking the language of progress, small states like Switzerland or Norway portrayed themselves as global leaders in social legislation. National governments also sponsored and financed internationalist activity, for example the Interparliamentary Union, an association of European parliamentarians. After its 1904 meeting in St. Louis the Interparliamentary Union managed to established a strong American chapter, comprising over one hundred members of Congress.

The view that internationalism should be regarded as nationalism’s complement and not its counterforce is further supported by internationalism’s frequent connections to domestic social reform. One historian of the American peace movement has argued that internationalism in the Progressive era served as a rallying point for a variety of concerns, temporarily bringing a diverse array of professional and reform groups under one umbrella. Nevertheless, internationalism’s claim that there was no contradiction between forging cross-national connections and patriotism did not always translate easily into practical action in times of international tension. This explains why wars regularly split internationalist and pacifist movements during the 19th and 20th century.

Oldenbourg, 2000). Herren regards the United States as a key user of internationalism as a ‘back-door strategy’.

14 Herman, Eleven Against War, 18; Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism, 59.
16 Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism, 7-8; Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, 50-53.
Thus three big questions divided the movement during the golden age of bourgeois internationalism which lasted from the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899 until the outbreak of the Great War. First, there was the issue of how much social reform at home would be necessary to bring about the emergence of an harmonious international community. Second, internationalists wondered what kind of institution would best respond to the new economic, administrative and cultural interdependence of the world, be it a permanent system for the arbitration of inter-state disputes which had been established by the Hague Conferences or an international organisation which could ultimately lead to a world state. The creation of the League of Nations after the First World War forced internationalists to take sides with regards to this issue, and, arguably, weakened the movement as a whole. Finally, in times of crisis internationalists had to confront the problem of reconciling the allegiance to the national interest of their homeland with the bonds of international friendship. Some, the men who made up the American philanthropic elite in the early 20th century among them, felt that there should be no contradiction between the two and, despite numerous setbacks, were determined to combine international cooperation with patriotic commitment.

Legalist Internationalism and the Transformation of the American Peace Movement

Two internationalist groups, lawyers and businessmen, assumed the leadership of the American peace movement in the early 1900s and transformed it in the process. One factor that contributed to this development was the attempt of peace societies to shed their sentimentalist image. Around the turn of the century, they started to broaden their membership base and to include patrons of a ‘practical’ mindset. Instead of condemning war on moral and religious grounds, peace activists began to focus on positive action to avoid international conflicts, commonly on the arbitration of international disputes. New outlets for peace activism sprang up. Most notable among these were the annual
Lake Mohonk conferences which had been set up in an upstate New York holiday resort in 1895 and attracted national leaders in politics, academia, business and the legal profession for the next twenty-one summers. The conferences consciously addressed the concerns of businessmen by discussing economic interdependence and war’s disruptive effect on commerce and industry. The issue that received most attention at Lake Mohonk, however, remained international arbitration.\textsuperscript{17}

Arbitration as a new paradigm in international relations had gained prominence after the successful settlement of the Alabama Claims by the Geneva Tribunal in 1872. Although repeated attempts to negotiate an Anglo-American arbitration treaty failed in the 1880s and 1890s, arbitration played a decisive role in the ‘great rapprochement’ between Britain and the United States, even if the British mostly gave in to American demands for arbitration, notably during the Venezuelan boundary dispute of 1895/97.\textsuperscript{18}

The formation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899 marked a high point for the international arbitration movement and underlined the importance of legal expertise in the conduct of international relations.\textsuperscript{19}

For a distinct group of prominent American lawyers, serving with arbitration tribunals and commissions became a formative professional experience. Secretary of State Elihu Root was among them, as were Oscar Straus, future Secretary of Commerce, David Brewer, Justice of the Supreme Court and John Bassett Moore, legal scholar and former


\textsuperscript{19} Francis Anthony Boyle, \textit{Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International Relations, 1898-1922} (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 26-36; note that the Permanent Court of Arbitration was merely a machinery that allowed for the setting up of arbitral tribunals by the contracting parties. It was not replaced by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920 but continued to function. Michael Akehurst, \textit{A Modern Introduction to International Law} (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), 296.
Assistant Secretary of State. Robert Lansing made his professional reputation by appearing before arbitral tribunals.\textsuperscript{20}

It was this group of prominent former and future government officials and international lawyers who established the American Society for International Law (ASIL) at the 1905 Lake Mohonk conference. In 1907 the first issue of ASIL’s periodical, the \textit{American Journal of International Law (AJIL)}, was published. On its editorial board were Lansing, Straus and Moore but also Leo S. Rowe, director of the Pan-American Union. Under the managing editorship of James Brown Scott, the State Department’s solicitor for arbitration matters between 1906 and 1911 and author of the first American casebook on international law, \textit{AJIL} swiftly became the most prominent English-language periodical in the field of international relations before 1914 and was highly regarded among non-lawyers, too. It also provided a vibrant forum for an emerging paradigm in Anglo-American international law, international legal positivism.\textsuperscript{21}

Since the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, American legal scholars in particular had been taking issue with the dominant paradigm in Anglo-American jurisprudence, John Austin’s command theory, which defined law as a command issued by a sovereign. According to Austinian logic, international law did not pass the litmus test of ‘real law’ because a superior authority able to impose sanctions on sovereign states did not exist. Austin merely conceded the existence of an international morality. This, however, was exactly what American international lawyers wanted to move away from. In a conscious attempt to leave behind their Grotian natural law heritage and to create a positivist science of public international law, the jurists who published in \textit{AJIL} argued that the

\textsuperscript{20} Marchand, \textit{Peace Movement and Social Reform}, p. 46. For a list of lawyers prominent in the American peace movement during the progressive period see ibid., p. 40, n. 4.

facts of international life, namely that states did consent and adhere to treaties and agreements, proved that international law did exist. A positivist approach to international law had to be based on the actual, observable customs and formal conventions between states and eschew philosophical speculation.\(^{22}\)

A seminal article in *AJIL* by British jurist Lassa Oppenheim in 1908 gave this new paradigm a coherent programme which exhorted international lawyers to expose and critique the existing rules of law, conduct historical research, prepare codifications, maintain the distinction between the old customary and the new conventional law, promote arbitration and work for the public understanding of international law.\(^{23}\) Put into practice, Oppenheim’s suggestions necessitated a huge amount of research and publication activity which, only a few years later, the Carnegie Endowment’s International Law Division would embark on by publishing, for example, a series of classics in international law.

But international legal positivism still faced the contention from Austinian orthodoxy that international law was not enforceable and therefore not law. Legal positivists fought back by proclaiming the centrality of public opinion as a sanction. James Brown Scott argued that Austin defined sanctions too narrowly as physical compulsion. Nicholas Murray Butler, a political scientist and president of Columbia University, proposed that public opinion was the only effective sanction. Elihu Root supported this view and claimed that the risk of being ostracised from the international community served as an effective sanction due to the growing interdependence among nations.\(^{24}\) These arguments tapped into common tropes of contemporary bourgeois

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\(^{22}\) Boyle, *Foundations of World Order*, 11; note, though, that Europeans also hotly debated the pros and cons of the Austinian perspective on international law from the 1870s. By the early 20th century, Austin was taken to have been refuted. Irwin Abrams, “The Emergence of the International Law Societies”, *Review of Politics* 19, no. 3 (1957): 362 n.


\(^{24}\) Schmidt, *Political Discourse of Anarchy*, 105-107.
internationalism, notably the conflation of ‘nation’ and ‘state’, and turned the international legal positivists into natural allies of those who campaigned for increased international cooperation. International law was seen as yet another area where a functioning framework of cooperation would benefit the constituent members to such a degree that exclusion from the network constituted a tangible penalty and acted as deterrent.25

American international lawyers and their intellectual allies thus became part of a wider, transatlantic movement of legalistic internationalism and started to cultivate contacts with like-minded Europeans. James Brown Scott, for instance, became an associate of the Institut de droit international (IDI), a European-dominated association of savants and legal practitioners, in 1908 (full member in 1910) and even assumed its presidency between 1925 and 1929.26 In 1912, the IDI agreed to act as an advisory body to the Carnegie Endowment’s International Law Division.27 Nicholas Murray Butler forged a deep friendship with the French aristocrat, former diplomat and parliamentarian Paul Henri d’Estournelles de Constant. Butler and d’Estournelles de Constant first met during the first Hague Peace Conference which converted the latter to the cause of internationalism. Like Butler, d’Estournelles de Constant was a polity internationalist rather than a social reformer, even though he supported good governance as means of keeping international socialism at bay. He was close to the French legalist-internationalist peace organisation Association pour la paix par le droit.28 His own internationalist society Conciliation Internationale, founded in 1905,
aimed at bringing together “eminent men of different nationalities” to create an internationalist public conscience by example, an endeavour which was similar to Butler’s aim of fostering a world public opinion.29 Butler referred to this project as creating an “international mind”, which he defined as “that habit of thinking of foreign relations and business, and that habit of dealing with them, which regard the several nations of the civilized world as friendly and co-operating equals in aiding the progress of civilization, in developing commerce and industry and in spreading enlightenment and culture throughout the world” .30

D’Estournelles de Constant regarded the United States’ society and political system as a model for Europe and was particularly keen on winning the support of Americans of suitable social standing for his organisation.31 Butler’s contacts enabled d’Estournelles de Constant to enlist the likes of Andrew D. White, Elihu Root, Oscar S. Straus, John Hay, and Andrew Carnegie for the American branch of Conciliation Internationale, the American Association for International Conciliation. By 1906, the American members outnumbered all but the French in the organisation as a whole. Carnegie’s generous gifts financed the American branch as well as some of Conciliation Internationale’s work, and this support was continued by the Carnegie Endowment

30 Nicholas Murray Butler, The International Mind: An Argument for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1912), 102; that Butler confined the international mind to the “civilized world” was no idiosyncrasy but a commonly held assumption of European and American internationalists, and often voiced in transnational associations such as the IDI; Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 56; see also James Brown Scott’s plea for the cooperation of “the nations of the civilized world”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book 1920 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1920), 110.
once it was established in 1910. \(32\) Conciliation Internationale’s motto, \textit{pro patria per orbis concordiam}, would become, in slightly altered form, that of the Endowment.

The timing of Conciliation Internationale’s founding is not insignificant. In 1905, another voluntary association designed to foster goodwill and international harmony was created: the Rotary Club. As Rotary International, the organisation exported the ‘service ethic’ of American small-town businessmen to Europe, where it was re-appropriated to suit local conditions. Like Conciliation Internationale, Rotary International claimed non-partisanship but promoted a certain kind of sociability.\(33\) Its expansion into Europe serves as a reminder that social models with the purported aim of encouraging international friendship crossed the Atlantic in both directions. If Rotary’s weekly lunches originally served small businessmen to bond and forge valuable contacts, Conciliation Internationale’s sumptuous society dinners, by far its most successful activity, enabled social and political elites to profess their love for peace and thereby assert moral leadership in a socially exclusive setting.\(34\) The model of the elite peace society thus had its origin in aristo-bourgeois European social mores and was successfully introduced across the Atlantic. At the same time, d’Estournelles de Constant and Conciliation Internationale were pioneers of transatlantic fundraising.

Even if they exported their sociability to the New World, European internationalists in general acknowledged American leadership in other areas, notably international law.\(35\) Lassa Oppenheim himself noted “that America is able to foster the


science of international law without being dependent upon the assistance of foreign contributors” and that “just as the body of rules which is called “international law” shows everywhere the traces of American influence, so the science of international law will likewise soon receive new stimuli from America”.36 Indeed, between 1898 and 1922 the American government championed international law and it was the first to refer a dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. As Francis Anthony Boyle has argued, a legalistic approach to international affairs and a growing acceptance of international law among European states suited traditional U.S. foreign policy aims towards Europe which called for isolation in peace and neutrality in war. With the emergence of the United States as an imperial power after the Spanish-American war, the demands of U.S. foreign policy-making became more complex and provided the international lawyers and lawyer-diplomats with an important role in the conduct of American foreign relations.37

This group’s expertise (as demonstrated in the pages of ASIL), its good connections to the State Department and its links to philanthropists won its members posts and influence in established peace groups such as the American Peace Society.38 As a group, the lawyers who reinvigorated but also reorganised the American peace movement in the early 20th century were conservatives within the broad church that was American Progressivism. Like their European counterparts, with whom they maintained a number of links, for example through organisations such as the IDI and Conciliation Internationale, they rejected radical demands for social reform and supported certain liberal ideas which were the heritage of fin-de-siècle bourgeois internationalism, such as the promotion of international commerce and a generally positive view on an enlightened public opinion.

38 Marchand, Peace Movement and Social Reform, 68-73.
American legalist internationalists had been attracted to peace advocacy, previously dominated by provincial and genteel reformers, for several reasons. First, international lawyers furthered the standing of their own profession through the peace movement. Anti-imperialism, which had briefly caused rifts within peace groups at the turn of the century, ceased to be an issue by 1905, so that the movement could comfortably accommodate Root, the architect of the American colonial administration in the Philippines, and others who had campaigned for expansionism in Hawaii and the Caribbean.\(^\text{39}\) By identifying their own professional concerns with the aims of the peace movement, international lawyers in particular were able to pose as reformers while still promoting respect for judicial authority and the law. Finally, as judicial supremacy at home was targeted by Progressive critics, the lawyers promoted not just arbitration but a rule-bound international court as the solution to the problem of international disorder and war. Peace activism represented a safe and respectable cause to those who disdained Progressivism’s more radical demands at home. At the same time it enabled them to profess a sensitivity to the Progressive desire for order and efficiency by championing the establishment of stability and the rule of law abroad.\(^\text{40}\)

*Origins of Philanthropic Internationalism I: the Carnegie Endowment*

Andrew Carnegie also fits the pattern of the conservative internationalist. Having amassed a fortune in steel, Carnegie was an intensely public figure and frequently made the headlines with his opinions on a variety of subjects. ‘Merry Andrew’, as he was called, was something of a national treasure.\(^\text{41}\) But Carnegie also became a ‘transatlantic liberal’ during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Spending much of his


time in Britain, he cultivated friendships with British politicians, notably Gladstone, and donated substantial amounts of money to the Liberal Party. On both sides of the Atlantic, Carnegie pestered politicians with a constant stream of letters and proposals regarding international affairs. His main interest was arbitration but he was also an ardent supporter of Anglo-American federation and even proposed the establishment of a League of Peace in 1905. Carnegie supported U.S. expansionism in the Caribbean—unremarkable among American internationalists who generally saw American power abroad as a force for peace. He also believed in the importance of personal relations between national leaders and unsuccessfully tried to persuade Theodore Roosevelt to discuss the League of Peace plan with the German kaiser. As David Nasaw has argued, Carnegie, who happened to be a large donor to the Republican Party, was probably responsible for President Taft’s spending so much time on proposals for arbitration. Theodore Roosevelt was not so easily bullied, and he once remarked that Carnegie would have done much better to have spent his millions on his steelworkers instead of on peace societies and laughable attempts at personal diplomacy.

There was indeed a dark side to Carnegie’s conduct as a captain of industry, evidenced by the violently suppressed Homestead strike of 1892. Nevertheless, Carnegie, a staunch defender of big business and opponent of social reform, was lionized by the Progressive Herbert Croly. Despite the obvious differences between Progressives who sought to tackle the social problems caused by the United States’ industrialisation in the second half of the 19th century and men like Carnegie and John D.

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Rockefeller who had profited tremendously from the very same process, a certain
affinity between progressivism and the creators of scientific philanthropy existed. Both
agreed that governments needed help with the task of ordering a rapidly changing and
often chaotic society. Here wealthy citizens had a special responsibility. Both were
equally obsessed with social control, and both optimistically believed that social
betterment was possible if education were given an appropriately important role.46

Carnegie is often credited with formulating the tenets of ‘scientific philanthropy’
in his famous essay “Wealth”.47 Published originally in the North American Review in
1889, it was re-titled “The Gospel of Wealth” and printed in the British Pall Mall
Gazette.48 It was under this title that Carnegie’s appeal to the rich to dispose of their
money during their lifetime received widespread attention.49 Judith Sealander, an
historian of early 20th century American foundations, defines ‘scientific philanthropy’ as
philanthropy exercised by organisations structured in a particular way, for a specific
purpose. Institutionally, ‘scientific philanthropy’ resulted in the creation of large
foundations, organised and led like business organisations by a professional staff who
were overseen by a small number of trustees.50 With regard to its purpose, it
distinguished itself from other charitable activity through its ambition to pursue ‘big
ideas’ and, ultimately, to shape public policy.51 Nevertheless, according to Sealander,
scientific giving remained the exception, not the rule. “Only six creators of foundations
established institutions with broader purpose and more sophisticated, policy-shaping
goals: Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller Sr., John D. Rockefeller Jr., Edward

46 Sealander, Private Wealth, 25-34.
47 Brenner, Philanthropy, 100-102.
York: The Century Co., 1900); Gerlach, British Liberalism, 151.
50 Sealander, Private Wealth, 2, 9-16; Judith Sealander, “Curing Evils at their Source: The Arrival of
Scientific Giving”, in Charity, Philanthropy and Civility in American History, ed. Lawrence J. Friedman
and Mark D. McGarvie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 222.
51 Sealander, Private Wealth, 22.
The foundations set up by the Rockefellers, Andrew Carnegie and the Harkness family also engaged in a significant amount of activities overseas. Charitable giving in the United States had frequently crossed national boundaries ever since the early Republic, with the first example of widespread and systematic support of an overseas cause being the American aid to the Greek freedom struggle in the 1820s. However, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was the first philanthropic foundation with an explicitly international mission and also the first to establish a branch office on non-American soil.

Despite Carnegie’s role in formulating a new, ‘wholesale’ approach to philanthropy, during his lifetime many of his foundations engaged in more traditional charity projects, for example the building of libraries and church organs or the provision of pensions for college professors. However, one Carnegie foundation clearly represented a ‘wholesale’ philanthropic project: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Founded with an endowment of $10 million in December 1910, its explicit goal was the elimination of warfare and its activities had little to do with traditional charity. The idea for a foundation that would systematise his giving in the

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52 Ibid., 12.
53 The widow of Stephen Harkness established the Commonwealth Fund which sponsored mostly child health and educational programmes. Edward Harkness, her son, founded the Pilgrim Trust which mainly supported educational activities in Britain. Nielsen, Big Foundations, 254-262; Curti, American Philanthropy, 310-312; for a survey of the occasional overseas activities of other American foundations see American National Committee on International Intellectual Cooperation, ed., The Study of International Relations in the United States: Survey for 1937 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), 26-29.
54 Curti, American Philanthropy, chapter 2.
55 Berghahn, “Philanthropy and Diplomacy”: 397.
56 Sealander, Private Wealth, 18; for a list of philanthropic foundations created by Andrew Carnegie see Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, A Manual of the Public Benefactions of Andrew Carnegie (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1919). Even though Sealander’s criticism of the lack of public policy-changing potential of most of Carnegie’s philanthropic creations is well founded, at least until the steel magnate’s death in 1919, it must be said that not even the Rockefeller Foundation always adhered to the tenets of ‘scientific giving’, often due to founder intervention.
57 Sealander, “Curing Evils at their Source”, 225.
cause of peace was first suggested to Carnegie by Nicholas Murray Butler, who himself became a leading figure in Carnegie’s new philanthropic organisation.\(^{58}\)

As the leaders of his peace foundation, Carnegie chose the legal internationalists who had assumed the guidance of the American peace movement at the time. Elihu Root became president of the Endowment, and Nicholas Murray Butler and James Brown Scott assumed key roles. The Endowment’s trustees were selected from the group of Carnegie’s influential and prominent conservative friends, sidelining established peace activists.\(^{59}\) This was a heavy blow to other peace advocates as Carnegie had supported the movement on both sides of the Atlantic with substantial financial contributions to peace societies, peace journals and ambitious ad-hoc projects like the ‘Peace Palace’ at The Hague. Since the 1880s, the steel tycoon had given $50,000 annually to peace-related causes.\(^{60}\)

The Endowment pursued a two-fold strategy in its early years, dividing its resources between research and public education. It consisted of three divisions: John Bates Clark led the Division of Economics and History, concerned with researching the causes and effects of war; James Brown Scott, who also served as the Endowment’s Secretary-General, was in charge of the Division of International Law which published monographs, supported scholarly law journals, funded lectureships in international law and also paid John Bassett Moore’s salary for collecting all known arbitrations for the State Department; Nicholas Murray Butler directed the Division of Intercourse and Education, the Endowment’s propaganda arm.\(^{61}\) The two research divisions were at the heart of the Carnegie Endowment’s function as a ‘scientific’ foundation. The educational arm of the Endowment circulated peace-oriented publicity and set out to

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\(^{58}\) Butler, *Across the Busy Years*, ii, 90.

\(^{59}\) Patterson, “Carnegie’s Quest”: 379; Kuehl, *World Order*, 110.

\(^{60}\) Minutes of Meeting of the Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 March 1911, CEIP, box 12, folder 5.

“cultivate friendly feelings” as well as “knowledge and understanding” between eminent men from different countries, continuing the project that had been introduced to the United States by Baron d’Estournelles de Constant and Conciliation Internationale. Butler’s division also subsidised other agencies that furthered the Endowment’s general mission.62

Geographically, the Endowment did not limit itself to the United States and Europe. On the contrary, from its very inception, it sought to establish links with Latin America and Asia.63 These efforts often took the form of sending “representative” American men on unofficial missions to distant places.64 But the Endowment also employed a Japanese “special correspondent”, the lawyer Tsunejiro Miyaoka. His reports to the Carnegie Endowment’s trustees were published, and in one he argued for an abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in favour of closer American-Japanese relations. In the same treatise, Miyaoka also subtly put the finger on the implicit racism of contemporary movements for international understanding, several years before the issue came to the fore in international politics when Japanese attempts to include a clause on racial equality in the League of Nations Covenant were rejected: “The internationalism which is deeper than the fraternization of different political units of affiliated races is the real internationalism.”65

63 As this dissertation is chiefly concerned with the transatlantic role of American foundations, relations with the rest of the world had to be sidelined. However, a closer examination of the Carnegie Endowment’s activities in Latin America and Asia would be valuable, especially since recent treatments remain thin and unsystematic. Winn, “Carnegie Endowment”, 55-78.
Carnegie requested that the Endowment’s Executive Committee continue some of his donations to the peace movement, with the American Peace Society and the American section of the Interparliamentary Union being the larger ones. In Europe, Carnegie asked for the German-language journal *Die Friedenswarte* as well as several British peace societies to be supported.\(^{66}\) The Trustees honoured Carnegie’s request initially but were uneasy with some of the more outspoken peace activists he had championed.\(^{67}\) After a few years, they cut off many of the traditional peace societies, a move that seems to have displeased Carnegie to such an extent that he founded another peace foundation, the Church Peace Union, none of whose officers belonged to the Endowment.\(^{68}\)

Historians of the American peace movement have not seen the Carnegie Endowment in a very positive light: it diverted funds from more progressive activists, promoted a very cautious approach to the problem of world peace and weakened older societies.\(^{69}\) The largest of those, the American Peace Society, became financially dependent on the Endowment. Its leadership was increasingly dominated by legal internationalists.\(^{70}\) The establishment of a $10 million peace fund also suggested to potential donors to the movement that other causes were in more need of financial support and consequently contributions to peace societies decreased.\(^{71}\)

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\(^{66}\) Carnegie to Scott, 24 February 1911, CEIP, box 12, folder 5.

\(^{67}\) Minutes of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 March 1911, CEIP, box 16, folder 3.

\(^{68}\) Patterson, “Carnegie’s Quest”: 381-382.


\(^{70}\) Marchand, *Peace Movement and Social Reform*, 129-139; Patterson, “Carnegie’s Quest”: 379-381.

The Endowment’s involvement with the peace movement in Europe was equally problematic. In 1912, the foundation had established a European office in Paris under the directorship of d’Estournelles de Constant, the *Centre européen de la dotation Carnegie pour la paix internationale*, commonly referred to as *Dotation Carnegie*.\(^{72}\)

The French press had hailed this venture as “une œuvre moderne”, a sober and enlightened venture and not one of the many eccentricities of a famous American billionaire.\(^{73}\) But the *Dotation* hardly engaged in any activity itself before the war as the Carnegie Endowment relied on the *Bureau international de la paix* in Berne, an umbrella organisation for the national peace societies of Europe, to distribute grants to European groups. The collaboration with the Berne Bureau, however, broke down quickly since the Endowment, as in the United States, preferred to support only the most conservative groups such as the German *Verband für Internationale Verständigung*.\(^{74}\) This divided rather than united the European internationalist movement. Once the First World War started, the Endowment swiftly pulled out of most of its European commitments, which left its former beneficiaries in a financially precarious state.\(^{75}\)

The Great War brought lingering tensions within the American peace movement to the fore. In 1915, the movement split into liberal-left internationalism and conservative internationalism. The liberal-left internationalists aimed to obtain a negotiated settlement between the belligerents, and linked social justice at home to peace abroad, while the conservative internationalists, including the Endowment, were clear about their desire for an Allied victory. They also advocated a post-war

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international organisation based on international law, and criticized Wilsonian plans for a League of Nations.76 Once the United States entered the war, the Carnegie Endowment threw its full weight behind the American war effort. In 1919, the Endowment made clear that it had finally washed its hands of the peace movement:

Its attitude in the war has drawn a sharp line between the Endowment and a very considerable group of citizens, commonly called pacifists, with whom it was formerly in active cooperation, and most of whom have loyally followed its example and supported the government in all its undertakings. … In some other cases their attitude was such as to make the word “pacifism” a synonym for disloyalty.77

With the death of Andrew Carnegie in 1919, the trustees also felt no longer obliged to support the former beneficiaries of Carnegie’s generosity. After the war, the Endowment, especially Nicholas Murray Butler’s division which had been in charge of liaising with peace societies, was in search of a new strategy and a coherent policy in Europe. It took until the mid-1920s for the Dotation to acquire a new, more ‘scientific’ profile but the Endowment’s other two divisions launched pioneering approaches to the study of international relations from the early 1920s. Meanwhile, other organisations, mostly those founded by another philanthropist, John D. Rockefeller, entered the European field, and established large-scale programmes first in the medical and natural sciences, and then also in the social sciences.

Origins of Philanthropic Internationalism II: the Rockefeller philanthropies

The story of the Rockefeller Foundation and its smaller sister-organisations is well known.78 John D. Rockefeller, Sr., a still more successful industrialist than Andrew

78 For accounts of the Rockefeller Foundation written by former members of the American world of philanthropy see Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation; Nielsen, Big Foundations, 47-77;
Carnegie, was a reserved and religious man who, even while he was not particularly wealthy, had given a fixed part of his income to charity. Contrary to his fellow philanthropists, he had never become the figurehead of any reform cause; in fact, in the 1910s, during the heyday of the conservative peace movement, Rockefeller was the only member of New York City’s philanthropic elite who did not belong to the New York Peace Society. Under the influence of a Baptist preacher, Reverend Frederick T. Gates, Rockefeller engaged in systematic charitable giving. Rockefeller’s first large-scale gift went to the University of Chicago and from the early 1900s, the philanthropist founded institutions bearing his own name. The first was the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in 1901; the General Education Board followed in 1903, and was succeeded in 1909 by the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission which aimed to eradicate ankylostomiasis (hookworm disease) in the American South. It should be noted, though, that Rockefeller relied heavily on the guidance of his son John D Rockefeller, Jr. and Gates with regards to his personal philanthropy. By 1921, “Senior”, as he was known within the family (his son was referred to as “Junior”), had ceased to make any significant philanthropic gifts.

Frederick Gates, who also managed the older Rockefeller’s personal assets, intended to promote Rockefeller philanthropy “in all lands” in order to advance civilisation. He had surveyed the state of American philanthropy and discovered that, while philanthropic activity had increased in the 1890s, little of it went abroad. An impact-making philanthropic foundation should, as Gates saw it, emulate foreign

Bremner, Philanthropy, passim; for a number of smaller Rockefeller philanthropies see Seelander, Private Wealth, chaps. 2, 3, 5, 6; Martin Bulmer and Joan Bulmer, “Philanthropy and Social Science in the 1920s: Beardsley Ruml and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1922-1929”, Minerva 19, no. 3 (1981).


Marchand, Peace Movement and Social Reform, 91 n.


Collier and Horowitz, Rockefellers, 60, 103-104.
missionaries who spread not just the Christian gospel but also science and technology, and so the first Rockefeller-funded projects abroad were in the fields of medicine and public health, covering Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia.\textsuperscript{83} Historians have observed that the early geographical focus of Rockefeller philanthropy overlapped with U.S. expansion in the Western Hemisphere, where the American military conducted several sanitary campaigns between the 1890s and the 1910s. Rockefeller campaigns in these areas also relied on personnel recruited from former military and colonial officials.\textsuperscript{84} Similar to those of the Carnegie Endowment, the Rockefeller activities dovetailed with American foreign policy objectives.

The Rockefeller Foundation’s motto, “the Well-Being of Mankind Throughout the World”, reflected this new international orientation. However, during the first years of its existence, the relationship between the foundation, the Rockefeller family’s largest philanthropic project, and policy makers in Washington was fraught with the immense hostility that John D. Rockefeller, Sr.’s business activities aroused. Progressive muckrakers such as Ida Tarbell had fashioned an image of the older Rockefeller as the head of a ruthless corporate empire. Even after the dissolution of Standard Oil in 1911 his personal wealth only increased, much to the disgust of the American public. For three years after the older Rockefeller signed over 50 million dollars in Standard Oil securities to the nascent Rockefeller Foundation in 1910, the foundation petitioned Congress in vain for a federal charter; it failed because government endorsement of the Rockefellers was simply deemed too controversial in


times of violent labour unrest. In 1913 the New York State Legislature finally passed a bill granting the charter but the family and its philanthropies then came under fire during the investigations conducted by the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations between 1913 and 1915. The Ludlow massacre of 1914, a violently suppressed coalminers’ strike in Colorado which resulted in twenty fatalities, further damaged the Rockefeller name, as one of the mining companies involved was owned by the family. This was to be the high point of congressional and public opposition to Rockefeller philanthropy which John D. Rockefeller, Sr. mostly ignored but which had a profound impact on his son who made it his mission to improve the family’s reputation.  

Eager to be perceived as a philanthropist in his own right, and spurred on by strong religious commitments, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. took the chance to assume the role of social reformer after serving as foreman of a Special Grand Jury on prostitution in New York City in 1910. The ‘White Slave’ traffic was an archetypal social concern of the Progressive Age, symbolising Americans’ anxieties about the transformation of their society. The younger Rockefeller developed a personal interest in the jury’s deliberations and supplemented its budget. At the end of the investigations, he channelled his reformist zeal into a new philanthropic project, the Bureau of Social Hygiene, whose work in sex education and sex research was groundbreaking at the time. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. was convinced that ignorance and a lack of available knowledge lay at the root of most social ills. The Bureau of Social Hygiene’s matter-of-fact reports set a model for the production of policy-relevant scientific expertise. Impressed with this novel approach, the Carnegie Endowment copied the format.  

As a result of his work on the White Slave Grand Jury, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. met

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85 Collier and Horowitz, Rockefellers, 64, 100; Sealander, Private Wealth, 218-234.
Raymond Fosdick, New York City’s commissioner of accounts. This meeting was of huge significance for both of them. Fosdick would become the architect of Rockefeller internationalism and, finally, in 1936 president of the Rockefeller Foundation. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. had found a trusted personal advisor who would, for several decades, shape his and his family’s outlook on world politics.  

Partisan politics separated the two men—Fosdick was a Democrat and a protégé of Woodrow Wilson, Rockefeller supported the Republicans. In contrast to the legal internationalists who around the same time rallied around Andrew Carnegie to become trustees of his peace endowment, Fosdick embraced Progressive social reform. A Princeton graduate from a modest background, Fosdick became involved with the social reformers of New York City’s Henry Street settlement where he lived and supervised two boys’ clubs. After finishing his law degree in 1908, Fosdick went into municipal administration. True Progressive that he was, he even created a “bureau of efficiency” as a subdivision of his own office. The Bureau of Social Hygiene hired him as an investigator in 1913 and posted him to Europe, where he compiled an influential report on European police systems.

This work brought him to the attention of Newton Baker, U.S. Secretary of War. In 1916 Fosdick was asked to undertake a survey of conditions in U.S. army training camps. He was then appointed Chairman of the wartime Commission on Training Camp Activities, a governmental clearinghouse that coordinated the efforts of various civilian agencies to make soldiers morally and physically fit for battle. Like so many other initiatives of the time, the Commission on Training Camp Activities redirected domestic

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Progressive idealism towards the war effort. And, like other Progressive reformers, Fosdick turned his attention to international affairs. He eschewed the pacifism adopted by some of his former acquaintances in the settlement movement—after all, his wartime job was to produce more efficient soldiers—but, after a stint as Civilian Aide to General Pershing during the Paris Peace Conference, he joined the League of Nations as an Under-Secretary-General at Woodrow Wilson’s request. After this appointment ended in 1920, when it was clear that the United States would not join the League, Fosdick returned once more to New York to open a law practice. As John D. Rockefeller, Jr.’s personal lawyer, Fosdick also served on the executive committees and boards of trustees of all important Rockefeller philanthropies.

The architecture of both the Rockefeller and the Carnegie foundations owed much to the Progressive obsession with efficiency and expert politics. Both Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, Jr. selectively affiliated with Progressive reform movements. While Carnegie popularised the principles of scientific giving, the Rockefeller philanthropies may have followed them more rigorously, inducing the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to copy the Bureau of Social Hygiene’s methods. Conversely, by virtue of Andrew Carnegie’s links to the international arbitration movement, the Carnegie Endowment was ahead of the Rockefeller Foundation when it came to the creation of transnational networks. Both foundations, however, shared a global outlook, either due to the interest of the founder or of those in his immediate vicinity. The philanthropic activities of both organisations also supplemented official U.S. foreign policy, be it through the strengthening of international law or the epidemiological management of an American sphere of influence in the Pacific and the

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91 Fosdick, Chronicle, 169-217.
Western hemisphere. Thus, certain traits of philanthropic internationalism had already become visible before 1917. The Great War changed the environment in which the foundations operated. At home, the American war effort co-opted most progressive reform energy. Internationally, the outcome of the conflict transformed the global balance of power and, due to the establishment of the League of Nations, the international system as such. But did the war fundamentally change the foundations’ outlook?

*World War I as a Turning Point for American Philanthropy Abroad?*

Ludovic Tournès has argued that the Great War constituted a turning point for American philanthropy as it changed attitudes towards Europe. European countries who used to be regarded as a model for the United States now became a field for reformist and reconstructive activity. But was the war really the defining moment when the progressive search for order became, in Warren Cohen’s words, “a search for world order”? Certainly, wartime experiences in the areas of relief work, war administration and peace making shaped the outlook of foundation employees and founders. Most importantly, the increased role of scientific expertise in the shaping of foreign policy was impressed on philanthropic leaders. Nevertheless, continuities in the way American foundations conceptualised the United States’ role in the world should not be overlooked. Ideas that had been prominent before the war did not vanish in its aftermath and neither did the transatlantic networks in which they circulated.

Historians of social reform movements have seen the Great War as the beginning of the end of unchallenged European leadership in setting the social policy

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92 Tournès, “Universalisme philanthropique américain”: 183; a similar point has been made by Benjamin B. Page, “First Steps: The Rockefeller Foundation in Early Czechoslovakia”, *East European Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (2001): 275. Page emphasises that the Rockefeller Foundation regarded the war-induced turmoil in European societies as an opportunity.

agenda in the industrialised countries of the North Atlantic. Before, American progressives looked to Europe, without receiving much interest in return. After, transatlantic exchanges became less one-sided as Fordism and other symbols of the American “machine civilisation” travelled eastwards. The American relief workers who tested progressive models in town-planning, public health, and education on war-devastated French civilians were the harbingers of this role reversal. Shortly after hostilities commenced in 1914, U.S. civilians resident in Paris organised an ambulance service. Other American-led voluntary initiatives soon followed. Among these the Commission for the Relief of Belgium, which was organised by Herbert Hoover and enjoyed unofficial government recognition, remains the best-known. With the American entry into the war, the American Red Cross, representative of the U.S. government, proceeded to absorb and streamline these various private groups, with a high degree of success. In fact, it used the organisational structure of the private American Relief Clearing House as a blueprint for its own operation. Consolidation under the Red Cross also marked the introduction of large-scale, streamlined and business practices into overseas relief operations.  

Even personal philanthropy became more coordinated. During the war, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. orchestrated the United War Work Campaign, an interdenominational effort that raised over $170 million. This experience of cooperation across national,

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religious and social lines further impressed on the young Rockefeller the importance of mutual understanding and shaped his ‘personalist’ approach to international relations.\textsuperscript{96} The Rockefeller Foundation created its own War Relief Commission and provided over $19 million to humanitarian and war-related initiatives between 1914 and 1918. Its first large donation, almost one million dollars, benefited Belgian war relief, but more than eight million dollars went to the Red Cross in the course of the war. Other major beneficiaries included the younger Rockefeller’s United War Work Fund, the YMCA, a war demonstration hospital and the Commission on Training Camp Activities, Fosdick’s wartime employer.\textsuperscript{97} Complementing Fosdick’s mission, the foundation collaborated with the American Social Hygiene Association in order to prevent soldiers from succumbing to the usual dangers that came with duty in foreign lands—alcoholism and sexually transmitted diseases.\textsuperscript{98}

In a further step towards direct involvement in Europe, the Rockefeller Foundation’s War Relief Commission decided in 1915 that its future relief efforts would best be administered by “agents on the spot”.\textsuperscript{99} Thus, the war also set a precedent for dealing with European governments. For instance, prior to its work in German-occupied Russian Poland, the Rockefeller Foundation negotiated an understanding with the German Ministry of External Affairs through the American ambassador.\textsuperscript{100} A new Rockefeller philanthropy, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, also engaged in

\textsuperscript{96} Albert F. Schenkel, \textit{The Rich Man and the Kingdom: John D. Rockefeller and the Protestant Establishment}, Harvard Theological Studies (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 52. The ‘personalist’ approach can be defined as follows: ‘if only the leader of country X were friends with the leader of country Y, then war between those two countries would be an impossibility’. Note that this assumption conflates ‘nation’ and ‘state’.

\textsuperscript{97} Rockefeller Foundation, \textit{Annual Report 1918} (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1918), 54-55.

\textsuperscript{98} Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow (hereafter RF), Record Group (hereafter RG) 1.1, series 100, box 56, folder 555, passim.

\textsuperscript{99} War Relief Commission, “Policy for Foundation in regard to War Relief work”, 27 October 1915, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 56, folder 553. It is important to note that this step was taken before American entry into the war.

\textsuperscript{100} Dr Theodor Lewald, the Undersecretary in the German Ministry of External Affairs provided Rockefeller agents with papers and a military vehicle for their reconnaissance trip to Poland. “Russian Poland – Report of the War Relief Commission to the Rockefeller Foundation”, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 62, folder 616.
relief work similar to that of the Rockefeller Foundation. The Memorial had been established in 1918 in memory of John D. Rockefeller, Sr.’s late wife and had a capital endowment of $79 million. Early on, it aided social welfare and religious organisations, but from the 1920s it became active in the social sciences and shaped Rockefeller approaches to the study of international relations.

Public health remained a concern for the Rockefeller Foundation as it expanded its programmes in Europe from 1917. The foundation’s anti-tuberculosis campaign in France was the first European project and was succeeded by several public health programmes in Central Europe. It is important to note here that other foundations also entered the public health field in Europe in the early 1920s as an indirect result of their war relief work. The Commonwealth Fund became involved in Austria through its appropriations to the American Relief Administration and, once the Administration pulled out, built up a comprehensive child health programme in several Austrian cities and districts in the course of the 1920s. Special programmes for the professional middle classes were a common feature of philanthropic war relief operations in Central Europe, showing a particular concern for what American relief organisations hoped would become the managerial elites of the new democracies in this part of Europe.

The Carnegie Endowment’s position was rather different. Because of its remit—it did not deal with ‘uncontroversial’ projects like medicine or public health—it

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101 Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Records, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow (hereafter LSRM), series III, subseries 3 (hereafter series III.3), box 9, folder 106, passim.
104 See, e.g., the following report which galvanised the officers of the Commonwealth Fund into appropriating $500,000 for food drafts for intellectuals: “Upon the brains of this intellectual class depends the future of these countries. Their new governments are inexperienced and are at present for the large part drawn from the untrained classes of social democrats. Sooner or later these new nations must appeal to their intellectuals for aid in the restoration of industry, education, and public affairs.”, Alonzo Taylor (American Relief Administration), “The Situation of the Intellectual Class in Central Europe”, n.d., Commonwealth Fund Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow (hereafter CF), series 18, box 12, folder 119.
prescribed itself a conspicuously neutral stance from August 1914. Most of its grants to European peace groups were discontinued and the *Dotation Carnegie* went into hibernation: until the war’s end Carnegie employees in Paris spent their time tending to the *Dotation*’s library.\(^{105}\) Although many of the Endowment’s trustees were privately pro-Ally, they concentrated on Pan-American relations and educational activities in the United States during the early phase of the war.\(^{106}\) James Brown Scott, head of the Endowment’s Division of International Law, was the biggest supporter of Pan-Americanism within the foundation. Together with the Chilean lawyer Alejandro Álvarez and the Argentinean Ernesto Quesada, Scott proposed the creation of a Pan American Intellectual Union at the Second Pan American Scientific Congress of 1916, a gathering which had also received a subvention of $25,000 from the Carnegie Endowment.\(^{107}\) At the same congress, Scott also led the first session of the American Institute of International Law, a federation of the Western hemisphere’s national societies which promoted a regional, specifically Pan-American conception of international law.\(^{108}\) Álvarez popularised this attempt to fuse the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental legal traditions prevalent in the Americas and to construct an “American public law” in a series of Endowment-sponsored lectures at American universities.\(^{109}\) But with the United States’ entry into the war, the Endowment turned its attention back

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\(^{105}\) “Le centre européen de la Dotation Carnegie (Memento Chronologique)”, 19 March 1921, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Centre Européen Archives, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York (hereafter CEIP CE), box 60, folder 2, 10-11.  
to Europe. In 1918 it donated $550,000 to relief efforts, a sum that made up almost half of its annual budget.\(^{110}\)

While the Carnegie Endowment was not able to contribute as much financially as the Rockefeller philanthropies, once the United States entered the conflict, its leaders saw it as their civic responsibility to rouse fellow Americans to their wartime duties. Nicholas Murray Butler strongly criticised people in public life who had uttered anti-war statements. In July 1917 he also made a distinction between “true internationalism” and “false internationalism”. False internationalism was supranational in nature and “lay stress upon a world-wide community without national ties or national ambitions”. True internationalism, on the other hand, strengthened “nationalistic and patriotic sentiments and aims … in a larger human undertaking of which each nation should be an independent and integral part”.\(^{111}\)

John D. Rockefeller, Jr. equally nimbly bridged the gap between international understanding and patriotism. In a 1918 speech entitled “Brotherhood of Men and Nations”, Rockefeller praised the Allied cause and denounced the “barbarous principles” of the Germans. Only after a German defeat would brotherhood be extended to all nations: “We shall have reason to feel that the hundreds of thousands of brave men who have laid down their lives could not have made the supreme sacrifice for any cause which will contribute more largely to the maintenance of universal peace, the contentment of humanity and the well-being of mankind throughout the world.”\(^{112}\)

Ending the speech with the Rockefeller Foundation’s slogan, Rockefeller also confirmed that his philanthropic work was part and parcel of an emerging internationalist conscience that was reinforced by religious conviction.

\(^{110}\) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book 1919, 27.


\(^{112}\) John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Brotherhood of Men and Nations: An Address Delivered before the Civic and Commercial Club at Denver, Colorado, June 13, 1918 (s.l.: 1918), 35.
The Endowment did not limit its assistance to speeches and humanitarian aid. During the war, the Division of International Law offered its services to the State Department and compiled studies in preparation for the Paris Peace Conference. James Brown Scott was given leave so that he could join the American delegation at the conference. Other Endowment staff members, George A. Finch and James T. Shotwell, who was also a member of the Inquiry, followed Scott to Paris. Employees of the Rockefeller foundations assumed important roles in the war administration at home and abroad. Examples include Fosdick and Arthur Woods, both members of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial’s Executive Board. Woods, well-connected and related to the Morgan banking dynasty, started out as Colonel in the War Department’s Division of Military Aeronautics and from 1919 served as assistant to Secretary of War Newton Baker. But foundation staff also collected experiences with the semi-official agencies that became so prominent during the war. Tracy B. Kittredge, the Rockefeller Foundation’s Assistant Director of the Social Sciences Division in the 1930s, worked for Hoover’s Relief Commission in Belgium. In 1920 he continued his career at the League of Red Cross Societies where he eventually assumed the post of Secretary-General. Thus many foundation employees served their country either as expert advisors, regular military personnel or in a semi-official capacity.

Those who went to the Paris Peace Conference were also present at the creation of new institutions that would shape interwar theorising on international relations, namely the international affairs institutes, prototypes of the foreign policy think tank. The Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs emerged from the meetings of the Anglo-American experts in Paris and rose to

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115 Tracy B. Kittredge Biographical File, RF.
prominence during the 1920s. Both attracted foundation funding in the interwar years.  

The Institute of Politics in Williamstown, a similar but less well-known venue, started to offer a summer academy in 1921 and became an influential model within the United States and abroad. Like the Council on Foreign Relations, it served as something of a follow-up organisation for the experts who had been recruited in the course of government preparation for the Paris Peace Conference. Williamstown, as it was known, enjoyed the financial support of John D. Rockefeller, Jr. and the Carnegie Corporation. Archibald Cary Coolidge of the Council on Foreign Relations, James Brown Scott, and a few more Ivy League professors in history, political science and law sat on the original board of advisors and were later joined by the director-general of the Pan-American Union Leo S. Rowe, the reparations expert and later trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation Owen D. Young, and public intellectual Walter Lippmann. The summer conferences were open to academics and businessmen—the two largest contingents at the sessions—but also to journalists, diplomats and military personnel. Williamstown acted as an important transatlantic meeting-place and its list of speakers and guests reads like a roll-call of European internationalism. Paul Mantoux, William Rappard, Count Carlo Sforza, Nicolas Politis, Walter Simons, Moritz Julius Bonn, André Siegfried, Count Pál Teleki, Graham Wallas, and Arnold Toynbee all gave lectures or led round table discussions at the institute between 1921 and 1929.  

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118 Williamstown Institute of Politics, *Preliminary Announcement: The Institute of Politics, Second Session* (Williamstown: Williams College, 1922); Buffinton, *Institute of Politics*, 46-63. All of the Williamstown participants mentioned also had at least one connection to the foundations. The Franco-
Considering the wartime roles of philanthropic leaders, it is clear that their experiences brought them into closer contact with foreign policy makers than was hitherto the case. Especially those involved in the peacemaking process realised to what extent government was willing to rely on outside expertise. Finally, philanthropic leaders now increasingly emphasised that the fulfilment of American foreign policy objectives was a prerequisite to universalist aims such as world peace. Patriotic duty had to come before internationalist duty—or, as John D. Rockefeller, Jr. insisted, there were cases “where Brotherhood must halt until Right Prevails”. But then, the idea that the United States was a champion of right, a promoter of international law and a model for other nations was nothing new in 1918.

Nicholas Murray Butler said as much in 1914 when he concluded that the war had only confirmed the United States’ “right to be appealed to on questions of national and international morality”. In the same interview, Butler suggested that Europe adopt the American principle of federation. After the war, Butler’s suggestions, which also linked up with Álvarez’s ideas for an international order organised through

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Greek jurist Nicolas Politis, the Italian liberal politician Carlo Sforza and the German economist Moritz Julius Bonn all became members of the Advisory Council of the Carnegie Endowment’s European organisation in the mid-1920s. Paul Mantoux, a scholar-politician who had been the principal interpreter for the Council of Four at the Paris Peace Conference, and William Rappard were the directors of the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Geneva, which was founded with a large grant from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. Graham Wallas, an eminent political scientist who had been a visiting professor at Harvard and a strong influence on the young Walter Lippmann, taught at the London School of Economics, another major recipient of foundation funding in the 1920s and 1930s. Arnold Toynbee was associated both with the LSE and Chatham House, which received a number of grants from the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1930s. Moreover, Toynbee became a key member of the International Studies Conference. Pál Teleki was a Hungarian prime minister who collaborated with the Carnegie Endowment’s James T. Shotwell in an attempt to establish research committees on international relations in Eastern Europe in 1931. Walter Simons, a German Chief Justice during the Weimar Republic, sat on the board of the foundation-supported Deutsche Hochschule für Politik in Berlin. André Siegfried, a French geographer best known for interpreting the United States to a European audience, gave lectures under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment and was a member of the Centre d’études de politique étrangère which was founded with a Rockefeller Foundation grant in 1935.

119 However, it should be noted that plans for meeting-places that brought together academic experts and government officials predated the war. Harry Augustus Garfield had already started to seek funding for the Williamstown Institute in 1913. Buffinton, *Institute of Politics*, 1.

120 Rockefeller, *Brotherhood of Men and Nations*, 33.


122 Ibid.: 567.
regional or hemispheric legal regimes, were taken up by some Europeans active in the Pan-European movement. In 1913, Paul S. Reinsch voiced similar sentiments when he advised Europeans to study the American political system “for the lessons it contains in regard to the possibility of organizing world-wide interests upon a basis of co-operation and a recourse to law”. To convince Europeans of the rightfulness of American plans for international life was, Reinsch claimed, the United States’ “national destiny”. American efforts to transplant their national experiences to nascent international institutions date back to the 1899 Hague Conference when the U.S. delegation proposed the establishment of a permanent court of arbitration along the lines of the Supreme Court. Efforts to promote international law did not cease after 1919. While many legal internationalists, those within the Endowment among them, did not back the League of Nations, support for an American affiliation to the Permanent Court of International Justice remained strong. Elihu Root even led the American delegation to the Advisory Committee of Jurists which planned the Court at The Hague in 1920.

Americans did not need the wartime experience to justify their desire to transform Europe in the United States’ image. The Carnegie Endowment’s European office had been established in 1912 with the explicit aim of reorganising European internationalism in order to make it more efficient. Major Carnegie endeavours in the interwar years, the Endowment-sponsored Social and Economic History of the World War and the Academy of International Law at The Hague, were outcomes of initiatives

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125 Boyle, *Foundations of World Order*, 27.
126 Kuehl and Dunn, *Keeping the Covenant*, 57-59.
that the war had prevented from blossoming. Thus the war certainly did not mark the beginning of an American philanthropic presence across the Atlantic. Attitudes towards Europe did not undergo such a dramatic change either. Raymond Fosdick, who had lauded European police systems and denigrated the American counterpart before the war, still suffered from a cultural inferiority complex well into the 1920s. Quoting André Siegfried, a French observer of American civilisation, Fosdick diagnosed a worrying level of intellectual, cultural and artistic impoverishment in his homeland which constituted a “cultural lag”. In spite of his critical comments about the United States, Siegfried repeatedly benefited from the largesse of American foundations in the interwar years.

*Philanthropic Internationalism after the Great War*

But despite the continuities, which are more apparent when taking into account not just the Rockefeller Foundation but other philanthropies as well, World War I was a defining moment in the development of philanthropic internationalism, if only because it exposed the different stances of philanthropic leaders towards international organisation. Root and Butler of the Carnegie Endowment did not endorse Wilson’s League on the grounds of Article X, which, they thought, infringed too much on a state’s sovereignty. They still preferred a world court with public opinion as a sanction. In the mid-1920s, however, the Endowment changed its stance and became more supportive of the Geneva system. Fosdick, by comparison, was a clear supporter of

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127 The Endowment sponsored a successful international conference of historians dedicated to the study of causes and effects of war, which took place in Berne in 1911. See Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin-Dahlem (hereafter GStA PK), VI. HA Nl Schiemann, Nr. 15: “Historiker-Kongress in Bern der Carnegie-Stiftung, 1911-1913”, passim. The Hague Academy of International Law had been established with a substantial grant of the Endowment in 1914 but its opening was delayed until 1923; see next chapter.


129 Dubin, “Advocacy of a League of Nations”; Kuehl and Dunn, *Keeping the Covenant*, 59-60. See also the discussion of the *Dotation Carnegie* in the next chapter.
the League from its inception and never ceased to be one throughout his life. He convinced John D. Rockefeller, Jr. to lend financial support to internationalist groups, among them the League to Enforce Peace, an organisation about which Root, Scott and Butler were sceptical. 130 From 1922, the Rockefeller Foundation also collaborated with the League of Nations in several areas, notably in international health. It is estimated that Rockefeller funding for the League’s health organisation alone amounted to circa $100,000 per year. Personal gifts from the Rockefeller family to the League and the International Labour Organisation complemented this work. 131

Here it is necessary to comment briefly on the relationship between private and foundation philanthropy. As has been emphasised in the literature on ‘scientific philanthropy’, philanthropic foundations professionalised and thus transformed charitable giving. Nevertheless, the creators of foundations often maintained a significant level of private philanthropic activity. In the case of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., one can observe that he also professionalised his personal giving which was managed by a permanent “Advisory Committee”. Raymond Fosdick chaired this committee and some Advisory Committee staff members, for example Thomas B. Appleget, later worked for the Rockefeller Foundation. Fosdick had a remarkably free hand when it came to determining where exactly private Rockefeller gifts went. He frequently suggested donations to the younger Rockefeller who left his trusted adviser in charge of fleshing out the details. 132 There were also cases in which private Rockefeller gifts were used to support projects that did not really fit the official programme of any of the Rockefeller philanthropies. If such a privately supported venture turned out to be a

131 Kuehl and Dunn, Keeping the Covenant, 144-145. See also RFA, RG 2, World Affairs series, box 24, folders 198-204 (League of Nations), passim.
132 See, e.g., Rockefeller to Fosdick, 12 June 1931, RFA, RG 2, World Affairs series, box 24, folder 200, in which the younger Rockefeller decides to donate $25,000 to the cause of disarmament but leaves it to Fosdick to name the individual grant recipients in consultation with other American internationalists.
success, a grant from one of the foundations often followed.\textsuperscript{133} Thus, private Rockefeller philanthropy fulfilled the function of a testing device in the Rockefeller Foundation’s set of tools for determining which organisations to support. Alternatively, it was used as a way of channelling funds to causes which foundation officers felt were worthwhile but outside the remit of their programmes.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that the Rockefellers had no input into their own personal philanthropic giving. Rather, personal and public philanthropy were intertwined. The younger Rockefeller and especially one of his sons, John D. Rockefeller III, cared deeply about European affairs and the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{134} Occasionally, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. intervened in the running of his foundations, for example when he redirected some of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial’s funds towards evangelical Protestant churches in Belgium and France after the Great War.\textsuperscript{135} These instances seem to have been rare, though. In the case of the Carnegie philanthropies, donor intervention was even less prevalent during the time period considered in this study, simply because Andrew Carnegie passed away in 1919. There is, however, evidence that his widow, Louise Carnegie, took an interest in the programmes of her husband’s foundations and had some influence.\textsuperscript{136}

One historian of Wilsonian internationalism has argued that the difference in allegiance between leading figures in the Carnegie Endowment and the Rockefeller Foundation was due to partisan political affiliations, and that later on in the 1920s, an “idealist synthesis” united internationalists across party lines.\textsuperscript{137} To some extent this is

\textsuperscript{133} One example of this pattern is the Foreign Policy Association which was first supported by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. and then by the Rockefeller Foundation. When the Foundation began its support, the private gifts were decreased accordingly. See Advisory Committee Resolution “Foreign Policy Association”, 15 June 1933, RFA, RG 2, World Affairs series, box 1, folder 8.

\textsuperscript{134} See, e.g., John D. Rockefeller III to Everett Colby, 2 November 1935, RFA, RG 2, World Affairs series, box 24, folder 203.

\textsuperscript{135} W.S. Richardson to Beardsley Ruml, 22 June 1922, LSRM, series III.2, box 6, folder 71.


\textsuperscript{137} Steigerwald, \textit{Wilsonian Idealism}, chapter 3.
true, especially when one considers the intense cooperation between the Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropies that began in the 1930s. However, it should not be forgotten that the Endowment also contained the odd Democrat, for example James Brown Scott. What seemed to matter more was the predominance of international lawyers in the Carnegie organisation, who were simply more comfortable with a judicial rather than a political solution to war. Therefore, the Carnegie Endowment continued its support for international law after 1919. It was the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial which came up with a different approach to the problem of reforming international relations.

Again, Raymond Fosdick played a decisive role. Although a lawyer himself, his approach to internationalism sidelined the legal internationalists and focused on the social sciences. This new orientation resulted directly from Fosdick’s wartime experience which had convinced him that, while humanity had the technological capacity for immense destruction, it lacked the social tools to deal with these scientific advances: “This divergence between the natural sciences and the social sciences, between machinery and control, between the kingdom of this world and the kingdom of the spirit—this is where the hazard lies.” In Fosdick’s opinion, modern life was adversely affected by an antiquated form of social organisation. This was where philanthropic internationalism could make a real contribution.138 Optimism about the applicability of social scientific knowledge and the potential for the scientific planning of societal developments was common in American academia at the time. The 1920s were boom years for the social sciences: for the first time, the general public became aware of some social science disciplines. Progressive prescriptions for efficiency were

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still followed but they were now sought through the measure of social control by a small, well-informed elite.\textsuperscript{139}

To some extent these ideas linked up with suggestions contributed by European internationalists before the war. After all, it had been Léon Bourgeois who introduced the “technique of dealing with a political difficulty by a recital of an apparently incontrovertible socio-economic fact” into diplomatic practice at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference.\textsuperscript{140} Fin-de-siècle internationalists had also counted sociologists such as Émile Dürkheim among their ranks, and even the international lawyers who founded the IDI were amateur sociologists of sorts—many of them had participated in the reform-oriented \textit{Association internationale pour le progrès de sciences sociales}.\textsuperscript{141} In 1912, Walther Schücking and Theodore Ruysse, both prominent international lawyers, had suggested that the Carnegie Endowment establish university chairs in international sociology and morality. These were to conduct sociological studies of international conflicts and international institutions and deliver a curriculum distinct from contemporary university teaching of international law.\textsuperscript{142} In the 1920s, the \textit{Dotation Carnegie} also collaborated with the \textit{Institut des hautes études internationales} of the University of Paris’s law faculty, an institution which sought to reform the discipline of international law, rid it of its “caractère sèchement juridique” and take into account the sociological realities of international life.\textsuperscript{143} While the Carnegie Endowment still advocated principally the development of international law as the most important contribution to world peace after the war, it also started to rely on the social sciences by commissioning a 120-volume \textit{Economic and Social History of the World War}. This


\textsuperscript{140} Koskenniemi, \textit{Gentle Civilizer of Nations}, 285.


\textsuperscript{142} “Art. 6 de l’ordre de jour, chaires de sociologie et de morale internationales”, 21 November 1912, CEIP CE, box 293, folder 3, esp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{143} Alejandro Alvarez and Albert Geouffre de La Pradelle, “L’Institut des hautes études internationales et l’enseignement du droit des gens”, \textit{Revue Générale de Droit International Public} 46, no. 6 (1939): 666.
represented an acknowledgment that social scientific knowledge would play a role in the development of peaceful international relations.\textsuperscript{144}

Nevertheless, it was the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial which formulated most clearly the relevance of the social sciences to international affairs. But the conflict between impartial expertise in international affairs and national loyalties that had already vexed pre-war internationalists lingered on in spite of the disciplinary and methodological break with the past. Beardsley Ruml, director of the Memorial from 1922, developed a philanthropic programme which emphasised the training of social science experts. He hoped to foster “an internationally minded group of students of social problems” able to “view international society with a new objectivity”: “And as the results of their researches, and as their point of view becomes the intellectual property of greater numbers of men, there will have been created an important antidote for prejudice and irrationality in the relations among the people occupying the various political subdivisions of the world.”\textsuperscript{145} In Ruml’s imagination, the training of social science experts could provide what other efforts to bring about the ‘international mind’ had failed to do. Ruml also assumed that social science expertise would immediately lead to an absence of national prejudice. Fosdick seconded this claim in a pamphlet which he wrote for the League of Nations Association. International society and international conflicts were technically so sophisticated that they could only be handled by experts. In his view, nationality did not play a role in the way the experts working at the League approached problems.\textsuperscript{146}


\textsuperscript{145} “Recent Trends in Social Science”, speech delivered at dedication of Social Science Research Building, University of Chicago, 17 December 1929, Beardsley Ruml Papers, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago (hereafter Ruml Papers), box 6, folder 5.

\textsuperscript{146} Raymond B. Fosdick, \textit{An Expert Approach to International Relations. The League of Nations as an International Clearing House} (New York: League of Nations Non-Partisan Association, 1924), 9; interestingly, this view on League civil servants has been confirmed by some recent work on the Economic and Financial Organisation of the League: Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessels, “Transnationalism and the League of Nations: Understanding the Work of Its Economic and Financial
Such optimism was tempered by Abraham Flexner, a staff member of the Rockefeller-funded General Education Board, who wrote an influential memorandum for the Memorial. Flexner cautioned that knowledge was not enough, and had to be accompanied by political will. Experts without nationality did not seem appealing to him. “Every country must develop within itself broadminded and ultimately effective groups, not of pacifists or outsiders, but of its own loyal nationals, who will in appropriate ways educate public opinion, the press, industry, officialdom to see all sides of their own—and others’—current problems.” He went further: “Internationalism, in the sense in which it is embodied in the League, requires no one to purge himself of his own nationality.”

Throughout the interwar years, the foundations had to wrestle with the conflicting outlooks of those who followed Ruml and Fosdick and those who were more sympathetic to Flexner’s reasoning. Significantly, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial implemented a dual policy in the 1920s. It established national centres of research in the social sciences but also an institute for the study of international relations close to the League, the *Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales* in Geneva. There were two objectives: first, new experts in the social sciences were to be trained, and second, the border-transcending collaboration of these experts should facilitate international understanding. The Rockefeller Foundation itself did not deal with the social sciences before 1929, as this was the domain of the Memorial.

The Carnegie Endowment represented essentially the product of a conservative response to Progressive demands and stayed true to its legalist heritage for much of the

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147 Abraham Flexner, “Memorandum Regarding a Proposal to Establish at Geneva an Institute of International Research”, 1 September 1926, LSRM, series III.9, box 105, folder 1062, 18, 26.
interwar period. Significantly, its International Law Division also co-founded and promoted an international institution for international studies: The Hague Academy of International Law. The Endowment’s Paris office was restructured in the mid-1920s and became an international educational centre. The Endowment’s Division for Intercourse and Education also increasingly emulated the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial in its support of national institutes, for example the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik. In the next chapter, the foundations’ efforts to create international centres for the study of international relations will be discussed, focussing on the three cities of The Hague, Paris and Geneva.

A Note on Finances

Bearing in mind that the chief impact of philanthropic foundations does not result from their grants, but from “connecting with and helping to organize key groups of leaders”, detailed financial accounting might not be the best approach to study philanthropic funding patterns. Nevertheless, a few general remarks are in order. First, the Carnegie Endowment was a much poorer foundation than the Rockefeller philanthropies, simply because it had a smaller endowment which had to last over a longer time period. (The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial spent almost all its capital in the course of its short existence.) Moreover, the Endowment spent much of its money on a few costly ventures, such as the Hague Academy and the Carnegie History. Its other grants in the field of international relations did not amount to more than a few thousand dollars at a time.

149 Moreover, from the early 1920s, the Carnegie Endowment increasingly relied on additional funding from the Carnegie Corporation, which, although it was also a Carnegie creation, was highly critical of the Endowment’s policies and only grudgingly extended financial aid. See Carnegie Corporation Archives, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York (hereafter CC), grant files, box 72, folder 9, passim.
Rockefeller grants in that field, especially to institutions, were more substantial and those directed to International Studies Conference member institutions have been listed in the Appendix, with the proviso that the sums which were actually paid out were often less than the sums originally appropriated. This is due to the fact that grants were not always used in total and sometimes partly expired. Moreover, it should be noted that grants provided by the Foundation’s Paris office, which were generally in the region of a few thousand dollars, are not listed. It has been estimated that the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Foundation spent about $10 million in the field of the social sciences in Europe between 1924 and 1941, which is significantly less than the amounts given to the natural or medical sciences.\footnote{Christian Fleck, \textit{Transatlantische Bereicherungen: Zur Erfindung der empirischen Sozialforschung} (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2007), 124.} As part of the social sciences programme, international relations received a fair share of the funds, especially if fellowships to individuals are also taken into account, even though it would be justifiable to say that much philanthropic expenditure in the social sciences in Europe was driven by international concerns.
Foundations and the Internationalisation of International Studies

“What Bayreuth is to music, The Hague to applied international law, Wall Street to international finance, Williamstown … is to discussions on international politics”, wrote Carlo Sforza from his French exile in 1927. However, according to the former Italian senator, the reason behind the summer school’s success was not the outcomes of the round table discussions (of which he was rather critical), nor the voluminous conference publications (which he found turgid), but the conciliatory atmosphere. To Sforza, the easy conviviality at Williamstown seemed most conducive to international understanding and put this refugee from fascism into an “euphorie morale”.¹ Moral uplift had been the intention of Williamstown’s founder, Harry Augustus Garfield, for whom the annual sessions represented an opportunity to endow his small college town with cosmopolitan glamour and to show off his own comfortable lodgings. He also invited nationalities from both sides of the Great War on purpose. While the official aim of the Williamstown Institute of Politics was to promote the non-partisan discussion of international problems, the basic concept behind it resembled the founding idea of many similar ventures in the interwar years and aimed at fostering an international sociability and a community of values.²

Williamstown in particular had many admirers, among them Otto Hoetzsch, a specialist on Eastern Europe who taught at the University of Berlin and at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik.³ The Williamstown model was also imitated in the United

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² Harry A. Garfield, Lost Visions (Boston: Thomas Todd, 1944), 5-7, 38-39.
States. However, the Institute of Politics at Williamstown was by no means the only institution dedicated specifically to fostering cross-national encounters. Some of these harked back to older approaches such as *Conciliation Internationale* or the *Institut de droit international* which sought to unite notables and legal experts respectively. The proliferation of international scientific congresses from the second half of the 19th century established a new mode of intellectual exchange but scientists also habitually praised the intrinsic benefits of international meetings. Appeals to forge personal relations across national borders were, according to Jean Dhombres, a way of bringing the individual into the international sphere, bypassing the confines of nationality. However, it should not be overlooked that such international exchange also fetishised the concept of nationhood: without national belonging there could be no inter-national exchange. The seemingly banal assertion that the very act of people of different nationalities meeting and exchanging views was a significant contribution to inter-state harmony was faithfully repeated in congress after congress.

International meetings became more institutionalised in the interwar years, boosted to some extent by structures established by the League of Nations. This period saw a proliferation of ventures that focused on the young, in particular university students, and included exchange programmes and the International House movement, a campaign to provide students of different nationalities with the opportunity to live together in designated houses of residence. Summer schools for students were also

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4 Institutes similar to Williamstown were established, *inter alia*, in Pasadena, Denver and at the University of Virginia. See memorandum by Tracy B. Kittredge, adviser on the Rockefeller Foundation’s European fellowship programme in the social sciences, “International Relations Program”, 7 March 1941, RF, RG 3, series 910, box 7, folder 66.


6 For the United States see Whitney Walton, “Internationalism and the Junior Year Abroad: American Students in France in the 1920s and 1930s”, *Diplomatic History* 29, no. 2 (2005); Liping Bu, *Making the
popular. For instance, in 1920 the Union of International Associations launched the project of an international university at the *Palais Mondial* in Brussels, a meeting place which combined instruction in different disciplines with the explicit aim of promoting peace. These were examples of the personalist approach to international relations, aimed at changing mentalities and fostering a habit of collaboration. American foundations were important financiers of such ventures which, even if the naïve assumptions on which they were founded invite derision, were able to shape individual biographies.

In 1935, the Carnegie Endowment received a letter from Laszlo Hoffman, a young Hungarian law student who was, in many ways, a child of the personalist internationalism fostered especially by American voluntary associations in the interwar years. As a secondary school pupil, Hoffman joined the World Brotherhood of Boys, a correspondence club which put him in touch with an American from Oregon. When Hoffman’s pen pal visited Europe with the National Students Forum, the two teenagers met and, the young Hungarian claimed, “through him, I came to know much more about world peace”. Hoffman then acted as an interpreter for the American contingent at the Boy Scouts’ 1933 World Jamboree in Gödöllő, Hungary. These experiences motivated him to study international law at Budapest University, a career move which, he hoped, would enable him to translate his personal interests into professional achievement. Again, he relied on structures established by an American organisation when he asked the Carnegie Endowment to include his university in its International Relations Clubs scheme. The enthusiasm of the Budapest students was assured, a professor supported

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8 For a definition of this elite-focused variant of internationalism, see previous chapter, footnote 96.
the idea, so the foundation merely needed to provide “information, instructions and
directions necessary for putting this plan into action”.  

Hoffman’s quest for an International Relations Club in Budapest remained unfulfilled as the Endowment had suspended the programme in most European
countries in the early 1930s before resurrecting it in 1936. However, the example of the
International Relations Clubs provides an illustration of how American foundations
harnessed variants of personalist internationalism and transported them into an
academic or scientific setting, proving that projects for the “scientification of the social”
also thrive beyond the nation state.  

But the divides between Boy Scout meetings, Williamstown and the academic study of international relations were bridged by assumptions commonly held by intellectuals during the fin-de-siècle and the interwar years. One of these was, as Glenda Sluga has argued, a belief in the deep psychological roots of national difference. This belief was frequently voiced at international gatherings, for example by Elihu Root during one of his speeches at Williamstown. Based on “hundreds of years of racial history and experience”, psychological differences created fundamental chasms between nations, which was, according to Root, another reason why democratically controlled foreign policy held so many dangers and had to be formulated under the benign influence of expert knowledge.

Providing transnational spaces where these international experts could meet was one of the ways in which foundations supported the study and discussion of international relations in the interwar years. While the Great War had brought about a significant innovation in the form of the international affairs institute which served a

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national community of foreign policy professionals, international institutes with an
international constituency harked back to an earlier model. This was pioneered by the
international lawyers who launched the *Institut de droit international* which met once a
year at changing venues. Like other organisations rooted in the pre-1914
internationalism, the institute mixed the constituencies of academia and government.\(^\text{13}\)

However, it stuck to one discipline, whereas venues such as Williamstown had a more
‘holistic’ approach to discussing international affairs and dealt with topics such as
technological advances, in particular aviation, agriculture, commerce and finance, and
even chemistry.\(^\text{14}\) Nevertheless, the study of international law as the main route into the
study of international relations remained popular and vibrant during the interwar years.
Even the League, although it did not have a provision for codification in the Covenant,
got involved in the development of international law. To Laszlo Hoffman, the hopeful
young internationalist from Hungary, the discipline also seemed the most promising for
the fulfilment of his ambitions.

This chapter analyses three international institutions that the foundations
supported in the course of the interwar years. All of them subscribed to the basic idea
that international tensions could be resolved by bringing together experts of different
nationalities, and that this was indeed a prerequisite for the ‘scientific’ study of
international relations. The ways in which they went about this, however, differed
considerably. The Academy of International Law at The Hague focused on debating and
disseminating the rules for the conduct of states. Its main source of funding was,
unsurprisingly, the Carnegie Endowment’s Division of International Law, and this
chapter will provide an insight into the workings of this rather neglected branch of the
Endowment. The Rockefeller philanthropies were less interested in international law,

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\(^{13}\) Madeleine Herren, “Modernisierung, Außenpolitik und Integration im Jahrhundert des

\(^{14}\) Williamstown Institute of Politics, *Report of the Round Tables and General Conferences at the Sixth
Session* (Williamstown, Mass.: Institute of Politics, 1926).
although this rule had important exceptions, as will be explored through an analysis of foundation involvement in League initiatives for the codification of international law. The Carnegie Endowment’s European branch office, the *Dotation Carnegie*, intended to transform itself into a hub for communicating international ideas and attempted to develop a mechanism for the dissemination of international knowledge. Finally, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial established in Geneva an interdisciplinary institute for the study of international relations that was not focused on international law, the Graduate Institute of International Studies. Importantly, the Geneva institute had an international faculty, and there were from the beginning attempts to internationalise the student body.

Thanks to the creation of the League, Geneva became something like an international capital in the 1920s and managed to eclipse other small-state cities which had styled themselves as internationalist hubs in the pre-war period, for example Brussels (seat of the *Office central des associations internationales*) or Berne (seat of the *Bureau international de la paix*). Another such hub was The Hague, the city of the peace conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. In 1911, James Brown Scott of the Carnegie Endowment had been able to assert that The Hague was “rapidly becoming the center of internationalism”.¹⁵ The Hague, and not Geneva, was the first site of a foundation-created institution for the study of international relations on European soil, starting the quest for the best way to organise scholarly activity in the field of international relations in the interwar years. The Hague Academy of International Law can be regarded as an institutional bridge between the legalist internationalism of the pre-war years and approaches to the study of international relations that were more committed to the social sciences. Nevertheless, with its origin in the Hague Peace Conferences, the Academy had broader aims than merely the

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academic teaching of international law. Its main backer, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, fully recognised this. Again, as with regard to the first establishment of an American philanthropic presence in Europe, the pioneering effort of the Endowment in the internationalisation of the study of international relations must be acknowledged.

*The Hague Academy of International Law*

The original idea for an academy for international law emerged in the early 20th century out of lawyers’ debates on alternatives to the compulsory arbitration of disputes between states. Such conflicts, some argued, might also be resolved by a body of experts with enough moral and scholarly authority to state definite opinions on the obligations of states under international law. Otfried Nippold, a Swiss jurist and future member of the Carnegie Endowment’s European Advisory Council, was the first to develop the idea for a specialised university for the teaching of international law at The Hague, linked to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Nippold’s suggestions were discussed at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907 but deemed too ambitious, before they were taken up again by the Dutch jurist T.M.C. Asser, bearer of the Nobel Peace Prize of 1911 and co-founder of the IDI. Asser came up with the idea of an academy for international law, running only in the summer months, with a changing but internationally renowned body of instructors. It was also Asser who, in January 1911, approached the newly-created Carnegie Endowment. James Brown Scott took a special interest in the prospective academy and fleshed out the details of the project together with his IDI colleague. At Scott’s request, Asser canvassed the opinions of the most influential authorities on international law in Europe and even those of foreign
governments to determine whether they would consider sending their diplomatic staff to the new academy for training.\textsuperscript{16}

Scott’s plan for the Academy was not wedded to a narrow conception of international law, at least not in his communications to the Executive Committee of the Carnegie Endowment. He included in his plans the other two divisions of the Endowment which, under the auspices of the new institution, could study the “economic effects of certain wars” as well as “the role of peace societies, scientific conferences and congresses; the methods of reaching the public; the reform of education in public schools, colleges, and universities so far as history, economics and political science are concerned”.\textsuperscript{17} Privately, however, Scott held that international law was the key to world peace: “it is through International Law and through it alone that the status of peace is to be preserved or brought about, if it be broken”, he wrote to the president of the IDI in 1912.\textsuperscript{18} The published lectures held at the Academy would result in a comprehensive and authoritative body of knowledge on international life: “the monographs would be consulted by specialists and general readers and would make their way into the literature of the subjects, thus profoundly modifying prevailing conceptions. … for in addition to his small audience at The Hague, the lecturer would have the world for his audience”.\textsuperscript{19}

Given that the Carnegie Endowment was only a fledgling institution itself at the time, it is not surprising that Scott was eager to seek the approval of a more venerable organisation before forging ahead with his ambitious plans at The Hague. Having been assured by Asser that governments and individual scholars favoured the creation of the Academy, Scott also sought the collaboration of the IDI, the world’s oldest and most

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, \textit{Year Book 1911}, 114.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Scott to F. Hagerup, 6 June 1912, CEIP, Vol. 255, 1137.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, \textit{Year Book 1911}, 114.
\end{itemize}
respectable international law society. In December 1911, the Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment had appropriated $20,000 for a general grant to the IDI. In a letter to its president, Scott insinuated that this might become an annual subvention, if relations between the IDI and the Endowment’s International Law Division could be formalised: “I cannot conceive of any better way of formulating the plans of the Division than in co-operation with the Institute, which, as you know, has and justly merits the confidence of the whole world.” Together, Scott went on, the Endowment’s International Law Division and the IDI could succeed in “formulating and, if possible, developing a system of law between the nations”. At its 1912 session, the IDI accepted this proposal and created a special committee which would act as consultant (“conseiller juridique”) to the Endowment, and thus lend it its own scientific credibility. Some IDI members were against this, fearing that the association would damage said credibility by embroiling the Institute in propaganda activities. Scott, who, as an IDI member, was present at the meeting, diffused these fears, emphasising the scientific character of his Division. He also proposed that the various nationalities be represented on the consultative committee, “given the difficulty of considering problems of international law in an absolutely neutral fashion”. This suggestion was heeded when the committee was put together in 1913.

Shortly after, the Endowment asked the IDI consultative committee to pronounce on the usefulness of creating the Hague Academy. In its recommendation for such an academy, the committee chose explicitly to speak of a “study centre”, a “centre

20 On the formation of these societies in the 1870s see Abrams, “International Law Societies”.
21 Scott to F. Hagerup, 6 June 1912, CEIP, Vol. 255, 1136.
22 The Norwegian member W. W. Gram feared the IDI might “se lancer dans une propagande pacifiste d’un caractère abstrait”. “Délibération en séance plénière sur la proposition faite à l’Institut par MM. les Trustees de la Fondation Carnegie dans l’interêt de la paix”: 571.
23 Ibid.
24 “... vu la difficulté de considérer les questions de droit international comme absolument neutres ...”. Ibid.: 572.
de hautes études de Droit International et de sciences connexes”. Other formulations such as “école” or “faculté” seemed too evocative of national institutions of instruction, with whom neither the Endowment nor the IDI wanted to engage in competition. The links between the new institution and the IDI were cemented when the consultative committee drew up the Academy’s statutes in early 1914. No nationality was allowed to be represented by more than one member on the Academy’s Curatorium and present and former IDI presidents received ex officio seats. Another space was allocated to a Dutch member of the Carnegie Foundation of the Peace Palace at The Hague. The Palace had been financed by Andrew Carnegie and provided a home to the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

The Academy, under its official name Académie de droit international de la Haye, établie avec le concours de la Dotation Carnegie pour la paix internationale, was to be inaugurated in the autumn of 1914 but the First World War intervened and postponed its launch until 1923. Scott in the meantime had been in high demand as an expert on international law. He advised the American delegation to the Washington Conference of 1921 and accompanied Elihu Root to The Hague in order to assist in the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice which formally opened in the Peace Palace in 1922. With regard to the sources for its adjudications—a perennially difficult question in international law due to the lack of a formal legislature—the new court also named “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations” as a subsidiary source. This established an

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intellectual link with the new Academy of International Law which began its operation one year later also in the Peace Palace.

The themes and contradictions that had marked the Academy’s protracted birth were again present. In his inaugural speech, Scott stated that the Hague Academy would be a place where “professors of different nationalities, in absolute freedom of thought” would teach “the principles of international law to students of different nations”, with the ultimate aim of “internationalising” international law.\(^{30}\) Scott and his colleagues were aware that international law scholars, even if they professed to be only bound by their scientific principles, were not free of national bias—otherwise it would not have been necessary to enforce such strict rules of national representation on the Academy’s Curatorium. For similar reasons, the Academy would also, for the time being, not feature any lectures on the laws of war.\(^{31}\) In 1923, that topic was still too controversial, especially considering to what extent the ruthless practices of states on both sides of the Great War had damaged the standing of international law.\(^{32}\)

Notwithstanding these delicate manoeuvres, the opening of the Academy in July 1923 was an unmitigated success, attracting over 300 students from 26 countries, eager to listen to a multinational and world-renowned body of lecturers.\(^{33}\) While almost two thirds of the auditors at the first session came from the Netherlands, their number declined to 36 % by 1929, making the Academy’s audience even more international.\(^{34}\) This diversity was aided by a number of governments who provided scholarships in

\(^{30}\) “… où des professeurs de différentes nationalités, dans la liberté absolue de la pensée, enseignent les principes du droit international aux étudiants de différentes nations, afin que, par leur action commune, l’esprit international se développe et que le droit des gens s’internationalise.” “Préface”, Recueil des Cours 1 (1923): viii.

\(^{31}\) Ibid.: vii.


\(^{34}\) Another remarkable feature is the relatively large number of female students: 93 out of a total of 433 students at the end of the second period in 1929. “Report of the Administrative Council of the Academy of International Law at The Hague, Established with the Aid of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on the Session of the Academy in 1929“., CEIP, box 268, folder 2.
order to encourage the attendance of their nationals at The Hague. The United States remained conspicuously absent from this list, with the State Department claiming it had no money for such purposes. Scott’s idea of placing Carnegie Endowment Scholarships at the disposal of the State Department did not bear fruit, either. Unlike the officials of other governments, American members of the diplomatic, military or judicial service could not attend the Academy’s courses as part of their duties but had to undertake the journey to The Hague in their spare time. This disappointed the Academy’s backers, as one continuing objective was to raise attendance from the United States. Eelco van Kleffens, the Academy’s secretary, wrote to James Brown Scott: “I need not tell you that we shall welcome all the Americans that you may be able to send us.” The Carnegie Endowment did provide some scholarships for students from the United States, but increasing the American attendance at The Hague remained difficult throughout the interwar years. Apart from a lack of funds, one frequently-cited reason for the low American turnout was the fact that the Academy’s official language was French. Some of the published lectures in its journal Recueil des Cours were translated by the New Commonwealth Institute in the 1930s, but criticism of France’s linguistic dominance remained strong among the members of the Academy’s American constituency.

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35 In 1929, Germany, Canada, Chile, China, the Free City of Danzig, Egypt, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Uruguay provided assistance. The Dutch government also offered scholarships specifically for non-Dutch students. Ibid.
36 Department of State to Scott, 27 June 1924, CEIP Vol. 297, 2557-8.
37 Scott to Van Kleffens, 3 July 1924 1924, CEIP Vol. 297, 2562.
38 American Association of the A.A.A. [auditeurs et anciens auditeurs] of the Hague Academy of International Law, Secretary’s report for the years 1932-37, CEIP, box 268, folder 3.
41 American Association of the A.A.A. of the Hague Academy of International Law, Secretary’s report for the years 1932-37, CEIP, box 268, folder 3; George Finch to Gilbert Gidel, 18 July and 7 October 1946, CEIP, box 268, folder 4. English became a second language of instruction at the Academy after 1945, but not on an equal footing with French. The issue was only resolved fully with the installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment in the 1970s. See Giles Scott-Smith, “Attempting to Secure an ‘Orderly Evolution’: American Foundations, the Hague Academy of International Law, and the Third World”, Journal of American Studies 41, no. 3 (2007).
The Francophone influence was also felt on the Academy’s Curatorium, whose sessions took place in Paris. In practice, and in contravention of the Academy’s statutes, matters relating to the programme of the Academy were decided by a small group consisting of Charles Lyon-Caen, Gilbert Gidel (both law professors at the University of Paris) and Nicolas Politis (a former foreign minister of Greece and also a professor of international law in Paris). Administrative matters were dealt with by a Dutch committee at The Hague.\textsuperscript{42} The “Father of the Academy”\textsuperscript{43}, James Brown Scott, was heavily involved in the selection of speakers, as his regular correspondence with the Paris-based Curatorium members, especially Politis, testifies.\textsuperscript{44} In 1924, the latter was also nominated to the Carnegie Endowment’s European Advisory Council. During the interwar years the Carnegie Endowment contributed $40,000 per year to the running of the Academy but also managed its publicity in the United States.\textsuperscript{45} This was necessary because, in the course of the 1920s, the Academy’s concept was widely imitated and a number of international summer schools on world politics started to compete for the attention of an interested audience.\textsuperscript{46}

In 1923, however, the mix of international scholarship and politics at the Academy was truly unique in the way it attempted to transcend national systems of academic instruction. Yet, the function of the Academy was not to supplant national ideologies with an international ideology but to establish the discipline of international law as the single most important political technology of international life. The unifying theme of the lectures and courses held at the Academy became, according to one alumnus, “the function of law in the international community, in particular in the

\textsuperscript{43} Van Kleffens to Finch, 7 November 1946, CEIP, box 268, folder 4.
\textsuperscript{44} See CEIP box 268, folder 2, passim.
maintenance and strengthening of peace through the rule of law". The point of the Academy was not to establish a coherent doctrine of international law—after all, lecturers were not chosen for their particular doctrinal positions but for scholarly excellence—but to increase the influence of the profession as such. Hence it was very important for its founders to be able to boast both scholarly impartiality and good relations with national governments, even if this meant professing to be simultaneously relevant to political decision makers and yet remote from politics.

International lawyers involved in the Academy maintained that its lectures, courses and publications both explained the state of positive law (lex lata) and had an impact on the making of new international law (lex ferenda, ‘evolving law’). Thus, the Academy was able to indirectly offer solutions to judges at international courts and policy makers, and, very gradually, change the international legal order. However, it is not clear even to advocates of the Academy today to what extent the courses and lectures at The Hague initiated or merely reflected political change—their influence rose and fell with the importance of international law to states’ behaviour in general. Nevertheless, what was said and done at the Peace Palace mattered to European governments. Otherwise, they would not have sent their officials there for training, nor would they have been quite so interested in the Academy’s publications and annual reports, and also in the changes applying to the composition of its Administrative Council.

The Hague Academy’s importance lies also in the fact that it created a distinct milieu of scholars, civil servants and policy intellectuals who believed in the

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47 Skubiszewski, “Contribution of the Academy”: 78.
50 Skubiszewski, “Contribution of the Academy”: 79; Kuehl and Dunn, however, do not give enough credit to the academy when they state that it had no impact on codification or the teaching of international law. Kuehl and Dunn, Keeping the Covenant, 117.
51 See e.g. repeated requests by the German Ministry of External Affairs for documents relating to the Academy in PA AA, R 53703.
potential power of international law to transform international relations.\textsuperscript{52} And the Academy was very successful at establishing itself as a \textit{de rigeur} destination in the market for the training of international lawyers, managing, for example, to organise former students of the Academy in an alumnus association, the \textit{auditeurs et anciens auditeurs}. A stint at The Hague, as student or as lecturer, became a boost to the career of academics as well as national and international civil servants.

Thus, the Academy fulfilled one ambition of its philanthropic backer, namely to shape the next generation of academic law teaching. In 1928, George G. Wilson, an international law professor at Harvard, estimated that recipients of fellowships from the Carnegie Endowment’s International Law Division were “occupying … all of the principal junior positions in the colleges and universities” in the United States. Philip C. Jessup, one of the Endowment’s most promising protégés and a future World Court Judge, was regarded as “a product of the fellowships and also of the Academy of International Law at The Hague”.\textsuperscript{53} Throughout the interwar years, the Academy was one of the Endowment’s flagship projects, until the grants were terminated in 1949.\textsuperscript{54}

In its new approach to educational internationalism, the Hague Academy took a stance different from many international scientific associations at the time of its foundation in that it was unusually and consciously inclusive. In the early 1920s, this was not a given. World War I had caused a great rift between scholars of enemy nations. International scientific bodies excluded scholars from the Central Powers, to the extent that between 1919 and 1925 sixty percent of international gatherings in the humanities and natural sciences met without a German delegation. This academic quarantine became less and less strict from 1920, due to the non-cooperation of scholars from Britain, the United States and the neutral countries, but French and Belgian academics

\textsuperscript{52} Sacriste and Vachez, “Force of International Law”: 88-91.
\textsuperscript{53} Scott to N.M. Butler, 13 January 1928, CEIP, Vol. 310, 490-1.
\textsuperscript{54} The Rockefeller and the Ford Foundation took over the support of the Academy, though. On its post-1945 history see Scott-Smith, “Attempting to Secure an ‘Orderly Evolution’”.

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were often adamant that Germany should remain excluded from the international scientific community.\textsuperscript{55} From the very beginning, though, the Academy’s Curatorium included a German jurist, and its first programme featured a lecture by another German scholar.\textsuperscript{56} Despite some doubts, the Academy also admitted a student from another suspect state, Soviet Russia, in 1923. Apparently, this had not been an easy step for the Curatorium but in the end it was decided that “political discriminations must not be made a precedent”.\textsuperscript{57}

In disciplinary terms, however, the Academy was less open. While it may have striven to become, in the words of one alumnus, “a truthful painter of the international reality, its normative lacunae, and institutional weaknesses”, the perspectives taken and the frameworks applied were mostly those of lawyers.\textsuperscript{58} This necessarily limited approach was not approved of everywhere. While the Academy’s model of creating an international institution that did not deny the legitimacy of national systems of instruction was copied in other places, its legalistic focus was censured, for example in the European branch office of the Carnegie Endowment, the \textit{Dotation Carnegie}, which serves as a reminder that decision making within philanthropic foundations tends to be the outcome of a complex process of negotiation between differing points of view.

From the early 1920s, some internationalists associated with the Carnegie Endowment and other philanthropic foundations increasingly criticised the efforts of legal scholars in the cause of world peace. They were uncomfortable with the way international lawyers attempted to monopolise what was often referred to as ‘techniques’ or ‘technologies’ for peace. To some extent, this discomfort can be

\textsuperscript{55} Schroeder-Gudehus, “Challenge to Transnational Loyalties”: 98, 102. Note, though, that the author uses a 1940 German source which is likely to have exaggerated the effectiveness of the ‘boycott’.
\textsuperscript{56} “Préface”: iv; Carl Heinrich Triepel, “Les rapports entre le droit interne et le droit international”, \textit{Recueil des Cours}, no. 1 (1923).
\textsuperscript{57} “World Law School Ends First Period.”
explained by disciplinary rivalries between lawyers and non-lawyers. But within the *Dotation*, for example, the criticism levelled at international lawyers was that their ideas and publications were aimed at a very narrow audience conversant in the technical jargon of the discipline.\(^\text{59}\) Josef Redlich, an Austrian economist associated with the Endowment, pointed out that “the main problems of international life” were not just legal in nature.\(^\text{60}\) And even though international lawyers deserved recognition for their efforts, the golden age of international law as a peace technology was in the past, having reached its high point at the two Hague Peace Conferences. Such was the implication of a circular letter to the Advisory Council of the *Dotation* by its president, Paul Henri d’Estournelles de Constant, who briefly alluded to the great progress of the Endowment’s Division of International Law before moving on to a long list of meritorious international lawyers who had all recently deceased.\(^\text{61}\)

In the interwar years, the relationship between the discipline of international law and the field of international relations was complex. There were overlaps but also rivalry and competition. After all, international relations was an interdisciplinary enterprise, defined more by subject matter than by approach. International lawyers tried to take this into account and, in some cases, to connect their discipline with other forms of knowledge. Nevertheless, they also continued the pre-war project of expanding the international legal order and of establishing juridical solutions for political problems, especially in the first decade after the Great War.\(^\text{62}\) Before moving on to other philanthropic efforts to organise the study of international relations within an international framework, the foundations’ approach to creating an international legal

\(^{59}\) *Dotation*, Administrative Committee Minutes, 5 December 1925, 6, CEIP CE, box 115, folder 1.
\(^{60}\) Redlich to Earle B. Babcock, 14 December 1925, CEIP CE, box 114, folder 6.
\(^{61}\) Letter to members of *Dotation* Council, 15 February 1923, CEIP CE, box 114, folder 1.
\(^{62}\) The 1920s move to subordinate politics to law can also be observed on the domestic level. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century* (London: Penguin, 1999), 5.
order will be examined, by analysing their contributions to the codification of international law.

*Foundations and International Law Research*

In the course of the Great War, belligerents violated international law with impunity, by invading neutral countries and by resorting to questionable forms of economic warfare. States seemed to do what they wanted, and their behaviour was not tamed by international law, be it in the form of customary standards of conduct or codified conventions. Quincy Wright, an American international law professor at the University of Chicago, noted that “The idea has been pervaded, partly by semi-popular organizations designed to influence public opinion, that after all international law is not to be taken too seriously and that the pre-war international law is a thing of the past.”

Instead of continuing the lawyers’ project of the Hague Peace Conferences—after all, the third conference had been postponed indefinitely due to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914—governments embraced a new approach for ordering relations between states, that of international organisation. Advocates for the League of Nations were able to build on a wave of popular enthusiasm, channelled into new forms of political activism by the various League of Nations societies. International law, it seemed, had been abandoned by a public invigorated by the possibilities of social and political reform.

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63 Quincy Wright, “Research in International Law Since the War”, in SSRC Committee on International Relations, Survey of Research, International Relations, 1928-1929, Rockefeller Archive Center, Social Science Research Council Archives (hereafter SSRC), Series IX, box 64, folder 343.
64 This upset quite a few American international lawyers, for example Elihu Root. He would have preferred to build any new international organisation around a strong international court. Marchand, *Peace Movement and Social Reform*, 170-171; European international lawyers, in particular in France, seem to have had a more positive attitude towards the League, see Koskenniemi, *Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, 293-296.

International lawyers reacted in different ways to losing their exclusive hold on the internationalist imagination. Some, including quite a few within the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, initially opposed the League of Nations and hankered after times past. They did not feel that international law was obsolete and continued their advocacy for an international court to which states would subscribe voluntarily.\footnote{Including Scott, Root, George Finch; Dubin, “Advocacy of a League of Nations”; Schmidt, \textit{Political Discourse of Anarchy}, 182.} Others saw the emergence of a multilateral order with its new institutions as an opportunity, for their own professional advancement within those institutions, but also for the discipline as such. Alejandro Álvarez, James Brown Scott’s Chilean collaborator and co-founder of the \textit{Institut des hautes études internationales} in Paris, noted that the war had created new social and political realities to which international lawyers had to respond. If they wanted to make a meaningful contribution to understanding and shaping international relations, they would have to branch out. In a Carnegie Endowment pamphlet he conceded that “the more vital international questions rest in the field of politics and not in that of law, for example, territorial expansion, and all matters known as imperialistic. … In the future it will be necessary to find a new conception or system of international law which can regulate all international relations, and not as to-day, regulating only a few.”\footnote{Álvarez, \textit{International Law and Related Subjects}, 35.}

Similarly, Roscoe Pound, a law professor at Harvard, and representative of “sociological jurisprudence”\footnote{For the genealogy and development of sociological jurisprudence see G. Edward White, “From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America”, \textit{Virginia Law Review} 58, no. 6 (1972).}, argued that international lawyers should embrace

A legal philosophy that shall take account of the social psychology, the economics, the sociology as well as the law and politics of today, that shall enable international law to take in what it requires from without, that shall give us a functional critique of international law in terms of social ends, not an analytical critique in terms of itself, and above all that shall conceive of the legal order as a process and not as a condition.  

This was a dynamic view on international law that made more conservatively inclined jurists uncomfortable in two ways. First, it advocated the use of other disciplines to steer the analysis and evolution of international law. Second, Pound argued that international lawyers should not merely strive to restate the law as it was but to develop it so that “jurists of the next generation [might] do as much for the ordering of international relations as Grotius and his successors did in their day by a creative theory founded on the philosophy of that time”.  

This line of reasoning was diametrically opposed to the kind of international law that more cautious jurists embraced. James Brown Scott did not desire to “develop” international law but merely to reveal the law as it already existed. Adopting a formulation which seemed to do away with society’s contribution to law entirely, Scott wrote in the Endowment’s annual report: “A law has unconsciously grown up, but the society must become conscious of its existence, and it must consciously have a law.” However, it does appear that Scott became more sympathetic to the progressive development of international law in the course of the 1920s. As the president of the IDI, he chaired an international conference on human rights in 1929, which was also financially supported by the Carnegie Endowment. In practice, the differences between progressive and conservative lawyers did not always reveal themselves so starkly, and both groups collaborated on a number of foundation-funded projects in the  

70 Quoted in Quincy Wright, “Research in International Law Since the War”, in SSRC Committee on International Relations, Survey of Research, International Relations, 1928-1929, SSRC, Series IX, box 64, folder 343.  
71 Ibid.  
72 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book 1920, 110.  
interwar years.\textsuperscript{74} Alvarez and Wright both published under Endowment auspices. Indeed, the mission statement of Scott’s Division of International Law at the Carnegie Endowment did include “the development of international law”.\textsuperscript{75} However, in practice this was pursued on very cautious terms. Apart from providing grants to international law journals and societies, the Division published some two hundred volumes of international law monographs, most of which provided documentary evidence for international law. They took the form of, \textit{inter alia}, documentary collections of treaties, outcomes of tribunals and classical texts of international jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{76} Some of these publications became standard works.\textsuperscript{77}

It is important to appreciate the significance of the Division of International Law’s publication activity. One of the principal problems of international law is being able to define what actually constitutes it. In the absence of a formal legislature, international law has to be derived from state practise, custom or the opinion of judges, documentary evidence of which may be scattered and hard to retrieve. Codification of international law is therefore of prime importance to clarify, and sometimes to create, the rules of the international legal order.\textsuperscript{78} The main outcome of both Hague Peace Conferences had, in essence, been codified conventions. The published records of the discussions among the members of international law societies such as the \textit{Institut de droit international} or the American Institute of International Law delivered important

\textsuperscript{74} For example under the auspices of the American Law Institute, funded with over $ 1 million from the Carnegie Corporation: Lagemann, \textit{Politics of Knowledge}, 71-93.

\textsuperscript{75} "To aid in the development of international law, and a general agreement on the rules thereof, and the acceptance of the same among nations. To establish a better understanding of international rights and duties and a more perfect sense of international justice among the inhabitants of civilized countries. To promote a general acceptance of peaceable methods in the settlement of international disputes." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, \textit{Summary of Organization and Work, 1911-1941}, 31.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 39-43.


\textsuperscript{78} Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, \textit{The Making of International Law} (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), 163.
impulses for the codification of international law which were taken up by governments, and, especially after 1945, also by international and nongovernmental organisations.79 Codification was also a major preoccupation of the Carnegie Endowment’s Division of International Law.80 To a lesser extent than the Rockefeller Foundation and the Commonwealth Fund, the Endowment became involved in the most important private codification effort of the interwar years, the Harvard Research in International Law.

The Harvard Research in International Law consisted of thirteen draft conventions prepared in connection with the League of Nations’ 1930 Conference for the Codification of International Law.81 The research was undertaken by a distinguished committee of American experts, based at Harvard Law School. Manley O. Hudson, member of the Inquiry and legal adviser to the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, directed the project.82 In 1920, the Advisory Committee of Jurists assembled at The Hague urged the League Assembly to convene a successor to the Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, explicitly citing the necessity to re-establish and modify those rules which had been affected by the First World War.83 The proposal was, however, not adopted at first, partly because it was felt that the League itself was now in charge of continuing the work of the Hague Conferences, and partly because attempts to harmonize international law so soon after the war were seen to be futile. In 1924, however, the Assembly acted on the jurists’ recommendation and the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law was convened. In the course of the next three years, the Committee identified areas of international law that

83 “Historical Survey”: 103.
were ready for codification. In September 1927, the League Assembly finally adopted a resolution to convoke a conference and submitted three topics for consideration: nationality, territorial waters, and the responsibility of states.\(^{84}\)

Manley O. Hudson had been an unofficial promoter of a new codification conference since 1924, by way of his friendships with Eric Drummond, the League’s first Secretary General, and George E. Wickersham, the American member on the Committee of Experts and, like Hudson and Raymond Fosdick, a leading light in the American League of Nations Non-Partisan Association.\(^{85}\) Shortly after the Assembly resolution of 1927, Hudson approached the Commonwealth Fund with a proposal to organise “systematic research … in order that the work of the forthcoming Conference may be as effective as possible”. In his grant application, Hudson not only underlined the importance of the conference, “one of the notable events in the history of International Law”, but also stressed the remarkable backing of the U.S. government for the conference: “Our Government’s replies to the questionnaire sent out by the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law indicate a lively interest in this work, and would seem to afford a basis for anticipating that the Government of the United States will cooperate fully in the work of the future Conference.” This collaborative stance of the non-League member the United States presented American legal scholars with “a great opportunity”.

Hudson proposed to organise the preparatory research for the codification conference according to a template established by the American Law Institute which had been founded in 1923 as an organisation of legal scholars, corporate lawyers and judges with the aim of restating American law. An Advisory Council guiding the work would include almost every member of the American international law elite at the

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\(^{84}\) Ibid.: 66-77.

\(^{85}\) Kenny, “Harvard Research in International Law”: 320.
time. It comprised scholars as well as practitioners, for example Edwin Borchard, James Garner, Charles E. Hughes, John Bassett Moore, James Brown Scott, George G. Wilson and Quincy Wright. Though not a prominent international lawyer, Raymond Fosdick was also on the Council. Thus the Harvard Research truly aimed to “represent the best in American experience and American scholarship”. Hudson’s proposal was accepted and from 30 December 1927, the Commonwealth Fund appropriated $30,000 over two years under the auspices of its Legal Research Program.

In early 1928, the Harvard Research went underway. It attracted considerable attention, including that of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. Up to this point, the Memorial had not been particularly interested in international law. Although it had given two $7,500 grants to ASIL in 1923 and 1924, the archival record reveals that those were solely intended for ASIL’s purchase of the League of Nations Official Journal’s Treaty Series. By the means of this subscription, Fosdick assured the bilingual publication of the series. The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial almost had to cajole ASIL into accepting the money. Thus, the relationship between the Memorial and the

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86 Hudson, “Project of Legal Research in the Field of International Law. Submitted to the Legal Research Committee of the Commonwealth Fund by the Faculty of the Harvard Law School”, n.d., CF, series 23, box 8, folder 106. The ALI method for a cooperative restatement of the law consisted in assigning a particular topic to a Reporter, usually a leading authority, whose draft restatement would then be reviewed by a committee of advisors and the ALI Council. Lagemann, Politics of Knowledge, 82.

87 Many of the Harvard Research’s Advisory Council members were law professors: Edwin Borchard taught at Yale, Quincy Wright at Chicago, and George G. Wilson at Harvard. James Brown Scott was a part-time law instructor at Georgetown University, although his work for the Carnegie Endowment consumed most of his time. John Bassett Moore had been a law professor at Columbia before his appointment to the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1921. Charles E. Hughes was, of course, the former U.S. Secretary of State (1921-25), and a lawyer by training. Note that the Council also included the occasional non-lawyer, for example James Garner, a political scientist from the University of Illinois.

88 Roscoe Pound, opening statement at the first meeting of the Advisory Committee, CF, series 23, box 8, folder 107.


90 Summary minutes of the first meeting of the Advisory Committee, 7 January 1928, CF, series 23, box 8, folder 107.

91 Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, Report for 1923 (New York: Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1924), 16; Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, Report for 1924 (New York: Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1925), 17. See also Hudson to Fosdick, 20 April, 2 and 4 May 1923; Sweetser to Hudson, 8 February 1924, LSRM, series III.6, box 49, folder 510.
United States’ foremost international law society was not very close. The latter’s stance towards Geneva might have been a reason why. According to Hudson, ASIL was “filled with people with prejudices about the League of Nations” and had not supported his work for codification under League auspices. But although law was not one of the core interests of the Memorial—it really branded itself as an organisation dedicated to the support of the social sciences—its officers were very interested in the Harvard Research. Edmund E. Day, a staff member and from 1929 the head of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Social Science Division, gave the following assessment: “The project which Professor Hudson has presented involves work along lines that are significantly related to the Memorial’s program in social science and social technology.”

For administrative reasons rather than disciplinary incompatibility, the Memorial never supported the Harvard Research financially. Nevertheless, it recommended Hudson’s project to John D. Rockefeller, Jr.’s Advisory Committee which, under Fosdick’s chairmanship, administered the younger Rockefeller’s personal philanthropy. Thus Fosdick secured a personal gift of $10,000 for the Harvard Research. In April 1929, John D. Rockefeller, Jr.’s Advisory Committee referred the project back to the Rockefeller Foundation as “sociological research”. The Foundation had by then

92 Note, though, that in 1925 and 1928 the Memorial gave altogether almost $120,000 to the ALI, concerned with domestic law. Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, Report for 1925 (New York: Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1926), 16; Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, Report for 1927/1928 (New York: Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1929), 11.

93 Hudson to E.E. Day, 9 March 1929, RG 1.1, series 200, box 343, folder 4085. In the same letter, which answered Day’s query why the research had to be organised at Harvard, Hudson also commented negatively on the Carnegie Endowment’s International Law Division even though James Brown Scott was on the Harvard Research’s Advisory Council. It seems likely that Hudson exaggerated ASIL’s and the Endowment’s hostility to the League Codification Conference to make sure that his project received the maximum of philanthropic support.

94 Law was generally not included in Memorial definitions of the social sciences, see Martin Bulmer and Joan Bulmer, “Philanthropy and Social Science in the 1920s: Beardsley Ruml and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1922-1929”, Minerva 19, no. 3 (1981): 362. Occasionally, law projects on the margins of the social sciences received support, but only seven of altogether 178 fellowships awarded in the course of the Memorial’s existence went to lawyers. “Report of European Fellowship Program in the Social Sciences of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1923-1928”, RF, RG 1.2, series 100, box 50, folder 380.

95 Day to Ruml, 23 February 1928, RF, RG 1.1, series 200, box 343, folder 4085.

96 Day felt that the research should have been organised under a national body and that its set-up was too expensive. Ibid.

97 Hudson to Barry C. Smith (CF), 5 March 1928, CF, series 23, box 8, folder 106.
incorporated the Memorial as its own Social Science Division and was able to make an
appropriation. Again, the endorsement was strong: “No question of quality of work or
strength of backing in influential quarters.”98 Over the next three years, the grants
amounted to $60,000.99

The Carnegie Endowment was also involved in the Harvard Research, though in
a different way. It was through the Endowment’s mediation that the draft conventions
emanating from the Research were published in the American Journal of International
Law.100 As a member of the Advisory Committee, James Brown Scott had an early
influence on the direction of the work, successfully proposing that the Committee
accept the IDI’s previous contributions to codification as a model. His view on what the
Harvard Research should aim to achieve was predictably cautious: it should state
generally accepted views, precedents and principles of international justice.101 This
contrasted with Roscoe Pound’s ambition to turn the research into a “first step in a
progressive codification”.102 Even when asked to endorse the Harvard Research in a
letter submitted for another grant application, Scott flatly stated that the work aimed to
“authoritatively state” what international law was, not to develop it.103 The Advisory
Committee also discussed to what extent the research should be tailored so that the
American government would be likely to accept it. Pound did not see this as a
priority—but here he was in a minority. George Wickersham, the Committee’s
chairman, even proposed that the work should be undertaken in direct contact with the

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98 Staff Conference, 2 April 1929, RF, RG 1.1, series 200, box 343, folder 4085.
99 Project History, n.d., RF, RG 1.1, series 200, box 343, folder 4085.
100 Roscoe Pound to Smith, 10 Jan 1928, CF, series 23, box 8, folder 106.
101 Summary minutes of the first meeting of the Advisory Committee, 7 January 1928, CF, series 23, box 8, folder 107.
102 Pound, opening statement at the first meeting of the Advisory Committee, CF, series 23, box 8, folder 107.
103 James Brown Scott, letter in support of Harvard Research, 6 January 1932, RF, RG 1.1, series 200, box 343, folder 4085.
The Harvard Research did indeed rely on the work of scholars, practitioners and government officials alike, and in the course of its existence, the State Department was represented on ten codification projects.105

This, however, did not ensure the success of the League’s Codification Conference itself which took place in March and April of 1930. Hudson, Jesse Reeves and Edwin Borchard attended as technical advisers. On his return, Hudson received a letter from E.E. Day, asking about the results in a way which revealed the Rockefeller Foundation’s priorities: “To what extent were those of you who represented the research program accepted by the officially designated American delegates? More specifically, were the results of your researches utilized as fully as you think they should have been? Your frank comments along this line will be much appreciated.” Hudson’s reply was mixed. While the results of the Harvard Research were praised and utilised at the Conference, it was clear that as a whole, the meeting had been ill prepared on the part of the League, governments and private organisations. “As to the American delegates, they had little preparation for the Conference except that which was contained in our drafts. The difficulty was, however, that there had been no agreement on policy in Washington, and the delegates were left without sufficient guidance on policy.”106 In effect, only one draft convention, that on nationality, was discussed in any way at the Conference. Apart from the lack of preparation, there was also a lack of agreement as to the purpose of codification, whether it referred to the clarification of existing rules or the progressive development of the law. This lack of consensus regarding purpose had, of course, also been a feature of the Harvard Research. There was no follow-up conference to the 1930 meeting and in the end, the League referred the codification issue back to national

104 Summary minutes of the first meeting of the Advisory Committee, 7 January 1928, CF, series 23, box 8, folder 107.
105 Grant and Barker, “Genesis to Exodus”, 18.
106 Day to Hudson, 12 May 1930; Hudson to Day, confidential, 15 May 1930, both RF, RG 1.1, series 200, box 343, folder 4085.
governments, thus ensuring its demise for the rest of the interwar period. As an intergovernmental conference, the meeting at The Hague was an abject failure.\textsuperscript{107}

Hudson himself recognised the unlikelihood of another League effort at codification. However, he persevered with the Harvard Research, which went through another three cycles after the Conference. In his view, the débâcle at The Hague had shown that governments were unlikely to come up with any useful draft conventions in future and that the onus was more than ever on “non-official bodies”, a fact reflected in the League Assembly’s resolutions which called for the collaboration of “international and national scientific institutes”.\textsuperscript{108} Hudson was undeterred but the Rockefeller Foundation refused to renew its grant to the Harvard Research in 1932, claiming it was impossible “under present circumstances”. However, the Social Science Division encouraged Hudson to seek funds from the Harvard Bureau for International Research which was entirely Rockefeller-funded.\textsuperscript{109} With this indirect form of support, the Harvard Research continued and its results, despite the minuscule immediate impact, went on to shape future codification projects. Recognising the importance of a permanent body dedicated to codification, in 1947 the U.N. established the International Law Commission which built on the Harvard Research’s experience.\textsuperscript{110} Recent assessments of the value of the work and its influence on the long-term development of international law also praise the quality and originality of the Harvard Research draft conventions.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{107} Grant and Barker, “Genesis to Exodus”, 5-7.
\textsuperscript{108} Manley O. Hudson, “The Prospect for Future Codification”, \textit{American Journal of International Law} 26, no. 1 (1932): 143.
\textsuperscript{109} Day to Hudson, 2 May 1932; Hudson also undertook a futile attempt to extract funds from the Carnegie Endowment’s propaganda division under Nicolas Murray Butler. Butler to Hudson, 8 Feb 1932, both in RF, RG 1.1, series 200, box 343, folder 4085; on the Bureau see “Report of the Bureau of International Research of Harvard and Radcliffe College, July 1, 1929 to June 30, 1938”, LSRM, series III.6, box 54, folder 574.
\textsuperscript{110} Dhokalia, \textit{Codification}, 71-72; Boyle and Chinkin, \textit{Making of International Law}, 171-204.
\textsuperscript{111} John P. Grant and J. Craig Barker, eds., \textit{The Harvard Research in International Law: Contemporary Analysis and Appraisal} (Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein & Co., 2007); so far, historians have not paid
When the American international law elite assembled under the umbrella of the Harvard Research it sought to take advantage of a unique opportunity to shape the international legal order under League auspices by submitting “drafts or projects, embodying American views, even if American views from a universal rather than a national standpoint, and the results of American scholarship and American experience”. Once that opportunity had passed in 1932, the Harvard Research lost its Rockefeller funding, even though the Rockefeller Foundation admitted that the quality of the work was excellent. Neither the Foundation nor the Memorial saw international law as a key field of interest but they did acknowledge its potential to shape the international order. From 1936, the Rockefeller Foundation told potential grant recipients that it had stopped giving any support to international law projects as a matter of policy. James Brown Scott joined the Harvard Research Advisory Committee by virtue of his professional standing within the American legal community but never actually became involved in any of the drafting work. His main concern seemed to be to ensure that his American colleagues paid homage to their European predecessors of the IDI and did not become too creative when drafting conventions.

It is likely, though, that Scott welcomed the League’s efforts in the area of codification. By participating in the Harvard Research he was able to ensure that these efforts would be underpinned by the models and ideas emanating from the legalist internationalism of venerable organisations such as the IDI. Indeed, by the mid-1920s, the Carnegie Endowment had substantially revised its stance towards the League in enough attention to the Harvard Research. Kuehl wrongly states that it only produced a number of volumes with limited impact. Kuehl and Dunn, *Keeping the Covenant*, 124.

112 Pound, opening statement at the first meeting of the Advisory Committee, CF, series 23, box 8, folder 107.

113 Roger Evans to John Willits, 19 February 1942, “Harvard Law School – Request from Acting Dean Morgan, 2/16/42”, RF, RG 1.1, series 200, box 343, folder 4086. However, that stance was to change in the course of World War II, when it became apparent that international law had again attracted the attention of policy makers, see Epilogue.
This was due, on the one hand, to a change of guard. Elihu Root, the Endowment’s cautious president, vacated his chair to to the more enterprising Nicholas Murray Butler in 1925. On the other hand, the Endowment's more favourable attitude to the League later in the 1920s may have been linked to the well-founded perception that the institution, as it developed, represented less of a break with traditional international politics than many Wilsonians had hoped. Moreover, the Endowment faced substantial pressure from its European collaborators with regard to its attitude towards the League. The next section of this chapter deals with the Endowment’s attempt to establish its European organisation, the *Dotation Carnegie*, as a centre for international publicity.

**The Dotation Carnegie and the International Mind**

During the very first meeting of what was left of the Advisory Council of the *Dotation Carnegie* after the armistice, president d’Estournelles de Constant informed his colleagues that he had asked Nicholas Murray Butler to provide money for a League of Nations newspaper. In stark contrast to the usually cautious stance of the Carnegie Endowment’s American trustees, d’Estournelles de Constant had provided office space and clerical support to Léon Bourgeois’ *Association française pour la Société des nations* from late 1918, when the shape of the League Covenant had not even been discussed yet by the Allied powers. He had also been in contact with the League to Enforce Peace, an organisation that Butler, Scott and Root famously had refused to join. Thanks to his considerable interpersonal skills, d’Estournelles de Constant

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114 As has been observed but not fully explained in Kuehl and Dunn, *Keeping the Covenant*, 60.
116 I am grateful to John A. Thompson for this observation.
117 Minutes of meeting, 1 February 1919, 1-18, CEIP CE, box 113, folder 3.
usually managed to extract a maximum of independence from his American backers and in 1913, the American trustees had accorded the *Dotation Carnegie* the right to allocate grants independently from its budget. But after the United States had formally rejected the Versailles Treaty, d’Estournelles de Constant felt it wise to quietly remove the *Association française pour la Société des nations* from the *Dotation*’s premises, diplomatically citing a lack of space as the reason. The real rationale was the anti-League stance of the American leaders of the Carnegie Endowment in the early 1920s. The question as to what extent the *Dotation* would be able to support League-associated organisations remained an issue that divided Europeans and Americans within the Carnegie Endowment. On one occasion, when both Butler and Root were present at a full meeting of the *Dotation* in Paris, their European collaborators criticised them heavily but were told that public opinion in the United States was already hostile enough towards the Endowment. However, Butler did not object to discreet support for certain small projects, for example for a book on the work of the League by Léon Bourgeois.

It is not clear whether Butler was aware of another League-related initiative of his European organisation. Since before the war, one prime concern of the *Dotation* was publicity in the cause of peace, with the aim of breaking the monopoly of nationalist news agencies and publicists who instilled irrational hatreds in the masses. In 1919, the leaders of the *Dotation* concluded that a daily newspaper should be launched, first in the Entente and later in the neutral countries. Its line should be independent but popular.

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119 Minutes, *Conseil consultatif*, 13 July 1921, 2nd session, 4-5, CEIP CE, box 113, folder 3.
120 Scott: “On nous accuse de nous opposer à la politique des Etats-Unis et de vouloir imposer une politique internationale qui n’a pas le consentement des Etats-Unis.” Minutes, general meeting, 9 July 1923, morning session, 26 bis, CEIP CE, box 114, folder 1; see also Butler’s assertion that the Endowment had to respect the prevalence of isolationism in the U.S.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Year Book 1924*, 49.
121 Minutes, general meeting, 9 July 1923, morning session, 3-4, CEIP CE, box 114, folder 1.
with the American *Christian Science Monitor* as a possible model.\(^{122}\) This would be the only means of having an impact “on a public opinion which is led to aberration and crime by unwholesome incitement”.\(^{123}\) D’Estournelles de Constant was fully aware that such a project necessitated a considerable outlay in the region of several million francs and, predictably, the American trustees were not interested. Thus, at a *Dotation* meeting in 1920, it was decided to approach the League of Nations.\(^{124}\)

D’Estournelles de Constant wrote directly to Eric Drummond himself to communicate two suggestions. First, the League should endow university chairs and second, publish a daily newspaper, “aussi populaire que possible”\(^{125}\). Appealing to the democratic and the scientific ambitions of many post-1919 peacemakers, d’Estournelles de Constant underlined that such a project would fulfil both the League’s high mission and respond to popular demand.\(^{126}\) By putting the League in charge of the realisation of ideas which had been discussed within the *Dotation* since 1912, d’Estournelles de Constant ensured their transition from pre-war internationalism to League internationalism. The suggestions were seriously discussed in Geneva, as their printing as a Council document indicates.\(^{127}\) Moreover, they sparked fresh ideas on international propaganda within the League, whose financial director developed the concept of a League summer school in Geneva “to which the professors of Universities throughout the world would be invited”. Such a format, the clairvoyant League officer reasoned, would be very popular with Americans, and might thus serve to draw the non-member

\(^{122}\) Minutes of meeting, 1 February 1919, 18, CEIP CE, box 113, folder 3.
\(^{123}\) “… c’est là le seul moyen d’agir, d’une manière efficace, sur une opinion publique que des excitations malsaines conduisent à l’aberration et au crime.” Ibid., 20.
\(^{124}\) “Le centre européen de la Dotation Carnegie (Memento Chronologique)”, 19 March 1921, 13-4, CEIP CE, box 60, folder 2.
\(^{125}\) D’Estournelles de Constant to Drummond, 29 February 1920, Archives of the League of Nations, United Nations Library, Geneva (hereafter LN), R1333. I am grateful to Frank Beyersdorf for drawing my attention to this source.
\(^{126}\) Ibid.; on the tensions between the peacemakers’ scientific and democratic pretensions see Sluga, *Nation, Psychology, and International Politics*, 32.
\(^{127}\) “Resolutions passed by the European Council of the Carnegie Endowment”, 20/4/43, LN, R1333.
United States closer to the League. Ultimately, though, the League’s Information Section passed the buck back to the *Dotation*, concluding that “The best propaganda … should emanate from such organs as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace”.

In the course of the 1920s, the Endowment experimented with several approaches to effective internationalist propaganda. The idea of a *Dotation*-sponsored publication was further developed, as was the project for university chairs devoted to international studies. Other publicity methods were also explored, albeit less successfully. In the field of education, the Endowment launched the project of university-based International Relations Clubs for students in Europe, and it briefly considered transforming an American library in Paris into a large cultural centre. Thus, the Carnegie Endowment, specifically the Division for Intercourse and Education under Butler, strove to internationalise its Paris office and turn it into a hub for internationalist publicity.

This aim intersected with other, underlying aspirations of the Endowment. One of these was a desire to shape the new nation-states of Eastern and Central Europe and to support movements for the economic integration of the Danubian countries. The Carnegie Endowment had displayed an interest in Danubian federation from 1921 when it allocated $10,000 for a conference in cooperation with the International Chamber of Commerce, which, however, never took place. The issue as such remained on the agenda of Endowment officers, though, in particular that of James T. Shotwell. As a member of the Inquiry, he had helped to shape the new political geography of Eastern Europe and he embarked on several missions in that region in the course of the interwar

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129 Pierre Comert, Memorandum, 9 March 1920, LN, R1333.
years.\textsuperscript{130} In addition, the Endowment encouraged European-American cultural exchange and attempted to project a positive image of the United States through the \textit{Dotation Carnegie}. Libraries and specific ways of organising information played a particular role in this endeavour, as to many Americans abroad they seemed to offer an opportunity to overcome cultural inferiority complexes while at the same time promoting international goodwill. A pamphlet issued by the American Library in Paris made precisely this point: “In art, in literature, in drama, America has followed foreign models; in formal education she has built on Continental systems; but in library service the nations of the world are looking to America for leadership. Because of this, public library service has come to be regarded as a prime factor in the establishment of international harmony.”\textsuperscript{131}

After d’Estournelles de Constant’s death in May 1924 the \textit{Dotation} underwent a reorientation. Butler’s complete overhaul of the \textit{Dotation}’s Executive Committee in 1925—it even changed its name to ‘Administrative Committee’—signified that he wanted a fresh start. The former committee members who mostly belonged to the French legalist peace group \textit{Association pour la paix par le droit} were replaced by an international board including Nicolas Politis, Henri Lichtenberger, a French professor of German literature, and Gilbert Murray, classical scholar, chairman of the British League of Nations Union and member of the League’s Committee on Intellectual Cooperation. Earle B. Babcock, Dean of New York University’s Graduate School, professor of Romance languages and first president of the International Auxiliary Language Association, an organisation which promoted the artificial language Interlingua, became


\textsuperscript{131} Funding appeal of the American Library in Paris, April 1928, RF, RG 1.1, series 500, box 16, folder 161.
the new director of the *Dotation*. Married to a French woman, Babcock soon acquired considerable standing within the vibrant American community in Paris which included representatives of all walks of life, as noted by a contemporary commentator: “We have American bars in Paris, an American Hospital in Paris, American Jazz-Bands, American Newspapers, American Crooks, Philanthropists, Barbers, Dentists, Doctors, and American Undertakers in Paris.”

Paris also boasted an American library whose board was led by Babcock. This institution—simply called the American Library in Paris—became a hub for a thriving community of American information professionals. They included Waldo Leland, a contributor to the Carnegie History, who compiled a multi-volume guide to sources on American history in French archives on behalf of the Carnegie Institution of Washington. He had been involved in this work on and off since 1907 and, while in Paris, used office space in both the *Dotation Carnegie* and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. W. Dawson Johnston, the librarian of the American Library, advised the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial on “the next steps in the relief of European students and in the establishment of closer intellectual relations between America and Europe” when the Memorial conducted a survey of the European field in 1924. As a librarian, Johnston was very aware of the “numerous agencies” which sought

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to augment the stream of English-language publications into continental Europe.  

According to one estimate, there were more than twenty British and American civil society organisations involved in the distribution of books, ranging from the Royal Society of Literature to the American Red Cross.

The foundations occupied a prominent role in the spreading of Anglo-American print culture in European countries, a less well-known chapter in the history of 20th century Americanisation. In the mid-1920s, the Dotation toyed with the idea of integrating its own operations with that of the library, and to transform it into a $1,000,000 center for American culture on the Left Bank, which would be, according to Babcock, “a focal point for the spread of American cultural influence not only in France but throughout Europe”. The American Library in Paris was another relic of the Great War, having served as the headquarter for the Library War Service with the American Expeditionary Forces. Due to a lack of funds, the Carnegie Endowment shelved its plans for the library but the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial supported it on a smaller scale from 1923. The feature that the Memorial was mostly interested in was the library’s Research Service on International Affairs. This reference service published a journal, the European Economic and Political Survey, to which various American banks, universities and embassies, but also institutions like the LSE and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, subscribed.

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136 Johnston to John Jacob Coss, 14 March 1924, LSRM, series III.6, box 61, folder 657.
137 “British and American Organizations Interested in the Distribution of Books in Europe”, undated memorandum, LSRM, series III.6, box 61, folder 657.
139 Memorandum of interview by William Lingelbach with Babcock, 19 April 1926, RF, RG 1.1, Series 500, Box 15, Folder 160.
141 “List of Subscribers to the European Economic and Political Survey as of December 31, 1927”, LSRM, series III.6, box 48, folder 505.
declined throughout the 1920s and in 1933 lost its Rockefeller funding, also because, by the mid-1930s, a lot of the American community had left Paris.¹⁴²

Nevertheless, the interest of American foundations in libraries highlights how much importance they attached to the way knowledge was stored, organised and displayed.¹⁴³ Moreover, libraries served the broader aim of a “cross-fertilization of ideas” between the United States and Europe, which was also on the agenda of Beardsley Ruml who felt that “effective steps should be taken to secure that in London at least and also if possible in two or more cities on the European continent there shall be a thoroughly representative collection of American books, periodicals and other publications in the field of social science”.¹⁴⁴ This also meant that librarians, in their role as information professionals, found a route into the foundations’ work in international relations. One example is Florence Wilson, the League’s librarian until 1926, another veteran of the Inquiry and the Paris Peace Conference, where she had organised the archive of the American delegation.¹⁴⁵

Wilson was hired by the Endowment to develop the European branches of its International Relations Clubs (IRCs), an initiative which Butler had rolled out at mostly provincial American universities from 1921 and was eager to expand. A number of IRCs were established in Latin America, Asia and the British Dominions. The Endowment supplied these student discussion clubs with reading lists and books, with

¹⁴² Robert Davis to E.E. Day, 22 September 1933, RF, RG 1.1, Series 500, Box 15, Folder 160. Note, though, that when the American Library was threatened with closure in 1937, the Carnegie Corporation provided an emergency grant through the American Library Association. In 1940, the Rockefeller Foundation also donated a small sum. See Kraske, Missionaries of the Book, 125-126.
¹⁴⁴ Ruml, Memorandum “American Libraries for Europe”, 12 January 1927, LSRM, series III.6, box 55, folder 592.
the purpose of cultivating the ‘international mind’.146 From 1927 Wilson threw herself into the work of organising the clubs in Europe and the Near East. She achieved remarkable results, especially in South-Eastern Europe.147 However, Babcock and Butler killed the initiative in 1931, after a critical review of Wilson’s work appeared in an Orientalist journal which alleged that her proposals regarding Turkey were indicative of “an ambitious and broad propaganda programme for the reputation of the United States”.148

Only the British IRCs were continued under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment’s New York office, as Babcock felt that the “psychology of public opinion in Great Britain is so similar to that in the United States” that any “misunderstanding” could be avoided.149 However, the Endowment kept on receiving numerous requests for the endorsement of new clubs and the maintenance of those established by Florence Wilson.150 Inadvertently, it had scrapped an initiative that had elicited considerable grass-roots enthusiasm all over Europe, from Romania to Spain—probably more than any other Endowment-backed scheme. After Babcock’s sudden death in 1935, the Dotation’s new American director, Malcolm Davis, decided to revive the IRCs in continental Europe, but the Endowment’s overly cautious stance in 1931 had cost it a valuable opportunity.151

The most successful Dotation initiatives in the field of publicity were the Carnegie Chairs and the in-house journal, L’Esprit International. Both projects were

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147 List of IRCs, January 1930, CEIP CE, box 38, folder 2.
149 Babcock to Wilson, 21 April 1930, CEIP CE, box 38, folder 3.
151 Malcolm Davis to Amy Jones, 19 May 1936, CEIP CE, box 39, folder 5.
started as soon as Babcock took over the direction of the *Dotation*. The *Chaire Carnegie* in Paris was effectively a series of public lectures held at the *Dotation* itself. Most of them were given by André Tibal, the former director of the *Institut Français* in Prague, but he alternated with international guest lecturers. Tibal, originally a scholar of German literature, had a background similar to those of many Endowment leaders. Serving his country during the war, he produced the *Bulletins politiques de presse allemande* for the French *Maison de la Presse*, the precursor to the Quai d’Orsay’s information and press division. In 1919, Tibal moved to the University of Prague as “Professeur d’histoire de la civilisation française”, a post sponsored by the French government. In 1920, he became director of Prague’s newly created *Institut Français*. His involvement in official cultural policy, and possibly his marriage to a Romanian, shaped his research interests which by then had veered towards the relations between the Slavic nations, Germany and France.

Tibal’s tenure was regarded as a success and the *Dotation* renewed his contract year after year. In an undated letter which was probably intended for his former colleagues at the Quai d’Orsay, Tibal outlined the purpose of the Carnegie Chair. First, it should function as a stabilising factor in the political, economic and cultural reconstruction of Central Europe, a region that was slowly discovering a new identity after the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Seemingly above politics, the organisers of the Carnegie lectures would find it easier, according to Tibal, “to extricate from a chaos of contradictory information the true factors, the legitimate interests and

the most appropriate measures to ensure harmony and prosperity among the peoples”. 155

Second, by educating the public about contemporary Central Europe, the Carnegie Chair would contribute to a better understanding between nations. Finally, the Carnegie Chair sought to import an “Anglo-Saxon” debating culture, aiming at the ideal of open and respectful discussion among an educated but not necessarily specialist audience. 156

This last aspiration, though, was abandoned after several years, “because of the meagre results obtained”. 157

Tibal’s programme certainly dovetailed with French political ambitions in Central Europe as it was formulated during a period when relations between France and the countries of the Little Entente were strengthened by friendship treaties (1924-1927). Nevertheless, the Chaire Carnegie should be interpreted in the context of both French cultural diplomacy and European movements for reconciliation. The German novelist Thomas Mann, for example, was invited to give one of the numerous guest lectures at the Chaire Carnegie. 158 This invitation was extended also on behalf of Prince Karl Anton Rohan’s Pan-European Kulturband. 159 It is also important to note that under d’Estournelles de Constant, the Dotation had been one of the first French organisations to extend an olive branch to German pacifists after the war. 160 Moreover, Tibal was

155 “… de dégager d’un chaos d’informations contradictories les véritables facteurs, les intérêts légitimes et les mesures les plus propres à assurer la concorde et la prospérité des peuples.” Tibal to “Monsieur le Ministre”, on Quai d’Orsay, service d’information et de presse letterhead, n.d., CEIP CE, box 177, folder 6.
156 Ibid.
159 On Rohan, whose eclectic political philosophy combined Catholicism, conservatism and Pan-Europeanism, and who later lent intellectual support to Nazism, see Guido Müller, Europäische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg: das Deutsch-Französische Studienkomitee und der Europäische Kulturband (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005).
160 The Dotation decided already in mid-1921 to look into re-establishing relations with Germany, earlier than mainstream French peace groups. Prudhommeaux, Dotation Carnegie, 73-80; Ingram, Politics of Dissent, 47.
keen on securing the collaboration of a diverse array of speakers representing as many different (European) nationalities as possible.161

Ultimately, the Carnegie Chair project represented an attempt to come to terms with a conception of politics that was, in the 1920s, still relatively novel, namely the view that the world was not structured by a network of empires but by a series of nation-states that were, in theory at least, equal. Tibal indicated as much in his letter to the Quai d’Orsay: “More and more we will have to admit that Europe, or, more generally, the world, is a republic of equals and that … each people has a right to its place in the sun with its national individuality.”162

The lectures held under the auspices of the Carnegie Chair soon evolved into collaborations with academic institutions both in France and abroad. The Institut des Hautes Études Internationales based at the University of Paris’s law faculty developed a whole course in international relations in association with the Carnegie Endowment, and another Carnegie Chair was established at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik in Berlin in 1926.163 This institution also received funding from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Rockefeller Foundation. The lectures at both Carnegie Chairs were aimed at an educated lay audience but given by academics or high-ranking officials from international organisations, for example Albert Thomas, the head of the International Labour Organisation.164 The Dotation seems to have realised that the academic imprimatur was useful in its task of shaping public opinion in Europe. Fundamentally, though, they were concerned with the influence of these activities on

161 Tibal to N.N., 19 May 1936, CEIP CE, box 182, folder 1.
162 “Il nous faudra de plus en plus admettre que l’Europe ou plus généralement le monde est une république des égaux et que … chaque people a son droit à sa place au soleil avec son individualité nationale …”, Tibal to “Monsieur le Ministre”, n.d., CEIP CE, box 177, folder 6.
163 The establishment of more Carnegie Chairs, for example in Geneva, was also discussed. “Compte-rendu des Séances tenues par MM. les Membres du Comité d’Administration du Centre Européen”, 22 March 1926, CEIP CE, box 116, folder 2.
164 See press clippings in CEIP CE, box 183, folder 1.
public opinion and sought to organise others that would involve “des personnalités de notoriété intellectuelle”.\footnote{165}

In 1927 Babcock successfully launched the *Dotation*’s own quarterly journal, *L’Esprit International*, for which he managed to recruit the young historian Pierre Renouvin and a journalist from the right-of-center *Journal des Débats* as editors. Lively discussions within the *Dotation* preceded the journal’s creation, as two already existing publications, Prince Rohan’s *Europäische Revue* and the *Journal de Genève*, had offered to cooperate with the Carnegie Endowment. As the *Dotation* was keen to develop its own profile, the offers were rejected.\footnote{166} Simultaneously avoiding the templates of pacifist, literary and scholarly international law journals, *L’Esprit International* aimed to become “one of the leaders of public opinion in international tasks and problems in all European Countries”, something like a European version of *Foreign Affairs*. As was typical in the interwar years, the journal also contained a documentary section which reprinted international treaties and agreements. Finally, another element of its editorial policy was “to make the United States better known and less criticised” in Europe.\footnote{167}

Some of *L’Esprit International*’s articles indeed served the purpose of ‘explaining’ the United States to a European audience, often in the form of travel reports. One of these pieces, written by the editor, praised American “efficiency”, the service-ethic and American “socialité”, and discussed common French criticisms of U.S. foreign policy, in particular the refusal to scrap war debts, as well as fears of being steamrolled by the American economic powerhouse. In its ambivalence, the article,

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\item\footnote{165} “Compte-rendu des Séances tenues par MM. les Membres du Comité d’Administration du Centre Européen”, 22 March 1926, 20, CEIP CE, box 116, folder 2.
\item\footnote{166} *Dotation*, Administrative Committee Minutes, 5 December 1925, 6, CEIP CE, box 115, folder 1.
\item\footnote{167} Redlich to Babcock, 14 December 1925, CEIP CE, box 114, folder 6.
\end{itemize}}
which finished on a positive note, probably served as a convincing propaganda piece.\textsuperscript{168} Apart from such musings on the European-American relationship, \textit{L’Esprit International} offered pieces on current affairs, international law and European federation. Its editorial line was liberal and anti-communist, its authors were well-known liberals, such as Butler himself, Count Carlo Sforza and William Rappard, the latter two of Williamstown fame. \textit{L’Esprit International} also published several articles by Robert Seton-Watson, a prominent expert and advocate for the political emancipation of the Slavic nations of the former Austro-Hungarian empire, and the founder of Slavic Studies at King’s College, London.\textsuperscript{169} Thus, key interests of the Endowment can also be traced in this aspect of the \textit{Dotation’s} activity.

Finally, it is important to note that the \textit{Dotation’s} influence was not only intended to radiate throughout Europe but also beyond. Paris represented an intellectual centre not just for Europeans and expatriate Americans, but also in Latin America. Copies of \textit{L’Esprit International} were sent to Latin American intellectuals and, while the European International Relations Clubs remained underdeveloped, Renouvin assisted the Endowment in the management of its Latin American IRCs.\textsuperscript{170} Since the Endowment felt that Spanish books were not “truly international” and “either very antagonistic to the United States or else foolishly pro-American”, Renouvin was charged with selecting appropriate French literature which could be sent to the IRCs.\textsuperscript{171}

The \textit{Dotation} fulfilled an important role with regard to the Carnegie Endowment’s presence in Europe. Shortly after the Great War, its French leadership built links with the League of Nations and attempted to connect with popular, League-focused internationalism. In the early 1920s, it thus provided an antidote to the legalistic

\textsuperscript{168} Georges Lechartier, “Les États-Unis dans le monde d’aujourd’hui”, \textit{L’Esprit International}, no. 12 (1929).
\textsuperscript{169} For an overview see \textit{L’Esprit International}, Tables des Années, 1927-1936 (1936).
\textsuperscript{170} Amy Jones to Davis, 24 June 1936, CEIP CE, box 39, folder 5.
\textsuperscript{171} Jones to Davis, 23 September 1935; Jones to Mme Perreux, 16 December 1936, both CEIP CE, box 39, folder 4.
bent of the Endowment, which was dominated by James Brown Scott and Elihu Root at the time. Efforts to transform the *Dotation* into an international cultural centre under American leadership from the mid-1920s were only partly successful. In particular, the opportunity offered by a more forceful expansion of the International Relations Clubs was missed. The Carnegie Endowment’s publicity activities stand in contrast to the more research-oriented ambitions of the Rockefeller philanthropies, explored in the next section. The *Dotation* was not interested in developing new models for international organisation or instruments that would make an international legal order more precise. Instead, it aimed to be “a mirror of international feeling”, directing public opinion while at the same time presenting the raw material, ‘facts’, from which it was to be synthesized.\(^{172}\)

University for the League: the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies

The lectures and publications offered by the *Dotation Carnegie* in Paris paled into insignificance when compared to the huge variety of educational offerings available in Geneva, the site of another institution created with foundation money, the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies (*Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales*). The Institute was mostly supported by Rockefeller funds and developed into an international centre for the study and teaching of international relations. Its influence was not just felt in Switzerland, where it became the prime institution for the study of international history, but also abroad, chiefly due to the prominence of several liberal economists who taught there. Moreover, the Institute was an integral part of the cosmopolitan milieu around the League of Nations, a social scene partly financed by American philanthropic foundations.

\(^{172}\) Redlich to Babcock, 14 December 1925, CEIP CE, box 114, folder 6.
In the 1920s, Geneva was something like an international capital and thus attractive to anybody interested in learning more about international politics or observing them closely from the sidelines. From the mid-1920s there were several private initiatives in that field, notably a number of summer schools. The French Association de la paix par le droit organised the so-called cours Ruyssen, named after Theodore Ruyssen, the president of the International Federation of League of Nations Societies and former auditor of the Dotation Carnegie.\(^{173}\) An English speaking equivalent was the Geneva Institute of International Relations. Organised in 1924 in cooperation with the British League of Nations Union and the American League of Nations Non-Partisan Association, it featured a series of lectures by international speakers during the summer and eventually grew to accommodate an average of 250 attendants at meetings. Its proceedings were published in the Problems of Peace series.\(^{174}\) The Carnegie Endowment supported the Geneva Institute of International Relations with several thousand dollars per annum from 1925.\(^{175}\)

Another initiative, often confused with the Geneva Institute of International Relations, was the Geneva School of International Studies. This summer school was run by the British scholar Alfred Zimmern who worked for the League of Nations’ International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation and had a special interest in internationalist education.\(^{176}\) He also sat on the committee of the Geneva Institute.\(^ {177}\) The Geneva School of International Studies’ origins date back to the 1924 founding congress of the International Student Union for the League of Nations (Fédération

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\(^{173}\) Ingram, Politics of Dissent, 55.


\(^{175}\) Kuehl and Dunn, Keeping the Covenant, 60.


\(^{177}\) Minutes of meeting of the Committee of the Geneva Institute of International Relations, 15 August 1933, Archives of the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales (hereafter IHEI), folder “Zimmern 3/Bureau, Ecole Int. Y.M.C.A., Geneva Institute”.
John D. Rockefeller, Jr., along with several other wealthy Americans, supported the school between 1926 and 1934 to the tune of $40,000.\footnote{Memorandum “The Geneva School of International Studies”, 16 April 1926; Fosdick to Thomas Appleget, 30 November 1926; Robert K. Straus to Fosdick, 4 February 1930; Memorandum “Geneva School of International Studies”, 22 March 1934, all in RFA, RG 2, Educational Interests series, box 29, folder 184.}

The person responsible for attracting most of the private American funds that flowed into Geneva was Arthur Sweetser, a member of the League of Nations Information Section since September 1919.\footnote{Arthur Sweetser League Secretariat personnel file, LN, Personnel Files S889, Varia 2 425. I am grateful to Frank Beyersdorf for directing me to this source.} Sweetser was a crucial unofficial mediator between the League and the United States in the interwar years and a fixture of the American community which had started to develop around the League in the early 1920s. In the course of the decade, the number of American citizens who visited the League increased substantially, to the extent that the U.S. consul in Geneva reported in 1933 that they formed the largest national contingent of visitors.\footnote{Prentiss B. Gilbert, despatch 526 political, 27 February 1933, NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 811.43/66.} For many upper-class Americans, a pilgrimage to Geneva became a compulsory element of a European tour and most of them would enjoy the hospitality of Arthur Sweetser at some point.\footnote{Kuehl and Dunn, \textit{Keeping the Covenant}, 81-82; Susan Sweetser Clifford, \textit{One Shining Hour: A Memoir} (privately printed, n.d.), 58.}

So did three foundation representatives who came to Geneva in the spring of 1924. One of them described the experience in a letter: “He took us in, talked for an hour, during which President Hopkins of Dartmouth came in, and then took us out to his delightful home in a village outside Geneva, facing the Alps and looking across the lake.”\footnote{John Jacob Coss to mother, 24 March 1924, John Jacob Coss Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York (hereafter Coss Papers), box 8, part I.}

Sweetser, who worked in the perpetually cash-strapped Information Section, took great care to outline the League’s financial needs to the foundation representatives as he was concerned that the League might not receive all it was due from the
philanthropic pork barrel. He need not have worried, though. Both the Rockefeller and the Carnegie foundations became major donors to the League and other Geneva-based institutions in the course of the 1920s. Interlinked with the informal League network which had been established by American nongovernmental organisations, the foundations ensured that the United States became, at least with regards to technical collaboration, a de facto member of the League of Nations.\(^{183}\)

Among the foundations’ largest financial contributions to the Geneva milieu were those dedicated to an academic institution, the Graduate Institute of International Studies, founded in 1927. The original idea for the Graduate Institute had been developed by William Rappard.\(^{184}\) Rappard, a Swiss born in the United States, retained very good contacts with his country of birth which helped him when negotiating with American philanthropic backers.\(^{185}\) Noting the numerous educational opportunities that had opened up in Geneva due to the presence of the League and the International Labour Organisation, Rappard envisioned, associated with the University of Geneva, a specialist institute “the students of which would attend the already existing lectures of international law” but also receive instruction in other disciplines.\(^{186}\)

The idea of a scientific institute devoted to international questions in Geneva easily found favour with Beardsley Ruml, the director of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, who desired to create an international elite of social science experts. Ruml felt that such an institution could use League resources in the form of archives or simply intellectual stimuli to conduct new research while at the same time providing a hands-on educational experience to advanced students of international questions. Moreover, Ruml saw Geneva as a provincial intellectual backwater that had to be rescued from its

\(^{183}\) This interpretation is supported by Kuehl and Dunn, *Keeping the Covenant*, passim.

\(^{184}\) For biographical information on Rappard see Introduction, footnote 54.


\(^{186}\) Rappard to Huntington Gilchrist, 12 January 1925, LSRM, series III.9, box 105, folder 1061.
“mediocrity and superficiality” by a new institution with “a competent Faculty and alert
student body”. As an afterthought, Ruml added that the creation of this new institute
might also represent an innovation in the higher education sector: “I wonder whether
there is not a rare opportunity to build a modern university in Europe free of whatever
traditions may be hampering and at the same time with the background of European
university tradition and experience.”\(^\text{187}\)

Raymond Fosdick also perceived the opportunity to establish a new academic
institution in Geneva. Putting forward his own proposal, Fosdick echoed some of the
concerns that affected decision makers within the Carnegie Endowment but gave the
League mechanism a larger role. “The basis of any intellectual judgment and action in
the science of government is facts”, Fosdick began, before describing how independent
research institutions had started to supply these to American municipal and state
authorities in the Progressive Era. With the monumental changes since the war, “The
time has now come, I believe, for a similar development in the international field.” In
that arena, one had to deal with “new and untouched problems … economic, industrial
and social in character”. These problems, Fosdick believed, were so numerous, that only
those should be tackled which were “in public international discussion and susceptible
to early governmental action”. Therefore, the prospective institute should “serve as an
aid and stimulant to the League” while also “us[ing] the League of Nations as the
medium for translating its findings into government action”. Finally, the proposed
institute should be staffed with international personnel:

I believe that the head of the Institute should be an American or an
Englishman—the most competent man that could be secured, and the staff
should be chosen with painstaking care. I would suggest an International Board
of Trustees, perhaps at the start an Anglo-American Board. The Board could be
built up slowly from a small nucleus. Perhaps three or four men could start it—
men like Lord Cecil, Gilbert Murray and Professor Baker from England, and Mr.
Root, Owen D. Young and Mr. Wickersham from the United States. …A non-

\(^{187}\) Ruml to A. Flexner, 23 December 1925, LSRM, series III. 9, box 105, folder 1061.
Anglo-American name that might be immediately considered is Rappard, a
Swiss, the new head of the University of Geneva and formerly professor at
Harvard.\textsuperscript{188}

After lengthy negotiations involving Rappard, the relevant Swiss authorities and the
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, some of Ruml’s and Fosdick’s ambitions were
realised when the Graduate Institute of International Studies was inaugurated in
September 1927 with a Memorial grant of $100,000.\textsuperscript{189} This support was continued by
the Rockefeller Foundation and remained substantial throughout the interwar years.\textsuperscript{190} It
was only terminated in the late 1940s.

The Institute had less of an Anglo-American character than Ruml and Fosdick
had desired but its make-up was certainly international. Rappard and the French
historian Paul Mantoux shared the directorship. Over the years, a distinguished
international faculty was assembled which included the German jurist Hans Kelsen, the
Italian historian Guglielmo Ferrero and the liberal economists Ludwig von Mises and
Wilhelm Röpke. The international relations specialists Arnold Wolfers and Pitman
Potter were among the visiting professors, as were André Siegfried and the American
economist Jacob Viner.\textsuperscript{191} The student body was also fairly international, with Swiss
students in the minority. Like the administrators of the Hague Academy of International
Law, Rappard was at pains to increase the American contingent and even considered
establishing special bursaries for applicants from the United States.\textsuperscript{192}

Instruction at the Graduate Institute rested on a combination of the disciplines of
history, international law and economics, thus only including one of the social sciences

\textsuperscript{188} “A proposal to establish an Institute of International Research”, n.d. [ca. spring 1926], Paul Mantoux
\textsuperscript{189} Monnier, \textit{Rappard}, 360-369; Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, \textit{Report for 1926} (New York:
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1927), 17.
\textsuperscript{190} See Appendix.
\textsuperscript{191} Graduate Institute of International Studies, \textit{Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales
Genève, 1927-2002: 75 ans au service de la paix par l’enseignement et la recherche en relations internationales}
(Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2002), 55-64.
\textsuperscript{192} Viner to Rappard, 26 May 1930; Rappard to Viner, 6 June 1930, both Jacob Viner Papers, Seeley
Mudd Library, Princeton University, box 22, folder 4.
which the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial aimed to develop in the 1920s. The Rockefeller Foundation was aware of this when it took over from the Memorial in 1929, as a report written for the Foundation admonished that “International research has thus far been largely in the hands of the historians, the diplomat and the jurists” while “the more modern approaches through economics, through anthropology, psychology, education” were still neglected, also in Geneva. However, the Graduate Institute did make a significant contribution to economics, at least in the long run. The Institute provided a haven for liberal economists outside the Keynesian orthodoxy which became so entrenched from the 1930s. Thus Geneva acted as a launch pad for the free-market critique of state intervention in Western societies. Von Mises and Röpke were founding members of the Mont Pèlerin Society, a think tank created in a small Swiss village in 1947, and one of the institutions responsible for the global rise of neo-liberalism as a political ideology in the second half of the 20th century.

As with so many long-term political outcomes of philanthropic projects, the question to what extent the ascent of neo-liberalism was consciously engineered by Rockefeller philanthropy through the support of the Graduate Institute in Geneva is difficult to answer. Foundation officers almost never couched their preferences in explicitly political terms, pointing instead to the potential policy-relevance of the knowledge they intended to help produce. Rappard himself certainly subscribed to a form of liberalism and he also emphasised to his colleagues on the board of the Graduate Institute that the Rockefeller Foundation was not trying to steer the institution into a particular political direction: “I do not believe that one can discern in the efforts

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which are encouraged [by the Foundation] a definite national or international political tendency.”

Arguments between the directors of the Graduate Institute and the Rockefeller Foundation, which became more frequent from the mid-1930s, revolved around the Institute’s lack of ‘concrete’ accomplishments in the form of ground-breaking and policy-shaping studies on particular problems. Nevertheless, the Foundation’s insistence that the Institute should work harder to provide blueprints for policy alternatives during the 1930s heyday of economic nationalism, protectionism, autarky and the planned economy indicates that Rockefeller officers indeed hoped to promote a liberal world economic order, as did their more outspoken colleagues in the Carnegie Endowment. Of course, this is not particularly surprising. What is remarkable, though, is the extent to which these political preferences were neutralised by a discourse focused on expertise and practical policy relevance, and remained unrecognised by grant recipients who had similar convictions.

Even before the Great War, American foundations started to experiment with different institutional models for the study and teaching of international relations. Accordingly, in the course of the 1920s, several institutions, wholly or partly financed by philanthropic funds, were founded or restructured. Although the social sciences became more important in scientific approaches to international relations, international law remained a key discipline. The models explored in this chapter represent attempts to ‘internationalise’ the process of finding and disseminating scientific facts about nations and the international order. The Hague, Paris and Geneva became international hubs for

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197 Monnier, Rappard, 496-506.

198 On the crisis of classical economic liberalism in the 1930s see Mazower, Dark Continent, chapter 4; on the Carnegie Endowment and economic liberalism see Greco, “A Foundation for Internationalism”, esp. chapters 4, 7, 8.
international relations experts, funded with philanthropic gifts. In the next chapter, the foundations’ support for the study of international relations within national frameworks will be examined.
International Relations As Seen From the Capital:
Philanthropy and Cultural Diplomacy

A Survey of European Prospects

In early 1924, three American academics embarked on what one of them later termed a “European safari.”¹ For two months, they travelled across Britain, France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Switzerland, consulting with European scholars on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. The party consisted of John Jacob Coss, a philosophy professor at Columbia University who had made a name for himself as chairman of the Contemporary Civilization course, Guy Stanton Ford, Dean of the University of Minnesota’s Graduate School and James T. Shotwell, Columbia historian and editor of the Carnegie History of the World War.² Their journey from country to country serves as a spotlight on the background, attitudes and motives of American foundation representatives and on the remarkable density of a philanthropic network in Europe that dated back to the war years and which they could take advantage of in the course of their journey. It also serves as a reminder that the foundations, despite their attempts to ‘internationalise’ the field of international relations, were equally concerned with how the institutions they supported fitted into national contexts. This meant that the foundations had to negotiate the particularities of national systems of higher education which were often geared to train a national elite. Small states tended to be more accommodating to internationalist ventures in science and education—great and formerly great powers had more to lose from opening up a

² The Contemporary Civilization course was based on Columbia’s War Issues course, a wartime invention carried over into the academic mainstream after 1919. Gilbert Allardyce, “The Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course”, American Historical Review 87, no. 3 (1982).
traditional bastion of nation-building, namely elite education. This put the foundations on a potential collision course with national bureaucracies and required them to get involved in cultural diplomacy, despite their ostensibly ‘private’ status. Their strategy for negotiating this problem was to encourage national viewpoints but with the aim of uniting them all in the same project. The journey of the three foundation representatives flags up these issues. This chapter will examine the foundations’ need to negotiate a national context mainly through a case study on Germany. At a time when international relations was still as much a scientific discipline as a movement for international conciliation, Germany and its reintegration into transnational politico-scientific networks was a major concern for foundation officers, especially those who were sent to Europe in the early and mid-1920s.

Coss, Ford and Shotwell had been assigned slightly different tasks in Europe but, taking the same ship from New York harbour on 2 February 1924, they resolved to “be much together”. The trip had been arranged at very short notice. Days before the departure, Ford had received a phone call from George E. Vincent, his former boss at the University of Minnesota and now president of the Rockefeller Foundation. “They had had very distressing, disturbing reports about conditions in universities in Germany, following the World War and the inflation and collapse there.” While the Rockefeller Foundation had already provided assistance to the natural sciences, Ford was to examine conditions in history and the social sciences under the auspices of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. He would be accompanied by John Jacob Coss whose task it was to prepare the ground for the Memorial’s European fellowship programme in the social sciences. Midwesterners both, Coss and Ford knew each other through their wartime service on the Committee on Public Information. Like many American

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3 Coss to sister, 2 February 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I.
4 Ford Oral History, iii, 487; at that time, Ford was not yet, as has been claimed by Fleck, a staff member of the Memorial. He only joined after the European trip. Fleck, Transatlantische Bereicherungen, 71.
academics of their generation—Ford was born in 1873, Coss in 1884—they had pursued graduate studies in imperial Germany. It was under different circumstances that they would now visit the new German republic and other European countries, even if Ford intended to “go as a visiting scholar”, not as the “overt representative of a Foundation with money to distribute”. However, Ford’s choice of travel companion made it quite clear that he came as a foundation representative. James T. Shotwell, the third member of the party, was not only the director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Division of Economics and History—he had succeeded the economic historian John Bates Clark in July 1923—but had also been busy establishing a philanthropic network across Europe for several years.

Shotwell was the driving force behind the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, a project he had been involved in since December 1914, when, at Clark’s behest, he submitted a proposal for a history of the war designed to reveal the social and economic dislocations caused by armed conflict, in particular by wartime government intervention. As a representative of the “New History” in the United States, Shotwell was committed to the use of a social scientifically-grounded history as a tool of social reform. During the war, he also advised the Creel Committee on historical matters. From 1920 onwards, Shotwell moved constantly all over Europe and across the Atlantic in his capacity as editor-general, establishing a temporary basis in London and securing the contribution of editors and authors in each country covered by the project. His trip

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5 Ford Oral History, iii, 488; on Coss see James Gutmann, “John Jacob Coss, 1884-1940”, n.d., Coss Papers, box 5, Folder: Coss, John J. – Biographical; on Ford see the biographical sketch contained in Guy Stanton Ford, *On and Off the Campus, with a biographical introduction by George E. Vincent* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1938), 1-34.
in early 1924 with Coss and Ford served the same purpose. Shotwell succeeded in assembling a huge number of government officials and scholar-politicians for his history. The revolutionary idea behind it was that it should be written by those who had participated in the war at a high political or administrative level. Those who were united through this project, for example Charles Rist, a member of the Carnegie History’s French editorial board, or William Beveridge, director of the London School of Economics and author of one volume, keep on appearing throughout the interwar years in philanthropic funding networks, which makes the Carnegie History one of the missing links between the war and the philanthropic projects of the mid-1920s. In fact, Raymond Fosdick had sought Shotwell’s advice regarding the situation of social scientists in Germany just weeks before Coss and Ford embarked on their journey. Therefore, it is not surprising that Shotwell’s Carnegie History network came to overlap with another philanthropic network, namely that of the fellowship advisers appointed by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial.

After a short journey across the Atlantic, Shotwell and Ford disembarked together in Cherbourg, leaving Coss to continue to London where he arrived on 9 February 1924. His first evening in England was spent in the company of William  

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10 The Carnegie History is recognised as an early and crucial attempt to construct a narrative of the war. It has been interpreted as the “testimony of those who ran important facets of the war effort”. Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4.
11 Charles Rist (1874-1955) was a political economist who had written, together with Charles Gide, a monumental history of economic theory, which marked him out as one of the few French liberal economists. Like many scholars who collaborated with the foundations, Rist had also taken on the role of expert advisor to policy makers during the war. In 1926, he oversaw the stabilisation of the French franc. William Beveridge (1879-1963) was a civil servant before moving to the LSE in 1919. He continued to serve on government commissions and committees on social policy, and wrote a volume on wartime British food policy for the Carnegie History. It was largely down to Beveridge that the LSE received such a large amount of Rockefeller funding in the interwar period. Beveridge was also involved in the foundations’ work in international relations and worked on some projects based at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Until 1932, Beveridge served as chairman of the International Studies Conference’s Executive Committee.
12 Shotwell to Fosdick, 17 January 1924, LSRM, series III.6, box 52, folder 558.
Beveridge and Graham Wallas, whom Coss described as a “dear old fellow who has written some really big socio-political books”.\textsuperscript{13} It was no accident that Beveridge and Wallas were the first point of contact for Coss. Both worked at the London School of Economics, an institution that the Memorial had supported since 1923.\textsuperscript{14} After several interviews in London, Coss left for Oxford, Cambridge, Liverpool and York. While the first two destinations are highly plausible for an American academic setting out to survey the British university scene, Coss’ trip to the North of England, where he visited the model village of Port Sunlight on Merseyside and the Rowntree chocolate factory in York, seems more unusual.\textsuperscript{15} However, Coss’ itinerary was far from random and should be interpreted against the backdrop of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial’s origins and its development of a policy towards the social sciences.

Leading British industrialists had established Port Sunlight and a similar model village near York as their philanthropic projects. When Coss visited them, he continued a long-standing transatlantic exchange of social models, exemplified by the settlement movement, the professionalization of social work and the social survey. Philanthropic organisations on both sides of the Atlantic had frequently been at the forefront of such developments. The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial was steeped in the same tradition, and, for the first years after its creation, committed to funding social welfare organisations. When Coss made his journey to the North of England, the Memorial had only recently begun the transition “from charity to knowledge-based social engineering”, as Martin Bulmer has put it.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13} Coss to sister, 2 and 9/10 February 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I.
\textsuperscript{15} Coss to sister, 12, 15 and 18 February 1924; Coss to mother, 14 and 20 February 1924; both Coss Papers, box 8, part I.
This evolution of Memorial policy owed much to the energetic leadership of Beardsley Ruml. Maintaining that increasing scientific knowledge was the best route towards increasing human welfare, Ruml advocated channelling financial aid to the social sciences, at the expense of social welfare and religious organisations. Ruml’s strategy centred on encouraging the advancement of the social sciences at the universities while ensuring that social scientists produced knowledge that was based on empirical research and practically useful.\textsuperscript{17} In the United States, this new approach led to the formation of the Social Science Research Council under Memorial auspices, the establishment of a fellowship programme and institutional support for universities.\textsuperscript{18} In Europe, a similar programme was rolled out in a number of countries. Coss’ visit to the North of England in February 1924 mirrored the journey that the Memorial itself had taken in terms of its policy. Acknowledging the efforts of a previous generation of philanthropists, of which the model village was a typical example, Coss nevertheless thought that it was not a blueprint for the future: “good plant, but old methods”, he wrote to Ruml about Port Sunlight.\textsuperscript{19}

After two weeks in England, Coss travelled to Paris. Again, he was not left to his own devices but could take advantage of the amenities of the Rockefeller Foundation’s branch office at 20, rue de la Baume. The origins of this office date back to the Rockefeller tuberculosis campaign of 1917 in France, when the Foundation decided to join the Carnegie Endowment in maintaining a permanent European presence.\textsuperscript{20} Coss’ colleagues in Paris did their best to help. He found them “Very kind and willing but

\textsuperscript{17} Bulmer and Bulmer, “Philanthropy and Social Science”: esp. 361-368.
\textsuperscript{19} 28 February 1924, LSRM, series III.6, box 51, folder 535.
their field is medicine, mine economics, so on men they have little advice to give.”

Nevertheless, Coss soon found the local collaborator for the Memorial’s fellowship programme that he was looking for, Charles Rist. Rist was one of the few French liberal economists and, like many scholars who collaborated with the foundations, he had also taken on the role of expert advisor during the war. This experience recommended him to Shotwell who commissioned him to write a report on Central Europe and put him on the French editorial board of the Carnegie History. After a “delightful” lunch with Rist and his family in Versailles, Coss asked the economist to become the Memorial’s French fellowship advisor.

Coss also, as he had in London, where he had met Civil Service Commissioner David Mair, visited state officials with a potential interest in the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial’s activities. Just before his departure, he had an interview in the Quai d’Orsay. Bernard Fay, a French academic, accompanied Coss as intermediary and interpreter. In the meantime, Rist was to talk to Paul Appell, the Rector of the University of Paris. In a letter to Ruml, Coss stated that “I don’t like these official warnings but better us tell them than have them find it out in some underground way and be mad”. Foundation officers were aware of their curious position as foreign interference in what was traditionally a domain of the nation state: elite education. They realised that in order to complete their ambitions in Europe, they had to have the quiet backing of governments. As Coss put it, “the Foreign Office must be informed,

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21 Coss to mother, 25 February 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I.
22 Mazon, Origins, 43-44.
24 Coss to sister, 27 February 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I.
25 Coss to mother, 22 February 1924; Coss to father, 1 March 1924, both in Coss Papers, box 8, part I.
26 On the way educational and knowledge institutions represented and shaped national ideas see Ralph Jessen and Jakob Vogel, eds., Wissenschaft und Nation in der europäischen Geschichte (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2002).
and in secret, so they will not be offended”. 27 These behind-the-scenes accords of course put into question the foundations’ self-image as disinterested promoters of non-political intellectual exchange but even if Coss disliked these official visits, they were standard practice. 28

After only five days in France, Coss left for Berlin to meet Guy Stanton Ford. Travelling through the occupied Rhineland, Coss wrote to his sister that he empathised with the Germans, “a bitter and resentful people—don’t really see how they could be otherwise”. 29 A former tutor whom Coss looked up also appeared “very bitter against England’s blockade which was as brutal he says as any U-Boat warfare”, a detail which Coss again found worthy of including in a letter. 30 Even to those Germans who did not articulate any feelings of acrimony, Coss ascribed a sense of victimhood, for example when he portrayed his two main collaborators as “without self-interest, wise and gentle, and full both of humor and kindliness—real people, and able people who feel their distress deeply but are saying nothing about it”. 31 Belying this image of smooth serenity, organising the German side of the Memorial’s fellowship programme was actually a rather complex task. Coss and Ford, who decided to join forces in Germany, had to set up a mechanism that would take account of existing hierarchies and the peculiarities of local academic culture. The two American foundation representatives approached this task with a mixture of deep respect for a university system they had come to admire in their formative years and a sense of frustration with this system’s negative by-products which, in their view, impeded the reconstruction of German academia.

27 Coss to Ruml, 28 February 1924, LSRM, series III.6, box 51, folder 535.
28 Arthur Woods, a Memorial trustee, also asked the American ambassador in Germany to make similar inquiries on behalf of the Memorial before any involvement in that country was contemplated. Woods to Ruml, 30 July 1924, LSRM, series III.6, box 61, folder 657.
29 Coss to sister, 1 March 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I.
30 Coss to sister, 4 March 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I.
31 Coss to mother, 11 March 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I.
When Coss arrived in Berlin, Ford had already spent the past weeks touring Germany, visiting nine universities to inspect the working conditions for historians and social scientists. Two issues struck him as most pertinent: the material problems of German scholars and their lack of familiarity with academic trends outside of Germany.\textsuperscript{32} “Intellectually as well as physically”, Ford wrote to Ruml, “they have lived for ten years on their own flesh. More than they realize they are out of touch with what has been done in the fields you have in mind.”\textsuperscript{33} Mixed in with Ford’s observations on the intellectual isolation of German scholars were somewhat gleeful comments on the war-induced decline of the mandarins, German middle-class professors brought down by hyperinflation and a lack of public funds for the universities.\textsuperscript{34} Ford mocked the mandarins’ outrage at being reduced to what he later admitted were “skimpy living conditions” and, more importantly, to a lower rung in social hierarchies, a situation that only improved slowly.\textsuperscript{35} Commenting on a newspaper article reporting that young academics were finally able to find a suitable fiancée again, Ford added sarcastically: “Cheer up! The young Privat-Dozent may yet be as eligible as a Prussian officer in the old days. The sun is rising and the worm turns!”\textsuperscript{36}

But although hyperinflation had been curbed by the time Ford arrived, it had had a devastating impact on the professional middle classes. In Austria, where the situation was even more desperate, their plight was taken up by the American Relief Administration and the Commonwealth Fund which, from 1920, established special programmes “for university professors, students, and impoverished members of the

\textsuperscript{32} Ford Oral History, iii, 493.
\textsuperscript{33} Ford to Ruml, 12 March 1924, LSRM, series III.6, box 61, folder 657.
\textsuperscript{35} Ford Oral History, iii, 490.
\textsuperscript{36} Ford, Memorandum, dated “Feb. or March 1924”, LSRM, series III.6, box 52, folder 558. A \textit{Privatdozent} is a scholar who has fulfilled the formal qualifications for an appointment as professor but has yet to secure a chair.
middle classes generally”. One of these initiatives provided food relief for university professors in the form of a heavily subsidised lunch club. This institution, called Professorentisch, spread throughout Austria and attracted numerous smaller donations, notably from the Carnegie Endowment, which subsidised meals consumed by Austrian authors of the Carnegie History. James T. Shotwell fondly cited the Professorentisch as an example of “constructive” aid because they did not just feed professors but also acquainted them with a different model of academic sociability. Previously isolated scholars could now discuss their work in an informal setting, as they would do in an American faculty club. Shotwell regarded the highly individualistic organisation of research common at German and Austrian universities as an anachronism and felt that American foundations should strive “to enlarge the point of view of German scholars”. Ford took a similar stance when he recommended not a relief programme for professors but grants to enable university libraries to buy foreign books and journals.

The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial’s sister organisation already aided German university libraries. In 1922, the Rockefeller Foundation started to donate medical journals and distributed them through the Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft (Emergency Fund for German Science). The Notgemeinschaft was Germany’s own answer to the problem of reconstructing its research base after the war. Formed by scholars and bureaucrats in 1920, it coordinated and funded academic

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37 French and Smith, Commonwealth Fund, 17.
38 Franz Adlgasser, American Individualism Abroad: Herbert Hoover, die American Relief Administration und Österreich, 1919-1923 (Vienna: VVGÖ, 1993), 256-258.
39 Shotwell to Fosdick, 17 January 1924, LSRM, series III.6, box 52, folder 558. Fleck also cites this letter but wrongly infers from it that the Professorentisch was run by the Quakers. This would have been highly unusual, and, in fact, Quaker food relief in Austria was limited to children and adolescents. Fleck, Transatlantische Bereicherungen, 131; John Forbes, The Quaker Star under Seven Flags, 1917-1927 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962), 74-84.
40 Ford to Ruml, 12 March 1924, LSRM, series III.6, box 61, folder 657.
research. Coss and Ford relied heavily on the connections previously established by the Rockefeller Foundation and thus the Notgemeinschaft became a key institutional partner of the Memorial. However, the basic idea for the organisation of the German fellowship programme came from a contact established through the Carnegie History network. Interrupting their stay in Berlin, Coss and Ford made a day trip to Hamburg to see Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, the director of the Institut für Auswärtige Politik, the first German institution dedicated to the study of war and peace.

Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, a jurist, was the co-editor of the Carnegie History’s German series, and, as Coss recognised, “Shotwell’s chief German advisor”. During a long conversation with Ford and Coss, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy counselled against nominating just one fellowship advisor for the Memorial. Instead, he “Would take many on a committee because of great specialization and group and state jealousies.” Ford later passed on this recommendation as his own insight:

> Well, I knew Germany well enough to know that I couldn’t pick any one man that would be satisfactory, North, South, Protestant, Catholic, Jew and that could cover the social sciences as we understood them—history, economics and so on. I therefore determined on a committee of five, which I was very successful in forming, some very important front names, taking all of these factors into consideration, knowing all the time that the main business was to find an executive secretary for this outfit who would really do the thing.

In fact, Ford and Coss arrived at this solution with the approval of the Notgemeinschaft whose chairman, Friedrich Schmidt-Ott, was nominated to the fellowship committee, along with Mendelssohn-Bartholdy. Schmidt-Ott also influenced Ford’s

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43 Coss to mother, 11 March 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I.
45 Coss to sister, 6 March 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I.
46 Ford Oral History, iii, 497-498.
recommendations for the Memorial regarding grants to German libraries. The secretary of the fellowship committee was also a *Notgemeinschaft* employee.\(^{47}\)

Together, Ford and Coss continued their journey to Prague, where Shotwell joined them. Within two days, they appointed two fellowship advisers for Czechoslovakia, one Czech and one German speaker, reflecting the divisions of the country’s university system.\(^{48}\) Ford relates that they dealt mainly with Alice Masaryk, the daughter of the Czechoslovakian president.\(^{49}\) Miss Masaryk, herself president of the country’s Red Cross and something like an ambassador for nongovernmental organisations, had been instrumental in getting the Rockefeller Foundation into Czechoslovakia where it set up its first post-war public health and medical programme in Europe.\(^{50}\) Unsurprisingly, President Masaryk was also involved in the Carnegie History, and Shotwell arranged both a luncheon with Czechoslovakian Foreign Ministry staff and an audience with the president himself.\(^{51}\) After this flying visit, the Americans continued to Vienna, where the next fellowship adviser was swiftly appointed. Again, Shotwell introduced his colleagues to suitable candidates. He signed up the acting Austrian Chancellor as another author for his history, too.\(^{52}\) At the end of their stay, the American foundation representatives were driven to the train station in a car belonging to the Commonwealth Fund, relying once more on the close-knit nature of the American philanthropic network in Europe.\(^{53}\) The next stop was Munich where Coss and Ford made their final appointment for the Memorial’s German fellowship committee. As usual, they also treated themselves to some European high culture: in Vienna, they had

\(^{47}\) Coss to mother, 11 March 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I. For the members of the German fellowship committee see “Report of European Fellowship Program in the Social Sciences of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1923-1928”, RF RG 1.2, series 100, box 50, folder 380.

\(^{48}\) Coss to mother, 15 March 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I.

\(^{49}\) Ford Oral History, iii, 513.

\(^{50}\) Page, “Rockefeller Foundation in Early Czechoslovakia”: 261, 307 n.

\(^{51}\) Coss to mother, 15 March 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I; Ford Oral History, iii, 510-512; Shotwell, *Outline of Plan*, 75.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., 12, 61; Ford Oral History, iii, 514-517.

\(^{53}\) Coss to mother, 20 March 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I.
gone to see the opera *Cosi fan tutte*, conducted by Richard Strauss, but in Munich they went to the cinema to watch *Siegfried*, the first part of Fritz Lang’s recently released silent film *Die Nibelungen*.54

The trio continued to Geneva, their last stop, where they, like most high-profile American visitors to the League of Nations, enjoyed the hospitality of Arthur Sweetser. In his idyllic country house Sweetser outlined the League’s work and also its financial requirements to the three foundation representatives.55 Sweetser was obviously keen to swell the stream of philanthropic funds to Geneva which he had helped to start in the early 1920s and so, two days after Coss, Ford and Shotwell had left, he complained to Raymond Fosdick that they should have come to Geneva first: “with so many interests at the League, and so many contacts, and so varied a personnel … the logical jumping off place for any enquiry”.56 However, this opinion was not necessarily shared by Beardsley Ruml back in the New York headquarters of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial.

*The Development of Foundation Policies towards Europe in the 1920s*

In a 1924 policy document, Ruml had outlined the need for “more information concerning social science in other countries, particularly in the principal countries of Europe”.57 Geneva may have been the seat of the League but Ruml did not lose the great powers out of sight—in political or scientific terms. Coss and Ford’s reports may have emphasised to him to what extent Europe’s academic community was still racked by divisions and mutual resentment, even if American foundation representatives were well-liked both in former Allied countries and in those formerly belonging to the

54 Coss to sister, 16 March 1924; Coss to father, 21 March 1924, both Coss Papers, box 8, part I.
55 Coss to mother, 24 March 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I.
56 Sweetser to Fosdick, 28 March 1924, forwarded to Ruml, 11 April 1924, LSRM, series III.10, box 111, folder 1119.
57 Memorandum “Assistance to research institutions”, 1924
Central powers. The shadow of the Great War was constantly present, mostly in the philanthropic network itself which, after all, relied heavily on structures and contacts established as a result of the conflict. On the recommendation of his envoys, Ruml tailored his programme to national specifics, opting, for example, to have a fellowship committee in Germany, but leaving only one man, Rist, in charge of fellowships in France. Finally, foundation officers took care to inform government officials in the countries where they operated of their plans and cultivated political elites. So even while the foundations built up a transnational network, the power of the nation state was ever-present in their calculations, which may be a feature that most transnational endeavours share.58

When Coss and Ford returned to the United States, Ruml used their recommendations, together with those of another Memorial envoy, Frank Aydelotte, to appoint a network of national fellowship advisers.59 Ruml also allotted $16,500 to the emergency grant programme for German libraries devised by Ford, thus cementing the Memorial’s link to the Notgemeinschaft which administered the programme. In 1925 and 1926, he also started grants for social science institutions in Europe, principally in Britain ($377,000), Germany ($70,000) and Sweden ($75,000). On top of that, $100,000 went to the Graduate Institute in Geneva.60 These institutional grants multiplied and resulted in a programme that until 1935 supported basic social science research in a dozen European countries.61 It is notable that Ruml decided not to make a large appropriation in France, a lacuna that has been explained by the theoretical bent of

60 Memorandum “Social Science”, 23 November 1926, LSRM, series III.6, box 63, folder 676. While the German and the British case have been comparatively well-researched, very little has been published on the Swedish programme. See Earlene Craver, “Gösta Bagge, the Rockefeller Foundation, and empirical social science research in Sweden, 1924-1940”, in The Stockholm School of Economics Revisited, ed. Lars Jonung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
61 For an overview see Fleck, Transatlantische Bereicherungen, 124-130.
French social scientists who taught, moreover, mostly in law faculties.\textsuperscript{62} Ruml might also have been influenced by Harold Laski who had advised him in 1923 that France held “little possibility”.\textsuperscript{63} Only after the Memorial had been amalgamated with the Rockefeller Foundation in 1929 did France receive similarly generous grants as other large European countries, starting with an institutional grant for a research institute in economics headed by Charles Rist.\textsuperscript{64}

In the field of international relations, Germany represented a key country for American foundations. German scholars enjoyed a high reputation among foundation officers who had mostly received some of their graduate education in the country. Another factor was the desire on the part of the Americans to smooth over the rifts caused by the war and to re-integrate Germany into an international scientific but also political community. With the exception of Britain, which was more important in the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial’s social science programme as a whole, Germany was the European country on which the foundations spent most attention in the 1920s. Germans made up the second-largest contingent of Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial fellows, after the British.\textsuperscript{65} As will be discussed later, the Memorial had even more ambitious plans for a national centre for the study of international relations in Berlin which, however, did not come to fruition. With the rise of Nazism in the early 1930s, local conditions became less and less accommodating to a liberal venture such as that of the foundations and they directed their energies elsewhere, first to Britain and then to other European countries.

In the larger European countries, the foundations were more likely to encounter government opposition to their plans for internationalist research and education. After

\textsuperscript{62} Mazon, \textit{Origines}, 41-43.
\textsuperscript{63} Memorandum of Interview Laski, 15 September 1923, LSRM, series III.6, box 55, folder 592.
\textsuperscript{65} “Report of European Fellowship Program in the Social Sciences of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1923-1928”, RF, RG 1.2, series 100, box 50, folder 380.
all, the international institutions set up by the foundations for the study and teaching of international relations had, with the exception of the publicity-oriented *Dotation Carnegie*, their seats in small states which, in an attempt to raise their profile, often competed for the privilege of hosting international organisations, be they of an intergovernmental or nongovernmental nature. 66 Thus it is no accident that the German grant recipients in the field of international relations were private institutes, existing outside the state-run university system. Both of them, the *Institut für Auswärtige Politik* in Hamburg and the *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* in Berlin, have been credited with laying the foundations for the institutionalisation of international relations as a discipline in Germany. 67 The *Institut für Auswärtige Politik* has also been interpreted as a representative of the post-1919 foreign affairs institutes movement, alongside Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations. 68

Before analysing the foundations’ support for these two German institutions and the triangular relationship between philanthropy, grant recipients and German foreign policy that ensued, it is necessary to clarify to what extent the foundations’ programmes were part and parcel of *American* foreign policy in the interwar years. Standard accounts of the development of American cultural diplomacy claim that the non-political, voluntarist system which marked the American approach to cultural relations in the interwar years and of which the foundations were an integral part differed greatly from that embraced by European countries. The latter has been summed up as

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Kulturpolitik, culture in the service of power politics. While there certainly were differences—for a start, European states institutionalised the conduct of cultural relations several years earlier—the question remains whether they were differences in form or in substance. Hence, the relationship between the foundations and American foreign policy makers will be examined before moving on to the German case study and the trajectory of foundation policy in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

Foundations and the State Department

Throughout the 1920s and the 1930s, the philanthropic elite of the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations retained a certain closeness to officials in the State Department, and in American embassies abroad. It is well-known that leading officers of the Carnegie Endowment in particular were regularly drafted as expert members of American delegations to intergovernmental conferences. This was also the case for some Rockefeller Foundation officers. James T. Shotwell’s role as the intellectual father of the Kellog-Briand pact is also recognised. And, of course, the numerous studies on international law which were instigated and sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment served policy makers in the State Department. Rockefeller officers were also valued for their expertise and took part in informal consultations. Foundation leaders and trustees frequently belonged to a social elite which has been identified as the American foreign policy establishment. The best example here is probably elder

72 Cohen, Empire Without Tears, 60.
73 See e.g. a request from the State Department’s assistant secretary whether a “responsible head” of the Rockefeller Foundation would be available in Europe for consultation, W. R. Castle to Rockefeller Foundation, 16 January 1928, NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 811.43 Rockefeller Foundation 1/1-7.
statesman Elihu Root who certainly enjoyed privileged access to decision makers in government.74

For their part, foundation officers were keen on supporting projects that were favoured by U.S. policy makers. This led to a situation in which prospective grant applicants sought the State Department’s opinion on certain projects, realising that official approval would strengthen a proposal. Edwin Borchard, the prominent law professor who had participated in the Harvard Research, for instance, sent an outline of what later became the Yale Institute of International Studies to the State Department and requested a statement confirming that government officials would find “value in such a private agency for public service”.75 What Borchard really wanted was an official endorsement that he could then present to philanthropic backers.76 However, the State Department would merely send a personal letter of encouragement. Policy makers were not quite ready to outsource the creation and formulation of expertise and rely on private research institutes, as is clear from a State Department memorandum:

While the Department, of course, could not call upon such an organization to make researches with respect to questions pending before it, and would seldom, if ever, need to do so since it has its own corps of experts to develop such questions, it is conceivable that reports of researches already made … might be utilized to advantage. The results of such researches could not, of course, be accepted at face value, but they would probably often save a great amount of work in the Department and in that way would be helpful.77

75 Borchard to J. Reuben Clark, 11 April 1929, NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 811.43 – Research Institute of International Law/1
76 Indeed, in June 1929, Borchard approached the Commonwealth Fund, the first foundation he asked for support, see “Special Report, # 2257 Yale University – Institute of International Law”. In another appeal, Borchard said that there was official interest in his proposal: “I am convinced that the Institute will be called on frequently by the legislative, judicial and executive departments of the Government.” Memorandum, enclosed in Charles E. Clark to Barry C. Smith, 1 Nov 1929; all in CF, series 23, box 8, folder 108. The Commonwealth Fund turned the proposal down but the Rockefeller Foundation became the Institute’s major backer from 1935. For Rockefeller involvement see Ramos, “Yale Institute of International Studies”, 97, 201-209.
77 Memorandum from State Department’s Solicitor’s Office to Clark, 28 May 1929, NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 811.43 – Research Institute of International Law/2.
At least the State Department was not unsympathetic to the proposal. When Borchard approached the State Department again, asking for the assistance of the American embassies in London and Paris with a Carnegie Corporation funded investigation of state insolvency, government officials were happy to comply. James G. Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State, concluded “that inasmuch as the project was under Carnegie and Yale auspices I thought the Department might be willing to write a letter to the Ambassadors concerned”. The Carnegie stamp, as much as the affiliation with an Ivy League university, assured government officials that the project was worthwhile, when other initiatives probably would have received a less sympathetic hearing.

Evidence of the State Department’s accommodating attitudes to foundations dates back to the 1910s.

Foundation officers not only maintained close contacts with the State Department but also with American diplomatic staff abroad. These contacts could range from informal consultation to the reining in of private philanthropic diplomacy or even to official attempts to use a foundation as a vehicle of American foreign policy. The State Department archives yield evidence for all of the above. Malcolm Davis of the Carnegie Endowment regularly conferred with the American consul at Geneva, Prentiss Gilbert, supplying him with information on the League Secretariat, various nongovernmental organisations around the League and American voluntary groups in Geneva. Gilbert, whose posting to Geneva lasted from 1930 to 1937, was an acute

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78 Borchard to Secretary of State, 22 June 1931; James G. Rogers to Secretary of State, 25 June 1931; letters to Paris and London embassies, 2 July 1931, despatches 682 and 841, all NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 032 Yale University/1.
79 See e.g. letter from Rockefeller Foundation president Vincent to Lansing, thanking him for all the help of the State Department in connection with the Foundation’s work in foreign countries, 6 March 1918, NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 123 R 271/69.
observer of League business and insisted on its importance to the American national interest.  

Nicholas Murray Butler’s annual ventures to European capitals, often connected with a sumptuous banquet in his honour and a lengthy speech, were unconcealed exercises in private diplomacy. On a 1931 visit to Hungary to receive honorary degrees from the universities of Budapest and Szeged, Butler delivered two public addresses, greeted with apprehension by S. Pinkney Tuck of the American Legation in Budapest, “for both subjects he selected were capable of interpretation and development along lines which might render my official presence distinctly embarrassing”. To Tuck’s relief, the speeches did not cause too much publicity in Hungary: “The local press contented itself with brief but flattering comments on Dr. Butler’s position in public life in the United States and the real pleasure with which the Hungarian Government welcomed him to Budapest.”

Butler’s standing as a quasi-official figure certainly contained the potential for diplomatic ruptures. Yet, neither he nor any other American foundation representative was ever threatened with the Logan Act which prohibits unauthorised citizens from conducting American foreign policy. This had happened to Herbert Hoover, due to his involvement in World War I relief operations. In Butler’s case, however, the State Department tolerated a significant amount of unofficial diplomacy.

In other cases, American diplomats encouraged it. One example is the issue of Balkan federation, a major concern of the Carnegie Endowment since its investigation

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82 Despatch 118 from American Legation in Budapest, 22 June 1931, NARA, Record Group 59, Central Decimal File, 032 Butler, Nicholas Murray, 1936.
83 Joan Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), 170.
of the Balkan wars in 1913.\textsuperscript{84} The American legation in Athens supported Greek initiatives for pan-Balkan federation which gained momentum in 1929. While officials in Washington were sceptical—any movement for integration in the Balkans risked colliding with both the aims of the Little Entente and growing Italian expansionism—and opposed giving the idea any direct encouragement, they were pleased when they heard that the American legation had managed to interest a representative of the Carnegie Endowment in the matter.\textsuperscript{85} The State Department’s Chief of Near Eastern Affairs concluded: “Thus it seems that the seed has found fertile soil and is growing. … This appeals to me as being the ideal solution of the question we have had in mind, as it seems desirable from all points of view that any offer which may be forthcoming should appear as emanating directly from the Carnegie Foundation.” Any insinuation of official backing, however, was to be avoided.\textsuperscript{86} The Carnegie Endowment did indeed support the Council of the Balkan Conferences which took place between 1930 and 1934 to the tune of $10,000 per annum, despite the opposition of its European Advisory Council.\textsuperscript{87} Earle Babcock attended several Balkan Conferences as an unofficial observer, thus confirming the predictions of the American legation in Athens which, ever fond of horticultural metaphors, had forecast that “the seed … will strengthen and fructify entirely beyond the domain of the Department of State”.\textsuperscript{88}

The relationship between foundations and the State Department involved mutual trust and recognition, and a commitment to keeping the link discreet and outwardly ‘unofficial’. From the archival evidence, it cannot be surmised that the State Department

\textsuperscript{85} Robert Skinner, American Legation Athens, despatch 1093, 11 October 1929; Skinner, despatch 1391, 12 June 1930; Wallace Murray (Chief Near Eastern Affairs) to Skinner, 9 July 1930, personal and confidential; all in NARA, Record Group 59, Central Decimal File, 770.001 – Pan Balkan Union/.
\textsuperscript{86} Murray to Skinner, 2 Sep 1930, NARA, Record Group 59, Central Decimal File, 770.001 – Pan Balkan Union/12
\textsuperscript{87} Winn, “Carnegie Endowment”, 150-151.
\textsuperscript{88} Skinner to Murray, 2 October 1930, NARA, Record Group 59, Central Decimal File, 770.001 Pan Balkan Union/16.
was directing foundation policy. However, it was certainly prone to encouraging foundation activity that dovetailed with American foreign policy objectives. This approach helped especially the Rockefeller Foundation cultivate an image of impartiality and independence in its dealings abroad. Some scholars have tried to capture the nature of this relationship in Gramscian terms, assigning a “state spirit” to the foundations, meaning that they acted in the interest of the state, even if they were not of it. According to Inderjeet Parmar, such action included preparing American public opinion for an active, interventionist foreign policy which would enhance U.S. power in the world.\textsuperscript{89}

But this state-focused interpretation neglects that pushing the American state towards a globalist foreign policy was not on the top of the foundations’ agenda in the interwar years. Rather, philanthropic programmes helped construct a narrative which emphasised Americans’ positive role in international nongovernmental cooperation and portrayed the American nation as a disinterested, modern and rational force in the world. In some ways, this resembled U.S. banker’s diplomacy of the 1920s.\textsuperscript{90}

Foundations helped promote a distinctively American style of conducting foreign relations which held that American cultural policies were qualitatively different from European cultural policies. This was effective because it was persuasive. André Tibal, who ran the Carnegie Chair in Paris, was critical of official European cultural diplomacy as he was “convinced that any Minister of Foreign Affairs to whom you speak of the teaching of international relations will immediately and necessarily begin thinking how he can make that teaching a vehicle for his propaganda”. In contrast, the Dotation Carnegie was, Tibal proclaimed, completely “free and disinterested” as it was


not state-sponsored.\textsuperscript{91} This emphasis on the distinction between state and private, however, benefitted both the foundations and the American state.

Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, there were two axioms of foundation behaviour towards the Department of State. First, the foundations did not publicly criticise American foreign policy, even if their behaviour at times contradicted it. An example of the latter is the foundations’ involvement in the League of Nations which flourished at a time when the State Department would not even acknowledge communications from Geneva. Second, American philanthropic foundations desired to appear more independent of official foreign policy than they really were. However, not all of their foreign collaborators quite believed this elaborate ruse. Thus Nicholas Murray Butler was treated like an American cultural attaché would have been and the Rockefeller Foundation’s grants were regarded as a way of “bringing the Americans in”. As for the State Department, its attitude towards the foundations was marked by general, if at times detached, benevolence: foundations were useful for those things that official diplomacy could not do itself. These attitudes underwent a change in the second half of the 1930s, along with the rest of American cultural diplomacy. For now, however, it can be concluded that the foundations were partners of the State Department but the initiative for their projects remained in New York and not in Washington.

\textit{Cultural Diplomacy and International Relations Research in Germany}\textsuperscript{92}

Contrary to the United States, in Germany the conduct of cultural relations was institutionalised shortly after the First World War. This allowed the systematic formulation of cultural policies and their implementation. The roots of German cultural

\textsuperscript{91} Quoted in International Studies Conference, \textit{University Teaching of International Relations}, 157, 159.

\textsuperscript{92} An earlier version of the following three sections has been published as Katharina Rietzler, “Philanthropy, Peace Research and Revisionist Politics: Rockefeller and Carnegie Support for the Study of International Relations in Weimar Germany”, \textit{Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, Washington D.C.} Supplement 5 (2009).
diplomacy lay with the cultured bourgeoisie (Bildungsbürger) which had started to
discuss possible cultural alternatives to military might from the 1900s. France, a country
which successfully projected its national culture abroad, was regarded as an example to
be emulated. Bureaucrats and politicians took up this debate in the newly formed
Weimar Republic and argued that Germany should try to expand its scientific and
cultural influence to compensate for its lost great power status. In 1920, the Ministry
of External Affairs created its department of cultural relations, the Kulturabteilung. It
was responsible for German educational institutions in foreign countries, international
scholarly exchange and the promotion of German culture and language abroad. During
the 1920s, German cultural policies broadly pursued two aims: first, influencing
domestic and international debates on the origins of the Great War, and second, ending
the international scientific isolation of German scholars.

The debates on the origins of the war had, of course, direct political relevance.
Article 231 of the Versailles treaty, the so-called ‘war-guilt’ clause, was pivotal to
German attempts at treaty revision. Interpreted as assigning moral responsibility for
the war exclusively to Germany, the clause was a favourite target for the public and the
Ministry of External Affairs alike. Officials fuelled campaigns against Article 231 and
hoped to take the battle against the ‘war-guilt-lie’, the Kriegsschuldlüge, abroad,
convinced that influencing public opinion in the former Allied countries would improve
the prospects for revision. The Ministry created and funded organisations dedicated to
supplying ever more ‘scientific’ arguments against German responsibility for the war. It

93 Eckard Michels, Von der Deutschen Akademie zum Goethe-Institut: Sprach- und auswärtige
94 Hammerstein, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 35.
95 Düwell, Deutschlands Auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 70-88, 103.
University Press, 2005), 59.
97 Michael Dreyer and Oliver Lembeke, Die deutsche Diskussion um die Kriegsschuldfrage (Berlin:
Dunker & Humblot, 1993), 226-228; Erich J. C. Jahn, “The German Foreign Ministry and the Question of
War Guilt in 1918-1919”, in German Nationalism and the European Response, 1890-1945, ed. Carole
also attempted to suppress publications by German scholars and archives that ran contrary to the official line.\textsuperscript{98}

The \textit{Kriegsschuldliüge} campaign reaped its greatest success abroad with a multi-volume collection of German diplomatic sources relating to the period from 1871 to 1914, entitled \textit{Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette}.\textsuperscript{99} The Ministry of External Affairs had commissioned it as an authoritative collection of documents that presented German pre-war diplomacy in the best possible light, and successfully put pressure on the Allied governments to open their archives in turn. The editorial board consisted of several well-respected German historians and was headed by Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy who soon after became a key collaborator of the foundations. However, the \textit{Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette} underwent an extensive vetting process by German diplomats before publication and the Ministry of External Affairs repeatedly intervened in the publication process. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy complained about this practice but other members of the editorial board justified this deviation from scholarly standards with political necessity.\textsuperscript{100}

The second salient issue that concerned practitioners of German cultural diplomacy in the early 1920s was the international isolation of German scholars, caused by the ‘boycott’ imposed by the International Research Council between 1919 and 1926 and the resulting counter-boycotts. Public opinion in the Allied countries veered towards the idea that the German academic elites had only themselves to blame as they had fully supported the German war effort and alienated colleagues abroad at the outbreak of war with aggressive statements such as the “Manifesto of the Ninety-three

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\textsuperscript{100} Heinemann, \textit{Öffentlichkeit und Kriegsschuldfrage}, 80-82, 87.
\end{flushright}
As Ford and Coss had observed when they visited Germany, the boycott was exacerbated by the general funding crisis affecting the German university system after the war. Academic libraries were especially hard hit. The Bavarian State Library in Munich, for example, even had to cancel a subscription to the London Times which had been uninterrupted since 1852.

The boycott was never complete, though, and the Rockefeller Foundation was one of the key organisations subverting it. The German cultural relations elite explicitly acknowledged this. The Kulturabteilung desired to see the boycott’s final demise, especially as German diplomacy took a more conciliatory turn once membership in the League of Nations became an option. Since good relations with foreign cultural elites became ever more important in the era of Locarno, the Ministry of External Affairs encouraged German scholars to resume membership in international scientific associations. Foundation officers had their own reasons for opposing the boycott. On the one hand, they highly regarded the quality of Germany’s scientific output and felt obliged to give “a stimulus to productive scholarship which may offer a contribution to us all”. On the other hand, they feared that an isolated Germany might develop, as James T. Shotwell put it, “a rival line of European history based upon German theories, especially those dealing with the origin of the war”. Foundation officers did not doubt that Germany was ultimately to blame for the outbreak of the First World War.

102 Memorandum Bavarian State Library Munich, 22 March 1924, LSRM, series III.6, box 61, folder 657.
104 “Protokoll der Sitzung, betreffend Interpellation Nr. 375 Dr. Schreiber und Genossen im Reichsministerium des Innern am 17. Februar 1925”, PA AA, R 65521, Bd. 3, III 754 II Ang.
105 Shotwell to Fosdick, 17 January 1924, LSRM, series III.6, box 52, folder 558.
106 Ibid.
107 Shotwell, in particular, was firmly in the camp of the American anti-revisionist historians, who opposed the notion that responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War did not lie mainly with Germany. Novick, That Noble Dream, 223.
Nevertheless, they thought that isolation would only harden revisionist positions, and so the foundations embarked on a policy of engagement.

Writing the German Carnegie History

This policy meant that the former Central powers were invited to participate in one of the biggest philanthropic projects of the 1920s. Shotwell, who had originally planned to organise the monumental Carnegie History along thematic lines, treating subjects such as finance or railway transportation in single, border-transcending volumes, resolved in 1920 to establish several national series of volumes which would be directed by national editorial boards. Thus, the organisation of the Carnegie History became a metaphor for philanthropic internationalism itself: national viewpoints were encouraged but with the aim of uniting them all in the same project.

Shotwell organised the German series relatively late in the process and started to assemble an editorial board in 1921. He secured the collaboration of Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and Carl Melchior, a Hamburg banker. Both men had been expert counsels to the German delegation at Versailles, sharing the peacemaking experience of so many of Shotwell’s collaborators, albeit on the other side of enemy lines. In 1923, as a reaction to debates on the origins of the war, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and Melchior co-founded the Institut für Auswärtige Politik which became an institutional base for the Carnegie History. The Institute’s journal Europäische Gespräche was the first foreign policy periodical in the Weimar Republic and had a substantial subscription base abroad.

The Institute’s methodological approach to international relations was the same as that

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108 The budget of the Carnegie History exceeded $600,000, most of which was provided by the Carnegie Corporation. “Report of Special Committee to consider and report upon the General Plan of Publication of the Economic and Social History of the World War—Approved and Adopted by the Executive Committee January 4, 1924”, CEIP, Vol. 28.
110 Erich Nickel, Politik und Politikwissenschaft in der Weimarer Republik (Berlin: Rotschild, 2004), 25.
of Chatham House and the Council of Foreign Relations. It relied heavily on
documentation, the assembling of facts which was seen as a scientific way of dealing
with questions of international politics.\(^\text{111}\)

Mendelssohn-Bartholdy himself was a liberal democrat with pacifist leanings.
He did support the revision of the Versailles Treaty but in a multilateral framework.\(^\text{112}\)
Part and parcel of this strategy was cooperation with Britain and the United States, the
two Allies most favourable to treaty revision. Thus, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy’s
collaboration with American foundations did not contradict his role within German
cultural diplomacy in the slightest. To Shotwell, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy described
\textit{Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette}, the publication he was editing at the behest
of the Ministry of External Affairs, as a “parallel undertaking” of the Carnegie History,
probably implying that the History would be similarly authoritative and
comprehensive.\(^\text{113}\) In reality, the German volumes of the \textit{Economic and Social History
of the World War} were also subjected to similar levels of government intervention.

Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and co-editor Melchior intended to base the volumes
they were responsible for on official documents. However, the editors soon encountered
difficulties when one of their authors was refused access to files held by the German
Ministry of the Interior. Melchior and Mendelssohn-Bartholdy appealed to several
ministries in an attempt to generate official support for the Carnegie project, describing
its purpose as to “give an objective account of the effects of the war and to contribute to
a balancing of the different evaluations of the World War that are still prevalent in the
world”. For Germany this would be the first opportunity “to participate in a discussion
on an entirely equal footing with other countries” as the “the German volumes [were] on
a par with those offered by England and France and describe[d] the economic and

\(^\text{111}\) Haase, \textit{Pragmatic Peacemakers}, 33.
\(^\text{113}\) Shotwell, \textit{Autobiography}, 150.
political aspects of the conduct of the war in an objective and convincing fashion, especially to the audience in the United States”. As Melchior explained in a letter to the influential State Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, Ago von Maltzan, the German volumes of the Carnegie History could “supplement and, where necessary, correct Belgian, French and Polish accounts”. Melchior also warned that the government’s refusal to cooperate with regards to the publication would be interpreted as “a guilty plea confirming the existence of highly compromising material”, especially in the United States.

In the Defence and Finance Ministries, these arguments fell on deaf ears. The Carnegie History was vilified as a “cloak” used by “foreign enemies” for the purpose of “vicious propaganda”. However, the arguments of the Carnegie editorial board had convinced officials in the Ministry of External Affairs who concluded that the German contribution to the Carnegie History was “politically important” and that the editorial committee should therefore be granted access to government files. Since the American public was the main target of propaganda orchestrated by German diplomats, and since the volumes would be published in an international series, the Carnegie


115 “Einen besonders wichtigen Platz nimmt dabei die Darstellung der Verwaltung der besetzten Gebiete in so fern ein, als hier die deutsche Darstellung ergänzend und, wo es nötig ist, berichtigend neben die belgische, französische und polnische treten kann. … Wenn in der deutschen Schriftenreihe gerade die Darstellung der Verwaltung der besetzten Gebiete ausfiele, so würde das bei den (sic) politisch interessierten und sachkundigen Leserkreis des Gesamtwerks gerade in den Vereinigten Staaten als ein Eingeständnis für das Vorhandensein schwerst kompromittierenden Materials gedeutet werden …” Melchior to von Maltzan, 2 May 1923, PA AA, R 65152, VI D 2021.


117 Göppert to Ministry of the Interior, 8 May 1923, PA AA, R 65152, VI D 2026.
project neatly slotted into the general pattern of officially sponsored ‘pre-emptive historiography’. Nonetheless, government cooperation came at a price. Manuscripts prepared for the Carnegie History had to be submitted to the relevant authorities for review, while some topics were out of bounds. To ensure compliance with these conditions a governmental committee regularly met with the editorial board. By seeking government cooperation, Melchior and Mendelssohn-Bartholdy exposed the Carnegie History to the influence and censorship of state authorities. Some volumes were not published due to government interference, to the disappointment of Shotwell who thought that “the politicians were merely hurting Germany’s case by refusing to open up the economic and social costs of war”. There were also cases of self-censorship, as Alfred Vagts, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy’s assistant at the Institut für Auswärtige Politik, recounted.

But then, it had never been Shotwell’s ambition to publish a history that would not pass official scrutiny. His surprise at a certain level of censorship and his outrage directed at “the politicians” seem slightly disingenuous. Any state has an interest in keeping secrets, and as the files of the Ministry of External Affairs make clear, career civil servants (not politicians) cautioned against releasing into the public domain war-related information that might be used to Germany’s disadvantage. One concrete case involved a request for information on the requisitioning of goods by the occupying German army in war-time Poland, an issue that came before a mixed arbitral tribunal after the war, with Poland seeking substantial compensation. In the post-1919 international order in which conflicts were increasingly decided by way of international

118 Heinemann, Öffentlichkeit und Kriegsschuldfrage, 91.
119 Göppert to Melchior, 8 May 1923, PA AA, R 65152; Ministry of Interior to Ministry of External Affairs, 15 May 1923, PA AA, R 65152, VI D 2028.
120 Memorandum, 2 June 1923, PA AA, R 65152, VI D 2136.
121 Shotwell, Autobiography, 151.
litigation, relevant information that might sway a legal case became precious. Thus, the
Ministry of External Affairs had good reason to suppress a planned Carnegie History
volume on war-time economic practices in territories which had been occupied by the
German army, even if this had a negative impact on relations with an influential
American foundation. Indeed, the fact that the German government had prevented the
publication of some volumes was reported in foreign newspaper reviews of the
Carnegie History. In more subtle ways, though, the German series of the Carnegie
History also undermined *Kulturabteilung* propaganda, simply by offering a perspective
on the war that did not revolve around the *Kriegsschuldüge*. The Carnegie volumes on
the impact of the Great War on crime or on public health did break new ground and
broke the mould of the officially perpetuated discourse on the war’s origins.

*Foundation Funding for National Institutes of Foreign Affairs in Germany*

After 1923 Mendelssohn-Bartholdy seems to have avoided much contact with the
Ministry of External Affairs which failed to recruit him for “further influencing” the
Carnegie Endowment. However, he secured the support of another American
foundation for his work and his institute. From 1926 to 1930, the *Institut für Auswärtige
Politik* received funding from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, totalling
$20,000. In addition, staff at the Institute held Memorial fellowships. Alfred Vagts,
who later became a well-known international historian, went to the United States for

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123 Schönberg to Ministry of Interior, 29 March 1923, PA AA, R 65152, VI D 1230.
124 See, e.g., “152 Volumes of War History: Massive Task now finished”, *Sunday Mercury*, Birmingham,
England, 4 April 1937, and other reviews filed in James T. Shotwell Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript
Library, Columbia University, New York (hereafter Shotwell Papers), box 280, folder “Economic and
Social History of WW I: Press Comments on Completion of”.
125 Gerhard Hirschfeld, “Der Erste Weltkrieg in der deutschen und internationalen Geschichtsschreibung”,
Beilage/001.html, last accessed 30 June 2009; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Summary
126 Memorandum, 11 January 1926, PA AA, R 65804, microfiche reel 7859, VI B 2747.
127 Memorandum “Social Science”, 23 November 1926, LSRM, series III.6, box 63, folder 676.
one year in 1927.\textsuperscript{128} The Memorial grants were generally used for special research projects, for example on the League of Nations mandate system, the concept of the state, or the practice of diplomacy before 1914. Some money was used for work on *Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette* and towards publication costs. The Memorial grant also facilitated international contacts as it enabled the librarian of the *Institut für Auswärtige Politik* to study the methods of the Royal Institute for International Affairs, whose librarian in turn paid a reciprocal visit to Hamburg.\textsuperscript{129} Given the importance of the documentary approach, this type of exchange was highly relevant to spreading methodologies in the field of international relations.

Beardsley Ruml seems to have been satisfied with the work of the *Institut für Auswärtige Politik* as he intended to expand it with Rockefeller support. Just before the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial was merged with the Rockefeller Foundation, Ruml proposed it as a “splendid opportunity” for further involvement, and suggested building an institute “to house all of the social sciences”.\textsuperscript{130} However, this plan faltered because of a lack of support from the relevant authorities in Hamburg who would have had to co-finance such an institution. Nevertheless, if it had been possible to move the Institute away from the relatively provincial Hamburg, and possibly to Berlin, Rockefeller support may have continued.\textsuperscript{131} The grants ended in 1930 but Mendelssohn-Bartholdy remained a member of the philanthropic network and participated in Rockefeller-sponsored research projects. The Rockefeller Foundation also assisted him when he had to emigrate to Britain in 1934 as a refugee from Nazism.\textsuperscript{132} Carnegie and Rockefeller support for the *Institut für Auswärtige Politik* remained narrow as, given its

\textsuperscript{128} Gantzel-Kress, “Geschichte des Instituts für Auswärtige Politik”, 61-62.
\textsuperscript{129} LSRM, series III.6, box 52, folder 561, passim.
\textsuperscript{130} “Memorandum of conversation of SMG with B. Ruml”, 15 August 1928, LSRM, series III.6, box 63, folder 676. Selskar M. Gunn (SMG) was the Rockefeller Foundation’s vice-president in Europe.
\textsuperscript{131} Mendelssohn-Bartholdy to Ruml, 17 October 1928, LSRM, series III.6, box 52, folder 561; Diary excerpt John Van Sickle, 4 July 1930, RF, RG 1.1, series 717, box 20, folder 184.
\textsuperscript{132} “Resolution Special Research Aid Fund Social Sciences for Dr. Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, No. 16-1934”, RF, RG 1.1, series 401, box 65, folder 863.
small size and location, the Institute could only have a limited impact on the political and academic culture of the Weimar Republic. Another institution became more prominent in the policies of both foundations, the *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*.\textsuperscript{133}

Founded in 1920, the *Hochschule* loosely collaborated with the *Institut für Auswärtige Politik* in Berlin. Nonetheless, their objectives were quite different. While the Hamburg institute had been designed as a research institute from the start, the founders of the *Hochschule* stressed the educational role of their school. Thus, the *Hochschule* cannot be classified as a foreign affairs institute but should be seen in the tradition of elite education pioneered in the 1870s by the French *École libre des sciences politiques* which aimed to provide specialist knowledge for administrative and political elites. The Berlin school tried to do the same for the Weimar Republic but also offered general courses for a lay audience under the label ‘citizen’s education’. From the mid-1920s the number of courses at university level was increased. The school established permanent professorships and professional academics replaced politicians and civil servants as teachers. In 1930, parts of the curriculum were accredited as university courses. Yet although the *Hochschule* was able to enhance its academic reputation over time, the overall emphasis remained on teaching.\textsuperscript{134}

The founders of the academy emerged from the ‘national-liberal’ milieu around Friedrich Naumann. They supported the constitutional consensus of the Weimar

\textsuperscript{133} On this institution see Steven D. Korenblat, “The Deutsche Hochschule für Politik: Public Affairs Institute for a New Germany, 1920-1933” (PhD, University of Chicago, 1978); Antonio Missiroli, *Die Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* (Sankt Augustin: Comdok Verlagsabteilung, 1988); Rainer Eisfeld, *Ausgebürgert und doch angebräunt: Deutsche Politikwissenschaft, 1920-1945* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991); Alfons Söllner, *Deutsche Politikwissenschaftler in der Emigration: Studien zur Akkulturation und Wirkungsgeschichte* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996), esp. chapter 1; Nickel, *Politik und Politikwissenschaft*; Steven D. Korenblat, “A School for the Republic? Cosmopolitans and Their Enemies at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, 1920-1933”, *Central European History* 39 (2006). Missiroli and Nickel stress the liberal character of the *Deutsche Hochschule* and regard it as instrumental in establishing political science in Germany. Korenblat, Söllner and especially Eisfeld have been more critical. Eisfeld argues that the *Hochschule*’s founders had a ‘functionalist’ approach to democracy and provided a forum for conservative and anti-democratic forces. Söllner examines to what extent the *Hochschule* contributed to the development of a research paradigm for the new field of political science. Korenblat still offers the most thorough investigation and balanced analysis.

\textsuperscript{134} Missiroli, *Deutsche Hochschule*, 22-42; Korenblat, “Public Affairs Institute for a New Germany”, 142.
Republic, even if most of them were *Vernunftrepublikaner*, ‘republicans by reason’, who lacked a firm commitment to parliamentary democracy as such.\(^{135}\) They aimed to create an institution that was above party lines. By fostering a political elite the *Hochschule* hoped to contribute to a national renewal after the lost war.\(^{136}\) Some members of the founding generation were politically on the right, for example the conservative historian Otto Hoetzsch. Young scholars like Herrmann Heller, Hajo Holborn and Sigmund Neumann represented the liberal left. From 1927, there was an influx of anti-democratic scholars from the radical right, a development that threatened the *Hochschule’s* original maxim to remain open to all parties, except those on the extremes.\(^{137}\)

The *Hochschule* had excellent links with the political and administrative elites of the Republic. Ernst Jäckh, its well-connected director and president since 1930, was a compulsive networker. He had made a name for himself as a publicist and expert on Turkey before the war, and had acted as an advisor to the Ministry of External Affairs. During the Weimar era, Jäckh maintained an informal relationship with the ministerial bureaucracy and also held prominent positions in countless professional and political associations, notably the German League of Nations Union (*Deutsche Liga für Völkerbund*). Tirelessly seeking official backing for his *Hochschule*, he managed to recruit a number of illustrious people for its Board of Trustees, for example Chief Justice Walter Simons, the industrialist Robert Bosch and the banker Hjalmar Schacht.\(^{138}\)

Jäckh was crucial for establishing the *Hochschule’s* international contacts, especially with regards to bringing in the support of American foundations. In the winter of 1924/1925 he travelled to New York where he met Nicholas Murray Butler,

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\(^{135}\) Ringer, *Decline of the German Mandarins*, 203.

\(^{136}\) Söllner, *Deutsche Politikwissenschaftler*, 35-36.

\(^{137}\) Korenblat, “Public Affairs Institute for a New Germany”, 148-149.

the president of the Carnegie Endowment.\footnote{German Consulate New York to Ministry of External Affairs, 9 January 1925, PA AA, R 64151, III Ve 1482; Report Maltzan to Ministry of External Affairs, 1 May 1926, PA AA, R 65804, microfiche reel 7859, VI B 9018.} Jäckh’s visit occurred at a time when Butler himself was seeking to establish official relations between the Carnegie Endowment and the German government. A letter from Butler to Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann in April 1925 was followed by several conversations between Butler and Ago von Maltzan, who had left Berlin in 1925 to take up the post of German ambassador in Washington.\footnote{Report Maltzan, 18 November 1925, PA AA, R 65804, microfiche reel 7859, VI B 2747.} Maltzan saw clear advantages in a stronger relationship between the Endowment and German government circles:

Because of its large assets—since 1913 the Endowment has spent on average more than half a million dollars, in some years significantly more—the Carnegie Endowment has remarkable opportunities to influence public opinion in all countries, especially in intellectual circles. We must not miss this opportunity to achieve a more favourable attitude towards Germany.\footnote{“Die Carnegie-Stiftung verfügt infolge ihrer reichen Mittel – sie hat seit 1913 jährlich durchschnittlich über eine halbe Million Dollar, in manchen Jahren sogar erheblich mehr, ausgegeben – doch über sehr beachtenswerte Möglichkeiten, die öffentliche Meinung, insbesondere in intellektuellen Kreisen, in allen Ländern zu beeinflussen. Die Gelegenheit, auf eine für Deutschland günstigere Einstellung hierbei hinzuarbeiten, dürfen wir uns nicht entgehen lassen.” Memorandum Maltzan to Ministry of External Affairs, 11 September 1925, PA AA, R 53701, VJ 3298.}

Of course, the Endowment, mainly through the \textit{Dotation}, had already established links with German pacifists in 1921. These, however, were often highly critical of government policies, especially with regard to Germany’s attempts to circumvent rearmament restrictions. It is no accident that, shortly after Butler conferred with Maltzan, the Endowment attempted to sever its relations with the pacifists.\footnote{Winn, “Nicholas Murray Butler”: 569-571. It is interesting to note, however, that the most vocal pacifist critic of German clandestine rearmament among the Endowment’s collaborators, Friedrich Wilhelm Förster, also contacted the British ambassador in Paris. The British Foreign Office, however, did not take Förster’s allegations seriously. See National Archives/Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter PRO), FO 371/12125.}

Jäckh succeeded in using his official contacts to ensure that prospective benefactors of the \textit{Hochschule} were welcomed in Berlin. When Butler visited in June 1926 he was treated to a high-profile dinner. The numerous guests included several business leaders, politicians, professors, the U.S. ambassador and Stresemann.
himself. Jäckh asked Maltzan to ensure that other Endowment representatives were also received well. The efforts paid off and in March 1927 the Carnegie Endowment created a “Carnegie Chair for International Relations and History” at the Hochschule. As in Paris, the Carnegie Chair offered a series of public lectures, most of which were on current affairs. In Berlin, however, there was no permanent incumbent at first. The lectures were given by an international roster of academics, members of international organisations or former government officials. Scholars who lectured on the Carnegie Chair included the German philologist Ernst Robert Curtius, the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, and the well-known French commentator on North America, André Siegfried. Albert Thomas, the head of the International Labour Organisation, spoke on Franco-German relations in 1928. William Rappard gave a lecture on the League’s mandates system, and Alfred Zimmern, who had recently been appointed as the Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford, spoke in his capacity as an international relations specialist. The character of the Chair changed slightly in 1931 when a permanent professorship was established by the Endowment in response to concerns at the Hochschule that the existing format was not academic enough. Hajo Holborn, a diplomatic historian, was the first (and only) incumbent.

Even after Holborn’s appointment the guest lectures continued. The Endowment favoured this format as it brought foreign scholars to Berlin and generated a significant amount of news coverage. From the beginning, Butler had impressed on Jäckh the importance of international cooperation, suggesting that he “establish friendly relations and cooperation both with the British Institute for International Affairs … and with the

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143 CEIP CE, box 182, folder 6, passim.
144 Maltzan to Ministry of External Affairs, 5 January 1927, PA AA, R 64152, VI W 890.
145 CEIP CE, box 182, folder 6, box 183, folders 1-5, passim.
147 Hans Simons to Butler, 6 June 1928, CEIP CE, box 183, folder 1. The Carnegie lectures were reported in national and regional newspapers, see newspaper clippings in CEIP CE, box 182, folder 6 and box 183, folder 1.
Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Paris”.¹⁴⁸ Using the contacts of the Endowment, the Hochschule succeeded in becoming part of a network of institutes, the Conference of Institutes for the Scientific Study of International Relations.¹⁴⁹ This association also included the Institut für Auswärtige Politik, the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London and the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales in Geneva. Its first meeting was held in Berlin, with the participation of Earle Babcock for the Dotation Carnegie. Jäckh dutifully reported this achievement to the Kulturabteilung in the German Ministry of External Affairs.¹⁵⁰

The collaboration between Endowment and Hochschule was cemented by cordial relations between Butler and Jäckh. After a trip to Berlin in 1930, Butler declared that this visit had been “the high-water mark of my European experiences during more than forty years”.¹⁵¹ Butler may have enjoyed this particular sojourn so much because Jäckh had involved him in a new project for international conciliation, a foundation commemorating the recently deceased Gustav Stresemann. Mission and organisational structure of the planned Stresemann-Memorial-Foundation bore a striking resemblance to those of the Carnegie Endowment. The new foundation’s aim was to “examine the real conditions and requirements for peaceful relations between states and nations in all areas and to disseminate the results of these inquiries”.¹⁵² An associated “Peace Academy” would conduct scientific research on peace, disseminate knowledge, encourage international understanding, offer a space for international collaboration and educate public opinion.¹⁵³

What Butler did not know was that the Academy’s original name had been “War Academy” and not “Peace Academy”, and that Jäckh had hatched the plan with Julius

¹⁴⁸ Butler to Jäckh, 23 July 1926, CEIP CE, box 182, folder 6.
¹⁴⁹ See next chapter.
¹⁵⁰ Jäckh to Freytag, 23 November 1927 and 6 January 1928, PA AA, R 64152, VI W 8556, VI W 218.
¹⁵¹ Butler to Jäckh, 5 May 1930, CEIP CE, box 183, folder 3.
Curtius, the acting Minister of External Affairs. The late 1920s saw a number of projects that attempted to institutionalise peace research and Jäckh’s proposal was an attempt to take part in an international competition for funds and influence. The Ministry of External Affairs listed several such “competing plans from abroad”: a chair for peace science at the University of Lyon, an “École de la Paix” planned by Louise Weiss, publisher of the influential French journal *L’Europe Nouvelle*, and a “Plan Shotwell” for an “Institute of Europe” in Geneva. Indeed, as the new head of the American Social Science Research Council’s Advisory Committee on International Relations, Shotwell had launched a plethora of ideas for new foreign affairs institutes and mechanisms that would coordinate their activities on an international level, accompanied by a frenzy of activity in 1930 and 1931. But Jäckh, possibly acting with official encouragement, had persuaded Shotwell to give up his Geneva plans in favour of the new Peace Academy. Butler conducted the fundraising effort for the Stresemann Memorial in the United States, putting together an American support committee. The Carnegie Endowment itself pledged 100,000 marks.

Designated president of the Stresemann Memorial was Julius Curtius, the Minister of External Affairs. He announced the creation of the Memorial and the Peace Academy on American radio on 21 June 1930. Only four days after his radio appearance, Curtius demanded “full political freedom and equality of rights” for

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154 “Die Bezeichnung „Friedens-Akademie“ (im Gegensatz zur früheren „Kriegs-Akademie“) habe ich Ihnen schon mündlich begründen können.” – “I have already explained to you the reasons behind the name “Peace Academy” (in contrast to the previous “War-Academy”).” Jäckh to Curtius, 22 Dec 1929, PA AA, R 64171, VIW 11685.
158 Excerpt of Minutes of Executive Committee, 7 May 1931, CEIP, box 324, folder 4.
Germany in the Reichstag, marking a move towards a more assertive foreign policy.\(^{160}\)

Those who watched German politics closely had strong misgivings about Curtius’s role as a patron of peace research. The former Agent General for Reparation Payments S.

Parker Gilbert refused to join the American support committee for the following reasons:

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\text{I had the greatest admiration for Dr. Stresemann and his work and would be happy to share in a movement to honour his memory. But I have some fear that the German mind would regard an Academy of this kind as an instrument of German foreign policy rather than as a memorial to Dr. Stresemann, and there are many indications nowadays that German foreign policy is no longer the foreign policy of Dr. Stresemann.}\(^{161}\)
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Butler encountered further setbacks during his fundraising campaign for the Stresemann Memorial. Potential donors were struggling with the impact of the Depression and proved unwilling to give. More than a year after Curtius’s announcement, the Stresemann Memorial still only existed on paper.\(^{162}\)

Jäckh’s ambitious plans and hopes for the Stresemann Memorial in Berlin were left unfulfilled, despite Butler’s best efforts in New York. Nevertheless, the project was of interest to Rockefeller representatives in Paris and New York. The plan created sufficient momentum to bring the Hochschule back into the Rockefeller Foundation’s network of grant recipients. The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial had already supported the Hochschule with emergency grants in 1926 and 1928.\(^{163}\)

However, on the grounds of the Rockefeller Foundation’s German fellowship adviser’s reports, subsequent applications had been rejected. The fellowship adviser had described the Hochschule as an innovative, promising institution but also, correctly, identified its

\(^{160}\) Quoted in Steiner, *Lights that Failed*, 488.

\(^{161}\) S. Parker Gilbert to Butler, 19 January 1931, CEIP, box 324, folder 4.

\(^{162}\) Gunn to Day, 8 November 1931, RF, RG 1.1, series 717, box 20, folder 188.

\(^{163}\) Ruml to Walter Simons, 18 March 1926; Ruml to Jäckh, 6 April 1928, LSRM, series III.6, box 51, folder 537.
main activity as teaching.\textsuperscript{164} The Rockefeller Foundation, however, was only willing to support research activity.\textsuperscript{165}

The first two years after taking over from the Memorial in 1929 served as a time of reorientation for the Rockefeller Foundation’s Social Science Division. Thus it did not commit any institutional funds to Germany but considered a number of projects. Under Beardsley Ruml, the Memorial had followed an interdisciplinary, relatively eclectic social science programme which was oriented towards basic research and only implicitly cited international relations as a special interest. The newly created Division of Social Sciences, however, singled out three areas of concentration, namely international relations, economic stabilisation and public administration.\textsuperscript{166} To some extent, this focus reflected the impact of the world economic crisis which had decreased the income of foundations and highlighted the practical importance of certain fields of research.\textsuperscript{167} Rockefeller officers now also explicitly announced their intention to create “strong national centers” for the study of international relations, parallel to their involvement in Geneva.\textsuperscript{168}

One idea floated among Rockefeller officers harked back to Ruml’s original plan for a social science research institute in Germany, and entailed expanding the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (\textit{Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht}) in Berlin into a research centre for international law and international relations. The Rockefeller trustees earmarked $750,000 for this venture, significantly more than the Memorial had ever given to any other institution in Europe, with the exception of the London School of

\textsuperscript{164} Fehling to Ruml, 31 January 1926; Fehling to Day, 3 May 1928, LSRM, series III.6, box 51, folder 537.
\textsuperscript{165} Appleget to Hans Simons, 12 August 1930, RF, RG 1.1, series 717, box 19, folder 177.
\textsuperscript{166} Fosdick, \textit{The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation}, 203.
\textsuperscript{168} Diary excerpt John Van Sickle, 15 April 1930, RF, RG 1.1, series 717, box 20, folder 184. See Appendix for a list of these centres, most of which became member institutions in the International Studies Conference.
However, the project never got past the stage of informal discussions and the announcement of the Stresemann Academy as a rival project caused the Rockefeller Foundation to shelve the plan.

Once it became clear, though, that the Stresemann Memorial had not made any progress, Rockefeller Foundation officers became more receptive to new proposals in the area of international relations. Again, personal relationships between foundation representatives and long-term collaborators were crucial. Schmidt-Ott, head of the Notgemeinschaft and also member of the Stresemann Memorial’s governing board, approached Ruml with the idea of requesting Rockefeller funds for the stalled Peace Academy. Schmidt-Ott, Ruml and Jäckh agreed on the wording of a grant application made to the Rockefeller Foundation. As a result, a grant of $25,000 was awarded to a ‘Notgemeinschaft-Committee for Research in International Relations’ in December 1931. The Hochschule itself received an even larger grant. In April 1932, the Rockefeller Foundation awarded $90,000 over three years for its research programme.

What had caused this change of heart? First, once Jäckh realised that the Foundation would only support research-oriented institutions, he and the new director of the Hochschule, Arnold Wolfers, tailored grant applications accordingly. From the late 1920s, research activities at the Hochschule had indeed increased, and the

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169 Diary excerpt John Van Sickle, 27 January 1930, RF, RG 1.1, series 717, box 20, folder 184; “Excerpt from Minutes – Notgemeinschaft Committee for Research in International Relations”, 16 December 1931, RF, RG 1.1, series 717, box 20, folder 188.
172 “Deutsche Hochschule für Politik”, 13 April 1932, RF, RG 1.1, series 717, box 19, folder 177.
requirements of the Rockefeller Foundation may have accelerated this process. Second, to present their case more convincingly, Jäckh and Wolfers increasingly arranged personal meetings with Rockefeller officers in Paris, often organised through the *Dotation Carnegie*. Thereby they were able to bypass local advisers of the Rockefeller Foundation whose opinions were still taken seriously, even though the Rockefeller Paris office had assumed full responsibility for the awarding of fellowships and smaller grants in 1929. Rockefeller policy changed, too. Worried by the tense political situation in Germany, foundation officers put more and more emphasis on what they perceived to be a “liberal spirit” at the *Hochschule*. Selskar M. Gunn, the Rockefeller Foundation’s vice-president in Europe, was under no illusion that the quality and quantity of research projects conducted at the *Hochschule* were limited. Regardless of these concerns, he viewed the institution as “an extremely significant and important center in a country whose importance it is unnecessary to discuss”. Favourable comments by British scholars who had described the *Hochschule* as “a real ray of light in Germany, as far as an objective attitude in connection with international affairs is concerned” also influenced Gunn’s judgment. He concluded that the *Hochschule* should be supported, even if only to strengthen a liberal institution in an academic landscape that was increasingly affected by assaults from the extreme right: “The very existence of an institution in Germany which has the objective attitude and scientific spirit in problems in the social sciences is an encouraging fact, and, in my opinion, the chief argument for aid from the Foundation.”

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173 Gunn to Day, 10 March 1932, RF, RG 1.1, series 717, box 19, folder 177; Söllner, *Deutsche Politikwissenschaftler*, 32.
174 Gunn to Day, 4 February 1932, RF, RG 1.1, series 717, box 19, folder 177; Jäckh to Babcock, 15 March 1932, CEIP CE, box 182, folder 6.
176 Gunn to Day, 10 March 1932, RF, RG 1.1, series 717, box 19, folder 177.
Thus the Rockefeller Foundation ended up pursuing a two-fold strategy for its international relations programme in Germany: some research took place within a collaborative framework set up by the Notgemeinschaft, and some was conducted, less successfully, at the Hochschule. The Notgemeinschaft Committee was composed of virtually the same members as the corresponding Stresemann Committee. Initially, its meetings were dominated by Julius Curtius, whose proposals for research topics exhausted themselves in German reparations, international migration and settlement, the Polish Corridor and limits of arbitration, reflecting the tendency of the Ministry of External Affairs to use scholarship for power political aims. The committee adopted two of the suggestions (the Polish Corridor and reparations) as part of a long list of research topics. These topics included international economic relations, tariffs, the concept of the state and political science terminology, thus reflecting the multi-disciplinary and eclectic nature of the field of international relations at the time.

Gunn admitted to “some forebodings” regarding the research on the Polish Corridor but decided that this would be a test for the committee. “It will be interesting to see how objective the Germans can be in this investigation.” During the second year of the committee’s existence, Curtius’s suggestions had vanished from the agenda, and some promising interdisciplinary approaches had developed, for example that of Alfred Weber’s research group at the University of Heidelberg which combined political science, sociology and psychology in a study on foreign policy. Research conducted at the Hochschule, however, did not meet Rockefeller expectations. “During the past year it has taken the form of unsystematic, individual research by members of

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177 Schmidt-Ott to John Van Sickle, 24 July 1931, RF, RG 1.1, series 717, box 20, folder 188.
179 Gunn to Day, 30 March 1932, RF, RG 1.1, series , box 20, folder 188.
180 Memorandum, Tracy B. Kittredge, 21 November 1932, RF, RG 1.1, series 717, box 20, folder 188. On Rockefeller support for the social sciences in Heidelberg see Rausch, “US-amerikanische Scientific Philanthropy”: 93-95; Fleck, Transatlantische Bereicherungen, 143, 146.
the staff, according to their several interests and inclinations.” Interestingly, foundation officers did not comment on the fact that many Hochschule teachers writing on international questions did not espouse the supposed “liberal spirit” there. A striking example was Max H. Boehm, an explicitly anti-Weimar irredentist.

It is difficult to give a rounded assessment of the Rockefeller Foundation’s work in international relations in Weimar Germany, as the collaborations ended prematurely and abruptly. After Hitler came to power in 1933, it soon became clear that the Hochschule would cease to exist in its original form. Jäckh tried to convince the Rockefeller Foundation not to withdraw its funding but by obscuring the real situation at the Hochschule, he made himself look increasingly suspicious. His short-lived attempts to act as a mediator between Nazi Germany and other countries equally damaged his credibility with the Foundation. In May 1933, the Rockefeller Foundation finally decided to terminate its support. In June, the Carnegie Endowment followed suit, although it was never able to recuperate the money it had donated to the Stresemann Memorial Foundation. The Rockefeller grant to the Notgemeinschaft ended in 1934, coinciding with Schmidt-Ott’s forced resignation.

Most of the Hochschule staff lost their appointments and emigrated. Many ended up at the New School for Social Research in New York. A plan developed by Arnold Wolfers, which had envisioned transferring some of the Hochschule work to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, came to nothing. This would have allowed Hochschule staff who had lost their jobs to remain in Germany while working under the auspices of Chatham House. The Rockefeller Foundation’s Paris office supported the

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182 Söllner, Deutsche Politikwissenschaftler, 42.
183 For a detailed account of Jäckh’s manoeuvres and the later embellishment of his activities between 1933 and 1934 see Eisfeld, Ausgebürgert, passim.
184 John van Sickle to Day, 12 May 1933, RF, RG 1.1, series 717, box 19, folder 178; Babcock to Jäckh, 20 June 1933, CEIP CE, box 184, folder 3.
plan and was willing to co-fund it, especially since the collaboration with Chatham House, which had received a substantial Foundation grant in 1932, was going well. After it became clear, though, that the German authorities demanded a say in the selection of researchers working under this scheme, the plan was abandoned.\textsuperscript{186} Wolfers himself emigrated to the United States, where he took up a position at Yale and later became a prominent figure at the Yale Institute of International Studies.\textsuperscript{187} Jäckh moved to Britain where he became involved with the New Commonwealth Institute, a private research and propaganda institute which advocated the establishment of an international police force. He also came back into the fold of the Rockefeller Foundation which first topped up his salary at the New Commonwealth Institute and then supported a research project of Jäckh’s when he moved to the Graduate Institute in Geneva.\textsuperscript{188}

The Hochschule itself came under the direction of Goebbels’ Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda. Teaching continued on a smaller scale and according to Nazi guidelines. In 1940, the Hochschule became part of the University of Berlin and was transformed into the Deutsches Auslandswissenschaftliches Institut (German Institute for Foreign Studies), a research and teaching institute designed to deliver relevant knowledge to the Nazi war effort. The Institut für Auswärtige Politik in Hamburg suffered a similar fate. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy had to give up his chair at the University of Hamburg in September 1933, and in March 1934 was forced to resign as the director of the Institute. A former staff member of the Hochschule called Friedrich Berber took over and in 1937 moved the Institute to Berlin, where it became an instrument of Nazi propaganda.\textsuperscript{189}

\textsuperscript{186} Wolfers to Arnold Toynbee, 12 June 1933; John Wheeler-Bennett to Chatham House Council, 16 July 1933, both RIIA, 2/III/8d.
\textsuperscript{187} Ramos, “Yale Institute of International Studies”, passim.
\textsuperscript{188} Paris Grant-in-Aid Action No. 11, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Dr. Ernst Jäckh. Maximum $6,000 for study of “Problems of Regional Federalism in Europe”, 22 June 1939, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 104, folder 941.
\textsuperscript{189} Missiroli, Deutsche Hochschule, 44-47; on the Deutsches Auslandswissenschaftliches Institut see Gideon Botsch, “Politische Wissenschaft” im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Die “deutschen
A Watershed in 1933?

Of course it seems opportune to terminate the story of foundation involvement with German foreign affairs institutes in 1933. After all, the experience of a Nazi takeover of supposedly objective and scientific institutions must have been eminently sobering for foundation officers, maybe even inducing them to question their policies. Moreover, one would assume that further transnational intellectual exchange was not encouraged by a totalitarian regime. Except that to conclude here would leave out the end of the story. As is well known, Rockefeller involvement with Germany did not stop in 1933. In the natural sciences, Rockefeller grants to institutions continued to flow until the late 1930s, albeit accompanied by much internal debate and recrimination within the Foundation itself. In the social sciences, ostensibly much more vulnerable to politicisation, grants to institutions stopped, but individual scholars from Nazi Germany could still receive fellowships.¹⁹⁰

In purely financial terms, certainly, there was a definite break, as even individual fellowships to German scholars could not make up for the end of large-scale institutional funding. Other European institutions, notably the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, attracted the philanthropic funds which might have gone to Germany in the course of the 1930s.¹⁹¹ Chatham House had been on the Rockefeller radar from 1927, when John D. Rockefeller, Jr. provided the Institute with a private gift to enable it to develop its Study Group programme. In May 1932, this was

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¹⁹¹ See Appendix.
followed by a Foundation grant of $150,000 over five years. The disappearance of the Berlin and Hamburg institutes as potential recipients of funding in 1933 strengthened Chatham House’s position with philanthropic backers.

Nevertheless, for Rockefeller Foundation officers, Germany was not out of the picture. Neither were the Carnegie Endowment’s links to Germany cut off after 1933. As will be seen in the next chapter, both foundations encouraged the continued participation of German scholars in the transnational networks they had started to build up in the course of the late 1920s and early 1930s. As before 1933, philanthropic networks were exploited by revisionist powers to push particular foreign policy aims. The momentary rupture caused by the Nazi rise to power should not detract from the continuities that mark the relationship between foundations and official cultural diplomacy.

The case of the Stresemann Academy illustrates how foreign ministries attempted to harness and exploit popular movements for international conciliation and how foundations, in their role as mediators between state power and nongovernmental organisations, were the unwitting instruments of these attempts. German government officials saw the presence of philanthropic foundations as an important asset in Germany’s cultural relations, which could be exploited to reach foreign policy aims. The Ministry of External Affairs tried to manipulate the relationships between foundations and collaborators, influencing their form and outcome and effectively limiting transnational agency. After all, the announcement of the Stresemann Academy had an impact on the transnational contest between several models of international affairs institutes as it blocked similar ventures.

Occasionally, foundation officers were uneasy with the closeness between those engaged in research in international relations and policy makers, for example in the case

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192 Gunn to Day, 14 March 1932; resolution docket RF 32127, 13 April 1932, both RF, RG 1.1, series 401, box 77, folder 1012.
of the Notgemeinschaft Committee on International Relations and its research on the Polish Corridor. But that did not make them question the fundamentals of their own approach. By the early 1930s, foundation policy had evolved and become increasingly sophisticated. Moreover, organising objective international relations research along national lines at first seemed to be entirely possible due to the methodological dominance of the documentary approach which had been developed in the Anglo-American foreign affairs institutes. Another influential approach was that of the Study Group, pioneered by Chatham House, a process of distilling scientific knowledge into policy-ready reports.\textsuperscript{193} Foundation officers were convinced that they had found a mechanism of organising research and discussion of international affairs that would satisfy both scientific and political aspirations and fuse the national and international dimension in a more satisfactory way than that followed by the international institutes which had been established in the early and mid-1920s.

A Rockefeller Foundation staff conference in which the international relations programme was discussed summed up this approach:

[There are two conceptions of desirable development, one involving the creation of a great international organization with branches in different countries for an objective scientific approach to international problems, the other that of starting a considerable number of national institutes, analyzing and discussing international problems under strictly national auspices with an idea that these institutes might subsequently come together in some sort of conference or union.\textsuperscript{194}]

The “conference or union” was to become the International Studies Conference on which many of the hopes of Rockefeller and Carnegie officers rested during the 1930s and which is the subject of the next chapter.


\textsuperscript{194} Excerpt of minutes of staff conference, 1 April 1932, RF, RG 3, series 910, box 7, folder 60.
Competing Internationalisms: American Foundations and the International Studies Conference

In July 1936, José Castillejo, the Spanish member of the League of Nations’ International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, favourably remarked on a scholarly association called the International Studies Conference. It was, Castillejo claimed, evolving into a “League of Public Opinion”, an independent body which exercised an increasing influence on policy.¹ The International Studies Conference (ISC) had begun its life as the clumsily labelled Conference of Institutes for the Scientific Study of International Relations before adopting a more elegant name in 1933.² However, the original label denoted exactly what it was, a federation of institutions dedicated to a ‘scientific’ approach to international relations. The ISC held a series of annual meetings on international affairs which in the mid-1930s hosted delegates from twenty-six nations.³ In the course of its existence, the ISC developed a sophisticated mechanism for the multidisciplinary study and discussion of questions that were of immediate relevance to international politics. Although assessments of the ISC’s importance vary, it is certain that the name of almost any renowned scholar writing on international relations in the interwar years can be found on its lists of conference attendance or its publication records.⁴

² For simplicity’s sake, both the International Studies Conference and the Conference of Institutes for the Scientific Study of International Relations will be referred to as ISC throughout the chapter.
⁴ Older accounts of the ISC are generally positive. See, e.g. Jan Kolasa, International Intellectual Cooperation: The League Experience and the Beginnings of UNESCO (Wroclaw: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1962), 93-108, who claims that the ISC was an important forum for scholar-activists sympathetic to the League of Nations; later authors, especially those following a state-centric approach, do not attribute much importance to the conferences, for instance Jean-Jacques Renollet, L’Unesco
The International Studies Conference, even though it had started out as a League initiative, came under the complete control of American philanthropic foundations. In particular, the foundations and with them the American cultural relations elite furthered the politicisation of the ISC in an attempt to turn it into a para-diplomatic entity. The Rockefeller Foundation paid for administrative costs and bankrolled many of the participating institutions. The Carnegie Endowment did the same, although on a much smaller scale. A considerable number of conference delegates were alumni of Rockefeller and Carnegie fellowship programmes. At one point, the director of the \textit{Dotation Carnegie} presided over the ISC’s programme committee. Supporting the International Studies Conference represented the culmination of both the Rockefeller Foundation’s and the Carnegie Endowment’s joint efforts to build up institutions for the study of international relations in Europe, both on a national and on an international basis. As has been outlined in previous chapters, in the course of the 1920s and early 1930s Rockefeller and Carnegie funds had been channelled to such institutions, including the \textit{Deutsche Hochschule für Politik} in Berlin, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the \textit{Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales} in Geneva and the Academy of International Law at The Hague, all of which were constitutive ISC members.

The ISC was founded in 1928 under the auspices of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) in Paris, one of the organs of the League of Nations’ Intellectual Cooperation Organisation. The IIIC acted as a secretariat to the ISC and

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organised its annual conferences. Rockefeller and Carnegie funds towards the running of the ISC were channelled through this body, which, by virtue of its League association, had its origins in an intergovernmental agreement. Thus, coordinating the scientific study of international relations through the mechanism of the ISC had the foundations deeply involved in the complexities of intergovernmental and League politics. In addition, from the mid-1930s, the ISC was also the target of aggressive cultural diplomacy from the dictatorships, in particular Germany. All of the questions pertinent to philanthropic internationalism in the interwar years came to the fore in the ISC. Was a ‘scientific study’ of international relations possible? If yes, what would it look like? To what extent did the funding of the study of international relations in foreign countries, and the foundations’ involvement in the cooperation of scholars and intellectuals across national borders, constitute cultural diplomacy? Could transnational nongovernmental agencies like the foundations successfully cooperate with intergovernmental institutions? Is the opposition between intergovernmentalism and a transnational civil society supposedly free from government intrusion even a valid one to make? This chapter will examine these questions by analysing the origins and outcomes of the foundations’ support for the ISC. It will assess the importance of this first, and understudied, international association for the study of international relations which, without foundation support, would not have thrived in the way it did.

*Foundations and Intellectual Cooperation under the League of Nations*

In order to understand the foundations’ stance towards the ISC, it is necessary to examine American involvement in League initiatives for intellectual cooperation in general, an area in which the foundations also played a crucial role. American philanthropy was indirectly connected even to the first attempts to institutionalise
international intellectual cooperation in a League context. While the League Covenant did not mention intellectual matters, the issue was pushed onto the international agenda from 1920 by francophone civil society groups which happened to be recent beneficiaries of the *Dotation Carnegie*. Paul Otlet and Henri La Fontaine, leaders of the Brussels-based *Union des associations internationales*, lobbied the League Council and Assembly with a proposal to turn their own organisation into the League’s technical body for intellectual work. At the same time, the French League of Nations Association, the *Association française pour la Société des nations*, presented Secretary-General Eric Drummond with an alternative outline for the organisation of intellectual cooperation under the League. French government officials within the Ministry for Public Instruction recognised the importance of these nongovernmental initiatives and set out to harness them for the benefit of France, traditionally the leading nation in matters cultural and intellectual and a pioneer in the field of bilateral cultural diplomacy.

Although a sceptical Quai d’Orsay feared that intellectual internationalism under League auspices would interfere with France’s national educational system, the Belgian competition in the form of the *Union des Associations Internationales* finally convinced the Foreign Ministry that France would be better off co-opting new multilateral League initiatives rather than opposing them.

Thus, despite its initially reticent attitude towards organised international intellectual cooperation, the French government set out to dominate it once the League Assembly adopted a resolution for the creation of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) in September 1921. France tried to safeguard its

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influence by ensuring that a majority of the new commission’s members would be sympathetic to the French point of view, even though the League Secretariat prevailed in an argument over whether ICIC members should represent governments or be appointed by virtue of their intellectual distinction. The ICIC was set up as a consultative organ of the League Council and met in Geneva only for a few days per year. Thus, in 1924 the French government offered to fund a permanent executive organ of the underfinanced ICIC. The International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) was thus established in Paris and inaugurated in January 1926. Its director Julien Luchaire had previously been inspector-general of public instruction in France and presided over a largely French staff at the Institute. Luchaire had ambitious plans for his organisation and hastily expanded its employee numbers and projects. He sought to turn the IIIC into the global centre of intellectual life, removed from the oversight of Geneva. Moreover, under his leadership, the IIIC also drifted towards being an extension of French cultural diplomacy. This, as well as the vagueness and inefficiencies of the IIIC’s programme, brought him into open conflict with the ICIC in 1929 which led to a reorganisation of the League’s intellectual cooperation work and to Luchaire’s replacement by Henri Bonnet, a member of the League Secretariat, in 1930.

American foundations became directly involved with the new League institutions for intellectual cooperation. The Dotation Carnegie established relations with the IIIC in Paris even before the institute officially opened its doors. Along with several international nongovernmental organisations such as the International Federation of League of Nations Societies, the Girl Guides and the International Organisation of Secondary School Teachers, the Dotation was invited to form the Comité d’Entente des Grandes Associations Internationales under the auspices of the

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IIIC in December 1925. In collaboration with the IIIC, the Comité d’Entente promoted international educational cooperation, especially with regard to education in the aims of the League of Nations. The inclusion of the *Dotation*, which was, after all, neither a professional association nor a grass-roots based nongovernmental organisation, in the Comité d’Entente indicated on the one hand that the Carnegie Endowment was regarded as an important player in the field of intellectual cooperation by the IIIC and on the other hand how eager Luchaire was to foster a cordial relationship with American foundations. Thus, he aided the *Dotation*’s work, for example by publishing an article on *Dotation* events in the very first edition of the IIIC’s journal.

Endowment officers in New York reciprocated the good will extended to them and invited Luchaire to a Carnegie-sponsored conference in the United States. In the following years, the two organisations frequently collaborated on various projects, for example an investigation into school history textbooks. By 1929 Babcock was able to praise the “bonne collaboration” between IIIC and *Dotation*. However, his reports to the Carnegie Endowment’s trustees in New York also contained plenty of negative remarks on the Institute which he thought was poorly organised and led. It is a testimony to Babcock’s diplomatic sensibility that he found it wise as the representative of an American foundation in Paris to maintain good relations with a powerful, government-backed institution of which he was nevertheless critical.

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9 Luchaire to Babcock, 5 December 1925, CEIP CE, box 28, folder 3.
11 O. de Halecki (IIIC University Relations Section) to Mlle Peylade, 10 March 1926, Archives of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, UNESCO Archives, Paris (hereafter IIIC), B.IV.5.
12 Luchaire to Butler, 12 February 1926; Samuel McCune Lindsay to Luchaire, 19 March 1926, both IIIC, B.IV.15.
13 Babcock to Luchaire, 26 July 1928, CEIP CE, box 28, folder 2.
14 Babcock to M. Coste (IIIC), 26 January 1929, IIIC, B.IV.5.
15 See e.g. Babcock’s verdict on the Institute in 1932: “After an intimate acquaintance with the I.I.I.C. of some seven years, I must confess that I went to attend the Geneva meetings without much enthusiasm.” Report on ICIC meeting, July 1932, CEIP CE, box 29, folder 4.
Relations between the IIIC and the Rockefeller Foundation were less close, even though Luchaire tried hard to cultivate the goodwill of Paris’s second American philanthropic outpost. An offer of collaboration to the president of the Rockefeller Foundation was rebuffed with the note that the Foundation had a narrow interest in public health and medicine and therefore was not able to be of any assistance to the Institute.\footnote{George Vincent to Luchaire, 12 May 1926, IIIC, B.IV.23.} Even after the Rockefeller Foundation turned its attention to the social sciences in 1929, its view on the IIIC remained negative. A staff member at the Paris Office commented on the “French” character and “redness” of the institute and concluded:

> It is well to keep it under observation, owing to the fact that it occupies, inadequately but blockingly, the position of that central clearing-house or ‘exchange’ between European countries which should be of the utmost value to our sort of work: - and which, but for this pre-existence, it might have been our first aim to create in more respectable form.\footnote{G. Winthrop Young (RF Paris Office), confidential report, “Intellectual Cooperation”, June 1929, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 105, folder 952.}

This quote reveals an underlying rivalry between the foundations and the IIIC which has to be understood in the context of the peculiar legal status of Luchaire’s Institute. Although its activities were overseen by the League’s International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation in Geneva, the IIIC, as a largely French-sponsored organisation, was a curious hybrid between an intergovernmental and a state-sponsored quasi-nongovernmental organisation. This ambiguous status allowed it to collaborate with nongovernmental organisations, for instance in the form of the Comité d’Entente.\footnote{Renollet, Unesco oublée, 60, 84.} The ICIC in Geneva, a fully-fledged League body, faced more limitations in this regard as Article 24 of the Covenant, which regulated the attachment of international bureaus to the League, only opened League affiliation to organisations created by
intergovernmental agreements. Thus, the hybrid nature of the IIIC allowed it to become active within both the intergovernmental and the private, nongovernmental sphere of intellectual cooperation. Moreover, the IIIC could take advantage of the prestige that its link to the League automatically bestowed. This turned the Institute into a formidable competitor of private initiatives which were also interested in organising international intellectual life. The foundations clearly belonged in this category, as the Rockefeller Foundation’s Paris Office implicitly recognised. Hence, the Rockefeller officer’s disparaging analysis of the IIIC’s work contained a hefty tinge of envy.

Nevertheless, the Foundation’s assessment also accurately reflected contemporary criticism levelled at Luchaire who was politically on the left and certainly aimed to further French foreign policy through the work of the IIIC. Especially the latter led to tensions between the IIIC and the ICIC in Geneva as well as with the semi-official National Committees for Intellectual Cooperation which had been formed in a number of countries from 1923. Both the Commission and the National Committees opposed how the IIIC deviated intergovernmental and administrative aspects of the League’s intellectual cooperation work from Geneva to Paris, and in 1929 both supported a reorganisation of the League’s entire intellectual cooperation work. This was achieved in 1931 when the IIIC, the ICIC and the National Committees were incorporated into the new Organisation for Intellectual Cooperation which the League formally recognised as a technical body. Originally, the National Committees for Intellectual Cooperation had come into existence in an unregulated process. Their funding and composition ranged from entirely private to entirely governmental and

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staffed by members of ministerial bureaucracies. Often, ICIC members stimulated the creation of National Committees in their respective countries.\textsuperscript{20}

This was also the case in the United States, a country which was from the very beginning represented on the ICIC. In 1925, the American representative, Robert A. Millikan, a professor of physics at the California Institute of Technology, successfully pushed for the creation of the American National Committee for Intellectual Cooperation. He also managed to secure the Carnegie Corporation’s financial support.\textsuperscript{21}

The American philanthropic elite was heavily represented on the committee by Raymond Fosdick, Elihu Root and Henry Pritchett, president of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Members of the American private cultural relations network also joined, for example Stephen Duggan of the Institute of International Education, Librarian of Congress Herbert Putnam and Leo S. Rowe of the Pan-American Union.\textsuperscript{22} Compared to other National Committees for Intellectual Cooperation, the American committee was remarkably well organised, administering a number of subcommittees and conducting large-scale, nationwide surveys. With an annual budget of $10,000, it also disposed of significant financial resources, in contrast to the ICIC which remained chronically underfunded.\textsuperscript{23}

As with other instances of American participation in so-called technical activities under the League of Nations, American non-membership in the League was an

\textsuperscript{20} Northedge, “International Intellectual Co-operation”, 401-415. An illustration of the loosely defined role of these National Committees is the British case. Apparently, the Foreign Office toyed with the idea of merging the British National Committee for Intellectual Cooperation with the British Council in 1938. In the end, the merger was rejected as it was felt that the British Council could not take on multilateral functions, whereas the National Committee could. Minutes “Draft International Act regarding Intellectual Cooperation”, 19 January 1938, PRO, FO 371/22555.
\textsuperscript{22} Memorandum, 6 November 1928, Shotwell Papers, box 134/5, folder “Membership American National Committee”.
\textsuperscript{23} Report on first meeting of the American National Committee of Intellectual Cooperation, 5 January 1925, CEIP CE, box 28, folder 2. Note, though, that the committee’s budget fluctuated over time. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. pledged altogether $6,000 between 1932 and 1934. The Carnegie Corporation’s contributions did not follow a fixed arrangement but declined over the years. See Minutes of Meeting, 27 October 1932, CEIP CE box 29, folder 4, and Financial Statement, 30 September 1935, CEIP CE, box 31, folder 3. On funding problems of the ICIC see Renollet, \textit{Unesco oubliée}, 32.
incentive for certain circles in the United States to become doubly active. Millikan regarded it as “very important that we are as well represented within the [intellectual cooperation] organization as is possible” and hoped the committee “may be able to exert an important influence”.24 This sentiment was echoed by James T. Shotwell, who took over from Millikan in 1931: “With the United States out of the League, Intellectual Cooperation is an open door to the kind of helpful cooperation with the League itself which must be included in the picture of the National Committee.”25 In a personal letter to Harold Butler, director of the International Labour Organisation, Shotwell made a similar point: “The fact that we are not in the League makes this quasi-official connection with the League organization perfectly possible without raising any of the political questions that would bother an administration at Washington.” But, he also said, the ICIC’s programme was wanting—what was needed was “a program with some practicality about it”, and Shotwell was determined to lobby for that.26

The American National Committee managed to exert a significant influence on the League’s intellectual cooperation work, thanks also to its strong link with the foundations. According to the IIIC’s historian, Jean-Jacques Renollet, the prospect of future foundation funding played a large role among those League officials who pushed for a reorganisation of the intellectual cooperation work in the late 1920s. Gilbert Murray, who, as the ICIC chairman from 1928, spearheaded the move for reform, was aware of the foundations’ doubts about the League’s intellectual work in its current state, especially as the ICIC was increasingly morphing into an intergovernmental body instead of an elite intellectuals’ club. He anticipated that a move towards more technical

24 Millikan to Wickliffe Rose (International Education Board), 26 February 1926, Shotwell Papers, box 134/5, folder “Membership American National Committee”.
26 Shotwell to Harold Butler, 14 November 1932, CEIP CE, box 29, folder 4.
work and away from inter-state cultural diplomacy would attract foundation funding. But the foundations’ stance towards political work and technical work in the League of Nations was a complex one and cannot be captured in a simplistic opposition of ‘neutral’ technical work versus ‘political’ multilateral diplomacy, as Renollet seems to suggest when he claims that an IIIC “de moins en moins politique” ensured the collaboration of the foundations in the 1930s. On the contrary, the foundations and with them the American cultural relations elite furthered a politicisation of the League’s intellectual cooperation work, all while they were claiming to be merely interested in nongovernmental and technical cooperation. As Shotwell’s comments make clear, the extension of technical work simply meant increasing U.S. influence in Geneva.

Shotwell was one of the most active American scholar-politicians in the field of international relations at the time. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, he devoted much of the early 1920s to the editing of the Carnegie History but he also became involved in the creation of the International Labour Organisation and the drafting and popularising of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Shotwell also became active in the Institute of Pacific Relations which had been formed in 1925. In the spring of 1931 Shotwell was recruited as the chairman of the Social Science Research Council’s Advisory Committee on International Relations. The Council strengthened its international relations programme at the time, in accordance with the wishes of the Rockefeller Foundation, its main sponsor.

Shotwell spent the summer of 1931 travelling all over Europe and sizing up various European initiatives for the study of international relations. In Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland he encouraged the formation of national committees for the

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study of international relations, harking back to his old plans for Danubian economic federation.\textsuperscript{31} A stopover in Geneva, where Murray offered him a seat on the ICIC, convinced Shotwell of the necessity to reform the committee. Shotwell wanted to see the likes of Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy or the Hungarian Count Pál Teleki as ICIC members, instead of Marie Curie or Albert Einstein.\textsuperscript{32} He also insisted that the committee should engage with social and political problems instead of pure science and literature.\textsuperscript{33} In a protracted correspondence with Gilbert Murray, Shotwell used the question of his affiliation with the ICIC as a bargaining chip in his quest to open the committee to more political, or as he would have put it, “practical” work. The discussion between Murray and Shotwell went to the heart of the ICIC’s purpose and, by extension, of that of the League’s intellectual cooperation work in general.

Shotwell’s proposal to staff the ICIC exclusively with “representatives of Political and Social Science” did not convince Murray who insisted that the committee should “promote co-operation between men of science and scientific associations in the different countries, so that mathematicians, physicists, librarians, and curators of museums are as much in place upon it as publicists”. Murray’s implication that the social scientists which Shotwell wanted to have on the ICIC were “publicists” almost led to a breakdown in the correspondence. Clearly, Shotwell was very self-conscious about the scientific credentials of his own discipline—for he, even though a historian by training, clearly regarded himself as a social scientist—which he insisted did not lack any of the intellectual rigour commonly ascribed to the natural sciences.\textsuperscript{34} This was confirmed by his attacks on those ICIC members who, in Shotwell’s opinion, could make few claims to scientific or intellectual distinction. Murray did not disagree and

\textsuperscript{31} Shotwell to Butler, 27 October 1931, CEIP, box 104, folder 3.
\textsuperscript{33} Shotwell to Butler, 27 October 1931, CEIP, box 104, folder 3.
\textsuperscript{34} Murray to Shotwell, 16 December 1931; Shotwell to Murray, 24 December 1931, both Shotwell Papers, box 134/5, folder “Membership American National Committee”.

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conceded that “many of them are politicians, others are put on chiefly for political or
diplomatic motives and not because they represent either genuine learning in the
political and social sciences or constructive ideas”. Nevertheless, he asked Shotwell to
understand that an intergovernmental body like the ICIC would always have political
appointments. “The mischief is that the Council of the League, consisting of practical
politicians, is not much interested in intellectual co-operation itself but has discovered
that a seat on the Committee is a compliment highly valued by various countries or
interests which have from time to time to be appeased.” To transform the ICIC into a
body of social scientists which would provide political consultancy to the League
Council was, as Murray remarked in a letter to Millikan, “impracticable”: “The Council
consists of governments and all Governments (however regrettaibly) think politics their
own business; they will hear the various specialists and then decide. They will not take
advice on Politics.”

In the end, Murray and Shotwell reached a compromise. Shotwell confirmed his
nomination as new ICIC member, even if the composition of the committee remained
unchanged otherwise. In return, the ICIC drafted a resolution to include the social
sciences in its remit, acknowledging “today’s importance of the collaboration of men of
thought and men of action for the solution of urgent problems pertaining to the current
world situation”.36 The League Council and Assembly adopted the resolution in 1933.37
In terms of concrete projects, Shotwell’s démarche yielded an international inquiry on
the problem of mechanisation.38 This was a compromise topic, adopted in the place of

35 Murray to Shotwell, 4 January 1932; Murray to Millikan, 18 January 1932, both Shotwell Papers, box 134/5, folder “Membership American National Committee”.
36 “… en tenant compte de l’importance que présente, de nos jours, la collaboration des hommes de
pensée et des hommes d’action, pour la solution des problèmes urgents qui dominant la situation actuelle
du monde”, CICI.301, 21 July 1932, CEIP CE, box 29, folder 4.
37 American National Committee on Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations, ed., The Study of
International Relations in the United States: Survey for 1934 (New York: Columbia University Press,
1934), 447.
38 International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, L’Institut International de Coopération
Shotwell’s own suggestion for a simultaneous public opinion survey in a number of countries. Via the IIIC, he did manage to stimulate the compilation of studies based on the model of the American National Committee’s own output. In France, such a national survey on the study of international relations was eventually conducted by the Rockefeller-sponsored Centre d’études de politique étrangère as a result of an IIIC request in 1935.

Shotwell’s more radical proposals were neutralised by his co-optation onto the ICIC. Nevertheless, Murray’s and Shotwell’s basic ideas were not that far apart. Murray noted in a letter to Babcock that “the C.I.C. is moving in the direction which Shotwell and I have long wished, but the actual application of his ideas presents problems”. Murray himself was a prominent member of the British League of Nations Union and drawn to the nongovernmental internationalism which aimed at a modernisation of foreign policy making, that embraced by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. In 1928, he had already outlined his plans for the ICIC in a letter to his son-in-law Arnold Toynbee, who, from 1924, occupied the post of director of studies at Chatham House: “And if the ICIC develops as I wish it to, into an international research organization, it will be a good deal akin to the RIIA.” Like Shotwell, Murray saw “the need of bringing into the sphere of the League some greater element of objective, scientific, constructive thought in international politics”. But, he concluded, perhaps the ICIC was not the ideal place for that:

Where are we to look? I seemed to see the most promising place some years ago when studying the British Institute of International Affairs. There you have a purely scientific and objective organ for the study of international problems; only it is British, and what we want is international study. But there

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40 Tracy B. Kittredge, Memorandum “Program of Centre d’Etudes de Politique Etrangère – Conversation of TBK with M. Louis Joxe, Paris, October 23, 1935”, RF, RG 1.1, series 500, box 20, folder 204.
41 Murray to Babcock, 30 December 1932, CEIP CE, box 121, folder 5.
42 Murray to Toynbee, 10 November 1928, RIIA, Registry Files, 10/1m.
are similar bodies in other countries: the Hochschule für Politik, the Ecole des Hautes Études Politiques, etc. By 1932, these bodies were increasingly collaborating through the ISC, a process that Murray had furthered by encouraging Toynbee to position Chatham House as a driving force behind the extension of the conferences. Murray was not the only person who came to the conclusion that the best way of internationalising the field of international relations was to coordinate the activities of several national institutions. Debates within the foundations circled around the same question in the early 1930s and a number of models were discussed. At the same time, the International Studies Conference also underwent a process of transformation, largely initiated by its constituents. In the following section, the origins of the ISC will be discussed, before moving on to an analysis of the relationship between this organisation and American philanthropic foundations.

Beginnings and Transformation of the International Studies Conference

The International Studies Conference had its origin in a plan to establish an international university, which came before the ICIC and was passed on to the IIIC in May 1926. Luchaire reframed the idea and proposed to establish a federated system of national institutes with a head office in Paris. According to an internal memorandum in the Dotation’s files he even considered turning the École des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris into the hub of this network, possibly attracting French government support. In the end, however, the project was developed on a smaller scale. Remarkably, though, Luchaire’s plan completely omitted international law, as that discipline was, in

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43 Murray to Millikan, 18 January 1932, Shotwell Papers, box 134/5, folder “Membership American National Committee”.
44 Ibid.
his opinion, already amply provided for. The new academic network would focus on social, moral, historical, economic and financial questions.\footnote{Il reste toutes les autres questions: sociales, morales, historiques, économiques et financières. Pour toutes celles-la, Monsieur Luchaire pense que l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes Sociales [sic] pourrait en être le noyau.” Memorandum, 3 August 1926, CEIP CE, box 28, folder 2.}

Within the IIIC, Alfred Zimmern, the head of the General Affairs section, took steps to put Luchaire’s vague scheme into practice, a matter that received renewed urgency once the ICIC asked the Paris institute in 1927 to convene an international meeting of experts in international studies.\footnote{Luchaire to Babcock, 7 February 1928, CEIP CE, Box 28, folder 2.} Zimmern had only recently established a connection with the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik and secured Ernst Jäckh as a speaker for the 1926 session of his Geneva School of International Relations. For the Hochschule, the link to the IIIC was an important means to further its own international standing and so it made a bid to host what became the first meeting of the International Studies Conference in March 1928. Thanks to its excellent relations with the German Ministry of External Affairs, the Hochschule also received an official subsidy for the conference.\footnote{Korenblat, “Public Affairs Institute for a New Germany”, 113, 120-114.} Luchaire, who habitually mixed intellectual and diplomatic relations, had previously ensured German official support for the conference during a meeting with Dr Soehring of the Kulturabteilung.\footnote{Excerpt of a letter from Geneva School to Jäckh, 21 September 1926, GStA PK, I HA Rep. 303 Dt. HS für Politik, Nr. 2116 (Internationales Institut für geistige Zusammenarbeit, Paris, alte Signaturen: 347).}

Despite (or maybe because of) this intergovernmental background, the Berlin ISC meeting resulted chiefly in steps towards greater administrative collaboration between the participants.\footnote{International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, 252-254.} These consisted of delegates from Chatham House, the Geneva School of International Relations, the recently created Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, the Academy of International Law at The Hague, the Ecole libre des sciences politiques and other institutes in Paris, as well as several Italian
The only American representative at the conference, apart from the
_Dotation Carnegie_, was the Institute of Politics in Williamstown, a shoe-in for the
Council on Foreign Relations. In subsequent years, however, the Council became an
ISC member itself. Earle Babcock joined the ISC’s Executive Committee and the
_Dotation_ occasionally made modest grants to meet publication costs and other small
expenses. Between 1928 and 1930, the work of the ISC was limited to practical
collaboration such as the exchange of information and the compilation of handbooks.
A suggestion to embark on joint research projects had been opposed by the British
deblegation in 1928. Nevertheless, the meetings and discussions were conducive to the
dissemination of institutional models and thus a certain amount of standardisation.
Isaiah Bowman noted the strong interest displayed in the Council on Foreign Relations’
“Survey of American Foreign Relations” and estimated that future conferences would
help spread the Council’s working methods. This was not mere self-flattery as the
Council’s publication activity was indeed regarded as a model to emulate by other ISC
participants. A similar move towards standardisation through the comparison of
different national approaches occurred in the field of university teaching of international
relations, an issue that remained an ISC concern throughout its existence. Moreover,

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51 List of conference participants, PA AA, R 64152, IV W 2960.
52 Walter H Mallory to Werner Picht, 17 May 1928; Walter Wallace Mac Laren (Institute of Politics) to
Mallory, 16 November 1928, Council on Foreign Relations Archives, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton
University (hereafter CFR), box 572, folder 9.
53 International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, _Handbook of Institutions for the Scientific Study of
International Relations_ (Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 1929); International
Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, _Répertoire international de centres de documentation politique
(Conférence des institutions pour l’étude scientifique des relations internationales)_ (Paris: International
Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 1930).
54 Chalmers-Wright, _International Studies Conference_, 18.
55 “Council on Foreign Relations confidential memorandum for members, May 27 1929 – Dr. Bowman’s
57 Resolution VI, Report on the Third Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International
the conference stimulated increased activities in countries not originally affiliated with it.\textsuperscript{58}

As the ISC expanded—by 1930, eleven national members were affiliated as well as five self-designated international institutions, namely the Hague Academy, the 

\textit{Dotation}, the Geneva School, the Geneva Graduate Institute and the IPR—the issue of collaborative research projects returned to the agenda.\textsuperscript{59} In December 1929, the ISC Executive Committee asked Zimmern and F.B. Bourdillon of Chatham House to prepare a report on methods for collaborative study. Zimmern and Bourdillon passed on this task to John B. Condliffe (1891-1981), a young economist from New Zealand who was also the first research secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR).

The IPR had been established in 1925 as a private organisation for the promotion of mutual understanding among the nations of the Pacific Rim. It received substantial personal funding from John D. Rockefeller, Jr. as well as from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment. The IPR conducted its affairs through autonomous national councils, each with committees of research and education. By the mid-1930s, national councils had formed in the United States, Japan, China, Korea and the Philippines. Britain and the Dominions were also represented. So were the continental European colonial powers France and the Netherlands, signifying that the IPR did not challenge colonial rule, even if non-sovereign nations such as the Philippines had a voice in its meetings. An international governing body based in Honolulu, the International Secretariat, coordinated the work of the national councils and organised the IPR’s biannual conferences, the

\textsuperscript{58} It seems that Toynbee who mentioned the 1928 conference in a speech he gave in Poland was responsible for the affiliation of that country to the ISC. Picht to Hans Simons, 15 May 1928, GStA PK, I HA Rep. 303 Dt. HS für Politik, Nr. 2116 (Internationales Institut für geistige Zusammenarbeit, Paris, alte Signaturen: 347).

organisation’s main tool for the construction, promotion and dissemination of expert knowledge.60

Condliffe attended the 1930 ISC meeting in Paris on behalf of the IPR and gave an influential paper which deftly summed up current thinking on the state of international relations as a scholarly endeavour.61 Condliffe repeated common epistemological tropes, such as a presumed lag between the natural and the social sciences, and that in the study of international relations “the ordinary academic distinction between the social sciences” should be ignored. He also remarked on the democratisation of foreign policy-making after the First World War which, in an age of successful nationalisms, made the transition from nation state building to international cooperation difficult. Exhibiting a distrust of public opinion clothed in a confirmation of the principles of the ‘new diplomacy’, Condliffe pronounced that “post-war diplomacy must strive to base itself on the popular will, and must also contrive in some way to carry popular opinion along with the negotiated compromises of experts and statesmen”.

The question was how this triangulation between the masses, the experts and the policy makers could be ‘contrived’. Unsurprisingly, Condliffe put forward the IPR as the ideal solution, but with a nod to other flourishing models. He lauded Williamstown which, by including non-American speakers, was an “important means for the presentation of foreign points of view to the American people”. The Council on Foreign Relations and Chatham House were successful research institutions, even if limited by a

membership restricted to nationals, and a “national approach” in their research. Only the IPR could provide “face-to-face discussion” with foreign opinion.  

Condliffe’s paper galvanised the ISC Executive Committee into action. At a meeting in January 1931, it was agreed that the agenda of future sessions should include the study of “concrete problems of international relations”. To garner support for this decision, the committee arranged for Toynbee to give a paper at the 1931 ISC conference which took place at the Copenhagen Institute for Economics and History (Institutet for Historie og Samfundsøkonomie). Toynbee’s speech was crucial for determining the future direction of ISC. That the organisation would adopt an IPR-inspired model in the future was not in question. In fact, Toynbee had himself participated at several IPR conferences. What was unclear, however, was whether the ISC would continue to function under IIIC auspices. Henri Bonnet, the IIIC’s new director from 1930, wanted to keep the organisation close to the IIIC. Others, most importantly Shotwell, preferred reorganising the ISC outside the League’s orbit. One of the many ideas that Shotwell had developed in the early 1930s was an “Institute of the Atlantic”, with the North American, British and German foreign affairs institutes at its nucleus. This scheme enjoyed the backing of Beveridge, Jäckh, Rappard, Wolfers and members of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, according to Edward Carter of the IPR who visited the Copenhagen ISC meeting on Shotwell’s behalf. Carter believed that Bonnet saw in ISC “a new lease of life” for the IIIC and, moreover, had a tendency to “see world problems as essentially Europe-centered”. This was not the view of Carter, who felt that “There is a certain loose grouping of problems which are of primary concern to the peoples in the area stretching from Vancouver to Moscow. It is

62 J.B. Condliffe, “International Collaboration in the Study of International Relations”, C.89.1930 Annex B, CEIP CE, box 28, folder 4, also filed with the Rockefeller Foundation’s documents on the IPR, see RF, RG 1, series 200, box 356, folder 4223.
possible that these could be better studied viewing the Atlantic as the center, rather than Europe as the center.”

In the end, though, Bonnet succeeded in keeping the ISC tied to the IIIC. As he revealed in a letter to the American consul in Geneva, Toynbee had planned to suggest a new institute along Shotwell’s lines but could be persuaded to propose instead that the ISC meetings should become a permanent instrument for the scientific study of international relations, possibly along IPR methods. Given that Bonnet wrote a overly friendly letter to Shotwell soon after, in which he announced Toynbee’s volte-face, it is likely that the IIIC director was the persuasive origin of Toynbee’s change of heart. The ISC might have been pushed to develop along the lines of the American-dominated IPR but League officials, in particular Bonnet, managed to prevent an Atlanticist outlook in the new research organisation. It was firmly tied to the League’s Intellectual Cooperation Organisation, and so were the foundations who decided to support the venture, which shelved Shotwell’s plans for a new institute.

Apart from confirming its allegiance to the IIIC, Toynbee’s speech itself did not provide many surprises. It repeated truisms about the interdependence of nations which was pioneered by economic forces and now came to pass in the political and cultural spheres. Toynbee also expanded on “the tendency for private people to enter the field (hitherto monopolised by Governments) of international politics” and interpreted it as “a healthy and reassuring symptom”, especially since governments in return had recently started to discover the realm of culture for their policies. The future research

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64 Copy of letter to Shotwell from Carter, reporting on his study of possibility of a European or Atlantic institute, 24 June 1931, SSRC, series I.X, box 65, folder 345.
65 Bonnet to Prentiss Gilbert, 9 May 1931, IIIC, A.I.31.
66 Bonnet to Shotwell, 28 May 1931, IIIC, A.I.40. An exchange of letters between the Council on Foreign Relations and Chatham House indicates that both institutes disliked Shotwell’s and Carter’s proposal as it implied establishing a permanent organisation. Toynbee, it was alleged, apparently favoured having a regular conference with “frank discussion” instead. Mallory to Ivison S Macadam (RIIA), 1 October 1931 and reply, 20 October 1931, CFR, box 572, folder 10.
67 “In any event, it would seem to me that [the ISC] should be given an opportunity to show what it can do before any steps are taken looking toward the creation of an Institute for Europe for the Study of International Relations.” Gunn to Day, 22 June 1932, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952.
organisation which the ISC was to become would “provide the private people of the world, who have become alive to the crucial importance of international politics, with the means for scientific study; to enable them to learn the facts of international politics with accuracy and to discuss the issues of international politics with the least amount of passion and prejudice and recrimination that is humanly possible”.  

Yet, in one important aspect Toynbee’s vision differed from that of Shotwell who had planned a network of regional institutes in the mould of the IPR. In his speech, Toynbee underlined that European affairs were still of world importance. Thus, even though the ISC was based in Europe, membership was open to non-Europeans, too; in fact, their participation was “indispensable”. This of course was a barely veiled attack on American political isolationism and the “illusion that the non-European world can safely leave Europe to cope with her own troubles”. However, Toynbee’s speech was also a self-confident affirmation of Western, and in particular European, cultural superiority. Post-war dislocations may have pushed European powers to the sidelines, Toynbee admitted, but not entirely. “Even if Europe was to lose its economic and political importance, Europe will then have lost the kingdom and the power, but, it is submitted, she may retain her cultural leadership for an indefinite time to come.” So while the ISC adopted the blueprint of a regional organisation for itself at Copenhagen in 1931, its pretensions remained universal.

Over the next few years, the ISC transformed itself from an annual meeting where academics leisurely discussed administrative matters into scholarly conferences with a common theme. After the Copenhagen meeting, the practice of two-year study cycles was adopted, emulating the IPR’s biannual conferences. From 1933, a programme committee, on which Rockefeller Foundation officer John Van Sickle took

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68 “Summary of an address by Professor A. J. Toynbee on The Trend of International Affairs since the War”, CEIP CE, box 29, folder 1. Extracts of the speech were published in the IIIC’s journal Coopération intellectuelle.

69 Ibid.
a seat, determined the subjects of study. These had to conform to a number of criteria. Apart from practical considerations such as being manageable in the time available, original and of interest to all ISC members, the subject had to be accessible from a number of disciplines, be neither completely practical nor theoretical, and result in a publication capable influencing public opinion. Moreover, the ISC conferences were to treat topics on which there was no unanimity of opinion. Especially this latter requirement was lifted from the model of the IPR, as were the practices of not allowing votes to be taken at study meetings, and of not requiring conclusions, recommendations or unanimous decisions.\textsuperscript{70}

The topics chosen for the biannual study cycles were closely related to current international problems; between 1932 and 1933, state management of the economy was discussed; the 1934/1935 conferences were on collective security; in 1936 and 1937 the problem of peaceful change was addressed; and in 1938/1939 economic policies were on the agenda again. Even the choice of the conference venues—Madrid in 1936, Prague in 1938—uncannily ensured that the ISC remained close to current international crises. The programme for 1940 and 1941 on international organisation had to be aborted because of the Second World War. In 1940, the ISC counted thirty-one members. Six of these were international institutions, comprising the five which have already been mentioned as well as the Geneva Research Center, a private research institute funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment. The other twenty-five delegations represented thirteen European countries and twelve non-European countries, among them the British Dominions, China, India, Egypt, Mexico, Chile, Argentina and the United States.\textsuperscript{71}


\textsuperscript{71} Jean-Jacques Renollet, “L’Institut international de coopération intellectuelle, 1919-1940” (PhD, University of Paris I, 1995), iii, 832-834; for a list of ISC meetings and venues see Long, “Who Killed the International Studies Conference?”, 622.
Debates on Foundation Policy in the Early 1930s

As has already been implied, internal discussions within the foundations also influenced the gradual transformation of the ISC. What was the fundamental problem that the foundations were trying to solve? Shotwell put it most clearly when he urged ICIC to give more attention to the social sciences. Shotwell’s rationale for internationalising the social sciences pointed to the role that these disciplines had played in the creation and consolidation of the nation state, as they gave intellectual ammunition to those forces which promoted its “apotheosis”. Now, he concluded, it was time for the social sciences to “achieve for the community of nations what they have already achieved for the nation state”. 72

It is important to note that Shotwell was not advocating a ‘de-nationalised’ discipline, or even a new, cosmopolitan science. The study of international relations was to be about nations, not about humanity. This is abundantly clear in the definition of international relations which Shotwell put forward in a lengthy memorandum written for the Social Science Research Council: “By “international relations” we mean literally what the phrase itself indicates, that is, the relation between the nations themselves. It does not include the incidental contact of individuals from different nations. … It is the overlapping and interpenetration of national activities beyond the frontiers of the country of origin.” As Shotwell understood it, the nation was a coherent entity which should not be broken up. Any attempt to create a super-state, as intimated by “radical liberals” in the early days of the League, would only lead to more instead of less international disorder. Shotwell’s perspective on public opinion also explains why he did not want to forego the ordering effects of national institutions. In his view

“representatives of the whole body of public opinion” were “less instead of more liberal than the representatives of governments”. In difficult times such as during an economic depression, Shotwell thought, “The uninformed opinion of private citizens, who lack direct contact with the problems of citizens in other countries, and who now are chiefly responsible for any slowness of action at Geneva, would be more likely to put back the clock than to move it forward”.

Thus, public opinion had to be shaped in a way that would leave national specificities intact. Shotwell was looking for “some instrument capable of educating public opinion in each of the countries concerned toward clearer thinking on international problems in which they are deeply concerned, while not yet interfering in any way with their own natural bent in culture, economics, or politics”. He found it in “a federated system of national institutes, each adjusted to its own native soil and yet with a purpose and program that would render it capable of articulation with similar institutes in other countries, to work out objectively and scientifically the problems which are common to them all”.  

International bodies, such as the Graduate Institute in Geneva, were problematic “for then the different national units tend to be suspicious of international direction and control”.

Shotwell, and also his colleagues in the Rockefeller Foundation, saw the way forward in a European version of the IPR, an organisation which operated on the assumption that the dissemination of facts could influence an elite public opinion and, by extension, policy makers. Rockefeller support for the organisation was strong from the beginning. In 1930, the head of the Social Science Division gave the IPR a glowing assessment:

73 “Scientific Method in Research and Discussion in International Relations – A Proposal for Institutes of International Relations”, confidential memo, circulated in May and June 1931, in “International Relations, 1931, Vol. II”, SSRC, series I.X, box 65, folder 345.
The program of objective research which the Institute is developing has unusual promise. Projects are being critically appraised and carefully matured. General direction of the program is in thoroughly competent hands. Unusual opportunities are presented for stimulating scientific and scholarly work over a wide area in which relatively little has thus far been done.\(^75\)

Foundation officers were also aware of Shotwell’s proposal to adapt the IPR model for Europe. They considered it among several approaches in a debate on the direction of the Rockefeller Foundation’s policy towards international relations which took place in 1931 and 1932. After consolidating the Graduate Institute in Geneva and appointing the *Notgemeinschaft* Committee for International Relations, Rockefeller officers were asking themselves “What should we do next?”\(^76\) The early 1930s were a transitional period for the Rockefeller Foundation’s Social Science Division, also due to the Depression-induced drop in foundation income which necessitated a concentration in policy. From 1935, the Social Science Division pursued three narrow fields, namely social security, public administration and international relations.\(^77\) Nevertheless, a special interest in international relations always existed, continuing a trend already visible during Memorial times.\(^78\) Another continuity represented the foundation’s explicit linking of academic research with a practical peace project, as was stated in one of its annual reports: “The expert and the statesman need to develop the habit of fruitful collaboration. Only so can research in the field of international relations fully justify itself.”\(^79\)

Despite being aware of Shotwell’s plans and the activities of various national institutes, it took a hint from the Carnegie Endowment for the Rockefeller Foundation to get involved in the ISC. An internal document dates the first contact to March 1932, when Earle Babcock forwarded the plans for the ISC’s Milan meeting to Selskar M.

\(^{75}\) E.E. Day, Memorandum “Institute of Pacific Relations”, 1930, RF, RG 1 series 200, box 356, folder 4223.
\(^{76}\) Excerpt letter Selskar M. Gunn to E.E. Day, 31 December 1931, RF, RG 3, series 910, box 7, folder 60.
\(^{78}\) “Interracial and International Studies” were listed as a special interest already in the first year of the Social Science Division’s existence. Rockefeller Foundation, *Annual Report 1929* (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1929), 250.
Gunn, the Rockefeller Foundation’s Associate Director in Europe. Without realising it, the Rockefeller Foundation had been giving grants to ISC members for several years. Gunn, who, at the suggestion of the Carnegie Endowment, visited the Milan conference in May, noted that he “was rather surprised at the number of people present who are connected with institutions of one kind or another which are receiving aid from us at the present time”. In his opinion, the ISC had the potential to fulfil a task that the Foundation had pursued for a while: “This may possibly develop into the organization in Europe which would bring about a coordination of research programs in studies of international questions.”

Ever since Luchaire’s departure from the IIIC in 1930 and the connected perceived waning of French governmental influence, a grant to the Institute for the ISC became a much more attractive option to both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment.

In the following years, Rockefeller officers at the Paris office and in New York closely observed the development of the ISC. Starting with a small Paris Office grant of $1500 in 1932, the Rockefeller Foundation entered into a substantial financial commitment. Contributions to the ISC via the IIC steadily rose from a further $3500 in Paris Office funds between 1932 and 1935 to substantial contributions in 1935 ($30,000) and 1936 ($40,000). A $100,000 grant awarded in 1937 and complemented by another $5000 grant-in aid in 1938 finally turned the ISC into the Rockefeller Foundation’s European flagship programme in international relations. Between 1935 and 1937, the foundation also made individual, smaller grants to national groups or institutions affiliated with the ISC, a task which the IIIC took over in 1938. But of

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81 Gunn to Day, 22 June 1932, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952.
82 The new director, Henri Bonnet, also managed to bring about less acrimonious relations between ICIC and IIIC; see Babcock’s report on ICIC meeting, July 1932, CEIP CE, box 29, folder 4.
83 Resolution RF 37117, 1 December 1937, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952. Note that the $40,000 grant of 1936 was not given to the IIIC but was distributed directly to ISC members.
course the Foundation was no passive source of money. In collaboration with the Carnegie Endowment, which, despite its feeble financial muscle, had again acted as a scouting organisation for its fellow philanthropic foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation moulded the ISC into an organisation which barely betrayed its beginnings under the auspices of the IIIC.

**Foundations and the International Studies Conference: Early Achievements**

In what ways did the foundations influence the direction of the International Studies Conference? As has been shown, the foundations indirectly contributed to the discussions on the transformation of the ISC in 1931 and 1932 via Shotwell’s foundation-funded Social Science Research Council activities. The most obvious impact that especially the Rockefeller Foundation had on the ISC was, of course, financial. Between 1932 and 1938, the Rockefeller Foundation appropriated altogether $180,000 to the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation for supporting the ISC, with the last grant running out in 1940. Apart from the Geneva Graduate Institute, the foundation spent more on the ISC than on any other item of its international relations programme in Europe. Support from the Rockefeller Foundation came at a critical time for the IIIC. In 1931, the League of Nations had cut the budget of the Institute by forty percent, and France, as the principal donor, followed suit the same year. As contributions from official sources dwindled, the Rockefeller grants increased. In 1938, funding from the Rockefeller Foundation exceeded that of the French government. To both the Foundation and the IIIC the International Studies Conference represented a big

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84 1 December 1937, Resolution RF 37117; postscript dated 16 April 1930 [likely to be 1939], both RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952.
85 See Appendix.
investment. For Rockefeller officers, the ISC was a flagship project, and for the Institute failure or success of the ISC determined its survival.

Between 1932 and 1935, the foundations and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation collaborated more or less harmoniously in developing the ISC. Foundation resources paid for additional staff at the Institute so that it could function as a secretariat for the ISC and liaise between the ever growing number of national groups. Foundation officers sat on the executive and programme committees and, through their Paris offices, coordinated their work. Thus, the ISC became a catalyst for the increasing collaboration between Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropy. On several levels, the foundations were pleased with the progress the ISC made. First, despite the initial misgivings about using the IIIC to coordinate the cooperation between the national institutes, foundation officers recognised that the IIIC’s status was helpful as that enabled it to make more influential suggestions than a national body could. Moreover, the foundations’ qualms about supporting a League-affiliated body were allayed when the ISC declared itself an independent and autonomous organisation in 1934, a move that was probably a result of foundation pressure, as later discussions within the Rockefeller Foundations indicate. Second, foundation officers noted with pleasure that the ISC seemed to be moving in the “general direction of the set-up of the Institute of Pacific Relations”. Third, the ISC stimulated the formation of national institutes for the study of international relations in several countries along lines that the foundations favoured.

87 Memorandum “Re: International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, Paris”, 22 May 1934, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952.
88 In Chalmers-Wright, International Studies Conference, 29. Walker to Kittredge, 14 Nov 1936, stating that “the funds which we are placing at the disposal of the ISC are given with the idea that it is an independent body”, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 105, folder 954.
89 Memorandum, Day and Van Sickle conversation in London, 20 May 1934, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952.
The Rockefeller Foundation’s preferred model for national institutes was Chatham House, which had, from 1932, benefitted from considerable philanthropic largesse. Prior to 1933, the British and German ISC groups were regarded as the most significant ones, but with the demise of the German infrastructure for the study of international relations after the Nazis came to power, British initiatives and notably Chatham House became a veritable blueprint for the development of Rockefeller international relations work in other countries.90 After the 1933 International Studies Conference in London, one Rockefeller Foundation officer noted that the meeting “exercised a considerable influence upon the thinking of the scholars from other European countries. It was a revelation to many of them to see the organization of Chatham House, the quantity and quality of its research work and the prestige and influence which Chatham House exercises upon public opinion and political leaders generally.” 91 Chatham House represented the model for national foreign affairs institutes for the Rockefeller Foundation. Since the ISC helped to spread this model, it was regarded as very useful by foundation officers. The Rockefeller Foundation even asked Chatham House to provide an assessment as to what extent a transfer of its own model to other European countries would be possible, “notably France, Holland, Belgium, Poland, Roumania (Gusti), Czechoslovakia (Lev Winter) and the Scandinavian countries”.92

One country that was particularly high on the agenda was France. Despite the existence of a loose association of French scholars with an interest in international relations, the Commission française de coordination des hautes études internationales, there were no coordinated institutional structures, a state of affairs which E.E. Day, director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Social Science Division, came to refer to as

90 Gunn to Day, 22 June 1932, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952.
91 Van Sickle to Day, 8 June 1933, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952.
“the French gap”.

At the ISC, France was mostly represented by Louis Eisenmann, a Sorbonne professor with a specialism in the history of the Slavic countries, who was also on the programme committee. The 1933 International Studies Conference in London seems to have motivated the French coordinating committee to develop a plan for a permanent institute in the mould of Chatham House. Consequently, John Van Sickle, the Rockefeller Foundation’s Assistant Director in Europe, entered into discussions with “key people” in Paris. As a result, the Centre d’études de politique étrangère (CEPE) was founded in Paris in 1935.

Its programme resembled that of Chatham House closely, featuring study groups, an information service, review and monograph publications as well as individual and collective research projects. Half of the funding came from French sources but the Rockefeller Foundation supported the venture with two major grants of $70,000 and $102,000 respectively. Interestingly, Bonnet was one of CEPE’s vice-presidents. Etienne Dennery, a professor at the Ecole libre, and Louis Joxe, a former teacher and civil servant who worked at Havas, France’s oldest press agency, were responsible for the running of the new institute. The Dotation-affiliated Pierre Renouvin was in charge of its information service. These informal links to the Carnegie Endowment became more definite in 1938 when CEPE started to administer the Carnegie Endowment’s French side of its recently resurrected International Relations Club programme. The CEPE directors were quite aware of the foundations’ priorities. In conversation with Rockefeller Foundation officers Joxe affirmed that their goal was

93 Day to Gunn, 13 July 1932, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952.
94 Kittredge, Memorandum “Conversation with Prof. Bouglé, Paris”, 16 Nov 1933, RF, RG 1.1, series 500, box 20, folder 204. Mazon does not mention the ISC as a catalyst of the French developments, probably because she takes a country-specific approach. Mazon, Origines, 59-60.
95 Day to Packard, 19 March 1934, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952.
96 RF Resolutions 35136, 27 Sep 1935; 38046, 6 April 1938, RF, RG 1.1, series 500, box 20, folder 204.
97 Kittredge to Walker, “Projects for development of activities of the Centre d’Etudes de Politique Etrangère”, 15 June 1938, RF, RG 1.1, series 500, box 20, folder 205.
to build “a French equivalent of Chatham House”.98 As had happened in Britain, the French IPR group effectively became part of CEPE in 1936. In its major field of interest, colonial studies, CEPE also embarked on collaborative studies with Chatham House.99

The Rockefeller Foundation’s plan to spread the Chatham House model also bore fruit in Northern Europe. Before 1936, the ISC only had one Scandinavian member organisation, the Institute for Economics and History in Copenhagen, a recipient of Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and Rockefeller Foundation funding since 1928.100 Sydnor Walker, assistant director of the Foundation’s Social Science Division and chiefly responsible for the international relations programme, regarded the Copenhagen institute as “one of the best prospects for a national center” for international relations.101 The situation was less promising in Norway and Sweden where there were no equivalent institutions. After a plan for a Scandinavian research programme in international relations did not succeed, the Rockefeller Foundation used the ISC mechanism to encourage the formation of national coordinating committees for international studies in those two countries, both of which contributed to ISC research programmes. Ultimately, the foundation’s prompting led to the launch of two foreign affairs journals and the foundation of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in 1938.102 Again, the ISC helped the Rockefeller Foundation to achieve its goal of

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101 Walker, Memorandum “International Studies Conference”, 8 January 1936, RF, RG 1.1, series 713, box 6, folder 68.
102 Bjørn Arne Steine, “Scandinavian Foreign Policy Elites and their Networks, 1900-1939” (paper presented at the Nordic Summer School in Contemporary History, Great Powers, Small States and International Institutions, St. Petersburg, 12-17 August 2007).
creating a network of foreign affairs institutes all over Europe. Similar developments took place in Poland and Romania.\textsuperscript{103}

But the Rockefeller Foundation’s ultimate motive for supporting the International Studies Conference and with it the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation was always clear: it was “the promotion of better international relations”.\textsuperscript{104} “Better international relations” was of course a loaded and yet vague term which could mean different things to different foundation officers. They rarely spelt out what they meant by it themselves. Most of them, though, would have agreed that a reversal of protectionist trade policies would have been a good thing, as well as a containment or even moderation of fascist aggression, and the acceptance of liberal values. What is clear, however, is that foundation officers had long moved away from promoting intellectual cooperation for intellectual cooperation’s sake. Tracy B. Kittredge of the Rockefeller Paris office communicated this point of view rather bluntly to IIIC staff, explaining that “The RF while interested in the Studies Conference looked upon it as a means rather than an end.”\textsuperscript{105}

Therefore, the Foundation was keen on attracting foreign policy elites, namely policy makers and those around them, to the conferences. It was for this reason that Kittredge had underlined in one of his reports on CEPE that the institution had successfully recruited businessmen, journalists, diplomats and politicians.\textsuperscript{106} This constituency corresponded to that of the IPR, which is why one continuous question asked by foundation officers was when the ISC would move on from intellectual

\textsuperscript{103} Kittredge to Walker, memorandum “Future Program in the Field of International Relations in Europe”, 7 February 1935, RF, RG 3, series 910, box 7, folder 60.
\textsuperscript{104} Day to Packard, 19 March 1934, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952.
\textsuperscript{105} Kittredge, Memorandum of Interview with Gross, former Austrian Fellow, Paris, 28 October 1935, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 953.
\textsuperscript{106} Kittredge to Willits, “Centre d’Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Paris”, 19 June 1939, RF, RG 1.1, series 500, box 20, folder 205.
cooperation to para-diplomatic conferences. The minutes of a 1935 staff meeting illustrate this:

[E.E. Day:] “[The IIIC grant] relates to a program in Europe which is coming to parallel a bit the program of the Institute of Pacific Relations. They are holding conferences of organizations interested in research in international relations.” [Thomas B. Appleget] asks “Over and beyond the field of scholarly co-operation? (EED) So far on the academic and research side, but they are gradually drawing in men of affairs, just as the Institute has. It is very promising thus far.”

This stance left its mark on the ISC which, by 1937, described its work as having three objectives, namely to “develop a system of technical collaboration among its affiliated institutions”, to “organise collective research on specific problems in international relations” and “place … an objective machinery at the disposal of the statesmen, politicians, diplomats, journalists and others concerned with the practice of international affairs”.

Before the Rockefeller Foundation decided to allot its first substantial grant to the ISC in September 1935, there were indications, as noted in the quotation, that the conferences would be able to reach out to foreign policy elites. At the 1934 and 1935 sessions statesmen like Edouard Herriot and Austen Chamberlain were present. However, official interest in the ISC brought its own problems, as discussions at the conferences were often used by national groups to present the policy positions of their respective governments, instead of scholarly opinions on a particular issue. One Rockefeller Foundation officer described the split between delegations from the liberal democracies and authoritarian states that came to the fore at the 1934 Paris meeting:

The discussion revealed the increasing difficulties arising out of the presence in a single Study Conference of representatives coming from States with authoritarian governments and others coming from States where freedom of research still prevails. The English group tried in vain to secure recognition of

107 “Staff Conference” September 20, 1935, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 105, folder 953.
the principle that at the big Conference next year, the attending scholars should remain free to express their individual convictions. The Italian and the Polish representatives made it plain that as far as they were concerned their delegates would have to voice the opinions formulated in their respective countries in the course of their internal studies.110

The Rockefeller Foundation hoped to solve this problem by improving the mechanism of the conferences in order to achieve a higher degree of liaison between the national groups. This plan became apparent during the grant discussions with Bonnet in summer 1935. The Rockefeller Foundation requested that its grant be used to pay for increased travel expenses of IIIC staff and to facilitate frequent meetings of the representatives of the national organisations.111 The Rockefeller Foundation regarded the ISC as its best hope of fulfilling the aims of its international relations programme. The grant to the IIIC was seen as an experiment, to see whether the ISC mechanism could develop. However, the collaboration between the foundations and the IIIC soon turned sour.

Foundations and the International Studies Conference: Doubts and Conflicts

A major source of dissatisfaction lay in the very nature of the IIIC as an international organisation with a highly developed bureaucracy and complex administrative processes. As such, it was unable to produce the efficient mechanism for the coordination of the national group efforts which the Rockefeller Foundation desired. The completion of preparatory reports progressed slowly, meetings were unproductive and when Bonnet remarked that it might not be possible to complete all the necessary work in time for the 1937 conference, Sydnor Walker reacted angrily. Having lobbied forcefully to keep the ISC linked to Paris, Bonnet and the IIIC now had to accept much

110 Memorandum “International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, Seventh Session of the International Studies Conference”, 24 May 1934, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952.
of the blame for its failings. “The countries themselves have in a number of cases been slow in organizing, but some of the responsibility is clearly that of the central body”, Walker wrote. She was suspicious that the money intended to go to the ISC was really used to prop up the ailing IIIC. Nor did she have much sympathy for the explanations that Kittredge, who backed Bonnet, put forward, as she underlined that “there are a number of strategic reasons for trying to bring in a definite report on the subject in 1937. The obvious importance of producing something tangible to focus the attention of the various governments of Europe is of primary concern.” If the ISC was unable to deliver, she implied, funding would be withdrawn.\(^{112}\)

Walker also criticised the bulky and, in her opinion, unreadable ISC publications.\(^{113}\) This criticism was justified to some extent as the conference proceedings as such certainly lacked popular appeal and lacked the reader-friendly design of, for example, the Foreign Policy Association’s *Headline* books. Whether and with what intensity the ISC publications were consulted by foreign policy makers is hard to assess.\(^{114}\) However, sometimes the transition from ISC discussion to intergovernmental policy was made successfully. Charles Kindleberger, for example, has observed that the Tripartite Monetary Agreement of 1937, arguably one of the bases for the post-1945 world economic system, was inspired by a suggestion made by Danish economist Jørgen Pedersen at the 1933 International Studies Conference in London. The proceedings of that conference had been distributed to the delegates of the World

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\(^{112}\) Walker to Kittredge, “Program of the International Studies Conference”, 20 May 1936, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 105, folder 954.

\(^{113}\) Walker to Kittredge, “Madrid Conference of the ISC”, 19 June 1936, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 105, folder 954.

\(^{114}\) They can be found in government archives, though. See ISC documents from the mid-1930s, some of them marked, in PA AA, R 102538.
Economic Conference which took place at the same time and place, and in that case, the transfer from academic discussion to policy had been successful.  

Other reports from Kittredge were even more disquieting. In a bid to make the ISC more efficient, the subject for the 1937 conference, peaceful change, had been divided up into four subtopics, to be prepared by international expert committees on colonial questions, population problems, raw materials and Danubian questions. Each of these preparatory studies, in effect a synthesis of the studies of the national groups, was coordinated by a secretary-rapporteur. In the case of the colonial studies group, this was a Norwegian former Rockefeller social science fellow, H.O. Christophersen. He complained to Kittredge that his work was made more difficult by the ISC mechanism, as correspondence was diverted through the IIIC. Moreover, it seemed that the national groups were not keen on disinterestedly sharing information, as had been the idea, but on pushing national colonial claims. “The national groups themselves are very jealous in many cases of their prerogatives, and instead of turning over the enquiry to qualified experts often prepare themselves the reply, giving not the information desired by Christophersen, but the information which the national groups, as such, think it would be wise for him to have.” Walker replied dryly that she was “not surprised to hear that the individual countries view the colonial question from the point of view of national interests” but again put the failures of the colonial group down to the IIIC’s inadequacies, claiming “that the machinery for research set up by the ISC is not yet functioning smoothly”.

Maybe it was for this reason that Malcolm Davis, the director of the *Dotation Carnegie*, assumed the chairmanship of the Danubian studies group, to ensure that a question which had been an enduring concern for the Carnegie Endowment, would be treated with the appropriate objectivity. The main focus of this group was to prepare a basis for the discussion of Danubian economic integration, and a number of statistical and documentary studies were produced.\textsuperscript{118} The Danubian group seems to have progressed satisfactorily, as the Rockefeller Foundation supported the continuation of this work beyond the scope of the ISC with another grant in 1937.\textsuperscript{119}

Increasingly, the Rockefeller Foundation doubted whether the IIIC was really capable of integrating cross-national collaborative research programmes. Some of the criticisms, mostly those related to the bureaucratic inefficiencies of an essentially intergovernmental body such as the IIIC, were most probably justified. Other problems that the foundation encountered went to the heart of the entire ISC project. Foundation officers increasingly perceived the International Studies Conference as an appropriate venue for discussion and the dissemination for information but not for collaborative research; smaller research institutes with an international staff but attached to the ISC were seen as better equipped for that function. Just as general doubts in the efficacy of the ISC mechanism became apparent, the issue of another foundation-supported venture came up which enabled the foundations to sideline the IIIC and to develop alternative structures for administering the ISC. At the foundation’s initiative, more and more coordinating functions were displaced from Paris and moved to Geneva, to a private research institution named the Geneva Research Center.

The Geneva Research Center was formed in 1930 by a group of American expatriates in Geneva. They included American staff at the League such as Arthur

\textsuperscript{118} International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, *Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle*, 274.

\textsuperscript{119} Resolution RF 37118 awarded $25,000 to the Danubian group, 1 December 1937, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 110, folder 1002.
Sweetser and Benjamin Gerig, representatives of American nongovernmental organisations such as the League of Nations Association representative Felix Morley, as well as American scholars who taught at the Institut de Hautes Études Internationales, namely the international organisation specialist and former assistant to James Brown Scott Pitman Potter, and the economist Jacob Viner. The purpose of the centre was to keep Americans informed about the League of Nations, mostly via two publications, the monthly newsletter Geneva and the so-called Geneva Special Studies. The Geneva Research Center also completed special assignments for the Council on Foreign Relations and the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences. A personal gift by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. to Arthur Sweetser helped fund the centre while the Carnegie Endowment provided the salary for its director Malcolm Davis from 1931.\footnote{RF Resolution 33027, 12 April 1933; Memorandum, “The Growth of the Geneva Research Center”, 1932; John Van Sickle, Memorandum “Geneva Research Center”, 23 January 1933, all RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 5, folder 45.}

Davis was a journalist who had been introduced to Shotwell and Butler by Sweetser, a former colleague at the provincial newspaper for which Davis had written prior to the war. Davis was a typical American elite internationalist, even if not from a wealthy background. A Yale graduate with a Committee on Public Information war record, he ran an unsuccessful monthly foreign affairs magazine before becoming executive director of the Council on Foreign Relations between 1925 and 1927. He then moved to Yale University Press but still worked as a contributing foreign affairs editor for Outlook. The Carnegie Endowment recruited him as the director of the Geneva Research Center but mainly to write reports on the Disarmament Conference due to assemble in Geneva in early 1932.\footnote{Davis Oral History, i, 17, 80-96.} Butler and Shotwell, who seem to have regarded Davis’ services as those of a personal research assistant, valued his insights into League politics so much that they distributed his missives as confidential reports for the
Carnegie Endowment Trustees. Although the level of Davis’ inside knowledge was disputed by the Carnegie Corporation, which, at that time, funded a significant number of Endowment activities, he seems to have been very well-connected within the ‘Geneva scene’, at least according to the American consul Prentiss Gilbert, who passed Geneva Research Center publications on to the State Department. In 1933, Gilbert claimed that the centre “By virtue of the position of some of its members … has access to [League] Secretariat information unequalled perhaps by any other private organization”.

It was also on the strength of the centre’s “objective” publications that the Rockefeller Foundation started supporting it in 1933 with a three-year grant of $24,000. This was increased in 1935 to compensate for the U.S. dollar’s depreciation and two additional appropriations of altogether $53,350 followed in 1936 and 1937. Mostly, however, the Geneva Research Center served the American community in Geneva and organisations in the United States. Kittredge recognised that the centre did not really link up with the rest of the Foundation’s work in Europe. When Malcolm Davis left Geneva to assume the directorship of the *Dotation* in 1935, however, the centre was reorganised under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Association (FPA), a private foreign affairs think tank, with the tacit approval of the Rockefeller Foundation. The FPA had already collaborated with the centre occasionally, and issued joint

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122 Shotwell to Haskell, 13 April 1932, CEIP, box 130, folder 1. See also Davis’ reports in CEIP, box 130.
123 A Carnegie Corporation staff member was characteristically unimpressed: “Sometimes, indeed, when one of these memoranda comes to me, mysteriously circulated, marked strictly confidential and then is found to tell in rather a breathless and mystic hush what one has been reading in the newspapers for ten days, the effect is a little banal.”, Memorandum “Carnegie Endowment: Mr. Davis’ reports from Geneva”, 15 August 1933, CC, grant files, box 73, folder 1; Prentiss Gilbert, despatch 972, American consulate Geneva, 16 August 1934, NARA, RG 59, 800.43 International Federation of League of Nations Societies/24.
124 Despatch 526, American consulate Geneva, 27 February 1933, NARA, RG 59, 811.43/66
125 Memorandum Van Sickle to Day, 29 July 1932; RF Resolutions 33027, 12 April 1933; 36113, 25 September 1936; 37068, 21 May 1937; in addition, the Rockefeller Paris office allotted a grant-in-aid of $2,400 in 1938 (No. 4, IR), all RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 5, folder 45. The RF also gave $50,000 for a collaborative study on commercial policy and international trade which was based at the Geneva Research Center under the direction of J.B. Condliffe. Memorandum ME for Joseph Willits, 11 May 1939, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 6, folder 53.
126 Excerpt letter Kittredge to Walker, 15 February 1935, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 5, folder 46.
At the time of the reorganisation, the Rockefeller Foundation also gave substantial subsidies to the FPA. Its president, Raymond Leslie Buell, was an alumnus of the Rockefeller philanthropic network. Buell wrote a magisterial study on colonialism in Africa under the auspices of the Bureau of International Research of Harvard and Radcliffe College, an institution entirely dependent on Rockefeller funding. He was also a protégée of Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial trustee Colonel Arthur Woods who took a special interest in Buell’s African field research.

In August 1935, Buell temporarily moved to Geneva. He endeavoured to turn the Geneva Research Center into an overseas liaison hub for the FPA, through which it would be able to distribute its publications in Europe. To that end he proposed to internationalise the centre, putting Europeans onto the hitherto exclusively American board and cooperating with foreign affairs institutes such as Chatham House and the newly-formed CEPE. Buell specifically intended to utilise the distribution channels of the Royal Institute of International Affairs as well as the subscription base of *L’Esprit International* for FPA purposes. Finally, Buell sought to rupture the centre’s links with the League Secretariat and the American League of Nations Association which the centre informally represented. This was a thinly veiled attack on Sweetser, the centre’s most important link to the League. Buell labelled the previous activities of the Geneva Research Centre as League propaganda. However, the Foreign Policy

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127 Memorandum, Van Sickle conversation with M. Davis, 15 June 1934, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 5, folder 45.
128 From 1933 to 1943, the RF allotted altogether $515,000 to the FPA. See summary of grants, 7 December 1938; RF resolutions 38106, 7 December 1938 and 41110, 3 December 1941, all RF, RG 1.1, series 200, box 333, folder 3968.
Association engaged in wide-ranging publicity campaigns in the United States itself, even if it, just like the Geneva Research Centre, always professed non-partisanship. Coincidentally, just as Buell became active in Geneva, the FPA was about to launch a new popular education programme with its Headline books series—the first was published in 1936. Thus, Buell’s move against the old board members of the centre seems to have been motivated more by rivalry than by a difference in approach, as has been claimed previously.

Malcolm Davis and the Rockefeller Foundation officers backed Buell. They also suggested an association between the International Studies Conference, hitherto unknown to Buell, and the Geneva Research Center. Malcolm Davis made the necessary inquiries in Paris and, together with Kittredge, drew up a plan that set up the centre as an international clearing house that was to assist the national groups of the ISC and provide a meeting place for informal discussions. In accordance with the wishes of Sydnor Walker, a permanent director was also appointed in the person of John B. Whitton, a Princeton economics professor. Malcolm Davis secured an additional grant of $8000 from the Carnegie Endowment. Finally, a reluctant Sweetser also agreed to a new, international board which included Bonnet and representatives of the several ISC members, such as William Rappard of the Institut de Hautes Études Internationales, Etienne Dennery of CEPE and Ivison Macadam of the RIIA. The new board also included a German jurist, Friedrich (Fritz) Berber, whom Buell had recruited on a trip to Berlin during his extended European sojourn.

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132 Kuehl and Dunn, Keeping the Covenant, 175. Moreover, a strong link to the League might have been something of a liability for a foreign affairs think tank at the time, as American enthusiasm for the League had decreased markedly after it became clear in mid-1935 that a final rejection of World Court membership by the United States was imminent.

133 Memorandum of conversations of Kittredge and Walker with Buell, May, Gerig, Sweetser in Geneva, 29-30 August 1935, 6 and 10 September 1935; Kittredge to Walker, 12 October 1935 (two letters),
To Kittredge, the reorganisation of the Geneva Research Center held exceptional promise. Finally, it might provide a suitable mechanism for more direct foundation leadership within the ISC: “Perhaps the most encouraging fact of all is the tendency, already evident, that the national centers will look to us for leadership and inspiration.”

The Geneva Research Center started to host ISC subgroup meetings from 1937. In the same year, and due to Rockefeller pressure, a special programme committee independent of the IIIC and under the chairmanship of Malcolm Davis was created for the supervision of cross-national, long-term studies. This was a further attempt to change the ISC structure. The Rockefeller Foundation’s continuous interventions, also with regards to the nomination of general rapporteurs, finally led Bonnet to accuse Kittredge of wanting to take over “the complete control of the mechanism and program of the Conference.” But despite the increasingly strained relationship between the IIIC and the foundation, a major grant was awarded in December 1937. In the grant resolution, the Rockefeller Foundation held on to the idea that the ISC was, for better or for worse, the only way to fulfil the purposes of its international relations programme. “There is no other unofficial organization which has the opportunity of the International Studies Conference to provide for the study and discussion by representatives of many nations of the problems which to-day complicate both national and international life.”

However, even the fraught reorganisations of the ISC in 1937 could not improve its outcomes, at least in the view of the Rockefeller Foundation’s New York office. Kittredge who was based in Paris was a lot more optimistic about the ISC’s results than

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Walker to Kittredge, 30 October 1935, all RF, RG 1.1 series 100, box 5, folder 46; Kittredge to Walker, 18 March 1936, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 5, folder 47; Kittredge to Walker, 9 October 1936, 13 October 1936 and 19 November 1936, all RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 5, folder 48.

134 Kittredge to Walker, 22 October 1936, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 5, folder 48.


137 Resolution RF 37117, 1 December 1937, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952.
his colleagues in New York. In one of his reports, he explained that “While the tangible results of the Conferences are difficult to appraise, it does undoubtedly represent a vigorous effort to improve the processes by which scientific knowledge of international problems can be increased, and this knowledge disseminated for the enlightenment of public opinion in all of those countries where public opinion still plays an effective role in the determination of foreign policy.” The short and sceptical comment that Walker scribbled on the margin was: “How?”

Of course, the New York officers were the ones who had to justify Rockefeller support for the ISC to the Trustees of the Foundation, and the international atmosphere of the late 1930s certainly did not inspire confidence in the possibility of peaceful cooperation among nations. This was not the fault of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation or the ISC but it eroded the Rockefeller Foundation’s commitment to intellectual cooperation in the cause of peace. As Walker noted, “There is increasing distrust of the results to be expected from conferences carried on by academic or near-academic people. We are rather afraid since the political tension has so increased that the ISC will become less realistic and more academic.”

By July 1939, shortly before the last International Studies Conference in the inter-war period, the Rockefeller Foundation had lost almost all enthusiasm for a project it had embraced so wholeheartedly just a few years before. Walker confessed to a colleague that she could hardly begin to brace herself to attend the next conference in Bergen which took place between 27 August and 2 September 1939. Although Walker had already decided in May 1939 not to appropriate another large grant to the ISC for the time being, the outbreak of the Second World War terminated Rockefeller commitment to this particular project for good.

138 Kittredge to Walker, 6 Sep 1937, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 955.
139 Excerpt letter Walker to Kittredge, 13 April 1938, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 958.
140 Walker to Gunn, 24 February 1939, excerpt, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 959.
In the eyes of Rockefeller Foundation officers, the ISC had been a failure. After all, it had not been able to prevent a new war in Europe. Even more embarrassingly, foundation lobbying had actually ensured the participation of scholars from the dictatorships in the ISC. The most vocal and influential one, Fritz Berber, even proposed to take over the direction of the IIIC after the fall of France as the Third Reich’s commissioner for intellectual cooperation. Between 1935 and 1937, Berber also continuously pressured the Rockefeller Foundation to weaken the link between IIIC and ISC as it made German participation in the conferences more difficult.\footnote{See e.g. Berber to Kittredge, 2 October 1937, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 106, folder 957.} Shortly after Germany left the League in October 1933, German membership in the ISC ended, too, after consultations between the German coordinating committee and the Ministry of External Affairs in Berlin concluded that the link to the IIIC made further participation impossible.\footnote{Memorandum Oster for Barandon, 12 Dezember 1933, PA AA, R 65746, VIW 10389.} However, Berber only a year later attended the 1935 International Studies Conference as an observer. The research institute he directed, the \textit{Deutsches Institut für Außenpolitische Forschung}, became a corresponding member of the ISC in 1936.\footnote{Chalmers-Wright, \textit{International Studies Conference}, 44.}

What had caused this reversal, and why were the foundations not more puzzled by it?

\textit{National Socialist Participation in the International Studies Conference}

Berber had originally been on the staff of the \textit{Deutsche Hochschule für Politik} where he had led the research division. It was here that he had first come into contact with the foundations. In 1935 he took over the directorship of the Hamburg \textit{Institut für Auswärtige Politik}, and oversaw its transfer to Berlin where it was renamed the \textit{Deutsches Institut für Außenpolitische Forschung} (German Institute for Foreign Policy Studies). The move was ordered by Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler’s foreign policy adviser and later Minister of External Affairs, who took Berber under his wing and got
him to work for his own foreign policy brains trust, the Dienststelle Ribbentrop.\textsuperscript{144} The Dienststelle Ribbentrop was a sophisticated cultural relations operation outside the German Ministry of External Affairs, and thus fitted into the plurocratic system of foreign policy-making in the Third Reich. It worked on ad-hoc tasks given to it by Hitler but also developed a method of using the internationalist rhetoric on international conciliation of the 1920s for the purposes of the Third Reich. To that end, it maintained a division for organising Franco-German meetings of Great War veterans. Staff of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop forged relations with influential elites in selected countries and used them to create positive propaganda for Germany. A favourite strategy was the used of targeted indiscretions designed to make foreign interlocutors believed that they were being taken into their confidence and were able to influence the formation of Nazi foreign policy.\textsuperscript{145}

This is precisely what Berber started to do at the ISC, as well as create goodwill for Germany. During a debate on regional pacts at the 1935 conference, Berber explained why Germany was not in favour of them, referring to a recent speech by Hitler. “But it was impossible for him to go in detail into the reasons why Germany felt as she did so long as the Third Reich remained ‘terra incognita’ and so long as outsiders continued to regard it, as they did quite wrongly, as a fascist state, as a totalitarian state or as a dictatorship. It was none of these things.”\textsuperscript{146} He continued his publicity effort for Nazi Germany with a lecture held at the Dotation Carnegie in May 1936, and he

\textsuperscript{144} For biographical information on Berber see Hermann Weber, “Rechtswissenschaft im Dienst der NS-Propaganda: Das Hamburger Institut für Auswärtige Politik und die deutsche Völkerrechtsdoktrin in den Jahren 1933 bis 1945”, in Wissenschaftliche Verantwortung und politische Macht, ed. Klaus Jürgen Gantzel (Berlin: Reimer, 1986), 376-409; Berber also left an autobiography which seems, however, to have been written with the main aim to justify and exculpate his actions during the Third Reich. Rather appropriately, the title translates as "Between Power and Conscience". Friedrich Berber, Zwischen Macht und Gewissen: Lebenserinnerungen (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1986).


published an article in the *Dotation*’s journal. The Royal Institute of International Affairs was also targeted. Berber gave a lecture there and managed to invite several Chatham House members over to Berlin, among them Arnold Toynbee. His speech, which advocated colonial possessions in Africa for Germany, was warmly received in Berlin and harshly criticised in London.

Although assessments of Berber in the secondary literature remain vague—he never became a Nazi party member and could apparently secure a modicum of intellectual freedom for his staff—it is certain that he used his international contacts to support the regime and to undermine the ISC. A journey he undertook in March 1936 to participate at an ISC administrative meeting had been instigated by Ribbentrop personally. It is likely that Berber’s participation in the subgroup on colonial questions in which he lobbied intensely for German access to colonies was also directed by Ribbentrop whose *idée fixe* was German colonial expansion in Africa.

Foundation officers were not unaware of Berber’s connections to the Nazi foreign policy elite. However, Berber also possessed certain intellectual credentials which made it easier for him to participate in the ISC’s structures. His ideas on international law and international politics were actually taken up by other ISC

152 His most influential publication seems to have been Fritz Berber, *Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit: Eine allgemeinverständliche Einführung in die Hauptprobleme der Völkerrechtspolitik* (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1934).
participants, notably by E.H. Carr.\textsuperscript{153} Carr, a former diplomat and member of the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, had left the Foreign Office to take up the Woodrow Wilson Professorship of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, in 1936. He was profoundly critical of liberal internationalism and a vocal supporter of appeasement. Carr attended the 1937 conference, as a member of the British Coordinating Committee, and cited Berber in his well-known \textit{Twenty Years Crisis}.\textsuperscript{154} In that study, Carr refuted the legal positivism which had inspired at least some of the philanthropic backers of the ISC and returned to Austinian command theory which held that international law did not actually exist. To be fair to Carr, though, he did not adopt Berber’s \textit{völkisch} conception of law, but used it to underline that international law had to be based on a strong international community of values. As long as these were absent, international law was weak, and it was, Carr argued, futile to depend on it for the maintenance of peace.\textsuperscript{155}

Berber also received the stamp of approval from émigré scholars who were trusted sources of information for the Rockefeller Foundation. One of them was Arnold Wolfers, a former colleague at the \textit{Hochschule}, who classified Berber as a ‘moderate’ and thus worthy of Rockefeller support against more extreme forces within Germany. Wolfers also told the Foundation about a book by Berber on Locarno which had received positive reviews in the London \textit{Times} and specifically encouraged the Foundation to work with Berber.\textsuperscript{156} Wolfers was certainly not a Nazi sympathiser. He aided German scholars who had to flee the Third Reich and asked for his assistance in

procuring academic jobs in the United States. However, his positive appraisal of Berber had consequences which Wolfers had probably not been able to foresee.

Berber and his German collaborators, many of whom worked at institutions which had been supported by the Rockefeller Foundation before 1933, profited materially from his good standing with the foundations. Not only was Berber able to access ISC funds which the Rockefeller Foundation had granted to the IIIC for the national groups, the Deutsche Institut für Außenpolitische Forschung also received a donation of several hundred foreign-language books from the Dotation Carnegie, which might have been difficult to procure otherwise. Malcolm Davis and Tracy B. Kittredge specifically asked IIIC officers to provide generous grants for German ISC studies under Berber’s direction.

In the mid-thirties, some Rockefeller Foundation staff members, in particular Kittredge, came to the conclusion that scholars from Italy and Germany, and possibly even from the Soviet Union, should be included in the ISC because in these countries experts supposedly had “even greater influence in the councils of government than scholars in the liberal countries”. What the ISC could do was to convince these individuals of “the political nature of present national dissatisfaction and of the revisionistic claims of certain of the powers”. Therefore, influential experts such as Berber were welcome at the ISC, precisely because they were close to governments. Kittredge’s superiors in New York partly agreed with him, even though they were more open to German than Soviet participation in the ISC. Neither Fosdick nor Walker

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157 Wolfers to Kuenzer, 28 February 1938, Arnold Wolfers Papers, Stirling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, box 2, folder 19.
158 See lists of books expedited to the Institute, probably in 1937, CEIP CE, box 163, folder 36.
159 Kittredge to Gross, 11 March 1938; Davis to Gross, 11 March 1938, both IIIC, A.II.28 ter.
160 Kittredge to Walker, 16 June 1936, memorandum “Underlying problems presented by the International Relations Program”, RG 3, Series 910, Box 7, Folder 60.
161 Kittredge to Walker, 29 June 1936, “International Studies Conference”, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 954.
162 During the era of the Popular Front, the Soviet Union sent observers to ISC meetings, and a Soviet foreign affairs institute even approached the Rockefeller Foundation’s Paris office via Bonnet. Kittredge
completely shared Kittredge’s assumptions, though, as their handwritten comments on his reports indicate. They remained wary of Berber.\textsuperscript{163} Nevertheless, they did not order Kittredge to nudge Berber out of the ISC, or the Geneva Research Center, not even after the Rockefeller Foundation had been criticised publicly in the United States in November 1936 for a grant given to a German physics research institute.\textsuperscript{164} This is all the more remarkable as leading ISC participants, notably Alfred Zimmern, repeatedly voiced their objections to Berber’s attendance of ISC meetings.\textsuperscript{165}

Berber left his mark on the ISC not just by participating in study meetings but also by becoming the Third Reich’s special envoy for the IIIC after the fall of France, in August 1940. The building which housed the Institute had been taken over by the German army during the occupation of Paris.\textsuperscript{166} In a final confrontation with Malcolm Davis in Geneva in August 1940, Berber again managed to convince a foundation officer that his intentions for the IIIC were benign and that he would prevent worse things from happening—and Davis later flattered himself that it was due to this conversation that the IIIC survived the war.\textsuperscript{167} However, while the Institute survived, much of its archive was looted during the German occupation. Specifically, the card index detailing correspondence regarding the ISC as well as the entire stock of reports on the last study cycle vanished.\textsuperscript{168} While it is not clear whether Berber was implicated in this archival theft, the looting of the files of international organisations and the systematic gathering of information on international networks by the Nazi propaganda

\textsuperscript{163} See e.g. Fosdick’s sceptical comments scribbled on a letter from Kittredge to Walker, 23 September 1937, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 111, folder 1023.

\textsuperscript{164} Macrakis, “Wissenschaftsförderung”: 372-373.

\textsuperscript{165} Gross to Condiliffe, 18 August 1939, IIIC, A.II.28 ter.

\textsuperscript{166} Renollet, Unesco oubliée, 151-154; in his memoirs, Berber mentions an August 1940 trip to Paris but conveniently omits his role as commissioner for the IIIC: Berber, Zwischen Macht und Gewissen, 105.

\textsuperscript{167} Davis Oral History, ii, 301-307.

\textsuperscript{168} International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, 296.
ministry’s Central Conference Office was part of the Third Reich’s military intelligence operations during the Second World War. The fact that Nazi authorities were interested in the workings of international organisations and networks has only recently attracted the attention of historians, as it seems to contradict the existing historiography of the Third Reich.  

Berber used the contradiction between National Socialist rhetoric, which linked the term ‘international’ to a lack in patriotism and the presumed ‘Jewish world conspiracy’, and the promotion of internationalism by the Central Conference Office and the Dienststelle Ribbentrop to his advantage. In his conversations with foreigners he managed to style himself as a dissenter from official German foreign policy who, by participating in international activities such as the ISC took a personal risk and could therefore be trusted, a pose which he also adopted in his autobiography. However, in the Ministry of External Affairs under Ribbentrop, Berber analysed the contents of foreign archives for the benefit of German policy makers. This is exactly what he did with files that were transported to Germany from Austria after the Anschluss—Berber was the head of the commission in charge (Leiter der Kommission für die österreichischen Akten) and his interpretations of their content is still preserved in German archives, along with his hints as to which member of the Ministry of External Affairs might be interested in which file. In retrospect, Berber was certainly not a protégé that the foundations could be proud of.

169 Madeleine Herren, “‘Outwardly ... an Innocuous Conference Authority’: National Socialism and the Logistics of International Information Management”, German History 20, no. 1 (2002).
170 Berber, Zwischen Macht und Gewissen, 72.
171 PA AA, R 101340, passim.
172 This did not keep Kittredge, who left the RF in 1941, from writing Berber a glowing letter in 1953, possibly intended as a reference. In the letter, he credited the German committee under Berber’s direction with making “a significant contribution” to the ISC. “We were also aware that your efforts to maintain a liberal and objective attitude in this Committee necessarily involved grave personal risk at a time when the Nazi program was becoming the rule in Germany. … It was obvious to many of us on the outside that only the influence of scholars like yourself, with a genuinely international viewpoint, might bring some moderation in the councils of the German Government and mitigate the aggressive tendencies of certain of the uninformed leaders of the Nazi party.” Kittredge to Berber (copy), 12 October 1953, RIIA, 10/ln.
What conclusions can be drawn from this engagement of private American foundations in a scholarly association under the patronage of an international organisation? First, contrary to Jean-Jacques Renoliet’s assessment, American foundations were not interested in technical collaboration at the expense of more ‘political’ projects. In fact, the story of the ISC is one of the politicisation of an international organisation through an outside agency, notably the Rockefeller Foundation. In particular, the Foundation’s decision to engage in an intellectual struggle with the totalitarian powers made the ISC and also the IIIC extremely vulnerable. Fundamentally, the foundations were less concerned with theoretical developments or the disciplinary formation of international relations. They were interested in a reform of international politics with experts as protagonists. Consequently, the institutions they supported were foreign affairs institutes, modern-day think tanks, and should properly be classified as nongovernmental organisations. The Anglo-American model of a foreign affairs think tank was arguably spread effectively through the ISC.

Second, did the foundations fulfil a role as mediators between international organisations and local groups? To some extent, the case of the ISC confirms such a thesis. The overlap between the ISC and institutions supported by or close to the Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropies is striking. Without Rockefeller support, it is also questionable whether so many new members would have sprung up or affiliated with the ISC. However, the transformation of the conference mechanism also suggests that, rather than mediating between the IIIC and ISC members, the Rockefeller Foundation tried to undermine intergovernmental structures by taking over the IIIC’s

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Berber himself left Germany after the war and worked as a legal adviser for the Indian government. He returned to Germany in the 1950s to take up a professorship in Munich, where he specialised in the international law affecting border-crossing river systems.
coordinating functions. Thus, the Foundation became a transformative force rather than a mediator.

Finally, how should we evaluate the history of the ISC? The foundations’ involvement with the International Studies Conference was brief, and to them it seemed that the conferences were a promise that was never fulfilled. The lack of sustained foundation support after 1945 was one of the factors which ‘killed’ the ISC. Certainly, if the benchmark was to change the course of European history in the 1930s, the International Studies Conferences were a failure. But, in a way, the story of the ISC is also the story of a missed opportunity. The most recent work on the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, by Renoliet, dismisses the ISC because of its lack of impact—and here Renoliet uncritically adopts the view of foundation officers in the late 1930s.

This treatment is much too harsh. The International Studies Conferences had a scope that the discipline of international relations lacked after World War II. Its multidisciplinarity, for example, could have provided an alternative direction to the path the discipline took in the 1940s and 1950s. In the interwar period, the international and interdisciplinary academic exchange offered by the ISC was truly unique. After 1945, American realist IR scholars, especially Hans Morgenthau, argued that the ISC should not be revived because IR was fundamentally a branch of political science.173 But maybe Morgenthau should have acknowledged that the International Studies Conferences had played a role in shaping realism in the 1930s. Even in a classic text of realism, E.H. Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis, we can trace, in the section on Peaceful Change, the discussions that took place at the 1937 International Studies Conference. It is perhaps also interesting to note that Carr quoted Fritz Berber’s 1934 study Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit in the text, and directly adopted key concepts such as the fundamental

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inequality of states. Carr would not be the only self-styled realist to have taken elements of the critique that German international lawyers who were ideologically close to the Nazis mounted on interwar internationalism. Carl Schmitt’s influence on Hans Morgenthau is by now well-established. The irony is that post-1945 realism became so attractive because it could claim for itself that it had a better answer to the question of how to deal with aggressive regimes like Nazi Germany than any of the so-called idealist projects. Moreover, it is not true that the Conferences had no impact on policy whatsoever, as the example of the Tripartite Monetary Agreement of 1937 demonstrates. It is possible to argue that the foundations torpedoed similar transfers by being so eager to include ‘experts’ from the dictatorships in the conferences—but that was the price they paid for their pretensions of scientific objectivity, bipartisanship and the assumption that a community of scholars without borders really existed.

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Epilogue

The advent of the Second World War precipitated a rupture in American philanthropic networks in Europe. Shortly after the outbreak of war, the Rockefeller Foundation’s Paris office was transferred to La Baule, a seaside town on the Atlantic coast where Malcolm Davis also had a residence. The *Dotation*, having disbanded its European Advisory Council in May 1939, ceased all activities once war broke out. Its offices were shut down when the German army invaded Paris. Those foundation officers who participated in the ISC’s Bergen conference (27 August to 2 September) heard the news of the German invasion of Poland as the conference was wrapping up. Sydnor Walker returned directly to New York. Malcolm Davis did not even come back to his post in Paris but went straight to Geneva as the freshly recruited representative of the American Red Cross. Switzerland became his base for a number of missions he carried out on behalf of civilian refugees in Europe in the early phase of the war. It was also here that he had his final conversation with Fritz Berber.

Many accounts that deal with international expert networks or with the disciplinary history of international relations stress that the advent of the Second World War rang in the end of an era. Although this dissertation also ends with the closure of the foundations’ branch offices and the German takeover of the IIIC in 1940, this epilogue intends to point towards continuities that link the interwar years to the post-war period. These continuities complicate conventional narratives and open up research.

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1 Kittredge to Macadam, 11 September 1939, RF, RG 1.1, series 401, box 78, folder 1021; Davis Oral History, ii, 254.
3 Walker to M. Cleeve (RIIA), 22 September 1939; RF, RG 1.1, series 401, box 78, folder 1021.
perspectives that are beyond the scope of this study. Hence, this chapter will trace the war-time relationship between the foundations and what was left of the International Studies Conference, an organisation which was revived after 1945.

The Impact of War on Philanthropic Funding Patterns

By the end of 1939 the Rockefeller Foundation’s Social Science Division had pulled out of most of Europe, apart from Britain, France and Switzerland. But despite the outbreak of war, work on the International Studies Conference continued. At the Bergen meeting, a new study topic, international organisation, was chosen. Pitman Potter, the renowned specialist on international organisation, became the general rapporteur, operating out of Geneva. At least in the eyes of Kittredge, war had not made the ISC obsolete but even more necessary. The Geneva Research Center was to “provide [the] secretariat to assure contact with groups in Europe that may now begin studies of [the] basis for [a] new peace, and for [a] new development of international organization”. And although the Rockefeller Foundation had decided not to award another major grant to the ISC in May 1939, smaller appropriations were certainly considered. As a memorandum in the foundation’s archives indicates, draft dockets for grants were drawn up in March 1940, and an appropriation was made to the Norwegian ISC committee, even if it was not paid out due to Norway’s invasion by the Germans. In 1940, the Rockefeller Foundation even awarded a grant of $11,000 to the newly created Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm. Another such grant was made in 1942.

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8 Kittredge memorandum, 19 March 1940, and attached handwritten note by Walker, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 106, folder 960.
The Rockefeller Foundation also continued to direct support to France, in particular to CEPE, which, as soon as war broke out, started a war programme on the conditions of a future peace settlement.\(^{10}\) For the new programme, CEPE also continued the collaboration with Chatham House.\(^{11}\) Kittredge’s evaluation of CEPE’s activities was very positive. “Its independence and autonomy has been maintained, but close cooperative relations have been established with government agencies in Paris or with persons now charged by the government with investigations related to post-war problems.”\(^{12}\) When the centre’s financial base became precarious due to the fall of the franc, the Rockefeller Foundation even diverted funds from other recipient institutions in Paris, to ensure the independent running of the Centre. According to Selskar M. Gunn, this was done to prevent “the Centre [from being] driven to the necessity of attempting to get government money for the studies now in hand. Certainly one wants to foster local appropriations, but in terms of the subject matter of these studies, it is wiser that the government should not contribute.”\(^{13}\)

The Rockefeller Foundation took a similar stance in Britain. The Royal Institute of International Affairs moved most of its operations to Oxford at the outbreak of war and put them at the service of the British government. The Oxford operation, known as the Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS), was directed by Arnold Toynbee and at least eight former Rockefeller Social Science fellows were on its staff. When news of the Foreign Research and Press Service reached the Rockefeller Foundation, it decided

\(^{10}\) Kittredge to Walker, 26 September and 11 October 1939, RF, RG 1.1, series 500, box 20, folder 205.
\(^{11}\) Dennery to Kittredge, 5 January 1940, RF, RG 1.1, series 500, box 20, folder 206.
\(^{12}\) Kittredge, memorandum “Centre d’Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Paris”, 7 February 1940, RF, RG 1.1, series 500, box 20, folder 206.
\(^{13}\) Kittredge memorandum, 27 April 1940; Gunn to Willits, 20 March 1940, both RF, RG 1.1, series 500, box 20, folder 206. The other institutions supported by the foundation at the time were Charles Rist’s Institut scientifique de recherches économiques et sociales and a special body for the social sciences at the University of Paris. See Mazon, _Origines_, 43-60; Tournès, “Institut scientifique de recherches économiques et sociales”.
to end its grant as it could not subsidise government work.\textsuperscript{14} During a full staff conference, Joseph Willits, the new director of the Foundation’s Social Science Division from 1939, gave a harsh verdict: “[Chatham House] is joining the war machine and its position is pretty much compromised.”\textsuperscript{15} Ever skilful at managing its relationship with the foundation, Chatham House picked up on the “embarrassment” that its government work was causing across the Atlantic, and promised to separate the FRPS from the rump Chatham House in London, which was to become completely independent again and have the exclusive benefit of Rockefeller grants.\textsuperscript{16} However, as is clear from the archival record, this separation was contrived entirely “for Rockefeller purposes” and not maintained in reality.\textsuperscript{17} In 1943 the FRPS was merged with the Political Intelligence Department to form the Foreign Office Research Department.\textsuperscript{18}

The second phase of the war brought the termination of almost all foundation funding for institutes of international affairs in Europe. The IIIC was taken over by the German army. Bonnet went into exile in the United States. CEPE was shut down as the Germans advanced towards Paris and its offices were occupied by the Gestapo. Some CEPE staff temporarily regrouped in Clermont-Ferrand but soon had to abandon their work. Louis Joze and Etienne Dennery, the two directors, went into exile, eventually


\textsuperscript{15} Memorandum Staff Conference, 24 October 1939, RF, RG 1.1, series 401, box 78, folder 1021. However, it seems that the possibility that Chatham House might become an auxiliary intelligence service to the British government had been discussed with foundation staff previously. Note on meeting with Stacey May, 21 November 1938, RIIA, 2/III/8h.

\textsuperscript{16} Cleeve to Kittredge, 5 January 1940, RF, RG 1.1, series 401, box 78, folder 1022.

\textsuperscript{17} Heather Harvey to Cleeve, 16 May 1940, RIIA, Registry File, 2/III/8b. John Hope Simpson, for example, was involved in both work carried out under the Rockefeller grant and Foreign Research and Press Service studies. See also Harvey to Cleeve, 15 April 1940, \textit{in eo loco}.

working for the Free French. The German invasion of France, Scandinavia and the Lowlands also induced the Rockefeller Foundation to create a new Emergency Program for European Scholars which was similar to the Aid for Deposed Scholars which the Foundation had extended to scholars persecuted under fascism since 1933. Thus the Rockefeller Foundation became instrumental in procuring university posts in the United States for almost sixty scholars who had to flee France, a vital contribution considering the strict American immigration policies. Many social scientists who were aided found posts at the New School for Social Research in New York.

The American staff of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Paris office also left France, save for one Rockefeller officer who was stationed in Lissabon and assisted exiled scholars with their journey to the United States. Kittredge, who must have been aware of Berber’s government connections, wrote him a semi-reproachful letter in July 1940: “I trust that your local representatives in Paris and La Baule are treating our offices with appropriate respect.” Kittredge had seen Berber in person as recently as April and still included him in ISC work. It is possible that Kittredge regarded Berber as a valuable source of inside information and therefore kept in touch with him just until the United States entered the war. In a rather awkward manner, Kittredge requested Berber to forward the publications of his institute to the Geneva Research Center, giving Kittredge an “opportunity to familiarize myself with recent literature in Germany related to problems of world organization”.

Meanwhile, the Geneva Research Center continued to function, even though Pitman Potter decided to pack up its archive and send it to the United States in the case

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19 Kittredge to Willits and G.J. Beale, 2 August 1940; Joxe to Kittredge, 17 August 1940; Summary of memorandum by Maurice Pernot, 21 September 1940, all RF, RG 1.1, series 500, box 20, folder 206. See also folder 207 and 208 for wartime activities of CEPE staff.
21 Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report 1940, 8.
22 Kittredge to Berber, 18 July 1940, RF, RG 1.1, series 717, box 19, folder 178.
23 Kittredge to Berber, 8 November 1941, RF, RG, 1.1, series 717, box 19, folder 178.
of a German invasion. Due to Rappard’s insistence, the Graduate Institute also continued its work, although some professors left for the United States.\textsuperscript{24} However, with regard to the ISC the centre of gravity was shifting westwards. Bonnet, who had set up a makeshift New York office in the building of the Carnegie Endowment, argued that the ISC secretariat be transferred to the United States where it was to oversee a new grouping representing the democracies. This plan, however, seems to have come to nothing, due to lack of enthusiasm on the part of Malcolm Davis, and from late 1940 ISC work was effectively terminated for the duration of the war. Potter himself finally returned to the United States permanently in autumn 1941.\textsuperscript{25} In accordance with the wishes of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Geneva Research Center was merged with the Graduate Institute in 1942.\textsuperscript{26}

One initiative which had been heavily associated with the Geneva Research Center was kept alive even once the institutional structures had disappeared. The Danubian study, a project which had always enjoyed strong foundation backing, survived the war thanks to former ISC delegate Allen Dulles who insisted the study was of high value “to both scholarship and government”. Dulles, who was stationed in Berne working for the OSS, kept up the communication with the study’s secretary and, after granting a personal advance, transmitted Rockefeller and Carnegie funds to him throughout the war.\textsuperscript{27} The Danubian inquiry continued after 1945 and its reports found their way to the American State Department.\textsuperscript{28} Dulles, of course, became a key

\textsuperscript{24} Potter to Kittredge, 15 Aug 1940, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 6, folder 56. Monnier, \textit{Rappard}, 507.
\textsuperscript{25} Bonnet to William W. Lockwood (American ISC committee), 24 October 1940, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 6, folder 56; Kittredge interview with Potter, “Re: International Studies Conference”, 8 October 1941; Memorandum of conversation EFG and Kittredge, 15 October 1941, both RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 6, folder 58. International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, \textit{Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle}, 295.
\textsuperscript{26} Memorandum to R.F. Evans, 1942, “Geneva Research Centre”, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 6, folder 59.
\textsuperscript{27} Grant-in-aid RA SS 4402, 24 February 1944, RF, RG 1.1, series 100, box 110, folder 1005; see also Davis Oral History, i, 144-146.
\textsuperscript{28} J.J. Mayoux (IICI) to Valentin Wagner, 18 April 1946, IIIC, A.II.28 bis.
protagonist in the post-1945 movement for European integration as a founder member of the American Committee on United Europe.\textsuperscript{29}

Other initiatives to revive the ISC or those foreign affairs institutes which had to close down were not encouraged by the foundations. A proposal by Joxe and Dennery which would have revived CEPE under the auspices of French anti-Vichy and anti-Nazi resistance was rejected with the justification that “the RF isn’t a political body and can’t use its funds to wage war no matter how we as individuals feel” and that “we no longer live in the days of a Santa Claus budget”.\textsuperscript{30} Similarly, when Chatham House proposed a plan for an International Research Institute which would have united research groups composed of representatives of governments in exile, foundation officers criticised that “some intellectuals … feel that RF is a Santa Claus”.\textsuperscript{31} Curiously, though, the actual working methods of the proposed institute strongly resembled the ISC and the IPR templates. National groups studying post-war reconstruction would discuss their research under the auspices of the institute, not, according to the Dutch representative, to “formulate inter-Allied policy” but to provide “an interchange of information” as “in the world as it exists to-day the purely national field of research is too narrow”. Nevertheless, most of the groups, apart from Chatham House, were obviously sponsored by their governments-in-exile and openly admitted that they would be interested in the project as a way of helping them formulate national policies.\textsuperscript{32}

But while Kittredge cited budgetary constraints and a reluctance to support refugee groups as reasons for rejecting the proposal during a conversation at Chatham House, the Rockefeller Foundation’s president Raymond Fosdick felt uncomfortable

\textsuperscript{30} Willits to Fosdick, memorandum “Support for a French Center”, 23 June 1941, RF, RG 1.1, series 500, box 20, folder 207.
\textsuperscript{31} Memorandum to Willits, 12 June 1941, RF, RG 1.1, series 401, box 78, folder 1026; for an outline of the proposal see memorandum “Proposed European Research Centre, London”, RIIA, 2/II/8i. \textsuperscript{32} Minutes of meeting, “European Research Centre”, 24 July 1941, RIIA, 2/II/8i.
with supporting an initiative that was so obviously related to government policy.\textsuperscript{33}

Recounting an interview with Ivison Macadam and Sir Frederick Whyte of Chatham House, Fosdick expressed these doubts to Willits: “Sir Frederick Whyte obviously speaks for the British Foreign Office. To what extent do the Foreign Office and our State Department see eye to eye? In the second place, Whyte’s proposal is predicated on the restoration of the ante-bellum status in Europe. Who can guess what the post-bellum status will be?”\textsuperscript{34} A little over a month after the Atlantic Charter had been signed, Fosdick remained cautious. It was clear to him that this would not be a quick war and a sure Allied victory, and he was loath to embroil the Rockefeller Foundation in a diplomatic tangle. Moreover, since the late 1930s, the foundations’ relationship with the State Department had also undergone a change with the result that foundation officers became more mindful of the needs of the American government.

\textit{At the Service of Government: Wartime Commitments of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment}

The relationship between the foundations and the State Department, although never remote, did undergo a change in the late 1930s, along with the rest of American cultural diplomacy. In July 1938, the State Department created its Division of Cultural Relations, as a reaction to propaganda activities by the Axis countries in Latin America. The new division implemented what Frank Ninkovich has called a “voluntarist” concept of cultural relations. This entailed, supposedly, little change in the way American cultural diplomacy was conducted, namely by private organisations such as philanthropic foundations, and with minimum interference from the state. The only difference, according to Ninkovich, was that an existing system for the conduct of

\textsuperscript{33} Notes on interview with Kittredge on 11 September 1941, 13 September 1941, RIIA, 2/11/8i.

\textsuperscript{34} Excerpt letter Fosdick to Willits, 19 September 1941, RF, RG 1.1, series 401, box 78, folder 1027.
cultural relations finally received state approval and support.\(^{35}\) This assessment, however, may underestimate the amount of pressure that was now exerted on the foundations. Whereas before 1938 the initiative mostly lay with private organisations and individuals and not the State Department, this relationship flipped after the Division of Cultural Relations was created. The impact of Axis propaganda in Latin America produced an attitude within the State Department which changed the perception of foundations from facilitators to executors of U.S. foreign policy.

A despatch from Alexander W. Weddell of the American Embassy in Buenos Aires complained about the “distressing indifference” that both the Carnegie Endowment and the Rockefeller Foundation displayed towards Latin America.\(^{36}\) Presenting an analysis of the Rockefeller Foundation’s annual report, the diplomat launched a diatribe:

On the other hand, ignoring the huge appropriations going to England, France and other European countries, I cannot but feel that out of the $154,000 to Japan (actually paid out of an appropriation of nearly $900,000), the $172,000 allotted to Rumania, the $53,000 earmarked for Munich, the $6000 spent at Melbourne, the $90,000 to be expended in Denmark, the $60,000 set aside for Siam, the $15,000 which the Soviet Ministry of Public Health is to expend, the $27,000 to go to Leipzig, the $112,000 for the University of Leiden, the $12,000 to the University of Sofia, Bulgaria, the $175,000 to the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures in London, the $26,000 to the Prussian State Library, Berlin, for the preparation of a catalogue (this in a land where books are being burnt today), the further appropriation of $45,000 for research in African linguistics, some small sum might have been deducted without damage to the high programs pursued, and used in helping some of the struggling universities and libraries and cultural groups in Latin America, especially in this country, and thereby counterbalance in part the substantial amounts being expended by European countries, not alone in legitimate cultural activities but in positively harmful propaganda.\(^{37}\)

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\(^{35}\) Ninkovich, *Diplomacy of Ideas*, 26-34.

\(^{36}\) Embassy Buenos Aires, Alexander W. Weddell to Secretary and Undersecretary of State, despatch 2124, 29 July 1938, NARA, Record Group 59, Central Decimal File, 811.42735/41.

\(^{37}\) Ibid.
Weddell not only communicated his dissatisfaction with philanthropic policies to the State Department, he also contacted the Rockefeller Foundation itself and received a reply from its Executive Council which promised that Rockefeller policies were about to change and give much more attention to Latin America. A similar promise was made by Sydnor Walker during a formal meeting in March 1939 with the head of the Cultural Relations Division and representatives of other voluntary organisations involved in cultural relations. In the course of the Second World War, the foundations’ subservience to government authority became ever stronger: it only took an irate letter from the American embassy in Buenos Aires for the Rockefeller Foundation to pledge a complete reversal of policy in 1938. Foundation officers, however, had trouble reorienting their programmes as quickly as the State Department would have liked them to and were reminded of their promises by official visits from Cultural Relations Division staff “with no particular object in mind except to talk over problems of Latin America”.

The State Department’s Cultural Relations Division may have intended to continue the old system of voluntary initiatives and informal cooperation but the relationship between policy makers and foundations did change. Throughout the interwar years, foundation officers exhibited a willingness to adjust their policies to the needs of American foreign policy as they perceived them. When the foundations were finally and openly asked to do what the State Department deemed necessary in the late 1930s, they complied without complaints and, it seems, pleased that finally government fully recognised the importance of their programmes. In 1943, at a time when the State

38 Despatch 2228, Embassy of the U.S. Buenos Aires, Alexander W. Weddell to Secretary and Undersecretary of State, 30 Sep 1938, 811.42735/43, NARA, Record Group 59, Central Decimal File, 811.42735/41.
39 “Memorandum of Dr. Cherrington’s Visit to New York of March 20-21”, 22 March 1939, NARA, Record Group 59, Central Decimal File, 810.42711 Student Exchanges/75.
40 Interview with Charles Thomson, Department of State, 17 December 1940, Joseph Willits Diary, RF.
Department ran a vetting process of the Rockefeller Foundation’s entire fellowship programme in Latin America, a solicitous foundation officer summed up his employer’s stance towards Washington: “we wish to work in complete harmony with the State Department”. 41 Similarly, Malcolm Davis of the Carnegie Endowment thought about how best to aid the State Department’s efforts in the cultural relations field. In a letter to Philip Jessup he proposed that “we should work out plans relating to our own purposes and supplementing those of the Division in the Department and of the Coordinator’s [of Inter-American Affairs] Office and the American Library Association”. 42

The outbreak of war also changed the relationship between the State Department and the Council on Foreign Relations which from October 1939 assembled four study groups to work on the confidential War and Peace Studies. Some of the studies became highly influential in the formulating of wartime U.S. policy, notably with regard to the decision to declare Greenland part of the Western hemisphere. The Rockefeller Foundation provided altogether $300,000 for the project and financed other research that was used in the State Department during the war. 43 Calling on George Messersmith, Assistant Secretary of State and main official contact for the Council of Foreign Relations, Joseph Willits was keen on finding out what the State Department thought of other civil society organisations the foundation was also supporting, in particular the IPR. 44 Clearly, the Rockefeller Foundation realised that the American government was increasingly willing to commission and utilise outside expertise instead of relying on the uncoordinated osmosis that took place in the realms cultivated by the foreign policy

41 Harry Miller (RF Natural Sciences Division) to Charles A. Thomson (Chief of Division of Cultural Relations), 27 April 1943, NARA, Record Group 59, Central Decimal File, 811.42710 Rockefeller Foundation Fellowships/9.
42 Davis to Philip Jessup, 24 January 1942, Philip C. Jessup Papers, Library of Congress, box I-83. The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs was, of course, headed by Nelson Rockefeller, John D. Rockefeller, Jr.’s son.
44 Joseph Willits Diary, 11 October 1939, RF.
establishment. If the Foundation was able to pay for some of this expertise, all the better.

The Carnegie Endowment also backed several war-related initiatives, mostly those connected with the movement for the United Nations. James T. Shotwell became particularly active in planning the post-war world organisation and in November 1939 formed the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. Sticking to a familiar format, the Commission conducted research and issued recommendations. The Endowment provided the major financial backing for the venture. As the project for a new world organisation acquired a more definite shape after the Moscow Declaration of October 1943, the Rockefeller Foundation also started to support a group led by Manley O. Hudson, former director of the Harvard Research, whose scheme was discussed at the Dumbarton Oaks meeting. While the Foundation had stopped supporting Hudson’s international law research in the early 1930s, now that he was leading an effort that was taken seriously by government officials, he came back into the Foundation’s orbit. As in the Great War, the Carnegie Endowment’s International Law Division acted as something of an ad hoc research bureau for various government departments. John Condliffe, who had become the assistant director of the Endowment’s Division of Economics and History, also coordinated campaigns that promoted international trade with State Department officials. He thus ensured that a long-standing interest of the Carnegie Endowment could be pursued with government approval.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and American entry into the war, the Council on Foreign Relations study groups lost some of their influence as the State Department expanded its own planning structures. However, study group participants

46 RF, RG 1.1, series 200, box 343, folder 4086, passim.
were recruited into government service, either as technical advisers or into the OSS.\textsuperscript{49} Malcolm Davis also joined this forerunner of the CIA.\textsuperscript{50}

\textit{The Foundations’ International Relations Programme in the Aftermath of War}

The wartime experience had a profound impact on foundation officers. During the final phases of the war, they took stock of the programmes they had supported in the past and tried to come up with policies fit for new circumstances. In 1945, Joseph Willits produced a memorandum that revealed how difficult this process was for the foundations. While Willits acknowledged that educating public opinion was still an important task, he advocated retreating from that field in favour of other ventures. The first and foremost of those was aiding the American government “in every legitimate way to develop a mature and integrated foreign policy”. Other concerns that had already been present during the interwar years such as economic policy or population were also cited by Willits. Another area of future interest was listed as “Studies of a few countries about which knowledge is most important”, which pointed towards the massive amount of money that the new field of Area Studies would receive from philanthropic foundations in the post-war years.\textsuperscript{51} Europe also ceased to be the principle objective of the foundations. With the advent of the Cold War and the prospect for a rapid decolonisation of former imperial possessions, Soviet Russia and “backward countries” received more attention.\textsuperscript{52}

Foundation policies in the field of international relations did change after 1945, not least due to publications that shaped the discipline internally, such as \textit{The Twenty

\textsuperscript{49} Wala, \textit{Council on Foreign Relations}, 42-44.
\textsuperscript{50} Davis Oral History, iii, 319-320.
\textsuperscript{52} Excerpt Willits memorandum, 22 June 1949, RF, RG 3, series 910, box 7, folder 61.
Years’ Crisis, or Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations. However, interwar experiences also seemed to have played a role. While one complaint in the days of the International Studies Conference had been that there were too many studies containing too much detail and not enough synthesis, a differentiation took place after 1945. In the 1950s, the study of international relations was divided into the fields of international politics and Area Studies, a country-specific approach with less emphasis on theory. With the advent of a new president at the Rockefeller Foundation in 1953, Dean Rusk, social science spending was significantly reduced. The Ford Foundation took over the dominant position that the Rockefeller Foundation had hitherto enjoyed in that field.\(^{53}\) The old philanthropic network that had been forged in the interwar years to some extent helped to smooth that transition, for example when Arnold Wolfers brought the Graduate Institute in Geneva to the attention of a Ford Foundation officer.\(^{54}\)

The Graduate Institute proceeded to receive substantial funding from the Ford Foundation. Many other recipients of foundation funding in the interwar years were able to profit from continued philanthropic largesse after 1945, for example Chatham House but also CEPE. Funding for these foreign affairs institutes was only phased out in the 1950s. The same is true for the International Studies Conference which was revived after 1945, with some foundation help. The contributions were very small and may have been intended as an opportune way of slowly but definitively withdrawing funding completely, even if some foundation officers retained a personal interest in the ISC.

*Who Killed the ISC?*

According to David Long, the ISC’s final demise in 1954 was due to a number of factors. First of all, it was a European-dominated organisation and the evolving

\(^{54}\) Jacques Freymond to Wolfers, 12 December 1956, IHEI, folder “Cours temporaires du 1929 au sep 1962, V-Z”.
American perspective on international relations was not in tune with it. Moreover, there was competition in the form of the academic International Political Science Association, founded in 1949. After 1952, UNESCO, an organisation which was not fond of interdisciplinarity, stopped funding the ISC. This was unfortunate for the ISC as American philanthropic backers had also lost interest.55

There are several gaps in that story, however. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the ISC was only revived with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment, a fact which underlines that the foundations had, in principle, still an interest in the concept of the ISC.56 Malcolm Davis still attended ISC meetings after the war.57 Then, as the ISC affiliated with UNESCO, the foundations backed away. Instead of continuing support for the ISC, the Carnegie Endowment set up an entirely informal association of foreign affairs institutes in 1950. The Rockefeller Foundation paid for a conference where the constituent institutes met in 1953. As they had in the interwar years, the foundations undermined intergovernmental structures.

Conference participants included many ISC alumni, for example H.O. Christophersen, Margaret Cleeve and Ivison Macadam of Chatham House, Vera Michele Dean of the FPA, William Holland of the IPR, Stacy May (who had moved from the Rockefeller Foundation to the Council on Foreign Relations) and Georg Schwarzenberger of the New Commonwealth Institute.58 Just like in old times, the national institutes all embarked on studies, each describing the politics and the attitudes of a nation towards the United Nations. These were then synthesised in a volume by another ISC alumnus, Maurice Bourquin. In his foreword to the volume, Joseph Long, “Who Killed the International Studies Conference?”.55

Malcolm Davis to George A. Finch, 11 October 1946, CEIP, box 211, folder 2; Cable Willits to J.J. Mayoux, 8 January 1947, RIIA 10/1aa.


RF, RG 1.1, series 200, box 315, folder 3749, passim.
Johnson, the Carnegie Endowment’s new president, outlined the scope and purpose of the volume: it was to provide a study of international organisation from the national point of view, as any international organisation depended on an accord between national ideas, interests and politics. Naturally, Johnson wrote, private bodies were best suited to represent national viewpoints which were not necessarily the views of governments.\textsuperscript{59} It remains open to speculation whether Johnson consciously offered this insight as a justification for the delegation of the ‘national’ study on Russia to the conservative Hoover Institution in Stanford. Thus, while the ISC as an organisation may have been dead by 1954, it lived on in spirit.

Conclusion

The story of philanthropic support for the ‘scientific study’ of international relations in a transatlantic context sheds light on a range of major problems that affected the American-European relationship before the Second World War. The construction of transatlantic networks of experts which started off as a form of elite internationalism before the Great War and became a large-scale philanthropic enterprise in the interwar years involved American foundations not just in the construction of a new academic discipline but also in cultural diplomacy and intergovernmental politics. Pivotal to understanding the foundations’ activities is the role they assigned to experts and to expertise in the creation of foreign policy and how this intersected with philanthropic notions of the nation as the basis of political life. In the following sections, previously discussed material will be summarised and suggestions for further research will be presented.

After the Great War, philanthropic foundations were actors in a new international politics which they also sought to rationalise. The new international politics was marked by the intertwining of bilateral diplomacy, multilateral governmental structures and nongovernmental activity. This dissertation has attempted to untangle the complexity of philanthropic involvement in international relations by using a methodological approach inspired by histoire croisée and other transnational perspectives on the writing of history. Instead of focusing on the activities of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment in one particular country or at the League of Nations, the preceding chapters have captured the different facets of a specific philanthropic project, the support for a ‘scientific’ approach to international relations. As a whole, the dissertation has focused on crossings, circulations and the
dynamics that this project initiated in several contexts and on several scales, influenced but not predetermined by national structures.

As became clear in an analysis of the origins of philanthropic internationalism, this project was based on certain unspoken assumptions and had its own internal contradictions. As a response to progressive reform movements, philanthropic internationalism aimed to reorganise the world using American institutions as a blueprint, for example for an international court or for regional integration. The legal positivism of American international lawyers with its emphasis on the power of public opinion was a distinct contribution to contemporary transatlantic theorising on international relations. At the same time, the protagonists of philanthropic internationalism participated in a transatlantic exchange of social models and extolled the benefits of European inventions, be it the elite peace society or European police systems.

Most importantly, philanthropic internationalism contained the fundamental tension that bourgeois internationalism faced in general, namely, how to square patriotic duty with the compromises that were necessary for any form of international society to function. The protagonists of philanthropic internationalism were too close to the nation state’s corridors of power to seriously consider that it be abolished. Indeed, through their training, either in law or the social sciences, and their professional occupations as educators, publicists and administrators, they had been key players in the nationalising of societies which was coupled with the beginnings of the 20th century welfare state. The internationalist dilemma was met with a boundless optimism with regard to the possibility of scientific objectivity, especially in the social sciences. Legal positivists took a similar route and became fellow disciples in this ‘cult of the fact’.

Methodologically, the approach found its expression in an emphasis on empirical knowledge, documentation and analysis. Incontrovertible facts would, it was assumed,
speak for themselves. It is important to note that foundation officers were not alone in the belief that sophisticated analysis of international phenomena would be an impetus to policy coordination between states, as this notion was also held by international civil servants, for example in the Economic and Financial Organisation of the League.¹

The impact of the Great War on European societies opened up a number of opportunities for philanthropic internationalists and, although there had been a philanthropic presence in Europe before the war, their activities increased. In the course of the foundations’ relief and reconstruction work, they also directly negotiated with foreign governments for the first time. At home, the wartime cooperation between scholars and government convinced foundation officers of the influence that outside expertise could have on policy making. Those who participated in the Paris Peace Conference also learnt that the pronouncements of experts, in particular those working in the fields of history and geography, could shape the territorial outcomes of peace negotiations. For many, this was a formative experience which led to the creation of the first foreign affairs institutes. After all, as Glenda Sluga has argued, Paris 1919 marked the birth of “the new scientific peace”.² International lawyers had been the first who by virtue of their scientific training acquired expert authority within governments and others in different disciplines followed suit.

For some experts, however, the promise of the scientific peace remained unfulfilled. Politicians, they felt, still had too much influence and had failed to agree on a truly expert-crafted peace at Paris. Consequently, politicians received most of the blame for the problems associated with the Versailles Treaty. Importantly, experts on both sides of the Great War’s enemy lines could agree with the notion that the peace was imperfect. Throughout the interwar years, self-styled experts sought to recover the imaginary ground they had been forced to cede to the politicians at Paris. American

¹ Clavin and Wessels, “Transnationalism and the League of Nations”: 482.
² Sluga, Nation, Psychology, and International Politics, 36.
foundations made it their task to help them in this endeavour. This motivation lay at the root of philanthropic programmes for the scientific study of international relations. Noting down his impressions of a discussion between Shotwell, Zimmern and von Mises at the 1936 International Studies Conference in Madrid, Tracy B. Kittredge observed that “It was generally agreed that the Peace Conference of 1919 failed largely because political decisions were taken by the statesmen responsible for the conduct of negotiations entirely independently of the recommendation and advice of the technical experts in their respective delegations.” Kittredge himself implicitly agreed with this statement and promoted the ISC as a probate remedy.

But how did the foundations determine who was an expert? Was he—for only in rare cases were international relations specialists female—an accomplished scholar, or were political influence and proximity to power more important? In the interwar years, the foundations rarely had to make this choice as the field of international relations was dominated by scholar-politicians and expert-administrators. Alfred Zimmern, an incumbent of the very first university chair in international relations was scholar, internationalist educator and international civil servant. Arnold Wolfers, one of the most influential IR scholars in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s and a long-time Rockefeller protégé, regarded his discipline as the archetypal ‘policy science’.

Rockefeller Foundation officers held Wolfers in higher esteem than Ernst Jäckh whose excellent political connections were not matched by equal intellectual brilliance.

A more important element of the foundations’ definition of the international relations expert was active participation in transnational networks. While the Carnegie

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3 Kittredge to Walker, memorandum “Underlying problems presented by the International Relations Program”, 16 June 1936, RF, RG 3, series 910, box 7, folder 60.
Endowment’s conception of transnational networks was indebted to the pre-1914 ideal of an elite network of notables, the Rockefeller philanthropies consciously developed the concept of a network of experts. In practice, of course, the foundations’ networks overlapped, and in the course of the 1930s, the Carnegie Endowment and the Rockefeller Foundation cooperated ever more closely in the field of international relations. In the view of the foundations, an international relations expert was somebody who led a roundtable discussion at Williamstown, who gave a lecture at the Hague Academy or at the *Dotation Carnegie*, who sat on the board of the Geneva Research Center or wrote a paper which was circulated at the International Studies Conference. A budding international relations expert might have received his training at the Graduate Institute in Geneva and internationalised his own academic biography with the help of a Rockefeller or Carnegie fellowship or a visit to a foundation-sponsored summer school. Being an expert meant functioning in the transnational structures that foundation philanthropy supported. These structures gave international relations experts a space where they could define themselves as a group and where newcomers were socialised. It also provided a source of legitimacy. In this way, and not by promoting a coherent ideology, the activities of philanthropic foundations became constitutive of expertise in the field of international relations.

It would be reductive to describe the group of foundation-affiliated international relations experts as a transnational “epistemic community”, as the notion of knowledge-based expert communities does not give adequate consideration to the social and political realities which shaped this particular group. Neither was another fundamental characteristic of an epistemic community, consensus with regard to cause-and-effect relationships, a given in the discussions that took place within the philanthropic
network. Nevertheless, foundation networks did manage to set the terms of international debate. The International Studies Conference in particular introduced terms like “collective security” and “peaceful change” into the everyday vocabulary of foreign policy elites, as was acknowledged by foundation officers. And it is also remarkable how vigorously experts from countries that challenged the core assumptions of the post-1919 world order attempted to change these terms of debate. When Francesco Coppola of the Centro Italiano di Alti Studi Internazionali urged ISC participants at the 1934 session in Paris to rethink the concept of collective security and to accept that wars were a legitimate way of adjusting the status quo, he was not making merely a point on terminology but attempting to influence what was thinkable and ultimately doable in international politics.

Some of the foundations’ activities represented attempts to forge closer-knit subgroups of international relations experts which were indeed knowledge-based and capable of defining a problem and drawing up policies in particular areas, for example the Danubian Studies group of the ISC and the study groups clustered around the Geneva Research Center. But even here, foundation representatives and their interlocutors insisted on the participation of scholars from the dictatorships. The openness of philanthropic networks in particular to scholars from Nazi Germany who were not just intellectual allies of the regime but quite literally agents of the Nazi

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6 Kittredge to Walker, 20 March 1939, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 106, folder 959.


8 John B. Condliffe, in particular, was keen on German participation in a study on economic policies and accepted that such participation could also serve German propaganda: “This, I am sure you will agree, presents an admirable opportunity to explain Germany’s economic case and policies.” Draft letter Condliffe to Berber, 13 April 1938, IIIC, A.II.28 ter.
government remains puzzling. One possible explanation is that since Germany had been such an important country in the network during the 1920s, the foundations were reluctant to cut off support completely. After all, scholars like Berber—multilingual, close to policy makers and comfortable with the sociability cultivated by the international expert elite—seemed to ‘fit in’. Another explanation is that in the 1930s many liberals became disenchanted with liberal democracy and capitalism and thus developed a more sympathetic attitude to authoritarian models.9 One only needs to recall James T. Shotwell’s disparaging remarks on an ill-informed public or the assumption voiced at the ISC that experts could have a greater influence on policy making in the dictatorships than in democratically governed states. Finally, ideologically, the philanthropic network had always cast its net wide. It could accommodate the most radical free-market critics of state interventionism, such as Ludwig von Mises, as well as adherents to state planning, even if most foundations interlocutors were self-described liberals.10 Thus, it is not entirely surprising that apologists for the fascist economic order, or at least those experts able to rationalise it, were included.11

Important sites for expert policy making were, of course, the League of Nations and other international organisations established after the Great War. As has been observed in the recent historiography, while the political achievements of the League may have been slim, its remit for technical work enabled it to define the nature of international problems and to offer the expertise to solve them. Thus the League and the International Labour Organisation were able to export their expert-generated solutions back onto the national level where they were implemented, a process which some

9 Mazower, Dark Continent, 23.
11 Note, though, the Rockefeller Foundation’s lackluster response to the prospect of Soviet participation in the ISC.
historians regard as analogous to the politics of development in the ‘Third World’ after
the Second World War.\textsuperscript{12} American foundations fully recognised the importance of this
aspect of the League’s work as well as the potentially transformative innovation of
assembling a multi-national body of dedicated personnel in the League’s technical
organisations. The foundations acknowledged that the League was a breeding ground
for a new type of policy maker, the international civil servant. While the League of
Nations has commonly been analysed as a mere bargaining forum in which diverging
national interests competed with one another, more recently historians who have
focused on the League’s personnel have claimed that staff did not further the interests of
their originating nation-state, at least not in the technical organisations, and that
nationality played a minor role in the choice of the policies which were advocated.\textsuperscript{13}
International civil servants at the League did develop a distinct identity and it was this
identity that foundations sought to connect with and to shape. Thus they established
institutions with multinational constituencies and the capacity to integrate with the new
international politics.

Sometimes these institutions were the direct outcome of the pre-1914
internationalism, for example in the case of the Hague Academy whose advocates were
the mostly European jurists organised in the \textit{Institut de droit international}. Yet this first
systematic attempt to promote the rules of international law through an international
academy was integrated into the new, post-1919 multilateral order as its target audience
were the judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice as well as the
government bureaucracies which sent their diplomats to The Hague for training. They,
too, were to be instructed in the scientific principles of foreign policy making and
international litigation, as the organisers of the Hague Academy recognised that national
governments were still the site where crucial decisions in international politics were

\textsuperscript{12} Kott, “Une “communauté épistémique” du social”; 31.
\textsuperscript{13} Clavin and Wessels, “Transnationalism and the League of Nations”; 491.
made. The Graduate Institute in Geneva was founded both as a training institution for international civil servants and as an institution which would endeavour to make the knowledge accumulated in international organisations available to a broader audience. Crucially, it also moved away from a conception of an international expert elite entirely made up of lawyers, instead combining instruction in international law with history and economics.

Of course, the foundations continued to support international law as a discipline in the interwar period, notably through the Carnegie Endowment’s International Law Division. The enormous philanthropic support for the codification of international law in the form of the Harvard Research’s draft conventions was, however, chiefly an attempt to shape the rules of the international order under League of Nations auspices. Like other foundation-funded activities in the orbit of the League, the Harvard Research was heavily supported because it presented an opportunity for American participation in League work without all of the encumbrances that official membership would have brought with it. Crucially, the Harvard Research also had the approval of the State Department. It fell to the foundations to finance the United States’ unofficial participation in the League which ensured that Americans could, according to Malcolm Davis, “eat our cake and have it too”.14

Similarly, the *Dotation Carnegie* served as a hub for the American expatriate community in Paris, even though it had been designed as an international cultural centre ever since its previously largely French governing board and staff were internationalised in the mid-1920s. The *Dotation* itself interpreted its mission as providing a meeting place for European and American intellectual elites and as disseminating scientific knowledge about nations, with a particular emphasis on the new nations in Eastern and Central Europe. Thus, it participated in the consolidation of national characteristics in

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14 Davis Oral History, ii, 164.
the imagination of its patrons. As it secured the contributions of a roster of
internationally renowned intellectuals to its public lectures and its journal, the Dotation
did become involved with several other efforts for international conciliation in the
sphere of culture and education, for example Prince Rohan’s Kulturbund and the Comité
d’Entente, but it always styled itself as a scientific enterprise.

The Dotation’s activities also serve as an interesting spotlight onto the
foundations’ attempt to connect with popular internationalism and grass-roots
movements for peace in the interwar years. The Dotation certainly represented a
resource for these movements, as did the summer schools which were supported by the
Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropies. The foundations’ interest in popular education
manifested itself for example in their support for the Foreign Policy Association or in
the public lectures offered by the Dotation. But the foundations’ approach to
internationalist education was top-down and they certainly did not seek to support a
transnational “advocacy network”.\textsuperscript{15} This of course complicated their self-appointed
task of influencing public opinion. But then, the definition of public opinion which the
foundations and many of their collaborators embraced was very limited. As Sydnor
Walker explained to Edward Carter of the IPR, she “was not thinking at all of the
general public but of those in public life and commerce”.\textsuperscript{16} It is telling that one of the
Carnegie Endowment’s most successful programmes in the sphere of popular
internationalism, the International Relations Clubs, were scaled back instead of
expanded in 1931, even though they evoked a remarkable level of interest in a number
of European countries. Yet, the programme had been labelled by foreign scholars as
American propaganda activity and had thus become too controversial. Moreover, the
entire approach of the foundations to internationalism as a movement was marked by

\textsuperscript{15} Margareth E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, \textit{Activists Beyond Borders} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
\textsuperscript{16} Walker to Carter, 9 December 1936, RF, RG 1.1, series 200, box 356, folder 4227.
the push towards academicisation, as shown, for example, in the case of the Geneva Research Center’s reorganisation and eventual merger with the Graduate Institute in Geneva. Internationalism as a science, however, could hardly be expected to be mass-compatible.

Being perceived as agencies for propaganda, a term associated with influencing the masses, was a big fear of the foundations during the interwar years as it would have seriously compromised their place within the broader framework of American cultural diplomacy. The latter may not have been institutionalised and been the object of official policy making before 1938—but to not have a policy is a policy, too. As has been argued in chapter three, the foundations did fulfil certain functions in the broader context of U.S. foreign policy, even if those depended heavily on informal structures. By ostensibly conducting their programmes disconnected from the state, the foundations made it possible to construct an image of the American nation as an impartial and disinterested arbiter in international affairs. The ‘non-political’, private status of the foundations was part and parcel of official foreign policy, and the distinction advanced in much of the scholarship on the Cultural Cold War between free-flowing, organic intellectual processes organised by civil society groups and one-directional state-led cultural efforts which exclusively promote the national interest is too reductive.¹⁷ The example of the International Studies Conference, where the involvement of private American groups led to an increased politicisation of an intergovernmental body, is instructive here and acts as a reminder that the usefulness of the public-private distinction should continue to be questioned.

As the case of the foundations’ involvement in Germany illustrates, philanthropic programmes were received as cultural diplomacy abroad and became the target of state manipulation, often precisely because the foundations were eager to ensure the approval of foreign governments for their programmes. Again, it is useful to distinguish between the Carnegie Endowment, which was more willing to openly collaborate with the political elites of recipient countries, as the case of the Stresemann Academy illustrates, and the Rockefeller Foundation, whose approach was more discreet but nevertheless ensured that foreign governments were kept abreast of philanthropic programmes. But while foundation philanthropy was a target for government propaganda, it was not always an easy target. The censoring of certain volumes of the Carnegie History damaged Germany’s reputation in the foreign press and the History’s entire approach subtly challenged the fixations of German ‘preemptive historiography’. The *Notgemeinschaft* international relations committee also changed its approach over time and the influence of government officials, especially Curtius, actually diminished. As with most of the foundations’ activities abroad, programme outcomes were determined by a complex process of negotiation as foundations, governments, international organisations, academic institutions and the individuals caught up between them all wielded their respective forms of soft power.

As in the United States, the key interlocutors of the foundations were scholars with good connections to foreign policy elites—and this remained the case after 1933, when most but not all of the foundations’ partners had to leave Nazi Germany. What is remarkable here is that philanthropic networks withstood these ruptures and continued to exist as German émigré scholars remained within the foundations’ orbit for years, sometimes decades, to come. It is also noteworthy that the Rockefeller Foundation considered transplanting entire research programmes abroad which suggests that, while the focus on institutions supported by foundations is useful, especially as it captures a
large part of the financial dimension of foundation support, it can only convey parts of the story and it is individuals who must be followed. This dissertation has only been able to do this to a certain extent and a more systematic collective biography of members of philanthropic networks would be a desirable project for future research. Some progress in this direction has been made by historians who have investigated the fellowship programmes of the Rockefeller Foundation. However, fellowships are only one avenue of philanthropic support and do not convey adequately the patterns of inclusion and exclusion which structured philanthropic networks.

One motivation behind the foundations’ habit of seeking out interlocutors in European countries which belonged or had good connections to political elites was the hope that official approval would facilitate the implementation of philanthropic programmes. As the “safari” of Shotwell, Ford and Coss has illustrated, this represented a common approach all over Europe. But a more fundamental conviction which underlay the entire project of philanthropic internationalism played an even stronger role and this was the foundations’ search for an authentic national point of view. In the minds of foundation officers, the nation was the irreplaceable foundation of world politics. Of course, some nations were more advanced than others. Colonised nations remained outside the circle of those who could lay claim to fully developed nationality. The young nations of Eastern and Central Europe also remained an object for civilising efforts. But this differentiation did not change the underlying assumption that any effort to bring forth a peaceful world order would have to deal with the nation as the salient political entity. Thus, it was also foundation policy to establish strong national foreign affairs institutes and national editorial boards for the Carnegie History. This may also be why Albert Thomas, head of the International Labour Organisation, dedicated his

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Carnegie Chair lecture in Berlin to a discussion of French foreign policy, a puzzling choice for the leader of a major international organisation who would have been well qualified to speak on his work.

As a result of the privileging of the nation, foundation officers tended to emphasise the nationality of experts, too. Again, it is necessary to differentiate. In the early 1920s, as enthusiasm for the League project coloured the judgement of philanthropic leaders such as Ruml and Fosdick, an elite of de-nationalised experts was at least thought possible. This led to the foundation of the Graduate Institute in Geneva, an institution with a multinational staff. Nevertheless, cautious voices existed even then. Ultimately, Abraham Flexner argued that only “loyal nationals” would be able to translate the scientific findings of experts into national policy. Hence, the foundations strengthened their relations with national foreign policy elites, supporting such ventures as the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik. And, it must be admitted, from the mid-1920s, it seemed that the foundations yielded remarkable successes in terms of policy outcomes with this approach, notably in the form of the Kellogg-Briand pact which was fêted during the first lecture given by Shotwell under the auspices of the Berlin Carnegie Chair. By the early 1930s, foundation officers may have opposed the intergovernmentalism of such bodies as the ISC in the form of perceived government interference, but the principle of national representation in any body aiming at international policy coordination was firmly entrenched.

Another question is whether foundation officers believed that solutions for the reform of domestic societies and the international society were essentially the same. Their progressive heritage would suggest that foundations interpreted international life as the sum of the different variants of national life. This was often the case, as is reflected by many ISC studies which essentially consisted of the comparing of different national approaches, for example in the field of colonial administration. On the other
hand, both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment supported the work of David Mitrany, the inventor of functionalism, a theory of international organisation which proposes the border-transcending administration of social programmes as a way of ordering international life. Moreover, the foundations’ support for federalist projects, in particular Danubian economic integration, also points to a predilection for supranational solutions, albeit modelled on the American experience. A comprehensive assessment of the huge variety of intellectual projects which the foundations financed in the field of international relations has been beyond the scope of this dissertation but represents a fruitful area for future research. In particular, the role of non-émigré scholars in the ISC could be investigated. What can be said, however, is that the foundations located the potential for political solutions to international problems firmly on the national level and, therefore, the inclusion of national delegations from countries which threatened international stability in the ISC was important.

Given their complex stance towards international experts, what was the relationship between the foundations and international organisations? Throughout the interwar years, there were manifold philanthropic links to both the League and the International Labour Organisation. As has been discussed in chapters one and two, Rockefeller family funds as well as foundation grants supplemented the League’s financial resources and also contributed to the social environment around the League, the famous Geneva scene. But the foundations also consciously enabled Americans to participate in the League’s work and made sure that the United States was the most important non-member state at Geneva. The Harvard Research’s draft conventions, the most significant contribution to the 1930 Codification Conference, were produced by lawyers who were quite conscious of the fact that this would be a specifically American

19 On Mitrany see Ashworth, Creating International Studies.
contribution to the reformulation of the world’s legal order. In the case of the League’s intellectual cooperation work, including the ISC, foundation activity actually weakened rather than strengthened League institutions. So even though the foundations were great benefactors to the League, it is also possible to take a critical stance with regard to this philanthropic largesse. Throughout the interwar years, philanthropic foundations undermined intergovernmental structures and sought to replace them with unofficial ones which were, nevertheless, dominated by American groups. This could happen even while philanthropic gifts were ostensibly directed at bolstering the League.

Finally, to what extent did the philanthropic project to promote a scientific approach to the making of foreign policy extend American power in Europe or influence other aspects of the American-European relationship in the interwar years? The case studies explored in this dissertation confirm the findings of previous studies which emphasise that the outcomes and often even the design of philanthropic programmes are the result of complex negotiations which are highly contingent on local structures. As has been analysed in chapter four, intergovernmental structures were also a significant factor in such processes. There were instances when European partners of the foundations succeeded in pushing through their preferred solutions, as has been shown in the case of the ISC’s affiliation to the IIIC. However, the foundations were also able to exert a significant amount of power on the functioning of the ISC when they diverted essential coordinating powers away from Paris. With regard to bilateral relationships between the foundation and grant-receiving institutions, it must be concluded that foundation officers were often deceived as to the true nature of the projects they supported. The most salient case is obviously that of Fritz Berber and the Deutsche Institut für Außenpolitische Forschung, but the Royal Institute of International Affairs’ decision to use its grant for FRPS work also contravened the conditions under which the money had been appropriated.
To what extent did American foundations contribute to the Americanisation of Europe in a broader sense? One constant feature of philanthropic programmes in the field of international relations is the conscious attempt to increase American participation, whether with regard to student numbers at the Hague Academy and at the Graduate Institute in Geneva or American participation in collaborative endeavours such as the 1930 Codification Conference and the ISC. The Geneva Institute usually had at least one visiting American professor, often an academic with good foundation connections, for example Quincy Wright or Jacob Viner. The foundations also encouraged the use of English as a language of instruction at some European institutions, in particular the Hague Academy, where English was only given the same status as French after the Second World War. The Dotation’s abortive attempt to create an American cultural centre in association with the American Library in Paris also gives a distinctly American flavour to the foundations’ internationalist project. But looking for instances of Americanisation only captures some effects of foundation funding. In the case of the philanthropic international relations programmes, a circulation of institutional models within Europe and within a transatlantic and even global framework was furthered by the foundations. One only needs to recall the promotion of the Chatham House model in Europe or the support for transplanting the IPR. Williamstown, another foundation-supported institution, also found many imitators on both sides of the Atlantic. Finally, the foundation-created international institutions also increased the mobility of academics.

As has been observed by other students of the European programmes of American foundations, notably John Krige, European interlocutors of the philanthropies tended to share points of view and basic political orientations with their American backers. Thus they were able to enter a relationship marked by “consensual hegemony”. This was also the case in the interwar years. Most of the foundations’ European partners
were self-described liberals and supporters of the post-1919 settlement who were interested in securing American participation in certain intellectual and institutional projects. Scholar-practitioners that they were, they realised that world political decisions would not be made without the United States. This, however, did not imply that they wished to invite American domination. Rather, they hoped that participation in transnational, foundation-funded networks would also transform ideas and opinions of elites in the United States. The basic promise of philanthropic internationalism, that it was possible to be a “loyal national” and a good internationalist, also appealed to many Europeans. This sentiment is captured in a letter by William Beveridge to Shotwell in which he argued for stronger American participation in the ISC: “We do not, of course, want the specifically American point of view but we want Americans to come and take an international view.”

Squaring this circle was difficult for all kinds of experts in the interwar years.

20 Beveridge to Shotwell, 5 February 1932, CEIP CE, box 29, folder5.
## Appendix: RF payments (actual) to the IIIC and European ISC member institutions (in USD), source: RF Annual Reports, 1929-1939

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