The Formation and Allegiance of the Romanian Military
EliteOriginating from the BanatMilitaryBorder

Ph.D. Thesis

Ph.D. Candidate: Irina Marin
Supervisors: Professor Dennis Deletant
Dr Zoran Milutinović

University College London
School of Slavonic and East European Studies

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I, Irina Marin, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
Abstract

The present thesis examines the formation and loyalties of the Romanian officers originating from the Banat Military Border who reached the rank of general in the Austro-Hungarian army between 1870 and 1918. As such, it covers an important blind spot in English-, German-, and Romanian-language historiography as, on the one hand, it contributes a multiple case study, based on extant personal testimonies, to the historical literature on the Habsburg officer corps and, on the other hand, it validates and brings together into a coherent narrative the snippets of historical evidence invoked in Romanian bibliography on the topic. The thesis goes beyond the above-indicated time span and follows the development of the Banat Military Border from its establishment in the eighteenth century to its dissolution at the end of the nineteenth century. Particular emphasis is placed on the formative environment of the military elites under discussion, whether this means historical or legal precedent, official stereotypes, or community identity and symbolism. The Border generals are presented in their relationships to the state (in its various instantiations), the army and civil authorities, as well as in their relations with the Romanian intelligentsia of the Empire. The main goal of the thesis is to account for their sense of identity and allegiance: who were these generals? to whom were they loyal?
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Imperial and National Literature on the Banat Military Border</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Conceptual Framework</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Romanians in Imperial Discourse</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Romanian Military Elite of the Banat Military Border</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Military Elite Status within a Social-Cultural Context</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Professions of Allegiance (I): GM Trajan Doda</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Romanian Border Generals</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between the Imperial and the National Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Conclusions</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Appendices</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Abbreviations of primary sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OeStA</strong></td>
<td>Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (Austrian State Archives, Vienna)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>KA</strong></td>
<td>Kriegsarchiv (War Archives, Vienna)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>KM Präs</strong></td>
<td>Kriegsministerium Präsidium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MKSM</strong></td>
<td>Militär Kanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers</td>
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<td><strong>KÜA (MK/KM)</strong></td>
<td>Kriegsüberwachungsamt</td>
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<td><strong>HHStA</strong></td>
<td>Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv</td>
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<td><strong>MAE</strong></td>
<td>Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (The Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ANIC</strong></td>
<td>Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale București (The Central Historical National Archives, Bucharest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANCS</strong></td>
<td>Arhivele Naționale Caraș-Severin (Caraș-Severin National Archives, Caransebeș)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ANCN</strong></td>
<td>Arhivele Naționale Cluj-Napoca (Cluj-Napoca National Archives)</td>
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<td><strong>ANS</strong></td>
<td>Arhivele Naționale Sibiu (Sibiu National Archives)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>ANBN</strong></td>
<td>Arhivele Naționale Bistrița-Năsăud (Bistrița-Năsăud National Archives)</td>
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<td><strong>ANT</strong></td>
<td>Arhivele Naționale Timiș (Timiș National Archives, Timișoara)</td>
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<td><strong>PRO</strong></td>
<td>formerly the Public Record Office, now The National Archives, London</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Military and historical abbreviations

FM – Feldmarschall
FZM - Feldzeugmeister
FML – Feldmarschalleutnant
GM – Generalmajor

k.k. – kaiserlich-königlich (after 1867 used in reference to institutions pertaining to Cisleithania)
k.u.k. – kaiserlich und königlich (after 1867 used in reference to the common institutions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, with the exception of the army, which became k.u.k. after 1888)
k.u. – königlich ungarisch (used in reference to Hungarian institutions post Ausgleich)

Note on the use of place names and proper nouns

For the sake of clarity, consistency, and historical accuracy I have made the following choices:

(1) Given that the timespan of the present thesis does not go beyond 1918, I have opted for the spelling of place names which was in official use at the time (i.e. Temesvár instead of Timișoara, Hermannstadt instead of Sibiu). Where necessary, I provide in between brackets the Romanian or German counterpart. In quotations I retained the author’s choice of spelling. In the case of Caransebeş, there being so many spelling variations (Karánsebes, Karansebes, Caransebes, Caransebesiu), I have chosen the most frequent spelling used by the Border Generals, i.e. Caransebes.

(2) As regards the names of the generals under consideration, throughout this thesis I use the German spelling or, where documentary evidence is available, the spelling which they themselves used. The appended list of generals specifies all metamorphoses of their names, including their current Romanian spelling.
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Motto:

The Unknown Citizen

(To JS/07 M 378
This Marble Monument
Is Erected by the State)

He was found by the Bureau of Statistics
to be
One against whom there was no official complaint,
And all the reports on his conduct agree
That, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, he was a saint,
For in everything he did he served the Greater Community.
Except for the War till the day he retired
He worked in a factory and never got fired,
But satisfied his employers, Fudge Motors Inc.
Yet he wasn't a scab or odd in his views,
For his Union reports that he paid his dues,
(Our report on his Union shows it was sound)
And our Social Psychology workers found
That he was popular with his mates and liked a drink.
The Press are convinced that he bought a paper every day
And that his reactions to advertisements were normal in every way.
Policies taken out in his name prove that he was fully insured,
And his Health-card shows he was once in hospital but left it cured.
Both Producers Research and High-Grade Living declare
He was fully sensible to the advantages of the Instalment Plan
And had everything necessary to the Modern Man,
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a frigidaire.
Our researchers into Public Opinion are content
That he held the proper opinions for the time of year;
When there was peace, he was for peace: when there was war, he went.
He was married and added five children to the population,
Which our Eugenist says was the right number for a parent of his generation.
And our teachers report that he never interfered with their education.
Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd:
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard.

From Another Time by W. H. Auden
Chapter 1. Introduction

The present Ph.D. thesis was initially meant to be an examination of inceptive Romanian national discourse. Such a topic had eventually to be qualified and narrowed down for two reasons: the sheer extent of the cultural and social space to be covered and, more importantly still, the heterogeneous nature of Romanian national discourse itself. With a few exceptions, present-day Romanian historiography presents a unitary, monolithic view of Romanians as a teleological national entity in an evolutionary movement of coalescence, converging slowly but surely towards a Romanian unitary state. Following the 1918 Union, whereby Transylvania, the Banat, Bukovina, and Bessarabia joined the existing Romanian state (formed in 1859 through the union of Wallachia and Moldavia), attempts were made to solidify the new political and state unity by stressing cultural commonalities (language, ancestry, etc.) and smoothing out administrative and institutional differences. Traditional Romanian history writing reflects this centripetal process of consolidation by sometimes anachronistically reading national awareness and purpose into events and characters’ actions that do not warrant this. What is not very often mentioned is that this apparently seamless unity has existed for less than one hundred years and that the present-day Romanian unitary state is the result of a conglomeration of provinces with widely divergent historical legacies and a complex pattern of loyalties.

Of all the Romanian-inhabited territories that went into Greater Romania in 1918, I chose to stop at the Banat of Temesvár, the former Habsburg, and subsequently, Hungarian province, given its borderland location in relation to both its former as well as its current polity and, in particular, given the combination of
similarities and dissimilarities with Transylvania, the neighbouring province, which has received the lion’s share of scholarly attention. While compiling the preliminary synopsis of historical literature on the Banat, I came across a number of contributions on the Banat Military Border. Its extraordinary social, administrative and even political peculiarities as well as its close connections with the imperial centre and the postulated staunch loyalty of the militarized population led me to further narrow down the scope of my thesis to focus on this part of the Banat. By virtue of this gradual process of bibliographical whittling down, I arrived at the final topic of my thesis: an examination of the process of identity and allegiance formation among the military elites of a community whose development has been relegated to the periphery of Romanian historiography as well as being underrepresented in other historiographies: the militarized population of the Banat Military Border.

The present thesis will, therefore, provide an analysis of the genesis and loyalties of the Romanian military elite originating from this segment of the Austrian Military Border. For methodological purposes I have opted for a concept of military elite confined to the Romanian officers who reached the rank of General in the Austro-Hungarian army between 1870 and 1918. The notion of elite is defined here in a double sense: in reference to the military hierarchy, it designates the highly skilled, decorated and, in some cases, knighted Romanian officers promoted to important positions as part of the Austro-Hungarian military apparatus; in relation to the Romanian community out of which these officers emerged, the notion of elite refers to the educated and politically aware officers, who, on several occasions, became the mouthpiece of the community before the authorities and promoters of cultural and economic reform.
The primary aim of the thesis is that of recovering the ‘voice’ of this military elite, more often than not suppressed or ventriloquized, by tracking down documents and personal testimony as well as any type of collateral or incidental evidence that can afford an insight into their sense of allegiance and identity. In so doing, the thesis is intended as a critique of Romanian historiography, which assimilates these officers’ sense of national identity to the teleological nationalism that helped consolidate the Romanian state post 1918 and later on. Additionally, it constitutes a multiple case study which contributes a necessary qualification to the view that the loyalties of the Habsburg officer corps lay ‘beyond nationalism’, which represents the common denominator of English-language historical literature on the Habsburg officer corps.

I shall proceed to preface the actual exposition of hypotheses underlying this thesis with a brief presentation of three historical episodes, which will set the parameters of the subsequent discussion.

***

1737. The Banat of Temeswar. War is raging anew\(^1\) in the recently conquered Habsburg province. The local population takes to the forests and mountains in what has become a secular ebb-like movement typical of war-depleted borderlands. Twenty years after the Peace of Passarowitz, which made the Banat a Habsburg possession, the new authorities have developed but a feeble hold on the sparse elusive population of the province. Faced with impending destruction at the hands of the Turks the people side with the strongest, placate, and bribe in order to survive. A Banat chronicler records episode after episode of such negotiations with the invaders:
‘Omer Pasha together with his 2000 [soldiers] crossed over at Orsova and coming across many stores he was content and set up camp. Many old Romanians came to him through the woods with gifts from the villages and he received them. [The Romanians] even told him how the Turks could get to the main thoroughfare across Strajovaţ, Mehadia’s hill.∗∗

And later:

‘Omer Pasha settled as ruler in Mehadia fortress. The villagers who had fled to the woods came and bowed in submission to him and brought him rams, lambs, butter, and cheese as gifts. And the Pasha gave them writs for safe-passage called ‘buruntii (salva guardie)’, and a Turk or two subpasha and Sipahi to bring their people back to their villages.’∗∗∗

At this point in time neither Turks nor Habsburgs could enlist the locals’ allegiance. Sources⁴ tell of a population unmoored by any loyalty, not genuinely swayed either way but rather acting on shear survival instinct. The habit of crossing over to the enemy and banditry as a way of life gained the Wallachian population the notoriety of a ‘disloyal people’. Marshal Marmont, duke of Ragusa, described the state of the Banat population prior to militarization in the following terms:

‘The long wars between Hungary and Turkey and the following devastations had reduced the frontier population to a most destitute state: often dispossessed, tossed about by the whims of fate, forced to lead a life on the run, full of misery. Someone came up with the idea to subordinate them to an organization that could protect them and give them stability.’∗∗∗∗

---

∗ ‘Omer paşa, cu ceâile 2000, [...] el la Oraşava trecu şi aflînd multe magazine, îi pâru bine şi se aşeză. Unde mulţi rumâni bătrâni, cu pocloane, din sate, prin pâduri mergea şi el primrea. Carii i-au şi spus lui cum pot turci pre după dealu Mehadii, Strajovaţ, deasupra a eşi, iar în drumu mare.’

∗∗ ‘Omer paşa în fortu Mehadii s-au aşezat domn. La el săteînii de prin pâduri fugiţi, cu berbeci, miei, unt, brînză poclon vin, să închina, cu satele; cărora paşa cărţi numite buruntii (:salva gvardie) în mâna le da, apoi şi cîte un ture sau doi subaşă şi spahii de-a aduna oamenii în sate-şi le da.’

∗∗∗ ‘les longues guèrres entre Hongrie et la Turquie, et les devastations qui en avaiant été la suite, avaient réduit au plus grand état de misère la population de la frontière. Souvent déposédée, jetée ça et là, suivant le caprice du sort, forcée à mener une vie errante et malheureuse, on a eut l’idée de la soumettre à une organisation qui pût la protéger et lui donner de la consistance.’
The beginnings of the Banat Military Border were marked by mutual distrust between the population and the Habsburg authorities. Although regimentation, that is, assimilation into the Austrian Military Border system and subordination to the imperial military authority, brought with it a number of exemptions and privileges, the people were initially adamant in their opposition to it. Militarization meant being subjected to a strict order, which, as pointed out by some authors, ran counter to the lax Ottoman type of administration to which they had been accustomed. A more apposite explanation of this resistance to militarization would be that this was not so much an instance of nostalgia for good old Turkish days as an attempt to retain the fluid status on which their very survival hinged. It can be, moreover, interpreted as a clear sign of a non-committal attitude, of a lack of loyalty, not in the negative sense of disloyalty, but rather, to use a coinage, that of *a-loyalty*.

Less than a century later, during the 1848-49 turmoil, when even the most *kaisertreu* of people doubted what side they should be on, the militarized Wallachian population in the Banat Military Border are reported to have declined the offers of participation in the new government formed by the Hungarian revolutionaries and to have called their bluff, while upholding their own status as staunch supporters of the Emperor:

‘The expression of dissatisfaction with the new order of things and with the introduction of the Hungarian Ministerium showed most clearly among the population [...] they unanimously stated that, as long as they did not see the Emperor himself and did not hear from his very mouth that he did not need them anymore, they would not give credence to any of these discussions and proclamations.’6 *

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6 ‘Der Ausdruck der Unzufriedenheit mit der [...] neuen Ordnung der Dinge und mit der Einführung des ungarischen Ministeriums zeigte sich bei der Bevölkerung am deutlichsten, [...] da sie einstimmig
And the report is not singular:

‘In the presence of myself and General Lieutenant Korniz the assembled communities of the Corniac Company stated that, given their proved loyalty and submission to the Imperial House, they could not understand how they could be handed down to the Hungarian Ministerium and they would not break their loyalty to Emperor and King; at this, Corporal Ianku Ionescu and frontiersman Ianku Stoloschesko, in particular, applauded on behalf of both communities. [Stoloschesko] even said, how did they think they could justify themselves if the Emperor held them responsible for their gullibility […] they demanded even to go in person to His Majesty to check if it was true that His Majesty wished to hand them down as orphans to the Hungarian Ministerium’.7

Thus, eighty years after the militarization of southern Banat, the Romanian Grenzer seem to have undergone a complete volteface from the least reliable of imperial subjects to a dependable military force, purposeful and fully aware where its loyalties lay.

A quarter of a century later, in 1872, the first Banat Border officer reached the rank of general. By 1918 the militarized population of the Banat had given the Austro-Hungarian army fifteen generals, as indicated by Antoniu Marchescu in his landmark history of the Banat Grenzer: ‘Bacila, Bihoi, Ladislau Cena, Nicolae Cena, Traian Doda, Guran, Ion, Iovescu, Lugoianu, Lupu, Matăringă, Muica, Seracin,
Şandru, and Trapsia, all of them being self-made men who rose to high ranks and positions.¹⁸

The above-mentioned historical moments (pre-militarization status, *kaisertreu* position in the events of 1848-49, and the final emergence of high-ranking officers from this Border community) have been chosen to illustrate the comparatively rapid metamorphosis of a community from an unreliable group prone to defection to a hothouse of loyal military manpower and, eventually, to a source of military grey matter for the joint army. Thus the questions to which this thesis will provide an answer fall under two headings. The first category refers to the community as a whole: what were the factors that created a sense of allegiance among this disenfranchised population?; is there a tenable connection between imperial loyalty and the rise of national consciousness?; to what extent did the imperial discourse, which gave rise to *Kaisertreue*, also foster community self-awareness?

The second category of questions refers more specifically to the elite that emerged out of this militarized borderland: who were these high-ranking officers and how did they reach the rank of general? Can one actually pinpoint and define their sense of allegiance? Is there any documentary evidence that would warrant the recruitment of these military men as emblematic figures within Romanian historiography? How does national self-consciousness appear in a tightly regulated military borderland? Does it define itself in conjunction with, or in contradistinction to, imperial allegiance? Can the term ‘nationalism’ be at all used to describe this type of loyalty? Is this allegiance in itself a monolithic, homogenous relationship or does
it break down into various brands of loyalty and, if so, what is their nature and their relation to one another?

In tackling the above questions one should not lose sight of the almost phenomenological distinction between things as they ‘really’ happened and things as recorded and rehashed by various sources. As I shall argue in the next chapter, the bibliography on the Banat Military Border is formed of a string of authors, each one drawing on their predecessors’ work, and thus perpetuating snippets of documentary evidence, which eventually lose their reliability through quote, misquote and fuzzy paraphrase. Patrick Leigh Fermor’s insight into the devious workings of history writing remains a classic and a valid caveat for all endeavours in the field:

“Let us assume” turns in a few pages into “We may assume”, which, in a few more, is “As we have shown”; and after a few more pages yet, the shy initial hypothesis has hardened into a brazen established landmark, all the time with not an atom of new evidence being adduced. Advantageous points are coaxed into opulent bloom, awkward ones discreetly pruned into non-being. Obscurity reigns. It is a dim region where *suggestio falsi* and *suppressio veri*, those twin villains of historical conflict, stalk about the shadows with dark-lantern and bow-string.”

Therefore in this thesis I set out to verify to what extent there exists archival evidence to substantiate claims regarding the allegiance of the military elites originating from the Banat Military Border. I am laying such particular emphasis on sources because this constitutes one of the main problems when reading Romanian bibliography. Attitudes and personal positioning, although constantly invoked, go for the most part unreferenced and are the product of inference and speculation rather than interpretation of concrete testimony. Moreover, when it comes to researching a period of time spanning the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the very process of tracking down documents and extracting information (in the form of deciphering,
transliterating and translating) has, I believe, an important bearing on the research outcome. I shall reserve the final section of the present chapter for describing the challenges I encountered in my research.

In what follows I will flesh out the historical outline I sketched at the beginning of this chapter and delineate the main transformations brought about by militarization in the south-eastern part of the Banat of Temeswar. The emphasis will be on historical developments conducive to antagonisms that later on would play an important role in the politics of allegiance formation, as well as on administrative structures that would eventually give rise to differences in social status.

Since the setting up of the Military Border system is closely connected with Habsburg rule, I shall begin this presentation at the point where the Banat of Temeswar became a Habsburg land. The very name of the province, the Banat of Temeswar, did not come into use before the seventeenth century, when it appeared for the first time in Habsburg official documents. Although conquered *de facto* in 1716, the Banat was ceded *de jure* to the Habsburg Crown in 1718 following the Peace of Passarowitz (Požarevac). The newly conquered territory did not revert to its pre-Ottoman status, that is, it was not retroceded to the Hungarian Crown. As a consequence of this, the Banat became a bone of contention between the Habsburgs and the Hungarian estates, who demanded a *restitutio in integrum*, that is, the restoration of the territory to the Hungarian Crown and, administration-wise, a return to the county system prior to 1552. The Habsburgs followed, instead, the victor’s advice: Eugene of Savoy urged the monarch to assume the title of *dominum terrestre* (master of the land) on top of his absolutistic *summus principatus* (supreme lordship/dominion).11
Consequently, the Banat became Crown land administered as a *neoacquisticum* (newly acquired territory), meaning that, from a political and legal point of view, the slate was wiped clean so that no landownership rights prior to 1716 were recognized. The territory had been acquired *jure belli* (by right of sword/conquest) and was to be eventually ceded to Hungary in 1779, and even then only the civil part of the province. The reasons for this were at least two: the strategic position of the region in relation to the Ottoman Empire; and secondly, the reluctance to add to the might of the already restive Hungarians (the anti-Habsburg revolt led by Rákóczi had taken place only a couple of years earlier).

Under the Habsburgs the pattern of landholding was similar to that imposed by previous rules: just like the Ottomans and the Hungarians before them, the Habsburg Emperor was the absolute owner of land, which was allotted to the inhabitants within a usufructuary framework. The same administrative expedient as resorted to by previous rulers was applied this time as well. Effective contact with the population of the newly conquered territory could only be established by mediation. Thus, the village *knezi* were retained and absorbed within the Habsburg administrative system, so much so that a new position came into being which was modelled on the *knez* function. The *oberknez* was an Austrian creation and endured until 1776. Unlike the *knezes*, the *oberknezes* were not elected by the villagers but appointed by the Banat governor. Unlike the *knez*, the *oberknez* was a salaried function.\(^{12}\)

In 1751 Maria Theresa decreed the separation of civil from military administration.\(^{13}\) Repeated conflicts with the Porte and, in particular, the 1737-1739 war, which ended with the loss of northern Serbia and Oltenia (Little Wallachia) to the Turks, brought home the strategic importance of the Banat as a defence line and emphasised the need for a defence system more effective than the existing frontier
militia. This had been the rationale behind the formation of the Habsburg Military Border, a defence line dating back to the sixteenth century, initially limited to part of the Croatian lands, and conceived as a buffer zone between the Habsburg possessions and the Ottoman Empire. Starting from the eighteenth century, this territory stretching from the Adriatic, and eventually, all the way to the Transylvanian border, acquired an organizational structure of its own, whose main appeal resided in a self-sustaining economic system based on feudal-type distribution of land in exchange for military service and placed under the control of a centralized military administration. An important point on Empress Maria Theresa’s agenda of military reform following the Silesian debacle, the organization of the Military Border institution aimed at ‘converting an irregular frontier militia into a rigidly disciplined and ever-ready military force, maintained at little or no cost to the state in times of peace.’

Amidst efforts to consolidate the military strength of the new province, a land militia came into being in 1726 known as Banatische Landmiliz or Temeser Grenzmiliz. The setting up of a new military border establishment became necessary after the dissolution of the Tisza – Maros (Tisa-Mureș) confinium in 1741, a defence line introduced at the turn of the century and marking, at the time, the latest Habsburg advance into Ottoman territory. The second wave of Habsburg conquests culminating with the Treaty of Passarowitz pushed the frontier line farther south to include the Banat, northern Serbia and little Wallachia, and thus rendered superfluous an inland military border. The influx of former frontiersmen from the Tisza-Maros area together with refugees from Serbia, lost to the Turks in 1739, required a solution of relocation.
As the Banat Landmiliz proved unsatisfactory upon later inspection in terms of discipline, training and territorial distribution,\textsuperscript{16} Habsburg authorities proceeded to militarize the southern Banat and to assimilate it into the administrative system of the Croatian and Slavonian Military Border. Between 1765 and 1768 three new Military Border subdivisions were formed: the Illyrian Border Regiment, the German Border Regiment and a Wallachian Battalion reinforced by later additions.

Before moving on to discussing the organization of this extension of the Habsburg Border, I would like to make one particular point regarding the semantics of the noun ‘border’. This will, I hope, prevent any confusion that might arise from the polysemy developed by the term ‘Border’ (Rom. Graniță, Germ. Grenze) in the context of the Habsburg institution. Well before one learns about the intricacies of military administration and the peculiarities of landholding and resource management in this territory, one comes across an unusual use of language in reference to the Military Border: ‘Nemulțumiri \textit{în} graniță militară bănățeană la începutul secolului 19’ (Discontent \textit{in} the Banat military border at the beginning of the nineteenth century) reads the title of Costin Feneșan’s 1973 article in \textit{Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie Cluj}. But the word ‘graniță’ designates a line of demarcation between territories or countries and, by extension, between realms, abstract domains etc., and as such collocates with surface rather than volume prepositions: ‘\textit{la} graniță’ and less frequently ‘\textit{pe} graniță’ (corresponding to the German \textit{an} der Grenze). Nonetheless, the temptation to lay the charge of solecism at the author’s door dwindles considerably as one discovers that the next author too, and the next, irrespective of origin, language or period, resort to the same idiosyncratic use of language. Costin Feneșan, an important contemporary scholar of Banat history, makes a point of using the volume preposition ‘\textit{în}’ throughout his
articles (see also his 1970 article in Studii de Istoria Banatului entitled ‘Contribuții la istoricul învățământului în granița militară bănățeană la sfârșitul secolului al 18-lea, începutul secolului al 19-lea’). Bujor Surdu opts for the same preposition as does Ion Georgescu (‘Mișcări anti-habsburgice româno-sârbe în granița militară bănățeană la începutul secolului al 19-lea’). Antoniu Marchescu uses the Latinate term ‘confiniu’ (Lat. confinium = border, frontier) as a more academic synonym of ‘graniță’ and feels the need for the same type of volume preposition: ‘Grănicerii din acest confiniu au primit cu nemulțumire măsura luată de împărăteasă’. A basic stylistic analysis shows that, in this context, graniță becomes synonymous to confiniu and teritoriu militarizat (militarized territory).17

As most of the Romanian bibliography on the topic inevitably draws on Austrian sources, the origin of this usage cannot be doubted. And indeed we find it in Hietzinger’s seminal work Statistik der Militärgränze des österreichischen Kaiserthums as early as 1817: ‘Daß übrigens der Vorwurf der Trägheit und Unthätigkeit nur den Mann, nicht das Weib in der Gränze treffe […] hatten wir bereits forüber zu bemerken Gelegenheit.’18 Another Austrian author, Pidoll zu Quintenbach writes towards the middle of the nineteenth century: ‘in der österreichischen Militär-Grenze sind auch Wiesen ein Privat Eigenthum der Grenzer.’19

The explanation for this unusual choice of preposition lies not only in scholarly precedent but also in the nature of the referent itself, that is, the object denoted by the word ‘border’. In the case of the Habsburg military establishment, die Grenze ceases to designate a mere frontier line punctuated by sparse sentinel posts and marked by coils of barbed wire and comes to denote an entire militarized border area or country/region (hence Hietzinger’s reference to it as Soldatenland) engulfing
whole village communities, from among whose members the necessary military force was recruited, and subject to a completely different administrative system regulated according to laws especially laid down to further the defense purpose of the Border. The idiosyncratic use of prepositions signals a semantic change deriving from the historical specialization of the term. Using the surface prepositions customarily associated with the word border/Grenze/graniță would, in this context, be misleading and would strip the term of the specialized meaning it has acquired.

Coming back to the organization of the Border, I will, in what follows, review the two main legal landmarks defining its specific configuration. The Military Border Constitution of 1807 (die Grundgesetze der Karlstädter, Warasdiner, Banal, Slavonischen und Banatischen Militär-Grenze) stipulated that the overriding purpose of this institution was the provision of military service. Everything else was, therefore, perceived as subordinate to this ultimate goal. Bearing this in mind will help one understand why similar associative patterns of landholding yielded dissimilar economic outcomes in other parts of Europe.

The Military Border system was predicated on usufruct of land and other possessions in exchange for military service. The land was, thus, literally divided into ‘Militär-Lehen’ (military fiefs), the Emperor retaining absolute possession over them in direct, unmediated fashion (jus domini directi). Following the same logic of the preeminence of military rationale over any other considerations, the land in the Military Border was subject to strict regulations aimed at precluding its fragmentation through alienation and, stemming from this, the possibility of breach and infiltration, which might weaken the effectiveness of the Border in its twofold function of frontier defence and pest control or cordon sanitaire. Consequently immovable goods fell into two categories: Stammgut and Überland. The former,
comprised of house, yard and land, was inalienable, that is, could not be sold, leased, mortgaged or given away.\textsuperscript{21} The latter, less extensive than the former, was free of such constraints.

The peculiarity of social organization in the Military Border was given by the perpetuation of an archaic form of land possession, the \textit{zadruga} or \textit{Hauskommunion}, in which several families, connected or not by blood ties, lived under the same roof and worked their land in common. Although the system is thought to have originated among the Slavic populations (Croatians, Serbs, Bulgarians), the validity of this hypothesis has been called into question at various times on the ground that communal social patterns are typical of archaic societies in general rather than one ethnic group in particular.\textsuperscript{22}

Unlike modern associative structures of landholding set up across Europe, the \textit{zadruga} or communal household was used within the framework of the Military Border primarily for its subsistence potential, for its capacity of absorbing loss and weathering hardships, rather than for a modernising, innovative function of profit making. The joint-family household was, thus, in a position to maintain itself in times of peace and, more importantly still, in times of war, when the men capable of bearing arms had to follow the call of duty. The patriarchal hierarchy of the \textit{Hauskommunion}, headed by a \textit{pater familias}, who saw to the smooth running of household duties and the promotion of wellbeing and morality among its members, ensured the status quo rather than change with a view to prosperity or otherwise. Change was, moreover, inhibited by the administrative ‘gauntlet’ that had to be run in order to obtain permission from the regiment authorities for transferring land or possessions, dividing households or even getting married.
This closely supervised military system paid off in times of war. According to Marchescu, the Military Border as a whole mobilized seventeen regiments, whereas non-militarized territories with the same number of inhabitants could only muster up to three regiments’ worth of soldiers. However, from a social and economic point of view, the Hauskommunion proved an antiquated, backward system, which, while providing for subsistence agriculture, programmatically failed to provide an incentive for work and innovation that could bring about economic development and increased prosperity.

What set apart the situation of the Grenzer from that of the inhabitants of the civil Banat was the clearly defined system of dues and taxes. This in itself contributed to the comparatively enhanced social and economic status of the Grenzer, who, in terms of superiors, looked up only to the company and regiment authorities and ultimately to the Emperor himself, unlike the civil inhabitants of the Banat, who remained subject to manorial corvées as well as to the ancient judicial system in which the noble or owner of the land acted as judge and *ad-libitum* dispenser of justice. In his description of the Transylvanian Border Regiments, George Barițiu stresses the great difference between serfs, who were at the mercy of landowners, and the militarized population, subject to strict but ‘concrete’ laws. Thus, in the Military Border the introduction of unambiguous regulations regarding the amount of labour owed to state and community did away, to a considerable extent, with abuses and exploitation. At the very least this rigorously defined corpus of rules and regulations offered the legal basis for appeal in case such abuse did take place.

A second advantage of the system of labour dues, as well as a second point of difference when compared to the civil part of the Banat, lay in the use to which this
labour was put. Thus, in the non-militarized part of the Banat, the robot contributed to the welfare of the landowner and presented no benefits for the peasant himself. On the contrary, work for the landowner meant more often than not neglecting one’s own land. Hence the peasant’s reluctance to work at all or to do it efficiently, as pointed out by John Paget. While the same reluctance to apply oneself characterised the Grenzer as well - see Hietzinger’s description of the Border system as failing to provide the necessary Ermunterung zur Arbeitsamkeit (incentive to work) – this was valid only in the case of land cultivation within the joint-family system and had nothing to do with taxation and labour obligations. The latter were not implemented for the benefit of one individual or authority but were channelled towards maintaining and consolidating the infrastructure of Border communities: building roads, dredging rivers, draining swamps, erecting buildings for public use, etc. The tax on land, commerce, industry and mills as well as the so-called exemption tax went into the Grenz-Cassa or Border treasury. Moreover, the tax on land paid by the militarized population amounted to only half the tax to which civil inhabitants were liable.

In the wake of the political upheaval of 1848-49, the 1807 Military Border Constitution underwent significant changes, which can be viewed as an attempt on the part of imperial authorities to keep up with the latest developments and to secure the continued allegiance of the militarized population. As 1848 saw the abolition of serfdom throughout Hungary, feudal relations within the Border became obsolete. Consequently, in 1850 the Constitution was altered, in congruence with the same change effected throughout the Monarchy, in the sense of terminating feudal relations. This brought about the transformation of landholding rights, so that what used to be usufructuary possession of land became absolute ownership. As a
consequence of this measure, the frontiersmen were freed from their unpaid labour obligations to the state. A number of additional reforms were stipulated by the refurbished constitution, among which was the introduction of vernacular languages at all levels of the educational system as well as in the administration and justice.30

This is the general framework within which the Romanian segment of the Banat Military Border came into being, acquired organic structure, and was eventually dissolved in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Transylvanian segment of the Border was the first to be demilitarized as early as 1851, after the Szekler regiments sided with the Hungarians in 1848-49. Further steps towards the conversion from military to civilian administration of the remaining Border segments were taken following the Ausgleich. The Border system was formally dissolved over a period of ten years starting from 1872.31 Its territory was retroceded to Croatia-Slavonia and Hungary, while the regiments became regular line troops.

The regimental division of the Banat Border varied between its establishment in 1768 and its disintegration one hundred years later: what started out as a Wallachian battalion later on merged with the Illyrian regiment (1774), only to be once again split into an Illyrian battalion and a Wallachian Regiment in 1838, the latter changing names in 1848 from Wallachian to Romanian Banat Border Regiment. The numbering of the Border regiments changed in 1790, when they were set apart from the rest of the line regiments and numbered from one to seventeen.32 As a consequence of this, the Wallachian-Illyrian Banat Regiment received the number thirteen.

I am dwelling on this seemingly insignificant issue of numbering because one of the interesting, but unsubstantiated, hypotheses regarding the relationship between Romanians and imperial authorities hinges on a coincidence of numbers. Thus Liviu
Groza argues that the reason for which the Romanian Border Regiment received the number thirteen was so that the military authorities could hark back to their Roman ancestry and in particular as a reminder of the Roman Legion XIII Gemina, which had been stationed close to where the Military Border lay now. In support of this assumption he brings as evidence the non-consecutive numbering of regiments: as the German Banat Regiment was no. 12, it would have been logical that the Illyrian Regiment should have been no. 13 after the 1838 split, and the Romanian regiment no. 14. To this, he moreover adduces another piece of evidence in the form of an inscription on a military flag reading ‘A lui Romul vitejie, peste voi români să fie!’ (Romanians, let Rome’s bravery be in you as well). Although this martial slogan is intriguing and does raise questions as to who thought of it in the first place and under what circumstances it was adopted, it does not necessarily corroborate the Roman hypothesis. On the other hand, the numbering argument is untenable for two reasons: firstly, an overview of the territorial disposition of Border regiments will easily show how erratic their numbering was throughout the Border, with, for instance, the 5th and 6th regiments stationed close to the 10th and 11th, while the latter were completely disconnected from the 9th and 12th respectively. Secondly, both Antoniu Marchescu and, before him, the Austrian military historian von Wrede show that in 1838 the Wallachian-Illyrian Border Infantry Regiment no. 13 was split into an Illyrian battalion and the Wallachian Banat Border Regiment, which, logically enough, retained the number of the old regiment, that is, number thirteen, since the numbering took into account only regiments and not single battalions.

In exploring the allegiance of the military elites originating from the Banat Military Border, I shall take as my starting point George Barițiu’s distinction
between cultural and political unity as formulated in his work *Părți alese din istoria Transilvaniei pre 200 ani în urmă* (1889):

‘As for this, [our] adversaries can stand on their heads even, for a Dacoromania will always exist no matter what, and that is the Dacoromania represented by, and to a certain extent materialised in, the unity of Romanian language and literature, which is one for ten million inhabitants living in several states. Just as spoken and written French is one and the same in France, Belgium and Switzerland; just as German is one in Austria, Germany, Switzerland etc., just as Spanish [is spoken] in Spain and several South American states, so is Romanian common to all Romanians in all the states they live in.’

In keeping with the view presented in this quotation, my main hypothesis holds that the military elites of the Banat Romanian Border Regiment cherished just such a ‘cultural’ sense of national identity, which did not necessarily entail commitment to a political irredentist cause and that cases like General Moise Groza’s, who are held to be emblematic for such national commitment among Romanian frontiersmen, are an exception rather than the rule.

The very formulation of this hypothesis depends on the following question: how does one establish the allegiance of a population who lived almost a century and a half ago? How does one arrive at an understanding of what they felt, in what terms they thought of themselves, to whom they were loyal and what the actual depth of their loyalty was? The answer can only be a mapping of extant documents. The classification of sources into first-person testimony (letters, memoirs, diaries), which is the closest one can hope to get to these people short of mind-reading, and reported accounts of events (e.g. officers’ relations about the attitude of the common people),

*‘În catu pentru acesta, adversarii potu se si stea in capu si o Dacoromania totu va exista totdeauna, era aceea este Dacoromania reprezentata si oresicum incarnata in unitatea limbii si a literaturii romane, care este una unica pentru diece milioane de locuitori impartiti in cateva state. Precum este una limba franceza vorbita si scrisa in Franta, in Belgia, in Elvetia; precum e limba germana in Austria, Germania, Elvetia etc, limba spaniola in Spania si in cateva state si sud americane, intocma este si limba romana comuna tuturor romanilor si tota staturilor in care locuiesc ei.’*
which, given their redoubled subjective nature (someone’s report of someone else’s \textit{état d’àme}), should be taken with an epistemological pinch of salt – this classification, therefore, imposes a number of restrictions on the very definition of the subject of study. There is a fundamental distinction between 1) the ‘silent’ mass of people, who are at best spoken on behalf of, but do not have a \textit{recorded} voice of their own; and 2) the historically ‘audible’ military elite of Romanian officers, formed in the Border and subsequently involved in promoting the welfare of the Romanians within the Empire. It is this ‘audible’, articulate voice of the Romanian military elites from the Banat Military Border that will constitute the main object of my thesis. The primary aim is, as mentioned above, that of recuperating their ‘voice’ and accounting for their sense of identity and allegiance.

My initial assumptions are the following: these elites’ notion of national belonging, of national loyalty, was a \textit{modus vivendi} developed within the framework of the Monarchy rather than an instance of inceptive irredentist ambitions. Additionally, the centre of gravitation for these military elites was Vienna and the Emperor, and after the \textit{Ausgleich}, possibly Budapest as the location of the Hungarian Parliament, and not Bucharest or the Romanian \textit{Regat}; moreover, in relation to the House of Habsburg, the rise of Romanian national awareness was a centripetal, not a centrifugal development. The volatility of the term nation and its quality of being easily appropriated led subsequent Romanian historiography to assimilate this type of ‘nationalism’ to the teleological nationalism that would help consolidate the Romanian state post 1918 and later on. Evaluating the usefulness of this concept as well as proposing a more apposite framework of analysis will form the task of Chapter Three of the present thesis.
What follows is an outline of the chapters making up this thesis and of the main points they set out to demonstrate. The introductory chapter is followed by a selective survey of historical literature. As the subject of the thesis spans several bibliographical strands (Austrian Military Border literature, Romanian bibliography on the Banat and Transylvanian Military Border, general studies of the Habsburg officer corps as well as other, miscellaneous works such as volumes of correspondence, family monographs, or studies on the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878), one chapter would have been insufficient to review all available titles. Consequently, I have opted to dwell on insights from nineteenth-century studies on the Austrian Military Border, which more often than not are relegated to the footnote system of subsequent historical literature. As well as providing valuable background information on the life style and peculiarities of Border communities, these works also constitute, by their a-national character, a necessary counterpart to the Romanian historiography on the Military Border, which tends to read pre-1918 events through the lens of unitary nation-state ideology.

The third chapter is devoted to the conceptual framework within which all subsequent analysis in the present thesis will take place. Given that most of the archival evidence in this thesis revolves around legal cases, trials and contentious issues, it is my methodological option to describe the network of legal relations in which the Romanian Border officers functioned and, in particular, to account for the interaction between their civil and military status and its effects.

The fourth chapter is an excursus into historical terminology and charts the change in legal and religious status of the Romanian population in the Banat of Temeswar and in the Banat Military Border as reflected by the change of official designations for this population: Wallach to Illyrian to Romanian. The chapter is
intended as a necessary preamble to a discussion of allegiance and identity among the ethnic community from which an important number of future kaiserlich-(und)-königlich generals emerged. As such it highlights official assumptions and perspectives on the militarized Romanian population in the Banat Military Border. An important part of the chapter is dedicated to an explanation of the Illyrian nation, to which the Romanian population in the Banat were affiliated. This explanation has the function of removing ambiguity from the usage of concepts such as that of Illyrian Privileges and providing arguments for rejecting the attempt to identify the Habsburg Illyrians with any one ethnic group (Serbs, Romanians or even Ruthenes). It, moreover, accounts for the preservation of Orthodoxy in this border area and the feeble representation of Uniatism (as opposed to the situation in Transylvania). The great majority of the fifteen generals under discussion were Orthodox, with a few notable exceptions, and Orthodoxy, as we shall see, did represent an important element of national identity with some of them.

The fifth chapter examines the formation of the Romanian military elite originating from the Banat Military Border and maps, on the basis of both secondary literature and official military records (in particular Qualifikationslisten and Pensionsprotokolle), the various paths to the rank of general and the mechanism of promotion.

The sixth chapter provides a three-tiered view of the social and cultural environment of the Border officers. Thus, the first section concentrates on the military symbolism existent in the Romanian Border communities and assesses the validity of assumptions in Romanian historiography to the effect that the Habsburg

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\*kaiserlich (und) königlich, henceforth abbreviated k. (u.) k., signified imperial(and) royal and referred to the joint institutions of Austria-Hungary. In the case of the military, the und or \textit{u.} appears in brackets to indicate the Austro-Hungarian army before and after 1888. The \textit{und} was added as a concession to the Hungarians in 1888.
authorities purposefully promoted Roman symbolism as a binding medium between the Imperial House and the Romanian Grenzer. The second section moves from the local to the cosmopolitan level and examines to what extent imperial cultural centres brought the Banat Border officers into contact with Romanian intellectuals from across the Empire. The final part of the chapter provides a brief presentation of the Habsburg officer corps as envisaged by English- and German-language historical literature to date.

As indicated above, Chapter Five focuses on the fifteen generals listed by Antoniu Marchescu in his history of the Banat Military Border. As such, it represents a lower, and broader, level in the pyramidal structure of the thesis, in the sense that, while there is official information of one type or another on every one of these generals, personal testimony is, however, scant. Thus, Chapters Seven and Eight, which examine extant expressions of allegiance and national identity, will, therefore, reduce the number of generals from fifteen to six (Doda, Trapsia, Cena, Lupu, Guran, Domaschnian), out of which only four played a prominent cultural and political role and, by virtue of this, left behind an important number of written traces.

Chapter Seven concentrates on Generalmajor Trajan Doda, the first k.k. officer of Romanian origin from the Banat Military Border to reach generalcy in the Austro-Hungarian army and also the only one who, after his retirement, became an MP in the Hungarian Parliament. The chapter is not intended to be a biographical study of Doda’s life and political activity, but rather an examination of two important moments in his political career, which constitute evidence as to the nature of Doda’s loyalties and his identity. The first episode marks the beginning of his political

*Generalmajor* (henceforth GM) was the lowest rank of general in the Austro-Hungarian army (one-star general), preceded by Oberst and followed by Feldmarschalleutnant, Feldzeugmeister (or its counterparts in the infantry and cavalry), and Feldmarschall.
career as a candidate on a national programme to the Hungarian Parliament. It refers to the explanations he had to give to the military authorities in Temesvár and Vienna relative to his political programme. I have chosen to dwell on Doda’s justifications as they cast light on his relationship with the military authorities, on his political views and on his stance on the Hungarian nationality law.

The second episode covers the end of Doda’s political career in the context of the 1887-1889 press trial under the charge of incitement to hatred against the Hungarian nation. The focal point of my analysis is not so much the trial proper as Doda’s petition to the Emperor two years later and its outcome. Doda’s explanations and the, at times, conflicting evidence regarding the discontinuation of the trial against him will be used as a starting point for an examination of his loyalties: to the Emperor, to his nation, to the ‘Fatherland’. The chapter relies on new archival material and for the first time proposes a contrastive reading of sources revising clichéd assumptions from Romanian literature on the subject.

The eighth chapter is devoted to three other generals, for whom there is available documentary evidence to support an analysis of personal allegiance: Michael von Trapsia, Nikolaus Cena, and Alexander Lupu. Just as in the case of Doda, the primary aim has not been a prosopographical presentation of life and activity, but the examination of extant testimony conducive to an inference of the nature of their loyalties. Thus, with Trapsia, most of the analysis centres on his posthumous collection of aphorisms, in which he addresses notions such as legality, nation, Volk, state, and Fatherland. I have chosen to dwell on his views on Magyarization as they constitute a blind spot in secondary literature on Trapsia and also because, one
generation later, they will be echoed by Feldmarschalleutnant∗∗ Cena in private correspondence.

Belonging to a later generation than Doda and Trapsia, the next two generals, Nikolaus Cena and Alexander Lupu, evince commonalities with their predecessors as well as differ from them in certain respects. The chapter examines their sense of allegiance to the Romanian nation, the accusations of espionage brought against them by the Hungarian and Austrian authorities respectively, as well as the role played by Orthodoxy in their loyalties to nation and Emperor.

Whereas the previous chapters examined the Border generals within the framework of the Empire in their relationships to civil and military authorities, the penultimate chapter views them in relation to the Romanian authorities in Bucharest and the fledgling Romanian army. The chapter is conceived in response to diffuse and not always substantiated claims in Romanian secondary literature that on the eve of, and during, the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, there were attempts at recruiting high-ranking officers of Romanian origin from the Austro-Hungarian army, among them being Trajan Doda, David Urs de Margina, and Alexander Guran. The chapter will explore, on the basis of new archival evidence, the negotiations held between Ion Bălăceanu, the Romanian diplomatic agent in Vienna, on behalf of Ion Brătianu, the Romanian Prime Minister, and Count Andrássy, as a representative of the Austro-Hungarian government and of the Monarch, and will show to what extent the Romanian Border generals were the target of these overtures and their response to them.

∗∗ Feldmarschalleutnant (henceforth FML) was a two-star general, higher in rank than a Generalmajor and immediately below Feldzeugmeister/General der Infanterie/General der Cavallerie.
The final chapter will revisit the initial hypotheses formulated in the introduction and establish their validity in view of the evidence deployed in the previous chapters.

Before I proceed to the next chapter I would like to give a nuts-and-bolts account of the research process and the challenges implicit in it. In the literature survey as well as in some of the later chapters of the thesis I will outline the problems posed by Romanian secondary bibliography on the Military Border, that is, the sometimes defective referencing system which obscures the dividing line between author’s input and historical document. I tend to lay particular emphasis on this point as it calls for a painstaking return to primary sources in search of confirmation that the information purveyed by such secondary sources is reliable and can be built on. The aspects I would like to talk about in this final section are those regarding the actual interaction with Romanian archives and libraries. The following remarks and caveats refer to the first three years of my doctoral research, when the Romanian national archives had not been reformed. Since then, they have been undergoing a process of modernization, which is visibly improving the process of research.

When I embarked on my research for the present thesis, I encountered a number of procedural and even ethical problems. The first challenge was that posed by what I would call the needle-in-the-haystack effect. When I began my research in 2005, the Romanian archives had no electronic databases or catalogues, which meant that they could only be browsed on the premises. Moreover, the system of classification of available material can be very general, with holdings which are labelled in a vague manner by means of umbrella phrases that give little indication as to the information contained in the documents. This is the case of the archival index at the Caraş-Severin branch of the National Archives. Here some of the listings have labels
such as ‘incoming/outgoing items’ or ‘the Sacabert affair’, etc. Or, when the
documents are catalogued more accurately, as in the microfilm collection from the
Viennese archives to be found at the National Archives in Bucharest, the exact
location of a certain material on the microfilm reel is given with generous
approximation. Thus, Kossuth’s 1848 ten-page address to the frontiersmen is listed
between frames 318 and 456, that is, more than a hundred pages of manuscripts
more or less legibly penned in the German *Kurrentschrift* of the time; or documents
about the intervention of the imperial army in the 1848 revolution are to be found
between frames 513 and 764, which is a far cry from György Kurucz’ *Guide to
Documents and Manuscripts in Great Britain relating to the Kingdom of Hungary*,
where, in addition to an exact location and shelfmark number of the document, the
reader is provided with a short description of the contents of every single document
and a good index of names and place names. More flagrantly, in the Mocsonyi
family archive, for instance, one can find correspondence dating from the 1890s in
folders containing documents about 1848-1849 and catalogued as such, which
introduces an additional element of chance in one’s research.

Whereas I overcame this first challenge through the exercise of patience and
perseverance, it nevertheless became a real obstacle in combination with archival red
tape. Taking my cue from the opening line of the famous Shakespearian monologue
(‘Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow…’) I tend to call this the Macbeth effect,
which vitiates the reader’s attempts at coping with the above-mentioned
shortcoming. In the case of Romanian archives, the line does not function as a
metaphor but rather as a literal description of the procedures for accessing material.
Thus, one cannot submit a request for a reading permit (the request must be
rubberstamped by the director himself), obtain the permit, browse the catalogue,
order the items, and view them on the very same day. The permit request form takes one day to validate. Depending on the disposition of the archivist, the browsing of the catalogue can only be done once the permit has been obtained. Any materials can be ordered for the next day only and there is a limit to how many items one can view per day (only two microfilm reels can be viewed per day in the Bucharest National Archives).

Depending on the branch of the National Archives one happens to work in, the archivist on duty can give you a hard time or can choose to make things easy for you. At the Caraş-Severin branch the archivist punctiliously followed every step of the procedure, which gave rise to a situation that bordered on the theatre of the absurd: I could only obtain a permit and, consequently, be allowed to look at the catalogue, if I filled in a request form. On the request form I was to specify my research topic, which action, as the proviso at the bottom of the page indicated, was of a binding nature in the sense that I would only be allowed to consult material strictly related to that topic and none other. Having no notion what the archive contained (the catalogue was off-limits until I got the permit) I opted for an all-inclusive topic. The next day the same archivist told me that the topic had been too broadly defined and dictated to me what she thought I was interested in and I would be likely to find in the archive. The rewriting of the request form meant another wasted day. She did grant me access to the index one day in advance of what the rules stipulated but made it clear to me that she was committing an illegal act. It was only a year or so ago that the restrictions on material to be viewed were lifted.

The National Archives in Bucharest, on the other hand, have helpful, friendly staff and the ordering and viewing of items is a much smoother process. Even there, however, the system could be less than propitious to research previous to the
modernization measures implemented of late. If they happened to have a photocopying backlog, it could take weeks and even *months* to have anything photocopied irrespective of the number of pages required. In the case of printed material this problem could be circumvented by selectively copying material by hand. However, when it came to manuscripts in German *Schrift* it was important to have a copy of the original text for further reference and as a way of subsequently verifying the accuracy of the initial transliteration.

The ethical challenge to which I alluded earlier regards the politics of accessing unpublished archival material. In the Caraş-Severin National Archives I was allowed to view a body of manuscript documents consisting of Military Border officers’ reports about events and military operations that took place during 1848-1849. Permission to consult these documents was granted on condition that I did not mention this to Colonel Liviu Groza, who, having had a falling-out with the director, had been denied access to them. Thus caught between the devil and the deep blue sea, I could not discuss the documents with indisputably one of the most knowledgeable people on the subject, or if I did that and word got out I risked antagonizing the archivists and incurring the same fate as Liviu Groza, that is, being myself debarred from documents, which, given the context, could easily be sent to be *sine die* microfilmed. An informal discussion I had with Professor Nicolae Bocşan, the Rector of Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj, highlighted the same problem of accessing archival material, depending on circumstances such as the archivists’ and the director’s good-will, the staff’s degree of acquaintance with the holdings, informal networks (which function in the case of private holdings), etc. This apparent elusive character of archival material seems to stem from a peculiar view of historical research as a rat race for unpublished documents, which once
discovered and printed ensure celebrity for the researcher and become old hat for subsequent scholars.

While the aspects I pointed out in this section are not to be generalized into an overall indictment of the archives system in Romania (the Bistrița-Năsăud branch of the National Archives, for instance, is a very welcoming place for research with enthusiastic and tremendously helpful archivists), the happenings above are, nevertheless, actual incidents that did render research unnecessarily tortuous as well as leading to an inefficient use of time and funding.
The war alluded to is the 1737-1739 war between the Habsburg Empire (allied with Russia) and the Ottoman Empire. Due to heavy losses the Austrians had to withdraw earlier and conclude a separate peace with the Turks, thereby ceding Northern Serbia and Little Wallachia to the Ottomans. The Banat becomes once again a borderland.


3 Ibid., p. 171.


6 ANCS, Fond nr. 1 Regimentul de graniță nr. 13 român-bănățean, Inv. nr. 54, Relation by Hauptmann Popovic, of Teregova Company, dated 10th February 1863, f. 210/ verso.

7 ANCS, Fond nr. 1 Regimentul de graniță nr. 13 român-bănățean, Inv. nr. 54, Relation by Claus Bojedin, dated 16th February 1863, f. 177/ recto.

8 Antoniu Marchescu, Grănicerii bănățeni și Comunitatea de Avere (Contributioni istorice și juridice), Tiparul Tipografiei Diecezane Caransebeș, 1941, pp. 295-296 – hereafter Grănicerii bănățeni.


10 An explanation of the etymology and semantic metamorphosis of the term ‘banate’ is to be found in Martyn Rady’s unpublished study ‘The Banate of Szörény’.

11 Costin Feneșan, Administrație și fiscalitate în Banatul imperial (1716-1778), Editura de Vest, Timișoara, 1997, p. 15.


13 Costin Feneșan, Administrație și fiscalitate, p. 71.


15 Marchescu, Grănicerii bănățeni, p. 54.

16 Ibid., p. 72.

17 Ibid., p. 25.


19 Carl Freiherrn von Pidoll zu Quintenbach, Einige Worte über die russischen Militär-Kolonien im Vergleiche mit der k.k österreichischen Militär-Grenze und mit allgemeinen Betrachtungen darüber, Vienna, 1847, p. 33.

20 Marchescu, Grănicerii bănățeni, p. 122.

21 Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881, p. 27.


23 Marchescu, Grănicerii bănățeni, p. 134.


26 Hietzinger, Statistik der Militärgränze des österreichischen Kaiserthums, p. 284.

27 Antoniu Marchescu, Grănicerii bănățeni, p. 145.

28 Ibid., p. 147.

29 Ibid., p. 148.

30 Ibid., p. 270.

Ibid., p. 81.


34 Marchescu, Grăniceri bănăteni, pp. 169-170; Alphons von Wrede, Geschichte der kuk Wehrmacht, Vienna, 1898-1905, p. 239.

35 Bariţiu, Părţi alese din istoria Transilvaniei pre 200 ani în urmă, p. 230/ verso.
Chapter 2: Imperial and National Literature
on the Banat Military Border

As the present thesis seeks to account for the formation and allegiance of Banat military elites originating from the Austrian Military Border, this bibliographical chapter will concentrate on two types of secondary historical literature: 1) statistical studies and travel accounts contemporaneous with the Austrian Military Border; 2) Romanian studies on the Banat and Transylvanian segments of the Border. Given that English-language scholarship concentrates for the most part on the Croatian Military Border, such works will be acknowledged in the bibliography of the thesis but, for reasons of space and relevancy, I will not dwell on them in this chapter. The main assumptions of literature on the Habsburg officer corps will be briefly surveyed in Chapter Six.

My reason for focusing on nineteenth-century contributions is their double level of significance. Most of the subsequent literature on the Border has relied on them owing to their denotative value (in other words, the circumstantial information they conveyed about the Habsburg institution). There is, however, a second level of signification, a connotative one, which has been little explored by later contributions. These nineteenth-century writings are not only an invaluable source of concrete administrative and demographic data about the Border, but also an index of official discourse on the subject, of how the Border and its inhabitants were viewed at the time, of the level of knowledge available then, of the stereotypes and possible myths that were coming into being at the time.

Contemporary accounts of the Military Border span the nineteenth century and are, for the most part, written by Habsburg authors. Names such as Pidoll von
Quintenbach, Schwicker, Vanicek, Carl Bernh. Ritter von Hietzinger, Leonhard Böhm, constitute bibliographical sources that most subsequent studies on the subject build on. Paradoxically, this flurry of nineteenth-century studies is attributable not, as one might expect, to the success of the Military Border as an imperial institution but rather to a sequence of critical moments in its history when it was challenged and proposed for dissolution. As a consequence, with some exceptions, most of the writings in this period are generated by a polemical context: thus, Demian’s and in particular Marmont’s contributions are occasioned by the change of hands undergone by the first six Border regiments in the early nineteenth century following the Napoleonic Wars. The proposed dissolution of the Border became then a subject of debate as French representatives advised against its retention as a hotbed of Austrian imperial loyalty. Pidoll von Quintenbach writes in 1847 and draws a parallel between the Austrian Grenze and the Russian colonies amidst reiterated exhortations, especially from the Hungarian side, that the Border should be demilitarized and its territory returned to the Hungarian Crown. Schwicker’s 1883 study marks the actual dissolution of the institution (one year before, that is, in 1882) and is the first post-factum history of the Military Border.

The first extensive work aiming at a synoptic view of the Military Border and bringing together all the loose strands of previous contributions on the topic is the impressive three-volume Statistik der Militärgränze des österreichischen Kaiserthums by Carl Bernhard Edler von Hietzinger, published starting with 1817. The author worked in the Militärgrenze Departement of the Hofkriegsrat and was subsequently appointed Kriegssekretär and Referent of the General Command in Karlstadt and Warasdin (for more information on the author, see the capsule biography in the appendix section).
For the purposes of this thesis Hietzinger’s comments on the social configuration of the Border are of particular value. The author’s take on the Habsburg institution stands out in that ethnic differences play only a secondary role in the description of the militarized population. Instead, he offers a cohesive, monolithic view of the Grenzer (or frontiersmen), who are presented as sharing common cross-ethnic traits deriving from their military status:

‘All in all there is only one class in the soldier land, that of the frontiersmen, or the general frontier class, which is formed of land-tilling warriors. All other classes or professional groups of frontier inhabitants exist in relation to the first and one can say that the latter are there only for the sake of the former; such is the case of priests, officers, merchants, craftsmen, and so on.’

As presented in this quote, the Grenzer constituted the raison d’être for this institution with all the other classes discharging a secondary, instrumental function. The image Hietzinger offers is a balanced, down-to-earth one, tinged with the optimism of eighteenth-century meliorism. The influence of nurture-over-nature pedagogy informs the section on Talent and Education (Talent und Bildung), where inborn characteristics such as intelligence, power of judgment, wit, and eagerness to learn, as well as eloquence are hindered by a lack of proper education. The raw material is there in the form of good qualities and proclivities but cannot be fully turned to account for want of a suitable education. The result is a culture rife with superstition and a community tenaciously clinging to the old ways.

Hietzinger, moreover, provides valuable insight into the causes of the frontiersman’s seemingly contradictory attitude to work:

** ‘Es gibt in dem Soldatenlande in Allgemeinen nur einen Stand, den des Gränzers, oder den gemeinsamen Gränzstand, der sich im ackerbauenden Krieger ausspricht. Alle übrigen Standes- und Berufs-Klassen der Gränzbewohner beinahe stehen in Beziehung zu demselben und man kann sagen sie seyen nur um seinenwillen da; so die Geistlichkeit, so die Officiere, so die Handels- und Gewerbsleute u.s.w.’
'Generally the frontiersman sheds his laziness when away from home. Of all soldiers, there is none so ready as the frontiersman to hand over his house and land activities to his billeting officer. At home up until now he has lacked an incentive to industriousness for he sees very little advantage for himself in being more industrious than others. But in this as well the Constitution has brought some progress for him.'

The passage comes across as a veiled critique of the *zadruga* or *Hauskommunion* system, which formed the basis of landholding in the Military Border: the joint family and not the individual was the usufructuary of land and goods, and they engaged in subsistence agriculture, whose ultimate purpose was not so much the economic advancement of the community as the upkeep of soldiers. Hietzinger’s connection between the people’s reluctance to apply themselves and the administrative framework within which they lived and worked chimes in with later arguments concerning the *zadruga* system in Croatia and the robot system in Hungary.

Thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century Croatian liberals militated for the dismemberment of *zadrgugas* as a way of ushering in the bases of capitalist economy: the dissolution of the joint family system of landownership was seen as conducive to ‘a more intensive tilling of the soil, a firm basis for credit, a greater desire for education, fewer infringements of the law, and higher morale in individual families.’ The robot system in Hungary was questioned on the same grounds of lack of productivity and failure to incentivize the peasant to effective work. ‘The system of rent by robot or forced labour – that is, so many days’ labour without any

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*** ‘Anm. Überhaupt legt der Gränzer außer der Heimath seine Trägheit ab. Unter allen Soldaten ist keiner so bereit, seinem Quartiergeber in allen häuslichen und landwirtschaftlichen Beschäftigungen an die Hand zu gehen, als der Gränzer. Zu Hause fehlte es ihm bisher auch darum an Ermunterung zur Arbeitsamkeit, weil er zu wenig Vortheil für sich sah, wenn er fleißiger war, als andere. Aber auch darin haben ihn die Grundgesetze um einen starken Schritt weiter gebracht.’
specification of the quantity of work to be performed, - is a direct premium on idleness,’ John Paget pointed out in 1839:

‘A landlord wishes a field of corn to be cut: his steward sends out, by means of his Haiducks, information to the peasants to meet at such and such a field at such an hour with their sickles. Some time after the hour appointed a great part of them arrive, the rest finding some excuse by which they hope to escape a day’s work; a Haiduck stands over them to see that they do not go to sleep and between talking, laughing and resting they do get something done. Where horses are employed, they are still less inclined to hurry lest they should tire them for the next day when they use them for their own purposes.’

The common denominator of the above-mentioned critiques is that all these systems (Military Border Hauskommunion, Croatian zadruga, Hungarian robot) were adverse to individual landownership and counterproductive in themselves as they disincentivized the labourer on whom they depended for their existence. In their different ways, they all failed to provide what Hietzinger called die Ermunterung zur Arbeitsamkeit (incentive to work). As we shall see later on in this chapter, the stagnant economy of the Military Border would come under attack as a feudal throwback. One of the aspects I will follow up in Chapter Five is the effect of this economic environment on the social dynamics of the Border communities. This constitutes one of the blind spots of existing literature on the Border. There are, on the one hand, studies that deal with the intricacies of the system of labour dues and landholding and, on the other hand, there are analyses of educational reforms and of the mechanism of information dissemination within Border military communities. What is, however, lacking is the type of literature that would make a connection between these two dimensions (the administrative and the cultural), that would elucidate the consequences deriving from the combination of the two.
Among the social strata that Hietzinger postulated as ancillary to the general frontiersmen class (der gemeine Gränzstand) are the Border officers, among whom ‘reigns to a great extent the usual culture of our cities’ (herrscht gröstenthieils die gewöhnliche Cultur unserer Städte). The same nationality blindness accompanies Hietzinger’s description of them. One of the points of interest is constituted by the book collections and libraries of the Border, Pancsova being one of the few places to boast such a facility. The lack of local bookshops as well as that of a local newspaper, despite it being presented as an obstacle to reading, seems to work paradoxically towards opening up the Border to cultural influences from without: ‘those in Agram, Hermannstadt and Klausenburg are the only ones which are located closer to the frontiersmen.’

One of the authors that pass the examination of Hietzinger’s critical eye is Johann Andreas Demian, an Austrian military writer and statistician. His study of the Military Border represents the fourth and last part of an extensive statistical description of the Habsburg Monarchy, which he began in 1804, Darstellung der Oesterreichischen Monarchie nach den neuesten statistischen Beziehungen. For the purposes of the present thesis I shall be referring to volume four, which was published in 1807 and covers the Military Border in Hungary, including the Banat.

Demian’s presentation of the Banat segment of the Military Border follows the fashionable pattern of statistical writings of the day. A brief historical introduction sets the scene for a stark but useful description of the Border in terms of physical geography and social structure. The division of the Border into two regiments - das Deutsch-Banatische Regiment, based at Panciova, and das

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‘Die zu Agram, Hermannstadt und Klausenburg sind die einzigen, welche den Gränzern zum Theil näher liegen.’
Wallachisch-Ilyrische Regiment, with its headquarters in Caransebes - underlies and structures the geographical and social description of the Banat Military Border. The description of ‘Das Land selbst’ has for a counterpart a terse chapter on the Border inhabitants and their number, demographic density, and ethnic history. Thus, under the heading ‘Ethnic Variety of the Inhabitants’ (Völkerschaftliche Verschiedenheit der Einwohner), the Wallachians are depicted in the following terms:

‘The Wallachians are the oldest inhabitants of the Banat. Most numerous are these descendants of the most famous of peoples, who were equally devoted to plough and sword, in the Wallachian-Ilyrian regiment, where they live mostly in the mountains on the Wallachian and Transylvanian border.’

Detailed tables containing data on crops and types of land, use of woodland, export and import articles, etc., are not matched by a commensurate appraisal of the social composition of the territory. Hence the lopsided rapport between Kultur des Landes and Geistige Kultur, the latter being a mere enumeration of the confessions to which the inhabitants belong followed by a short review of existing schools. Although laconic, the author does point to a fundamental discrepancy between the state-funded Catholic and Protestant churches, as well as German schools, on the one hand, and the Griechisch Nichtunirte churches and schools, on the other hand. The latter are allowed to function but solely at the expense of the communities for which they cater:

‘The Non-Uniates of both Banat Border regiments have 120 national schools, which were attended in 1802 by 3,588 pupils. […] Here as well, the Illyrian national
schools and their teachers have to be maintained and salaried by the non-Uniate communities out of their own pocket.***12

Demian’s 1810 book on the first six border regiments, which were included in the Illyrian Provinces, provides an in-depth examination of these at the expense of the other segments of the Military Border. Referring to Demian’s work, Hietzinger points out its shortcomings in the following terms:

‘it lacks – not to mention other things - information on the Transylvanian Border as a whole and in the case of the other Border provinces it fails to mention their constitution and administration. These important sections were added in the repeated editing of the Karlstadt and Banal Border, but this only proved his utter inability to talk about these aspects.’** 13

The blind spot Hietzinger highlights is understandable given that, although serving for a while in several infantry regiments (De Vins-, Württemberg-, and Coburg-Infanterie) between 1800 and 1803, Demian did not have first-hand experience of the Military Border. His detailed information appears to have come from his activity of officially collecting statistical material on the k.k. Militärgrenze conducted in 1804. 14 Moreover, unlike other nineteenth-century authors, he is more of a writer than a military figure and this inevitably influences his perspective.

The middle of the nineteenth century sees the publication of the first comparative study of the Habsburg Military Border. Pidoll zu Quintenbach’s 1847 tract Einige Worte über die russischen Militär-Kolonien im Vergleiche mit der k.k. Militärgrenze

draws a parallel between the Austrian system of defence and its Russian counterpart. A high-ranking officer in the Hofkriegsrat, Quintenbach holds out a strategist’s perspective on the institution, stressing its advantages as well as its uniqueness of purpose and organization. The comparison with contemporary Russian military colonies set up in 1810 is instrumental in bringing out this singularity.

Thus, whereas the two institutions were subject to military administration and followed a similar organizational pattern (the Russian colonies were subordinated to the Ministry of War just as die Militär-Grenze fell within the purview of the Hofkriegsrat; both of them, moreover, had a specially designated department in these respective institutions, in the Austrian case this being das Militär-Grenz Departement), they, nevertheless, differed greatly in their goals.

The purpose of the Russian military colonies was that of overcoming the serious problem posed to military tactics and deployment efficiency by the sheer extent of Russian territory. Consequently, these military colonies functioned as partially self-sustaining outposts capable of maintaining an efficient standing army, which could be rapidly mustered. Quintenbach goes on to mention a second goal for setting up these colonies, that of providing the soldiers with a home, with a permanent place of residence. This strikes one as a subsidiary goal, a humanitarian justification bolstering up the principal, Realpolitik goal of rationalizing the distribution of army forces.

According to the Hofkriegsrat official, the main difference between the two systems was of a social nature and lay in the militarization process undergone by the population involved. In the case of the Russian colonies, the term militarization applied only to administration but not to the actual process of turning civilians into
military. It did not, therefore, designate an instance of social metamorphosis (from peasants into soldiers). The soldiers were not part of the peasant communities themselves but merely provided for by the latter: ‘in the Border regiments the soldiers are usually mingled with the mass of people; in the colonies they are completely separate.’ This leads to another, more important, dissimilarity:

‘In Austria the settlers, the peasants, are gradually turned into soldiers. They are given officers and non-commissioned officers, who train them in the military service. Not so in Russia. There whole standing regiments are inserted among the colonists and are all of them already trained soldiers, who must be hosted and cared for by the inhabitants of the land.’

As the quote shows, from a social point of view the two systems could not be more dissimilar: whereas the Russian strategy was predicated on the insertion (einlegen) of an alien military element into the peasant communities from which they parasitically derived their means of subsistence, the Austrian military border was patterned on an organic model of development, that is, on the painstaking transformation of peasants into soldiers so that the military community and the breadwinning community were, in this case, coterminous.

The rationale behind the choice of the type of ‘militarization’ used (that is, by expedient insertion or by painstaking ‘cultivation’) stems from a complex of financial and demographic reasons: the depleted population and war-impoverished lands constituting the eastern border of the Habsburg Empire made inadequate the use of line troops (Germ. Linien-Militär) for cost-effective defence purposes (such

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** ‘in den Grenz-Regimentern sind die Soldaten gewöhnlich mit der Volksmenge vermengt, in den Kolonien sind sie völlig unterschieden.’

*** ‘In Österreich bildete man die Ansiedler, die Bauern, nach und nach zu Soldaten. Man gab ihnen Offiziere und Unteroffiziere, um sie in dem militärischen Dienste abzurichten. Nicht so in Rußland. Dort legt man ganze bestehende Regimenter bei den Kolonisten ein, alle schon abgerichtete Soldaten, welche die Landesbewohner bei sich aufnehmen und verpflegen müssen.’
troops could only function at great expense for the central authorities). The solution of setting up self-sustaining border communities, which would also form a steady pool of recruitment, took into consideration the colonization imperatives of the area and the double threat posed by Turkish raids and disease propagation. The overriding goal of the Military Border was to stave off Ottoman inroads of the 1529 and 1683 type, when the Turks all but conquered Vienna, and at the same time to provide a *cordon sanitaire*, which would keep at bay epidemics and also reinforce the budding Habsburg sanitation policies.

Thus, while the Habsburg authorities introduced the Military Border system with a view to economizing, for their Russian counterpart money seemed to be a less important issue, as they were able to to a considerable extent to finance and invest in their colonies: Russian soldiers received their uniforms and their wages from the state; according to Quintenbach, well-maintained hospitals were to be found in these colonies in contrast to the few and precarious ones in the Military Border; while in both militarized territories food and fodder stocks were available for rainy days (*Fruchtvorrathspeicher und Fourage-Magazine*), in Russia these were better provided for; the Russian colonies, Quintenbach points out, benefited from a loan system (*Leihanstalt*), which was nonexistent in the Habsburg Border.

The geographical disposition of the two strategic formations reflects, in its turn, their different functions: the continuity and compact character of the Austrian Military Border, stretching all the way from the Adriatic to Transylvania almost without interruption, was dictated by its role of buffer-zone and all its elements (administration, landowning regulations, etc.) converged in this function of precluding incursions and infiltrations of any kind. One of the crucial peculiarities of the Border was its system of land tenure, ‘a true feudal system’, as Quintenbach puts
it, ‘in which the frontiersmen are obliged to offer military service in exchange for the free use of their lands.’

This should be contrasted with the system of full landownership valid in the Russian colonies, which were discontinuous and interspersed with non-militarized territory. This erratic territorial distribution shows that the main function of the Russian border settlements was not massive defence but rather that of providing nodal points of military strength, thus covering the huge Russian expanse by means of a triangulated disposition of armed forces.

Quintenbach’s comparison has the merit of highlighting those characteristics of the Austrian Military Border which, as I will make a point of analysing further on, will form the premises for unique social and cultural developments, and also for maintaining the military profession as the most important path of social advancement.

A previous account of the Military Border, to which Quintenbach harks back at the beginning of his study, is the 1837-38 travel account by Marshall Marmont, Duc de Ragusa, who first introduced the comparison with the Russian colonies, which Quintenbach was to take up and develop ten years later. Appointed Governor General of the Illyrian Provinces after the Peace of Vienna in 1809, Marmont was in charge of the first six regiments of the Military Border and, in this capacity, drew up in 1810 Le Rapport officiel sur les Provinces Illyriennes.

Marmont’s evaluation of the Austrian Military Border system is doubly valuable as it comes from a marshal in Napoleon’s army and, as such, a former ‘enemy’ of the Habsburg Empire. His great appreciation for the organization of the Militär-Grenze stems from close acquaintance with the system and finds its expression in his successful attempt to dissuade Napoleon from dissolving it. His

\* ‘ein wahres Lehn-System, in dem die Grenzer für den freien Genuß ihrer Gründe Militär-Dienste zu leisten verpflichtet sind.’
plea for retaining the Border is prompted by both enlightened principles of government and strategic reasons:

‘Being aware of the serious consequences that must arise for these peoples, happy in their own way, and for the government too, out of a change of organization, I pleaded with Napoleon in favour of retaining the organization which was already in place. […] These are the regiments which guard the entire frontier of the Austrian monarchy with Turkey, and provide the Austrian Empire with an army of seventy thousand men, always ready for war, who cost [the Monarchy] next to nothing in times of peace.’

In Marmont’s observations the strategist’s awareness of the advantages of the Austrian military institution intermingles with philosophical considerations on the best-suited form of government and humanist concern for the ‘happiness’ of the population: ‘the first condition for civilizing barbarians is to give them a powerful organization so as to establish among them a permanent order and then to give them educated leaders’.

While such considerations might be viewed as mere political idealism or as a re-reading of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century political reasons through the lens of French Romantic ideology with its emphasis on *le peuple* and its welfare, they do nevertheless touch on the unwitting social consequences of the Border institution. What Marmont presents as the fully intentional attempt by the Austrian authorities to improve the life of their hapless subjects in the peripheral regions of the empire is rather the by-product or spin-off of a high-politics strategy, which initially had little to do with the subjects’ welfare.

** ‘Pénétré des conséquences graves qui devaient résulter pour ces peuples heureux de leur sort, et pour le gouvernement, d’un changement d’ organisation, je défendis ce qui existait auprès de Napoléon. […] Ce sont ces régiments qui gardent toute la frontière de la monarchie autrichienne du coté de la Turquie, et donnent à l’empire d’Autriche une armée de soixante-dix mille hommes toujours prête pour la guerre, qui ne lui coûte presque rien en temps de paix.’

*** ‘la première condition pour civiliser les barbares, c’est de les organiser fortement, de manière à établir parmi eux un ordre permanent, et ensuite de leur donner des chefs instruits.’
As a former commander of the Military Border, Marmont was well acquainted with its fortes and its social particularities. He dwells at some length on the economic structure and various offices and regulations. Of particular interest is his attempt to explain the valour and loyalty of the Grenzer by this very peculiar social configuration, which sets the Border apart from all other military communities:

‘it is owing to this regime that the soldiers, who are always in the midst of their families, spread out on a great expanse of the country, are constantly possessed of the military, warrior spirit, as well as that of respect for their officers, and obedience, as if they had been formed in a barracks. One finds them as valiant on the first day of war as on the last. To what causes should this phenomenon be attributed, if not to their childhood impressions, to discourses, to parental example, to the opinion of all the population?’

On the whole, Marmont’s description of the Romanian segment of the Military Border, occasioned by his visit to Caransebes, is more concerned with the system in its entirety as an enactment of a solution pertaining to political philosophy:

‘The course to follow is this: bringing together and organizing the individuals, making them obedient and giving them enlightened leaders: their progress becomes rapid and, when time and the work habit have trained them, they can be left to govern themselves. But until then the protective hand of a paternal government, which cares for them and leads them step by step, is useful to them. We can only admire the salutary effects of this regime when we see the degree of wellbeing and prosperity reached by the peoples that were subject to it.’

* ‘C’est grace à ce régime que les soldats, qui sont toujours dans leurs familles, dispersés sur une grande étendue de pays, ont constamment l’esprit aussi militaire, aussi guerrier, autant de respect pour leurs officiers, autant d’obéissance que s’ils sortaient d’une caserne. On les trouve aussi braves le premier jour de la guerre que le dernier. À quelles causes attribuer ce phénomène, si ce n’est aux impressions de leur enfance, aux discours, à l’exemple de leurs parents, à l’opinion de toute la population?’

** ‘La marche à suivre est celle-ci: rasssembler et organiser les individus, les rendre obéissants et leur donner des chefs éclairés: leurs progrès deviennent rapides, et quand l’habitude du travail et le temps les ont formés, ils peuvent être livrés à eux-mêmes. Mais jusque là, la main protectrice d’un gouvernement paternel, qui veille sur eux et les conduit pas à pas, leur est utile. On ne peut
Although the welfare of the population comes across as a leitmotif of his account, there is very little he actually says about the population or their officers. Thus, despite the fact that he kept in contact with some of the Border officers, Marmont does not feel the need to talk about them, to focus on their way of life, and thus bridge the gap between the general description and universal laws of government he enunciates, on the one hand, and the tangible pulse of the community in all its concrete details and manifestations, on the other. The only part of the population that receives some attention are ‘les Zingares’, nomads panning for gold, who alone ‘are worthy of capturing the travellers’ attention’. This limited scope is, thus, typical of travel accounts, in which the eye of the traveller seeks out the unusual, the exotic, and the anecdotal, and remains blind to ‘ordinary’ activities and people. Detail-rich descriptions are only devoted to things out of the ordinary, whereas what belongs to day-to-day life is relegated to the realm of generalities.

If hands-on travel accounts such as Marmont’s fall short of minimalistic descriptions, full-fledged comprehensive studies of the Military Border of the kind Johann Heinrich Schwicker was to publish in 1883, following the dissolution of the Border, are even less likely to provide the reader with a micro-level account of the individual communities forming the Border institution. Schwicker makes it clear in the introduction that the focus of his book will be on historical, political, and military matters, which he considers to be reflective of the true nature of the Border institution. The cultural-historical element comes into discussion only insofar as it has any bearing on the military function of the Border. It therefore plays a secondary role in Schwicker’s discussion, a structural choice which influences the

qu’admirer les effets salutaires produits par ce régime, quand on voit à quel degré de bien-être et de prospérité sont arrivés les populations qui y sont soumises.”
kind of information included in the book and predefines the highlights and blind spots of the narrative offered.

The study is the first complete *post-factum* history of the Military Border, published in the wake of the dissolution of the Habsburg institution. It brings together a rich bibliographical apparatus including archival material as well as a wide range of secondary sources featuring the works of Griselini, Demian, Hitzinger, Vaniček, Barițiu, Böhm, and Pesty, among others. For the purposes of this thesis, the most relevant chapters in Schwicker’s book are those concerning the impact of the national movements on the Military Border and the crucial events of 1848-49, when the loyalty of the imperial troops as well as that of the military communities were sorely put to the test. As far as the spread of nationalism in the Border is concerned, this is cogently dealt with in the second chapter of Part Two, ‘Die nationale Bewegung und die Militärgrenze’ (the national movement and the Military Border). Schwicker distinguishes between two main sources of nationalism in the militarized territory: ‘The nationality movement generally came to the Military Border via two channels: through the channel of Illyrianism and through the vehicle of Serbian nationalism.’ However accurate this distinction is, it nevertheless fails to account for any other nationalities comprised in the Military Border apart from the Serbs and the Croats (that is, the Romanians and the Szeklers).

Making good the intention stated in the introduction, Schwicker approaches the 1848-1849 events from a purely military point of view, so that the chapter takes the form of a long enumeration of battles, which leaves the Banat and its social and national problems out of the picture.

*** ‘Die Nationalitäts-Bewegung kam übrigens auf zweierlei Wegen nach der Militärgrenze: durch den Canal des Illyrismus und durch das Medium des Serbismus.’
Schwicker’s work is very much a source-based one, rather than one stemming from personal experience and close acquaintance with the Military Border, as had been the case with previous writers such as Pidoll zu Quintenbach, Marmont or even Hietzinger. Moreover, his background was a literary-didactical one, with important contributions to the development of school reform in Hungary (he was a co-founder of the *Banater Lehrerverein* among other things), with occasional articles published in various Hungarian and Austrian as well as local newspapers and a number of historical writings.

John Paget’s comments on the Military Border counterbalance, in an even-handed perspective, the optimistic reformist view of the Border, typical of Austrian writings, with the Hungarian side of the story, which reads nowadays as a prefiguration of a Foucauldian rationale:

‘We have seen that an immense military force has been thrown round one-half the circumference of Hungary: - in what hands does the command of this force lie? From what sources does it draw its supplies? What sympathies and feelings are encouraged in it? – in other words what is its nationality? In a constitutional country these are important inquiries. […] There are some, too, who urge that this border wall is more efficacious and better constructed for keeping Hungarians within their boundaries, than Turks without them, and there are not wanting those even who regard the whole quarantine system as a great engine of police. In favour of this view of the matter they urge that the cordon has been more frequently strengthened on the appearance of what Government is apt to consider most pestilential, - a political fever within the country, than of a plague invasion from without’.  

The questions Paget raises (control over the Border, nationality and allegiance) are vital ones in understanding the dispute between the Habsburg and the Hungarian authorities. However, the author merely echoes Hungarian anxieties as to the intrusive Germanising effect of the Border system and stops short of a more detailed analysis. The repression of Szeklers in Transylvania, who acted on their
age-old privileges and resented as a demotion the comparatively new Habsburg military impositions, is briefly mentioned but the impact of militarization on the Wallachian population and the effect of national schools and enhanced education\textsuperscript{36} on the dynamics of national allegiance are left out. Some of these issues will be later taken up by Romanian historians.

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For the most part Romanian bibliography on the Banat Military Border dates back to the interwar period. Up until that time one can find publications only incidentally dealing with this topic\textsuperscript{37} or, through some contingency, falling short of it. Thus, in the introduction to Antoniu Marchescu’s history of the Romanian Banat Border Regiment we come across the following explanation for one of the historiographical gaps: ‘Patriciu Dragalina, the erudite historiographer of the Banat, died before publishing the 4\textsuperscript{th} volume of his impressive work ‘Din Istoria Banatului Severin’, which dealt with the history of the frontiersmen from the 13\textsuperscript{th} Regiment. Unfortunately the manuscript has remained unpublished to this day.’\textsuperscript{38}

The beginning of the nineteenth century had seen the publication of one of the few first-hand testimonies concerning the Banat Military Border in Nicolae Stoica de Haţeg’s Chronicle of the Banat. The author covers the beginnings of the Military Border in this region, the process of militarization, and the population’s response to it. The same introduction to Marchescu’s history as mentioned above makes reference to the first autochthonous attempt at writing a history of the 13\textsuperscript{th} Romanian-Banater Border Regiment in 1863. A certain Captain Carol Schwab was assigned this task and, to this end, he drew on officers’ testimonies as well as available documents.\textsuperscript{39} In 1941, when Marchescu’s prefacer made this reference to Schwab’s history, the manuscript was believed to have gone missing during the war.
It was only decades later that it would eventually be tracked down in the history museum in Reşiţa.40

In the 1930s Grigore Popiţi wrote two tracts based on archival material. The first one, printed in 1935,41 offers a general description of the Banat Military Border with its historical subdivision (initially into two districts, after 1838 acquiring a tripartite form: the German Banat Regiment, the Illyrian Banat Battalion, and the Wallachian Banat Regiment). In his subsequent argument he sought to undercut, on ethnic grounds, the logic of this administrative structure: the author was out to demonstrate, as prefigured in the title, the Romanianness of the Banat Military Border. The evidence he invokes is, for the most part, sensible and well chosen and, in part, corroborated by the Austrian military historian von Wrede.42 Popiţi points out a number of discrepancies in various demographic statistics and, more convincingly, highlights the number of translations available in Romanian and Serbian for various official documents targeted at the military communities. Thus, in 1807 the new Border constitution was circulated, via the regiments, in all Border communes with a view to being made known to the people. Popiţi finds evidence that the new law was sent in 500 copies of Romanian translation and only 50 copies in Serbian translation.43 Forestry charts, listing existing types of vegetation, were, according to Popiţi, drawn up in German and Romanian, this being taken as proof that Romanian was considered the language of the region.44 At times the polemical drift of the argument makes itself felt in certain inconsistencies. This is the case of another piece of evidence Popiţi comes up with, which runs counter to a complaint he was to express four years later in his second tract. The 1935 contribution invokes Maria Theresa’s salutation at the end of the Illyrian Constitution as proof that this was addressed to the Romanian population:
‘Maria Theresa’s greeting in the Illyrian Constitution addressed to the Banat “Illyrians” in the Wallachian tongue, addressed, therefore, to the Romanians, has come true in part and will be fulfilled hereafter: “for the future good of the said people, for their honour and happiness and increasing glory”.’ 45

The tremendous privilege of being thus singled out by the Habsburg monarch and bestowed on the boon of imperial favour seems to disappear by 1939, when Popiţi prefaces his compilation of archival material46 with the following sentence:

‘One must show the reason that determined the Austrians to lend support on every occasion and in every possible way not only to the Germans but also to the Serbs at the expense of autochthonous Romanians.’**47

Notwithstanding such incongruities of argument, the importance of Popiţi’s tracts lies in the fact that they flag up, and for the first time translate into Romanian, archival material regarding the relationship between Romanians and Serbs, the religious chafing that emerged between them at a time when language became increasingly ‘nationalized’,48 and the attempts made by the government of the fledgling Romanian Kingdom49 at recruiting Romanian officers from the imperial army.

The same archival enthusiasm informs Nicolae Iorga’s 1940 book Observaţii şi probleme bănăţene,50 a painstakingly sourced compendium of the history of the Banat, reviewing existing material and highlighting new historiographical challenges deriving from it. In his sketchy chapter on the Military Border, ‘Noua armată

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* ‘Urarea Mariei Therezia din “Regulamentul iliric” comunicat “ilirilor” bănăţeni în limba valahă, deci adresat românilor, s-a împlinit în parte şi urmează să se desăvârşească: “şi întru binele ce va să fie a numitului neam, întru cinstea şi fericirea şi mai mare mărică lui”’.

** ‘Trebuie arătată cauza ce-i a determinat pe Austrieci […] să ajute în toate împrejurările şi pe toate căile nu numai pe Germani, ci şi pe Sârbi în detrimentul Românilor băştinaşi.’
Iorga makes two important points. The first concerns the quality of the educational system in the Border: according to Iorga, the school teachers in the newly established Romanian schools were the best among Romanian teachers in the Austrian Empire.

The second point he makes has to do with the interactions between the Banat Grenzer and Romanians in the Principalities. One such interaction was occasioned by the Crimean War, when Romanian frontiersmen from the Banat formed part of the Austrian army stationed in Moldavia:

‘In one of the churches, at Prigor, they still keep the great church, as well as battle, flag, which they [the frontiersmen] had commissioned from a painter in Galați at the time of their stay in these Moldavian lands of ours.’

Liviu Groza reviews the episode in one his books and fleshes out the story by providing a picture of the church flag and glossing on its symbolism. The circumstances and rationale of its acquisition remain, however, as sketchy as Iorga left them.

The following year sees the publication of what would become a landmark of Romanian bibliography on the Military Border, that is, Antoniu Marchescu’s 1941 history of the Romanian Banat Border Regiment from its inception to its dissolution, *Grănicerii bănățeni și Comunitatea de Avere (contribuțiuni istorice și juridice)*. Marchescu, a lawyer in *Comunitatea de Avere* (literally, the Community of Wealth), the administrative unit which emerged following the demilitarization of the Border in 1872, achieves an impressive synthesis of primary and secondary sources with

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*** ‘au fost cei mai buni dascăli din toată lumea alor noștri supuși Împăratului, acei învățători cari scriau frumos numele lor pe scoarțele cărților de biserică’.

‘în una din biserici, la Prigor, se păstrează marel prapur de biserică, dar și steag de oaste, pe care ei au pus să li-l facă un zugrav gălățean, în momentul când se aflau pe aceste locuri moldoveniști ale noastre.’
particular emphasis laid primarily on legal/administrative aspects of the organization and development of the Border system as a whole as well as of each of its subdivisions. The lucid, source-based account provides the reader with a profusion of details rendered in an objective, straightforward style surprisingly free of emotional language and high-flown rhetoric. Marchescu’s original contribution in this book is that he goes beyond the mere compilation of secondary source information and, in his capacity as lawyer of Comunitatea de Avere, he uses the archive of the former Romanian Banat Border Regiment complete with officers’ official notes and reports as preserved from the time of the 1848/49 Revolution.

A note of caution should be introduced at this point. As with many non-academic writings, Marchescu’s book falls short at times of a scrupulously kept citation system, not so much in the case of the secondary as that of the primary sources he quotes. The military reports to which he makes reference must have formed part of his personal library when he wrote his book and, consequently, they are only briefly acknowledged as ‘Locot. Nestor Cena: Relation, 20, II, 1863 (manuscris)’ or ‘Maior Oreskovics: raportul no. 70/1851 către reg. 13 grâniceri (manuscris)’ or ‘Locot. Schwab: raport, din 4-11-1851, către reg. 13 grâniceri’, etc. No indication is provided as to their location and availability at the time, which, compounded with the upheavals of the half a century that has since then elapsed, casts doubt on the possibility of retrieving this material. The need to go back to the primary sources is felt all the more keenly as the use of inverted commas is rather erratic and occasionally fails to distinguish between Marchescu’s own words and those of the officers he quotes. The line between quote and paraphrase is sometimes completely blurred so that the narrative reads like an uninterrupted monologue. Moreover, as Marchescu chooses a chronological perspective and, consequently,
shuttles between reports, their origin, actual information and style remain unknown to the reader.

This bibliographical shortcoming, in conjunction with the preferential access to material sometimes practiced in Romanian archives, was to result in a spurious sense of mystery and attempts at historiographical ventriloquism prompted by this very bibliographical silence. I will begin with the latter case. I.D. Suciu’s study of the 1848-49 Revolution in the Banat points to the problem of the whereabouts of Marchescu’s sources. The comment, however, does not stop here but goes on to imply a purposeful suppression of information on Marchescu’s part:

‘The unfolding of military operations during the revolution, especially those carried out by the Romanian 13th Regiment in the Banat, can be followed in A. Marchescu’s documented study. The author is well informed but fails to indicate the whereabouts of his sources. The various officer reports are used indiscriminately and because of this the great importance of the rebellion of Romanian masses, as well as their military contribution, goes unrecognized.’ **52

On the other hand, Liviu Groza, whose work I will be discussing further on in this chapter, holds out the promise of major revelations and creates a sense of mystery surrounding the documents describing the 1848-49 events in the Banat, including the Military Border. This, Groza points out, is owing to his not being able to access these documents although well aware that they are to be found in the Caraş-Severin National Archives:

‘For a complete picture of the revolution in the Banat as well as the état d’âme within the Romanian Border Regiment no. 13 based in Caransebeş, researchers should consult the reports of the regimental officers which are to be found in a well

** ‘Desfăşurarea operaţiilor militare din timpul revoluţiei, mai ales cele efectuate de Regimentul nr. 13 româno-banatic, se poate urmări în studiul documentat datorat lui A. Marchescu. Autorul e bine informat, dar nu indică depozitul izvoarelor. Rapoartele diferenţilor ofiţeri sunt luate fără discernământ critic şi, din această cauză, marea importanţă a ridicării gloatelor româneşti, ca şi aportul lor militar, nu e recunoscut.’
preserved volume in the Caraş-Severin National Archives. These documents have a history of their own, but if published and competently interpreted they will shed due light on a much debated subject, hidden by history. […] To my regret and, implicitly, that of those interested, these reports were not available to me for various reasons.∗∗∗

As it happens, I was able to access the volume of documents to which this author was referring and, after struggling for a while with the sometimes not very calligraphically penned military reports, came to the startling conclusion that they were none other than the reports quoted by Antoniu Marchescu in his history of the Military Border. Upon comparing Marchescu’s quotes and paraphrases to the original reports, I realized that the former were a very accurate rendition of the latter and that what I took to be Marchescu’s own words or paraphrase was in fact a verbatim, if unacknowledged, translation of the manuscripts.

Marchescu’s is primarily a military history set against a minutely reconstituted legalistic background. The involvement of the Romanian 13th Border Regiment with the 1848/49 Revolution (both on the Italian and the Hungarian front), the Russian-Turkish war of 1853, the renewed hostilities with Italy (1859), and the disastrous conflict with Prussia (1866) are scrupulously recorded as the author follows the movement of the detached battalions and maps their victories and defeats.

Wedged in between this section on military history and the third part of the book, devoted to Comunitatea de avere, there is a chapter dedicated to the regimental elite, that is, to the Romanian generals originating from the Banat

∗∗∗‘Pentru a avea o imagine completă a revoluţiei din Banat, inclusiv a stării de spirit din cadrul regimentului de granită româno-bănătean nr. 13 din Caransebeş, cercetătorii trebuie să consulte rapoartele știfterilor regimentului, rapoarte ce se găsesc, legate într-un volum bine conservat, la Arhivele Naţionale Caraş-Severin. Aceste documente au istorie a lor, dar publicate şi comentate cu competenţă vor aduce cuvenita lumină asupra unui subiect mult controversat şi tănuit de istorie. […] Spre regretul meu şi implicit al celor interesaţi, aceste rapoarte nu mi-au stat la dispoziţie din varii motive’.
Military Border. The chapter is divided into two sections, which distinguish between those officers who reached the rank of general within the Austrian-Hungarian army and those who crossed over to the Regat while still lieutenants (Moise Groza) or Unterlieutenant (Ioan Dragalina) and became generals in the Romanian army. Marchescu draws extensively on information taken from Coriolan Buracu (*Din istoria Banatului Severin, Muzeul Nicolae Cena și Cronica Mehadiei*). Of particular note is the disparity between the number of generals who were formed and stayed in the k.(u.)k. army to the end of their careers and those officers who chose to enrol in the Romanian army. Thus, section A (*Generali români din granița bănățeană în armata română/Romanian Generals from the Banat Military Border in the Romanian army*) contains only three names (Moise Groza, Ioan Dragalina, and Gheorghe Domășneanu), the last one barely fitting the category as he only joined the Romanian army after the First World War, up until then having faithfully served the Monarchy and, as a consequence, been promoted to the rank of brigadier general in 1917.

The highlights of these generals’ military careers follow for the most part the same pattern: outstanding results in school, subsequent studies at prominent Austrian military academies of the time, wars and decorations, gradual ascent of the military hierarchy. With some variations this sequence functions as a leitmotif for the presentation of each of the generals. Each biographical outline unswervingly ends on the same note: whatever their personal trajectory and commitments, these men remained loyal to their ethnic group, to their religion, and to their Romanian background. Even while serving the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy as high-ranking military, their ‘Romanian feelings’ remained intact and unsuppressed. This latter reference was to General Domășneanu.
However, what is quoted in support of these statements are usually eulogistic articles or obituaries or, in the case of Dragalina, the incentivising speech given before the Romanian troops on the eve of a major operation during the First World War. In other words, snippets of rhetorical, one could almost term them ‘propagandistic’ material, and not genuine personal testimonies and professions of allegiance.

Staple bibliography for the history of the Banat Military Border is the industrious historiographical output of the retired Colonel Liviu Groza. His books, covering a considerable time span, resume the work of Antoniu Marchescu. Although lacking the latter’s legalistic emphasis, Groza’s contributions aim instead at fleshing out, in a reader-friendly way, the stark generalities and juridical framework delineated by Marchescu and seek to recreate the day-to-day life of Romanian Banat frontiersmen through a profusion of eclectic ethnographic, archival, and anecdotal data. The slogan behind his endeavours (informing his as well as other Romanian authors’ work) is that of shedding light on less known, yet unjustly ignored, historical realities. Hence the ‘extensive’ approach used, one of accumulation, of assiduously compiling miscellaneous information, which sometimes leads to startling juxtapositions of valuable primary source material gleaned from the Viennese archives and rather bathetic hearsay or unverifiable fable-like dialogues.54

Groza’s principal study is his 1993 book Contribuţii la cunoaşterea culturii grănicerilor bănăţeni, which, together with the monographs dedicated to Generals Doda and Trapsia, as well as numerous other booklets covering various aspects of the Banat Military Border history and culture, form the only contemporary source of
information in Romanian on the subject. These books are too numerous to mention in this bibliographical chapter. I will inevitably refer to some of them in the course of the present thesis. It is important to note that Groza’s contributions are a labour of love and pioneering in several respects: they have the merit of bringing to light new archival evidence and the hypotheses and assumptions they put forward form the necessary basis of future scholarship. As I shall stress later on in this thesis, the downside to this rich bibliographical source is the irretrievable character of primary documents, either because they are mentioned as being in the author’s possession or because, when a call number or Signatur is provided, this is erroneously quoted.

Liviu Smeu, the author of a 1980 study of a subsection of the Banat Military Border establishment, the Almăj Valley,⁵⁵ achieves a much more focused study, which, although cramped by the ideological strictures of the time, lays before the reader important empirical evidence that counterbalances the propagandistic conclusions of the study. He achieves a modus vivendi between analysis and evidence, whereby the two are kept separate so that, while the former fails the test of time, the latter is still valuable nowadays.

Smeu’s history of the militarized Almăj Valley builds a strong case for the Military Border as a tightly regulated space of Habsburg social and cultural reform. The author relies on imperial circulars, the so-called Befehl-Protocoll, containing orders sent from the General Command to the Border companies and disseminated by the church. On the basis of this documentary material, Smeu conveys the image of a community apprised of the latest international developments and compelled, or incentivized, as the case may be, to send their children to school.

Apart from these substantial studies of the Banat segment of the Military Border (to which correspond equally detailed studies of the Transylvanian Border
regiments), there are also a number of volumes of conference proceedings testifying to an upsurge of interest in the Austrian Military Border among European academics. Thus, in the 1990s several such collections of contributions were published: *The Austrian Military Border. Its Political and Cultural Impact*, edited by Liviu Maior, Nicolae Bocșan, and Ioan Bolovan; *Microhistory of the Triplex Confinium: international project conference papers*, edited by Drago Roksandić; and *Constructing border societies on the Triplex Confinium: international project conference papers 2. Plan and practice. How to construct a border society? The Triplex Confinium 1700-1750*, edited by Drago Roksandić and Nataša Štefanec.

The first of the three collections of essays is devoted entirely to aspects and problems of the Romanian Border regiments (with a Transylvanian bias) whereas the last two tackle mainly the Croatian segment of the Austrian Military Border. For the purposes of this chapter I shall dwell on one of the Romanian contributions dealing with the social and cultural evolutions deriving from the militarization of Romanian population in Transylvania: Ladislau Gyémant’s ‘Die rumänische Grenzbevölkerung aus Siebenbürgen – Stellung und Streben’ (The Romanian Border population in Transylvania – their status and aspirations). The author emphasizes the emancipatory effect of militarization:

‘Following their liberation from feudal burdens and from a part of the labour they had to do for the State, and given their obligation to undertake military service and other public services, the military status meant for the overwhelming majority of Romanian frontiersmen, who had originally been dependent peasants, an undoubtedly significant step forward in comparison with their previous status, given their free social position as well as the economic and cultural possibilities of emancipation created within the new framework.’

** `bedeutete der Grenzstand für die überwiegende Mehrheit der rumänischen Grenzer, die aus Reihen der abhängigen Bauern stammten, infolge deren Befreiung von den feudalen Lasten und von einem Teil der zugunsten des Staates geleisteten Dienste und deren Verpflichtung, dafür Militärdienst und
This enhancement of social status is seen as conducive to an early ‘ripening’ of group and, subsequently, of national, self-awareness (‘eine frühere Reife des Eigenbewußtseins’).\textsuperscript{59} Thus, in 1784 the Grenzer showed ambivalent feelings towards, and even overt sympathy for, Horea’s uprising. A decade later they were lending their support to the petitionary movement that was to produce the \textit{Supplex Libellus Valachorum}.\textsuperscript{60}

The Military Border regiments were, in cultural matters as well, an ever-ready source of support for national initiatives:

‘The officers of the Romanian Border regiments are listed among the subscribers to Romanian periodicals and, among them, there were those who gave financial support for the printing of textbooks for the national schools. The fact that in the 1830s Professor Alexandru Gavra turned to the Romanian border regiments for help with the projects of his publishing house is symptomatic in this respect.’\textsuperscript{61}

This is consistent with George Barițiu’s description of the Transylvanian Border Regiments as providers of educational facilities and also echoes Nicolae Iorga’s earlier-mentioned point about the high quality of Banat Military Border tuition:

‘out of those schools came not only people who were necessary in the lower ranks of regiments, but also high-ranking officers. The selfsame military schools were a genuine boon for the great mass of civil inhabitants. For lack of local schools in their communes, priests and lay parents, being desirous to send their offspring to...'}
study, sent them to Orlatu or to Nasaud, from where they went on to the gymnasium in Blaj, Sibiu, or somewhere else.∗ 62

In the Banat, Constantin Diaconovici Loga, one of the leading Romanian intellectuals and head of the national schools in the Military Border, supervised the final examinations that took place in Caransebes. An association of the Romanian primary school teachers of the Military Border came into being in 1865, organizing conferences on methodology and giving demonstrative lessons.63

One of the more recent and frequently quoted books dedicated to Romanian officers is Liviu Maior’s 2004 study Românii în armata habsburgică.64 Drawing on István Deak and Liviu Groza for his data, as well as on his own previous scholarship, Maior emphasizes the loyalty to the Emperor demonstrated by Romanian generals in the imperial army and dwells on the particular cases of Trajan Doda, Nikolaus Cena, and Moise Groza. The characterization of Romanian military lacks, as do most previous studies on the subject, a solid basis of personal testimony. Secondary sources are quoted for the most part,65 while the historical characters involved remain silent with the author speaking on their behalf.

The conclusion of this bibliography survey is, like the reviewed sources, twofold. The first part regards Habsburg literature, which has the advantage of providing the reader with carefully sourced information and a general view of the Military Border and its characteristics. The downside is given by the fact that most of these studies focus either on the Croatian segment of the Border or remain at a

∗ ‘din acelea scóle au esitu nu numai individi necessari in regimente pentru servitiile inferióre, ci si oficiari de ranguri inalte. Totu acelea scóle militarie au fost unu adeveratu daru si pentru multume mare din clasa civila a locuitoriloru. Preoti si alti parinti mireni doritori de a-si da pe fiii loru la carte, in lipsa de scóle proprie in comunele provinciali, ii trimiteau la Orlatu sau la Nasaud, de unde inaintau la gimnasiulu din Blasiu sau la Sibiu sau pe aiera.’
level of generality that does not allow for a study of allegiance or loyalties in any of the Military Border regiments.

Romanian bibliography, on the other hand, takes a close look at the Banat and Transylvanian Romanian Border regiments and relies on a rich body of sources. However, with a few notable exceptions, most pre-1989 studies on the subject necessitate careful sifting of the information they offer and sometimes a painstaking return to the primary sources they use. The nature of the primary sources would in itself require such revisiting, since accessing them presupposes the twofold task of transliterating and translating. The leap of faith one is forced to take in reading secondary bibliography on the Banat Military Border is thus redoubled and one finds oneself at times in the situation of reinventing the wheel or rather charting archival territory where others have gone before and yet failed to produce accurate maps of it.

As mentioned above, another shortcoming of Romanian bibliography is the authors’ tendency to adopt an empathetic, ventriloquial style when confronted with a dearth of primary sources. Personal testimony is scant and inadequately referenced. Consequently, all assumptions and conclusions regarding the état d’âme, the attitudes and allegiance of the Romanian military elite in the Austrian Border should be taken with a hefty pinch of salt. It is the purpose of the present thesis to fill in this historiographical gap by tracking down and analysing extant documents testifying to the political stance of Romanian frontiersmen in the Banat Military Border. The principal goal of this thesis is to retrieve the identity and personal trajectory of the military elite of the Border, to attach actual persons to the names circulated in Romanian bibliography, and, archives permitting, to restore their voice, which was muted and overwritten by traditional histories.
2 Ibid., p. 251.
3 Ibid., p. 277: ‘Um seine herrlichen Anlagen im vollsten Glanze zu zeigen, hat er nur Bildung nöthig, und diese leider! fehlt ihm. Die gröbste Unwissenheit herrscht unter dem gemeinen Volke, besonders unter den Walachen, und es ist dem thörigsten Aberglauben befangen.’ (In order to show his excellent endowments to best advantage, he only needs education and this, alas, he lacks. The grossest ignorance reigns among the common people, especially among Wallachians, and it is mixed with superstition.)
4 Ibid., footnote on page 284.
8 Ibid., p. 281: ‘Zu Pancsova bestand 1810 eine Leseanstalt, die manch nützliches Buch auslieh.’
9 Ibid., p. 281.
13 Hietzinger, *Statistik der Militärgränze des österreichischen Kaiserthums*, p. 3.
16 Ibid., p. 4.
17 Ibid, p. 6: ‘Wollte man den Soldaten eine Heimath und einen ruhigen Aufenthalt nach zurückgelegter Dienstzeit verschaffen.’ (They wanted to provide the soldiers with a home and a quiet residence after the allotted service time.)
18 Ibid., p. 25.
19 Ibid, section 4, p. 29.
20 Ibid, p. 29: ‘es viele Zeit und Mühe braucht, aus Bauern Soldaten zu machen, besonders wenn sie fortfahren sollen, ihre Felder zu bestellen und sich davon zu ernähren.’ (Much time and effort are needed to make soldiers out of peasants, particularly when they must go out and till their fields and feed themselves from them.)
21 Ibid., p. 29.
22 Ibid, section 24, p. 44.
23 *Voyage du Maréchal Duc de Raguse en Hongrie, en Transylvanie, dans la Russie méridionale, en Crimée, et sur les Bords de la Mer d’Azoff, a Constantinople, dans quelques parties de l’Asie Mineure, en Syrie, en Palestine et en Égypte*, Tome Premier, Paris, MDCCXXXVII, p. 79: ‘Nommé après la paix de Vienne (en 1809) gouverneur general des provinces Illyriennes avec les pouvoirs les plus étendues, j’avais sous mon administration les six premiers regiments, qui faisaient partie des pays qui nous avaient été cédés.’ (Being appointed after the Peace of Vienna (in 1809) general governor of the Illyrian Provinces and invested with the most extensive of powers, I had under my administration the first six regiments, which formed part of the territories that had been ceded to us.)
24 Ibid., p. 80.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 86.
27 Ibid., p. 95.
28 Ibid., p. 110.
The turning-point meeting between Moise Groza and General Florescu, the Romanian War Minister, during the summer of 1871 takes the following anecdotal form: ‘[Gen. Florescu:] “As a Romanian and having such military training wouldn’t you rather join the Romanian army?”'

30 Ibid., Vorwort: ‘Es wurde dabei vorwiegend der historisch-politische und militärische Gesichtspunkt festgehalten; denn in diesen beiden Richtungen kam die eigenhümliche Natur des Grenzinsituts zum Ausdrucke.’
31 Ibid., Vorwort.
32 Ibid., p. 302.
33 Constant von Wurzbach, Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich, Zweiunddreißigster Theil, k.k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, Wien, 1876, p. 381.
34 Warriner, Contrasts in Emerging Societies. Readings in the Social and Economic History of South-Eastern Europe in the Nineteenth Century, p. 53. He was in an ideal position to comment on such fractious issues as the Military Border because he had travelled extensively throughout Hungary, then married Polyxena Wessely and settled in Transylvania. A commonsensical take on things is corroborated and, at times, counterpointed by an inside view of Hungarian and Transylvanian matters and concerns. His remarks are balanced and constantly present both sides of the story while trying to remain objective and rational.
35 John Paget, Hungary and Transylvania; with remarks on their condition, social, political, and economical, volume II, London, John Murray, 1855, pp. 24-25.
36 Ibid., p. 23: in Hungary (in the Military Border) ‘probably nine-tenths of the whole [number of matriculated children] can read and write in one or two languages.’
37 Iuliu Vuia, Școlile românești bănățene în secolul 18, Sebeș, 1896; Andrei Gidiu, Iosif Bălan, Monografia orașului Caransebeș, 1909.
38 Marchescu, Grâncerci bănățeni, p. iii, translation mine.
39 Introduction to Marchescu, Grâncerci bănățeni, pp. ii-iii.
42 von Wrede, Geschichte der k.u.k. Wehrmacht, Band 5, p. 225: [about the setting up of the German sector of the Banat Military Border] ‘Diese Compagnien wurden auch, obwohl aus allen Nationalitäten bestehend, “Deutsche Veteranen-Compagnien” gennant.’ (Although comprising soldiers of all nationalities, these companies were named ‘German Veteran Companies’.) Italics mine.
44 Ibid., p. 10.
45 Ibid., p. 11.
46 Grigore Popiți, Date și documente bănățene (1728-1887), Tipografia Națională Timișoara, 1939.
47 Ibid., p. 3.
48 The term ‘nationalise’ is used here in the sense proposed by Pascale Casanova in her discussion of literature, nation and politics. According to Casanova ‘nationalization’ means ‘appropriation’ par les instances nationales comme une symbol d’identité’ (Pascale Casanova, La republique mondiale des lettres).
49 The Romanian state came into being following the 1859 union of Moldavia and Wallachia, acquired its independence from the Ottoman Porte in 1877 and was proclaimed a kingdom in 1881. 
50 Nicolae Iorga, Observații și probleme bănățene, Academia Română, Studii și cercetări XL, Monitorul Oficial și Imprimierile Statului, Imprimeria Națională, București, 1940, pp. 57-61.
54 The turning-point meeting between Moise Groza and General Florescu, the Romanian War Minister, during the summer of 1871 takes the following anecdotal form: ‘[Gen. Florescu:] “Românul și cu asemenia pregătire militară n-ai prefera să iei în armata română? [Moise Groza:] Cum să nu! Aceasta este și dorința mea, a răspuns bucurios tânărul ofițer. I-a explicat inșă generalului că, în conformitate cu legile în vigoare, trebuia să mai slujească încă doi ani pentru a i se putea accepta demisia.”’ (Gheorghe Preda, Liviu Groza, Un erou bănățean al independenței: Generalul Moise Groza, Editura Militară, 1877, p. 14)
“Why, of course! This is my wish too,” came the young officer’s keen answer. He explained to the general, however, that according to current laws, he had to serve an additional two years before his resignation could be accepted.


Ibid., p. 33.

Ibid., p. 34.

Ibid., p. 37.


Smu, Almăjul grăniceresc, pp. 124-125.


See also Günter Klein’s 1996 article ‘Die rumänischen Offiziere in der k.(u.)k. Armee. Sozialer Aufstieg ohne Verlust der nationalen Identität?’ in Revista istorică, Tome 7, No. 3-4, Editura Academiei Române, București, pp. 175-189. The article is equally based on secondary bibliography.

As Edna Bentz points out in her 1999 book on deciphering German records, the similarity between certain letters is such that one might waste months looking up records in the wrong parish if a capital R is mistaken for a capital K (Edna M. Bentz, If I Can You Can Decipher Germanic Records, San Diego, California, T.J. Bentz, 1999).
Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework

Preliminaries to an analysis of nation and nationality

in the Habsburg Monarchy

As this thesis seeks to provide an account of the sense of identity and the loyalties of the Romanian military elite from the Banat Military Border and, moreover, given that such a task presupposes dealing with intrinsically subjective categories, the present chapter serves as a preface to the analysis proper and evaluates the concepts that constitute the investigative tools needed for such an analysis: nationalism, national identity, nation and nationality, loyalty, and allegiance.

I would like to start with a discussion of the usefulness of the concept of ‘nationalism’ when trying to map the loyalties of a given community (in this case, the Romanian Military Border community and, in particular, the elite which emerged from their midst). Does ‘nationalism’ (however defined from our own vantage point) help to a better understanding of the questions set in the introductory chapter? Is it worth retaining in the following analysis or does it obscure more than it reveals? Would it be worth replacing with a less controversial term such as ‘allegiance’ or ‘loyalty’? These are not questions prompted only by the baffling polysemy of the term nationalism but rather pertain to the more general sphere of the use and abuse of umbrella terms. The notion of culture has given rise to similar queries and, in what follows, I shall draw on one of the solutions to the culture debate proposed by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz in my attempt to assess the validity of nationalism as a conceptual tool of inquiry.
Geertz’s theoretical system belongs to the variegated family of historicist thought.¹ He equates the problem of interpreting a different culture with that of investigating a past age in that in both cases the culture or the time one lives in ends up influencing and distorting the final analysis. In both cases we are dealing with an unwitting process of resemanticization, that is, reading into words and practices meanings that are alien to that culture or time frame. Geertz’s solution takes the form of a method of enquiry called ‘thick description’, that is, a detailed description (devoid of value judgments) of the system of meanings and signification that underwrites cultural and historical manifestations.² ‘The point is not to devise with hindsight a better explication of past events, but to enhance the way they are already “scientifically eloquent” on their own.’³

Thus, in the case of nationalism too, an investigation of a past age should start with just such a thick description of the conceptual framework in which a given community functioned and which informed their actions and attitudes. While present-day notions of nationalism are useful for comparative purposes, they should nevertheless be used cautiously when explaining phenomena belonging to a different conceptual system. One must take into account the fact that ‘national’, ‘nationalism’, ‘nationalist’ are all derivative terms and that the root word ‘nation’ is historically fluid.

Terms such as nation, nationality, nationalist were common in nineteenth-century public discourse and figured prominently in political debates and personal testimonies. The challenge they pose for contemporary research is that of ascertaining what exactly was meant by them at the time, particularly within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy and given the historical context in which they functioned, dominated as it was by conflicting ideological tendencies and
experiments ranging from irredentism to federalism and neo-imperialism. The difficulty of pinpointing the meaning of these notions stems from their being fluid and easily appropriated while at the same time politically and emotionally charged. This is, paradoxically, due not so much to a lack of unambiguous definitions as rather to a plethora of personalized definitions verging on humptydumptyism. An evaluation of a group’s allegiance, such as the present thesis seeks to effect, necessarily hinges upon the need to elucidate the semantics of this political jargon.

While the etymology and historical polysemy of nation has formed the methodological starting point for most analyses of the concept in its medieval and early modern instantiations (Kedourie, Turville-Petre), and cultural filiations of the modern acceptation of nation have been traced back to such thinkers as Herder and Fichte, the term and its derivatives remain for the nineteenth century as elusive and baffling in their polysemy as they had been before, if not even more so. Moreover, the nationality blindness in bureaucratic taxonomy further contributed to this plurality of meanings. According to Ian Hacking, ‘Austria established a statistical office, on the Prussian model, only in 1829’. The statistical method had, admittedly, percolated into the Austrian literary system by the early 1800s as testified by land descriptions such as Demian’s statistical description of the Habsburg Monarchy. At that stage, the population of the Banat Military Border was divided into peoples (Völker), the only express mention of nation being in the old juridical sense and used in reference to the Illyrian nation.

If at the official, literate level classifications and demographic categories were barely beginning to take shape, at the level of common perception, the boundaries between the social and the ethnic were practically nonexistent. A
manuscript quoted by I.D. Suciu explains the empirical usage of ethnic labels in the Banat:

‘the Romanian from the Banat hated the Hungarian because he did not see Hungarians who were like himself nor did he see any Romanians who were like the Hungarian. He knew them [i.e. the Hungarians] only as Hungarian nobles and these were for the most part either landowners or high officials and, naturally, he did not love them because they taxed, judged, punished and ruled over him. So they said the Hungarian ruled over everything.’

Censuses, the official sources of population classification for the nineteenth century, added to the general confusion surrounding the concept of nationality and its relationship to language groups and the old notion of Volksstum. They introduced new categories, such as Umgangssprache, which, while useful for state purposes, failed to clarify the intricate relations holding within multilingual and multiethnic communities and sparked off controversy. As James C. Scott points out, this was due to the fact that census categories were, like all other state simplifications, not designed to ‘represent the actual activity of the society they depicted, nor were they intended to; they represented only that slice of it that interested the official observer.’

Thus, if imperial census takers in the Habsburg Monarchy took note only of the language used in everyday affairs, in the fledgling Romanian state the 1859 census recorded only citizenship without reference to the ethnic structure of the population.

As Costin Feneșan points out in his editorial notes to the Romanian edition of Johann Jakob Ehrler’s 1774 Landesbeschreibung, in the case of the Banat, the German term Nationalist was used by eighteenth-century Habsburg administration in

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* ‘românul din Banat ura maghiarul că nu vedea maghiar sieşi asemenea, nici alt român asemenea maghiarului ci-i cunoștea numai ca maghiari nobili și aceștia erau în mare parte sau proprietari sau direcțori și pă aceștia fișește nu-i iubea că îi luaus dădii, îi judeca, îi pedepsea, îi stăpânea, și zicea că maghiaru înstăpânește.’
reference to the autochthonous population, Serbs and Wallachen. Alex Drace-Francis holds, moreover, that, in the Banat, ‘the word Nationalist was used in German […] to mean a member of the natio Illyrica’, while ‘in the Bukovina, recently under Habsburg domination but where the Illyrian privileges did not apply, it was used with an apparently similar meaning to denote a representative of the local population.’

By 1869 the term nationalist was still being used in the Banat but its meaning had shed its original Illyrian ambiguity, that is, it no longer signified a representative of the natio Illyrica but rather a representative of one given ethnic group (Romanian or Serbian), although a commonality of political purpose was still evident in it. The semantic specialization of the word comes across in Antoniu Mocsonyi’s invitation to a national conference in Timișoara issued on 20 January 1869 in the following terms:

‘Given that the elections date is drawing near, I, acting upon the right that every genuine constitution must grant its citizens, and also answering the challenge that several nationalist gentlemen proposed to me, hereby take the liberty of inviting the distinguished national intelligentsia, or, in the case of those living in far-away regions, their trustworthy representatives and the representatives of the people, to a brotherly public assembly and conference in Timișoara on 26 January 1869.’

The residual element of Illyrian commonality (see the following chapter for an explanation of the Illyrian Privileges and natio Illyrica within the Habsburg Monarchy) becomes apparent at the level of political programmes and goals. The informal organizational meeting preceding the conference proper brought together the members of the Mocsonyi family, and also Vincențiu Babeș and Constantin Rădulescu, among others, as well as the leading Serbian politician Svetozar Miletić. The outcome of the conference was the creation of an independent national party.
which would endorse the bill regarding the nationality issue proposed by both Romanian and Serbian MPs in the previous Diet. The new political formation was conceived, in Alexandru Mocsonyi’s words, as a legal means for furthering the nationality cause.\textsuperscript{16} As such, it would be the political representative of the Romanians in Hungary.

That the word nationality had, by then, become synonymous to the ethnic group or \textit{Volk} is attested by Vincențiu Babeș’s speech to his voters in Sânt-Nicolaul-Mare, Torontal County, following the 1869 parliamentary elections, where for rhetorical purposes the speaker glosses the term:

\begin{quote}
‘I have had occasion to admire your good understanding, zeal and solidarity, irrespective of nationality, Serbs or Romanians, and irrespective of confession, uniate or non-uniate’.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

For all such explanations, however, terminological variations and idiosyncratic usage seems to have been quite common. Thus, the Romanian MP Eugen Ioan Cucu spoke of ‘the mistrust between the various nationalities and the Hungarian \textit{race’}.\textsuperscript{18}

The terms nation and nationality used in the speeches of various MPs became problematic when it came to legislating rights for the groups thus loosely designated. The controversy triggered by the amendment proposed by the Romanian MP Vasile Butean as a modification to the article of 6 December 1868 raised eyebrows over the use of the word ‘nations’ instead of ‘nationalities’. The proponents defended their choice of words on the grounds that ‘nationality is nothing but a derivation of the word nation’\textsuperscript{∗} and that those who call themselves a nation are not thereby endangering Hungary’s existence and political unity.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{∗}‘Dar aici, onorătă casă, e deosebire numai etimologică, fiindcă naționalitate e numai coloratura expresiei ‘națiune’ și preste tot nu e cu prejudiții față de cealaltă.’
The quibble over whether the non-Hungarian peoples constituted nationalities or nations stemmed from the subsumption of all nationalities to the Hungarian nation effected by the controversial so-called Law of Nationalities (GA XLIV) of 1868. Its introductory passage stipulated that

‘all citizens of Hungary, according to the principles of the constitution, form from a political point of view one nation – the indivisible unitary Hungarian nation – of which every citizen of the fatherland is a member, no matter to what nationality he belongs.’

This provision constituted the bone of contention for all subsequent interpretations and implementations of the law. There were polemical reactions to it such as that of the Romanian MP Sigismund Borlea, as quoted by Păcățian:

‘as regards the observation made by Mr MP Smeskal against the word nation, I would point out only this, that it should be taken into consideration that the law and its article, whereby we are decreed Hungarians, was not issued with our consent but against our will. And he must know, surely, that not only nations, but also individuals, who are herded somewhere by force always crave to escape. One can even say that if it were possible for living people to be forcefully driven into Heaven, they would most likely try to escape just because they were forced into it.’

There were also attempts at reaching a compromise between the two principles of state unity and equality of rights, stipulated by the law, such as that made by the Romanian MP Alexandru Mocsonyi, who ‘was ready to accept even that all citizens formed one political nation’ provided that ‘all the other nations should be recognized

** ‘Ce privește observarea făcută de domnul deputat Smeskal în contra cuvântului națiune, notez numai atată, că ar trebui să se iee în socotință că legea aceea, precum și articolul ei, prin care suntem decretăți maghiari, nu s-a creat cu învoirea noastră, ci contra voioșei noastre. Iar aceea o va ști și Dumnealui, că nu numai națiunile, ci și indivizii, mânați fiind undeva cu forța, năzuiesc totdeauna a scapa de-acolo. Ba pot zice, că de s-ar putea întâmpla ca oamenii să intre de vii în raiu – dacă cineva i-ar introduce acolo cu forța – zâu că și de-acolo ar încerca să fugă, numai pentru că au fost forțați să intre acolo.’
as such within this unique nation'. Commentators have repeatedly pointed out, as the main source of controversy, the language-bound ambiguity of the term ‘magyar’, which was used in reference to both the political nation, including all the other nationalities, as well as to the linguistic and cultural community, and which eventually constituted the legal premise for a policy of Magyarization.

By comparison, in the Austrian half of the Monarchy nationality legislation did not form a separate law, but constituted a passage in the general law on citizen rights. Article 19 of law 124/1867 postulated no overarching political nation of the kind stipulated by its Hungarian counterpart. Drawing on the Kremsier Constitution draft of 1849, the Austrian nationality stipulations laid down equality of rights for all Volksstämme or peoples, their right to preserve and cultivate their nationality and language, as well as the equality of all languages (landesübliche Sprachen) in school, administration and public life.

Similar to the Hungarian nationality legislation, the Austrian constitution did not recognize the nationalities as political entities either, nor were its liberal stipulations fully translated into practice.

As regards the Habsburg, later Austro-Hungarian army, up until the end of the nineteenth century, when the language of command became an issue within the Dual Monarchy, the military system was, at least at the bureaucratic level of personnel classification and characterization, beyond nationalism, as István Deák put it, and, indeed, beyond ethnicity. Officers’ personal details consisted only of place of birth and religion. One’s mother tongue was relegated to the skills section among other languages, so that, as István Deák points out, it was only by a combination of inference and corroborating material that one could deduce the nationality or ethnic background of a given officer.
The legal framework of the joint army was set, together with the other institutions of the Dual Monarchy, by the *Ausgleich* legislation of 1867 and subsequent additions to it. As László Péter and other commentators pointed out, the military stipulations were more complex than the economic ones and conditioned by the terms of the Pragmatic Sanction. Thus, in the military sphere Hungarian jurisdiction was limited, while imperial power was wide ranging if vaguely defined. However, although disposal of the army (*Verfügung über die Armee*) remained the Monarch’s prerogative (*Reservatrecht*), recruitment was subject to parliamentary approval.\(^27\) This latter stipulation became the cause of considerable friction and stalemating negotiation and, as has been argued, led in the long run to military backwardness and inefficiency in the First World War.\(^28\)

The paradox of the joint army, at least from the Hungarian point of view, was the fact that, although it was partly stationed in Hungary, it was subordinated to the War Ministry in Vienna and not to the *Ministerium* in Budapest. Moreover, it was dominated by the German element in the high echelons of command and often prone to incidents between civilians and officers.\(^29\)

For all these analyses concentrating on the legal stipulations of the *Ausgleich* concerning the joint army and the newly formed *Honvéd* and *Landwehr*, most of the studies do not touch on the relationship between the military and civil status of the officers of the joint army. A host of questions, which, as will become apparent in the present thesis, are relevant to an evaluation of the Romanian generals from the Military Border, necessitate a detailed explanation of the legal framework regulating civil and military jurisdiction: how was citizenship defined in Austria-Hungary? Was there a joint Austrian-Hungarian citizenship? Were there an Austrian and a Hungarian citizenship respectively? What criteria determined the set of laws
(Austrian or Hungarian) one was subject to? How did one’s civil status impact on one’s military standing and vice versa? An answer to these questions is important for clarifying the societal fabric these generals were embedded in, the network of legal relations they were a part of and conditioned by, and also the legal avenues that were open to them by virtue of the overlapping spheres of jurisdiction, civil and military.

I consider it important to retrieve the system of relations in which these generals evolved as it helps account for the emergence of imponderables such as identity and allegiance. These are psychological categories, which have no tangible or material existence and cannot be easily pinpointed. In the course of this thesis I will seek to ascertain the nature of these officers’ loyalties on the basis of their actions and professions under certain circumstances and particularly in moments of crisis, when they clash with the system and are consequently forced to state their position and justify their actions. Personal identity and civic and political loyalties are, in this view, relational in character. I am thus arguing that the historical and cultural context in which the Romanian military elites were formed, and especially the legal system within which they moved, are of vital importance in evaluating these generals’ sense of identity and their political and social allegiance.

I tend to attach so much importance to legal categories for the same reason that Ian Hacking stresses the importance of statistical categories in a process which he calls ‘making up people’:

‘I claim that enumeration requires categorization, and that defining new classes of people for the purposes of statistics has consequences for the ways in which we conceive of others and think of our own possibilities and potentialities’. 30

The advent of constitutionalism in Austria-Hungary resulted in the introduction of new social and political categories as opposed to the fuzzy notion of
Völker or peoples, which had been used up until then. The concepts of citizenship (Staatsbürgerschaft) and citizen rights (Staatsbürgerrecht) came into legal use following the reformation of the Monarchy along constitutional lines (in the 1860s and after 1867). The Ausgleich brought into being two ambiguously-related constitutional states, each of them with their own laws regulating citizenship. In Hungary, as Péter showed in his excursus on Verfassungsentwicklung in Ungarn, prior to 1867 there existed the notion of populus, which designated solely the nobility, and that of plebs, or non-nobles, who were subjects of the Hungarian Crown. Péter goes on to point out the existence of a third category, that of honosság (Landesangehörigkeit), which remained ambiguous in its reference, given that the acquisition of honosság entailed entry into the nobility class. With the constitutional transformation of 1867, állampolgárság (citizenship) superseded the old concept of honosság, thus extending its civic scope to the entire population. However, while socially all inclusive, the new legal category was at the same time more politically restrictive than the previous one. Thus, whereas the honosság brought with it political rights, the newly created állampolgárság was essentially a passive civic status, devoid of political rights.31

Given the twofold interpretation of the Ausgleich as a whole and the complex and intricate relationship between the two halves of the Monarchy to its very dissolution in 1918, there is little wonder that perspectives on Austrian and Hungarian citizenship and the relationship between the two should have been equally controversial and subject to dual interpretation. This comes across in Ivan Soubbotitch’s 1926 study Effets de la dissolution de l’Autriche-Hongrie sur la nationalité de ses ressortissants, in which the author foregrounds the Hungarian
view of citizenship in the Dual Monarchy, while acknowledging the opposite perspective. Taking his cue from Arpad Kiralyfi, Soubbotitch argues as follows:

‘There being no Austro-Hungarian state, there was consequently no “Austro-Hungarian” citizenship. [...] The quality of Hungarian citizen was completely different from that of Austrian citizen, in the same way that the Hungarian state – made up of the community of Hungarian citizens – was distinct from the Austrian Empire, composed of the totality of Austrian citizens.’

Although Soubbotitch espouses the Hungarian view of the Dual Monarchy, he does present the contrary opinion put forward by two Austrian authors, Mayerhofer and Herrnritt, to the effect that, in relation to the outer world (par rapport à l’étranger), there was solely one type of citizenship, the Austro-Hungarian one. The Austrian and Hungarian citizenship respectively were valid only within the framework of Austrian-Hungarian internal relations. For all Soubbotitch’s contrary argument, the second view would seem to be the more convincing of the two, given the post-1867 division between unitary foreign policy, regulated by joint institutions, and dual domestic affairs, falling under the incidence of the respective legislations in the two halves of the Monarchy, Austrian and Hungarian. Karin Olechowsk-Hrdlicka, after revisiting the legal literature on Austro-Hungarian common affairs, reaches an intermediary conclusion between that espoused by Soubbotitch and Kiralyfi, on the one hand, and that of the above-mentioned Austrian authors, on the other hand:

‘The Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy was more than a personal union. It was not only the Monarch that was common, there were also other common institutions (a common Ministry, Delegations, a common army). From the outside a certain unity
was visible, even if – for lack of an Austrian-Hungarian people and an Austrian-Hungarian state territory – one could not speak of a Reich in the sense of a state.∗

In support of her argument, Olechowski-Hrdlicka quotes a note of protest from the Hungarian Trade Ministry to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs against the usage of the expression ‘Austrian-Hungarian citizens’ (österreichisch-ungarische Staatsangehörige) by the Consulate in Baltimore, USA. The Hungarian authorities were, thus, drawing attention that this label was constitutionally erroneous (staatsrechtlich unrichtig) and that the right designation was that of ‘österreichisch oder ungarisch’.35

Even more relevant for the purposes of this thesis is the status of the employees of joint institutions in Austria-Hungary and, in particular, of the officers of the k.u.k. army. Quoting once again Kiralyfi, Soubbotitch points out that these were recruited from among Austrian as well as Hungarian citizens and retained their citizenship while in the service of a joint institution (as opposed to the Austrian laws, which required that, for entering Austrian civil service, one had to become an Austrian citizen). Thus, Soubbotitch concludes, appointment to a position in the joint administration had no effect on one’s citizenship.36

But what were the criteria used for attributing one type of citizenship or another? As Soubbotitch argues, in both the Austrian and the Hungarian cases, jus sanguinis, that is, being born to Austrian or Hungarian parents, was decisive in determining citizenship, while one’s place of birth (jus soli) had no influence on it. Thus, there was one legislation ‘für alle Angehörige der im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder’ and another for the lands of the Hungarian Crown,

including Croatia and Fiume. Unlike the Austrian stipulations, which formed the first article in the Staatsgrundgesetz über die allgemeine Rechte der Staatsbürger of 1867, the first Hungarian citizenship law was passed in 1879, against the background of a European legislative flurry concerning citizenship. The Hungarian law was similar to its Austrian counterpart in that it listed descent (jus sanguinis), legitimization, naturalization and marriage as ways to acquire citizenship. Thus, Hungarian citizenship was granted by virtue of descent to ‘anybody who is a legitimate child of a Hungarian father or who was born to a mother of Hungarian citizenship’.

What is not clear in this description, or in that of Soubbotitch, is how one ascertained that one’s parents were Hungarian in the case of the various nationalities or ethnic groups living in Hungary on the basis of jus sanguinis alone. The postulate of a unitary Hungarian nation, irrespective of ethnic background, seems to argue, on the contrary, for jus soli as a determining criterion of citizenship: someone who was born on Hungarian soil (whether their parents were ethnic Hungarians or Slovaks, Serbs, Romanians, etc.) automatically became a Hungarian citizen or national. One can, of course, similarly deconstruct the rationale behind any type of citizenship predicated on jus sanguinis by a reductio ad absurdum of the question ‘what makes a Hungarian Hungarian, an Austrian Austrian, etc.?’ But in the case of the Hungarian nation as decreed by the 1868 law of nationalities, this argument becomes even more justified. This incongruity becomes evident in the above quoted article by Norbert Varga, where he traces the new legal stipulations on descent as a criterion for citizenship to a previous legal provision which evinces all the attributes of a jus soli:

“This legal provision had been in effect even before the passing of the citizenship law, since such people were called the “sons of the home country” (nativi Hungari, patriae filii).”
Although neither of these authors address the nationality problem in Hungary and although Varga, moreover, presents the reaction of the Hungarian MPs to the citizenship bill, but not that of the national MPs, it becomes evident from the amendments to this bill that the nationality problem, even if not stated, was at the back of the Hungarian statesmen’s mind. Thus, as Varga shows, section 47 of the new bill stipulated that

‘those individuals who have been implicitly regarded as recognized citizens in the legal practice so far, shall preserve their status unless they will attest within one year, as from the Act of Parliament taking effect, that they intend to preserve their foreign citizenship.’

The Hungarian Minister of Justice, however, objected to its centrifugal potential and noted that

‘it cannot be trusted to a person’s will “he should be a Hungarian or not, because […] it will induce that those being liable to or having been enrolled to military service could exempt themselves or their sons from this liability with a simple declaration asserting that they wish to keep the allegiance to their former homeland as without being able to prove the preservation of the foreign citizenship by means of their passport or any other document.”’

As the rationale behind the Hungarian law of citizenship was that of further consolidating the Hungarian state and unifying its population not only politically and culturally (which is what the law of nationalities in 1868 aimed to achieve) but also from the point of civil status, citizenship could not be made entirely discretionary, otherwise half of the population of Hungary, by virtue of their ethnic background, might be tempted to misuse this legal provision.

If one judges by the above criteria of citizenship, all fifteen generals from the Banat Military Border will have acquired Hungarian citizenship after 1879, given that, by the early Hungarian definition of citizenship as the quality of patriae filii,
their parents as frontiersmen were inhabitants of a territory that had been gradually integrated into Hungary since 1872, when the dissolution of the Military Border had started. As indicated by Soubbotitch, being part of one of the common institutions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had no influence on one’s citizenship: if one was Austrian, one remained so when fulfilling their job, and if one was Hungarian, one remained Hungarian when appointed to a common institution. It follows that the officers of the k.u.k. army had one of the two citizenships of the Monarchy while being part of the common army. Thus, in their capacity as k.u.k. officers, they were subordinated to the Kriegsministerium in Vienna whereas, by virtue of their civil status, they came under the incidence of Austrian or Hungarian laws respectively.

The stipulations of GA XII: 1867 and the Delegationsgesetz divided the army question into three spheres: pragmatic, dualistic and autonomous. Among the last category, that of Autonome Angelegenheiten, were listed those dispositions regarding the deployment and provisioning of the army as well as those regarding Hungarian civil relations, rights and duties of the Hungarian army which had no connection with the military service (jener ungarischen bürgerlichen Verhältnisse, Rechte und Verpflichtungen des ungarischen Kriegsheeres, welche sich nicht auf den Militärdienst beziehen). Thus, non-military affairs remained within the purview of Hungarian or Austrian jurisdiction respectively. This clarification is necessary because it explains why a retired k.u.k. general such as Trajan Doda came to be prosecuted under the Hungarian press law in 1887 or why a k.u.k. FML such as Nikolaus Cena was placed under arrest by the local Hungarian authorities in 1914. On the other hand, as will become apparent in the present thesis, even when retired, these generals were still very much part of the army, they received their pension rights from Vienna and their military file with the Kriegsministerium remained active until their death.
In conclusion, for the purposes of the present thesis I have made the following methodological choices: 1) scrapping the umbrella term of nationalism and replacing it with the more manageable concepts of loyalty and allegiance; 2) sidestepping the infinite regression of meaning implicit in the polysemy of the term nation by concentrating on the historical and legal concepts of nation and nationality specific to Austria-Hungary in the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century; 3) providing a description of the legal/constitutional framework and the spheres of jurisdiction existent in Austria-Hungary, which conditioned the evolution of the Romanian military elites to be evaluated in this thesis.
2 The logic of this theory is best illustrated by the metaphor in David Lowenthal’s book *The Past is a Foreign Country*, Cambridge, CUP, 1985.
4 For federalist projects see studies such Hans Hartl’s *Der „eine“ und „unabhängige“ Balkan: Zur Geschichte einer politischen Vision*, R. Oldenburg Verlag, München, 1877.
5 The term ‘humptydumptyism’ was coined by the American psychologist Frank Ambrose Beach.
16 Ibid., p. 51.
17 Ibid., p. 145.
18 Ibid., p. 164.
19 Ibid., p. 165.
25 Ibid., p. 103.
33 Ibid., p. 14, footnote 2.


39 Ibid., p. 140.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., p. 128.

42 Ibid.

Chapter 4. Romanians in Imperial Discourse

*Motto:*

‘As for national consciousness, I have mentioned that older peasants called themselves Masurians and their speech Masurian. They lived their own life, forming a wholly separate group, and caring nothing for the nation. I myself did not know I was a Pole till I began to read books and papers, and I fancy that other villages came to be aware of their national attachment much in the same way.’

*(Jan Slomka, *From Serfdom to Self-government: memoirs of a Polish village Mayor 1842-1927)*

It was only after 1848 that the term *Romanian* (Germ. *Rumäne,-en*) came into official use to designate one of the ethnic communities of the Habsburg Monarchy. Up until then the Romanians had been generally known as *Wallachen* and, in the case of the Banat of Temeswar (including the Banat Military Border), alternatively lumped together with other Greek Orthodox peoples under the umbrella term of *Illyrians*. Although this shifting terminology points to a change of status and a recategorization of this community within the framework of imperial discourse, historical bibliography tends, however, to proleptically use the word Romanian in reference to time periods when the term had not yet come into official use. However, naming introduces relationships and, as such, is anything but innocent, even less so in a political-historical context, where the recognition of rights and bestowal of privileges are crucially dependent on a legal hermeneutics of names.

The present chapter proposes to analyse the three community labels that were applied, at different points in time, to part of the Banat population and, implicitly, to the inhabitants of the Banat Military Border. Although this evaluation of historical terminology precedes the actual time span with which this thesis is concerned, I
consider it is necessary to map the social status of the Romanian Border community within the Habsburg Monarchy as they constituted the demographic pool out of which the Romanian military elites emerged. The first Border officers who went on to become generals in the k.(u.)k. army after 1870 were born in the 1820s and 1830s in the Banat Military Border amidst a community which was still officially referred to as Wallachen, a community which, as we shall see in the present chapter, had for a long time been dogged by ill repute in Habsburg circles and which, up until 1848, had enjoyed an enhanced social status by comparison with the civil population of the Banat.

By dwelling on the three labels attached to the Banat Romanian community, I am aiming to account for the historical and social background against which these military elites would define themselves in the latter half of the nineteenth century. A study of the historical meaning of the Illyrian nation within the Habsburg Monarchy will, moreover, enable me to delineate the premisses of the unchallenged preservation of Orthodoxy among Banateers. Orthodoxy was to play an important role in the identity of the Border community and also, as we shall see in particular in Chapter Eight, in that of some of the Border generals.

The semantics of the three names (and, implicitly, of the transition from one to the other) will be analysed starting from emblematic historical episodes, when the community acquired topicality in the eyes of Habsburg authorities (and not only) and, consequently, figured prominently in a number of documents of the time.

4.1. The Wallachen

Within the Habsburg Empire, the Wallachen appeared as an ethnic minority following the conquest of Transylvania from the Turks in the late seventeenth
century. Prior to that, Byzantine and early medieval chronicles had mentioned at various points in time the Romanized population north and south of the Danube. Most generous in information on the north-Danube Vlachs and the source of the first attempts at writing a history of the people (and also at mythologizing it in the process) are the works of Italian Renaissance humanists. The myth launched by Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, also known as Pope Pius II, to the effect that the term Valahia is a derivation of Flaccus, the Roman army leader sung by Ovid, caught on and circulated in the works of leading humanists such as Antonio Bonfini and Sebastian Münster.

Within Hungarian medieval historiography, the Vlachs acquired topicality and were seen to necessitate genealogical vindication whenever they formed the ethnic background to Hungarian nobility and royalty. Thus, during the reign of Matthias Corvinus, himself of Vlach origin after his father, the court chronicler Antonio Bonfini duly highlighted the noble Roman origins of the king. The humanist Nicolaus Olahus, Archbishop of Esztergom, and a relative of John Hunyadi (Iancu de Hunedoara), the latter being the father of Matthias Corvinus, wrote at more length about his fellow Vlachs and their Roman descent. The picture that results from these documents is considerably more complex than the ethnically construed dichotomy promoted by Romanian historiography: Hungarian (nobility) – Vlach (peasantry). One’s Vlach origin did not automatically entail exclusion from political life and represented no hindrance to being part of the Hungarian nation, participation in which did not constitute a denial of this origin. The name of Vlach was differently valorized at various points in time. In Transylvania, the institutionalization of the negative sense of Vlach came later, following Michael the Brave’s late-sixteenth-century ephemeral rule of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania. According to
David Prodan, subsequent seventeenth-century Diet decrees (the Approbatae and Compilatae) record this event as a before-and-after landmark for a differentiated treatment of runaway serfs, with the Vlachs being singled out for discriminatory measures.

The status of the Banat population and the significance of the name Vlach or Wallach after the Habsburg conquest of the province in the early eighteenth century was not affected by these prejudices legislated by the Transylvanian Diet. Given the neo-acquisitum status of the Banat and its uncompromising subordination to imperial authorities, Hungarian law as well as precedents of any sort (legal, political, proprietorial) had no bearing on this territory. In what follows I propose to delineate the image of the Wallachisch population in the Banat as it gradually coalesced within eighteenth-century sources (that is, those sources which were contemporaneous with the setting up of the Banat Border Regiments) and to convey in particular, but not solely, Habsburg perceptions of this community.

My approach will be that of concentric circles, closing in on the Banat Wallachen together with official documents of the time. The documents I shall be reviewing range from the most general and remote accounts to first-hand testimonies, i.e. from diplomatic correspondence, dealing mainly with high politics and taking a bird’s eye view of the Banat and its inhabitants, to travel writings, rich in individual perceptions of the land and ethnographic descriptions as a result of direct unmediated contact.

The Banat is mentioned, as a side issue, in mid-eighteenth-century British diplomatic correspondence surrounding the Turkish war of 1737-1739 (as a result of which the Banat became once again a Habsburg borderland). The letters provide a contemporary gloss on the crisscrossing interests of Moscow, Vienna, and
Constantinople in the lower Danube region. Of particular interest are the comments of Sir Everard Fawkener, the British ambassador in Constantinople, on the ambivalent relations between Vienna and Moscow, which occasion a brief reference to the Banat of Temeswar:

‘there are considerations of the greatest Moment why they [i.e. the Austrians] should desire the Russians may not pass the river Bog. They would then become borderers, and a weak declining Empire is a less dangerous neighbour than one that is in full strength and vigour. Moldavia and Valachia are open as well as rich provinces, and he who is Master of the first, may possess them both as soon as he can march over them. The Inhabitants are all of the greekish Religion, and look upon the Czarina as their natural Protectress, as those of the Banat of Temeswar. The German Valackia, Servia and Slavonia are all zealous Professors of the same Religion, and not in the most easy situation as to their civil government. If a powerfull Prince was in possession of the neighbouring Provinces it would be impossible to keep the people from revolting or deserting their Country. I may deceive myself but these Notions have so far possessed me that if the Czarina should advance towards the Danube, I shall expect to see a very sudden change in the sentiments of the Courts of Vienna and Petersburg towards each other.’ (Letter addressed to the Duke of Newcastle from Constantinople on 16 May 1736 – underlining mine.)

The image conveyed is that of Habsburg authorities faced with the portentous centrifugal tendencies of the Orthodox peoples, prone to gravitating towards Russia for support and, as was to happen one decade later, even for permanent residence. Vienna’s fears of Russian influence over its own peoples became reality after the dissolution of the Tisza-Maros confinium (1741), when a considerable number of former frontiersmen migrated to Russia to form what was to become the New Serbia settlement. This demographic haemorrhage was doubly detrimental as it depleted the Habsburg lands of valuable taxpayers and, at the same time, padded out Russia’s population and, implicitly, its financial and military power. In his dispatches to the Russian Czarina Elizabeth, Mikhail Bestuzhev, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna,
strongly advocated Serbian migration from Austrian lands, highlighting the advantages this might bring to Russian geopolitics:

‘A large-scale migration of Orthodox Serbs promised Russia immediate defence benefits in the Ukraine as well as long-term strategic gains in the Balkans: emigration would rekindle the Petrine tradition of support for the Balkan Orthodox and “might in time bear exceptionally good fruit.”’\(^9\)

A set of documents of a different nature and finality, which testifies to the same view of the autochthonous population as unreliable, are the official reports dispatched by General Moritz Graf von Lacy and the counsellor of the Hofkommission, Anton Koczian, to the Habsburg central authorities and occasioned by the setting up of the Military Border in south-eastern Banat starting from 1768. In a letter to the Emperor dated 26 October 1768, General Lacy expounds on the necessity of reinforcing the Banat border, points to the inadequacy of its defence system, and depicts the land and its inhabitants.

‘The border along Turkish Wallachia stretches from the village of Marga, or the dividing line between Transylvania and the Banat, to Orsova, or the Danube, for 14 ½ miles, and is, at the moment, guarded only by the local militia Captain Peter Vanza and his 27 so-called Plajashi, who are subordinated to the Banat Administration.’\(^10\)

‘s small barracks for infantry and cavalry have been set up in the small market towns of Caransebes and Mehadia, lying further back, to which have been moved a company of the Garrison Regiment and a squadron of De Ville cuirassiers, in Caransebes, and 134 soldiers of the said Garrison Regiment, in Mehadia. However, these German infantry and cavalry are by no means useful for guarding that mountain border with Wallachia, so that they were not transferred there, but

\(^{9}\) ‘Die Gränze längst der Türkischen Wallachey erstrecket sich von dem Dorf Marga, oder der Siebenbürgisch-Banatischen Gränitz-Scheidung bis gegen Orsova, oder die Donau auf 14 ½ Meilen, und ist derzeit lediglich dem unter der Landes-Administration stehenden Land-Miliz Capitain Peter Vanza und denen ihmene untergebenen 27 sogenannte Plajaschen anvertrauet’.
instead those in Mehadia were sent to the Danube Cordon and those in Caransebes [are] without service and use; consequently, the mountain border is exposed to secret crossings from Wallachia, attacks by thieves, smuggling of forbidden wares, actions against sanitary norms, and many more, as the villages lying immediately behind these mountains in the valley from Caransebes to Mehadia are inhabited by very few Serbs and Germans and predominantly by Wallachen, a people who in times of peace are inclined towards a community with the Turkish Wallachen and whose loyalty in times of war is very fickle.**11

On the other hand, Anton Koczian advised against the planned colonization of the region with German settlers given, primarily, the high costs of such an undertaking but also in view of the advantages of retaining the local population in place:

‘this nation would only with great reluctance forsake their birth place, the healthy air, the best of waters, the astounding number of fruit trees, which their forefathers planted, and the richly wooded mountains, and exchange all these with a region where they would find unwholesome air, foul water, and no tree or wood, where, moreover, the old Wallachen would have to go without the Sliwowitza, a drink they have been used to since they were young, because they would not live long enough to see the newly planted trees bear fruit again.

Such a change in their life circumstances would affect these people tremendously and one worries that many of them will die before their time because of the above-mentioned natural causes or will emigrate.***12

** ‘zwar in dem rückwärts liegenden Markt-Flecken Caransebes und Mehadia kleine Casernen für Infanterie, und Cavallerie errichtet, worinn man in Caransebes eine Compagnie vom Garnisons Regiment und eine Escadron von De Ville Cuirassiers, dann in Mehadia 134. Mann der besagten Garnisons-Regiments verleget stande.

Jedoch zu Bewachung dortiger Gränitz-Gebürge gegen die Wallachey ist diese Mannschaft von Teutscher Infanterie, oder Cavallerie keinerdings brauchbahr auch zu diesem Ende dahin nicht verleget worden, sondern jene zu Mehadia ist zu dem hierunter bemelten Donau Cordon gewiedmet, jene hingegen zu Caransebes ganz ohne Dienst, und Nutzen, folghar das vorliegende Gränitz-Gebürg selbst den geheimen Einschleichungen aus der Wallachey, Räuber Einfällen, Einschwärzungen Verbottener Waaren, und Sanitäts widrigen Vermischungen um so mehr exponiret, als die nächst hinter diesem Gebürg in dem Thal von Caransebes gegen Mehadia angelegte Dörfer bis auf sehr wenige Häuser von Raitzen und Teüschen mit lauter Wallachen, folgl. mit einem solchen Volek besetzt seynd, welches in Friedens-Zeiten zur Gemeinschaft mit den türkischen Wallachen geneigt, auch in Kriegs-Zeiten in seiner Treue sehr wankelmüthig ist.’ (underlining mine)

*** ‘so wird diese Nation ihre Geburt-stätte, die gesunde Luft, das beste Wasser, die erstaunliche Menge von Obstbäumen, die ihre Vorältern gepflanzt haben und die Waldreichen Gebirge nicht anders als mit der größten Empfindlichkeit verlassen und mit einer solchen Gegend verwechseln, wo
Moreover, transplantation to another region would bring little benefit to the state as the population was not skilled in agriculture but lived mostly off cattle raising and fruit.\textsuperscript{13}

For all the humanitarian concern that seems to emanate from Koczian’s report (such as the fear that the transmutation of the population might result in many of them dying), the rationale behind this exposition of reasons against colonization is, fundamentally, a mercantilist one. Although the \textit{Wallachen} were considered fickle (\textit{wankelmütig}) in their loyalty, as Lacy put it, they were, nevertheless, a hardy lot, much better suited to the climate and hardships of the region than the colonists. Their frugal life style, moreover, meant that the state would incur less expense with them than with an alien population brought from inside the Empire. Holding on to the \textit{Wallachen} of south-eastern Banat was, moreover, a way of retaining valuable taxpayers, who would otherwise, as Koczian points out, emigrate and reinforce the demographical potential of foreign powers. General Lacy’s characterization is itself a sample of pragmatic thought, concentrating on the tendencies of the population as far the Habsburg authorities were concerned. ‘A community with the Turkish \textit{Wallachen}’ signified a porous border and, therefore, the possibility of smuggling as well as the risk of demographic depletion through emigration. The \textit{wankelmütig} epithet harks back to the latest Turkish war, when the Habsburg troops had to both fight the enemy and bring to heel the local population. The Military Border in the

\textsuperscript{13} ‘Der Feldbau ist dermal ihrer geringste Beschäftigung, weil sie aus der Viehzucht und aus dem Obst ihrer größten Nutzen ziehen.’

\textsuperscript{102}
Banat was organized against this social background of a reportedly unreliable, if financially useful, autochthonous population.

Another genre of writings that contribute to creating an external image of the Wallachen in the Banat of Temeswar are the so-called Landesbeschreibungen, or descriptions of the land, commissioned by the Habsburg authorities with a view to the more effective administration of the newly acquired territory. This is the case of Jakob Ehrler’s study *Das Bannat von Ursprung bis jetzo*, published in Temeswar in 1774.14 To such official writings can be added the very fashionable epistolary travelogues, which were the product of industrious and enthusiastic literati (as in the case of the polymath Francesco Griselini and his influential historical-geographical study of the Banat15) or they could be the travel notes of nondescript Austrian authors, who were eager to see their name in print (such as the shoemaker Johann Kaspar Steube16).

As Costin Feneşan points out in the preface to the 2000 bilingual edition of Ehrler’s book, ‘the first attempts at sketching out a history of the Banat were made, with very few exceptions, by high-ranking representatives of the Habsburg bureaucracy in Temeswar.’17 An inspector with the Imperial Administration of the Banat based in Temeswar, Jakob Ehrler draws up his Landesbeschreibung with a very definite goal in mind: the work would serve as a source of information for the newly appointed Governor of the Banat, Baron Pompeo von Brigido, and function as a starting point for ‘a planned administrative reform’ of the province.18 Thus, the bulk of it consists in a painstaking description of each one of the Banat counties in terms ethnic composition of population, economic structure and land typology.
Francesco Griselini’s 1780 essay on the political and natural history of the Temeswarer Banat (Versuch einer politischen und natürlichen Geschichte des Temeswarer Banats in Briefen) follows the same pattern of Landesbeschreibung but differs from the punctilious work of the Habsburg clerk in both scope and impact. This is the work of a scholar animated by the spirit of eighteenth-century dilettantism, enthusiastic about historical relics and Latin inscriptions, living out his classical formation in a remote Habsburg province. The pragmatic element, however, is not lacking: according to Feneșan, Griselini brought his agricultural knowledge to bear on the reforms implemented by the Banat administration with a view to modernizing the culture of rice and white mulberry.\textsuperscript{19}

Although no proof has, to date, been discovered that Ehrler ever met Griselini, their works evince a number of similarities, which could be explained either by such a meeting or by the wide circulation of their common ideas at the time. The most important of these refers to the distinction both Ehrler and Griselini make between the name of the population as given by the authorities and that they themselves used: ‘In their language they call themselves Rumani, that is, Romans’, points out Ehrler. With Griselini, the same observation is more than a mere ethnographic remark and comes integrated in a historiographical discussion on the origins of the Wallachen. The Italian author devotes a section of his work to the various hypotheses put forth in Latin texts (among which that of the eighteenth-century Hungarian historian Szentiványi, who maintained that the Vlachs originated south of the Danube). Griselini refrains from siding with any of the reviewed authors and confines himself to pointing out the only piece of hard evidence in this historiographical puzzle:
‘I will not judge mere hypotheses. One thing is certain: these people never refer to themselves by this name [i.e. Vlach]. They call themselves rumunj or rumanesch, that is to say, romuli or Romans, and their language is proof enough of their Roman origin.’

The discrepancy between the in-group and out-group names given to the community surfaces in Ehrler’s work in similar terms:

‘The Wallachen form the majority of the population. In their own language they call themselves Rumani, that is Romans, and they are truly the remains of the already mentioned colony transferred here by Emperor Ulpius Traianus. Their language has the greatest similarity to Latin, just as their clothes, customs, and food resemble the ancient Roman ones.’

Both Ehrler and Griselini mention the Roman past of the province, the latter, in particular, taking a passionate interest in the archaeological traces of the Roman legions, which were beginning to be unearthed across the Banat starting from the middle of the eighteenth century. I shall dwell on this topic at more length in Chapter Six.

Another important aspect of these two works is their reception and circulation. In this respect, they are paradoxically different and yet similar. The similarity lies in their capacity for influencing public opinion. Both writings had an impact on their contemporaries. The difference lies in the manner in which this impact was achieved. The more successful of the two was indisputably Griselini, whose book ran into several editions (two of which were in German) and who,

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* ‘Ich will unter Muthmassungen nicht entscheiden. Soviel ist gewis, daß die Nation selbst sich nie diesen Namen giebt; sie nennen sich Rumunj oder Rumagnesch, d.h. Romuli oder Romani, und beweisen es genug durch ihre Sprache das sie römischer Abkunft sind.’

following his being received at the Court by Empress Maria Theresa herself, was to dedicate the Italian edition to her.\textsuperscript{22} One can speculate that part of the success of the book was due to the topicality of the Banat in Viennese imperial affairs, given that between 1778 and 1779 the civil part of the province was retroceded to Hungary, the Empress, thus, making good on a promise made at the 1741 \textit{Landtag}.\textsuperscript{23}

Ehrler’s ideas, on the other hand, gained currency in a less flamboyant way. As mentioned above, his work was from the very beginning to have an impact on administrative policies as it provided a necessary survey of the province. Apart from this, according to Feneşan, Ehrler published anonymously sections of his work in the local periodical \textit{Temeswarer Nachrichten}. The fragment Feneşan discovered to be identical was the one concerning the Roman conquest of Dacia and referring to a Latin inscription to be found in Caransebes.

I am making a point of highlighting the circulation/reception of these works and their implicit impact because this constitutes their main element of novelty. The information they bring before the reader and, in particular, the clear distinction between \textit{Wallachen}, the name given to the community, and \textit{Rumani}, the name actually used by the community in reference to itself, as well as the Roman descent of this population, were by no means new at the time and, as Hurdubeţiu points out, had been a leitmotif of Western scholarship for several centuries. Thus, a certain Giovanandrea Gromo, who had served in the army of John Sigismund Zápolya and had come into contact with Transylvanian \textit{Wallachen}, wrote about his experiences sometime around 1564-1565 in the following terms: ‘They claim to be descendants of the Roman colony […] so that even to this day they speak a language similar to
The Transylvanian Saxon historiographer Johannes Lebel argued in his 1559 book ‘De opido Thalmus’ that the fact that the Transylvanian Wallachen called themselves ‘romuini’ was proof enough of their awareness of their Roman descent. Taking his cue from Antonio Bonfini, Leonhard Uncius, the Court poet of King Stephen Báthory, emphasized the Wallach origin of the Corvinus family and the Roman and Dacian descent of the Wallachen. The Magyarized Transylvanian Saxon Kaspar Helth (Heltai Gáspár) opted in his 1575 Magyar Krónika for the name Románusok instead of Oláhok, pointing out that the former was the one the community itself used.

The difference between these scholarly documents and the Habsburg land descriptions lies in their impact, the former having a relatively confined sphere of circulation and, thus, little bearing on official policies, while the latter enjoyed broad circulation deriving from their administrative function.

Another contemporary testimony of the socio-ethnographic realities of the late-eighteenth-century Banat is provided by an author very different in social and professional background from both Ehrler and Griselini: Johann Kaspar Steube. According to Feneşan, who in turn takes his information from the prefacer of the modern German edition of Steube’s work Wanderschaften und Schicksale (1791), the author was a butcher’s son, born in Gotha (Saxony), who became a shoemaker apprentice and then a Corporal in the guard regiment serving the Queen of Sweden. He moved from place to place, defected, worked on a Dutch ship, ended up in India, then returned to Europe and Italy, got enlisted in the Habsburg Ried Regiment in Cremona. He sought a cure for his gout at the Baths of Mehadia, where he had asked

\[\text{‘Fanno professione d’essere discesi da colonia Romana […] così ancora usano lingua assomigliante all’antica Romana.’}\]
to be transferred. It is in this context that he became familiar with the population and customs of the Banat.

Two are the points I would like to dwell on in this brief review of his work. One refers to the Roman origin of the Wallachen in the Banat, an observation which had by then become a cliché of descriptions of the region and which shows not only empirical evidence but also a certain amount of intertextual contamination (the influence of works such as Griselini’s on subsequent travel accounts cannot be gainsaid):

‘The inhabitants of the whole of Banat are very mixed, Wallachen, Raitzen, Neubanater [Roma], Germans, Italians, and French. Even the Spaniards have built a village which they have named Neu-Biscaja. The Wallachen are by far [ohne Vergleichung] the most numerous. They are the descendants of the Roman colonists settled in the Banat during Trajan’s rule. This is proved by their Slav name of Wallachen, which means Italian, as well as by the name they call themselves by, that of Rumugni and Rumugneski.’

The second, more important, point made by Steube, offering an insight into the community’s perception of chronology and their way of relating themselves to past events, is the manner in which the individuals inferred their own age by reference to a series of episodes in the collective memory of the community:

‘As their priests keep no birth records, the Wallachen never know how old they are. Therefore, if one asks an elderly Wallach how old he is, he will answer as follows: I was already a boy driving the cattle when the Turks were still masters of Temesvár, or, when they were digging the Canal, I was old enough to get married.’

The same remark is to be found in Ehrler’s book under the title of Banat curiosities (Banatische Merkwürdigkeiten):
‘The nationalist cannot tell you how old he is. He approximates his age starting either from the time when Prince Eugene entered the country or when this or that battle took place or even when Temeswar or Belgrade were conquered and lost again.’

As concerns religion, Steube depicts an image which was to circulate widely in official reports as well as travelogues, that of a population staunch in their devotion to the old faith and deeply superstitious:

‘As to religion, the Wallachen are Christians and follow the Greek liturgy. There are among them some Catholics as well as a significant number of Greek-United, but, despite the efforts made by the missionaries, the proselytes are few and number-wise they bear no comparison with the non-uniates. […] The Wallachen share the superstitions of the ordinary people in the Hungarian Kingdom, being afraid of Vampiren. Moreover, the Wallachen believe a great misfortune will befall them if a woman were to cross their path. That is why the Wallach woman never walks in front of a man, even if he happens to be a twelve- or fourteen-year boy, but will always wait until she can walk behind him.’

The works presented so far fall into the category of informative studies, aimed at either acquainting the authorities with the state of affairs in the land (the case of Ehrler) or regaling and, at the same time, informing the learned public (Grisellini and Steube). Their role in shaping official perceptions of the autochthonous population in the Banat can be assessed judging by their function or, alternatively, by the number of editions they ran into. Relevant for this imagological analysis are also the travel notes occasioned by the Hofreisen, or imperial visits, to the Banat as well as the contemporary accounts of these journeys. In the latter half of the eighteenth century Joseph II made five such journeys to the Banat driven by the same peripatetic fervour which, according to B.A. Riedesel, the Prussian minister in

*‘Zudeme weiß nicht einmal der Nationalist erst anzugeben wie alt er ist. Die Bestimmung seines Alters fängt entweder von da an, da der Prinz Eugen ins Land gekommen, entweder sie diese or jene Bataille ware oder gar wie Temeswar oder Belgrad eingenommen und wieder übergeben worden.’
Vienna, had become a standing joke with Joseph’s enemies, who derisively pointed out that the Emperor governed his state out of a stagecoach. Mitrofanov lists these journeys among the most powerful cultural influences on the Habsburg Monarch:

‘Joseph’s various journeys had a great influence on him. They were his favourite pastime and seldom did a year go by without him either visiting one of his remote provinces or going abroad.’

The first of these four visits was undertaken in 1768 while Joseph was still a co-regent and his impressions of the Banat were searing in their criticism, the young Emperor depicting ‘un villain tableau des administrations et des places qui y existent.’ According to Dan and Feneşan, a second trip followed soon after (in 1770), about which little is known:

‘it seems that, being dissatisfied with the slow progress of the changes ordered on his first journey, the Emperor insisted on returning to the Banat without any warning so as to get objective information and to be able to take the necessary measures to put things right.’

The third imperial journey resulted in an extensive journal, entitled ‘Journal der Reise Seiner Majestät des Kaisers durch Ungarn, Bannat, Siebenbürgen und Marmaross im Jahre 1773’. In the Banat, the Emperor was interested in the state of the troops and the progress they made, or failed to make, since his last visit, as well as in the administrative and the economic problems of the place. In Mehadia, he talked via Dolmetscher (interpreter) to the frontiersmen of the newly established wallachisches battalion under the command of Colonel Papilla. The latter’s report to

‘Großen Einfluß übten auf Joseph die vielfachen Reisen aus, die er unternahm; sie waren sein lieber Zeitvertreib und selten verging ein Jahr, ohne das er entweder eine seiner entlegenen Provinzen oder das Ausland besucht hätte.’

‘Se pare că, nemulțumiți de evoluția lentă a transformărilor ordonate cu ocazia primei vizite, împăratul a ținut să revină înopinat în Banat, spre a se informa cât mai obiectiv și a putea elabora măsurile de îndreptare a situației.’
Joseph II bears the imprint of the negative view of the Wallachen that predominated at the time: ‘One should not be too lenient with the Wallachen, but should be permanently strict to them, otherwise they get out of hand.’

In Cronica Banatului (1825-1827), Nicolae Stoica de Hațeg, who, according to his own testimony, acted as interpreter for Joseph II in 1773 (for more information, see the capsule biography in the Appendix section), provides a more detailed account of the Emperor’s visit to the Banat. He recounts the encounter between Joseph II and the intractable population of the Almăj Valley in southern Banat (the new Border segment was added starting from 1774). The people are shown as being adamant against militarization. The already militarized villages, on the other hand, enjoyed the boon of imperial favour and secured from the Emperor the promise of bigger plots of land and better weaponry. But the militarization of the region seems to have been no guarantee of docile behaviour on the part of the Border inhabitants: having heard that the Emperor was about to come, the people from a number of villages fled to the woods. According to Stoica de Hațeg, this circumstance sparked off an exchange between the Emperor’s companions (General Lacy and Lieutenant Schlegel), which corroborates the assumptions put forth in the already quoted reports sent by Lacy and Koczian to the central imperial authorities:

‘Seeing that the Emperor was displeased, Lacy said to him: “Your Imperial Majesty, this unfaithful people should be removed from the country or entirely rooted out and in their stead should be brought faithful Christians, […] good workers, accustomed to the mountains.” […] Upon which, Lieutenant Schlegel, in his capacity as Papilla’s head engineer, said to Lacy: “Your Excellency has uttered divine truth that the people from Styria, Tirol, and Kraina work in the mountains and are accustomed to them; but in order to bring them here, one has to build them houses and give them utensils, cattle, and wagons. And, since they are used to eating well and sleeping on

*** ‘Mit den Wallachen müsse man überhaupt nicht sehr gut seyen, und ihnen beständigen Ernst zeigen, ansonsten sie einem über den Kopf gleich die Hand gewinnen.’
soft pillows, one will have to build strong houses for them up in the mountains, make them straw beds, and give them all sorts of victuals. [...] Whereas these past two years I have seen what these poor and simple Romanians take with them when stationed on the cordon: whether summer or winter, they have the same thing, maize flour bound up in a sheep’s stomach. [...] And for sleeping, they have no cover but their woollen cap and in the winter they sleep outside by the fire.”

The reviewed testimonies show that, depending on the writer and his degree of acquaintance with the land and people, the Wallachen were perceived as volatile and prone to fleeing, and, as such, to be replaced by other, more reliable inhabitants of the Empire, or, conversely, as a highly useful lot, whose rudimentary, undemanding life style outweighed their lack of staunch allegiance, in that the Aerarium (the Treasury) would incur fewer expenses than those involved in the colonization of the region.

4.2. The Illyrians

Before embarking on an explanation of the significance of the words Illyrian and Illyrian nation within the framework of the Habsburg Empire, I shall proceed to examine the concept by briefly pointing out the various meanings attached to it across time and disciplines. Ancient history and classical studies use the term Illyria and Illyrians to describe the region lying east of the Adriatic and its Indo-European population. Under the Romans the fluid territory of the Illyrian kingdom acquired stable borders and was known as Illyricum starting from the second century.
As the Oxford English Dictionary points out, the literary use of the term Illyrian is derived from this initial ancient history sense and as such designates entities ‘pertaining to the regions lying along the East Coast of the Adriatic.’ A more specialised usage is offered by linguistics, where Illyrian refers to ‘the group of ancient dialects represented by modern Albanian’ as well as to ‘a division of the eastern branch of the Slavonic languages’ (hence the distinction between Russian, Bulgarian, and Illyrian).

The semantic metamorphosis of the term, which came to designate different political entities at different points in time, has already been highlighted by various authors. Thus, in the mid nineteenth century, Hippolyte Desprez counts at least three Illyrias: the ancient Roman province, ‘a French Illyria, which had been planned by Napoleon since the Treaty of Campio Formio’, and, finally, ‘an Illyria that has no official existence, imagined by patriots with a view to uniting in one single moral entity the populations of Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria.’ The last part of Desprez’s triptych makes reference to the Illyrian Movement of the 1830s and 1840s, the school of thought advocating South Slav unity, whose main promoter was the Croatian scholar Ljudevit Gaj.

At the beginning of the twentieth century an Italian author, Mateo Giulio Bartoli, offered a more rigorous explanation of the Illyrian avatars. The perspective is comprehensive and takes into account the official historical usage of the term:

‘Very different spatial and temporal borders were ascribed to the concept of Illyria as the name of a state or a province: the ancient Illyrian Kingdom, then, during
Roman times, the province, the tax district, and the prefecture Illyricum, and finally the Napoleonic Provinces illyriennes and the Austrian Kingdom of Illyria.∗

As Bartoli goes on to point out, after the Roman institutionalization of the name, during the Middle Ages it gradually fell into oblivion dwindling to a mere literary reference circulated in ecclesiastical writings. After a hiatus of several centuries, the term acquired once again political meaning under Napoleon against a background of neoclassicist flurry.48 One last political entity bearing the name of Illyria, which the previous author had failed to take into account, was the short-lived Kingdom of Illyria, which came into being within the Habsburg Monarchy in the first half of the nineteenth century: ‘Austria then took over the Napoleonic designation and changed its borders so that its Kingdom of Illyria (1816-1848) was comprised of the latter two, and least Illyrian, provinces.’49

Of particular relevance for the semantic evolution of the word Illyrian is a mid-seventeenth-century papal document which clarifies the term in an attempt to stem the flow of contention surrounding a fifteenth-century donation. Around 1453 the hospice of Saint Hieronymus in Rome was founded on the basis of a papal donation (wurde gestiftet) with a view to taking care of ‘pauperum heremitarum Dalmatiae seu Illiricae nationis’. According to Bartoli,

‘after repeated disputes over the interpretation of the name “Illiricae”, the Sancta Rota of 24 April 1656 issued the definitive judgment that as provinces of the Illyrian nation were and are to be understood Dalmatia or Illyricum, of which Croatia, Bosnia and Slavonia are a part, wholly excluded are Carinthia, Styria and Carniola,

∗ ‘Recht verschiedene örtliche und zeitliche Grenzen werden dem Begriffe Illyrien als Namen eines Staats- oder eines Provinzial-verbandes zugeschrieben: die alten illyrischen Reiche, dann, in römischer Zeit, die Provinz, der Steuerbezirk und die Prefektur Illyricum, endlich die napoleonischen Provinces illyriennes und das österreichische Königreich Illyrien.’
and only [people] originating in the said four regions, Dalmatia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Slavonia can be admitted**

When considered from the perspective of Habsburg history, the above-mentioned accounts evince one major blind spot: in between the Roman and the Napoleonic times the term Illyrian resurfaced once again as a political designation, this time referring to the Orthodox immigrants from Turkish lands within the Habsburg Empire. This usage was, as we shall see further on, different from the ancient historical, classicist one preserved by humanistic writings and almost disjunctive with the seventeenth-century ecclesiastical acceptation as highlighted by Bartoli.

I am, thus, making a distinction between, on the one hand, the ancient historical meaning of Illyrian(s), which will have been a familiar enough name in cultured circles given its close association with Roman history (and, derived from this, the loose learned usage of the same term in reference to regions and peoples east of the Adriatic) and, on the other hand, the politicized or politically specific meaning of Illyrian as it surfaced within the Habsburg Monarchy during the eighteenth century. It is the latter meaning of this polysemous term that will form the object of my analysis in what follows and against which the name Wallachen will be measured.

But who were the Habsburg Illyrians? The following brief historical outline will seek to clarify this notion. On 6 April 1690 Emperor Leopold I issued the so-called Invitatorium addressed to the Patriarch of the Serbs Arsenije Ćronjević.51 This episode, together with the Great Serb Migration of later the same year, has been

** ‘nach wiederholten Streitigkeiten bei der Interpretirung des Namens “Illiricae” gab die Sancta Rota am 24. April 1656 “definitiuam sententiam […] Provinciam nationis Illiricae fuisse et esse ac intelligi debere Dalmatiam siue Illyricum, cuius partes sunt Croatia, Bosnia et Slauonia, exclusis penitus Carinthia, Styria et Carniola et oriundos ex dictis quatuor regionibus, Dalmatiae, Croatiae, Bosnieae et Slauoniae tantum admitti posse.’”
associated with the issuance of privileges to the Illyrian nation within the Habsburg Monarchy. This is how R.W. Seton-Watson describes the event and its aftermath:

‘On April 6, 1690, Leopold I issued a memorable proclamation to the Christian population of the Balkan Peninsula, urging them to rise against their oppressors and promising them Imperial protection, the free exercise of their religion and the privilege of electing their own voivode. As a result of these summons, the Patriarch of Ipek, Arsen Crnojević, with 36,000 Serb families migrated to Hungary and occupied the now desolate territory between the Theiss and the Danube. The imperial charters of August 21, 1690, and August 20, 1691, assured to Leopold’s new subjects their full recognition as a nation.’

However, as Noel Malcolm points out, the imperial address was not an invitation to Serbian emigration to Hungary but, quite the contrary, it specified that the people should not desert their home and hearth as well as being ‘an exhortation’ to the Patriarch to ‘rouse his people to rebel against the Turks’. The letter as such was addressed to Arsenjie the ‘Patriarch of the Rascians’, Rascian being the name which commonly designated the Serbian émigrés who had fled from Turkish territories north of the Danube and, ‘in seventeenth-century Austrian usage […] the Serbs who lived in Habsburg territory’. The privileges bestowed following the migration were, moreover, nominally assigned to the Rascians, that is, to the Serbs. The Latin text of the charter testifies to this singling out: ‘Toti denique communitati eiusdem graeci Ritus et Nationis Rascianorum’. The promises and dispensations enshrined in the Leopoldian charters were generous, but only to a very small extent were they to be applied.

Although these imperial privileges did not at any point use the name Illyrian, either as a synonym for Rascian or as an umbrella term for the Orthodox people, they did, nevertheless, constitute the legal matrix for a new political nation in the Habsburg Empire, the so-called Illyrian nation, which, by the middle of the
eighteenth century, had come to designate the ethnically heterogeneous Orthodox inhabitants of the Empire. Thus, according to Johann Christoph von Bartenstein (1689-1767), Vice-Chancellor under Maria Theresa and President of the *Illyrische Hofdeputation* (the Illyrian Aulic Council), the imperial administrative body regulating matters related to the Orthodox subjects of the Empire,

‘under the name of Illyrian nation are to be understood, according to the privileges bestowed in 1691 by the gloriously remembered Emperor Leopold I, primarily three peoples: the Rascians, the Wallachen, and the Ruthenes, who are in certain respects very different from one another, but who are all of them Greeks and for the most part non-united.’

Although it is by no means clear how the transition took place from the ‘*graeci ritus et Rascianorum Nationem*’ of the Leopoldian privileges to the *Illyrische Nation* of Theresian times, Bartenstein’s 1761 study *Kurzer Bericht von der Beschaffenheit der in k.k. Erblanden zerstreuten zahlreichen Illyrischen Nation* throws some light on the vagueness of the name Illyrian, which the author himself would be instrumental in fixing into a new political entity, as he contributed to the setting up of the Illyrian Aulic Council, whose first president he was. The importance of his study lies not so much in the effort proper of defining and clarifying the political entity of Illyrian nation, as in its finality: the book served, on the one hand, as a source of official information influencing Habsburg policy at the highest level, and, on the other hand, as a parenetic-type of writing targeted at educating the Crown Prince, whose private tutor Bartenstein was:

‘Since the relationship and the evolution of those matters concerning the said nation are thoroughly known but to a few, and the number of the souls comprised in this

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***‘Unter dem Namen der illyrischen Nation werden in den von [...] Kaiser Leopold Majestät glorwürdigsten Andenkens ihr im Jahre 1691 ertheilten Privilegien vornehmlich dreierlei Völker, als: Raizen, Wallachen und Ruthener, verstanden, die zwar in einigen Stücken sehr vom einander unterschieden, doch alle insgesamt Griechen, und meistens nicht unirt sind.’***
nation has increased in the imperial hereditary kingdoms and countries, exceeding one and a half million and nearing two million, I have, therefore, undertaken the not unnecessary task of teaching the Great Prince, who will, in his time, rule over them, and that of putting together in a systematic order numerous documents I painstakingly read through.\footnote{‘Weil aber der Zusammenhang und Verlauf dessen, was besagte Nation betrifft, nur Wenigen gründlich bekannt ist, und die Anzahl der darunter begriffenen Seelen in gesammten k.k. Erbkönigreichen und Landen so hoch angewachsen, daß sie anderthalb Millionen übersteigen und von zwei Millionen nicht viel auslassen dürfte: so habe ich keine unnütze Arbeit zu unternehmen vermeinet, wenn ich zum Unterrichte des großen Fürsten, der sie zu seiner Zeit zu beherrschjen haben wird, und theils aus den mühsm durchgegangenen vielen Schriften bewußt ist, in einer systematischen Ordnung zusammenzutragen würde.’}

Bartenstein’s study, moreover, represents the effort at regrouping on the part of the Habsburg authorities faced with Serbian discontent at the repeated infringement of their chartered privileges.\footnote{Bartenstein's study, moreover, represents the effort at regrouping on the part of the Habsburg authorities faced with Serbian discontent at the repeated infringement of their chartered privileges. Consequently, Bartenstein maps the legal precedents of the Leopoldian privileges tracing them back to the tax exemptions granted by the Hungarian kings to the Orthodox peoples who had fled from Turkish lands and sought protection in the Kingdom of Hungary. From a terminological point of view, this historical-legalistic excursus reveals the source of Bartenstein’s postulated division of the Illyrian nation into Rascians, \textit{Wallachen}, and Ruthenes. This is a triad carried over from medieval Hungarian Diet articles, as shown, for instance, by the enumeration included in the 45\textsuperscript{th} Article issued by the 1495 Diet under King Wladislaw II: ‘Quod a modo de Caetero, ab ipsis Rascianis, Rutenis, Wallachis et aliis Schismaticis, in “quibuscunque terris christianorum residentibus,” nullae penitus decimae exigantur.’} Consequently, Bartenstein maps the legal precedents of the Leopoldian privileges tracing them back to the tax exemptions granted by the Hungarian kings to the Orthodox peoples who had fled from Turkish lands and sought protection in the Kingdom of Hungary.\footnote{From a terminological point of view, this historical-legalistic excursus reveals the source of Bartenstein’s postulated division of the Illyrian nation into Rascians, \textit{Wallachen}, and Ruthenes. This is a triad carried over from medieval Hungarian Diet articles, as shown, for instance, by the enumeration included in the 45\textsuperscript{th} Article issued by the 1495 Diet under King Wladislaw II: ‘Quod a modo de Caetero, ab ipsis Rascianis, Rutenis, Wallachis et aliis Schismaticis, in “quibuscunque terris christianorum residentibus,” nullae penitus decimae exigantur.’} From a terminological point of view, this historical-legalistic excursus reveals the source of Bartenstein’s postulated division of the Illyrian nation into Rascians, \textit{Wallachen}, and Ruthenes. This is a triad carried over from medieval Hungarian Diet articles, as shown, for instance, by the enumeration included in the 45\textsuperscript{th} Article issued by the 1495 Diet under King Wladislaw II: ‘Quod a modo de Caetero, ab ipsis Rascianis, Rutenis, Wallachis et aliis Schismaticis, in “quibuscunque terris christianorum residentibus,” nullae penitus decimae exigantur.’\footnote{From a terminological point of view, this historical-legalistic excursus reveals the source of Bartenstein’s postulated division of the Illyrian nation into Rascians, \textit{Wallachen}, and Ruthenes. This is a triad carried over from medieval Hungarian Diet articles, as shown, for instance, by the enumeration included in the 45\textsuperscript{th} Article issued by the 1495 Diet under King Wladislaw II: ‘Quod a modo de Caetero, ab ipsis Rascianis, Rutenis, Wallachis et aliis Schismaticis, in “quibuscunque terris christianorum residentibus,” nullae penitus decimae exigantur.’}

Despite Bartenstein’s postulation of the Illyrian nation as comprising both the \textit{Wallachen} and the Ruthenes, in lay matters this composite nation did not exist. The setting up of the Military Border regiments in southern Banat testifies to the tendency of equating Illyrian with Serbian or Rascian. Hence the distinction between an \textit{Illyrisches} regiment (including the Serbian settlements in south-eastern Banat)
and a *Wallachisches* Battalion (covering the Mehadia-Caransebes area, which was predominantly Romanian), or, subsequent to their merger, the dual name of *Wallachisch-Illyrisches* Regiment.

Moreover, even from an ecclesiastical point of view Bartenstein’s triad of peoples was not altogether watertight. Although equally named *Wallachen*, the Orthodox population of Transylvania was not included in the Illyrian nation and, as such, did not benefit from the Illyrian privileges.63 As Bartenstein pointed out, unlike their Transylvanian counterpart, the *Wallachen* of the Temeswarer Banat were useful imperial subjects not only because they were economical (‘they need little because of their many fasts’), but also because ‘they are not burdened with any estates’, that is, not subject to the nobility.∗∗64 As for the Ruthenes in Bukovina (which, at the time when Barteinstein was writing his tract, was not part of the Empire), the Illyrian Privileges were never extended to include them.65

Given the apparently fuzzy boundaries of the word nation in this context, a clear distinction should be made between its modern and the pre-modern meaning. In this case *nation* is used in its pre-modern, legalistic sense, as a set of rights and privileges and the beneficiaries thereof. The so-called *natio hungarica* or the Polish nation of early modern times had the same limited meaning of membership to a set of privileges which had nothing to do with ethnic boundaries.66 That this is also the case with the Illyrian nation is shown by the attempts made by the Transylvanian Orthodox, in reaction to the Union, to subordinate themselves to the Metropolitan of Karlowitz and, thus, to partake of the Illyrian privileges.67 This goes to show that the

\*\* ‘hauptsächlich aus zwei Ursachen, nämlich, weil sie eines Theils von wegen der vielen Fasten sehr wenig brauchen, und es andern Theils bei ihnen auf Behandlung der Stände nicht ankommt, der Landesfürst von ihnen, wenn sie Deutschen untergeben werden, und sich ihre Gowohnheiten einigermaßen gefügt wird, größern Nutzen, als von andern Unterthanen, zu ziehen vermag.’
Illyrian nation as conceived of within the framework of the Habsburg Empire referred to a collection of primarily religious privileges (the political stipulations of the Leopoldine charters were, as mentioned above, never put into effect) bestowed on the Serbs and extended to all the other Orthodox communities of the Empire (bar the Transylvanian Orthodox), who were hierarchically subordinate to the Metropolitan See of Karlowitz. As Prodan points out,

‘the decree of December 18, 1703, issued by Leopold I, recognized the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Arsenie Cernoievici per Hungarium, Dalmatiam, Liccam, Corbaviam, Transylvaniam, aliasque finitimas Partes et Provincias Nostras’. [...] On August 25, 1735, Vichentie Ioanovici called himself archbishop and metropolitan of “all the Christian people, under the aegis of the all-enlightened and unconquerable Roman Emperor”.69

Under these circumstances, Keith Hitchins’s formulation comes across as the most apposite description of the nature of the Illyrian privileges: ‘In the Habsburg Empire the Serbian Church was granted extensive privileges by Leopold I in 1691.’70 Thus, it was not so much the ‘nation’, as we understand it nowadays, as the Church that received these privileges.

In secular matters, however, the term Illyrian was unambiguously used to refer to the Serbs of the Habsburg Empire as opposed to other ethnic groups. Ecclesiastically speaking, Serbs, Wallachen, and Ruthenes were all Illyrians, that is, subject to the Serbian religious hierarchy and in this capacity entitled to the Illyrian privileges. As laymen, they remained ethnically distinct.
4.3. The Romanians

In the Habsburg Monarchy the substitution of the name *Wallach* by that of Romanian has its roots in the early-eighteenth-century Uniate terminological innovations. The need to dissociate the Transylvanian Uniate population from those who continued to adhere to Orthodoxy led to the introduction, for clarifying purposes, of the phrase ‘Romano-Valachus’. This double name was resorted to, as Keith Hitchins points out, so as to individualize the Uniates among, on the one hand, the other nations of Transylvania, and, on the other hand, the pool of Oriental Orthodoxy. However, this dissociation gradually acquired ethnic connotations in the sense that the religious group it thus demarcated was seen to be coterminous with the ethnic community:

‘Uniate intellectuals looked upon their church as a Romanian national institution [...] and upon the union of the church as a reaffirmation of their Roman origins.’

What started out as a conjunction of two elements (Romano-, as in the Roman Catholic Church, and Valachus, the name of the Orthodox population in Transylvania), gradually transformed into a disjunctive phrase in the philological and historical works of the Transylvanian Uniate scholars, with the first element accruing an increasingly more patent association with the origins of the population rather than their ecclesiastical affiliation. The titles of Samuil Micu’s books best illustrate this tendency of sidelining and, eventually, shedding the term ‘valachus’ and retaining only the first part of the initial Uniate tandem: *Historia daco-romanorum sive valachorum, Elementa linguae Daco-Romanae sive Valachicae* (1780). Moreover, the growing number of translations into Romanian did away with the alien and, within a Transylvanian context in particular, negatively connotated term Valachus and gave currency to the in-group name.
In the Banat the educational reforms of the latter half of the eighteenth century had a similar effect of giving the name rumân a quasi-official status in the sense of an appellation used in reference to the language of the population which constituted the target of textbooks and teaching material translated into Romanian. Thus, as early as 1769, a Romanian primer with Latin characters was published in Vienna under the title *Bucoavna pentru deprinderea pruncilor la cetanie în limba rumânească cu slovele ceale bătrâne rumânești* (Alphabet book for accustoming children to read in Romanian with the old Romanian letters)\(^7\) as part of an eventually abortive undertaking by Daniel Lazarini, a jurist in Temesvár, who was commissioned by the Imperial Court to draw up ‘an ABC *cum* reader for the Orthodox children.’\(^7\) This initial project was followed by other more successful ones, which resulted, after 1790, in a flurry of Romanian translations of primarily church books but also ‘books of fables, manuals of craftsmanship and agriculture, and elementary schoolbooks and grammars.’\(^7\) By 1831 Constantîn Diaconovici-Loga, the director of the national schools in the Banat Military Border, was publishing a religious translation entitled *Viața Domnului nostru Iisus Hristos Mantuitorului lumii: Pentru indreptarea cresterii Tinerilor catra faptele ceale bune si ale Crestinatâtii*, using throughout the name roman and the corresponding adjective romanesc without any further clarification of the type employed by the Transylvanian Uniate writers from the previous generation (i.e. the above-mentioned explanatory disjunction). In the educational sphere, where translations formed the essential scaffolding of the tuition process, the in-group name had, thus, become institutionalized. In all other matters, administrative, military and legal, the term Wallach/-en was still in use.
In addition to this and following the Transylvanian Uniate model, a series of philological and historical writings by Banat authors began to appear starting from the end of the eighteenth century, such as Paul Iorgovici’s *Observații de limbă rumânească* (1799), Nicolae Stoica de Hațeg’s *Cronica Banatului* (1825-27), Damaschin Bojincă’s *Anticile românilor* (1832-33), and Eftimie Murgu’s polemical, historical and linguistic, tracts, to mention just some of the more memorable publications. These, too, added to the budding literature in Romanian and imparted further prominence to the term Romanian at the expense of the centuries-old *Wallach*.

It was not until 1848 that the process of name shunting, which had already been under way for half a century, was officially sanctioned in domains other than the cultural-educational, that is to say, the in-group name began to percolate official discourse outside the autochthonous sphere of cultural politics. Within a military context, the initiative came from the Transylvanian Border Regiments and was propagated to the Banat as confirmed by an 1848 report from the General Command in Temesvár to the Imperial War Council in Vienna:

‘The General Command in Temesvár reports to the Imperial War Council that, as the Romanian Border Regiments in Transylvania introduced in their correspondence the name of Romanian, instead of *Wallachen*, Banat Border Regiment – the Command has accepted for the Border Regiment No. 13 the name of Romanian Banat Border Regiment and hereby asks for the superior sanction of the War Council.’

*** ‘Comandamentul general Timișoara raportează Consiliului de Război Aulic că regimentele de grăniceri români din Transilvania introducând în corespondența lor denumirea de Regiment de Graniță român-bănățean în loc de valaho-bănățean – Comandamentul a acceptat pentru Regimentul de Graniță Nr. 13 denumirea de Regiment de Graniță român-bănățean și cere aprobarea superioară a Consiliului de Război.’
Approval was soon given so that, after a syncope of one year caused by the turmoils of 1848-49, the *K.K. Militär Schematismus*, the annual roll of the Habsburg army, lists for the year 1850 a *Romanen-Banater Grenz Infanterie Regiment* together with the corresponding *Romanen Siebenbürgische Militär Gränz Infanterie Regimenten*.

On a religious level, the gradual assertion of the name Romanian corresponds to a movement of dissociation of the emergent Banat intelligentsia from the Illyrian block, that is, from Serbian ecclesiastical hegemony. Habsburg educational reforms led to a nationalization of tuition in the sense of the introduction of national languages in schools. The process reverberated in the religious sphere, where it gave rise to demands that Old Church Slavonic should be replaced with the vernacular in religious service and that the Romanian Orthodox population should, moreover, be subordinated to a Romanian ecclesiastical hierarchy.

Fledgling claims to national recognition were often framed in reaction to Serbian religious domination and in this respect George Bariţiu’s remark in *Parţii alese din istoria Transilvaniei* can be seen as indicative of the animosity towards Serbian hegemony that reigned among a number of Romanian intellectuals in the Habsburg Monarchy:

‘the most cruel and burdensome slavery over the Romanian inhabitants of the Banat counties is owing to Serbian dominance, as was acknowledged and stated by Joseph II himself.’

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*‘ca sclavia spirituala cea mai cruda si mai apasatore din toate domnise preste romanii locuitori in comitatele Banatului din causa predominiei serbesci, dupa cum recunoscuse si enuntase insusi Iosif II.’*
Eftimie Murgu, one of the leading Romanian intellectuals of the Banat and an active, if controversial, actor in the 1848-1849 events, was himself an advocate of Romanian emancipation from Serbian hegemony.

However, the anti-Serbian reaction was by no means generalized and, therefore, the nineteenth-century claims for national recognition (I am using *national* in the strict Habsburg sense of a ethnic minority endowed with certain cultural and political rights) on the part of the Banat Romanians should be conceived of, rather, as both a result of, and a reaction to, Serbian religious preeminence. It was under the protective umbrella of the Illyrian privileges that educational reforms, which would give an important boost to culture in the vernacular, were implemented so as to include the Romanian population of the Banat and it was in response to the newly perceived Serbian religious dominance that the budding Romanian religious and cultural life was to further develop. The long-term consequence of this process was that, with ever-growing national self-awareness on both sides, the Serbs and the Romanians of the Banat were to part ways as the nineteenth century wore on. One by one the labels used in reference to the population of the Banat (*Wallachen*, in secular matters, and *Illyrians*, in religious) were gradually superseded by the in-group name of Romanian. The affirmation of this term corresponded to a change of cultural and political status of the community within the framework of the Habsburg Empire and created the premiss for new developments and further claims.
For an in-depth analysis of the works of Italian Renaissance humanists and their sources see also Şerban Papacostea’s article ‘Les roumains et la conscience de leur romanité au Moyen Âge’ in Revue Romain d’Histoire, 1965, 1, Tome IV, pp. 15-24.

2 Hurdubeţiu, Die Deutschen über die Herkunft der Rumänien, p. 24.

3 Ibid., p. 25.

4 Ibid., p. 25.

5 David Prodan, Supplex libellus valachorum or The Political Struggle of the Romanians in Transylvania during the eighteenth Century, Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Bucharest 1971, p. 98.

6 Ibid., p. 102: ‘The Diet of 1667 decided that if the flesh of some stolen cattle is found on the precincts of some village and it is not clear who is to pay for it, it is the Romanian inhabitants of the village who should indemnify the loser, as robbery and thieving are widely spread among them.’

7 Public Records Office (The National Archives), London, SP 97/28, f.71-74 – henceforth PRO.


10 OeStA, KA, Hofkriegsrath, 1769, 45-31, folio 0003, recto. The full translation into Romanian is to be found in Trinţu Măran, Documente din istoria graniţei militare băneţene, Vol. II, Necesitatea amenajării graniţei militare băneţene. Începuturile regimentului de graniţă românesc, Viena, 1995, pp. 72-82.

11 OeStA, KA, Hofkriegsrath, 1769, 45-31, folio 0003/ verso, 0004/ recto.

12 OeStA, KA, Hofkriegsrath, 1770, 39-21, folio 34/ recto and verso.


17 Costin Feneșan’s Preface to Ehrler, Banatul de la origini până acum (1774), p. 12.

18 Ibid., pp. 15, 26.


21 Ehrler, Banatul de la origini până acum (1774), p. 179.

22 Feneșan, ‘Introduction’ to Francesco Griselini, Încercare de istorie politică și naturală a Banatului Timișoarei, p. 11.

23 For more details, see Marlen Negrescu’s ‘Quellenberichte über die Anexion des Banats durch die Ungarische Krone (1778-1779)” in Das Banat im 18 Jhr., Tipografia Universităţii de Vest din Timișoara, Timișoara, 1996, pp. 103-109.

24 Hurdubeţiu, Die Deutschen über die Herkunft der Rumänen, p. 27.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., p. 28.

27 Ibid.

28 Feneșan’s Preface to Johann Kaspar Steube, Nouă ani în Banat (1772-1781), Editura de Vest, Timișoara, pp. 8-9.

29 Steube, Nouă ani în Banat (1772-1781), p. 90.

30 Ibid., p. 94.

31 See Alex Drace-Francis’s quoted article for an explanation of the meaning of ‘nationalist’ in the Banat.

32 Ehrler, Banatul de la origini până acum (1774), p. 256.

33 Steube, Nouă ani în Banat (1772-1781), pp. 97, 106.
36 Ibid.
38 Dan and Feneșan, ‘Informații privind pregătirea celei de-a treia călătorii a lui Iosif II în Banat’, p. 261.
40 Nicolae Stoica de Hațeg, Cronica Banatului, pp. 196-197.
41 Ibid., p. 197.
42 Ibid., pp. 198-199.
47 Bartoli, Einleitung und Ethnographie Illyriens, p. 115.
48 Ibid., p. 118.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., p. 123.
53 Malcolm, Kosovo. A Short History, p. 159.
54 See Malcolm’s short historical account of the semantics of the term Rascian: ‘Deriving originally from the medieval territory of Rascia (Raśka), the early heartland of the Serb state, it had been largely superseded by the word “Serb” within the Serb lands themselves, and was more widely used by outsiders. […] Although some writers tried to maintain a geographical distinction between “Serbia” and “Rasia”, any distinction between the people bearing those names became very blurred.’ Malcolm, ibid., p.145.
56 Ibid., footnote 55: ‘(a) Liceatque vobis inter vos ex propria facultate ex natione et lingua Rasciana constitutere Archiepiscopum. (b) Promittimus vobis eligendi Vajvodae libertatem. (c) Volumos ut sub directione et dispositione proprii magistratus eadem gens Rasciana perseverare et antiquis privilegiis, eidem a Maj. Nostra benigne concessis eiusque consuetudinibus imperturbate frui valeat’.
58 Ibid., p. 2.
59 Ibid.
60 R.W. Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question, p. 44.
61 Bartenstein, Kurzer Bericht von der Beschaffenheit der in kaiserlichen königlichen Erblanden zerstreuten zahlreichen illyrischen Nation, p. 68.
62 Ibid., p. 9.
63 Ibid., p. 103.
64 Ibid.
66 See also Keith Hitchins’s distinction between the two acceptations of the word natio circulating in parallel during the eighteenth century in Transylvania and constituting at times a bone of contention in the Hungarian Diet: ‘La dispute entre Klein et ses adversaires dans la diète sur l’emploi du terme de natio révèle deux conceptions distinctes de la nation, dont l’une essentiellement médiévale et l’autre plus proche de l’acceptation moderne. La première se rapporte […] à un groupe séparé de la masse de la population par certains privilèges. C’était une conception juridique.’ Hitchins, L’idée de nation chez les roumains de Transylvanie (1691-1849), Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1987, p. 51.
67 Prodan, Supplex libellus valachorum, p. 196.
68 Although in these texts Transylvania features within the Serbian Orthodox jurisdiction, it was never an actual part of it. The mid-eighteenth-century unrest among the Transylvanian Orthodox was defused by appointing an exempt Orthodox bishop, independent of the Serbian hierarchy (Prodan, Supplex libellus valachorum, p. 200).
69 Prodan, Supplex libellus valachorum, p. 196.
71 Ibid., p. 96.
72 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
73 Keith Hitchins traces this association back to the first Uniate scholars (Gherontie Cotorea, in particular), according to whom the Union with the Catholic Church was a natural step towards a recognition of the Roman roots of the Wallachen in Transylvania.
77 Index entry to the report of the General Command in Temesvár to be found at ANT, Fond nr.1, Nr.inv. 1313, Fond Comandamentul General Bănățean, pachet CDLXVII, Nr. 40 /1848, Noiembrie 29, Timișoara.
78 George Barțiu, Părti alese din istoria Transilvaniei pre 200 ani în urmă, Manuscript No. 983, The Academy Library, Bucharest, Romania, 1889, p. 252, recto.
Chapter 5. The Romanian Military Elite of the Banat Military Border

In the nineteenth century, amidst the conceptions and preconceptions of the social and historical background delineated in previous chapters, a Romanian military elite gradually emerged out of the Banat Military Border. The present chapter maps this process of elite formation and comprises two sections. The first focuses on the economic factors and educational system that led to the creation of such a military elite. The second part is an analysis of official records, which traces the various paths to the rank of general and examines the mechanism of promotion, dwelling on the most important skills that recommended these officers as the grey matter of the military establishment.

The set of questions to which the chapter will provide an answer are the following: what was the environment that shaped the personality and cultural and political inclinations of the young men born in the Romanian segment of the Banat Military Border who would in later years become generals in the Austro-Hungarian army? What were the reasons for taking up a military career? What were the professional trajectories leading up to the rank of general and how difficult was the system of promotion?

Terminological clarifications

For the purposes of this thesis I shall confine the concept of military elite to the Romanian officers who reached the rank of general within the Austro-Hungarian army. The notion of elite is defined here in a double sense: in reference to the
Habsburg military hierarchy, it designates the highly skilled, decorated, and, in some cases, even knighted Romanian officers promoted to important military positions as part of the Austro-Hungarian military apparatus; in relation to the Romanian community out of which these military emerged, the notion of elite refers to the educated and politically aware officers, who, on numerous occasions, became the mouthpiece of the community before the authorities and promoters of cultural and even economic reform within the selfsame community. The high-ranking Romanian officers born in the Banat Military Border were thus, at one and the same time, an elite in respect to their ethnic group as well as an elite of the imperial army, i.e. part of the Habsburg officer corps.

While by no means trying to detract from the merits of these officers, one should, however, be aware of the considerable distinction between the several types of generalcy existent in the imperial army and the hierarchical relationship holding between them. Romanian historiography on the subject uses the term general to indicate the rank of these officers without qualifying it or explaining the officer’s actual position in the chain of command. More often than not, general is employed as a laudatory term rather than in a strictly military sense. According to Michael Hochedlinger, ‘the highest rank for general officers in the Habsburg army’ was that of Field Marshal (Feldmarschall, FM). This was followed by the Feldzeugmeister (FZM), which was on a par with General der Infanterie and General der Cavallerie (GdC). The third-highest rank was that of Feldmarschalleutnant (FML). The lowest rank for general officers in the Habsburg army was that of Generalmajor (GM). Moreover, one should also be aware of the difference between effective ranks and honorary ones, the latter being devoid of actual commanding powers and responsibilities and bestowed on after retirement. To indicate this, the rank is
followed by abridgments such as *Ad hon.* (*Ad honores*) or *T.u.Ch.* (*Titel und Charakter*).

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### 5.1. Military Education and Elite Formation

As pointed out in the Introductory Chapter, the Military Border communities were administratively and economically geared towards discharging the fundamental function of the establishment, that of providing military service and securing the south-eastern confines of the Empire. The 1807 Constitution spelt out the essentially feudal character of the contract between the *Grenzer* and the Emperor:

‘All territories of the Military Border remain steadfast in their primary function of doing military service within and without the Empire. The frontiersmen are accordingly in duty bound to the Emperor and King to do military service in times of peace and during encampment, inside the country and abroad, in accordance with the high commands, and to help with the upkeep of the Border. For this reason they have land in their possession for them and their descendants to use as inheritance.’

Consequently, the main occupation of the Border inhabitants remained that of soldier-cum-farmer within the framework of the *Hauskommunion* or communal household. This ensured the subsistence of numerous families with little land as well as that of families with too much land and few work hands, in either case these functioning as a source of soldiers. According to the constitution, there were three categories of men: fit for military service, partially fit, and unfit. Not all fit men (*dienstfähig*) were recruited for military service. Some remained at home to work the land and see to the wellbeing of their family. In times of war, all men were

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*‘Toate ținuturile graniții militarești rămân nesminte în chemarea lor cea mai dinainte spre slușbetele ostășești dinlăntru și din afară. Grănicerii după chemarea acesta sunt îndatoriți Cesaro-Crăieștii Mării a face toată slușba militarească în vreme de pace și de tabără, în țară și afară de țară, după îndreptarea preaînaltelor porunci, și a ajuta întru cele de lipsă spre ținerea graniții dinlăntru. Pentru aceea, stăpânesc pământurile sale cele pre drept pentru sine și pentru următorii lor, ca o adevărată moștenire folositoare.’*
mobilized while the families providing soldiers received various tax exemptions.\textsuperscript{3} Exceptional cases aside, the Border recruitment policy was a trade-off between military imperatives and economic necessity, the two being mutually dependent and, as such, mutually sustaining.

The 1807 Constitution did allow for the practice of other professions but only to the extent that they did not impinge on the main occupation of the frontiersmen (that of tilling the land and providing military service). Engaging in crafts and commerce was possible in one’s spare time.\textsuperscript{4} When these secondary activities came to monopolize one’s entire activity, they became subject to official regimental approval and to a series of limitations:

‘Not all frontiersmen can become small merchants. The general commander consents to the opening of a new shop only by appropriate people, who possess sufficient wealth, and only in accordance with the consumers’ needs. To this end, he always secures the approval of the regimental commander’.\textsuperscript{5}

As concerns the cultural-educational aspect, the 1807 Constitution relegated this branch of activity, together with the crafts and commerce, to the sphere of ‘exceptional occupations’, which were dependent on high official approval and considered incompatible with ‘wielding the weapon and the plough’.\textsuperscript{6} This affected access to higher education, the only exceptions being made in the case of those who wished to study theology.

This state of affairs endured until 1850, when, in the wake of the social and political upheaval of 1848-1849, the old Military Border Constitution was amended. As previously mentioned, the groundbreaking alteration consisted in the transformation of the nature of landholding. What used to be usufruct property by

\textsuperscript{5} ‘Nu orice grânicer poate deveni mic comerciant. Comandantul general nu încuviințează deschiderea unei noi prăvălii decât persoanelor capabile, cu avere corespunzătoare și numai în măsura nevoilor reale ale consumatorilor. Spre acest scop, ia totdeauna și avizul comandantului de regiment.’

132
virtue of the feudal contract (land in exchange for military service) became now full and absolute land ownership and the previous servitudes in the form of labour dues to the state were abolished.

The disappearance of the service contract put an end to the strictures imposed on education and professions. This meant that the frontiersmen were from now on free to choose their career in life. Education remained, however, strongly oriented towards military formation and dominated by military schools. As Antoniu Marchescu points out,

‘public education was greatly valued under the military regime. Primary school attendance became mandatory as early as 1829, while in Hungary it was introduced only in 1869. Military education was the principal goal of the schools. They had, therefore, a pronounced military character. Each commune was entitled to a local school in the native language of its inhabitants. The local national school was followed by the trivial school in the company headquarters town, with German as the language of tuition. The best three students in the commune went on to attend the trivial school and afterwards the superior school, which trained them to become non-commissioned officers. The mathematical school, located in the regimental headquarters town, prepared officers.’

As pointed out in Chapter Two, Liviu Smeu described the official system of coercion and incentives which was in place to insure the effective running of the Banat Military Border schools. Thus, on Sundays and on holidays, teenagers under eighteen had to attend special classes for grown-ups held by the priest, who read to them imperial circulars with news from around the Empire and beyond, and then catechized them on it. School attendance and pupils’ morality were closely supervised by the regimental command. According to an order given by the Caransebes command in 1838, company commanders had to inspect the school every eight days. Smeu found documentary evidence of the existence of classes for
deaf-mutes, their first attestation going back to 1838-39. In 1848 the regimental command sent to the Bozovici company three copies of a methodology book for teaching to deaf-mutes.\textsuperscript{11}

The enthusiasm with the reformist educational system in the Military Border that comes across in Smeu’s study should not, however, go unqualified. The sources used are official documents, which, while a good index of administrative policies and of the imperial discourse of the time, cannot entirely convey the extent to which these regulations were actually put into practice or their effect on the population. The quality and accuracy of the information purveyed via school and church is itself open to debate. The author exemplifies one of his points with a piece of news about the coalition against France, which is, in fact, a justification of the war against France rather than an analysis of the international context.\textsuperscript{12}

A comparison with the situation in the Second Transylvanian Romanian Border Regiment in Năsăud shows that the strict supervision of the education process was a common feature of the Military Border school system. Additionally, extant reports on school attendance dating back to the 1850s indicate that, rather than being uniform, attendance and school performance was mixed, in the sense that complaints about the poor level of attendance in village schools coexisted with requests for admission into the Ober-schule or Gymnasium, and even with applications for admission into the Wiener-Neustadt Military Academy.\textsuperscript{13}

In what follows I shall map the progress of Romanian Banat Border generals from their earliest education to the apogee of their military career. The stress will be placed on origins, family precedent, and the institutional structures in which they were integrated.
Between the setting up of the Banat Border Regiment and the 1850 relaxation of impositions on the choice of profession, the only channel of social and economic advancement remained the military career. The occupational constrictions legislated by the 1807 Constitution resulted in a professional Hobson’s choice, which shaped the social dynamics of the Military Border in a decisive way. The almost one hundred years’ institutional pressure led to the creation of an evolutionary military family tradition among the frontiersmen, which becomes apparent in the biographical profiles of later generals as recorded in their lists of characterization (Qualifikationslisten).

My observations are based on a selection of ten such military records, having taken as a starting point for my investigation Antoniu Marchescu’s list of Romanian generals originating from the Banat Military Border. A short note of caution should be made at this point. One of the problems in identifying these military records, which are, for the most part, to be found in the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna in alphabetical order, is the Romanian spelling used by Marchescu and other Romanian authors, who more often than not alter the names in disregard of the fact that, up until 1918, official records would have employed a German or Hungarian style of spelling. In his Liste aller aus der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee hervorgegangenen Offiziere, die 1930/1931 in der rumänischen Armee noch aktiv waren, Franz Kuschniriuk draws attention to this tendency towards Romanianizing names:

‘Once included into the Romanian army yearbook, a number of names were orthographically changed. First names are, for the most part, Romanianized and
sometimes replaced by Romanian equivalents (for instance, Rudolf became Radu). It should be verified if family names have been altered as well.∗

An additional, if lesser, problem is posed by the sometimes incomplete statement of these generals’ names. Marchescu, for instance, occasionally indicates only the surname without the first name, which, in the case of very common names or relatives, can become an element of confusion.

A comparison of Marchescu’s list of generals with the Verzeichnis der Generale in the Kriegsarchiv and the actual records in the Qualifikationslisten holding shows that, of the fifteen generals mentioned by Marchescu, ten are both listed in the Verzeichnis and have military records in the Qualifikationslisten Bestand (Aron Bihoy, Trajan Bacsila, Ladislaus Cena, Nikolaus Cena, Trajan Doda, Alexander Guran, Johann Jovesko, Alexander Lupu, Theodor Seracsin, Michael Trapsia), four are merely mentioned in the Verzeichnis (Ienache Ion, Nikolaus Logoschan, Daniel Materinga, Michael Schandru), one does not figure at all in either the general index or the Qualifikationslisten (Muica), while one of the generals listed as active in the Romanian army had also been a general in the Austro-Hungarian army (Georg Domaschnian).

As can be seen in the chart under Appendix One, the great majority of the future generals were sons of officers (Offizierssohn) or of common frontiersmen (Sohn eines Grenzers). The only exceptions are Alexander Lupu, a townsman’s son, born in Lugoj, outside the Military Border proper, and Georg Domaschnian, the son of a tax official from Mehadia. All the others follow in the footsteps of their parents. An evolution within the military hierarchy is visible in these Qualifikationslisten,

∗’Bei der Aufnahme in das rumänische Armeejahrbuch sind verschiedene Namen in rumänischer Schreibweise geändert. Die Vornamen sind meistens romanisiert, wenn nicht durch rumänische Vornamen ersetzt. (Bsp.: Rudolf = Radu). Festgestellt werden muß, ob nicht auch Familiennamen romanisiert wurden.’
given that upon the setting up of the Banat Military Border the officers were initially foreigners. By comparison, this mid-nineteenth-century generation of Romanian military already had at its back a family tradition, which, as the century went on, included increasingly higher military echelons. The ten officers listed would take this progression further, ascending, by the end of the nineteenth, beginning of the twentieth century, to the first two ranks of general (Generalmajor and Feldmarschalleutnant).

The first level of education was received in the local village, where national schools functioned maintained and staffed at the expense of the local community while the infrastructure was provided by the state, as stipulated in the Military Border Constitution. Thus, article 135 of the 1807 Constitution devolved part of the robot dues to the national schools, that is, part of the community work went into ‘the renovation and mending of national schools, […] and providing them with firewood’. Given the close supervision of education, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, school attendance was higher in the Military Border than in the civil part of the province, with an important number of people being able to read and write as well as speak German.

The evolution of the local national schools (scholae vernacularae seu nationales) was closely connected with imperial policies regarding the Illyrian nation. National schools began to be systematically organized in the Banat during the governorship of Clary von Aldringen (1769-1774) at the initiative of the Illyrische Hofdeputation, the administrative body regulating matters concerning the Illyrian nation. The imperial Normal-Patent issued on 20 May 1771 included stipulations regarding primary education in the Banat and was predicated on the recognition that ‘the Illyrian nation does not have enough schools of its own, in which to learn what
they owe to God, to the Monarch, and to their fellow men.’ As a consequence, the Church and political administration should see to it that ‘the youth are not deprived of education.’

This development was synchronized with the general education reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, which materialized in a 1774 act, Allgemeine Schulordnung, applicable to German schools and the Military Border, and the Regulae directivae (1774) and Schulpatent (1776), which targeted the Illyrian schools in the civil part of the Banat. The so-called Ratio educationis totiusque rei literariae per Regnum Ungariae et Provincias eidem adnexas (1777), that is, the set of regulations concerning education in the Kingdom of Hungary and the annexed counties of Szatmár (Satu Mare), Bihar (Bihor) and Arad, would be applied to all schools in these regions and, starting from 1779, to the civil part of the Banat as well, until 1868.

As their name indicates, national schools used Romanian (Serbian, respectively, in the Serbian communities of the Banat Military Border) as the language of tuition. The subjects taught were, during the first grade, religion, reading, writing, and arithmetic, using Cyrillic primers, and during the second grade, religion, biblical history, reading out of the psalter, book of hours and primer, citizens’ duties, calligraphy, and arithmetic. This predominantly religious education was strictly Orthodox, which imparted to the school both a national and confessional character.

Eligibility to attend the next level of education, i.e. the trivial school, was dependent on good results and behaviour as well as on a good knowledge of German, which will have been acquired in the national school or, in some cases, at home. As Liviu Smeu points out, David and Trajan Doda (the latter being a future
general in the Austro-Hungarian army) will have learnt German both in school and at home as their father was an ensign (*Fähnrich*) in the Border Regiment. Trivial schools functioned in the communes and towns that constituted company headquarters, that is, at Orșova, Mehadia, and Bozovici. They consisted of three grades and all of them taught in German.

A short comparative note in regard to the use of German in school and its social impact on the Romanian population of the Banat is necessary at this point. Although this linguistic imposition might easily be termed Germanization, its rationale and impact on the population were completely different from those of subsequent Hungarian linguistic policies. Two are the main dissimilarities: the backdrop against which these respective language policies were enacted and their finality. Firstly, the Habsburg educational system in German was trailblazing and, as such, did not oust or radically alter an already existing autochthonous institutional structure. The later, Hungarian linguistic policies no longer functioned within a *tabula-rasa* territory, but sought to change an already consolidated educational system and, thus, ran against the grain of organic developments, which were by then already under way. Secondly, the Habsburg school system of German language aimed at centralization, which did not entail assimilation or the suppression of ethnic identity (hence the introduction of national schools); the late-nineteenth-, early-twentieth-century Hungarian school system aimed at cultural levelling in a context in which national identity within the Empire had developed beyond the point where it could tolerate such impositions.

In the Military Border this contrast comes across even more patently. German being the language of command and each communal family having to provide the troop with a soldier, it follows that at least one person in every family
possessed some knowledge of German. The cultural shock of studying in a foreign language was not as great as it would be for students at the beginning of the twentieth century. Military Border students were phased into the new language, while their counterparts decades later would experience the full blow of a new linguistically alien environment. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Petru Râmneanțu wrote:

‘Here [i.e. at the new school] we had to write our timetable in a new language. I couldn’t speak a word of Hungarian. Apponyi’s law of education was to be put into effect that very year. When the teacher dictated the timetable, I listened, looked on, and sighed like a neophyte overwhelmed by the mysteries of the temple.’

As pointed out by R.W. Seton-Watson, the Romanians were not the only nationality facing this problem. ‘A deliberate Government policy,’ Seton-Watson was writing in 1908, ‘deprives over two million Slovaks of all means of culture and progress, and insists that they shall either learn Magyar or nothing.’ As will be shown in Chapter Eight, the the Border generals had their own take on these policies of Magyarization.

Additionally, in the regimental headquarter towns there were capital schools in German, which ran for four years, as well as mathematical military schools, which trained non-commissioned officers (Unteroffiziere). The most important school in the Romanian segment of the Banat Military Border was the mathematical school in Caransebes. Aron Bihoy, Alexander Lupu, Johann Iovesko, and Demeter Cenna are listed as having attended it. Trajan Doda returned to Caransebes in later years as a teacher for this school.

*Aci trebuia să-mi scriu programul școlar într-o limbă nouă. Nu știam un cuvânt din limba maghiară. Legea școlară a lui Apponyi în Gai urma să fie impusă în practică abia în acel an. La dictarea orarului de către dirigintele clasei, ascultam, priveam, dar mai mult suspinam ca neofitul, copleșit de misterele templului.*
These schools represented the capillary level of the Habsburg system of military education, which followed a tripartite structure. The first level was that of Militär Unter-Erziehungshäuser (later known as Militär Unterrealschulen), which prepared students for the Militär Ober-Erziehungshäuser (Militär Oberrealschulen), followed by the Schul-Compagnien (known as Kadettenschulen from 1866), which trained non-commissioned officers or Unteroffiziere.\textsuperscript{28}

These institutions, whose names and location varied greatly during the nineteenth century, constituted a recruitment pool for the military academies, which trained officers. The Military Academy at Wiener-Neustadt furnished lieutenants to the infantry, cavalry, and riflemen units (Jäger). The Artillery Academy at Mährisch Weisskirchen prepared officers for artillery and sapper units as well as for the railways and telegraph regiments (das Eisenbahn- und Telegraphenregiment).\textsuperscript{29}

The more famous of the two, the Wiener-Neustädter Akademie or Theresianische Militär-Akademie, was founded by Maria Theresa in 1752. Joseph II’s donation letter [Stiftsbrief] of 1786 stipulated that, of the four hundred places available, three hundred and four were to be kept for

‘those officers’ sons whose fathers had served faithfully as superior officers, taking into account particularly the orphans and children of worthy parents or of parents who did military service in regions where there are no possibilities of education for their children.’\textsuperscript{30}

The institution was famed not just for its founder but also for the elite corps of officers it formed. Alan Sked depicts a picture of lavish life style (four-course dinners) redoubled by strict rules encouraging segregation from family and the outer

\footnote{‘304 Plätze “für solche Offizierssöhne vorgesehen waren, deren Väter as Oberofficiere mit Zufriedenheit ihrer Vorgesetzten gedient hatten, wobei erstatlich auf Waisen, zweitens auf Kinder von besonders verdienstlichen Eltern oder solchen, die in Ländern oder Gegenden ihre Dienstleistung verrichten, wo sie keine Gelegenheit hatten, für den Unterricht ihrer Kinder zu sorgen, Bedacht genommen wurde.”’}
world: ‘the Wiener-Neustadt pupils could not have been more restricted had they been members of an Austrian leper colony’. ³¹ Dorothea Gerard, a turn-of-the-century English writer married to an Austro-Hungarian officer, pointed out in her 1916 book *The Austrian Officer at Work and Play*: ‘Here everything was forbidden which was not specifically allowed’. ³² The pupils entered the Academy at the age of ten or eleven and graduated ten years later. ³³ The Wiener-Neustädter officer was easily recognizable in society and found it, at times, difficult to integrate. Theoretically superior to other officers, he was more often than not socially inadequate after years of secluded military tuition. ³⁴

While this may have been the case with some academy graduates, the institution proved an unexpected opportunity for professional and social advancement for pupils of lesser extraction. As Michael Hochedlinger emphasizes,

‘the Military Academy did not serve to discipline the nobility, unlike the Prussian cadet schools, but primarily provided a welcome opportunity for impecunious subaltern officers who had risen from the ranks to have their sons educated at public expense and then commissioned into some regiment, again without having to pay for it.’ ³⁵

The previously quoted Josephinian stipulation had laid the tentative foundation for, if not entirely meritocratic, at least socially broader, access to higher education. The condition for being accepted on one of the free places in the academy was that the prospective student (*Militär-Zögling*) should be the son or orphan of an officer or civil servant who could prove that he had served for at least twenty years. Remaining places were allotted to candidates who benefited from state or private grants (*Militär-Stiftling*) and to the sons of civilians who were able to pay an annual fee of 400 to 800 florins (*Zahl-Zögling*). ³⁶
As apparent in the appended chart (pp. 312-316), a third of the listed Romanian officers graduated from the *Wiener-Neustädter Akademie* (Trajan Doda, Alexander Guran, Teodor Seracsin, Trajan Bacsila, and Georg Domaschnian), while Michael Trapsia and Ladislaus Cenna were graduates of the Artillery Academy. This could be ascribed primarily to the military tradition existent in Banat *Grenzer* families (mentioned earlier on in this chapter), a tradition which felicitously dovetailed with the requirements of the military academy for non-fee-paying access.

Although the Wiener Neustadt institution was the more famous of the two military academies, it promoted military proficiency to a lesser extent than did the technical academy. As Erwin Schuster points out, the latter was a *Fachanstalt* (a special-skills institution), whose admission criteria were not social, as in the case of the former, but rather meritocratic. Eligibility on skills criteria thus ensured a socially broader number of students in the technical academy in contrast to the restrictive system of admission of the *Theresianische Militär-Akademie*, which accommodated only the sons of impoverished nobility and of imperial officers and clerks.³⁷

The technical military academy had its roots in the 1717 *Ingenieur Akademie*, which underwent several metamorphoses during the nineteenth century. In 1851 it became a *Genieakademie*, based in Klosterbruck near Znaim. 1852 saw the setting up of an Artillery Academy at Olmütz, which would be transferred to Mährisch Weißkirchen in 1858, then merged with the technical academy in 1869 and moved to Vienna. In 1904 the technical academy moved to Mödling and was divided into two sections, artillery and engineers.³⁸ It is important to map these institutional transformations in order to understand why Michael Trapsia, for instance, is listed as a graduate of the Artillery Academy in Olmütz while Demeter and Ladislaus Cenna
were equally Artillery Academy graduates but from the Mährisch Weißkirchen institution. The two different locations do not point to two different academies but rather to distinct phases in the life of the same institution.

Not all officers’ sons could enter the military academies, the number of places available being extremely small. The so-called cadet schools (Cadetenschulen), up until 1866 known as Schulcompagnien and after 1875 as Infanterieschulen, made up for this shortage. By comparison with the academies, these were less restrictive, more down-to-earth and concentrated to a greater extent on practical, rather than theoretical, subjects. By 1889 there were infantry cadet schools in Lobzow near Krakow, in Liebenau near Graz, in Budapest, Pressburg, Temesvár, Prague, in Karthaus near Brünn, in Hermannstadt, Carlstadt, Innsbruck, and Trieste. In addition to these, there functioned a cavalry cadet school in Weißkirchen (Moravia), an artillery cadet school in Vienna, and a Pionnier-Cadettenschule in Hainburg, which also trained officers for the railway and telegraph regiments.

The third level of military tuition was represented by the Kriegsschule and the higher-education artillery and engineer courses (die höhere Artillerie- und Genie-Curse), targeted at officers who had already served for three years with outstanding results. These schools of higher military education and specialization (Fort- und Fachbildungsanstalten) contributed to the erosion of the aristocratic system of promotion in the Habsburg army. They were a means of advancement along meritocratic lines and, in the case of the Kriegsschule, a ‘gateway to high command’.

‘Graduation from the Kriegsschule and completion of these courses leads to promotion to the rank of Stabsoffizier for various weapons, respectively to the same
rank in the branch of intendants, which is equivalent to regular promotion from the 9th to the 8th rank without any examination.⁴⁵

Highly skilled and professionally versatile officers were employed by the Generalstab, or General Staff, which had, by the nineteenth century, evolved into a vital military institution in charge of the strategic, tactical, and administrative organization of the army. During peace time, its officers were used in the General Staff bureaux: das Bureau für Personal- und Ökonomische Angelegenheiten (the Bureau for Personal and Economic Matters), das Bureau für operative und besondere Generalstabsarbeiten (the Bureau for Operative and special General Staff tasks), Landesbeschreibungsbureau für Evidenzhaltung fremder Heere (Land Survey Bureau for the Monitoring of Foreign Armies), das Eisenbahn- und Telegraphen Bureau (the railways and telegraph bureau). General Staff officers could also be appointed to work with higher commands and military authorities, used as military school commanders and teachers and, sometimes, as military plenipotentiaries and attachés abroad.⁴⁶ As Allmayer-Beck pointed out, the Stäbler or General Staff officers formed a special elite⁴⁷ within the elite that the officer corps was. As we shall see further on, the great majority of the Romanian officers under consideration worked for the General Staff.

5.2. Paths to generalcy

An overview of the appended personal data chart and of the more detailed lists of characterization (Qualifikationslisten) shows that there was no single path to generalcy, nor was there any one institutional solution for advancement. As

* ‘Mit der Absolvierung der Curse, beziehungsweise der Kriegsschule ist die Befähigung zur Vorrückung in die Stabsoffizierscharge der verschiedenen Waffen und in die gleiche Rangsstufe der Intendantursbeamtenbranche in der Weise erlangt, dass die seinerzeitige Beförderung aus der IX. Rangssklasse in die VIII. ohne besondere Prüfung erfolgen kann.’
previously mentioned, military family tradition in the Banat Border led to an important number of Romanian students meeting the entrance requirements for the Wiener Neustadt Academy. While the honour of being received into such a prestigious institution was undoubtedly considerable, graduation from it did not automatically guarantee celerity of promotion to the highest echelons of command.

Trajan Doda, the oldest of the generals under consideration, entered military service in 1842 as Unterlieutenant 1. Classe, having graduated from the Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt with outstanding results. The 1848 and 1850 issues of the Militär-Schematismus reveal a very rapid instance of promotion from Unterlieutenant in 1848 to Hauptmann 1. Classe in 1850. This represented wartime advancement for military merits demonstrated during 1848 in Italy and the 1848-49 battles in Transylvania and the Banat. As a consequence, Doda received the Militär Verdienst Kreuz (MVK) in 1849. Subsequent promotion proved, however, less rapid. Although at times recommended for special promotion (außertourliche Beförderung), as for instance from Hauptmann to Major, for ‘good behaviour in the line of duty, very good military skills, and, in particular, for his efficiency (Tüchtigkeit), one comes across the odd note drawing attention to an undeservedly protracted wait for promotion:

‘It is regrettable that the most recent list of advancements stopped precisely at him so that he remains the oldest Major. He would have deserved exceptional treatment in view of his outstanding services in Dalmatia during the last war. (Ladislaus Nagy, FML - Vienna, 31 October 1859)’

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**‘Es ist zu bedauern, das die jüngste Avancements-einstellung gerade bei ihm abtheilt und er dadurch der älteste Major blieb. Er hätte für seine ausgezeichnete Dienstleistung in Dalmatien während der abgelaufenen Kriegszenode auch eine ausnahmsweise Berücksichtigung verdient. (Wien am 31 Oktober 1859, Ladislaus Nagy, FML)’**
Another graduate from the Wiener Neustadt academy, Alexander Guran followed a similar path, entering the army as Unterlieutenant 2. Classe in September 1843 and ranking first among the graduates of the higher course of the military academy. He reached the rank of Hauptmann in roughly the same number of years as Doda (seven years), covering the next levels of the military hierarchy at a comparable pace, if with a slight difference to his advantage with every promotion: seven years from Hauptmann to Major, six years to Oberst, and slightly longer than Doda from Oberst to General Major (eight years instead of five). Unlike Doda, who retired in 1872, Guran went on to be promoted to Feldmarschalleutnant (FML), a rank he held until his retirement in 1879.

Both Doda and Guran and, as we shall see in the following military profiles, the majority of the other generals, qualified and acted as General Staff officers. Doda’s pedagogical and organizational skills recommended him for administrative positions:

‘He is suitable for a position of adjutant with the General Staff and for any other administrative posts. He also possesses the necessary ability to form a new troop or to improve the state of a disarrayed one.’

The time he served in the Banat Military Border Infantry Regiment no. 13 as well as the three years spent as a teacher at the military school in Caransebes were instrumental in providing him with ‘good knowledge of military economy and Border administration’, which he would put to good use after his retirement in his capacity as president of Comunitatea de Avere, the administrative unit that emerged

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*Ist zur höheren Adjutantur, für den General Staab, und zu jeder administrativen Stellung geeignet, und hat auch die Angemessenheit zur Errichtung eines neuen, oder Verbesserung eines in seinem Zustande herabgekommenen Truppen Körpers verwendet zu werden. –*
in lieu of the Banat Romanian Border regiment following the dissolution of the Military Border.

Guran, on the other hand, made a career based on his cartographical and orientation skills, discharging General Staff functions as well as taking active part in the military survey initiated in the Dual Monarchy in the latter half of the nineteenth century. He was one of the commanders of the *Kriegsschule* and, starting from 1876, director of the Military Geographical Institute in Vienna. He was decorated with the Knight Cross of the Imperial Leopold Order (*Ritterkreuz des K.K. Leopold-Ordens*) for ‘outstanding services as head of the Fifth Division (*Vorstand der 5. Abtheilung*) in the *Reichs-Kriegs-Ministerium*’.54

Theodor Seracsin graduated from the Wiener Neustadt Military Academy and entered the army as *Unterlieutenant 2. Classe* in 1854, one generation later than Doda and Guran.55 If Doda’s progress from *Unterlieutenant* to *Hauptmann* had been telescoped by the 1848-49 events and Guran’s promotion followed at a similar pace, it took Seracsin almost twelve years to make it to *Hauptmann*. As well as endowing him with additional specialized military skills, his two-year attendance of the *Kriegsschule* also facilitated his promotion to the next rank. His ascension further up the military ladder took place in much the same way as Doda’s and Guran’s. Just like the latter, he made it to *Feldmarschalleutnant*, a rank he held for two years until his retirement in 1894.

The promotion lag accumulated throughout his career seems to have led to a physical impossibility of further promotion beyond the rank of *Feldmarschalleutnant* and into the upper echelons of the general rank bracket. Thus, the *Hauptbericht* for the year 1893 describes him as an ‘experienced (*diensterfahrener*) general who has started to grow old’ while to the formulaic question at the end of each report whether
he be suitable for his present position and for further promotion (Ob der Beschriebene seiner gegenwärtigen Stellung entspricht; ob er und für welchen höheren Posten, oder für welches höhere Commando, dann ob er für eine höhere Charge geeignet ist), the 1893 answer was that ‘he is suitable as Infantry Troop Division Commander’ but that ‘for another position he does not possess the necessary aptitude and will be too old anyway when his turn for promotion comes’ (Entspricht als Infanterie Truppen Divisions Kommandant gut; für ein höheres Kommando, hat er nicht die Eignung, wäre auch bis die Reihe an ihn käme zu alt).56

Trajan Bacsila was the orphaned son of an Oberlieutenant and, as such, entitled to a free place initially in the Militär-Unterrealsschule at Güns and, subsequently, in the Wiener Neustadt Academy.57 Once in the Austro-Hungarian army he used the existent institutional props for further promotion: he attended the Kriegsschule between 1893 and 1895, while in 1906 he sat and passed the examination which secured him promotion to the rank of Major for the General Staff.58 It thus took him ten years to become a Hauptmann 2. Classe and nine years to reach the rank of Major. By the end of the First World War he had been promoted to Generalmajor and retired in this capacity in 1919.

Georg Domaschnian was by far the most copiously praised officer to emerge from the Banat Military Border, according to extant Qualifikationslisten.59 The orphaned son of a tax official from Mehadia, he qualified for entry into the Military Academy at Wiener Neustadt, which he graduated in 1890 from with very good results. He went on to accumulate further qualifications (Infanterie Equitation course, attendance of the Kriegsschule), as well as a string of medals and distinctions. In 1913 he was appointed head of the Fifth Division of the War Ministry in Vienna, which was in charge of matters relating to the General Staff,
Operations, and Railways (Generalstab, Operativer Dienst, Eisenbahnangelegenheiten). It is in this capacity that, as we shall see later in the thesis, he would write to his superiors in defence of FML Nikolaus Cena, another Banat Border general and a native of Mehadia, just like Domaschnian.

That personal merit and subsequent skill acquisition and not so much attendance of the Wiener Neustadt Academy were the essential ingredients for reaching the rank of general becomes evident in the professional evolution of Georg Doda, Trajan Doda’s brother. He benefited from the same military education as Traian Doda and graduated from the Wiener Neustadt Military Academy with good results but made it only to the rank of Major, a rank he was promoted to ad honores in 1876. Another Wiener-Neustadt graduate, Daniel Doda, a lieutenant’s son born in Petnik in the Banat, did not advance beyond the rank of captain (Hauptmann 2. Classe).

As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the second institutional springboard to the rank of officer was the Artillery Academy at Mährisch Weisskirchen. Michael Trapsia, Demeter and Ladislaus Cenna graduated from it.

According to Liviu Groza, Trapsia attended between 1850 and 1852 the regimental school at Kaschau in northern Hungary. The purpose of this school was, in Trapsia’s quoted words, ‘educating the offspring of former soldiers’ and ‘subsequently, also receiving officers’ sons who had not been fortunate enough to be admitted into the Military Academy at Wiener-Neustadt.’ Although a good student and proposed for admission to the Academy, Trapsia was finally denied access on the ground that his application ‘was not in accordance with the lists of proposal’ and had to settle for the Flotillenschule (flotilla school) in Klosterneuburg near Vienna, a Schulcompagnie which functioned between 1852 and 1856. According to the
personal notes Liviu Groza claims Trapsia left behind, the subjects studied at the naval school were:

‘mathematics, history, trigonometry, mechanics, physics, geometry, stylistics, Italian, naval service, sapper service, artillery, infantry regulation, interior service regulation, war theory, and administration. As practical exercises: weapon wielding, cannon instruction, front instruction, gymnastics, fencing, swimming, weapon firing, and flash signalling.’

His excellent results in the Flotillenschule, as recorded by his Qualificationsliste, earned him a place in the Artillery Academy. In 1855 he entered the army as Vice-Corporal in the Artillery Academy and graduated four years later the second of his class. It took him seven years to cover the ranks between Lieutenant 2. Classe and Hauptmann 1. Classe. Of note within this time span was his attendance of the Kriegsschule ‘mit recht gutem Erfolge’ between 1861 and 1863, which propelled him to the rank of Oberlieutenant. He reached the rank of Major in seven years, that of Oberst in five years, and after another six years he was promoted to General Major.

For the most part, his record of promotion shows his superiors’ positive evaluation of his military skills and merits, hence the frequent recommendation for ‘außertourliche Beförderung’. As these Qualifikationslisten were peer-reviewed, in the sense that the original report had to be countersigned by the writer’s military peers or, in some cases, by his superiors, one sometimes comes across differences of opinion as regards promotion and characterization. Thus, in an 1880 note, GM Leopold von Hofmann, Artillery Director, states that Oberst Trapsia ‘does not always observe the necessary tact towards his superiors and is prone to antagonism’ (Beobachtet gegen Vorgesetzte nicht immer den nöthigen Takt. Ist zum Widerspruch geeignet). This is counterpoised by a superior’s annotation in the following terms:
‘it seems to me that the change from promotion in the second category, for which his ability has already been acknowledged, to regular promotion is so exceptional that it should be thoroughly justified by the Artillery Director and the commanding generals.’”71

This episode is not singular and one encounters written evidence of such clashes of personality in other officers’ records as well. Trajan Doda, for instance, was similarly admonished in an 1866 Qualificationsliste. The writer not having yet had the opportunity to ascertain Doda’s military abilities, as the latter had been freshly transferred, falls back on input from a peer, FZM Baron Alleman, who, while praising Doda’s professional proficiency, adds that:

‘apart from his numerous valuable traits I have had occasion to note in particular a certain too persistent clinging to his own views, which is perhaps to be traced back to his many years spent in chancelleries.’””72

The characterization list for the following year, however, clears Doda of this accusation as follows:

‘As regards the note of His Excellence FZM Baron Alleman, included in the previous Individual Description, to the effect that he perceived “a certain too persistent clinging to his own views on Oberst Doda’s part”: Since he started his service with the General Command, he has given no more occasion for a similar characterization and, upon voicing his own dutiful and honest opinions, Oberst

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* ‘die Herabminderung der ihm zuerkannten gewesenen Eignung zur Beförderung nach 2. Kathegorie zu jener in der Rangstour erscheint mir jedoch so auffällend, daß dies seitens des Artillerie-Direktors und des kommandirenden Generalen ausführlicher begründet werden sollte.’

** ‘Außer den vielen schätzenswerthen Eigenschaften habe ich nämlich bei dem Genannten ein zuweilen zu starres Festhalten an seinen Ansichten zu bemerken Gelegenheit gehabt, wozu vielleicht dessen vieljährige Verwendung in den Kanzeleien den Grund gelegt hat.’
Doda has always willingly subordinated these to the somewhat opposed views of his superiors.∗∗∗73

As we shall see further on, divergences of opinion between referees could occur even higher up the hierarchical ladder as in the case of Ladislaus Cenna. Born in 1844, the son of an imperial army lieutenant, Cenna followed the typical triptych of a military career: the Obererziehungsschule in Kamenitz (1856-1860), the Artillerie-Schul Compagnie in Krakow (1860-1862), and the Artillery Academy in Mährisch-Weißkirchen (1862-1865). He acquired further specialized skills by completing the higher artillery course and later on the Regiments-Equitation.74

The 1902 Hauptbericht characterizing Feldmarschalleutnant Cenna reveals a certain tug of war between the referees over the general’s suitability for promotion. Whereas one of them makes a point of repeating that Cenna had not been tested for any higher posts and was, as such, unsuitable for further promotion (‘Für einen höheren Posten nicht erprobt, daher auch für die höhere Charge nicht geeignet’), his peer, on the other hand, chooses to highlight Cenna’s military skills and experience in the field of artillery as well as his suitability for various positions, concluding that he is fit for promotion.∗75

This disagreement perpetuates itself into the following year, the supplement to the Hauptbericht for 1903 testifying to it. Whereas the first referee persists in his

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opposition to promotion, repeating verbatim his characterization from the previous year, the second referee sticks to his initial recommendation and further expounds on Cenna’s qualities and suitability for promotion. Cenna was not promoted beyond the rank of Feldmarschalleutnant. He would, however, by virtue of the second referee’s recommendation, be appointed General-Artillerie-Inspector.76

Just as in the case of the Wiener Neustadt Military Academy, the Artillery Academy was in itself no guarantee of access to the rank bracket of generalcy. As István Deák pointed out in his 1985 conference paper ‘Education, Training, and Ideology of the Habsburg Army Officers’ Corps, 1848-1914’, graduates from the same school ‘could have quite different careers. One might still be a lieutenant in his regiment when his lucky comrade had already attained staff officer’s rank in another’.77 While Deák highlights the arbitrary element of luck in the process of promotion, there is, however, evidence that nuances this view. Demeter Cenna, for instance, although a graduate of the Artillery Academy just like Ladislaus Cenna and others who went on to become generals, does not appear to have gone beyond the rank of Hauptmann 1. Classe, according to his extant Qualifikationsliste in the Kriegsarchiv.78 The stumbling block and, implicitly, the promotion deterrent seems to have been his failure to pass the examinations of the Kriegsschule, which he attended between 1862 and 1864 without good results (‘hat in dieser nicht entsprochen’).79 In this case, the failure to be promoted is attributable to lack of intellectual ability rather than bad luck.

Conversely, there were generals who did not graduate from either of the two academies and, for all this, outdid, as regards promotion, some of the academy graduates. One was Alexander Lupu, a townsman’s son, who started out as a fee-paying student at the mathematical school in Caransebes, went on to become a cadet
(Gemeiner) in the Romanian Banat Border Regiment No. 13 and by 1895 was being promoted to Oberst.

Aron Bihoy followed a similar path. The son of an imperial officer, he attended the Normal- and Ober-Schule in Weißkirchen in the Banat and, later, the mathematical school in Caransebes. Just like Lupu, he only acquired his GM rank ad honores upon his retirement in 1892. In both cases, the lack of academic military training was subsequently compensated by ‘further education’ (‘später absolvierte Schulen u.dgl.’), primarily the attendance of the Stabsofficiers-Curs.

Nikolaus Cena, one of the few Romanian officers who made it to the rank of Feldmarschalleutnant in the k.u.k. army, started his career by attending the military engineer school (Pionierschule) in Tulln and ascended the military hierarchy by means of further qualifications, in particular the General Staff officer course.80

I decided not to dwell on the personal characterization available in the Qualificationslisten as, given its repetitive, formulaic nature, it provides little insight into the officers’ character. With very few exceptions and modulations, they are all invariably ‘proper’ in their attitude to superiors, and ‘just and well-meaning’, if sometimes ‘strict’, to their subordinates. The characterizing adjectives, rather devalued through endless repetition, are more relevant for an analysis of the military jargon of the time and convey the official picture of what an imperial officer should be rather than what he actually was.

I will, however, make an exception in the case of Georg Domaschnian, whose superlative Qualificationsliste for the First World War years seems to me to go beyond the level of perfunctory, formulaic praise and to show the exceptional abilities of a perfectly integrated officer. The 1918 referees present him as a person of distinguished, chivalrous character, noble-minded and enthusiastic, full of ideals;
generous and of a lucid and broad mind; quick on the uptake and accurate, with sharp judgment and rapid decisions. According to his Qualifikationsliste, he possessed all the characteristics of an exceptional troop leader: courageous, cold-blooded, and decisive. One of the referees proposes him for the position of Commander of the prestigious Kriegsschule, while the others subscribe to the superlative praise: ‘A complete man’, ‘an exceptional general’. Two years before, in 1916, Generaloberst Krobatin was concluding Domaschnian’s characterization describing him as ‘one of the most outstanding officers, in character and spirit, that I have ever met in my long military career.’

From the above-quoted Qualifikationslisten it becomes apparent that, by virtue of their military training, these officers became wielders of what Heinz Hartmann called ‘functional authority’, that is, authority ‘based on special knowledge and skill (Fachwissen)’, which is ‘achieved and not ascribed’, that is to say, arrived at meritocratically. And, indeed, a closer look at the Kenntnisse and Geschicklichkeiten sections of the Qualifikationslisten reveals an impressive record (even by today’s standards) of specialized skills and abilities, which recommended such officers as the grey matter of the military establishment.

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***‘einer der hervorragendsten Offiziere, nach Charakter und Geist, die mir im Verlaufe meiner langen Dienstzeit bekannt geworden sind.’
As concerns their communicational abilities, the great majority of them were at least tri-lingual (German, Romanian, and another language, which could be French or the language of the regiment where they served, Italian, Serbian, or Hungarian), while some could master up to six foreign languages in addition to their mother tongue (according to his Qualificationsliste, Alexander Guran could speak German, Romanian, Serbian, Hungarian, Italian, Russian, and French). Admittedly, not all foreign languages will have been spoken and written with the same degree of proficiency. In some cases, they would be only ‘zum Dienstgebrauch genügend’, sufficient for military service purposes, (the characterization of Ladislaus Cenna’s command of Serbian or Georg Domaschnian’s Italian) or even ‘notdürftig’, scanty (used in reference to Trajan Bacsila’s Hungarian). Notwithstanding this, the importance of their multilingualism lay in the professional versatility it imparted, which rendered them particularly valuable for the military system.

In addition to the regular military skills acquired in the academy and in higher military education institutions, the General Staff skills listed in the Qualificationslisten (cartography, triangulation, reconnaissance, land survey) constituted another important asset. They are, on the one hand, indicative of good mathematical and technical training and, on the other hand, offer a detailed picture of the extent to which these officers travelled and the cosmopolitan outlook that must have accompanied this geographical and, implicitly, cultural awareness. Whether billeted or on General Staff journeys or as participants in military survey operations, these officers came to be closely acquainted with most of the Austrian lands, parts of Hungary, Italy and Bohemia, while reconnaissance and cartography missions led them to Transylvania, Bukovina, Maramures, and the Romanian Principalities. Their knowledge of Romanian inferably recommended them for missions in Romanian-
speaking lands. Michael Trapsia, for instance, was credited with knowledge of the
Banat, Bukovina, and Western Transylvania, as well as Venice, parts of Hungary,
Styria, Carinthia, Tyrol, the western part of Istria, Florence, Genoa, Turin, Milan,
Vienna, Olmütz, Lemberg, parts of Upper Austria, and eastern Bohemia. According to official records, Alexander Guran became familiar with Lombardy-
Venice and Istria due to war operations, with the upper regions of Italy through various postings and marches, with Hungary and Wallachia through cartography,
with northern Bohemia, Croatia, Slavonia, Syrmia during land survey missions, with the Banat, Upper and Lower Austria, Tuscany, and Galicia through various journeys. Theodor Seracsin knew Galicia and Bukovina, a large part of Hungary and the Banat through prolonged postings, Vienna and its surroundings as well as parts of the Austrian lands as a military student and via cartography exercises, Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland due to the 1864 war, parts of Croatia and Slavonia and the upper Military Border through military mapping conducted between 1867 and 1868, as well as the Banat Military Border as a native of the region and through travels.

In the present chapter I made a point of delineating each of these officers’ military profiles, educational trajectories and, in particular, their skills and qualifications. By placing these officers within an institutional context, one can better understand their status as members of the military community as well as their status within the Monarchy. Their schooling and promotion record constitutes evidence that they were part of an elite corps in the imperial (later Austro-Hungarian) army. Moreover, professional success or the lack thereof will become a potential factor in the discussion of their loyalties and in assessing some of these
officers’ option (not) to join the Romanian army in 1877-1878, a point which will be analysed in the last but one chapter of the present thesis.
1 Michael Hochedlinger, *Austria’s Wars of Emergence*, p. xvi. In 1915 the rank of Generaloberst was introduced as the second highest rank after Feldmarschall.
2 Antoniu Marchescu, *Grănicerii bănăteni și Comunitatea de Avere*, p. 121.
3 Ibid., pp. 143-144.
4 Ibid., p. 126.
5 Ibid., p. 132.
6 Ibid., p. 133.
7 According to V. Țîrcovnicu, outside the Military Border trivial was another name for national schools, whereas within the Military Border, it designated a distinct and higher level of education (Victor Țîrcovnicu, *Contribuții la istoria învățământului românesc din Banat (1780-1918)*, pp. 44, 72).
8 Marchescu, *Grănicerii bănăteni*, p. 270.
10 Ibid., p. 101.
12 ANBN, Fond Regimentul II românesc de graniță Nr. 61, Document number 79, folios 9/recto, 23/recto, 53/recto; and Document no. 97, folios 3, 5.
14 OeStA, KA, Manuscripts/Allgemeine Reihe, MS Allg. 509, p. 20.
16 Ibid., p. 124.
17 Ibid., p. 126.
18 Ibid., p. 132.
19 Ibid., p. 133.
20 According to V. Țîrcovnicu, outside the Military Border trivial was another name for national schools, whereas within the Military Border, it designated a distinct and higher level of education (Victor Țîrcovnicu, *Contribuții la istoria învățământului românesc din Banat (1780-1918)*, pp. 44, 72).
22 Ibid., p. 47.
23 Ibid., p. 71.
24 Victor Țîrcovnicu, *Contribuții la istoria învățământului românesc din Banat (1780-1918)*, p. 29.
25 Ibid., p. 46.
26 Ibid., p. 71.
28 Ibid., p. 141.
29 According to V. Țîrcovnicu, outside the Military Border trivial was another name for national schools, whereas within the Military Border, it designated a distinct and higher level of education (Victor Țîrcovnicu, *Contribuții la istoria învățământului românesc din Banat (1780-1918)*, p. 72).
31 Ibid., p. 46.
32 Ibid., p. 101.
33 ANBN, Fond Regimentul II românesc de graniță Nr. 61, Document number 79, folios 9/recto, 23/recto, 53/recto; and Document no. 97, folios 3, 5.
35 OeStA, KA, Manuscripts/Allgemeine Reihe, MS Allg. 509, p. 20.
36 Ibid., p. 101.
38 Ibid., p. 101.
40 Ibid., p. 124.
41 Ibid., p. 126.
42 Ibid., p. 132.
43 Ibid., p. 133.
44 According to V. Țîrcovnicu, outside the Military Border trivial was another name for national schools, whereas within the Military Border, it designated a distinct and higher level of education (Victor Țîrcovnicu, *Contribuții la istoria învățământului românesc din Banat (1780-1918)*, pp. 44, 72).
46 Ibid., p. 141.
47 Ibid., p. 141.
48 According to V. Țîrcovnicu, outside the Military Border trivial was another name for national schools, whereas within the Military Border, it designated a distinct and higher level of education (Victor Țîrcovnicu, *Contribuții la istoria învățământului românesc din Banat (1780-1918)*, p. 72).
50 Victor Țîrcovnicu, *Contribuții la istoria învățământului românesc din Banat (1780-1918)*, p. 72.
51 Ibid., p. 46.
52 Ibid., p. 71.
54 Ibid., p. 141.
55 According to V. Țîrcovnicu, outside the Military Border trivial was another name for national schools, whereas within the Military Border, it designated a distinct and higher level of education (Victor Țîrcovnicu, *Contribuții la istoria învățământului românesc din Banat (1780-1918)*, p. 72).
57 Victor Țîrcovnicu, *Contribuții la istoria învățământului românesc din Banat (1780-1918)*, p. 72.
60 Ibid., p. 419.
61 Sked, *The Survival of the Habsburg Empire. Radetzky, the Imperial Army and the Class War*, 1848, p. 3.
62 Ibid., p. 4.
64 Sked, *The Survival of the Habsburg Empire. Radetzky, the Imperial Army and the Class War*, 1848, p. 7.
65 Hochedlinger, *Austria’s Wars of Emergence*, p. 306.
67 Erwin Schuster, *Die österreichischen Militärscrullen und ihre Zöglinge bis 1918 (ingeschränkt aus Cisleithanien)*, OeStA, KA Wien, MS/All, 327, p. 71.
69 Gustav Bancalari et al., *Unter den Fahnen. Die Völker Österreich-Ungarns in Waffen*, p. 449;
72 Ibid., p. 453.


45 Bancalari et al., Unter den Fahnen. Die Völker Österreich-Ungarns in Waffen, p. 454.


48 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationen 471 (Dobrzensky-Doell).

49 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationenlisten 471 (Dobrzensky-Doell), Qualifikationsliste für das Jahre 1853.

50 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationenlisten 471 (Dobrzensky-Doell), Qualifikationsliste für das Jahre 1859.

51 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationenlisten 899 (Gunzy-Gurth).

52 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationenlisten 471 (Dobrzensky-Doell), Qualifikationsliste für das Jahre 1853.

53 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationenlisten 471 (Dobrzensky-Doell), Qualifikationsliste für das Jahre 1853, section on Geschicklichkeiten.

54 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationenlisten 899 (Gunzy-Gurth).

55 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationenlisten 3165 (Senyk-Serb).

56 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationenlisten 3165 (Senyk-Serb), Hauptbericht für das Jahr 1893.

57 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationenlisten 72, Fasz. 80, Classifications-Liste des Zöglings Trajan Bacsila.

58 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationenlisten 72, Qualifikationsliste für das Jahre 1907.

59 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationenlisten, Karton 479 (Domansky-Döme).


61 It is not clear from the biographical description in the Qualifikationslisten what the exact relationship was between Trajan and Georg Doda. They were born in the same village in the Banat Military Border, with only eight years difference between them and were both Roman Catholic. An obituary in an 1890 issue of Luminătorul, a Temesvár newspaper, confirms that the departed Major Georg Doda was Trajan Doda’s brother (see Luminătorul: Organ pentru politică, literatură etc., Timișoara, Nr. 86, 27/15 Decembrie 1890, p. 2, recto.)

62 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationenlisten 471 (Dobrzensky-Doell).


64 Ibid., p. 232.

65 Michael Trapsia graduated from the Artillery Academy in the early stages of this institution, when it was located in Olmütz, from where it was subsequently transferred to Mährisch-Weißkirchen.


67 Verzeichnis des Kriegsarchivs, Bestandsverzeichnis, Militär-Erziehungs- und Bildungsanstalten, p. 54.

68 Groza, Din viața și activitatea Generalului Mihail Trapșa, p. 27.

69 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 3532 (Trappl-Traun).

70 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 3532 (Trappl-Traun), Qualifikationsliste für das Jahre 1880.

71 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 3532 (Trappl-Traun), Qualifikationsliste für das Jahre 1880.

72 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 471 (Dobrzensky-Doell), Qualifikationsliste für das Jahre 1866.

73 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 471 (Dobrzensky-Doell), Qualifikationsliste für das Jahre 1867.

74 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 339 (Cendov – Cezar Jenak), Fasz. 383

75 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 339 (Cendov – Cezar Jenak), Hauptbericht für das Jahr 1902.

76 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 339 (Cendov – Cezar Jenak), Zusatz zu Hauptberichten pro 1903.


78 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 339 (Cendov – Cezar Jenak), Qualifikationsliste für das Jahr 1876, Demeter Cenna, Hauptmann 1. Classe.

79 Ibid.

80 ÖStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten, Karton Nummer 338 (Cezaj-Cencur)
81 OeStA, KA, Qualificationslisten, 479, Domansky – Döme, Vormerkrblatt für die Qualificationsbeschreibung für die Zeit vom 22./4. 1917 bis 15./2. 1918.
82 OeStA, KA, Qualificationslisten, 479, Domansky – Döme, Vormerkrblatt für die Qualificationsbeschreibung für die Zeit vom 27. Juli 1915 bis 31. Mai 1916, Fasz. 528, page 1/ recto, Begutachtung, Krobatin Generaloberst, 31/12 1916.
84 OeStA, KA, Qualificationslisten 3532 (Trappi-Traun).
85 OeStA, KA, Qualificationslisten 899 (Gunzy-Gurth).
86 OeStA, KA, Qualificationslisten 3165 (Senyk-Serb), Qualificationsliste für das Jahr 1878.
Chapter 6. Military Elite Status within a Social-Cultural Context

While the previous chapter focused systematically on official characterizations with a view to highlighting career trajectories and professional skills, the present chapter is devoted to a more eclectic presentation of the social and cultural environment within which these officers moved, concentrating primarily on those elements that reinforced their elite status, prestige, and exceptionalism. For the sake of coherence, the presentation follows a pattern of concentric circles: it starts at the local level, where it diachronically examines the military symbolism of the Romanian Border communities and, in particular, the Roman slogans on their military flags; it then moves on to the cosmopolitan level and shows how these officers’ peripatetic lifestyle facilitated contact with the Romanian intelligentsia in the Empire; it concludes with a section on the k.u.k. officer status and esprit de corps, which reconstitutes the professional milieu of the Banat Border generals and clarifies how the next three chapters fit in with the general literature on the Habsburg officer corps and what the contribution of the present thesis will be in relation to it.

6.1. Romanian Military Border Symbolism

The strategic function of the Military Border within the Habsburg Empire ensured a special status for its inhabitants: the Grenzer or frontiersmen were not only valuable tax payers and defenders of the southern and eastern reaches of the Empire but also a ready-trained and ready-to-mobilize military force that the House of Habsburg could rely on in their external and internal wars. The value of this militarized population lay, therefore, in their dependability deriving from staunch allegiance to the
Emperor. As a consequence, the Military Border system was geared towards securing the good will and loyalty of the frontiersmen by recourse to policies of privilege and exemption (land in exchange for military service, tax reduction, and wartime indemnities). Part and parcel of this process of allegiance formation was the military symbolism and ‘emotive imagery’\cite{1} that developed and was used as a binding medium between the ethnically variegated Grenzer and their Habsburg monarch.

A considerable number of Romanian studies\cite{2} point to an instrumentalization of the Roman past, seen as a means wielded by Habsburg authorities to secure the loyalty of the Romanian population of the Habsburg Empire and, in particular, that of the Military Border. As regards this postulated intersection of two sets of claims to Roman descent (Habsburg and Romanian), there have been few attempts to substantiate it and none whatsoever to give it exhaustive coverage. The assumption is predicated on the implicit belief that the Roman past to which the Habsburgs looked back and that which the Romanians claimed for themselves was one and the same and, as such, qualified as an element of historical and symbolic commonality between the two.

A closer look at the Roman appendage in the imperial title (Holy Roman Emperor), a dignity the Habsburgs held almost uninterruptedly since 1438,\cite{3} will, however, show its fundamentally different nature when compared to the Romanians’ invoked Roman past. As Marie Tanner points out, Habsburg claims to Roman roots were part of a broader, essentially fanciful, genealogical project aimed at buttressing imperial prestige and dating back to the reign of Rudolf I.\cite{4} Moreover, the Roman was not the only genealogical strand in the Habsburg panoply. Thus, Maximilian I (1563-1576) was able to equally authoritatively claim direct kin to
‘Jewish kings and prophets, Greek and Egyptian demigods, Roman divinities and Christian saints, Trojan heroes and their historical progeny among the Frankish emperors; thus, Saturn and Osiris, Hector and Priam, Noah and Christ, Clovis and Charlemagne sprout from various branches of the Hapsburg family tree’.5

As John Gagliardo explains, the office of Holy Roman Emperor was least dependent on such symbolism as

‘the dignity of the position, as well as its functions, required a candidate to possess high noble status, but also that he govern directly a dynastic state or territory with sufficient resources as to confer weight and power in the execution of imperial tasks’.6

The imperial dignity can, therefore, be viewed as one which was the crowning recognition of power and influence and not the source of it. It was the fact that power preceded, instead of exclusively devolving from, the imperial title that ensured the functionality of the Empire and the authority of the Emperor even after the Peace of Westphalia.7 In this context, claims to a Roman descent, whether going back to Constantine, the Anicier dynasty, or to Charlemagne, were mere rhetorical props in a show of already acquired power.

Whereas with the Habsburgs the Roman past was an almost ornamental element among the host that formed the trappings of dynamic power, with their Romanian subjects it constituted the vital core of their gradually coalescing political identity and, as such, had a strong polemic and demonstrative value. As pointed out in Chapter Four, representatives of the Romanian Uniate clergy in Transylvania asserted this Roman past, initially, as a justification of the Union with the Catholic Church and, subsequently, as a historical trump card meant to secure political recognition for the Romanian nation. Thus, the Roman past invoked was not a
dynastic one but rather a reiteration of a scholarly leitmotif, which was given currency by Italian Renaissance humanists, who pointed out that the Vlachs were the descendants of the Roman colony set up in conquered Dacia by Emperor Trajan.

By the second half of the eighteenth century, when the Romanian Border regiments were organized in the Banat and in Transylvania, the Roman descent of the autochthonous population had become a cliché replicating itself from one author to another with little variation, testifying to a certain intertextual quality of statistical and travel literature of the time. That the imperial authorities were indeed aware of the Roman past of the region is attested to by Francesco Griselini in his chapter ‘Ueber die Walachen, die im Bannat wohnen’. The Italian scholar divides his archaeological subject matter into two: relics which were still to be seen at the time (‘welchem in dieser Gegend zurzeit noch gesehen werden’) and those which were no longer in place. The latter, Griselini explains, were for the most part discovered in 1736, when General Andreas Hamilton, the Governor of the province, had the Roman baths at Mehadia refurbished on imperial order and some of the more spectacular Roman relics shipped over to Vienna, ‘where, side by side with others brought from Transylvania, they serve as adornments of the antechamber and staircase leading to the imperial public library.’

A Habsburg map from the time of the 1737-39 war against the Turks entitled Plan des Donau-Stroms zwischen Bellegrad und Orsova worauf die an Selbe liegende dermaliche wehrhafte Festungen auch alle Schlößer und Rudera angemerkt seyndt (sic) punctiliously transcribes the Roman inscriptions on both banks of the

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river, with particular emphasis on Tabula Traiana.\(^9\) One assumes that such archaeological notations will have served as landmarks as well as historical curios.

Griselini’s interest in old Roman inscriptions shows that at the time the literati, at least, were aware of the military past of the region and could gloss on tegular inscriptions.\(^{10}\) It is Griselini who mentions the famous Roman legion Gemina XIII, traces its change of name to Antoniana, after Emperor Antonius Pius, and remarks that it was stationed in Dacia.\(^{11}\) In his exposition on Roman inscriptions Griselini makes references to Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli and Caryophilus. The former referred in his *Danubius Pannonico-Mysicus* to ancient inscriptions such as the one extracted from the ruins of Mehadia castle. The fortress was subsequently mentioned by Moritz Graf von Lacy, who, while inspecting the strategic potential of the Orsova-Marga route in the Banat, mentioned in a 1768 report that the fortifications at Mehadia had been pulled down in accordance with the stipulations of ‘the last peace treaty’ (i.e. the Treaty of Belgrade of 1739).\(^{12}\) Caryophilus was the author of a thesis titled *De termis Herculanis nuper in Dacia detectis* (1737), which records the fact that in 1736 seven statues of Hercules had been dug up and sent to Vienna.\(^{13}\)

According to Traian Simu, the first systematic archaeological discoveries (as opposed to the more or less accidental unearthing of Roman statues at the baths of Mehadia), as well as the first Habsburg reports on the topic date back to 1792-1793.\(^{14}\) Nicolae Stoica de Hațeg is credited with having discovered the Roman castrum *Praetorium* in 1829.\(^{15}\) At the beginning of the twentieth century, Nikolaus Cena, a retired *k.u.k. Feldmarschalleutnant* and a native of Mehadia, continued the work of archaeological exploration of the ruins and the material he gathered formed the starting point for the local museum bearing his name.\(^{16}\) His archaeological
preoccupations would render him suspect with the local Hungarian authorities in the summer of 1914. His detention and the intricacies of his case will be analysed in Chapter Eight.

Although awareness of ancient relics and inscriptions was widely spread among the Habsburgs (and not only) at the end of the eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century (as archaeological research became more systematic), there is little evidence to suggest that the ancient Roman paraphernalia actually influenced official policy. One document belonging to the Hofkriegsrath holding in the Viennese archives and dated 1783 contains a section on the healing baths of Mehadia and their modernization. The report deals exclusively with pragmatic matters such as the annual tax levied for the maintenance of the baths, whose ‘utility’ had already been proved. The Habsburg author proceeds, sensibly enough, to highlight the need for building bridges. He concludes by recommending that such bridges should, for the sake of durability, be built in brick. This is essentially a no-nonsense, down-to-earth approach which most likely will have characterized Habsburg interactions with places steeped in history and their inhabitants.

The only official sphere where the Roman legacy was consciously capitalized on was the military sphere. It is the extant military slogans harking back to a glorious Roman past as used within the Romanian Border Regiments (in both the Banat and Transylvania) that seem to bear out the instrumentalization thesis mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. ‘Virtus romana rediviva’, ‘Avere si sange pentru imperatul nostru’ (Our wealth and blood for our Emperor), ‘A lui Romul vitejie între noi, Români, să fie’ (Romanians, may Rome’s bravery be among us) are examples of martial slogans used in the Transylvanian Border Regiment in Bistrița-Năsăud (the first two) and the Banat Border Regiment with its headquarters in Caransebes (the
third slogan), and preserved in the form of inscriptions on military flags. Archduke Charles (Erzherzog Karl) (1771-1847), the great reformer of what had, by then, become the Austrian army, drew attention to the importance of military flags in the 1808 Dienstreglement:

‘The flag or the standard is “sacred for a soldier, it is the glorious pledge of the faith put by the state in its warriors’ valour […] and the cover under which they must win or die […] its preservation is inextricably bound with the glory of the troop”’.*

The Archduke stresses the two fundamental dimensions of military flag symbolism: religious and secular. The first one derives from the original apotropaic function of the flag, that of protecting the soldiers in battle by displaying the image of a beneficent deity:

‘The earliest flags and standards were almost always religious in nature […] the authority of the flag or standard was initially derived from the power of these religious connections.’

In time the reverence commanded by religious symbolism mutated into secular allegiance, with flags becoming ‘the symbol of the regiment’s duty to sovereign and country, of the men’s duty to the regiment.’ If reverence to religious and/or secular authorities defines the external significance of a military flag, there is, however, an even more important, internal function, that of providing cohesion and generating collective memory. Sir Charles Napier alluded to this aspect in the following terms:

‘apart from representing authority and unity of purpose, the flags of regiments came to embody the memory of the men who had come before, the war history and

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* ‘die Fahne (bzw. die Standarte) ist “das Heiligtum eines Soldaten, das rühmliche Pfand des Vertrauens, welches der Staat in die Tapferkeit seiner Krieger setzt, […] und das Panier, unter welchem sie siegen oder sterben müssen […] mit ihrer Erhaltung ist der Ruhm der Truppe unzertrennlich verbunden.”’
traditions of the regiment. [...] To allow such a flag to be captured was to dishonour the regiment and all the men who had gone before.'21

In this context, the flag represents more than a rallying point in battle (its initial function, according to Wise, was to distinguish the forces of the two sides and provide rallying points in confused fighting); it becomes a symbolic axis around which a powerful sense of community is built as well as a sense of ancestry and honorable descent. It binds together the community and gives it a purpose and direction.

As Anton Dolleczek pointed out at the end of the nineteenth century, a number of exceptions were made to the 1868 Circular-Verordnung, which stipulated that each regiment should have one flag only, in reverence to historical and emotional ‘reminiscences’ associated with certain regimental flags.22 In the case of the Military Border regiments, the flags and the accompanying inscriptions were emblematic not just of the soldiers who went to battle but of the entire community which formed the pool of recruitment.

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, one of the hypotheses put forth by Liviu Groza to the effect that the number 13 in the title of the Banat Border Regiment constitutes a reference to the Roman Legion XIII Gemina hinges on two pieces of evidence: 1) the great number of tiles and bricks bearing the stamp of this legion to be found across the territory of the Banat Military Border; and 2) the inscription on a military flag ribbon invoking Rome’s bravery as an incentive to brave conduct in battle for the Banat frontiersmen (a picture of which is to be found in Johann Christoph Allmayer-Beck’s Die K.(u.)K. Armee 1848-191823). In default of more substantial supporting documents, the former, archeological, argument is tenuous because bricks bearing the stamp of the XIII Gemina could be found in other
places in the Banat as well as in Transylvania, where the legion was actually stationed (that is, at Apulum). The latter, heraldic, piece of evidence is the more intriguing of the two in terms of origin and chronology.

The above-mentioned slogans were embroidered on appendices to the flag proper called streamers. As Jelena Borošak-Marijanović explains in her book on Croatian flags,

‘during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, so written documents record, it became the custom at “the consecration of the flag”, when there was a new flag or to celebrate a regimental anniversary or when a regiment returned from war, to add decorative streamers to the flag staff. […] These streamers had a “godmother” who was usually the wife of some famous officer or often even from the royal house or the families of the nobility or outstanding citizens. […] In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century the “godmother” would embroider the streamer. From the beginning of the nineteenth century we have streamers embroidered by Franijca Drašković, née Kulmer, wife of Janko Drašković, one of the leaders of the Revival movement, and Francisca Novosel, née Vrhovec. In the stormy year of 1848, streamers were embroidered by Sidonia Rubido Erdödy and Sofia Jelačić.’

Thus, while the flags were made and distributed by a central Commission, which ‘drew up regulations for the design of infantry and cavalry flags on the basis of sketches from the Military Council’, the streamers were, more often than not, a local, personalized regimental input, functioning as annotations to the main symbolism of the flag.

Late nineteenth-century Austrian literature on the subject points to a much longer tradition than indicated by Borošak-Marijanović. The oldest flags of the Habsburg army were embroidered by ladies, possibly as part of a medieval chivalric tradition. In time, however, as the standing army came into being, the making of the flags and the techniques involved in it became the office of carpenters (Zimmerleute). As a series of eighteenth-century decrees considerably reduced the
number of flags, the old tradition of lady-hand embroidery, which had fallen into obsolescence, was revived in the form of resplendent flag ribbons (*Fahnen- und Standarten-bänder*) donated to the regiments by gentlewomen and other high-society figures and immortalizing in gold and silver embroidery momentous historical and military episodes. Each regiment thus had several such flag ribbons, which served to embellish the flag proper on special, festive occasions.\textsuperscript{28} The act of donation customarily accompanied the consecration of the flag (*Fahnenweihe*) and the flag ribbon as such was a religiously sanctioned accoutrement. The personalities who bestowed this honorary ribbon on the regiment were known as godparents of the flag (*Fahnenpaten*). More often than not, it was a woman figure that embroidered the flag ribbon and acted as a godmother (*Fahnenpatin*).

The languages in which these inscriptions were written map the linguistic evolution in administration from Latin (most of the slogans during the Thirty Years War), to German in the eighteenth century and all the other languages of the Empire throughout the nineteenth century. It is worth mentioning at this point that Latin inscriptions and Roman symbolism were quite common in the eighteenth century and by no means confined to Romanian flags. Thus, the standard belonging to the hussar troop of the Karlovac Border Regiment and dated 1746-1749 displayed on the reverse a ‘medallion showing a set of Roman military trophies (*signa* and *vexilla*, shields, and lances with the inscriptions “IOVIA/NI”) and the motto “RETRACTATA NITESCUNT”.\textsuperscript{29} The fact that the inscription on the flag ribbon of the Banat Romanian Border Regiment is in Romanian may indicate that it appeared later, sometime during the nineteenth century.

In what follows I shall dwell on the military flag slogans belonging to the Second Transylvanian Romanian Border Regiment. Although the officers under
discussion in the present thesis originated from the Banat Border Regiment and not from Transylvania, the lack of sources on Banat flags and their history prevents me from advancing hypotheses as to their origins. In order to make up for this dearth of sources for the Banat I will examine the cognate Transylvanian case as the closest analogy that could be drawn with the Banat. This is partly because there is much more literature available on the Transylvania Border Regiments than there is on the Banat regiment and partly because the extant archival material in the former case is more substantial.

The military slogan of the Second Transylvanian Romanian Border Regiment as embroidered on the ornamental streamer attached to the regimental flag, that is, *Virtus Romana Rediviva* (Roman Virtue Revived), not only served its immediate military purpose of incentivizing the troop and creating prestige sentiments,\(^{30}\) to use Weber’s words, but went beyond the military sphere. After the early dissolution of the Transylvanian Border in 1851, many of the military assets remained in possession of the demilitarized community and transformed into cultural capital. This is the case of the uniform fund (‘*fondul de mondire*’), which comprised both state and community contributions towards the acquisition of military uniforms. After 1851 this money was turned into deeds and kept by the state, while the 5% interest yielded was allocated to the frontiersmen’s descendents as scholarships.\(^{31}\) In much the same way, the military slogan *Virtus Romana Rediviva* turned into a cultural and political watchword and gave the name to an active cultural association.

For the Second Transylvanian Romanian Border Regiment there are two contemporary attempts at glossing the origin of the flag streamer and of the military slogan *Virtus Romana Rediviva*. The first is the explanation provided by Francisc Mihailes, a captain in the Second Transylvanian Romanian Border Regiment, in his
memoirs ‘Amintiri din anii 1848-49’, currently kept in the Bistriţa-Năsăud branch of the Romanian National Archives. The author’s reference to the juxtaposition of the regimental slogan to the Romanian tricolour flag (‘the Romanian flag (standard) consisting of three colours (blue, red, white), on which was embroidered in golden letters the inscription from our military flags, Roman Virtue Reborn’), occasions an explanatory footnote which answers, at least in part, some of the questions raised earlier in this chapter:

‘I have previously mentioned in other places that Empress Maria Theresa, being the godmother of our flag, sent to the Second Romanian Regiment a ribbon [with the inscription] “[Ai…] Virtus romana redivivat”, which was displayed on the regimental flag on all state occasions’

The second explanation is to be found in Captain Karl Klein’s 1867 *Military History of the k.k. National Romanian Transylvanian Border Infantry Regiment no. 17.* The author, born in Bukovina, of evangelical faith, set about writing his work in the wake of the 1848-1849 revolution, during which an important part of the Năsăud regimental archive was destroyed. According to Adrian Onofreiu, the authorities initiated a campaign of document collection from local priests and retired officers in an attempt to provide material for such a history of the regiment. Klein’s reference to martial symbolism in the regiment highlights the importance of the Latin slogan *Virtus Romana Rediviva* and tells a slightly different story than that of Captain Mihai:\

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\text{‘stegetul (stendartul) de 3 culori rumanescu (albastru, rosu, alb) pe care era brodita cu lettere de auru Inscriptiunea de pe standartele noastre militare Virtutea Romana reinviesta’.

\text{‘am comentat mai ante in alte locuri, ca împăratasea Maria Theresa fiidu nanasia standartului nostru Regimentului II rumanescu i trimasa [bandana] “[Ai ....?] Virtus romana redivivat”, care se purta la toate parasile solemne pe standartu regimentului.’}
\]
‘Following the high order of Her Imperial Majesty, Queen Maria Theresia, the Second Transylvanian Romanian Border Infantry Regiment received the symbol *Virtus Romana Rediviva*. This symbol was written on the flags of the two infantry battalions as well as on the flag of the National Military Institute in Năsăud and was etched on all official seals of the regiment. On the left side of the imperial eagle were written in big Latin characters the following words “Virtus Romana” and on the right side, “Rediviva”. The slogan of the first infantry battalion was “Pro imperatore, honor et gloria”, and that of the second battalion, “Perpetua fides”. These slogans were embroidered in golden letters on the flag ribbon.’

Mihailes’s and Klein’s accounts corroborate each other in that both maintain that the source of the Latin slogan of the 2nd Transylvanian Border Regiment was imperial and that Maria Theresa herself, either as godmother of the flag (according to Mihailes) or as issuer of a special order (in Klein’s version), was involved in this.

Although not explicitly based on ascertainable archival sources (which, in itself, is understandable since the authors of these accounts were contemporaneous with the events recounted), both explanations provide, for all this, valuable insight into the perceived relationship between the Romanian *Grenzer* and the Imperial Hause. Irrespective of whether or not Maria Theresa herself commissioned the embroidered ornamental inscription on the flag ribbon or issued the above-mentioned order, the very circulation of this information among the frontiersmen testifies to the collective perception of their special relationship with the monarch. Mihailes’s explanatory footnote, in particular, reveals a myth the Romanian *Grenzer* lived by. Of no less importance is the association between imperial patronage and

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national pride implicit in the act of donation or, in Klein’s account, in the imperial order. Both of them envisage the Habsburg Empress as promoter of an awareness of Roman descent among her militarized Romanian subjects.

As regards the location of the military flags and their ribbons, we have it from Dolleczek that, following the dissolution of the Border Regiments in 1873, a *Circular-Verordnung* was passed which stipulated that their flags were to be donated to the church in the town where the regimental headquarters used to be.\(^{37}\) I am not aware of any such flags or flag ribbons being preserved in Caransebes or in Năsăud. The only mention of such extant military paraphernalia is, as pointed out above, to be found in Johann Christoph Allmayer-Beck, who references them to the *Heeresgeschichtliches Museum* in Vienna.

6.2. The wider circle of a peripatetic military career

In 1826, the Orthodox priest of Mehadia, Nicolae Stoica de Hațeg, a widely-travelled man by virtue of his position and linguistic skills, expressed his regret at not being able to follow a military career:

‘As I mentioned to you, I went off with three armies, but never entered Berlin, or Holland, or Constantinople. Whereas your parents, uncles, cousins, and relatives who were field soldiers saw not only Austria, Bavaria, the German lands, the Netherlands, the Rhine River, Switzerland, Saxony, all of Italy, but they also saw France and outdid me by much. In the big armies, those who could read and write German became superior officers and majors, whereas I remained what I was before.’\(^{38}\)

\(^{38}\) ‘Eu vă spuşi că în 3 ștîri am plecat, însă nici în Berlin, nici Holandu, nici în Țarigradu n-am intrat. Iară părinții voștri, unchi, veri, neamuri ce-au fost în sus în feldsoldați pe francozi, ei nu numai că Estraihul, Baieru, Țara Nemțească, Niderlandu, apa Rainii, Șvaițu, Sacsonia, toată Italia, ce și Franția au văzut și cu mult m-au întrecut. În care greați oști, cei ce au știt a ceti și a scri nemțeâște, oberofitiri și maiori au ajuns, iară eu, cum am fost, tot așa sînt.’
As highlighted by Linda Colley, the impact of this peripatetic lifestyle on a soldier’s outlook should be more closely studied especially when it comes to a discussion of loyalties and patriotism. In her book *Britons. Forging the Nation 1707-1837*, Colley addresses the question of a soldier’s growing awareness of national identity acquired via military postings. She maps the psychological evolution from the atomized parochialism of secluded village life, where bringing in the crops took precedence over patriotic calls for joining the army, to the final realization of ‘what he was [...] by contact with what he was not’, acquired during wars abroad. Thus, Joseph Mayett, a Buckinghamshire militia man, wrote in his autobiography in reference to his return from Ireland in October 1814: ‘On the 23rd we landed Safe on old England shore.’ Colley reads into this remark a budding sense of belonging to a wider, national community. She, moreover, stresses the importance of soldiery as ‘political education in the widest sense’.

The case of the Romanian officers in the k.(u.)k. army, while evincing a number of similarities with that of Colley’s English soldiers, differs, however, from the latter in its complex configuration. The Romanian officers were part of a multinational army in duty bound to the Habsburg Emperor, protecting the boundaries of a multinational empire, which would never have been perceived as the ‘old Austrian shore’ (although, as we shall see in Chapters Seven and Eight, loyalty to the Empire as a whole, or *Reichsgefühl*, was cherished by most of the Border generals analysed). The psychological evolution captured by Colley becomes, nevertheless, relevant when considering these officers’ return to their native land (the Banat, in their case) or their contact with Romanian-inhabited lands, and also prompts further questions such as: what was the impact of military journeys and reconnaissance trips into the Romanian-speaking lands outside the boundaries of the
Monarchy upon these officers’ allegiance and sense of identity? And, conversely, what was the impact of the close contact with other ethnic groups within the Monarchy and their display of self-awareness?

Regarding the latter question, one wonders if the 1906 testimony of Mihai Teliman, a Romanian folklorist from Bukovina, could be extrapolated to the case of the Romanian officers in the imperial army:

‘Did I have national consciousness? [...] I did not; I only had my heart. Having been brought up under foreign influences completely opposed to the Romanian spirit, I only had my memories of my parental home.’

Following his visit to the Czech colony in Vienna, he was to note:

‘We are foreigners and among foreigners one learns how to be oneself. [...] it was then that I received the baptism of national consciousness [...] and was resurrected from the dead. What the Czechs had sown in my impressionable heart, ‘România jună’ brought to fruition.’

The above quote brings the discussion to the paradoxical role played by imperial cultural centres (Vienna, in particular, but not only) in catalysing and, in some cases, even engendering a sense of national identity by bringing together Romanian students and intellectuals from all Romanian-inhabited lands. The Viennese literary society România jună (Young Romania) was instrumental in creating just such a Romanian république des lettres, which explicitly aimed at transcending political boundaries. Officially founded in 1871, the social-literary academic society România jună resulted from the fusion of two previous, and for a while inimical, cultural societies, Societatea literară științifică, set up in 1864, and

∗ ‘Aveam conștiință națională? [...] Nu; inimă numai. Crescut sub influențe diametral opuse geniului românesc, îmi rămaseră numai amintirile casei părintești.’

∗∗ ‘Suntem străini și între străini înveți să fii al tău [...] Și atunci am primit și eu botezul conștiinței naționale [...] Și am înviat din morți. Ceea ce Cehii au sădit în impresionabila mea inimă, a cultivat “România jună” mai departe.’
România, founded in 1868. It included among its honorary members prominent figures of Romanian cultural life such as Vasile Alecsandri, Vincenţiu Babeş, George Barţiu, Timotei Cipariu, B.P. Hasdeu, Ion Creangă, the Barons Hurmuzachi, Titu Maiorescu, A. Treboniu-Laurian, A. Mocsony, and others.42

The importance of the society comes across in contemporary testimonies. As Teliman pointed out, ‘it was only during the meetings of România jună that many young Romanians who had arrived in Vienna learned to speak Romanian and started to feel they were Romanian’.43 In almost identical terms, Iuliu Moisil, a native of the former Military Border regiment in Năsăud, Transylvania, and after 1879 a student in Vienna and member of the society, emphasized that ‘here [at România jună] many young men, who had had to attend foreign schools, learned to speak, write and feel Romanian, and made friends for life’.44 According to Ioan Slavici, the University of Vienna was a point of interaction for Romanian students from all Romanian-inhabited lands, while România jună, whose first president Slavici was, represented a forum for the much debated question of cultural unity.45

The relevance of România jună for the study of Romanian military elites in the Austro-Hungarian army may not become immediately apparent, as none of the future generals under discussion completed their education in Vienna at the time, so they would not have featured among the members of the society or the students who attended its meetings. The point I am trying to make is that a closer look at the cultural activities of România jună and the networks it created shows that at least some of these Romanian officers were, even while still active in the Austro-Hungarian army, involved, more often than not indirectly, with Romanian cultural politics. Thus, in 1896, Feldmarschalleutnant Seracsin is listed as having attended the religious service dedicated to the departed members of the society and

179
occasioned by the jubilee celebrating twenty-five years since its foundation.\textsuperscript{46} Twelve years later, in 1908, General Alexander Lupu gave a speech at the festive meeting of \textit{România jună} in remembrance of the Romanian composer Ciprian Porumbescu, who had died at an early age twenty-five years before.\textsuperscript{47} In the annual report of the society for the year 1891, Aurelia Trapsia-Kron, General Trapsia’s wife, figures among the honorary members.\textsuperscript{48} Such instances of involvement in Romanian cultural events are all the more significant as these generals were constrained in their actions by their military status, which required that for each and every personal initiative they had to obtain official permission.

Another point of convergence between military life in the Austro-Hungarian army and Romanian cultural politics is to be found at the religious level. Romanian regiments in Vienna brought from Transylvania or Hungary would celebrate the New Year and the Christian holidays in the so-called \textit{Garnisonskirche}, each confession having its own priest.\textsuperscript{49} This garrison church service preceded the setting up of a Romanian Orthodox chapel in Vienna, which was achieved in 1907 owing to the efforts of one of the above-mentioned generals, Alexander Lupu. Up until the early twentieth century, the Romanian Orthodox community in Vienna shared a church with the Greeks on the basis of a late-eighteenth-century imperial privilege. The subsequent reiteration of this privilege put a strain on Romanian-Greek religious relations as it increasingly gave precedence to the Greek element at the expense of the Romanian one in hierarchical matters.\textsuperscript{50} The first steps towards creating the legal framework and renting a place for a Romanian Orthodox chapel in Vienna were taken between 1905 and 1907 by the then Colonel Lupu. Another two generals from the former Banat Military Border, Michael Sandru and Daniel Materinga, were in attendance at the consacration of the chapel in January 1907.\textsuperscript{51}
Regarding the first of the two questions posed earlier in this section (what was the impact on these officers’ allegiance of the military journeys conducted for reconnaissance and cartographical purposes in Romanian-speaking lands inside and outside the boundaries of the Monarchy?), it is possible to reconstitute, on the basis of Qualifikationslisten information, the extent to which these officers came into contact with a Romanian cultural environment.

There are those among them who started out or served at one point in their military career in the Romanian Banat Border Regiment no. 13 (Trajan Doda, Alexander Lupu, Theodor Seracsin, and Johann Jovesko). Others, although they left the Banat at an early age and served in other regiments, came into contact with Romanian-inhabited lands during military postings and missions. This was the case of Michael Trapsia, who was sent in 1878 on a military diplomatic mission as part of the border regulation commission between Austria-Hungary and Romania on the Prut river (‘im September in militärisch-diplomatischer Mission bei der Grenzregulirungs Commission zwischen Östreich-Ungarn und Rumänien am Pruth’). According to Liviu Groza, Trapsia’s posting in Hermannstadt (Sibiu) as artillery director was the occasion for a fruitful collaboration with George Barțiu. The two translated together an artillery textbook titled Instrucțiunea de artillerie pentru tunarii bateriilor de câmp and kept in touch even after Trapsia’s transfer.

Alexander Guran, on the other hand, participated as a captain in the 1856 cartography mission in Wallachia. Between 1901 and 1904 Trajan Bacsila conducted reconnaissance missions in the Carpathians, in Transylvania, parts of Moldavia and Wallachia, as a General Staff officer in the Russian section of the Landesbeschreibungsbureau.
Another category is formed by those officers who, after retirement, chose to return to the Banat and occupied various positions in the local administration. Thus, following his transfer to *Ruhestand* in 1876, Major Georg Doda came back to his native place, Mehadia, and held the function of Commander of the Military Spa at Herculane until his death in 1882. As will be enlarged on in the next chapter, Trajan Doda returned to the Banat and became the first president of *Comunitatea de Avere*, a Hungarian MP as well as a strong militant for Romanian political and cultural rights. Not unlike Nicolae Stoica de Haţeg, *Feldmarschalleutnant* Nikolaus Cena retired to his native village and put together an important collection of archaeological artefacts from Mehadia and its surroundings as well as gathered documentary information from the Viennese archives relative to the past of the region, which he subsequently donated to the local museum.

6.3 Esprit de Corps

The image of the k.(u.)k. officer corps presented by English- and German-language scholarship is that of a German-dominated military community (comprising 80% German speakers, according to Allmayer-Beck and Deák, and 75% according to Kiszling - although scholars such as Alan Sked question the accuracy of these percentages). The corps was increasingly constituted along meritocratic lines starting with the second half of the nineteenth century, drawing its military elites from the imperial academies at Wiener Neustadt and Mödling, and marked by a strong sense of identity (*Standesgefühl*). Various authors have pointed out the social gulf between the officer class and the rest of society, and argued that the officers in general perceived politics as ‘an unclean business’ (*unsauberes Geschäft*). The average k.(u.)k. officer is, moreover, credited with staunch loyalty to the Monarchy (*Reichsgefühl/Reichspatriotismus*).
Austrian and German scholarship on various aspects of the Habsburg army is, as was to be expected, more substantial than its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. On the early modern period of the Habsburg army the most informative English-language work is that of the Austrian historian Michael Hochendlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, already quoted in the course of this thesis. A comprehensive review focusing on research conducted to date on the early modern elites of the Habsburg army is to be found in Hochendlinger’s *Des Kaisers Generale: Bibliographische und quellenkundliche Anmerkungen zur Forschung militärischer Eliten in der frühneuzeitlichen Habsburgermonarchie*. A major project was launched in 2004 by the Kriegsarchiv and the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum in Vienna, together with the German historian Dr. Antonio Schmidt-Brentano. The aim of the project is that of producing a biographical lexicon comprising detailed information on the life and career of Habsburg generals between 1618 and 1815.

In English-language scholarship Alan Sked provides a history of the imperial army for the period 1815 to 1848. For the purposes of this thesis, of particular interest is his description of the *Akademiker*, the graduates of the two military academies, and their social environment. This was briefly mentioned in Chapter Five. His presentation of the *Grenzer* in 1848-49 concentrates for the most part on the South-Slav troops and their questioned reliability.

István Deák’s *Beyond Nationalism. A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps* covers the period between 1848 and 1918 and presents the ideal image of the officer corps as ‘the nerve centre and spiritual essence of the army’, for whom ‘service to the monarch was the basic commitment, overruling all other considerations’. Deák stresses the extraordinary cohesion of the officer corps as well as the nationality blindness informing promotion. When referring to the
officers originating from the Military Border, Deák mentions, just like Sked before him, only the Serbs and the Croats. Drawing on memoirs and collections of anecdotes, the author points out that ‘the average Grenzer officer was content to remain in his own regiment and lacked the ambition needed for a great career’. In contrast, he also makes reference to the great number of South-Slav military dynasties and generals of Croatian and Serbian origin.⁶⁵

None of these writings, however, account for officers belonging to the other nationalities of the Empire (Poles, Ruthenes, Romanians, Slovenes, etc.). This can be attributed to the nature of these studies, conceived as broad synopses of the imperial army, and, as Dr Hochedlinger pointed out in his presentation of the challenges of research on early modern Habsburg military elites, also to the atomization of existing secondary literature along national lines.⁶⁶ Given this bibliographical context, the present thesis contributes to English-language scholarship a multiple case study, which focuses on one of the non-German nationalities of the Empire and engages with the notion of a multinational Habsburg army from the point of view of a fringe elite group, the Romanian Banat Border officers.

While Austrian authors such as Allmayer-Beck draw attention to the fact that the image of the a-political k.u.k officer was by and large a piece of fiction,⁶⁷ there is surprisingly little historical literature in English or in German that goes beyond this fiction, that shows, in other words, how the various nationalities making up this multiethnic army actually related to it, to the Monarchy as a whole, to their own nation, and how they negotiated and seesawed between their civil and military status. If they were indeed politically aware, what was their political orientation?; how did they act on it?; did it affect their military status?
One of the few studies that engages with the question of the officers’ involvement in politics is Antonio Schmidt-Brentano’s *Die Armee in Österreich. Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft 1848-1867*, which examines Austrian military reactions to the constitutional framework of the Monarchy and to the emergence of the parliamentary system. The author points out the scarcity of personal testimonies indicative of military attitudes to the metamorphosis of the structure of government.68 Relying on extant documentary evidence, Schmidt-Brentano shows that, although active officers were debarred from any political involvement, once retired they were allowed participation in constitutional processes, such as elections, out of a conviction that ‘their keeping away from politics would unnecessarily weaken the conservative element.’69

Another study dealing with the relationship between military and civilian authorities is Christoph Führ’s *Das k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando und die Innenpolitik in Österreich (1914-1917)*, although, as the title indicates, the book covers only the interaction between the k.u.k. high command and the Austrian government, with only passing remarks on the situation in Hungary, more often than not presented as having a *Sonderstellung* by comparison with Cisleithania.

Given the configuration of bibliography on the Habsburg officer corps as delineated above, the following chapters will contribute new evidence of the interplay between military and civil status by concentrating on extant testimonies of the Banat Border generals of Romanian origin.


1 Linda Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation 1707-1837, p. 333.
2 1 ’Imprimatul Iosif al II-lea a recunoscut pe români [...] ca urmași ai vechilor romani. Fiindcă pe acea vreme împărații Austriei purtau titlul de „împărat roman”, - după un vechi obiceiu – Isosif al II-lea, având supuși pe Români, era mandru de dânsiși și se considera ca adevărat împărat roman. Fiecare șă și grănițierii l-au priceput și s-au folosit de această mândrie împărătească exprimată de Isosif al II-lea, întârindu-le acesta sentimentul național și mândria lor românească’. (Iuliu Moisil, ‘Conștiința națională și eroismul grănițierilor nășădeni’ in Arhiva Someșană, no. 24, Năsăud, 1938, p. 144.)


27. Dolleczek, Monographie der k.u.k. österr.-ungar. blanken und Handfeuer-Waffen, p. 158.

28. Ibid., p. 159.

29. Dolleczek, Flags through the Centuries, p. 120.


32. The manuscript consists of 1000 pages’ worth of crammed, small handwriting and has, according to the archivists, daunted all attempts at publication.

33. ANBN, Francise Mihaiies, Amintiri din 1848-49, folio 25/ verso.

34. Karl Klein, Istoria de arme a Regimentului cezaro-craiesc graniceresc de infanterie nr. 17 national roman transilvanean, (Eds.) Adrian Onofrei and Ioan Bolovan, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2006.


36. Ibid., p. 81.

37. Dolleczek, Monographie der k.u.k. österr.-ungar. blanken und Handfeuer-Waffen, p. 162.


40. Ibid., p. 333.


43. Grămadă, Societatea Academică Socială Literară „România jună” din Viena, p. 4.


47. Ibid., p. 83.


52. OEStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 3532 (Trappl-Traun).


54. OEStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 899 (Gunzy-Gurth).

55. OEStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 72.


57. Marchescu, Grânicerii bănați, pp. 298-299.
Chapter 7: Professions of Allegiance (I):

Generalmajor Trajan Doda

While Chapter Five examined, on the basis of official military records, the formation of a Romanian generalcy stratum originating from the Banat Military Border, and Chapter Six set the social and cultural scene on which these generals acted, this and the following chapters will focus on the extant testimonies of four of these generals in an attempt to explain where their loyalties lay and, source permitting, what they understood by the much circulated concept of nation and if/how they acted on it. The initial number of fifteen generals listed by Antoniu Marchescu in his history of the Banat Military Border had to be narrowed down to Trajan Doda, Michael von Trapsia, Nikolaus Cena, and Alexander Lupu on account of the scarcity of reliable documentary sources. It is these generals and their extra-military activity that will form the subject of chapters seven and eight. Particular emphasis will be given to expressions of allegiance or any actions on their part conducive to an inference of the nature of that allegiance. Sporadic and, for the most part, incidental information is available on other Banat Border generals as will become apparent in this and the following chapters.

The entire seventh chapter is given over to Trajan Doda and this for several reasons: he is the first k.k. officer of Romanian origin from the Banat Military Border to reach the rank of General (in his case, Generalmajor); he is, moreover, the only one of these Generals to become an MP in the Hungarian Parliament; last but not least, and, to a certain extent, deriving from the first two reasons, there is much more archival and journalistic material available on Doda than on any other Banat
Border general. As we shall see further on, the availability of material is proportionate with the degree of involvement in cultural politics of these generals and the controversial character of this involvement. It is my methodological option to dwell on moments of crisis, which I view as occasions for stating one’s identity and spelling out one’s position within the Empire and vis-à-vis the controversial issues of the day.

FZM B. Diettrich, a former director of the Wiener Neustadt Academy, was reminiscing around the year 1864 about his Romanian students from the Military Border. He particularly recalled one incident involving a young Romanian corporal, who, although serious and conscientious, could also be very restless:

‘One day through his vivacity and mobility he incurred the wrath of the commanding Director of the Institution, who rebuked him in a harsh tone of voice: “Sie unbändiger wilder Kroat!” (You unruly and savage Croat!). On this, the small corporal stood to attention before his superior and, looking him straight in the eyes, replied: “Ich bin weder wild, noch Kroat!” (I am neither a savage, nor a Croat!). Such audacity gave pause to the commander, who, before finding something to say, saw the midget salute and withdraw in regular step with all gravity.”

The corporal that B. Diettrich remembered was Trajan Doda, who, by the time this story was recounted to Vincențiu Babeș, had become a Colonel and a local Commander in Venice. This anecdote, extracted from a couple of extant draft pages of Vincențiu Babeș’s autobiographical notes to be found in the National Archives in

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‘O dată prin vivacitatea şi mobilitatea sa escesivă a scos din fire pe Directorele comandante al Institutului, carele de cei în răstite i-a apostrofat “croațule salbatic și nestarnic!” (“Sie unbändiger wilder Kroat!”). La aceste cuvinte, micul caporal s’a pus în postură înaintea mai marei și fixându-l ager i-a răspuns: ”Ich bin weder wild, noch Kroat!” (“Nici nu sun selbatic, nici Croat!”). Comandantele a stat încremenit d’ata ta cutesană și până se gândia, că ce să-i dicu, piticul a salutat și în pas regulamentar s-a retras cu tota gravitatea.’
Bucharest, will serve as a preface to my analysis of Doda’s sense of allegiance as apparent primarily in his parliamentary activity.

Following his retirement from the Austro-Hungarian army in 1872 as Generalmajor, Trajan Doda returned to Caransebes in the, by now, former Military Border Regiment district and became the first president of Comunitatea de Avere, the new administrative unit formed in the wake of the Military Border dissolution in the Banat. Apart from his administrative and cultural duties, and his initiatives in this capacity, between 1874 and 1887 he was actively involved in Hungarian politics as an MP for the Caransebes electoral district, one of the largest of its kind in Hungary. Doda’s political career between 1874 and 1887 has been little documented, secondary literature, itself scant, focusing primarily on the end of his involvement with Hungarian politics and the scandal surrounding it.

Prefiguratively, Doda’s entrance onto the Hungarian political stage was marked, in a less virulent form than was his exit in 1887, by controversy and accusations. Antoniu Marchescu presents Doda as a candidate of the national party in the early 1874 elections for the Hungarian Parliament and provides a full translation of Doda’s account of the speech he gave in front of a voters’ assembly in December 1873. Apart from the reiteration of a rather unusual question to his audience (‘in what capacity are you all gathered here, as ordinary voters or on behalf of a party?’) and the fact that the General himself provided a written account of the meeting, which constituted Marchescu’s source, there is no indication that this was anything more than the usual electoral meeting (for an English translation of Doda’s account of the meeting, see the first appendix to Chapter Seven).

The first four points in the General’s programme contained his profession of allegiance to the Emperor and King and his devotion to preserving the ‘integrity of
the fatherland’, while recognizing the Ausgleich and all the laws sanctioned by the Emperor. In contrast, his support for the government as a Member of Parliament was presented as conditional upon it furthering the good of the people. Central to Doda’s programme was the nationality law, which he deemed ‘insufficient and unjust’ and in need of modification ‘so that everyone should find in it the guarantee of their national existence and development.’ The new law should, in Doda’s view, ensure ‘equality of rights for all nationalities’ and, in particular, the right of all nationalities to education in their own language. This ‘nationalization’, understood in a linguistic sense, should, moreover, be extended to the ‘authorities with whom the people come into contact’, meaning that ‘the people should communicate in their national language with the communal authorities as well as with the districts and counties, with all legal authorities and with the Ministries.’

An extant document in the Kriegsministerium Präsidium holding of the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna discloses the saga behind this seemingly non-descript electoral episode as well as explaining why the General insisted on learning in what capacity the voters had gathered there and the reason behind his keeping a verbatim record of the meeting. The KM Präs document is a report, dated 26 January 1874, submitted by Doda to the Military Command in Temesvár and forwarded by the latter to the War Ministry in Vienna. The report contains Doda’s justification as requested by the Temesvár military authorities following the publication of an article in Neue Temesvärer Zeitung calling into question the General’s honourable character and conduct during the electoral campaign. The article was one of a series of incriminatory pieces, which accused Doda of having deceived the governmental party by leading them to believe he would act as their candidate in the forthcoming elections.
According to Doda (see my transliteration of the German original of his report as Appendix 2.2), local supporters of the governmental party attempted to recruit him as their candidate in October 1873, at a time when he had already accepted to run for Parliament as a national party candidate. Moreover, Doda points out, the governmental party had already chosen their candidate in the person of a certain Ladislaus Szende, who had made public his electoral programme in November 1873. Doda repeatedly stresses that, although various notables of Caransebes representing the governmental party visited him and asked him for an electoral programme, he received no official offer of candidacy from them and also signified to them he had no intention of presenting a programme. Doda goes on to mention that he had been campaigning on behalf of the national party ever since they chose him for their candidate and, as his past was for them the best of programmes (‘*meine Vergangenheit für sie das schönste Programm wäre*’), he did not proceed to elaborating one.

It is not clear to what extent the continued insistence of the governmental party that Doda should announce a programme on their behalf was the result of strategic planning. Doda interprets it as an attempt to recruit him in order to garner votes and, thus, improve their weak power base in Caransebes. The motivation he received from the local governmental party was their intention to achieve a fusion of the two parties (national and governmental) by choosing Doda as their joint candidate (‘*hiedurch zwischen der Regierungspartei und der nationalen oder Volkspartei eine Vereinigung in meiner Person als dem gemeinschaftlichen Candidaten herbeizuführen*’). It is in this context that Doda decided to make known his electoral programme at the voters’ assembly of 8 December 1873 and it is on
account of these informal discussions with various members of the Regierungspartei that he insisted that the assembled voters should state their political affiliation.

Rumours set into circulation after the assembly led Doda to have an account of the meeting printed and distributed among his electors. The anonymous authors of the incriminatory article published in Neue Temesvárer Zeitung claimed that the printed minutes of the meeting did not correspond to the speech Doda gave at the time, in particular, as regards his attack on the law of nationalities. This accusation, as pointed out earlier, alerted the military authorities in Temesvár, who asked Doda to provide an explanation, which they duly forwarded on to Vienna. The Temesvár Command did not consider it necessary for this explanation to appear in print and confined themselves to showing that Doda as an MP could clarify the matter in one of the parliamentary debates.10

I have chosen to dwell on this initial episode in Doda’s political career not only because it derives from new archival information, which is not to be found in any of the secondary sources consulted, but also because it highlights a number of aspects that are relevant for my further analysis. Firstly, it casts light on Doda’s relationship with both the military and civil authorities and shows that, although he was a retired general, he was still very much part of the imperial army and, therefore, liable to account for his acts as a civilian before his ‘militärischen Standesgenossen’ (his military peers). Similarly, Doda’s notification of his election to Parliament sent to the Temesvár and Viennese military authorities shows he himself felt in duty bound to communicate the change in his political status and to add that his domicile had remained the same.11

As we shall see in the next chapter as well, in particular in Cena’s case, these generals’ retirement did not signify their exiting military jurisdiction or foregoing
military status and prestige. I am making a point of stressing the preservation of this relationship into the Ruhestande in order to counteract assumptions in Romanian secondary literature to the effect that these generals were no longer bound to the military establishment after their retirement and that, as such, they could engage more overtly in national projects and even irredentist fraternization.12

Secondly, the episode highlights the importance of the notion of Ehre, or honour, in both Doda’s political discourse and in his interaction with the authorities, military or civil. Thus, although in presenting his programme he spoke in the name of the non-Hungarian peoples with a view to an amelioration of the nationalities law, which he denounced as unjust, he also emphasized his loyalty to the Monarch and his military past as a defender of the ‘Fatherland’. In his report to the Temesvár Command, he refuted the accusations published in Neue Temesvárer Zeitung as a man of honour and as a soldier, for whom honour was the most prized possession, which, in his own words, was not for sale even for millions (‘zwar behaupte ich dieß als Ehrenmann, als Soldat, dem die Ehre das theureste Gut ist und welcher selbst um Millionen nicht feil ist’).13

Moreover, the fusion between military honour and probity, on the one hand, and the courage of supporting the national cause, which can be detected in Doda’s refutation of the accusations levelled against him, will, as we shall see in this and the following chapter, become a discursive leitmotif with these generals. Defending the nationality issue is not perceived as a centrifugal, irredentist tendency. On the contrary, it is presented as an occasion to denounce a social and political ill plaguing the Monarchy and as an attempt to heal it for the sake of the Monarchy and of the peoples in it:
‘I called the Nationality Law unjust because I believe it to be so and I have the courage, too, to thus voice my conviction. If all laws were good and just, then there would soon reign eternal peace instead of perpetual war.’  

Thirdly, and, as we shall see in the penultimate chapter of the present thesis, by no means less importantly, these persistent attempts at enlisting Doda’s electoral support by the governmental party as well as his successful courting by the national party are evidence to the general’s great popularity and electoral appeal in the region. He was a native of the former Military Border, with whom the common Grenzer could identify; he was also a decorated imperial general and, as such, part of a cultured, meritocratic elite, who could appeal to and, indeed, had connections among the intelligentsia; by virtue of his military status, he was perceived as a figure of authority and a direct link to the Emperor; finally, he had once before secured the vote of confidence of his community when he was elected President of Comunitatea de Avere.

This was the symbolical capital with which the general was invested. Evidence suggests that, for all his reputation, his effective political influence was limited. Thus, in 1882 he headed a committee commissioned by the Banat ex-Border communes to set up a high school in Caransebes, which was to be sponsored with funds that the community was entitled to after the dissolution of the Border. Ten years later, the application for approval to the Minister of Public Instruction was still without an answer, as the authors of the 1892 tract The Romanian Question in Transylvania and Hungary pointed out.  

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*Ich nannte das Nationalitäten-Gesetz ein ungerechtes schon deshalb, weil ich es als solches halte und auch den Muth habe, es als das zu bezeichnen, was es nach meiner Überzeugung ist. – Wären alle Gesetze gut und gerecht, so würde bald ewiger Fried statt des ewigen Kampfes herrschen.*
The most important and controversial episode of Doda’s political career took place in the context of the 1887 elections for the Hungarian Parliament. Doda secured a parliamentary seat as the national representative of the Caransebes electoral district. According to Antoniu Marchescu, the seven other Romanians elected to the Hungarian Parliament that year were governmental candidates. Consequently, Doda emerged as the sole Romanian national representative and, in protest, refused to hand in his credentials. He justified his attitude in a letter of 10 October 1887 to the Speaker, or President, of the Chamber of Deputies, Tamás Péchy, as a form of protest against the fraudulent way in which the government had handled the elections. The validation of only one national representative of the Romanians in Hungary in the 1887 elections constituted the nadir of political under-representation of Romanians in Hungarian politics since the setting up of the modern constitutional system in 1848. In protest, Doda withheld his credentials and refused to participate in the parliamentary proceedings, at the same time refusing to give up his parliamentary seat.

Doda’s political stance and its singularity can be better understood if considered within the context of Hungarian politics post 1867 and, in particular, that of Hungarian electoral practice. Notoriously admonished in the Hungarian governmental daily *Pester Lloyd* as an instance of Babel-like confusion (*babylonische Verworrenheit zum Gesetz erhoben*), the Electoral Law of 1874 was a refurbishment of the 1848 law and a highly interpretable and intricate act of Parliament. As such, it granted franchise to a small percentage of the total population of Hungary on a complex basis of property, taxation, and ancient rights, and, far from drawing clear boundaries between electors and non-electors, lent itself to discretionary interpretation and enforcement so that ‘its stipulations made it
possible for even a moderately astute copyist to either contest or demonstrate the right to vote of any given person in Hungary’ (Pester Lloyd, No. 177, 24 July 1894 as quoted by Brote). In addition to the legislated confusion regarding criteria for designating franchise holders, a number of other factors contributed to an erratic and, as such, manipulable voting process. One of them was the demarcation of electoral districts, which, given the lack of any legal stipulation, fell to the lot of administrative authorities and gave rise to chronic gerrymandering. Thus, the number of voters varied between 158 (Abrudbánya) and 6,009 (Homonna) for one electoral district, notwithstanding the fact that each of them could only send one representative to Parliament. The boundaries of electoral districts were tailored so that in each of them pro-governmental voters constituted a majority. Eugen Brote shows how a number of twelve non-Romanian districts, together amounting to 5,161 voters, still fell short of the voter number of the Caransebes district, with a majority of Romanian population (5,275 voters), so that the former could elect twelve representatives while the latter, only one.21

As Andrew Janos points out, administrative bureaucracy had become, by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a powerful instrument for ‘making the elections and perpetuating the Liberal majority’ with the result that ‘some 160 constituencies, inhabited mainly by Slovaks and Romanians, turned into “rotten boroughs” under bureaucratic tutelage’ returning with ‘monotonous regularity candidates of the incumbent party’.22 Within this context, a frequently used strategy of manipulation was the location of the polling station at the periphery of an electoral district or as far away from the non-Hungarian voters or non-governmental sympathizers as possible in an attempt to foster absenteeism.23
The response to this political situation on the part of Romanian intelligentsia in Transylvania and Hungary was polarized between two types of attitude: a passivist and an activist one. By virtue of the distinct electoral law valid in Transylvania, Romanian political participation was reduced to a minimum, which triggered among Romanian intellectuals the scandalized refusal to take part in parliamentary elections. Voices, such as that of the Metropolitan Andrei Şaguna, pleading for a continuation of the active constitutional struggle, did not succeed in swaying this predominant mood, being associated with the propaganda made by public servants in the pay of the government.\footnote{\textit{Din împrejurarea că pentru politică de activitate a lui Şaguna faceau propagandă mai ales funcționarii publici, aflători în serviciul guvernului unguresc, s-a născut părerea că politică lui Şaguna e politică guvernului unguresc.}}

By his double refusal (to hand in his credentials and to give up his parliamentary seat) Doda boycotted not so much the elections to Parliament as their result. His stance combined the passivist with the activist line of action: he entered the electoral process and emerged a winner and only then did he withdraw from further political participation. His obstruction to the system was, therefore, more efficient than the complete passivism of his Transylvanian co-nationals and more conspicuous too. As an elected MP he placed himself in a position where he made himself heard in that his abstention became a procedural issue, which had to be dealt with by the Speaker. In less academic terms, he became a thorn in the side of Parliament. This complex attitude on Doda’s part was in keeping with the promise he had made to his electorate in his 1873 programme, where he gave assurance that he would not withdraw his candidacy of his own accord but only if he should be constrained to it by a superior power or will.
As mentioned earlier, Doda justified his position to the Speaker in a letter dated 10 October 1887, which appeared in the press. A second letter was sent to his voters in the Caransebes electoral district on 12 October 1887, which occasioned a reiteration of his allegiance to Throne and nation in the following terms:

‘In the unbelievable case, which I am not even going to consider, that you should not approve of my action, I would like to state from the very beginning that a possible reproach from you would not move me in my conviction that I am, thus, faithfully and honourably fulfilling my duty to the Throne and to my nation; you would only prove to your nation that you are not its worthy sons, your electoral district being now called upon to defend the national honour. If you approve of my step, and I am fully persuaded that you do, then remember that a long and difficult battle lies ahead of you; today we are no longer talking about a seat or a vote in the Hungarian Parliament or about some minor national linguistic or political concessions – for these are mere trifles today given the critical situation we are in; today the cause of the entire Romanian nation and, indeed, the honour itself of the Romanian people are at stake, a people who was ousted from the constitutional fight through machinations and violence and who found one last refuge in your electoral district.’

An order sent on 29 November 1887 by the Deputy Lord Lieutenant (Rom. Vice-comite, Hun. alispán) of the Krassó-Szörény County to the Mayor of Caransebes charts this event at a local level and asks for vigilance against all anti-state and illegal actions in anticipation of the voters’ assembly to be held in Caransebes on 1 December that year. The account contained in this order refers to the second letter Doda wrote to the Speaker in response to the latter’s demand that he submit his credentials within fifteen days. The account testifies to the strong base of support Doda enjoyed in Caransebes and, interestingly enough, to the cohesion of political purpose of other former k.k. officers, who are shown to endorse Doda’s action:
‘We were informed that the letter MP Traian Doda of Caransebeș addressed for the second time to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and which was signed by several members of the ecclesiastic consistory [consistoriu] of Caransebeș as well as by several retired k.k. officers, was printed and distributed to the population side by side with the manifesto addressed to the voters.

In this manifesto the voters of the Caransebeș electoral district are summoned to the conference that will be held on the first of December in Caransebeș, where points of view will be considered and ways in which to support Doda’s mandate, to which conference they are all urged to be present.‘

Romanian officers, whether active or in retirement, lending support to national claims was not a novelty and, as Zenovie Pâclișanu shows, the pattern dates back to the late eighteenth-century petitionary movement among the Transylvanian Uniate clergy which culminated with the _Supplex Libellus Valachorum_. Pâclișanu stresses the importance of an earlier petition drawn up by Ioan Para and Petru Maior (which was to be submitted to Emperor Leopold II) and considers it revelatory of the emergence of a new social element in the realm of Romanian politics: the officer class (Rom. _ofiterimea_). Thus, one of the copies of this petition was signed by twelve officers from the two Transylvanian Romanian Border Regiments, while the text proper of the petition dwelt at some length on the military contribution of the Transylvanian Romanians as frontiersmen and as the bulk of the regular militia forces. The military argument seems to acquire here almost as much weight as the historical one traditionally used in support of the claim that the Romanian population be recognized as a fourth political nation in Transylvania. From a rhetorical point of view, the invocation of loyal military service was (perceived, at least, as) a more

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*‘Ni s-a adus la cunoștință că scrisoarea deputatului în Adunarea Națională, Traian Doda din Caransebeș, adresată pentru a doua oară președintelui Adunării reprezentanților și semnată de mai mulți membri ai consistoriului ecleiastic din Caransebeș și de mai mulți ofițeri cezaro-crăiești în retragere, a fost difuzată populației sub formă de tipărită alături de manifestul adresat alegătorilor. În acest manifest alegătorii din circumscripția electorală Caransebeș sunt chemați la conferința stabilită pentru ziua de 1 decembrie la Caransebeș la care se vor dezbate modalitățile și punctele de vedere pentru susținerea mandatului lui Doda.’*
effective argument with the imperial authorities: imperial officers guarding the
boundaries of the Empire and, implicitly, protecting its integrity, could hardly be
suspected of seditious intentions. Thus, national claims allied with military
arguments stood a better chance of finding a sympathetic ear.

Almost a century later, this rhetorical pattern had not lost its viability and
was still being used to refute accusations of irredentism and rebellious intentions.
Thus, in 1878, in conclusion to the Sibiu (Hermannstadt) electoral conference,
George Barițiu highlighted the importance of the Romanians in the Dual Monarchy
as ‘a people whose sons form whole regiments of brave and loyal soldiers in His
Majesty’s army, a people amounting to three millions, whose hard work contributes
tens of millions to the state treasury annually’.

With Doda this type of justification by invoking military loyalty ceases to be
a mere trope and becomes a **pro-domo-sua** argument. Thus, the general asserted his
allegiance to the state and monarch and reiterated it in both his capacity as a general
and as an MP. As his case was referred to the Incompatibility Commission (Rom.
**comisia de incompatibilitate**) of the Hungarian Parliament, Doda declined its
summons holding that his initial position and justification as addressed to the
Speaker had not changed and exhorted the Commission to analyse this case ‘from
the point of view of higher reasons of state’. In this context, he viewed his own
abstention as ‘the greatest favour’ he could have done to his fatherland as an MP
under such circumstances.

Doda’s initial statement of loyalty and his military prestige lent authority to
his political stance. The above-mentioned voters’ assembly, which took place, as

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**‘un popor ai cărui fii supremul beliude are sub stindardul armatei sale corpuri întregi de ostași
bravi și credincioși, un popor de trei milioane, din a cărui sudoare cruntă se varsă pe fiecare an zeci de
dizioane în tezaurul statului’.”**
anticipated, on the first of December 1887 in Caransebes, confirmed once more the electorate’s support for Doda, who thanked them for their loyalty and drew their attention to the critical situation the Romanians were in:

‘My purpose was to wake the Romanians up and also to get our complaints to reach the highest places, so that His Majesty can see that our discontent is great indeed and our suffering has increased so that we cannot bear it any more, for if I, as a general who has bled for Throne and Fatherland, am forced to do this, then something must be rotten in our Empire and measures must be taken to mend the ill.’\textsuperscript{31}

This is the narrative one gleans from secondary literature and from Doda’s official statements. An exploration of the Mocsonyi family archive in the Bucharest National Archives brings to light new snippets of evidence concerning Doda’s post-electoral stance (for a brief history of the Mocsonyis see the capsule biography in the appendix section). I thus came across what at first sight seemed to be one of Doda’s letters, in which he justified his political attitude to a friend and asked him to hand in his official justification to the Emperor (for the full transcription of the German original, see Annex 2.3.):

‘I take full responsibility before the world for this step of mine and, at the same time, I consider it my military duty as His Majesty’s devoted soldier to make this act of mine known to him.

I am therefore asking you, dear friend, to submit to His Majesty’s attention my declaration (enclosed here in German translation), which I sent to the Hungarian Parliament and which contains the specific motives behind this step of mine.’\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{31} ‘Scopul meu a fost să deștept pe Români și totodată, ca vaietele noastre să strâbată până la locurile cele mai înalte, ca vadă și Majestatea Sa, că nemulțumirea noastră este mare și că suferințele noastre au ajuns de nu le mai putem suporta, pentru, dacă eu, ca general, care am sângeat pentru tron și patrie, sunt silit să fac aceasta, atunci trebuie să fie ceva putred în împărăția noastră și trebuie luate mijloace spre sanarea răului.’

\textsuperscript{32} ‘Zwar nehme ich die volle Verantwortung für diesen meinen Schritt vor der ganzen Welt auf mich, dennoch halte ich es, als der stets treu ergebene Soldat Sr. M., für meine militärischen Pflicht diesen meinen Act zur allerhöchßten Kenntniß zu bringen.

203
The letter as such is neither signed nor dated and puzzles one through its rough draft appearance (various sentences are crossed out and reformulated). Its contents, however, bear a striking resemblance to Doda’s official statement as submitted to the Hungarian Parliament and published in several newspapers and, particularly, to the letter addressed to his electors. One comes across similar phrases such as ‘passive abstention’ (passive Renitenz), unnatural/abnormal political relations (die Widernatürlichkeit unserer politischen Verhältnisse/abnormen Verhältnisse). Added to this, there is the unique combination of elements which leads one to think of Doda as the author (the writer has been newly re-elected as an MP for the Caransebes district, he is protesting against the unjust political system in Hungary, he is refusing to give up his mandate and, at the same time, will not participate in parliamentary activity). The decisive argument in favour of the assumption that this is, indeed, a Doda letter is, however, the invocation of military duty and the unequivocal reference to himself as ‘His Majesty’s constantly loyal soldier’. Thus, if in the wake of the Doda scandal, his line of protest was replicated by the second Caransebes MP, Mihail Popoviciu, with the same result, that is, the eventual cancellation of his mandate, he could not have written such a letter because he was a priest (Rom. protoprezbiter) and not a soldier. The third candidate, Lajos Mocsáry, a Hungarian journalist and politician, submitted his credentials and took part in the parliamentary proceedings.33

However, a number of manuscript tracts in draft form on Hungarian politics and the nationality problem,34 written in virtually the same hand, point to Alexandru Mocsonyi as the author of both these and the ‘Doda’ letter. Additionally, rough
drafts of Doda’s letter to his electors as well as of his declaration to the Hungarian Parliament, to be found in the Vincenţiu Babeş personal archive in Cluj, are also written in Mocsonyi’s hand and headed by ‘Dódás Declaration an den Reichstag von 1887’, which would have been an odd title to put in if Doda himself had been the author of the draft.

A brief reference to the Doda episode in Teodor Botiş’s monograph of the Mocsonyi family confirms the above inferences:

‘When the general was brought to trial for the contents of his letter to the Speaker of Parliament, Alexandru Mocsonyi, who was the author of the letter and the one who had inspired the general’s attitude, felt in duty bound to express his opinion and published a judicious article in Luminătorul, a Timişoara newspaper’.*35

This piece of information does not figure in secondary bibliography on Trajan Doda and the very auctorial reversal it suggests is symptomatic of one of the major shortcomings of existing literature on Romanian generals such as Doda: they are described in isolation with little attempt to relate their actions to the wider historical context or to focus on their relationship with other members of the Romanian intelligentsia in Hungary and in the Regat. The fact that Alexandru Mocsonyi was behind the Doda protest does not necessarily detract from the general’s merits but it does point to an orchestrated effort, which brought together a lawyer’s expertise (that is, Mocsonyi’s) and an imperial general’s prestige and popularity, rather than to a quixotic individual initiative.

The origin of this blind spot lies in the deterministic bibliographical chain that informs our knowledge of Doda and his actions. Authors such as Liviu Groza fall back on Marchescu’s history of the Banat Border, which draws its material from

* ‘Când generalul a fost dat în judecată pentru conținutul scrisorii sale către președintele Camerii, Alexandru Mocsonyi – care era autorul scrisorii și inspiratorul ținutei generalului – a ținut de datoria sa să-și spună cuvântul, publicând în ziarul “Luminătorul” din Timișoara, un judicios articol’.
Teodor V. Păcățian’s massive opus *Cartea de aur sau luptele politice naționale ale românilor sub Coroana ungăriă* (The Golden Book or the national political struggles of the Romanians under the Hungarian Crown), which, in turn, relies exclusively on published material (the minutes of the Hungarian Parliament, articles printed in the main Romanian and Hungarian newspapers, official statements etc.). Păcățian reproduces Alexandru Mocsonyi’s article from *Luminătoriul*, in which the latter defended General Doda against the charge of incitement. As this article, however, makes no reference to Mocsonyi’s own involvement with this action, Păcățian and all the subsequent literature drawing on his work inevitably portray Doda as the sole initiator of this political stance.

A letter from Vincențiu Babeș to Ioan Slavici dated 3/15 October 1887 reveals not only that other Romanian intellectuals were involved in this political move but also that this had been a well-planned project, which was meant to solve the problem of political under-representation in a more effective way than the hitherto applied policy of passivity and petitionarism:

‘The Doda combination was mentioned as early as last autumn, when I was already predicting that the grand vizier [i.e. Tisza – editor’s note] would go to any lengths to exclude me and even Truță from the Diet. Last summer that combination was effectively planned out at Herculane by Doda and Mr Ales. Mocioni. I thought of this during the Sibiu Conference and I would have been pained indeed if a decision in favour of passivity had rendered impossible this brilliant action. *Entre nous,* the action will not be over with the letters to the Diet and the message to the voters; there will also be an attempt to put these documents before the Monarch’s eyes via His Majesty’s military chancellery through Baron Popp. Should this succeed, then there will be no more need for protracted memoranda on the part of the Sibiu Committee.’**37
In light of this testimony, the addressee of the unsigned draft letter in the Mocsonyi personal archive in Bucharest might well be the said Baron Popp, the ‘dear friend’, as referred to in the letter, who was urged to submit to the Emperor Doda’s political justification.

The outcome of the protest was the eventual cancellation of Doda’s mandate and the organization of new elections for the Caransebes district. The letter of 12 October 1887 addressed by Doda to his voters came to constitute the grounds for his impeachment under the charge of incitement against the Hungarian race. This was consequent upon a new addition to the Penal Code of 1878 (§ 172 Strafgesetz 1878), which criminalized incitement through the press against class, nationality, and religion, and rendered it punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment. An attack of apoplexy prevented Doda from showing up in court and the sentence was passed in contumaciam without allowing his defence lawyer to plead his case. The sentence (two years imprisonment and 1,000 Florins fine) was annulled following medical investigation of Doda’s condition by a forensic doctor but the trial remained open.

On 11 July 1889 Doda sent a petition to the Emperor asking for intercession and pleading his innocence of the charges brought against him. His expressed incredulity regarding the accusation of hate mongering rests on the same type of rhetoric mentioned earlier:

‘An imperial general inciting to hatred against a nationality! I, who have always upheld the principle that only brotherly communion and the collaboration of all

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Eu aveam acestea în vedere pe timpul conferinței din Sibiu și de aceea tare m-ar fi durut dacă un concluz pentru pasivitate generali ne făcea imposibilă această eclatantă manifestațione. Şi între noi fie zis, lucrul n-are să fie terminat prin literile cătră dietă și apelul cătră alegători; are să mai urmeze o încercare d-a pune aceste acte, prin cancelaria militară a Maestății Sale, respectiv baronul Popp, de-a dreptul naintea ochilor monarhului. De va succede, apoi nu ne mai trebuesc memorande anevoioase din partea Comitetului din Sibiu.’
peoples that make up Austria-Hungary can preserve this monarchy! I should laugh at such an allegation if its consequences were not so terribly sad.∗∗∗

Unlike other supporters of Romanian national rights (Ioan Slavici, ‘who had reproduced Doda’s address in Tribuna, and had commented on it as a sign of national awakening’, and subsequently the signatories of the 1892 Memorandum, to mention only the most prominent of them), who were imprisoned for similar accusations, Doda was cleared of the charges in December 1889. However, opinions as to the source of this decision vary. Marchescu merely quotes the official decision of the Arad tribunal (procurorul din Arad), Seton-Watson and Bodea present this denouement as an instance of ‘reprieve by imperial order’ and Liviu Groza holds that it was imperial ‘caution’ that prompted the cancellation of the sentence passed by the Royal Tribunal of Arad. There are at least two arguments against this assumption. Firstly, the very formulation of the Arad tribunal notification sent to Doda on 3 December 1889 seems to indicate that the Emperor merely rubberstamped a decision which was essentially made by the Hungarian Royal Ministry:

‘His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, having given His approval, in the High Resolution of 7 September, on the decision of 14 July 1889 by the Royal Hungarian Ministry to discontinue the trial against the sender of this petition under the charges of press offence, the said royal tribunal withdraws its charges in the said press trial.

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‘Un general împăraţesc să agiteze la ură împotriva unei naţionalităţi! Eu, care susţin cu tărie principiul, că numai frâţeasca împreunare şi conlucrare a tuturor popoarelor, care constituiesc Austro-Ungaria, pot să conserve monarhia aceasta! Ar trebui să râd de asemenea afirmare, dacă lucrurile nu ar avea nişte urmări atât de grozav de triste.’

The German text of the petition was published in Tribuna, No. 286, 15/27 December, p. 1141: ‘Ein kaiserlicher General soll zum Hasse gegen eine Nationalität reizen? Ich, der ich den Glaubenssatz festhalte, dass nur die einträchtige Zusammenhalten und Wirken aller Österreich-Ungarn bildenden Völker diese Monarchie erhalten können! Die genannte Behauptung wäre zum Lachen, wenn der Gegenstand nicht so furchtbar traurige Folgen hätte!’
The retired imperial royal general Traian Doda is hereby notified of this decision.
Arad, 3 December 1889, Parecz György, Royal Prosecutor'.**47

Secondly, further doubt as to the reasons behind this decision is cast by an 1889 issue of Tribuna, which argues that the decision of the Hungarian Ministry in Budapest preceded any imperial intercession:

‘General Traian Doda’s petition was dated 11 July 1889. It was sent by post to Vienna to His Majesty our Emperor and King. However, as early as 14 July 1889 the Hungarian Royal Ministry in Budapest decided to propose to the Crown the discontinuation of the trial through an act of imperial grace. Moreover, at the same time, Dr Vasile Lucaciu48 was acquitted by the Sătmar [Szatmár] tribunal.’***

(Tribuna, No. 288, 17/29 December 1889, p. 1149)

I am insisting on this legal issue because its clarification casts light on the relationship between Doda as an imperial general and the Monarch. If the Emperor was indeed the one who ordered the cancellation of the trial against Doda, this would go to show that the direct relationship between Emperor and his army extended into the civilian sphere and overrode Hungarian jurisdiction. Conversely, if the Emperor merely seconded a decision already made by the Hungarian Ministry, then this would give the lie to existing literature on the Doda case, which claims that the trial was brought to an end by imperial intercession or reprieve.49 Nevertheless, a decision by the Hungarian authorities would be equally singular given the unpropitious context set by the 1879 Penal Code50 and the ensuing spate of

** ‘Majestatea Sa imperială și regală apostolică, îndurându-se a lua, prin preaînalta hotărâre dela 7 Septembrie, cu aprobare la cunoștință hotărârea dela 14 Iulie 1889 a Ministerului reg.ung. de a se sista procedura pusă în cursere în contra prezentatorului acestei petiții, pentru delict de presă, subscrișa procuratură regească și retrage acusa în respectivul proces de presă. Despre ce generalul ces. și reg. în pensiune Traian Doda e înmânințat prin prezenta deciziune. Arad, 3 December 1889, Parecz György, Royal Prosecutor.’

*** ‘Petițiunea domnului general Traian Doda e datată dela 11 iulie 1889. Ea a fost trimisă prin poștă la Viena, Maiestății Sale Imperatului și Regelui Nostru. Cu toate acestea încă la 14 iulie 1889 ministerul reg-ung. ia în Budapesta hotărârea de a-i propune Coroanei sistarea prin act de grație a procesului. Ba tot atunci e achitat și dl. Dr. Vasile Lucaciu de tribunalul Sătmar.’
prosecutions to which the non-Magyar press was subjected. Three years later, in 1892, the Committee of the Romanian National Party (PNR) were not admitted to an audience with the Emperor and their ill-fated Memorandum triggered ‘the usual charge of incitement’ and ‘a total of thirty-one years two months’ imprisonment’ for the leaders of PNR.  

As pointed out by the above-quoted Tribuna columnist, the source of the decision was a matter of speculation even at the time it was taken and, interestingly enough, it was perceived as a sign of conciliation, or Versöhnung, on the part of the Hungarian authorities, irrespective of the motives that might have lain behind it:

‘We will not look into the reasons of state by virtue of which this spirit of conciliation arose in the Budapest circles. We shall only confine ourselves to acknowledge with contentment that it has arisen, and to confess that we feel in duty bound to take it into consideration.’ (Tribuna, No. 288, 17/29 December 1889, p. 1149)∗

A Konferenz Protokoll of 26 December 1887, from the MKSM Bestand (Militär Kanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers) of the Viennese War Archives, shows that the legal action against Doda was brought to the Emperor’s attention as early as 1887, if only as a cursory note on the military agenda to be discussed by the monarch and his Field Marshals.  

As becomes apparent from the entries in the MKSM indices and the Anmerkung section in the Pensionsprotokolle, the practice of recording and tabulating information on officers and generals even after their retirement was a current one. Thus, the arrest of Nikolaus Cena in 1914 is duly recorded in the MKSM Namen-Register per 1914, although he retired in 1904.

∗‘Nu vom cerceta ş i nici nu avem să cercetăm, care sunt rezonanle de stat în virtutea cărora s-a produs în cercurile de la Budapesta acest spirit de conciliaţiune, ci ne mărginim a recunoaşte cu mulţumire că el s-a produs, ş i a mărturisit că ne simţim angajaţi a ține seamă de el.’
The records in the Kabinettskanzlei archive of the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv seem to confirm the chronological sequence of the events as presented in the quoted Tribuna article. The Vortrag of the Hungarian Minister of Justice, Desider Szilágyi, dated 27 October 1889,\textsuperscript{54} acknowledges receipt of Doda’s petition to the Emperor bearing the latter’s signature (‘das A[ller] h[öchsten] signirte Gesuch’, ‘das der A.h. Signatur gewürdigte Majestäts-Gesuch’) but makes a point of showing that the Hungarian Ministry had already made the decision to discontinue the trial against Doda by the time the said petition reached them:

‘Given that Your Imperial and Apostolic Royal Majesty’s humble Hungarian Ministry had, on the 14\textsuperscript{th} of July of the current year, decreed, even before the receipt of the mentioned petition for pardon, on the grounds stipulated below, following urgent consultation, that the necessary steps should be taken to discontinue the pending trial against the petitioner, I saw no necessity for the present case to be referred to the subordinate organs of justice, which is the usual procedure for petitions for grace, and I allow myself as a result to make the following humble report on the basis of the penal facts hereto reverently attached.’\textsuperscript{55} (underlining mine)

After a presentation of the evolution of the Doda trial and the eventual annulment of the sentence of 17 September 1888, Szilágyi goes on to list the Ministry’s reasons that led to the decision of a discontinuation of the trial against Doda:

‘In view of the fact that, because almost two years have passed since the publication of the open letter, which constituted the grounds for the first legal action, the matter has all but passed into oblivion, and given that its revival does not seem to serve any purpose [zweckmäßig] from a political point of view, even less so as the controversial open letter had no important impact as a result; furthermore, in consideration that Trajan Doda, who is moreover of an advanced age, is gravely ill having suffered a stroke, - the Hungarian Ministry concluded in its meeting of the
14th of July of the current year that the necessary steps should be taken towards the discontinuation of the trial against Trajan Doda.56

Unless the Hungarian authorities went to such lengths as to forge the Protokolle of their own Ministry by pre-dating them, the minutes of the Hungarian Ministry Conference, which took place on the 14 July 1889 under the presidency of Count Tisza, seem to confirm that the decision of dropping the charges against Doda was, indeed, made before receipt of the latter’s Gnadengesuch bearing the imperial signature. Thus, point four on the Ministry Conference agenda ran as follows:

‘Mr Prime Minister posed the question whether the press lawsuit against Trajan Doda, which was initiated following the decision of the Ministerrat [Council of Ministers] of the 2nd of January 1888, should continue or not, given the fact that the legal action so far was annulled on account of a procedural error on the part of the Royal Curia.

Given that, since the publication of the open letter on account of which the lawsuit was initiated, almost two years have passed and the letter itself has all but fallen into oblivion and its negative effects were not at all felt; given that Trajan Doda, who is really ill, would most probably fail to appear before Court in the case of the appointment of a new trial, and he would have to be brought in by force, which, in view of his condition, is likely to give the appearance of an unmotivated political persecution; in view, moreover, that the success to be achieved would not match the moral disadvantages, which, in case the trial proceeds, would be detrimental to the authority of state power, and it would not be convenient to offer the opportunity to elements inimical to the state to take advantage of the precariousness of penal regulations in press affairs – in view of all these, the Council of Ministers has decided to bring into discussion the continuation of the trial’.57

Szilágyi’s report communicates the ministerial decision and the rationale behind it, at the same time laying particular stress on the reluctance (on Szilágyi’s part, at least) with which this step was taken, as becomes apparent in the following paragraph:
‘I cannot leave unmentioned the regrettable fact that it was only by taking advantage of the flaws of our press lawsuit that Trajan Doda succeeded in invalidating the factually substantiated verdict of the jury given against him – and in his humbly submitted petition he totally unjustly accuses the Arad jury court not only of bias but also of deliberate antipathy; and, although in the present state of the matter there is still a legal ground on which, following a new trial, his condemnation would certainly be achieved just as it was achieved in the first, entirely lawful and norm-abiding, trial, I, however, since I am not willing to encourage by means of, otherwise deserved, severity his unveiled and offensive attempts aimed at political martyrdom, allow myself, on the basis of this decision of the Council of Ministers, to present this humble petition.’ 58 [to the effect that the Emperor gives his approval for the discontinuation of the trial]

(for the full contents of the report see the transcription of the original document in Annex 2.4.)

To conclude this ample diversion into the intricacies of the Doda trial, evidence suggests that, indeed, the Hungarian Ministry decision preceded imperial intercession and also that it was not so much Doda’s petition as the Hungarian authorities’ perception that a continuation of the trial would not be politically convenient for them that brought to an end the legal action against Doda. There are, however, a number of incongruities in the dates that appear in various sources. As can be seen above, Marchescu’s quotation of the notification of the Arad tribunal mentions that the imperial sanction to the Hungarian Ministry decision was given on 7 September, whereas the Szilágyi report in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv asking for such an approval is dated 27 October. While it is quite tempting to read into these incongruities an instance of a subtle imperial intervention, there is, however, no evidence that I am aware of to support such an assumption.

What Doda himself thought of the outcome of the trial and of the effect of his petition fails to come across in the only extant letter in which he touches upon the subject. The letter, which is part of the Vincenţiu Babeş personal archive to be found
in the Cluj National Archives, was addressed to the editor of the Temesvár newspaper *Luminătoriul* in reaction to an article which maintained that Doda owed his freedom to imperial pardon and that he had submitted his petition under the influence of ‘cowardly, opportunistic people’ (see the full text of the letter in Appendix 2.5). Unfortunately for us, Doda took offence at the article and, consequently, made short shrift of the explanation to the editor, the result being a thickening of the plot, rather than a clarification of what (he thought) actually happened:

‘In issue 89 of *Luminătoriul* you put in a note under the rubric “Reviews and news” that the press trial launched against me was discontinued entirely by means of Imperial pardon. The news that appeared in foreign newspapers regarding this matter is not accurate. You then go on:

“We have the information, which is wholly credible, that General Doda, being egged on by cowardly and opportunistic people, of whom he cannot rid himself, submitted his petition to His Majesty, the Monarch, and as a consequence of this petition they put a complete stop to this press trial.”

I have no intention of starting a polemic against your information, wholly credible as it is, for I have never sought justification except before my own conscience; that is why I write these lines to you only.

The Romanian jubilee has already suffered enough because of the quarrelling between its leaders. […]

I am not in the habit of doing things, for which not me but others, least of all cowardly, opportunistic people, should be held responsible. The incentive you have given me is not such as to put me in the right state of mind to reveal to you the true story and content of my petition to His Majesty. […]

I am already an old man, who has gone through even more difficult trials and whose deeds and character cannot be put on a piece of paper, but I confess to you that I have never served anyone else’s interests.’59
The two episodes I have selected for my evaluation of Doda’s loyalties suggest that his allegiance went explicitly and actively to his own nation, while lending support to the other nationalities. He does not actually gloss the terms nation and nationality, but there is no trace of any irredentist attitude when he defends the rights of the Romanian nation. He engages in politics within the legal framework of the Monarchy and protests against what he views as social injustice in the name of his dynastic and professional loyalty to Emperor and Fatherland. His approach to politics mirrors his military skills as recorded in his *Qualificationsliste*: his 1853 referee highlighted his particular ability to set up a new troop or to improve the condition of one that had fallen into disarray. In politics he seems to display the same tendency towards ameliorating, restoring, and better organizing, this time, Hungarian national politics and this for the benefit of the Monarchy as a whole. His actions are constructive and, by his own admission, aimed at keeping together the Monarchy by purging it of the ills that plague it.
Marchescu holds that Caransebeş was the largest electoral district in Hungary without mentioning from what point of view. According to the number of electors, Caransebeş was, indeed, one of the largest but by no means the largest. In 1895 its franchise (5,275 voters) was exceeded by at least two other districts: Uzdin (5,720 voters) and Homonna (6,009), without counting in the Transylvanian districts.

Marchescu, Grănicerii bănăţeni, p. 316; Eugen Brote, Die rumänische Frage in Siebenbürgen und Ungarn, Berlin, 1895, pp. 142-152.

Marchescu, Grănicerii bănăţeni, pp. 375-361.

I am grateful to Dr Michael Hochedlinger for showing me how to convert an Exhibitenzahl into a valid Signatur and, thus, helping me to locate the mentioned document.

OeStA, KA, Kriegsministerium Präsidium (henceforth KM Präs), Jahr 1874, Aktenzahl 9 – 2/2.


R.W. Seton-Watson, Corruption and Reform in Hungary, p. 4.

Brote, Die rumänische Frage in Siebenbürgen und Ungarn, p. 72.

Brote, Die rumänische Frage in Siebenbürgen und Ungarn, p. 72.

Ibid., pp. 74-76.


Brote, Die rumänische Frage in Siebenbürgen und Ungarn, p. 75.


Marchescu, Grănicerii bănăţeni, p. 366.


Teodor Păcăţian, Cartea de aur sau luptele politice-naţionale ale românilor de sub Coroana ungară, vol. VI, Sibiu, Tipografia Arhidiecezană, 1910, p. 646.

Marchescu, Grănicerii bănăţeni, pp. 370-371.

Păcăţian quoted in Marchescu, Grănicerii bănăţeni, pp. 371-372.

ANIC, Fondul Familiei Mocsonyi, II/4, folio 55.


ANIC, Fondul Familiei Mocsonyi, II/18.

Teodor Botiş, Monografia familiei Mocioni, Fundaţia pentru Literatură şi Artă „Regele Carol II“, Bucureşti, 1939, p 270 — emphasis mine.

Păcăţian’s multi-volume work was written on the initiative of the president of the Romanian National Party, Ioan Raţiu, and used a variety of sources, mainly historical works and newspaper articles, as well as less accessible works from the library of the House of Deputies in Budapest (Corneliu Sigmirean, Teodor V. Păcăţian. O Viaţă de cărţiură, Editura Veritas, Târgu-Mureş, 1996, pp. 42-43).
37 Mihail P. Dan, George Cipăianu, Ana Maria Cipăianu (Eds.), Corespondența lui înscenitor Babes: Scriitori trimiși, Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1983, p. 222.

38 Marchescu, Grânicerii bănăteni, p. 373.


40 In his monograph on Ioan Slavici, D. Vatamaniuc quotes a letter from Patriciu Dragalina to Tribuna, in which Dragalina put down Doda’s stroke to the news that Slavici had been condemned to one year’s imprisonment on account of his support for Doda’s electoral stance: D. Vatamaniuc, Ioan Slavici și lumea prin care a trecut, Editura Academiei Republicii Socialist România, București, 1968, p. 323.

41 Marchescu, Grânicerii bănăteni, p. 378.


44 Marchescu, Grânicerii bănăteni, p. 379.


47 Marchescu, Grânicerii bănăteni, p. 379.


49 The notion of reprieve cannot be used to describe the outcome of the Doda case because the initial sentence passed against Doda was invalidated owing to a procedural flaw, hence there was no longer a punishment to halt or delay, which is what usually achieved through a reprieve.


52 OEStA, KA, Militär Kanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers (henceforth MKSM), Signatur 562, Titel 15-29, Jahr 1887, Document number 20 – 1/ 13 – 1.

53 OEStA, KA, Pensionsprotokolle, Jüngere Reihe, Generäle, 3ten Band, Folio 110: Trajan Doda.

54 OEStA, HStA, Kabinettskanzlei, Karton 20 K.Z., 1889, No. 4261/1889.


57 OEStA, HStA, Kabinettskanzlei, 12. Ungarische Ministerrats-Protokolle 1888-1889, C.Z. XVIII.

58 OEStA, HStA, Kabinettskanzlei, 12. Ungarische Ministerrats-Protokolle 1888-1889, C.Z. XVIII.

59 ANCN, Fond personal Vincențiu Babes Nr. 627, Section IV: Corespondența personală, Document number 202, letter from Trajan Doda, Caransebeș, 10th of January 1890.

60 OEStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten, Karton Nummer 471 (Dobrzensky-Doell), Trajan Doda, Individual Beschreibung überrascher Nachmannen für die Jahres 1853, Section Ob zu einer speziellen und zu welcher Verwendung besonders geeignet.
Chapter 8: Professions of Allegiance (II):

*GM Michael von Trapsia, FML Nikolaus Cena,*

*GM Alexander Lupu*

While the previous chapter was devoted exclusively to *GM* Trajan Doda, owing primarily to his popularity and controversial political actions, which resulted in a wealth of information available from various sources, the present chapter is given over to three other Banat Border generals for whom there is available documentary evidence to support an analysis of personal allegiance: Michael Ritter von Trapsia, Nikolaus Cena, and Alexander Lupu. The first one belongs to the same generation as Doda, whereas the last two achieve promotion to the rank of general in the early twentieth century, that is, one generation later, and they survive the breakup of the Monarchy. This chapter division was dictated by reasons of space and material availability but also, as will become apparent in what follows, by the commonalities of attitude and outlook that the generals under discussion evince.

If in the case of Trajan Doda, extant sources indicative of allegiance and sense of identity take, for the most part, the form of official statements, with General Michael von Trapsia one finds oneself in the frustrating situation of knowing of the existence of extensive autobiographical notes and, yet, not being able to access them. Thus, Liviu Groza’s 1995 book on Trapsia’s life and activity was written on the basis of the general’s autobiographical notes, which, according to the prefacer, were inherited by the general’s nephew, Aurel Moaca, who had selected and brought them to Caransebes. When asked as to the whereabouts of these notes, the author told me he had access to them for consultation only, after which the family destroyed them.
There is a twofold problem with these autobiographical notes as quoted by Groza. Firstly, they are not rendered in their entirety but fragmentarily and, more often than not, the selection is made with a view to highlighting Dickensian episodes (such as punishment in school), while important episodes narrating momentous encounters such as that between Trapsia and Avram Iancu are paraphrased in an anecdotal style. Secondly, the fact that one cannot access the original documents casts a permanent epistemic doubt on their very existence and on the reliability of the author’s quotations. Consequently, the following account will concentrate mostly on extant archival evidence and press coverage and only occasionally (and with a hefty pinch of salt) make reference to these autobiographical notes.

I shall, therefore, start my analysis with an entry from an 1893 military record (*Unterabtheilungs-Grundbuchblatt*) for Michael Trapsia, which testifies to a change of name spelling following his submission of his christening certificate: ‘instead of Trapscha, the name is to be written Trapsia in accordance with Romanian orthography, retaining, however, the earlier pronunciation.’ There is no indication as to the reasons of this request made by the then Captain Trapsia so that one can only speculate that either there was some pragmatic rationale that made it imperative for Trapsia to revert to the original spelling of his name or he was conscious and proud enough of his Romanian descent to go to the trouble of submitting an official request and producing evidence in support of it. In what follows I shall try to argue that, in default of any corroborating information, the latter hypothesis is the more likely of the two in view of Trapsia’s involvement with Romanian cultural politics in the Empire.

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1870: Namensänderung, Laut No. 520 ex. 1869 deposit. vorgelegten Taufscheine statt Trapscha ist nach der romänischen Orthografie Trapsia jedoch mit der früheren Aussprache zu schreiben.
As pointed out in the previous chapter, Trapsia was an outstanding graduate of the Artillery Academy, whose military career culminated with the rank of General Major in 1885 after having been elevated to Ritterstand in 1882. His marriage to Aurelia Kron in 1869, although childless, was financially and culturally beneficial. According to the 1890 Qualificationsliste, his wife possessed wealth (Seine Gattin besitzt Vermögen) and took an interest in Romanian culture, as confirmed by the membership list of România jună, the Romanian cultural society in Vienna mentioned in Chapter Six.

The following analysis of the nature of Trapsia’s allegiance and sense of identity will take the form of a triptych, which constitutes both a chronological sequence and a division according to three types of documents available: correspondence, testament, and posthumous works.

The first documentable episode relevant for this analysis took place in 1878 in the context of an abortive attempt on the part of Vincenţiu Babeş and other Romanian intellectuals to raise money for a new Romanian periodical. This initiative was rendered necessary by the discontinuation of the weekly Albina, a Romanian newspaper published in Vienna and then in Pest, which appeared between 1866 and 1876 with the financial support of the Mocsonyi family and which was an important promoter of Romanian culture. Vincenţiu Babeş’s correspondence as published by George Cipăianu et al. constitutes evidence of the close collaboration in this project between Babeş and Trajan Doda. The latter used his network of connections to secure sponsorship for the new journal and referred Babeş to Oberstlieutenant Trapsia in Vienna as a potential shareholder and someone who could help find other sponsors. Trapsia’s answer to this request came promptly and, as becomes apparent in the following letter, cautiously:
Vienna, 15 January 1878

It is with great pleasure that I learnt from the illustrious General Doda the news and the challenge of setting up a national paper to replace Albina and I salute this patriotic initiative in the hope that it will become reality and will thrive for the public good.

I too would like to buy a share and I hereby lay down 100 Florins for it.

I would take the liberty to make a suggestion that the shares should not be nominal, just as they are in any other enterprise, and that the shareholders should not be named in public.

Pray do not take it amiss if I make one further suggestion. The name of the paper seems to me too conspicuous and, in my opinion and Mr Grigoroviţă’s, it would be more sensible to give it a more indifferent name such as The Future, Life, The Day, Justice, The Awakening, Progress, etc.

The above-named gentleman and Mr Nicolaevici promised to buy a share each and they will be sure to contact you.

I take this opportunity to assure you, honourable Gentleman, of my highest esteem for you and, together with my wife, I am sending our best wishes to you and your family.

Yours,

Trapsia, Lieutenant Colonel.”

The note of caution is common to both Trapsia and Doda, the latter also objecting to the proposed title of the paper and making suggestions for other possible

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Și eu iau o acţiune și depun de alături 100 florini pentru dânsa
De mi-ar fi iertat a face o observare apoi aș propune ca acțiunile să se facă fără nume personal pe ele, cum se fac la orice altă întreprindere, și acționarii să fie nenumați în public
Mă rog a nu-mi lua în nume de râu o altă observare. Numele fui-mi pare prea bătător la ochi și după părea mea și a domnului Grigoroviță ar fi mai consultat a da un nume mai indifferent. De exemplu Viitorul, Viața, Ziua, Dreptatea, Deșteptarea, Progresul etc.
Domnul sus-numit și dl. Nicolaevici mi-a promis a lua câte o acțiune și se va adresa sigur către Domnia ta
Cu ocaziunea aceasta, mult onorate Domnule, te asigur stimei mele distinse și esprim cu soția mea felicitările noastre cele mai bune pentru Domnia ta și pentru familia Domniei tale
Al Dumitale devotat,
Trapsia V[ice] C[olonel].“*
titles. Despite the collective efforts, the necessary funds could not be raised and the project eventually fell through.

Further involvement with Romanian cultural politics was occasioned by Trapsia’s transfer to Hermannstadt as artillery director in 1882. Here he collaborated with George Baritiu for the Romanian translation of a military textbook *Instrucțiune de artilerie pentru tunarii bateriilor de câmp* (Artillery Textbook for Field Battery Cannoneers), which was published in Vienna in 1884. This occurred in continuation of Trapsia’s publication record in the military domain as attested to by his 1877 *Qualificationsliste*, which briefly mentioned his publishing ‘several interesting and instructive military-science articles.’

Extant documents testify to a close relationship between *Oberst* Trapsia and George Baritiu. The former expressed his consideration for the latter in deferential terms in a letter dated 3 June 1892 in celebration of Baritiu’s eightieth anniversary. Following Baritiu’s death, Trapsia contributed to the newly established ‘Fond Baritiu’, out of which prizes would be awarded to Romanian literary works and new places would be created in the *Astra*-sponsored school for girls in Hermannstadt. In the note which accompanied his postal contribution of 100 Florins, Trapsia hailed the initiative as ‘a noble and great idea’, and eulogized Baritiu as ‘the morning star of the Romanian nation’.

His most substantial contribution was a testamentary one, namely his bequest of 5,000 Florins towards a fund for the setting up of a Romanian confessional school for girls in Caransebes. In his testament he insisted that the language of tuition should be exclusively Romanian and that the curriculum should include, in addition

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* ‘Hat mehrere interessante und lehrreiche militär-wissenschaftliche Aufsätze veröffentlicht.’
** ‘Fell L. von Trapsia, Graz Rechbauer St., tremete 100 Fl pentru fondul „George Baritiu”, ce în Luminătorul # 35, 24/5 1893 e anunțat ca se va strângge un fond sub nume „George Baritiu”, e o idee nobilă și maretia. Luceferul națiunii române se numai pera, ci sa fie etern. Din Lumină lui nască raze spre tota națiunea. Graz 26/5 1893.’
to practical subjects, natural sciences, history, geography, as well as Romanian national literature classes. He stressed that his donation was meant as an inspirational act, whereby he set an example and urged other ‘nation-loving Romanians’ to contribute to this project. The donation was presented as ‘the most ardent wish of a faithful son of the Romanian nation’ (einen sehnrlichsten Wunsch als treuer Sohn der rumänischen Nation), a formulation echoed in his posthumous book of aphorisms, which is described as ‘the last greeting of a faithful fatherland-loving son of his people’ (der letzte Gruss eines von Vaterlandsliebe begeisterten treuen Sohnes seines Volkes).

The full transcription of Trapsia’s testament has been attached to the present thesis in Appendix 3.1. Although the quotes I am using in this chapter are from the original German document, a copy of which is to be found in the Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv in Graz, my starting point in locating the document was the Romanian translation provided by Liviu Groza in his 1995 book. Given that this translation was not referenced, I considered it necessary to locate the original document before using information from it. After transliterating and translating the German original, I was able to conclude that Groza’s translation was an accurate one and could be relied on for citation purposes.

There are two other, ascertainable, sources for Trapsia’s perception of nation and his political views. The first one, and the more substantial of the two, is the above-mentioned, (partly) bilingual, collection of aphorisms, Aforisme, cugetări și reflecșiuni/ Aphorismen, Gedanken und Reflexionen (Aphorisms, thoughts and reflections), published in Temesvár after the general’s death in 1896 and signed M.v.T. (Michael von Trapsia). Snippets of this apothegmatic work are quoted by both Marchescu and Groza but neither give any indication as to its whereabouts,
although the latter does provide additional editorial information (place and year of publication). As I discovered during my research in the Astra Library in Sibiu (Hermannstadt), a copy of this book is to be found there.

With very few exceptions, Trapsia’s aphorisms do not go beyond the level of philosophical generality. Notes regarding state and nationality are scattered among parenetic advice and moral enunciations. Interestingly enough, although the book was used by Marchescu and Groza, it was only for quoting what, by comparison with the rest of the book, seems to be the least revealing aphorisms, while Trapsia’s stronger reactions to the Magyarization policies, for instance, or his political thoughts are completely omitted. The explanation for this could be that Marchescu, given the scope of his work, never intended to give anything more than a brief overview of Trapsia’s literary output, hence the cursory quotes from both his collection of aphorisms and his poems. With Groza, the explanation is twofold. Firstly, as a retired colonel, he naturally took more interest in the military aphorisms. Secondly, and this derives from the partially bilingual character of the 1896 book, the fragments referring to enforced Magyarization in Caransebes are only available in German, a language that, by his own admission, Groza does not speak. The book of aphorisms is intriguing in this respect, in that some of the Romanian sections have no German counterpart and, conversely, for some of the German fragments there is no Romanian translation.

Trapsia’s political philosophy has strong contractarian overtones (that is, it deals primarily with the issue of political legitimacy) and revolves around two concepts: that of State and that of Nation or Volk. It is interesting to note that one can find no trace of Kaisertreue or any expression, however perfunctory, of an acknowledgment of imperial authority. The contractarian streak of Trapsia’s
aphorisms comes across in a number of passages stressing the importance of the existence of a legal relationship (Rechtsverhältnis) regulating interaction between all parts of society: ‘Where two people have to live together, there should already exist a legal relationship between them, all the more so between families, peoples, and states.’

The equity of these legal relationships and their preservation is, in Trapsia’s view, the raison d’être of a state:

‘The acknowledgement and observance of human rights is the first condition for a civilized state […] The right to self-determination, equality before the law, the observance of customs and traditions, as well as the right to education in one’s own language, to trade in it, to be judged in it – are the most essential elements of human rights. So liberty, equality, fraternity.’

Trapsia’s strongest enunciations are for the most part generic such as the following: ‘The protection of life and goods (both spiritual and material) is the first duty of a state. A state that does not fulfil this duty has no right to existence’, a sententia which repeats itself later in the book in a slightly altered form: ‘A state which does not have the welfare of its peoples for its aim has no right to existence.’

These philosophical statements are interspersed with more concrete, autobiographical notes in which Trapsia takes a stance against Magyarization:

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∗ ‘Wo zwei Menschen beisammen wohnen sollen muss schon ein Rechtsverhältnis bestehen, umsoweniger zwischen Familien, Völkern und Staaten.’

∗∗ ‘Die Anerkennung und Achtung der Menschenrechte ist die erste Bedingung für einen Culturstaat. […] Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht, die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetze, die Achtung der Sitten und Gebräuche; dazu gehört insbesondere das Recht in seiner Sprache sich auszubilden, im Handel und Wandel sie anzuwenden, in ihr gerichtet zu werden, - sind die wesentlichsten Elemente der Menschenrechte. Also Freiheit, Gleichheit, Bräderlichkeit.’

'7/10 1884
In Caransebes, a place where there are no Hungarian inhabitants, a boy was locked up for an hour because, when he was telling a story in Hungarian, he used the future instead of the past tense. The mind revolts itself before such abuse.'19

'17/10 1887
When I was in Caransebes, my nine-year-old niece Adriana sang to me a very pretty song in Hungarian. I asked her if she understood the lyrics. She answered, smiling ashamed, that she did not. Well, haven’t they explained it to you? said I, and the answer was again “No”! This fact filled me with the deepest sadness. This was then Hungarian culture! There will come a time when the curse of this affair will erupt with a vengeance and will destroy this spectre, which has delivered a whole generation to ignorance.”20

My purpose in quoting these paragraphs is not so much to hold them as emblematic for what was actually happening in the schools of Caransebes at the time, as to highlight Trapsia’s perception of Hungarian culture as an instrument of alienation and exclusion, an idea which is reinforced throughout the book by a number of other notations such as ‘In a land in which one does not know the language one remains always a stranger’ (In einem Lande, in welchem man die Sprache nicht kennt, bleibt man stets fremd) and ‘They who build on the ignorance of a people are always mistaken and lead themselves and the others to ruin’ (Wer auf die Unwissenheit eines Volkes baut, irrt stets und führt sich und andere ins Verderben.)21 What Trapsia seems to resent is not Hungarian culture per se (and the consequent development of bilingualism – he was after all himself the product of

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* ‘Im Jahre 1884 7/10: In Caransebes, ein Ort, der keinen magyarischen Einwohner zählt, wurde ein Knabe, weil in der Geschichte die er magyarisch hersagen soll, ein Zeitwort statt in der vergangenen Zeit in der Zukunftsform setzte, eine Stunde eingesperrt. Der Verstand bäumt sich beim Wahrnehmen solcher Missbräuche.’

17/10 1887
Als ich in Caransebes war, sang mir meine 9-jährige Nichte Adriana ein recht hübsches Liedchen mit ungarischem Text vor; ich frug sie, ob sie den Text verstünde; da antwortete sie beschämt lächelnd: Nein! Ja, hat man Dir dies nicht erklärt, sagte ich und die Antwort war wieder nein! Mit tiefster Trauer erfüllte mich diese Thatssache, und das soll magyarische Cultur sein! Möge nicht einst der Fluch über diesen Vorgang in Wuth ausbrechen und zertrümmere dieses Truggebilde, welches eine ganze Generation der Unwissenheit überliefert.’
such a system, i.e. the German-language school system), but rather the violent imposition of it and the concomitant suppression of national identity (Entnationalisierung):

‘The violent destruction of culture is unbelievable and yet true in nineteenth-century Central Europe. Hungarians have destroyed the schools of the non-Hungarians in Hungary and taught the people to disobey the law.’

‘Violent de-nationalization is the result of brutality, which will have the saddest of consequences. The subordination of nations can only be brought about through peaceful work. General culture builds points of attraction and contact. Violence repels and engenders opposition.’

These judgments are borne out by later memoirs such as the early-twentieth-century autobiographical notes of Petru Râmneanţu and Petru Nemoianu, who tell a similar story of the sense of exclusion experienced by Romanian students in Hungarian schools. An illustration of Trapsia’s notion that violence repels and engenders opposition is to be found in Petru Nemoianu’s account of his school days and of the context in which he first heard of Avram Iancu. He particularly recalled one of his teachers, who

‘whenever he asked me to say the Hungarian history lesson, he would also ask me if I did not want to “wash my hands in Hungarian blood as Avram Iancu did”. He repeated this question with such insistence on every occasion that we had to find out who Avram Iancu was, what role he played in the history of Transylvania, and what cause he fought for.’

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‘Gewaltsame Entnationalisirung ist ein Auswuchs der Brutalität, die die traurigsten Folgen nach sich ziehen wird.

Die Unterordnung der Nationen kann nur durch friedliche Arbeit erreicht werden.

Die allgemeine Cultur bildet die Anziehungs- und Berührungspunkte. Die Gewalt stösst ab und erzeugt Widerstand.’

‘De câte ori mă chema să spun lecția din istoria Ungariei, mă întreba dacă nu cumva și eu vreau „să-mi spăl mâinile în sânge unguresc ca Avram Iancu”? Întrebarea a repeta cu atâtă stăruință cu
As comes across in R.W. Seton-Watson’s comments, which were quoted in Chapter Five, the same sense of exclusion will have been experienced by Slovaks as well, who, in Seton-Watson’s words, stood before a choice between education in Hungarian or no education at all.

A certain mixture of relativism and essentialism characterizes Trapsia’s conception of nation. On the one hand, he points out that ‘every century has its ideas over which it enthuses and fanaticizes’, and ‘at present it is the nationality idea that is ruling.’25 On the other hand, he exhorts: ‘Never forget the love of your nation. The renegade will come to no good’; or ‘united in the love of nation, the nation becomes immortal’; ‘honour the worthy ancestors of your nation, for this way you are honouring yourselves’.26 There is not sufficient evidence in the collection of aphorisms to conclude whether Trapsia used the terms nation and nationality interchangeably or, on the contrary, he viewed the former as an ethnic group, as a community of language, and the latter as a political designation, the product of nineteenth-century developments. From the available sententiae it becomes clear, however, that his basic allegiance goes to his nation or people, for which ‘language is the most precious thing’ (Einem Volke ist das theuerste seine Sprache), while, as a soldier, it is his duty to die for ‘justice, liberty, and the independence of one’s fatherland’.27 Once again, the generic character of these thoughts leaves the concept of fatherland undefined and open to interpretation.

Of particular relevance to the relationship between the military and the state as perceived by Trapsia are a couple of passages under the heading ‘Ältere

fiecare prilej încât am fost nevoiți să ne informăm cine a fost Avram Iancu, ce rol a jucat în istoria Ardealului și pentru ce cauză a luptat.’

‘Jedes Jahrhundert hat seine Ideen, für die es sich begeistert, fanatisirt. Gegenwärtig herrscht die Nationalitäts-Idee.’
Gedanken’, which, although retaining the same level of generality that characterizes most of the collection, present the army as a barometer of the state and postulate a causal relation between equity of rights within a state and the performance of its army in war. Trapsia predicates this relation on Rechtsgefühl (sense of justice) and views it as forming the basis of a state’s legitimacy and of a soldier’s honour, or Ehre:

‘In a state where the general sense of justice is nurtured so as to achieve the earlier mentioned valuable equality, this is also transmitted onto the soldiers and differs only in a more careful cultivation of honour – this palladium of the soldier class. – If this direction does not predominate in the state, then the shadows of this tendency are cast on the soldier class as well and destroy their sense of justice. [...] The more rampant the destruction of the sense of justice, the more fade the living conditions of the state, its armies are all the more easily defeated, and with their defeat the state is shattered. [...] 12 o’clock at night, 21./1. 1878. A difficult day.’

The cited passages provide a counterpoint to the problem pointed out by J.C. Allmayer-Beck in his evaluation of the k.u.k army in the fifth volume of the Habsburgermonachie series, Die Bewaffnete Macht. Allmayer-Beck emphasizes the incongruity within the Habsburg Monarchy between ‘the dynastic and, thus, supranational state conception (Staatsgedanken)’ and the increasingly multinational state structure. In this context, ‘solutions had to be found in order to diminish or, if possible, even prevent the repercussions of this multinational state structure onto the supranational army.’ The solutions Allmayer-Beck goes on to mention (boosting Reichspatriotismus through military schools, stationing troops of one ethnicity in

** ‘In einem Staate, wo das allgemeine Rechtsgefühl zur Erreichung des eben früher erwähnten und würdigen Gleichgewichtes gepflegt wird, überträgt es sich auch auf den Soldaten und unterscheidet sich bei diesem nur durch die sorgfältigere Pflege der Ehre – diesem Palladium des Soldatenstandes. – Herrscht aber nicht diese Richtung im Staate überhaupt, so fallen auch die Schlagschatten dieser Tendenz auf den Soldatenstand und vernichten das Rechtsgefühl in demselben. [...] Je mehr die Vernichtung des Rechtsgefühls um sich greift, desto mehr schwindet die Lebensbedingung des Staates, desto leichter werden dessen Armeen geschlagen und mit ihrer Niederlage der Staat zertrümmert. [...] 12 Uhr nach Mitternacht 21./1. 1878. ein schwerer Tag.’
parts of the Monarchy of a different ethnicity) show that, rather than going to the roots of the problem (the nationality problem), attempts at remedying the ill were confined to removing the symptoms. In contrast, what Trapsia suggested, perhaps idealistically so, was the necessity to engage with the question of rights and justice in the civil and political sphere. The resolution of this problem would, in his view, solve the military problem deriving from a diminished legitimacy of the state and the consequent disaffection of its soldiers.

The second vehicle of self-expression for Trapsia was his poetry, which was never published during his life time, nor is there any evidence, unlike in the case of the aphorisms, that he wished it to be published after his death. A couple of his poems appeared in print a quarter of a century after his death in Foaia Diecezană no. 1/1926 and nos. 44-46/1926, on the initiative of his nephew, Aurel Moaca. According to his explanatory note prefacing the poems, Moaca ‘went through the contents of the private library, correspondence, and writings of the late General Trapsia’ and came across two poems which he submitted for publication as evidence of the general’s national sentiments. Although they were never intended for publication, the two poems are fairly subdued in tone. They communicate a mixture of feelings of pride in being Romanian, protest against injustice, and a determination to fight against it to the death. There is no clear political reference and no definition of the enemy. The poem published in issue no. 44-45 of Foaia Diecezană was occasioned by the centennial of the 1784 peasant uprising and presents the three leaders, Horea, Cloșca, and Crișan, as heroes and martyrs for liberty.

It should be added, moreover, that Trapsia’s collection of aphorisms contains a number of short poems, all of them in German, with no Romanian counterpart, which seems to indicate that they were originally written in German. Although for
the most part composed in the low-key Romantic style of the time, one comes across
the occasional politically charged stanza such as the following:

‘Earthly Fate dictated,
that the Austrian Double Eagle
Should unfold its wings equally
over its multitude of peoples.
Then brother holds out the hand to sister,
And stronger than ever is our Fatherland!
Then warmth and air is everywhere
and our Fatherland is happier than ever.’***

These lines follow the previously quoted passages about the introduction of
the Hungarian language in Caransebes. I have chosen to reproduce and dwell on
them because of their potential explanatory value as regards Trapsia’s conception of
‘State’. As we have seen earlier on in the chapter, he repeatedly referred to state
legitimacy and loyalty to the state. One was never sure, however, whether he meant
by this Hungary or the Dual Monarchy as a whole. These lines of poetry seem to
indicate that his notion of state and Fatherland referred to the latter, that is, to the
Oesterreich Doppel-Aar. Judging by this evidence, one can characterize Trapsia’s
sense of loyalty as ‘Reichsgefühl’ or ‘Reichspatriotismus’, to use Allmayer-Beck’s
terms. Although in his analysis, Allmayer-Beck dwells on the German element as
predominant in the Habsburg officer corps and, in connection to this, he holds that
‘Reichspatriotismus and Reichsgefühl, at least in the case of the active officers of the
common army, were not entirely devoid of national elements’, meaning that ‘the

*** ‘Das Erden Schicksal walte,
Dass Oesterreich Doppel-Aar
Die Flügel gleich entfälte
Ueber seine Völkerschaar,
Dann reicht Bruder der Schwester die Hand,
Und kräftig wie nie, ist unser Vaterland!
Dann streicht Wärme und Luft überall
Und glücklich wie nie ist unser Vaterland.’
Reich was predominantly seen with German eyes, his statement remains valid in the case of non-German officers too. Both Doda’s and Trapsia’s testimonies suggest that allegiance to the Monarchy did not come into conflict with allegiance to one’s nation, that the two were, indeed, organically interlinked.

One generation later, another general originating from the former Banat Military Border, Nikolaus Cena, would wax more outspoken than his predecessors, according to the testimony of one of his contemporaries, Coriolan Buracu. The latter, an Orthodox priest in Mehadia and a friend of Cena’s, had access to the general’s autobiography and drew upon it in presenting the main highlights of Cena’s military career. Cena was born on 21 November 1844 in Mehadia and, as a descendant of a Grenzer family, embarked on a military career. His father, Nestor Cena, had been an Oberlieutenant in the Romanian Banat Border regiment and had fought in Italy during 1848-49. The son, Nikolaus Cena, attended the military school in Caransebes, then the pioneer school in Tulln, and saw action during the 1866 war against Prussia.

His career is characteristic for the new type of promotion system along meritocratic lines. In times of peace (which is what the latter half of the nineteenth century mostly offered), as a valuable military technician and specialized officer, he held several positions as a teacher and commander of various military schools: the Cadettenschule in Temesvár, Karlstadt, Karthaus (Königsfeld bei Brünn), and Kamenitz. His didactic and organizational activity earned him imperial recognition and decorations, as recorded in his Qualifikationsliste. Of lowly extraction and without being eligible for a state-sponsored place in one of the military academies, Cena climbed the military hierarchy by virtue of his intellectual abilities and was received into the ranks of the service nobility upon bestowal of the Ritterkreuz des
Franz-Joseph Ordens in 1896. He retired in 1904 as a Feldmarschalleutnant, the highest rank attained by a Romanian in the Austro-Hungarian army.\textsuperscript{35}

Coriolan Buracu makes a strong case for the general’s sense of allegiance to his nation recounting emblematic episodes,\textsuperscript{36} which he does not actually reference, and which, one can only infer, he must have either extracted from the said autobiography or learnt from the general himself. Judging from the episode, where, on Cena’s leaving his home, his mother gave him a letter written in the Cyrillic alphabet, which upon subsequent perusal turned out to be Andrei Mureșanu’s Deșteaptă-te, Române, one can argue that, in this case at least, the sense of national awareness and pride was partly acquired at home and later built on. This creates a contrast to the perception highlighted in the previous chapter by certain authors to the effect that young Romanians usually developed a sense of national identity only when they went abroad and congregated with members of such cultural societies as România jună in Vienna. While this may have been the case with young Romanians from other Romanian-inhabited lands, it appears that frontiersmen’s sons from the Banat, such as Trajan Doda and Nikolaus Cena, were aware of their national/ethnic identity before fame and social advancement put them in a position to interact with prominent Romanian intellectuals.

That community identity was much better defined in the Border can be attributed, as pointed out by several authors and as theorized by Linda Colley, to the functional intensification of information circulation in this territory and, especially, to the early contact with the Other via military campaigns abroad. Coriolan Buracu maintains that General Cena would always refer to himself as a Romanian frontiersman (Rom. român grănicer) and that he insisted on marching his troops to
the music of *Deșteaptă-te, Române*, which, as Buracu shows, was what earned him his sobriquet ‘the Daco-Roman’.\(^37\)

As Buracu reminisces, Cena’s justification for returning to his native village was his wish to retire there ‘where my parents’ house is, where they were buried, in the midst of the Romanian people – trying to make myself useful to them’.\(^38\) In addition to this, Buracu remembers that Cena used to sit in on the religion classes, the only ones held in Romanian, and would give books and money as a prize to the most meritorious of students. He was, moreover, a member of Romanian cultural institutions such as *Astra* and *Fondul de teatru roman*, and an active supporter and organizer of the local Romanian Orthodox Church as a member and then president of the parochial council in Mehadia.\(^39\)

Cena’s most durable legacy to his community was his pioneering archaeological work on the Roman ruins near Mehadia. The first attestation of these ruins was made by Luigi Ferdinando, Count of Marsigli, in 1690. He was followed by other scholars, among whom, in the early nineteenth century, Nicolae Stoica de Hațeg, and other historians and scholars.\(^40\) The first systematic archaeological excavations took place in 1909-1910 and were conducted by the retired General Cena.

His endeavours resulted in an article published in the journal of the Academy of Sciences in Vienna (*Anzeiger, Jahrgang 1911, Nr. XII, der phil.-hist. Klasse d. Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien*). The article communicates to the Academy the discovery and deciphering of an inscription, defaced by *damnatio memoriae*, dedicated to the mother of the Emperor Severus Alexander, which was unearthed by the *porta praetoria* (or main gateway) of the Roman fortress near Mehadia. The final section of the contribution offers strategic and tactical comments
on the rationale for building the Roman fortress in that particular location. I am
dwelling on this archaeological article for two reasons: firstly, as a confirmation of
Cena’s reported preoccupations with the Roman past of the region and his
knowledgeable, if amateurish, awareness of the ancient history of the place; and
secondly, and more importantly from my point of view, as proof of the transfer of
skills which fostered Cena’s interest and made possible his archaeological
interaction with the Roman past. The technical and mathematical skills acquired in
the pioneer school at Tulln turned into archaeological instruments of measuring and
accurate description, as the article shows, while his extrapolated military strategic
knowledge led him to observations regarding Roman engineering works such as the
bridge at Turnu-Severin and the defence role of fortresses built on the main
thoroughfares.41

While this contribution is considered dated and amateurish by the standards
of today’s archaeological scholarship, Cena’s important merit was, according to
Macrea et al., that of putting together a comprehensive collection of the artifacts and
inscriptions discovered at the archaeological site near Mehadia.42 As Buracu
remembers, this private collection attracted numerous Romanian and foreign
intellectuals and, after 1918, became a place of ‘pilgrimage’, to use Buracu’s term,
for notable Romanian scholars such as Dimitrie Onciul and Vasile Pârvan, as well as
for military, teachers, and students. The height of this was reached in June 1920
when Prime Minister Averescu and his ministers came to visit Cena’s collection.43
The collection was finally donated to the history museum bearing the general’s name
in Bâile Herculane, after a series of requests from various other museums including
the Military Museum in Bucharest.44
It was his passion for archaeology and the Roman past of Mehadia as well as his connections in particular with Romanian military that led to suspicion and his eventual arrest under the accusation of espionage and agitation on 26 July 1914. There is very little information available in secondary literature on Cena’s arrest and his release one month later and it is to be had once again from Coriolan Buracu’s recollections. As my research in the Kriegsarchiv yielded an unexpected wealth of official information on this trial, I shall dwell on it at some length and this for three main reasons. Firstly, the archival material found in the Kriegsministerium Präsidium and Kriegsüberwachungsamt holdings throws light on the relationship between Cena as a Feldmarschalleutnant, the Austrian military authorities, and the Hungarian civil authorities, and, in this context, on the standing and the play of assumptions, expectations, and reactions of Cena as a high-ranking k.u.k. officer involved in an espionage investigation riddled with irregularities. Secondly, these documents corroborate Buracu’s testimony and thus raise its status from memoir literature purveying essentially unverifiable information to a reliable source, quite accurate in its quotation of dates, places, and institutions. And thirdly, the trial documents are important in that they provide new data on Cena’s activities and contacts.

As pointed out earlier in this chapter, Coriolan Buracu’s account of Cena’s arrest is based on the latter’s autobiography, out of which Buracu quotes the following passage:

‘At 10 am two ordinary gendarmes came to my house and declared I was being arrested. Thinking I did not hear well, I asked them what they wanted. A sergeant replied, ‘You are under arrest, come with me.’ I was astonished: I was being arrested by two ordinary gendarmes, instead of officers as required by regulations. I asked to see the order of arrest. They showed it to me. There was nothing else for me to do than to obey. I told them to wait until I changed my general’s uniform and put on
civilian clothes. While I was changing, I dictated to my nephew, who happened to be there, telegrams to Corps 7 in Temesvár, to the War Ministry in Vienna, and to the Honvéd Ministry in Budapest, asking for intervention. These telegrams never reached their destination.45

The above episode occurred on 26 July 1914, two days before Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, at a time when partial mobilization had been decreed in Austria-Hungary following the rejected terms of the ultimatum given to Serbia in the wake of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.46 In this context, as the Hungarian Minister of Justice Balogh pointed out in a report to Krobatin, the Austro-Hungarian War Minister, numerous people considered political suspects and placed under surveillance (politisch verdächtige und unter Beobachtung stehende Personen) were arrested during mobilization and as many as eight hundred were prosecuted.47 By September 1914, almost two months after the partial mobilization in Orsova, during which Cena and others were arrested, requests for intercession were still circulating on behalf of some of the detainees.48 Thus, Cena’s detention was not an isolated, exceptional case, but rather part of an over-zealous rush for prosecution, which lumped together citizens of various categories (see the Beschäftigung column in the list of suspects of the Border Police in Orsova49) and various nationalities (Romanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Jews, Turks, Serbs).50

What set apart Cena’s case was his prominent position as a retired and several times decorated k.u.k. Feldmarschalleutnant (which, as correspondence shows, entitled him to being addressed ‘Your Excellence’) as well as his advanced age (at 70 he was the oldest detainee on the Orsova Border Police list of suspects). He considered his arrest by mere gendarmes and his being treated as a common criminal to be an abuse and an insult. Moreover, as pointed out in one of the KM
documents, his hasty arrest had been effected during peacetime as, strictly speaking, war was declared two days later.\textsuperscript{51}

Cena’s detention as recounted by Buracu provides no details about who performed the arrest, what the actual accusations and grounds for suspicion were, who eventually released Cena and why. One learns only that on 26 July 1914 Cena was detained and escorted by ‘Count Tisza’s gendarmes’ to the Border Police station in Orsova, and handed over the following day to the Caransebes Tribunal, where he was registered as an inmate of the Caransebes prison. On 24 August they offered to release him provided he agreed to leave Hungary. Cena took the offer and went to Vienna. He is, moreover, said to have been helped by Colonel Georg Domaschnian, another of the high-ranking Romanian officers originating from the former Military Border and, like Cena, a native of Mehadia.\textsuperscript{52}

Documents in the Kriegsarchiv tell, if not a completely different, then at least a much more complex and complete story involving not only the gendarmerie in Orsova but also the War Ministry in Vienna and the civil authorities in Budapest. The earliest notification of Cena’s arrest is to be found in the Kriegsüberwachungsamt archive and it is one of the telegrams Cena dictated to his nephew on 26 July, which, contrary to what Cena himself thought, did reach the Kriegsministerium in Vienna and was registered by the Kriegsüberwachungsamt on 30 July.\textsuperscript{53} This is the image the k.u.k. military authorities had of the sender as becomes apparent in the short description scribbled on the back of the telegram:

‘Cena Nikolai EKO-R3, FJO-R, MKV
Retired FMLt, permanent address Mehadia;
Short man in pince-nez, corpulent, speaks fast, keeps himself to himself,
German-Croatian’\textsuperscript{54

\textsuperscript{5} Cena Nikolai EKO-R3, FJO-R, MKV
Tit.-Charge Pens. FmLt., ständ. Aufenth. Mehadia
And this is what they thought had happened to him as the pencilled note appended to the telegram shows:

‘FMLt d. R. Cena
Message from the representative of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior
On 25/7 at night FMLt d.R. Cena was arrested by the local Gendarmerie Command on the order of the Stationskommando in Ujvidék being suspected of espionage. On 27 July he was allowed to return to his native place on the promise that he would remain there.’

This contradicts Cena’s testimony, according to which he spent almost a month in prison and was only released on 24 August. The following two documents in the Kriegsüberwachungsamt archive relative to the Cena case are evidence to a certain communicational syncope between Vienna and Budapest. Thus, on 15 August 1914 a telegram from Ottokar Graf Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Bucharest, drew attention to the harmful effects of local press allegations that General Cena had been shot or imprisoned and urged for an official Dementi of these rumours. One of the notes scribbled at the bottom of Czernin’s deciphered telegram points out that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed that General Cena was free (sich auf freiem Fuß befindet), although they were not apprised of his current whereabouts.56

A document dated 29 August 1914 addressed to the Hungarian Prime Minister shows that the War Ministry in Vienna had not known anything about Cena’s one-month arrest before Cena was released and himself informed them upon

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Kl. Mann im Zwicker, corpulent, rasch sprechend, verschleiert, deutsch-kroatisch’

‘FMLt d. R. Cena
Am 25/7 nachts wurde FMLt d.R. Nikolaus Cena über Befehl des Stationskommandos in Ujvidék als der Spionage verdächtig, durch das dortige Gendarmerie-Flügel Kdo verhaftet. Am 27 Juli wurde er über ehrenwörtliche Verpflichtung, in seine Gemeinde abzureisen und sich dort aufzuhalten freigelassen.’
his arrival in Vienna. In the same document the Viennese War Ministry (the act bears the signature of War Minister Krobatin, among others) ask for explanations and express their surprise at the treatment received by FML Cena while under arrest as well as at the fact that the detention took place without the knowledge of the War Ministry and, as it appeared to them, without that of Count Tisza. In addition, they were surprised that the release had been made in the name of the War Ministry.\textsuperscript{57}

The said document was consequent upon a declaration given on the same day by FML Cena to the \textit{Kriegsüberwachungsamt}, in which he recounted that on 24 August, after almost one-month imprisonment, the State Prosecutor (\textit{Staatsanwalt}) spoke to him as if on behalf of the \textit{Kriegsministerium} and made him a proposal of release which was conditional on his agreeing to leave the country within three days (see Annex 3.2./I for the full \textit{Protokoll}).\textsuperscript{58} It was the clash between Cena’s declaration and the information the War Ministry had received up until then that set the bureaucratic machine in motion and resulted in several detailed reports from the State Prosecutor in Caransebes, from Tisza and the Hungarian Minister of Justice, which essentially bear out Cena’s testimony and also flesh out the body of accusations brought against him, which eventually proved too tenuous to lead to condemnation.

Three were the main grounds of suspicion against Cena as communicated by the State Prosecutor in Caransebes.\textsuperscript{59} Firstly, he was placed under suspicion for taking numerous photographs of Mehadia and its surroundings, in particular of railways, bridges, tunnels, and ruins, some of which subsequently ended up in the hands of a certain Romanian officer by the name of Jon Rosu and of others suspected of espionage. Secondly, he had old maps of Mehadia copied from the archive of the District Tribunal (\textit{k. Bezirksgericht}) in Orsova. Thirdly, earlier that summer he had
received the visit of two Romanian generals from the Regat. Cena defended himself against the first two accusations by maintaining he was gathering material for a history of his native village Mehadia and intended to use the photographs and maps for illustration purposes. As to the visit of the two Romanian generals, by his own admission this had taken place on 12 July that year and he presented it as nothing more than a Höflichkeitsbesuch (a courtesy call). Of the two generals, Mujka and Musztecza, Cena had met the former in 1911 in Romania when Mujka was still a Colonel, while the latter was a new acquaintance. The State Prosecutor’s report records part of the dialogue between General Musztecza and Cena, as recounted by Cena:

‘During the conversation he strongly rejected General Musztecza’s assertion that the Romanian army was better than the Austrian-Hungarian; when General Musztecza said “Things could turn out in such a way that Romania might find itself involved in a war against Austria-Hungary”, Cena replied, “I would be sorry about that, but you would find us on the other side”.’**

While one is inevitably wary of such a reported conversation, given that Cena communicated it to the prosecutor in an attempt to defend himself against accusations of espionage, it, nevertheless, goes to show that he did have contacts among high-ranking Romanian military and that the subject of the Romanian army and of side-taking during a possible war did come up during this courtesy visit. Given the lack of any corroborating information (letters or personal testimony that might provide the reader with insight into Cena’s attitude regarding a possible war against Romania), the statement ‘you would find us on the other side’ should be

**‘Während des Gespräches wies er die Behauptung des Generals Musztecza, dass die rumänische Armee besser ist wie die öst.ung mit heftigen Widerspruch zurück, als dieser General Musztecza sagte „es können sich die Verhältnisse so gestalten, dass Rumänien mit Österreich-Ungarn in einen Krieg verwickelt wird“, drauf hat er erwidert „Es würde mir sehr leid thun, aber da werdet Ihr uns gegenüber finden.“’**
taken at face value (whether it was uttered out of conviction, or military duty, or just as an expression of historical fatality).

The documents on the Cena case available in the holdings of the Kriegsarchiv consist of Hungarian reports in the original and in German translation. However, a number of originals were not translated, probably because they repeated information already present in the translated material. One of these reports presents the stages of the investigation and dwells on the interrogation of Cena (see Annex 3.2./III for the full text of the document in Hungarian and English). The additional information provided by this report is important for the purposes of the present thesis as it conveys the scope of Cena’s activities (thus, corroborating the only extant secondary source, that is, Coriolan Buracu’s recollections) and the manner in which he became acquainted with Romanian fellow officers. In his official statement to the Caransebes tribunal, Cena mentions his contribution to the 1911 issue of the yearbook published by the Viennese Academy of Sciences as well as his intended book titled Bilder aus der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart der Grossgemeinde Mehadia (Images from the past and present of Mehadia). The wealth of maps found in his house is explained by his military profession and also by his position as president of the Orthodox parish committee and his involvement in the management and administration of Mehadia. Cena relates how he met the then Colonel Mujka when he was in Romania attending a military parade in celebration of the King.61 Coriolan Buracu mentioned in his book that Cena had attended a military parade in Romania on 10 May 1910, so unless 1911 is a typographical error in the Hungarian

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61 ‘1911 évben a Romániában a király tiszteletére rendezett katonai ünnepségre elment s ott magas rangú tisztekkel – közülük egy Mujka nevű román kir. ezredessel – is megismerkedett.’
report and what was meant instead was 1910, this shows a certain frequency of his attendance at this annual event.

Interestingly, according to the same report, Cena reiterated his reliability by invoking his 1878 military intelligence mission to Oltenia on the orders of the then FML Scudier, the Commander of Temesvár. As we shall see in the next chapter, this information is borne out by Cena’s Qualificationsliste, which does mention an undercover mission in Oltenia at the time of the Russo-Turkish war.**62

As Cena’s complaint to the Viennese military authorities was accompanied by a demand for satisfaction and, thus, the question of responsibility came up, both Tisza’s and Balogh’s reports63 to War Minister Krobatin have a justificatory tone and pin the blame on the local military authorities and the state policing system introduced by the Austrian central authorities. Both Tisza and Balogh present themselves as the intercessory civil authority that put an end to Cena’s detention. Tisza, moreover, reproaches Vienna with ‘dieses ganze System von Espionage und Geheimpolizistentums’.64 He was to send a similar note of warning to the Militärkanzlei in September 1914, in which he exhorted that arrests should be made only on the basis of strong evidence, otherwise they ran the risk of making enemies out of loyal citizens.65

The stance of the Austrian military authorities in Vienna regarding the question of satisfaction and responsibility was itself mixed. This comes across in the annotated reports circulated within the War Ministry. While mitigating

** ‘megbizhatóságára felhozza, hogy 1878 évben mint főhadnagy az akkori altábornagy Skudié által az orosz-román-török harcztérré kém gyanánt kiküldetett.’

6 ‘Es sind vielfache Klagen eingelaufen, daß in letzterer Zeit neuerlich zahlreiche Verhaftungen von angeblich politisch Verdächtigen oder Unzuverlässlichen in allen Teilen der Monarchie stattgefunden haben, Verhaftungen, welche fast lediglich auf Veranlassung oder über Anforderung militärischer Kommandos und Behörden erfolgen. Ich befehle, daß alle militärischen Stellen strengstens angewiesen werden, derartige Maßnahmen nur auf Grund schwerwiegender Verdachtsmomente zu veranlassen. Ich will nicht, daß durch unberechtigte Verhaftungen auch loyale Elemente in eine staatsschädliche Richtung getrieben werden.’
circumstances are invoked in justification of the rash decision to arrest a k.u.k. 
Feldmarschalleutnant (mobilization conditions, impending war as well as Cena’s
own lack of caution leading to suspicion\(^66\)), the referees are unanimous that
satisfaction should be given by the Kriegsministerium, although the culprit is
variously pinpointed as the Orsova Landwehr Commander or the head of General
Staff of the 7\(^{th}\) Army Corps in Temesvár. Oberst Georg Domaschnian of the 5\(^{th}\)
Division in the War Ministry contributed his own personal testimony on Cena’s
upright character and urged that amends should be made to Cena in vindication to
the officer class, whose image had been affected by Cena’s ill treatment at the hands
of the civil authorities. He appeals to the solidarity of the officer corps and, in so
doing, echoes Crown Prince Rudolf’s 1887 reference to Austro-Hungarian soldiers
‘as the first and most distinguished class’ in society (‘Wir, Soldaten, als der erste
und vornehmste Stand’\(^67\)):

‘I feel in duty bound to inform you that I have known FMLt Cena since I was a
child, that I respect and consider him a model officer, who is held in high regard by
everyone in his community – Hungarian chauvinists excepted. If sufficient
satisfaction is not granted to FMLt Cena, this would give the impression that the
officer in general – the first class in the Monarchy – has been abandoned to the
whims of the civil administration, which could have detrimental effects on the loyal
population of the former Border.’\(^*\)*\(^68\)

Although something of an inconsistency becomes apparent in Domaschnian’s
argument (he holds the military authorities in Orsova responsible for the
mistreatment of Cena and, yet, he warns against the risk that the officer class might

\(^{***}\) ‘Ich fühle mich verpflichtet zu melden, daß ich Seine Exzellenz den Feldmarschalleutnant CENA
aus meiner Jungendzeit her kenne, achte und als Vorbild eines Offiziers schätze, der in seiner Heimat
bei jedermann – magyarische Chauvinisten ausgenommen – in hohem Ansehen steht. Wird dem
Feldmarschalleutnant CENA keine ausreichende Genugtuung zuteil, so wird dies den Eindruck
machen, daß der Offizier in allgemeinen – der erste Stand im Reiche – der Willkür der
Zivilverwaltung ausgesetzt ist, was bei der loyalen Bevölkerung in der ehemaligen Grenze die
bösesten Folgen zeitigen könnte.’
be perceived by the local population as being at the mercy of civil authorities), this
final remark on Cena as a member of the officer class highlights the composite
nature of these generals’ identity. Thus, as a Hungarian citizen of Romanian
nationality, Cena is subject to Hungarian jurisdiction and comes under suspicion
because of his activities and his contacts with Romanian citizens. It is in this
capacity that he is imprisoned. On the other hand, he is a retired general in the
imperial army and this status creates at least the expectation of a certain treatment
and of certain procedures (if not an actual implementation of these), which set him
apart from ordinary suspects. Moreover, his military rank entitles him to an appeal to
the authorities in Vienna, that is, circumventing Hungarian institutions and also, by
virtue of his military status, achieving that they are held responsible for any
procedural irregularities.

Although the arrest of Cena and his investigation under the accusation of
espionage did not result in a trial, the retired general insisted, nevertheless, on being
vindicated before his peers by asking for an investigation by a military Ehrenrat,69 a
council of honour, before which he would have the possibility to refute the
accusations and clear his name of the moral blemish that he incurred by association
with espionage. In his plea to the Kriegsministerium he reiterated his loyal service to
Emperor and Fatherland and his wish to end his life as an honourable man, free of
the shade of ignominy.70

This insistence on having his name cleared as well as a number of other
details to be found in his KM reports and in Buracu’s quotations (as, for instance, his
outrage at being arrested by mere gendarmes, his taking offence at being forced to

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69 ‘Ich habe dem Vaterlande und meinem Kaiser durch 41 Jahre treu, ehrlich, in vollen Ehren und
verdienstvoll gedient und will mein Leben auch als Ehrenmann, nicht aber mit dem Schatten der
Schande befleckt, beschließen.’
travel in a third-class car, rubbing shoulders with the dregs of society, instead of a first-class car, in which he was probably accustomed to travelling and for which he was willing to pay, and his imprisonment alongside common criminals), point to another possible line of interpretation of this investigation. While Buracu presents it in terms of ethnic conflict, what comes across in these reports, however, is that for Cena the arrest was not so much an ethnically connotated act as a social affront and a demotion from his exalted civil and military status: as a *Feldmarschalleutnant*, he knew very few superiors and he was addressed in official correspondence as ‘*Eure Excellenz*’.71 In his report to the General Staff of the 7th Army Corps in Temesvár, asking for a military assessment of the evidence brought against Cena, the Royal Chief Prosecutor in Temesvár stressed the urgency with which a reply was expected ‘given Cena’s exalted social status and the fact that he was under preliminary arrest.’\(^{72}\)

Evidence of Cena’s strong awareness of his military status as well as of his ethnic background comes across in the scanty extant correspondence between him and Valeriu Braniște. In the context of the 1909 electoral battle for the Hungarian Parliament, Cena proudly declines his identity as follows:

‘I am a soldier, an officer and, God willing, in a future war once again a commander of troops; above all, I am a true Romanian, I do not run like a coward before a fight. Had our ancestors always fled like cowards from the battlefield, then would our nation still be worthy to exist? Would Johann Hunyady have become, without us Romanians, the famous man who is celebrated nowadays?’\(^{73}\)

\(^{71}\) ‘Figyelemmel Csena Miklós magas társadalmi állására és arra, hogy előzetes letartóztatásban van: kérem a véleménynek süröös közlését.’

\(^{72}\) ‘Ich bin Soldat, Offizier, in einem künftigen Kriege – so Gott will – wieder Truppenführer, vor allem bin ich echter Romäne, ich fliehe nicht wie ein Feigling vor einem Kampf. Wenn unsere Vorfahren vom Kampffelde stets feige geflohen wären, wäre da unsere Nation noch wert zu existieren? Wäre ohne uns Romänen Hunyady Johann jener berühmte Mann geworden als der er heute gefeiert wird?’
Cena’s self-references are predominantly military and his comments on political or ecclesiastical elections frequently contain martial allusions or comparisons with the military. This particular style and the appeal to honour and the value of the given word are reminiscent of Doda’s stance in the Hungarian elections two decades before. His view of politics, however, bears out Allmayer-Beck’s characterization of the average k.u.k. officer as disdainful of politics and politicians:

‘For I am no politician, but a soldier, who always expresses his thoughts openly and frankly to everyone, unconcerned that they might be pleasant or unpleasant to A or Z.’

‘Should an officer sin against the good name of his class as Dr Barbu has sinned against his, he would very shortly be forced to step down. Such people do not know the significance of their own class nor do they know how to honour it, and therefore would be well advised to choose another profession.’

An interesting take on the need for Romanians to learn Hungarian is to be found in Cena’s letter to Branişte of 15 December 1909, which provides a counterpart to Trapsia’s earlier views on Magyarization. If with Trapsia deficient knowledge of Hungarian was seen as an obstacle to integration and social advancement, with Cena, the necessity of mastering Hungarian becomes all the more pressing as he envisages it as a weapon for fighting against Hungarian hegemony:

‘We are no friends of the Hungarian parliamentary parties, but supporters of the National Party. We wish that the Romanian nation be recognized as a political entity, but are not so obtuse as to want that no Romanian should learn the Hungarian

** ‘denn ich bin kein Politiker, sondern ein Soldat, der stets offen und ehrlich seine Gedanken gegen Jedermann ausspricht, unbekümmert darüber, ob es dem A oder Z angenehm ist oder nicht.’

*** ‘Wenn ein Offizier sich an dem Ansehen seines Standes so versündigen würde wie Dr. Barbu sich an dem seinigen versündigt hat, so würde der betreffende Offizier in kürzester Zeit gezwungen werden, den Königsweg auszuziehen. Solche Leute kennen die Bedeutung ihres eigenen Standes nicht, wissen auch nicht wie sie demselben gerecht werden sollen, und sollen daher lieber sich einen anderen Beruf wählen.’
language. On the contrary, we wish that they should learn and master this language even better than most Hungarians themselves and, this way, acquire a weapon so as to beat the Hungarians on their own ground, so as to increase our sources of income and thereby strengthen our welfare and financial power, so that we are well equipped when the crucial hour comes.\textsuperscript{77}

The correspondence with Valeriu Branişte also testifies to Cena’s involvement with the Orthodox episcopal election in Caransebes in 1909, where he acted as a member of the electoral commission (Rom. Comisia de scrutin). His support went to the Banateer Iosif Olariu, who eventually lost to Miron Cristea, the future Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church after 1918. Cena’s relations to the Orthodox Church and, as we shall see further on, Lupu’s as well point to a commonality of purpose of the political and the ecclesiastical representatives. While this symbiosis between Orthodoxy and national politics had its roots in a historical precedent, that is, the preservation of the Orthodox faith of both the Serbian and the Romanian communities in the Banat by virtue of the Habsburg construct of the Illyrian Nation, contemporary circumstances such as the Magyarization policies led to a continued conflation between religion and nationality in the Banat. As pointed out above, the only subject given in the vernacular was religion. Thus, religion became, in this context, the sole vehicle for the dissemination of national culture.

\textit{Generalmajor} Alexandru Lupu, another of the Banat Border generals on Marchescu’s list, although born not in the Military Border proper, but in Lugoj (northern Banat), pursued in the first decade of the twentieth century an intense

\textsuperscript{77} ‘Denn wir sind keine Freunde der magyarisichen Parliamentsparteien, sondern Anhänger der Nationalpartei. Wir wollen die roumânische Nation als politisches Individuum anerkannt wissen, sind aber nicht so verbohrt zu wollen, das kein Române die magyarisich Sprache lernen soll, im Gegenteil, dass sie diese Sprache noch besser lernen und beherrschen sollen, als die meisten Magyaren selbst, um damit eine Waffe zu Gewinnen, die Magyaren auf ihrem ureignen Boden zu schlagen, um die Zahl der eigenen Erwerbsquellen zu vermehren und damit unseren Wohlstand, unsere finanzielle Kraft zu stärken, auf das wir in der Stunde der Entscheidung gerüstet dastehen’.
activity with a view to setting up a Romanian Church in Vienna, where he had settled after his retirement. His military career was very similar to that of a frontiersman’s son, working his way up the military hierarchy from the rank and file. According to his Qualificationsliste, he spent the first eight years in the Romanian Banat Border Regiment No. 13 and it took him almost twenty years to reach the rank of captain (Hauptmann), another nine to Major, and eight years to Oberst. In 1896 he retired and twelve years later he received his GM rank as Titel und Charakter. 78

Lupu’s national allegiance manifested itself through active involvement with the Romanian Orthodox community in Vienna. He recorded in his autobiographical notes his endeavours towards setting up a Romanian Orthodox chapel in Vienna:

‘After ascertaining that the parishioners [credincioșii] of the Viennese Greek-Orthodox churches, namely the Greek, Russian, and Serbian church, spoke Romanian more than any other language, I decided to draw up a list of all the Romanians in Vienna. In 1898 I extracted all the Romanian addresses from the Lehmann dictionary; I then sent the young people from România jună throughout Vienna to verify the Romanian identity of these families. I personally went to Catholic monasteries to find out how many Romanian girls there were there; I then requested from the Schulrat the name of all the Romanian Greek-Orthodox female students enrolled at secondary and national [poporale] schools in Vienna.’ 79

As becomes apparent in the above quote, Romanian identity is, in Lupu’s view, defined by the use of the Romanian language, while the preservation of this can only be achieved through the continued practice of Orthodoxy (hence his expressed concern that Romanian girls were being educated as Catholics). It would

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78 ‘După ce m-am convins că credincioșii din bisericile greco-ortodoxe vieneze și anume: din cea grecească, din cea rusească și din cea sârbească, vorbesc mai mult românește decât în alte limbi, am hotărât a compune o listă a românilor din loc (Viena). În decursul anului 1898, am făcut un extras din dicționarul „Lehmann”, care cuprindea toate adresele românești, apoi am trimis tinerii de la „România jună” prin toate districtele Vienei, ca să se convingă despre identitatea românească a familiilor. Am intrat personal prin mănăstirile catolice și mă convingeam cătate fiice române se aflau în ele; mai departe, am cerut într-o petiție de la Schulrat să-mi facă cunoscut numele elevelor greco-orientale române de la școlile medii și poporale din Viena.’
be interesting to know (although it is highly unlikely that one can still find evidence
in this sense) what criteria for establishing Romanian identity were employed by the
young people of România jună who carried out the informal census Lupu had
entrusted them with: native language, place of birth, religion, professed identity, or
all four? The census constituted a preliminary to setting up a Romanian Orthodox
Society in Vienna, which aimed at building, initially, a Romanian chapel (in 8
Löwelstraße) and, later on, a parish church.80

These endeavours to create a Romanian church and, thus, bind together the
Romanian community in Vienna and preserve its identity take the form of an
integrationist assertion of national identity. Thus, the new society (Asociaţia română
greco-orientală jubiliar imperială pentru zidirea bisericii și întemeierea comunităţii
bisericeşti din Viena) added to its name the tag phrase ‘imperial jubilee’ as a way of
reaffirming its loyalty to the Throne and, in 1908, set itself as one of its first major
tasks the celebration of Franz Joseph’s sixty-year reign. Therefore, the affirmation of
national and religious identity was presented as an implicit reaffirmation of
Romanians’ allegiance to the Monarch and efforts were made to dispel the suspicion
of secessionist intentions implicit in the 1892 refusal of the Niederösterreich
authorities to allow the foundation of a Romanian colony on the grounds that ‘the
applicants did not need a National Colony as long as they were citizens of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’.81

The solution to the problem of finding a Romanian priest for the chapel
comes from Lupu as a former imperial colonel. In this capacity he addressed a
request to the War Minister to the effect that the military priest Dr Virgil Ciobanu be
allowed to perform religious service in the Romanian chapel outside his regimental
duties.82
Surprisingly, the above-quoted secondary sources fail to mention the military trial initiated against Lupu in early 1918. While literature on the other two Romanian generals involved in legal actions tends to be quite generous, in the case of Lupu the 1918 trial constitutes a major blind spot in secondary bibliography. But for a note in a *Pensionsprotokoll*, Lupu’s military record in the *Kriegsarchiv* is equally silent on the subject. This contrasts with the profusion of information available on the Doda and Cena cases, which could be traced to several holdings, *Kriegsministerium Präsidium* (KA), *Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät* (KA), and *Kabinettskanzlei* (HHStA). None of these *Bestände*, however, affords any information on Lupu concerning this trial, although several documents are present referring to him and his wife as regards the latter’s *Heiratskaution*.

The *Pensionsprotokoll* entry mentions a trial under the accusation of espionage (‘*Gerichtliche Ermittlungsverfahren wegen Verdachtes der Ausspähung und Spionage*’) and two document numbers for the year 1918 introduced by M.K. / K.M, an acronym which refers to the *Kriegsüberwachungsamt* archive in the *Kriegsarchiv*. Although listed under 1918, the two documents are not to be found in the corresponding boxes. The KÜA *Protokoll* volume for 1918 lists the two documents but it is only in one of the entries that Lupu actually figures. More importantly, both documents are further referred to a *Sammelakt No. 2196*, which explains their absence from the original boxes. However, in the KÜA index for documents (*Aktenkartons*), the sought-for number is not to be found for the year 1918, but for 1917. The *Sammelakt* thus located explains this apparent incongruity in that the trial was not originally launched against Lupu but against a certain Iorga Alexander Stefan and accomplices (*Genossen*) and it started in 1917 and carried over into the next year.
The difference between this trial and the previous two analysed in the present thesis is that, whereas Doda and Cena were placed under accusation by Hungarian authorities (the former by civil and the latter by military authorities), Lupu’s indictment was initiated by Austrian military authorities.

‘The k.k. military prosecutor of the k.u.k. military commander in Vienna announced the *Evidenzburo* of the k.u.k. General Staff in Vienna by means of the letter of 31 January 1918, G.Z.A. 1942/17, that the commander in charge had ordered the extension of the pending trial against Alexander Stefan Jorga launched by the k.k. *Landwehrdivisionsgerichte* in Vienna according to § 144 M.St.P.O., against the retired *Generalmajor* Alexander Lupu, who is to be tried in liberty, according to § 321 StG. respectively § 326 M.St.G., as the latter is suspected that, being privy to the punishable relations between Jorga and the military attaché Styrcea, he provided the former with financial support through occasional *money contributions* and through the procurement of salaried positions of secretary with several Romanian institutions and gave to Styrcea through Jorga an *ethnographic map of the Monarchy* extracted from a military work and annotated with information on the number of people of Romanian nationality in the regiments. Additionally, General Lupu is accused that he introduced Jorga to an engineer by the name of Trimbitoi so that the latter should devise for Styrcea a *contraption for anchoring cannon trestles* on the basis of a mechanical principle so that this should be used in the Romanian army.’

(see full text in Appendix 3.3)

The *Sammelakt* contains no further information about Lupu or about the trial in which he was involved. As there is no reference in it to a definite document or to the outcome of the trial, I consulted the index of the *Militärgericht* archive in the *Kriegsarchiv*. Far from casting light on the case, my index search resulted in a hundreds of pages of references to boxes of documents pertaining to the Vienna Military Command for the year 1918.

What one can ascertain about Lupu post 1918 is that he did continue to reside in Vienna as proved by extant 1919 documents relative to his wife’s *Heiratskaution*.
According to secondary literature,\textsuperscript{85} he applied for Romanian citizenship, which, once obtained, lost him his pension as a retired Austrian general. We have it from the same source that he acted as a synod and congress representative (*deputat sinodal și congresual*) of the Caransebes eparchy in Vienna until his death in 1925.\textsuperscript{86} In my research I also came across evidence that Lupu and his wife were listed among the founding members of *Astra* in Lugoj.\textsuperscript{87}

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The above-mentioned statements and actions of the three generals point, in their diversity of circumstances and purposes, to a common denominator. All of them acted with a view to alleviating the predicament of the Romanian nation as an ethnic community within the boundaries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. With Trapsia, the Nation or *Volk* takes centre stage and is discussed for the most part in relation to the State, the two of them being viewed as part of a contractual relationship in which *Kaisertreue* no longer figures. With Cena and Lupu, there is evidence of connections with the *Regat*, but it appears that the accusations of espionage, at least in Cena’s case, could not be substantiated. In default of more information on the outcome of the Lupu trial, one can conclude that before 1918 Lupu’s efforts were directed towards maintaining intact the Romanian identity of his co-nationals in Vienna and promoted (to a certain extent, polemically so) a vision of nation as an integral part of the Monarchy and conflated with the practice of Orthodoxy. Similarly, prior to 1918 Cena’s cultural and administrative endeavours were aimed at improving the condition of Mehadia parishioners and that of the Romanian nation in Hungary. On the other hand, one cannot disregard Buracu’s testimony of the emotion with which Cena went to meet the first Romanian troops
after the war: ‘In the winter of 1918 he cried and devoutly kissed the flag of the Romanian guard, who together with the people honoured him like a martyr.’

Whether there existed an actual pull towards the Romanian Principalities, and later Romanian Kingdom, for these Romanian k.(u.)k. generals, either from a professional or an ideological point of view or both, constitutes a question that the next chapter will frame an answer to.
In addition to the above translation, Antoniu Marchescu lists another seven titles as Trapsia’s most important publications, the majority of them being military works: *Studie über das Maass der Streitkräfte*, Wien, 1876; *Über Dispositionen*, 1878; *Über die Leistungsfähigkeit des Pferdes*, Wien, 1879; *Beitrag zur Verwendung der Streitkräfte (Der Kampf der Infanterie)*, Wien, 1879; *Geschichte der Feld-Artillerie-Regiments No.2 Kronprinz Erzherzog Rudolf*, Wien, 1881; *Die letzte Friedens-Thätigkeit des Batterie Kommandanten*, Olmütz, 1882. (Marchescu, *Grănicerii bănaţeni*, p. 303.)

9 Biblioteca Astra (Astra Library Sibiu), Colecții Speciale, Manuscrise, Inventar 483.

10 ANS, Fond Astra, Acte, Nr. 188/1893.

11 ANS, Fond Astra, Acte, Nr. 218/1893.

12 A copy of the testament is to be found in the Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv, Graz, Signatur BG Graz I D 837/1896, as communicated by Dr. Elisabeth Schöggl-Ernst. The Romanian translation of the testament is available in Liviu Groza’s *Din viața și activitatea Generalului Mihail Trapșa*, Lugoj, 1995, p.106, without any bibliographical reference attached to it.


14 Liviu, Groza, *Contribuții la cunoașterea culturii grănicerilor bănațeni*, Fundația Europeană Drăgan, Lugoj, 1993, p. 84; Groza, *Din viața și activitatea Generalului Mihail Trapșa*, p. 77.


16 Ibid., pp. 37, 38.

17 Ibid., p. 38.

18 Ibid., p. 81.

19 Ibid., p. 52.

20 Ibid., p. 80.

21 Ibid., pp. 46, 47.

22 Ibid., p. 52.

23 Ibid., p. 58.


26 Ibid., pp. 25, 83, 19.

27 Ibid., pp. 46, 74.

28 Ibid., pp. 75-76.


31 *Foală Diecezană*, Caransebeș, Nr. 44-45, 1926, p. 5; Nr. 1, 1926, p. 4.

32 Ibid., p. 5.


35 OeStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten, Karton Nr. 338 (Cejnek- Cencur), Nikolaus Cena, National und Dienstbeschreibung für das Jahr 1903, folio 3.


37 Ibid., p.4.

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., pp. 4-5, 7.
42 Macrea et al., Praetorium. Castrul si asezarea romană de la Mehadia, p. 16.
43 Buracu, Muzeul General Nicolae Cena în Băile Herculane şi Cronica Mehadiei, p. 8.
44 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
45 Ibid., p. 5.
47 OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1914, Aktenzahl 40 – 19/5, Folio 6/recto.
48 See the letters in the Valeriu Braniște archive concerning the arrests made at the beginning of the war in the Banat: ANCN, Fond Personal Valeriu Braniște, Pachet VI, Nr. act. 213, 10th of September 1914 – letter from G. Noaghea to Valeriu Braniște; and Pachet VI, Nr. act. 152, 14th of November 1914 – letter from Nicolae Ionescu to Valeriu Braniște.
49 OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1914, Aktenzahl 40 – 19/5-3, Folios 38-39.
50 ANCN, Fond Personal Valeriu Braniște, Pachet VI, Nr. act. 152, 14th of November 1914 – letter from Nicolae Ionescu to Valeriu Braniște, folio 2/verso.
51 OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1914, Aktenzahl 40 – 19/5, Confidential report A cs. és kir. 7. hadtest Vezérkari Osztályának, from Dr. Gozsdu Elek, Royal Chief Prosecutor with the Royal Tribunal in Temesvár, dated 22 August 1914, page 11/recto.
52 OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1914, Aktenzahl 40 – 19/5-2, Folio 18/recto.
53 OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1914, Aktenzahl 40 – 19/5-3, Confidential report A cs. és kir. 7. hadtest Vezérkari Osztályának, from Dr. Gozsdu Elek, Royal Chief Prosecutor with the Royal Tribunal in Temesvár, dated 22 August 1914, page 11/recto.
54 OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1914, Karton 1583 (40/1 – 41/3), Aktenzahl 40 – 19/5-2, Confidential report A cs. és kir. 7. hadtest Vezérkari Osztályának, from Dr. Gozsdu Elek, Royal Chief Prosecutor with the Royal Tribunal in Temesvár, dated 22 August 1914, page 12/verso.
55 OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1914, Karton 1583 (40/1 – 41/3), Aktenzahl 40 – 19/5, Confidential report A cs. és kir. 7. hadtest Vezérkari Osztályának, from Dr. Gozsdu Elek, Royal Chief Prosecutor with the Royal Tribunal in Temesvár, dated 22 August 1914, page 12/verso.
56 OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1914, Karton 1583 (40/1 – 41/3), Aktenzahl 40 – 19/5, Confidential report A cs. és kir. 7. hadtest Vezérkari Osztályának, from Dr. Gozsdu Elek, Royal Chief Prosecutor with the Royal Tribunal in Temesvár, dated 22 August 1914, page 12/verso.
57 OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1914, Karton 1583 (40/1 – 41/3), Aktenzahl 40 – 19/5, Confidential report A cs. és kir. 7. hadtest Vezérkari Osztályának, from Dr. Gozsdu Elek, Royal Chief Prosecutor with the Royal Tribunal in Temesvár, dated 22 August 1914, page 12/verso.
58 OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1914, Karton 1583 (40/1 – 41/3), Aktenzahl 40 – 19/5, Confidential report A cs. és kir. 7. hadtest Vezérkari Osztályának, from Dr. Gozsdu Elek, Royal Chief Prosecutor with the Royal Tribunal in Temesvár, dated 22 August 1914, page 12/verso.
59 OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1914, Karton 1583 (40/1 – 41/3), Aktenzahl 40 – 19/5, Confidential report A cs. és kir. 7. hadtest Vezérkari Osztályának, from Dr. Gozsdu Elek, Royal Chief Prosecutor with the Royal Tribunal in Temesvár, dated 22 August 1914, page 12/verso.
60 OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1914, Karton 1583 (40/1 – 41/3), Aktenzahl 40 – 19/5, Confidential report A cs. és kir. 7. hadtest Vezérkari Osztályának, from Dr. Gozsdu Elek, Royal Chief Prosecutor with the Royal Tribunal in Temesvár, dated 22 August 1914, page 12/verso.
61 OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1914, Karton 1583 (40/1 – 41/3), Aktenzahl 40 – 19/5, Confidential report A cs. és kir. 7. hadtest Vezérkari Osztályának, from Dr. Gozsdu Elek, Royal Chief Prosecutor with the Royal Tribunal in Temesvár, dated 22 August 1914, page 12/verso.
Chapter 9: Romanian Border Generals

Between the Imperial and the National Army

This chapter evaluates the relationship between the Border Generals of Romanian origin in the Austro-Hungarian army and the Romanian military authorities in the United Principalities, later on the Romanian Kingdom. The question it sets out to answer is a twofold one: did the military authorities in Bucharest attempt to attract highly skilled officers of Romanian origin from the Austro-Hungarian army into the fledgling Romanian army and, conversely, did the latter represent an attraction for these military elites, either of an ideological or of a professional nature? The question thus formulated comes as a response to secondary literature describing cases of k.k. military resigning from the Austro-Hungarian army and joining the Romanian army, or alluding to attempts on the part of the Romanian authorities to recruit such officers into the young Romanian army or to enlist their support for the 1877-78 war effort.

As most of the primary material presented in this chapter is the result of detective work starting from assumptions or quotes from secondary literature and as the conclusions inevitably involve a dialogue with these secondary sources, I have opted for a heuristic layout of the subject matter. Thus, rather than offering a seamless historical narrative incorporating all the information available from primary and secondary sources, I chose to emphasize the research process conducive to the final conclusions, making a point of assessing, in a separate section of the present chapter, the state of secondary literature on the subject and then proceeding to contrast it with primary source information.
9.1. Secondary literature and its challenges

I shall begin by pointing out that there is no comprehensive study of this question in Romanian historical literature or in any other language for that matter. Information is, indeed, available in various books and articles but only sporadically and tangentially (more often than not, relegated to footnotes and endnotes). As will become apparent in the following brief review of secondary literature, contemporary authors writing about the Border generals and their involvement with the Romanian army do not build on each other’s work nor do they use the same sources and, consequently, produce parallel and fragmentary accounts of what is essentially the same subject. The present chapter seeks to put together these disparate historical strands, confront them with new archival evidence, and, on the basis of this dialogue of sources, to provide an informed answer to the question stated above.

In his history of the Banat Military Border, Antoniu Marchescu quotes, from a collection of documents by Grigore Popîti, an 1868 circular of the General Command in Temesvár calling for vigilance on the part of the Banat commanders in the following terms:

‘Reliable sources communicated to the Royal-Hungarian Ministry of the Interior that several Austrian Romanians, who went to Bucharest, received of late the secret mission of attracting into Moldo-Vlach service officers and NCOs from the k.k. army, especially from Transylvania, and of winning the sympathies of the Romanian troop for the Bucharest government.

Given that the achievement of this goal has been attempted primarily among those demobilized and those on leave, the Royal-Hungarian Ministry of the Interior will issue the strict orders which are necessary for the Hungarian civil authorities to stop this action, but because such agitation could also take place among the Romanians in active service, we bring to your attention the Rescript of 31. l. t. No. 3855/Pres. of the Imperial War Ministry, and we delegate you to forestall such intentions in good
time and to communicate to me without delay everything you notice. Schmering, 
GM"1

For the years between 1868 (the date of the report above) and the outbreak of 
the Russo-Turkish war in 1877, there is hardly any secondary literature that would 
enable one to conclude whether this was an isolated case or part of a recruitment 
campaign initiated either by the Romanian authorities or by various nationalist 
groups in Romania.

There are a couple of secondary sources mentioning another such case of not 
so much recruitment as encouragement on the part of the Romanian authorities: the 
early 1870s meeting between Moise Groza, a lieutenant in the Austro-Hungarian 
army on a cartographical mission in Transylvania, and General Ioan Emanoil 
Florescu, the Romanian War Minister at the time. Antoniu Marchescu, quoting 
Coriolan Buracu, mentions Moise Groza’s meeting with General Florescu sometime 
between 1870 and 1873. Florescu is said to have appreciated his skills and 
application and to have suggested that he join the Romanian army. As a 
consequence, Unterlieutenant Groza resigned from the Austro-Hungarian army at 
the end of 1873 and enrolled in the Romanian army at the beginning of 1874 with 
the rank of lieutenant.2 Gh. Preda and Liviu Groza maintain that the encounter took 
place during the summer of 1871, without, however, referencing this piece of

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1 ‘1868. XI. 4. Ordin circular No. 782/ Pres. al Comandamentului din Timișoara, trimis comandanților 
din Banat.

“Din sursă de încredere s-a comunicat Ministerului de Interne reg. ungar că mai mulți Români 
austrieci, care au fost la București, au primit în ultimul timp misiunea secretă să atragă în serviciul 
moldo-vlach ohițeri și subofițeri din armata cesaro-crăiască, mai ales din Transilvania, și în general să 
câștige simpatia trupei române față de cărmuirea din București. 
Dar fiind cǎ realizarea acestui scop a fost încercată în primul rând printre demobilizați și cei din 
concediu, Ministerul de Interne reg. ungar va da ordinele severe necesare autorităților civile ungare 
pentru zădărnicirea acestei acțiuni, dar pentru că astfel de agitații se pot face și printre Românii din 
serviciul activ, vă aducem la cunoștință rescriptul din 31 l.t. No. 3855/Pres. al Ministerului de 
Război Imperial, și vă însărcinăm să preîntâmpinați din vreme încercările cu astfel de intenții și să-
mi comunicați neîntârziat tot ce observați. Schmering, general de divizie.”’
information. Their version of the meeting is anecdotal and lacks bibliographical data.3

On the eve of the 1877 Russo-Turkish war, what had been mere rumour and suspicion on the part of the Hungarian authorities ten years before became now official policy of the Bucharest government. Thus, Monitoriul României, as quoted in the Hermannstadt periodical Telegraful român (25, No. 43, 2/14 June 1877, p. 174), announced that ‘the soldiers and officers [Rom. militarii] of Romanian origin who served in foreign standing armies can be admitted into the Romanian army’ while Der Krieg. Siebenbürgisch Deutsches Tagesblatt (4, No. 1042, 31 May 1877, p. 499) reported on Prince Carol’s inspection of the troops at Calafat and, in this context, mentioned ‘the admission of officers of Romanian nationality from other armies as officers of the Romanian army’.4 In 1877 Gazeta Transilvaniei published under the title ‘La arme’ an appeal to former Austro-Hungarian officers to enrol into the Romanian army as volunteers where, so the article promised, they would be received ‘with open arms’.5 That the Romanian army was, indeed, in need of manpower to be acquired by all means is apparent also in the decision of General Alexandru Cernat, of 13 May 1877, to accelerate the promotion of military school students to the rank of sublocotenent (Non-Commissioned Officer or NCO).6

It seems that some of those who answered this call for volunteers were young people from southern and northern Transylvania. Thus, Iuliu Moisil mentions the participants from the territory of the former second Transylvanian Border Regiment in Năsăud, in particular those who distinguished themselves in the battle for Plevna.7 In the south (corresponding to a certain extent to the former territory of the first Transylvanian Border Regiment), the crossing of the border by ‘numerous young
Romanians from Făgăraș and Sibiu’ triggered the protests of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Andrássy.⁸

In his book Transilvania și războiul pentru independență (1877-1878), Liviu Maior relates two attempts of the Romanian government at recruiting Banat generals. The targeted officers were Trajan Doda and Alexander Guran. A telegram from Ion Bălăceanu, the Romanian diplomatic agent in Vienna, to Vincențiu Babeș, Doda’s friend, is quoted in support of this account: Doda was offered the position of Chief of General Staff in the Romanian army; he accepted it; his petition to the Emperor was, however, rejected on the grounds that Austria-Hungary wished to remain neutral.⁹ Maior goes on to point out that another was the actual reason for this refusal and that Bălăceanu explained this to Prince Carol in a report dated 20 July 1877. Maior does not provide any quotations from this report nor does he actually reference it. He merely presents Doda as a very popular figure with both the Romanians in the Monarchy as well as with other nationalities by virtue of his political activity after his retirement from the army. A number of other episodes of Doda’s political career are mentioned such as his refusal to participate in the parliamentary debates after his election to Parliament as a representative of Caransebes as well as his being received by the Emperor as the leader of a Banat delegation protesting against the gerrymandering which prevented the Romanians from having political representation commensurate with their numbers.¹⁰ It is not clear whether the above is a paraphrase of Bălăceanu’s report to Prince Carol or it represents data derived from another source.

The same ambiguity as to the source of information conveyed plagues the report about Guran, who is presented as ‘easier to persuade’ as he was at the time in active service and as such ‘had no other alternative’.¹¹ Maior’s 2004 book enlarges
slightly on this and, at the same time, changes the rationality behind Guran’s refusal. Guran is said to have discontinued discussion with Bălăceanu when he heard from his colleague (that is, from Doda) what the outcome of the latter’s petition had been, having thus realized he had no chance of success.\textsuperscript{12}

The main problem with the information provided by Liviu Maior is that it is referenced to his 1873 article, which only relies on three telegrams from Bălăceanu to Babeș, whose originals cannot be retrieved. Maior mentioned that they were part of the correspondence between Bălăceanu and Vincențiu Babeș, which at the time was in Professor Mihail Dan’s possession. According to Professor George Cipăianu of the University Babeș-Bolyai in Cluj, who was one of Mihail Dan’s Ph.D. students, the Babeș archive was donated to the National Archives in Cluj. However, no such correspondence from Bălăceanu to Babeș is to be found there and Professor Cipăianu does not remember coming across it either when he edited the 1876 volume of Babeș’s received correspondence. He also added that Professor Mihail Dan had lent some of the documents to various scholars, who never returned them.

Further mention of the Doda episode is to be found in Liviu Groza’s 1999 monographic study of General Trajan Doda, \textit{Oameni de seamă din Granița Bănățeană. Generalul Traian Doda}. Liviu Groza does not use Liviu Maior’s contributions and, consequently, his account is a parallel one. Quoting one of Radu Rosetti’s lectures given at the Romanian Academy on 6 December 1944, Groza refers to a meeting between Doda and Ion Bălăceanu at Herculane in 1877, during which the former received the invitation to come to Romania to lead the Romanian army during the war. Doda is said to have been flattered by this proposal but doubtful that the Emperor would approve his request to join the Romanian army. He instead offered strategic advice regarding the place on the Danube to be chosen by
the Romanian army for crossing the river. As proof of this, Groza quotes from Rosetti a telegram sent by Bălăceanu to Bucharest.\textsuperscript{13} The quote is, however, referenced to a lecture that cannot be retrieved. The 1945 report of the general secretary of the Romanian Academy\textsuperscript{14} mentions two lectures by Radu Rosseti in 1944, one given on 22 October and another one on 8 December. There is no lecture on 6 December, which is the date mentioned by Groza. Assuming that this was a typographical error, and what was actually meant was the 8\textsuperscript{th} and not the 6\textsuperscript{th} of December 1944, the lecture quoted was, according to the said Academy report, ‘Operation Projects between 1876 and 1878’ (\textit{Proiecte de operațiuni din anii 1876-1878}). However, this particular lecture does not appear to have been published as the Romanian Academy Annals for the years 1943-1944 do not include it although they do include Rosetti’s previous lectures as recorded in the 1945 Report.

Moreover, the fact that the addressee of Bălăceanu’s telegram is not mentioned (was it sent to the Romanian Foreign Ministry or, being a dispatch of military import, to the War Minister? or to Prince Carol himself?), makes the document even more difficult to find. The volume of correspondence between the Romanian Foreign Ministry and its diplomatic agencies for the years 1876 to 1879 contains several of Bălăceanu’s telegrams, none of which has the above content. On the contrary, for the year 1877, when the meeting between him and Doda is supposed to have taken place, Bălăceanu was reported to be ‘\textit{gravement malade}’ and then on his way to Pest.\textsuperscript{15} Whether his illness required him to also go to Herculane to benefit from the healing facilities of the famous spa (and thus have a pretext for meeting Doda) is not, however, mentioned in this body of correspondence.
9.2. The State of the Romanian Army

Before moving on to answering, on the basis of extant archival evidence, the question whether the Romanian government was successful in recruiting for the 1877 war, in addition to young and enthusiastic cannon fodder, also highly skilled officers of Romanian origin from the Austro-Hungarian army, I shall first dwell on the condition of the Romanian army at the time of the war and its evolution since the establishment of national militias in the two Romanian Principalities following the Treaty of Adrianople, which concluded the 1828-1829 Russo-Turkish war. I consider the evaluation of the actual strength of the Romanian army an important argument when assessing the impact of such attempts of recruitment among Romanian officers already well advanced in the Austro-Hungarian military hierarchy.

The Treaty of Adrianople having curtailed the power of the Porte, which had up until then vetoed the setting up of standing armies in the Principalities, national militias of ‘armed guards’ came into being in the early 1830s as well as the first military uniforms.\textsuperscript{16} Two officer schools appeared in the 1840s and 1850s in Jassy and Bucharest, and in 1859 the General Staff (\textit{Statul Major General}) was created, followed by the unification of the two war ministries under General Ioan Emanoil Florescu.\textsuperscript{17} The 1868 law of army organization structured the military system into a permanent army and its reserves; the doroban\textit{ţi} (local police forces) and border guard corps; militias; civic guard and gloatele (male population fit for military service).\textsuperscript{18}

The actual capacity for combat and level of training of the fledgling Romanian army was a matter of debate and polemical demonstration during the decade preceding the 1877 war. The consolidation of a viable armed force in the
United Principalities served two purposes, a strategic and a political one. The former, and the more obvious of the two, was that of protecting the newly formed state or, as expressed by Prince Carol in a speech he gave in the Romanian Parliament in 1868, preserving its neutrality in case of an armed conflict. The latter purpose was that of building an army as an indispensable state institution and thereby demonstrating that the new state could function as an independent political unit (which would later on contribute to justifying a claim to political independence). This was part and parcel of a wider process of state building, which encompassed the Church, the educational and landowning systems.

The reports of the Austro-Hungarian consuls in Bucharest to Freiherr von Beust (see capsule biography in the appendix section) and to Count Andrássy reflect, from a diplomatic point of view, the growing pains of the young Romanian army as well as the web of speculations surrounding this process. Thus, the 1868 consular reports circulate the rumour of the Romanian government’s intentions not only of preserving the integrity of the new Romanian state but also that of expanding its territory by incorporation of Transylvania, Bukovina, the Banat, and Maramures. Freiherr von Eder, the Austro-Hungarian consul in Bucharest at the time, presented the Prince and the governmental party as promoting ‘eine Rußland sympathisch und Oesterreich feindliche Richtung’ (a direction favourable towards Russia and inimical towards Austria), the explanation for which was, according to von Eder, the Romanian government’s reliance on Prussia for both protection against Russia and for the ‘realization of their utopian attempts to expand their territory at Austria’s expense.’

Prussia features in von Eder’s report not only as alleged protector of the Romanian Principalities but also as a military model vying with the French cultural
model, which had been predominant until then. In a report of 29 January 1868 he
dwells on the discontent of the French officers placed at the disposal of the Moldo-
Vlach authorities. ‘One of the reasons for this discontent’, comments von Eder, ‘may
lie in the strong Prussian tendencies, which have had as a consequence the partial
disappearance of the French culture, which existed here until recently.’∗

As von Eder reports, French Bataillonschef Lamy complained that the opinions of the
visiting French military were ignored and their mission was, as such, superfluous
(überflüssig). The discontented French commander depicted a Romanian army
whose commanders did not possess either theoretical knowledge or practical
experience, an army lacking both the necessary means and the knowledge as to what
was needed for rendering it ready for battle.** Moreover, Prince Carol’s ability to
supervise military matters was called into question by the same Commander Lamy,
who pointed out that, although the Prince had served in the Prussian army, ‘he only
made it to the rank of Unterlieutenant and that, judging by his knowledge, he
belonged to those officers who busied themselves with matters other than the
military.’***

By 1874 the tone of the consular reports, as the well as the Austro-Hungarian
consul in Bucharest, had changed. Ernst Freiherr von Haan noted in his dispatch to
Count Andrássy of 28 February 1874 that ‘of late, true enthusiasm reigns here for the
Romanian army’, which was the one topic that managed to unite the otherwise

∗ ‘Einer der Gründe dieser Unzufriedenheit, dürfte in dem hervortreten preußischen Richtungen
liegen, die ein theilweises Verschwinden des, hier noch von nicht lange bestanden habenden
französischen Kultus, zur Folge haben.’

** ‘Den Leitern des hiesigen Militärwesens fehle es ebenso an theoretischen Kenntnissen, als an
praktischen Erfahrungen [...] Nicht bloß daß man hier das für eine Armee Erforderliche nicht habe,
wisse man nicht einmal, was eine Armee um schlagfertig zu sein bedürfe.’

*** ‘Auf meine Frage, ob der Fürst, der in der preußischen Armee gedient, nicht in militärischen
Sachen bewandert sei, meinte Kommandant Lamy, daß der Fürst in der preußischen Armee es zwar
bis zum Grade eines Unterlieutenants gebracht, daß er aber, nach seinen Kenntnissen zu urtheilen,
 wahrscheinlich zu jenen Offizieren gehörte, die sich mit andern als Militärangelegenheiten befaßen.’
constantly warring Romanian MPs: ‘All parties are at one in looking upon the
Romanian army as the palladium of the country as well as in preparing themselves to
declare the independence of the country by means of it.’\textsuperscript{23} The outcome of this
enthusiasm was the passing by a great majority of a law stipulating the
transformation of already existing urban fire brigades into artillery troops.
Additionally, a credit of 8 million francs was voted for military engineering
works.\textsuperscript{24}

This and the following reports testify to a feverish concern for the
modernization of the Romanian army, with a view to which constant demands for
funding were pressed in Parliament.\textsuperscript{25} Moreover, efforts were made to apprise the
Great Powers of its organizational progress. Thus, foreign military representatives
were invited to the military manoeuvres organized by the Romanian government in
1874. On the eve of these manoeuvres General Florescu was at pains to describe to
Freiherr von Calice, the Austro-Hungarian consul in Bucharest (see capsule
biography in the appendix section), the amplitude of the upcoming Romanian
autumn military exercises, providing the latter with detailed information on the
logistics and number of troops involved.

‘At the same time I concluded from the news brought by the War Minister that,
according to the most recent dispositions, approved of by His Majesty the Prince,
this year’s autumn manoeuvres (presumably following the announced visit, which
flatters a great deal here) will have a greater amplitude than that which I was in a
position to communicate in my earlier humble reports to your Excellence. There
will, thus, be concentrated not merely 7,000 or 8,000 but rather around 25,000 men,
into two corps, which will manoeuvre against each other from Bucharest and Fokshani on the Ialomizza River and will seek to join at Ursiceni. These troops will consist of 39 Battalions, 38 Squadrons, and 16 Batteries, half regular, half territorial. Also the bridge material, with which the Romanian army has recently been endowed, will be used.***

In his report of 26 October 1874 to Count Andrassy, Freiherr von Haan noted the overall good impression the Romanian army made during these manoeuvres and emphasized the efforts to impress in particular the Turkish military delegation. Haan concluded his report by quoting the verdict of the foreign officers that

‘the Romanian army is made up of the best material and is in some respects well trained, but lacks any tactical instruction and, therefore, can only be of military significance as an auxiliary troop under the leadership of a foreign army.****

In addition to issuing the invitation to the Romanian military manoeuvres, the Romanian War Minister Ioan Emanoil Floresco strove to obtain permission for Romanian officers and generals to attend the annual military exercises of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and German armies, stressing the need for the young Romanian army to model itself on those of the neighbouring Great Powers.***


**** ‘Schließlich erlaube ich mir das Urtheil der fremden Offiziere über die rumänische Armee, dahin zusammenzufassen, daß die rumänische Armee aus dem besten Materialen besteht im Einzeln ganz gut geschult ist, ich aber jedweder taktische Schulung fehlt und ihr daher für lange Zeit nur als Hilfstruppe unter fremder Führung eine militärische Bedeutung beigemessen werden kann.’

*** ‘Im Vorlaufe des Gespräches theilte mir General Floresco mit, daß seine Hoheit der Fürst und er selbst einerseits den Wunsch hiegen, daß es einem oder mehreren Offizieren der rumänischen Armee gestattet werden möchte, irgend einem der größeren Manöver, welche in Verlaufe dieses Jahres in der k.u.k. (folio 201/recto) Monarchie abgehalten werden sollen, beizuwohnen. Er ersuchte mich, daß ich
sending officers abroad for military training and for acquiring war experience was part and parcel of the effort of building the new army, which was in need of skilled commanding officers and specialized training.29

Contemporary accounts regarding the Romanian army are for the most part polemical and make it difficult for one to ascertain the actual level of training and capacity for combat of the Romanian army on the eve of the 1877 war. Thus, the image one conceives from the 1877 reports of the French diplomat Frédéric Debains is that of a caricature of an army dependent on requisitions from the population, the result of Prince Carol’s vanité and forfanteries militaires (military snobbery)30 at a time of financial crisis due to administrative mismanagement:

‘The reserves and soldiers of the territorial army keep arriving stripped of everything, some of them in tattered uniforms, others carrying a gun on one arm and a child on the other, most of them followed by women in tears and emaciated by the time they enter the towns. The cavalry of the territorial army is incapable of putting on a march and under my very eyes several horses collapsed with tiredness and could not get up anymore. There is hardly any intendance and that which does exist possesses no financial means.’ (Bucarest, le 27 Avril 1877; Frédéric Debains to Son Excellence Monsieur le Duc Decazes, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Paris)**31

Austrian military reports convey a similar image of the Romanian army in 1877. The dispatches of General Staff officer Josef Manega, affiliated with the
Austro-Hungarian Consulate in Bucharest, highlight the hardships plaguing the Romanian army and the makeshift character of its troops and provisions.

‘The state of the Romanian army is the same as before. The spirits are low both in the higher and in the lower ranks, and their disposition is not at all warrior-like; the supply problems are the same as earlier, and to these of late has been added the lack of linen and footwear. The local War Ministry receives daily requests for clothes. In order to press these requests all the more emphatically, the state of the army clothing is depicted in such a way as is inconceivable in regular army reports. In order to make up for the perpetually felt lack of officers, 20 military students from the local Military School were prematurely [vorzeitig] enrolled as lieutenants in the Prince’s army.’ (Report No. 39 by Captain Josef Manega to the k.k. Reichs-Kriegsministerium in Vienna, Bucharest, 11 July 1877)

The supply of the troops is, as pointed out by previous sources, achieved mostly by requisitioning. As Manega notes, the authorities are industriously requisitioning goods for the Romanian army, in particular beef cattle and hay from Moldavia. With the setting in of the cold weather, the endemic lack of clothes becomes dramatic:

‘The state of the Romanian army is becoming increasingly worrying. The army suffers from everything and the fact that there have been already 100 amputations, as the opinci do not provide enough protection against frostbite, is telling proof in

*** ‘Der Zustand der rumänischen Armee ist nach wie vor derselbe. Die Stimmung ist sowohl oben wie unten gleich gedrückt, der Geist nirgends ein kriegerischer; die Verpflegsschwierigkeiten sind dieselben wie früher, und diesen gesellen sich neuesten Datums auch der eingetretene Mangel an Wäsche und Schuhwerk bei. Im hiesigen Kriegsministerium laufen täglich Forderungen an Bekleidungsstücken ein. Um diesen Forderungen den nötigen Nachdruck zu geben, werden die Bekleidungszustände in einer Weise geschildert, wie sie in geordneten Armeeverhältnissen kaum denkbar sind. Um dem stets fühlbaren Offiziersmangel abzuhelfen, wurden 20 Zöglinge der hiesigen Militärsschule vorzeitig als Lieutenants in die fürstliche Armee eingetheilt.’

∗∗∗ ‘Für die rumänische Armee wird nach wie vor im ganzen Lande fleißig requirirt. Besonders Schlachtvieh und Heu geht viel aus der Moldau über Piatra an die Donau.’ (Report No. 58 by Captain Josef Manega to the k.k. Reichs-Kriegsministerium in Vienna, Bucharest, 16 October 1877)
The youth and inexperience of the army are stressed in a number of other reports such as those sent in from Galați in October and December 1877 and monitoring the local movement of troops:

‘The squad strength of these regiments consists of 110-120 cavalry, most of them very young and with little riding skill. The horses are 15 ½ to 16 hands tall and of good breed.’ (Report dated 6 October 1877)35

‘The troop consists to a great extent of very young people, who have borne arms for scarcely more than a couple of months, and are equipped with Krnka rifles.’ (Report dated 5 December 1877)36

‘Reserve battalion No. 14 has for the most part a troop which could be more appropriately designated by the term ‘boys’, who hardly know how to dress themselves [sich adjustieren], and cannot carry the gun correctly. There is no march order whatsoever.’ (Report dated 12 December 1877)37 ***

The occasional silver lining crops up in diplomatic reports such as that of the General Consul Ritter von Zwiedinek, who acknowledges the good figure the Romanian army cut on the battlefield:

‘Despite the fact, which cannot be doubted anymore, that the young Romanian army has behaved very well on the battlefield, the disposition of the population here is,
however, a very low one.’ (Report No. 237, Bucharest, 16 September 1877, from Ritter von Zwiedineck to Graf Andrásy)\(^\text{38}\)

A polar opposite image of the Romanian troops on the eve of the war is offered by Nicolae Iorga, who contrasted what he perceived as disparaging foreign accounts to a different, more optimistic view conceived on the basis of contemporary newspaper reports. Thus, quoting from *Le Temps*, *Le Constitutionnel*, and other mainly French journals, Iorga depicts a well-equipped, sturdy, high-spirited army eager to prove itself in battle.\(^\text{39}\)

The Romanian army was not supposed to enter the war. The Russians, counting on a short war and ready victory over the Ottomans, had declined Romanian offers of military support. The Plevna hitch in the summer of 1877 turned out to be an insurmountable impasse. It was at this point during the war that the Russians started to ask for help from the Balkan states. As the Greeks pressed too many territorial claims and the Serbs were unable to help, the Russians had to settle for the assistance of the Romanian army, whose commander, Prince Carol I, had no territorial claims, but merely conditioned their participation on independence of military command and the concrete terms of a military agreement.\(^\text{40}\)

Literature on the Russo-Turkish war shows that the Romanian troops took part in the attacks against Plevna between August and December 1877 and in the storming and conquest of the Rahova, Vidin, and other redoubts, fighting for the most part on the Western front. They acquitted themselves well of their missions and ‘rendered valuable service to their more powerful ally.’\(^\text{41}\) Several authors mention

\(^*\) ‘Trotz der nunmehr nicht länger zu bezweifelnden Thatsache, daß die junge Armee des Landes sich auf dem Schlachtfelde ganz trefflich gehalten hat, ist die Stimmung der Bevölkerung hier doch eine sehr niedergeschlagene.’
instances of praise and military distinctions received from the Russian high command as well as eulogistic coverage in the foreign press.42

For all the endemic shortages and inadequacies, which constitute a leitmotif of contemporary foreign reports, for all the attempts on the part of the Romanian diplomacy to play down, or, depending on their political affiliation, to detract from, the importance of the constant acquisition of armament (Mavrogheny: ‘vouloir peser dans la lutte européenne des puissances ce n’est ni plus ni moins que ridicule’43; Balatchano: ‘Entretenir des idées belliqueuses avec nos moyens, ce serait vouloir prendre la lune avec les dents’44), the fact of the matter remains that, by 1877, the Romanian army had come a long way in its development. In the 1830s there had been 3 mixed regiments (infantry and cavalry) in Wallachia, amounting to 4,673 soldiers, and 1 mixed regiment of 1,129 men in Moldavia.45 According to the History of the 1877-1878 War drawn up by a group of Romanian officers shortly after the war, in 1876 the permanent army was comprised of 37 Batallions, 42 Squadrons, and 18 Batteries, totalling 38,000 men and 120 cannons.46 As a result of the same drive for modernization Romanian military authorities invested for the development of the artillery, in particular by purchasing Krupp cannons, initially, on Prince Carol’s initiative and, subsequently, on General Florescu’s order.47

General Radu Rosetti strikes, in my opinion, the right balance between deprecatory and eulogistic descriptions by pointing out that the Romanian army that went to war in 1877-78 was not a long standing organism and its evolution did not coincide with that of the Romanian Principalities. It was rather a new creation, merely forty odd years old, that is, less than a generation.48 Thus, many of the problems highlighted by contemporary writers, sometimes in caricature form, were real. However, as the outcome of the war showed, Carol’s urgency to build an army
and, subsequently, to take active part in the hostilities was not mere spear-shaking or snobbish conceit, but rather a steadily pursued political strategy, which would eventually turn Romania into an self-standing state, independent of both the Ottoman Empire and Russia.

9.3. The Border Generals and the 1877-1878 War – extant documentary evidence

Having reviewed the information gleaned from secondary literature in the first section of the present chapter and assessed the state of the Romanian army up to and during the 1877-1878 war in the following section, I will now proceed to an analysis of extant archival documents in order to provide an informed answer to the twofold question stated at the beginning of this chapter. As already mentioned, the main challenge in doing so was posed by the scarcity and disparity of information and, not the least, by the defective bibliographical apparatus of some of the studies touching upon this subject.

A copy of the 1868 document quoted by Marchescu from Grigore Popiţi is to be found in the Kriegsministerium Präsidium holding of the War Archives in Vienna. The document, dated 31 October 1868, alerts the military authorities in Vienna that several Austrian citizens of Romanian nationality who had returned from Bucharest were encouraging retired or on-leave officers from the k.k. army, from Transylvania in particular, to enter the Moldo-Vlach army and generally attempting to gain the sympathy of the Romanian troop for the Bucharest government.∗

∗ An sämmtliche commandierenden Generäle /: ad personam:/
Wien, am 31. Oktober 1868
Starting from this document, I went on to check the KM Präs Protokoll entries for the following years in order to ascertain whether this was a singular incident or part of a series that would suggest a steadily pursued strategy on the part of the Bucharest government. Thus, under the rubric *Donaufürstenthümer* for 1869 are mentioned ‘*Agitationen zur Gewinnung kais.-österr. Soldaten/Urlauber*.’\(^{50}\) The extant documents corresponding to this reference turned out to be a follow-up to the 1868 alert. This time, however, the agitators were no longer Austrian citizens freshly returned from the Principalities, but members of a so-called Romanian action party (*Actions-Parthei*) in Bucharest, who, according to a report from the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior, dated 13 January 1869, ‘have taken it upon themselves to persuade officers of Romanian nationality as well as soldiers to resign from the k.k. army and enter Moldo-Vlach military service.’\(^{51}\) The Hungarian report goes on to suggest more radical measures such as the translocation of Romanian troops from Transylvania to Hungary and their replacement by Hungarian contingents.\(^{52}\) In response to this report, the Austrian military authorities acknowledged the need to

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\(^{50}\) ‘Nach ämtlicher Mittheilung des königlich ungarischen Ministeriums des Inneren, haben sich gewisse Glieder der rumänischen Actions Partheii zu Bukarest anheischig gemacht, die der rumänischen Nationalität angehörigen Offiziere sowohl als auch Mannschafsglieder des k.k. gemeinsamen Heeres zum Abfalle und beziehungsweise zum Übertritte in das moldo-walachische Kriegsheer zu verleiten.’

\(^{51}\) ‘[ich] würde in dieser Richtung zuvorderst für nothwendig erachten, daß die aus rumänischen Elementen bestehenden Truppenkörper von Siebenbürgen, wo dieselben der Versuchung zunächst, ausgesetzt, und diese mit Hinblick auf die Stimmung der dortigen rumänischen Bevölkerung zumeist Anklang finden dürften, in geeignetere Dislokations Bezirke nach Ungarn verlegt, und in Siebenbürgen durch – aus ungarischen Elementen bestehende Truppen ersetzen werden sollen.’

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keep an eye on and prevent all such recruiting activities but considered it
unadvisable to proceed to a transfer of troops.****

There are no more similar entries for the following years up until 1877 in the
KM Präs protocols.

The most intriguing and frustrating reference, but also, as we shall see further
on, that which led eventually to some rewarding research results, was the Doda case.

My starting point was the chapter dedicated by Liviu Groza in his 1999 monograph
to the encounter between the Romanian agent in Vienna, Ion Bălăceanu, and Trajan
Doda at Herculane in 1877. As I could not track down the quoted lecture by Radu
Rosetti, which constituted Groza’s source, nor could I infer who the addressee of the
cited telegram was, I was not in a position to retrieve the original and, as such, had to
take Liviu Groza’s word for it. I managed to overcome this bibliographical impasse
by going through all the published articles and studies of General Radu Rosetti in the
hope that, if Groza’s quote was indeed accurate, if poorly referenced, Rosetti will
have repeated, and maybe even enlarged on, this information in one of his other
writings on the 1877-78 war. The French telegram as cited by Groza does not appear
in any of the published studies by Rosetti. However, the latter’s 1926 book Partea
luată de armata română în Răsboiul din 1877-1878 contains information which
corroborates Groza’s contribution in the form of an endnote of the following content:

‘The Prince was not satisfied with the way in which the manoeuvres were executed
today and was very critical of them (King Carol I’s Memoirs, 4 October 1874).
Because of this, in 1876 they sought to enlist [a obține serviciile] Romanian officers
from the Austro-Hungarian army who had distinguished themselves in war –

**** ‘Weitere Maßnahmen sowie die angeregte Translozierung der Truppenkörper rumänischer
Nationalität von Siebenbürgen, erscheinen jedoch schon [illegible word] in Anbetracht der Jahreszeit
und anderwäriger Umstände wegen dem gegenwärtigen Momente nicht wohl angezeigt; jedoch
werde ich diesen Gegenstand im Auge behalten, und nicht versäumen in dieser Richtung allenfalls
nötige Verfügungen rechtzeitig zu treffen.’
General Doda and Colonel Urs. (see the letters of V. Babeș, who was entrusted with this negotiation, one dated 21 November/ 8 December 1876 and addressed to I.C. Brătianu, and the other one dated 19 June/ 1 July 1877 addressed to Bâlăceanu – *I.C. Brătianu Documents*). The Austrian government did not grant permission (see Bâlăceanu’s telegram to Brătianu dated 26 April 1877 - *I.C. Brătianu Documents*).54

This footnote shows that the addressee of the quoted French telegram was I.C. Brătianu, the Liberal Prime Minister under Carol I between 1876 and 1881. However, the body of documents referred to as *Documente I.C. Brătianu* does not provide any indication as to the whereabouts of this archive and, given that the book was published in 1926, the legitimate question arose whether these documents survived both the war and the Communist regime. Further research led me to the conclusion that the *I.C. Brătianu Documents* were part of the Brătianu family archive (*Fondul familial Brătianu*) held in the National Archives in Bucharest. The following account is based on my findings in this family archive corroborated with information from other sources such as the published correspondence of Vincențiu Babeș and Dumitru Brătianu.

Evidence suggests that, as early as autumn 1876,55 informal attempts were made by the Romanian authorities in Bucharest to secure the services of two Romanian high-ranking officers from the Austro-Hungarian army, that is, the retired Generalmajor Trajan Doda and Oberst David Urs de Margina (for the latter, see the capsule biography in the appendix section). Vincențiu Babeș communicates this to George Barțiu in a letter of 17/29 November 1876 deploiring the tactless manner in which the Romanian authorities proceeded in the matter without seeking the cooperation of the Transylvanian Romanian intellectuals.56
By spring 1877, tentative diplomatic negotiations were under way between the Romanian authorities, who had in the meantime resorted to the services of Vincenţiu Babeş in dealing with Trajan Doda, and the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The latter were, thus, asked to grant permission to a k.k. general of Romanian origin to join Prince Carol’s army. This becomes apparent in the letters and coded telegrams exchanged between Ion Bălăceanu, the Romanian diplomatic agent in Vienna, and I.C. Brătianu, the Romanian Prime Minister. These attempts at obtaining a k.k. general were part of a mediated process of negotiation. Bălăceanu received his instructions from I.C. Brătianu, who in turn relayed information to and from Prince Carol. The Austro-Hungarian authorities were represented by Count Andrássy, who sounded the Emperor and conveyed his answer to Bălăceanu, the latter sending the message further to Brătianu and the Prince. The telegrams in the Brătianu family archive throw light on the Romanian end of this negotiation. The full text and the English translation of these telegrams are available in Appendix 4.

The following exchanges took place against the backdrop of the Russo-Turkish war, which started on 24 April 1877. On the 10 May 1877 Carol I signed Romania’s declaration of independence and from this point on the Romanian government offered military collaboration to the Russians, which was refused by the latter till the last moment. The main source of disagreement were the terms of such a collaboration: whereas Romania wished to enter the war under its own separate military command, the Russians pointed out that Romanian help was not indispensable to them and would only be acceptable under Russian command. The logic behind Romania’s wish to enter the war was that of achieving recognition of its de-facto political independence by making a point of retaining military operation independence during the war. However, independent military command
presupposed the existence of an experienced Chief of General Staff who could effectively lead the army into battle. Paradoxically, on the eve of the 1877 war, General Ioan Emanoil Florescu, the former War Minister and also the person who best knew the Romanian army as its main organizer and modernizer, was sidelined through political machinations and denied command during the war.\textsuperscript{59} It is in this context that the telegrams and letters between Bălăceanu and Brătianu of May and June 1877 were written. They testify to the hopes of the Bucharest authorities of obtaining an experienced Romanian general and several high-ranking officers and the reticence and eventual refusal of the Austro-Hungarian authorities.

‘8 May 1877
Andrássy avoided communicating to me the Emperor’s reply on the subject of the Romanian general. I gathered, however, that he was very willing to give it to us but that he was prevented by the certainty that our army would collaborate with the Russian army. No one believes anymore that the war will remain local.
Bălăceanu.’\textsuperscript{60}

‘June 1877
The Prince would be happy if the Emperor were to authorize Doda to come to us. We will offer him a very advantageous and safe position and, I repeat, we wish that the Austrian-Hungarian government should send an officer to the Prince’s army in Oltenia.
I.C. Brătianu\textsuperscript{61}

‘Vienna, 14 June 1877
Confidential
Dear Mr President,
It was on the spontaneous initiative of Mr Babesiu (pronounce Babesh) that I sent you a telegram on the subject of General Doda. The latter had promised to be here last week but, as urgent matters kept him in Caransebes, he has twice postponed his departure. I am sending you here enclosed his latest telegram (addressed to Babesiu), which leads us to think that he will arrive on Saturday or Sunday. Doda being the Emperor’s favourite may succeed in obtaining permission to go to
Romania at the risk of measures which the Hungarian government will no doubt take against him; but one should not think that the ministers in Vienna and Pest will agree to send an officer to the General Staff of the Prince. It is something that the Emperor cannot do without them.

I am quite intrigued by the fact that Comte Andrássy would not let me know the Emperor’s answer to the request which he [Andrássy] had so willingly taken upon himself to submit on our behalf (relative to a general and several high-ranking Romanian officers), when it would have been so easy for him to say: “The Emperor will not or cannot”. I tried to find out the cause and learnt that – although I cannot guarantee it – they consulted Berlin, who answered by a negative shake of the head! If this is true, I doubt that the Emperor will allow Doda to leave.’ 62

A letter of 19 May 1877 from Vincenţiu Babeş to Ion Bălăceanu explains the intermediary role played by the former in the negotiations as well as revealing the frictions between the Romanian intelligentsia in Transylvania and the Bucharest politicians. The letter, moreover, provides unexpected insight into General Doda’s and Colonel Urs’s attitude relative to the Romanian army and also their reasons for refusing to join it in the spring of 1877. Although a full translation of the letter is available in Appendix 4/2, I have opted for quoting from it at some length, given that it represents one of the very few personal testimonies of these officers. Most of the material I have analysed so far consists of official stances and statements and very few first-person accounts, so that an account, even if a reported one, of two of these officers’ reasons for refusing to enter the Romanian army is one of the few extant testimonies throwing light on the nature of their loyalties.

‘General Doda arrived here on Sunday morning as announced in his telegram. I spent the whole day with my friend and explained to him the situation, as much as the information I had allowed me to, and communicated to him the content of your valuable epistles. He listened to me with great interest and then asked for 24 hours of thorough deliberation in order to make a firm and serious decision. Last night we talked until midnight and I regret to inform you of his explanations.
“It is too late. It is impossible for me to commit myself to such a momentous thing, full of such responsibility, on the eve of the event, ignorant of the means available and without having the time to examine and possibly amend or replace them.”

Then: as our Monarchy does not recognize Romania’s independence and, on the other hand, wishes to remain neutral, it cannot authorize one of its generals, [...] to take part, let alone in a cardinal capacity, in Romania’s war action.”

The time was ripe, if not around 1868/69, when Doda and C. Ursu, sounded by the Brătianus, offered their services, but were rebuffed [reu desconsiderați], then at least last autumn, when Doda, through the mediation of Senator Deșliu and encouraged even by the Prince [prin voia Domnitorului], was ready to go, but suddenly he was rejected by Mr Bratianu!...”

Since then he could have familiarized himself with and even integrated into the Romanian army [a se familiariza și chiar contopi cu puterile și factorii din armata română]. It is no longer possible to do that today and it would be an unforgivable foolishness to get involved now only to produce more confusion!

In much fewer words Colonel Ursu from Sibiu informed me, upon my confidential inquiry, that, at this stage, under no circumstances should we count on him. [...] Having heard about the highly inappropriate attempts made here in Transylvania by the Bucharest leaders, I took it upon myself to recommend to Mr Brătianu twice to use other methods and much more caution, that is, to get them to win over General Doda, who was at that time burning with desire [ardea de poftă] to join the Romanian army and prepare it for that which we all knew was going to follow. But Mr Prime Minister did not answer, and General Doda found out that around Easter Mr Brătianu did not hesitate to commission a missionary of the Hungarian Government, the Hungarian MP Al. R., to hire him. Al. R. thus openly expressed himself before my friend D., whereas we here avoid even as much as touching upon such subjects.”

As the above quotes indicate, in the spring and early summer 1877 the Romanian authorities were, indeed, bidding for several high-ranking officers from the Austro-Hungarian army. Their first choice was, on Vincețiu Babeș’s suggestion, the retired General Doda. The novelty this Babeș letter brings is the information that Trajan Doda and Baron Urs de Margina were ready to join the Romanian army as early as 1868/69, and also that Doda offered his services once again in the autumn of
1876, when, according to Babeș, he was rejected by Brătianu himself. In light of the somewhat contradictory evidence offered by the previously mentioned November 1876 letter from Babeș to Barițiu, to the effect that the Romanian authorities were courting Doda and Ursu in autumn 1876, one can conclude that this was rather an ill-organized attempt of the Romanians, who lacked unity of action and purposefulness in dealing with the two officers.

The reference to 1868-69 as a time when both Doda and Urs de Margina offered their services inevitably puts one in mind of the synchronous alert among the (Austro-) Hungarian authorities documented by authors like Marchescu and Popiți. Given that the 1868 alert seems to have been a one-off event with some reverberations into the next year, one wonders, in conjunction with Babeș’s testimony, if the suspicions of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior were aroused precisely by these initial, abortive discussions between Doda and Ursu, on the one hand, and the Brătianus, on the other.

Fragmentary evidence of an early initiative of attracting Romanian officers from the Austro-Hungarian army appears in the correspondence received by Ion C. Brătianu from his brother, Dumitru Brătianu. As confirmed in a letter dated 23 September 1868, the latter had written to Prince Carol about the necessity of hiring several Romanian officers from Austria (‘quelques officiers distingués et aguerris’) and also about the possible means of rendering the offer more attractive to them:

‘Among other things I write to him [i.e. to Prince Carol] about the officers we could hire from Austria. I believe we absolutely need at least three or four of the most distinguished Romanian officers in Austria, even if this means that the Prince will have to secure their position until this can be regulated by Parliament and, as an incentive, it would be good if they could be promised a higher rank than the one
they held or are holding in the Austrian army. I took some steps in this respect when I was in Vienna.*65

This proposal comes at a time when the organization of the Romanian army was in full swing and its legal framework was beginning to be articulated. Thus, 1868 had seen the passing of the first army law. What Dumitru Brătianu alludes to is the lack of a legal basis for accepting and integrating officers from foreign armies into the Romanian army. It was only in June 1877 that this framework would be defined by a special law stipulating that Romanian officers who had served in foreign armies could be received with the same rank into Romanian military service.

Dumitru Brătianu’s suggestion coincides with the frictions and diplomatic malaise occasioned by Carol’s introduction of Prussian officers and instructors into the fledgling Romanian army. As captured also by the Austro-Hungarian consular reports analysed in the previous section of the present chapter, the source of discontent were the clashes between the Prussian instructors and the members of the French military mission, and, at a diplomatic level, the bellicose message construed by countries like France and Austria-Hungary, who suspected Romania of sliding into the area of dominance of either Prussia or Russia. Against this backdrop of international rumour, Dumitru Brătianu reiterates the need for Romanian (as opposed to foreign) officers as a possible solution for lulling suspicions and putting an end to speculations.

‘Dear brother,

The news of Colonel Krenski and other Prussian officers going to Romania as instructors in our army has had a great impact. This measure displeases all Powers

* ‘Între altele îi vorbescu de oficierei ce am putea angaja în Austria. Cred că ar fi de ne apărâtă trebuință să avem mai multe ofiteri, întrucât măcar trei, patru din cei mai distincți din Austria chiar de ar trebui să le asigure Domnitorul poziționarea până să se pot regula lucrul prin camere, și spre mai mare indemn să ar fi bine să îi se promită un gradu superiorul gradului ce au ocupat sau ce ocupă în armata austriacă. – Am lucrat ceva în privirea acesta cându mă aflam la Viena.’
and even our best friends criticize and deplore it. If this is true and if there is still time [it would be advisable? – illegible word] to drop or at least postpone this project. All the more so as I do not see that there is any pressing need for foreign instructors; on the contrary, it is a weakness on our part to show the world that, just like the Turks, we are in perpetual need of foreign leaders. We do, indeed, need several experienced officers, but [let them be] Romanian, and I have shown to you how they could be obtained. Adding to the suspicions that are already hanging over us the saga of a Prussian military mission of no real necessity would be an unjustified and harmful bravado.’**

There is no indication, either in the archive I consulted or in the documents and letters from Dumitru Brătianu’s archive published by Al. Cretzianu,**67 of the outcome of these 1868 suggestions. It, therefore, remains unclear what the reasons were for the rejection of Doda and Ursu, as mentioned by Vincențiu Babeș in his 1877 letter to Bălăceanu. The above-mentioned Cretzianu collection of documents shows this to have been a long-standing concern with Dumitru Brătianu, gradually acquiring more definite expression. Thus, one can detect an evolution from the 1848 letter to Paul Bataillard, in which D. Brătianu asked for support and stressed the need for weapons and for several superior officers with war experience;68 to the anonymous *Apel către Românii ardeleni din armata austriacă*, tentatively dated 1852 and found by Cretzianu in the D. Brătianu archive, a leaflet demonizing the Emperor and exhorting all Romanians enrolled in the Austrian army to join the Romanian army for a better life;69 to, finally, the more purposeful and clearly

**‘Iubite frate, nuvela mergerii în România a colonelului Krenski și alții ofiicieri prusiani ca instructori ai armatei noastre a produsu un forțe mare și forțe viu efectu. Acestă măsură displace tutorul Puteriloru și chiar amicii noștri cei mai buni o critică și o deplîng. De este lucrul adevăratu și de mai este timpu [illegible word] a face să cadă sau buținu să să amâne acelu proiectu. Cu atât mai cu semănă că nu vedu ușă neapărată trebuință de instructori strimi; din contra este ușă schădere pentru noi d’arăta lumei că întocmai ca turcii avem nevoie continuă de conducători strimi. Ne trebuie într’adevăr câțiva ofiicieri experimentați, însă români, și îți’arătat cum se pot dobîndi. Pe înălță prepusurile ce așpășă aspru ne să mai adăogăm istoria unei misiuni militare prusiene fără ușă absolută necesitate, ar fi o bravă nejustificabilă, forțe vătămătoare, care [damaged document – lower part of the page was ripped off]."
defined 1868 suggestion of approaching several Romanian officers and ensuring the invitation was made as attractive as possible.

Coming back to the 1877 diplomatic telegrams in the Brătianu archive, although they do not provide an explanation of the 1868 rejection of officers like Doda, they are, nevertheless, evidence to a poor grasp of the political and military situation of these officers on the part of the Romanian authorities. The very request for a k.k. general with a view to entering the Russo-Turkish war, which was already under way, and the hope that, if the Prince were to write to the Emperor, this request would be granted were unrealistic in themselves. As will become apparent in the following telegrams, such an action would have signified that Austria-Hungary was indirectly getting involved in the war (which, if its ill-fated involvement in the Crimean War was anything to go by, was the last thing Austria intended to do) or that it was encouraging Romania’s war initiative. Moreover, the assumption that Doda, being the Emperor’s favourite, to use Bălăceanu’s words, was, therefore, more likely to get imperial approval to join the Romanian army comes across as misinformed, at best, and reveals an ignorance of the relationship between the Emperor and his generals. Doda, on the other hand, seems to have been fully aware of both the political and the military implications of such a belated action, as Babeş’s 1877 letter shows. The Romanian authorities continued, however, to press their request in blatant disregard of the international diplomatic configuration, very much to the mortification of the likes of Babeş, who were aware of the impossibility of success of these tardy attempts (see Babeş’s letter to Visarion Roman dated 23 June 1877). As the following telegrams show, the tone of the Bălăceanu-Brătianu correspondence remains optimistic:
‘Vienna, 29 June 1877
His Excellence Mr Bratiano, President of the Council [of Ministers], Bucharest
Doda arrived. I conferred with him for three long hours. I succeeded in abating his resentment, which is Deșliu’s doing. The only obstacle lies in the lack of time in order for him to study and get to know all the workings of the machinery that we want to entrust him with. He will ask permission from the Emperor to come to Romania as a civilian. From there he will send in his resignation if he decides to enter the Prince’s army. The Austrian-Hungarian government will not send an officer to our Quartier Général because it has not recognized us as belligerents.
Balatchano.’

As a result, Doda reconsidered his position and asked for permission from the Emperor, as communicated in the French telegram quoted by Liviu Groza, a Romanian translation of which is to be found in the Brătianu Family Archive:

‘Brătianu, President of the Council [of Ministers], Calafat
Bucharest, 2 July 1877
Doda will see the Emperor tomorrow, from whom he hopes to obtain a favourable answer. He came to see me and tell me that I should inform you that crossing the Danube upriver from Vidin would be an immense mistake, because in case of defeat we would have no other alternative than to push the army into Serbia, which would immediately attract the Austrian army there. According to Doda, our army should cross over around Bechet, thus, even if we were defeated, we would not be forced to cross over the Danube again, which would be bad for us. We could retreat along the Danube and reunite with the nearest Russian army corps. Doda recommends to the commanders that they should keep alert day and night to avoid surprise attacks.
G. Cantacuzino.’

The name incongruity (the French telegram was signed by Bălăceanu, while this Romanian translation is attributed to Cantacuzino) is explained by previous telegrams, which show that Cantacuzino relayed telegrams from Bălăceanu to Brătianu.
The Emperor’s answer, mediated by Andrássy, came at the beginning of July 1877, spelling out the friendly but neutral attitude of Austria-Hungary as well as rejecting the Romanian request for Doda:

‘Brătianu, President of the Council [of Ministers], Craiova
Vienna, 2 July 1877
For H.H. the Prince. After receiving once again the Emperor’s orders this morning, Andrássy asked me to directly inform your Highness of the following, on behalf of the Emperor: From the triple point of view of Austria’s neutrality, as well as that of our financial situation and of the pretext that would be given to the Cabinets which are only too willing to deny the neutrality we have requested, the Emperor cannot advise your Highness to cross the Danube. But if the Prince considers that he owes to his people and his army the satisfaction of having contributed to the liberation of the Christians in Turkey, Austria-Hungary will not put up any obstacles, directly or indirectly, and will not add a soldier more to the regular garrisons in the towns bordering on Romania, waiting for Romania’s independence to turn from de facto into de jure. Austria-Hungary will not make any distinction between us and the other belligerents. The Emperor asks your Highness for two things, without which he would be forced to desist from the amicable attitude he wishes to retain towards Romania to the very end: 1) that no battalion should cross the Serbian border; 2) that they should not pursue territorial conquests in Bulgaria. In exchange for this, the imperial government is entirely willing to have a certain part of Dobrogea ceded to your Highness in the future peace treaty. An extended version of this message via letter. The favourable result of the delicate negotiations on this subject is owing to Count Andrássy, whose tireless benevolence and steady sympathy towards Romania were proved on this occasion as well. The reasons that prevented the Emperor from authorizing Doda to go to the Romanian Quartier Général are all political. I will communicate them to Mr Brătianu shortly. We can have a superior officer of equal value, but one whom the Romanians of Hungary will not have turned into a national hero. This, unfortunately, seems to be General Doda’s case.
Bălăceanu.’

Bălăceanu reiterates in his next telegram his promise to expatiate on the reasons given by the Emperor for his negative answer. There is, however, no such letter to be found in the Brătianu Family archive.
‘To his Excellence Mr Brătianu, President of the Council [of Ministers], Craiova
Vienna, 3 July 1877

Tomorrow I shall send you a telegram enlarging on the cautious reasons Andrássy
gave me as grounds for the Emperor’s refusal to allow Doda to leave. His Majesty
did not designate another officer in his stead as this would give too much the
impression that he encouraged us to cross the Danube, all the more so as Andrássy,
who expects to be furiously interpellated, is determined to reply that he could have
prevented us from crossing over, but that he did not even try to [missing section in
the transcribed telegram]. The Emperor will allow any superior officer to go to
Romania. We will not wait too long.’74

Notwithstanding the Emperor’s negative answer, Doda offered strategic
advice to the Romanian authorities and continued to help with suggestions, as we
have seen in the telegram dated 2 July 1877 and as the following telegram shows:

‘His Excellence Mr Brătianu, Bucharest
Vienna, 7 July 1877

I pray his Highness to forgive the delay with which I am writing. My eyes are out of
order at the moment. Doda asks me to tell you that under no circumstances are we to
cross the Danube without a General Staff Chief with complete war experience and if
you have to confine yourselves to taking a Russian general, he recommends
Dragomiroff. As there are two of this name, this is the one who has written a much
appreciated work on the 1866 Austro-Prussian war. Andrássy signified that, had we
asked for a high-ranking officer less prominent than Doda, we would have got it. I
could not find out to whom he was alluding.
Bălăceanu’75

Running completely against the grain of this correspondence, Bălăceanu’s
memoirs mention the Doda episode cursorily and tell a different story altogether.
Bălăceanu the memoirist remembers, or rather misremembers, things as follows:

‘I went to the Emperor, who saw no obstacle to Doda accepting the position offered
by Romania, but only on condition that he resign from the Austro-Hungarian army. I
communicated to Doda the Emperor’s answer. To this he exclaimed: “Good, we
have a deal! But tell me, is Romania at least going to go to war against Russia?” – “No, as it is our ally.” – “What about later on?” – “How can I vouch for what the future holds? Who is to know what will happen later?” – “In this case,” exclaimed Doda, “I won’t come!” And nothing could make him change his mind. ⁷⁶

Georgeta Filliti, the editor and translator of Bălăceanu’s memoirs, does point out, however, in her prefatory notes that the text is interlarded with the biased views, exaggerations and, at times, wholly fantasied dialogues. Given the body of diplomatic correspondence quoted above, Bălăceanu’s rendition of his talk with Doda might well be entirely fictional.

A 1937 monograph adds Eugeniu Carada to the number of people involved in recruiting Doda for the high command of the Romanian army. The reported story of the Carada-Doda meeting is provided by M. Theodorian, Carada’s son, in the following terms:

‘[Carada] went to Mehadia, where the spa doctor Popovici took him to Traian Doda. They discussed for three days. “[Carada] convinced himself”, as Mr M. Theodorian writes, “that the brave general lacked some of the qualities required of a generalissimo. He left him and hurried back to Bucharest.” ⁷⁷

If anything, these fragmentary and rather contradictory personal testimonies show that Doda was approached by different people sent by Brătianu at different points in time. The Chinese-whispers character of this information (in both Bălăceanu’s and Carada’s cases the information was filtered and edited by a member of the family) renders the diplomatic correspondence in the Brătianu archive all the more valuable as it provides a definite and comparatively more reliable sequence of events.

As this correspondence indicates, by virtue of backstage discussions between Bălăceanu and Andrássy, the Romanians continued to look for another, less famous,
k.k. Romanian general in the same slapdash manner Vincențiu Babeș was complaining about in his letter:

‘Mr Bălăceanu, Diplomatic Agent of Romania, Vienna
Bucharest, 10 July 1877
I was in the county in inspection. This is why you did not immediately receive my congratulations on the benevolence that you managed to secure. As regards the superior officer, find out about Guran, as the other one is impossible to get, but work fast because we are in a hurry. The requested letter will be sent to you.
Minister President Ion C. Brătianu.’ 78

The above-mentioned Generalmajor Alexander Guran, was, just like Doda, a native of the Banat Military Border and, as pointed out in Chapter Five, had a successful career behind him based on outstanding military skill (several times decorated, director of the Kriegsschule, head of the 5th Division in the k.k. War Ministry). At the time of the 1877 Russo-Turkish war, he had been recently appointed Director of the Military Geographical Institute in Vienna, in which capacity he would to be promoted to the rank of Feldmarschalleutnant in 1878. 79

His answer to the Romanian authorities’ invitation to join the Romanian General Staff had been, according to Bălăceanu, negative from the very beginning and there was little hope of him being prevailed upon. 80 The diplomatic agent’s persistence elicits a possible explanation for this flat refusal:

‘Mr Brătianu, President of the Council [of Ministers], Craiova
Vienna, 16 July 1877
Guran refuses categorically. Among the Romanian officers [it is a] catastrophe to be with the General Staff. There is only Colonel Trapsia left, who is not here. I will have his answer the day after tomorrow.
Bălăceanu’ 81 (underlining mine)
Oberstlieutenant Michael Trapsia, the last name on Bălăceanu’s list, was, according to the 1877 entry in his Qualifikationsliste, conducting operative and special General Staff works in Burnau. The characterization list records a very active and busy year for Trapsia. In 1877 he participated in the great General Staff trip in Upper Austria (Oberösterreich), led the exercises of cartography and reconnaissance for the students of the higher artillery and engineering course, as well as functioned as a member of the board of examiners for the final examinations in the War Academy and for the examinations of the General Staff applicants for the sanitary troops. In September 1878 he was sent on a military diplomatic mission as part of the commission in charge of border regulation (Grenzregulierung) between Romania and Austria-Hungary.*82

The answer expected by Bălăceanu from Trapsia is not recorded by any of the telegrams in the Brătianu archive. What is recorded, however, is the fact that Brătianu was not interested in Trapsia, who was not deemed high enough in the military hierarchy to be desirable. However, given Trapsia’s experience as a graduate of the flotilla school at Klosterneuburg, one would have thought he would have been a preferred choice with the Romanian authorities, who were about to get involved in a war in which most of the battles would be given along, or in the proximity of, the Danube. Brătianu’s hasty discarding of Trapsia as an unsuitable candidate goes to show once more that the Romanian authorities in Bucharest knew little about the people they were attempting to recruit.

* ’1877: Im Burnau für operative und besondere Generalstabsarbeiten. Hat die große Generalstabskommission in Oberösterreich mitgemacht. Hat durch 2 Monate die Mappirungs- und Recognosirungs Übungen der Frequentanten des höhere Artillerie und Genie Courses geleitet; und war als Kommissions Mitglied sowohl bei den Schlußprüfungen der Kriegsschule, als auch bei den Prüfungen der Stabs Offiziers Aspiranten der Sanitätstruppe verwendet. [...] 1878: Im September in militärisch-diplomatischer Mission bei der Grenzregulirungs Commission zwischen Östreich-Ungarn und Rumänien am Pruth.’
‘To Mr Bălăceanu, Romanian Agent in Vienna
Pitești, 18 July 1877
Colonel Trapsia’s name completely unknown here. Besides, if he cannot get promoted without delay, he would have no authority over our officers. Impossible to write a letter to the Emperor in this respect as we cannot officially ask Austria for a general without asking Russia as well.
Minister President Ion C. Brătianu.’

That the Romanian government encouraged and even tried to recruit k.k. Romanian officers was by no means a secret. As shown in the report of 13 June 1877 sent by the military attaché Captain Josef Manega to the Kriegsministerium in Vienna, on 6 June the Romanian government promulgated a law article stipulating that Romanian officers who served in foreign armies could be received into the Romanian army with the same rank they held previously and with the same rights as enjoyed by all Romanian citizens. The same Captain Manega adds that, to his knowledge, the names of two k.k. colonels of Romanian origin were circulated in the Romanian War Ministry at the time: Urs de Margina, mentioned earlier in the chapter in Vincențiu Babeș’s letter to Bălăceanu, and a certain Wilhelm Poppovics from the artillery. No mention is made, however, to Doda, Guran, or Trapsia, which indicates that these negotiations were kept secret. The same conclusion is


supported by the conspicuous absence of any such reference in the apocryphal memoirs of King Carol I.

By 1877 the rest of the Border officers under discussion had not attained generalcy and were, as such, of less interest to the Romanian authorities. On the basis of *Qualificationsliste* information, one can account for some of them at the time of the Russo-Turkish war. Thus, in 1877 Alexander Lupu was a field company commander with the rank of *Hauptmann 2. Classe* (Captain second class) in the Infantry Regiment Carl Alexander Großherzog von Sachsen Weimar Eisenach No. 64.  

Ladislaus Cena was a *Hauptmann 2. Classe* in 1877, when he was transferred to the Artillerie Stab ‘beim k. und k. General-Artillerie-Inspector’. The only one of the Romanian generals-to-be for whom there is official evidence that he was in Romania at the time of the war (and who, as we saw in the previous chapter, was to use this information to ward off accusations of espionage in 1914) was Nikolaus Cena, who had been sent there on a military intelligence mission. He was at the time an *Oberlieutenant* with the Infantry Regiment No. 64 in Temesvár. He also had considerable teaching experience in military engineering (*Pionierdienst*), fortifications (*Permanente- und Feldbefestigung*), and tactics, among other subjects, which, apart from the fact that he was a native Romanian, may have influenced the decision to send him on this mission in the first place. Thus, his *Qualificationsliste* mentions for the year 1878, under the rubric *Verdienste im Frieden* (Merits during Peacetime), that,  

‘in accordance with the order of the k.k. military command in Temesvár, 28/2 1878 Präs. Nr. 234, he travelled through Oltenia [kleine Wallachei] all the way to Craiova in civilian clothes in order to ascertain the strength of the Russian and Romanian
troops deployed along the southern Austrian border and reconnoitre their fortifications.∗∗∗

It is only late in Cena’s life that we find evidence of his consideration for the Romanian army, as testified to by Coriolan Buracu, his priest friend in Mehadia. The latter notes that Cena’s ‘yearning to see the Romanian army brought him on 10 May 1910 to Turnu-Severin, where he watched the Romanian military parade.’ On this occasion he is said to have told the Romanian officers that ‘the young Romanian army had such a beautiful past and would have a glorious future’.∗∗∗∗ After 1918, the same Buracu recounts, Cena was received into the Romanian army with the rank of general de divizie and decorated with the order ‘Coroana României în gradul de mare ofiţer’. He reportedly wore with great pride the Romanian military uniform and this decoration.91

9.5 Conclusions

In view of the information presented in this chapter, I argue that the answer to the twofold question ‘Did the Romanian authorities try to recruit high-ranking Romanian officers from the k.k. army and, conversely, were the latter in any way attracted by the prospect of joining the Romanian army?’ is affirmative and in need of qualification.

Firstly, evidence from various sources points to a lack of skilled command in the young Romanian army. Hence the need for foreign officers as instructors, the repeated requests for sending officers abroad to attend military manoeuvres, the

∗ ‘1878 Hat zufolge Auftrages des k.k. Militär-Commandos Temesvár 28/2 1878 Präs. Nr. 234 durch
14 Tage die kleine Wallachei bis Krajova im Civile verkleidet bereist, um die Stärke der längst der österreichischen Südgrenze aufgestellten russischen und rumänischen Truppen zu erkunden und die etwa aufgeführten Befestigungen zu recognoscieren.’

∗∗ ‘Dorul său de a vedea armata română l-a dus în a. 1910 (10 mai) la Turnu-Severin, ca să asiste la parada militară. Atunci făcuse ofiţerilor români declaraţia profetică “tânăra armată română are un trecut atât de frumos, va avea şi un viitor glorios!”’
conclusions of foreign military guests that the Romanian troop was essentially good but only under foreign command, the speeding up of graduation in Romanian military schools to make up for an endemic dearth of officers. The presence of foreign officers in the Romanian army was, however, problematic as it led to diplomatic friction and suspicion. It turned into a polemical matter during the Romanian preparations for entering the war in 1877, when accepting a foreign commander came to mean overt involvement of one or another power in the conflict and was also seen to affect the status of the Principalities at the end of the war.

Secondly, extant documents indicate that the Bucharest authorities did attempt to recruit Romanian officers from the Austro-Hungarian army as early as 1868 and, more explicitly, on the eve of the 1877 war. My interpretation of the archival evidence put forth in the present chapter is that this was not an orchestrated, large-scale recruitment campaign spanning the decade before the Russo-Turkish war, but rather a case of nominal recruitment, which involved sounding three or four officers (the most prominent of them being Doda and Urs de Margina). The 1868-1869 Hungarian documents alerting against such attempts at recruitment are too generic and vague for one to ascertain if more than a couple of cases actually occurred. The reference to Romanian members of the so-called action party in Bucharest seems to point to the Brâtianus and their addresses to Doda and Urs. In default of more conclusive evidence, this remains a mere hypothesis.

Thirdly, Doda and Urs de Margina were ready to join the Romanian army when sounded in 1868. Their 1877 refusal was determined by previous rejection followed by the belated, one can say almost opportunistic, invitation they received on the eve of Romania’s entering the war in the summer of 1877. There is no evidence that I am aware of which throws light on the Romanian authorities’ refusal
to receive the two before 1877. Doda eventually asked for and was refused permission from the Emperor to join the Romanian army. He submitted to his Emperor’s wish while continuing to provide the Bucharest authorities with informal military and strategic advice. Of the two other Romanian officers who were contacted by the Romanian diplomatic agent in Vienna, Guran refused categorically, while Trapsia was not considered to be high enough in the military hierarchy to be of use.

If anything, the above quoted documents are more explicit in indicating the reasons why these military could NOT or would NOT join the Romanian army, rather than the rationale behind their wish to do so. Motivations for refusal range from antagonism in reaction to the attitude of the Romanian authorities, tardiness, *realpolitik* on the part of the Austro-Hungarian authorities, to implied unwillingness to sacrifice one’s career and the fastidiousness and inconsistency of the Romanian authorities.

I have dedicated this chapter to an analysis of the telegrams and letters in the Brătianu family archive not so much because they bring radically new data in comparison to that available in secondary literature as because they constitute a new, more comprehensive source of information, which, on the one hand, links up previously disparate episodes and suggests a continuity between them, and, on the other hand, answers some of the questions set in previous studies and helps change modality (probably, perhaps) and hypothesis (it may be that…) to statement of fact. Up to a certain point they bear out the sketchy scenario in the existing bibliography: Doda and Urs de Margina were invited to join the Romanian army but the Emperor refused to grant permission. The importance of this body of correspondence lies, however, in that it provides a more articulate narrative, a definite chronology, as well
as an element of intentionality, which is essentially missing in secondary literature or, if it does exist, it is the author’s input. In particular Vincenţiu Babeş’s letter to Bălăceanu is a valuable source as it, on the one hand, widens the picture beyond the 1877 events and establishes links between seemingly disparate historical episodes (the 1868 Hungarian alert and the concomitant sounding of Doda and Urs by the Brătianus), and, on the other hand, provides the reader with (indirect) access to these officers’ thoughts and attitudes as expressed not in official statements but in an informal discussion between friends. It, moreover, constitutes proof of the wish of Doda and Urs de Margina to join the Romanian army even while in active military service. To conclude, this archival material clarifies the course of the 1877 negotiations for a k.k. general and offers vital information concerning the Romanian officers’ actual response to this recruitment initiative.
footnote and its elucidation necessitated research into the holdings of the branch of the Austrian State Archives. The full bibliographical information is that indicated at the beginning of this report of 15 January 1868 to be found at OeStA, HHStA, Politisches Archiv (henceforth PA), Konsulate, Karton 178, 1868 Bukarest I-V, Bericht No. 8, Bukarest 29.

20 OeStA, HHStA, PA, Konsulate, Karton 178, 1868 Bukarest I-V, Bericht No. 1, Bucarest, 2. Jänner 1868, Freiherr von Eder to Freiherr von Beust, folio 38/verso.


23 OeStA, HHStA, PA, Konsulate, Karton 203 (PA XXXVIII), 1874 Buk-P, Rapports de Bucarest 1874, Report No.14, Bucarest, 28 February 1874, from Ernst von Haan to Count Andrássy, folio 42/verso. This particular report (and other related ones) were highlighted and paraphrased by General Rada Rosetti in one of the lectures given at the Romanian Academy on 22 October 1943 and published under the title ‘Un capitol al luptei pentru neaţărmare’ in Analele Academiei Române: Memoriile sectiunii istorice, Seria 3, Tom 25 (anii 1843-1844). However, in the said article the reports are referenced as being in ‘the Archive in Vienna’ and are, on the basis of this information only, irretrievable. The full bibliographical information is that indicated at the beginning of this footnote and its elucidation necessitated research into the holdings of the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv branch of the Austrian State Archives.

24 OeStA, HHStA, PA, Konsulate, Karton 203 (PA XXXVIII), 1874 Buk-P, Rapports de Bucarest 1874, Report No.14, Bucarest, 28 February 1874, from Ernst von Haan to Count Andrássy, folio 42/verso.


19 Prince Carol’s speech in the Romanian Parliament was commented on in an Austro-Hungarian report of 15 January 1868 to be found at OeStA, HHiStA, Politisches Archiv (henceforth PA), Konsulate, Karton 178, 1868 Bukarest I-V, Ad Bucarest, 15. Jänner, 1868. A printed copy of the speech is appended to the report.

18 Ibid., p. 64.

17 Ibid., pp. 58, 60.

16 Coman and Giurescu, România în războiul de independenţă (1877-1878). Documente militare, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1971, p. XXVI.


11 Ibid., p. 29.

10 Ibid., p. 30.

9 Maior, Transilvania şi războiul pentru Independenţă, pp. 28-29.


6 Dan Berindei et al., Războiul pentru independenţa naţională (1877-1878). Documente militare, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1971, p. XXVI.


4 Elena Dunăreanu and Mircea Avram, Războiul de independentă oglindit în presa sibiiană (1877-1878), Biblioteca „Astra”, Sibiu, 1977, pp. 9, 18.


2 Elena Dunăreanu and Mircea Avram, Războiul de independentă oglindit în presa sibiiană (1877-1878), Biblioteca „Astra”, Sibiu, 1977, pp. 9, 18.

1 Marchescu, Graniţerii bănăteni, pp. 283, 284, Footnote 1.
26 OeStA, HHStA, PA, Konsulate, Karton 203 (PA XXXVIII), 1874 Buk-P, Rapports de Bucarest 1874, Rapport No. 44, Bucarest am 29. Juni 1874, from Freiherr von Calice to Andrásy, folio 200/recto.

27 OeStA, HHStA, PA, Konsulate, Karton 203 (PA XXXVIII), 1874 Buk-P, Rapports de Bucarest 1874, Report No. 67/ Bukarest 29 Oktober 1874, from Freiherr von Haan to Count Andrásy. The report was quoted by Radu Rosetti in his article ‘Un capitol al luptei pentru neatârnare’ in Analele Academiei Române: Memoriile secțiunii istorice, Seria 3, Tom 25 (anii 1843-1844).

28 OeStA, HHStA, PA, Konsulate, Karton 203 (PA XXXVIII), 1874 Buk-P, Rapports de Bucarest 1874, Report No. 44, Bucarest, 29 June 1874, from Freiherr von Calice to Count Andrásy, folios 199-201.


31 Ibid., p. 130.


33 OeStA, KA, KM Präs., 1877, Karton 508, Aktenzahl 47 – 11/1/44, Report No. 58, Bucharest, 16 October 1877, p.3/ verso.

34 OeStA, KA, KM Präs., 1877, Karton 508, Aktenzahl 47 – 11/1/44, Report No. 60, Bucharest, 31 October 1877, p.3/ recto.

35 OeStA, KA, KM Präs., 1877, Karton 511, Aktenzahl 51 6/176.


37 OeStA, KA, KM Präs., 1877, Karton 511, Aktenzahl 51 6/238, p.1/verso.


41 Wirthwein, Britain and the Balkan Crisis 1875-1878, p. 240.

42 Dumitru P. Ionescu, Războiul de independență a României și problema Basarabiei, Editura Academiei Române, București, 2000, pp. 91-94; Ștefan Pascu (Ed.), The Independence of Romania, Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, București, 1977, pp. 80-90, 97, 100-101; Radu Rosetti, Partea luată de armata română în răsboiul din 1877-1878, p. 76.


44 OeStA, HHStA, PA, Konsulate, Karton 210 (PA XXXVIII), 1876 Buenos Aires, Bukarest I-VII, Berichte aus Bukarest, No. 27 Bucharest le 14 Février 1876, from Freiherr Calice to Count Andrásy, Folio 113/verso.

45 Coman and Giurescu, România în Războiul de Independență: 1877-1878, p. 57.

46 Ibid., p. 67.


48 Rosetti, Partea luată de armata română în răsboiul din 1877-1878, p. 8.

49 OeStA, KA, KM Präs, Jahr 1868, Karton 286, Aktenzahl 54 9/1, p. 1 recto and verso.

50 OeStA, KA, KM Präs Bücher, Register A-Z, 1869, Rubrik Donaufürstenthümer.

51 OeStA, KA, KM Präs, 1869, Karton 294, Aktenzahl 25 1/1, Report dated 13 January 1869, p. 1/recto.

52 OeStA, KA, KM Präs, 1869, Karton 294, Aktenzahl 25 1/1, Report dated 13 January 1869, p. 1/verso.

53 OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1869, Karton 294, Aktenzahl 25 1/1, Report dated 23 January 1869 addressed to Count Andrásy, p. 1 recto and verso.

54 Rosetti, Partea luată de armata română în răsboiul din 1877-1878, p. 108, footnote 171.
See Babeș’s letter to George Barțiu dated 17/29 November 1876 in George Cipăianu and Mihail Dan, Corespondența lui Vincențiu Babeș (Scrisori primate), Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1976, p. 23.

56 George Cipăianu and Mihail Dan, Corespondența lui Vincențiu Babeș (Scrisori trimise), Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1983, p. 23.

57 Iorga, Războiul pentru Independența României, pp. 107-109.

58 Rosetti, Partea luată de armata română în războiul din 1877-1878, p. 28.


60 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 22/1877, p. 80/recto, Transcribed telegram – handwritten (from Bălăceanu to Brătianu).

61 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 19/1877, p. 3/recto (original)

62 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 141/1877-1879, pp. 28-29, original.

63 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 21/1877, pp. 87-92 (transcribed and typed-out letter).


65 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 155, p. 1/recto, Letter from Paris dated 23 September 1868, from Dumitru Brătianu to his brother, Ion C. Brătianu.

66 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 22/1877, p. 110/recto (handwritten and transcribed telegram).


69 Ibid., pp. 283-289.

70 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 19/1877, p. 128/recto.

71 Cipăianu and Dan, Corespondența lui Vincențiu Babeș (Scrisori trimise), p. 155.

72 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 22/1877, p. 112/recto (transcribed telegram).

73 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 22/1877, p. 110/recto (handwritten and transcribed telegram).

74 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 22/1877, p. 118/recto (handwritten and transcribed telegram).

75 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 22/1877, p. 130/recto (handwritten and transcribed telegram).


78 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 22/1877, p. 134/recto (handwritten and transcribed telegram).

79 OeStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 899 (Gunzy-Gurth).

80 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 22/1877, p. 135/recto (handwritten and transcribed telegram).

81 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 22/1877, p. 155/recto (handwritten and transcribed telegram).

82 OeStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 3532 (Trappl-Traun).

83 ANIC, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286, Dosar 22/1877, p. 160/recto (handwritten and transcribed telegram).


86 OeStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 1842 (Luoni – Luria), Qualifikationslisten 1896.

87 OeStA, KA, Qualifikationslisten 339 (Cendov – Crel Jenak), Fasz. 383.

88 OeStA, KA, Qualifikationsliste, Karton No. 338, Cejnek-Cencur.

89 OeStA, KA, Qualifikationsliste, Karton No. 338, Cejnek-Cencur.

90 Buracu, Muzeul General Nicolae Cena și Cronica Mehadiei, p. 5.

91 Ibid., p. 6.
Chapter 10. Conclusions

The student who conducts research in Romanian archives and libraries on an off-mainstream topic requires perseverance to weather loaded questions: who gave you this topic? What does your supervisor know about the Military Border? Why is he interested in this? Why go to London to do a Ph.D. on a Romanian topic? When I started my research and made my first inquiries after primary material regarding Banat Border officers, I was told there is little chance of finding anything by way of personal testimonies. There is such and such a scholar, I was told, who has done some work on inscriptions on religious books from the Banat (Valeriu Leu) and there is also this Colonel in Caransebeș (Liviu Groza), who has been writing on the Banat Border Regiment.

My subsequent research showed that there is a wealth of official material in the Austrian State Archives relative to these military elites and a part of it can be brought to bear on an analysis of personal allegiance. Secondly, a methodical approach to research in Romanian archives can result in unexpected archival discoveries, which cast new light on old assumptions (as, for instance, the involvement of Border officers in the 1877-78 war presented in the previous chapter). Thirdly and no less importantly, the slighted and, paradoxically, frequently quoted contribution of writers such as Liviu Groza proved, by subsequent research into the subject, to be pioneering work of genuine value, despite its at times non-academic use of sources and the division of labour underlying the research that went into it (see his collaboration with Trințu Măran).
The present thesis has taken such secondary literature as its starting point and built on it to the extent that its information could be corroborated with primary source material. Given that this thesis worked not only with historical facts and dates, but also with imponderables such as identity, loyalty, allegiance, the epistemological question ‘How does one know about the past?’ which inevitably informs all historical writing, represented the key question in approaching the main hypotheses formulated in the introduction. Consequently, the result has not been a seamless narrative, but rather the narrativized track record of a four-year research process, foregrounding sources (or, as the case may be, the lack thereof), highlighting methodological and bibliographical conundrums, and proposing ways of circumventing them.

In the present thesis I have been seesawing between two tiers of historical information: primary sources and secondary literature. The more reliable of the two, and also that which forms the basis of these conclusions, is the first category of sources. However, without the insights from secondary bibliography, the pathways of research it outlined, the intriguing and sometimes erroneous assumptions it conveyed, I may not have discovered an important part of the archival material that went into this thesis. It is worth noting that there are a number of claims made in secondary literature for which I have not been able to find corroborating evidence in primary sources. Given that, as shown in the course of this thesis, authors such as Coriolan Buracu or Liviu Groza are not entirely unreliable, I have chosen to take an agnostic view of their unconfirmed, historical or anecdotal, information and mention it all the same, with the caveat that evidence is yet to surface which will either bear it out or disprove it.
This thesis started from the hypothesis that the Banat Military Border elites cherished a cultural sense of nation and national identity and sought a *modus vivendi* within the Monarchy in a centripetal movement of allegiance to the Emperor and to imperial authorities. The evidence deployed and examined here with a view to verifying this hypothesis has led me to the following conclusions:

All the Border generals for whom I was able to locate extant personal testimony demonstrate an unambiguous sense of allegiance to one’s nation, which they conceived of as the Romanian ethnic community within the boundaries of the Habsburg Monarchy or, alternatively, as the political nationality represented in the Hungarian Parliament. Consequent to this, they were all (culturally or/and politically) involved in ameliorating its condition. This was not unlike the concept of Romanian nation shared by a number of Romanian intellectuals in Transylvania and the Banat at the time, which was essentially based on an integrationist view of the Romanians in the Habsburg Monarchy. Thus, intellectuals such as George Barățiu, Ioan Slavici, and Alexandru Mocsonyi militated for the cultural unity of all Romanians and encouraged contacts with the Romanian Kingdom but expressly rejected all accusations of irredentist tendencies. It is my interpretation in the present thesis that the Romanian Banat Border generals, by virtue of their elite status and their military profession, shared this view of society, according to which cultural unity and development were not coterminous with separate statehood. In the absence of soul-searching memoirs testifying to this, the question whether this was making a virtue out of necessity or it was an actual, deep-seated belief takes the discussion into the realm of psychological speculation. To paraphrase W.H. Auden’s ironic question in the motto of this thesis – ‘Were they free? Were they happy?’ – the question is
certainly not absurd, although it does show the limitations of historical research and the epistemological doubt accompanying all interpretation of textual traces of the past.

As a parenthesis to this argument, Slavici’s personal testimony conveys the ambiguity of the concept of unity. In his recollections Slavici deplored the accusation of irredentism and, implicitly, that of dishonesty levelled at the Transylvanian participants to the 1871 celebration held at Putna Monastery in Moldavia. He, thus, pointed out that

‘there were among the Romanians a lot of people who did not doubt that we said one thing and thought another, and they ranked us among those who, under the mask of fealty, conducted a fierce irredentist propaganda.’

This view, however, did not exclude the contemplation of future political unity, which he presented as the result of an organic process of evolution from cultural to political unity.

Conversely, in 1909 Take Ionescu, one of the Conservative politicians in the Romanian Kingdom, expressed in conversation with R.W. Seton-Watson a Realpolitik rationale for preserving the unity of Austria-Hungary and foregoing what he saw as the dream of all Romanians:

‘There is not a single Romanian who does not dream of Greater Romania and the unity of the race. Those who deny this are not telling the truth, or else are merely giving meaningless official assurances. At the same time there is not a single man with a grain of commonsense in the country who does not realize that this dream can only be realized through the collapse of Austria-Hungary, and this would create an infinitely more dangerous situation for the Romanians. Unity is, therefore, an attractive dream, but does not lie in the interest of the Romanian people itself.’

∗∗∗

‘erau între români o mulțime de oameni, care nu se îndoiau, că una gândim și alta zicem, și ne punem în rândul celor ce sub masca lealității fac cea mai îndârjită propagandă iredentistă.’
It is difficult to assess where, on a gradient running from complete loyalty to *Realpolitik*, the Banat Border generals’ allegiance to the Monarchy was situated. Most probably, and also varying according to individual character, a sober type of loyalty was the case.

Although reported evidence seems to suggest that some of these officers were ready to join the young Romanian army in the late 1860s and also that they were courted by the Romanian government on the eve of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the circumstances and reasons for the failure of these projects to materialize remain obscure. As such, this evidence continues to be intriguing but cannot be used as irrefutable proof of irredentist tendencies on the part of these officers.

A corporate sense of identity and adherence to the code of honour of the k.u.k. officer corps becomes evident either in overt statements or, more often than not, in indirect allusions to military status and values. Moreover, as is apparent in the case of GM Trajan Doda and FML Nikolaus Cena, membership to the officer corps bestowed on one a double identity, civil and military, by virtue of which they could appeal to the imperial military authorities and thus circumvent, or apply pressure on, the civil authorities in case of an investigation or a trial. This also enhanced their elite status and their prestige in the eyes of the Romanian community as they were perceived to have a direct line to the Emperor and, as such, to be in a better position to press social or national claims. While the actual efficiency of this political strategy is difficult to substantiate, there is, at least in the case of Trajan Doda, conclusive documentary evidence of intense petitionary activity on behalf of the Banat Border community, just as there is proof of his contemporaries’ perception of his military
status as a potential trump card in the context of Romanian national politics in the Empire.

Particularly in moments of crisis, but not only, the examined generals expressed allegiance to Emperor, Fatherland, and State, and a concern for the preservation of the Monarchy and the peaceful cohabitation of all the peoples in it. Evidence to the contrary exists only in the form of uncorroborated accounts in secondary literature. Thus, Michael Trapsia is said to have expressed in his autobiographical notes criticism of the attempts at germanization of the Banat Border population by the Habsburg authorities and of the pragmatic function of the Military Border, which failed to ‘create a civilization’.⁶ In Cena’s case, Coriolan Buracu recounts the latter’s emotional reception of the first Romanian gendarmes who reached the Banat after the end of the First World War.⁷ Such reported testimonies run as an undercurrent to the official and personal expressions of allegiance invoked in this thesis. My interpretation is that, while the Monarchy lasted, the Banat Border Generals adhered to it and believed in it, and this did not exclude overt or veiled criticism on their part.

After 1918, the elite status of those officers who survived the war and had their domicile in the newly enlarged Romanian state, was preserved to a certain extent, although it became parochial in relation to the new political centre: Cena was received into the Romanian army with the same rank, but did not play any leading role in Greater Romania (not the least of reasons being his advanced age); he was placed in charge of the commission for historical monuments in the Banat, whose presidency he gave up in 1921;⁸ Georg Domaschnian, who, just like Cena, was received into the Romanian army with the same rank as held in the Austro-
Hungarian army, ran for a seat in the Romanian Parliament but failed to obtain it. As a contemporary article pointed out, this was allegedly due to political machinations on the part of one of the Romanian ministers. For a short period of time, between March and December 1929, he was mayor of Timișoara.

Given that the present thesis focused on those Banat Border officers who reached the rank of general within the k.(u.)k. army and given, moreover, that by 1918 the great majority of them had already retired, it falls outside the scope of this analysis to account for their life in the enlarged Romanian state or elsewhere. In those cases where I came across evidence of some of these generals’ post-1918 career, I specified this in the course of the thesis. It would be interesting to know how the dissolution of the k.u.k army affected those Romanian officers who were still active and mid-career by 1918-1919, whether they opted to remain part of the rump Austrian army or they changed flags and allegiance and integrated into the Romanian army; once there, how were they viewed by their peers and their superiors? All these questions, however, will have to be answered in a future study.

The officers that formed the subject of the present thesis were the most socially and professionally advanced product of the Military Border in the Banat, an elite among their co-nationals in the Austro-Hungarian Empire as well as within the k.u.k officer corps. To this day, Doda, Trapsia, Cena, Domaschnian continue to be local heroes, with streets and institutions named after them in Caransebeș, Mehadia, and Timișoara. In the territory of the former Banat Border Regiment no. 13, Grenzer identity endures to this day, having survived land reform in the 1920s and weathered the communist onslaught.

The Border generals’ identity evinces the sort of complexity that is easily oversimplified by circumscription to either a national or an imperial conceptual
framework. The present thesis has sought to chart the evolution of the historical institution that shaped their native community, the myths they lived by, and the web of social, political, and legal relations within which they pursued their military careers. More importantly, the thesis has provided an account of the intricate pattern of personal and professional allegiance which bound them to the Monarchy and to their ethnic community at a time when Greater Romanian ideas and political irredentism, although existent, were a distant, utopian prospect, while the social, political, and legal context of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was the day-to-day tangible reality. They were not completely a-national and a-political, as some, though by no means all, Austrian military documents made them out to be, nor were they Romanians under foreign yoke in tense anticipation of the eventual reunion with their brethren. They were born and spent the best part of their lives (in some cases, their entire life) in the Habsburg, later Austro-Hungarian, Monarchy; they were schooled in the military institutions of the Monarchy; they swore allegiance to Emperor and Fatherland and acted on it; those belonging to an earlier generation took part in the 1848-1849 upheavals; the later generation was weaned on family stories of it; they lived under the Dualist system and saw the introduction of constitutionalism and parliamentarism; they were in contact with members of the Romanian intelligentsia as well as rubbed shoulders with the other nationalities of the Empire and witnessed their national claims. Despite the common assumption that k.u.k. officers were a-political or disdainful of politics or, indeed, beyond nationalism, the paradox remains that, as members of the military profession, they were in a better position than most others to comment on political and national issues within the Monarchy as well as on problems of foreign policy. The evidence deployed in this thesis has shown that military status did not amount to an ivory
tower of blind *Kaisertreue* and that, while retaining loyalty, these officers were also involved with (more often than not, cultural) politics in the Empire.

The militarized borderland community from which these generals originated developed out of the duality of being at the margin of the Empire and, yet, for strategic reasons, in close connection with the imperial centre.\(^{13}\) The Roman past of the region, rediscovered and invested with new symbolic meaning in the nineteenth century, may not have functioned as anything more than a badge of historical identity, but in one respect it can be invoked when assessing these officers’ identity. Theirs was a Janus-type of identity: they were integrated enough to be looking up to the Monarch with loyalty and fight for the preservation of the Monarchy, but, by virtue of their very military status, they were also aware of the greater picture, of the rise of nations and nation-states.
see Ioan Slavici’s testimony in this respect in Închisoriile mele. Scrisori adresate unui prieten din altă lume, Editura Librăriei Universale Alcalay.

2 Ibid., p. 41.


5 ANCN, Fond personal Vincențiu Babeș, Nr. 627, Section IV: Corespondența personală, Document number 202, letter from Trajan Doda, Caransebeș, 10th of January 1890, pp. 1-2.

6 Liviu Groza, Din viața și activitatea Generalului Mihail Trapașa, Lugoj, 1995, p. 17.

7 Buracu, Muzeul General Nicolae Cena în Băile Herculane și Cronica Mehadiei, p. 6.

8 Ibid. See also ANCN, Fond Nr. 900, Fond personal Valeriu Braniște, Inventar nr. 5 al scrisorilor primite de Valeriu Braniște (I), 50: Cena renunță la președinția Comisiei Monumentelor Istorice [Cena gives up presidency of the Commission for Historical Monuments], see Cena’s letters dated November and December 1921.


12 See Trajan Doda’s letter to Vincențiu Babeș, dated 6 April 1878, in which he expresses concern for Romania’s policy towards to the Russians over the issue of Bessarabia - ANCN, Fond personal Vincențiu Babeș, Nr. 627, Section IV: Corespondența personală, Document number 191, p. 2/ recto.

13 See also Ray A. Billington, quoted in Rady, The Banate of Szörény, p. 84: ‘Frontier societies may often replicate the patterns of the interior even to the extent of exaggerating them.’
1) Appendix to Chapter Five: 
Index of Banat Border Generals in the k.(u.)k. army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of birth</th>
<th>Name (German and Romanian spelling)</th>
<th>Personal details, education and studies before entering the imperial army</th>
<th>Final Rank, Retirement and date of death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 4  | 1836 | Theodor Ritter v. Seracsin  
(\textit{Teodor Seracin}) | Offizierssohn, Zögling der Wr Neustädter Militär Akademie, welche er mit Vorzug absolvirte | F.M.L. 1./5. 1893 + am 12. April 1901 in Karansebes |
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<td>1836</td>
<td>Gr. Orientalisch</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 5  | 1838 | Alexander Lupu  
(\textit{Alexandru Lupu}) | Sohn eines Bürgers; hat die mathematische Schule zu Karansebes als Zahlzögling mit Vorzug absolvirt | GM 25./2. 1908 T. u. Ch. + Wien |
|    | 1838 | griechisch-orientalisch                                   |                                                                                 |                                                                                    |
| 6  | 1838 | Michael Ritter von Trapsia  
|    | 1838 | Griechisch-Nicht unirt                                    | 1855-1859: Artillerie Akademie                                                 |                                                                                    |
|    |      |                                                            | 1861-1863: Kriegsschule                                                        |                                                                                    |
| 7  | 1844 | Ladislaus Cenna  
(\textit{Ladislau Cena}) | Sohn eines k.k. Lieutenants; Hat seine Erziehung in Militär-Bildungs Anstalten erhalten; | FML: 1./15. 1902 28. März 1914 gestorben in Wien |
|    | 1844 |                                                            | 1856-1860: die Obererziehungsschule zu Kamenitz;                               |                                                                                    |
| 8 | 1844 | Nikolaus Cena (Nicolai/Nicolae Cena) | 1860-1862: Artillerie-schul Compagnie zu Krakau;  
1862-1865: die Artillerie-Akademie zu Mährisch-Weisskirchen  
1868-1870: der höhere Artillerie Curs  
1866/7: die Regiments-Equitation. | Griechisch nicht unirt | Sohn eines k.k. Officiers; hat die Pionierschule zu Tulln mit sehr gutem Erfolge absolviert /: 1860-1863:/  
die Infanterie Equitation zu Erlau im Jahre 1872 mit gutem Erfolge. 1889 den Stabsofficiers-Curs mit entsprechendem Erfolge absolviert. | FML  
T.u.Ch. (17.06.1908)  
Pens. 1.08.1904  
Gestorben  
14.03.1922 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9 | 1850 | Daniel Mataringa von Bánya (Daniel Matărînga) | | Griechisch-orientalisch | Sohn eines Grenzers. Hat als Zögling die Grenz Militärsschule in Karansebes mit vorzüglichem Erfolge absolviert. | GM  
Pens. 1.1. 1913  
Pension: 13000 K  
Gestorben  
22. April 1918 in Wien. |
| 10 | 1851 | Johann Iovesko (Ion Iovescu) | | | | GM  
26/2 1912 T.u.Ch  
Pens. 1.11.1909  
Domicil und Evidenz |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr.</th>
<th>Jahr</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationalität</th>
<th>Behörden Graz</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1852</td>
<td>Jenakie John (Ienache Ion)</td>
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<td>GM (23.12.1910)</td>
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<td>Pens. 23 Mai 1912</td>
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<td>Domicil und Evidenz-Behörden: Orsova</td>
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<td>Pension: 13 000 Kr.</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>1852</td>
<td>Michael Schandru von Kismiháldy (Mihail Şandru)</td>
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<td>FML (1.05.1911)</td>
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<td>Domizil Wien</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>Nikolaus Logoschan von Karánsebes (Nicolae Lugojanu)</td>
<td>Katholisch</td>
<td>GM (1.11.1917)</td>
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<td>Pens. 1.01.1919</td>
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<td>Gestorben 27.03.1927</td>
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<td>Hermannstadt</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>1867</td>
<td>Trajan Bacsila (Traian Băcilă)</td>
<td>griechisch orientalisch</td>
<td>GM: 1. VIII 1917</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10/6 1931 – gestorben in Wien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1868</td>
<td>Georg Domaschnian (Gheorghe Domășneanu)</td>
<td>Sohn eines Steueramts-Offizials, hat die Militär-Unterrealschule,</td>
<td>GM: 1. VIII. 1917, 7.IX. 1917</td>
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<td>1. Jän. 1919</td>
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<tr>
<td>Griechisch-orientalisch</td>
<td>die Militär-Oberrealschule und die Theresianische Militärakademie mit sehr gutem Erfolg absolviert.</td>
<td>pensionirt gestorben: 18.9.1940, Timișoara</td>
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2) Appendices to Chapter Seven

2.1. Doda’s account of the 1873 electoral meeting

(OeStA, KA, KM Präs 1874, Aktenzahl 9 – 2/2)

Rede,

gehalten am 26. November, 8. Dezember 1873 in einer
Versammlung von Wählern des Wahlkreises Caransebes

Meine Herren!

Sie wissen warum sie versammelt sind.

Sie wollen mich zum Deputirten für den Landtag candidiren. Ist es so?

(Ant. So ist es!)

Und sie wollen mein politisches Glaubensbekenntniss oder mein Programm kennen?

(Ant. Wir bitten darum.)

Gut! Aber vor Allem habe ich eine Erklärung abzugeben und eine Frage zu stellen.

Die Erklärung ist:

Nach meiner Überzeugung und nach meinen constitutionellen Grundsätzen, finde ich es nicht für recht, dass auch die Regierung ihre Candidaten aufstelle.

Die Regierung kann durch ihren Einfluss und durch Mittel, die ihr zu Verfügung stehen, leicht ihren Candidaten zum Siege verhelfen und hiedurch die Stimme des Volkes fälschen; da ein durch den Einfluss und die Mittel der Regierung gewählter Deputirter nicht der Vertreter des Volkes, sondern der Vertreter der Regierung ist.

Das System des wahren Constitutionalismus fordert, dass das Volk an der Gesetzgebung durch seine aus freien Wahlen hervorgegangenen Vertreter Theil nehme, welche sonach den wahren Ausdruck des Volkswillens sein sollen.

Da ich mich an den wahren, ungefälschten Constitutionalismus halte, so erkläre ich hiemit: dass ich eine officielle Candidatur oder jene der Regierungsparthei nicht annehme.
Dies war meine Erklärung.
Meine Frage ist:
Sind Sie hier als Parthei, z. B. als Regierungspartei oder nur als einfache Wähler des Wahlkreises Caransebes versammelt?
Wollen Sie mich daher als den Candidaten der Regierungspartei oder als den Candidaten des Volkes aufstellen?
(Allgemeines Schweigen.)
Ich bitte um eine deutliche Antwort, denn meine Frage war bestimmt genug.
(Nach dieser Aufforderung erklärte Herr I. Jonasiu, dass insoweit er wisse, hier nicht Partheien sich versammelt haben, sondern nur einfache Wähler des Kreises Caransebes, einfache Wähler aus dem Volke, welches in diesem Wahlkreise eine einzige Parthei bildet, und bat mich die Candidatur zum Volksdeputirten für den Landtag anzunehmen.
Herr Ign. Paulovics erklärte sodann ebenfalls, dass obwohl die einzelnen hier anwesenden Wähler verschiedenen politischen Partheien und zwar: der Regierungs- und der nationalen Parthei angehören; sie hier dennoch nicht als Parthei sondern nur als einfache Wähler versammelt sind, welche wünschen mein Programm zu hören.)
Meine Herren! Nach dem eben Gehörten, bitte ich wiederholt um bestimmte Antwort: ob die Versammlung mir die Candidatur von Seite der Regierungspartei oder von Seiten des Volkes anträgt?
(Die Versammlung antwortete hierauf mit Einstimmigkeit, dass sie mich einzig und allein nur als den Candidaten des Volkes aufstelle.)
Weil Sie eben erklärten, dass Sie mich einzig und allein nur als den Candidaten des Volkes aufstellen; so nehme ich unter dieser ausdrücklichen Bedingung die Candidatur an.
Jetzt meine Herren! wollen Sie mein Programm hören:
1. Ich bin treu Sr. Majestät dem Kaiser und König; ich erlaube Niemanden daran zu zweifeln.
2. Ich habe die Integrität des Gesammtvaterlandes vertheidigt – und werde sie auch künftighin nach meinen Kräften vertheidigen;
3. Im Landtage werde ich die Regierung dann unterstützen, wenn sie im Interesse der Völker arbeitet; ich werde ihr aber Opposition machen, wenn sie gegen dieses Interesse wirkt.


Meine Herren! Es ist Ihnen bekannt, dass die nichtmagyarischen Völker mit ihrem jetzigen Loose nicht zufrieden sind. Ich bin überzeugt, dass die Hauptursache ihrer Unzufriedenheit aus der Missachtung ihrer Sprache, aus dem Mangel eines gerechten, auf dem gleichen Rechte fassenden Nationalitäten-Gesetzes entspringt.

Das jetzige Gesetz ist ungenügend, ungerecht und muss derart reformirt werden, damit im selben alle Völker ihre nationale Existenz und Entwicklung gewährleistet finden.

Dieses Gesetz muss mit einem Worte die Gleichberechtigung aller Nationalitäten in sich fassen.

Jede Nationalität hat das Recht ihre Jugend in ihrer Muttersprache zu unterrichten und auszubilden.

Demgemäss müssen die Deutschen deutsche, die Romanen romanische, die Serben serbische, die Slovaken slovakische Schulen haben, mit einer Worte: alle Nationalitäten in ihrer Sprache.

Aber der nationale Unterricht und die nationale Bildung haben sich nicht auf die sogenannten Volks- und Bürgerschulen zu beschränken; sondern sie müssen sich auch auf die höheren Anstalten, die Universitäten inbegriffen, ausdehnen.

Mit einem Worte alle Schulen müssen nationale Schulen sein.

Wenn eine Nationalität nicht die Mittel zur Erhaltung dieser Schulen besitzt; dann ist der Staat verpflichtet die hiezü nöthigen Mittel aus der Staatskasse zu geben. Denn, wenn wir gut sind, unser Hab’ und Gut, unser Leben zur Erhaltung des Staates zu geben; so ist auch der Staat verpflichtet, uns, die zur Entwicklung unserer nationalen Cultur nothwendigen Mittel zu geben.

Ich behaupte weiter, dass es nicht genügend sei, dass die Sprache des Volkes in Nationalschulen gelehrt und cultivirt werde; sondern es muss diese Sprache auch in das öffentliche Leben eingeführt und im selben angewendet werden.

Ich verlange deshalb, dass bei allen Aemtern, mit welchen das Volk in direkte Verbindung kömmt, die Sprache des betreffenden Volkes gebracht werde: in Folge dessen muss das Volk sowohl in der Gemeinde als auch mit den Stuhlbezirken,
mit den Comitaten, mit allen Gerichtsbehörden und auch mit den Ministerien in seiner nationalen Sprache verkehren.

Durch Vorbesagtes will ich durchaus nicht das Recht der führenden, d. i. der magyarischen Nation verletzen: sondern bin ich dafür, dass die magyarische Sprache die Regierungs- und die Gesetzgebungs-Sprache bleibe.

Ich glaube, dass Jedermann diese Forderungen als gerechte anerkennen werde, jene Beamte vielleicht ausgenommen, welche die Sprache jenes Volkes, in dessen Mitte sie functioniren, - nicht erlernen wollen. –

6. Meine Herren!

Ihnen ist die traurige Lage unserer Finanzen bekannt.

Sie wissen, dass um die ungeheueren Ausgaben und Deficite des Staates zu decken, wir ein Anlehen von 153 Millionen Gulden machen mussten.

Neuesten Nachrichten zu Folge soll auch dieses Anlehen ungenügend sein und sollen wir im künftigen Jahre ein noch zu bedeckendes Deficit haben. Wir haben keinen Credit und ohne die Staatsgüter, welche als Garantie des Anlehens dienen, hätten wir kein Geld bekommen.

Es ist für uns eine gebieterische Nothwendigkeit, eine Bedingung der Existenz, dass wir so bald als möglich das Gleichgewicht zwischen Einnahmen und Ausgaben herstellen.

Wir haben im Lande zu viele Beamte; wir haben auch viele gut gezahlte Sinecuren.

Um das erwähnte Gleichgewicht zu erreichen, ist es nicht genügend grosse Reducirungen vorzunehmen, sondern wir müssen den ganzen Staatshaushalt, wir müssen das ganze Verwaltungs-System reorganisiren: denn das bisherige System führt uns zum Verderben, mit demselben werden wir das ersehnte Gleichgewicht zwischen Einnahmen und Ausgaben nie erzielen.

Die directen Steuern sind genug drückend und können demaligen nicht erhöht werden.

Alle Bestrebungen der Regierung und des Landtages müssen auf das Auffrühen, auf das Glück und nicht auf die Ueberlastung der Völker gerichtet sein.

Wir müssen ehrlich arbeiten und in allen Zweigen des öffentlichen Lebens, so viel als nur möglich sparsam sein.
Wir müssen genügend verwalten und weniger Politik treiben, - denn die Politik beherrscht die Regierung, den Landtag und die Beamten mehr als der materielle, geistige und moralische Fortschritt der Völker.

Ich könnte noch über andere Fragen sprechen, glaube aber, dass das Entwickelte genügt.

Mehrere Wähler haben mich ersucht, dass ich in keinem Falle von der Candidatur zurücktreten soll.

Ich erkläre hiemit, dass ich aus von mir anhängenden Ursachen nicht zurücktreten werde, - ausser das mich eine höhere Macht oder ein höherer Wille dazu zwänge.

Meine Herren! ich habe geendet.

(Hierauf dankte Herr Paulovic für das entwickelte Programm und schloss, - indem er der Ueberzeugung Worte lieh, dass er Jedem der Anwesenden aus dem Herzen spreche, mit: „Es lebe der Herr General Trajan Doda, unser Candidat zum Landtagsdeputirten.“

Darauf wurde unter lebhaften Beifallsrufen der ganzen Versammlung meine Candidatur als Lantagsdeputirter des Volkes aus dem Severiner Comitat einstimmig proclamirt.)


(Hierauf löste sich die Versammlung unter lebhaften Vivat-Rufen.) –

Traja Doda,
k.k. Generalmajor

Translation:
‘Gentlemen!
You know why you have gathered here.
You intend to offer me the MP candidacy for the Diet. Is this so?’

Answer: It is so.
‘And you would like to know my political convictions and my programme?’

*Answer:* Please do let us know.

‘Very well. I shall make a statement and ask you a question.

My statement is:

According to my conviction and constitutional principles, I consider it unjust for the government to put forward its own candidates.

The government can, through its influence and the means it possesses, help his own candidates to win and thereby falsify the vote of the people, for an MP elected through the influence and means of the government is not the representative of the people but that of the government.

A genuine constitutional system requires that the people should participate in the process of law making through its freely elected representatives, who should thus be the real expression of the people’s will.

And as I am a supporter of genuine, unfalsified constitutionalism I declare that I will not accept an official candidacy or that of the governmental party.

This has been my statement.

My question is:

Are you here gathered as a party, as, for instance, a governmental party, or as mere voters of the Caransebes electoral district?

Do you want me to be a candidate of the governmental party or a candidate of the people?

(General silence)

Please give me a definite answer for my question was clear enough.’

After this exhortation, Mr Ionaşiu stated that, as far as he knew, there were no parties gathered there, only ordinary voters from among the people, who in this district formed a single party, and he asked me to be the people’s MP candidate for the Diet.

The engineer Paulovici then added that, although some of the voters that gathered here do belong to various parties, that is, the governmental and the national party, they are nevertheless gathered here as ordinary voters, not as a party and would like to listen to my programme.

‘Gentlemen! These having been said, I would like to ask you once again to give me a definite answer: does the assembly offer me the candidacy on behalf of the governmental party or on behalf of the people?’
To this the assembly answers unanimously that they are offering me the candidacy only on behalf of the people.

‘As you have declared that you are supporting my candidacy only on behalf of the people, I accept it on the following express conditions:

Gentlemen, here is my programme:

1. I am faithful to His Majesty the Emperor and King and I will not allow anyone to doubt this.

2. I have defended the integrity of the fatherland and will go on defending it in the future to the best of my abilities.

3. In the Diet I will support the government if it works for the people, but I will be against it, if it works against these interests.

4. I recognize the 1867 pact concluded between Austria and Hungary as I do all currently valid laws which bear His Majesty’s sanction.

5. I now come to the most important point of my programme, which is the nationality law.

Gentlemen! It is well known to you that the non-Hungarian peoples are not content with today’s situation. I am convinced that their main reason for discontent lies in the disregard for language, given the lack of a just law of nationalities based on equal rights.

Today’s law is insufficient, unjust and must be modified so that everyone should find in it the guarantee of their national existence and development.

This law should essentially stipulate the equality of rights for all nationalities.

Each nationality has the right to educate and develop its youth in their mother tongue.

On this premise, the Germans should have German schools, the Romanians, Romanian schools, the Serbs, Serbian schools, the Slovaks, Slovakian schools, in short, each nationality should have schools in its language.

National education and development should not, however, be confined to popular and civil schools, they should be extended to higher institutions, including universities.
In short, all schools should be national schools.

If a nationality does not have the necessary means to maintain these schools, it is the State’s duty to provide out of the State treasury the means they need. For if we are liable to contributing to the support of the State with all our wealth and our life, then the State is, in its turn, in duty bound to give us the necessary means for our cultural national development.

I moreover consider that it is not enough that the language of the people be learnt and cultivated in national schools but should also be introduced and used in public life.

I therefore maintain that all authorities with whom the people come into contact should use the language of that respective people; consequently, the people should communicate in their national language with the communal authorities as well as with the districts and counties, with all legal authorities and with the Ministries.

I thereby mean to bring no offence to the right of the dominant nation, that is, the Hungarian nation, for I am in favour that Hungarian should remain and language of the government and legislation.

I believe everybody recognizes the justice of these postulates with the exception of the civil servants, who do not want learn the language of the people in the midst of whom they work.

Gentlemen!
You are acquainted with our sad financial situation.
You know that, in order to cover the huge expenses and deficits of the State, we had to take out a loan of 153 million florins.

According to the latest news, not even this loan is enough and in the future we will have to cover a new deficit. We don’t have any credit and without the state goods, which are the loan guarantee, we would not have received any money.

It is absolutely necessary for us that we restore sooner rather than later the balance between expenses and incomes.

We have too many civil servants and too many well paid positions.
In order to achieve the above-mentioned balance, it is not enough to have personnel reductions; it is also necessary to reorganize public management and administration
as a whole; because the system which has been in place until now is leading us to the ruin. With it we will never be able to achieve the balance between incomes and expenses.

Direct taxation is burdensome as it is and cannot be increased anymore.

All the endeavours of the government and of the Diet should be directed towards the good and not the oppression of the people.

We must work honestly and in all branches of public life we should be, as far as possible, less heavy-handed/ or lenient (Rom. cruțători).

Let us engage more in administration and less in politics, for it is politics that the government, the Diet and the civil servants are preoccupied by rather than the material, spiritual and moral progress of the people.

I could speak of other problems as well. But I think what I have said so far is enough.

Several voters asked me not to withdraw my candidacy no matter what happened.

I here declare that I will not withdraw it out of my own accord, but only if I should be constrained to it by a superior power or will.

Gentlemen, I have finished.’

On this, Mr Paulovici gives thanks for the presented programme and, expressing his conviction he speaks on behalf of everyone present, concludes ‘Long live General Traian Doda, our MP candidate for the Diet!’

After this, amidst stormy applause, the whole assembly proclaimed my candidacy as the people’s MP for the Diet for the Severin County.

‘Gentlemen, I thank you for your confidence and I assure you that in the Diet I will always work towards the good of the country and of the peoples to the best of my abilities and knowledge.’

The meeting came to an end amidst shouts of ‘vivat’.

Caransebes, 26 November (8 December) 1873.

Traian Doda,

Imperial and royal General Major.
2.2. Doda’s 1874 Report to the Military Command in Temesvár

OeStA, KA, Kriegsministerium Präsidium, Jahr 1874, Aktenzahl 9 – 2/2.

(P.1 recto)

Trajan Doda, k.k. Generalmajor des Ruhestandes

An
Das k.k. Militär-Commando
Temesvár

Caransebes, 26. Jänner 1874

Im Auftrage Präs. No. 128 vom 20. Jänner Folge leistend und mit Bezug auf die in der Neuen Temesvärer Zeitung vom 20 Jänner an mich gerichtete Interpellation habe ich die Ehre Folgendes zu berichten:

1. Sollte es wahr sein, daß die zur Reichstags-Rechten sich bekennenden Wähler des Caransebeser Wahlkreises mich zu allererst zum Reichstags-Candidaten auserkoren haben; so ist mir davon nichts bekannt geworden. Die sogenannte Regierungspartei hat es nicht der Mühe werth gehalten, mich hiervon zu verständigen und mir die Candidatur anzutragen, da doch die Annahme oder Ablehnung (page 1 verso) derselben nur von mir abhing.

2. Es ist wahr, daß ich schon im Oktober 1873 die Candidatur angenommen habe und zwar auf wiederholtes Bitten der sogenannten nationalen oder Volksparthei.

Nicht ein einziger Wähler der Deak-Partei (denn von einer Regierungspartei, war, so viel mir bekannt, damals noch nicht die Rede), hat mir diese Candidatur angetragen.

Es ist übrigens hier und im ganzen Comitate bekannt, daß im Oktober und November v.J. nicht ich, sondern der Herr Ladislaus Szende der Candidat der Deak-Partei war. – Beweis sein Programm, das er am 22. November 1873 veröffentlichte.


Ich bewundere den Pamphletisten, der auf einem nur ihm bekannten Wege, meine Gehirnthätigkeit kontrollieren konnte.


Rottar ward ersucht, mich zu bewegen, daß ich sobald als möglich nach Caransebes zurückkehre.
Ich erwiderte ihm, daß ich es sonderbar finde, daß die Regierungspartei mein Programm kennenlernen will, da ich doch von ihrer Candidatur nichts weiß.

Jetzt erfuhr ich wenigstens auf indirektem Wege, daß eine Regierungspartei existiert, die sich um mich interessiert. –

Ich ersuchte Rottar zu antworten, daß ich im Bade sei, daß ich nicht bade, daß mich die Ungeduld oder Verlegenheit (ich weiß nicht mehr, welches Wort ich gebrauchte) der Regierungspartei nicht rühre, daß ich am 23ten früh mit der Post in Caransebes einzutreffen gedenke, jedoch nicht in Folge des erwähnten Briefes, sondern weil ich nicht länger im Bade bleiben wolle. –

Ich kam am 23ten nicht mit der Post sondern mit einem Privatwagen um 8 Uhr Abends hier an.

(p. 3 verso)

Wegen ungünstigen Wetters hatte ich die Nachtfahrt aufgegeben.

In den Nachmittagsstunden dieses Tages wurde eine Wahlen-Versammlung abgehalten und zwar in Caransebes. –

Bei meinem Eintreffen fand ich auch eine Einladung zu dieser Versammlung für mich vor, - der ich selbstverständlich nicht entsprechen konnte, da ich um jene Zeit wahrscheinlich noch im Teregovaer oder Slatinaer Schlüssel stand/stack.

Am anderen Tage, 9 Uhr früh kam der Bürgermeister Brancoviciu zu mir. Er verständigte mich von der abgehaltenen Versammlung und ihrem Wünsche, mein Programm zu hören.

Jetzt erfuhr ich zum zweiten Male, daß die Regierungspartei sich um mich interessiert, - ein Antragen der Candidatur erfolgte noch immer nicht.

(p.4 recto)

Dem Bürgermeister erwiderte ich, daß meine bisherigen Committanten ein Programm nicht verlangen und ich von der Deák-Partei nichts wissen will.

Vor 12 Uhr des nämlichen Tages kam der köng. ung. Ober-fiscal Ignaz Pauloviciu zu mir. Ich sah und sprach ihn jetzt zum ersten Male. – Nach einer Abhandlung über die politischen Partheien Ungarns bat auch er mich um das Programm.-

Nachdem ich ihn gefragt, in wessen Auftrage er mit dieser Bitte gekommen, - gab er sich als Chef des sogenannten Central-Wahl-Actions?-Comite der Regierungspartei aus. -
Ich teilte ihm mit, daß meine Commitanten ein Programm nicht fordern, daß ich ihm ein solches auch nicht geben könne, daß ich übrigens bereit wäre, alle seine Fragen zu beantworten.

Nachdem ich alle Fragen in einer Weise beantwortet hatte, die jeden Zweifel oder (p.4 verso) Undeutigkeit ausschloß, einsprach ich mich mit dem Bemerken, daß ich durch einige Tage beschäftigt sei und er in 3-4 Tagen wieder kommen möge. Bis dahin werde ich sehen, was sich in der von ihm angeregten Angelegenheit thun lasse; es kann dann vielleicht auch ein Programm das Licht der Welt erblicken.

Diese 3-4 Tage habe ich selbst mir anberaumt, nicht etwa um über ein Programm zu brüten, sondern um Besuche mir zu ersparen, die mich in, mit der Candidatur in keinem Nexus stehenden Arbeiten, gestört hätten.

Herr Pauloviciu kam am 30. Novbr. wieder zu mir. Er entfernte sich mit demselben Resultate wie das 1te Mal, d.h. ohne ein Programm bekommen zu haben.

Am folgenden Tage besuchte mich der Obergespan. Zweck seines Besuches war, die von der Regierungspartei durch Herrn Pauloviciu mit mir gesuchte Verständigung bezüglich Bekanntgabe eines Programms (p. 5 recto) zu einem für diese Partei günstigen Resultate zu führen. –

Wir schieden von einander mit der gegenseitigen Erklärung, daß die Unterhandlung mit mir als abgebrochen zu betrachten und daß zwischen mir und der Regierungspartei von jetzt ab eine Demarcationslinie gezogen sei. –

Aus Vorstehendem geht hervor, daß die sogenannte Regierungspartei durch den Bürgermeister, den Ober-fiscal und Obergespann mein Programm kennen lernen wollte, ohne, daß, wie erwähnt, sie mich jemals um die Candidatur gebeten oder daß ich mich darum beworben hätte.

Ich will hier noch Folgendes nachtragen: Als ich dem Severiner Obergespann am 13. Oktbr. einen Besuch erwiderte, sagte er mir, daß er vernommen, daß die Majorität der Bevölkerung des Comitats mich als ihren Candidaten aufgestellt habe.- Ich bejahte (p.5 verso) dieß mit den Bemerken, daß ich die Candidatur bereits angenommen habe. –

Die Bejahung einer Aussage wird man wohl nicht nachträglich als Antrag zur Annahme der Candidatur seitens der Regierungspartei aufbauen wollen.

Majestät in Budapest gewesen, mich an einem Nachmittage besuchen werde, da er mir Nachrichten aus der Hauptstadt mitzutheilen habe.

Am 5. Dezbr ersuchte mich der Bischof, ihn um 5 Uhr Abends zu besuchen, da er mir den angekündigten Besuch wegen Unwohlseins nicht abstatten könne.


Ich erklärte ihm, daß ich dieses Programm annehmen könnte, daß es alle sogenannten Nationalen unterschreiben würde, daß ich es aber doch nicht annehme.

Später, etwa um 6 Uhr kam der Obergespann und Herr Pauloviciu dazu. Die Bemühungen dieser 3 Herren mich zur Annahme des Programms zu bewegen, hatten kein anderes Resultat, als daß ich mich herbeiließ am folgenden Abend mit dem Obergespann und Oberfiscal wieder beim Bischof zusammen zu kommen, um die wiederholten Verhandlungen abzuschließen.

Aus Vorstehendem geht hervor, daß der Bischof den Vermittler zwischen mir und den Obergespann spielte, ohne darum von mir gebeten worden zu sein.


Als ich von diesem Besuche nach Hause ging, begleitete mich der bishöfliche Sekretär.

Als einem Intimus des Bischofs erklärte ich ihm offen, daß ich über seine Einladung sehr aufgebracht bin, nachdem ich vor einer offiziellen oder der Candidatur der Regierungspartei nichts wissen will und ich bereits am 1ten Dezbr jede weitere Unterhandlung mit dem Obergespann abgebrochen habe; somit die von mir nicht verlangte Vermittlung des Bischofs nicht am Platz war. –

Der Sekretär versicherte, daß der Bischof dieß nicht gewußt habe.

Am nächsten Tage, d.i. am 6. Abends kam ich zuerst und nach einer Stunde (p.7 recto) auch der Obergespann mit dem Oberfiscal zum Bischof. Nachdem ich erklärt hatte, daß ich eine offizielle oder die Candidatur der Regierungspartei nicht annehme; wurde ich wiederholt gebeten einen Tag und eine Stunde zu bestimmen und vor einer Versammlung von Wählern das mir am 5ten vorgelegte oder ein
ähnliches Programm zu entwickeln und hiedurch zwischen der Regierungspartei und der nationalen oder Volkspartei eine Vereinigung in meiner Person als dem gemeinschaftlichen Candidaten herbeizuführen.

Ich bestimmte hiezu die 3te Nachmittagsstunde des 8ten Dezbr und als Versammlungsort der Saal des Municipiums, um endlich – ich kann mit Recht sagen – der Bewerbungen der Regierungspartei los zu werden.

Das Resultat dieser Versammlung ist aus der anliegenden gedruckten Rede zu entnehmen.

Ich glaube, daß Vorstehendes genügt (p. 7 verso) um zu zeigen, was mich bewogen, ein Programm zu entwickeln. Ich habe mich dazu bewegen lassen, um der äußerst kleinen Regierungspartei den Übergang in das nationale Lager zu erleichtern und ihn die Bürde abzunehmen einen Gegencandidaten aufzustellen, der bei der Wahl glänzend durchgefallen wäre.

Offen gestanden habe ich hiedurch eine Gutmütigkeit und Großherzigkeit beweisen, die jetzt durch einen journalistischen Schmäh-artikel vergolten werden.


(p. 8 recto) Die Albina hat das Programm, wenn auch in abgekürzter Form dem Sinn und zum Teile auch dem Wortlaute nach, richtig gebracht.

Es schien mir jedoch, als ob Herr Pauloviciu sich meine Rede etwas zurecht gelegt hätte. Ich wollte ihm diese Freude nicht stören, was ich leicht gekonnt hätte. – Ich brauchte ja nur – da ich selber noch zu wenig magyarisch verstehe – mir eine genaue Übersetzung des erwähnten Artikels zu verschaffen.

8. Die gedruckte Rede ist identisch mit der gesprochenen.
Ich nannte das Nationalitäten-Gesetz ein ungerechtes schon deshalb, weil ich es als solches halte und auch den Muth habe, es als das zu bezeichnen, was es nach meiner Überzeugung ist. – Wären alle Gesetze gut und gerecht; so würde bald ewiger Fried statt des ewigen Kampfes herrschen:

9. Was nun die eigentliche Interpellations betrifft; so erkläre ich hiemit:
ad a) Erkenne ich die Druckschrift als mein geistiges Eigenthum an. Ich habe sie drucken und erscheinen lassen.
ad b) Ich habe die Rede drucken und vertheilen lassen, um lügenhafte und tendenziöse Berichte und Telegramme aus dem Lager der Regierungspartei zu entkräften, da sie mich trotz der gegenteiligen am 8. Dezbr abgegebenen Erklärung beharrlich zum Candidaten der Regierungspartei stempelten; offenbar in der Absicht um die Geister zu verwirren, die Gemüther meiner eigentlichen Committaten zu erбирtern überhaupt die nationale Pfalanx zu spalten.
ad c) Wer in der Versammlung gesunde Ohren (p.9 verso) hatte, um zu hören und ein treues Gedächtniß besitzt, um das Gehörte zu behalten, muß bestätigen, daß meine gedruckte Rede identisch mit der gesprochenen sei. Ich habe nicht nur so gesprochen, sondern ich habe sogar mehr gesprochen, als in der gedruckten Rede aufgenommen anscheint. – Ich habe gar Manches gesprochen und doch ausgelassen, weil es sich in den Schrift drastischer ausnimmt als im mündlichen Vortrage. Ich habe der gedruckten Rede nichts hinzugefügt, wohl aber von der gesprochenen Vieles ausgelassen.

Ja wohl behaupte ich, daß das Gedruckte wirklich gesprochen worden ist, und zwar behaupte ich dieß als Ehrenmann, als Soldat, dem die Ehre das theureste Gut ist und welcher selbst um Millionen nicht feil ist.


Die schließliche Behauptung der „Mehrere Wähler der Regierungspartei“ daß sie meinen angeblichen Enthüllungen (welche?) gegenüber kein Stillschweige beobachtet hätten; so muß ich euer Würde erklären, (p.10 verso) daß es hintendrein leicht ist, den Muthigen zu spielen.-

Die Versammlung in ihrer überwiegender Majorität, war von meiner Rede derart hingerissen, - um nicht zu sagen enthusiasmirt-, daß Niemand gewagt hätte, eine Einwendung gegen das von mir Entwickelte zu erhaben.

Man sah es den biederen und ehrlichen Männern an, daß ich ihnen aus dem Herzen sprach.

Gerade die Interpellanten – deren Namen bereits von Mund zu Mund gehen – wußten sehr gut, daß sie durch die geringste Einsprache sich selbst und ihre Brodherren in nicht geringe Verlegenheit stürzen würden. – Einige Worte von mir und ihre Partei wurde in ihre Ohnmacht zurückgeschleudert.

Nur dadurch, daß sie sich entschloß mit der nationalen Partei in der Wahl des (p.11 recto) Candidaten gemeinschaftliche Sache zu machen, maskirte sie ihre Schwäche. –

Gerade mein Programm war für sie die ersehnte Veranlassung, sich um mich, als den Candidaten des Volkes zu scharren, wie die Brücke auf welcher sie mit Sack und Pack in das nationale Lager übertrat.
Ich will Privatissimo nicht an die große Glocke hängen – darf aber, um den nachgeborenen Muth der Interpellanten in die rechte Beleuchtung zu setzen, so viel erwähnen, daß zwei hohe Würdenträger mit Bangigkeit dem Ausgange der auf ihr Betreiben inscénirten Wählerversammlung entgegen harrten, fürchtend, daß irgend ein Heißsporn durch ein unvorsichtiges Wort, die von ihnen so sehr gewünschte und angestrebte Vereinigung der Regierungs- mit der nationale Partei zu nichts machen würde.


Aber Herr Pauloviciu als Präsident des Deak-Clubs (euphemistisch Regierungspartei genannt) wußte, was er thun mußte.

Bevor ich zu etwas Anderem schreite, muß ich noch mittheilen, daß ich vollkommen vorbereitet in der Versammlung ging. Niemand wußte, was ich thun oder sprechen werde.

Diejenigen, die mich genauer kennen, wissen gar Manches von meinem treuen Gedächtniß zu erzählen.

Soll ich da nicht mein eigenstes geistiges (p. 12 recto) Product getreu und jeden Falls am getreuesten reproduzieren können?

10. Diejenigen, welche vorstehende Aufklärungen gelesen, mögen nun die Frage aufwerfen, welcher Ansage die harmlose Interpellation in der Neuen Temesvarer Zeitung ihre Entstehung zu verdanken habe?

Ich will versuchen diese zu enthüllen: Es ist allgemein bekannt, daß die Deak oder Regierungspartei bei den meisten Deputirten-Wahlen, Candidaten ihrer Partei aufstellt und Alles daran setzt, um diesen zum Siege zu verhelfen.

Die Regierungs und die Deakpartei hervorgegangen, thut durch ihre Organe ebenfalls ihr Möglichstes zur Unterstützung der Deako-stischen oder Regierungs-Candidaten und zur Bekämpfung der Gegencandidaten.

Dieses geschieht aus dem Triebe der Selbsterhaltung; sie will die Herrschaft, welche sich in ihren Händen befandete, auch fortan behaupten.


Diese Partei trug mir nie die Candidatur an, schon deshalb nicht, weil sie nothwendiger Weise diese nur einem Deakisten geben dürfte.

Sie mußte noch Terrän gewinnen, mußte die Zahl ihrer Anhänger vermehren und that, bis sie sich stark genug gefühlt hätte, als wenn ich ihr Candidat werden müsse, da sie meinte und dieß auch ausposaunte, daß (p.13 recto) ich als k.k. General nur der Regierungspartei angehören könne.

Diese Partei vergrößerte sich nicht, im Gegentheile sie schien sich verkleinern zu wollen durch Abfall Unabhängiger.

Als die Leiter der Regierungspartei – die Regierungsorgane nämlicl – zur Erkenntniß gelangten, daß sie mit ihrem Candidaten glänzend durchfallen werden – (denn von 6672 eingeschriebenen Wählern waren über 6000 unbedingt für mich) – nahmen sie ihre Zuflucht zur Diplomatie.

Wie ich bereits geschildert, waren ihre Bemühungen und Anwerbungen, mich in ihre Netze zu locken, vergeblich.

Die Regierungsorgane, welche sich wahrscheinlich dem Ministerium gegenüber engagirt hätten, einen Deakistischen o. Regierungs-Candidaten in den Reichstag zu bringen, waren jetzt in arger Verlegenheit.

(p.13 verso) Sie wollten diese Verlegenheit und die Ohnmacht ihrer Partei gegenüber der sogenannten nationalen oder Volkspartei nicht offenkundig werden lassen, darum beschlossen sie die Vereinigung der Regierungs- mit der Volkspartei in der Person des Candidaten.

Die von mir für den 8. Dezbr anberaumte Wählerversammlung und das Programm, das ich in derselben entwickeln würde, sollte diese Vereinigung bewirken und bewirkte sie auch?.

Was ich jetzt weiter sage, darüber kann ich zwar keinen gerichtsordnungsmäßigen Beweis erbringen, habe aber die moralische Überzeugung, daß trotz meiner in der
entschiedensten und klarsten Weise abgegebenen Erklärung, daß ich die offizielle oder die Candidatur der Regierungspartei nicht annehme, ich dennoch dem Ministerium als der Mann der Regierung, als der Regierungs Candidat bekannt gegeben wurde.

(p.14 recto) Zu welchem Zweck – liegt vor dem geistigen Augen Aller, die in dieser Sache urtheilen können. Soweit meine moralische Überzeugung.

Die lügenhaften und tendenziosen Berichte, welche über meine Programmrede unter die Bewölkerung dieses Comitats verbreitet wurden, zwangen mich, meine Rede zu drucken und zu veröffentlichen, um allen böswilligen Ausstreuungen ein Ende zu machen.

Dieß hatten die Verfasser der falschen Berichte nicht erwartet.-

Jetzt fürchteten sie, daß die Druckschrift ihren Oberen zu Gesichte kommen und ihnen über den wahren Sachverhalt die Augen öffnen würde. Dieß dürfte nicht geschehen; also frisch darauf los mystificirt!! Mann hätte ja darin Übung genug – und Übung macht den Meister. Ich will mich nicht eines zutreffenderen Ausdruckes bedienen.

Da ging ein Zeitungsartikel los, dann (p. 14 verso) ein zweiter und ein dritter und wer weiß viele nachfolgten.

Da werde ich beschuldigt, daß ich die Regierungspartei getäuscht habe. Lieber Himmel! Wo war diese Regierungspartei in der Wählerversammlung am 8. Dezbr, vor welcher ich mein Programm entwickelte?

Hat nicht Herr Pauloviciu, ihr Haupt und Wortführer auf meine Frage bestimmt und deutlich geantwortet, daß obwohl die Anwesenden verschiedenen Parteien angehören, sie dennoch nicht als Partei, sondern nur als einfache Wähler versammelt sind?

Schade, daß ich nicht einen Diogenes mit hatte – um mir in der Auffindung dieser unsichtbaren Partei behilflich zu sein.

Wie konnte ich eine Partei täuschen, die in der Versammlung nicht anwesend war, oder doch den Muth nicht hatte, sich als solche zu bekennen?

(p.15 recto)

Ich glaube, dieses Kunststück könnte selbst ein Hegelianer nicht begreifen.

Als ich den Verfasser dieses ersten Artikels frage, wie er denselben schreiben konnte, antwortete er mir unter Entschuldigungen, daß er als Staatsbeamte dieß thun mußte, um sich den Rücken zu sichern.
Also um sich den Rücken zu sichern, muß er einem Zweiten an die Ehre gehen!
Schöne Moral das! Gratulire zu solcher Moral!
Ein zweiter Artikel will imperativ/o eine große Versammlung von Wählern der
Regierungspartei, um gegen die Gültigkeit meiner mit Acclamation bewirkten Wahl
zu protestiren.
Ja diese Acclamation thut ihnen weh! Man berufe diese große Versammlung, jedoch
to dem erwähnten Zwecke, zähle dann die Häupter seiner Lieben und (p.15 verso)
man wird finden, daß Alle fehlen!
Was die Verfasser des dritten Artikels oder der Interpellation in der Neuen
Temesvarer Zeitung betrifft; so können sie nur solche Individuen sein, welche über
die Wählerversammlung vom 8. Dezbr falsch berichtet habe, und nach
Veröffentlichung meiner Rede demaskirt, sich nur dadurch rein zu waschen
glaubten, daß sie schamlos zur Lüge, zur Entstellung, Verdrehung und Mißdeutung
der Thatsachen ihre Zuflucht nehmen.
Es können nur solche Biedermänner sein, welche nach der Gunst der Regierung oder
einflußreicher Regierungsorgane haschen, welche jede Gelegenheit gierig benützen,
um sich durch Berichte, Enthüllungen u.d.g. (und dergleiche) selbst auf Kosten der
Wahrheit, vermeintliche Verdienste zu sammeln.
Ich glaube sogar, daß diese Biedermänner nicht aus eigener Initiative, sondern in
Folge höherer Inspiration den Schmähartikel vom Rappel (last page/recto) ließen,
daß sie zum blinden Werkzeuge sich hergaben.
Sie wissen nicht, was sie thaten – und da mir ihr Gebahren nicht gleichgültig sein
cann und ich die schamlosen Behauptungen schon meinen Standesgenossen
gegenüber nicht mit Stillenweinen übergehen kann; so mögen sie sich nennen,
damit ihnen die Maske der Ehrenmänner, hinter welcher sie ihr wahres Antlitz
verbergen, herunter gerissen und ihnen jene Behandlung zu Teil werde, die sie
verdienen.
Zum Schluße erwähne ich noch, daß am 25. Okt./dm? eine Deputation hiesiger
angesehener Bürger – Deutsche, Magyaren und Romanen – bei mir war, um mir ihre
Entrüstung und Bedauere über den erwähnten Artikel auszudrücken, wobei sie
betonten, daß echte Bürger aus Caransebes den Artikel nicht verfaßt haben können.-

Sie gaben den Verfassern Epithete, die ich nicht wieder geben kann.

Doda, GM
31. Jänner 1874
Präs. No. 188

In the same set of documents there is also the following:

K.K. Militär-Commando zu Temesvar
Präs No. 188
K.K. Reichs-Kriegs-Ministerium

Temesvar am 31. Jänner 1874


Eine Veröffentlichung der in der Äußerung enhaltenen Widerlegung durch die Presse halte ich aus dem Grunde weder für notwendig noch für opportun, weil dem Herrn Generalmajor Doda bei seinem nächsten Erscheinen im ungarischen Abgeordneten-Hause ohnehin die passendste Gelegenheit gebothen sein wird, die Interpellation mündlich zu beantworten.-

Scudier
FML

On the end page of this report there are several notes, one of which reads:

2.3. Doda letter to a friend in Al. Mocsonyi’s hand

Liefer Freund!


Nota: this letter has no date, no addressee and is unsigned. It is to be found in Fondul Mocsonyi, II/ 4, folio 55, Bucharest National Archives, among other letters addressed mostly to Alexandru Mocsonyi. The letter looks like a rough draft with many things crossed out and reformulated.
2.4. Szilágyi’s report on the Doda trial

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, HHStA, Kabinettikanzelei, Karton 20 K.Z., 1889, No. 4261/1889

5 November

Vortrag
des ung. Justizministers
Dr Szilagy
Dd 27 Oktober 1889
No. 32111

(document pages are not numbered)

Folio 1/recto:


Die gegen dieses Urtheil eingelegte Nulitätsbeschwerde, hat die Curie verworfen.

Nachdem ein preßgerichtliches Contumaz-Urtheil, welches auf Freiheitsstrafe lautet, nur nach einer neuerlichen Verhandlung, zu welcher der Angeklagte eventuell mittelst Brachialgewalt stellig zu machen ist, - exekutirbar?
erscheint, sollte in dieser Angelegenheit eine neuere Verhandlung anberaumt werden; jedoch hatte der Verurtheilte inzwischen die Rechtsverfügungsklage und die Einwendung gegen die Gerichts-Competenz erhoben, und wurde der ersteren durch den Arader Gerichtshof mit dem [Erkenntnisse?] vom 16. Feber l.Jh. Folge gegeben; sein weiteres Begehren, aber, daß in Folge seines gerechtfertigten Wegbleibens von der Hauptverhandlung jede gerichtliche Verfügung für unwirksam erklärt werde, sowie auch die Einwendung gegen Gerichtes Competenz abgewiesen.


(folio 2/recto)


Ad 4261 . 889

Folio 1/recto:

Allergnädigster Herr!

Der pensionirte General karansebeser Einwohner Trajan Doda bittet in dem der allerhöchsten Signatur gewürdigten unter ./. ehrerbietigst angeschloßnen Majestäts-Gesuche das, gegen denselben wegen des im Wege der Presse begangenen
Vergehens der Aufreizung gegen eine Nationalität vor dem königlichen Gerichtshofe zu Arad als Preßgericht anhängig gemachte Strafverfahren im Wege der allerhöchsten Gnade einstellen zu lassen.


Da Trajan Doda dies sein Vorgehen vor seinen Wählern rechtfertigen wollte, ließ derselbe das an den Präsidenten des Abgeordnetenhauses gerichtete Schreiben in rumänischer Übersetzung im Wege der Presse vervielfältigen, und dieß in Begleitung eines gleichfalls gedruckten offenen Briefes unter seine Wähler vertheilen.

Nachdem aber in diesen (folio 2/verso) offenen Schreiben behauptet wurde, es hätte/hätte die ungarische Nation durch Intriguen der Bemühung und Gewalt die rumänische Nation aus allen ihren Positionen des politischen Kampfes ausgeschloßen; nachdem weiters derselbe mit dem Nothschrei, wir bereiten uns zu einem großen mühevollen Kampfe vor, die Nationalehre des rumänischen Volkes ist aufs Spiel gesetzt.- die Rumänen dazu aneiferte, daß sie den Boden der That betreten mögen, welcher ausser den Schranken des constitutionellen Kampfes gelegen ist, und nur Haß schüren kann in dem leichter zu bethörenden Theile des rumänischen
Volkes gegen die ungarische Nationalität, - wurde gegen Trajan Doda wegen des im §172 des Strafgesetzes normirten und in der im §171 umschriebenen Weise im Wege (folio 3/recto) der Presse begangenen Vergehens der Aufreizung vor dem königlichen Gerichtshofe in Arad als Preßgericht das Strafverfahren eingeleitet. –


Nach der schwurgerichtliche Verfahren normierenden Verordnung kann ein auf eine Freiheitsstrafe lautendes Urtheil, welches ohne Anwesenheit des Angeklagten gebracht worden, nur nach neuerer Verhandlung vollstreckbar werden, zu welcher zweiten Verhandlung der Angeklagte eventuell mit Brachialgewalt stellig zu machen ist. –

Bevor diese Verhandlung im Sinne des 583. der Vorschriften über das Verfahrens stattgefunden hatte/hätte, machte Trajan Doda von der Rechtfertigung Gebrauch und erhob Einwendungen gegen die Gerichts-Competenz.


Über die gegen diese Entscheidung eingegangene Berufung beziehentlich Nullitätsbeschwerde hat die königliche Curie mit dem am 9ten Mai l. Jh. unter Zahl 3837 gefällten Beschluß das am 17. September 1888 gebrachte Contumaz Urtheil mit seiner Folgen außer Wirksamkeit (folio 4/verso) gesetzt und den königlichen
Gerichtshof zu Arad als Preßgericht angewiesen, ein ganz neues Verfahren gemäß §84 der Vorschriften einzuleiten.

Zufolge dieser Entscheidung der königlichen Kurie ist daher die in Rede stehende Anlegenheit in jenes Stadium zurückgeleitet worden, in welchem sich dieselbe vor der ersten Verhandlung befand.


Auf Grund dieses Beschlußes des Ministerrathes, - obgleich ich nicht unerwähnt lassen kann die bedauerliche Thatsache, daß es dem Trajan Doda nur allein durch die Ausbeutung der schwachen Seiten unseres preßgerichtliches Verfahrens gelingen konnte die Wirkung des gegen denselben factisch gebrachten Verdictes der Jury zu entkräften (folio 5/verso), - und daß derselbe auch in seinem nun ehrerbietigst vorgelegten Gnädengesuch völlig unbegründet das Arader Schwurgericht nicht nur der Befangenheit sondern auch der absichtlichen Abneigung beschuldigt; und obschon auch bei dem dermaligen Stande der Sache der gesetzliche Grund gegeben ist auf welchen in Folge einer neueren Verhandlung dessen Verurtheilung sicherlich erfolgen wurde, sowie diese bei der ersten völlig gesetzlichen und vorschriftsgemäßen Verhandlung erfolgte: nachdem ich jedoch nicht Willens bin dessen unverhüllt anzugliche und auf ein politisches Märtyrerthum abzielende Bestrebungen in die ansonst verdiente Waagschale der Strenge zu legen, erlaube ich den allerunterthänigsten Antrag zu stellen:

(folio 6/recto)

Geruhen Euer Kaiserlich und Apostolisch Königliche Majestät die Geltendmachung des obgedachten Ministerrath-Beschlußes, das ist Fallenlassen des
gegen Trajan Doda anhängig gemachten Strafverfahrens allernächigst zur Kenntniß zu nehmen.

   Den in diesem Sinne verfaßten Entwurf der allerhöchsten Entschließung erlaube ich mir unter 3. / in tiefster Ehrfurcht beizulegen:

   Budapest am 27. October 1889
   Desider Szilágyi m. p.

   Entwurf der allerhöchsten Entschiessung
   Über Vortrag Meines ungarischen Justizministers habe Ich den am 14ten Juli 1889 gefaßten Beschluß Meines ungarischen Ministeriums, daß das, gegen den karansebeser (folio 6/verso) Insassen Trajan Doda wegen des im Wege der Presse begangenen Vergehens der Aufreizung gegen eine Nationalität anhängig gemachte Strafverfahren fallen gelassen werde genehmigend(s) zur Kenntniß genommen.

OeStA, HHStA, 12. Ungarische Ministerrats-Protokolle 1888-1889
C.Z. XVIII
Übersetzung
Folio 335/recto
Protokoll über die am 14ten Juli 1889 in Budapest abgeschaltene Minister-Conferenz unter dem Vorsitze des königl.ungar. Minister Präsidenten Koloman von Tisza
   (among the Gegenwärtige: Desider Syilagyi, Justizminister)

Folio 338/recto:
4.
   Der Herr Ministerpräsident hat die Frage gestellt, ob das Preß-Strafverfahren gegen Trajan Doda, welches infolge Ministerraths-Beschlusses vom 2. Jänner 1888 eingeleitet wurde, angesichts dessen, als das bisherige Verfahren wegen eines Formfehlers seitens der königlichen Curie kassirt wurde, noch weiter fortzusetzen sei?
   (Folio 338/verso)
In Anbetracht, daß seit dem Erscheinen jenes offenen Briefes, weswegen das Strafverfahren eingeleitet wurde, bereits nahezu 2 Jahre verstrichen sind und derselbe schon beinahe in Vergessenheit gerieth und dessen nachtheilige Wirkung durchaus nicht wahrzunehmen war; in Anbetracht daß Trajan Doda, der wirklich krank ist, wahrscheinlich auch im Falle der Anberaumung einer neueren Verhandlung vor dem Gerichte nicht erscheinen würde, und seine Vorführung angeordnet werden müßte, was mit Rücksicht auf seinen Zustand den Anschein einer unmotivirten politischen Verfolgung hervorzurufen geeignet wäre, in Anbetracht ferner, daß der erreichbare Erfolg mit den moralischen Nachtheilen in gar keinem Verhältnisse wäre, welche (folio 339/recto) im Falle der Fortsetzung des Prozeßes die Auctorität der Staatsgewalt erleiden würde, und es nicht zweckmäßig wäre Gelegenheit zu bieten, daß die Mangelhaftigkeit der strafrechtlichen Bestimmungen in Preß-sachen seitens der staatsfeindlichen Elemente ausgebeutet werden: hat der Ministerrath von der weiteren Fortsetzung des Verfahrens Umgang zu nehmen beschlossen.
Stimate Dle Redactor,

In numărul 89 al Luminătoriului aduci sub rubrica „Chronica şi sciri” notiția, că procesul de presă, intentat contra mea, s-a sistat cu totul pre ceea grației Majestății. Scirile apărute în foile straine despre acesta afacere nu sunt exacte. Mai departe susții:

„Noi avem informațiunea demnă de tot crediențială, că dl General T. Doda, îmboldt și nepăciuit? numai de unii omeni lași și speculați, de cari dl General nu se pote scutura, a dat rugarea sa de-a dreptul Majestății Sale, Monarhului, și în urma cărei rugari prime s-a dispus totala sistare a acestui proces de presă.”

Nu am de gând să intru în polemic cu informațiunea Dtle, demnă de tot crediențială, căci nu am căutat nici odată altă justificare decât înaintea conscienciei mele, de aceea î-ți scriu numai Dtle aceste rânduri.

Jubileul roman a suferit deja destul din cauza certelor între conducătorii lui. –

Dacă ar fi adevărată informațiunea, pe care Dta credi, că este cuviințios a o publica asia, precum ai făcut-o, Te încredințiez, că renunțiu la cruțiarea, de care îmi faci personal parte. – Nu am datina să fac lucruri, pentru care nu eu ci alții, și încă omeni lași și speculați, se primescă responderea. – Felul de îndemn, ce-mi dai, nu e de natura de a-mi produce dispozițiunea sufletescă, că se-ți descoper adevăratul istoric și cuprins al adresei mele către Maiestate.

Fi asigurat, că vătămarea ce-mi faci, nu-ți voi lua-o în nume de reu, căci cel ce crede despre mine, ca asiu fi în stare să întreprind lucruri, nu din alte cause ci nu mai ca se nu fiu nepacuiit de omeni lași și speculați, pe cari îi ascult, acela nu pote sem-o dică decât pote, fiindcă în lunga lui esperiență, s-a deprins a sluji, fie chiar și fără voie, la informatori de același soiu.

Eu sunt deja? un om bătrân, care am trecut prin încercări mult mai grele și a căruia fapte și caracter nu se pote pune pe o foie de hârtie, dar î-ți mărturisesc, că nici o dată n-am servit personelor.-

Poftindu-Ți un an nou ferice, remân cu stimă deosebită.
Dear Editor,

In issue 89 of Luminătorul you put in a note under the rubric “Reviews and news” that the press trial launched against me was discontinued entirely by means of Imperial pardon. The news that appeared in foreign newspapers regarding this matter is not accurate.

You then go on:
“We have the information, which is wholly credible, that General Doda, being egged on by cowardly and opportunistic people, of whom he cannot rid himself, submitted his petition to His Majesty, the Monarch, and as a consequence of this petition they put a complete stop to this press trial.”

I have no intention of starting a polemic against your information, wholly credible as it is, for I never sought justification except before my own conscience; that is why I write these lines to you only.

The Romanian jubilee has already suffered enough because of the quarrelling between its leaders.

If the information were true, which you thought fit to thus publish, then I assure you that I will give up all decorum that I hitherto used towards you. I am not in the habit of doing things, for which not me but others, least of all cowardly, opportunistic people, should be held responsible. The incentive you have given me is not such as to put me in the right mood to reveal to you the true story and content of my petition to His Majesty.

Be assured that I will not hold against you the ill turn you have done me, for he who thinks that I am capable of doing things only so as not be disturbed by cowardly and opportunistic people, whom I obey, he who says that does it because in his long experience he has become accustomed to serving, even without knowing it, just such class of informers.
I am already an old man, who has gone through even more difficult trials and whose deeds and character cannot be put on a piece of paper, but I confess to you that I have never served anyone else’s interests.-

Wishing you a happy new year, I remain

Respectfully yours,
Doda.

PS. I apologize for the unpleasant letter. I could not write it any other way!!
3) Appendices to Chapter Eight

3.1. Trapsia’s testament

Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv
Signatur: BG Graz I D 837/1896
Bearbeiter: Dr. Elisabeth Schöggl-Ernst

Mein Testament

Bei klarem Verstande und nach reiflicher Überlegung verfüge ich Folgendes:

Ich wünsche im griechisch-orientalischen Friedhofe in Caransebes im Temescherbanate in einem eigenen Grabe – also abgesondert jenem meiner Eltern – beigesetzt zu werden.
Das Leichenbezeugniß soll möglichst einfach sein, der militärische Conduct soll in Caransebes beigestellt werden.
Als Erbin alles Beweglichen setze ich meine liebe Frau Aurelia ein.
Außerdem soll meine Frau Aurelia erben die mir eigenthümlichen Hausplätze Grundbüchs Nr. 182 und 183 in Caransebes, ferner soll von der mir eigenthümlichen Hälfte des Platzes Nr. 176 in Caransebes circa 150 Quadratklefter zur Erweiterung des Platzes Nr. 182 also entschließend, an der Gassenseite 8 (:acht:) Klefter lang, - an den Platz Nr. 182 angegliedert und ebenfalls meiner Frau gehören.
Der Rest der mir eigenthümlichen Hälfte des Hausplatzes Nr. 176 dann die mir gehörige Hälfte des Hauses und Platzes Nr. 175 in Caransebes sollen mein Neffe Aurel Moaca und meine [page 2] Nichte Andriana Moaca zu gleichen Theilen erben.
Das mir gehörige Feld in den Teus in Caransebes vermache ich meinem Neffen Aurel Moaca.
Ich bitte meine gute Frau aus den beweglichen Gegenständen meinem lieben Neffen Otto von Demuth ein Andenken zu übergeben.
Allen Verwandten und Freunden meinen Scheidegruß.
Schließlich habe ich einen sehnsüchtigsten Wunsch als treuer Sohn der Rumänischen Nation zur Errichtung einer confessionellen rumänischen Mädchenschule in Caransebes anregend beizutragen und bestimme ich hierzu 5000 Fl (: fünftausend Gulden ö.h.) zur Bildung eines rumänischen Mädchenschulfondes.
Die Grundsätze für die zu errichtende confessionelle rumänische Mädchenschule sind folgende:

Ich bitte meine liebe Frau Aurelie dieses Legat von fünftausend Gulden öst.h.? an die rumänische bischöfliche Synode in Caransebes mit einer Abschrift dieses Theiles meines Testamentes zu übergeben.
Ich bin mir vollkommen bewußt, daß zur Realisirung dieser Mädchenschule ein hoher Fond erforderlich ist und darum bitte ich die Synode diesen Theil meiner letztwilligen Anordnung angemessen zu verlautbaren, und dadurch zu Beiträgen anzuregen, in der Überzeugung daß die rumänische Nation noch viele treue Söhne hat, welche durchdrungen sind von der Wahrheit, daß eine Nation nur in
ihrer Muttersprache sich zu entwickeln vermag und daher auch? dies unentwegt anstreben.

Bis zur möglichen Eröffnung der Schule beziehungsweise Realisierung dieses meines sehnlichsten Wünsches soll der Fond in einem rumänischen Geldinstitute sicher angelegt und die Zinsen zum Capital geschlagen werden.

/./

[page 4]

Ich habe dieses mein Testament eigenhändig geschrieben und unterfertigt.

Graz am 3. Jänner 1893

Michael Ritter von Trapsia m/n

Vor uns dieses Document
als sein Testament und eigenhändig unterschrieben

Julius Ritter von Panecke m/n
K.u.K. Oberst i. R. als Zeuge
Leopold Ritzberger m/p Hptm als Zeuge
Rudolf Ritter von Frieß m/n
GM als Zeuge

Rundgemacht Graz am 12. Mai 1896
D Albert Beer m.p.

[in a different hand]
Diese für den Verlaßact bestimmte Abschrift ist gleich dem aus einem Bogen bestehenden ungestempelten Originale. Graz am zwölften Mai achtzehnhundert sechs und neunzig.

[Signature]
Albert Beer
3.2. Cena investigation reports

I. Declaration given by FML Nikolaus Cena to the imperial military authorities in Vienna

Protokoll

Se. Exz. FMlt. Cena gibt am 29./8. beim Kriegsüberwachungsamte zu Protokoll:


Ich wurde zweimal einvernommen; einmal in meiner eigenen Angelegenheit, das zweitemal als Zeuge in einer anderen. Ich wurde lediglich aufgefordert (p.4/verso) „mich zu verteidigen“, ohne daß mir konkrete Anschuldigungen vorgehalten worden wären. Infolgedessen konnte ich auch nur ganz allgemein diesen Anschuldigungen entgegentreten und es müssen meine diesbezüglichen Angaben im aufgenommenen Protokolle enthalten sein.

Am 24./8. 11h vorm., bis zu welcher Zeit ich unausgesetzt in Einzelhaft war, erschien der Staatsanwalt in meiner Zelle und machte mir folgende Eröffnung:

„Das Kriegsministerium frägt sich an, ob Sie gewillt sind das Land binnen 3 Tagen zu verlassen, wenn ja, werden Sie freigelassen.“ – Ich mußte Ziel und Route meiner Reise angeben und mich mit Ehrenwort verpflichten, mit dem nächsten Zuge
(25./8. 4h 41 vorm.) abzureisen und die gewählte Route (Temesvár, Budapest, Bruck, Wien) genau anzuhalten. Ich kam am 27./8. früh hier an und meldete mich hier beim Platzkmdo.

Ich bin hier VI. Gumpendorferstr.18. II/13 abgestiegen.

Nach Verlesung:
Meine Angaben sind richtig aufgenommen:
Nicolai Cena
Fmlt, d.R.

(p.5/recto)
Geschlossen und gefertigt!
Wien, **29/8 1914**
Schleyer, Fmlt
Kárpáthy Mjr

*A typed copy of this Protokoll is to be found in KA, KÜA 1914, Aktenzahl 4066.*

**II. Count Tisza’s response to the interpellation of the Kriegsministerium:**

OeStA, KA, KM Präs, 1914
Karton 1583 (40/1 – 41/3)
Aktenzahl 40 – 19/5
P.2/recto:

6673 BIZALMAS

_____ Saját kezébe.

M.E.

Seine des Herrn k.u.k. wirklichen geheimen Rathes, Feldzeugmeisters, k.u.k. Kriegsministers
ALEXANDER RITTER von KROBATIN
Excellenz
WIEN
EUER EXCELLENZ!


Wie Euer Excellenz wohl bekannt ist, war die jetzige ungarische Regierung, welche von diesbezüglichen im Herbst 1912 vorgenommenen Vorarbeiten nichts wusste, peinlich überrascht zu erfahren, dass gleich am ersten Mobilisierungstage massenhafte Verhaftungen angeblich politisch verdächtiger Personen von militärischer Seite veranlasst wurden. Euer Excellenz werden sich darauf erinnern, dass ich gegen diese ganze Action von Anfang an die schwersten Bedenken hegte, auf das energischste Stellung nahm, an die Intervention Seiner Majestät appellierte und dass es mir in dieser Weise gelang, ein modus vivendi herzustellen und bei späteren Verhaftungen die Ingerenz der politischen Behörden zu sichern, welche selbstredend mehr in der Lage sein müssen, sowohl die Zuverlässigkeit einzelner Persönlichkeiten wie auch die Folgen

./.

(p.2/verso) solcher staatspolizeilicher Massnahmen richtig beurteilen zu können.

Die ersten Verhaftungen waren jedoch schon vollzogen, und lassen ihre schädlichen Folgen in mancher Hinsicht fühlen. Unter diese ersten Fälle reiht sich auch die Verhaftung des k.u.k. Feldmarschalllieutenant Cena.

Unter diesen befand sich der Feldmarschallleutenant Cena, welcher infolge des erhaltenen Befehles vom Gendarmerieflügel-Commandanten verhaftet und mit den anderen an den Staatsanwalt in Karánsebes abgeführt wurde. Dieser wurde nur davon instruiert, dass die Verhaftung auf Befehl des Militärcommandos aus Rücksichten der Sicherung des Heeres geschah, und dass die Arrestanten im Gefängnis der Staatsanwaltschaft zu unterbringen wären.

Auf eine schriftliche Anfrage des Staatsanwaltes erhielt derselbe vom Stationscommandanten in Orsova am 4-ten August sub Zahl 199 die Verständigung, dass Nikolaus Cena als der Spionage verdächtig verhaftet wurde, und seine Inhaftierung bis zur Beendigung der in Gang gesetzten Untersuchung aus militärischen Rücksichten unbedingt nothwendig sei.


Wie Euer Excellenz aus diesem Tatbestand ersehen können, ist sowohl die Verhaftung, wie die Verlängerung der Untersuchungshaft auf directe Veranlassung der militärischen Commanden geschehen, wobei der königl. Staatsanwalt die Angelegenheit nach Tunlichkeit beschleunigt und widerholt Schritte getan hat, um die Freilassung des Genannten zu ermöglichen. Was aber die Intervention der kön.ung. Regierung anbetrifft, so bestand sie, wie bei allen ähnlichen Fällen, so auch
bei diesem Fall, in einer möglichsten Beschleunigung des Verfahrens und endlich in der directen Intervention und Freilassung des Betreffenden.

Wenn also irgend jemanden ein Vorwurf in dieser Frage (p.3/verso) treffen kann, so sind es keineswegs die Civilbehörden des Landes und wohl auch weniger einzelne militärische Organe, als dieses ganze System von Spionage- und Geheimpolizistentums, welches zu meiner peinlichen Überraschung in manchen militärischen Kreisen so sehr überhandgenommen hat.

Genehmigen Euer Excellenz den Ausdruck meiner vorzüglichen Hochachtung.

BUDAPEST, den 4-ten September 1914

Tisza m.p.

A typed copy of this report is to be found in KA, KÜA (Kriegsüberwachungsamt), Aktenzahl 4066.

III. Request sent by the Royal Head Prosecutor in Temesvár to the General Staff Command of the 7th Army Corps in Temesvár concerning the Cena case.

Bizalmas

A cs. és kir. 7. hadtest Vezérkari Osztályának

Temesvár

A orsovai m.kir. határszéli rendőrség az orsovai katonai állomás parancsnokság megkeresésére letartóztatta és folyó évi július hó 26-án bekísérte a karánsebesi kir. törvényszéki fogházba CSENA MIKLÓS nyugalmazott cs. és kir. altábornagyt azon alapon, mert kémgyanús, akinek a letartóztatása a mozgósítás keresztülvihetése és hadi ezél elérhetésére vált szükségesessé.

A kémkedés büntette miatt ellene folyamatba tett nyomozás a következő adatokat szolgáltatta:

a Csena Miklós mehádiai lakásán a határszéli rendőrség által megtartott házkutatás alkalmával nagy számú fényképlemez és kész amateur fénykép, továbbá
rendkívül sok katonai könyv és térkép találatot; a fényképek legnagyobb része Mehádia és környékének hidjairól, alagutjairól vannak fényképezve, különösen az árvízpusztítás utáni megrongált állapotban és újra épülő állapot különböző fázisaiiban. A katonai térképek azon helyek terepeit mutatják, hol Csen Miklós hosszu katonai ideje alatt szolgálatot teljesített; A meglevő katonai könyvek a nevezett tényleges szolgálata alatt lettek beszerezve; arra nézve, hogy a fényképek külföld számára készültek volna, avagy szállítattakk volna, semmi nyom vagy jel nem található; ezenkívül található és önként átadott tárgyak: 11 darab saját rajzú térképrész illetve térképváz, 1 darab „Műszaki Világ” 1910. július 14-iki száma, 1 darab köszönő levél a meteorológiai intézet pecsétjével ellátva, 1 darab az orsosvai kir. járásbíróságnak ezimzett köszönő levél folgalmazványa, 2 darab Krassószőrény vármegyei térkép saját jegyzettel bővítve, 1 darab a „Drapelul” újság 1911. szeptember 19-iki száma.

A házkutatásnál jelen volt Bacsilla Mária – gyanusított testvére azt adta elő, hogy a 11 darab térképvázlatot Csen azért készítette, mert ő mint egyházi elnök az elszántott és a víz alá került egyházi földek telekkönyveit akarta rendezni, mivel a telekkönyvi betétek rendezése ezután következik.

Klein Mihály, Steiner Sándor, Toldi Elek, Prerau Jakob, Alcscher Ludmilla tanúk és szintén terheltként szereplő Bozsinka Fábiusz vallomásaival megállapítható az, hogy

1. folyó évi június havában az orsosvai kir. járásbíróság vezetőjének utasítására kiadattak Csen Miklós altábornagynak ennek kérelmére Mehádia község beterületét ábrázoló eredeti járásbírósági telekkönyvi térképek, amelyket Csen Miklós magához véve elismervény ellenében elvitte és mintegy 14 napig magánál tartva visszaküldte, a járásbíróságnál levő elismervényét pedig Kriznyik járásbírósági díjnak Toldi Elek hivatalszolga utján az orsosvai államás parancsnoknak leendő kézbesítés végett Grozeszku Döme orsosvai örmesternek adott át;

2. Csen Miklós altábornagy mintegy 3 éve Alcscher orsosvai fényképészhez többször vitt kész fénykép felvételeket előhívás végett azzal, hogy minden lemezről egy képet készítsenek s azt neki küldjék el, a lemezeket pedig tartsák meg, másrészt többször vásárolt kész lemezeket. A lemezek legnagyobb részre hidakat ábrázolnak többféle helyzetben, igen sok lemez az árvíz által Herkulesfürdő és Orsova között elmosott vasúti pályatestet, más lemezek pedig magános házakat is ábrázolnak; a
fényképész kérdésére Csena azt a felvilágosítást adta, hogy a híd felvételek azért kellenek neki, mivel ő mint pionir tiszt ezen dolgok iránt érdeklődik.

Csena Miklós altábornagy tagadja, hogy akár a térképekkel akár a fényképekkel a bármiféle büntetendő cselekményt, kémkedést akart volna és követett volna el; a karánsebesi kir. ügyészségéhez írásban beadott védekezésében azt adja elő, hogy ő 1904 augusztus 1-éje óta van nyugalomban és Mehádián semmiféle katonai intézet avagy erődítmény nincs, amelyet ő kikéremelhetett volna, írt már egy a bécsi tudományos akadémia 1911 évi évkönyvében megjelenő „Über den Fund einer römischen Inschriften Basis in ad Mediam /: Mehádia:/ der Peutinger-schen Tafel” csimű művet; újabban egy munkát akart írni „Bilder aus der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart der Grossgemeinde Mehadia” címen és ezen műhöz volt neki szüksége Mehádia régi térképeire, amelyek után még a temesvári katasteri osztályban is kutatott; megbízhatóságára felhozza, hogy 1878 évben mint főhadnagy az akkori altábornagy Skudié által az orosz-román-török harcztérre kém gyanánt kiküldetett; a karánsebesi kir. ügyészség előtt történt kihallgatása alkalmával pedig azt adta elő, hogy ő mint mehádiai gör.kel. hitközség vezető embere a hitközség viszonyait igyekszett rendbe hozni, 1911 évben a Romániában a király tiszteletére rendezett katonai ünnepségre elment és ott magas rangú tisztekkel – köztük egy Mujka nevű román kir. ezredes – is megismerkedett; folyó évi július 12-én felkeresték őt Mehádián a lakásán nevezett Mujka ezredes és Musztecza tábornoknak bemutató polgári ruhába öltözött egyének, akik a román hadsereget dicsérték és azt mondtaik, hogy lehet, hogy Románia háboruba keveredik Ausztria-Magyarországgal, amire ő t.i. Csena felháborodva válaszolta, hogy Monarchiánk hadseregét nem lehet a románnal összehasonlítani és hogy a román katona tisztek által említett háboru esetén „nagyon sajátnám, mert akkor bennünket szemtől-szembe fogtak találni”; azt is előadta, még Csena, hogy a kir.Járásbírósági térképeket azért kérte ki, mert ezeken a régi időben Mehádián létezett erődítmények is fel voltak tüntetve, és ezeket szerette volna a készülő munkájával felhasználni, ugyancsak ezen munkájához volt szüksége azon fényképekre, amelyeket maga vett fel Mehádia környékéről és dolgoztatott ki az orsavai fényképészsel.

Ezek a nyomozás adatai.

Csena Miklós ellenében gyanant keltő azon körülmény, hogy ő 1911 évben Romániában katonai ünnepélyen részt vett, hogy őt folyó év július havában két román tábornok felkereste és vele az általa is beismert beszélgetést folytatta, hogy a
fénykép felvételeket már 3 éve tehát 1911 évben is folytatta, hogy hidakat, alagutakat, több különböző nézőpontból vett fel, hogy Mehádia térképeit folyó évi június havában kérte ki a járásbíróságtól s hogy a román tisztek által történt meglátogatása folyó évi július első felére esik, hogy az általa említett tervbe vett ujabb munkájának és abban a térképek és fénykép felvételek felhasználásának tényére adat nincs.

Ezen terhelő körülmények folytán annak ismeretére van szükségem, hogy a Csena Miklós által lemosztott mehádiai régi telekkönyvi térképek s az általa eszközölt fénykép felvételek katonai szempontból mennyiben szolgálhatnak egy ellenséges állam előnyére, azok megszerzése esetén és mennyiben sértené ez az állam érdekét, a lefényképezett tárgyak – különösen figyelemmel arra, hogy egy-egy tárgy különböző nézőpontból lett többször lefényképezve – az állam hadi ereje és védelme szempontjából katonai fontossággal bír-e s így ezek kikémlelése az állam érdekeit sért-e; fel vannak-e tényleg tűntteve Mehádia régi telekkönyvi térképein a régi időben létezett erődítmények és ezek ismerete katonai szempontból szintén fontosnak tekinthető-e; katonai szempontból és az állam érdeke szempontjából említett fénykép felvételek és ezekről fényképek készítése megengedhetőnek tekinthető-e; végeredményben megállapítható-e terhelt ellenében, hogy o az állam hadi erejére és védelmére vonatkozó intézkedéseket, tárgyakat – melyekről tudta vagy tudhatta, hogy titokban tartandók – kikémlelt s ezen cselekménye által az állam érdeket megsértette-e?

A nyomozati iratok, ugy a bünjelként lefoglalt 11 másolt térkép, 3 nyomtatott térkép, 98 darab fényképlemez, 1 darab Csena címére szóló levél, 1 darab az orsovai telekkönyvi hatóságnak szóló levél fogalmazványa, 1 darab jegyzet / Mehádia a török hódoltság idejében:/, 1 darab „Drapelul” című újság és 1 darab „Műszaki Világ” című újság ./ alatt átküldése mellett tisztelettel kérem a cs.és kir. Vezérkari Osztályt, szíveskedjék fentiekre nézve részletes katonai szakértői nyilatkozatot adni, mivel pedig a lefényképezett tárgyaknak és a telekkönyvi térképeken állítólag feltüntetett régi erődítmények helyeinek a természetben való megszemlélése a vélemény kialakulásához lényegesen döntő befolyással lehet: tisztelettel kérem ezeknek a helyszínén leendő megtekintését, az eredeti térképeknek szükség estére az orsovai kir. járásbíróságnál leendő megtekintését és ezeknek a Csena Miklós által készített másolatokkal leendő összehasonlítását avégből, hogy a
másolatok a rávezetett saját megjegyzéseivel nem-e szolgálnak Csena ellenében szintén terhelő támpontul.

Figyelemmel Csena Miklós magas társadalmi állására és arra, hogy előzetes letartóztatásban van: kérem a véleménynek sürgős közlését.

Temesvár 1914 évi augusztus hó 22-én
Dr. Gozsdu Elek
kir. főügyész
Királyi Főügyészség
Temesvárott

Translation:
(I am grateful to Ms Eszter Tarsoly for proofreading my translation.)

Confidential
To the General Staff Command of the k.u.k. 7th Army Corps in Temesvár

On the command of the Orsova military station, the Orsova royal frontier police arrested Miklós Csena, retired k.u.k. Feldmarschalleutnant, on the 26th of July, the current year, and committed him to the Caransebes royal tribunal prison on the grounds that he was suspected of espionage. His arrest was necessary for military reasons during mobilization.

The investigation held on account of the charge of espionage furnished the following data:

During the house search conducted by the border police in the Mehadia house of Miklós Csena were found a great number of photographic plates and ready-made photographs as well as many military books and maps. There are many photographs of bridges and tunnels in Mehadia and its surroundings, in particular of those damaged by flooding and those in the various stages of being built. The military maps represent those places where Miklós Csena did military service during his long military career. The available military books were (said to have been) obtained when
he was in active service. No trace or sign was found that the photos were to be made for foreigners or that they were to be dispatched.

In addition, there were found and freely handed over the following objects: 11 items of his own drawings of sections of maps and sketches; a copy of the 14th of July 1910 issue of „Technical World”; one thank-you letter bearing the seal of the meteorological institute; one thank-you letter to the Orsova royal court of law in draft form; two maps of Krassószörény county, with his own annotations; one copy of the newspaper „Drapelul” of the 19th of September 1911.

Maria Bacsilla was present during the house search – the sister of the suspect stated that Csena made the 11 maps because, as church president, he intended to sort out the land register of the church lands with water infiltrations and those that had been ploughed over, followed by the settlement of the land register contributions.

By means of the testimony of K.M., S.S., T.E., P.J, A.L., as witnesses, and of B.F. as equally accused party, it can be established that:

In the month of June of the current year, on the command of the head of the Orsova royal tribunal were delivered to FMLt Miklós Csena, on his request, original maps from the tribunal land registers representing the area of the Mehadia parish; Csena collected them with receipt and returned them, having kept them for 14 days; however, Kriznyik, the local tribunal clerk, gave the receipt, via Toldi Elek, to Sergeant Grozescu Dome for the future use of the Orsova station commander.

Three years before, FMLt Miklós Csena sent, on several occasions, to Alscher, the Orsova photographer, ready-made photographic plates and plates to be developed with a view that they should prepare a photograph from every plate and send them to him and that they should kept the plates; on various occasions, he bought ready-made plates.

Most of the plates show bridges in various positions and many plates show the flooded railway tracks between Orsova and the Hercules Baths; other plates, however, also depict individual houses.
To the photographer’s question Csena gave the information that he needed the photos of bridges as, when he was a pioneer [engineer] officer, he took an interest in such things. Miklós Csena denied that he intended or that he perpetrated any criminal acts or spying by means of the maps or photos.

Miklós Csena denied that he intended or that he perpetrated any criminal acts or spying by means of the maps or photos.

In his written defence handed in to the Caransebes royal prosecutor he stated that he was retired since 1st August 1904 and in Mehadia there were no military institutions or fortifications for him to spy on; he wrote an article entitled „Über den Fund einer römischen Inschriften Basis in ad Mediam /: Mehádia:/ der Peutinger-schen Tafel” published in the 1911 yearbook of the academy of sciences in Vienna.

He wanted of late to write a work entitled „Bilder aus der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart der Grossgemeinde Mehadia” and for this writing he needed the old maps of Mehadia, for which he also searched in the Temesvár cadastre department.

In support of his trustworthiness he adduced that, in 1878 when he was a first lieutenant, he was sent out by the then FMLt Scudier to the Russian-Romanian-Turkish frontline as a undercover man. However, during the interrogation before the Caransebes royal prosecutor, he stated that, when he was head of the Greek-Oriental parish in Mehadia, he endeavoured to improve the relations of the parish; in 1911 he attended in Romania the military celebrations held in honour of the [Romanian] king, and there he also got acquainted with high-ranking officers – among them [being] one named Mujka, a Romanian colonel.

On 12th of July this year the mentioned Colonel Mujka and General Musztecza visited his house in Mehadia dressed in civilian clothes. They praised the Romanian army and said: what if Romania were to get involved in a war with Austria-Hungary, to which he replied with indignation that one cannot compare the army of our Monarchy to the Romanian army and that, in the event of a war, as mentioned by the Romanian officers, „I am very sorry, but we will be on different sides.”
Csena also stated that he wanted the maps from the royal tribunal because they represented the fortresses of Mehadia in ancient times and he wanted to use these in his work. Likewise he needed for his work those photographs, which he himself took of the peripheries of Mehadia and sent to be processed by the photographer in Orsova.

These are the data of the investigation:

Against Miklós Csena were given the following grounds for suspicion: that in 1911 he attended the military ceremony in Romania; that in July of the current year, two Romanian generals visited him and had the [above-] mentioned discussion with him; that even 3 years before, that is, in 1911, he developed photographs, which showed bridges and tunnels from various perspectives; that in June he wanted to take maps of Mehadia from the tribunal, and that the visit paid by the Romanian officers took place during the first part of July of the current year; that he gave no evidence for the subsequent utilization of his maps and photos for the mentioned purpose in his recent work.

As a result of these incriminating circumstances I need to know the following: to what extent the maps from the old Mehadia land registers copied out by Miklós Csena and the photographs developed by him can benefit an inimical state from a military point of view if such a state were to acquire them; and to what extent can these photographs harm the state interest – in particular with regard to the fact that the photos are taken from various angles – do they hold military significance for state defence and would spying on these be harmful to the state interests? Were the ancient fortresses represented on the Mehadia old land register maps and could the knowledge thereof be considered important from a military point of view? Are the mentioned photographic plates and the photos made from them legal from a military point of view and from the point of view of state interest? Finally, can it be ascertained that he spied on actions and matters regarding state military defence – which he knew or could have known were to be kept secret - and did he, through this action, harm the state interest?
I would like to respectfully remit to the imperial and royal general staff department the investigation documents, which were confiscated as evidence: 11 copies of maps, 3 printed maps, 98 photographic plates, one letter addressed to Csena, a draft letter to the land register authority, notes entitled „Mehadia under Turkish rule”, one copy of the newspaper „Drapelul” and a copy of the newspaper „Technical World”. I would like to request that you look at the above mentioned and make a detailed expert military statement given that an inspection of the objects on the photographic plates and of the places and old fortresses supposedly represented on the land register maps can be essential to the formation of a verdict with a substantially conclusive impact.

I would like to respectfully ask for the prospective inspection of the terrain and, if needed, the prospective inspection at the Orsova tribunal of the original maps and a comparison of these with the copies made by Miklós Csena in order to [ascertain] if the copies with his own annotations can serve as incriminating evidence against him.

Given the high social standing of Miklós Csena and the fact that he is under preliminary arrest, I am asking for the urgent issuance of this statement.

Temesvár 22nd of August 1914
Dr. Gozsdu Elek
Royal Head Prosecutor

The Royal Tribunal
in Temesvár
3.3. Lupu trial

OeStA, KA, KM MK, 1917, (1731-2320), Karton 218, Aktenzahl 2196.

Iorga Alexander Stefan & Gen.
Ausspähung

Pr.Z./ 18 Z.St.
Jorga Alexander Stefan und Genossen – Verbrechen der Ausspähung
Zur h.o. Berichte v. 13.II.1918
Pr.Z.329/9 Z.St.

An
die Ministerialkommission im k.u.k. Kriegsministerium
in Wien

bezüglich der Verankerung der Kanonenlafetten auf Grund eines staatlichen Prinzipes behufs Verwendung derselben in der rumänischen Armee vorführe.

Dieser Bericht ergeht gleichlautend an das Präsidium des k.k. Ministeriums des Innern, das k.k.n.ö. Statthaltereipräsidium, die Ministerialkommission im k.u.k. Kriegsministerium und an das Präsidium des k.k. Ministeriums für Kultus und Unterricht.

Ministerialkommission im k.u.k. Kriegsministerium

Wien, Prä. am 8 Mrz 1918 – 4 Apr 1918
M.K./K.M. No. 1516
4) Appendix to Chapter Nine:

Telegrams and letters to and from Ion Bălăceanu, the Romanian diplomatic agent in Vienna, and Ion C. Brătianu, the Romanian Prime Minister, between May and July 1877

I have kept the original text and provided an English translation for each of them. I have also tried to order them chronologically, although in some cases the date is probable, not certain.

Arhivele Naționale București, Fond familial Brătianu Nr. 1286

1) Dosar 22/1877, p.80/recto
Transcribed telegram – handwritten (from Bălăceanu to Brătianu)

8 mai (aprilie crossed out) 1877
Andrassy avoided communicating to me the Emperor’s reply on the subject of the Romanian general. I gathered, however, that he was very willing to give it to us but that he was prevented by the certainty that our army would collaborate with the Russian army. No one believes anymore that the war will remain local/be localised. Balaceanu’

2) Dosar 21/1877, p. 87/recto
Typed-out letter from Vincențiu Babeș to Bălăceanu

‘Pesta, în 19 maiu 1877
Inaltu Onorate Dle Agentu
Dlu gen. Doda sosii aici, precum mi-anunțase prin telegrama sa, domniea dimineția. Acea diuă întreagă petrecută cu amicul meu i-am explicat, precât mi permiteau informațiunile ce aveamu, situațiunea, și i-am comunicat cuprinșului preprețuitelor dvostre epistole. M-a ascultat cu mare interesu, și a poftit apoi timpu de 24 de ore spre a pondera bine toate împrejurările, și a lua o deciziune fermă și seriosă.

Aseră petrecerămu împreună până către mediul nopței și cu părere de rău vinu a vă descrie precisele sale respicări:

„Este pres? tardiu. – În preseeră acțiunei neconșiențu de feliu organele, capacițățile existenți, și ne mai avându timpu de a le essamina eventualmente completă, or înlocui: este imposibil a se imagia la vun lucru atâtu de gravu, cu atâta responsabilită.”

Mai vine ca: Monarchia voastră? nereconșiențu independenția Romaniei, dalta parte pastrându neutralitatea (p. 88/recto) nu se poate se autorize pe unu generalu alu seu, - măcar și numai în modu oficiosu, d-a participa, și încă într-o calitate cardinale, la acțiunea resbelică a României.”

Timpulu era deca nu la 1868/69, cându și Doda și C. Ursu, sondați prin D-nii Brătienescu și-oferiseră servitiele, dar fuseseră reu desconsiderați, macar toamna trecută, când Doda prin dl. Senatore Deșliu și încurajat chiar prin voia Domnițorului, sta gata să plece, dar, - neașteptate de odată se vediu refuzat de Dl. Bratianu! ...”

De atunci și până astăzi era posibilu a se familiariza și chiar contopi cu puterile și factorii de acolo și anume din armata română. Astă-zii nu mai este posibilu și ar fi o neertabilă ușurință, a se îngaja pentru d-a produce doră numai o mai mare confuziune!

In multu mai pucine cuvinte, seu adecă în câte-va pucine linii m-a încunoștințiatu – la o provocare a mea confidențială, dl. Colonel Caron Ursu din Sibiu, că în stadiu unde ne aflăm, sub nici o condiție să nu se conțeze pe dânsul. (p. 89/recto)
Și eu cumpenind seriosa situațiunea și trecutului, trebuie să-ți mărturisescu, că pricepu pe deplin scrupulu cari provini din consciința curata și soliditatea caracterului acestor matadori militari.

Dl. I. Bratianu precum de comun România pururea prea mare a țienutu contu de noi cei din coci, și din nenorociri învețiendu a ne cunoște mai vertosu din
mulțimea de omeni slabi, parte mari fânfaroni și ciarlatani, care trecu de la noi dincolo și-și dau aerul de martiri apostoli, bărbați cu influență: tocmai soliditatea și realitatea a perduit-o din vedere!

Eu asta ierna întîielegându-de încercările forte nepotrivite ale celor mari din București în părțile noastre, în două rânduri mi-am permis u a recomanda D-lui Brătianu alte procedere și multu mai multu precauțiune, și anume a-i lega de căcigirea numai de cătu a generalului Doda, carele pe acelu timpul ardea de poftă se a intra în armata română dă a o prepara la cele ce toți le prevedeem că au să urme. Dar Dl. Primu Ministrului României nici că mi-a datu vun răspunsu, precând daltă parte, precum tocmai ier află Dl. General Doda, este timpu pe la pasci, cându (p. 90/recto) un missionariu al Guvernului Maghiar, deputatului de la Camera Ungurească Al. R., petrecea la București de bună seamă pentru a da Dl Brătianu n-a pregetatu alu însărcina pre acesta ca să îngajeze pre gen. Doda! Celu mare, astfel se rosti cu tota posivityatea ieri Dlu AL. R. naintea amicului meu D. precând noi aici ne ferim a da măcar „bună ziua” cu atari subiecte.

Vă scriu acestea, Dle Agentu, curatu numai pentru ca se vedeti de cătu de buna socotela a procesu Dl Brătianu în aceste cause momentose și delicate, ceea-ce eu din a mea parte cu atât mai multu trebuie se regretu de oare-ce de la 1866 în coce, de când am avutu fericirea de a conosce mai de aprope pe Dlu J. Bratianu, n-am perdu nu o ocasiune fără a lu ruga să nu pregete a studia să conosce mai bine personele și împrejurările nostre de dincoci, îndegetându-i pururea și isvorele și căile.

Nu ve pot descrie mâhnirea mea pentru lipsa de rezultatu în acesta causa, de carea mi legamult mult frumose speranțe pentru România și România întreagă.

Ve rogu deci, tocmai pentru motivulu aceastei profunde ((p.91 is identical to (carbon copy of) p. 90)) (p.92/recto) mâhniri ale mele, a-mi scusa iritațiunea tonului și, în fine, a fi convinși despre perfecta mea plăcere la ori-ce sacrificiu pentru causa României.

Remanendu al D-voastre

Devotatu Stimatoriu și Servitoriu

ss/ V. Babeșiu

P.S. D-lu General D, de [...] n. va petrece 4-5 zile în Viena; er otelul unde de comun descâlcea e la „Wandel” am Peter. Me semțim indetoratu a-mi completa prin această notiția; - aici în Pesta d-sa locuiesce în Otelul „Frohner”.
‘Pest, 19 May 1877

To the honourable diplomatic Agent

General Doda arrived here on Sunday morning as announced in his telegram. I spent the whole day with my friend and explained to him the situation, as much as the information I had allowed me to, and communicated to him the content of your valuable epistles. He listened to me with great interest and then asked for 24 hours of thorough deliberation in order to make a firm and serious decision.

Last night we talked until midnight and I regret to inform you of his explanations.

“It is too late. It is impossible for me to commit myself to such a momentous thing, full of such responsibility, on the eve of the event, ignorant of the means available and without having the time to examine and possibly amend or replace them.”

Then: as our Monarchy does not recognize Romania’s independence and, on the other hand, wishes to remain neutral, it cannot authorize one of its generals, even in an official way??, to take part, and in a cardinal capacity too, in Romania’s war/bellicose action.”

The time was ripe, if not around 1868/69, when Doda and C. Ursu, sounded by the Brătianus, offered their services, but were rebuffed [reu desconsideraţi], then at least last autumn, when Doda, through the mediation of Senator Deşliu and encouraged even by the Prince [prin voia Domnitorului], was ready to go, but suddenly he was rejected by Mr Bratianu!...

Since then he could have familiarized himself with and even integrated into the Romanian army [a se familiariza și chiar contopi cu puterile și factorii din armata română]. It is no longer possible to do that today and it would be an unforgivable foolishness to get involved now only to produce more confusion!

In much fewer words Colonel Caron Ursu from Sibiu informed me, upon my confidential inquiry, that, in the stage we are in, under no circumstances should we count on him.

Having pondered over the serious situation and the past events, I must confess that I fully understand the scruples coming from these two soldiers’ clear conscience and solid character.
Mr Bratianu as well as Romania as a whole have taken us, the people from across the mountains, into consideration, and having come to know us in our misfortunes, to tell us apart from the hosts of weaklings, some of them clowns and charlatans, who crossed the mountains and play the martyrs, apostles and influential men: it is precisely the wholesomeness and reality that they lost sight of. [muddled sentence]

Having heard about the highly inappropriate attempts made by the Bucharest leaders here in Transylvania, I took it upon myself to recommend to Mr Bratianu twice to use other methods and much more caution, that is, to get them to win over General Doda, who at that time was burning with desire [ardea de poftă] to join the Romanian army and prepare it for that which we all knew was going to follow. But Mr Prime Minister did not answer, and General Doda found out that around Easter Mr Brătianu did not hesitate to commission a missionary of the Hungarian Government, the Hungarian MP, Al. R., to hire [ca să îngajeze] General Doda. Al. R. thus openly expressed himself before my friend D., whereas we here avoid even as much as touching upon such subjects.

I am writing this to you, Mr Agent, so you can see how Mr Bratianu proceeded in these important and delicate matters, which is all the more regrettable to me because, ever since 1866, when I had the good fortune of making Mr Brattianu’s acquaintance, I have missed no opportunity to ask him to get to know better the people from across the mountains and their situation, always pointing out to him the sources and the ways.

I cannot describe my disappointment over the lack of results in this matter, to which I had pinned such high hopes for Romania and for a greater Romania.

I ask you, therefore, on account of this deep disappointment, to excuse the irritation of my tone and to be persuaded of my readiness to any sacrifice for the Romanian cause.

Your devoted servant,

V. Babeşiu

P.S. General Doda is in Vienna for 4-5 days. The hotel he usually stays at is „Wandel” am Peter. I feel obliged to add to this note: here in Pest he is staying at the „Frohner” hotel.’
Iunie 1877 [archivists’ input]

‘Ministerul Financelor
Cabinetul Ministrului
Monsieur Balatchano agent diplomatique de Roumanie
Vienne

Prince sera heureux si l’empereur autorisait Doda venir à nous lui ferions positions très avantageuses et la plus sûre et je vous répète nous serions désireux en coulisse gouvernement Austro-Hongrois envoyer (p.3/verso) un officier attaché auprès du Prince à l’armée de la petite Valachie
I.C.Brățianu’

‘June 1877

The Prince would be happy if the Emperor were to authorize Doda to come to us. We will offer him a very advantageous and safe position and, I repeat, we wish that the Austrian-Hungarian government should send an officer attaché to the Prince’s army in Oltenia.
I.C. Brățianu’

4) Dosar 141/ 1877-1879, p. 28/recto
(a copy of this letter translated into Romanian and typed out is to be found in Dosar 21/1877, p. 16/recto)

‘Vienne, 14 Juni, 1877

Confidentielle
Mon cher Président,
C’est sur une démarche spontanée de M. Babesiu (prononcez Babèche) que je vous ai télégraphié au sujet du général Doda. Le dernier avait promis d’être ici la semaine dernière; mais des affaires urgentes le retenant à Karansébes, il a remis à deux reprises déjà son départ. Je vous envoie ci-inclus son dernier télégramme (adressé à Babesiu) qui nous autorise à croire qu’il arrivera samedi ou dimanche. (p. 28/verso)
Doda, étant le favori de l’Empereur, parviendra peut-être à en obtenir la permission d’aller en Roumanie, au risque des mesures que le gouvernement hongrois ne
manquera pas de prendre contre lui; mais il ne faut pas songer à ce que les ministres de Vienne et de Pest consentent à l’envoi d’un officier attaché à l’état-major du Prince; or, c’est une chose que l’Empereur ne peut pas faire sans eux. –

Fort intrigué de ce que le Ct. Andrassy ne voulait pas me faire connaître la réponse de son souverain (p.29/recto) à la demande qu’il s’était chargé si volontiers de lui soumettre de notre part, (relativement à un général et à quelques officiers supérieurs roumains) alors qu’il lui aurait été si facile de me dire: «l’Empereur ne veut, ou ne peut pas », j’ai cherché à en découvrir la cause et j’ai appris – sans vous le garantir toutefois – qu’on avait consulté Berlin, qui avait répondu par un signe de tête négatif! Si cela est vrai, je doute que l’Empereur autorise Doda à partir. […]

‘Vienna, 14 June 1877
Confidential
My dear Mr President,

It was on the spontaneous initiative of Mr Babesiu (pronounce Babesh) that I sent you a telegram on the subject of General Doda. The latter had promised to be here last week but, as urgent matters kept him in Karansebes, he has twice postponed his departure. I am sending you here enclosed his latest telegram (addressed to Babesiu), which leads us to think that he will arrive on Saturday or Sunday. Doda being the Emperor’s favourite may succeed in obtaining permission to go to Romania at the risk of measure which the Hungarian government will no doubt take against him; but one should not think that the ministers in Vienna and Pest will agree to send an officer to the General Staff of the Prince. It is something that the Emperor cannot do without them.

I am quite intrigued by the fact that Comte Andrassy would not let me know the Emperor’s answer to the request which he (Andrassy) had so willingly taken upon himself to submit on our behalf (relative to a general and several high-ranking Romanian officers), when it would have been so easy for him to say: “The Emperor will not or cannot”, I tried to find out the cause and learnt that – although I cannot guarantee it – they consulted Berlin, who answered by a negative shake of the head!

If this is true, I doubt that the Emperor will allow Doda to leave. […]’
5) Dosar 24/1877-1890, p.78/recto: Typed-out telegram

‘Vienna, le 29 juin 1877

S.E.M. Bratiano
Président du Conseil
Bucarest

Doda arrivé. Je viens de conférer trois longues heures avec lui. Je suis parvenu à calmer son ressentiment qui est l’œuvre de Desliu. Le seul obstacle est dans la manque de temps pour étudier et connaître tous les rouages de la machine que nous voulons lui confier. Il demandera à l'Empereur permission d’aller comme simple particulier en route. De là, il enverra sa démission s’il se décide à entrer au service du Prince. Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois ne veut pas attacher un officier à notre quartier général parce qu’il ne nous a pas reconnus comme belligérants.

Balatchano’

6) Dosar 19/1877, p.122/recto [partially ciphered original]

‘30/6 1877 [written in a different ink]

f.f. urgentă

Dlui Ministru Brățianu

Severin

(sau ori unde va fi) [written in a different ink]

Ece cele două depeșe. Cetitile cu cheia Brăila:

Doda a sosit, am conferit cu el trei ore am parvenit a împăca superarea lui care e opera lui Deșliu – singura piedică este lipsa de timp pentru a studia ș’a cunoște tot
To Mr Minister Brătianu

Severin

(or wherever he may be)

Here are the two dispatches. To be read with the Brăila key.

Doda has arrived. I have conferred with him for three hours and managed to abate his discontent, which is Deșliu’s doing – the only obstacle is the lack of time to study and get to know all the workings of the machinery we want to entrust him with. He will ask the Emperor for permission to come to Romania as a civilian. From here he will send in his resignation if he decides to join the army. The Austrian government will not send an officer to our army because it has not acknowledged us as belligerents. – The second dispatch contains complaints against you that you ignore his letters and insult him through the telegraph.

G. Cantacuzino.’

3rd July 1877

Mr Bratiano, President of the Council of Ministers, Bailești

Vienna

Je crois que sur une demande du Prince l’empereur nous céderait un ou plusieurs officiers supérieurs si son Altesse écrit à l’empereur au moins pour le remercier priez-le de mettre dans sa lettre quelques paroles flatteuses pour le Ct. Andrassy.

Balatchano’

3rd July 1877

Mr Bratiano, President of the Council of Ministers, Bailești

Vienna
I think that upon a request from the Prince the Emperor will give us one or several superior officers. If his Highness writes to the Emperor at least to thank him, ask him if he could include in his letter some flattering words for Count Andrassy. Balatchano.

8) Dosar 22/ 1877, p.112/recto
Transcribed and translated telegram
‘Brătianu, Președinte de Consiliu
Calafat
București 2 Iulie 1877
Doda will see the Emperor tomorrow, from whom he hopes to obtain a favourable answer. He came to see me and tell me that I should inform you that crossing the Danube upriver from Vidin would be an immense mistake, because in case of defeat we would have no other alternative than to drive the army into Serbia, which would immediately attract the Austrian army there. According to Doda, our army should cross over around Bechet, thus, even if we were defeated, we would not be forced to cross over the Danube again, which would be bad for us. We could retreat along the Danube and reunite with the nearest Russian army corps. Doda recommends to the commanders that they should keep alert day and night to avoid surprise attacks.
G. Cantacuzino.’

‘Brătianu, President of the Council, Calafat
Bucharest, 2 July 1877
Doda will see the Emperor tomorrow, from whom he hopes to obtain a favourable answer. He came to see me and tell me that I should inform you that crossing the Danube upriver from Vidin would be an immense mistake, because in case of defeat we would have no other alternative than to drive the army into Serbia, which would immediately attract the Austrian army there. According to Doda, our army should cross over around Bechet, thus, even if we were defeated, we would not be forced to cross over the Danube again, which would be bad for us. We could retreat along the Danube and reunite with the nearest Russian army corps. Doda recommends to the commanders that they should keep alert day and night to avoid surprise attacks.
G. Cantacuzino.’
Dosar 22/ 1877, p.110/recto
handwritten and transcribed telegram

‘Brătianu. Președintele Consiliului, Craiova

Viena 2 Iulie 1877

Pentru A.S. Prințul. Andrassy după ce a luat încă odată, azi dimineață, ordinele suveranului său mă însărcinează să fac cunoscut direct Alteței Voastre, din partea împăratului, următoarea comunicare: Din întreîntul punct de vedere al neutralității Austriei căt și acela al situației noastre financiare și al argumentului ce s-ar da Cabinetelor ce nu sunt decât prea dispuse a ne refuza neutralitatea ce am solicitat, Împăratul nu poate sfătu pe Alteța Voastră să treacă Dunărea. Dar dacă Prințele socotește că datorește poporului și armatei sale această satisfacțiune, de a fi contribuit la desroboarea creștinilor din Turcia, Austro-Ungaria nu va pune nici o piedică nici direct nici indirect și nu va adăoga un soldat mai mult la garnizoanele ordinare ale orașelor limitrofe României, așteptând ca Independența României să treacă din domeniul faptului în acela de drept. Austro-Ungaria nu va face nici o deosebire între noi și ceilalți beligeranți. Împăratul cere Alteței Voastre două lucruri fără de care s-ar vedea silit să se îndepărteze de la atitudinea amicală pe care doresc-o păstreze până la sfârșit față de România: 1) de a nu călca cu nici un batalion hotarele Serbiei, 2) de a nu urmări o cucerire de teritoriu în Bulgaria. În schimb guvernul imperial este cu totul dispus a face să se cedeze A-ței Voastre prin viitorul tratat de pace o oreșică de teritoriu din Dobrogea. O desvoltare a acestui mesaj prin scrisoare. Rezultatul acesta favorabil al delicatelor negociere care au avut loc asupra acestei chestiuni e datorit Contelui Andrassy, a cărui neobosită bunăvoință și trainică simpatie pentru România nu s-au desmințit cu acest prilej. Motivele care au împiedicat pe Împărat să autorizeze pe Generalul Doda să se ducă la cartierul general român sunt toate de ordin politic. Le voi comunica D-lui Brătianu în scurt timp. Vom putea avea un ofițer superior de egală valoare, dar din care Românii din Ungaria să nu fi făcut un drapel național, acesta pare a fi din nenorocire cazul cu Generalul Doda.

Bâlăceanu’
Vienna 2nd July 1877

For H.H. the Prince. After receiving once again the Emperor’s orders this morning, Andrassy asked me to directly inform your Highness of the following, on behalf of the Emperor: From the triple point of view of Austria’s neutrality, as well as that of our financial situation and of the pretext that would be given to the Cabinets which are only too willing to deny the neutrality we have requested, the Emperor cannot advise your Highness to cross the Danube. But if the Prince considers that he owes to his people and his army the satisfaction of having contributed to the liberation of the Christians in Turkey, Austria-Hungary will not put up any obstacles directly or indirectly and will not add a soldier more to the regular garrisons in the towns bordering on Romania, waiting for Romania’s independence to turn from de facto into de jure. Austria-Hungary will not make any distinction between us and the other belligerents. The Emperor asks your Highness for two things, without which he would be forced to desist from the amicable attitude he wishes to retain towards Romania to the very end: 1) that no battalion should cross the Serbian border; 2) that they should not pursue territorial conquests in Bulgaria. In exchange for this, the imperial government is entirely willing to have a certain part of Dobrogea ceded to your Highness in the future peace treaty. An extended version of this message via letter. The favourable result of these delicate negotiations on this subject is owing to Count Andrássy, whose tireless benevolence and steady sympathy towards Romania were proved on this occasion as well. The reasons that prevented the Emperor from authorizing Doda to go to the Romanian General Quartier are all political. I will communicate them to Mr Brățianu shortly. We can have a superior officer of equal value, but one whom the Romanians of Hungary will not have turned into a national hero. This, unfortunately, seems to be General Doda’s case.

Bălăceanu.'
a desemnat un alt ofițer în locul său căci ar avea prea mult aerul că ne încurajează să trecem Dunărea și cu atât mai mult cu cât Andrassy, care se așteaptă la interpelări furioase, e hotărât să răspundă că ar fi putut poate să ne împiedice să trecem dar că nici nu a încercat să

(nga.20)

Împăratul va permite oricăruși ofițer superior să meargă în România, nu vom aştepta prea mult. Andrassy e încredinţat că nu se poate salva Turcia. Ambasadorul turc a venit azi dimineață să-i spue că armata română era pe punctul de a intra în Serbia și că armata turcească ar voi să o preceadă. Contele Andrassy a răspuns cu aceste cuvinte: Scrieți la Constantinopole că orice armată care va (p.119/recto) intra în Serbia va avea după 24 de ore armata austro-ungară în spate.

Bălăceanu’

‘To his Excellence Mr Brătianu. The President of the Council. Craiova

Vienna, 3rd July 1877

Tomorrow I shall send you a telegram enlarging on the cautious reasons Andrassy gave me in support of the Emperor’s refusal to allow Doda to leave. His Majesty did not designate another officer in his stead as this would give too much the impression that he encouraged us to cross the Danube, all the more so as Andrassy, who expects to be furiously interpellated, is determined to reply that he could have prevented us from crossing over, but that he did not even try to [missing section in the transcribed telegram]. The Emperor will allow any superior officer to go to Romania. We will not wait too long. Andrassy is persuaded that Turkey cannot be saved. The Turkish ambassador came this morning to tell him that the Romanian army was about to enter Serbia and that the Turkish army would like to precede it. Count Andrassy replied with the following words: write to Constantinople that any army that enters Serbia will have within 24 hours the Austro-Hungarian army at its back.

Bălăceanu’

11) Dosar 22/ 1877, p.130/recto

handwritten and transcribed telegram

‘Exelecente Sale Domnului Brătianu. București
Vienna 7 July 1877
Rog pe Alteţa Sa să erte întârzierea ce am pus pentru a-i scrie. Ochii îmi sunt în acest moment în afară de serviciu. Doda mă însărcinează să vă spun că cu nici un preț să nu trecem Dunărea fără șef de Stat Major având o complectă experiență a răsboiului și dacă trebuie să vă mărginiți a lua un general rus, vă recomandă pe Dragomiroff. Cum sunt doi cu acest nume, e vorba de acela care a scris o lucrare foarte apreciată asupra războiului Austro-Prusian din 1866. Andrassy mi-a dat să înțeleg că dacă am fi cerut un ofițer superior mai puțin în evidență decât Doda, l-am fi obținut. Nu am putut ști la cine facea alusie.
Bălăceanu’
‘His Excellence Mr Brătianu, Bucharest
Vienna 7 July 1877
I pray his Highness to forgive the delay with which I am writing. My eyes are out of order at the moment. Doda asks me to tell you that under no circumstances are we to cross the Danube without a General Staff Chief with complete war experience and if you have to confine yourselves to taking a Russian general, he recommends Dragomiroff. As there are two of this name, this is the one who has written a much appreciated work on the 1866 Austro-Prussian war. Andrassy signified that, had we asked for a high-ranking officer less conspicuous than Doda, we would have got it. I could not find out to whom he was alluding.
Bălăceanu’

12) Dosar 22/ 1877, p.134/recto
handwritten and transcribed telegram
Dlui Bălăceanu
Agent Diplomatic al României
Viena
București 1877 Iulie 10
Eram în județ în inspecție, iată de ce n-ați primit imediat felicitările mele pentru asigurarea bunăvoinței ce ați reușit să dobândați. Cât privește ofițerul superior, informați-vă de Guran, de oarece celălalt nu e cu puțință, dar lucrăți repede căci suntem grăbiți. Scrisoarea cerută vă va fi trimisă.
Ministru Președinte Ion C. Brătianu’
Mr Bălăceanu, Diplomatic Agent of Romania, Vienna

Bucharest 1877 July 10

I was in the county in inspection. This is why you did not immediately receive my congratulations on the benevolence that you managed to secure. As regards the superior officer, find out about Guran, as the other one is impossible to get, but work fast because we are in a hurry. The requested letter will be sent to you.

Minister President Ion C. Brătianu.’

13) Dosar 22/ 1877, p.135/recto
handwritten and transcribed telegram
Excelegenței Sale Domnului Brătianu. Președintele Consiliului, București

Vienna 10 Iulie 1877

Guran a refuzat de la început. Voi face nouă încercare dar fără nădejde de izbândă. Rog a avea deosebită comprelență a-mi comunica dacă ați primit telegrama mea adresată Principelui și aceia prin care vă rugam a plăti 500 lei fiului meu.

Bălăceanu

‘His Excellence Mr Brătianu, President of the Council, Bucharest

Vienna 10 July 1877

Guran refused from the very beginning. I will make another attempt but without any hope of success. Pray have the goodness to communicate to me if you received my telegram addressed to the Prince and the one in which I was asking you to pay 500 lei to my son.

Bălăceanu’

14) Dosar 22/ 1877, p.139/recto
handwritten and transcribed telegram
‘Excelegenței Sale Domnului Brătianu. Președintele Consiliului
București

Vienna 11 Iulie 1877

Împăratul nu poate autoriza pe niminea să vie la noi atât timp raporturile armatei române față de armata Rusă și sârbă nu vor fi mai bine stabilite. Nu ar servi decât dacă odată trecută Dunărea, armata română nu va coopera cu sârbii și nu va fi forțat
pusă sub comanda marelui Cartier rus. În acest din urmă caz orice înfrângere a armatei române ar fi imputată de Karageorgevici și de Ruși ca o trădare a gralului [generalului] austriac. Sunt însăși cuvintele Împăratului. Trebuie să mă puneți în măsură, ca prin Andrássy, Împăratul să fie complet edificat în această privință.
(p.140/recto) În orice caz trebuie să i se lase alegerea ofițerului.

Bălăceanu’

‘To His Excellence Mr Brătianu, President of Council
Bucharest
Vienna 11 July 1877
The Emperor cannot authorise anyone to come to us as long as the relations between the Romanian army and the Russian and Serbian armies are not better defined. It will not work? unless, once they cross the Danube, the Romanian army will not cooperate with the Serbs and will not be forcefully subordinated to the Russian Great Quartier. In this latter case any defeat of the Romanian army will be interpreted by Karageorgevici and the Russians as a betrayal of the Austrian general. These are the Emperor’s very words. You will have to put me in a position that, through Andrássy, I can provide full explanations to the Emperor. At any rate the officer’s choice will be his.
Bălăceanu.’

15) Dosar 19/1877, p. 69/recto [original]
‘14 iulie 1877
‘Monsieur Bratiano
President du Conseille
[in cipher]
Gu-ra-n absent est attendu chaque jour une lettre du Prince à Empereur me paraît seul moyen d’obtenir un général roumain.
Balatchano
(telegram translated into Romanian in Dosar 22/ 1877, p. 148/recto)

‘14 July 1877
Mr Bratiano
President of Council
Guran is away. He is expected every day. A letter from the Prince to the Emperor seems to me to be the only way of obtaining a Romanian general.

Balatchano.’

16) Dosar 22/ 1877

p.155/recto
handwritten and transcribed telegram
‘Domnului Brătianu. Președintele Consiliului, Craiova

Viena 16 Iulie 1877

Bâlăceanu’

‘Mr Bratianu, President of the Council, Craiova

Vienna 16 July 1877

Guran refuses categorically. Among the Romanian officers [it’s a] catastrophe to be with the General Staff. There is only Colonel Trapsia left, who is not here. I will have his answer the day after tomorrow.

Balaceanu’

17) Dosar 22/ 1877

p.160/recto
handwritten and transcribed telegram
‘Dlui Bâlăceanu
Agentul României la Viena

Pitești 18 Iulie 1877

Numele Colonelului Trapșa complect necunoscut aici. De altfel neputând parveni a avea fără întârziere grad superior, nu ar avea nici o autoritate asupra ofițerilor noștri. Cu neputință a scris scrisoare Împăratului în această privință căci nu putem cere oficial un general Austriei fără a cere și Rusiei.
Ministru Președinte
Ion C. Brătianu’
‘To Mr Bălăceanu, Romanian Agent in Vienna

Pitesti 18 July 1877

Colonel Trapsia’s name completely unknown here. Besides, if he cannot get promoted without delay, he would have no authority over our officers. Impossible to write a letter to the Emperor in this respect as we cannot officially ask Austria for a general without asking Russia as well.

Minister President Ion C. Brătianu.’
Capsule Biographies

Vincențiu Babeș (1821-1907), Transylvanian lawyer, journalist, and politician. He was one of the founding members of the Romanian National Party. Elected to the Hungarian Parliament (1860-1890), he militated for Transylvanian autonomy and for the separation of the Romanian church from the Serbian one. He contributed to the foundation of the Orthodox Metropolitan See in Sibiu (1864). He was president of the Romanian National Party between 1881 and 1891. (Dicționarul general al literaturii române, Letters A to B, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2004, p. 293)

George Bărițiu (1812-1893), Transylvanian journalist and cultural mentor. He was the editor of Gazeta de Transilvania and Foaie pentru minte, înimă și literatură. In 1848 he participated in the Blaj assembly. He went to Cluj together with Bishop I. Lemeni to present the programme of the Blaj assembly to the Diet and returned to Brașov disappointed by the vote for the union of Transylvania to Hungary. He established the first Romanian printing house in Brașov. He travelled widely and kept in touch with Romanian intellectuals from the Regat. After 1860 he entered politics and, following the Ausgleich, he was a supporter of political passivism. In 1861 he helped set up Astra (The Transylvanian Association for Romanian literature and culture). He moved to Sibiu where between 1878 and 1885 he edited Observatoriul. In 1881 he was among the founding members of the Romanian National Party, whose president he became in 1884. (Dicționarul general al literaturii române, Letters A to B, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2004, pp. 378-379)

Ion Bălăceanu (1828-1914) was a Romanian diplomat and minister, the descendant of an old boyar family. 1849 found him in the General Staff of General Josef Bem. After the 1859 union of the Romanian Principalities he was appointed Police Prefect in Bucharest, then he acted as Prince Cuza’s emissary to Piedmont and France, where he pleaded for the recognition of the union. He helped remove Cuza from power. In 1876 he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. He pursued an active diplomatic career as diplomatic agent in Paris (1866-1877), Vienna (1876-1878) and
Constantinople (1870-1871) and as extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister to Vienna (1878-1882), Rome (1882-1884), Paris (1884-1885), Constantinople (1886-1889), and London (1893-1900). *(Dicționarul general al literaturii române, Letters A to B, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2004, pp. 422-423)*

**Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust** (1809-1886), Saxon statesman and supporter of the triad idea (there should be a third dominant German state in addition to Prussia and Austria). He became Austrian Foreign Minister in 1866 and Prime Minister (Minister-Präsident) in February 1867 and played an important part in the drawing up of the *Ausgleich*. *(Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon, vol. 1, p. 79)*

**Valeriu Braniște** (1869-1928), Transylvanian journalist. He was editor of Tribuna and founder of the Timișoara newspaper Dreptatea. He was involved in the Memorandum trial on account of his articles. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and spent 15 months in the Vác prison. He moved to Lugoj in 1901 where he founded two newspapers, Drapelul and Banatul. He participated actively in the Banat artistic and cultural life. He was imprisoned again in 1918 for refusing to sign the declaration of allegiance to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. After 1919 he was placed in charge of the public instruction and religion division of Consiliul Dirigent for Transylvania and Banat, in which capacity he signed the founding act of the University of Cluj. *(Dicționarul general al literaturii române, Letters A to B, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2004, pp. 641-642)*

**Ion C. Brătianu** (1821-1891), Romanian politician and leader of PNL (*Partidul Național Liberal*). He acted as President of the Council of Ministers between 1876 and 1888. He was born into a boyar family and initially pursued a military career. He studied in Paris and, together with his brother, Dumitru Brătianu, was an active member of the Romanian student society in Paris. He joined the French freemasonry. He returned to Wallachia, where contributed to the outbreak of the 1848 revolution. He was instrumental in bringing about the 1859 Union of Wallachia and Moldavia. He helped topple Prince Cuza and bring to the throne Carol I, under whose rule he became a leading politician. He created the notion of ‘prin noi înșine’ (single-handedly, by ourselves), which advocated a limitation of reliance on foreign capital
and an orientation towards economic self-sufficiency. (Dan Stoica (Ed.), *Dicționar biografic de istorie a României*, Editura Meronia, București, 2008, pp. 81-91)

**Heinrich Graf von Calice** (1831-1912), Austrian diplomat, who acted in turn as Vice-Chancellor with the Consulate in Constantinople (1857), Secretary and Protocol Leader for the Commission of the Danubian Principalities in the Ministry of Commerce (1858), Consul in Liverpool (1864), General Consul and Minister Resident at the imperial courts in China, Japan and Siam (1871), diplomatic agent in Bucharest (1874), extraordinary Envoy and plenipotentiary Minister in Constantinople (1876), and Ambassador with the extraordinary Mission to the Sultan (1880). Several times decorated, he became Graf in 1906 (*Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon*, (1815-1950), (Eds.) Leo Santifaller and Eva Obermeyer-Marnach, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 1, p. 133.)

**Carl Bernhard Edler von Hietzinger** was a prominent figure in nineteenth-century Habsburg administration. He was a law and philosophy graduate who entered civil service (*Staatsdienst*) as part of the *Auditoriatskanzlei* in the Viennese *Generalcommando* and then went on to occupy various posts in military and civil bodies of the imperial administration. In 1807 he entered the *Militärgrenz Direction* within the *Hofkriegsrat* (Imperial War Council). The following year he was appointed *Unterlieutenant* (Second Lieutenant) in the administration of the 2nd Banal Border Regiment and transferred a year later to the German Border Regiment in the Banat. In the years up to 1817 he worked in the *Militärgrenze Departement* of the *Hofkriegsrat*. He was subsequently appointed as *Kriegssecretär* and *Referent* of the General Command in Karlstadt and Warasdin. It is while occupying this position that he embarks on the first volume of his *Statistik der Militärgränze des österreichischen Kaiserthums*, to which he would devote more time upon his return to the *Grenz Departement* in 1818. He completed his work in 1823. (Constant von Wurzbach, *Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich* (enthaltend die Lebensskizzen der denkwürdigen Personen, welche seit 1750 in den österreichischen Kronländern geboren wurden oder darin gelebt und gewirkt haben), Neunter Theil, K.K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, Wien, 1863, pp. 7-9.)
Alexandru Mocsonyi

The Mocsonyi family (Rom. Mocioni) was one of the prominent Romanian noble families of nineteenth-century Banat. They were the descendents of Macedo-Romanian merchants from Moscopole who had sought refuge in Hungary at the end of the seventeenth century. Towards the end of the eighteenth century the family bifurcated into two separately ennobled branches (Mocsonyi and Mocsonyi of Foen). Members of the two branches such as Andrei Mocsonyi (1812-1890) and Alexandru [Sandru] Mocsonyi (1841-1909) were involved in Hungarian politics and ecclesiastical debates. Of the two, Alexandru Mocsonyi was the first president of the Romanian National Party in Hungary founded in 1869 and a supporter of the principle of a ‘modus vivendi’ between the Romanians and the other nationalities in Hungary (Vincenţiu Bugariu, Figuri bănătene, (Ed.) Aurel Bugariu, 19--, pp. 93-94; Teodor Botiş, Monografia familiei Mocioni, Fundația pentru Literatură și Artă „Regele Carol II“, București, 1939, pp. 16-17).

Ioan Slavici (1848-1925), Transylvanian writer and journalist. He was the first president of România jumă and one of the main organizers of the Putna Monastery celebration in 1871. He worked in Bucharest as an editor of Timpul, then moved to Sibiu where he founded in 1884 the Romanian-language daily Tribuna. His articles triggered five press trials. His support for Trajan Doda in the 1887 elections had him condemned to a year’s imprisonment, which he spent in the Vác prison between 1888 and 1889. After 1890 he moved to Bucharest. On the eve of the First World War his pro-Habsburg views made him unpopular and he was imprisoned in 1916 by the Romanian authorities. During the German occupation of Romania he contributed to Gazeta Bucureștilor. In 1919 he was arrested again and sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment but released after one year. (Dicționarul general al literaturii române, Letters S to T, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2007, pp. 242-243)

Nicolae Stoica de Hațeg (1751-1833), Romanian priest and scholar, director of the Romanian schools in the Banat Military Border. He is the author of Cronica Banatului (The Banat Chronicle), written between 1825 and 1827, in which he recounts the history of the region from ancient times to his day. He also wrote numerous religious, didactic, and administrative writings in German, Serbian, and
Romanian. According to his own testimony, he acted as an interpreter for Joseph II during the latter’s visit to the Banat in 1773. He worked as a translator and military priest and recorded his experience of the 1787-1791 war against the Turks in a number of notes known as *Cronica Mehadiei*. He took an interest in numismatics and Roman artefacts. (Damaschin Mioc and Costin Feneşan (Eds.), *Scieri. Cronica Mehadiei şi a Băilor Herculane. Poveşti moşăşti şcolarilor rumâneşti. Varia*, Editura Facla, Timişoara, 1984, pp. 71-74.)

**David Urs Baron de Margina** (1816-1897) was an officer in the First Transylvanian Border Regiment. He was decorated during the 1866 war, promoted to Colonel, and accorded the title of Baron. He was a founding member of *Astra* and actively involved in cultural projects after his retirement (Simion Retegan, *George Bariş şi contemporanii săi. Corespondenţă trimisă*, Vol. X, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 451, footnote 4). He held the MVK (*Militär Verdienst Kreuz*) and was a knight of the Theresian Order (OeStA, KA, KM Präs, 1877, Aktenzahl 47 – 11/1-40, Report No. 33, p. 3 recto and p. 7 verso).
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