UCL logo

UCL Discovery

UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery

Myopic versus intertemporal manipulation in decentralized planning procedures

Laroque, G.; Rochet, J.-C.; (1983) Myopic versus intertemporal manipulation in decentralized planning procedures. Review of Economic Studies , 50 (1) pp. 187-195.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Manipulation is studied in abstract planning procedures in exchange economies with private goods and a generalization of the results of Champsaur-Laroque (1980) is obtained. When the Nash equilibrium corresponding to myopic manipulation is unique, the outcome of consistent intertemporal manipulation on a time interval [0, T] is characterized. It is shown that when T goes to infinity, the exists a Nash equilibrium only when the initial allocation is Pareto-optimal.

Type:Article
Title:Myopic versus intertemporal manipulation in decentralized planning procedures
Publisher version:http://www.restud.com/abstract.asp?vid=50a&iid=1a&aid=8454
Language:English
UCL classification:UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics

Archive Staff Only: edit this record