Laroque, G. and Rochet, J.-C. (1983) Myopic versus intertemporal manipulation in decentralized planning procedures. Review of Economic Studies , 50 (1) pp. 187-195.
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Abstract
Manipulation is studied in abstract planning procedures in exchange economies with private goods and a generalization of the results of Champsaur-Laroque (1980) is obtained. When the Nash equilibrium corresponding to myopic manipulation is unique, the outcome of consistent intertemporal manipulation on a time interval [0, T] is characterized. It is shown that when T goes to infinity, the exists a Nash equilibrium only when the initial allocation is Pareto-optimal.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Myopic versus intertemporal manipulation in decentralized planning procedures |
| Publisher version: | http://www.restud.com/abstract.asp?vid=50a&iid=1a&aid=8454 |
| Language: | English |
| UCL classification: | UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics |
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