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Strategic behavior in decentralized planning procedures

Champsaur, P.; Laroque, G.; (1982) Strategic behavior in decentralized planning procedures. Econometrica , 50 (2) pp. 325-344.

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Abstract

Noncooperative strategic behaviors are studied in the Malinvaud-Dreze-de la Vallee Poussin decentralized planning procedure. We depart from the assumption of myopic behavior by assuming that every agent takes into account the effect over a given period of time [0, T] of his answers to the Center. One shows that, for T large, every Nash equilibrium of the ensuing game in intertemporal strategies approaches: (i) a competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy, and (ii) a Lindahl equilibrium in an economy with public goods. Thus, the Center loses any significant influence on the income distribution.

Type: Article
Title: Strategic behavior in decentralized planning procedures
Publisher version: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/1184825...
Language: English
Additional information: This issue is available via JSTOR subscription: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912632
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of SandHS > Dept of Economics
URI: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/16708
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