Jehiel, P;
Moldovanu, B;
(2001)
A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions.
Economics Bulletin
, 3
(1)
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Abstract
Combining the result of Palfrey (1983) about the role of bundling and the revenue equivalence theorem, this note shows that there is a conflict between revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions even with symmetric bidders.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/16653 |
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