Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games.
Journal of Economic Theory
In two-player infinite-horizon alternating-move games, a limited forecast (n1, n2)-equilibrium is such that (1) player i chooses actions according to his ni-length forecasts so as to maximise the average payoff over the forthcoming ni periods, and (2) players′ equilibrium forecasts are correct. With finite action spaces, (n1, n2)-solutions always exist and are cyclical, and the memory capacity of the players has no influence on the set of solutions. A solution is hyperstable if it is an (n1, n2)-solution for all n1, n2 sufficiently large. Hyperstable solutions are shown to exist and are characterized for generic repeated alternate-move 2×2 games.
|Title:||Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games|
|UCL classification:||UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics|
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