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Collusion and antitrust detection

Friedman, J.; Jehiel, P.; Thisse, J.; (1995) Collusion and antitrust detection. Japanese Economic Review , 46 (3) pp. 226-246. 10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00014.x.

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Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of antitrust policy on the strategic choice ofproduct specification when firms can collude with respect to prices, cannot collude with respect to location and may have their collusion ended if it is detected by the antitrust authority. Depending on the aggressiveness of the antitrust authority, different location configurations may emerge in equilibrium. Extremely aggressive and extremely lax policies lead to the least efficient outcomes while the configuration maximizing social welfare is obtained by an intermediate policy.

Type:Article
Title:Collusion and antitrust detection
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00014.x
Publisher version:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00014.x
Language:English
UCL classification:UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics

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