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Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata

Binmore, K.G.; Samuelson, L.; (1992) Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata. Journal of Economic Theory , 57 (2) pp. 278-305. 10.1016/0022-0531(92)90037-I.

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Abstract

We consider a game in which “meta-players” choose finite automata to play a repeated stage game. Meta-players' utilities are lexicographic, first increasing in the (limit-of-the-means) payoffs of the repeated game and second decreasing in the number of states in their automaton. We examine the outcomes in this game which satisfy a version of evolutionary stability that has been modified to permit existence. We find that such automata must be efficient, in that they must maximize the sum of the (limit-of-the-means) payoffs from the repeated game.

Type:Article
Title:Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(92)90037-I
Publisher version:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90037-I
Language:English
Keywords:C72
UCL classification:UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics

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