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Social contract iv: convention and evolution

Binmore, K.G.; (1992) Social contract iv: convention and evolution. In: Selten, R., (ed.) Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi. Springer Verlag: Berlin/ Heidelberg, Germany.

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Abstract

From book description: The unifying theme of the 23 contributions to this book is the social interaction of rational individuals. The work of John C. Harsanyi on game theory, social choice, and the philosophy of science finds an echo in these essays. Contributions by well known game theorists and economists present a great variety of stimulating theoretical investigations. Part I contains six papers on non-cooperative game theory written by Maschler, Owen, Myerson, Peleg, Rosenmüller, Hart and Mas-Collel. Part II with three contributions by Kalei, Samet, van Damme, d'Aspremont, and Gérard-Varet is devoted to the use of non-cooperative game theory in the analysis of problems of mechanism design. Basic questions of non-cooperative game theory are discussed in three essays by Güth, Hardin, and Sugden in Part III. Applied game models are discussed in three papers by Friedman, Selten, and Shubik in Part IV. Problems of social choice are investigated in Part V which deals with utilitarianism and related topics in five contributions by Hammond, Binmore, Arrow, Roemer, and Broome. Finally, Part VI contains three papers: an interdisciplinary comparison of physics and economics by Samuelson, a methodological essay by Brock, and an appraisal of the work of John C. Harsanyi.

Type:Book chapter
Title:Social contract iv: convention and evolution
ISBN-13:9783540550679
Publisher version:http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/book/978-3-540-55067-9
Language:English
UCL classification:UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics

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