UCL logo

UCL Discovery

UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery

On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests

Bhaskar, V.; (1995) On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests. Mathematical Social Sciences , 30 (3) pp. 273-284. 10.1016/0165-4896(95)00797-0.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionary stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion of neutral stability. This paper shows that such examples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategy is unstable. We apply our result to the battle of the sexes between males and females over the raising of offspring.

Type:Article
Title:On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests
DOI:10.1016/0165-4896(95)00797-0
Publisher version:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(95)00797-0
Language:English
Keywords:JEL classification: O26. Evolutionary game theory, instability of mixed strategies
UCL classification:UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics

Archive Staff Only: edit this record