Six Paths to Vertigo-free Legal Theory.
Law and Philosophy.
© Oxford University Press 2007. All rights reserved. Legal theorists dread a particular kind of vertigo, commonly striking those who, looking for some solid ground on which to base their evaluative outlook, find nothing but a congruence of seemingly random subjectivities. If there is nothing to our moral commitments but a contingent balance of interests and desires, how can the law ever stand on firm ground when it has to refer to such commitments in order to settle controversial cases? No one expressed this vertiginous feeling more candidly than Montaigne. His critique of the natural law model was inaugural not only in the challenge it raised but also, most remarkably, in the strategy deployed to recoil from it. This chapter discusses six ways of avoiding the vertigo described above, starting with Montaigne's 'mystical move'.
|Title:||Six Paths to Vertigo-free Legal Theory|
|UCL classification:||UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Laws|
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