advantages of a universal monarchy, acting as a judge above the sovereign states, who in turn are balanced against each other in the institution-alised federative system. On this basis, Penn believed, trust among states would be possible. This would in turn advance the ‘Peace and Prosperity of Europe’. Pious words, but Penn apparently did not doubt that there was a realistic chance for trust and ultimately for peace on the basis of his proposal.

4.3 The Abbé De Saint-Pierre’s (1658–1743) Project for Peace and his Challenge to Early Modern Statecraft

In contrast to the previous wars waged by Louis XIV, the War of the Spanish Succession was not started by him. It ensued because of conflicts endogenous to the European state system. The European powers had long anticipated this conflict over the Spanish inheritance since they all had vested interests in how to divide the enormous territories of the Spanish monarchy. France and the Austrian Habsburgs seemed to have equally valid dynastic claims to succeed to the Spanish throne. The Protestant maritime powers – England and the Dutch Republic – could not allow the huge Spanish overseas dominion to fall solely to the French. But all plans, secret agreements of partition and attempts to sort out these conflicting European interests on the basis of dynastic politics failed. Not long before his death, Charles II had declared in his will that Philippe of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV, should become heir to the Spanish crown. In the winter of 1700 French diplomacy was prepared to take the risk of driving the sea powers into the arms of the Austrian Habsburgs. When Charles II died on 1 November 1700, Louis XIV declared on the sixteenth of the same month in the name of his grandson that France was willing to accept Charles II’s testament. He knew that this move would provoke the other European powers and he consequently prepared to secure the execution of Charles II’s will by force. The Bavarian prince elector Max Emanuel and the prince elector of Cologne were the only allies on the French side.

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201 Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 419.
France thus faced a formidable coalition of European forces, formed as the great alliance of The Hague in September 1701 and led by William III and Leopold I. With Prince Eugen and John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, the military campaign of this coalition was led by two remarkable generals. When William III died on 8 March 1702, Louis XIV recognised the son of the former King James II who had died in 1701 in French exile, as James III King of England. This was perceived as an additional threat to England, especially as it threatened to re-catholicise the English crown, and it helped to further cement the coalition between the Austrian Habsburgs and England.

As we have already seen with Penn’s plan for a European peace from 1693 and Fletcher’s *Discours concerning the Affairs of Spain* from 1698, French aggression and the pending question of the Spanish succession attracted the attention of European political thinkers. The *Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe* by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658–1743) and a minor text with an apparently similar proposal by John Bellers (1654–1725), entitled *Some Reasons for an European State, proposed to the Powers of Europe*, were written towards the end of the war of the Spanish succession and can be seen as closely related to the concerns already raised by Penn and Fletcher. Like Penn, they followed in the tradition of earlier works and both explicitly reference Henry IV’s *Grand Design.*

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207 Bellers stated in his long, cumbersome title his indebtedness to the *Grand Design*. The full title is J. Bellers, *Some Reasons for an European State: Proposed to the Powers of Europe, by an Universal Guarantee, and an Annual Congress, Senate, Dyet, Or Parliament, to Settle Any Disputes about the Bounds and Rights of Princes and States Hereafter. With an Abstract of a Scheme Form’d by King Henry the Fourth of France, Upon the Same Subject. And Also, a Proposal for a General Council Or
Like his friend Penn, Bellers was a Quaker. Unlike Penn’s and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s writings, though, his short pamphlet does not engage with a systematic evaluation of the inherent problems of a federative constitution for Europe. He claims that the English union with Scotland shows that Europe could achieve the same and that Queen Anne should ‘use Her endeavours for Uniting the Powers of Europe in one peaceable Settlement’. Although he advocated that an ‘original contract’ between the European states should be signed in order to establish a federal jurisdiction and arbitration, his argument seems initially to lack the conviction and persuasive force of both Penn and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Bellers tried to influence the formulation of the war aims of the allied powers ranged against France. His appeal to interest and utility is mixed with ethical and moral claims but, similarly to Penn and later Saint-Pierre, his proposal was ‘that at the next General Peace, there should be settled an Universal Guarantee, an Annual Congress, Senate, Dyet, or Parliament, by all the Princes and States of Europe, as well Enemies, as Neuters, joynd as one State, with the renouncing of all Claims upon each other, with such Articles of Agreement as may be needful for a Standing European Law’.

However, Bellers’ main and – compared with the Abbé de Saint-Pierre – more audacious contribution was on religious politics. As the full title of his work suggested, he proposed a ‘General Council Or Convocation of All the Different Religious Perswasions in Christendom, (not to Dispute what They Differ About, But) to Settle the General Principles They Agree In: By which it Will Appear, that They May be Good Subjects and Neighbours, Tho’ of Different Apprehensions of the Way to Heaven. In Order to Prevent Broils and War at Home, when Foreign Wars are Ended’.

Convocation of All the Different Religious Perswasions in Christendom, (not to Dispute what They Differ About, But) to Settle the General Principles They Agree In: By which it Will Appear, that They May be Good Subjects and Neighbours. Theo of Different Apprehensions of the Way to Heaven. In Order to Prevent Broils and War at Home, when Foreign Wars are Ended (London 1710). In a later edition the Abbé changed the title of his Projet and also explicitly referred to Henry IV’s Grand Design. Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Projet de Traité pour rendre la paix perpétuelle entre les Souverains chrétiens, pour maintenir toujours le commerce libre entre les nations, pour affirmer beaucoup davantage les maisons souveraines sur le trône. Proposé autrefois par Henry le Grand, roi de France, agréé par la reine Elisabeth, par Jaques Ier, roi d’Angleterre, son successeur et la plupart des autres potentiats d’Europe (Utrecht 1717). At the end of this chapter the significance of the change of the title will be discussed.

There are only few studies dedicated to Bellers. See in particular van den Dungen, “The Abbé de Saint-Pierre and the English ‘Irenists’” and some scattered comments in Goyard-Fabre, La Construction de la paix, p. 103–105. Ter Meulen, Der Gedanke der Internationalen also has a short chapter on Bellers. However, he is mistaken to claim p. 177 that Bellers’s pamphlet had been published anonymously. Although his name is not mentioned on the title page, it appears three times on p. II, VI and 20.

Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. II.
Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. II.
Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. 4.
Tho’ of Different Apprehensions of the Way to Heaven’. The Quakers’ various proposals for reform were motivated by religious concerns. Penn and Bellers both proposed multiple ways to reform society and their plans for European peace have to be seen in this wider context. Bellers insisted that it was because of ‘the pretence of (...) Religion, [that] it’s [sic] Professors shall have the hottest Animosities and hatreded, there having been far more Christian Blood spilt, by one another, than ever was spilt, by the greatest of their Heathen Prosecutors’. What is thus essential for achieving reliable peace in Europe is, according to Bellers, not only a federative structure as already proposed by Penn, but the end of religious persecution and ‘a New sort of General Council of all the several Christian Perswasions in Europe’.

Bellers had been prosecuted and imprisoned several times before the English Parliament passed the Toleration Act in 1689. And he had seen the persecutions in France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. As a matter of fact, he had helped Huguenots to flee France and settle in the New World, in Pennsylvania. There can, therefore, be no doubt that Bellers and Penn worked very closely together on their projects. They were both motivated by religious convictions. At the heart of Bellers’ proposal for European peace lies a deep concern for religious toleration and a quest to find common ground among the different Christian confessions. Only in this way would it be possible ‘to put an end to all Wars and Bloodshed for Religion’.

Bellers’ short work may only have had limited influence on the political debates about the reorganisation of the European state system, but his concern for a religious settlement signals an element missing in the Abbé’s plan for peace. When the first English translation of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe appeared in 1714, Bellers commented: ‘The many Advantages of an European State and Senate, are excellently well discoursed of, by the Abbot St. Pierre, of the French Academy, lately published in English. (...) But he saith little about

\[212\] Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State.

\[213\] Ter Meulen, Der Gedanke der Internationalen, p. 171: ‘Die Friedensbestrebungen der Qu¨aker stehen mit ihren anderen humanit¨aren und sozialen Forderungen in engem Zusammenhang. Alle erk¨a¨ren sich aus ihrer religi¨osen ¨Uberzeugung’. See also J. Bellers, An Essay Towards the Improvement of Physick in twelve Proposals by which the Lives of many Thousands of the Rich, as well as of the Poor may be saved yearly (London 1714).

\[214\] Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. 10f.


a peaceable settling of the Religious Disputes, tho’ they have been some of the greatest occasions of War in Christendom, and until Persecutions and Violences about Religion are prevented or stopt, they will so long make all Arguments for a General Peace ineffectual, however valuable and demonstrable those Reasons may be’. However, ‘Bellers quickly became a forgotten figure, and when he was re-discovered almost a century after his death, it was not his peace plan but his schemes for economic reform which excited interest’. 

In fact the Abbé’s own plan for peace was for a long time considered an eccentric and utterly unrealistic idea. Voltaire’s acid criticism exemplifies this negative view. Under the telling pseudonym of Dr Goodheart, Voltaire published his De la Paix perpétuelle in 1769. The second half of the first sentence of this work was targeted at the Abbé: ‘The peace imagined by a Frenchman named Abbé de Saint-Pierre is a chimera which will never survive between princes any more than between elephants and rhinoceroses, between wolves and dogs. Carnivorous animals always tear each other apart at the first opportunity’. Accordingly, Kant remarked that the peace project of the ‘Abbé St. Pierre (…) has always been ridiculed by great statesmen, and still more by heads of state, as an academic and childish idea emerging from the schools’.

This situation has not much improved in recent scholarship. Notwithstanding some important studies, the significance of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre as a political thinker has long been ignored. In many ways this has to do with what appears to be no more than a minor biographical detail that stubbornly remains misleading in wide parts of the relevant literature. Even in fairly recent studies on the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, or in general accounts of the history of international relations, we find the myth

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218 Bellers, An Essay Towards the Improvement of Physick, p. 47.
220 This text is now easily accessible in a reprint: Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe [Utrecht 1713], ed. by S. Goyard-Fabre (Paris 1981).
221 Voltaire, “De la Paix perpétuelle” in Oeuvres complètes vol. 23 (Paris 1828), p. 25: ‘La paix imaginée par un Français, nommé l’abbé de Saint-Pierre, est une chimère qui ne subsistera pas plus entre les princes qu’entre les éléphants et les rhinocéros, entre les loups et les chiens. Les animaux carnassiers se déchireront toujours à la première occasion’.
reiterated that the Abbé attended the negotiations at Utrecht as secretary to the French envoy Abbé de Polignac and that as a result of this experience he wrote his *Projet*. Nothing is further from the truth. It is difficult to see how such a misconception survives, given that Herbert G. Folkes already settled this matter convincingly in 1966. But for many scholars this misconception determined their negative verdict on the political thought of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, as if he only wrote in favour of his king, Louis XIV, to help negotiate a favourable peace at Utrecht for the French crown.

In fact the Abbé de Saint-Pierre simply could not have travelled to Utrecht together with the Abbé de Polignac, who left Paris for Utrecht on 7 January 1712, because ‘on this very day (…) the Abbé de Saint Pierre signed the attendance register of the French Academy and he kept signing it three times a week during this whole year. He missed just one of the hundred and fifty sessions, on the fourteenth of November’. Additional circumstantial evidence points to the same conclusion. The letters of accreditation and passports for the envoys to the congress do not show the name of Saint-Pierre, nor does the Abbé himself talk in his *Annales politiques* as though he had been at the congress in Utrecht. The assertion – made without any endeavour to provide the slightest proof – that the Abbé ‘was present at the Congress of Utrecht, which gave him the idea of writing the *Project*’ is simply not substantiated.


Speltore, “Federalism in the History of Thought”, p. 221. Unfortunately, even François Bluche reiterates the same error in his *Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle* when he states (F. Bluche, “Saint-Pierre” in *Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle*, ed. by F. Bluche (Paris 1990), p. 1396): ‘En 1712, quand la paix commence de se négocier sérieusement à Utrecht, le maréchal d’Huxelles et le futur cardinal de Polignac (…) s’apprêtent à gagner les Provinces-Unies en qualité de plénipotentaires. L’abbé de Saint-Pierre les accompagne, comme secrétaire de l’abbé de Polignac’. It is more than regrettable that this myth even found its way into such a prestigious work of reference, as it also did into Sven Stelling-Michaud’s prominent introduction to Rousseau’s writings on the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. (See S. Stelling-Michaud, “Écrits sur l’Abbé de Saint-Pierre” in J.-J. Rousseau, *Œuvres complètes* vol. III (Paris 1964), p. CXL). That this error is repeated in such prominent places may well be the reason that the myth of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s presence at the negotiations at Utrecht has not died so easily.
The Abbé de Saint-Pierre had started on his project well before 1712. We know of at least four shorter prior versions written between 1708 and 1711. However, this does not mean that he was not keen to present the final version to exert influence on the preliminary peace negotiations and the outcome of the settlement: ‘It does not seem complicated to me to improve this project’, he wrote ‘(...) but several people who know about public affairs and who have carefully read the book assured me that as it is, if it were printed in several languages and spread in the most important cities of Europe, it could give useful insights to the principal ministers and to those who will be involved in future peace negotiations and thus make the peace easier to achieve and more lasting.’ The Abbé made a similar claim in the preface to his Projet: ‘It is easy to understand that the more this project contains methods to make peace unalterable in Europe, the more it will be able to help facilitate the conclusion of the one we are currently treating at Utrecht.’


230 Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères (Paris), M. D. France 309, 2r f.: ‘Je vois sans pain combien je pourrois encore perfectionner ce projet (...) mais plusieurs personnes qui ont connoissance des affaires publiques ayant lu l’ouvrage avec attention m’ont assuré que tel qu’il est, s’il eût été imprimé en diverses langues et repandu dans les principales villes de l’Europe; il pourroit donner des vues tres utiles aux ministres principaux et à ceux qui seront employez dans les negociations de la paix prochain pour la rendre plus facile et plus durable’.

231 Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle, p. XVIIf.: ‘Il est aisé de comprendre que plus ce Projet refermera de moyens de rendre la Paix inaltérable en Europe, plus il peut contribuer à faciliter la conclus de celle que l’on traite présentement à Utrecht’.

the French, with a preface by the translator (London 1761). Later, Richard Tuck can still claim that ‘Saint Pierre (. . . ) was (as Rousseau pointed out) extremely naïve about the process whereby the warring states of Europe could unite’. If Rousseau does not provide an adequate understanding of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s proposal for perpetual peace, the explanation lies in the fact that for Rousseau, but not for the Abbé, the Holy Roman Empire was crucial to guaranteeing the balance of power in Europe.

Arguably the Abbé was sidelined because he challenged what appeared to almost all contemporary diplomats and statesmen to be the most important concept in the realm of international politics, that is to say, the balance of power among European sovereigns and states. After the Peace of Westphalia, the idea of a balance of power emerged as the highest wisdom of European statecraft to safeguard interstate relations and the status quo. The Abbé de Saint-Pierre challenged the centrality of the balance of power,

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234 Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 141. For instance, C. Covell, The Law of Nations in Political Thought. A Critical Survey from Vitoria to Kant (Houndmills 2009), p. 157–161, makes a similarly misleading statement. More nuanced is Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations, p. 291. The best English study on the relationship of Rousseau and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre is still Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. He states on p. 9: ‘Rousseau, who as the Abbé’s foremost interpreter has influenced the attitudes of many people, at times sacrificed accuracy to the spirit of controversy and on certain issues distorted Saint-Pierre’s projects with a heavy hand. He devoted most of his attention to the Abbé’s specific reforms and omitted the theoretic structure on which they rest’.

The Struggle for Hegemony and the Erosion of Trust

seeing it instead as the obstacle to a durable peace structure.\textsuperscript{236} He was well aware that the doctrine of sovereignty was at the heart of the raison d’être of the balance of power. But he had to confront this conception if he was to provide an alternative. The constitution of the Holy Roman Empire provided him with a historical example; moreover, it served as a means of accommodating sovereignty in a wider framework, which in turn would allow for reliable peace and stability.\textsuperscript{237}

Facing the dilemma that the sovereigns of the European states jealously guarded their prerogatives\textsuperscript{238}, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre reformulated the problems already spelled out by Machiavelli and Hobbes in his attempt to provide new answers. As argued in Chapter 3.3, Pufendorf addressed this dilemma in a systematic analysis. His equation of the state of nature with the relationship between states tackled the most troublesome aspect of interstate relations, namely, how international law can be enforceable and at the same time compatible with the sovereignty of each state. The idea of a system of states allowed for a new conceptualisation of this intractable problem. However, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre was equally critical of Grotius and Pufendorf, whose solutions rested in his view on theories of natural law. Instead – and that is, prima facie, more than surprising – he praised Hobbes as the most pertinent source of guidance: ‘Hobbes (...) has approached this more by using the good method of demonstration, but, unable to address all principles, instead of real

\textsuperscript{236} As we have seen in the previous chapters, the Abbé was not the first to explicitly develop a project for peace in Europe nor was he the first to elaborate a theory of international relations. For a general overview on other peace projects during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see also Malettke, “Europabewusstsein und Europäische Friedenspläne, p. 63–92 and Arcidiacono, Cinq types de paix.


\textsuperscript{238} See Edwards, Hugo Grotius. The Miracle of Holland, p. 82: ‘there was no law and no obligations among rulers of states, since there could be no devotion to a common higher good. Further, since there was no superior human power to impose standards of behavior on individual princes, each prince remained an authority in his own right – a power above which there was no other. What this amounted to was an expressed belief that relationships among political states were unrestrainedly competitive’. Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 252, claims that ‘there is not the slightest evidence that sovereign states in this century will agree to subordinate themselves to a world government founded upon consent’. 
proofs, he gave us, as Machiavelli had done (…) many important paralogisms'.

Although in his Projet he does not mention Hobbes’s name, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre drew on his theory of sovereignty to apply Hobbes’s political philosophy to the sphere of interstate relations. As long as a sovereign arbiter over the various nations is not implemented, the remedy provided by natural law necessarily remains deficient. Hobbes maintained that sovereignty was not applicable to relations between states. For Hobbes, one is therefore ‘not to expect such a peace between two nations; because there is no common power in this world to punish their injustice’. The Abbé de Saint-Pierre applied the Hobbesian solution to overcome the consequences of the state of nature to the international sphere, namely to establish an arbiter above the anarchical society of states.

At the historical watershed, where the concrete development and philosophical justification of state authority were emerging in response to the breakdown of universal Christendom, the Abbé perceived the anarchical society of states as the obstacle to a lasting peace. That relations between states were similar to the situation of individuals or families in the state of nature was a commonplace in political theory and practice. Given that sovereigns of states claimed themselves to be judge in their own case, all treaties and contracts remained precarious, there being no redress if any of the contractual parties decided not to honour the contractual obligations. ‘Sovereigns may give their word, may bind themselves by mutual promises, sign contracts between themselves; but there is not the least security that one or the other of the contracting parties will not change his mind’. The lack of mutual trust re-emerges as a central problem in interstate relations. Promises and treaties are only binding

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239 Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Ouvrages de moral et de politique vol. 6 (Rotterdam 1729–1741), p. 127f.: ‘Hobbes (…) a plus approché de la bonne méthode de démontrer, mais, faute d’embrasser tous les principes, au lieu de véritables démonstrations, il nous a donné comme Machiavel (…) beaucoup de paralogismes en matières très importantes’.


241 Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 17: ‘Les Souverains peuvent se donner des paroles, s’engager par des promesses mutuelles, signer entre eux des Traitez; mais il n’y a nulle sûreté suffisante, que l’un ou l’autre des Contracteurs ne changera pas de volonté’.

242 The importance of trust was analysed and employed equally by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre in his other reform projects. In particular as part of his plans for financial reform he put forward the argument that the crown would be ill-advised to continue using their brutal and deceitful measures. Instead, a transparent and well-regulated system should be put in place. This would in turn inspire the confidence that would incline the state’s creditors to lend funds on terms more favorable than
in the subjective conscience of the contracting party, but they lack an enforceable obligation in case of non-fulfilment.

The issue for the Abbé de Saint-Pierre was how to introduce the shift from a moral requirement to a legally binding framework. This challenge could only be met if politics were not determined by short-sighted calculations of self-interest that reached no further than a balance of power. This might represent a realistic response to the de facto situation of interstate relations, but failed to provide any structural stability beyond the contingent outcome of fickle alliances and the fortunes of war. Politics which skirted around the challenge of providing a framework in which mutual trust was feasible could not escape the shifting pattern of alliances and counter-alliance. Self-interest would thus perpetuate mistrust and fear among states, a regrettable situation that Saint-Pierre attributed to the balance of power: 'If the evidence reasoning provides is not sufficient, one should consult experience, so that one sees what has happened in the last two hundred years in the system of a balance of power. One may read the history of Europe. What has this unfortunate system achieved apart from almost constant wars? How little time did the truce of Vervins last? I could not call with another name than truce this peace which was not able to last. However, since this truce, how long has the war lasted? Here is the effect of the balance so much desired by all. Is it not the role of the past to teach us that with a similar cause we can only expect a future with similar results? Who does not see that under the system of a balance of power one only enjoys security with weapons in one’s hand? And therefore, we cannot enjoy our freedom at the expense of our respite'.

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243 The Treaty of Vervins was concluded on 13 April 1598 between Philip II and Henry IV – officially France was again at war with Spain from 1635 onwards, but actually one could argue that Louis XIII’s nomination of Richelieu as member of the Conseil in 1624 was also the moment France resumed the war against Spain. See Weber, “Vom verdeckten zum offenen Krieg”, p. 203–217, Parrott, Richelieu’s Army and for Spain J. H. Elliott, “Foreign Policy and Domestic Crisis: Spain 1598–1659” in K. Repgen (ed.), Krieg und Politik 1618–1648 (Munich 1988), p. 185–202.

244 Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 38f.: ‘Si l’expérience du raisonnement ne suffit pas, que l’on consulte l’expérience, que l’on voie ce qui est arrivé depuis deux cens ans dans le Système de l’Equilibre, qu’on lise l’histoire de l’Europe? Qu’est-ce qu’a opéré ce malheureux Système, sinon des Guerres presque perpétuelles? Combien peu a duré la Trêve de Vervins? Je ne saurais appeler d’un autre nom un Paix qui ne peut pas durer. Combien de temps au contraire a duré la Guerre depuis la fin de cette Trêve jusqu’à présent? Tel est l’effet de cet Equilibre si désiré. Or le passé ne nous instruit-il pas que d’une cause semblable, on ne doit attendre pour l’avenir que de semblables effets? Et qui ne voit pas que dans le Système de l’Equilibre on ne trouve de sûreté que les armes à la main? Et qu’ainsi l’on ne peut jamais jouir de sa liberté, qu’aux déçens de son repos’. 
The Abbé de Saint-Pierre addressed two levels of argument throughout his *Projet*. He was keen to demonstrate that right reasoning would lead everybody to the same conclusions he drew himself. He presented his method as being in the tradition of Descartes and maintained that human reason was the critical judge of the validity of any intellectual undertaking. But, as he implies in the above citation, some people may not be used to abstract reasoning, or think it not sufficient proof in the realm of politics. When these people refer to experience, they too will be drawn to his conclusions. In recalling that the period between 1598 and 1713 was not one of peace and stability, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre is stressing the difference between a temporary truce and an enduring peace treaty. The latter is, of course, meant to end the hostilities for good. But it is the notion of a truce, not peace, that characterises a balance of power.\(^{245}\)

The Abbé de Saint-Pierre denounced the balance of power as nothing more than an improvised system\(^{246}\) which tried, in his view entirely in vain, to address the underlying structural contradictions of the anarchical society of sovereign states.\(^{247}\) He was more sceptical about this system and its underlying principle of a balance of power than many of his contemporaries. What was necessary, according to the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, was the rule of law. Only this would provide stability and reliability, which would in turn make mutual trust possible. But the rule of law among states was, analogous to the state of nature, only possible if states gave up the unrestricted rights of their sovereignty.\(^{248}\)

The problem was that ‘the present constitution of Europe would never bring about anything other than almost permanent wars because it was unable to provide sufficient security for the execution of

\(^{245}\) As we saw in Chapter 4.1, Leibniz had made a very similar point before him.

\(^{246}\) Heinz Duchhardt stressed the importance of the notion of a state system. He perceived such a system as interwoven by cultural, economic and political links which were not intended to destroy other states but were meant to last and to provide a structural basis for the relations between states. Duchhardt, “Das Reich in der Mitte des Staatensystems”, p. 2.

\(^{247}\) Abbé de Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe* vol. I, p. 47: ‘Or quand les Alliez seroient parvenus à former une égalité, un Équilibre entre deux Souverainetéz, quel moyen peuvent-ils jamais avoir pour rendre égaux les génés des Souverains qui doivent dans la suite gouverner ces États égaux? Cependant sans ce moyen qui est impossible, n’est-il pas aussi impossible qu’ils ayent jamais aucune sûreté de conserver cet Équilibre seulement pendant un demi-siècle? Or jusqu’à quand séduits par de vaines apparences prendront-ils pour une réalité spéciuse une chimère qui leur coûte déjà tant d’hommes & tant de richesses, & qui leur en doit encore tant coûter’.

\(^{248}\) Every conflict demonstrated that each party believed it had right on its side. They were the only judge in the conflict. Abbé de Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe* vol. III, p. 7: ‘Je suis Juge (…) & seul Juge dans ma propre Cause, & dans toutes mes prétentions, je ne reconnais aucun Superieur sur la Terre’.
According to the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, this unstable situation had to be overcome in order to ensure that the conflicting parties were to have ‘another rule than the will of the sovereign princes, that is to say the rule of law’. In reference to Hobbes, the Abbé reiterated almost *expressis verbis* the Hobbesian description of the state of nature: ‘I reflected upon the sad life of the savages. In truth they do not depend on any sovereign, any law or society; but because of the necessities of life they are extremely dependent on the seasons. They are even dependent on ferocious animals and what is most terrible about their dependence is that they also depend on their neighbours who are no different from the ferocious animals and who could at any time take their possessions and even their lives without punishment. (…) It is all very well that they make mutual promises in order to enjoy their possessions in peace, they have no security whatsoever that they will be kept. (…) Who would be so eccentric as to prefer the life of the savages, with its independence of all laws coupled with its hard and perpetual dependence of each on the other, to the life that we enjoy of perfect independence from others, coupled with our dependence on laws?’

The state of nature scenario serves once more to evoke the consequences when no legal legitimate framework safeguards human society. Without the rule of law there will be no security which would allow states to trust in the keeping of promises and contracts.

Drawing the same conclusion as Hobbes reached for individuals in the state of nature, Saint-Pierre envisaged an arbiter endowed with sufficient power to enforce agreement between states, which would be in the interest of every state concerned, because it would not only overcome the fragilities of a balance of power but also enhance commerce and industry: ‘They
are not facilitated by arts or commerce, because they have no laws, nor a permanent society which can punish those who break the laws’. Like in Hobbes’s political society, the interstate order that Saint-Pierre envisaged is not an arbitrary social gathering of people, but the legal framework of a political body, established and thus legitimised by contract, and backed by an enforceable law. As to an arbiter of this system of European states under the rule of law, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre envisaged a European Union or federation with representative institutions in the form of a permanent congress and a law court. The arbiter was, therefore, not conceptualised as a single person or individual sovereign.

Unlike a social contract between individuals, however, the envisaged contract for establishing a society between the European states had to be installed to be effective. For the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, it was crucial to convince the European sovereigns to join together in such a contract. Hence his endeavour to demonstrate that it was not only in the interest of each state, but that such a society was at the same time a practicable solution to the endemic conflicts between the states. Nevertheless: ‘It is absolutely necessary that everyone remains in possession of what he currently enjoys’. Saint-Pierre grasped that preservation of the liberty and independence of the different states was a precondition and the goal of the contract: ‘It is absolutely necessary for the preservation of their lives, their goods, their freedoms and their rights, that they agree in their protestation that no one will claim to be judge of his own cause’. Being judge in


253 As a matter of fact, and still in close analogy with Hobbes’s argument, only under the legal framework which was endowed with an arbiter would the notion of property be meaningful. Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe vol. III, p. 78: ‘Dans l’Arbitrage chacun est sur de conserver les biens qu’il possede, & ceux qu’il pourra acquérir par son industrie, [ou] par son travail ( . . . ). L’Arbitrage ne peut point lui ôter rien de ses biens, parce que l’Arbitrage est établi pour conserver tranquillement chacun dans ses biens, & pour empêcher les invasions réciproques. L’Arbitrage est une convention faite pour l’intérêt de chacun des Associez: Or, un point important pour l’intérêt commun; c’est que chacun puisse avoir une véritable propriété de ses biens’.

254 That is to say, whereas the contractual foundation of the particular states was only a hypothesis which allowed for the consideration of the relation and, as for instance in the case of Locke, separation of powers, the reference to a foundational contract for the Union Européenne had de facto to be realised.


256 Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe vol. III, p. 51: ‘Il est absolument nécessaire pour la conversation de leur vie, de leurs biens, de leur liberté de leurs droits, qu’ils conviennent que dans leurs contestation nul ne prétendra être Juge legitime dans sa propre cause’. 
one’s own case (ipse judex) was the distinguishing character of the state of nature.

What remained was to define an institutional organisation to guarantee the security of a society based on law. ‘It is absolutely necessary that they [the states] agree to provide sufficient means to give arbitration sufficient strength to execute the general laws and particular judgements. The sword is no less necessary for justice, than the scales, laws and judgements ( . . . ) which would be useless if arbitration had not the power to execute them. We have to make sure that no one could be tempted to resist the force of arbitration’.257 The challenging task was, on the one hand, to establish an arbiter empowered with sufficient authority and adequate powers of coercion and, on the other hand, to ensure that such an arbiter would not misuse his coercive power and thus threaten the rights and liberty of the contracting states. A federative structure of states was the Abbé’s answer to this challenge. A political body based on federative principles would allow for the establishment of a sufficiently strong arbiter but still respect the rights and liberties of the contracting parties.258

Initially, the Abbé chose the federative structure of the Swiss, Dutch and German states as an appropriate example for the European union of states: ‘I found that if the ( . . . ) Sovereigns of Europe in order to preserve their role in the current government, to avoid war between them and to gain all the advantages of perpetual trade from nation to nation, wanted to conclude a treaty of union and a perpetual congress, more or less on the

257 Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe vol. III, p. 56: ‘Il est absolument nécessaire qu’ils conviennent de moyens suffisans pour donner à l’Arbitrage une force suffisante pour faire exécuter les Loix générales, & ses Jugemens particuliers. L’épée n’est pas moins nécessaire à la Justice que la balance, les Loix, les Jugemens ( . . . ) seroient inutiles si l’Arbitrage n’avoit pas la force de les faire exécuter; il faut absolument faire en sorte que nul ne puisse être tenté de résister à la force de l’Arbitrage’.

same model of the seven sovereignties of the Netherlands, or the thirteen sovereignties of Switzerland, or the sovereignties of Germany and to create the European Union based on what is good about these Unions, especially the Germanic Union which is composed of two hundred sovereignties ( . . . ) so that the weakest would have enough security, the most powerful would not be able to ruin the others, and everyone would keep their reciprocal promises exactly’. 259 We ought to pause here for a moment. The enumerated advantages of such a union with a coercive power for arbitration at its disposal are first and foremost the avoidance of war, followed by trade, enjoyment of the political privileges of the sovereign states, the security of even the smaller members of such a union and the trustworthiness of given promises. The notion of trust enjoys a status in this concept that is not to be overlooked. It is of equal importance with the other prima facie more tangible benefits and values listed.

The Holy Roman Empire was the prime example for the Abbé’s union of European states. Reference to the Swiss or Dutch Republics had long been commonplace in political thought260, but selecting the Holy Roman Empire as the key example for his own Projet was more unusual: ‘In examining the government of the sovereign states of Germany, I did not encounter more difficulties in creating this European Union for our time, than they [videlicet the German sovereigns] did previously when they created the Germanic Union, to execute on a larger scale what had already been created on a smaller’.261 What he saw in the Holy Roman Empire was an elaborate division of power institutionalised in its various political establishments and procedural customs. The Holy Roman Empire served as the best example by virtue of the fact that it successfully accommodated a range of very different political units. Greater and smaller states could

259 Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe vol. I Preface, p. VII: ‘Je trouvai que si les ( . . . ) Souverainetés d’Europe pour se conserver dans le Gouvernement présent, pour éviter la Guerre entre elle, & pour se procurer tous les avantages d’un Commerce perpétuel de Nations à Nation, vouloient faire un Traité d’Union & un Congrès perpétuel à peu près sur le même modèle des sept Souverainetés de Hollande, ou des treize Souverainetés des Suisses, ou des Souverainetés d’Allemagne, & former l’Union Européenne sur ce qu’il y a de bon dans ces Unions & sur tout dans l’Union Germanique composée de plus de deux cens Souverainetés, ( . . . ) que les plus foibles auroient sûreté suffisante, que la grande puissance des plus forts ne pourroit leur nuire, que chacun garderoit exactement les promesses réciproques’.


261 Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe vol. I Preface, p. VIII: ‘En examinant le Gouvernement des Souverains d’Allemagne, je ne trouvai pas plus de difficultez à former des nos jours le Corps Européen, qu’on en trouva autrefois à former le Corps Germanique, à exécuter en plus grand ce qui étoit déjà exécuter en moins grand’. 
form a political body because the Empire operated a wide range of institutions.

But a question remains. After giving a historical account of the Holy Roman Empire from the time of Charles the Great, and of the later competitive relationship between the estates and the emperor resulting in the eventual establishment of a federal structure, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre advances the claim that such a federation had been founded by commitment to a treaty and that such a treaty rested on the theoretical work of a ‘wise author of the Germanic union’ who had sketched such a union as a project. Why, one has to wonder, did the Abbé introduce this myth? Especially since the Holy Roman Empire was intended to play a crucial role in the Abbé’s argument for the practicability of such a foundational contract and its ensuing functioning political institutions for Europe. This whole idea of a founding contract for the federation of the Holy Roman Empire on the basis of a previous project becomes even more puzzling when the Abbé asserts: ‘I do not know if this project was first the idea of a prince or of an individual. I do not know either who contributed to its creation, but still the Union was to be established. It was not created without a project and it was in that time that this political masterpiece appeared, worthy of a good prince or a good citizen, and which had been so necessary for the salvation of the country’. Among many of the Abbé’s critics was Leibniz, who criticised him exactly because of this conception. ‘It seems’, Leibniz argues, ‘that he conceives the German union as having begun with some treaty; but this cannot be reconciled with history’.

Though lacking the historical facts regarding the foundation of the Holy Roman Empire, the Abbé was nevertheless keen to demonstrate that
its existing institutions could serve as a model for his envisaged union of European states. He knew, however, that the institutional structure of the Holy Roman Empire was less than straightforward. Criticising the emperor for undermining the federative union of the Holy Roman Empire, the Abbé found the tension between the emperor and the estates to have jeopardised the project of a federative republic. It was because of 'this old monarchical construction [that it was so difficult] to form all those states into one republican state like the Germanic one'. Leibniz maintained the opposite view: ‘The defect of the Empire is not, as M. l’Abbé de Saint-Pierre seems to take it, that the Emperor has too much power, but that the Emperor, as Emperor, does not have enough’. But the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s commitment was to establish a federative union on republican principles that would overcome the structural problems of the anarchical and precarious society of European states.

In the Abbé’s account of the Empire, the Diet and the imperial law chamber, the Reichskammergericht, mutually endorsed and incorporated the federative structure, these two institutions guaranteed the representation of all the members in the Diet and served as arbiter for disputes within the federation. Also crucial was the system of the imperial circles (Reichskreise) providing for an even distribution of power within the union. However, this republican structure was threatened by the emperor: ‘The weakening of the freedom of the Germanic Union becomes even more evident if we consider the state in which the authority of the Imperial Chamber is currently found. (...) It was, so to speak, the centre of the Union (...). The authority of this Chamber combined with the authority of the Diet (...) made up all the strength of the Union, it was in the

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267 It is this strategy which might help to explain the ambivalent and confusing references to the history of the Holy Roman Empire.


269 Abbé de Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe* vol. I, p. 85; ‘ce vieux édifice Monarchique, [that it was so difficult/bien difficile] de faire de tout ces Etats un Etat plus Republicain, que celui de Corps Germanique’.

270 Leibniz, “Observations on the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s ‘Project for Perpetual Peace’”, p. 182. This confirms Leibniz’s patriotic attitude towards the Empire (Reichspatriotismus) as discussed in Chapter 4.1.
The Struggle for Hegemony and the Erosion of Trust

Emperor’s interests to weaken them’. The conflict of interests between the emperor and the estates was a commonplace topic of debate in the Holy Roman Empire and in France alike. Bypassing the intractable question of where sovereignty could be found in the Holy Roman Empire, the Abbé’s emphasis was on the original structure and foundation of the Holy Roman Empire, conceived as a republican federation that endured in the form of the imperial institutions. Regrettably the Emperor had usurped the sovereignty previously enshrined in the institutions: ‘The Emperor became ( . . . ) the unique judge of the differences between the other sovereigns; therefore we can say that this single defect led irresistibly towards the ruin of the German Republic.’

At least the notion of a founding project for the Holy Roman Empire allowed the Abbé a point of reference that transcended the imperfect actuality of the Holy Roman Empire. In this he was different from Rousseau, who admired the existing Holy Roman Empire as decisive in preserving the balance of power in Europe: ‘Despite the negative aspects of the constitution of the Empire’, Rousseau claims, ‘it is certain that as long as it lasts, the balance of Europe will never be broken, no potentate will have to fear being dethroned by another, and the Treaty of Westphalia will have a good chance to remain the foundation of our political system’. Whereas Rousseau argued as a historian or politician referring to evident facts and their concrete implications, the Abbé’s intention had been very different. ‘Rousseau’, as rightly argued by Sven Stelling-Michaud, ‘has here deformed the thought of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’. The Abbé was

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271 Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 80ff.: ‘L’affaiblissement de la liberté du Corps Germanique est encore devenu fort sensible par l’état où se trouve présen-
tement l’autorité de la Chambre Imperiale ( . . . ). C’était, pour ainsi dire, le centre de l’Union. ( . . . ) L’autorité de cette Chambre jointe avec l’autorité de la Diette ( . . . ) faisoient toute la force de l’Union; il étoit l’interêt des Empereurs de les af


much more daring than Rousseau gave him credit for. Rousseau warned that such a plan was ‘too good to be adopted’ and any attempt to realise it would demand ‘violent means, which are unacceptable for humanity’.  

A republican constitution for the European sovereign states was the political aim. But since experience showed that on the interstate level one was ill-advised to trust entirely the goodwill of sovereigns, the Abbé recognised that to realise his project for perpetual peace might call for a virtuous lawgiver, if one could be found. In the third volume of his project he observed that the essence of his programme had ‘previously been proposed by Henry the Great, king of France’. It is telling that the Abbé changed the title of his project after Louis XIV’s death on 1 September 1715. In the first two volumes of the Projet published in 1713, the Abbé addressed only the reader in his preface and avoided reference to Louis XIV, but after Louis’s death he addressed the regent, Philippe d’Orléans (1674–1723), in the third volume. It is clear why he avoided addressing Louis XIV directly. As we have seen earlier, when considering the criticism Fénelon mounted against Louis XIV, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre

the young Rousseau had met the ageing Abbé de Saint-Pierre in 1741 for the first time, asked the Abbé de Mably to suggest to Rousseau that he should rework the political writings of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. The result was the above-mentioned Extrait. Mably even more than Rousseau still treated interstate relations as nothing more than a chain of alliances and counter-alliances, wars and the peace treaties which followed them. Even the title Le Droit public de l’Europe. Fondé sur les Traitez conclus jusqu’en l’année 1740 suggests that interstate relations are founded on treaties between sovereign states, but nothing is said about their validity and their inherent philosophical and practical problems, such as the ipse judex principle. See Drouet, L’abbé de Saint-Pierre, p. 331. Rousseau gives an account of these events in book 9 of his Confessions. J.-J. Rousseau, The Confessions, ed. by J. M. Cohen (London 1953), p. 379f. On the intellectual relationship between Rousseau and Mably, see Schröder, “‘Une distinction frivole’ – Enlightenment Discussions of Citizenship” as well as the still invaluable studies by R. Derathé, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la Science Politique de son Temps (Paris 1995) and Wright, A Classical Republican in Eighteenth Century France. See also the preface to Leibniz’s collection of international treaties (Codex Iuris Gentium, 1693), where he claims that the basis of international law is enshrined in international treaties. G. W. Leibniz, “Codex Iuris Gentium (Praefatio)” in G. W. Leibniz’ Political Writings, ed. by P. Riley (Cambridge 1988), p. 170.


278 On the death of Louis XIV, see Bluche, Louis XIV, p. 879–899. Bluche’s study occasionally comes close to hagiography. Much more critical – and interesting – is Voltaire, The Age of Louis XIV.

279 In his will Louis XIV had declared that Philippe d’Orléans, who was a member of the royal family of France, should serve as Regent of the Kingdom until Louis XV (1710–1774) would be of age in 1723. The first eight years of Louis XV’s official rule were politically unstable. Louis XIV’s testament stipulated that the kingdom was to be governed by a Regency Council made up of fourteen members. The Duke of Orléans had only limited powers as president of the council as all decisions were to be taken by majority vote. See J. Shennan, Philippe, Duke of Orléans. Regent of France, 1715–23 (London 1979).
was not the only French intellectual disappointed by the way his king used his power. But now, with the death of Louis XIV, the Abbé believed that the regent and perhaps future king, Louis XV, might make better use of his proposals. The reference to Henry IV appeared in the address: ‘To the regent, Sir, after having given in the third volume the remaining explanations which seemed necessary to demonstrate the importance and solidity of the famous project of Henry the Great, your ancestor; I thought that I should not dispense with offering your royal highness the entire work’. A single sovereign, it seems, might have the power to help realise a republican project of a European union. At issue for French foreign policy was a stable constitutional framework which would allow for peace and in turn foster free trade and the economic advantages flowing from it.

The Abbé de Saint-Pierre merits recognition as a political thinker who questioned certain consequences of the formation of the modern state at a time when this process was at its height. Though not the only writing which accompanied the negotiations at Utrecht, the Abbé’s Projet represents

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282 It is quite telling that even in the twentieth century political thinkers are readily prepared to rely heavily on the idea of individual political leadership. The most important example is, presumably, John Rawls when he somewhat surprisingly introduced the statesman as a crucial link in his international political theory. J. Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Harvard 1999), p. 97: ‘It is the task of the student of philosophy to articulate and express the permanent conditions and the real interests of a well-ordered society. It is the task of the statesman, however, to discern these conditions and interests in practice. The statesman sees deeper and further than most others and grasps what needs to be done. The statesman must get it right, or nearly so, and then hold fast from this vantage’.

283 See also the contemporary account C. Freschot, *The compleat History of the Peace of Utrecht as also that of Gertruydenberg: Containing All the Acts, Memorials, Representations, Complaints, Demands, Letters, Speeches, Treaties and other Authentick Pieces relating to the Negotiations there*, 2 vols. (London 1715). Freschot mentioned the English interest in establishing a balance of power, which reiterates the position which we have already seen in the early seventeenth century. One month before the treaty with Spain was signed at Utrecht, Queen Anne asserted in a speech to parliament that: ‘the present Opportunity would be irrecoverably lost, of Britain’s Establishing a real Balance of Power in Europe, and Improving our Commerce’. Freschot, *The compleat History of the Peace of Utrecht* vol. I, p. 110. Britain’s long-standing pursuit of establishing a balance of power was eventually achieved, which meant that Britain could now claim to defend the balance of power. Not surprisingly the balance of power became an increasingly polemical term in the
a thorough analysis of the interstate system. Contemporary concern was raised regarding the trustworthiness of Louis XIV and thus the reliability of the Utrecht peace settlement. Christoph Ziegler suggested in the subtitle of his *Umständliches Friedens-Diarium* that French negotiations for peace were conducted with fraudulent intent. 284

The treaties concluded at Utrecht expressly based the European state system and assurance of peace on the idea of a balance of power285: ‘But whereas the war which is so happily ended by this peace, was at the beginning undertaken, and was carried on for so many years with the utmost force, at immense charge, and with almost infinite slaughter, because of the great danger which threatened the liberty and safety of all Europe, from the too close conjunction of the kingdoms of Spain and France. And whereas to take away all uneasiness and suspicion, concerning such conjunction, out of the minds of people, and to settle and establish the peace and tranquility of Christendom by an equal balance of power (which is the best and most solid foundation of a mutual friendship, and of a concord which will be lasting on all sides) as well the Catholic King as the Most Christian King have consented, that care should be taken by sufficient precautions, that the kingdoms of Spain and France should never come and be united under the same dominion’. 286 That the European powers remained suspicious of each other is confirmed by the idea that a balance of power would be the best and most solid foundation of a mutual friendship. Mistrust and lack

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284 The full title reads: *Umständliches Friedens-Diarium, worinnen anfänglich alle diejenige von Frankreich Zeit gegenwärtig blutig geführten Krieg arglistig gesuchte Friedenshandlungen bis auff die erste Conferenz inclusive, vorgestellet: Dann was von Tag zu Tag auf an noch währendem Friedens-Congress passirte; und viel andere merkwürdige Begebenheiten und zu dieser Materie gehörrige Documentten, Brießschaften u. mehr zu finden und anzutreffen* (Frankfurt am Main 1712). An excellent account on the war of the Spanish succession, including the various conflicts and struggles for hegemony outside Europe, is Bernardo Ares, *Luis XIV Rey de España*. Still valuable is also Gerard, *The Peace of Utrecht*.

285 See also the general assessment in Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, p. 177: ‘The treaties of Utrecht (1713) still referred to the *Respublica Christiana*, though they were the last treaties to do so. They were also the first to declare that they were made in order to preserve the European balance’.

of institutional mechanisms to mediate conflicts remained intrinsic to this system.

The Abbé’s alternative programme addressed the issue of trust as well as the shortcomings of the balance of power. In his *Annales politiques*, published shortly after his death, he summarised again in five ‘fundamental articles for a European Diet’287 the stipulations to which all European sovereigns needed to subscribe. Only by establishing a permanent federative representation of all European states, endowed with power of arbitration to resolve any ensuing conflicts, would enduring security for all states be possible.288 This remained the essential alternative to the anarchical society of independent sovereign states and their unstable balance of power. A reoccurring objection to the idea of a federative association as an effective institutionalised framework guaranteeing peace was that it impinged on the prerogatives of (princely) state sovereignty, ‘a Thing’ as William Penn put it in his *Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe* ‘they will never endure’.289 But as Penn and others like Crucé or the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, who advanced some such framework were eager to demonstrate, this objection was ‘a Mistake, for they [the sovereign states] remain as Sovereign at Home as ever they were. Neither their Power over their People, nor the usual revenue they pay them, is diminished (...). So that the Sovereignties are as they were, for none of them have now any Sovereignty over one another: And if this be called a lessening of their Power, it must be only because the great Fish can no longer eat up the little ones’,290 and that each Sovereignty is *equally defended* from Injuries, and disabled from committing them’.291

The concept of trust had emerged in the international political thought of the seventeenth century as a key component in alternative conceptualisations of interstate relations. But on its own it remained too feeble to ground and enforce an interstate order of peace. According to the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, trust needed to be re-enforced by legitimate power. This was only possible on the basis of a delegation of sovereignty on the international level in the form of a republican federation of the sovereign states.