How can island communities deal with environmental hazards and hazard drivers, including climate change?

Abstract

This paper provides a critiquing overview of how island communities deal with environmental hazards and hazard drivers, including climate change. The key activity is disaster risk reduction including climate change adaptation, for which many concepts and techniques have emerged from island studies. Although these concepts and techniques are not exclusive to island contexts, this paper focuses on island communities in order to illustrate the importance of human actions in causing and dealing with disasters involving environmental hazards. This point is demonstrated by examining key human and physical geography characteristics representing 'islandness': population, area, geomorphology, and connectedness. The characteristics are not mutually exclusive, but island stereotypes emerge as small and static populations, small resource areas, highly volatile and changing geomorphology, and limited connectedness. In exploring exceptions and diversities amongst islands, stereotypes are sometimes seen and sometimes not seen in reality. Advantages and disadvantages are demonstrated for different island settings dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers.

Keywords

CCA, climate change adaptation, disasters, disaster risk reduction, DRR, environmental hazards, islands, resilience, risk, vulnerability
Introduction

Island communities are often said to be at the forefront of impacts from disaster risk involving environmental hazards and hazard drivers (UN 1994, 2005, 2014; IPCC 2013-2014). Disaster risk arises from a combination of hazard and vulnerability (e.g. Lewis 1999). Hazards refer to phenomena, events, or processes which could potentially harm society. For this paper, the focus is environmental hazards, such as earthquakes and tornadoes, and their drivers, for example changes to the climate and human alterations of the landscape. Environmental hazard drivers could have their main origins in nature such as El Niño, could be a combination of natural and anthropogenic causes such as climate change, or could be principally anthropogenic such as dams and sea walls.

The process of dealing with disaster risk is termed disaster risk reduction (DRR). DRR focuses on understanding and tackling root causes of disasters to explain why people choose or are forced to live in harm’s way. DRR covers all potential hazards and hazard drivers, including earthquakes, volcanoes, drought, El Niño, floods, storm surges, tsunamis, and wildfires.

One major hazard driver is contemporary climate change, which has a significant anthropogenic component due to emissions of greenhouse gases and land use changes reducing absorption of those gases (IPCC 2013-2014). Sea-level rise is a major expected climate change impact for islands, emerging from three main components (IPCC 2013-2014). First, the increasing mean global atmospheric temperature heats the oceans’ surface water. Since water becomes less dense as its temperature rises, this expansion
manifests as tens of centimetres of sea-level rise. Second, glaciers and ice sheets are melting, injecting freshwater into the oceans and raising sea levels by centimetres. Third, possibilities exist for large ice sheet collapses, mainly in Antarctica and Greenland, which could raise sea level by several metres over decades or centuries.

Adjusting to climate change impacts is one DRR subset called climate change adaptation (CCA; IPCC 2013-2014). Dealing with environmental hazards and drivers amounts to implementing DRR including CCA.

Using DRR including CCA as a baseline, the objective of this paper is to answer the question: How can island communities deal with environmental hazards and hazard drivers, including climate change? This critiquing overview cannot be comprehensive in covering all literature and topics, instead extracting key elements from previous work. These key elements move away from the discourse of ‘natural disasters’ which are ‘caused’ by environmental hazards and hazard drivers. Instead, the challenge is human actions causing disasters while the opportunity is human actions dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers so that disasters do not occur. This approach is well-established in disaster research (e.g. Lewis 1999), but it is less often seen in island studies (one exception is Lewis 2009 who identifies gaps) and is frequently obscured by the dominance of climate change in many sectors.

To better integrate disaster research with island studies, typical human and physical geography characteristics highlighted as representing ‘islandness’ (islands, island communities, and their characteristics) are explored and critiqued: population, area, geomorphology, and connectedness (Royle 1989, 2001; Lewis 1999, 2009; Baldacchino
2007, 2008). The characteristics are not mutually exclusive, such as populations interacting and so incorporating connectedness. For islands, the stereotypical traits are assumed to be small and static populations, small resource areas, highly volatile and changing geomorphology, and limited connectedness.

Considering area further, islands are frequently characterised as having small land areas. A balancing dimension is that, for oceanic islands, the water areas readily accessible for islanders are often large and thus the ocean can define an island community much more than the land (Hau'ofa 1993). For example, Kiribati has a land area of approximately 810 km$^2$ and an Exclusive Economic Zone of approximately 3,550,000 km$^2$. These ratios are not so extreme for less dispersed island jurisdictions, such as in the Caribbean or Mediterranean, or for freshwater islands, such as Manitoulin Island (Ontario) in Lake Huron. Even so, the water plays a significant part in resources and livelihoods, especially for tourism, fishing, and mineral extraction. Moves toward electricity generation from renewable sources, including for desalinating water, draw on the surrounding water as much as the land for many island communities.

Regarding geomorphological forms, islands are varied, ranging from low-lying atolls rising just a few metres above sea-level such as Tokelau to mountains standing over 4 kilometres above sea level such as Hawai‘i. These characteristics help shape the possible environmental hazards as well as responses for dealing with them.

This paper’s subobjectives are addressing the following questions, which are answered in order in the following sections:
• What is a disaster? What does and could island studies offer in dealing with disasters involving environmental hazards and hazard drivers?

• How are the stereotypes for islandness characteristics (population, area, geomorphology, and connectedness) representative or not representative for island communities dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers?

• What are the general lessons and future directions from and for island communities dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers?

**Island communities and disasters**

This section provides an overview of the theoretical baseline, linked to practice, for island communities dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers, including climate change. The island emphasis does not denigrate non-island contributions or wider scopes. It highlights the contributions from island-related literature, as per the mandate of this thematic issue and the papers in it.

**What is a disaster?**

Hazards and vulnerabilities combine to form disasters (UNISDR 2009). Many environmental phenomena are simultaneously hazards and resources for society, supporting livelihoods and making living in a place viable. For instance, volcanic slopes and river floodplains are frequently productive agricultural lands, encouraging settlement. Whilst no location could be free from all environmental hazards, the smaller the land area, the more difficult it is to find settlement locations far from the most devastating environmental hazards, identifying a challenge faced by many islanders. All
of Sicily (Italy) is in range of Mount Etna’s volcanic ash. All of Tongatapu (Tonga) would be severely rattled by a nearby subduction zone earthquake with all the main settled areas in the potential tsunami inundation zone.

Rather than hazards causing disasters, instead social and political processes, circumstances, and characteristics lead societal groups to be potentially harmed by hazards (vulnerability) or to be able to deal with those hazards (resilience) without being harmed (Lewis 1999; UNISDR 2009; IPCC 2013-2014). Examples are (in)equity, (in)justice, lack/presence of livelihoods, and lack/presence of access to resources.

Vulnerability and resilience are not strictly opposites, because both can exist simultaneously due to the same social process (Box 1).

Insert Box 1.

Despite this paper referring to ‘island communities’, DRR including CCA accepts that communities are not homogenous, but have various groupings, sectors, power structures, and differences within themselves (Lewis 1999). One consequence is that one community group might reduce vulnerability for some while (or through) increasing vulnerability for others. Different community groups could also work at cross-purposes in enacting DRR including CCA.

Because social and political processes occur over multiple time and space scales, the groups within society creating and perpetuating vulnerability and resilience to environmental hazards and hazard drivers are not always those experiencing any disaster. For instance, international trade regimes incentivising livelihoods dependent
on external forces, such as tourism, alongside decisions by insurers in world financial capitals to increase disaster premiums, affect Barbados’ vulnerability and resilience to environmental hazards and hazard drivers, despite Barbados having minimal influence on these decisions (Pelling and Uitto 2001).

Given that vulnerability is a necessary input into a disaster, alongside hazard, and given that vulnerability is entirely an anthropogenic process (constructed socially and politically), few ‘natural disasters’ exist, because most disasters are human-caused through vulnerability. In fact, most disasters could be averted through long-term vulnerability reduction and resilience building. Many hazards are also influenced by human activities, such as wildfire regimes affected by forest management and flood regimes affected by river and coastal engineering, making those hazards not-quite-natural (e.g. Tobin 1995 for floods and Johnson et al. 1998 for wildfires). Some environmental hazards, however, can have planetary-wide consequences irrespective of DRR, such as ice ages and large-magnitude volcanic eruptions.

Within these varied human and environmental influences on hazards, contemporary climate change is one global hazard influencer with a significant proportion caused by human activities and yielding considerable concerns for island communities (IPCC 2013-2014). Climate change primarily affects weather-related hazards, changing the frequencies, intensities, and extents of potential hazards such as storms, precipitation-related floods and droughts, and landslides (IPCC 2013-2014). Warming and rising oceans further affect ecosystems, including through coral bleaching and salinification of coastal lowlands (IPCC 2013-2014). The changing environment has been increasing
invasive species; contaminating freshwater supplies with saltwater; and cannot always be addressed through traditional, local knowledge (e.g. Nunn 2009).

Climate change effects are particularly acute for island communities, from the SIDS (Small Island Developing States) to the Arctic (IPCC 2013-2014). The emerging patterns of island vulnerability and resilience are complex. As will be further explored below, much depends on how resources are allocated and managed, cementing the human cause of disasters.

What does and could island studies offer in dealing with disasters?

Islands have long contributed significant knowledge to dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers, including climate change. These contributions provided many foundational theoretical and empirical works for dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers, including climate change. Many disciplines contributed, including anthropology (Belshaw 1951), human and physical geography (McLean et al. 1977), seismology (Angenheister 1921), and development studies (Lewis 1981). The 1970s yielded seminal literature alongside the beginning of concerns about climate change and the founding of contemporary theories of vulnerability and resilience to environmental hazards and hazard drivers. Two island-related projects stand out from this decade (Boxes 2 and 3).

Insert Box 2.

Insert Box 3.
The themes from Boxes 2 and 3 continued through the ensuing decades of research, policy, and practice related to island communities dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers. By using Antigua, Lewis (1984) led a methodology of constructing a multi-hazard history, breaking down silos separating hazards by discipline. Using Tuvalu and sea-level rise, Lewis (1989) became one of the first peer-reviewed journal papers to connect vulnerability theory and climate change.

Through the Malé Declaration (1989), the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) was founded to lobby for SIDS’ interests in international climate change negotiations. AOSIS has become a powerful group within UN contexts (UN 1994, 2005, 2014), highlighting small countries’ vulnerabilities to external forces and keeping ocean topics prominent in UN agendas (Betzold 2010; Betzold et al. 2012). The 2015 climate change negotiations in Paris leading to the UNFCCC (2015) agreement demonstrated not only AOSIS’ influence in the intense discussions surrounding a global mean temperature target of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, but also their ultimate lack of power through their failure to set the agreement’s baseline below 2°C (Fry 2016). SIDS have been less prominent in the international DRR negotiations, not because of lack of interest but because of lack of resources and lack of bargaining power. Their interests nonetheless end up being expressed in voluntary international agreements on DRR (e.g. UNISDR 2015), mainly via mentions of islands as being particularly vulnerable.

With the founding of island studies followed by expanding research into the particular vulnerabilities and resiliences of islands (Journal of Coastal Research 1997; Sustainable...
Development 2006), island communities have continued to be leaders for developing
and testing innovative methods for DRR including CCA. Examples are:

• Combining different knowledge forms to ensure that neither local, traditional
  knowledge nor external, scientific knowledge is sidelined in DRR including CCA (Nunn
  2009).

• Community members using local materials to build three-dimensional desktop maps
  for identifying their hazards, vulnerabilities, and resiliences (Leon et al. 2015; Maceda
  et al. 2009).

• Historical reconstructions to intuit islander decision-making regarding, and influences
  on, local environmental changes (Nunn 2003).

All these examples indicate the balance of internal and external factors contributing to
hazards, hazard drivers, vulnerabilities, and resiliences, exemplified by island
communities and their characteristics.

How are island stereotypes representative or not for disaster risk reduction?

Population

Islands are generally assumed to have small communities with strong kinship networks.
This characterisation has plenty of truth, especially for more remote locations, along
with plenty of exceptions, notably for cities comprising islands and cities on islands
such as Copenhagen, Jakarta, Manila, Mumbai, and New York (Grydehøj 2015). For
dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers, no specific population
characteristic is inevitably a panacea or a detriment; population characteristics have
both advantages and disadvantages.
A smaller population has fewer total requirements for dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers, but also might lack the skills or resources to deal with them internally. Consequently, islands frequently pool resources through organisations (such as AOSIS) to harness the best expertise from across island communities while providing a focal point for island interests and advocacy/action power which might otherwise be diluted. Countries such as the Faroe Islands and St. Kitts/Nevis with populations of approximately 50,000 each would have trouble finding in-country individuals with the deep technical expertise across all scales and activities needed for dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers.

Multilateral cooperation overcomes limited population size by bringing together experts from around a region to support all countries within that region on a specific topic, such as the UNFCCC (2015) and the UNISDR (2015) agreements. Pooling resources is further advantageous in drawing on multiple, diverse perspectives rather than producing a cloistered, inward-looking framing which could miss lessons and advice from others’ experiences and perspectives.

Small populations, especially with stronger kinship-based connections, display nimbleness and swiftness in preparing for and responding to environmental hazards due to trust and ease of communication. Impediments are seen through petty disputes and loss of trust precisely due to tightness, smallness, and familiarity. While the island literature examines such issues of kinship and trust (e.g. Randall et al. 2014), there is little empirical research examining a population’s kinship, internal trust, and coherence for dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers.
Furthermore, a small population does not necessarily mean an ignorant population. Island communities often have extensive knowledge about their local environmental hazards and hazard drivers and are sometimes able to respond well through local warning systems (examples are given in the next section). Nevertheless, no knowledge system could ever be complete. External knowledge should contribute, provided that it supplements and complements, rather than displaces or supersedes, local knowledge—and vice versa. Local knowledge should neither dominate nor disparage external knowledge.

Island communities have led research and application regarding combining knowledge systems for dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers. Cronin et al. (2004ab) brought together community members, government representatives, and external scientists for dealing with volcanic hazards in Vanuatu and Solomon Islands. Facilitated by external parties, an open, participatory process for applying everyone’s knowledge, for identifying gaps, and for filling in the gaps overcame distrust and political conflict.

Gaillard and Maceda (2009) adopted a multi-hazard, multi-vulnerability, multi-resilience approach for Filipino communities, piloting Participatory 3-Dimensional Mapping (P3DM). Minority and majority community members joined with local government, local and external scientists, and NGO workers to build scale models of the community using locally sourced materials in order to identify hazards, vulnerabilities, and resiliences. P3DM combines knowledge forms from different societal groups, yielding original data for risk analysis while leaving behind a legacy of the map and
increased awareness. This knowledge and the map’s data can be shared externally to maintain dialogue and to continue seeking external collaboration for action. Leon et al. (2015) used this method for BoeBoe village (Solomon Islands) with similar successes, focusing on the hazard driver of climate change, especially sea-level rise.

A population’s dispersiveness can be advantageous in dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers when island diasporas mobilise to assist their affected home. Island communities receive remittances for post-disaster assistance, with kinship networks meaning that remittances usually exceed official aid in terms of effectiveness, speed, and reaching the most affected people (Le De et al. 2015). Islanders have long used economic migration and remittances as risk management and livelihoods strategies (Bertram and Watters 1985). Migrants reduce an island community’s population, thus taxing local resources less, while developing their own, external resources to assist their home community.

Island communities have also been prominent regarding discussions of forced migration as a response to environmental hazards and hazard drivers. Islanders have long undergone forced migration with no guarantee of return due to environmental hazards including volcanic eruptions (e.g. Niuafo’ou (Tonga) in 1946; Lewis 1979) and hazard drivers including climate and sea-level changes (e.g. around the Pacific in the fourteenth century; Nunn 2007).

In contemporary work, the most notable manifestation is the rhetoric on islanders becoming ‘climate refugees’ due to the hazard driver of climate change. Some island communities are planning and undertaking relocation due to only climate change, such
as from the Carteret Islands (Papua New Guinea; Connell 2016; Yamamoto and Esteban 2014) and from Kivalina and Shishmaref (Alaska; Bronen and Chapman III 2013). Some entire island countries are considering migration due to climate change, such as Kiribati and Maldives. Even though they consider this migration to be forced, the islanders tend to reject the label of ‘refugees’ because they wish to control the manner, mode, and timing of their movement as much as feasible, even while recognising the need for external assistance in effecting their own migration-related decisions (McNamara and Gibson 2009).

The discussions regarding islander migration for dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers occurs within the context of many islanders having long been migrants (Hau'ofa 1993). Pacific exploration over the last few millennia and the extensive Caribbean communities in North America and Europe evidence migration reasons as being livelihoods, education, family, health, and adventure/exploration. These reasons do not justify forced migration due to contemporary human-induced environmental changes. They do indicate that stereotypical assumptions regarding island populations have truths and exceptions with the populations’ characteristics providing advantages and disadvantages in dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers.

Area

As noted in the Introduction, islands are frequently characterised as having small land areas, but their water area plays important roles. Even islands which are comparatively large in land area frequently look towards their water. Greenland is one of the largest
islands in the world by land area. It is mainly covered by an ice sheet, so communities remain coastal, small, and dispersed—half of Greenland’s population lives in settlements of fewer than 3,000 people—while using comparatively little land area for living and livelihoods. Instead, traditional livelihoods are based on ocean hunting and fishing while more recent livelihoods, such as administration, tourism and small businesses, are based within the settlements (Statistics Greenland 2016).

Despite the contribution of water area to island life and livelihoods, few islanders live on or in the water. Some nomadic peoples live in boats, such as throughout the Mergui Archipelago (Burma; Dancause et al. 2009). Consequently, most islander homes sit, and dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers generally occurs, on the limited island land area—including when evacuating elsewhere. For locations without higher ground or without much land to evacuate to, such as atolls, with enough warning, tsunamis can be ridden out by travelling to the deep sea.

The generally small land area of islands thus imposes significant constraints for dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers. Tsunamis can inundate 100% of land area, salinating freshwater supplies and agricultural land for years, as occurred for some Maldivian atolls on 26 December 2004 (Orłowska 2015). The eruption of Laki, Iceland from 1783-1784 led to a famine killing approximately 25% of Iceland's population (Grattan and Charman 1994). Ireland's population required more than a century to recover to the levels seen prior to the main nineteenth century famine and emigration period (Boyle and Grada 1986). Many volcanic eruptions have led to entire island evacuations, such as Niuafo'ou (Tonga; Lewis 1979) and Vestmannaeyjar (Iceland; Chester 1993). An environmental change or trend can make living on an island
unviable, as noted for Pacific communities in the fourteenth century (Nunn 2007). Such difficulties were also seen during droughts in the 21st century affecting Tuvaluan islands, for which continued habitation might not have been feasible without importing water and desalination equipment (Kuleshov et al. 2014).

Nevertheless, islanders have had many successes in dealing with environmental hazards within the small land area of their communities (Box 4). In the western Pacific, many islands have been continuously occupied for over three millennia (Hung et al. 2011). Inhabitants of Simeulue (Indonesia) have oral traditions of tsunami warning and response, so they evacuated to high ground after feeling an earthquake on 26 December 2004, saving their lives during the subsequent tsunami (Gaillard et al. 2008). In all these cases, despite the small land area of the islands, sufficient locations existed to be out of harm’s way for the particular environmental hazards experienced.

Insert Box 4.

**Geomorphology**

Observations of island geomorphological responses to changing sea levels are mixed at present (Woodroffe 2008; Rankey 2011; Kench et al. 2015; Albert et al. 2016; Nunn et al. 2016). Depending on localised parameters such as waves, currents, and human activities including sea walls and sand mining, islands have grown, shrunk, changed longitudinally, or not been significantly affected in locations with measurable sea-level rise. Future responses, as sea level increases and perhaps the rate of rise accelerates,
are hard to project—except to note that island disappearance is a possible but not inevitable outcome.

Another uncertainty is ocean acidification. Ocean water absorbs some of the increased atmospheric carbon dioxide, yielding carbonic acid which increases the ocean's acidity. Acidification impacts on coastlines including shingle beaches are not well understood. Coral reefs experience the two-fold stress of increased acidity and increased temperatures, which can kill them through coral bleaching. While coral reefs across previous millennia rebounded from massive bleaching events as well as large changes in sea level and ocean temperature, it is unclear how well they will survive under contemporary climate change projections (Hoegh-Guldberg 2014). Coral reefs protect land from currents and waves, meaning that massive coral die-offs could expose island shorelines to the ocean's full power, leading to accelerated geomorphological changes (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2007).

Even if geomorphological changes do not destroy islands, dealing with some environmental hazards seems likely to become more difficult under climate change. Freshwater management will become challenging as rising seas salinate groundwater and freshwater lenses. As ecosystems change, subsistence food will be affected due to invasive species and species extinctions (Wetzel et al. 2012; Betzold 2015). Fisheries are particularly concerning due to many island communities' reliance on this sector (Nurse 2011). Changing biota, in turn, affects island geomorphology such as if coastal vegetation no longer traps sediment or if inland vegetation no longer anchors soil during rainfall.
Human responses which alter an island’s geomorphology, such as raising islands above the sea or building floating settlements, have been proposed (Yamamoto and Esteban 2014). While the engineering appears to be technically feasible, the funds required are so far not available. Consequently, much discussion emerges regarding migrating from island communities as a method of dealing with environmental hazards—or forced migration as a failure to deal with environmental hazards, including both climate-related and volcano-related (see above).

Many islands are volcanoes, which shapes livelihoods, such as fertile soil resulting from volcanic ash or lack of arable land due to hardened lava. Volcanoes can have long stretches between eruptions, so the current human population settled on an island might have limited knowledge of potential activity, as occurred for Montserrat in the Caribbean in 1995 (Pattullo 2000). Lack of knowledge and experience can inhibit responses to environmental hazards, underscoring the importance of combining local and external knowledge forms (see above). The town of Sete Cidades, Azores, sits in a caldera with volcanic walls rising over 150 metres above the settlement. One potentially apocryphal story from the town, as told to this author during field work there, is that, prior to modern transport, people could be born in the town and never leave the caldera; they would never have seen the sea despite being just a few kilometres from the coastline. The island’s geomorphology precluded experience with the ocean and associated environmental hazards.

Connectedness
The stereotype of islands as isolated, insular, and marginalised which then creates difficulties for dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers appears often (e.g. Boxes 3 and 4). Lack of connectedness can, however, also lead to striving for self-sufficiency, thereby dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers (Box 5).

Insert Box 5.

For sea-level rise (see above), engineering-based approaches could make low-lying atolls inhabitable under many scenarios. These approaches are expensive to construct and maintain in isolated locations, partly due to the need for transporting all materials and expertise long distances. Many donors have invested in engineering islands; for instance, Japan's construction of sea walls in Tonga and Maldives. So far, no one has been willing to commit the full resources necessary to guarantee century-scale inhabitation of the countries that are most expected to need to move due to climate change.

Other mechanisms overcoming island isolation include physical connections (fixed links of bridges, tunnels, and causeways), transportation connections incorporating ferries and airplanes, and communications connections which would be mainly the internet and phones. These mechanisms assist in dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers, but can also lead to dependency. If an assumption is made that a mobile phone and a bridge could be relied on for requesting and bringing in disaster aid, then maintaining local caches and local skills could be neglected. An environmental hazard could then render the phone networks or bridge unusable, causing response problems.
This situation is a concern in the Pacific where many islanders prefer imported, cheap, unhealthy foods leading to reduced interests in and capabilities for local foods, thus increasing disaster vulnerability (Campbell 2009). The expectation of post-disaster assistance has also diminished some local Pacific capabilities for dealing with environmental hazards (Lewis 2009). In Fiji, more isolated communities which have previously received less aid than less isolated communities have developed more local capabilities for dealing with cyclones (Johnston 2015).

Nonetheless, not all islands are isolated, insular, or marginalised. Island diasporas can be important connectors (see above) or can support island isolation and marginalisation. For Cuba, parts of the diaspora, especially in Florida, became vociferously opposed to Fidel Castro, deliberately seeking to increase Cuba’s isolation in order to bring down his government (García 1996).

Islands can also be more connected than they seem, particularly when dealing with environmental hazards. When Montserrat’s volcano first started erupting in 1995, it was seen by the UK government as a minor crisis in a faraway, small, irrelevant place. The inept governance of the crisis especially by the UK’s government contributed to a major political scandal followed by an overhaul of how the UK Overseas Territories are governed (Pattullo 2000). Political connectedness meant that Montserrat had major ramifications for London. When Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland erupted in 2010 sending volcanic ash across Europe and stopping tens of thousands of commercial flights for several days, the implications and crisis management were felt worldwide (Alexander 2013).
Island connectedness and separateness have many levels. At times, stereotypes exist in reality, influencing dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers. Many exceptions exist as well, affecting plans based on assumptions regarding island connectedness.

**What are the general lessons and future directions?**

This paper has provided a critiquing overview of how island communities deal with environmental hazards and hazard drivers, including climate change. It emphasises human action in causing disasters and, through DRR including CCA, addressing disasters. Many concepts and techniques in this field have emerged from island studies. Island communities demonstrate positive examples and examples with lessons for improvement, many of which are transferable to non-island contexts. The material, discussion, and island lessons do not preclude the wealth of literature on this topic emerging from non-island locations, from which island studies and island locations have adopted many important ideas and actions.

More comparative analysis between island and non-island locations would assist in indicating why tailoring is needed, how to make it more effective, and how to carry on exchanging between island and non-island situations. Island studies continues to interrogate the meaning of its own field (e.g. Baldacchino 2008), exploring definitions, forms, and characterisations of islands while querying whether or not islands, islanders, and island communities truly display fundamental and important differences from non-island contexts. The stereotypes of island characteristics and the examples which affirm
and defy the stereotypes demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of different island settings in dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers.

Ensuring that this knowledge is put into practice, most importantly by islanders, can be achieved by several means (e.g. Nunn 2009; Gaillard 2012; McNamara 2013; Nunn et al. 2016), thereby answering the question in this paper’s title and achieving this paper’s objective:

1. Technical and non-technical approaches need to be combined while being locally and culturally appropriate. Too often, potentially successful actions are scuttled by being imposed externally without considering or engaging with local contexts.

2. Knowledge forms within and outside of the community need to be combined (Cronin et al. 2004ab; Leon et al. 2015) rather than relying on only one group’s understandings.

3. Community ownership of the processes is needed from the beginning and throughout the activities (see also Cronin et al. 2004ab), while incorporating the critique that no community is homogenous. Groups marginalised within their own communities need to be included as part of successful community ownership.

4. Activities need to be connected to daily needs and interests through livelihoods. Focusing on climate change only as part of averting a difficult, distant future, or focusing on DRR for rare hazards, might not seem to be relevant to communities struggling with day-to-day needs (e.g. Gaillard 2012 for Kiribati).

5. Vested interests are not necessarily seeking success in DRR including CCA because they gain from the status quo of vulnerability (e.g. Lewis 2009 for Martinique).

These five points concatenate into the participatory development truism (Cooke and Kothari 2001) that policies and actions need to balance internal and external...
contributions while ensuring that interventions are accepted and expected by those most affected by them, in this case being islanders. Often, islanders must take the initiative to lead the endeavours, as with local groups leading the work by Leon et al. (2015). At other times, as with Cronin et al. (2004ab) and Maceda et al. (2011), external parties invited by the communities serve as catalysts and facilitators.

These examples help to overcome stereotype that island populations are too small, isolated, and marginalised to help themselves, so external action must be foisted upon the islanders. In particular, environmental hazards and hazard drivers have always been part of island life and livelihoods, with plenty of successes in avoiding adverse consequences from them (Gaillard et al. 2008; Hung et al. 2011). Nonetheless, disasters continue to exact a heavy toll in island communities. Many hazards are now entering regimes different to those under which traditional knowledge developed, due to hazard drivers such as climate change and land use modification. Meanwhile, internal and external causes of vulnerability are increasing, as are options and opportunities for tackling those causes through DRR including CCA.

Any such action for and by island communities needs to identify and overcome island disadvantages without interfering with island advantages. For example, aid remains a large component of many island economies, which is a disadvantage, but no guarantee exists that aid will be forthcoming or accepted at similar rates in the future. To help themselves, island community advantages include their experiences and their diasporas. Diasporas can spread the island experiences, knowledges, and wisdoms of dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers, including climate change, offering it to the world in exchange for assistance requested by island communities on
their own terms. Rather than one-way aid delivery, DRR including CCA for island communities could be a mutually beneficial exchange, so that everyone gains and learns how to help themselves in dealing with environmental hazards and hazard drivers.

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Box 1: Simultaneous vulnerability and resilience due to tourism in Maldives.

Tourist resorts in Maldives provide livelihoods and incomes, giving people resources and choices, thereby increasing their resilience, while making them depend on the global economy (e.g. currency exchange rates), thereby increasing their vulnerability. The greenhouse gas emissions from tourists’ travel contribute to climate change induced sea-level rise which is likely to exacerbate flooding and erosion of Maldivian islands. Separating many tourist resort islands from Maldivian communities restricts Maldivian livelihood and living options, thereby increasing vulnerability. It also helps to preserve Maldivian culture and identity, supporting community coherence for resilience, yet maintaining inequitable and oppressive cultural traditions leading to vulnerability.
Box 2: The Bradford Disaster Research Unit (BDRU).

BDRU ran from 1973-1977 at the Project Planning Centre, University of Bradford, UK. The work focused on islands, such as Gane (1975) for the Pacific and O’Keefe and Conway (1977) for the Caribbean, in order to extrapolate to more general contexts for understanding disasters and vulnerability. BDRU’s research approach was deliberately non-disciplinary, drawing on a variety of theories, methods, and evidence to explore why disasters occur and how they might be prevented. A foundation was provided for explaining why disasters are not isolated, extreme, unexpected events caused by hazards, but occur due to chronic, deep-rooted circumstances of development caused by social and political conditions, starkly evident from the island case studies they examined.
Box 3: UNESCO/UNFPA Population and Environmental Project in Fiji.

This project was organised from 1974-1976 under the auspices of the Man and the Biosphere Programme. Brookfield et al. (2012) explain that it was a pilot project seeking applied research on human-environment interactions, especially regarding environmental conservation and natural resource management. Sustainable development concepts were just engraining themselves in policy, with this ethos investigated within the project. Islands were selected because the researchers felt that smallness and isolation were best suited for exploring the project's themes.
Box 4: Island knowledge for surviving a cyclone.

On 28 December 2002, Tikopia and Anuta in the far east of Solomon Islands experienced Category 5 Cyclone Zoë which wrecked most of the communities’ infrastructure. No immediate fatalities occurred because the population, despite having no off-island communication at the time, knew the signs of a forthcoming cyclone and were prepared by having food stocks, by protecting fishing equipment, and by retreating upslope to shelter under overhanging rocks (Treadaway 2007). They had dealt with the immediate threat to life themselves. They did need external aid for reconstruction, which was delayed because no off-island communication was available and the government of Solomon Islands’, embroiled in political disputes, did not send out reconnaissance. A journalist eventually chartered a helicopter and landed, then selling an exclusive story that the islanders had survived but needed assistance.
Cuba is a large island which is not geographically isolated, although it was politically isolated by its neighbour the USA soon after Fidel Castro took power in 1959. This political isolation was amplified after the Cold War's end and the disbanding of the USSR, Cuba's main backer. In response to the political isolation, Cuba developed a highly successful hurricane warning and evacuation system so storms killed few people over the decades (Aguirre 2005; Sims and Vogelmann 2002). Part of Cuba's success was due to Castro's totalitarian dictatorship (Aguirre 2005; Sims and Vogelmann 2002). When the government ordered evacuations, people had to obey, efficiently moving populations out of floodplains until the storm had passed. Yet Cuba under Fidel Castro was less successful in dealing with recovery, reconstruction, and longer-term hazards such as drought, partly due to its isolation including the US trade embargo and partly due to the country's leadership (Aguirre 2005). Concerns have also been raised that the country would not be ready for climate change's impacts (Sims and Vogelmann 2002).