Accountability and responsibility: ‘Rogue’ school leaders and the induction of new teachers in England

Sara Bubb, Peter Earley and Michael Totterdell

Institute of Education, University of London

Abstract

This paper considers the professional responsibility of schools in England to provide effective induction practices in the context of a central government mandated policy. It looks at individual schools as ‘habitats’ for induction and the role of school leaders and LEAs as facilitators or inhibitors. Notions of professional responsibility and public accountability are used to analyse the small number of ‘rogue’ school leaders who, within the new legislative framework, treat new teachers unprofessionally and waste public resources. A typology of ‘rogue’ schools that are in some way deviant in transgressing induction requirements is developed and the various sanctions that can be deployed against such schools are examined. How LEAs handle their monitoring and accountability role and manage deviant schools is considered. Finally, suggestions are made for improvements, such as the need to clarify professional responsibility and refine systems of professional accountability.

Notes on Contributors

The authors work at the Institute of Education, University of London. Sara Bubb is an induction consultant, conducting research and training NQTs and induction tutors nationally. Michael Totterdell is Dean of Initial Teacher Education and Head of INSET/CPD. Peter Earley is Reader in Education Management, head of the Management and Organisation Studies Centre, associate director of ISEIC and a MA course leader at the Institute of Education.

Correspondence:

Sara Bubb, Institute of Education, 20 Bedford Way, London, WC1H OAL.
Email: s.bubb@ioe.ac.uk
Accountability and responsibility: ‘Rogue’ school leaders and the induction of new teachers in England

How to ensure high quality induction for all newly qualified teachers, no matter what their context, is a long-standing and world-wide issue. This paper considers the accountability and professional responsibility of schools in England (specifically that of headteachers or principals and induction tutors or mentors) and of local education authorities (LEAs or districts) to provide effective induction practices in the context of a central government mandated policy. In doing so, it looks at individual schools as ‘habitats’ for induction and the role of school leaders and LEAs as facilitators or inhibitors. Notions of professional responsibility and public accountability (Gross and Shapiro 2002; O’Neill 2002) are used to analyse the small number of ‘rogue’ school leaders (Bubb 2002) who, within the new legislative framework, treat new teachers unprofessionally, wasting public resources and, in some cases, hindering or potentially ruining individuals’ careers and losing them to the teaching profession.

The paper raises awareness of the complexity of issues involved in inducting new teachers into the profession, and of the key responsibility of school leaders. It examines the sanctions – both positive and negative – that the state and its agencies can deploy against deviant schools and their headteachers who choose to implement the statutory requirements perfunctorily, only partially or not at all. How to deal with school leaders who do not act responsibly and the effect that this has on new teachers and ultimately their students will also be addressed. Suggestions will be made for improvements such as the need to clarify professional responsibility, and refine systems of professional accountability - all of which may have to involve the recently established General Teaching Council (England).

We examine the following questions in considering professional accountability and responsibility to support new teachers:

- What are the common contraventions of the induction policy directive?
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• Is it possible to conceptualise different types of reasons why and circumstances in which schools do not comply with regulations?
• Is it possible to devise a typology of ‘rogue’ schools that have failed to comply with the induction regulations?
• How do LEAs handle their monitoring and accountability role and manage deviancy?

Methodology

In an attempt to address these questions we draw on three pieces of research, which have gathered both qualitative and quantitative data:

A. A large-scale research project into induction in England that took place between October 2000 and December 2001 (Totterdell et al 2002). This deployed both quantitative and qualitative research methods in order to pursue the full range of objectives and provide an integrated explanatory narrative with reference to structures and organisational factors, attitudinal dispositions and motives, and relevant practices. We sent questionnaires to all local education authorities (LEAs); a sample of 650 headteachers and induction tutors in schools throughout the country; and 650 of each of the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 cohorts of newly qualified teachers. Responses were gained from 93 LEAs, 247 head teachers and 223 induction tutors in state-maintained schools throughout the country, and 240 of the 1999-2000 and 328 of the 2000-2001 cohorts of NQTs. Telephone interviews and follow-up calls were made with key personnel in LEAs and supply teacher agencies. We visited 24 schools of different sizes and types to carry out detailed case studies of how induction was being implemented in specific contexts. These were located in eight LEAs selected on the basis of regional distribution over the whole of the country and their being representative of rural, urban, metropolitan and unitary authorities of varying size. Three schools were then selected from each LEA – one recommended by the LEA as exemplifying ‘best practice’ and two chosen at random by the researchers. The sample was also distributed to incorporate different age phases, sizes and types of school to enable us to carry out case studies of how the different components of induction were being implemented in specific contexts. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with an NQT, induction tutor and the headteacher in
each school, visiting on two separate occasions in order to judge experiences at different stages in the induction period and the embedding of the policy over time.

B. Analysis of the popular *New Teacher Forum* part of the *Times Educational Supplement* website chatroom ([www.tes.co.uk/staffroom](http://www.tes.co.uk/staffroom)) where NQTs can anonymously discuss problems, sound off and seek advice. We used this as an up to date and frank picture of new teachers’ concerns and how their induction is being carried out. The drawback is that there is no way of corroborating their testimony or of getting the whole picture of their situation and thereby knowing how representative it is. While the use of the web to gather data is relatively new, it was a key research technique in another project based at the Institute in London (see Earley et al 2002) and although its research limitations have been noted (Halpin et al 2001), it represents an authentic source of prima facie evidence.

C. Independent case studies (including interviews with headteachers, induction tutors, NQTs and the LEA staff involved) of schools where there were persistent indicators of non-compliance with statutory regulations including the strategies employed to encourage school leaders to be professionally responsible and publicly accountable.

Our initial research project evaluated the first two years (1999-2001) of the induction policy. In doing so it took statements from within the key policy text *Circular 5/99* (DfEE, 1999) and translated these as directly as possible into questions to ask practitioners. On the assumption that ‘evaluation really is about determining value’ (Shadish, 1998, p.1), the statements acted as criteria of merit against which the policy could be assessed. The research team sought to conceptualise their research evaluation in terms of a synthesis involving:

- **process** – the way the policy is implemented, for example, how its principles were translated into practice
- **output** – by measuring the ‘products’ of the policy, for example how many NQTs were inducted successfully or otherwise
In assessing outcomes we were particularly influenced by Schalock’s (2001) schema of person- and organisation-referenced outcomes of policy (and its implementation). This schema differentiates outcomes in terms of the use made of a policy programme by recipients (programme evaluation), the extent to which a programme meets its goals and objectives (effectiveness evaluation), whether a programme made a difference compared to no programme (impact evaluation), and the equity, efficiency or effectiveness of policy outcomes (policy evaluation). These various outcomes demand a degree of ‘methodological pluralism’ and allow for a wide range of stakeholders to be involved in the evaluation process. In this paper we concentrate particularly on the outcomes in relation to programme and policy evaluation.

The research team utilised Scriven’s (1981) logic of evaluation as a basic framework, acknowledging a distinction between evaluation in the sense of the normal human process of evaluating and an ‘honourific or ideal sense’ which ‘adds to “valuing” the quality of being based on explicit methodology that can be scrutinised for its validity’ (p.3). Thus as a working axiom, we found it useful to adopt the definition of evaluation offered by Reuzal and Vander Vilt (2000) ‘as the determination of value – value covering the merit or worth for all those affected – by use of valid methods’ (p. 383). As the research progressed, we became increasingly confident that such an approach could be methodologically catholic by asking both, what is going on in this situation as a social event and process, and what do the stakeholders within this event make of it? It is the breadth of valuing and the systematic approach to it that offer the possibility of the twin legitimating concepts of reliability and validity to the research.

We sought to update existing knowledge in the light of new evidence so that we did not make judgements about the results of the body of evidence acquired by our research in isolation. We drew on the direct access members of the research team had to considerable past experience and present expertise relating to induction and research. This helped us to focus our research questions and clarify our theoretical axis. Thus self-consciously (and hopefully self-critically) we ‘accorded an explicit place to the role of prior knowledge or prior information, belief, and
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subjectivity …’ (Roberts, 2002, p.5) within a mixed ‘numbers and narratives’ methodology (Nash 2002) in order to pursue the full range of objectives and elicit all the effects the implementation of statutory induction actually has. In determining the effects of induction, we were dependent on frameworks of beliefs and expectations informed by different stakeholders’ perspectives by reference to which our own criteria of merit were gradually firmed up. It is within this framework that we drew upon the data mediated by the New Teacher Forum and sought corroborative evidence from supplementary case studies. Taken together, this multi-layered evidence base has allowed us to build up a detailed picture of different sorts of ‘rogue’ schools.

The paper begins by describing, with a brief historical perspective, the key features of England’s induction policy and evaluating its implementation before considering what we know about common contraventions based on a synthesis of the three strands of evidence outlined above. The second part of this paper introduces the notion of ‘rogue schools’ and offers a typology of such schools linked to levels of competence and degree of intent to flout the regulations concerning induction. Case studies of four such schools are briefly described. The paper concludes by considering the role of the LEA and some of the issues related to professional responsibility and public accountability.

England’s induction policy

Understandings of induction in England today are enhanced by critical appreciation of the historical context of policy and practice. It was in 1925 that the Board of Education first attempted to link initial training and induction, and in 1944 the McNair Report attempted to establish the principle of assessing new teachers’ work within a context of proper support. In 1972, the publication of the seminal James Report sought to establish an appropriate balance between assessment and professional development in teachers’ first, ‘probationary’ year. Despite these various reports and recommendations, the situation was still considered unsatisfactory. This is perhaps best exemplified by findings given in ‘The New Teacher in School’ (HMI, 1988) that became highly influential with policy makers and practitioners. Many aspects of the current statutory induction policy can be seen as stemming from this work but a
more direct and immediate outcome was the abolition of the ‘probationary year’, which had rarely been implemented with rigour and was ideologically at odds with the then Conservative government.

Between 1992 and 1999 there were no national regulations for induction in place. Hence, individual schools and local authorities were free to choose whether or not to offer their own model of induction and how extensive their programme of support would be. So, for seven years there was neither assessment of the first year of teaching nor a requirement for schools to provide induction. There were many instances of good practice by schools and local education authorities (LEAs) but these were isolated from one another. It was up to the ‘professional integrity of heads, teachers and advisers to sustain and encourage good practice’ (Bleach 1999, p.2). Nevertheless, the broad agreement between the profession, local authority employers and successive governments was that the induction of NQTs was inadequate and ought to be improved. There was widespread consensus (e.g. Earley and Kinder 1994; HMI 1988; Simco 2000) that, throughout the country:

- there were no systematic links between induction and the early professional development of teachers;
- the issue of individual needs was not uniformly addressed; and,
- provision was highly variable across and within schools and LEAs.

It is against this background that the induction of NQTs was made statutory in England in May 1999 with the issuing of the government circular 5/99. Now, all NQTs have to complete a statutory induction period of a school year (full time), to teach in state maintained schools. The policy has two main principles:

- A national entitlement for NQTs, to support and professional development;
- Assessment of NQTs against defined national standards.
Thus, induction in England can be seen as a ‘carrot and stick’ policy, incorporating simultaneously the dual forces of enticement plus punishment, and is also in the spirit of one of the government’s key principles - “zero tolerance of under-performance” (DfEE, 1997). It should make the first year of teaching considerably easier but carries the threat of individuals being barred from teaching if they cannot demonstrate that they meet all the standards achieved during their initial training and the additional Induction Standards.

The government intends induction to be ‘a bridge from initial teacher training to effective professional practice’ (DfEE 1999, para.1). It gives a reduced timetable and a framework of monitoring, support and diagnostic assessment. No longer should a successful first year of teaching be a matter of luck and favours: it is an entitlement that should be planned by schools, funded at £3,000 per NQT per year, and which headteachers are required by law to give. Provision should comprise:

i) A 10 per cent lighter teaching timetable than other teachers in the school.

ii) A job description that doesn’t make unreasonable demands.

iii) Meetings with the school ‘induction tutor’ (mentor), including half termly reviews of progress.

iv) An individualised programme of support, monitoring and assessment.

v) Objectives, informed by strengths and areas for development identified in the career entry profile, to help them meet the induction standards.

vi) At least one observation of their teaching each half term with oral and written feedback.

vii) An assessment meeting and report at the end of each term. NQTs who are doing well perceive these as a carrot – they are a stick for those who are having problems.

viii) Procedures to air grievances at school and local education authority level.

Induction is therefore a mixture of pressure and support. Support comes from feedback after half-termly observations of NQTs’ teaching, the individualised and structured support programme to meet specific objectives, induction tutor and 10 pre cent reduction in timetable for professional development activities such as observing other teachers. Pressure comes from the
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observations but mainly from the assessments undertaken by the school at the end of each of the three terms that make up the induction period.

Has it been a success?

Our large-scale research project (Totterdell et al 2002) into induction in England found that the vast majority of NQTs, headteachers, induction tutors and representatives from LEAs believe that statutory induction is beneficial, particularly in helping NQTs to be more effective teachers. In the words of one headteacher: ‘The tradition was sink or swim: now we help to train Olympic athletes’.

Many headteachers and induction tutors thought that the structure of induction had accelerated the progress of their NQTs, enabling them to get to grips with aspects of teaching earlier than previously. The policy has also raised expectations of what should be achieved in the first year of teaching.

Contraventions of induction regulations

Induction in England is a top-down government-led policy but it addresses a popular need and is based on ideas about what people know to be the important issues in induction and has sought to address weaknesses in previous practices and policies. However, the variability of experience that was a feature before the induction policy is still a factor. In our large-scale national survey, we found that a fifth of NQTs did not receive all of their reduced timetable throughout the year, a fifth did not think their induction tutor gave useful advice, One in eleven had not observed any other teachers, three-quarters had some non-teaching responsibility and half considered that they taught classes with challenging behaviour. What we need to know more about is the ‘patchy periphery’; the ‘rogue’ schools that do not conform to the regulations and what can be done to ensure that all new teachers receive their statutory entitlement to a good induction experience.
All three of our research strands indicate that there are widespread contraventions of the NQT induction entitlement. Though there are meant to be procedures in England for NQTs to air dissatisfaction at both school and LEA level, they are rarely used. For who is going to complain about their assessor - the head and induction tutor - when these people can recommend a fail which would result in the NQT being forever barred from teaching in a school? In our national research case studies and analysis of posting on the New Teacher Forum, we found that few NQTs aired grievances officially, but moaned informally. The tension is summarised well in this NQT’s words:

At the end of the day, no matter what structures are in place, it’s actually very difficult to discuss problems. I want to pass my induction year and if this means keeping my head down and mouth shut that’s what I’ll do. The alternative is to highlight problems with my support and then have to face awkward times with my induction tutor or head, with the implications that might have on whether they pass or fail me. (Bubb et al 2002)

Both the national survey and the related case studies indicate that NQTs are dissatisfied with inconsistency of provision, which they see as unfair and bringing into question the status of induction as a whole. Individual new teachers appeared highly aware of the provision other NQTs were receiving because they stayed in contact with college friends through networking sessions and courses. Indeed, the most common area needing improvement identified by the NQTs surveyed was tighter monitoring of school provision.

**Rogue schools**

Of particular concern are the persistent offenders - what we call the ‘rogue’ schools and headteachers – and their accountability. If schools can be identified as at risk of not getting induction right, then something can be done to help the situation.
We considered looking at how much of the induction entitlement certain schools failed to give, but this did not provide a clear picture. In our large-scale national research and case studies we found that NQTs highlighted that it was the whole induction package that mattered rather than being able to say that one element was more beneficial than another. Looking across the three strands of evidence, the factors that seemed most common across schools whose NQTs reported weak provision centred around two features, the:

1. Level of management competence
2. Degree of intent to flout regulations

1. Level of management competence

The efficiency with which schools are managed and led is an important factor for the implementation of any policy. Certainly the complexity of the induction regulations means that schools need to be knowledgeable about the rules and procedures, and proactive in organising the reduced timetable and nominating and training an induction tutor. Effective management of induction at school level was found to be essential by the national research project. NQTs highlighted the regularity and structure of various practical elements as beneficial. In schools where there was a teacher shortage, induction tutors had less time to spend with their NQTs and cover for the 10 per cent reduced timetable was difficult because the demand for supply teachers elsewhere was very high. Schools in difficulties were more likely to have inadequate induction provision. This in turn often led to new teachers avoiding or leaving the very schools that needed them most.

2. Degree of intent to flout regulations

The other dimension of induction non-compliance that emerges particularly from the New Teacher Forum website chatroom and the independent case studies of non-compliant schools is that of wilful intent: the deliberate intention to flout the induction regulations. This concept allows one to distinguish between those schools that neglect their new teachers deliberately from those that do so out of ignorance, misunderstanding and incompetence. It is helpful to analyse compliance in relation to the spirit of the guidance as well as with actual conformity to
its statutory elements. For instance, the national induction research case studies found that there are schools which don’t manage to provide scheduled induction tutor sessions but whose ethos is so supportive that new teachers thrive through enormously helpful informal support networks. However, it also found others that on paper appear to be complying with the regulations but where new teachers don’t make the expected progress because everything is given at a minimum and a grudging level. In some the balance between support, monitoring and assessment was found to be weighted towards the latter with the result that NQTs get bowed down by pressure. In others the emphasis on support to the neglect of the other elements was found to result in new teachers not making the progress and being deceived into thinking that they are more effective than they are.

A typology of rogue schools

Schools with poor induction practice can thus be conceptualised in terms both of how well they are run and how deliberately they decide not to comply with regulations (see Table i).

<< Table i: Rogue schools – a typology>>

It is therefore possible to postulate four broad categories of schools:

A. The well-managed school that does not comply with the regulations out of ignorance
B. The well-managed school that deliberately flouts the regulations
C. The poorly-managed school that does not comply with the regulations out of ignorance
D. The poorly-managed school that deliberately flouts the regulations
In examining the case studies from both the national induction research and the independent research on specific instances of non-compliance, we found examples of schools that fit each category. Their compliance with the induction regulations is summarised in Table ii.

<< Table ii: A comparison of rogue schools’ compliance with induction regulations >>

**Type A schools: Well-managed non-compliers who are ignorant of the regulations**

In our three research strands, we found few schools in this category. Contraventions of induction policy were rarely deliberate, but more due to key personnel in schools not being up to date, perhaps because the school rarely appointed NQTs. Those we did identify were quick to remedy weaknesses in provision when they realised the need. The following profile of one such school is indicative.

*Alpha* is a successful and well-led secondary school, which gets good results. It has a stable staff, and hasn’t needed to appoint a NQT since induction became statutory in 1999. Hilary, the NQT was mature and highly qualified in her subject. However, these apparent strengths became her Achilles Heel because staff assumed that she would not need as much support as the average NQT. Her classroom was isolated and she had no head of department to check her plans or drop into lessons. The school left her to her own devices. They considered that she must have been doing well because the extra-curricular activities that she organised were successful. Induction provision was at first non-existent but when the LEA monitoring pointed this out the school was quick to remedy matters. However, the harm was done: she was a poor teacher who argued with everyone who suggested that she had weaknesses, blaming the school's lack of induction compliance in the first half term for all subsequent problems.

**Type B schools: Well-managed but who deliberately flout the regulations**

This category was also rare in the national induction study, but the independent case studies of non-compliant schools indicate that it is much more problematic in terms of outsiders
seeking to improve such schools’ practice. The following example from a case study of ‘non-compliance’ is illuminating in this respect.

Beta is a very well-managed primary school, which gets good results from a socio-economically disadvantaged group of students. However, its management of human resources is less impressive. It employs large numbers of NQTs: over a third of the staff in any year. The school gives NQTs half a day out of their classroom a fortnight rather than every week, meaning that they only have a five per cent reduced timetable.

No staff have attended induction tutor training. There are NQT meetings with induction tutors but they are not supportive, nor are they intended to be - they are line-management meetings to ensure that the NQTs are conforming to school policies. The only induction is into the school’s systems and procedures, not to meet any individual needs. NQTs have no choice in how to spend their reduced timetable but are told what to do and whom to observe. They are not allowed on any courses despite all other primary NQTs in the LEA attending the local programme. Each NQT has objectives but these are set for them rather than being negotiated. Observations are carried out by people within the school, but they are done to monitor and assess, rather than support and so NQTs dread them. All assessment reports are completed, but without any meeting with NQTs to discuss the content.

Almost all the NQTs (10 out of 11) left during or at the end of their first year at the school. The four NQTs whom we interviewed spoke of severe bullying, ‘They (the SMT) made my life miserable’. They found the experience damaged their self-confidence enormously: ‘I nearly left teaching altogether, and it took me six weeks to build up the confidence to start looking for work again’. We were unable to discover how many of the ten who left remained in teaching.
What the LEA did

The headteacher does not like any outside help, considering it ‘interference’. The LEA ensures that the school is sent all invitations to social events, questionnaires, good practice guides, letters and correspondence that participants in the NQT and induction tutor courses receive – in the hope that messages might get through. Numerous phone calls and letters have been sent to the headteacher reminding him of his statutory duties towards his NQTs, particularly in regard to their only getting a five per cent reduced timetable, and reminding him of the LEA’s role in monitoring his school’s provision. The LEA has sought advice from the DfES, and has made this clear to the headteacher. However, none of these actions have brought about an improvement in the school’s induction provision.

Type C schools: Poorly-managed and not complying with the regulations out of ignorance

This category was found to be more common than the other types in the national induction study. Moreover, whereas sometimes there appears to be genuine ignorance of the complexity of the induction requirements, more often it is simply the case that where schools have many problems to deal with, induction provision falls to the bottom of the pile of priorities. The following case study emerged from a visit to a school context that graphically illustrates the deleterious consequences of poor management coupled with ignorance of the induction regulations.

This category is more common than the other types. Sometimes there is genuine ignorance of the complexity of the induction requirements but more often it is simply that where schools have many problems to deal with, induction provision falls to the bottom of the pile of priorities.

At the time of the research the headteacher and deputy of Gamma secondary school had been suspended. Others within the school had to take on greater leadership roles. The school was in crisis for a long time, with staff leaving and replacements not being found. Student
behaviour deteriorated. The suspended deputy had been the induction tutor but left without letting anyone else have the necessary information. The school was understandably in chaos.

For one and a half terms the NQT, Lucy, taught as full a timetable as other teachers. It was only arranged after she complained to the LEA in the second term. The LEA acted quickly, visiting the school and trying to ensure that this basic provision was in place. Unreasonable demands were made of Lucy. She taught classes that would challenge an experienced teacher and the senior management team did not always back-up the school behaviour policy. At the end of the first term her head of department left the school and was not replaced. The only other member of the department was a part-timer, so Lucy had to take on some of the tasks of a head of department and set work for the supply teachers who were taking the HoD’s lessons. She had little help with students with special needs because the Senco was on sick leave for much of term 2. The NQT was also the form tutor for a difficult Year 9 group. Lucy did not enjoy her first year. She left at the end of the year, without having another job to go to.

What the LEA did

The LEA responded quickly to make the school provide her with a reduced timetable, but only after she had complained and a considerable amount of time had elapsed. They were not proactive. There was no investigation into whether other elements of induction were being provided and no monitoring visits or checks.

Type D schools: Poorly-managed that deliberately flout the regulations

This category was found to be rare in the national study. However, supplementary evidence from the TES website and case studies of non-compliance indicate that it is also difficult to deal with due to the deliberateness of the contravention of the policy and because in a poorly led school it is invariably difficult to get at the roots of a problem.

*Delta* school is for students with severe learning difficulties. The LEA judged that the headteacher’s management of the school was poor and her leadership style was autocratic.
John trained at the school on the graduate teacher programme. The headteacher considered that the school had supported him enough during his training year and that he did not need any additional support: induction would for him be unnecessary and the money could be better spent elsewhere. She deliberately flouted the regulations – John had no element of induction except for the three termly reports - but did not return the £3,000 the LEA provided for induction costs.

Unreasonable demands were made of John. He taught a large class – 15 nine year olds with severe and widely differing special needs such as autism, Downs syndrome and global delay. One boy was very violent: John had scratch marks on his neck on the day we interviewed him. The climate in the school was not conducive to raising any points or making any criticism. John did not know any of the LEA personnel to complain to.

John enjoyed his first year as a qualified teacher, despite it being very tough. He was completely committed to his students and is still working at the school.

What the LEA did

The LEA found that John had not had any of his induction entitlement when they made a quality assurance visit at the end of the school year. It subsequently wrote an official letter of complaint to the headteacher. We were given to understand that as a consequence, arrangements were made for John to receive support and a reduced timetable in his second year as recompense.

Professional responsibility and public accountability

In devolved education systems it seems to be the case that the counterpart of greater freedom at institutional level is an increased need for accountability to show how such freedom has been used. Accountability has been defined as ‘a condition in which individual role holders are liable to review and the application of sanctions if their actions fail to satisfy those with whom they are in an accountability relationship’ (Kogan 1988, p25). Professional
responsibility – a sense of being governed in one’s conduct by professional answerability to colleagues about how one justifies the way one’s work is done (Davis, 1991) – can be seen as one of several kinds of accountability. Indeed, teachers and schools have four kinds of accountability relationship:

- To pupils (moral accountability)
- To colleagues (professional accountability)
- To employees or political masters (contractual accountability)
- To the market – where clients have a choice of institution they might attend (market accountability).

Within England over the last decade, the accountability framework has been dominated by Ofsted, the government’s school inspection agency. As part of its framework for inspection, Ofsted examines a school’s provision for professional development, including the induction of NQTs. Where such provision is found to be a serious weakness, it would be identified as a ‘key issue’ and one which the school would be asked to include in its ‘post-inspection action plan’ (Ferguson et al 2000).

Headteachers are therefore publicly accountable to Ofsted for the effective use of public funds and the overall quality of the school, but they are also accountable to others – most significantly, parents, governing bodies and LEAs. As far as NQT induction is concerned, as noted earlier, LEAs have a key role in monitoring or quality assuring arrangements.

**The role of LEAs**

LEAs as approved bodies are accountable for ensuring that all of their schools with NQTs carry out induction properly. They are meant to monitor the quality of:

- induction provision in schools;
- assessment reports;
However, the national research on induction found that 14 per cent of schools have very little relationship with their LEA beyond the submission of termly assessment reports. Moreover, we found that the turnover of personnel responsible for induction within LEAs is high. This is a concern because it takes time and experience to set up effective procedures and build relationships with schools. We have found that some LEAs are proactive but most are more reactive. The four schools that feature in our typological case studies of rogue schools illustrate different approaches. Alpha and Beta schools are in LEAs that can be described as proactive. They had systems that spotted problems, and then tried to remedy them albeit unsuccessfully in the case of Beta school. Gamma school’s LEA was reactive. It moved quickly when asked to remedy a problem but the NQT had to complain first. Delta school’s LEA had quality assurance procedures but they acted too late to help a NQT who had received no induction support or monitoring because they were not proactive in seeking information until the end of his first year of teaching.

Whilst LEAs have responsibility for induction, they have only limited powers to control what actually happens in their schools. This means that they need to ensure compliance by devising ways to encourage, guide and influence; they cannot impose change. Several did this by publishing induction newsletters and sending out questionnaires. The latter was effective not only in providing a picture of provision in the area but in reminding people about all the elements of the induction entitlement in the government circular.

All LEAs visit at least some NQTs. Interestingly, we found that individual LEAs either visit a very small number or almost all, with few functioning in the middle level. So, LEAs across England appear to follow distinctive policies and practices. Whilst some aim to see almost all NQTs, others are highly selective.

Responsibilities and sanctions
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Induction is a positive experience for most new teachers, and the current regulations in England are a distinct improvement on previous arrangements (Earley and Kinder 1994; HMI 1988). However, the ‘habitat’ in which NQTs spend their early years is crucial. Induction can help their speed of development (Bubb 2003) but also determine what sort of a teacher they become. It is in everyone’s interests for new teachers to be highly effective as soon as they can and for as long as they can.

We have described England’s induction arrangements as a carrot and stick policy for new teachers. Should there not also be some carrot and stick response to school leaders in terms of their induction provision? They are responsible, both morally and professionally, for the development of school staff, including NQTs. However, as resources are increasingly devolved to schools, there are few negative sanctions that can be effectively deployed against ‘rogue’ schools and headteachers. LEAs may decide that a withdrawal of funds is the ultimate sanction but these funds have increasingly been devolved directly to schools. As noted above, LEA advice and guidance can be easily ignored and whilst NQTs are free to raise their concerns with the school or the LEA, few do so for obvious reasons – the school makes the decision about the success or otherwise of the NQT’s first year and whether or not they have met the induction standards.

Neither do Ofsted inspections of schools provide an effective deterrent. They take place infrequently (every 4-6 years) and it is clear that unless the school is seriously failing to provide an adequate education for the students, the inspectors are incapable of exerting the pressure needed to ensure compliance. As earlier noted, they identify key issues for action which the school is asked to respond to but whether they do so or not depends on whether they are seen as important by the school (Ferguson et al 2000).

School governing bodies, another body to whom headteachers are accountable, are being encouraged to act as ‘critical friends’ but they have been shown not to be a strong accountability mechanism, their effectiveness often hinging on the attitude and approach of
the headteacher. Indeed, it is the headteacher as chief gatekeeper to information about such matters that plays the key role (Creese and Earley 1999).

What needs to be done?

The sanctions for non-compliance at the moment are weak and there appears to be little that can be done to counter the activities of unprincipled or ‘rogue’ headteachers. It is therefore essential for the preparation and training of headteachers to stress these wider responsibilities within a system of site based management and, crucially, for those responsible for their appointment to give due attention to questions of values and ethical leadership (Gold et al 2003) In order to ensure that school leaders act both accountably and responsibly, we suggest the following:

LEAs identify potential rogue schools

Our typology of rogue schools may help LEAs identify NQTs that are likely to suffer from poor induction experiences. This will enable them to use their finite resources efficiently by proactively checking that new teachers in ‘at risk’ schools are receiving a good induction experience - and to do so early on, before damage is done. Rogue schools that are not complying out of ignorance or poor leadership can be fairly easily supported. Where non-compliance is more deliberate, tougher measures will need to be taken, as we illustrated in the case study of Beta school.

Ensure that all school leaders understand the regulations, the benefits of induction and the consequences of poor experiences

In all strands of our research we found numerous examples of misunderstandings of the induction regulations. Although NQTs in the most part are knowledgeable some headteachers are not, particularly if they haven’t employed new teachers in recent years. Training and the clear dissemination of key information for all school leaders are imperative. The changes to
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the induction standards and the replacement of the Career Entry Profile with the Career Entry and Development Profile make such action particularly timely.

The principles behind the induction regulations also need to be made explicit. Feiman-Nemser et al's (1999) identification of the three uses and understandings of the term ‘induction’ is valuable in this respect:

• A stage or phase in teacher development – the first year of any job is a time of ‘intense learning and anxiety, different to what has gone before and what comes after’.
• Socialisation both into the school and into the profession.
• A formal programme for new teachers.

The variability of treatment of NQTs has perhaps been as a result of school leaders interpreting the term induction differently. England’s induction policy can be seen to cover all of the above three elements. It primarily helps the socialisation into the school and profession, but the reduced timetable recognises that the first year in the job is the hardest and one that will benefit from fewer teaching demands. Little (1999) emphasises the need for school leaders to organize daily work to support teacher learning. Workloads and schedules that leave teachers with little out-of-class time make sustained reflection next to impossible. The regulations move away from the idea of a formal programme, to an individualised one that meets specific needs.

Our national induction research shows that there is a positive correlation between ‘enjoyment’ of the induction year and whether key elements of induction, such as an accessible induction tutor and 10 per cent reduction in timetable, are in place. Where NQTs perceived themselves not to be receiving a ‘fair deal’, they were quick to consider alternative opportunities - to leave the school and sometimes the profession. The consequences of poor induction experience impact on retention, and ultimately on recruitment. Beta school, which deliberately flouted some of the induction regulations and certainly the spirit of supporting new teachers, lost
significant numbers of staff. The cost to the profession of teachers whose self-esteem has been affected is huge – to say nothing of the effects of attrition.

Tighten systems of accountability

In the context of site based management, devolved budgets and the absence of ring-fenced monies for induction with the new changes to the Standards Fund, it is essential that headteachers be clear about their accountability in providing adequately funded induction arrangements. Headteachers are responsible for all arrangements and judgements concerning NQTs - though they can delegate tasks they cannot shirk this important responsibility. They need to be held to account for how they spend the funds that the school receives for induction. This will mean that the money cannot be spent in other ways determined by local exigencies or the idiosyncrasies of school heads. In our view, rogue school leaders need to be accountable not only to their staff and their LEA, but also ultimately to the General Teaching Council – the body responsible for maintaining and judging contraventions of professional standards.

Conclusion

Ultimately induction is a matter of professional accountability – a professional and ethical responsibility - to students and staff working within schools and to the profession as a whole. Intelligent accountability, as O'Neil (2002, p. 58) reminds us, is inextricably linked to a sense of trust requiring more attention to good governance and much less fantasizing ‘about Herculean micro-management by means of performance indicators or total transparency’. Values-driven leaders or ‘principled principals’ (Gold et al 2003) are concerned about the well-being of their staff and strive towards improving the quality of teaching and learning in their schools. Ethically responsible leadership is more important than ever but cannot be mandated or legislated for. The growth of site based management, greater school autonomy and the devolution of resources make it crucially important that school leaders act responsibly and develop a school ethos or culture that supports both student and teacher learning. Efforts therefore need to be made through their preparation, training and professional orientation to
ensure that headteachers and other school leaders are responsible and accountable for their actions, both to their profession - including its recent recruits - and to the wider community. We need to ensure that the next generation of teachers is given the best possible start and that they are not lost to the profession. As one professionally responsible headteacher put it:

If they don’t succeed we’re all going to fail because we won’t have teachers to put in front of students...if these NQTs now don’t get the time to develop properly we’re on a slippery slope - we’ve got to look after them.

References

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