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To cite this article: Joe Penny (2016): Between coercion and consent: the politics of “Cooperative Governance” at a time of “Austerity Localism” in London, Urban Geography, DOI: 10.1080/02723638.2016.1235932

To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2016.1235932

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Published online: 21 Sep 2016.

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Between coercion and consent: the politics of “Cooperative Governance” at a time of “Austerity Localism” in London

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ABSTRACT
At a time of “austerity localism”, this paper explores how local authorities in London, England, are simultaneously addressing the dual pressures of delivering fiscal retrenchment and of enrolling citizens in new participatory public service arrangements, asking whether “these trends pull against one another, in opposite directions, or whether they are the tough and tender dimensions of a singular process: austerian management” Drawing on empirical research into the London Borough of Lambeth’s Cooperative Council agenda, as well as Foucauldian and Gramscian critiques of participatory network governance theories and practice, this paper shows how participatory forms of governance can be folded into the logic of hierarchy and coercion through various governmental technologies of performance and agency (consent), and through tactics of administrative domination (coercion). As budget cuts continue to affect local government in England, this paper concludes that although small experiments in participatory governance may persist, the dominant mode of governance is likely to shift towards more hierarchical and coercive forms.

1. Introduction
For the past five years, England has been at the vanguard of self-imposed austerity. Soon after its formation in May 2010, in an attempt to “pay down the national deficit”, the Coalition Government embarked on “the most far-reaching and precipitate attempt to achieve fundamental restructuring in an established welfare state… in recent years” (Taylor-Gooby, 2012, p. 61). Local government has been at the heart of this restructuring process as both “site and target” (Ward et al., 2015, p. 443) of fiscal retrenchment and a renewed emphasis on localism. Local authorities increasingly find themselves in the uneasy position of “agents of austerity”; tasked on the one hand with administering unprecedented budget cuts and on the other with catalysing economic growth and coordinating local welfare programmes which meet “new demands that public services should empower citizens and communities, develop partnerships, collaborate with ‘civil society’ groups, and foster ‘co-production’ arrangements with service users” (Newman & Clarke, 2009, p. 6). How this conundrum is resolved is a defining issue facing local government today, with “long run and potentially path changing consequences…” (Peck, 2012, p. 647).
In what is proving to be a prescient book for the current conjuncture, Cynthia Cockburn (1977, p. 2), writing about Lambeth Council in London during the crisis of Fordism, identified “two new trends in local government: corporate management and community development; the one an attempt to exercise tighter control over council finance and the workforce, the other an attempt to encourage democracy through ‘participation’”. Recognising the tensions between these modes of governing—one hierarchical and centralising, the other ostensibly more horizontal, decentralising and inclusive—Cockburn asked the question “do these two trends pull in opposite directions, or are they the tough and tender aspects of one principle: management?” Cockburn concluded in favour of the latter analysis, demonstrating the ways in which the two seemingly opposed trends were operationalised in concert to gain consent for the restructuring of local government. In doing so, not only did Cockburn’s work pick up on what would become a recurrent theme in local government in England, the enrolling of citizens and “community” in the practices of government, she also recognised the tendency for participatory forms of governance to be folded into the logic of hierarchy and coercion at a time of austerity.

Thirty years later, writing in the aftermath of the 2008 neoliberal financial crisis, Roger Keil (2009, p. 239) pointed to these two trends anew. For Keil (2009, p. 240), there are two “possible pathways of urban politics” during the current austerity moment: Roll-with-it 1 referring to “more authoritarian, capital-oriented, market-serving policies and political constellations”; and, Roll-with-it 2 referring to “more democratic, populist, reformist, ecological options” (Keil, 2009). Echoing Cockburn, Keil does not see these two types of roll-with-it neoliberal governance and politics as inimical. Rather, they co-exist as two sides of a Janus faced approach to governing the contradictions of capitalism at the urban scale. The salient question is to which side is the face now turning, and with what consequences?

In this paper I return to the site of Cockburn’s study and to her enduringly relevant line of enquiry. Drawing on critical discourse and policy analysis, as well as 48 interviews with local actors, I explore the ways in which the pressures of “austerity localism” (Featherstone, Ince, Mackinnon, Strauss, & Cumbers, 2012) are being managed in the London Borough of Lambeth through their “Cooperative Council” agenda—an attempt to enrol citizens, community groups and private-sector partners in new network governance arrangements and service configurations—and ask, at a time of seemingly permanent austerity (Pierson, 1998), how the balance between hierarchic and coercive (or Roll-with-it 1) and horizontal and consensual (or Roll-with-it 2) modes of governance is shifting, and with what implications for processes and politics of urban neoliberalisation after the crash.

To do so, the paper proceeds in three sections. In the first, I draw on Foucauldian and Gramscian-inspired critiques of network governance to extend Cockburn and Keil’s insights based on a dialectic of coercion and consent. Following this I provide background context into the challenges facing local authorities in England, highlighting the shifting operational parameters set by central government within which local actors manoeuvre. I then evaluate the unfolding governance arrangements and practices of the case study in relation to the coercion-consent dialectic in two empirical discussions. The first draws out the soft and diffuse forms of power as they work through neoliberalising rationales, technologies and subjectivities. The second focuses on the harder
forms of power and the hierarchical and coercive tactics of governance that make up the realpolitik of decision-making in the council. In the conclusion, I suggest that as austerity deepens in England we are likely see a shift towards the more coercive “authoritarian, capital-oriented, market-serving policies and political constellations” (Keil, 2009, p. 239) associated with “roll-with-it neoliberalization 1”.

2. Theorising consent and coercion in network governance and localism

Emerging in the late 1980s, and growing in volume and diversity since, network governance theories have identified and engaged with an apparent shift from “the age of bureaucratic government” to an “age of network governance” (Sørensen, 2002, p. 693). Broadly speaking, the literature describes a move from “hierarchically organised, unitary systems of government that govern by means of law, rule and order, to more horizontally organised and relatively fragmented systems of governance that govern through the regulation of self-regulating networks” (Sørensen, 2002, p. 693). These networks have been identified at multiple scales, across a proliferation of sites, involving a diversification of actors from the state, market and civil society, enrolled in a range of open and collaborative partnership arrangements and participatory practices. In the UK context they have been connected to discourses around the “New Localism” (Brenner & Theodore, 2002), privileging local government as a site for network experimentation.

Running through network styles of governance are “the Habermasian consensual notions of values in partnership working of mutual trust, sharing, willingness to learn, and mutual respect…” (Kokx & Van Kempen, 2009, p. 1235). Where hierarchies and markets are seen to operate through command and competition respectively, cooperation and consensus are the key principles for networks to be successful (Davies, 2005). Echoing Habermas’s normative procedural guidelines for communicative deliberation, Schmitter (cited in Swyngedouw, 2005, p. 1994) suggests ideal governance arrangements should be based on “common and distinctive features”, including “horizontal interaction among presumptive equal participants without distinction between their public or private status; regular, iterative exchanges among a fixed set of independent but interdependent actors; [and] guaranteed (but possibly selective) access, preferably as early as possible in the decision-making cycle…”. While it is decentred by these new approaches, the state does not disappear from view. Pierre and Stoker (2000) suggested that the state has a role to play in developing and sustaining consensus by setting a shared vision, maintaining relationships with and between stakeholders, and regulating the network’s activities to achieve commonly agreed outcomes.

Advocates of networked approaches to governance make a series of claims about their potential, including efficacy and efficiency arguments, especially with regards to better coordinating actors and resources to solve “wicked” problems in an increasingly fragmented society, as well as assertions that governance networks, particularly at the local level, can expand and deepen democratic spaces beyond the confines of representative democracy. The virtues of summoning and enrolling citizens in networks of governance have been a feature of much network governance theory, including “Public Value Governance” theories (Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomburg, 2014; Dahl & Soss, 2014). Here, citizens are ostensibly afforded a central role in the co-creation of public values (a society’s normative consensus on rights,
responsibilities and governing principles) and public value (the public sector equivalent to private sector value), with the promise that rationalities other to those associated with neoliberalism will gain traction.

Network theory is not without its detractors however. As well as concerns about the equity, accountability, antiproceduralism and democratic legitimacy of networks, broader critiques have questioned the disjuncture between rhetoric and reality, questioning whether networks really work in a horizontal and trust-based way, or whether in fact “the ideology of networks is a rhetorical sleight of hand that obscures historic continuities in power relations and governing strategies” (Davies & Spicer, 2015, p. 234; see also; Raco & Imrie, 2000). A number of studies have pointed to the ways in which state-led efforts to promote horizontal networks of governance may in fact be implicated in top-down, even autocratic, attempts to develop governmental projects and scalar fixes capable of managing the contradictions inherent in neoliberal modes of capitalist accumulation, including by deepening marketisation, privatisation and responsibilisation in the provision of welfare services (Clarke, 2005; Davies & Spicer, 2015; Newman & Clarke, 2009; Raco, 2013).

Foucauldian critiques have been particularly insightful in this regard. Taking up Foucault’s “political task” of unmasking “the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely” through the workings of “institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent” (Chomsky & Foucault, 2006, p. 41), a body of work has emerged to explore the soft and diffuse expressions of power as they work through normative political rationalities, technologies, and subjectivities. The importance of such interventions here is that they highlight the variety of ways in which the state mobilises and enrols non-state actors through governance networks as neoliberal subjects: as entrepreneurs of the self (Lemke, 2002), as self-organising and self-providing communities (Davies & Pill, 2012; Kokx & Van Kempen, 2009), and as resilient societies (Joseph, 2013). The normative claims for network governance theory are shown to be naïve of the multiple, diffuse and informal ways in which power operates and in which conduct is conducted to further governmental aims.

In this vein, Swyngedouw (2005) argued that while the seeds of inclusive and empowering participation can be found across a range of network governance “innovations”, network governance in practice is decidedly contradictory, and on balance seems more likely to propagate neoliberalising governmentalities and deepen democratic deficits. For Swyngedouw whilst they are presented in neutral ways, as magical fixes that can simultaneously address the democratic deficit and intractable social problems, consensual governance arrangements are far from neutral. They rearticulate state, market and civil society relationships in ways that profoundly circumscribe the parameters of political democracy; infusing them with neoliberal rationalities (privileging the market as “the preferred social institution of resource mobilisation and allocation”) and with neoliberalising technologies of governmentality (downloading more and more social responsibilities onto civil society) (Swyngedouw, 2005). Dahl and Soss (2014) reached much the same conclusion in their evaluation of Public Value Governance, arguing that claims that network arrangements can empower citizens and deepen democracy are undermined by a tendency to elide “foundational questions of power and conflict and advance prescriptions that are at odds with important democratic values” (Dahl and Soss 2014 p. 496).
Building on his earlier work, also stressing the constitutive importance of conflict in urban governance, Jonathan Davies (2010, 2012) has recently argued that analyses of network governance, including the critical Foucauldian sort, fail to properly grasp the role of the state, not just in orchestrating the actions of non-state actors through networks, but also in directly coercing non-state actors through hierarchical modalities of governance, including through various forms of administrative domination. There is, he argues, “a significant disjuncture between conceptual frameworks that emphasise soft power and wide-ranging empirical research which points to the incremental roll-forward of disciplinary state power” (Davies, 2010, p. 8). Recourse to forms of soft power alone cannot adequately explain contemporary modes of governing generally, and neoliberalisation and austerity more particularly. A more sophisticated analysis of harder forms of power is also needed. In order to extend a critique of network governance which is attentive to the role of coercion in contemporary configurations of governance, Davies turns to Gramsci and his notion of the integral state.

Davies draws on Gramsci to theorise the tendency for hierarchy and coercion to pervade governance at all scales: from the supra-national structural adjustment programmes of the IMF; to national state violence in Chile under Pinochet and in Britain under Thatcher; to urban crises, austerity and neglect in 1970s New York City and contemporary Detroit (Peck, 2014). The notion of the integral state captures the “dialectical unity of ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’” (Thomas, 2009, p. 30), where political society is understood as government by force (the coercive power of the state) and civil society is conceived of as “the terrain upon which social classes compete for social and political leadership or hegemony…” (Davies, 2010, p. 16). When understood together in this way, political society and civil society demonstrate that at the heart of the capitalist state exists a dialectic between domination and hegemony, coercion and consent, and harder and softer forms of power. Since hegemony can never be final, and is always at risk of counter-hegemonic forces, the state must have recourse to domination and the “armour of coercion”. The coercion-consent dialectic shows us that neither is ever wholly absent from the processes and practices of governing. For Davies, the question is not whether a particular configuration of governance is horizontal and consensual, or hierarchical and coercive; but rather “which term of the relationship is the most prominent in any spatio-temporal and scalar conjuncture” (Davies, 2010, p. 17).

From this perspective it is possible to conceive of a continuum of coercive practices inherent in some guise in all forms of governing, from the spectacular event (including Naomi Klein’s (2008) instances of neoliberal shock doctrine) to the prosaic practices of administrative domination: “Just as consent ranges from passive and grudging to active and enthusiastic, so compulsion is a continuum from bureaucratic impediment to all out war” (Davies, 2010, p. 18). Coercion and domination cast a long shadow over consent and hegemony; where the latter cannot be obtained and looks under threat, which given the many contradictions of capitalism (Harvey, 2014), is oft-recurring, the shadow materialises more or less forcibly, paradoxically showing both the state’s strength and its weakness. This means recognising that coercion is not epiphenomenal, but a routine part of the day-to-day governance of cities and the micro-politics of everyday life, especially at the interface of the local state, the market and civil society (Davies, 2014).
In the empirical discussions that follow, I draw Gramsci and Foucault together to explicate how the dialectic of consent and coercion works in one specific case. In doing so, I am not attempting to combine these two philosophers together into a single watertight conceptual totality, gainsaying the important dissonances between their respective structural and post-structural interpretations of power and ideology (on these see Daldal, 2014; Kreps, 2016). Rather, the aim is to work generatively and heuristically with the consonances between Gramsci and Foucault to demonstrate how multiple forms of “power over” and “power through and between” inhere in social relations and in fact co-exist dialectically. For Gramsci, “the main problematique of the state is to incorporate the will of each single individual into the collective will, turning their necessary consent and collaboration from ‘coercion’ to ‘freedom’” (Daldal, 2014, p. 156). Foucault can help us understand how certain “common sense” ideas are normalised, however incompletely, through specific rationalities, technologies and subjectivities, and how power functions at the microscale of local state practices to procure consent positively in relation to and through civil society. A Gramscian approach enables us to relate Foucault’s micropolitical analysis to broader logics of macropolitical state restructuring and also, through his attentiveness to political society and power over, clarifies how the state responds when Foucauldian governmental projects fail.

3. Whatever is happening to local government and governance in England?

The context out of which network theory and practice emerged is reflected in today’s similar conjuncture of austerity and state restructuring. Writing in the wake of over a decade of Margaret Thatcher’s austerity-driven neoliberal experimentations, as “Britain was on the cusp of systemic changes in modes of urban governance” (Ward et al., 2015, p. 443), Alan Cochrane (1993) asked “whatever happened to local government?” Recognising, and to some extent anticipating, the importance of networks to local governance, Cochrane suggested that local government in England was undergoing a process of fragmentation and decentring as a “proliferation of different agencies... both in the fields of welfare and economic development” (Cochrane, 1993, p. 5) became important actors and part of the local state’s transformation along more competitive and entrepreneurial lines. Cochrane’s analysis would prove insightful. Following the election of New Labour in 1997, the significance of relational, collaborative and partnership-based modes of governance grew and the enabling role of local government was valorised (Bailey and Pill, 2015). Now, after five years of fiscal retrenchment, aimed decidedly at local government, Cochrane’s question takes on renewed relevance—whatever is happening to local government and, we can now add, governance?

In England institutional transformation, governance reform and public-service restructuring at the urban scale are being driven along two axes (Ward et al., 2015), both of which run through local government. The first axis echoes a familiar narrative of decline, or roll-back neoliberalism as witnessed under Thatcher in the late 1970s to mid-1980s. In 2010, opting to address a perceived public deficit problem overwhelmingly through public spending cuts, the Coalition Government set about rolling back the frontiers of the social state, targeting the budgets of local government especially. Between 2011 and 2015 the budget of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), responsible for allocating local government revenue funding,
experienced cuts of almost 40% in real terms (Beatty & Fothergill, 2014). This was complemented in 2013 by a further 10% of cuts, with 56% more announced up until 2020 following the election of a majority Conservative government in May 2015 (Lowndes & Gardner, 2016). To put these figures into historical context, the cuts up to 2015 are estimated to be three times the level of those experienced during the previous notable round of austerity in English Local Government between 1978 and 1985 (Newman, 2014). Geographically the distribution of these reductions has been uneven. In a move away from the principle of spatial redistribution in local government funding, the Coalition Government have applied a flat-rate cut to all local authorities (Innes & Tetlow, 2015) and have abolished Area-Based Grants for the most deprived parts of the country. Consequently, those local authorities most dependent on central government funds have seen “the largest average cuts to spending per person” (IFS, 2015), including many boroughs in London (Fitzgerald & Lupton, 2015).

Along the second axis, Local Government has been constructed afresh as a site for “catalysing latent potentialities for economic growth” (Ward et al., 2015, p. 443) and civic renewal. In a move almost without precedent in the history of local government funding in England, the Business Rate Retention Scheme (BRRS), introduced in April 2013, decouples local government funding from local need and erodes what had been an enduring commitment to spatial equalisation since the late-19th century (Sandford, 2016). Within rules effectively limiting the amount local authorities can increase council tax by to 1.99 per cent, this new funding regime is designed to replace central government funding for local services with local business taxes by 2020. This ensures that the future of local services, including institutionally and centrally mandated welfare duties to meet growing demands for social care, will be financially dependent upon local economic development. It also encourages local authorities to compete for investment in an opportunity-driven framework which elides enduring spatial and regional inequalities in a single-minded, “aspirational”, focus on economic growth (Pugalis & McGuiness, 2013).

Meanwhile, through the Localism Act local government is expected to lead the way on public service modernisation, enrolling citizens and communities in open and plural public service networks that save money whilst empowering “local people”, unleashing civic entrepreneurialism and reviving grass-roots engagement. Eliding the growth in private sector entanglements with the social state, especially locally (Raco, 2013), and obscuring the inequalities, differences and conflicts between diverse and shifting communities of “local people” (Featherstone et al., 2012), a series of community rights are somewhat hopefully expected to give people greater choice and control in and over local services and incentivise volunteering as part of the nebulous big society agenda. In this way, local authorities are exhorted to pull back from providing services directly and instead look to a plurality of potential providers, including community groups, charities, social enterprises and private companies.

There are continuities between what is happening to local government today, and some of the trends that Cochrane identified in the early 1990s. Local Government is once again being used to absorb and resolve the crisis tendencies of neoliberal capitalist accumulation and uneven development through local governance innovation. However, these policies amount to more than a simple return to the roll-back and roll-out policies of neoliberalism witnessed under Thatcher and New Labour. Whilst current approaches
certainly draw on and rework extant processes of entrepreneurialism and competition, privatisation and marketisation, and responsibilisation, the extent and nature of fiscal disciplining today deepens and broadens the scope and scale of neoliberal local state restructuring, opening up new frontiers in the antagonistic, push and pull, landscape of local government and governance (Newman, 2013) as authorities seek to harmonise retrenchment and restructuring simultaneously.

The rest of this paper focuses on a “critical” (see Flyvbjerg, 2006) case study of the tensions and contradictions of managing “austerity localism” in the inner-London borough of Lambeth. Drawing on qualitative research conducted between January 2015 and April 2016, involving discourse/policy analysis, 48 in-depth interviews with local actors, and observations at public council meetings, the next section explores the council’s primary response to fiscal retrenchment and local state restructuring in two empirical discussions, organised around the dialectic of consent-coercion. The first discussion, framed around Foucault’s governmental “triptych” (rationalities, technologies and subjectivities), explores how Lambeth council seeks to govern through civil society by enrolling citizens and “communities” in new consensual public service configurations. The second looks at what happens when civil society “partners” act in unexpected and unscripted ways, highlighting some of the hierarchic modes and coercive tactics of governing with which the council responds.


The London Borough of Lambeth is one of the largest of London’s inner-city local authorities, stretching from Waterloo on the Southbank of the river Thames in the North, down to Crystal Palace and Streatham in the South East and South West respectively (Figure 1.) It is a largely residential borough, and one of the most densely populated, with over 100 people per hectare—over twice the average London population density. It is home to an ethnically diverse population and, like London generally, is an unequal place; there are pockets of entrenched deprivation, concentrated in the wards near Brixton, as well as areas of high affluence, particularly in parts of Clapham.

Like many other deprived London boroughs (Fitzgerald & Lupton, 2015), Lambeth has been hard hit by the government’s austerity measures. By 2018, Lambeth council are expected to make over £200 m of savings following a 50% reduction in their settlement funding from central government, which made up three-quarters of the authority’s total revenue income (Figure 2.). Lambeth’s capital finances are also under pressure. Lambeth has been heavily reliant on central government for capital investment, which is spent on council housing provision and maintenance, schools, roads and parks. Following a 60% reduction in Central Government contributions to Lambeth’s capital budget since 2010 a funding gap of £93.2 m has opened up for what the council describes as key infrastructural and maintenance work.

Already tensions are emerging out of this “austerian” regime in Lambeth. Over the next three years planned cuts will compromise the council’s ability to provide services as rising need, a product of demographic change and central government welfare reform, outstrips the council’s shrinking budget capacity. Belying central government rhetoric about the scale of efficiencies still to be made in local government, the council’s
Figure 1. The London borough of Lambeth.

Figure 2. Actual and projected Lambeth Council funding from central government between 2010 and 2019.
2015 budget report showed that several key services are forecast to overspend, including those for vulnerable groups such as mental health services, temporary accommodation, and children’s social care. Requirements to meet statutory responsibilities for social care in particular risk overwhelming the council’s budget, drawing resources away from discretionary services. As one senior officer in Lambeth Council noted:

“We estimate that our total budget in 2018 will be equivalent to what we are spending on adults and children’s social care at the moment... Our adults and children’s social care budgets are spent on about 10,000 people and we have a population of over 300,000. So it’s not possible to protect adults and children’s social care... and anyway people value parks, they want to have their bins emptied”. Senior Commissioner.

This unfolding social care “crisis” is a London-wide issue. In a recent report by London Councils, an advocacy group for local government in the city, it is estimated that by 2019/20 social care alone will account for 58% of borough spending across London, up from 39% in 2010. When combined with waste management responsibilities, another significant statutory duty placed on local government, it is estimated that 67% of local government funding in London will be spent on meeting statutory responsibilities, leaving less to spend on discretionary services, such as parks, libraries, youth services, and the like. As London’s population ages and a growing number of people live longer with physical and mental disabilities, financing social care, which is already more costly in London than elsewhere in England due in large part to inflated “production costs”, is fast becoming a mission impossible. In a context of shrinking revenue budgets, if these instituted welfare commitments continue to be financed at the local level, as looks likely for the foreseeable future, the operational parameters of the local authority and people’s collective choices, be they expressed through representative or participatory forms of governance, will necessarily be narrowed.

4.1 Conducting consent: normalisation, responsibilisation and contractualisation

In May 2010, anticipating the cuts to come, the London Borough of Lambeth set out its ambition to reshape the settlement between citizens and the state by becoming a “Cooperative Council”. Reflecting a growing interest from public authorities across the UK in recruiting citizens in the business of governing, managing and providing for themselves (Newman & Clarke, 2009), the Labour-led council proposed to develop equal relationships with communities, civil society and non-profit organisations: incentivising “citizens to play a more active role in their local community...”; and encouraging a “wide range of service providers (be they social enterprises, cooperatives, public sector organisations, businesses, faith organisations... [etc.]) to deliver tailored services in different areas” (Lambeth Council, 2011, p. 4. To achieve this it was recognised that the local state’s role would need to change from a “deliverer of services” to a “facilitator of cooperative working”, shaping the political vision and coordinating local actors efforts to achieve commonly agreed outcomes (Lambeth Council, 2011).

The stated rationales for moving towards a new cooperative approach to governance and service delivery in Lambeth were set out by the former leader of the council Steven
Reed in the forward to the council’s report *Sharing Power: A new settlement between citizens and state* (Lambeth Council, 2011). Drawing on network governance rhetoric in ways that resonate with Third Way progressivist discourses, as well as the Coalition government’s *Open Public Services, Big Society, and Localism* agendas, Reed made a series of connected claims in support of “fundamental change”. First, that due to funding cuts, local government cannot survive in its current form and that change is objectively necessary. Secondly, that local government is too hierarchical, top-down, and managerial to effectively address “wicked” social issues. Third, that local government is overly paternalistic and has reached too far into community matters, crowding out bottom-up initiatives, enterprise, and “the virtues of mutualism, civic action, and self-reliance” (Williams, Goodwin, & Cloke, 2014, p. 2800). And finally, that a democratic-deficit characterises relationships between the council, citizens and communities, preventing the full realisation of people’s needs and wants. To remedy the situation, Reed suggests that local government must engage citizens and a plurality of local service providers in more equal and collaborative relationships to “find new and better ways of delivering public services in the 21st century” (Lambeth Council, 2011, p. 2).

From the outset, Reed was careful to distance the Cooperative Council from the Coalition Government’s austerity and Big Society agendas, as well as from the Conservative-led London Borough of Barnet’s privatising approach, stating that:

“The Tories’ ‘easyCouncil’ model, championed by Barnet council, means substandard services for most people with the wealthy few able to pay for ‘upgrades’ to better quality. That is fundamentally unfair and in Lambeth we reject that... We also stand apart from David Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ model that is really just about a smaller state” (Reed, 2010, n.p.)

However, whilst Reed does not go as far as to uphold the Coalition Government’s zero-sum understanding of the relationship between civil society and the (local) state (see Featherstone et al., 2012), it is nonetheless clear from reading early policy documents that the Cooperative Council is framed by, and embeds, the logic of austerity as an incontrovertible macro-economic exigency, requiring a rethinking of New Labour’s partnership approach based on funding and capacity building for the institutionalised collective engagement of civil society. In step with network-oriented discourses and policy models propagated and circulated by various think-tanks and policy experts, including those of “public value” and “relational governance” (see Newman, 2014), Lambeth Council positioned citizen and community empowerment instrumentally, as a means of delivering efficiency savings and managing demand. In contradistinction to the political leadership of the early 1980s, which (in)famously refused to cap rates at the expense of meeting local need, the council have, however reluctantly, accepted the disciplinarian logic of austerity as inevitable, privileging fiscal restraint, efficiency and demand management over meeting people’s growing needs. As budget cuts have continued, austerity has been accepted and normalised as an axiom of responsible governance, infusing the Cooperative Council with normative appeals for people to be sensible, do the right thing and take over local services, or risk losing them.

In its early manifestations, the Cooperative Council was implemented tentatively and unevenly in various experiments that sought to responsibilise citizens and community
groups across a range of service areas, including in children and youth services, libraries and parks management, and street cleaning. Obscuring the extent to which services were already being outsourced to large national and multinational providers, as well as the proliferation in recent years of public/private entanglements in the delivery of local welfare, community and voluntary groups were privileged in early policy documents and constructed as “sites of desire”, “where people can govern, provision and manage themselves beyond the structures of state systems” (Newman & Clarke, 2009, p. 46). They have been summoned through a range of “technologies of agency” to deploy their own freedoms, skills and capacities to meet Lambeth Council’s objectives, including by: mediating state projects, as when residents and (in)formal groups have been asked to consult on ways of redesigning public services with and without the state; drawing on resources beyond the state, for example, through appeals to citizens and friends of parks groups to match fund (by crowdfunding and bid writing) £9 m for parks improvement works; and by acting as alternatives to the state, when, for example, residents are nuded to “do the right thing” and organise street cleaning “parties”, shovel snow, say hello to neighbours, or take over the management of buildings, libraries and parks (Figure 3).

This form of citizen engagement with, and participation in, local government is built around constituting and enlisting similar kinds of subjectivities—the responsible and responsibilised active citizen—implied by the Big Society and Localism Act. Echoing central government rhetoric, Lambeth residents are told that the future survival of local services is predicated on their active engagement with and beyond the council in the design and delivery of those services. Doing the right thing in this context means taking on a number of idealised roles in relation to the local state, including that of the “charitable self”, “called upon to exemplify the virtues of self-help, community resilience, and philanthropy” (Williams et al., 2014, p. 2802); the “entrepreneurial volunteer”, encouraged to take part in Made in Lambeth “hack”/“challenge” events by using their creative skills as “graphic designers, artists, project managers and community organisers. . . [as well as] legal, financial and software development skills” to improve local services; and as the “citizen auditor”, summoned to take advantage of Lambeth council’s pioneering role in Central Government’s Open Data Programme and hold councillors and council officers to account for money (mis)spent.

In 2012, recognising that the sum of these technologies of agency lacked strategic direction and was, in bleak financial circumstances, unlikely to deliver sufficient cost savings, the council adopted a more top-down and calculative approach, seeking to embed their cooperative principles through new “technologies of performance” within established commissioning, procurement and contracting practices. This decision led quickly to a reorganisation of the authority: Five service departments were rationalised into three areas of commissioning activity; an “outcomes-based” model was developed to guide service planning, allocate resources, procure goods and services, and manage contracts; and cabinet members were empowered as lead commissioners, strengthening hierarchical executive structures within the council.

Commissioning was an already established practice in Lambeth long before it became cooperative, having been embraced in the mid-2000s. By 2010 the authority was one of the most outsourced in the country. The Cooperative Commissioning approach then signals more of an evolution of previously established practice, than anything transformational. In
order to embed cooperative principles into this new commissioning model, citizens and community groups are called on to co-produce decision making at all stages of the extant commissioning cycle, from setting outcomes (in line with the council’s strategic priorities), to helping choose preferred providers (from a short-list selected by commissioners) and evaluate the quality of provision (following the council’s performance indicators and benchmarks). Prospective providers, for their part, are expected to comply with expectations to coproduce the design and delivery of services (as a means of managing demand), demonstrate financial sustainability (understood as evidencing a business model that is not reliant on council funding beyond the short term), and, in line with the Public Services Act,
deliver additional “social value” by, *inter alia*, paying employees the London Living Wage, providing apprenticeship and volunteering opportunities, and contributing to the council’s strategic outcomes including by reducing social isolation and increasing “community resilience”. This kind of social value is expected in addition to the “core” outcomes specified in the terms of the service contract and is to be provided without extra resourcing from the authority.

Belying the cooperative qualification, these commissioning goals are translated into concrete and calculable interventions through competitive processes of contractualisation. Cooperative principles are embedded into a “utopian top-down model of contractual management” (Raco, 2014, p. 177) where budget cuts and desired service delivery models, outcomes and social value are packaged together into discrete contracts and put out to tender in an increasingly competitive funding environment. In this way the council devolves responsibility for achieving “more for less” and, to a certain extent, insulates itself from the demands of the public by requiring provider organisations to manage relationships with service users. The council’s role becomes increasingly regulative, working to ensure that providers meet the terms of their contract (still measured by New Public Management inspired technologies of performance, including KPIs) and that contracts provide value for money, despite staffing reductions which reduce its capacity to do so in practice.

Whilst mobilising discourses of cooperation, equal partnership and consensually agreed outcomes, a Foucauldian perspective, exploring the soft and diffuse expressions of governmental power as they operate through normative political rationalities, technologies and subjectivities, suggests that Lambeth Council are trying to “utilize, instrumentalize and mobilize techniques and agents other than those of the ‘state’ in order to govern ‘at a distance’… according to their own programmes and to mobilize resources for their own ends” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 181 emphasis added). Whilst denying that this is a “cuts-driven agenda” and taking care to present it as a bottom-up political programme for community empowerment, the council are enrolling community and voluntary organisations in a top-down governmental project whose underlying role—whether stated and intended, or not—is to help absorb the contradictions of the global financial crisis, as manifest in the politics of centrally prescribed and downloaded austerity, by deepening processes of responsibilisation and contractualisation in the provision of local public services and welfare. In so doing, the Cooperative Council agenda mobilises an ambiguous mixture of technologies of agency and performance that: instrumentalises citizens and communities, whilst obscuring its own responsibilities for them; enrolls service providers into ostensibly cooperative contractual arrangements, whilst eliding the uneven power relations between different providers and between providers and the council; and constructs “the community and voluntary sector as depoliticised acquiescent actors willing to work alongside [their cooperative]… vision…” (Williams et al., 2014, p. 2802).

4.2 From consent to coercion: bureaucratic impediment, administrative domination and unlawful dissimulation

Lambeth council have made much of the democratic potential of the Cooperative Council, claiming that power is being shared, services co-designed, and budgets set in
more open processes. In doing so the council constructs a harmonious and consensual vision of community action, obscuring the varying means, social positions and contingencies of different communities (Brown, 2015) and underestimating the ways in which civil society groups have “been associated with forms of politics that make them ambiguous and potentially difficult ‘partners’ for government” (Newman & Clarke, 2009, p. 46). In this section, I explore examples of what happens when civil society actors become difficult partners, showing the ways in which, at a time of increasing fiscal pressure, the council reverts to hierarchical modes of decision-making and employs coercive tactics to govern, including bureaucratic impediment, administrative domination and unlawful dissimulation.

Even before the reality of austerity was fully known, there were signs that the council’s willingness to coproduce with its citizens would extend only so far as citizens were willing to play “depoliticised acquiescent” roles. In an illuminating section on political leadership in the Sharing Power report, it is stated that:

“In developing this shared vision for the improvements which need to be made in the borough and the outcomes Lambeth Council wishes to realise, it will be essential that this process does not thwart an elected council administration’s duty to carry out its manifesto commitments”. (Lambeth Council, 2011, p. 28 emphasis added)

From the outset then, the participation of citizens in shaping the future of the local state, of engaging in debates over the proper role, quality and functions of local government, was limited to complementing and building on manifesto commitments made with little public participation. Anything else is framed as a potential threat to the political commitments and aspirations of the council, rather than as potentially productive expressions of “agonism” (Mouffe, 2005). This has been made clear in recent years through the council’s cooperative consultation process on the future of leisure services, including libraries.

As already noted, the council’s decision-making scope over the prioritisation of different services in the borough is limited by centrally mandated duties pertaining to adult and social care services, which despite supporting around 10% of the local population, absorb over half of the council’s revenue budget. As pressure on funding has increased, the council’s political priority has been to protect social care spending at the expense of discretionary budgets, leaving parks, libraries and leisure services on the frontline of budget cuts, with savings requirements set at £4 m. Tensions between the council’s commitment to cooperative governance and more hierarchic modes and coercive tactics of governing have emerged as a result.

In an attempt to procure consent for these cuts and enrol citizens in possible “solutions”, in February 2015 the council initiated the Cultural Services 2020 consultation, detailing how the parks, library and leisure services were to be reconfigured. Within the parameters of a fixed financial envelope, the council initially proposed selling two of their libraries and transferring the management of three more to community groups, who would become responsible for fundraising and service delivery. These proposals were strongly opposed by the council’s library staff and those community groups the council had hoped would “do the right thing” and take over these “assets”, on the grounds that they were unsustainable and over-responsibilised communities. The consultation process was also heavily criticised for not giving community
groups sufficient time to formulate alternative ideas, and for failing to seriously consider those which were proposed in time, including one by the head of the libraries service.

Several weeks after the formal consultation process had ended, the council announced that a last-minute “behind the scenes” deal had been made with a London-based social business. In a move that had not been part of the original consultation, the social business agreed to take over the management of the buildings currently housing Lambeth’s libraries and turn them into private gyms, promising to provide a much reduced public library service on the side. This new model has provoked significant and sustained resistance from a heterotopic alliance of community groups, trade unionists, activists, disaffected council officers and one Labour councillor, who have organised a high-profile campaign and engaged in a range of disruptive tactics, including occupying one of the libraries for a week, attracting national press coverage. In response the council have become increasingly defensive and coercive: After evicting the occupiers, Lambeth council are now spending more money on paying private security guards to keep libraries closed than it cost to keep them open, and after public remarks criticising the council’s plans, the aforementioned Labour councillor has been suspended from the party for six-months.

Framed by the fiscal parameters set by central government, statutory imperatives and the executive decisions of senior councillors and officers, the limits of participatory democracy at a time of austerity have been thrown into sharp relief. Yet, the Cultural Services 2020 consultation is not an isolated example. Despite drawing extensively on the language of bottom-up participatory cooperation between local actors, with few exceptions the engagement of citizens and community and voluntary organisations with the Cooperative Council is taking place on a time-limited, project-by-project, basis where local residents and groups are encouraged to take part in “invited” spaces of participation in which agendas are pre-determined and substantive decisions have already been made by senior councillors and officers. This is noticeable throughout the council’s commissioning approach. In spite of stated aims that Cooperative Commissioning processes would be coproduced by residents and service users, the changes detailed in the previous section seem to have centralised decision making, giving more power to cabinet members and senior officers. As one commissioner put it: “The power has shifted to the cabinet and the directors primarily. Decisions are made behind closed doors and nobody is made part of those decisions below the director level”. This group of actors make all budget related decisions, including setting budgets for specific services and balancing budgets across priority areas. This has a significant bearing on the kinds of service models tendered by the council.

Within the commissioning approach, specific procurement and contracting processes tend towards hierarchy and coercion by working against equal forms of association and undermining the collectivisation of responsibility through practices of competitive tendering that shape preferred market behaviours and pit prospective providers against one another for increasingly small amounts of money. However well-intentioned the cooperative commissioning approach may be, when rolled out at a time of austerity, with the expectations that organisations will deliver more for less, the approach risks “doubly responsibilising” providers. They are expected to compete with one another to attract sources of funding and contribute to the wider economic, social and environmental well-being of the borough “in the context of powers and...
contingencies radically limiting their ability to do so” (Brown, 2015, p. 131). At their worst these contractual devices serve as technologies of administrative domination. They are mechanisms by which the council “downloads” the risks and responsibilities of budget cuts, promulgates further neoliberalising governmentalities by “installing ‘economic’ logics of calculation… and strategies of ‘self-governing’ subjects” (Newman, 2013, p. 6), and mobilises various forms of invisible community labour through expectations of added social value.

Local providers, whose funding options are increasingly limited within and beyond the council, are reticent to put their heads above the proverbial parapet and challenge this state of affairs. Several council officers recognised this and explained that the fact and threat of de-commissioning “troublesome” partners was muting the collective voice of the VCS. One prominent organisation, who helped coordinate the voice of VCS organisations in the borough, found their funding withdrawn in 2013. Council officers intimated that this had little to do with concerns around efficacy or efficiency and much to do with the organisation’s antagonistic relationship with senior officers and councillors. In its place a volunteer centre was commissioned with a reduced budget, challenging self-fundraising responsibilities and a more tightly prescribed mission focused on volunteering.

The tendency to revert to hierarchical and coercive modes of governance when consent cannot be secured, has been further exemplified in recent years by several local housing campaigns, organised to prevent the eviction of long-standing housing cooperatives, and the demolition/regeneration of some of the council’s housing estates, including Cressingham Gardens and Central Hill estates. A full account of these cases is beyond the scope of this paper, however a summary of the Save Cressingham Gardens campaign highlights a number of shared concerns with how the council have operated.

In December 2012, Lambeth Council notified residents of Cressingham Gardens, an architecturally celebrated estate bordering Brockwell Park in Tulse Hill, that improvement works would be required to bring almost half of the homes on the estate up to Lambeth’s Housing Standard. The notification suggested that refurbishment was not viable; not only was it unaffordable within the council’s reduced capital budget, but it would also be insufficient given the structural scale of the improvements needed. The council were therefore considering some form of estate demolition and regeneration, whilst promising residents to “look at all possible options for improving [the estate]…” Adding that, “so long as they are high quality, affordable, sustainable and meet the needs of residents… then they will be considered”. Following this, between July and September 2013, Lambeth Council contracted Social Life, a community engagement consultancy, to run a “consultation and co-production process” with residents to gauge their opinions on five options for the estate, ranging from refurbishment and in-build (options 1–3) to partial or complete demolition and re-build (options 4 and 5). Overwhelmingly, residents favoured option 1 for refurbishment.

Despite consulting on all five of these options into 2015, the council claimed that refurbishment was not a viable option for the estate. They argued that it would cost more than the council could afford within its reduced capital budget and that there was a need to deliver greater density on the estate to contribute towards a 2014 manifesto commitment to build 1,000 new homes at council rent levels in the borough. The future of the estate was framed increasingly in terms of financial exigencies, poor quality
housing and the need to house some of the 21,000 people on the housing waiting list. In
the winter of 2014/15 the council continued to engage with residents on the estate over
all 5 options, with a specific project team set up to scrutinise the financial viability of
each. On the 26th of February, however, whilst the financial scrutiny was still on-going,
the council presented residents with an unexpected fait accompli: that the council
would be no longer be consulting on options 1 to 3, which they considered unaffordable
based on their unreleased viability assessments, and that they intended to pursue option
5 instead (Figure 4).

In March 2015 Lambeth’s Cabinet approved the complete demolition of the estate
and its regeneration through a controversial Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which
transfers ownership of the estate to a private company, run by the council. This new
company enables the council to make use of the “rent gap” on the estate and seek
external investment outside of the constraints imposed by the capital budget to build
new homes at market values, subsidising the building of an additional 27 homes at
council rent levels. Controversially, the SPV effectively privatises the council homes on
the estate, whose landlord will be the SPV and not the council directly, affecting their
tenancy agreements. The SPV can also be sold in the future, should the council’s
financial position worsen, potentially acting as a gateway to Global Corporate
Landlordship (GLC) (Beswick et al., 2016).

Residents involved with the Save Cressingham Gardens (See http://savecressingham.
wordpress.com/) campaign have accused the council of behaving uncooperatively and
of pursuing coercive tactics ranging from bureaucratic impediment to unlawful dissim-
ulation, including: failing to communicate consistently and honestly; refusing to divulge
key financial information about the viability of the different options being consulted on;
exaggerating the costs of refurbishment to legitimise demolition; trying to set lease-
holders and council tenants against one another; rejecting in just two days a profes-
sionally produced alternative business case for a green retrofit of Cressingham Gardens;
misleading council tenants about the nature of the SPV and leaseholders about the cost
of buying a new home on the estate; and acting unilaterally against the wishes of the

Figure 4. Residents of Cressingham Gardens make their grievances known.
Source: Brockwell
majority of residents, despite previous assurances from the Leader of the Council that they would not do so. In November 2015, residents won a successful judicial challenge (Bokrosova Vs London Borough of Lambeth) against the council concerning the nature of the consultation, which the judge stated had been “unlawful” for removing options 1 to 3 whilst they were still being scrutinised by the resident-led project team. Whilst the verdict did not overturn Lambeth’s decision to demolish the estate, it did require the council to re-run their consultation process.

At the time of writing, despite overwhelming and continuing opposition from leaseholders and tenants, the local authority continue to push through their plans for estate demolition, limiting consultation with residents to influencing decisions made within the frame of option 5.

5. Conclusion: towards ‘Roll-with-it 1’?

This paper has sought to shed light on the governance and politics of “austerity localism” through a case study of the Cooperative Council in Lambeth. Framed in relation to a Foucauldian and Gramscian analysis of consent and coercion as dialectically related modes of governing, it has been argued that the scale and nature of the financial pressures facing local authorities has, in this case, helped push Lambeth Council towards more hierarchic and coercive practices. Yet, this case study has also indicated that the Cooperative Council cannot be fully understood as an instance of good intentions blown off course by the strong headwinds of neoliberal austerity (Peck & Theodore, 2015). Such an interpretation would over-determine the role of central government at the expense of a more granular analysis of the antagonistic political landscape of local government. Rather, it has been shown that the Cooperative Council, from the outset, articulated with austerian discourses, circulating between and beyond central and local policy actors that accept as axiomatic the need to make budget cuts and refigure the relations between state, market and civil society. Within a context of waning fiscal democracy locally, it also inherited a set of enduring tensions between participatory and representative decision-making, intrinsic and instrumental attitudes towards citizen and community empowerment, and what the public values and what is seen as being valuable for the public. As an urban policy, the Cooperative Council emerged from and evolved through shifting central-local relations, the limitations of territorially bounded politics, and locally unresolved tensions inherent to network governance theory and practice. The shift that this paper has identified towards hierarchic and coercive governance must be understood within this context.

Thinking ahead, as Davies (2010, p. 17) puts it, the question is not so much whether a particular configuration is horizontal and consensual, or hierarchical and coercive; but “which term of the relationship is the most prominent in any spatio-temporal and scalar conjuncture”. The election in May 2015 of a Conservative majority Government spells further immiseration for local authorities in England, who are again expected to shoulder the burden of deficit reduction. As budgets are reduced year on year, leaving less to spend on discretionary services, the council’s ability and appetite to enrol citizens in receding local services is lessening. Already there are signs that the Cooperative Council agenda is losing political backing; in the 2014 local Labour manifesto the term was not used at all. Whilst small and relatively inexpensive experiments in local service provision may continue, the pressures towards the centralisation of governance and towards outsourcing to large private providers
and attracting private financial investment, including through Special Purpose Vehicles, are great. At a time of deepening and seemingly permanent austerity, the balance between horizontal networks and hierarchy, between soft and hard forms of power, and between consent and coercion seems likely to tip inexorably to the latter.

As this happens the ability of local authorities to neutralise dissent “through co-optation and marginalization of critique” (Keil, 2009, p. 237) may come under pressure as the infusion of neoliberal austerity with social policy rhetoric and other apparently progressive political registers rings increasingly hollow. Already across London “activist citizens” are looking beyond the narrow terms of public service reform to ask more fundamental questions about collective consumption and the processes of urban development, capitalist accumulation and creative destruction constitutive of urbanisation in London and what, if anything, the local state can do about such issues. As citizens step further outside of the spaces prescribed for their engagement, and act in unauthorised ways as citizen activists, pretence to cooperative and collaborative decision making may well dissolve, emphasising more clearly the point that the state must always have recourse to domination and the “armour of coercion”.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisors, Prof. Mike Raco and Dr. Susan Moore for reading drafts of this paper, and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for funding my research, and all of those kind enough to speak with me as part of my research, without whom none of this would be possible. All inaccuracies are the author’s responsibility.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [ES/J500185/1].

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