Representations of displacement from the Middle East and North Africa
Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, University College London

As you walk on the trace
Of those who left before you,
While the moon is faint in the sky,
Say to yourself, if you can:
Absence is the trace of those who disappeared.

Yousif M. Qasmiyeh

Introduction

Forced migration moves in and out of the public sphere, with political, media and civil society attention ebbing and flowing across time and space. However, while displacement is increasingly common – ‘one in every 122 humans is now either a refugee, internally displaced, or seeking asylum’ (UNHCR 2015a) – and also increasingly protracted – over half of the world’s refugees (more than 14 million people) have been displaced for over ten years -, the vast majority of contexts of forced migration typically remain invisible in the global North until moments identified as ‘crises’ arise, puncturing and punctuating this invisibility. In the contemporary context, and since the summer of 2015 in particular, European and North American political discourses, media representations and civil society campaigns have become saturated with images of certain refugees, in particular those from the Middle East.

The current hypervisibility of Middle Eastern refugees in media and political discourses is, on many levels, understandable given the sheer number of refugees fleeing from diverse, intersecting crises and conflicts across the Middle East and further afield, and also in light of the challenges faced by Northern states and Northern-led organisations attempting to respond to these processes of forced migration. However, hypervisibility is itself regionally governed; it is arguably not the ‘humanitarian crisis’ evolving in the Middle East but rather Europe’s (self-)position(ing) as a space overwhelmed by the arrival of an estimated 1 million refugees in 2015, that is at the core of this process of hypervisibilisation in the European public sphere. In contrast, forced migrants across the global South remain invisible precisely because they are of no consequence to Europe. Ultimately, processes of (hyper)visibility have themselves also simultaneously been characterised by the reinscription of diverse forms of invisibility and marginalisation.

This short piece draws on my research with and about refugees from the Middle East and North Africa both to historicise and contextualise what I refer to as intersecting processes of representation and footnoting (following Derrida) in the study of, and diverse responses to, forced migration (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010, 2014a, 2016a). In particular, I evoke the concept of representation to examine the extent to which certain groups of forced migrants and particular identity markers (real, imagined and imposed) on the one hand, and certain modes of ‘humanitarian’ response to forced migration on the other, are centralized and heralded while others are concealed from public view for diverse reasons and with different effects. The deconstructive

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1 Cited in Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh (2010: 294).
framework underpinning my work as a whole leads me purposefully to centralize that which has previously been assigned a peripheral position throughout the ever expanding ‘archive of knowledge’ (Foucault 1989, 25) vis-à-vis particular refugee situations, and simultaneously to critically interrogate how, why and with what effect only certain bodies, identity markers and models of humanitarian response become hypervisible in the public sphere. In the following pages, I start by tracing the roles of visibility and invisibility in constituting the ‘ideal refugee’ (and the concomitant figure of the ‘a-refugee’), before turning to my ongoing research into refugee-refugee humanitarianism as an invisible form of Southern-led (rather than Northern-led or dominated) responses to displacement from Syria.

Repressentations and ‘Ideal Refugees’

Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, Syrians have moved not only within and across borders but also in and out of favour with different international actors. Until an individual who had allegedly entered Europe with a Syrian passport was identified as one of the perpetrators of the Paris attacks in November 2015, Syrian refugees were in many ways positioned as the ‘ideal refugees’ in Europe: their requests for asylum were not only ‘legible’ for decision-makers, but they were considered both to be legitimate, and priority ‘candidates’ for international protection. In effect, asylum seekers from Syria in Europe have been ‘fast-tracked’ in many ways due to the hypervisibility of their vulnerability and worthiness of protection. Such was the experience of Nabil whose application for asylum in the UK resulted in the granting of protection in less than one month in the summer of 2013, and Hosam, who was granted refugee status only two months after applying for asylum in France in 2014 (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016b; Gabiam and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, under review). The speed, and apparent efficiency with which asylum claims have been processed when submitted by individuals fleeing persecution in Syria is particularly notable when compared with the insecurity which has typically characterised asylum proceedings, with UK-based asylum-seekers from the Middle East often having had to wait for up to 10 years to have their claims for refugee status resolved (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh, 2010). This reaffirms that the temporality of insecurity faced by asylum-seekers in Europe is not only based upon their point of origin, but also the geopolitical context in which their cases are being reviewed (ibid).

Indeed, at the same time as Nabil’s and Hosam’s asylum claims were processed so rapidly, a hierarchy of recognition and worth has emerged, with other refugees having been rendered ‘bad refugees’ or even ‘a-refugees’. While Syrians were prioritised for registration on the Greek island of Lesbos and their onwards migration to the Greek mainland, Iraqis and Afghans were situated as ‘second-tier refugees’ destined to wait longer and receive less humanitarian assistance than their Syrian counterparts (Domokos and Kingsley, 2015). By late-2015, Western and Eastern European states were deporting asylum-seekers who were neither from Syria nor from Iraq or Afghanistan, refusing to allow them entry into their countries and sending them back to Greece. Throughout those processes, Other refugees from across the Middle East and North Africa, South East Asia, and further afield, have been rendered invisible ‘as’ refugees deserving of protection. Indeed, this is not an historical anomaly, since groups including Palestinians have often been represented as what I denominate ‘a-refugees’ whose very existence is denied or who are not considered to be worthy of humanitarian or political support (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015a: 176).
The concept of the ‘ideal refugee’, as a key figure against whom ‘Other refugees’ are simultaneously compared, and constituted, was explored in detail in my first book, *The Ideal Refugees* (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014a). This book - based on multisited ethnographic fieldwork with Sahrawi refugees and their aid providers in South-West Algeria (the base for the Sahrawi camps since 1975), and in Cuba, South Africa, Spain and Syria (which have offered Sahrawi refugees different forms of humanitarian and political support over the past four decades)² – examined how, why and to what effect Sahrawi refugees have systematically been presented by observers from across the global North as ‘unique’ and ‘socially superior’ to ‘other refugees’ (ibid). It was in *The Ideal Refugees* that I first developed the analytical framework of *repress*entation to examine not only how refugees are represented by others – academics, the media, politicians and aid agencies -, but also how refugees represent both themselves and other refugees, and how these processes relate to the politics of survival. Centralising the significance of intersectionality within postcolonial analyses, I examined the processes through which Sahrawi refugees’ Islamic belief and practice have been rendered invisible, while claims of secularism, democracy and gender equality have been purposefully highlighted by the Sahrawis’ political representatives throughout their interactions with diverse audiences from across the global North. Ultimately, I argued that the erasure of Islam and violence against women, coupled with the centralisation of secularism, democracy and gender equality in the Sahrawi official discourse emerge as discursive strategies invoked to position the Sahrawi as ‘the ideal refugees’ precisely as a means to secure both essential humanitarian assistance and political support for the quest for national self-determination from Northern state and non-state actors.

An additional dimension that is particularly pertinent in the contemporary refugee situation in the Middle East and Europe alike, pertains to the strategies that may be mobilised by refugees to secure legal status by aligning themselves with the figure of the ‘ideal refugee’. Indeed, refugees are not merely ‘affected by’ policies and politics, nor do they merely ‘have’ lived experiences that can be documented, recognised and analysed by different stakeholders. Rather, Qasmiyeh and I draw on Boal (1992) to argue that refugees are ‘spect-actors’ who not only observe the structures that frame their lives, but ‘who resist, negotiate and enact a number of discourses and counter-discourses, thereby embodying processes of individual and collective transformation’ (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh, 2010: 295). Such a focus does not intend to romanticise or celebrate refugees’ agency, nor to argue that all refugees have equal fields of vision or of action (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011). Indeed, the hypervisibility of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa has often emerged due to the securitisation of asylum seekers in general and Muslim refugees in particular, in which refugees’ agency has been perceived, and represented, as threatening in nature.

² While the Sahrawi are themselves a group which is largely invisible in European and North American public spheres, the Sahrawi refugee camps and the Sahrawi’s quest for self-determination are nonetheless hypervisible in the Spanish political, civic and media discourses; this is largely due to Spain’s colonial occupation, and the popular perception that Spain ‘abandoned’ its former colonial subjects when it withdrew from the territory formerly known as the Spanish Sahara, and now called Western Sahara (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2012, 2014).
In the context of refugees from the Middle East, including refugees fleeing the conflicts across Syria, hypervisibility and agency are not benign terms, since they have frequently been the framework through which refugees have been represented as threats, including of terrorism (Kingsley, 2015) and of patriarchal violence against women (Hoffman et al, 2016). As Derrida noted, ‘The blessing of visibility and daylight is also what the police and politics demand’ (Derrida, 2000a: 57). However, it is precisely against the backdrop of the securitisation of asylum-seekers, Islamophobia and the constitution of ‘Muslim Others’ as quintessentially patriarchal and ‘barbaric’, that refugees have at times developed a range of representational strategies to secure humanitarian, political and legal support, including precisely by disavowing their religious beliefs (Akram, 2000; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014a), or by centralising their minority (religious, gendered, or sexuality) status ‘as’ victims of the archetypal Muslim Other (ibid) to meet the expectations and preferences of aid providers and decision makers (Ticktin 2005; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015b).

While developed as a means of analysing the power relations between refugees, their political representatives, and Northern aid providers in the case-study of the Sahrawi refugee camps, the concepts of ‘the ideal refugee’ and ‘repressentation’ are travelling concepts (following Said, 1983) which can help us understand how, why, and to what effect refugees from MENA attempt to present themselves as deserving of protection in the contemporary refugee situation. In contexts of marginalisation, hostility and overt violence refugees may variously present themselves as members of the moment’s ideal refugee group, or attempt to blur or magnify identity markers to ensure their physical, and existential, survival.

For instance, the erasure of particular identity markers combined with the magnification of other features identified as being prioritised by the international community, can be seen in the cases of non-Syrian asylum-seekers who have taken on the persona of the Syrian refugee in the hope that this will expedite their granting of protection, even when their ‘real’ asylum case may clearly meet the grounds for being granted refugee status under the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees (on the latter, also see Sandvik, 2011).

In the context of the Syrian refugee situation in Europe, such ‘performances’ have led to the increasing usage of ‘dialect testing’ to filter out ‘real’ Syrians from those asylum-seekers presenting themselves as such in order to access registration systems, humanitarian assistance, or refugee status (UK Government, 2015). ‘Language resists all mobilities because it moves about with me’ (Derrida 2000a: 91), and yet the question remains: ‘Is language in possession, ever a possessing or possessed possession?’ (Derrida, 1998: 17). In spite of this potential paradox, European policy makers have mobilised this process of linguistic accompaniment in order to determine the ‘true’ origins of the asylum-seeker.

While officially used as a means of rejecting or supporting claims of belonging to well documented persecuted groups (Naysmith, 2015) in spite of the unreliability of this practice being extensively documented (i.e. Green, 2015), dialects have also often been used as a means of waging war. In the context of the Lebanese civil war, for instance, key shibboleth were used to differentiate Palestinian refugees from Lebanese citizens, with those ‘mispronouncing’ the shibboleth being readily identified and persecuted accordingly.
The instrumentalisation of ‘dialect testing’ as part of immigration and asylum procedures in Europe (i.e. UK Government, 2015), however, is based on a number of key assumptions which are anathema to many refugees’ lived experiences, and indeed, to the ethnic and national heterogeneity of societies in the Middle East and North Africa (and elsewhere). Major challenges include the extent to which mothers and fathers, or broader family members, may speak different dialects within the same household, and the extent to which children may develop their own hybrid dialect as a result (Qasmiyeh, 2013, 2016). So too is this the case of children who have studied outside of the Middle East, to return speaking neither their mother tongue nor the language of their formal education fluently (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015b: 48, 63).

Amongst those displaced by the Syrian conflict, people seeking international protection speak not one hyperaudible dialect, but a range of dialects with diverse accents precisely due to this heterogeneity, which has itself been the cause of persecution in the past.

**Overlapping displacements**

Indeed, this is a significant illustration that the contemporary displacement scenario is characterised not only by increasingly protracted displacement – as noted above -, but also by overlapping displacements (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2012, 2015b). That is to say that individuals, families and communities displaced by the Syrian conflict have often been displaced internally and internationally on one or more occasions in the past. While largely remaining on the margins of media, political and academic attention, the Syrian conflict has displaced not only Syrian citizens, but also Palestinians, Kurds and Iraqis (inter alia) who were living in Syria as refugees and stateless people at the outbreak of the civil war and have subsequently been displaced both within and from Syria (Gabiam and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, under review; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015c, 2016b; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh, 2016).

This is not to argue that Palestinians and other non-Syrian nationals displaced from Syria are resolutely invisible in the global North, since numerous counter-examples prove the contrary: in particular, the centrality of images of the siege of the Palestinian refugee camp of Yarmouk in Damascus in 2013, and of Aylan Kurdi’s body lying on a Turkish beach in 2015 have already been recognised as emblematic images of the Syrian conflict which, at the time prompted a paradigm shift in the global North’s political, humanitarian and empathic responses to the overlapping conflicts and crises of and emanating from the Middle East (Gabiam and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, under review). In effect, when they have reached Europe, Palestinian refugees fleeing the siege of Yarmouk have been recognised as being in need of international protection – as exemplified, in fact, by the cases of Nabil and Hosam cited above, who were granted asylum in the UK and France respectively as Palestinians born and raised in Yarmouk camp in Syria.

Nonetheless, these defining moments - which already form part of the evolving archive of knowledge pertaining to the Syrian conflict and Europe’s responses to this - remain temporary ‘snapshots’ puncturing and punctuating longer-standing processes of the invisibility of those overlapping groups of displaced people who have remained in their region of origin, sharing (and contesting) spaces with citizens and Other refugees alike in contexts characterised by what Derrida so astutely conceptualises as ‘hostipitality’ (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015a/b; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh, 2016).
Indeed, in spite of the predominance of media accounts pertaining to the refugee crisis in Europe and declarations that ‘the European project’ itself is at risk by virtue of the mass arrival of refugees in and across the European space, the vast majority of refugees from Syria continue to be hosted in neighbouring countries, as is the case worldwide (86% of all displaced people remain within the global South - UNHCR 2015b). And apart from emerging during unique moments of crisis, both displaced people in the global South, and the diverse responses developed by state and non-state actors in the global South have remained on the margins of academic, political and policy accounts of forced migration.

South-South Humanitarianism

Academics increasingly recognize the existence of multiple humanitarianisms, including ‘humanitarianisms of Europe, of Africa, of the global, and of the local’ (Kennedy 2004:xv), and yet humanitarian action not borne of the Northern-dominated and highly institutionalized international regime has remained largely neglected in academia (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto 2015; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015b). In effect, my ongoing research examines why, how and with what effect diverse ‘alternative’ humanitarianisms have been ‘erased’ from or ‘footnoted’ from we can refer to as the hegemonic ‘archive of knowledge’ regarding humanitarianism (following Derrida and Foucault respectively) (ibid).

Academics and practitioners alike have long argued that humanitarianism (as ideology and as practice) reproduces, rather than disrupts, Northern colonial ties of exploitation and control over the South (Duffield, 2007). Postcolonial and critical studies of humanitarianism have long critiqued Northern actors’ motivations behind, and models of intervening in, situations of conflict and displacement. Inter alia, they have highlighted the neo-colonial power imbalances between Northern donors and Southern recipients, the hegemonic representations of the needy and desperate ‘Other,’ and the inherent paternalism of protection scenarios in which Northern actors are positioned as the only forces able to save ‘them’ (i.e. Rajaman 2002; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014b).

In this context, when Southern actors’ responses to conflict-induced displacement have been analysed, academics and policy observers have often expressed concerns that such responses may be motivated by ideological and faith-based priorities, rather than adhering to the ‘international’ humanitarian principles of neutrality, universality and impartiality (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Ager 2013; Ager et al 2015; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto 2015). Throughout such debates, the humanitarian dimension of Southern actors’ responses to processes of forced migration has not only been questioned but often automatically discredited.

In contrast, my analysis of the genealogy and contemporary manifestations of South-South humanitarianism starts from the premise that critically analysing the power relations underpinning Southern responses to conflict-induced displacement is essential in order to avoid either prematurely idealising these responses as egalitarian and empowering processes that challenge neo-colonial humanitarian interventions, or demonising them a priori through the application of securitisation frameworks which have arguably prompted much of the academic and policy focus on faith-based humanitarianism (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011, 2015b).
In order to better understand the motivations, nature and impacts of Southern-led initiatives to displacement from Syria, my research aims to centralise refugees’ own experiences of and perspectives on initiatives and programmes designed and implemented by ‘Southern’ actors in support of refugees from Syria. By bringing refugees’ voices to the forefront, my work continues to strive not only to examine refugees’ lived experiences of displacement and receiving aid, but also to shed light on refugees’ understandings of humanitarianism, and the extent to which they consider that diverse Southern-led responses to conflict-induced displacement can or should be conceptualised as ‘humanitarian’ programmes. This approach is exemplified both through my research with Sahrawi and Palestinian refugees regarding their perspectives on the diverse forms of assistance provided by Cuba, Algeria, Libya, Lebanon, and South Africa (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014a, 2015b), and with Palestinians from Syria and Syrian refugees regarding their views of local community responses in Lebanon (ibid, 2015c).3 Such an approach is particularly significant in order to transcend debates regarding the desirability and/or tensions of ‘alternative’ forms of humanitarianism which have, until now, been monopolised by Northern academic and policy perspectives (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015b). Furthermore, bringing refugees’ voices to the fore also requires us to explore the agency of refugees as not only recipients, but also as providers of assistance, by examining under-researched processes of ‘refugee-refugee humanitarianism’. Critically assessing the implications of these processes is particularly significant given the increasingly protracted, and often overlapping, nature of conflict-induced displacement in the Middle East.

**Refugee-Refugee Humanitarianism and Hospitality**

In spite of their invisibility in media and political representations projected from and to Europe, commentators have argued that civil society groups are in fact the most significant actors supporting refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey (ie. IRIN 2012; Gatten and Alabaster 2012). These initiatives have included Lebanese, Jordanian and Turkish citizens providing food and shelter to refugees (IRIN 2012) and local faith-based organizations delivering aid and providing spiritual support to refugees in Jordan (El-Nakib and Ager 2015); but also protracted Palestinian refugees offering support to ‘new’ refugees seeking sanctuary in Lebanon (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015c; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh, 2016).

In many ways, refugee-led initiatives developed in response to existing and new refugee situations challenge widely held (although equally widely contested) assumptions that refugees are passive victims in need of care from outsiders (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014a, 2015c). While Palestinian refugees’ very existence has often been denied and they have been positioned as the quintessential ‘a-refugees’ (see above), the example of ‘established’ Palestinian refugees offering humanitarian support to ‘new’ refugees situates Palestinians as active providers of

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3 Centralising refugees’ own conceptualisations and negotiations – not solely their experiences - of bureaucratic processes has long been a central aim of my research; for instance, through research with 50 Palestinians in France, Sweden and the UK between 2011-2015 I have analyzed Palestinians’ personal and political critiques of ‘statelessness’ as a legal and political identity marker imposed by diverse academics, practitioners and policy-makers alike (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016b).
support, rather than dependent recipients. Equally, it reflects the extent to which refugee camps can become ‘shared spaces’, spaces to which ‘new’ refugees can head in search of safety (Qasmiyeh and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2013; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015c). However, far from idealising these responses, this example simultaneously raises key questions vis-à-vis the power imbalances and processes of exclusion and overt hostility that may characterise local responses to conflict, and also regarding the sustainability such refugee-led responses in contexts of widespread, and overlapping, precariousness and violence.

Derrida’s notion of hostipitality is particularly pertinent in elucidating, as well as problematising, the relationship between welcoming and rejecting neighbours in times of conflict and peace alike. Hospitality, ‘a quasi synonym of “welcome”’ (Derrida, 1999: 45, is never absolute; rather, it is always ‘parasitized by its opposite, “hostility”, the undesirable guest which it harbours as the self-contradiction within its own body’ (Derrida, 2000b: 3). Hospitality inherently bears its own opposition (and opposite), the ever present possibility of hostility towards the Other who has, at one time, been welcomed at the threshold. The possibility of rejection – and overt violence - is always already there, and a neighbour can only ever welcome another neighbour in a conditional way: to offer welcome is always already to have the power to delimit the space or place that is being offered to the Other. As such, whether we are the host or the guest in asylum, we do not know what hospitality is – it is ultimately unknowable and also unachievable (ibid: 4): ‘Perhaps no one welcomed is ever completely welcome’ (2000b: 6). In effect, Palestinians – whether the hosts or the guests in this case-study - have never ‘known’ what it is to ‘be’ completely welcome[d]’ in the Middle East (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015b: 109).

‘We arrived in the camp, not in Lebanon’

Baddawi is a Palestinian refugee camp in North Lebanon which was established in 1955 and – while estimates vary widely - was home to between 25,000 - 40,000 Palestinians before the outbreak of the Syrian conflict. Like other Palestinian camps across Lebanon, Baddawi is beyond Lebanese jurisdiction and has long been characterised by violence and lawlessness. However, while the Palestinian camps are commonly referred to as ‘islands of insecurity’ (Sayigh, 2000), Baddawi has also become a space of protection and assistance for thousands of ‘new’ refugees4 from Syria since 2011. These ‘new’ refugees include Syrian nationals who have fled violence and persecution in their country, but also Syrian Palestinians, Kurds and Iraqis who have been displaced from refugee camps and cities across that country. Whilst they may be categorised as ‘new’ arrivals in Lebanon and Jordan when compared with these ‘established’ refugee communities, refugees from Syria are now officially categorised as protracted refugees and, indeed, for thousands of Palestinians and Iraqis, this is the second, third or fourth time that they and their families have been displaced by conflict.

4 This is not the first time that Palestinian refugees in Baddawi have hosted ‘new’ refugees, having provided sanctuary to an additional 15,000 Palestinians displaced from near-by Nahr el-Bared refugee camp when that camp was destroyed during the fighting between Fatah Al-Islam and the Lebanese army in 2007. 10,000 Palestinians from Nahr el-Bared camp remained in Baddawi by 2009. See Qasmiyeh and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2013; Qasmiyeh, 2016.
During a recent fieldtrip in the summer of 2015, many of my interviewees in Baddawi camp reiterated that when they fled Syria ‘we arrived in the camp’ and just ‘passed through Lebanon.’ Having crossed the Syrian-Lebanese border, they were physically on Lebanese territory and yet explained that they had travelled directly to, and arrived in, Baddawi camp, where established residents and local organisations offered them shelter, food and clothes. In many ways, the camp has superseded the (hypervisible) Lebanese state, with many refugees from Syria explicitly stating that, from the very onset of their journeys, they had identified Baddawi as their intended destination. Indeed, in spite of the extreme poverty and ad hoc clashes that take place between the Palestinian factions that compete to assert their presence and/or to control different parts of the camp, Baddawi continues to be perceived by many ‘new’ refugees as being safer than any of the spaces available outside of the existing Palestinian camps. The Palestinian refugee camps are thus simultaneously ‘islands of insecurity’ and ‘islands’ that are in many ways separated from national Lebanese policies vis-à-vis ‘new’ refugees, whether these national policies offer support or, as is increasingly the case, restrictions on their presence in Lebanon.

**Refugee-refugee solidarity and hierarchies of inclusion and exclusion**

In many ways, arriving in the camp – whether Baddawi or other Palestinian camps in Lebanon – has reflected the emergence of a new form of solidarity: solidarity between old and new refugees. Established refugees in Baddawi camp and ‘new’ refugees often have a great deal in common, providing strong foundations for this form of refugee-refugee support: inter alia, they share the legal and political status of being refugees and an embodied understanding of the nature and impacts of violence, dispossession and displacement. Sharing the increasingly cramped space of Baddawi refugee camp has, in many ways, been an opportunity to form part of the broader refugee nation, a space of solidarity in which they can – following Nancy (2000: 4) – ‘be with’ other refugees, rather than arriving as outsiders to a Lebanese city.

However, refugees in Baddawi are not positioned equally, nor have they been equally welcomed, or had equal access to the services and resources available. Ultimately, ‘togetherness and being-together are not equivalent’ (Nancy, 2000: 60), and a new hierarchy of refugee-ness has emerged (even though this hierarchy is different from that reflected in and reconstituted by European media representations and state policies). In Baddawi, established residents describe ‘Other’ refugees ‘as’ refugees, clearly differentiating between the camps’ natives (the original, authentic refugees) and the newcomers (somehow inauthentic and challenging the rights, and space, of ‘established’ refugees). Indeed, this differentiation between the refugee Self and Other parallels increasing tensions between established and new refugees, not only over the limited space in the camps, but also over increasingly limited resources and job opportunities there.

Baddawi camp has become a space in which both of the United Nations’ refugee agencies are present: the ‘global refugee agency’, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), providing assistance and protection to all refugees from Syria *apart from* Palestinians (who remain invisible in UNHCR statistics and programmes – Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016b), while the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has a mandate to provide support *only* to Palestinian refugees, including both established and new Palestinian refugees in the camp. Following UNHCR’s arrival in the camps, camp residents have transformed...
‘UNHCR’ into a verb: the camps have been ‘UNHCR-ized.’ Through this process, Palestinians who had originally worked for UNRWA – the main employer in the camps – have shifted, when possible, to UNHCR positions, which are more highly paid than UNRWA roles. ‘Established’ Palestinian refugees who used to provide help to other Palestinians in the camp through UNRWA are now helping Syrian refugees through UNHCR. Simultaneously, Palestinians are becoming increasingly aware that UNRWA itself is a feeble and frail body unable to cope with the weight of their presence and existence, rights and needs for the present and the future. They are thus coming to terms with the inescapable disappearance of this body, which is being overshadowed and smothered by UNHCR.

With Baddawi camp's already limited services and infrastructure being severely under-resourced, established camp residents and local organisations are increasingly running out of resources to support ‘new’ refugees, and, indeed, their own immediate families. Just as antagonism between refugees and citizens around the world has been well-documented, and as non-Syrian refugees become increasingly frustrated by the unequal treatment of asylum-seekers across Europe and North America, so too are insecurities and inequalities becoming increasingly visible in Baddawi camp amongst and between new and established groups of refugees.

Concluding Thoughts
In this highly complex and under-resourced crisis, refugee-refugee humanitarianism – whilst relegated to the margins – continues to fill a significant gap, providing material, emotional and spiritual support to many of those who have been displaced by the Syrian conflict and remain within their region of origin. Such support is highly valued by many ‘new’ refugees, and yet local, refugee-to-refugee assistance, by neighbours who are simultaneously identified as part of the refugee Self but also the refugee Other, is becoming increasingly unsustainable as time passes. From the initial sense of sorority and fraternity that underpinned the ‘welcoming’ of ‘new’ refugees by Palestinians in Baddawi camp, established refugees have increasingly questioned the short-, medium-, and longer-term implications of hosting ‘new’ refugees and of the UNHCR-ization of the camps. As established residents have refocused on their own situations, hospitality has been increasingly replaced by a sense of detachment from ‘new’ refugees’ needs; ultimately, this has shifted to a response that has embodied, at best, the ‘unwelcoming’ of ‘new refugees’, and at worst, overt hostility and violence.

Across the Middle East and Europe alike, solidarity, welcome and hospitality have been interspersed with and superseded by exclusion, violence and hostility towards refugees. In spite of the hypervisibility of refugees from Syria in the European and North American public spheres – whether framed as objects of pity or fear - the vast majority of refugees (who primarily remain in the global South) and the vast majority of Southern-led responses to displacement have remained invisible across time and space. The tropes of visibility and invisibility have provided the framework guiding this short piece, which has aimed to examine the ways in which refugees from the Middle East and North Africa have been represented to and by different stakeholders, including the ways in which refugees represent themselves to neighbours, aid providers and decision-makers. In so doing, it has been my intention neither to idealise nor demonise refugees, but rather to centralise the ways in which refugees negotiate the politics of survival and of solidarity in contexts of overlapping and
seemingly ever-expanding precariousness and hostipality. Today, as in the past, it is equally the case that refugees’ ‘existence is exposed and exposing’ (Nancy, 2000: 17), while, simultaneously, ‘absence is the trace of those who disappeared’ (Qasmiyeh, op cit).

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Acknowledgement

This piece draws on research supported by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (2005-2009), Leverhulme Trust (2011-2015), OUP Fell Fund (2012-2014), and the Henry Luce Foundation (2014-2016). I thank Paladia Ziss and Nell Gabiam for their research assistance in the UK and France respectively, and Yousif M. Qasmiyeh for his insightful feedback on an earlier draft of this paper.

Biographical Note

Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh is Co-Director of the Migration Research Unit at the Department of Geography, University College London, where she is also the Coordinator of UCL’s interdisciplinary research network, Refugee in a Moving World. Her research examines the intersections between gender, religion and forced migration, with a particular focus on the Middle East. Her recent publications include The Ideal Refugees: Gender, Islam and the Sahrawi Politics of Survival (2014) and South-South Educational Migration, Humanitarianism and Development: Views from the Caribbean, North Africa and the Middle East (2015).