Rothschild, DH;
Spectre, L;
(2018)
A Puzzle about Knowing Condtionals.
Nous
, 52
(2)
pp. 473-478.
10.1111/nous.12183.
Preview |
Text
Rothschild-D__A Puzzle about Knowing Condtionals.pdf Download (355kB) | Preview |
Abstract
We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams’ Thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from a disjunction.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | A Puzzle about Knowing Condtionals |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1111/nous.12183 |
| Publisher version: | http://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12183 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Copyright © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Rothschild, D. and Spectre, L. (2016), A Puzzle about Knowing Conditionals. Noûs, which has been published in final form at 10.1111/nous.12183. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1508442 |
Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
