Allegiance and Betrayal: British Residents in Russia during the Crimean War

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This article reveals a previously unsuspected instance of a problem that has troubled most states at some point in their history: the treatment of foreigners in wartime following their transposition from the status of ‘resident alien’ to that of ‘enemy alien’. Debates on the rights of foreign residents, in contra-distinction to those of native citizens, can be traced back to the Athenian city state, where Aristotle himself was a Macedonian resident alien (metic). Wars may never have been the only crises to challenge those rights -- food shortages seem most often to have led to the expulsion of foreigners from ancient Rome and it remains uncertain whether it was Aristotle’s foreign status that twice forced him to leave Athens -- but, ever since classical times, foreign residents, variously defined, have repeatedly fallen under suspicion when their adopted homelands have come under threat from their native countries. More than 2000 years after Aristotle’s death, the issue remains current thanks partly to the controversial detention of noncitizens of the United States in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11. In studying the period between the ancient world and our own, historians have focused on the widespread introduction of mass internment during the First World War, a policy revived by leading belligerents between 1939 and 1945. Issued shortly after the Italian declaration of war in June 1940, Churchill’s notorious instruction to ‘collar the lot!’ is sometimes supposed to have heralded a uniform experience for Italian residents in Britain, most of whom had dual nationality. Yet some continued to serve in the British armed forces while others, especially women, faced a range of verbal and physical abuse as they struggled to sustain their family businesses in a hostile environment. Since the contested loyalties that resulted were no more a creation of the twentieth century than the question of how to handle foreign residents in wartime, the period before mass internment deserves greater attention. In detaining people of Japanese ancestry during the Second World War, the United States had recourse to the 1798 Alien Enemies Act, the only one of the four Alien and Sedition Acts introduced by the Federalist government of President John Adams to remain on the statute book in the twenty-first century. The first use of the term ‘alien enemy’ recorded by the Oxford English Dictionary dates from 1625, and the phenomenon itself was already implicitly understood in the late fourteenth century, when war with France led to the establishment of the principle that foreign residents ‘seeking the fullest expression of their rights should transfer their allegiance from the rulers of their natal lands and swear fealty to the Crown of England’. As we shall see, questions of allegiance were equally central to the
treatment of British residents in nineteenth-century Russia and to the conflict of loyalties experienced by many of them during the Crimean War.

Since it was not until 1914 that the Russian government embarked on systematic sequestration and expulsion as part of a concerted attack on ‘enemy aliens’ -- a category which included Jews, Muslims and other minority populations in its own empire -- the fate of foreign residents in earlier conflicts has never been thoroughly investigated. While the Russian Old Believers were treated as fifth-columnists during the Crimean War, its impact on the Crimean Muslims is contested. And it is generally agreed that most British residents in Russia suffered little more than an intensified level of surveillance. Even some who occupied exposed positions survived unscathed. As sole agent of the British and Foreign Bible Society, the evangelical Scottish merchant Archibald Mirrielees was permitted to distribute his tracts not only to wounded Russian soldiers but also to British prisoners of war. Samuel Upton pursued his career as an architect in the Caucasus spa resorts even though his brother, William, a military engineer in Russian service, had been arrested by the British outside Sevastopol. Anxious to maintain the impression of normality, the tsarist government demonstrated its efforts to establish due title to the personal effects of even the poorest of intestate foreigners by continuing to send the Foreign Office records of the deaths of British residents. And just as friends reassured a tutor who had left St Petersburg in 1853 that ‘the persons and property of British subjects’ had been ‘as religiously respected as those of Russian subjects now resident in England’, so members of the British community in Moscow later testified that Nicholas I had treated them with ‘almost fastidious delicacy’. All this echoed the prevailing discourse in which Russians sought to challenge bitterly resented charges of barbarism while the British strove to enhance their status as the self-appointed guardians of global civilization. In July 1854, when a visit to London by Count Nikolai von Pahlen prompted questions in parliament and the press about the intrusion of an ‘alien enemy’, The Times reminded protesters that Pahlen had been a friend of that ‘arch traitor’, the duke of Wellington. Self-styled ‘patriots’ who attacked such a man had ‘no right to talk about civilized war at all”: ‘They don’t belong to the nineteenth century.’

While acknowledging that many British residents in Russia benefited from relative security during a war in which each side was anxious to be seen to behave with restraint, this article will focus on those who found both their property and their persons at risk. Striking in themselves, their experiences throw light on the wider question of treason, itself only one of the forms of betrayal that stemmed from the contrasting naturalization laws then in force in Russia and Britain. Because allegiance to a state and its monarch carried both rights and
duties, the article will discuss in turn the wartime diplomatic protection offered to British subjects in Russia and the obligations demanded by both sides of those who had become naturalized Russian subjects. Each of these issues came into sharp focus in February 1855, when the British government branded as traitors those naturalized British entrepreneurs in St Petersburg who contracted to manufacture engines for Russian warships and the Russian government refused to release their unwilling British artisans. However, since such questions are best considered in the context of earlier developments in the British community, the article begins with the shaping of allegiances in the reign of Nicholas I.¹⁵

Pre-war allegiances: British residents in Russia, 1825-1854

‘Foreigners’, confided General L.V. Dubel’t to his commonplace book sometime in the 1840s, ‘are the vermin which Russia warms with her sunshine, and burns them so that they crawl out to bite her’. But since Russia’s leading secret policeman thought that the most offensive thing about foreigners was their condescension -- ‘These scoundrel foreigners all think that they are better and cleverer than us’ -- he wanted Russia to exploit their expertise in order to match and outsmart them. That was why he supported orders for British marine engines, the naval hardware that later provoked the most controversial episode in the history of the British in Russia. Contradictions in the mind of ‘le général double’ were obvious to his contemporaries.¹⁶ It has taken historians longer to appreciate the extent to which, by representing a more widespread schizophrenia, they inadvertently helped to shape a series of foreign communities whose allegiances were no less complex.

In April 1854, shortly after the outbreak of the Crimean War, Dubel’t’s Third Section counted 904 ‘English’ residents in St Petersburg; in 1855 a further 453 were registered in Moscow, where they constituted 6.3 per cent of a foreign community dominated by 3635 Germans. Taking into account the textile workers based in surrounding districts, it was estimated that approximately 1500 Britons lived in Moscow province at the end of the war.¹⁷ Colonies of mill hands in the provinces of Vladimir and Tver’ swelled the numbers further along with smaller enclaves and individuals scattered across the empire. There would surely have been more had Nicholas I not determined to tighten surveillance over foreigners through a stream of edicts implemented by provincial governors and co-ordinated by the Third Section.¹⁸ As so often, his instinct to control outweighed the need for independent initiative and Russia’s relative economic backwardness came partly to be blamed on the tsar’s restrictions on foreign entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, since such restrictions served to raise rewards in the sectors in highest demand, the possibility that the economy might have
performed better should not obscure the fact that a number of foreign settlers made their fortune in Russia. The Bremen cotton merchant Ludwig Knoop dominated the textile industry by linking British machine builders to the Russian entrepreneurs for whom he acted simultaneously as agent, technical adviser and banker.\textsuperscript{19} Thousands more calculated that whether as a result of financial opportunity, emotional ties or sheer desperation they were more likely to prosper in Russia than anywhere else. The British continued to play as varied a part in the influx as they had done since their community took root in the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{20} As the wartime exodus showed, the kaleidoscopic range of their occupations included a former valet to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon.\textsuperscript{21} Apart from the labourers, however, most were merchants, engineers, teachers or (less frequently noticed) horsemen.

Though merchants were to be found from Archangel to Odessa, their hub was in St Petersburg, where several dynasties in the British Factory successfully diversified in the face of the faltering trade in Russian naval stores.\textsuperscript{22} In an under-monetized empire, credit had long been supplied largely by foreign merchants and one contemporary calculated that foreigners controlled no less than 97 per cent of Russia’s entire import and export trade in 1847.\textsuperscript{23} Visiting Russia in that year, Cobden learned that the empire’s cotton mills were ‘as a rule either owned by or under the management of foreigners’ and managers, many of them British, could command up to £1000 a year. Such men were not easily cowed. When the manager at Giles Loder’s spinning mill addressed a dinner for 200 British merchants -- ‘pretty much in the style of some of my old Chartist opponents in England’ -- Cobden was ‘struck with the freedom of speech & absence of restraint which pervaded the meeting, & which contrasted with the timidity I had sometimes seen in Italy & Austria’\textsuperscript{.24}

Confidence came from prosperity. Of the forty-six British millionaires who died between 1870 and 1890, three were Rothschilds and two were Russia merchants: Loder himself bought a 10,241-acre English estate out of his profits from Nicholas I’s protectionism; the herring merchant William Miller sat as a Liberal M.P. between 1859 and 1868.\textsuperscript{25} That was the year in which Charles Bell, partner in the St Petersburg finance house of Thomson Bonar through the 1840s and 1850s, was elected as a Conservative for the City of London.\textsuperscript{26} Since all deals involving Russia were stymied by the Crimean War -- in the debate on the Russian Government Securities Bill in August 1854, Palmerston made a point of declaring that it was ‘equally treasonable to advance money to the enemy in this country as in a foreign country’\textsuperscript{27} -- Bell returned to London, underlining his loyalty by sending Clarendon
occasional Russian intelligence.28 Miller remained in St Petersburg, communicating indirectly with the Foreign Office via a stream of letters from his brother, Alexander.29

Whether they were employed by the state or in business for themselves, many engineers were engaged in potentially sensitive work, particularly at the Black Sea naval bases. Having escaped debts in Britain, John Upton took charge of dock construction at Sevastopol from 1832 until his death in 1851, the year in which new British machinery was installed at the naval rope factory at Nikolaev. British expertise had flourished there since the administration of Admiral A.S. Greig (1816-33), the only son of the hero of Chesme to become a Russian subject.30 Though the English superintendent of the arms factory at Ekaterinburg left when the Crimean War broke out, his counterpart at Tula, a naturalized Russian resident there for forty years, was still in post in summer 1854.31 The potential for rival allegiances is revealed by the contrasting wartime experiences of two entrepreneurs who will feature prominently in this article: Alfred Evans, who ran the Warsaw foundry and machine-works established in 1818 in partnership with his brothers Thomas and Douglas, and Francis Baird, who in 1843 inherited the celebrated St Petersburg conglomerate founded by his father, Charles, in 1792. The two first met at the time of Cobden’s visit in 1847, when Evans guided the railway engineer, Charles Vignoles, to meetings with Nicholas I and his ministers in order to secure the contract for a huge suspension bridge at Kiev.32 Baird entertained them on his steam-powered yacht and took them, as he took all his prized visitors, to see St Isaac’s cathedral, the greatest prestige project of the age, then under construction with multiple contributions from the Baird Works. During the Crimean War, their fates diverged: Evans, a British subject, was expelled from the tsarist empire in 1855, the year in which Baird, a naturalized Russian, was decorated for supplying machinery to the St Petersburg arsenal.33

While it was possible for governesses to enter Russian society -- Julia Graves, whose brother was librarian to Count M.S. Vorontsov at Alupka in the Crimea, married the artist Ivan Aivazovskii in 184834 -- most led isolated lives, particularly if they were in service to a private family. By 1853, British governesses were sufficiently numerous in Moscow alone to prompt Rev. Christopher Grenside to warn the Russia Company that a married clergyman might more effectively counsel them on ‘the dangers and difficulties’ of their position.35 But this was partly a ruse to escape a congregation riven by increasingly rancorous disputes. Though some employers doubtless subjected their governesses to unwelcome advances, these young women and their male counterparts also faced challenges from bureaucrats anxious to limit their potential to undermine a regime legitimized by an official ideology for the first
time since the sixteenth century. After Count S.S. Uvarov launched his doctrine of ‘Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality’ in 1833, private tutors and governesses became one of several new semi-professional social groups, established by fiat in an attempt to align occupation with status and restricted by formal entrance qualifications.\textsuperscript{36} For those who persevered, the rewards were considerable. Lacking formal schooling, Percy [Boris Ivanovich] Beresford, the son of a London policeman, could hardly have anticipated a successful academic career. However, following his arrival in Warsaw in 1846, he graduated from tutorial positions in Volhynia province via a diploma from Kiev University to various posts in Kazan’, where in 1859 he published (in German) a treatise on French irregular verbs. Another privately educated Englishman, Henry-John [Genrikh-Fomich] Bishop, began his Russian career at the Naval Cadet Corps in St Petersburg, where he took the diploma that allowed him to teach briefly at Kazan’ University. In December 1856, he became lector in English at the St Petersburg Theological Academy.\textsuperscript{37} Edward Tracy Turnerelli, an idiosyncratic Tory who later embarrassed Disraeli by proposing a People’s Tribute to him in 1878, had also begun his career at Kazan’ in 1837, returning to Britain in August 1854 as an overt Russophile.\textsuperscript{38} More modest individuals remained scattered across Russian provincial estates. British prisoners of war on the march to Voronezh in 1855 were surprised to be visited at Khar’koy by ‘an Englishman named Aldridge, tutor in the family of a Russian nobleman … who [himself] spoke excellent English, and who greatly gratified us by bringing out a whole lot of the \textit{Illustrated London News}, in which we saw pictures of all that had been going on in the Crimea’.\textsuperscript{39}

In fact, such landowners were a feature of the provinces south of Moscow, where they helped to inspire contemporary caricatures of the \textit{angloman}.\textsuperscript{40} Some, like Semen Iakovlevich Unkovskii in Kaluga, ‘a passionate admirer of Dickens’, had seen service in the Royal Navy in the reign of Alexander I.\textsuperscript{41} Many more were fanatics of the horse racing introduced into Russia by Count Aleksei Orlov. Richard Walkden supplied English stallions to the imperial stud from 1820 to 1827, when he was succeeded by a fellow Lincolnshire man, John Ashton. A third northern dealer, John Jackson, active in Moscow since the turn of the century, was still a name to conjure with at the Howden horse fair at the outbreak of the Crimean War.\textsuperscript{42} ‘Mr Jackson has regularly drawn off to Russia some of the finest animals we produce’, the Foreign Secretary was warned in 1854, ‘to which, doubtless, may be ascribed the superior mounting of the Russian soldiers now opposed to ours’.\textsuperscript{43} By then, opportunities still existed for the jockeys, trainers and grooms who had first come to Russia more than fifty years earlier.\textsuperscript{44} Some may never have left their provincial stud-farms;\textsuperscript{45} others travelled to the
annual meetings in Moscow, Tsarskoe Selo and Lebedian, the small town in Tambov province where English was heard throughout the Crimean War at the hippodrome where racing officially began in 1827.46

Many Britons shared the conceit that Nicholas I favoured their industriousness and political reliability, and it is true that in 1847, when the tsar had unusually good reason to suspect the German lands as a source of revolutionary contagion, the British were explicitly exempted from restrictions on the recruitment of foreign artisans and labourers.47 Such exceptions, however, are best regarded not as a symbol of national distinction but as a symptom of a regime that had traditionally conferred a hierarchy of socially differentiated privileges in return for services rendered. As Eric Lohr has shown, a similar culture applied to questions of allegiance from the time of Peter the Great: ‘Nearly every group entering the empire negotiated a “separate deal” with the tsar that created a mix of rights and obligations before the law and the Russian state that was distinct and different from the laws and rights pertaining to the tsar’s other subjects of similar social standing.’48 It is indicative of the intermediate status generated by naturalization in Russia -- half-way between foreigners and native subjects -- that the most important shared characteristic of these ‘deals’ allowed naturalized Russians to relinquish their claim to Russian nationality, on payment of duties and completion of a tortuous bureaucratic procedure, and to return to their native lands.49

Some 11 per cent of the British residents in St Petersburg in 1854 were recorded as Russian subjects, a figure higher than the average between 1839 and 1863, when the annual rate of official naturalizations in the empire hovered between 5 per cent and 10 per cent of net immigration.50 One motive for naturalization under Nicholas I was his restriction of inheritance rights for those who spurned it.51 Another was the fact that only Russian subjects were permitted to trade on the domestic market. This helps to explain why there were so few firms ‘of British Merchants (solely & strictly such)’ -- by one estimate ‘probably not more than 20 in the whole Empire’ in 1854.52 More positively, those who acquired noble status by becoming Russian subjects could anticipate not only a greater degree of social acceptance than most of them would have achieved in Britain, but a greater degree of integration than most naturalized subjects achieved anywhere in Europe.53 The temptation to those from relatively humble backgrounds is obvious. A case in point was Edward Harvey [Eduard Vasilʹevich Garve], scion of a modest Essex family, who lost his father when young and moved to Russia with his elder brother as a youth, having taken up with Alexander I’s entourage in London in 1814. By teaching English at Moscow University and the Moscow Commercial School from the late 1820s, Harvey acquired the right to nobility through service
and became a Russian subject in 1851 in order to register with the heralds. Harvey exemplifies Lohr’s instinct that the decision to naturalize was often dominated by social motives, though it is sometimes hard to disentangle the balance between individual ambition and a desire to please a state that had rewarded settlers well and was anxious to enrol all its subjects in the soslovie system.⁵⁴

Overt pressure to naturalize remained low, not least because its implications were serious. Consider the edict of 1844 which amended the oath of loyal service taken by foreigners who entered Russian state employment without becoming subjects of the tsar. They were no longer obliged to pledge fealty ‘to their true and native Sovereign’ (svoemu istinnomu i prirodnomu Gosudariu) because this phrase, ‘relating exclusively to Russian subjects, cannot be applied to subjects of other states’.⁵⁵ While the amendment confirms Russia’s flexibility in the search for foreign talent, it also highlights the uniqueness of a subject’s status. Even in the twenty-first century, when citizenship is measured in terms of impersonal statehood, dual nationality remains controversial.⁵⁶ At a time when political loyalties in both Britain and Russia remained intensely personal, it was inconceivable to take an oath of equal standing to two sovereigns simultaneously. Naturalization as a Russian subject might only have been temporary and partial, but, for so long as it lasted, Russian law regarded the commitment as unconditional. This was to have significant consequences during the Crimean War, when contradictions with British assumptions were rapidly exposed.

English law, as retrospectively systematized between the 1840s and 1860s, regarded as a British subject every child born within the dominions of the Crown, whatever the nationality of its parents. Strictly interpreted, as Andreas Fahrmeir notes, this ius soli would have made aliens out of all British subjects’ children born abroad.⁵⁷ Even a less draconian gloss proved hard to apply. In 1859, the Home Office warned that any general issue of certificates of nationality by the British consul in Moscow would be ‘very inconvenient’ since ‘the child of an Englishman born abroad is not a British Subject, unless born in wedlock, which introduces a vast variety of difficult questions’.⁵⁸ In wartime, however, attention was focused not on the acquisition of British nationality but on its inalienability. The Russian government was told in July 1854 that ‘the abandonment by a British subject of his national character is not contemplated as possible by the English Law -- any act which may be done in furtherance of such an object is considered null & void’.⁵⁹ While such a verdict evidently posed difficulties for naturalized Russian subjects, others were also troubled. Perturbed by rumours that the British government would regard as traitors any British subjects who continued to serve the Russian state, a university professor asked his
sister to seek clarification. The Foreign Office confirmed that although it would be treasonable to remain in the military, naval or civil service of a state at war with Britain, the professor had nothing to fear: ‘Civilized Nations do not make war against Literature or Science, nor do they desire to prevent their progress even in the Country of an Enemy.’

*Rights: British residents under pressure, 1854-1856*

By stressing the permanence of British nationality, the British government intended to highlight not only its subjects’ obligations, but also their rights to diplomatic protection. Following the abrupt departure of the ambassador, Sir Hamilton Seymour, on 10/22 February 1854, British consuls were intended to remain in Russia. But when the consuls, too, were jointly withdrawn in April, British residents were placed under the care of the Danish ambassador in St Petersburg. Having married a Gagarin, Baron Otto von Plessen boasted impeccable social connections; Nesselrode was said to regard him as his own son. But such intimacy with the enemy raised doubts in British minds about a diplomat to whom Russian defeat was unthinkable. Since the Danish envoy in London, Count V.T. Oxholm, also admired Russia -- and, like Plessen, survived the replacement in December 1854 of the conservative Ørsted-Bluhme administration by a Liberal government led by Peter Bang and Ludvig Scheele -- the Foreign Office never fully overcame its suspicions about Danish neutrality. It was presumably to counter such concerns that successive foreign ministers in Copenhagen forwarded to the British ambassador, Andrew Buchanan, not only copies of Plessen’s despatches, but also the most significant original communications from L.G. Seniavin, Nesselrode’s deputy at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1850 and 1856, who corresponded privately with Plessen rather than on official notepaper.

For closer acquaintance with the British community, Clarendon urged Plessen to consult Dr Edward Law, chaplain to the British Factory in St Petersburg between 1820 and 1864. The baron needed no encouragement. Though the congregation on the English Embankment struck most outsiders as hermetically sealed, its minister was well connected. Nesselrode, a nominal Anglican born in Lisbon of German descent, famously took his annual communion from Law, a nephew of Lord Ellenborough sufficiently at ease in society to give English tuition to the Imperial family. Law in turn relied on Grenside’s successor, Rev. William Gray, appointed by the Russia Company in November 1853 in preference to Rev. Howell Phillips, an avowed admirer of Nicholas I. By February 1854, Gray was already settling into the quasi-consular duties traditionally performed by the Anglican chaplain in Moscow, where there was no British consul until after the Crimean War.
Gray himself soon required Danish assistance, having provoked the Russian authorities by praying that the queen might be granted ‘victory over all Her enemies’. As Plessen drily remarked, the chaplain’s explanation that the enemies in question were purely spiritual and internal was unlikely to impress Moscow’s governor-general, A.A. Zakrevskii, ‘who is known as a man of very plain speech’.66 To the relief of Gray’s family, Plessen settled matters confidentially and services continued uncensored.67 After all, similar prayers were offered in Russian palace chapels, where the young lady-in-waiting, Anna Tiutcheva, ‘experienced a certain satisfaction at the sight of foreign princes … praying to God to deliver us from our enemies, with whom the majority of them are secretly allied’.68 Neither was this the only incidence of low comedy. A British merchant ‘party of pleasure’ was rapidly released after crossing the Russian border near Memel (present-day Klaipeda in Lithuania) equipped with ‘many bottles of champagne’ but no passports, and in the company of two Prussian ‘songstresses’.69 Plessen’s services proved to be equally unnecessary for the superintendent of the Mosolov stud in Moscow province. Ivan Golovin, an outspoken critic of Nicholas I naturalized as a British subject in 1846, told Clarendon that the trainer had been exiled to Siberia for destroying a bust of the tsar in revenge for Russian press criticism of the queen.70 However, it emerged on investigation that a local court had accepted that the bust had been accidentally smashed by his nephew, the groom Thomas Day, during a drunken scuffle with lads at a rival stable. Both men were unmolested and had left Moscow merely in order to attend the races at Tsarskoe Selo and Lebedian.71

British residents nevertheless had reason for anxiety in the early months of the war. The Russian press bristled with alarmist news from London; a quantity of anglophobic verse appeared in the semi-official Severnaia pchela; pamphleteers vilified Palmerston, renowned for his hostility towards Russia, and Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier, the commander of the British fleet in the Baltic which threatened Kronstadt after storming Bomarsund.72 When Napier’s squadron appeared off Kronstadt in mid-June 1854, the excited imperial family drove out to see it -- in an English coach and four.73 Beyond this royal picnic, the atmosphere was not so light-hearted. In anticipation of Napier’s descent, British residents had been banned from their estates on the Gulf of Finland -- ‘I would have banned them […] from the whole of Russia’, snorted Dubel’t -- and public opinion remained hostile even once the threat of invasion had evaporated.74 Though few Britons were denounced to the Third Section, many were subjected to hurtful slights. Rebecca McCoy, a domestic teacher of English who epitomized the condescending attitudes that so enraged Dubel’t, acknowledged that when war
came even her Russian friends would ‘just as readily have touched a toad as have shaken hands with an English person’.  

Foreseeing trouble when war was declared, some, like Miss McCoy, set off to England overland via Moscow, Warsaw and Berlin; others tried to charter a ship, only to find that Nesselrode refused to allow a neutral vessel to enter Kronstadt. British residents there were obliged to move when all private houses were commandeered as Russian billets. Still, there was no reason to panic since both sides adhered to the convention by which each guaranteed the safety and protection of the other’s domiciles. ‘Such protection and safety’, ran the official Russian declaration, ‘both as regards them personally and also the property belonging to them, will in Russia, without exception and to whatever class they may belong, be fully enjoyed by all subjects of Great Britain and of France who, peacefully following their occupations, observe the existing laws and abstain from acts which those laws forbid’. Vexed to learn shortly after this announcement that even their own ambassador’s possessions had nevertheless apparently been impounded, the Foreign Office summoned the departing Russian consul for a formal protest at the end of April 1854. With time, however, the mood became calmer. News reached London from Warsaw in August that although all British subjects were under surveillance, its impact was slight: ‘As for ourselves personally, and for our own workmen, we are obliged to show ourselves only twice a week at the police office; and this not, perhaps, so great an annoyance, all things considered, as we might have expected in a state of war.’ For one group, in particular, this proved to be merely a lull before the storm. Though it had been established in Warsaw for thirty-three years and some of its members were Russian subjects, the mission of the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews was expelled in December 1854, not to reopen until 1875.

Most British residents nevertheless had time to weigh the hazards of remaining in Russia against the risks of abandoning their livelihoods and property.

For many immiserated labourers, this was Hobson’s choice: without financial support, repatriation was scarcely a viable option. In July 1854, William Miller offered to charter a vessel for the ‘numerous English’ who had ‘been thrown out of employment’ in St Petersburg. But although the British government guaranteed such a ship safe passage provided it carried nothing except British subjects, the allied blockade prevented any Russian vessel from returning to Kronstadt. Problems were equally acute in Moscow, from where Gray repeatedly urged the Russia Company to press the government to fund ‘the poor English who are unable to return home without assistance’. Over the previous six months, he reported in February 1855, his congregation had donated 960 silver roubles for this purpose and ‘could
not be expected to continue so large an expenditure’. Since the British government, alone among its European counterparts, was prepared to fund the return of destitute subjects, Clarendon unhesitatingly offered relief, being delayed only by the Company’s failure to estimate the number of deserving cases. Matters stalled until June, when he read Gray’s plea on behalf of Henry Nuttell, a Rochdale artisan resident in Russia since 1848 but dependent on charity for a year following the collapse of his employer’s business. ‘He has a wife and 2 children of the ages, respectively, of about 8 & 10 years.’ The Treasury not only granted Nuttell’s travel expenses, estimated at between £35 and £45, but also ruled that the ‘peculiar difficulties’ experienced by British residents at Moscow, made it ‘the duty of the Home Government to act liberally towards them’ by refunding their 960 roubles. Thus encouraged, Gray raised further cases, all of which were approved by the Foreign Secretary. Indeed, when the Treasury baulked at subsidizing two ‘young unmarried men in the prime of life’, Clarendon insisted that the government must help all the destitute, regardless of age or marital status, not least because it was ‘desirable that a good mechanic should not remain in Russia where he may be compelled by want to work for the Russian Govt’.

A more prosperous individual had unexpectedly chosen to do so, even when offered diplomatic protection. This was the twenty-seven-year-old engineer, William Crichton, a native of Leith who had been employed since 1850 at the Åbo shipyard owned by his fellow Scot, David Cowie. Assured that there would be no obstacle to his return to Britain in May 1854, Crichton duly applied for a passport only to be arrested by Finnish police who mistakenly extended to him a measure intended to apply to British engineers in Russian state employment. Escorted to St Petersburg, he was threatened with detention in Moscow and released thanks only to the intervention of his great uncle, Sir William Crichton, a retired doctor to the imperial family whose own uncle had led medical reforms under Alexander I. Interviewed by Plessen, young Crichton revealed that although he believed that a passport would not now be refused, he nevertheless intended to remain in St Petersburg, where an opportunity had arisen under the Engineer General, Alexander Wilson, director of the Izhora state foundry at Kolpino. Crichton was careful not to say (what Plessen probably knew) that Wilson, a naturalized Russian subject aged almost eighty, had been commissioned to manufacture marine engines to replace lost British orders, a task widely believed to be beyond his factory’s capacity. Neither did he mention that Wilson’s need was urgent since his long-serving deputy, James Johnston, had returned to Scotland in a fanfare of publicity rather than accept promotion to Kronstadt and become a Russian subject.
confirmed from the sanctuary of Sir William’s Pavlovsk estate was that ‘in the mean time’ he wished no further steps to be taken.94

Those unable to rely on such exalted patronage experienced a more delicate dilemma. Matilda Peskett, governess to the family of the governor of Minsk, sought to leave when war broke out and was referred to Plessen when difficulties arose; James Stuart Rees, tutor to the family of Count A.F. Orlov, Benckendorff’s successor at the Third Section, was presumably relieved to be placed under the baron’s protection after asking Clarendon for the impossible: a passport permitting him to remain in Russia, but to return to Britain whenever he wished.95 Doubtless many would have liked to hedge their bets in this way. The Russian government discouraged them from doing so by confirming in January 1855 the only exceptional measure it claimed to have taken with respect to British rights. This was the stipulation that no British subject who left Russia during the war should be allowed to return until hostilities had ceased.96 Since the length of the conflict was no more predictable than the security of estates left vacant by absentee foreign owners, the balance of interests for those with significant investments militated in favour of standing their ground.

The risks of leaving property unoccupied were discovered by Alexander Bower St Clair, whom Palmerston had recommended to Clarendon as war loomed on grounds of his ‘curious & encouraging’ intelligence about ‘the intense Discontent’ in Russia’s Polish provinces.97 Trusting that war would reduce the tsar’s dominions ‘to Dimensions more compatible with the Repose of Europe’ -- and convinced that the Polish-Lithuanian lands could be ‘conveniently’ annexed to Prussia -- Palmerston credited St Clair as an authoritative source in view of his long residence at Vepriai (Wieprze), the estate in Kovno province belonging to his wife, Countess Pelagia Kossakowska. Following their marriage at Florence in 1834, the couple had eventually settled in Lithuania, where St Clair financed a steam-powered flour mill at Kovno, engineered by a fellow Scot, Alexander Lawrie.98 However, while the St Clairs were attending their son’s passing out parade at Sandhurst, both estate and mill were sequestered. No permanent confiscation was intended, Seniavin assured Plessen in May 1855, but the precaution was necessary because Kossakowska had left the empire on a British passport without completing the formalities required of a Russian landowner, while St Clair had distributed ‘seditious writings’ and ‘assisted in the transmission of an improper correspondence with persons residing abroad’.99 ‘With so much at stake’, St Clair objected, ‘to be guilty of the offences imputed to me would be madness’. But since he had been recommended to Palmerston by Prince Adam Czartoryski, the protest sounds hollow: St Clair’s letters to Clarendon reveal him as an unabashed advocate of Polish liberties.100
Thanks to Plessen, Kossakowska was eventually permitted to return to Lithuania, where, to her husband’s disgust, she was initially confined to Vilna. But when peace was declared, Seniavin proved as good as his word, even if there was a sting in the tail. St Clair reported that Vepriai had been restored to his wife on condition that she sold it before 23 October 1856 ‘and that neither herself or family including myself, ever return to Russia’. The Kovno flour mill was also threatened with a forced sale, a more troubling prospect since its value had allegedly declined thanks to police neglect.\textsuperscript{101} Clarendon thought sufficiently highly of St Clair to raise his case privately during the Paris treaty negotiations, but neither he nor Lord Wodehouse, British ambassador in St Petersburg from June 1856, succeeded in gaining compensation.

The most vulnerable Britons in Russia were naturally those who had worked in the defence industries. Using the Kronstadt chaplain as his courier, R.S. Thompson, a young engineer on a civil steamer, smuggled out sketches of mines intended for Kronstadt harbour and volunteered for the British fleet in April 1854. Keen to ‘get him out’, Clarendon offered to pay his expenses. But Thompson, who reached Berlin on 5 June, consented to enlist only when assured of the safety of his mother and father, his ship’s chief engineer, and of the state-employed engineers then trying to leave Russia.\textsuperscript{102} On 24 June, the \textit{Times} published a lurid account of their ‘escape’, claiming that all manner of ‘subterfuge’ had prevented them from receiving passports within the promised eight days.\textsuperscript{103} Although a partial retraction was issued when the engineer closest to the tsar denied that their departure had been blocked, the paper proved accurate in its prediction that those who remained in Russia would find it hard to leave.\textsuperscript{104} Edmund Collins and Thomas Edmond, who plied the Circassian coast out of Kerch with the Black Sea fleet, were among those detained under the regulations that inadvertently led to Crichton’s arrest. Under contract until 1856, Edmond had resigned at the outbreak of war but had been obliged to complete four months’ notice. Finally presented with a passport via St Petersburg in August 1854, he was arrested there and escorted back to Moscow, ‘for why and for what he did not know’. Since then, his wife told the Foreign Office in December:

\begin{quote}
a Mr Rees has arrived from St Petersburg and informed me that my husband stood from the morning he left St Petersburg for Moscow under the surveillance of the Gendarmes and that a Court informed him the Emperors Reasons for detaining him where simply these that all the Engineers, that had been sent home had joined the English Fleet and gone out against him, and my husband being acquainted with every corner of the Black Sea would immediatly come here and do the same thing.\textsuperscript{105}
\end{quote}
The intelligence proved more accurate than the spelling. When Plessen requested that Edmond and Collins be permitted to leave Russia or paid their full salary, release was refused on the ground that their knowledge of Russian military affairs might enable them to transmit sensitive information to the enemy (as indeed some returning engineers intended to do). Seniavin defended the halving of their pay to £10 per month not only as ‘amply sufficient for their comfortable maintenance’ but as all they could rightfully claim because they were at liberty to seek employment in any Moscow manufactory. Plessen’s warning that it would be futile to persist prompted Clarendon to complain to Oxholm of a breach of trust: according to the governments’ agreement in 1854, ‘justice would require’ that both men be granted either their money or their freedom. By late July 1855, both had been released and Collins was back in Greenwich, petitioning the Russian government for his salary arrears -- a claim Plessen had some hope of satisfying in November.

He had not, however, been able to secure the release of William Whitworth, an engineer for the past decade at Nikolaev, where most of the Black Sea fleet was built. Whitworth had inherited the Congregationalist sense of propriety that led his father, Nicholas, to both bankruptcy and imprisonment as a result of anti-corruption campaigns in Lancashire and Ireland and ultimately underpinned a dynasty of Liberal politicians. In 1865, William’s brother Benjamin became M.P. for Drogheda, where the family had settled after moving briefly to the United States, but it was to Nicholas’s third son, Robert, a successful Manchester businessman, that William wrote from Zhitomir in June 1855. Since the Russian Government ‘were bound at the expiration of my contract to give me a passport to return home with’, William explained, he had ‘waited with the utmost impatience the moment when [he] could lawfully demand it’. When that moment came, in February 1855, he reluctantly embarked, with his wife and four children, on ‘a most miserable, expensive and dangerous journey’ to Zhitomir, following assurances from the military governor of Nikolaev that he would be granted a passport after eight days. Though an inspection of his possessions by the Nikolaev police had uncovered nothing untoward, the governor-general of Kiev determined to consult the head of the Naval Ministry, the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, who forbade Whitworth’s return to Britain on grounds of his specialist expertise. After three months in Zhitomir, he was ordered ‘to leave immediately for Moscow there to remain’:

There is no reason given for this most unjust and to me astounding resolution. They however inform me that if I will not leave of my own accord for Moscow they will forward me with my family there accompanied by an officer of the Police. Not
wishing to go through the Country like a thief, I have stated that in a few days I will leave here for Moscow in obedience to their orders.\textsuperscript{113}

Whitworth’s petition to the Grand Duke was naturally fruitless (it would be different, he believed, if the tsar were to hear of his plight). He had contacted the Danish ambassador: ‘what will be the result God only knows’.\textsuperscript{114} Now he beseeched his brother to appeal to Clarendon: ‘Say that I am detained against my will, and compelled to spend the little money I have in travelling about Russia without any reason being given for it. It can only be done either to ruin me or to compel me to serve them -- they will not succeed for as long as they are at war with old England nothing shall induce me to serve them directly or indirectly.’ The plea, however, was in vain. Following the fall of Sevastopol on 8 September 1855, the Russians were seen to be anxious ‘to diminish the loss they have sustained in the eyes of the nation by representing the greater importance of Nicolaieff as a Naval Port and arsenal’.\textsuperscript{115} Grand Duke Konstantin celebrated his twenty-eighth birthday there on 9/21 September at the start of a two-month visit to supervise renovations that were inspected by the tsar himself.\textsuperscript{116}

In the circumstances, Whitworth’s detention was inevitably prolonged: he remained confined to Moscow until after the end of the war.

A British subject with more to lose was Alfred Evans, ordered to leave the Russian empire after refusing to take the oath of loyalty to the tsar. Seniavin reported that Evans had been expelled ‘because he had shown his enmity to the Government both by his conduct and his language’, a plausible enough claim in the light of Evans’s subsequent revelations to St Clair about Russian troop movements near his Radom estate. Buchanan, however, learned that the ‘real reason’ was that Evans had ‘refused to manufacture implements of War for the use of the Russian Government’.\textsuperscript{117} It was all too much for the bluff ambassador, aptly characterized by Colin Matthew as one of the ‘shire horses’ of the Victorian diplomatic service.\textsuperscript{118} Declaring Evans’s refusal to supply arms to the enemy ‘very proper’, and thinking it ‘unjust to expect’ that his ‘language in the circle of his friends, should be favourable to the cause of a Country at war with Gt Britain’, Buchanan complained to the Danes, without consulting Clarendon, that ‘if the Russian Govt consider wishes expressed for the success of H.M. arms a sufficient cause for the expulsion of the subjects of the Queen from the dominions of the Emperor, there are probably few Englishmen in Russia who have not rendered themselves liable to be expelled’.\textsuperscript{119} In conveying such sentiments to Nesselrode, Plessen presumably thought discretion the better part of valour. But it made no difference. Notwithstanding Buchanan’s ‘repeated remonstrances’, Seniavin promptly confirmed St Petersburg’s refusal to rescind a decision taken ‘par de graves motifs’.\textsuperscript{120}
Obligations: treason and betrayal

By the time that the British government took up Evans’ cause, the question of treason had been highlighted by an Order in Council of 8 February 1855. Based on information from Russia, this warned that those who supplied military matériel to the queen’s enemies were ‘liable to be apprehended and dealt with as traitors’. The most likely source of the intelligence, Alexander Miller, had advocated in August 1854 a proclamation ‘warning British subjects that it is illegal (if not high treason) to carry on either import or export trade with Russia while we are at war with her’. However, although he informed Clarendon on 3 February 1855 that the tsarist government was absorbed in military preparations, his letter made no mention of the gunboat construction that prompted the Order in Council.

Moreover, as the characteristically well-informed Economist reported, that was a measure directed not at profiteers in Britain, but at the ‘three or four’ British entrepreneurs in St Petersburg to whom the tsar had ‘lately advanced a considerable sum of money to enlarge their premises, on condition that they shall cast and prepare large engines for war steamers’. Though the paper mentioned no names, one of these men was Francis Baird. ‘As Mr. Baird is a naturalised Russian subject’, Robert Harrison tartly observed, ‘and of a rank which enables him to hold serfs, we ought perhaps to moderate our surprise at the circumstances of his having undertaken contracts with the Russian Government, which in time of war no man calling himself an Englishman should have undertaken’.

On 15/27 February, Dubel’t noted that two more British firms -- Thomson-Isherwood and Ashford & Stevens -- both of which had contracted to manufacture engines for Russian gunboats, had reneged in the light of the queen’s proclamation. ‘They have been told that if they are not prepared to work, they will be subject to the full force of the laws, which they gave their signatures to obey.’

Though they affected to be affronted by the proclamation, Russian ministers had little cause for surprise about its contents. When Russia went to war with the Ottomans in October 1853, Nesselrode had been instructed to ask the Foreign Office whether orders placed for British iron bridges on the Moscow-Warsaw railway would be fulfilled in the event of a rupture between the two powers. It had been a key (if unachievable) aim of the Aberdeen Coalition to prevent the export of marine engines to Russia even before Britain declared war. The opening of hostilities was followed in April 1854 by well-publicized seizures on the Thames and the Clyde, resented by the manufacturers but legitimized by a Royal
Commission in November; to St Petersburg’s embarrassment, vessels laid down for the Russian navy were commandeered as British corvettes.\textsuperscript{128}

The significance of the February proclamation lay not so much in its content as in its timing. Though Palmerston’s role in it is unclear, it was issued two days after he kissed hands as prime minister and symbolized to the Russian government all their longstanding reservations about the new premier. By coincidence, news of it reached them shortly after the promulgation of Nicholas I’s manifesto on the formation of local militias, a defensive measure designed to revive memories of the partisans of 1812 that was less warmly received than the government had hoped.\textsuperscript{129} A sense of national crisis was intensified when the tsar fell ill and died within a fortnight. Rumours that the nobility had secretly pressed his successor to abandon the militia prompted the Holy Synod to issue a call to arms, proclaimed in all churches on 7/19 March.\textsuperscript{130} Since Alexander II was equally committed to a new bout of naval construction -- begun in January 1855, co-ordinated by N.I. Putilov under the direction of Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, and designed to compensate for lost British orders -- the authorities could hardly tolerate errant British-owned foundries. St Petersburg’s military governor decreed that not only their naturalized owners, but each individual employee must sign a statement confirming his commitment to contractual obligations to the Russian government on pain of exile to the interior.\textsuperscript{131}

It was this apparent persecution of a vulnerable workforce that prompted Clarendon to intervene in late April, prompted by a despatch from Lord Bloomfield, his ambassador in Berlin, who had served in St Petersburg between 1839 and 1851 and remained close to William Miller, among others. Bloomfield reported that the majority of British subjects employed in arms manufacture, having learned of the queen’s proclamation long before they saw the copies he had forwarded to Russia, ‘either threw up their employments or gave notice to their employers that they must quit’:

Many of these men, particularly those who have families, have made great sacrifices for they were earning from Twenty Five to Thirty Pounds per month, and can find no employment at all, as there is not a single forge or foundry in the neighbourhood of St Petersburgh where articles of a warlike kind are not being made at this moment, and there is a general complaint among them that H[er] M[aisty’s] G[overnment] ought to have published the Proclamation at the breaking out of the War, when they would have got out of their engagements whereas now the Imperial Government refuse to let some of them leave Russia, and they must therefore either starve or become traitors to Their Country.\textsuperscript{132}
Though the Foreign Secretary determined to rescue all those placed in this invidious position, it was harder for Plessen to plead on behalf of a lowly social group than on behalf of a few individuals. At first, he apparently made no attempt to do so. In May, he reported only that Seniavin had yet to respond to his request for passports for two British artisans, and that a further request -- made at the instigation of Dr Law for a passport for Francis Baird’s cousin, Charles -- had been refused. As Clarendon already knew from Bloomfield, Charles Baird, manager of the Baird Works since the mid-1840s, had been charged with inciting its employees to strike. Even if the accusation was unfounded, Plessen believed that Baird faced insuperable ‘prejudices’, despite influential support for him in the capital.

Though the British government cared little for the Bairds, the impulse to repatriate their foremen was intensified when a second abortive allied offensive in the Baltic confirmed the momentum of Russian naval development. When the tsar sailed to see Napier’s squadron at anchor on 11/23 June 1855 -- a more melancholy excursion than the previous year’s picnic at Bronnaia gora -- ‘the imperial yacht passed through a line of completely new gunboats’.

‘Last year’, Tiutcheva boasted, ‘the Russian fleet had not a single one: now it has 60 of them thanks to the efforts of Grand Duke Constantine who allegedly paid for the construction of a significant proportion of them out of his own fortune’. The grand duke’s mentor, A.V. Golovin, put the figure at 40 vessels. In fact, as the Naval Ministry subsequently confirmed, 32 gunboats had been commissioned in January 1855 and Baird, Thomson, and Ashford & Stevens had all contributed to the delivery of 23 engines and 26 boilers by 15 May. So Alexander Miller was largely accurate in reporting on 11 July that the Russians had contracted for 36 gunboats (the scale of the subsequent order) and that 21 of them had been finished by the beginning of June. When Bloomfield’s successor in Berlin reminded Clarendon on 1 September that several of Baird’s employees were still ‘forcibly detained and compelled to work under a threat of being sent as Prisoners into the interior’, Plessen was instructed to renew his efforts, this time on behalf of eight British artisans. Again he failed. Considering the threat of internment real, the baron warned that further intervention would be counterproductive: while the Russian government would have allowed the men to depart at the start of the war, it regarded their decision to stay as irrevocable and dismissed the February proclamation as a provocation. Clarendon reluctantly accepted this advice, bemoaning ‘fresh proof of the little reliance which can be placed on Russian assurances’ and insisting ‘that the Queen’s proclamation, even if it had been a provocation to Russia, which it was not, would afford no pretext for the violation of an engagement’ or for reducing Baird’s
workforce ‘to the condition of Slaves, as they are compelled to work against their will, &
against their allegiance under fear of punishment’.  

Notwithstanding such emotive language, it was not only tsarist actions that raised
questions of treason for British residents in Russia. The case of William Upton proves that
they could be treated just as ruthlessly by their own government. In the 1840s, Upton had
assisted his father in the Sevastopol dockyard and emulated him by taking the oath to
Nicholas I in 1850. On the death of John Upton in the following year, William briefly
succeeded him in charge of the Sevastopol Dock Committee. But when that body was
disbanded in 1852, he was discharged with the rank of colonel and granted a suburban estate
and vineyard. It was from there on 17 September 1854 that he and his family witnessed the
approach of the allied fleet that was to overturn their lives. Within ten days, Upton was a
prisoner of Lord Raglan’s invading army, escorted to his headquarters by Raglan’s military
Questions of allegiance immediately arose. When Upton explained to his captors the terms on
which he had become a Russian subject, Steele asked ‘whether I had obtained the permission
of the Queen to take this step, and on ascertaining that I had not, he told me that they should
consider me as an English subject, treat me as such, and expect me to give such information
as lay in my power’. Nevertheless, if Upton could provide information leading to the capture
of Sevastopol, ‘they would guarantee that I should be remunerated for any losses I might
sustain by compromising myself with the Russian Government as being a Russian subject’.

It did not work out that way. Though permitted to safeguard his family and some
possessions, Upton was detained at Balaklava, where he was employed in correcting the
defective plans of Sevastopol brought to the Crimea by British military engineers. Ironically,
it was local knowledge that caused his downfall. Taken by Airey and Lt. General George de
Lacy Evans to the heights of Inkerman on 25 October -- the day before the first Russian sortie
leading to the battle on 5 November -- he was asked whether a road existed between there
and the roads which supplied Sevastopol. Upton said he knew of no such road and thought it
unlikely that one could be built in view of the profusion of bogs and ravines along the coast.
When it transpired that the Russians had not only made a road but used it to defend
Sevastopol from Raglan’s attack, Upton was accused of supplying false information and
refused compensation for the loss of his property, valued by him at £4527 in December 1854.
Not until the following March did a military Board of Enquiry award him £500, an offer he
refused. He remained a prisoner of war in the Crimea until May 1855, when he was permitted
to return to England on the intervention of Lord Kinnaird, whose brother, Arthur, had served
in the British Embassy at St Petersburg between 1835 and 1837. Even then, Upton was obliged to give his parole not to return to Russia. He remained a prisoner of war until his claim for the allowances due to him prompted his release. Thanks presumably to Arthur Kinnaird, a keen supporter of Palmerston, the prime minister granted Upton an interview. But his attempts to secure full compensation nevertheless failed. General Evans, ‘strongly of opinion’ that Upton had ‘been treated altogether very unfairly’, offered in January 1856 to support a campaign in parliament. Upton, however, shunned publicity. As he pointed out to a friend, ‘if the Russian authorities were aware that I had given any information to the English; they might be induced to stop my mother’s pension’.  

Upton’s dilemma helps to explain a widespread contemporary perception that naturalized Russian subjects were both compromised by their relationship with the tsar and unjustly rewarded by it. The most conspicuous beneficiaries of that relationship were the Bairds. From the outset, they had profited from attention to contractual detail and their ability to manipulate Russian regulations. But they can hardly have failed to resort to the sorts of informal practice that prompted the suggestion in 1805 that the firm’s founder was already ‘intimately acquainted with the proper mode of applying the Key to the private Doors of the Chief-Officers in most of the Govĕ Departments’. Even the adulatory Turnerelli wondered whether it was fair for Francis Baird to trump his commercial rivals thanks to the tsar’s personal favour. The greatest resentments, however, were experienced by those who incurred substantial losses as a result of their loyalties to the Crown. ‘It will be very hard to lose all this on account of War as a British Subject’, Alexander Lawrie complained, ‘for had I become a Russian Subject it would not have been the case’. No-one felt a keener sense of injustice than William Whitworth, who received only ‘paltry’ travelling expenses when the Foreign Office took up his case after the war at the behest of the Radical M.P. for Manchester, Thomas Milner Gibson. Though Wodehouse repeatedly pressed Whitworth’s claim for compensation, conscious of its significance as a precedent, the Russian government maintained that they had been ‘fully justified’ in detaining British subjects who had been employed in docks and arsenals. ‘Should another war take place’, Whitworth sourly observed, ‘I am sure that every Englishman in the Russian Service will continue in it, rather than meet certain ruin both to himself and his family’. In January 1857, he went further, issuing a public ‘warning to any of our countrymen at present in Russia or considering going there’:

If I had remained in the Russian service, as, for instance, Mr. Baird of St. Petersburg and one or two others did, I should, I grant, have been a traitor, but by the terms of the
Treaty of Paris a pardoned one; and I should now have been at home with some 3,000l. in hand, instead of having sacrificed 1,200l., to say nothing about the anxiety and annoyance of being detained in Moscow. In truth, the four or five individuals who were detained under somewhat similar circumstances, and did what they ought to do, are made to suffer, while the traitor is pardoned by the English Government, and liberally rewarded by the Russians.  

Technically, this was incorrect. Though a Russian subject dependent on government contracts, Francis Baird had never been in Russian service. Nevertheless, the proclamation of 8 February 1855 had made him a traitor and the perception persisted that it was risky to deal with him. When he ordered two marine engines from Greenwich in autumn 1856, the manufacturers, presuming that Baird intended to replace machinery seized in 1854, thought it prudent to ask the Admiralty whether they should undertake the work. Approving their ‘proper’ inquiry, Clarendon ruefully confirmed that his government was powerless to intervene. All Orders in Council proscribing trade with Russia had been annulled at the end of the war. Free to resume his business, Baird went from strength to strength, being decorated for his Crimean service in 1857 and again in the following year when St Isaac’s was finally consecrated. By meeting the testing requirements of the Russian navy, he became the fourth largest employer in St Petersburg by 1862 with a workforce of 15 master craftsmen, 750 adult labourers and 100 children under fifteen. Though Francis Baird died suddenly in March 1864, a month after returning from his daughter’s London funeral, his firm remained in the hands of his grandson, George, until he sold out to French interests in 1881, a decade after enrolling in the Russian nobility.

Post-war allegiances: British residents in Russia, 1856-1870

Though Lohr was puzzled by the spike in rates of naturalization in 1857, when 37 per cent of immigrants are recorded as having become Russian subjects, part of the explanation lies in the widespread belief that only naturalized Russians would prosper after the war. That perception was boosted in autumn 1856 when it emerged that the new Black Sea Steamship Navigation Company, subsidized by the government and sponsored by the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, was ‘to be entirely composed of Russian Subjects on the ground that great part of the business will consist of trade between Russian ports’. The government’s determination to switch from foreign purchase to domestic construction of ironclad ships also benefited naturalized Russian subjects. No sooner had the war ended than one of them, the British merchant banker Matthew Carr, resident in Russia for more than twenty years,
founded in May 1856 a partnership with Mark MacPherson, who had served as engineer on the imperial yacht in 1852-53. Though they, too, learned the hard way about the rigidity of Russian contractual demands, their shipyard on Vasil'evskii Island, still a going concern as the Baltiiskii zavod, rapidly came to compete with the Baird Works for government orders. In 1861, Carr and Macpherson won the contract for the Opyt, the first ironclad gunboat built in Russia, and in 1866, two years after the death of Francis Baird, who had initially outbid them for engines, they came in ‘significantly lower’ than his grandson in the tender for the frigate Minin. William Crichton’s gamble on his Russian future also proved justified in the longer term. In the 1860s, he not only took control of the Cowie yards at Åbo but bought more of his own in the Okhta district of St Petersburg. Both enterprises were still thriving at his death in 1884. Indeed, as late as 1911, French investment analysts predicted that the ageing Crichton shipyards on the Neva would attract a healthy order book if only they could be rebuilt to meet the requirements of a modern navy.

Whitworth’s warning nevertheless fell on increasingly deaf ears as Russian tariffs came down in 1857, Britain signed a new trade treaty in January 1859 permitting a new generation of British subjects to arrive in Russia with no intention of naturalizing, and Russia’s naval reforms continued to rely on foreign expertise well into the 1860s. Even some of the British residents most directly unsettled by the war were keen to return at its end. The only prominent figure to experience difficulty was Charles Bell, who learned, on applying for a passport in April 1856, that a mark had been placed against his name by the secret police. Wodehouse was surprised to discover the reason why. Unable to secure the prompt release of his brother, an engineer arrested on board an Egyptian steamer in the Black Sea soon after Russia went to war with the Ottoman Empire, Bell had taken ‘the imprudent step of writing in strong terms to the Grand Duchess Marie’, inviting her to close her account with Thomson Bonar. Nicholas I understandably took offence, ‘and as Mr Bell was already on the black list of the police on account of the part taken by him in the secession of English from the English Club some years ago [in 1842], and from his conversation on political topics, the Russian Government determined not to allow [him] to return to Russia after the war’. But these were more optimistic days, symbolized by Dubel’t’s retirement from the Third Section, and Wodehouse had secured a passport for Bell by the end of July. In Warsaw, Douglas Evans was soon collaborating with Charles Vignoles on a £360,000 bid to replace decrepit pontoons across the Vistula with a road and rail bridge. Though that bid failed, the Evans brothers remained in control of their firm until their retirement in the mid-1860s, when it passed into the hands of Lilpop, Rau and Loewenstein. James Stuart Rees apparently settled
in Kiev province, where his Russian wife gave birth to a daughter, Olga, in 1876.\textsuperscript{160} The Russia Company paid for the widow of one of its members, ‘compelled to quit Russia on account of the late war’, to return there because she had failed to find employment as a teacher in Britain.\textsuperscript{161} Evicted from Lithuania, even the St Clair family kept its interests in Warsaw, where Edmund Bower St Clair became vice-consul in 1900.\textsuperscript{162}

By 1870, both the tsarist and British governments had moved to alleviate some of the problems of allegiance that plagued them in the Crimean War. Though Alexander II continued, to the perceived disadvantage of British merchants, to offer varying immunities to different ‘foreign guests’, he promulgated in 1864 an edict that ‘embodied a conceptual shift toward the creation of a single, generic, unified citizenship’ by making naturalized Russian subjects equal to natural-born subjects in the eyes of the law.\textsuperscript{163} Six years later, the British Naturalization Acts of 1870 released from their obligations to the queen all those who had voluntarily naturalized abroad. As they learned from a characteristically incisive pamphlet by their consul, Thomas Michell, British residents in Russia now faced an unprecedentedly stark choice: either to abandon their British nationality, and with it the right to British diplomatic protection, or to remain a British subject with all the obligations that entailed. For those of fighting age, the dilemma was especially acute, though crucial ambiguities relating to others remained unresolved: it would, Michell warned, be ‘difficult to define all the cases in which the acts of a British Subject who continued to serve the Russian Government during a war with Great Britain would be considered treasonable’.\textsuperscript{164}

Those with long memories like the Kronstadt-born Michell knew that armed conflict generated multiple opportunities for betrayal.\textsuperscript{165} In 1855, the year in which Michell began his career as translator and interpreter to Russian prisoners of war at Lewes, the British government branded as traitors those naturalized Russian subjects who contracted to manufacture engines for Russian warships, and it regarded the Russian government’s refusal to release unwilling British artisans as a breach of the belligerents’ agreement to guarantee the protection and security of their respective domiciles. Consonant with the nature of a war in which ‘diplomacy had only occasionally been interrupted by battles’, the British government arguably devoted as much care to these few vulnerable individuals as it spared for the thousands of its troops languishing in the Crimea.\textsuperscript{166} The Russian government, on the other hand, maintained that all those British residents in its service who failed to leave at the beginning of the war were bound to serve its interests thereafter and it refused to release military engineers whose knowledge could be turned against the tsar. One such specialist, William Upton, undoubtedly betrayed Russian secrets, even if he could reasonably claim that
the British Army reneged on its promises to compensate him for so doing; another, William Whitworth, resented the sacrifices he made to preserve his allegiance to the queen while Francis Baird had profited from his loyalty to the tsar. Taken as a whole, these conflicted loyalties suggest that the Crimean War should no longer be regarded as a mere ripple on the surface of the history of the British community in Russia. Instead, it merits recognition as an unusually illuminating instance of the complexities of British government policy toward British residents abroad, and of the paradoxes of Russian government policy toward foreigners in the era before systematic persecution of ‘enemy aliens’ began.
Simon Dixon is Sir Bernard Pares Professor of Russian History at UCL SSEES. This article is dedicated to Professor Anthony Cross FBA in the year of his eightieth birthday. The author is grateful to Roger Bartlett and Jonathan Parry, and also to two readers for SEER. Unless otherwise indicated, dates follow the Gregorian calendar, twelve days ahead of the Julian calendar used in nineteenth-century Russia and given here as Old Style (O.S.).


The National Archives (TNA), Kew, FO 22/227, ff. 41, 105-05v., 134-34v., August-September 1855. On the legacies of deceased Turkish, Persian, and ‘Asiatic subjects in general’, see *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (PSZ)*, 2nd series, no. 27929, 15 February 1854 O.S.

Robert Harrison, *Notes of a Nine Years’ Residence in Russia from 1844 to 1853*, London, 1855, p. 302 (Harrison was librarian of the London Library from 1857 to 1893); John Murphy, *Russia at the Time of the Coronation of Alexander II: Being a Series of Letters Addressed from Moscow and St. Petersburg to the ‘Daily News’*, London, 1856, p. 132.


For comparisons, see Véra Milchina, ‘Les français en Russie sous Nicolas Ier (1825-1855): D’après les documents de la Troisième Section de la Chancellerie Impériale’, in *La France et


17 Mahnke-Devlin, Britische Migration, pp. 49, 55, table 5; TNA, FO 65/473, no. 178, Wodehouse to Clarendon, Moscow, 3 October 1856.

18 For the results in Smolensk province, see A.V. Tikhonova, ‘Nadlezhashche smotret’ ... ‘: Nadzor za inostrantsami v Rossiiskoi imperii (1801-1861), Smolensk, 2013, pp. 115-91.


21 TNA, FO 65/457, J. Shaft to Clarendon, 28 June 1854.


23 Alfred J. Rieber, Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia, Chapel Hill, NC, 1982, p. 73.


26 Bell narrowly secured the City’s fourth seat at the General Election in November (a Liberal triumph), only to die in February 1869.
Hansard, vol. 135, col. 1147, HC Deb 2 August 1854. The Bill was introduced by Lord Dudley Stuart, cheerleader of the Polish émigrés in London and despised by Dubel't as the ‘shameless patron of all rebels’: ‘Zametki i dnevni L.V. Dubel’ta’, p. 237, diary, 3 February 1854 O.S.

For example, TNA, FO 65/465, C. Bell to Clarendon, 13 September 1855 (private), on famine in Ukraine and the western provinces.

The Millers maintained that ‘the most effectual way to sicken the Russian people’ of an unpopular war was ‘to shut up their trade’: A. Miller to Clarendon, TNA, FO 65/455, 4 April 1854; FO 65/458 13 September 1854. Stuart Thompstone, ‘Miller, Sir William, First Baronet (1809-1887)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, mistakenly claims that Miller returned to Britain when war broke out.


43 TNA, FO 65/455, Cath. A. Taylor to Clarendon, 7 April 1854. ‘I should like to put a stop to such exportation’, Clarendon noted, ‘but fear it would be difficult’.

44 Cross, ‘By the Banks of the Neva’, pp. 20, 42-3.


Eric Lohr, *Russian Citizenship: From Empire to Soviet Union*, Cambridge, MA, 2012, p. 20. Under Nicholas I, for example, Prussian residents were governed by the joint convention of 1844: *PSZ*, 2nd series, no. 18200, 8 May 1844 O.S.; no. 18403, 30 November 1844 O.S.

*Svod zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*, 3rd ed., 15 vols, St Petersburg, 1835, vol. 9, paras 904--29 & Appendix II; *Extracts from the Russian laws, concerning the position of foreigners in Russia*, London, 1853.


*PSZ*, 2nd series, no. 21410, 14 July 1847 O.S.; no. 21968, 4 February 1848 O.S.


See, for example, Peter Sahlins, *‘Unnaturally French’: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After*, Ithaca, NY, 2004.


*PSZ*, 2nd series, no. 17957, 2 June 1844 O.S.


58 TNA, FO 65/545, G. Clive to E. Hammond (Permanent Under-Secretary), 3 August 1859, original emphasis.

59 Home Office minute, quoted without context in Fahrmeir, *Citizens and Aliens*, p. 47.

60 TNA, FO 65/458, Mary Berg to Clarendon, Paris, 20 September 1854; FO 65/459, Hammond to Mary Berg, 25 October 1854 (draft). Mme Berg was careful not to reveal her brother’s identity, which remains elusive.

61 At Warsaw, where Colonel Gustav du Plat was instructed ‘to destroy those of his archives he cannot bring away’, British subjects were entrusted to the Prussian consul, but only after St Petersburg overrode objections by local officials: see FO 64/370, Bloomfield to Clarendon, Berlin, 22 April 1854; FO 64/374, no. 40, Bloomfield to Clarendon, 8 August 1854.


64 Royer, *The English Prisoners in Russia*, p. 163. A striking portrait of Law, attributed to T.A. Neff, hangs in the Special Collections Department at the Brotherton Library, University of Leeds.

65 On Phillips, see *Times*, 14 November 1846, p. 8; 20 November, p. 5. He and Gray were interviewed from a field of seven: see London Metropolitan Archives (LMA), MS 11741/13, pp. 237-44, 326, Russia Company Court minutes, 11 November 1853 -24 February 1854.


67 Gray’s father-in-law, a pioneer of education in the West Indies, was profuse in his thanks: TNA, FO 22/228, f. 72, Rev. J.M. Trew to Hammond, Dublin, 25 January 1855; f. 113, Trew to Wodehouse, 2 February.

TNA, FO 64/375, no. 43, Hertslet (vice-consul at Memel) to Bloomfield, 29 August 1854; no. 51, Landrath Dieckmann to Ober-President Eichmann, 30 August (copy, translation); FO 22/211, f. 200, Plessen to Bluhme, 9/21 September 1854 (copy).

TNA, FO 65/458, I. Golovine to Clarendon; Ivan Golovine, *Russia under the Autocrat Nicholas the First*, 2 vols, London, 1846. Golovin was familiar to the racing fraternity as a member of the Paris Jockey Club.

TNA, FO 22/212, f. 47, Gray to Law, Moscow, October 1854 (copy extract); ff. 45-6, Plessen to Bluhme, 7/19 October 1854 (copy); f. 39, Buchanan to Clarendon, 30 October 1854. The Days were scions of the Hampshire dynasty spawned by John Barham Day (1793-1860). Andover, ridden to victory in the Derby by Alfred Day in 1854, went to Moscow two years later; William Day, *The Racehorse in Training*, London, 1880, was translated as Vil’iam Dei, *Trenirovanie skakovoi loshadi: s ukazaniiami skakovago dela voobshche i neobkhodimykh v nem preobrazovanii s prisovokupleniem glavy o kovke loshadi*, St Petersburg, 1884.


Mahnke-Devlin, *Britische Migration*, p. 41; ‘Zametki i dnevnik L.V. Dubel’ta’, p. 240, diary, 14 March 1854 O.S.

Ibid., p. 243, diary, 19 April 1854 O.S.; A Lady [Rebecca McCoy], *The Englishwoman in Russia*, London, 1855, p. 291.

TNA, FO 65/455, H. Addington ( Permanent Under-Secretary) to T. Weguelin (Chairman, Russia Company Court), 1 April 1854; J. Venning to Clarendon, 6 April; LMA, MS 11741/13, pp. 251-60, Russia Company Court minutes, 8 August 1854. Granted a passport on 31 March O.S., McCoy was among the first to leave: see Anthony Cross, ‘Two English “Lady Travellers” in Russia and the House of Murray’, *Slavonica*, 17, 2011, 1, p. 7.

Pribavlenie k Kommercheskoi gazete, 6 April 1854 O.S., no. 40; official translation at TNA, FO 65/456. For the matching British guarantee, see *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*, 23 March/4 April 1854. Though the Russian government officially made no distinction between
Britain and France, the British government was wary of any attempt to drive a wedge between the allies and popular hostility in Russia focused overwhelmingly on the British.

TNA, FO 65/455, Paper read to Mr. Consul General Krehmer, 26 April 1854.

TNA, FO 65/458, Col. W.W. d’Arley to Clarendon, London, 23 August 1854, on behalf of the indisposed consul, du Plat. Du Plat’s informant was probably his friend, Alfred Evans.


On sectoral winners and losers, see Olive Anderson, *A Liberal State at War: English Politics and Economics during the Crimean War*, London, 1967, pp. 268-73. Among the first individual casualties was the St Petersburg consul, Michele, who sought compensation for £1000 p.a. loss of earnings as agent to the Russia Company. The figure surprised Seymour and the Foreign Office refused the claim on grounds of precedent, but the case dragged on until 1862 thanks to Michele’s devious attempts to reimburse himself following his return to Russia after the war. See TNA, FO 65/622.

TNA, FO 64/373, no. 392, Bloomfield to Clarendon, Berlin, 10 July 1854, reporting Miller’s private approach.

TNA, FO 22/211, ff. 19-20, Buchanan to Bluhme, 16 August 1854 (copy).

TNA, FO 22/226, ff. 105-6, Gray to T. Cope (Secretary, Russia Company), 11 February 1855.

TNA, FO 65/463, Cope to Clarendon, 14 March 1855; Hammond to Cope, 22 March; Hammond to Treasury, 28 March.

TNA, FO 65/464, Gray to Hammond, 13/25 May 1855, forwarded by Cope on 6 June.

Ibid., J. Wilson to Hammond, 19 June 1855. On Wilson, see below, n. 122.

TNA, FO 65/465, Hammond to Wilson (draft), 22 October 1855. The Treasury succumbed on 8 November. Hitherto, scholars have noted only cases relating to France: in 1848, when the Treasury paid at least £866 to rescue 3000 labourers from anti-immigrant riots, and in 1854. See Fahrmeir, *Citizens and Aliens*, pp. 171-72.


91 TNA, FO 22/210, ff. 124-24v., no. 224, Buchanan to Clarendon 31 July 1854 (confidential); ff. 126-26v., Plessen to Quaade, 13/25 July 1854 (private; copy); f. 226, Buchanan to Clarendon, 18 August 1854; ff. 230-32, Plessen to Bluhme, 19/31 July 1854 (copy).

92 Fraser’s Magazine, June 1854, p. 618; Newcastle Courant, 9 June 1854. The orders had gone to Britain in 1853 only because Wilson could not guarantee timely delivery: see A.P. Shevyrev, Russkii flot posle Krymskoi voiny: Liberal'naia biurokratiia i morskie reformy, Moscow, 1990, pp. 131-32. On lost orders, see below, n. 127.

93 The Times, 16 May 1854, p. 11, and others echoed the Falkirk Herald, in which Johnston boasted that the Russian government had offered to retain his services even if he insisted on remaining a British subject.

94 TNA, FO 22/210, ff. 234-34v., Crichton to Plessen, 14 July 1854 (copy).

95 TNA, FO 65/457, F. Peskett (father) to Clarendon, 8 June 1854; FO 22/212, f. 11, Buchanan to Clarendon, 24 October 1854; ff. 148-51, Plessen to Bluhme, 25 October/6 November 1854 (copy). Rees apparently did not linger long: see below, n. 105.

96 TNA, FO 22/220, ff. 138-9, Buchanan to Clarendon, 9 February 1855; Plessen to Bluhme, 11/23 January 1855 (copy). The information came in response to a Home Office request: see FO 65/460, H. Waddington (Permanent Under-Secretary) to Hammond, 16 December 1854.


98 Lawrie, forced to return to Kircaldy when the mill was sequestered, failed in his campaign to claim moneys owed to him: see, finally, TNA, FO 65/509, Hammond to Lawrie, 7 March 1857 (draft), and below, n. 147.

99 TNA, FO 22/221, ff. 88-9, Buchanan to Clarendon, 7 May 1855; f. 90v., Scheele to Buchanan, 5 May 1855 (copy).


101 TNA, FO 65/479, St Clair to Clarendon, 27 March 1856.
TNA, FO 64/370, no. 219, Rev. J.H.H. McSwiney to Bloomfield, Dresden, 20 April 1854 (copy); FO 64/372, Bloomfield to Clarendon, Berlin, 6 June, ‘separate’, delivered by R.S. Thomson.

The Times, 24 June 1854, p. 12, widely echoed in the provincial press.

The Times, 26 June 1854, p. 9. British railway engineers later told Lord Granville that ‘they had been civilly treated during the war, but thought they would not have been allowed to go away even if they had wished it, which they did not’: TNA, PRO 30/29/20/12, p. 853, Granville’s journal, St Petersburg, 17 August 1856 O.S.

TNA, FO 65/509, Edmond to Hammond, 26 January 1857; FO 65/460, petition from Mrs Edmond, 175 Goswell St., Aldersgate, London, dated 29 December 1855, postmarked 30 December 1854. The messenger was evidently Orlov’s tutor: see above, n. 95.


For comparison, British officers imprisoned at Penza in 1855 paid 65 silver roubles a month (approximately £11) for three suites of hotel rooms on full board: see Colonel Atwell Lake, Kars and Our Captivity in Russia, with Letters from Gen. Sir W.F. Williams, Bart., of Kars, K.C.B.; Major Teesdale, C.B.; and the late Captain Thompson, C.B., London, 1856, p. 316.

TNA, FO 22/220, ff. 164-64v., Seniavin to Plessen, 10 January 1855 O.S.; ff. 154-57, Buchanan to Clarendon, 13 February 1855.

TNA, FO 22/226, ff. 114-15, Clarendon to Oxholm, 17 March 1855 (draft); FO 22/221, Buchanan to Scheele, 25 May 1855 (copy); ibid., f. 215v., Scheele to Buchanan, 7 June 1855 (copy).

TNA, FO 65/464, Collins to Clarendon, 21 July 1855; FO 65/465, same to same, 11 August 1855; FO 22/223, f. 153, Buchanan to Clarendon, 14 November 1855. Plessen’s optimism proved premature: see FO 65/480, Collins to Clarendon, 9 August 1856. Edmond’s post-war campaign for compensation also failed.

TNA, FO 22/223, ff. 159-60, Scheele to Buchanan, 13 November 1855 (copy).


slovar’, Nikolaev, 1999, gives his contract dates as October 1845 to February 1855. Robert Whitworth believed that William had been ‘in Russian service about 17 years’: see TNA, FO 65/464, R. Whitworth to J. Brotherton, 13 June 1855, enclosing extracts from William’s letters from Zhitomir.

114 News of Plessen’s protection had spread, though Whitworth confused him with Bluhme.
115 TNA, FO 64/397, Lord A. Loftus to Clarendon, Berlin, 22 September 1855.
116 A.V. Golovin, Materialy dlia zhizneopisanii tsarevicha i Velikogo Kniazia Konstantina Nikolaevicha, St Petersburg, 2006, pp. 97-100.
117 TNA, FO 22/221, ff. 92-92v., Buchanan to Clarendon, 7 May 1855.
119 TNA, FO 22/221, f. 98, Buchanan to Scheel, 7 May 1855 (copy); ff. 92v-93, Buchanan to Clarendon, 7 May 1855.
120 TNA, FO 22/222, ff. 29-29v., Buchanan to Clarendon, 4 July 1855; f. 33, Seniavin to Plessen, 3 June 1855 O.S. (copy).
121 London Gazette, 9 February 1855, p. 476, reprinted as ‘British Proclamation, declaring as Traitors all British Subjects who shall assist Her Majesty’s Enemies’, in British and Foreign State Papers, 1855-1856, vol. 16, London, 1865, p. 542. For comment, see The Times, 10 February 1855, pp. 4, 8; Derby Mercury, 14 February; Morning Post, 15 February, p. 4 (leader).
122 TNA, FO 65/458, A. Miller to Clarendon, 26 August 1854; FO 65/463, same to same, 3 February 1855.
123 Economist, 17 February 1855, p. 172, ‘Englishmen helping the czar’. The paper, whose editor, James Wilson, was simultaneously Financial Secretary to the Treasury, was critical mainly of earlier government policies that had encouraged men of talent to settle in Russia. On Wilson, see Anderson, A Liberal State, pp. 261-64.
125 ‘Zametki i dnevniki L.V. Dubel’ta’, p. 268, diary, 15 February 1855 O.S.
Ibid., p. 224, diary, 18 October 1853 O.S. I have found no evidence that the question was put.


130 Tiutcheva, Pri dvore dvukh imperatorov, 1855-1882, p. 11, 7 March 1855 O.S. Though Tiutcheva’s future husband, Ivan Aksakov, enlisted in the Serpukhov detachment (see I.S. Aksakov, Pis’ma k rodnym 1849-1856, ed. T.F. Pirozhkova, Moscow, 1994, pp. 333-429), even Slavophiles were tepid in their support: Vera Aksakova, Dneviki. Pis’ma, ed. T.F. Pirozhkova, St Petersburg, 2013, pp. 127, 135-38, diary, 6 and 16 February 1855 O.S.

131 Mahnke-Devlin, Britische migration, p. 42, where the proclamation is misdated 20 January.

132 TNA, FO 64/392, no. 165, Bloomfield to Clarendon, Berlin, 12 April 1855.

133 TNA, FO 22/221, ff. 159-60, Buchanan to Scheele, Copenhagen, 26 April 1855 (copy).

134 Ibid. ff. 250-51, Plessen to Scheele, 17/29 May 1855 (copy); [Tower], Memoir, p. 6.

135 Tiutcheva, Pri dvore dvukh imperatorov, 1855-1882, pp. 37-8, 11 June 1855 O.S. The imperial yacht Alexandria had been delivered three years earlier by the Blackwall yard, Mare and Co.; Times, 10 June 1852, p. 8.

136 Golovin, Materialy dlia zhizneopisaniia, p. 95.

TNA, FO 65/464, A. Miller to Clarendon, 11 July 1855, countering a report of twenty-eight ships in the Times. Clarendon forwarded this letter to Palmerston, respecting Miller’s request for anonymity.

TNA, FO 64/396, Loftus to Clarendon, 1 September 1855: ‘they should not be exposed to the persecution of their employers or of the Russian authorities’.

TNA, FO 22/223, f. 218v., Buchanan to Scheele, 30 November 1855 (copy).

The following two paragraphs draw on Bartlett and Vanden Bosch, ‘More light on the Upton family’ (above, n. 11), based on William Upton’s diary.

For restrictions on foreigners’ residence in Sevastopol and the connection with viticulture, see PSZ, 2nd series, no. 25315, 17 June 1851 O.S.

William Upton diary, 26 September 1854, quoted in Bartlett and Vanden Bosch, ‘More light on the Upton family’, 30/1 and 30/3.

William Upton to Charles Holte Bracebridge, ca. 1 July 1855, quoted in ibid., 30/3.


Manchester Times, 13 June 1855, ‘Mr. Turnerelli’s conversations on Russia’, is more explicit than Turnerelli, What I know of the late Emperor Nicholas, pp. 58-9.

TNA, FO 65/481, A. Lawrie to Clarendon, 8 December 1856. See above, n. 98.

TNA, FO 65/472, Wodehouse to Clarendon, 20 September 1856; FO 65/481, Whitworth to Wodehouse, n.d., postmarked 24 October 1856. Wodehouse also represented two similarly affected men who had been in private rather than state employment: the superintendent of a Finnish smelting works and a Volga steamship engineer.

The Times, 31 January 1857, p. 12.

TNA FO 65/481, J. Penn and Sons to Capt. W.B.W. Walker, R.N., 7 October 1856 (copy); Hammond to T. Thinn (Admiralty Counsel), 11 October (draft).

The authorities’ fastidiousness emerges clearly from ‘Otchet predsedatelia korablistroitelnago tekhchineskago komiteta, Polkovnika Cherniavskago, za 1858 god’, Morskoi sbornik, 41, 1859, 6, official section, pp. 268-70: ‘Ob izgotovlenii mekhanizma v 460 sil, na zavode dvorianina Berda, dlia korablia “Orel”’. Statishcheskiia svedeniia o fabrikakh i zavodakh v S.-Peterburge za 1862 god, St Petersburg, 1863, pp. 7, 24, 26-7, suggests that only the Nevskii and Sampsonievskii cotton mills and the Liteinyi foundry were larger than the Baird Works; most enterprises employed fewer than fifty.


TNA, FO 65/472, no. 173, Wodehouse to Clarendon, 24 September 1856. It was rumoured that the Company’s vessels could be converted to gunships, but in fact they were used largely to ferry pilgrims to Constantinople en route to the Holy Land, another of the grand duke’s interests.

Kipp, ‘The Russian Navy’, pp. 126-27; *Otchet o deistviakh Korablistroitel’nago Departamenta Morskago Ministerstva za 1860 god*, St Petersburg, 1861, pp. 38-41; *Otchet ... za 1861 god*, St Petersburg, 1862, pp. 18-21; *Otchet ... za 1866 god*, St Petersburg, 1867, p. 16.


See David Saunders, ‘Charles Mitchell, Tyneside and Russia’s First Ironclads’, *Northern History*, 48, 2011, 1, pp. 75-95.

TNA, FO 65/479, Bell to Clarendon, 25 April 1856; 65/471, no. 9, Wodehouse to Clarendon, 4 July 1856 (confidential).


LMA, MS 11741/13, p. 314, Russia Company Court minutes, 14 October 1857, on Mrs George Davies.


LMA, MS 11741/13, pp. 332-34, Russia Company Court minutes, 9 December 1858; Lohr, *Russian Citizenship*, pp. 55-8 (p.55).

