What should educational research do, and how should it do it? A response to “Will a clinical approach make educational research more relevant to practice” by Jacquelien Bulterman-Bos

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In the article that provides the focus for this dialog, Bulterman-Bos raises two central questions about educational research: what should educational research seek to do, and how should it go about doing this?

Stokes (1997) suggests that there are two crucial issues in the conduct of research: whether the research is conducted with a concern for how the results of the research will be used, and whether the research is conducted with a concern for fundamental understanding (Figure 1). Where neither of these is a concern the result is applied research unmotivated by applications, which Stokes suggests is exemplified by the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe. Where usage is a concern, but fundamental understanding is not, the result is pure applied research, exemplified by the work of Thomas Edison. Conversely, where fundamental understanding is a concern, but application is not, we have pure basic research, exemplified by the work of the Danish physicist Niels Bohr. Finally, where both considerations of use, and fundamental understanding are important, we have “Pasteur’s quadrant”—use-inspired basic research.

Almost from its first emergence as a field of inquiry, educational research has been criticized for its lack of relevance to practice—and in particular that too much educational research has emphasized a quest for fundamental understanding at the expense of considerations of use. In 1945, J. Cayce Morrison, assistant commissioner for research in the State Education Department in New York, lamented that there was “too wide a gap between research at its best and much of its practice in education” (Morrison, 1945, p. 243).

The frustration appears to be caused, at least in part, by an expectation that while it was easy to accept that problems in nuclear physics and rocket science might be difficult to solve, educational problems should be much more tractable. As early as 1917, H. L. Mencken pointed out that problems in the social sciences were generally far more complex than they appeared: “There is always an easy solution to every human problem—neat, plausible, and wrong” (Mencken, 1917/1949 p. 443).

A similar perception appears to have driven Robert F Kennedy, in the hearings of the Senate sub-committee on Education in 1966 to ask the Commissioner of the United States Office of Education, Harold “Doc” Howe II, “What happened to the children? Do you mean you spent a billion dollars and you don't know whether they can read or not?” (McLaughlin, 1975).
Implicit in such criticism, there is often an underlying belief that educational researchers make things complicated because they enjoy or value the complexity. While there may be a small element of truth to such criticism, in most cases, researchers make things complicated because they are complicated; they have learned that approaches that elide, or refuse to acknowledge, these complexities have not been successful in addressing the challenges of improving educational outcomes. Consider the issue of class-size reduction policies.

Class-size reduction programs (CSRPs) are an attractive route to improving educational achievement, being popular with both parents and teachers. However, given the high cost of implementation, it would seem advisable to get some clear evidence of the likely benefits before embarking on such a program, especially given the political difficulties of reversing such reforms.

The issue of class-size reduction would seem to be an ideal candidate for rigorous, high quality research, and indeed there is no shortage of well-designed studies on the effects of CSRPs. Perhaps the best-known of these is the Tennessee Student-Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR) study, described by Mosteller (1995) as “one of the greatest education experiments in United States history”. Teachers and students in kindergarten and first grade were assigned at random either to small classes (13-17 students), large classes (22-26 students) or large classes with a teacher’s aide. By the end of third grade, student achievement was significantly higher, especially in reading, and the gains were most marked for socio-economically disadvantaged students and those from minority ethnic communities. More importantly, when the students returned to larger classes, although some of the advantage of the smaller classes diminished (Krueger and Whitmore, 2001), students who had experienced smaller classes had a lower rate of grade-retention (Pate-Bain et al., 1997) and higher aspirations to continue education beyond school, evidenced by increased tendency to take the SAT (Krueger and Whitmore, 2001). The fact that the improvements were maintained over such a long period of time is significant, since so many educational interventions have yielded initially promising effects that disappear when a program is ended (e.g., Head Start: see Brody, 1992: pp. 175-175).

The size of the impact found in the star study was equivalent to an extra three or four months learning per year for the students in the smaller classes, with effects up to twice as great for minority students. So far, so good. Except, of course, it is not as simple as that. First, the STAR study appeared to have no difficulty in recruiting additional teachers without a reduction in average teacher quality, which is unlikely to be the case when such a program is implemented on a state-wide or national basis (what economists call equilibrium effects). In evaluating a CSRP in California, Jepson and Rivkin (2002) found that the decline in teacher quality reduced, and in some cases completely negated, the effect of smaller classes. Second, the STAR study found that the smaller classes made faster progress in kindergarten and first grade, and thereafter, the gap between the smaller and larger classes stayed constant. The fact that the earlier gains were maintained is important, but so is the fact that smaller classes appeared to confer little benefit in second grade and beyond. Indeed, the consistent finding across the research literature on CSRPs is that effects are strongest in grades K to 3, much weaker in grades 4 to 8, and practically non-existent in grades 9 to 12. These two points suggest that the benefits of CSRPs as system-wide reforms are likely to be significantly smaller than found in the STAR study, and suggests that the money might more profitably be spent in other ways. The research working in Bohr’s quadrant, concerned only with fundamental understanding, might be
content to stop here, but the fundamental limitation of this analysis is that it tells us only about what did happen in the STAR study, rather than what might be possible with reduced class sizes. One of the most intriguing findings of the study was that the teachers in the study do not appear to have changed their teaching approaches very much. Clearly some teaching approaches that are feasible with 15 students are more difficult with classes of 22 and may be impossible for the average teacher with a class of 30 students. It is possible, therefore, that the potential effects of CSRPs may be significantly greater than has been found to date, because few studies have systematically investigated class-size reduction combined with inservice training for teachers on how they can best make use of smaller classes (although there are significant exceptions, such as Blatchford, Basset, Goldstein, & Martin, 2003).

The lesson I wish to draw from this brief example is that in education, what we can learn from the scientifically detached approach—in the terminology used by Labaree (2003), an approach that emphasizes the analytic, the theoretical, the universal, and the intellectual—provides only a part of the story and the scientifically detached account is partial in both senses of the word. It provides only a partial picture, and, more importantly, it is a picture that is actually misleading. As the work of Blatchford et al. (2003) shows, class-size reduction programs do offer significant possibilities for improving educational outcomes at scale, but only when they are combined with well-designed programs of inservice support for teachers.

So, what seemed at the outset like a very clear simple question does not have a clear simple answer. Given the equilibrium effects, and the age-specificity, found in most CSRPs, it seems that the costs might well not justify the benefits, and other uses of the money could well produce better returns. If, however, the question is changed from “by how much have class-size reduction programs improved student outcomes?” to “by how much can class-size reduction programs improved student outcomes in the past?” then we may get very different answers, but only if we are prepared to tangle with the messy reality of the contingent and the variable.

The relationship between physics and engineering may be an instructive parallel here. To design a bridge that will be safe in operation, it is necessary to know the physical properties of the materials to be used, such as knowing that stone is a reliable material to use in compression, but behaves unpredictably in tension, while steel and, to a lesser extent, wood, are relatively predictable in their behavior in both tension and compression. However, precise knowledge of these kinds of properties does not provide any guidance about what the bridge should look like. The detailed knowledge of the physical properties of the materials will indicate whether a particular design is likely to be effective, but they do not, by themselves, provide guidance about how to generate the design. Designing a bridge, requires knowledge of the properties of the materials to be sure, but at its heart is a fundamental creative process, substantially under-determined by the physics.

In the same way, the challenge of “engineering” effective learning environments requires knowledge of the findings of educational research, but this research, no matter how well it is done, underdetermines what is possible. Rather than limiting the enterprise of educational research to the pursuit of “knowledge” (in the sense of collections of items of generally agreed upon information) and the development of theories, it seems therefore that a more
appropriate focus would be that of actually moving people—teachers, teacher educators, school administrators, policy makers, etc.—to action (Wiliam & Lester, 2008).

This is the heart of the argument made by Bulterman-Bos—a call for a change in focus in educational research from what is correct, to what is good. This echoes the arguments made by Bent Flyvbjerg in his book *Making social science matter*. There, Flyvbjerg argues that social enquiry is at its least successful when it attempts to emulate the natural sciences, adopting as its central criterion analytic rationality. In contrast, social enquiry is at its most successful when it focuses instead on value rationality (Weber, 1914/1978).

In framing this argument, Flyvbjerg draws on the three principal intellectual virtues proposed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, (Aristotle, 1976): *episteme*, *techne*, and *phronesis*. *Episteme* (ἐπιστήμη) concerns knowledge of eternal and universal truths, such as the fact that the base angles of an isosceles triangle are equal. Once one has established, for example by reasoning from Euclid’s postulates, that the base angles of an isosceles triangle are, indeed, equal, there is no need to re-verify that it remains the case on another occasion. As *episteme*, it will be true for all time and all (Euclidean) space. *Episteme* equates to what we call scientific knowledge, and according to Aristotle:

> is a demonstrative state, (i.e., a state of mind capable of demonstrating what it knows)...i.e., a person has scientific knowledge when his belief is conditioned in a certain way, and the first principles are known to him; because if they are not better known to him than the conclusion drawn from them, he will have knowledge only incidentally. This may serve as a description of scientific knowledge. (Aristotle, 1976 1139b18-36)

Episteme therefore embodies the notion of scientific detachment. The privileging of scientific detachment is not necessarily a philosophical choice—it could be driven simply by a concern for parsimony. On the grounds that parsimonious explanations are to be preferred to more complex and convoluted explanations, all other things being equal, then the attraction of scientific detachment is clear. If we can establish that something is always the case, then once this has been done, we can rely on the same truth forever, and in all contexts. However, scientific detachment delivers the goods only when there such timeless universal truths exist. Where they do not, different intellectual virtues are required.

*Techne* (τέχνη), in contrast, is the virtue of being able to bring into being those things that are contingent and variable. It differs from *episteme* in that *episteme* is concerned with things that are the way they are of necessity (otherwise they would not be eternal truths), whereas *techne* deals with things that could be different from what they, in fact, are.

> Since (for example) building is an art [techne] and is essentially a reasoned productive state, and since there is no art that is not a state of this kind, and no state of this kind that is not an art, it follows that art is the same as a productive state that is truly reasoned. Every art is concerned with bringing something into being, and the practice of an art is the study of how to bring into being something that is capable either of being or of not being....For it is not with things that are or come to be of necessity that art is concerned [this is the domain of episteme] nor with natural objects (because these have their origin in themselves). ... Art . . . operate[s] in the sphere of the variable.

Although Aristotle discussed *techne* in terms of the ability to make things such as tables and buildings, the ability to bring into being, for example, an effective tax regime would also be regarded as *techne*. It is the ability to bring into being those things that need not be
the way they are. By itself, however, techne is no guarantee that the building, the table, or the tax regime, will be fit for the purpose for which it was created.

Aristotle’s third principal intellectual virtue, *phronesis* (φρόνησις)—“prudence” or “practical wisdom”—in some senses transcends both *episteme* and *techne* since it concerns the problem of acting rationally (literally, “along with reason”) in situations that are contingent and variable. According to Aristotle, phronesis is the ability “to deliberate rightly about what is good and advantageous” (Aristotle, 1976, 1140). Aristotle points out that this is quite different from *episteme* since there is no point in deliberating about things that are universally true—*phronesis* requires knowledge of particular (variable and contingent) circumstances. *Phronesis* is also different from *techne* since it is designed to move people to action rather than production. Aristotle’s point here is that *techne* is product oriented because the aim of the production is not the production itself but the product, whereas action is process-oriented—the end is doing *well*.

Since *episteme* deals with universal truths, it is independent of individual experience. Those with different experiences should be able to agree on the extent to which a particular claim is universally true (the “view from nowhere” supposedly secured with scientific detachment). With *phronesis*, however, individual experience is crucial:

Whereas young people become accomplished in geometry and mathematics, and wise within these limits, prudent young people do not seem to be found. The reason is that prudence is concerned with particulars as well as universals, and particulars become known from experience, but a young person lacks experience, since some length of time is needed to produce it (*Nichomachean Ethics* 1142a).

Although *phronesis* is relevant only when there is no universal truth, that does not mean there are no general principles involved. *Phronesis* is the practical wisdom to act well by the successful integration of general principles with detailed consideration of the specificities of the particular case in question. From this perspective, the notion of clinical research practice involves, for the practitioner, a move from *techne* to *phronesis*. While the primary intellectual virtue required of the traditional educational researcher is closest to *episteme*, and the expert practitioner demonstrates *techne*, the teacher/researcher envisaged by Bulterman-Bos transcends these by the acquisition of *phronesis*. It requires the knowledge of the general findings from the educational research literature, but requires the ability to interpret these general principles in the light of a specific context of practice.

The physical sciences have succeeded because they have focused on *episteme*. And there are some aspects of the social sciences that are fruitfully explored with *episteme*. But in the main, within the social sciences and specifically in education there are few universal truths, because successful action will always require the integration of general principles and specific contextual details. In this context, it is important to note that while some authors have likened the distinction between *episteme* and *phronesis* to the distinction between quantitative and qualitative approaches to inquiry (e.g., Laitin, 2003), this is emphatically not the case, as Flyvbjerg notes:

Phronetic social science is opposed to an either/or and stands for a both/and on the question of qualitative versus quantitative methods. Phronetic social science is problem-driven and not methodology-driven, in the sense that it employs those methods which for a given problematic best help answer the four value-rational questions [Where are we going? Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power? Is this development desirable? What, if anything, should we do about it?]. More often than not, a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods will do the task and do it best. (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.
While Aristotle’s account is useful for thinking about the kinds of expertise that might be required of different roles in the educational enterprise, this formulation provides little advice about how this expertise might be acquired or developed (apart simply from experience). For this, the classification of different kinds of systems of inquiry proposed by Churchman (1971) provides a useful organizing principle.

Churchman proposed a classification of inquiry systems based on what was the primary or most salient form of evidence, and he labeled each category of inquiry system with the name of a philosopher whose own stance, according to Churchman, typified the category: Leibniz, Locke, Kant, Hegel, and Singer.

In Leibnizian inquiry system, certain fundamental assumptions are made, from which deductions are drawn by the use of formal reasoning. Within a Leibnizian enquiry system the most important form of evidence is rationality—whether the conclusions follow logically from the assumptions. The obvious example of a Leibnizian inquiry system is pure mathematics. Although there may conceivably be occasions in educational research when such methods might be appropriate, they generally inadequate—typically inquiries into educational phenomena require some sort of empirical data from the situation under study.

In what Churchman called a Lockean inquiry system, the main source of evidence is observation of the world. Empirical data are collected, and then an attempt is made to build a theory that accounts for the data, or conversely, multiple theories are developed that generate testable hypotheses that can then form the basis of a “crucial experiment” that will indicate which of the theories is correct. This is the standard method of inquiry for the physical, life, and earth sciences. The major difficulty with a Lockean approach is that, because observations are central, it is necessary for all observers to agree on what they have observed, leading to the need for the “scientific detachment” described by Bulterman-Bos. If observers disagree on what they have observed, if the evidence is in doubt, then the Lockean inquirer cannot begin.

Philosophers of science have long recognized that all observations are theory-dependent. As Werner von Heisenberg observed, “What we learn about is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our methods of questioning” (quoted in Johnson, 1996, p. 147). Nevertheless, there are many situations, even within the social sciences where considerable progress can be made, because the relevant data are sufficiently-widely agreed to provide a fruitful starting point for the Lockean inquirer.

Where there is no such sufficient agreement about what the relevant data are, then a Kantian inquiry system is more appropriate. The Kantian inquirer accepts that there can be no such thing as “scientific detachment”—what is generated by any theory will inevitably be, to an extent, a consequence of the assumptions made by the inquirer about what constitutes the relevant data. Kantian inquiry involves the deliberate framing of multiple alternative perspectives, on both theory and data (thus incorporating both Leibnizian and Lockean systems). This could be done by building different theories on the basis of the
same set of data or, alternatively, two (or more) theories related to the problem might be generated. For each theory, appropriate data would be collected, and it is entirely possible that different kinds of data might be collected for each theory.

In practice, this might mean that researchers would construct competing explanations on the basis of the same set of data. These perspectives would result in part from their engagement in serious reflection about their underlying assumptions, and in part from submitting their data to the scrutiny of other persons who might have a stake in the research. It may not be immediately apparent where these theories overlap and where they conflict, and indeed, these questions may not be meaningful, in that the enquiries might be incommensurable (Kuhn, 1962). However, by analyzing these enquiries in more detail, it may be possible to begin a process of theory building that incorporates the different representations of the situation under study.

This idea of reconciling rival theories is more fully developed in a Hegelian inquiry system, where antithetical and mutually inconsistent theories are developed. Not content with building plausible theories, the Hegelian inquirer takes a plausible theory, and then investigates what would have to be different about the world for the exact opposite of the most plausible theory itself to be plausible. A crucial question for the Hegelian inquirer is, “What would have to be different about the world for the exact opposite of my conclusion to be plausible?” If the answer is, “not very much” then this suggests that the available data underdetermine to a significant degree the interpretations that are made of them.

The tension produced by confrontation between conflicting theories forces the assumptions of each theory to be questioned, which might then result in sufficient clarification of the issues to make possible a co-ordination, or even a synthesis, of the different perspectives, at a higher level of abstraction. The differences between Lockean, Kantian and Hegelian inquiry systems were summed up by Churchman as follows:

The Lockean inquirer displays the “fundamental” data that all experts agree are accurate and relevant, and then builds a consistent story out of these. The Kantian inquirer displays the same story from different points of view, emphasizing thereby that what is put into the story by the internal mode of representation is not given from the outside. But the Hegelian inquirer, using the same data, tells two stories, one supporting the most prominent policy on one side, the other supporting the most promising story on the other side (Churchman, 1971 p. 177).

It is tempting to view these four inquiry systems as a hierarchy, and in one sense, there undoubtedly is a logical order relation. The Hegelian inquiry system is a special case of a Kantian inquiry system, where the multiple representations are constrained to create a dialectic. The Lockean inquiry system (which clearly subsumes the Leibnizian inquiry system) is also a special kind of Kantian inquiry where one representation is singled out as privileged. However, this does not mean that Kantian inquiry systems are always to be preferred, since this may produce such complexity that progress is impossible—the most complex representation of a problem is not necessarily the most useful. There is a trade-off between parsimony and completeness, and therefore there is a choice to be made. In other words, we can inquire about inquiry systems, questioning the values and ethical assumptions that these inquiry systems embody.

This inquiry into inquiry systems is itself, of course, an inquiry system, which is termed Singerian by Churchman after the philosopher E. A. Singer (see Singer, 1957). Such an
approach requires a constant questioning of the assumptions of inquiry systems. Tenets, no matter how fundamental they appear to be, are themselves open to challenge in order to cast a new light on the situation under investigation. This leads directly and naturally to examination of the values and ethical considerations inherent in theory building.

In a Singerian inquiry, there is no solid foundation. Instead of asking what “is,” we ask what are the implications and consequences of different assumptions about what “is taken to be”:

The “is taken to be” is a self-imposed imperative of the community. Taken in the context of the whole Singerian theory of inquiry and progress, the imperative has the status of an ethical judgment. That is, the community judges that to accept its instruction is to bring about a suitable tactic or strategy . . . . The acceptance may lead to social actions outside of inquiry, or to new kinds of inquiry, or whatever. Part of the community’s judgement is concerned with the appropriateness of these actions from an ethical point of view. Hence the linguistic puzzle which bothered some empiricists—how the inquiring system can pass linguistically from “is” statements to “ought” statements—is no puzzle at all in the Singerian inquirer: the inquiring system speaks exclusively in the “ought,” the “is” being only a convenient façon de parler when one wants to block out the uncertainty in the discourse. (Churchman, 1971 p. 202).

Within a Singerian inquiry system, one can never separate out the meanings of a piece of research from its consequences. Educational research is a process of representing educational processes, and the representations are never right or wrong, merely more or less appropriate for a particular purpose, and it is perfectly fair to expect the researcher to defend the appropriateness of the representations. Greeno (1997) suggests that educational researchers should assess the relative worth of competing perspectives by determining which perspective will contribute most to the improvement of educational practice and of course this evaluation must take into account the constraints of the available resources (both human and financial), the political and social contexts in which education takes place, and the likelihood of success. While the Lockean, Kantian and Hegelian inquirer can claim to be producing knowledge for its own sake, Singerian inquirers are required to defend to the community not just their methods of research, but which research they choose to undertake.

Singerian inquiry provides a framework for debating the issues raised by Bulterman-Bos about the nature of educational research. At one extreme, should all educational research be undertaken only by those with substantial practical experience as educators? Or at the other extreme, should we value as knowledge only that produced by studies designed from the outset to be widely generalizable? Within a Singerian framework, both are defensible, but the researchers should be prepared to defend their decisions. The fact that the results of action research are often limited to the classrooms in which the studies are conducted is often regarded as a weakness in traditional studies. Within a Singerian framework, however, radical improvements on a small scale may be regarded as a greater benefit than a more widely distributed, but less substantial improvement.

To sum up the argument so far, I have suggested that educational research should be broadened by an acceptance that a complete reliance on “scientific detachment” results in such limitations about what could be said that the whole enterprise becomes irrelevant, somewhat along the lines of Wittgenstein’s closing line in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus: “That of which one cannot speak, one must pass over in silence” (Wittgenstein, 1921/1961, my translation). If we accept that educational research should
speak about those things where we cannot pronounce with certainty and scientific
detachment, we must accept that other intellectual virtues, and specifically, practical
wisdom—“reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for
people” (Aristotle, 1976 1140a24-b12, 1144b33-45a11)—become part of the requirements
for an effective research practice. For this to occur, we must broaden the basis about what
counts as evidence in educational research, including multiple representations of
educational settings, and an acknowledgement that, as well as data and theories, values
have a role to play.

This shift from a sole reliance on scientific detachment also has implications for how the
findings of research are to be communicated, shared and “disseminated.” Shotter (1993)
proposes that this shift can be characterized as a shift from scientific rationalism to
communicative rationalism, which differs from scientific rationalism in three important
ways. First, rather than regarding the social world as "out there waiting to be discovered,”
the communicative rationalist insists that the world can only be studied from a position of
involvement within it (in the same way that Polanyi insists that knowledge is rooted in an
engagement with, rather than a detachment from, the object of study). Second, “knowledge
of [the] world is practical-moral knowledge and does not depend upon justification or proof
for its practical efficacy” (p. 166). Third, “we are not in an ‘ownership’ relation to such
knowledge, but we embody it as part of who and what we are” (loc. cit.).

Embracing communicative rationalism involves changes in not only in how knowledge is
warranted, but also in what is to count as knowledge. The practical knowledge that teachers
possess about their classrooms—and in particular how to make complex, nuanced
judgments in the face of considerable complexity and absence of complete information—is
to be counted as knowledge even though such knowledge may be tacit, and cannot be
reduced to the explicit formulations of the decontextualized, transcendent, but often
difficult-to-apply “truths” of scientific rationalism.

The complementary roles of tacit and explicit knowledge are brought out clearly in the
model of knowledge-creation in organizations developed by Nonaka and Tageuchi (1995).
The fact that knowledge can exist either as explicit or tacit results in four different modes of
knowledge conversion, as shown in Figure 2. The process of socialization can be viewed as
one in which one person’s tacit knowledge comes to be shared by others, while
externalization involves making previously tacit knowledge explicit. Developing new
explicit knowledge from existing explicit knowledge is a process of combination, and
internalization consists of making explicit knowledge “one’s own.” Nonaka and Tageuchi
(1995) then propose that these four processes typically occur in the following sequence:

First, the socialization mode usually starts with building a “field” of interaction. This field facilitates the
sharing of members’ experiences and mental models. Second, the externalization mode is triggered by
meaningful “dialogue or collective reflection,” in which using appropriate metaphor or analogy helps team
members to articulate hidden tacit knowledge that is otherwise hard to communicate. Third, the
combination mode is triggered by “networking” newly created knowledge and existing knowledge from
other sections of the organization, thereby crystallizing them into a new product, service or managerial
system. Finally, “learning by doing” triggers internalization. (pp. 70-71)

<< Figure 2 about here >>
What this analysis makes clear is that scientific rationalism is concerned only with those situations in which one person’s explicit knowledge is transmitted to others as explicit knowledge—(bottom-right cell of Figure 1). Communicative rationalism, on the other hand, involves all the kinds of knowledge-creation shown in Figure 1.

The framework offered by Nonaka and Tageuchi allows us to regard the knowledge that is generated in a clinical practice approach to research alongside that generated by more traditional forms of inquiry. More importantly, it offers a way of thinking about how we might move beyond these dualities to a more integrated approach to knowledge management. The systemic knowledge generated as a result of “traditional” research can become operational knowledge through “learning by doing.” This operational knowledge becomes sympathized knowledge when experience of practitioners is shared, and dialogue between teachers supports the creation of conceptual knowledge in practice. Networking with other professionals produces new systemic knowledge, and so the cycle can repeat.

**Conclusion**

In this response I have used three theoretical perspectives in an attempt to illuminate, and to deepen the argument made by Bulterman-Bos about the contributions that a clinical approach might make to educational research.

First I suggested that the three main intellectual virtues identified by Aristotle—episteme, techne, and phronesis—exemplify the skills required by the “pure” educational researcher, the skilled classroom practitioner, and the clinical researcher respectively. Second I proposed that the framework of inquiry systems proposed by Churchman—based on whether logic, observation, representation, dialectic, or values were regarded as the main source of evidence—provided a useful way of thinking about different kinds of inquiry in education. Specifically, I suggested that while the phronetic researcher may be, at any one time, operating in Leibnizian, Lockean, Kantian or Hegelian mode, these are always moral choices that the researcher is prepared to defend, since the primary aim is to do good. Third, I suggested that the framework for knowledge transfer proposed by Nonaka & Tageuchi (1996) indicates a way in which knowledge gained through different methods of inquiry might be developed in parallel, and perhaps even integrated, so that educational research can become a powerful force for acting well in the world.

**References**


Figure 1:

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<tr>
<th>Quest for Fundamental Understanding?</th>
<th>Consideration of Use?</th>
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| Yes                                 | Yes                   | Use-Inspired Basic Research  
  \textit{Pasteur} |
| Yes                                 | No                    | Pure Basic Research  
  \textit{Bohr} |
| No                                  | No                    | Applied Research  
  Unmotivated by Applications  
  \textit{Brahe} |
| No                                  | Yes                   | Pure Applied Research  
  \textit{Edison} |
Figure 2:

 Tacit knowledge

 from

 Tacit knowledge

 to

 Explicit knowledge

 Socialization

 Sympathized knowledge

 Sharing experience

 Internalization

 Operational knowledge

 Learning by doing

 Externalization

 Conceptual knowledge

 Networking

 Combination

 Systemic knowledge