Lechene, V and Preston, I (2011) Noncooperative household demand. ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
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Abstract
We study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary model. We provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods. Demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against noncooperative alternatives and the noncooperative model against a general alternative. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
| Type: | Report |
|---|---|
| Title: | Noncooperative household demand |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.013 |
| Keywords: | Nash equilibrium, Intra-household allocation, Slutsky symmetry, PRIVATE PROVISION, PUBLIC-GOODS, GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION, SEPARATE SPHERES, NASH EQUILIBRIUM, GROUP-BEHAVIOR, INCOME, UNIQUENESS, MARRIAGE, CURVES |
| UCL classification: | UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics |
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