A verifiable secret shuffle of homomorphic encryptions.
In: Desmedt, YG, (ed.)
PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY - PKC 2003, PROCEEDINGS.
(pp. 145 - 160).
We show how to prove in honest verifier zero-knowledge the correctness of a shuffle of homomorphic encryptions (or homomorphic commitments.) A shuffle consists in a rearrangement of the input ciphertexts and a reencryption of them so that the permutation is not revealed. Our scheme is more efficient than previous schemes both in terms of communication complexity and computational complexity. Indeed, in the case of shuffling ElGamal encryptions, the proof of correctness is smaller than the encryptions themselves.
|Title:||A verifiable secret shuffle of homomorphic encryptions|
|Event:||6th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography|
|Dates:||2003-01-06 - 2003-01-08|
|UCL classification:||UCL > School of BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > Computer Science|
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