Korpeoglu, CG;
(2015)
Assignment Rules of a Single Indivisible Object under the Full Preference Domain.
Preview |
Text
Korpeoglu_Assignment.pdf Download (137kB) | Preview |
Abstract
We consider the allocation problem of a single indivisible object to one of several agents under the full preference domain when monetary transfers are not allowed. Our central requirement is strategy-proofness. The additional properties we seek are Pareto optimality, non-dictatorship, and non-bossiness. We provide characterizations of strategy-proof rules that satisfy two out of three additional properties: Pareto optimality and non-bossiness; non-dictatorship and non-bossiness; and Pareto optimality and non-dictatorship. As a consequence of these characterizations, we show that a strategy-proof rule cannot satisfy these three additional properties simultaneously.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Assignment Rules of a Single Indivisible Object under the Full Preference Domain |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Indivisible Object; Strategy-proofness; Pareto Optimality; Full Preference Domain. |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1474467 |
Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
