Networks and regional leadership in El’tsin’s Russia: 
the case of Eduard Rossel’ in Sverdlovsk Oblast, 
1989-1999

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I, Thomas Carter, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
This thesis examines the regional leadership in Sverdlovsk Oblast between 1989 and 1999. Focusing on the identity of the regional governor, Eduard Rossel’, who rose to power at the end of the Soviet period and dominated the region throughout the El’tsin decade, the research considers the role and use of networks as critically important to the exercise of regional power. The research questions consider the nature of the political system that Rossel’ installed, focusing on how his involvement in different vertical and horizontal networks, both as patron and client, facilitated the construction of a personalised power system in this heavily industrialised region. It finds that the activation and use of different relationships at the numerous critical junctures that emerged in centre-regional relations during the El’tsin decade protected Rossel”s grip over regional power, through use of a ‘boundary control’ model that ensured he was the only actor capable of leading the region in this decade. Whereas many previous studies of regional politics in the 1990s have focused on the development of institutions, this research considers that the ability of the Sverdlovsk leader to participate in, and lead, overlapping networks outweighed the consolidation of institutions, resulting in his personal domination of the regional political space. The thesis considers the effect of Putin’s recentralization programme on the personalised system of power that Rossel’ constructed, finding that the introduction of alternative routes to the centre weakened his position amongst the regional and inter-regional elites.
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Introduction

The regional elite in post-Communist Russia have provided a rich area of research into the development of new political regimes in transition states. This thesis examines the features of regional leadership in Sverdlovsk Oblast between 1989 and 1999, focusing on the nature of the regional political leadership, the role of network structures and the strategies pursued to consolidate and preserve power during the uncertain period of the El'tsin decade.

The thesis seeks to further knowledge of regional processes during the 1990s by concentrating on the identity and actions of one of the leading figures in Russian centre-regional relations of this period, Eduard Rossel’, who was governor of the Sverdlovsk region from 1991 to 1993, and then from 1995 until his removal in 2009. By considering the exercise of control by individual figures over overlapping networks that existed at all levels of power, from national to local, this research shifts the emphasis away from institution-building aspects of regional politics to consideration of the personalised development of the individual political regimes that were characteristic of 1990s Russia. With this in mind, this study constructs a rich understanding of the dynamics of the various network relations that typified Rossel’’s method of rule. These networks were based on vertical ties to Moscow, horizontal cooperation with leaders of other Russian regions and the projection of vertically-downwards power into the regions.

Several factors identify Rossel’ and this time-period as worthy of detailed study; within the context of centre-regional relations of the 1990s, Sverdlovsk Oblast, and Rossel’ in particular, were at the heart of regional initiatives to increase the decentralization of power from Moscow to the provinces. In the late Soviet period, Sverdlovsk Oblast was a highly politicised region that was strongly pro-El'tsin (indeed it was Boris El'tsin’s native region), and had overwhelmingly supported the Russian President during the
first Russian Presidential elections in June 1991, during the 1991 August coup, and at subsequent times of need during his presidency. It was a heavily industrialised region, with a strong sense of what its own position had been in the USSR and what it should become under the new Russian state. Under Rossel’’s leadership the region was at the forefront of centre-regional relations in the first decade of post-communist Russia; it attempted to autonomously upgrade its federal status to that of a Republic in 1993, obtained the right to hold the first in a new round of officially sanctioned gubernatorial elections in 1995, and successfully concluded the agreement of the first bilateral treaty between a non-ethnicised region and the federal centre in 1996, all against the apparent wishes of the central political elite. The fluid and uncertain nature of Russian regional politics under El’tsin make these events stand out. Critical to the entire period is the identity of Rossel’ and the longevity of his popular appeal and political power.

Through examination of how Rossel’ constructed and maintained his political support, even where it meant going against the centre, we can gain further insight into the political regime that developed in the region during this period and explain the longevity of Rossel’’s political power.

A note should be made here on the terminology used throughout the thesis. The Russian Federation was made up of 89 units during the 1990s. Of these, a distinction should be made between the 21 titular ethnic republics and the remaining 68 oblasts and krais. The term ‘regions’ refers to all units of the federation, although where necessary the difference between the republics and the remaining regions has been noted. ‘Regional leaders’ and ‘governors’ has been used to note the actors in the leading political position in the oblasts and krais, with the leaders of the republics noted as ‘presidents’. The transliteration of Russian names and words has been done according to the Library of Congress format, with the Russian soft sign being represented with an apostrophe, for example, in the spelling of Boris El’tsin.
El'tsin’s Russia, elites and networks – a literature review

Many different aspects of regional politics, economics and society have been explored by researchers in order to understand the dynamics of change within the Russian state. Among the areas of change monitored with great interest were those to state structure and organization of political process in the vast territory that Russia encompasses, and in particular, the process of decentralization of centre-regional power relations that President Boris El'tsin initiated. By the end of the decade, analysis of the system of federal relations that had emerged led researchers, such as Martin Nicholson, to find that the prospects for a strong post-Soviet Russia lay in the strength of the regions as they attempted to force change in Russian state structure through developing centre-regional relations from the bottom up.¹ Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin the reverse has been observed, and criticised, by researchers. This area of study has been broken into many different sub-units, including the legal, institutional and social aspects of regional life. Despite the processes of the 1990s now being firmly in the past, there is still a requirement for continued research into regional issues of this period, in particular with regard to the individual nature of regional regimes and how critical political actors were able to transform Russia from a unitary state into a mosaic of territories with huge variations in practices.

The first section of this literature review examines the role of regional political systems in El'tsin’s Russia, considering the institutions of regional political power and the role of regional governors. This is followed by a discussion on the changing nature of the political elite in post-Soviet Russia and the increasing influence of networks over most aspects of life. By examining the actions of Eduard Rossel', we can demonstrate how he implemented and made use of overlapping, multi-functional network structures to consolidate political power within his region, allowing for the development of functioning patron-client relations with Boris El'tsin, the construction of borders around his political

power to protect against threats to his leadership and the assumption of satisfying the requirements of his own client networks to create a regional political regime that had influence outside of the formal borders of the Sverdlovsk region as well as within them.

The construction of federalism and regional politics in El'tsin's Russia

The immediate tasks facing El'tsin and his reform government in the period following the August 1991 coup and until the events of October 1993 were to change the identity of the state, reposition it geopolitically, and carry out economic and political reform. Of these, Liliia Shevtsova and Michael McFaul have both noted that securing Russia’s borders (and its respective position in the world), changing the state’s ideology from communism and the urgent need for economic reform were the most pressing, with the building of functional political institutions seen as less of a priority.\(^2\) With a number of titular ethnic republics making political and economic demands for national self-determination and sovereignty, Richard Sakwa has noted that the centre refrained from interfering in the regions in return for loyalty, and explains that ‘federal relations were a result of the immediate needs of the president’ with the regions creating a *de facto* bottom-up devolution of power that acted as a check on central power in place of an effective legislature or judiciary.\(^3\) This is argued to have come at the expense of long-term political development, with Nicholson further noting that the outcome of a ‘state built on local units’ made it difficult for the centre to govern.\(^4\)

The collapse of the Soviet Union forced Russia to move from being a unit within the federal structure of the Soviet Union to becoming a federal state itself, addressing issues of federal construction that it had no previous experience of. Significant research has been carried out, including by Alexei Salmin, Valerie Bunce, Alfred

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\(^4\) Nicholson (1999), p.72
Stepan, Jeffrey Kahn, Cameron Ross, Elizabeth Pascal, Konstantin Kiselev, and Natal’ia Pankevich, on the development of Russian federalism spanning the El’tsin decade and Putin’s first presidency, approaching the problems faced by the state from the starting position that the inherited system of territorial-administrative divisions carried over from the RSFSR meant that the state structure was based on the Soviet structure rather than a newly negotiated process. Nicholas Lynn and Alexei Novikov stated that the asymmetric nature of federal relations, which favoured the titular ethnic republics over the remaining oblasts and krais, meant that the nature of early Russian federalism was hotly contested as to whether it should follow a top-down system with strong central structures and federal presence in the sub-national units, or a ‘bottom-up’ system whereby the strength of the federation came from its member units. It was pointed out by Elizabeth Pascal that the perception of Russian federalism under El’tsin differed between Russian and Western observers; Russian observers focused on the reliance that the centre forced upon the regions for revenue and economic development, whereas Western researchers have concentrated more heavily upon the decentralization of power and the resulting problems that have arisen from this.

Discussion of the literature on Russian federalism in the 1990s in this section focuses in the first instance on the legal and institutional structure of the state and the role of the ethnic republics in determining outcomes.


7 Pascal (2003), p.2
The centre-region relationship is, by its very essence, defined by the structure of the state. In his study on the theory of federal systems, William Riker states that ‘federalism is the main alternative to empire as a technique of aggregating large areas under one government.’

Gregory Gleason has argued that the hesitation by the Soviet authorities to renegotiate federal relations and the effect of economic decentralization allowed federal units (with the Union Republics at the forefront) to seize the initiative and press for more rights against the centre. This hesitation turned into near paralysis in the new Russian state which continued to display a lack of a coherent regional policy leading to a continuing process of sub-national units seeking more powers vis-à-vis the federal centre. In practice, the conditions of centre-regional relations became a mixture of passivity from El'tsin and pragmatic decision-making based on practical requirements for support for his leadership at key junctures. In his detailed biography of El'tsin, Timothy Colton considered the President’s own perception of the centre-regional structure, singling out his hands-off approach to the regions, whereby El'tsin allowed regional leaders the space ‘to solve their problems self-reliantly with minimal tutorship from Moscow’.

During the El'tsin decade, studies frequently focused on the exercise of the leverage that Moscow held over regional leaders as historical processes played themselves out. It has been suggested that the reality of the threat of removal made governors ‘appointed bureaucrats’ implementing the centre’s will; a state of affairs that only changed with the introduction of popular election. Such a criticism of regional governors is an overly Moscow-centric view of the state of the regional political field and fails to consider the lack of guidance and the level of inconsistency in El'tsin’s approach to regional conditions resulting in sub-national territories taking an ad hoc approach to the development of institutions as events unfolded on the ground,

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11 Shevtsova (1999), p.204
assuming powers that the centre was not fulfilling, holding elections, and co-opting federal officials. The initial system of appointment of Regional Heads of Administration, which only settled into routine gubernatorial elections in 1995 following several false starts, constructed a delicate system of presidential-regional relations with the threat of dismissal acting as the lever with which the centre ensured gubernatorial loyalty, as noted by Sakwa and Colton.  

William Clark put forward the argument that the appointment of regional leaders presented El'tsin with a chain of command leading to his door, placing sufficient authority in the institution to remove the threat of the popularly elected regional soviets assuming a foothold in regional decision-making. This interpretation of the appointment system suggests that El'tsin and his team intentionally returned to the traditional system of regional emissaries that the Russian Empire had used to control the regions, although the counter-argument can be made that there was little other option as the deterioration of regional conditions meant that they could not endure a long drawn-out process of regime building. Ironically, the settled approach echoed the subordination of former regional Party officials to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. As Clark stated, ‘not surprisingly, to the degree that El'tsin was interested in separating local soviets from the exercise of executive power throughout Russia, and to the degree that he wanted a greater degree of centralised executive authority to reside in his office, he was compelled to create an executive substitute for the Party committee secretariats that he had done so much to destroy.’

Darell Slider, Gerald Easter and Robert Orttung (et al) have all noted that out of this structure, as the regions struggled to consolidate and legitimise their regimes, the holding of unsanctioned gubernatorial elections, attempts to autonomously upgrade the federal status of regions and the struggle from the provinces for greater decentralisation all prompted responses from El'tsin resulting in the dismissal of his

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14 Clark (1998), p.28-29
While stating the above, Zlotnik noted that before the events of October 1993, regional governors posed particular problems for El’tsin in areas where they were highly supported by the regional soviets. At the time of Zlotnik’s study, the emphasis of research was on the role that institution building would have on regional regimes. The expectation was that gubernatorial elections and the creation of the Federation Council would strengthen regional leaders through giving them a forum to influence federal policy making. He argued that El’tsin had to approach dismissing regional leaders carefully, citing the case of Irkustsk governor Iurii Nozhikov. The uncertainty of regional life prompted those leaders with a wider variety of sources of political capital to seek alternatives to the system of relying on the president, although even when dismissed, in several cases regional leaders were able to swiftly return to political life based on residual support from within their territories.

Regional (oblast and krai, as opposed to ethnic republics) attempts to equalise federal relations unilaterally have been referred to in common with the threat of secession that some ethnic republics pursued. In these cases, Remington has argued that as certain regional leaders sought to determine their own relationship with the centre they increased the threat of secessionism and state fragmentation. The threat of secession was of considerable concern to Western and Russian analysts during the early- to mid-nineties, as leading titular ethnic republics, particularly in the Volga region, refused to fall in line with the centre’s federalist plans, although in hindsight, this can now perhaps be viewed as part of the struggle for power and domination that was part of the state-building process under the new conditions of the state. The unfavourable federal relations that oblasts and krais found themselves to be participant in led some,

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16 Marc Zlotnik, (1996), ‘Russia’s governors: all the President’s men?’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.43, No. 6, pp.26-34
17 Zlotnik (1996), p. 27
18 Thomas F. Remington, (1999), Politics in Russia, New York, Longman
as in the case of Rossel’, to challenge the asymmetric nature of the new state structure, however, while this has been argued by some to have been threatening secession, Rossel’s attempt to upgrade Sverdlovsk Oblast’s status to that of a republic is viewed here as having the aim of consolidating his own personal power in his region rather than an attempt to obtain sovereignty for the Urals.19

Centre-regional relations began to settle with the agreement of bilateral treaties with the ethnic republics in 1994, which led in turn to their agreement with the remaining regions, and the reversal of the practice of appointment to the position of Head of Regional Administration as El’tsin slowly allowed the introduction of gubernatorial elections in selected regions from 1995 onwards. These elections significantly overturned the existing centre-regional relationship by removing the leverage that El’tsin held over governors, but were a necessity for the ailing Russian president in order to shore up support ahead of his re-election campaign. The first of this new wave of gubernatorial elections was held in Sverdlovsk Oblast in 1995, following a personal agreement between El’tsin and Rossel’ (discussed in chapter four). Tolz and Busygina noted that the introduction of gubernatorial elections diminished the Presidential Administration’s ability to exert control over the regions, and Hahn supported this position finding that the introduction of gubernatorial elections provided more autonomy for regional leaders and marked the collapse of the vertical chain of power in the form that it had previously existed, mainly due to the fact that El’tsin’s national political struggles had left him too weak to enforce vertical power.20 Matsuzato later argued that the introduction of gubernatorial elections, initially as an exception in Sverdlovsk Oblast, was prompted by the 1996 presidential elections as part of a deal with regional

19 Matthew Crosston, (2004), Shadow Separatism: Implications for Democratic Consolidation, Aldershot, Ashgate
leaders to shore-up El’tsin’s electoral base in key regions. Incumbent governors found themselves in a favourable position ahead of elections, as they exercised control over the appointment of the head of the regional electoral commission and were able to shape the electoral system to assist in their legitimisation of power, as found by Andrew Konitzer. Control over local channels of communication also placed the incumbent ahead of competitors, however, incumbency did not guarantee election and control of the media had to be done carefully, relying on managerial credentials rather than affiliation to a particular ideology. Furthermore, the centre had its own capabilities to influence outcomes and achieve the ‘right’ result. As noted by Olga Kryshtanovskaya:

Governors often lost elections, a thing impossible had their administrative resource been the decisive factor in election campaigns. A current governor was often replaced under the influence of the federal administrative resource directed against him, rather than because of his insufficient popularity in his region. In a clash between a regional administrative resource and the federal one, it is normally the latter that got the upper hand.

Colton noted that an important feature of El’tsin’s leadership was his personalisation of relations between the president and small group of regional leaders. At the outset of the new Russia, the continuation of Soviet-era interpersonal relations was a significant resource for those able to make use of them. Within the appointment system, El’tsin’s personal relations with regional governors offered the potential for increased access to decision making. As part of a wider tendency in post-Soviet Russia that is discussed below in the section on networks, personal ties with the President vastly increased the

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25 Colton (2008), p.287
opportunity to promote regional cases and offered the possibility of avoiding external
gatekeepers who tried to limit access to El’tsin. Even following gubernatorial elections
and the lifting of the threat of removal, the importance of personal ties was still
significant. A common theme in the research on El’tsin’s rule finds that when potentially
significant rearrangements of the centre-regional relationship were attempted, imposing
formal vertical relations on governors was difficult. An example of this is seen in
changes to the Federation Council that gave elected governors an automatic seat in
this upper chamber of the national legislative branch. At the time, the suggestion was
made by Zlotnik, and Tolz and Busygina, that the increase in significance of regional
leaders through election would re-define their role nationally. This did not occur and the
Federation Council remained weak, due to what Nicholson and Yaroslav Startsev
found to be a result of a lack of horizontal cooperation and the fact that stronger
regional leaders placed self-promotion at the national level over the pursuit of benefits
for all regions.26

Regional regime building and individual leadership

Research on the individual regional political regimes and leaders that emerged in the
Russian regions has taken a mixture of approaches. Historical parallels have often
been used to describe the type of regimes that were established. These have used
Russian (and non-Russian) history in attempts to explain the fate of regional power
through a form of historical path dependency. Razuvaev’s study of Moscow Mayor Iurii
Luzhkov compared his regime with the boyars of medieval Rus’, the high ranking
officials that were given extensive opportunity to rule over lands as long as they
provided resources (mainly financial, but also military) to the centre.27 The parallel was
drawn over how regional leaders slowly increase their powers as they rule over their

Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 336-361
35, No.4, pp. 27-42
Matsuzato also used a historical comparison when looking at Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiev and his development from Bonapartism in the early 1990s, whereby Shaimiev built himself the status of the ‘strong leader’ bringing his people to statehood, to a Latin American-style ‘Caciquismo’ system that was akin to Spanish leaders of the Conquistador era in Latin America. Comparative approaches have included Gel’man’s, Ryzhenkov’s and Brie’s research on the influence that regional leaders and their networks have played on the process of exiting transition to reaching stable regional political systems. Where institutional approaches broach the subject of individual actors’ specific actions, their treatment of the personal nature of regional politics in the 1990s is limited resulting in generalisations that are broadly applied to all regions. This downplays the specific nature and highly individualised conditions at ground level in the Russian regions that make each case different from the next.

Specific research looking at Sverdlovsk Oblast has yielded insight into the institutional effects of Rossel’s power. Where the role of Sverdlovsk Oblast has been examined with regards to Russian federalism, attention is paid to the declaration of the Urals Republic; as noted above, this is frequently equated with the threat of fragmentation posed to the Russian Federation, as suggested by Remington, or the unilateral imposition of a quasi-separatist autonomous region, as argued by Crosston. Gerald Easter instead argued that that the motivation for Sverdlovsk Oblast’s attempts to upgrade its federal status was within-system reform, placing the conflict between Sverdlovsk Oblast’ and the centre as an ‘intra-state elite power struggle over political, economic and status resources. The idea of the construction of a sub-national myth surrounding the Urals identity to compete with ethnic nationalism in other parts of Russia as a strategy for increasing federal status as an important factor in the attempt

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28 Razuvaev (1997), p. 27
29 Matsuzato (2001), pp.43-77
30 Vladimir Gel’man, Sergei Ryzhenkov and Michel Brie, (2003), Making and Breaking Democratic Transitions, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield
31 Easter (1997), p.631
to create the Urals Republic has also been taken up by Alexander Kuznetsov.\textsuperscript{32} This study considers these findings, although takes the consequences of the Urals Republic on the regional political space alongside its effects nationally, considering it as a critical juncture in the internal power structure of the Sverdlovsk region and the personal ambitions of Rossel', who was able to use the process to mobilise a new set of political resources to enhance his role. This promotes the understanding that Rossel”s regime consisted of a consolidated regional elite through which he held power and considers the strategies used to consolidate this elite. The failure of the Urals Republic highlighted the necessity of making greater use of network connections, as raised by Easter in his analysis of elite cohesion:

Elite cohesion grew out of the informal ties that had existed among regional political and economic actors in the Soviet period. These informal ties cut across the post-communist political institutions, facilitating the coordination of goals, strategies and tactics. The major victories for the regional movement came during periods when executive and legislative organs acted in concert. While the personal relationship between El’tsin and Rossel was ultimately crucial to the outcome, the initial confrontation never would have unfolded had regional actors failed to mobilise their potential power resources.\textsuperscript{33}

The necessity and advantage of ties to the centre are underplayed in previous analyses of Sverdlovsk Oblast, the processes of the Urals Republic as well as the later push for gubernatorial elections and the agreement of the bilateral treaties between Sverdlovsk Oblast and the federal centre, and should be revisited. Easter broaches this subject by noting that Rossel”s access to the centre was not solely the result of his previous contact with El’tsin, but also the result of elite ties within the region. Further to this, more research is required as to the nature and value of other elite interactions, and how they arose, were serviced and declined. Examining the period following Rossel”s re-election in 1995, Startsev examined the factors behind and the


\textsuperscript{33} Easter (1997), p.631-632
consequences of Rossel’s growing domination of the region. The finding of this article pays particular attention to the ‘power infrastructure’ that elite support for Rossel’ provided, specifically through the construction and effective control that his own political movement, ‘Transformation of the Urals’, allowed him over regional affairs.34 This, combined with his existing reputation as a strong economic manager, extended Rossel’s influence beyond Sverdlovsk Oblast and into the wider Urals territory, most notably through his role as chair of the Association of Joint Economic Activity for the Republics and Regions of the Urals (Bol'shoi Ural).35

Such activity also had a secondary but important symbolic significance. Not only the governor, but also the whole region and elements beyond its limits within the Urals, came to an understanding of the region as a territory bearing special status, which was most clearly visible in the coordination of economic matters.36

The role of regional political parties and the level of organizational development that Sverdlovsk Oblast displayed in elections were examined by Gel’man and Golosov.37 Taking the region as a single case to investigate a causal link between regional elites and political parties, they noted that when compared to Russian national-level and other regional political movements, democratic electoral competition was unusually strong. A connection is made between this and the presence of different elite groupings competing for power, which were ultimately unable to wholly defeat their opponents in the electoral process. They highlight the local creation of political parties in the region that were clearly distinguished from branches of national political parties, noting that the success Rossel’ found through the use of his Transformation of the Urals (Preobrazhenie Urala) movement as a vehicle to get himself and his supporters elected to the Oblast Duma in April 1994, was copied by competing political actors in the region.

34 Startsev (1999), p.336
36 Startsev (1999), p.342
who aligned themselves with federal political parties to try to emulate his success.\textsuperscript{38}

One important finding from this study is the implication of the division between the Oblast elite and the elite of the regional capital city, Ekaterinburg (called Sverdlovsk until September 1991). At the regional level, elite loyalty towards Rossel’ was particularly strong (and closely monitored and controlled) as his elite network neither took the opportunity of his dismissal as governor following the failed Urals Republic attempt to replace him with someone else from within their network nor shifted their support to his replacement.

In so far as Rossel’ firmly controlled the executive and the legislature, no need of political parties had been felt. As soon as he was dismissed and started to fight to restore his authority, Transformation of the Urals had been launched. While the power struggle had been initiated by Moscow, and the federal authorities continued to be portrayed as an ‘external enemy’, Rossel’’s immediate political rivals were those members of the Ekaterinburg elite who capitalised on his dismissal.\textsuperscript{39}

The development of a competitive political environment where there was agreement to follow a set of ‘rules’ for how to conduct political competition was later applied to the case of Volgograd, where reference is made to Sverdlovsk Oblast noting how the political elite established and observed the ‘rules of the game’ promoting stability in the region.\textsuperscript{40} The use of networks to undermine political institutions is taken up by Marie Mendras, who notes the nature of relationships within regions as being based upon an ongoing struggle for resources. She argued that Rossel’ offers a good example of this through his construction of a system that used informal hierarchies that allowed him to rule through coordination of his networks rather than developing the role of governor as an institution.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{38} Gel’man and Golosov (1998), p.35. Seeking external political legitimacy from national figures was not only limited to branches of national parties, but also extended to seeking approval from individual heavyweight national politicians.

\textsuperscript{39} Gel’man and Golosov (1998), p.42

\textsuperscript{40} Gel’man, Ryzhenkov and Brie (2003), pp. 30-32

\textsuperscript{41} Marie Mendras, (1999), ‘How regional elites preserve their power’, \textit{Post-Soviet Affairs}, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp.295-311
While each of these articles offers great insight into the processes occurring regionally at the time, taking into account the role of the elite in these processes and noting the existence of networks, there is a clear gap in the body of research that requires a more detailed account of how and where personalised network relations were applied, which would allow for a richer understanding of the overlap between the formal and informal aspects of regional leadership under El'tsin. This thesis pursues this angle of research through asking questions of how Rossel' immersed himself in network relations and how he used them to protect and advance his position. This will facilitate understanding of how constituencies were built to support his actions and how he made use of his political, economic and social capital.

Continuation and change of regional elites in Russia

One of the key concepts of this study is Eyal’s, Szelényi’s and Townsley’s statement that in the transition from Communism ‘those who are able to adjust their trajectories to meet social change most successfully are those who possess the most diverse portfolio of different kinds of capital.’42 While this statement was made in the context of the construction of a middle class in post-communist Central Europe, it can be applied to Russia’s regions to suggest an explanation of the ability of the post-communist Russian regional ruling elite to maintain positions of power in the provinces in the 1990s. Using the shifting use of capital to suit specific demands at particular times, the thesis uses the above statement to demonstrate how Rossel’s use of different forms of capital served to create the elements of boundary control, proposed by Edward Gibson as the strategy used by sub-national elites under conditions of national regime transition to protect power. Discussed in more detail in chapter three, Gibson uses examples of authoritarian sub-national regimes in democratising Latin American countries to articulate the idea that three main ‘boundaries’ are used to protect these regimes from political threats – the parochialization of power (the hegemony of the

governor over the subnational territorial system), the nationalisation of influence (the pursuit of strategies to influence national decisions that affect the subnational unit), and the monopolisation of national-subnational linkages (the ties between all levels of territorial organization). \(^{43}\) Within this thesis, the argument is proposed that the effective implementation of the boundary control strategy is located in Rossel’’s ability to adjust his portfolio of capital to suit the different demands of the era. This ability to use different resources to support his own personal political position had its foundations in the multiple elite networks that he could call upon at any one time. The research presented in the subsequent chapters considers who these elites were and how they facilitated Rossel’’s strategy, building upon Easter’s finding noted above that it was the presence of a coherent regional elite that allowed for Rossel’’s regional domination.

The elite under Soviet rule developed out of a ‘system of appointments that enabled the Party to maintain hegemony’, which became regarded as a wider political class, the ‘nomenklatura’.

\(^{44}\) Bohdan Harasymiw’s assessment of the ‘nomenklatura’ highlighted its composition of persons ‘[included] in the CPSU patronage list of ‘eligibles’. \(^{45}\) Harasymiw had previously noted that the system of nomenklatura made it possible for individuals with sufficient influence over entry into the larger elite to control and use it to ‘build a power base in the party or elsewhere’. \(^{46}\) He went on later to note that ‘the organizational features of the selection system, and the personalities of both candidate and selectors, move into first place in determining induction into, as well as promotion within, the nomenklatura. [This is] because, in the first place, in order to be selected for a political career one must catch the eye of someone – a party instructor or cadres.

\(^{44}\) David Lane and Cameron Ross (1999), The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin, New York, St. Martin’s Press, p.144-146.
secretary. In his study of the Soviet ‘ruling class’ in a supposedly class-less society, Mikhail Voslenskii demonstrated it to be in operation at different levels of the hierarchy, encompassing the decision making group as well as those who had no powers to affect decisions.

During Russia’s transition, discussion of elites has looked at the rotation that occurred at the end of Soviet rule. Despite central elites changing at the USSR level as the system collapsed there was continuity in the Union republic level state institutions and their leaders; at the regional level in Russia, a large number of former Chairmen of the Regional Executive Committees (Oblispolkoms) were appointed Head of Regional Administration by El’tsin providing some continuity in skills required to run large administrative territories. Retaining political actors who had worked within the Soviet system prompted existing elite networks to be carried over into the post-Soviet regime. The position and frequency of former Soviet era elites in the ruling class of the new Russian Federation has been discussed by Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, James Hughes, David Lane and Cameron Ross, and Vladimir Gel’man. These studies all consider whether ‘elite circulation’, in which a ‘substantial variation in the character of the political leadership’ must take place with a different set of political actors emerging from outside of the former ruling class, or ‘elite reproduction’, whereby the previous communist political elite ‘reconstituted’ themselves into a new form, took

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47 Harasymiw (1984), p.171
48 Mikhail Voslenskii, (2005), Nomenklatura, Moscow, Zakharov, p.110. Voslenskii quotes the post-war Yugoslav Vice-President, and later one of its most famous dissidents, Milovan Dijlas, a former member of the nomenklatura himself, “Modern Communism is not just a party of a special type and not just a bureaucracy, owing its existence to extreme intervention of the state in economic life. The fundamental trait of modern communism is precisely in a new class of owners and exploiters.”
place at the regional level.\textsuperscript{50} Central appointment of regional governors has been argued by both Kryshtanovskaya and White, and Hughes as being a core reason for the successful reproduction of the former Soviet elite at the regional level in the transition period. When looking specifically at the gubernatorial corps, due to El'tsin’s reliance on appointing regional leaders and the lack of available cadres to run the regions it is noted that despite there being turnover in the physical identity of the governors, by the end of the 1990s their ‘structural characteristics’ (including biographical characteristics such as Party membership and length of office in higher Party roles) remained largely unchanged.\textsuperscript{51} According to James Hughes, prior to the system of appointment of regional governors, elite colonisation of legislative bodies occurred as members of the elite sought election to the regional soviets during the elections that occurred in 1990 (they were seen to potentially offer elites more power than Party and administrative positions as the state changed). Analysis of the results of the 1990 regional soviet elections by Kryshtanovskaya and White show that almost half of the new deputies came from administrative and economic management positions, with the overwhelming majority of deputies coming from within the nomenklatura elite.\textsuperscript{52} Research into the elite during the El’tsin decade further questioned what constitutes the ‘old’ or ‘new’ ruling elite.\textsuperscript{53} According to the different positions taken in the study of elite renewal, Rossel' falls into either category depending on the initial standpoint taken; as a member of the ‘old’ elite, Rossel’ held a position of authority in the Communist Party structure prior to August 1991, whereas viewing him as a part of a new elite stems from the position that he was first appointed to a position of political power as Chairman of the Sverdlovsk regional Soviet’s executive committee (Oblispolkom) in April 1990, i.e. after elections to the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies which introduced a new cohort of actors into positions that had previously been closed off and is argued as

\begin{itemize}
  \item Lane and Ross (1999), p.143
  \item Kryshtanovskaya and White (1996), p.728
  \item Kryshtanovskaya and White (1996); Lane and Ross (1999); James Hughes and Peter John, (2001), ‘Local elites in Russia: adaptation or competition’, \textit{British Journal of Political Science}, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp.673-692
\end{itemize}
being the initial point of elite renewal. While both approaches have their merits, the conditions on the ground at the time almost by default required the continuing role of networks, meaning that even where individual actors were from the new elite there was the likelihood that they retained connections to members of the old elite. Whatever the standpoint taken, a policy of lustration was deemed by the central government to be impossible, as it would exclude too many individuals who had the key experience the El’tsin regime required for them to stave off the total collapse of regional political, economic and social conditions, and the result was that the political biography of an actor’s participation within the Soviet nomenklatura could be overlooked by the centre and the population under the critical circumstances of the early 1990s. This was seen in the case of former Regional Party First Secretary Egor Stroev who continued in power in Orel Oblast, and the Presidents of the titular ethnic republics, such as Shaimiev, or Rakhimov in Bashkortostan, who were not forcibly removed due to having been communist-era leaders of their territories. For Rossel’, despite having been a long-term party member and part of the nomenklatura, even in such a pro-democratic region as Sverdlovsk Oblast, his relatively short time in a position of power in the Soviet regional political structure meant that he emerged relatively free from association with the communist regime.

Associated with the statement above that successful actors are those who are able to adapt and adjust according to the conditions, Ol’ga Kryshtanovskaya’s assessment of the political actors in Russia was that they sought ‘to control [their political capital] and consolidate their power.’\textsuperscript{54} It is the source and continuous development of this political capital that provides the grounds for continued political power. Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley address this in their research on the development of a propertied middle class in Central and Eastern Europe after communism; they argue that those members of the elite that successfully sustained positions within the higher echelons of society were those that were able to exhibit the ability to ‘learn how to dispose of devalued

\textsuperscript{54} Kryshtanovskaya (2004), p.46
types of capital and acquire those types of capital that had increased in value. In these countries, political capital drastically decreased in value to members of the elite seeking to maintain their positions, due to the obvious heavy connotations to the past, whereas economic capital and education level rose to more prominent positions over former Party connections. In Russia, the opposite was true as old forms of political capital and the contacts and networks that they provided were carried over into the post-Communist era.

The continuing role played by nomenklatura ties in the post-Soviet political space has placed them as the basis of existing networks, particularly in the regions. Political support for regional leaders in the early post-Communist system in Russia was heavily influenced by the legacy of the nomenklatura practice due to the experience, connections and resources that these members of the elite brought to the table. It is noted by Geoffrey Hosking that patronage in the imperial Russian, Soviet and post-communist Russian state can be defined as 'a hierarchical relationship under which a client offers goods, services or support to a patron in return for protection and perhaps promotion of the clients’ interests or other benefits.' The Soviet nomenklatura, and later El’tsin-era networks, relied heavily on patronage ties developed according to specific political economic or social needs, where all participants required some form of capital or resource. Early regional power in El’tsin’s Russia was built on a system that placed a value on loyalty to the president, yet unlike the Soviet system whereby regional leaders represented the interests of their Moscow patrons, in post-communist Russia regional leaders themselves became the patrons for the representation of regional (and their own) interests to Moscow.

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56 Eyal, Szélényi and Townsley (1998), p.6-7
Within the regions, ‘selective patronage’ (as termed by Alla Chirikova and Natalya Lapina), denotes the administrative support provided by regional administrations to political and social movements. This support could be of a private nature, rather than public, and through this ‘soft’ display of patronage regional executives were able to ‘[occupy] almost all of the public sphere’, including exerting influence over social organisations and the mass media.\footnote{Alla Chirikova and Natalya Lapina, (2001), ‘Political power and political stability in the Russian regions’, in Archie Brown (ed.), (2001), \textit{Contemporary Russian Politics}, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p.396} This created a nexus between regional governors and their bureaucracies (as the approver and distributor of resources respectively), which Chirikova later highlighted as requiring the loyalty of these interest groups. Such ‘selective patronage’ connected regional leaders’ with new local business and economic interests, sustaining their territories when faced by the inability of the centre to provide financial security.\footnote{A.E. Chirikova, (2010), \textit{Regionalnye elity Rossii}, Moscow, Aspekt Press, p. 88}

Kathryn Stoner-Weiss introduced the idea that regional administrations were captured by interest groups, suggesting a direct relationship between the level of business influence on the regional government and non-compliance with federal law. She argues that the ‘business-government nexus’ in the regions was stronger than federal government influence.\footnote{Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, (2006), \textit{Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia}, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.110} In many cases the political-business nexus was vital to the regions in order for them to compensate for lack of attention from the centre to their needs, and criticism of provincial ambition forgets that this stemmed initially from the breakdown of central control over the economic structure of the Soviet Union. In accusing regional leaders of simply acting to protect their gains in early post-Soviet Russia, Stoner-Weiss excuses the lack of central policy towards the regions under El'tsin and disregards the specific nature of conditions in each territory, created by the Soviet system and its subsequent disintegration. This study of Rossel’ and Sverdlovsk Oblast considers the relationship between governor and business interests through the
context of the industrial structure of the region and the consensus held within the region that the regional administration should protect local interests.

Between regions, inter-elite networks extended horizontally between larger geographic areas. The cross-regional lobbying groups of the 1990s are neglected in studies of the period, mentioned largely in passing. These bodies should not be disregarded as insignificant, in particular with regard to the role of the promotion of regional interests and the attempt to influence national policy. The exception is James Hughes’ study of the Siberian Agreement, made up of a number of Siberian regions and republics, which demonstrated the potential benefits territories found through inter-regional bargaining.

Most relevant to this study is the centre’s response to inter-regional horizontal integration as it initiated direct negotiation with individual territories to prevent the development of coordinated action and disrupt any potential cooperation between governors. Inter-regional cooperation was primarily due to the need for exchanging resources to replace the command economy. The literature on federal relations touches upon this by connecting a region’s financial value to the central state with favourable outcomes. Donor regions, those that submitted more to the federal budget than they received as subsidies, and the ethnic republics in which titular ethnic nationalism threatened the integrity of the state, were considered by Pascal as an elite category of units of the federation. Daniel Treisman made a connection between the gains made by units of the federation through confrontational action taken by their leaders towards the centre, while Peter Soderlund has looked at how structural approaches link the influence of geopolitical and geostuctural factors with improvement of an individual territory’s federal position. While these approaches add value to the debate on centre-regional relations under El’tsin, they overestimate the

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presence of a coherent central policy towards the regions and pay too little attention to the ad hoc nature of elite bargaining.

**Establishing the new rules of networks**

Networks are considered here as the formal or informal grouping of actors who are linked together in structures which complete functions that its members would find difficult to fulfil on an individual basis. This is done through the provision of access to resources and benefits to participants that they would not otherwise have access to outside of the network. Alena Ledeneva uses the term ‘network’ to refer to such a unit, with the resources which are brought by its members and made available labelled as the ‘capital’ brought by members to the group.\(^6\) Political capital is viewed as a ‘special case’ of social capital, institutionalised through the decision-making parts of society (the elite); for political networks, as opposed to social networks, the nature of these networks is one of function rather than sociability. These political networks arise in political systems and societies where some aspects of life require additional support mechanisms to supplement existing institutional functions and social norms. In the case of the Soviet Union, political networks were located within the wider Communist Party structure, whereas in the first decade of the post-Soviet era, at the regional level the heads of regional administration were in command of overwhelming political capital when faced with their rivals.

Networks provide an exclusive form of organization with specific relations to other members of a group and with specific purposes; they give benefits to members that others do not have access to. The nature of regional power is suggested by David Knoke as a series of compromises between the desire for unitary control over the political space and the acceptance of complex, multi-layered control over a political

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structure that supports and protects political power with the potential for increasing it. Knoke's study on political networks places them as the location of ‘asymmetrical actual or potential interactions in which one social actor exerts greater control over another’s behaviour’. Through influence and domination strategies, the most influential figures form patronage bonds and are able to get their clients to act according to their wishes. A variety of complex approaches have been developed for the study of networks, which can be applied to social movements, organizations, international relations and domestic political structures amongst others. Through examining the role of networks patterns of interaction among individual members, webs of interaction, consideration of resource exchange and institutional networks can be revealed.

Understanding the function and role played by networks in Russia is an essential part of understanding the processes that have occurred alongside the drastic social change that has been seen as former communist institutions and ways of life were broken down at rapid speed. In the more recent past, research has looked at networks more closely, particularly focusing on the role they have played at the national level. According to Vadim Kononenko, with specific reference to Putin’s Russia, the presence of networks as a practice within the state does not have to be perceived as derogatory to the way in which the state functions. Instead, he argues that the ‘actual qualities of the governmentality of the state, its logic and rationality, have merged with elite networks’. Research into the personalised networks of leadership has featured more prominently in research into Putin’s Russia than it did the previous decade of post-Soviet Russia. Andrew Monaghan has noted the importance of the informal network that surrounds President Putin and Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev, which includes political actors, business leaders and the security services. He notes that an inner network of individuals radiates into the formal structures of the state, overlapping

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64 David Knoke, (1990), Political Networks: The Structural Perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.3
through patronising broader areas while retaining the role of shaping the decision making of the state. Studies of the role of networks frequently focus on the nature of interaction, such as Alena Ledeneva’s study on the political sistema under President Medvedev. This study suggested that the most important feature of present-day networks is loyalty, which under the Putin system of power (although no less important under El’tsin) is argued to be the essential operating principle of the state system. Membership and participation in networks is fluid, and resources from one network can be distributed to a different network to resolve particular situations. One of the aspects of 1990s networks in the regions was the ability of regional leaders to ‘capture’ federal actors present in their territories and incorporate them in their networks (this is discussed in chapter eight on the introduction of presidential representatives). Nikolay Petrov has noted that the El’tsin-era position of strong regional networks was deliberately diluted under Putin through the increase of parachuting the regime’s own actors into regions. The result has been the ‘digestion’ of formerly autonomous regional networks into a unified central-regional network of which the governors are no longer the sole representative of the regional elite to the federation.

The composition of Russian elite networks has been deconstructed by Kryshtanovskaya into numerous different informal sub-groups internal to the network, such as clans, cliques, strategic and interest groups and an inner circle (oboima). Of these, for example, it is suggested that the inner circle operates as an exclusively informal and personalised group, whereas strategic and interest groups can encompass both formal and informal aspects. In the case of Sverdlovsk Oblast, where the regional bureaucracy was controlled by a small inner circle of loyal members, it can be likened to the construction of clan, described by Kryshtanovskaya

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69 Kryshtanovskaya (2004), p. 85
as a grouping that gathers around a powerful leader in order to achieve a monopoly
over leadership positions.\textsuperscript{70} Mendras argued that regional political actors, and
specifically Rossel', used informal hierarchies and clienteles as a personalised
bureaucracy to implement policies while remaining above the fray.\textsuperscript{71}

The effectiveness of a network is influenced by its purpose, whether political, social,
institutionalised, informal or interest- or time-specific. Membership in networks is
understood by Luis Roniger as a functional process, prompted out of a specific need
for supplementary trust, particularly in cases where this is lacking (although it doesn’t
necessarily imply friendship ties). Most often, they arise and operate informally and
without any institutional boundaries that regulate them or any participatory process that
officially appoints a patron.

Clientelist bonds involve the exchange of instrumental, economic, and political resources
interwoven with expectations and promises of loyalty and support in a type of package
deal. No resources are exchanged separately at their market value; rather they are
exchanged in a combined deal that imbues them with broader social and political
meaning.\textsuperscript{72}

Andrew Buck’s study on patronage in Putin’s Russia found that the power that patrons
develop over their client relations is derived through the development of these bonds,
but further through preventing the clients from moving into positions of power within the
network. He argues that a critical factor of the patron-client relationship is the
reputation that patrons earn through building clientelist associations and that the
success of networks relies on the participation of ordinary members of the group.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{70} Kryshtanovskaya (2004), p. 83
\textsuperscript{71} Mendras (1999), pp. 304-306
\textsuperscript{72} Luis Roniger, (2004), ‘Political Clientalism, Democracy and Market Economy’, \textit{Comparative Politics},
Vol. 36 No. 3, p.356
\textsuperscript{73} Andrew Buck, (2010), ‘Network mobilization and the origins of the Putin coalition’, \textit{Journal of
Communist Studies and Transition Politics}, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 451
To this understanding, we should add the role of society as an interested participant in network relations, as a force that can legitimise power structures through electoral support. The interaction between political, economic and social life and networks is seen in Alena Ledeneva’s earlier research into the role of favours (blat) and exchange in everyday Soviet life and how this carried over into post-Soviet political life. She found that in 1990s Russia, the operational foundation of networks continued to rely upon the informal exchange and distribution of resources, impacting on the political level due to the fact that control over resources became associated with hegemony, subordination and influence over political, economic and social actors, in some way preventing institutional development.74

The emphasis is placed on the personal ties that networks promote and their shifting nature that means that new networks can be created if there is a requirement for one to address a particular problem. Networks as a wider phenomenon in present-day Russia have been further investigated into their systemic function as part of the regime, and the change that this has brought upon regional networks. In the post-Soviet period, and particularly in the Putin era, personal ties characterise networks rather than the location (institution) in which the network is focused.

Summary and Research Questions

The literature described above shows the conditions and the requirement for regional leaders to be able to adapt, change and react accordingly to the political and economic conditions within their territory, and beyond. In order to make best use of the capital (political, economic, and social) available to them required the management and effective manipulation of different elite interests. With regional leaders constructing their own ‘nomenklatura’ systems of favoured and selected actors, the cultivation of loyalty became essential, requiring the establishment of mutual benefit and,

importantly, choking off alternative sources of resource allocation and distribution. The process of exchange and distribution of capital and resources, and the ability to judge where capital could be most effective defines the success or failure of a regional leader in El'tsin’s Russia, as those that could not manage their resources to the benefit of themselves and the President found themselves falling out of power.

The research questions being asked by this thesis arise from the review of the current body of literature on regional leadership, federalism and networks. The central question of the thesis asks what was the nature of Rossel’’s regional power during the time period studied? To answer this, the following subsidiary questions are asked; how did Rossel' construct and manage his political networks (vertically and horizontally to sustain his leadership over Sverdlovsk Oblast during the 1990s), and what were the strategies used to ensure loyalty from his clients and prevent competing networks from threatening his position? Finally, the answers to the above questions contribute to examining the longevity of Rossel’’s leadership, allowing to suggest why he remained in power for so long.

This study contributes to existing research in several ways: firstly, while supporting existing literature on the institutional development of centre-regional relations during El'tsin’s presidency, it places greater importance on the development of personal networks by Rossel' both before and after the introduction of gubernatorial elections as part of a clear strategy to make himself irreplaceable to the regional political and economic elite as well as to society. It offers the view that the use of networks became a systematised method of working, substituting for institutions that the centre could not effectively establish in the provinces. The focus on the individuality of regional regimes as a critical aspect of the complex relationship between regional leaders and the centre, vertically and horizontally, is noted as countering force to the uncertainty of regional political life. While, as noted above, some researchers have noted that El'tsin’s response to regional regime struggles was to dismiss regional leaders, the argument
proposed here is that the ability to retain loyalty from his networks meant that Rossel’
preserved his place at the centre of Sverdlovsk political life beyond El’tsin’s (and other
central actors’) ability to remove him from such a position. Examining regional power
through looking at the extent to which networks penetrated all aspects of regional
political life presents a within-region perspective that looks outward, rather than trying
to look at the regions from outside, as more institutional approaches have perhaps
done. Secondly, it introduces the boundary control idea to the post-Soviet space from
its previous location within Latin American studies, as suggested by Gibson (see
chapter three), and provides a richer understanding of El’tsin’s relations with the
regions by telling us more about the relationship the first Russian president held with
his regional appointees (and later elected officials). Finally, in considering the changes
of the Putin era, where research has largely focused on the top-down implementation
of change and its consequences for state structure, this thesis considers the impact on
networks and personal power that the recentralisation of the state had, offering a
localised perspective of the forced changes to the system of regional power that had
embedded itself by the end of El’tsin’s rule and that were thought to be non-negotiable
as Putin took over.

Methodology

In order to examine the questions posed above, I have relied on numerous primary and
secondary sources taken from the regional press and regional archives to complement
the existing secondary literature that was available. Primary documents from Soviet
and post-Soviet sources were obtained from research conducted at different archives
in Ekaterinburg. The empirical chapters, (chapters two, four, five, six and seven) use
these sources and regional media sources from three competing Sverdlovsk Oblast
and Ekaterinburg newspapers – Ural’skii rabochii, Vechernyi Sverdlovsk (which was
renamed Vechernii Ekaterinburg in 1991) and Oblastnaia gazeta - to provide the
information herein. These sources of information are supported by elite interviews
conducted with members of the Sverdlovsk elite who were active at various periods during Rossel’s leadership. The semi-structured interviews, conducted in Russian, asked specific questions that were intended to elaborate further detail on areas of interest and to support (or not) information gathered from other primary and secondary sources. Secondary literature from published sources (monographs and journal articles) have been used to provide the information for the comparative chapter on the regional regimes in Moscow, Tatarstan and Saint Petersburg (chapter three) as well as for the chapter on Putin’s reforms to the federal system. These are a variety of English-language and Russian-language sources, published in monographs and journal articles. Further secondary sources, that would otherwise be unavailable, were obtained from libraries in Ekaterinburg and Moscow.

A qualitative approach has been taken in gathering these sources together to highlight information relating to the role of networks in Rossel’s leadership. The use of primary documentary sources and newspaper articles allows the questions raised to be examined through the context of the times. While it can be argued that the focus on a single political actor may limit any wider the scope of the research and inferences that can be drawn from it, it is argued that instead it offers the chance to obtain a richly detailed understanding of the dynamics of network relations at the source of regional leadership. It takes heed of Gerring’s note that ‘it is difficult to write a study of a single case that does not also function as a case study, and vice versa… One wishes to know both what is particular to that unit and what is general about it, and these elements are often unclear.’\(^75\) The discussion held in the comparative chapter offers a cross-regional understanding of network utilisation, without detracting from the focus on Rossel’ as one of the most-important regional leaders in 1990s Russian regional politics. Within the study, multiple observations are present of different sections of the elite that overlapped with Rossel’, allowing for natural comparison with themselves, resulting in

natural within-case analysis.\textsuperscript{76} It allows us to reach final conclusions as to the specific role of the supporting and competing elites in the successful construction of a dominant form of regional leadership.

The limitations and issues posed by the combination of these sources is accounted for through the ‘triangulation’ of the information they yielded, in particular with regards the elite interview materials, through cross-referencing against the archive and secondary sources gathered.\textsuperscript{77} Newspaper sources, particularly in Russia during the 1990s, where influence and financial sponsorship of the press was able to exert an influence on the editorial perspective provide a permanent and unchanging record to the essential facts.\textsuperscript{78} Particular attention was paid when interpreting the information collected to take into consideration the underlying circumstances of the time. The importance of seeing the processes and events in Sverdlovsk Oblast as a product of the times is emphasised throughout and forms a key part of the theoretical approach to the thesis.\textsuperscript{79}

Primary archive documents were accessed from the Urals El'tsin Centre (\textit{Uralskii Tsentr B.N. El'tsina}), which has collated an archive from numerous sources relating to Boris El'tsin’s ties to Sverdlovsk Oblast, both from his days as Regional First Party Secretary of the region (1976-1985) and as Russia’s first President. The archive here also contains material relating to the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet's relations with Rossel' and the movement behind the Urals Republic. The State Archive of Sverdlovsk Oblast (\textit{Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sverdlovskoi Oblasti} – GASO) was a source of documentary information relating to the development of Sverdlovsk Oblast's foreign economic and political relations in the late Soviet period and the 1990s, while at the Centre for Public

\textsuperscript{76} Gerring (2007), p.28
\textsuperscript{78} Peter Burnham, Karin Gilland, Wyn Grant, and Zig Layton-Henry, (2004), \textit{Research Methods in Politics}, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, p.172
\textsuperscript{79} This is the approach taken by Archie Brown in his assessment of Gorbachev’s reforms as General Secretary of the Communist Party. Without judging whether actions were ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ it placed the argument of Gorbachev’s management of political transformation of the Soviet Union within the strict boundaries of what was possible taking into account the entrenched nature of the political system. Archie Brown, (1996), \textit{The Gorbachev Factor}, Oxford, Oxford University Press
Organisation Documentation of Sverdlovsk Oblast (Tsentr Dokumentatsii Obshchestvennykh Organizatsii Sverdlovskaoi Oblasti) I was able to locate supplementary archive materials from the Regional Party Committee and Sverdlovsk Regional Soviet. Access to almost a decade’s worth of regional newspaper sources was obtained through the regional studies centre of the V.G. Belinskii public library in Ekaterinburg, and numerous Russian-language secondary sources were found in the holdings of the library of the Urals State University (a part of the Urals Federal University). The final source of information was gathered through a series of elite interviews taken from selected members of Sverdlovsk political society during the 1990s. The interviewees included members of Rossel’s administration in the 2000s, his 1995 and 1999 gubernatorial electoral campaigns, members of the gubernatorial administration that succeeded Rossel' between late 1993 and 1995, regional election candidates and members of El'tsin’s government.

**Chapter structure**

Rather than consider the events of the El'tsin decade through a chronological approach to the chapters, the thesis has been separated into themes encompassing the vertical and horizontal network structures that were present in Rossel’s power structure.

The theoretical approach taken to the thesis is presented in chapter one. The framework for the study underlines the importance of causal mechanisms and the significant role that the context of political and economic conditions played on the development of regional power during these years. It emphasises the role of the ‘boundary control’ strategy followed by the Sverdlovsk political leadership, originally proposed by Edward Gibson to explain the existence of authoritarian subnational regimes in democratising Latin American countries, and applies this to a model of regional regime development (without the implication of authoritarianism) in the post-
communist world, providing an example of how this strategy was applied under conditions of national and subnational regime uncertainty.

To be able to suitably contextualise the period of the study within the location of political power in Sverdlovsk Oblast, chapter two considers the value of networks that were carried over from the Soviet period, charting the rise of Rossel' to the position of Regional Head of Administration. Here, we consider the ties between Rossel’ and El'tsin that set the tone for vertical relations between Sverdlovsk and Moscow that are considered in subsequent chapters. It looks at the deterioration of political and economic conditions under the final years of the Soviet Union, and argues that Rossel’’s appointment as governor was a result of the tension between the rise of pro-reform political forces and the immediate need for socioeconomic recovery, which resulted in the imposition of a third type of political leader, who was more manager (khoziain) than politician.

Chapter three takes a comparative look at the regimes and leadership of other regional leaders – Iuri Lzukhov of Moscow, Mintimir Shaimiev in Tatarstan and Anatolii Sobchak in Saint Petersburg, in order to highlight the wider role that personal power and networks played in shaping regional regimes. It gives an indication as to why some of the most successful regional regimes in El’tsin’s Russia had these two factors at their heart, while also noting the differences between these regimes, which will allow us to consider Rossel’ as a separate case of Russian regional leadership, with features common to other regimes. The study notes the distinctive leadership styles of each of these figures, comparing the manner in which they ruled their territories and managed the networks that they had inherited and developed. These leaders have been picked to demonstrate the successes and failures of other regional leaders in the use of networks. In the case of Luzhkov and Shaimiev, the longevity of their power in their respective territories was based on their controlled patronage over networks. In the case of Sobchak, the chapter discusses the failures of the Saint Petersburg Mayor to
develop lasting networks resulting in his attempt to dominate by force. This chapter highlights the similarities and differences between subnational regimes, considering the aspects that will help to develop the discussion of the case of Rossel'.

The subsequent four chapters (chapters four to seven) contain the empirical research of the thesis, focusing on Rossel' during the 1990s. They break the time period into different themes considering the positive networks that were assets to Rossel’s power, consolidating it vertically, horizontally (inter-regionally) and vertically downwards (intra-regionally) against those competing networks that offered a threat to his leadership at the same levels. Discussion of these networks is proposed making suitable reference to the context of the times and the events occurring parallel to the network relations. It frames all of the actions taken by Rossel’ with regards to patronage and clientelism within the boundary control strategy of preserving power.

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Chapter four examines Rossel’â€™s relationship with the first Russian President through evaluating the factors that prevented other regional actors from within Sverdlovsk Oblast from developing close ties to El’tsin, while also considering the difficulties that political actors faced when constructing new networks. It notes the highly personal patron-client relationship between president and governor that held the key to many of the successes that Rossel’ enjoyed in converting his own regional vision of power into a national policy towards the regions, promoting him from simply being a regional leader to having a degree of national presence. The following chapter looks at political
rivalries at the centre as actors competed for influence in the absence of a formal
delineation of power, constructing new networks that were able to resonate at the
centre, and hence influence national policy making affecting the regions. It considers
how these brought Rossel’ into conflict with central elites reluctant to relinquish the
traditional control over the provinces that had always existed previously, and the cross-
regional strategy that Rossel’ pursued with the aim of promoting the interests of the
Oblast and Krai of the Urals as a single, coordinated unit. This aspect is also shown to
have served as a vehicle for him to portray himself as the spokesperson for the wider
Urals and play the role of mediator of relations with the centre for other regions outside
his own. Chapters six and seven bring the focus to the regional level. Chapter six looks
at how Rossel’ developed the perception that he was the only political actor capable of
representing the Sverdlovsk region, constructing a loyal and stable political following
through the development of a regional political movement to contest power in
democratic elections. Although this offered a degree of stability within the region, it
parochialised power, fuelled by, and fuelling, the perception that no alternative political
force could manage the territory. Finally, chapter seven considers the threat to this
stability that the Mayor of Ekaterinburg Arkadii Chernetskii posed. This chapter
demonstrates the cumulative effect of the boundary control strategy and offers a vivid
demonstration of how it stifled competition to the Rossel’ regime from Chernetskii.

Chapter eight discusses the post-El’tsin decade, and the effects of Vladimir Putin’s
recentralisation strategy, beginning in May 2000 with the creation of presidential
representatives to act as intermediaries between regional governors and the President.
Effectively breaking the direct access to the very top that had been enjoyed by Rossel’
beforehand, the chapter highlights the degree of influence that the El’tsin-Rossel’
connection provided through discussion of how Putin’s reforms chipped away at
Rossel”s domination of the region, offering networks alternative routes to resources
and their distribution where previously these had been controlled by Rossel’. Finally,
the conclusions of the study are presented to summarise the findings of the research and answer the research questions of the thesis.

Eduard Rossel’ and the critical junctures of the 1990s

As a final note to the introduction, a short biographical note about Eduard Rossel’ is required. Born in 1937 in Gorkii Oblast to a family of ethnic Germans, Eduard Rossel’ studied in Sverdlovsk, and became the director of the Nizhny Tagil construction enterprise “Tagilstroi” in 1981. Two years’ later, he was transferred by Boris El'tsin, then Regional First Party Secretary of Sverdlovsk Oblast, to the post of deputy director of the Sverdlovsk-based construction enterprise Glavsreduralstroi, of which he became director in 1988 when it was reorganised into the enterprise ‘Sreduralstroi’. In April 1990, Rossel’ was elected as Chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblispolkom, and following his support for El'tsin during the August 1991 coup was later appointed Head of Regional Administration. During his leadership of the region in the 1990s, the range of actions that Rossel’ took to try to increase the powers allocated to the region has made Sverdlovsk Oblast stand out over other non-ethnicised regions. As a response to the inherent inequality between regions and republics in the immediate post-Soviet state structure, Rossel’ worked with the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet to unilaterally declare the upgrading of Sverdlovsk Oblast to that of the Urals Republic in 1993. The Urals Republic lasted only a few days before Rossel’ was dismissed by El'tsin. He went on to compete in the elections to become a Senator from the region to the new Federation Council, and was elected to the new Regional Duma in 1994, becoming its Chairman. From this position, he worked on the development of the first Regional Charter to be agreed as per the 1993 Russian Constitution, a clause of which entailed the holding of a gubernatorial election, which eventually took place in 1995. Having returned to the gubernatorial chair as a result of these elections, Rossel’ agreed the first bilateral treaty to be signed between a region and the federal centre in 1996, following on from similar

agreements between republics and the centre. He stood for re-election in 1999, and won, and was again elected in 2003. With the return to appointed governors, Rossel’ was reappointed to his role for another term in 2007, before being removed from the Governorship by President Medvedev in 2009 and replaced by Aleksandr Misharin.
Chapter 1

Exercising power through networks in the Russian regions

This chapter establishes the theoretical framework through which we can examine the nature of Eduard Rossel’s regional power in Sverdlovsk Oblast in the 1990s. It outlines how the Sverdlovsk leader used access to and control of networks to sustain his political power, through exercising ‘boundary control’ to protect his power from external challenges. At the foundation of this explanation we use the ideas elaborated in Falletti’s and Lynch’s study on the role of causal mechanisms to provide the structure that is to be applied to examine the questions posed in the research.81 Factors that enabled this mechanism, elites, the structure and function of networks and a brief examination of the power of individuals within leadership are discussed with the purpose of presenting them as inputs applied to this strategy that provide a wider view on the conditions of the key elements of the study during the period under review. The questions of how and why Rossel’ was able to dominate political activity within the region making use of these factors are developed within the boundaries of the outlined model and supporting theories.

The chapter will first consider the idea of causal mechanisms and ‘boundary control’ and their application to this particular case, discussing the interaction between agency and structure and the influence this plays on examining how Rossel”’s political power relied on networks. A brief discussion will set the context of what constitutes the elite, followed by a discussion on networks, which are described as the channels through which the elite exercise power and implement decisions. This section considers how and why networks are constructed, their maintenance and issues surrounding their breakdown. It highlights the contrast between personal and institutional capital and how network theories allow for the use of both aspects in power. Finally, the chapter will

attempt to incorporate the idea of charismatic leadership developed by the German sociologist, Max Weber, to give background to the construction of Rossel’’s political identity. These three themes, elites, networks, and the role of leadership, constitute the factors that are the inputs to the mechanism of ‘boundary control’, which enabled the outcome of dominant political power in the region.

‘Boundary control’ as a strategy for controlling the regional political space

One of the major questions surrounding what happened in the Sverdlovsk region of Russia during the 1990s is that of how Rossel’ was able to obtain the outcomes to major events that he did, and why did he enjoy such longevity of leadership? This is answered through the explanation of how the use of networks resulted in the development of sustained, predictable regional power in the immediate post-communist period despite the wider instability that symbolises this period in recent Russian political history. While the role of networks in Sverdlovsk Oblast is no way unique in the case of Russia, the durability of Rossel’’s political authority is of great interest due to the lack of some of the other underlying tendencies, such as nationalism, kinship, political ideology or capital status, that were present in other regions and republics of Russia with similarly long-term leaders. Using the conditions of Rossel’’s leadership and placing it within the context of wider centre-regional relations, the argument is made that it was the networks that already existed or were constructed by the Sverdlovsk leader that lie at the heart of a system of power that emphasised Rossel’ as an individual, rather than as the incumbent of the institution of regional leader, and the use of these networks that allowed him to dominate the region and the wider Urals territory, even allowing for a degree of competition from rival actors.

The theoretical approach starts with that taken by Falleti and Lynch, which emphasises the importance of combining causal mechanisms along with the context in which they occurred to credibly explain questions posed in political analysis. For many
Researchers, causal mechanisms have fallen into the wider category of variables that are observed in attempts to find reasons for certain actions resulting in certain outcomes. Falletti and Lynch made the argument that specific variables, when placed in close conjunction with the context in which they are present, require further recognition and separation. From these variables, causal mechanisms can be identified that ‘explain how and why a hypothesised cause, in a given context, creates a particular outcome [in the given context]’. Such causal mechanisms are described as “relational concepts [… which] reside above and outside the units in question, and they explain the link between inputs and outputs [by explaining how things happen].” The argument is made that independent variables cannot be disconnected from the wider context that is used to explain the event in which they occur. This approach makes the study of small-N case studies more meaningful, in that the study of specific inputs and outcomes seen in the context within which they occurred can contribute as much to the study of phenomenon as larger-N studies that look at numerous variables, with the advantage of deeper analysis of the link between factor and context allowing the researcher to reach rich conclusions. We can simplify the definition of causal mechanisms to mean the method of facilitating factors (inputs) that convert an intended action into a desired outcome (output).

Two of the causal mechanisms that are identified by Falletti and Lynch that can be applied to Russia are rational choice (where individuals act to maximize gains) and power reproduction (where the elites preserve their power by only allowing entrants that hold the same beliefs into their political spheres of activity). Power reproduction is concerned with the ability of a regional political system to ensure that it is succeeded by actors with similar mindsets, and whose aim is not to break down the structures and achievements of its predecessor. The idea of ‘boundary control’ as proposed by Edward Gibson’s research on sub-national authoritarian regimes in Latin America, is

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82 Falleti and Lynch (2009), p.1143
83 Falleti and Lynch (2009), p.1147
centred around the strategies taken by sub-national leaders to preserve their power before (or instead of) concern over any successors. Boundary control is considered here as a strategy pursued with the purpose of protecting actors (and actions) from outsiders entering their territory (political rather than geographic) through the exercise of hegemonic control over centre-regional relations and regional-local relations.

In looking at the manner in which subnational regimes in his case studies held on to power, Gibson noted the importance of the territorial space that conflicts play out in. Of particular interest is the finding that the outcomes depend not only on the processes inside the territory, but also on the interconnections that arise external to the territory in question. The location of impact of actions taken by subnational leaders is of importance in assessing the scope of such action. Taking this into consideration, Gibson identified three strategies taken by subnational leaders in the United States and Latin America in order to consolidate and preserve their authority through the development of specific boundaries: the parochialization of power (seen as the ability of the regional leader to ensure hegemony over the subnational territorial system, making the elite and the wider general public in the region absolutely reliant on his goodwill), the nationalisation of influence (attaining the position of being the only actor from the region capable of pursuing strategies at the national level that can affect or promote regional interests), and the monopolisation of national-sub-national linkages (ensuring control over networks and contacts with the centre, so as to force elites to go through the regional leader to advance their causes nationally). Where it was possible for subnational leaders to keep any conflicts local to their territories and avoid federal escalation, these boundaries were found to shelter the incumbents from threats to their leadership. Highlighting the importance of strategically interacting with the national political system, Gibson suggested that if the sub-national regime lost the confidence of

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85 Gibson (2012), pp.15-17
86 Gibson (2012), pp. 26-29
extra-regional actors resulting in national intervention in local matters, where this intervention became allied with internal opposition actors the possibility of ‘opening’ these boundaries to remove the incumbent increased.

In Gibson’s study, the idea of boundaries can be applied to either individuals or to groups of actors, with the emphasis being dependent on the context they are being applied to. He explores the individual use of boundary control as a strategy used by regional leaders in Argentina in the 1990s and Mexico in the 2000s to maintain their power under conditions of democratization and the strategy as a method for blocs to protect their interests using the case of the Southern Democrats of the United States in the late 19th century following the American Civil War. Here, the sub-national regimes were already in place and long-standing at the point at which the national political arena began its democratization process explaining the continuation of authoritarian practices even under conditions of national regime change, and closely examined how these regimes utilised the resources available to the incumbent leaders.

In the case of the United States, Gibson examined the role of the Democratic Party and its regional leaders in the southern states following the American Civil War. He looked specifically at the manner in which they acted as a bloc, to counter attempts to allow access to the electoral system to sectors of society, including former African-American slaves, the poor and illiterate through various means of coordination between the states and their federal political party structures. In this case, he found that the ideology of the Democratic Party at the time sustained the notion that each individual state’s laws and traditions were different, allowing for the inequalities of the subnational regimes to not contradict the more egalitarian stance of the northern states approach to enfranchisement. Within the states themselves, the Democratic Party governors were hegemonic, using legal and extra-legal methods to prevent the Republican Party from contesting the political state. By offering stability to those with a vested interest in maintaining the system, there was no opportunity for opposition forces to contest these
regions. This internal state was emboldened by the disproportionality of representation that the southern states gave to the federal Democratic Party, with strength in combination as a bloc of delegates in the Senate supporting the national party, allowing them to resist reformist pressure from above.

In Argentina, Gibson looked at the role of individual regional leaders’ attempts to maintain their hegemony against challenges from factions within their own parties and rival political parties as a two party system emerged in the 1980s. The combination of the ability to provide the regional vote in federal elections, the manipulation of regional electoral systems to combat factionalism within the Peronist Party to ensure hegemony and the apportionment of federal resources all combined to allow incumbents to marginalise competing forces. Here, Gibson’s focus was on individual leaders and their boundary control actions rather than on the creation of coordinated cross-regional actions. In Argentina, regional governors found themselves in control of regional branches of the leading political party and controlling financial transfers from the centre, allocating them as they saw fit. The lack of will of federal actors to involve themselves in regional affairs, unless absolutely required due to reasons of civil unrest, allowed for the entrenchment of clientelism, which only gave way to boundary opening when it threatened the national regime requiring federal intervention in cases where sub-national leaders’ actions threatened the standing of the federal government and head of state. Whereas long periods of institutional stability gave security to sub-national regimes in America and Argentina, in Mexico, regional leaders were subject to greater competition particularly from local municipalities. The federal government exerted greater federal influence over regional political systems than in the previous two cases, and control over local government influenced the stability of regional regimes. Similar to Boris El'tsin’s position towards the Russian regions, as President Vicente Fox focused on national democratisation in Mexico in the 2000s sub-national authoritarian regimes consolidated due to the lack of will for federal intervention. Mexico had had a single-party system for more than 70 years previously, and it was a
loose coalition of opposition parties, that were not united by ideology but rather by a sense of wanting to change the political state, that overcame the existing structure. The federal system there exerted greater control over regional government, limiting the amount of autonomy they had in developing regional regimes, and placing greater importance on local government, so unlike the cases of the United States and Argentina, where national crisis and federal intervention opened the boundaries, in Mexico the major threat to leaders came from below as regional cities sought to develop wide-ranging coalitions of opposition forces to oust authoritarian leaders.

It is helpful to highlight some of the common factors that the case studies presented by Gibson and the possibility and difficulties of applying this model to other geographies, particularly to the case of sub-national power in Russia. In all three of Gibson's case studies, we can note the presence of entrenched federal political parties. In the case of the USA, the Republican and Democratic parties' prior contestation of the political state had established a stable two-party system through which federal representation was exercised. In contrast, the cases of Argentina and Mexico demonstrated the breakdown of authoritarian federal regimes based on single political parties, with opposing forces emerging to contest the political space. Here, we can see that the primary aim of sub-national regimes under the strain of federal political democratisation was based on taking measures to counter opposing political parties intent on unseating them in order to overturn the existing regime. In the southern states of the USA by contrast, the main threat to the Democratic Party governors was through the extension of political participation to the disenfranchised. The inability of the Republican Party to overcome ingrained practices of racism and discrimination among society and the lack of will from the federal branches of power to enforce enfranchisement on the US south allowed these regional leaders to ally amongst themselves and maintain their hegemony over the region, supported by an electorate that wasn't seeking change. This is starkly in contrast to the conditions of Russia following the end of the Communist Party’s domination and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The withdrawal of the only previously
existing political party did not result in its replacement with alternative dominant federal parties. Where political parties did emerge, they were fragmented in terms of regional influence, with little integration with regional governors. Secondly, the degree of asymmetry in the cases of Argentina and the United States both carry echoes of Russia’s condition in the 1990s. Here, the federal system of power allowed regional regimes to create their own institutions and political systems, as long as the agreed separation of powers was observed. This spilled over into electoral systems, fiscal policies and the allocation and distribution of resources; in the case of Russia, the decentralisation of the state following the end of Communist Party rule resulted in wide differentiation of region-types and regimes. Finally, Russia diverges from these cases through the system of initial appointment of sub-national leaders, with the exception of ethnic republic presidents, by the President. The lack of elections presented each regional regime in the new Russia with a different starting point, resulting in wildly different figures being vertically imposed on the majority of sub-national units. This approach, combined with the lack of an organised and consistent policy from the federal centre, gave space to the newly appointed regional leaders to shape their own regional political systems in return for the expression of loyalty to El’tsin, and resulted in the emergence of individual regional leaderships that took a variety of forms. Using the example of Eduard Rossel’ offers an opportunity to test how the boundary control strategy can be applied on the case of Russia, and whether this worked for his own system of power, although it is not to say that this is how all regions in Russia developed (see the comparison of three different types of regional regime discussed in chapter three).

The idea of boundary control is taken here and tested on the Russian sub-national case by suggesting that this causal mechanism occurred under conditions of a simultaneous national and sub-national transition (although that is not to say that national and sub-national transition were always in the same direction heading towards democratization). Whether the sub-national regime is authoritarian or not, in the
absence of enforceable rules for subnational government applied by the national
government, boundary control offers a strategic method of operation whereby a
‘controlling area’ is established that allows regional leaders to “[monopolise] power in
the local political arena, but also [manipulate] levers of power in other arenas as well. It
requires controlling linkages between levels of territorial organization as well as
exercising influence in national political arenas.”

Boundary control is, therefore, considered here as the mechanism applied by Rossel’ to convert the inputs (elites,
resources and networks) to an outcome of long-term, unthreatened, regional political
dominance. The arguments put forward in the analysis of Rossel”s actions are
intended to show that this behaviour was intentional and, importantly, fulfilled the aims
that it set out to achieve. Chapters four to seven demonstrate this strategy as a method
of ensuring Rossel’ dominated the Sverdlovsk region, preventing opposition (both local
and national) from finding political space to threaten his position. This helps us to
understand Rossel’ as both an individual and as an institutional actor (as part of a
collective political system that he was at the heart of), insulating himself from rivals.
Examining the development of and participation in numerous, distinct and overlapping
networks made up of the federal and regional elite (political and economic) and as
influenced by Rossel’s character provides the inputs which resulted in consolidation
and sustainability of strong political leadership.

All three elements of boundary control as elaborated by Gibson’s study of Latin
America are proposed as being in evidence in Rossel”s leadership in the following
way:

- the parochialization of power (whereby Rossel’ was able to ensure hegemony
  over the subnational territorial system, controlling the key institutions and
  making the elite and the wider general public in the region absolutely reliant on
  his goodwill);

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World Politics, Vol. 58, No. 1, p106
- the nationalisation of influence (where Rossel' was able to present himself regionally and cross-regionally to the political and economic elite as the only actor from Sverdlovsk Oblast capable of pursuing strategies at the national level that would influence regional interests, particularly in the absence of a hegemonic federal political party);

- the monopolisation of national-sub-national linkages (ensuring that only Rossel’ had control over networks and contacts with the centre, so as to force elites to go through him to advance their causes nationally).  

The factors that contributed to this strategy explain Rossel’’s powerful leadership as a reflection of himself as an individual, but more significantly as a result of making use of the conditions that the elites within the Sverdlovsk region found themselves in under the immediate post-communist transition. Having lost their previous patron in the guise of the Communist Party (and individuals within this), elites still required networks and patronage in order to adjust to the new realities of political life in transition Russia.

While agency (the ability of actors and/or institutions to act, and the actions that were taken) is the most important factor in the processes that are under review, it was underpinned by the role played by the circumstances in which they occurred, which is to say, the pre-existing social structure or the context of the political, economic and social conditions. Understanding the temporal and contextual conditions that events are situated in helps to reveal explanations of why decision and actions are taken by actors, even though these conditions may only influence, rather than directly determine, the actions taken by the actors.

[S]ocial actors produce their actions out of pre-existing social structure. [...] pre-existing social structure lacks the capacity to initiate activity and to make things happen of its own

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88 Gibson (2012), pp. 26-29
accord, [but it] does affect the course of events in the social world by influencing the actions that people choose to undertake.\textsuperscript{89}

Thus, while agency (viewed here through the actions and role taken by Rossel’) is an active factor in explaining the ‘boundary control’ theory, the structures that this agency occurs within are seen as its passive counterpart, played by context providing knowledge of the historical setting and the circumstances at a specific moment in time.

As this study has its roots in a historical perspective, it is placed within a fixed period of review, starting at a point where there is a radical change to the previous circumstances (a critical juncture). There is some debate as to whether critical junctures are a suitable tool for analysing processes, and the presence of such moments in time brings the approach into the area of historical institutionalism. The concern here is whether specific, single moments of time really signify change in wider circumstances and structures or whether they need to be further developed to be seen within the context that they occurred within. For the purposes of this study, the collapse of the communist regime marks a natural starting point and emphatically marks a point of significant change from previous practice. However, so as not to simply place this as the point of Rossel”s political birth as regional leader, deeper context to this juncture is provided by examining the emergence of Rossel’ prior to the collapse of communism and his role in the regional political space at this time. The end-point chosen for the analysis is set as the end of El’tsin’s presidency arising out of his resignation on 31\textsuperscript{st} December 1999, although once again this requires further contextualization in order to give greater meaning to the study, achieved by examining the direct effect of the emergence of Putin as Russia’s President on Rossel”s position. Within the chosen time frame specific critical moments present themselves within the discussion; in particular, the development of the idea of the Urals Republic and the first gubernatorial elections in the region. By adding contextualising descriptions, these conditions of the time and

the structures that existed (both historically and at key moments) are connected with the actions taken by the agent, thus conforming to the theoretical outline given above. Importantly for any wider inferences to be drawn from this study, these contextual moments not only affected Sverdlovsk Oblast (as the geographical location that they occurred in), but also other sub-national regimes as well as national (federal) conditions.

Having established the outline of the mechanism of boundary control and the argument that this was the strategy taken by Rossel’ to sustain and protect his leadership position, it is necessary to outline the factors involved that made this causal mechanism possible. It is put forward that two essential criteria, the condition of the regional elite and the individual personality of Rossel’, provided the foundations for the continuation and creation of networks that made ‘boundary control’ possible. Starting with a discussion of the role and scope of the elite, followed by introducing the idea of charismatic leadership, it is suggested that these features provide the basis of the patronage networks that Rossel’ participated in (as both patron and client), which allowed him to establish borders of power that he would not permit rivals to cross.

**Elite theory and its application to Russian regions**

In order to understand the actions of the Sverdlovsk leader we have to look at how he interacted with the structure of the political and economic elite at the regional and federal level. The study of elites at different levels has developed into a key area for understanding modern Russian life, with specific interest being paid to questions of the circulation and reproduction of the layer of society that holds the levers of power. Here we take a brief look at the fundamental definition of the ‘elite’ that divides this layer from the rest of society.

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90 These have been bracketed under the wider label of elite ‘transition studies’ in Vladimir Gel’man and Inessa Tarusina, (2000), ‘Studies of political elites in Russia: issues and alternatives’, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 33, pp. 311-329
The emergence of elite theory as a field of study arose from the theories of Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto in the early 20th century. These scholars developed their theories with some fundamental differences in the definition of what constitutes the elite. Pareto described the term ‘elite’ to mean a group of actors with a certain set of values and qualities that enabled them to make decisions and rule over the rest of society. He gave the notion of a somewhat meritocratic approach to the separation of society between the rulers and the ruled. For Pareto, the elite were those that influenced the development of the aspects of life that were shaped by decisions taken by leaders, rising to such positions through the possession of qualities that marked them out over others. Mosca’s understanding was from an opposite perspective, more abruptly placing the notion of the elite as a separation of society into the rulers and the ruled that developed over the course of history out of the existing structures of society. For Mosca, the ruling group was made up of a small section of society, which monopolised power and fulfilled all of its functions, enjoying benefits and advantages of controlling the decision making process that placed them in a position of power over the ‘ruled’, perpetuating itself. While both imply a minority ruling over a majority (which is the reality of an elite), Pareto’s view of the elite left open the possibility of recruitment based upon talent and skill, while Mosca’s approach was rooted in connections (networks) and the legacy of history in constructing a closer elite. These differences both viewed the elite externally, looking at the way in which the elite see themselves with regard to the society that they have influence over.

In the case of the Soviet Union, the elite structure of the state followed the Moscan understanding of a layer of society that separated Communist Party leadership from the rest of society on the basis that while the state proclaimed itself to be constructed on the basis of meritocracy (as theoretically it allowed for the possibility that all members of society could in theory become a member of the Communist Party and subsequently rise to become part of the elite), in reality, the elite were more akin to a
separate grouping that rose that was difficult to break into from outside. Voslenskii observed that the Soviet elite, the ‘nomenklatura’, became its own specific class in his insider study of the construction of this section of society.⁹¹ The upper Soviet elite held a distinctively separate position in society and clearly benefitted materially and theoretically by monopolising power functions. In post-communist Russian society, there has been a continuation of many of the aspects of a closed-off elite, particularly amongst the appointed regional leadership, and it has been pointed out in many studies that the membership of the post-Soviet elite in the 1990s changed little from the nomenklatura of the Soviet period.⁹² As was most often the case in the Communist era when Regional First Party Secretaries were the highest regional positions, in the post-communist period, the term ‘regional elite’ is most often applied to mean the actors holding the highest roles, which at its highest level is the heads of regional administration. These actors are in the leading positions of authority and during the 1990s were largely those that held decision making power in regional political, economic and business spheres of life during the El’tsin years.⁹³ Within the internal space of a region, the concept of a ‘regional elite’ is delineated further to differentiate between regional leaders and other members of the regional decision making hierarchy (high-ranking members of the security and law enforcement services, regional leaders of federal parties, speakers of regional legislatures, and leading business and economic figures). There is further separation of the regional elite when considering the role of local-level elites particularly those from regional capital cities. In Table 1.1, the overlap between the three main levels of the elite is presented to demonstrate the direction of crossover between administrative capacities.

⁹¹ Voslenskii (2005), pp.82-107
⁹² Kryshtanovskaya (2004); Kryshtanovskaya and White (1996). For balance it should be pointed out that other studies have argued that there was substantial change in the post-communist elite structure, for example Lane and Ross (1999). Gel’man and Tarusina (2000) present an overview of elite studies from within Russia.
⁹³ During the Putin/Medvedev era, the monopoly over decision making that they enjoyed under El’tsin has been significantly reduced and the regional leaders absorbed into a wider state bureaucracy that was supposed to limit the ability of regional leaders to act independently of the centre.
Table 1.1: Representation of different levels of Russian elite and the direction of interaction under El’tsin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of political elite</th>
<th>Key members</th>
<th>Network interaction with other branches of elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal (Moscow-based elite)</td>
<td>President, Presidential Administration, Government, State Duma and Federation Council. FSB, SVR, MVD, Armed Forces. Business leaders of federal enterprises and industries.</td>
<td>Vertically downwards with regional (oblast, republic, krai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional (oblast, republic, krai)</td>
<td>Republic presidents, Oblast and Krai Governors, members of their governments (where applicable), regional legislative assemblies. Business leaders of regional-level enterprises and industries.</td>
<td>Vertically upwards to federal elite. Vertically downwards to local elites (where they exist as a subgroup) Horizontally (cross-regionally) with other members of regional political elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Mayors of regional capitals, other heads of city administration (non-regional capitals), local legislative assemblies. Business leaders of local-level enterprises and industries (more likely to be SME leaders)</td>
<td>Vertically upwards to regional and federal elites Horizontally amongst municipalities and other local structures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The regional elite are seen as a sub-set of the national (federal) elite, with significant cross-over and competition with them; the local elite are viewed as subset of the regional elite but with the opportunity to bypass the regional level and liaise directly with the federal elites, in particularly in attempts to weaken regional leaders. Under El’tsin, the swift decentralization of power resulted in a dismantling of the vertical
integration that the Soviet system enjoyed, with regional government often becoming detached from federal structures, and federal and local elites able to pass over the regional elite in their contact with one another.\textsuperscript{94} The spheres of activity that regional and local elites operated in are frequently considered as being located within the same space, due to the interests of the localities being more closely reliant on the actions and policies of the regional level.\textsuperscript{95}

Robert Michels’ ‘iron rule of oligarchy’, argued that it is inevitable that an oligarchy will form out of any bureaucratic structure and close off access to outsiders. In the system that emerged in Sverdlovsk Oblast, a small number of people, with Rossel’ at the head, dominated the political (and economic) space, and worked to prevent non-members of the ruling group from having the opportunity to enter this space. In the analysis of Rossel’’s power and position, while the Sverdlovsk governor dominated the political territory of the region, part of the strategy of boundary control allowed for subsidiary elite members to remain interested enough in the chance of entering the upper level of the ruling group through participation in Rossel’’s networks to not ally themselves with rival actors in an attempt to gain a higher position in the elite. In cases where rival groups did emerge, the analysis will develop how the three factors of boundary control listed above blocked any threat to countering Rossel’’s political control. Willingness to be part of network structures that were built was sustained by a distribution of resources that kept participants more or less satisfied with their positions, and the analysis raises the treatment given to those that attempted to seize an opportunity to break into the upper ranks ahead of their turn. In this way, the study identifies Rossel’’s boundary control actions with regard to regulating the clients within his networks and non-members of his networks that attempted to rival these networks.


From the above, the elite aspect of the study of Rossel’s leadership implies an elite firmly based on personal and economic connections to the Sverdlovsk governor. While this was largely closed-off to competing and aspirational outsiders, the aim was to exert control over entry to the elite and prevent encroachment on areas of regional power that were to be protected not by outlawing competition but by closely managing it.

**The emergence of the ‘charismatic’ leader**

The appearance of more readily identifiable individuals in the immediate post-communist political space in the regions was a clear change from the homogenised political system of the Communist Party where only a very limited number of regional First Party Secretaries had shown any discernible character that could single them out within the wider bureaucracy of the Party. In the post-communist Russian provinces the system of appointments to regional heads of administration and the ‘elections’ of republic presidents marked a return to a ‘traditional’ system of political authority within each region, with the implied idea of the regional governor being seen as the ‘authority over the household.’ By this, we see a return to a personalised power structure with the requirement that the ruled had little option but to offer their loyalty to the ruler, who was now acting in a largely individual capacity rather than as part of a cohesive larger ruling group. With the reversal in the flow of power from the hands of a bureaucracy to those of an individual, maintaining appointed leadership positions relied on sustaining the support of the president (or those close to him) that appointed them in the first instance. In the period under review, many regional leaders should be seen as leading territorial entities that can be viewed practically as small kingdoms that joined with similar territorial regimes to create the Russian state through the concept of federalism. In these regions, it took only a short time for regional leaders to find that through using their own individual identity they could shape their institutions. In the case here,

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Rossel’s use of his own personality to develop a system of patronage that replaced former loyalties to the CPSU is in evidence.

Critical to this form of the regime as a kingdom is the idea of the ‘charismatic’ leader, noted by the German sociologist Max Weber, who placed this within his theories of overcoming bureaucratic systems. At the turn of the twentieth century, Weber began to take a close look at the bureaucratic system of power that existed in the German Empire; from his perspective, he defined bureaucracy as the creation of a monopoly over expertise in the state and over the way in which the state was administered by a professional ruling group. It was noted that the strength of such a system was to be found in the order and predictability of the exercise of power, and, in his view, its weakness was that this system was effectively making its own policies and decisions, becoming unaccountable to the population by acting in its own interests rather than on behalf of the national political leaders. While Weber was not arguing that the idea of bureaucracy was necessarily authoritarian in its nature, he made a clear argument that in the form it existed in at the time it was a highly organised and efficient structure that was able to decide on policies and their implementation without recourse to elected officials that represented society. Weber argued that the decision- and policy-making spheres had to be returned to democratically accountable (elected) officials for fear that the bureaucracy would become too powerful in controlling the lives of the nation’s citizens. Under the surface of this critique of the structures that governed political life, Weber gives an insight into how he believed individual political leaders needed to approach the bureaucracy. His main concern in this process was to ask how a political leader could avoid being undermined by the bureaucracy. Instead of being led in policy matters, how could an individual project their own policies onto the bureaucracy and cause them to be implemented? Weber’s answer was to focus on the qualities required of an individual leader in order to impose themselves. From this question came his notion of the ‘charismatic’ leader. Such a leader needed basic characteristics that

distinguished them as ‘gifted’ and ‘energetic’, and almost with superhuman qualities. 

On the basis of such qualities, such a leader would seize the policy making agenda and force the implementation of their own will on the political agenda. This required the individual not to be passive when promoting views onto the bureaucracy, but instead to be able to generate and subsequently use to their own advantage whatever popular support outside of the bureaucracy that they enjoyed. Weber intended this support to be through electoral legitimacy, but it was not completely defined by this. Much of the leader’s ‘charisma’ had to be reflected from the social conditions and the role of the public in selecting their leaders. Over the course of the 20th century, ‘charismatic’ leaders emerged on several occasions and out of different circumstances throughout the world, with the result that frequently, forceful individuals subordinated existing political structures to dictatorial rule, reversing the trend of bureaucracy influencing policy making (the most obvious cases being revolutionary Russia and fascist Germany). In the post-authoritarian 20th century landscape, the importance of the personality of the political leader retained significance and as the Russian state broke down from one run by an organised bureaucracy to a post-bureaucratic system of individuals jostling for positions of power, one of the features of the political landscape became the rise of numerous individuals from the ashes of the bureaucracy, all attempting to impose their individual beliefs on national politics.

The upper levels of Soviet nomenklatura functioned as a bureaucracy in Weber’s terms. Quite clearly, the Party functioned as a separate layer of society that created its own policies that purported to be in the interests of society without being accountable to them or consulting them. Elites at various levels of the Party could control and influence decision making according to their own interests, with the top-level elite in the role of the Party General Secretary and the Politburo able to project their power.

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99 Beetham (1985)
100 While such a view on Soviet society was prevalent in the West, the same critique of Communist control emerged from within communist societies, as stated by Milovan Dijlas. Milovan Dijlas, (1983), *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*. New York, Harcourt and Voslenskii (2005).
downwards on the rest of the elite, which followed their orders. The severity of the challenge to the Party from 1990 onwards, leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union, brought about an enforced change to leadership at national, regional and local levels with the removal of the Communist Party Regional First Secretaries by President El'tsin leaving a gap at the top of the bureaucratic structures of the Party and at the head of the regional elite table. In many regions, this gap was not securely filled until Putin restored the vertical system of power well into the 2000s, and powerful regional figures emerged, either with pre-existing power structures or new, socially-constructed power bases.\textsuperscript{101} Weberian charismatic politicians that emerged in some regions while supposed to break the bureaucratic nature of top-down politics, simply replaced previous bureaucratic systems with structures that served themselves, and indeed in several regions this resulted in powerful political individuals controlling their territories. Relating the above to Eduard Rossel', his emergence from within the bureaucracy of the Communist Party system presented him with pre-existing networks that were re-shaped into becoming responsive to him individually rather than to a wider institution through his development into a ‘charismatic’ leader. The connection is made with the figure of El'tsin to show how Rossel’ used the experiences of El'tsin’s charismatic popularity to win popular support as part of the ascent of personal power at a time when allegiances to a wider organization had collapsed. It is argued that the relationship between El'tsin and Rossel’ bolstered the latter’s claims to be a ‘charismatic’ political figure within the region on the basis of El'tsin having blazed a trail ahead of him at the national level.

**Networks as the basis of the Russian social and political system**

As noted above, the argument put forward is that the development of patronage in the region arose from the need for elite interaction between various levels of society

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\textsuperscript{101} An example of a pre-existing power base would be that of Ulyanovsk governor, Iurii Goriachev, who remained in power and based his leadership on the region’s continued support of the Communist Party from 1992-2001, while in the Republics, socially-constructed political regimes based on ethnicity retained existing leaders in positions of power, replacing communist ideology with ethnic identification.
following the breakdown of Soviet regulated structures and the charismatic leadership displayed by Rossel' as the individual capable of managing the cross-over of resources between the different branches of the regional elite (both political and economic). The networks that emerged out of this are raised here.

How networks are viewed by the observer is important to the examination of networks and their role in a causal mechanism, such as boundary control. An ‘internal’ approach to viewing networks looks at them from within, taking a depersonalised view of the role of the actors and how the dynamics of the network are sustained, looking at how changes may affect the structure of the network rather than looking at the effects of such changes on spheres of social life outside of the structure being examined.102 This approach is most appropriate when focusing on the social workings of members of the network, how they interact with each other and the exchange of resources that occurs between them. Such an approach has been used to explain social phenomenon and the impacts of social change on different layers of society. The opposite approach would be to view networks and their actors externally, that is to say, looking less at the impact of social relations on the network itself, but instead focusing on what impact the network and its actors can have on wider spheres of life, and on the institutions that regulate or are affected by networks (Table 1.2 offers a breakdown of some of the factors differentiating internal and external views of networks). This provides the scope here to look at how the creation of networks were instrumental to regional political power in the 1990s and facilitated its maintenance. While many of the internal factors are present in the approach taken, such as personal interactions and interpersonal relations, these are not offered as the source of political life in Sverdlovsk, but rather as the instrument for conducting political life, therefore approaching networks from the external viewpoint placing networks as the instrument for exercising boundary control.

102 Ledeneva (2008), p. 60
### Table 1.2 Factors of internal vs. external approach to networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal view</th>
<th>External view</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal interactions, social and interpersonal relations; networks as the source of social life; survival strategy; depersonalised look at the network as a whole</td>
<td>Effect on institutions; networks as an instrument for conducting social life; strategy for social promotion; may focus on a single individual or small group of individuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Core to the structure of a political network is the idea of inequality amongst members with regards to the power and standing of individuals within the group. In all networks different actors bring different resources and different positions to the group, but in a political network these positions are often directly connected to the political power and economic/financial potential of those resources. A political network therefore is far more likely to be asymmetrical, vertically-structured and frequently has a stand-out patron, who holds unequally greater power than the other members and acts to attract resources and distribute them in order to implement a particular goal. While in social networks, the exchange of resources is frequently a survival strategy at the most basic of levels, in a political network with patrons and clients this exchange is a set of relations regulated not only by resource and opportunity, but also by ambition and a certain ruthlessness in seeking additional resources to propel the actor to a desired position within the group’s hierarchy. Throughout the analysis it becomes clear that there is a mix of formal and informal networks and the lines between these can quickly blur as actors and institutions move fluidly between defining rules of the game and subsequently ignoring them.

While quite clearly not unique to Russia, patron-client network structures have existed there since at least the 15th century, providing the potential for an exchange of resources whereby participants offer their resources to the patron in return for the benefits that the powerful individual can supply to them in other branches of life. 103 These resources and benefits are fluid rather than fixed and shift according to the

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103 Hosking (2000)
situation or outcome that is trying to be achieved. Both patrons and clients must react to frequently multiple, competing demands, and all actors can be participant in numerous networks at any one time and with drastically (and often competing) aims. It is noted that there can be concurrent participation in different networks. By looking at how Rossel' functioned in different roles (as patron and as client) at the same time, we can show how he was able to adapt in both roles to make optimal use of his political position and the resources that were provided to him within his networks. This reflects the claim made by Eyal et al, that the success of all actors in post-communist societies is greatly dependent on the ability to adapt networks and capital according to the requirements of the situation.¹⁰⁴ To do this requires an ability to build authority within different groups, something that became more difficult as competing ideas emerged in the new Russia over the future direction of the state and of the regions. Any authority that is conferred upon a leading actor within a group can lead to that network becoming patrimonialist, whereby a sense of legitimacy is given to that person by the members of the network to act as the patron. Further consideration is required to account for the conditions of the context in which the network functions; how do the political, economic and social conditions shape the nature of networks? The development and change in the legitimacy Rossel' found in his appointment by the President to his position and then gained through popular election perhaps drives us towards making the distinction that Rossel’’s patronage developed further into neo-patrimonialism as it progressed from ‘traditional’ legitimacy conferred on him by the president to electorally accountable legitimacy granted through popular (and competitive) elections, which gave exercising boundary control greater credibility and political strength.

Returning to the contextual conditions of the times, the immediate post-communist period presented Russia with a set of volatile circumstances leaving great uncertainty over the future stability of reform. The system of authority that Rossel’ enjoyed, connected to the continuous manoeuvres to prevent encroachment on his position, was

grounded in the conditions of the Sverdlovsk region and the Russian state during the 1990s. In the post-El’tsin period, this study of Rossel”’s leadership gives additional explanation to the conditions that prompted Putin to return central patronage over the state as a whole. While, in hindsight, the argument can be made that Rossel”’s system of power may have been damaging to the development of Russian reform as it deterred the construction and consolidation of institutions, and stunted the development of rule of law to the extent that institutions became dysfunctional and reliant firmly on the personality and strength of an individual leader, it must be pointed out that his unrivalled authority over the region did not descend into regional authoritarianism of the type that was in evidence in similar long-term political regimes at the sub-national level, as seen in several of the ethnic republics within Russia at the same time or as may be seen in present-day central political power.  

Summary of the model

Through examining the network relations in which the Sverdlovsk leader acted as either patron or client each chapter attempts to cover the key areas of the boundary control strategy. These are the ability to force the regional elite to rely on Rossel’ to represent their interests; the development of Rossel as the only agent capable of pursuing policies at the national level that would affect the region; and the domination of Rossel”’s own networks over those of other actors that forced any interested parties to work with the Sverdlovsk leader to achieve their own goals. Within each of these areas are the factors developed above – the nature of the elite in the region, the importance of Rossel”’s own character, and the system of patronage that kept actors in check. Using the theme of centre-regional and intra-regional relations we can explain the structural process of using networks that Rossel' used to exercise power.

105 For example, in Kalmykia under Kirsan Iliumzhinov.
Chapter 2

The rise of Rossel' in Sverdlovsk Oblast’, 1989-1991: replacing political networks in the final years of Communist rule

Political networks as a form of capital necessary to establish and maintain political power and privilege under communism were at the forefront of progression in Soviet society, institutionalised through membership of the Communist Party. The decline in the ability of the Communist Party to ensure control over such networks, as seen from the period of the first elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989 onwards, resulted in the end of the Communist Party’s monopoly over support for the regime, and allowed competing ideas to emerge into the open. Whereas the collapse of communist regimes in Central Europe had promoted other forms of capital to the fore, such as social and economic capital, in Russia political networks continued to be the prime form of capital.

This chapter explores the changing regional political environment in Sverdlovsk Oblast in the period from the first competitive elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD) in March 1989 to the August 1991 coup to consider how the Communist Party's monopoly over power in Sverdlovsk Oblast broke down. Focusing on the change in the political leadership of the region and the replacement of the old Soviet elite it looks to explain the characteristics of Eduard Rossel' s rise to regional political power as the Communist Party came under increased pressure from 1990 onwards and the basis from which he constructed his political regime that allowed him to dominate the region’s political space for nearly two decades.

Despite a change in the individual characters involved, with a different set of patrons and clients emerging, there was little change in the reliance on political networks for

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regional power to function effectively. The most significant source of political backing for pro-reform forces in the Sverdlovsk region came from the region's most famous son, Boris El'tsin. This chapter notes the linkage between the context of the processes occurring in the Soviet Union and the RSFSR during this period and the emergence of Rossel' noting the reliance on El'tsin's own precarious position within the state. This contextualises the continuation and construction of networks in the later Soviet period that carried over into the new Russia as a response to uncertainty in political society.

Power relations in the Russian regions 1989-1990

The system of party control in the Soviet provinces and the relationship between the regional party organs and the regional soviets in the RSFSR had been constructed in a way so as to give the Party total control over appointments, planning and decision making. This served not only to ensure adherence to central policy in the regions, but also to control the reproduction of Soviet elites and the associated discipline that it demanded from all levels of society. The Communist Party's highest regional representative, the First Secretary of the Regional Party Committee (Oblastnoi komitet KPSS or Obkom) was selected by the Central Committee of the CPSU, and, in El'tsin's own words, ruled his territory as 'God, Tsar and Master', with a tight grip over subordinates.107

Organisationally, the structure of the Soviet system relied heavily on both ideological loyalty to the Party and personal loyalty to the most powerful individual at the respective level of society. The formal structure of the regional First Secretary’s power consolidated his position with a body of carefully selected officials in the Obkom, and a smaller number of other figures appointed to a bureau (buro), who were tasked with the full-time management of specific branches of regional political life. Most commonly there was an organizational secretary (usually noted as the Second Party Secretary),

107 Colton (2008), p.81
an ideological secretary, and secretaries for agriculture and industry.\textsuperscript{108} The Obkom was responsible for all aspects of life in its territory, from achieving central planning targets to the ideological education of citizens and had day-to-day responsibility for implementing central directives. It made all formal policy decisions within a region and all of its officials reported to the First Secretary.\textsuperscript{109} The formal traditions of Party discipline and patron-client relations meant that decisions taken by the First Secretary were rarely challenged.\textsuperscript{110} This structure was repeated at all administrative levels downwards, so that in large cities there was a City Committee (Gorkom), subordinated to the Obkom, city district committees (Raikomy), subordinated to the Gorkom, and Party committees of regional administrative districts (also called Raikom), subordinated directly to the Obkom. In this way, the complex system of regional Party Committees was designed to ensure the vertical chain of authority held by the Party continued from the very top level all the way down to the smallest sections of society.

Patronage was a critical factor in appointments as well as in access to resources and the exercise of power in the regions. The First Party Secretary would have clients going down the Party hierarchy, starting from within the ranks of second secretaries, other members of the Obkom or the Oblast soviet executive committee (Oblispolkom).\textsuperscript{111} Informally, the entire nomenklatura system relied upon patronage ties connecting actors to someone higher up the chain within the Party. Actors worked closely with each other to serve the Party interests with the result that connections became an essential feature for career progression, often even over competency, as loyalty was frequently the most important factor for individual promotion.

\textsuperscript{109} Hough and Fainsod (1979), p.492
\textsuperscript{110} Hough and Fainsod (1979), p.501
\textsuperscript{111} Colton (2008), p. 72-75. Colton notes this phenomenon in Sverdlovsk Oblast when First Secretary Iakov Riabov acted as patron to Boris El’tsin, then of the Sreduralstroi Construction Enterprise, and later as El’tsin moved up the Party hierarchy.
Although the operation of the Soviet system was that all interests were those of the state as defined by the Communist Party, in regions dominated by large state enterprises, Regional Party First Secretaries often found their own interests to be subordinate to the interests of directors of powerful industrial or military enterprises (frequently represented on the Obkom) who had their own support structures that went straight to the top of Soviet society, and were significantly more influential than those of the First Secretary. These more powerful interests had to be accommodated by the First Secretaries when it came to regional planning not least due to the fact that much of the social balance within the regions came from the provision of public goods, such as housing, child care, medical facilities by these enterprises.112 Within subordinate state structures and the political organization of the state there existed rivalry between networks and groups of actors seeking resources or progression, particularly in the vertically upward direction.

Downwardly, the Obkom held authority over the regional assembly (soviet), which was the seat of deputies chosen via the Party nomenklatura to “democratically” represent society. A representative body rather than a legislative branch of government, the Oblast Soviet was made up of deputies who were elected in single candidate ballots to represent the social structure in the region (although not competitively, and to ensure that only Communist Party members or its supporters were deputies). Until competitive elections to this body were introduced in 1990 it functioned to rubber-stamp decisions made by the regional executive committee, the Oblispolkom. The regional soviet was not a permanent body, meeting only a handful of times per year in short sessions lasting a few days at most with the Oblispolkom acting as its elected, full-time representative to act in between sessions. Although subordinated to the soviet, the Oblispolkom discussed policy directives from the Obkom or higher up in the Party, leaving sessions of the soviet to concentrate on approving decisions taken. It was also subordinated to the Council of Ministers at the next level up (for example, in Russia this

112 See Gel’man, Ryzhenkov and Brie (2003), pp.48-50
was to the RSFSR Council of Ministers), with the heads of the various departments in
the Oblispolkom subordinated both to the Oblast soviet as well as to the territorial
Ministries and Departments of which they were the regional representatives. The
Oblispolkom elected its own Chairman (although, again, this in effect meant via
selection by the Central Committee), who was assisted by a deputy Chairman, the
Chairman of the regional capital’s executive committee (Gorispolkom) and heads of
departments of the Oblast soviet. While the Oblispolkom Chairman presided over
Oblast soviet sessions, the soviet itself was entirely restricted to approval in its
contribution to the actual decision-making process, leaving no doubt to the Party’s
oversight of the committee. For any political actor, the position of Chairman of the
Oblispolkom was as an important stage in political career development holding a seat
on the Obkom bureau and considered to be a training ground for the post of First Party
Secretary.

The introduction of competitive elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies
began the process of undermining the authority of regional Party figures, not least the
First Party Secretary. The regional soviets filled with members of the nomenklatura,
who saw in them a potential alternative seat of power, particularly when organising
themselves around social movements. A large number of Regional First Party
Secretaries found it difficult to adapt to the threat to the job security that they had
enjoyed since the Brezhnev era, and the further initiation of elections to a Russian CPD
and regional soviets in May 1990 reflected the pressures on Party rule. In removing the
monopoly of power that the Party had previously guaranteed itself under Article 6 of the
1977 Soviet Constitution, and with the possibility for discussion of policy in the regional
soviet, they found themselves threatened for the first time in a generation, prompting
some to turn either to more conservative Party forces or to seek to re-invent

113 Hough and Fainsod (1979), p.489
114 D. Richard Little, (1980), ‘Regional legislatures in the Soviet political system’, Legislative Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 5 No. 2, p.237
115 Tomila Lankina, (2001), ‘Local government and ethnic and social activism in Russia’, in Archie
themselves as reformers (as many regional leaders did particularly in the autonomous republics of the RSFSR on the back of nationalist ideology and calls for sovereignty). As new actors appeared on the political scene, often politically inexperienced and coming from within the existing elite, the ability to distance themselves from the connotations of existing higher Party officials became a valuable resource. Furthermore, political reforms within the USSR transferred control over economic aspects of Soviet life to the Oblispolkom, requiring the First Secretaries to devote themselves to political leadership and ideological issues. Experiments in certain regions, including Sverdlovsk Oblast, were permitted in the economic sphere, with the regions moving to a new system to self-accounting, or khozraschet, and it was a short step from gaining control over economic life to altering the power structures of regional political life, as growing popular anti-Party feeling further weakened the power of the Obkom in regions such as Sverdlovsk.

**Sverdlovsk Oblast regional authorities in the late-Gorbachev era**

The growing economic crisis facing the industrial enterprises of Sverdlovsk Oblast, alongside strong support for El’tsin, played an important role in the breakdown of the CPSU’s exclusive control over regional political resources, which to a large degree has been overshadowed by the roles taken by Moscow and Leningrad. While the discussion groups and Popular Fronts of the two capitals were most influential in bringing down Soviet power, the emergence of new political forces were of great significance for the wider Urals, and its associated social, economic and political structures.

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116 See the discussion on Mintimir Shaimiev of Tatarstan in the next chapter of this thesis and Mary McAuley, (1997), *Russia’s Politics of Uncertainty*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, chapter 2 on how he transitioned from loyal Party functionary to champion of ethnic Tatar rights in order to maintain his hold on power.

The expectation that elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in March 1989 would underpin the authority of the Party, not least through its regional Party officials winning election to the Congress, did not come to fruition, and conversely demonstrated the growing lack of satisfaction with the Communist Party at the regional level. In a result that took the Communist leadership by surprise, 38 Obkom secretaries failed to win election to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies.\textsuperscript{118} Sverdlovsk First Party Secretary, Leonid Bobykin, who had a Party career dating back to the Brezhnev period, was among this number. His subsequent resignation in February 1990 was officially attributed to him being of retirement age, but it is clear that his electoral failure made his position untenable, especially under attempts by Gorbachev to rejuvenate Soviet cadres.\textsuperscript{119} A period of extreme instability ensued for the regional Party leadership, with two further First Secretaries being appointed and replaced in quick succession, before the Party settled on Vladimir Kadochnikov, the former First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk City gorkom in June 1990.\textsuperscript{120} This period saw more than 25% of Communist Party members in Sverdlovsk Oblast leave the Party, a figure far higher than the average for the Urals territory overall.\textsuperscript{121} One of the major implications of regional elections was the removal of reliance on the Party for appointment for deputies elected to the soviet and members of the Oblispolkom. It also removed the prerequisite of cultivating personal relations with Party members higher up the chain as a means of career development for members of the regional soviet. Elections to the USSR CPD had allowed a number of non-nomenklatura actors to become involved with popular support, and regional soviet elections held in March 1990 similarly brought in outsiders to a number of regions. These elections opened access to political debate to a wider population and different views on the future role of the Soviet and associated executive committee in Soviet regional politics were heard. There were further

\begin{footnotes}
\item[118] Brovkin (1990), p.18
\item[119] ‘Vystupienie L.F. Bobykins’, \textit{Ural’skii rabochii}, 14 February 1990, p.3
\end{footnotes}
expectations that the internal balance of power would shift, with the Chairman of the Soviet rivalling the Chairman of the Oblispolkom for power. The uncertainty over where power lay in the new regional soviets is demonstrated by the actions of Vladimir Vlasov, the Chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblispolkom at the time of the March 1990 regional soviet elections. Vlasov resigned his post as Chairman of the Oblispolkom following his election as Chairman of the competitively elected Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet, in a move that can only be construed as having been due to a belief that the regional soviet chairmanship had greater potential for political power now that it had become a genuinely elected body. Vlasov’s move to the post of Chair of the Oblast soviet proved to be unsuccessful; after an embarrassing series of rejections of his candidates for Deputy Chairman and his opposition in the Central Committee of the CPSU to El’tsin’s candidacy for the post of Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, he was recalled following a vote of confidence by deputies of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet from his post in June 1990. The fact that the Oblast Soviet removed its own Chairman (rather than him being removed by higher Party authorities) demonstrates the emboldened nature of the representative chamber arising from the first competitive soviet elections. The vote of 146 regional soviet deputies out of 217 to remove him was noted by local commentators from the newspaper of the Sverdlovsk City Soviet, Vechernii Sverdlovsk, that the role of the Chairman was now to represent the views of the electorate and of the Soviet, rather than the Party bosses. In April 1990, Eduard Rossel’, a member of the Sverdlovsk Oblast soviet but nonetheless a minor figure in the upper levels of the regional political structure, was elected as Vlasov’s replacement to the post of Chairman of the Oblispolkom. As a senior manager within the construction industry he was well positioned within the nomenklatura system that made up regional soviet deputies. When considering Rossel’’s appointment to the Oblispolkom in a period where Party connections were weakening in importance, his lack of ties to the highest level of the regional Party leadership meant that he was not

constrained by being part of the patron-client network at this level, freeing him somewhat from any loyalties towards the former regional masters.

**El'tsin as a source of political support in the period 1990-1991**

In contrast to the republics where he had been able to harness popular support through supporting ethno-nationalist demands, in order to build support from the political elites of Russia’s regions, El'tsin needed closer links within the regional institutions of power. At the same time, for many, association with El'tsin was an easy path to being perceived as pro-reform. An important facet of this was his use of emerging pro-reform movements (for example in the cases of Popov and Sobchak in Moscow and Leningrad), which on the surface supported El'tsin, but held to a more ambitious ideological platform of democratization than that voiced by him. From potential political actors’ perspective, even the most tenuous association with El'tsin could be used during electoral campaigns for the RSFSR CPD and regional soviets. In Sverdlovsk Oblast, El'tsin’s huge popularity and the presence of a strong local pro-reform movement simplified the task of developing a support base. Within his home region, Rossel’ was an ideal candidate to fit El'tsin’s requirements; they had previously worked well together, they had similar backgrounds, and through his patronage of Rossel’, he now had a client in this critical region. The conditions of El'tsin’s own struggle with the centre demonstrated that this informal relationship worked both ways, and as is shown in chapter four, the manner of its initiation lent this patron-client relationship more significance (in a positive and negative sense) than the majority of other future ties the Russian president had with regional leaders. The result was that their relationship became grounded in clearly separated areas of the ‘national’ and the ‘regional’, with each side controlling their respective domain. Rossel’ could display loyalty on issues affecting the future of El'tsin’s regime, but on matters of regional

123 El'tsin was later accused in the 1990s of continuing to act like a regional Party boss while as President. Evidently, the nature of political support networks during his time as Sverdlovsk Party Secretary gave him reason to seek to re-create similar structures later.
importance he became accustomed to taking his own approach, which would later cause tension with the centre.

Additionally, informal groups (neformaly) that sprung up as political and social control began to relax under perestroika, are indirectly connected in the influence of El'tsin on Rossel’s rise. Such groups emerged throughout the country as a channel for the wider discussion of political and socioeconomic conditions in Soviet society. In Sverdlovsk Oblast, the most prominent of the neformaly was the ‘Discussion Tribune’ (Diskussionyi Tribunal), formed in 1987 in Sverdlovsk City. The group, and particularly its initiator Gennadii Burbulis, a lecturer in Marxist-Leninist philosophy at the Urals Polytechnic University (El’tsin’s alma mater), was highly influential during campaigning for the 1989 USSR and 1990 RSFSR CPD elections. Channelling the politicisation of the region through creating a forum for alternative political conversations to occur, the Discussion Tribune quickly became highly popular, bringing together a number of the leading intelligentsia of Sverdlovsk to discuss the changes required in the political life of the region and the country. Its key protagonists were largely members of the Communist Party rather than dissidents and initially had the approval of the city Party organs. In the run-up to elections to the 1989 USSR Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD) it broke from Party supervision and approval and concerted its efforts into campaigning for pro-reform candidates, taking the regional Party organs by surprise in the 1989 USSR CPD elections. The pro-reform sentiment in the region was dubbed by journalists as a ‘Sverdlovsk Spring’ (with the intentional nod to events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the 1950s and 1960s), and by the time of the RSFSR CPD elections in March 1990 Discussion Tribune was a founder member of the “Movement for Democratic Choice” (Dvizheniia Demokraticheskogo Vybora - DDV), which itself fell

124 See for example Judith Devlin, (1995), The rise of the Russian Democrats: the causes and consequences of the elite revolution, Aldershot, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 5 pp.74-105 for a look at the spectrum of the neformaly groups in the country. The focus here is centred on their presence in Moscow and Leningrad, but, it is worth pointing out that the Discussion Tribune in Sverdlovsk was more open than its counterpart in Moscow which restricted its participants. This study gives an indication as to the spectrum of interests represented by these groups and their transition into more formal electoral campaigning movements.
under the umbrella of the Democratic Russia (Demokraticheskaia Rossiia) group at the USSR CPD level. Of the 32 deputies elected to the Russian CPD from Sverdlovsk Oblast (the largest number from any of the Urals regions - Chelyabinsk had 24 deputies and the Bashkir ASSR sent 27), 12 of them were members of pro-reform factions in the Congress (including Svobodnaia Rossiia and Demokraticheskaia Rossiia) and were firmly supportive of El’tsin’s attempt to become chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.  

In the internal politics of Sverdlovsk region, Gennadii Burbulis, who was attending Sverdlovsk regional soviet sessions while also fulfilling his role as a deputy in the USSR CPD, proposed Rossel’ as a candidate for Chairman of the Oblispolkom in April 1990. This offered the regional soviet a quick solution that avoided uncertainty and was palatable to both conservatives and reformers. With his experience of running El’tsin’s office in Sverdlovsk while he was elected to the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies, Burbulis was a trusted figure and could well have been considered as a candidate for Head of Regional Administration. Instead, Burbulis was focused on developing a career at the national political level, and went on to join El’tsin in Moscow, running his presidential election campaign in July 1991, before eventually becoming Secretary of State in 1991. While the suggestion of Rossel’ might have appeared somewhat surprising coming from Burbulis, as Rossel’ had not been a part of the pro-reform movement, it is clear that El’tsin wanted Rossel’ as Chairman of the Oblispolkom. Despite a lack of pro-reform credentials, Rossel’ was considered by El’tsin as ‘one of his people’ (svoi chelovek). Previous contact between the two dated

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126 Kirillov (1997), p.20
128 Interview with Gennadii Burbulis in Moscow, September 2011. Burbulis noted that El’tsin remained acutely aware of the political scene in Sverdlovsk Oblast at this time. Among the reasons that Burbulis picked out as to why Rossel’ was proposed as Chairman of the Oblispolkom were his loyalty to El’tsin, his background being untainted by power, his leadership skills and charisma in getting the job done, and most importantly, as this coincided with El’tsin’s famous ‘take as much sovereignty as you can swallow’ statement to the titular ethnic republics, that he felt that Rossel’ would best ensure that his home region could be exemplary in reform.
back to El'tsin’s time as First Party Secretary of the Sverdlovsk region between 1976 and 1985. Both had been involved in the construction industry and it has been reported that El'tsin later offered Rossel’ the role of chairman of the Gorispolkom of the region’s second largest city, Nizhnii Tagil, which he turned down citing a lack of preparedness to move from construction (and a fear that this would trap him into a local Party role). Rejecting a promotion was not a decision to take lightly in the Soviet system, although Rossel’ continued to work effectively under El'tsin. A few years later, El'tsin oversaw Rossel’’s promotion to Deputy Director of the construction enterprise Sreduralstroi in 1983, from where he was later promoted to Director of the Glavsreduralstroi construction enterprise (a re-named successor to Sreduralstroi).

The pressure that the Communist Party found itself under nationally in the RSFSR and locally in the regions at this time also helps to explain why a non-political actor was preferred as Chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblispolkom in 1990. As the Oblispolkom took on more economic responsibility for the region, it became a practical necessity that regional economic control should be in the hands of someone who understood the realities of the socioeconomic position the region faced rather than those of a Party theorist. Appointing a Chairman who had experience of running a large-scale enterprise covered both bases, with them having political and management experience (although not necessarily Party experience). With the presence of many of the super-heavy industrial enterprises located in the region, particularly the influential industrial powerhouses of Uralmashzavod and Uravagonzavod, the choice of the director of a construction enterprise (El’tsin’s former profession) over directors of these powerful branch enterprises further underlines the influence of El’tsin on the suggestion of Rossel’. Furthermore, others in the group of ‘Sverdlovskers’ taken by El’tsin with him to Moscow in 1985, of which the most enduring was Viktor Iliushin, knew Rossel’ from his

earlier days in the Sverdlovsk city of Nizhnii Tagil, and would likely have supported or even influenced this choice.\(^{130}\) It is also notable that over the years to come, Iliushin and Iurii Petrov, of the State Investment Corporation, (and also from Nizhnii Tagil), figured in Rossel’’s new political career and were later accused of having protected him from criticism in the centre and of preventing such criticism from reaching El’tsin.\(^{131}\)

**Preparing the ground for the future power system: the emergence of ‘unified power’**

The second part of this chapter looks at how Rossel’ obtained further powers in the region and consolidated his position within the Oblast soviet and its Executive Committee, culminating in his successfully replacing the First Secretary as the de facto leader of the region. The basis for future regional power to remain focused on a single figure has its roots in this period, as the regional soviets began to emerge as potential alternate seats of political power.

In several regions, conflict as to whether there should be a continued separation of powers between the Chairmen of the Soviet and the Oblispolkom led to many combining these roles in order to overcome the lack of clarity over where power lay. In unifying these two roles a single individual was able to control its proceedings.\(^{132}\)

Termed ‘unified power’ (*edinonachalie*), movement towards this began in Sverdlovsk Oblast in June 1990, just a few months after Rossel’’s election to the Oblispolkom, following the humiliating recall of the newly-elected Oblast Soviet Chairman, Vlasov. The position taken by Rossel’ was that unifying these roles would prevent a conflict of powers emerging, highlighting the example of Sverdlovsk city, in which the

\(^{130}\) Iliushin had been a Raikom First Secretary and part of the Sverdlovsk Obkom under El’tsin, and became head of his Secretariat in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in 1990 and the Presidential Administration in 1991. See http://www.gazprom.ru/subjects/2533.shtml (Last accessed on 22 November 2008)


\(^{132}\) Kirillov (1997), p.25-26, notes this same feature in Kurgan Oblast, while contrasting it with the conflict that emerged between the Chairman of the Oblispolkom (Petr Sumin) and the Presidium of the Oblast Soviet in Cheliabinsk Oblast
Gorispolkom and the Gorsoviet were both seeking to take control over the Oblast capital's affairs, leading to paralysis in management of the city. In his argument for edininachalie, Rossel' was forceful in stating that such a combination was absolutely necessary, criticising the Soviet for being unable to act quickly enough, holding too many personal conflicts between deputies and ineffectiveness in implementing decisions. The counterargument made against edininachalie was that it dragged the Oblast back to former times when all power was in the hands of one person instead of in the hands of the Soviet. Some members of the pro-democratic factions of the Oblast Soviet went as far as denouncing unified rule as ‘dictatorship, iron rule in the hands of one person’ and as a ‘creeping counter-revolution’. This process was an early indication of Rossel’’s willingness to act as a single figure in charge of the political space, with the suggested alternative being the dissolution of the Oblispolkom altogether and transferring power into the hands of an Oblast Soviet presidium. Unsurprisingly, the political conditions at the national level were influential in Rossel’ obtaining unified rule, as this coincided with El'tsin’s struggle with the Soviet authorities and his encouragement of republics and regions to seek their own paths of development. El'tsin himself, at a meeting in Sverdlovsk, stressed that although different regions were suggesting different solutions for regional power there was a need for one solution for all of Russia. The weight that El'tsin’s backing for unified rule carried was decisive in the Sverdlovsk regional Soviet; the issue was raised by Rossel’ during visits by El'tsin to the region and the indicated approval of the Russian leader for this system eventually swung the issue within the Soviet, which obeyed the leading national figure following several rounds of voting in November 1990. As already stated, in what should be viewed as an early power grab by Rossel' under the

137 ‘Stenogramma vstrechi B.N. EL’tsina s rukovoditeliami oblastnogo i gorodskogo Sovetov i ispolkomov, 15.08.90’, UTs BN El’tsina, F.5 O.1 D.8 L.159-160
conditions of wider uncertainty over the future political structure, this not only indicates early domination of the national-subnational linkage in regional politics, but also Rossel’s ability to marginalise competing forces (in this case the regional Soviet). While this may well have been due to the fact that regional soviets more generally were still weak due to their own inexperience in decision making as an elected body, we can see his control over the political space through a willingness to override newly emerging democratic forces in the region, including closing off attempts by the regional Soviet to impose checks and balances on his power. With regards to the Communist Party, while there was infrequent criticism from the new Regional First Party Secretary, Vladimir Kadochnikov, their attentions lay largely elsewhere focusing on national issues of deteriorating Party leadership and criticism of Gorbachev.

Rossel’ and the role of regional economic crisis in the foundation of his regional power

With Gorbachev’s reforms focusing the Party on ideological matters rather than overseeing economic and production concerns, it fell to regional governments to take over the roles of central ministries and represent the needs of local enterprises in order to stave off total social collapse as the traditional forms of industrial interest representation that had previously been under the control of the branch ministries started to break down. This particularly affected those regions that were heavily reliant on the industrial enterprises located in their territories. We now look at how

139 ‘Na sessii obsioveta’, Ural’skii rabochii, 20 June 1991, p.1. The difficulty in raising a quorum for Oblast soviet sessions undoubtedly worked in Rossel’s favour as the Communist Party’s power waned in the region. This is particularly the case over the scandal of Rossel’s construction of a cottage outside of Ekaterinburg in 1991. Questions were asked in the media and in the Oblast soviet sessions as to where he had obtained the money for such a project and even materials. The inquorate nature of the soviet’s sessions allowed him to take any questioning of him off the agenda and to close sessions of the soviet. See also ‘Trudnyi god predsedatelia’, Ural’skii rabochii 13 July 1991, p.2
140 See, for example, ‘Vystuplenie V.N. Romanova – sekretar’ Sverdlovskogo Obkoma KPSS’, Ural’skii rabochii, 10 August 1991, p.1
greater economic management by Rossel’ to combat the growing socio-economic crisis in the Russian regions brought him directly to take up a position from which he could influence national-regional bargaining, develop a position as the origin of the pursuit of national decisions that affected the regions, and by extension initiate the process of monopolising political influence in the region.

One of the key areas of Rossel’’s rise to assuming the role of regional leader can be seen in his public voicing of doubts that the Soviet centre could continue to adequately provide for the region. Whereas the majority of regions took a wait-and-see approach to the outcome of struggles at the centre in the period from 1990-1991 rather than taking new initiatives to resolve issues at the regional level, Rossel’ symbolised the emergence of a pragmatic non-Party figure who could pursue economic management in a way that was outside of the practices of the Party. 142 Using El'tsin’s campaign visits to Sverdlovsk to discuss the political problems that the region faced gave rise to taking matters of economic management into his own hands in a way that did not rely on an external decision-making power. As El'tsin and Gorbachev both sought to gain the support of the regions and republics for their respective positions, regional actors such as Rossel’ saw the opportunity to play both sides of power against each other to make vertical requests for additional resources or assistance, alongside developing horizontal relations between regions, something that the Soviet method of planning and subordination outlined above had systematically prevented. Amongst the regions of the RSFSR, Sverdlovsk Oblast was one that the Soviet authorities could ill-afford to ignore; its highly urban, industrialised and politicised society was at high risk of social collapse, with low living standards despite its position as one of the most economically developed regions in Russia. 143 The Soviet authorities, as opposed to the Russian, were better suited to resolving problems associated with the breakdown of economic

142 One of the definitions of pragmatic in the OED is given as ‘dealing with matters in accordance with practical rather than theoretical considerations or general principles; aiming at what is achievable rather than ideal; matter-of-fact, practical, down-to-earth.’ This fits well with the role played by Rossel’ at this time. http://dictionary.oed.com (accessed 25 August 2009).
planning, and the advantage of direct approaches to the Soviet centre lay in the expediency of decision-making, although it was certainly the case that regional matters were secondary to the battle over the future of the regime being fought at the Union level. Potential channels of contact between Sverdlovsk Oblast and the Soviet centre were supplemented by networks that had arisen from its historical significance as a training ground for future senior Soviet political figures (a further example of a member of the central elite with experience of the region was the USSR Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, who had been the Director of the Uralmash factory from 1970-1975). These contacts, combined with the more explicit threat voiced from within the region that the whole complex of issues it faced could lead to major civil unrest propelled the centre into responding to immediate demands, notably over the supply of food and consumer goods.

Comparatively, other Urals regions such as Cheliabinsk Oblast and Perm Oblast were in a similar perilous condition to their neighbour.\textsuperscript{144} Horizontal contact had previously been strictly limited to the supply of raw materials and consumer goods. The prospect of coordination between regions, outside of the confines of the planned economy, provided the opportunity of a new type of network that both overlapped with existing vertical subordination, while at the same time undermining it. The formation of the Association of Oblasts and Republics of the Urals Region for Economic Cooperation (also known as ‘Bo\'shoi Ural’) in September 1990 followed on the heels of the Siberian Agreement that brought together a number of Siberian regions, and was prompted by the understanding that centralised agreements between regions as part of central planning could no longer be relied upon to be fulfilled and could be more effectively renegotiated without involvement of the centre. The heads of Sverdlovsk, Cheliabinsk, Kurgan, Orenburg, Perm and Tiumen’ Oblasts agreed to coordinate action to prevent the break-down of the supply network and consolidate economic relations to give a

\textsuperscript{144} Dmitrieva (1996), p.83
degree of protectionism and self-sufficiency.\textsuperscript{145} As part of the process of undermining the Soviet leadership, El'tsin officially signed Bol'shoi Ural into existence, as a matter of RSFSR importance, in June 1991. The influence of Rossel’ as the driving force in this group can be seen in early discussions held by this group over the potential creation of a new territorial entity made up of six of its participant regions, Sverdlovsk, Perm, Cheliabinsk, Orenburg, Kurgan and Tiumen' Oblasts, although this idea was dropped when the leaders of the other participant Urals regions felt that Rossel's rising power threatened their own positions.\textsuperscript{146}

Competing forces for influence were still present, and resistance to the regionalization of economic control came most significantly from the military-industrial sector, which remained loyal to its central ministries. Low Soviet investment in conversion and the shift away from a defence-oriented economic structure had weakened the influence of this branch in Moscow, although it remained tightly controlled by the ministries who were not favourable towards El'tsin. Support in this sector for conservative Party forces grew, in particular, for the new Soviet Prime Minister, Valentin Pavlov, who advocated a return to the former planning systems and the re-implementation of state support for the defence industry. This position had strong resonance in the military-industrial complex of Sverdlovsk Oblast, resulting in Aleksandr Tiziakov, Director of the ZIK (Zavod im. Kalinina) rocket factory, and member of the Sverdlovsk Obkom, acting as one of the leading participants in the August 1991 coup.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{145} Kirillov (1997), p.27; 'Poriadok vedeniia sobraniia trudiashchikhsia Ural'skogo regiona, 02.10.1990', UTs BN El'tsina F.5 O.1 D.6 L.65
\textsuperscript{146} Startsev (1999), p.337
The August 1991 attempted coup and the installation of Rossel’ as Head of Regional Administration

Patron-client resources not only contribute resources to a network and receive benefits when resources are distributed, but they also lend support to participants at critical junctures. While many of Russia’s regions fell silent as the State Committee for Emergency Rule (GKChP) declared itself in control of the USSR, waiting to see how events played out in Moscow before announcing their support or condemnation, confirmation of the ties between Rossel’ and El’tsin was shown in the immediate and absolute support that came from the Sverdlovsk leader’s condemnation of the seizure of power by the putschists. Poplar sentiment in Sverdlovsk Oblast had already demonstrated itself as against any conservative restoration of power, when in the referendum of March 1991 on the future of the Soviet Union it had sensationally been the only region of the RSFSR to vote ‘No’ on the question of retaining the Soviet Union in a renewed format. It was not simply a protest against perestroika, but a resounding vote cast in favour of El’tsin and Russia. Despite the public rejection of the future of the Union, on the morning of 19th August 1991 Rossel’ was in Moscow as a guest to witness the intended signing of the new Union treaty agreed between some of the Soviet republics (including Russia) and Gorbachev. Upon the announcement of the coup Rossel’ contacted El’tsin and was surprisingly allowed to return on a flight to Sverdlovsk with one of the Russian President’s closest confidants, Oleg Lobov, a former member of the Sverdlovsk Obkom and Chairman of the Oblispolkom (1985-1987), who was given the task of setting up the necessary facilities for the Russian government to function in exile from within Sverdlovsk Oblast should it be required. It is most likely that the putschists simply did not consider the possibility that regional figures would dare oppose their orders (due to misplaced expectations of Party

In addition to many regions, the titular republics of the RSFSR were largely supportive of the GKChP, not least due to the fact that the leaders of these republics felt a sense of loyalty to the Party that had put them in their posts. See McAuley 1997. Once it became clear that the coup had failed, leaders such as Shaimiev harness the nationalist sentiment within their regions that they had previously tried to deflect in order to maintain their positions by presenting themselves to El’tsin as providing continuity and stability for restless territories.
discipline and hierarchy) and so took no steps to ensure that non-consenting figures be isolated. In Sverdlovsk Oblast, Rossel’ was by this time stronger than the Party in his region, and so this expectation of loyalty was misplaced. Support from the Oblast soviet, underscored when an emergency session prompted by Rossel’ immediately approved all of El’tsin’s decrees rejecting the putsch, affirmed the region’s adherence to Russian law and pronounced its full support for the legitimately elected Russian government and President, providing El’tsin with the morally important support of his home territory.\footnote{Postanovlenie Oblastnogo Soveta, Ural’skii rabochii, 20 August 1991, p.1} The Oblast soviet, Sverdlovsk City soviet and other district soviets set up a coordination committee made up of 25 officials to agree further actions against the coup in Moscow, and refused to implement a regional representation of the GKChP, threatening a general strike and civil disobedience.\footnote{Stenogramma chrezvychainogo sobraniia Sverdlovskogo Oblastnogo Soveta, 20-21.08.1991’, UTs BN El’tsina, F. 5, O. 1, D. 6, L.124-125} As in a number of other regions, the regional soviet and its legitimately elected Oblispolkom declared themselves the legitimate source of power in their territory.\footnote{‘Postanovlenie No. 2’, Ural’skii rabochii, 20 August 1991, p.1} On the 20th August 1991, Rossel’ made a television address to the region supporting El’tsin, and the next day huge demonstrations were organised in Sverdlovsk, where, according to estimates, 100,000 demonstrators gathered to support the Russian President.\footnote{Kirillov (1997)., p.28}

The leadership of the regional response displayed by Rossel’ and the support given to him by the regional soviet should be contrasted with the inaction of the regional Obkom during the GKChP, which only served to demonstrate the end of their authority in the region. The failure of the Obkom to provide a coherent position and even comment on the coup raised criticism from society, with even its own newspaper, Ural’skii rabochii, condemning its inaction, commenting that ‘the position of some of its secretaries and members of the bureau can be characterised as passive support for the GKChP’.\footnote{‘Ustoiali! No…’, Ural’skii rabochii, 23 August 1991, p.1} The desire of the Obkom for the restoration of Party authority was hardly surprising as it was losing control over the country; by Summer 1991 a growing tendency to the
restoration of conservative forces within the regional town soviets was observed, such as in Sukhoi Log, Asbest and Artemovsk. These forces had claimed considerable support within the Obkom for anti-Gorbachev views, and repeatedly called for his resignation and for the Party to restore itself as the 'controlling and directing body [of society]'\textsuperscript{154}. The Obkom’s later published claims that not a single Party organisation in the Oblast supported the GKChP were so belated as to seemingly strip them of any credibility.\textsuperscript{155} The national transfer of regional power according to decree No. 75 of 22 August 1991 "On several questions of the powers of organs of executive power in the RSFSR", from the First Party Secretaries to temporary regional leaders appointed by El’tsin confirmed the end of Communist Party control over the regions.\textsuperscript{156}

Rossel”s appointment as Head of Regional Administration was formalised in November 1991, and he became one of twenty-three Oblispolkom Chairmen appointed Head of Regional Administration from the 68 oblasts, krai, federal cities and autonomous units by El’tsin following the collapse of the coup. All of the appointed Heads of Regional Administration entered into an informal bargain with the president, whereby their positions were conditional owing to the leverage held over them in the form of the threat to remove them from their posts should they fail to back his leadership.

**Conclusion**

As the development of the three strands of boundary control are discussed in subsequent chapters, this period grounds Rossel"s future leadership through his monopolisation of networks. His ability to speak to different groups over different issues prevented them from seeking alternative representation, allowing for the

\textsuperscript{154} ‘Uidet li Gorbachevu v otstavku, kak trebuet togo sekretari gorkomov KPSS?’, *Ural’skii rabochii*, 3 July 1991, p.2
\textsuperscript{155} ‘V Obkome KPSS’, *Ural’skii rabochii*, 24 August 1991, p.1. These claims were published in the local press two days after the formal end of Party rule had been announced following El’tsin’s ban of the Communist Party in Russia, dissolving the central and regional Party structures at a stroke.
monopolization of internal political power, relations with the centre and influence over
regional regime development.

The rise of Rossel’ from Chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblispolkom to Head of Regional
Administration in the post-Coup reality of Russia offers a particular demonstration of
the survival of Soviet networks among the El’tsin-era political elite. While Rossel’ had
not been part of the upper nomenklatura elite, the connections that he was able to draw
upon promoted his own status within the internally, cross-regionally, and most
importantly, nationally. The multi-directional nature of Rossel’’s network relations that
provide the foundation of his rise to power are drawn on as a consistent theme
throughout the discussion of his boundary control strategy for retaining power and
organising networks during the El’tsin decade. This strategy of drawing on a multitude
of networks allowed him a significant degree of independent action in developing his
own political regime subsequently. Support for El’tsin, even during periods when his
independent policy approach brought into conflict with the centre, will be demonstrated
as important in providing him greater sticking power than a large number of other
regional leaders, certainly until gubernatorial elections became the norm.

By the end of August 1991, Rossel’ boasted a strong level of regional political capital
that leaves no doubt as to his position as the dominant regional political force in
Sverdlovsk Oblast. What is interesting to note is that his own ideological leanings do
not appear to have played a strong role in this, offering support to the idea that the
ability to skilfully manage different group interests and relating these to economic
recovery was critically important in constructing his political power. In what was a
strongly pro-reform region, he had managed to achieve political control without ever
having to outline his own democratic credentials.

Quite opposite to the rigid Party leadership, Rossel’ demonstrated himself to be
pragmatic, and frequently opportunistic, using all available resources to negotiate the
circumstances facing the region as the former regime imploded. It was significant that Rossel' successfully built relations with the existing nomenklatura pulling their allegiances away from ties to the Party, rather than attempting to remove them from their posts to strengthen his position as regional leader.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{157} This can be contrasted with, for example, V. Diakonov's failed attempt to remove the Soviet nomenklatura from his post-Soviet regime in 1991-2 in Krasnodar Krai. In this case the Soviet-era elites successfully toppled El'tsin's appointee to the region, restoring a more conservative regime. See McAuley (1997), p.121-2
Chapter 3

The value of network relations in Moscow, Saint Petersburg and Tatarstan

Having looked at how Rossel’ emerged as leader of Sverdlovsk Oblast, this chapter takes a comparative look at three other regional leaders to provide comparative examples of how other executive leaders in post-communist Russia used networks to construct personalised regimes in the 1990s: Iurii Luzhkov of Moscow, Mintimir Shaimiev of Tatarstan and Anatolii Sobchak of Saint Petersburg. These three leaders have been chosen from amongst the other regional heads of administration in the 1990s due to their relative successes and failures in the use of networks to conduct regional leadership during the El’tsin decade. All three of these regions are considered within the group of ‘donor regions’ (regions and republics that sent more money to the federal centre than they received in federal transfers), as was Sverdlovsk Oblast. The long-term control over a territory as displayed by Luzhkov and Shaimiev (spanning nearly two decades) is contrasted here with the difficulty experienced by Sobchak in establishing his authority. The duration of Luzhkov’s and Shaimiev’s tenures from the El’tsin period to the Dmitrii Medvedev presidency (2008-2012), only marginally surpasses that of Rossel’, and the manner in which they governed their territories had far-reaching consequences for the development of Russian regional politics. Sobchak provides a contrasting case, losing his position in the gubernatorial elections held in the mid-1990s. His inability to construct functional relations with the Saint Petersburg elite meant that even as one of the key regional opposition actors, he faced an insurmountable challenge to assert himself in regional politics. In Sobchak, we can also see the difference in his approach as a regional leader attempting to take on the established elites as a new politician rather than as a regional manager (khoziain), and as such found regional administration tougher than those who were able to continue existing administrative patronage networks.
Outlining the nature and structure of their respective regimes, this chapter discusses the similarities and differences of these subnational regimes in the 1990s, and considers the aspects that are to be addressed in detail with regards to Rossel'; the type of political power systems that these individuals developed in their territories, the involvement of these actors in patron-client relations and their relations with the federal centre, and El'tsin in particular. The chapter begins with a short biography of each actor describing their route to power and the key events that marked their tenures during the El'tsin decade, before then drawing out the abovementioned themes.

**Continuity or change: Luzhkov’s, Shaimiev's and Sobchak’s rise to power**

The city of Moscow and Iurii Luzhkov were inseparable for nearly two decades and it is easy to forget that Luzhkov was not the city’s first Mayor. His appointment in 1992 was due to the resignation of Gavriil Popov, who had been elected to the position in the city’s first mayoral elections in 1991. Elected on the same ticket as Deputy Mayor, Luzhkov was the natural choice to succeed Popov, but no fresh elections to the post were held and he was instead appointed by El'tsin on the basis that the electorate had chosen him alongside Popov in 1991. Similar to Rossel', a connection between Luzhkov and El'tsin already existed prior to Luzhkov’s appointment as Mayor. El'tsin had first come across him during his time as the Moscow City First Secretary in the late 1980s, appointing him from his position as deputy to the Chairman of the Moscow City Executive Committee (Gorispolkom) to take charge of fixing the city’s food supply problems as part of the changes in cadres undertaken to reduce the influence of El'tsin’s predecessor as Moscow First Party Secretary, V. Grishin.158 By the time of the June 1991 Mayoral elections, Luzhkov was seen as a capable manager and his selection as Popov’s deputy was reportedly upon the recommendation of El'tsin, to compensate for the fact that the new Mayor himself had little knowledge of the

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problems facing the city and the figures in prominent positions that he would have to
work with. Throughout the 1990s, Luzhkov was a constant figure both in Moscow
and in national political life; he was a strong supporter of El'tsin up to and including the
president’s re-election, although there were clear differences of opinion between
Luzhkov and members of El'tsin’s government and close circle. Due to the national
significance of the territory he governed, Luzhkov was increasingly viewed as a
potential future Russian leader, but it was only in 1999, when his ‘Fatherland’ political
party joined with Mintimir Shaimiev’s ‘All-Russia’ that he attempted to make a move
into a national position, contesting the 1999 State Duma elections, with an eye on a
presidential bid.

In the Volga republic of Tatarstan, Mintimir Shaimiev had risen to power in the final
years of the Soviet Union; from being the First Secretary of the Tatar Obkom of the
CPSU he became the Chairman of the Tatar Council of Ministers and was appointed
Chairman of the Tatar Supreme Soviet in 1990. As the final Soviet-era Chairman of the
Tatar Supreme Soviet (the highest political position in the Tatar ASSR), Shaimiev
became the republic's president before the dissolution of the USSR and played a role
throughout the 1990s that shaped outcomes not only for Tatarstan, but also in the
surrounding Volga-region ethnic republics and strongly influenced the shape of
Russian federalism in the first half of the decade. His leadership coincided with
increasing nationalism in the republic, during a period when nationalities issues
became increasingly tense. As a counterweight to growing calls from the Baltic States
for secession, Gorbachev planned to increase Tatarstan’s status from ASSR to full
Union status in order to strengthen his own support for renewing the state, and when
El'tsin declared Russia's sovereignty in June 1990 without mentioning the status of
Tatarstan, Shaimiev seized the opportunity to declare Tatarstan’s own sovereignty from

attempt at macro-regionology’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.20, No.2,
pp.98-123
Russia. This indicated the beginning of a process that placed Tatarstan at the heart of future Russian centre-regional relations. Holding elections for a republican president on the same day as presidential elections were held in the RSFSR was seen as a way of underlining Tatar statehood to Russia, and Shaimiev was unchallenged in his election as Tatar President. Motivated by the desire to ensure increased status of the Tatar ASSR, and owing to a fear of Gorbachev’s cooling intention to raise Tatarstan’s status within a renewed Union, Shaimiev supported the August 1991 putsch, hoping that his support for the GKChP would continue this process. With Tatar claims to sovereignty in mind, Shaimiev had already rejected Tatarstan’s participation in referendum on the creation of a Russian presidency in March 1991 and would do so again in the April 1993 and December 1993 referenda in Russia, arguing that they affected a different country. It was only upon the signing of the Bilateral Treaty between Russia and Tatarstan in April 1994 did Tatarstan’s participation in Russian politics become the model for El’tsin’s new system of electoral support for the Russian president in return for the centre allowing the regions increased decentralization. Shaimiev’s style of leadership, particularly it seems with regards to the centre, has been described as more restrained and discreet than that of leaders of Russian regions, such as Luzhkov and Rossel’, who actively attempted to promote themselves onto the national stage.

Similar to many sub-national leaders of the era, he promoted himself as a manager (khoziain) rather than an ideologist, demanding the loyalty of the regional elite. His skills as a politician were expertly demonstrated in the use of the threat of nationalism from within the republic along in order to extract concessions from Moscow that allowed Tatarstan to operate in its own interests. As the El’tsin era drew to a close, Shaimiev allied himself with Luzhkov in the Fatherland-All Russia political party to contest the 1999 state parliamentary elections.

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162 Matsuzato (2006), p.106
163 Crosston (2004), p.52
164 Matsuzato (2001)
165 Matsuzato (2001), p.57. It has since been argued that in the Putin period, the system of relations developed in Tatarstan between the republican president and the municipalities, districts and regions has been transposed onto national-subnational relations. See Matsuzato (2006) and V.V. Mikhailov, (2010), ‘Authoritarian regimes of Russia and Tatarstan: coexistence and subjection’ Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 26, No.4, pp. 471-493.
Fundamental differences in background and experience played their part in Anatolii Sobchak’s term in office as Mayor of Saint Petersburg. A popular deputy from Leningrad to the first USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, Sobchak was also an elected deputy of the pro-democracy Leningrad City Soviet (Lensovet) in April 1990. He was elected as Chairman of the Soviet, in which the democratic bloc held a majority (240 deputies out of 400), and presided over efforts to reverse the tendency of the soviets’ role being that of simply authorising the decisions of the executive committee, trying to bring the executive committee under the control of the representative branch and establish a real legislature that would make decisions for the executive committee to implement.\textsuperscript{166} When relations between the Soviet and the Executive Committee finally broke down, the Chairman of the City Executive Committee (Gorispolkom) proposed the creation of a mayor to run the city as an executive leader.\textsuperscript{167} In the subsequent elections in July 1991, Sobchak was elected Mayor of the city. In an about-face of his previous position, Sobchak found it difficult to use the fresh start of the Mayoral system to create a working executive-legislative relationship to change embedded methods of working, and instead sought to subordinate the City soviet to his executive power despite the common ground that both branches held through participation in the Democratic Front. It has been suggested that Sobchak’s presidential-style approach to decision making and desire to rule without being subject to checks from the City soviet put him on collision course with its deputies.\textsuperscript{168} In the months running up to El’tsin’s assault on the Russian parliament, which Sobchak firmly supported, the City soviet unsuccessfully attempted to remove him from his position, and found itself dissolved following El’tsin’s defeat of the Russian parliament in October 1993.\textsuperscript{169} Sobchak became an influential participant in the writing of the new Russian Constitution, and participated in the 1993 State Duma elections as the leader of the

\textsuperscript{166} McAuley (1997), p.224
\textsuperscript{168} It was claimed by members of the city soviet that Sobchak was ‘autocratic, vain and a poor administrator’. In return, Sobchak accused the deputies of being amateurish and only interested in self-enrichment. McAuley (1997) p.238
\textsuperscript{169} McAuley (1997), p.245
Russian Movement for Democratic Reform (RDDR), which contributed to the fragmentation of the democratic vote that meant that reformist parties performed poorly. By the point of the 1996 gubernatorial elections, Sobchak was increasingly isolated in city politics and one of his own deputies, Vladimir Iakovlev, stood against and defeated him.¹⁷⁰

The development of personalised regimes as a response to the end of the unitary state

The idea of a regional ‘boss’ lying at the heart of successful regional regimes in Russia is a recurring theme in the literature on long-term leaders of subnational government. As Russia moved away from being a unitary state and as the weakness of the central government towards the regions became increasingly evident, the emergence of regionally (and in cases, locally) dominant individuals transposed the myth that Russia requires a strong hand at the top to the subnational level as the disruption of the vertical chain of power transferred the monopoly over power from the centre to the republics, oblasts and krai. As long as subnational leaders could combine support for El’tsin with fulfilling the terms of the social contract of providing housing, heat, education, and food supplies they could expect to be given almost a free hand to manage their territories as they saw fit, without the threat of widespread interference from the centre. As a result, various degrees of machine politics emerged, whereby the regional executives concentrated as much power as they possibly could into their own individual persons, to the detriment of the institution of the regional executive.

As a backdrop to the study of Rossel’ in Sverdlovsk Oblast, the three leaders being considered here all stand out with regards to the degree of personalisation that distinguished the regimes that they constructed or attempted to build. Luzhkov’s and

Shaimiev’s longevity was facilitated by the fact that they led their territories unchallenged from within and in a fashion that suited the federal authorities. Both of these leaders used top-down domination over all aspects of political life in their areas, and both had gained significant experience of political operation under the Soviet system, with the associated critical knowledge of the importance of networks for governance. While Shaimiev managed a large territory with several layers of sub-regional governance and inherent tensions surrounding the rights of the Tatars, Luzhkov and Sobchak faced considerable challenges with regards to the maintaining the status of their respective cities as something apart from the rest of the country. While initial opposition to Luzhkov from the Moscow City Soviet (Mossovet) fell away within a short period, Sobchak was faced with considerable and growing opposition from a legislative branch that he was not able to dominate, and with no previous experience of managing and retaining the loyalties of the administrative cadres needed to govern the territory, his Mayoralty lasted only until 1996.

As noted in the literature review, historical parallels and institutional structures have been presented in previous studies to describe the types of regional regimes that developed in 1990s Russia. In studies of Moscow and Tatarstan, the ability of Luzhkov and Shaimiev to command absolute loyalty is a common denominator. With sub-national leaders considered to be the third most-important actors in Russian political authority, after the president and the Prime Minister and his government, a trajectory of increasing power over their territories was an important part of their role in Russia’s departure from top-down control in the 1990s. Whether seen through the prism of a return of the Boyars, Bonapartism or the implementation of South American Caciquismo, in the cases of Luzhkov and Shaimiev we see much that indicates their positions were that of rulers of states within the state.\textsuperscript{171} The case of Sobchak demonstrates that far from all regions reached this position within the new federation. While Luzhkov and Shaimiev used their authority to dominate the elites, Sobchak

\textsuperscript{171} Razuvaev (1997), pp. 27-42; Matsuzato (2001)
attempted to rule using the mandate given to him by the electorate, believing that the fact that he had received the voters’ consent to lead permitted him to lead in the manner of his own choosing (delegative democracy), even where other branches existed within the division of powers.\textsuperscript{172} In no small part due to the existence of competing groups, his attempts at domination were consistently undermined, as he entered into conflict with the city legislative/representative branch of power, attempting to bring them to his subordination. The suggestion is that his leadership was not suited to allowing Saint Petersburg to function independently of the state.

We can break down the comparison of the three regimes following the system of networks that are to be used to study the case of Rossel’ – at the nature of relations with President El’tsin, the construction of power with regards to their respective regional and republic legislative branches and districts, and the development of patronage relations.

Table 3.1. Luzhkov, Shaimiev and Sobchak background history, electoral success and areas of conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period in Office</th>
<th>Soviet-era Background</th>
<th>Electoral successes</th>
<th>Major grounds of conflict</th>
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<tr>
<td>Luzhkov</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman of Moscow City Executive Committee; Manager in Chemical industry</td>
<td>3 Mayoral elections</td>
<td>Conflict with individuals close to El'tsin, including with Chubais over privatization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shaimiev</td>
<td>First Secretary Tatar ASSR Obkom CPSU (from 1989), President of Tatarstan ASSR (from June 1991)</td>
<td>3 presidential elections</td>
<td>Conflict with centre over increased status of Tatarstan. Internal threat of ethnic tension (Tatar and pro-Russian).</td>
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<td>Sobchak</td>
<td>Academic; Lensoviet Chair from mid-1990s,</td>
<td></td>
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<td>June 1992-</td>
<td>June 1991-March</td>
<td>First Secretary Tatar</td>
<td>3 Mayoral elections</td>
<td>Conflict with individuals close to El'tsin, including with Chubais over privatization</td>
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<td>September 2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>ASSR Obkom CPSU (from</td>
<td>3 presidential elections</td>
<td>Conflict with centre over increased status of Tatarstan. Internal threat of ethnic tension (Tatar and pro-Russian).</td>
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Relations with El'tsin – the influence of vertical ties

For most regional leaders, their ties with the president in the immediate post-Soviet years were of considerable importance to their job security and how they developed their regional regimes. Under the system of appointing regional heads of administration, El'tsin had the power to remove leaders from their positions, although republic leaders were elected and, thus, not directly under the president’s influence. A commonality of all three of the leaders considered here is that all were elected to their post (albeit under considerably different circumstances), with the effect that the ties that they had with El’tsin were less reliant on maintaining the president’s confidence, although in the cases of Luzhkov and Sobchak, it is likely that had El'tsin wanted to replace either of them he could have done so.

Sobchak was elected as Mayor of Leningrad on the same day as El’tsin was elected as the first Russian president. The fact that he was elected and did not owe his position to
El'tsin’s benevolence can be seen as both positive and negative for his regime; while not relying on El'tsin for his position, he also could not cite presidential backing through being appointed to the position as the head of the city (despite the fact that they had been close allies in the run up to the elections). Coinciding with Sobchak’s election as Mayor was the referendum on renaming the city as Saint Petersburg, as Russian cities went through the phase of restoring their pre-Soviet names (including the renaming of Sverdlovsk city to Ekaterinburg, although this was not extended to renaming Sverdlovsk Oblast to move away from its Soviet past). The relationship between El'tsin and Sobchak between 1991 and 1993 was considered to be close, and Sobchak was one of a number of regional leaders enjoying a ‘confidential relationship’ with the president. Despite good relations, and an underlying degree of respect that the president held for Sobchak, by the time of the 1996 Mayoral election in Saint Petersburg, El'tsin found himself caught between investigations into Sobchak initiated by the federal power ministries, who accused the Saint Petersburg Mayor of being involved in large-scale corruption. In his memoirs, El'tsin admits that he doubted the veracity of the accusations but allowed the investigations to continue.  

With the introduction of regional elections (Moscow and Saint Petersburg constitute units of the federation and the Mayoral elections are equivalent to gubernatorial elections in these cities), El'tsin’s low stock left him unable to influence their outcome, with the result that Sobchak lost the election to a member of his own team, Vladimir Iakovlev.  

From a position of initial antagonism towards El'tsin, whose declaration of Russian independence threatened the attempts that Tatarstan had made in the later years of the Soviet Union to increase their status, Mintimir Shaimiev developed good relations with the Russian leader. Having backed the August 1991 putsch, Shaimiev could reasonably have expected himself to be removed from his position as President of the Republic of Tatarstan, to which he had also been elected on the same day as El'tsin. In  

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174 Colton (2008), p.287
the period after the putsch, issues of Tatar sovereignty presented Shaimiev with a strong hand in his relations with El'tsin, particularly with reference to El'tsin’s earlier words that regions should ‘take as much sovereignty as [they could] swallow’.\textsuperscript{175} Tatarstan’s refusal to sign the Federal Treaty in 1992 and further refusal to stage referendums important to El’tsin (both in April 1993 and the later Constitutional referendum in December 1993) were significant diplomatic weapons deployed in the negotiation of a bilateral treaty between Tatarstan and Russia in April 1994. While not advocating a violent attempt at secession similar to that occurring in Chechnya, the lack of participation in referenda and in national presidential and parliamentary elections became the primary source of Shaimiev’s strength with regards to El’tsin and the federal centre. The effective non-turnout of the vote in this republic was glaring in the final count and one which could no longer be ignored by the centre.\textsuperscript{176} Although nationalist sentiments were a potential flash-point for trouble in Tatarstan, the series of agreements that made up the bilateral treaty allocated greater rights to the republic (which was followed by other republics, including Bashkortostan and Sakha), largely taking the sting out of this threat not only in Tatarstan, but in the rest of the mid-Volga region.\textsuperscript{177} In return for increased rights, Shaimiev offered full participation (and cooperation) in the politics of the state – a critical resource for El’tsin for the reason that Shaimiev’s close control over his subordinates meant that he could all but guarantee the return of votes from the republic’s population in favour of El’tsin. A period of close cooperation followed, which only began to deteriorate as the 1990s drew to a close, when the Tatarstan president grew concerned that the gains made by him would be threatened in the post-El’tsin period. To counter this Shaimiev aligned himself with the group of regional leaders that united to form the Fatherland-All Russia (\textit{Otechestvo-Vsia Rossiia}) movement to contest the 1999 parliamentary elections.

\textsuperscript{175} Sakwa (2002), p.216
\textsuperscript{176} Matsuzato (2001), p.59
\textsuperscript{177} The titular ethnic Volga republics also stabilised themselves on the basis of bilateral treaties, and ethnic nationalism has been subdued in these republics since, with the exception of the republics of the North Caucasus, where violence and political instability has only increased the more that the centre tries to regulate the nature of its ties to the federation.
The relations between Luzhkov and El'tsin show the pendulum swinging in an opposite direction to the ties between Shaimiev and the president – from support to opposition. No regional leader throughout the 1990s was closer to the president (geographically and in terms of support up to El'tsin’s re-election in 1996). At all of the President’s critical moments (during the Putsch of August 1991, the shelling of the White House in 1993, parliamentary elections in 1995 and presidential elections in 1996), Luzhkov unconditionally supported El'tsin, and it was inevitable that the closeness of their ties would cause concern to those surrounding the president, such as the head of El'tsin’s security team, Aleksandr Korzhakov, (who attempted to convince El'tsin to open corruption investigations against the Moscow Mayor), and Anatolii Chubais, with whom Luzhkov disagreed ideologically over the conduct of privatization.178 El'tsin offered a great deal of protection to Luzhkov, including going against his close advisors, for example, overruling the advice of Chubais not to grant Moscow special privileges with regards to privatization and allowing the city to conduct its own processes that ensured that at least a 20% stake in all privatised enterprises was given to the Mayor’s office.179 The personal El'tsin-Luzhkov relationship was similar to that with Shaimiev, where support at the cost of concessions went hand in hand. It is claimed that following the ‘Davos Pact’ made in February 1996 by the leading federal oligarchs to support El'tsin’s re-election, Luzhkov’s attitude towards the president and the direction of the country began to change, with the Mayor rejecting the form of oligarch capitalism that had emerged in Russia in favour of his advocated form of ‘municipal social democracy’ that respected private property and the demands of the market while at the same time giving provision to other sectors of society in the city.180 Such a claim should be viewed sceptically as we can consider that, by this time, Luzhkov dominated the city as much as any oligarch dominated their specific sector and he operated as though he was the ruler of his own state within the state. While still supporting El'tsin as the leader of Russia, El'tsin’s increasingly erratic behaviour, dismissing a series of prime ministers,

179 Medvedev (2008), p.73
and the August 1998 financial crisis prompted Luzhkov to begin to position himself as a potential candidate for the presidency.\footnote{El’tsin is particularly critical of Luzhkov and the attempt to catapult himself to national power on the back of the August 1998 financial crisis and the collapse of successive governments. Yeltsin (2000) p.186-188} The creation of the Otechestvo-Vsia Rossiia political party to contest the 1999 parliamentary elections linked Luzhkov with other like-minded regional leaders, such as Shaimiev and Sobchak’s successor, Iakovlev, on the basis of a party of the regions that would create a new system that strengthened parliament with Luzhkov at its core, rather than the federally-central based top-down parties of power that had subserviently sustained El’tsin’s presidential rule. The creation of this political bloc, and specifically, the threat of Luzhkov becoming Prime Minister and Evgenii Primakov potentially becoming president is said to have prompted El’tsin into creating the rival Unity party that swept Putin to power in 2000.\footnote{Yeltsin (2000), pp-289-295 & 351-357. Hoffmann (2011), pp.464-470 provides an account of the threat felt by the Kremlin inner elite, of which the oligarch Boris Berezovskii was part, of the potential leadership tandem by Luzhkov and Primakov, and the highly successful smear campaign undertaken to discredit the Moscow mayor.} Even with the change in president, Luzhkov’s position in Moscow was under no threat, allowing him to safely transfer his allegiance to the new president over time, eventually resulting in the alliance of his Otechestvo movement with Unity to form the United Russia party.

**The construction of power systems**

Common to all three of these leaders is the aim of concentrating personal power in their own hands, although each of them took a different approach to regime-building. Luzhkov and Shaimiev expected total obedience from their networks through different strategies of resource distribution, whereas Sobchak found that the legislative branch did not agree with his view that a popular mandate allowed him free reign. As a result, he attempted to circumvent them by developing his own patronage networks that would give him administrative levers to exercise control.
Turning initially to the regime constructed by Luzhkov, his role as leader of the capital city placed him apart from other regional figures. Geographically closest to the President and financially stronger and with more potential than any other part of Russia, the system of power that Luzhkov built around himself was focused on the control and distribution of financial resources. By connecting his leadership to the operations of property, banking and commerce, Luzhkov promoted himself as an economic manager rather than a politician. In the day-to-day running of the city, economic reconstruction was at the centre of policy, and he constructed a strategy based on improving city finances, surrounding himself with economic advisors and having close ties to the financial industrial groups that made Moscow their headquarters. The city’s politics was totally subordinated to Luzhkov’s authority, he appointed all prefects, heads of district and public services to their posts, effectively creating a city bureaucracy that entirely depended on the Mayor for its existence. At the time of elections to the Moscow city Duma, due to the tight control he held over the allocation of resources, Luzhkov faced no opposition from any factions within the city legislature and as such, there was no conflict between the two branches.¹⁸³ Without any competition from the city Duma, nor any significant cleavages in the local districts of the city, Luzhkov was unchallenged throughout the 1990s. His strategy of maintaining the city’s stake in privatised enterprises ensured steadily increasing finance for administration of the city, although this was coupled with the perception that the city was his empire. With regards to the electorate, Luzhkov advocated ‘municipal capitalism’, supporting the market but with a high degree of social responsibility for citizens, which made him popular and resulted in his winning nearly 90% of the vote in the 1996 Mayoral elections. The only competition that Luzhkov experienced with other political actors was, therefore, vertically, by placing himself among and comparing himself with national figures.

¹⁸³ Medvedev (2004), p.56
Bearing in mind that Shaimiev had been forced to transform himself from a Communist Party official to the representative of the Tatar quest for sovereignty (or at the very least greater status), it should be noted that the Tatar president ran his region in a restrained way, having to balance the forces of Tatar and Russian nationalism, without presenting himself as an ideologue.\textsuperscript{184} Ruling the republic on the basis of tight control over cadres and the potential threat to the centre of flaring ethnic nationalism, Shaimiev also positioned himself as a manager. The political system that emerged has been labelled as similar to the Caciquismo systems that emerged in Latin America under Spanish colonialism and Sultanism, whereby all offices were instruments of Shaimiev’s power.\textsuperscript{185} The executive branches of the sub-republican areas were filled with the district bosses from the communist era, who were, in the majority, ethnic Tatars (with ethnic Russians having been more urbanised in the communist period).\textsuperscript{186} Through using local bosses, the ‘caciques’, to control local territories and distribute resources, Shaimiev was seen as answering the calls of Tatar nationalism to re-Tatarise the republic after long periods of Russification as they acted as brokers between the local community and the republic centre.\textsuperscript{187} Appointing heads of districts and municipalities, Shaimiev made it a condition that members of executive administrative organs had to be popularly elected to their respective legislative organs, or else face dismissal. This effectively packed the republican and sub-republican legislative branch with his own appointees, and tightly enforcing their loyalty by holding the threat of dismissal (with the forced subsequent resignation from the legislative branch) over them. In this way, Shaimiev avoided the potential cleavages and rivalries that could emerge out of nationalist sentiments. As long as he was seen to be increasing the prestige and rights of the region this satisfied pro-Russian nationalists also as they benefitted materially from the gains made by Tatarstan.\textsuperscript{188} Where competition did occur, Shaimiev’s networks allowed him to be in control of the flow of information coming to him and he

\textsuperscript{184} Matsuzato (2001), p.50
\textsuperscript{185} Matsuzato (2001) and Mikhailov (2010).
\textsuperscript{187} Matsuzato (2001), p.54
\textsuperscript{188} Matsuzato (2001), p.53
was able to react quickly to counter any threats; for example, in 1998 when a group of deputies began to press for greater autonomy of municipalities, Shaimiev learnt quickly about the move and was able to suppress any dissent amongst his appointees.\footnote{Matsuzato (2001), p.63. In this case, members of the Republic parliament (Shaimiev’s appointees) were discontented with his control of appointments in all areas of political life and a sizeable number of deputies rejected Shaimiev’s decision to have the Chairman of the Tatar parliament re-elected in 1998. See also Izmail Sharifzanov, (2007), ‘The Parliament of Tatarstan, 1990-2005: vain hopes, or the Russian way towards parliamentary democracy in a regional dimension’, \textit{Parliaments, Estates and Representation}, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp.239-250}

Shaimiev’s uncontested position in the republic, including three unopposed presidential election runs, demonstrated his system in its entirety. Local bosses were appointed to return an overwhelming election result in favour of Shaimiev, in which case they would get to keep their positions and the resources that followed from this. As noted above, the issue of sovereignty for Tatarstan went hand in hand with the republic’s non-participation in state referenda, denying El’tsin a large proportion of the votes of republic with a population of 4 million citizens. Shaimiev had made support from the electorate, as delivered by his local appointees, the foundation of his political system, which has been argued to have been later exported by Moscow to the regions, starting with the Sverdlovsk Oblast gubernatorial elections in which Rossel’ returned to power in 1995, to establish treaties based on votes for El’tsin being used as currency to obtain better terms in the Russian federal bargain.\footnote{Matsuzato (2001), p.72}

If Luzhkov and Shaimiev are to be regarded as managers, Sobchak should instead be viewed as a politician. With a background in academia rather than in party administration, Sobchak was on the front lines of the pro-democracy movement in Leningrad in the late 1980s. His lack of experience in political administration, combined with the fragility of the pro-democracy network, meant that the biggest challenge facing him as Mayor of Saint Petersburg was managing the competing interests of different groups through the different branches of power. His response was to seek to build his own personalised system, so that the Mayor’s office determined the policy process with the legislative branch acting in support. Unable to subordinate them to his aims,
Sobchak promoted his own executive decision-making power over the legislative process. In particular, during the privatization process, he promoted a lobbying system that directed interested parties to himself rather than conducting the privatization of enterprises and property through the legislative process. At the same time, the legislative branch did not rely on the Mayor, its deputies had its own contacts in the capital through which they could pursue their own agenda and undermine the mayor. Although the dismissal of the city Soviet in 1993 ameliorated Sobchak’s position, new elections to the City Duma failed to return an improvement by means of a majority that would back him and he continued to prefer a system that placed him in total control. As a leader, Sobchak chose a force strategy rather than cooperation to obtain results. Whereas the administrative control that Luzhkov and Shaimiev held over subordinates prevented any competition from within, the method of attempting to force subordination resulted in not just threats to Sobchak’s leadership from the legislative branch, but also a perceived decline in the conditions of the city. As a management style, top-down authority failed to work in the city, and the resulting challenge that emerged to Sobchak’s leadership in the 1996 mayoral elections came from a collaboration between members of the legislative (and executive) elite that were excluded from bargaining over the outcome of the elections.

Horizontal and vertically downward networks – the value of local patronage

The legacy of experience and the continuation of networks from the Soviet administrative system demonstrated its importance in the models of patronage displayed by each of these three leaders. In the cases of Luzhkov and Shaimiev, this gave them considerable authority to wield control over large administrative structures

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191 McAuley (1997)
and to adapt their patronage of networks as post-Soviet society developed, specifically with regards to industry and the private economic sector. For Luzhkov, patronage over business elites came via his control over the distribution of municipal property and the lack of political competition meant that the Moscow City Duma submitted to his leadership. For Shaimiev, the system of dual control over executive and legislative positions in the republic ensured loyalty to himself from the political elite, and by further filling management positions in enterprises with clan members (family and figures from his native region), particularly in the oil industry, resulted in a system of patronage that provided no alternative sources of resource distribution.\textsuperscript{193} At the other end of the scale, the competitive nature of Saint Petersburg meant that rival patrons existed, preventing any domination over the city by Sobchak. The attempt to construct individualised, personal relations with the business elites through the process of privatization left Sobchak open to accusations of corruption and to undermining from opposing actors, eventually resulting in his electoral defeat. Looking at the role of each of these as patrons requires looking at the political and economic elites as well as the role of patronage over society.

In Moscow, as in Tatarstan, patronage of the political elite was exercised through control over appointments. With the resignation of his predecessor, Popov, a stable administrative bureaucracy was created by Luzhkov that was responsive to his leadership, an area in which the former Mayor had struggled, perhaps due to his more academic and theoretical approach to the city's problems. The city had a high concentration of former members of the nomenklatura in positions of power, and Luzhkov's experience in being part of the ruling network assisted him in gaining the loyalties of these officials. With almost all posts in the executive branch appointed, officials returned to hierarchical patronage and in return enjoyed significant stability in their positions. It was Luzhkov's involved and personalistic management over economic and business aspects in the city, putting economic and business priorities at

\textsuperscript{193} Crosston (2004), p. 66-67
the forefront of the capital’s politics, that was more significant in terms of his patronage of the city uniting a powerful team of business leaders that around his Mayoralty. Through control over the distribution of the city’s resources, including conducting privatization differently to the rest of the state, where the city retained a significant stake in all privatised property and enterprises, Luzhkov controlled the flow of income into and out of the city. In certain sectors, privatization of enterprises entailed the city taking a sizeable (sometimes majority) stake. While this added financial might to the city’s budgets, the results were accusations of mafia and dictatorial powers taken by the Mayor, which it is claimed he did not object to. The value of Luzhkov to the emerging Russian oligarchs cemented his authority amongst his appointees, as he quickly became the most important regional-national political figure in the country. Embracing federal oligarchs placed Luzhkov in a unique position amongst regional and republican leaders as other heads of administration either sought to prevent the incursion of federal business entities during the 1990s, or relied on them to prop up their regimes. In Moscow, the nature of the Mayor-Oligarch relationship was more of mutual reinforcement than one of patronage; the Mayor could enable favourable terms for business and in return received much-valued support in fulfilling the needs of Moscow’s inhabitants, through improving housing, providing employment, and funding for health care and education. Furthermore, the mayor was part of the delicate balance of interests that existed in the capital, and as such, a countering force to opponents close to the president, particularly members of the government and the Presidential Administration, who were attempting to advance their own interests. While the oligarchs famously came to the rescue of El’tsin in the 1996 presidential elections, in the period immediately prior to this, some were observed to have built ties with Luzhkov as a way of protecting themselves from sinking with a declining El’tsin in the years from 1993-1995. Luzhkov’s closest ties to an oligarch were with the media magnate, Vladimir Gusinskii, which caused a cleavage between him and members of

194 Medvedev (2004), p. 52
195 Medvedev (2004), p. 57
196 Razvuzaev (1997), p.30
El’tsin’s team. Gusinskii’s MOST media group provided a healthy dose of pro-Luzhkov propaganda at the federal level, while in return Luzhkov’s patronage provided a long list of business opportunities. As the third most-important figure in the state, behind President and Prime Minister, Luzhkov could realistically enter into conflict with federal networks operating in the same location and through administrative methods squeeze enough to obtain concessions. The perceived threat to the presidential circle became such that El’tsin’s Head of Security, Korzhakov, who viewed Luzhkov as a rising threat for the 1996 presidential elections, resorted to blunt intimidation against Gusinskii in late 1994, as a way of warning the media oligarch against criticising El’tsin’s war in Chechnya through his NTV television channel, and hence turning people against the president. Public support for Luzhkov stemmed from the perception that he had restored order to the city both during and after the difficulties of perestroika and the immediate post-Soviet reforms. Patronage over society was constructed through a carefully cultivated process that substituted for a perceived dour personality. His social patronage is primarily seen in his support for the Russian Orthodox Church, at a time when El’tsin in particular was equivocal about its emerging role in society. Sponsoring the reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, and breaking the ground for its construction, Luzhkov quickly identified himself with the resurgent wave of religiosity that has been seen in Russia since the collapse of communism using it as a way of bringing himself closer to the people. Secondly, through fostering a public identity of himself as a worker first and an official second (his flat leather cap became symbolic among the population as he toured construction sites and spent his leisure time playing football and participating in social actions), he made himself identifiable with the people, tricks that El’tsin had used when he was regional Party First Secretary of Sverdlovsk Oblast and, later, head of the

197 Hoffmann (2011), p.285. Hoffmann describes in detail the mutually beneficial relationship developed between Vladimir Gusinskii and Luzhkov, whereby the former received rights to city property for free in order to reconstruct before returning half or 75 percent of it back to the city. For Luzhkov, this was an effective way of repairing the neglected housing and office stock of the city, while offering Gusinskii rich profits. (p.163)
Moscow Gorkom. Further strengthened by his espousing ‘municipal capitalism’ and social justice, Luzhkov clearly became a popular figure with whom the city’s residents could identify and feel close to.

Shaimiev’s patronage of the political elite was different to that exercised by Luzhkov, in that he devolved a high measure of control over resource distribution to his clients. The system of dual participation in the executive and legislative branches, allowed Shaimiev to maintain a constant threat over actors who would lose their entire political standing if they failed to serve the regime in Kazan appropriately.\(^{200}\)

In return, Shaimiev’s patronage was ruthless in that although he devolved a great deal of trust onto his clients, who acted in the name of their leader at the local level, in return an almost one hundred percent level of public electoral support was expected. As a result of this tough management it was difficult for actors to countenance moving against him. Valuing political coercion more than patronage over economic matters, Shaimiev ‘Tatarised’ the republic, bringing in ethnic Tatars from his own native region and reversing Soviet history that had squeezed ethnic Tatars out of the cities and into rural areas and the agricultural sector.\(^{201}\) Any participation of ethnic Russians in the presidential regime was reliant on them showing loyalty towards Shaimiev and placing Tatarstan’s interests ahead of any loyalty to Russia, to the extent that the Tatar leader dismissed actors for participating in federal organs where this competed with Tatar impressions of sovereignty.\(^{202}\) Economically, Shaimiev secured control over the natural resource sector and the leading industrial and agricultural enterprises of the territory through the installation of a clan-based system based on his own relatives to replace Soviet-era directors (who were also more likely to have been ethnic Russians).

Privatization in the republic was constructed to prevent non-residents of the republic

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\(^{200}\) Matsuzato (2001). Shaimiev’s protection came in the form of them being practically guaranteed not to lose legislative elections following appointment, on the basis that the electorate felt that if Shaimiev has appointed them, then they must be suitable for the task and deserve support. Only a small number of appointees failed to win the necessary legislature positions.

\(^{201}\) Faller (2002), p.81-82

\(^{202}\) Crosston (2004), p.59
from acquiring shares and was manipulated to result in the creation of leading economic actors coming from within the Shaimiev clan.\textsuperscript{203}

With Luzhkov’s close personal control, based on accumulating increasing financial control and stakes at one end of the scale, and Shaimiev’s patronage through delegation the other, the attempt taken by Sobchak to forcibly install himself as a patron in a situation where there was an existence of competing groups resulted in his failure to become neither an authoritative leader, a broker between competing groups, nor a democratic executive that implemented laws developed by a complementary legislative branch. Without inheriting any pre-existing client groups, or more importantly, being unable to construct a new elite with a strong allegiance to him, particularly in a politically refreshed environment such as Saint Petersburg, Sobchak faced significant problems that he was unable to overcome as he struggled to gather support around himself from the political and economic elite. The role of the Soviet nomenklatura in city life following the March 1990 city soviet elections, demonstrated the drastic change in composition of the city’s administrative staff as members of the Soviet elite began to depart from political positions quickly upon the victory of the pro-democracy group. In contrast to political changes, directors of enterprises retained their positions without needing to align themselves with the pro-democracy movements.\textsuperscript{204}

Upon election as Mayor in 1991, this presented Sobchak with a two-fold problem in that not only had the city’s administration lost experienced functionaries (albeit ideologically opposed to the new forces in the city), the continuation of the former elite in enterprises and industry made it increasingly difficult for Sobchak to become a useful patron to them, due to the fact that they had their own contacts and patrons elsewhere. Those actors carried over from the former regime had little interest in supporting any attempts of the new Mayor by fulfilling the traditional terms of the social contract that had now become the Mayor’s responsibility. Where Sobchak did make new appointments, he

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\textsuperscript{203} Crosston (2004), p.66
\textsuperscript{204} McAuley (1997), p.243
recruited from amongst his own personal contacts and networks, which constructed a relationship that was not that of traditional patronage, as past personal (as opposed to administrative) associations placed the clients outside any hierarchical structure and on a more equal footing to the Mayor.\textsuperscript{205} The creation of a political party to try to compensate for the lack of an administrative network also proved to be a failure. The Russian Movement for Democratic Reform failed to perform in the 1993 State Duma elections, despite, or perhaps in spite of, Sobchak’s role in the writing of the new Constitution. The effect was to reduce his authority in the city, which deteriorated further following the 1994 city election, which failed to result in any greater support for his Mayoralty. Without the willingness of city industry to support the Mayor, the city administration had few levers to ensure that he could overcome an obstinate legislature. Unlike the situation in Tatarstan or in Moscow, Sobchak could not coerce these sectors into assisting him, and instead attempted to force them into his patronage, and his struggles were further deepened by his autocratic tendencies and the unpredictability of his decision making. Encouraging personal representations to him from business leaders was an unstable strategy that only held in as far as each side saw immediate returns from negotiations but with short-term arrangements replacing the creation of a longer-term clientele.

\textsuperscript{205} McAuley (1997), p.243
Table 3.2 – Key elements of comparison of the Moscow, Tatar and Saint Petersburg leadership regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Luzhkov</th>
<th>Shaimiev</th>
<th>Sobchak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime description</td>
<td>Personalised and centralised power</td>
<td>Personalised, decentralised power</td>
<td>Failed personalised power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to power</td>
<td>No opposition political movements</td>
<td>No opposition political movements</td>
<td>Political challenges from legislative branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support base</td>
<td>Loyal clients</td>
<td>Loyal clients</td>
<td>Failed in attempt to build client network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical relations</td>
<td>Initially close relations with El’tsin, deteriorating after 1996 elections</td>
<td>Initially poor relations with El’tsin, improving after 1994 Bilateral Treaty</td>
<td>Good relations with El’tsin, but El’tsin unwilling to become patron to Sobchak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal relations</td>
<td>Vladimir Iakovlev, and later with Shaimiev and Rakhimov (Bashkortostan President)</td>
<td>Rakhimov and other republic presidents; later with Luzhkov</td>
<td>Initially with liberals from within Saint Petersburg and federally, but influence declining over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy employed</td>
<td>Monetaristic control in return for resources</td>
<td>Control over political elite through delegation and economic elite through kinship</td>
<td>Alliance with economic elite to counter competing political elite</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusions**

The importance of networks in the Russian regions and the part that they played in the conduct and longevity of individual regional regimes is presented here and used as a basis to relate to the manner in which Rossel’ constructed his regime in Sverdlovsk Oblast. Table 3.2 above shows the approaches taken by these three regional leaders to their regional regimes, with the more authoritative leaders clearly demonstrating the support of those beneath them. The nature of their respective relations with El’tsin is
telling; whereas Shaimiev and Luzhkov used their resources initially to force concessions from the centre, before consolidating and deepening ties with the president to counter the influence of those close to him, the case of Sobchak shows the opposite in that there was no stimulus to El'tsin to intervene favourably to alleviate Sobchak's difficulties as the Saint Petersburg Mayor showed no signs of accumulating resources that he could use to bargain with the president (and because Sobchak's political backers, the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform, opposed El'tsin). In the cases examined here, strength within the territory appears to equate to strength with regards to the state.

The existence of political competition also influenced the shape of the regimes in practice. Where personal power was rivalled or unrivalled shaped the ability of a regional leader to become a totally dominant patron to the key groups in the respective territories. Prior experience of administrative practices and management served Luzhkov and Shaimiev well in establishing their patronage positions. Control over mechanisms that kept the distribution of resources embedded in their own regimes (even where delegated to local actors) was the strategy pursued by both, and ensured close control over actors in their territories. In the case of Sobchak, the lack of a client base resulted in him attempting to break competition through forcing the development of networks, which failed to secure the boundaries to his leadership. Thus, prior administrative experience is also suggested as a valuable form of capital (political, economic and social) that allowed regional leaders to 'manage' rather than be 'political', which suited the two long-serving leaders in their presentation to all sectors of society.
Chapter 4

Building vertical networks without vertical integration: the monopoly of the El’tsin-Rossel’ relationship

The vertical system of power in Russia has been an enduring element in the history of the country and the main structure through which the centre has been able to maintain control over its vast periphery. It has allowed the regulation of networks and maintaining the monopoly over the distribution of resources from the centre to plenipotentiaries in the provinces. The rush to decentralize power in late 1991 was aimed at dismantling the vertical structures that had been the basis of the Soviet and Imperial unitary state for many centuries, albeit in an uncontrolled manner in which the centre needed to break the habits of the old regime while at the same time retaining some element of stability that would prevent citizens from freezing in their homes and going hungry.\(^{206}\) The system of presidential appointment of regional executives brought a large number of new political actors into a changing state structure, without any of the official controls that the Communist Party had previously provided.\(^{207}\) In dismantling the institutions that had been responsible for central planning and allocating goods and resources to the regions, Moscow left a void in its day-to-day dealings with its provinces, and as a result, personal contacts grew in status and became an essential part of life for regional Heads of Administration seeking to stabilise the declining conditions in their territories.

The uncertain nature of the system of presidential appointment resulted in the high turnover of appointed regional heads of administration between 1991 and 1996, yet, while the centre had issues with appointees, in the view of regional leaders, the centre was often seen to be unresponsive to the problems facing individual territories as the

\(^{206}\) Interview with Gennadii Burbulis, Moscow, September 2011

\(^{207}\) Half of the new regional appointees were former chairmen of the Oblispolkom or speakers of Regional Soviets, 20% were from lower rungs of the Soviet apparatus, and only 30% were fresh faces. Kryshtanovskaya (2004), p.120
country underwent political and economic reform. Once in the post, the primary task facing all regional leaders was to seek resources (financial and political) from elsewhere to ensure the survival of their territory as the ever deepening political, economic and social crisis gripped. Through action taken to stabilise their own territories, regional heads of administration were playing their role as clients of a larger network as this stability was their contribution to the patron. The central focus of this chapter is to look at the actions taken by Rossel’ as a client to El’tsin’s patron. By following his policy of seeking increased federal status for the Sverdlovsk Region, it is suggested that Rossel’ proceeded along a learning curve that, in time, lead to a strategy of actively using the patron-client relationship with the President to acquire additional resources. In a relationship where it became evident how fragile the position of regional Head of Administration was, we can see how the notion of a ‘special’ relationship between El’tsin and Rossel’ was cultivated in Sverdlovsk Oblast, becoming beneficial to both parties in the pursuit of power stability. It proposes that the El’tsin-Rossel’ relationship was substantively different to the President’s relationship with the majority of other regional leaders, on the basis of Rossel’ actively seeking to agree privileges or advantages on a personal level with the president. The change in approach to vertical communication that Rossel’ took from the second half of the decade onwards was a major contributing factor to the boundary control strategy through the construction of the notion, to be expressed to the political and economic elite as well as to the general public, that rival figures in the region were not capable of the kind of direct communication with the Russian president that would result in significant benefits for regions.
The Rossel’-El'tsin interpersonal network as a form of learning how to deal with Moscow

The degree of knowledge that El'tsin had of his regional leaders varied heavily from region to region, and in many cases, appointments were made upon the recommendation of those close to the president or by prominent pro-reform actors within the regions.208 As a result, the head of state often had little prior knowledge of, and certainly no personal relationship with, a number of his appointees. With the development of Russia’s regions far down the list of the centre’s priorities, regional leaders were presented with little in the way of regular formal contact with El'tsin, who passed the responsibility for everyday contact with the provinces to his government and newly created Presidential representatives (his supposed eyes and ears in the regions).209 The result was that channels of communication from region to centre were subject to influence and distortion according to the interests of bridging actors; while the president was occupied by matters of state and international relations, figures within the Presidential Administration, the circle of close advisors which later became known as the ‘family’, and various others were able to control and manage the flow of information received by the President according to their own interests. Anything that offered the possibility of attracting El'tsin’s personal attention offered a distinct advantage to sub-state actors to lobby directly for resources (for example, the most powerful republic leaders had the threat of ethnic nationalism and secession to use as a tool for getting straight to El'tsin).210 It is the mobilisation of the ‘El'tsin card’ by Rossel’ in the mid-1990s, using a more personalised approach in order to convince the centre to allocate additional resources that changed the dynamic of the patron-client

208 Interview with Gennadii Burbulis, Moscow, September 2011
209 The willingness of regions to take the initiative in relations with the centre also varied greatly. Examples of regions that were more passive are Perm Oblast and Tver Oblast (see Gel’man, Ryzhenkov and Brie (2003), pp. 215-242 and McAuley (1997), pp. 156-173. Other regions, such as those involved in the Siberian Agreement attempted to dictate a relationship with the centre on their own terms (see Hughes (1994), pp.1133-1161
210 Personal ties with the future Russian president had been equally influential in the early career of Iurii Luzhkov, the former Moscow Mayor, facilitating his appointment to the Moscow city administration in 1986 and then as successor to Gavriil Popov in 1992 without elections (see Chapter 3).
relationship between these two figures, with the result of turning around Sverdlovsk Oblast’s attempts at greater decentralization and economic independence. By becoming a closer participant in the president-regional leader network, Rossel’ consolidated his position within his home territory (Sverdlovsk Oblast), macro-region (the Urals) and emerged as one of a small number of regional figures of national repute.

The context in which we can most clearly demonstrate the relationship between El’tsin and Rossel’ is in the development of federal relations. As the reform of the political and economic system began in the early 1990s, the introduction of federal relations was fraught with early tensions. In its attempt to prevent state fragmentation along the lines of what happened in Yugoslavia, the three-tiered federal arrangement of republics, autonomous regions, regions, krais and cities of federal importance under a Federation Treaty was designed to hold Russia together until a new constitution could be ratified. From the perspective of the regions and krais, which comprised the third tier of the hierarchy, the Federation Treaty didn’t treat them as equal members of a renewed federal system for a new Russia. Even with the clause in the 1993 constitution that all republics, krais, regions, and federal cities were equal in rights, the asymmetric nature of the system remained.211 On the surface, the early 1990s demonstrates the most significant period of administrative decentralization in Russia’s history. Comparatively, the oblasts and krais had de facto gained a significant number of new responsibilities that the centre could simply no longer fulfil. Nevertheless, shortly after the Federation Treaty was agreed a number of oblasts and krais argued that they were deserving of greater rights and authority, making the argument that they were unable to stabilise the situation in their territories and develop due to the onerous burden being placed on them to support less well-managed regions through federal transfers.212 With the centre failing so vividly to come to terms with the mounting socioeconomic crisis, there was a

211 1993 Russian Constitution, Article 5 (www.constitution.ru accessed 20 July 2011)
212 These were the ‘donor’ regions. While the exact number of donors varies according to the analysis, among such regions was Moscow city, Nizhegorod Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Tyumen Oblast.
sense of opportunity in a number of regions that they could redefine the structure of the state and seek to build a new federal system with significant powers devolved to the regions and projecting upwards, reversing the unitary state that had existed previously. Of a number of regions that followed a strategy of greater independence of action on regional matters in order to resolve their declining socioeconomic position, Sverdlovsk Oblast took this route further than any other. Its attempt to unilaterally raise its status to that of republic was unsuccessful, but, it provoked Rossel’ into activating the personal capital that he had with the federal centre, making use of the value of El’tsin as a source of political capital. Taking advantage of El’tsin’s tendency to make decisions above and beyond the advice he received from those around him (and often directly in contradiction of such advice), Rossel’ successfully adjusted the source of his own capital from regional support to direct presidential intervention and laid the foundation for a powerfully active patron-client relationship that consolidated his regional and national political standing.

As discussed previously, the connection between El’tsin and Rossel’ was due to their experience of working in the construction sector of the region (the most influential lobby within the region in Soviet times that had a focus on the internal conditions of the region), learning the structure of the region, the economic potential and the boundaries in which it was possible to work under the Soviet system. In their political relationship during the Soviet period, Rossel’’s rejection of El’tsin’s patronage in return for career progression led to threats from El’tsin that he would end Rossel’’s political career.

The power relationships between centre and regions in the first decade of post-Soviet Russia were continuously under adjustment according to the conditions at the centre

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213 The jockeying for extra resources had existed throughout the Communist period. The Urals had a long history of gaining benefits from the centre, for example as it sought to remain a centre of heavy industry in the 1930s (see James Harris, (1999), The Great Urals: Regionalism and the Evolution of the Soviet System, Ithaca NY & London, Cornell University Press), and continuing into the late 1980s through the granting of permission for the region to experiment with khozraschet.

214 While the defence industry dominated the region’s economic structure, its loyalties were to the Soviet ministries in Moscow. The construction industry is seen as being the most important lobby concerned with intra-regional affairs.

215 See Chapter two, footnote 127
and, accordingly, we can identify three distinct phases of the El'tsin-Rossel’ relationship. Firstly, we can see the attempt by Rossel’ for independent political action, within his role as an appointed head of regional administration where there was no attempt to appeal to any personal connection with the President, whose patronage existed in its barest form. In this period we can see the entire cycle of development, declaration and dissolution of the Urals Republic ending in the dismissal of Rossel’ as regional leader. The second phase, arising from the failure of the first, is signified by Rossel’s expulsion from the group of regional leaders that were active at the national level and the consequential total withdrawal of access to the President. The third phase is marked by a return to the top level of regional political life and a strident return onto the national level, which was made possible through the restoration and use of El’tsin as a form of political capital. The outcome of this third phase, which included the implementation of the Sverdlovsk regional charter and gubernatorial elections, was the perception that Rossel’ was the only Sverdlovsk actor able to fight the region’s corner and a critical contribution to the monopolisation of the further notion that his rivals did not have the capital (nor the potential to grow such capital through participation in networks) to represent the needs of the regional elite. Significant importance is attached to the nature of this dyadic relationship, where Rossel’ was the instigator but not the main resource-holder and yet was still able to shape a favourable outcome for his own personal power.

**Independently seeking resources – 1991-1993**

Deterioration in socioeconomic conditions as market reforms gripped led to a rising sense of disappointment from the Sverdlovsk elite that El’tsin was not doing enough to protect the interests of his home region. Interview with Vadim Dubichev, Ekaterinburg, April 2011. Dubichev was a regional political commentator during the 1990s, and became a member of Rossel’’s press-team, eventually becoming Press-Secretary in the 2000s. Dubichev highlighted the fact that El’tsin knew the strengths of the region first-hand, was aware of the potential of the region and the resources that it had and as a result he expected the regional leadership to work within those boundaries and was ungenerous in his distribution...
resources gave extremely limited results as the weakness of the central state grew and at this time direct appeals and requests to the president were used sparingly by Rossel’. Instead of the president, tactical questions regarding the day-to-day survival of the region, such as requests for food aid from central reserves, were directed to the new Russian government. Despite the reforms aiming to break down the former command economy supply chains, the Sverdlovsk regional leadership (both Rossel’ and the elected soviet) pursued the policy of restoring former supply chains for its heavy industry and attracting new resources internationally, cross-regionally with other regional leaders and internally among local industries.217

Institutionalising the independent approach to resolving its own socioeconomic problems became the key political issue for the region. The idea for the creation of the Urals Republic was not original to Sverdlovsk Oblast, having originally been raised by the then Chair of the Mossovet, Gavriil Popov, in 1990 as part of a wider scheme for increasing the influence of the RSFSR within the context of reforms to the Soviet Council of Ministers.218 The idea was developed into the suggestion of a pan-Urals entity, promoted by the Sverdlovsk political elite to other Urals regions (with the suggested name of the ‘Trans-Ural Krai’).219 After initial support, the five other proposed constituent Oblasts of this new subnational entity distanced themselves from the project, leaving Sverdlovsk Oblast to pursue the idea on its own. The Sverdlovsk regional executive and legislative branches worked closely together and public approval ran high for upgrading the region’s status. An inner circle of figures from the regional administration and Soviet built a strategy based upon unilateral action, influenced by the political identity of the Sverdlovsk region as a stronghold of post-

217 Rossel’ became active upon his appointment as Head of Regional Administration in seeking to open the region to foreign investment, creating a Department of International and Foreign Economic Affairs of Sverdlovsk Oblast (Upravlenie po mezhdunarodnym i vneshneekonomicheskim sviaziam administratsii Sverdlovskoi Oblasti), which he had initiated as Chairman of the Oblispolkom several months earlier. ‘Reshenie Oblispolkoma 16.7.91 No.365’, Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sverdlovskoi Oblasti - GASO, Fond R-2827, Opis 1, Delo 1, List 1-2


219 Easter (1997), p.622
Soviet democratization and support for El'tsin. Upon its unilateral declaration in July 1993, its primary aims were to bring certain aspects of economic authority that it felt the federal centre was neglecting or misusing under its own direct jurisdiction, adding clarity to the Federation Treaty which had left vague many of the spheres of federal, regional and joint responsibility. Particularly, this concerned the right to retain tax revenue transfers, increased rights over the formation of the regional budget, and greater freedom to adapt market reforms outside of state regulation, including land reform, privatization and the use of natural resources extracted in the region. One further item of significance was that among the stated political aims was the transfer away from presidential appointment of the regional executive to a popularly elected ‘president’ as was the case in the republics. Both the regional executive and legislative branches appear to have expected the President’s support almost by default for a variety of reasons, including the connection between the President and the region and the fact that the president himself had called on regions to increase their powers back in 1990. In order to make clear its proposed status within the new Russia, political actors from the region made repeated denials that it was separatist in nature, with clearly outlined references in the Urals Republic’s draft constitution used to underline the region’s commitment to the Russian Federation. As El’tsin remained relatively quiet over the issue, limiting himself to wider generalisations on the development of Russian federalism, there was mounting suspicion amongst the Sverdlovsk regional political actors that the president and Rossel’ had reached a private agreement prior to the declaration of the Urals Republic. However, there is no indication that Rossel’ sought prior Presidential agreement, instead relying on presenting the fact as the next step in the natural development of Russian federalism. In the days following the declaration of the Urals Republic in July 1993, El’st in commented on the upgrading of status from Oblast to Republic made by Sverdlovsk and Vologda Oblast (who were taking a similar

220 L.S. Tarabanchik, V.V. Shirogorov and Sverdlovskii Oblastnoi Sovet Narodnykh Deputatov. Innovatsionnyi Komitet, (1993), Srednii Ural: novyi federalism i regional’nai politika. Ekaterinburg, Sverdlovskii Oblastnoi Sovet Narodnykh Deputatov. p.6
approach in unilaterally upgrading their status) in a report made to the Constitutional Commission noting the failure of the centre to build a mechanism to allow the Federation Treaty to function, while underlining the equality of all subjects of the Federation in the draft Constitution. Appealing to Sverdlovsk and other regions considering such action to raise their issues with the Constitutional Commission and wait for the constitutional process to be completed, the President mildly rebuked his home region without offering a strong condemnation of the action.222

The entry into force of the Urals Republic came immediately after El’tsin’s action against the Russian Parliament in October 1993, and when he did speak about the Urals Republic on its fourth day of existence, he stated on live television that he could perfectly well understand why some regions were taking unilateral action to increase their status in the Federation.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that subjects of the Federation are taking unilateral action to resolve [the regional question], including through increasing their status. It would be naive to only see personal ambition of local leaders and the regional elite in this tendency. In Moscow, there is a huge will [among the bureaucracy] to keep hold of power over the regions. But the time has come to finally understand that maintaining the previous system is impossible – the demands of the time require a well thought out division of functions and responsibilities. There’s no alternative to this and there cannot be an alternative.223

On the basis of El’tsin’s public statement, Rossel’ returned to the region triumphant and preparing for the ‘presidential’ elections that were, according to the Constitution of the Urals Republic, to be held by mid-December. At the above cited meeting of the Council of Ministers on 3rd November 1993, which Rossel’ had personally attended, he had not spoken with the President (although perhaps it was that El’tsin had chosen not to speak with him), and handed over documents on the Urals Republic to the Presidential

222 El’tsin’s report to the Constitutional Commission, 12 July 1993, as printed in ‘Tak o chem zhe spor?’, Uralskiy rabochyi, 14 July 1993, p.1
Administration to arrange for their publication. Yet as the draft of the new constitution neared completion, El'tsin took action that demonstrated his unwillingness to allow Rossel’s regional ambitions to interfere with or set this back further, dismissing the regional soviet and removing Rossel’ from his post. Noting the danger of the asymmetric federal structure, there was an article within the constitution concerning the equal rights for regions and republics and the opportunity for regions to negotiate additional areas of sole- or shared- powers within the federal structure, which was claimed to have been a result of the attempt to create the Urals Republic. It has further been suggested that republic leaders were so incensed by Rossel’s actions to upgrade Sverdlovsk Oblast’s status that they had threatened to prevent the Constitution from being endorsed in their territories, thus throwing Russia back into the ‘parade of sovereignties’.

The Urals Republic experience gives a clear demonstration of the uncertainty surrounding centre-regional relations, while further noting the breakdown in centre-regional elite networks. A combination of the early post-communist conditions of a chaotic system of governance, a lack of a clearly defined regional policy from the federal centre and broken communication channels disrupted and corrupted the flow of information to the centre, contributing to the failure of the Urals Republic. Under the system of presidential appointment, regional heads of administration formally met face-to-face with the president just once per year, although El'tsin had a number of structures available to him to receive information on the developments in Sverdlovsk Oblast (such as the presidential representative to the region, a number of

224 ‘Skvoz’ igol’noe ushko da k solnyshku’, Ural’skii rabochii, 6 November 1993, p.1
226 Interview with Anatolii Kirillov, Ekaterinburg, March 2011. Kirillov is the Director of the Ural’s El’tsin Centre in Ekaterinburg, and was formerly an advisor to Rossel’ in the 1990s.
227 Interview with Anatolii Kirillov, Ekaterinburg, March 2011. As noted in the comparative chapter, Tatarstan refused to participate in the constitutional referendum in December 1993, which placed the ratification of the new RF constitution at risk.
228 Interview with Vadim Dubichev, Ekaterinburg, April 2011. Dubichev was a member of Rossel’’s press team, and later served as press-secretary to Rossel’’s successor, Aleksandr Misharin.
Sverdlovchane alongside him in Moscow, and his own contacts in the region). Further, in April 1993, three months before the initial declaration of the Urals Republic, El'tsin met with all of his regional leaders to discuss the results of the recently held referendum on the future of the Russian presidential and parliamentary systems in which Sverdlovsk Oblast had added a fifth question to the four national questions, asking society whether they supported Sverdlovsk Oblast’s right to equal status with the republics. So, while El'tsin could not have been taken by surprise by the actions of the region to increase its status, there was a significant delay between the Urals Republic coming into force at the beginning of November 1993 and El'tsin taking action against Rossel'. By absenting himself from the process, El'tsin had allowed his home region the space to experiment with regional development while also sidestepping further criticism from the Russian legislature on the erosion of state structure.

Severed ties – 1993-1994

The dissolution of the regional soviet for exceeding its authority by declaring the Urals Republic and the subsequent dismissal of Rossel' was viewed within the region as a harsh (zhestkii) punishment, and equally interpreted by other regions that there were to be no ‘special relationships’ in centre-regional relations. Nonetheless, El'tsin did not entirely sever his patronage role with regards to Rossel' and did not exile him completely from the political system. The forthcoming 1993 parliamentary elections, the danger of creating an opposition movement within his home region and Rossel”s standing among his fellow regional leaders, all contributed to El'tsin allowing the

229 In his detailed account of the process leading up to the declaration of the Urals Republic, Levin claims that Rossel’ had spoken to Viktor Iliushin (El’tsin’s First Assistant), Egor Gaidar and Oleg Soskovets (Vice Prime-Minister) about the intentions of the region. Levin (1995), p. 116
230 ‘Novosti v odin abzats’, Ural’skii rabochii, 30 April 1993, p.1. The fifth question, ‘Do you agree that Sverdlovsk Oblast in its powers should be equal with Republics of the RF?’ received 83.4% of the vote in favour. (See commentary on the development and short-life span of the Urals Republic, ‘Korotkii Vek’ , Ural’skii rabochii, 12 November 1993, p.1)
231 Interview with Konstantin Kiselev, Ekaterinburg, September 2011. Kiselev is a former advisor to Rossel’’s electoral campaigns and is currently the head of the Political Science department of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Urals Branch.
232 See the interview with the Chairman of the dismissed Oblast Soviet, Anatolii Grebenkin, one of the ideologues behind the Urals Republic, ‘Udar, esheche udat!’; Ural’skii rabochii, 12th November 1993, p.1
dismissed former leader of the region to continue to play a role in regional politics. The day after his dismissal, the leaders of the regions and republics that made up the Urals Economic Association (Bol’shoi Ural), the second largest regional association in Russia, were reportedly to have sought El’tsin’s permission to appoint Rossel’ as the organisation’s ‘President’ (Rossel’ was already its Chairman). 233 Within Sverdlovsk Oblast, the appointment of Rossel’ as President of Bol’shoi Ural was portrayed as an act of solidarity and protest by his colleagues; in giving Rossel’ his title they were defying the centre in a risky act, that if misjudged could jeopardise their own positions. 234 Secondly, the Central Electoral Committee agreed to bend its own rules for elections to the Federation Council in December 1993, extending the closing date for the registration of candidates beyond the deadline in order to give Rossel’ time to register as a candidate. Until his decision to stand, three days before the closing date for registration, only one candidate, Galina Karelova, had been registered - a single candidate would have prevented Federation Council elections from proceeding leaving Sverdlovsk Oblast without representation in the newly structured upper chamber. Having allowed Rossel’ to register, the electoral committee prolonged registration further so that a ‘dummy’ third candidate could be found to stand to ensure the elections could be held, and once these necessary conditions were met, Rossel’ was essentially gifted a federal political position to compensate for his loss of regional position. 235

233 Interview with Anatolii Kirillov, Ekaterinburg, March 2011. The presidential decree dismissing Rossel’ was received in Ekaterinburg coinciding with a meeting of the leaders of the republics and regions of the Urals Economic Association. While on the one hand sending a message to other regional leaders considering unilateral action by being outwardly tough (for example Cheliabinsk was on the cusp of declaring the South Urals Republic), the president is reported to have given his consent to the leaders of Bol’shoi Ural to elect Rossel’ president of the association the very next day. While he admits that such a claim is undocumented, Kirillov, who worked for Rossel’ at this time, argued that the remaining regional leaders in Bolshoi Ural must have received permission from El’tsin for such a move or else find their own positions under threat after taking such action. (See also ‘Novoe naznachenie’, Ural’skii rabochii, 13 November 1993, p.1)


235 Anatolii Kirillov claimed that El’tsin must have influenced the process of bending the electoral rules to ensure the elections could proceed. ’65 tysyiach podpisei’, Ural’skii rabochii, 16th November 1993, p.1, and ‘Kto-to teriaet, kto-to nakhodit’, Ural’skii rabochii, 19th November 1993, p.1 discuss the Federation Council elections and noting the entry of a third candidate into the elections at the last moment. A. Sysoev, the Director of the Bogoslovskii Aluminium Factory.
The loss of regional power affected Rossel’s tone towards the president, and for a time he became more openly critical of the reform process and the shape of federal relations (whereas as recently as the events of October 1993, he had been wholehearted in his support for El’tsin).\textsuperscript{236} From his new position as a senator to the new Federation Council, Rossel’ continued to pursue the Urals Republic, and was granted an inquest to examine the legality of his dismissal (with the implication that El’tsin had acted outside of the law) and a hearing into the ideas of the Urals Republic in the State Duma.\textsuperscript{237} Criticism of the centre and the president reached a peak during the elections to the new Sverdlovsk Regional Duma in 1994, as Rossel’ hurriedly constructed a political movement, \textit{Preobrazhenie Urala} (Transformation of the Urals) to contest seats in the new regional legislature, on the basis of attacking the centre for a lack of trust towards the regions. The recent political culture of Sverdlovsk Oblast, whereby a figure perceived to have been wronged by the state was elevated to near hero status (in the way that El’tsin had been once the region’s public learnt about the proceedings of the infamous October 1987 Politburo meeting), meant that Rossel’ and his political association was able to battle regional branches of federal parties to win a majority in the new regional Duma, presenting him with a third concurrently high-ranking regional position as he was unanimously elected as Chairman of the new regional Duma. Having achieved this quick return to regional political life, securing the second most important position in the region, Rossel’ was able to use his political movement to apply pressure on the new regional head of administration and attempt to restore himself to the national-subnational capital network that was now clearly a necessity in centre-regional life.

\textsuperscript{236} As he had done as chairman of the Oblispolkom in August 1991, Rossel’ immediately published a telegram sent to El’tsin in support of action against the parliament in the regional press. ‘Volna nasiliia’, \textit{Ural’skii rabochii}, 5 October 1993, p.1
Changing course: patronage relations between the federal centre and Governor Aleksei Strakhov

To underline the importance of patron-client ties with El'tsin in this period it is useful to contrast Rossel’’s position with that of his replacement, Aleksei Strakhov, who was appointed Governor of the region in November 1993. Strakhov had been a deputy mayor of Ekaterinburg and was something of a surprise choice for appointment, proposed by El'tsin's advisor and former Sverdlovchanin, Viktor Iliushin. A former supporter of the Urals Republic who had later criticised the whole process following its overturning, Strakhov was faced with a problem of legitimacy in the eyes of the public, not only as Rossel’’s replacement and an appointee, but also in reconciling his position of ending tension with Moscow with the mood of the region. The tendency of Strakhov’s administration was unambiguously in favour of top-down central authority and he disavowed the regionalist stance of his predecessor, portraying the region-first approach as being against the interests of the region and Russia in the wider picture.

Such a position was pleasing to the centre as it promoted regional stability and subordination to Moscow against the backdrop of the October 1993 crisis, problems in the North Caucasus and the deepening socio-economic decline of the state.

As an individual, Strakhov was known to El'tsin. Under the Soviet regime he had worked for the regional division of Glavsnab, the department that organised the supply of materials to enterprises and industry, and which would have invariably brought him into contact with leading figures from the construction sector. His most important personal connection with Moscow was with the Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

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238 Levin (1995); Interview with Gennadii Korobkov, Ekaterinburg, December 2011. Korobkov was Strakhov’s Vice Head of Regional Administration from August 1994 to August 1995.

239 Within the region, a clear attempt to discredit the idea of the Urals Republic followed in the regional press by portraying the idea as an unnecessary use of time and resources by Rossel’: cost-estimates per head of population for the entire process, and analysis of the financial state of the region deteriorating due to finance being withheld by the centre as the Urals Republic crisis was resolved were publicised. See for example ‘Gosudarstvo i poriadok – biznestsy-brat’ia’, Ural’skii rabochii 1 March 1994, p.1; ‘I grustno, i zatratno’, Ural’skii rabochii, 14 April 1994, p.1; ‘Poverim lideram’, Vechernii Ekaterinburg, 1 March 1994, p.1.

240 Interview with Gennadii Korobkov. Ekaterinburg, December 2011
who was also the leader of the federal branch of the *Nash Dom Rossiia* (NDR) party. This is perhaps not so surprising considering the decline in the president's popularity and the increasing influence of Chernomyrdin. To counter Rossel’s regional political movement, Strakhov was the head of the Sverdlovsk regional branch of NDR, within the paradigm of regional Heads of Administration being expected to represent the government’s party in the upcoming State Duma electoral cycle in 1995. Involvement in NDR was useful to Strakhov as it offered him access to contacts in the centre that he otherwise didn't have, particularly in light of the fact that, as an appointee, he had no strong regional support base to speak of.\(^{241}\) Within the region, NDR was expected to assist Strakhov with administrative resources to counter Rossel’s political movement and continued regionalism, but such administrative resources were in limited supply; Chernomyrdin didn't appear at regional conferences of NDR (failing to give the boost to regional support that his presence was expected to provide among representatives of industry) and Strakhov had to rely on district administrators who were involved in the regional branch of NDR and Moscow-based financial structures and enterprises present in Sverdlovsk Oblast that supported Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister.\(^{242}\)

The lack of involvement that El’tsin took in NDR limited any reason for contact between the president and Strakhov, and it was claimed by one of Strakhov’s close colleagues that there were no meetings between the two and little in the way of contact between them.\(^{243}\) The weakness of Strakhov’s position with regards to federal patronage was demonstrated when El’tsin agreed the Regional Charter should be signed against Strakhov’s wishes, and when allowing gubernatorial elections to proceed before the national parliamentary elections, despite protest from the regional governor, members of the Presidential Administration and the federal Government, who all preferred them

\(^{241}\) The lack of public support became one of the most significant problems of Strakhov’s tenure as governor. The newspaper *Ural’skii rabochii* ran a series of monthly ratings of regional politicians from 1994 to 1996 in which the top twenty regional political figures were ranked and rated with explanations derived from regional analysts, media and public opinion on the work of regional figures. From the inception of these ratings until June 1995 Rossel remained consistently at the top of the rating, only falling behind Strakhov on the eve of the gubernatorial elections.

\(^{242}\) "V vtorom ture pobedit izbiratel’", *Vechernyi Ekaterinburg*, 17 August 1995, p.2,

\(^{243}\) Interview with Gennadii Korobkov, Ekaterinburg, December 2011
to be held after the Presidential elections. As a result, although Strakhov’s defeat in the August 1995 gubernatorial elections was largely due to his inability to counter the grass-roots support Rossel’ had constructed in the region, the lack of visible support shown by the centre, and certainly the lack of a powerful central patron undoubtedly added to his lack of success.

**Putting political capital to work -1994-1999**

The events of the Urals Republic founded the identity of Rossel’ as a ‘charismatic leader’ who fought for the interests of his region. In becoming Chairman of the Regional Duma, Rossel’ had converted the sense of injustice from the region over his removal as governor into votes not only for himself, but for his strongly regionalist movement, presenting the central leadership with something of a political headache. With his return to regional political life, Rossel’ began the transition of shifting the perception of a collision between the two into one of a return to cooperation in the interests of the region. The ‘appointed’ governor, Aleksei Strakhov, was now directly competing with his predecessor over the future development of the region with this competition initially manifesting itself around the proposed regional Charter, the founding document outlining the basic laws for the political structure of each region, permitted under the 1993 Constitution.

The Charter proposed by the Regional Duma (under the leadership of Rossel’ and very openly based on the Constitution of the Urals Republic) stated that the governorship was to be an elected position and was repeatedly rejected by Strakhov, who recognised the threat that this posed to him. To break the impasse between legislative and executive branches, Rossel’ turned to the horizontal networks that he had formed previously with other regional leaders (discussed in chapter five) and to act as a conduit and open the door to a meeting with El’tsin. Complaining to Shaimiev, the Tatarstan President, about being denied access to El’tsin by the Presidential
Administration, it was suggested that Shaimiev would broker a meeting, eventually gaining El'tsin's agreement to meet. Under the system of centre-regional relations, the head of the regional Duma was far removed from the patronage of the president; they were accountable to the regional electorate and any federal networks were on the basis of federal political parties. Clearly, the case of Rossel' was an exception, both due to a shared history with El'tsin and the importance of Sverdlovsk Oblast to El'tsin's popular support. The resulting meeting that Rossel' held with El'tsin had significant influence on the political role of the region throughout the second half of the 1990s. Primarily, it allowed Rossel' to make personal representation to be allowed back into direct contact with El'tsin. Secondly, it allowed him not only to present information surrounding the regional charter to the President without any disruption or misinformation but also to clear the air surrounding the events of Urals Republic (El'tsin was well known to bear grudges until suddenly all was forgotten). At this meeting, El'tsin stated that his sources had informed him that the Charter conflicted with the Constitution in many areas, but he allowed Rossel' to go through the proposed Charter point by point in conjunction with the Constitution, eventually conceding that it should be allowed to be signed into effect. In his public account of the meeting, Rossel' couched it heavily in the language of a ‘meeting of friends’ and ‘trusting dialogue’, claiming to have convinced El'tsin not to sign a pre-prepared decree from the Presidential Administration overruling the regional Charter and removing him as Chairman of the Regional Duma. The implication was that Rossel' had righted the wrong done to him two years earlier. Clearly, this meeting undermined Strakhov’s authority in the region and confirmed Rossel’ as an alternate source of power in the region as viewed from the centre. A shift in the political strategy taken by Rossel’. 

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244 Levin (1995), p.187. Gerald Easter writes in his 1997 article that Rossel’ stormed in on a meeting and forced El’tsin to talk to him. However, in my interviews with figures close to Rossel’ and from examination of the regional press there is no such account, and had this been the case it would surely have been reported as it fits the status of fighter that Rossel’ was keen to foster.

245 Colton (2008), p. 287


ensued, with emphatically more active participation as a client to El'tsin’s patron. Direct request of the president forced the holding of a gubernatorial election (as had been a key clause of the Charter) in summer 1995, and following Rossel”s election as governor, he subsequently negotiated and signed a series of bilateral agreements with the centre on the redistribution of powers to the region in 1996. In both of these cases El'tsin stood to gain in terms of securing favourable voting in the forthcoming presidential elections. Exporting the scenario that had been used in Tatarstan, whereby treaties formalised the increased rights of federal subjects in return for support for his presidential re-election, El'tsin significantly increased the potential for receiving the majority of Sverdlovsk Oblast’s votes through support from Rossel”s electorate. It was of critical importance that he ensured the support of his home region for the forthcoming presidential elections in 1996, and the perception of experts within Sverdlovsk Oblast was that Moscow had lost nothing in signing the Treaty. El'tsin’s personal involvement in granting gubernatorial elections and the bilateral treaty played a decisive role, overruling members of his government in allowing them to be held before the 1996 presidential elections and in setting priorities, timetables and deadlines on his government during the negotiation of the bilateral agreements. The success of this strategy not only provided the opportunity for Rossel' to return to the governor’s chair, but also changed the dynamic of this network, facilitating frequent meetings between the president and the governor, that eventually developed into pre-arranged monthly meetings offering unhindered access to El'tsin to discuss regional conditions and policies. More importantly, these meetings were initiated at El'tsin’s own request, having reproached his administration for failing to organise regular contact between

248 Matsuzato (2001), p.72
249 ‘Pirrovaia pobeda’, Ural’ ski rabochii, 7 February 1996, p.2
250 In January 1995 Vice Prime-Minister, Sergei Filatov had appealed to the regional Duma to postpone gubernatorial elections (which were already being scheduled for Spring 1995) until after the 1995 parliamentary and 1996 presidential elections. ‘O svoevremennosti vyborov’, Oblastnaia gazeta, 31 January 1995, p.1; El’tsin became personally involved in Bilateral treaty negotiations holding tri-party talks with himself, Chernomyrdin and Rossel’, pressuring the Prime Minister to resolve differences between the centre’s position and Rossel’. ‘Sverdlovskii gubernator – politik goda’, Oblastnaia gazeta, 15 December 1995, p.1; ‘Priletel soglasyat’ dogovor’, Oblastnaia gazeta, 1 December 1995, p.1
himself and the most important regions. The complaints of the early 1990s that El’tsin was not doing enough to assist his home region were now a thing of the past. While the anecdotal evidence from interviews taken in the Sverdlovsk region suggests it would be difficult to describe the two as friends, the closer communication that became practice resulted in a high level of mutual trust between the two by the time of El’tsin’s resignation, resulting in the claim that El’tsin continued to exercise his patronage over Rossel’ into the Putin regime, supporting Rossel’’s re-election in 2003 and influencing the centre not to oppose his candidacy.

Conclusions

The significance of the El’tsin-Rossel’ relationship lies in two critical aspects connecting the exercise of power in the Sverdlovsk region on power networks. Firstly, it demonstrates that despite the wish of the centre for the regions to survive by themselves, it quickly became clear that the centre itself was not prepared to sever patronage ties entirely. The case of the Urals Republic underlines the fact that without direct permission from the most powerful decision-maker in the land, policy initiatives from below that threatened the fragile balance of emerging federal relations were not allowed to proceed, thus, it was only through the restoration of full patron-client relations between the president and the former regional governor, in this case, that any further devolution of powers to the post of regional governor could proceed. This leads us to the second aspect highlighted by this chapter, seen in the introduction of the idea to the elites and the general population of the region that only Rossel’ was capable of creating such links with El’tsin that would ensure greater rights to the region. The perception was constructed that El’tsin and Rossel’ could personally agree on terms, whereas other actors (demonstrated in the case of Strakhov) enjoyed neither a direct

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251 ‘Prezident vzjal na kontrol’, Oblastnaia gazeta, 2 October 1997, p.1. The Presidential Administration arranged the schedule of the President, and agreed with Rossel’ on a monthly basis when the two would meet in Moscow.

252 This was mentioned by both Anatolii Kirillov and Vadim Dubichev in interviews. Both commented on El’tsin’s argument to the centre to ‘let Rossel’ keep working’.
route to communicate with the president nor the shared history and confidence of the president to persuade him to allow Sverdlovsk Oblast any requested concessions. This perception of El’tsin’s patronage was a key element of the boundary control strategy employed by Rossel’ to prevent competitor encroachment into his own political territory and prevent the outflow of support from the critical elites that provided dependable electoral and regime support.

Through activating the most important line of political capital available to him, Rossel’ gained something that was not available to other actors. The contrast in relations between Rossel’ and Strakhov demonstrates that even under the conditions of presidential appointment, implying support from the top of the power pyramid, the ability to reach personal agreement appears to have been more significant than the development of institutional factors regulating the centre-regional power relationship. Through close ties to the president, Rossel was able to shape outcomes that returned him to regional executive power and a stronger position than before. The achievement of the regional charter, gubernatorial elections, and the bilateral treaty all created the perception of a ‘special relationship’ and established the popular perception that El’tsin trusted Rossel’ to experiment with regional structures (ignoring the very real interest he had in preserving his own position through granting concessions to regions in exchange for support).
Chapter 5

Diversifying national-subnational linkages: Rossel’s approach to competing networks and constructing cross-regional relations

The previous chapter acknowledges the ties between Rossel’ and El’tsin, noting specifically the changing relationship that occurred once the informal aspects of political capital were mobilised by the Sverdlovsk leader. In the new Russia, the breakdown of vertical relations left power structures subject to a high degree of interference from rival groups, particularly from those present in the Moscow bureaucracy and those in circles close to the president. Rivalries over the pursuit of political capital were a feature of early Russian politics as actors attempted to consolidate and further their reach and influence. The competing networks that Rossel’ faced at the national (federal) level, primarily made up of government actors, were also involved in centre-regional relations and attempted to impose their influence over regional leaders.

This chapter examines how the Sverdlovsk governor worked within this changing system of power relations across numerous network domains developing the boundary control strategy that ensured that the region’s vertical relations with the centre were reliant on his participation and that the federal-Sverdlovsk connection could not bypass him. It considers the potential obstructing role played by existing networks at the federal centre and the resulting attempts to construct new networks aimed at building links outside of his home region and expanding his political reach into the wider Russian political system. Finally, it looks at Rossel’’s construction of new national and international networks based on personal interaction that placed his voice on factors affecting regional, macro-regional and federal development to build and enhance his reputation as a regional actor of national significance.
Network competition

With drastic political change, the new political elite and the networks that they established amongst themselves became more fluid, constantly adapting and adjusting as they struggled to replace the institutionalised structure of vertical relations that the Communist Party had instilled. This emerging flexibility is seen in the speed at which networks formed and the frequency that participants joined and exited networks.\(^\text{253}\) The new system of values brought an almost relentless struggle for political and economic resources that all branches of the elite entered into, competing against one another to ensure that resources flowed to their own networks rather than to rivals. The position of actors in networks, including movement within and across networks, involved countering rival forces from all sides as actors competed throughout the El'tsin decade to protect and improve their personal position in the political and/or economic space in which they functioned.

It has been suggested that there are two distinct elements in political power relations, influence (which we can summarise as the control over the flow of information), and domination (control over the behaviour of subjects of the network).\(^\text{254}\) With the collapse of the hierarchical network discipline that the Communist Party had projected downwards previously, those previously in positions at the top of such structures (and particularly those networks that had carried over from communist to post-communist Russia) found themselves losing their control over ideas (influence), the ability to impose implementation of these ideas and the loyalty of members lower down the network chain (domination). One group particularly affected by this was the Moscow ministerial elite in its dealings with heads of regional administration up to the introduction of competitive gubernatorial elections in the mid-1990s. While the central bureaucracy continued to expect the unconditional obedience of the periphery to Moscow’s command, relying on the ‘prestige’ of its central status, conflicting signals

\(^{253}\) Kryshtanovskaya (2004)
\(^{254}\) Knoke (1990), p.11
were being transmitted to the regions with regards to the development of the post-communist state as republics and regions began to act in their own interests and resist the previous domination of the centre, receiving information from other sources, and withholding it from their previous patrons. The titular ethnic republics were at the forefront of such change, and with confident regional leaders unwilling to be left behind, the result was the breakdown of the centre-regional vertical structure, and the beginnings of a total overhaul of such relations.

Simultaneous membership of multiple networks broadened the scope of actors' interests. With the removal of the unifying ideology that had bound the elite (in the formal sense), networks became more influenced by personal interests, frequently based on interpersonal relations and emerging economic interests, and less so on an overriding value structure or set of politically motivated rules. The temporary nature of the constant push and pull of inter-elite relations, who could provide what resource, what was required in return, and how actors could be used to achieve certain ends, gave rise to suspicion and a loss of trust between all branches of the elite. This increased rather than diminished the necessity for multiple networks as interpersonal disputes and preferences were aired in the open, freed from the secretive nature of the nomenklatura network that had existed in Soviet times leaving actors requiring support for their actions among their fellow members of the elite. The increased competition within these structures entailed a far more complex series of relationships, which required careful management in order to progress up the power chain. The constant push and pull of networks gave ample opportunity for actors to move up (or down) the hierarchical scale and with frequent exchanges in roles as former clients became patrons and former patrons found themselves cast aside as new networks formed to pursue the same (or alternative) resources. Many factors influenced the development of networks, and the benefit of proximity to decision makers meant that the level at

255 Vladimir Gel’man has likened regional elite relations to a game of chess with no rules in which players can simply pick up the board and strike their opponents with it. See Gel’man, Ryzhenkov and Brie (2003), p.12
which a network sought to participate in politics was frequently limited to the scope of their geographical reach. At the level of regional leaders, for example, those heading industrially weaker regions frequently looked to leaders of industrial regions that were more influential federally, latching on to their stronger counterparts’ ability to lobby for extra resources from the state (aside from geography, the hierarchy of regional cooperation was often based on the legacy of the interconnected nature of the Soviet planned economy as one factory in one region would manufacture parts required by another factory in another region to build final products). Despite their proliferation, the aim of networks continued to be monopolising links to resources and preventing competitors from accessing these. The chapter now focuses on three areas of networks that Rossel’ attempted to place himself at the centre of and looks at the impact they had on furthering his political aura as the only figure from Sverdlovsk Oblast capable of bringing extra resources to this territory.

The Presidential Administration – rivalry for influence and domination

The manner in which Rossel’ operated within the system of federal power relations furthered the reach of his networks is of interest, and this section looks at the key areas of struggle against rivals and the methods used to enter into existing networks or construct new ones. As the ability of the central bureaucracy to influence the direction of decision making under perestroika deteriorated swiftly, under El’tsin, it resulted in open competition amongst actors occupying the same space.256 In the previous chapter it was noted that El’tsin was prone to taking decisions that caught those around him off guard, although the close circle of advisers surrounding the president and the bureaucratic Presidential Administration still managed to retain some degree of influence. These supporting actors promoted their own views and interests in the development of the new political system, and under the appointment system and

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beyond, playing the role of bridging structures (and in some cases, gate keepers) between the president and the wider elite.\footnote{El’tsin describes how both Iliushin and Filatov organised the close system of control that surrounded the president in his memoirs. See Yeltsin (2000), p.215. Another example of a bridge to the inner circle is Valentin Yumashev, who acted as the broker between El’tsin and Berezovskii over the publication of El’tsin’s second volume of memoirs. This propelled the oligarch into the President’s inner circle. Hoffmann (2011), p.280} Taking the example of two specific actors, Viktor Iliushin, the head of El’tsin’s Secretariat from 1992 to 1996, and Sergei Filatov, Head of the Presidential Administration from January 1993 until January 1996, who were both close to the president and held a stake in the system of vertical-downward relations from centre to region, we can examine their attempts to control the vertical nature of sub-presidential relations between Rossel’ and the centre. In these terms, Iliushin’s and Filatov’s ability to work behind the scenes, within and across networks amongst the Moscow bureaucracy was at its peak during the period when Rossel’ did not activate the capital of his own personal relationship with the President as seen in the previous chapter. The actions of these two figures demonstrate the conflicting interests held by different networks and the ‘interfering’ role that could be played by rivals to influence patron-client relations, which created uncertainty in the outcome of representations to actors in different networks. Further, on the basis of whoever controlled access to the president could present themselves as controlling the flow of information to president, Iliushin and Filatov found themselves to be rivalling each other.\footnote{This rivalry is described in Colton 2008, p.341. In El’tsin’s ‘Midnight Diaries’, the Russian president strongly criticised Filatov as a disappointing figure, whose academic approach to political power ‘had almost no relationship to real life’. Yeltsin (2000), p.215.} One of the important differences between the two was the depth and scope of the formal and informal networks that they were involved in and the interests that they represented. Iliushin was an outsider whose political capital was inextricably tied to El’tsin (to whom he owed his position in the capital city as a member of the former Sverdlovsk elite that El’tsin had brought to Moscow in the mid-1980s), while Filatov was a Muscovite who had been elected to the first Russian Congress of People’s Deputies from the Democratic Russia bloc and had been the Secretary of the RFSFR.
Supreme Soviet throughout 1991. The difference in their formal roles influenced the relationship that they could develop with regional actors, and in the case of Rossel’, any impact they had on centre-regional relations between the Kremlin and Sverdlovsk was nullified once the Sverdlovsk leader activated the patron-client relationship with the president as outlined in the previous chapter.

The role of bridging actors in attempts to communicate with actors outside of a particular network enhances the risk of distortion and manipulation of any message being delivered, therefore, the ‘bridge’ takes on additional importance. At the informal level, as one of El’tsin’s close inner circle, Iliushin was able to act as a conduit to transmit information without the formal implications of a presidential meeting. Trust in Iliushin’s ability to deliver any message in its intended form was underscored by Rossel’’s familiarity with him from their crossing in Nizhnii Tagil Party structures during the 1970s, and also took into account that Iliushin had almost constant access to El’tsin and could choose the correct time to deliver such information. In the case of transmitting Sverdovsk Oblast’s intentions to develop the Urals Republic, Iliushin, whose role was to manage the president’s diary, acted as a counterbalance to the Presidential Administration, based on the likelihood of information reaching the president without being distorted or corrupted, particularly as he had little to gain in not transmitting the information to the president. In contrast, the Presidential Administration was a formal network that replaced the Communist Party Secretariat, and was responsible for working with the regional administrations, with Filatov as its head. The Presidential Administration had been tasked with organising the flow of information to El’tsin, and ensuring the implementation of presidential decrees throughout the country, with a particular remit to play a supervisory role over the presidential representatives to

259 Colton (2008), pp. 223-225 & p. 337 makes note of the recurring role links to Sverdlovsk played in a number of El’tsin’s initial appointments in late 1991, including that of Egor Gaidar, who was connected to the Urals through one of his grandfathers, Pavel Bazhov, a writer of Urals fairy tales.

260 Iliushin was from Nizhnii Tagil and had been the city First Secretary in the 1970s when Rossel’ was rising through the ranks at Tagilstroi. In interviews with Anatolii Kirillov and Konstantin Kiselev in 2011, the importance of Iliushin in influencing decisions favourable to the region was dismissed, although they noted that he was a convenient figure through which Rossel’ could pass information to El’tsin.
the regions that had been appointed by El’tsin to monitor regional leaders. Early relations between regions and the Presidential Administration saw both sides trying to gain the upper hand, although it has been stated that El’tsin and his Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, were generally supportive of regional leaders’ attempts to resolve local problems themselves. As head of the Presidential Administration, Filatov took an aggressive stance against Rossel’s attempts to unilaterally reorganise the state structure, and it was the Presidential Administration that acted to terminate the Urals Republic project.

The delicate nature of Rossel’s vertically-upward relations was displayed in the reaction of Filatov and Iliushin to the Urals Republic. Accounts from the time indicate that, as Rossel’ met with both to speak about the region’s plans to increase its federal status, Iliushin took this information to El’tsin (without significant public comment), while Filatov openly rejected the Urals Republic project along with the Vice Prime-Minister Sergei Shakhrai, who went further to speculate in the national media, that Rossel’ had overstepped his authority and would be dismissed by the president. It can be suggested that previous ties and the lack of personal gain meant that Iliushin was likely to have transmitted the information to its intended audience, while Filatov, on the other hand, held a greater interest in the institutionalisation of the Presidential Administration, including in its perceived authority over regional leaders; with support from republic and other regional leaders worried by Rossel”s attempts to increase his own power, by dismissing the idea and keeping it off the agenda with the president he could be viewed...
by these leaders as asserting his authority with regards to the development of federal relations. Upon his eventual dismissal, while El'tsin allowed Rossel' to continue to play a role in the region, the central elite was wary of allowing him to return to political activity should he become a focal point for regional lobbying and have undue influence on the formation of regional institutions. The influence of figures from Sverdlovsk (Sverdlovchane) upon the president was a sore point for the Presidential Administration, and Rossel’ s removal was viewed positively in the centre as further diminishing the influence of this group, leaving only Viktor Iliushin remaining out of a group that had counted Gennadii Burlulis, Iurii Petrov, Oleg Lobov and now Rossel’ among its numbers. With the Urals seen as a powerful lobby and influencer over the President, the national press painted Rossel' as a modern day Nikita Demidov, ruling the Urals region as he pleased. Nevertheless, following Rossel' s dismissal, it was Iliushin, rather than Filatov, who was trusted with the role of identifying a new governor for the region, based on his knowledge of Sverdlovsk Oblast and recent events there. In fulfilling his role as gatekeeper to access to the president, Iliushin protected his own nomination for the role by blocking attempts by the dismissed governor to obtain an audience with the president, forcing Rossel’ to eventually resort to his inter-

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265 In an interview in Moscow in September 2012, Gennadii Burlulis noted that Rossel’ was one of the most well-prepared of the regional leaders, who never asked for anything without being able to make a very strong case. Burlulis highlighted Rossel’ s specific ability to convince those around him of his side of the argument, and indicated that this was used in his relations with federal figures also, explaining the reason why actors would attempt to keep him away from the President whose impulsive nature meant that he could be swayed by arguments.

266 An association was formed (the Association for the development of the Urals) amongst members of the political, economic, and cultural elite that had moved from the Urals to Moscow and its aim was to lobby for Urals interests in all spheres of life, led by another former Sverdlovsk First Party Secretary, Iakov Riabov. ‘Uralets – on i v Moskve uralets’, Ural’skii rabochii, 15 September 1993, p.2.

267 ‘Kto sumeet perelomit’ Ural’ skii khebet’, Komsomol’skaia pravda, 19 January 1994. Demidov was an industrialist who founded a number of factories in the Urals, specialising in artillery, in the 18th century. His monopoly over industry in the region was challenged by a new industrialist, Vasilii Tatishchev, who won the support of Peter the Great to break Demidov’s stranglehold over the region and allow the further development of the Russian Empire in the Urals, founding the city of Ekaterinburg. The symbolism in this article is that Rossel’ had built a monopoly of power over resources in the region, and his replacement by Strakhov was in the same vein, replacing one clan with another to stimulate development.

268 Iliushin himself was later dismissed by El’tsin following a scandal in June 1996 during the presidential campaign involving a recorded conversation between himself and Anatolii Chubais. “Prezidenta prosiat otstranit’ Chubaisa i Iliushina”, Nezavisimaiia gazeta, 23 November 1996, (electronic version accessed at http://www.uni-potsdam.de/u/slavistik/zarchiv/1196wk/k221-12.htm - 12th October 2012)
regional ties (with Shaimiev) to bypass the President’s secretary and gain an audience with El’tsin (see previous chapter).

Prior to this episode it was already becoming clearer that as central institutional controls over the regions were eroded and regions were encouraged to choose their own paths, the only way central actors could retain any semblance of authority over regional leaders was by exerting informal pressure on them, resulting in a clear distinction between those regional leaders that could stimulate action from the ground up and those that were forced to rely on benefits from central policies trickling downwards. From a wider perspective, even such an institutional ‘razborka’ (brawl) as the one that had taken place between the centre and Sverdlovsk Oblast over the Urals Republic could be put behind the actors involved as soon as the next set of resources and interests appeared for distribution, even where these concerned the same or similar actors. Filatov perceived Rossel’ to be challenging for power in the same political space as occupied by the Presidential Administration (and by inference for the same resources). The unwritten understanding of centre-regional relations under the appointment system was that regional appointees were supposed to be given as much room for manoeuvre to operate within their territories free of interference from Moscow. Yet, once Rossel’ had been given the green light to return to political activity by El’tsin (as suggested in the previous chapter), Filatov, and the Presidential Administration, ended their action against him in the knowledge that El’tsin’s permission counted for more than any action they could take against the former Sverdlovsk leader, and furthermore, avoiding the risk of generating a figure excluded from the process around whom new opposition forces could gather (particularly in light of the dissolution of the Russian parliament and the shelling of the White House in October 1993).

269 Interview with Gennadii Burbulis, Moscow, September 2011. Gennadi Burbulis stated that while the selection of all regional leaders under the appointment system went through El’tsin, he did not, and could not, select them all by hand, thus a number of different groups with different interests were involved in the selection, particularly in late 1991 following the GKChP. Burbulis attributes the disappointment of the leadership with regional executives and the high rotation initially of regional executives to this fact.
270 Interview with Gennadii Burbulis, Moscow, September 2011
The forum that was created to allow regional leaders to formally interact with the centre was the Federation Council. It had been designed to soothe the regions’ sense of inequality in the new political system and to represent their interests, but the nature of the selection of its speaker demonstrated the unwillingness to truly allow regional leaders to encroach on central political territory. Having easily won a seat to the Federation Council in December 1993 as one of two Senators from Sverdlovsk Oblast, Rossel’ emerged as a potential candidate for the Speaker’s position. His nomination originated from outside of the central elite, and with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin overseeing the process of allocating roles, was viewed as a threat to the plans for control of the institution that had been made in Moscow. The speaker’s role had been earmarked for Vladimir Shumeiko, the former first deputy Prime Minister, as compensation for losing his position in a government reshuffle in 1994 (keeping the leading position of the body in the hands of Moscow rather than allowing a regional figure to be in charge of it). However, when it came to the selection of the speaker by the senators themselves, Rossel’ was one of four nominations to contest for the post, and was viewed as a serious contender.\footnote{Alongside Shumeiko and Rossel’, the other two candidates were P. Romanov (a general director of a large defence enterprise in Krasnoiarsk Krai), A. Titkin (former Russian minister of industry).} It took four rounds of voting, but more tellingly the use of administrative resources such as Rossel’’s German ethnicity, allowing senators to vote by telegram and direct pressure on 30 dissenting governors (in the form of a breakfast meeting with Chernomyrdin to convince them to make the ‘correct’ choice), to get Shumeiko confirmed in the post.\footnote{‘Nachalo posle zakata’, Vechernii Ekaterinburg, 28 January 1994, p.2} In an act of appeasement towards those opposing Shumeiko, Rossel’ was offered the position of deputy speaker, although he turned this down, publicly stating his deep disagreement with the speaker.\footnote{‘Nachalo posle zakata’, Vechernii Ekaterinburg, 28 January 1994, p.2} It can further be suggested that accepting the role of Deputy Speaker would have been detrimental to Rossel’’s position at home, as acceptance would remove him from Sverdlovsk Oblast and risk his political base over time by absenting himself from the daily political life of the region, although even being linked with the position

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\end{itemize}
enhanced his status within his region and cross-regionally as having influence at the national level.

**Building new networks to influence the centre – Rossel’’s as leader of the greater Urals region**

Concurrent to the development of vertical relations, one of the features of Rossel’’s political power, was his ability to construct new networks cross-regionally within the conditions of their breakdown under the transition from a planned to market economy. If we can summarise the above-noted vertical relations as a failure by Rossel’ to control the terms of centre-regional relations, the development of horizontal structures became one of the bedrocks of his self-promotion as the single actor capable of successful negotiation with the centre, not just in the eyes of Sverdlovsk Oblast, but extending into other parts of the Urals.

The lack of popular legitimacy that regional executives enjoyed under the system of appointment in 1991 left them with considerable shortfall when seeking to consolidate their positions, and with popular elections off the table until the president allowed them to proceed, alternative sources of legitimacy had to be actively sought or created in order to popularly establish leaders’ political credentials. A valuable part of artificially creating such legitimacy entailed constructing new networks that were grounded in terms of halting economic decline and restarting the regional (Urals) economy. The most immediate and visible network in which we can see the central role of Rossel’’s participation and accumulation of political and economic capital was the *Bol’shoi Ural* inter-regional association, This horizontal forum of regional executives and republic presidents quickly developed into a convenient and regular forum, and one which became more than an empty discussion shop, making progress in attempts to resolve the supply and production problems facing the Urals region as a whole. From the remnants of the Soviet economic system, Rossel’, among others elsewhere in the
country, had quickly realised that in post-command economy Russia regional political power was highly dependent on the state of any regional economic recovery. To this end, Bol’shoi Ural offered up the opportunity for frequent and top-level inter-regional dialogue on the economy, although political matters were also discussed. In addition, and due to the nature of Sverdlovsk Oblast it provided an excellent opportunity to reiterate Sverdlovsk’s traditional hegemony in the Urals, with Rossel’ at the head of the table as the group’s spokesman. As chairman of the association (elected to the role by his peers following his dismissal as governor in late 1993), Rossel’ provided the charismatic leadership needed to promote inter-regional horizontal cooperation that could offer workable solutions to economic problems experienced across the Urals. Through coordinating their positions with each other the regions and republics of the Urals were argued to be stronger as a bloc rather than as individual subjects of the federation, and under Rossel’’s leadership, which placed industrial renewal at its heart, the inter-regional association in the Urals became something of a business alliance of its members.274 His value to other regional leaders in the forum was seen in the potential benefit to their own lobbying activities his federal political capital brought (primarily through his access to the president and also in his ability not to be cowed by conflict with central actors).275 Taken as a whole, the leverage that came from representing not only the president’s home region, but the macro-region that was the industrial and natural resource heartland of the new Russia, lent Rossel’ additional impact when bargaining with the centre. His role with Bol’shoi Ural assisted the shift in his political image from being a troublesome regional leader to a critical actor at the national level and cemented his popularity among other regional leaders, who now gravitated towards him as a strong advocate of regional political power at a time where they only received the attentions of Moscow if electoral support was required. It has later been noted by Urals actors that the seriousness and high level of economic policy proposals and debate at sessions of the association, combined with the state

275 Interview with Anatolii Kirillov, Ekaterinburg, March 2011.
significance of the Urals region in terms of industrial production and the military industrial complex, meant that neither Chernomyrdin, Stepashin nor Putin in their respective periods as Prime Minister could ignore the significance of the association, with each of these Prime Ministers attending selected sessions. Speaking authoritatively to the rest of the country on behalf of the leaders of the wider Urals, Rossel' repeatedly raised issues facing the ‘backbone’ (khrebet) of the country, widening his political community and confirming him as the emissary of the entire Urals to Moscow.

While further discussed in chapter eight, it is without doubt that the perceived centrifugal tendencies of strong regions within the federal structure was behind the May 2000 federal reforms undertaken by President Putin as his first major policy move following his election. In a significant statement of intent by the Kremlin to reduce the influence of Rossel’ in the Urals, the new Federal District was made up of only 6 regions, Sverdlovsk, Cheliabinsk, Kurgan and Tiumen Oblasts, and the Khanty-Mansi and Iamalo-Nenets Autonomous Regions. As a way of fracturing Rossel”s position in the Urals, Permskii Krai and Bashkortostan were deliberately placed in the Volga Federal District with a specific intent to remove their spheres of interest from those of Sverdlovsk Oblast, reducing the possibility for a collusion of positions between three such strategically significant regions. Formally bringing Tiumen’ Oblast and its constituent autonomous regions into the official Urals space provided a strong counterweight to Rossel’, as the loyalties of these oil-rich regions, traditionally

277 Interview with Anatolii Kirillov, Ekaterinburg, March 2011; Vozdvizenskii (2010), p.12. The main comparable inter-regional association was the Siberian Agreement, see Hughes (1994). However, in contrast to Bolshoi Ural, no single leader emerged as prominently within the group as Rossel’ did within the Urals Association.
considered to be part Western Siberia, were closer to the Kremlin than they were to any idea of a Urals' identity.  

\textit{Nemets v regione} – international ties as a source of external legitimacy\textsuperscript{280}

The speed at which the Russian regions opened up to foreigners, including opening up formerly closed cities, was related to the attitudes of the ruling political elite in their desperate search for foreign investment in the final months of the Soviet Union. As the potential for foreign economic relations on a sub-national level began to develop, it was the republic leaders, and chief among them Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Yakutia (Sakha), that made the first clear demands to be allowed to develop their own foreign economic policies.\textsuperscript{281} Following their lead, at the oblast level, the opportunities for developing foreign economic relations without the centre was not lost on leaders. In Sverdlovsk Oblast, this process had been slowly initiated following Russian ‘independence’ within the Soviet system, with Rossel’ actively laying the foundations for the organization of such relations, creating a Committee for International and Foreign Economic Ties (\textit{Upravlenie po mezhdunarodnym i vneshenekonomicheskim sviaziam administratsii Sverdlovskoi Oblasti}) in July 1991, under the control of the Oblispolkom (which can be taken to mean as being under his own control).\textsuperscript{282} Its aims were ‘to make plans for the development of the international business sphere’, and ‘to open representations of foreign enterprises and firms in the region’.\textsuperscript{283} Almost immediately following the collapse of Party rule, Rossel' and a number of other members of his regional administration were included in presidential delegations abroad to seek new investment and business opportunities. The most productive of

\textsuperscript{279} The role of Tiumen’ as a region that is very loyal to the Kremlin can be seen in the career progression of its previous leaders, including Sergei Sobianin, the former regional governor who is now Moscow Mayor.
\textsuperscript{280} Taken from the title of Alexandr Rar’s (2000) book on Putin, ‘\textit{Nemets v Kremle}’, Moscow, Olma Press
\textsuperscript{281} McAuley (1997), pp.42-108
\textsuperscript{282} ‘Reshenie Oblispolkoma 16.7.1991 No. 365’, GASO, F. R-2827, O. 1 D. 1 L. 4. This department has survived and developed under various forms to the present, where it now has the status of a regional Ministry.
\textsuperscript{283} ‘Reshenie Oblispolkoma 16.7.1991 No. 365’, GASO, F. R-2827, O.1 D.1 L.1-2
Sverdlovsk Oblast’s early attempts to build foreign relations were with the German region of Baden-Württemburg, which developed into a long-term programme for regional economic development. Close relations with Germany, (one of the key investors in post-Soviet Russia), can be linked to Rossel’s German ethnicity. In the past, Rossel’s ethnicity had prevented him from pursuing a career in the military and had seen him subjected to discrimination in Soviet times. With the need for the new Russia to attract foreign investment, having an ethnic German leader of a key industrial region was seen as offering both opportunity for the region and a symbol to demonstrate El’tsin’s hopes for the rest of the world to come to Russia’s aid and support the democratisation process by opening up parts of the state that had formerly been closed to the world. With Rossel by his side on trade delegations, El’tsin was able to show that the new Russian government was working hard to resolve the ‘German question’, allowing the German government to make investment in the new Russia. In addition to these links, international trade agreements were reached with a number of regional administrations from other Western countries, including those of the former COMECON area and Western Europe.

284 Viktor Kress, Governor of the Siberian Tomsk Oblast was also an ethnic German. Kress was another of the long-serving governors, appointed by El’tsin in 1991 from his role as Speaker of the Tomsk Oblast soviet and served as Governor uninterrupted until 2012.

285 Sverdlovsk Oblast is not a region with a large German ethnic minority, although such a minority group is present. The diaspora is far smaller than many of the Volga regions, such as Saratov and Volgograd, where strong anti-German rhetoric was a source of embarrassment for the Russians when seeking German financial assistance, but also a fact of everyday life considering the history between the two countries.

286 Trade agreements were signed between Sverdlovsk Oblast and regions such as Wisconsin (USA), Edinburgh, Friuli-Venezia in Italy, Brno in the Czech Republic, and on a national level with states such as Hungary. ‘Spisok tovarov predlagaemykh dla postavki iz Vengerskoi Respubliki na osnove zaprosov Sverdloskoi Oblasti v 1993 g., 20.1.93’, GASO, F. R-2827, O.1 D.4. L.25-27; ‘Protokol o namereniakh po rashsireniyu torgovo-ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva mezhdru Vengerskoi Respubliki i Sverdlovskoi Oblasti, Rossiiskoi Federatsii 28.9.92’, Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sverdlovskoi Oblasti (GASO), F. R-2827 O.1 D.5 L.43; ‘Protokol o namereniakh po rashsireniyu torgovo-ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva mezhdru Vengerskoi Respubliki i Sverdlovskoi Oblasti, Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 2.11.92, Budapesht, Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sverdlovskoi Oblasti (GASO), F. R-2827 O.1 D.5 L.43; (untitled report on machine-building fair in Brno, Czech Republic) GASO, O.1 D.11, L.146-149; ‘Soglashenie mezhdru pravitel’stvom Sverdlovskoi Oblasti i Edinburgskim Gorodskim Sovetom, 19.3.97’, GASO, O.1 D.7 L.69; ‘Soglashenie mezhdru pravitel’stvom Sverdlovskoi Oblasti i pravitel’stvom shtata Viskonsin SSHA o torgovo-ekonomicheskom sotrudnichestve, 1998’, GASO, O.1 D.7 L.96-97. Ekaterinburg was scheduled to be the host for a trilateral meeting ‘bez galstuka’ (without neckties) between El’tsin, Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac in 1998. At this meeting Rossel’ had planned for El’tsin to sign a number of decrees giving extra state support to the industry of the region, deepening ties with France (which had already invested heavily in the reconstruction of Ekaterinburg’s Koltsovo international airport), and continuing the close links with Germany. The meeting was cancelled and moved to Moscow at the last minute.
Towards the middle of the decade the USA began to feature heavily in the foreign commercial flow of investment and trade as the region sought to deepen its foreign connections.\textsuperscript{287} The regional potential that Rossel' demonstrated in the early years of the new Russia in the sphere of foreign relations brought one of the most significant (both politically and economically) actions in regional development to Ekaterinburg. Following some heavy lobbying of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the US State Department, as reported by Rossel' himself, the United States decided to change its plans to open a consulate in Novosibirsk to serve the rest of Russia outside of Moscow, St. Petersburg and their surrounding regions, locating it in Ekaterinburg instead.\textsuperscript{288} The importance of such a decision for the region cannot be overestimated, nor should the effect of Rossel'’s influence over the proceedings, most of all because once the USA set up a consulate in his regional capital, the majority of other Western European states followed, as the UK, Germany and Austria all set up consulates in the 1990s, with the Italians, French, Danes and other nations creating representative offices in the city. The permanent presence of foreign diplomatic missions and their trade departments in the city not only increased the flow of investment and gave Rossel' and his administration direct access to influential figures in the international arena, but it also gave the Sverdlovsk leader considerable status amongst his fellow regional executives, further substantiating his standing cross-regionally as a political heavyweight.\textsuperscript{289}

\textsuperscript{287} The foreign trade statistics from 1995 until 1999 had the USA in first or second place for each of these five years in the total proportion of trade activity. ‘Strany-osnovnye torgovye partnery Sverdlovskoi Oblasti v 1995 g.’ GASO, F. R-2827, O.1, D.34, L.33; ‘Strany-osnovnye torgovye partnery Sverdlovskoi Oblasti v 1996 g.’ GASO, F. R-2827, O.1, D.34, L.36; ‘Osnovnye itogi razvitia mezhdunarodnykh i vneshekonomsicheskikh sviazei Sverdlovskoi Oblasti v 1997 g.’, GASO F. R-2827, O.1, D. 73, L.1; ‘Strany-osnovnye torgovye partnery Sverdlovskoi Oblasti v 1999 g.’, GASO, F. R-2827, O.1, D.109, L.22. Predictably, of the areas of trade that were most important to the region and despite the overall decline in the regional economy, the most prominent were petrochemical products, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, timber and heavy machinery. ‘Osnovnye itogi vneshekonomsicheskoi deiatel’nosti predpriiatii i organizatsii Sverdlovskoi Oblasti za ianv-dek 1998 g.’, GASO, F. R-2827 O.1 D.87, L.1

\textsuperscript{288} While Novosibirsk is located well into Siberia and geographically serves as a focal point for Siberia and the Far East regions, its political leadership at this time was not as prominent as that of other Siberian regions nor able to compete with Rossel’ in Sverdlovsk for influence with the centre or foreign relations. El’tsin invited Rossel’ to meet the US President, Bill Clinton, in Moscow ahead of the opening of the Ekaterinburg Consulate, which occurred during the period of his fall from favour. Additionally, Rossel’ was able to receive Hilary Clinton on a second occasion and members of the UK government including
Much of Rossel’s leadership at home and in the Urals was based on the rebuilding of the regional economy, and to this effect the decision to seek greater assistance from the West was clearly not a difficult one, although the process of increasing the number of foreign enterprises and, indeed, foreigners, was a delicate matter for a region where the industrial elites were resistant to outside interference. Furthermore, Rossel’s ability to develop diplomatic long-term foreign relations gave him influence in the Federation Council although foreign investment in the region was limited by Rossel’s domestic policy of protecting regional heavy industry and the natural resources sector from outsiders (see chapter six).

With regards to the ‘near abroad’, the day-to-day need for close cooperation and strong economic relations that the regions found to be essential can clearly be seen to be in conflict with Moscow’s geopolitical approach to the former Soviet states. While at the state level Russia was struggling to come to terms with the independence of the former Soviet states and formulate a clear idea for integration under the guises of the CIS, in the provincial capitals, there was a need to resurrect the ties of the Soviet economic system. Under the command economy, Sverdlovsk Oblast, like many other regions, had supplied and received materials and goods from all over the Soviet Union. Restoring these ties became not only a way to develop the region, but a necessity in ensuring access to cheap goods, materials and markets. The 1996 bilateral treaty signed with Moscow had given official recognition to the regional leadership’s attempts to conduct its own foreign relations (which it had been conducting previously without Moscow’s formal authorisation), and helped to alleviate some of the frustration that had been present previously when the federal centre had been an obstacle to international relations conducted by the region. By 1999, Kazakhstan was rivalling the USA as the Oblast’s largest trade partner and Rossel was actively engaging with heads of state of other CIS nations. By the end of the El’tsin decade, he had been either a guest of, or

the Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind. ‘Tumannyi Al’bion, iasnye perspektivy’, Ural’skii rabochii, 26 March 1997, p.1. On the whole, the flow of foreign business into Russia has been considerably slower outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and even more so east of the Urals.
received Aleksandr Lukashenka of Belarus, President Petru Lucinschi of Moldova and Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan, as well as deepening relations with the state ministries of other nations, for example, in the construction of joint enterprises with the Uzbek Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Energy. By the end of the decade, 40% of all imported goods to the region were from various parts of the CIS, which fits with the geographic and historical ties the region had with this area. It is the degree of intensity of the ties with CIS countries that is striking due to it conflicting with the national policy taken by the Russian state which sought to dominate, rather than cooperate with the former Soviet states. Furthermore, the economic reality and the need for trade to boost the regional economy meant that economic ties with the CIS were largely constructed on the basis of cash payment rather than through barter (which would flood the region with potentially unwanted goods), to the extent that by the end of the 1990s barter made up less than 2.5% of foreign economic turnover.

Developing a national profile

The increasing national profile Rossel' enjoyed as came as a result of consolidating his connections to different groups and branches of the state and in some cases to the international community, as noted above. By the end of the El'tsin decade, being seen to be at the very heart of events concerning Sverdlovsk Oblast and the Urals was the standard for Rossel', allowing him to appear dominant in the eyes of the public and the elite on key issues of national importance, ranging from economic policy to the state of the military, and clearly identifying him alongside other federal political actors. In a national survey conducted in the middle of July 1999, Rossel' was rated the 11th most influential politician by businessmen in the country, the 15th most influential political

291 ‘Godovoi otchet osnovnykh itog razvitii mezhdunarodnykh vnesheekonomicheskikh sviazei Sverdlovskoi Oblasti v 1999 g.’ GASO, F. R-2827 O.1 D.109 L.6
292 ‘Osnovnye itogi vnesheekonomicheskoi deiatel’nosti predpriiatii i organizatsii Sverdlovskoi Oblasti za ianv-dek 1998 g.’, GASO, F. R.2827 O.1 D.87, L.2
figure by politicians and the 13th most influential overall; the only regional leaders ahead of him in the ratings were Iurii Luzhkov, Minitimir Shaimiev and Aman-Geldy Tuleev, the Governor of Kemerovo Oblast, who had stood in the Presidential elections of 1991, 1996 (and was standing again in 2000).  

Alongside the development of his national political persona came the dropping of the aggressive, informal and unilateral approach to Moscow that had previously gained him popular support at home but had antagonised groups at the centre. Following his successful election as governor in 1995, Rossel’s demeanour towards federal politics was based on cooperation with Moscow and concentrated on economic issues, such as the regional military-industrial complex (MIC) rather than issues of state structure. Earlier, during his time as Chairman of the Oblispolkom, Rossel’ had sought to support the MIC in the region by winning permission from Moscow to sell a proportion of the military equipment produced in the region without having to go through the centralised structures that dealt with arms sales.  

The conversion of the military-industrial complex had shifted some of the region’s industrial production away from military goods, but the defence industry remained critical to the region. In order to both stimulate production and to advertise the range of military hardware produced in the region, the Sverdlovsk administration decided to hold an arms fair, the Ural Arms-Expo, in Nizhnii Tagil in 1999, to demonstrate equipment being made by defence enterprises in Sverdlovsk Oblast and other Russian regions. With permission from Moscow to do this, particularly as foreign guests were invited to attend, the arms fair was seen on a national level as positive action taken to stimulate this sector, all under Rossel”s leadership. Such an exhibition was an important development in the post-Soviet defence industry, as it attempted to restore the reputation of Russian military goods following the very public humiliation of the Russian armed forces and its outdated hardware in the Chechen conflict, particularly among former buyers of Soviet

293 ‘Udar po fizcheskim litsam’, Oblastnaia gazeta, 17 July 1999, p.1
294 ‘Tanki na prodazhi!’, Ural’skii rabochii, 26 October 1990, p.1
295 ‘Bronia Rossii po-preznhemu krepka’, Oblastnaia gazeta, 1 July 1999, p.1
weaponry, but also within the context of the restoration of the role of the military of the Russian state that has happened under Putin. Long-term support for the military-industrial complex paid off for Rossel’ inter-regionally and at the centre, resulting in a decision by Vice-Prime Minister Ilia Klebanov to turn the Expo into an annual event to be held in Sverdlovsk Oblast rather than in the more internationally accessible and infrastructurally-developed Moscow region.\[296\] In a precursor to the demonstrations of personal power chosen by President Putin who has participated in a number of ‘stunts’ to portray himself as a strong leader, Rossel’ opened the 1999 Ural Arms-Expo by flying into the ‘polygon’ (exercise grounds) in a Mig-29 fighter jet.\[297\] This symbolism portrayed Rossel’ as a key player in the Russian defence sector, and was popularly well-received in keeping with Rossel”s political strategy for regional dominance while also increasing his national profile. Yet, despite his strong recognition as a political figure at the national level, Rossel’ never made the leap to become a federal politician. He became more involved with the Russian government in 1998, under Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov as part of the Russian government Cabinet of Ministers and continued to play a minor advisory role under Sergei Stepashin and Vladimir Putin, but faded into the background nationally as federal politics moved on to the struggle between the two new political parties, Edinstvo (Unity) and Otechestvo-Vsia Rossiia (Fatherland-All Russia) at the end of 1999, leaving no free space in the public arena for figures, like Rossel’, who attempted to participate nationally without being in either of these two parties.\[298\]

\[296\] The event was considered to be so successful that shortly after it was held, Vice-Prime Minister Ilia Klebanov was appointed by Prime Minister Putin to be the Chairman of the Second Urals Arms Exhibition. Attempts by other central ministers to hold a competition among regions to see which could hold the most successful Arms Expo were rejected by Klebanov, and the Urals Expo was granted a large federal budget for its organization. ‘Il’ia Klebanov: Eto samaia ser’eznaia vystavka v Rossii’, Oblastnaia gazeta, 11 December 1999, p.1

\[297\] ‘Rossel’ had held ambitions of becoming a test pilot in his youth but had been rejected from the Soviet Air Force on the grounds of his German ethnicity. In March 2000, Putin famously flew into Grozny in a SU-27, which has gone down as just one of a long line of symbolic gestures demonstrating his youth, strength and masculinity to the nation. ‘Asy oboronki demonstriruiut vysokii klass’, Oblastnaia gazeta, 2 July 1999, p.1

Conclusions

The release of regional power elites from the authority of the Communist Party structure created the necessity for actors to seek to gain control over the resources they required to further their institutional goals. Where this was possible, the result was a consolidation of power and expansion of influence over others. The examples of Rossel’s actions above demonstrate how he participated in existing networks and created new opportunities at the federal, inter-regional and international level, increasing his stature in the eyes of competing forces. For central government actors, the development of Rossel’s relationship with El’tsin as explained in the previous chapter, meant that they were forced to accommodate such a prominent regional figure, failing in their attempts to bring him under their influence rather than being able to marginalise him and other regional leaders as subordinate to their wishes.

The fragmentation of central power prompted attempts by political actors at all levels to monopolise power resources. Nonetheless, in this fragmented state, regional leaders had to accumulate legitimacy within the regional leadership cohort so as not to remain parochial and in order to be able to lobby federal decision makers. The construction of horizontal ties, combined with the steady trajectory of increasing his national profile, developed new informal and personal ties with actors and consolidated older ties that could be called upon to get certain things done. The examples considered in this chapter demonstrate participation in networks placing Rossel’ both at the centre and at the periphery of network relations, demonstrating above all his ability to put himself at the heart of events concerning the regions.
Chapter 6

Constructing the identity of patron: Rossel’ as the benevolent leader of Sverdlovsk Oblast’

This chapter focuses on the process by which political power within Sverdlovsk Oblast was controlled on the basis of Rossel’’s development of vertically-downward networks and patronage over sub-national actors within the region. It questions how his authority was constructed and consolidated, before considering the requirement for its continual maintenance in order to ensure that he remained the most significant figure within the region. By looking at how new forms of political, economic and social capital were managed and manipulated the chapter deepens understanding of how the Sverdlovsk regional regime was constructed. Focusing on the strengths and successes of the creation of a new regional elite to insulate his regime within his territory, it fulfils a secondary function to demonstrate the ease with which regional actors allegiances could be controlled under Rossel’’s authority.

With the political structures of each region determined by the individuals appointed to run them, the personal capacities and resources that they could gather around them influenced the development and consolidation of new political regimes. Regional power structures relied heavily on the use of informal personal ties and semi-formal institutional factors in order to retain patronage over clients. The previous chapters have already raised the issue of central regime approval and regional elite approval is discussed here through the manner in which it was harnessed to elevate Rossel’’s status from appointed administrator to a charismatic and popular leader. The specific Urals identity, with its heavy industry, productivity and a popular notion of being the fundament of the country (opornoi krai derzhavy) at its core, was expertly revitalised under Rossel’ to create a regionalist political culture to develop an atmosphere of regional self-reliance. This political culture served the purpose of providing moral
legitimacy to Rossel’s leadership as the region (and the Urals’) struggled to survive the fallout of the ‘political Chernobyl’ of the Soviet collapse. 299

In terms of the boundary control approach to internal regional politics, this chapter, and the subsequent chapter focusing on the conflict between Rossel’ and Ekaterinburg city Mayor Arkadii Chernetskii, demonstrates the aspects of ensuring the regional elite’s reliance on Rossel. Using the pursuit of the Urals Republic, Rossel’ initiated his own transformation from appointee to popular leader, allowing him to occupy the very centre of regional life. With regards to the general public, public identification with his leadership qualities stemmed from his ability to assure society that he was not a politician, while at the same time convincing the regional elites that he was an industrial manager that enjoyed political influence (in a similar way to Luzhkov and Shaimiev). The significant cultivation of political resources focused elite support around himself, creating a personalised bureaucratic regime based on loyalty and shared beliefs over the identity, economic potential and future role of the Sverdlovsk region within the federal structure of the country.

Charismatic leadership and the cultivation of legitimacy

The stability of inter-elite relations and the control over interests within regions have already been suggested as influencing the type of regional political system and structures that emerged in the Russian regions of the 1990s, determining the forms of transition from that of a ‘winner-takes-all’ scenario of dominance by the strongest political actor to ‘elite bargaining’ and the emergence of political competition. 300 Control over fractured political and social groups depended greatly on the abilities of individuals appointed by the centre to gather resources around them. Weber’s notion of the charismatic leader was placed in the struggle to overcome a heavily bureaucratic state

299 Interview with Gennadii Burbulis, Moscow, September 2011. Burbulis used this term frequently to explain the aftereffects of the collapse of Soviet political and economic power.
300 Gel’m, Ryzhenkov and Brie (2003)
structure and remove the policy making process from the grip of such a bureaucracy and replacing it with a figure attributed with certain qualities that can’t be found in others.\textsuperscript{301} Such a leader turns popular elections into votes of confidence in the person rather than the policies and monopolises the political space to the extent that expressions by members of their own support group are devoid of individuality and reflect the dominance of the principal actor. Fundamentally, the existence of a ‘charismatic leader’ can only be defined in individual terms, whereby the expression of individualism by a particular figure must by consequence suppress the individuality of those that follow him.\textsuperscript{302} The conditions of early 1990s Russian political power can be seen to be conducive to the emergence of a number of ‘charismatic’ political figures, nationally and regionally, who were able to occupy the space left by the collapse of the communist ideology. The rise of the individual has been viewed as typical of many Russian regional regimes in the 1990s, where individual leaders were allowed by the centre to raise their profiles as high as they possibly could, not only in those cases discussed in chapter three, but also Evgenii Nazdratenko of Primorskii Krai, Kirsan Iliumzhinov of Kalmykia, Boris Nemtsov in Nizhnii Novgorod, and Murtaza Rakhimov of Bashkortostan, to name a few.\textsuperscript{303} From this we can put forward the argument that the El’tsin decade was an era of political individualism, with power at all levels underlined by single figures or small groups each trying to push their own agendas and frequently working against the interests, and the stability, of the Russian state. The creation of Rossel”s patronage over Sverdlovsk Oblast and Urals actors should be viewed from this starting point, as one of a number of regional leaders bringing decision making into their own hands by preventing other actors from promoting their own identities. As noted in chapter three, one of Weber’s main structural political concerns was to ask how an individual politician could avoid being led by a bureaucracy but instead impose policy making upon them. From this evaluation, a ‘charismatic’ figure, who met the

\textsuperscript{302} Beetham (1985), p.580
demands of the social conditions and needs of the populace being governed, would receive popular backing to make those around him or her act as directed.

Rossel' propelled himself into the Sverdlovsk popular consciousness, personalising the Urals Republic project as his own and framing the issue as a struggle between himself (as representative of the region’s best interests) and the bureaucracy of the state. It is from this point that we can trace the origins of his transition from a Soviet-trained administrator to charismatic leader. In conveying his regionalist idea to the public, Rossel' shaped the values and expectations of society, converting his political status from appointee to that of a popular leader of the region. The pursuit of federal relations on terms different to those set out by the centre presented Rossel' with the opportunity to articulate the idea to Sverdlovsk society that the region would be better off if it was given the right to resolve its own socioeconomic problems on its own terms. Using the Urals identity and values noted above, the Urals Republic rationale fostered an ‘us’ (Uraltsy) versus ‘them’ (Moskvichi) attitude with Rossel' playing the role of the leader that could meet the needs of the region. Capitalising on the popularity gained from his unsuccessful brinkmanship against the Kremlin, the creation of a political movement and his decision to stay in regional politics rather than take up a national position (see previous chapter) allowed Rossel' to dominate the popular vote within the region, bringing the regional legislature under his personal leadership as well as representation to the centre through the Federation Council, before beginning an assault on his replacement appointee as governor of the region. A technocratic approach taken to building the regional political system played a stabilising role in Sverdlovsk, and the consistency of a trusted core of actors in Rossel’’s inner circle not

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304 Achkasov, Eliseev and Lantsov (1996), p.90, talk about the decline of institutions and values by the end of the Soviet Union. In Russia particularly, the breakdown of mass political culture and social values led to changes in political behaviour. How they were restored or replaced differed widely in the country, with the regional political elite offering a wide-range of substitute values, from demagoguery to tyranny, and populism.

305 This attitude had existed to a degree in the Soviet period, whereby the Sverdlovsk region had been among a small number of regions allowed to experiment with a more independent approach to socioeconomic management in the sovnarkhoz experiment during the Khrushchev era and khozraschet during perestroika.
only dominated the political space, but facilitated the construction of a bureaucracy that was responsive to his patronage.

Rossel’s core support – the parochialization of internal political power

For the second time in the twentieth century, the Russian provinces were faced with the task of constructing entirely new systems of governance for regional affairs. Revolutionary change at the regional level of political power was subject to the actions of those cadres available on the spot and their will and ability to implement the changes demanded at the national level. Following the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks’ regional appointees built their regional structures around figures with whom they had previously worked with (and fought alongside) in the revolutionary struggle.306 As already noted, many of the heads of regional administration were appointed from the regional Oblispolkom as the perception was that they were not discredited through their ties to the Communist leadership and had the necessary experience to take charge of a region. These figures enjoyed extensive networks as a resource to draw upon in order to fill administrative positions. While this new regional elite had been created somewhat artificially, appointed rather than emerging through a process of legitimisation, common to all was a necessity to demonstrate an ability to rule, particularly by showing control over the decision-making processes in the region. This new crop of regional leaders had to make their authority felt within the political space, including through knowledge of the specifics of a territory and other actors as well as how and where to apply pressure or allow a freer hand in order to consolidate their power.307

307 Andrei Nechaev, (2011), ‘Pervoe rossiiskoe pravitel’stvo – krizisnyi upravliaushchii’, in P.S. Filippov (ed.), (2011) ‘Istoriia novoi Rossi: Ocherki, interv’yu v 3 t., Volume 1, Saint Petersburg, Norma, p.48. Nechaev, a former Minister of Finance under El’tsin, notes these qualities as key to the central bureaucratic apparatus during the collapse of the Soviet Ministries and the transfer of bureaucrats to Russian ministries. These qualities are easily transferable to the regional leaders upon appointment by the centre.
The appointments made by Rossel’ to his regional administration reveal no strong ideological tendencies. Focusing on stability in administration, Rossel”s early personnel choices were eased by the organizational weakness of the democratic movement, which had been so influential in Sverdlovsk during the collapse of the Soviet regime, but failed to make use of this position due to an absence of individual figures with experience of actual administration. It is unremarkable, therefore, that many of his appointments had Communist Party backgrounds and training (they were largely taken from the lower branches of the nomenklatura, such as district and town executive committees), as the overriding quality that they possessed was the necessary experience to help manage a complex region such as Sverdlovsk Oblast. Largely speaking, the figures that Rossel’ appointed to leading positions held similar perspectives with regards to the economic regeneration required. By appointing experienced individuals that had been loyal to the previous hierarchy of public administration, Rossel’ lay the foundations for the creation of a personalised bureaucracy that would serve his primary political interest in the economic revival of the region rather than pursuing their own agendas. Through exercising close personal control over appointments, based on experience and association with himself and trusted individuals, Rossel’ made his role as patron the cornerstone of the construction of his political regime. The lack of will from the centre to interfere in appointments made by the head of regional administration meant there was no pressure on Rossel’ to include members of the pro-reform movements in his own political team.308 Thus, upon Rossel”s appointment, the ideological struggle that had gripped the region during perestroika was almost instantly replaced by a ‘pragmatic’ set of political actors, with industrial and managerial backgrounds ruled by economic values, and having strong opinions on state-structural issues and ideas of economic independence from Moscow.

308 Interviews with Gennadii Burbulis and Boris Guseletov. Despite the high number of figures with Communist Party backgrounds, the centre decided to allow regions to build their own structures with as little interference as possible from Moscow. Burbulis argued that this was considered to be the only way of preventing the delicate political atmosphere in 1991 from developing into civil war.
A further feature of the political structure built by Rossel’ was the stability of the core political actors within the region. As with his relationship with the president, Rossel’\’s regional network was based on the personalisation of relations between the key actors. Offering a great deal of trust to leading members of his administration and the political elite in the running of the region, Rossel’ reaped the benefits of a high level of political harmony and satisfaction amongst his supporters and a bureaucracy that was highly responsive to his demands. In particular, the close relationship between the executive and legislative branch during his second term as governor following the successful gubernatorial elections of September 1995 was based on the previous construction of the Transformation of the Urals political association and his Chairmanship of the Regional Duma and gave Rossel’ a ‘traditional’ system of personalised power within Sverdlovsk Oblast, whereby the participants’ allegiance to his person allowed for both branches to entirely represent his own leadership interests.

Singling out the most influential members of Rossel’\’s network in the region, helps to demonstrate the importance of personalised relations in dictating the pattern of relations that placed him in total control of the region (see table 6.1). The most important members of Rossel’\’s Sverdlovsk network were Aleksei Vorob’ev (who in November 1991 became the Director of Rossel’\’s apparatus), and Viacheslav Surganov, a RF CPD deputy and the head of administration of Verkhniaia Pyshma (a satellite town near Ekaterinburg) who moved into regional politics after the dismissal of the Legislative branch by El’tsin in October 1993. Both of these figures were active political supporters of Rossel’ in the region over a sustained period of time and were heavily involved in the pursuit of greater federal powers to the region; Vorob’ev as one of the key ideologues of the Urals Republic, and Surganov in playing a leading role in the 1995 regional Charter and subsequent bilateral agreements with Moscow. They both had the characteristics that were important to Rossel’\’s leadership; an

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understanding of the economic issues facing the region and the necessity to increase resources flowing inwards, administrative experience (within the Communist Party organs of the region), and personal loyalty to Rossel’ without any public expression of personal ambition. Their relationship with Rossel’ was reflected in their progression and consolidation within positions in the regional political elite – Vorob’ev rose to become the Chairman of the Oblast government in 1996 and Surganov became the Chairman of the Oblast Duma following Rossel’’s victory in 1995 gubernatorial elections (and was therefore Senator to the Federation Council alongside Rossel’ in the period 1996-1998). In the post-1995 regional political conditions, the triangle of power with Rossel’ at the pinnacle and Surganov and Vorob’ev supporting his leadership, dominated the executive and legislative branches of Sverdlovsk Oblast’ and provided the basis for political authority within the region. A settled system of personal power and distribution of authorities alongside the common values that they held meant that there was no need for Vorob’ev or Surganov to challenge their patron or seek alternative roles (although the promise of future succession was never ruled out).^{310} Both Surganov and Vorob’ev made frequent public demonstrations of their loyalty to Rossel’ downplaying their personal roles within the region and highlighting the leadership and good management of the regional governor, as both became increasingly identifiable with Rossel’’s political system.^{311} From outside of the network these three figures were often seen as a single ‘cohesive’ political unit, although Rossel’ consistently provided the public face. In relations with the federal centre throughout the 1990s they worked in harmony to block attempts by federal actors to divide and rule the regional elite (an example of this can be seen in 1995 when the Head of the Presidential Administration, Sergei Filatov, attempted to persuade the regional Duma to delay the consideration of gubernatorial elections and was met with firm and public rejection by Surganov, who

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^{310} Interviews with Anatolii Kirillov, Boris Guseletov, and Konstantin Kiselev

echoed Rossel’s opinion that gubernatorial elections should proceed as soon as possible).  

As patron, Rossel’ rewarded both with long political careers in the region. Vorob’ev followed Rossel’ from the regional administration to the Oblast Duma and back again, as head of his gubernatorial administration (a position of great influence similar to the role of head of the Presidential Administration at the national level). When the third-placed candidate in the 1995 gubernatorial elections, Valerii Trushnikov, was controversially removed from the post of Head of Government, to which he had been appointed in return for electoral support for Rossel’ in the second round, under the lightweight accusation of ‘too much politicking’, Vorob’ev was appointed Head of the Regional Government. While the regional Supreme Court later ruled Trushnikov’s dismissal to have been illegal, Vorob’ev continued in his new role, with pressure applied to Trushnikov not to seek to return to his Government post despite the courts’ ruling. Surganov played the role of Rossel’s key vassal in the Regional Duma. He was second on the party list of Rossel’s political association ‘Transformation of the Urals’ (Preobrazhenie Urala) (hereafter PU) for the 1994 Oblast Duma elections (after Rossel’ himself), and was later appointed its Chairman. In the tradition of post-communist Russian political parties, PU was a strongly personalised movement, and while, as governor, Rossel’ was no longer the official head of the association he clearly remained its ideological leader.

A third figure should be added to the inner ruling elite of Sverdlovsk Oblast – that of Aleksandr Levin, the prominent press-secretary to Rossel’ who cultivated the public aspect of the regional leader at a time when individualism in leadership was re-

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312 The regional Charter stipulated that gubernatorial elections were to be held, but didn’t give a specific timeframe. Sverdlovsk Oblast Charter, as published in Oblastnaia gazeta, 7 December 1994. Article 45 Section 1.
emerging following the bureaucratization of leadership under the Soviet system. The role of maintaining a positive image of the regional leadership fell to Levin in late 1991, and was an innovation that was quickly copied by a large number of regional politicians throughout the country. Levin was a low-level journalist from the local ‘Sverdlovsk Evening News’ (Vechernii Sverdlovsk) (later re-named Vechernii Ekaterinburg), and he rose to become as influential on Rossel’ as Surganov and Vorob’ev.\textsuperscript{315} Once again, the relationship was based on a strong element of loyalty from the client to the patron, as Levin demonstrated an allegiance to the traditional power system with Rossel’ as the unquestionable master of the house. Strikingly, Levin remained in the same post from his appointment in 1991 until Rossel’’s removal from regional politics in 2009; this included resigning his position as press secretary to the Head of Regional Administration upon Rossel’’s removal by El’tsin in 1993, acting in the same role when Rossel’ was Chairman of the Oblast Duma, before being amongst the first to be restored to his prior position following the 1995 gubernatorial elections.\textsuperscript{316} His role was particularly effective in the early 1990s through the use of radio broadcasts, question and answer programmes and regular regional television appearances, bringing the political elite closer to the general public in a way that it had not been since El’tsin was First Party Secretary of the region.\textsuperscript{317}

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{network.png}
\caption{relations between the key members of Rossel’’s Sverdlovsk network}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{315} Interview with Boris Guseletov, Moscow, 29 September 2011. Boris Guseletov was a candidate for the Sverdlovsk Regional Duma, and later worked as the International Secretary of the federal political party ‘Spravedlivaia Rossia’ (Just Russia)

\textsuperscript{316} Levin has published two books recounting his time with Rossel’. His first book, \textit{Kak stat’ gubernatorom v byvshem SSSR} gives a rich informative account of the workings of Rossel’’s leadership and relations with Surganov and Vorob’ev among others. His second book, \textit{Fenomen: shtrikhi k portretu Eduarda Rosselia}, Bank kul’turnoi informatssii is a sycophantic account of Rossel’, who is presented as a person with almost supernatural political abilities – embodying the definition of the ‘charismatic’ leader.

\textsuperscript{317} Levin (1995), pp.82-85
The settled nature of the hierarchy of power and participation in the political domains patronised by Rossel' did, however, result in difficulties over time in attracting new political actors into the ruling elite, as it was clear to participants that the possibility for career advancement higher up the power chain were limited. While the creation of PU was primarily to provide a vehicle for election to the Regional Duma and a controllable faction once there, it gave a boost to lower-level members of the political elite who wanted to receive the political benefits of aligning themselves with Rossel' and increase their role and standing in the regional political environment. The most visible and locally significant new actor that emerged from this movement was Anton Bakov, an Oblast Duma deputy from Ekaterinburg, who in the period 1995-1998, emerged from within the pro-Rossel' branch of the newly elected political elite of the region. Young and ambitious, Bakov's provocative manner was beneficial to Rossel', who looked on benevolently as Bakov made frequent personal attacks on members of the opposition within the region (for example, labelling members of Strakhov's regional administration as criminals, strongly criticising Ekaterinburg Mayor Arkadii Chernetskii and standing against him in Mayoral elections). Bakov was rewarded with a prominent position within PU and played a leading role in bilateral negotiations with the federal centre in 1996. He was regarded by outsiders as something of a prodigal son to Rossel', and is reported to have been repeatedly forgiven transgressions against the regional leader. Ultimately Rossel''s demand for absolute loyalty required him to expel Bakov from his close circle in 1998 following the latter's brief flirtation with a rival regional political movement, Mai. While seen as something of a maverick figure in the region, Bakov's swift rise and fall demonstrated the drawback of the stability of the top-level elite for aspiring political elites who were impatient in seeking career growth but found themselves faced with a career ceiling, where the only positions available for

318. 'Data vyborov opredelena', Vechernii Ekaterinburg, 19 May 1995, p.1; Interview with Konstantin Kiselev, Ekaterinburg, September 2011
319. Interview with Boris Guseletov, Moscow, September 2011
320. Interview with Boris Guseletov, Moscow, September 2011. See also 'Iskluuchenie iz pravil?', Ural'skii rabochii, 26 February 1998, p.1 Bakov later competed unsuccessfully in the 1999 gubernatorial elections against Rossel', and seized control of the Serov Metallurgical Factory in a struggle against local Sverdlovsk oligarch Pavel Fadeev (in which it seems highly likely that he received administrative support from actors within the city of Ekaterinburg).
the foreseeable future were committee chairmanships or departmental positions within the regional government. The role that Bakov played underlines Rossel”s exercise of the boundary control strategy. By excommunicating Bakov from his immediate network, the Sverdlovsk leader was ensuring that no potential challenge to his authority could develop, offering a warning to other actors of the consequences of challenging from within, and reiterating that members of his network relied upon his patronage for development.
Table 6.1 – Key figures in Rossel”s political elite network

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<tr>
<td>Viacheslav Surganov</td>
<td>RF CPD Deputy; Head of Administration of Verkhniaia Pyshma</td>
<td>Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma Deputy</td>
<td>Second on Party list in 1996</td>
<td>Chairman of Oblast Duma (Lower chamber) and member of Federation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleksei Vorobev</td>
<td>Director of Department of Head of Administration</td>
<td>Chairman of Oblast Duma Apparatus</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>First deputy Chairman of Government; Chairman of Government (1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleksandr Levin</td>
<td>Press Secretary to Rossel'</td>
<td>Press Secretary to Rossel'</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Press Secretary to Rossel'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anton Bakov</td>
<td>Oblast Duma deputy</td>
<td>Yes (expelled in 1998)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy of Oblast Duma; Failed candidate in Ekaterinburg mayoral elections; Failed candidate in 1999 Sverdlovsk gubernatorial elections</td>
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The ability to parochialise regional power lies in the ability to make the elite reliant on the patron’s goodwill for their career position, development and socio-economic status.
While on one hand the patron must ensure that they are the only actor that can give a final decision on preservation or exclusion from the elite, they must also take positive action to retain the loyalty and services of members of the lower branches of the patronage structure. The process of securing patronage over elected members of the regional political establishment followed Rossel’s personal career developments inversely, increasing as his political position with regards to the federal centre declined in the period 1993-1995, providing the foundation for regional political domination following the 1995 gubernatorial elections.

Further to the role that the individuals noted above played, Rossel’s patronage extended to the political association that he used as a vehicle to gain control over the legislative branch of power in 1994. In the period from 1991 up to the dissolution of the Regional Soviet, the executive and legislative branches found common ground on which to focus their activities; close cooperation in the development and lobbying of the Urals Republic, where only small pockets of opposition to the idea of extra regional powers and responsibilities existed allowing the regional leadership to develop its plans for renewed centre-regional relations in cooperation with elected members of the new regional political elite. Once removed from his position as Head of Regional Administration, there was a need for Rossel to initiate a vehicle that could gather in, develop and control the political capital he had accumulated at home over the Urals Republic process. With election to the Federation Council and the regional Duma being all but guaranteed even before he announced his participation, the formation of Preobrazhenie Urala consolidated a broad cross-section of the regional political and economic elite under a single, 'personalised' umbrella. Its successful performance in the 1994 Oblast Duma elections stemmed from Rossel’s own popular legitimacy (which was based on his political charisma and the perception that he had been badly let-down by the federal elite). For the deputies that were elected to the regional Duma under Preobrazhenie Urala's banner, it is almost impossible to single any of them out for any personal advocacy of political beliefs, rather they were comprehensively
absorbed into the Rossel’ political machine and elected on the basis that they were Rossel”s people regardless of any personalisation of their electoral campaigns. The appointment of Surganov to the chairmanship of the regional Duma (appointed by and replacing the patron) returned the regional political space to the status quo ante of the early 1990s of total cooperation between regional executive and legislative branches.321

The leadership of Preobrazhenie Urala closely controlled the legislative agenda and deputies’ voting behaviour within the legislature. Even after its less successful performance in the 1998 regional Duma elections, where it lost its majority and status as the largest party in the legislature to the rival Nash Dom Nash Gorod (NDNG) movement led by Arkadii Chernetskii, PU preserved its dominance by lobbying deputies from other fractions into support for its motions, thus re-confirming the influence association with Rossel’ had over political actors. This influence was seen most clearly when NDNG attempted to elect one of its own members as Speaker of the Oblast Duma, with Rossel”s movement able to successfully counter by convincing deputies from other fractions to support Surganov to continue as Speaker.322

Despite the existence of a competitive political system based around political parties in Sverdlovsk Oblast, Rossel”s ability to link the activities of his clients to his personal control (including the monopoly of influence over the Preobrazhenie Urala movement) demonstrated the wide reach of his power, making it extremely difficult for deputies and members of various levels of administration to seek alternative patrons.323 Access to administrative resources held by Rossel’ regulated the loyalty of lower ranked members of the political elite, as competing forces found it impossible to break into the

321 This role was later changed to Speaker of the Oblast Duma, as the Sverdlovsk legislative branch became a bicameral parliament. The Oblast Duma became the lower chamber, with the Palace of Representatives as the upper chamber of the parliament.
322 ‘Na krugi svoia’, Ural’ski rabochii, 19 May 1998, p.1. NDNG succeeded in removing Surganov as Speaker for a period of one month following the 1998 regional Duma elections. However, NDNG was not strong enough to force its own candidate’s election, nor its second preference, and under pressure from Preobrazhenie Urala (and Rossel’) Surganov was returned to the post.
323 Gel’man and Golosov (1998)
decision making process. As a member of Rossel’s staff during the 1990s explained, pressure on elected members of the regional Duma could be exerted through material benefits received by deputies according to their positions:

[Rossel'] had one important characteristic – he supported the elites. He always found them work, for example, if the head of a municipality wasn’t re-elected or if he himself removed them. He understood that the political space was not huge and that it was against his interests to provoke the emergence of opposition. And so, he had different ways of pressuring them, particularly in the regional Duma. We had a cunning law; a deputy was elected for four years, and given a flat allowing them to grow into political life in Ekaterinburg. This was an expensive luxury, not all were wealthy. Those four years would pass by and for them to keep such benefits they would be offered a move into the regional government, or a ministry, or the administration, basically, they could become a bureaucrat. Or else Rossel’ would find them alternative work. And of course, this lever was used, and used to dilute the opposition. As a rule, deputies spent their first two years of a mandate in active opposition, then they would pause and think, what does the future hold for me? And so, they would begin to do as they were told...and leave any thoughts of opposition behind. This is how opposition from Chernetskii’s supporters was broken up. This approach worked; a deputy would suddenly feel insecure about his future – they may have come from Nizhni Tagil, or somewhere like Sukhoi Log, arrived in Ekaterinburg, settled for four years, children at school or university, and suddenly they were threatened with having to leave this all behind. This was the system used to pressure deputies. 324

Although, while he exercised close control over the accumulation and distribution of political capital, Rossel’ was not punitive towards clients that acted against him in the way that El’tsin dealt with clients that offended him, limiting action to little more than expulsion from his patronage, as in the case of Bakov. 325

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324 Interview with Anatolii Kirillov, Ekaterinburg, March 2011. As a member of Rossel’s analytical department during the 1996-1998 regional election cycle, Kirillov was well positioned to observe these tendencies. This approach was repeated under Putin in the 2000s who allowed members of the State Duma freedom to work in return for support of his initiatives, this effectively formed an overwhelmingly loyal deputy corpus and reminded opposition forces that administrative levers could be applied that would affect their positions and benefits as deputies.

325 Mikhailov (2010) notes the approach taken by Mintimir Shaimiev, equating this with acting in a more Soviet fashion towards his clients. By offering them a ‘soft landing’ when removing them from their positions, Shaimiev reduced the possibility of creating a disgruntled elite and kept elite initiative low (pp. 483-4)
With the structure of the regional political system having been prescribed in the regional charter by Rossel’ and his team prior to his election as governor in 1995, his return as regional leader allowed him to begin the process of forming and implementing these aims. The agreement of a series of bilateral agreements reached with the centre in late 1995 further consolidated reliance on the regional executive; for example, one such agreement allowed the regional governor the right to appoint regional heads of federal branches of executive power, noticeably increasing the tendency towards personal control over all aspects of the regional political space.\textsuperscript{326} Previously Moscow had appointed people to positions in the region that were responsible to federal branches of power, maintaining the separation of federal interests from regional ones, however, the terms of the agreement clearly shifted the balance in favour of the regional leadership, further establishing themselves as their own, strongly bordered organizational entity within the Russian state.

Administrative influence extended to local self-government, which although constitutionally separate from direct subordination to state authorities was subjected to pressure from Rossel’s executive leadership.\textsuperscript{327} Members of local self-government formations advocated the transfer of greater powers from regional jurisdiction to the local level (specifically to mayors), a tendency that was particularly visible in the regional capital, Ekaterinburg (see the next chapter). The argument from the regional leadership was that there existed a lack of clarity regarding the integration of local self-government into the new Russia, with heads of municipal formations and districts enjoying too much independence from regional power at the expense of the efficiency of the state – a position which Rossel’ had no trouble in internally reconciling with his own demands for more independence from the federal centre, no matter how contradictory this appeared on the outside. By the beginning of 1997, the majority of leadership positions in local self-government had been popularly elected in Sverdlovsk

\textsuperscript{327} Lankina (2001) has noted that in Russia ‘local government has come to be an instrument for the exercise of power by the regional regimes…’ (p.398).
Oblast, but the regional executive branch voiced concerns that its influence over local self-government formations and the right to remove local actors had been diminished.\textsuperscript{328} Such a lack of oversight over local actors threatened the patrimonial bureaucratic system that was at the heart of Rossel’s power, subverting the system of hierarchical authority in the region as local actors could potentially work outside of the electoral mechanisms that constructed reliance on the Rossel’ political machine for their positions. To counter this, Rossel’ imposed six administrative districts at the regional level to which he appointed prefects to act as a regulatory link on behalf of the regional executive over the heads of local self-government on the basis that this connection would simplify the ability of the regional authorities to respond to local needs. The introduction of such a mechanism of control over local self-government was a motion towards dragging local self-government into a vertical system of regional power to make sure that there was no area of political life outside of the reach of the ‘organization’ of power.\textsuperscript{329} Appointed prefects held no financial authority over local self-government and few administrative resources to wield, but they provided the regional executive branch with the flow of information about the actions of municipal formations, and a threat to local self-government formations encouraging them to coordinate and clear their actions with the regional executive.\textsuperscript{330}

The pattern emerging by the late 1990s, shows that regionally, Rossel’ had successfully ‘parochialised’ his own vertically integrated political system, maximising his hegemony over the region and detaching the Sverdlovsk political system from reliance on the federal centre in a way that the large majority of regions were unable to do. The stability of political actors, the loyalty they showed to the patron and the high level of trust invested in them, as well as the development of a party mechanism to

\textsuperscript{328} ‘Skvoz’ status zamertsali vybory’, \textit{Ural’skii rabochii}, 27 February 1997, p.1
\textsuperscript{329} The Director of Rossel’’s administration, A. Gaida, cited the need to integrate municipal formations into a ‘single economic system’, coordinate work between organs of state power and construct vertical relations as the key to the issue, or else the position of regional governor was pointless unless they could have an element of control over local self-government. “Geografiia” trebuet uтоchnenii”, \textit{Ural’skii rabochii}, 25 April 1997, p.1.
\textsuperscript{330} Interviews with Boris Guseletov and Gennadi Korobkov, 2011
amalgamate and direct their level of influence in regional politics all contributed to the development of Rossel’ from crisis manager to establishing total control over the Oblast. Having appointed delegates to roles within his hierarchy, Rossel’ (assisted by Surganov, Vorob’ev, and the political weight of the Preobrazhenie Urala association) did not allow them to act for themselves in return for providing the loyalty of the electorate as Shaimiev allowed in Tatarstan, but instead actively controlled and managed the actions of his network in a way that was closer to the Luzhkov model, giving his clients clear limits to their scope and functions. It is worth underlining that such a model of power was centred on the continuation of Rossel’ in the leading position of the region, and by the end of the 1990s to publicly re-affirm his credentials he stood for re-election in a bitter contest with his main rival, Chernetskii.

Protecting regional industry

Protecting and incorporating regional economic interests under the umbrella of Rossel’’s political structure diversified reliance on the regional leader, extending it further than the political elite to encompass the regional industrial elite (and by association large swathes of the regional population reliant on regional industry for their livelihood). With the breakdown of the Soviet Union’s planning, production and distribution system, industry found itself cut adrift from finance, with neither orders nor vital raw materials required for production and short of material goods and money for the payment and satisfaction of workers’ everyday needs. Under Egor Gaidar’s economic reforms in 1992, it quickly became clear to the national economic elite that the state could no longer afford to carry the cost of loss-making sectors that were of much less importance to the new Russian state than they had been to the Soviet Union.331

That there was little choice for the regional government to take over control of the industrial base in Sverdlovsk Oblast is clear – in its two largest cities (Ekaterinburg and Nizhnii Tagil), and numerous other towns and districts within the Oblast, the military-industrial complex employed the majority of the population, providing them with housing, education, child care and, above all, work. An estimated contraction of more than four fifths the number of orders from the state for defence-related products in 1992-3 left the entire sector nationally struggling to pay wages, produce goods, undertake conversion, and keep the factory gates open.\(^332\) Large industrial enterprises, such as the Uralmash and Khimmash complexes in Ekaterinburg, and Uralvagonzavod and Nizhnii Tagil Metallurgical Plant in Nizhnii Tagil, found themselves adrift from central protection and entered into an informal agreement with Rossel'. While on the one hand, Rossel' was to act as the patron of these enterprises in order to represent their interests to the centre, in return the Sverdlovsk region's industrial enterprises would support him by maintaining the social obligations listed above. For these enterprises, Rossel' was an entirely acceptable patron due to his previous experience as the director of a large enterprise in the region, his vocal support for keeping control of industry within the Urals, and certainly his perceived connection to El'tsin.\(^333\)

The privatization of industry and property prompted a struggle for control over economic and industrial resources in all regions. Due to greater access to finance and influential decision makers who held sway over the privatization process at the federal centre, Moscow-based elites found themselves with an advantage in gaining control over profitable regional branches of industry. Furthermore, the opening up of formerly closed regions to foreign-based business interests who slowly participated in the privatization process increased the threat to regional leaders of losing control over valuable sectors of the economic and social landscape of their territories, who put forward the argument that federal legislation on privatization was allowing outsiders to

\(^{332}\) Urinson (2011), pp.91-93

\(^{333}\) Interview with Anatolii Kirillow, Ekaterinburg, March 2011
acquire property at knock-down prices at the expense of interests within the region.\textsuperscript{334}

In Sverdlovsk Oblast, there was clear political capital to be gained by retaining control and influence over this sector, and the subsequent strategy of the leadership was to protect regional industry from outsiders (both Moscow and foreign).\textsuperscript{335} In a region where a large majority of the labour force worked in the industrial giants, by attempting to ensure that ownership remained in the Urals and protecting jobs, Rossel’ was able to build strong, grass-roots political support. Workers within the production branch of the organization felt happier working for their own (svoi) than being subject to the risk of being acquired by outsiders. This cultivated a sense of loyalty from industry towards a leadership that was working to keep them local. Indeed, reviving the industrial fortunes of a region became a cornerstone of Rossel’’s future election strategy, easily contributing to his fending off competition in two gubernatorial elections during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{336} In the 1995 gubernatorial elections Rossel’, while industry was a major issue, centre-regional differences were still at the heart of his campaign, however, by the 1999 gubernatorial elections, it was argued by one of his electoral strategists that by linking his candidacy with the protection of industry, Rossel’ was viewed as the guarantor of long-term development against the short-termism of his rival candidates who were portrayed as merchants, standing for consumption over production.\textsuperscript{337}

Personalised patronage was again effective amongst the industrial elite as it was with the political elite – Rossel’ is reported to have known almost all of the directors and senior management of enterprises located within the region on a first-name basis, and

\textsuperscript{335} Kirillov and Kirillov (1999), p.14
\textsuperscript{336} In April 1996, seven months after his election as Governor, Rossel’ highlighted his support for industry in the region as his second most important achievement, after the signing of the bilateral agreements, since his return to the post. ‘Vypolniaet li gubernator predvybornoie obeshchaniia?’, \textit{Ural’skii rabochii}, 9 April 1996, p.1 References to the Urals as Russia’s backbone have renewed in recent times with a major television series broadcast on Russia’s First Channel (\textit{Pervyi Kanal}) by the popular presenter Leonid Parfenov and the Urals author, Aleksei Ivanov titled ‘Backbone of Russia’ (\textit{KhrebetRossii}).
\textsuperscript{337} Interview with Konstantin Kiselev, Urals Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Ekaterinburg, September 2011.
travelled extensively around the Oblast to view conditions first-hand.\textsuperscript{338} Loss-making enterprises received support and representation from the regional leadership, including forgiving regional taxes for periods and lobbying Moscow for credit lines as well as vocally rejecting proposals from the RF government to liquidate some of the industrial giants of the region which in its consideration were no longer needed by the country, such as Uralvagonzavod and Nizhnii Tagil Metallurgical Plant.\textsuperscript{339} Both of these factories were critical to the socioeconomic structure of the region’s second city, prompting the regional government to devise special measures to attempt to revive both plants.\textsuperscript{340}

By characterising himself as an authoritative figure on the difficulties facing industry in the region for survival, Rossel’ absorbed the interests of the largest sector of society fostering the belief among enterprise management and workers that his policy of taking responsibility for the region’s own economic development rather than entrusting it to the state was the only possible route that provided for the regeneration of the industrial potential of Sverdlovsk Oblast. Reward for this support for industry came in the shape of the loyalty of industrial leaders, who notably remained supportive of Rossel’ during the period of his removal from the governorship preferring to aligning themselves with the fallen leader rather than his replacement, Aleksei Strakhov. To further deepen the regional government-industry relationship, a number of its representatives were given places on the party lists from Preobrazhenie Urala for the Oblast Duma elections, bringing the industrial branches into the political elite of the region.

**Electoral support from society**

It was often the case in Russian politics since the end of communism that public opinion and support was an afterthought for political actors that only arises when

\textsuperscript{338} Interviews with Konstantin Kiselev and Boris Guseletov
\textsuperscript{339} ‘Pust nam pomozhet optimizm’, Ural’skii rabochii, 17 June 1998, p.1
\textsuperscript{340} Equally, Rossel’ sought to protect ‘smaller’ industrial enterprises within the region from Moscow, such as the case of “Uralmoto”, a motorcycle factory in the town of Irbit in the north of the region, ‘Zatianem remni’, Oblastnaia gazeta, 17 April 1996, p.1.
elections are on the horizon. In the early post-communist period, one of the pressing problems for El'tsin’s appointees in the oblasts and krais was one of public legitimacy. Under deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, social support for regional political leadership fluctuated according to how they were perceived in defending the interests of the population from the excesses of economic and political reform.

In the cases of the republics, ethnic nationalism presented political leaders such as Tatarstan’s Mintimir Shaimiev, and Bashkortostan’s Murtaza Rakhimov, with a pre-existing source of legitimacy, presenting themselves as the leaders of their ethnic groups, which carried them into the post-communist era with high levels of popularity. However in the oblasts and krais, nationalism was not such an important factor. In Sverdlovsk Oblast, while Rossel’’s appointment was a predictable choice, he was nonetheless faced with the need to legitimise himself, firstly with regards to the regional soviet and secondly, to society.341 After a short period of struggle between the regional executive and legislative branches for supremacy, the political cleavage that emerged between the region and centre over federal inequality brought them together. On the basis of this, and his courting of regional industry, Rossel’ strongly convinced society that he had the authority necessary to bring agreement among rival forces in the interests of the region, beginning the process of converting himself from presidential appointee into ‘charismatic' regional leader.342 Although the regional soviet was as active as Rossel’ in developing the aims and demands for greater rights from the centre, it was the regional executive that became the personification of the process, quickly adapting to the new political circumstances to use social support as an additional resource to presidential approval. By putting the Urals Republic at the heart

341 Interview with Gennadii Burbulis, Moscow, September 2011. In an interview with Konstantin Kiselev, Rossel’’s former advisor and now a well-known political analyst in the Urals, he claimed that Burbulis could never have been a serious candidate to run the region as the regional absolutely required an actor rather than a talker.

342 Achkasov et al (1996) write about the process of post-socialist legitimization. In their opinion, charismatic leaders are typical of a large number of Russian regional regimes in the 1990s, when regional leaders were allowed to raise their profiles as highly as they possibly could. Under the Putin reforms of the 2000s, we see a dramatic decrease in the profile and political nature of regional governors. Rossel’’s successors, Aleksandr Misharin and Evgenii Kuivashev, are typical of the relatively characterless regional managers that the centre has appointed to the regions under the guidance and control of the presidential administration.
of his own political persona, Rossel' outshone the regional Soviet and presented himself as the only way to protect the region's interests from subjugation to outside forces.

Two popular strategies were adopted by Rossel' with regards to the public; firstly, he began the process of building a regional political culture in society – this time based on finding a new status for the region for a new era. The use of centre-regional relations as a banner under which society could rally around Rossel' stands out because of the ease by which it developed. While the regional administration carried out a propaganda campaign informing the public in the regional press about the comparatively worse-off economic status of Sverdlovsk Oblast to other regions in federal relations, the need for the regional elite to convince society of the need to improve its position with regards to Moscow has been played down by people involved in the process, noting that the Oblast population did not need to be convinced and that there was overwhelming public approval for increasing Sverdlovsk Oblast's status to that of Republic.  

Secondly, by using some of the tricks that El'tsin had used back in the 1970s and early 1980s, Rossel', with the assistance of his press secretary, made himself part of the everyday life of the citizens of the region by mixing with them rather than talking to them from above. During election cycles there are stories of him repeating El'tsin's habit of abandoning his official cortege and travelling around Ekaterinburg on public transport and speaking to citizens about their problems. While this can be seen as an exercise in PR and electioneering in a way that El'tsin's actions in the 1970s were not, it nevertheless cemented his reputation as working in the interests of the people.

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343 Interviews with Anatolii Kirillov and Boris Guseletov
344 ‘Vse upiraetsia v vybory’, Vechernii Ekaterinburg, 4 February 1995, p.1
345 On a number of occasions during field work in Ekaterinburg in 2010-2011, in conversations with people from the Urals State University (now Urals Federal University), one of the first things that they would comment when talking about the Rossel’ period was that he ‘was one of us’ – much like El’tsin had been considered as First Party Secretary in the 1970s, with society coming to refer to him by the late 2000s as ‘Deda’ Rossel’ (Grandpa Rossel’).
Following his dismissal in November 1993, Rossel’ initiated a change that catapulted him from simply being a visible manager to becoming a powerful political operator, taking advantage of this perceived wrong to further his identity as someone that would battle for the interests of the region against someone who sought to return to the past (as Strakhov sought to return the region to subordination to Moscow). Preobrazhenie Urala was reliant on the use of his personal identity for its electoral success and the electoral legitimization of his leadership at the regional Duma level provided the moral authority for him to enter into conflict with Strakhov over the regional Charter, while also lowering the stakes for El’tsin to allow gubernatorial elections to proceed in August 1995. The short period in which public support for Rossel’ can be seen in serious decline coincides with the first round of the 1995 gubernatorial election, in which Aleksei Strakhov, who had struggled for public support as regional leader, showed signs of developing into a serious alternative, at least within the influential city of Ekaterinburg, where the urban electorate showed a tendency towards reconciliation with Moscow.\footnote{Strakhov only became a viable competing force for regional popularity in the final months before the 1995 gubernatorial elections according to his Deputy Governor, Gennadii Korobkov (Interview, Ekaterinburg December 2011).} By overcoming the electoral challenge presented by Strakhov, Rossel’ obtained the electoral legitimacy that he had wanted since the Urals Republic. Quickly re-establishing his former team and continuing as he had done as chairman of the Duma, Rossel’ was able to return to the style of his previous term as governor without essentially changing anything in the way he did things, and with the added resounding endorsement from society.

**Conclusions**

Constructing the political regime and ensuring that it successfully preserved his power stemmed from Rossel’’s pursuit of the preventing other actors from encroaching on his position within the region. This could only be achieved through the domination of all of the key areas of regional life, actively seeking out and consuming as many potential
areas of networks that would prevent his rivals from having the political oxygen to mount a threat to him. Through this domination of the key sectors of Sverdlovsk society, Rossel' was able to starve these rivals of sources of political, economic and social capital. That political competition did emerge is the subject of the next chapter, as we look at how the boundary control strategy was used effectively to counter the threat posed by Ekaterinburg Mayor, Arkadii Chernetskii.
Chapter 7
The battle for control of the regional capital: the Rossel’-Chernetskii conflict

The final area of operation of the Sverdlovsk regional leader during the 1990s considered here focuses on the difficult relationship between Rossel’ and the Ekaterinburg Mayor, Arkadii Chernetskii. The conflict between these two figures lasted almost the entire decade and continued into the 2000s. The struggle that ensued for political control and that divided the regional capital city, Ekaterinburg, and the rest of the Oblast, demonstrates the implementation of the ‘boundary control’ strategy and how it was used by the regional leadership to suffocate political competition. This argument is in contrast to much research carried out in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which positively highlighted the competitiveness of the region’s political space, while failing to characterise the controlled nature of this competition.347 The central focus of the chapter is on what became a personal conflict between the governor and mayor, with a deeper division between region and regional capital in the political arena of Sverdlovsk Oblast running as an undercurrent to this conflict. Disagreement and conflict between regional leaders and city mayors was commonplace in the El’tsin period, due to the thirst for power among leading individuals, competing ideological forces, differences in the possibilities for coercion of actors, competition over the control of resources and a lack of legal clarity over local self-government in the new state. Within these intra-territorial conflicts at this time, the struggle between Rossel’ and Chernetskii stands out as it developed further than others into a form of institutionalised competition that transformed from simple personality politics into competing pseudo-political movements.348 While this conflict was publicly exercised through the city’s electorate, who were made to distinguish between oblast and city

347 Starsev (1999) and Gel’man and Golosov (1998)
348 Gel’man and Golosov (1998)
interests, it continued to involve the economic elites of the region at the same time behind the public facade.

Emerging from the shadow of patron-client relations

In looking at the governor-mayor conflict in Sverdlovsk Oblast we can see the breakdown of patron-client relations under conditions where it was prompted by one of the sides independently exiting the network. This further develops the understanding of the nature of Rossel’’s power (and gubernatorial power as an institution), as it grew from informal, pragmatic leadership to seeking greater formalised elite cohesion. Patron-client network theory has suggested that it is possible for informal relations to continue after roles have been institutionalised, undermining these institutions and hindering their development.349 Further, it has been argued that a mutual dependency emerges between patron and client over the exchange of resources, stunting the will of actors to eventually break free from such ties.350 While it would seem logical to suggest that the longer patron-client ties continue, the more likely they are to develop into personalised relations, the fractious Rossel’-Chernetskii relationship demonstrates the potential for collapse in relations once a client has left the patron’s orbit.

As explained below, Rossel’’s choice of Chernetskii for Ekaterinburg mayor was a pragmatic one, prioritising third-party support (industrial elites in this case, rather than a functioning bureaucracy) over institutional or personal ties. Once ‘reciprocal dependency’351 lost its relevance, Rossel’ found that he no longer enjoyed a position of control over Chernetskii’s position – a different outcome to relations enjoyed elsewhere in the oblast whereby he was able to retain the loyalties of clients. The short time span

351 Stein (1984), p.34
of Rossel’s patronage of Chernetskii (just under two years) and the distinct lack of personal ties between the two meant that such dependency between the patron and client did not become habit, and once outside of the formal boundaries of the network, precluded any sense of loyalty on behalf of Chernetskii towards his former patron, with the result that he began to challenge Rossel’s dominance of the political space and allocation of resources to other clients that he had held. Whereas initially the patron-client ties between them had served to add a layer of legitimacy to their positions, as these ties were severed the emerging competition between the two for political power at the gubernatorial and mayoral level can be seen as instrumental in the public rather than state-legal process of institutionalisation of the political power structure of the region, introducing a degree of pluralism and accountability to these positions.

Considering that the breakdown of the formal relationship was caused by external factors to the governor-mayor relationship following the reversal of the Urals Republic, why did Chernetskii break out of the dyadic patron-client relationship with Rossel? To turn this question around, what was different about Chernetskii that made Rossel’ unable to retain his loyalty in the same way that he retained the loyalties of the industrial and economic elite in the region? Secondly, as he developed into an opponent of Rossel’, and became a similarly long-standing political figure in the region, how did Chernetskii construct his own political capital outside of this relationship and how did it compete with that of his former patron?

**A growing counterweight to power in the region – the trajectory of Chernetskii from client to opponent**

As personal power and the preservation of such took priority over the subordination to state interests, which were poorly, when at all, articulated by higher instances, the system of appointing political actors resulted in a continuation of the patronage traditions of regional power and precluding the development of a neutral professional
bureaucracy. This is not to say that those in such positions enjoyed complete free rein over appointments, dismissals, policy directions and other actions, as there was a need to at least acknowledge the competing interests of different sections of the elite.\textsuperscript{352} Within existing patron-client structures, other clients of the same patron would certainly be able to lobby for or against the entry of new clients and only agreed to changes in the political structure to go ahead if there was a benefit to them.\textsuperscript{353} Much like conditions for citizens socioeconomically, in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Soviet rule regional political power incurred its own struggle for day-to-day survival before the new rules of the game (loyalty to El'tsin, the seizure of resources and support of influential elites) established themselves.

Already in late 1991-early 1992, Rossel' clearly understood the nuances of being an appointed regional leader. To balance the uncertainty from above (in conditions where the victory of ‘pro-reform' forces was not yet assured) he realised the value of support from the most influential sections from within the regional economic elite. The appointment of his own proposed candidate as mayor of the capital city of the region was the first test of Rossel's authority within the region, and as such, it was critical that he not be challenged over this choice, particularly by the very elites that he supposedly represented. At this time, before the development and consolidation of Rossel' and his team as a strong political force, support for Rossel''s proposed candidate was conditionally balanced within the framework of what the industrial elite of Ekaterinburg saw themselves potentially gaining from the new political order. In the few months that had passed since the final collapse of the Soviet system, the prominent position of the directors’ corps in the region had hardly changed despite economic collapse in the

\textsuperscript{352} The mayors of the majority of regional capitals and cities with importance to the centre were officially appointed by El’tsin in 1992, upon the recommendation of the appointed regional governors. Gel’man, Ryzhenkov, Belokurova and Borisova (2008), p.58-9

\textsuperscript{353} The ability of entrenched elites to obstruct leaders from making changes that they did not approve of, particularly at the regional level, should not be underestimated. Archie Brown makes this underlying point in his discussion of the changes in personnel in the higher echelons of the Soviet Communist Party conducted by Gorbachev at the beginning of his leadership – that members of the elite could have blocked Gorbachev from making many of the appointments that he did, but that they themselves saw the potential benefits of a certain amount of reform. Brown (1996), pp.53-129
heavy industry and military-industrial sectors. Thus, the choice of Chernetskii, the
General Director of the Uralkhim mash factory in the city, one of the largest industrial
plants which dominated the southern part of the city, was uncontroversial and carried
the support of other members of the city’s director-elite. While never personally close
to him, the convenience of this candidate once again highlights Rossel’s pragmatic
early approach to leadership, shoring up his own position with regards to the economic
elite and developing his patronage of this group at the expense of perhaps not having a
closer ally as the head of Ekaterinburg. The directors of a number of other large
enterprises from the city, including the influential Uralmash (*Uralskii Mashinostroitelnnyi
Zavod*) plant, were firmly behind Chernetskii’s nomination, publicly praising his
‘managerial qualities’ and ‘suitability’ for the post to convince a politicised general
public. Most importantly, in selecting a candidate from within the existing ‘director
corps’, Rossel’ was taking care to maintain the structural *status quo ante* of the recent
past, under which the interests of the military-industrial complex, heavy industry and
construction figured high on the agenda. Through bringing in another member of the
industrial elite rather than a member of the political elite, he was acknowledging their
primacy in the region and acquiring their support to begin the legitimisation of his
leadership. From the perspective of the directors, their agreement to Chernetskii’s
nomination is of importance, not least because in the hierarchy of industry in
Ekaterinburg, the Uralmash factory can be traditionally ranked higher in importance
than Khimmash. Although Rossel’ was also part of the director elite in the region, his
movement into political power meant that he was in a position to influence and control
the development of local and regional industry; in supporting and pressing for another
figure from within their own sub-section of the elite to be within the upper administrative
structures, the directors were hedging against any future risk to their interests.

354 Interview with Anatolii Kirillov, Ekaterinburg, March 2011
Rossel’ with a list of material demands should he be the chosen figure, which the regional press seized on
as being unreasonable and somewhat greedy. The directors of a number of industrial enterprise wrote an
open letter to the *Ural’skii rabochii* paper stating that ‘the Mayor of such a city should be supported both
morally and materially more than others’.
On the basis that the governor was appointed by the centre to run the region and, with the lack of popular elections to the position, the selection of Chernetskii as Mayor brought him under Rossel’’s patronage. Chernetskii’s managerial knowledge of industry in the region complemented Rossel’’s own enterprise management experience, and was promoted as being of vital importance in preventing socioeconomic conditions from spiralling further downwards in the regional capital. In the choice of experience and knowledge over political ideology, which is to say, stability and pragmatism over uncertainty (the very characteristics that Rossel’ pronounced himself to espouse) there are echoes of the choice that El’tsin made in appointing Rossel’ as regional leader.357 Certainly, Chernetskii’s early approach to running the city chimes with Rossel’’s experience at the regional level; a managerialist approach to running city affairs and building a team based on former contacts and personnel with experience in administration, with the ability to fulfil the functions required given priority over ideological position. As expected under the terms of patronage, Chernetskii supported the governor in return for assistance from the regional administration in financing and running the city. In the period of the Urals Republic, there was cautious support from the city’s administration for the regional executive, while city, town and district affairs appeared low on the radar of the regional leadership providing the mayor with room to construct his own system of control over the city.358

The breakdown of the patron-client relationship that tied them together allowed for conflict between the governor and the mayor to erupt. The effect that Rossel’’s dismissal as regional leader in November 1993 had on his political status regionally and federally has already been discussed in previous chapters, but a further effect of El’tsin’s decision to remove the principal actor of the Urals Republic was to set in

357 See the interviews with Arkadii Chernetskii in Ural’skii rabochii immediately prior to and after his appointment as Ekaterinburg Mayor by El’tsin. ‘V mery ne naprashivalsia’, Ural’skii rabochii, 18 January 1992, p.1 and ‘Zhit’ stanet luchshe?’, Ural’skii rabochii, 13 February 1992, p.1
358 As the regional branches of power were located in Ekaterinburg, there was much opportunity for city and regional branches of power to exchange views. This did not spread to the rest of the region, however. For example, Nikolai Didenko, the mayor of Sverdlovsk Oblast’s second city, Nizhnii Tagil, initially complained about the lack of attention paid to local self-government by Rossel’ and his government and spoke of poor region-city ties. ‘Nam ne khvataet optimizma’, Ural’skii rabochii, 12 March 1992, p.1
motion the future collision between the two most influential figures within his home region. With Rossel’’s dismissal, the patron-client relationship that Chernetskii had signed up to ceased to exist as the Ekaterinburg Mayor remained in his position and Rossel’ no longer held any political leverage over him. While the Ekaterinburg mayor may well have expected himself to become the next governor of the region, the appointment of one of his own deputies, Aleksei Strakhov, left him in an extraordinary position; Chernetskii now found a member of his own staff above him in the vertical hierarchy. While this could have led to antagonism between the mayor and the newly appointed governor, the important difference here is that Strakhov did not attempt to act as patron to Chernetskii and instead, formed close and cooperative ties with the mayor, providing the new governor with a minor degree of legitimacy within the regional capital, and re-balancing the governor-mayor into a cooperative rather than the hierarchical relationship that was the basis of Rossel’’s power structure. With Rossel’’s instant return to regional political life in the Federation Council and regional Duma moving him away from formal influence over the city mayor, Chernetskii could begin to assert his own political position on issues that had remained unvoiced while Rossel’ had been regional leader. Belatedly speaking out against the Urals Republic, Chernetskii grew in political confidence, and began to advocate a mildly conflicting approach to that of his former patron with regards to the allocation of powers between federal-regional and regional-city (and town and district) relations. While this was far removed from the struggle between the regional executive and legislative branches that emerged soon after over the regional charter, it marks the beginning of competition to Rossel’’s public appeal in Ekaterinburg, which had previously been unthreatened due to public sympathy in the battle against federal hegemony. Further to this, Strakhov’s struggle to impose his personality on the public left Chernetskii as a clear alternative to Rossel’ in the region overall, increasing the perceived threat to Rossel’’s

359 Interview with Gennadi Korobkov, Ekaterinburg, December 2011. Korobkov was Strakhov’s deputy governor from August 1994 to August 1995 in charge of relations with society. Korobkov noted the closeness of political ties between Strakhov and Chernetskii while the former was regional leader that allowed for a strong degree of close coordination between the city and the regional administrations in this period.
popularity as the former client began to openly challenge his former patron.\textsuperscript{360} It is this threat that sparked the development of what was to become a long-running conflict between the two, lasting until the end of their regional political careers at the end of the first decade of the 2000s.

Three themes are highlighted below in governor-mayor relations in Sverdlovsk Oblast that demonstrate Rossel’’s loss of patronage over the mayor and the actions taken to try to limit the possibilities of Chernetskii threatening his domination over the regional elite and the political space. Firstly, we look at the role of local self-government within the region as the catalyst for conflict. Clear contradictions emerged between previously advocated positions on state structure and Rossel’’s behaviour towards local self-government in general (not only with regards to Ekaterinburg), of which there were 62 towns and cities and 73 municipal (and district) entities in the region by 1998.\textsuperscript{361} Secondly, as the conflict was brought into the open and as both sides sought to popularise their legitimacy, competing political movements representing the positions of their figureheads took over the political space inside the city. While these political movements did indeed lend an air of pluralism to the political space, they were fundamentally competing at different levels, limiting the reach of Chernetskii’’s own political party ‘Our Home, Our City’ (\textit{Nash Dom Nash Gorod}) to largely within Ekaterinburg. Finally, we look at the role of the industrial elite that had supported both figures, looking at why the need to maintain elite support prevented the escalation of this conflict beyond electoral competition and precluded the use of force strategies.

\textsuperscript{360} Korobkov further notes Strakhov’s demonstrably weaker skills at public speaking. The implication was made that this left him appearing less charismatic than both Rossel’ and Chernetskii affecting his ability to construct greater support with the public sufficient to rival Rossel’.

\textsuperscript{361} ‘Kak podelish’, tak i poznesh’, \textit{Ural’skii rabochii}, 4 February 1998, p.2
Local self-government in Russia and the grounds of governor-mayoral contest

Local self-government has played a mixed role in the development of Russian society since the nineteenth century. From the zemstvo reforms of low-level rights for local formations to manage a closely limited sphere of powers, to the early Bolshevik demands for ‘all power to the Soviets’ with local councils being formed at all levels, a functioning system of local self-government that could resolve specific local problems at the immediate level at which they arose (and able to function independently of the bureaucracy of both the tsarist guberniia and the communist system of subordination) has remained elusive in the reform of the structure of the state.\textsuperscript{362} With the end of the Soviet state, the system of local self-government began to evolve once again. The break from the system of tight Party supervision over the raikomy and gorkomy of the Soviet system of municipal and district power to what effectively became an abandoned area of the state for many years (notwithstanding the passage of the highly ineffective federal governing law “On the general principles of organising local self-government in the RF” in 1995), meant that local self-government became a contested area of political control between regional administrations and units of local self-government, focused around the allocation of (financial) resources, the division of property and the pace and results of privatization. The lack of functioning legislation to regulate the actions of local self-government, which was supposed to work in accordance to a hierarchical system of legal regulation with the Constitution of the RF as the highest law followed by federal law, regional law and the Charter of the local self-government, both provided and restricted the political-legal space for the exercise of power at the local level.

Although according to the 1993 constitution local self-government was officially outside of state power, regional leaders were able to use the administrative resources available

\textsuperscript{362} See Gel’man, Ryzhenkov, Belokurova and Borisova (2008), pp.38-98 for an account of the development of local self-government from the 19th century to the modern day.
to them to appoint or ensure election of their own people to positions in local administrations and coerce opponents into obeying the *de facto* hierarchy of power. As a result, the interests of regional power could be easily projected onto the local level, effectively stripping local self-government of the intended right to be able to resolve issues and continuing the top-down bureaucratic tendencies of the Soviet past. Regional capital cities and larger cities in the provinces were the strongest units of local self-government and generally the most capable of contesting this, whereas small towns were unable to resist regional pressures. As the shift of responsibilities transferred from the state to the regions, which in turn passed the burden of maintaining the social contract onto local self-government, the latter faced the rising costs of providing public utilities, housing, education services and basic social welfare on budgets that were inadequate to deal with such socially vital responsibilities. For affected larger cities and districts, seeking additional rights of taxation, budget formation and control over the privatization of property in order to pay for the essential services required in their territory brought them into conflict with regional administrations.\(^{363}\)

In Sverdlovsk Oblast and its capital, Ekaterinburg, this fuelled the long-running conflict between the two most powerful and influential figures in the region, gaining momentum throughout the 1990s, increasing in intensity after Rossel’’s election as governor in August 1995. The conflict between governor and mayor, importantly, kept Chernetskii in the public eye outside of the regional capital, and provided an element of balance to the dominating regional leader.\(^{364}\) Many of the ideas that had been central to the federal-regional dispute in the first half of the decade recurred at the regional-local level, particularly to do with the division of power and allocation of authority, resulting in

\(^{363}\) Gel’man, Ryzhenkov, Belokurova and Borisova (2008) estimate that 75% of local self-government budget was spent just on housing, education, health care and welfare payments (p. 29). The upkeep and privatization of other vital infrastructure such as electricity, water, heating, roads and public transport were among the others areas requiring the attention of local self-government.

\(^{364}\) Both Rossel’, replaced by Aleksandr Misharin by President Medvedev in November 2009, and Chernetskii, replaced by an appointed ‘city manager’ rather than elected mayor in 2010, became senators from Sverdlovsk Oblast to the Federation Council upon the end of their regional powers.
a struggle for control over resources (political, economic and physical) at their respective levels.

As implied above, building a new and functional system of local self-government in the new Russian state was not something that held a great deal of interest to members of the federal or regional elite. The centre allowed regional leaders to build their own political systems in return for their support and, prior to a federal law outlining the principles of local self-government eventually being passed in 1995 (and only as pressure grew to have such a law in place before Russia joined the Council of Europe), regional leaders in the Federation Council had been able to actively hinder the development of any formal delineation of the powers of local self-government formations on the basis that it was against their interests to allow the development of local power outside of their influence, and worse, permit elections to local and district executive bodies, removing the power that they had in appointing and dismissing city, town and district leaders.365 With the cascading system of legal hierarchy still to be put into effect, in early 1995 the Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma, led by Rossel’, passed its own regional law on local self-government before the federal law had been passed. Such a move was viewed by Chernetskii as both hostile and premature as it promoted adherence to regional law before even knowing its obligations under federal law.

Combined with the regional charter and pursuit by Rossel’ of gubernatorial elections, it was clear by the summer of 1995 that Chernetskii was not prepared to return to the previous patronage relations. With the mayor’s mandate expiring in March 1996, Rossel’ and his supporters in the Oblast Duma began to lobby for the holding of an early mayoral election. The tactic of trying to hurry elections in the hope that one side would be underprepared is normally used by the incumbent trying to limit the campaigning time of rivals; in this case, the pro-Rossel’ camp in the regional Duma were trying to force the pace of mayoral elections in order to hold them on the same

365 As Gel’man et al point out, patrons need to be elected before the clients or else risk losing control and influence over them, in the same way that many in the centre wanted presidential elections to be held before gubernatorial elections. Gel’man, Ryzhenkov, Belokurova and Borisova (2008), pp.95-96
day as gubernatorial elections to link their own candidate for mayor, Anton Bakov, to Rossel’s gubernatorial candidacy, while connecting Chernetskii to Strakhov. The regional Duma was unable to force the holding of mayoral elections at their preferred moment due to the lack of laws agreeing the procedure for mayoral elections (popular election or election by the City Duma), and they were delayed until mid-December 1995, eventually being held on the same day as the RF Duma elections. The contesting of the first mayoral elections will be dealt with in the section below, but we should mention here that following Rossel’s victory in the gubernatorial elections, a new series of attempts, this time through the Oblast Court (and reportedly via the RF Ministry of Justice), were made to prevent popular elections to the mayor’s post from taking place.

The development of a system of prefectures (as discussed in the previous chapter) came partly as a response to mayoral elections, and underline the contradiction in Rossel’s own campaign to attain the right to greater economic independence from the centre and clarification of the status of the region with regards to local politics. As we have already noted, the creation of prefectures was designed to apply a degree of pressure on local self-government on the part of the regional executive, and it should be viewed not only in the context of Rossel’s return to power, but also in the growing differences between himself and Chernetskii. The electoral mandate Rossel had just received from the citizens of the region and the negotiation of the bilateral agreements formally devolving greater political and economic powers from the centre to the region had resulted in his dominance over the region, but in the growing discrepancy between how he saw relations with Moscow and his attitudes towards internal power in the

366 Grigorii Golosov, (2004), Political parties in the regions of Russia: democracy unclaimed, Boulder CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.130. Bakov was at this time formally part of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) but was closely linked to Rossel’ and the Preobrazhenie Urala movement, although was not formally put up for election by Rossel’s movement (Ivanov (2014), p.239)

367 Two days before the mayoral election was due to be held the Oblast Ministry of Justice ruled the Ekaterinburg city charter illegal as a high number of city deputies had been absent for the vote accepting it, which in the words of the court ‘violated the rights of a high number of Ekaterinburg residents.’ This meant that any election would violate federal law in what seems an obvious attempt from Rossel’s side to prevent them from proceeding. The use of the Ministry of Justice added a layer of disguise to this, so as not to damage Rossel’s credibility in the eyes of the city.
region lies the development of the political rivalry with Chernetskii. The series of bilateral treaties agreed between Rossel’ and Moscow delineated those powers that were to be of federal-only, regional-only and joint jurisdiction, and Chernetskii argued that the next logical step was to complete a similar process between region and local self-government to provide the final link in the chain of state structure.\textsuperscript{368} Having achieved the desired transfer of powers from the centre, rhetoric from Rossel’ on local self-government toughened significantly from that of greater rights to be transferred downwards to talking openly about the need to strengthen state vertical power (notwithstanding agreements already reached between centre and region).\textsuperscript{369} With the executive and legislative branches working in tandem, Rossel’ could control the debate, arguing that increasing the rights of local self-government threatened to undermine the powers of the governor, who would no longer have any oversight over heads of local self-government now that they were elected.\textsuperscript{370} This was a weak argument, not least because through control over both branches of regional power Rossel’ had regained the monopoly over the allocation of administrative resources – such as control over (and delay of) fiscal transfers, and the transfer of regional property to municipal funds – that could be used to apply pressure on local actors not acting according to the regional executive’s wishes, even after popular elections to local self-government formations.\textsuperscript{371} The introduction of prefectures applied increased pressure on local self-government formations in the region in return for obedience. That this was implemented in violation of federal and regional laws on the separation of powers did not slow down the process, as pro-Rossel’ officials, already holding administrative

\textsuperscript{368} ‘Poluchil vlast’, peredai dal’she’, \textit{Ural’skii rabochii}, 28 February 1996, p.1
\textsuperscript{369} A marked change can be seen in Rossel’’s public statements from early 1996 onwards as he began to develop the theme of prefectures within Preobrazhenie Urala and later at widened meetings of the RF government.
\textsuperscript{370} ‘Skvoz’ status zamertsali vybory’, \textit{Ural’skii rabochii}, 27 February 1997, p.1
\textsuperscript{371} Anatolii Kirillov spoke about the lack of competition in the region and the various administrative resources available and used by Rossel’ and his team over regional politicians. With control over the allocation of property to the municipal level and influence among the industrial elites, for example, pressure could easily be applied to the local level, not only by prefects but by the regional leadership also (see Chapter six, footnote 322).
positions in local self-government, were appointed prefects.\(^{372}\) In Rossel”s view, having local self-government outside the vertical power system, that is to say not directly subordinate to regional power, increased the reality of the erosion of central power and the disintegration of the state (a key theme in Moscow’s rejection of the Urals Republic).\(^{373}\) Ironically, he attacked what he claimed to be his opponent’s ‘demagoguery’ with regards to local self-government, claiming that Chernetskii was interpreting local self-government as the concentration of total power in the hands of one person at the head of local administrations.\(^{374}\)

**Ekaterinburg versus Sverdlovsk: a case of asymmetric competition**

How the conflict, which on the surface was over ideas of regional administrative construction, was brought into the foreground shows the nascent institutionalisation of competition in the region. In the previous chapter the formation and activity of Rossel”s political movement, *Preobrazhenie Urala*, was noted as a vehicle for consolidating his position and forming a disciplined and controlled political unit to compete in regional Duma elections, challenge the newly installed governor and maintain Rossel”s leading public position in the region. As the first genuinely successful regional political movement in Russia (as opposed to a regional branch of a federal party), *Preobrazhenie Urala* demonstrated the value of political organization to regional actors. It is of no surprise then that the same approach, having being highly successful for Rossel’, was taken by others in the region to challenge the governor.

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\(^{373}\) ‘Otvet krizisu – ideia gosudarstvennosti – doklad gubernatora Rosselia na XIV s’ezde obshchestvennogo nepartiinogo ob”edinenia “PU” 17 aprelia 1999, g. Nizhnii Tagil’, *Oblastnaia gazeta*, 21 April 1999, p.3. At the 14th Congress of Preobrazhenie Urala in April 1999 (and at a time when Rossel’ was building his political movement to go federal to compete in the 1999 RF Duma elections), he said there were three options for strengthening the state; a return to the past in the unitary state, a confederacy (prompted by local self-government), which would lead to disintegration, or his way, the creation of prefectures to supervise local self-government.

The difference in political culture between the regional capital city and the rest of the Oblast plays an important role in the Rossel’-Chernetskii conflict; regional capitals are generally expected to be more politically educated and, thus, show a greater propensity towards demonstrating varying preferences, than other oblast cities, due to them being the chief location of the academic institutions and decision making organs. This difference was demonstrated in the first gubernatorial elections held in 1995, where a wide ideological split between regional capital and oblast was represented in the division of the vote for Rossel’ and Strakhov based on their respective approaches to the federal centre. As the central location of those seeking election, the Ekaterinburg population was highly connected not only to the campaign process, but to the perceived consequences of both candidates’ approaches – subordination or confrontation with the centre – with the results demonstrating a clear preference for ending confrontation with the federal authorities. In the socio-demographic balance of the region, Ekaterinburg makes up approximately a quarter of the Oblast population; Rossel’ was aware of the fact that he only needed to maintain the support of the wider oblast electorate (the industrial and worker cross-section) rather than attempting to achieve majority support of the regional capital, while also convincing those members of the city population without a direct stake in the industrial sector (the intelligentsia and those involved in trade and services).

In the inaugural Ekaterinburg mayoral elections, finally held in December 1995, the issues around which the gubernatorial campaign had played out were still fresh in citizens’ memories. Once again, campaigning was centred around two sides of the state-structure coin – Chernetskii advocating greater devolution of power to local self-government, against Rossel’’s candidate, Anton Bakov, who was campaigning on a platform of greater integration of the city into the system of regional power and returning the mayor’s post to the patronage of the governor. The incumbent mayor’s victory was comprehensive, and can be further viewed through the prism of the fallout from the gubernatorial battle between Rossel’ and Strakhov; the results of the RF State
Duma elections in the city that were held on the same day as mayoral elections showed a clear division along a region-city axis in the voting behaviour. In Ekaterinburg, the Our Home is Russia party (Nash Dom Rossiia) for which Strakhov was the regional head of party, came out on top with approximately 12 percent of the city vote compared to Rossel’s Preobrazhenie Otechestva (Transformation of the Fatherland – the federal branch of the Preobrazhenie Urala movement), which polled fifth in the city with 8% of the vote, behind Iabloko, Demokraticheskii Vybor Rossii and the distinguished eye surgeon Stanislav Federov’s Partiia samoupravleniia trudiashchikhsia. Conversely, the results for the entire oblast put Preobrazhenie Otechestva party in first place, with 12.1% of the vote and NDR third, behind Zhirinovskii’s LDPR, with 8.35%, underlining the position of Ekaterinburg in Sverdlovsk regional politics with regards to Rossel. On the basis of the endorsement received from the city and the obvious differences between the regional and city electorate, Chernetskii formed Our Home, Our City (Nash Dom Nash Gorod – NDNG) in early 1996, following an agreement with Chernomyrdin’s federal party, Nash Dom Rossiia (NDR). This new political movement united seven regional branches of federal political parties, including Boris Federov’s “Forwards, Russia” (Vpered Rossiia) and the local NDR branch. Chernetskii made the case that it was not strong opposition to Preobrazhenie Urala, but was a local party focused on local issues – the further transferral of powers taken by the region from the centre to the local level. With elections to a new, bicameral regional legislature on the horizon NDNG followed the model chosen by its rival Probrazhenie Urala, and constructed its political identity almost entirely on the personality of Chernetskii. Announcing its aims as being primarily ‘to protect the interests of the city’ (against regional-level transgressions), NDNG focused its campaign on having the regional law on local self-government rewritten, as

375 ‘Gaidar vperedi ne shagaet’, Oblastnaia gazeta, 22 December 1995, p.1
376 Ibid.
377 ‘Arkadii Chernetskii – Nash Dom-Nash Gorod’, Ural’skii rabochii, 29 March 1996, p.5. (Electoral advert). The idea of ‘weak opposition’ has become a theme in post-Soviet Russian party politics, particularly under Putin’s presidency, for example, Spravedlivai Rossiia (Just Russia) upon their formation announced themselves as an ‘opposition’ party that largely supported the policies of the president and planned to work with Edinaia Rossiia within the RF State Duma. Spravedlivai Rossiia visit to SSEES, 16 June 2008.
by this time it clashed with recent federal law.\textsuperscript{378} The idea of weak opposition quickly developed into outright competition between \textit{Preobrazhenie Urala} and NDNG (for which we should read as between Rossel’ and Chernetskii) over the 1996 and 1999 regional Duma election cycles and also for the 1999 gubernatorial elections.

Due to the effectiveness of Rossel’’s strategy towards the Oblast’s industrial sector and the reliant population, Chernetskii had little hope of enjoying similar reach outside of the capital, and candidates that attached themselves to the NDNG movement were from outside of the networks of the ruling elite.\textsuperscript{379} The pool from which Chernetskii could draw support was increasingly diminished as elections to local self-government became the norm, with a large number of heads of local administration participating in \textit{Preobrazhenie Urala} in return for appointment and delaying of competitive local elections. The result of this was that no matter how much Chernetskii and NDNG attempted to place local self-government at the heart of the 1996 regional Duma election campaign it remained a largely Ekaterinburg-centric issue, drowned out by Rossel’’s gubernatorial victory that had prioritised regional primacy over local issues. Despite this, NDNG became an established political party in the regional Duma, and a counterweight to \textit{Preobrazhenie Urala} in the regional legislature. By the 1998 Oblast Duma elections, NDNG returned sufficient deputies to break the \textit{Preobrazhenie Urala} majority in the legislature, although not enough to form a majority itself or install one of its own deputies as speaker.\textsuperscript{380} Yet there was little in the party discourse to suggest that the movement had matured into a party that could challenge reliance of the wider region on Rossel’, let alone represent its interests at the federal level.\textsuperscript{381} NDNG

\textsuperscript{378}’Poluchil vlast’, peredai dal’she’, \textit{Ural’skii rabochii}, 28 February 1996, p.1
\textsuperscript{379} Rossel’ was quick to use his resources against members of local self-government that allied themselves with Chernetskii, for example, Boris Poluiakhtov, the mayor of the city of Kamen’-sk-Ural’sk (close to Ekaterinburg). On becoming a member of NDNG, Poluiakhtov quickly found himself on the wrong end of regional administrative resources and soon after was defeated by Viktor Iakimov, the chairman of the Oblast Duma economic and finance policy committee and Rossel’ loyalist.
\textsuperscript{380} See Chapter 6 for discussion on attempts to remove Viacheslav Surganov from the role of Speaker of the Oblast Duma in 1998.
\textsuperscript{381} The mutual accusations of dirty campaigning underline the degree of competition that had developed between the two sides, as previously, Rossel’’s popularity had reduced the overt need for the use of ‘political technologies’. Chernetskii publicly criticised the regional administration for using
remained restricted in its reach and scope, continuing to be a party primarily of the regional capital and still heavily relying on the discourse of local self-government. In comparison, Preobrazhenie Urala, now chaired by Rossel”s close ally Surganov, continued to focus on regional and federal political ideas, including where these intersected with local matters.

The 1998 regional Duma elections had been seen as a way of measuring Chernetskii’s prospects for a gubernatorial challenge in 1999, and NDNG’s success led to him challenging for the governorship. The limitations of the NDNG movement, and of Chernetskii himself, were highlighted by the ease with which Rossel’ won re-election. According to political analysts at the time, on the basis of clearly being identified as the second most-visible politician in the region, Chernetskii and his electoral team assumed that passage into the second-round was all but a formality, and focused the majority of their resources on the expected head-to-head battle with Rossel’ in the second round.382 His electoral campaign found itself trapped within this paradigm, failing to portray him as Rossel”s equal, and suffering heavily when a leading member of his strategy team defected to Rossel”s administration in early 1999.383 The national

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382 Interview with Anatolii Kirillov, Ekaterinburg, March 2011.

383 The person in question, Alexander Kobernichenko, who was labelled Chernetskii’s ‘Grey Cardinal’, claimed he was making the switch to be able to act as peacemaker between the competing figures, but career development seems a more likely factor, once again highlighting the importance of retaining the
political landscape was also influential in this contest. Members of the entire political spectrum of the region, including from *Preobrazhenie Urala*, allied themselves with Moscow Mayor, Iurii Luzhkov’s *Otechestvo* (Fatherland) political party, on the basis that Luzhkov was being viewed as the potential next president.\textsuperscript{384} Chernetskii won the regional branch’s nomination to become the Sverdlovsk leader of Otechestvo, while Rossel’ made no attempts to link himself to the movement, preferring his own movement. The projection of the potential benefits of patronage from Luzhkov offered little additional credibility to Chernetskii’s candidacy in the outlying areas of Sverdlovsk Oblast, which was struggling with the effects of the August 1998 financial crisis, and even in Ekaterinburg such an alliance seemed even less inspiring than Strakhov’s ties to Chernomyrdin had been previously. The perception of Rossel’ as a regional-level actor, who had the experience and gravitas needed to function at the national level, eclipsed the electorate’s view of Chernetskii as being able to function at the same level. The strategic mistake of Chernetskii’s team in not ensuring a favourable first-round vote allowed Alexander Burkov, a minor figure in the regional Duma, to take second-place, with Rossel’ securing an overwhelming victory in the second-round of the election.\textsuperscript{385}

The separation of the Sverdlovsk and Ekaterinburg political space highlighted above prevented Rossel’ from gaining control of the city. However, it also limited the development of party competition in the region in that while Chernetskii and NDNG were able to participate in regional level elections (Duma and gubernatorial), they were not considered to be politicians or parties of the same level as Rossel’ and *Preobrazhenie Urala*. By highlighting the differences in scale between himself and his rivals Rossel’ was able to restrict the political ambitions of Chernetskii, despite NDNG’s


\textsuperscript{385} Elena Denezhkina and Adrian Campbell, (2009), ‘The struggle for power in the Urals’, in Cameron Ross and Adrian Campbell (eds), (2009), *Federalism and local politics in Russia*, Abingdon, Routledge, p. 211
electoral success in 1998 and the acceptance of the Ekaterinburg mayor as the second figure of the region, to such an extent that Chernetskii didn’t challenge Rossel’ in the final competitive gubernatorial elections held in the region in 2003. With the re-centralization of power that came with Putin’s presidency, the cancelling of gubernatorial elections and the emergence of Edinaia Rossiia (United Russia), regional party competition in its most limited form was eliminated from developing any further, sidelining the electorate and restoring the emphasis on centre-regional patronage.

Stability of interests – the role of the industrial elite in the balance of power between regions and cities

If the local popularity of Chernetskii and the presence of NDNG prevented Rossel’ from gaining a strong grip on the city, why didn’t the regional governor use his dominant position to force the outcome and insert a loyal client into the city? Gel’man’s typology of regional exit from transition suggests that a tacit agreement between regional elites in Sverdlovsk oblast emerged, establishing ‘competition within the rules’, rather than the brute force strategy of the ‘winner takes all’ scenario that was used in other regions.\(^386\) It has been argued that the low population proportion of Ekaterinburg to the rest of the region meant that it was, in a manner of speaking, punching above its weight in its role in the regional political system.\(^387\) For the regional administration, this meant that, while not ideal, their inability to dominate the regional capital was clearly not strategically fatal to its control over the region as a whole.

The situation established itself as such that, as long as the governor-mayor conflict didn’t escalate into equal competition for political space between the two (that is to say, as long as Chernetskii was unable to make the step from local to regional political

\(^{386}\) Gel’man, Ryzhenkov and Brie (2003) suggest Moscow city and Saratov Oblast as examples of ‘winner takes all’ transitions, whereby one dominant actor controlled the entire political space of the territory.  
actor), Rossel’ did not need to use stronger administrative measures, such as the legal pursuit of Chernetskii and his team, or the forcible seizure of municipal property.388 More importantly, the industrial and economic elite of both city and region acted as a regulating force on the lengths to which competition between the two could escalate. Even after popular election as governor, the industrial elites behind the positions of power still retained a large influence. While Rossel’ could take action against Chernetskii’s political supporters and conduct personalised electoral campaigns, striking against the mayor extra-legally would seriously upset the balance of resources. The electoral tactics of Rossel’’s campaign demonstrate how he was able to pitch the region-local split in such terms that were damaging to Chernetskii’s prospects of election and tells us much about the strategy of the Rossel’ regime in dealing with competition within the region. The power structure that developed in Sverdlovsk oblast holds strong echoes with the Soviet system, not just for its desire to order power within a hierarchy and integrate downwards. In maintaining the leading role of industry in the region, Rossel’ was able to deflect the challenge of rivals by constructing the political and economic structures in a way that only he could represent regional interests. As noted in the previous chapter when looking at the governor’s patronage of industry, one of the lines used to discredit Chernetskii in the 1999 gubernatorial elections was that the Ekaterinburg mayor represented the merchants – the development of trade over the historical traditions of production that the Urals are known for.389 By presenting the difference in region and local development in such stark terms, there was an indication to the industrial elite of the possibility that, should another candidate be elected, the region ran the risk of losing its production identity and moving towards an unknown post-industrial future (the replacement of industry with services). This threat to the future of the Urals highlighted the different playing levels of both candidates and brought industrial elite support to the Rossel’ camp in the gubernatorial elections. While

388 This doesn’t mean that elections were fought cleanly, as the use of ‘political technologies and ‘dirty’ PR dominated the 1999 gubernatorial elections and Ekaterinburg mayoral elections in 2003. Denezhkina and Campbell (2009), pp.211-213
389 Interview with Konstantin Kiselev, Ekaterinburg, September 2011
trade was now an important facet of Ekaterinburg’s economic structure, industry provided employment, supported small businesses and dominated entire districts of the city. The different levels of financial and administrative support on offer from the regional and local administration (particularly in the form of tax subsidies and relief) could ensure that they held an interest in retaining a clear distinction between governor and mayor. An attack against Chernetskii using more forcible methods to completely remove his opponent, such as the courts, rather than beating him at the polls, would have been seen by this branch of the elite either as an attack against the director corps, destabilising the regional economic balance, and would not have been supported.\textsuperscript{390} The industrial elite of the city offered their support to Chernetskii at the city level, while recognising the benefits they could have in continuing to support Rosssel’ at the oblast level, as demonstrated by defeat for Chernetskii in industrial districts of Ekaterinburg in the 1999 gubernatorial elections, but an overwhelming victory for him in the mayoral elections of the same year.\textsuperscript{391}

**Conclusions**

What we see from the deterioration of the Rosssel’-Chernetskii network is the management of competition by Rosssel’’s regime, under which he could tolerate the challenge from Chernetskii as long as it showed no sign of spreading outwards from the regional capital into the provincial areas of the territory. In this chapter and the preceding one, we can see a tendency for a clear compartmentalization of the elite, which formed itself into a rigidly hierarchical structure, under which each leading actor

\textsuperscript{390} Such a strategy worked for Putin against Yukos chairman, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in order to warn other oligarchs not to stray into the political arena. Yet, this was following the rise of a new interest group, the siloviki, who could wield huge resources from the federal level downwards.

\textsuperscript{391} In the 1999 gubernatorial elections Chernetskii won in the city centre Lenin District of Ekaterinburg, but failed to win in the two large industrial districts of the city, Chkalovskii District (Khimmash) and Zhelezodorozhnyi District (Uralmash). Rosssel’, on the other hand, took all of the larger towns and cities in the oblast surrounding Ekaterinburg, such as Nizhnii Tagil, Kamensk Ural’sk, Pervoural’sk, and Asbest, among others. The second-placed candidate in the first-round of the elections, Alexander Burkov, did not place higher than third in any Ekaterinburg district. See ‘Bez vtorogo tura ne oboit’s’, *Ural’skii rabochii*, 31 August 1999, p1, and ‘Chernetskii: my ne uchli, chto vybory – eto shou’, *Ural’skii rabochii*, 1 September 1999, p.1
had a role assigned and in which ‘stability in cadres’ appears to be the order of the day. This rigid structure, with its closely controlled organization through the *Preobrazhenie Urala* movement and attempt at the resurrection of vertical integration, made it possible for Rossel’ both to deflect competition and suffocate it where necessary. This was used to sustain Rossel’’s hegemony over the region through his exercise of the threat of alternatives being unable to acquire the same resources that he could.

The closed nature of the elite and the long duration of these clients of the network in the regional space are of great interest. None of the leading actors – Surganov, Vorob’ev, Chernetskii, even Bakov – moved any further along the line of hierarchy in any way during the 1990s, neither through their support for, nor opposition to Rossel’. Where Chernetskii failed in his challenge to Rossel’’s dominance throughout the latter half of the 1990s is in his inability to convince the elite (political and industrial) that he provided a viable alternative to Rossel’ and the *Preobrazhenie Urala* movement, a problem equally faced later by Anton Bakov in the 2003 gubernatorial elections when he turned from client to challenger. The rigid allocation of positions in Rossel’’s system provided stability and crushed any political competition to the extent that Chernetskii decided against challenging Rossel’ in future gubernatorial elections in 2003, instead choosing to align himself with the United Russia party and become a part of the state network of political elites, which saw him remain as Mayor until 2009. With the emergence of United Russia, all of the interest groups of the region were forced to step back from any political competition and merged into the restored centralised state vertical. The result going into the second decade of the new Russia was a degree of stagnation of cadres within the region as members of the Rossel’ clan placed position within the network over political development.
Chapter 8

Putin’s power vertical and the decline of Rossel’s regional leadership, 2000-2004

The post-El’tsin period saw a recentralisation process that pressed regional leaders either into voluntarily becoming supporters of the restoration of “vertical power” or finding themselves coerced into working within the new boundaries of centre-regional relations in order to maintain their positions. With his first major policy announcement upon becoming President in 2000, Vladimir Putin initiated a process of reversing the flow of power relations between centre and regions, ending El’tsin’s individualised bargaining with regional leaders in return for support. The detail of Putin’s federal reforms has been thoroughly dealt with elsewhere, but the standout features are the creation of seven federal districts, with an appointed plenipotentiary (polnomochnyi predstavitel’ prezidenta or polpred) to each district, reform to the Federation Council to the detriment of regional governors, and the president taking the right to dismiss governors for violations of federal law. Leaders that had dominated their regional political space throughout this period were quickly forced to adapt to the new circumstances, with the overwhelming majority of regional executives in the early 2000s finding it easier to abandon the previous relationship they had enjoyed with Moscow and subordinate themselves to more clearly articulated state interests under the new president. Steps towards re-establishing Moscow’s hegemony over the regions proceeded with little resistance, firmly closing the chapter of Russia’s experiment with greater scope for regional political action.

Having looked at the nature of the networks that were developed by the Sverdlovsk regional leader throughout the El’tsin decade, this chapter takes an overview of the period of the first Putin presidency (2000-2004) and asks how and why Rossel’s power...
relations were broken up by the forcible recentralisation of political capital. The gradual reduction of the ability of Rossel’ (and other regional leaders) to play a determining role in the development of the state through federal relations sharply reduced his dominant position as the patron of the region. The decline in Rossel’’s political power in the region can be connected to the ending of his monopoly position over relations with the centre. The erosion of regional political power, although allowing him to remain in the governor’s chair until 2009, transformed Rossel’ (as it did other regional executives) from being the source of regional political activity into becoming a tool of regional policy implementation.

Starting with an outline of the federal reforms that Putin pursued following election as president and the consequences of these reforms for regional leaders, the chapter notes the return to top-down leadership, removing regional leaders’ potential to influence outcomes through trading support in return for exceptions and favourable conditions. Through considering the role of the new presidential representative as an emerging rival for network attention in Sverdlovsk Oblast, the diminution of Rossel’’s position at the head of different elite groups becomes clear. Despite the lack of any formal powers allocated to this revival of an older system of observing the regions, downwards pressure from a federal centre that was tightening its hold over political activity of the state made it increasingly difficult for Rossel’ to maintain his prior position as the key distributor of resources in the region. By imposing a system of ‘total patronage’ exercised through a presidentially-headed pyramid (of which the key factor was the return of delegated powers ensuring control over political and economic resources), and a system of divide and rule that enforced central interests, the mechanisms for replacing regional patronage and why Rossel’’s boundary control failed under the change in federal circumstances are observed. The result was a
significant change from being at the heart of the movement for regions to be able to determine their own outcomes to that of clinging on to power at all costs.\textsuperscript{393}

**Changes in the source of legitimacy**

Political power within networks is specific to the situation that it exists in, and so it follows that in order to shift the balance of power a prospective patron must change the situation to assist the emergence of new political forces.\textsuperscript{394} In the previous chapters, the source of Rossel’\textquotesingle s regional power was found to be drawn from his tightly controlled relations with the regional elite and the centre that prevented alternative routes to decision making and distribution of resources becoming available. Such a structure was possible while the centre was forced into devolving powers to region in order to shore up support for the president. With the immediate announcement of federal reform to return control over the provinces to the Kremlin, the support structures around Rossel’ (and leaders that had built their power on similar power networks) began to see other potential resource distributors in federal business structures and central appointees, reducing the role Rossel’ could play as the sole actor capable of representing their network interests. That these new distributors of patronage were in turn subject to the patronage of the Kremlin in some form or another contributed to the restoration of top-down ‘vertical power’ emanating from the centre in a form that led to Rossel’ accepting a new function over time to in order to stay within the power structure of the state. In this we see the weakness of the type of power structure that Rossel’ had constructed under the new rules of the game that Putin was introducing, in which his own position in centre-regional relations was invested in links to a single individual. Under El\textquotesingle tsin, the system had given the opportunity for regional leaders to build their own power structures – part of the idea of restoring vertical power was to return regional governors into delegated ‘roles’ with expectant behaviour appropriate to how

\textsuperscript{393} Manfred Kets de Vries and Stanislav Shekshnia, (2008), ‘Vladimir Putin, CEO of Russia Inc.: the legacy and the future’, *Organizational Dynamics*, Vol. 37 No. 3, p. 236
\textsuperscript{394} Knoke (1990), p.1-2
the centre wanted to shape the institution. What we see in the case of Rossel' under Putin is an actor that had established himself as almost an individual client of the highest level patron being forcibly returned into a collective pool of network actors, rather than voluntarily submitting to the changes taking place.

The new class of bureaucrats ('chinovniki') that emerged under the Putin system, while far from being a professional bureaucratic class, were tied ideologically to the state network that Putin continues to head (and for the large part separating itself from society through membership and participation in the party of power, United Russia). Through these functionaries, the state gained a new method for the operation of centre-regional relations (as well as other aspects of political and social control) with a unifying sense of identity that the elites of the 1990s had never had. Utilising this new bureaucratic control, and the members of this segment of political society, the centre was able to rotate actors outside of their native regions, diminishing the scope for individual regions to act independently of the centre.

The federal reforms of May 2000 as the start of a slow decline in regional leadership

The turnover of prime ministers between 1998 and 1999, and the associated political instability that this brought, heightened by the August 1998 financial crisis, meant that political actors at the regional level presumed that a new president would need time to embed himself in the system and at the same time be reliant on regional leaders providing a stable political environment within the country. On the basis of this, they expected a degree of continuation in influencing policies in Moscow. The manner of the

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395 Knoke (1990), p.7
396 While at the time the recentralisation of power was seen as an attempt by Putin to impose his authority over the regions, more recent studies have noted that by its peak in 2004, it had failed to achieve the absolute subordination to a hierarchy of power that it had been intended to, with only 55% of presidential instructions being fulfilled. Monaghan (2012), p. 9.
397 Nikolay Petrov has called these non-native actors ‘Varangians’, derived from the Russian term ‘Variagi’, the 9th century Vikings that ruled Medieval Rus’. Petrov (2011), p.85
planned transfer of power from El’tsin to Putin, although not intended to herald a change in the political structure (rather a smooth transition and continuation of the system that would protect El’tsin and his ‘family’), required the construction of popular legitimacy in order that Putin be accepted as El’tsin’s successor. Only through stimulating society into supporting Putin, a previously obscure political figure before his appointment as Prime Minister in August 1999, could power be smoothly transferred to the new leader through the electoral process. As the latest in a string of Prime Ministers, Putin’s own political networks were not initially considered to be particularly strong, however, on the back of the successful and short conflict in the North Caucasus, the Edinstvo political party, whose primary role was to support his election as President in March 2000 presented him with a organised support network that could act as a conduit for channelling his increasing popularity. Upon election, popular electoral legitimacy plus the added support he had already gained from Edinstvo’s showing in the State Duma elections, demonstrated the success of the transition plan to install a new patron over the state. This gave Putin significant space to carry out a major overhaul of centre-regional relations as his first major policy initiative, signalling his intent to create what has become known as the ‘power vertical’.

In order to impose new rules of the game, the centre had to deconstruct the ‘pinch-point’ occupied by regional leaders in the state structure from which all processes, whether flowing downwards or upwards had to pass through. In order to remove this bottleneck, and with it the regions’ opportunities to dictate conditions to the centre, the means of implementing policy required a change in the system of governance at the top, moving away from having a single actor (El’tsin) deciding policy on the back of individual lobbying, and instead placing intermediaries into the centre-regional structure to remove the direct president-regional leader connection and exert federal authority in the regions.

With the aim of breaking into consolidated regional structures and occupying the space in order to put into practice the new rules of the game, the Kremlin introduced new actors into regional political and economic spheres to change the nature of centre-regional relations. One of the immediate effects of the federal reforms was the presentation of alternatives presented by the central leadership to the support structures and networks of the regional elite. The initial step for this was the introduction of presidential representatives. Sending emissaries into the regions was nothing new, and the immediate task facing these new presidential representatives was to assert themselves in what were largely closed elite circles. A further aspect of the presidential representatives’ role as overseers was that they inserted a deliberate layer of bureaucracy in the path of previously direct governor-presidential relations. El’tsin had attempted to use presidential representatives in each region to monitor the actions of the regional governors, but these figures had been easily rendered ineffective as his own appointees co-opted his monitors into becoming dependent on the resources controlled by the local leaders. The introduction of representatives under Putin aimed to avoid repeating these mistakes by reducing the number of representatives and making them cross-regional, with the most obvious difference being that in the economic recovery following the August 1998 financial crisis they were backed by (and had access to, although not control over) financial resources that their predecessors had not had, leaving them less likely to be susceptible to becoming reliant on the governors that they were supposed to be overseeing. With five out of the seven appointed representatives coming from different branches of the power ministries (the siloviki upon whom Putin has relied so much), we can easily equate them with discipline and loyalty to their master, further reducing the threat of regional co-optation.\footnote{The non-silovik representatives were Sergei Kirienko, the former Prime Minister (Volga Federal District) and Leonid Drachevskii, a former diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Siberian Federal District).} Marginalising the former channel of direct patron-client relations between president and governor was deepened by a restructuring of the Federation Council, the
federal representative body for the regions, removing the direct connection between
regional governors and state policy making and implementation.\textsuperscript{401} In transforming this
into a full-time upper chamber, Putin forced the regional executives into giving up their
position of being able to use the chamber to block legislation that was unfavourable to
regional interests, reaching an agreement with the regional leaders for their gradual
withdrawal from the Federation Council.\textsuperscript{402} These actions, along with the new right for
the president to dismiss popularly elected governors, signified a shift in the power
balance in favour of the federal centre and have been argued by some as the return to
a unitary state.\textsuperscript{403}

The new president’s path to rebuilding the Russian state required control over regional
leaders. Different methods were used by the centre to convince governors to support
the change in patron; some regional leaders became members of \textit{Edinaia Rossiia} as it
offered them electoral support required to remain in power, for others, membership of
this network offered the opportunity for fast career development as for example was the
case for Sergei Sobianin, who rose from being a member of the Federation Council for
Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Region in 1996, to governor of Tyumen’ Oblast in 2001,
Head of the Presidential Administration (from 2005-2010) and then Mayor of Moscow,
replacing Iurii Luzhkov in 2010. Not only was there a linearly vertical realignment
between regional leaders and the president, but also a shift in the vertical link between
local and regional elites, who were now able to connect federally without having to use
regional leaders as an intermediary bridge.\textsuperscript{404} The next section of this chapter looks at

\textsuperscript{401} The creation of the State Council became the new forum for governors offered as a mechanism for
governors to retain a degree of contact with President Putin, with a presidium made up of one regional
leader from each of the federal districts. Representatives from the regions to the presidium were chosen
on a rotating and short-term basis, and it is obvious that such a structure could not possibly replace the
individual network that existed between Rossel’ and El’tsin, for example. Sakwa (2002), p.134
\textsuperscript{402} Darrell Slider, (2005), ‘The regions’ impact on federal policy: the Federation Council’, in Peter
Reddaway & Robert Orttung (eds), (2005), \textit{The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform of Federal-
Regional Relations Volume II}, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, p.123
\textsuperscript{403} See, for example, Elizabeth Teague, (2002), ‘Putin reforms the federal system’, in Cameron Ross (ed.),
(2002), \textit{Regional Politics in Russia}, Manchester, Manchester University Press
\textsuperscript{404} See Vladimir Gel’man and Sergei Ryzhenkov, (2011), ‘Local Regimes, sub-national governance and
particular interest is the finding here that the restructuring of the power vertical removed competition
the strands of Rossel”s network power under Putin and the rival influence of the presidential representative.

The role of the presidential representative in Sverdlovsk Oblast – new patron or political inconvenience?

Having established the reasons behind the federal reforms implemented by Putin, we can now turn to look at Rossel”s approach to dealing with the impact of the revision of centre-regional relations. Frequent changes to the rules of how the state functions and their lack of transparency have been formulated into the idea of a “governance puzzle” existing for actors in Russian political life. An understanding of the how these rules work is an essential part of power in Russia, particularly knowing when a directive or order needs to be acted upon and when it can be ignored. While a number of leaders accepted the latest change in federal relations, the response to changes in the centre-regional relations from Rossel’ as well as from other regional leaders, such as his ally, Bashkortostan president, Murtaza Rakhimov, can be seen as being influenced by the fact that the rules of the game had previously been a process of negotiation for key regions. As a result, Putin’s reforms were initially seen as the latest in a series of changes to the system that would not seriously change the field in which the regional leaders would operate, nor threaten the special relationship between governor and president. This attitude was displayed in Rossel”s response to the appointment of General Petr Latyshev as the Urals Federal District presidential representative. The introduction of the presidential representatives signalled the beginning of the centre’s attempts to seize back control over areas of state power that had been given away. It left entrenched regional leaders such as Rossel’ having to adapt to the new practices of state administration; the unexpected lack of permanence of the settlement achieved between elites within the regions as the control over the distribution of resources and incentives for compliance was removed from the governors and returned to the central state. As long as activity didn’t challenge the strategy of the state (instead of the strategy of the governor), which included removing political competition to the state’s policies, then the reward was tacit permission for regional actors to act in their own interests.

Ledeneva (2011), p.39
in the El'tsin era and the swiftness with which the centre was able to start affecting the political and economic landscape in the regions contributed to the response to the reforms.\footnote{Pankevich (2008), p.8} The concept of the presidential representative was for Putin to install actors that were loyal to him into the regions and report back on the conditions of the regions. Additionally, their monitoring role was supposed to apply pressure on the regional governors and their manner of exercising regional power. Rossel’s perception was that as the \textit{polpred} had no formal powers, the arrival of Latyshev in Ekaterinburg could be shrugged off as being neither relevant nor affecting his relationship (as an ‘established’ and well-resourced regional leader) with the centre. However, the effect on Rossel’s regional leadership of the introduction of the presidential representatives to the newly created federal districts was to threaten his position at the head of the networks outlined in the previous chapters. The experience of political competition that Rossel had seen his strategy focus on preventing other actors holding the same access to the kinds of political, economic and social resources that he wielded, resulting in him being the key link in the chain inside the oblast and nationally.

As an outsider who was directly appointed by and reporting to the president, Latyshev posed a challenge to Rossel’ on how to prevent this new figure from accessing his networks. The creation of the presidential representative introduced a novel possibility into the regional political space; that the governor’s connections to the centre were no longer the only route to Moscow – an unfamiliar position in his role as governor.

Formally, the presidential representative was only supposed to keep the centre informed of what was happening in their federal district; in practice, they took up an active role in inter-regional political life, and their presence served as a reminder to the governors that, on the basis of their reports to the centre, the state could withdraw support for the governors. Although governors were popularly elected until the system of appointing regional leaders returned after 2004, the centre began to apply its own resources to support or contest re-election campaigns and influence results. The initial
tension that surfaced between Rossel’ and the presidential representative reflected this new paradigm of centre-regional relations based on an assertive centre, and should be interpreted as the former testing the durability of this new institution and whether it was going to be able to enforce its own rules of operation. Upon Latyshev’s arrival in Ekaterinburg, the capital of the Urals Federal District and where he was to be based, Rossel’ recycled a strategy from the El’tsin era, attempting to limit the access the competing actor had to resources and force the polpred to submit to his patronage. By manufacturing a scandal in Ekaterinburg that allowed him to publicly criticise Latyshev’s choice to locate his institution’s offices in the city’s centrally-located Children’s Palace of Culture (Dom Detskogo Tvorchestva), Rossel’ was attempting to embarrass the ‘outsider’ in the eyes of the local population, and signal to the polpred that he did not accept this encroachment on his regional authority. In response to such blatant attempts to force him into reliance on Rossel’, Latyshev singled out Sverdlovsk Oblast within the Urals Federal District for criticism in his reports to Moscow over the high level of discrepancies between regional and federal law, and personally criticised Rossel’ over his lack of success in dealing with organised crime in Sverdlovsk Oblast’ in the years of his leadership. In order to diminish the effect of his failure to influence the polpred, members of Rossel’’s administration began to apply a degree of cognitive dissonance to claim that the presidential representatives had never posed a threat to the regional political structure in the first place and had in fact been demanded by the regions.

407 In an interview with Vadim Dubichev, Rossel’’s press secretary in Ekaterinburg in January 2006, he argued that the institution of presidential representatives essentially removed nothing from governor-presidential relationship.
408 It was the Sverdlovsk regional government (as a key component of Rossel’’s power structure) that had allocated this building to Latyshev, although it was made to appear that the Presidential Representative himself had chosen this spot. Latyshev’s response was to use the Presidential Administration to quietly apply pressure on the region to resolve the issue. ‘Petr Latyshev detei ne obidit’, Cheliabinskii rabochii, 3 November 2000, (http://www.pressarchive.ru/chelyabinskiy-rabochiy/2000/11/03/320546.html) [last accessed 29/12/2014].
409 While this criticism didn’t link Rossel’ to organised crime on the surface, the subtext of the criticism was clearly to connect the two. Latyshev had a background in investigating high-level crimes and was the officer in charge of the investigation of the murdered State Duma member, Galina Starovoitova. Nelson and Kuzes (2002), para.11 of 41
410 Interview with Vadim Dubichev, Ekaterinburg, January 2006. Dubichev stated that in May 2000 the regional elite in Sverdlovsk Oblast had understood the need for federal reform and saw in Putin’s reforms...
Unlike the experience of the El’tsin administrations, the centre followed up federal reforms using its parliamentary support to pass legislation to substantiate it, prompting regional leaders to seek to adjust their own strategies for dealings with Moscow. In Sverdlovsk Oblast, this adjustment was necessitated by the threat of an alliance between the presidential representative and Rossel’s main rival, Chernetskii. Using the bargaining skills that had served him well with El’tsin, Rossel entered into more constructive dialogue with Latyshev in order to preserve his formal position, but also his informal position as the focal point for the regional elite.\footnote{Lynn D. Nelson and Irina Y. Kuzes, (2005), ‘Implications of the federal reform in three regions: Sverdlovsk, Smolensk, and Voronezh’, in Peter Reddaway & Robert Orttung (eds), (2005), The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform of Federal-Regional Relations Volume II, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, p. 436} A critical juncture in the Rossel-Latyshev relationship was reached ahead of the 2003 gubernatorial and State Duma elections, the last competitive gubernatorial election held in the region, which had the potential to once again result in a struggle between the ever-popular regional leader and the administrative resources of the state. Incorporating regional leaders into the new political system was a particularly clear component of Putin’s strategy for obtaining loyalty in centre-regional relations, particularly when it was time for incumbents to seek to maintain their position. Long-standing governors, who were proving difficult for the centre to control, were coerced into the ruling political party structure as a means of reducing their scope for independent political activity, starving them of the space to differentiate themselves from the state, and making their positions connected to compliance with the centre. In the run-up to the 2003 gubernatorial elections in Sverdlovsk Oblast, the deteriorating relations between region and centre echoed the 1990s as the central press portrayed Rossel as clinging to a fiefdom (votchina) that had no place in Putin’s attempted renewal of centralised federalism in
the country.\textsuperscript{412} In the new order, where loyalty to the ruling network in Moscow has been one of its most recognisable features,\textsuperscript{413} Latyshev offered the Sverdlovsk governor the opportunity to work with the United Russia (\textit{Edinaia Rossia}) party, which in turn offered Rossel' the chance to make amends for his initial criticism of federal reforms, affirm his loyalty to Putin, and receive the support of the Kremlin in gubernatorial elections, which might otherwise go to his local rivals.\textsuperscript{414} Bringing Rossel' under Moscow’s influence was important to Latyshev; the region was viewed as a test of the United Russia project in the Urals, and had Latyshev been unable to ensure this success for the party of power it would threaten his position both as the hand of the centre with regards to the regional elite and with regards to losing the confidence of his patron.\textsuperscript{415} This approach was seen elsewhere, such as in Orel Oblast, where Governor Egor Stroev, who had been the First Party Secretary of Orel Oblast under the Soviet system and remained a loyal member of the KPRF throughout the 1990s, was eventually brought into Edinaia Rossia in 2005, by which point gubernatorial elections had been cancelled, and was rewarded with reappointment to the governorship by Putin for another term.

As shown in the preceding chapters, an important aspect of Rossel'’s power had always been the management of the different group interests that existed in the region. In what should be seen as the beginning of the decline in his status as the patron of the region, by joining the United Russia movement, even as head of the regional branch of the party, Rossel’ now managed these interests as a client of the state network.

Considering that his close circle of trusted figures remained in place and that he


\textsuperscript{413} Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White have argued that Putin has replicated Andropov’s ideological tendency that loyalty to the network is a stronger binding force than loyalty to an individual. Kryshtanovskaya and White (2011), p.24

\textsuperscript{414} The campaign against Rossel’’s re-election as governor was being led by Chernetskii, who backed Rossel’’s former protégé, Anton Bakov, as a candidate against the incumbent governor, based on linking Rossel’ to organised crime. The support of United Russia and Putin became critical in ensuring Rossel’ retained the Governor’s chair in 2003. See Denezhkina and Campbell (2009), pp.207-226

continued to enjoy popular support (as proven by his election in 2003), it is hard to suggest that Rossel’ had become totally dependent on the centre at this point, nor that he had lost his position of authority at the head of his own networks, but he was now certainly subordinated to the centre in a way that he had not been throughout the previous decade.

Inside the region, one of the consequences of Rossel’’s co-optation was that it clouded plans for the transfer of power for the post-Rossel’ period. By working with the federal state, Rossel’ had entered into a new power structure, which gave rise to the potential that his leadership would stagnate as it was now reliant on the centre. Under these new conditions, he was faced with the choice of either remaining in power to prevent an outsider being appointed who might reverse previous actions, or seek to hand power over early to one of his close staff in order to negotiate his own exit. The boundary control structure had sealed off the upper levels of power to outsiders, and Rossel’ had indicated at various junctures that a member of his inner circle would be his natural successor. Within the ruling elite, it had been indicated that his chosen successor was Aleksei Vorob’ev, who would continue to represent the interests of the pro-Rossel’ groups and protect his former patron against any future pushing back on decisions taken under his leadership (a El’tsin-esque solution). Such a transfer of power had been pencilled in for 2007. Before the appointment of governors by the centre was introduced, however, Rossel’ distanced himself from his potential successor following the 2003 gubernatorial elections, and, breaking with his previous actions, began to create divisions within his closest circles, favouring a group led by Aleksandr Levin that advocated him remaining in power for as long as he could. A further implication of Rossel’’s bargain with Latyshev to play the centre’s role in the region was

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416 De Vries and Shekshnia (2008), p.236. In the case of El’tsin, while he took the opportunity to choose his exit point, the cultivation and testing of numerous successors led to confusion and the final choice of Putin can be viewed as due to his reputation for loyalty.

that previous rivalries remained in place, as in securing a further term, the governor was not forced to bring in outside actors into his ruling group.\textsuperscript{418}

Alignment with the centre affected the regional governor’s standing with regards to business networks the introduction of the presidential representation and wider policies promoting the reach of the Kremlin into the regions presented issues that participating in regional networks had previously been insulated against. The increasing financial might of federal enterprises and the introduction of the presidential representative as an important intermediary for business, not just in Sverdlovsk Oblast but in the wider Urals, removed the position at the top of the chain for representing business interests that Rossel’ had held throughout the 1990s. Enterprises that Rossel’ had struggled to keep alive during the economic crises of the 1990s were now being acquired by Moscow-based state enterprises and the importance of governors in looking after the interests of this branch of the elite weakened. Having previously been the main spokesperson for the industrial elite of the region and the Urals on the national scale the result of such acquisitions by federal enterprises of regional firms reduced Rossel’’s influence in Moscow when lobbying regional interests. A number of the most prominent business oligarchs expanded their empires in acquiring Sverdlovsk enterprises, for example Viktor Veksel'berg’s SUAL company purchased the Verkhnesal’dinsk Metallurgical Plant (that Rossel’ had fought hard to keep alive during the 1990s) and became a key shareholder in Ekaterinburg’s Kol’tsovo airport.\textsuperscript{419} Other industrialists entering the region included Vladimir Lisin, head of the Novolipetskii Metallurgical

\textsuperscript{418} Interview with Vadim Dubichev, Ekaterinburg, April 2011. The stagnation of the regional elite continued in the post-Rossel’ era. Dubichev, who became press secretary for Rossel’’s successor Aleksandr Misharin noted that one of the key difficulties for the new governor was a lack of suitable people with experience that could be appointed to critical positions in the region.

\textsuperscript{419} ‘Iz Londona vidny Ural’skie gory’, \textit{Ural’skii rabochii}, 20 April 2005. This acquisition was announced at the Russian Economic Forum in London in 2005. This forum had traditionally been one in which Rossel’ had sought foreign investment into the region, but interestingly at this forum the major announcements had not been outside investment but the consolidation of control over Russia’s resources by enterprises close to the Kremlin.
Plant, who acquired the Ekaterinburg enterprise, ‘VIZ-Stal’ and Oleg Deripaska, whose RUSAL company acquired the Bogoslovskii and Ural’skii Aluminium Factories.\textsuperscript{420}

The increasing pressure on business networks and the deterioration in inter-regional influence experienced by Rossel’ was a factor in the decline of his position as the lynchpin of Urals affairs with regards to other governors and business leaders. While Rossel’ still tried to play a role in economic activity where it affected the region, the presidential representative now emerged as an alternative source of support and the entry of federal industrial forces into the region further diluted the monopolisation of national-sub-national linkages. A good example of this is seen in the inter-regional business dispute that emerged in 2003 between the newly formed Urals Mining and Metallurgical Company (UGMK), based in Sverdlovsk Oblast but owned by the oligarch, Iskander Makhmudov, and Cheliabinsk Oblast’s Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works (MMK) over shares in the Cheliabinsk regional company ‘OAO Karabashmed’ (Karabash Copper Smelter).\textsuperscript{421} What began as a business dispute became overtly political as Rossel’ began to publicly support the claims of UGMK to acquire Karabashmed.\textsuperscript{422} Once ‘outside’ business interests began acquiring Sverdlovsk enterprises and entering the regional business space, the natural consequence was that these enterprises would have their own corridors of influence in Moscow, leaving Rossel’’s status at the head of the industrial chain under threat. In response, Rossel’ involved himself in this business dispute in order to demonstrate to this new organisation (UGMK) that he was best placed to represent their interests regionally and federally, and demonstrate to the wider regional business elite that his role as patron to enterprises was unchanged by the federal reforms.\textsuperscript{423} By involving himself in the

\textsuperscript{421} Nelson and Kuzes (2005), p.442
\textsuperscript{422} ‘Eduarda Rossel’ia vvidiat v zabluzhenii’, Cheliabinskii rabochii, 4 July 2001 (http://www.pressarchive.ru/chelyabinskiy-rabochiy/2001/07/04/320946.html) [last accessed 29/12/2014]
\textsuperscript{423} UGMK is now one of the most important industrial enterprises in the Sverdlovsk region. A glance at the UGMK website demonstrates the extent of its penetration in the Urals minerals and natural resources sector (www.ugmk.com/ru). The organization conducts significant activity in the social sphere also, implementing the centre’s policy that Russian firms had to participate in society (Gel’man and
dispute, Rossel’ was attempting to remind his Cheliabinsk colleague, who was increasingly critical of the Sverdlovsk leader and closer to Latyshev, that he still considered himself to be the *de facto* leader of the Urals and that any outcomes should be decided in concert with him. Yet, in what became an increasingly bitter dispute between Rossel’ and the Cheliabinsk Governor, Petr Sumin, the presidential representative benefitted most from the situation, acting as arbiter between the conflicting governors to present the centre’s position on the dispute and demonstrating the rise of the presidential representative as an effective conduit for regional enterprises.

**The dismantling of Rossel’’s inter-regional status**

Sergei Kondrat’ev has previously argued that the geographical-administrative structure of the Urals Federal District was created in such a way as to weaken Rossel’, who was seen as wielding too much influence amongst the group of Urals leaders. In removing Perm Oblast’, Orenburg Oblast and Bashkortostan from the Urals District (and including them in the Volga District) and bringing Tiumen’ Oblast and its two constituent autonomous oblasts, Khanty-Mansi and Iamalo-Nenets Autonomous Regions, into the District from its more traditional association with Western Siberia, the centre separated Rossel’ from key allies (most importantly, Bashkortostan President, Murtaza Rakhimov). The administrative formation of the federal district cast a shadow over the relevance of *Bol’shoi Ural* in its existing form, with the expectation that should the organisation continue, Latyshev would assume the role of chairman, replacing

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424 Sumin had not backed Rossel’ in his criticism of the presidential representatives and his attendance at a gathering of regional leaders with Latyshev and Vice-Prime Minister Valentina Matvienko (a meeting which Rossel’ and Murtaza Rakhimov of Bashkortostan had boycotted), was seen as a strategy to distance himself from the Bolshoi Ural group. ‘Oporny krai derzhavy stal opornym kraem politiki’, *Cheliabinskii Rabochii*, 2 November 2000 (http://www.pressarchive.ru/chelyabinskiy-rabochiy/2000/11/02/319903.html) [last accessed 29/12/2014]

Rossel’. The potential benefit that the federal reforms gave individual regions to form closer ties to the state on a singular basis can be seen in the reaction of other regional leaders. As pointed out above, one of the critical aspects of regional leadership is to be able to correctly judge the mood of the leadership higher up the chain of power. A display of dissent from Rossel’ and Rakhimov towards the centre with regards to the creation of the federal districts had been observed at the assembly of Bol’shoi Ural in October 2000, just prior to the scandal over the location of Latyshev’s offices. Both leaders publicly criticised the manner in which the federal reforms had been carried out and displayed irritation at the centre’s indication that it was intending to withdraw from the bilateral agreements agreed with El’tsin. At this session, Cheliabinsk governor, Petr Sumin, chose not to support his colleagues in their criticism of the centre, and asked that the session itself, scheduled to be held in Cheliabinsk, be moved from his region as he did not wish to be associated with the positions that his Sverdlovsk and Bashkir colleagues were going to take. The only representatives of the governor corpus at this session, moved to the Bashkortostan capital, Ufa, were Rossel’ and Rakhimov, as other Bol’shoi Ural leaders also made their excuses, sending representatives to the session held in the Bashkortostan capital so that they would not be associated with the session. While this allowed the subsequent criticism of Putin’s reforms to hold centre-stage, it also showed a fracture in inter-regional relations, whereby the other regional leaders were moving away from Rossel’, motivated by the recognition that the value of the state’s patronage had increased since El’tsin’s time with strong support being shown for the presidential representatives by Sumin, Gennadii Igumnov (Perm Oblast) and Oleg Bogomolov (Kurgan Oblast). This approach to the polpred was almost certainly further influenced by the fact that all three were facing the prospect of gubernatorial elections in 2000 and hoped to associate

themselves with the popular national leader to assist their re-election hopes.\textsuperscript{428} As a result of this loss of inter-regional support, Rossel’ found his position as the focal point of Urals integration and coordination undermined.\textsuperscript{429} While Latyshev did not assume the chairmanship of \textit{Bol'shoi Ural}, he formed his own inter-regional development group, ‘Industrial Urals-Polar Urals’ (\textit{Ural Promyshlennyi-Ural Poliarnyi}), through which he could offer regional leaders a ‘bridge’ to the federal centre and to the federal funds for regional programmes that went with cooperation.\textsuperscript{430} While \textit{Ural Promyshlennyi-Ural Poliarnyi} faded over time, it provided an alternative for the regional governors, and an opportunity for them to be seen to be cooperating with the centre.\textsuperscript{431} By the end of 2002, Latyshev was already claiming to have doubled foreign investment in the Urals through making the business climate more predictable and less reliant on individual governors.\textsuperscript{432}

In the eyes of the centre, restoring the reliance of the regional political and economic elites on Moscow-based actors, not only in Sverdlovsk Oblast but throughout Russia would strengthen the state. That Rossel’ resisted this process for a considerable length of time demonstrated the strength of the legitimacy that these two groups inferred upon him. As the electoral system of regional governors returned to a system of appointment rather than popular election, the local (regional) system of networks that had sustained Rossel”s political persona throughout the El’tsin years was no longer the resource it had previously been, particularly as it could be interpreted as a rival power base for the


\textsuperscript{429} In a demonstration of the shift in authority cross-regionally, Latyshev was able to convince the other leaders of the regions not to attend the tenth anniversary session of Bolshoi Ural in 2001, getting them to send representatives in their place. Once again, only Rossel’ and Bashkortostan’s Murtaza Rakhimov could be counted from the regional leader corpus attending this session. Vitalii Sotnik, ‘Dolgo li zhit’ “Bol’shому Uralu”?’, \textit{Nezavisimaya gazeta}, 9 October 2001, <http://www.ng.ru/regions/2001-10-09/6_ural.html>. [accessed 22 July 2006] (para. 4 of 9)

\textsuperscript{430} Vozdvizhenskii (2010), pp. 11-35

\textsuperscript{431} Bol’shoi Ural shifted away from being a forum for regional leaders, and their nominated representatives became the active members of what changed from a forum for policy cohesion into one for limited policy discussion with little chance of leaders acting upon outcomes of sessions.

regional governor. Following the election of Dimitrii Medvedev as president in 2008, the centre embarked on a round of replacing a number of the longest serving regional leaders, among them Rossel', who was retired to a role as senator for the region in the Federation Council in 2009, and replaced with the grey, bureaucratic manager, Aleksandr Misharin, originally from Sverdlovsk Oblast but with long experience of working in Moscow. Making up for a lack of charisma with devoted loyalty to the centre and to the ruling political party, Misharin consolidated both the top-down system of power and the position of Edinaia Rossiia in a region that was still considered to be of high strategic value to the centre.433

Conclusions

An important part of the federal reforms was to subordinate the regional elite, as a major section of Russian society that influenced and made decision affecting the state and society, to the new state system, leading them away from the individual-interest structures that had developed following the end of the Soviet Union. This can be seen as a fundamental difference in the perception of the nature of the Russian elite between Putin and El'tsin, particularly as Putin continued to seek to install a system of values that tied the elite to the idea of a strong national power network (with Putin at its head), in contrast to El'tsin’s interpretation of the elite system, in which personal support was exchanged between individuals in return for power. This fundamental difference in perception of the basis of the structure of centre-regional relations was taken by Putin as an opportunity to restore the authority of the centre over individualistic regional leaders, who were perceived as acting outside of the wider interests of Russia.

433Misharin had no experience of regional administration and was a clearly managerial appointment to run the region, having been a top manager in Russian Railways and Russian Deputy Transport Minister before becoming regional governor. See Petrov (2011), p.98
If in previous chapters we saw Rossel’ as being a product of the El’tsin years, acting independently and using the set of rules that existed, we can also see in him the effect of the forcible restructuring of the state that has occurred since then. During the first period of Putin’s presidency Rossel’ was forced to change by outside forces rebranding himself yet again, from firebrand regional politician to loyal representative of the state. From the personal closeness he had enjoyed in the second-half of the 1990s with the Russian President, by 2003 little remained of the independent 1990s political actor that had made unilateral demands of the centre.

As he remained in power for almost nine years after El’tsin’s resignation, Rossel’ became symbolic of the decline in political activity in Russia’s regions and the increasing uniformity of regional life in the state. Interestingly, the period of Rossel’’s decline in real influence lasted almost as long as the period of his entry into power and its consolidation. This was a drawn-out affair in which he initially resisted accepting his new role as a member of the network rather than controlling proceedings. The outside-imposed end of the boundary control strategy demonstrates further the argument that Rossel’ presided over a power structure that promoted as much his own interests as those of the oblast.
Conclusions

The aim of this thesis has been to examine the political system that was developed by Rossel’ in Sverdlovsk Oblast, and to question how he used networks in his regime. Evaluating Rossel”s role as regional leader in Sverdlovsk Oblast allows us to reach certain conclusions about the nature of his power during the 1990s, as well as the conditions of Russian regional politics and centre-regional relations in this period and into the next decade. The approach taken has been to consider the role of actors, institutions, resources and strategies within the context of the times, demonstrating that Rossel”s personality and the construction, projection and perception of his networks (as both patron and client) inside the region and cross-regionally determined the nature of his political regime, his domination of the Sverdlovsk region and longevity of leadership. The factors that were present, including the condition of the elites under the political and economic uncertainty that can be equated with the El’tsin decade and the existence of an organised opposition, resulted in the implementation of a strategy of ‘boundary control’ that contained, limited and eventually suffocated threats to his established position at the top of the pyramid of power in the region.

Research into Russian politics in the 1990s has rightly focused on the critical need for the development of institutions ahead of considerations of the personalised aspects of everyday interactions at all levels of the state. Yet, referring back to the literature review, this approach placed the influence of institutions on regional power above the personal factors that are argued here as being more influential, in the case of Sverdlovsk Oblast, than institutional arrangements. In these models, the notion of a network regime in regions was considered negatively, as holding back the development of institutions. The fundamental conclusion to be drawn is that the personalised structure of elite and network relations were the source of Rossel”s power, explaining his regime in Sverdlovsk Oblast. Current studies of the state system in Russia have

434 See the sub-section ‘The construction of federalism and regional politics in El’tsin’s Russia’ in the literature review, pp. 11-18
now reached the conclusion that, as in Putin’s Russia, the role of networks does not necessarily need to be linked to replacing the role of the state. This thesis has attempted to demonstrate how, in the El’tsin years, networks were used by Rossel’ to fill gaps in the distribution of power to the regions under the state system, showing his tendency to cultivate sources of capital vertically, horizontally and within the region whenever required in order to achieve his aims. It should once again be highlighted, that the areas of political priority that regional leaders faced were vastly different, so the study of Rossel’ allows us to build a detailed picture of the way in which networks facilitated leadership in a single region, while at the same time, noting that the use of different sources of capital was a common feature in regional politics in El’tsin’s Russia as the central state struggled to impose itself on its provinces. The boundary control theory has provided the opportunity to delve deeper into how these networks were managed in order to ensure the longevity of Rossel”s leadership.

Under the system of appointment, it was easy to assume that appointed governors were little more than bureaucrats who were responsive only to the threat of dismissal by El’tsin, as stated by Shevtsova (1999). Instead, the case of Eduard Rossel demonstrates that being able to act and react to a wider range of political and economic threats, nationally and sub-nationally, was made substantially easier where networks were more highly developed. The role played by networks provided Rossel’ with an essential tool that could be mobilised to limit the space available to any competing forces, even in the presence of agreed rules, minimising the threat to his power.

The discussion in the preceding chapters has attempted to underline the importance of the 1990s in our understanding of Russia, both from the perspective of how the country entered into its post-communist state and when looking at Russia under Putin. The

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435 Kononenko (2011), p.9
436 Shevtsova (1999), p. 204
limitations of the initial centre-regional structure under El'tsin have had long-reaching consequences as the institutions that were expected to regulate the ties remained weak, resulting in informally bargained solutions between the President and regional leaders. The contrast between El'tsin’s use of a personalised system of centre-regional relations, which was used as a chip to bargain for support for his leadership, contrasts starkly Putin, whose reaction to this weakness was to quickly reprogramme these ties in favour of the federal centre, on the basis of his high level of popular support. That this recentralisation project was successfully realised and brought governors under the influence of the state, as shown in Chapter 8, highlights the fact that the informal agreements reached with El'tsin remained just this, personalised agreements rather than institutionalised structures.

Throughout the approach taken in this study, considering the role and interaction of networks at more than one level, it has been impossible to escape the fact that networks at all levels intersected and overlapped. Political actors surround themselves with and enter into numerous relationships from which they can benefit. Such networks, including their functioning and the ability to manage them, should be seen as one of the most critical aspects of political power in Russia at this time due to their ability to cut across formal and informal barriers. When understanding the dynamics of regional power we must remain aware that the actions of regional leaders and how they intersected with the networks occurred quickly and concurrently. This has been demonstrated throughout the thesis, particularly through the example of the connection between Rossel' and El'tsin, and the effect that this had on the regional leaders of other territories of the Urals and the Sverdlovsk political and economic elite. Conversely, local relations between elites were frequently influenced by the ties that actors had with different sectors of the political space. That this was not always a positive influence is demonstrated in the inability of Aleksei Strakhov and Arkadii Chernetskii to use the connections that bound them together and that were developed with other federal actors in order to overcome Rossel”s domination of the region.
The networks developed and managed by Rossel’ often determined the means by which he achieved his political aims and became an indispensable part of the type of regime that Rossel’ presided over as he successfully used connections at different levels to prevent the emergence of legitimate competitors. In terms of Russia in the late 20th century, Rossel’’s pragmatic use of these connections vertically upwards, horizontally, and vertically downward to ensure the material day-to-day survival of the Sverdlovsk region by filling the gaps left by the inability of the post-communist Russian state to support its regions while faced with the demands of political and economic reform and total change in ideology allows us to view his leadership as an alternative reaction to the conditions of the state relying on legitimising his leadership through representing interest groups rather than enforcing his own power from above, as seen in comparison with the regimes in Moscow and Tatarstan. Securing Rossel’’s own position within the elite, and converting the capital that he derived from his ties in order to legitimise his power, for example through elections, and to bring participant clients into those areas where they could be of use demonstrates the success of the strategy of boundary control for Rossel’ during the 1990s in monopolising all aspects of the regional and territorial political space. Nonetheless, when alternative sources of capital arose that offered similar or improved terms without any extreme opportunity cost to abandoning the former patron, these networks shifted loyalties, as seen in the changing demands of the political system in the 2000s that provoked the breakdown of Rossel’’s leadership, although not the breakdown of a structure that required patronage and network relations for the elite to function.

**Everything within its own context**

The study has followed the approach noted in the literature review of research carried out into the Gorbachev period, whereby, without judging what is right or wrong, the approach is to remain conscious of the boundaries of what was possible at the time
according to wider events and historical legacies that influenced power. Although agency takes a prominent position in the examination of Rossel’s actions, consideration of the conditions of Russian regional political life and the fast-moving, uncertain changes that occurred in national and regional life runs as an undercurrent. It is only possible to judge Rossel’s leadership when bearing in mind the legacy of the communist period’s system of regional leadership, the effect of the breakdown of existing institutions, and the attempt to renew conditions that ended up more in a series of ad hoc adjustments according to the conditions and needs of a particular region with its own particular set of problems. Importantly, throughout the discussion it should be recognised that the study is looking back at a period that is now complete, which allows for interpretations to be made of the events and actions taken that explain why Rossel remained in power for so long.

In order to survive the simultaneous political and economic reforms that turned entire areas of society and the economy on its head, a return to ‘traditional’ power structures became the fall-back position for many regions to ensure everyday survival. It is no coincidence that the leaders that installed such patronage structures were those that served longer terms, enduring beyond the period of appointment by the president and winning competitive elections. As El’tsin’s regime lurched from one crisis to the next, regional leaders seized upon the lack of supervision from the centre to follow a ‘master of the house’ paradigm that constructed individual power systems instead of building and consolidating institutions that would ensure stability. Criticism has been made of the early post-Soviet reformers’ rush to build a market instead of focusing on functioning institutions; the same criticism could be made of regional political actors, who prioritised personal power over the development of regional institutions capable of regulating regional life. When answering the questions posed at the outset, on the nature of Rossel’s regional power and why he stayed in power for so long, the context of a lack of coherent regional strategy from Moscow combined with attempts by central

437 See footnote 79 in Introduction.
actors to retain their influence over regional regimes both precipitated the development of network regimes.

The cases of Luzhkov, Shaimiev and Sobchak have shown that while different circumstances existed across Russia’s regions and republics, leaders succeeded or failed as a result of their interaction and use of the political, economic, and business elites within their territories, limiting rivals’ access to power, and monopolising relations between the centre and the region. Regional elites that found themselves left without the patronage of Communist Party and branch ministeries submitted to a new arrangement that subordinated them to regional leaders. In both the cases of Luzhkov and Shaimiev, there was effectively no competition to their leadership during the period under review and no alternative patrons in their territories. The cases of Rossel’ and Sobchak demonstrate challenges from organised political opponents. While Rossel’ implemented a strategy of boundary control to limit threats to his power to a sufficient degree that outweighed his rivals’ ability to encroach on these boundaries, Sobchak’s inability to fulfil any of the boundary control criteria left him unable to defend himself against rival networks and actors and could not protect his leadership from encroachment by rivals.

One of the limitations of this study lies in the inability to obtain access to the main protagonist of the study; only third-party accounts have offered insight into the motivation of particular actions and whether they were strategic moves or accidental offshoots of other decisions. This underlines the value of understanding the conditions of El’tsin’s Russia to view the conditions decisions were taken in and the circumstances in which they played out. It is bearing in mind these points that all of the conclusions can be reached.

It is also worth asking what we can draw from this to develop the boundary control theory further. Gibson’s original research looked at entrenched subnational
authoritarian regimes in the context of Latin American democratisation and North-South dynamics of the United States in the late nineteenth century. In transposing this approach to the study of Russia in the late twentieth century we should be aware of the different starting point that it faced. To recap from Chapter One, these primarily concerned the lack of an entrenched federal party following the collapse of the Communist Party that could gather regional leaders under its banner and exert influence over them (a role that El'tsin was also unwilling to play), and the fact that the transition from authoritarianism to democracy was occurring at the federal and subnational levels simultaneously, unlike Gibson’s Latin American counterparts that had federally overthrown authoritarianism and now required the regional regimes to follow. With this in mind and using the case of Rossel’ to highlight this, we can consider that boundary control is transferrable to the examination of subnational regimes more widely where an element of competition to the ruling elite is present or emerging. Not all subnational regions in Russia can be viewed from the boundary control paradigm; certainly the cases of Luzhkov and Shaimiev noted in Chapter Three do not fall into the boundary control theory as these respective leaders advanced different methods in order to preserve their powers. In the case of Luzhkov, it was his mafia-esque style of controlling all financial and property distributions of the nation’s capital, whereas for Shaimiev, his bargain with local elites to delegate power to them in return for unswerving support as well as his demonstrated ruthlessness in dismissing those that tried to find ways around this system resulted in his incumbency for over two decades. The actions of Sobchak in Saint Petersburg provide us with a failed case of boundary control. The attempts to force the regional elite to work through his mayoralty were doomed to failure specifically due to the fact that Anatolii Sobchak was unable to monopolise the centre-regional relationship, nor become the sole advocate of regional interests in the centre or achieve dominance within the Saint Petersburg political space. Sobchak has traditionally been seen as one of Russia’s leading democrats in the early 1990s, and the contrast with Rossel’, who firmly placed himself as a manager rather than a politician may hold the key to revising the boundary control thesis for
application more widely to other countries undergoing combined federal and subnational democratisation.

The breakdown of boundary control in Gibson’s thesis arises when the incumbent governors’ interests were no longer able to outweigh the emergence of opposition. In this case, it could be proposed that the key to successful boundary control in these situations lies in the ability to continually incorporate, or at least not polarise, the interests of the different layers of the elite, finding ways of coordinating these overlapping networks at the vertically upwards, horizontal and vertically downwards that incorporates a multitude of interests in order to achieve the key pivot position that being able to implement all three of boundary control’s aspects suggests. Further study of the boundary control theory in democratising federal states would be of benefit to developing this paradigm. In the post-Soviet context, Russia is the obvious candidate for this further research under its federalist structure, and comparative research into the strategies taken by long-serving leaders such as Viktor Kress in Tomsk or Egor Stroev in Orel would result in an even greater understanding of the nature of the relationship between regional power and elites through the monopolisation of representation. Under circumstances of national democratisation, this approach could also be applied to regional appointees in Ukraine under non-federal conditions, up to the point of the recent conflict. The elite structure of the Ukrainian regions and the role of industrial oligarchs within these regions offer rich soil for investigation into their linkages with regional heads of administration, as does the case of Aslan Abashidze in the autonomous region of Adzharia in Georgia from 1991 until 2004 and the Rose Revolution that brought Mikheil Saakashvili to the Georgian presidency and resulted in federal intervention in the region to remove him.
Where you stand depends on who you sit with^{438}

A significant part of any conclusion drawn about the nature of Rossel’s regional power and the reason why he was able to dominate regional politics must consider the type of actors involved in the networks he constructed and the personal control that he exerted over them, as the most important resource available to him for implementing his own political strategies. Participation in networks penetrated all aspects of his political relations, and these were used according to his needs at different junctures. The most influential actors involved in Rossel’s political system have been demonstrated to have come from the dominant sector of the elite in the region at the point of his rise to power, the industrial elite. Through representing their needs in terms of resource attraction and allocation, and through increasing their status by bringing them into the political fold, Rossel’ was particularly successful at constructing sets of networks that represented the wider requirements of the oblast, leaving the space left for the narrower set of interests that the regional capital city held to be occupied by his rivals, safe in the knowledge that this was insufficiently influential to unseat him.

The overlap between vertical and horizontal networks constructed a complicated web of ties that kept Rossel’ as the focal point for the transmission of information, policy and resources from region to centre, from region to municipality and from region to region within the greater Urals, and it is this that is proposed as being the major strength of the Rossel’ system of power, as different to Shaimiev’s or Luzhkov’s leadership in their respective territories. Formally, Rossel’’s positioning of himself as both facilitator and gatekeeper in all directions was made possible by his institutional role and the nature of centre-regional relations, but the informal nature of these ties had its roots in his industrial background and managerial personality, offering him the influence to see off any rivals pretending to a similar position. The study of Sverdlovsk Oblast presented

^{438} Taken from the bureaucratic principle according to Brown 1996 (p.297) of ‘where you stand depends on where you sit’.
demonstrates that rival actors attempted to compete with him by replicating his own system and portraying themselves as fulfilling the boundary control functions better than Rossel’, but that they struggled to attract the necessary elites to them, and found themselves categorised with a certain type, such as Strakhov’s connection with the central elite and Chernetskii’s connection as a representative of small and medium enterprises that carried little weight in a region reliant on the mammoth industrial enterprises that dominated many of the outlying towns and cities. That all of his competitors were ultimately unsuccessful in preventing Rossel’s domination of the political space shows the effectiveness of this approach and the nature of the region that he was governing (as well as the nature of political life in other regions of the Urals). From this, it can be drawn that the personalisation of networks within the dominant sector of the region acted as the foundation of this system.

Above all, the most important of these personal connections was with the first Russian president, Boris El’tsin. As shown in chapters four and five, the El’tsin-Rossel’ link demonstrated both the wish of the centre for regions to pursue their own policies, due to the necessity of economic decline, but also the reluctance of central elites to relinquish patronage. Interpersonal trust between the two, although subject to El’tsin’s tendency to fall out with and then reconcile with actors, underpinned the argument made in this chapter, that patron-client ties were an essential factor in the method of boundary control promoted by Rossel’ ensuring that he was the only player in the region able to influence the head of state; Rossel’ benefited greatly from El’tsin’s own self-preservation tendencies and political weaknesses, particularly in the run-up to the 1996 presidential elections where the support of his home territory was vital, as well as El’tsin’s insistence on taking final decisions.

El’tsin’s role in regional affairs during the 1990s is also seen in his frequently passive attitude that would suddenly give way to sweeping acts with consequences for federalism in Russia. In effect, we can see two El’tsins as being present in Rossel’s
Sverdlovsk; the real El’tsin as an unpredictable, and somewhat disappointing, head of state, with whom personal bargains could be reached if they fulfilled the self-interest of the leader, and more importantly, the imagined myth of El’tsin, in which the ‘special relationship’ with Rossel’ was effective. For Rossel’, it was the projection that this was a ‘special’ relationship that gave him the credentials at home that permitted him to claim to be unique amongst regional figures within Sverdlovsk Oblast and in the Urals, leaving only him equipped with the capital and connections to represent the region. By allowing the impression that he had privileged access to the president to persist, Rossel’ elevated the value of his leadership among the elite that he surrounded himself with. This was not for reason of devotion to the president, but purely for the access to the distribution of resources (through decision making and decrees) that this entailed.

The struggle of national elites to impact on regional politics

Beneath the patron-client ties of El’tsin and Rossel’, the position that the Sverdlovsk leader took up with regards competing elites at the national and regional levels can be seen in all four chapters of the study examining the El’tsin decade (chapters four to seven). It was put forward in chapter five that the attempts of central actors to exercise control over regional actors through sponsorship of regional competitors were successfully countered by Rossel’\’s ability to construct and activate new external networks, in addition to the presidential link, on a territorial basis (through the Bol’shoi Ural group), and through increasing his profile outside of Sverdlovsk Oblast. In this and the subsequent chapter it was found that Moscow\’s attempts to preserve its influence over the regions was conducted through its attempt to tie regional elites with federal counterparts, particularly federal political parties.

The fragmentation of central authority following the collapse of Communist Party control and the resulting necessity to seek new networks (often through renewal of previously existing ones) gave rise to elites at the centre looking to become patrons to
actors in the regions. In the case of Sverdlovsk Oblast, Rossel’’s monopolization of the Moscow-Sverdlovsk link at the institutional and informal level became an essential tool in preventing the development of outside patrons gaining a foothold within the region that could threaten him. The connection between El’tsin and Rossel’, based on a triumvirate of regional identity, career history and electoral need, was prominently given such importance that even in times of its breakdown, any competing forces were obliged to pay considerable attention to this connection (in reality and perception). Within the region, this can be seen in the conflict between Rossel’ and Chernetskii examined in chapter seven, as Chernetskii’s attempts to use central networks were unsuccessful as Rossel’’s ability to circumvent central networks created the connotation of Chernetskii as a representative of actors in Moscow.

The interaction between Rossel’, his networks and federal political parties highlights the incompatibility of the national ‘parties of power’ parties with regional regimes at this time. This was evident in the inability of federal parties in the El’tsin era to gain a footing in the regional legislatures, and the case of Rossel’ shows that the ties connecting regional political figures to federal parties had effectively broken down in Russia. Federal parties were attempting to organise themselves using a centralised system, whereas the regions were already further down the path of organising their own power systems, with their own routes to accessing decision makers and resource holders. That this is the case may largely be due to the fact that these parties were attempting to start from scratch, following on from an era of political party domination, and the personalisation of power by regional figures such as Rossel’ represented new interest groups connecting other regional elites with available resources instead of waiting for federal commands.

The progression of Russian federal political parties and their lack of penetration into the regions since 1991 is charted in the above research. As seen in Chapter 2 discussing Rossel’’s rise, the strengthening of his position within the Sverdlovsk Oblast power
structure owed something to the weakness of the democratic movements in the region being unable to harmonise their ideologies into a coherent approach and was effected at the federal level through El’tsin’s lack of participation in regional affairs unless they threatened his authority and the personalised nature of the appointment system of regional Heads of Administration. The economic structure of the region itself and the domination of powerful industrial interests resulted in the prioritisation of enterprise management-style leadership, and due to Rossel’’s lack of strong pro-democracy tendencies, it was evidently more natural for him to seek to represent his own branch, the industrialists, rather than to occupy a role within a movement that he had not been strongly allied to previously. Rossel’’s subordination of national issues in favour of pursuing regional (and personal) interests in the form of the Urals Republic, gubernatorial elections and the bilateral treaties consolidated the political landscape as focussed on local issues rather than national ones, diminishing the potential influence for federal parties to subordinate regions into a national party political space.

The outcome of this was seen in the results of the 1994 regional Duma elections, where Rossel’’s own political movement ‘Transformation of the Urals’ dominated. The attempt by Aleksei Strakhov to ally himself with the federal party of power, Our Home is Russia (Nash Dom Rossiiia) was unsuccessful due to the ability of Rossel’ to incorporate the regional elite into his own political movement. By bringing many of the enterprise directors and industrial figures into his Transformation of the Urals movement, he secured their loyalty (and the votes of their workers) effectively against support for a Strakhov-Chernomyrdin alliance that was seen as being detrimental to the regional elites’ interests (and was repeated later in Chernetskii’s attachment of his Our Home Our City party with the Our Home is Russia party). As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, the timing of the gubernatorial elections of August 1995 and Rossel’’s victory, served as a primary election for the December 1995 State Duma elections, and it would have been surprising had the region voted for Rossel’ in August and then against him (and his own party) later that year. Continued closeness to the regional elite, and
representation of the Urals region in organisations such as *Bolshoi Ural*, further allowed Rossel’ to keep his networks closer to his own movement in the later 1990s through his continued ability to hold the resources that they sought. With the development of new potential federal parties that were structured around regional interests, such as the Fatherland and All Russia movements led by some of Rossel”s close contemporaries, Rossel’ could continue to pursue his own movement on the basis of the continuation of his ability to be the only possible representative of the regional industrial and political elite. For his own networks, neither Luzhkov nor Shaimiev could offer them any potentially greater benefits than those that Rossel” had to offer. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, the perception of Rossel”s status at the centre of being able to attract attention to the region and bring in resources, combined with lack of any realistic alternative meant that federal political parties struggled to entice Rossel”s networks into greater party political support.

It was only with the opening of the boundaries that Putin’s leadership brought did the relationship between Rossel’, his networks and federal parties began to change. The increasing role of the United Russia party as part of Putin’s political power base in the early 2000s and their incorporation of regional legislative actors into the party structure established it as not only the most important federal political party but also the largest, above the Communist Party. Pressure applied from above in the 2003 gubernatorial elections effectively forced Rossel’ to become part of the federal party system in order to maintain his leading roles and retain his influence over his own networks. Again, the role of elite interests was critical to this process - the emergence of an alternative patronage system and new routes to the distribution of resources as provided by the presidential representative and United Russia left Rossel’ in a position where he needed to reassociate himself with the federal centre in order to survive politically.

At the national level, federal institutions, such as the State Duma and the Federation Council, were an area where the construction of overlapping networks and patron-client
relations served to build the perception of degree of influence over national policies that Rossel' held as part of the boundary control strategy. Initially based on conflict with the centre in the attempt to gain additional powers for the region, in the second half of the 1990s, relations between the region and centre became more cooperative. Unlike in the Putin system, within the State Duma, many members from the region in 1995 and 1999 were from the region, and by consequence many were connected to Rossel”s networks. The Federation Council, that allowed regional leaders a form of check over the legislature, became an additional strand of influence for Rossel' both at home and cross-regionally, presenting some members of the central elite with problems as to how to retain their influence over the regions. The procedure of electing a Speaker of the Federation Council and Rossel”s candidature examined in Chapter 5 demonstrated the strength of cross-regional networks developed by Rossel' prior to his dismissal as governor in November 1993. The intervention of the Russian government, and specifically Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in the election of the Speaker is telling in the central elites’ approach to the regions and their desire to not entirely leave centre-regional policy in the hands of President El'tsin. Relations with the Russian government echoed this, with Rossel”s ties steadily increasing over the course of the decade, as the government came to realise the strength of certain individual regional leaders and the resources they could offer in helping the government control other regions. While the starting point in these relations had been in a mutual weakness under conditions of extreme economic crisis, over time we can witness how Rossel”s cross-regional status led to him working with the government in specific sectors, (particularly representing the military-industrial complex as a key sector in the Urals economic structure), and receiving a minor role under Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov as part of his government's Cabinet of Ministers.

If in the above-mentioned relations with central actors we can see Rossel”s role as increasing in cooperation and benefit to his leadership, one area that the research has highlighted as more problematic is in ties with the Presidential Administration. As long
as Rossel’s ties to El’tsin were not converted into a form of active capital, the bureaucratic Presidential Administration managed to retain a bridging role, that could facilitate or obstruct relations with the President according to its own interests. To some extent, this could be attributed to the presence of an experienced Moscow-based bureaucracy close to the highest echelons of power, who found their own level of importance threatened by the breakdown of formal centre-regional relations and the establishment of a system of individualised bargaining. However, upon the activation of the Rossel’-El’tsin network in late 1994, the gatekeeping that its Sergei Filatov as Head of the Presidential Administration attempted to maintain was dealt a severe blow.

The importance of the individual leader – Rossel’s personalised system of power

Within the Sverdlovsk region, political competition was centred around regional-capital city interests, with Rossel’ at the head of the oblast’ and Chernetskii as the head of the regional capital city, Ekaterinburg. A strong focus has been placed on the individuals and their group relations, associating them both as the figureheads of wider tendencies regarding the devolution of political power in post-communist Russia. The conclusion is drawn that Rossel’s power as an individual outweighed the power deferred to him by the institution of regional governor. As demonstrated in chapter two, following his appointment as Chairman of the Oblispolkom, Rossel’ was able to use his appeal as neither a member of the old guard nor a radical reformer to consolidate ‘unified’ power in his own hands. This critical step instigated his domination over the region, although it took personalising the Urals Republic movement as his own and the subsequent loss of his position following his dismissal to develop his identity as the leader of the region.

Using this as a foundation, chapters six and seven found that the use of networks constructed the personalisation of power, while also fostering deliberate institutional weakness, creating a political system that was reliant on Rossel’ having the right
connections to different groups in order to achieve the specific tasks at hand. His ability to delegate responsibilities to his inner circle and play a leadership and coordinating role allowed him to preserve his position as patron to the region while retaining an overview of events, leaving him free to pursue the larger tasks that required his own personal intervention. The power system that was constructed relied on a closed and carefully constructed elite that acted in a hierarchical fashion, where loyalty to the top of the pyramid was the key unit of currency. The closed nature of the elite was the fundament of Rossel’s strength, as a core group emerged to control and manage the networks that he patronised over this prolonged period. Through managing a system of overlapping networks that fulfilled roles at the oblast level and locally, and through economic policy internally, cross-regionally, and internationally, Rossel became the sole candidate that could unlock perceived and actual access to resources (such as influence, decision making and finance), and is further underlined when looking at the subsequent breakdown in Rossel’s position that occurred with the emergence of Putin and the recentralization policies that followed. Such a conclusion supports historical tendencies that during times of upheaval and crisis, traditional power structures that offered a return to stability were preferred in Russia. The legacy of the Soviet period is in evidence here as the elevation of Rossel to such a dominant role within the region and cross-regionally continued the trend of the Russian population’s acceptance of powerfully-appointed forces, such as the Tsar’s Governors and the Communist Party Regional First Secretaries.

The legitimacy that Rossel held, first as the delegate of regional power, appointed by a popular president, and later as the elected representative of the people of Sverdlovsk oblast, presented him with grounds to construct a regime that progressed from a more traditional form of paternalism (as the master of the house), to a neo-paternalistic form of leadership, whereby popular election gave approval to the construction of a system of relationships that allowed the exercise of personal control over regional executive and legislative politics. His longevity as the leading political force for nearly two
decades can also be assumed to be a result of his ability to manage processes of competition within the political space, as seen in his successful electoral campaigns for the Regional Duma in 1994, and the gubernatorial elections of 1995 and 1999. By rejecting the patronage of federal political parties in favour of developing his own patronage over the region, Rossel’ created a responsive political movement that took advantage of its personal nature to construct a loyal following in the regional and local legislatures.

**Power through networks**

The conditions of the boundary control paradigm can be summarised from the above and further demonstrate why Rossel’ stayed in power for so long. The development of Rossel’’s charismatic political persona (chapter six) provided the foundation for his parochialisation of power amongst the elite and the public, and his monopolisation of the vertical and horizontal links between the networks he constructed with the result that new members of the elite found progression within the network hierarchy difficult. While it could be argued that the personalisation of power broke down the bureaucratic structures of the Soviet system and returned an identifiable public face to executive decision making rather than decisions being made on behalf of the region somewhere else, over time it became somewhat self-fulfilling as the new system of relations ended up responding to the wishes of the governor rather than reacting to the needs and demands of the electorate. The third factor present for boundary control, where Rossel' became the only individual capable of representing the region’s interests nationally, is present in the portrayal of conditions in the region during electoral cycles, whereby it was made clear that only Rossel' had the influence at the federal level to pursue regionally advantageous policies at the centre, as other actors would be captured by central interests (chapter seven). This was the strategy used to warn the elites of all varieties, political and economic, that it was not worthwhile attaching themselves to rival competitors, specifically, Arkadii Chernetskii. By portraying Chernetskii as
representing traders, while Rossel' represented industry, the Sverdlovsk governor became a hybrid of democratically elected leader, all-powerful Soviet Minister and First Party Secretary, presenting the risk that would be taken should the elite decide to change tack at the point of elections. As a strategy, boundary control can clearly be extended to the post-communist world, despite the different starting point to the original form described in Latin America. The idea of competition in political space is to convince the electorate on the basis of an argument that one set of opinions is more favourable to another. The boundary control strategy exercised in Sverdlovsk oblast is a negative tendency, in that it used the tactic of suggesting that political opponents were not up to the task because they were not part of a privileged relationship. In pro-democracy conditions, such as those in Sverdlovsk Oblast as well as in other regions, regional leaders prioritised control over power through the use of existing or potential resource allocation, stunting the development of competing forces.

In answer to the final question asked at the outset, why Rossel' remained in power for so long, we can conclude that this was immeasurably linked to his ability to ensure loyalty within his political networks and the fact that this allowed Rossel' to use boundary control to manage internal and external threats to his power. The achievement of such loyalty is closely connected to the ability of a patron to continue to be able to attract and distribute resources to their client structures; as long as the patron is viewed as a successful participant in structures higher towards the apex of the pyramid of political and economic influence, then the patron’s own clients are more likely to retain confidence and stay loyal to the client. Rossel’’s rivals were unable to tempt his clients away from him while El’tsin remained as president. Neither Strakhov nor Chernetskii were capable of disrupting these networks, due to the negative potential that they had of emulating the Rossel’-El’tsin dynamic through their connections to Chernomyrdin (and later Luzhkov). The findings of chapter eight, discussing the changes in the vertical patron-client relationship between Rossel’ and the Head of State under Putin, demonstrate the effect of the replacement of an existing
patron on subsidiary client networks. The introduction of the presidential representatives had such an effect on Rossel’s networks due to the significant backing that they were given by Putin and the role they played in creating a new system of access to the head of state.

Network influence encompassed domination of the regional economy. As the comparison between Luzhkov, Shaimiev and Sobchak shows, and furthered by the case of Rossel’, successful regional leaders were those that positioned themselves as regional managers (khoziainy) rather than as politicians in a new political order. With regards to fulfilling the terms of the social contract inherited by regional governors, Rossel’s patronage of oblast-level enterprises and the protection of such from outside (federal) forces made it possible to isolate the regional capital’s political voice without it threatening the oblast vote due to the proportionality of Ekaterinburg’s industrial base and that of the greater Sverdlovsk region. Returning to the theme of the charismatic leader, the attention that Rossel’ paid to the directors of the region’s large industries, such as knowing them all individually and taking personal charge of representations to the centre in the attempt to obtain desperately needed financial support and production orders, Rossel’ nationalised his influence on industry, proposing national economic policies that assisted enterprises in his own region.

What does this say about the Russian political system of the 1990s and 2000s?

As a final note, it is worth considering what this thesis can tell us about the Russia during the El’tsin period and beyond to the Putin and Medvedev leaderships in wider terms than the confines of Sverdlovsk oblast. This thesis brings a new emphasis to our understanding of regional networks under El’tsin’s presidency and how they shaped regional regimes as well as giving us some important insights into the overall nature of his power. One of the tendencies of the body of literature written during in the El’tsin
period itself was to present the transition of Russia into a series of ideal institutions that, largely from a Western perspective, would result in a functioning post-communist state that could be declared to be transitioning to democracy. With specific relation to centre-regional relations, these included, among others, federal and sub-national elections, a functioning set of laws regulating the allocation of powers between the units of the federation and the development of subnational executive and legislative power. The above discussion has focused on the processes that sprung almost organically out of the conditions of institutional breakdown following the end of the Soviet Union and substituted for the development of more formal institutional power.

The breakdown of formal institutional structures that could provide a set of rules for all to follow, and the lack of mechanisms to enforce these rules as Russia exited communism left ad hoc individual bargaining, negotiation and special arrangements at the heart of the El’tsin political system. The fragmented nature of central political power, the disintegration of vertical structures and the competing nature of different elite groups to retain and increase their influence all contributed to the replacement of top-down control with a mixed system of centre-regional power whereby the federal centre (and particularly the President) held some levers over the appointed (and later elected) regional leaders, while also finding itself reliant on the regions to run themselves without presenting too many challenges to the centre that would require action that it was ill-equipped to carry out. Federal intervention, where it did occur, was done through the removal of governors under the appointment system and later through centrally-sponsored electoral competition (and in the case of separatist regions, through armed conflict).

The weakness of the centre and its grip over the regions resulted in the swift decentralisation process that allowed for the rise of regional leaders that could pursue their own agendas. These regional actors were forced to take action to counterbalance volatile rule from above, while also ensuring that they remained in the president’s
favour. One of the key aspects of the El'tsin regime that we now understand is how he retained control over key decision making through deliberately fostering weak institutions at the centre. Central weakness transferred to the subnational territories as regional leaders constructed their own regimes, taking the lead from El'tsin’s lack of desire for strong vertical subordination. It is clear that it was impossible for El'tsin to enforce a strict vertical system of central power over the regions, while his own political position was unsteady. By being able to make deals with the regional leaders individually on the basis of mutual benefit and trust, we can see the high value El'tsin placed on informal methods, particularly personal attributes. The polarised conditions of Russian politics throughout the 1990s left him in the position of being insufficiently strong to force subnational leaders to be subordinated to the centre, and his personal interest in loyalty to his leadership prompted him to install individualised relations with the governors as the mechanism for ensuring their support. From this, we can suggest that networks were the currency of political power in 1990s Russia, with ownership of and participation in multiple and overlapping network structures giving additional value to political roles, plugging the gaps that were left in formal institutions. In other words, we can suggest that networks became more valuable to their participants than job titles.

In response to the weakening role of Moscow in its ties with the regions, many of the stronger regional leaders were able to take matters into their own hands, making effective and strong connections with the different layers of elites in their territories and cross-territorially. At the subnational level, there was a greater scope for pragmatic action, and a new approach to the federalisation of the country. The case of Sverdlovsk Oblast highlights that network activity resulted in strong bonds between actors as long as the interests that were being represented were adequately served. As noted above, the role of federal institutions was countered by the ability of regional representatives to use networks to work around the formal channels of power that federal bodies still expected to be observed. This was seen in the inability of federal political parties to
build strong political support bases in the regions (with the exception of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which continued to have representatives in the regions in the legislatures and in local government). Easily undermined by regional leaders and members of the regional elites, the high turnover in ‘parties of power’ can be attributed to the lack of purchase that they had in regional systems of power, and the ability of governors to disconnect their regimes and networks from these parties.

The decentralisation of power in this period resulted in what could be described as possibly the only period in Russia’s history where regions have been able (and allowed) to represent their own interests. Under El’tsin, the emergence and continuation of informal approaches offered greater returns than the costs of imposing new formal rules. El’tsin’s approach broke down the former authoritarian structures and introduced much-needed flexibility into the fledgling Russian federal system, however, as his leadership drew to an end it was clear that this could no longer continue, as seen in the attempt by regional leaders such as Luzhkov and Shaimiev to become federal actors and the central action taken through elevating Putin to prevent this from happening by reimposing vertical authority over the regions. The overreliance on informal agreements was seized upon immediately by President Putin in May 2000, and his recentralization project should be attributed as a response to the growing strength of regional individuals. For many of these leaders, there was the expectation that Putin had been appointed to continue El’tsin’s work, and the announcement of wide-ranging federal reforms amongst his first acts as President began a new process of drawing regional governors into a more formal vertical network than that experienced with El’tsin. As pointed out in the above discussion on the effect of the presidential representative to the Urals opening the boundaries of Rossel’s political system, the creation of seven federal districts can be seen as a strident move from the centre to reduce the number of potential bargaining routes networks had to directly access the centre. Through basing these districts loosely upon the boundaries of the state military districts rather than, for example, on the structures of inter-regional associations that
had been functioning over the past decade, and appointing representatives from the law-enforcement agencies, military and security services, Putin quite clearly signalled a change in vertical relations that precluded the possibility of co-optation. While bargaining and networks were not removed from the process, the newly imposed vertical structure that Putin was applying served to put distance between the centre and the regions re-ordering patron-client relationships to the disadvantage of regional heads of administration, precisely due to the fact that the centre was now taking an active interest in regional affairs.

The continuation of the centralisation policy in Putin’s second term further increased the influence of the centre and decreased the ability of regional regimes to act independently of it. Importantly, up until Putin’s second term, gubernatorial elections were still taking place, offering regional leaders local popular legitimacy. This alternative source of legitimacy was threatening to the imposition of the new vertical system of power as it provided an alternative to top-down approval that Putin sought to implement. It took the massacre at School Number 1 in Beslan in September 2004, where separatists killed more than 300 children and school teachers, for this to change. Not forgetting that much of Putin’s early popularity had been based on the swift and successful pursuit of the second Chechen conflict in 1999, Putin used the threat of terrorism to abolish gubernatorial elections, returning to a system of appointment that, although offering some formal oversight by the regional legislatures, which were now mainly dominated by his United Russia party, strengthened top-down authority over regional leaders. Even prior to this, governors were already been slowly subordinated to the ‘presidential vertical’ that was being created, as noted in Chapter 9 where Rossel’ had been forced to come to an arrangement with Petr Latyshev during the 2003 Sverdlovsk gubernatorial election to bring himself under the United Russia banner. For many governors, including Rossel’, the return to the system of appointment was not inconvenient, as it refocused their accountability to the centre rather than the local population, and gave them the opportunity to extend their terms in office further.
With regards to networks, the result of this was to almost completely restructure the network system. Networks continued to play a critical role in the life of the regions, with overlapping and competing interests continuing to be important in securing internal support within a region, while also moving away from the sole orbit of regional leaders to playing a role within the wider structure of state interests. Overall, we should note the effect of the refederalisation changes upon the vertical, horizontal and vertically-downwards structures that epitomised regional leadership in the 1990s in replacing regional leaders as the heart of such structures with loyalty to Putin and the United Russia mechanism.

Finally, we should note the end point for many of the regional ‘old guard’ that occurred under Dmitrii Medvedev’s presidency from 2008 onwards. The political tandem of this era, with Medvedev as President and Putin as Prime Minister, saw the end of the majority of the entrenched governor corpus that had ruled Russia’s regions since the early El’tsin years. Regional heavyweights such as Luzhkov, Shaimiev and Rossel’ all saw their regional leadership careers ended in this period, as Medvedev used the presidential prerogative to directly remove them (in the case of Luzhkov, who was once again viewed as a potential emerging threat to the leadership), or encourage them to retire, with the compensation of decorative roles as Senators in the Federation Council. Territorially, this period saw the introduction of the ‘Varangian’ governors (figures appointed with little or no connection to the territory over which they govern), the effect of which has been to construct a new corpus of technocratic governors responsive to the centre rather than local populations’ needs, and has been argued as contributing to the ‘degradation of the regional elite’.\textsuperscript{439} While the popular protests that arose following the 2011 parliamentary elections resulted in the centre intimating that it would start to allow some decentralisation back into the federal system, including the return of gubernatorial elections, this appears to have been simply a strategy for venting social...

\textsuperscript{439} Nikolai Petrov made this statement at the ‘Russia and Ukraine: Spotlight on the Regions’ conference held at University College London on 2\textsuperscript{nd} June 2015.
frustrations; following Putin’s election as President in 2012 those gubernatorial elections that have taken place have been tightly controlled, with no turnover in incumbents.

Attempting to draw conclusions from the experiences of the El’tsin period and the post-El’tsin era have led to an overwhelming feeling that the 1990s saw a number of missed opportunities to create functioning centre-regional relations on the basis of institutions that could have strengthened federal relations and prevented the over-centralisation of the state that currently exists. The El’tsin period offers a unique period in the Russian history of the decentralisation of power, where the interests of the regions became possibly more represented than ever before in Russian history. While the resulting asymmetry of regional regimes suited El’tsin’s system of bargaining, under Putin this system was viewed unfavourably and the return of centralisation began to slowly but surely remove the gains that had been made. The nature of regional regimes that had established their own systems of power and were applying this in their relations with the federal centre to consolidate and further their positions made it difficult for the return of powers to the centre to occur without imposing a more strictly controlled vertical system of power. In seizing back control over regional political spaces, Putin has ensured that Russian regional regimes are now firmly representing the interests of the state, rather than the territories. On the one hand, this has removed the idea that the regional governor was a king within his region by ensuring that their loyalties were to Moscow rather than to the populations of the regions they control, however, on the other hand it has also removed the notion that Russia is a federal state in anything other than name and reaffirmed the representational deficit that existed prior to the El’tsin era.
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Gennadii Eduardovich Burbulis – Moscow, September 2011. At the time of the interview, Gennadii Burbulis was the Provost of the Moscow International University. Prior to this, he had been a deputy of USSR Congress of People’s Deputies (from the Lenn District of Sverdlovsk City), Boris El'tsin’s electoral campaign manager in the 1991 RSFSR Presidential elections, Secretary of State to El'tsin from 1991-1992, and First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Government.

Vadim Rudol'fovich Dubichev – Ekaterinburg, January 2006 and April 2011. Vadim Dubichev was a former member of Evgenii Ziablitsev’s electoral campaign for the 1995 Sverdlovsk gubernatorial elections. He was a member of Rossel”’s press team from 2003 until 2009, when he became Press-Secretary for Sverdlovsk Governor Aleksandr Misharin.

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Anatolii Dmitrievich Kirillov – Ekaterinburg, March 2011. Anatolii Kirillov is the Director of the Urals El’tsin Centre in Ekaterinburg. He is a former academic, who taught regional studies at the Urals State University and has authored many books on Urals politics. He was a member of Rossel”’s analytical department from 1996 to 1998.

Konstantin Kiselev – Ekaterinburg, September 2011. Konstantin Kiselev is the head of Political Science of the Urals Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He was a member of Rossel”’s electoral strategy team during the 1995 and 1999 gubernatorial elections.

Gennadii Korobkov – Ekaterinburg, December 2011. Gennadii Korobkov is the Director of ‘Ural’skoe zemliachestvo’, an organisation for natives of Sverdlovsk Oblast that have left the region to stay involved in regional life. He was previously a membe of the Sverdlovsk Obkom, and in 1994 was the First Deputy Governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast and a member of the Sverdlovsk regional government, under Governor Aleksei Strakhov.
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