Mainstreaming Inclusive Violence Prevention
in the Agenda of Multilateral Development Banks:
The Case of the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank
in Latin America and the Caribbean

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Declaration

I, Chloë Fève, confirm that this thesis is the result of my own work. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
Abstract

Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention is a policy option that has been under-studied. As a strategy, mainstreaming responds to the transversal nature of violence both in its multi-dimensionality and multi-causality, and ultimately highlights violence’s intrinsic links to development. It also acknowledges the strong gender dimensions at play in the manifestation and reproduction of violence. Building upon this understanding and developing a framework for it, this research examines opportunities and constraints for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in the agendas of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).

For the past three decades, citizens in LAC have suffered from pandemic levels of violence, which has proved extremely complex and difficult to tackle. Governments in LAC have called for support from two of the largest MDBs in the region, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. Both have responded, yet slowly and timidly. This research asks three main questions: Why has violence prevention remained marginalised in MDBs’ agendas despite its socio-economic multiplier effects on development? What are the opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention in MDBs’ agenda? How do national counterparts perceive the potential for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention and the relevance of MDBs in this regard?

The research uses a qualitative methodology, including more than 150 in-depth interviews with MDBs’ staff, shareholders, counterparts, and key informants, and a case study in Colombia. Building on three conceptual bodies of literature related to priority-setting, mainstreaming and donor-recipient aid relations, the research uses cognitive frame, actor power, operational knowledge and organisational treatment as keys to explore the research questions. The findings show that multiple constraints exist, such as competing cognitive frames, contradictory incentives for staff, leadership turnover and lack of in-house expertise, and scattered efforts to develop operational knowledge. Yet opportunities also exist, including an increasing internal space for dialogue, particularly in some sectors, and interest and demand from countries.

The main contribution of this thesis is to develop a framework to disentangle factors at play in the emergence and institutionalisation of new, complex, transversal issues that could be usefully adapted to other contexts and topics.
For my grand-father,
Jean Bonnefoy,
symbol of resistance, humanism and joy.

For my grand-mother,
Suzanne Bonnefoy,
model of intellectual curiosity, coherence and deep values.

For my mother,
Monique Fèvre,
the most courageous, compassionate and generous woman I know.

And for the countless extraordinary women and men who care and act.
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This research has been a stimulating journey to which numerous women and men have contributed through their encouragement, presence, guidance, reflection and inspiration.

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The completion of this thesis was possible thanks to the Director of the Office of Evaluation and Oversight at the Inter-American Development Bank, Cheryl Gray, who gave me the possibility to take an extended leave of absence. The thesis has also benefitted from the encouragement from my former colleagues at the World Bank and the IADB. I want to thank in particular Pablo Alonso, Rafael Rodriguez-Balza, Jamil Salmi and John May.

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<th>Meaning</th>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country Assistance Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDH</td>
<td>Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos – Interamerican Commission for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPL</td>
<td>Development Policy Loan</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNP</td>
<td>Departamento Nacional de Planeación (National Department for Planning)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>IADB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Institutional Capacity of the State</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<td>IFD</td>
<td>Institutions for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>IL</td>
<td>Investment Loan</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>MDB</td>
<td>Multilateral Development Bank</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MiVP</td>
<td>Mainstreaming inclusive Violence Prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PND</td>
<td>Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (National Development Plan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVE</td>
<td>Office of Evaluation and Oversight</td>
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<td>PAHO</td>
<td>Pan-American Health Organisation</td>
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<td>PBL</td>
<td>Policy-Based Loan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSIA</td>
<td>Poverty and Social Impact Analysis</td>
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<td>SIL</td>
<td>Specific Investment Loan</td>
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<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
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<td>TC</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollars</td>
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<td>VP</td>
<td>Violence Prevention</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WDR</td>
<td>World Development Report</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

‘We owe our children a life free from violence and fear. We must address the roots of violence. Only then will we transform the past century’s legacy from a crushing burden into a cautionary lesson.’

Nelson Mandela (1918-2013)

1.1 Introduction

This research examines how and the extent to which inclusive violence prevention has penetrated the agenda of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) working in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and has been recognised as a transversal issue that could be mainstreamed. Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention is a policy option that has been under-studied so far. It responds to the transversal nature of violence in both its multi-dimensionality and multi-causality. Its inclusiveness reflects the strong gender dimensions in the manifestations and reproduction of violence. It also highlights the intrinsic links between violence and development. Although MDBs have not officially committed to implementing a mainstreaming approach for the inclusive prevention of violence, they have acknowledged the option, and the mainstreaming literature clearly provides a relevant body of research to study transversal issues within development organisations.

This research has three specific objectives. First, it aims to better understand why, despite the well-acknowledged destructive socio-economic multiplier effects of violence in Latin American countries, violence prevention has been slow to emerge in the agendas of MDBs working in that region. Second, it seeks to identify opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention in the agenda of MDBs. Third, it seeks to comprehend the perspective of a country, the Republic of Colombia, on the role and contribution of MDBs in inclusive violence prevention, and margins of manoeuver for mainstreaming the inclusive prevention of violence at the national and local levels. By so
doing, this thesis aims to contribute to advancing operational and policy-oriented knowledge in violence prevention in institutions and policies in the developing world.

Preventing violence in Latin America and the Caribbean is a major development challenge. For more than three decades, the region has suffered from pandemic levels of violence.\(^1\) With homicide rates ranging from 21 to 25 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (hphti), LAC has had more than three times the world average (6.9 hphti) (data of 2010 or latest year available, UNODC 2011). These averages hide high variations among and within countries, with cities like Guatemala City or Caracas showing alarming rates of over 100 hphti\(^2\) (opcit). Beyond homicides, the region also shows very high levels of victimisation,\(^3\) with on average 30 to 40 per cent of the households surveyed reporting at least one victim of violence or crime over the past year (Lagos and Dammert 2012). In terms of intimate partner violence, even though systematic data at the regional level are lacking, country specific surveys indicate significant levels, with more than half of women as victims of violence at some point in their life in countries like Peru\(^4\) (WHO 2005).

High levels of violence have enormous costs for individuals, families, communities and societies at large. In addition to the human suffering and trauma, violence negatively affects human and social capital (Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter 1999; McIlwaine and Moser 2001;)

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\(^1\) The Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) talks about pandemic levels of violence when they are higher than 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (hphti) (Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 1997). Since 1980s, LAC average homicide rates have constantly been above 10 hphti. UNODC defines homicide as unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person, and uses a variety of national and international sources of data based on criminal justice or public health systems (UNODC 2011).

\(^2\) Rates were respectively 116.6 hphti in 2010 in Guatemala City, and 122 hphti in Caracas in 2009, latest year available (UNODC 2011: 118).

\(^3\) Victimisation rates include all forms of violence and crime. A sample of the population is asked: ‘Have you or a family member been assaulted, attacked or victim of a crime over the past twelve months?’ (In Spanish: ‘¿Ha sido Ud. o algún pariente asaltado, agredido o víctima de un delito en los últimos doce meses?’) (Lagos and Dammert 2012:24). It is then possible to disentangle by form of violence and crime.

\(^4\) In urban Peru (called ‘Peru City’ in the WHO survey), 51 per cent of women surveyed have ever experienced physical or sexual violence or both in their lifetime, this rate was 69 per cent in ‘Peru Province.’ See ‘Prevalence of lifetime physical or sexual violence by intimate partner’ (WHO 2005:6, Figure 2).
Moser and Winton 2002; Krug et al. 2002; Dahlberg and Butchart 2005), and economists have estimated that violence could cost up to 15 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Londoño 2001; Concha-Eastman 2002; Soares 2009; Skaperdas, Soares, Willman and Miller 2009). This is three times the share of the GDP dedicated to Education in countries like Mexico or Brazil (World Bank Edstats 2010). These enormous costs necessarily hinder the sustainable development of countries in the region.

Today, in LAC, one of the most urbanised and unequal regions in the world, violence most severely affects the urban poor. Rural areas are not exempt though (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011), but with more than 75 per cent of the population living in cities in LAC, violence follows the population concentration (UNODC 2011, 2014). Violence affects everyone, but more severely poor men and women who tend to live in areas where infrastructure, public services and other commodities are scarcer or of less quality. Some neighbourhoods are ‘controlled’ by illegal groups that often use violent means including threats and fear to maintain their power (Kruijt and Kooning 1999; Rotker 2002; Moser 2009; Colak and Pearce 2009; Pearce 2010). Public authorities, including the police, do not dare enter these territories or are coopted through corruption (opcit). To literally survive, those living in these marginalised and highly violent neighbourhoods either pay for protection, hire private guards, disengage from social life, or take justice into their own hands as shown through ‘social cleansings’ (McIlwaine and Moser 2001; Moser and Winton 2002; Rudqvist, Hettne, Löfving et al. 2003; Winton 2004; Kliksberg 2006; Baird 2011; UNODC 2013). Violence also tends to stigmatise those who live in poor neighbourhoods, even though only a minority actually act violently. This stigmatisation increases further the injustices that those men and women struggle with.

Violence is a highly complex phenomenon that evolves along a gendered continuum. Its complexity comes from its multi-dimensionality and multi-causality. As all social, and thus relational, phenomena, violence has strong gender dimensions that clearly appear in the

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5 Violence negatively impacts human capital through disabilities, poor performance in school, traumas, depression, disabilities, loss of productivity, loss of wellbeing, reproduction of the violence cycle, etc. Violence also hinders social capital because it generates fear and tends to weaken social ties and lessen the propensity of people to associate, organise, and help each other.
reproduction of violence. In fact, many forms of violence reinforce each other: men and women who are violent on the streets tend to also be violent at home; men and women who have suffered or witnessed violence during their childhood have more probability of becoming violent or victimised adults; men who are violent with women tend to be violent with children or the elderly or other men (Bott, Morrison and Ellsberg 2005; Willman and Makisaka 2010). The concept of a *continuum of violence* that translates violence’s reproduction in *time and space* (Pearce 2010) thus needs to be gendered to fully grasp the relational, complex nature and dynamics of the phenomenon, and to adequately guide policymaking.

Despite its overwhelming negative impact, violence has proven to be particularly difficult to prevent. Only a few examples exist in LAC that have successfully reduced violence in a sustainable way. Bogotá and Cali in Colombia, and Diadema in Brazil are probably the most famous examples (Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 1997; Buvinic, Morrison and Orlando 2005; Heinemann and Verner 2006; UNODC and World Bank 2007; Soares and Naritomi 2010; Petesch 2013; UNDP 2013). But they are the exceptions rather than the rule. Actually, as previously noted, many cities throughout the region face alarming situations. Many factors contribute to make preventing violence a very challenging endeavour. Among them, the fact that understandings of violence are highly ideological makes policymaking even more partisan and inconsistent, which in turn makes the implementation of strategies and programmes precarious. This lack of continuity represents a severe obstacle for violence prevention strategies to produce results, and more generally, to better understand how preventing violence in developing countries works.

In fact, today, preventing violence in LAC is better understood theoretically than empirically. Over the past decades, knowledge has progressed on the causes but also the solutions to violence. In particular, a growing consensus now exists on the multi-causality of the phenomenon that has increasingly been recognised as a development challenge. The World Health Organisation has promoted the ecological model to disentangle the multiple factors facilitating the perpetuation of violence at different levels of interaction, from the individual to the societal levels. This is highly valuable, for it highlights the multi-causality of violence and its context-specificity. However, such a diagnostic tool also easily appears...
overwhelming when translating it into policies and programmes, in particular in developing countries contexts characterised by resources scarcity and institutional weaknesses. Indeed, despite this greater theoretical consensus (at least in the development community), how to translate the multi-dimensionality and the multi-causality of violence into multi-sector, gender-sensitive policies in the developing world is still a pending question.

Among possible policy options, ‘inclusive violence prevention mainstreaming’ (violence prevention from a gender and development perspective) has been little explored in the literature and research relating to violence. It might provide an option for the sought-after operationalisation of the ecological model, for it suits transversal, multi-causal issues, and builds on the above-mentioned concept of the gendered continuum of violence. In particular, it sheds light on the importance to address domestic violence as part of an urban violence prevention strategy, instead of in siloes as it is commonly the case. It also draws attention to the role of women in the perpetuation and prevention of violence, as opposed to the traditional male-biased focus, and recognises the association between violence and the dominant model of masculinity as a risk factor. It finally places policies and programmes to prevent violence within an inclusive development paradigm that supports the double idea that violence is preventable and a shared responsibility.

1.2 The role of Multilateral Development Banks in violence prevention

Among the multiple stakeholders of the development process, MDBs gather a series of characteristics that gives them a unique position to deal with violence: they are generalist institutions, therefore working in all sectors relevant to violence prevention; they have direct access to the highest ministries in Government (Ministries of Finances and Planning), which a priori facilitates a multi-sector approach; they have joined in the Beijing Platform for Action to Mainstream Gender and have developed specific plans of action to mainstream gender in their development agenda; their publications and conferences are oriented to policymakers and give them a voice to influence development paradigms; and they play a catalysing role for further international assistance, through their multilateral status, their safeguards and their financial conveying power (see Box 1 on basic facts on MDBs).
There are eight main MDBs in the World: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) created in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference; the International Development Association (IDA) created in 1960 to respond to the specific needs of the least developed countries: IBRD and IDA are grouped into the World Bank Group (commonly called World Bank); five regional banks: the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) all created in the late 1950s-1970s (respectively 1959, 1964, 1966, 1970 and 1975) to complement IBRD and IDA funding with a special regional focus; and the European Development Bank (EBRD) created in 1991 at the end of the Cold War (Head 2004: 248). In addition, there are a number of sub-regional development Banks and multilateral financial institutions.

All MDBs share a similar mission of economic development. They provide loans and grants to developing countries to finance specific projects (investment loans) and policies (policy-based loans). Those loans are reimbursable at preferred conditions (usually 20 to 30 years at low interest rates). This financial status gives them a specific role within the international development community, for certain types of influences matter more than others, and economic influence is certainly among the most influential. A Board of country members governs these financial institutions. The Board combines borrowing and non-borrowing countries in all MDBs, but members’ power or voting share varies. At the World Bank for instance, the shares are proportionate to countries’ contribution, making the US and the European holders of the majority of shares (with the US having a veto power), while for example, at the IADB, borrowing countries in LAC hold 51 per cent of shares. In addition to their commitment to development, non-borrowing countries receive some incentives to become members: their firms are eligible for bidding for equipment and civil works financed through MDBs’ projects (with the exception of EBRD) (Head 2004: 249).

Since their creation, MDB’s mandates have continually expanded, and yet, at the same time, their relevance has also been questioned. MDBs originally financed infrastructure (mainly transportation and power-related infrastructure) and were referred to as ‘brick and mortar’ banks. Different waves have widened the scope of interventions, first to human development with a focus on health and education in the 1980s, and then to more complex, multidimensional challenges, such as environmental sustainability, equitable income distribution, institutional strengthening, banking regulations, gender inequalities, corruption, climate change, road safety, among others (Satterthwaite 1999; Head 2004; Gutner 2005). Some authors have denounced this expansion as an unmanageable ‘mission creep’ (Einhorn 2001; Gutner 2005; Nielson, Tierney and Weaver 2006), while others justify this expansion in relation to the complexity of development and the need to get involved in complex issues that hinder sustainable and equitable development and poverty reduction (Head 2004).

More generally, MDBs have faced severe critiques on their legitimacy and relevance that remain until today. In terms of legitimacy, critiques in the literature have focused of their
role in global power relations. In particular, authors like Wade or Cammack have questioned the dominance of the US and Non-borrower countries in the governing boards of MDBs, in particular at the World Bank (Wade 2004; Vestergaard and Wade 2013) as well as the predominantly neo-liberal policy frameworks of MDBs in which approaches to participation of developing countries are highly controlled (Cammack 2004; Wade 2004). Wade (2013), for instance, examined and criticised the governing reforms at the Bretton Woods institution and emphasised how giving more predominance to borrowing countries, and in particular to the poorest countries remained a rhetorical exercise. He points out how the asymmetry in power between non borrowing and borrowing countries suggest a lack of legitimacy in a changing world economy power. Cammack (2004) has also criticised the legitimacy of MDBs like the World Bank through an examination of what they meant by poverty reduction and has highlighted how reforms were predominantly neo-liberal and geared towards capitalist accumulation at the global level. In terms of relevance, criticisms have also been significant. They have spanned from ineffectiveness to reducing poverty; too narrow or too broad interpretation of their mandate (too narrow economic focus versus ‘mission creep’); disregard of human rights; contradictions in policy prescription; poor financial advice; excessive and ineffective conditionalities; and weaknesses in staffing and management among others. Some have even argued for a dismantlement of MDBs (see Head 2004 citing Meltzer Report 2004:300). Head (2004) points out though that their counterfactuals would be either an increase in bilateral assistance, which might be more political, more fragmented and less well funded; and/or an increase in private sector lending, which might be extremely costly for least developed nations. He concludes that the myriad of criticisms reflect the growing importance that MDBs have gained as regulatory bodies.

In the context of middle-income countries, to which most LAC countries belong, the question of MDBs’ relevance has gained a particular salience. In the 1990s, private capital flows to middle-income countries increased sharply. Hence, financial resources were not scarce anymore and private lenders actually exceeded MDBs flows. In this context and given the general criticisms above mentioned, whether or not MDBs had lost relevance and influence in those countries became a source of debate that remain until today. The Gurria and Volker Commission (2001) studied the question and concluded that MDBs should
continue providing lending and advice to middle-income countries, in particular in times of crises to limit the impact on the poor. The Commission recalls that lending is a vehicle for promoting policy reforms and international goals and standards, such as poverty reduction, human development, protection of the environment, financial accountability and better governance, and that middle-income countries value the technical advice and safeguards that accompany MDBs lending (Gurria and Volker commission report 2001:7). MDBs’ relevance in LAC also needs to be placed in perspective with the diversity of the region that gather countries with different needs, from lower middle income countries such as Nicaragua or Honduras, to fragile economies such as Jamaica, and upper middle income countries like Mexico or Brazil.

Despite debates on MDBs’ relevance and legitimacy, LAC Governments have called for the support of MDBs in violence prevention. Since 2001, Heads of State and Government explicitly ‘urge[d] multilateral organisations to intensify their support and technical assistance to those countries that so request[ed], in the elaboration of national strategies and actions regarding [violence prevention].’ 6 In 2009, Heads of State reaffirmed their commitment to public security in the Americas and their call to International Financial Institutions’ support in that respect: ‘We thus invite the international community and international financial organisations to continue making financial contributions and other appropriate forms of assistance, within the scope of their respective competencies, to facilitate the achievement of the objectives of public security in the Americas.’7

For the past fifteen years, MDBs have worked on violence prevention, but only recently has the issue gained more visibility within the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the World Bank, the two largest MDBs working in LAC. The IADB was the first

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6 During the third Summit of the Americas (April 20-22, 2001), 34 Heads of State and Government agreed on an action plan to address the most important challenges faced by the Hemisphere of the Americas, as identified throughout a three-year consultation and negotiation process with member States, International Organisations, Financial Institutions and Civil Society Organisations. The Declaration of Quebec City and Action Plan set out the priorities for the region for the coming years. [http://www.summit-americas.org/eng-2002/quebeccity-summit.htm](http://www.summit-americas.org/eng-2002/quebeccity-summit.htm), accessed December 25, 2011.

International Financial Institution (IFI) to approve stand-alone loans\(^8\) with the objective of reducing violence and crime (referred to as ‘citizen security projects’). The loans were approved in 1998 for two countries: Colombia and Uruguay. Since then, the IADB has remained the MDB with the largest violence prevention-related portfolio in the region, but still a comparatively small portfolio (only 16 loans in the 14-year-period, 1998-2011). The World Bank has shown even more resistance to dealing with violence prevention. While the IADB was preparing and approving the first citizen security projects, the World Bank was publishing studies that would slowly open the door to include violence prevention within its mandate. In the mid-2000s, the World Bank LAC Region took the operational lead on the issue and started to include small components of violence prevention within Urban Development projects. By the end of the decade and the beginning of the next, the World Bank had developed policy dialogue with some of its clients on the issue and had approved budget support with components to prevent violence. The recent World Development Reports (WDRs) on Conflict and Security (2011) and on Gender (2012)\(^9\) also mark a shift in the World Bank’s position towards violence, at least in terms of institutional acknowledgement of the importance of the issue for development. Yet, in both banks, investment lending explicitly targeting violence prevention has been tiny considering the overall lending of MDBs. Even for the IADB that has the biggest lending portfolio, half a billion US dollars over 14 years is almost negligible in comparison with the yearly amount the regional bank lends. In 2013, for instance, for one year alone, the IADB approved 168 projects for nearly 14 billion US dollars (IADB 2014)\(^10\).

1.3 Research questions and methodology

With the overarching objective of better understanding opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention in the agendas of MDBs, this thesis asks three

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\(^8\) A stand-alone loan consists in a self-contained operation with its own objectives, components and indicators, as opposed to a mainstreaming process or safeguards (for example gender, environmental sustainability or indigenous rights) that are supposed to be included in most projects to improve the quality and sustainability of the operation, independently of its main objective.


main research questions:

- Why has violence prevention remained marginalised in the agendas of MDBs despite violence’s socio-economic multiplier effects on development?
- What are the opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention in MDBs’ agendas?
- How do national counterparts perceive the potential for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention and MDBs’ relevance in this regard?

The research uses a qualitative methodology, including 167 in-depth interviews with MDBs’ staff, shareholders, counterparts and key informants, and a case study in Colombia. I chose to undertake a comparative analysis of the two largest MDBs working in LAC, the IADB and the World Bank, to better understand commonalities and differences regarding the emergence, treatment and institutionalisation of violence prevention, and to identify opportunities and constraints that go beyond the specificities of a single case. For this, I interviewed 85 staff members at all levels of the organisations, representing eight sectors (Education, Social Protection, Health, Gender, Urban Development, Transport, Justice, and Citizen Security/Violence Prevention). I also interviewed 11 international experts on violence prevention as key informants.

I also undertook a country case study to analyse donor-recipient relations in more depth. I chose Colombia for the following three reasons that I discuss further in Chapter 4: Colombia has been pioneer in the field of violence prevention policies in LAC; the country has a large portfolio and a long standing relationship with MDBs; Colombians’ expertise and experience in addressing violence make the informants knowledgeable, making it possible to deepen the level of reflection on their own policies and the role of MDBs. For the case study, I analysed the National Development Plan and the National Citizen Security Policy to assess the extent to which violence prevention was treated as a transversal, gender-sensitive issue. I also interviewed 71 stakeholders, including ten national agencies and ministries, secretaries in four municipalities (Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellín and Cartagena), academics, and practitioners. These interviews aimed to identify opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention at the local and national levels, and to investigate counterparts’ perceptions of the relevance of MDBs in violence
This thesis focuses on violence in urban settings and includes all forms of interpersonal violence (including domestic violence), that is, what has been referred to as ‘everyday violence’ (Sheper-Hughes 1992). I adopt the definition that the World Health Organisation (WHO) promoted in its 2002 World Report on Violence, and to which academics, policymakers and practitioners have largely subscribed since then:

‘The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or a community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation.’ (WHO 2002:5)

This definition has the advantage of being as comprehensive and inclusive as possible, for it acknowledges different forms of both violence and its consequences, while being precise enough to be applied in policy debates. The research focuses on violence, not crime. It is important to distinguish both terms, for they are often used interchangeably, but refer to different concepts. While crime is an illegal activity that depends on the legal system of a country and is therefore time and space specific, violence, as above defined, is arguably universal (thus the debates around its definition and its scope that I examine in Chapter 2). Violence and crime often overlap, but not necessarily. Some crimes are not violent (money laundering or corruption), while some forms of violence are not always considered as a crime (for instance, marital rape or some forms of child maltreatment in some countries) (Buvinic and Morrison 1997, 1999).

1.4 Structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured as follows. Following this Introduction, Chapter 2 provides an analytical background in the understanding of violence, its link with gender and development. Chapter 3 discusses conceptual understandings of the emergence and the mainstreaming of inclusive violence prevention. It adopts a social constructivist and collective empowerment stance, and combines selected debates from three interlocking bodies of literature: priority setting, mainstreaming, and donor-recipient relations in the
context of aid to identify four analytical categories. These categories respectively examine cognitive frame; actor power; operational knowledge; and organisational treatment. Each category then unfolds in specific variables that I empirically examine in the findings chapters, as explained in Chapter 4 that describes the methodology. Chapter 5 discusses violence in LAC with a special focus in Colombia, and analyses the main features of policymaking in the region and in the Andean country. Chapter 6 looks at the emergence and treatment of violence prevention within the development agenda of the IADB and the World Bank during the period 1998-2011. Chapters 7 and 8 build on this stocktaking and process tracing exercise to analyse why it has happened that way. Building upon the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3, they respectively analyse cognitive frame and actor power (Chapter 7), and operational knowledge and organisational treatment (Chapter 8) in an empirical way so as to better understand the slow emergence of violence prevention and identify opportunities and constraints to mainstream the inclusive violence prevention in the agenda of both banks. Chapter 9 focuses on donor-recipient relations and presents the findings from the case study in Colombia. Based on in-depth interviews with stakeholders at the national and local levels, it discusses opportunities and constraints for a mainstreaming approach to the inclusive prevention of violence at the country level, and studies counterparts’ perception of MDBs’ relevance in that respect. Finally, Chapter 10 concludes by reflecting on the main findings and contribution, and highlights directions for further research.
Chapter 2: Gendered Understandings of Violence and the Implications for Policy

‘The most important thing we have learned after decades of research on violence is that violence, and more specifically, youth violence, can be prevented.’

Joan Serra Hoffman, Lyndee Knox and Robert Cohen (2011)

Violence is an eminently complex development challenge, whose gender dimensions are often overlooked. It is complex for at least three reasons. First, it is polysemous. Violence refers to multiple imaginaries. Second, it is multidimensional. Even in its narrower understanding (physical, direct violence), it has multiple manifestations and categorisations. Third, it is multi-causal. These multiple causes, or risk factors, vary according to the context and the form of violence. Violence is also highly gendered, as all social phenomena are. However, because of certain cognitive frames and limitations in data and measurement, violence in urban settings is generally seen as a ‘young male syndrome’, as young men are both the main victims and perpetrators of homicides. But as males do not live in isolation and homicides are just the tip of the iceberg of violence, multiple gendered dimensions are in fact at stake in the reproduction of violence. In that regard, the gendered continuum of violence shows how different forms from the private to the public spheres reinforce each other, and how models of masculinity and femininity are important variables in the equation. Finally, violence is interrelated to mal-development, both in its causes, and its costly and long-term consequences, which increases multi-fold the complexity at play.

Different policy approaches exist to address violence in urban settings, however, there is still a gap between policy and research to translate the complexity and gender dimensions above mentioned. In particular, the ecological model that is a useful tool to guide policymaking towards multi-sector, gender-sensitive approaches, still needs to be operationalised to translate the theory into practice.

This chapter is organised as follows. Sections 2.1 to 2.5 examine the characteristics of violence as a complex phenomenon that intersects with gender and development. On the
basis of this, Section 2.6 explores the different policy responses to violence, highlighting the gap between policy and research and looking for potential bridges. Section 2.7 then concludes on one potential bridge, mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention that will be discussed further in Chapter 3.

2.1 Violence as a polysemous concept

2.1.1 Narrow to wide definitions: Where to place the boundaries?

Violence is intuitively understood, yet its definition has long been debated among philosophers, anthropologists and sociologists. A core question is where to put the boundaries of the definition of violence (Bufacchi 2005). In its narrowest understanding, violence is defined as the individual or collective use of physical superiority or force on another person; or the abusive use of force to constrain another person (Vautrelle 2009:8). The core parameter is someone else’s body (Chesnais 1981; Coady 1986; Dewey 1980). Violence here implies inter-subjectivity, intentionality and harm.

Feminist scholars have criticised the narrow focus on the harmed body alone, and have proposed referring to the notion of illegitimacy instead. They argued that violence was not always visible. In fact, sexual and psychological violence might not mark the body, but nonetheless traumatically affects the integrity of the person. Similarly, some objects can be taken or destroyed to hurt somebody, and living under threat or constant fear can lead to long-term trauma (Hester, Kelly and Radford; Radford and Stanko 1996). In extreme contexts, genocide survivors also witnessed how psychological violence can be among the most terrible acts of violence (Bufacchi 2005:198). Non-feminist scholars have also endorsed the dichotomy between legitimacy and illegitimacy to define violence (Sheper-Hughes and Bourgeois 2004; see also Riches 1986; or Garver 1968 who defines violence in reference to violation and transgression).

At the end of the 1960s, Galtung (1969) widened the understanding of violence even more to place it in the context of human rights and development. By so doing, he highlighted the distinction between direct violence that is perpetrated by a person or group of persons, and
**structural violence**, where violence is built into unequal power relations. In the same year, Arendt (1969) argued that violence was not just about force, but the instrumental expression of power (Bufacchi, 2005:195-196). Violence thus became a restriction of liberty or deprivation linked to injustices and inequalities. Galtung (1990) then introduced the concept of *cultural violence* to express the structural and direct violence that could be made acceptable through symbols and rituals in the social life. Bourdieu (1998, 2004) adopted a similar approach when he defined what he called ‘symbolic violence’, that is, violence that is imposed by the dominating patriarchal system. Bourdieu explained that when the dominated accept and conform to the dominant’s limits, even without consciousness, symbolic violence takes the form of ‘bodily emotions’, such as shame, humiliation, or anxiety. Following Galtung and Bourdieu, Salmi (1993) argued that violence needed to be understood in its widest meaning and proposed to define it as ‘any avoidable action that constitutes a violation of a human right, […] or which prevents the fulfilment of a basic human need’ (cited in Bufacchi, 2005:196). In this sense, deprivation is a form of violence.

These wide definitions of violence have been criticised for being vague and for encompassing everything that contradicts any socio-economic rights. Betz (1977), for instance, argues that such wide definitions would make violence inescapable, and ultimately meaningless. Even definitions focusing on illegitimacy have been condemned either because they made violence hard to measure, or because they leave undefined the question of who was to judge whether the act was legitimate or not (Pearce 2007:17). By doing so, critiques referred to the unsolved question of the universality versus the subjectivity of violence (Vautrelle 2009; Schröder and Schmidt 2001; Riches 1986; Pearce 2007).

Such concerns are valid in the context of policymaking that requires actionable boundaries, but they undermine the structural factors at stake in the reproduction of violence that if not acknowledged will remain unaddressed. In fact, structural and symbolic violence have the advantages of placing debates on contemporary violence in the context of development and diversity. That is, wider definitions refer to political debates regarding the societies we are building. Such debates are healthy reminders in the context of Latin America and the
Caribbean, characterised with high levels of inequality and violence, and highlight the link with (mal)development and unequal gender relations (see below). Figure 1 summarises key parameters used to define violence along a scope going from narrow to wide meanings.

Figure 1: Definitions of violence

2.1.2 The definition adopted in this thesis

As mentioned in the Introduction, this thesis adopts the WHO’s definition of violence, for its actionable comprehensiveness. In particular, the definition gathers key elements common to most definitions such as intentionality and harm in all its forms, and can be applied to private and public settings. Violence is thus defined as follows:

‘The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or a community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation.’ (WHO 2002:5)
2.1.3 Definitions and imaginaries: multiple cognitive frames on violence and its solutions

The polysemy of violence translates into different imaginaries, or cognitive frames,\textsuperscript{11} that in turn shape policymaking. Yet, these coexisting interpretations are seldom acknowledged (Parkes, Heslop, Oando et al. 2013). Hume (2009), among other feminist scholars, has shown how whoever names violence inevitably installs a hierarchy within violent acts as well as among victims. As such, the dominant definition in a given context needs to be systematically questioned.

A common source of confusion leading to different cognitive frames lies in the multiplicity of related terms. They include crime, un-safety, insecurity, delinquency, abuse, aggression, and incivility, among others. In particular, and as explained in Chapter 1, violence and crime are often used interchangeably, when they refer to different concepts. It is important to distinguish violence and crime, first because focusing on violent crime might overlook certain forms of violence, and second because addressing crime inevitably refers to the criminal justice system while solutions to violence require a broader understanding of its root causes (see Section 2.6).

The profusion of expressions also concerns solutions to violence, which in some instances reveals a lack of clarity. Most common expressions include violence prevention, violence and crime prevention, crime prevention, citizen security, human security, social coexistence, peace, public safety, national security, and public security, among others. Most of these expressions are very broad and need to be precisely defined. When used interchangeably, they indicate, at least, a lack of conceptual clarity relating to violence and its solutions. When used purposefully, they refer to specific and intended cognitive frames. For instance, referring to ‘security’ does not have the same connotation as ‘social coexistence’ or ‘public safety’. Indeed, security often refers to the use of repressive state

\textsuperscript{11}See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion on the frame theory and cognitive frames.
apparatus, while safety has a broader scope and refers to public health and unintentional events (such as road accidents, diseases or natural disasters). Being precise and consistent with definitions and expressions helps build a common understanding around the issue that in turn helps clarifying debates in public policy (see Section 2.6 and Chapter 3).

2.2 Violence as a multi-dimensional phenomenon

2.2.1 Multiple forms of violence with different statistical treatment

Violence encompasses multiple manifestations within three broad typologies: self-directed, interpersonal, and collective. Self-directed violence includes suicide and self-abuse. Interpersonal violence includes domestic violence (intimate partner violence, child maltreatment, elderly abuse) and community violence (when strangers and non-family members are perpetrators of the violent acts). Collective violence refers to violence perpetrated by organised groups or institutions for political, economic, or social objectives, such as wars, armed conflicts between states, organised crime, terrorism, etc. (WHO 2002: 5). As stated in the Introduction, this thesis focuses on interpersonal violence in urban settings.  

This multidimensionality leads to the question of measurement when talking of ‘violence’ in general. In fact, violence is commonly measured in terms of homicides, for this is the most reliable and comparable statistic. However, homicide rates only provide a limited picture of the problematic and generate a bias towards young males who traditionally appear as the main perpetrators and victims of homicides (WHO 2002, 2005, 2010, 2013; Bannon and Correia 2006; UNODC 2011, 2014). In contrast, violent acts that do not lead to death are those that affect the daily lives of millions of women, men and children. Many of those violent acts remain invisible though, for statistical systems do not capture them either because they are under-reported, for technical reasons (difficulty to measure), or for political motives.

12 In other words, this thesis does not include self-directed violence, political violence or organised crime. Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that as categorisations are fixed, they are by definition limited. In violence, boundaries are in fact often blurred. For instance, as I explain later in the chapter, it is unclear how youth gangs are linked to drug trafficking and organised crime.
There are four main sources of data regarding violence, but issues commonly exist on data availability and reliability. Data sources include police records, hospital records, victimisation surveys, and specific qualitative studies and surveys, including epidemiological surveys. Police and hospital records are the main sources for official statistics, but their quality and reliability hugely vary from country to country, in particular in developing countries where statistical systems are usually weak and prone to political manipulation (Rüdqvist, Hettne, Löfving et al 2003; UNODC and World Bank 2007). Even when statistical systems are relatively strong and transparent, they might not provide an accurate picture of the situation in terms of violence. Many violent acts are indeed never reported, and represent what is commonly called the ‘dark figure’ or the ‘black figure’. To overcome such issues, victimisation surveys have been developed. They consist in taking a random sample of the population and asking households if they have been victims of a violent act or a crime\(^{13}\) (with or without violence) within a specific timeframe (usually the last year). These surveys are also useful to target specific forms of violence, such as intimate partner violence or child maltreatment, as well as for collecting specific data on the victims and perpetrators and other crucial information (means, place, time, etc.). Nonetheless, victimisation surveys depend on the willingness of the victim to share, their memory, the quality of the questionnaire and the professionalism of interviewers, and do not necessarily include all forms of violence. Thus, qualitative ethnographic or anthropologic studies or ad-hoc surveys can be helpful in documenting specific forms of violence and providing complementary information. They usually respond to specific purposes and target forms that remain statistically invisible, such as child maltreatment, elderly abuse, intimate partner violence, school violence, violence against minorities (including ethnic groups, and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual (LGBT) groups), violence at work, violence against persons with disability, and emotional violence. Such data collection and the different treatment of forms of violence inevitably impact policymaking. If we do not know the scope of an issue, it is more difficult to put it high on the political agenda and develop sound policies and programmes to address it. It is

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\(^{13}\) Victimisation surveys usually focus on crime and offences and specify if crime is committed with or without violence. As such, they adopt a narrow definition of violence focusing on bodily integrity and do not recognise the emotional violence associated with being a victim of a crime or an offence (see Figure 1).
noteworthy that data-related issues most commonly concern forms of violence whose victims are usually women, children, the elderly, or minority groups.

### 2.2.2 How to categorise violence?

As violence is multi-dimensional, different approaches exist to categorise violence, which adds a layer of complexity to the phenomenon. As Table 1 summarises, violence has been classified in terms of motives, types, victims, aggressors, the relationship between the victim and the aggressor, gender, the consequence of violence, the place where it occurs, or the mean (Buvinic and Morrison 1997; McIlwaine 1999; Moser and Schrader 1999; WHO 2002; Moser 2006). These multiple ways to categorise violence make it even more complex to address, for they offer competing perspectives to analyse the issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of violence</th>
<th>Sub-categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motives</td>
<td>Economic, social, socio-economic, political, racist, irrational/passional/anomic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types</td>
<td>Sexual, physical, psychological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>Children, men and women of certain ages, ethnicity, sexuality, dis(ability), profession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressors</td>
<td>An individual, self, a group of individuals, for example, gangs or pandillas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between the victim and the aggressor</td>
<td>Acquaintance, family member, stranger, peer, relative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Gender-based violence including violence against transsexuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequence of violence</td>
<td>Lethal, non-lethal, needing medical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place where it occurs</td>
<td>Rural, urban, school, workplace, public transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>With firearms, with white arms, without arm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Moser and Schrader 1999; McIlwaine 1999; Buvinic and Morrison 1997; WHO 2002; Moser 2006.

### 2.3 Violence as a multi-causal phenomenon

#### 2.3.1 Understanding violence with multi-disciplinary lenses

Numerous disciplines have sought to understand violence and its causes. From sociology, economics, anthropology and political sciences, to psychology, biology, neurosciences, and more recently to urban planning, gender studies, public health and development studies, all disciplines have proposed and favoured theories to explain the emergence of violence.

This diversity offers richness, but also makes understanding the causes of violence more complex, and at times, overwhelming. In fact, most disciplines remain in siloes, and their
supporting theories appear at times contradictory. While sociologists emphasise norms, culture and social organisation (Hirschi 1969; Hein 2010), economists generally endorse a rational choice theory and discuss opportunity cost (such as widespread impunity for example). They also look into net utility for individuals or groups of individuals (‘expected benefits’) to behave violently or illegally (Becker 1968). Anthropologists point to rituals and traditions, in particular in the transition from childhood to manhood and the implications of belonging to a group (identity formation and sub-culture) (Ramphele 2001; Abbink 2001), and political scientists point to the institutional context, in terms of weakness of criminal justice systems (widespread impunity and corruption), state violence, weak democracies, discourses around violence and crime, the presence of drug-related criminal organisations, the availability of firearms, and structural violence (Keane 1996; Pécault 1999; Galtung 1969; Bourdieu 1989; Pearce 2010). Psychologists focus on deviant or pathologic behaviours and insist on the learning process that leads an individual to become violent (McIlwaine 1999:457), as opposed to biologists and neuroscientists who accept the idea that some individuals are born more predisposed to violence than others, and look into nutrition and the brain development to suggest possible neurobiological factors for violent behaviours (Restak 2009; Kerns and Prinz 2002). Urban planners, geographers and demographers link rapid urbanisation, migration and the youth bulge (massive numbers of people arriving in cities that could not offer jobs, housing or basic services, forcing them to survive in minimal conditions) (Rotkers 2002; Caldeira 2000; Beall 2009) to explain increases in crime and violence (see also Briceño-León 2002; Concha-Eastman 2002; Moser et al. 2005; Pécault 1999; Koonings and Krujt 1999; Fajnzylberg et al. 1998). Gender specialists and feminist scholars point to the structural inequality between men and women, patriarchal ideologies and the patriarchal system that legitimises domination of some women and men over other women and men, along with traditional gender identities that tend to link masculinity with force and violence and femininity with weakness and victimhood (Hume 2004; Heise 1994, 1998; Prise 2005; Larrain 1999; Bott et al. 2005). Epidemiologists follow a public health methodology to identify risk and protective factors that together increase the propensity for violence

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14 Sociologists highlight the consequence of a history of conflict (legitimisation of the use of force to resolve conflict), the phenomenon of anomie (inadequacy between expectations and potentialities in an unequal society) (Hein 2010), inequality and discrimination (economic, racial, sexual or gender-based), and social control (positive or negative connection with institutions, from family to the school or the State).
(Londoño and Guerrero 2000; Duque et al. 2008; WHO 2002; PAHO 2001; Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 2000). Among others, they identify the use of alcohol, carrying of firearms, etc., and underline the link between different levels of causality (individual, family, community and society), what is currently referred to as the ecological model (WHO 2002; Turpin and Kurtz 1997, see below). Different schools of criminologists favour varying combinations of theories used by other disciplines, but most discuss the deterrence effects of sentencing (Sherman et al. 2002). Finally, because of the high costs of violence and crime on societies and their long-term consequences, experts in development aim to make the synthesis of previous explanations and adopt a development lens by focusing on inequality and mal-development. They show the link between development and violence, in particular through high rates of poverty, inequality and structural issues, such as low quality education systems, high youth unemployment rates, weak institutions and weak law enforcement, and insalubrious built environment (Cunningham et al. 2008; World Bank 2007, 2010, 2011).

2.3.2 The ecological model as a tool to disentangle multiple, context-based risk factors for violence

To make the synthesis of each discipline’s contribution while having a coherent framework of analysis, the WHO, in its World Report on Violence (2002), has promoted the use of the ecological model. The ecological model follows a contextual, epidemiological approach, and identifies violence-prone risk or protective factors at different levels. Risk factors are factors that tend to increase the probability for an individual to behave violently. Protective factors, on the contrary, increase the resiliency of individuals, and make them more resistant to violence, both as victims and perpetrators. Researchers consider that enhancing protective factors is more effective than reducing risk factors (Naudeau et al. 2008). The ecological model presents a combination of risk and/or protective factors that varies depending on the context and are grouped in four levels: individual, relationship (family and friends), community (school, neighbourhood), and society (Figure 2 for main risk factors\textsuperscript{15}). Today, there is an increasing consensus among academics, policymakers, and development partners on the multi-causality of violence and the ecological model is largely

\textsuperscript{15} There is more evidence on risk factors than on protective factors, and as such the ecological model tends to present risk factors only.
endorsed in the development community, in particular because it shows the links between violence and development (Buvinic and Morrison 1999; WHO 2002; Moser and Shrader 1999; Buvinic, Alda and Lamas 2005; UNODC and World Bank 2008; World Bank 2005, 2007, 2011, 2013; Cunningham et al. 2008; Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011) (see Section 2.4.)

Figure 2: Ecological model with examples of risk factors


2.4 Violence as a development challenge

Violence and development are intertwined both in their causes and in their consequences. Many of the risk factors associated with violence, as highlighted in the ecological model, such as weak institutions, corruption, exclusion and inequality are linked to mal-development. Violence also hinders development efforts through its enormous costs and negative long-term consequences. Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter (1999) talk about violence’s ‘social and economic multiplier effects’ that can affect not only individuals, but also communities, and the society at large with consequences that can last for decades.
There are numerous ways in which violence negatively affects development. Moser and Shrader (1999:7) show how violence erodes different types of capital, understood as ‘stocks of assets’. Violence erodes human capital (that includes investments linked to education, nutrition and health), when child maltreatment and bullying hinder children’s development through consequences such as low self-esteem, mental health disorders (anxiety, depression), low capacity of concentration at school, aggressive behaviours, isolation, and a higher probability to reproduce violent behaviours when adolescent and adult (Willman 2009; Cunningham et al. 2008; Naudeau et al. 2008). Similar consequences are found common for children witnessing violence, in particular in their home (Willman 2009; Willman and Makisaka 2010; WHO 2002). Other human capital-related costs include lower self-esteem and less productivity, especially for women victims of intimate partner violence (Buvnic, Morrison and Orlando 2005; WHO 2013). Injuries caused by violence might also lead to disabilities, both mental and physical.

In terms of social capital (defined as the rules, norms, obligations and trust in social structures and relations), violence dissuades people from organising when gangs control territories, or when fear is widespread and citizens are afraid of retaliation on themselves or their family. Such situations enhance a ‘culture of silence’ (Pécault 1999; Rotkers 2002). Rubio (1997) has shown how violence also builds ‘perverse social capital’, which is the bonding, solidarity and ‘esprit de corps’ among gang members. It is perverse not only because those groups are violent towards others, but also because they employ violent practices within the group. Their codes and rituals are intrinsically linked to violence, and so is their identity and solidarity as a group. At the macro institutional level, violence also affects political stability and legitimacy, through widespread citizens’ distrust in public

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16 Health and nutrition determine the capacity to work and education the skills or preparation to work; labour being a fundamental asset in human capital.

17 Anthropological studies confirm this when they relate life histories of pandilleros who explain they escaped from a violent home and took refuge on the streets where they began a new, violent life (see for instance Salazar 2001; Rocha 1999; Hume 2009; Rubio 2007).

18 It is noteworthy to clarify that there is no causal link. What researchers have pointed out is that most of adults who behave violently had themselves experienced or witnessed violence as a child. This does not mean that all children victims or witnesses of violence will become violent adults.
institutions, in particular those related to the criminal justice system, lack of collaboration with the police, privatisation of security, as well as social cleansings (Caldeira 2000; Winton 2004; Kliksberg 2006). Citizens then consider they can take justice into their own hands because the State is overwhelmed, corrupted, or simply does not respond effectively to the situation. This tends to increase tolerance towards the use of violence to solve problems and conflicts, and feeds a ‘culture of violence’ (Taussig 1992; Kruijt and Koonings 1999; Bourgois 2002; Torres-Rivas 1999; Schepers-Hughes 1992). Ultimately, this also weakens democracies (Koonings and Kruijt 1999; Rotkers 2002; Pearce 2010).

Finally, in economic terms, the costs of violence are enormous. Depending on the method used, economists have estimated that they could represent between 5 and 15 per cent of the GDP in countries worst affected by violence (Londoño and Guerrero 2000; Concha-Eastman 2002; Soares and Naritomi 2010). This includes justice-related costs and direct costs to health (health-related costs for injuries, disabilities, or traumas) and mortality, and costs to the business climate (reduction in tourism, private security costs, firm protection measures, etc.). As mentioned in Chapter 1, 15 per cent of GDP is nearly three times the public expenditure as a percentage of the GDP dedicated to Education in countries like Brazil or Mexico. In terms of life, some regions, like the Caribbean, loose nearly one-fourth (24 per cent) of years of healthy life due to violence, according to WHO’s estimations (as calculated in Disability-Adjusted Life Years or DALYs) (UNODC and World Bank 2007:56).

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19 According to UNODC and the World Bank, there are at least six different methodologies to assess the costs of violence: (i) assessing specific costs; (ii) adding up total costs using an ‘accounting approach’; (iii) estimating total cost or ‘willingness to pay’, using econometric methodologies; (iv) calculating the Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) lost due to violence; (v) estimating effects on economic growth through cross-country regressions; and (vi) measuring the marginal willingness-to-pay for reductions violence (UNODC and World Bank 2007: 42).


21 Some studies also suggest that people who have been victimised are 5 to 10 per cent more likely to be less satisfied with life (UNODC and World Bank 2007:56). Other indicators include willingness to pay for security or business climate (disincentives for private and foreign investment because of extra costs generated by high rates of violence in terms of private security, higher insurance costs, loss in infrastructure, lower productivity, or ‘rentas’ (taxes) by mafia-type organised crime, etc.) (World Bank 2007, 2010, 2011).
The very high monetary and non-monetary costs as well as the multi-causality of violence have made the link between violence and development increasingly apparent. As previously discussed when defining violence (see Section 2.1), Galtung (1969) had already argued that violence was the result of structural injustices. It is not until the end of the 1990s, however, with a sharp increase of violence in LAC in particular, that international development economists began studying the relationship between violence and poverty and other economic variables. They found that more than poverty in absolute terms, it was inequality that explained differences in violence across countries (Ayres 1998; Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 1998, 2000). More recently, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has shown that countries with low human development have the largest share of homicides, and those with high levels of income inequality have rates four times higher than ‘more equal’ countries (UNODC 2011:10).

In sum, violence feeds mal-development by hindering investment and weakening human, social and economic capital, and asset accumulation. It is intertwined with inequalities and structural injustices linked to class, gender, age and ethnicity, and as such, is also the product of mal-development. By reinforcing each other, mal-development and violence feed a ‘perverse cycle’ (Buvinic and Morrison 1997), a cycle that is highly gendered.

2.5 Gender dimensions and the gendered continuum of violence: questioning patriarchy as a root cause for violence

2.5.1 Violence, a ‘young male syndrome’?
Violence is often characterised as a ‘young male syndrome’ (Abbink 2001). This arises because young males are the main victims and perpetrators of homicides everywhere in the world (UNODC 2007, 2011, 2014), because violence is mainly measured in terms of

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22 Those economists worked for the World Bank. Similar efforts were taking place at the IADB as well. See Lora 2000 for example.

23 The WHO has estimated that the homicide rate for youth aged 10-29 was 36 per 100,000 in LAC (WHO 2002). In countries with high homicides rates, the ratio male-female victims of homicides can reach 1:15 (Waiselfisz 2008). Young males are also considered the main perpetrators of homicides. However, reliable information is often missing because the majority of homicides and violent crimes are not solved (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011). Therefore, generalisation on perpetrators’ profiles must be treated with caution, in particular regarding their age.
homicides (Section 2.2), and because of the visibility of youth gangs, debates around violence are generally biased towards males.

Youth gangs, in particular, tend to embody ‘the problem of violence’. In Latin America and the Caribbean, youth gangs, also called pandillas, usually share four characteristics: (i) they are territorial groups; (ii) they are male-dominated, even though females are also linked to gangs either as members or girlfriends, and there are also some female-led gangs; (iii) their members tend to come from low-income neighbourhoods in urban areas; and (iv) they tend to be young people, in general below 25 or 30 years old (Rodgers 1999; Moser and Winton 2002; Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011). However, beyond these four general traits, youth gangs encompass a wide variety of phenomena, as they diverge by structure, size, motive, and practice across countries, cities, and even territories. They span from informal gatherings of a few youth who commit delinquent acts or incivilities, to maras that are structured as large criminal organisations (with thousands of members) and carry out cruel practices (Rodgers 1999; Moser and Winton 2002). Their motives and practices go from identity searching, petty crime and fights (Rocha 2000; Sosha and Rocha 2001; Rocha and Rodger 2008; Baird 2011), to extortion, including ‘rentas’ (a form of taxation) in public transportation or small businesses for protection in the case of maras (Rubio 2006; WOLA 2006). Nevertheless, available statistics in most countries suggest that youth gangs are not responsible for the majority of homicides or other violent crime. Even maras in Central America (mainly present in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala) do not appear in studies as the main perpetrators of homicides, even though they are generally considered as the main violent threat (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011). The link between youth gangs and drug trafficking is also unclear. Many of them consume drugs (marijuana, cocaine and

24 In general against another pandilla leading at times to destruction in neighbourhoods, for they use stones and other artisanal cocktails Molotov, etc. However, anthropological studies have shown that in a number of countries, pandillas’ practice has evolved: while for years they tended to protect their neighbourhoods, researchers have reported that they now rob and steal the inhabitants of their own ‘barrio’ (see Rocha and Rodgers 2008).

25 Studies are inconclusive but suggest that in Guatemala only 14 per cent of homicides are attributed to gang activities; in Honduras, studies are less precise and estimate that less than 5 per cent of homicides are committed by youth under 18 years old; and in El Salvador, 60 per cent of homicides are attributed to maras (see Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011: 106).
crack), and increasingly distribute them at a smaller or larger scale. However, the extent to which youth gangs are connected to drug cartels is not clearly established (opcit). Despite these uncertainties, youth gangs’ presence and visibility, as well as the way some media portray and focus on them, tend to make young poor males scapegoats of the problem of violence. The risk of such shortcuts is to essentialise all young poor males, when only a minority behave violently. At the core of such risk lies the question of gender identities.

2.5.2 Gender identities as overlooked risk factors for violence

Anthropologists and sociologists have shown how a certain model of masculinity based on domination, competition, power and respect-seeking attracted male adolescents to join gangs (Rodgers 1999, 2006, 2007; Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2000; Rocha 2000; Sosha and Rocha 2001; Salazar 2002; Rubio 2007). When young males enter adolescence (age of identity seeking) there is a range of conditions that can result in violence becoming a way to affirm one’s identity (Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2000; Briceño-León 2002; Parkes 2007; Moser 2009; Baird 2011). These conditions include the lack of positive role models (because of absent or unknown fathers, siblings or fathers that have been gang members) (Ramphele 2001), difficulties in school, no attractive economic opportunities, and/or they live in communities where youth gangs already exist. Sociological studies have also shown how belonging to a violent group, such as a pandilla in Latin America, gives young males a sense of belonging, an identity of a ‘real man,’ and a more active sexuality (Rubio 1997, 2007), as if there was only one way to be a ‘real’ man, and this way necessarily involved violence and power. Decades of feminist research have denounced such essentialist views around masculinity and femininity, showing the difference between sex (biology) and gender (identity), and demonstrating how gender identities were socially constructed. Carrigan, Connell and Lee (1985) have called ‘hegemonic masculinity’ the model of masculinity based on domination to which young gang members aspire when they seek to prove themselves as ‘real men’. Such ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is constantly reaffirmed through the media and other social means, and supported by structural inequalities, as

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26 As previously mentioned, Rubio (2007) has developed the concept of ‘perverse social capital’ to refer to it. See also Parkes and Conolly (2013) for the case of young males and peer dynamics in the UK.
Bourdieu has argued,\textsuperscript{27} but is seldom acknowledged as a risk factor to be addressed when designing strategies to prevent violence. And yet, dominant models of masculinity can evolve, as has been the case in many European countries (Bannon and Correia 2006), and in the particular case of youth gangs in Latin America, studies have shown that events linked to perceptions of and changes in gender identities, such as having a girlfriend, getting married, or becoming a father, were catalysts of change and motives to leave the gang (Rodgers 2005). Such events also confirm the false dichotomy between public and private spheres, as shown through the gendered continuum of violence.

\textbf{2.5.3 The gendered continuum of violence}

The focus on homicides and young males tends to sideline other forms of violence, and generally results in overlooking how different forms reinforce each other to reproduce the perverse cycle of violence (Whitzman 2008). In particular, domestic violence has traditionally been disregarded in public debates, and in some countries, still remains a ‘public secret’ as Hume (2004, 2009) has argued in the case of Central America. Yet, domestic violence and street violence are interrelated and evolve along a gendered continuum of violence.

Several scholars have used the concept of \textit{continuum of violence} to show the relationship among forms of violence. Bourgeois (2004) argues that different levels or types of violence as described by different authors (mentioned in parenthesis) exist along a continuum: political, structural (Galtung 1969), symbolic (Bourdieu 1998), and everyday violence (Schepers-Hughes 1992). Moser and Shrader (1999) establish the same interconnection among different motivations of violence: economic, political, social, and institutional (see also Moser and McIlwaine 2004; Moser 2006). Kelly (1988), a feminist scholar, focuses on the continuum of sexual violence, and along with other authors (in particular feminist researchers working on politics) challenged the dichotomy between private and public violence, showing how both forms are often intertwined. More generally, Nordstrom (2004) speaks about a continuum through the violence of tomorrow, beyond the immediacy of the violent act, i.e. pointing out its reproduction and lasting consequences. These

\textsuperscript{27}Bourdieu (1998, 2004) explains that patriarchy is a form of symbolic violence; see Section 2.1 and Chapter 3.
different versions of the *continuum of violence* are all drawing attention to the same idea: the transmission of violent habits and landmarks through *space and time*, as summarised by Pearce (2010:288). Building upon the previous discussion on the male-biased focus, gender identities as overlooked risk factors, and the irrelevant dichotomy between public and private spheres, it is useful to place the continuum in a gender perspective to highlight the gendered mechanisms at stake in the reproduction of violence. This, in turn, uncovers patriarchy as one of root causes enabling this reproduction. Figure 3 highlights the gender dimensions throughout the ecological model, and Figure 4 translates this analysis into a gendered continuum of violence.

**Figure 3: Gendered dimensions of risk factors in the ecological model**

- Inequality and poverty *(female headed households)*, impunity, *unequal gender relations (patriarchy)*, higher tolerance towards violence *(which form?)*
- Presence of male *(and female?)*, gangs, poor school system, firearms, lack of employment *(for whom?)*
- Domestic abuse, parenting *(absent or violent father/ mother)*, lack of positive *female/male* role model, delinquent *male/female peers*
- Neurobiology, personality *(low-self-esteem, greed, impressionable)*, *girl/boy victim of witness of abuse, deprivation of maternal care*

Source: Adapted from WHO 2002.
2.5.4 Patriarchy as a root cause of violence

The gendered continuum of violence reveals how key dynamics in the reproduction of violence are embedded in unequal gender relations where power is based on domination. In that regard, Bourdieu (1998) has explained how the subtle objectification of masculine domination and the correlated model of masculinity based on dominating power are imposed and constantly reinforced through symbols and beliefs that impregnate bodies and minds, and thus go beyond clear consciousness. For Bourdieu, the patriarchal system legitimises itself through ‘schemes of perception, appreciation and action that constitute habitus’, and therefore make appear normal and natural what is indeed constructed through incessant efforts (both by agents and institutions) (Bourdieu 1998: 58-59-own translation).

As mentioned in Section 2.1, this is what he refers to as ‘symbolic violence’. If, as this research argues, the gendered continuum of violence reveals that key dimensions (domestic and gender-based violence) are embedded in unequal gender relations and dominating gender identities (hegemonic masculinity), then the patriarchal system might appear to be
one of the root causes of urban violence. Not questioning more systematically gender when addressing urban violence might, as a result, be explained in reference to Bourdieu’s symbolic violence: through a subtle objectification of the link between violence and power, power and masculinity, and therefore violence and masculinity, the patriarchal system and its symbolic violence make it appear counterintuitive to question gender when analysing and addressing what appears a straightforward masculine reality.

Understanding the gendered continuum of violence has concrete implications in public policies. When gendered, the continuum of violence from the home to the streets and through generations supports the idea that separating domestic violence from other forms of urban violence into different strategies fails to acknowledge key mechanisms of violence transmission. More broadly, it shows that creating and sustaining conditions for peaceful societies requires more than punctually addressing impunity. It requires challenging embedded injustices that feed the perverse cycle of violence, gender inequality, and mal-development, as discussed in the next section.

### 2.6 Implications for policy: Rationale and challenges for multi-sector, gender-sensitive violence prevention policies in practice

The policy debate around violence has traditionally opposed partisans of prevention to partisans of control strategies. The first draw attention to the need for work on root causes of violence, understood as a learned behaviour that can be unlearned or not learned in the first place (Buvinic and Morrison 1997; Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 1997; Torres-Riva 1999; World Bank 2011). The second consider that lack of punishment is the most important issue to be addressed both as a remedial and dissuasive approach (Ayres 1998; see also Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011:116, 122). These debates reflect the different theories put forward by the multiple disciplines that study violence (see Section 2.3.1), but in part only. Ideology and more or less well-informed understanding of the phenomenon have fixed these debates, despite progress in research and a growing consensus on the multi-causality of the issue.
Authors have argued that opposing prevention to control was misleading because control comprises of prevention through impeding an individual or group of individuals to commit further violent acts (Buvinic and Morrison 1999; Arriagada and Godoy 2000; among others). In fact, tertiary prevention targets offenders and includes programmes and interventions to prevent them from recidivism (see different levels and types of prevention, Box 2). However, such a standpoint is valid only to the extent that control or criminal justice strategies focus on preventing violence through improving relationship between the police and communities, police performance, equal access to timely justice, fair sentencing, rehabilitation of offenders and their reinsertion into society. When control strategies solely focus on repression and punishment, with severe human rights issues regarding arrests, sentencing and detention, and little or no rehabilitation of offenders, they lose their focus on root causes and thereafter the preventive perspective.

**Box 2: Different levels of prevention**

Preventing violence refers to developing a set of actions for violence not to happen in the first place, or not to happen again. There are three levels of prevention that target different groups of beneficiaries.

*Primary prevention* targets the general population, i.e. before any violence occurs;  
*Secondary prevention* targets population at higher risk of committing an act of violence or a crime, such as youth-at-risk, pandilleros, drug or alcohol consumers, or high-risk parents; and  
*Tertiary prevention* aims to prevent recidivism through rehabilitation and supervision of offenders.  

Table 2 summarises different policy approaches based on the initial Moser and Shrader (1999)’s categorisation and its development (Moser and Winton 2002; Moser, Winton and Moser 2005). The multiplicity of approaches translates different cognitive frames on violence and their causes that in turn lead to favouring different categorisations of violence and lenses to develop policies and programmes (see Sections 2.1.3 and 2.2.2). For instance, social prevention focuses on groups of potential perpetrators and/or victims of different forms of violence, while situational prevention focuses on places where violence occurs to make it more difficult to happen. Criminal justice focuses on crime (with or without violence), and on the enforcement of the law, etc. Different approaches also show different treatment of gender issues, with social prevention more prone to be gender-sensitive, for it focuses on people and their relations. The main limitation of these sector-specific

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28 See Appendix A for a detailed explanation for each policy approach.

29 Though this is not guaranteed if a gender perspective is not explicit.
approaches is that they focus on certain risk factors and can, as a result, only offer partial solutions, if any given the interrelation among different factors at different levels (see Section 2.3). They are also usually developed in siloes, which tends to leave forms of violence unattended and gendered continuum of violence ignored.

To respond to these limitations, *multi-sector*\(^{30}\) approaches have been developed (see Table 2 and Appendix A). They seek to translate the multi-dimensionality and multi-causality of violence through addressing different risk factors in a coordinated fashion. They typically combine social and situational prevention with criminal justice reforms, in particular to improve police efficacy and police-community collaboration (Moser and Shrader 1999; Moser and Winton 2002). As such, they target different groups of beneficiaries, from the general population (primary prevention) to high-risk groups (secondary prevention) and offenders (tertiary prevention) (see Box 3). They also seek to strengthen the institutional capacity of institutions working in violence prevention at the national and local levels, and to strengthen data collection analysis for a sounder policymaking (Moser and Winton 2002). When multi-sector strategies are gender-sensitive, they acknowledge the gendered continuum of violence and include in the same strategy domestic and street violence (Whitzman 2008; Pearce 2010). They also build on the fact that gender identities are historically and socially constructed, and therefore can be influenced and changed (Moore 1994). \(^{31}\) More generally, multi-sector, gender-sensitive strategies adopt a gender perspective in their diagnostic, interventions, and result frameworks, and as such, in theory, seem to best respond to the complexity of violence.

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\(^{30}\) Multi-sector approaches imply coordination among actors and sectors that contribute to enhancing protective factors and lessening risk factors. They are also referred to as ‘integrated approaches’. MDBs in particular favour this term. I chose to use the expression ‘multi-sector approaches’ to avoid confusion with the use of ‘integration’ in regard to mainstreaming, as I explain in Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3.

\(^{31}\) In that respect, empirical work with men, in particular in the health sector such as Programa H in Brazil and Mexico, provides concrete examples as to how the hegemonic masculinity can be challenged. Barker (2006) and others (for example Bird *et al.* 2007) have shown how programmes can support alternative masculine models, emphasising fatherhood and cooperative behaviours with women.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy approach</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Types of intervention</th>
<th>Institutions /Actors in charge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Social prevention seeks to address a combination of risk factors that together form the social root causes of violence | Public health / Epidemiological approach     | Reducing risk factors, enhancing protective factors | - Epidemiological and geographical mapping of violence  
- Educational campaigns  
- Alcohol sales restriction  
- Arms wear permits restriction  
- Promotion of behavioural change | Mayor, University, Police, Media, NGOs, Hospitals |
|                                                     | Education / Conflict resolution               | Strengthening human capital and resilience      | - Prevention of bullying in school  
- Conflict resolution training  
- Prevention of teen dating violence  
- Citizenship competencies  
- Control of anger and emotions  
- Cultural and recreational activities  
- Leadership training and team play  
- Positive parenting  
- Lifeskills training | Schools, Parents associations, NGOs, Ministry of Education, Mayors |
|                                                     | Youth development                            | Strengthening human capital and resilience      | - Vocational training  
- Gender and sexual education, masculinities and femininities  
- Drug prevention  
- Mentoring/role models  
- Lifeskills training | Schools, University, Training Institutes, Mayors, Private Sector, NGOs, Media |
|                                                     | Community organisation                       | Building social capital, trust, social cohesion | - Safety marches  
- Community activities  
- Community policing  
- Recreational and cultural activities  
- Campaign  
- Victims services  
- Youth services  
- Domestic violence prevention  
- Reinsertion of ex-offenders/ restorative justice  
- Parenting programs  
- Citizenship culture | Communities, Mayors, NGOs, Justice, Police, Schools, Hospitals/ (Youth) Clinics |
| Situational prevention (use of the built environment and how people interact in places to identify risky situations) | Urban planning/ CPEDT                       | Modifying urban settings to reduce opportunities for violence and increase natural surveillance | - Safety marches  
- Cut trees and vegetation  
- Increase human presence  
- Develop economic activities  
- Focus on the whole journey from home to work through public transportation  
- Focus on markets, bus stops, school entrances and where people use to gather  
- Focus on places where people are afraid and/or violence happens | State, Mayors, Private Sector, Architects/Urban Planners, Communities/Community Leaders (both women and men) |
| Criminal justice (the most traditional)             | Police                                       | Deter and control violence through higher arrest | - Police reform  
- Hot spot policing  
- Community policing  
- All-women police stations | Police, Ministry in charge, Mayors |
approach and includes the police, the justice, and the penitentiary system)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rehabilitation</th>
<th>Offenders to help reinsert society upon completion of their sentence</th>
<th>Courts, Ministry in charge, Mayors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deter and control violence through higher conviction rates</td>
<td>Judicial reform - Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms - Accessible justice systems - Mobile courts - Alternative sentencing - Adult and juvenile drug courts</td>
<td>Penitentiary systems, Ministry in charge, Mayors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rehabilitation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multi-sector (for multi-dimensionality and multi-causality of violence)</th>
<th>Citizen security/Safer cities</th>
<th>National and municipal strategies</th>
<th>Prime Minister, Ministries, Mayors, Multiple agencies and NGOs at local and neighbourhood levels, Police, the Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All of the above</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted and enhanced from Moser and Shrader (1999), Moser and Winton (2002), and Moser, Winton and Moser (2005).

However, today, multi-sector strategies are little understood in practice. The multiplicity of target groups, types of interventions and actors make them particularly complex (OVE 2013, 2014). Moreover, the ecological model and the gendered continuum of violence imply a ‘shared responsibility’ between actors and sectors that still needs to be translated into coherent and effective policies and programmes. In other words, the operationalisation of the ecological model, its gender dimensions, and its goal as a policy still need to be better understood to ensure a sound translation of theory to practice. This is particularly important considering the multi-fold constraints in developing countries, the overall lack of evidence available (Sherman 2012)\(^{32}\), and the lack of continuity that characterises most policies dealing with violence. Even more so, when we take into consideration the need to work across levels of government and across sectors, with a particular emphasis at the local level where constraints are usually the greatest, and with a gender perspective for an issue dominated by male-chauvinist considerations (see Section 2.4).

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has shown how violence is a complex development challenge whose gender dimensions are often overlooked. In particular, the gendered continuum that shows the interrelation between different forms of violence helps uncover deeply ingrained causes

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\(^{32}\) Most evidence comes from industrialised countries.
based on exclusion and patriarchy. Such analysis suggests that preventing violence in a sustainable way and creating the conditions for peaceful societies requires rethinking about how violence is dealt with. In particular, it argues for transforming traditional approaches to violence prevention and promoting, developing, and implementing multi-sector, gender-sensitive strategies. Among the challenges for developing such strategies to prevent violence are building a common cognitive frame for all stakeholders in all sectors, focusing on strengthening the theories of change implied in the shared responsibility and the operationalisation of the gendered ecological model, clarifying goals in particular considering that structural injustices and the patriarchal system participate in perpetrating the cycle of violence and better understanding operational considerations and mechanisms through learning from the experience of other transversal issues, and of course, through ‘informed trials and errors’ on the ground (Sherman 2012). To contribute to this enterprise, in Chapter 3 I develop the concept of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention, and discuss key analytical categories for its prioritisation and institutionalisation in the development agenda.
Chapter 3: Conceptual Understandings of Mainstreaming Inclusive Violence Prevention

‘We need something between unfounded optimism and hopeless pessimism. The middle way is called strategy.’

Sara Hlupekile Longwe

If, as Chapters 1 and 2 have argued, violence is one of the main contemporary development challenges and is multidimensional, multi-causal and evolves along a gendered continuum, then the question is how to translate this transversality into sustained change within organisations and in the life of women, men and children in developing countries.

The need for continuity and for operationalising the shared responsibility for violence discussed in Chapter 2 led me to the notion of mainstreaming. However, mainstreaming is not an easy concept. In fact, it has been widely criticised both in theory and in practice. Nonetheless, in the search for solutions to a challenge as pressing as violence in the developing world, we cannot afford to discard options for their complexity or operational difficulty without first undertaking a sincere and serious effort to analyse it. This is what this chapter, and more broadly this thesis, are about.

Mainstreaming has become a familiar concept for transversal issues in policy and planning. It was first referred to for the inclusion of handicapped children within regular classrooms (Harrison and Phillips 1978), and since then, has been used for issues as diverse as gender, the environment, human rights, governance and anti-corruption, ethnicity, disaster management, intercultural relations, among others. More recently, climate change mainstreaming has received a lot of attention in the development community. But among all issues, gender equality is probably the most advanced process of mainstreaming in development and at the global level (Gupta 2010).

One lesson from the thirty years of gender mainstreaming is that mainstreaming is often misunderstood and sometimes subverted. It is useful to retrace briefly the history of

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33 Cited in Hannan (2000:264).
mainstreaming through the lens of gender equality to understand the specificity of mainstreaming as opposed to integration, and define the value added of the process that would justify adapting it to violence prevention.

Gender mainstreaming appeared in the 1990s and was formally adopted at the Beijing fourth World Conference on Women (1995) as a strategy for development partners and governments worldwide to promote gender equality. Before gender mainstreaming, integrationist movements sought, in the 1970s and 1980s, to include women’s interests and needs in the development agenda. Nonetheless, such integration rapidly became sidelined as ‘women’s issues’, and feminist scholars and practitioners increasingly raised their voice saying that transformation could not happen as an ‘add-on’ to ‘business as usual’, i.e. without challenging unequal power relations deeply ingrained in most governments’ policies and practices that development agencies were financially and technically supporting (Jahan 1995; Longwe 1994, 1997; Rao 1995; Goetz 1995; Elson and McGee 1995; Levy 1992, 1996). If we were to achieve gender equality, we needed to ‘transform’ existing rules, they were arguing (opcit). As a result mainstreaming emerged in the early 1990s. It was conceived as a political process aiming to transform unequal gender relations. Instead of including women and ‘adding and stirring’ (Moser 1989), gender mainstreaming would produce a paradigm shift of how development and political and social life in general were planned by addressing gender inequality in all sectors at all levels (Rao 1995; Razavi and Miller 1995; Walby 1997; Council of Europe 1998).

Since Beijing, virtually all development agencies and most governments in the world have adopted a mainstreaming strategy to achieve gender equality. Yet, progress in implementation has been slow and the political dimensions have often disappeared behind technical or technocratic considerations. This made making mainstreaming a technocratic process more similar to integration than to mainstreaming as it was conceived in the 1990s. Part of the issue lays on the lack of clarity in concepts and strategies (Hannan 2000; Jackson 2002; Daly 2005; Moser and Moser 2005; Rao and Kelleher 205). Nonetheless, despite wide critiques and polemics surrounding gender mainstreaming, significant progress in terms of gender inclusion in the development agenda has been made, albeit insufficient, and a number of transversal issues have sought to adopt a mainstreaming
approach for their own sake. This is probably because ‘we have not found anything better so far’ (to use Hannan’s expressions, 2000) for addressing multi-causal and multi-dimensional issues that intersect with class, gender and other structural injustice in development, and require changing mindsets. Yet, the challenge is to make it work.

To develop the concept of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention, I combine three interlocking bodies of literature: mainstreaming, priority setting and donor-recipient relations. As there is an evident need to clarify theoretical positioning, concepts and strategies, I first build upon lessons from a rich body of literature on gender mainstreaming in its different aspects. Then, because violence prevention is relatively new on the development agenda, I combine mainstreaming research with priority setting, to identify what makes an issue emerge as a priority. This is particularly pertinent in the context of aid, where multiple issues compete with each other for visibility and space within an overall context of resource constraints and ‘mission creep’. Finally, as the analysis focuses on development agencies, there is also the need to look at donor-recipient relations when discussing key variables that would guide the analysis towards identifying opportunities and constraints to mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in the development agenda.

This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention. Section 3.2 proposes a definition for the concept. Section 3.3 clarifies the goal of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention and looks into conceptual debates surrounding the process, as found in the gender mainstreaming literature. Section 3.4 builds on and proposes a synthesis of five frameworks that study priority setting and mainstreaming to develop a four-pronged analytical framework. These variables will serve as keys of understanding to empirically analyse opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention in the development agenda of MDBs in LAC, as the conclusion highlights in Section 3.5.

3.1 Theoretical underpinnings: Social Constructivism and Collective Empowerment

Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention (MiVP) is grounded in social constructivism and collective empowerment. Social constructivism understands reality as socially
constructed and impermanent, and therefore changeable by the women, men and children that interpret and build it. As such, it denounces essentialist views that too often lead to fatalism. It acknowledges that violence can be understood through multiple frames and sheds light on the importance of building a common understanding of the issue and its solutions as a first step to create lasting conditions for change. But for this to happen, a certain level of consciousness, collective action and a certain understanding of power are needed. Thus, the MiVP also builds on collective empowerment, for it seeks to transform the way violence is traditionally dealt with by bringing to practice the shared responsibility for violence in all its forms, and ultimately redefining power as potentiality.

3.1.1 Social Constructivism

Social constructivism emerged in opposition to naturalistic views around race and gender inherited from the XIXth century (Keucheyan 2012). Social constructivists sought to challenge assumptions, such as those that stated that black and white persons did not have the same abilities because of race, which in turn justified differential treatments. This was a case in debate at a lawsuit in the United States in the first half of the XXth century. Then, social scientists had to ‘deconstruct’ social beliefs that would justify differential treatment among people of different colours based on biological or essentialist traits, in this case the prohibition for black people to undertake tertiary studies (see Lawsuit Sweatt vs. University of Texas, 1946, cited in Keucheyan 2012:67-68). Through a similar exercise of ‘deconstruction’, De Beauvoir (1946) highlighted the difference between being female (biological sex) and being a woman (constructed social identity) that would open the door for the feminist movement to expand and denounce unequal gender relations. Since then, social constructivism has underpinned all major intellectual movements against discrimination, including race, class and gender.

Social constructivists consider reality as a process that is socially constructed, as opposed to an object that would pre-exist. For them, social reality constantly changes and depends on the agents’ representations (Keucheyan 2012:67-68). Structuralists criticise such views as too relative, and consider that social reality must be understood through a combination of forces and rules that are imposed on the agents, despite their conscience and will (Wacquant 2012:200-201). That is, social constructivists focus on the agent’s experience
and representations and denounce all forms of essentialism, while structuralists seek to uncover the set of relations at play that ‘determine’ individuals’ representations and behaviours.

In the case of violence, social constructivism helps disentangle the different cognitive frames surrounding violence and its causes as I have discussed in Chapter 2. In particular, it questions the fact that violence is a given and some people are born violent, as opposed to it being a learned phenomenon. That is, a social constructivist perspective denounces the risk of essentialising poor young males as inherently violent, and seeks to deconstruct deterministic views on violence by looking into the different meanings of the issue in different settings. It seeks to disentangle the causes of violence, and fundamentally supports the idea that violence is learned and embedded in a complex network of relationships that move, shape and are shaped by individual and societal experiences. As such, it focuses on the violent acts or behaviours, and moves away from generalising groups as violent. It does not fall into pure relativism either. In particular, when intertwined with gender and development, it helps uncover patriarchy and exclusion as root causes of violence, otherwise left largely unquestioned outside of feminist scholarship (see Chapter 2).

Social constructivism also sheds light on the importance of framing for social change. As early as 1967, Berger and Luckmann, the fathers of social constructivism, have explained that ‘the analyses of objectivation, institutionalisation and legitimation [were] directly applicable to the problems of the sociology of language, the theory of social action and institutions’ (Berger and Luckmann 1967:185). Thereafter, Goffman (1974) developed the ‘Frame Theory’. He explained that there were two main levels of frames: internal and external. Internal frames refer to how individuals interpret their reality; external frames to how an issue is portrayed by a larger public. Both influence each other. In fact, the public portrayal of an issue as relayed in the media influences how women and men, girls and boys interpret their reality. This is the case for example when people report high levels of feeling unsafe in relatively safe countries.34 On the other hand, women, men and children interpret public messages also based on their own reality. As such, there is a subtle and

34 This is the case for example in countries like Chile or Uruguay where citizens report high levels of concern and feeling of insecurity despite relatively low overall violence-related indicators (Latinobarómetro 2009).
undefined interaction between internal and external frames. Goffman also highlights the fact that frames are often unconscious, but when competing frames exist, they can become conscious and influenced (opcit). These are fundamental theoretical fulcrum for social change. Actually, ‘in the social movements literature, individuals overcome collective action problems by developing shared frames about their predicament and agreeing on the best course of action.’ (Chong and Drukman 2007:120) Among others, Benford and Snow have used Goffman’s analytical tools of frames and frameworks to highlight three functions of framing in collective action: diagnostic, i.e. the definition of a social situation; prognostic, i.e. the anticipation of consequences of an action, and of transformation of this situation; and motivation (rationale) that gives reasons and justifications for action (Snow, Trom and Cefaï 2000: 158). Many authors studying gender mainstreaming have also highlighted the importance of framing and have linked it to social change (Razavi 1997; Daly 2005; Verloo 2005; Eveline and Bacchi 2005; UNEP 2006; Razavi 2009; Parkes, Eslop, Oando et al. 2013) as I discuss further in Section 3.2. But to change or influence frames towards action, we first need awareness, which leads us to collective empowerment.

### 3.1.2 Collective Empowerment

At the core of empowerment theories are the questions of power, consciousness, and collective action. Batliwala (1994, 2007), Kabeer (1994, 2001) and Rowlands (1997) have studied and defined empowerment in relations of gender inequality. Batliwala (1994:130) defines empowerment as ‘the process of challenging existing power relations, and of gaining greater control over the sources of power.’ She highlights the importance of consciousness-raising of the subordinated, in particular women, through education, and the need to challenge unequal power relations through mobilisation and collective action. Batliwala starts with the experience of women and their self-awareness, and puts at the core of empowerment the power to make decisions, in particular through the control over different resources (material, intellectual and ideological). She sees empowerment as a political process leading to transformation of the patriarchal system and its apparatus that sustains oppression and subordination. Along with Batliwala, Kabeer (1994, 2001, 2005)

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35 See Ruiz Castro (2009), Empowerment and Gender in the Workplace: Experiences in Accounting and IT Firms in Mexico, PhD Thesis, DPU, UCL, London, for an extended discussion on collective empowerment.
has also focused on self-awareness and has insisted on the ‘self-determination’ of women, that is, the capacity of women to take their life and destiny into their hands. As Kabeer (2001:21) explains, agency implies ‘a much wider range of purposive actions, including bargaining, negotiation, deception, manipulation, subversion, resistance and protest as well as the more intangible, cognitive process of reflection and analysis.’ As such, she agrees with Batliwala on the importance of consciousness-raising and collective action, and also defines empowerment as a political process leading to transformation. Rowlands (1997) follows in that direction. Studying women in Honduras, Rowlands proposes to refine empowerment by identifying core values, and facilitators and inhibitors of the empowerment process. In terms of core values, Rowlands identifies self-confidence and self-esteem at the personal level; the ability to negotiate and communicate at the level of close relationships; and group identity and self-organisation at the collective level. Batliwala, Kabeer and Rowlands see a continuum from self-awareness to collective mobilisation and action towards transforming unequal power relations. All three feminist scholars emphasise consciousness and identify at least three levels of empowerment: immediate, intermediate and deeper, as Kabeer name them, or personal, close relationships and collective in Rowlands’ words.

In the case of inclusive violence prevention, collective empowerment responds to the double disempowerment of violence. Violence in itself disempowers and patriarchy amplifies this disempowerment for women who have too often been reduced to a role of victims (see Section 2.5.4 in Chapter 2). As such, collective empowerment refers to re-creating and re-organising space (including through transforming how organisations work) for women and men, girls and boys to act upon their individual and collective power to address risk factors for violence and break free from the vicious cycle of violence that feeds fear, distrust and a general feeling of disempowerment.

Authors have often highlighted how empowerment had commonly been misunderstood, in part because of different understandings of power (Batliwala 1994; Hannan 2000). Empowerment does not necessarily imply a ‘zero sum’ result, i.e. whoever becomes empowered takes power away from others. This has often been a source of concern regarding women’s empowerment, which was seen as automatically ‘disempowering’ men.
Empowerment can, on the contrary, be creative and expands power instead of dividing it. This has a lot to do with the definition used for power. In that regard, Arendt (1958) and then Pearce (2007) have proposed to define power as ‘potentiality’.

Power as potentiality is creative and unlimited, and helps reframe the challenge of violence and its intersectionality with gender and development. If power is understood as potentiality and not domination, then using violence becomes the result of powerlessness, not power. Redefining power as potentiality enables opening windows of opportunity for more equal and cooperative gender identities, in particular masculinities that have been identified as risk factors for violence (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2). As Pearce points out, ‘Arendt’s view of power [...] is very similar to some contemporary and feminist views of power as generative and about capacity of action’ (Pearce 2007:23). This capacity of action is embedded in social relations and requires cooperation and solidarity to emerge. As such, the transformative potentiality of power is more likely to be realised if the focus is on questioning gender identities and gender relations. Such transformative action is at the core of the concept of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention that builds on empowerment of women and men as agents of their own individual and collective destiny. If empowerment comes from within, ‘outsiders’ can nevertheless play an important facilitating role (Hannan 2000: 267). Such role is what is at stake when discussing mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in the context of development agencies.

3.2 Defining inclusive violence prevention mainstreaming

The concept of inclusive violence prevention mainstreaming builds on the definitions and discussions on mainstreaming inherited from other experiences, in particular gender mainstreaming, adapts them to the case of violence prevention from a gender perspective, and locates the discussion in the organisational context of development agencies.

3.2.1 Definition

Gender scholarship usually refers to one of the following two definitions for gender mainstreaming: the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council’s definition, and the Council of Europe Group of Experts on Gender Mainstreaming’s one.
‘Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.’ (UN Economic and Social Council, 1997: 28)

‘Gender mainstreaming is the (re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy making.’ (Council of Europe Group of Experts on Gender Mainstreaming, 1998:15).

It is noteworthy that neither of the definitions refers to the participation of women and men in the process. As such, they do not acknowledge the need for collective mobilisation and action highlighted in the discussion on empowerment. The same can be said of definitions of other mainstreaming processes. Table 3 presents such definitions for climate change, environment, and natural disaster.
Table 3: Examples of mainstreaming definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of mainstreaming</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change mainstreaming</td>
<td>Mainstreaming of climate change into development and/or development cooperation is the process by which development policies, programmes and projects are (re)designed, (re)organised, and evaluated from the perspective of climate change mitigation and adaptation. It means assessing how they impact on the vulnerability of people (especially the poorest) and the sustainability of development pathways – and taking responsibility to redress them if necessary. Mainstreaming implies involving all social actors – governments, civil society, individuals and local communities – in the process. Mainstreaming calls for changes in policy as far upstream as possible.</td>
<td>Gupta and Van Der Grijp (2010:207-209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental mainstreaming</td>
<td>Environmental mainstreaming means to integrate poverty-environment linkages into national development planning processes and their inputs, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and Millennium Development Goals (MDG) strategies. It involves establishing the links between poverty and environment – including climate change- and identifying the policies and programmes to bring about better pro-poor environmental management. It is targeted at influencing national plans, budget processes, sector strategies and local level implementation – reflecting the need to integrate the valuable contribution of environmental management to improved livelihoods, increased economic security and income opportunities for the poor. The overall aim is to establish enduring institutional processes within government, from national to local levels, and within the wider stakeholder community, to bring about environmental mainstreaming that is focused on the government bodies responsible for poverty reduction and growth policies, and that strengthens the role of environmental agencies and non-governmental actors.</td>
<td>UNEP-UNDP (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster mainstreaming</td>
<td>Disaster mainstreaming implies taking into consideration risks emanating from natural hazards in medium-term strategic frameworks and institutional structures, in country and sectoral strategies and policies and in the design of individual projects in hazard-prone countries. Mainstreaming requires analysis of how potential hazard events could affect the performance of policies, programmes and projects and of the impact of those policies, programmes and projects, in turn, on vulnerability to natural hazards. This analysis should lead to the adoption of related measures to reduce vulnerability, where necessary, treating risk reduction as an integral part of the development process rather than as an end in itself.</td>
<td>Brensons and Twigg, (2007:5), cited in Gupta and Van der Grijp (2010:75-76)</td>
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</table>

Source: Author’s compilation.

Based on those definitions, seven elements characterise mainstreaming. First, it is a process, or it influences a process; second, it deals with planning and policy making; third, it covers all areas at all levels at all stages; fourth, it has a clear goal or vision; fifth, it concerns all actors involved in policy making, from design to implementation; sixth, it has specific tools; and seventh, it is monitored and evaluated.
Given these characteristics and building upon existing definitions of mainstreaming, I define inclusive violence prevention mainstreaming as:

‘The process that acknowledges the multi-dimensionality, multi-causality and gendered dimensions of violence, and aims to operationalise and institutionalise a shared responsibility for its sustained prevention through planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all policies, programmes and projects in all areas and at all levels. It involves the development of specific tools, methodologies and training, and a participatory, gendered and diversity approach. The ultimate goal is to achieve peaceful and inclusive societies, where low levels of inter-personal violence (including domestic and community violence) would be compatible with the wellbeing of women and men, girls and boys in all their diversity, and with sustainable development.’

A short version complements this long definition: ‘Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention is the institutionalisation of the prevention of violence from a gender perspective throughout the development agenda so as create lasting conditions for peaceful, inclusive societies, communities, families and individuals in all their diversity.’

In these definitions, institutionalisation is defined as ‘a process whereby social practices become sufficiently regular and continuous to be described as institutions’, that is ‘social practices that are regularly and continuously repeated, are sanctioned and maintained by social norms, and have a major significance in the social structure’ (Abercombe et al. 1988: 124 cited in Levy 1998: 255). In other words, ‘institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience’ (Scott 2001:48), they are ‘the rules-in-use’ (Hannan 2000). In the context of development agencies, institutionalisation largely refers to the organisational culture. As such, mainstreaming aims to change the organisational culture of development agencies to make them not only violent-free environments, but also agents of change of the development agenda by making the inclusive prevention of violence a central, embedded goal and practice. For this, it is useful to clarify the different dimensions and levels of mainstreaming.
3.2.2 Dimensions and levels of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention

Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention implies first and foremost to not heighten conditions for violence (‘do no harm’) and then involves a dual mainstreaming approach. Not creating or heightening conditions for violence means systematically analysing potential changes in situations and power relations as a result of a policy, programme or project through violence prevention lenses. This implies first to undertake such analysis before the policy, programme or project’s approval and to eventually redo the analysis once the policy, programme or project is in place, which in turn requires enough time, financial resources, capacity and clarity about risk factors for violence at different levels. MiVP also combines violence prevention mainstreaming and gender mainstreaming. That is, the concept implies understanding violence and its solutions from a gender perspective as discussed in Chapter 2. It thus seeks to improve women’s safety within urban violence prevention strategies, as Whitzman (2008) and Moser (2009) have argued, and includes domestic and gender-based violence within overall strategies to prevent urban violence (as opposed to silo-type approaches), and takes it a step further: it seeks to change the paradigm of how violence is understood and dealt with. As previously mentioned, the objective is to make violence systematically understood in relation to a gendered understanding of development, and to make its prevention normally perceived as the responsibility of all, and as such, to be truly ingrained in the development planning and practice (the question of the goal is further discussed in Section 3.2.3). As such, MiVP has three dimensions as expressed through policies, programmes and projects that:

- do not heighten conditions for violence;
- adopt a gender perspective and include domestic and gender-based violence within overall strategies to prevent urban violence; and
- acknowledge the intersectionality between violence, gender and development, and seek to address root causes for violence through a redefinition of power, gender roles and relations, and development processes based on participation and inclusion.

The definition also evokes a transversal approach at all levels. In the context of development agencies, they include two levels on the policy side and one on the organisational side. In policy, mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention includes the inter-sector and intra-sector levels.
- The *inter-sector level* aims to strengthen protective factors or reduce risk factors associated with each sector. For example, drop out of school in the Education Sector, or alcohol consumption in the Health Sector, or aggressive driving in public transportation.

- The *intra-sector level* seeks to prevent violence within each sector. That is, to prevent bullying at school or improve school climate for safe schools in the Education Sector, or to prevent harassment and inappropriate behaviours for safe buses or subways in public transportation.

- The *organisational level* refers to preventing violence for female and male staff members in all their diversity within the organisation. This includes violence at work such as verbal or sexual harassment among staff members at all levels of hierarchy; violence during work duty, in particular for staff members in country offices or staff members on mission visiting high violence neighbourhoods; and domestic violence for staff members and their family.

Figure 5 shows the triple level of mainstreaming processes.

![Figure 5: Inclusive violence prevention mainstreaming](image)

Source: Own analysis.
A fourth level, not graphically represented here but nonetheless fundamental, is the country level. Mainstreaming is a mean to an end, as Hannan (2000: 289) recalls, and as such, what matters is the goal of mainstreaming: peaceful inclusive societies, communities, families, women and men, girls and boys. Such deep changes cannot happen if mainstreaming as a political goal is not supported and implemented at the country level.

3.2.3 Clarifying goals and examining conceptual debates on mainstreaming: technocratic integration versus political transformation

The goal of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention appears in the theoretical underpinnings and the definition discussed in the previous section: it aims to transform how violence and its solutions are understood and treated, to ultimately lower the tolerance and risk factors contributing to violence, and to enhance conditions for peaceful societies, communities, families and individuals in all their social diversity. That is, mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention is a political process, as is gender mainstreaming, and seeks to produce a paradigm shift.

Transformation as a goal has been at the core of debates in the gender mainstreaming literature. Following the experience of the 1970s and 1980s that sought to include women’s interests and needs in the development agenda and was denounced for leading to sidelined results (Longwe 1994, 1997), Jahan (1995) proposed that a distinction be made between two types of mainstreaming: integrationist and agenda setting. Integration refers to the incorporation of the issue (gender and violence prevention in this research) within the current understanding and practices of development issues. Agenda setting seeks to generate a paradigm shift of how policymaking is done. In other words, it aims to ‘transform the mainstream’, as Walby (2005) summarises it. This transformation-based goal refers to the need for collective consciousness and empowerment of women and men, so as to deeply modify gender relations, as discussed in Section 3.1.

Nonetheless, the integrationist perspective is probably the most common form of mainstreaming in the development community (Hannan 2000; Gupta 2010; Moser and Moser 2005). It focuses on technical aspects of mainstreaming aimed to facilitate its
operationalisation and reduce resistance. Under this perspective, integrationists argue that the issue to be mainstreamed would enhance the effectiveness of the sector. By doing so, they adhere, consciously or unconsciously, to the dominant frame of the organisation in the context of development effectiveness. For example, adopting a gender perspective in sectors such as public transportation would imply adapting the service and the routes to the demand by gender, which would increase overall users satisfaction (one of the indicators used in many countries to measure the sector’s performance). A transformation alternative would imply rethinking the design and implementation of public transportation so that it takes into account gender interests and needs from the beginning and adopts an inclusive violence prevention lens for the planning of public transportation, which might lead to different transport provision and safer use of public space (see Levy 2013 on the ‘deep distribution’ of urban transport systems and its potential for transformation towards the just city).

Feminist scholars have criticised the priority given to technical aspects because it makes mainstreaming an instrumentalist process, and ultimately, depoliticises it (Longwe 1994, 1997; Hannan 2000; Daly 2005; Walby 2005; Rao and Kelleher 2005; Verloo 2005). Loosing sight of the political goal can be problematic, for it can lead to the marginalisation or invisibilisation of the issue, which becomes a technical ‘add-on’, an additional thing to do without necessarily understanding why, therefore missing to generate the pursued change (Longwe 1994; Daly 2005). The focus on integration can also be the result of a lack of consciousness of those pursuing change regarding the integrationist/transformatory differentiation, as it can be the result of resistance, which might lead a transformatory process to become integrationist (see for instance Moser and Moser 2005; Rao and Miller 2005 for the case of gender mainstreaming). In this respect, the distinction, developed by Molyneux (1984, 2001) and then operationalised by Moser (1989), between practical and strategic gender interests and needs constitutes a useful conceptual tool. While strategic gender needs seek to address unequal gender relations and formulate concrete alternatives to the subordination of women, practical gender needs only respond to the immediate situation of women in order to help them perform their traditional triple roles (reproductive, productive and community-managing roles), i.e. without seeking to change the gender division of labour (Molyneux 1984, 2001; Moser 1989). Following this conceptual
differentiation, an integrationist perspective usually focuses on practical gender needs only, for they do not challenge existing assumptions regarding gender roles and identities. In contrast, a transformative agenda can focus on key practical gender needs in order to reach more strategic gender needs that would then aim to transform unequal gender relations and empower women and men equally.

Many denounce the failure of mainstreaming as a transformatory process highlighting the little and differential impact in countries and organisations (Daly 2005; Moser 2005). In the mid-1990s, Longwe (1994, 1997) already drew the attention to the risk of evaporation of gender mainstreaming. Following Longwe (1994; 1997), Moser then categorised three major risks that explain the difficult implementation of gender mainstreaming in development agencies: ‘evaporation, invisibilisation and resistance’ (Moser 2005:11). *Evaporation* refers to well intended policies that have yet failed to implement gender in practice; *invisibilisation* deals with monitoring and evaluation procedures that do not capture ‘what is occurring on the ground,’ while *resistance* directly points out political barriers that block gender mainstreaming (opcit). These organisational backlashes show the complexity and difficulty of the mainstreaming process to change habitus. However, denouncing its ineffectiveness might not sufficiently take into account that structural change, as is at stake when dealing with gender equality (and inclusive violence prevention), takes time and iterative efforts, as Hannan (2000) among others have pointed out. The criticisms surrounding gender mainstreaming echo the frustration of feminist scholars and advocates because injustices are always unbearable, and thus reversing them is always pressing. Nonetheless, as Walby (2005) has argued, we should also remember that mainstreaming is a *process*. And today gender equality as a goal has reached mainstream of development studies (even though the goal is at times misunderstood), is acknowledged as an important issue in the discourse of most development agencies, and a growing body of related research, expertise and tools exist in a diversity of contexts. If gender mainstreaming has not yet produced a radical change, the process nonetheless exists and is still the primary strategy of most development actors, albeit the diversity of practices. The embedded intersection of gender mainstreaming with development and other societal issues surely makes the process leading to structural change uncertain and incredibly complex. However, the option to discard mainstreaming because it has not produced quick enough or
radical enough results might be counterproductive, in particular because so far there is no credible alternative and the core of the issue is not related to the concept itself but to its implementation. That is, the question is more how to make it work better given the uncertainties and complexity highlighted. This leads to the transition from theory to practice, and the traditional and core question of strategy, as discussed in Section 3.3.

3.3 Strategy for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in development agencies’ practice

Bridging the gap between ideas and change in the daily life of women, men and children, i.e. translating theory into practice is always the most challenging stage in the policy continuum. However, it is also what keeps us from ‘unfounded optimism’ and ‘useless pessimism’ as Longwe (as cited in Hannan 2000:264) reminds us. In the case of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention, it is important to build on previous work that has explored the issues of priority setting and mainstreaming. Looking at priority setting is pertinent in the present research, for violence prevention is relatively new in the development agenda (see Chapter 1). Then, the question is how to maintain a high enough level of priority to make the institutionalisation process possible, which would then produce the conditions that could lead to the desired deep change in the way violence prevention is understood and treated in the practice of development agencies.

To analyse these strategy-related questions, I build on three interlocking bodies of literature (mainstreaming, priority setting, and aid) and I combine five frameworks that seek to explain how an issue becomes important enough to be institutionalised in the development agenda. I chose them for their complementary in the context of this research. All of them pinpoint similar elements, but with particular perspective, which enriches a deeper comprehension of the most salient factors and makes a finer synthesis possible. The different categories used in the frameworks reflect different articulation and expression of power in the organisation, or different ‘sites of power’ as Levy name them (Levy 1996:4). The five frameworks are the following (they are named by their authors and presented in no chronological order, following instead the characteristics that make them complementary):

Shiffman and Smith (2007), and then Shiffman (2009), focus on understanding the variance in political priority for health initiatives in the global arena. In other words, they seek to explain why an initiative gains political priority on the global agenda, while others do not. It is very relevant to the case of inclusive violence prevention because, as previously highlighted, violence prevention is fairly new on the development agenda, thus the need to better understand how to create space for an issue to emerge and then become a priority (see Table 4).

Table 4: Shiffman and Smith (2007) and Shiffman (2009) analytical framework for priority setting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actor</strong></td>
<td>Policy community cohesion: the degree of coalescence among the</td>
<td>The strength of the individuals and organisations concerned with the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>network of individuals and organisations that are centrally involved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with the issue at the global level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership: the presence of individuals capable of uniting the policy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>community and acknowledged as particularly strong champions for the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cause</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guiding institutions: the effectiveness of organisations or coordinating</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mechanisms with a mandate to lead the initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil society mobilisation: the extent to which grassroots organisations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>have mobilised to press international and national political authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to address the issue at the global level</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideas</strong></td>
<td>Internal frame: the degree to which the policy community agrees on</td>
<td>The ways in which those involved with the issue understand and portray it</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the definition of, causes of, and solutions to the problem</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External frame: public portrayals of the issue in ways that resonate with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>external audiences, especially the political leaders who control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political contexts</strong></td>
<td>Policy windows: political moments when global conditions align</td>
<td>The environments in which actors operate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>favourably for an issue, presenting opportunities for advocates to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>influence decisionmakers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global governance structure: the degree to which norms and institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>operating in a sector provide a platform for effective collective action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issue characteristics</strong></td>
<td>Credible indicators: clear measures that show the severity of the problem and that can be used to monitor progress</td>
<td>Features of the problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Severity: the size of the burden relative to other problems, as indicated by objective measures such as mortality levels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective interventions: the extent to which proposed means of addressing the problem are clearly explained, cost effective, backed by scientific evidence, simple to implement, and inexpensive.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Then, Levy’s web of institutionalisation helps us take a step further to understand how to transform this priority into the day-to-day routines of the organisation. Through the four spheres (political, organisational, delivery, and citizen) of her web, Levy (1996) shows what conditions are necessary for change to happen and be sustained at the meso level (see Table 5).
Rao and Kelleher (2005) build on Levy’s web and propose a framework that focuses on international bureaucracies, which is directly pertinent to the object of this research. Rao and Kelleher propose a web of five spheres of power (politics, organisational politics, institutional culture, organisational process, and programmatic interventions) to explain how change occurs in development organisations (see Table 6).
Razavi and Miller (1995) building upon Kardam (1993, 1995) also focus on mainstreaming in international organisations. They adopt a three-pronged framework focusing on external pressures and influences; organisational mandate, ideology and procedures; and the existence and capacity of internal advocates and entrepreneurs. As such, they study the same object but offer a different, yet complementary perspective to Rao and Kelleher, which makes possible comparisons, and thereafter, a richer synthesis (see Table 7).

### Table 7: Razavi and Miller (1995) analytical frameworks for gender mainstreaming in international organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External pressures and influences</td>
<td>Donor governments within governing body</td>
<td>The organisation's degree of independence from external pressures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governments through Trust Funds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International NGOs through consultative status and lobbying governments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational mandate, ideology and procedures</td>
<td>Easy fit with the organisational mandate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organisational procedures in place (including staff skills, decision-making structure)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analysis and tools (social analysis/cost-benefit analysis, guidelines, checklists, gender inputs in project design and evaluation forms)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence and capacity of internal advocates and entrepreneurs</td>
<td>Presence of staff willing and able to promote a new issue and equipped with skills (technical, analytical, brokering, bargaining)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy entrepreneurs (in-house experts, those who have the knowledge of the issue to be mainstreamed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advocates (those who promote the issue without having necessarily the technical knowledge)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women in senior positions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, because of critiques on mainstreaming as a technocratic process and the call for its re-politicisation to keep the agenda-setting goal in sight (Sandler and Rao 2012; see Section 3.2), I include Hannan’s holistic approach. Hannan does not develop a framework as such,
but describes three spheres that are complementary and important to change the mainstream. Through a ‘consequence analysis’, she in fact reverses the analysis: instead of looking for ways to make the issue enter the organisation, she asks ‘how can the agency best organise and work to attain this goal?’ (Hannan 2000:364). In particular, she argues that ‘the aspects of institutions and organisational culture are the missing links in most frameworks for promoting mainstreaming’ (opcit:291). As such, Hannan’s analysis complements previous frameworks by focusing on what influences organisational culture (see Table 8).

Table 8: Hannan (2000) holistic approach on gender mainstreaming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Substantive level</td>
<td>Fit of the agency to the goal of gender equality (rather than the other way around) in terms of ideology, vision, goals, mandate, policies and strategies</td>
<td>Which kind of analyses? Which type of data? How to collect and analyse them? Which kind of consultation with whom? (level of participation) Partnership development based on sound knowledge of gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural and procedural level</td>
<td>Development agency’s organisation/structure (sectorally and geographically)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type of hierarchy (steep or flat)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision-making process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competency development programme for all staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff development linked to gender equality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procedures and processes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Action plan for each department within the agency to describe how they are contributing to gender equality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational culture</td>
<td>Identification of sources of power and distribution of power within the organisation</td>
<td>This includes working at three levels: symbols, practice and values, and implies acknowledging that change is a multi-staged process based on negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analysis of the history and mission of the organisation, including its sectors and products</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of new attitudes and behaviours on the basis of new information and cognitive redefinition (motivation to change) by focusing on changes in key individuals</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong management commitment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>New recruits be given thorough grounding in gender equality</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feedback mechanisms to personnel</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I build on the five frameworks’ similarities as well as on my own experience working in international development to develop a four-pronged analytical framework geared at analysing opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention in the development agenda. This framework places the emphasis on cognitive frame, actor power, operational knowledge, and organisational treatment. Donor-recipient relations are embedded in the framework as a transversal theme, for the research takes place in the context of aid. These categories are sites of power and can be seen as sources of resistance, but also sources of possibility for change.
3.3.1 Cognitive frame

The first category of the framework is the power of cognitive frame, or the extent to which there is a common understanding of the issue, which is the focus of change. In the context of development agencies, cognitive frames play out at two levels: on the issue itself (how do development agencies’ staff members and counterparts at the country level understand violence prevention?); and in relation to the mission of the organisation (to what extent do staff members and counterparts acknowledge violence prevention as relevant to the mission of development organisations?).

Cognitive frame on violence

Inter-personal violence is traditionally and commonly perceived as a ‘security’ issue for which the police are primarily responsible (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3). Even when academic research argues for other frames (such as those linking violence to development), the conjunction of personal experiences (either direct or indirect that build internal frames to use Goffman’s concept, see Section 3.1.1) with messages from the media (usually generating fear and stereotypes, influencing external frames) tends to reinforce dichotomist understandings of violence based on moralistic conceptions of bad and good persons. This makes it particularly challenging to influence a common understanding of violence prevention as a gendered, development issue for which a multiplicity of stakeholders should take responsibility (see discussion on the ecological model in Section 2.3.2 and 2.5.3 in Chapter 2).

Cognitive frame on the relevance of violence to the mission of development agencies

Internal and external frames also influence the understanding of the issue in relation to the mission of the organisation. In the context of aid, this refers to the extent to the development agency’s management, staff and counterparts find legitimate that the organisation work on the issue. There might be competing frames among actors. For instance, among staff members, different specialists might interpret violence in different manners depending on their own experience and training, which in turn will condition the way they find it relevant to the mission of their organisation. The same is true at the country level, with external cognitive frames varying from country to country.
Shiffman and Smith (2007) and then Shiffman (2009), in their priority-setting framework, underscore the importance of cognitive frame through the category of ‘Ideas’ (see Table 4). Shiffman even suggests that ‘the rise and fall of a[n] […] issue may have less to do with how ‘important’ it is in any objective sense than with how supporters of the issue come to understand and portray its importance. Specifically, those issues that attract attention may be ones in which policy community members have discovered frames – ways of positioning an issue – that resonate with global and national political elites, and then established institutions that can sustain these frames’ (Shiffman 2009:608). Hannan (2000) and Rao and Kelleher (2005) also highlight the importance of frame (outcome) and framing (process) in their analysis, pointing out how ‘a lack of clarity endangers implementation of gender mainstreaming strategies’ (Rao and Kelleher 2005:61). This refers both to the issue to be mainstreamed, and to the mainstreaming process itself. Cognitive frames also underpin all the elements in Levy’s web of institutionalisation. In the web, framing relates to the discursive practices that affect how the actors concerned understand each element. Other authors in the gender mainstreaming literature have also joined in to underscore the importance of cognitive frames (see for instance, Eveline and Bacchi 2005).

Frames are often unconscious, but can be influenced and changed, as Goffman himself specifies (Section 3.1.1). The question then is to determine what makes a frame resonate and how to orient the framing process towards a large and diversified enough public so that it can become and stay a priority leading to change. In that regard, Benford and Snow (2000) propose two parameters to explain the resonance of frames in public policy: credibility and salience. ‘Credibility has to do with how truthful people perceive the frame to be; salience with how central it is to their lives’ (Benford and Snow 2000:609). For Benford and Snow (2000), credibility is simultaneously influenced by frame consistency (congruency between claim, beliefs, and action), empirical credibility (can the claim be empirically verified?), and trust in actors who support the frame. Salience is influenced by centrality (to what extent the issue is central to the life of the audience), experiential commensurability (congruency with everyday experience), and narrative fidelity (the closeness with dominant culture and beliefs) (Benford and Snow, 2000: 619-621). In other words, for development agencies to mainstream inclusive violence prevention it is not
enough to build a common understanding on the issue and its solutions, it needs to be ‘credible’ and ‘salient’.

In the context of aid, this credibility and salience must be understood in relation to the situation in countries that adds an extra layer of complexity towards building a salient and credible common frame. Stone (1989), in fact, shows how the political dimension of causal stories heightens the dichotomy between research and politics. While research tends to emphasise the complexity of causes, the political arena constantly seeks to simplify it:

‘Complex causal explanations are not very useful in politics, precisely because they do not offer a single locus of control, a plausible candidate to take responsibility for a problem, or a point of leverage to fix a problem. Hence, one of the biggest tensions between political science and real-world politics. The former tends to see complex causes of social problems, while the latter searches for immediate and simple causes’ (Stone 1989:289).

These immediate and simple causes might contravene the need to understand violence as a complex, gendered phenomenon where multiple risk factors intervene at different levels and reinforce each other. Within such understandings, there are no scapegoats, but a deconstruction of causes and assumptions that requires time, effort, and collaboration. Finding a powerful frame that would be simple enough to fit ‘real politics’ while not denaturing the complexity at stake and the need for time and continuity is surely a real challenge for development agencies. More generally, it is important to understand that the way violence and its causes are politically framed can influence the legitimacy or relevance of development agencies’ role in that respect, as interpreted by both counterparts and the agencies’ staff and management. The questions surrounding cognitive frames lead to examine the power of the actors that hold, interpret, and eventually change them.

3.3.2 Actor power

The second category of the framework examines the power of the actors that support the issue to give it visibility and institutionalise it within the organisation. Unsurprisingly, authors studying priority setting and mainstreaming systematically emphasise the importance of actors. All five frameworks identify ‘actors’ as key variables for priority
setting and mainstreaming. The expression ‘actor power’ is actually borrowed from Shiffman and Smith (2007). This is unsurprising because women and men in their different capacity bring organisations to life. But what are the characteristics of the actors that matter most in making an issue a priority and creating space for its institutionalisation? Based on the review of the five frameworks, I identify four groups that are all necessary to produce lasting change in the context of development agencies: (i) Supportive political leadership; (ii) Legitimate champions; (iii) Critical mass of in-house experts; and (iv) Interested local and national Government counterparts.

**Supportive political leadership**

Political leadership refers to the vision given by an individual or group of individuals in an organisation. Given that development organisations are often hierarchical, this vision is often held at the top, that is, at the highest hierarchical instance in the organisation. They are the shareholders, presidents, or managing directors. Their support opens the door for the organisation to work on an issue and facilitates catalysing forces to implement the mainstreaming process.

Shiffman and Smith (2009) cite the example of former Director of the United Nations for Children (UNICEF), James Grant, as a political leader who embodied the issue of child survival. From Levy’s identification of political commitment to donor government within governing bodies in Razavi and Miller (1995), to donors and boards of directors in Rao and Kelleher (2005), all emphasise the need for strong political will from the top of the organisations. As Hannan (2000:295) summarises: ‘strong political commitment is required which includes explicit senior management support.’ Beyond the five frameworks, Sietz, Boschütz and Klein (2008) and Gupta (2010) in the literature on mainstreaming climate change also highlight the need for the organisation’s commitment and leadership. As such, there is a consensus on supportive political leadership as a key variable for mainstreaming to happen.

Shiffman and Smith (2007), Levy (1996) and Razavi and Miller (1995) take a step further and discuss how this supportive political leadership can be pressured by external bodies to act. These include international NGOs through consultative status and lobbying donor
governments (Razavi and Miller 1995), but also a wider policy community as a network of individuals and organisations that are centrally involved with the issue at the global level (Shiffman and Smith 2007). In that respect, Shiffman and Smith (2007) draw attention to how the fragmented structure of a policy community with competing organisations, no formal coordination, and moving priorities can affect priority setting. When there are many voices for the same sector with none of them having the legitimacy to lead, priority setting and institutionalisation becomes more uncertain and confusing. What Shiffman and Smith describe for public health is very similar to the situation for violence prevention. Competing organisations deal with the issue (WHO, UN-Habitat, UNODC, UNDP, MDBs, UNIFEM and UNICEF) and none has a clear mandate to lead on violence prevention. More generally, the extent to which a strong and coherent external policy community exists might act as a lever or a constraint to influence political leaders within development agencies towards pushing the issue forward in the development agenda. In any case, political leadership itself is not enough, unless we adopt a very top-down autocratic understanding of how organisations work, which is not the case in this research. For an issue to emerge and then be institutionalised, it also needs to be embodied by legitimate champions.

Legitimate champions

Champions are those that push for the issue, develop a vision, articulate cognitive frames in a way that resonates with the organisation’s mandate and staff members’ interests. In other words, champions are those that ‘make the case’ of the issue so that it will rise high on the agenda and stay there to produce change. They are the internal advocates par excellence. Champions need to be legitimate for the advocacy work to be effective. By legitimacy, I mean professional respect (in terms of seniority, expertise and /or experience).

Razavi (2009:145) supports the importance of senior advocates to advance the implementation of mainstreaming when she recalls how ‘many studies […] show that little can be achieved when junior staff members with little or no resources at their disposal and few specialised skills are given the task of gender mainstreaming (in addition to their other responsibilities that remain unchanged).’ In a recent study making the synthesis of an e-discussion among gender practitioners and experts, Sandler and Rao (2012) also highlight that a key parameter to push forward the agenda of mainstreaming is to support
‘transformational leadership and the work of internal ‘change agents’ - that is, individuals who make change happen.’ They also highlighted two dimensions to the issue of leadership: the willingness to transgress norms and values and ‘the price to be paid for this’ (Sandler and Rao 2012: 555). In the case of violence prevention, this might imply that an organisational leader be selective in the kind of projects the organisation supports and eventually refuse to do some projects that are not in line with the positioning of the agency in terms of inclusive violence prevention, despite organisational and recipient pressures. This might also imply putting on hold the promotion of staff members who are investigated for perpetration of violence in its various dimensions either in the home or in the workplace. Such organisational leaders willing to take those risks are needed, according to Sandler and Rao (1012) to change organisational culture. However, on their own and even with political leadership, these champions cannot implement the mainstreaming process by themselves. They need a critical mass of in-house experts.

**Critical mass of in-house experts**

A vision must be translated into practice to gain credibility, survive and expand. For this, staff members must be interested and knowledgeable enough to translate this vision into policies, programmes and projects. For mainstreaming to take place and produce a paradigm shift on how violence prevention is understood and dealt with in the development agenda, it requires professionals in each sector to take the issue on board in their sector agenda. As Sandler and Rao (2012) have pointed out, this requires double and even triple expertise in the case of inclusive violence prevention, for staff members need to know about their sector, violence prevention, and gender.

Razavi and Miller (1995) and Hannan (2000) explicitly discuss this variable (existence and capacity of internal advocates and entrepreneurs). Razavi and Miller in particular highlight the importance of staff ‘willing’ to promote a new issue and ‘able’ to do it. That is, a critical mass of staffs needs to be equipped with relevant skills (technical, analytical, brokering, bargaining) and knowledgeable about mainstreaming and the issue to be mainstreamed. These policy entrepreneurs are the ones who are able to actually do the work at different levels of the organisation and in different sectors, and primarily at the operational level. They are also the ones who engage in policy dialogue and technical
discussions with governments. These governments and their interest in engaging on the issue are essential for the mainstreaming process to take place. This is the fourth variable of actor power.

Interested national and local Government counterparts

Development agencies fundamentally depend on the dynamics of donor-recipient relations; as such, the demand from governments is incontrovertible. If counterparts do not express interest in working with development agencies on an issue like inclusive violence prevention, the mainstreaming process will be more difficult to implement, if at all. In fact, change occurs through practice, and practice in the context of aid depends on donor-recipient relations and their operational collaboration. This operates at the planning level through negotiations with the Ministry of Finances or Planning that have an overview of the country’s development strategy, which is essential to support a mainstreaming approach. It also occurs at the sector level, in specific ministries where collaboration might take place to mainstream the issue within sectors. At the local level, counterparts’ interest is also crucial, for implementation happens when local actors have the corresponding will and capacity. National government, local government and citizens complicate donor-recipient relations, for they imply triangular dynamics between the donors, governments (at different levels) and citizens (also referred to as beneficiaries). Levy (1996) has underlined the importance of donor-recipient relations in the web through two dimensions: policy and citizen spheres. In the policy sphere, Levy highlights the need for political commitment, policy and planning at the country level, while the citizen sphere refers to women and men’s needs and interests that need to be voiced through political constituencies, and heard and advocated for at the political level to lead to scaled-up change. Rao and Kelleher (2005) mention the pressure from women’s constituencies who push for the issue at the country level, and Shiffman and Smith (2007) argue that strengthening the link between the initiative and grassroots movement generates more support at the national and local level, therefore increasing or maintaining the momentum on political leaders (both in governments and in development agencies), as it was for the case for AIDS for example. This shows the interrelation among the different variables in the actor power category. These actors and their respective power also need operational knowledge to act, for ‘deep change requires practice’ (Rao and Kelleher 2005:64).
3.3.3 Operational knowledge

Operational knowledge refers to one of the necessary conditions to make the organisation ‘able to intervene’ (Rao and Kelleher 2005:61). The category of the operational knowledge is probably the most developed in the mainstreaming literature and the less controversial. Nonetheless, it is worth clarifying a few points regarding three specific dimensions of operational knowledge in addition to the development of tools, methods, toolkits and handbooks. Indeed, all five frameworks and other authors (Moser 1993; Kabeer 1994, 1997; Verloo 2005; Walby 2005; Moser and Moser 2005; Sietz, Boschütz, Klein et al. 2008; Razavi 2009) abundantly agree on their necessity.

Three types of operational knowledge need to be available: knowledge regarding effectiveness (what works in general and in each sector); context-based knowledge linked to implementation (what elements must be taken into consideration when designing and implementing a programme effective elsewhere; what conditions have been identified as conducive of successful implementation in a diversity of contexts); and knowledge regarding measurement and data (which indicators can meaningfully capture the impact of the project or a specific intervention towards the issue). Absence of such elements of operational knowledge might lead to resistance and block the mainstreaming process, and change will not happen.

Available knowledge on effectiveness

Knowledge on effectiveness refers to identifying ‘what to do’ based on available evidence on outcomes (whether or not an intervention or policy has reached its goal). Shiffman and Smith (2007) argue that an issue whose characteristics include the availability of effective interventions, i.e. solutions that are cost-effective, evidence-based, simple, and cheap to implement are more prone to gain political priority. This variable is self-evident: if we do not know what works, it is difficult to push the agenda forward, at least immediately. In fact, the state of knowledge regarding effectiveness leads to the need to examine whether there is an active research agenda, as Levy (1996) points out in her web. This research agenda needs to be coherent and consistent with the goal of mainstreaming as reflected through the types of knowledge selected, and the kind of interventions evaluated. In fact, the issue regarding effectiveness is twofold. First, there needs to be enough rigorous
evidence to identify what works to prevent certain forms of violence. Often times, this evidence is available in siloes as it comes from different disciplines and bodies of research (see Chapter 2). Efforts must thus focus on identifying available evidence, and compiling it across disciplines in order to identify eventual gaps. It also mainly comes from industrialised countries, thus raising questions on their relevance and replicability in the context of developing countries. Second, the question of effectiveness deals with how to assess multi-sector strategies, which is linked to context-based knowledge for successful implementation and meaningful indicators.

*Context-based knowledge for successful implementation*

Effectiveness-related knowledge helps identify the type of interventions that have generated positive results in a specific context, usually in industrialised countries where research is more abundant. To enhance the probability for success in other contexts, often characterised by accrued challenges such as scarcity of financial, human, and technical resources, and overall institutional weakness as is the case in most developing countries, understanding the conditions under which such programmes or interventions have worked is equally important. For instance, in the case of violence prevention, knowing that parenting programmes are effective to reduce risk factors for child maltreatment is an important first step that nonetheless must be completed with practical information on conditions such as the type of methodology followed, the number of hours and length of the programme, the exposure time of beneficiaries, the gender of parents who attend, etc. Without this operational and context-specific implementation-based knowledge, and given the fact that ‘implementing partners might lack capacity’ (Rao and Kelleher 2005:61), resources might be unwisely invested, and success might not happen on the ground. As success breeds success, these elements are crucial to enhance conditions for institutionalising an issue.

As implementation-based knowledge concretely refers to the ‘how to’, it directly deals with the operationalisation of the ecological model as discussed in Chapter 2. This includes pacing of reforms, i.e. sequencing of interventions to maximise and prioritise resources towards higher impact. These are fundamental questions missing so far. Today, there is in fact very little knowledge to guide policymaking on cost-effectiveness of interventions to
prevent violence, as well as on what to do first in a context where scarcity of resources governs choices, or how to combine interventions so that the overall impact is maximised. There is also a lack of visibility of the kind of coordination and accountability mechanisms that make multi-sector, gender-sensitive strategies implementable and sustainable. These knowledge gaps are all the more important for development agencies that are increasingly pressured to show results, which leads us to the question of indicators.

**Meaningful indicators**

In the context of development effectiveness, indicators play a crucial role in the development of sound diagnostic (scope of the issue), monitoring and evaluation policies, programmes and projects that together would contribute to change. Indicators refer to monitoring and evaluation that are fundamentally linked to the other two variables of knowledge: do we know what works in developing countries, and do we know under which conditions it works? Both are possible only if meaningful indicators capture in a rigorous and pertinent manner the information that would then provide evidence that investment is worth the risk. In that sense, indicators are powerful variables for mainstreaming the issue on the development agenda: if interventions can be measured and are successful, this arguably increases the probability to create and sustain mobilisation within the organisation and in country to continue the programmes. However, it must be recognised that not all indicators are valuable for a mainstreaming process aiming at structural change, and hence the focus on ‘meaningful’ and the capacity of the indicators to measure change.

Diagnostics assess the severity of the issue at stake (Shiffman and Smith 2007). The meaningfulness of indicators and data here refers to how and whose needs are measured. In fact, an issue is a problem when the challenge is severe and the needs to respond to this challenge are not addressed. The introduction of needs is important, for it sparks the question of who (whose needs), that pinpoints the analysis towards gender. This is particularly salient in the case of violence. As explained in Chapter 2, there is a recurrent and worldwide bias towards addressing violence that occurs on the streets where men are more prone to be victims, versus violence that occurs in the home, where women, children and the elderly are overwhelmingly victims. The selection of indicators thus refers back to framing and cognitive frames, or the particular understanding of the issue (Section 3.3.1).
Of course, indicators also depend on the availability and reliability of statistics, and in many countries there are real and significant constraints (UNODC and World Bank 2007; Chapter 2). Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the selection of indicators tends to vary according to what needs to be shown, what affects the imaginary of constituents or donors, who measures, and who would be held accountable for the issue.36

The question of measurement also refers to the types of methods used to measure progress towards change. As Rao and Kelleher (2005:63) have pointed out in the case of gender mainstreaming, ‘measurement systems need to be developed that can capture the full range of gender equality outcomes, both tangible and intangible.’ That is, qualitative assessments must complement ‘how much’ and ‘how many’ type of indicators (Hannan 2000:297; Sandler and Rao 2012). The challenge at stake is not to be undermined. As Rao and Kelleher (2005) and then Sandler and Rao (2012) explain:

‘At a deeper level, is the problem of measuring the intangibles that are at the root of social change of any sort. This is the change in consciousness of women and men, the change in community norms, or the change in attitudes. Incremental changes must be perceived and understood as valued results, knowing that gender equality is a long-term goal.’ (Rao and Kelleher 2005:61)

‘Our challenge as feminists involved in the project of social transformation is how to assess our strategies for ending discrimination and furthering women’s rights, and how to measure the results of our struggles. How do we judge if what we do now has transformatory potential for the future? How do we assess whether what we have done has actually effected transformation? What prism will accurately reflect whether these incremental modifications of the underlying structures of a social system and its mechanisms of social reproduction [can] cumulatively transform the system?’ (Sandler and Rao 2012: 550)

In fact, the question of attribution is particularly pertinent to MiVP: how to build a solid theory of change with a results framework that would capture the impact of the programme.

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36 There is, for instance, a recurrent debate on the interpretation of violence and crime statistics, as reported by the police: if rates increase, does it mean better reporting or worse performance?
or the intervention in terms of violence prevention? Which forms of violence are we targeting? Which victims or perpetrators? How do we measure the preventive impact? Do we have enough reliable data to compare and measure? In addition to these difficulties, economists that tend to govern development agencies might show resistance towards qualitative methods, often referred to as ‘anecdotal’. The bias towards quantitative methods and simplified result frameworks is certainly a challenge for developing meaningful indicators, and refers back to the risk of evaporation and invisibilisation highlighted by Longwe (1994, 1997) and Moser (2005).

Ultimately, the question of indicators underscores the debates on how to assess the success of the mainstreaming process. Sandler (1997) and Verloo (2005) remind us that mainstreaming is in fact a process, and as such, talking about success or failure is inappropriate (also see Moser and Moser 2005). Other authors have nonetheless tried to provide guidance on how to assess the progress of mainstreaming or what success would mean (Daly 2005; Moser 2005; Moser and Moser 2005). In the case of gender and participation, Levy (1996) clarifies that success means that ‘the incorporation of a gender perspective in a participatory way becomes a regular part of the practice of all development practitioners’ (Levy 1998:265). Similarly, a successful agenda-setting mainstreaming process for the inclusive prevention of violence in the development agenda would mean that strategies, programmes and projects would be conceived and designed with violence prevention and gender lenses with the overarching goal of peace and social inclusion embedded in development practice. In that regard, the organisational treatment particularly matters, for it can create conducive conditions for this goal to be translated and sustained in practice.

3.3.4 Organisational treatment

How the organisation ‘treats’ the issue in terms of allocation of resources, mainstream location of responsibility, and incentives for staff development shows in tangible ways the extent to which the issue is considered as priority to be mainstreamed.

Resources allocation

Resources allocated to the issue are an important indicator of the priority given to it beyond discourses and political declarations. Resources here are mainly financial resources (i.e.
budget), but they also refer to the hiring of new recruits. This was a point Hannan (2000) insisted on to facilitate cultural change within the organisation towards a transformatory process. The importance of resource allocation cannot be over-emphasised in the context of scarcity of resources both at the organisational (budget restriction) and at the country or local levels. Resource allocation can have multiple sources and expressions. For instance, in the case of development agencies, the organisation can commit itself to push an issue forward on its agenda through redistributing its own budget to match new organisational priorities, and through allocating special funds to undertake research, policy dialogue, conferences, or other initiatives. It can also show the priority by developing the number of projects on the issue, as a share of the overall activity of the organisation. Resource allocation can also be ad-hoc and come from funding sources outside the mainstream funding of the organisation, for example, trust funds. Donors supporting the organisation can channel additional funding to push for the issue, as Razavi and Miller (1995) pointed out. In the web’s organisational sphere, Levy (1996) linked the importance of resource allocation to the mainstream location of responsibility. In fact, both dimensions underscore the question of accountability.

**Mainstream location of responsibility**

A recurrent question in the mainstreaming literature deals with where to locate responsibility for the new issue. In a government for example, the question would be which ministry would lead the mainstreaming process, and with which authority and resources. The question is often posed: is it better to locate the mainstreaming responsibility in the Ministry of Finances or Planning, among numerous other responsibilities and then throughout the government, or have a specific ministry that could focus on it but also risk being sidelined? Razavi and Miller (2005) and Daly (2005) among others argue for spreading responsibility throughout the organisation. The relevance of having special units for mainstreaming is in fact largely discussed in the literature. It is often argued that a special unit or bureau is contradictory to the mainstreaming process whose responsibility should be spread across the organisation (opcit). Nonetheless, the experience of gender mainstreaming shows how when ‘everyone’ is responsible, it easily turns out that ‘no-one’ is responsible when effective accountability mechanisms are not in place. Yet, as Hannan (2000:292) already pointed out fifteen years ago, even though ‘there is [...] general
agreement that accountability is crucial, […] [there is] still too little development of effective methods of mechanisms to achieve it’. This is the case for staff members across sectors throughout the organisation but also for management. Hannan concludes that central units are in fact necessary and should support a network of focal points and advocates (thus reinforcing the variables in actor power). This has proven to be effective in development agencies like Sida that implemented gender mainstreaming in the 1990s through a focal points system with central units ‘provided responsibility lies in management and the central units provides support and policy coherence’ (Hannan 2000:293). Moreover, since development agencies have usually privileged a dual approach to promote a transversal issues (i.e. mainstreaming combined with specific stand alone projects) (Hannan 2000), having a unit in charge of designing and monitoring those projects and be accountable for them gives the issue an institutional existence. Shiffman and Smith (2007) also insist on the fact that ‘initiatives must build their own institutions if they are to survive. This means having a strong guiding institution with the mandate to lead and implement the initiative.’ This could take the form of a Task Force [or a unit] specifically dedicated to the issue. The important point here is to sustain the priority by locating it within the organisation so as to give it institutional visibility and accountability. However, this mainstream location also needs to be influential. In the context of development agencies in particular, the unit or special bureau responsible for the mainstreaming process should be able to influence country strategy, a key entry point for mainstreaming to happen in the dialogue with countries and the development agenda in general. It should also be able to influence staff members within the organisation. In fact, the questions of responsibility and accountability are closely linked to incentives for staff to promote and sustain the motivation to change their habits to embrace the issue in their daily routine.

Incentives for staff

How to create incentives to ‘motivate’ the majority of staff members in a given organisation to embrace change is a recurrent question in public administration. There are two broad categories of motivation: intrinsic and external. Intrinsic motivation refers to the personal motivation of staff members who would adopt an issue, for example gender equality or violence prevention, because they believe in such goals. The organisation would thus need to hire new recruits taking intrinsic motivation into account, or provide training
to increase such motivation as Hannan (2000) has argued. Nonetheless, scholars have sought to empirically test those assumptions. Alonso and Lewis (2001), for instance, have shown in the context of civil servants in the United States, how intrinsic motivation alone was not necessarily linked to performance. In fact, traditional monetary incentives and even credibility in linking performance to career progression might be as effective in bureaucratic contexts. These findings are important in the case of mainstreaming within development agencies (international bureaucracies), for they suggest that transparent and credible rules linking career progression to mainstreaming might be effective in pushing the agenda forward.

Other incentives include training and staff development. Levy (1996) explains how staff development and methodology point to the condition that the organisation provides or facilitate training in the new area. Training is in fact directly related to the priority that the organisation gives to the issue and to the conditions for its institutionalisation.

3.3.5 Analytical framework for the research

Based on the above discussion, the analytical framework to understand and examine opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention in the development agenda is four-pronged and builds on the categories of cognitive frame, actor power, operational knowledge, and organisational treatment. In the context of aid, donor-recipient relations are embedded in the analysis of each analytical category. In total, the framework includes 12 variables as summarised in Table 9.
### Table 9: Analytical framework for MiVP in the development agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical category</th>
<th>Factors enabling priority setting and mainstreaming</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cognitive frame</td>
<td>On the issue</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On the relevance of the issue to the organisation's mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actor power</td>
<td>Supportive political leadership</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Legitimate champions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Critical mass of in-house experts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Interested national and local Government counterparts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operational knowledge</td>
<td>Available knowledge on effectiveness</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Context-based knowledge for successful implementation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Meaningful indicators</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisational treatment</td>
<td>Resources allocation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mainstreaming location of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incentives for staff</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.4 Conclusion

The concept of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention seeks to operationalise the shared responsibility for violence in all its forms and clarify the goal of the process: building lasting conditions for peaceful and inclusive societies, communities, families and individuals in all their social diversity by transforming the development practice. The new paradigm acknowledges the intersectionality between violence, gender and development, and adopts violence prevention and gender lenses throughout the development cycle from policy dialogue to project design to implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. It builds its foundation in social constructivism and collective empowerment, for sharing a powerful cognitive frame on violence that would resonate with actors within development agencies and their counterparts is a crucial link in the transformative process of collective action. Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention builds on lessons from previous mainstreaming experiences, in particular gender mainstreaming. It also builds on priority setting for it is important to understand how an issue, controversial and relatively new in development can climb the ladder of priorities in development agencies’ agenda. Based on five complementary frameworks that use different categories of power to study priority setting, institutionalisation and mainstreaming, this research proposes four analytical categories to study the opportunities and constraints in the emergence and evolution of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in the development agenda. They deal with cognitive frame, actor power, operational knowledge, and organisational treatment. The
concepts and this strategic framework both contribute to current conceptual discussions on mainstreaming and on violence prevention. In the first instance, it suggests a synthetic approach for mainstreaming new and complex issues in development agencies; in the latter, it develops a policy option that has been understudied so far despite having been acknowledged in the specialised literature and by development agencies themselves. The reminder of the thesis empirically tests these analytical categories in the case of the two largest MDBs in LAC. Before this, Chapter 4 presents the epistemological stance and the methodology with which this research has been conducted.
Chapter 4: Epistemological Stance and Research Methodology

This chapter presents the epistemology and the methodology used to conduct this research. The chapter is divided in four sections. Section 4.1 presents the interpretivist epistemological stance adopted for this thesis. Section 4.2 outlines the main research questions, hypotheses, and sub-research questions. Section 4.3 details the case study methodology, selection criteria and study population, research design to collect primary and secondary data, and methods of analysis. Finally, Section 4.4 discusses criteria of validity and reliability of the research, its ethics, and its limitations.

4.1 An interpretivist epistemological approach

The epistemology refers to the theory of knowledge, or the way in which knowledge is built. Della Porta and Keating (2008:19-39) distinguish four major epistemologies in social sciences: positivist, post-positivist, interpretivist and humanistic. While the first two consider social reality as an independent object for knowledge, the last two see social reality as always dependent on interpretation. Each epistemology engages to a different degree with this stereotypical ‘truth’, along a continuum going from pure objectivity to pure subjectivity.

Within this spectrum, the interpretivist approach acknowledges that social events depend on the context and on who interprets them. It builds on information and seeks the interpretation of this information with the actors involved. As such, it combines objective and subjective approaches, but does not aim to uncover an absolute truth. It seeks, instead, to better understand what is at stake and accepts the relativity of findings. As Della Porta and Keating explain, ‘since human beings are ‘meaningful’ actors, scholars must aim at discovering the meanings that motivate their actions rather than relying on universal laws external to the actors’ (Della Porta and Keating 2008:24-25).

This research adopts an interpretivist epistemological stance, for it seeks to reconstruct the process leading development agencies to give priority (or not) to an issue as important and complex as violence prevention, and to better understand opportunities and constraints for
such organisations to mainstream the inclusive prevention of violence in their own agendas. The research therefore focuses on interpretations of events, the interpretations being those of actors at different levels of the organisations, counterparts (‘clients’), and key informants (international experts and partners in the field). The research also draws from my own experience as former staff member and consultant of both organisations under study (see Sections 4.2 and 4.4). The objective is to propose explanations and not to reach a universal law of causality.

4.2 Research questions and hypotheses

An interpretivist epistemology leads to the use of a qualitative methodology (Della Porta and Keating 2008) and to a process of interpretation through the research itself. The framing of the questions became clearer and the analytical framework was refined throughout the research process. Since the choice of the methodology depends on the questions to be answered (Yin 1994), I present the research questions and hypotheses first, and then the choice of the methodology.

This thesis seeks to answer three main research questions:

- Why has violence prevention remained marginalised in MDBs’ agenda despite violence’s socio-economic multiplier effects on development?
- What are the opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention in MDBs’ agenda?
- How do national and local counterparts perceive the potential for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention and MDBs’ relevance in this regard?

The main hypotheses for this research are that violence prevention has slowly and with difficulty, albeit differently, entered MDBs’ development agenda for a combination of factors, including competing cognitive frames regarding violence prevention, and violence and gender, the presence of leaders in the organisation pushing for the issue (or lack thereof), and contradictory incentives embedded in the intrinsic contradiction between the development mission and the banks’ survival imperatives. These reasons have led to a lack of clarity and vision for the role those banks could play in violence prevention and the link
with gender. This explains why mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention has not been pursued so far, despite the responses it might offer to actual challenges in policymaking.

Based on the above hypotheses and the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3 whose key variables were identified from the beginning but were refined throughout the research process, the thesis sets out to test four sets of variables to respond to the main research questions and explain differences between the MDBs. In addition, in the context of aid, donor-recipient relations become a transversal set of variables that makes the analysis of the other variables more complex and subtle. Below each set of variables, I include corresponding sub-research questions (SRQ).

• **Cognitive frame**: Understanding of violence prevention through transversal, gender-sensitive, development lenses versus law-and-order/national security lenses both within MDBs and within countries; understanding of the link between violence prevention and MDBs’ mandate and organisational culture both within the organisations and in client countries.

  SRQ1: To what extent has a common understanding of violence and its prevention emerged and evolved in MDBs working in LAC? To what extent is such understanding shared at the country level? How has violence and its prevention been interpreted in relation to MDBs’ mandate? And to what extent do client countries consider MDBs relevant in violence prevention?

• **Actor power**: Political leadership that supports the issue within the organisations; emergence and longevity of in-house, legitimate champions who define inclusive violence within the particular structure and content of the development agenda; availability of in-house experts as critical mass of staff members who are able to develop projects and initiatives and push the agenda forward in different sectors; local and national Governments’ explicit demand for MDBs support.

  SRQ2: To what extent have MDBs’ political leaderships, through their respective Board and President, supported the issue so that it enters and gains legitimacy within
the banks’ development agendas? To what extent does the presence of internal leaders explain the emergence, treatment, and institutionalisation of violence prevention in MDBs? To what extent does the in-house capacity matter in that respect? How and to what extent does demand from countries influence the emergence, treatment, and institutionalisation of the issue in MDBs’ agenda?

- *Operational knowledge*: Availability of rigorous regional evidence on the effectiveness of policies, programmes and interventions dealing with inclusive violence prevention (what works and what does not in multi-sector, gender-sensitive strategies and sector by sector); availability of implementation-oriented knowledge (implementable context-specific programmes and projects; ‘how-to’); and availability of credible data and meaningful indicators.

SRQ3: To what extent does the available regional evidence on effectiveness influence the emergence, treatment and institutionalisation of inclusive violence prevention in the organisations and at the country level? How does the available implementation-oriented knowledge influence the emergence, treatment and institutionalisation of the issue? To what extent does the availability of credible data and meaningful indicators explain the evolution of the issue in the organisations’ agendas and in countries’ strategies?

- *Organisational treatment*: Financial resource allocation for the issue; mainstream location of responsibility in development agencies and in countries (relationship between sector divisions, multi-sector operations and mainstreaming); and factors influencing staff development, including incentives and accountability mechanisms.

SRQ4: What do financial resources allocated to the issue by the organisations reveal regarding the emergence, treatment and institutionalisation of inclusive violence prevention? Where is the issue located within the organisations, and how does this location influence its treatment and its institutionalisation as a transversal issue? To what extent do incentives related to staff development influence the emergence, treatment and institutionalisation of the issue?
4.3 Research methods

The choice of the methodology is based on the scope of the research and the questions it seeks to answer. Since the research takes an interpretivist stance and aims to better understand the emergence and strategy surrounding violence prevention in general, and violence prevention and gender in particular, qualitative methodology matches best such objectives. Qualitative methodology enables an in-depth understanding of complex phenomena drawn into why and how questions that quantifiable or positivist methodology cannot satisfactorily explain.

4.3.1 Comparative case study analysis and selection criteria

Among qualitative methods, case studies allow for a detailed study of settings, organisations, events, groups, communities or individuals (Berg 2004). In particular, they have become a common method to study organisations (Gellner and Hirsch 2001) that are the main objects of analysis of this thesis. They imply a systematic collection of information regarding the object of analysis, and the immersion of the researcher so as to gain a deep understanding of the dynamics at stake through observation, interviews, and documents analysis (Gellner and Hirsch 2001). As such, case studies and ethnographic studies share similarities, for the ethnographer immerses herself or himself into the context under study.

I chose to undertake a comparative case study analysis. The use of case studies has been criticised for its limitations to a single context, and lack of generalisation of the findings (Bell 1993). Such criticisms resonate with the debate of positivist versus interpretivist approaches. As previously mentioned, an interpretivist approach does not aim to reach a universal truth, but gain an in-depth understanding of a particular question or setting. In that respect, case studies provide useful methods to reach the pursued depth. As the context of the present research is Latin America and the Caribbean and the investigation focuses on MDBs, I compared the IADB and the World Bank, the two main MDBs working in the region (see Box 1 in Chapter 1). The comparative analysis makes it possible to identify the dynamics at stake in such big development organisations that could usefully inform other
development agencies. It does not however eliminate the specificity of each organisation and the limitation of generalisation of the findings.

The choice of case studies in qualitative research is also informed by the interest of the cases per se more than the search for universalising the findings as in positivist research. This was clearly the case in this research as, from the beginning, I was interested in understanding violence prevention at the IADB and the World Bank that share a series of characteristics I found worth studying in the case of violence prevention, as I have indicated in Section 1.2 in Chapter 1. Those characteristics include:

(i)  *Multi-sectorality:* MDBs work in virtually all sectors of development, which gives them a comparative advantage over sector-specific aid agencies, as regard to operationalising the shared responsibility for violence prevention.

(ii) *Multilateral status:* As compared with bilateral aid agencies where political interests govern the development agenda, the multilateral status of development banks implies negotiations and coalition reducing but not dissolving, direct political interests.

(iii) *Continuity:* MDBs have a continuous dialogue with governments independently of who is in power, placing their interventions in the long term. The projects they finance have an average lifetime of four to ten years. This creates some continuity, facilitates bridging over changes in administrations and allows evaluations, when other initiatives struggle to do so.

(iv) *Influential voice:* Although their direct power on policy making is debated and might be reduced in middle-income countries (Box 2 in Chapter 1), their voice through studies and conferences is still widely influential and often serves as reference.

In addition to these comparative case studies, I designed a country case study to test variables related to donor-recipient relations. In fact, MDBs are partners in development and their clients are governments. MDBs maintain a policy dialogue with governments, and negotiate portfolios that would determine the scope and content of the assistance, be it through loans, grants, or technical assistance. Both parties are mutually dependent to reach an agreement and make the partnership work. I decided to select a country in LAC to interview counterparts of the IADB and the World Bank, and balance what would have
otherwise been a one-sided story. Among the 42 countries in LAC, I chose Colombia for three main reasons:

(i) **Pioneer in the field of violence prevention:** Colombia was avant-garde in successfully designing and implementing multi-sector violence prevention policies. In Cali for instance, as early as 1992, Mayor Guerrero adopted an epidemiological approach to violence that focused on preventing and reducing risk factors. This led to the halving of homicide rates in one of the most violent cities in Colombia. In Bogotá and Medellin, similar principles based on multipronged prevention strategies led to remarkable results that few other countries have experienced (McIlwaine and Moser 2001, 2004).

(ii) **Large portfolio of MDBs’ projects:** Both for the IADB and the World Bank, Colombia is among the top four countries that have the largest portfolios in LAC, showing that even as an upper middle-income country with promising economic conditions, Colombia considers both banks as relevant enough to partner with them on a wide range of development issues. Furthermore, in the specific case of violence prevention, Colombia was the first country to negotiate and implement a citizen security project with the IADB at the end of the 1990s. At this same time, the World Bank published its first participatory studies on violence, with Colombia being one of the few countries selected.

(iii) **Knowledge and experience on violence:** Colombia’s long history of violence has generated a large pool of experts (even creating a field of study called ‘violentologia’) as well as numerous initiatives to address urban violence. This local and national knowledge and experience is outstanding for the research because they reduce the importance of variables that might be found in other countries (lack of knowledge at the country level, lack of national experts, lack of trained professionals at the local level, lack of financial resources, passive civil society). The high level of preparation of Colombian technical, ministerial staff as well as civil society organisations and

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37 At the IADB, Colombia has the fourth largest portfolio (out of 26) in terms of total yearly and cumulative approval (USD 872.9 million in 2013 and USD 18,124.1 million over the period 1961-2013), which corresponds to respectively 7.8 per cent and 9.12 per cent of total lending (IADB’s Annual Report 2013). At the World Bank, Colombia has the third largest portfolio (USD 600 million in 2013 and 4,963 million for the period 2008-2013), which corresponds to respectively 11.53 per cent and 9.62 per cent of total IBRD and IDA commitment in LAC (World Bank external website, figures of 2013).
academics also enabled educated and informed conversations, which was very valuable to get the most out of the findings from counterparts.

4.3.2 Secondary data collection and methods of analysis
I reviewed two categories of secondary data: the IADB’s and the World Bank’s institutional strategies, and documents related to their investment loans explicitly financing violence prevention over the period 1998-2011. Institutional strategies include institutional statements, policies, and guidelines. These documents contain the rhetoric of MDBs regarding the importance given to the issue and their respective positioning. All institutional statements were collected through online searches in the organisations’ respective external websites.

As for investment loans documents, they reflect the practice of both banks regarding violence prevention. MDBs are ultimately banks, and investments are their core business. They financially support governments by providing loans, grants, and technical assistance to design, implement, or evaluate policies, programmes and projects. The project documents reviewed included project documents (POD) and operational plans that describe the project (diagnosis, components, budget and result framework) for the IADB; and project appraisal documents (PAD) and intermediate completion reviews (ICRs) for the World Bank. It was easier to retrieve World Bank’s project documentation than IADB’s, for the World Bank’s database is available online, systematic and well maintained. It provides an excellent basis for the basic information of each project, even though all details of the implementation are not captured. As regard to the IADB, project documents were harder to find and far less systematic. The IADB has a renewed policy for public information that now makes the availability of all project documents mandatory (as is the case for the World Bank, both policies having been renewed in 2011). Despite this new policy, I found very unequal access to project documents. This was not an issue for citizen security projects (projects explicitly targeting violence prevention as a main objective), for the universe of projects is still relatively small (16 projects, see Chapters 1 and 6). Nonetheless, this was an obstacle to build a systematic database of projects spanning several sectors across countries, as I intended doing for both banks to assess the extent to which inclusive violence prevention was taken into account and addressed in projects.
beyond those explicitly targeting the issue. Later, as I joined the Office of Evaluation at the IADB (see Section 4.4), I found that such an exercise was only possible with internal access to documents and intranet. However, even then, findings were incomplete and not systematic. I therefore decided not to use such mappings. That is, I did not use POD and PAD documents in projects and programmes other than those explicitly targeting violence prevention.

4.3.3 Primary data collection
I collected primary data through semi-structured, in-depth interviews with two study populations: staff members of both MDBs, and local and national counterparts in Colombia. I also conducted in-depth interviews with international experts and partners who were key informants to verify findings. For each category of interviewees, I present the objectives of the interviews, the selection criteria, the method to contact persons, the method to record data, and the questions asked. This detailed description aims to strengthen the reliability of the research (see Section 4.4). Appendices B.1 present the main questions asked by study population.

Semi-structured interviews with MDBs’ staff members
From February to April 2011 and then in July 2011, I travelled to Washington, D.C., where the headquarters of the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank are located. Thereafter, in 2012, I completed interviews with staff members at the IADB while working for the organisation (see Section 4.4.). I conducted 85 interviews (42 at the IADB, comprising 23 during the field work and 19 carried out in 2012, and 43 at the World Bank), including all major actors directly involved in the history and present of the issue in both organisations (see Table 10). The interviews with staff members of the IADB and the World Bank aimed at reconstructing the process that led each bank to adopt violence prevention within its own development agenda, questioning internal debates about the rationale, the best approach to choose, and how gender was taken into consideration at different levels of each organisation, as well as identifying opportunities and constraints for a mainstreaming approach to violence prevention. I contacted staff members with the following characteristics:
(i) Operational Specialists working in Violence Prevention/ Citizen Security in LAC, and at the Anchor for the World Bank;\textsuperscript{38}

(ii) Specialists working in LAC in the following sectors: Gender, Education (including Early Childhood Development), Urban Development (including Transportation and Slum Upgrading), Social Protection and Health, Youth, and Justice;

(iii) Specialists and Managers of Gender and Youth Units at the central level (World Bank’s Anchors);

(iv) Management/Regional and Sector decision makers: Vice-Presidents (VPs) or previous VPs, Country Directors (CDs) or previous CDs (World Bank), Country Managers, Sector Managers and Advisers (World Bank), Division Chiefs (IADB); and

(v) Board members: Executive Directors (EDs).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>IADB</th>
<th>World Bank</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Security / Violence Prevention</td>
<td>19*</td>
<td>13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation/ Urban development</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Protection and Health</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human resources/ TFs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social safeguards</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
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**Management**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IADB</th>
<th>World Bank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board members</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Presidents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers/Country Directors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total interviewees   | 42   | 43         |

Notes: * Out of 27 identified - these interviews were carried out in 2012
** Out of 17 identified
*** Justice is included in citizen security at the IADB

Access to the study population was facilitated by my previous work experience as an international consultant. Each meeting led to others quite easily. In addition, to identify additional Specialists, Division Chiefs and Board Members at the IADB, and Executive Directors, Vice-Presidents and Country Directors at the World Bank, I searched on the

\textsuperscript{38} The Anchor is a general unit that provides cross support to operational teams in regions.
external website for names. I kept a very detailed excel table where I recorded all the persons contacted, the dates of meeting, or when to follow up. This method was very useful and has proven to be effective as most of the persons contacted responded. I include a list of interviewees at the IADB and at the World Bank in Appendices B.2.1 and B.2.2.

The interviews were conducted in English, Spanish or French. They lasted from 35 minutes to 2.5 hours, with the majority of them lasting 1-1.5 hours. I chose not to tape-record the interviews to ease the dialogue and enhance a genuine and relaxed conversation. At the beginning of each meeting, after recalling the scope and objectives of the research (I had previously sent emails explaining the request for meeting), I asked the person if he/she agreed that I take notes during our conversation. All of them agreed. I also asked permission to include their title in a list of interviewees to be placed in the Appendices of the thesis, indicating that I would not quote them by name directly in the text.

To ensure the smoothest and most honest discussion possible as well as to get the possibility to adapt to the personality, reactions, and availability of the interviewee, I began by asking open-ended, general questions. I then allowed the conversation to evolve, depending on the kind of responses I was getting. This was important, first not to bias the answers by suggesting my own interpretation of facts, and then, to avoid putting the interviewee in a defensive position. More specific questions were introduced during the conversation after the dialogue was going on and the interviewee showed willingness to reflect and respond sincerely about the issues at stake. This was the case for the large majority of participants. When on rare occasions, the interviewee answered too generally or expressed some irritation or other signs of discomfort, I broadened back the questions or just thanked them for their time, but never pushed too much to get answers when the interviewee clearly did not want to offer them. Appendices B.1 include the questions asked.

As soon as possible following each meeting, I would write the transcript in English (therefore translating myself when the meeting was held in Spanish or French) based on my written notes and immediate memory. This method was used in similar research (Satterthwaite 1999; Gulrajani 2005). All meetings therefore led to a written transcript (from two to eleven pages) that includes an overall impression, keywords, and the conversation.
Semi-structured interviews in Colombia

From May 1 to June 30, 2011, I went to Colombia to interview MDBs’ counterparts, at both the local and the national levels, as well as experts and practitioners. As mentioned in the selection criteria for the country case study, going to Colombia aimed to better understand the contextual opportunities and constraints as regard to mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention, and to check the consistency with what development banks’ staff were telling me. It also served to better understand how counterparts perceived development banks’ work in relation to the issue: their contribution so far, their relevance, their power or influence, and what would be needed from these development organisations as regard to inclusive violence prevention.

I decided to undertake interviews in different cities of Colombia to diversify sources, experiences, and gather a grounded understanding of the following aspects: urban violence contexts beyond the capital; the limitations and needs of decision makers, practitioners, and activists at the national and local level; their appreciation of development banks, and what is or could be their comparative advantage when dealing with urban violence. I undertook fieldwork in Barranquilla, Bogotá, Medellin, and Cartagena, but did most of the interviews in Barranquilla and Bogotá. Barranquilla is the third largest city in Colombia and has developed very rapidly under the last Administration of Mayor Alejandro Char (2008-2011), working both with the World Bank and the IADB on different aspects of economic, social and urban development. Both banks were therefore actual partners with the local government, and also worked with the Governor at the department level. The city faces challenges in terms of violence in all its forms that go beyond the limits of the district. The Governor of the department of Atlántico and the Mayor of the largest city in the department, the two main decision makers, do not share the same position regarding strategies to tackle violence (preventive-oriented versus repressive-oriented). This context is ideal to better understand margins of manoeuvre and constraints to implement policies and projects in the field. I also went to Bogotá, where the Ministries and most of the experts were located, and to Cartagena and Medellin mainly because I followed key informants for the research. The interviews in the latter two cities proved to be very informative as I was
able to observe different parts of each city, and therefore understand more easily and visualise what policymakers and practitioners were referring to. Observation is, in fact, a common method used in ethnography and other social sciences studies to facilitate the immersion of the researcher in the context under study (Gellner and Hirsch 2001).

Given the objectives of the field research in Colombia, I chose to interview two main study populations:

(i) local and national governmental staff both at technical and decision-making levels in the seven sectors I chose for this research (Citizen Security/Violence Prevention, Gender, Education, Transportation/Urban Development, Social Protection and Health, Youth, and Justice). By mirroring the selection of sectors in the MDBs, I not only ensure consistency in the research design, but also made sure to interview actual or potential counterparts of development banks; and

(ii) experts and practitioners in urban violence, gender, and sectors relevant to violence prevention.

In total, I interviewed 71 persons in Colombia: 37 counterparts and 34 experts and practitioners, as summarised in Table 11.
### Table 11: Study population in Colombia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colombian Institutions</th>
<th>Number of Interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNP</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Social Protection</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Transport</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Justice</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acción Social</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBF</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFES</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Governments</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality of Bogota</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality of Barranquilla</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality of Medellin</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality of Cartagena</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gobernación de Atlántico</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Counterparts at National and Local Levels</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Society and Experts</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs and Think tanks</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chambers of Commerce</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics/ Experts</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organisations/Partners</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forensic Medicine</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Experts and Practitioners</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Interviewees in Colombia</strong></td>
<td><strong>71</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All interviews were conducted in Spanish, lasted between one and three hours, and followed a similar conversational approach as for the development banks. A list of interviewees in Colombia is provided in Appendix B.2.3. At the national level, I met with decision makers (level of Directors of Division and Directors of Department) and technical staff (below the level of Directors but who were in charge of a particular issue) in the ministries indicated in Table 11. At the local level, I met with local mayors, secretaries, sub-secretaries, and technical staff working in secretaries of Government, Gender Affairs, Youth-at-risk, Economic Development and Treasury, and Citizen Security. At the departmental level, I interviewed technical staff in charge of the departmental violence and
crime observatory, human rights, and citizen security. The experts I interviewed in these four cities were academics, practitioners, directors of civil society organisations (local and national NGOs focusing on youth, childhood and gender issues, including masculinities and violence prevention), experts in think tanks and consulting firms (specialised in violence prevention, citizenship culture, and urban transport), managers in chambers of commerce, and specialists in development agencies other than MDBs.

I began my field research in Barranquilla. I initially did a research on the Internet to contact different secretaries. I sent many emails and followed up, but did not receive any answer, which surprised me. In the end, I was able to interview them when I showed up at their office. I contacted the District of Barranquilla, the Gobernación of the Atlántico (Department of the Atlantic), NGOs, and academics at UniNorte (the best ranked university in the department). I proceeded in a practical way as I asked the people with whom I met if they might suggest other persons and eventually give me their phone numbers. I found incredible kindness and support as many of them decided to call colleagues to make sure I would obtain an appointment. In other cases, I decided to go directly to offices introducing my work and asking in person for an appointment. This strategy worked as well in Cartagena. In Bogotá and Medellin, all contacts were done by emails, with some follow-ups by phone. I was either introduced by Colombian friends who knew Directors in Ministries, which then converted into ‘snowballing’, one contact leading to another. In addition, most organisations, be they public, private, or non-for-profit, now have a website that often provides an email, even a general one, that I used to dig further and ask for the resource person relevant to my research. This worked well, even though recommendations were always more efficient and (numerous) follow-ups were in most cases necessary.

*Interviews of international experts*

The interviews with international experts and partner organisations of the IADB and the World Bank sought to:

(i) better understand how both organisations were perceived in the field of violence prevention;

(ii) provide an additional check about what development banks were saying in terms of challenges related to urban violence in countries and existing constraints;
(iii) better understand how international partnerships worked and what partners expected from development banks;
(iv) better understand the comparative advantage of development banks and how they could contribute the most to inclusive violence prevention in LAC; and
(v) identify opportunities and constraints for inclusive violence prevention mainstreaming.

From the literature review, I identified think tanks, foundations, NGOs, and international organisations in the field of violence prevention and gender. Similarly to interviews with other populations, ‘snowballing’ was an effective approach, as one interview led to another, in particular considering that the sector is still quite narrow and most of the experts know each other. I interviewed eleven international experts based in Washington, the list is provided in Appendix B.2.4 and Table 12 provides a summary by type of organisations. The interviews were either in English or Spanish, and lasted between one and two hours. I used similar conversational style and recording techniques as for the interviews with development banks.

Table 12: Key informants from subject expert organisations and partners (by type of organisations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organisations</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Think Tanks</td>
<td>Brookings Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ICRW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WOLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td>Open Society Foundations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>PAHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations</td>
<td>OAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Promundo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Man Up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.4 Method of analysis for primary data

I combined different methods to analyse the content of the interviews I conducted. I did not use statistical programs to analyse the data, but instead systematically reviewed all transcripts to identify most salient elements following a specific objective for each type of interviews. First, for interviews with MDBs’ staff members or counterparts who directly worked (and for some are still working) on the issue, or who were decision makers
(Management and Board members), I employed a method called ‘process tracing’. That is, I used the interviews to reconstruct the storyline and the reasons behind the evolution of both banks as regard to violence prevention. As Venesson (2008:233-234) explains:

‘Process tracing allows the researcher to look for the ways in which [a] link manifests itself and the context in which it happens. The focus is not only on what happened, but also on how it happened. It becomes possible to use process tracing to examine the reasons that actors give for their actions and behaviour and to investigate the relations between beliefs and behaviour […]. Process tracing is a fundamental element of empirical […] research because it provides a way to learn and to evaluate empirically the preferences and perceptions of actors, their purposes, their goals, their values and their specification of the situations that face them.’

With this method, I used interviewees’ responses to test the variables identified through the literature review and the conceptual framework, which in turn allowed for a refining of the framework throughout an iterative research process. Second, for interviews with staff members of the IADB and the World Bank from other sectors, I analysed the content through a triple perspective: how different sectors perceived their own role to contribute to preventing violence in cities; what were the constraints to do it and what would be needed for it; and whether or not there was a specificity to violence prevention as regard to gender in comparison with other sectors. Thanks to this approach, I was able to assess the opportunities and constraints to adopting a mainstreaming approach to violence prevention from a gender perspective. Finally, I reviewed the interviews with counterparts, practitioners and experts to identify how development banks were considered in the field of violence prevention, how their contribution was considered, and what would be needed from them. I also identified which constraints were most referred to by these stakeholders in terms of design and implementation of multi-sector, gender-sensitive approaches, and in relation to the adoption of a proactive mainstreaming approach for the inclusive prevention of violence.
4.4 Validity and reliability, ethics, and limitations

4.4.1 Validity and reliability criteria

The validity of the research consists in its trustworthiness. I used three strategies to ensure its highest quality and reliability (Yin 1998: 32-36). First, I collected data from multiple sources of evidence, combining secondary and primary data, and diversifying the sources for primary data. This technique serves to validate the construct of the research, for it implies a triangulation in the data collection. Second, I used consistency checks between responses of informants, as well as with my own experience and with informal conversations with consultants and staff from both organisations. I had worked for nearly five years at the World Bank before undertaking the PhD thesis (see Section 4.4.2 on ethics and positionality). This experience was very valuable as a way to immediately react to responses, asking for further explanations when I was surprised by the answer and making it possible to deepen the conversation more quickly. Since the IADB has a similar mission and structure as the World Bank, and thanks to previous informal conversations with IADB staff and consultants, I benefitted from a similar additional check for the information acquired from interviews at the IADB. Thereafter, I joined the IADB as staff member - after having completed the data collection for this thesis. I worked at the IADB for two years and a half, and then decided to take a leave of absence to be able to complete my dissertation. The revision of the thesis therefore benefitted from this additional experience. Finally, the detailed description of the protocol of the research, including identification and contact of resource persons, way to record data, and questions asked, aimed to minimise biases in the research and to provide enough guidelines so that another researcher could reproduce the same study and reach similar findings.

4.4.2 Research ethics and positionality

The ethical standards of the research consisted in asking for permission to take notes at the beginning of the interview, guaranteeing the informant’s anonymity (never quoting them by name in the text), asking permission to include their name or title in the list of interviewees, and of course, answering any questions regarding the research. Ethical conduct also entailed transcribing the interview as quickly as possible after each meeting to ensure accuracy and precision. When notes were unclear and I could not remember precisely, I always mentioned it in the transcript.
Another key ethical consideration that relates to my unique positionality in this research dealt with my work experience in both MDBs, in particular with the IADB that I joined during the course of the PhD. As previously mentioned, I had worked for five years at the World Bank, mainly in the Human Department of the Africa Region, when I decided to apply for a PhD. During that time, I designed a project to support women victims of violence in Colombia, called the ‘Golondrina project’ that received a USD one million grant from the Japanese Trust Fund. My research for this project reinforced a long-standing reflection on the main challenges and injustices in the developing world and motivated me to embark on the PhD journey, for I wanted to research in more depth what major aid agencies like MDBs could do to push the agenda forward in violence prevention from a gender perspective. I thus left the World Bank to go to the United Kingdom to begin the Doctorate. After I had completed the coursework, passed the upgrading seminar and conducted all the interviews in the United States and in Colombia, I received an offer to join the IADB as a Young Professional. Aware that such positions were rare and prestigious, and in consultation with both of my supervisors at the Bartlett Development Planning Unit (DPU) at University College London (UCL), I accepted the offer. I declared my research during the recruitment process and upon arrival, and informed the Ethics Office of the IADB. I also informed the Director of the Office of Evaluation and Oversight to which I had been assigned. After six months, I received an offer to become Specialist at the IADB. At the Office of Evaluation and Oversight, I first co-led an evaluation on implementation processes of five citizen security projects in Central America and the Caribbean, and then led a thematic evaluation on citizen security at the IADB looking at its contribution in relation to major challenges in the sector. Both evaluations were in line with my research but did not overlap. The first study involved five case studies and looked at implementation variables that facilitated the execution of particular projects. The second evaluation focused on looking at how the IADB had responded to the complexity, risks, and knowledge gap that characterise citizen security in the region. My PhD research has fed and is enriched by this work on citizen security at the IADB. It has fed it because my research gave me a solid understanding on violence prevention and the role of MDBs in that respect, understanding that is reflected in my analysis in both studies. It has also been enriched because I spent the past two years working on citizen security and getting to know
from the inside the operational and strategic discussions surrounding the issue. During that time, I interviewed all Citizen Security Specialists at the IADB. This unique positionality as PhD researcher and MDB staff highlights key ethical questions in the research process and data analysis. I build upon a rich body of feminist literature that reflects on power relations and the particular positionality of the researcher, and subscribe to England’s words when she argues that ‘the researcher’s positionality and biography directly affect fieldwork and fieldwork is a dialogical process which is structured by the researcher and the participants’ (England 1994:80). In the particular case of my research, I am aware interviewees might have responded differently to the Evaluation Officer and to the PhD researcher. I thus used the knowledge gained through the 19 interviews undertaken in 2012 as background information only. With the agreement of my Director and the Human Resources Department at the IADB, I decided to take a leave of absence to complete my dissertation. As such, my role as a researcher and an Evaluation Officer has always been transparent and fully disclosed throughout the process. Beyond the question of transparency, it is undeniable that the final thesis is the result of this dual positionality and a dialogical process constructed in an iterative manner between the researcher (myself) and the researched, with the specificity that some of the ‘others’ being researched, as England (1994:87) name them, were sharing and reflecting part of my own experience as former MDB staff member.

4.4.3 Research limitations

This research presents three main limitations. These limitations do not affect the validity of findings and could serve as the basis for future research. First, the research does not present a detailed mapping of interventions in the six sectors (in addition to Citizen Security/Violence Prevention) where interviews were conducted. I started such a mapping, systematically examining more than 150 projects at the World Bank in six sectors to assess the extent to which violence prevention and gender were explicitly referred to in the diagnostic, components, and result frameworks in projects documentation. When I began doing a similar exercise for the IADB, I quickly realised I would not be able to undertake a similar analysis and compare results, for lack of access to information. As Evaluation Officer, I then commissioned such an analysis during my work at the IADB, but results were still unsatisfactory because of varying levels of available information across projects.
Even at the World Bank, interviewees pointed out how project documentation only partially reflected the interventions developed in countries and how levels of detail regarding those interventions varied significantly PAD to PAD. I thus stopped the mapping exercises. I considered them interesting pieces of analysis and information, but they were not indispensable to conduct the research and reach meaningful findings. In fact, none of the banks has officially adopted a mainstreaming approach to violence prevention. What mattered was to collect and analyse participants’ responses about the opportunities and constraints affecting the mainstreaming of inclusive violence prevention.

The second limitation of this research lies in the single country case study. As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, single case studies have been criticised for the lack of generalisation of the findings (Bell 1993). In the present case, and in the context of aid, case studies in other countries might have found different results, for donor-recipient relations vary with the level of economic development of the country and the political position of Governments towards MDBs. As such, findings from the Colombian case do not aim to be generalised. They are nonetheless interesting for the characteristics highlighted in the selection criteria for Colombia, in particular in terms of readiness of the context for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention and levels of reflectiveness on the role of MDBs in that respect.

Finally, this research shares a common limitation to all research projects relying principally on data collected through in depth interviews: findings depend on the particular experience of interviewees in the study populations. Even though I contacted as many staff members, managers, and Board members in both MDBs as I could, I am aware that I might have missed relevant resource persons either because I did not identify them, they did not reply, or they were not in Washington when I was there. Not having done these interviews does not jeopardise the findings of the research. In fact, in most cases, I interviewed other persons who had a similar position. I intentionally contacted as many persons as I could identify, aware of the fact that in any research project there is always a number of persons who cannot or are not willing to participate, above all considering the time constraints of a PhD field work. All the interviews were conducted in depth and their number were equal or higher compared to those undertaken in other thesis similar in scope (Satterthwaite 1999; Gulrajani 2005). They also covered a wide range of positions, sectors, and experience that
allowed me to gain an extended understanding of both organisations from an internal and external perspective, and test all the hypotheses and variables of the research. Another limitation of primary data lies in the semi-structured format of the interviews. I chose to adopt a conversational approach to collect as much information as possible and obtain the genuine interpretation and perception of staff members. This technique facilitated contact and brought a wealth of informative anecdotes to the research, but I could not always ask all the questions I would have liked. This was nevertheless the exception rather than the rule, and I consider it as the price for opting for flexibility instead of rigidity.

4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has described the interpretivist stance and the qualitative methodology used to conduct the research. The findings are presented in the following chapters. Chapter 5 provides the context in which to interpret the results from the in-depth interviews with MDBs’ staff members, managers and Board members, and the country case study. It presents the situation of violence in LAC with a special focus on Colombia, and identifies the main challenges in policymaking to prevent violence from a development and gender perspective in LAC. Chapter 6 presents the findings from the process tracing analysis. It reconstructs the evolution of violence prevention at the IADB and the World Bank from 1998 to 2011. Chapters 7 and 8 analyse responses from MDBs’ interviewees to explain why violence prevention has only emerged slowly in the agenda of both banks. For this, it discusses the analytical categories developed in the conceptual framework. Chapter 9 presents the findings from the case study in Colombia, and Chapter 10 concludes by reflecting on the main findings and proposing directions for future research.
Chapter 5: Violence and Violence Prevention Policies in LAC with a Special Focus on Colombia

High, persistent rates of violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, the complexity of the situation and the challenges to design, implement and sustained multi-sector, gender-sensitive violence prevention policies motivated this research. This chapter grounds the analysis of MDBs as regard to violence prevention in the context of the region. Section 5.1 provides an overview of the situation in terms of trends and rates of different forms of violence in LAC, with a special focus on Colombia, the case study for this research. Section 5.2 then looks into explanations and discusses the main risk factors for violence at the regional level and in the Colombian context. Finally, Section 5.3 examines policy responses to violence. It first discusses the main characteristics of public policies related to violence in the region, and then examines the specific case of Colombia’s latest national policy framework to prevent violence. This analysis contextualises findings from interviews in Colombia that I discuss in Chapter 9.

5.1 Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean with a special focus on Colombia

High rates of violence in Latin America and the Caribbean represent a severe development challenge for the region. As explained in Chapter 2, this challenge is particularly complex, for it is multi-faceted, multi-causal, and context-specific. It also involves strong gender dimensions that are often overlooked. This section provides an overview of the multiple forms of violence first at the regional level, and then in Colombia. It ends with a discussion on risk factors following the ecological model described in Section 2.3.2 in Chapter 2.

5.1.1 Violence in LAC in historical and geographical perspective: homicides and other forms of violence

The legacy of violence

The specialist literature often links contemporary violence in LAC to the dictatorships and authoritarian regimes that marked the region’s XXth century. In the Southern Cone and the Andean countries in particular, those regimes institutionalised the use of violence to control
power and political opponents, often through brutal means (disappearances, torture, rapes, death squads, kidnappings, ethnic discrimination, etc.) (Koonings and Kruijt 1999). In Central America and Colombia, civil wars and guerrilla warfare have led to decades of internal conflicts (see Section 5.1.2 for the case of Colombia). This long-standing political violence has contributed to the formation of a ‘culture of violence’, and to what Koonings and Kruijt (1999:2) have called ‘a legacy of terror, of violence, of fear’.

Since the end of the 1970s, Latin America has experienced important economic, social, and political changes. Most countries have moved towards democracy and legitimate civil governance, but the region has also experienced economic crises, and continued to experience internal social and political conflicts (Koonings and Kruijt 2009). In the 1990s, many countries benefitted from economic recovery while consolidating their democracy. The democratic transition has delegitimised the use of State-led violence, even though it has not eliminated it (Koonings and Kruijt 1999; Pécaut 1999; Basombrio and Dammert 2013). However, authors have argued that the neo-liberal economic reforms undertaken during dictatorships have left divided societies in many countries, leading criminal, social, and anomic violence to replace political violence as the predominant forms of violence (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011:95). Criminal or economic violence rose very quickly also because of changes in the drug trafficking business (Levitt and Rubio 2000). As such, the main perpetrators of violence were not anymore public authorities, State representatives, or political groups, but individuals and criminal organisations more or less linked to illegal trafficking, in particular drug, firearms, and human trafficking (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011).

Very high, historical and contemporary regional homicide rates with significant variations across and within countries

In 2010, homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean were among the highest in the world, above 20 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (hphti), about three times the world’s average (6.9) (UNODC 2011:19-21). Only Southern Africa had higher homicide rates (32

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39 Bureaucratic-authoritarian military regimes were different throughout the region. Yet, they shared the characteristic of defending internal order, ‘national interests’, or ‘permanent national objectives’, and considered communists or radicals as threats or internal enemies (see Kroonings and Kruijt, 1999: 10-11).
Since the 1970s, homicide rates have increased throughout the region, but at different pace. In Colombia, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago, they multiplied by four to five times between 1970s and 1990s, whereas in Brazil, they doubled, and increased more moderately in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011). Since the 1990s, the situation has been particularly worrisome in Central America and the Caribbean where homicide rates have continued to increase, whereas in most other regions in the world they were decreasing, including in countries in South America such as Colombia. Since the 1990s, the Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO) talks about a ‘social pandemic’ when referring to LAC levels of violence (PAHO 1997), and more recently, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has warned that the situation is reaching a ‘crisis point’ in Central America and the Caribbean (UNODC 2011:10).

Latin America and the Caribbean are very diverse, and countries and cities show major differences (Figure 5). On the upper side of homicide rates, Honduras, El Salvador, Venezuela, Jamaica, Guatemala, Colombia and Brazil are among the most violent countries in the region, whereas Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Costa Rica are closer to levels found in the United States (data of 2010). Country averages also hide major differences between cities. For instance, while Mexico has an average homicide rate of 25.6, Ciudad Juarez has nearly six times this rate (147.7 hpti). San Pedro Sula in Honduras is considered one of the most violent cities in the world with 158.8 hpti, double an already very high national average (82.1 hpti). Within Brazil, Recife (with almost 160 hpti) faces

40 The PAHO refers to pandemic levels when homicide rates are above 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (see Cesar Chelala, 1997).

41 UNODC defines homicide as unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person, and uses a variety of national and international sources of data based on criminal justice and/or public health systems.

42 With respectively 82.1, 66, 49, 52, 41, 33.4 and 22.7 hpti in 2010; and 2009 for Brazil and Venezuela (UNODC 2011).

43 With respectively 3.7, 5.5, 6.1 and 11.3 in 2010; 2009 for Chile and Argentina (UNODC 2011). Within sub-regions, variations exist as well. For instance, in Central America, Nicaragua and Honduras are two extremes in terms of homicide rates, with 13.2 hpti for the former and 82.1 hpti for the latter (UNODC 2011). Jamaica’s homicide rate of nearly 60 hpti is the highest in the Caribbean, one and a half times Trinidad and Tobago’s (40) and three times Guyana’s (20). In South America, the situation in terms of homicides in Uruguay or Chile is closer to that of the United States (4.6 hpti) with respectively 3.7 and 6.1 hpti, than to Brazil (22.7) or Venezuela (49) (UNODC 2011 using latest year available).
challenges significantly higher than São Paulo (60 hpti), Rio de Janeiro (60 hpti), Brasilia (40 hpti) and Salvador de Bahia (40 hpti)\(^{44}\) (see Figure 5). In general, big cities, cities on the border, or in the route of drug trafficking are usually the most affected by violence (UNODC 2011).

**Figure 5: Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean: most versus least violent countries and selected cities, 2010**

![Graph showing homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants for various countries and cities in Latin America and the Caribbean.]


**LAC’s multi-faceted violence that affects women and men differently**

The WHO estimates that for every homicide, 20 to 40 other non-fatal acts of violence that require medical interventions are committed (WHO 2002, 2004).\(^{45}\) This does not include those that are not officially reported and do not need immediate medical attention. Various forms of violence are indeed seriously under-reported, and victimisation surveys are used to complement official statistics (police and hospitals records) (see Chapter 2). In Latin America and the Caribbean, about 33 per cent of households have been victims of a crime over the period 1995-2011, and about 18 per cent of crime was committed with violence (Lagos and Dammert 2012).\(^{46}\) If young males are the main victims of homicide (37 per cent

\(^{44}\) Figures for Brazilian cities come from Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011.

\(^{45}\) In this contextual chapter, I only present a few forms of violence, focusing on the victims to highlight the gender dimensions of violence, but other categorisations exist as discussed in Chapter 2.

\(^{46}\) Violence patterns do not follow the level of victimisation, for countries with similar levels of victimisation show very diverse situations in terms of use of violence. For instance, Ecuador, Brazil and Venezuela have
of victims were aged 18-25 years old and 36 per cent, 26-40), women and men were equally victims of crime (data from Latinobarómetro aggregate all crime, ‘delito’ in Spanish, with or without violence) (Lagos and Dammert 2012:28) (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Victims of homicides, intimate partner homicides, and crime/offense (victimisation), by gender, 2011

[Graph showing victimisation rates by gender]


Women are disproportionately victims of intimate partner violence and sexual violence. A 2013 WHO report shows that intimate partner violence is considerably higher in LAC than in other regions of the world (between 40.6 per cent and 27.4 per cent compared to world average 26.4 per cent). Only Southern Latin America (23.7 per cent) is lower than the world average (WHO 2013:47) (see Figure 7).47 Men are also victims of homicides in their home, but at a much lower rate than women (UNODC 2011:9; Lagos and Dammert 2012:28) (Figure 6).48 Sexual violence (including rapes, sexual assaults and sexual offences against children) is also alarming in many countries of the region, in particular in similar levels of victimisation (32 per cent), but diverge in terms of violence with crime committed with violence representing 56 per cent, 12 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively (Lagos and Dammert 2012:28).

47 This does not include sexual and psychological violence such as forced sex, threats, or controlling behaviours.

48 Domestic violence against men is another issue that often remains invisible. Surveys in Medellin indicate that men are victims of psychological and physical violence in similar proportions as women (Duque et al. 2007). The main differences between men and women victims of intimate partner violence are the consequences on the victims. They tend to lead to more hospitalisation and deaths in the case of women. Also men tend to report less because of shame and stereotypes. Domestic violence also happens in same-sex relationships. More surveys are needed to have a more precise and accurate picture of the current situation at the regional level.
the Caribbean: the Bahamas, Grenada, and Saint Kitts and Nevis show the highest rates of sexual violence with 138.2, 143.6, 118.3 acts per 100,000 inhabitants, compared to 36.1 for El Salvador, 30.1 for Mexico and 10.4 for Colombia (UNODC, figures of 2011, using police-recorded offences).

**Figure 7: Prevalence of intimate partner violence by Global Burden of Disease region**

Source: WHO 2013.  
Note: WHO groups the prevalence data by the 21 regions used in the 2010 Global Burden of Disease (GBD) Study. Here are just included a subset of regions, focusing on Latin America and indicating the world average and regions with the highest and lowest rates as benchmarks (Appendix 2, WHO 2013).

Child maltreatment is also frequent according to qualitative data and surveys, despite the lack of systematic quantitative data. Studies have suggested that up to six million children in the region were victims of severe maltreatment (Knaul and Ramírez 2005). School violence (including bullying among students and violence between teachers and students in both ways) is another widespread source of violence. For instance, in Brazil, 70 per cent of 12,000 students surveyed in 143 schools in six states said they had been victims of violence. In Colombia, a 2006 survey of 82,000 students in more than 1,000 schools in Bogotá showed that 32 per cent of students were victims of physical abuse from fellow-students within their school. In Jamaica, 22 per cent of students in eleven schools in

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49 These figures are conservative since rape and other sexual offences are notoriously under-reported everywhere in the world.

50 This does not include child trafficking and child prostitution organised by criminal organisations.
Kingston declared having suffered violence from other students, and 22 per cent having attacked teachers and staff; 90 per cent of them were worried about school violence (different studies cited in World Bank 2008). Surveys on elder abuse remain rare and are found only in some countries. In Colombia for instance, estimates indicate that 10,000 elder people were abused from 2004 to 2011, with older men slightly more affected than older women (Medicina Legal 2013).

5.1.2 Special focus on violence in Colombia in the XX\textsuperscript{th} and XXI\textsuperscript{st} centuries

Within this regional context, Colombia presents similarities and specificities. The Andean country has long been associated with violence and today’s situation remains complex in many respects. This section presents a brief history of violence in Colombia, followed by the main trends in terms of homicides, domestic violence, child maltreatment, sexual violence, and other forms of inter-personal violence. This Colombian focus clearly illustrates the complexity of violence at the country level.

*Violence in Colombia in the XX\textsuperscript{th} century*

A succession of very violent episodes has marked the XX\textsuperscript{th} century in Colombia. After Independence from Spain (1819), political opposition within the elite increased, and eventually led to the Thousand Day War (1899-1902), the 1932-33 civil war, and twenty years of quasi-civil war known as ‘La Violencia’ (1946-1964). The two main parties that fought each other were the Liberals and the Conservatives. Both were elite parties (the Liberals representing the industrial and mercantile bourgeoisie, and the Conservatives, the large landowners). They were in opposition on questions such as the abolition of slavery, centralism, and the role of the Church in public life. The Liberals defended the abolition of slavery, a federal model for governance and the separation of State from Church; the Conservatives, the contrary (Rudqvist 2003; Pécaut 1999). In 1946, a mass movement began, entitled the *Gaitanista*, named after its leader the liberal politician Jorge Eliecer

51 Other studies have described the phenomenon of bullying at the university level as worrisome but not dramatic (Hoyos et al. 2009 for a survey in Barranquilla for example).

Gaitán. The movement advocated for expanding social and economic rights, and civil liberties. Conservatives and some of the Liberals fiercely opposed it. Gaitán was assassinated in 1948, a Conservative President won the elections, and political violence became widespread. ‘La Violencia’ had begun (Rudqvist 2003).

In 1964, a peace agreement officially ended ‘La Violencia’, through a division of power between the two parties (known as ‘the National Front’), but soon after, rebellious groups emerged. They opposed the National Front that did not leave political space for opposition in a context of increasing inequalities and growing popular discontent (Rudqvist 2003). The latter denounced the lack of land reforms that maintained the concentration of land and capital in the hands of a few families (Gutiérrez 2013). The FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, ‘Revolutionary Armed Forced of Colombia’, in English) and the ELN (Ejercito de Liberación Nacional, ‘National Liberation Army’) were the two main guerrilla groups, on the extreme left wing that emerged in the 1970s, and really expanded during the mid-1980s. In 1997, it was estimated that guerrilla groups were present in 600 municipalities out of 107553 (Levitt and Rubio 2000). Paramilitaries also developed on the other extreme of the political arena (ultra-conservative). They replaced vigilante groups formed by landowners to protect their lands and properties from guerrilleros. The main paramilitary group was and still is the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, ‘United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia’). At the same time, drug cartels expanded their activities, in particular in Medellín and Cali. In the 1980s and 1990s, drug cartels were identified as main perpetrators of violence (Rubio and Levitt 2000). Finally, the ‘Bacrim’ (Bandas Criminales, ‘Criminal Groups’) grew as non-political criminal groups, often intertwined with drug trafficking and other illegal activities, such as human trafficking, extortions, etc.

This multitude of armed groups fought each other and the National Government for years to control parts of the national territory and primary production (drug production, such as coca and poppy, but also coffee, banana, emeralds and petroleum). In fact, Colombia has the

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53 Today, there are 1098 municipalities in Colombia (PND 2010-2014); the figure here mentioned referred to 1997.
largest coal reserves in Latin America, produces 90 per cent of the world’s emeralds, and has large petroleum reserves (Gutiérrez 2013). According to Pécaut (1999), politically motivated conflicts merged with criminal activities and blurred the distinction between political and criminal violence, and organised and unorganised violence. Indeed, it became more and more difficult to isolate motives and practices, for guerrillas got involved in criminal activities such as kidnappings, ransoms, and drug production, while drug cartels got involved politically, mainly by corrupting the judiciary and political systems (Pécaut 1999). In addition, groups were very diverse and permeable (drug cartels in Medellin, Cali, Bogotá and the Atlantic Coast are loose coalitions of small groups and the FARC gather more than 60 groups). ‘This situation produced a fragmentation of Colombia’s national territory in response to the relative strength of the various actors involved’ (Pécaut 1999: 145).

Homicide rates in Colombian history have always been high, but increased considerably in the 1980s. During ‘La Violencia’, homicide rates stayed around 20 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (hpti). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, they multiplied by four, and rose to 80 hpti, before decreasing to around 60 hpti in the mid-1990s, and decreasing again in the 2000s to reach the actual level of 33.4 hpti (year of 2010, UNODC 2011). The decrease in the 1990s was mainly associated to the dismantlement of the Medellin and Cali drug cartels (Levitt and Rubio 2000).

During the 1980s and 1990s, Colombian citizens were hostages of ‘daily terror’ (Pécaut 1999). Armed groups entered villages and raped, killed, and imposed racket protection on peasants and landowners in many parts of the country. Citizens were left without protection or margins of manoeuvre. According to Taussig (2004), this situation led to a culture of silence and distrust among the population, and a destruction of social capital. The military was also seen as part of the problem, for it did not distinguish between civilians and guerrilleros and drug traffickers, and left the population abandoned to the mercy of guerrillas. Hundreds of thousands of people were forced to flee their homes. And many young people were forced to join either group. This resulted in a ‘banalisation of terror and

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54 Only a minority of homicides was due to political violence (7 per cent in 1987 according to a study cited by Pécaut 1999:143; 15 per cent according to Rodgers 2003; 23 per cent according to Imbusch et al. 2011).
violence’, a discredit of public institutions, and a lack of popular mobilisation (Pécaut 1999).

*Violence in Colombia in the XXI\textsuperscript{st} century*\textsuperscript{55}

Since 2002, homicide rates started to decline and are now around 34 hphti (33.4, figure of 2010, UNODC 2011) (see Figure 8). This still places Colombia above the LAC average (22 hphti) and four times higher than the world average (6.9 hphti), but the decrease has been significant over the past decade. 75 per cent of homicides happen in urban settings, with Cali and Medellin being the cities where the probability to be killed is the highest (respectively 83.1 and 69.7 hphti in 2011) (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal 2011). In terms of characteristics, 91 per cent of victims are males and the majority are young (37.4 per cent were 20-29 years old). Nearly half of homicides happened in public spaces, and 10 per cent happened in the home. 78 per cent of homicides were by firearms. As for perpetrators, nearly half had primary education, and another half had secondary education; 13 per cent had no occupation\textsuperscript{56} (Ricaurte Villota 2011).

If homicide rates have declined over the years, interpersonal violence has increased. The rates of interpersonal violence went from 260 in 2002 to 332 acts per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011 (Mendoza 2011). In Colombia, interpersonal violence includes all acts of violence perpetrated by non-family members that lead to injury or negatively impact the health of the victims, but not death (opcit)\textsuperscript{57} (see Figure 9). Victims are principally men, but at a lesser proportion than for homicides (66 per cent males and 34 per cent females), and mainly young (the average age is 30 years old, and 19 per cent of victims are between 20 and 24 years old). In terms of circumstances, fights, vengeance and alcohol consumption were the main motives (47.5 per cent in 2011), followed by kidnappings, terrorism, crime, and other acts committed by criminal groups. 12 per cent of cases have no information. In

\textsuperscript{55} Appendix D.1 summarise the main contemporary sources of statistics related to violence in Colombia.

\textsuperscript{56} These figures refer to those for whom data is available, i.e. 67 per cent for education and 32 per cent for occupation.

\textsuperscript{57} As explained in Chapter 2, the WHO includes domestic violence in interpersonal violence. Differences in definitions are common in violence, thus the need to systematically define the object of analysis and question definitions.
the majority of cases, the victim knew the perpetrator. Bogotá is the city where most of interpersonal violent acts occur (Mendoza 2011).

**Figure 8: Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in Colombia, 1997-2011**

![Graph showing homicide rate from 1997 to 2011](image)

Source: Medicina Legal, 2011.

**Figure 9: Interpersonal violence rate per 100,000 inhabitants in Colombia, 2002-2011**

![Graph showing interpersonal violence rate from 2002 to 2011](image)

In terms of intra-family violence, numbers are on the rise since 2002. Intra-family violence includes intimate partner violence, child maltreatment, and elderly abuse. In 2011, there were 89,807 acts known to forensic medicine, more than 25,000 more than in 2002 (when the number of intra-family acts was 64,619) (see Figure 10). These figures are probably underestimated, for intra-family violence is underreported everywhere in the world (WHO 2002). Women form the overwhelming majority of victims (about 80 per cent). 65 per cent of cases are from intimate partners, 18 per cent are from relatives, 15 per cent against children, and 2 per cent against the elderly (Carreño Samaniego 2011). In terms of intimate partner violence, permanent partners are the main perpetrators (43 per cent), followed by spouse (22 per cent). Victims are generally young (25-29 years old), have completed secondary education, and are housewives (opcit). Violence against children and the elderly have increased over the years. Men are most affected by this last form of intra-family violence (see Figure 11). Bogotá, D.C., Cundinamarca, and Antioquia are the departments were most intra-family violence acts are reported (Valle del Cauca is also important for elderly abuse).
Figure 10: Number of intra-family violence acts (2002-2011)

Figure 11: Intra-family violence acts by gender (2011, Colombia)

Source: Medicina Legal, 2011
Note: The bars for elderly abuse are nearly at the same level, with the male bar (804 acts in 2011) a bit higher than the female one (764 acts).

Sexual violence is also on the rise in Colombia. About 49 acts per 100,000 inhabitants were reported to forensic medicine in 2011 (there were 35 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2002). 72 per cent were sexual abuse and 15 per cent were sexual assaults, the rest is undetermined. The ratio of men to women was 1:5 (Vergel 2011). Finally, as previously mentioned in Section 5.1.1, school violence is of serious concern in Colombia (see also De Zubiria Samper 2008; Hoyos et al. 2009).

In summary, even though homicide rates have decreased in Colombia over the past decade, violence in its multiple forms remains worrisome and is even on the rise in multiple instances. Different forms of violence affect different groups differently. Women are the main victims of intimate partner violence and sexual violence (both on the rise), and men are mainly victims of homicides (with decreasing trends). Child maltreatment and elderly abuse affect both genders relatively equally (with both forms having ascending trends). It is important to keep in mind the differences in trends at the time of analysing policy responses, so as to question levels of priority among forms of violence and to assess their gender-sensitiveness (see Section 5.3).

5.2 Explaining high rates of violence in LAC and in Colombia
Violence is a very complex phenomenon everywhere in the world, as I have explained in Sections 2.1 to 2.5 in Chapter 2. In LAC, the complexity is intrinsically linked to development challenges at the regional level. Following the ecological model, this holistic analysis makes it possible to have a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon in a particular context. It also highlights the numerous difficulties at stake at the time of designing responses to violence. Here, I briefly present the main risk factors at the regional level, and focus on a more detailed analysis of the Colombian situation. Based on this analysis, the following section will discuss policy responses (see Section 5.3).

5.2.1 Risk factors for violence in LAC

Multiple risk factors contribute to explaining high violence rates in LAC. At the regional level, i.e. in aggregate terms, it is only possible to present societal factors within the ecological model. Scholars studying violence in LAC and seeking to understand what made it the most violent region in the world (along with Southern Africa) underscore a series of factors. I list them here and provide specific regional data and references in Table 13. The risk factors most commonly cited in the specialist literature include: a high rate of exclusion and inequality; high prevalence of corruption and weak institutions; the presence of drug trafficking in the continent; a large number of available firearms; widespread impunity; a history of conflict leading to a culture of violence and the acceptance of violence as a way to resolve conflict; high rates of domestic violence and child maltreatment; a dominant model of masculinity based on domination and patriarchy; a rapid urbanisation; the loss of traditional structures at times linked to the phenomenon of anomie; and popular medias conveying messages of violence.
# Table 13: Societal risk factors for violence in Latin America and the Caribbean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk factor</th>
<th>LAC-specific explanation / data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion and inequality</td>
<td>LAC’s Gini coefficient(^{58}) is about 0.5, very high compared to other regions in the world, and rates of youth unemployment are also very high in some countries (30 to 50 per cent of the unemployed in the Caribbean when youth represent 20-30 per cent of labour force, ECLAC 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and weak institutions</td>
<td>The majority of the countries in the region score below 4 on a 10 points scale (10 being no corruption) in the 2011 perception corruption index of Transparency International. According to UNODC, countries where homicide rates have increased over the past 15 years have weak institutions, whereas those that have achieved to strengthen their rule of law have shown a decrease in homicide rates (UNODC 2011: 10).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug trafficking</td>
<td>Latin American countries produce an estimated 900 tones of cocaine annually with a market worth USD 60 billion (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011:101). The cocaine business dominated by the Colombian cartels used to go from Colombia to the US by air. Now, the Mexican cartels use maritime roads, along Central America and the Caribbean. In addition, Mexico, Colombia and Guatemala now produce heroin and export to the US. The Caribbean are geographically located between the producers and consumers of drugs, with a number of small islands and kilometres of coasts that are difficult to control. In Brazilian favelas, drug trafficking has also a strong explanatory power, in particular in terms of recruitment of poor young people. Milicias (type of paramilitary groups formed by ex-policemen military or other security forces, including private security guards) have emerged in the favelas as a new source of violence, for they often ‘charge’ residents for protection, transport, etc. (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of firearms</td>
<td>About 74 per cent of homicides are perpetrated with a firearm, compared to 21 per cent in Europe (UNODC 2011:10). It is also estimated that 500,000 firearms are legally registered in Central America and 800,000 are unregistered (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011:106).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impunity</td>
<td>Above 95 per cent in some countries (Rotkers et al. 2002). In Venezuela, for instance, authors have estimated that seven per cent of violent reported deaths were solved, and only one per cent of perpetrators was sentenced (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011:112).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of conflict leading to a culture of violence</td>
<td>Many countries have suffered from civil wars, guerrillas, or authoritarian regimes in the XX(^{th}) century that have institutionalised the use of violence leading to a culture of violence and fear that remains until now. Authors have also argued that such past had led to an overall acceptance of violence as a way of resolving conflict. See for instance: Hein 2010; Briceño-León 1999, 2001, 2002; Rubio 2000; Rotkers 2002; UNODC and World Bank 2008; UNDP 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rates of intra-family violence</td>
<td>See Section 5.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A dominant model of masculinity based on domination</td>
<td>Anthropologists and sociologists have emphasised how a certain model of masculinity based on domination, competition, power and respect attracted male adolescents to join gangs. See for instance Rodgers 1999, 2006, 2007; Salazar 2002; Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2000; Rocha 1999; Rubio 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid urbanisation</td>
<td>79 per cent of the LAC population lives in urban areas and this proportion is increasing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation based on several authors as cited in the table.

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\(^{58}\) The Gini coefficient measures levels of income inequality in a country. 0 means perfect equality while 1 means perfect inequality. The Gini coefficient of the region has risen in the 1990s and reached 0.53 before declining in a majority of countries in the 2000s. It is now at 0.49 (Gasparini and Lustig, 2011).
5.2.2 Risk factors for violence in Colombia

Because violence is context-specific, I present the specificity of risk factors in the Colombian context following the four levels of the ecological model (see Section 2.3.2 in Chapter 2).

At the *macro or societal level*, general risk factors include exclusion and inequality levels (including poverty levels and youth unemployment), corruption, drug trafficking, firearms availability, widespread impunity, rapid urbanization, and a higher social tolerance towards violence, among others. ⁵⁹ Colombia is among the most unequal countries in LAC, and even the world. Colombia’s Gini indicator belongs to the ten highest in the world (0.572 in 1995; 0.594 in 2002; 0.578 in 2009) (World Bank 2011). This means that the richest 10 per cent earned 60 times more than the poorest 10 per cent of the population in the 2000s; the ratio was 40:1 in the 1990s (Rudqvist 2003:13). If poverty levels have decreased in Colombia, they remain high for an upper middle-income country. As the World Bank puts it, Colombia is ‘not a poor country, but it is a country with a lot of poor people’ (2011:75). The World Bank estimates that poverty has decreased from 60 per cent to 45.5 per cent from 1995 to 2009, mainly because of growth, when in other countries of the region poverty decreased through a combination of growth and redistribution policies (World Bank 2011). Among the 45 per cent of Colombians living in poverty, about 17 per cent suffer from extreme poverty. Unemployment is also very high, in particular for the youth and the poor (overall 12 per cent in 2009, 22 per cent for the youth and 35 per cent for the poor) and the informal sector represents 50 to 60 per cent of the labour force (World Bank 2011:5). There are significant challenges in terms of provision of social services and basic infrastructure for the poor, including access to safe water, nutrition, early childhood development and quality of education, and health services (opcit: 5).

Colombia suffers from structural corruption. In particular, in the 2012 Transparency International ranking on corruption perception index, Colombia had the worse score in ten years with 94 compared to 57 in 2002 (Gutiérrez 2013:1). At the time of my research, the

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⁵⁹ This review of risk factors/main explanations does not aim to be exhaustive. I cite here the main characteristics that together form a conveying context for high levels of violence and crime, as found in the literature. Nonetheless, there is an abundant body of research on the causes of violence and crime that exceeds what is summarised here. A complete review is beyond the scope of this chapter.
scandals of corruption that drew the highest attention included the investigation of two of the last four Presidents and 25 per cent of the Congress for political misconduct and abuse of power, and the suspension from office of the Mayor of Bogotá for irregularities in awarding contracts (Gutiérrez 2013:3). Linked to corruption are money laundering and the infiltration of drug traffickers and paramilitaries. Authors have even called the latest wave of crimes as ‘narco-paramilitaries’ (opcit).

Drug trafficking is the most cited explanation for high levels of violence in Colombia. For instance, Levitt and Rubio (2000) argue that drug trafficking and high impunity rates are mainly responsible for high homicide rates in Colombia. Colombia is one of the main producer and distributor of cocaine, and more recently, heroin. The drug trafficking generates violence because of its illegal nature: violence is the only way to impose power over and order within the market (Levitt and Rubio 2000). In the 1990s, a decline in homicide rates coincided with the dismantling of the Medellín and Cali drug cartels, two of the three cities that had the highest concentrated of homicide rates in the country (opcit: 23) (see Section 5.1.2).

There are also a high number of firearms circulating in Colombia. Currently more than 700,000 licensed firearms in the hands of Colombian, according to the Office for Firearm Control and Trade of the Ministry of Defence, and more than 40,000 firearms have been confiscated each year from 2002 to 2004, which suggests a very high number of illegal arms in circulation, even though estimations are difficult to establish in this respect (Aguirre et al. 2009).

In terms of impunity and the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice system, impunity rate is estimated at 80 per cent in Colombia (Erazo 2012:4). Nonetheless, prisons are already overcrowded by 40 per cent (opcit). Impunity regards crime differently. In particular, authors have estimated that the probability for a homicide to be sentenced is lower than three per cent; it is 20 per cent for the other types of crime (Rivera and Barreto, 2007). Regarding the efficiency of the justice system in general, the Colombian criminal justice system is the third slowest in LAC and the sixth slowest in the World (Erazo 2012:4). Colombia ranked 154 out of 185 in terms of judicial efficiency (as measured in
terms of ease to enforce contracts, following the World Bank Doing Business methodology, World Bank 2013:86). At the same time, studies suggest that 700 judges have been threatened and five have been killed because they attempted to investigate corruption cases of powerful persons (Gutiérrez 2013:7).

Colombia also faces challenges related to its high urbanisation. 75 per cent of Colombians live in the five largest cities (Bogotá, Cali, Medellin, Barranquilla and Cartagena), and the growth of urban centres has faced challenges regarding quality of services, in particular in terms of land management and low-income housing for the poor (World Bank 2011:8). The problem has worsened with a constant wave of displaced persons forced to flee their land because of armed groups (guerrillas, paramilitaries, and others), who arrive in cities without economic and social opportunities. In 2010, 3.5 millions of persons were displaced because of the armed conflict (NDP 2010-14:443). Bogotá, Medellin, Santa Marta, Sincelejo and Cali are the main receptor cities (opcit: 444). 60

Finally, as previously mentioned, authors like Taussig or Pécaut have highlighted a higher social tolerance towards violence leading to a ‘banalisation’ of violence (Pécaut 1999), or a ‘culture of violence and terror’ (Taussig 2004). This led to distrust not only towards public institutions, but also among neighbours, and weakened social capital.

At the community and relationship levels, youth gangs (pandillas) are often cited as a source of violence and insecurity. In a participatory study in nine communities in Colombia, for example, pandillas were identified as the most important violence-related problem in five of them (Moser and McIlwaine 2001, 2004). Rodgers (2003) estimates that there are about 400 youth gangs in the country. Those are often called parches in Colombia, and are very different among themselves in terms of structure, age and activities

60 There is also a blurred distinction between rural and urban violence, since Bacrim for example have their base in rural areas and often commit violent acts and crime in urban settings. There is also the use of sicarios (professional killers) in urban settings, at times commanded by guerrillas or other criminal groups (DNP 2001).

61 Parches is a general term that refers to groups of people. Groups of friends not necessarily violent can refer to themselves as parches. The term is commonly used for youth gangs in Colombia.
(Rodgers 2003:117). In particular, there is a significant difference between bandas,\textsuperscript{62} that are organised criminal groups, whose main motive is economic, and parches, which are small groups of young males (under 25 and most under 20 years of age) that gather and share a common identity around a territory (at times very small: one or two blocks in a neighbourhood). Their delinquent activities are often spontaneous, and again characterised by diversity (from street mugging to armed robberies) (Rodgers 2003:118). Parches or pandillas’ group identity is not only linked to the protection of a territory, but also to a model of masculinity similar to the hegemonic masculinity described by Carrigan (1985), which in turn refers to a male chauvinist culture (machismo) at the societal level. This masculinity is based on the use of violence, risk taking, and a very active sexuality (tendency of considering females as sexual objects) (Rodgers 2003; Rubio 2007; Perea Restrepo 2007), and very much linked to patriarchy (Bourdieu 1998) (see Section 2.5 in Chapter 2). Here, we see how societal and community risk factors are interrelated.

Finally, at the individual level, life histories of pandilleros or parcheros suggest that consumption of alcohol and drugs, difficult histories within the family (in particular intra-family violence), hyper and early sexuality, and dropping out of school are important factors that characterise young people who join gangs. All these characteristics were reported in the case of Colombia (Rubio 2007; Rodgers 2003; Moser and McIlwaine 2001, 2004; Duque et al. 2008; Salazar 1999; Perea Restrepo 2007; among others). Statistics in terms of child maltreatment and school violence suggest high levels of conflict. In addition, restricted access to public services, in particular health and early childhood development, as well the high food costs suggest that poor people face enormous challenges to ensure children’s healthy development (World Bank 2011).

5.3 Examining policy responses: main characteristics and challenges of violence-related policies in LAC with a special analysis of Colombia’s latest policy framework

The scope and trends of different forms of violence and the numerous risk factors show the amplitude of the challenge that policymakers and their partners face to develop responses to violence. Despite increasing consensus on the need for multi-sector approaches, criminal

\textsuperscript{62} Banda in Spanish is translated as band, group, or criminal group in English.
justice-centred strategies still prevail in LAC. The case of Colombia, through its latest policy framework, illustrates the difficulties at stake even in one of the most favourable contexts for multi-sector, gender-sensitive strategies to happen.

5.3.1 Violence-related policies in LAC: a persistent tendency to rely on criminal justice-centred strategies

A few cities in the region have adopted multi-sector strategies and achieved extraordinary results in terms of violence reduction, but they remain the exception rather than the rule. Bogotá and Cali in Colombia are probably the most famous examples, for the municipalities succeeded in halving homicide rates in less than a decade (1994-2000) (Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 1997; Mockus 2001). Diadema, in Brazil, is another well-known experience, with a reduction of 44 per cent in homicide rates (Duailibi et al. 2007). At the community level, the prevention programme Fica Vivo in Belo Horizonte, also in Brazil, led to a reduction of 68 per cent in homicides (Silveira et al. 2010). They have all combined multi-sector strategies, with a strong emphasis on preventing risk factors. Nonetheless, those examples still need to be better understood to serve as benchmarks. In fact, even though these experiences have inspired other strategies in the region (with the support of international development agencies), those have failed to be implemented (OVE 2013).

In many countries of the region, policymaking still gives priority to punitive criminal-justice-centred approaches that are often disconnected or untargeted to the actual profile of violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2006; Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011:125). In Mexico, for instance, researchers point out how the country lacks an integrated vision that includes violence prevention (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011:104). Among others, Azaola (2008) shows how Mexico has systematically increased penalties and sentences, but has failed to simultaneously reduce impunity rate.\(^{63}\) Azaola calls it ‘penal populism’, and contrasts it with the estimation that only seven per cent of the inmate population serve sentences for violent crime, the large majority being incarcerated for pre-trial during investigation, or for minor, non-violent offences. This situation is not specific to Mexico and has been observed

\[^{63}\] As Beccaria (1738-1794) has once argued, in his *Des délits et des peines*, that is not the cruelty of punishment, but its certainty that is dissuasive (see Vautrelle 2009:61).
in most countries in the region (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011). In the Caribbean, Harriott (2002) shows how policymaking is biased towards the criminal justice approach, with little space for approaches that have a more direct social and situational preventive focus. In Central America, iron-fist (mano dura) policies in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala have been contrasted to more social prevention strategies in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, with the former leading to an escalation of violence (UNDP 2013).

Analysing LAC’s policy responses to violence, researchers usually call attention to the fact that iron-fist policies are expensive, ineffective, counterproductive, and biased towards males (Thale 2006; Aguilar 2007; Basombrío and Dammert 2013). In many countries, citizens do not trust the police because of their brutal past, but also because of the widespread corruption and lack of professionalism (Hinton 2006; Newburn and Hinton 2009). Many strategies of repression have also led to an escalation of violence, with a series of human rights violations (Arriagada and Godoy 2000). More generally, such policies fail to address many root causes of violence, and only focus on the symptoms through heavy-handed crackdowns on youth gangs (Aguilar 2007; Basombrío and Dammert 2013) and by filling up prisons with individuals in pre-trial or petty crime offenders. This in turn results in high prison over-population and the incapacity of most penitentiary systems to focus on inmates’ rehabilitation (UNDP 2013). Repressive mano dura policies also suggest how violence is considered a men’s issue for targeting young males, ignoring other forms of violence such as domestic violence, and leaving unquestioned dominant gender identities (Hume 2009; Whitzman 2008). Given these shortcomings, why are such control-focused strategies still the norm in LAC despite a widespread call from researchers and experts for multi-sector, gender-sensitive strategies to prevent violence?  

64 Many countries in LAC face serious issues related to prison over-population. As the UNDP recalls, prison density higher than 120 per cent is considered a serious problem. Over population can reached enormous levels, such as in El Salvador with 298 inmates per 100 places (UNDP 2013: 124).

65 Imbush, Misse, and Carrión summarise: ‘Even though there is widespread agreement about the need for preventive measures to deal with violence, and even though integrative programmes are generally given preference […], strategies of social control have been employed with greater frequency […], [and] strategies of repression by the police and the military have invariably been used when the task was to combat violence or crime directly and to arrest criminals or perpetrators of violence.’ (Imbusch, Misse, and Carrión 2011:125)
5.3.2 Analysis of the latest policy framework for violence prevention in Colombia

For all the characteristics described in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.3.1 on selection criteria for the country case study), Colombia is arguably a favourable context for multi-sector, gender-sensitive policies to be developed. Examining the evolution of political understandings of violence in Colombia and its latest policy framework helps to illustrate the complexity at stake when developing violence prevention policies even in propitious contexts.

Evolution of Colombian Governments’ understandings of violence

For the past fifteen years, Colombian Governments have acknowledged violence as a constraint to development. However, violence was principally understood in reference to the internal conflict. More recently, public authorities have recognised that violence was also due to unequal development. This is the case in the current National Development Plan 2010-2014.

In previous administrations, Governments focused on re-establishing peace and recovering State control over those parts of the country occupied or ruled by guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug cartels. In the early 1990s, the Medellin and Cali drug cartels were dismantled with US support and a hard line anti-drug policy. Drug trafficking was not eradicated though. On the contrary, the end of the monopoly of drug cartels led to a multiplicity of actors involved in the drug trafficking business. They include guerrillas groups (narcoguerrillas), paramilitaries and Bacrim (Bandas Criminales), as well as individual delinquents and youth gangs ( parches or pandillas) (see Section 5.1). Some authors even argue that the dismantling of the drug cartels had the unintended consequence of strengthening the guerrillas, in particular the FARC (Peceny and Durnan 2006:101-105). The Medellin cartel was indeed one of the main opponent of the FARC, so by dismantling it, the guerrilla movement expanded and got more control on the drug trafficking by raising taxes. The Cali Cartel opted for paying those taxes instead of fighting the FARC. Its dismantling under the Samper Administration (1994-1998) led to a fragmented and small-scale drug industry that eased FARC taxation on drug revenues (opcit:104-106). At the end of the 1990s, the Pastrana Administration (1998-2002) concentrated efforts on negotiating peace with the guerrillas, before finally dropping the unsuccessful negotiations. When
Álvaro Uribe became president in 2002, the FARC and ELN had expanded their control over the national territory. To respond to the situation, President Uribe (2002-2006) developed the concept of *democratic security* upon entering into office. Uribe’s *democratic security* aimed to restore internal security not only by increasing military capacity, but also by strengthening the political system, the criminal justice system and the rule of law (Mason 2003). The diagnosis was that part of the country was lawless (under guerrillas and paramilitaries control), and the State needed to restore its presence while respecting human rights and civil liberties (opcit). With unprecedented US support, the policy was aggressively implemented through a ‘massive military presence, the re-staffing of police posts, roadblocks, curfews, restrictions on movement, house-to-house searches, and detention powers’ (Mason 2003:397). Throughout the eight years of the Uribe Administration (2002-2006 and 2006-2010), the strategy achieved the weakening of FARC and the ELN, and resulted in the demobilisation of part of the paramilitaries. Violence in both rural and urban areas decreased in terms of homicides, kidnappings and extortions. In particular, national homicide rates nearly halved during the period (from about 60 hpti to about 34-36). Yet, the strategy was also criticised for not implementing the democratic component, for enhancing vigilante groups and other private security forces, and for violating human rights (opcit).

*The 2010-2014 National Development Plan and violence prevention*

Building upon an improved situation in terms of violence and crime, but also in economic terms, President Santos (who was President Uribe’s previous Minister of Defence) geared his Administration’s strategy towards reducing inequalities and ensuring ‘prosperity for all’. The 2010-2014 National Development Plan (*Plan Nacional de Desarrollo*, PND for its acronym in Spanish) provides the roadmap for the Government to achieve this goal through three main pillars: sustainable growth, equal opportunities, and peace consolidation. The PND gives a special importance to the issue of citizen security and adopts a multi-sector approach to violence prevention. President Santos also nominated a High Presidential Counsellor on Coexistence and Citizen Security, showing the importance given to the issue. The PND’s approach to violence prevention still focuses on consolidating peace (i.e. in relation to the internal conflict that was officially recognised as such by President Santos), but now gives more importance to urban violence prevention, or citizen security (see Box 3
The plan also explicitly acknowledges the multiplicity of forms and causes of violence, and expressively links poverty and inequality reduction to violence prevention.

**Box 3: Colombia’s definitions of coexistence and citizen security**

The Colombian Government uses the expression ‘coexistence and citizen security’ to refer to violence prevention. It defines citizen security as ‘the universal protection of citizens from those crime and offences that affect their dignity, personal safety and property, and from fear of insecurity.’ Coexistence is defined as ‘the promotion of citizens’ attachment and support to a civic culture based on the respect of the law, others, and basic behavioural and social coexistence norms’.

**Source:** Own translation, PND 2011:1-2.

The 2010-2014 National Development Plan adopts a multi-sector approach to violence prevention. It acknowledges the *shared responsibility* for the issue among ministries, levels of government and stakeholders. In particular, it seeks to enhance the participation of civil society and the private sector. Two chapters within the PND are directly relevant to violence prevention: Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 deals with Equality of Opportunities for Social Prosperity (*Igualdad de oportunidades para la prosperidad social*), and includes an integral development and social protection policy for early childhood, childhood, adolescence and youth, and culture, among others; policies for displaced population as a result of violence; as well as differentiated policies for ethnic groups, gender, and disability. Chapter 5 aims to consolidate peace (*Consolidación de la paz*) with a focus on security both as public order and as citizen security and coexistence. The PDN does not explicitly consider violence prevention as a transversal issue, like it does with gender, ethnicity, disability, poverty reduction, human rights, anti-corruption, or youth development. Nonetheless, the PND opens the doors for a *mainstreaming approach* (at least an integrationist one) within key sectors (Early Childhood Development, Education, Health, Culture, Sports and Recreation, Urban Development), in particular through targeting vulnerable or at-risk population. Appendices D.4 and D.5 complement Table 14 and presents PND’s strategic guidelines and programmes that either directly refers to violence prevention or supports the National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy.

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66 In Spanish: ‘Se entiende por seguridad ciudadana la protección universal a los ciudadanos frente a aquellos delitos y contravenciones que afecten su dignidad, su seguridad personal y la de sus bienes, y frente al temor a la inseguridad. La convivencia, por su parte, comprende la promoción del apego y la adhesión de los ciudadanos a una cultura ciudadana basada en el respeto a la ley, a los demás y a unas normas básicas de comportamiento y de convivencia social’ (PND 2011: 1-2).

67 See Appendix D.2 for the demography, geography and territorial administration in Colombia and Appendix D.3 for the composition of the Colombian Government in 2011.
### Table 14: Colombian PND strategic axes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic axis</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Implementation measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First axis: social and situational prevention</strong></td>
<td>To promote sexual and reproductive rights; prevent early pregnancies; promote responsible paternity; develop programmes for parenting training to prevent intra-family violence and sexual abuse; promote peaceful conflict resolution, including for parents and teachers; reduce school desertion, and more generally, strengthen the link between children and youth and the school system; among others.</td>
<td>To be implemented in collaboration with other line ministries and in support or complement to other governmental programmes, as outlined in PND’s Chapter 4. However, the policy is not explicit on how the coordination will take place beyond the dialogue and negotiation among levels of government. To integrate violence prevention criteria within urban development plans and housing programmes (which is what most resembles to a mainstreaming approach). (DNP 2011: 15-17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second axis: police presence and control</strong></td>
<td>To develop community policing and strengthen the National Plan for Community Vigilance through Cuadrantes (Plan Nacional de Vigilancia Comunitaria por Cuadrantes).</td>
<td>To be implemented within the framework of Safe Departments and Municipalities Programme (Programa Departamentos y Municipios Seguros), launched in 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third axis: justice, victims and rehabilitation</strong></td>
<td>To improve the criminal justice system for adults and adolescents, in particular through better investigation and alternative resolution modalities, rehabilitation of adolescents in conflict with the law (construction of new centres, separation of youth by type of crimes committed, and educational programmes), and assistance of victims, following the example of Bogotá and Buracamanga’s centres for attention to victims (Centro de Atención a Víctimas) that provide integrated support to victims (psychological, medical and legal).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fourth axis: legality and coexistence culture</strong></td>
<td>To promote respectful behaviours among citizens, citizens’ respect towards the law, and respect of life in general. It includes the adoption of a new Coexistence Code.</td>
<td>A transversal effort to strengthen information systems (in particular violence observatories and consolidation of different sources of data) and develop studies related to public policy in violence prevention, complements the five axes. As do relevant normative developments, such as the new 1452 Law on Citizen Security, the new Code of Civic Coexistence, or the reform of the Penitentiary Code (DNP 2011: 29).68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fifth axis: active and responsible citizenship</strong></td>
<td>To promote community participation and civil society involvement in violence prevention, crime reporting, information sharing and solidarity, through the strengthening of Local Security Fronts (Frentes de Seguridad Local), and Coexistence and Citizen Security Schools (Escuelas de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana). It also includes working with the medias to promote peaceful coexistence and legality culture, among others (DNP 2011: 25-26).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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68 I could not retrieve information regarding budgeting, which is a key parameter to assess the feasibility of the policy and its implementation at the local level.

In 2011, the Colombian Congress approved the Citizen Security and Coexistence Law (Law 1452), which provides the legal framework for the National Policy for Coexistence and Citizen Security (DNP 2011). This policy is the result of several months-long negotiations with multiple stakeholders at the local and national levels, led by the High Presidential Counsellor for Citizen Security and Coexistence, and the National Planning Department (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, DNP for its Spanish acronym). The Director of the Justice, Security and Government Direction at the DNP (DNP-DJS) interviewed for this thesis explained that the leadership of the High Counsellor was decisive to give legitimacy to the participatory process, which was in turn considered essential to the success of the new policy. The Government’s intention was to develop a policy that would go beyond the traditional criminal justice system, and respond to the multi-causality of violence; thus, the need to dialogue and engage with multiple line ministries, local governments, and experts (Interview DNP, Bogotá, June 2011). The Foundation Ideas para la Paz, a think tank specialised on violence prevention and citizen security, accompanied the DNP in the process, with the IADB’s support.

Main features of the 2011 Colombian policy to prevent violence

The policy clearly reflects the above-mentioned intention as it adopts a multi-sector approach to prevent violence. It builds on five principles, four of which deal with coordination, and ten criteria for the policy’s implementation (see Box 4).

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69 The Direction for Justice, Security and Government at the DNP is in charge of guiding and promoting the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, plans and programmes in the sectors of Justice, Defence and National Security (following the National Development Plan’s Chapter 5: Peace Consolidation).

Box 4: Colombian 2011 National Policy for Citizen Security and Coexistence: Guiding principles and criteria for implementation

Colombia’s most recent policy to prevent violence builds on five principles, four of which deal with coordination: co-responsibility (with local governments that are those primarily in charge of ensuring citizen security in territories); coordination nation/territory; territorial autonomy; articulation of programmes and projects within the State; and safeguards of liberties and individual rights.

The policy also states ten criteria that should gear the implementation of the policy: (i) long-term vision; (ii) focused integration; (iii) determining factors (known risk factors); (iv) territorial specificity (context-based); (v) at risk population (secondary and tertiary prevention); (vi) adolescents and youth as priority (12-26 years old); (vii) prioritisation of crime (based on impact, interrelation with other crime and incidence on security perception); (viii) lessons learnt from successful experiences (evidence-based interventions or promising interventions); (ix) adequate incentives (opportune, relevant and strategic for enhancing protective factors or reducing risk factors); and (x) monitoring and evaluation.


The policy translates the five priority axes for action put forth in the PND (see Table 14 and Appendix D.4) and provides a general framework. The detailed strategies need to be negotiated and adapted at the local level depending on the context and the coalition of actors. As such, the policy only presents what the National Government is willing to support. The policy prioritises twenty municipalities that experience the highest concentration and proportion of violent crime in Colombia, as measured in terms of homicides, robberies and personal injuries. These forms of violence were selected for their high impact, interrelation with other crimes and incidence on perception of security (DNP 2011:11). Through this prioritisation, the National Government aims to facilitate the implementation by providing technical assistance and other support for the development of local diagnostics and plans (following the three principles of decentralisation), thereafter ensuring a greater impact on the national average in terms of violence and crime reduction (Interview DNP-DJSG, Bogotá, June 2011). The implementation begins with a local diagnosis to identify the territorial specificities in terms of violence and crime. Then, the municipality together with the DNP proceeds with a prioritisation exercise to select activities and programmes, priority areas, beneficiaries and indicators.

Limitations to the current treatment of violence prevention from a multi-sector, gender-sensitive perspective

Despite its multi-sector approach, the policy does not explicitly aim to mainstream violence prevention, in the sense of systematically including violence prevention lenses to
governmental policies and programmes. It adopts a practical approach that tries to encompass multiple risk factors for violence through a multi-sector focus. This could be seen as a preliminary stage to mainstreaming violence prevention, at least in the design of the policy and from an integrationist perspective (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3).

In terms of implementation, the policy shows limitations in terms of coordination and prioritisation. With regard to coordination, the policy mentions, but does not elaborate on, the coordination with other national entities that would help develop social and situational programmes. In particular, no mention is made on how sectors are supposed to collaborate, or which coordination mechanisms need to be in place at the local level. This is particularly important for small municipalities where services would mainly depend on departments or the direct provision from the State. A clear collaboration or coordination mechanism by type of municipalities would have given greater credibility to the multi-sector approach to violence prevention, beyond a series of juxtaposed options.

In terms of prioritisation, focusing on twenty municipalities might indeed facilitate the implementation and logically impact the most the national average, but also leave out those municipalities that probably need it the most. Colombia has in fact 1098 municipalities of different sizes, capacity and resources. The DNP explained that the targeted twenty municipalities might serve as examples for the others (Interview DNP, Bogotá, June 2011). However, if the others do not have capacity, knowledge, tools, or means to develop their own diagnostic and strategy, this will arguably not happen. The policy is also loose on the rationale for each axis and how they respond to specific risk factors.71 This is reflected in the choice of indicators. The DNP explained that they would be negotiated at the local level.

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71 Some bilaterals and multilaterals have been concerned with the theory of change. The policy would have been stronger by developing the rationale and theory of change at the macro level, and requiring this theory for change to be explicit in local plans. The Centre for Theory of Change (which is an NGO dedicated to promoting a sound use of theory of change) provides the following definition: ‘A theory of change defines all building blocks required to bring about a given long-term goal. This set of connected building blocks—interchangeably referred to as outcomes, results, accomplishments, or preconditions is depicted on a map known as a pathway of change/change framework, which is a graphic representation of the change process. Built around the pathway of change, a Theory of Change describes the types of interventions (a single programme or a comprehensive community initiative) that bring about the outcomes depicted in the pathway of a change map. Each outcome in the pathway of change is tied to an intervention, revealing the often complex web of activity that is required to bring about change.’ (http://www.theoryofchange.org/what-is-theory-of-change/#1)
depending on the diagnostic and the agreed priorities. They would nonetheless systematically include the main indicators included in the policy (homicides, robberies and personal injuries). It is noteworthy that widespread and increasing forms of violence, such as domestic and sexual violence (see Section 5.1.2), are not prioritised in the policy, and the link between forms of violence is not clearly recognised (i.e. gendered continuum of violence, Chapter 2). When asked why, the Director of Justice, Security and Government at the DNP explained that they had to focus on those crime and forms of violence that had the greatest social impact, and be humble about what could be achieved in a four-year period:

‘We need to be realistic about what could be done. Indicators should reflect this. If we can reduce a bit the homicide rates, we would be very happy.’ (Interview DNP-DJSG, Bogotá, June 2011)

The difficulty of implementation in a decentralised context and the pressure to show results at the national level in a short period of time explain why, according to the DNP, no indicators on intra-family violence or sexual violence were included. The DNP further mentioned issues related to the availability of indicators. For instance, the ICBF in charge of child maltreatment prevention does not have a proper information system that would allow monitoring and evaluating progress on this particular form of violence. Nonetheless, the National Institute for Forensic Medicine does report statistics on those forms of violence in a disaggregated manner at the municipality level and on a yearly basis. The same is true for other forms of intra-family violence and sexual violence. In fact, the Ministry of Social Protection does monitor the evolution of gender-based violence, for it is responsible to implement the 1257 Law on domestic and sexual violence. So, while the National Development Plan acknowledges the need to deal with intra-family and sexual violence within the citizen security framework (PND 2010-2014:503), those forms of violence were not given priority in the national policy, as assessed through the selection of indicators. This reminds us how negotiations and participation take time, while public administrations are pressured to show quick results. But it also suggests that different forms of violence are still dealt with separately (even though they reinforce each other and happen along a gendered continuum), and that a gender-biased hierarchy among forms of violence does exist, as feminist scholars have long pointed out (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2).
5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the context in which MDBs operate in terms of scope and challenges surrounding the multi-dimensionality, multi-causality and context-specificity of violence, as well as in terms of country-specific challenges for designing and implementing multi-sector, gender-sensitive violence prevention policies. As the case of Colombia illustrates, even in contexts where those general challenges are lesser than in other countries of the region in particular in terms of understanding the phenomenon of violence through development and transversal lenses and the availability of high capacity and expertise, challenges remain evident. In particular, questions related to implementation mechanisms such as coordination, prioritisation and choice of indicators appear to be weak links in the development of the 2011 National Policy on Citizen Security and Coexistence. I will further explore those questions when discussing opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention both within MDBs (Chapters 7 and 8) and at the country level (Chapter 9). In the next chapter, Chapter 6, I retrace the emergence and evolution of violence prevention at the IADB and the World Bank.
Chapter 6: Tracing the History of Violence Prevention at the IADB and the World Bank (1998-2011)

Chapter 6 retraces the emergence and evolution of violence prevention at the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank over the period 1998-2011. Before going further, I must first clarify the terminology that will be used in this chapter. The IADB and the World Bank use different terms to refer to violence prevention. Even in each bank, the vocabulary changes relatively often. This is more so at the IADB than at the World Bank. At the IADB, the following terms coexist and seem to be interchangeable: violence and crime reduction, violence prevention, citizen security, public safety, citizen or civic coexistence. At the World Bank, the term most frequently used until recently was violence and crime prevention. The World Bank now increasingly refers to citizen security. I use citizen security for the IADB, and violence and crime prevention for the World Bank, for these are the terms most frequently employed by each respective MDB.

The IADB was the first international financial institution to approve stand-alone loans with the explicit and principal objective to prevent violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. The loans were approved in 1998 for two countries: Colombia and Uruguay. Since then, the IADB has remained the MDB with the largest violence prevention-related portfolio in the region. The World Bank has followed a different path. While the IADB was preparing and approving the first citizen security projects and opted for a ‘learning by doing’ approach, the World Bank was publishing studies that would slowly open the door to include violence prevention in its mandate. The World Bank’s Latin America and the Caribbean Region then took the lead and started to include violence prevention components within Urban Development projects. Recently, the World Bank has developed policy dialogue on the issue with some of its clients and has approved budget support with components to prevent violence. The recent World Development Reports (WDRs) on Conflict and Security (2011) and on Gender (2012) also mark a shift in the World Bank’s

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72 A stand-alone loan consists in a self-contained operation with its own objectives, components and indicators, as opposed to a mainstreaming process or safeguards (for example gender, environmental sustainability or indigenous rights) that are supposed to be included in most projects to improve the quality and sustainability of the operation, independently of its main objective.

73 *WDR 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* and *WDR 2012: Gender Equality and Development.*
position towards violence, at least in terms of institutional acknowledgement of the importance of the issue for development.

How did the IADB and the World Bank get involved in violence prevention? How has the issue evolved within both banks over the years? And, what has been their contribution in terms of operational work during the fourteen-year period under review? This chapter answers these questions by presenting the findings from a process tracing undertaking that combines a stock taking exercise of projects and other major initiatives approved by both banks and interviews with MDBs’ staff members and key informants. The stock taking exercise focuses on projects explicitly targeting violence prevention. As such, for the IADB, it concentrates on the area of citizen security and does not include the work done by the organisation in other sectors such as Education, Social Protection, Justice, Urban Development, or Gender (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2). However, for the World Bank, it includes Urban Development, as this was the approach explicitly chosen by the latter organisation. The stock taking exercise ends in 2011, the year when interviews were conducted.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 presents, in a comparative fashion, the stock taking findings for the IADB and the World Bank’s involvement in respectively citizen security, and violence and crime prevention. Section 6.2 retraces the institutional evolution of the IADB with regards to citizen security. Section 6.3 does the same for violence and crime prevention at the World Bank. Section 6.4 concludes.

6.1 The IADB and World Bank’s operational portfolios in violence prevention (1998-2011)

The operational portfolios for the IADB and the World Bank include specific investment loans and/or budgetary support loans (see Tables 15 and 16). The IADB has chosen to finance citizen security projects relatively early in comparison with the World Bank. Even

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74 The operational portfolio includes also technical assistance/technical cooperation operations (TAs or TCs). TCs are usually grants that can take the form of studies, consultancies, evaluations, or workshops/events. Due to issues in information availability in both banks, I could retrieve only a partial list of TCs/TAs. Moreover, staff members could not verify this list. As a result, I present here only the lending portfolio.
before the first stand-alone citizen security projects were approved in 1998, the regional bank approved a project to reform the justice system in El Salvador that included a component on citizen security (OVE 2014). Nonetheless, over a period of fourteen years, the regional bank has approved only sixteen projects, with six of them during the last two to three years. The World Bank decided to proceed differently. It opted first to finance studies and capacity building, and then incorporated the issue in a handful of Urban Development projects. In the past two years, it has developed policy dialogue and included violence prevention within Development Policy Loans (DPLs).76

75 As early as 1994-96, the IADB began working on violence prevention through a series of regional conferences and studies on gender-based violence prevention. The Justice Reform project for El Salvador was also approved in 1996 (OVE 2014).

76 In addition to these projects, the World Bank has financed a Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL) on Peace and Development in Colombia. This is a unique experience because of the context of Colombia. The first LIL was approved in 2000 and has had three tranches of funding so far. It was showcased internationally as a successful experience on how to develop social and economic activities in zones affected by conflict. Colombia’s Peace project is, however, a single experience in Latin America. It targets rural areas, but the World Bank has been discussing ways to adapt it to urban contexts. However, to date, these considerations have not materialised.
Table 15: List of IADB’s approved projects in citizen security (1998-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Title (a)</th>
<th>Amount (USD million)</th>
<th>Approval date</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Support for Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Closed 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Program for Citizen Safety: Crime and Violence Prevention</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Closed 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Citizen Security and Justice Program</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Closed 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Project to Support the Social Peace Program</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Cancelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Peace and Citizen Coexistence Project for the Municipalities of the Sula Valley</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Program Safer Chile</td>
<td>10*</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Closed 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Citizen Security Program</td>
<td>7.2**</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Closed 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Violence Prevention Program</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Reformulated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Citizen Security Program</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Integral Security Program</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. and T.</td>
<td>Citizen Security Program</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Community Action for Public Safety</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Violence Prevention and Social Inclusion Promotion Program</td>
<td>132.4</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Citizen Security and Justice Program II</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Citizen Security and Inclusion Program</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Citizen Security Program for Social Cohesion</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16 loans: 9 active, 5 closed, 1 cancelled, 1 reformulated (as of 2011)</strong></td>
<td><strong>439.01</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 16: List of World Bank’s approved projects specifically aiming to prevent violence (1998-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Amount (USD million)</th>
<th>Approval date</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Bahia Poor Urban Areas Integrated Development-Viver Melhor II</td>
<td>19.45 [Total 49.3]</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Barrio Ciudad Project</td>
<td>1 [Total 15]</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project</td>
<td>3.9 [Total 29.3]</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 loans with components specifically targeting violence prevention</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.34</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In terms of country targeting, the IADB’s projects span many countries, with 81 per cent of projects almost equally distributed between Central America (43.5 per cent) and South
America (37.5 per cent), and with the remaining 19 per cent in the Caribbean (as of 2011) (see Figure 12). Only Jamaica has had two projects approved in citizen security over the past fourteen years. Since the World Bank has financed only five projects that in some way address violence prevention, the distribution is marginally less representative, but still similar to the IADB’s distribution: 40 per cent for Central America (Honduras), 40 per cent for South America (Brazil), and 20 per cent for the Caribbean (Jamaica only) (see Figure 13).

What is common between both banks is that they have only recently developed an agenda on citizen security/violence and crime prevention. Six projects out of sixteen financed by the IADB (38 per cent) for the fourteen-year period have been approved in the last three years (2008-2011) of the period under review (see Figures 14 and 15). These six operations account for nearly 50 per cent of the total financial investment. This is due to the large Costa Rica project (which accounts for 30 per cent of the citizen security loans during the period). Costa Rica is still an exception but is symptomatic of a will to increase IADB’s lending in citizen security.77 The majority of the projects are nevertheless situated between USD 10 and 25 million. A year later, in 2012, another project was approved in Honduras (USD 63.8 million), and four others were in preparation (El Salvador: Support for Citizen Security Strategy (USD 36 million); Jamaica: Second Expansion of the Citizen Security and Justice Program II (USD 11.5 million); Brazil: Prevention of Youth Violence in Rio Grande State (USD 61 million); Brazil: Social Inclusion and Opportunities for Youth in Rio de Janeiro (USD 100 million)).

77 IADB specialists in charge of designing the Costa Rica project explained that the amount was even larger during negotiations and corresponded to what the Government asked. There were no limits from the IADB’s side. On the contrary, the approved amount USD 132 million is in line with a general trend to approve larger loans since the realignment.
Figure 12: Approved amount (in USD million) in citizen security at the IADB, by country

Note: Countries are presented in chronological order, Colombia being the first project to be approved and Ecuador the last one. Source: Project Loan Documents, available at the IADB operational website: www.iadb.org, accessed August 2011.

Figure 13: Approved amount (in USD million) in violence prevention at the World Bank, by country


Figure 14: Number of IADB’s projects in citizen security (yearly approvals), 1998-2011


Figure 15: Number of WB projects financing violence prevention components (yearly approval 1998-2011)

The IADB projects adopt a multi-sector approach. They usually combine two to four of the following components: (i) Institutional strengthening of local and national institutions in charge of citizen security, including improving support to strategy making/evidence-based public policies, capacity building, information systems and crime observatories; (ii) Community policing, mainly through capacity building/training and equipment; (iii) Community services, including community mobilisation, social services (domestic violence prevention/attention, youth-at-risk services, educational, vocational and recreational activities, youth employment) and situational prevention; (iv) Justice, mainly strengthening of criminal justice system; (v) Rehabilitation/reinsertion of young offenders; and (vi) Communication and social awareness, mainly through campaigns.  

Appendix C presents IADB’s citizen security projects with their respective objectives and components. The Unit of the Modernization of the State (whose name and acronym since 2007 is the Institutional Capacity of the State, ICF/ICS) prepared all projects with the participation of specialists from Social Development, Health, Social Protection, and/or Education Units. Chile is an exception since the Social Development Unit prepared the proposal.

At the World Bank, the first three loans that included components on violence and crime prevention were Urban Development projects. The approach was to incorporate measures to target the most vulnerable population, to provide them with basic services in terms of infrastructure, to improve their immediate environment following Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles, and to develop social services to address risk factors, such as youth idleness, lack of support for domestic violence, lack of training or opportunities. The approach was deliberately ‘humble’ (as the World Bank presents it itself), and focused on neighbourhood-level initiatives (barrios). The objective was to develop ‘synergies’ (mainly at the municipal level) through comprehensive

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78 Compilation based on loan documents of all citizen security projects.

79 In its 2010 evaluation of Citizen Security projects, OVE, the IADB’s independent Office for Oversight and Evaluation classified the components in four categories: (i) institutional capacity; (ii) educational; (iii) community participation; (iv) situational prevention (OVE 2010:11-13).

80 This is due to the organisation of the IADB until 2007, which was divided into regions. As explained later in the chapter, citizen security was led by the ICF/ICS team in two out of three regions and by the Social Development team in the third region.
interventions that would focus on prevention (both situational and social) and would complement efforts by the police (but without being part of the latter), and involve partnerships with other levels of government, civil society organisations and the private sector. The interventions include diagnoses (mapping, victimisation surveys, willingness to pay for safety, community-based and situational diagnoses), situational prevention (mainly through CPTED methodology and urban renewal), capacity building and technical assistance (all stakeholders), grants for complementary investments and activities (additional activities not funded by the project but to which the community has given priority), community organisers (to coordinate the work and liaise with other stakeholders), and monitoring and evaluation (advanced sampling and evaluation methodologies with control groups). The two recent Development Policy Loans (DPLs) (2011 Rio and 2011 Honduras) adopt a wider perspective, for they aim to support national strategies to promote citizen security in each country. In Brazil (Rio), the DPL still focuses on urban development and the component of crime and violence combines situational and social prevention methods (in a similar pattern as for the previous Specific Investment Loans, SILs), while in Honduras, the DPL spans from the reform of taxation and pensions to citizen security and education. Bank support in violence and crime prevention targets institutional strengthening of the new coordinating agency in charge of the issue and finances social prevention interventions. So far, none of the above-mentioned projects have addressed criminal justice reforms. They refer to them and acknowledge the need for such measures, but do not finance them.

Before analysing the variables that explain the evolution of violence prevention within both MDBs (Chapters 7 and 8), it is important to understand the institutional context in which this evolution has taken place. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 review such contexts for first the IADB, and then, the World Bank.

6.2 Citizen security at the IADB: learning by doing?

The emergence and evolution of citizen security at the IADB can be summarised in four chronological sequences.

6.2.1 The beginning (1996-2001): standing up to respond to countries’ needs

In the 1990s, violence and crime were very serious concerns in many parts of Latin America and the Caribbean (see Section 5.1 in Chapter 5). The issue then began to emerge in countries’ discussions with donors. At that time, with the eighth General Capital Increase (GCI-8) that took place in 1995, the IADB had become the largest MDB in LAC with more than 50 per cent of multilateral financing.82 The regional bank then took the lead in consultative groups with other donors in many countries in the region. In the same year (1995), violence appeared in negotiations for a loan in El Salvador. However, internal resistance within the IADB led to a restructuring of the loan into a Justice Reform project. It was eventually approved in 1996, and nonetheless included a citizen security component. That was the first lending component explicitly targeting violence prevention, but it was somehow hidden within a less controversial Justice Reform operation (OVE 2014).

At the same time, in Colombia, public authorities manifested their will to reach out to the international community to respond to violence. As described in Section 5.1.2 in Chapter 5, at the end of 1990s, the Andean country faced high homicide rates, with important differences among cities.83 The experience of Bogotá under the first Mockus Administration (1995-97) showed that preventive and multi-pronged interventions could be effective, with a reduction in homicide rate from 58.8 to 47 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants between 1995 and 1997.84 The Colombian Government wanted to pursue and expand the experience, and implement it in other cities. The National Department for Planning (Departamento Nacional de Planeación) worked together with the three main cities of the country (Bogotá, Medellin and Cali) to develop local strategies to address violence. They organised consultations with experts, academics and donors, including the


83 There were, for example, 248 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Medellin and 112 in Cali in 1995 (IADB 1999:1).

IADB and the World Bank. They eventually raised the question as to who would be willing to finance the strategies. The IADB stood up to support the initiative despite the novelty of the loan and resistance within the Bank. In fact, the reputational risks associated with working on violence were considered to be very high for a development organisation (see Section 7.1 for a detailed explanation). The then IADB President, Enrique Iglesias, however, supported the initiative. His frequent travels to the region made clear to him how important the issue was, and the multi-pronged, negative impact it had on development. In 1999, President Iglesias declared:

‘Violence is not inevitable, but to reduce it we need to act right away. Governments should take the initiative and work in a concerted effort with civil society, the private sector, and the mass media to assure the rights, health and economic welfare of citizens. The IADB supports these efforts.’

But even with the support of IADB’s President, approving the first loan on violence prevention had not been easy according to the IADB’s staff (Interview, Washington, D.C., July 2011). Senior Managers advised the President to let the Board decide on whether or not to approve the loan. The Colombia project was therefore presented to the Board that eventually approved it in 1998. The voting majority at the Board belonged to the Latin American and Caribbean countries that were more sensitised to the issue because most countries in the region faced challenges in terms of violence and crime (Interview with IADB Executive Directors, Washington, D.C., June 2011, see Section 7.1 in Chapter 7 for further analysis). They therefore supported the initiative. A door was opened.

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85 When capitalised, ‘the Bank’ is a common appellation used within both the IADB and the World Bank to call their own organisation. It is used as such in the text. Without capital letters, the bank or the banks refer to the generic name, i.e. the short version of multilateral development banks.

86 Interview with an Executive Director at the IADB who was very close to President Iglesias (Washington, D.C., July 2011).


88 Voting powers are determined by the amount of shares each member country holds. See Section 7.1 for further explanation and details regarding voting powers in MDBs.
Following the Colombia project, another loan was approved the same year, 1998, for Uruguay. Both projects took an average of two years to prepare. The IADB facilitated access to international experts\(^{89}\) to support national teams to design the operations, but as one adviser in Colombia recalled, the in-house expertise was weak on violence prevention and the IADB’s technical contribution to the first projects was minor (Interview, Medellin, May 2011). According to interviewed staff members, IADB’s position was to ‘learn by doing’ and to support the clients, even with lack of knowledge of what would work and what would not in developing countries. All the interviewees I met in Colombia generally acknowledged this: all of them appreciated the *courage* of the organisation to take the risk to support the initiative, but also highlighted that the IADB did not have enough technical capacity to provide substantial contribution to the design of the first citizen security projects (see Chapter 9 for the case study on Colombia and further discussion on counterparts’ perception on MDBs’ relevance in violence prevention).

Following these projects, a group of Colombians inside the Bank decided to take the principles applied in Colombia (as reflected in IADB’s project in Colombia) and adapt them to other contexts, in particular to Central America and the Caribbean where violence and crime were most severe, and where the IADB played a leadership role among donors. In 2001, IADB’s Board approved the first Jamaican Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP). Based on these examples (Colombia, Uruguay, Jamaica), demand increased from other countries in the region (see Table 15). Such demand led IADB’s Management to ask for greater clarity on how the Bank could effectively support its clients in improving efforts to confront the challenge of violence and crime. At the same time, the third Summit of the Americas strongly called for Multilateral Development Banks to support Governments of the region to develop strategies to prevent violence and crime.\(^{90}\) All those external and internal messages converged, resulting in the preparation of the Preliminary Guidelines for IADB Violence Prevention projects.

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\(^{89}\) Until then, public policies had been developed more on a political basis than on a scientific and evidence-based one, according to an adviser who contributed to the design of the Medellin project. (Interview, in Medellin, Colombia, May 2011)

6.2.2 Trying to operationalise a preventive, multi-sector approach (2002-2007)

Following the first projects and considering the region’s situation in terms of violence and crime, IADB’s Management and operational staff asked for guidelines in the area of violence prevention. In 2002, the IADB approved the ‘Preliminary Guidelines for the Design of Violence Reduction Projects (Document CP-2190-9) (thereafter, 2002 Guidelines or Preliminary Guidelines). The Social Department prepared them,91 with inputs from the Modernisation of the State team (ICF/ICS for its acronym). Their objective was to clarify IADB’s scope of interventions and to provide operational guidance to teams with little or no experience in violence prevention. The 2002 Guidelines specifically mentioned that they were ‘preliminary’ and would evolve along with the knowledge gained by the organisation from both operational experience, and in-house and external research:

‘These guidelines are a work in progress; they must evolve and incorporate more best practices and lessons learned specific to the Bank and the region, as the Bank progressively gains more experience in this area’ (as cited in IADB 2009:3).

There too, the approach described was clearly ‘learning by doing’ with the implication that it was the responsibility of the Bank to support its client countries to find solutions to this complex issue (Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011). Since the Bank approved the Colombia project in 1998, debates on the rationale for its engagement were intense within the organisation (opcit). The Preliminary Guidelines then focused on making the case for IADB’s relevance in violence and crime prevention, emphasising costs and consequences in terms of development. The 2002 Guidelines also mentioned the political mandate given by Heads of State and Government gathered in the 2001 Quebec Summit of the Americas (IADB 2002:4; see quote in Section 1.2 in Chapter 1).

The Preliminary Guidelines emphasised a multi-sector approach with a strong focus on prevention as justified by its cost-effectiveness. Gender, through domestic violence against women, is present throughout the document, but issues of masculinities or cultural change are not mentioned. The Preliminary Guidelines proposed that the IADB follows a mixed approach of stand-alone operations and components in projects of other sectors, such as

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91 At the time, one unit within the IADB centrally prepared all institutional guidelines.
Health, Education, Justice and Urban Development. Such an approach could have led to a mainstreaming approach in the longer term, but the Preliminary Guidelines did not develop further on how to concretely implement this dual approach, nor did they adopt an explicit gender perspective to the issue. Instead, the Preliminary Guidelines focused on defining three broad priority areas: (i) public policy planning; (ii) violence prevention; and (iii) certain selected activities related to control, criminal justice and rehabilitation (IADB 2002:3). They included work on police and prisons, with limits mainly left to the discretion of operational teams. In fact, the Preliminary Guidelines provided minimal guidance and left decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis. Some prohibitions are stated based on the Articles of Agreement: the IADB could not finance arms and drugs, and could not get directly involved in political matters. However, the rest of the guidance was broad and open.

Following the Preliminary Guidelines, six projects were approved, including five in Central American countries (the sixth being Chile in 2003) (see Table 15). At that time, in 2002-2006, the IADB was organised in three regions. The group of Colombian specialists who designed the first projects worked in the Central American region. The scope of the issue and the sensitivity of the IADB team working in Central America explain to a large extent why the projects concentrated efforts in this region. The design was a mix of social interventions to prevent violence combined with institutional strengthening and police reform, and at times, justice sector reforms (see Appendix C). The team then changed following Bank’s realignment initiated by the new IADB President.

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92 From 1994 to 2007, the IADB was structured in three geographic regions: Regions 1, 2 and 3 with each region having its own departments, such as Sustainable Development (SDS), Trade and Integration (INT), and the Private Sector (PRI). With the realignment that occurred in 2007, the structure shifted to four vice-presidencies that report directly to the President and the Executive Vice-President of the IADB: Vice-Presidency of Countries; Vice-Presidency of Sectors and Knowledge; Vice-Presidency of Private Sector and Non-sovereign Guaranteed Operations; and Vice-Presidency of Finance and Administration. (IADB Restructuring: ‘What Does It Mean? Risks and Opportunities Based on Current Available Information’, January 22, 2007, Washington DC, available at: http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.3096.aspx, accessed June 2012).
6.2.3 Going back to criminal justice? (2007-2009)

In 2005, Luis Alberto Moreno succeeded Enrique Iglesias as IADB’s President. With President Moreno, the regional bank began a process of deep reform and realignment. The realignment took place in 2007. The objective was to bring the organisation closer to the countries’ needs, and make it more effective and efficient with greater accountability on the development impact of its interventions. This entailed profound changes in institutional organisation and in staffing. Instead of having virtually three banks operating, the realignment would centralise and harmonise the work. The three regions were merged and a new matrix was adopted. Citizen Security used to belong to the ICF/ICS in Regions 2 and 3, and to the Social Department in Region 1. In parallel, many Senior Managers either left or changed position. For Citizen Security, this meant that many of the staff working on this issue left the IADB (many of them joined the World Bank, or retired). A new centralised team was formed (as the division by region disappeared), the Institutional Capacity of the State (ICF/ICS), with the mandate to work on citizen security for the whole LAC. Three projects were approved in 2008 and 2009 following the realignment: Panama, Argentina and Jamaica II (see Table 15). In this new organisational context and with serious issues of violence and crime persisting in the region, new operational guidelines were prepared.

In 2009, IADB’s Board of Directors approved the ‘Operational Guidelines for Programme Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public Safety’ (GN-2535 06/OCT/2009) (thereafter, Operational Guidelines or 2009 Guidelines), superseding the preliminary ones approved seven years earlier. The new guidelines’ objective was to ‘provide staff with the overall operating approach to the civic coexistence and public safety sector’ (IADB 2009:4). They adopt a new terminology ‘civic coexistence and public safety’ as compared to ‘violence reduction’ in the Preliminary Guidelines, but do not reflect on this.

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93 The realignment was agreed at the annual meeting in Belo Horizonte and approved in December 2006.


95 According to several IADB interviewees in Washington (Interviews, April and July 2011). Some of them even suggested that almost all staff members working in citizen security changed following the realignment (except two including the actual coordinator who got promoted as such for this same reason), but I could not verify this information.
shift in vocabulary. This shift is also not clearly translated into the three ‘priority target areas’ that include a broad list of activities without being prioritised:

(i) The first component refers to ‘public policy planning’ and includes government policies, comprehensive analysis of citizen security, institutional capacity building, and strategic knowledge for decision-making.

(ii) The second component deals with ‘prevention activities’. This includes a multidimensional focus, activities specifically targeted at vulnerable and at-risk minors and youth, prevention of domestic violence, sexual violence and gender violence, activities to improve social interaction within communities, situational prevention activities, and support for the prevention of organised crime.

(iii) The third component is entitled ‘activities relating to prevention, criminal and alternative justice and rehabilitation from a preventive perspective’. This includes policy frameworks and administrative cultures, support for policing and penitentiary systems, support for the criminal and alternative justice sector, and support for social rehabilitation (opcit).

In other words, the Operational Guidelines provide an ample catalogue of interventions that the IADB could support. There is no prioritisation, i.e. no analysis of comparative advantage of the Bank on where it could contribute the most (based on staff expertise, experience and resources availability). As for gender, it is mentioned only in relation to domestic and gender-based violence. That is, the Operational Guidelines solely focus on gender practical needs, and do not question the connection between violence and gender inequality, nor do they acknowledge the gendered continuum of violence (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.3). The Operational Guidelines still refer (as did the 2002 Preliminary Guidelines) to what the IADB should not finance because of the high reputational risk linked to the risk for abuse to human and civil rights and the interference in countries’ political affairs they entail. Here again, the final decision is left to the judgment of the operational teams. The Operational Guidelines also include some mitigation mechanisms for potential risks in working with the police and the penitentiary systems, such as the collaboration with other specialised bodies, where the expertise called upon lies in other agencies. However, no criteria are mentioned to apply such mitigation mechanisms.
In terms of approach, the Operational Guidelines still mention the possibility of including components to prevent and reduce violence within other sectors (which could lead to a mainstreaming approach to violence prevention as previously considered in the Preliminary Guidelines, see Section 6.2.2), but do not provide a roadmap, or even a clear call for the Bank to implement such an approach. When the Operational Guidelines were approved in 2009, the IADB was preparing the ninth General Capital Increase that was considered necessary for the organisation to be able to support the region’s needs for the next decade. This new funding replenishment marks a milestone in the recent history of the IADB as, for the first time, the Governors conditioned their additional financing on compliance with a result framework, which had 2015 as time horizon. The result framework includes citizen security indicators and gives clear incentives towards increased lending.

6.2.4 Renewing priority to citizen security but without clarity in goal or strategy (2010-2015)

During the recent period, the IADB reaffirmed the importance given to citizen security. This appears through a combination of institutional statements and operational documents. In 2010, the ninth General Capital Increase (GCI-9) took place with a report outlining the roadmap for the Bank for the next five years (2010-2015). For the preparation of the GCI-9, the IADB organised a survey of over 3000 representatives of civil society organisations. The objective was to identify the comparative advantage of the Bank in the region and the areas that should be prioritised looking forward. Among the top challenges identified, citizen security ranked third, following quality education and social security (IADB 2011:27). This gave a clear signal to IADB’s Management and Board of Governors. As a result, the GCI-9 report includes citizen security in its result framework. The output indicator that the Bank should reach by 2015 was to assist 32 cities in the region with citizen security programmes. The baseline indicator was the rate of homicides (27.5 per 100,000 inhabitants), but no target was set for 2015. As mentioned earlier, the GCI-9 sets the roadmap agreed by the Governors, the highest body and owners of the IADB. As such, the fact that citizen security was included in the result framework clearly indicates the importance given to the issue by the organisation. Yet, the chosen indicator is vague, and

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96 It is not clear whether this figure is for 2009 or 2010, Strategy GN2587-2 (IADB 2011:34).
the strategy of the Bank to affirm a comparative advantage in the sector is undefined beyond the Operational Guidelines that are themselves broad and vague (see Section 6.2.4).

Following the GCI-9, the IADB approved new sector strategies. Among them, two directly relate to violence prevention: the Sector Strategy Institutions for Growth and Social Welfare and the Strategy on Social Policy for Equity and Productivity. Citizen security is part of the first, while youth-at-risk, gender-based and domestic violence are included in the second, even though both documents refer to each other regarding those matters. The sector strategy on Institutions selected its priority areas based on the combination of regional development challenges, potential demand from clients and IADB’s comparative advantage (IADB 2011:9). Within the identified priorities, citizen security stands out as a ‘niche’ for the regional bank (opcit:5). It is formally part of the third priority area that aims to improve the enabling environment for growth and social welfare. In a similar fashion as for the 2009 Operational Guidelines, the strategy provides three broad directions for IADB’s involvement in citizen security.

Other institutional statements and documents show the growing importance given to the issue of citizen security at the IADB. The framework for Sustainable Cities includes a component on citizen security as safe cities. IADB’s President Moreno, a Colombian

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97 The strategy specifies that the comparative advantages of the IADB involve ‘enough expertise and knowledge and capacity to effectively add value to policymaking in borrowing countries. […] The comparative advantages of the Bank were assessed on the basis of an internal analysis of institutional mandates and limitations relative to other development organisations, prior operations, methodological tools and in-house knowledge.’ (IADB 2011:9)

98 A 2009 study by Reyes on the niches for the IADB states that 80 per cent ‘of the total financial flows from multilateral organisations in support of citizen security projects come from the IADB.’ (Reyes 2009 cited in GN2587-2 (IADB 2011:5). Latinobarómetro and FLACSO surveys also show that citizens put citizen security in the top priorities for development in the region.

99 The three priority areas for the Institutions strategy are: (i) improving innovation and productivity for growth and social welfare; (ii) improving the provision and utilisation of resources for growth and social welfare; and (iii) improving the enabling environment for growth and social welfare.

100 Which is unsurprising since the same team wrote both texts.

101 The three directions for IADB’s support in citizen security are: (i) Supporting public policy planning and implementation; (ii) Preventing crime and violence, with a focus given on multi-dimensionality of the problem addressing several risk factors and targeting at-risk population; and (iii) Criminal and alternative justice and rehabilitation from a preventive perspective (IADB 2011: 27-28).
national, in his book *A decade for Latin America: a real opportunity* (2010), insists on the importance of citizen security for the region and includes it as a key area for IADB’s assistance in the coming years. The Office of Oversight and Evaluation (OVE), the independent evaluation unit of the Bank that reports directly to the Board of Directors, included the issue in its work programme for the period 2010-2014 (three evaluations in three years), ¹⁰² which shows the importance of the issue both for the organisation and the region. In terms of operational translation of the importance given to citizen security, since 2009 and until 2011, the Bank approved three projects in citizen security (see Table 15 and Figure 14) and a major Citizen Security Initiative with up to 20 million US dollars in grants to facilitate cooperation and disseminate knowledge in the region (IADB 2012). New Country Strategies ¹⁰³ also included violence prevention as major components for the four years going forward. Uruguay is a recent example with its Country Strategy stating violence prevention as a priority.

The set of institutional and operational documents shows how the IADB considers violence and crime as a development issue and a priority for the region, and gives it the corresponding importance for the organisation, at least in rhetoric given the relatively small but increasing number of citizen security projects approved so far. The process tracing also reveals an evolution in terms of the preferred solutions to the issue with a greater emphasis on traditional criminal justice interventions in recent years, in contrast to the beginning of the period when the IADB really pushed forward the social and situational prevention agenda. Overall, what seems to be missing is a firm standpoint for the regional bank, that is, a clear goal and the corresponding operational strategy that sets priorities and provides concrete tools and staffing to implement the multi-sector approach set forth in both

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¹⁰² In 2010, OVE did an evaluation of Citizen Security projects approved until 2009, mainly focusing on the evaluability of Citizen Security projects. In 2012, OVE prepared a comparative project review that aimed to provide operational recommendations on the design of Citizen Security projects. In 2013, OVE undertook a comprehensive sector evaluation of crime and violence.

¹⁰³ The Country Strategies are very important since the programming needs to be planned within and in accordance with the Strategy. However, in terms of operational importance, Country Programming (done yearly) is the key instrument since it is when projects are included in the portfolio (or not). Teams depend therefore on Country Programming to prepare and propose investment loans to the Board. It can happen that Country Programming includes loans in sectors that are not included in the Country Strategy when the situation changes and the Government specifically asks for the assistance on a particular issue.
guidelines approved to date. The gender dimension also appears limited to the mention of domestic and gender-based violence, and do not explicitly acknowledge the link between gender inequality, patriarchy and the reproduction of violence. Such acknowledgement would have given a clear stance for the organisation in its understanding of violence. The following section examines these questions in the case of the World Bank.

6.3 Violence and crime prevention at the World Bank: a cautious and selective LAC-driven evolution

The evolution of violence and crime prevention at the World Bank follows a different dynamic to the IADB’s. The emergence and development of the issue, both in the Latin American and Caribbean Region (commonly called LAC) and at the Anchors,\(^{104}\) is summarised in five periods.

6.3.1 Opening the door through analytical work (1998-2002)

In the mid-1990s, the World Bank’s Chief Economist for LAC, Guillermo Perry, a Colombian national, led a study on the econometric determinants of violence and crime with a cross-country analysis. In 1998, the ‘Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World: An Empirical Assessment’ was published (Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 1998). In 2000, followed ‘Crime and Victimization: An Economic Perspective’ from the same authors. These publications made the case for violence and crime as a development issue. They showed that inequality, more than poverty alone, was correlated to higher levels of violence and crime. These studies formally opened a space for discussion on the issue at the World Bank.\(^{105}\) In the same period, the Anchor of Social Development published the first studies on violence and crime at the country level, first in Jamaica (Moser and Holland 1997), and then in Colombia and Guatemala using urban

\(^{104}\) The World Bank is organised in Sectors, Regions and Anchors. The Anchors are central units that aim to provide the policy guidance and the institutional positioning of the Bank in central issues of development. They provide also technical support to the Regions.

\(^{105}\) The first studies dealing with violence focused on gender-based violence in 1993. However, dialogue on violence as a development issue within the World Bank really began to gain visibility with Fajnzylberg et al. studies, according to all interviewees at the World Bank. This might suggest how gender-based violence was considered at the periphery of the issue of violence and crime.
appraisal techniques (Moser and McIlwaine 2001). These studies were undertaken under the leadership of Caroline Moser, who had then joined the LAC Social Development Unit. Moser developed a research agenda on violence in collaboration with UK academics. This included a series of literature reviews useful to clarify the state of knowledge on issues the Bank was not accustomed to work on (for instance, on violence as a development issue (McIlwaine 1999); youth gangs (Rodgers 1999); gender-based violence (Moser and Moser 2003); and urban violence (Winton 2004)). When Moser left the World Bank, no one took over the issue, and the World Bank remained without specialists in charge of urban violence for the following four years (Interview, Washington, D.C., March 2011).

6.3.2 Clarifying the Bank’s positioning on violence prevention in LAC (2003-2008)

Given the importance of the issue of violence and crime in the LAC region, the need to develop in-house responses became clearer and clearer. In 2003, the LAC Urban Development unit called upon the person who previously worked with Moser to develop municipal strategies to urban violence and crime. The objective was to operationalise responses to a very complex issue that was largely misunderstood at that time (Interview, Washington, D.C., March 2011). The agenda took a three-pronged approach:

(i) Development of the analytical basis with the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Vice-Presidency (PREM) through Economic Sector Works (ESW) on violence and crime. The objective was to strengthen the rationale for the Bank to get involved in the issue and to internally make the case for it to Management and Country Directors. Three ESWs were published.

(ii) Capacity building through the development of a training course, first face-to-face, and then online (now fully managed by the World Bank Institute, WBI). The Bank mobilised

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106 These studies were very important in showing the perspective of women and men, girls and boys who suffered the most from violence. Through participatory techniques, community members in disadvantaged and highly violent neighbourhood expressed what they needed and considered would be effective to prevent violence. However, these studies did not translate into operations.

107 ESWs included one in Brazil (2006), another in the Caribbean with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2008), and a last one in Central America (published in 2011).

108 The original course was held in Spanish in 2006. It was then adapted to the World Bank-TEC platform (of the TEC de Monterrey, in Mexico –ITESM) that delivers the course in collaboration with the World Bank. It is called ‘Diplomado Ciudad Segura’ and approximately 2000 persons have been trained through this course (informal data given by one of the course designer, June 2012). In 2009-2010, the course was developed in
international experts, in particular from South Africa and Latin America, to develop training courses and guides. The focus was mainly on situational and social prevention, with three resource guides published.\footnote{The resource guides included: ‘Municipal Capacity Building Course on Crime and Violence Prevention’; a toolkit on school-based violence prevention; and a toolkit on public private alliances for citizen security.}

(iii) Operational work, with an approach choosing to include violence prevention components in Urban Development projects. The idea was to take advantage of the expertise of the Bank in Urban Development and to include CPTED and social development activities within those projects (see Table 16). The position to opt for components instead of stand-alone projects was mainly due to the resistance within the Bank to embark on violence prevention (Interviews, World Bank, Washington, D.C., February and April 2011) (see Section 7.1 in Chapter 7 for further analysis). The LAC team thus advanced very cautiously, pedagogically explaining that the components would be limited to preventive interventions at the community level.

This became the strategy on violence and crime prevention that the World Bank would slowly develop over the years. Again, the approach was to convince, both internally and externally, by developing tools, methods and studies. Contrary to the IADB that did not prioritise or select among possible interventions, the World Bank clearly delimited its scope of intervention: the Bank could only offer situational and social prevention programmes, no police-related or prison-related interventions. Most of World Bank staff interviewed, former and actual, considered this limited and specific positioning as an advantage. For them, the lack of major limitations at the IADB led the regional bank to finance too risky police-related reforms.\footnote{Section 7.1 in Chapter 7 discusses the respective interpretation of both banks of their own Articles of Agreement in relation to what could be done or not in violence and crime prevention, in particular in terms of getting involved in police-related and other criminal justice matters.} This perception of advantage, however, began to change later with new staff in charge of the issue (see Section 6.3.4). During the period, three projects were approved (see Table 16). The Honduras ‘Barrio Ciudad’ project took two years to prepare. According to World Bank staff interviewed, the discussion with the Government
was focused on finding solutions to very disadvantaged and violent neighbourhoods, and the concern came from the President of Honduras himself who took part in the discussions with the World Bank on these issues. In Jamaica, the discussions on violence prevention were embedded in the urban poverty discussions, which also focused on most violent neighbourhoods. In Brazil, the Bank team suggested the inclusion of violence prevention elements in the Slum Upgrading project of Bahia. So for this latter project, the Bank took a proactive role as regard to incorporating a violence prevention scope (Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011). The development of the agenda went through a slow process because the team was very small (two to three persons including only one staff member, the others being consultants). Convincing the Bank to get involved in violence prevention and letting the countries know that the organisation could support them in this area took several years. All the activities that made possible the development of the World Bank’s violence prevention agenda were funded by Trust Funds. At the same time, the Social Protection department developed an agenda on youth-at-risk. This led to the publication of a regional study on youth-at-risk as well as toolkits to promote operational work on the issue. Both departments (Urban Development and Social Protection) collaborated on the issue of violence prevention. The Gender Anchor, on the other hand, published some studies on domestic violence, gender-based violence, and masculinities, but the priority was clearly given to women’s economic empowerment, and this was even more so when, in 2007, the new Director of the Gender Anchor took office (see Section 6.3.4).

6.3.3 Expanding demand and offer for Bank’s support: LAC’s renewed agenda on violence prevention (2009-2011)

In 2009, the responsibility for violence and crime prevention went from Urban Development to Social Development in the LAC region. The Urban department had many issues within its agenda and violence was getting very little visibility, for the Sector Manager did not position it as a central topic (Interview, Washington, D.C., March 2011). At the same time, the Social Development department was interested in taking the lead on the issue and a Sr. Specialist who had recently joined the department was willing to take the lead as coordinator for violence prevention in LAC. This is how the agendas got rebalanced, and the violence and crime leadership passed from the Urban Development department to the Social Development one. However, collaboration continued between both
departments, as the projects approved that far were still affiliated to Urban Development. Specialists directly involved in violence prevention in LAC perceived the shift differently. Some argued that it disadvantaged the importance given to violence and crime, as Urban Development is a ‘more prestigious’ unit within the Bank than Social Development, for Social Development is more a ‘supportive unit’ than an operational one (Social Development is the unit that develops safeguards and has a very small operational portfolio on its own). Others argued that it benefitted the issue since it made more sense to put violence and crime under the wider spectrum of social development to avoid focusing solely on the infrastructure side of situational prevention. In addition, having the support of the Sector Manager was considered very important for the visibility of the issue (Interviews, Washington, D.C., July 2011) (see Section 8.2 in Chapter 8 for the discussion on the location of responsibility).

The new LAC team in charge of violence prevention decided to renew the agenda in terms of what the Bank could offer in violence prevention so as to gain visibility at the country level. So far, the World Bank had played a minor role on violence prevention, leaving the IADB a quasi-monopoly on the issue (Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011). The new LAC team thus focused its efforts on developing policy dialogue and development policy loans in the largest countries in the region (Mexico and Brazil). They also increasingly considered expanding the offer of World Bank’s support beyond social and situational prevention, as suggested through the Rio DPL that supported the strategy of the city largely designed around strengthening Pacifying Police Units (UPP). In parallel, President Zoellick visited Central America and reaffirmed the Bank’s commitment to support Central American countries in their efforts to face common challenges, including security. Thereafter, the Bank engaged more proactively in Central America (DPL in Honduras, policy dialogue in Guatemala, and contribution to the regional SICA initiative). The Bank then approved the Bank first stand-alone in violence prevention in Honduras (2012). This renewed priority in LAC also helped to increase the collaboration with the Anchors.
6.3.4 Absence of Bank-wide vision in violence prevention from a gender perspective (2009-2011)

At the central level, violence was part of the Bank’s Urban Strategy until 2009. It then shifted to the Social Development Anchor, similarly to what occurred in the LAC region (see Section 6.3.3). In 2009, the group in charge of post-conflict situations was split into two central units that would complement each other: one called ‘Post-Conflict, Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group’ (OPCFC) that would focus on simplifying procedures for the Bank to work in those countries; and one called ‘Social Cohesion and Violence Prevention’ that would focus on the policy side of the different forms of violence, including inter-personal violence in urban settings. According to World Bank interviewees, the creation of one specific central unit on violence was a response to the LAC region’s demand for more support. LAC at that time had only three persons working on urban violence (including only one staff member) and could not respond to a growing country demand. In an overall context of budget constraint, the need for the Anchor’s cross support was heightened (Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011). However, even at the Anchor, human resources were scarce. In fact, the Social Cohesion and Violence Prevention Anchor covered many issues that spanned from political violence and civil war to forced displacement, urban violence and crime, and youth and gender-based violence, with only twelve specialists (including only two staff members) spread across these issues. Nonetheless, interviewees considered the shift of responsibility from the Urban to the Social Development Anchor coherent, for the urban agenda was crowded with too many issues and focused mainly on infrastructure, when ‘violence was much more complex than this’ (opcit; see Section 8.2 in Chapter 8 for further analysis on the location for responsibility).

111 The difference between staff members and consultants has implications in terms of budget, responsibilities and continuity. Even though staff members are increasingly contracted for two to five years (instead of open-ended positions as it was the case until recently), they are considered the core employees of the organisation and are the only ones who can lead a project. Consultants are usually employed to support teams and provide punctual expertise linked to a product. Nevertheless, MDBs increasingly employ consultants for budgetary purposes as their contracts are less protective and the benefits are less than those of staff members. The fact that teams have very few staff members gives an indication that the topic is not a priority for the organisation (see Section 7.2 in Chapter 7 for the discussion on actor power and the critical mass of its in-house experts).
The Anchor in charge of violence prevention did not opt to elaborate its own strategy, but instead referred to the 2005 Social Development Strategy. In this strategy, violence prevention was included only through LAC’s lenses. It referred to two strategic priorities: (i) policy dialogue at the macro-level, and (ii) investment lending. The first strategic priority included a series of studies, including some (undetermined) on social violence and on gender, whereas the second priority broadly referred to increasing own-managed Social Development projects in a variety of topics (World Bank 2005:14, 33-34). The only reference to violence and crime appears within the Development Economics (DEC) agenda to improve the Bank’s research and focused on conflict (opcit:45). Despite the shift of responsibility from Urban to Social Development, the 2010 Urban Strategy remains the most specific institutional document in terms of Bank’s vision towards violence prevention in urban settings. The Urban Strategy in fact clearly refers to violence and crime as a major challenge for the urbanised world, and includes the issue in the first thematic area (‘Area 1: Focusing on the core elements of the city system’). It identifies the

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112 It did, however, develop a three-year agenda, similar to the approach initially developed in LAC in the 2000s. According to the Director of the Anchor, the agenda consisted in three steps. First, develop the analytical base. This led to the publication of the book Violence in the City (2010) that aimed to serve as conceptual framework for Bank’s actions in urban violence. They also strengthened the team (including by contracting specialists from the IADB who worked on the first citizen security projects), built a network of consultants, carried out studies on the costs of violence, and developed a database (mainly on homicides and domestic violence). Second, develop work in the regions, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, by influencing Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) on how to include urban violence in programming. Third, continue the work in regions and push the agenda on youth violence (Interview, Washington, D.C., July 2011).


114 In fact, the Social Development Strategy mentions in general terms: ‘Number of Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIAs), Country level analyses and ESWs focusing on Youth and Development (e.g. Argentina, Jamaica, Andean Region), Social Violence, Gender, Impact of Migration and Remittances (e.g. Caribbean, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras), Ethnic Minorities, Forced Displaced Population (e.g. Colombia)’ (World Bank 2005: 33-34).

115 These topics include indigenous peoples, gender, afro-descendants, youth and violence, etc. (World Bank 2005: 14, 33-34).

116 They include civil wars; crime/inequality in South Africa; local conflict management in Indonesia (World Bank 2005:45).

types of activities that the World Bank could finance in supporting local governments to address violence and crime, and provides examples of existing programmes that have shown positive results, but does not provide specific guidance.

In sum, there is no clear Bank-wide vision on violence prevention, but instead a few items under the Social Development Strategy to increase the agenda both in policy dialogue and in lending in LAC, without any target or specific guidance, and examples of situational prevention activities for Bank support under the Urban Strategy. This confirms how the multiple approaches to prevent violence generate competing lenses and directions for action, whose strategic synthesis is not evident to find (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3; see also Chapters 7 and 8 for a more detailed analysis on cognitive frame (Section 7.1) and organisational treatment (Section 8.2)).

As for gender and violence prevention, the World Bank’s position focuses on women’s economic empowerment, leaving gender-based violence and other gender dimensions of the continuum of violence to the Social Development Anchor and the Regions. In 2007, a new Gender Anchor Director, Mayra Buvinic, came into office. Buvinic was a leading expert on gender equality who had extensive experience at the International Centre for Research on Women (ICRW), and then at the IADB where she led the regional bank’s agenda on gender and also played a leading role in making the case for the IADB to get involved and focus on violence prevention until IADB’s realignment. When Buvinic arrived at the World Bank, she and her team decided to align objectives and strategies with the Bank’s organisational culture and comparative advantage, and thus focused on women’s economic empowerment. The assumption was that economic empowerment would lead to a reduction in gender-based violence. The approach on ‘gender as smart economics’ followed an integrationist-type mainstreaming targeting specific sectors such as infrastructure, transport, and economic development. As the Director and Sr. Specialists of her team explained, the rationale behind this selective approach was that lasting change comes from making people want it and seeing the benefit of it. That is, convincing a few people in traditionally resistant sectors to adopt a gender perspective in their projects would bring more lasting results than adopting a large mandatory approach that would be seen as an additional burden and might therefore be short-lived (Interviews, Washington, D.C., July
The Gender Anchor through its ‘Gender Action Plans’ (GAP- 2006 and 2010) thus chose not to embrace the battle of gender-based violence, domestic violence, and gender identities linked to power as domination and violence, and justified this choice as ‘practical and realistic’ (opcit). However, ‘gender advocates’ in the Bank did not always understand this standpoint. They in fact criticised what they considered as a focus on practical gender needs, and expressed frustration as the Gender Anchor strategy deprived them from the traditional Trust Funds they used to finance initiatives on gender, including gender-based violence (Interviews, Washington, D.C., March 2011). Many regretted a lack of more courageous and transformative stance on gender and violence prevention, and were sceptical on what gender mainstreaming could achieve. Such scepticism also highlights controversies regarding mainstreaming as a strategy to achieve structural change that I discuss in Chapters 7 and 8 (see also debates on mainstreaming in Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3).

‘At the Bank, the policy on gender changed drastically: before you had some money to do gender and it was compulsory to at least write a paragraph on gender, but then [...] [the new Director] came and she did not want nothing to do with legal and gender-based violence: she focused entirely on economic empowerment of women. Then she mainstreamed gender, so all the financing, for example BNPP [Bank Netherlands Partnerships Programme] that had funding for gender, eliminated the gender window because if it is mainstreamed, you don’t need specific money for gender projects. But nobody followed up on the gender mainstreaming thing.’ (Interview, Washington, D.C., March 2011)

The Social Cohesion and Violence Prevention Anchor took charge for gender-based and domestic violence. The Director of this Anchor considered that the internal sensitisation

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119 In many conversations, staff did not know why the Director opted for the strategy and discarded previous efforts done until 2005. This indicates, at the very least, a problem in terms of internal communication.
was the most pressing step as an effort to make the World Bank less risk-adverse regarding embarking on such issues. Convincing Team Leaders and Country Directors to include violence prevention in their projects or Country Strategies, in particular in Africa, had indeed proven to be a difficult endeavour. As such, the team at the Anchor organised a conference on gender-based violence in 2010 for the tenth anniversary of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325),\(^{120}\) in addition to multiple Brown Bag Lunches (BBLs) aimed at the internal sensitisation (Interview in Washington, D.C., April 2011). The Anchor also participated in the 2011 WDR on Conflict and Security and the 2012 WDR on Gender, but did not endorse any leadership roles.\(^{121}\) Another important way to clarify Bank’s positioning regarding an issue is in fact through WDRs.

6.3.5 WDRs on Security and Gender: Creating space for greater involvement in citizen security? (2011-2012)

When World Bank’s Presidents come into office, they choose topics that will be developed into World Development Reports (WDRs), one of the Bank’s most widely disseminated publications. During the period analysed, three Presidents chose topics related to violence and its solutions. President Wolfensohn (1995-2005) selected ‘Youth’ as one key topic that would eventually be investigated under President Wolfowitz mandate (2005-2007). The 2007 WDR on Youth included youth-at-risk and youth violence. According to a Senior Economist who participated in this WDR, it was very well received outside of the Bank, but did not help enhance the Bank’s operational portfolio on key aspects related to youth development, youth-at-risk, or youth violence prevention (Interview, World Bank, Washington, D.C. June 2011). He further explained that the follow-up of the WDR was not effective and the toolkits were not specific enough to serve operational work (opcit). In 2011, the Children and Youth Anchor was even dismantled.


\(^{121}\) This is traditionally the case: an ad-hoc team of experts throughout the Bank that do not have a specialisation on the topic write WDRs. Anchors participate through reviews and comments but do not lead the efforts.
President Zoellick (2007-2012) chose Conflict and Security, and Gender as two of the five development issues to put forward during his mandate. The choice for security was influenced by the work of Paul Collier who was Director of the Development Research Group and was well respected within the World Bank. Collier published the *Bottom Billion* (2008) and other publications on violence and conflict, and saw the issue as a priority for development. When he left the Bank, fragility and conflict were seen as security issues that could lead to terrorism. According to high-level staff at the Bank, President Zoellick, an American national, was very receptive to such arguments, and decided to take the issue as a priority for his presidency (Interviews, Washington, D.C., July 2011).

The World Bank published the WDR on Conflict and Security in 2011, and the WDR on Gender in 2012. Both WDRs were well received according to interviewees, both within and outside of the Bank. The fact that a WDR on Security included a part on citizen security (thus with a shift in expression as compared with violence and crime prevention) might help to further open up the space for the issue within the Bank, but this is just a hypothesis as urban violence is not at the core of the report. What is noteworthy in the WDR on Conflict and Security is that beyond insisting on the importance of institutions and good governance (anti-corruption measures), the report insists on the need to work on reforming criminal justice systems, both in the judiciary and the police force. As mentioned throughout this chapter, the World Bank has never been willing to embark on these issues. Therefore a new discussion is opened and might lead to a reconsideration of its initial position on the issue (see the discussion on cognitive frame in Section 7.1 in Chapter 7). The WDR on Gender includes gender-based violence, which might lead to greater work on the issue, but this will mainly depend on the new Director of Gender who succeeded to the previously mentioned incumbent in 2012, and on the follow-up given to the WDR. This will also depend on the availability of Trust Funds. As of 2011, a new Gender Action Plan has been approved that builds on the previous one and still focuses on economic empowerment of women, *smart economics*, and leaves to one side the cultural and legal aspects of gender-based violence.
6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has shown the institutional context in which the emergence and development of violence prevention at the IADB and the World Bank has taken place. Findings from this process tracing, including a stocktaking exercise and in-depth interviews on the history of violence prevention in these two major MDBs, show that violence prevention has been largely marginalised within their development agenda, more at the World Bank than at the IADB though, and that gender has been dealt with on an ad-hoc basis when dealing with domestic and gender-based violence, and more in analytical than in operational terms. The findings also show that mainstreaming has been envisioned as a strategy that could be relevant for violence prevention in both banks, but none of them has pursued it in proactive terms, and none has further developed the concept. Why has it been so difficult for these banks to give greater priority to violence prevention given the inter-relation between violence and development, and the socio-economic multiplier effects of violence, in particular its demining power on other development investment these banks finance? What does explain the difference between both banks in regard to the emergence and evolution of the issue? Why did gender largely remain sidelined in how violence prevention was treated, despite the fact that specialists dealing with violence prevention were also gender specialists? Based on the findings of this stocktaking and process tracing exercise, Chapters 7 and 8 empirically analyse the four categories identified in the conceptual framework to answer those questions.
Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in the development agenda seeks to shift the paradigm of how violence prevention and development are understood and dealt with. The objective is to support inclusive, peaceful societies, based on the understanding that violence is the result of a context-based combination of multiple risks factors that intersect with class, gender and development, and has deep ideological roots (as discussed in Section 3.2 in Chapter 3).

Both the IADB and the World Bank have considered mainstreaming violence prevention a relevant strategy (Moser and Shrader 1999; IADB 2002), but none of them has proactively and explicitly adopted it. As explained in Chapter 6, the IADB has mainly opted for a stand-alone strategy where the multi-sectorality of violence prevention was translated within each operation. The World Bank has first included a component dealing with violence prevention in a few Urban Development projects, suggesting a beginning of ‘incorporation’ into sectors. It has not adopted a mainstreaming strategy as such, and recent developments suggest a shift towards specific stand-alone projects and budget support for the issue. Moreover, both banks currently lack clarity in goals, which is at the core of a successful mainstreaming process.

Yet, in contexts where violence has such negative socio-economic multiplier effects on all facets of development, where policymaking faces significant challenges and tends to be short-term and focus on symptoms, and where MDBs are willing to partner with governments in the search for sustainable solutions to this complex issue of violence, I ask the questions: Why have MDBs not acquired a better understanding of how mainstreaming could work to prevent violence from a gender perspective in their own agenda? The multi-sector stand-alone approach suggests an ‘integrationist mainstreaming’ at the country level. In other words, it is as if MDBs (above all the IADB) had passed on the challenge of mainstreaming to countries without applying it to themselves. Even more, the lack of
results so far and the enormous challenges in implementation (OVE 2013, 2014) indicate that they have not thought through the process in any depth and appear to make countries implement it without clarity in theory or practice. Nonetheless, MDBs work and gather incomparable experience in all sectors relevant to the prevention of violence (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2) and could use this knowledge and experience to think through how to make mainstreaming work. This inevitably begins with themselves. So this chapter and the following one investigate why MDBs have not developed a mainstreaming strategy to prevent violence and identify the opportunities and constraints for such an approach to be adopted and to transform the development agenda.

This chapter focuses on the analytical categories of cognitive frame and actor power, as described in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 in Chapter 3. Specifically, the chapter first seeks, in Section 7.1, to understand how the issue of violence has been perceived at the IADB and the World Bank, how this understanding has evolved over the years, and to what extent this understanding has influenced the emergence and treatment of the issue in each MDB’s development agenda. It also questions the perception of sector staff towards violence and the relevance of the issue for their own work. The chapter then analyses, in Section 7.2, the power of different actors within and outside MDBs. Namely, it examines if actors that support violence prevention gather enough political, advocacy-based, technical and legitimacy-based power to push the issue towards a mainstreaming process. Gender and donor-recipient relations are analysed throughout the discussions of each variable.

7.1 Cognitive frame under scrutiny

As explained in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.1), cognitive frame refers to two dimensions: the way violence is interpreted, and the extent to which violence fits the mandate of the organisation. This in turn implies looking at how MDBs’ staff understand and internalises their organisation’s mandate.

7.1.1 The interpretation of violence in development

The link between violence and economic development

At the end of the 1990s, the IADB and the World Bank published studies making the case for violence as a development issue. In 1998, the IADB financed studies to estimate the costs of violence (Londoño 1998), and in the same year, the World Bank published a
milestone study linking violence and crime to development by underlying its costs and the link to inequality (Fajnzylber et al. 1999; see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1). Yet, as McIlwaine (1999:453) emphasised, ‘violence and crime [were] not new phenomena in the field of development theory and practice.’ In fact, since the mid-1990s, the UK Development for International Development (DFID)’s White Paper and the 1995 Corbridge’s *Development studies: a reader* had already recognised violence as a development issue (ocpit). Nonetheless and despite these studies, interviewees explained that violence prevention had not been given more priority within the agenda of development banks because economists, that make up the majority of the staff, did not perceive it as an economic issue and thereafter, as a development issue. An Executive Director at the IADB further clarified that economists had not been exposed to violence as a development matter during their education or training, and thus were not trained or familiar with violence, in contrast to other issues that entered the mainstream of economics studies such as corruption or even gender (Interview, Washington, D.C., July 2011). Actually, in the previous example of the 1995 Corbridge’s reader, violence was only included in the final section on ‘New directions in development studies’ (McIlwaine 1999:454). This might explain why, even though both banks had published on the issue and specialists (even economists) within both banks were convinced and actively worked on drawing more attention to violence as a development issue, they faced constant resistance from a large part of the staff and Management. This is also why formally making the case for violence as a development issue was a necessary step to build the rationale for IADB’s and World Bank’s involvement in violence prevention (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2). They thus chose to do it through econometrical studies that were ‘speaking the language’ of MDBs’ Chief Economists, i.e. that ‘resonated’ with economists’ frames so as to engage in a dialogue with those colleagues who were reluctant to take on the idea. This also suggests why, at the World Bank, the initial efforts to work on violence were not translated into operations until several years later. In fact, the studies in Jamaica, Colombia and Guatemala (Moser and Holland 1998; Moser and McIlwaine 2001) that used urban appraisal techniques, mainly relying on qualitative methodologies such as focus groups and in-depth interviews, were regarded with

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122 Conflict is, on the other hand, more present in economics studies, which might explain why the focus has been more on this form of violence to date, as compared to urban or other forms of inter-personal violence in times of peace.
scepticism by many World Bank economists who considered such research methods as ‘anecdotal’ (Interview, key informant, London, September 2010). On the other hand, the econometrical studies were too theoretical to become projects financed by the Bank. A bridge between both approaches was missing for the World Bank to take the issue onto its agenda in the early 2000s. The resistance to alternative cognitive frames on violence was not only because violence was not perceived as a development or economic issue. It was above all because it was perceived as a security or law-and-order issue, closely related to the police and political matters.

**Violence as a law-and-order issue?**

Experts and MDBs’ staff often insisted on the specificity of violence: unlike other development topics, violence is very sensitive, politicised, and largely misunderstood. For many years, up until now in many instances, violence was considered a law-and-order issue, that is, a police-related issue, and MDBs’ staffs were no exceptions to this general understanding in the field. In fact, many specialists and managers working in LAC in both banks come from the region where the association with the criminal justice system largely prevails, despite the failure of *mano dura* policies (Moser and McIlwaine 2006; see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1). When citizens are afraid and exasperated, they tend to ask for quick and drastic measures to respond to insecurity. The media in many countries increase feelings of fear and insecurity through shocking images and alarming headlines. Opposition parties tend to use these messages to accuse the party in government of being weak in front of criminals. This happens independently of the ideology of who is in power. These contexts shape MDBs’ staff and counterparts’ cognitive frames. This is clearly seen through the reaction of the Legal departments in both banks when the first projects explicitly addressing the issue of violence were negotiated and discussed internally. MDBs’ lawyers opposed those projects, for at the time violence was considered the domain of the police, not of development agencies. At the end of the 1990s, for many within both banks and in particular for those working in Legal departments, the police represented the corrupt and brutal arm of autocratic regimes that abused their citizens’ human rights during most of the XXth century in LAC (Hinton 2006; Newburn and Hinton 2009). By looking at violence through security or police forces lenses, Legal departments voiced against MDBs’
involvement. Not only was violence not included in the mandate of the organisations, but it was forbidden according to a certain interpretation of MDBs’ mandate.

### 7.1.2 The interpretation of MDBs’ mandate and sector priorities

*Violence and the mandate of MDBs: What do the Articles of Agreement say?*

To justify their opposition, Legal departments referred to the Articles of Agreement. The Articles of Agreement are similar to the ‘constitution’ of MDBs. They state the mission and define the limits that founding members agreed on when creating each organisation. The clause on political matters is the one signalled when mentioning violence. This clause is similar in both banks. It strictly limits the involvement of each MDB to economic development, and forbids justifying projects or activities based on political matters. That is, economic development and growth in developing countries must be the only criterion to justify support to client countries in both banks (Article I on the purpose of each organisation is similar in both sets of Articles of Agreement). The Articles of Agreement do not specify further nor include a detailed list of prohibited activities. As such, they leave room for interpretation.

Clause f) of Article VIII (Organisation and Management) of IADB’s Articles of Agreement (1959) states:

> ‘The Bank, its officers and employees shall not interfer[e] in the political affairs of any member, nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purpose and functions stated in Article I.’

Clause 10 of Article IV of World Bank’s Articles of Agreement (1945, 1989) deals with ‘political activity prohibited’. The section says as follows:

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123 Article VIII, Organisation and Management. Article I refers to Purpose and Functions, with Section I stating the purpose: ‘The purpose of the Bank shall be to contribute to the acceleration of the process of economic development of the member countries, individually and collectively’, available at [http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_C-15_Agreement_Establishing_the_Inter-American_Development_Bank.htm](http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_C-15_Agreement_Establishing_the_Inter-American_Development_Bank.htm), accessed January 2012.
‘The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I.’ 124

Both sets of Articles of Agreement call for ‘these considerations [to] be weighted impartially’, but do not explicitly explain what this entails. Hence, it is not surprising that different interpretations have been made. Actually, despite a high degree of similarity, each bank refers to the Articles of Agreement in a different manner.

At the IADB, the Legal department referred to the Articles of Agreement saying the IADB should not get involved in political matters. The cognitive association between violence, crime, and the police (and thus the association with political matters) predominated. However, in the regional bank, this frame was less important than the need to act, for the proximity with the region made the seriousness of the situation too salient to be ignored. President Iglesias, an Uruguayan national, travelled a lot to the region to better understand governments’ preoccupations. According to close colleagues of the former President, Iglesias rapidly understood that violence was a development issue (Interview, IADB, Washington, D.C., July 2011). In addition, the group of Colombians mentioned in Section 6.2.1 in Chapter 6 were inspired by Mayor Mockus’ success in Bogotá, which showed that prevention could work. They felt the principles applied in Colombia could be adapted to other contexts of the region that urgently needed it. This combination of factors (that I discuss further in Section 7.2 when examining actor power) might explain why beyond the Legal department’s resistance, the regional bank was nevertheless responsive and very much receptive to the urgency of the situation.

This was not a smooth process though. After the first projects were approved (1998), controversies still continued. In the early 2000s, operational staff and Management requested more clarity about what the IADB could and could not do in this complex and sensitive area. The 2002 Preliminary Guidelines and the 2009 Operational Guidelines intended to address those concerns by including few limitations (arms, military, intelligence) explicitly linked to the prohibition referred to in Article VIII Section f (political matters) of the Articles of Agreement. Yet, the 2002 and 2009 Guidelines explicitly allow the possibility to work with the police and penitentiary systems. As such, the interpretation of the Articles of Agreement at the IADB has only limited teams to get involved in military and intelligence-related activities, and has left the door opened for a broad scope of interventions.

At the World Bank, the interpretation has been more restrictive, and as such, more constraining to taking on violence. In fact, the risks associated with financing police forces were considered substantial for the World Bank in case those forces were to be accused of political manoeuvres (coup d’Etat, or abuse against opposition parties), or any other kinds of human rights abuse (Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011). As previously mentioned, the cognitive frame associating violence with police explains such restrictive interpretation. These concerns were understandable insofar as they referred to the history of dictatorship and the role played by the police in some countries that led to human rights abuse (Hinton 2006; Hinton and Newburn 2009). However, this interpretation was also based on a restricted view of the role of the police in addressing violence and crime (mainly discarding their preventive role)125 and did not take into account the diversity of situations in the region. Operational teams failed to convincingly challenge this dominant frame, and instead responded to the Legal department’s concerns with caution and restriction. They insisted that the organisation’s involvement would be limited to a few infrastructure and

125 The fact that many publications of the World Bank acknowledged the preventive role of the police and consider it an important component to any strategy to prevent crime and violence suggests either the difficulty of internal pedagogy that operational teams faced, or an accommodation derived from a restrictive interpretation of the Articles of Agreement as the team did not have the expertise nor the will to get engaged into police reforms. That is, instead of the risk to work with the police (which shows a limited understanding of the role of the police that includes a range of preventive activities), another explanation might be that the World Bank does not have (and is not willing for now to build) the expertise for police reform, and then uses the Articles of Agreement to avoid dealing with this very complex and risky issue.
social development-related activities (see Section 6.3.2 in Chapter 6). In other words, the Articles of Agreement were interpreted in such a way that the World Bank could only get involved with violence in a very limited and almost apologetic fashion, instead of making violence prevention a priority for development. Other politically sensitive and risky issues like corruption also awakened significant controversies within the organisation, but in the latter case, they did not impede the Bank from intervening and setting corruption as a priority for development, suggesting the existence of specific resistance towards violence.

The majority of interviewees at the World Bank supported the restrictive interpretation of the Articles of Agreement, and even considered it an opportunity that the Bank ‘could not’ finance police-related matters. Most of them acknowledged the importance of reforming police forces in many countries, and even mentioned community policing in their studies, but did not feel comfortable with the idea of ‘their Bank’ getting directly involved with it. They preferred the straightforward message that the Bank could only finance social and situational preventive interventions. This explains to a large extent why the initial interpretation has not been challenged over the past decade. Nevertheless, interviews with the actual LAC Coordinator of the Violence and Crime Prevention team (who had recently taken office at the time of the interviews as indicated in Section 6.3 in Chapter 6) mentioned the need to reinterpret the Articles of Agreement to expand the scope of action. He, in fact, sees criminal justice reforms as incontrovertible reforms to really help improve the situation to lessen violence and crime in many countries of the region, in particular those with the weakest institutions, and to position the Bank as strategic partner for the issue (Interview, Washington, D.C., July 2011). The recent Conflict and Security WDR goes in the same direction when it refers to the need to work on institutional strengthening of the criminal justice systems, and insists on its importance to prevent violence of all types, economic, social and political (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.5 on WDRs).

The dominant interpretation of the Articles of Agreement in both banks relates to their respective interpretation of their own mandate, which in turn refers to the composition of each bank’s Board of Directors.

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126 Beyond the fact that the same persons remained in charge of the issue for most of the 2000s (when there were persons in charge).
Board composition and the interpretation of each Bank’s mandate

Interviewees in each bank pointed to the difference in Board composition as a core factor to understand the dominant culture, in particular as regard to taking risks, adopting change, and engaging in new issues such as violence prevention. The organisational culture in fact defines what cognitive frame is salient and credible to MDBs as they interpret their own mission as development banks (see Benford and Snow (2000)’s criteria for defining what makes a frame resonates as discussed in Section 3.3.1 in Chapter 3).

The Board of Directors is a permanent body in MDBs and represents the Board of Governors, the highest entity that represents the shareholders and makes all major decisions for the organisation. The Board of Directors is in charge of the operations of the banks, including the approval of loans, policies and strategies, among other duties. At the IADB, the Board of Directors is composed of 14 Executive Directors who represent 48 countries. At the World Bank, the Board of Directors is composed of 25 Executive Directors representing 187 countries. The voting power of the Executive Directors depends on the contribution of each country to the capital of each bank. At the IADB, Latin American countries hold 50.02 per cent of the votes, and at the World Bank, the region holds 8.64 per cent. In both banks, Boards’ members are predominantly males. Table 1 shows

\[127\] The IADB and the World Bank have a similar organisational structure at least in its higher instances. The Governors are representatives of the member countries, in general Ministers of Finance or Planning, or Presidents of Central Banks, who meet once or twice every year to make the most important policy decisions. Each Governor has a voting power proportional to the subscription of his or her country to the capital of the banks. During the rest of the year, they delegate their oversight power to the Board of Executive Directors. The President legally represents the organisation and is responsible for managing the operations and administration. The Board of Governors elects the President. The President chairs the meetings of the Board of Executive Directors but has no vote (except when there are equal votes in favour and against a decision). The President also proposes policies to the Board.

\[128\] IADB’s members countries are grouped as follows: Croatia, Japan, Korea, Portugal, Slovenia and UK (6.1%), US (30.01%), Canada (4%), Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, Sweden and Spain (4.78%), Belgium, Germany, Italy, Israel, Netherland, Switzerland and China (5.09%), Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay (2.45%), Brazil and Suriname (10.84%), Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua (2.42%), Chile and Ecuador (3.53%), Colombia and Peru (4.39%), Argentina and Haiti (11.18%), Panama and Venezuela (6.19%).

\[129\] At the World Bank, and as of January 2012, the countries that have at least 2% of the votes are (in addition to those earlier mentioned in Table 17): Saudi Arabia (2.68%), India (2.68%), China (2.68%), Canada (2.68%), Italy (2.68%), The Russian Federation (2.68%), the Netherlands (2.13%) and Brazil (2%). As part of the 2010 capital increase, the Governors of the World Bank agreed on increasing the voting powers of Developing and Transition countries at IBRD (+3.13 percentage point). They now hold 47.19% of the shares and voting power (compared to 42.6 in 2008).
the distribution of the main voting power by country or group of countries, and Table 18 presents the composition of MDBs’ Boards by gender.

Table 17: Voting power by country, or group of, at the IADB and World Bank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IADB Voting power</th>
<th>World Bank* Voting power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>50.02%</td>
<td>US 15.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>30.01%</td>
<td>Japan 9.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European countries and Japan, Israel, Korea and China</td>
<td>15.97%</td>
<td>Germany 4.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>LAC 8.64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See footnotes 126 for the balance of voting power at the World Bank.

Table 18: IADB’s and World Bank’s Boards composition by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IADB</th>
<th>World Bank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ED</td>
<td>Alternate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interviewees pointed out how Board’s composition influenced MDBs’ organisational culture. At the IADB, the fact that LAC countries hold the majority of shares makes the regional bank more demand-driven. The regional bank is indeed generally seen and sees itself as a ‘friendly bank’ (‘banco hermano’ or ‘banco amigo’ in Spanish). As such, it gives pre-eminence to responding to countries’ needs (Interviews, Washington, D.C, April 2011). This would be the salience element in what makes a frame resonate for the regional bank. The World Bank reacts differently and might give more importance to the credibility aspect that arguably makes it more risk-adverse. In fact, it struggles with a higher division of

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130 The respective voting power for LAC countries at the World Bank are (by alphabetical order): Antigua and Barbuda (0.05%), Argentina (1.08%), The Bahamas (0.08%), Barbados (0.07%), Belize (0.05%), Bolivia (0.12%), Brazil (2%), Chile (0.43%), Colombia (0.5%), Costa Rica (0.03%), Dominican Republic (0.14%), Ecuador (0.18%), El Salvador (0.02%), Grenada (0.05%), Guatemala (0.13%), Guyana (0.08%), Haiti (0.08%), Honduras (0.05%), Jamaica (0.17%), Mexico (1.13%), Nicaragua (0.05%), Panama (0.04%), Paraguay (0.09%), Peru (0.33%), St Kitts and Nevis (0.03%), St Lucia (0.05%), St Vincent and the Grenadines (0.03%), Trinidad and Tobago (0.17%), Uruguay (0.18%), and Venezuela (1.23%).
votes making it a more cautious organisation that needs to build consensus on every decision or change.\textsuperscript{131}

Differences in organisational culture and frame resonance are clearly illustrated in the case of violence. The urgency of the situation in many countries in LAC made IADB Board members, at least the borrowing members, acknowledge the importance to get involved, and support countries in their search for solutions (conditions for salience were met). In comparison, this acknowledgement was more ambiguous at the World Bank where LAC countries account only for less than ten per cent altogether and in the absence of rigorous evidence to guide interventions (conditions for credibility were not met). However, tensions existed in both banks, even at the IADB, also because of the importance played by the US in both Boards, and the dominant US cognitive frame on violence and security. As one Executive Director at the IADB explained, even in the traditionally demand-driven regional bank, it had taken a long time to put violence on the agenda because of the influence of the US and their understanding of violence as a law enforcement issue (Interview, Washington, D.C., March 2011). Since the IADB and the World Bank have their Headquarters in Washington D.C., and the US holds a large proportion of the shares in each bank, their interpretation indeed matters (opcit).

Cognitive frames and mainstreaming: is violence seen as a priority for sectors?

To mainstream inclusive violence prevention, in addition to a common understanding on what is to be mainstreamed (Walby 2005), clarity on the relevance of the issue to each sector and vice versa is essential. Among the eight sectors selected, all interviewees acknowledged the importance of violence in LAC and its link to development. Specialists in Social Sectors, in particular in Education and Social Protection, were those who more proactively engaged with the issue. At the IADB, respondents in Education and Social Protection sectors mentioned they were working on violence prevention in school as per country’s demand and were willing to engage more accordingly. At the World Bank, in particular after President Zoellick visited El Salvador, Sector Specialists were mobilised to

\textsuperscript{131} In fact, five countries (US, Japan, Germany, France, and UK) gather 38.68 per cent of voting power and weigh comparatively much more than all other regions. Each of these five countries have their own Executive Director as well as China, the Russian Federation, and Saudi Arabia. The rest of the countries are grouped and elect one Executive Director that would represent them all.
work on violence prevention and acknowledged its relevance to the World Bank’s work. Nonetheless, interviewees across sectors also insisted on the fact that violence prevention was not a priority. Actually, beyond Social Sectors, many were unclear on the relevance of the issue to their sector, and all expressed hesitation as to how they could contribute to violence reduction through their sector work. Even in Education, Specialists mentioned the fact that education systems in Latin America and the Caribbean were already facing enormous issues in terms of quality of education and reduction of drop out rates, and their list of items to check in weak-institutional capacity contexts was already too long to add the contentious and extremely complex task of violence prevention:

‘In countries like Honduras where teachers are on strike 100 days a year, it is difficult to envision how to ask the sector to contribute to violence prevention.’

(Senior Education Specialist, World Bank, Washington, D.C., April 2011)

In general, responses paralleled the situation in countries. Team leaders working in upper middle-income countries like Mexico, Brazil or Colombia saw much more possibilities than those working in LMIC or LICs like Honduras, Nicaragua or Haiti.

Within Social Sectors, it is noteworthy that Health Specialists were the most reluctant to include violence prevention as a health issue. At the IADB, they were sceptical regarding potential demand from countries for mainstreaming violence prevention (in particular from a gender perspective) into health sectors because of the practical consequences of it:

‘You can screen for domestic violence for example, but then what happens if you do not have a full route of attention or if there are reprisals against doctors who identify abuses?’ (Division Chief, IADB, Washington D.C., April 2011)

At the World Bank, they explained that the Health Sector focused on health systems and did not go into details such as curricula or hospitals guidelines for systematic screening.

Beyond Social Sectors, Specialists working in Urban Transport in both banks immediately acknowledged the relevance of the issue to their sector, for people often feel most vulnerable in public transportation. They clearly said the issue was not taken into account

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132 Their scepticism was corroborated by Colombian counterparts in the Health Ministry as discussed in Chapter 9, Section 9.1.1.
as of the time of the interviews (2011), except in an ad-hoc basis when local governments explicitly asked for it. That was the case for the World Bank in Peru (with cameras in bus stations) and Mexico (differentiated buses for women, men and children to avoid sexual harassment). But they saw violence prevention and gender as case-by-case issues to be dealt with to respond to specific demands from countries, and neither at the IADB nor at the World Bank did Urban Transport Specialists see their own organisation taking the lead in mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention.

As for Urban Development, Specialists interviewed at the World Bank were the most engaged with the issue, but they were also the ones managing the Slum Upgrading projects that included violence prevention components. In that respect, they were not entirely representative. They nevertheless pinpointed key opportunities and bottlenecks for MiVP as they explained how they focused on improving basic services in very violent neighbourhoods and included social activities to recreate social capital, but also emphasised barriers in terms of cognitive frame:

‘I bet you ask three colleagues of mine, all of them will say the Bank cannot do anything on violence because we don’t deal with police. Same is true with CDs [Country Directors]. In LAC, everybody agrees that violence is a huge concern. The issue is not a lack of appreciation or recognition that violence is important, the issue is to make clear what the Bank can do about it. Still violence is too often linked to police/repression and people retract saying the Bank cannot deal with this.’ (Lead Urban Development Specialist, World Bank, Washington, D.C., March 2011)

Sector Specialists responses in both banks suggest that there are margins of manoeuvre within MDBs to build a common understanding around inclusive violence prevention and its shared responsibility, but this is yet to be done. Most interviewees had a good knowledge and experience in Latin America and the Caribbean, which made the issue resonate with them. Some initially referred to the need to strengthen criminal justice institutions, and then quickly acknowledged that the issue required also the involvement of other sectors. The gender dimension was not systematically perceived though, but often acknowledged throughout the conversation. Findings also suggest that some sectors, in particular Education and Social Protection/Youth Development, engage more easily with
the issue and what their sector can contribute to preventing violence. This in turn suggests that a sequencing approach to the mainstreaming process might be relevant.

The resistance from other sectors referred more to the comparative advantage of MDBs towards the issue. That is, if cognitive aspects on violence were major constraints at the beginning of the process when violence had still to emerge on the agenda of MDBs, at the beginning of the 2010s, cognitive frames were still a constraint insofar as they were linked to being able to imagine what the IADB or the World Bank in general, and each sector in particular, could bring to the issue. It was therefore sector ownership for the shared responsibility for violence prevention that was not well established. In other words, the goal of the mainstreaming process as inclusive, peaceful societies was not a frame that easily resonated with MDBs Sector Specialists, to use Benford and Snow (2000)’s concepts (see Section 3.3.1 in Chapter 3). However, as Benford and Snow show, frames can be changed to increase their resonance in the target population.

Other cognitive constraints had to do with how mainstreaming itself was perceived. Most interviewees across sectors understood mainstreaming in its integrationist perspective, and mainly expressed resistance to the concept (see for instance the quote on gender mainstreaming in Section 6.3.4 in Chapter 6). They considered mainstreaming implied additional bureaucratic chores to their daily work, and were sceptical about its effectiveness as a strategy. We see here how debates surrounding the integrationist approach and its technocratic nature still prevail in MDBs (Razavi and Miller 2005; Hannan 2000; Rao and Kelleher 1995; see Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3).

Overall, findings from interviews with EDs, Managers and Specialists working in violence prevention and in eight different sectors confirm the relevance of cognitive frames and common understanding (or lack thereof) not only to comprehend the process of priority setting in MDBs but also to identify opportunities and constraints for mainstreaming in its political sense. To take a step further and go deeper into the analysis of current constraints and potential opportunities, a corollary question must be asked: with whom do (or should) such frames resonate to produce change? That is, the different actors and their respective power must now be examined.
7.2 Actor power: who did (or did not) make change happen?

While an organisation may be created with a particular mandate, what it actually does primarily depends on the people who give it life. They are those who lead it, manage it, work for it, and interact with it. They are those who hold, keep, change or influence internal and external cognitive frames, and decide the destiny of an issue on the development agenda. Interview data at the IADB and the World Bank confirm that four groups of actors need to come together and use their particular power for the emergence, institutionalisation and mainstreaming of an issue to happen. They are supportive political leaders, legitimate champions, a critical mass of in-house experts, and interested local and national Government counterparts.

7.2.1 The role of political leadership in MDBs

The role of Presidents

As Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.1) explained, the political leadership of President Iglesias (1988-2005) played a decisive role in getting violence prevention on the agenda at the IADB. Thereafter, President Moreno (2005-2015) and the Board of Directors recurrently showed their support to citizen security and acknowledged its importance for the region (in public events and at Board sessions). Nonetheless, no vision in terms of mainstreaming exists, and even regarding citizen security as a sector in itself, messages from the top remain general as it is unclear where the IADB stands in terms of goals and comparative advantage (OVE 2014).

In contrast, the lack of explicit political leadership from the highest authority at the World Bank might contribute to explaining the long, initial struggle the global financial institution experienced before engaging in violence prevention. When President Zoellick took a stand for violence as a development issue when visiting Central America in 2010, greater mobilisation and visibility followed, as well as more access to Trust Funds (Interview, World Bank, Washington, D.C, April 2011; see also Section 6.3.3 in Chapter 6). The importance of political leadership also clearly appears at the World Bank regarding domestic violence and its prevention for staff members and their families (see Box 5). In terms of mainstreaming, interviewees in the Education and Transport Sectors considered that strong political leadership sending the message that the Board of Directors or the
President would expect violence prevention to be mainstreamed in sectors would help catalyse efforts. A former World Bank Vice-President commented on how climate change flourished with high level support, and she affirmed, based on thirty years of experience at the World Bank, that ‘you need to send out a vision from the top’ (Former World Bank Vice President, Washington D.C., April 2011). However, even after President Zoellick’s visit to El Salvador and the publication of the WDRs on Security and on Gender, no signs of clear political leadership are apparent that would make violence prevention and the development of a corresponding strategy a priority for the World Bank.

**Box 5: Leading by example? The World Bank's domestic violence prevention programme**

Applying to yourself what you preach for others is a powerful message. Domestic violence prevention programmes for Bank’ staff and their families provides such an example. It highlights the importance of political leadership as it shows how such a chronic issue might gain or lose visibility according to the political support it receives. An in-depth interview with the Coordinator for Domestic Violence Prevention at the World Bank helped retrace the evolution of the programme over the past fifteen years.133

The World Bank Family Network (WBFN) started in 1972 as ‘Wives’, an association of staff members’ wives who gathered to develop activities for families and defend women’s rights in cases of abuse or divorce. At the time, the large majority of World Bank staff members were males who brought their wives with them and who then entirely depended on their husband in a country where they did not have family support. In the 2000s, President Wolfensohn’s wife supported the association, and her husband provided it with an annual budget so that it could expand its services. The association then grew and gained visibility to reach out and help women victims of domestic violence at the Bank.

When President Wolfowitz (2005-2007) came to the World Bank, he did not stop the programme, but did not support it either, and political leadership disappeared. The same was true with President Zoellick (2007-2012) who did not actively support - without blocking - the programme. Only Managing Director Ngozi, an African female leader from Nigeria, actively supported it by attending every annual meeting and delivering speeches. More generally, the issue of domestic violence gained some visibility through the 2012 World Development Report on Gender, but remains a virtually non-existent issue in the Bank’s operational work despite being a widespread worldwide phenomenon.

Today, the World Bank’s internal programme records on average one hundred cases a year. The population has diversified, for one third of World Bank staff are now women, and gay partners more openly seek out help when needed. One major hindrance for the programme to be truly effective, according to the interviewee, is to tie professional advancement to ethical conduct. In fact, people who abuse their partner are usually known and nonetheless continue progressing in their career. The World Bank has not taken such a major step yet.

The donor community and the development of an external policy community

In their model on political priority setting for public health initiatives in the global arena, Shiffman and Smith (2007) highlighted the need for an external policy community, i.e. a

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133 The same programme formally exists at the IADB. Nonetheless, the World Bank coordinator is the reference for the IADB’s programme, for no in-house coordinator is in function. The IADB has some information booklets in Washington D.C. and in countries where it has offices, but there is no strong political leadership to support the programme. Such leadership would give an important signal of the importance and coherence the regional bank gives to the issue, whose staff mainly come from a region that suffers from endemic domestic violence.
network of institutions, rules, civil movements, or academics pushing for the issue. Rao and Kelleher (1995) and Razavi and Miller (2005) also acknowledged the specific role that donors could play within or outside international bureaucracies to push for an issue to be mainstreamed (see Section 3.3, Tables 4, 6 and 7 in Chapter 3). The importance of the donor community was confirmed during interviews with staff members. Transport Specialists at the IADB and the World Bank, for instance, mentioned the fact that road safety became mainstreamed in all Transport projects through the mobilisation of the donor community. This translated in a special partnership between the World Bank and WHO that together published a ground-breaking annual report on road safety. Universal access was also mainstreamed in all Transport projects through clear donors priority given to the issue in the form of large amounts of funding from Trust Funds and the hiring of specialists (Interviews IADB and World Bank, Bogotá and Washington, D.C, May and July 2011).

In the case of violence prevention, a strong and coherent external policy community is only emerging. Until 2011, no formal worldwide authority or coalition led concerted efforts on the issue. The World Health Organisation played a major role in framing violence as a preventable issue following its 2002 World Report. However, only recently did it reach out beyond public health to embrace a wider community through the Global Campaign for Violence Prevention. Nevertheless, it must still be considered as an emerging external policy community, for none of the MDBs formally refers to it in their own strategy and none has actually officially adopted a public health approach. As for other initiatives, they have been limited and not coordinated. The UNODC gathers worldwide statistics on homicides, but it does not have a mandate on violence prevention as such, nor does it have multi-sector expertise. In the early 2000, the Inter-American Coalition for Violence Prevention sought to create a policy community by gathering major development agencies to share knowledge and build synergies on violence prevention in the region. Nonetheless, the Coalition has lost visibility, if not relevance. The fact that it remained without a coordinator for several months in 2011 seems to confirm this. Other initiatives to build a policy community on violence prevention include the regional meetings of Ministers in charge of Citizen Security and Public Health in LAC supported by the Organisation of American States (OAS), as well as UN-led efforts to give greater visibility to gender-based violence (UNIFEM), or push for safer cities (UN-Habitat). Nonetheless, to date, there are
no worldwide authorities or conferences on violence prevention that would enhance a concerted effort on the issue, reconcile different perspectives and try to build a coherent global vision.

As per the donor community, even though both MDBs have similar shareholders, they mobilised differently at the IADB and the World Bank. At the IADB, because of the regional status and the smaller number of shareholders, the issue gained more support from donors as evidenced through a Special Initiative on Citizen Security amounting to USD 20 million for a four-year period.\footnote{As of 2012, the initiative has financed more than USD 12 million in grants. Available at: \url{http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/citizen-security/citizen-security,1200.html}, accessed May 31, 2014.} So far, this recent initiative is the largest Trust Fund on citizen security in the development community. It could be seen as a political agenda from donors to push the issue forward in IADB’s development agenda, in a similar fashion, but in no comparable scope, as what happened for climate change or universal access in transport. However, the terms of reference of the Special Initiative are vague and do not include a clear goal or roadmap as to what the IADB would like to achieve with it, with even less clarity on mainstreaming (see also the discussion on organisational treatment in Section 8.2.2 in Chapter 8). At the World Bank, unlike other issues such as HIV/AIDS or climate change, there is no mobilisation on urban violence. In the former case, the UK played a major role to push for the issue, which materialised into a USD 5 billion multi-donor Climate Change Trust Fund. The international community, and European countries in particular, have not mobilised in a similar fashion for violence in LAC, in part because they do not directly suffer from the consequences of violence that remain very local (recently though, pandillas from LAC have been identified in the UK, Spain and Portugal, which might awaken greater concern from these countries). This is also because donors’ attention nowadays mainly focuses on Africa, where the issue of conflict overshadows all other issues related to violence (Interview, World Bank, Washington, D.C., April 2011). This overall lack of vision is linked to the question of champions in both organisations, or the lack thereof, for part of the 2000s and until recently.
7.2.2 Were champions legitimate?

This research shows how the emergence and ups and downs of violence prevention as an issue in both MDBs were idiosyncratic, i.e. followed the presence (or lack) of champions who embodied the issue. At the IADB, in the late 1990s, Gender Specialists Buvinic and Morrison, and Economist Londoño took the lead in making the case for violence prevention as a development issue. They did so through a series of studies, similar to what Moser and Collier did at the World Bank. When Buvinic, Morrison and Londoño left the IADB in the mid-2000s, the issue lost its champions. The lack of in-house champions impacted arguably more on quality than on quantity, for it did not stop the issue from expanding. In fact, following the realignment, a Cluster (first informal and then formal) was instrumental in locating the issue within the organisation, and the demand-driven culture of the regional bank helped sustain the issue on the agenda, as I explain further in Section 8.2 in Chapter 8.

Between 1996 and 2002 at the World Bank, Collier in DEC (‘Development Economics Vice Presidency’, the Research Department of the World Bank), and Moser, first at the Anchor, and then in the LAC region, created space for dialogue and investigation on violence, despite strong internal resistance. DEC formally stopped working on violence-related issues after Collier had left the World Bank. The paradigm he developed with his team on conflict and development remained unchallenged, and the Chief Economists who followed had other priorities for their research agendas. As a Lead Researcher explained:

‘Research and priorities are very idiosyncratic at the Bank; it all depends on people’s preferences’ (Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011).

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135 Buvinic later became the World Bank Director for Gender.

136 I could not retrieve the exact level of seniority and title of these three IADB staff members, but they were leading their respective agenda.

137 As explained in Section 6.3.1 in Chapter 6, other key staff members played major roles: LAC Chief Economist Perry and his team, and Lead Economist Fajnzylber who published milestone research with Lederman and Loayza to show the relationship between violence and development (or mal-development), and showing that inequality mattered more than poverty per se.

138 As the Lead Researcher further explained, researchers who used to work with Paul Collier and who consider the issue of violence important for the development agenda continue working on the issue, but informally and during their personal time. So far, there is no institutional support to formally develop research on violence and crime (Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011).
In operations, when Moser left the Bank, the issue became orphaned for four years. When a small team took back the issue, it took several years for it to gain visibility again, arguably and among other reasons, because no legitimate champions supported it. In terms of gender, as explained in Section 6.3.4 in Chapter 6, the new Director opted for a strategy focusing on ‘smart economics’ rather than violence prevention, and domestic violence and other gender dimensions of violence lacked their own legitimate champions.

7.2.3 Wanted: critical mass of in-house experts

Along with the change in champions, and lack thereof since the mid-2000s, the lack of in-house expertise appears as a key factor hindering the emergence and institutionalisation of violence prevention at the IADB and the World Bank. Interviewees explained that in a context where there are many competing priorities and the relevance of MDBs is open to question, in particular in upper middle-income countries (see Box 2 in Chapter 1), in-house expertise is essential to push internally for the issue and to show the banks’ capacity to effectively respond to potential demand.

At the IADB, the team in charge of citizen security changed several times over the past decade (including a major change in 2007 with the realignment, and Division Chiefs leaving the IADB as explained in Section 6.2.3 in Chapter 6). At the time of this research (2010-2014), seven staff members in Headquarters and eleven Specialists in country offices formed the IADB team on citizen security. However, these specialists were simultaneously in charge of all topics related to the ‘Modernisation of the State’. That is, they were not experts in citizen security, but instead were in charge of ‘managing’ loans and other activities within a broad area that included citizen security. In fact, many interviewees raised the issue of lack of in-house expertise, showing, to say the least, a distrust regarding the capacity of the team in place to develop a clear strategy on violence prevention. The lack of in-house expertise might be a consequence rather than a cause though. It could indeed be understood from an opposite perspective: the organisation did not bring or put adequate resources to build a stronger and larger expertise because the issue was not considered a priority worth mainstreaming (thus uncovering a gap between rhetoric and practice). In the case of climate change for example, MDBs built their expertise or are doing it because they consider climate change a key topic for development for the years to
come. This was also due to strong external leadership and financial support from European countries, as previously discussed in Section 7.2.1 on political leadership. Moreover, recruiting experts is also a challenge that cannot be underestimated. From my experience of working at the IADB, I could witness how the Cluster of Citizen Security struggled to keep experts and fill new positions. The alternate strategy to compensate the lack of in-house expertise has been to recruit external consultants, which is a common strategy in both MDBs, in particular for budgetary constraints. Nonetheless, consultants cannot replace in-house experts on which depends the quality of policy dialogue, in-house knowledge agenda, projects’ negotiations with clients, project design and supervision, and strategy preparation (OVE 2014).

As for experts in other sectors at the IADB, a greater collaboration between the Citizen Security Cluster and the Gender Division did emerge when Morrison, who was one of the initial champions of violence prevention at the IADB in the early 2000, was appointed Division Chief of the Gender and Diversity Division, confirming the importance of legitimate champions in that respect. The IADB’s Education Division hired a Specialist to specifically work on violence prevention in school, which arguably shows the growing importance of building in-house expertise on the issue in Education. But an Education Specialist quickly downplayed such optimism as she declared:

‘The issue [violence prevention] is clearly not a priority in the sector. In fact, it is even not discussed [among us].’ (Interview, Washington, D.C., March 2011)

Moreover, within the pool of Specialists working on Citizen Security at the IADB, none had specific sector knowledge, and as such, none of them could support other sectors in a mainstreaming perspective. This was even less so considering the lack of trust Sector Specialists expressed when referring to the Cluster of Citizen Security. That is, when Specialists were not considered knowledgeable professionals, other sectors felt hesitant in collaborating with them. We are thus still far from the double, let alone triple, expertise

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139 In fact, when a Lead Specialist left the IADB (to join the World Bank as long-term expert consultant, i.e. not staff member), the position remained vacant several months. At the time I am revising the thesis (2014) the position is still unfilled when the Lead Specialist had left a year ago.
required to mainstream inclusive violence prevention as put forth by Rao and Sandler (2012) (see Section 3.3.2 in Chapter 3).

At the World Bank, the team only included one staff member and two consultants throughout most of the 2000 decade and until 2009, when the team shifted to Social Development. Under the Social Development department, from 2009 to 2011, the violence prevention LAC team included two Specialists and one long-term consultant, plus additional consultants as per needs required and budget allowed (see Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 in Chapter 6). These three persons were in charge of violence prevention for the whole of the LAC region. The Anchor provided additional support with one or two experts. Efforts to expand the critical mass of Specialists included training country office staff members through the online course provided by the World Bank Institute (WBI), so as to enable them to respond to Government’s punctual demand and develop policy dialogue on the issue. However, the World Bank violence prevention team remained understaffed considering the importance of violence in LAC and the need to develop both an internal and external agenda on the topic, in particular considering that this involved organising recurrent events (like Brown Bag Lunches (BBLs) and conferences) and developing studies and toolkits, in addition to the operational work. As far as the Anchor was concerned, the team had strengthened, even though the twelve persons were in majority consultants, which means a greater degree of team precariousness. More importantly, the Anchor included a large spectrum of complex issues, spanning political violence and civil war to forced displacement, youth and gender-based violence, and urban crime and violence (see Section 6.3.4 in Chapter 6). So, among the twelve persons, only two or three persons worked on interpersonal violence in urban contexts, and were in charge of knowledge products as well as cross support to operations in LAC and Africa. As for Specialists in other sectors who might have provided expertise on specific aspects of violence prevention, such as gender-based violence, domestic violence, or bullying at school to cite but a few, they were not formally organised. In that respect, the new team in charge of violence prevention took the

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140 Consultants might leave or change units more easily than staff members, making institutional memory unpredictable and dependent on the good will of predecessors, in particular in absence of training.

141 Of course, understaffing is not specific to violence prevention and is rather common to non-traditional topics, as opposed to more World Bank core business ones such as infrastructure or public health.
initiative of developing a multi-sector monthly meeting (called BEAM),\textsuperscript{142} so as to identify and engage specialists from other sectors interested in violence prevention, create a network of sector-specific focal persons, and share knowledge. Interviewees could not cite any examples of the outcomes of such meetings though. In contrast, an issue that had a critical mass of in-house experts, such as climate change, grew relatively quickly on the agenda of the World Bank. As a former Vice-President of the World Bank explained regarding climate change:

‘You need both top-down and bottom-up. At the bottom, inside the Bank, you had people who had been practicing and wanted climate change, above all in Anchors where they did a lot of analytical work. They were thinking about the issue and were ready.’ (Former World Bank Vice-President, Washington, D.C., April 2011)\textsuperscript{143}

7.2.4 Is there demand for MDBs’ support in violence prevention from Government counterparts?

Overall, the greater number of IADB’s citizen security projects as well as their visibility in the region shows that demand for IADB’s support is greater than for the World Bank’s. Yet, as highlighted in Chapters 1 and 6, only sixteen projects in fourteen years for the whole region show that demand for the regional bank’s support has been slow, and might depend on other factors, as I explain in Chapter 9 when studying the case study of Colombia and counterparts’ perception of MDBs in violence prevention.

\textsuperscript{142} Aware of both the constraints and the necessity for multi-sector work, the team in charge of violence prevention at the World Bank developed an initiative to create a space for discussion among specialists of different sectors. This took the form of meetings called BEAM. The BEAM meetings gathered focal points from a variety of sectors that were interested in the issue of violence prevention. They met once a month to share information on what other sectors were doing on violence prevention. The focal point was then responsible for sharing this information with their colleagues in their own sector. BEAM participants interviewed had different opinions. While some argued that the chairing should rotate (it was under the Social Development sector that was formally in charge of violence and crime prevention) so as to increase the mobilisation of other sectors and listen to their perspectives, others considered the BEAM meetings were a very positive and useful space to share information and enhance internal pedagogy and communication on what could be done in violence prevention. However, none could tell me what the BEAM had produced in terms of multi-sector efforts (Interviews, World Bank, Washington, D.C., April and July 2011).

\textsuperscript{143} The Director of the Anchor in charge of violence prevention shared such analysis, and attempted to develop a corresponding strategy, but implementing it with such a small team was, as he stressed, ‘a challenging task’ (Interview, World Bank, Washington, D.C., July 2011).
At the World Bank, staff members recurrently emphasised the lack of countries demand for violence prevention when commenting on the quasi-inexistent operational portfolio. According to a World Bank Violence Prevention Specialist, two anecdotes illustrate how the Bank was not seen as a potential partner in violence prevention. In Senegal, during a conference organised by the European Forum for Urban Security, the above-mentioned specialist asked the Country Director about Government’s demand in urban violence. The CD replied that this was not an issue in Senegal and that the Government never brought it up in discussions. During the conference, the expert learned from the Prime Minister himself that he wanted to work with the European Forum on the issue. The World Bank was simply not considered a relevant partner in the area and Governments were seeking policy advice elsewhere. Another anecdote relates to a similar situation in Mexico. Although the situation worsened dramatically in terms of violence, the World Bank country office felt reluctant to engage in discussions with the Government on this matter. They felt the Bank did not have the capacity, tools or will to support the country in that endeavour. It was only when the LAC team engaged in proactive policy dialogue through trust-funded workshops and conferences that the issue arose in discussions. Such a priority issue for Mexico was ignored for many years in discussions by both parties simply because the Government and the World Bank country office did not know how the World Bank could help in violence prevention. Instead, Mexico turned to the US and Colombia.

In terms of Gender issues, when I asked why very few projects adopted a gender perspective or included a component related to gender-based violence, MDBs’ staff and Managers in both banks most commonly responded that countries did not request financing for gender-based violence. As an IADB Division Chief explained:

‘All of the countries in the region have laws and often protocols in place, but they do not ask for funding from development banks to implement them or develop specific activities to address the issue.’ (Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011).

According to the same Division Chief, when taking a loan on Gender, countries opted for general issues, such as childcare and labour-related equality (thus focusing on practical

144 Under the last Administration of Felipe Calderón who adopted a frontal fight against narco-traffickers.
gender needs), and not gender-based violence that in fact related to culture and deeply ingrained norms such as machismo that Ministers themselves might have adhered to (opcit). The Gender Anchor at the World Bank also focused largely on economic empowerment of women in rhetoric and on practical gender needs in practice. As previously noted (see Section 7.1), the same persons were in charge of the Gender agenda first at the IADB and then at the World Bank. What is surprising is that while the Chief person at the IADB, a Gender Specialist, was very active on domestic and gender-based violence, this activism switched to a more economic focus when joining the World Bank. She explained that the comparative advantage of the organisation was economic empowerment, and since ‘you need to pick your battle’ as she emphasised, issues of domestic violence and gender-based violence were not put at the forefront – it was assumed that increased economic power might reduce violence against women. This is actually a problematic assumption considering that empirical research has shown that financial programmes targeting women had the unintended consequence of increasing domestic violence in the short term (McCoskey 1996; Kimery and Baumrind 2004; see also Angelucci 2008; Bobonis, Castro and Gonzalez-Brenes 2006), or had no impact in the long term (Bobonis and Castro 2010). Beyond debates on the evidence that supported such an approach, the World Bank Gender Director also explained that economic arguments were the only way to reach out to Ministers of Finance who are the ones who decide on the collaboration with MDBs. As such, they decided to adhere to their clients’ cognitive frame, instead of trying to influence it. They also tried to promote aspects related to cultural change, such as positive masculinity and paternity, through publications, but admitted that they were difficult to

145 IADB’s Ciudad Mujer in El Salvador is an example. Even though improvements of services (practical gender needs) for women might improve the bargaining power and social position of women in society, they do not openly address the need to change the tolerance towards abusive treatment of women, girls and boys, and other male chauvinist cultural patterns (strategic gender needs).

146 Research on conditional cash transfers such as Progresa in Mexico has shown that women who received large amounts were more likely to be victims of intimate partner violence, but less likely if amounts were small (Angelucci 2006), and in the medium term were more likely to suffer from emotional violence (after two to six years after the transfers), but less likely to be victims of physical violence (Bobonis, Castro and González-Brenes 2006).

include in projects (Interviews, Washington, D.C., April 2011). Indeed, none of the loans reviewed for this thesis included such interventions.

Counterparts’ national and local capacity

When addressing complex issues that require coordination across sectors and levels of government, the level of institutional capacity plays a significant role. As a World Bank Lead Urban Development Specialist working in Central America and the Caribbean for more than ten years pointed out:

‘To achieve results, the most important is your partner and their capacity.’

(Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011)

This complicates further the role of MDBs’ staff in designing and negotiating operations that could lessen violence, through stand-alone projects or mainstreaming. In fact, multi-sector stand-alone operations are equivalent to ‘country mainstreaming’ as mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. The overall responsibility is passed on to the country with a focal point in MDBs to support the whole process without the corresponding multi-sector expertise (for no one can be expert in a number of sectors at once). Urban Development and Education Specialists in both banks have insisted on the characteristics of the counterparts for the mainstreaming process to be effective. In fact, as previously mentioned, if in some UMICs they considered there was room for manoeuver as the Colombian case study confirms (see Section 9.1 in Chapter 9), in other LMICs countries, they saw it as unrealistic, given the very high turnover of political and technical staff and the average low institutional capacity of governmental and local teams (Interviews, Washington, D.C., April and July 2011). Such differentiated response suggests a sequenced approach to mainstreaming not only by sector, but also by countries’ characteristics, even though in practice such a differentiated approach might be politically difficult to implement.

7.3 Conclusion

Overall, cognitive frame and actor power were key categories of analysis to understand inclusive violence prevention in MDBs, even considering the differences between the banks. It is clear that what was missing was a clear and coherent cognitive frame to consolidate a common understanding on the issue across sectors within each bank, as well
as on the overall vision and strategy of each bank towards the issue. Building a critical mass of in-house experts was the other urgent need for both banks to institutionalise violence prevention on their agenda. This critical mass needed to expand across sectors independently of the strategy followed (stand-alone projects or mainstreaming processes), for even in stand-alones double or triple expertise (violence prevention, gender and sector) was needed for multi-sector projects and the implementation of mainstreaming approaches at the country level. So far, for the eight sectors interviewed, violence did not appear as a priority, which suggests that there were little immediate opportunities for a political mainstreaming for the inclusive prevention of violence, the concept of mainstreaming itself being largely misunderstood or understood through an integrationist perspective and widely ‘feared’ among Sector Specialists. In general, the explanation regarding gender and violence prevention was thrown to the side in the rhetoric about lack of demand from countries with the recurrent discourse that ‘if they ask for it, we will respond’. Chapter 9 explores Colombia’s responses to these allegations. Before this, Chapter 8 looks into operational knowledge and organisational treatment categories to pursue the analysis further.
Chapter 8: Opportunities and Constraints for Mainstreaming Inclusive Violence Prevention in MDBs: Operational Knowledge and Organisational Treatment

Chapter 8 looks into two practical dimensions of mainstreaming, essential in translating theory into practice: operational knowledge and organisational treatment. As the analytical framework in Chapter 3 has proposed, to mainstream inclusive violence prevention in the development agenda, it is not enough to have strong and resonant frames to convince, convey and urge powerful actors to act in different sectors at different levels. These actors also need to know what to do and how to do it (operational knowledge), and incentives and organisational rules need to support them in this endeavour (organisational treatment).

Chapter 2 has shown how the gendered continuum of violence and the ecological model were yet to be operationalised in practice in most contexts. How did this knowledge gap affect the multi-sector treatment of violence prevention in MDBs? More generally, how did MDBs respond to knowledge-related challenges in violence prevention? How were gender dimensions affected in these considerations? In terms of incentives and organisational rules, which incentives are at play and to what extent are they conducive to inclusive violence prevention and its mainstreaming? How do resources allocated to the issue and the location of responsibility influence its treatment and the opportunities for mainstreaming?

This chapter answers these questions in two ways. First, it examines the operational knowledge in its three dimensions: effectiveness, implementation knowledge, and meaningful indicators (Section 8.1). Second, it studies the organisational treatment of violence prevention and gender in both banks in terms of incentives for staff to work on the issue, resource allocation, and mainstream location of responsibility (Section 8.2). The chapter concludes by reflecting on the main opportunities and constraints found in these two categories.
8.1 Operational knowledge: when guidance for action is uncertain, what do we do?

‘We don’t know what works’ was among the most recurrent answers at the IADB and at the World Bank in regard to violence prevention. Executive Directors, Senior Managers and Specialists across sectors in both banks highlighted the lack of rigorous regional evidence and uncertainties regarding how to develop, implement and measure strategies to prevent violence from a multi-sector, gender perspective. These knowledge-based limitations refer back to the complexity at stake given the multi-disciplinarity of violence (as discussed in Section 2.3.1 in Chapter 2), to the late link between violence and development (see Section 7.1.1 in Chapter 7), and to the lack of in-house expertise (see Section 7.2.3 in Chapter 7). More importantly, they highlight the difficulty in building a vision and a clear strategy when knowledge in its various forms blurs instead of guides action in MDBs.

8.1.1 Regional evidence on effective interventions: do we know what to do?

For the past fifteen years, both banks have stressed the lack of regional evidence on violence prevention in most of their publications and conferences. This was more noticeable at the World Bank because of its organisational culture and was further confirmed when respondents at the global financial institution explained that it was legitimate not to finance projects and interventions with very little indication of their potential effectiveness (Interviews, Washington, D.C., April 2011).

However, despite this shared observation on a major constraint, none of the banks had followed a systematic and coherent agenda to build the most needed and wanted evidence. At the IADB, OVE showed that the first eleven citizen security projects were not evaluable (OVE 2010). In fact, they lacked either baselines or specific indicators. In an attempt to measure some of the effects of these projects, the Evaluation Office conducted three separate ex-post evaluations. Findings showed positive results in the case of Jamaica, Chile and Colombia (Cali) (see Table 15 in Chapter 6), and overall, suggested that much more could have been learned if more rigorous result frameworks had been developed (opcit). Only recently, more efforts have been geared towards developing the knowledge base on violence prevention in the region. This was the objective of the new Initiative of Citizen Security that was approved in 2012 to finance impact evaluations (see Section 6.2.4 in
That said, the Initiative was too vaguely defined to allow the development of a solid and coherent knowledge agenda, which, if this issue is not addressed, would be another missed opportunity for the regional bank. At the World Bank, none of the three projects that included violence prevention as a component had main indicators on violence. Evaluations were nevertheless included in seed grants the World Bank provided to NGOs working on violence prevention, but such efforts were not commensurate to the challenge that most stakeholders had been underscoring for years.

In general, it is also worth noting that if evidence on what works is certainly limited in LAC, it is not non-existent either. Major cities in the region have developed strategies that have had positive results in terms of violence prevention: Bogotá, Medellin and Cali in Colombia, Sao Paulo and Diadema in Brazil, Santiago in Chile to cite but the most famous examples (see Section 5.3.1 in Chapter 5). Individual programmes have also been evaluated. They include ‘Programa H’ in Brazil (Pulitzer, Barker, Segundo, and Nascimento 2006), ‘Fica Vivo’ in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (Silveira et al. 2010), ‘My Safe Neighbourhood’ in the Dominican Republic (Cunningham et al. 2008). Regarding gender and violence, ‘Programa H’ in particular showed that changing men’s attitude towards gender-based violence could be achieved (Pulitzer, Barker, Segundo, and Nascimento 2006), thus suggesting that operationalising the gendered continuum of violence could be further explored. However, this exploration has not been taken on board by MDBs until now. Furthermore, evidence from the US, Europe and Australia has grown over the past decades and is now readily available through a series of websites and publications (see for instance, the Campbell Collaboration; Sherman et al 1998, 2004; Office of Justice of the US Government; San Diego State University and WHO SafetyLit; WHO 2013 for intimate partner violence, among others). The context in industrialised countries is of course different, and differences, particularly in terms of institutional strengths, cannot be overlooked. Nevertheless, there are also a large variety of contexts among Latin American countries, and some of them actually provide propitious conditions to replicate evidence from the North. As such, partners in development like MDBs could be instrumental in financing or disseminating more widely such evaluations. This in turn raises the question of knowledge as a public good and the role of MDBs in that respect. Beyond the lack of comprehensive evidence, which is actually not unique to violence prevention among
development issues (for example, climate change or corruption whose evidence on interventions' effectiveness is limited as well), what interviewees also emphasised was the lack of visibility of the conditions for successful implementation.

8.1.2 Conditions for context-based, successful implementation: do we know how to do it?

In both banks, Managers and Sector Specialists highlighted the need for practical guidance on the ‘how to’. At the IADB, a Regional Manager explained that country dialogue was hindered not by the lack of interest, but by the lack of clarity on pacing and prioritisation of reforms:

‘In terms of macro economic reforms, you cannot do certain reforms unless you have done first a regulatory one, or something like that. If you do not do that, you cannot liberalise. What is very important to know is what to do first, how to set priorities, on which criteria and why. If you want to do a mainstreaming, where do you begin? Which sectors first and why?’ (Interview, IADB, Washington, D.C., July 2011)

The same Manager further insisted on the need for more detailed operational knowledge in inclusive violence prevention:

‘What is really missing is an operational action plan, a plan that would describe step by step what to do and how to do it. So far, everybody knows that the justice sector should be reformed but nobody knows how to do it. At the IADB they refer and use a lot the plan for security of the European Commission, but it is not detailed enough.’ (opcit)

Such contextual knowledge-related constraints had concrete consequences during the implementation of the IADB’s citizen security projects. As underscored in OVE’s 2013 evaluation, most projects faced significant difficulties and delays in implementation mainly because the context was not sufficiently taken into account in project design (OVE 2013). This in turn led to the incapacity to implement the project as initially conceived, and thereafter, to properly learn from the experience in terms of programme effectiveness (see Section 8.1.1).
Beyond staffs directly working on violence prevention, other sector specialists also pointed out the need to develop such practical knowledge if the mainstreaming process was to have a chance to be implemented. In that regard, Urban Development and Social Protection specialists at the IADB decided to take stock of existing evidence and operational knowledge on their own (that is, independently of the Cluster of Citizen Security). In Urban Development for instance, they included violence prevention-related interventions in projects in Mexico (Habitat Programme) and Brazil (Favela Barrios), and opted for designing pilots to test methodologies (Interview, IADB, Washington, D.C., July 2011). In Social Protection, they published toolkits on youth-at-risk. Those efforts nonetheless faced a common shortcoming at the IADB, which was the lack of systematic dissemination. In fact, during my research, I found a number of useful studies and initiatives the IADB was undertaking, but that few people knew about. In general, the regional bank demonstrated deficiencies at disseminating and communicating about what it did, even internally. This led to replication, the ‘invisibilisation’ and thereafter, the ‘non-use’ of pertinent in-house knowledge. In contrast, the World Bank was much more efficient and better organised in terms of knowledge dissemination. Although in violence prevention, this was not always the case, as Education specialists working in countries most affected by violence were unaware of toolkits prepared to facilitate the incorporation of violence prevention in schools in the education sector among others. This pinpoints the constant need for targeting the internal audience within banks as much as the external ones.

‘To summarise: is violence a serious issue: yes. Should the Bank work on it: yes. Now, the question is how. […] I am an Economist and I would not know how to do a violence prevention programme at school.’ [Researcher: Do you know about the toolkit on violence prevention in school?] No.’ (Senior Education Specialist, World Bank, Washington D.C., April 2011)  

Specialists in other sectors, in particular in Social Protection, produced manuals on youth-at-risk, a key group for prevention programmes. However, as a World Bank Senior Social Protection Specialist working on youth issues insisted:

‘These manuals are useful but they do not go enough into details to be useful at the operational level.’ (Interview, World Bank, Washington, D.C., March 2011)
Such remarks suggest that more reflection is needed on the ‘type’ of tools to be developed to effectively serve the mainstreaming process. Among them, indicators were certainly given a high importance by MDBs staff members.

8.1.3 Meaningful indicators: Do we know how to measure it?

At the IADB and the World Bank, Education and Transport Specialists pointed out the need for indicators to operationalise the shared responsibility for the inclusive prevention of violence. Indicators were seen as incentives and accountability mechanisms to ‘motivate’ sectors to take the issue into account (Interviews, Washington, D.C., April and July 2011). Without credible indicators to properly capture each sector’s contribution, the mainstreaming process was deemed to fail (opcit). As World Bank Senior Specialists insisted, showing how the development effectiveness framework shapes priorities for Team Leaders (see also discussion on incentives in Section 8.2):

‘If you do not have accountability, the mainstreaming effort will not work, because sectors will not feel the issue is their own.’ (Interview, Sr. Transport Specialist, World Bank, Washington, D.C., March 2011)

‘Now, if you can add things on violence prevention that are easy to do and not costly, why not? Like for example make sure that schools have doors that close so that nobody enters when the children are in, lights, cleanliness, recreational/sports, painting etc. Or if you do curricula reform of teacher training, include something on how to deal with youth-at-risk or conflict at school or conflict resolution, etc. You could do it, but what about the impact? If you don’t have an indicator on violence, you don’t see the impact so it does not count.’ (Interview, Sr. Education Specialist, World Bank, Washington, D.C., March 2011)

Specialists in fact were worried that without convincing indicators to show sector contribution and measuring the performance of the issue, violence prevention would become a bureaucratic add-on in formal documentation that would eventually lead to the invisibilisation of the issue, just as gender scholars have shown in the case of gender mainstreaming (see Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3). To take a step further in the analysis, I thus explored staff members’ perceptions on the possibility to develop compound indicators to
create the currently missing accountability at the sector level. Compound indicators would include violence-and-gender-related indicators as sub-indicators of overall sector performance or quality. This is what the Government of Colombia did when it included *competencias ciudadanas* (citizenship competencies) in the student tests used to measure the overall quality of the Education Sector (see Section 9.1.1 in Chapter 9). Other sub-indicators in the Education Sector could take into account school climate, given that safe learning environments for girls and boys contribute to student achievement, one of the main measures for the sector’s performance. Similarly, in Transport, safe public transport, as measured in terms of perception and number of incidents by gender, could inform the quality of the service and users’ satisfaction. Actually, other sensitive and complex development issues like corruption gained leverage when they were included in the ‘Doing Business’ indicators, an initiative launched in 2002 by World Bank Economists that later became a worldwide ranking activity that was followed by many Governments. The ‘Doing Business’ indicators created incentives and accountability mechanisms for countries’ performance on corruption, for country performance then became visible to others and was included in the overall country ranking. That said, in the case of corruption, efforts to develop Doing Business indicators were led by champions under the political leadership of President Wolfensohn (1995-2005) who gave particular importance to fighting corruption. Such conditions are not currently present in either MDB as discussed in Section 7.2.1 in Chapter 7. Moreover, despite interviewees’ evident interest and curiosity in compound indicators for inclusive violence prevention, some explicitly expressed scepticism that more broadly reflected suspicion vis-à-vis mainstreaming processes in general. Such distrust can in fact be linked to organisational constraints as discussed in Section 8.2.

‘Much better if you go with a multi-sector project like the DPL, where you provide a line of budget to the country and agree on a series of indicators and reforms - or even a SIL [Specific Investment Loan] - instead of doing small things that won’t be coordinated nor have indicators [referring to mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in sectors] and therefore won’t be assessed. Go for a multi-sector project with Education, Transport, Health, etc. You do that in a low-income dangerous neighbourhood and then you measure against the effect on crime and violence. Then you can have something to show. The main question is a question of accountability. That is why you need your indicators and you need to be clear about what you will
be measuring.’ (Interview, Sr. Education Specialist, World Bank, Washington, D.C., March 2011)

8.2 Organisational treatment: does MDB institutional ‘architecture’ work for inclusive violence prevention mainstreaming?

At the meso level, incentives and rules for staff development, the resources allocated to the issue, and the mainstream location of responsibility, all provide key indications in terms of opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention.

8.2.1 Contradictory incentives embedded in the dual status of MDBs

Levy (1996) and Hannan (2000) pointed out the importance of incentives and clear rules for staff development when studying gender mainstreaming (see Section 3.3.4 in Chapter 3). This research confirms their pertinence and highlights the coexistence of different, largely contradictory, incentives at play in MDBs that makes the process of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention all the more complex. In fact, three main types of incentives are at play: incentives related to the pressure to increase and simplify the lending portfolio; incentives linked to the pressure to show results; and nascent and limited incentives to acquire double or triple expertise, and to work across sectors.

Incentives related to the pressure to increase and simplify the lending portfolio

Following severe criticisms on their relevance (see Box 2 in Chapter 1) and uncertainties regarding their sustainability, MDBs have increasingly shifted their priority towards approving large loans, shortening project preparation time and simplifying design. The objective since the mid-2000s was to quickly increase the lending portfolio for ensuring MDBs’ survival. This also aimed to show MDBs’ relevance to shareholders and other stakeholders. That is, if they lent more and larger loans, that would imply they would be needed, i.e. there was a demand for them. The emphasis was therefore placed on lending large amounts of money with fewer and fewer conditions so as to disburse quickly. Budget support loans (PBLs at the IADB or DPLs at the World Bank) were ideal, flexible instruments to reach these objectives with minimum conditions for the clients. In terms of investment loans, traditional infrastructure sectors were privileged, for they usually implied large loans. The ‘softer’ sectors, that are often more complex to implement, were not given

Such organisational priorities geared towards financial survival somehow contradict MDBs’ development mission, if we understand development as complex processes requiring participation, negotiation and a deep understanding of the institutional, political, social and economic context at the local and national levels. This is even more so for inclusive violence prevention for a series of reasons described in previous chapters, including significant limitations in relevant knowledge in all its forms in LAC (see Section 8.1), the multi-dimensionality and multi-causality of violence that requires the development of multi-sector responses (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3 in Chapter 2), and its gender dimensions deeply ingrained in ideology and structural inequality (see Section 2.5 in Chapter 2). How then to reconcile these two divergent currents? From one side, there is a powerful push for quick, large loans that are easy to disburse; on the other, a development imperative requires a slower process that involves initiatives to study it more, and to develop smaller and more complex operations where informed trials and errors are considered part of the development process. A World Bank Adviser in Public Sector Reform translated these contradictory forces into concrete organisational constraints and showed which incentives in the end shaped decision-making:

‘The CD [Country Director] is a key person here but his incentives clearly are to make the highest number and the biggest loans. Some Directors, if not most of them, do not want grants in their portfolios because they take staff time, are small (USD 1 million maximum in general), supervision and preparation intensive, do not produce much impact, etc. Some CDs agree if you push and get it approved by the Minister of Finance, but most do not like them. Same for small projects.’ (Interview, World Bank, Washington D.C., March 2011).

**Incentives linked to the pressure to show results**

Another set of incentives, as discussed in Section 8.1.3, comes from the Development Effectiveness Framework and the correlated need to show results. Here too, mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention appears as a complex exercise that raises staff disquiet. The attribution issue and the need for simplification (that also includes simplification of results
frameworks) do not go hand in hand with complex, relational processes implied in violence and gender. What is in fact at stake here is the risk of failure to achieve concrete and measurable impact through a single project because of the complexity of inclusive violence prevention. Team Leaders’ performance is evaluated in terms of number of projects prepared, timely delivery of projects, and increasingly, results frameworks. The design and implementation of complex projects do not enter into the category of quick disbursable projects. This explains that even advocates for violence prevention might lessen their advocacy, and within violence prevention, even specialists convinced that violence endorses strong gender dimensions might skip gender in design in the search for simplification (Interview, Washington, D.C., March 2011).

As a Lead Urban Specialist at the World Bank further explained, the projects in Honduras and Jamaica took two years respectively to prepare and negotiate before being approved. This represents an important investment and a high risk for the Team Leader and the Manager. Even more so in contexts where there are other needs that could be addressed through ‘easier’ projects (Interview, World Bank, Washington, D.C., March 2011). In addition, violence prevention, be it through capacity strengthening or community participation, might not lead to quick or visible results. Prevention takes time to manifest results, and depends on a series of factors that often fall outside the control of MDB teams, such as political or technical staff changes, unions, shift in priorities by the Government, non cooperation of the opposition to pass needed laws, etc. (beyond the question of the evaluability of MDBs projects, that remains an issue in itself as underscored in Section 8.1.1). These aspects are common in development, but might be over-salient in the case of violence prevention for the ideology attached to it and the resultant high volatility of political and technical personnel (OVE 2014). Furthermore, the choice of indicators is also very complex. As explained in Chapters 2 and 5, data is not reliable in many countries and might not be available at the local level on different forms of violence. As such, homicide rates are often chosen to measure whether the project has contributed to lessen violence, or not. This is of course risky as on the one hand, a single project might not be able to address homicide rates, and on the other hand, homicide rates are often only the tip of the iceberg in terms of violence, and might not be the prime concern of the people who fear daily violence, not to mention the gender implications of such indicators (see Chapter 2, Section
2.5.1). Some projects have included changing perceptions in terms of fear or trust to assess the impact the projects. This seems to be more reasonable to really apprehend the impact of a small project in a complex environment, but might be subject to criticism in terms of measurable results to effectively lessen the problem.

The choice of indicators and how to measure multi-sector, gender sensitive strategies is in fact a fundamental question that still requires further research (see Sections 8.1.1 and 8.1.3), but until then, their under-development plays as a disincentive for violence prevention in general and mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in particular. This disincentive strongly manifests at the level of Country Managers at the IADB and Country Directors at the World Bank, who are in charge of the relationship with the countries and prioritise which sectors to push forward in policy dialogue. Country Managers and Country Directors receive constant petitions from all sectors while managing complex situations to keep MICs interested and willing to borrow (Interview, Washington DC, April 2011). This illustrates how MDBs’ mission creep generates resistance to issues such as violence prevention to gain priority. At the IADB, such disincentives arguably affected the quality of design, for teams designed overly complex projects in the search for larger loan approvals (OVE 2014). At the World Bank, only through recent internal lobbying from the Violence Prevention team in LAC and at the Anchor, did Country Directors see the issue as a relevant feature to bring to the table while discussing with Ministers of Finance (see Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 in Chapter 6).

The incentives linked to the pressure to show results also led staff members in both MDBs to mention conditions and safeguards. Such discussion refers to the procedures element in Levy’s web (1996) and would support a differentiated approach mentioned in Section 7.2.4, Chapter 7. Urban and Education Specialists working on LMICs, mainly in Central America and the Caribbean where the issue of violence is the most severe and the institutional capacity the lowest, stressed the difficulty associated with working in sensitive and complex topics such as violence prevention when there were no conditions and no safeguards to ensure minimum conditions for the project to be implemented and beneficiaries’ rights to be protected (Interviews, Washington, D.C, March and July 2011). Their concerns would imply that if conditions were not met, then MDBs should not finance
loans, and instead, work with the counterparts on strengthening the institutional context to build the foundations indispensable for obtaining results. Yet, in addition to the fact that conditionalities have become taboo in MDBs after the 1990s vivid criticisms of structural adjustment and the conditions they entailed, there are also significant constraints on introducing conditions, even though they would have the merit of clarifying a firm standpoint for MDBs about the inclusive prevention of violence. Current constraints include the political agendas of policymakers that might not be receptive to such progressive and incremental approaches. Moreover, competition among donors does not concur with coherence and pragmatism. Finally, pressure for large loans and reduction of human and financial resources for project preparation do not converge towards taking more time for political dialogue and coordination.

As for how MDBs could push forward a mainstreaming strategy for inclusive violence prevention, a few interviewees suggested safeguards. Safeguards were seen as an organisational procedure to accelerate the incorporation of violence prevention from a gender perspective across sectors and countries, adopting an integrationist and mandatory perspective (Interview, Washington, D.C. April 2011). The focus then would be to ‘do no harm’ by making mandatory a screening on violence prevention, gender and human rights before all sector projects come to discussion at the Board of Directors (as has experimented in relation to Gender at the IADB since 2012). Such an approach would then overcome contradictory incentives and the lack of demand from countries by making it a requirement for all MDBs loans. The majority of staff members interviewed nonetheless dismissed such a safeguard approach as ineffective to produce change and expressed concerns as this would imply other bureaucratic layers to their daily work (Interviews, World Bank and IADB, March and April 2011).

_Nascent and limited incentives to acquire double or triple expertise, and to work across sectors_
Finally, there are concrete constraints to implement the shared responsibility for the inclusive prevention of violence in-house: the availability of specific training and the collaboration and coordination across sectors. Both refer to the adequate procedures and staff development included in Levy’s staff development and methodology sphere (see
In terms of training, both banks have initiated efforts towards providing training to staff to facilitate their work in violence prevention. The IADB developed clinics of citizen security since 2009 (usually one working week once or twice a year) that explicitly sought to respond to the lack of related training of Modernisation of the State specialists. These clinics remained largely focused on the criminal justice sector though. Moreover, they did not seek to reach out to sector specialists beyond ICS so as to build double or triple expertise throughout the Bank, which would have facilitated a better design of multi-sector stand-alone projects as well as the implementation of a mainstreaming process. At the World Bank, efforts concentrated on the e-course mentioned in Section 7.2.3 in Chapter 7. The e-course was well designed, but provided only basic training on violence prevention (with a stronger focus on situational and social prevention than at the IADB) and mainly targeted in external audience. The BEAM meetings could have played the role of peer training, following the strategy deployed by the Gender Anchor regarding gender mainstreaming, but as for the interview data, this was still not the case at the time of the research.

As for collaboration and coordination across sectors, most interviewees insisted on the difficulty of multi-sector work within banks and at the country level. Specialists in Health, Urban Development and Transport in both banks stressed how MDBs did not know how to work across sectors. They explained that incentives were not sufficient to enhance full participation of different sectors within a project, or coordination among projects. That is, in theory, team members would come from different sectors to participate in a multi-sector project, and specialists would take the lead for one component or a specific set of interventions according to their sectoral expertise and experience. In practice, the challenge deals with accountability and the benefit of sector specialists’ involvement in a project that ‘belongs’ to another sector. The IADB has developed a mechanism to respond to this issue called ‘double booking’. This mechanism makes it possible for a particular project to have two Team Leaders from different Divisions. As such, the benefit and responsibility or accountability for the project success falls under two Divisions that ‘own’ the project in their respective portfolio. To date, the double booking mechanism has been approved, but more analysis is needed to assess its effectiveness to enhance multi-sector work (OVE 2014)

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148 I participated in the first cohort of this e-course in 2011, as it was opened to external applicants.
on IADB’s realignment). Nonetheless, this is an innovative feature that aims to concretely address one major impediment to collaboration among sectors. At the World Bank, such double booking mechanisms have not been developed. Team members from other units might participate or be consulted during project preparation. When this happens, the collaboration usually occurs at the stage of review of the project design (‘Concept Note Review Meetings’) when experts from other Divisions are asked to comment on the project. Even if comments are taken into account and project design is adjusted, nothing guarantees that the Team Leader follows up on these adjustments if the team itself does not possess the sector expertise. This is a concern that has been raised several times during the interviews at the World Bank, and is seen as a concrete impediment of multi-sector projects. This difficulty also reflects the complexity of multi-sector work and mainstreaming strategies at the country level. For MDBs’ staffs, working with different executing agencies or finding one agency able to coordinate the work in multiple sectors at the national or local level is surely a challenge (see also the discussion on the mainstream location of responsibility in Section 8.2.3; the discussion on opportunities and constraints for MiVP in the case of Colombia in Section 9.1 in Chapter 9). Such issues make the implementation of projects more complex, and therefore work as counter-incentives for MDBs’ specialists to work in a multi-sector fashion. As for the coordination among sectors, interviewees explained it might happen on an ad-hoc basis, but was mostly non-existent. In other words, after the Country Strategy is negotiated with all sectors, project implementation mainly remains in silos, reflecting what is current practice in Governments. Overall, the question of incentives in their triple dimensions also depend on the extent to which MDBs can ‘generate business’ with inclusive violence prevention.

8.2.2 Resources allocation: Can MDBs increase ‘business’ with inclusive violence prevention?

Overall, the operational portfolio in violence prevention in both banks has been extremely small. As compared to the 168 loans approved for USD 14 billion in one year alone (2013) at the IADB, 16 Citizen Security projects for half a USD billion over a period of 14 years do not make violence prevention a major sector for the regional bank. At the World Bank, the operational portfolio is even smaller and quasi inexistent (see Section 1.2 in Chapter 1 and Section 6.1 in Chapter 6).
That said, since 2010, greater investment has been made in both banks. At the IADB, the number of loans and the amount per loan has significantly increased, with nearly 40 per cent of the portfolio approved since 2010 (opcit). This is due to the Costa Rica project that was approved for an amount of USD 132 million, as compared to the other projects ranging from USD 15 to 25 million. Interviewees explained that when negotiating the loan for Costa Rica, there was no limit to the amount from the side of the IADB. Actually, it was initially envisaged to reach USD 300 million (but was eventually reduced to USD 132 million because of delays and other donor-recipient negotiations). This, in any case, suggests a clear push from the regional bank to increase lending in the sector. At the World Bank, interviewees also clearly acknowledged the need to ‘create big business’ as they phrase it, to show that violence prevention could be ‘profitable’ for the Bank (Interview, Washington, D.C, April 2011). This thus oriented the strategy pursued through Development Policy Loans and through more proactive policy dialogue with major potential clients like Mexico, Brazil or even South Africa outside of the Region (opcit). The assumption was that if violence became an attractive entry point for countries to ask for DPLs or large investment loans, teams might then be strengthened and business and strategies developed further.

In terms of other sources of funding, such as Trust Funds, as explained in Chapter 7 (Section 7.2.1) when analysing actor power and the community of donors, the IADB has recently approved a large Special Initiative for Citizen Security that could reach up to USD 20 million in four years. Such Trust Funds do not exist at the World Bank. The focus on Africa and the division among donors at the World Bank made donor mobilisation for urban violence more arduous than at the IADB. Nonetheless, the World Bank hosts a number of Trusts Funds to which staff working on violence prevention can apply to develop policy dialogue on violence prevention. According to a Violence Prevention specialist, such facilities were actually crucial to push the agenda forward (Interview, World Bank, Washington, D.C, March 2011). However, the same specialist also highlighted that in absence of a specific Trust Fund for Violence Prevention, the team constantly needed to ‘convince’ and apply for ad-hoc funds to develop policy dialogue and other activities aimed at making the Bank more visible and credible in the area:

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'In Mexico, the issue of violence was very sensitive: the Bank cannot deal with police, drug or trafficking, but thanks to the Trust Fund, it engages in dialogue and shows that the Bank has experts and knowledge and tools to help the Government develop a strategy. [...] This Nordic TF was crucial to initiate the dialogue and give some visibility to the Bank in violence prevention. [...] In Central America, the team got a USD 40,000 BB [Bank Budget] for staff travel and other expenses. Zoellick’s visit to El Salvador helped a lot to convince for funding in particular for TF application, even though the actual amount allocated was small.’ (Interview, Violence Prevention Specialist, World Bank, Washington, D.C., March 2011)

Trust Funds are in fact becoming an increasing source of funding at the Bank. The Nordic Trust Fund, for instance, was established in 2008 to ‘mainstream human rights’ within the Bank, and was used in practice for financing a variety of pilots more or less directly related to human rights. As such, the Violence Prevention Team in LAC and at the Anchor used it for a number of pilots and other initiatives in Honduras, Colombia, Mexico and South Africa (Interview, World Bank, Washington, D.C., April 2011). Trust Funds in general were clearly instrumental in the case of Violence Prevention, also because they made it possible to hire consultants and term staff at the Anchor and in LAC. They included consultants working specifically on gender-based violence and youth violence that, without such funding, would probably not have been hired (Interviews World Bank, Washington, D.C., April 2011). When I asked the Coordinator of the Nordic Trust Fund how Trust Funds used for mainstreaming were usually perceived, she had this practical and clairvoyant response:

‘You know, it basically depends on where you sit in the Bank. If you are at the Anchor trying to push a topic, to try out pilots to make your case, then TFs are very welcome and they would go for it. But if you are a CD [Country Director] trying to implement an already complex Country Programme that you need to deliver and your staff come and say they want to do 10 TF grant activities, your priority won’t be to go for them. The CD will think these grants are to experiment in my country when I have already a complex programme to focus on and to implement. In that case, it is not because the issues are not important, but it is a matter of priorities. The Bank is a huge and complex institution, with some parts that are creative and
others that are more conservative. You need to know well how it works and who needs what.’ (Interview with Nordic Trust Fund Coordinator, World Bank, Washington, D.C., April 2011)

The Coordinator then added, after I referred to several other interviewees who had pointed out examples like climate change that climbed the priority ladder quickly in MDBs in part thanks to large Trusts Funds, and who underscored the need for resources to create an internal space for the issue and the challenge of developing a programme in an overall context of budget constraint:

‘Yes, but the question you have to deal with when you want to mainstream an issue is in the end, how do I make people do it with their own budget?’ (opcit)

Such a question clearly evokes how the institutionalisation of an issue and its mainstreaming requires the organisation to make it its own. This leads us to examine the location of responsibility.

8.2.3 Mainstream location of responsibility: where does inclusive violence prevention belong?

One first, clear observation is the diversity of locations and different organisational treatment in each MDB. As Chapter 6 has described, Violence Prevention has changed institutional situ at the IADB and the World Bank multiple times. The IADB has been more stable though, by mainly locating the issue in the Modernisation of the State Division, now Institutions for Development Division, in line with an interpretation of violence as multipronged, with nevertheless, an important pre-eminence given to criminal justice solutions. In 2011, a Cluster of Citizen security was formalised within the Division.149 It is still only a group (i.e. it does not have the rank of a Department or a Division), but has a clear organisational situ and appears on IADB’s organisation chart. At the World Bank in contrast, the issue has been mainly hosted under Urban Development in LAC and at the

149 Before this, regions, and in particular the Central American region, were leading the agenda, which was mostly placed under Modernisation or Reform of the State. In one region, Social Sectors led the issue (see Section 6.2.2 in Chapter 6).
Anchor for most of the 2000s, before moving to the Social Development department in 2010. World Bank specialists, as indicated in Section 6.3.3 in Chapter 6, perceived differently the shift in the location of responsibility, as the Social Development department is mainly a supportive unit (dealing with safeguards) than an operational one. Nonetheless, the shift remains in line with an interpretation of violence prevention through social and situational lenses. More importantly, the World Bank has not yet opted for institutionalising violence prevention by giving it more organisational permanence and visibility (through the creation of an institutional entity like a formal group or a cluster), therefore making it more dependent on potential champions to drive the issue.

One characteristic common in both banks is that none of the location of responsibility for violence prevention has the mandate to mainstream it. The tensions between the Cluster of Citizen Security and other Sectors and Divisions at the IADB even dissuades collaboration, and the limited in-house expertise makes having focal points, as Hannan (2000) among others had suggested, for now practically impossible.150 As for the World Bank, despite the smaller team and the more precarious organisational existence, the team has tried to reach out to sectors, even without a formal mandate or strategy, and has launched initiatives like the BEAM as described in Section 7.2.3, independently of the tangible results achieved so far. The idea was clearly to identify focal points within sectors. Such focal points would not only mobilise their sectoral colleagues on violence prevention, and disseminate sector specific information related to violence prevention, but also support the Violence Prevention team for specific sector-related expertise as needed (Interview, Washington D.C, March 2011).

As for the treatment of gender as regard to violence, differences among and within MDBs must be noted. At the IADB, over the 2000s and until 2011, gender-based violence, domestic violence and other gender dimensions of violence fell under the Gender and Diversity Division. The Cluster of Citizen Security (or its equivalent in previous years) dealt with gender only marginally. Since 2011, greater collaboration between both units has

150 Other Units/Divisions deal with youth-at-risk (Social Protection), bullying at school (Education), or CPTED (Urban Development) with little or ad-hoc collaboration with the Cluster. Interviews indicate that this is mainly because of distrust in the technical capacity of Citizen Security Specialists and lack of leadership to reach out to other sectors (see discussion on actor power in Section 7.2 in Chapter 7).
been announced and has materialised with one Gender Specialist dedicated to collaborating with the Cluster. Nonetheless, at the time this thesis is written, gender mainstreaming within citizen security projects and initiatives has not yet materialised.

At the World Bank, the treatment of gender and violence has been dealt with differently in LAC and at the Anchor. In LAC, the PREM Division formally in charge of Gender, took on the issue of gender-based violence and other aspects related to gender identities as part of its agenda. This mainly translated into conferences and studies. The Violence Prevention team worked on gender and violence in an ad-hoc way, and did not mainstream gender into its activities or methodologies. Nonetheless, interviews with staff directly involved in violence prevention activities suggested a clear recognition of gender dimensions of violence and the openness to embrace gender more proactively. In that respect, they recognised the support provided by the Anchor who had hired consultants and term staff to work specifically on gender-based violence. The Anchor was the unit with the clearer vision in terms of mainstreaming gender within its own activities; in fact, it embraced the issue when the Gender Anchor stepped out of it (see Section 6.3.4 in Chapter 6).

8.3 Conclusion

Is there a specificity of violence that would explain its late emergence, timid evolution, ad hoc gender perspective, and overall lack of mainstreaming in the development agenda? Chapter 8 has first examined the knowledge factors implied in this question. Findings confirm the importance of knowledge in terms of effectiveness and implementation, and suggests that indicators play a particularly important role as Shiffman and Smith (2007), Levy (1996), Razavi and Miller (2005), Rao and Kelleher (1995) and Hannan (2000) had pointed out. Knowledge considerations highlight some particularity of violence in the sense that limitations are surely significant in terms of effectiveness, implementation knowledge, and data and indicators in general and in LAC in particular. These limitations hinder the development of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention, for important elements are missing in the operational cycle. More specifically, interviewees have highlighted the need for the pacing of reforms, prioritisation, coordination mechanisms, and compound and sector specific indicators as essential links in the chain to operationalise the ecological model and the gendered continuum of violence. But is facing knowledge limitations not
intrinsic to development? Is it not common to emerging issues? Examples from climate change, corruption, and even gender or poverty, show that in development, we usually not know more than we need to be effective. Still, MDBs work on issues whose complexity also reflects the complexity and intersectionality of human life. Moreover, in the case of violence in LAC, there are a wealth of initiatives that still needs to be discovered, evaluated or scaled up. It is undeniable that a lot of creativity exists and needs to be leveraged. In other words, while knowledge-related constraints are certainly not to be undermined, they also suggest that there is less specificity to violence than usually implied. These constraints also highlight the responsibility of MDBs towards responding to these knowledge gaps as a public good, which refers back to the question of the vision, cognitive frames and actors to make it happen (see Chapter 7). This also sheds light on the importance of the organisational treatment of the issue, which was also examined in this chapter. In fact, even if champions or staff members have such vision, as I have met in both banks, they need to be adequately supported by the organisational structure to not only realise it, but also to sustain it. Here, the question of incentives certainly appears essential in both banks. In particular, the case of violence prevention from a gender perspective shows how the mission creep of MDBs tends to play against complex, new development issues, as do insufficient training opportunities to develop double or triple expertise, and contradictory incentives embedded in the dual status of financial institutions and development agencies, that in fact pull in different directions. Until such ingrained contradictions are discussed more openly and addressed, they will inevitably hinder the emergence and mainstreaming of crucial issues like the inclusive prevention of violence, despite the call for solutions expressed year after year by citizens across Latin America. Along with incentives, the question of resources also logically plays a two-pronged facilitating role: to give means to staff to push the issue forward (with Trust Funds being clearly instrumental), and to show that the issue can actually ‘generate business’ for the organisation, which would presumably open the door wider for greater involvement and strategising on the issue, as some interviews have suggested. Finally, the location of responsibility shows the extent to which the organisation is institutionalising violence prevention in its structure and where it locates it. The differences at the IADB and the World Bank reflect the different positioning in terms of responses to violence, with the IADB locating Citizen Security under Institutions and Modernisation of the State, while the World Bank vacillates between Urban
and Social Development. Yet, even though the IADB’s Cluster is more stable in terms of organisational situ, the distrust of other sectors as well as its lack of in-house experts make it unlikely to become an influential location for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention with focal points in sectors. At the World Bank, despite more precariousness and a considerably smaller team, a few key staffs with vision and experience are developing initiatives in that direction both in LAC and at the Anchor. In particular, the fact, that the Anchor embraces gender and all forms of gender-based violence in its agenda suggests a clearer vision as regard to the gendered continuum and a potential mainstreaming process for inclusive violence prevention than at the regional bank. As citizens usually look first to their Governments for solutions, and as MDBs are partners in development and fundamentally depend on donor-recipient relations, Chapter 9 explores counterparts’ ‘side of the story’ in terms of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention at the country level and MDBs’ role in that respect.
Chapter 9: Counterparts’ Perspectives on Mainstreaming Inclusive Violence Prevention and MDBs’ Relevance: The Case of Colombia

MDBs are (only) financers of and advisers to Governments in the developing world. As a consequence, they allegedly work on violence prevention to the extent that counterparts\(^{151}\) ask them to. Actually, as Chapters 6 and 7 have reported, MDBs’ staff recurrently used the argument of lack of country demand for violence prevention to explain its late emergence, timid evolution, and ad-hoc integration of gender considerations. They also pinpointed the lack of capacity at the national and local levels to implement multi-sector strategies and see it as a severe constraint for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention.

What is Governments’ take on these questions? To what extent is mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention an approach followed at the country level? How do challenges in policymaking and implementation at the national and local levels impact the mainstreaming process? How do counterparts perceive MDBs’ role in violence prevention? Are they relevant and needed? Is there a difference between the IADB and the World Bank? What is expected from them as partners in development?

Chapter 9 looks in more depth at donor-recipient relations and answers these questions based on a case study in Colombia. As Colombia is only one among the 26 potential borrowing countries in LAC, findings discussed in this chapter do not aim to be generalised to the entire region. However, as explained in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.3.1), Colombia gathers a series of characteristics that make the case study particularly relevant for the research. Among them, Colombia has pioneered preventive strategies to address violence at the local level, has a renowned expertise on the issue, has well trained and highly educated civil servants, and has a long-standing relationship with MDBs in general and in violence prevention in particular. All these characteristics make it a propitious context to investigate the main research questions from the counterparts’ perspective.

\(^{151}\) Counterparts are also called borrowers, borrowing countries, clients, or simply, Governments.
As such, this chapter has two objectives. First, it aims to better understand the opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention at the national and local levels in Colombia (Section 9.1); and second, it seeks to assess MDBs’ relevance in this context, as per Colombian stakeholders’ views (Section 9.2). Fulfilling these two objectives aims to ground the discussion articulated in this thesis upon the practice at the country level, as well as to deepen the analysis of the dynamics between MDBs and Governments. This would also allow the research to be placed in the wider perspective of policymaking, implementation, and collaboration between diverse public agencies and stakeholders.

9.1 Opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention in Colombia

The current policy framework on violence prevention in Colombia, as analysed in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.3.2), shows a consistent and coherent effort to adopt a multi-sector approach to prevent violence in urban contexts, in particular by focusing on risk factors related to human and social development. The analysis nonetheless highlighted two main issues related to mainstreaming. First, few sector-specific indicators reflected the contribution of the different sectors to violence prevention (similarly to what Sectoral Specialists in MDBs had pointed out, as analysed in Chapter 8, Section 8.1.3). Second, none of the sectors explicitly acknowledged the need and plan for preventing violence within the sector itself (i.e. none of them took into consideration the intra-sector level of mainstreaming, see Section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3). Appendices D.4 and D.5\textsuperscript{152} present the detailed analysis of Colombia’s latest policy framework related to violence prevention that complements Chapter 5 and serves as a reference for this section. To go deeper into the understanding of the policy context in Colombia as regard to mainstreaming inclusive prevention of violence, I subsequently discuss the findings at the national and at the local level (see Section 4.3.3 in Chapter 4 for the study population in Colombia).

\textsuperscript{152} The matrix analyses the strategic guideline of the 2010-2014 National Development Plan. To build this matrix, I assessed whether the sector diagnosis acknowledged the sector’s role in violence prevention or issues of violence within the sector; whether the sector strategic guidelines included components related to violence prevention; and whether sector indicators translated sector specific contribution to violence prevention (either directly or indirectly through risk factors).
9.1.1 Through the lenses of Colombian policymakers and bureaucrats: findings from in-depth interviews with ministries and presidential agencies

Based on the analysis of interviews with eight institutions at the national level, sector ministries (or equivalent) can be classified in three categories: those engaged in violence prevention, but showing resistance and stressing constraints to mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention; those engaged in violence prevention and creatively finding ways to make mainstreaming happen; those unengaged with violence prevention, but seeing opportunities for it in their sector. The large majority of interviewees belonged to the first category. I thus begin with them.

Sectors engaged with violence prevention but stressing constraints to mainstreaming

Interviews at the Department of National Planning with the Social Development Direction (Dirección de Desarrollo Social, DNP-DDS) and social ministries show a clear understanding and familiarity with multi-sector, gender-sensitive approaches to violence prevention and the role of different line ministries in this respect. All interviewees were familiar with the epidemiological (public health) approach to violence prevention (see the ecological model in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2), and had a concrete understanding of risks factors to violence. Nonetheless, they had different views on the role of their own ministry towards the issue and the probability to implement and institutionalise a mainstreaming approach to prevent violence.

The DNP-DDS embraced the idea of mainstreaming violence prevention in theory, but refrained in practice for at least two reasons. The first reason, according to the central department that has a prospective vision of and coordinates with all social sectors in Colombia, was the lack of sector ownership for the issue, and even resistance towards it. This was particularly the case of the Health Sector, thus echoing findings from MDBs’

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153 The Direction of Social Development (Dirección de Desarrollo Social, DDS) has a prospective vision of the Social Sectors in Colombia (including Education, Health, Social Security, Employment, Culture, Sports, Recreation, Income, and Stratification), and promotes the monitoring and evaluation of policies, plans, programmes and development projects to implement the National Development Plan. The DDS is in charge of developing the strategy for Social Sectors in Colombia. It closely works with sector ministries (National Education, Social Protection, Culture, ICBF and Acción Social) to implement the social strategic guidelines of the PND.

154 Perhaps the fact that the Director of the DDS was a medical doctor by training and profession helped in this regard.
staffs in the Health Sector (see Section 7.1.2 in Chapter 7). In fact, the Health Sector is primarily responsible for diseases, focusing on this from prevention to recovery. For violence prevention, in contrast, the Health Sector would depend on others to achieve results, which would disincentive ownership of the issue. The second reason lay in the lack of the operationalisation of the shared responsibility (already discussed in Section 2.6 in Chapter 2). In other words, the lack of clarity in terms of how sector-specific objectives needed to be combined, and how sectors needed to act in a complementary fashion towards the same goal was an obstacle to mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention (Interview DNP-DDS, Bogotá, June 2011; these constraints relate to issues discussed in the operational knowledge category in Chapter 8, Section 8.1).

Another constraint already highlighted by MDBs’ staff and confirmed by the DNP-DDS Director was the weak institutional capacity at the local level. In the Colombian context, Governors and Mayors are those who implement policies and programmes, and their institutional capacity varies greatly. As the DNP-DDS pointed out:

‘Implementing basic programmes are already challenging in some territories because of a very high turnover of personnel, corruption, and low capacity. [For an issue as sensitive, complex, and inter-dependent as violence prevention] the challenges increase multi-fold.’ (Interview DNP-DDS, Bogotá, June 2011)

Costs and sustainability-related issues were stressed as other constraints to translate the policy of mainstreaming into practice. This was the position of the Health Insurance Direction within the Ministry of Social Protection (MPS for its Spanish acronym). This Direction is in charge of implementing the universal health insurance coverage and thus, plays a crucial role in the translation of national policies into concrete planning and service delivery. Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention directly concerns it as regards to potential services to victims and perpetrators of violence. The Director and his team of advisers had a clear understanding and acknowledged the importance of the issue, but they confirmed what the DNP-DDS pointed out in terms of resistance from the Health Sector. The Direction felt this resistance was mainly for financial and sustainability reasons. Providing psychosocial assistance to victims and perpetrators of violence would be enormously costly for the health insurance system, for this would entail several sessions of
45 minutes or more by patient. Implementing the Law 1257 (2008) on domestic and sexual violence had already proved challenging for the Direction. In fact, the Law includes the obligation of the State to provide housing to victims of sexual and domestic violence who would need it. Yet, according to the team, such a measure was very expensive and difficult to implement in a sustainable way, and implementation remained uncertain at the time of interviews (Interview MPS-DSS, Bogotá, June 2011). Moreover, an additional piece of scepticism questioned the relevance of measures like early screening for child maltreatment and domestic violence, in the absence of other services to respond to the situation (thus echoing concerns already expressed by an IADB Division Chief, see Section 7.1.2 in Chapter 7).

Despite this resistance and scepticism, Directions within the MPS developed specific programmes to prevent violence by targeting specific risk factors. The Social Promotion Direction, for instance, was responsible for providing attention to victims of sexual violence, in particular to victims of the internal conflict and the displaced population. As for the Direction of Public Health, it was in charge of programmes to prevent adolescent pregnancy, and domestic and sexual violence. Directors and Technical Managers for those programmes expressed a great commitment to these issues, and a very thorough understanding of the need for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention. They also clearly saw the role the Health Sector could play in this respect. However, they quickly pointed out the lack of political commitment at the highest level of the Ministry and Government on the above-mentioned issues, and in particular on gender-based violence. (Interviews MPS-DPS and MPS-DSP, Bogotá, June 2011)

The Technical Manager for the Early Pregnancy Programme nonetheless insisted on the leverage that international commitments (could) have on national political priorities (this refers back to the policy community cohesion in Shiffman and Smith (2007) framework,

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155 It is noteworthy mentioning that all women interviewed were very committed and favoured a multi-sector approach to violence (with one exception who was more nuanced), whereas men (who were much less in number) had in general more mitigated views.

156 They nonetheless mentioned the nomination of High Presidential Counsellor for Gender, which raised expectations for giving more visibility to the issue.
and to the political leadership by donors, as discussed in Section 3.3 in Chapter 3). In the case of early pregnancy and the use of contraception, for instance, the Manager emphasised how having Millennium Development Goals\textsuperscript{157} and specific indicators enhanced, not only the visibility of the issues and their importance, but also their sustainability, as shown through the adoption of a Conpes, one of the documents with the highest levels of authority in Colombia.\textsuperscript{158} The same was highlighted in the case of Early Childhood Development (ECD). According to the ICBF, the Institute for Family Wellbeing in Colombia, international initiatives for ECD helped raise the issue on the Government’s agenda. There too, a Conpes was adopted and enhanced the institutionalisation of the programme (Interviews ICBF, Bogotá, June 2011). However, such international mobilisation was absent for violence prevention. This translated in less visibility for the programmes that the ICBF was developing in that regard (programmes that promoted positive parenthood, reduced corporal punishment, and prevented youth incorporation to violent, criminal groups, among others). In addition to the lack of political priority, the ICBF stressed a series of constraints related to the coordination among programmes and stakeholders at the national and local level, and the lack of capacity and resources at the local levels. These included the lack of pedagogical materials, the enormous needs for training large number of professionals, and the overall lack of capacity and motivation at the local level.

‘There is a lack of coordination with other entities and not the same involvement from other sectors. Each one has its own agenda and priority and this is very challenging to gather efforts and focus attention on some common goals. […] The ICBF has too many programmes, 33 in total. We do not have enough for the 33 programmes in all the regions, so this has a negative effect on impact because resources got divided and spread over. […] But the major challenge is the articulation between entities, this affects the impact: the question is how to operationalise it?’ (Interview ICBF, Bogotá, June 2011).

\textsuperscript{157} Specific goals and indicators of the Millennium Development Goals can be found at: http://www.who.int/pmnch/media/press_materials/fs/about_mdgs/en/

\textsuperscript{158} Conpes is the National Council of Economic and Social Policy (Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social), which is the highest national planning authority. Its documents (called ‘Conpes’ with a number) formalise the importance given to an issue, and facilitate its institutionalisation across administrations. Since lack of continuity is a major challenge in public policy, such normative developments are essential (https://www.dnp.gov.co/CONPES.aspx).
More generally, these institutional weaknesses at the local level were recurrently identified across ministries as a bottleneck for the implementation of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention. They included a very high turnover (mainly due to short contracts and widespread corruption); the need to mobilise and maintain the mobilisation of departments and municipalities; the lack of resources to recurrently train secretaries, professionals and practitioners on the issue, and to monitor and evaluate those programmes:

‘Colombia is very decentralised. At the departmental level, everything is very politicised. The Ministry comes and gives training to the Secretaries of Health and to the public hospital staff, and a few months later when they come to check if they are implementing it, the people who received the training are not there anymore. There is a huge rotation of human resources that really undermines the effectiveness of measures and programmes.’ (Interview MPS-DPS, Bogotá, June 2011)

Sectors engaged and creatively finding ways to mainstream inclusive violence prevention

The more advanced Ministry in terms of violence prevention mainstreaming was the Ministry of National Education (MEN for its Spanish acronym). The MEN has indeed endorsed the shared responsibility for violence prevention through the development of ‘citizenship competencies’. It has also given priority to address violence at school (i.e. intra-level mainstreaming). Interviewees explained that the decisive factor for such advancement was strong leadership from the Minister of Education who gave priority to the issue. This political will echoed efforts from the academia and other civil society organisations that were also decisive in raising public awareness and mobilisation on the issue of violence in schools. In particular, Colombian researchers (including Dr. Chaux and his colleagues at Los Andes University) undertook surveys to measure the extent of bullying in public schools, and helped develop specific indicators to assess citizenship competencies and school climate. The ICFES, the statistical agency for education, then further developed those indicators in collaboration with the researchers, and applied them in a larger survey. By so doing, the MEN, the ICFES and Los Andes University sought to find concrete ways to not only capture the extent of the issue in order to better address it,

159 This intra-level mainstreaming was not captured in the analysis of the National Development Plan, as previously mentioned, for the PND stayed at macro level. However, interviews pointed out its priority in the Education Sector Plan.
but also to institutionalise it within the Education Sector priorities. Indeed, those indicators served as sub-indicators of the quality of the Education Sector, which is a remarkable tool to institutionalise the issue within the sector and a concrete step towards mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention (see Box 6).

**Box 6: Mainstreaming Violence Prevention within the Education Sector in Colombia**

The Ministry of Education in its Sector Plan 2010-2014 formally acknowledged the shared responsibility for violence prevention, as well as the issue of violence in school. A significant part of the plan is geared towards strengthening peaceful and responsible citizenship and preventing violence at school and in classrooms. Three main activities are outlined:

1. The preparation of a national system;
2. The preparation and adoption of a Conpes (this Conpes would provide guidelines, objectives and responsibilities for different actors and sectors at different levels to promote a culture of respect to life and dignity for all citizens); and
3. The strengthening of the programme.

In addition, the Ministry works on strengthening sexual education, promoting human rights, and lowering down school desertion (in fact, violence was clearly identified as one of the factors explaining desertion). Finally, special attention is to be provided to population affected by violence.

The plan conveys the Education Sector’s commitment towards violence prevention at two levels: inter-sector and intra-sector. At the inter-sector level, it includes indicators to measure the implementation of the citizenship competencies programme, which is an important signal of the commitment of the Ministry to pursue this objective. In particular, a new law will provide the legal framework for the education system to assume this shared responsibility for violence prevention. This law will create the National System on School Coexistence and Training for the Exercise of Human Rights, Sexual and Reproductive Rights (In Spanish, ‘Proyecto de Ley por el cual se crea el Sistema Nacional de Convivencia Escolar y Formación para el Ejercicio de los Derechos Humanos, Sexuales y Reproductivos y la Prevención y Mitigación de la Violencia Escolar’); and at the intra-sector level, the prevention and mitigation of school violence.


**Sectors unengaged in violence prevention but seeing opportunities for it**

As far as the Ministry of Interior and Justice, the Ministry of Transport, and Acción Social are concerned, they all welcomed the idea of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention, but in a more indirect way. In particular, the Ministry of Interior and Justice focused on the actual challenges that impede the implementation of the citizen security strategy, while

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160 Those challenges included: i) the fact that the Ministry is in charge of citizen security but the national police reports to the Ministry of Defence; (ii) the Mayor is in charge of citizen security in their municipality but there is only one national police that reports to the Central Government; (iii) the Direction of citizen security is weak within the Ministry of Interior and Justice; (iv) the Ministry of Interior and Justice plays a role of coordinator between the police and the Mayors, but the police reports to the Ministry of Defence so there is a confusion regarding whether or not the police is in charge of citizen security; (v) the justice system is overloaded with a lot of structural issues that hinder improvements in citizen security; (vi) there are more than 1100 municipalities under 5000 inhabitants which makes it extremely difficult to have a good coverage in terms of police forces; (vii) for the 50 biggest cities, there is an issue of lack of specialised police forces;
Acción Social explicitly acknowledged that violence prevention was not an objective of the conditional cash transfer programme (*Familias en Acción*), but saw opportunities to include features in future improvements of the programme. In that regard, Acción Social’s Strategic Adviser insisted on the importance of pilots. For instance, piloting a component involving positive fatherhood incentives, as suggested by Barker (United Nations 2011:27), would help introduce the issue of violence prevention within large poverty reduction programmes that serve millions of women and men, girls and boys.

‘The IDAB and the World Bank have some influence. For example, the World Bank was at the initiative of serving indigenous population [in the *Familias en acción* conditional cash transfer programme]. Now, the IDAB and the World Bank say it is not enough to focus on access to education and health, the focus should be on the quality of education and health services. In this sense, climate of the classroom could well be included into quality of education. Or positive fatherhood could be included in pilots to see if it improves the programme in terms of getting fathers more involved with their family.’ (Interview, Acción Social, Bogotá, June 2011)

As for the Ministry of Transport, it embraced the idea and acknowledged the importance of violence prevention within the Transport Sector, in particular in urban areas. To go beyond a reactive treatment of the sector to the issue,\(^{161}\) the Director suggested that indicators and safeguards could help enhance the ownership of the issue by the sector as a whole, and as such contribute to the mainstreaming process. He also confirmed the importance of international guidelines, following the example of road safety that became an international priority that all countries were implementing:

‘[Violence] is a major concern and it could well be included in planning for the next generation, even though many preventive measures are more operational than a matter of planning per se, and each municipality is responsible for the operations, not the Ministry (that is responsible for norms). [...] If the IADB and the World Bank do it in their projects [through safeguards for example], this could serve as

\[^{161}\text{At the time of the interviews in Colombia (2011), the Transport Sector only responded to violence-related issues during the implementation, for example through changing routes and protecting construction workers, and did not include any parameters relevant to violence prevention in the design and preparation phase.}\]
model for other Transport projects beyond their direct involvement. Exactly as happened with environmental safeguards. This could have a multiplier effect.’ (Interview, MinTransporte, June 2011).

In sum, interviews with eight national institutions including five ministries in Colombia suggest country-specific prioritisation among opportunities and constraints related to the four analytical categories examined for MDBs. In particular, the case study found that political leadership is of paramount importance for a mainstreaming process to happen, as shown through the case of the Ministry of Education. Political leadership refers first and foremost to the highest authorities in the country, but also to the international community (see the different dimensions of political leadership in actor power, Section 3.3.2 in Chapter 3). Indeed, interviewees acknowledged on numerous occasions how international commitments influenced national priorities. This is important in the case of MDBs, for they could be instrumental in contributing to such international commitments. In violence prevention, the WHO is leading the agenda from a public health perspective, and MDBs, as general development organisations would be well placed to complement those efforts and expand the scope towards a multi-sector, gender sensitive perspective.

A common frame, sector-specific frames, and the need for indicators were also highlighted to enhance sector ownership on the issue (in line with cognitive frame and operational knowledge-related findings in Sections 7.1.1 and 8.1.3 respectively in Chapters 7 and 8). Here, the example of compound indicators developed in the Education Sector to institutionalise violence prevention within sector priorities is a powerful illustration that creative options can enhance sector ownership towards the operationalisation of the shared responsibility of violence prevention. Such indicators could be developed for other sectors and in relation to gender mainstreaming to ensure that gender considerations do not evaporate in such innovative sector-specific violence prevention indicators.

Finally, a widespread concern was raised regarding the enormous challenges to be tackled at the local level to make possible the implementation of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention (organisational treatment in relation to incentives and accountability mechanisms between the national and local level, and actor power in relation to the critical
Those local constraints are crucial to better understand, for programmes are ultimately implemented at the local level and local stakeholders play key roles in translating policies into actual change in the life of women and men, girls and boys. This is particularly the case given Colombia’s decentralisation structure. The next section thus investigates the extent to which stakeholders at the local level share the perception of central ministries and presidential agencies.

9.1.2 Through the lenses of local decision makers and practitioners: findings from interviews in four municipalities

Barranquilla, Bogotá, Medellin and Cartagena are the largest Colombian cities (in addition to Cali) and belong to the twenty priority municipalities targeted in the National Policy for Citizen Security and Coexistence (see Section 5.3.3 in Chapter 5). In particular, Bogotá and Medellin have consistently been among the cities with the highest violence-related indicators. Barranquilla and Cartagena, situated on the Atlantic Coast, have also suffered from increasing homicide rates, but the main issues concern intra-family violence, sexual violence, and inter-personal violence (opcit). I interviewed municipal secretaries in each of the four cities and programme managers in one department (Gobernación del Atlántico) (see Section 4.3.3 in Chapter 4 on study population).

Secretaries in Barranquilla, Bogotá and Medellin pinpointed a pre-condition for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention, and this was addressing corruption. Actually, the Administrations preceding Mockus (1995-1997; 2001-2004) in Bogotá and Fajardo/Salazar (2004-2007; 2008-2011) in Medellin, are all Mayors who focused on fighting corruption and restoring transparent municipal accounting, which led to higher revenues and better governance as well as trust from citizens (Interviews, Bogotá, and Medellin, May and June 2011). As a Senior Official of the Municipality of Barranquilla explained:

162 Decentralisation in Colombia is organised around the principles of co-responsibility, concurrence and subsidiarity. The 1991 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local Governments, both at the departmental and municipal level. The National Government sets the objectives and guidelines for the overall strategy (National Development Plan, national policies, Conpes and sectoral plans). Local Governments adapt those to their respective context. They are the ones in charge of implementing policies and programmes, and delivering services in the territories. This is the case for violence prevention or citizen security, for which Mayors are the primary responsible in their territory.
'First, you need to clean up and put some clarity in the ‘tributos’ [taxes], you need to control the collection of taxes and increase it. [You need to do that to cover urgent needs in schooling, infrastructure, etc.] […] When we arrived [the Char Administration], 45,000 children were out of school. So the priority was to put them back into the education system. For this, you need to find money to cover for the gratuity of primary schooling, build mega-colegios [large high schools], reformed public schools, and provide food to children, etc. There was also an urgent need for roads. People were ‘hostages’ in times of rain because of muddy roads. They could not go out from their houses, the police could not go, and ambulances could not reach there. One major issue is that Barranquilla grew very rapidly because of the phenomenon of displacement, so there was a lack of roads in many neighbourhoods. So the Alcaldia [the Municipality] proposed the plan ‘Barrios a la Obra’ providing the machines and materials and asking people to provide time, skills and labour. It changed many things for them. [But for this, you need resources.] […] When the Mayor came into office, he spent the first year cleaning the house.’ (Interview, Barranquilla, May 2011)

This quote also highlights the need for community participation. All municipalities agreed on this. In Bogotá, the municipality developed ‘community pacts’ (pactos) that officialise agreements between communities, the municipality, and other relevant institutions, such as the SENA, the institution in charge of technical training. They met once a month to monitor progress. In Medellin, community participation took the form of local assemblies where diagnosis was discussed with the community and priorities consensually agreed. In Barranquilla, local assemblies with cuadrantes were also organised, as well as escuelas de la vida (‘schools for life’) on gender-based violence and domestic violence. Secretaries in the four municipalities highlighted these examples of community participation as opportunities for action and for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention at the local level, provided key conditions were met. Nonetheless, they mainly focused on constraints during the interviews. They unanimously highlighted the lack of resources at the local level. In Barranquilla, for example, secretaries acknowledged the issue of violence was widespread in the city and the department, but also considered they had very limited margins of manoeuvre to act upon it because of scarce resources, and other sector priorities
for which they were held accountable. The transfer from the Central Government was earmarked with no or very limited margins of manoeuvre to allocate the remaining part of the municipal budget. They also mentioned coordination difficulties among secretaries to implement a multi-sector strategy. According to many secretaries, this was mainly due to differences in understanding the issue of violence and the responses to it (thus clearly highlighting the lack of shared cognitive frame). Coordination difficulties also came from the fact that the Mayor was constitutionally responsible for ensuring citizen security at the local level, but did not have authority over the police that solely depended on the Ministry of Defence (i.e. contradiction between responsibilities and means). Another major hindrance highlighted by most female secretaries was the male chauvinist culture, in particular on the Atlantic coast, where sexual abuse and domestic violence, including child and elderly maltreatment, were largely tolerated.\textsuperscript{163} Gender-based violence in Barranquilla, for instance, was under the responsibility of the poorly funded Sub-Secretary for Gender that had very limited means to develop programmes. For a population of 1.2 million inhabitants, and over a period of three years, 1167 participated in the ‘schools for life’, the main programme of the city on gender-based violence.

‘The biggest challenge is the machismo and the mentality, and the lack of resources for these questions. ‘Escuela para la vida’ [school for life] is a mobile school for men and women to teach them life skills and the law of protection of women [referring to Law 1287]. The programme comes from the will of these people, they asked for it. They wanted to become better persons, happier persons, to improve their relationships with others. This is how was born ‘Escuela para la vida’. […] We work with community leaders. Fifty leaders animate the process in different barrios [neighbourhoods]. They pay for their refreshments and food, this is not provided by the municipality, this is because the programme does not have a lot of money, and also because we wanted to ensure motivation for the programme.’ (Interview, Barranquilla, May 211)

The interviews with secretaries in four of the largest Colombian cities suggest that mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention is very complex to implement without

\textsuperscript{163} In that respect, I met with the chief medical doctor at the Legal Medicine of the Atlantic department in Barranquilla, who confirmed this and was alarmed by the situation.
additional resources, a clear and shared understanding of respective responsibilities and corresponding accountability, and the Mayor’s leadership. Without these key features, programmes were deemed to be precarious, leading to an overall lack of continuity and the incapacity to show results (also because without resources, costly evaluations could not be undertaken). In terms of resources, it is interesting to contrast local Governments’ prioritisation with national authorities’ positions. The DNP, for instance, estimated that the main challenge in terms of policies and programmes’ implementation was to mobilise local Governments, agree on local strategic plans for violence prevention, and efficiently target available resources to reach most vulnerable groups (Interview DNP-DJSG, Bogotá, June 2011; see Section 9.1.1). The DNP emphasised that the issue was not scarcity of resources, contrary to what local Governments were arguing, but a better use of available resources. Such contrasting positions need to be understood in a context of widespread local corruption and recent scandals both at the national and local levels. However, they also ground the analysis on the difficult but necessary exercise for national and local stakeholders and their partners to reconcile divergent standpoints for policy implementation.164 In such a context, are MDBs relevant, and how could they lever some of the identified constraints? Section 9.2 examines Colombian counterparts’ responses.

9.2 MDBs’ relevance in (mainstreaming) inclusive violence prevention: reflections from Colombian stakeholders

MDBs staff often questioned the relevance of their own organisation’s involvement in violence prevention. They also explained that country demand largely influenced the evolution and treatment of the issue on their development agendas. This section investigates those statements by looking at counterparts’ perceptions of MDBs in violence prevention in general, and in mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in particular.

9.2.1 Are MDBs relevant in violence prevention?

Four main messages emerge from Colombian counterparts’ interviews. The four messages target both MDBs. Nonetheless, interviewees highlighted important differences between the IADB and the World Bank. In general, they consider the IADB as better positioned on

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164 In terms of financing, the implementation of the policy is co-financed with local Governments that can also apply to a National Special Citizen Security Fund (FUNSECO).
the issue of violence prevention. This is mainly due to IADB’s citizen security loans that give visibility to the regional bank in the area. This is also due to numerous technical assistance grants at the national and local levels. In general, the IADB was also considered more flexible and accessible than the World Bank. IADB’s specialists were more present in the field and responsive to different demands. The World Bank was mostly seen as absent in violence prevention. Nevertheless, stakeholders also insisted that the IADB had no monopoly, and if the World Bank would be more proactive and take more risks to position itself, there would be space for it.

Message 1: MDBs are needed and have a role to play in violence prevention in the region. This is probably the strongest message from all interviewees in Colombia. Chapter 6 showed how strong debates within MDBs existed around the question as to whether or not violence prevention was part of MDBs’ mission. This debate is not relevant for Colombian counterparts. They clearly see that violence is a development issue to which MDBs can contribute, and in fact, for which MDBs are much needed.

Message 2: MDBs need to be coherent and consistent between what they preach and what they do. This was a recurrent message among interviewees, with a particular emphasis from Government officers and Ministerial technical staff: if MDBs want Governments to put some issues high on the agenda, they need to do it themselves in their own organisation. This was particularly salient for domestic violence and gender-based violence, above all in terms of number of projects and allocated funds, thus apparently contradicting what MDBs staffs were arguing. This is in reality more complex and highlights how tensions might exist within a Government between the Ministry of Finance and Planning and line Ministries, in particular those with relatively less power, who then look to MDBs as partners to help them relay and push for an issue like domestic violence or gender-based violence in donor-recipient negotiations. In this more nuanced and complex context, they

165 During the interviews, the DNP mentioned that IADB’s technical assistance financed the development of the National Policy of Citizen Security and Coexistence through the contracting of Foundation Ideas para la Paz, a consulting firm and think tank dedicated to these issues. The Ministry of Education mentioned the flexibility of the IADB to include a component on citizenship competencies within the loan as well as the support given to the SREDECC, a regional network of researchers on citizenship competencies. The municipality of Medellin referred to a technical assistance to develop local diagnostics on citizen security. Finally, the ICBF and the MPS mentioned that the IADB financed impact evaluations and the MPS acknowledged the advisers paid through IADB’s technical assistance.
expressed frustration when MDBs did not take up the issue as their own, but still preached for it. Sector ministries and secretaries, including Public Health, Social Protection, and Early Childhood Development, also brought the coherence requirement up for issues such as early pregnancy, youth-friendly clinics, assistance to victims, and early detection of abuse in early childhood. In fact, MDBs publish studies that highlight the importance of these issues that are not translated into their own operational priorities and projects. This message uncovers complex dynamics at stake in donor-recipient relations in part due to the multiple layers of responsibility and interests in each partner.

Message 3: There is space for MDBs to be more proactive.

‘MDBs need to clearly show what they could bring to the table.’

(Interview, Government of Colombia, Bogotá, June 2011)

Colombian stakeholders insisted on the need for MDBs to clarify their own position and comparative advantage at the central and local levels. Many interviewees called for MDBs to work on a clear strategy for their own organisation and to communicate it more widely. Counterparts at the local and national levels affirmed there was space for discussion with MDBs on violence prevention, and many of them even suggested they would welcome more proactive engagement. This finding complements message 1, and contradicts the argument that MDBs are irrelevant in (upper) middle-income countries and have no margins for manoeuver to influence or enter into strategic discussions with their counterparts. Interviews show that there is space for dialogue and propositions, and a genuine interest towards MDBs’ (potential) offer to help prevent violence from a gender perspective.

Message 4: MDBs need to strengthen their staffs’ skills and in-house expertise. To take advantage of the space for dialogue on violence prevention, MDBs nonetheless need to strengthen their own expertise. Ministerial Directors and Experts in particular expressed doubts regarding MDBs’ capacity of response. They explained that most MDBs’ specialists in charge of citizen security were not experts in violence prevention, and the number of specialists with appropriate knowledge and understanding was inadequate. In other words, they pointed out that MDBs did not have enough trained staff or in-house experts to
respond to an increased demand, develop policy dialogue on violence prevention, and gain or increase credibility as strategic partners in violence prevention in the region.\textsuperscript{166} This does not contradict previous messages; it is a call to MDBs to invest more on violence prevention, for there is space and need for their support in the region.

These four messages show that Colombian stakeholders consider MDBs relevant in violence prevention. In other words, there is no a priori barrier to entry for MDBs based on a political consideration that violence would be a sovereign issue, or that violence would not be linked to development, which would have discarded MDBs’ interventions. Actually, not one interviewee suggested MDBs were irrelevant and should not get involved. On the contrary, some even criticised them for either not taking the lead or not giving it enough priority within their own agenda. This again reveals the complexity of donor-recipient relations, and confirms the need to complement MDBs’ views with those of their counterparts. Without this, it would have been easy to conclude that countries do not want MDBs to intervene in violence prevention in general and in gender-based or domestic violence in particular. Another noteworthy finding is the need for MDBs to clarify and strengthen their approach to the issue, as well as their own expertise. Colombian Ministries wanted clarity from MDBs on their strengths and comparative advantage.

‘MDBs should identify their comparative advantage and show it to the Government. They should be very clear regarding what benefits the Government could get by taking a loan versus getting funding on the markets.’ (Interview DNP-DDS, Bogotá, May 2011)

It is probable that Colombian stakeholders’ level of exigency was higher than in other countries of the region because they are generally sensitised to the issue of violence and enjoy a relatively high common knowledge in violence prevention. It might also reflect an general demand for sound and proven technical expertise in the donor-recipient relations between UMIC and MDBs. In that sense, violence prevention would be no exception. It is

\textsuperscript{166} This message reveals concerns from counterparts but disregards the inherent limitations of MDBs in terms of staffing. As many staffs have underlined (see Chapter 6), budgetary constraints entail less staffing and therefore more workload for each staff member, and thus less possibilities to diversify skills and acquire new skills. This message is important for the Board and Management of both organisations to decide whether or not to build a critical mass of in-house experts.
in fact probably a combination of both, with the specificity that MDBs do not have a track record of effective projects or demonstrated expertise in inclusive violence prevention, as opposed to what they can show in other sectors. Finally, there was an overall concern for ensuring that MDBs limit themselves to supporting and accompanying ministerial programmes and projects, without changing, imposing, or seeking to influence too much those, in particular when they resulted from participatory processes. Practitioners at the local level echoed this concern (see Box 7).

**Box 7: Practitioners’ call to MDBs for respecting realistic timing and scales**

Meetings with practitioners in the four municipalities, some of whom had worked with the international cooperation, wanted to warn MDBs against the tendency to aim too big too fast.

‘Methodologies that are developed with communities and specific groups and are ‘owned by the people’ cannot be stretched or scaled up rapidly unless you loose this ownership, and therefore its meaning to people (and probably its impact too).’ (Interview, Cartagena, April 2011)

Similar remarks were made on repeated occasions. Civil society organisations’ leaders and managers who are deeply committed to their work and would like to benefit the greatest number of people possible, also know that it would be counter-productive to speed processes up just to reach quantity (they were indeed unwilling to take the risk of jeopardising quality).

This was the experience, for instance, of a project supported by the World Bank in Cartagena. The project team had to reduce the number of participating children during implementation, simply because the initial target was too high and the organisation did not have the capacity to train the teachers in good conditions in the short time allocated in the project. To scale up, not only financial resources are needed, but also human resources. In this case, trainers who could replicate the model in different sites could not been trained on time, for training trainers or teachers takes several years. Not recognising that generated a lot of frustration for all counterparts and disillusion in beneficiaries who did not receive what they had been promised, and might jeopardise the scaled up project’s sustainability since the organisation would go back to its normal work and size at the end of the project sponsored by the international community.

However, the same organisation also recognised that working with a MDB brought a lot of visibility to its work. It also acknowledges the importance of evaluations to strengthen their credibility and discourse, in particular with policy makers, and saw an important role for MDBs in that matter.

Source: Interviews with NGOs, Cartagena, April 2011

9.2.2 Where could MDBs help the most?

If MDBs have a role to play in violence prevention, what would it be? Where do Colombian stakeholders see MDBs’ main contribution to the issue? MDBs’ comparative advantage in violence prevention is drawn from a combination of clients’ needs with
MDBs’ resources and experience or expertise, at least as interviewees perceive them. To facilitate the analysis, I group them into MDBs’ traditional types of activities: technical expertise, political dialogue, financial resources, and knowledge contribution. Some contributions overlap two types of intervention as shown in Figure 14. The findings are prioritised based on the frequency of responses, with a heavier weight given to MDBs’ direct clients, i.e. national and local Governments.

**Figure 14: How could MDBs contribute the most to violence prevention? Responses from Colombian stakeholders (2011)**

Source: Own analysis based on findings from in-depth interviews with stakeholders of violence prevention in Colombia.


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167 Findings from in-depth interviews are inherently constrained by each interviewee’s own knowledge and familiarity with MDBs’ mission and means. However, the diversity of interviewees as well as the analysis from previous chapters and my own analysis mitigate these limitations (see Section 4.4.3 in Chapter 4).
**Technical expertise**

The technical expertise focuses on the ‘how to’. Most interviewees directly or indirectly referred to the need to operationalise current theories in violence prevention. As Chapter 2 as shown, this refers, in particular, to the ecological model and the notion of gendered continuum for violence. This includes clarifying each stakeholder’s role and developing incentives and accountability mechanisms to promote sector ownership for the issue. This also includes identifying the pace of reforms and effective coordination techniques, and confirms what MDBs’ Managers and staffs themselves had identified as important variables to mainstream inclusive violence prevention (see Chapter 8, Section 8.1.2). The main difference lies in the fact that counterparts clearly considered this to be MDBs’ role, as they saw it as a public good fitting MDBs’ mandate. That is, stakeholders saw the MDB as a bridge between knowledge and policy making. In practical terms, they called on MDBs assistance for helping local and central Governments and civil society to strengthen the ‘evaluability’ of projects; developing toolkits (i.e. step-by-step operational guides for practitioners and Government officers who are in charge of designing and implementing programmes, projects and interventions); strengthening information systems, including developing quality assurance mechanisms for violence observatories and enhancing analysis of data; strengthening monitoring and evaluation systems, with a particular attention on the implementation processes to identify facilitating and hindering factors; financing and undertaking impact evaluations; and technically and financially assisting in scaling-up processes. Regarding the last, scaling-up processes, many interviewees, including key informants, pointed out how LAC was a laboratory for innovation in terms of violence prevention. However, most of these initiatives remained at the very local level and faced great difficulties to be scaled up into public policies, even when they had been evaluated as successful. Identifying conditions for scaling up successful experiences was seen as one of the most important contributions MDBs could bring to the issue at the regional level.

‘A major contribution would focus on scaling up local initiatives. For example, remedial education for youth. This would give visibility to local initiatives, develop some funding mechanisms and help make the initiatives be and stay non-partisan. There, MDBs could help. […] They develop a programme, evaluate it and hope for a scale up at the State level. Look at what happened with AIDS in Brazil: the World
Bank financed a stand-alone project and the Government matched the fund. Now, there is a demand for it and the programme is there to stay.’ (Interview, Key Informant, Washington, D.C., April 2011)

**Policy dialogue**

The research in Colombia pinpointed policy dialogue as the second area where MDBs show a strong comparative advantage. Most interviewees cited the need for influential partners to help clarify debates on the causes of violence and its solutions. Despite the knowledge acquired over the past decades on the causes of violence, debates around violence remained trapped in ideology, in particular at the local level. According to Colombian interviewees and international experts who had been working in the field for decades, some policymakers did not consider prevention as a serious option to violence, and debates opposing prevention to repression were still vivid (Interviews, Key Informants, Washington D.C., July 2011). This suggests that efforts are needed to enhance a common understanding of violence as a development issue, which is multidimensional, multi-causal and gendered, which emerges and reinforces other structural injustices, and which requires an multi-sector, gender-sensitive and preventive approach to address multiple risk factors at multiple levels. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, the challenge at stake is to develop a powerful frame, simple enough to resonate with policymakers and their voters without caricaturing the issue and its solutions. MDBs could help by elevating the debate beyond ideology and clarifying the advantages and disadvantages of each type of policies. Through their policy dialogue with Governments, MDBs could consistently promote a mainstreaming approach to inclusive violence prevention both with Ministries of Finance and Planning, and with line Ministries. This would require a clear positioning from MDBs themselves and the implementation of a mainstreaming approach within their own agenda (see four key messages, Section 9.2.1).

‘There is an enormous political pressure for not so sophisticated policies. So one big contribution of development banks would be to enrich the public empirical debates through information, research that could lead to better quality policies. They have the expert criteria, but to reach their objectives they must be clear that politicians and policy makers face an enormous pressure, so in addition to long term preventive measures, they need to include short term gains that the Governments could show
and sell to the Media, otherwise they won’t listen.’ (Interview, Key Informant, Washington, D.C., April 2011)

To facilitate MDBs’ policy dialogue on mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention, stakeholders highlighted priority measures; many of them mirrored what MDBs’ staff members had highlighted. They included defining realistic, meaningful and measurable indicators; benchmarking reforms, in particular in terms of pacing (what to do first and why), in contexts where many priorities compete for limited resources; providing specific guidance on why and how to work in a multi-sector, coordinated fashion; and identifying the necessary pre-conditions for any violence prevention strategy to be adopted, implemented, and to produce results (both in the short and medium term). While some of the measures overlap with and reinforce what respondents suggested for technical expertise, others are more controversial. This is the case for the last measure that experts, practitioners and local Governments put forth: MDBs went from being severely criticised for imposing too hard conditions on countries to not imposing any (or very minor ones). For issues such as violence prevention, many Colombian interviewees criticised MDBs for not imposing enough conditions on Governments, thus echoing concerns from MDBs Specialists working in LMICs (see Chapter 8, Section 8.2). They explained how failing to have minimum conditions to implement projects dealing with highly sensible and politicised topics might lead to no or few results, and even cancellation or restructuration. This was considered problematic not only for MDBs’ relevance, but for institutionalising a multi-sector, gender-sensitive approach to violence prevention. According to them, success breeds success, and credibility must be based on tangible results; therefore, MDBs should take the responsibility to identify which conditions are necessary and require they are in place before financing a policy, programme or project.

‘It would be very useful if they could do it [MDBs on conditions]. In the end, they own the money they lend. So they should control it and provide TA and guidance on this, even through conditions.’ (Interview, MinTransporte, Bogotá, June 2011)

**Knowledge generation**

The third area where MDBs could significantly contribute to violence prevention in LAC deals with knowledge generation and dissemination. As most Colombian stakeholders
highlighted, much still needs to be researched in violence prevention, or make accessible to a wider public. This includes developing the evidence basis on what works and what does not work in Latin America, and on what contextual factors (institutional, political, social) are necessary for an intervention to be successful, and eventually be scaled up, as previously mentioned. MDBs can help generate and disseminate research, both at the operational and academic level. In addition to flagship publications, which provide a thorough synthesis of the latest literature and evidence on the topic, interviewees mentioned the need for best practices and operational toolkits (also highlighted in technical expertise).

Regarding MDBs’ flagship publications, most national ministries officers linked their value to their visibility and policy scope. Many mentioned the World Bank’s recent book, *Violence in the City* (2011), as well as the World Development Reports on Conflict, Security and Development (2011), and on Gender and Development (2012). These widely disseminated publications were considered instrumental for drawing policymakers’ attention on the importance of violence and gender, and their link to development. In that regard, the World Bank had an advantage as compared to the IADB, for World Bank’s publications were much more visible and best known that those of the regional bank. Other suggested contributions focused on supporting regional researchers networks to develop regional knowledge and promote exchange of ideas and experiences, organising conferences and workshops, and developing a work programme with the media, opposition parties and civil society, for these stakeholders play important roles in the adoption of multi-sector strategies, their implementation and their continuity. Many Colombian stakeholders referred to the Bogotá’s experience in that respect. The multi-sector strategy developed by the Mockus Administration (1995-1997) enjoyed an extraordinary longevity of three administrations (Mockus, 1995-1997; Peñalosa, 1998-2000) from the opposite party; and Mockus, 2001-2003)), which made possible sustaining the initial results. Interviewees pointed out the need for enhancing such continuity both at the national and

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168 Even though the WDR on Gender was published in 2012, it was prepared in 2011 when I undertook field interviews.

169 In that regard, the IADB has financed the SREDECC (*Sistema Regional de Competencias Ciudadanas*) in the Education Sector to promote exchange of experience on citizenship competencies and violence prevention in schools. However, according to interviews, the network does not receive funds anymore, for the IADB’ specialist who used to lead it, left the Bank. Therefore, doubts emerged regarding the continuity of the network, that was considered particularly useful by interviewees (Interview, Bogotá, June 2011).
local levels, and saw a role for MDBs in this endeavour, as technical a-political advisers to Governments.

‘What we need from the banks is a project as long as possible to motivate people to stay in the project.’ (Interview DNP-DJSG, Bogotá, June 2011)

‘What would be needed from the IADB and the World Bank are evaluations to ensure continuity of the programmes’ (Interview MPS-DGSP, Bogotá, June 2011)

‘The banks should establish long-term strategies and should begin with countries that offer the best conditions: begin with those willing and with conditions to show impact could be generated.’ (Interview, Key Informant, Medellin, June 2011)

**Financial resources**

Interestingly, financial resources were not the main comparative advantage interviewees cited. This is probably because Colombia has access to international financial markets, which makes financial resources largely available. Nevertheless, financial resources were important at the subnational level, provided municipalities and departments had enough financial health to take loans. At the national level, some ministries suggested the separation between financial loans and technical assistance. They favoured budget support for the former, and grants negotiated separately for the later. All stakeholders considered technical assistance as valuable tools to consolidate MDBs’ comparative advantage.

‘MDBs provide free expertise, so they play a big role. One of the priorities they should focus on is helping countries to select the first programmes to put in place and implement: the action should be strategic, proactive, the change would need at least a generation (15-20 years).’ (Interview, Key Informant, Medellin, June 2011)

Technical assistance was also needed to strengthen capacity at the local level and for a series of activities to facilitate the daily work of national and local bureaucrats and policymakers. Those particularly insisted on the facilitating role of MDBs for financing studies on specific issues relevant to the client and impact evaluations; providing grants to local researchers to develop local expertise (because having local experts was considered important to advise Ministers and Mayors, in particular when they tend to change
frequently); and providing grants to local NGOs to strengthen their capacity and develop programmes at the community level.

9.3 Conclusion

The case of Colombia illustrates the margins of manoeuvre for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in an upper middle-income country, with high capacity at the national level, yet facing important challenges in terms of inequalities and social and economic development.

Findings from interviews at the national and local levels in Colombia show that mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention at the country level is possible provided a series of conditions are met. It is possible because most of the interviewees showed receptiveness to such a strategy, agreed on the need to operationalise the shared responsibility for violence, and acknowledged its gender dimensions. It is also possible because the first steps of a multi-sector approach were actually being taken through the National Development Plan and the latest Policy for Citizen Security and Coexistence that seek to address the root causes of violence by engaging with multiple sectors at once. It is nonetheless difficult for a series of reasons whose prioritisation diverges between the national and local levels. Overall, political leadership at all levels (national, local, and international) was seen as incontrovertible for such an enterprise to succeed. In that respect, having strong international partners who push the agenda forward on the global arena was seen as a propitious condition for greater visibility and priority at the local level. Along with political leadership, all interviewees stressed the constraints created by multiple cognitive frames and the need to clarify messages both on the issue of violence and on mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention. In other words, they acknowledged the need for clarity of vision and goals that scholars studying gender mainstreaming had long highlighted as explained in Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3 (see for instance Daly 2005; Walby 2005; Razavi 2009; Rao and Sandler 2012). This is in fact a condition for the mainstreaming process to go from integration to agenda setting, and transform policy planning in highly violent countries and cities. Overall, Colombian policymakers and bureaucrats referred to opportunities and constraints in relation to the four analytical categories (developed in Chapter 3), but also insisted on the need to address corruption and
to focus on constant capacity building and community participation for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention to become a credible policy option.

As for the role of MDBs in violence prevention in general and MiVP in particular, Colombian counterparts and key informants considered MDBs not only legitimate, but also relevant to accompany and even propose programmes and projects on inclusive violence prevention. In other words, MDBs were clearly welcomed as partners to respond to the challenge of violence prevention, and Colombian counterparts even called for more proactivity in demonstrating that MDBs took the challenge as their own. This was particularly the case for gender-based and domestic violence. Findings also show that from the counterparts’ perspective, perceived comparative advantage of MDBs was primarily technical and political. At the technical level, stakeholders saw MDBs adding value in capacity building at the local level, information systems, indicators development, monitoring and evaluation, and policy-oriented studies. MDBs already undertake most of those activities (see Chapter 6), yet what was missing according to Colombian stakeholders, was a clear positioning and a more widely disseminated line of action within and outside MDBs, i.e. clearer communication. In addition, Colombian stakeholders highlighted the need for more in-house expertise on the topic both in general and sector by sector. Finally, the case study of Colombia highlights a series of specific new lines of action where MDBs could help on the political side. First, MDBs could be instrumental in enhancing conditions for continuity across administrations through long-term policy dialogue, loans and grants. Second, MDBs could use their influence to push the international agenda on violence prevention by organising high level and worldwide events, i.e. by participating in the development of an external policy community, and eventually suggesting international commitments. Through those efforts, Colombian stakeholders and key informants considered MDBs could make substantial contributions towards institutionalising violence prevention as a multi-sector, gender-sensitive issue, and thereafter, towards enhancing conditions for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention.
Chapter 10: Conclusion

I began this thesis five years ago. I was working for the World Bank at the time and designing a project to help women victims of violence in Colombia. Thinking about the main challenges that women and men, girls and boys in Latin America and the Caribbean had to face, I felt deeply that violence was the greatest injustice. The fact that not only most poor families had to struggle to survive but had to experience fear and violations of their very basic right to life for themselves, their children, partners, or friends, was unbearable. Then, as I was reading a number of life histories of young pandilleros in the region, the link between violence and gender gained particular salience. These young men, boys many times, had either left home because of domestic violence or were trying to build an identity as men that dominant models associated with violence. Yet, discussions around gender seemed isolated and confined to women’s issues, and overall marginalised in strategies to prevent urban violence. So the basic question that motivated this research was: who can do what to influence policymaking towards more multi-sector, gender-sensitive and humanistic strategies that would be built around the understanding that violence is preventable?

There are many actors along the policy continuum, and Multilateral Development Banks are just one of them. Beyond all debates regarding MDBs’ legitimacy, relevance and effectiveness, few other organisations have so much financial leverage to support and advise Governments in Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition, I had insider knowledge of these organisations, having worked at the World Bank. I would then gain in-depth knowledge of the IADB after joining the organisation a few years later after my field work. This dual positionality as insider and outsider researcher forced me to reflect on ethical issues of the research following a rich discussion by feminist scholars. By being transparent and conscious of this unique positionality, I acknowledge that the research is the result of an iterative and dialogical process where my experience fed my analysis and vice versa.

So, as I began this research and throughout, I wanted to understand what MDBs’ role in violence prevention could be, and how they could contribute to push the policy agenda
forward for multi-sector, gender-sensitive approaches to violence with an agenda-setting perspective. In particular, I wanted to understand why a mainstreaming approach to violence that would translate its multi-dimensionality and multi-sectorality had not been systematically pursued by these organisations, and what had been the constraints and opportunities in that regard, as a basis for looking forward into developing more innovative and effective violence prevention approaches. For this, I had to proceed by stages. I first had to understand the emergence and evolution of violence prevention within MDBs. In particular, I had first to disentangle why these major development agencies had not given violence prevention more priority over the past two decades despite violence’s negative multiplier effects on development and its enormous costs. In understanding this, it was important to identify the particularity of violence prevention in the development agenda to be able to discuss strategies looking forward.

I thus undertook an organisational ethnography, whose complexity is reflected in the difficulty to disentangle the main analytical variables from a density of qualitative data. The qualitative methodology fitted this research that sought to uncover complex, subtle and multi-layered dynamics at stake within international development organisations, at the country and local levels, and in donor-recipient relations. Puzzling out a large amount of data from a diversity of respondents whose perspective reflected their experience, training, gender, age and position required a systematic and synthetic analysis to pinpoint the most salient variables and identify commonalities and differences. For such exercise, it was important to proceed in an iterative manner. This made it possible to take the most out of a deep knowledge of all the specificities and details gathered, while applying an analytical distance. Without such iteration in the analysis, it is easy to either over-simplify and dismiss important data and thereafter findings, or become overwhelmed with the amount of data and the complexity of organisational processes and therefore incapable of meaningful analysis. This iterative process also allowed me to refine the conceptual framework whose key categories were initially identified through the review and analysis of important bodies of literature, but whose translation into specific variables was refined throughout the research process. When reflecting on the methodology, the process tracer appears as a fundamental part of this research as it underscores how historical processes matter to understand opportunities and constraints for mainstreaming processes. This is all the more
so in a context where MDBs are well known for their lack of institutional memory and a high turnover of personnel. Knowing, understanding and pondering on what happened in the past appeared as a key milestone to gain a finer understanding of potentialities in the present, which would then create conditions for substantial and lasting change in the future.

Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention is the institutionalisation of the prevention of violence from a gender perspective throughout the development agenda so as to create lasting conditions for peaceful, inclusive societies, communities, families and individuals in all their social diversity. The concept takes its theoretical underpinnings from social constructivism and collective empowerment to place women and men, girls and boys at the core of defining the problems that affect their lives, and developing solutions by sharing responsibility for it. As there are many ways to define violence, this thesis opts for the WHO definition that encompasses many manifestations and leaves room for acknowledging that structural injustices and patriarchy are embedded in the perpetuation of violence, as shown also through the gendered continuum of violence.

The concept builds on the lessons from the scholarship and experience of gender mainstreaming and priority setting. It makes the synthesis of five frameworks and identifies four analytical categories to analyse the opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention in the context of aid. These categories deal with cognitive frame, actor power, operational knowledge and organisational treatment, and are looked at through donor-recipient lenses.

I found that these categories provided relevant keys for understanding the emergence and evolution of violence prevention, and the conditions for its mainstreaming from a gender perspective in MDBs. As noted previously, the selection of variables within each category was refined throughout the iterative research process. All these variables complement and reinforce each other to identify bottlenecks and make sense of the resistance to such an important issue gaining priority and being institutionalised. Together, they suggest that it will be difficult to implement an agenda-setting mainstreaming approach for the inclusive prevention of violence in both banks, but not impossible. The research in fact highlights the difficulties in mainstreaming linked to the multi-layers of collective empowerment. As
discussed in Chapter 3, for transformation to happen, we need collective empowerment. What the comparative analysis in both MDBs and the case study in Colombia reveal is the difficulty for collective empowerment to happen at different levels (community, Government, and MDBs), with processes that sometimes contradict each other. This was shown through differences between the local and central levels in Colombia, but also through the contradictory incentives within MDBs and the tensions between development and financial survival. The research also shows how the analytical categories play out differently at the IADB and the World Bank. In particular, their relative salience in the explanation suggests directions to prioritise efforts looking forward.

A first interesting finding of this research confirms the importance of cognitive frames for priority setting and the institutionalisation of an issue in the development agenda. Framing is of course interrelated to the other variables (actor power, operational knowledge, organisational treatment, donor-recipient relations). Yet, it is seldom taken into consideration in strategic discussions. Through this research, I have shown how building a common understanding that strongly resonates is a key, and perhaps the main key, for priority setting and institutionalisation. This concretely means investing in building a powerful frame or common understanding in contexts where economists, the majority of MDBs’ staff members, might show spontaneous resistance to what might appear as ‘non-economic’ issues. At the banks, even very dedicated people cannot push the issue forward by themselves. They need allies throughout the organisation. For this, they need people to visualise and build conviction of the relevance of the issue to their own work and their capacity to change things from their sector perspective. Given staff turnover in both organisations, such common understanding and credible and salient frames need to be seen as a recurrent exercise. More generally, as it was the case for gender, mainstreaming is a slow process that requires changing mindsets and behaviours towards transformation. Today, new generations are used to dealing with gender even though a lot still needs to be done in implementation. For inclusive violence prevention, the first step is to make it a habit. That is, a practical objective would be to make violence prevention and gender appear as normal and effective practices throughout the project cycle for relevant sectors. The tension between integration and agenda setting might remain alive, but not incompatible, in particular in bureaucratic organisations that MDBs are. As Gupta (2010)
has shown in the case of climate change, they evolve along a continuum of political difficulty, but not necessarily in opposite direction. In the end, slowly changing mindsets and behaviours through training, incentives, experience, contact with the field, accountability and tools, all participate in shifting paradigms and reaching the political agenda for more inclusive, peaceful societies through the operationalisation of the shared responsibility for preventing violence.

A second interesting finding, even if it is not new, is the importance of women and men with influence. Here, the actor power factor played out differently at the IADB and the World Bank. Even at the IADB, where barriers are less rigid, the lack of vision and implementers of such vision (that is, the lack of critical mass of in-house experts) hindered the regional bank to make the most of its influence and experience in the issue. This is clearly a constraint, but also an opportunity as people keep changing and teams can be strengthened, even though leadership is always harder to create. Recent efforts led by the few in-house experts at the IADB to develop clinics and specialised training are aiming in this direction.

Other relevant findings had to do with knowledge and donor recipient-relations. Knowledge limitations were an easy answer many staff members in both banks almost systematically provided. Even though legitimate, it does not hold very long in particular when compared to other complex and nascent issues, such as climate change or corruption that also face strong knowledge limitations but nevertheless have climbed the priority ladder relatively quickly. Donor-recipient relations were another easy answer: ‘we do not work more on violence prevention, and within it on gender-based violence or domestic violence, because countries do not ask for it.’ Yet, when counterparts were asked in the case study on Colombia, often the opposite answer was given: ‘MDBs should first show what they can offer and be more proactive.’ Here again, the case of climate change is interesting as a comparison in the sense that a strong agenda by donors gave space to push the agenda forward in negotiations with countries, first through grants and technical assistance, and then loans. The multi-donor fund at the IADB might help doing so, provided the IADB strengthens its in-house expertise and own vision for its contribution to the issue. From my work experience, I am convinced there is room for greater and more strategic involvement.
from MDBs. Finally, organisational constraints revealed the contradictions of being a financial institution and a development agency at once. This created, in particular at the World Bank, a series of contradictory incentives not favouring the emergence of complex, small violence prevention loans, and was clearly a constraint for mainstreaming processes.

Today, as I write the conclusions of this research, violence is still a tremendous challenge and much still needs to be learned and done to prevent it in an effective, humanistic, and gender-sensitive manner. This thesis aimed to be a humble contribution to this by shedding light on the different factors that influence such a complex issue to gain priority among MDBs and their country partners, and second, by providing a firmer knowledge base for the discussion on how to institutionalise the issue from a gender perspective through developing the concept of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention and investigating opportunities and constraints in MDBs’ context.

As such, the main contribution of this research is to propose a framework for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention by providing a definition for debates, and looking at the variables that would eventually facilitate its implementation in MDBs. The framework builds on lessons from interlocking bodies of literature on priority setting, gender mainstreaming, and donor-recipient relations, and evolved throughout the research to reach its final stage of four categories and twelve variables. In other words, this research with the proposed framework aims to contribute to a nascent discussion, initiated by a few authors, including Moser (1999, 2006, 2009) and Whitzman (2008) who tried to link theory with practice, and inspired me to begin working on violence prevention. By exploring the views of MDBs’ staff and counterparts on mainstreaming, the objective was to assess the resonance of such an approach and pinpoint where the main resistance would be. Much remains to be done and studied in terms of better understanding how to operationalise the ecological model in MDBs and beyond. In particular, the concept and its corresponding operational discussion would benefit from debate in a variety of contexts so as to be refined, improved, and finally endorsed by academics, policymakers and practitioners. Among the main areas of research to deepen the concept and its practical implications, I suggest that future research investigates why other complex challenges did not gain more priority and were not mainstreamed within MDBs. This is the case for instance of
biodiversity, as a former World Bank Vice President suggested, and would usefully complement this research by showing similarities and differences in priority setting and institutionalisation processes in MDBs. Further investigation on mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention could usefully assess the resonance of different frames on the political goal as well as on the relevance of inclusive violence prevention by sector, study tools in terms of operational effectiveness and pertinent indicators and sub-indicators by sector, analyse the kind of mechanisms (incentives, accountability and coordination) most effective in different contexts to consolidate and expand the knowledge-base on conducive conditions for the mainstreaming process of the inclusive prevention of violence.

Finally, I want to go back to the bottom line of violence prevention, which is to always keep a human face in the strategies to be designed and implemented even in the worst contexts of all. Violence is preventable, and every person has a role to play. Since many cities in Central America and other parts of Latin America have been compared to war zones because of the very high levels of violence affecting daily life, I want to end with a note of hope coming from a survivor of one of the most horrific times of the XXth century that nevertheless had the courage and the motivation to live through it all and keep hope in humanity and the meaning of life. More than that, he showed how each single person mattered. His words remind me of countless stories of unknown heroes, many women and men who kept hope, cared, and helped improve other people’s life despite the most terrible adversity. I had the honour to witness such extraordinary behaviours in ‘ordinary life’ to borrow the expression from Moser’s latest book (2009), on multiple occasions over the past fifteen years in working and living in more than twenty countries. Throughout this research, I have had the privilege of meeting with numerous persons most of whom were honest, knowledgeable, and fully dedicated professionals who wanted to help. Violence prevention is definitely a very humbling topic. There is so much more that we do not know than we do know. And as a PhD researcher it is even more humbling as I look with some distance at very complex settings where margins of manoeuvre are constantly changing. So this research was conducted with full humility holding an honest, transparent analysis while acknowledging its limitations (including those I might not be aware of), and the difficulty of the job at stake for each individual in the organisations. For this reason, I have tried to always keep the analysis at the organisational level. But I nonetheless believe that each
individual can change things for the better. The challenge at stake is complex, but the many dedicated women and men, in all their diversity and responsibilities that worked to change things give me hope. They include many women and men in Washington, D.C. and in Colombia who can actually do things, despite the big organisational constraints. These women and men all matter in their singularity and have the power to change the status quo and create safer, more inclusive societies.

‘This uniqueness and singleness which distinguishes each individual and gives meaning to his [or her] existence has a bearing on creative work as much as it does on human love. When the impossibility of replacing a person is realised, it allows the responsibility which a man [or a woman] for his [or her] existence and its continuance to appear in all its magnitude. A man [or a woman] who becomes conscious of the responsibility he [or she] bears toward a human being who affectionately waits for him [or her], or to an unfinished work, will never be able to throw away his [or her] life. [They] know the ‘why’ for [their] existence, and will be able to bear almost any ‘how’.’

Viktor Frankl (1959)

*Man’s search for meaning: the classic tribute to hope from the Holocaust*
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Appendices A: Policy Approaches to Prevent Violence

This appendix complements the discussion in Section 2.6 in Chapter 2. I re-group policy approaches into five categories: criminal justice, epidemiological/public health, urban development, education, and multi-sector approaches to mirror traditional sector ministries.

The criminal justice approach

There are two broad strategies within this approach: the repressive one and the preventive/rehabilitative one. The first approach has been very popular in Central America and is referred to as Mano dura or Mano super dura. It seeks to harsher punishments and increase arrests (Neild 1999; Rodgers 2007). It does not invest in rehabilitation of offenders, often leading to counterproductive effects, as overcrowded prisons can serve as criminal laboratories.\footnote{170} Mano dura and its sister policies\footnote{171} have been criticised for abusing human rights (whoever was poor, young and male (and tattooed in some countries) was immediately assumed to be a gang member and risked being arrested, often with abusive treatment by the police) (Moser et al. 2005:149).\footnote{172} Critiques have also pointed out counterproductive outcomes of repressive strategies (many gangs have radicalised their practices and reorganised, leading to ‘a tit-for-tat spiral of violence’ (Rodgers and Muggah 2009:312)).\footnote{173}

Other countries and cities have adopted less radical approaches while still seeking to reduce impunity. Their rationale is that in many low-income neighbourhoods, police and justice are often inefficient and not trusted. For many poor people, police is often seen as a problem rather than the solution\footnote{174} and justice is considered inexisten
t and therefore useless

\footnote{170} In Guatemala, for example, rival incarcerated gang members engaged in a ‘tit-for-tat prison warfare’ (Rodgers and Muggah 2009:307).

\footnote{171} Called cero Tolerancia in Honduras, Plan Escoba in Guatemala (Rodgers and Muggah 2009).

\footnote{172} In El Salvador, for instance, ‘the directive advocated the immediate imprisonment of gang members for having gang-related tattoos or flashing gang signs in public (a crime punishable by two to five years in jail and applicable to gang members from the age of 12 and older). Between July 2003 and August 2004, approximately 20,000 pandilleros were arrested, although 95 per cent of them were eventually released without charge when the Mano Dura law was declared unconstitutional by the Salvadoran Supreme Court for violating the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)’ (Rodgers and Muggah 2009:308).

\footnote{173} Rodgers and Muggah conclude: ‘Repression simply does not remedy the underlying factors that contributed to gang formation and consolidation in the first place, and is leading to the rise of more organised crime’ (2009:312). The authors emphasise the importance of class (through unequal political economy) as a key of understanding of why it has been so difficult to develop coherent approaches to gang violence in Central America. Hume (2009) agrees and emphasises gender in addition to class to capture a more realistic picture of the reality and its complexity.

\footnote{174} A participatory research in Jamaica clearly shows this mistrust in police: ‘a focus group of young men in Campbell Town ranked police brutality third- equal to, but distinct from war and gang violence. [...] Almost all teenagers and young adults, and many of their elders, had negative views of the police as an institution. They perceived the local police to be ineffective, unresponsive and uncaring’ (Moser and Holland 1997:8).
(Moser and Holland, 1997; Moser et al 2005). This has led to a worrisome and out-of-control privatisation of security (Briceño-León 2002; Arriagada and Godoy 2000). To try to restore trust in criminal justice institutions, some countries have decided to bring the police and the judiciary closer to communities, and to develop their preventive role rather than just the repressive one. It is what is generally called ‘community policing’ and ‘community courts’ (Neild 1999). Many capitals have adopted and adapted a version of it (including Caracas, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Bogotá, São Paulo and Lima) (Moser et al. 2005; Neild 1999).

**The epidemiological/public health approach**

By reducing risks factors such as alcohol consumption and firearms possession, this approach seeks to prevent violent behaviours. Most famous applications of this epidemiological methodology (inherited from the public health sector) are the programmes developed in Bogotá, Cali (Desepaz) and Medellín, as well as in Diadema, São Paulo, Brazil at the end of the 1990s. Mayors Mockus and Peñalosa in Bogotá first developed this approach in 1994 (Moser et al. 2005). It begins with an assessment of the time, place and circumstances of most homicides to identify risk factors. Measures include a reduction in the sale of alcohol (famously known as the ‘ley zanahoria’ that forced bars to close at 1 a.m.), and of permit to wear firearms at certain times. They also include justice reforms

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This is confirmed in participatory research in Colombia and Guatemala with ‘the general distrust of the state security forces [...]’, coupled with widespread impunity, [leading] to the proliferation of other perverse organisations created to fill the void of law enforcement’ [i.e. social cleansing groups and paramilitaries] (Moser and McIlwaine 2001:980). Neild (1999:9) summarises saying that ‘the police are experienced as a ‘service’- even if an increasingly inadequate one- by the wealthy, but as a repressive ‘force’ by the poor’.

175 In many poor neighbourhoods, when the police intervenes, it often comes after a violent incident has happened, therefore leaving the inhabitants without any protection most of the time. As a result, private security has developed rapidly in many Latin American cities. Even though there is no (or very little) data on private security forces, it is estimated that they are up to three to five times the number of public police officers in some countries (Arriagada and Godoy 2000:115-116). This has had serious and worrying consequences: often, the poorest need to pay substantial share of their small income just to be able to go out and work (Hume (unpublished), Conference given at the Institute for the Study of the Americas, London on March 10, 2010). Not paying for a private armed vigilante (guard) might mean increased danger in an already very dangerous environment. It also certainly increases fear, which is already widespread in these neighbourhoods. Private security forces have also led to ‘social cleansings’ that have different names depending on the country, but all consist in killing street children or youth gang members as a mean to ‘clean’ the neighbourhood from ‘the bad boys’ (Arriagada and Godoy 2000; Briceño-León 1999). These social cleansings are particularly worrisome in terms of human rights and many civil society groups across Latin America have mobilised to protest against them. In many communities, there is also the huge problem (under-documented) of extortion, be it by the police, the gang members or the vigilantes. These factors increase fear and insecurity and worsen already difficult life conditions to a dramatic extent.

176 They also invest more on rehabilitation of juvenile offenders rather than putting them into [overcrowded] adult jails (Biehl 1999). These rehabilitation programmes include institutional treatment, group homes, and non-institutional treatment. Chile for instance has developed such rehabilitative approach of juvenile offenders.

177 Bogota’s 1994 Crime and Violence Reduction Programme included improving access to justice, controlling alcohol consumption and traffic accidents, assisting at-risk youth, recovering public parks (Moser et al. 2005:157). In Diadema, São Paulo, the bars were forced to close at 11p.m. (ICPC 2005).
and programmes for youth-at-risk. These policies were assessed very successful since the rate of homicides lowered by 50 per cent in Bogotá over six years of implementation (Moser et al. 2005).

Urban planning/Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Similar to the rationale of the epidemiological approach, the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) considers that some settings of infrastructure might increase risks of violence and crime. For instance, isolated parks or overcrowded bus stations might be propitious to sexual harassment of women, or aggressive robberies. CPTED is increasingly popular in Latin America and the Caribbean. Chile, Honduras, and Brazil (Prometropole in Pernambuco), for instance, have developed such programmes. Urban planning could be an effective tool that could impact both criminality and the fear of it, as examples from North America and Europe show (Moser et al. 2005:150). However, its impact may differ greatly for women and men depending on its design, implementation and maintenance. Women and men have indeed different use of public space (Smaoun 2000) and public transport (Levy 1992). Studies have shown that women from low-income neighbourhoods tend to walk more than men and use more buses (Levy 1992:102). They also experience different fears in relation to public spaces (Hollander 2001). Critics of CPTED underscore the fact that modification of infrastructure alone might not be enough to change behaviours. Human presence remains a fundamental aspect that should complement urban planning. This is particularly important in relation to fear (more salient for women, in particular regarding sexual harassment and aggression). Most CPTED planning (the ‘second generation’ of CPTED) now enhances human presence and adopts an educational approach.

Education and youth development

If violence is a learned behaviour, it can be prevented and unlearned (Biehl 1999; Arriagada and Godoy 2000; PAHO 2003). This is what education and youth development strategies intend doing. Schools are a direct medium to reach a large number of boys and girls. Studies have shown that greater connection to school from early childhood to secondary and tertiary education is the most effective way to prevent young people to join delinquent (often violent) groups and adopt risky behaviours (Naudeau et al. 2008; Blum and Ireland 2004). As a result, reducing school absenteeism and dropout are key features of youth violence prevention. Conflict resolution skills, early childhood development, vocational training, and sexual education are also among the most recommended strategies.

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178 Attacks in public transportation such as buses are well known all over Latin America.

179 Tools such as women’s safety audits are useful in this sense. These audits were initially developed in Toronto, Canada in 1989 and include an assessment of the situation by male and female users of the public space (Smaoun 2001).

180 Risky behaviours include school absenteeism and dropping out, sexual behaviours leading to early pregnancy or HIV/AIDS (or both), delinquency, violence, and substance use and abuse (Naudeau et al. 2008:76).
Conflict resolution programmes aim to teach boys and girls to find peaceful ways to resolve their conflicts (Chaux 2002). Vocational training aims to equip young people with skills that will help them find a job and integrate the formal labour market. Youth clinics seek to address the specific health-related needs of young people, in particular in relation to their sexual behaviours, but also to detect if some young people are victims of abuse (PAHO 2003). Finally, it is noteworthy underscoring the findings of a youth health survey undertaken in the Caribbean (Blum and Ireland 2004:495-496). This survey shows that females and males react differently to educational and youth development programmes, with some protective factors having more impact on girls than on boys. These results therefore advocate for different approaches for each gender (opcit:500).

Multi-sector approaches

Scholars and practitioners widely agree on the fact that violence is multidimensional and interventions that combine different approaches are expected to have better outcomes (McIlwaine 1999; PAHO 2003; Buvinic et al. 2005; Moser et al. 2005). The municipal multi-sector programmes Fica Vivo (Belo Horizonte) and Diadema (São Paulo) in Brazil, as well as Desepaz (Cali) in Colombia illustrate this. International organisations, including PAHO, UN-Habitat, IADB and World Bank, have thus advocated for the adoption of such cross-sector approaches. The IADB has pioneered in the late 1990s by developing a ‘blueprint’ multi-sector approach of urban violence reduction (Moser et al 2005; Buvinic et al. 2005). These citizen security programmes have similar components

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181 Naudeau et al. (2008) review the most effective youth development interventions. They include providing parenting information and support to expecting and new parents; fostering connections to schools from early age and for as long as possible; developing youth-friendly reproductive health services; providing youth with opportunities for civic engagement; incorporating life skills into all interventions for youth; and providing youth with information and guidance.

182 The study shows that ‘68.1 per cent of males and 75.9 per cent of females reported violent behaviour when no protective factors were present. […] School connectedness was the single most powerful protective factor associated with violence reduction; from 68.1 per cent to 39.9 per cent for males and 71.9 per cent to 11.6 per cent for female adolescents. When all three protective factors are entered into the model [school connectedness, family connectedness and religious attendance/religiosity], violence involvement falls to 26.7 per cent for males and 5.8 per cent for females’ (Blum and Ireland 2004: 495-496).

183 In the case of conflict resolution for instance, if gender relations are not included into the training, outcomes of such programmes might not reach their full potential. At a young age, boys tend to gather with boys and girls with girls, therefore they might learn to resolve their conflicts between peers of the same gender, but this does not guarantee that they will apply these skills to conflicts with their partners when they grow up, above all if domestic violence is culturally tolerated.

184 Fica Vivo developed in 2003 in Belo Horizonte (Brazil) combines both police and social protection actions. This includes community policing in risky areas to ‘alter the community’s negative perception of the police and to establish cooperation between the community and the police’; and ‘social support activities for young people such as education, health, sport, leisure and professional training projects’ (Peixoto, Andrade and Azevedo 2009).

185 Diadema and Desepaz follow the same logics with an epidemiological assessment and risk control measures such as reduction of alcohol sales and firearms permits combined with police and justice reforms and youth-at-risk programmes.
across countries and combine the creation of information systems, reforms of police and judiciary (often including community policing, community courts and rehabilitation programmes) with poverty reduction, youth development programmes, and some features of CPTED. Although they do not only target youth violence, most of the resources allocation (38-52 per cent for the first four projects implemented) goes to prevent juvenile violence and delinquency (Moser et al 2005:154). Evaluations of these programmes have concluded that is was impossible to attribute results to the IADB multi-sector projects (OVE 2010) and that implementation was challenging, mainly because of a lack of mechanisms to ensure efficient and effective multi-sector work (OVE 2013).
Appendices B: Methodology

Appendix B.1: Questions asked during semi-structured interviews

Appendix B.1.1: Questions asked to IADB and World Bank staff

Opened questions
- Could you please tell me about your experience or impression regarding the evolution of the Bank (both banks call themselves ‘the Bank’) in terms of engaging on violence prevention?
- What are the most plausible factors according to you that explain this evolution?
- What is the comparative advantage of the Bank according to you in the field of violence prevention?
- How gender-based violence and domestic violence have appeared in the policy dialogue and negotiations with counterparts?

Specific questions regarding gender
- To what extent and how has gender been taken into account in the discussions towards developing the strategy on citizen security and in the negotiations with Governments?
- What explains that very few operations have a component on domestic violence and/or masculinities?
- Why do gender-based violence, domestic violence and masculinities belong to the gender unit and not the violence prevention/citizen security unit?
- Why did the general Gender Strategy of the Bank choose not to deal directly with gender-based violence?
- Why are the Anchors and Regions not aligned in this respect (for the World Bank)?
- What would be needed to more systematically include gender into citizen security/violence prevention projects?

Specific questions regarding multi-sector approaches and the relevance and potential of mainstreaming violence prevention within sectors
- Do you consider violence relevant to your specific sector? If not, why? If yes, have you included violence prevention in operations? If yes, how and was it gendered? If not, what would be needed to do it (without adding an additional burden to the to do list of project managers)?
- What are your views regarding mainstreaming processes in general? What would be the best way according to you to include an issue such as violence prevention in a systematic fashion in your sector work to create continuity (i.e. to institutionalise the issue)?

Specific questions regarding the decision making process within the organisation
- How does an issue become a priority for the Bank?
I used the examples of climate change and anti-corruption to assess what was determinant when they suddenly became strong priorities for each bank. I also asked how the mainstreaming process works or could work, and who decided to opt for such a strategy.
Appendix B.1.2: Questions asked to study populations in Colombia

*Colombian counterparts*
- Could you please share with me your thoughts about what you consider the main challenges in terms of designing and implementing urban violence prevention policies and programmes? What would be most needed to respond to these challenges?
- According to you, how is gender usually considered in citizen security strategies? How do you think domestic violence fits within these policies and why? Is there a general understanding about causal links between different forms of violence?
- What do you think about the power of influence of development banks? How do you appreciate their involvement in violence prevention? According to you, do they have a comparative advantage in this sector, and why? What would be most needed from them?

*Sector experts, technical staff or practitioners*
- How do you perceive violence prevention? Does it or could it fit within your sector priorities? Would it be relevant and doable? What would be needed for it? According to your experience, what would be the best way to include it more systematically in the sector’s priorities?
- How is gender taken into account in your sector? What are the main factors that explain how gender is considered and dealt with?
- What do you think about the role of development banks? How do you perceive each of them? What is their comparative advantage in your sector? Do they have influence / margins of manoeuver as regard to suggesting priorities or components’ design in projects they support? Would that make a difference if they adopted gendered violence prevention lenses in the project they fund in your sector? According to you, what would be the best way to go about it? How could they contribute the most?

Appendix B.1.3: Questions asked to international experts

- How do you perceive development banks as far as violence prevention is concerned?
- Do you work with them? How would you qualify this partnership?
- According to your experience and expertise, what are the main challenges to develop gendered and multi-sector violence prevention strategies?
- What is lacking and what would be most needed to improve the situation in Latin American cities?
- Do development banks have a comparative advantage? What is it and why?
- What has been MDBs’ main contribution and what would be needed from them looking forward?
## Appendix B.2: List of interviews

### Appendix B.2.1: Interviews at the IADB

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<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Contact title</th>
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<td>Office of the Executive Director for Mexico and Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Executive Director (ED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Executive Director for Mexico and Dominican Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>and Tobago</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td>Gender and Diversity Unit</td>
<td>Chief</td>
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<td>State Modernization Specialist</td>
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### Appendix B.2.2: Interviews at the World Bank

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## Appendix B.2.3: Interviews in Colombia

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Appendix B.2.4: Interviews with international experts

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<td>International Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAHO</td>
<td>Regional Advisor, Intra-Family Violence</td>
<td>Area of sustainable development and environmental health</td>
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<td>ICRW</td>
<td>Gender Based Violence and Masculinities specialist</td>
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<td>Open Society Foundations</td>
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<td>Initiative on Confronting Violent Crime</td>
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<td>Senior Associate for Citizen Security</td>
<td>Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)</td>
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<td>Brookings Institute</td>
<td>Fellow, Foreign Policy</td>
<td>21st Century Defense Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>WOLA, ex IDB</td>
<td>Former Head of State modernization</td>
<td>Retiree and fellow at WOLA</td>
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<td>Senior Fellow</td>
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## Appendices C: IADB’s Citizen Security projects

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<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Support for Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security</td>
<td>Reduce levels of violence and insecurity in several Colombian cities by strengthening efforts to prevent, counteract and control factors associated with criminal acts and violence.</td>
<td>Two sub-programmes: (a) a national sub-programme to assist the Colombian government in designing and implementing a state policy to promote community harmony and security; and (b) a municipal sub-programme to enhance community harmony in cities and prevent, intervene with respect to and control urban and domestic violence.</td>
<td>Information system, justice, police, research, communication, youth at risk, citizen education, institutional strengthening</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Programme for Citizen Safety: Crime and Violence Prevention</td>
<td>Prevent and deal with interpersonal violence and reduce the perception of insecurity in Uruguay.</td>
<td>Three sub-programmes: (a) strengthening Uruguay’s institutional capacity for crime and violence prevention, including domestic violence and police training in prevention and community relations; (b) Promoting youth as violence preventers, through actions both within and outside the classroom, as well as rehabilitating youth offenders; and (c) Support to community-based activities in crime and violence prevention.</td>
<td>Reform / Modernization of the State (Modernization and Administration of Justice); institutional capacity, community organization, youth programmes</td>
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<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Citizen Security and Justice Programme</td>
<td>Enhance citizen security and justice in Jamaica: (i) prevent and reduce violence; (ii) strengthen crime management capabilities; and (iii) improve the delivery of judicial services.</td>
<td>Four components: (a) a National Crime and Violence Prevention Strategy; (b) capacity building of the Ministry of National Security and Justice (MNSJ); (c) strengthening of the criminal justice system; and (d) community action</td>
<td>Justice, institutional strengthening, communication/education campaign</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Project to Support the Social Peace Programme</td>
<td>Improve citizen security by combating crime and violence through preventive actions targeting youth (10-25 years) in the metropolitan area of San Salvador and other municipios with the highest levels of crime and violence and the densest population.</td>
<td>Three components: (a) juvenile violence and delinquency prevention; (b) rehabilitation and social reintegration of young offenders; and (c) institutional strengthening</td>
<td>Social investment (Family, childhood and youth): prevention of youth violence, citizen participation, prevention of domestic violence and victims services, police, youth employment, public awareness campaign, innovative projects, rehabilitation and reintegration, institutional strengthening</td>
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<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Peace and Citizen Coexistence Project for the Municipalities of the Sula Valley</td>
<td>Improve levels of peace, coexistence and citizen security in the 17 municipalities in the Sula Valley Region, contributing to a reduction in insecurity and violence among young people from 12 to 25 years of age.</td>
<td>Four components: (a) Institutional strengthening; (b) social prevention of violence and juvenile delinquency; (c) support for the community police and/or crime prevention project in Sula Valley Region (RVS); and (d) communications and social awareness strategy.</td>
<td>Social Investment: institutional strengthening, social prevention youth violence, youth at risk, domestic violence, community police, communication and awareness campaign.</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
<td>Programme Safer Chile</td>
<td>Contribute to a reduction in violence and crime, as well as the insecurity associated therewith, in selected municipalities and in neighbourhoods in Chile’s metropolitan, fifth, eighth, and ninth regions, which are affected by drug trafficking and organized crime.</td>
<td>Four sub-programmes: 1) sub-programme for strengthening the Citizen Security Policy; 2) the Safe Municipality sub-programme; 3) the Safe neighborhood sub-programme; and 4) the sub-programme for strengthening police community integration</td>
<td>Social Investment: inter-sector coordination, M&amp;E, communication, institutional strengthening, multi-sector pilot programmes of social prevention, community organization, rehabilitation, justice, information and observatories of good practices.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Citizen Security Programme</td>
<td>Contribute to improve the level of citizen security through supporting the reduction of youth violence in specific localities. Four components: a) institutional strengthening, especially of MIGOB, the authority responsible for policy on citizen security; b) integration and strengthening of juvenile violence prevention services using an inter-sector care and prevention model at the municipal level; c) expansion and consolidation of the community policing programme initiative; and d) a public information programme to encourage inclusion of the topic on the social agenda and to educate the public to the need for values and standards in order to have social harmony.</td>
<td>Social Investment: institutional strengthening, national public policy, capacity building, inter-institutional coordination, information system, M&amp;E, education, youth employment, after school activities, youth at risk, community organization, reinsertion, community policing, domestic violence, communication of police, social communication.</td>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Violence Prevention Programme</td>
<td>Comment: the government decided to turn to bilaterals to support its road map on security. Initially three components: a) institutional strengthening, b) prevention of juvenile violence and delinquency, and c) social communication.</td>
<td>Social Investment (Citizen Safety)</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
<td>Integral Security Programme</td>
<td>Help improve citizen coexistence and security in communities with the highest rates of violence through strategic, comprehensive, interagency, participative actions to prevent juvenile violence. Two components: a) Institutional strengthening (MINGOB, information system and observatory, M&amp;E, national police force, MIDES, MEDUCA, Municipal governments); b) Citizen security programmes (primary prevention: at school, youth at risk, communities in high risk zones, domestic violence; secondary prevention; tertiary prevention).</td>
<td>Reform / Modernization of the State (Modernization and Administration of Justice): police, institutional strengthening, information systems, M&amp;E, school, youth at risk, community mobilization, observatories, and rehabilitation.</td>
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<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>Citizen Security Programme</td>
<td>Contribute to the reduction in crime and violence in 22 high crime pilot communities through the financing of preventive interventions addressing the most proximal and modifiable risk factors.</td>
<td>Social Investment (Citizen Safety): police, institutional strengthening, information system, and community services.</td>
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<td>and Tobago</td>
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<td>Belize</td>
<td>Community action for Public Safety</td>
<td>Contribute to the reduction of youth involvement in major violent crime in Belize City by: (i) reducing youth involvement in criminal activities and youth violent behavior in the schools which are beneficiary of the programme resources; (ii) reducing recidivism among youth in the intervened juvenile rehabilitation institutions; and (iii) enhancing the government’s capacity to formulate and implement evidence-based policies on public safety. Three components: a) School-based positive youth development; b) Support for juvenile social rehabilitation; c) Interagency public safety management information system.</td>
<td>Reform / Modernization of the State: school, youth at risk, assessment, case model rehabilitation, information system, institutional strengthening.</td>
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<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Violence Prevention and Social Inclusion Promotion Programme</td>
<td>Help reduce violent crime in the country: make the police force at the national level more effective; reduce criminal behavior among at-risk youth in the project’s areas of influence, and reduce the recidivism rate among the population in conflict with criminal law.</td>
<td>Social investment: police, institutional strengthening, youth at risk, reintegration, equipment, information system.</td>
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<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Citizen Security and Justice Programme II</td>
<td>Contribute to the reduction in crime and violence in 28 high crime urban communities, by financing prevention and strategic interventions to address identified individual, family and community risk factors.</td>
<td>Social Investment (Citizen Safety): police, institutional strengthening, interagency, community justice, community services and organization, communication.</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Citizen Security and Inclusion Programme</td>
<td>Help reduce levels of crime, violence and insecurity in the province of Buenos Aires by improving the capacity of the province’s Ministry of Security, strengthening community participation, and introducing prevention programmes that will promote factors for protection of communities, families and individuals.</td>
<td>Social Investment (Citizen Safety): institutional strengthening, information system, surveys of victimization, emergency response system, community participation, outreach campaign, prevention and services to victims of GBV, domestic violence and youth violence.</td>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Citizen Security Programme for Social Cohesion</td>
<td>Improve the efficiency of the police action through the improvement of the use of information to reduce delinquency.</td>
<td>Reform / Modernization of the State: school, youth at risk, assessment, care model rehabilitation, information system, institutional strengthening: observatories, victimization survey, crime prevention plans.</td>
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Appendices D: Colombia

Appendix D.1: Statistics related to violence in Colombia

Colombia has relatively good violence-related data for LAC standards. There are three main official sources:

(i) the National reference center on violence of the National institute for legal medicine and forensic sciences (Centro de Referencia Nacional sobre Violencia del Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, INMLCF) that publishes statistics on homicides, interpersonal violence, sexual violence, intra-family violence, and suicide on a yearly basis (http://www.medicinalegal.gov.co);

(ii) the Information system on delinquency, contraventions and operational activity of the National police (Sistema de Información Estadístico Delincuencial, Contravencional y Actividad Operativa de la Policía Nacional, Siedco) that publishes annual statistics on a variety of crimes, from homicides to kidnappings, acts of terrorism and robberies (http://www.policia.gov.co/portal/page/portal/UNIDADES_POLICIALES/Comandos_deptos_policia/Comando_depto_Bolivar/Resultados_operativos_estadisticas/Estadisticas); and

(iii) the criminal justice system (Sistema Penal Oral Acusatorio, SPOA) that gathers information on trials and perpetrators.

In terms of data sources consolidation, issues include differences in figures and in units of analysis, as well as a lack of regular victimization surveys. Only once was such a survey applied in three major cities, in 2003 (Encuesta nacional de victimización, 2003, applied by Dane with IADB support).

There are also other efforts led by civil society. They include observatories and citywide victimization surveys, including those financed by Chambers of commerce (in particular the Chamber of commerce of Bogotá), and by other institutions such as Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, Corpovisionarios and Universidad del Valle (Activa survey). There are also international surveys including those of Latinobarómetro and International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS). Finally, there are opinion surveys, including those done by Bogotacomovamos, Medellincomovamos, Barranquillacomovamos etc., and the Vandebilt University-Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).
Appendix D.2: Demography, geography and territorial administration in Colombia

Colombia is very diverse geographically, ethically and culturally. At the time of the last census, the population counted 43 million inhabitants (2005 Census DANE), mainly living in urban centers (75 per cent of the population). The five largest cities (Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena) gather 42 per cent of the population. In 2010, it is estimated that 8 million of Colombians were 14-26 years old (DNP 2011:339), and 3.5 million were displaced population because of the armed conflict (DNP 2011: 443).

In terms of geography, Colombia is the fourth largest country in Latin America, after Brazil, Argentina and Peru. It is the only country with access to two oceans: the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean (Caribbean sea). It is crossed over by the Andean cordillera, and also includes the amazon forest, which makes part of its territory difficult to access.

Colombia is a pluri-ethnic and multicultural nation with four main ethic groups: indigenous population (87 groups); Raizal population; Black and Afro-Colombian population; and Rom or Gypsy population. According to the 2005 general census (DANE), 13.7 per cent of the national population declared themselves as belonging to an ethnic group, of which nearly 75 per cent were Afro-Colombians (NDP 2010-14: 463). In terms of multi-culturality, there are 65 indigenous languages spoken in Colombia. Indigenous groups also show cultural specificities related to a certain understanding of the world (cosmovisión), their relationship to their land, the environment, among others (opcit). These groups are in general among the most vulnerable groups in terms of poverty, informality, and overall quality of life.

In terms of territorial administration, there are three levels of government in Colombia: national, departmental (Gobernación), and municipal. At the territorial level, there are four districts (Bogotá, Cartagena, Santa Marta and Barranquilla), 32 departments, and 1098 municipalities. Other territorial entities include provinces, regions, and indigenous territories (art. 286, 1991 Constitution). Decentralization has been one of the key issues opposing the two main parties in Colombia over the past century. Since the end of the 1980s, decentralisation has made significant progress. In 1988, mayors were directly elected. A few years later, the 1991 Constitution made drastic changes in this respect by transferring 45 percent of current resources to departments and municipalities, and constitutionally protecting and increasing local taxes (DNP 1998-2002:41). Article 1 of the 1991 Constitution states: ‘Colombia is a social state governed by the rule of law, organized as a Unitarian, decentralized Republic, with autonomy of its territorial entities, democratic, participative and pluralist, funded on the respect to human dignity, work and solidarity among persons that belong to it, and the prevalence of general interest.’

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186 Own translation, original version in Spanish: ‘Colombia es un Estado social de derecho, organizado en forma de República unitaria, descentralizada, con autonomía de sus entidades territoriales, democrática, participativa y pluralista, fundada en el respeto de la dignidad humana, en el trabajo y la solidaridad de las personas que la integran y en la prevalencia del interés general’ (Art. 1. 1991 Constitution).
Three principles govern the Colombian decentralization: coordination (coherence among levels of governments to implement national priorities as defined by the national government); concurrence (concurrencia; when two levels of government or more work together towards a common goal to enhance efficiency and following respective competencies); and subsidiarity (when authorities of lower level ask for the support of authorities at higher level to implement their own activities and plans) (DNP 2004).

In terms of responsibilities, municipalities are in charge of service delivery and local development; departments control municipalities’ service provision and ensure territorial planning; and the national government defines plans, policies, and strategies. In other words, the three levels of government have some level of interdependency, but territorial entities are autonomous. In particular, to be implemented, national policies need to be translated in local plans and strategies, local development plans, and annual budgets. Each level of government can raise taxes. Since 2001, the national transfer to departments and municipalities for education and health are earmarked (2001 law 715).

Regions are extremely diverse in Colombia, in terms of income but also institutional capacity. For instance, the GDP per capita of Casanare and Bogotá are 4.3 and 1.6 times the one of Chocó, whose income per capita is the lowest in the country (DNP 2011: 37). Ten departments (Guaviare, Guainía, Magdalena, Putumayo, La Guajira, Sucre, Córdoba, Bolivar, Vichada and Amazonas) are below the median of the institutional capacity (DNP 2011:38).
Appendix D.3: Colombian government composition (2011)

At the time of the interviews, in 2011, the Colombian Government included the President of the Republic, a Vice-presidency and sixteen ministries:

- Ministry of Justice (MinJusticia)
- Ministry of National Defense (MinDefensa)
- Ministry of Interior (MinInterior)
- Ministry of External Relations (MinRelaciones)
- Ministry of Finance (MinHacienda)
- Ministry of Mining and Energy (MinMinas)
- Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (MinComercio)
- Ministry of Information Technology and Communication (MinTIC)
- Ministry of Culture (MinCultura); Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MinAgricultura)
- Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MinAmbiente)
- Ministry of Transport (MinTransporte)
- Ministry of Housing, Cities and Territories (MinVivienda)
- Ministry of National Education (MinEducación)
- Ministry of Labor (MinTrabajo)
- Ministry of Health and Social Protection (MinSalud)

In addition, ten High presidential counselors (Altos Consejeros Presidenciales- ACP for its Spanish acronym) directly report to the President. They include:

- ACP for Good Government and Administrative efficiency;
- ACP for Women equality;
- ACP for Public and Private Management;
- ACP for Peace; ACP for Political affairs;
- ACP for Social Dialogue;
- ACP for Citizen Security and Coexistence;
- ACP for Communications;
- ACP for Regions and Citizens Participation;
- ACP for Special programmes.
### Appendix D.4: 2010-2014 NDP strategic guidelines related to violence prevention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic guidelines/programs</th>
<th>Sectoral Ministry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Development and social protection integral policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Early childhood</td>
<td>De Cero a Siempre (integral attention for early childhood: quality, universal access) + family (parenting); Quality assurance system for early childhood (training of trainers/educators/parents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection Ministry (MPS), National Education Ministry (MEN); ICBF + local governments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Childhood, adolescence and youth</td>
<td>National policy for prevention and attention to different forms of violence, including intrafamily violence, maltreatment and sexual abuse; prevention of school desertion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 6-12 years old</td>
<td>Increase age of first pregnancy; lessen risky sexuality; National policy for the prevention and attention to intrafamily violence, maltreatment and sexual abuse; National policy of psychoactive substance consumption; National plan to reduce drug consumption; Criminal responsibility system for adolescents (SRPA); social and situational prevention (to complement citizen security strategies at local level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 12-18 years old</td>
<td>National strategy to prevent and eliminate the worst forms of child labor and to protect the young worker, 2008-2015 (ENETI); Fondo para la Atención Integral de la Niñez y Jornada Escolar Complementaria (FONIÑEZ); Inspección Vigilancia y Control del Trabajo (IVC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;14-26 years old</td>
<td>Promotion of youth participation (Los Jóvenes Tienen la Palabra; youth councils; consultative youth committees; Human Rights and Duties Schools); and prevention of youth delinquency; Strategy &quot;Municipios y Departamentos por la Infancia, la Adolescencia y la Juventud&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child labor prevention and elimination</td>
<td>National strategy to prevent and eliminate the worst forms of child labor and to protect the young worker, 2008-2015 (ENETI); Fondo para la Atención Integral de la Niñez y Jornada Escolar Complementaria (FONIÑEZ); Inspección Vigilancia y Control del Trabajo (IVC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Human capital formation</td>
<td>Reduce existing gap in terms of quality of education at all levels (including extended schooling day for a positive time of free time; studies on how to develop a combined indicator for quality education; improve overall quality of control of the system including vocational training provided by SENA); promotion of parents' involvement in schools and increase accountability of educative institutions and education secretaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate opportunities of access and permanence to close regional gaps within all cycles of the education system (reduce school desertion in particular for vulnerable population)</td>
<td>MEN, Acción social, Local secretaries of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educate with relevance for innovation and productivity (promote better articulation between secondary education and tertiary education and education for work; among others)</td>
<td>MEN and local secretaries of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen the management model at all levels of the education system</td>
<td>MEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen education secretaries for risk prevention and management (both natural disasters and armed conflict)</td>
<td>MEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Universal and sustainable health and well-being</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce existing gap in terms of quality of education at all levels (including extended schooling day for a positive time of free time; studies on how to develop a combined indicator for quality education; improve overall quality of control of the system including vocational training provided by SENA); promotion of parents' involvement in schools and increase accountability of educative institutions and education secretaries</td>
<td>MPS + local governments and EPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>MPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Culture promotion</td>
<td>Consolidate the national system for culture’s articulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen reading and writing processes through facilitating access to knowledge (public libraries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contribute to the integral development of children under 5 years old, promoting cultural rights through expressive and esthetic languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote artistic training and cultural creation (in particular in schools)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen the social ownership of cultural patrimony (including promote cultural diversity and community development; historic center preservation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen cultural industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Sport and recreation</td>
<td>Improvement and maintenance of infrastructure for physical activity, recreation and free time (creation of national social fund for sport infrastructure and recreation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion of recreation, physical activity and school and community sport to develop coexistence and peaceful environments (including &quot;superate&quot; a strategy of social insertion targeting vulnerable populations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training and preparation of athletes to enhance the national sport-related leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Social Promotion</td>
<td>Improve social spending targeting and implement exit strategies for social programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Network for extreme poverty alleviation (JUNTOS)</td>
<td>Consolidate JUNTOS and empower it as a strategy for risk social management (including national plan for social prosperity that enhances community participation and social capital, and seeks to reduce issues in local development; strengthening of red Juntos that becomes Red Unidos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transversal Transversal</td>
<td>Effective use of right (Goce efectivo de derechos -GED) for displaced population (including measures to prevent forced displacement and to protect victims’ rights; articulation of housing, income generation and land restitution policies within the framework of forced displacement; articulation of actions for integral reparation, among others)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Policy for population victim of forced displacement due to violence</td>
<td>Promote equal opportunities to development benefits, with a differential focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Differentiated policies for social inclusion</td>
<td>Protect fundamental rights of ethnic population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transversal</td>
<td>Strengthen organizations and own forms of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transversal</td>
<td>National Integral Policy for gender equality (including development of instruments to measure non-paid work; intersectorial actions for equalizing opportunities; monitoring of gender-based violence and establishment of strategic guidelines for its elimination (through among others the creation of a national observatory of violence with a special focus on domestic and sexual violence; services to victims of gender-based violence; prevention adolescent pregnancy); enhancement of women participation in political life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transversal</td>
<td>Política de Discapacidad (including indentification of risk factors for disability; improve employability of diable persons; strengthen opportunities for sports, recreation and culture; ensure quality education for disable persons within the educatol system; promote equal opportunities; coordinate with territories)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 1. Public order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Public order and citizen security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security for prosperity (integral defense and security policy for prosperity)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation of security and fight against GAML (grupos armados al margen de la ley—illegal armed groups) (including national plan for territorial consolidation; borders)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight against drug trafficking and illegality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization of security and defense sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of wellbeing conditions of public force members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public force, Ministry of Environment, housing and territorial development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public force, national police, military state security organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public force with other state institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2. Coexistence and Citizen security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Coexistence and citizen security policy (política de seguridad y convivencia ciudadana)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social and situational prevention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police presence and control (programa departamentos y municipios seguros y plan nacional de vigilancia comunitaria por cuadrantes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and denunciation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legality and coexistence culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active and responsible citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transversal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information systems and public policy-related studies (victimization and self-reporting surveys)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fondo Nacional de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana (FONSECON)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Transversal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Formal justice, orality and decongestion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information technologies (e-justice and judicial information systems)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice administration optimization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public-private partnership for infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention of anti-judicial harm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to justice and non formal justice as tool for decongestion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative conflict resolution mechanisms as tools for decongestion and access</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional focus for justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coherent and effective criminal policy against crime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State articulation and effective institutional structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening of investigative capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penitentiary policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerio de Interior y Justicia and other Ministries (MEN, ICBF, among</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. Justice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Integral national policy of human rights and international humanitarian law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transversal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional justice as a tool to achieve national reconciliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intersectorial commission for human rights and international humanitarian law, led by Vicepresident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### C. Human rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Macroprojects abd implementation of integra; neighborhood improvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing and living cities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAVDT in collaboration with Ministerio de Defensa y Seguridad and Ministeri de Interior y Justicia for implementation of both project to include coexistence and citizen security strategies within infrastructure and plans.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation based on NDP 2010-2014.
### Appendix D.5: Matrix analysing the 2010-2014 NDP through a violence prevention lens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic guidelines/programs</th>
<th>Sectoral Ministry</th>
<th>Diagnostic acknowledges violence within sector or role of sector in VP</th>
<th>Components that implicitly contribute to violence prevention with targeting on poor and vulnerable population</th>
<th>Components that explicitly contribute to violence prevention</th>
<th>Components that contribute to violence prevention within sector/group</th>
<th>Forms of violence</th>
<th>Violence prevention-related indicators (explicit)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Early childhood</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Cero a Siempre (integral attention for early childhood; quality, universal access) + family (parenting)</td>
<td>Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF)</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>intrafamily violence; child maltreatment; sexual abuse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality assurance system for early childhood (training of trainers/educators/carers)</td>
<td>National Education Ministry (MEN in Spanish)</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>intrafamily violence; child maltreatment; sexual abuse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Childhood, adolescence and youth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Juntos; Protection of childhood and youth and youth participation (parenting, training of teachers, nutrition, increase of school day (jornada escolar), culture, recreation: positive use of free time; prevention child labor)</td>
<td>National Youth System, Social Protection Ministry (MPS), National Education Ministry (MEN); ICBF + local governments</td>
<td>✔✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>intrafamily violence; child maltreatment; sexual abuse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 6-12 years old</td>
<td>Local Governments; MPS, MEN and ICBF</td>
<td>✔✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>NA (not a sector)</td>
<td>idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 12-18 years old</td>
<td>Local Governments; MPS, MEN and ICBF</td>
<td>✔✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>NA (not a sector)</td>
<td>idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;14-26 years old</td>
<td>Promotion of youth participation (Los Jóvenes Tienen la Palabra; youth councils; consultative youth committees; Human Rights and Duties Schools) and prevention of youth delinquency; Strategy “Municipios y Departamentos por la Infancia, la Adolescencia y la Juventud”</td>
<td>Multisecoral: National system for family wellbeing (Sistema Nacional de Bienestar Familiar-SNBF) + local governments</td>
<td>✔✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>NA (not a sector)</td>
<td>youth violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child labor prevention and elimination</td>
<td>National strategy to prevent and eliminate the worst forms of child labor and to protect the young worker, 2008-2015 (ENETI); Fondo para la Atención Integral de la Niñez y Jornada Escolar Complementaria (FONIÑEZ); Inspección Vigilancia y Control del Trabajo (IVC)</td>
<td>Local Governments + MPS, DANE, ICBF, MEN, DNP and national police</td>
<td>✔✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>NA (not a sector)</td>
<td>worst forms of child labor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter 4: Equality of opportunities for social prosperity
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Strategic guidelines/programs</th>
<th>Sectoral Ministry</th>
<th>Diagnostic acknowledges violence within sector or role of sector in VP</th>
<th>Components that implicitly contribute to violence prevention</th>
<th>Components that explicitly contribute to violence prevention with targeting on poor and vulnerable population</th>
<th>Forms of violence prevention-related indicators (explicit)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Human capital formation</td>
<td>Reduce existing gap in terms of quality of education at all levels (including extended schooling day for a positive time of free time; studies on how to develop a combined indicator for quality education; improve overall quality control of the system including vocational training provided by SENA; promotion of parents’ involvement in schools and increase accountability of educational institutions and education secretaries; Generate opportunities of access and permanence to close regional gaps within all cycles of the education system (reduce school desertion in particular for vulnerable population); Educate with relevance for innovation and productivity (promote better articulation between secondary education and tertiary education and education for work; among others); Strengthen the management model at all levels of the education system; Strengthen education secretaries for risk prevention and management (both natural disasters and armed conflict);</td>
<td>MEN, SENA + local governments (education secretaries at departmental and municipal levels)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Universal and sustainable health access and quality</td>
<td>Promote wellbeing and healthy life based on the promotion of health and illness prevention (including strengthening the national policy for the reduction of psychoactive substance consumption; implementing the national plan for mental health 2011-2014; developing actions to comply with the law 1257 to prevent and sanction forms of violence against women; among others); Relevant and quality service to SGSSS users (sistema general de seguridad social en salud); Consolidate health assurance; Regulation of services excluded from the benefits plans;</td>
<td>MPS + local governments and EPS</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic guidelines/programs</td>
<td>Sectoral Ministry</td>
<td>Diagnostic acknowledges violence within sector or role of sector in VP</td>
<td>Components that implicitly contribute to violence prevention</td>
<td>Components that explicitly contribute to violence prevention within poor and vulnerable population</td>
<td>Components that contribute to violence prevention with targeting on poor and vulnerable population</td>
<td>Forms of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionally strengthen SGGSSS (including strengthen the vigilance system for adolescent pregnancies; national and local information system for monitoring and evaluation of events in mental health, different forms of violence and use of psychoactive substance; inspection, vigilance and control system; implement management models and guidelines for health institutions and practitioners; among others)</td>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen the inspection, vigilance and control system (IVC)</td>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Employability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization of labor market</td>
<td>MPS, local governments</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of a policy of employment promotion within a framework of decent work</td>
<td>MPS, local governments</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support/accompaniment</td>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information systems</td>
<td>MPS, Comisión intersectorial para la Formalización (CIF)</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expansion of microcredit offer at the national level</td>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategies for public-private partnerships for the private sector inclusion in public and private programs of self-employment</td>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Culture promotion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consolidate the national system for culture’s articulation</td>
<td>Ministerio de Cultura (Sistema Nacional de Cultura (SNCu))</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthen reading and writing processes through facilitating access to knowledge (public libraries)</td>
<td>MinCultura, MEN, Ministerio de las Tecnologías, Información y Comunicaciones</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contribute to the integral development of children under 5 years old, promoting cultural rights through expressive and esthetic languages</td>
<td>MinCultura</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote artistic training and cultural creation</td>
<td>MinCultura, MEN</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic guidelines/programs</td>
<td>Sectoral Ministry</td>
<td>Diagnostic acknowledges violence within sector or role of sector in VP</td>
<td>Components that implicitly contribute to violence prevention</td>
<td>Components that explicitly contribute to violence prevention with targeting on poor and vulnerable population</td>
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<td>Forms of violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthen the social ownership of cultural patrimony (including promote cultural diversity and community development; historic center preservation)</td>
<td>MinCultura</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen cultural industries</td>
<td>MinCultura, DANE, Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo (MCIT)</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement and maintenance of infrastructure for physical activity, recreation and free time (creation of national social fund for sport infrastructure and recreation)</td>
<td>Coldeportes, Sistema Nacional del Deporte (SND), local governments</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✗</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promotion of recreation, physical activity and school and community sport to develop coexistence and peaceful environments (including &quot;superate&quot;a strategy of social insertion targeting vulnerable populations)</td>
<td>Coldeportes, MinCultura, MPS, MEN</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
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<td>✗</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training and preparation of athletes to enhance the national sport-related leadership</td>
<td>Coldeportes</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improve social spending targeting and implement exit strategies for social programs</td>
<td>Sistema de promoción social (SpS), Red Juntos</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consolidate JUNTOS and empower it as a strategy for risk social management (including national plan for social prosperity that enhances community participation and social capital, and seeks to reduce issues in local development; strengthening of red Juntos that becomes Red Unidos)</td>
<td>SpS and 16 national entities (including MEN, MPS, Acción Social, DNP, ICBF, Ministerio de Ambiente, Vivienda y Desarrollo Territorial, Policía Nacional, Ministerio del Interior y Justicia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, and others)</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✔</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Policy for population victim of forced displacement due to violence</strong></td>
<td>Effective use of right (Goce efectivo de derechos -GED) for displaced population (including measures to prevent forced displacement and to protect victims'rights; articulation of housing, income generation and land restitution policies within the framework of forced displacement; articulation of actions for integral reparation, among others)</td>
<td>Vicepresidencia of the Republic, Acción social, MDN, MIU, MEN, MPS, Ministerio Defensa Nacional, ICBF</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1. Ethnic groups</strong></td>
<td>Promote equal opportunities to development benefits, with a differential focus</td>
<td>Tranversal: all ministries</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transversal</td>
<td>Protect fundamental rights of ethnic population</td>
<td>Tranversal: all ministries</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transversal</td>
<td>Strengthen organizations and own forms of government</td>
<td>Tranversal: all ministries</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
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<td>Gender</td>
<td>National Integral Policy for gender equality (including development of instruments to measure non-paid work; intersectorial actions for equalizing opportunities; monitoring of gender-based violence and establishment of strategic guidelines for its elimination through among others the creation of a national observatory of violence with a special focus on domestic and sexual violence; services to victims of gender-based violence; prevention adolescent pregnancy; enhancement of women participation in political life)</td>
<td>Transversal; Alta Consejería Presidencial o la Equidad de la Mujer (ACPEM), Vicepresidencia de la República; MPS; other national ministries</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>Política de Discapacidad (including indentification of risk factors for disability; improve employability of disable persons; strengthen opportunities for sports, recreation and culture; ensure quality education for disable persons within the education system; promote equal opportunities; coordinate with territories)</td>
<td>Sistema Nacional de Discapacidad (SND), MPS; intersectorial</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security for prosperity</td>
<td>Security for prosperity (integral defense and security policy for prosperity)</td>
<td>Public force, Ministry of Environment, housing and territorial development</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic capacity</td>
<td>Consolidation of security and fight against GAML (grupos armados al margen de la ley-illegal armed groups) (including national plan for territorial consolidation; border)</td>
<td>Public force, national police, military, state security organizations</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modernization of security and defense sector</td>
<td>Fight against drug trafficking and illegality</td>
<td>Public force with other state institutions</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Modernization of security and defense sector</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coexistence and citizen security policy (política de convivencia y seguridad ciudadana)</td>
<td>Fondo Nacional de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana (FONSECON)</td>
<td>✔</td>
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<td>Social and situational prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police presence and control (programa departamentos y municipios seguros y plan nacional de vigilancia comunitaria por cuadrantes)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Justice and denunciation</td>
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<td>Legality and coexistence culture</td>
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<td>Active and responsible citizenship</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information systems and public policy-related studies (victimization and self-reporting surveys)</td>
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<td>Normative development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formal justice, orality and decongestion</td>
<td>Ministerio de Interior y Justicia and other Ministries (MEN, ICBF,)</td>
<td>✔</td>
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<td>Information technologies (e-justice and judicial information systems)</td>
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<td>Justice administration optimization</td>
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<td>Public-private partnership for infrastructure</td>
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<td>Prevention of anti-judicial harm</td>
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<td>Access to justice and non formal justice as tool for decongestion</td>
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<td>Alternative conflict resolution mechanisms as tools for decongestion and access</td>
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<td>Regional focus for justice</td>
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<td>Coherent and effective criminal policy against crime</td>
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<td>State articulation and effective institutional structure</td>
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<td>Strengthening of investigative capacity</td>
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<td>Penitentiary policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intersectorial commission for human rights and international humanitarian law, led by Vicepresident</td>
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<td>C.) Human rights</td>
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<td>Integral national policy of human rights and international humanitarian law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transitional justice as a tool to achieve national reconciliation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic guidelines/programs</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sectoral Ministry</strong></td>
<td><strong>Diagnostic</strong></td>
<td><strong>Components</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing and living cities</td>
<td>Macroprojects and implementation of integrity; neighborhood improvement</td>
<td>MAVDT in collaboration with Ministerio de Defensa y Seguridad and Ministerio de Interior y Justicia for implementation of both projects to include coexistence and citizen security strategies within infrastructure and plans.</td>
<td>Component that implicitly contributes to violence prevention</td>
<td>Component that implicitly contributes to violence prevention with targeting on poor and vulnerable population</td>
<td>Component that explicitly contributes to violence prevention</td>
<td>Components that contribute to violence prevention within sector/group</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**% of women victims of forced sex; % women victims of physical violence from intimate partner; % women victims of physical violence; proportion of women within intimate partner violence; rate of sexual expert reports within women population (all indicators are disaggregated by age group; however they do not have targets)**