The Return of the Ingrian Finns: Ethnicity, Identity and Reforms in Finland’s Return Immigration Policy 1990-2010

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DECLARATION

I, Nicholas John Bennison Prindiville, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
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This thesis investigates the construction of Finnish identity by Finnish policymakers when discussing the Right to Return Policy for Ingrian Finns. This policy, which existed from 1990 to 2010, granted Finnish residency to citizens of the Soviet Union, and subsequently Russia and Estonia, who descended from seventeenth century Finnish emigrés to the region around St Petersburg. The thesis critically analyses the discursive constructions of Finnish identity presented in the language of lawmakers on this policy, and argues that lawmakers established an ideology of Finnishness initially predicated on ideas of language, religion, ancestry, and historical relations to Finland’s neighbours Sweden and Russia. I further argue that lawmakers’ calls for an end of the policy in the late 1990s and 2000s used some of the same discursive constructions of Finnishness initially employed to justify Ingrian inclusion to now exclude Ingrians from their idea of Finnishness. To a large extent, the history of the Ingrian Return policy therefore presents a renegotiation of Ingrian, but not Finnish, identity by Finnish lawmakers.

The thesis contributes to the study of identity construction on two levels. Firstly the policy presents the tension between constructions of Finnishness as an ethnic identity and as a community of Finnish citizens, and shows the relative resilience of ethnicity-based identity constructions in Finnish immigration policy at this time. Secondly the Ingrian Finnish Return policy provides a case study of how essentialising discursive constructions of identity can be strategically used in political discussions. Analysis of this policy contributes to the broader study of identity theorisations as an example of establishing identity norms through public policy, using essentialising identity constructions that ignore alternative views of the nation as a diverse community, particularly in a period of increasing migration.
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Figure 1.
Map of Finland showing changing borders 1595-1812. Ingria is shown in the bottom-right corner. Reproduced from Kirby, *A Concise History of Finland*, p. 32.
A NOTE ON PLACE NAMES

Many of the place names used in this thesis have several variants, reflecting the changing borders and language influences in the eastern Baltic Sea region. Many Finnish cities have Finnish and Swedish-language names, particularly cities and towns with large Swedish city populations or old cities and towns founded during the Swedish period. Additionally, many formerly Finnish settlements in Karelia and Ingria, which had Finnish and Swedish names, received new Russian names once the area came under Russian control. Some were then given new names during the Soviet period. Some reverted to their former Russian names after 1991, others didn’t.

Unfortunately, many English-language sources concerning this area are not consistent with place names. It is common for some sources to refer to Turku by its Finnish name, while also referring to the 1743 treaty signed there as the Treaty of Åbo (using the city’s Swedish name). Likewise, some sources refer to Sweden’s two Karelian territories as Viipuri (the Finnish variant) over Viborg (the Swedish variant), but Kexholm (the Swedish variant) over Käkisalmi (the Finnish variant).

To retain use of the most recognisable place names and avoid confusion, whilst also maintaining consistence and clarity, this thesis employs the following rules for place names:

a) If there is a commonly used English name that differs from the Finnish and Swedish terms, the English shall always be used (eg Karelia, Savonia).

b) Concerning references to place names in Finland post-1918, the thesis follows the general Finnish practice of using the variant of the settlements’ dominant linguistic group, i.e. Finnish names for majority Finnish-speaking cities and towns (Helsinki, Turku, etc.), and Swedish names for majority Swedish-speaking towns (Raseborg, Ingå, etc.).

c) Concerning historic references to majority Finnish-speaking cities and towns during the Swedish period, the Swedish name shall be given, with the contemporary Finnish (and, if applicable, Russian) name noted in the first
instance in parentheses. This will include armistices, agreements and peace treaties signed by the Swedish crown during the Swedish period, i.e. the Peace of Fredrikshamn (Hamina) or the Treaty of Åbo (Turku).

d) Concerning references to settlements that belonged to the Grand Duchy of Finland or independent Finland after 1918 that have since come under Russian or Soviet control, the Finnish name is given when referring to these settlements during their time under Finnish jurisdiction, with the contemporary Russian name given in parentheses in the first instance.

e) Concerning contemporary references to formerly Finnish settlements after their integration into Russia or the Soviet Union, the Russian name is used with the Finnish name given in parentheses in the first instance.

f) Concerning Russian cities and towns that have changed names during the Soviet period, historical references to the settlement shall use the name of the period being discussed, with the contemporary name (if different) noted in parentheses in the first instance. For instance, references to the city of St Petersburg before 1914 and after 1991 shall use this name, whereas references to the city between 1914 and 1918 shall use the name Petrograd, and between 1918 and 1991 the name Leningrad, reflecting the city’s history of name changes. It should be noted that although Leningrad returned to its original name of St Petersburg in 1991, the surrounding district did not, and continues to be known as Leningrad Oblast.
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Figure 2
List of place names in Finnish, Swedish and Russian used in this thesis. For contemporary Finnish cities and towns, the name of the dominant linguistic group is italicised.
From 1990 to 2010, Finland’s Immigration Service (Maahanmuuttovirasto) followed a policy of preferential treatment and expedited granting of residence permits for those deemed to “have Finnish ancestry or otherwise a close connection with Finland”.\(^1\) Once an applicant’s “Finnishness” or connection to Finland was proven, “[n]o other reason, such as work or study, is required in order to receive the permit”.\(^2\)

The Finnish Immigration Service’s website (in August 2010) presented this policy as a “returnees” program, implying the granting of “return” immigration to Finnish émigrés and their families. The website also specifically addresses the eligibility of “returnees” from the former Soviet Union, noting that “[a] person from the former Soviet Union can be granted a residence permit if the person's nationality is Finnish, i.e. he or she is not a Finnish citizen but is of Finnish origin in terms of ethnic background”.\(^3\)

This policy, the Right to Return, was introduced in 1990 by Finland’s then-President, Mauno Koivisto (in office 1982-1994). In a famous televised interview in April 1990, Koivisto spoke of his decision to instruct the Finnish Immigration Service to grant residence permits to Ingrians, arguing that Ingrians met the core qualifications for Finnishness in the existing Right to Return provisions for the descendants of more recent Finnish émigrés.\(^4\)

Specific qualifications for Ingrians to the Right to Return provisions were introduced into Finland’s main immigration law, the Aliens Act, in 1991. Despite core reforms in 1996 and 2002-2003, Right to Return status for Ingrians continued to feature as an element of Finnish immigration law until 2010.

\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Maahanmuuttovirasto, “Persons Coming from the Former Soviet Union”, available online at URL: \<http://www.migri.fi/netcomm/content.asp?path=8,2475,2525>, accessed 17 August 2010.
\(^4\) Pekka Hakala, “Koivisto vehemently denies that Ingrian migration to Finland was KGB initiative”, *Helsingin Sanomat – International Edition*, 8 February 2011, available online at URL: \<http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Koivisto+vehemently+dens+that+Ingrian+migration+to+Finland+was+KGB+initiative/1135263653011>, accessed 12 March 2011. This article also mentions an emerging controversy that Koivisto was pressured by the KGB to grant Finnish residency to Russian spies, using the Ingrian Right to Return as a front. Koivisto rejects this as a motivating factor for the Ingrian Return policy.
The Ingrian Right to Return sets up an interesting divergence between two conceptions of the national community: one defined by legal status as a citizen, and one defined by a more opaque concept of nationality, described here by the Finnish Immigration Service as “ethnic background”. In this particular case, there thus appear to be two definitions of Finnishness. This policy appears to unite the concepts of Finnish citizens and “ethnic” Finns, conferring the status of the former on those deemed to belong to the latter category. Yet the latter category is also somewhat difficult to define – terms like “ethnic background” do not lend themselves easily to quantifiable definition. How should “Finnish ethnic background” be defined? Ancestry, cultural identification or other identity markers like language or religion may all be used to shape definitions of national identity based on “ethnic background”. Designing and implementing this Right to Return policy provides Finnish policymakers with an opportunity to articulate their vision of Finnishness as an identity, and Finns as a broader community transcending the confines of Finnish citizens.

This provides the core research questions of this thesis:

a) How is Finnish identity defined by Finnish policymakers in their discussion of the Right to Return policy?

b) How were these identity constructions used by Finnish policymakers to support or challenge the Right to Return policy?

To investigate these questions, I will examine the history of political discussions on the Right to Return policy as it existed from its inception in 1990 to its ultimate cancellation in 2010, focusing on the discursive construction of Finnish identity in policymakers’ public statements and policy documents, and how these identity constructions were strategically employed for policy ends. I argue that Finnish policymakers engaged in a strategic use of essentialising discourse to promote, and then challenge, the Right to Return policy.

This chapter of the thesis will place the investigation of Finnish identity in this policy within the context of research on Finnish identity and nationalism, including its relation to broader theories of nationalism and national identity construction in
Europe and the relation of citizenship and migration policies to these identity concepts. To this end, section A of this thesis provides a brief discussion on the development of the language of national identity in Finland, focusing particularly on the Finnish terms for “nationality” and “citizenship” as they emerged as inter-related concepts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Section B of this chapter discusses the existing literature on Finnish national identity and nationalism, including the broader theories of national identity construction in Europe. Section C provides an overview of the thesis’ structure for the remaining chapters.

A) Nationality and Citizenship in Finland

Finland presents a prime example of a state where the division between nationality and citizenship is grey and murky. Päivi Harinen et al. note that the Finnish terms for nationality (kansallisuus) and citizenship (kansalaisuus) are “difficult to distinguish from one another, even etymologically”. They argue that Finnish citizenship policy “has been flavoured both by national and by ethno-cultural protectionism…[based on] the myth of the cultural, ethnic and religious homogeneity of Finnish society”.

Indeed, Henrik Stenius’ study of the history of the concept of kansalainen, the Finnish term for citizen, argues that it was developed by the Finnish-nationalist Fennoman movement in the nineteenth century, particularly in the pages of the Finnish-language newsletter Valvoja, as surreptitiously linked to concepts of Finnish ethno-cultural nationalism. Significantly, Stenius notes that the stem word kansa in kansalainen refers to “the people” as specifically the agrarian peasantry, linking the concept of Finnish citizenship to the Finnish political model of municipal autonomy in the countryside, and rooting it in the agrarian, Finnish-speaking kansa rather than the Swedish-speaking bourgeoisie. The Fennomans were ultimately successful in advocating the term kansalainen for citizen above other alternatives, including Elias

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6 Ibid.
8 Ibid. pp. 320-1.
Lönnrot’s suggestion of *kansajäsen*. This was a more direct translation of the Swedish term *medborgar*, literally “member of the people”, which was offered as a more inclusive term for the inhabitants of Finland, distinguished from *kansalainen* as a member of the more exclusive concept of the Finnish-speaking *kansa*. Stenius argues that subsequent generations of Fennoman statesmen created a concept of citizenship as “a diffuse concept of inclusion” wherein one’s status in the *kansa* or people could be graded by degrees, differentiating for instance between the “‘Finnish people proper’ and the ‘Swedish speaking population’”. Most tellingly, Stenius concludes that “by the end of the century even groups east of the Finnish border in parts of Russia that had never been part of Finland (or Sweden) came to be recognised as Finnish citizens simply because they spoke Finnish”.

Thus, there is an established history in Finland of merging concepts of cultural or ethnic belonging into descriptions of the body of citizens. The use of Finland as a case study to illustrate the intersection between citizenship and ethnicity in the construction of national identity relies on the history of Finland not only as a state in which these two concepts have become intertwined, but also as a contested territory existing between European Great Powers and subject to fluctuating borders and political status. The territorial borders of the nation state are often impermanent, and fluctuations in border territories also influence transitions in citizenship status, if not ethnic or cultural self-identification. In the Finnish example, there was a population of Finnish descent in the Soviet Union concentrated in Ingria, a historic region on the easternmost point of the Baltic Sea surrounding the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland, which historically has served as a borderland between the Russian and Swedish spheres of influence. At the end of the Ingrian War in 1617, the Swedish Crown annexed this area, then a sparsely inhabited outer region of the Russian province of Novgorod, populated largely by indigenous peoples (Izhorians and Votes) speaking Finno-Ugric languages. Over the course of the seventeenth century, the Swedish

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. p. 186.
12 Ibid.
kings consolidated Ingria into the greater Swedish Kingdom, and the region built up a significant population of Finnish-speaking émigrés from the kingdom’s eastern parts, making them the dominant ethnic group in Ingria.\textsuperscript{14} This was to change dramatically following the Great Northern War of 1700-1721, during which the Russian Tsar Peter the Great claimed Ingria and constructed his new capital St Petersburg in its centre. This brought an influx of Russians that eventually reduced the Ingrian Finns to a minority population in the region.\textsuperscript{15} Ingria has remained within Russia since the Great Northern War, successively as a part of the Russian Empire, the Russian Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union, and the modern-day Russian Federation, and today corresponds roughly to the Russian province of Leningrad Oblast surrounding the federal city of St Petersburg.\textsuperscript{16} Ingrian Finns have been Russian and Soviet residents and citizens since the early eighteenth century, and have formed a significant minority group in the St Petersburg region, being overtaken as the dominant ethnic group in the late eighteenth century but remaining in second position until the 1920s.\textsuperscript{17} They therefore have made up part of the sociological composition of the St Petersburg region, its surroundings and Russia as a whole, playing this role as members of the Soviet and then Russian and Estonian society and citizenry. Their connection to Finland, by contrast, would evidently rely on notions of ethnic identity and belonging in place of citizenship status, drawing from a centuries-past shift in territorial borders.

The significance of Ingria as border-region underlines the Finnish geographer Anssi Paasi’s study of the changing sociological function of the Finnish-Russian frontier. For much of the twentieth century this boundary formed part of the Iron Curtain, delineating the communist East from the capitalist West as a clear ideological border.\textsuperscript{18} However, the collapse of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s marked an end to this relatively clear separation, and precipitated a rise of “diverging ethno-regionalistic and ethno-nationalistic movements” as identity and social-

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. p. 177.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. p. 178.
grouping processes. Thus the role history and geography play in defining (or complicating) identity in border regions has particular resonance for Finland. The fact that ethnic groups do not correspond (or indeed may never have corresponded) exactly to the boundaries of nation states denotes the limits of a geographical or inter-frontier definition of the nation, given the impermanence of boundaries highlighted in the Finnish example and the associated potential for transitions in citizenship status from one state to another. Ethnic and cultural conceptions of national identity, depending on how they are viewed and constructed, may nevertheless end up being more salient than citizenship in regions that have experienced significant geopolitical fluctuations.

B) Nationalism and the Nation: Finland as an “Imagined Community”

The core problem for studies of national identity and its relation to the nation and nation state remains, how should the nation and those it encompasses be defined. Hugh Seton-Watson, for instance, argues that the concept of nation defies simple classification, and yet nations clearly exist in some capacity, as a people, a territory or a political body. Amongst the most famous definitions of the nation is that of Benedict Anderson, who sees it as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. Nations bind together individuals in the abstract, rather than physically, in the sense that nations promote ties of kinship and solidarity with others one may never even see or meet. Anderson further argues that nations are limited, and do not imagine themselves as “coterminous with mankind”. There must therefore be a distinction between belonging and not belonging, or insider and outsider, in which the insiders together form a “deep, horizontal comradeship”. If the nation state is defined as a state in which the citizens (largely) comprise a single nation, the criteria the state provides for naturalisation may be seen as an indicator of what the national community sees as the elements that bind the nation together. In a

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19 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid. p. 7.
24 Ibid.
case study of the Right to Return for Ingrian Finns, if the policy’s criteria and the accompanying political discussions on Ingrians’ Finnishness suggest the Ingrians do belong in the Finnish national community, the extent to which notions of common ethnicity and cultural heritage inform citizenship policy would also suggest the extent to which these notions inform the “imagining” of Finland as a nation state and community.

A further point of salience for the Finnish case from Anderson’s work is the notion that nations draw on the imagined past for political purposes as nation states. Anderson writes that “[i]f nation states are widely conceded to be ‘new’ and ‘historical’, the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an immemorial past”. For the Finnish case, the significance of the past may be important in informing the extent to which Finns consider themselves to be bound to Ingrian Finns from the former Soviet Union: e.g. how much common history do they share, how much were they a part of the “ancient Finnish nation” from which the modern nation state draws its sense of self, etc. If for example Ingrians were to be accepted as members of the Finnish “imagined community” outside the legal limits of Finnish citizenship in 1990, this could therefore be informed by perceptions of shared historic experience. This may be seen as substantiating other aspects such as cultural heritage and ethnicity in defining citizenship and inclusion in Finland.

However, other scholars of nationalism and national identity see Anderson’s approach in Imagined Communities as inherently limited. Alexander J. Motyl suggests that Anderson “claims only that nations emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a result of various forces…[he] fails to suggest, in terms that are not specific to this historical period, what makes these factors converge at this time”. Indeed, he writes further that Anderson’s view “that imagining suffices to make nations of communities seems at best a gross overestimation of the power of imagination. That nations, unlike other entities such as classes and electorates, are especially susceptible to imagination seems wrong”. This charge that Anderson does not sufficiently differentiate between nations and smaller sub-national communities is

25 Ibid. p. 11.
27 Ibid.
also levelled by Yael Tamir, who argues that “all human associations, even if no larger than families or primordial villages, could, according to this definition, be considered imagined communities”. Why the nation should take pre-eminence in identity and the political formation of nation states is therefore left unexplained, unless a new element is introduced to increase the sense of the nation’s significance, permanence, and necessity beyond any other community or grouping. The state may be seen as the guarantor of the nation’s ethno-cultural identity, and thereby, right to return policies may be argued as moves to protect those communities that see themselves as vulnerable to loss or subjugation of their ethno-cultural identity.

An exact definition of what “ethno-cultural identity” specifically entails in the construction of national identity can be difficult to come by. Jennifer Jackson Preece provides one definition, arguing that the concept of “ethnicity” has been constructed as an identity transmitted by birth or descent, and shaped by common racial, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics. She writes further that ethnicity may become a tool for social organisation “which privileges some relationships above others”. Ethno-cultural identity therefore becomes an “imagined community” that focuses on birth and ancestral connections, which forge a community almost as a dispersed, hyper-extended family. In this construction, the connection to the community is shaped by inheritance, by blood (jus sanguinis) rather than by place (jus soli). The focus on “descent” transcends the spatial limits of the nation state to create a protofamilial community, with a shared “family history”. Where nation states have engaged with notions of ethnicity, Jackson Preece argues, they have “responded with various minority policies designed to prevent instability and fragmentation”, be it either through recognition or prevention of diversity.

Likewise, the sociologist Anthony D. Smith has famously argued that national identity draws from the concept of an ethnie, which he defines as a community linked by six core attributes: a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, an

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30 Ibid. p. 137.
31 Ibid. p. 138.
association with a specific homeland and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. Smith notes that unlike attempts to classify and organise peoples based on the notion of race in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the concept of *ethnie* makes no allusions to science. Rather, *ethnie* relies largely on subjective components, with paramount importance given to “the myth of ancestry, not any fact of ancestry (which can be difficult to ascertain)”. Indeed, the elements of *ethnie* remain subjective until they are given significance by a large number of individuals, as “it is only when such markers are endowed with diacritical significance that these cultural attributes come to be seen as objective”. In this sense, Smith sees *ethnie* as “anything but primordial, despite the claims and rhetoric of nationalist ideologies and discourses”. This sets up the potential conflict in defining ethnicity, between those primordialists who believe ethnicity to be a natural component of human existence, and those who see ethnicity as a construction, a contingent way of installing group mentality.

Smith also asserts that nationalists “find themselves divided in their allegiances between loyalty to the state to which they belong, and a lingering but explosive solidarity to the *ethnie* of their birth and upbringing”. Yet at the same time, Smith cites Finland as an example wherein these two concepts do not remain separate, but rather form a mutually renewing two-way relationship. He argues that the *Kalevala*, the collection of old Finnish poetry assembled by Elias Lönnrot in the nineteenth century, forms “essential links in the complex relationship between an active national present and an often ancient ethnic heritage, between the defining ethnic past and its modern nationalist authenticators and appropriators”. This gives rise to “the nation’s explosive energy and the awful power it exerts over its members”. This use of the *Kalevala* tales as a symbolic reference point for pre-nation state “Finnishness” implies a primordialist approach to ethnicity; a suggestion that Finns share a common

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33 Ibid. pp. 21-2.
34 Ibid. p. 22.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. p. 20.
40 Smith, “Gastronomy or Geology?”, p. 19.
ancestral link to the ancient characters and events of the *Kalevala*, which differentiates them from other peoples and which has transcended the Swedish and Russian periods to modern-day independent statehood. This viewpoint appears to endorse a *jus sanguinis* approach to defining the national community, for though the land itself as portrayed in the *Kalevala* remains significant, it is the ancestral connection to the figures within the epic that defines Finnishness.

Indeed, in the 1920s the Kalevala Society in Finland proposed building a monumental *Kalevalatalo*, or Kalevala House, which would serve as a monument to Finnish cultural heritage, or as historian Derek Fewster describes it, “the Finnish race and people”\(^41\) (though it is not specified how these terms would be qualified exactly). A plan for the *Kalevalatalo* was created by one of Finland’s most noted architects, Eliel Saarinen (responsible for, among others, Helsinki’s famed Central Railway Station) in 1921 (see figures 3 and 4), to be built in the western Helsinki neighbourhood of Munkkiniemi, but the project was delayed throughout the Second World War and eventually faded away.\(^42\) The design incorporated national romantic elements drawn from the *Kalevala*, and would act as a repository for Finland’s greatest cultural achievements, including the scores of Sibelius, a cinema to display filmed versions of the *Kalevala*, and a central courtyard, the *Kalevalapiha* (see figure 4), which would also feature a crypt for the great and good amongst Finland’s cultural and intellectual leaders.\(^43\) Had this great “Parthenon of Finnishness”\(^44\) been realised, the connection between Finnish nationalism and the *Kalevala* would have been afforded a highly conspicuous physical expression. The fact that the *Kalevala* was mostly assembled from folk poetry in Karelia, which since 1944 has been largely Russian territory, may underline the potential weakness of political and territorial definitions in the construction of national identity in favour of more culturally or historically informed identities.

\(^{42}\) Ibid. pp. 331-3.
\(^{43}\) Ibid. p. 331.
\(^{44}\) Ibid. p. 330.
Derek Fewster also argues against any “organic” connection between history and the emergence of Finnish nationalism in the early twentieth century. The Kalevalatalo is one example of how this connection could be constructed, or reinforced, for public consumption. Fewster argues that, whilst Finns did maintain a level of linguistic otherness during the Swedish period, and elements of collective memory may have survived in rural areas, most of what is known as “traditional” or “ancient” Finnishness was “imagined, invented and constructed by modern nationalists”, making the notion of Finnishness as an ethnie prior to the nineteenth century a
thoroughly questionable presumption. Far more significant to Fewster in the creation of modern Finnishness was the sole question of language. Fewster sees the Fennoman movement led by Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806-1881) in the nineteenth century as motivated by the concept that language was the sole key unifier of the population, above religion, race, folklore and history (although the nineteenth-century Grand Duchy of Finland was linguistically diverse, and many of the Fennoman movement’s most prominent members, including Snellman, were themselves members of its Swedish-speaking linguistic minority). Aira Kemiläinen describes Snellman’s approach to nationalism as a general belief that nations would eventually all speak a common language, and Finnish, as the first language of some 85% of the Grand Duchy’s inhabitants, must be the logical choice. If Finland began as a linguistic community, as Fewster appears to suggest, the other components of ethnic identity came later, as part of a “mandatory construction of a Great Myth of Ethnic Descent that could supplement the role of language in binding the population into a cohesive national identity.

However, Fewster’s argument that language acted as the only unifying concept of Finnishness as an ethnic identity in nineteenth century Finnish nationalism overlooks other arguments that language at this time in Finland was embedded in other discussions of class and racial concepts. Kemiläinen argues that nineteenth century language groups were often also presented as class categories, and common terms for social groups in both Swedish and Finnish reflected this division. The Swedish term ståndspersoner, in Finnish säätyläiset, or “estate person”, referred to the members of the three upper estates in the Finnish Diet – the nobility, clergy and burghers – amongst whom Swedish had predominated. The fourth estate, the mostly Finnish-speaking land-owning farmers, were not included as ståndspersoner, instead belonging to the broad term for Finnish-speakers, allmoge in Swedish and rahvas in Finnish, which carried a negative connotation like “mob” or “the masses”.

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46 Ibid. p. 404.
50 Ibid. p. 107.
51 Ibid.
Kemiläinen notes that even though Swedish-speaking peasants were not technically ståndspersoner, they identified with the term, and the Swedish language did help facilitate their social mobility and entry into this social category. This suggests Finnishness was presented as a social group, in which linguistic identity could be linked to social standing, mobility and the parameters of social role for Finnish speakers. This could facilitate the imagining of Finnish nationalism as a community of peasantry, distinct from Swedish-speaking ståndspersoner as the “Other”.

As much as the language division could be interpreted as a class division, racial categorisation was also a significant part of nineteenth century Finnish constructions of nation as a community of (ethnic) descent, and was also linked to language. Kemiläinen notes the significance of racial theories developed by, for instance, Matias Aleksanteri Castrén (1813-1852), who studied the philology of Finno-Ugric languages and proposed that the Finnish language’s apparent relation to Tatar, Turkish and Mongolian suggested Finns had originated from the Altai Mountains in Central Asia. British politician and linguist John Bowring (1792-1872) argued rather that Finnish was related to Persian, Sanskrit and Hebrew, which could also prove the ancient migration of Finns from this region. These theories of Finns’ Asian origins made their way into Joseph Arthur de Gobineau’s infamous 1850s Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines, in which he argued that Finns were semi-barbaric and inferior to the Germanic race he saw as representing the pinnacle of human development. Although Snellman rejected the significance of race in defining the nation, other groups like the Svekomans, who favoured the Swedish language, engaged with Gobineau’s theory that the Finns as a race were primitive and incapable of establishing their own state. This was taken to prove that Finnish Swedes, as representatives of the superior Germanic race, were needed to govern and promote arts and sciences in Finland. There was thus a strain of thought in Finland at this time that constructed “Finn” and “Swede” in Finland as racial categories as well as

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56 Ibid. p. 66.
57 Ibid. pp. 130-2.
linguistic categories. The perceived racial otherness of Finns, beside their linguistic otherness, was thus also significant in the construction of Finnishness in Finland, although this could be translated to different conceptions of a Finnish nation. Whilst Fennomans ignored racial categorisations to a large extent, and the Svekomans held it as justification for the social superiority of Swedish-speakers, figures like the historian Zachris Topelius argued that while Finnish and Swedish speakers in Finland had remained racially and linguistically separate, history and nature had joined them to create a single nation. Although linguistic identity in Finland was a particularly significant avenue for construction of Finnishness as an identity of descent, and thus bound in notions of “ethnicity”, theories of racial identity were also present in this discussion.

Whilst academic studies of ethnic nationalism have highlighted problematic definitions of ethnicity, it should be noted that ethnicity does appear to retain a degree of ongoing contemporary popular significance. Smith argues convincingly that the appeal of ethnic identity continues to play a role in the construction of national identity; he writes that the scholarly discussion on the formation of nations and nationalism has been focused too exclusively on economics, with no real exploration of the effects of political, social and cultural changes, or as he puts it “the conjuncture of culture and politics”, in the analysis of national identity construction. Social and cultural changes in Finland in the 1990s and 2000s, and their effect on political constructions of Finnish national identity, including changing demographics and immigration patterns, should therefore be a major avenue of investigation in the examination of identity constructs in the Ingrian Right to Return policy.

The nation, as it is “imagined” and defined, sometimes finds political expression as a community of citizens. Citizenship is the legal status of belonging to a state. There are examples and concepts of state-less nations and “anational” states, where no distinct relationship between nationality and citizenship is drawn. However, for the purpose of defining membership of the state, some states choose to draw on a definition of the

nation in their citizenship law, which as discussed in the Finnish example may be defined by conceptions of ethnic identity. William Rogers Brubaker is concrete in linking citizenship to notions of the nation state, defining citizenship simply as “membership of a nation state”. 62 Therefore, debates about access to citizenship and naturalisation “are simultaneously debates about nationhood. They are debates about what it means, and what it ought to mean, to be a member of a nation state in today’s increasingly international world”. 63 By contrast, scholars such as T.K. Oommen believe the concept of citizenship should be separate from national identity. 64 He argues that citizenship and national identity become intertwined largely through attempts “to meet the specific requirements of state-building”. 65 Likewise, Jürgen Habermas argues “citizenship was never conceptually tied to national identity”. 66 Rather, it should be linked to a Vertragspatriotismus, or “constitutional patriotism”, in which the citizen’s loyalty is not to an ethnic kinship but to the unifying principles outlined in a constitutional document. 67 However, for diverse communities with significant minority groups, Will Kymlika and Wayne Norman argue that the concept of citizenship (being distinct from national identity) becomes problematic, and can be seen either as a homogenising concept that makes minority groups “play by the majority rules”, or, if it includes specific deference to minority rights, a reflection of group rights and “the politics of narrow self-interest” instead of the individual rights a constitution is supposed to enshrine for citizens. 68 Therefore, citizenship appears to become problematic in diverse societies with significant minority groups, and the classic split between citizenship and identity in Habermas’ Vertragspatriotismus becomes somewhat doubtful. This may be particularly prevalent during times of political transition or instability, as then, Cynthia Enloe argues, “national ethnic groups are likely to be looked upon as alien, having less right to the rewards of

63 Ibid. p. 2.
65 Ibid.
national sovereignty than indigenous groups”. Thus, placing the notion of citizenship above and beyond constructions of national identity is problematic, and appears to ignore the way nation states behave in reality, wherein (as exemplified by language on the Ingrian Right to Return policy) ethnic identity and citizenship are constructed as linked concepts which may not be readily separated.

Many scholars have attempted to create models for understanding the roles for ethnicity and citizenship in forging national identity as it emerged in Europe. Hans Kohn’s influential 1944 work *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background* offers one interpretation: nationalism is an “idée force” or “state of mind” that serves as a link between the individual and the nation state. This “state of mind” developed in different ways in nineteenth century Europe to serve different purposes. Specifically in Central and Eastern Europe, it was developed “in protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern – not primarily to transform it into a people’s state, but to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands”. Kohn thus divides conceptions of national identity and its relation to statehood into two models: the Eastern European concept of nation state as a collective identity, which was held together not by identification with state institutions but by “traditional ties of kinship and status…[which] substituted for the legal and rational concept of ‘citizenship’ the infinitely vaguer concept of ‘folk’”, and the Western model of civic nationalism based on the concept of a “citizenship”-based identity. This considered, the development of Finnish nationalism, framed by the concepts of citizenship and belonging, could be considered as conforming more to Kohn’s idea of ethnically determined, exclusivist Eastern European nationalism than to its Western counterpart. This contrasts sharply with the notion of Finland as the last bastion of Western Europeanness straddling the border with the East (Russia), as described by Paasi in section A of this chapter. Indeed, the Kohn model of Eastern Europe as defined by its approach to nationalism potentially undermines any presentation of Finland as politically and culturally a wholly Western European

71 Ibid.
72 Ibid. p. 331.
nation, separate and distinct from the East across the border, if one views the Ingrian Finnish Return law as an example of an ethnically-informed citizenship policy.

“Folk” as a concept, however, has specific connotations in the Nordic region that diverge somewhat from the ethnic kinship concept in Kohn’s theory. The word *folk* in the Scandinavian languages, as noted by Mary Hilson, has traditionally been applied to the agrarian peasantry, denoting the peasant farmer as “the ideal embodiment of the people”, derived from “his intimate relationship with the harsh northern climate and landscape in which he and his ancestors had worked, thus cementing the bonds between *folk* and territory”.  

The ideology of national identity provided by the Danish philosopher N.F.S. Grundtvig, for example, is described as emphasising the unity of land, country, God and *folk*, which proved influential both in Denmark and throughout Scandinavia. Although this concept appears to reflect Romanticism’s notions of idyllic life in nature, Hilson notes that cultural emphasis on *folk* did have some important civic and political ramifications, namely the substantial civic and political participation of peasants in nineteenth-century Scandinavia. As discussed in section A of this chapter, *kansa*, as the Finnish translation of *folk*, had a similar function in the development of Finnish nationalism, and its etymological function as the stem of *kansalainen* denotes the significance of the peasantry in the Finnish conception of citizenship. However, the distinction between *kansa* as a Finnish-speaking identity distinct from Swedish-speaking town-dwellers, as noted by Stenius, introduces an ethno-centric understanding of *kansa* that brings it somewhat into line with the Eastern European concept of “folk” indicated by Kohn. Ilkka Liikanen argues that *kansa* as an expression of “the ordinary people” has been used by educated elites like the Fennomans as a nation-building concept, in which they attempted to assert their position as the “true” representatives of the Finnish people in

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75 Hilson, “Denmark, Norway and Sweden”, p. 196.

the countryside. As such, despite arguments for a particularly Scandinavian approach to the concept of *folk*, Finnish interpretations of *folk/kansa* do appear to involve ethno-cultural identity constructions that would place it within the East European tradition of folk nationalism in the Kohn model.

Kohn’s dual nationalisms model has found some influence amongst later twentieth and twenty-first century scholars, as variations on this theory have frequently entered scholarly discussions of nationalism and national identity construction in Europe. Many scholars view Kohn’s approach as outdated and unconvincing, but amongst these, many still attempt to account for a division in Eastern and Western traditions of nationhood with different explanations, whilst acknowledging that such a division exists. For instance, Ernest Gellner argues that conceptions of the nation in Eastern Europe are influenced by the legacies of multi-ethnic empires in the region, wherein communities were “locked into complex multiple loyalties of kinship, territory and religion”. Replacing these multilayered identities with national identity and a sense of loyalty to the nation state, creating “that close relation between state and culture which is the essence of nationalism”, could therefore necessitate what Gellner terms “a great deal of very forceful cultural engineering” that would make national identity more contiguous with the state, by removing (through expulsion or assimilation) those groups outside the nation’s identity parameters from the state’s borders. John Plamenatz similarly argues that nationalism emerged differently in Western and Eastern Europe, summarising Western nationalism as a unifying high culture, and Eastern nationalism as an attempt to create such a unifying high culture in diverse regions where it had not yet been established.

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80 Ibid.
These notions of a divide in models of citizenship and national identity between East and West speak to discourses on Western and Eastern Europe as separate and distinct civilisations. Perhaps the most famous twentieth century manifestation of this concept comes from Samuel Huntington, the Harvard political scientist who developed in a seminal 1993 article for *Foreign Affairs* the theory of a “clash of civilisations”, which in the European context translates to a divide between Western Catholic-Protestant and Eastern Orthodox-Islam spheres. These two spheres, in Huntington’s opinion, developed separately and are informed by different experiences – the West by the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Industrial and French Revolutions, the East by

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Ottoman or Tsarist dominion, only lightly touched by cultural and economic developments in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{83} To Huntington, “[t]he Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe”.\textsuperscript{84} Of particular relevance for the study of Finnish national identity, Huntington defines this line in Northern Europe as running along the Russo-Finnish border (see figure 5).\textsuperscript{85}

Indeed, despite the idea of a division between East and West based on models of citizenship and national identity constructions, which would make Finland part of the Eastern tradition when the development of Finnish nationalism and modern indicators like the Right to Return for Ingrians are viewed, political discussions of Finnish nationalism and identity in Finland appear to place particular relevance on this distinction between Finns as Western and Russians as the Eastern Other. However, Huntington is wrong to assert that the idea of a division between East and West is anything more than an idea; that there are quantifiable East and West civilisations that are fundamentally and demonstrably different, and always have been, ignores the many different interpretations of West and East in different discourses on identity. Rather, this division should be treated as one particular representation of identity, based on particular interpretations of history. Huntington’s suggestion that this division is based on a division in “civilisations”, particularly civilisations based on religious influences, is also extremely contentious, and is not borne out my analysis of the data on the political discourse on the Ingrian Finnish Return. Rather, I argue that perceptions of a division between East and West European identities in Finland are predicated on discursive representations of history, emphasising periods of peace and prosperity with Finland’s western neighbours and period of crisis and conflict with its eastern neighbours.

For instance, in contrast to Ingria, which was annexed outright by the Russians in the early eighteenth century, when Russia claimed the Finnish peninsula following the Finnish War in 1809 this newly annexed territory became an autonomous and self-governing Grand Duchy retaining most of the socio-legal features inherited from

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid. pp. 29-30.  
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid. p. 29.  
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid. p. 30.
Swedish rule. Nineteenth-century Finnish nationalists viewed this inheritance from the West as a defining feature of Finnish identity, which must be defended from the Eastern colonising, suppressive force, the Tsarist Russian system, as expressed artistically by Finnish painter Edvard Isto (also known by his fennicised first name Eetu) in his 1899 painting Hyökkäys, or The Attack (see figure 6). Occupying pride of place in the Finnish National Museum in Helsinki, the piece depicts the traditional personification of Finland, the flaxen-haired, blue-and-white clad Suomi-Neito, or Finnish Maiden, clutching at a large book with the Latin inscription Lex (law) that is being wrenched from her hands by a mighty double-headed Russian Imperial eagle. Isto’s work was first exhibited the same year as the infamous “February Manifesto”, issued by Tsar Nicholas II on 15th February 1899, which set limits to Finnish autonomy and the powers of the Finnish Diet and made the Grand Duchy subject to the same law as the rest of the Empire. Finnish nationalism, as presented by Isto, is demonstrated as a struggle to retain its laws (its credentials as part of the Western European legal tradition underlined by the Latin title page) at a time when they were threatened from the East. Indeed, Paasi argues that the ongoing significance of “Western” influences in Finland, particularly the Swedish-inspired legal system, enabled Finnish intellectuals to “classify their country exclusively in the realm of Western Europe and the Western cultural heritage”, despite a legacy of Russian political control. This, he argues, was most pronounced in periods of conflict with Russia or the USSR (for instance, the Winter and Continuation Wars). Paasi asserts that Finns themselves have presented their border with Russia/the USSR as the definitive cultural boundary between West and East. Differences between Russia and Finland were thus discursively produced and disseminated to support a particular political goal, in this case Finland’s independence. As argued in this thesis, this tradition of perceiving Western and Eastern Europe as separate identities continues in the political discussions on the Ingrian Finnish Return, based on discursive constructions of historical events and periods as either positive and negative. It would

88 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness, p. 123.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid. p. 273.
therefore be wrong to dismiss the idea that divisions between Russia as the East and Finland as the West were diminished in the Finnish political discourse when the Cold War ended, although the nature and reasons for this perception of division are not convincingly accounted for by Huntington’s thesis.

Figure 6
Hyökkäys (The Attack), by Edvard “Eetu” Isto.
Oil on canvas, 1899.
Suomen Kansallismuseo, Helsinki.

Taking into account the citizenship and nationalism models developed since Kohn, to belong to the “Western” tradition of nationalism should also involve attitudes towards national identity based on citizenship status and identification with certain civic or constitutionally expressed values, rather than perceived ethnic identity. To some extent, it is not completely accurate to suggest that Finnish identity developed in the nineteenth century as an ethnically homogenous movement, as the political scientist Miroslav Hroch argues that the period of Finnish nationalism in the late nineteenth century was marked by close and increased cooperation between the two largest ethno-cultural groups (Finns and Swedes) against Russian Tsarist governance as their common enemy.91 This presents a significant new factor to the discussion of Finnish

identity construction, in how the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland could fit into ethnically or linguistically essentialising national identity conceptions. It is possible that Swedish-speakers may act as living reminders of the links between Finland and the old Swedish kingdom, reinforcing Finland’s status as a Western European nation that appears significant to Finns’ self-perception. Yet overall, as is discussed further in this thesis with reference to the Ingrian Finnish Return policy, there is a later substantial political expression of Finnish identity as an ethnically homogenising concept, linking the nation state as a community of citizens to the concept of an ethnically defined national identity.

However, when one views any notion of a divide between Eastern and Western European identities as discursive constructions of identity that have become pervasive in the study of nationalism in Europe, these constructions run the risk of suppressing alternative views that transcend or ignore these perceived identities. Specific to the case of Ingria, Russians in the region have also viewed themselves as belonging to the cultural West to a certain extent, and the presentation of Russia as the invading Other swallowing parts of Western Europe into its own Eastern civilisation is rejected by some Russian descriptions of the annexation of Ingria. Indeed, one famous Russian interpretation of this event portrays it as a “Europeanising” moment for Russia. The poet Alexander Pushkin famously described in *The Bronze Horseman* Tsar Peter the Great’s tour of recently conquered Ingria, where he is said to have declared:

*Here, Swede, beware – soon by our labour*  
*Here a new city shall be wrought,*  
*Defiance to the haughty neighbour.*  
*Here we at Nature’s own behest*  
*Shall break a window to the West.*

The “Window to the West” was the new Russian capital, St Petersburg, founded in 1703 on the Neva River delta in Ingria. The city was consciously designed to create, as described by historian L.R. Lewitter, a “new and portentous landmark on the Baltic horizon…closer to Amsterdam and London”, in terms of geographical proximity, economic orientation and cultural identity, than to Moscow, Russia’s “ancient

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capital”. St Petersburg, as a “European” capital in its appearance and outlook, could be seen as a centrepiece of Russia’s arrival as a European power, a reflection under Peter of “the intense desire and fervent hope of becoming members, in every respect, of the European community”. The Russian annexation of Ingria was not, in this Russian understanding of history, an expansion of Eastern civilisation westward towards and into Finland, but rather a defining moment of the Russian Empire’s melding with Western European civilisation.

These divergent interpretations of the East-West cleavage denote a major divergence from geographical understanding of nationalism and identity. Different regions and nations appear more “Eastern” or more “Western” at different points in their history or in different aspects of their political make-up. For instance, Taras Kuzio argues that nationalism in Germany, Spain and Greece involves ethnic identity constructions, despite being geographically outside Eastern Europe. He argues that all nations, including those in the West, are constructed around an ethnic “core”, such that ethnic identity effectively always play a role in constructions of nationalism in Europe. He also cites Northern Ireland, Corsica and the Basque region as examples of violent ethnic nationalism that prove this problem cannot be singularly linked to the geographic East. Likewise, William Rogers Brubaker’s comparative study of the citizenship policies of six Western nation states (the UK, France, Germany, Sweden, the USA and Canada) shows inconsistencies in an understanding of Eastern-ethnic and Western-civic modes of national identity and citizenship. Significantly, both Sweden and Germany (at the time of Brubaker’s writing, West Germany) are seen to function on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, or citizenship by blood or heritage, and view citizenship as hereditary, e.g. the children of citizens will always be citizens no matter where they are born. Unlike the other four examples, Swedish and German citizenship policies do not factor in place of birth in their citizenship policies (in

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96 Ibid. pp. 20-1.
97 Ibid. p. 25.
France, Rogers Brubaker argues, *jus sanguinis* principles have always been strongly supplemented by *jus soli* requirements). Thus, in a thorough interpretation of the theory of “Eastern” ethnic nationalism, neither Sweden, with its very strong political and cultural influence over Finland, nor Germany may be considered truly “Western” in their attitudes to national identity and citizenship. Brubaker also notes the preferential access to naturalisation provided for those with “ethno-cultural kinship” ties to the nation state, which are most noteworthy in Germany. German citizenship is granted automatically to those who were forced to flee during the Second World War and their descendants, and all those of ethnic German heritage are permitted to apply for naturalisation without the normal 10 years residency requirement (a presentation of Germany’s immigration law history and own Right to Return policy is provided in appendix three of this thesis). This demonstrates a continuation of *jus sanguinis* beyond the notion of “inheriting” citizenship from citizen parents, to “inheriting” citizenship to a degree from one’s more distant ancestors. Again, this denotes an example of an apparently Western nation pursuing a line of policy more readily associated in much of the academic literature on European nationalism with Eastern Europe. This would suggest that in Finland the perception of belonging in Western Europe is distinct from and not reliant on pursuing the “Western” civic model of nationalism in defining national identity and belonging.

Other scholars of national identity in Europe challenge the approach to the model of Eastern Europe as intrinsically linked to ethnicity-based models of nationhood, without actually rejecting the idea that ethnicity-based models do predominate east of the former Iron Curtain. The political scientist and member of the European Parliament George Schöpflin is essentially dismissive of Kohn’s East-West/ethnic-civic theory of European nationalism, but acknowledges that ethnic identity retains a degree of greater political significance in Eastern Europe. This is the legacy of the communist political system, which removed “all possible civic institutions and codes of conduct…turn[ing] these societies into civic deserts”. Thus, ethnic nationalism emerged in post-communist Europe because “there was no other identity in the public

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99 Ibid.
100 Ibid. p. 114.
102 Ibid. p. 279.
103 Ibid.
sphere that could have played this role”. Indeed, Brubaker also writes on the legal intersection of ethnicity and citizenship in communist Europe, particularly in the USSR and its successor states, as the Soviet government’s attempt to grant a public space for ethnic identity that would remain distinct from one’s citizenship-delineated membership in a multi-ethnic communist society. He describes the USSR’s approach to citizenship and ethnicity as “institutionalised multi-nationality”, in which the Soviet state officially recognised ethnic identity amongst the Soviet citizenry. In this system, the USSR acknowledged “nations” as identifying both with political/territorial and ethnic/cultural entities. Though officially linked, ethnic/cultural entities never completely corresponded to the political/territorial entities, as individuals could retain their ethnic or cultural identity irrespective of the part of the Soviet Union they resided in.

As such, there was no real legal significance associated with ethnic identity in the USSR - Brubaker notes ethnicity was always presented by Soviet authorities as a social categorisation distinct from citizenship. The institutionalised multi-nationality approach could acknowledge ethnic identity, whilst still strictly limiting its legal and political significance to avoid undermining the Soviet state’s ultimate authority. It could therefore serve as a control structure for the central Soviet authorities, managing the peripheral regions with largely ethnically or culturally distinct populations – as Brubaker argues, “ethnocultural nations were given their own political territories, but not the power to rule them”. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Brubaker argues that “the sense of ethnonational entitlement and ownership of national territory” in the institutionalised multi-nationality system continues in the post-Soviet space, though it is now “joined to substantial powers of rule”. Thus, like Schöpflin, Brubaker’s presentation of the relationship between ethnic identity and citizenship sees this relationship as informed by the particularities of the communist political system, as he sees the conflation of ethnic and citizenship

104 Ibid.
106 Ibid. p. 28.
107 Ibid. pp. 32-3.
108 Ibid. p. 36.
109 Ibid. p. 46
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
identity as a legacy of the USSR’s use of ethno-cultural identity in managing ethno-cultural diversity. These arguments, however, do see that differences in nationalism between East and West exist, if the East is defined as post-communist Europe.

These explanations behind the increased merging of citizenship and ethnicity east of the former Iron Curtain following the collapse of communism relate to Anderson’s definition of the nation state community as “limited”. Indeed, he writes that “[t]he most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day when all the members of the human race will join their nations in the way that it was possible, in certain epochs, for say, Christians to dream of a wholly Christian planet”.\(^{112}\) In contrast, Brubaker points out that the USSR was never imagined as a nation state in this sense, and the sense of a “Soviet people” after 1917 was explicitly supranational, as the beginnings of a “new historical community” of the proletariat, rather than an exclusive nationalist community.\(^{113}\) The end of communism in the USSR precipitated the end of this construction of the Soviet people. With this decline, former citizens of the USSR could be perceived to have only their perception of belonging to an ethnic identity within the system of institutionalised multi-ethnicity to fall back on.

However, Finland did not spend the Cold War years with a communist government, and therefore such argument for modes of nationalism informed by post-communism have little relevance to the development of nationalism, and any role ethnicity may play therein, in this case. Likewise, Finland lacks the same heritage of Soviet constructions of citizenship and institutionalisation of ethnicity. The presence of ethnic constructions of identity in Finland’s immigration policies therefore presents an interesting counter-example to the link between post-communism and ethnic-nationalism in Europe. The Ingrian Return policy dates from the similar time frame (1990) to the decline of the USSR and the move towards a closer symbolic integration of ethnicity into citizenship in the post-Soviet space, yet it provides evidence of the ethnocentric understanding of national identity crossing the former Iron Curtain and finding intellectual credence in non-communist Europe. Indeed, the Ingrian Return law actually encompassed the old Soviet policy of recognising ethnic identity, as in the earliest years of the policy Finnish ethnicity was determined by the ethnicity

\(^{112}\) Anderson, p. 6.
\(^{113}\) Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, p. 28.
marked in a person’s internal Soviet passport. This followed a similar practice in the Federal Republic of Germany, wherein all those with ethnicity classified as German in their internal Soviet passport were eligible for “repatriation”. This approach was criticised by, among others, the former Finnish Ambassador to Moscow and Berlin, René Nyberg, who quipped about the seemingly perfunctory nature of classifying German ethnicity that “it was enough for your grandfather to have had a German shepherd as a pet.”

It therefore appears that both theories of ethnic and civic nationalism as respectively linked to the East and West respectively, and East and West as strictly defined by religious differences, are too inconsistent and unconvincing in accounting for the development of European nationalism and identity. The Finnish example undermines the notion that ethnic nationalism is the by-product of communist governments, and therefore limited in Europe to the former Warsaw Block. Rather, the Finnish case reflects a sense that systems of citizenship that attempted to acknowledge ethnic identity have played to elements of ethnic nationalism in Europe as a whole. Whilst there may appear to be no wholly convincing model for understanding the development of nationalism in Europe, there is nevertheless evidence of ethnicity’s ongoing popular significance. Such evidence is present in Jan Germen Janmaat’s analysis of a 2002 Eurobarometer survey conducted in 9 different European states (the UK, Austria, Greece, Italy, Spain, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Germany, with German results split between the former East and West) on what respondents consider to be the most significant delineators of national identity. Ethnic identity, encompassing ancestral and historic connection to the nation state, was highest in Greece, Hungary and Poland, and lowest in West Germany, Austria and Italy. Cultural identity, including language, was highest again in Greece, Hungary and Poland, and lowest in West Germany, East Germany, Spain and Britain. Political identity, encompassing the legal system, civic rights and duties and the socio-economic system, was highest in Greece, Spain and Poland, and lowest in West

114 Hakala, “Koivisto vehemently denies that Ingrrian migration to Finland was KGB initiative”.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Janmaat argues that this survey data shows basic conformity to the notion that ethnic and cultural conceptions of national identity are more significant in the East than strictly political or legal elements. However, he also notes that variations within the Eastern and Western groups are substantial, and that broadly speaking, the survey data indicate positive responses from most respondents across the board, indicating that most respondents consider both ethno/cultural and political constructions of nationhood to be important. He specifically notes the position of Greece, which he deems part of the West, as reporting high indications of ethno-cultural identity, and Poland, as part of the post-communist East, reporting high indications of political or civic identity. Variations on what one nation holds to be important in defining belonging within the nation state are therefore best viewed on a country-by-country basis, with the legacy of communist government and legal systems to be considered as just one potential factor in accounting for the significance any nation affords to ethnic-identity.

Political systems and other contextual factors are therefore significant in understanding the development of nationalism for different nation states, which may transcend simple classification as belonging to Eastern or post-communist ethnic or Western and non-communist civic traditions. Finnish approaches to nationalism are a key example of these divisions blurring substantially. Indeed, on the Finnish example, Max Engman argues

there evolved a kind of nationalism that mixed features of the form of nationalism customary in western Europe, nationalism as a ‘civic religion’, i.e. support for the existing state, with the form of nationalism customary in eastern Europe, which aimed at liberation from the multinational empires and from a ruling class that spoke another language".

Recognising the presence of elements of ethnic nationalism in Finland, in the form of an approach to citizenship that draws on constructions of an ethnic national identity that is informed by the peculiarities of Finland’s historical development as a nation state, is the most accurate approach to understanding identity in Finland. It also highlights the underlying call for the nation state to defend ethno-cultural identity.

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119 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid. p. 63.
123 Engman, “Finns and Swedes in Finland”, p. 182.
when it appears to be under threat, as exemplified in the Ingrian Right to Return policy. In this understanding of national identity, the national community can be seen to extend beyond the political borders and citizenship status of the nation state to all those who may claim membership of the nation’s ethno-cultural identity. Citizenship affords the legal protection of the nation state to those who claim this ethno-cultural identity.

As Anthony D. Smith quite rightly has written, economic factors continue to shape conceptions of the nation state, but the less-investigated ethno-cultural arguments also have their place.\textsuperscript{124} This study of the Ingrian Finns’ Right to Return therefore aims to follow Smith’s suggestion of investigating the significance of ethno-cultural rationale in the formation of national identity, as expressed through citizenship policy.

C) Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided into six chapters. The introductory chapter has introduced the background literature on nationalism and national identity, discussing the conceptualisations of national identity relevant to the Finnish case and the intersection of notions of citizenship and ethnic identity in the Right to Return law. From here, the thesis continues by studying the political discussions on the Ingrian Right to Return, how (and to what ends) politicians constructed Finnishness in these discussions, and what these discussions and constructions can reveal about discourses of national identity and their use in the politics of this period (1990-2010).

Chapter two of this thesis describes the historical context in which the Ingrian Right to Return policy was brought to Finland. This chapter charts the history of Ingria as a region in the frequently volatile borderlands between, first, the Novgorod Republic and Teutonic Order, the Swedish Kingdom and Russian Tsardom, and subsequently Finland and the USSR and Russian Federation. The historical account in this chapter runs from the Middle Ages through to the introduction of the Ingrian Return policy in 1990, addressing previous times in which Ingrians have entered the Finnish political discourse, and the economic and political realities of the late twentieth century as the

\textsuperscript{124} Smith, \textit{The Ethnic Revival}, p. 5.
Return law was introduced. This includes the economic recession and the challenged welfare-state model in the early 1990s, the changing security dimension of Europe after the collapse of the Iron Curtain, and the post-Soviet relationship between Finland and Russia.

Chapter three gives an account of the methodological approaches, particularly theories of identity and discourse analysis, that inform this thesis. It explains the concept of discursive resources as employed here, and describes the different themes into which the sources are divided for analysis in the core empirical chapters.

Chapters four and five form the empirical core of this thesis. They analyse the political discussions surrounding the Return law, employing the critical discourse analysis-informed methodological framework described in chapter three, to ascertain the ideology of Finnishness discursively produced by Finnish lawmakers here. Chapter four analyses discourses from the period of the first incarnation of the Right to Return law, beginning with President Mauno Koivisto’s important statement introducing the policy to the public in April 1990 and continuing to its initial legislative manifestation in the Aliens Act from 1991 up until 1995. The analytical focus of this chapter is on how the language of the Act’s provisions for Right to Return status, and Finnish politicians’ official discussions of these provisions, present and define Finnish identity relative to Ingrians as an initially inclusive relationship.

The fifth chapter analyses discourses on the Ingrian Finnish Return law from the period of reforms to the Aliens Act’s provisions for returnee status, beginning in 1996, up to the policy’s ultimate demise in 2010. This chapter investigates the response in the political discourse to the actual experience of Ingrian Finns living in Finland. I consider whether this period should be characterised as the completion stages of an overall project of Ingrian Finnish “repatriation”, or as a reassessment of the Finnish identity “credibility” of Ingrians. I focus in this chapter on the new amendments from 1996 and 2002-2003 to the policy, and their revised presentation of Ingrians’ belonging in Finland, as contrasted to the Act’s previous incarnation. In addition, I investigate the language of the 2010 decision to end the Right to Return policy for Ingrian Finns, with a view to analysing the change from inclusive to exclusive language in policymakers’ presentation of Ingrians’ connection to Finland.
and Finnish identity, and whether this involves a substantial change in Finnish lawmakers’ perception of Finnishness.

The sixth chapter introduces a further aspect of analysis of the Ingrian Return law, contrasting the presentation of Finnish identity from Finnish politicians at this time with concurrent constructions of identity emerging from within the Ingrian community, both those identifying as Ingrians in Estonia and Russia and those who had migrated through the Right to Return program to Finland. I have identified the editorials from an Ingrian Finnish community newspaper, Uutisia Inkeristä (News from Ingria), as one significant source, providing insight to the way Ingrians’ identity was constructed in relation to Finnishness. The editorials, written in Finnish by the director of the Ingrian Finnish community organisation in St Petersburg, Inkerin-Liitto (Ingrian League), Wladimir Kokko, engage with the notions of a separate identity construction for Ingrians, distinct from but related to Finnishness, and react to the exclusion of Ingrians from Finnish politicians’ definition of Finnishness with the cancelation of the Right to Return policy in 2010. I have also analysed interview and survey data from Ingrians both in Russia and in Finland, and their conceptualisations of Ingrianness and Finnishness, that have been collected by other researchers, particularly social psychologists, to analyse how Ingrians’ perceptions relate to the discussion in Finnish politics. This chapter evaluates the correlation between Ingrian constructions of their identity and Finnish politicians’ language surrounding the Ingrian Return law, and the potential intersubjectivity of Finnish political language on Ingrian identity for Ingrians’ own perceptions of their Finnishness, or lack thereof.

Finally, the thesis ends with a concluding chapter, which provides an overview of the key results of this study, and indicates their significance for the study of Finnish national identity, and more broadly, ways in which national identities in Europe have been studied and theorised. This chapter also suggests ways in which the results of this study can be employed for future research in related projects across different disciplines.

This thesis also provides three appendices: 1) a list of Finnish political parties mentioned here, along with their acronyms, 2) a timeline of the Ingrian Finnish Return policy set against the timeline of parliamentary and presidential elections, and
3) a brief comparison of the Ingrian Finnish Return with the Volga German case in Germany, showing the (potentially problematic) intersection of ethnic and citizenship concepts inherent in right to return policies.
CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT: INGRIA AND FINLAND UP TO THE 1990s

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the context of the Ingrian Return law, grounding the analysis of the law and its surrounding debates in the ensuing empirical chapters in the ideologically dominant historical narrative of Ingria for Finnish lawmakers and the relevant context of late twentieth century Finland and Europe, which prove crucial to understanding the Return law and its significance for the study of national identity construction. To this end, context is provided here in two broad categories:

1) An introduction to the history of the Ingrian region, charting the effects of its many changes between various state entities and powers, both as reflected by the dominant interpretations of history in Finland, and also as examples of the previous significance Ingria and Ingrians have played in Finnish politics

2) A presentation of the situation in Finland, both economic and political, at the time of the Return law’s introduction. The argument of this section of the chapter is effectively that political and geopolitical issues appear to have shaped the instigation of the Ingrian Finns’ Right to Return policy much more than economics.

To this end, this chapter first traces the history of border fluctuations in the eastern Baltic Sea region between Sweden, Russia, the USSR and Finland, from the thirteenth century until after the Second World War, as they have been presented in the dominant Finnish interpretations of history. The contemporary border between Finland and Russia, discussed in the previous chapter as an ideological border between West and East that scholars like Paasi have analysed as a key partition in Finnish constructions of identity, is here acknowledged as a historically malleable, fluid political border that has at various points in its history oscillated back and forth, particularly around the Karelian Isthmus and Gulf of Finland. Ingria directly abuts this border, switching from Novgorodian to Swedish to Russian (and subsequently,
Soviet) control over the course of the early modern and modern periods. These border changes, accompanied by influxes of new communities, have shaped Ingria’s characterisation amongst Finnish politicians as a region of problematised national identity, between Russian and Finnish, or Eastern and Western, identity constructions. As this thesis investigates the construction of national identity with reference to Ingria and Ingrians through the Return law, an understanding of the historical narrative of Ingria as presented in the dominant Finnish interpretations of history that inform the law is essential for this analysis. As history is used in the political rhetoric of Finnish politicians to promote connections between Ingrians and both Finnishness and Finland, a comprehensive analysis of this rhetoric should first require an understanding of the details of this history. This also serves to provide previous instances in which Ingria and Ingrians have entered the Finnish political discourse.

This chapter then progresses to a discussion of the context of the introduction of Ingrian Finnish Return law itself, examining the economic and political climate in Finland in the 1980s and early 1990s. This period for Finland was marked both by a transforming geopolitical situation, with the collapse of the old security order in Europe as the Iron Curtain was lifted, and a critical economic situation, as an economic crisis transformed labour shortages into significant unemployment levels. This information is presented here to provide an insight into relevant factors and pressures informing Finnish political decisions and rhetoric on the Return program for Ingrians, and to ground the study of the Ingrian Finnish Return law in the wider academic debates on how national identity construction has responded to the fall of the Iron Curtain in Europe.

A) **Introducing Ingria: Changing Borders in the Gulf of Finland Region**

Ingria has a complex place in the development of the Finnish nation state. The Right to Return for Ingrian Finns suggests that despite 300 years as citizens and residents of a different state, Ingrians retain connections to the homeland of their pre-seventeenth century ancestors. The Ingrian territory (for geographic location see figure 1) stretches along the easternmost coast of the Gulf of Finland, bordered to the east by Lake Ladoga and linking the Finnish peninsula with present-day Estonia. Prior to the thirteenth century, the region was a sparsely inhabited, outlying district of the
Republic of Novgorod, already subject to Russian-speaking immigration but largely populated by Votes (also called Votians) and Izhorians, who spoke Finno-Ugric languages related to but distinct from Finnish. In the thirteenth century, the region became an increasingly volatile border region between the Orthodox Novgorod and the then-Catholic powers of Denmark, Sweden and Livonia (part of present-day eastern Estonia and Latvia), who invaded but were unable to successfully occupy the region at several points during that century. The failure of the Swedes to gain a lasting foothold in Ingria appears to have (temporarily) marked the southeastern border of Swedish expansion in the Finnish peninsula through the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. By 1293, Sweden had ceased expansionist activities and begun consolidating administration of the new largely Finnish-speaking territories in the fortresses at Åbo (Turku), Tavastehus (Hämeenlinna), Viborg (Viipuri) and Raseborg (Raasepori). Viborg, which was fortified by the end of the thirteenth century, is located to the north of Ingria, and thus could function as the border and vanguard against Novgorod, with Ingria therefore outside of the Swedish-administered Finnish territories.

Finnish politicians’ discussions on the Ingrian Finnish Return law are informed by border changes between Sweden and Russia dating to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the early seventeenth century, Sweden was able to obtain a more permanent presence in Ingria. The region proved a strategic gain for the Swedes, establishing a land bridge linking the Swedish territories along the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland with newly acquired possessions along its southern coast in Estonia. The annexation of Ingria by the Swedish Crown was completed by 1617, and was followed by a period of some 80 years in which the region was governed as

2 Nazarova, “The Crusades against Votians and Izhorians in the Thirteenth Century”, pp. 177-9. For example, attempts by the Swedish Kingdom in 1240 and the Livonian Order in 1242 to take Ingria were unsuccessful, and were repelled respectively at the Battle of the Neva and Battle of Lake Peipus by the Novgorodians under Prince Alexander Nevsky See Eric Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, 2nd ed, London: Penguin Books, 1997, pp. 117, 134.
4 Ibid.
5 David Kirby, A Concise History of Finland, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 30. Kirby writes that this Swedish conquest was spurred by the “virtual collapse of the Moscovite state following the death of Boris Gudunov in 1605”.
6 Ibid.
part of Sweden’s eastern possessions. During this time, the region became a focal area for immigration by Finnish-speaking peoples from the Finnish peninsula, who would become the dominant ethno-linguistic group in the region. These settlers, and their descendants, have become known as the Ingrian Finns.

Finnish-speaking settlers at this time belonged primarily to two tribes, Savakkko and Äyrämöinen, delineated by different dialect, dress and customs, and only extremely rarely intermarrying. According to Ott Kurs’ geopolitical and historical profile of Ingria, the Finnish-speaking settlers in Ingria identified strongly with Finns living in Finland during the period of Swedish governance, united by Lutheran faith and use of the literary Finnish language, which was used during and after the Reformation for worship and education in local parishes. Thus, according to Kurs, the inhabitants of Ingria self-identified as Finns of Ingria. The cities of Narva, in present-day Estonia, and Nyen (in Finnish, Nevanlinna), on the site of present-day St Petersburg, became the main urban centres of the new territory, whilst fortresses were also maintained at Jama (Jaama) and Nöteborg (Pähkinälinna), which now exist as Kingisepp and Schlisselberg in Leningrad Oblast, but the region was not integrated into the core of the Swedish kingdom that included present-day Finland, and was governed separately. Later presentations of Ingrians as connected to Finland through their common Swedish administration minimise the significance of Ingria’s separate political administration by the Swedish crown at this, the only period in which Ingrian and Finnish territories were under a common authority as part of the Swedish Kingdom.

Less than a century after the commencement of Swedish rule, as a result of Russian conquest during the Great Northern War (1700-1721) Ingria was politically cut off from the Finnish peninsula. However, the divide between Ingria and the Finnish peninsula territories can be viewed as not an altogether clean cutaway, as the gradual

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8 Ibid. p. 177.
9 Rimpiläinen, “Ingrian Finnishness as a Historical Construction”, p. 102.
11 Ibid.
westward progression of the Russian Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries proceeded in stages that have continuously redefined what may be considered the “Finnish” territories. Other predominantly Finnish-speaking territories were taken by Russia over the course of the eighteenth century, including Viborg, which was ceded by the Swedes to the Russian Empire through the Treaty of Nystad (Uusikaupunki) in 1721, and Kexholm (in Finnish, Käkisalmi; in Russian, Priozersk), ceded through the Treaty of Åbo in 1743. These areas retained a degree of autonomy from the Russian Crown, and when the Russians conquered the rest of the Finnish peninsula in 1809 and established the Autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland, this area was joined to the Grand Duchy. Officially known as “Viipuri Province” using the Finnish city name, Russia’s eighteenth-century Finnish conquests have also been referred to as Vanha Suomi, or Old Finland. This designation did not include Ingria, whose position as the focal point of Peter the Great’s Westernisation movement and location of his new capital ensured it never formed part of the Grand Duchy and was governed wholly by Russian authorities. Once again, more recent interpretations of Ingria as connected to Finland through the common experience of Russian subjugation must minimise other potential interpretations of history that stress the difference in legal status between Ingria as part of Russia and the Grand Duchy of Finland as an autonomous entity within the Russian Empire.

Legally speaking, Ingrian Finns were an ethnic minority population within Russian territory, and thus subject to Russian law and not the semi-autonomous legal system of the Grand Duchy. There were, however, opportunities for Ingrian Finns to retain their religious and linguistic ties to the Grand Duchy, as the Evangelical Church of St Mary was founded in St. Petersburg in 1745 as the city’s first Finnish-language church (see figure 7), with an attached lycée that provided Finnish-language education

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14 Silvo, “Karelia: Battlefield, Bridge, Myth”, p. 66
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
18 Ingrian Finns in nineteenth century St Petersburg were a somewhat disadvantaged, largely working-class city minority group, often working in domestic service and negatively stereotyped as drunks – they were even mentioned as such in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s 1866 novel Crime and Punishment: “Amalia Ivanovna was simply a drunken St Petersburg Finn, and had probably worked as a cook earlier, or even as something worse...Amalia Ivanovna’s father (if she had one) was probably some St Petersburg Finn who worked as a milkman.” See Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Crime and Punishment, translated by David McDuff, London: Penguin Books, 2003, p. 466.
up to the seventh grade (see figure 8).\textsuperscript{19} Although Finnish-language elementary schools were abolished by the Tsar in 1908, Finnish-language religious instruction continued in the Ingrian Finnish parishes, such that Ingrian Finnish self-identification as linguistically and religiously connected to the Grand Duchy was maintained up until the Russian Revolution and Finnish independence in 1917.\textsuperscript{20} These details may form an important aspect of interpretations of the history of Finland and Ingria that stress connections between Ingria and the Finnish Grand Duchy, and the potential for commonality in identity between nineteenth century Finns and Ingrians that transcends their political separation.


The separation of Ingria from the Grand Duchy of Finland is indeed significant for the potential classification of Ingria as lost Finnish territory. Historian Matti Klinge has argued that defining pre-1809 Finland as a concrete geopolitical entity is in fact problematic.\textsuperscript{21} The development of Finnish nationalism in the nineteenth century was preceded by the construction of the Grand Duchy of Finland, albeit one that was heterogeneous both in language (with a substantial Swedish-speaking population) and religion (with an Orthodox community found largely in Karelia).\textsuperscript{22} Whereas Ingrians may have shared a common language and religion with the majority population in the Grand Duchy, the separation of Ingria from this territory nevertheless effectively ensured that Ingrian Finns existed outside this early legal conception of Finland and the Finnish citizenry, if “Finland” at this point is viewed as a national community based on principles of \textit{jus soli}. Encompassing Ingrian Finns into a “Finnish” identity would require looking past \textit{jus soli} definitions of national communities, and discounting Ingria’s isolation from Finland’s historic conceptions as a national entity.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. p. 70.
“Finland” as a concept would also need to be redefined as less a geographically or politically defined area, and more a community of ethnic descent, tracing roots back to a more vaguely defined region, with greater emphasis placed on shared historical origins and memories.

From the creation of Finland as a political entity in the nineteenth century through to independence in the early twentieth century, the Ingrian Finns have not been included within the geographical boundaries of the early Finnish nation state. However, there are examples of experiences in the independent Finnish nation state for Ingrian Finns, and notable examples of Ingrians entering Finnish political discourse before 1990. Pirkko Malinen calls the arrival of Ingrian Finns in Finland in the early 1990s the “third wave of Ingrian-Finnish migration to Finland”,23 the first wave being those who arrived in the years of civil war following the Russian Revolution, when Ingrian Finns lost much of their cultural and linguistic autonomy in the new Soviet Union, and the second wave being Ingrian Finns evacuated during the Siege of Leningrad in the Second World War.24 The periods of these two earlier waves of Ingrian migration to Finland have been characterised in Finnish political discursive constructions of Finnish identity as instances of Finnishness transcending the new and still malleable border between Finland and the Soviet Union. For instance, the Finnish state’s interaction with Ingrians during the Russian Civil War period, from 1917 to 1922, was informed by a larger movement of Finnish expeditions into Russian/Soviet territories with significant Finnish-speaking minorities, or indeed minorities speaking related Finno-Ugric languages. This period of interventionism from the Finnish side has been called the Heimosodat, or “kinship wars”, which included the Viena expeditions (Vienan retket) to East Karelia in 1918,25 the Petsamo expeditions (Petsamon retket) to what is now Pechenga, in the Pechengsky District on the White Sea in 1918-1920,26 the Estonian War of Independence in 1919,27 the Ingrian

24 Ibid.
26 Ibid. p. 68.
27 Ibid. p. 148.
struggles (Inkerin taistelut) of 1919-1920, and the Karelian uprising (Karjalan kansannousu) of 1921-1922. The historian Jussi Niinistö describes the Heimosodat as playing “an integral part in shaping the geographical development of newly independent Finland”. Niinistö may be considered to offer a particularly nationalist political interpretation of the Heimosodat and the links to territory and identity in the construction of the Finnish nation state they represent, as since 2011 he has been a member of parliament for the populist Perussuomalaiset (True Finns, see appendix I for note on their English-language name), whose chairperson and presidential candidate in recent elections has openly advocated renegotiating the Russo-Finnish border. However, this interpretation has broader significance, particularly for Ingrian Finns themselves at this time, as Pekka Nevalainen’s history of interwar Ingria also notes the irredentist movement in Northern Ingria from 1919-1920, which established a breakaway state (known in Finnish as Kirjasalon tasavalta, the Kirjasalo Republic, named for the northern Ingrian village that served as its administrative centre) and petitioned Foreign Minister Carl Enckell to pursue the joining of Northern Ingria to Finland at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Enckell advised caution, preferring to advocate Ingrian cultural autonomy without changes to existing borders, and though the issue was raised in Paris, it was not pursued further. However, Nevalainen argues that the Ingrian irredentist movement captured the imagination of Finnish nationalists in the young Finnish Republic, spurring Finnish volunteer brigades like the so-called Pohjois-Inkerin vapaajoukot (North Ingrian Free Corps, the volunteer Finnish paramilitary in Ingria), which in 1919 entered Ingria from the north. Other volunteer units that had fought in the Estonian War of Independence also marched into Ingria from Yamburg, and by sea from the mouth of the River.

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28 Ibid. p. 184.  
29 Ibid. p. 214.  
30 Ibid. p. 10.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Niinistö, Heimosotien historia, p. 185.  
35 Ibid.
Ingria in the midst of the Russian Civil War they came, under the pretext of “rescuing Ingria from the yoke of Bolshevism”.  

Anssi Paasi argues that much of the public and government discourse after the Finnish Civil War expressing anti-Bolshevism was related to sentiments of Russophobia, effectively equating Bolshevism specifically with Russians and seeing it as destructive to Finnish values and culture. Paasi describes the Soviet Union’s depiction in the Finnish public consciousness of the 1920s as “the eternal hereditary enemy of Finland, and as a Bolshevist bastion that posed a threat to Western civilisation and Christianity”. Indeed, there is historical evidence that supporters of the Ingrian irredentist movement considered the notions of “Bolshevik” and “Finnish” as antonymous. This view of Bolshevism sees it as an ethno-cultural homogenising force emanating from the East and attacking the particularly religious foundations that underscore Finns’ belonging to Western European civilisation. In response, Finland should protect its perceived ethnic kinfolk in Ingria from loss of cultural identity and autonomy. Amongst the most prominent leaders of the Pohjois-Inkerin vapaajoukot was Georg “Yrjö” Elfvengren, who later served as chairman of the Kirjasalo Republic’s governing committee. He wrote in July 1919 expressing frustration at the Finnish government’s lack of explicit assistance to the Ingrian irredentist movement:

If Finland tells us to hand over the Ingrian villages back to the Bolsheviks, and prohibits people from helping the rescue effort, then as a Finn I am willing to comply with these wishes, but as a Finnish citizen I can’t understand them. I delay the time so precious to the fate of Ingria, waiting for what Finland will say to her ethnic kinfolk.

Allowing the Ingrians to be governed by a Bolshevik government is presented by Elfvengren as an incomprehensible betrayal of fellow Finnish “kinfolk”. In his depiction of Ingria’s situation, Finland owes a responsibility to Ingrians, linked
through this relationship of heimo (tribe or ethnic kin), to rescue them from their fate under the Soviets. The heimo relationship constructed in this discourse may not have been explicitly supported at the time by the Finnish government, given Enckell’s cautious approach in Paris, but allows for a presentation of Ingrian and Finnish sameness that looks past potential differences, particularly in home territory and citizenship status. Later political discussions on Ingrian Finns in the Finnish political discussions of the 1990s and 2000s that stressed historical connection between Ingrians and Finnishness similarly emphasise periods of trans-border connection and cooperation, and relative resistance to elements like Bolshevism that may undermine Ingrians’ Finnishness. The Heimosodat period mirrors the Ingrian Right to Return period 70 years later by showing the presence in Finnish politics of assumptions that Ingrian Finns belong in the Finnish national community, although the Heimosodat activists see Ingrian inclusion in the Finnish nation state as extending to Ingrian territory as well as population.

Constructing Bolshevism as a threat to Finnishness was particularly pertinent in the contentious post-Civil War political climate in Finland, and it is significant to note that Elfengren’s statement, for instance, comes in a period of significant animosity between the victorious conservative Whites and the socialist Reds. David Arter argues that the significance the Bolsheviks played in assisting the Reds’ unsuccessful 1918 revolution in Finland, though in his view overstated, became a core narrative of the Whites’ historiography. The Whites’ construction of Bolshevism and the threat from the USSR would have departed substantially from how the Soviet Union was constructed in Red narratives, as this was also a period of substantial migration of socialist Finns, including those from the politically active émigré communities in North America, to the Karelian Soviet Socialist Republic, headed in Petrozavodsk by Finnish socialist Edvard Gylling, who had been active in the revolutionary Red government in Finland, and where Finnish was officially recognised as a state

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language. Alexey Golubev and Irina Takala have characterised the migration of Finnish socialists to Soviet Karelia as “the search for a socialist El Dorado”, suggesting representations of the Bolsheviks, the USSR, Russians and socialism that were not necessarily antithetical or a threat to Finnishness. Recalling Brubaker’s description of Soviet identity as explicitly supranational, the “new historical community” of the proletariat to replace exclusive nationalist communities, Finnish socialists with their mother tongue officially recognised in Petrozavodsk may therefore have constructed different narratives of identity relating to the USSR and communism in the early years of the Karelian Soviet Republic.

However, Golubev and Takala also note the effects of Stalin’s “Finnish Operation” of 1937-1938, in which Red Finns like Gylling and Kustaa Rovio were purged from the Petrozavodsk government and Finns in Soviet Karelia were accused of being “national deviationists”, “border hoppers” and “enemy agents” of the bourgeois Finnish government, leading to mass arrests and executions. They also note the lingering effects of the Finnish Operation on surviving Finns in the USSR, who frequently changed their names and avoided speaking Finnish to mask their origins and avoid further persecution. Stalinist era persecutions before, during and after the Second World War are a key narrative in the discursive construction of Finnish identity in relation to Russia, and its effects on the Finnish left are also significant. Tuomas Tepora writes that “[i]t is indisputable that the Soviet aggression in 1939 strengthened the bonds between social classes and political parties” in Finland, and Tiina Kinnunen further argues that the dominant White or rightist discourse of the Civil War as a “war of liberation” has undergone a degree of critical re-examination in post-Cold War Finland, informed by narratives of the Second World War that

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43 Ibid. p. xii.
44 Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, p. 28.
46 Ibid. pp. 142-7.
include Red participation in the war effort. Tepora and Aapo Roselius note that this is the view promoted in Väinö Linna’s fiction trilogy Täällä Pohjantähden alla (in English, Under the North Star), which prompted significant re-evaluation of Reds and their wartime loyalty to Finland when it was initially published in 1959-1962. Positive views of the USSR from Finnish socialists in the immediate post-Civil War period may thus contrast with constructions of the USSR/Russia amongst the post-war Finnish left. Yet in the Heimosodat period and the wake of the Finnish Civil War, Ingrians could carry particular significance in conservative Whites’ narratives of the Bolshevik threat that also reflect deep internal Finnish divisions between left and right.

The Ingrian struggles of 1919-1920 (and the Kirjasalo Republic) were ended by the 1920 Peace Agreement of Dorpat (Tartu). This agreement included the Declaration of the Russian Delegation Concerning the Position of the Population of Russian Ingria, which appeared to address the concerns of those like Enckell who focused on cultural autonomy over changing borders, as it proclaimed the Soviet Union’s guarantee

> that the Finnish population of the Government of Petrograd [now Leningrad Oblast] is granted full enjoyment of all the same rights and advantages that Russian law gives national minorities...[including to] make free use of the language of the local population for public education and teaching and for other internal affairs.

However, this agreement did not completely dispel the idea of Ingrians (and Ingria) as a part of the Finnish national community from Finnish political discourse. Paasi argues that the 1920s also saw the beginning of a flourishing of “kinship organisations”, which he describes as “strong social-pressure groups in Finnish society”. These organisations advocated for the notion of “Greater Finland” (Suur-Suomi). The concept was usually focused on Eastern Karelia, for which there were

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51 Paasi, “The Rise and Fall of Finnish Geopolitics”, p. 56.
several early pressure groups, including the Academic Karelia Society, the East-Karelian Committee of the Karelian National Union and the League of Finnicists.\textsuperscript{52} Paasi writes that by the 1930s, these organisations began to expand the concept of “Greater Finland” to a highly complex geographical entity shaped by an “imagined territory” of kindred Finns – including usually Karelia, Ingria, the Kola Peninsula, and occasionally also Estonia, the Western coast of the Gulf of Bothnia and Finnmark.\textsuperscript{53} Tenho Pimiä argues that the Greater Finland concept was specifically linked to pursuit of a larger nation state, a “utopian” vision of a united nation state “sharing a common cultural heritage and language”.\textsuperscript{54} The focus on Eastern Karelia was the most feasible avenue for an expanded Finno-Ugric nation state in the 1920s and 1930s, with an eastern border drawn from Lake Ladoga to the White Sea.\textsuperscript{55} However, Pimiä also notes that proponents of Greater Finland appeared to ignore mainstream Finnish perceptions of Eastern Karelia as “alien and Russian”, particularly due to their adherence to the Orthodox, rather than Lutheran, church.\textsuperscript{56}

Despite this, academic discourses on ethno-cultural identity linked specifically to nation states and political borders in the 1920s and 1930s fits into the broader environment of ethno-cultural interest at this time, particularly in the wake of the collapse of the Habsburg and Romanov empires and creation of new, more monocultural nation states. Indeed, there were interesting parallel developments at this time in Hungary, which in the 1930s experienced a similar surge in scholarly interest in Finno-Ugric ethnography and identity. This prompted Hungarian political interest in Finland, with its similar history as a Finno-Ugric nation under the political control of a European Great Power, as a model for post-independence social, economic and political development.\textsuperscript{57} The inter-war period thus also present cases in which Finnish political groups emphasised trans-border connections and common identity between Finns in Finland and groups in the USSR they perceived to be Finnish or closely

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. pp. 399-400.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. 400.
related, continuing somewhat the ideology of the Heimosodat. As Paasi writes, “[t]he basic idea of traditional geopolitical thinking has always been to emphasise the unity of the ‘state’ and ‘man’”, and this ideology informed these inter-war organisations based on a conceptualisation of people linked to a geographical region, its borders set not artificially by politics but by the natural boundaries that separated peoples pre-historically.

To some extent, the Greater Finland discourse mirrors concurrent developments in Nazi Germany, as Pimiä sees similar arguments for uniting ethnic kin as a political tool for states aspiring to expand their territories. Indeed, Pimiä notes links in the study of Eastern Karelia by Greater Finland proponents to those of Nazi ethnographers: Yrjö von Grönhagen, for instance, was active in Eastern Karelian research during the Second World War and had worked for the Ahnenerbe Institute for Ancient Studies led by Heinrich Himmler, wherein ethnographic research was specifically created and employed to justify territorial expansion and annexations. Hana Worthen notes the Finnish state-commissioned work Finlands Lebensraum: das geographische und geschichtliche Finnland from prominent mid twentieth-century academics Väinö Auer, Eino Jutikkala and Kustaa Vilkuna, was a particularly notable example of state-sponsored research designed to justify Finnish expansion into both Karelia and Ingria, supported by Nazi German academics and institutions. The concept of Greater Finland came to the fore in Finnish policy during 1941-1944, when Finnish armed forces occupied parts of Eastern Karelia, and the government began an education program for local Karelian and Finnish-speaking inhabitants, describing them as citizens of the forthcoming Greater Finland state, whilst local Russian-speakers and other “non-national civilians” were interned in concentration camps.

Finnish political thought during the Second World War thus also shows significant

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58 Paasi, “The Rise and Fall of Finnish Geopolitics”, p. 56.
60 Pimiä, “Greater Finland and Cultural Heritage”, p. 400.
61 Ibid. p. 429.
elements of national identity construction defined along ethnic lines, extending beyond the borders established by the 1920 Dorpat Treaty to include perceived ethnic kinfolk in the USSR, of which Ingrians were nominally part. In this sense, constructions of Finnish identity linking Finnish citizenship to Finnish (or Finno-Ugric) ethno-cultural identity can be traced further back into the twentieth century than the 1990s Right to Return discussion. Recent studies of the Finnish inter-war period and Greater Finland concept have been largely critical of this movement, seeing it as specifically linked to the racism and ethnic discrimination associated with ethno-culturally essentialist nation state constructions in diverse regions, including, at its most overt and disastrous, Nazism and the Holocaust. Yet, as evidence presented in the following chapters of this thesis indicates, such criticism of this period does not appear to have hindered development of new policy linking citizenship to ethno-cultural identity later in the twentieth century. Interpretations of history that suppress the negative connotations of ethnic nationalism in the interwar period, particularly this link to Nazi ideology, also enter into the discussion on the Ingrian Return law in the 2000s (see chapter five), when this omission or glossing-over of links to Nazism actually provokes some controversy and contestation.

In the history of the connection between Ingrian Finns and the Finnish nation state, the period of the Second World War has enormous significance, particularly the Ingrian experience of the War as refugees fleeing Leningrad for the safety of Finland. This presents the next stage in the history of Finland’s relationship with Ingrians, characterised by the second wave of Ingrian migration to Finland. Finnish politicians’ narratives of this period form a further example of promoting representations of Ingrians’ connection to Finnish identity. From 1941, Leningrad and its surrounds were the focus of a lengthy and extremely destructive military campaign, in which Nazi troops encircled the city, in what would become known as the 900-day Siege of Leningrad (lasting until 1944). As early as 1941, at the very start of the Siege, the Nazi government in Berlin entered into talks with the Finnish government to evacuate Ingrian Finns from the battle zone, although evacuations did not take place until

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By November 1944, some 63,211 Ingrian Finns had arrived in Finland and settled temporarily, largely in the south. However, their time in Finland was for the most part brief, as all but about 8,000 returned to the Soviet Union in 1944. The September 1944 armistice between the USSR and Finland effectively only demanded the return of those Ingrian Finnish men who had fought alongside German forces (of which there were less than 800), with the rest being supposedly free-willed returnees, though Ian M. Matley argues that it is probable Ingrian Finns feared forced repatriation if they did not return voluntarily. Once back in the USSR, Stalin moved the majority of Ingrian Finns from St Petersburg to the eastern Karelian Republic, central Russia (particularly the Ural Mountain regions) and even Siberia, under the notion that minorities with kin-state relationships to their neighbours, and thus questionable loyalty to the Soviet Union and irredentist potential, posed a security threat in border regions.

When President Mauno Koivisto gave his 1990 television interview and confirmed his commitment to bring the Ingrian Finns into Finland, strong undercurrents of historical atonement featured in his reasoning, noting in particular that the Ingrian Finns were the only people in the world persecuted for their ethnic Finnish identity. This element of atonement, or “righting the wrongs of the past”, appears a feature of right to return policies, as discussed in chapter one. However, a separating factor for Ingrian Finns from the target groups of other right to return policies is that in 1990, they are not in the full sense being invited back to the homeland they were forced to leave. The concept of atonement for Second World War persecution in right to return laws, discussed at greater length in chapters four and five of this thesis, is rather murky in the Finnish example, as the persecution of Ingrians was not carried out by Finnish forces, nor did the deportation of Ingrians from Finland deprive Ingrians of their homeland, when (and if) the homeland of Ingrians is seen as Ingria, rather than

66 Ibid.
67 Ibid. p. 12.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid. p. 9.
Finland. And yet, as previously noted, when the Finnish and German armies reached the outskirts of Leningrad (St Petersburg) and began the infamous 900-day siege, there were approximately 63,000 Ingrian Finns from the surrounding Leningrad Oblast who left for Finland as refugees, and 55,000 who supposedly voluntarily returned at the end of the War to the Soviet Union.  

Recent investigations by the Finnish National Archive suggest the Soviet Union and Allies may have exerted pressure on the Finnish government to forcibly repatriate them. In the Soviet Union, the many Ingrian Finns who were deported from Ingria to distant provinces were effectively punished for their perceived Finnishness. Those who had joined or cooperated with the Finnish army faced forced labour sentences, or more rarely, execution. Thus, though the Soviet Union under Stalin may be constructed as the primary antagonist to Finland and the Ingrians as Finns, Finland’s acquiescence to the USSR complicates its own presentation as the Ingrians’ historical protector. This suggests a more complex historical aspect to the Ingrian Return law: if Ingrians are being invited to Finland to atone for Finland’s inability to protect this perceived ethnic kin from persecution in the Second World War, this construction of Ingrian identity still presents Finns and Ingrians as a common people, with their political expression, the state of Finland, imbued with the responsibility of providing them the security of the national community.

There is not only an unresolved aspect of complicity from the Finnish government in the fate of the Ingrian Finns in the USSR, but also a construction of Finns as victims in the Second World War despite their status, confirmed in the 1947 Moscow Peace Treaty, as Nazi co-belligerents. The dominant Finnish political and public interpretations of the Second World War leave considerable room for portrayals of Finns as victims. As Henrik Meinander notes, the dominant post-war discourse on the

71 Ibid.
Winter and Continuation Wars has constructed them as necessary struggles to retain Finnish independence from the Soviet Union, and separate conflicts to the war with Nazi Germany.\textsuperscript{75} Finnish Presidents Mauno Koivisto, Martti Ahtisaari and Tarja Halonen have all given statements indicating this interpretation of history, Halonen most directly in a 2005 speech in which she employed the term “separate war against the Soviets”.\textsuperscript{76} Historian Matti Klinge similarly argues that at the public level, “the concept of a ‘Second Word War’ does not really exist: we were fighting our own war and had no part in a world war”.\textsuperscript{77} The Winter and Continuation Wars Klinge calls a \textit{bellum justum} in the Finnish self-image, in which Finns fought \textit{for} Finland rather than \textit{against} anyone.\textsuperscript{78} The discussion of Ingrians as Finns and as victims of wartime suffering in the Soviet Union conforms to discursive presentations of the Winter and Continuation Wars as Soviet-driven conflicts wherein Finland is a relatively innocent party. The dominant Finnish political discourse on the Second World War effectively ignores any interpretations of wartime history that may present Finns as aggressors, and Ingrians as deprived of their homes in Ingria by Finnish forces as a result of the Finnish invasion of Ingria during the Siege of Leningrad. In essence, the dominant Finnish construction of the Second World War period stresses both Ingrians connection to Finland, entitling them to the protection of the Finnish state in the face of persecution from Russians within the Soviet Union, and the threat Russians may pose to (Ingrian) Finns based on their Finnishness, which intrinsically separates them from the Soviet or Russian state.

Given the experience of these 55,000 Ingrians in Finland before their deportation to the USSR, the Second World War period attains an obvious significance to the history of Ingrian relations with Finland, and this is reflected in the 1990s “third wave” of Ingrian migration to Finland. Pirkko Malinen suggests that a reconnection to their Finnish “roots” may have been an important motivating factor in the immigration decision of some older Ingrian Finns, particularly those who have memories or established ties from being in Finland during the Winter and Continuation Wars.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid. 64-5.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid. pp. 65-6.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid. p. 121.
\textsuperscript{79} Malinen, “The Ingrian-Finnish Remigrants”, p. 196.
These older Ingrians had also expressed some concern that they were losing their language, and so had come to rely on Finnish radio broadcasts for language exposure, thus maintaining cultural and linguistic contact with Finland. Yet it is significant to note that the majority of Ingrian Finns moving to Finland (some 60%) were younger, and of working age. For almost all of these younger returnees, moving to Finland did not translate to finding employment, but Malinen notes the poor social security and low wages in the new Russia compared to Finland as a motivating factor for drawing these younger Ingrian Finns across the border, even if they would face chronic unemployment upon arrival. Though the experience of Ingrians during the Winter and Continuation Wars can be seen as a significant factor in the Ingrian migration to Finland, its importance should therefore not be taken as absolute. Interpretations of Ingrian connection to Finland that stress the experience of the Second World War, as argued in chapters four and five of this thesis, also have enormous significance for the justification of the Right to Return policy amongst Finnish politicians, even at the end of the policy in 2010. These interpretations also ignore, at least initially, alternative interpretations of the Right to Return which see it as driven by more practical considerations (labour shortages in 1990, humanitarianism). Ingrians’ connection to Finland has also involved financial considerations, and a chance to improve living standards, along with potential rediscovery of Second World War-era ties.

The movements of borders and of people between Finland and Russia/the USSR in the twentieth century, as indeed in the early modern era, serves to underscore the potential for interpretations of history that stress a national community and citizenship defined by common language, culture and ethnicity, where territorial limitations appear malleable or even perfunctory. Finnish political interpretations of history have frequently stressed commonality and shared historic experiences between Finns in Finland and groups in Russia and the USSR. The dominant interpretation of victimhood in the “separate struggle” of the Winter and Continuation Wars can

80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid. In this area, Ingrians shared the same experience with other immigrants arriving to Finland after 1990, who generally were most severely affected by the rise in unemployment, and were more likely to end up dependent on welfare assistance. See also Pirko Pikänen and Satu Kouki, “Meeting Foreign Cultures: A Survey of the Attitudes of Finnish Authorities Towards Immigrants and Immigration”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2002, p. 110.
reinforce these constructions, viewing Finnish identity as proven or strengthened by wartime suffering. At the same time, these interpretations of history may ignore or suppress events and details that promote varying or opposing historical narratives, and alternate interpretations of Finnish identity.

B) Finland and the Changing Political Climate of the 1980s and 1990s

The late 1980s and early 1990s were a period of profound geopolitical transformation for Europe, which also created a new foreign policy and security environment for Finland. Beginning in 1987 with the “Singing Revolution” independence movements in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, the formerly closed northwestern regions of the USSR, including Ingria and Karelia, could re-emerge in the Finnish political consciousness as the veil of the Iron Curtain was lifted by glasnost-perestroika and the following breakup of the USSR. However, the new Russian government could also pose problems similar to the Soviet Union for Ingrians. Perhaps most significant is the perception that the Ingrian minority in Russia, as in the Soviet Union, was under threat from a dominant majority culture. It has been argued that the perception of being part of an ethnic group with cultural traditions under threat has exercised a potentially definitive role in how and why nationalist movements emerge. Anthony D. Smith argues for an “ethnic election myth”, which he defines as the belief amongst an ethnie “that they possess what Max Weber calls ‘irreplaceable cultural values’, and that their heritage must be preserved against inner corruption and external control”. 83 Here, the belief would be that Russians posed a threat to the Finns of Ingria, as had the Soviets and indeed Tsarist Russia to Finns in Finland for two centuries, which was exacerbated as the multi-national Soviet Union was replaced by a more clearly Russian-dominated Russian Federation.

The central issue in Finnish/Russian relations is what Helena Rytövuori-Apunen calls Finland’s “old problem”: how Finland can present itself as a “normal European state” while existing next to a country that presents itself as a great power, without being

83 Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 128.
subjected to the political control of its larger neighbour.\textsuperscript{84} The memory of the Winter and Continuation Wars looms large over subsequent Finnish relations with the Soviet Union and Russia. For most of its post-war history, Finland pursued a policy of “active neutrality” with the USSR, in which its Cold War neutrality was guaranteed by agreement with the Soviet government. “Active neutrality” was the product of Presidents Juho Kusti Paasikivi (in office 1949-1956) and the long-serving Urho Kekkonen (in office 1956-1982) that became known as the “Paasikivi-Kekkonen line”.\textsuperscript{85} It has its foundations in the 1948 Finno-Soviet Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), wherein Finland pledged its neutrality and agreed to resist any armed aggression against the Soviet Union through Finnish territory.\textsuperscript{86} Heikki Luostarinen defines the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line as characterised by three features: an emphasis on periods of cultural and economic cooperation in Finnish-Russian relations rather than the periods of conflict, the benefits of economic security promised by peace with the USSR, and the new foreign policy role of Finland as arbiter of cooperation between the East and West spheres.\textsuperscript{87} David Kirby writes that this agreement attained “quasi-canonical status in Finnish political life; all the major political parties subscribed to its maintenance, and few queried its usefulness or validity until the mid 1980s”.\textsuperscript{88} However, particularly in reference to emphasising Finno-Soviet cooperation over conflict, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line subdued discussions of the Winter and Continuation Wars that criticised or ridiculed the USSR. One such example involves the USSR’s planned taking of Helsinki in the Winter War – so confident was the Leningrad Communist Party Secretary Andrei Zhdanov that Helsinki would fall, that he commissioned a suite of Finnish folk themes from Dmitri Shostakovich to be played by the marching bands of the Red Army after the city fell.\textsuperscript{89} After the War, this misguided confidence could potentially have afforded Finns an opportunity to ridicule the USSR’s cockiness. After all, Soviet authorities in Leningrad had themselves mocked Hitler’s overly-confident assertion

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid. p. 374.
\textsuperscript{88} Kirby, “The Baltic World”, p. 374.
that their city would fall by August 1942; Hitler had had invitations printed inviting dignitaries to a victory banquet at the Hotel Astoria on St Isaac’s Square, and now, a framed copy of one such invitation hangs on the hotel lobby’s wall.\textsuperscript{90} Yet in contrast to the Hotel Astoria example, there was no mocking or mirth to be had of this in Cold War Finland, as Shostakovich’s piece went unmentioned and unperformed in Finland until 2001.\textsuperscript{91}

Finland’s cultivated peaceful relations with the Soviet Union under Kekkonen could also afford Finland a certain international status, as a neutral state, to act as peace mediator between the USSR and NATO: Helsinki hosted the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the US and USSR in 1969, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975. Hans Löden argues that Finland’s neutrality was essentially a strategic or realist policy response to a potential threat to its territorial integrity from the USSR/Russia, which distinguishes it from Swedish neutrality, a more normative and identity-based phenomenon.\textsuperscript{92} Sweden’s neutrality, therefore, has been subjected to “domestic and international accusations of selfishness”, whilst Finland’s has been rationalised and less subjected to internal or external criticism.\textsuperscript{93} For Finland, it would appear neutrality was accepted domestically and internationally as a necessity, rather than a luxury.

Finland’s international standing as a neutral state thus afforded the opportunity to be active through its neutrality in the international security context, through a trust relationship with the USSR despite its status as a capitalist, multi-party democracy with links to the West. Writing in 1972, during the period of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line and active neutrality, Finnish political scientist Harto Hakovirta describes Finland’s relationship with the USSR under Kekkonen:

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
For the Soviet Union, the credibility of Finnish neutrality means first of all that the Soviet leaders trust Finland as a treaty partner...One reason for the Soviet Union to trust Finland as a friendly treaty partner is the fact that Finland has very strong incentives for behaving in a trustworthy fashion.\footnote{Harto Hakovirta, \textit{Soviet Images of Finnish Neutrality as Factors Influencing Foreign Policy Decision Making in Finland – Research Report 24}, Tampere: Institute of Political Science, 1972, pp. 15-6.}

Soviet political faith in Finland in the 1960s and 1970s allowed Finland to broker a major security agreement between the West and USSR in this period, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Kekkonen and his ambassador to the UN, Max Jakobson, developed the idea of an international security conference in Helsinki at a 1968 meeting at the presidential residence in Tamminiemi, responding to meetings with the Soviet ambassador Aleksej Kovalev conveying the Soviet Union’s expressed desire for the Western nations to recognise East German statehood.\footnote{Thomas Fischer, “‘A Mustard Seed Grew into a Bushy Tree’: The CSCE Initiative of 5 May 1969”, \textit{Cold War History}, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2009, pp. 183-5.} Foreign Ministry official Risto Hyvärinen, then head of the department for political affairs, described the summit:

\begin{quote}
The eventual balanced exploration of the conference would fit very well into the image of our neutrality. Helsinki would also be very suitable as a venue e.g. because of our German policy. Starting to promote the conference would also support our German policy because it would show concretely the use of our neutral approach to both German states and how exactly our German policy makes our country useful for such potentially important tasks for peace in Europe.\footnote{Cited in ibid. p. 185.}
\end{quote}

Helsinki’s role on the world stage was thus burnished by its standing with the USSR, achieved through the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, which gave its neutrality an “active” dimension in international security. But this neutrality was also “active” in the sense that it required constant effort to maintain, particularly in the form of self-censorship and willingness to collaborate with Soviet intrigues.\footnote{Kirby \textit{The Baltic World}, p. 426.} Kirby’s assessment of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line is that it created a sense of confidence in the viability of the independent Finnish state, but “a confidence [that] rested upon insecure foundations”,\footnote{Ibid.} suggesting a placation but not total eradication of fears of a Soviet threat.

The notion of Finnish foreign policy in the Cold War period as reflective of Finnish independence’s “insecure foundations” beside a slumbering giant appears to have continued to some extent beyond the decline and final collapse of Soviet power in the 1980s and early 90s. The evidence suggests Finland continued to proceed with caution when engaging with the newly independent Russian Federation in the early 1990s. Right up to the final dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kekkonen’s successor Koivisto continued to act prudently, as unlike the Scandinavian nations, Finland’s official stance on the Baltic independence movements remained “seemingly passive and non-committal”, and Koivisto instructed Prime Minister Harri Holkeri and Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio to abstain from any commitments to the Baltic independence cause being discussed at the Nordic Council.99 Indeed, Koivisto would later define his approach to foreign policy thus:

From our perspective, it is of paramount importance how our neighbour relations develop. When I was asked in 1981 what three words would define our foreign policy line, I answered: good neighbour relations.100

The fact that Koivisto calls Russia “generally, a good neighbour”,101 mentioning also that “many countries have much more difficult neighbours”,102 suggests his apparent willingness to follow the Paasikivi-Kekkonen tradition of working with Finland’s larger neighbour. However, in the broader Finnish political landscape the collapse of the Soviet Union and the temporary weakening of Russian political influence removed the “straightjacket of neutrality”, and allowed in Finland a certain re-evaluation of Finnish policy towards the Soviet Union, which Christopher S. Browning argues was marked by narratives of a “Faustian Pact” with the Soviets that betrayed Finland’s true “Western” self.103 At this time, a previously common political term, “Finlandisation”, gained renewed political saliency, used now in Finland to deride previous Finnish policies towards the USSR, and particularly the Paasikivi-

99 Kirby, *A Concise History of Finland*, p. 278.
101 Ibid, p. 298.
102 Ibid.
Kekkonen line, as indicative of the larger phenomenon of powerful nations exerting influence over, and compliance from, their smaller neighbours.\textsuperscript{104}

Finlandisation as a political science concept has its origins in 1960s and 1970s West Germany, initially amongst political scientists and other academics. Use of the term goes back to Richard Löwenthal, a professor of political science at the Free University of Berlin in the 1960s. In December 1962, he wrote an opinion piece for the British magazine \textit{Encounter}, in which he called for the West German government to assert greater firmness in its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, particularly with regards to the consolidation of Western European unity, rather than allow the Soviets, whose air of invincibility had just been undermined by the Cuban Missile Crisis, to dictate West German policy themselves.\textsuperscript{105} Later, in 1966, he criticised such an approach to Soviet relations as “Finlandisation”, the first use of the term, specifically referencing Finland as an example where deference to the USSR compromised foreign and military policy independence.\textsuperscript{106} By the 1970s, in a pamphlet published by the Institute for Conflict Studies in London, the term had been defined as describing

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a country [that] undertakes to follow neutrality as a neighbour of a Great Power which represents a different social order and uses arrogant political methods. This means that the country's authority to decide its foreign policy is limited, but that its internal authority is almost complete.\textsuperscript{107}
\end{quote}

As pointed out by Ville Kivimäki, what makes this term significant, and specifically related to Finland rather than any of the Central European Warsaw Pact nations, is that here foreign policy independence is given away voluntarily by a democratic, Western-orientated nation.\textsuperscript{108} Indeed, segments of the Western European media took up this comparison between the Central European communist states and Finland, rechristening Finland “\textit{Kekkosslovakia}”, a portmanteau of President Kekkonen’s

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\textsuperscript{104} Ibid. p. 228.
\textsuperscript{105} Richard Löwenthal, \textit{“After Cuba, Berlin?”}, \textit{Encounter}, December 1962, pp. 48-54.
\end{flushright}
name and Czechoslovakia, whose true level of independence from the Soviet Union had been verified in 1968 by the Prague Spring. “Finlandisation” as a negative assessment of wilfully dovish or rapprochement policy towards the Soviet Union became a popular political insult employed by West German conservative politicians, and is most often associated with Franz Josef Strauss, the Christian Social Union party chairman (1961-1988) in his criticism of Chancellor Willy Brandt’s *Ostpolitik*. The term would also find a measure of credence in the English-speaking world, used by the *Sunday Telegraph* in 1979 in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to criticise both British Labour MP Tony Benn and US Senator Edward Kennedy for perceived “intellectual and moral weakness” in the face of “the Kremlin’s plan for European ‘Finlandisation’”.

For Finland, however, Finlandisation has a particular history. Sami Moisio characterises initial Finnish political reactions to the term as an unfair mischaracterisation of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, failing to take into consideration

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111 Ibid.
the necessary political realism of post-war Finland’s situation. The Paasikivi-Kekkonen line continued in the 1960s as an important foreign policy ideology in Finland, and indeed also found cultural and artistic expression at this time. In 1968, the Finnish government erected a statue by sculptor Essi Renvall on the banks of Helsinki South Harbour, dedicated to peace between Finland and the Soviet Union (see figure 9). Yet when in 1974 a Centre Party politician and war veteran, Eino Uusitalo, suggested that the Finnish Independence Day (6 December, commemorating the 1917 declaration of independence) should be celebrated on a new date commemorating the peace agreement between Finland and the USSR at the end of the Second World War, an angry public response ensued. Though Kivimäki notes that many politicians in Finland in the 1960s and 1970s were war veterans, who had taken from the frontline the central lesson that peaceful relations with the USSR was essential for Finland, he also argues that outside the realms of politics, Finnish veterans had experienced the 1960s and 70s, the highpoint of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, as “a humiliation of their wartime efforts”. The response to Uusitalo showed “Finlandisation had its limits, too”.

By the 1990s, Finnish political attitudes towards the term had become far less benign. According to Browning, the term was lobbed around the Finnish political landscape in the early 1990s as a ways of dismissing those with less stringent views against Russia, giving rise to a new term of “post-Finlandisation”, described as “the current Finnish tendency, in which Russia and everything Russian is presented in an utmost negative light”. To some Finnish politicians of the 1990s, Finlandisation had been “a very real and malignant Finnish illness” from the Cold War. Finnish historian Timo Vihavainen described Finlandisation in 1991 as an amoral Finnish political stance, whereby Finland sold its soul and betrayed its Western, democratic identity. In part, this changing attitude towards the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line and the accompanying

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112 Moisio, “Finlandisation versus Westernisation”, p. 83.
113 Kivimäki, “Between Defeat and Victory”, p. 489
114 Ibid. p. 491.
115 Ibid. p. 490.
116 Ibid. p. 489.
117 Browning, Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis, pp. 228-9.
increased use of the Finlandisation term as a negative appraisal of Finnish Cold War foreign policy may reflect changes in the late 1980s and 1990s to the Finnish political landscape. Nicholas Aylott, Magnus Blomgren and Torbjörn Bergman note that in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, successive Finnish governments were comprised of coalitions dominated by either Kekkonen’s agrarian Centre Party, the Social Democrats, or both, to the exclusion of the centre-right National Coalition party.\textsuperscript{120} This was deliberate, as it was believed the National Coalition’s ideology made it potentially hostile to the Soviet Union, rendering it “untouchable” as a coalition partner.\textsuperscript{121} In the late 1980s, with the waning of Soviet interference in Finnish politics under glasnost-perestroika, such concerns were muted, and in 1987 a National Coalition-led government under Prime Minister Harri Holkeri returned the party to power for the first time since 1966.\textsuperscript{122} The increased room for criticism of the USSR, given its decline as an acute threat to Finland, could therefore have been exacerbated by the return to power of a party perceived to be anti-Soviet, which in turn would grant further opportunities for the kind of Soviet Union- and Russia-critical post-Finlandisation rhetoric in Finnish politics described by Browning.

Indeed, the transformations in the political landscape for Europe circa 1990 have also spurred reassessment of how European states in general approach national identity post-Iron Curtain. Richard Mole writes that at the beginning of the 1990s, European states experienced a shift in their international relations orientation. Now “freed from the constraint of the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union”, the nations of Europe were free to pursue national interests “as much in terms of identity and culture as in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity”.\textsuperscript{123} As Christopher Hill and William Wallace see it, in this context European nation states moved to develop such aspects of state behaviour as foreign policy based on “a shared sense of national identity” constructed upon “underlying assumptions...embedded in national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
them and external and internal developments reshape them”. Such constructions of national identity, at this point in Europe’s history, can therefore be considered as a response to the changing political and security circumstances, amongst other factors.

One sees this phenomenon in Finland. Its foreign policy formation as the Iron Curtain fell, for instance, transformed from the more realist traditions of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line to the more ideologically and culturally produced considerations described both by Mole and Hill/Wallace. Max Jakobson argued in 1980 that Finland’s foreign and security policy “is not based on historical or cultural ties and affinities or shared values, but on an unsentimental calculation of the national interest”. After the Cold War ended, and the necessity of negotiating between East and West as an Iron Curtain-bordered nation was removed, Finland’s political environment was substantially transformed. As described by Browning, Finnish foreign policy ideology began to manifest itself as an identity “normalisation”, presenting the Cold War as “a historical parenthesis” whose end meant Finland “has finally come home to the West and Europe”, particularly through accession to the EU in 1995. In 1994, then-Prime Minister Esko Aho declared “Finland has been part of Europe mentally and spiritually for at least the last eight hundred years”. Similarly, historian Tuomas M.S. Lehtonen wrote in 1999 that with entry into the EU, Finland “has taken its natural place as part of Western Europe to which it is bound by centuries of history”. This mirrors almost identical discourses of “returning” to the West and Europe presented by post-Soviet politicians in Estonia and Latvia, in which they presented the Soviet era as akin to a Babylonian captivity, which temporarily prevented the Baltic States from asserting their historic links to Western Europe.

126 Browning, Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 221.
127 Ibid. pp. 221-2.
EU membership (along with NATO membership) in 2004 was an opportunity to “re-join” the West.  

Indeed, a further example of Finland’s change from realism to identity-based foreign policy ideology can be seen in its policy towards the Baltics. The unsentimental and realist policy on Baltic independence under Koivisto from 1988 to 1991 had been to remain neutral, classify the Baltic independence movements as an internal Soviet issue, and refuse to condemn the Soviet Union for the quashed uprisings and killings in Vilnius and Riga in early 1991. Yet as Browning writes, with the Soviet dissolution later that year, “suddenly the Baltic States no longer seemed so far away”. The “normalisation” trend of correcting Finland’s “unnatural” neutral position between East and West by asserting its Western credentials also extended to the Baltics, particularly Estonia, whose “kinship” in related language and culture was stressed, and whose own EU membership application Finland prioritised. In 2000, the then head of the Finnish Foreign Ministry’s Eastern Affairs division, Ambassador René Nyberg, gave a speech on the Baltic Sea region in Greifswald in which he declared Baltic independence “represents a return to normality after the success of efforts to overcome the abnormal state of affairs wrongly considered ‘normal’ for so long”. The Baltic republics’ European identity was proven by “the reestablishment of ties built on the natural links to the opposite coast”, and on their EU membership applications, Nyberg stated “Northeastern Europe is where we can already discern the final external boundary of the EU”. This is reminiscent of rhetoric on Finland’s own EU accession in 1995. Under Koivisto’s successor, Martti Ahtisaari (in office 1994-2000), Finland prepared to join the EU and “re-join” the Western European family of nations. Moisio argues that the political rhetoric from President Ahtisaari echoed the first post-Second World War Finnish President, Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim (in office 1944-1946), and his assessment of the Winter War that Finland “showed for the rest of the world that it unavoidably belongs to the Western

132 Browning, Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 246.
133 Ibid. p. 247.
136 Ibid.
family of nations”. The post-Cold War landscape in Europe thus appeared to afford Finland the ability to construct its attitudes towards national identity based on perceived cultural identification, and was unequivocal in placing itself, along with the Baltic States, within a Western European construction. Such changes in the discursive construction of identity observed in policy from the 1990s and 2000s are particularly fascinating to observe in Finland, as a peripheral or “border state” between Eastern and Western European identity conglomerates, at a time when this border was being revised and reconsidered.

The opening up of Russian borders also brought back into view lands of historical and cultural significance to Finns, and indeed Rytövuori-Apunen argues that the early 1990s gave Finland the opportunity to view Russia as a “Russia of regions”, as opposed to a single closed entity, where now attention could be paid to the regions immediately bordering Finland. A notable instance of this is found in Vyborg and its surroundings in the Karelian territory annexed by the USSR after the Winter and Continuation Wars. Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Finns, particularly those who were born or had grown up in Vyborg, began to revisit the city and its sites of historic memories, especially its Finnish war graves. Petri J. Raivo argues that post-Soviet Vyborg has become an important spatial reference for Finnish collective memories of the Second World War. This builds on the idea of “lieux de mémoire”, or places/sites of memory, developed by historian Pierre Nora, who argues that physical locations can become infused with certain historical narratives, creating “a concentrated appeal to memory” for groups that identify with these narratives.

Whilst the post-Soviet “Russia of regions” has specific implications for Finnish development of national identity through historic and collective memory constructions, visible Finnish commemorations of the Winter and Continuation Wars in Vyborg depart from the Cold War-era policy inherent in Finlandisation of avoiding mention of Finno-Russian conflicts. This suggests there was a new Finnish political willingness to re-imagine and confront past conflicts with Russia in a way never

140 Ibid.
possible with the Soviet Union. Bearing in mind Smith’s concept of the “ethnic election myth” that includes imagining the ethnic community as in need of protection against a potential external foe, the possibility of Russia, with its troublesome historical relationship with Finland, appearing a threat to Finns could now be indicated, commemorated and confronted in fairly open ways.

The lifting of the Iron Curtain, still at its beginning by 1990, not only opened up contacts with Finno-Ugric peoples in the Soviet Union, but also made Finnish politicians aware of rising ethno-nationalist movements and tensions in Eastern Europe at this time. This was perhaps most notably expressed by the Finnish Foreign Minister, Pertti Paasio (a Social Democrat, in office 1989-1991), in a speech in Washington DC in November 1989, in which he stated:

The change under way in Europe affects domestic, as well as international, structures in the West and in the East. It appears to lead towards strengthened self-consciousness almost everywhere in the continent. Nationalities and nation states become more assertive in voicing their concerns. More room is left for differences and nuances which always have been the richness of Europe.\textsuperscript{142}

The reference to the new “assertiveness” of nationalities and nation states as Central and Eastern Europe was opening its borders with the West (the Berlin Wall would fall the next day) suggests a degree of concern regarding the possible rise of inter-ethnic conflict. Paasio addressed this point more specifically in a May 1990 speech on the history of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to the Tampere Paasikivi Society:

A permanent political CSCE body could also assume certain tasks relating to crisis management and endeavour to prevent states of tension. This is especially the case with regard to conflicts concerning human rights and ethnic minorities, the occurrence of which will probably be unavoidable even in the future.\textsuperscript{143}

Indeed, Paasio’s recommendations were satisfied in some respects with the establishing of a permanent CSCE body, the Organisation for Security and

\textsuperscript{142} Pertti Paasio, “Address by Mr Pertti Paasio, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, at the Dinner on the Occasion of the 70\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of Finnish-United States Diplomatic Relations, Washington DC, November 8, 1989”, in P. Paasio and M. Koivisto, \textit{Finland in the Changing Europe: Major Speeches by Dr Mauno Koivisto, President of Finland, and Mr Pertti Paasio, Minister for Foreign Affairs}, Helsinki: Ulkooslainministeriön Julkaisuja, 1990, p. 1.

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994. The OSCE’s activities, in its own words founded on the notion of “a forum for political negotiations and decision-making in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation”, 144 included the creation of a High Commissioner on National Minorities, tasked with monitoring and managing tensions surrounding ethnic minorities before open conflicts occur. 145

It is significant to note the degree to which these threats to national minorities were seen as emanating from the post-communist East, with their protection to be found only in the West. Many key Finnish political speeches from President Koivisto at this time follow similar constructions of Eastern European national identity to Kohn, presenting it as ethnically essentialist and prone to marginalise or victimise ethnic minorities, in contrast to the more inclusive West. Koivisto stated in 1988 that “the conflict between East and West has overshadowed the opposition between North and South”. 146 He was clear in presenting Finland as part of the West, as in an address to the University of Toulouse in 1983 he remarked on Finland’s legal and ideological heritage:

The old Swedish Empire was a nation focused on the sea, which had emerged in the Baltic Sea and of which the eastern half, occupied by Finns, formed a perfect part...It was not until the beginning of the 1800s that the great powers, France and Russia, during the Napoleonic Wars, agreed to a division of Sweden — against the will of the people...Our legal and social order, as well as our religious and national ideology, represent a continuity throughout the centuries, despite external factors threatening our existence many times. 147

This notion that Finland draws its national ideology and concepts of legal and social order from Western Europe, and that these characteristics only appeared more sacred in the wake of nineteenth century experiences in the Russian Empire, was again repeated by Koivisto in May 1990 in Strasbourg at the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, where he remarked:

146 Koivisto, Foreign Policy Standpoints, p. 93.
147 Ibid, pp. 30-4.
Having been an integral part of Sweden for more than 600 years, and thereafter a non-integrated part of Imperial Russia, Finland has cherished the Nordic traditions of liberty and human rights throughout her history.  

Koivisto muted somewhat his classification of Finland as firmly rooted in the Western European tradition in his November 1990 address to the CSCE Summit in Paris, still claiming that “[w]e are a Nordic country, proud of our Scandinavian heritage of values”, but also that Finland lay “at the crossroads of East and West…enriched by influences from both directions”. In the same speech, he expressed concern at the “period of trying reform” in the Soviet Union, and specifically addressed the issue of national minorities, stating that “national minorities are part of the diversity of Europe and contribute to its richness. Their identity must be protected and the human rights of their members honoured”. The issue of why national minorities should be threatened in the Soviet Union, but not in the Nordic space, was not specifically addressed by Koivisto, yet there emerges here a discourse on East-West division that promotes the West as comprised of homogenous, stable and democratic nation states with robust legal traditions, and the East as fractured, volatile and still developing. With its Swedish heritage of legal system and “traditions of liberty and human rights”, Finland is a Western European nation, without the same minority “problems” of the East.

However, Koivisto’s presentation of Finland as linked to a Kohn-like construction of a more inclusive Western Europe, less hostile to ethnic minorities, included some remarkable statements on Finnish stability. In essence, Koivisto concluded that the advanced, stable society of Finland in the 1980s and 1990s owed more to Finland’s lack of ethnic diversity than anything else. At Urho Kekkonen’s funeral in 1986, Koivisto claimed that Finland “has not suffered the divisive influence of the various racial, religious and language factors which are still helping to exacerbate conflicts in many countries today”. Similarly, his Toulouse speech of 1983 argued that “the Finnish society of today is strong. There are no agonising language, racial or other

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148 Mauno Koivisto, “Speech by the President of the Republic, Mauno Koivisto, at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on May 9, 1990”, in Kovisto and Paasio, Finland in the Changing Europe, p. 7.
151 Ibid. p. 62.
social antagonisms in our country”.\textsuperscript{152} Immigration patterns prior to 1990 appear to confirm to some extent this image of Finland’s relatively moderate diversity at this time, as shown in figure 10: the top ten nationalities for resident foreigners in Finland were overwhelmingly from Europe and North America, with Swedes clearly dominant. The number of Swedes in Finland in 1990 is almost equal to the combined number of resident foreigners from Asia, Africa and North and South America (6,169).\textsuperscript{153} The largest intake of non-European or US/Canadian immigrants pre-1990 occurred in the 1970s, when the government accepted a quota of 200 refugees from Chile and 100 from Vietnam.\textsuperscript{154} However, there are other aspects to the diversity of Finland, including national minorities. For instance, in 1990 there were also 1,734 native speakers of Sami languages living in Finland.\textsuperscript{155} Still, cultural diversity in Finland prior to 1990 appears statistically modest.

Koivisto’s discourse suggests that Ingrrian migration, given the apparent ethnic commonality between Finns and Ingrians, will not undermine Finland’s “stable” homogeneity, but will afford Ingrians escape from the problems of the ethnically heterogeneous, fractured East. To Koivisto, at least, Finland is not inclusive to

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\hline
\textbf{COUNTRY OF BIRTH} & \textbf{POPULATION} & \textbf{COUNTRY OF BIRTH} & \textbf{POPULATION} \\
\hline
Sweden & 6,051 & Poland & 582 \\
USSR & 4,181 & Norway & 530 \\
Germany & 1,568 & Denmark & 484 \\
United States & 1,475 & Italy & 395 \\
United Kingdom & 1,365 & Canada & 365 \\
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\caption{Table of Ten Most Common Foreign Nationalities in Finland, 1990}
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\textsuperscript{152} Ibid. pp. 34-5.
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\textsuperscript{154} Pitkänen and Kouki, “Meeting Foreign Cultures”, p. 105.
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diversity as much as it is immune from it. The Finnish government’s position on minority issues at the time was strong because a) its Nordic and Western legal heritage provided for concepts of human rights, and b) because Finland had no negative experience of national minorities itself, through a perceived lack of racial, linguistic or religious diversity, apparently ignoring the language conflicts and the background to the Åland Crisis in the 1910s and 1920s. This context lends itself to Finnish considerations of minority issues in the early 1990s focused on the threat Eastern (Soviet) powers to those Finno-Ugric peoples, including Ingrian Finns and Estonians, who by virtue of their common heritage within the Swedish Empire and their geographic, linguistic and cultural closeness to Finland could be embraced without posing a significant threat to Finland’s Western traditions and relative ethno-cultural homogeneity. Indeed, although Finland still acted with typical caution by acknowledging the Baltic States’ independence somewhat later than the other Nordic nations, by May 1991 Koivisto was already announcing Finland’s “special consideration” for Estonia, “this kin nation of ours”. 156 The political thought surrounding changing foreign policy realities and focus on national minority issues in Finland prior to 1990 thus reflects the notions of the preference for “stable” ethnic homogeneity, as well as legal and political traditions from the Swedish era as helping to shape Koivisto’s reactions to the impact of the collapse of the Iron Curtain. Within this context, Koivisto was to make his most concrete and lasting statement on Soviet Union national minorities issues when he addressed the issue of the Ingrian Finns in 1990.

To be considered parallel to the decline of the USSR is the other great political change in Europe of the early 1990s: the emergence of the European Union, established though the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which formalised the establishment of the EU as a common market, established the common currency and introduced preliminary elements of political union, common citizenship, and common foreign and home affairs policy. 157 The Soviet Union had maintained a decidedly negative response to Finnish participation in Western organisations, being reluctant to see

Finland join the Nordic Council in the 1950s, as, according to a memo from the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki:

closer military cooperation with Scandinavian countries would promote Finland's withdrawal from a line of neutrality friendly to us and would indicate its movement towards the pro-Western policy of the Scandinavian countries.\textsuperscript{158}

Similarly, the USSR successfully put pressure on Finland to withdraw from Nordek, the planned Nordic customs union, in 1970, leading to the eventual collapse of the Nordek project.\textsuperscript{159} Political discussions in Finland of EU membership up until the early 1990s viewed it as impossible due to the significance of neutrality and independence in Finnish foreign policy, which would be compromised by the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).\textsuperscript{160} Real interest in applying for membership effectively began in earnest after fellow-neutral Sweden’s October 1990 decision to seek membership.\textsuperscript{161} There were various economic considerations at play, particularly considering the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), a common-market agreement of which Finland had become a full member in 1986, which was now on the verge of being subsumed into the European Communities as the European Economic Area (EEA), and the decline of post-Soviet Russia as a market for Finnish exports. These made European integration seductive as a way to maintain market access and revive flagging exports.\textsuperscript{162}

With the Soviet Union gone, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which had governed Finno-Soviet relations for over 40 years, was subsequently annulled and replaced with a considerably more symbolic friendship treaty with Russia.\textsuperscript{163} When the Finnish government did initiate an application for EU membership in 1992, the surrounding political rhetoric emphasised continuity in Finland’s peaceful relationship with its eastern neighbour, and suggested that Finnish

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid. p. 24.
\textsuperscript{162} Browning, Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis, pp. 234-5.
participation in the EU and CFSP would add to Russian stability and welfare through relations with the broader European community.  

Kirby writes that despite the ongoing recession in early 1990s Finland, EU accession talks were from the Finnish perspective very much centred on national identity over economics. Up until this point, Finnish nationalism followed on from what Kirby terms a Hegelian sense of self-determination: small nations like Finland could “expect no favours from history”, and relied upon survival through inner unity, “with one language and culture; there was no place for cosmopolitan liberalism or individualism”. This is reflected in the observations of W.R. Mead, writing in 1991, who presents Finland as a nation with one of Europe’s strictest immigration policies, and as such, no experience of “more than a modest immigration”. The result would be a highly homogenous population, both “biologically as well as ethnically”. If the Soviet/Russian threat was gone, Finns were left with an open debate as to the necessity of such linguistic and cultural sameness and sense of strong national identity. Proponents of European Union membership argued in favour of Finland attaining the prestige of a Western European identity; the Finnish Social Democratic politician Paavo Lipponen argued in 1994 that Finnish membership in the EU would finally give Finland “an equal status in Western Europe after all this talk of finlandisation”, as well as a Western European “maturity”. Kirby writes that “with all the wild enthusiasm of the neophyte, the political and intellectual elite hailed Europe as the new focus for the nation’s identity”.

However, set against this new talk of a European identity and equality with the great West European powers, there appeared lingering concerns on the ongoing relevance of a “Finnish” identity. Matti Peltonen notes the gulf in support for European Union membership between the cities and the countryside, leading to a conception of Finland as split between “Euro-Finland” of the cities and “Forest Finland”.

164 Raunio and Tiilikainen, Finland in the European Union, p. 131.
165 Kirby, A Concise History of Finland, p. 279.
166 Ibid. p. 280.
168 Ibid.
169 Kirby, A Concise History of Finland, p. 280.
170 Ibid. p. 281.
Finland” retains a level of separateness from Europe, stressing the image of the rural Finn as separate from the urban-dwelling European, and preservation of this tradition shows a level of resistance to any integration into broader European identity.\(^{172}\) Concern for loss of Finnish identity’s otherness, at least at the level of ethno-cultural and linguistic homogeneity, played its role in the EU membership discussions, with the free movement of labour in the Union guaranteed in the Treaty of Maastricht providing a significant sticking point.\(^{173}\) Concern for an influx, real or imagined, of foreigners into Finland and their effect on long-held notions of the concept of Finnish separateness, was therefore also a key component of the Finnish political landscape in the early 1990s, just as the policy of Right to Return status for Ingrian Finns emerged.

Also in this period, Nordic identity parameters were being re-examined, and the borders of Northern Europe as an identity were open for reconsideration. Since Finland’s Nordic Council accession, Northern Europe as represented by this Council has been limited to five member states (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland) and three autonomous territories (Greenland, Åland and the Faroe Islands). However, the break-up of the Soviet Union created new identity discourses around the Baltic Sea that strove to expand this conception of Northern Europe. Both the Nordic Council as a regional cooperation institution and the Nordic welfare state as a model of social and economic organisation went through significant challenges and reassessments in the early 1990s. Hilson argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union, by removing the security concerns associated with joining the EEC and subsequently the EU, made the Nordic Council initially appear obsolete.\(^{174}\) Likewise, the economic collapse of the early 1990s in both Finland and Sweden (described in the next section of this chapter) precipitated what appeared to be the end of the Nordic welfare model itself.\(^{175}\) However, Hilson goes on to argue that this period of Nordic reassessment was accompanied by increasing interest amongst the Nordic states in their historical and cultural links, which was further buoyed by the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the opportunity to rediscover lost ties with the broader Baltic region.\(^{176}\) Similarly, Jóhann Páll Árnason and Björn Wittrock argue that the post-Soviet frontier between

\(^{172}\) Ibid. p. 274.
\(^{173}\) Mead, “Finland in a Changing Europe”, p. 313.
\(^{175}\) Ibid. pp. 110-1, 180-1.
\(^{176}\) Ibid. pp. 181-2.
the Nordic and Baltic world in North-Eastern Europe is now blurred, evidenced by increased economic ties extending from Sweden and Finland to Estonia and Latvia, as well as regular summits between Baltic and Nordic member-state ministers. Kazimierz Musia argues that the Nordic reorientation towards the Baltic was the result not only of the collapse of the Iron Curtain, which made cooperation with the now-independent Baltic states again possible, but also of changing circumstances amongst the Nordic states that made previous Nordic attitudes to international relations particularly obsolete. Musia argues that Nordic regional identity developed not only from the region’s religious foundations informing welfare provision, but also from its relative geographical and demographic isolation, which allowed for comparative peace during much of the conflicts of the twentieth century and a largely neutral approach to the Cold War power balance. Yet by the dawn of the twenty-first century, the Cold War had ended, and the wider Baltic Sea region had become perhaps “more fitting spatial units with which the Nordic countries could identify”. In 1992, Ole Wæver argued that the Nordic region would need to be “reinvented” within a larger Baltic Sea region to adapt to the changing circumstances of Europe.

A final point to consider is the discussion on humanitarian concerns, born of the post-Soviet food shortages in Russia, and their role in spurring a form of solidarity and concern for those across the Russian border, including perceived ethnic kin, which in some way recall the Heimosodat period without the calls for territorial expansion. Events unfolding across Finland’s eastern border may have transgressed Finnish wariness towards immigration. Mead writes that “[f]amine conditions across the border might well change the strictly correct relations that prevail and the two-metre-high barbed wire fence that crosses the Russo-Finnish no man’s land could easily be disregarded”. But there is also a suggestion that these humanitarian concerns only extend as far as a kind of ethnic solidarity, as he adds “Finns [cannot] forget that

179 Ibid.
180 Ibid. p. 291.
beyond the boundary there are kindred ethnic stock – near at hand the Ingrians, Karelians and Estonians: farther away, others”.\textsuperscript{183} There appears to be some evidence behind this reasoning in Koivisto’s own memoirs, as he wrote that in 1990, as the Baltic States began to break away from the Soviet Union, he dismissed a suggestion from Estonian sociologist Erkki Rannik that Finland support the creation of an autonomous Ingrian province between Estonia and Leningrad as a buffer zone between the Baltic States and the USSR, affirming that Finland’s primary concern was to alleviate the humanitarian situation there, both by channelling humanitarian assistance to Ingrians and by providing “the same kind of treatment generally accorded to other returning Finnish immigrants”\textsuperscript{184}

In effect, the political climate in Finland by the early 1990s was open to discourses on Finland’s position as part of a broader Western European identity, now that the changing security environment made joining perceived Western European structures like the EU possible. This notion of Western Europe distinguished Finland from an Eastern Europe most readily identifiable with the USSR and Russia. Finnish ties to its eastern neighbour prior to glasnost-perestroika and the decline of the Iron Curtain could be portrayed as a forced relationship that did not reflect the “normal” status of Finland as a Western-orientated nation state, now that the perceived security threat from the USSR/Russia was seen to have declined. Views of Eastern Europe could become more overtly negative, and include discussions of groups like Ingrians that were believed to be victims of Russo-Soviet aggression and discrimination. The political climate of the early 1990s in Europe also allowed Finnish politicians the opportunity to re-establish links with groups like the Ingrians without fear of Soviet retribution, and view the relationship between Finland and Ingrians as a kin-state relationship temporarily broken by the Iron Curtain.

C) \textbf{Economic Challenges and the Finnish Recession of the 1990s}

By 1980, the post-war Finnish economy had transitioned from the predominantly agrarian society of the pre-1950s to a predominantly urbanised wage-work society,

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid. p. 314.
complemented by a great expansion of social security benefits and public service spending in the early 1970s that has come to typify the Nordic welfare state model. Finland came relatively late to this model, and indeed as noted by Pauli Kettunen, by the 1970s some economist circles saw the Nordic welfare state as a relic of “sheltered national societies” standing against the wave of globalisation. This viewpoint is criticised by Kettunen as a shallow understanding of the Nordic model, failing to take into account how open the Nordic countries were to international investment and economic actors, and how dependent they had become on international economic fluctuations. Finland’s relatively late economic development compared to the other Nordic countries offered it a chance to see how experiments played out in Scandinavia, particularly Sweden, and how an international sense of the Nordic model as an alternative to the polarities of Western (particularly American) capitalism and Soviet communism developed in an attempt to find a level of harmony between the objectives of social equality and democracy and economic prosperity.

However, after mid-1990, the welfare-state model underwent significant challenges in Finland. The early 1990s Finnish economic depression, beginning in the summer of 1990, was the most severe in its post-Second World War history until the recent crisis of the late 2000s. Prior to the 1980s, the economic policy of post-war Finland had been organised with reference to long-term growth goals, which were achieved in part by using exchange rate devaluations to ensure competitiveness (major devaluations took place in 1949, 1957 and 1967). The cost of this policy, however, was increased economic volatility, including increased rates of inflation and relatively high levels of unemployment. In the 1980s, a succession of Social Democrat-led coalition governments under Prime Ministers Kalevi Sorsa and Mauno Koivisto followed a program of economic reform, which included the deregulation of markets and the lifting of capital controls. This resulted in a boom period in the late 1980s,
fuelled by rapid credit expansion and a real estate bubble. When the bubble burst, combined with the shock-effect of the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which had been a major market for Finnish exports, Finland was plunged into “the biggest slump among developed economies since the Second World War”, with close to 20% unemployment (see also figures 11 and 12).

Figure 11
Line Graph of Finnish Average Monthly Unemployment Percentage Rate, 1989-1994 (Seasonally Adjusted)


194 Ibid. p. 106.
Figure 12
Finnish Average Monthly Unemployment Percentage Rate, 1989-1994 (Seasonally Adjusted)

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<th>Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate, 1989</th>
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<td>14.1</td>
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<th>Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate, 1994</th>
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<td>17.6</td>
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The recession brought a sense of urgency to the large accumulating budget deficits, most of which were being incurred due to mass unemployment and the associated social security programs, and led to a series of cuts in a range of key social security benefits that were carried out by a new centre-right coalition government under Centre Party Prime Minister Eho Asko, elected in 1991. These cuts generally attracted broad cross-party consensus leading up to the 1995 parliamentary election.195 Cuts to welfare were accompanied by political and scholarly discussions on the risk of developing a state-based “dependency culture”, wherein disincetivised individuals became passive benefit recipients.196 However, austerity and undermining of the Nordic welfare state model was to prove unpopular with the Finnish electorate, as was demonstrated by the 1995 parliamentary election results, in which Aho’s Centre Party suffered a significant electoral loss in favour of left-wing parties like the Social Democrats, which David Arter sees as benefiting from a strong protest vote as the main opposition party.197 Despite the cross party consensus on austerity, voters


appeared to place the blame for cuts to social services and benefits predominantly on Aho and the Centre Party,\textsuperscript{198} whereas the Left Alliance, the only main party to denounce austerity publically in favour of increased public spending and increased income taxation to salvage the welfare state, increased its vote share significantly.\textsuperscript{199}

A broad Social Democrat-led coalition government ultimately formed with the Left Alliance, the centre-right National Coalition, the Greens of Finland and the Swedish People’s Party under Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen.

In this economic context, it may at first appear surprising that the Finnish government would continue with legislation designed to increase the number of legal residents, and thereby increase the number of job-seekers or benefits claimants. Interestingly, Sari Pekkala and Hannu Tervo find that the Finnish economic recovery and fall in unemployment actually coincided with a sharp increase in migration.\textsuperscript{200} The definition of “migration” used here, however, is not limited to international migration, being defined rather as movement to a municipality from elsewhere within Finland or abroad.\textsuperscript{201} Internal migration in Finland can also have significant social impacts and implications for welfare, including overcrowding of services in certain municipalities (particularly those that offer fully-subsidised healthcare) and exacerbation of urban poverty and social cohesion problems in the larger cities and towns. Immigration to Finland in the 1990s, including the Ingrian Finns, thus came at a period when the economic impact of migrants, particularly their impact (beneficial or otherwise) on post-recession economic recovery, became especially important. This includes the effect of migration on welfare provisions at a time when substantial welfare expansion may have appeared unfeasible.

A clear connection between inclusion in the welfare state and the significance of citizenship emerges in analysis of Nordic attitudes towards migration and migrants. Discussions and interpretations of the welfare model centre around the notion of citizenship as guaranteeing the social protection of the welfare state. This is seen in political scientist and researcher on pension schemes Kari Salminen’s definition of the

\textsuperscript{198} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid. pp. 195-8.
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid.
“citizenship model”, which defines the social rights inherent in citizenship as including unconditional, flat-rate benefits.202 More broadly, Kettunen argues that the concept of citizenship guaranteeing certain social rights is fundamental to the Nordic model,203 and thus, provision of citizenship becomes an indicator of inclusion and exclusion from the benefits and social protection afforded by the Nordic welfare state. This can involve excluding non-citizen migrants from welfare state protection, as non-citizen migrants may be deemed not to belong to the welfare state’s core community. Indeed, a study conducted by Ann-Helén Bay and Axel West Pedersen on attitudes in the Nordic countries towards the introduction of a basic income level, set against attitudes towards increased migration from abroad to the Nordic area, shows a distinct presence of attitudes towards migrants that demand their exclusion from the social benefits of the welfare state model.204 The significance this model places on “social solidarity” and the desire to help one’s own community relies on a sense of national community that appears somewhat exclusivist; Bay and Pedersen note that many initially positive reactions amongst the polled sample towards the proposed basic income level are reversed by “simply pointing out that an unconditional basic income will include non-citizens”.205 Likewise, many initially negative responses become positive “if it can be withheld from non-citizens”.206 As Bay and Pedersen deduce, “the high degree of social solidarity that could motivate support for a basic income scheme does not necessarily encompass newly arrived immigrants and/or ethnic minority groups”.207 If migrants are deemed likely to consume the social benefits of the welfare state, this would make immigration initiatives appear undesirable in times of economic recession to those who see social solidarity as predicated on notions of perceived sameness.

Indeed, Bay and Pedersen’s study alludes to broader discussions on the role of social solidarity in the Nordic welfare state, and how immigration affects this. Simply put, they posit that there is a consensus amongst voters in Nordic countries “that

205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
immigrants do not belong to the national community and therefore do not deserve to receive social benefits in times of need”. The development of the welfare state model in relation to nationality came about, according to Patrick Emmenegger and Romana Careja, as a means for nineteenth-century conservatives like Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of Germany in 1871-1890, and Eduard Taaffe, Minister-President of Austria in 1868-1870 and 1879-1893, to promote the working classes’ loyalty to the state over the emerging radical labour movements. As such, the aim of welfare policy was to “provide some legitimacy to the empire, increase social cohesion and induce national identity” as a “citizen-making through social benefits strategy”. Some early examples of welfare models in the Nordic countries use this strategy, such as the Swedish Social Democrats’ development of a social model metaphor, Folkhemmet or “The People’s Home”, which sees provision of state-financed services as a means to guarantee social cohesion and stability.

The functionality of welfare systems has become dependent on the cohesive identity of the citizen-group; Grete Brochmann argues that citizenship as an institution is defined not only by its legal dimension, as the guarantor of rights and duties afforded the individual, but also by its less-precise social dimension, implying concepts of identity loyalty, belonging, trust and participation. Historically, this has involved exclusionary or homogenising assimilation policies regarding national minorities, and there is indeed evidence of this in the Nordic countries, particularly regarding the Sami minorities in the north. Maria Wingstedt, for example, notes the nationalising policies in Sweden regarding the historic Sami and Tornedalen minorities, who prior to the 1950s did not have access to native-language education. Finland, as argued by Päivi Harinen et al., follows the Nordic system of welfare as a universal social insurance, and as such, “encompasses all areas of life …[and] demands of its

209 Ibid. p. 165.
members both cultural and social homogeneity as a condition for full membership in society". The challenge of post-Second World War migration in Finland, as a Nordic welfare state, is either to integrate migrants into these existing strands of cultural and social identity in the welfare state, or transform and expand the existing strands to encompass new migrants.

In the initial post-Second World War era, the Nordic welfare states developed systems of migration that met their requirements for post-war development while maintaining the nationalist exclusivity of the welfare state, with a temporary migration system W. R. Böhning calls “mercantilistic”. “Guest workers” from poorer countries in southern Europe, and later further afield, were recruited with the understanding that they would come without their families, and once their job was done, they would return to their homeland, and thus have no claim to the social benefits scheme. There was also significant intra-Nordic migration, particularly from Finland to the more developed wage-work economy in Sweden, which totalled 535,000 individual migrants between 1945 and 1990, peaking in the 1960s and 1970s. The Finnish community in Sweden is still significant, and the 2009 Swedish Law on National Minorities and Minority Languages identifies Finnish as an official administrative language for 24 municipalities throughout Sweden, including Stockholm. However, Emmenegger and Careja argue that the increasing importance given to human rights in liberal democracies in the more recent decades has meant the Nordic countries can “no longer treat their migrant populations as mere instruments of economic production”. Indeed, the characterisation of post-war Finnish migrants as cheap unskilled labour in Sweden prompted a Swedish Green Party politician, Maria Wetterstrand, to call on the Swedish government to apologise to Finland in a 2009

214 Harinen et al., “Multiple Citizenship as a Current Challenge”, p. 133.
opinion piece for the Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter*. The decline of the migrant worker system in the Nordic countries has also meant more recent migrants have not been excluded from social benefits, and thus at least in theory must be more closely integrated into the national community. This was particularly significant for Nordic approaches to the integration of refugees, which effectively became a significant immigrant group for Finland in the early 1990s after the arrival of asylum seekers from Somalia (around 5,000 in the 1990s) and the former Yugoslavia (around 4,500 in the 1990s). Since then, Pirkko Pitkänen and Satu Kouki argue Finnish authorities have pursued a Nordic approach of “universal values and solutions” stressing the importance of social equality and equality of access to social services for migrants, including refugees, as spelled out in a 1997 government program on immigration and refugee policy. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, migration had thus become a more weighty issue in terms of its lasting impact and relation to the nationalist dimensions of welfare allocation.

Given this socio-economic situation in early 1990s Finland, the introduction and continuation of an immigration scheme on the scale of the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return program may appear surprising. Ingrian migrants could exacerbate rising unemployment levels, and add strain to welfare and social services provision. If considered newcomers to the national community, they could also be seen as “undeserving” of welfare assistance by Finnish citizens. However, Wim Van Oorschot defines five general criteria that influence the perception of deservingness for welfare allocation; 1) responsibility (how able one is to control the reasons for needing social support), 2) level of need (if they are very needy they will be considered more deserving), 3) belonging or closeness to the national community, 4) conforming to expected patterns of behaviour, and 5) reciprocity (if they have earned the support). Several points here are of interest to the Ingrian Finnish case, particularly the fifth, given Koivisto’s explicit reference to the suffering of the Ingrian Finns and their wartime history, and the humanitarian element to the Right to Return

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221 Pitkänen and Kouki, “Meeting Foreign Cultures”, p. 105.
222 Ibid. pp. 107-112.
policy discussed earlier in this chapter. Of particular note, however, is the third point, being the perception of belonging to the national community, and how this relates to the perception of immigrants in the Nordic welfare state system. A working paper on the comparative dependence of immigrants on social benefits produced by Sari Pekkala Kerr and William R. Kerr suggests that there are several conflicting interpretations of data on this issue, depending on immigrant groups and host countries, with the most consistent result being that immigrants’ reliance on welfare is determined by their relative success in the labour force, which in turn is dependent on factors such as education level and language skills. The comparatively high education level of Ingrian emigrants was noted in 2002 by the *Helsingin Sanomat*, as was the jarring juxtaposition of work offered to Ingrians compared with their qualifications from Russia (an example included a chief accountant at the Finnish-Russian chamber of commerce, offered work in Finland as a seamstress from a somewhat misguided sympathetic Finn). The issue of language is more complex, as most working-age Ingrians were monolingual Russian-speakers, compared to older Ingrians who had retained a degree of bilingualism. However, a belief in “ethnic solidarity” and a more primordialist approach to ethnicity, would bring with it a belief that those with Finnish ancestry would integrate faster and acquire Finnish language skills more rapidly than those without Finnish ancestors, though the 2002-2003 amendment to the Aliens’ Act that introduced a Finnish language requirement for the Right to Return suggests Finnish authorities may have eventually come to accept this wasn’t the reality. The ability of Ingrian Finns as a group to circumvent any negative connotations of immigration in the early 1990s recession appears to hinge on the significance afforded to ethnic kinship in determining belonging and “deservingness” in the Nordic welfare state model.

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A final point on the economic perception of migrants in Finland, beyond concepts of inclusiveness through citizenship in the welfare state, at a more functional level is the separation of migrants from important organisations associated with the welfare state. This may continue to foster a sense of detachment between migrants and the welfare state, and exacerbate perceptions of migrants as apart from mainstream Finnish society. Of particular note is the role of unions, which formed a particularly key actor in representing the labour force in both wage negotiations and political engagement, particularly through the use of collective agreements in setting wage levels (a process that, through the “corporatist” approach from the 1960s, also included the government in order to integrate labour market parties with government decision-making). Union density reached its peak in Finland (at approximately 85%) in 1993, in the midst of the recession, particularly as at this time unemployment benefits were dependent on insurance provided by union membership. This figure has declined in recent years, and there is less impetus for immigrants to join unions, due to the introduction of an independent unemployment insurance fund that provides unemployment benefits without requiring union membership. Indeed, it has been a challenge for unions to attract members from immigrant communities. However, unions retain a high degree of significance in Finland, and collective agreements still cover around 95% of Finnish employees. Exclusion from such a significant forum for engagement with the welfare state runs the risk of further isolation from the national community, and serves to highlight the role of economic factors in preventing some aspects of immigrant integration in the Finland of the early 1990s.

Again, the ability of Ingrians to initially avoid this “othering” as immigrants in the potentially hostile political environment of the early 1990s Finnish recession speaks to the pervasiveness of perceptions of Ingrian belonging in Finland. Finnish lawmakers appeared ready to accept Ingrians as part of the Finnish national community, and thus deserving welfare recipients, even if this came with a potentially significant economic cost and a likely lack of participation in unions. There must also

229 Ibid. pp. 174-5.
230 Ibid. p. 175.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
be a perception that Ingrian migration to Finland will not compromise the social solidarity considered intrinsic to the maintenance of the embattled but still valued Nordic welfare model in the early 1990s.

D) **Conclusions**

Ingria’s history as a borderland region between various entities, broadly categorised as Western (Sweden, Finland) and Eastern (Russia, USSR), underlines its richness for studies of identity construction - its multifaceted population and history may lend it to various identity constructions. Foreign policy is one likely area in which these transforming constructions were manifested, but immigration policy also provides a rich case for study, given the state’s unique position to define itself as a national community through citizenship and immigration legislation. Pierre Bourdieu, for instance, has written of the state’s ability to contribute to the construction of national identity through its practices, amongst others, of “classification systems…inscribed into law”.\(^{233}\) In this thesis, I see immigration policy, and specifically right to return policies, as one such classification system inscribed into law. As will be discussed further in this thesis, I employ the example of Finland and its Right to Return policy for Ingrian Finns to study the construction of national identity in policymakers’ language, and how through discursive constructions of such national identity, policymakers are able to legitimise and delegitimise the connection of this particular group to the nation state.

The study of Ingrian Finnish Return law, and the construction of Finnish identity it reflects, is one avenue through which the contested nature of Ingria on the border between Eastern and Western notions in identity construction becomes apparent. Here is a region straddling the old Iron Curtain, politically East of the Finno-Russian border, which has also been described as a line of cultural identity demarcation between East and West. Yet the Ingrian Return law is also informed by its era under a Western power, long ago but not without living remnants, in the form of the region’s community of Finnish descent. Though Ingrians had previously been discussed in Finnish political discourse during the Russian Civil War and the Second World War, \(^{233}\) Pierre Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field”, translated by Loic J.D. Wacquant and Samar Farage, *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1994, pp. 8-9.
when the idea of ethnic kinship between Finland and Ingrians was promulgated, the issue of Ingrian Finns in post-war Finland would lie dormant until the early 1990s.

In April 1990, when President Koivisto gave a televised interview in which he publically announced Ingrian inclusion into existing Finnish Right to Return law, he stated (as paraphrased by Helsingin Sanomat) that “Ingrians are Finns…Their ancestors were moved there once at the behest of Sweden, and they have undergone much while they have been there”. Koivisto’s expansion of returnee status launched a policy initiative that culminated in the explicit mention of Ingrians as returnees in Finnish immigration legislation, extending the returnee status afforded to those in Sweden and North America to include Ingrian Finns. Prior to 1990, existing Finnish legislation had provided Right to Return status to more recent Finnish émigrés, namely those who had left in the early and mid-twentieth century for Sweden and North America, up until the 1980s made up the vast majority of migrants arriving in Finland. By the 1980s, there were at least 1.3 million individuals in Sweden and North America able to apply for returnee status in Finland through this policy, as returning emigrants or second, third and fourth generation descendants of Finnish emigrants. Thus, there already existed a rich pool of potential returnee migrants at this time. Koivisto himself highlighted return migrants in a 1987 speech commemorating the 70th anniversary of Finland’s only exclusively Swedish-language university, Åbo Academy in Turku, by citing the 700,000 emigrants who since the Second World War had departed Finland, mostly for Sweden, and the 350,000 of these who had returned, as evidence of Finland’s deepening shared culture and history with Sweden, also indicative of the relationship Finland maintained with the Finnish diaspora. This diaspora relationship reflects a tradition of Finnish political thought that did not define Finns solely as Finnish citizens, but rather as a broader concept related to less tangible definitions of cultural, ancestral and ideological identity transmitted through the Finnish diaspora.

234 Cited in Hakala, “Koivisto vehemently denies that Ingrian migration to Finland was KGB initiative”.
236 Korkiasaari and Söderling, “Finnish Emigration and Immigration After World War II”, p. 2.
237 Ibid. p. 4.
In assessing whether the Right to Return law for Ingrian Finns came about due to or despite the economic reality of late twentieth-century Finland, it becomes apparent that economic considerations did not appear to play a major role in spurring the policy’s formation. Rather, the notion of ethnicity and the perceived ethnic link between the Finnish state and Ingrians, constructed upon perceptions of historical connections between Finland and Ingria dating from the era of Swedish rule and continuing through to the twentieth century, appears to have afforded a bypass to the likely challenges of increased migration in a time of recession. With the opening up (and later breaking up) of the USSR, Finland was presented with what could be termed a “historical moment”, in which it became possible to reconnect with those groups considered in the dominant Finnish political discourse to be connected to Finland as “ethnic kin”, across the formerly impenetrable Soviet border. Given the presence in welfare state societies of the notion that those “belonging” or close to the national community are deserving recipients of social support in times of need, the political history of Ingria and its relationship with Finland seems to have afforded Ingrian Finns the opportunity to pursue more concrete expressions of their perceived connection to Finnishness, including residency, citizenship and social support in Finland. Therefore, when considering both the political and economic context of Finland by 1990, the key impression that emerges is that there was a perceived connection between the Finnish nation state and Ingrians, drawn from a construction of common ethnic identity and an interpretation of history which spurred, facilitated and eased the introduction of the Right to Return policy.
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

Some scholars argue that national identity, as much as any other formation of identity, flows from psychological impulses to create, as Mole puts it, “order out of chaos”; i.e. the creation of identity categorisations for ourselves and others, as distinct races, nations, ethnicities, classes, generations, etc., to establish expected norms of behaviour for our surroundings.¹ In essence, this categorisation impulse drives the notion of social identity theory, which asserts that human beings categorise, and are categorised, into groups based on two main practices: the internalisation of group categories (that is, as we form group categories for the world around us, we self-categorise based on these understandings), and the accentuation of similarities within groups and differences between groups.² Tobias Theiler argues that social identity theory is “self-consciously abstract”, in that it does not seek to define or explore “the signifiers used to demarcate group boundaries or the group norms that prevail at any given time…[which] are socially constructed and therefore culturally specific and historically contingent”.³ Understanding the nature of the group’s social identity that this theory creates – how they are qualified, the nature of their boundaries and the purposes they serve – is best ascertained through analysis of the language the group uses in its self-definition. Discourse analysis emerges as a means to this end, as a framework for establishing how groups such as a national community are delineated, through concepts like citizenship or ethno-cultural identity constructions.

Discourse theories, with a particular focus on poststructuralist and critical discourse analysis, inform the theoretical and analytical framework of this thesis, inasmuch as this thesis analyses the construction of national identity in the political discussions and policy language on the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return policy. This chapter explains this methodological approach as a toolkit for the discursive analysis of such language, and explains how this method will be used to address the core research problem investigated in this thesis. This approach is informed by my reading of Foucauldian, poststructuralist and critical discourse analysis methodologies. I have read the primary data for this thesis with a view to establishing what position on the Ingrian Return they take (the theme or themes), what constructions or elements of

¹ Mole, “Discursive Identities/Identity Discourses and Political Power”, p. 3.
³ Ibid. p. 262.
Finnish identity are employed (the discursive resource or resources), and how this relates to the context in which the discussions on the Ingrian Finnish Return is being produced and received to create an ideology of Finnishness as an identity.

A) Approaching Identity

Different disciplines provide different theorisations of identity that are pertinent to this study. In International Relations theory, Alexander Wendt provides a constructivist approach to identity, arguing that an actor’s identity is at its base self-ascribed, but the meaning of this identity is dependent on how it is represented by other actors. Wendt further argues that states, as his primary unit of analysis, make strategic choices based on given identities and interests, which are produced in “evolutionary” processes of cultural selection and socially disseminated through imitation and social learning. Other constructivism proponents, such as Martha Finnemore, argue that the constructivist approach to identity transcends the traditionally state-centric approach to International Relations, arguing that states are themselves embedded and “socialised” in an international structure of “meaning and social value” that may shape identity formation. The significance of constructivism for the study of Ingrian Finns’ relation to Finnishness, particularly as Wendt theorises identity, is that identities motivate state choices and actions – states make “strategic choices on the basis of given identities and interests”. As this approach treats identities as given, and informing actors’ choices, applying such an understanding of identity to Finnish politicians’ statements on Ingrians’ Finnishness would indicate their actions are informed by the given parameters of Finnish identity as they exist at this time. Constructivism has the advantage of stressing the intersubjective nature of identity construction, in which identity is produced and represented in a social environment, and indeed, the intersubjective aspect of Ingrian Finnish identity construction is explored in chapter six of this study. However, constructivist approaches do not address actors’ capacity to renegotiate identities strategically, rather than make strategic considerations based on existing or given identity

5 Ibid. p. 336.
7 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 336
constructions. As I argue in this thesis, identity constructions can be constructed and performed for strategic purposes, in this case to legitimise and delegitimise a particular immigration policy.

The “renegotiable” nature of identity is stressed in poststructuralist and critical constructivist approaches to identity study. The poststructuralist political theorist Chantal Mouffe argues that there are no “natural” or “original” identities; identities are instead inherently “nomadic” with parameters that are constantly being renegotiated through processes of “hybridisation” into emerging conglomerates like European identity.\(^8\) Jacob Torfing discusses identity construction with reference to poststructuralist discourse theory, arguing that “discourse is constructed in and through hegemonic struggles that aim to establish a political and moral-intellectual leadership through the articulation of meaning and identity”.\(^9\) Identity construction thus has a strategic function in discourse, as a means to create what Torfing calls the “credible principle” by which discourse becomes hegemonic and “capture[s] people’s hearts and minds”.\(^10\) To this end, the construction of identity is created rather through the construction of “social antagonism” provided by a “threatening Otherness” whose exclusion is significant to the ultimate stability and survival of the identity.\(^11\) In this way, identity construction is performative, created and recreated through discursive practices, and thus inherently dynamic. It is also reflective of constructions of the self and other, reflecting for instance Iver B. Neumann’s argument that identity study should begin with an analysis of its parameters, i.e. the “diacritica” or divide between the self and other.\(^12\) A particular example of poststructuralist analysis regarding the self and other divide is provided by Paasi, who links geographical understandings of East and West in Finland to discursive constructions of identity in Finland that placed Finland within an identity construct of Westernness, distinct from Russia as the “threatening Otherness” described by Torfing.\(^13\) Poststructuralist approaches to

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\(^10\) Ibid.

\(^11\) Ibid.


identity have the advantage for this study of stressing how identity is subject to shifting parameters and renegotiation, and how the self/other distinction is significant to the hegemonic success or viability of identity constructions in the broader social environment in which these discursively produced identities are received.

The success or viability of identity constructions draws back to social identity theory, introduced earlier in this chapter. Social identity theory relates the individual’s self-conception as belonging to a group or identity construct with the worth or value of this identity the individual experiences from it.\textsuperscript{14} Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams argue for a “self-esteem hypothesis”, which they argue has emerged as a cornerstone of social identity theory and the social psychology of intergroup relations.\textsuperscript{15} This hypothesis posits that the positive appeal of social identity categories to the individual’s sense of self-esteem is key to the category’s saliency.\textsuperscript{16} Maykel Verkuyten presents this idea as a distinction between the “external” nature of social identity, in that it can be ascribed to the individual by his or her environment, and the “internal” appreciation of this identity, how the individual thinks, feels, values or rejects this identity.\textsuperscript{17} Individuals are more likely to identify with social categorisations that have been externally proscribed to them if they have positive connotations to the internal sense of self. Verkuyten argues that social identity thus has a “dual nature” combining sociocultural constructions of identity with personal interpretations, and that these two elements should not be reduced to one another.\textsuperscript{18} Scholars in fields like social psychology studying social identity often focus on the subjective experiences of individuals over the social construction of identity constructions themselves.\textsuperscript{19} This thesis investigates the social construction of identity in the Ingrian Finnish Return law example, and the effective saliency of this identity, in terms of social identity theory and its focus on the internal and emotional appeal of

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. pp. 32-3.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. p. 61.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. p. 62.
the identity categorisations. The effectiveness of identity constructions in the debate on the Finnishness of Ingrians is dependent on the positive and emotional appeal of Finnishness as an identity, including positive narratives of Finns in history (particularly the Second World War) and the importance of protecting the cultural particularity of Finnishness (particularly the Finnish language).

As mentioned in chapter one of this thesis, I argue here that the Ingrian Finnish Return law debate in Finland provides an example of strategic uses of essentialising identity discourse. This idea draws from the postcolonial literary theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s notion of “strategic essentialism”, or, as she puts it, “a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest”. This theory argues that groups may perceive advantages to essentialising their identity into a simplified notion that is more readily represented and reproduced by others. Anne Phillips argues that, though Spivak herself has distanced herself from the strategic essentialism concept, the notion of groups that “‘take the risk of essence’ in order to have any political purchase remains an important theme” in politics. Neumann argues that post-Iron Curtain Europe has been particularly susceptible to the rise of essentialising identity discourse, as the class distinctions informed by a Marxist sense of collective relationship to the means of production are evaporating, and being replaced by so many possible social identities that there is a “rush to defend the story of the self that revolves around the nation” as a means of creating a salient overarching identity narrative. In the context of 1990s Europe and the turn to “hegemonic” identity politics, this has necessitated the construction of what Neumann terms “as if” narratives, which present identities “as if” they were essentialised, so as to gain political saliency and make the case for national identity as a “context-traversing” identity. This, he argues, undermines the notion in Mouffe’s nomadic identities theory – that hybridisation of identities will replace essentialising of identities – as Neumann sees essentialised identities as more able to group identities

23 Neumann, Uses of the Other, p. 212.
around a central self/other nexus. Neumann cites the EU accession debate in Norway as one example, noting that “as if” essentialising narratives were part of the dominant construction of European identity as a threat to the Norwegian self. 

Finland presents a particularly interesting alternate example, as Christopher S. Browning argues that EU membership in Finland was politically constructed as a “Westernising” narrative that “only became meaningful in the context of a series of narratives emphasising EU membership as an expression of continuity of national identity”. This kind of essentialising “Western” identity narrative emerges in historian Henrik Meinander’s characterisation of the Finnish EU accession as an “emotional homecoming”, arguing:

> it is perfectly understandable that many Finns feel that EU membership is like closing a wide circle, a circle that began when Finland, after 700 years under Swedish rule, became in 1809 a Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire. After at least two centuries of uncertainty and ideological searching, the Finns are no more continuously asking themselves whether their country belongs to Western Europe, and if that is actually the case, whether they are "on the brink" or rather "somewhere between" where European civilisation is concerned.

Similarly, Tapani Vaahkoranta argues that the Finnish foreign policy establishment communicated their will to join the EU in such a manner that “often sounded as if Finland was trying to take her place in the Western civilisation in particular”. At the time of accession in 1995, President Ahtisaari declared Finland’s “membership in the European Union has strengthened our European identity”. In this case, essentialising discourse has the strategic function of legitimising Finland’s EU accession as a binding of Finland to the West/East self/other nexus. The EU is thus not strictly constructed as a hybridising identity that “attacks” the national sense of self, as Neumann sees in the Norwegian case, but as a component of the national identity itself that distinguishes it from non-Europe (Russia) as the “Other”.

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25 Ibid. p. 214.
26 Ibid. p. 215.
27 Browning, Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 233.
30 Cited in Browning, Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 242.
The appeal of the “Western” component in the construction of Finnishness here, as part of the self-esteem hypothesis in social identity theory, relates to the positive and negative ways in which the terms “West” and “East”, respectively, have historically been constructed. Stuart Hall famously wrote that “‘the West’ is as much an idea as a fact of geography”. Westernness, Hall writes, is “a type of society that developed as industrialised, urbanised, capitalist, secular and modern” as a result of specific economic, political, social and cultural processes following the end of the Middle Ages. The West effectively means “modern”, and any state or society that shares these characteristics can be classified as “Western”, wherever they exist on the geographical map. Hall argues that one of the functions of the “Western” construction is that it “provides criteria of evaluation against which other societies are ranked and around which powerful positive and negative feelings cluster”. In this sense, there is an evident positive self-esteem appeal to the construction of Finnishness that stresses its Westernness. The strategic use of an essentialising discourse of Finnishness in the Ingrian discussion may thus appeal to the positive historical understanding of the West as a means to creating a positive identity that attracts individuals to identify with it.

This provides the core considerations for identity as it is constructed and employed by Finnish politicians in this period (1990-2010) regarding the Ingrian Finns. It is argued in this thesis that strategic use of essentialising discourse in the Ingrian Finnish Return discussion amongst Finnish politicians construct a self/other nexus that define Ingrians first as the self, then as the other, using some of the same identity parameters in both definitions. The self/other nexus is informed by the West/East construction, and is performed in the poststructuralist sense by Finnish politicians through discourse that characterises Ingrians as Finns, belonging to the cultural West, and then as Russians, belonging to the cultural East and thus separate from the dominant sense of the Finnish national self. The sense of Finnish national self is itself subject to renegotiation, from the neutral, Nordic “middle way” between East and West as security entities described in chapter two, to the construction of East and West as

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32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
cultural entities or civilisations with Finns in the West after 1990. This follows
scholarly investigation of post-Cold War Europe and the rise of identity politics, by
investigating how identity constructions in this context were negotiated and
renegotiated strategically in politics.

B) Discourse Analysis, Poststructuralism and Critical Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis has been defined by, among others, Rogers Brubaker and
Frederick Cooper, as analysis of language in which critical significance “may depend
not on any particular instantiation but on [language’s] anonymous, unnoticed
permeation of our ways of thinking and talking and making sense of the social
world”.

This theory is perhaps most closely associated with philosopher and social
theorist Michel Foucault, who included in his preface to Les Mots et Les Choses
(1966, “Words and Things”, published in English as The Order of Things) his purpose
to investigate

...language as it has been spoken, natural creatures as they have been perceived and grouped
together, and exchanges as they have been practiced; in what way, then, our culture has made
manifest the existence of order[.]

A discourse analysis of a group’s self-definition may therefore seek to ascertain
through the group’s own language deeper understandings of the group’s values, its
hierarchy and its understandings of the world and its place within it. The Foucauldian
tradition of discourse analysis lends itself to research that examines power relations.
As Foucault himself argued in his later works, discourses are formed and re-formed
by struggles for hegemonic domination, and thus are dependent on power relations.
In The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 he puts it thus: “Discourse transmits and produces
power, it reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and
makes it possible to thwart it”. Sara Mills argues that Foucault sees discourse both
as a means of oppression and of resisting oppression. Knowledge, and how
knowledge is produced and maintains its status as “factual”, is a product of power in

35 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity’”, Theory and Society, Vol. 29, No. 1,
February 2000, p. 16.
36 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York: Vintage
37 Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3, translation by Robert Hurley,
38 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley,
Foucauldian theory that is produced and maintained by power struggles.\(^{40}\) Power as Foucauldian theory sees it is complex, not limited to the relations determined by connection to the economic means of production (as in Marxist theory) or the ability to define people’s rights, and what they are not allowed to do (as in liberal humanism).\(^{41}\) Foucault sees power as social relations, producing as well as restricting behaviour.\(^{42}\) Discourse analysis is thus the study of how language produces, maintains and challenges hegemonic systems of knowledge in the social world.

For the study of national identity construction, several approaches to discourse analysis are possible. A recent doctoral thesis by Nevena Nancheva analysing national identity constructions in Bulgaria and Macedonia in the context of Europeanisation, for instance, employs a poststructuralist approach, which she argues offers analytical possibilities for the study of national identity that transcend “the limitations of rationalist accounts”.\(^{43}\) Poststructuralism posits that the distinction between “discourse” and “non-discourse” in language is unsustainable, and that all social phenomena are also “discourses”,\(^{44}\) following the notion from Jacques Derrida’s essay “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” that everything can be “discourse”.\(^{45}\) Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, proponents of the poststructuralist-informed Essex School of discourse analysis, provide an effective account of how the classification of events as “factual” rather than discourse is rejected by poststructuralism:

> An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or expressions of ‘the wrath of God’ depends on the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that subjects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence.\(^{46}\)

This introduces a significant element to the use of discourse analysis for this thesis, on the way in which historical “fact” is interpreted and strategically employed in discursive constructions of identity. The events described in chapter two of this thesis may have “happened” in the literal sense – borders were changed, wars were lost, people were transported – but the meaning of these events to the construction of


\(^{41}\) Mills, *Discourse*, p. 19.

\(^{42}\) Ibid. p. 20.


\(^{44}\) Ibid. p. 58.


identity is constituted by discursive practice. A Wittgensteinian approach to discourse argues that the meaning of a statement is dependent on its usage in a specific situation, and thus, discourse can only be understood within its historical context.\textsuperscript{47} I follow the appraisal of context as critical to the analysis of discourse. This thesis investigates discursive constructions of identity within context which is itself discursive, in which history is referenced, linked and employed by Finnish law- and policy-makers in the construction of Finnishness.

In addition to the poststructuralist-informed approaches to discourse analysis, I consider aspects of critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA accepts that discourse is “language in use”, and seeks to link linguistic analysis to social analysis, particularly the analysis of social inequalities and exclusionary practices, as discourse produces and reproduces social inequalities through language use.\textsuperscript{48} One of the key theorists on CDA, Norman Fairclough, asserts that discourse is essentially “constitutive”, in that it constitutes or constructs things instead of simply reflecting or representing them.\textsuperscript{49} In CDA, discourse has three core constitutive functions: constructing social identities, social relationships, and systems of knowledge and belief.\textsuperscript{50} Ruth Wodak describes CDA as

\begin{quote}
...fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language...CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimised and so on by language use.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

This follows on from Jürgen Habermas’ assertion of language’s role as a means of domination through legitimisation of power structures.\textsuperscript{52} The focus here is on exposing, through discourse analysis of a group’s language, the group’s practices of discrimination within its discursively constructed parameters of identity, relationships and knowledge and belief systems, which describe both the group itself and how it sees others.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid. p. 26.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. p. 10.
\textsuperscript{52} Jürgen Habermas, \textit{Erkenntnis und Interesse}, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977, p. 259.
CDA focuses particularly on power, and how discourse creates certain interpretations of the world that become ideologically dominant.\(^{53}\) Ideology is here understood as defined by John B. Thompson, “meaning in the service of power”, \(^{54}\) i.e. a way of thinking that creates or reinforces power structures. Fairclough argues that ideological constructions of reality are “built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of discourse practices”, and as such “contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination”. \(^{55}\) Thus, for example, in the Ingrian Finnish case, the power structures that exist within lawmakers’ ability to legislate and define identity through citizenship and immigration law give the constitutive meaning in their discourse increased ideological weight, to create ideologically dominant constructions of Finnishness as it relates to Ingrians. Discourses function ideologically when they create what Titus Hjelm calls “‘proper’ ways of thinking about and doing things - yielding a one-sided account that ignores the variety of practices”. \(^{56}\) Similarly, Fairclough sees the ideologies inherent in discursive practices as “most effective when they become naturalised, and achieve the status of ‘common sense’”. \(^{57}\) The power position of politicians as policy-makers gives them greater capacity to create ideologically dominant discursive constructions. These discursive constructions may also become ideologically hegemonic when they become so dominant as to suppress any alternatives. \(^{58}\) In essence, CDA posits that discourse constructions create ideological constructions of reality informed by the context in which they are produced. These ideological constructions are discursively produced through meaning, but there are different extents to which they can become dominant or hegemonic. This focus on how meanings in discourse use language to create power relations and ideological systems of interpreting the empirical world is a core feature of the CDA approach.

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\(^{55}\) Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, p. 87.

\(^{56}\) Hjelm, “Discourse Analysis”, p. 141.

\(^{57}\) Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, p. 87.

\(^{58}\) Hjelm, “Discourse Analysis”, p. 141.
However, Wodak and her colleagues also note that approaches to CDA are not homogeneous, and indeed Hjelm argues that each CDA research project necessitates an individual research design. Existing approaches have been described by Wodak and colleagues as belonging to various “schools”, including the British school exemplified by Fairclough, which they see as closely linked to Foucauldian traditions of discourse analysis, with an emphasis on linguistic theory. Wodak self identifies as part of the Viennese school, which she sees as grounded in an historical dimension that integrates as much available historical context as possible, allowing for an analysis that traces diachronic change in discourses over time. Fairclough and Wodak are united in seeing discourse as a form of social practice, yet Wodak and colleagues in the Viennese school emphasise how social, institutional or situational contexts shape discourse, arguing that “discourse constitutes social practice and is at the same time constituted by it”. Within the field of national identity studies, Wodak and colleagues assert that CDA can throw light on the largely contingent and imaginary character of nation and …sharpen awareness of dogmatic, essentialist and naturalising conceptions of nation and national identity which…threaten or make impossible what [Habermas] has described as ‘difference-sensitive inclusion’, that is, equal pluralistic co-existence of various ethnic groups, language communities, religious communities and forms of life.

This conception of discourse analysis is most appropriate for the study of Finnish political discourses surrounding the Ingrian Return law, as it allows the critique of constructions of national identities formulated against the context of an increasingly pluralistic nation state with a foreign policy and economic situation also in flux. As is argued in this thesis, the formulations of national identity promoted in the discourses surrounding this law would frequently take on an essentialist and primordial approach to national identity and conceptualisations of “Finnishness” that ignore potential

65 Ibid. p. 9.
alternative views of Finland in the 1990s and 2000s as an increasingly diverse national community.

Along these lines, a critical discourse analysis of the Finnish Right to Return policy (through its legal language and the political language used in discussion of its origin, justification and implementation) can be used to trace changes in the constructed relationship between Finland as a national community of citizens and Finnishness as a national identity. Critical discourse analysis has already been employed successfully in studies that have examined constructions of national identity in political language. Teun A. van Dijk has studied exclusionary and racist “othering” in Western parliamentary discourses, particularly in France and the USA, asserting that racist language from political elites has the negative social function of legitimising exclusivist and discriminatory language, as it may be translated into more radical or explicit forms by the media or public at large.66 The politics of creating government legitimacy through democratic-majority consent, along with the high visibility of political elites whose statements and views are then widely filtered and disseminated by journalists and other media professionals (most notably during election campaigns), gives particular influence to political language as a far-reaching method of constructing exclusivist identity constructions,67 particularly at the level of national identity constructions. Political language is thus a particularly significant avenue for CDA research, given the social function of politicians, who may legally codify discriminatory, exclusivist or racist identity constructions at a national level.

Jeff Millar’s study on national language discourses in immigration and integration policy in Canada is a further recent example of CDA’s use to the study of political language. This analysis uses CDA methods to analyse Canadian politicians’ “language ideological consensus on immigration integration” in Canadian integration policies.68 Millar argues that such analysis reveals a “hybrid” discourse combining a neo-liberal discourse on language as a skill, an academic discourse on language as “communicative competency”, and a research discourse on language as a factor in

67 Ibid. p. 34.
immigrant integration. Transforms in the Canadian immigration policy regime, Millar argues, can thus be studied as responses to changes in these discourses, which themselves mediate changes in social practices and institutional structures associated with immigration policy. As with Millar’s approach, this thesis employs an adaptation of CDA as a framework to analyse policy changes, viewing these changes as related to contextual changes. Though the discourse on national language in the Ingrian Return law is of also prime importance to this paper, my approach here is broader than Millar’s, as it also examines other constitutive elements of national identity conveyed or employed by the political discourse on this law. In essence, this thesis employs a critical discourse analysis of Finland’s 1990-2010 Right to Return policy to describe the shifting definitions of national identity and Finnishness in this period, as Finland (and more broadly, Europe) adapted to the new post-Soviet international relations context of the 1990s and 2000s, as described in the previous chapter, the economic challenges to come in the late 2000s, and to some extent to increasing migration diversity.

C) Critical Linguistic Analysis and Political Rhetoric

Before proceeding to a discussion on how the thesis’ analysis will be undertaken, it is useful to note a significant area in which the thesis’ analytical approach may differ from other established CDA traditions. The critical linguistic nature of CDA has been described by Wodak as almost always informed by Hallidayan notions of “systemic functional grammar”, which she sees as significant for a proper understanding of CDA. The linguist Michael Halliday argues that there is an explicit relationship between grammatical structure and social structure that is not reflective, but rather symbiotic. He asserts:

we should say that linguistic structure is the realization of social structure, actively symbolising it in a process of mutual creativity. Because it stands as a metaphor for society, language has the property of not only transmitting the social order but also maintaining and potentially modifying it.

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69 Ibid. p. 20.
70 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
In essence, Hallidayan notions of the relationship between grammar or linguistic structure and the social structure it conveys would in theory necessitate a close reading of the linguistic and grammatical features of the discourse texts. In other words, if one takes the assertion that language and society are mutually creative and must be studied as mutually constitutive structures, analysis of discursively produced social phenomena should entail close reading of discourse. Indeed, within the field of analysing discourses on immigration amongst policy-makers, scholars like Luisa Martin Rojo and Teun A. van Dijk have already undertaken CDA research that employs analysis of linguistic structure, including grammar and semantic moves, in a case study of discourses on illegal migration in the Spanish parliament.\(^74\)

However, employing political rhetoric as the primary discursive text (as this thesis does) does not necessarily require this specific analysis of language as a close reading of linguistic or grammatical structure. Martin Reisigl, for instance, suggests a “politolinguistic” framework to the analysis of political rhetoric, combining linguistic analysis with political science to examine the way in which language is used to convey political goals.\(^75\) This may be carried out in a variety of political fields, from lawmaking procedure to political administration or the various aspects of political campaigning.\(^76\) Reisigl notes that this approach does not necessitate any particular form of linguistic analysis, and is flexible in terms of the analytical toolkit that may be employed to the study of political rhetoric, though he still sees linguistic analysis as a feature of critical discourse analysis.\(^77\) Such approaches may go beyond an analysis of strict linguistic structure, as Reisigl offers the study of expression of nonliteral speech – such as metaphors (nonliteral use of language to convey similarity), metonymies (the use of a single characteristic to identify an object) and synecdoches (the use of part an object to identify it in entirety) – as a potential area of study within political discourses, all of which place greater emphasis on interpretation of meanings than structural form for discursive analysis.\(^78\)

\(^{74}\) Luisa Martin Rojo and Teun A. van Dijk, “‘There was a Problem, and it was Solved!’ Legitimating the Expulsion of Illegal’ Migrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse”, *Discourse and Society*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1997, pp. 523-66.


\(^{76}\) Ibid.

\(^{77}\) Ibid. p. 118.

For the purpose of this thesis, I focus analytical attention on interpretation of meaning over grammatical and linguistic structures. As a non-native Finnish language user employing Finnish-language materials, my data has driven me towards methods of analysis that focus on content and meaning rather than grammatical features that are difficult for non-native speakers to identify. Therefore, my own linguistic background has shaped the methodological approach to source material in this thesis. However, to maintain the thoroughness of my methodological approach here, I have taken great care to maintain meaning and content in my translations of Finnish text to English, and also to provide the original Finnish citations in footnotes for Finnish-readers to consult. Specifically, my analysis traces changes in the meaning of various repeating characterisations of Finnish identity in the relevant political discourse, which are employed for political ends in shaping and refining legislative policy. These characterisations of Finnish identity are in this thesis termed “discursive resources”, and are elaborated on in the following section. This approach ascribes to characterisations of identity the role of linguistic device, as binary classification points employed to delineate between “Finnish” and “Other”. This approach also has a practical advantage in that, for a speaker of Finnish as a second language, electing to employ analysis of the grammatical structure or form of discourse texts may be somewhat incomplete (see also section F on sources).

D) Discursive Resources

The core concerns of this thesis are the construction of ethnicity and Finnish identity in Finnish immigration policy, and the use of primordial or ethnically exclusive national identity constructions in modern European nations. CDA as a methodological approach emphasises analysis of exclusionary practices, for as Wodak and colleagues see CDA, its primary purpose may be described thus:

The aim of Critical Discourse Analysis is to unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control, and dominance, as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use.79

79 Wodak et al., The Discursive Construction of National Identity, p. 8.
Similarly, the CDA approach described by Stephen Harold Riggins has been particularly concerned with unmasking exclusionist identity constructions that create the “Self” and the “Other” as outsider in the language of group definitions. The transformation of the discourses on the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return law, from Ingrian inclusion in 1990 to subsequent exclusion as the policy was reformed throughout the remainder of its validity, creates a shifting categorisation of Ingrians as first insiders in the Finnish national community, and then as the “Other” and outsider. There is thus a transition in language from inclusion to exclusion. The language of inclusion and exclusion in this policy avenue may reveal not only the nature of exclusionary practices as they affect Ingrians, but also broader patterns of national identity construction that exclude non-Ingrian or non-returnee migrants from politically salient definitions of Finnishness. The strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in the discourses employed are presented in this thesis as “discursive resources”, the characteristics that are constructed as constitutive elements of Finnish identity, and employed as resources within the political discussion to assert an ideology of inclusive or exclusive relationship between Finnish identity and Ingrians.

In reading the approximately 50 available parliamentary and legal texts concerning Ingrian Finns and their status in Finland, I have identified in my analysis of the language employed by Finnish policy-makers five core discursive resources. These five discursive resources cover the entire language of Finnish politicians and laws on Ingrian Finns, as the construction of Finnish identity in each text employs one or more of these discursive resources to convey Ingrian inclusion or exclusion in Finland. These resources are termed in this thesis as 1) the Finnish language, 2) the Lutheran religion, 3) an ancestral connection to ancient or pre-statehood Finland, 4) a socio-cultural orientation towards Sweden and Western Europe, in part through the socio-legal legacy from the Swedish Kingdom, which survived past 1809, and 5) a history of animosity and struggle against Russia/the USSR, from the Great Northern War of 1700-1721 to the Winter and Continuation Wars of 1939-1944. The Ingrian Finnish migration to Finland, I argue, presented Finnish politicians with a chance to evaluate or re-evaluate Ingrian conformity to these characteristics, as well as potentially the  

relative significance of these discursive resources as indicators of Finnish identity at this time.

I have defined and categorised these resources based on an analysis of the primary and related data; all statements on the nature of Finnish identity in these data address at least one of these categories. These discursive resources are employed in Finnish political discourses on the Right to Return law, in whole or in part, as the elements of Finnish identity. I do not posit that these particular discursive resources are necessarily the only indicators of Finnish identity provided or promoted by Finnish politicians at this time, as other representations of Finnish identity may be present in studies of other laws or discussions. I have limited myself to the discursive resources that are relevant for the Ingrian Right to Return migration discussions. One may see instantly limitations to these discursive resources’ applicability to Finnish identity as a whole, given Finland’s constitutionally recognised status, for instance, as a bilingual state, to say nothing of its long-established linguistic (for instance, the speakers of Sami languages and Swedish) and confessional (for instance, Finnish Orthodox) minorities. However, these discursive resources are analysed as amalgamating (and then, separating) resources, as they link Ingrian Finns to (and then, disconnect them from) Finnish identity. Analysing how these characterisations of Finnish identity were employed as discursive resources to these ends is the core research focus of this thesis.

E) Themes

As the analytical framework employed in this thesis is primarily concerned with analysis of meaning, I have begun my analysis by separating the relevant source documents into themes, which represent at the most superficial level what these documents are “about”, or what particular aspect or rationalisation of the Ingrian Return they aim to contribute to or challenge. These themes do not represent a formal “coding” of the source material, but rather more hypothetical categories that have guided the way I approached analysis of my primary source material. This has allowed me to analyse how identity is constructed through use of discursive resources in the different ways in which the Ingrian Return policy was presented. These presentations of the Ingrian Finnish Return law are organised thematically into five
interconnected sections that broadly represent the ways the Ingrian Finnish Return was discussed by policy-makers. The language of these themes is informed both by notions of immigrant integration, and by reference to historical connections between Finland and Ingrians. The analysis of the construction of Finnishness pertaining to Ingrians in these themes is undertaken across two chapters chronologically, with a focus on changes in the construction of Ingrian inclusion in Finnish national identity, at first in the era of the initial formation of the policy (1990-1995), and then in the era of subsequent reformed and limited formations of the policy (1996-2010).

The themes that have emerged from my initial reading of the primary data describe the aim of each speech or data piece, i.e. what position it appears to advocate. All data I have come across referring to the Ingrian Return law conforms to at least one of these themes, which are frequently also interlinked. These themes have been defined and categorised in this thesis as follows:

The theme of integration capability, which highlights the notion that immigrants who share common identity constructions with the receiving country will thus be easily integrated into, or indeed already belong to, the receiving country’s dominant or mainstream society, especially when compared to immigrant groups whose identity is constructed as different or opposed to the mainstream. In the Finnish context, this may also be discussed as related to the negative discourse on Russians (and their potential for lower integration capability than Ingrians). This theme also involves notions of homeland, i.e. Finland as the homeland of Ingrian Finns over Ingria itself, which relates somewhat to the theme on the legacy of Sweden in this region. The focus of the integration capability theme is not the qualification or proof of Ingrian Finns’ Finnishness, but rather whether Ingrians evidently are Finnish, and should be automatically accepted in Finland as such.

The theme of historical atonement, a significant aspect of right to return policies in general as highlighted in the first chapter, which posits that the modern state has duties to those who have suffered under its previous incarnations. In the Finnish context, this refers particularly to the Second World War history of Ingria, the effects of the Siege of Leningrad on the Ingrian Finnish population, and the post-war deportation of Ingrian Finnish refugees in Finland to the USSR. This also relates to
the theme of a negative appraisal of the Soviet Union by reflecting the Stalin-era persecution of ethnic minorities in the USSR, followed by the deportation of Ingrian refugees in Finland back to the USSR immediately after the Second World War, and later by Finlandisation and Soviet appeasement within Finnish Cold War-era foreign policy. This theme places the onus on Finland, rather than Soviet successor states like Russia or Estonia, to atone for Ingrian suffering at the hands of the Soviet government.

The theme of a humanitarian imperative, which follows on from the notion of historical atonement, but also alludes to the duty of states to their perceived ethnic kin in contemporary situations of instability. In Russia, this includes the notion of the “lawless 1990s” (particularly in St Petersburg) and the early 1990s food shortages crisis. This theme also relates to the negative theme on Russia and the Soviet Union, either as the cause of this humanitarian problem, or as incapable of offering adequate protection to those within its borders. Indeed, Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson described the Finnish border with Russia in 1996 as follows:

For centuries, the Finnish-Russian border was the cultural divide between the East and West, fought over time and again in repeated clashes of civilizations. For almost 80 years, it was the frontline of Western democracy facing Soviet communism. Today, it is the steepest welfare gap in Europe.81

Finnish perceptions of Russia at this time, as seen here, were influenced by perceptions of living standards, with the result that the gap between Finland and Russia now transcends cultural and political cleavages to become a gap in welfare and quality of life. In this theme, Finnish politicians are able to imagine Finland as a humanitarian provider for Ingrians, who particularly in the 1990s were vulnerable to deprivation in Russia. This deprivation could be driven by Ingrians’ minority status and perceived outsider position within the new Russian-dominated Russian Federation.

The theme of a positive Swedish legacy, which relates to a construction of the era of Swedish rule in Finland as a defining period in the formation of modern Finland (particularly in terms of legal structure and cultural orientation towards the West).

This theme may indicate either Ingria as linked to Finland through common Swedish/Western heritage (thereby relating it to the first theme on the integration capability of Ingrians in Finland), or Ingrian Finns as remnants of a Western nation now left on the “wrong” side of the border between Eastern and Western Europe (suggested also in the discussions on integration capability and negative relations with Russia/the Soviet Union).

Both this positive interpretation of the Swedish period in Finland’s history and the negative interpretation of the Russian/Soviet periods discussed in the next section are examples of discursively produced interpretations that use history. “History” in this sense refers not only to the details of historic fact, but also to the narrative produced by “historians” (in this case, Finnish law-makers) using these facts. Historian Keith Jenkins argues that “history always conflates, it changes, it exaggerates aspects of the past”. He goes on to write:

I have argued that history is a shifting discourse constructed by historians and that from the existence of the past no one reading is entailed: change the gaze, shift the perspective and new readings appear.

Thus, if one moves past an understanding of history as an unchanging narrative unrelated to the historian who reproduces it, towards an understanding of history as discursively produced to serve a particular discourse objective, the use of history by Finnish law-makers becomes a further example of discursive production of national identity. In essence, this discursive production of national identity is informed by historical themes that are grounded in a certain reading of the past.

By the 1990s, the historiography of the early modern Swedish Kingdom had been reanimated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Estonia. The transformation of the Baltic Sea region, creating what David J. Smith has called the “Nordic Near Abroad”, brought with it attempts (most notably, the creation of the intergovernmental Council of Baltic Sea States) to replace East-West divides in the

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83 Ibid.
region with a new notion of “Northernness”. Even beyond the collapse of the Iron Curtain, governments in the 1990s were expanding this idea of Northern European identity beyond the Nordic Council states (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Iceland) and into new territories with conflicting national identities. The establishment of the European Centre for Minority Issues in Flensburg, a town in Schleswig-Holstein, the German state nearest the Danish border, was in part a response to the history of identity cleavages between German and Danish-speakers there. For the former Soviet nations, however, the concept of Northern European identity would also have a revisionist aspect. Estonia’s then-Foreign Minister, now President, Toomas Hendrik Ilves delivered a notable speech to the Swedish Institute for International Affairs on 14 December 1999 arguing that Estonia, as well as Finland, belonged to a Northern European cultural identity he termed “Yuleland”, based on the etymologically related words for Christmas, or Yuletide, found in the UK, Finland (Joulu), Estonia (Jõul), Iceland (Jól), Sweden, Denmark and Norway (Jul). The historian Pärtel Piirimäe has argued that such new concepts of a broader Northern Europe are built on the long-held popular Estonian vision of the “Good Old Swedish Age”, marked by enlightened Swedish governance and an improvement in peasant living standards (the perception of the Swedish Kingdom has often been that of a relatively advanced democracy in early modern Europe, especially since in the Swedish Kingdom, quite unlike in the rest of Europe, there was nominal representation for “peasants”, dependent on how this term is defined, to represent themselves in the Swedish Riksdag). In post-Soviet Estonia, for instance, there were state-sponsored attempts to link the contemporary state to the old Swedish kingdom, with its associated benefits of an established democratic pedigree, including the reconstruction of the Lion of Narva, a Swedish-era monument that Stuart Burch and David J. Smith see as “part of a state-sponsored effort to banish the Soviet past and

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reconnect with a past “Golden Age”, in 2000. This took place as Estonia sought to conversely minimise the physical reminders of its Soviet past, most infamously, the removal of the Bronze Soldier monument from central Tallinn in 2007, prompting rioting from the city’s Russian-speaking minority. Baltic independence, and the related decline in Russian influence in the region (though still considerable), allowed for a certain re-flowering of positive Swedish assessment amongst its former governed territories on the Baltic, which as previously discussed, also had a long tradition in Finnish political discourse. Indeed, negative appraisals of the Paasilv-Kekkonen line and Finlandisation, as discussed in chapter two, were grounded in the idea, as expressed by Sami Moisio, that it relegated Finland to the status of “a vassal state of the Soviet Union and thereby located in ‘Eastern Europe’ – a concept that has been highly political since the eighteenth century”. Finland’s status as a Western European nation, linked to Sweden, is the reverse side to this; it can be reinforced by a discursive construction of shared Swedish-Finnish (and Ingrian) history, and it underlines Finland’s claim to the more politically desirable status of a Western European state.

The theme of a negative Russian/USSR legacy, a counterweight to the previous positive interpretation of history, suggests a negative construction of the periods of Russian and Soviet control, both for Ingrians and Finland, including a negative construction of Russians as “the Other”, a common antagonist to Finn and Ingrian Finn alike.

The negative reception that Russia and Russians may receive in Finland is an oft-observed and described phenomenon: the third country report on Finland from the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance in 2007 cited Russian-speakers in Finland as an “at-risk” group, noting negative perceptions of Russians amongst society and within the public and political discourse. Indeed,

89 For more information, see Pronksöö: Vene Mäss Tallinnas (Bronze Night: The Russian Riot in Tallinn), dir. Urmas E. Lüü. Film, AS Kanal 2 Tallinn, 2007.
the report notes the use of Finnish derogatory terms for Russian-speakers, such as the fairly ubiquitous *ryssä*, denoting a Russian but considered as a general insult as opposed to the more neutral term *venäläinen*. Likewise, *Helsingin Sanomat* has reported on the results of an extensive Gallup International poll that revealed 64% of Finnish respondents had a “very negative” or “somewhat negative” view of Russia (only amongst respondents from Kosovo was the percentage expressing a negative view of Russians higher). The memory and public commemoration of independence and the Winter and Continuation Wars, strengthening the image of Russians as the independent Finnish nation state’s historical enemy, underscores this perception. In essence, this discourse presents the Cold War period as evidence of Russian otherness, in opposition to the Western/Nordic tradition to which Finns and Ingrians are deemed to belong, as well as highlighting the vulnerability of Ingrian Finns (and more broadly, related Finnic-language speaking groups) as minorities in Russia, evidenced through Ingrian suffering under Soviet rule.

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Figure 13
Summary of Themes and Discursive Resources

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I argue in this thesis that in each theme of discussion on the Ingrian Finnish Return law, there was a change in the way Ingrians were presented by Finnish policymakers in relation to the discursive resources of Finnish identity construction. Dividing the analysis of the discussion on the Ingrian Finnish Return law into themes thereby allows the analysis to address the various changes in the different facets of this discussion.

F) Sources

In compiling this analysis for my thesis, I have primarily drawn on the language of the Ingrian Right to Return provisions in the 1991 Finnish Aliens Act and its amendments (1996, 2002 and 2010), as well as the parliamentary questions and committee reports from the Eduskunta, the Finnish parliament. I have also examined the reports and recommendations of several Finnish ministries, including the Työministeriö (Ministry of Labour), Sisäasianministeriö (Ministry of Interior Affairs), Ulkoasianministeriö (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Sosiaali- ja Terveysministeriö (Ministry of Health and Social Services), which reflect the fact that responsibility for immigration in Finland is spread amongst several different government bodies.94

The Eduskunta parliamentary questions and statements make up the bulk of my primary data. Of these, the written questions (kirjalliset kysymykset) submitted by members of the Eduskunta to ministers are the most common. Generally, these questions ask for clarification from relevant ministries as to how policy is being implemented, and whether a particular factor is being considered. Other forms of data from the Eduskunta are budget allocation requests (talousarvioaloitteet) and new budget initiatives (raha-asia-aloitteet) from Eduskunta members, which request or suggest funding for new or expanded programs, in this case particularly concerned with integration programs and pension provisions for Ingrians in Finland. These forms of political data are employed across the timeframe of this thesis, but are particularly dominant for the later period of analysis (1996 – 2010). In part, this is reflective of constitutional changes to Finland at this time: reforms in the 1990s,

including 28 new amendments to the Constitutional Acts of Finland, and eventually a new Constitution in 2000, curtailed presidential powers in favour of the Eduskunta and limited the significance of the presidency as a decision-making institution.\textsuperscript{95} Thus, whereas explanations of political decisions by President Koivisto are of paramount importance in the analysis of the Return policy in its early period (see chapter four), the positions of subsequent Presidents Martti Ahtisaari (in office 1994-2000) and Tarja Halonen (in office 2000-2012) on the Ingrians are relatively unknown. By this stage, the Eduskunta had become the exclusive political institution considering the Ingrian Return law, and thus by this stage in the thesis, analysis has moved to focus largely on its members and ministers.

It should also be noted here that the nature of political sources in Finland impinges on the analysis possible in this thesis. Finland’s party system has traditionally been dominated by three parties, the Kansallinen Kokoomus (National Coalition Party), Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (Finnish Social Democratic Party) and Suomen Keskusta (Finnish Centre Party). These are organised around traditional left-right and centre-periphery cleavages – the National Coalition serving the centre-right, the Social Democrats the centre-left, and the Centre Party being traditionally agrarian and in favour of decentralisation from the metropole in Helsinki.\textsuperscript{96} Though together these parties have garnered an average of 63\% of the national vote since 1945, none has formed a government outright in this same period.\textsuperscript{97} Coalition governments uniting two of the three major parties have been the norm, the most common being the “red-earth” (punamulta) partnership between the Centre and Social Democrat parties,\textsuperscript{98} though in the period of greatest relevance to this thesis (1990-2010), there have also been porvari (bourgeois) Centre-National Coalition coalitions (1991-1995, 2007-2011) and sinipuna (red-blue) Social Democrat-National Coalition coalitions (1995-2003). These two-party alliances have not, however, governed alone; rather, they have always involved a few smaller, niche interest parties, which include those aligned to the environmentalist cause (Vihreä liitto, The Greens of Finland), the broadly defined leftist movement (Vasemmistoliitto, Left Alliance), a particular minority group

\textsuperscript{96} Aylott, Blomgren and Bergman, Political Parties in Multi-Level Polities, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
(Svenska folkpartiet i Finland, or Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue, the Swedish People’s Party of Finland), and even populism (Suomen Maaseudun Puolue, Finnish Rural Party, or more recently, Perussuomalaiset, True Finns). Frequently, and indeed in 20 of the last 37 governments formed in Finland since 1945, Finnish governments have actually involved a “surplus majority” – a coalition government including more parties than actually necessary to form government. This is fairly unique in the Nordic region, and is largely informed by history and constitutional peculiarities in Finland, including a constitutional provision (ended in 1992) that allowed a third of MPs to delay final adoption of an ordinary law until after the next election. Prior to 1992, this meant that a successful government required more than an absolute majority, and was obliged to include smaller parties in a larger coalition.

From this basis, Finnish political culture has embraced the tradition of large coalition governments, which has also aided in balancing cabinet assignments.

From reading Eduskunta sources, one also sees these broad coalitions have an effect on the political language in Finland, which is considerably less adversarial than in largely two-party systems like the Westminster model. All of the current political parties in Finland have experienced time in coalition government, with one notable exception, the True Finns. Political scientists examining Finland’s party system, such as Aylott, Blomgren and Bergman, as well as Johanna Korhonen, have recently begun arguing that the True Finns, who have challenged the pro-European political consensus amongst the other parties, have presented a challenge to the Nordic coalition-consensus model in Finland and could make the language of Finnish political discourse more adversarial, with issue-based cleavages more apparent. Yet these developments are very recent, dating primarily from the True Finns’

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99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid.  
101 Ibid.  
102 Ibid.  
103 Ibid.  
105 Aylott, Blomgren and Bergman, Political Parties in Multi-Level Polities, p. 91.  
unprecedented electoral gains in the 2011 Finnish parliamentary election,\textsuperscript{107} and are thus largely outside this thesis’ timeframe. By and large, the language of Finnish political discourse surrounding the Ingrian Finnish law shows the level of consensus encouraged by the party system’s broad coalition nature. It is important to note this here, as such language obscures potential party disagreements on this issue, and Finnish political source documents may thus give an illusion of greater consensus than may actually exist on a particular issue.

Indeed, the consensus-orientated nature of Finnish politics extends into the decision-making process, which may also present a challenge to using Finnish political sources as documents for analysis. In particular, this may further obscure potential party disagreements on policy within both the government itself and the Eduskunta. Finland, like its Scandinavian neighbours, works on a political decision-making system of so-called Nordic “consensus democracy”, characterised in part by “a high degree of concertation in the gestation of public policy”.\textsuperscript{108} Government bills are generally introduced in plenary sessions, but are then sent to inter-party specialised committees, where the proposed bill’s details are debated and agreed upon, before returning to plenary for final decision.\textsuperscript{109} As all political parties are represented in these committees, the bill they produce would be unlikely to face significant opposition by the time it is voted on in parliament. Individual members of parliament may also submit a Member’s Initiative as a legislative proposal, but by contrast, these rarely make it past the first plenary session, and are employed primarily to attract attention or awareness from the media or general public.\textsuperscript{110}

However, of greatest significance for this research project has been that, though the reports produced by the relevant committee on legislation related to the Ingrian Return policy are available to read, along with materials from experts the committee members have consulted, the protocols of committee meetings are not. There is thus no chance to find evidence here of any party disagreements that may have arisen on the policy in its gestation stage, and it is not possible to learn what, if any, parts of the

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\textsuperscript{107} Aylott, Blomgren and Bergman, Political Parties in Multi-Level Polities, pp. 118-9.
\textsuperscript{108} Arter, Democracy in Scandinavia, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{109} Aylott, Blomgren and Bergman, Political Parties in Multi-Level Polities, p. 89.
\end{flushleft}
policy were contentious at the time of initial debate. What one sees, rather, is that when politicians have publically questioned the provisions of the Right to Return policy (from both within and outside the government), the government has ultimately responded with amendments to the policy. There is no need for intense criticism of the policy, as virtually all parties have had a hand in its design and implementation. It is therefore not possible to form a conclusive schema of the Finnish political spectrum on this particular policy issue based on the available documentation from the Eduskunta. I have kept this in mind when conducting the analysis in this thesis – the absence of strong political debate on the issue, as well as a policy development that follows the issues raised in parliament quite directly, may not be taken as proof that the national identity constructions produced by this policy are wholly uncontested.

The core primary research data for this thesis is a collection of approximately 50 statements to parliament (primarily in the form of members’ initiatives or written questions to government ministers) and government acts. Additionally, I have used a smaller number of commissioned ministerial and committee reports, and recorded speeches and interviews from prominent Finnish political figures. Materials from the Eduskunta, ministerial reports and many of the recorded political speeches by President Koivisto and others are available either only in Finnish, or in Finnish and Swedish. Quotations from these sources use the original Finnish-language texts, which I have translated to English (unless otherwise noted in the footnote reference for the citation). In the conclusion of the thesis I discuss further avenues for research in this field, including linguistic and structural analysis methodologies that may be undertaken by native or near-native Finnish speakers.

Finally, I acknowledge the potential limitations to the results found in this thesis that arise from the limitations of conducting research on a single policy. From an analysis of the Ingrian Return policy, we can only know what that particular policy tells us about Finnish identity construction. Analysis of a different policy, or set of policies, could yield a different set of discursive resources to describe Finnish identity. Given the significance of immigration and citizenship policies in legally codifying identity constructions at a state level, such policies are an important data source for analysis of national identity construction. For Finland, the nature of the Ingrian Return law as an extensive immigration program responding to particularly significant changes in the
economic and political environments makes it particularly important for analysis. It is not, however, the only policy that can be analysed in such a manner.

G) Summary

The methodological toolkit employed in this thesis is an adaptation of discourse analysis informed by poststructuralist and critical discourse analysis theories, particularly the Viennese School of CDA as expressed primarily by Wodak and colleagues examining meaning in political discussions and policy language as production and reproduction of exclusivist and essentialist national identity concepts. I differ from Wodak and colleagues in my exclusive focus on meaning over linguistic and grammatical structures, which arises from the nature of my primary data. I follow CDA’s assertion that language as discourse is historical, and should be viewed within its context, by focusing on the changing socio-political, economic and international relations situation in Finland as the policy was developed, reformulated, and ultimately cancelled. This includes the changing context for Finland both in the political development of post-Cold War Europe and the diversification of immigration and the Finnish citizenry, particularly explored in chapter five.

I undertake this analysis by organising source documents chronologically, separated into an initial period of implementation (chapter four) between 1990 and 1995 and a later period of reforms and restrictions (chapter five) from 1996, ultimately culminating in the policy’s end in 2010. Within these two chapters, I have organised discussion around five identified themes in the political discussion, which indicate the aspect of rationale for the Ingrian Return policy the speaker is addressing at the most superficial level. I analyse how each theme shows change or consistency in the construction of Finnishness, and how Ingrians are seen to conform to this, by examining the discursive resources of Finnishness represented in their discussion.
CHAPTER FOUR
FINNISHNESS AND THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INGRIAN FINNISH
RETURN 1990-1995

This chapter explores the constructions of Finnish identity present in the political
discussions on the Ingrian Right to Return in its initial incarnation, from early 1990 to
1995, just before the implementation of additional requirements to the law in 1996.
Finnish politicians’ language on Ingrian Finns and their “return” to Finland
immediately after 1990 reflects distinct presentations of Finnishness and what it
specifically entails. As highlighted in chapter three, I argue that five principal
characteristics of Finnish identity emerge within these discussions – namely the
Finnish language, Lutheran religion, ancestral connection to ancient or early modern
(usually pre-Russian annexation in 1809) Finland, a cultural and political orientation
that points westward to Scandinavia, and a history of struggle against the East, Russia
or the Soviet Union – which are employed by Finnish politicians here as discursive
resources to include (or potentially exclude) Ingrians in their construction of
Finnishness.

Political discussions on Ingrian Finnish return migration, as described in this chapter,
began in the early 1990s with an assumption that Ingrians largely conformed to these
characteristics and were thus part of an identification of Finnishness that goes beyond
citizenship status to more ethno-cultural constructions of national identity. One may
argue that individually, these strands of Finnish identity have never accurately
reflected the Finnish population. Notably, they fail to include Swedish and Sami
speakers who are officially recognised by the Finnish state, and there is a Finnish
Orthodox Church with adherents primarily in the provinces of North and South
Karelia in Eastern Finland. However, the accuracy of these identity characteristics is a
separate argument, and of limited significance to how Finnishness was actually
presented by politicians at this time. Groups that do not conform to one identity
characteristic may perform an important symbolic function for another. For example,
non-native Finnish speakers like the Sami or Karelians may form an important link
between contemporary Finnish language/culture and its related Finno-Ugric
antecedents, underscoring the characteristic of an ancestral relationship to pre-historic
Finland. Similarly, the Swedish-speaking community may serve as a living memento of Finland’s Swedish past, associated with its cultural and historical ties to the West and Scandinavia and the arrival of Lutheranism in Finland.

Ingrians are initially discussed in the Finnish political context as largely conforming to these five discursive resources of Finnish identity present in the political discussions. With post-1990 return migration, and actual contact with Ingrians, Finnish lawmakers appeared to acknowledge that, in fact, their conforming to many of these identity markers was more problematic than anticipated. Yet at this point, there was not yet any real challenge to the idea that Ingrian Finns were inextricably linked to the Finnish nation state, or that their “lost Finnishness” couldn’t be rapidly regained. It is a primordialist presentation of identity that, for the most part, emerges in these early discussions of Ingrian return migration, which presupposes a connection to the Finnish nation state based on shared Finnishness. Though these discursive resources as constructions of Finnish identity may fail, as acknowledged by the mid-1990s, to present themselves fully within the new Ingrian Finnish community in Finland, Finnish lawmakers appeared at this time to believe this version of Finnishness remained within the Ingrians, buried deep in spirit and soul, ready to be rediscovered once back on Finnish soil.

This chapter discusses the political discourses on the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return between 1990 and 1995, in first part, by examining the background to Mauno Koivisto’s April 1990 statement and the initial legislation (though minimal) on this issue. From here, the chapter discusses five distinct but interrelated themes that emerge in the political discussion on Ingrians, which in the immediate period assume Ingrian conformity to the aforementioned five discursive resources constructing Finnish identity, though evidence of change emerges by mid-decade. This chapter will therefore firstly review the Koivisto interview of 1990 and its significance in shaping the Right to Return policy above any concrete or specific legal provision or legislation on Ingrians, before proceeding to analyse each discussion theme, and the views of Ingrian identity (consistent, or changing) they present. Such an analysis reveals a rather resilient construction of Ingrians as linked to the Finnish state, which actually continues even past acknowledgements in the discourse themes of the limits of Ingrian conformity to the most significant constructions of Finnish identity.
A) Mauno Koivisto’s Statement and Initial Legislation on the Ingrian Return

1990-1995

Although Finnish immigration legislation around the time of the Ingrian Return law’s inception in the early 1990s does provide some qualifications for how returnee status should be allocated, the decision to include Ingrians as returnees was effectively made at the discretion of then President Mauno Koivisto in early 1990. By the late 1980s, reform of Finland’s immigration and citizenship laws had already begun, and the Ministry of the Interior had received a report from Parliament’s Working Group on the Aliens Act (Ulkomaalaislakityöryhmä) in February 1989 with recommendations on the drafting of a new law. This report’s opinion on returnee status had clearly defined generational limits in its applicability, as it states when considering those entitled to be granted returnee status: “The committee considers those foreigners that have family roots in Finland, that is at least one parent being or having been a Finnish citizen, to be in the same position as a Finnish citizen”.\(^1\) This formation of Finnish immigration policy appears most relevant for the pre-1990 context, in which returnee status was aimed primarily at those Finnish citizens who had left in the 1950s and 1960s for Sweden and North America and their immediate families, as discussed in the second chapter of this thesis. However, by late 1989 and the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the shifts in Finland’s international context were apparent, and were highlighted at several points throughout 1989-1990 by President Koivisto and his ministers. Discussion of Finland’s immigration policy shifted eastwards, transforming a discussion of Ingria and Ingrian Finns in purely humanitarian-aid terms into a discussion on immigration and the “Finnishness” of Ingrians.

Early on in the history of the Ingrian Finnish issue after the Soviet Union’s collapse, plans to transfer the Ingrian population from Russia based on political views of their cultural heritage and identity were also discussed in newly independent Estonia. Arnold Rüütel, Chairman of the Estonian Soviet from 1990-1992 (and later President

from 2001-2006), floated the idea of creating an autonomous Ingrian Finnish region of Estonia, as he discussed in an interview with Finnish television:

Because there were many Ingrians in Estonia, I proposed a referendum on whether these Finno-Ugric people wanted an autonomous district in Russia or Estonia. Estonia didn’t have anything against the idea that Ingrians would become part of Estonia, but the people should be given the right to decide democratically.²

This plan, however, would ultimately come to nothing. Rüütel describes his discussions with his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin, and attempts to continue the plan once a new President and Prime Minister took office in Estonia in October 1992:

Yeltsin said that he was unfamiliar with the situation but would look into it and we could meet and discuss it later. I gave President Lennart Meri and Prime Minister Mart Laar the notes from my discussion with Yeltsin, and I hoped that they would use them. However, it seems that they did not act that way.³

This discussion on planned Ingrian migration to Estonia is often overlooked in the discussion on the Finnish Right to Return law. Finland was not, it transpires, the only nation to set itself up as the protector of perceived ethnic kin in Russia. Indeed, Rüütel’s own description of Ingrians as a Finno-Ugric people (thus also related to Estonians in a broader Finno-Ugric identity construction), and his impression that Ingrians would live better amongst their related kin in Estonia than in Russia, parallels concurrent discussions amongst Finnish politicians presented in this chapter. However, the lack of interest, willingness or political capital from future Estonian leaders in pursuing this area has meant that the Finnish policy for Ingrian migration from Russia became the dominant policy program concerning Ingrians at this time.

According to Seppo Tiitinen, the director of Finland’s Secret Police (Suojelupoliisi, or Supo) from 1978 to 1990, Koivisto’s initial concerns were humanitarian, and began to

take shape concretely in early 1990. In an interview presented on Finnish television in 2013, Tiitinen claimed:

Koivisto’s starting point was that the Ingrians, mainly the older generation, had endured much over the decades. Therefore, for the Finnish side it could be justified to arrange for them better living conditions than would be possible in the Soviet Union. On that basis, Koivisto wanted to know the number of Ingrians and the potential effects if a large number were moved here... It was actually on 18 January 1990, when Koivisto gave me the task of informing the Ministry of the Interior that we would be prepared to take in the Ingrians.4

It was approximately three months later that President Koivisto discussed this decision publicly, and advanced his own rationale for making it. On 10 April 1990, Koivisto gave an interview on foreign policy on the Finnish national broadcasting company’s current affairs talk show Ajankohtainen kakkonen. Questions focused at first on the emerging Baltic republics and the changing security circumstances in Europe with a reunifying Germany, all topics Koivisto had highlighted in speeches in the previous months, before turning to the topic of Koivisto’s Ingrian policy. Interviewer Ilkka Saari posed the question:

Let’s go then generally to this question of public opinion’s influence on foreign policy. Is public opinion, or has it been, influencing the fact that Finland has now decided to take in Ingrians to the country?5

In response, Koivisto outlined his rationale for expanding the Right to Return policy from the generational limits outlined in the 1989 Committee Report to encompass the Ingrian Finns. Pausing briefly to consider his words, he replied:

I don’t believe so. You see, this is a question of relatively modest proportions, at least so far. Perhaps it has had some influence. In any case, it’s about the fact that these are Finns, who by Swedish decree at the time were transferred to the area, and for example in religion are very


5 “Ilkka Saari and Eero Ojanperä interview President Mauno Koivisto”, Ajankohtainen kakkonen, 10 April 1990. Broadcast by YLE 2, Finland. Author’s own transcription. Original Finnish text: Mennäänpä sitten yleensä tähän kysymykseen kansalaismielipiteen vaikutuksesta ulkopoliitiikkaan. Onko, tai oliko kansalaismielipiteällä vaikutusta siihen, että Suomi on nyt päättänyt ottaa maahan inkeriläisiä?
strongly Lutheran rather than Orthodox, so yes they are suitable for these Right to Return criteria, although they have lived there [in Ingria] for a long time.\(^6\)

Despite his own assertion that the issue was of only modest importance in Finnish foreign policy, Koivisto’s comments on the Ingrians are significant in that they reveal a construction of Finnish identity tied to the West, specifically through the Lutheran religion, which separates Finns and Ingrians alike from Russians in the Gulf of Finland region. Koivisto’s aforementioned statements later that year in Paris on the relative stability of the Nordic region against the increasing ethnic fragmentation of the Soviet Union-in-crisis,\(^7\) along with his several statements linking Finland’s historical ties to Scandinavia to notions of human rights and stability,\(^8\) have indicated a discourse of Finland’s belonging in the Nordic region as positively distinguishing it from Russia and the USSR. The use of Lutheranism and Swedish history as discursive resources links Ingrians to this positive construction of Norden and the West.

Finland was by no means alone amongst Western nations in pursuing a Right to Return policy at this time: as noted by Liebkind\(\textit{et al.}\), in the 1980s and 1990s around a million Soviet and ex-Soviet citizens emigrated to Israel, Germany or Greece based on similar right to return policies built on conceptions of ancestry and an ethno-culturally defined national community.\(^9\) Here in Koivisto’s statement, however, some early incarnations of the central discursive resources involved in constructing Finnish identity are already present. The ancestral connection, the common Lutheran faith and to a certain extent the notion of cultural inheritance from Sweden are mentioned, and presented quite matter-of-factly as evidence of the Finnishness of Ingrians. A statement on the identity of Finns, which here includes Ingrians, thus emerges from Koivisto’s earliest approaches to Ingría, the fall of the Soviet Union and migration reform.

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\(^6\) Ibid. Original Finnish text: \textit{En uskoisi. Tässähän on kysymys verrattain vaatimattomasta, vaatimattomista, mittasuhteista ainakin toistaiseksi. Ehkä sillä on ollut joku vaikutus. Joka tapauksessa on kysymys siitä, että nämä ovat suomalaisia, jotka Ruotsin vallan toimesta aikoinaan on sille alueelle siirretty, esimerkiksi uskonnonltaan he ovat hyvin vahvasti Luterilaisia, eivätkö Ortodoksisia, niin että heihin kyllä soveltuvat nämä takaisinmuuttajien kriteerit, vaikka nämä suvat ovat siellä varsin pitkään eläneet.}

\(^7\) Koivisto, “Speech by the President of the Republic, Mauno Kovisto, at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on May 9, 1990”, p. 7.

\(^8\) Koivisto, \textit{Foreign Policy Standpoints}, p. 180.

On 22 February 1991, some ten months after the Koivisto interview on *Ajankohtainen kakkonen*, the *Eduskunta* passed the new 1991 Aliens Act, which reformed the immigration system per the instructions of the 1989 Committee report. The core area of concern for Ingrian Finnish would-be returnees, Section 18, reads as follows:

The conditions for granting residence permits abroad
A temporary residence permit may be granted if
1) a close relative of the alien resides in Finland or if the alien has other ties to Finland,
2) the alien will be studying at an educational institution in Finland and his/her livelihood is secure,
3) the alien may be granted a work permit, or if his/her income in Finland is otherwise secured, or if
4) there are compelling humanitarian reasons or other special reasons for granting a license.¹⁰

At first glance, the legislative language appears unremarkable. There is no specific mention of Ingrians or other groups to draw immediate attention. However, when viewed with Koivisto’s decision on Ingrians and his April 1990 statement in mind, points one and four of the new Aliens Act appear sufficiently broad to encompass returnee status for the Ingrian Finns, depending on if the core argument is for the Ingrians’ connection to Finland, which would be covered in point one. This comes despite Koivisto’s own admission that the homeland of the Ingrians had been Russia for “some time”. Alternatively, there are the humanitarian concerns, and the move to protect Ingrian Finns from inferred persecution, hostility and hardship in the USSR and Russian Federation, which would be covered in point four. The 1991 Aliens Act, although amended numerous times, and with specific effect for the Ingrian Finnish returnees in 1996 and 2002-2003 (as discussed in chapter five of this thesis), was the primary legal document codifying Finnish returnee immigration. The 1991 Act was replaced in 2004 by a new Aliens Act, though the Ingrian Finnish Return policy continued as a feature of Finnish immigration law until 2010.

Between 1990 and 1995, there was no specific legal language concerning the status of Soviet, Russian or Estonian citizens as Finnish returnees. Indeed, in November 1991 Social Democrat parliamentarian Paavo Lipponen (who, incidentally, had worked in the office of Mauno Koivisto when the latter served as Prime Minister in the late 1970s and early 1980s) submitted a written question to Parliament on this issue, noting:

For Ingrians, there has not been created any form of returnee program. State and local authorities have been forced to work on Ingrian return matters without a complete program and a clear definition of returnee status…A lack of legislative basis has in part made it difficult for expatriate Finns to come and settle in Finland. Among other things, whether they have the right to vote is a question awaiting an answer.11

A response to Lipponen’s question came from the Labour Minister Ilkka Kanerva, yet Kanerva is brief and matter-of-fact on the legal basis for Ingrian returnee status, noting only that “Soviet Finns were designated returnees in April 1990”.12 In light of later statements provided by Tiitinen, indicating that the decision to designate Ingrians as returnees was taken some months before Koivisto publically announced the shift in April 1990, this statement does not appear wholly accurate. No suggestion of plans to legally codify Ingrian return migration is given, and justification appears to rest uniquely on Koivisto’s own initiative.

Later, in 1993, another Social Democrat, Raimo Vuoristo, submitted a written question to the Interior Minister on the provisions for granting citizenship to Ingrian arrivals, noting the lack of a government statement regarding “on what basis return rights are granted, and what in fact the concept of ‘returnees’ means”.13 Vuoristo also discusses the difficulties in “proving” Finnishness to the authorities, as in earlier cases a Soviet passport with Finnish as internal nationality was required, but post-1991,

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Russian passports followed different formats, and for Ingrian Finns living in Estonia, Estonian passports were difficult (particularly for non-Estonian speakers) to obtain.\textsuperscript{14} Vuoristo reported that Ingrians in the former Soviet Union were unsure of what documentation of their Finnishness they should provide; knowledge of the Finnish language, membership of the Finnish Lutheran Church with a baptismal certificate, proof of residence as a refugee in Finland during the Winter and Continuation Wars, or other forms of evidence?\textsuperscript{15} The response from the minister Mauri Pekkarinen (a member of the Centre Party, then the main party in a broad centre-left coalition government) stated that “a special law for returnees does not exist…The Aliens Act does not recognise the concept of a returnee”.\textsuperscript{16} Pekkarinen argues that it is at the discretion of the President of Finland that decisions on returnee status are made, i.e. outside the scope of regular Finnish immigration law, but that irregularities in the current system of the Ingrian returnee program were leading to changes, including the provision that at least one of the returnee’s grandparents had to have been a Finnish citizen.\textsuperscript{17}

Koivisto’s assurance that the Ingrians were “surely Finns”, and the construction of Finnish identity across the border in the (former) Soviet Union implied therein, was therefore limited to a statement from within Finland by the President of the Republic of Finland. As such, without the base of legal language on the Ingrian Right to Return, the practice of bringing Ingrians to Finland after 1990 suggests a rather rigidly constructed notion of Finnishness and Ingrians’ role therein, disregarding as it does any discrepancies in identity that could emerge from nearly 300 years of political separation between Ingrians and Finland.\textsuperscript{18} The government’s approach to Ingrian Finns over the 1990s and 2000s sheds light on how Finnish national identity, as the perceived common identity of Finland’s people, was constructed by Finnish politicians at this time. As will be argued in this chapter, the Ingrian Finnish Return law shows how rigid and essentialist these constructions of Finnish identity were, chained to the five major discursive resources (Finnish language, Lutheranism,

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
ancestral connection, Swedish heritage and Russian animosity) constructing Finnish identity in the discussions on this policy in the early 1990s.

**B) Discursive Constructions of Finnishness in the Themes of the Ingrian Finnish Return**

1) **Integration Capability**

The issue of Ingrian working and living conditions in Finland was swiftly taken up in the *Eduskunta*, and within weeks of Koivisto’s televised interview, several questions were raised in particular on provision of social welfare to arriving Ingrians. Tina Mäkelä of the populist and socially conservative SMP submitted her own written question to the government on 25 May 1990, which she prefaced by praising the decision to bring Ingrians to Finland: Koivisto’s initiative was to be “welcomed with great satisfaction”, 18 especially as Ingrians would bring “much-needed help particularly to Southern Finland’s current labour shortage”. 19 What’s more, she describes these useful new arrivals as people “living in the Soviet Union [but] who consider themselves Finnish”. 20 The 1980s Finnish economy, as described in chapter two, was rapidly expanding, and the result by early 1990 was an acute labour shortage particularly in the capital region and Southern Finland (see figures 11 and 12: Finnish unemployment as Mäkelä was writing was still at a low of 2.9%). The effusive language employed here, noting that Ingrians (apparently) already define themselves as Finns, whilst simultaneously welcoming them as a positive solution to the ongoing labour shortage of the late 1980s, suggests some degree of assumption of “integration capability” amongst Ingrians. The combination of the two statements gives the impression that Ingrians are already integrated into the national community of Finland, and that their amelioration of the labour shortage in Southern Finland should be swift and straightforward.

19 Ibid. Original Finnish text: He tuovat monesti kaivattua apua varsinkin Etelä-Suomessa vallitsevaan työvoimalaan.
20 Ibid. Original Finnish text: toisaalta toimenpide on kädenojennus Neuvostoliitossa asuville itsensä suomalaisiksi tunteville kansalaisille.
Paradoxically, however, Mäkelä then notes that many Ingrian immigrants will not be of working age. She notes that “those people coming from the Soviet Union to Finland are often already relatively old, and will most likely not receive a pension from the Soviet Union”. Thereafter, her question also becomes an issue of providing Ingrian Finns with coverage under the Finnish welfare state model equal to that of Finnish citizens themselves, at the level of a Finnish worker’s retirement pension. Here there emerge some aspects of a negative presentation of the Soviet Union (see further section 5), with the implication that the Soviet Union does not take care of its Ingrian citizens as the Finnish welfare state can. Also significant, however, is the presentation of the Finnish welfare state as encompassing elderly Ingrians in its embrace. The equality Mäkelä sees between Finns and Ingrians, justifying similar coverage under welfare state pensions, denotes the Finnishness of Ingrians and their belonging within the Finnish nation state, based on their perceived Finnish identity and not the contribution to the Finnish welfare state they could have made through their labour and tax contributions.

However, as Ingrians began to arrive in Finland over the course of 1990, indications of limits to the Ingrians’ rapid integration capability began to emerge. By October 1990, around 1,500 Ingrians had arrived, and the Minister for Social, Alcohol and Gender Affairs Tuulikki Hämäläinen indicated at that time that as many as 10,000 would arrive in the next few years. In September 1990, a group of parliamentarians from the National Coalition party expressed concern to the government at the state of Ingrian Finns arriving in Finland:

Ingrian Finns who move to Finland come to a country that is strange and alien to them, and they must start their lives from scratch here. While the first stages of their migration here have revealed some degree of competence in the Finnish language, and a better education than the average, their knowledge of Finnish society is very incomplete.

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21 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Neuvostoliitosta Suomeen tulevat henkilöt ovat jossain tapauksissa jo suhteellisen iäkkäitä ja he eivät tule todennäköisesti saamaan Neuvostoliitosta minkäänlaista eläkettä.
22 Ibid.
Hämäläinen assured concerned National Coalition members that the Health and Social Services Ministry was providing incoming Ingrians with an advice package, “Tietoja Suomeen aikoville Neuvostoliiton kansalaisille” (Advice for Soviet Citizens Seeking to Enter Finland), which would provide them with information on life and getting by in Finland.26

By late 1991, the Finnish government had granted residence permits to around 5,000 Ingrians, 2,055 of which permitted the holder to work.27 Labour Minister Ilkka Kanerva, a member of the National Coalition, admitted in December 1991 that “only some of the Soviet Finns and Estonian Ingrians can adequately speak the Finnish language. This presents the Finnish reception system with new challenges”.28 The promise of a solution to labour shortages earlier mentioned by Mäkelä had also failed to materialise, as both Kanerva and Paavo Lipponen acknowledged the Ingrians’ difficulty to obtain work, due in part to unfamiliarity with Finnish working culture and employment resources.29 Lipponen suggested in November 1991 that “it would be worth finding out whether Ingrians could be better assisted at their current place of residence in the USSR”.30 Kanerva appeared to agree, suggesting in his reply to Lipponen a month later:

Finland should worry about the USSR’s Finnish communities and their viability. It would be fatal if all these communities’ young people moved to Finland. Fixed term employment, job training and work experience would improve the situation of Soviet Finns in their own home territory.

29 Lipponen, “Neuvostoliiton suomalaisen paluumuuttajan aseman parantamisesta”, p. 1. A group of kokoomus parliamentarians also suggested in September 1990 that “Työvoimatoimistot ovatkin olleet lähis aino virasto, jonka harteilla ovat olleet inkerinsuomalaiset paluumuuttajat kaikkine ongelmineen.” [The employment offices have been virtually the only agency on whose shoulders all the problems of Ingrian Finnish returnees have fallen]. See Kärhä, Uosukainen, Holvitie et al., “Määrärahan osoittamisesta Inkeri-asiamiehen viran perustamiseen”, p. 2183.
A draft cooperation agreement between Finland and Russia clearly refers to the Soviet Union’s Finnish population and its status and rights, which will in turn strengthen the position of this population.\footnote{Kanerva, “Vastaus”, KK 340/1991, p. 3. Original Finnish text: Suomen tulee kantaa huolta Neuvostoliiton suomalaisten yhdyskunnista ja niiden elinkelpoisuudesta. Näiden yhdyskuntien kannalta olisi kohtalokasta, mikäli aktiivinen nuorempi sukupolvi siirtyisi laajassa mittakaavassa Suomeen. Määräaikainen työskentely, työharjoittelu ja työkokemus saattis helpottaa osaltaa Neuvostoliiton suomalaisten asemaa heidän kotiseudullaan. Suomen ja Venäjän välillä neuvotellussa yhteistyööpinmusluonnoksessa on selkeä maininta Neuvostoliiton suomalaisväestön asemasta ja oikeuksista, mikä osaltaan vahvistaa jatkossa tämän väestönsan asemaa.}

This would appear to be an admission of defeat on the integration capability of Ingrians; they appear to lack the necessary language and cultural knowledge of Finland, particularly on matters related to employment, to integrate rapidly into Finnish society without significant government assistance. As such, here the discussion shifts to a potential alternative to return migration, suggesting that concerns for the welfare of Finnish communities in the Soviet Union should be addressed without integrating Ingrians into Finnish society. The discursive resource that draws on the Finnish language as a key characteristic of Finnish identity is here a significant element in the Finnish MPs’ constructions of Ingrian belonging in Finland.

When Finnish lawmakers assumed that Ingrians speak Finnish and will integrate rapidly, it is advocated that they should come to Finland. When the Finnish language capabilities of Ingrians are found to be more limited, it is suggested they may be better helped outside of Finland, and perhaps therefore exist within a broader understanding of the Finnish national community but outside the Finnish nation state. Indeed, the discourse in Kanerva’s statement also stresses Ingrian connection to their “home territory” in the USSR/Russia, as though Ingrians belong in the USSR and Russia. Finland must remain mindful of this, departing, at least momentarily, from the previous discussion on Ingrians’ real or imagined connections to the Finnish state.

Yet at no point in the discourse on integration at this time do parliamentarians or the Finnish government suggest directly that Ingrians should not be afforded a privileged position in immigration law. Rather, the government continues to intone a special status for Ingrian migrants arriving in Finland. For instance, addressing the Finnish language capabilities of Ingrian arrivals, Kanerva indicates that the staff at the Finnish consulates in St Petersburg and Petrozavodsk would organise language training, usually lasting six months, for Ingrian migrants. In larger cities like Helsinki and
Turku, they would be placed in their own language classes, whilst in smaller towns and municipalities they would be taught alongside other immigrant groups.\textsuperscript{32} Perhaps even more significantly, Kanerva also indicates the government’s plan to decrease the waiting period for citizenship for Ingrian Finns from five years (the standard amount for immigrants in Finland) to two years, in line with citizens from the other Nordic countries.\textsuperscript{33} Likewise, parliamentarians at this time eschewed questioning of the special status and integration capabilities of Ingrians in Finland, instead suggesting the government focus on the need for increased specialised assistance to Ingrians, to bring out their integration potential.\textsuperscript{34} The implication remains that Ingrians are more connected to the Finnish language, that pillar of Finnish identity, than non-returnee migrants. Bringing Ingrian citizenship waiting periods into line with those for migrants from other Nordic nations also gives some impression of Ingrians as connected, like Finns of Finland, to the broader cultural and political Nordic region.

Ancestral connection also remains an important aspect in the discursive construction of links between Ingrians and Finland. In October 1990, a trio of National Coalition parliamentarians, while listing the many integration challenges Ingrians faced upon arrival in Finland, also stressed that they continued to arrive in Finland drawn by “of course, an interest in their Finnish lineage”.\textsuperscript{35} Ingrians, they appeared to believe, therefore possessed a desire to integrate that other immigrant groups lacked, strengthening their integration capability in relation to groups without historical links to Finland. Implicit in this discussion is the notion that Ingrians have a primordialist link to Finland that overrides any difficulties they may experience in integrating into Finnish society, which will no doubt prove temporary. The view of Ingrians as connected to Finnishness through these shared characteristics thus remains ideologically dominant amongst Finnish politicians. Although potential weaknesses in Ingrian conformity to Finnish politicians’ understanding of Finnishness, particularly on language, are acknowledged and discussed, implementation of the policy

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{35} See Kohijoki, Korkia-Aho and Varpasuo’s note that Ingrian Finns have “tieteenkin kiinnostus suomalaisista sukujuurista” [of course, interest in their Finnish lineage], in “Inkeriläisiä paluumuuttajia palvelevan Inkerikeskuksen perustamisesta”, p. 1.
progresses on the assumption that Ingrians are linked to Finnishness, which will facilitate better integration in Finland even if there is initial need for language training. In the discussion on integration capability in 1990-1995, there is not yet any substantial rejection of the ideology of Ingrian inclusion in Finnishness by Finnish politicians, despite substantial potential avenues for challenging Ingrians’ conformity to their construction of Finnishness, particularly based on language capabilities, already emerging.

2) Historical Atonement

On 22 May 1990, a large contingent of National Coalition, SMP and Swedish People’s Party parliamentarians (including Kirsti Ala-Harja, Ben Zyskowicz, Riitta Uosukainen, Henrik Westerlund and Sulo Aittoniemi) submitted a written question to the government, evoking the troubled twentieth-century history of the Ingrian Finns, and in particular their fate in the Winter and Continuation Wars:

In the defence of Finland during the Winter and Continuation Wars, there were participants for example from Sweden. Swedish soldiers injured during the war received a small annual pension under the Military Injuries Act, even if they are not Finnish citizens. In these wars, Ingrians also served in many different positions in the army. After the war, as per the peace agreement, Ingrians were returned to their homeland.36

This indicates a key justification for Ingrian resettlement in Finland after 1990, as based on a construction of Finnish identity linked to a history of struggle against the USSR. As mentioned by the SMP’s Tina Mäkelä, a large section of Ingrian Finns expected to migrate to Finland, and amongst them Finland could expect some Ingrian men who had participated in combat roles during the Winter and Continuation Wars, as well as Ingrian refugees who had spent the war in Finland and then been repatriated to the Soviet Union.37 The question from Ala-Harja et al., interestingly, refers to the


Soviet Union, and not Finland, as the Ingrian kotimaan (homeland), 38 which undermines the portrayal of Ingrian immigration to Finland as a “return”, but the above extract of the question to parliament suggests that inclusion of Ingrians into the Finnish national community is justified by their service to Finland in the Winter and Continuation Wars. This inclusion, therefore, should necessarily come about through coverage of Ingrian Finnish veterans through the Military Injuries Act that (according to Ala-Harja et al.) already covers Finnish and Swedish citizens.

The provision of residency and war pensions as a reward for Second World War service, or as an attempt at atonement for wartime suffering (or post-war hardship stemming from service), has played out in other instances, such as the 2009 decision in the UK parliament to grant the Nepalese Gurkhas who served in the British Army leave to enter and remain in the UK under The Immigration (Discharged Gurkhas) Bill. 39 The debate on the Gurkhas’ rights, given increased prominence in the British media due to the support of actress Joanna Lumley, whose father had served with the Gurkhas in the Second World War, was described by Liberal Democrats leader Nick Clegg as predicated on “a simple moral principle…if someone is prepared to die for this country, surely they deserve to live in this country?” 40 This same basic principle of honouring wartime service of non-citizens with residence permission informs the Finnish Ingrian example.

Yet there is an additional dimension to the Ingrian Finnish case. Just three days after Ala-Harja et al. submitted their question, Tina Mäkelä submitted a further question to the Minister for Health and Social Services, entitled Rintamapalvelustunnuksen myöntämisestä sotiin osallistuneille inkeriläisille [Awarding Front Line Veteran Status to Ingrian Participants in the Wars]. She begins by stating:

During the most recent wars, a number of Ingrians fought in the Finnish Army. After the war, and the deportation of Ingrians, they were almost all forced to return to the Soviet Union where they have often lived in difficult circumstances for much of the time since then. Some of them have suffered particularly from the fact that they defended Finland with a gun in hand.\textsuperscript{41}

This aspect of the discussion on historical atonement in the Ingrian Finnish Return policy notes the residual effects of the Soviet-Finnish conflicts in the Second World War on the Ingrian Finns, and the idea of Finnish identity as defined by a history of struggles with Russians. The Ingrian Finnish veterans were left to live in the territory of their former adversaries (something the Gurkhas were unlikely to have experienced in post-Second World War Nepal). Not only does Mäkelä’s presentation of Ingrian Finnish history suggest that the Soviets, like the Finns, see Ingrians as Finnish, it also draws on Ingrians’ experience of suffering for their Finnishness in the post-war Soviet Union as an imperative to now provide Ingrians with Finnish residency.

The Stalinist-era persecution of Ingrians for their Finnish identity and wartime affiliations alluded to by Mäkelä was long over by 1990 and the era of glasnost and perestroika. The Finnish government’s offer of return migration to Ingrians could obviously not relieve Ingrians from this persecution, whose worst effects had already been felt. By itself, historical atonement thus appears an insufficient rationale for launching the Right to Return policy at this time. Ingrian resettlement in 1990 does not, in this sense, amount to humanitarian intervention against government persecution, as the persecution Ingrians faced has been endured, and was not, in 1990, likely to immediately reoccur. However, the obligation of Finland to deport Soviet refugees after the Continuation War, and the reappraisal in the 1980s and 1990s of Soviet influence in Finnish politics in the time of Finlandisation (as discussed in chapter two of this thesis), emerges in the language employed by Mäkelä – it represents a betrayal of Ingrians, as loyal Finns who served their spiritual (if not literal) homeland in the Winter and Continuation Wars, to appease the Soviet Union and send them back to the USSR. This perception of Ingrians as linked to Finland and commonly opposed to the Soviet Union appears predicated on the discursive resource

of Finnishness as defined by its opposition to Russians and Soviets. The language employed by Finnish politicians like Mäkelä here makes an appeal to the concept of sacrifice and suffering, suggesting with emotional impact that Ingrians’ Finnishness has been tried and tested in the most fundamental way, in a struggle with the Soviet Union that the dominant Finnish historical interpretation views as a struggle for survival. References to wartime suffering thus have a critically important function in establishing the ideological dominant view of Ingrians as proven Finns at this time, for their contribution and sacrifice to the cause of Finnish independence.

Now, in 1990, Finland had an opportunity to atone for the Ingrian deportation, bring Ingrians to Finland and grant Ingrian veterans the war veterans’ pensions they have, according to this discourse, so rightly earned. Indeed, Ala-Harja et al. continue their written question by noting:

As now the situation has changed and Ingrians have the opportunity to return to Finland as Finnish returnees as per the presidential statement, it would be opportune to examine the issue of Ingrians’ merits to the right of veteran status and veteran’s benefits. Only those who have lived in Finland for five years receive the national pension. Such a long waiting time for Ingrian immigrants seems unreasonable.42

In essence, Ala-Harja et al. also advocate that Ingrian Finns should be treated as Finns, as they proved their allegiance to Finnishness in the Second World War. This equality of treatment should be manifested in provision of welfare and veteran’s benefits, and therefore, would suggest an extension of the Finnish welfare state to include Ingrians. At the very least, this faction of the National Coalition accepts the premise of Ingrian Finns as separate from other non-citizens or immigrants, and belonging in Finland, based on an interpretation of Finnishness that binds Ingrians to the Finnish nation state and entitles them to its protection. This is predicated on the notion that wartime service of Ingrians proves a loyalty to Finland, and post-war suffering of Ingrians involves some culpability on the part of Finland, which abandoned them to the USSR after 1944. Ingrians are united with Finns, therefore, in their struggle for existence in the face of their larger eastern neighbour. Wartime

suffering effectively proves Ingrians’ opposition to the Russian mainstream in the Soviet Union, and thus, their Finnishness.

Concretely, Ala-Harja et al. asked the Finnish Minister of Health and Social Services for specific measures the government was intending to take for Ingrian veterans who participated in the Winter and Continuation Wars. Mauri Miettinen, the minister serving under Prime Minister Harri Holkeri (both Holkeri and Miettinen were members of the centre-right National Coalition, which led a coalition government with the Social Democrats, Swedish People’s Party and SMP), responded on 25 June 1990, in essence assuring that a committee had been set-up in 1989 to explore the feasibility of expanding war veterans’ benefits to non-citizens who had participated in the defence of Finland. He gave an identical response the same day to Mäkelä’s earlier, similar question. However, Miettinen takes issue with the assertion from Ala-Harja et al. that Swedes already have access to these benefits, and asserts that no claims from non-citizens who fought voluntarily in Finland are heard:

Those citizens of foreign countries who freely participated in the wars do not have a legitimate claim. Veteran status has not been granted, for example, to Swedes, Estonians nor to Ingrian volunteers.

The theme of historical atonement presented in Miettinen’s account of existing policy departs sharply from his National Coalition colleagues’ interpretation of how things should be. Ingrians are grouped together alongside Swedes and Estonians as allies, though foreigners. This grouping does, however, link Ingrians to other Nordic peoples rather than with Russians and the East.

The voluntary participation of the Ingrian veterans, underlined in Miettinen’s response, also undermines their status as hapless victims of Finland’s conflicts with the Soviet Union. This may be interpreted as an attempt from a generally more conservative party to limit welfare expenditure, particularly in the lead-up to the early 1991 parliamentary election, despite discussions on historical atonement that were

43 Ibid.
presented elsewhere in the *Eduskunta*, even amongst members of the same party’s backbenchers. David Arter notes the generally parochial character of the campaign leading to the 1991 election, which largely ignored foreign policy considerations (the government’s reluctance to condemn the violent subduing of anti-Soviet protests in Vilnius, or the Finnish application to the European Communities) in favour of economic considerations, including the issue of social security matters like pensions or study allowances in the wake of the deepening recession.\(^{46}\) Thus, there may have been considerable political impetus to avoid expansion of pension programs at this time. Though early post-1990 discussions in the *Eduskunta* on historical atonement for Ingrian suffering appear to stress their Second World War links to Finland over Russia, and their willingness to protect a country that subsequently failed to protect them, there was by no means consensus on their status, or their rights, in Finnish political discourse itself at this point.

Miettinen presents a challenge to some perceptions of the symbolic function of Ingrian wartime suffering, but in general, Finnish politicians continued to discuss Ingrians with the assumption that this wartime experience validated their Finnishness, and their inclusion in the Finnish national community. By 1991, National Coalition parliamentarian Maunu Kohijoki had taken up the issue, continuing a discussion on atonement that Ingrian veterans’ situation should be rectified by equating Ingrian volunteers to Finnish frontline veterans. Kohijoki evoked both the heavy losses experienced by Ingrian volunteers on the frontline, and their post-war fate as refugees (the lucky few who escaped to Sweden, and on to the United States, the unlucky many forced to return to the USSR following the Finnish surrender).\(^{47}\) He added:

> Very few people who fought on behalf of Finland as foreign volunteers have received much praise for the sacrifices they made for our country's independence. Yet there are left a few thousand. As a concrete sign of respect and gratitude, the Finnish state should immediately begin to pay them an equally large (or, rather, an equally small = 199 Finnish Marks per month) veteran’s pension as our Finnish war veterans.\(^{48}\)


\(^{48}\) Ibid. Original Finnish text: Kovin harva Suomen puolesta taistelleille ulkomaalaisista vapaaehtoisista on saanut osakseen kiitosta maamme itsenäisyden hyväksi tekemistään uhrauksista. Vielä heitä on jäljellä muutama tuhat. Konkreettisena kiitollisuuden ja kunnioituksen osoituksena Suomen valtion tulisi viipymättä ryhtyä maksamaan heille rintamalisäätä saman suuruuisena (tai paremminkin yhtä pienenä = 199 mk kuukaudessa) kuin suomalaisillekin sotiemme veteraanille.
This quote gives some indication of the position veterans hold in Finnish society, protecting Finnish independence and deserving of eternal respect and gratitude. This respect and gratitude is shown to Finnish veterans in part through the veterans’ pension. With the arrival of the Ingrian Finnish returnees, Kohijoki’s assertion that they too should be granted this symbol of respect underlines their belonging in Finland, as contributors to Finland’s defence in the Winter and Continuation Wars. However tenuous their “old” or ancestral connections to Finland, Ingrians veterans have proven, at least in the discussion on historical atonement, their loyalty to the Finnish nation state in the recent past. Contrasting this depiction of heroism to their fate, abandoned to their former enemies in the USSR, is an evocative appeal to sympathy, and argument for the need for Ingrian “repatriation” to Finland. To Kohijoki,

[even in these economically difficult times, some things must be set over others. As such, we should now deal with the matter of volunteers who fought on behalf of the independence of Finland, which after decades is still unresolved.]

Here again, Ingrian participation in the Second World War, and the fact that some of these war veterans are still alive, is presented as translating to Ingrians’ right to live in Finland and enjoy the comfort, respect and gratitude Finnish politicians deem them to have earned. The economic hardship of the early 1990s, which relates the Ingrian return migration to a discussion on humanitarianism, is here also invoked as something from which Ingrian veterans should be sheltered, and the long delay in resolving their status appears finally as an additional burden on Ingrians that the Finnish state must take responsibility for and ameliorate. Again, the nature of this language on Ingrians appeals to collective memories of the Second World War, to perceptions of this conflict as the narrow escape of Finnish independence, and calls for gratitude for Ingrians despite the economic challenges of providing for Ingrians in a time of recession. This gives some indication of the strength of the discursive resource on historical opposition to Russians/Soviets in Finnish lawmakers’ construction of Finnish identity, and the powerful function it can have in reinforcing the perception of Ingrians as having a proven Finnishness – the Winter and

[Ibid. Original Finnish text: Taloudellisesti vaikeinakin aikoina jokiin asioita on voitava asettaa muiden edelle. Sellaisena tulisi nyt käsittellä Suomen itsenäisyden puolesta taistelleiden ulkomaalaisten vapaaehtoisten asia, mikä vuosikymmenien takaa vielä on ratkaisematta.]
Continuation Wars proved Ingrians would fight Russians, and therefore, even a half-century later, they must be Finns.

Despite Kohijoki’s evocative language, a January 1992 response from the then Health and Social Affairs minister Eeva Kuuskoski to his statement indicated that a pension for Ingrian veterans was not feasible.\(^{50}\) A working group on veterans’ affairs had been set up and had reported that, whilst Ingrians should be recognised for their contributions in the defence of Finland in the Winter and Continuation Wars, there was no agreement amongst veterans groups and the government for extension of veterans’ benefits.\(^{51}\) As with the earlier query from Ala-Harja et al., the government indicated that, despite the rather passionate discourse, the imperative of historical atonement would not go beyond allowing Ingrian settlement in Finland. Ingrian Finnish migration, therefore, was the primary means to reward Ingrian wartime loyalty to Finland. Yet the passionate discourse does underscore many parliamentarians’ conviction that Ingrians had proven their connection to Finland, and the ongoing belief in the emotional link between Ingrians and the Finnish nation state through a common narrative of suffering under the same adversary. Though the government may have been reticent to quantify this connection monetarily through pension payments, it does appear, forceful and ardent, in the language of Finnish politicians at this time.

However, as with the theme of integration capability, experience with Ingrians a few years into the Right to Return program seems to have challenged this narrative. SMP parliamentarian Sulo Aittoniemi asked the government to answer to reports that, by 1994, there were 10,000 unemployed Ingrians in Finland living on public benefits.\(^{52}\) According to Aittoniemi, “the original aim [of the Right to Return] was to create a migration option for those Ingrians who, after the Second World War, were forced to return to the former Soviet Union, and their descendants”.\(^{53}\) He thus sees the Right to


\(^{51}\) Ibid.


\(^{53}\) Ibid. Original Finnish text: \textit{Alkuperäinen tarkoitus oli luoda muutomahdollisuus niille inkeriläisille, jotka sodan jälkeen olivat pakotetut palaamaan takaisin silloiseen Neuvostoliittoon, sekä heidän jälkeläisilleen.}
Return for Ingrians primarily through the lens of historical atonement for this deportation. The discussions on the early 1990 labour shortage (prior to rising unemployment after mid-1990) was a repeatedly invoked reason for an Ingrian return migration program, so the primacy Aittoniemi affords the atonement aspect may be somewhat overstated. With this in mind, Aittoniemi submitted his question to the government:

Is the government aware how many Ingrian Finnish returnees moving to Finland meet the condition of having been forced to return to the former Soviet Union, or their descendants, and if the ratio of legitimate to unauthorised migrants is obvious, what action does the Government propose to take to bring unjustified migration to an end?\(^{54}\)

The SMP, defunct since the mid-1990s, has been described by political scientists in Finland as “the most salient populist party in Finland since the latter part of the 1960s...aimed at mobilising and catching all the social and political dissatisfaction wherever it might be found”, typically amongst rural workers and war veterans.\(^ {55}\) Particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the SMP attempted (with some electoral success) to utilise xenophobic fears to engage potential voters.\(^ {56}\) Indeed, Kyösti Pekonen, Pertti Hynynen and Mari Kalliala argue that the SMP “has not been called an extreme right-wing party, even though it sometimes would have been justified”.\(^ {57}\) Nationalist sentiments have in fact been employed by the SMP not only against immigrants, as some SMP candidates have sought support from Finnish-speakers by agitating against the Swedish-speaking minority.\(^ {58}\) It should be noted that as a populist party, the SMP was not bound to any particular strain of nationalism, as indeed it had no permanent ideology, being rather the party of the protest vote, profiting from any political dissatisfaction it was able, at times, to exploit.\(^ {59}\) Sulo Aittoniemi, however, appears to have earned a particular reputation in the late 1980s

\(^{54}\) Ibid. Original Finnish text: *Onko Hallitus tietoinen, miten moni Suomeen muuttavainkerinsuomalainen paluumuuttaja täyttää siihen kuuluvan ehdon, eli on aikanaan idäntä sotien jälkeen pakkomuutettu siiloiseen Neuvostoliittoon tai on heidän jälkeläisiään, ja jos suhde oikeutettujen ja oikeudettomien muuttajien välillä on ilmiselvä, mihin toimenpiteisiin Hallitus aikoo ryhtyä perusteetoman paluumuodon lopettamiseksi?*


\(^{56}\) Ibid.

\(^{57}\) Ibid.

\(^{58}\) Ibid, p. 40.

\(^{59}\) Ibid.
and early 1990s as an agitator against immigration and diversity in Finland, representing a section of the SMP for whom this issue was of particular focus. Aittonemi’s hostility to immigration is evident in his question here, yet his differentiation between Ingrians who have been forced to return to the USSR and others who may have never left the USSR also belies the significance of the discursive resource of opposition to the Soviet Union/Russia in Finland’s national identity. To a parliamentarian hostile to outsiders and those deemed non-Finnish, who uses populist xenophobia against such groups to attract the protest vote, this particular characteristic appears to confer Finnish identity only on a select group of Ingrians.

However, in response to Aittoniemi, Labour Minister Kanerva disputed his numbers, placing the figure of Ingrian returnees in Finland at 3,800 of which 2,000 were currently employed. More significantly perhaps, he disputed the notion of historical atonement’s role in dividing returnees into the categories “legitimate” and “unauthorised”:

When the Ingrian Finns’ return was made possible in practice, beginning at the end of 1989, it has never been the goal that the return would only apply to those who had been in Finland during the Second World War, and then moved back to the Soviet Union. Nor does the opinion President Koivisto gave in an interview in April 1990 present this opinion, as his statement specifically sees an equivalence between Ingrian Finns and other expatriates and returnees.

The idea presented in this written question, that the original intention was to create an opportunity for those returning Ingrians who after the War were forced to return to the former Soviet Union is therefore invalid. Thus it is not possible to speak of “legitimate and authorised migrants”, nor is there any criteria or conditions to take action to end “unjustified return migration”.

Thus, when the discussion of Ingrians along historical atonement lines is challenged, and Ingrians as a group are presented as limited or unproven in their conformity to the

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discursive resource of opposition to Russia and the USSR in this sense, the government responds by challenging the practical significance of wartime experience in the first case. Though parliamentarians appear to consider the Second World War and the Ingrian deportation to the Soviet Union as a strong emotional reason for Ingrian Right to Return status, the government does not present this as an exclusivist criterion. Kanerva himself represented a new centre-right coalition government elected in March 1991, under the Centre Party’s Esko Aho as Prime Minister, which continued something of a departure from tradition in Finnish politics, marking only the second time in government for the National Coalition party since 1966, the first being the preceding National Coalition-Social Democrat led coalition elected in 1987 that had broken the long-standing succession of centre-left (red-earth) coalitions. As stated previously, this new centre-right government was dedicated to financial reform in the face of the new economic crisis, including reform of select social security payments. This may go some way to explaining the new government’s reluctance to expand social security programs to include Ingrian returnees. Kanerva’s response, as well as the aforementioned reluctance of the government to extend veterans benefits to Ingrian volunteers, suggests a limitation to the significance the Finnish government, by the 1990s, was willing to give actual wartime service as a qualifier for access to the Finnish state and its benefits. Yet Kanerva’s response also highlights the universalist approach to Ingrian identity the Finnish government appeared to take, unlike Sulo Aittoniemi’s approach which separates Ingrians into veterans and non-veterans. As something of an outlier in Finnish politics, it is perhaps unsurprising that Aittoniemi’s attempt to challenge the Finnishness of some Ingrians (whilst simultaneously endorsing the Finnishness of others) failed to influence the more mainstream government line on Ingrians’ Finnishness. To the government, all Ingrians regardless of their age or history are included within the concept of Finland’s national identity. The discursive resource that constructs Finnish identity in part as a narrative of struggle against the Russians is therefore not attributed individually, but rather to the entire Ingrian population. The emotional appeals to the memory of Second World War experience in Finland thus continued to serve as a potent element to the language of Ingrian inclusion in Finland in 1990-1995.

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Aylott, Blomgren and Bergman, *Political Parties in Multi-Level Polities*, p. 90.
3) The Humanitarian Imperative

Throughout the post-Second World War period, the Nordic countries have established a tradition of humanitarianism, and an international role as “norm entrepreneurs”. Christine Ingebritsen argues that twentieth-century figures like Raoul Wallenberg and Dag Hammarskjöld established a role for Scandinavians in humanitarian interventionism and human rights promotion that has since become a hallmark of the region on a global scale, carried through to the 1980s and 1990s by figures like the Swedes Olof Palme and Anna Lindh, Denmark’s Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, or indeed Finland’s Martti Ahtisaari, Koivisto’s successor as President from 1994 to 2000, with extensive United Nations service and the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize to his name. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink identify the concept of an actor in international relations, the “norm entrepreneur”, that creates and promotes standards of behaviour for the international community, and Ingebritsen argues that the Nordic countries fulfil this position. Aloof from international engagement, the Nordic countries’ traditions of social democracy (particularly in Sweden) and neutrality (Sweden and Finland both declined membership in NATO) gave them a role in conflict management and peace promotion. The so-called line of “active neutrality” pursued by Finland post-Second World War came to greatest fruition in the 1970s with the creation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, the later Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE) in Helsinki.

The norms the Nordic countries promoted include what Ingebritsen calls “global welfare”, a responsibility of richer nations to help poorer ones, and thus bring the concept of Nordic welfare to the broadest international community – “[a]s domestic...
institutions took responsibility for impoverished groups within society, and perpetuated a norm of social solidarity, the logical extension of this commitment was a global one”. The notion of promoting humanitarianism and aid thus becomes part of Finland’s self-identification as part of the Nordic cultural and political region, closely linked to its Scandinavian neighbours, in particular Sweden, to which it owes much of its identity construction as a Western European nation. The positive view of the Nordic, and by extension Western European, cultural and political region is a recurrent theme in the discussions of Ingrian return migration. The discursive resource of Finnish identity present in this discussion is that Finns are Western Europeans with a positive global influence. This positive influence can be transmitted as humanitarian assistance to Ingrians, and this assistance may take the form of providing residency in Finland.

For the Nordic countries, and particularly for Finland, a focus of this culture of humanitarian interventionism post-Cold War was the provision of assistance to the development of the neighbouring Baltic area. According to Ingebritsen, this was “a central element of Scandinavian foreign-policy making during the 1990s”. In 1993 and 1994, Sweden’s then Prime Minister Carl Bildt published opinion pieces in *Foreign Policy* and *The New York Times* on the topic of stability in the Baltic area, arguing that the situation presented a test for the European institutions in their commitment and aptitude for conflict-prevention, right on their own doorstep. Specific measures for the Nordic states on this issue included not only individual contributions (including Finland’s military cooperation and training offered to Estonia’s defence forces), but also collective financial investment from the Nordic Council, including two million Danish crowns in aid donated in 1991 to the newly independent Baltic republics. Essentially, conflict prevention and moderation in post-Soviet Northern Europe also stipulated economic development of the politically transforming (and, in the context of friction between ethnic groups and the new Baltic

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69 Ibid. p. 18.
70 Ingebritsen, *Scandinavia in World Politics*, p. 36.
72 Ingebritsen, *Scandinavia in World Politics*, pp. 36-7.
governments, somewhat politically unstable) Baltic Sea region as a peace-building tool. As such, Nordic approaches to humanitarian issues in this region initially preferred on-site development, rather than migration. This echoes political thinking amongst Finnish parties at this time, some of which appeared to express reluctance to opening borders in the name of humanitarianism. Indeed the Finnish Centre Party, which led the 1991-1995 coalition government, had established a specific policy position on refugees for the 1990s that preferred on-site humanitarian assistance, expressed in the statement “[t]he focus of our nation’s refugee policy has to be helping refugees on-site, by adding support to the international refugee organisations”. Despite this, Finnish political language on Ingrians at this time did contain a theme of humanitarianism linked to migration, suggesting that exceptions would be made for those distinguished by perceived links to Finland.

Finnish humanitarian intervention for Ingrians began before Koivisto’s 1990 announcement, but was transformed in scope and tone after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This collapse was followed by considerable political turbulence in the early 1990s in Russia, including the 1993 constitutional crisis and use of military force at the Russian parliament, as well as the rising image of St Petersburg as a lawless mob town, which came to a head with the assassination of local politician Galina Starovoytova in 1998. On 19 September 1989, immediately prior to Koivisto’s announcement, Social Democrat parliamentarians Jouni Backman, Timo Roos, Marja-Liisa Tykkyläinen, Jukka Gustafsson and Kari Urpilainen introduced a budget proposal to government entitled *Määärärahan osoittamisesta inkerinsuomalaisen nuorten koulutusohjelmia varten* [Dispersal of Appropriation to Training Programs for Young Ingrian Finns]. Backman *et al.* begin by noting that “the need for educational and cultural programs in the Ingrian Finns’ own language has grown strongly over the past few years”. Interestingly, they do not specifically qualify the

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reasons behind this need, nor do they state whether the Ingrians themselves have expressed concern at the decline of Finnish-use in their community or loss of culture. Rather, the written question from Backman et al. proceeds to detail the current programs in place for teaching of Finnish in Ingria, including student and teacher exchange and the provision of approximately 100,000 text books for Finnish language schools and language study groups. Their request was for 200,000 Finnish marks from the state budget to be allocated for language training programs for Ingrians in the USSR. The significance of the Finnish language as the cornerstone of Finnish politicians’ perception of Ingrians’ Finnishness is here again underscored, but there is also a somewhat unspoken assumption that Finns owe assistance to Ingrians not only because Ingrians are in need, but because Ingrians are part of an extended concept of the Finnish national community. This departs somewhat from Ingebritsen’s notion of Nordic humanitarianism motivated by “global welfare”, being rather more parochial in its aims and focus.

As the 1990s progressed, events in the new Russian Federation made the humanitarian situation more serious. Throughout 1992-1993, there were major food shortages in Russia, spurred by drought, and the Russian government appealed to the international community for aid. This could have presented an avenue in which the discourse on humanitarian intervention could flow; i.e. that the Right to Return policy allowed Finland to offer protection to Ingrians from a difficult and unstable life in Russia. Indeed, the frequently raised issue of pensions for Ingrians was often presented as a means to provide Ingrians with a livelihood they simply had no access to in Russia. However, beyond this, there was not a pronounced focus on the humanitarian situation in Russia in the political discourse on the Ingrian return migration. Rather, the focus appears to have shifted to suggest that humanitarian intervention for Ingrians could best be served with Ingrians remaining in Russia and Estonia. In 1992, Sulo Aittoniemi suggested that immigration to Finland would not improve the humanitarian situation for Ingrians; he notes “on the other hand, Ingrian

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Inkerinsuomalaisen omakielisen sivistys- ja kulttuurityön tarve on tullut kuluneen vuoden aikana voimakkaasti esille.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.


Finns moving to Finland could easily become a minority here and remain in lower level living conditions". Aittoniemi suggests that the employment situation (as mentioned in his previous statements, discussed earlier) could not absorb Ingrian Finns with lower Finnish-language skills and levels of education, who as non-citizens would likely languish at the bottom of the social strata in Finland. Labour Minister Kanerva again responded to this question, and challenged the suggestion that Ingrians would not be better off in Finland, appealing to a sense of hope and charity with his choice of words: “To Ingrian Finns, Finland represents a chance to improve their level and quality of living, and will also benefit the Ingrian Finnish community”. As with the discussion on historical atonement, the language employed here appeals to emotional, rather than rational, considerations. Finland’s position as a Nordic humanitarian actor would necessitate provision of assistance for vulnerable groups, and the hope for an improved life Finland provides for vulnerable Ingrians thus makes an emotional appeal to the idea of Ingrian inclusiveness in Finland. This inclusiveness is here built on perceptions of negative relations between Russia and Finland (the discursive resource of Finns as opposed to Russians) and Finland as belonging to a particular positive Nordic tradition (the discursive resource of Finland as a Western European nation with a Nordic heritage). This ideology of Finnish identity, still including Ingrians, thus appears to retain its dominant impact at this time amongst Finnish politicians.

Yet Kanerva indicated that he did not anticipate all Ingrian returnees would settle permanently in Finland, and suggested that the real humanitarian benefit would be through the earnings, knowledge and skills they could bring back to their Ingrian homeland. This echoes a 1992 statement by Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen:

> Only few of the Ingrians arriving in Finland for a longer period have announced that they want to become permanent residents of Finland. Most wish to work temporarily in Finland.

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81 Ibid.


83 Ibid.
This is not primarily immigration or resettlement, but rather, seeking to improve the living conditions at home.\textsuperscript{84}

The government’s discussion on humanitarian intervention at this point thus appears to focus on (voluntarily) temporary residence as a tool for improving Ingrian standards of living, and within the context of rising unemployment in the early 1990s economic crisis in Finland, this makes a certain amount of political sense. Indeed, Kanerva points out that “for returnees, just as other immigrant groups, the state cannot guarantee any particular living conditions”, \textsuperscript{85} though he argues that there is no evidence of Ingrians falling too far behind the mainstream in this regard. \textsuperscript{86} To some extent, these comments follow Aittoniemi’s perception of Ingrians as a migrant minority group in Finland, rather than simply as part of the dominant Finnish mainstream. However, neither Kanerva, Väyrynen nor Aittoniemi reject the notion of providing assistance for Ingrians based on their perceived connection to Finland outright. Indeed, in the same statement as he suggested the temporary nature of the Ingrian return to Finland, Foreign Minister Väyrynen also notes “[t]he connection to Finnishness is an important part of Ingrian identity”. \textsuperscript{87} The nature of the discussion on humanitarianism at this time, therefore, does not exclude the perceived Finnish identity, or connection to Finnishness, of Ingrians.

Though the theme of humanitarian intervention from the government at this stage appears to suggest a degree of separation between Ingrian and Finnish identity, at least inasmuch as Ingrians could still identify the Ingrian region as their homeland and do not seek to move permanently to Finland, their special status as connected to the Finnish nation state is nevertheless emphasised. The discussion on humanitarian assistance may have been moving away from permanent resettlement in Finland for Ingrians as the 1990s progress, but there was still an assumption in the language of Finnish politicians that Ingrians were owed some assistance based on their inclusion


\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.

in a perception of Finnishness. Earlier assertions that Ingrians are vulnerable in Russia based on their Finnish identity, which is again predicated primarily on their history of opposition and otherness to Russians, are not substantially revisited or revised. Emotional language on the vulnerability of Ingrians as a Finnish minority in hostile, chaotic Russia could therefore remain an effective tool for promoting an ideology of Ingrian inclusion in an understanding of Finnishness by the mid 1990s.

4) The Positive Assessment of the Swedish Period

The theme of a positive Swedish period in Finnish and Ingrian history is a relatively minor aspect of the discussion on the Ingrian Return law in 1990-1995. It is alluded to evocatively at times, but is not extensively expanded upon. The assessment of the Swedish legacy stipulates a discursive construction of Finland’s “Western” identity, which transformed in the 1990s from a link via Swedish cultural and legal inheritance to Nordic Europe, to a broader link to Western Europe and the European Union.

The specific period 1989-1991 was marked by a decline in the traditional international perception of Nordic identity, as Ole Wæver notes that the decline of the USSR had made the Nordic countries’ position as arbiters between capitalism and communism with the Nordic welfare state, and (for Sweden and Finland) between the Warsaw Pact and NATO as neutral states, appear obsolete. To Wæver, the future was in the new Baltic region, affording small nations and regions of Northern Europe the opportunity to develop into a dynamic region and avoid being cast as the European periphery. Incidentally, this “new” region corresponds to a great extent with the old Swedish kingdom of the seventeenth century, and efforts like Ilves’ “Yuleland” draw on common cultural inheritance dating from the pre-Russian era in forming a new identity for this region as part of the EU.

The discursive resource linking Finland to the West was very much in evidence in this period, as the Nordic expansion of the European Union came to a head in 1995. Christopher S. Browning argues that the October 1994 referendum on EU

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89 Ibid. pp. 96-7.
membership in Finland, unlike the concurrent debate in Norway, was framed within a discourse on Finland’s place in the East or West. Indeed, unlike Norway, where EU membership was painted as a threat to Norwegian identity, Finns saw EU membership as “protecting, even enhancing their national identity”, and as Finland’s “return home” to the West after its Cold War-mandated isolation. Likewise, the veteran Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson viewed EU membership as an affirmation of Finland’s Western identity. Whereas the European Union presented a new structure for Finland to present its Western European identity, its pre-1809 connection to Sweden had served a similar function. President Koivisto had alluded to the perpetual connection between Finland and Sweden in speeches in France in 1983 and 1990, and the status this afforded Finland as a Western, Nordic nation.

Koivisto’s 1990 interview posits that despite being separated from Swedish governance by a century more than Finland, Ingrians shared this heritage with Finns. His statement was echoed in later political discussions on the issue, such as National Coalition parliamentarians Kirsti Ala-Harja, Riitta Jouppila and Pentti Mäki-Hakola’s 1991 statement, which begins:

"There are an estimated 60,000–100,000 Ingrian Finns in the Soviet Union, of which most live in the Ingrian lands of Leningrad Oblast. Ingrian Finns are not related to Finns, they are Finnish themselves, the descendants of Finns who in the seventeenth century moved to Ingria."

This, essentially, is the extent of the discourse on the Swedish legacy in the Ingrian discussion. The historic connection to the seventeenth Swedish Kingdom, with its positive Westward connotations, appears shared by Finns and Ingrians, thus simultaneously granting Ingrians a related Finnish identity though the discursive

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resources of Western, Scandinavia-ward orientation and ancestral connection to ancient Finland. This is not substantially challenged at any point between 1990 and 1995 by the Finnish governments or parliamentarians.

There is also the notion of Lutheranism, brought to Finland by the Swedish King Gustav Vasa in the early modern era, and specifically addressed in the 1990 Koivisto interview, that plays into the discussion of the positive Western/Swedish legacy in Finland and Ingria. Scholars such as Henrik Stenius have written on the significance of the Lutheran tradition in Nordic European history, and Stenius in particular suggests its role in shaping an understanding of Nordic heritage.\(^94\) Given Koivisto’s specific 1990 mention of Lutheranism as binding Ingrians to Finland or Nordic Europe, and the significance Huntington, for example, gives the religious divide in separating Eastern and Western “civilisations”, with Finns thus as Western Europeans and Russians as Eastern, it is perhaps surprising that the Lutheranism of Ingrians finds very limited mention in the ensuing political discourse on the Ingrian Return law. After Koivisto, no other major Finnish politician employs the same discursive resource to note Ingrian and Finnish sameness, and Finnish/Ingrian and Russian otherness. However, there is some evidence to suggest a degree of decline in the significance of religion as an identity marker for Finnishness at this time. Writing in 1990, Gustav Björkstrand notes that whilst overall Lutheran Church membership still remained at 90% at this time, and the majority of major political parties (barring the Left Alliance and Greens) did not actively support the complete separation of church and state, the Lutheran Church was experiencing a decline in membership, and secularism was gaining some (limited) ground.\(^95\) Kimmo Kääriäinen, Kati Niemelä and Kimmo Ketola also argue that the Lutheran Church in Finland post-Second World War had had to respond to secularisation challenges and become more strident in its role as a “folk church”, separate from the state but advocating social and moral positions it deemed to be representative of Finnish values, such as the defence of the welfare state model in the 1990s.\(^96\)

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\(^{96}\) Kimmo Kääriäinen, Kati Niemelä and Kimmo Ketola, Religion in Finland: Decline, Change and Transformation of Finnish Religiosity, Tampere: Church Research Institute, 2005, pp. 60-1.
some indications of the rise of secularism and potential declining omnipotence of Lutheranism as the spiritual core of Finnish national identity constructions by the 1990s, despite the Lutheran Church still retaining a significant social role and broad membership base at this time. The religious confession of Ingrians may have therefore been of lesser significance in promoting their Finnishness, if Finns in Finland had themselves a waning relationship with the Lutheran Church.

The lack of mention of the need to offer religious protection to Lutheran Ingrians in Russia by bringing them to a majority Lutheran country, as well as any expression between 1990 and 1995 of Ingrians being more or less active in religious life in Finland than anticipated, also suggests that in practice, the Lutheran connection was relatively uncontested in parliamentary discussions on Ingrian return migration. After Koivisto had specified their Lutheranism inherited from the Swedish Kingdom as indicative of their Finnishness in April 1990, mentions of Ingrian Lutheran identity are by and large limited to discussions of use of Lutheran Church membership in Ingria as means of proving Finnishness. Thus, Lutheranism does retain some practical significance as a discursive resource for “proof” of Finnish identity. The lack of dissent from Finnish politicians on church membership as a means of providing this proof therefore suggests both that there is a certain degree of consensus on the Finnishness of Ingrians based on their connection to the Western-orientated, Swedish-exported Lutheran tradition, and that the pro-Western discussion on common Swedish Stormaktstid history declined in significance in the justification of the Ingrian Finnish Return law after Koivisto’s April 1990 statement.

5) The Negative Assessment of Russia and the Soviet Union

According to Heikki Luostarinen, the 1980s, glasnost and perestroika, and the early stages of the opening up of the Soviet Union transformed global perceptions of the USSR. The Western powers, particularly the United States, had been embroiled in a “Second Cold War” with the Soviets in the early years of the Reagan Administration, yet the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev served to moderate Western perceptions of the

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97 Vuoristo, “Suomen kansalaisuuden myöntämisestä inkeriläisille paluumuuttajille”.
USSR and Russians in the latter half of the 1980s. The Finnish perceptions of the USSR and Russians, at once more familiar and less mystical to them than to Americans, Luostarinen sees as following a similar pattern of a dissolving “enemy image”. The 1948 Treaty, to Luostarinen, removed any real threat of Soviet attack on Finland, and particularly after the 1970s, Finland’s new-found national identity as an active neutral and “East-West bridgebuilder” served to dissipate any negative political discourses on the Soviet Union. But Luostarinen was writing in 1989, and the post-Soviet situation in Northern Europe would dramatically change the ways in which Finland was able, or believed it was able, to react to its eastern neighbour. Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, Browning argues that the discourse shifted to “post-Finlandisation”, a rebuke of the silence Finland had kept in criticising Soviet leaders and policy in the post-war era, to a more free and, if necessary, critical approach to Russian affairs.

Anni Kangas identifies three voices in the Finnish discourse on Finno-Russian relations: primordialists who see Russia as Finland’s constant enemy, instrumentalists who see the relationship and its use of history as constructed to serve political ends, and the identity-based school that focuses criticism on the distinctions made between Finns and Russians. The discussion on Ingrians, with respect to the Soviet and Russian government, shows a distinct presence of primordialist constructions, focusing in particular on Russian actions towards Ingrian refugees during and after the Second World War (also discussed at length in section 2, under the discussion of historical atonement).

A case in point is SMP parliamentarian Marita Jurva (later Mäkinen)’s 1993 written question to Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen, which begins:

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100 Ibid. p. 124.
101 Ibid. p. 131.
102 Browning, Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis, pp. 228-9.
Evocation of Stalinist crimes against the Ingrian population, even going so far as to term them genocide, is the most aggressive anti-Soviet discourse on Ingrians from a Finnish parliamentarian. Beyond criticism mentioned in previous sections that the USSR or new Russian Federation were not able to provide for their citizens, the mention of the Stalin-era fate of the Ingrians in this discussion depicts an anger in the Finnish political discourse on Soviet post-war actions that continued to ferment. The language employed here is highly evocative in its choice of words, including accusations of “genocide”, a particularly penetrating term. The “genocidal” relationship between Soviets and Ingrians contrasts sharply to the immediately preceding “kin” relationship between Ingrians and Finns.

Similarly, a large group of National Coalition parliamentarians submitted a written question to Minister Väyrynen in 1992 that begins:

In Russia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, and in some other parts of the former Soviet Union, there now live about 67,700 Ingrian Finns. This much remains from the 200,000 people who lived in Ingria previously for centuries. In Stalin's time, Ingrians began to be persecuted and moved away from their former dwelling places. Cultural rights were taken away, the Finnish language was banned, the churches were closed. Ingrians were exiled to Siberia even before the Second World War, and tens of thousands of them were executed. Since 1955, Ingrians have had the opportunity to return to Ingria, but the internal passport requirement (since 1959) is still preventing many from returning to their home.


Including also those Ingrian Finns deported from the Finnish border regions under Stalin to remote Siberia and Kazakhstan, this presentation of the suffering Russians inflicted on Ingrians gives the sense that Ingrians may not be safe amongst Russians: there is no direct mention of the significant change in government between Stalin and Gorbachev, or later Boris Yeltsin, and one is left with the impression that a threat, even if diminished, remains. A focus on the negative history between Soviets/Russians and Ingrians, therefore, relates closely to the discussion on historical atonement at this point, and emphasises the need to bring Ingrians to Finland, even if no real or impending threat can be deduced from the Soviet or Russian governments. The discursive resource of Russia and Russians as a negative influence on Finnish history is thus here employed as a clear rationale for bringing Ingrians, deemed as Finns themselves, to Finland. Despite changes in Finland’s relationship to Russia by the early 1990s, the persistence of this discursive resource continued to shape the Finnish approach to Ingrians at this time.

However, as with the assessment of the Swedish legacy, discussions on Soviet history in the Finnish parliament on Ingrian matters should be viewed as secondary, employed to add weight to other discussions as the core debate on Ingrian Finnish return migration. Reflections on the Swedish and Soviet legacies in the region, more broadly related to Finnish identity than focused sharply on the Ingrian issue, were not challenged by the arrival of Ingrian returnees, and the Finnish government did not appear to have sought to justify the Right to Return policy solely along these lines, although they influenced other discussions on the policy to varying extent. The Russian example in particular allowed Finnish politicians to play to overarching popular negative attitudes towards the USSR and Russia, particularly as Finland’s adversary in the Winter and Continuation Wars, along with generally negative historical assessments of Stalin himself, to reinforce an ideologically dominant perception of Finnishness in the period of post-Finlandisation in 1990-1995 that at this time includes Ingrians. The discursive construction of Finnishness as in opposition to Russianness extends to Ingrians through their shared history of opposition to Russians/Soviets, is therefore still an important element in the early discussion on the Ingrian Right to Return and the constructions of Finnish identity therein.
C) Conclusions

Mauno Koivisto’s April 1990 statement on the Ingrian Finns introduced discursive constructions of Finnish identity, and launched a political discussion that inferred the connection of Ingrians to a set of core characteristics of Finnish identity. Taking Finland’s largely Finnish-speaking, Lutheran population, with long ancestral connections to the land and a Western, rather than Eastern, European political orientation as the cornerstones of Finnish identity, Finnish politicians initially took for granted that Ingrian Finnish returnees would also conform to these identity constructions. Yet the way in which various aspects of the political discussion on Ingrian migration to Finland presented here – namely the notions of integration capability, historical atonement, humanitarian intervention and views of the Swedish and Soviet influence on the region – shift over the period 1990-1995 reflects the reality that Ingrians did not easily fit the identity categories Finnish politicians held to describe Finnishness. It is the notion that Ingrians belong within the dominant constructions of Finnish identity, rather than the validity of these discursive resources as a whole, that is re-examined somewhat here. This gives some indication of the pervasiveness of these discursive resources in defining Finnishness for Finnish lawmakers at this time, despite challenges from the experience of Ingrians, still held to be Finns, in Finland by the mid 1990s.

In particular, within the discussions on integration, atonement and humanitarian intervention, cases are presented both from parliamentarians and the government ministries that acknowledge a disparity between the Finnish ideal of Ingrians and the reality. The discussion on humanitarian intervention, for example, acknowledged Ingrians’ connection to their homeland of Ingria in Russia, rather than Finland, and disparities in language competency in particular that would make long-term residency and integration in Finland difficult and potentially unhelpful to improving Ingrian standards of living. This discussion thus becomes a question of short-term residency as a temporary escape for Ingrians from a difficult transitional period in Russia and Estonia. The discussion on historical atonement also shows elements from the populist wing (which was initially enthusiastic about this Ingrian return migration) that emphasise the Finnishness of Ingrians based primarily on their service to Finland in the Second World War, separating Ingrian veterans from other Ingrians and
opening an avenue for questioning of non-veterans’ relative Finnishness, thus creating a “hierarchy” of Finnishness in Ingrians, though this diverges from the then government’s official line. Discussions on integration also begin to question preconceived notions of Ingrians’ connection to the Finnish language, which exacerbate concerns for labour market integration at a time of increasing unemployment.

Yet the discourses on these notions do not yet cancel completely the concept of Ingrian connectedness to Finland, nor the appropriateness of special treatment of Ingrians in immigration policy based on this concept. For the most part, the discussions on Ingrian Finnish return migration overall continue to present the notion that Ingrians conform to the discursive resources shaping discussion and construction of Finnish identity here. For instance, the humanitarian intervention and historical atonement discussions still appear focused on the notion that Ingrians are owed some assistance from the Finnish state, based on their kin-relationship to Finland and their service and suffering for this relationship in the post-war Soviet Union. This is communicated through particularly emotive and evocative language from Finnish politicians, which plays particularly on wartime memories in Finland, as well as narratives of Ingrian suffering under Stalin in the USSR. Particularly in the post-Finlandisation context of early 1990s Finland, this was an effective discursive method in forging the ideological dominance of Ingrian inclusion in Finland, relating interpretations of Ingrians’ history to dominant perceptions of Finnish history with the USSR, particularly the “separate struggle” for Finnish independence.

Thus, constructions of Finnish national identity inherent in this policy before 1996 appear to conform to an ethno-culturally essentialist ideology of Finnish national identity, viewing Finnishness as a broader concept of identity beyond the status of citizenship. Though some scholars of national identity in Europe continue to follow the model of an East-West divide in Europe, particularly viewing the ethno-cultural Eastern model of identity as informed by the legacy of communist governments and absence of civil society, analysis of the Ingrian Finnish Return law in this initial period shows ethno-cultural ideologies of national identity transcend the old Iron Curtain and find credence also in a self-identifying Western European democracy.
Finland also represents a logical inconsistency between definitions of Eastern and Western Europe as culturally separated or distinct “civilisations” defined primarily by religious and cultural differences. Finnish politicians’ perception of Finland’s “Westernness” appears more readily the result of historic narratives devised and employed to create identity borders for politically expedient purposes, in this case a claim to the perceived prestige of Western Europeanness, integration into the European Union and maintenance of national independence against a larger neighbour with an expansionist history in the twentieth century.
This chapter examines the constructions of Finnishness in the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return as the policy was altered, reformed and ultimately cancelled. The transitions in the Ingrian Finnish Return policy begin with the first introduction of specific criteria to define and limit returnee status in 1996, and end with the final decision to close the Ingrian Right to Return in 2010. In both 1996 and 2002-2003 new regulations and criteria were introduced, by which applicants would be assessed to qualify for returnee status. These regulations included concrete definitions and limitations of Finnish ancestry and Finnish language capability to be proven before departure for Finland, which can be viewed as an attempt to weed out those amongst the Ingrian Finns whose Finnish lineal ancestry was deemed too distant, or dedication to learning the Finnish language too weak (in essence, those who failed to conform to two of the five core identity characteristics used as discursive resources to connect Ingrians to Finnishness in 1990-1995). This represents something of a departure from the government line in 1990-1995, when creating a split between “deserving” and “undeserving” Ingrian return migrants was specifically rejected. The reform and ultimate cancellation of the Ingrian Finnish Return policy shows the resilience of some characteristics of Finnishness used by politicians to describe Finnish identity, even if Ingrians, previously held to be Finnish, did not conform to them. Indeed, the changes in the Ingrian Finnish Return policy to its cancellation also show the willingness of Finnish politicians to exclude Ingrians rather than renegotiate some of their perceptions of Finnishness. Effectively, the realisation that Ingrian Finns failed to comply completely with some identity features, despite previous assumptions, spurred a gradual decline in the perceived “Finnishness” of Ingrians in Finnish politicians’ discussions, rather than a re-evaluation of what “Finnishness” was.

I argue in this chapter that, in essence, analysis of the changing discussions on the Ingrian Finnish Return policy suggests that Finnish political decision makers re-evaluated Ingrian, but not Finnish, identity. I see language capabilities as playing a major part in the limitations to returnee status introduced over this period, reflecting the symbolic weight the Finnish language holds as a cornerstone of Finnish identity,
even in an officially bilingual nation. I further argue that Finnish political figures also questioned Ingrians’ ideological orientation towards Western Europe and the validity of their ancestral connection to Finland. Thus, regulations were introduced that sought to restrict ancestral descent to within living memory (two generations, along the lines of a “grandmother clause”) rather than less-readily proven connections potentially spanning many centuries. This indicates some degree of challenge to the construction of Finnishness as purely a community of descent, which had been used as a discursive resource to link Finns and Ingrians to a common identity in 1990-1995. Now, in 1996-2010 Ingrians would increasingly be portrayed as fundamentally separate from the mainstream of Finnish identity, which continued to be defined to varying extents through other core discursive resources – Finnish language, positive connection to Sweden/Scandinavia and Western Europe, and negative connection to Russia/the Soviet Union, as in the policy’s earlier years.

This chapter progresses by examining the same five themes of the Ingrian Finnish Return presented in the previous chapter, which continued to dominate the political discussion on Ingrian returnees after 1996, but under different circumstances. Economic developments in early-1990s Finland had already made some of the cases made in 1990 for Ingrian Finnish return migration redundant or antiquated by 1991. In particular, the economic collapse between 1990 and 1993, in which Finland’s GDP declined 12%, ended the years of labour shortages in southern Finland and saw a sharp increase in unemployment.\(^1\) Belief in the relative “usefulness” of Ingrians for the labour market had declined before 1996, and though the rate of unemployment had begun to generally decline from 1994 (at a high of around 18%), by 1998 it still sat at over 10%, compared to a 1990 low of less than 3%\(^2\) (See also figure 14). The case for bringing Ingrians to Finland for economic purposes was now more difficult to make – Ingrian resettlement would now occur despite, rather than because of, the

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labour market situation in Finland, and its numbers would need to be carefully managed.

Figure 14
Line Graph of Finnish Average Yearly Unemployment Percentage Rate, 1994-2010 (Seasonally Adjusted)

The global economic recession of 2008 also impacted Finland, and again unemployment figures rose (see figure 14), this time from 6.2% in April 2008 to 8.2% in May 2009 (although this increase was less than the average across the European Union member states). In 2009, Labour Minister Anni Sinnemäki predicted the unemployment rate would exceed 10% by 2010. In the end, the rate averaged 8.4% in 2010, less than anticipated by Sinnemäki (see figure 14). Economic concerns, thus perhaps worse in anticipation than in reality, would also impact upon the rationale for the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return made towards the end of the policy, with the experience of labour shortages in the first year of the Right to Return policy set against the ongoing reality of labour integration challenges amidst rising unemployment, calling into question the feasibility of continuing the policy beyond 2010.


The global recession also focused Finnish public and political discussion on the Eurozone bailouts for Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland in the late 2000s, and the rise of a potential new identity divide in Europe, between North and South rather than East and West. Former chairman of the US Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan opined that cultural differences between the North, including Germany and Finland, and the South, including Greece and Portugal, were a major contributor to the disparity between the two regions in sovereign debt accumulation and vulnerability to prolonged recession. This notion very clearly entered the public discussion of Europe in Finland by late 2010, when the Republic of Ireland’s bailout was being negotiated. *The Financial Times* noted that Finnish political support for an Irish bailout was made conditional on strict Irish financial policy reform (particularly in matters related to its low corporate tax rate), and characterised the surrounding public and political discourse on the bailout as stressing Finland’s own fiscal prudence in comparison to other European states’ recklessness. European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs Olli Rehn, himself from Finland, expressed concern that public debates between North and South could undermine a joint European recovery plan.

However, this new North-South cleavage should not be taken as a replacement for the more established East-West divide that has ideologically influenced discussion of the Ingrian Return law in Finland. Firstly, it should be noted, as Giandomenico Majone does, that whatever economic disparities exist between North and South in the Eurozone pale in comparison to the divergence between West and East in the broader European Union. Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the EU in the 1980s with income levels of approximately 65% of the EU average, whereas the post-communist 2004 candidates joined with income levels at an average of 40%. The greatest per capita income gap in Europe is between Luxembourg and Romania – the Romanian average

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7 Ibid.

is less than a tenth of Luxembourg’s.\textsuperscript{9} Perhaps more significantly, the East vs. West divide retains a cultural dimension which, unlike the North-South divide, paints one side as \textit{more} European than the other. This idea still found expression in the 2000s in Europe, for instance in a 2005 article by Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas that identified France and Germany as “Core Europe”, the focal point of a new emerging European identity growing in counterweight to the United States.\textsuperscript{10} The idea of Core Europe was criticised by those outside its boundaries, such as Peter Esterházy, who argued that it created a notion of “first-class” and “second-class” Europeans, divided between core-West and peripheral-East.\textsuperscript{11} This disparity in levels of Europeanness is a crucial difference between discursive constructions of European identity in the old East-West and new North-South divides, as the North-South divide does not appear to function as an identity marker for the overall notion of Europeanness.

In Finnish politics, the recession and Eurozone bailouts had a particular effect on how the idea of Europe was employed. Positive depictions of the EU and the “Westernising” narrative from the early 1990s were replaced by a degree of Euroscepticism, with the True Finns obtaining an historic 14.9% gain in the vote share in 2011 (the largest increase in Finnish parliamentary history) running on an anti-European integration platform.\textsuperscript{12} However, this electoral success should not be viewed as a specific challenge to the positive construction of Finland’s (West) European identity. Indeed, Douglas R. Holmes argues that European identity may be employed by right-wing populist parties to further ethnically or culturally exclusionist conceptions of national identity, nested in an overarching European identity that is disseminated through exclusivist discursive resources like shared Christian religion or shared historical experience.\textsuperscript{13} Similarly, Michael Bruter argues that nationalists may

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.
construct an “ethno-European” identity based on “any form of common history; moral, religious, or ethnic traditions; philosophical, political, and moral norms and values”. For populist parties, the argument is effectively that European identity exists, but should be directed at rejection of multiculturalism and immigration from the non-West rather than erosion of the power of national governments. Cas Mudde sees the 2000s generation of Eurosceptic anti-immigration parties as self-described defenders of the “Europeanness” of their national identity, particularly with reference to European immigration from North Africa, Turkey and the Middle East. Interestingly, Niko Pyrhönen argues that Finnish anti-immigration populists in the late 2000s framed their stance particularly through discursive constructions of immigration as a challenge to Finland’s Nordic identity through its welfare state model, which demonstrates the same principles within a smaller supranational identity nest. Construction of Europe and European as identities may similarly become a significant aspect of national identity construction, conveyed using similarly exclusivist discursive resources. This may be seen in the Ingrian Finnish Return law example, as the notion of Europe specifically constructed in opposition to Russia is discursively employed by policymakers to legitimise the migration of Ingrians as Finns to Finland, or alternatively, delegitimise their migration as Russians to Finland.

Whilst the Right to Return policy was subjected to changing economic and political circumstances in Finland from 1996 to 2010, one matter of relative continuity within domestic politics from Mauno Koivisto’s presidency onwards was the way in which Finland’s experience in the Winter and Continuation Wars was presented. Koivisto’s successors as President, Martti Ahtisaari and Tarja Halonen, both also Social Democrats, advocated a view of the military conflicts between the USSR and Finland between 1939-1944 as a “separate war”, wherein Finland struggled for its own

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survival, rather than as part of the larger European theatre of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{18} This relates to the construction of Finnish identity as a Western nation separate and opposed to the East. Indeed, the personal experiences of Koivisto’s immediate successor Martti Ahtisaari (in office 1994-2000), who was born in Viipuri and evacuated to Kuopio in Savonia after the Soviet annexation of eastern Finnish Karelia, kept the legacy of the Winter and Continuation Wars in public view.\textsuperscript{19} Ahtisaari himself referenced the role this aspect of his personal history had played in shaping his worldview in his acceptance speech for the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize, in which he states:

\begin{quote}
I too was a child affected by a war. I was only two years old when, as a result of an agreement on spheres of interest between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union, war broke out, forcing my family to leave soon thereafter the town of Viipuri. Like several hundred thousand fellow Karelians, we became refugees in our own country as great power politics caused the borders of Finland to be redrawn and left my home town as part of the Soviet Union. This childhood experience contributed to my commitment to working on the resolution of conflicts.\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

Here, the Finnish discussion of humanitarianism continues to be viewed through the prism of Finland’s Winter and Continuation War experiences with the Soviet Union, despite the passing of more than 60 years. Ahtisaari’s successor, Tarja Halonen (in office 2000-2012), attracted controversy in 2005 for referring to Finland’s participation in the Second World War as a separate struggle to Germany’s, although Finland had signed the 1947 Paris Peace treaty as a German co-belligerent.\textsuperscript{21} Her statements may be less delicately worded than Ahtisaari’s, but both still subscribe to the notion that Finland was a victim, rather than aggressor, in the Second World War. For the Ingrians, who like Finns from Soviet-annexed Karelia were portrayed as victims of the USSR’s invasion and intimidation of Finland, this ongoing construction of Second World War history in Finland’s political culture gives life to their return migration. Whereas other discussions on the Ingrian Right to Return policy shifted against changing political and economic situations, this discussion, and its legislative results for Ingrians, remains relatively constant in its advocacy for inclusion in Finland.

\textsuperscript{18} Henrik Meinander, “A Separate Story?”, p. 66.  
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{21} Meinander, “A Separate Story?”, p. 66.
At the same time, this period saw the rise of the populist True Finns party, a successor to the previous populist SMP, and led by former SMP-member Timo Soini. The True Finns continued to raise the Karelian issue on populist-nationalist grounds, and Soini, as the party’s presidential candidate in the 2006 elections, pledged to pursue the return of Karelia from Russia, emphatically stating “Karelia is a part of Finland. I agree, and hope that it will one day return to Finland”.22 A second 2006 presidential candidate, the independent Arto Lahti, also advocated the return of Karelia.23 Karelia has a symbolic function, beyond any (unlikely) concrete actions for its return. It is evocative of the Finnish struggle for survival against the Russo-Soviet threat, and an indicator of Finland’s fate under the Russians in a there-but-for-the-grace-of-God scenario: Karelian Finns had been made to suffer throughout the conflict between Finland and the Soviet Union, and the loss of Karelia remains a reminder of this moment of existential threat, as well as (less directly) the loss of homes and dispersal of Finnish-speakers from the eastern Baltic region. The change in border also recalls the argument from Paasi (discussed in chapter one) that the Finno-Russian border has a symbolic and ideological function as a stronghold dividing Western and Eastern peoples. Evacuation of Karelians as Westerners was required once the border was shifted and the region fell to the Eastern invaders. With the True Finns persistent in keeping Karelia within the political discourse, the discussion on atonement for Ingria’s Second World War history could also remain potent. Indeed, as is seen in the analysis of this theme, this is one discussion in which attitudes remain largely unchanged from 1990 to 2010.

Further political changes in Finland, however, did alter the discussion on the Ingrian return migration. Significantly, on 1 January 1995 Finland had become a member of the European Union, which brought with it new obligations and regulations affecting immigration, settlement and movement of peoples, as well as placing Finland in a new position, and presenting it with new tools, to engage with its eastern neighbour. The 1995 enlargement has been popularly referred to as the “Nordic” enlargement, given the expansion of the EU at this time to include Sweden and Finland (along with

Austria, a similarly neutral state that had not joined NATO), alongside simultaneous accession talks with Norway (though Norwegians ultimately rejected membership in a 1994 referendum). Indeed, the Finnish-Swedish EU enlargement brought about renewed focus on the Nordic and Baltic region in Europe, including the creation of the so-called “Northern Dimension” – a policy for EU-Russian cooperation in the Baltic Sea region that was spearheaded by Finland. The origins of this policy came during Finnish accession negotiations in 1994, when Foreign Minister Heikki Haavisto told members of the European press:

New Nordic members, if and when they join, will bring with them a whole new northern dimension to the EU…The implications of the northern dimension to the Union are gradually being recognised in Brussels and EU capitals.

This was echoed shortly after in Brussels by Prime Minister Esko Aho, who summarised the positive contributions of the new Nordic EU States as:

1) A geographical extension to the North;
2) Well established welfare societies with deeply rooted democratic traditions,
3) Strong economies adapted to unfavourable conditions with sound ecological approaches
4) An extension to the east and northeast, a geographical proximity to and traditions in dealing with Russia and the Baltic States.

The Northern Dimension policy, which was formally announced in 1997, planned from 1999 and finally reached full fruition in 2006, represented a particular new avenue through which Finland could address its relationship with Russia, perhaps emboldened with a new confidence born from the backing of the rest of the EU. Yet it does not necessarily represent a departure from some of the discussions present in the earlier 1990s, as evidenced by Aho’s second point on the positive traditions of Nordic nations as bastions of democracy. The Nordic nations have become accustomed through their geography to dealing with Russia, which may stretch into the North of Europe but is not constructed as culturally Nordic, as per Aho’s fourth point. This distinction is clearer in English than in Finnish or the Scandinavian languages, which

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26 Ibid. p. 11.
do not have a separate term for the Nordic region beyond “the north”: in Swedish, Norden, in Finnish pohjoismaat - northern countries.

The circumstances for Ingrian Finnish returnees were then further affected by the 1 May 2004 accession of Estonia to European Union membership, negating to some extent (but perhaps not completely, given the ongoing controversy in Estonia over officially stateless non-Estonian speakers without passports) the need for Ingrian Finns from Estonia to obtain residence permits to resettle in Finland.

Figure 15
Table of persons of select most-common non-EU nationalities resident in Finland, for years 1990 and 1995-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8,446</td>
<td>9,038</td>
<td>9,689</td>
<td>10,340</td>
<td>10,652</td>
<td>10,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former USSR</td>
<td>4,181</td>
<td>6,163</td>
<td>5,187</td>
<td>4,675</td>
<td>3,628</td>
<td>2,966</td>
<td>2,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2,407</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>2,541</td>
<td>2,518</td>
<td>2,521</td>
<td>2,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>9,720</td>
<td>11,810</td>
<td>14,316</td>
<td>16,861</td>
<td>18,575</td>
<td>20,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4,044</td>
<td>4,555</td>
<td>5,238</td>
<td>5,371</td>
<td>4,410</td>
<td>4,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>1,844</td>
<td>1,833</td>
<td>1,905</td>
<td>2,001</td>
<td>2,063</td>
<td>2,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>1,855</td>
<td>2,435</td>
<td>2,670</td>
<td>2,960</td>
<td>3,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>2,084</td>
<td>2,143</td>
<td>2,171</td>
<td>1,965</td>
<td>1,840</td>
<td>1814</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The years 1996 to 2010 also saw increased migration to Finland, partially as a result of EU membership. Humanitarian and refugee programs also brought to Finland asylum seekers from conflict zones in Eastern Europe and Africa (particularly Somalia, with the Somali community becoming a small but significant minority in Finland by the mid 1990s – see figure 15, showing the number of Somali-born Finnish residents peaking in 1998, though it begins to decline thereafter). The Somali community’s regional concentration in the major cities, particularly in the eastern and northeastern districts of Helsinki, has also increased their visibility as a new community in Finland. Though Finland remained less diverse than many other EU members in terms of the percentage of its inhabitants with migrant backgrounds

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during this period, the changing demographics of Finland did present a new context in which the Right to Return policy could be viewed at this time, particularly in its impact on the status of non-returnee immigrants and their descendants as Finnish.

Figure 16
Foreign-Born Population as Percentage of Total Population in European states, 31 December 2008


Analysis of the discussions in Finnish political sources, particularly the questions and answers delivered in the Eduskunta, the major ministerial reports, the language of agreements and treaties and of course the relevant amendments to the Aliens Act restricting the definition of returnees, are presented in this chapter as an indication of a decline in the constructions of Finnish identity that stress ancestral and genealogical links to ancient Finland and Lutheranism. In place, there is a reassessment amongst Finnish lawmakers of Ingrian Finnishness, based on the remaining discursive resources: the Finnish language, Western cultural orientation and opposition to the East/Russia. These discursive constructions of Finnishness serve as exclusionary and essentialist identity definitions, which now potentially exclude Ingrians from their definition of the Finnish national community but also, within the context of increasing

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30 Finland, represented as FI, is at less than 5%, ranking 19 out of the 23 states included in the survey.
immigrant diversity, risk excluding other new communities in Finland. Thus, though the decline of the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return program appears to accompany a decline in the ancient and inherited aspects of identity in relation to citizenship and belonging in the modern Finnish nation, at least in relation to the earlier years of the policy’s existence, the discussion still presents some elements of exclusionist or ethno-culturally essentialist national identity constructions.

A) Finnishness in the Changing Discussion on the Ingrian Finnish Return

1) Integration Capability

The mid-1990s changes in the discussion on the Ingrian Finnish Return law were connected to the assumption of Ingrian integration capability in Finland. By 1 August 1996, new regulations governing the resettlement of Ingrian Finns in Finland came into force, as outlined in the Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laiksi ulkomaalaislain muuttamisesta [Government Bill to Parliament on Amending the Aliens Act]. The preamble to the amendment, which gives an overview of the situation and justification for change at some length, specifically ties the question of Ingrian Finnish migration to that of first and second generation Finns in Sweden and North America returning to Finland, noting:

Returnees are expatriate Finns who have moved to Finland. In 1990, around 625,000 first and second generation expatriate Finns lived abroad. More than half of these lived in Sweden, and a third in North America. Counting third and fourth generation expatriate Finns, the number is around 1.2 million.

In the 1980s, around 120,000 people immigrated to Finland, of which around 90% were returnees. In recent years, Finland’s net immigration has fallen steadily. Without the return migration of Ingrian Finns and Swedish Finns, emigration from Finland would outweigh immigration.31

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Including Ingrian Finns with Finns from Sweden in the return migration figures ties Ingrian return migration with other forms of return migration based on much more recent (largely first and second generation, maximum third and fourth) Finnish descent. Indeed, the preamble further states on the Ingrian Finnish matter:

The government had discussed the matter with the President and came to the conclusion that there is no need to take legislative action, but rather, the Ingrian Finnish return migration would be taken as part of the general return migration law.\textsuperscript{32}

This new amendment, therefore, represents the first instance of legislation that concretely designates Ingrian Finns as belonging to the Finnish diaspora groups for which the Right to Return migration law had been introduced. This status for Ingrian Finns had previously been effectively taken for granted.

However, the 1996 Aliens Act amendment serves to undermine in several respects the notion that Ingrian Finnish return migration is equivalent to return migration from Sweden or North America, and that the same assumptions of integration capability for these returnees could be taken for granted in Ingrian Finns. The 1996 amendment, specifically addressed to return migrants from the former Soviet Union, provides a residence permit for migrants on the following conditions:

1) if the applicant himself/herself, or his/her parents, or at least 2 out of four grandparents, has been noted in his/her documents as a Finnish national, or
2) if the applicant has other evidence of other cohesive connections to Finland and Finnishness, but he/she does not possess documentation to qualify under paragraph 1.\textsuperscript{33}

The new amendments appear to bring the criteria for Ingrians closer to the standard of other returnee groups, with the particular limitation on generational connection to Finland at least serving to bring Ingrian ancestral connection to Finnish citizenship to within living memory. This excludes those whose ancestral connections to any political incarnation of Finland ended during the Swedish era. Thus, the construction

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. Original Finnish text: Hallitus oli keskustellut asiasta presidentin kanssa ja tällöin oli tultu siihen johtopäätökseen, että ei ole tarpeen ryhtyä lainsäädäntötoimiin vaan inkerinsuomalaisten paluumuuttoon suhtaudutaan kuten paluumuuttoon yleensä.

of Finland as a national community of ancestral descent appears to show some signs of limitation: the Finnishness inherent in ancestry appears to expire or diminish after many generations living outside the Finnish nation state and Finnish national community. Yet the language of this amendment is noticeably vague. There is no definite requirement that one grandparent hold or have held Finnish citizenship. Rather, the grandparent should have proof of a “cohesive connection to Finland and Finnishness”. The exact nature of such a connection, and what form the proof of it should take, is left unspecified.

Indeed, though ancestral connection appears to be the core concern of this amendment, the lack of specificity on how long Ingrians or their parents and grandparents had lived in Finland, and the exceptions listed in paragraph two, with its more general provisions on connections to Finland and Finnishness, still allow those whose familial connection to Finland may be brief or undocumented to pursue the status of returnee. The specifics of paragraph two, as outlined in the preamble for the bill to parliament, stress integration capability, particularly in the field of language competence, as on a par with documented living experience in Finland. The preamble states that connection to Finland and Finnishness may be proven by fluency in Finnish or Swedish, as well as knowledge of Finnish society and culture.34 In some respects, familiarity with Finnish society and language is afforded greater significance than ancestral connection – those who qualify under paragraph 1 are still expected to complete training in adapting to life in Finland before migrating.35 Questioning the Finnish language capabilities of Ingrians, particularly younger Ingrians, had already arisen in the Finnish political discourse after 1990 (see for example the quotes from then Labour Minister Ilkka Kanerva in the discussion on integration capability in chapter four). The continuation of this discussion, and its translation into new reforms in 1996, thus suggests the waning in significance of ancestral connections to ancient Finland vis-à-vis proficiency in Finland’s national languages as a key discursive resource in constructing belonging to the Finnish national community. The jus sanguinis construction of Finland as a national community of ancestral descent thus appears to be of lesser import than other core discursive resources in proving Finnishness, although its significance is not completely ignored, as Ingrians could still

34 Suomen Eduskunta, “Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laiksi ulkomaalaislain muuttamisesta”.
35 Ibid.
prove their Finnish identity through the Finnish ancestry, or ethnic identity, of their
grandparent (i.e. the grandparent did not have to be a Finnish citizen, just noted as of
Finnish origin). Ancestral connection as a discursive resource to convey connection
to Finnishness therefore does not completely exit the Finnish political discussion on
Ingrians. The assumption present in the earlier discussions that even non-Finnish
speaking Ingrians possess greater integration capability than other migrants through
their ancient ancestral connection to Finland is not completely diminished.

Parliamentary discussions on the Ingrians in the mid- to late 1990s in large part reflect
the sentiment of the restrictions introduced in 1996, and refute earlier notions of
Ingrian integration capability based on Finnish ancestry. One such instance is a 1998
question to the government from a quartet of National Coalition parliamentarians
(Kimmo Sasi, Ilkka Kanerva, Ben Zyskowicz and Suvi Lindén), who wrote:

Today, however, only about a fifth of Ingrian returnees coming to Finland can speak Finnish,
and for many the connection to Finland is actually very weak. Their ability to gain
employment in Finland is also very poor. This situation has led to Finland likely gaining an
unemployed and monolingual Russian minority that is threatened with deep social exclusion.
There is already alarming news of Ingrian youths spiralling into drugs and related crimes.³⁶

It is significant to note the clear and definite classification of Ingrians as a
monolingual Russian minority, and the way in which lack of Finnish language
abilities is here directly and immediately translated to a “very weak” connection to
Finland. Their ancestral connections to Finland are here also generally described as
weak: multigenerational and centuries-long gaps in the Ingrian connection to Finland
now appear to be too tenuous to guarantee Finnish identity. As has been relatively
common in the Finnish political discussions on Ingrians, the politicians’ language
here appeals to some degree of sympathy for Ingrians, but in a rather new way.
Ingrians are now seen as a vulnerable minority in Finland, rather than in Russia.
Failed integration capability, born of Ingrians’ apparent lack of “Finnishness” as

³⁶Kimmo Sasi, Ilkka Kanerva, Ben Zyskowicz and Suvi Lindén, “Inkeriläisten maahanmuuttoedelly”,
KVN 43/1998, available online at URL:
Suomeen tulevista inkeriläisistä paluumuuttaajista vain noin viidesosa osaa suomen kieltä ja monen
yhteys Suomeen on tosiasiallisesti hyvin vähäinen. Heidän mahdollisuuksiensa saada Suomessa työtä
ovat muutoinkin hyvin heikot. Tämä tilanne on johtamassa siihen, että Suomeen uhkaa syntyä työConnor ja
kielitalotai työstä vähemmistö, jota uhkaa syvä yhteiskunnallinen syrjäytyminen.
Inkeriläisnuorten huumetieteen ja siihen liittyvästä rikollisuudesta on jo olemassa hälytätävää tietoa.
defined by speaking the Finnish language, has been deleterious for Ingrians, and necessitates a re-examination of the Right to Return policy.

That this comment came from National Coalition parliamentarians also speaks to the fact that in this period, the National Coalition party would adopt a policy platform on immigration for the period 2003-2007 that specifically addressed the language capability of migrants, which should be considered in labour migration decisions, and stated that labour migration and refugee migration policies should be kept separate. The Ingrian Finnish Return policy was not quite one or the other, and could rather be interpreted as an instance where labour and humanitarian issues became conflated. Considering National Coalition thinking on migration at this time, statements from their parliamentarians questioning the language abilities of Ingrians suggests the centre-right in Finnish politics saw Ingrian migration as labour migration. Labour migration is discussed as partly dependent on language abilities for integration, and it is here argued that Finnish language abilities amongst Ingrian Finns have been mistakenly assumed as uniformly well-developed. Thus, Ingrian migration as labour migration is ill-conceived.

The decline in Finnish lawmakers’ faith in Ingrian integration capability becomes more specifically linked to language with the next wave of amendments to the Right to Return clause in the Aliens Act, drafted by the government in 2002. The third point of the first section of amendments, which came into force on 1 April 2003, states that applicants may be granted Right to Return status on the following basis:

if the applicant himself/herself, one of his/her parents, or at least two of his/her four grandparents is or has been documented as of Finnish nationality, and the applicant has sufficient knowledge of Finnish or Swedish.

This section, taking the previous 1996 amendment on generational ties to Finland, thus further adds language capability into its restrictions. The importance of

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integration into Finnish society through one of Finland’s national languages, implied in the previous amendments, is now specifically stated and legally codified. This is a significant departure from previous discussions assuming Finnish-language competence from Ingrians based on their Finnish ancestry, as with this amendment, Ingrians could prove competence by studying either Finnish or Swedish to claim returnee status.

The amendment of 2002-2003 further notes that the issuing of a Right to Return residence permit is conditional on three points, the second of which states:

as referred to in paragraph one, subparagraph 3 of the amended law, applicants must participate in an organised returnee orientation program in their country of origin and complete a language exam organised by the Finnish authorities to show sufficient knowledge of Finnish or Swedish at the skill level of A2 in the European Union’s Common European Framework language proficiency rating scale, unless circumstances prevent the returnee orientation program or language test from reasonably being completed.39

Thus the minimum requirements for language capability are specifically set, and proof is now required before the returnee moves to Finland. The A2 skill level indicated by the amendment is not particularly advanced, suggesting perhaps more a nominal demonstration of willingness or commitment to learn one of Finland’s national languages prior to immigration. Neither the Parliamentary Committee set up to draft this legislation in October 2002, nor the commissioned opinion of the Eduskunta’s Constitutional Law Committee, offer any justification or reasoning for the introduction of such language restrictions, beyond stating that the restrictions do not violate the right of those of Finnish origin to return to Finland, and that returnee residence permits should be considered different from other residence permits granted to non-returnee immigrants.40 At this stage, even with the limited Finnish-language competency of Ingrians noted, Finnish legal language on immigration still grants

39 Ibid. Original Finnish text: edellä 1 momentin 3 kohdassa tarkoitettuun tarkoituksessa hakija osallistuu lähistömaassa järjestetyn paluumuuttovalmennukseen ja esittää Suomen viranomaisen järjestämän kielen suorittamisesta todistuksen, jonka perusteella hänenä on sellainen suomen tai ruotsin kielen taito, joka vastaa Euroopan neuvoston yleiseurooppalaisen viitekehysen mukaisen kielitaidon arviointiaistetun taitotason A2, jollei paluumuuttovalmennuksen tai kielenosan suorittaminen osallistumisista ole pidettävä hakijan olosuhteet huomioon ottaen kohtuuttomana.

them a privileged position as returnee migrants, built on a still-held belief in Ingrians’ Finnishness.

The final decision to close the application queue for Right to Return migrants came in 2010. The 1991 Aliens Act had by this time been replaced by a new version in 2004, though the sections on the Right to Return for Ingrians had remained essentially unchanged. In the preamble to the 2010 amendment that cancelled the Return policy for Ingrians (though return migration for Winter and Continuation War veterans and deported refugees remained), the government cited two principal justifications for its action: that it was reasonable to assume that in twenty years, all those with serious intention of moving to Finland would have done so, and also that legitimate concerns of the ability of Ingrians to integrate into the labour market by this time made continuation of the policy unfeasible.

Though the situation had been reviewed in 2005-2006, it was seen by the government at that time (before the late 2000s recession) that Ingrian migration would assist in preventing a labour crisis as the baby-boomer generation entered retirement. After the recession in 2008, however, concerns were raised on the continuation of labour market integration. Finland recorded two periods of falling production in consecutive quarters in 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, spurred by the global financial recession and associated weak market for exports, in addition to the rising unemployment rate noted in figure 14. The global recession of the late 2000s has had a particular political effect, described by Larry M. Bartels as “retrospective economic voting”, by which electorates “simply, and perhaps simplistically, punished incumbents of every stripe for economic hard times”. In Finland, this meant the rejection of the Centre Party-led coalition under Matti Vanhanen, and later Mari Kiviniemi, in the first

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42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
parliamentary election following the onset of the crisis, in early 2011.\textsuperscript{46} The National Coalition under Jyrki Katainen took over as the leading party with the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Left Alliance, Greens and Swedish People’s Party in a broad left-right coalition government.\textsuperscript{47} Perhaps the most dramatic result of this election was the substantial electoral gains for the True Finns party, who had openly run on a platform criticising excess spending on bailouts for the Eurozone’s most embattled economies (described in more detail in the introduction to this chapter).\textsuperscript{48} Increased public debt had been a core issue of the campaign over 2010 and early 2011, and the True Finns were able to profit most from the public’s substantially conservative fiscal attitude.\textsuperscript{49} In this political environment, though faced with the perhaps insurmountable prospect of electoral defeat, the Vanhanen-Kiviniemi governments nevertheless may have found it prudent to limit the influx of foreigners by bringing the Right to Return policy to an end.

Significantly, the language of the 2010 decision specifically mentions the economic situation since 2008, and the corresponding difficulties for labour market integration in a time of high unemployment, as a rationale for ending the Return program, which is explicitly linked to Ingrians’ perceived perception as ethnic Finns. The 2010 decision states that “the purpose of return migration has been to permit the migration of people who have embraced the Finnish identity and who have a cohesive relationship with Finland”.\textsuperscript{50} However, on the potential labour integration of Ingrians, the decision states that “it was seen that closely regulated labour migration increasingly grounded in ethnic criteria for Ingrian Finns was no longer necessary, and should come to an end”.\textsuperscript{51} These contrasting citations suggest that one’s Finnishness is dependent on labour integration, in which the amendment suggests the Ingrians have not been sufficiently successful, particularly based on Ingrians’

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid. pp. 236-8.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid. pp. 235-8.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid. Original Finnish text: nähtiin, että työvoiman maahanmuuton yleistyessä etnisin kriteereihin perustuva inkerinsuomalaisen tarkoin säädelly ja säännelly paluumuuttojärjestelmä on tullut tiensä päähän eikä sen ylläpitämistä nykyisessä muodossaan pidetty tarpeellisena.
language capabilities, which the amendment acknowledges have frequently required considerable time and financial resources from the Finnish state to improve.\textsuperscript{52} The queue would be closed with effect from 1 June 2011, though those with applications still in process could still be granted residence permission.\textsuperscript{53} Thus Finnish politicians’ concerns over Ingrian Finnish integration capability, exacerbated by the political and economic situation in Finland by the late 2000s, were expressed in language that highlighted disparities between Ingrians and the politicians’ perception of Finnishness, particularly on language capabilities.

The 2010 amendment, while acknowledging the significance of Finnishness to the Right to Return program, thus also gives a final indication of how Finnishness can be limited. The 2010 cancellation indicates the government no longer believes that remaining Ingrians from Russia speak Finnish, or are committed and able to learn a Finnish national language particularly quickly. Isolated from the national community by language barriers, the relative Finnishness of Ingrians thus appears diminished.

The discussion transformed from the initial period of 1990-1995, starting with the notion of Ingrian Finns’ greater integration capability, to the latter period of 1996-2010, in which problems with language and employment integration dominate the political language on the issue. This demonstrates a key observation in the construction of Finnish identity through this migration policy – the significance of language as an integration requirement remains, or indeed even strengthens, but is notably transformed in the Ingrian Finnish example from a discussion of Ingrians’ assumed Finnish capabilities to an implementation of a commitment from Ingrians to learn \textit{either} Finnish \textit{or} Swedish, suggesting Finnish politicians have relinquished the notion that Ingrians already speak Finnish or will increase their Finnish capabilities rapidly. Now, they are required to study one of the Finnish national languages and individually prove their own ability to integrate in Finland. Though the political discussion on Ingrian language capabilities notes their lack of both Finnish and Swedish capabilities, the lack of Finnish language knowledge amongst the Ingrian Finns appears both a surprise and a disappointment to Finnish lawmakers. Finnish, as Finland’s dominant, indigenous and unique national language, has held a particular place in the construction of Finnish national identity since the nineteenth century, as

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
described in chapter one of this thesis. As a discursive resource in the construction of Finnish national identity, according to which every native Finnish speaker is seen as a Finn, though not all Finns are native Finnish speakers, this was a core rationale for the definition of Ingrians as part of the Finnish identity discussed at the beginning of the Ingrian Return policy in the early 1990s. The amendment in 2002-2003 in particular shows this assumption has gone. Without these previously assumed language competencies, the notions of Ingrians’ belonging in Finnish society, and their speedy and easy integration into its labour markets, appears greatly diminished, and hastened the 2010 decision to end the policy.

2) **Historical Atonement**

In 1998, National Coalition politicians Kimmo Sasi, Ilkka Kanerva, Ben Zyskowicz and Suvi Lindén stated to the government that “initially Ingrian migration permission was right in taking into view Ingrians’ perceived historical wrongs”.\(^{54}\) To some extent, this attitude towards providing compensation to Ingrians for wartime suffering continued strong past 1996, indicative of the role war memory still plays in Finnish politics.\(^{55}\) Funding for Ingrian veterans was requested, for instance, by then-Christian League\(^{56}\) parliamentarian Bjarne Kallis from 2000 to 2009, in budget initiatives to the *Eduskunta* that called for increased funding to the Ingrian and Karelian veterans associations.\(^{57}\) Likewise, in 2002, Christian Democrat parliamentarian Leea Hiltunen expressed her support for the new stricter language restrictions for returnee immigrants, and approved of the fact that the new restrictions would not affect the return of Ingrian Winter and Continuation War veterans and deported refugees, as she wrote in a September 2002 question:


It is also fair that these conditions do not apply to those who were part of the Ingrian Finnish deportations of 1943-1944, or those who served during the Second World War in the Finnish army.\textsuperscript{58}

Indeed, the 2002-2003 amendments to the Right to Return law, entering into force in 2003, begin by specifically stating that returnee status may be granted on these conditions:

1) if the applicant belonged to the Ingrian emigrants who between 1943 and 1944 were transferred to Finland and then after the War returned to the Soviet Union
2) if the applicant has served in the Finnish Army between 1939 and 1945.\textsuperscript{59}

The notion of historical atonement for Ingrian wartime suffering thus appears to retain a lasting importance in the Ingrian Finnish Return discourse, and remains a key focus of Finnish legislation on the issue in the late 1990s and 2000s.

Indeed, at points later in the period of the Ingrian Finnish return migration, Second World War history emerged dramatically in the public and political discourse, and continued to effect the discussion on Ingrians. In 2003, Finnish historian Elina Sana published a prize-winning study of Second World War deportations from Finland, \textit{Luovutetut} (The Deported), in which she detailed many previously unacknowledged deportations of political and Jewish refugees from Finland to Germany.\textsuperscript{60} Sana, then publishing under her maiden name of Suominen, had already in 1979 authored a high-profile work, \textit{Kuoleman laiva} (Ship of Death), on forced repatriation of Jewish refugees from Finland, identifying an undercurrent of anti-Semitism in mid-century Finland as a partial cause, despite efforts of some groups (including the Finnish Social Democrats and Helsinki Jewish Congregation) to halt them.\textsuperscript{61} In particular, Sana honed in on the wartime head of Finland’s State Police, Arno Kalervo Anthoni, and


noted that the post-war Polish government had requested that Anthoni, as well as Finland’s Interior Minister Toivo Johannes Horelli, be indicted as war criminals for their role in the deportations, although they never were.\textsuperscript{62} Her newer work expanded significantly on such events, stating that some 2,829 prisoners of war, including 525 political refugees and 74 Jews, were deported to Germany from camps at Köyliö and Naarajärvi in Finland, following government directives in 1941 and 1942.\textsuperscript{63} The Simon Wiesenthal Centre, dedicated to justice for wartime atrocities committed against Jews, called for an investigation into her findings, and the issue of wartime responsibility in Finland again entered the public discourse.\textsuperscript{64} Antero Holmila argues that this, in the new millennium, was the first time in which the issue of the Second World War and Holocaust culpability finally entered the Finnish political discourse in a meaningful way.\textsuperscript{65}

To some extent, the success of Sofi Oksanen’s 2007 play \textit{Puhdistus} (Purge) and its 2008 novelisation also kept these issues in the public consciousness, as the novel gives a fictional depiction of an Estonian nationalist, Hans Pekk, who fights with German forces in Finland against the Soviets, whilst his supporters remain conspicuously silent when Jews from their home village are deported.\textsuperscript{66} The novel was successful internationally, and brought international attention to this period of history; for instance, Jacob Silverman criticised Oksanen in his review for failing to go further into the issue of collaboration in the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{67} Noting the public response to Sana’s work as well as the Simon Wiesenthal Centre’s call for further research, a group of National Coalition parliamentarians (along with Raimo Vistbacka, of the True Finns) wrote to Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen adding their voices to the call for further research with particular attention to the fate of wartime Ingrian refugees in Finland, given the pertinence of their experience to Right to

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid. p. 10.  
\textsuperscript{64} “Elina Sana Wins Tieto-Finlandia Prize for Book on Wartime Expulsions”, \textit{Helsingin Sanomat}.  
Return migration. Vanhanen’s response notes that a well-known professor of history, Heikki Ylikangas, had been commissioned by the government and Academy of Finland to research further into the 1944 Armistice Agreement with the USSR and subsequent transfer of populations.

By 2010, when the end of return migration for Ingrians had been announced, the amendment to the Aliens Act actually retained residence permission for two groups specified in the 2002-2003 amendment: the Ingrian emigrants transferred to the USSR in 1943-1944, and those who had served in the Finnish Army between 1939 and 1945. Notable is the removal from the previous 2002-2003 amendment of language that had left open the Right to Return for all those who could prove connections to Finland and a degree of Finnish or Swedish language capabilities. The Parliamentary Committee convened for this amendment noted that, though the orientation program for returnees would no longer be required (deemed unnecessary), proof of language proficiency would still be required. Army veterans from the Winter and Continuation Wars, as well as those deported from Finland after the Wars, thus still retained their position within the construction of Finnish identity, as the experience of these conflicts remained a major crucible for Finnish identity for politicians. Those who threw in their lot with Finland over the USSR have proven their conformity to the construction of Finnish identity as culturally and politically orientated towards the West, and away from the Soviet Union. By 2010, and the end of the Return policy for most other Ingrians, those with documented Second World War-era service or suffering in the face of Soviet aggression were still held to have proven their own Finnishness. The discussion on historical atonement, though now more narrowly defined, thus trumps all others in relating the Ingrian Finnish Return to constructions of Finnish identity based on the significance of the discursive resource of struggle.

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against Russia. The ideological dominance of this discursive resource, which deems the Winter and Continuation Wars to be wars of survival, appears to have weathered the challenges of academic reassessments of Second World War history and Finnish culpability.

3) The Humanitarian Imperative

By early 1996, the discourse on the humanitarian imperative for Ingrians had already shifted from return migration, which was now seen as unfeasible or undesirable, to a more on-site program that channelled assistance and funds to Ingria itself. On the one hand, segments of the Finnish political spectrum continued to advocate return migration as a humanitarian form of immigration policy. The Finnish Christian League, for instance, mentioned both return migrants and refugees as humanitarian migration recipients in their 1998 policy platform. In 2006, as the Christian Democrats, this party specifically pledged to continue the Ingrian Finnish Return policy, addressing it as a major element of their policy platform on immigration, in which they claim that “it is natural that Finland takes migrants of Finnish origin, because they are already somewhat familiar with Finnish language and culture”.

On the other hand, the focus of this discourse in 1996-2010 for other parties in Finland became the need to provide assistance to Ingrians without depriving Ingria of its Ingrian Finnish population, which was presented as approaching the same “ethnic cleansing” that Stalin had engendered a half-century earlier, and for which the Finnish state had taken some responsibility. Though the notion of historical atonement as discussed in the previous section remains more or less unchanged in the period 1996-2010 in its focus on military service during the Winter and Continuation Wars and Stalin-era persecution and suffering amongst Ingrians, the perceived need to avoid an unintentional repetition of Ingrian removal from Ingria significantly alters the

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concurrent discourse on humanitarian intervention in Ingria. An early example of this comes from Hannu Kemppainen, a Centre Party parliamentarian who at several points in 1996 raised the issue of Ingrian Finns that had been placed in the Klooga detention camp in Estonia, and deported to Finland in 1942-1943, then returned after the War.74 The Russian and Estonian governments had agreed to grant increased social security benefits to those who could obtain proof from Finland that they had been deported from Klooga to Finland, and Kemppainen called for the Finnish National Archives to allow greater access for Ingrians to such records, beginning in his March 1996 written question:

The Russian and Estonian governments grant social security benefits to those Ingrian Finns and Izhorians who were transferred to Finland in 1943-1944 via Klooga camp in Estonia. A certificate of this transfer can be obtained from the Finnish National Archives. The certificate costs 75 Finnish Marks, and for many elderly Ingrians, this is prohibitively high. Pensioners, for instance, have daily budgets of just 2 Finnish Marks.75

Of particular note here in the first instance is Kemppainen’s differentiation between Inkerin suomalaiset (Ingrian Finns) and inkerikot (Izhorians, the descendants of earlier Finno-Ugric settlers of Ingria). The distinction between the two is not made readily apparent here, as the Finnish terms are closely related. This effectively creates a link between Ingrians and the earlier settlers and thus giving some suggestion that Ingrian Finns, like Izhorians, are related to, but distinct from, Finns of Finland as part of an over-arching “Finno-Ugric” identity, and that they are specifically defined by their connection to the Ingrian region. The discussion on humanitarian concern for Ingrians, however, has here shifted to a greater degree of responsibility for the Estonian and Russian governments, who are criticised somewhat for providing low or inadequate pensions to Ingrians – Finland’s role is now auxiliary, in assisting with documentation to give Ingrians greater access to funds in their homelands. The response Kemppainen’s initial question received from the minister in charge of the National Archives, Education Minister Olli-Pekka Heinonen, specified that the large number of Ingrians seeking this documentation (around 2,000 in 1995) had

overwhelmed the archival staff and made waiving the standard fee impossible (though Heinonen does suggest possible alternative measures, such as giving diplomatic staff from Tallinn and St Petersburg access to the archives, or suggesting Russian and Estonian authorities use documentation from their own archives, which also possess the lists of persons detained at Klooga). Yet Kemppainen remains adamant the National Archives should waive their fees for Ingrians, reasoning that:

The difficulty in obtaining these Klooga certificates is preventing these deserving people from accessing enormous amounts of social benefits. Making these benefits easier to obtain for return migrants in their country of origin would likely reduce the pressure they feel to move to Finland. It would therefore be considerably cheaper to the Finnish state if these potential returnees could continue living in their own familiar communities.

“Cheaper” introduces an aspect of cost-effectiveness directly into discussions of humanitarian provision in this context. This is a notable departure from much of the previous language on Ingrians from Finnish politicians, which had placed emphasis on sympathy for Ingrians’ current and historic difficulties as a means to creating a dominant impression of Ingrians as those who had suffered, and continued to suffer, for their Finnishness. Now, however, the Finnish political discussion of humanitarian concerns is not immune to financial concerns.

Financial concerns in Finland were further pertinent in political discussions after the 1990s economic downturn. Kemppainen is more explicit in citing this, amongst other reasons, for his support of the Klooga camp Ingrians, stating in an October 1996 written question:

The launch of the Ingrian Return policy is generally seen in the public’s opinion as payment for the experience of displacement for around 65,000 Ingrians during the Second World War, forced to move from Finland to Siberia and scattered far from their homes. At the beginning of the 1990s, repatriation appeared to be justified in Finland because of the need for labour. Now, with mass unemployment here, the situation is quite different.
Here Kemppainen specifically references the role economic and employment concerns played in the Ingrian Return policy at its time of formation in 1990. As much as providing residence and employment in Finland for Ingrians can be constructed as a form of humanitarian aid, this is further evidence of the shift in the mid-1990s from return migration towards more cost-effective forms of humanitarian aid, not reliant on residency in Finland, for Ingrians. This discussion of cost-effective humanitarianism could find particular salience in periods of economic difficulty. The humanitarian imperative had not disappeared from the discussion on Ingrians, yet the economic realities of mid-1990s Finland did appear to have muted it.

At the same time, Kemppainen’s call for humanitarian aid to Ingrians in their home territory of Ingria does appear to present a new construction of Ingrian identity as related to, but distinct from, Finnishness. It departs from earlier presentations of Ingrians as Finns in favour of a more complex identity with a culture related to, but distinct from, mainstream Finnish society, and thus worthy of protection as a minority culture in Russia and Estonia. The discussion now focuses on Ingria, not Finland, as the homeland of the Ingrian Finns, and stresses the need to keep an Ingrian Finnish presence in the region. Kemppainen’s October 1996 written question notes:

Though the return migration certainly meant well for the Ingrian population, it has begun negative trends in the migrants’ regions of origin, especially Ingria. The recovery of their own language and culture began with perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union, but now this kind of return migration activity has seen an alarming decline in the most active part of the Ingrian population, including cultural and administrative figures, many of whom have moved or are expected to move to Finland. At worst, such developments will lead to an ethnic cleansing of the area.79

The reference to ethnic cleansing (etninen puhdistus) is particularly evocative, recalling the Stalinist deportations and the mid-twentieth-century suffering of Ingrians in the Soviet Union. In the context of the 1990s, ethnic cleansing was a particularly
charged term, given the events in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Indeed, Clotilde Pégorier argues that the 1990s saw the term emerge as an “international crime” in academic and popular discourse. The link between these tribulations and the current Ingrian migration gives the impression that the Right to Return policy could have the unimagined effect of achieving Stalin’s goal of destroying Ingrian culture and removing its vestiges from the Ingrian region. Kemppainen notes the uniqueness of Ingrian language and culture as distinct from Finland’s mainstream; to some extent a challenge to the presumption of Ingrians’ presumed conformity to the key discursive resources that comprised the prevailing constructions of Finnish identity (their identity being distinct from Finland’s, but very much Finnish-related), though his concern for Ingrians does underline a perceived connection between Finland and Ingrian Finns.

Kemppainen was by no means alone in this theme of targeting humanitarian assistance to Ingria rather than bringing Ingrians to Finland. Sulo Aittoniemi, the former SMP politician whose contributions to the discussion on Ingrian return migration are discussed in greater detail in this chapter’s section on the anti-Russian theme, had joined the Centre Party briefly before forming his own party, Alkiolaisen keskustaryhmän (Alkion Centre Group), in 1999. He argued in a September 2001 budget initiative that providing 200,000 Finnish Marks in funding to Ingrian retirement communities in Russia would improve Ingrians’ quality of life more than their immigration to Finland. Other contributions to this discourse on Ingrian humanitarian need questioned the extent to which the Right to Return policy should be viewed as akin to asylum status. The National Coalition parliamentarians Sasi, Zyskowicz, Kanerva and Lindén reminded the government in 1998 that “Ingrians are not asylum seeking refugees, but rather immigrants”. This appears a direct challenge to the notion of Ingrian Finnish migration as a form of humanitarianism, given that Ingrians were by the mid-1990s no longer directly persecuted in Russia.

81 Ibid.  
However, the discussion on humanitarian intervention for Ingrians takes an interesting turn in a 2005 question to parliament from Greens MP Heidi Hautala. She states:

In the last 15 years, Finland has received more than 25,000 Ingrian Finnish returnees from Russia and Estonia. Now it turns out that at least 200 Ingrians, mostly very young returnees, have been deported to Russia for committing offences in Finland. These young people have been expelled to Russia, and to circumstances to which they have no prior knowledge…Is it not time to consider that this is a major humanitarian problem in Finland…?34

This presentation of humanitarianism actually shifts focus to Ingrians now living in Finland, relates at least in part to problems of their integration into Finnish society, and even recalls (though not directly) previous deportations of Ingrians that form the heart of the historical atonement discourse discussed in the previous section. Hautala’s statement is significant in that it presents humanitarianism and Finnish responsibility for Ingrians as directed towards those Ingrians living in Finland, rather than those living in Ingria. Ingrians in Ingria had been the target of humanitarian discussions up until this point, and Hautala’s statement gives some new indication that by the mid-2000s, with an Ingrian community in Finland that appeared, at least according to Hautala’s statement and the deportation figures she cites, to be struggling, the focus of Finnish aid to Ingrians should be constructed as aid to an immigrant minority in Finland rather than a (perceived) Finnish immigrant minority in Russia. There is some acknowledgement, though veiled, that Ingrians are a Russian minority in Finland, separate from the Finnish mainstream.

Both this and Kemppainen’s discussion of aid to Ingria challenged the notion that Ingrians belong in Finland. Since the humanitarian discussion had been focused so much on Ingrians’ compatriot relationship to Finland, the notion that they are different in some respects from the Finnish mainstream, as framed by the five discursive resources of Finnish identity, now challenges this assumption. The transformation in the political discussion of humanitarian interventionism relates to challenges in the political discussion on integration, with the inference given that

Ingrians don’t integrate into Finnish society, and thus don’t conform to the main discursive resources shaping constructions of Finnish identity here. Therefore, return migration to Finland is ineffective as a humanitarian act.

The notion is implicit in Finnish politicians new presentation of humanitarian intervention for Ingrians that Ingrians’ language and cultural orientation could be more orientated towards Russia than Finland, and that the Finnish government must adjust its activities on Ingrian matters to reflect this fact. The connection between Ingrians and Finland is not altogether nullified, as there is still an assumption present in this discussion that Finland should offer aid to Ingrians resident either in Finland or Ingria based on a perceived kin-relationship, but the notion of offering residence as a humanitarian gesture appears now out of fashion. In particular, Finnish politicians’ statements on Ingrian humanitarianism in difficult economic times, especially in the 1990s recession, highlight the “unfeasibility” of return migration as a humanitarian gesture, promoting instead the more cost-effective alternatives that place Ingrians somewhat outside the Finnish national community. Given the end of the policy in the late 2000s, when economic difficulties were again a reality, this could be an effective discourse for Finnish politicians to now exclude Ingrians from their perception of the Finnish national community.

4) The Positive Assessment of the Swedish Period

Discussions of Finland’s Nordic credentials, its links to Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia, and the Nordic dimensions to its identity enter an interesting period in the 2000s. Nordic identity was a particularly enlivened discussion in 2010, when the Swedish historian Gunnar Wetterberg published The United Nordic Federation, which advocated a quasi-federal system in the Nordic region. Wetterberg called his plan for a United Nordic Federation “a realistic utopia...capable of transcending borders – both geographic and political”. Though this work has yet to translate into

85 Ibid. p. 17.
any concrete policy changes, Johan Strang writes that it has “captured the imagination of the media, commentators and intellectuals”.  

Traditional views of Norden see it as constructed around a regional core, that of the Scandinavian Peninsula (Sweden and Norway) and Finland. Norbert Götz argues that the idea of the Nordic region is built on common structures (Nordic languages, Lutheran religion and political culture), but driven by elites and political actors “with collective material and immaterial interests”. whilst Henrik Stenius sees it as constructed upon a similar worldview, born of common experiences, or “a common Erfahrungsraum”. However, rather than see it as an organic grouping of nations sharing common identity markers, Bo Stråth and Øystein Sørensen define Norden as a model of social organisation constructed as a response to specific political requirements, and the Nordic model as a specifically social-democratic model which embeds the historically-derived concept of Norden as a “foundation myth”. Wetterberg’s plan for a Nordic federation could be seen as an attempt to replace stalling European integration with a new focus on Norden, uniting the Nordic Council member-states in a union based on common identity constructed on narratives of Norden’s historical and socio-political “otherness”.

In contrast to the East vs. West divides in discourses on Finland’s EU membership in the early 1990s, based on spatial and temporal narratives of “homecoming” to Finland’s former “natural” state as part of a broadly defined Western Europe, Joenniemi argues that Finland’s ongoing adherence to the Nordic principles of neutrality, in the face of the European discussions of a Common Security Policy and the expansion of NATO, shows Finland pursuing “an option beyond a bifurcated

East-West construction”. In this line of thinking, the Nordic region is neither East nor West, as these concepts are seen largely as defence and security alliances, and Nordic Europe is characterised by its peace and neutrality. Joenniemi also argues that the collapse of the Iron Curtain along Finland’s eastern frontier allowed for a de-securitised view of the border, in which adjacent municipalities were encouraged to develop beneficial trans-border ties, and the earlier view of this boundary as delineating two profoundly contrasting entities was reduced. David J. Smith suggests that Finnish politics in the 2000s worked with the notion that there were significant financial benefits Finnish businesses could pursue through increased cooperation between the EU and Russia, and David Arter likewise argues that northwestern Russia has become part of the Nordic “near abroad”, borrowing the Soviet-Russian terminology for its European neighbours. This new “near abroad” identity construction views the new post-Soviet northwestern Russia as a resource periphery for the more economically developed Nordic region, rather than as a new or re-connected part of the Nordic region itself. This understanding of Northern Europe, with Nordic core and new post-Soviet “near abroad” periphery, thus appears to replace the early-1990s constructions of an East-West identity divide between Finland, as part of Western Europe, and Russia with a new discourse of Nordic particularism. However, this construction still presents a notion of separateness between the Nordics and Russia. Browning argues that efforts to include Russia in the “New Northern Europe” have most often constructed a narrative of Russian equality, but difference, to the Western European/EU states on its border, which still reproduces a narrative of Russian exclusion from Europe and a hierarchical discourse of Eastern European otherness. Nevertheless, discussions of Nordic identity certainly entered a dynamic period in the 2000s.

Ibid.
95 Smith, “Nordic Near Abroad or New Northern Europe”, p. 51
97 Smith, “Nordic Near Abroad or New Northern Europe”, p. 69.
Given the context of interest in Nordic identity and the particular history of this region, it is perhaps surprising that the positive discourse on Finland and Ingria as part of the Swedish sphere of power is notable in its absence in the period 1996-2010, despite, for instance, the bicentenary of the 1809 Russian annexation in 2009. Not once after 1995 is this period of history brought up by Finnish politicians as a means to explain, justify or question the Ingrian Right to Return, which is significant considering Koivisto’s mention of the Swedish Kingdom in 1990. This suggests that despite a new focus on Norden at this time, which was constructed on narratives of the shared historical particularity of the Nordic states, this discussion in Finland did not extend to those communities from across the Russian border whose connection to Nordic history was no longer significantly promoted in Finnish political discourse.

There is also no mention of Ingrian Finns’ religious connection to Finland and their common heritage of Lutheranism dating from the Swedish epoch, although Götz cites Lutheranism as a key structure of Nordic identity construction.99 There were, however, considerable developments at this time in the relationship between the Lutheran Church of Finland and the Finnish state. A new law on freedom of religion had come into force in 2003, in part a reaction to the increase in religious diversity that had come from growing migrant communities, which guaranteed religious education in public schools for groups with at least three pupils.100 A push towards greater religious plurality also spurred debates in the mid-2000s on further separation of the church and state in Finland, which, although ultimately unsuccessful in the face of broad political opposition, led to one significant political party, the Greens, adopting the separation of church and state in its 2006 election manifesto, albeit with some contentiousness.101 In this environment, it was perhaps less significant to question the relative Lutheranness of Ingrians as proving Finnishness. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that Lutheranism was not employed as a discursive resource of Finnishness in the late 1990s and 2000s. Whether or not Ingrians were Lutherans could be set aside in the political discussion on Ingrian return migration, which

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moved on to discussions of how language and cultural orientation might now differentiate between Finns and Ingrians.

As seen in the discussion on integration capability, the legislation on the Ingrian Right to Return increasingly, in three stages, restricted access to residence based on language, privileging to some extent this discursive resource of Finnish identity above others, particularly ancestral connections to Finland that dated back to the Swedish Stormaktstiden. Indeed, the first amendment to the Right to Return clause of the 1991 Aliens Act in 1996 specifically attempted to reduce this ancient connection to Finland as grounds for return migration, limiting valid ancestral links to Finland to, at most, two generations. The eventual cancellation of Right to Return status in 2010 for all but those with their own direct experience within the Finnish nation state during the Winter and Continuation Wars then completely removed all significance afforded to ancient ancestral connections to Finland. To this end, one sees particular diminishment in the significance afforded to ancient connections to the pre-1809 conceptions of Finland in the construction of Finnish identity, as has also been discussed in the section on integration capability. This connection could no longer be taken for granted as stand-alone proof of Ingrian connection to Finnishness by 1996, suggesting ancestral descent is a lesser discursive resource in Finnish identity, although it has not been completely insignificant.

5) The Negative Assessment of Russia

Tuomas Forsberg and Hanna Ojanen have argued that the key issue for Finland’s sense of security and defence policy has been the relationship with its Eastern neighbour, which continues to be coloured by memories of conflict. With the accession of Finland to the EU, Forsberg and Ojanen argue that the dynamics of this relationship have changed – the notion of Russia deciding Finland’s fate in a Munich 1938-style conference with Europe seems impossible, but by 2000 Russia remained a

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“factor of uncertainty”. However, European Union membership has provided Finland a blueprint for containing the perceived Russian threat and limiting the potential for conflict, especially through fostering of economic interdependence, for “integration is seen as a peace strategy underlying the European Union. If it has worked in Western Europe, it should work for Europe as a whole”. The major avenue for this was the Northern Dimension policy, the agreement between the EU, Norway, Iceland and Russia described by Paavo Lipponen, Prime Minister of Finland during its initial negotiation, as essentially a plan “to integrate Russia into Europe as a democracy and a market economy”. The Northern Dimension policy was a Finnish initiative, initiated in 1999 and agreed upon by the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia at the Northern Dimension Summit in Helsinki in 2006 during the Finnish presidency of the European Union, which sought to build a framework for increased economic integration and cooperation, primarily through existing institutions, in Northern and Baltic Europe. The Political Declaration of the Northern Dimension Policy, signed in 2006, includes language in its preamble that specifically notes the significance of economic integration and cooperation for stability in the region, as the agreeing parties declared they were reaffirming their shared responsibility for the prosperity of Northern Europe, its sustainable development, and the well-being of its population, and their commitment to create favourable conditions for the development of the region and for further strengthening of mutually beneficial multilateral cooperation in Northern Europe, including cross-border and subregional cooperation.

Likewise, under “Objectives” in the Northern Dimension Framework Document, which stipulates the avenues and mechanisms for regional cooperation between the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia in Northern Europe, point 10 reads:

The Northern Dimension policy will aim at providing a common framework for the promotion of dialogue and concrete cooperation, strengthening stability, well-being and intensified…

economic cooperation, promotion of economic integration and competitiveness and sustainable development in Northern Europe.\textsuperscript{110}

Indeed, amongst the six “priority sectors” (point 19) outlined by the Framework Document, the first is “economic cooperation”, which would include “promotion of trade, investments, customs, SMEs, business, innovation, well-functioning labour markets, financial services, [and] infrastructure”.\textsuperscript{111} Thus by 2006, with introduction of a new foreign policy initiative that employed the backing of the broader European Union, Finland appeared to have arrived at a new consensus on the potential of a Russian threat: the late 1990s and 2000s presented an opportunity to neutralise Russia through a program of building economic dependence. In this way, the Northern Dimension policy was as much constructed on security as humanitarian concerns. The negative perception of Russia in a sense persists, but new mechanisms to muzzle the threat were instigated.

However, there have also been instances in the 2000s where integration with Russia may have acted to fuel the perception of Russia as a threat to Finnish and European stability. Most notably, Russia’s position as a major natural gas exporter has created what Øistein Harsem and Dag Harald Claes call a “highly asymmetric” structural relationship with Europe, wherein Russia is able to leverage its gas reserves, the particular importance of gas for everyday basic needs, and the difficulty in finding immediate energy substitutes for gas-fuelled technology (exacerbating the effects of even a short-term shut-down) as political clout in Europe.\textsuperscript{112} As Harsem and Claes surmise, “even though Russia is dependent on the income from gas exports to the European market, the European gas consumer seems relatively more dependent on Russian gas supplies”.\textsuperscript{113} Significantly, they also note the disparity in effect a Russian gas shut-down would have on different EU member states, given their different levels of dependency on Russian gas imports.\textsuperscript{114} Finland is at the most extreme end; completely integrated into the Russian gas export market, it relies on this source for

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid. p. 5.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
100% of its gas supplies. At several points in the 1990s and 2000s, Russia shut down energy exports to neighbouring countries. There were early 1990s disruptions to exports in Ukraine during a Russian-Ukrainian dispute over ownership of the Black Sea Fleet stationed in Crimea, and a June 1993 gas cut-off to Estonia, which the state-owned Russian news agency RIA Novosti openly described as retaliation for state discrimination against Russian speakers living in Estonia. More recently, in January 2007, exports to Belarus were temporarily suspended over a price dispute. Russia also cut gas exports twice to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, officially over price disputes, though Karen Smith Stegen suggests Russian displeasure with then Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, who unseated the Kremlin-endorsed incumbent in the Orange Revolution in 2004 and supported Georgia in its 2008 conflict with Russia, as likely having influenced the decision. Particularly after the 2009 Ukrainian shutdown, European governments appeared to recognise the vulnerability of their gas supply to Russian-Ukrainian disputes if Ukraine continued to serve as a transit country, and several governments, including Finland, dropped their environmental concerns to the building of an alternative submerged pipeline, Nord Stream. However, though Nord Stream may insulate Finland from future energy conflicts between Russia and a third party, these conflicts show post-Soviet Russia is also able to act as a destabilising agent in Europe, and Finnish total reliance on Russian gas makes it particularly vulnerable to such actions from Russia should any new Finno-Russian disputes arise.

As such, Harsem and Claes have characterised Finnish attitudes to Russia in the 2000s as those of a “friendly pragmatist”, placing business interests above political goals and striving to maintain a close relationship. This is reminiscent of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, and suggests something of a continuity in the way Russia is politically constructed in Finland: outwardly as a positive trading partner, but inwardly as a potential security threat. By the late 2000s, the potential pitfalls of the

115 Ibid. pp. 787, 789.
119 Ibid.
Northern Dimension strategy of increasing economic integration with Russia become apparent, especially if the economic integration were to prove as asymmetrical as energy integration. Therefore, economic integration and trade links might not necessarily ameliorate the significance of the perceived Russian threat in Finnish political discourse.

The Northern Dimension also involved expanding the EU’s presence in the Baltic Sea through Baltic States’ membership, seen in Finland as an expansion of the “sphere of European stability” in the North. Indeed, this is echoed in the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ own published account of Lipponen’s 1997 speech in the northern city of Rovaniemi, laying out the idea of the Northern Dimension as “based on the wish to increase stability in Northern Europe and in the Union as a whole. One of the key objectives was to bring the Baltic States closer to the EU, an aim that also served Finland’s security policy objectives”. However, parallel to the expansion of the European Union was the expansion of NATO – the Baltic States joined on 29 March 2004, just weeks before their accession to the EU. Discourses in the Baltic States on NATO differ sharply to the Finnish political debate on membership, as evidenced by Latvian President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga’s address to the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague:

For us in Latvia, it comes as a sign of international justice, to put an end once and for all to the last vestiges of the Second World War, to the last sequels of what started with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, to the consequences of the decisions taken in Tehran and in Yalta... We do not want to be in some sort of grey zone of political uncertainty, we would like to enjoy the full sunshine of the liberty and rights that NATO has been defending so long.

This presentation of NATO membership as “re-joining” the West and undoing the Soviet-era expansion and aggression at the heart of the negative discourse on Russia was not replicated in Finland at this time. Finnish attitudes towards NATO as a means to maintaining security from a potential Russian threat were moot, as the 2004 Finnish government’s white paper on defence policy stated it would not pursue

121 Forsberg and Ojanen, “Finland’s New Policy”, p. 115.
joining, without firmly closing the door to future membership. The potential for membership had continued to emerge periodically in political discussions through the 1990s, such as in early 1996 after the Bosnian crisis and the question of Finnish involvement in peacekeeping missions, though Prime Minister Lipponen stressed that Finnish participation in NATO-led peacekeeping missions would not necessarily be a stepping-stone to membership. Tarja Halonen, the Social Democratic Foreign Minister who became President in 2000, has been somewhat ambiguous in her own statements on NATO’s role in Northern Europe, supporting the Baltic expansion but not treating Finnish membership as a viable option. Finnish public opinion in 2000 continued to favour non-alignment, seen as a key issue in determining the presidential election, which favoured non-alignment advocates Halonen and former Prime Minister Esko Aho, the second round candidates, over pro-NATO figures like Defence Minister Elisabeth Rehn, defeated in the first round.

Indeed, NATO expansion in the Baltics presented a challenge, and perhaps a counterexample, for Finland. NATO’s Baltic expansion had the potential to set dividing lines in Northern Europe between East and West and raise security concerns for Russia, whose conventional military power and room to manoeuvre in the Baltic region may have been diminished since Soviet times, but in the late 1990s still very much existed. Finland avoiding NATO membership itself may have pacified Russia somewhat, particularly when viewed against Russian statements on the Baltic States. In August 2010, for instance, the Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin issued a statement in which he called Estonian fear of Russia “clear paranoia”, and pointed to Finland, “which managed to become a bridge between the East and the West in the most complicated period for the continent, [and] could be a good example

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127 Ibid. pp. 81-2.

Whenever Finnish membership in NATO has been raised (most recently, in the summer of 2012), Russian political and military figures including President Vladimir Putin and commander of armed forces General Nikolai Makarov have issued warnings that such a move could provoke Russian concerns, or even conflict. Finnish Minister of Defence Stefan Wallin, like Rehn a Swedish People’s Party member with pro-NATO sensibilities, has responded that “Finland evaluates its relationship with NATO in a manner consistent with its government policy program on the basis of its own security and defence policy interests”, a diplomatic retort that suggests perhaps a careful manoeuvring to avoid such Russian reactions, but also a degree of assertiveness (albeit gradual and carefully presented) in Finland’s transition from the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line to shaping its own security priorities. This assertiveness included, at the very end of this period, the development of NORDEFCO, the Nordic Defence Cooperation, which was introduced following a 2009 report by the former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg. The USSR had already delayed Finland joining the Nordic Council, and had vetoed efforts at advanced intra-Nordic cooperation like Nordek, but when the post-Cold War international security climate removed the taboo of defence cooperation for the Nordics NORDEFCO was able to go ahead. Nordic cooperation at this level, previously deemed impossible due to Soviet objections, was now being openly discussed as a possibility.

There has thus been a degree of departure from previous Finnish perceptions of Russia. In the early 2000s, it could be seen as less threatening, more open and more integrated into the European economy, which has prompted changing foreign and security policy approaches including increased integration and cooperation (at time of writing in 2014, given the Crimean Crisis, this image may have changed

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132 Ibid.

133 Strang, Nordic Communities, p. 17.

134 Ibid. p. 36.
considerably). However, despite this degree of change in the Finnish political perception of Russia from the 1990s to the new millennium, the notion of Russia as a threat does not completely disappear. The ongoing political discussions on Russia in Finland have addressed subduing the Russian threat through integration measures in the European Union and Nordic region, and avoiding antagonism over the ongoing NATO question. Thus by the 2000s, Finnish political discussions on Russia still appeared to view it as a security policy focus, albeit in a somewhat new context.

Indeed, in some respects this new context has allowed for a more direct presentation of negative attitudes towards Russia. In the 2000s, some Finnish politicians, perhaps most notably the Greens MP Heidi Hautala, have shown greater freedom in criticising Russia. The negative discourses on Russia in more recent years differ from earlier discourses in their more direct, undisguised criticisms of Russian internal politics, showing that fear of Russia as a threat to Finnish independence is waning. Hautala, a former Environment Minister, openly criticised Russian environmental and energy policy in the mid-2000s, and in her 2008 book *Venäjä-teesit: Vakaus vai Vapaus* (The Russia Theses: Stability or Freedom), in which she censures the status of democracy in Putin’s Russia and writes that “Finland’s parliament and Russia’s Duma have the same historic origin, but we have since moved in different directions”. Finnish mistrust of Russia is still evident, but is presented in a direct manner that suggests the end of the traditional Russian threat, i.e. that Russia should be viewed as a potential source of instability rather than a traditional military threat.

How, then, does this transforming discussion on Russia translate to the Finnish debate on the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return? In one sense, it appears to have mollified the argument for a return migration to rescue Ingrians from a Russian threat to Finnish kinfolk. This is evidenced in the rhetoric of Sulo Aittoniemi, by the mid-1990s a member of the agrarian Centre Party but with a background in the SMP (defunct since 1995), whose primary support base comprised older small-scale farmers resettled in Finland from Karelia under state-sponsored programs following the Soviet

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annexation, many of whom felt the Finnish government in the era of Finlandisation had ignored them. Hence, a somewhat reflexive anti-Russian sentiment from an-SMP politician would not seem altogether surprising. Aittoniemi began his commentary on the Ingrian Return law in September 1996 with a *talousarvioaloite* (budget initiative) to the *Eduskunta* stating:

In recent years, as many as 20,000 so-called Ingrian Finns have moved from Russia to Finland. The decision to allow and promote the return at this scale was a bad error. Ingrian Finns have not found what they came looking for in Finland, and many desperately long to return to their former homes, if the conditions would at least be tolerable. Their wishes are to both Finland and Ingrian Finns’ advantage.

Based on the above considerations, it is suggested that the Parliament would take from the state budget for 1997 80,000,000 Finnish marks for those Ingrian Finnish returnees willing to return to Russia to facilitate their return and improve their conditions, particularly the housing situation.

The language employed here is in marked contrast to previous, more compassionate language from other politicians calling for sympathy to Ingrians, even if the call to improve living situations for Ingrians is still present at the end of this statement. Reference to Ingrians as “so-called Ingrian Finns” directly challenges previous assertions that Ingrians belong within the Finnish national community. Thus the suggestion shifts from bringing Ingrians to Finland under the Right to Return policy, to assisting homesick émigrés in repatriation to Russia. Whilst the new discussions on the humanitarian imperative to assist Ingrians in Russia rather than bring them to Finland is very much present in Aittoniemi’s initiative here, the presentation of Russia as the Ingrian homeland is also significant, depicted here as the Ingrians’ longed-for home that was left for purely economic reasons, rather than any sense of threat or being driven out, nor of any emotional connection to Finland. There is a distinction,

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therefore, between the “new” Russia that Aittoniemi presents as the Ingrian homeland and the “old” Soviet Russia marked by deportations and discrimination under Stalin.

However, in Aittoniemi’s presentation of the Ingrian Finns, concurrent statements on the nature of returnees themselves reveal an ongoing negative discourse on Russia and Russians, but one which paints Ingrians as influenced by, or connected to, negative stereotypes of 1990s Russian behaviour. In a 1997 written question to the Interior Minister Jan-Erik Enestam, Aittoniemi writes:

The Right to Return mission has later been judged a clear failure. Among other things, it has attracted only elderly Ingrians who are no longer rooted in Finland. They are knocking their walking sticks against the asphalt, crying and craving to go back to their old homes. On the other hand, for many of these returnees willing to move here, there is the possibility of abusing the Right to Return without justification. Some pursue criminal activity, for instance trafficking. Very few have adapted to the labour market.\(^\text{139}\)

This statement continues the notion that Ingria, rather than Finland, is the traditional Ingrian Finnish homeland, as well as the overriding economic and labour market concerns with increased migration at this time. However, Aittoniemi also plays into pervasive turn-of-the-millennium perceptions of Russian criminality in Finland. *Helsingin Sanomat* similarly ran articles concerning Russian mafia infiltration into Finland, with particular reference to trafficking of prostitutes from Estonia to Helsinki’s western Lauttasaari district,\(^\text{140}\) and the rise of the Estonian-Russian prostitution ring in Helsinki organised by the mafia organisation “Obtshak” (Russian for “Common Wealth”).\(^\text{141}\) Aittoniemi’s statement also specifically notes criminal trafficking activity as an issue for Ingrians. He was even more specific in his accusations in a November 1997 question to parliament, accusing Inkerin-Liitto, the Ingrian community’s cultural organisation collaborating with the Finnish Consulate-General in St Petersburg in processing Right to Return applicants, of being a KGB

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infiltration front, and both the Inkerin-Liitto chairman Eero Pellinen and St Petersburg Consul-General Ludmila Zaturina of being KGB double agents. 142 His distrust of Inkerin-Liitto appears born of his belief that “NGO activities for instance in Russia are in no way comparable to those of Finnish organisations”, 143 thus suggesting that Inkerin-Liitto is an organisation of Russians, rather than Finns. Aittoniemi himself questioned the Finnishness of Ingrians in a 2002 statement, claiming that “a large part of the Ingrian Finns coming to Finland do not have any roots in Finnishness”. 144 The negative assessment of Russians therefore extends here to Ingrians, and hence, Ingrians are presented now as Russians, or at least more connected to Russia than Finland. The particular negative view of Russians in Finland at this time was thus used in political discussions on Ingrians here to exclude Ingrians from Finnishness by re-defining them as Russians. This is a key discursive resource of Finnishness; that Finns and Russians are different and in opposition. This now informs language excluding Ingrians from Finland, where it had in other discussions, such as the discussions on war veterans and historical atonement, linked them.

To some extent, this view was opposed by the parties on the left. During oral question time in the Eduskunta on 12 September 2002, Social Democrat Liisa Jaakonsaari complained of a xenophobic atmosphere (muukalaisvihamielistä ilmapiiriä) in the discussions on reform to immigration laws. 145 Similarly, Outi Ojala of the Left Alliance criticised xenophobic attitudes towards immigrant language capabilities, specifically referencing Ingrian returnees, in the Eduskunta in February 2002. 146 Indeed, though the period 1996-2010 was marked by a somewhat waning negative view of Russia as a geopolitical threat in Finland, negative language on Russians remained an aspect of political discussions around the Ingrian Return that some

143 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Kansalaisjärjestötoimintaa esimerkiksi Venäjällä ei voi mitenkään verrata suomalaiseen yhdistystoimintaan.
politicians saw as problematic. Yet both those critical of Ingrians, and those defensive of them, now make their arguments with the assumption that Ingrians are foreigners, and specifically Russians, in Finland.

**B) Conclusions**

Political discussions on the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return from 1996 and 2010 were characterised by increasing indications that the Ingrian community did not conform to many of the dominant understandings of Finnish identity held by Finnish policymakers. This is shown both in the amendments to the policy in 1996, 2002-2003 and 2010, which restricted and ultimately ended the influx of Ingrian return migrants based on identity considerations, as well as in the characterisation of Ingrians by individual Finnish MPs, which increasingly saw a separation between Ingrians and the Finnish national community as the MPs understood it. The amendment documents and the statements from Finnish politicians are both characterised by discursive constructions of Finnishness that now exclude Ingrians from the Finnish community to some extent, although a degree of connection is often still acknowledged. However, it is significant to note that transformations in the way Finnish politicians viewed Ingrians do not necessarily translate to broad transformations in how Finnish politicians view Finnishness. Of the five core discursive resources on Finnish identity employed to connect Ingrians to Finland discussed previously in chapter four, most are not extensively disputed as relevant to the definition of Finnishness. Finnish language, Western European orientation and opposition to the East are still taken as core aspects of Finnishness, though now, Finnish political language increasingly sees these characteristics as separating, rather than linking, Ingrians and Finnishness. The remaining discursive resources, on Lutheranism and ancestry, are now either ignored or minimised as legitimate characteristics of Finnishness. Thus in effect, Finnish politicians’ renegotiation of Finnishness was comparatively lesser than their reclassification of Ingrians’ Finnishness. The Finnish language and cultural orientation towards the West and away from the East could still be used as discursive resources of Finnishness past the cancellation of the Ingrian Right to Return policy.
Primarily, the constructions of Finnishness based on language and on attitudes towards Russia show a reversal in how Ingrians were viewed by Finnish politicians. Broadly speaking, the experience of Ingrians in Finland had shown Finnish authorities that Ingrians did not often speak advanced Finnish, and remained to some extent culturally orientated towards Russia. Thus, Ingrian returnees in Finland could present a challenge to these identity characteristics when employed as discursive resources to describe Finnishness. If one believes Ingrians are indeed also Finns, the importance of language and of attitude towards Russia should therefore be afforded limited or no importance in shaping this understanding of Finnishness. Yet this does not appear to be the line of thought pursued by Finnish policymakers. Rather, these constructions of Finnishness retain their significance, and continue to limit the dominant understanding of Finnishness in these political discussions, now to the exclusion of Ingrians.

By contrast, other constructions of Finnishness previously deployed as discursive resources to include Ingrians in the Finnish national community appear to have diminished from the political discussion. Over the period 1996-2010, there was no reference to the discursive resources of Ingrians as connected to Finland through their Lutheran religion, despite the fact that this element of Finnishness was initially highlighted by Mauno Koivisto when he first addressed his justification for the policy in April 1990. Amendments to the law in 1996 limiting generational ties to Finland to within recent memory, and to the modern Finnish Republic, rather than the seventeenth-century Swedish Kingdom, suggests there are limits to the political salience of connections based on potentially centuries-old familial or cultural ties, which ignore the realities of Ingrians’ lives in Russia and/or the Soviet Union, in the political discussions on Ingrian Finns.

Rather than view Ingrians as displaced members of the Finnish national community, Finnish policy makers came to formulate new perceptions of Ingrians. On the more populist end of the political spectrum, Ingrians could be characterised as effectively Russians, and thus well outside their understanding of Finnish identity. Other politicians have advocated a more multi-faceted interpretation of Ingrian identity, as influenced by both Finnish and Russian elements, and thus uniquely Ingrian, serving as an identity bridge between Finnishness and Russianness in the region. This
challenges somewhat the perception of the Finno-Russian border as a strict delineating line between opposing Eastern and Western cultures. However, discussions on Ingrians’ identity as distinct from both Finnish and Russian mainstreams still places Ingrians outside the construction of mainstream Finnish identity, and fails to acknowledge the potential for “Russianness” as existing within the Finnish national community. The ongoing significance of a historical atonement theme related to the Winter and Continuation Wars in the discussion on Ingrian migration, which is informed by discursive resources of Finland’s Westward orientation and difficult relationship with Russia, shows that traditional perceptions of the divide between East and West are still significant to Finnish politicians and still emerge in Finnish policy on Ingrians. Ingrian veterans of the Finnish Army, and those refugees deported back to the USSR from Finland after the Moscow Peace Treaty, survived the 2010 cancellation of the Ingrian Finnish Return law, and are still permitted residency in Finland, as they are presented as having proven their commitment to Finland over the USSR or Russia.

As such, the changes in the Ingrian Finnish Return law, including its ultimate cancellation in 2010, should not be taken as an indication of a general rejection of ethno-cultural understandings of Finnish identity by Finnish politicians at this time. These ethno-cultural understandings of Finnishness continue to find political credence in Finland, and continue to promote an exclusionary and essentialist perception of Finnish national identity. The key change between 1990-1995 and 1996-2010 is that this exclusion has increasingly extended to Ingrians in the later period. As the 1990s and 2000s was a period of substantial increases in immigration and ethno-cultural diversity in Finland, this understanding of Finnish identity may become increasingly problematic. The cleft between Finnishness as a citizenship and Finnishness as a discursively produced national identity in Finnish political discussions, like the discussion on the Ingrian Right to Return policy, can function as an alienating force for some communities living in Finland at this time. Now, this alienation may also extend to Ingrians.
Previous scholarly investigations of Ingrian migration to Finland after 1990 with reference to identity and Finnishness have largely been carried out by researchers at Finnish institutions. There is therefore a body of data from Finnish researchers on how Ingrians themselves view their identity and relationship to Finnishness and Finnish society as a receiving or kin-state environment. This body of study was not directly referenced by Finnish politicians in their discussions on Ingrians and the Right to Return law. However, at several times Finnish politicians claimed to be basing their statements and intentions regarding the Right to Return for Ingrians on Ingrians’ own self-perception as (at first) Finnish or (later) not Finnish. Notable examples of this discussed in previous chapters include Sulo Aittoniemi’s 1996 assertion that “Ingrian Finns have not found what they came looking for in Finland, and many desperately long to return to their former homes, if the conditions would at least be tolerable”\(^1\) and his 1997 view that Ingrians were “crying and craving to go back to their old homes”,\(^2\) as well as the contentions from National Coalition parliamentarians in 1990 that Finland was “strange and alien” to Ingrians,\(^3\) and in 1998 that Ingrians felt only a “very weak” connection to Finland that had prompted “deep social exclusion” after migration.\(^4\) On the other (inclusive) side, there is the claim expressed in 1992 by then-Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen that “[t]he connection to Finnishness is an important part of Ingrian identity”,\(^5\) and Tina Mäkelä’s 1990 belief that Ingrian Finnish return migrants “consider themselves Finnish”.\(^6\) Assertions of Ingrian Finns’ own construction of their identity as connected to Finnishness or otherwise were thus a feature of Finnish politicians’ language on the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return law. Given the available data and studies on how Ingrians view or have constructed their own identities in the same period, one is able

\(^1\) Aittoniemi, “Määrärahan osoittamisesta Venäjälle palaamaan halukkaiden inkerinsuomalaisten elinolosuhteiden parantamiseen”, p. 56.
\(^3\) Kärhä, Uosukainen, Holvitie et al., “Määrärahan osoittamisesta Inkeri-asiamiehen viran perustamiseen”, p. 2183.
\(^4\) Sasi, Kanerva, Zyskowicz and Lindén, “Inkeriläisten maahanmuuttoedelly”.
to contrast the discursive construction of Ingrianness (as Finnishness, Russianness, neither, or a combination of the two) provided from within the Ingrian community against the discursive constructions put forward by Finnish politicians of either an inclusive or exclusive statement of Finnishness concerning Ingrians. This gives some idea of the intersubjectivity of identity construction between Finnish politicians and their constructions of Finnishness with reference to Ingrians, and the Ingrian community’s own ideas of identity and connection to Finland.

It is not, however, possible to ascertain a causal relationship from the available data: how much, if at all, Ingrian statements of their own identity directly influenced Finnish politicians’ language on this issue. Assertions from parliamentarians on Ingrian self-identification as either part or not part of their idea of Finnishness do not cite specific sources or studies that show Ingrian attitudes to their own identity, their connection to Finnishness or the role identity considerations have played in their decisions to migrate to Finland, or indeed to remain in Russia or Estonia. It is therefore not the contention of this chapter that Ingrians were (or weren’t) able to directly influence the language on inclusion and exclusion from Finnish political figures. Rather, this chapter provides some idea of whether Ingrians and Finnish parliamentarians were effectively talking about identity in similar ways, and if/how the statements of Finnish politicians on Ingrians affected Ingrians’ discourses on their identity. This gives some idea of the intersubjectivity of Finnish politicians’ assertions of Ingrian identity, in its relationship to the discursive constructions of identity produced from this community in the same time period, though direct links between discursive constructions of Ingrians’ identity from Ingrians and Finnish politicians’ discursive constructions of Finnish identity as it pertains to Ingrians may not be directly established through analysis of Finnish politicians’ language on this issue.

Concretely, the purpose of this chapter is to analyse if/how Ingrians’ language on their identity and connection to Finnishness correlate to the discourse in Finnish politics, including the change from inclusion to exclusion in the later part of this period. To this end, I have identified two areas for analysis in this chapter. Firstly, I analyse the discursive construction of Ingrian identity promoted in the editorials of *Uutisia Inkeristä* (News from Ingria), an online newsletter run by the Inkeri-Liitto (Ingrian League), an Ingrian NGO in St Petersburg. These editorials provide an
insight into local media discourses on Ingrian identity and the Ingrian perception of the Right to Return policy, particularly in the later stages of its reform and ultimate cancellation. Secondly, I examine the discourses on Ingrian identity provided by Ingrian Finnish return migrants in Finland (and, to some extent, Ingrians that remained in Russia and Estonia) in interview and survey data collected by researchers for study of Ingrian attitudes towards identity and return migration. Essentially, I argue that Ingrian Finns’ construction of identity engages with concepts of Finnishness, Russianness and Ingrianness as a middle-option at different times and in different ways, without necessarily conforming to Finnish political perceptions of Finnishness and Russianness as mutually exclusive and opposing identity categorisations. This indicates that there was only limited correlation between Ingrians’ own views and the language of Finnish politicians. In particular, the ongoing use by Finnish politicians of discursive resources like the Finnish language and negative constructions of Russia/Russians as “othering” arguments for Ingrian exclusion in the late 1990s and 2000s, based on a perception of Ingrians as Russians and not Finns, contrasts with language from Ingrians’ themselves that presents more multi-faceted approaches to identity that include elements of sameness and otherness between their identity and Finnishness.

A) **Uutisia Inkeristä: A Case Study of the Discussion on Ingrian Finnishness in Local Ingrian Media**

*Uutisia Inkeristä* is an online newsletter produced by an Ingrian community organization based in St Petersburg, *Inkerin-Liitto* (Ingrian League). Its editorials are primarily written by Wladimir Kokko, a prominent Ingrian Finnish community leader, founder and director of the *Inkerin-Liitto*, who remained in St Petersburg after the collapse of the Soviet Union. *Inkerin-Liitto* is particularly linked to the Right to Return law in Finland, as this organisation was responsible for teaching language and orientation courses for return migration applicants in Russia, and indeed this role was referenced in the Finnish political discussion on Ingrians, most notably by Sulo Aittoniemi in 1997.⁷ There are obvious limits to what interpretations can be drawn from the *Uutisia Inkeristä* editorials, given that they were primarily written by one

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Kokko has given clear indications of the identity characteristics he sees as defining Ingrianness: in a interview for a 2013 Finnish television documentary, he stated “three things unite us [Ingrians]: the Finnish language, Lutheranism and a love of the Ingrian land”.8 Significantly, Kokko here employs two of the same discursive resources (language and religion) that feature in Finnish politicians’ language, but here rather as distinguishing features of Ingrianness rather than unifying features for Ingrians to Finnishness. Ingrianness and Finnishness may be constructed in part through the same discursive resources as Finnishness, but in this construction as effectively separate identities. Language and religion are joined with a territorially-linked construction of identity, and this connection Kokko sees between territory and people in his construction of Ingrianness is underscored by the name of his organisation’s newsletter - the title “News from Ingria” presents this news as a bulletin from the homeland going out to the diaspora. Indeed, Kokko has rejected the term “return” to describe the 1990s migration of Ingrians to Finland, and the presentation of Finland as Ingrians’ true homeland. In the same 2013 interview, he stated that “the true return migration is the Ingrian Finnish return from Siberia to the Ingrian homeland. This is the true return migration”.9 This introduces a territorial aspect to his construction of Ingrian identity, which is further discussed later in this section. Kokko engages substantially with language and religion as discursive resources of Ingrian identity, which present aspects of commonality with Finnishness, whilst the territorial element stresses an element of Ingrians’ otherness from Finns of Finland.

On the Finnish language, Kokko elaborates extensively in a 2008 editorial for Uutisia Inkeristä, entitled Suomen kieli ja inkeriläisyys [The Finnish Language and

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9 Ibid. Original Finnish text: oikea paluumuutto on inkerinsuomalaisen muutto Siperiasta koti-inkeriiin. Tämä on se oikea paluumuutto.
Ingrianness]. Here, Kokko firstly states his characterisation of Ingrian identity, with the same discursive resources he mentioned in the 2013 interview:

What factors have created the Ingrian Finnish nation? There are in my opinion three factors: 1) the Finnish language, which distinguished them from the Russian majority, 2) Lutheranism, which distinguished them from other Finnish-speaking minorities in Ingria, and 3) belonging in Ingria, which spurred the nation’s rapid development at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries, and which determined their tragic fate in the last century.10

It should firstly be noted that Kokko describes Ingrians as a nation [kansa]. Language and religion as discursive resources of Ingrianness are used here to define Ingrians as a nation separate from Russians, and from other (presumably Orthodox) Finnish-speaking communities in Ingria, although it is not readily apparent whom these Orthodox Finnish-speaking communities in Ingria would be. He may be referring to Izhorians (Izhors, also periodically referred to as Ingrians or native Ingrians), Votians (Votes) or Vepsians (Veps). These are minority groups in northwestern Russia speaking languages closely related to Finnish, but often treated officially as distinct languages rather than dialects of Finnish. Vepsian was listed as a separate language to Finnish in the 1989 Soviet Census’ survey of mother-tongues in the USSR,11 and Ott Kurs notes the brief rise of Izhorian as a standardised written language in the 1930s, and the research conducted by linguists from Estonia on Votian and Izhorian as endangered languages with their own regional variations and dialects in the later twentieth century after Stalin’s mass repressions.12 Particularly as Kokko’s editorial concerns the role of the Finnish language in defining Ingrianness and differentiating Ingrian Finns from other groups in the region, his broad approach to the definition of Finnish language, encompassing those held in other sources to be related but distinct Finno-Ugric languages, appears somewhat surprising. In Kokko’s discourse, Ingrian Finns at once appear as separate (through religion) and joined (through language) to other minority groups in the Gulf of Finland region, and this itself can serve a strategic goal of linking Ingrian Finns to a broader community of what he sees as

Finnish-speaking groups in northwestern Russia, within a broader identity based on the Finnish language that encompasses several distinct Finnish-speaking groups, including Finns of Finland, Ingrian Finns, Izhorians, Votians and others. In this sense, there is continuity to his construction of Ingrianness that it is distinct from Finnishness, though based on several points of commonality.

Kokko continues in this editorial to write on the Finnish language and Ingrianness, and whether local dialects of standard Finnish (kirjakieli, or written language) should play a definitive role in defining Ingrians’ identity:

Every Finn grows up knowing two languages, the “mother-tongue” (regional dialect) and Finnish (standard Finnish). The correct answer is of course standard Finnish. It connects us – remember it’s after all what we speak with Ingrian Finns from other countries when we meet at summer festivals. The regional dialects are spoken languages, which change very quickly. Ingrian Finns in Sweden have mixed up all the Ingrian Finnish dialects, and from this a new “common dialect” has formed. Young Ingrian Finns no longer learn Ingrian dialects, and speak only standard Finnish.

Dialect is not a national identity, but a local identity. I remember how my grandfather from Keltto used to laugh when my grandmother from Venjoki used the “wrong language”. Standard Finnish is again the bridge between us and the Finnishness of Finland, which is more and more significant for our small minority, in danger of losing its identity.

Significantly, this extract specifies standard Finnish as the most important unifying language for Ingrianness. Ingrian dialects are not presented here as playing a defining role for Ingrianness, as Kokko sees them as both too local (differentiating between different towns or parishes) and too impermanent to shape or unify Ingrianness as an identity. It is also significant to note the connection Kokko sees between Finland (and Finns of Finland) and Ingrian Finns through common use of standard Finnish; he sees Finland’s Finnishness as playing an increasing role in protecting Ingrian identity. This is highly reminiscent of discourses from Finnish politicians in the later 1990s and 2000s, who saw Finland as playing a protective role for Finnish-speaking minorities and their culture in Russia. There is thus a degree of correlation in how Kokko

constructs Ingrian identity, through use of Finnish, and how Inrngianness it was presented by Finnish politicians at this time, as separate but related to Finland, with the Finnish government in position to provide some support for the survival of the Finnish language in this region. There appears a degree of consensus that the Finnish language connects Finland and Ingrians, but stops short of Ingrian inclusion in Finland’s national community. However, there is no mention in this editorial of how this connection could be limited by the limited Finnish language skills of many Ingrians, which was a key narrative in the “connected but separate” argument amongst Finnish politicians in the late 1990s and 2000s.14

Kokko did, however, write on the decline of Finnish language skills amongst Ingrians, in other editorials, for instance in a 2006 piece entitled Inkeriläisyys ja kieliongelma [Ingrianness and the Language Problem]. Here, he writes that “[i]n the current situation, whilst in Russia, Estonia and Sweden Ingrian Finns make up only a small minority, the Finnish language is forgotten. There's no doubt that this also shows a partial loss of identity”.15 The need for an external force to guarantee the survival of the Finnish language amongst Ingrians, and thus Ingrian identity, is here underlined. This role need not, and indeed to Kokko’s mind should not, be undertaken through providing a return migration program. When, for instance, Finnish Centre party MP Hannu Kemppainen questioned the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return policy in 1996, he portrayed the migration of Ingrians to Finland as a loss of Ingrian culture, even an “ethnic cleansing” of Ingrian culture from northwestern Russia.16 His construction of Ingrians is, like Kokko’s, as a distinct community for whom Finland still holds some responsibility as a larger, closely related group. This responsibility is predicated on notions of connections like the Finnish language, and Kokko’s use of Finnish language as a discursive resource to construct Ingrissaness is here reminiscent of this element of Finnish politicians’ language.

In 2010, Kokko authored an editorial in *Uutisia Inkeristä* entitled “*Inkerinsuomalaisten tragedia*” [The Tragedy of the Ingrian Finns], in which he likens the twentieth century history of the Ingrians to a Shakespearean tragedy. In particular, he links Ingrian history to *Hamlet*, with the theme of a breakdown of relations between generations, and asks “can there be anything more terrible than when children and parents don’t understand each other, the work of the older generations being lost rather than carried on by the next generation, so people won’t learn anything of their history?” The transmission of Ingrian history and culture from generation to generation he now sees as being hindered by two factors – the loss of Finnish language capacities during the Stalinist period, and the migration of Ingrian Finns to Finland. On the effects of Stalinist repression, he writes:

During the Stalin period, the persecuted Ingrian Finns were afraid to speak Finnish to their children, tell them the stories of their families, and even changed their last names so their children wouldn’t grow up as Finnish. The connection with the past was so broken, that many born in Ingria lacked language skills, and even didn’t feel themselves Finnish.

The decline of the Finnish language amongst Ingrians after Stalin, to the point where Ingrians would be considered as a largely Russian-speaking community by Finnish parliamentarians, is here presented as a decline of Ingrianness. The reference to “connection with the past” denotes an evidently primordialist construction of identity, with language here serving as a hereditary indicator of identity. Loss of language skills compromises the identity’s further generational survival. Interestingly, however, Kokko also connects the loss of Ingrian identity in this editorial with the Right to Return migration of Ingrians to Finland. Writing on young Ingrians now living in Finland and attending Finnish schools, Kokko states:

Those in the Finnish comprehensive schools grow up undoubtedly to become real Finns of Finland, for whom the concept of Ingria is quite unknown and who speak something else than their Russian-speaking parents. At some point, these children start to become alienated from

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18 Ibid. Original Finnish text: *Voiko olla jotakin kauheampaa, kun lapset ja vanhemmat eivät ymmärrä toisiansa, kun vanhemman sukupolvien luoma tuhoutuu eikä siirry tulevalle sukupolvelle, kun kansa ei oppi mitään omasta historiastaan?*
19 Ibid.
their strange *faija* (father) and *mutsi* (mother) who don’t even know what do do with themselves in contemporary Finnish society.\(^{21}\)

As previously, the primordialist role language takes in creating Ingrian identity is underscored here as an element of identity passed down by family through the generations, with particular use in this excerpt of the colloquial words for father and mother associated more with the Helsinki-orientated *stadin slangi* [city slang]. The effect is to portray young Ingrian Finns as aspiring to the urban culture of Southern Finland, foreign to their parents and to Ingrian Finns in Ingria, and thus an example of, in one sense, language as a dividing feature between Finns of Finland and Ingrian Finns. Again, Kokko differentiates between Ingrianness and Finnishness, recalling similar arguments made by Finnish politicians in the later period of the Right to Return law, and links the loss of the Finnish language under Stalin with the Right to Return migration, in a similar vein to Kemppainen’s discussion of a new “ethnic cleansing” of Ingria and loss of Ingrian culture in the 1990s and 2000s.

Yet, Kokko’s own admission that some descendants of Ingrians today are primarily Russian-speakers raises a question for his own construction of Ingrianness as predicated on the Finnish language. Some Finnish politicians and authorities initially held similarly primordialist views of the Finnish language and its role in identity for Finnishness as an innate aspect of identity transmitted through the bloodline. The initial integration programs for Ingrian returnees supposed Ingrians would take less time than other migrants to learn Finnish.\(^{22}\) However, this line of argument was abandoned by the 2000s, and indeed the reforms of 2002-2003 specifically addressed concerns on the limits to Finnish language capabilities amongst Ingrian returnees.\(^{23}\) Thus, while there are significant points of commonality in how the Finnish language was used to define Finnishness for Finnish politicians, and how it has been used by Kokko to define Ingrianness, Kokko continues with a primordialist construction of the Finnish language’s role in identity beyond its briefer use in Finland. Kokko does not


take into account the effects of the modern use of Russian amongst Ingrians in his construction of identity, beyond stating that some he describes as Ingrian are Russian-speakers, as part of his Ingrian “tragedy”. Kokko therefore merges the Finnish language with ancestry in his construction of Ingrianness, rather than taking a more functional approach to Finnish language as a unifying identity marker of Ingrianness. Whereas ancestral or generational links became less significant in Finnish politicians’ discussions of identity as discourse was increasingly used to exclude Ingrians from Finnishness, for Kokko at least, ancestry retained significance in defining Ingrianness. However, there is a key difference in how ancestry is strategically employed by Kokko and by Finnish parliamentarians. In Finland, it was initially to link Ingrians to Finland and Finnishness, drawing on their seventeenth century migration from Finland and thus, the ancestral links they draw back (across 400 years) to Finns of Swedish-Finland. To Kokko, ancestry is strategically employed to draw contemporary Russian-speakers back to their Finnish-speaking ancestors in Ingria, going back a much shorter period. In effect, parliamentarians and Kokko were discussing ancestry in very different ways.

Kokko followed his 2008 editorial in Uutisia Inkeristä on the Finnish language with one on the role Lutheranism has played in shaping Ingrian identity, entitled Luterilaisuus ja inkeriläisyys [Lutheranism and Ingrianness]. This editorial begins by referencing Lutheranism as a historic link between Ingrians and the seventeenth century Swedish kingdom, in a similar vein to Mauno Koivisto’s statement on Lutheranism as a legacy of the Swedish period in his April 1990 interview. Kokko writes:

The current geographical concept of Ingria was formed during the Swedish reign, when the Kingdom’s borders were drawn from the Treaty of Stolbova, and the parishes on the southern isthmus [between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Lagoda] were attached to form a new province. Orthodox populations fled the Swedish forces, and Lutherans from Finland moved in. From the offspring of these Lutheran immigrants later came the Ingrian Finns. Thus, the birth of our nation and the emergence of Protestant Christianity from Martin Luther are intrinsically related to each other.\textsuperscript{24}

These historical links between Ingrians and the Swedish kingdom through Lutheranism appear to follow similar primordialist ideas of identity as Kokko’s discussion of the Finnish language and identity. Lutheranism is also portrayed as transmitted through descent from the early Lutheran settlers of Ingria to contemporary Ingrian Finns, and is thus also an intrinsic and immutable element of Ingrianness. This is particularly underscored by the presentation of Lutheranism as the “birth moment” for Ingrianness – the idea that Ingrianness could not exist without the rise of Lutheranism.

Kokko has presented the re-founding of the Lutheran Church of Ingria and restoration of ruined Lutheran religious buildings like the Kupanitsa temple in 1991 (see figure 17) as a re-birth of Ingrianness in Ingria, stating in a 1999 address at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden that “[t]he renewed activity of the churches was a visible sign of the will of Ingrian Finns to survive”.25 This departs somewhat from the very limited use of Lutheranism as a discursive resource of Finnishness by Finnish politicians in their discussion on Ingrians, which was effectively limited to Koivisto’s April 1990 interview. Lutheranism was a very marginal discursive resource of identity in that discussion, used strategically by Koivisto to include Ingrians in Finnishness, but never really engaged with by other Finnish politicians and not used to exclude Ingrians from Finnishness at the end of the Right to Return policy, as the Finnish language was. I argued in chapter five of this thesis that this may be partly a response of a decline in some of the Finnish Lutheran Church’s social and political influence in Finland in the 2000s. Arguments for the significance of Lutheranism as a core element of identity for Ingrians from Ingrian sources like Kokko and Uutisia Inkeristä therefore do not correlate extensively with Finnish politicians’ concurrent discussions of identity and Ingrians at this time. Lutheranism appears a significant discursive resource for Kokko to define the parameters of Ingrianness, and not necessarily to directly connect Ingrians to Finnishness.

Figure 17
The restored Lutheran Kupanitsa temple in Gubanitsy, Leningrad Oblast, Russia, showing the date of restoration (1991) below the central belfry. Photo by XS, XXL, 5 January 2009.

It is also significant to note that, compared to his construction of the role the Finnish language plays in Ingrianness, Kokko appears more willing to engage with arguments that Lutheranism’s significance for identity amongst contemporary Ingrians has declined. In the 2008 editorial, he also writes:

Personally, I know dozens of Ingrian Finns, who have been influenced by the [Orthodox] majority in recent years to choose the Orthodox faith. Others have tried their luck with new exotic religions. Thousands have stayed outside the church…Lutheranism is still the most common religious denomination for Ingrian Finns, and it is decisively influential for the formation of Ingrian identity, but now you cannot say that Ingrian Finnish automatically means Lutheran…And you can no longer say that membership of the Lutheran Church of Ingria automatically means Finnish, as our church has declared itself multicultural and multilingual.26

This discussion of Lutheranism appears to some extent to correlate with the waning influence of the Church in the discussion of Finnishness amongst Finnish politicians discussing Ingrians in the 1990s and 2000s. Of course, modern St Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast are different environments to Finland, where the Finnish Lutheran Church still predominates amongst the general population. Lutheran Ingrians live in a largely Russian Orthodox environment, and indeed this relates to Kokko’s perception of Ingrianness as vulnerable to being lost amongst the Russian majority, which here translates to Ingrians joining the Orthodox faith, along with those who have remained non-confessional or affiliated to “exotic” non-traditional religions in the region. Referring to followers of non-traditional religions in Ingria as “trying their luck” also lends an air of insincerity in their religious conviction, suggesting they are less serious and their faith should be taken less seriously than Lutheranism. Lutheranism thus does have a significant strategic function here to differentiate Ingrians from the Russian majority, rather than link Ingrians with the Lutheran majority in Finland.

Despite this acknowledgement of the waning influence of Lutheranism in Ingria, Kokko appears to see a kind of secular role for the Lutheran Church as a “folk church” in the construction of Ingrian identity, which he expresses in other editorials for *Uutisia Inkeristä*. He writes in a Christmas-themed editorial from 2008 that “I have gotten to understand how much of an impact Christianity has had on European culture in general, and how those of us outside the church can not live without Christian values”. In this editorial, he likens the celebration of Christian holidays like Christmas to a transmission of Ingrian (Lutheran) culture from generation to generation, through a personal narrative of himself, as a self-identified secular person, continuing the religious Christmas customs of his grandfather.

Kokko also makes a similar argument in a 2009 editorial on Ingrian traditions:

Many Ingrian Finnish folklore traditions have developed over the centuries from Christian customs. Christmas in Ingria a hundred years ago was celebrated in almost the same way as

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27 See for example the description of Ingrians as a small community whose survival is in danger in Kokko, “Suomen kieli ja inkeriläisyys”.
29 Ibid.
Lutheranism is thus explicitly linked to Ingrian folklore and folk culture, which serves as a discursive link to Central and Northern Europe, and thus a distinguishing feature from the surrounding Orthodox majority. In some sense, there is thus here an appeal to the notion of a cultural separation between Lutheranism and Orthodoxy, echoing Samuel Huntington’s thesis nearly two decades earlier. However, Kokko’s argument for Lutheranism as an element of Ingrian Finnish folk culture also echoes the development of the Lutheran Church in Finland as a “folk church” in the 1990s and 2000s, though more as a social and moral advocate for “Finnish values” than a safeguard of cultural traditions and celebrations like Christmas. This line of argument was not substantially engaged with by Finnish politicians discussing Ingrians. There were no statements of the need to protect Ingrian Finns’ Lutheran-informed cultural values and traditions from the Orthodox majority. Kokko’s own argument appears to suggest Ingrians themselves are responsible for maintaining their culture and traditions in Ingria, as there is no suggestion that these traditions could be better maintained amongst a Lutheran majority in Finland. Thus, Kokko appears to afford a larger and more defined role for Lutheranism in the construction of Ingrianness than Finnish politicians appeared to for Finnishness in their discussions on the Right to Return, but this does not necessarily translated to a sense of threat to Ingrianness as a minority identity in Ingria, nor advocacy for Ingrian emigration to Finland.

Effectively, Kokko’s discussion of the role language and religion play in defining Ingrianness correlate in part with the way these discursive resources were used to define an inclusive relationship between Ingrians and Finnishness by Finnish politicians at the start of the Right to Return policy. Both Finnish politicians at that
time and Kokko hold that Ingrians are Finnish-speakers and Lutherans, and that these are significant markers of their identity. Critically, however, Finnish politicians in favour of the Right to Return policy in the early 1990s saw these markers of identity as tying Ingrians to Finland, whereas Kokko sees a spatial element to Ingrian identity that specifically links them to the old territory of Ingria. Indeed, Kokko devotes an entire editorial in 2007 to the changing historical borders of Ingria, and notes the challenges for Inkerin-Liitto in the present day to continue to promote the unity of Ingrian peoples and the Ingrian homeland now split between two federal districts of Russia – Leningrad Oblast and the Federal City of St Petersburg.32 Kokko thus endorses a territorial element to Ingrianness, and links Ingrian belongingness to Ingria rather than to Finland. He appears to reject perceptions of the Finno-Russian border as a clear dividing line between Finns and Russians as distinct or opposing civilizations, identities or communities, being instead rather inline with the 1990s/2000s view of this frontier as a more porous, “soft” border than it had been as part of the Iron Curtain.

However, several of Kokko’s editorials in Uutisia Inkeristä do make key distinctions between Russians on one side, and Ingrians and Finns on the other, employing some of the same discursive uses of history (particularly Second World War history) as Finnish politicians. He mentions his own family history during the Second World War in the 2007 editorial Inkerinsuomalaisena Venajällä [As an Ingrian Finn in Russia], in which he writes “People were expelled [from Ingria] for one reason only: because they were Finnish. A Finnish origin was enough to be a criminal offence; it was in fact a crime. Finnishness was a curse in the USSR of the 1940s”.33 He makes particular use of history in a 2009 editorial commemorating the 200-year anniversary of the Finnish War of 1809, Mitä oikein tapahtui 200 vuotta sitten? [What Really Happened 200 Years Ago?], in which he gives a historical narrative of Finland’s transition from Swedish territory, with a particularly fluid eastern frontier, to a Grand Duchy under the Russian Tsar, to then the growth of nationalism and the

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independence movement at the turn of the 1900s. He also recalls the Fennoman motto that “[Finland] was no longer Swedish and it would never be Russia”. The effect of this language here is that Finland’s historical narrative shows the identity divide between Finns and Russians. Finns were once part of Sweden, but will never be Russians: the separation between Russians and Finns is definitive, while the links to Sweden are more changed by history but far less impossible.

In a 2010 editorial commemorating the 90th anniversary of the Dorpat Peace Agreement, Kokko recalls the guarantees made by the Bolshevik government in the USSR for national minority groups like the Ingrian Finns. He then moves to the betrayal of this agreement after 1937-1938 and the start of Stalinist oppression:

Again, on the language and culture side in the Ingria of 1920-1936 a lot was done, and Finnish-language education had been developed better than ever. The supportive minority nationality policy, however, came to a bloody halt in 1937-1938, when education in Russian became mandatory all over Ingria and the remaining Lutheran churches were closed.

The final sentence of this editorial describes the start of the Winter War on 30 November 1939, when “the Soviet Union attacked Finland”, as the final end of the Dorpat Peace Agreement. This construction of inter-war history has the significant discursive function of portraying Stalin’s USSR as the enemy to Ingrianness, with particular focus on the Finnish language and Lutheran churches as Kokko’s oft-cited core elements of Ingrian identity. This recalls many of the arguments made by Finnish politicians in the early years of the Ingrian Finnish Return policy, when negative discursive representations of the USSR in Second World War history were discussed with particular reference to the fate of Ingrian Finns. Key examples are the 1990 calls from Tina Mäkelä and a contingent of SMP, National Coalition and Swedish People’s Party MPs for frontline veterans’ benefits for Ingrian volunteers in the Second World

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38 Ibid.
War, discussed in chapter four. However, the detail here is that Ingrians suffered in the USSR because of their connection to Finland, for they had defended Finland from Soviet attack, as Mäkelä puts it, with “Finnish gun in hand”. By contrast, Kokko’s discourse focuses on oppression of Ingrian identity as an internal other in the USSR, without particular reference to Ingrians’ connections to Finland as a kin-state relationship. This demonstrates the crucial difference in the approach Finnish politicians and Kokko take to constructing Ingrianness: although they involve many of the same discursive resources of identity, for Finnish politicians it is seen in relation to Finnishness, whereas for Kokko, Ingrianness is seen in relation to the dominant Russian majority.

![The Ingrian flag](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ingria_flag_large.png)

Figure 18
The Ingrian flag
Created by Tsujigiri, 29 December 2004. Released to the public domain.

Kokko’s constructions of the USSR/Russia are not limited to historical examples. Kokko explores similar constructions of contemporary Russia in relation to Ingrianness in an editorial on the Ingrian flag (see figure 18). He notes the significance of the flag in key moments for Ingrian history, including when it flew on 8 September 1919 in Kirjasalo and again for the first time on Laskiainen, the Finnish Shrove Tuesday celebration, in the early Spring of 1989. In the wake of a Russian government crackdown on extremist symbols following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA, the Russian State Duma proposed banning all flags with crosses, including the Ingrian flag. Kokko ridicules this proposal, noting the problems it

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42 Ibid.
might cause when a Nordic head of state visits Russia.\textsuperscript{43} He also likens it to other Russian crackdowns on national minorities’ culture:

In all its wisdom, the State Duma knows how to make the most astonishing decisions. Do you remember the law that forced Russian indigenous people to write their own languages in the Cyrillic alphabet? This law is in effect, but has not influenced in any way what appears in the Petrozavodsk Karelian, Finnish and Vepsian language newspapers.\textsuperscript{44}

The Russian State Duma comes across as a somewhat ineffectual enemy to Ingrians as a minority group in Russia. They have unsuccessfully attempted to subdue a core aspect of Ingrian identity (the Finnish language), and thus echo, though in a less immediately destructive way, the Stalinist-era Russification policies of the USSR. However, the potential banning of the Ingrian flag adds an interesting element. Social psychologists Julia C. Baker \textit{et al.} note that flags serve as an important symbol in social identity theory, serving to identify in-group belonging and positively differentiate the group from out-groups.\textsuperscript{45} Baker \textit{et al.} argue that in certain social contexts and circumstances, flags threaten intergroup relations, particularly if they are linked to concepts of nationalism and national supremacy.\textsuperscript{46} Banning national minority groups’ flags follows from this, creating a hostile image of the dominant national group. Linking the Ingrian flags’ potential banning to other attempts to subdue Ingrian identity in Russia serves to underscore this interpretation of contemporary Russia as an enemy to Ingrianness. This follows on from similar discourses from Finnish politicians in the 2000s that have portrayed Russia in this way, linking contemporary Russia to historical narratives of an enemy image, particularly involving the Second World War period. The discursive resource of negative portrayals of contemporary Russia is thus also employed amongst the Ingrian community, exemplified by Kokko, to discursively construct identity. To this end, it is significant to note that Kokko maintains a construction of separation between Ingrians and Russians in Ingria at a time when Finnish politicians like Sulo Aittoniemi were increasingly attributing negative Finnish perceptions of Russians to

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid. Original Finnish text: \textit{Kaikessa viisaudessaan duuma osaa tehdä mitä ihmeellisimpiä päättöksiä. Muistatteko lain, joka pakotti Venäjän kantakansoja käyttämään kyrilikkaa omissa kielissään. Tämä laki on voimassa muttei vaikuttanut millään tavalla Petroskoissa ilmestyvään karjalais-, suomalais– ja vepsäläislehdistöön.}
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. pp. 3-6.
Ingrians.\(^{47}\) Ingrians were also being discussed in Finland as a Russian-orientated and Russian-speaking minority group,\(^ {48}\) as discussed in chapter five. This shows a critical difference in discursive representations of Ingrianness between Finnish politicians and Kokko. Although the Finnish language, Lutheranism and perceptions of Russia are discursively employed to define both Finnishness and Ingrianness by both, Kokko maintains a separation between Ingrianness and Finnishness without linking Ingrianness to a Russian-orientated identity, as seen in Finnish politicians language. Kokko’s arguments correlate more with arguments in the Finnish political discussion that Ingrians are not displaced Finns, but a minority in Russia with certain points of commonality and connection to Finland.

Given these differences in identity construction, and given Kokko’s own questioning of the 1990s-2000s Ingrian migration to Finland as a “return”, his reaction to the end of the Ingrian Finnish Return law in 2010 is surprising. In early 2010, he describes the Finnish Ministry of the Interior’s statement of intention to end the law as a reaction to problems with the waiting queue system, overburdened with 5,000-6,000 applicants, and argues the decision as a “punishment of the innocent”\(^ {49}\). He rejects the distance this decision places between Ingrians and Finland, and specifically argues that Ingrian return migrants have a unique benefit to the Finnish state:

> But who will serve the Finnish labour market better than Ingrian Finns? They are orientated to Finland, they have some of the cultural and linguistic capacity to live in Finnish society, they have a good educational background, and they agree to work in areas for which Finns can no longer be found. I am quite sure that the nurses from the Philippines and farm workers to the EU from Bulgaria are worse options for the Finnish labour market.

Here, Kokko engages in many of the same strategic uses of essentialising discourse as Finnish politicians early in the 1990s. He links Ingrians to Finnishness through common cultural, linguistic and cultural orientation discursive resources. Although much of Kokko’s previous discussions present some degree of separation between

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\(^{48}\) Sasi, Kanerva, Zyskowicz and Lindén, “Inkeriläisten maahanmuuttoedelly”.


\(^{50}\) Ibid. Original Finnish text: *Mutta ketkä kelpaavat Suomen työmarkkinoille paremmin kuin inkerinsuomalaiset? He ovat Suomeen orientoitujia, heillä on joitakin kulttuuri- ja kieltäitovalmiuksi asua suomalaisessa yhteiskunnassa, heillä on hyvä taustakoulutus ja he suostuvat aloille, joille suomalaista halukkaita ei enää löydy. Olen ihan varma, että lähihoitajat Filippiineillä ja maatalouslomittajat EU:n Bulgariasta ovat huonompia vaihtoehtoja Suomen työmarkkinoille.*
Ingrianness and Finnishness, particularly though discussion of a spatial element to Ingrianness linked to the Ingrian territory rather than Finland, here Kokko draws on an argument of inclusion in Finland, at a time when the political discussion in Finland had moved to Ingrian exclusion. The Finnish discussion on Ingrian exclusion in Finland thus appears to have the effect of re-enforcing Kokko’s construction of Ingrians’ connection to Finnishness, using essentialising discourse. Kokko’s mention of Filipino and Bulgarian immigrants as incongruous with Finnishness in particular underscores his essentialising discursive construction of Finnish identity here. Kokko’s language also presents elements of a hierarchical view of immigration to Finland, where Ingrians should be afforded a privileged position in Finnish policy because of common elements of identity.

In his second editorial on the end of the Ingrian Return law in 2010, Kokko particularly explores historical atonement arguments for the Return law. He writes:

One would just have to decide that those who were in Finland during 1943-1944, and who were persecuted in the Soviet Union for being Finnish between 1930-1953, who wish to return to Finland, would be accepted as "returning migrants" without delay. The evacuation to Finland was accurately archived, and those persecution on political grounds in the ex-Soviet Union have a "rehabilitation certificate" in hand. I understand that Finland does not bear responsibility for Stalin’s persecutions, but this is the only example in history of people who were persecuted for their Finnishness. Maybe Finland could show mercy to the survivors of the “Finnish Holocaust”.

The discussion on historical atonement, as I argue in chapters four and five, was amongst the most significant themes in Finnish political discourse on Ingrians. Ingrian veterans were the only group who continued to apply for residence permits once the Right to Return queue was closed. Kokko does mention or appear aware of this in this editorial. However, the Finnish government’s perceived rejection of the connection between Ingrians and Finland prompts Kokko here to engage with this theme, in which he makes particular use of narratives of Second World War history to

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criticise the government’s change of policy. The choice of “Finnish Holocaust” to describe the Stalinist persecution of Ingrians is particularly evocative. This kind of language has the particular effect of conveying intense persecution, and even extermination, while placing Ingrians’ experiences in this period with events in the Second World War that have become a cornerstone of post-war European politics, identity and discussion of history. However, here again Kokko also presents a Finnish identity for Ingrians, which is somewhat incongruous with other presentations he gives of an Ingrian identity linked to an Ingrian homeland, and indicates the particular effect this change in Finnish policy could have on perceptions of Ingrians’ Finnish identity credentials from an Ingrian source.

Kokko explores the notions of Ingrianness and Finnishness as separate or same identities in an April 2010 editorial to commemorate the 20-year anniversary of Koivisto’s significant television interview. In this editorial, Kokko describes the primary reasons why Ingrian Finns migrated to Finland. He notes an investigation from the 1990s, which showed the most significant reason was uncertainty about the future of Russia, followed by desire for improved living standards. Reconnecting with Finnish culture, and raising children as Finns, ranked only third. By the late 2000s, the situation was altered, and economic differences between Finland and Russia were less stark. Still, Kokko sees those in the migration queue as motivated by a desire to escape corruption and limited democracy in Russia. Kokko himself is critical of these motivations, which he sees as a “pretty weak foundation to build a happy future in a new country”. In his opinion, Ingrians should move to Finland because they want to live in Finland, not merely to escape living in Russia. Here, Kokko decries a lack of identity-considerations amongst Ingrian return migrants, which gives the impression that his own characterisation of Ingrians’ identity is somewhat idealistic, and not representative of what the Ingrian community at large holds to be significant. Indeed, given the motivations for migration to Finland Kokko

53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. Original Finnish text: aika heikko perusta rakentaakseen onnellista tulevaisuutta uudessa kotimaassa
cites, one may question the notion of whether the concept of an Ingrian identity is actually salient within the community itself. Instead, return migrants may just be those seeking to benefit from Finnish immigration law to improve their personal circumstances, without substantially engaging in the identity discourse embedded in the law and its justification.

However, Kokko’s editorial also notes the complexities in identity construction for Ingrians, particularly concerning the role of Finland. He describes Ingrians’ initial reaction in 1990 to the Right to Return law at the Inkerin-Liitto that they were now seen by the Finnish government as Finns:

For many, “return migration” felt strange, as we sang at that time “Mun isänmaani Inkeri, ma sinne kaipaan ain [My fatherland Ingria, I always long for there]. Young and naive, we thought that the dispersed Ingrian Finns of the world only dreamed of moving to their home villages in Ingria.”

This extract illustrates Kokko’s discursive construction of Ingrian identity as separate from Finnishness and Finland, particularly informed by a territorial aspect – the Ingrian homeland serves as a key discursive construction of Ingrian identity here, and this was not substantially engaged with by Finnish politicians discussing Ingrian identity. Kokko elaborates on Ingrian’s connection to Finland further in this editorial:

For me personally it was hard to understand that now I have two native lands, but at some point I found a compromise decision that two is better than none. I know that, due to their deportation, Ingrian Finns felt themselves a homeless nation.

Now, Kokko appears to modify his own statement on the significance of Ingria as a homeland for Ingrians, to now characterise Ingrian Finns as a “homeless nation” with links to modern Ingria and Finland: two homelands to replace the lost homeland of pre-war Ingria. This further suggests an interesting effect of the change to Ingrian exclusion in Finland on the identity discourse presented by Kokko. Kokko now seeks to underline Ingrians’ Finnishness, moving away from his previous use of a territorial


59 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Minun henkilökohtaisesti oli vaikea ymmärtää, että nyt minulla on kaksi synnyinmaata, mutta jossakin vaiheessa löysin kompromissipäätyöksen, että kaksi on parempi kuin ei yhtään. Tiedän, että karkotuspaikoissa ollessaan inkerisuoimalaiset tunsivat itsensä aivan kodittomaksi kansaksi.
discursive resource. In one sense, this brings Kokko’s characterisation of Ingrians more into line with Finnish politicians’ statements from the early 1990s, which included Ingrians within Finnishness. Kokko also appears to be employing this characterisation for the same policy function – to legitimise Ingrian migration to Finland. The crucial difference is that Kokko’s characterisation comes later on, when Ingrian inclusion has become out-modeled in Finland. In another sense, this extract also gives indication of a more complex, multi-faceted approach to identity construction amongst Ingrians than the more bifurcated, in-or-out approach to Finnishness presented by Finnish politicians in relation to Ingrians. Ingrians may, in Kokko’s mind, feel an attachment to Finnishness while at the same time preserving a sense of difference from Finland’s Finns through their Ingrianness.

Kokko’s discursive construction of Ingrian identity appears to mirror Finnish politicians’ construction of Finnishness in many ways – the construction is informed by the Finnish language and the Lutheran religion in particular, with some reference also to historical perceptions of the USSR/Russia as an “Other”. However, much of Kokko’s construction of Ingrianness also preserves a sense of otherness from Finns of Finland, particularly informed by the symbolic influence he affords to the Ingrian territory as the real Ingrian kotimaa, or homeland. By 2010, when Kokko defends the Finnishness of Ingrians in the wake of the decision on the end of the Return policy, he moves to a discourse of Ingrian identity that preserves both a connection to Finnishness and a separate identity as Ingrians. Kokko does present the view cited by Finnish politicians that Ingrianness is not the same as Finnishness, but he does not endorse the notion that the Ingrian community is not connected to Finnishness in a meaningful way, and that Ingrians do not deserve a privileged position in Finnish immigration law because of this connection. This indicates a significant way in which the discursive construction of Finnishness that excludes Ingrians in Finland, which became dominant in the late 1990s and 2000s, affected the discourse on identity in an Ingrian source.
B) **Surveys of Ingrian Attitudes Towards Identity, Finnishness and Return Migration**

Attitudes of Ingrians themselves towards their identity and connection to Finland have been a significant avenue of research for Finnish social scientists, many of which use survey and interview data from Ingrian migrants in Finland to study their views of identity. Ismo Söderling, director of research at the Finnish Migration Institute, provides a summary of Finnish-language research on Ingrians in the 1990s and 2000s, generally characterising the scholarly interest as micro-level studies of identity, particularly the notion of self-ascribed bicultural or monocultural identities in Ingrians.  

One example is Sanna Iskanius’ 1999 study of Finnish language acquisition amongst Russian-speaking school children, predominantly returnee migrants, and its relation to attitudes towards identity. Iskanius argues that Russian-speaking children in 1990s Finland developed a self-perception as Finnish-speaking Russians, positively identifying with the Finnish language but viewing themselves as distinct from Finns and mainstream Finnish culture. 

This idea of a multi-faceted approach to identity that blurs divisions between Finnishness and Russianness is significant to understanding Ingrians’ views of their own identity. It emerges in varying forms from Ingrians’ discussions of identity that have been recorded and analysed by social scientists working with Ingrians.

Helena Miettinen provides an analysis of how Ingrians engage with the characteristics of Ingrianness in discussion on their identity. Interestingly, she cites the exact same identity characteristics as Wladimir Kokko as dominating this discussion: the Finnish language, Lutheran church and connections to the Ingrian homeland. However, she further argues that whilst these views are the prevailing social representation of what Ingrianness is, they are not necessarily the way in which people identifying as Ingrian see themselves. She is particularly critical of the overlooked role generational

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62 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
differences play in the construction of Ingrianness, whereby elements like the historical narrative of Ingrians in the Stalinist period and Second World War play a significantly more substantial role for the older generation who lived through them.  

Younger Ingrians, she notes, more readily associate their identity with Russia over Finland. For these younger Ingrians, without direct experience of discrimination from Soviet authorities based on their perceived connection to Finland, Russia and Russianness may carry significantly less negative connotations. Some researchers on Ingrians also reject the notion expressed for instance by Kokko that Ingrian identity is connected to the concept of an Ingrian homeland. Lauri Honko argues that the shifts in borders and populations in Ingria may problematise the construction of an Ingrian homeland, or indeed an Ingrian ethos or culture. Indeed, Ingria as a defined geographical territory disappeared from maps in the early eighteenth century, and Markku Teinonen reflects on this when citing interviews with Ingrians – one woman born in 1929 tells him “I don’t understand what it means. I’m a Finn and was brought up in Russia. There is no such area as Ingria!” Teinonen cites this as evidence to his argument:

The significance of the historical Ingria or the geographical Ingria should in fact not be overemphasised in examining what the region we call Ingria actually means in the minds of the Finns living there, or what it means to people’s identity… Amongst the Finns living in the region, Ingria is a very vague historical and geographical concept.

Yet Teinonen is not completely convincing in this argument. Ingrian Finns may avoid or reject the description of their homeland as “Ingria”, but the significance of geography in defining their identity is still significant, and this is shown in other data Teinonen presents. He notes particularly a 1993 poem published by an Ingrian Finnish author, entitled “Toksova in the Olden Days”, a highly romanticised portrait of the town of Toksovo, (in Finnish Toksova, formerly Korpiselkä), in northern Leningrad Oblast. Teinonen sees this as evidence of a “local” over Ingrian identity, with “Ingria” used more as a general term to describe the areas of northwest Russia and

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65 Ibid. p. 91.
66 Ibid. p. 88.
69 Ibid. p. 102
70 Ibid. p. 104
Estonia with significant historical Finnish settlements. However, the real significance of this data for the study of identity constructions, particularly with reference to the Right to Return law, is the emphasis on the local environment in northwestern Russia and Estonia over Finland as the spiritual homeland of Ingrians. The Right to Return law was constructed on a notion that Ingrians’ Finnishness bound them to Finland, with Finland positioned as the Finnish homeland. Discourse evidence from Ingrians themselves suggests the territorial connection to Finland is not a significant element in language from the Ingrian community on their identity. Teinonen cites one woman, born in 1926, who states:

I suppose we’re Ingrians. We speak Finnish, but we’ve never lived in Finland. Of course our ancestors are in Finland. They must have come here a long time ago. We don’t know where we came from, where our family began.

This excerpt effectively challenges discursive resource of ancestry as a means to connect Ingrians to Finland. This correlates to later discursive representations of ancestry as not significant in denoting Ingrians’ Finnishness from Finnish politicians in the late 1990s and 2000s. In this discourse, however, it is a discursive resource of ties to the Ingrian homeland that challenges the significance of ancestry. This is also featured prominently in the discourse from Wladimir Kokko in Uutisia Inkeristä. This is missing from the discussion in Finnish politics, where the discussion took on an increased focus on language and cultural orientation to undermine Ingrians’ ancestral connection as a salient argument for their Finnishness.

Like Kokko, however, the Ingrian respondents in Teinonen’s interviews make particular use of the Finnish language and Finnish Lutheran Church as discursive resources in constructing their identity. Teinonen notes the use of language both as a signifier of ethnic identity, and as a historical link to the past, carried on through ancestry, or as he puts it, “the idea of a continuum stretching from the past to the present and on into the future”. He argues that private use of Finnish amongst the Ingrian community in the Soviet Union, particularly in times when public use of Finnish was difficult, was a survival strategy of Ingrians’ “hidden social identity”.

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71 Ibid. pp. 103-4  
72 Ibid. p. 106.  
73 Ibid. p. 112.  
74 Ibid. p. 113.
borrowing the phrase from Peter Niedermüller’s analysis of identity construction in Habsburg Central Europe.\textsuperscript{75} Like Kokko, the Ingrians in Teinonen’s study often identify their own local dialects as part of their largely local-orientated identity, which complicates the characterisation of their language as “Ingrian”, when no uniform Ingrian Finnish dialect exists.\textsuperscript{76} One respondent in particular gives an example of differences between northern and southern Ingrian dialects as they say “three and a half”; “kolme ja puoli” or three \textit{and} a half in the north, and “kol poulen kans” or three \textit{with} a half in the south.\textsuperscript{77} Kokko has suggested that standard Finnish or \textit{kirjakieli} should be the \textit{lingua franca} of Ingrian Finns, but Teinonen notes that in practice, many Ingrians communicate in Russian, the language in which the majority of Ingrians he interviewed are most comfortable speaking.\textsuperscript{78} Thus, the Finnish language should feature less prominently in these Ingrian communities’ discursive construction of an Ingrian identity, if they hold Ingrians to have a specifically Ingrian identity. Lauri Honko argues, however, that language capacity is only part of the way in which individuals may identify with a particular language, as language can function as a symbol of the cultural identity rather than as only a practical tool of ingroup communication.\textsuperscript{79} He calls this “extralinguistic identity”.\textsuperscript{80} Ingrians may therefore be able to identify with the Finnish language as an aspect of their cultural identity, although in practice they may speak little. Indeed, Teinonen notes the response from many older Ingrians that their grandchildren should learn Finnish as a second language to continue their link to the past, and the old Finnish settlement of Ingria.\textsuperscript{81} Thus, effectively, Ingrian community sources do indicate constructions of their identity using the Finnish language as a discursive resource.

Similarly, the Lutheran church in Ingria also features as an important discursive resource of Ingrianness amongst the Ingrian interviewees in Teinonen’s study. Like language, religion appears to have functioned as a survival strategy for Ingrians’

\textsuperscript{76} Teinonen, “The Present as a Mirror of the Past”, p. 112.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid. p. 113.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid. p. 114.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Teinonen, “The Present as a Mirror of the Past”, pp. 113-4.
hidden social identity, as one Ingrian interviewee born in 1926 cites relatively clandestine Lutheran Christmas celebrations in Soviet times, which Teinonen argues allowed a continuing sense of community amongst Ingrians who used religious celebrations as a chance for social gathering.\textsuperscript{82} The 1990 Soviet law on the freedom of conscience and religious communities, which as Teinonen puts it “signified the official approval of religion”,\textsuperscript{83} allowed for Ingrians to “come out” as Lutherans, and the Ingrian church to physically re-establish its presence in the region. Like Kokko, Teinonen sees this as particularly represented by the restoration of the Lutheran church in Kupatsina (figure 17), which he describes as “now considered a symbol of modern Ingria”.\textsuperscript{84} Teinonen also notes that the use of the Ingrian Finnish church as a point of identity connection between Ingrians and Finland has caused problems with the broader community in the region. Humanitarian aid from Finland is often channelled through the church, which itself has received funding from Finland to restore dilapidated Lutheran church buildings.\textsuperscript{85} In particular, flea markets organised by the church using items donated by charities in Finland, with money raised being used to support the work of the church, were met with suspicion and resentment from the Russian Orthodox community, who argued that the economic conditions in 1990s Russia were equally precarious for all, and the humanitarian aid from Finland afforded the Ingrian Lutheran congregation was unfair.\textsuperscript{86} In practice, the Ingrian church can act as a link to Finland, as Teinonen notes the practice of Finns from Finland acting as godparents at Ingrian baptism ceremonies.\textsuperscript{87} This indicates ways in which the Lutheran Church could be represented as a link between Ingrians and Finland, and denote Ingrians’ connections to Finnishness and otherness from the Russian Orthodox majority. These representations were apparently also featured in Russians’ language on Ingrians at this time in the 1990s. This departs from the discussion on Ingrians in Finnish politics after Koivisto, where Lutheranism is mentioned very rarely as a discursive resource linking Ingrians to Finland.

While Ingrians in the 1990s may have constructed their connection to Finnishness using Lutheranism and Finnish language as discursive resources, research into

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid. pp. 115-6.  
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid. p. 116.  
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid. p. 109  
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid. pp. 115-7.  
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid. pp. 116-7.  
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid. p. 117.
Ingrians’ attitudes towards the Right to Return reveals a complex and interwoven interpretation of this connection. Sociologist Eve Kyntäjä, working with Ingrian Finns in Estonia circa 1998, provides an excerpt of an interview with an Estonian-born Ingrian Finnish woman, aged 38:

The Finns don’t like us, although we ourselves are Finnish, but not really, not actually…Besides, Finns living in Finland are somehow different from us, they aren’t on the same wavelength, they still consider us their eastern neighbours, they are cautious and speak to us like children…My goodness, why should I move there? My home is here in Estonia.⁸⁸

Although Kyntäjä notes such opinions of migrating to Finland were likely to come from the more prosperous Ingrians who stood to gain little from this move,⁹⁰ this quote nevertheless suggests a relatively layered approach to the Ingrian identity, encompassing a self-definition as Finnish with a distinction from Finns living in Finland. The interviewee sees herself as Finnish, and indeed Ingrian Finns as Finnish, but the experience of living in Estonia, physically removed from Finland, has spurred an identity gulf between herself and Finns living in Finland. She is separate from Finns of Finland as much in her own eyes as she is in theirs. Also of note is her view that Finns continue to see Ingrians as their “eastern neighbours”, distinct from the westward cultural and political orientation of Finland. Her final point, that her homeland is Estonia, also notes the disparity between ethnic identity and concept of homeland – it is possible in this woman’s eyes to be Finnish but without ties to Finland, or rather, to be a Finnish part of Estonia. Sanna Rimpiläinen argues against use of the term “Ingrian Finns” altogether, suggesting that it “presumes a clear division of peoples to the ‘genuine’ and ‘ingenious’ Ingrian Finns” based on personal and non-comparable beliefs and circumstances like place of birth or homeland.⁹¹ A better term, in her mind, is ‘people of Ingrian Finnish origin’, a more flexible term that allows for multiple identities that would reflect the status of many Ingrian Finns who identify strongly as Russian or Estonian, but are aware of, or interested in, their Finnish ancestry.⁹¹ This multi-layered discourse differs from the discussion in Finnish

⁸⁸ Eve Kyntäjä, Viron sosiaalinen kehitys ja inkerinsuomalaiden paluumuutto Suomeen, Helsinki: Suomen Kuntaliitto, 1998, p. 41. Original Finnish text: Ei ne suomalaiset meikäläisistä tykkää, vaikka olemme itsekin suomalaisia, mutta ei niitä varsinaisia, oikeita...Sitä paitis Suomessa asuvat suomalaiset ovat jotenkin erilaisia kuin me, emme tule löytämään samaa aaltopituutta, he pitää meitä edelleen itänaapurina, he ovat varovaisia ja puhuu kuin lapselle...Hyvää nälää senään, miki muun pitaisi sinne muuttaa? Minun kotioni on täällä Virossa!

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Rimpiläinen, “Ingrian Finnishness as a Historical Construction”, p. 107.

⁹¹ Ibid.
politics, which was more orientated towards establishing in-group/out-group classifications for Ingrians, and often presented Finnishness as antithetical to other identities (particularly Russian) and more connected to Finland as homeland.

Beyond this, the experience of Ingrian Finns living in Finland in the later period of the Right to Return is a further area in which Ingrians’ interpretations of the Finnish political discourse on their connection to Finnishness can be studied. Here, the rejection of both purely Russian or Finnish identity constructions by Ingrian Finns is a recurrent aspect to the study of how they discursively present their own identity and relationship to Finnishness. This includes the construction of a third or middle identity between Finnish and Russian, which may be presented as specifically Ingrian. For Ingrian return migrants in Finland, Ekaterina Protassova finds evidence that “Ingrian” as a term for defining identity may have the strategic function of differentiating oneself from the Finnish mainstream, as she notes an interview with an Ingrian migrant in Finland who defines herself as Finnish in Russia and Ingrian in Finland.92 Ingrians may be viewed as Finnish in Russia, but their experience of living in the USSR, Russia or Estonia has its own influence on the way they discursively construct their identity, particularly after migrating to Finland, as an environment in which they may also feel a minority. Mika Lähteenmäki and Marjatta Vanhala-Anizewski argue that the official discourse on Ingrians as Finns in the 1990s was not represented in the way Ingrians were received in Finland, where they were largely labelled as Russians on the basis of their origin in the former Soviet Union and their linguistic and cultural orientation towards Russia, particularly as they made up the largest-subgroup of migrants from Russia and Russian speakers in Finland.93 This suggests the Finnish political discourse on Ingrians experienced a change towards Ingrian exclusion after discursive constructions of Ingrian otherness had become dominant in other arenas of society. This was largely based on a discursive strategy that stressed Ingrians’ Russianness, and indeed, Lähteenmäki and Vanhala-Anizewski argue that the

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propensity for viewing Ingrians as Russians in Finland was so strong, it frequently extended to Ingrians from Estonia whose first language was Estonian.\textsuperscript{94}

Lähteenmäki and Vanhala-Anizewski draw on data from a small-group survey of 22 Russian-speaking immigrants in Finland, including Ingrian Finns, and find that most respondents give a multi-faceted impression of their identity, informed by a variety of definitions of homeland, native language and other core identity markers.\textsuperscript{95} One respondent, when asked whether Finland was his/her native country, replied “I mainly consider myself as a Finn. In Estonia I feel I’m Estonian, while in Russia I feel I’m Russian. It really depends on the situation. However, in the end my home country is Estonia”.\textsuperscript{96} This is reminiscent of aspects of the identity construction in the extract from Kyntäjä cited previously, and gives further indication of complex identity formations, which are based on situational and impermanent factors and show the malleability of identity in this community. These situational factors may include representations of Ingrians as foreigners in Finland based on their connections to Estonia and Russia. To this end, native language plays a significant role, as some respondents did not necessarily identify their first language as their native language, instead citing their best or most fluent language as their “mother tongue”.\textsuperscript{97} This definition may be influenced by further results Lähteenmäki and Vanhala-Anizewski find on Russian-speaking immigrants’ experiences speaking Russian in public in Finland, which the majority of respondents found had an distancing effect from Finnish bystanders, who were perceived to link the Russian language to negative constructions of Russians as the “Other” in Finland.\textsuperscript{98} One respondent notes, “I do not want to speak Russian in public on all occasions, because Russians have a certain reputation and I do not want to be identified with them”.\textsuperscript{99} Negative constructions of Russians and Russia in Finland, which was a significant aspect of the Finnish political discourse on Ingrian return migrations, thus also have an influence on hybrid identity construction amongst Russian-speaking immigrants like Ingrians in Finland.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid. pp. 126-9.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid. p. 127.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid. 128.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid. pp. 132-7.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid. p. 136
A further interesting example of how Ingrians’ negotiated negative perceptions of themselves as Russians in late 1990s and 2000s Finland is given by an early 2000s interview by Ekaterina Protassova with Anna P., who was born in Karelia to a Finnish-speaking family of Ingrian and Karelian origin.\(^\text{100}\) Anna P. states:

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\text{I don’t feel any ethnic belonging at all. With Russians, I feel myself non-Russian, with Finns, I am not a Finn. I feel myself a European, because my mother tongue is Russian and I know Russian culture, I know French culture well, I understand the Finnish character well, and from childhood on, I was surrounded by Finnish culture...Knowing positive and negative sides of the Russian character, shortcomings and merits of the Finnish character, I am greatly satisfied that I am neither Finn nor Russian. Thanks to my Karelian mother (and we lived in Karelia) I was always self-reliant (in contrast to my Ingrian friends) and confident in my rights. Well, additionally, in contrast to many others who lived in Russia, we had nothing to hide.}\(^\text{101}\)
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Two interesting strains emerge from this extract. The first is the positive discursive representation of Europe as a supranational identity, particularly as in this case it allows Anna P. to identify with cultures with which she has some experience or affinity but not necessarily family connections – in this case, French. The second is the negative discursive representation of both Russian and Finnish as identities. The final part of the extract gives some indication that Anna P. experienced Finnishness as a negative identity in the Soviet Union, and was grateful that the Karelian side of her family background allowed her to minimise her connections to Finnishness in the post-war USSR. The notion that communities in this region would wish to avoid identity constructions that could be readily linked to histories of conflict and discrimination, has made an alternative European identity constructions appear more attractive here. This approach to identity is not readily engaged with by my Finnish politicians, were the dominant construction of European identity in particular is employed as an aspect of, rather than alternative to, Finnish identity, mostly to separate Finnishness from Russianness as indicative of the Eastern “Other”. Characterising Ingrian return migrants as Russian over Finnish, which was frequently the case in the post-1996 political discussion in Finland, does not substantially correlate with this rejection of both these categorisations as reflective of Ingrian identity, nor discursive constructions of Russianness that do not see it as antithetical to Europeanness. Europeanness is used quite differently as a discursive resource in this excerpt than in the Finnish political discussions.


\(^{101}\) Ibid. pp. 167-8
Olga Davydova and Kaija Heikkinen have also studied Ingrian views on their connection to Finnishness in the late 1990s and 2000s, as the Right to Return law changed. They cite an interesting quote from a Finnish consul in Russia, last name Pietiläinen, in 1999 to describe the change in official perceptions of Ingrians in Finland after Ingrian return migrants began arriving in Finland:

I expected to find energetic Finnish-speaking Finns, but to my surprise these are mostly people who are encultured into Russian culture. Only something like 10 percent are something like Ingrian grandmas...The others are Russians in practise, but officially they have the status of a person of Finnish origin.102

This quote illustrates well the changing discursive representation of Ingrians’ connection to Finnishness in the later 1990s and 2000s from Finnish politicians and officials, in which the ancestry that had previously linked Ingrians to Finland was downplayed, and language and cultural orientation discursive arguments that had previously been employed to justify the Right to Return policy were now reversed to construct Ingrians as Russians, and thus outside the community of Finnishness. In 2000, at a similar time to these changes to Finnish political discussions on the Ingrian Return law, Davydova and Heikkinen conducted interviews with 45 people in Petrozavodsk undertaking the preparatory course for return migration as Ingrians to Finland.103 They describe two kinds of discursive strategies as dominating the language in these interviews – “orientation speech” which seeks to create links to Finland, and “experiential speech” which expresses differences between Ingrians and Finns of Finland based on personal experiences.104 In orientation speech, family connections and ancestry are a particularly important discursive resource for creating links to Finland, as evidenced by one excerpt from a 60-year old man, who describes his attraction to Finland as “through blood. And a desire to find my father’s relatives. I have cousins there. A wish to meet them and deal with them”.105 A 40-year old man describes his ethnic identity as a mix of “pure Finn” on his mother’s side and Vologdan on his father’s, which Davydova and Heikkinen see as a strategy for

103 Ibid. p. 180.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid. p. 182.
solving the problem of mixed ancestry by stressing the “purity” of the mixed lines and ranking one higher, depending on the situation.\textsuperscript{106} For those who speak Finnish (and Davydova and Heikkinen note the interviews were conducted in Russian, the group’s best language)\textsuperscript{107} the Finnish language can also serve as a discursive resource in orientation speech to create links with Finland, and one 50-year old woman argues that speaking fluent Finnish in the Oulu dialect with her mother at the Finnish consulate-general in St Petersburg was critical to proving her Finnishness to the Finnish authorities and succeeding in her application for return migration.\textsuperscript{108} Experiential speech as a means of underscoring differences between Ingrians and Finns of Finland make interesting use of the discursive resource of religious experience to note Ingrian otherness in this group, as one 50-year old woman notes she feels closer to Orthodoxy “because I live in Russia”, and another similarly-aged woman notes she celebrates both Finnish and Russian religious holidays.\textsuperscript{109} Links to Russian Orthodoxy and Russian Orthodox celebrations are informed by Ingrians’ experiences living amongst a Russian Orthodox majority, and are here employed to suggest a point of otherness between Ingrians and Finns of Finland that is effectively seen as inconsequential to their return migration. Davydova and Heikkinen cite these attitudes as indicating that “[i]n the context of remigration, it appears as if matters of inherited tradition are perceived as less important and more flexible than inherited origins”.\textsuperscript{110} The absence of consequential discussion on Ingrians’ faith amongst the Finnish politicians at this time also indicates this discursive element was relatively unimportant in proving or disproving Finnishness in the later period of the Right to Return policy. The orientation speech/experiential speech model presented here is one particular way of presenting the more complex attitude towards Ingrian identity and relation to Finnishness, in which points of commonality are employed at the same time as points of otherness are noted. Ingrians’ connection to Finnishness and Russianness appear to feature simultaneously in their discussions of self-identity in this particular study. Again, this departs from Finnish political discussions at the time that tended to view Finnishness and Russianness as mutually exclusive and opposing identity constructs.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid. p. 183.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid. p. 180.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid. p. 181.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid. p. 187.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
Sirkku Varjonen, Linda Arnold and Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti have also investigated the self-perception of Ingrian return migrants before and after migrating to Finland, as to how they identify with the concept of Finnish identity particularly at the end of the policy in the late 2000s.111 Their study uses focus group data to contrast Ingrian self-perceptions and definitions of Finnishness before and after migration, finding that Ingrians generally self-identified as Finns while still living in Russia, but developed more complex, multifaceted self-labels after arrival in Finland, placing themselves in a longitudinal schemata of Finnish-to-Russian identity dependent on the surrounding dominant culture.112 Finnish identity in Russia is particularly based on the discursive resource of negative perceptions of Russia and Russians, with Ingrians in Russia self-identifying as Finns because Russianness carries the negative connotation of, amongst other things, deceitfulness and irritability.113 They also simultaneously recast Russian negative portrayals of Finns as slow-witted as instead positive traits like propensity to be thorough, calm and with a strong work ethic.114 Unlike in the Finnish political context, this discursive argument makes use of personal characteristics of Russians, informed by living amongst a Russian majority, and not historical events like the Second World War to create a negative impression of Russianness and positive identification with Finnishness. However, negative constructions of Russianness exist in both discussions.

By contrast, when the same group was re-interviewed after migration to Finland, the conversation is dominated by their sense of otherness from Finnish mainstream culture. One respondent identifies with a Filipino woman in her Finnish language course, who she believes has been excluded from Finnishness based on racial constructions, and will thus never be accepted as Finnish because of her appearance.115 She sees her own experience in this kind of essentialising discrimination, claiming “when I heard that, I understood that she’s right. I’ll never be Finnish here, I’ll always be Russian here. Although I know where my roots are, that

113 Ibid. 115-6.
115 Ibid. p. 121-2, 123.
I’m Ingrian. And that’s the truth”.\textsuperscript{116} This shows some particular effects of Finnish discursive representations of Ingrians as connected to Russianess as a negative identity, in that it promotes a reconsideration of self-identity as more distant from Finnishness, though still not Russian. The authors note that other respondents also employ the term Ingrian to describe themselves after migrating to Finland, including those who before migration had employed different self-labels like Finnish.\textsuperscript{117} The authors categorise the language from their data group as belonging to “repertoires” of biology (stressing ancestry and inherited trains of Finnishness), socialization (stressing learned behaviour from one’s social and cultural context), and intergroup relations (stressing perception of one’s group from the broader social milieu).\textsuperscript{118} Discursive resources of language and religion often belong in the repertoire of socialization, informed by connection to Russianness, whilst negative attitudes towards Russia and Russians and the discursive “othering” of Russianness in Finland belongs in ingroup relations, effectively replacing negative attitudes towards Finland and Finnishness in Russia as a discursive resource for identity construction as a vulnerable minority in the post-migration context.\textsuperscript{119} These experiences also show the how Finnish discursive representations of Ingrian identity are interpreted and negotiated by Ingrians, this time inside Finland. One potential discursive strategy for avoiding the negative perception as Russian in Finland, whilst acknowledging a divide between themselves and Finnishness, is to self-identify more as “Ingrian”.

Related research by Tuuli-Anna Mähönen and Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti investigates self-perception of Ingrians as Finns also argues that Ingrians’ views of their own Finnishness are dependent on their experiences and anticipated experiences of discrimination from mainstream society in Finland.\textsuperscript{120} This is informed by negative discursive representations of Russians and Russianness. The study employs data from interviews of Ingrians participating in Finnish-language courses for return migrants in Russia in 2008, and follow-up interviews with the same return migrants after

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Ibid. pp. 121-2
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Ibid. p. 122.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Ibid. pp. 126-8.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Ibid pp. 127-8.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} Tuuli-Anna Mähönen and Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti, “Anticipated and Perceived Intergroup Relations as Predictors of Immigrants’ Identification Patterns: A Follow-up Study”, \textit{European Psychologist}, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2012, 120-30.
\end{itemize}
migration to Finland in 2009-2010.\textsuperscript{121} Again, particularly in the post-migration stage, the authors find that Ingrian discursive representations of their identity noted their perceived ethnic discrimination as a negative result of national identification, and their perceived low status in Finland as connected to their Russian minority identification.\textsuperscript{122} This provides some further indication of the appeal of a third identity category, as Ingrian rather than specifically Russian or Finnish, also indicated in the study by Värynen, Arnold and Jasinskaia-Lahti. The authors also find that anticipation of discrimination in the pre-migration stage is influenced by perceptions of their identity groups’ permeability, i.e. that they are considered as Finns in Russia and Russians in Finland.\textsuperscript{123} Again, this indicates an impact of negative discourses on Russianess in Finland on how Ingrians discursively represent their identity.

Much of these same attitudes towards identity are reflected in research undertaken by Pirjo Takalo on Ingrian return migration for the Health and Social Services Ministry in 1994, which found that Ingrians often take a “multi-faceted” approach to integration that included identification with Russian or Estonian groups, as well as Finnish, in Finland.\textsuperscript{124} Takalo’s report has greatest potential for influencing Finnish politicians’ attitudes towards Ingrians’ identity and conformity to their construction of Finnishness, as it was directly commissioned by the Finnish government’s ministry. Thus, when analysing Finnish politicians’ identity constructions in relation to Ingrians, there is some potential for intersubjectivity between Ingrian perceptions of their identity upwards to Finnish politicians considering the future of the Right to Return law. However, constructions of more complex notion of Finnishness, Ingrianness and third-culture identity are largely not apparent in the political discussion on Ingrians. As such, without a strong and unifying self-perception as connected to Finland amongst the Ingrians themselves, Finnish political representations of bringing Ingrians to Finland after 1990 suggests that Ingrians’ connection to the rather rigidly constructed notion of Finnishness was taken without account for the discrepancies in identity that could emerge from nearly 300 years of

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. pp. 123-4.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. p. 127.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
political separation between Ingrians and Finland, and which were found to influence Ingrian attitudes towards identity particularly after migrating to Finland.

C) Conclusions

Ingrian descriptions and discussions of their identity and connection to Finland and Finnishness differ substantially from how this connection was discursively constructed by Finnish politicians. The role of Lutheranism in the discursive construction of this connection appears to have played a much more significant role to Ingrians than it did in Finnish politics, as evidenced by both the discourse provided by the Uutisia Inkeristä editorials and studies of Ingrian communities in Russia. Language was also used as a discursive resource somewhat differently by Ingrians to construct this connection, as Ingrians do not appear to have held their sometimes limited Finnish language skills as decisive in how much the Finnish language could be viewed as a constitutive element of their identity. Ingrians, particularly those who migrated to Finland at this time, also discursively construct their relationship to Russianness in different ways to how the Russianness of Ingrians was represented by Finnish politicians, as they do not always view connections to Russianness as undermining connections to Finnishness. Thus, though many of the same discursive resources are engaged with by the Ingrian sources investigated here, these discursive resources are employed in ways that do not substantially correlate with their use in Finnish political discourse. Finnishness is discursively constructed in many respects as a different concept for Ingrians than for Finnish politicians in 1990-2010.

This chapter has also investigated the interpretations of Finnish political constructions of Ingrian connection to Finnishness to how Ingrians discursively construct this relationship themselves. The analysis of Wladimir Kokko’s views of Ingrian connection to Finnishness in the 2010 editorials of Uutisia Inkeristä shows one particular effect – that the Finnish closure of the Return queue, confirming the effective exclusion of Ingrians from Finnishness, spurred him to increasingly assert the Finnishness of Ingrians, including by engaging in essentialist identity constructions that placed other migrants (Filipinos and Bulgarians) behind Ingrians as appropriate or desirable for Finland. Kokko also moved away from many discursive arguments he had previously made, including a rejection of the term “return” to
describe the Ingrian migration to Finland in 1990-2010, in favour of describing a “return” of Ingrians from Siberia to Ingria after the Stalinist period.

Scholarly investigations of Ingrian identity employing interview and survey data from the Ingrian community also shows a complex relationship to Finnishness, and interesting effects of Finnish characterisations of Ingrians as not belonging in Finnishness at the end of the policy on their own constructions of identity. Ingrians’ discourses on their identity have responded to their negative categorisation as Russian, for example, by stressing Ingrianness as a third, middle option between Finnishness and Russianness as identity categorisations. At other times, Ingrians engage with elements of both Finnishness and Russianness, arguing that elements of their Finnishness, particularly ancestry, mark them as Finnish in Russia, while their reliance on the Russian language marks them as Russian in Finland. In Finland, they seek to underplay the Russian aspects of their identity by avoiding public use of the Russian language. Attitudes towards Russianness can be complex, influenced both to some extent by the negative construction of Russia and Russians used by Finnish politicians in their discussion of Finnishness, and by other experiences of living amongst a Russian majority. To some extent, this may be influenced by generational differences, as the negative perception of Russians from the Second World War and Stalinist period wanes over time from the generation most directly effected by it to the younger generations for whom it carries less personal connotations. In any case, Ingrian discussions of identity provided by Finnish scholars have negotiated their perception as Russian in late 1990s and 2000s Finland by blurring the distinction between constructions of Finnishness and Russianness.

Therefore, whilst there were significant points of departure from how Ingrians and Finnish politicians discursively represent and/or challenge a connection between Ingrians and Finnishness, Finnish politicians’ exclusion of Ingrians in the later period of the Return policy, particularly the cancelation in 2010, does appear to precipitate some renegotiations of identity discourse from Ingrians themselves.
CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In 2000, Diego Marani, a translator and policy officer in the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Interpretation, released a novel (translated from Italian to English in 2011) entitled *New Finnish Grammar*. This novel tells the story of an unknown, mostly mute and amnesiac soldier, pulled unconscious from the Adriatic Sea during the Second World War, who is believed to be Finnish on the basis of a name sewn into his jacket. He is taken to Helsinki and taught the Finnish language, in the belief that he will recover his Finnish identity.¹ His teacher tells him

> If you were once Finnish, at some point you will find all this within you, because all this is not stored in your memory, it cannot be mislaid. It is in your blood, your guts. We are what remains of something extremely ancient, something that is bigger than ourselves and is not of this world.²

In this novel, Finnish language becomes the particular vessel of a primordialist understanding of Finnish identity, accompanying and expressing an ancestral link to ancient times. The teacher goes on to tell his student “when you can read the *Kalevala* you will be a real Finn; when you can feel the rhythm of its songs your hair will stand on end and you will truly be one of us!”³ However, in the denouement of the novel, the unknown soldier feels incapable of reconnecting to his lost identity and meets a tragic end, only for it to be posthumously revealed that he was in fact an Italian soldier on mission disguised as a German.⁴ This leaves the narrator to muse “we come into this world in one place only, and only there do we belong”.⁵ This novel, written by a professional linguist with responsibilities for language policy in Europe, addresses several aspects of the conceptions of Finnish identity explored in this thesis, including the role of language in the definition of the national community and the notion of both national identity and language itself as inherited genetically, fused with *jus sanguinis* conceptions of Finnishness. Though the characters in Marani’s work see Finnish identity as immutable and inherited, as explored in this thesis, national

² Ibid. p. 54.
³ Ibid. p. 70.
⁵ Ibid. p. 186.
policymakers in Finland have found Finnishness a more complex concept to construct.

There is a divide between how the Finnish national community is legally defined through citizenship, and how Finnish national identity is discursively constructed in political discussions. This thesis has argued that political discussions on the Ingrian Finnish Return law in Finland defined Finnish national identity based on discursive resources of language, religion, ancestry, and historically informed notions of Western and Eastern Europe. However, these discursive resources were not always of equal importance in creating an ideology of Finnish identity. The particular context of Ingrian Finns’ return migration has prompted some focus on certain discursive resources over others. In general, an analysis of these discursive resources over the complete history of the Ingrian Finnish Return law between 1990 and 2010, as the policy was reformed and ultimately cancelled, shows that in particular, language and notions of belonging to the West and being separate from the East retain strong saliency in Finnish politicians’ construction of Finnishness across this period. As Ingrians were found not to conform to the identity norms promoted by the Return policy as much as previously imagined (as evidenced by two rounds of amendments to the policy introduced in 1996 and 2002-2003), Finnish politicians did not abandon these discursive resources of Finnish identity. Rather, some of the same discursive resources employed to justify the Ingrian Return law in 1990 were later employed to argue for an end to it in the 2000s. Thus, the idea of Finnishness promoted by Finnish policymakers is more resilient than their belief in the inclusion of Ingrian Finns in the Finnish national community.

This final chapter of the thesis provides a summary of the core results of this study and their significance for the field, as well as suggestions for future research on national identity construction that build on these results.

A) Key Concepts and Arguments

As argued in the first chapter of this thesis, in nation states the relationship between definitions of the state as a community of citizens defined by legal status, and the nation as an “imagined” community of the kind described by Benedict Anderson,
defined by notions of kinship and solidarity,⁶ can be complex and problematic. In the Finnish case, this relationship can be explored through the Ingrian Right to Return law’s provision for residency and a path to citizenship based on the target group’s perceived connection to Finnishness and the Finnish nation. In this case, the two conceptions appear linked, the one informing the other. Ingrian belonging to the imagined community of Finnishness was initially used to justify their migration to and legal inclusion in Finland.

There is a certain tension between the concepts of national identity and citizenship, which is explored in this case through discursive constructions of identity based on perceptions of ethnic and cultural links, and a construction of identity based on a citizenship community that is potentially more inclusive of cultural and ancestral diversity. As Stuart Hall argues,

We need to be able to insist that rights of citizenship and the incommensurabilities of cultural difference are respected and that the one is made a condition of the other... Since cultural diversity is, increasingly, the fate of the modern world, and ethnic absolutism a regressive feature of late-modernity, the greatest danger now arises from forms of national and cultural identity- new or old- which attempt to secure their identity by adopting closed versions of culture or community[.]⁷

Exclusionary and essentialising constructions of the imagined community risk diverging from the potential diversity of the citizenry and marginalising those who do not conform to ethno-cultural conceptions of national identity associated with their citizenship status. As noted in chapter five of this thesis, particularly with reference to figures 14 and 15 showing the increase in migration diversity to Finland, essentialist discursive constructions of Finnishness depart from alternative constructions of the Finnish national community that stress potential ethno-cultural diversity. The Ingrian example indicates Finnish policymakers still gave some credence to an ethno-cultural understanding of Finnishness, although by the end of the 2000s this was less defined by ancestry. Finnish politicians were willing to exclude those who do not conform to other significant features in their understanding of Finnishness, such as language and cultural orientation towards the “West” and away

⁶ Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 6.
from Russia. This understanding of Finnishness ultimately excluded Ingrians, whose relative inclusion had previously been taken for granted.

As the Finnish nation state took shape in the nineteenth century, the notion of Finnish identity as a community of Finnish-speakers was promoted by certain Finnish leaders, described by historian Derek Fewster.\(^8\) Although the notion that the Finnish community is in any way limited to Finnish speakers appears to overlook the status of Swedish as one of Finland’s national languages, as well as the significance of race and class discourses at this time, the Finnish language was interpreted by nineteenth-century nationalists as a symbolic identity link to early Finno-Ugric settlers in the region pre-dating Swedish rule,\(^9\) which relates to the notion explored by Anthony D. Smith of national identity constructed on a “great myth of ethnic descent”.\(^10\) Language and descent played a particular role in the development of Finnish national identity in the nineteenth century through the publication and promotion of the *Kalevala*, which Smith cites as a specific example of creating links through language between contemporary national identity and an ancient, mythic past.\(^11\) Both the Finnish language and the notion of the national community as the descendants of ancient ancestors feature prominently in the early Finnish political discussions on the Ingrian Return law. They have been cited in this thesis as two of the five relevant discursive resources for constructing Finnishness in these particular political discussions. However, by the end of the Ingrian Return policy, they differ considerably in their importance for Finnish politicians in proving Finnishness for Ingrians. By not speaking Finnish at a native level, Ingrians are now outside the dominant understanding of Finnishness amongst Finnish politicians. Their ancestral connections to ancient Finland are deemed less important, and limits are introduced to the validity of ancestral connections for obtaining Right to Return status. This suggests a re-evaluation of the Finnish national community as a community of putative descent, and a continued construction of Finnishness as informed by the Finnish language.

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\(^9\) Ibid.


As Europe responded to the collapse of the Iron Curtain as an ideological dividing line between two identity spheres, West and East, Samuel Huntington famously put forward the culturalist thesis that a new identity cleavage was emerging, informed by a cultural-religious division between Catholic/Protestant West and Orthodox/Islamic East. This new dividing line was drawn by Huntington down the Finno-Russian border, positing the two neighbours on the bulwark of their respective civilisation identities. As with the discussion on language and national identity in Finland, this construction essentialises Finnish identity to a direct correlation with Lutheranism, notably ignoring or downplaying the existence of an established and state-recognised Finnish Orthodox Church. Analysis of the identity discourses in the Ingrian Finnish Return law shows religion actually had a very limited role in defining Finnishness for Finnish politicians, and particularly in the later years of the policy, was not mentioned at all. A division between East and West is very much present in Finnish politicians’ discussion of Finnish identity and Ingrians, but this is defined by historically informed perceptions of Russia as an enemy-image in Finland. The discursive construction of national identity amongst Finnish lawmakers at this time sets Russians as fundamentally separate from Finns, particularly through discursive representations of Second World War history. Other experiences of Finnish historical memory, such as the Swedish Stormaktstid and its socio-cultural legacy, are also employed, but this is inconsistent. Finnish politicians begin to challenge Ingrians’ Finnishness especially once Ingrians are seen to be largely monolingual Russian-speakers with a perceived cultural orientation towards Russia. This pivot is most visible amongst the populist wing of Finnish politics, particularly the SMP and its former members, who greeted the Ingrians enthusiastically as Finns in the early 1990s, but later decried them in sometimes colourful language (most notably employed by Sulo Aittoniemi, cited several times in chapter five) as Russians later in the decade and into the 2000s. Even as Russia was being re-examined in the post-Cold War European security landscape, Finnish lawmakers did not completely reject their view of Russia and Russians as fundamentally opposite to the Western European and Nordic geopolitical space they saw Finland as belonging to. Ingrians could therefore be connected to Finnishness in this way only if they were not connected to Russianness. The lasting significance given to some Ingrians’ experience as veterans fighting the Soviet army in the Second

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13 Ibid.
World War, which is held as proving their Finnishness through opposition to the USSR/Russia, highlights the ongoing significance of East vs. West identity constructions in Finnish politics at this time.

However, it is also significant to note more moderate constructions of Ingrian identity presented elsewhere in the Finnish political spectrum at this time, which also rejected the notion of Ingrians as Finns based on their linguistic and cultural orientation towards Russia and the East, but attempted to form a new “third” categorisation as neither Finns nor Russians. Instead, they saw Ingrians as having a separate identity influenced by connections to both Russia and Finland. Reassessing Ingrian conformity to the discursive resources of Finnishness that specify cultural orientation towards the West, and suspicion of the East, thus does not necessitate transformations in absolute values. As described in chapter two, historical discussions of Finnish national identity in the early twentieth century have also described various sukulaiset, or perceived related Finno-Ugric peoples, including Estonians, Karelians and Maris, who have been viewed in Finland as related to, but distinct from, Finns as a nationality. Ingrians were not initially included in this concept of related sukulaiset, as they were rather portrayed as Finns at least up until the later years of the Ingrian Return law. The more moderate reassessment of Ingrian identity as connected to both Russia and Finland suggests some room for Ingrian inclusion in such an understanding of broader Finno-Ugric identities in the Finno-Russian borderlands. Thus, there may be some allowance for grey-shaded areas in the line of cultural division between East and West, Finns and Russians, amongst sections of the Finnish policymaking community.

Indeed, the analysis provided in chapter six of how Ingrians themselves constructed their identity and connection to Finnishness in 1990-2010, and how their constructions negotiated the Finnish political rejection of this connection in 2010, shows that Ingrians surveyed at this time rejected constructions of themselves as either completely Finnish or Russian, and increasingly strove to discursively represent Ingrian identity as connected to but still distinct from Finnishness. The editorials of the Ingrian newspaper Uutisia Inkeristä, another key source for analysis in this chapter, provide a different reaction, in which the connection between Ingrians and Finnishness, which before 2010 had been viewed in a somewhat critical light, was
now at the core of Ingrian identity construction. These findings suggest Ingrians view the Finnish connection as a positive identity feature, which they attempt to defend using different discursive strategies at the time when the discourse provided by Finnish politicians is undermining this connection.

B) Avenues for Further Research

As described in detail in chapter three, critical discourse analysis (CDA) scholars like Ruth Wodak and colleagues have studied national identity as it is produced through discourse.\textsuperscript{14} They argue that discourses on national identity emphasise “national uniqueness and intra-national uniformity, and largely tend to ignore intra-national differences”.\textsuperscript{15} This construction of an essentialising national identity, they argue, is produced and reproduced at four core levels: amongst political élites, by the media, in small social groups and in the quasi-private sphere.\textsuperscript{16} Analysing national identity with reference to these four levels of data production allows one “to survey the broadest possible range of identity constructs and their dialectical interrelations, as well as identify in detail the re-contextualisation of important concepts and arguments”.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, the production of national identity discourse at any level does not take place within a vacuum, and is both informed by and informs discourse production at other levels. A complete investigation of national identity construction surrounding the Ingrian case, for example, should therefore engage with all levels of data.

However, detailed analysis of such a broad variety of material, which would necessitate different methods of data collection and analysis, is an extensive undertaking that is beyond the scope of this thesis. This thesis has contributed the first level of analysis to the construction of Ingrians’ connection to Finnishness, focusing on discursive production of identity norms at the political level, with some discussion of how these identity constructions relate to Ingrians’ own construction of their connection to Finnishness. This research could be built on by comparing the findings presented to an analysis of focus group or survey data that specifically asks Ingrians about how they view their connection to Finnishness after the 2010 end of the Return

\textsuperscript{14} Wodak et al., The Discursive Construction of National Identity, p. 186.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. pp. 187-8.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. p. 187.
policy, to investigate in further detail how the identity constructions of political elites relate to those found at these other levels. The overall investigation of national identity construction should therefore be interdisciplinary, encompassing the political perspective presented here, along with media studies and disciplines that focus on individual or small-group level identity construction, such as social psychology.

Beyond this particular line of further research, the analysis provided in this thesis also offers opportunities for further study of how essentialist identity discourses are strategically employed in politics. In particular, this thesis provides an example of how constructions of an East-West divide have been employed by policymakers in their discursive production of national identity. Lines between Eastern and Western Europe continue past the divide between Finland and Russia, and through the European continent. There are multiple case-study possibilities for a comparative investigation of the strategic use and political saliency of the East vs. West theory elsewhere in Europe, including the post-Soviet transitions of the Baltic republics, the European Union expansion into the Balkans in the 2000s, or perhaps even more significantly, the 2013-2014 Ukraine Euromaidan protests against the rejection of an EU-Ukraine agreement, which were unfolding as this thesis was being completed.\(^\text{18}\) It is worth noting, for example, that journalists Michael Crowley and Simon Shuster have described the protest movement as having “explicitly rejected the political values Putin has championed in favour of a West European democratic model”.\(^\text{19}\) The president of the National Endowment for Democracy Carl Gershman, for instance, strategically employs the East/West discourse to criticise Russian influence in Ukraine for a *The Washington Post* editorial, arguing that “Ukraine’s choice to join Europe will accelerate the demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism that Putin represents”.\(^\text{20}\) Other commentators, such as the Ukrainian author Andrey Kurkov, have conversely rejected the discourse on a West and East division in values with


respect to this conflict, arguing that differences between East-West are not cultural, but rather informed by regional economic and industrial disparities between the West and the East, which has made the East more accessible to Kremlin-endorsed oligarchs.\textsuperscript{21} Finnish policymakers’ strategic use of the divide between East and West could therefore become the first part of a broader study of this identity discourse has been engaged with and strategically employed in the countries along a perceived East/West dividing line.

C) \textbf{Final Remarks}

As has become evident in the discussion of Ingrians and the Ingrian Return law in the 1990s and 2000s, Finnish policymakers have endorsed the primordialist significance of the Finnish language in the construction of Finnish identity, but largely no longer endorse, as Marani’s characters do, the idea that national identity can be transmitted through several generations and centuries of living outside the national community. Ingrians are only deemed part of the Finnish national community when they are believed to speak Finnish, though their status as descendants of Finnish émigrés is unchanged. Moreover, notions of Finnish identity based on cultural inheritance from Sweden and Western Europe and a history of struggles against its eastern neighbour also informed the political discussion on Ingrians, as Ingrian language capabilities were reassessed. Nineteenth-century Fennoman politicians argued that Finnish identity exists as a national community of Finnish speakers.\textsuperscript{22} Their argument still finds a degree of echo amongst Finnish lawmakers at the turn of the millennium.

\textsuperscript{22} Fewster, \textit{Visions of Past Glory}, p. 403-4.
# APPENDIX I

## LIST OF MENTIONED FINNISH POLITICAL PARTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finnish Party Name</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Alkiolaisen keskustaryhmän</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alkionian Centre Group (author’s own translation)</td>
<td>Founded by former SMP and Centre Party member Sulo Aitoniemi, existed from 1999-2003. Named for early twentieth-century Centre Party leader Santeri Alkio and his political ideology “alkiolaisuus”.</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Kansallinen Kokoomus</em></td>
<td>Kok.</td>
<td>National Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Perussuomalaiset</em></td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>The True Finns</td>
<td>Since August 2011, <em>Perussuomalaiset</em> have adopted the official English-language name “The Finns Party”. However, as this name-change takes place outside the main period of study in this thesis, and the previous name continues to dominate in many English-language sources, it is also employed in this thesis.</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Suomen Keskusta</em></td>
<td>Kesk.</td>
<td>Centre Party of Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party Name</td>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit</em></td>
<td>KD</td>
<td>Christian Democrats of Finland</td>
<td>Prior to 2001, the party’s Finnish name was <em>Suomen Kristillinen Liitto</em> (SKL).</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Suomen Maaseuden Puolue</em></td>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>Finnish Rural Party</td>
<td>Defunct since 1995. The SMP’s final party secretary (Timo Soini) and chairman (Raimo Vistbacka) founded The True Finns in the same year.</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue</em></td>
<td>RKP</td>
<td>Swedish People’s Party of Finland</td>
<td>Frequently also referred to by its official Swedish name, <em>Svenska folkpartiet i Finland</em>.</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue</em></td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Vasemmistoliitto</em></td>
<td>Vas.</td>
<td>Left Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Vihreää liitto</em></td>
<td>Vihr.</td>
<td>The Greens of Finland (official English name)</td>
<td>Also referred to in some English-language sources as The Greens League, a literal translation of its Finnish name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Ingrian Finnish Return Policy</td>
<td>Finnish Government</td>
<td>Finnish Presidency</td>
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| 1990 | In January, Mauno Koivisto instructs the Finnish Immigration Service to begin processing residency permits for Ingrians as return migrants.  
In April, the Ingrian Return policy enters public discussion following a TV interview with President Koivisto. | Holkeri Government (Kok.). Coalition partners SDP, RKP and SMP. | Mauno Koivisto (SDP) |
<p>| 1991 | The 1991 Aliens Act is passed, including provisions for return migrants. | From April - Aho Government (Kesk.). Coalition partners Kok. RKP, SKL | |
| 1992 | | From March - Martti Ahtisaari (SDP) | |
| 1993 | | | |
| 1994 | | | |
| 1995 | | | |
| 1996 | Amendments to the Right to Return Policy are introduced – applicants must now demonstrate knowledge of Finnish or Swedish language before migrating. | From April - First Lipponen Government (SDP). Coalition partners Kok., Vas., Vihr., RKP. | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Coalition Partners</th>
<th>Other Information</th>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Further amendments are introduced to the Ingrian Return Policy, requiring applicants to prove a Finnish connection through at least one grandparent.</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>The 2002 amendments come into force.</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>A new Aliens Act is passed, retaining the current Return policy provisions.</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>The migration queue for Ingrian returnees is closed.</td>
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APPENDIX III
THE VOLGA GERMANS

In this annex, a brief history and analysis of the Volga Germans is provided for context and comparison to the Ingrian Finns. The Volga Germans (Wolgadeutsche) were the focus of a larger-scale Right to Return migration policy to Germany, which has been studied in greater detail, particularly in the comparison to Germany’s other, non-returnee migrant communities. As this thesis has investigated the intersecting relationship between the concepts of ethnicity, national identity and citizenship within a case study of a particular Right to Return policy, using Finland and the Ingrian Return law, a brief comparison with another significant Return policy in Europe may provide some significant further insights into the relationship between this genre of migration policy and the increasing diversity of migrant communities in Europe.

Right to return policies, which grant immigration and citizenship preferences to those who are (or are descended from) the ethnic kin of receiving states, are fairly ubiquitous in Europe. In the 1990s in particular, the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe spawned right to return policies that varied from permanent citizenship law provisions to resettlement programs of limited duration, which were implemented in the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Norway,1 Poland, Serbia and Hungary. The Estonian Right to Return law, for example, grants citizenship to those forced out of Estonia as political refugees by the Soviet Union and their descendants,2 while the German Right

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1 Norway has a Right to Return policy for Kola Norwegians, descendants of late nineteenth and early twentieth century settlers of the Kola Peninsula in far northwest Russia. Applicants must normally prove at least two grandparents were Norwegian citizens to gain residency. The required ancestral connection is therefore expected to be considerably shorter than in the Ingrian Finnish example. See Norwegian Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, “A-8/2006 Ikrafttredelse av lov 10.06.2005 nr. 51 om statsborgerskap og statsborgerforskriften, samt av endringer I rettshjelpesloven og utlendingsforskriften”, 11 August 2006, available online at URL: <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/bld/documents/rundskriv/2006/a-82006-ikrafttredelse-av-lov-10062005-n.html?id=272460>, accessed 26 April 2014. In addition to their more recent ancestral connections, Kola Norwegians are distinguished from Ingrians by their smaller number: about 200 were living in Norway by 2004. See Jan Gunnar Furuly, “Kolanordmenn lever på sosialen”, Afterposten, 11 June 2004, available online at URL: <http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article807148.ece#.U1vmyq2SyW6>, accessed 26 April 2014.

to Return is introduced in Article 116 of the German Constitution (*Grundgesetz*), and grants citizenship to those forced out by Nazism or any previous political persecution. These laws and programs specifically mention, or target, groups that fall into two broad categories:

- Those that faced expulsion and forced exile in the twentieth century, such as nationalists from Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia who fled the Soviet Union, or German refugees escaping the Nazis; and
- Those that found themselves on the “wrong” side of borders drawn up after the collapse of multi-ethnic or multi-lingual states, such as the Hungarians of Slovakia or the Czechs of Volhynia in Ukraine after the breakdown of the Habsburg Empire post-First World War.

The Finnish example fails to comply fully with either of these categories. The German example in particular presents the modern Federal Republic of Germany as the successor state of the Third Reich, with a moral impetus to right the wrongs of the Nazis, and in doing so reverse the expulsion of those deprived of their citizenship between 1939 and 1945. The Baltic countries consider themselves the continuation of the pre-war independent states, interrupted but not replaced by Soviet occupation, and offer returnee citizenship to those the Soviets pushed out. But the Ingrian Finns, as the target group of the Finnish Right to Return policy, have not lived in what is now Finnish territory since the seventeenth century. Four centuries of separation have ensured there is no first-hand memory amongst Ingrians of living as citizens of Finland or its predecessor states, the Grand Duchy of Finland or the Swedish Kingdom. Moreover, the suffering of Ingrian Finns in the twentieth century came particularly under Stalin, whose government Finland cannot imagine itself to be the successor to. This would apparently negate the argument for a Right to Return law based on the state’s assumption of guilt for historic crimes (though, as described in

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chapters four and five, Finnish politicians did develop their own discussion on Finnish responsibility and atonement for Ingrian suffering).

On the second category, concerning the altering of borders, the frontier changes around Ingria occurred centuries before 1990 (the changes brought on by the Winter and Continuation Wars did not reach into Ingria).\(^6\) The decline of a recognisably multi-ethnic state that marks the aforementioned Hungarian or Czech cases does present itself in the Ingrian example (in this case, the decline of the Swedish Kingdom at the turn of the eighteenth century, followed by the collapse of the Russian Empire in the early twentieth century). However, the break-up of these states here did not alter the political separation between Finland and Ingria, as both the Swedes and Russians governed them as (or as part of) different sub-national entities (see chapter two).

The analysis presented in this thesis of the political discourse on the Ingrian Return policy, and how it presents ethnicity in relation to Finnish citizenship and national identity, reflects a conception of the nation and its citizenry as ethnically defined. This idea of the nation and citizenship is at the crux of all Right to Return policies, and is particularly evident in Finland. The term “suomalainen” (“Finnish”) presented in this discourse appears not to distinguish clearly between citizens of Finland and so-called “ethnic Finns”, and thus this terminology becomes murky and overlapping. A comparison with the German Right to Return policy, which shows key features of this genre of immigration law, but in relative contrast to Finland has not escaped previous extensive critical analysis, reflects the peculiarities of the Finnish case, and its comparatively tenuous presentation of the traditional historical atonement aspects of right to return policies.

Up until the Russian Revolution, Volga Germans were a largely self-contained community situated along the Volga River between Tsaritsyn (now Volgograd, known in the Soviet period as Stalingrad) and Samara. They were largely monolingual German-speakers with their own dialects of Hessian and Palatine

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origins, indicative of their origin in western Germany. Hesse, today a federal state in the western-central regions of Germany along the rivers Rhine and Main, was prior to the First World War itself divided between two principalities (Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Kassel), and had been the theatre of conflict in several major wars over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Major battles of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), particularly the *Hessenkrieg* (Hessian War, 1645-1648), as well as the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714) and the Seven Years War (1754-1763), were all fought in the region, in part due to its strategic position between France, Prussia and Austria. This resulted in violence and severe burdens of taxation and conscription (Hesse-Kassel was also notorious for conscripting men and renting them to other nations as mercenaries). The ghost of one such mercenary, sent to Revolutionary America, appears in fiction as the famed headless horseman of Washington Irving’s 1790 story *The Legend of Sleepy Hollow*.

On 22 July, Catherine issued her Manifesto of 1763, inviting all foreigners of Christian faith to settle in the southern Volga region. At the same time, Catherine established the Chancellery for the Guardianship of Foreigners, which the Volga Germans called the *Tutel Kanzlei* (Tutelary Chancellery), to administer the resettlement, and actively recruit settlers from the most deprived areas of Hesse-Kassel and Hesse-Darmstadt. There, field agents from the Tutelary Chancellery came to be known as *Menschenfänger* (people catchers) or *Seelenverkäufer* (soul sellers). Within three years, approximately 30,000 Germans had emigrated to the lower Volga lands, establishing the German-speaking population of the region before

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8 Ibid. p. 5.
9 Ibid.
11 Koch, *The Volga Germans*, pp. 4-6.
12 Ibid. p. 12.
13 Ibid. pp. 6-7.
14 Ibid. p. 7.
the German kings, alarmed at the depopulation of their own lands, forbade participation of their citizens in the Russian colonisation program.\textsuperscript{15}

Though Catherine had welcomed the German settlers, shifting moods in Russia towards Germans and Germany affected the Volga Germans’ peace and position in Russia across later generations of the Russian Monarchy. Catherine’s great-great-grandson Alexander III (reigned 1881-1894) pursued an ethnically exclusivist “Russia for Russians” vision that specifically targeted the German-speaking communities, and was here supported by his Danish-born wife Maria Fedorovna, who was severely critical of Germans following the Prussian invasion of her homeland in the Schleswig-Holstein War of 1864.\textsuperscript{16} Russification under Alexander III included a loss of many of the autonomy privileges for Germans established by Catherine’s Manifesto, particularly exemption from military conscription, and precipitated an exodus of Volga Germans to the New World in the later years of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{17} However, by 1913 there remained approximately 1.5 million German-speaking residents in Russia, and 192 German-dominant towns in the lower Volga region.\textsuperscript{18} The following year, with the outbreak of the First World War, these populations immediately became a national security threat in the eyes of the Slavophile factions in the Russian government.\textsuperscript{19} As described by Koch, “[i]t was incomprehensible to many Russians that these Volga Germans, as a national minority, could be loyal to the Russian crown and at the same time hold to their language, their religion, and most of their ethnic culture”.\textsuperscript{20} The enclosed and Germanic identity of the communities came largely through education in the German language basic schools (the \textit{Volkschüle}) and membership of evangelical Lutheran or Catholic churches, which came to an end with the implementation of a law banning instruction in German in 1914 (the law was repealed by the Communists four years later, but had already closed most of the \textit{Volkschüle} in region), and the Communist banning of religious education in 1918.\textsuperscript{21} This new law thus capped off several decades of suspicion and attack on the perceived “Germanness” of the lower Volga settlers.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. p. 8.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. p. 197.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. pp. 202-3.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. p. 155.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. pp. 155-6.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. pp. 240-1.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. p. 156.
Though the early years of the Soviet Union curtailed the religious freedoms of the Volga German settlers, their language and ethnic identity was initially less of an issue than it had been during the First World War, at least formally. In 1924, shortly before Lenin’s death, the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established, promising a degree of autonomy for the German-speaking population, though in practice it delivered a rather tyrannical government under Russian communist “advisors”.22 When the Germans again invaded in 1941, the USSR’s German population faced its greatest threat. Hitler’s forces reached the Volga German homeland in southern Russia quickly, and Stalin’s reaction, described by Koch as “restrictive and punitive”, swiftly put an end to any idea of Volga German autonomy.23 A decree dated 28 August 1941 from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dictated the expulsion of Volga Germans from their homeland to territories around the Urals and northern Kazakhstan, announcing:

According to reliable reports by military authorities, there are in the Volga province among its German population thousands and ten thousands of diversionists and spies who, upon a signal from Germany, are to commit acts of sabotage in the areas occupied by the Volga Germans. None of the Germans living in the Volga district has informed the Soviet authorities of such a large number of diversionists and spies among the Volga Germans, consequently, the German population on the Volga is concealing in its midst existing enemies of the Soviet people and the Soviet Power…[I]n order to forestall undesirable consequences of this nature and to avoid bloodshed, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has found it necessary to resettle the entire German population of the Volga district to other areas[.]24

This decree follows similar themes of distrust and the linking of ethnic identity to state loyalty to those exemplified by the deportation of the Ingrian Finns, though at an even greater scale, as the fate of the Ingrian Finns under the Soviets echoes in many ways the treatment of the Volga Germans. Wars and perceived kin-state relationships leading to distrust leading to deportation accompanied by Russification are recurrent themes, and the Volga Germans can be seen as suffering more acutely than the Ingrians, who were in time allowed to return to their pre-War home region, likely due to the more enduring memory of Germany as the pre-eminent threat to the USSR in the Second World War. The eighteenth-century origins of the communities as part of the growing Russian Empire are a further point of commonality, stressing the later

23 Ibid. p. 283-4.
uncomfortable reactions amongst Russia’s rulers to the ethnic diversity inherited under the earlier Petrine and Catherinian expansions, though in the case of the Ingrians, this was a case of an inherited minority, rather than the actively-sought colonisers of the lower Volga lands. Ethnic diversity in Russia had become problematic by the end of the nineteenth century. The reaction to come in the Western European nations of Finland and Germany would also show patterns of preference for perceived ethnic conformity, as seen through their return immigration laws.

Figure 19

The deportations of the Volga Germans, beginning in early September 1941, were “in the most brutal form”, in involving repossession of all land and property, and execution of all resisters. Although in 1964 Khrushchev politically rehabilitated the Volga Germans and retracted the 1941’s indictment of mass treason, this retraction granted neither remuneration nor facilitation of return to the Volga region.

26 Koch, The Volga Germans, p. 286.
27 Ibid. p. 299.
settlements on the Volga were renamed, and German community buildings were left damaged and abandoned (see figure 19). Dispersed amongst the towns and villages of Siberia and Kazakhstan, the Germans settlers formerly of the Volga region continued to be Russified on the grounds of preventing nationalist unrest, by a government, as described by the former Italian ambassador to Moscow Luca Pietromarchi in his examination of Soviet political culture The Soviet World, insistent on “drown[ing] the national minorities in a sea of Russians and Ukrainians”. 28

The Volga Germans’ descendants have since resettled in the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, the former West Germany, and after 1990 the reunited Germany, hereafter referred to as Germany), through Germany’s own Right to Return immigration policy. Legal provisions for residency and citizenship differ primarily between Germany and Finland in that, up until 1999-2000, Germany defined itself more strictly as a community of jus sanguinis. The Right to Return law for Ingrian Finns may have presented advantages for those of perceived Finnish identity to settle in Finland, but Finnish law nevertheless presents relatively straightforward provisions for naturalisation of non-citizen long-term residents, and has codified practices and requirements for naturalisation clearly and concisely in the 2003 Nationality Act, which passed without controversy or real dissent. 29 In contrast, German traditions of citizenship before 2000 have generally been welcoming to the German diaspora (including Volga Germans) whilst remaining quite closed to non-German migrant communities, rejecting long-term and even German-born residents of migrant backgrounds from citizenship. 30 Many German residents from migrant backgrounds are legacies of the Gastarbeiter (guest worker) program from the 1950s and 1960s, which attracted immigration from North Africa, the Middle East and Southern Europe for temporary work in Germany. Guest workers who opted to settle in Germany permanently did not necessarily qualify for German citizenship up until the year 2000, nor did their German-born descendants. 31 Despite approximately 7

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million foreigners living permanently in the reunited Germany by the mid-1990s, Germany’s 1990 Alien Act (Auszländergesetz) stated that Germany was not a country of immigration, a notion controversially echoed by German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble in 2006 when he announced to a Congress of German Conservatives that “we have never been an immigration country and we still aren’t one today”. Schäuble is a Christian Democrat, the German party most associated with strict and conservative stances on immigration and citizenship law reform, which came to a head in 1999 when the party staunchly opposed reforms introduced by the Social Democrat-Greens coalition government under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to allow naturalised German citizens to hold dual citizenship. The German Christian Democrats thus give perhaps the clearest representation of a tradition of thought in Germany aligned more to the idea of citizenship as a national community of descent, even if it is distinct from the community actually residing in the nation state.

The relationship with this tradition of *jus sanguinis* and right to return immigration law is, unlike in Finland, enshrined in Germany’s constitutional document. Article 116 of the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) reads:

1) A German within the meaning of this Basic Law is a person who possesses German citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the boundaries of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin or as the spouse or descendant of such person.

2) Former German citizens that between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945 were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial or religious grounds, as well as their descendants, shall on application have their citizenship restored. They shall be deemed never to have been deprived of their citizenship if they have established their domicile in Germany after 8 May 1945 and have not expressed a contrary intention.

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34 Green, “Immigration, Asylum and Citizenship in Germany”, p. 97.

The references to the Second World War expulsions and refugees in both sections of Article 116 echo similar ideas of atonement for historic injustices to those seen in the Finnish example (as discussed in chapters four and five). Yet here, this atonement forms part of Germany’s constitutional identity. Marc Morjé Howard argues that the post-Second World War environment in Germany was acutely aware of the wartime and post-Second World War recriminations the descendants of German settlers in Eastern Europe (referred to in German as Aussiedler) faced, and thus “allowing them to return to Germany was considered a basic fundamental human rights issue”. In 1953, the Bundestag in Bonn passed the somewhat opaquely named Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge (Law on the Affairs of the Expellees and Refugees, most often referred to simply as the Expellee Law), Article 6 of which broadly defines the expellees and refugees named in the Grundgesetz as all those who had suffered in Eastern Europe for their perceived kin-state relationship to Germany. This would logically include the Second World War deportations of the Volga Germans.

Between 1950 and 1984, an average of 36,000 Aussiedler per year migrated to Germany. By the late 1980s, barriers to emigration in the Soviet Union had been diminished by glasnost-perestroika, simplifying Volga German emigration and resulting in a peak in 1990 of 400,000 Aussiedler arriving in Germany from the Soviet Union. Between 1987 and 1999, 2.7 million Aussiedler from the Soviet Union had resettled in Germany. As this dramatic increase began, the Federal Republic of Germany was simultaneously occupied with the costs and challenges of integrating the former East Germany into the newly reunited nation state, making the added burden of integrating large groups of new settlers politically undesirable, so the government reacted by implementing measures to control the inflow. Beginning in 1992, a limit of 220,000 Aussiedler permitted to resettle in Germany was

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39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
implemented, followed by other measures, including requiring potential return migrants to apply at foreign diplomatic missions, and pass a national language test (similar restrictions would also be introduced by Finland in its own Right to Return policy, as discussed in chapter five).\textsuperscript{42} The measures were largely effective in reducing migration numbers, bringing the year-total for \textit{Aussiedler} arrivals in Germany to under 100,000 by 2000.\textsuperscript{43} Coincidentally, the Volga German Return migration would not outlast the Ingrian Finns’ equivalent, as the German government made the decision in 2010 to end the admission of Volga Germans to Germany as returnees.\textsuperscript{44}

The notions of identity constructed in the Volga German law largely mirror those of the Ingrian Finnish example, minus the specifics of Finland’s historical relationships with Sweden and Russia. Notions which would also be discussed in the Ingrian Finnish Return law on integration capability, on the nation state’s duty to protect vulnerable kin-minorities abroad, and on the legacy of the Second World War which are investigated in chapters four and five of this thesis, also define the Volga German example. However, Germany’s large non-\textit{Aussiedler} immigrant communities provide a readily available point of comparison with the newly arrived Volga German returnees, which, as will be further argued here, diminished the significance of ancestral connection in defining national identity more readily than could happen in Finland, with its significantly smaller immigrant communities. Though Finland has until relatively recently seen comparatively moderate levels of immigration, and thus has lacked minority communities with which to compare its returnee settlers, Germany may stand as a potential vision of things to come for Finland as immigration increases and diversifies there.

The ideas of German national identity prompted in the political discussion on Volga Germans in Germany are perhaps best summarised in the 1953 Expellee Law itself, which states:

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid. pp. 122-3.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid. p. 123.
Ethnic Germans in the context of this law are those who are regarded as belonging to the German ethnicity in their homeland, if this identification can be confirmed by certain characteristics like ancestry, language, upbringing or culture.  

Ancestral connection to Germany, the German language, German values and German cultural inheritance are thus presented as the elements of German identity espoused here, creating an apparent link between Germany as a community of ethnic Germans and the Aussiedler as ethnic Germans outside the core community. The history of the Aussiedler migration program shows an evolution in how the first characteristic, ancestral connection, relates to the others. Under a *jus sanguinis* citizenship model, ancestry is the omnibus identity construction that defines all others – the German language, German upbringing and German culture are thus the product of ethnic German descent, rather than of the experience of living in the German national environment, and becoming fluent in German and acquainted with German values and culture in this way.

The idea of integration capability for Volga Germans is particularly pertinent as it relates to the significance of German language as a characteristic of German identity. Specifically, the experience of Volga Germans with limited German language abilities as compared to other second and third generation migrant communities speaking fluent German transformed the perception of German language from an ancestrally inherited capability to a product of environment. To this end, Morjé Howard argues that the contrast between the experiences of monolingual Russian-speaking Aussiedler in Germany, granted automatic citizenship, against the position of German-born Turks who spoke fluent German but as descendants of non-citizen Gastarbeiter did not qualify for citizenship, was fundamental to undermining the *jus sanguinis* model in the 1990s.  

Perhaps the first notable expression of this was in 1989, after several German municipalities began to extend voting rights to non-citizens. The German Federal Constitutional Court issued a ruling that local voting by foreigners was unconstitutional, but included in its statement a recommendation that foreigners living

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47 Ibid. p. 126.
permanently in Germany should be granted citizenship to allow for their political participation.\textsuperscript{48} Here was one of Germany’s most elite, influential and respected political institutions arguing for citizenship law reform.\textsuperscript{49}

This precipitated a major reform to German immigration and citizenship law in 1999-2000, when the Social Democrat-Greens coalition government introduced new legislation to move Germany towards a \textit{jus soli} model of nationality. The reform established a right to German citizenship after a residence of 8 years, provided certain criteria had been met, including knowledge of German language, though this test was administered by state rather than federal government, and was known to be more challenging in conservative German states like Bavaria than in the more liberal city-state of Berlin.\textsuperscript{50} As much as German language abilities are held as indicative of German identity, there is a tacit notion within the 2000 law that German-speaking, German born descendants of Turkish \textit{Gastarbeiter} are more readily integrated in Germany than Russian-speaking, Russian born descendants of German \textit{Aussiedler}.

However, German citizenship law could not be completely liberalised; the German Christian Democrats balked at the proposal to allow dual nationality, and spearheaded a petition against the measure in early 1999 that had received 5 million signatures by May of that year.\textsuperscript{51} Eventually, a compromise was reached – dual nationality was possible up until age 23, at which point the second nationality must be renounced, or German citizenship would automatically be lost.\textsuperscript{52} The new law, passed in May 1999 and entering into effect in 2000, is described by Morjé Howard as “a remarkable change after decades of exclusive reliance on \textit{jus sanguinis}”.\textsuperscript{53} However, Morjé Howard goes on to note that “the prohibition of dual citizenship makes the liberalisation only partial, and it remains to be seen whether Germany will truly open up its conception of who can be German”.\textsuperscript{54} Likewise, Simon Green argues that Germany’s policy after 2000 still retains “more than a whiff of ethnocultural

\begin{footnotes}
\item[48] Ibid. pp. 126-7.
\item[49] Ibid. p. 127.
\item[51] Green, “Immigration, Asylum and Citizenship in Germany”, p. 97.
\item[52] Green, “Beyond Multiculturalism?”, p. 116.
\item[54] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
exclusivity”. Yet despite its limitations, the beginnings of a transition from *jus sanguinis* to elements of *jus soli* does indicate a reassessment of German identity that limits the relative significance of ancestral connections, in favour of being raised in Germany, as a better indicator of German language capabilities, and by extension, integration capability into the German national community.

The discussion of atonement for historic oppression is rich in the discussion on Volga German return migration, as it will be for the Ingrian Finnish example (see chapters four and five). Atonement for Nazi crimes has been at the crux of post-War German national identity for some time, and in a sense can be seen to inform the notion of the “upbringing” component of German identity presented in the 1953 Expellee Law. German upbringing as understood here is the imparting of national values from generation to generation, and the discourse on historical atonement presents repudiation of the Nazi past and dedication to contrition for the diverse array of Second World War victims as a core national value, enshrined in national law and expected to be imparted to the next generations of German citizens. Teaching of Second World War history has proven contentious in Germany, perhaps most famously in the late 1980s during the Historikerstreit (historians’ debate), in which right-wing historian Ernst Nolte claimed the rise of Nazism should be characterised as a reaction to the fear of communism and the threat of Soviet domination. The issue of ethnic German suffering in post-Second World War communist Europe also became a theme of this debate, after the 1986 publication of conservative historian Andreas Hillgruber’s *Zweierlei Untergang: Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europäischen Judentums* (Two Kinds of Ruin: The Fall of the German Reich and the End of European Jewry), in which he draws comparisons between the suffering of the Aussiedler and that of Holocaust victims. In essence, such discourses represent a re-statement of the notion of historical atonement present

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in the Basic Law Article 116; the Aussiedler had suffered for the wartime crimes of other Germans, and thus per the Basic Law were entitled to German citizenship. Yet in the Historikerstreit, this notion spurred firm rebuttals from left-wing historians such as Jürgen Habermas, particularly as Germany was opened up to a new wave of newcomers, the former citizens of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).

In a 1992 opinion piece for Die Zeit, Habermas accused Nolte of using the spectre of communism to “justify” fascism in Germany. The end of the communist German Democratic Republic, Habermas argued, introduced a mass of new citizens to the Federal Republic of Germany whose opinion on the crimes of the Second World War may have been informed by different interpretations of history than those expressed by the conservative historians. For former East Germans, merging “de-Stasification” with “de-Nazification” and viewing Germany’s need for historical atonement as somewhat lessened by the perceived communist threat, could be less convincing. By 2006, Norman Davis was arguing that the post-Berlin Wall uncovering of Soviet and other communist government atrocities largely discredited the position of left-wing historians. Yet the era of the Historikerstreit does underline the changing context of the 1990s and the effects of the end of the Cold War and German reunification on the values Germans extract from the legacy of the Second World War, particularly as it relates to justifying Volga German resettlement in Germany. The discussion of historical atonement requires a prime antagonist, and the Historikerstreit shows how the instantly increased diversity of upbringing in reunified Germany might problematise this.

In this way, the discussion on historical atonement also relates to the notion of German culture as a key element of German identity. Indeed, Cynthia Miller-Idriss argues for the understanding of Germany as a Kulturnation; that is, a nation defined culturally. The persistency of jus sanguinis in Germany, she argues, “masks the extent to which cultural elements have always played a key role in Germans’

60 Ibid. pp. 21-3.
61 Ibid. pp. 21-3.
conceptions of themselves". Cultural elements may be understood as norms, beliefs, attitudes and their expression through the arts, entertainment and recorded culture. Klaus von Beyme argues that German culture acted as a unifying concept for the politically separate East and West Germanys; that the notion of *Kulturnation* transcended *Staatsnation*. One such unifying cultural touchstone was the writer Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, whose 200th anniversary in 1949 was celebrated alike in Frankfurt am Main, city of his birth in West Germany, and Weimar, city of his death in East Germany. Yet as with understandings of German history and upbringing, the different political realities of East and West could inform different understandings of cultural elements. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it may no longer be accurate to describe the German *Kulturnation* as having the same resonance for former Easterners as for the more established citizens of the Federal Republic. Indeed, sociologist Wolf Lepenies argues:

> Only Germans born after October 1990 will be united, not only in the sense that they will have comparable opportunities, but also in the sense that there will be an increasing correspondence in their life situation, which includes a common outlook on the future as well as a shared historical identity.

Divergence in perceptions of German identity for former East Germans and West Germans may wane over time, but the pre-1990 generations were informed by different political, social and thus cultural realities, and may have diverging interpretations of German cultural identity based on these different social, political and cultural environments. What’s more, differences in cultural outlook between East and West Germans when the Iron Curtain was lifted could appear quite minute compared to differences with Soviet-raised *Aussiedler* descendants, much further beyond the Iron Curtain and isolated from contact with West Germany and West German notions of a unifying German cultural identity.

An idea of humanitarianism also relates to the discussion on historical atonement, which also takes as its starting point the legacy of the Second World War. Morjé

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64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid, p. 44.  
Howard describes Germany’s asylum policy as amongst the world’s most generous, and Wesley D. Chaplin attributes this directly to the shadow of the Third Reich, and the need to escape its negative legacy. The result before 1990 was relatively large but manageable refugee numbers (57,400 in 1987), until the collapse of communism and outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia, when numbers increased dramatically (438,000 in 1992, a European record). Though Volga Germans arriving at the same time shared with Yugoslavian asylum seekers the experience of ethnic discrimination in their homeland (in the Volga German case, more historic than contemporary), Volga Germans had the distinct advantage of rights to citizenship based on Germanness, not afforded to Yugoslavian asylum seekers. The perceived ethnic link to Germany, therefore, remained a great advantage as a tool to leave previous home nations for humanitarian reasons. The large number of asylum seekers in Germany bred resentment and violence from far-right movements: asylum centres in Rostock, Mölln and Solingen were attacked, and several demonstrations and counter-demonstrations were held in 1992-1993. This was interpreted in the international press as a serious undermining of the post-war German values of tolerance and peace. However, the disparity in treatment of Yugoslavian refugees and Volga German return migrants, both grounded to varying extent in humanitarian arguments, again shows how increased diversity in Germany challenged the German Right to Return law’s principle of ethnic exclusivity. Sections of the German left noted the disparity in treatment, and forced a compromise with conservative politicians seeking to decrease the refugee flow in 1993: asylum would not be granted for those who had passed through a safe third country before arriving in Germany, while limitations in the number of ethnic German returnees permitted citizenship would also be introduced. The early 1990s asylum application spike is thus an example of how diversity of immigration flows to Germany provided a choice for Germany to legally define itself as a community of descent, or to maintain the construction of German identity that specifies liberal and tolerant attitudes as the new post-war German values. The 1993 reforms indicate the choice was for the latter.

70 Wesley D. Chaplin, *Germany for the Germans?*, p. 58.
In 1991, the sociologist Nora Räthzel described the Aussiedler in Germany as “the not-really-German-at-all ethnic German[s]”.75 Indeed, the context of Germany in the early 1990s, opened to a diverse array of non-citizen residents – including asylum seekers from the Balkans and the former Gastarbeiter and their descendants – challenged previous assumptions of ancestral or ethnic German identity and their legal saliency. The aspect of German identity that is defined as an ancestral connection to the German Vaterland defined by language, culture and values comes into conflict with the realities of modern Germany, which is diverse in its language, culture and values. All three areas, as it emerged in the 1990s, are shaped more by national environment than ancestral connection, and this undermined the construction of Volga German identity in the German Right to Return Law as more German than non-citizen individuals with longtime German residency. Rather, the gradual decline of the Volga German Return law indicates a transition in Germany to a somewhat more jus soli identity construction.

This transition was facilitated by the presence in Germany of a diverse range of non-citizens and those with migrant backgrounds. This distinguishes the German example from that of Finland, even though the discourses on the Return laws themselves show points of great commonality. Both laws maintain discussions on integration capability, humanitarian interventionism and historical atonement, yet without the large migrant communities and diversity present to prompt a reassessment of Finland’s own construction of national identity, the example of the decline of the Ingrian Finnish Return law can better be understood as a reassessment of Ingrian identity, rather than Finnish identity, at the political level. By contrast, the Volga German Return law declined as the concept of Germanness, and the status of other migrant groups in Germany, was also being altered and reassessed. However, non-returnee migrant communities in Finland are present (and do increase over the period 1990-2010), as noted particularly in chapter five, though not at the same scale as seen in Germany, and without yet the same political voice or impact. If Finland does continue to diversify, and groups with migrant backgrounds that do not necessarily conform to its established identity constructions continue to grow, it stands to reason

that Finland could follow Germany and begin to reassess its national identity to more accurately reflect the community actually residing there.

The example of the Volga Germans shows how right to return laws’ constructions of identity can be essentialist, or outdated and non-reflective of the national community. As discussed further in chapter five, Finland’s population has become increasingly diverse across the period 1990-2010, with growing migrant communities from non-returnee backgrounds. Thus, the construction of Finnish identity promoted by Finnish political figures and institutions in the Ingrian Return policy, implying ethnic limitations on the concepts of Finnishness and Finnish citizen, does not necessarily reflect the population of Finnish citizens actually living in Finland over this period. If the immigrant communities of Finland are expected to increase, both as a result of inter-European migration through Finland’s membership in the EU, and an anticipated growth of immigrant communities for which strong base communities have been established (particularly Somali and Vietnamese communities—see figure 15 in chapter five), ethnically exclusivist definitions of Finnish identity become increasingly problematic. This experience has already played out in the German case, with a similar law in a country where more diverse immigration patterns are already established, and immigrant communities are consequently larger.

Effectively, the Volga German case shows how discursive constructions of national identity based on ethnicity in citizenship and immigration policies can become problematic through their exclusion of other groups living within the nation state’s borders, and how such discursive constructions of national identity suppress alternative national identity constructions that can embrace and encompass these other groups. Excluded groups like the non-citizen guest workers and their descendants have succeeded to some extent in undermining the ethnically-essentialist identity constructions of German immigration law by challenging the Right to Return law. However, as is argued in this thesis, the challenge to (and cancellation of) the Right to Return law in Finland follows a different pattern, which does not really depart from ethno-culturally exclusivist constructions of national identity. National identity constructions that exclude those living within the nation state deemed not to conform to perceived ethnic core characteristics have therefore not been challenged and undermined in Finland in the same way as they have in Germany, although increasing
diversity in Finland leaves open the possibility that future challenges may occur even after the end of the Finnish Right to Return policy.
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