Rothschild, D;
(2015)
Conditionals and Propositions in Semantics.
Journal of Philosophical Logic
, 44
(6)
pp. 781-791.
10.1007/s10992-015-9359-5.
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Abstract
The project of giving an account of meaning in natural languages goes largely by assigning truth-conditional content to sentences. I will call the view that sentences have truth-conditional content propositionalism as it is common to identify the truth-conditional content of a sentence with the proposition it expresses. This content plays an important role in our explanations of the speech-acts, attitude ascriptions, and the meaning of sentences when they appear as parts of longer sentences. Much work in philosophy of language and linguistics semantics over the last halfcentury has aimed to characterize the truth-conditional content of different aspects of language.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Conditionals and Propositions in Semantics |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10992-015-9359-5 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9359-5 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9359-5. |
| Keywords: | Indicative conditionals; Semantics; Truth-conditions; Probability. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1462145 |
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