Religious Liberty and Authority: Hobbes’s Use of the Bible in *Leviathan* in the Context of the English Civil War

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Abstract

It has long been a great riddle why Hobbes expressed his bizarre view about Christian religion in *Leviathan*. This thesis is a serious attempt to explain it. The procedure followed is, in the first place, to identify the precise nature of arguments distinctive of *Leviathan* and of the new religious challenges Hobbes faced in *Leviathan*, and then to connect them with religious issues in the English Civil War. The issues identified are enthusiasm, “the Foole” in Chapter 15, and the toleration controversy.

The first context investigated is several rational justifications for the authority of the Bible as a reaction to enthusiasm. Works by William Chillingworth, Edward Leigh, John Goodwin, Seth Ward and Henry Hammond are examined, and the originality of Hobbes’s view on biblical authority in comparison with them is clarified. It lies in Hobbes’s radical scepticism towards all forms of the pretended word of God as his solution to the political threat of enthusiasm, and in the correspondent certainty of his answer, the civil sovereign as the foundation of biblical authority. Clarification has been given of several layers of his scriptural interpretation underlying the conclusion, such as the philological investigation about revelation in the Bible in Chapter 36, the foundation of Moses’s authority in Chapter 40. This conclusion, in turn, lays a theoretical foundation for Hobbes’s eschatology in Chapter 38.

The second context examined is the Anglican defences of toleration as part of the toleration controversy most relevant to *Leviathan*. The possible influence Hobbes and Jeremy Taylor had on each other concerning mutual toleration is shown, together with their originalities compared with Chillingworth. Moreover an explanation is supplied of some arguments specific to *Leviathan* as Hobbes’s reaction to the general toleration controversy.

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1. Introduction

If our aim is to abandon our own standpoint and to regain that of the ancients, we cannot afford to discard all the elements which seem foreign to our own ways of thinking, any more than the historian of religion can afford to discard as ‘superstition’ beliefs and practices which educated people in the civilized world have outgrown. Rather we should fix attention on elements which strike us strange and unaccountable. We may find in them a clue to the attitude of mind we are trying to recover.¹

I

**Leviathan**, written by Thomas Hobbes and first published in 1651, is today recognized as one of the classical works in social and political thought. The state of nature and the construction of the state through contracts, in particular, are renowned and often referred to. However, the latter half of *Leviathan*, Parts 3 and 4, where Hobbes treated Christian religion, is much less read or known.² One modern edition of *Leviathan* omitting some of the

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The abbreviations for Hobbes’s works are as follows:
- **Lev**: *Leviathan*, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012). As for the text of *Leviathan*, references are given to chapter and page number, (e.g. Lev, 12: 174 refers to chapter 12 of *Leviathan* at p. 174 of this edition), but
arguments about Christian religion in it illustrates this. This situation indicates that the religious argument in *Leviathan* is hard to comprehend for a reader today. Even among scholars of Hobbes, it has frequently and long been described as “bizarre,” “idiosyncratic,” or “eccentric.” The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to explain why Hobbes developed the bizarre religious argument found only in *Leviathan*.

Compared with Hobbes’s earlier works of political philosophy, *The Elements of Law* and *De Cive*, the idiosyncratic characteristic peculiar to *Leviathan* lies in the addition of new and utterly unconventional interpretations of the Scriptures. The enlargement of the scriptural interpretation means undermining one of the merits of *De Cive*, its brevity, in spite of the fact that even in *Leviathan* Hobbes still found some value in shortness. Moreover, probably what is most puzzling about the new interpretation in *Leviathan* concerns the difficulty with understanding its specific political relevance.

Certainly, Hobbes’s own account in his Latin verse autobiography suggests the religious situation in the English Civil War as the background of *Leviathan*, by associating his writing of *Leviathan* with divine law and with the arrival of

as with the introduction of this edition, references are given without abbreviations in the same way as other articles or books.


5 Lev, 31: 574.
Prince Charles in Paris, where Hobbes lived at that time. Nevertheless, it has still been a great riddle why it was necessary for Hobbes to write another work on theologico-political problem, *Leviathan*, despite the publication in 1647 of *De Cive*, which already included some religious arguments and interpretation of the Scriptures; in addition, the difference of the political conclusions about religious matters between the two works was not, at first sight, great enough to justify enlarging the religious and interpretative argument so expansively. In the case of Part 4 of *Leviathan*, Hobbes specified, at least to some extent, his political adversaries: Presbyterians, Catholics, and to a much smaller extent Anglicans. However, as for Part 3, it is not clear even what type of political adversaries and arguments Hobbes had in mind and was responding to with the new discussions presented there. As a result, while in Part 3 there are a number of arguments specific to *Leviathan*, their political significance remains unclear.

Therefore, this thesis will mainly focus on the religious argument peculiar to *Leviathan*, especially Part 3. Examining *The Elements of Law* and *De Cive* in the religious context of the English society during and before the 1630s is not the subject of this thesis. This means in particular that this thesis does not deal with the theme of Hobbes and atheism in the sense of the

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Also, in the preface of the second edition of *De Cive*, Hobbes revealed a clear interest in the political situation in his homeland. DC, 82.

denial of the existence of God, because Hobbes’s argument about what may be called natural religion including his view on the existence and nature of God changes little from *De Cive* to *Leviathan*. The aim here is to compare *Leviathan* with his earlier works and place the argument distinctive of *Leviathan* in the specific political and religious contexts of the English Civil War during the 1640s.

II

So far it has been shown that the main tasks of this thesis are of two kinds. The first is to identify new religious elements in *Leviathan* by comparing it with Hobbes’s earlier works of political philosophy. The second is to explain the elements in the specific context of the English Civil War. The choice of the English Civil War as the relevant context is partly derived from Hobbes’s own assertion about the origin of *Leviathan*, and partly from his concern with war and peace. Another major factor for the choice is that the religious upheaval during the Civil War was the only major change in the religious situation after Hobbes wrote *De Cive*.

Now that our task and aim have been clarified, the fruit of existing Hobbes scholarship will be reviewed and the position of this thesis in it will be clarified. In the first place, although Martinich, Curley and Schotte discuss the religious argument of *Leviathan*, they rarely distinguish the layer of *De Cive* from that

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8 See Chapter 15 in *De Cive* and Chapter 31 in *Leviathan*. There has been much discussion about this theme. Yet if our focus is not on his contemporaries’ view on Hobbes but only on Hobbes’s own argument, the question to be asked is why Hobbes developed his argument about natural religion for the first time in *De Cive*, and not in *The Elements of Law*. For a useful overview of how Hobbes began to be regarded as an atheist, see Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700*, 133-35, 52-54.

9 Another theme beyond the scope of this thesis is the main characteristics of the Latin version of *Leviathan* and its context. For this, see Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 146-95.
of Leviathan. As a result, though both their researches and this thesis focus on Leviathan and both aim to explain Hobbes, the direction of our investigation is rather different from theirs. Perhaps the difference can be described as follows: while they try to clarify what Hobbes says, this thesis aims to explain why Hobbes says as he does. Similarly, while Schuhmann's useful article focuses on the similarity between De Cive and Leviathan, this thesis mainly pays attention to the difference between them and thereby clarifies the distinctive features of Leviathan.

More close to our approach and aim are Tuck and Sommerville, who published the standard and seminal works on Hobbes's view on religion around two decades ago. They distinguish the layer of De Cive from the new one in Leviathan. They explain the political conclusion of the religious argument in historical context. They have established the importance of the Great Tew Circle for understanding Hobbes's religious argument. These are their chief achievements. Moreover they ask questions very similar to ours, and their answer is still the standard one today.

Nevertheless, there remains room for improvement in answering our research question in three respects. In the first place, their

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answer does not explain why *De Cive* was insufficient and why it was necessary for Hobbes to go beyond *De Cive*, developing and expanding the religious theory further in *Leviathan*. The more recent works have not explained this point either, and thus explaining this is one of our chief tasks. In the second place, the contexts they explored are mainly the France during the Civil War or the religious discussions before the 1640s. They did not inquire to a great extent into the new religious situation during the Civil War. However, as we have indicated, this is, to say the least, one of the most relevant contexts for *Leviathan*. Thirdly, they have mainly focused on the political conclusion of Hobbes’s religious argument, but his philological argument specific to *Leviathan* also needs explaining.

In the past two decades, Hobbes scholars have made some progress in situating *Leviathan* in the context of the English Civil War. Here the distinction should be made between understanding Hobbes himself and the reception of Hobbes. The contextual approach to Hobbes can contribute to both of them, but our main focus is on Hobbes, and not on his reception.\(^{15}\) As for the reception of Hobbes, Parkin’s work is the definitive one, consciously focusing on the reception of Hobbes, and not on Hobbes himself.\(^{16}\) Collins dealt with both of them.\(^{17}\) His contribution to answering our question lies in distinguishing clearly the argument about religious liberty in *De Cive* or *The Elements of Law* from that in *Leviathan*, and in trying to explain the latter in the context of the Civil War. On the other hand, while Collins mainly chose political

\(^{15}\) Similarly, while Jackson investigates the controversy between Hobbes and Bramhall, our main concern is on *Leviathan*. Jackson, *Hobbes, Bramhall and the Politics of Liberty and Necessity: A Quarrel of the Civil Wars and Interregnum.*


events as relevant contexts, we pay attention to arguments or controversies, especially religious ones. Also, apart from arguments about religious liberty, there are also numerous new religious elements in *Leviathan*, and Hobbes's Erastianism, which Collins emphasised, cannot explain these new elements, because his Erastianism does not change between *De Cive* and *Leviathan*.19

As for Hobbes’s notorious eschatology in *Leviathan*, Overhoff’s work is worth mentioning. Although this topic has long been discussed by various Hobbes scholars,20 among Hobbes scholars he for the first time noted that part of Hobbes’s eschatology, including his use of the Bible, had specific precedents in the Civil War, such as the views of Richard Overton and John (or Henry) Archer. This thesis aims to give further thought to the political significance and theoretical foundation of Hobbes’s eschatology.

Lastly, the work perhaps most close to our concern and approach is Hoekstra’s article on Hobbes and prophets.21 He noted Hobbes’s increasing concern with prophets, and tried to explain this in the context of the Civil War. In particular, he not only pointed out the importance of the enthusiasts for *Leviathan*, which in itself was noted by Skinner and others, but also showed Hobbes’s endorsement of scepticism in *Leviathan* as the reply to the threat of the enthusiasts.22 This thesis agrees with Hoekstra’s general

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18 In this respect, Sommerville’s article on Independency is more relevant to our work than the work of Collins. J. P. Sommerville, "Hobbes and Independency," *Rivista di storia della filosofia*, no. 1 (2004).
19 Collins places the main chapter dealing with Hobbes’s argument about Christian religion before his explanation of the Civil War. This suggests that his concern is different from ours. Collins, *The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes*, 11–57.
22 Ibid., 124–41. Quentin Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of*
position. What we explore further is the precise relationship between De Cive and Leviathan, and the significance of Hobbes’s philological investigation in relation to his reply to the enthusiasts.

III

In our review of Hobbesian scholarship so far we have not mentioned one major field of our investigation: Hobbes’s use of the Bible. This is still a rather new theme in the vast Hobbes scholarship. Even in Schotte’s systematic treatment of Hobbes’s view on religion, or Farr’s article on Hobbes’s “interpretative practice,” his use of the Bible does not necessarily come to the fore. However, two works deserve mentioning here. One is Fukuoka’s work on the comparison of Hobbes’s and Spinoza’s interpretation of the Old Testament. She probably for the first time paid full attention to how Hobbes interpreted the Scriptures in Leviathan, and elucidated clearly Hobbes’s treatment of supernatural things in the Old Testament and the subtle difference between Hobbes and Spinoza. Nevertheless, this is a work mainly on Spinoza and its chief task is to investigate his thought in the context of the Dutch Republic. It is the task of Hobbes scholars to examine Leviathan in the context of the

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English Civil War. Also, in the case of Hobbes it is necessary to consider his handling not only of the Old Testament but also of the New Testament.

Another major contribution has been made by Malcolm in his new edition of *Leviathan* and its introduction, though he modestly remarks, “Hobbes’s handling of biblical texts is a very large subject, which can be treated only very briefly here; a full study remains to be written.” Drawing on Malcolm’s achievement, as an introductory remark on Hobbes’s use of the Bible we shall here touch on the problem of which versions of the Bible Hobbes used and quoted.

This could be an important issue because translations played a great role in transmitting the Christian doctrine in the Scriptures, and here grave problems could arise. There are possibilities of erroneous translations, and they can be sources of attack on some existing Christian doctrines. In political or doctrinal controversies based on the interpretation of the Bible, the suitability of translations can be a topic of dispute. The most famous controversy related to the translation of the Bible concerned the authority of the Vulgate, and this was one of the principal watersheds between Catholics and Protestants. While Catholics defended the authority of the Vulgate, Protestants denied it, turned to the original Greek and Hebrew texts and produced new vernacular translations based on them. Furthermore, each party of Protestants embraced its own translation(s), and the differences between translations could lead to distinct doctrines.

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In view of the possible political implications involved in the translation of the Scriptures, which particular attitude Hobbes adopted toward this problem can be a matter worth investigating. In *De Cive*, Hobbes mentioned translators of the Bible from the original languages as a possible choice for the authoritative interpreter.28 This suggests that Hobbes was aware that translators of the original languages in the Bible could acquire some political influence. On the other hand, he denied translators the status of authoritative interpreter of the Bible.29 Similarly, he was certainly conscious that the accuracy of translations could be a matter of controversy: in several places in *Leviathan*, he compared and examined translations of some scriptural passages.30 However, this kind of examination of translations was quite rare in the argument of *Leviathan* as a whole. This rarity might be related to Hobbes’s knowledge of the original Hebrew and Greek languages. Of course, as a humanist and translator of Thucydides’ historical work, Hobbes had a deep understanding of Greek. As for the Hebrew language, however, as Malcolm convincingly remarks, Hobbes was simply unable to read it at the stage of writing the English version of *Leviathan*.31

Another related and much more complicated issue is how Hobbes himself cited the Bible in *Leviathan*, and here Malcolm’s research and annotations added to the text are the path-breaking groundwork.32 Certainly, there are numerous cases where Hobbes followed faithfully one version of the Bible (the King James Version or KJV in *Leviathan* and the Vulgate in *De Cive*).33

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28 DC, 17:18.
29 Ibid.
31 *Leviathan*, 109, 92-93.
32 Ibid., 108-14.
33 In the case of *De Cive*, it can safely be said that Hobbes cites the Vulgate,
However, especially in *Leviathan*, there are also a number of places where Hobbes diverted from the versions above mentioned. The versions of the Bible he could have used were original Greek texts, translational versions he clearly mentioned, and two English versions prior to the KJV. While in some cases Hobbes used one of the editions, in others he diverted from any existing versions.

Several reasons can be adduced for the diversion. One possible reason is that, based on the comparison with the original text, he regarded the translation in his text as more accurate. Another possibility is that he changed the wording so that it could become more suitable for his doctrine. However, Hobbes might have been simply negligent in the wording of translations. Malcolm remarks at the end of the investigation of this topic that Hobbes’s “combination” “of careful analysis and negligent... delivery is quite typical” in *Leviathan*. In this investigation of Hobbes’s use of the Bible, exactly how Hobbes diverted from the existing translations will be clarified, and possible reasons for it will be offered. There will also be a comparison of how Hobbes cited biblical texts in *De Cive* and in *Leviathan*. Moreover, several versions of the Bible contain not only the text but also marginal

and not the Junius-Tremellius translation with the Beza translation, though this does not exclude the possibility that he also refers to the latter. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 114.

The biblical translations referred to are the KJV, the Geneva Bible, the French Geneva Bible, the Bishops’ Bible, the Junius-Tremellius translation with the Beza translation, and the Vulgate. For the editions used, see the article of the Bible in the Bibliography. Otherwise mentioned, the KJV is cited, whose verbal expressions are usually the closest to Hobbes’s own. This thesis fails to refer to the original Hebrew and Greek versions of the Bible.

The distinctive characteristics of each of these versions and their positions in the England of the early 17th century would be interesting themes to be pursued. As for the Septuaginta, see a valuable article by Mandelbrote. Scott Mandelbrote, "English Scholarship and the Greek Text of the Old Testament, 1620-1720: The Impact of Codex Alexandrinus," in *Scripture and Scholarship in Early Modern England*, ed. Ariel Hessayon and Nicholas Keene (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
notes appended to the text. These notes can be seen as interpretations of the Bible prior to Hobbes, and this thesis will compare the interpretations of the notes attached to passages of the Bible with those of Hobbes. This will help to gauge more precisely the originality or unconventional character of Hobbes’s interpretation of the Bible.

IV

The research question of this thesis requires a contextual approach, or going beyond Hobbes’s text into the wider historical context. However, it is often considerably difficult to connect Hobbes’s argument with known historical issues, partly because Hobbes is a highly original thinker and his theory seems to have little to do with his contemporaries’. Another difficulty with it is that Hobbes scarcely specified the precise sources he might have been drawing on or disagreeing with. As a result, there is almost always some uncertainty in identifying contexts relevant to Hobbes.

In the light of the difficulties, then, it would not be futile to explain the contextual approach taken in this thesis. In the first place, this thesis limits the relevant context in several ways. The first limitation is the focus on the England of the Civil War period for the reasons already mentioned. It is true that this does not involve denying the existence of other possible factors. Actually in order to identify the new religious situation during the Civil War it is necessary to have some idea about the pre-war religious situation. For this reason this thesis deals with William Chillingworth as a leading religious controversialist before the Civil War and as a friend of Hobbes. However, the focus on the English Civil War does involve emphasising this factor as the

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most immediate and relevant context for *Leviathan*, and insistence that without reference to this aspect any answer to our question would be insufficient. The second limitation is that in investigating the religious context of *Leviathan*, we try to start from the text of *Leviathan* by identifying religious problems and themes specific to this work. The third limitation is to pay attention to Hobbes and not to the reception of Hobbes. In so far as the text of *Leviathan* itself is provided, the commentary on Hobbes, even by his contemporaries, is of secondary importance for understanding Hobbes. Rather, the motive and possible bias of the commentary should be investigated.37 This limitation in particular means excluding most texts published in the 1650s. Within these limitations, however, this thesis tries to explore every possible factor to explain the religious argument specific to *Leviathan*.

Next, in exploring the factors, the ideal of this thesis would be to conduct two types of investigation. In the first place, there are new religious topics in *Leviathan*, such as the philological investigation of the word “spirit,” the authority of the Bible, and eschatology. If there are people who argue about these topics during the Civil War, we include them in our investigation. That will help explicate Hobbes’s discussing the new topics in *Leviathan*, especially because Hobbes’s contemporaries, unlike Hobbes, often explicitly explained the reason why they discussed the topics, and they often referred to the religious upheaval as the main factor. In comparing the treatment of the same topic by Hobbes and by his contemporaries, there are two possible cases. If their handling has some similarities with Hobbes’s, they might be regarded as possible influences on Hobbes. It is true that Hobbes’s new discussion might be entirely due to his ingenuity and the similarities might be mere coincidences. Nevertheless, to the

extent Hobbes’s contemporaries expressed the same view as his, Hobbes’s argument will no longer be so strange or inexplicable. Our aim, strictly speaking, is not to identify the influence of Hobbes’s contemporaries on him but to explain the bizarre argument in *Leviathan*. The other possibility is that the handling of the topics specific to *Leviathan* by Hobbes’s contemporaries is quite different from Hobbes’s own. In this case, we clarify the nature of the difference between them, which certainly helps little to answer our question. Nevertheless, it does help to explain why Hobbes did not take other possible approaches to the subject and to that extent why he took the one as he did. Also, the investigation in both of the cases will at least help us to grasp the precise nature of Hobbes’s originality, or of his position in the spectrum of his age.

The second type of investigation which this thesis will hopefully, but in fact only partially, carry out is to identify Hobbes’s enemies, or the kind of argument Hobbes refuted or might have refuted in and only in *Leviathan*. While in the first kind of investigation both Puritans and Anglicans discussed similar topics to Hobbes, the target of Hobbes in the context of the Civil War was, it can safely be said, mainly Puritans, especially radical Puritans as will be shown. However, since Hobbes stayed in France during the period, the report or criticism of Puritans by Anglicans, or that of radical Puritans by Presbyterians, are also important and relevant sources. The extent to which Hobbes’s presentation of his enemies corresponds to the argument presented by Puritans themselves varies according to the situation. However, taking Hobbes’s presentation as the main control by which we must test our hypothetical context, we will explore various possibilities. In particular, we take into account three possibilities. The easy case is where Hobbes presented Puritan arguments faithfully. Or Hobbes might have used Anglican or Presbyterian report of Puritans or sectarians. The most difficult case is where Hobbes
made his own original presentation of Puritans based on the sources he used. In the third case the relevancy of the designated context for *Leviathan* is most dubious, because this case presupposes some gap between the presentation of Puritans by themselves and by Hobbes without any contextual help for bridging the gap. Nevertheless, if such contextual help cannot be found and the second possibility is excluded, then this third possibility should still be taken into account.

As we have already indicated, our starting point and goal of contextual investigation is Hobbes’s text itself. In particular, the context to be investigated has to explain why the religious argument in *De Cive* became insufficient for Hobbes in the late 1640s. Then, before turning to the contextual research itself, this thesis will consider the subtle change in Hobbes’s presentation of the religious problem among his works of political philosophy. Then the identified contexts will be considered. Finally *Leviathan* itself will be examined. The new factors in *Leviathan* will be explained in relation to the investigated contexts, or to put in another way, the value of the examined contexts as explanatory factors will be tested.
2. Identifying religious contexts relevant to

*Leviathan*

I

In this chapter an attempt will be made to clarify more specific contexts relevant to *Leviathan* through a close examination of how Hobbes articulated the religious problem in his three works of political philosophy. This examination, hitherto undone, will shed new light on why Hobbes wrote *Leviathan* as it was.¹

In all of the three works of political philosophy, Hobbes articulated the religious problem before discussing what is necessary for salvation. However, the articulations changed slightly between the works. To understand his expanded treatments of the religious problem, therefore, it will be useful to compare the three articulations of the problem and capture accurately the distinctive characteristics of his perception of the religious problem in *Leviathan*.

In *The Elements of Law*, Hobbes identified the problem as follows: “we have amongst us the Word of God for the rule of our actions: now if we shall subject ourselves to men also, obliging ourselves to do such actions as shall be by commanded: when the commands of God and man shall differ, we are to obey God, rather than man: and consequently the covenant of general obedience to man is unlawful.”² Then he specifies his antagonists: “they that follow their own interpretation, continually demanding liberty of conscience: and those that follow the interpretation of others not ordained thereunto by the sovereign of the commonwealth, requiring a power in matters of religion either above the power

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¹ Among others, if the following argument is valid, it will give us some textual evidence related to the composition of *Leviathan* other than the data Malcolm offered. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 1:60, esp. 57-59.
² EL, 2:6:1.
civil, or at least not depending on it.”³ The problem here was that the interpretation of the Bible was not unified under the sovereign.

Two years after writing *The Elements of Law*, Hobbes provided his developed theory of religion in *De Cive*. In it, he articulated the problem as follows:

Because *one must obey God rather than man*, a difficulty has arisen as to how obedience can be safely offered if an order is given to do something which CHRIST forbids. The reason for this difficulty is that God no longer speaks to us in a living voice through CHRIST and the Prophets, but by the holy scriptures, which are understood differently by different people.⁴

Here again Hobbes similarly presented his problem as the diversity of the interpretation of the Bible, though he made some theoretical development concerning the articulation of the religious problem in *De Cive*.⁵ In view of the new articulation of the religious problem in *Leviathan*, on the other hand, the added important point in this presentation is that it clearly presupposes that there are no prophets in Hobbes’s age. It also assumes that the word of God reaches people in whatever way, though the routes might be various. It was these assumptions that were called into question in *Leviathan*.

II

³ *EL*, 2:6:2.
⁴ *DC*, 18:1.
⁵ *De Cive* explains why such diverse interpretations occur. The key lies in the contrast between the living voice and writings, and Hobbs elaborates on this contrast in Section 18, Chapter 17 of *De Cive*. “It is universally true of language that … it cannot do the job on its own: it needs the help of a context. A living voice has interpreters right there in the time, the place, the expression, gesture and purpose of the speaker,” and so on. The lack of “interpreters right there” in writings causes various interpretations.
Before turning to *Leviathan*, however, this thesis will examine the second edition of *De Cive* published in 1647, and here also some new arguments can be observed which were beyond Hobbes's perception of the religious problem in the first edition of *De Cive*. In the preface peculiar to the second edition, Hobbes presents, though in an abstract form, some religious arguments of his adversaries.

As for those who refuse to be subject to the civil magistrate and want exemption from public burdens and yet demand to be in a commonwealth and to be protected by it from violence and wrongs, I hope that you will regard them as enemies and saboteurs and not gullibly accept all that they put before you openly or secretly as the Word of God. I will speak more plainly. If any preacher or confessor or casuist says that this doctrine is consistent with the Word of God: that a sovereign may rightly be killed, or any man without the sovereign’s orders, or that citizens may rightly take part in any rebellion, conspiracy or covenant prejudicial to their commonwealth, do not believe him, but report his name. Anyone who approves of this will also approve my design in writing.

There are two new important elements in the argument. Firstly, though the allegations of the word of God might depend on the interpretation of the Scriptures, here it is not, at least, specified so. Secondly, this religious opinion challenges directly sovereign power itself. To see its fuller significance, it is necessary to turn back to the argument in the first edition and to examine Hobbes’s view in the last section of *De Cive* on the mechanism of how dangerous possibilities of civil war arise from religious opinions related to civil matters.

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7 DC, 83.
Hobbes, after dismissing these opinions as not related to faith or salvation, but only as matters of power, profit or intellectual eminence, identifies disagreements over such questions as the accelerating factor for the bitter enmity between different religious positions.\(^8\) This discussion corresponds to a former section, where he compares religious sects to factions: “The bitterest wars are those between different sects of the same religion and different factions in the same country, when they clash over doctrines or public policy.”\(^9\) Here Hobbes sees the origin of both types of conflict in intellectual dissension and ultimately in human desire for honour. Though intellectual dissensions about religious matters can certainly lead to fierce civil wars, still they are fights between sects, and not against the sovereign. Therefore, the instigation of the rebellion against the sovereign was not within Hobbes’s perception of political implications of religious opinions in the first edition of *De Cive*.

In this identification of the religious problem, it was not necessary for Hobbes to specify religious sects by name. Moreover, he tried to avoid possible dangers. In the epistle dedicatory written in 1641 Hobbes remarked that he paid careful attention not to mention any specific laws, “i.e. not to approach shores which are sometimes dangerous because of current storms.”\(^10\) This is a remark fitting for a man who had just escaped from the troublesome political situation in his homeland. It is also known that the first edition of this radical work, despite being published, was circulated only among learned friends of Hobbes or Mersenne.

By contrast, the second edition of *De Cive* not only was a full-scale publication and actually sold well,\(^11\) but also included an annotation explicitly mentioning religious sects by name. The

\(^{8}\) DC, 18:14.
\(^{9}\) DC, 1:4.
\(^{10}\) DC, 76.
annotation, attached to Section 11, Chapter 6, begins with the confirmation of the insight in the last section of De Cive. Religious disagreements are a major cause of wars, but “this is not because the dogma is false, but because of human nature: men want to believe themselves wise and appear so to others.... This is why I have not spoken of opinions of that kind in this passage.”¹² This sentence shows that even at the stage of the second edition of De Cive, Hobbes felt it unnecessary to refute religious opinions related to civil matters as in Leviathan, especially in Part 4. However, the next passage indicates a departure from the attitude abovementioned. “There are certain doctrines which lead citizens imbued with them to the belief that they have the right and the duty to refuse to the commonwealth, and to struggle against sovereign Princes and sovereign authorities.”¹³ This passage suggests that Hobbes himself was aware that the type of the doctrine here and in the preface which opposes directly to the sovereign was not within the framework of the first edition. Hobbes then mentions explicitly the politically harmful doctrines of “the Roman Church” “on the pretext of religion.”¹⁴ His awareness of the peculiar significance of the explicit designation can be seen in the remark, “I do not conceal;”¹⁵ he could have refrained from mentioning specific names or doctrines.

Nevertheless, in spite of his new awareness of the politically dangerous implications of some religious opinions, Hobbes’s answer here was still the same as in the first edition: he left the sovereign to judge whether those religious opinions were pertinent to peace or not.¹⁶ This answer, however, leaves the possibility that the sovereign, not being aware of perilous political implications of such religious opinions, allows them to spread.

¹² DC, ann. 6:11.
¹³ Ibid.
¹⁴ Ibid.
¹⁵ Ibid.
¹⁶ Ibid.
Part 4 of *Leviathan*, on the other hand, he eliminated this possibility by refuting directly such opinions. The above interpretation helps to explain Hobbes's increased concern with errors in *Leviathan*.\(^{17}\)

So far the significance of the religious type of seditious opinion against the sovereign for Hobbes's religious framework has been examined. However, this new kind of opinion also poses a major problem for Hobbes's theoretical framework of civil matters proper. It was difficult for Hobbes's scheme of human psychology and nature to explain the passions which drove those who expressed the religious type of seditious ideas to do so. In *De Cive*, religious conflicts were concerned with honour, one of the three passions which led human beings to violence in the state of nature. Certainly, Hobbes was keenly aware that those who pursued honour and political offices were likely to hope for “the failure of current public policies” or “opportunities for revolution” due to the discontent with failing to gain access to political offices.\(^{18}\) Nevertheless, the offices themselves were part of the organisation of the state, and in this sense seekers of honour were, strictly speaking, not in pursuit of overthrowing the state. On the other hand, those who asserted the religious kind of seditious opinion targeted at the sovereign right itself. For this reason, it was necessary for Hobbes to develop new elements in his civil theory which could explicate the motive of those advocating this opinion. Here it is certain that the new notion of “dominion” in the state of nature in *Leviathan* plays this role. In all of the three works of political philosophy Hobbes specifies the same three factors of passion which induce people to violence: desire for commodity,

\(^{17}\) Malcolm’s explanation of the reason for this change misses the point, because it is about Hobbes’s increasing concern with people’s opinions and not with errors, nor about the insufficiency of just demonstrating the truth as in *De Cive*. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 47-51.

\(^{18}\) DC, 12:10.
honour and fear. However, in *Leviathan* he connects desire for commodity and fear to desire for dominion.\(^\text{19}\)

This consciousness of human desire for dominion, in turn, would enable Hobbes to gain the new awareness that, basing themselves on religious arguments and speaking in the name of God, people searched not only for honour but rather for dominion. This idea can explain several new elements in *Leviathan*. In the first place, while in both *De Cive* and in Part 4 of *Leviathan* Hobbes refuted false opinions, in Chapter 47 of Part 4 Hobbes associated the religious type of false opinions with the private benefit which the false opinions would bring to those who claimed them, Catholics and others. This new type of refutation reflects the above awareness.

Secondly, this opened the way for the change of Hobbes’s view on religion. In *De Cive*, Hobbes regarded religion mainly as matters necessary for entering the kingdom of God or heaven as opposed to those concerning human kingdom.\(^\text{20}\) In Chapter 12 of *Leviathan*, by contrast, Hobbes made a scandalous identification of religion as a kind of politics. While the founders of the religion of the gentiles have nourished and ordered the seeds of religion “according to their invention,” “the other, have done it, by Gods commandement, and direction: but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men that relyed on them, the more apt to Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity, and civill Society.... The Religion of the later sort is Divine Politiques: and containeth Precepts to those that have yeeled themselves subjects in the Kingdom of God.... Of the later sort, were Abraham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour.”\(^\text{21}\) Here the realization of the human pursuit of dominion in the name of religion affects Hobbes’s explication

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\(^{19}\) Lev, 13: 190, 192: 17: 254. This introduction of the notion of dominion, it seems, is difficult to explain only within his theory of the construction of the state.

\(^{20}\) DC, 18:14.

\(^{21}\) Lev, 12: 170.
about the intention of the founders of the religion: it points to the maintenance of dominion. However, in the case of Moses or Abraham, their establishment of religion could be explained simply as an act of obedience to the commandment of God. In the fact that Hobbes captured their intentions in terms of civil society, it can be seen that his general thrust was to go through with this framework and identify religion in general as a kind of politics, which is different from *De Cive*. Although associating religious dominion with false religion such as paganism or false Catholic doctrines was common at that time, the radical nature of *Leviathan* lies in applying this religious dominion even to true

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22 Thirdly, though this is not, by itself, a religious matter, the new consciousness that people aim at dominion in the name of religion concerns Hobbes’s changed view and wider use of rhetoric in *Leviathan*. As long as people search for dominion under the pretext of religion, their aim contradicts the civil sovereign’s maintenance of dominion and peace. In this sense, they are enemies of Hobbes. In turn, Hobbes’s two tasks in *Leviathan*, refuting his adversaries’ opinions and thereby searching for victory over them on the one hand, and searching for religious truth on the other, fit together. This new possibility was missed in Hobbes’s presentation in *De Cive* of the contradiction between rhetoric as the search for victory and logic as the search for truth. (DC, 12:12.) This would have led to his wider use of rhetoric in *Leviathan*. Another factor for the change is Hobbes’ refutation of many more religious opinions in *Leviathan* than in *De Cive*. Even in *De Cive*, in spite of his hostile remark about rhetoric, Hobbes made some use of rhetorical techniques, especially in confuting common opinions. (DC, 1:2, 9:1.) Hobbes’s wider use of rhetoric in *Leviathan*, especially against his religious enemies, can be seen as an elaboration of this practice. Though, as Nauta points out, Skinner’s argument that one of the main reasons for Hobbes’s changed attitude toward rhetoric is his lost confidence in reason in *Leviathan* is problematic, there still needs some kind of explanation for this change. Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*, 347-50, 426-36; Lodi Nauta, "Hobbes the Pessimist?," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 10, no. 1 (2002): 48-54. Apart from this, Skinner’s account of Hobbes’s use of rhetoric in *Leviathan* is invaluable.

It is also to be noted that this view of religion as a kind of politics reveals another departure from *De Cive*. While here the kingdom of God is regarded as a kind of civil society, in *De Cive* it was characterised by lack of human subjection. (DC, 16: 8, 9, 15.) As will be discussed later, this cognition of the kingdom of God as a kind of civil society in contrast to *De Cive*, is in turn based on Hobbes’s epistemological argument about the foundation of Moses’ authority, also peculiar to *Leviathan*. 28
Christian religion, especially to authoritative biblical characters such as Moses.\textsuperscript{23}

IV

Now that the significance of the new religious problem in the second edition of \textit{De Cive} has been clarified, the next topic to be examined is Hobbes's identification of religious problems in \textit{Leviathan}.

The most frequent praetext of sedition, and Civill Warre, in Christian Common-Wealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once, both God, and Man, then when their Commandments are one contrary to the other. It is manifest enough, that when a man receiveth two contrary Commands, and knows that one of them is Gods, he ought to obey that, and not the other, though it be the command even of his lawfull Soveraign (whether a Monarch, or a sovereign Assembly,) or the command of his Father. The difficulty therefore consisteth in this, that men when they are commanded in the name of God, know not in divers Cases, whether the command be from God, or whether he that commandeth, doe but abuse Gods name for some private ends of his own.\textsuperscript{24}

The problem articulated here is that when people are commanded in the name of God, they do not know whether the commandments really come from God or not, which could be defined as “the problem of pretended prophets.” There are several distinctive characteristics in this new presentation of the religious problem in comparison with \textit{De Cive}. Firstly, the situation Hobbes had in mind became more specific: sedition or civil war. This reflects new types of seditious allegation found in the second edition of \textit{De Cive}. Correspondingly, this new articulation of the religious problem calls our attention to the political significance of

\textsuperscript{24} Lev, 43: 928.
the allegation of the word of God: it amounts to a form of command. This suggests that if the allegations are true or believed, pretended prophets acquire dominion, a new insight in *Leviathan*.²⁵ Hence, to prevent this acquisition of dominion, which is likely to lead to rebellion, the audience’s attitude towards the divine word becomes vital. Thus in *Leviathan*, Hobbes not only refuted false religious views but also placed great emphasis on and encouraged a critical and sceptical attitude of the audience towards the pretended word of God.

Actually, the critical attitude was the second feature of the formulation of religious problem in *Leviathan*. In *De Cive* the voice (in the name) of God was assumed to come truly from God, and the problem was only the diverse interpretation of the content of God's voice. Here, on the other hand, doubt has been cast on this assumption: the problem is whether the voice in the name of God is really from God or not. It was this doubt which was an important stepping stone for the theoretical development from *De Cive to Leviathan* in Hobbes's general argument on Christian religion and his approach to the Bible.

Thirdly, while the formulation of the problem in *De Cive* contrasted the time of Hobbes with the past and characterised his time as lacking in prophets as opposed to the writings of the word of God, the Scriptures, the identification here does not presuppose such a contrast. It can deal with the pretended word of God both through the Scriptures and through prophets. However, what does this inclusion of the possibility of prophets in Hobbes's age precisely mean? To see the significance, it is useful to have a look at the type of the argument Hobbes refutes in Chapter 32. Here Hobbes mentions allegations of the word of God, not only through the Scriptures, that is to say, “by mediation of the Prophets, or of

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²⁵ Lev, 36: 232. “He that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity, pretends to govern them: that is to say, to rule, and reign over them.” Also see Lev, 47: 384.
the Apostles, or of the Church,” but also through immediate and supernatural revelation, that is to say, through dreams, visions, the voice, and supernatural inspiration.26 The latter type of argument was beyond the scope of De Cive.27 However, it is known that during the 1640s this allegation of immediate revelation independent of the Scriptures became prevalent. Those who alleged this have been called the enthusiasts.28 Thus it is the enthusiasts that will be the focus in order to understand contexts of Leviathan.

Certainly, Hobbes also treated the topic related to the enthusiasts, namely spirits and inspiration, in The Elements of Law.29 However, while in The Elements of Law only spirits were handled as a means of direct revelation, in the abovementioned passage in Leviathan, other mediations of immediate revelation such as dreams and visions are also dealt with. Also in Leviathan there are many more arguments which deal with immediate revelation. This development is partly due to the insight unique to Leviathan into the political implications of allegation of the word of God: the acquisition of dominion over believers in the allegation, incompatible with the sovereign power. Another related factor is that the enthusiasts during the Civil War, in so far as they were

26 Lev, 32: 580. Also see the same distinction in Hobbes, Behemoth, or, the Long Parliament, 225.
27 DC, 16:13, 18:1. Here the following questions Tuck and Sommerville posed are not sufficiently sharp. “Why should Hobbes have felt so deeply about the theology in Part III [of Leviathan]? The political point could have been made independently of the theology – to say that the sovereign is the sole authoritative interpreter of Scripture is a sufficiently striking and alarming claim, without the added complication of a new theology.” Tuck, “The Civil Religion of Thomas Hobbes,” 132. “Why did he [Hobbes] bother to analyse its [the bible’s] meaning at such great length? One answer is that he intended to persuade his contemporaries of the truth of his ideas, and by so doing prevent future civil wars.” Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, 106-7.
28 Although the term “enthusiasts” or “enthusiasm” can be used in various ways, and Hobbes himself used this term only a few times in Leviathan, the issue here is that only in Leviathan Hobbes dealt consciously and extensively with the claim of immediate revelation, or what is called “enthusiasm” here.
29 EL, 1:11-7.
Puritans, fought against the Royalists and the king as the civil sovereign.

V

The emergence of the enthusiasts helps to explain distinctive features of *Leviathan* to a certain extent. However, it still leaves a puzzle about one of the most notorious chapters in *Leviathan*: Hobbes’s eschatology in Chapter 38. The difficulty with understanding the political significance of this chapter is that even in *De Cive* and of course also in *Leviathan* Hobbes showed the way to salvation. If the way to salvation is shown, why is it necessary to discuss further an afterlife, especially a quite peculiar version? Though the significance of Chapter 38 has been a great riddle among Hobbes scholars for a long time, at least since the publication of Pocock’s article, previous studies have never shown this precise difficulty.\(^\text{30}\)

If Hobbes’s own word is used as a starting point for considering the context of this chapter, one obvious clue is his mention of justice at the beginning of the chapter.\(^\text{31}\) Then, on turning to the corresponding chapter on justice, Chapter 15, a new argument is found, or more precisely new kinds of people: what Hobbes called “the Foole.”\(^\text{32}\) Although the argument of the fool comprises both civil and religious elements, attention will now be paid to the discussion related to the kingdom of God. Major characteristics of the fool’s argument lie not only in its support of injustice, but especially in its disregard for the fear of God. This means that it


\(^{31}\) Lev, 38: 698.

\(^{32}\) Lev, 15: 222.
defies the basic articulation of the religious problem at the beginning of the religious part both in *De Cive* and *Leviathan*: what the divine law is. If the fear of God is taken away, the discussion about divine law and punishment becomes irrelevant. Based on this disregard of the fear of God, the fool focuses on the enormous good which might arise from unjust actions.

He [the fool] questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the feare of God, (for the same Foole hath said in his heart there is no God,) may not sometimes stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good: and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in condition, to neglect not onely the dispraise, and reviling, but also the power of other men. The kingdom of God is gotten by violence: but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? Were it against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it? And if it be not against Reason, it is not against Justice: or else Justice is not to be approved for good.

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33 DC, 15:1; Lev, 31: 554.
34 Even though the fool appeals to the notion of the kingdom of God, Hobbes regards the fool as an atheist. This is probably the reason why the fool is called as such. (For different views, see Patricia Springborg, "Hobbes's Fool the *Stultus*, Grotius, and the Epicurean Tradition," *Hobbes Studies* 23(2010): 30-31. Kinch Hoekstra, "Hobbes and the Foole," *Political Theory* 25, no. 5 (1997): 622. While Hoekstra’s article focuses on the validity of Hobbes’s reply to the fool, our concern is on the role of this type of argument for the formation of *Leviathan.*) In *De Cive*, Hobbes counts, among several categories of the atheist, the fool or “insipiens”, the translated word for “the Foole” in the Latin *Leviathan* as well. (DC, 14:19 ann.: Lev, 15: 223.) It is ironical that in spite of his refutation of the atheist in both *De Cive* and *Leviathan*, Hobbes himself was later to be taken for an atheist.

In relation to this, Hobbes’s sincerity or internal belief has often been a topic of discussion. For example, Curley, "I Durst Not Write So Boldly": How to Read Hobbes’s Theological-Political Treatise," 497-593. However, as Springborg argues, this is a matter different from “the relevance of his [Hobbes’s] theological arguments to his political theory; for to accept that he considered a settlement of the question of ecclesiastical authority crucial to his civil case does not presuppose any religious beliefs on his part at all.” “Hobbes’s theological arguments are to be judged ... not on the basis of his private religious beliefs but on his public commitment to resolve this problem in the terms in which he understood it.” Springborg, "Leviathan and the Problem of Ecclesiastical Authority," 289-90.

35 Lev, 15: 222.
Here it can be seen that the huge gap between the large benefit arising from entering the kingdom of God and the possible punishment of the civil sovereign makes the civil law null and void. Certainly, as regards this type of argument Hobbes could offer some refutation. “As for the instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall felicity of Heaven, by any way: it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable: and that is not breaking, but keeping of Covenant.”36 As long as the matter was concerned with the way to salvation, he was able to defend his position. However, Hobbes provided another modified version of the fool’s argument more difficult to deal with.

There be some that proceed further: and will not have the Law of Nature, to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on earth: but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death: to which they think the breach of Covenant may conduce: and consequently be just and reasonable.37

The gist of this argument and its more radical character compared with other common fools probably lies in the expression, “may conduce.” The enormous amount of benefit which they think comes from entering the kingdom of God renders the mere possibility of a mere help for the entry a sufficient motive of “unjust” action or breaching their covenants. However, if a tiny possibility is sufficient, the demonstration that such an action is quite unlikely to lead people to enter the kingdom of God, or even the one that it never leads people to, would lose much of its momentum. Now it is obvious that the notion of eternal felicity, or of the extraordinary benefit of going into the kingdom of God, assumes, by itself, dangerous political implications. The way Hobbes refutes this argument here is by pointing out it is based

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36 Lev, 15: 224.
37 Lev, 15: 226.
on faith, and thus cannot be called “natural” law.\textsuperscript{38} However, there is no wonder that in Parts 3 and 4, where the argument is based not only on natural knowledge but also supernatural revelation, Hobbes deals with this new threat: this would be one of the major political significances of Chapter 38.\textsuperscript{39} Therefore, together with the enthusiasts, it is this fool that we have in mind as part of religious contexts of \textit{Leviathan}. Here it is to be noted that, as far as is known, Hobbes scholars have so far failed to pin down who could be thought of as what Hobbes called the fool in the context of the English Civil War.

VI

It will be appropriate here to pay some attention to one great difficulty related to allegations of both the enthusiasts and the fool: they are concerned with supernatural matters. The enthusiasts claim supernatural revelation, and the matter of after life was, at least in \textit{De Cive}, dependent on Christ’s authority as opposed to natural reason.\textsuperscript{40} In \textit{De Cive}, these supernatural matters were thought to be beyond the scope of philosophy and impossible to investigate.\textsuperscript{41} In \textit{Leviathan}, however, Hobbes did discuss numerous things once regarded as impossible to analyze.\textsuperscript{42}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Though the religious implication of the argument of the fool has been investigated in the main text, the fool was also a contributing factor for Hobbes’s stronger emphasis on the importance of people’s opinion in \textit{Leviathan}; for in the very place where Hobbes emphasised it, he mentioned the fool. Lev, 30: 522.
\item In turn, seeing that in the same place Hobbes argued that without the cognition of justice punishments would be regarded as an act of hostility, the distinction peculiar to \textit{Leviathan} between them in the beginning of Chapter 28 was, it can be said, also a product of the fool. Compare DC, 10:7 and Lev, 28: 484, 486.
\item \textsuperscript{40} DC, 17:13.
\item \textsuperscript{41} DC, 17:14, 28, 18:4.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Fukuda points out that in \textit{Leviathan} Hobbes “marched forward even into the territory which in \textit{De Cive} had been protected as belonging to the domain of faith.” Our point is the difficulty with this march. Arihiro Fukuda, \textit{Sovereignty and the Sword: Harrington, Hobbes, and Mixed Government in the English Civil Wars} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997),
\end{itemize}
Hobbes’s treatment of supernatural things in *Leviathan* became more subtle and sophisticated than in *De Cive*.

On the other hand, his concern with things supernatural had already begun in *The Elements of Law*. In it, discussing the relationship between natural law and divine law, Hobbes defended his argument against “the opposition and affronts of supernaturalists now-a-days, to rational and moral argument.”

This defence of rational argument against “supernaturalists” was one of the underlying tones of Hobbes’s religious argument. Though this was tacitly presupposed in *De Cive*, in *Leviathan* Hobbes again explicitly defended natural reason in the treatment of supernatural revelation. In the first chapter concerning Christian religion, Hobbes initially points out that the discourse henceforth depends much on supernatural revelations of God. “Nevertheless,” he continues, “we are not to renounce our Senses, and Experience; nor (that which is the undoubted Word of God) our naturall Reason.”

In this sense, the most sophisticated argument in *Leviathan* was the culmination of his defence of natural reason. One of the main tasks of this research is to clarify this aspect: the way in *Leviathan* Hobbes analyzed “supernatural” things once regarded as beyond human cognition and its subtle nature.

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144.
43 EL, 1:18:12.
44 Lev, 32: 576.
45 This poses the problem of the relationship between the “supernaturalists” and the enthusiasts, a topic regrettably beyond the scope of this thesis.

One of the important signs which indicate the subtle nature in his treatment of supernatural things in *Leviathan* is a new distinction between things “above Reason” and things “contrary to it,” though this distinction itself was conventional. While he refuted irrational religious opinions held by the pagans and his contemporaries in Chapter 12 and Part 4, he saw in the Scriptures themselves only supernatural phenomena and denied irrational elements in them. Probably this subtle distinction prompted Hobbes to capture religion in general with human errors and deceptions as in Chapter 12 of *Leviathan*, in addition to religion suggested by natural reason, which can also be found in *De Cive*.

In relation to previous Hobbes studies, this fuller-scale research into the development of Hobbes’s handling of supernatural things from *De Cive* to *Leviathan* has two immediate implications. First, this thesis calls into question one prevalent explanation of the reason why Hobbes wrote *Leviathan* anew, such as “Hobbes’s increasing awareness of the real implications of his general philosophical position”, or his ambition to “render Christianity consistent with the thoroughgoing materialism.” It is true that Hobbes made a much more markedly materialistic interpretation of the Bible in *Leviathan* than in *De Cive*. The issue here, however, is how to explain this change, in particular why he applied his materialism to his scriptural interpretation only in *Leviathan*, and not in *De Cive*, even though he had already held a materialistic view of the world at the time of writing *De Cive*. Here it is not clear whether the motive to explore further the

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46 Lev, 32: 576.
religious implications of first philosophy can explain a new inquiry into what was thought to be beyond the sphere of philosophical or human exploration in the first place as opposed to unsolved riddles within the scope of philosophy. Rather it seems that the emergence of new political threats based on allegations appealing to supernatural phenomena forced Hobbes to reconsider his treatment of supernatural things in De Cive. What is more, the general notion of implication does not explain specific differences between De Cive and Leviathan. Hobbes’s religious argument in Leviathan is much more multifaceted and complex than this explanation suggests, and the precise role Hobbes’s materialism played in the argument specific to Leviathan as a whole has to be specified.

Second, this research emphasises the distinction between the supernatural and the false, which comments on Hobbes’s wider and more emphatic refutation of errors in Leviathan are likely to blur. Based on this distinction this study does not accept the widespread opinion that in Leviathan Hobbes undermined Christian religion or the Scriptures themselves, as well as what he saw as false ideas prevalent in his age.

VII

48 Similarly, Johnston maintains that for Hobbes “theological truths based upon faith and revelation were perfectly compatible with the philosophical truths.” Johnston, “Hobbes’s Mortalism,” 649-55, esp. 54.
49 For example, Hobbes’s new cases in Leviathan for religious liberty or toleration are, as will be shown, largely independent of his materialism, and thus are to be explained by other factors.
So far matters concerned with peace in *Leviathan* have been examined. However, in the religious argument of *Leviathan*, there is yet another remarkable feature. Hobbes’s notable remark in the dedication is a good starting point to see this.

I know not how the world will receive it [*Leviathan*], nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a way beset with those that contend, on one side for too great Liberty, and on the other side for too much Authority, ‘tis hard to passe between the points of both unwounded.52

While Hobbes’s caution concerning “too great liberty” is shared by all of his three works of political philosophy, his defence of liberty against “too much authority” is new and peculiar to *Leviathan*. Certainly, this remark on authority can be understood in connection with civil parts of *Leviathan*.53 However, also in Parts 3 and 4 of *Leviathan*, Hobbes devotes a large amount of space to the discussion of various kinds of religious authority and their foundations. Correspondingly, in *Leviathan* Hobbes’s new defence of minimal internal liberty and more famously of “Christian liberty” can be seen.54 It is true that his defence of liberty can also be found in *De Cive*. Hobbes counted securing harmless liberty of citizens, “essential to happy lives for citizens,” among the duties of the sovereign offices.55 More fundamentally, the construction of the state meant acquiring secure enjoyment of freedom, or freedom from fear of other people’s intervention or violence.56

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52 Lev, Dedication: A2r.
53 For example, one of the implications of the argument concerning the basis of the sovereign right to punish would be to deny the sovereign the authority to punish, because the sovereign’s right to punish is not the product of the authorisation in the establishment of the state. (Lev, 28: 482.) Also, against some Royalists, Hobbes specifies exceptional circumstances under which the obligation of citizens to the sovereign no longer lasts. Lev, 21: 344, 46.
54 Lev, 47: 1114, 16.
55 DC, 13:15-17.
56 DC, 10:1, 13:17.
Nonetheless, Hobbes’s several defences of religious liberty are found only in *Leviathan*. Then, it seems possible to understand this general assertion in the dedication in relation to religious affairs.

As a clue to understanding what Hobbes might have meant by the controversy over religious liberty and authority, it can be seen in the manuscript version in Chapter 18 his mention of “doctrinal factions of Presbyterians and Independents,” which in the published version is converted into “Dissenters about the liberty of Religion.”

This doctrinal dispute is what is now called the toleration controversy. This is the third aspect which is paid attention to for exploring contexts of *Leviathan*.

So far three specific contexts have been identified for understanding *Leviathan*: the enthusiasts, the fool or the political use of heaven as eternal happiness, and the toleration controversy. The next chapter will explore the identified contexts.

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57 Lev, 18: 278.
3. Contexts of *Leviathan*

3.1. Controversy over Biblical Authority

I

One of the most significant characteristics of the Civil War was that as a result of the fragmentation of Puritanism it saw the emergence of some fundamental challenges to Christian religion. Before the Civil War, religious controversies were made between Catholics and Protestants, or among English Protestants between Laudian Ariminians and Puritans about, for example, predestination. During the Civil War, authorities’ rein on schism and heresies became lax, and new radical opinions became conspicuous which challenged common basic assumptions that the parties engaged in the controversies before the war had held. One obvious example was Socinianism, which opposed the doctrine of the Trinity. More fundamentally, however, there arose some opinions which questioned and impugned, in one way or another, one of the basic principles of Christian religion, the divine authority of the Scriptures. One of them was enthusiasm, which alleged immediate revelation outside the Scriptures. Another was antiscripturism, a flat denial of biblical authority.

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1 For a balanced and reliable account of Puritanism in general, see John Spurr, *English Puritanism 1603–1689* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). Although Hobbes did not use the term “Puritanism” or “Puritans,” this term is useful for describing at the same time the continuity and change of the English religious situation before and after the outbreak of the Civil War.

2 For Hobbes’s view on these pre-war controversies, see EL, 2:6:9, 2:7:1.


5 The increasing concern with atheism in this age can be seen in this context.
Now, this chapter provides only a brief view of what radical Puritans, main proponents of these radical opinions, themselves said. Instead, it examines mainly the report of the conspicuous appearance of the radical views, and some new rational justifications for biblical authority and Christian religion as a response to the radicals, with some comparative perspective with the pre-war discussion. It is certain that some radical views existed among Puritans even before the Civil War, and that the forerunners of the radical opinions can be traced back to the early period of the Reformation. However, what was significant about the Civil War period in English history was that it was only in this era that the radical opinions became conspicuous, and that people, including Hobbes, started to consider seriously how to deal with the challenges the radicals posed.

Among people who defended the fundamental principle of Christian religion in this age, some were Puritans, while others took the side of the king and the episcopacy. The latter Anglican group were closer to Hobbes both personally and intellectually. To begin with, as a starting reference point and an example of the pre-war argument, there will be a brief examination of the discussion about the authority of the Scriptures by William Chillingworth. Then, Puritan and Anglican arguments for biblical authority during the Civil War will be investigated in turn.

This study will try to develop previous research in three respects. Firstly, many of the people to be discussed here are

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8 This distinction is provisional, because here Baxter’s work is not treated.
known as proponents of reasonable Christianity, and this chapter tries to clarify the distinctive feature of each of their reasons.\(^9\) Secondly, compared with the erudite and standard treatment of this topic by Christopher Hill, this study gives a more detailed account of each person discussed and the relationship between them.\(^10\) Thirdly, this study aims to show the specific significance of Hobbes's multi-layered and complicated discussion on biblical authority in *Leviathan* in relation to his English contemporaries.

William Chillingworth was one of the chief members of the Great Tew circle, a cultivated learned circle flourishing in the 1630s, which Hobbes himself took part in.\(^11\) Chillingworth and Hobbes were friends, and John Aubrey reports Hobbes's comment on Chillingworth's character as a fervent controversialist.\(^12\) Hobbes scholars have already discussed the relationship between Chillingworth and Hobbes, and on the topic of biblical authority, the influence of the Great Tew circle on Hobbes has been known.\(^13\)

\(^9\) It is to be noted that this examination is quite different from just comparing the definition of the “reason” each of them gives. Cf. G. E. R. Lloyd, *Magic, Reason and Experience: Studies in the Origin and Development of Greek Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).


\(^11\) For this circle in a wider perspective, H. R. Trevor-Roper, "The Great Tew Circle," in *Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans: Seventeenth Century Essays* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1987). This article covers the period from its formation to the dispersion, and examines not only intellectual but also political aspects of the circle.


Chillingworth’s most renowned work, *The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation* (1638), takes the form of the refutation of the Jesuit Edward Knott, who in turn rebutted the Laudian divine Christopher Potter, who had formerly argued against Knott’s work. Thus Chillingworth’s book is the fourth work produced in the controversy. Knott provided some standard Catholic arguments in defence of tradition, the authority of the Pope and his infallibility, and against the Protestant principle sola scriptura. Knott’s strategy was to emphasise lack of certainty in the Protestant side. He notes possible corruptions of the Hebrew text, and different readings among the copies, and as for translation, possible mistranslations and different results of translation. Then, the only way to certainty was to rely on the infallibility of the Catholic Church.\(^{14}\) Against this, Chillingworth answers that these problems are not related to the church. The problem concerning original texts can be dealt with by a basic technique of textual criticism, a collation of various copies. As for translations, learned people can examine them by comparing them with the original Hebrew text.\(^ {15}\) However, more fundamentally, Chillingworth accused Knott of demanding something impossible (equally for Catholics and Protestants) and unnecessary for salvation, that is, mathematical and absolute certainty in matters of faith.\(^ {16}\) Against this demand of Knott, Chillingworth maintains that the nature of faith admits of only moral certainty, probability or a lower degree of certainty.\(^ {17}\) This notion of moral certainty also helps to solve the problem posed in relation to the plurality of translations and copies of the Scriptures. Though some minor parts might contradict each other


\(^{15}\) Ibid., I: 179.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., I: 3, 10, 114-15, 75, 79, 84, 89, 266-67.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., I: 115, 267.
in several translations and copies, still the main part retains the unity, and the moral certainty necessary for salvation remains intact.\textsuperscript{18}

When it comes to the authority of the Bible itself, both Knott and Chillingworth agree that its foundation must be sought outside the Bible. While Knott appeals to the Catholic Church, Chillingworth refers to “the goodness of the precepts of Christianity” and to “a constant, famous, and very general tradition,” or “original and universal tradition” “descended to us from Christ” as opposed to the Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{19} He regards the universal tradition as authoritative, and says, “it is upon the authority of universal tradition that we would have them [Catholics] believe scripture.”\textsuperscript{20} Though Chillingworth defended the use of reason against the Catholic doctrine of infallibility,\textsuperscript{21} to that extent Chillingworth admitted authority. He did not develop a more detailed argument about the foundation of biblical authority than this. Here it is also to be noted that he viewed the Bible as the common principle both to Catholics and Protestants.\textsuperscript{22} He pointed out that as opposed to atheists and Jews, Christians had both Testaments as the sufficient means to determine all controversies among themselves.\textsuperscript{23} Thus it was not necessary for him to examine the foundation of the authority of the Bible in further details.

II

The Civil War saw the radicalization of Puritanism. Thomas Edwards, a well-known Presbyterian reporter of “heretical”

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 1: 175-76, 80. For Chillingworth’s use of Socinian ideas in his refutation of Catholicism, see Mortimer, \textit{Reason and Religion in the English Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism}, 67-82.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 1: 238.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 1: 235-39.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 1: 164-65, 195, 230.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 1: 271.
opinions in his age, gives a comprehensive account of what kinds of opinions there were at that time. Some of them were concerned with the authority of the Bible: “that ... the Scriptures are a dead letter, and no more to be credited than the writings of men, not divine, but humane invention” “that the Scripture, whether a true manuscript or no, whether Hebrew, Greek or English, is but humane, and so not be able to discover a divine God.”24 Yet in this report the political significance of enthusiasm was not apparent.

In the late 1640s, however, more direct justifications of the military and political action based on enthusiasm began to appear. Here we have the direct testimony of William Erbery. In his defence of the New Model Army, he characterised the Army as “the Army of God,” and put a great emphasis on the dwelling of Godhead in the body of the “saints” or soldiers.25 This dwelling, he argued, justifies the Army’s fight against the king or Parliament.26

This kind of argument is also reported by William Walwyn, a Leveller leader closely connected with the gathered churches supporting the Army. In his description of the gathered churches, the members of the churches are reported to assert that they speak “from the inward suggestion of the Spirit.”27 With this teaching of God within them, they subordinate the Scriptures to their inward spirit, “not examining their opinions by the Text, but

25 William Erbery, The Armies Defence, or, God Guarding the Camp of the Saints, and the Beloved City. Shewing, That All Oppressions in Governors, and Government Shall Case by the Appearance of God in the Saints. Whether the Appearance of God in the Army, with the Saints, Be in Contrariety or Enmity to the Good Spirit and Minde of God. Not to Rebuke an Evil Spirit in Any, but Soberly to Enquire Whether God Doth Not Act with Highest Power in the Saints, When They Are at Lowest Weakness. And Whether It Be Their Weakness to Act in This Way of Power (London: Printed by T. N. for Giles Calvers, 1648), passim.
26 Ibid., 10.
urging that the Text is to be interpreted by their Opinions and experiences.”

They also present their word as the word of God, not the word of man, “as if it were the sin of the sinnes, for men to doubt it.”

This assertion, Walwyn infers, amounts to pretending infallibility.

Though in the report of Walwyn the connection between the allegation of revelation and the political action of the gathered churches is not so clear, in our third example, which comes from Henry Hammond, the link is more marked. In his *Address to Fairfax*, Hammond urged him to consider several opinions which impelled him and the Army to proceed with their political action. The first issue Hammond raised was their reliance on the spirit of God and their belief that political action had been led by the spirit. Here Hammond sorts the problem into two cases. If the voice of the spirit is the same as the Bible, Fairfax should be able to point out the specific scriptural passages on which he relies. Yet the main problem lies in the second case, where the voice of the spirit is different from the Scriptures. Hammond’s argument here is noteworthy, because his treatment of enthusiasm is somewhat reminiscent of Hobbes’s identification of the religious problem specific to *Leviathan*. Here Hammond’s asks Fairfax to present the ground of the revelation,

so that pretended Spirit may according to the rules prescribed by God in his acknowledged Word be tried and examined regularly, whether it be of God or no? before the subject-matter of such Revelation be believed infallible.

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28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 313.
30 Ibid., 331.
31 For Hammond, see the latter part of this chapter.
33 Ibid.
Hobbes was probably dealing with this kind of political and military action based on the claim of immediate revelation.

However, enthusiasm itself was a serious challenge to most Christians, and there were several kinds of reactions to it. One was to write a heresiography about contemporary heresies and to warn people against them, as did Thomas Edwards. Another major move made by the Parliament was the enactment of the Blasphemy Act, a crackdown by legal force. However, yet another reaction which is focused on now was to offer a rational ground of the authority of the Bible. During the Civil War at least two Puritans are known to have discussed the authority of the Bible: Edward Leigh and John Goodwin.

Edward Leigh is today known mainly for his philological study of the Bible, *Critica Sacra*. Born in 1603, he received a Puritan education and by the late 1630s he himself belonged to a member of a godly circle. He was appointed a JP for the first time in 1641, and during the civil war he actively supported the Parliament as a JP, and tackled the ecclesiastical issues of the day. The work in which he discussed biblical authority is *A Treatise of Divinity*, published in 1647. His aim was to go through a difficult middle way “between the Socinians reason, and the Famalists [sic] spirit. Socinians wil have nothing but reason, no infused habits, and so they destroy the testimony of the spirit; the Familists wil have nothing but Spirit they rest wholly in an immediate private spirit.”

This suggests the difficulty for standard Presbyterians in undertaking rational defences of authority of the Bible against

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34 See John Sutton, “Edward Leigh,” ODNB.
enthusiasm. Actually, precisely because Leigh’s approach, despite his erudition, is not especially original, it reveals the difficulty all the more.

On the one hand, he kept a distance from the Socinians by limiting the scope of the arguments. He notes that it is only the holy spirit within us that provides the certainty about faith (certitudo fidei).\(^{36}\) While Chillingworth only admitted of moral certainty or probability, Leigh saw the source of solid certainty in the holy spirit. On the other hand, Leigh tried to distinguish himself from the enthusiasts. The function of the spirit was concerned about witnessing the divine authority of the Scriptures, and not about individual salvation. In addition, the spirit did not work directly for laying foundations for biblical authority, but ultimately after and combined with other rational grounds.\(^ {37}\) Furthermore, in opposition to the Catholics, he asserts that the Scriptures have authority in themselves, “not borrowed from any persons in the world.”\(^ {38}\) “The Scriptures prove themselves by their own natural light.”\(^ {39}\) This assertion was meant to refute the papist position, which saw the foundation of biblical authority in the testimony of the church.\(^ {40}\) However, this also meant that he did not want to rely on any external actors in the vindication of biblical authority as Chillingworth had done.

Though he mentioned two external factors as rational grounds, miracles and the testimony of the church in all ages, of martyrs, and of the gentiles,\(^ {41}\) Leigh was mainly concerned with the

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 23.
\(^{37}\) The spirit does not witness “that the Scripture is the word of God immediately but ultimately.” Ibid., 24.
\(^{38}\) Ibid., 25.
\(^{39}\) Ibid., 26.
\(^{40}\) Against the heathens, he makes a distinction between biblical authority itself and that in respect of us. Though the Bible is in itself divine, in human viewpoint they are divine only when people acknowledge them to be. Ibid., 10.
\(^{41}\) Ibid., 19-23.
content of the Bible. He refers to contents such as the divine and supernatural matter beyond the reach of human reason, the nature and excellency of God, the requirement of the most exact and perfect goodness, the glory of God as the end of the Scriptures, impartial commandments, lack of contradictions and so on. Or the grounds are inferences from the content, such as the fulfilment of biblical prophesies, and its antiquity based on the biblical history. Or one ground is about the style of the argument. The Bible is different from all other writings in the phrase and manner of writing. While the Bible speaks things without proof authoritatively, other authors use many arguments to confirm the truth of what they say.

Whereas Leigh had several kinds of adversaries in his mind and his argument concerning biblical authority had a composite and eclectic character, John Goodwin, another Puritan who discussed the authority of the Scriptures, made a more straightforwardly rational defence. While Goodwin is today mainly known as one of the principal proponents of toleration during the Civil War, he is also known as an advocate of rational religion, and his *Divine Authority of the Scriptures Asserted* (1648), one of his major theological works, evinces this latter feature. In contrast with Leigh, Goodwin did not mention the spirit. This would mean that Goodwin’s position could look too close to the kind of Socinians which Leigh tried to avoid. On the other hand, from Goodwin’s own viewpoint, the underlying cause of the problem in his age, the sudden appearance of people denying the authority of the Scriptures, was “dead faith.” It was people’s negligent reliance

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42 Ibid., 11-18.
44 John Goodwin, *The Divine Authority of the Scriptures Asserted, or the Great Charter of the Worlds Blessednes Vindicated. Being a Discourse of Soveraigne Use and Service in These Times: Not Only*
on their teachers, orthodox opinions, the civil sovereign and so on, or their failure to give grounds for their faith which could reply to every kind of opposition. Therefore, he advocated offering rational grounds for the article of faith without any hesitation. This work on the authority of the Bible was part of this strategy and an expression of his faith.

In addition to his neglect of spirit, another related characteristic of Goodwin’s argument is that he also failed to make such a distinction between moral certainty or probability and mathematical certainty as Chillingworth had made. It seems that Goodwin was not aware of the possibility of the absolute certainty. This might be related to the different characters of their adversaries. While Chillingworth confronted the Catholic demand for absolute certainty and denial of any other form of credibility, Goodwin was faced with the denial of the authority of the Scriptures. Even if his arguments were just relative and not conclusive, he was probably satisfied with them as long as they would contribute to the credibility of the Scriptures as the word of God. Then he provided as many pieces of evidence as he could find.

The most immediate cause of his writing this work was some criticisms against his other work in defence of toleration, *Hagiomastix*. In this work Goodwin demanded the clarification of the meaning of the word “the Scriptures” when the denial of the Scriptures as the word of God and the foundation of Christian

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religion was said to deserve capital punishments. “The Scriptures,” on the one hand, could not mean the English translation. There were different versions of the translation, contradicting each other in some parts. Also, the translation was authentic only as long as it accorded with the original. On the other hand, it could not mean the original copies. The writing was preceded by the preaching of the apostles, which was complete in itself. In addition there are again differences among copies, and possibilities of errors by the scribes. If some copies were to be perfectly divinely inspired, it would not be possible to be certain about this. In sum, the foundation of Christian religion is not any books or writings but the “substance of matter, those gracious counsels of God concerning the salvation of the world by Jesus Christ.”

Goodwin’s main argument is generally an amplification and elaboration of Leigh’s rational arguments. He divides it into both “intrinsecall” and “extrinsecall.” The former depends on the body of the Scriptures themselves, while the latter comes out of the Scriptures. Again, Goodwin divides the former internal part into subsections: 1. the phrase, language and manner of framing the Scriptures; 2. substance with divine characters. The latter external is also divided into subsections: 1. divine providence, 2. acts and saying of men in accordance with the divine providence. More specifically, he discusses the preservation of the Scriptures, the propagation of Christianity, and the fulfilling of predictions in the Scriptures, and others. As shown here, for Goodwin external factors do not signify some human actors like the Pope, but events related to the Scriptures.

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46 Goodwin, *The Divine Authority of the Scriptures Asserted*, 4-10.
47 Ibid., 10-11.
48 Ibid., 14.
49 Ibid., 17.
50 Ibid., 31.
51 Ibid., 228.
In each subsection, Goodwin picks up several topics. In the phrase or language subsection, he discusses the nature of the style, authoritative speaking, the Bible’s antiquity, and other topics. In the next subsection of the substance, Goodwin chooses topics such as a tendency to godliness, a denial of one’s own, a heart-searching character, transforming power, and wisdom. To view Goodwin’s argument about the antiquity of the Scriptures in a little more detail, he pays special attention to the parts which bear the most ancient date: the Pentateuch. Moses was the most ancient writer, more ancient than Homer, Hesiod, and the like. Goodwin accepts the view that ancient writers of the heathen borrowed from Moses when they wrote about divine things.

Goodwin oftentimes shares topics he selects with Leigh, but he amplifies and elaborates the structure of the argument. First he shows what the Bible teaches, for example, godliness. Then he connects the teaching of godliness with the assertion that the Bible is from God, not from men. In this second part, Goodwin takes into account possible rival opinions, a major feature of his argument. Firstly, he frequently admits that heathen philosophers taught similar things to a certain extent. Yet the teaching and power of the Bible is beyond the limit of human wisdom. Secondly, he considers factors which hinder people from believing. For example, reports which contain contradictions are not likely to be believed. In this respect he acknowledges that the Bible, with superficial contradictions, is on the surface not in a good position. Thirdly, he gives consideration to the rival claim of Islam, another positive and powerful religion. Goodwin’s answer is that the success of Islam owes its fitness to human natural disposition, while the greatness of Christianity lies in its propagation despite its teaching being opposed to human carnal

52 Ibid., 41-48.
53 For example, ibid., 75-77, 99-100, 138.
54 Ibid., 279-84.
55 Ibid., 296-305.
nature. This concern with the heathens can also be seen in his discussion about the sin of unbelievers.\textsuperscript{56} While people who can access the teaching of the Gospel have means to believe, it might sound unreasonable to talk about the sin of unbelief concerning those who cannot. Goodwin answers that those who cannot access the Gospel have still sufficient means of believing in God based on the providence of God. The concern with the heathens, together with the clarification of the meaning of the “Scriptures,” is, it can be said, his contribution to the controversy over the authority of the Scriptures.

III

Next let us turn from the Puritans to two Anglicans who considered the foundation of Christian religion after 1640: Seth Ward and Henry Hammond. Ward published his work on biblical authority in 1652,\textsuperscript{57} and Hammond, well-known as one of the main intellectual founders of the Church of England in the Restoration era, published \textit{Of the Reasonableness of Christian Religion} in 1650.\textsuperscript{58} Both of them were intellectually closer to Hobbes than Leigh or Goodwin; while Ward probably wrote the epistle of \textit{Humane Nature}, the former part of \textit{The Elements of Law} containing Hobbes’s epistemological analysis of human nature and published in 1650,\textsuperscript{59} Hammond was, like

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 183-88.
\textsuperscript{57} For a biographical account of his life, see John Henry, “Seth Ward,” ODNB.
\textsuperscript{58} It is certain that he was energetically engaged in the defence of the Church of England in the difficult period. Trevor-Roper, “The Great Tew Circle,” 219-27; Mortimer, Reason and Religion in the English Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism, 129-37. However, it should be noted that this work was not the vindication for the Church of England against Puritans, but that of Christian religion in general against radical scepticism. Here we do not agree with Hugh de Quehen, who views this work in relation to the cause of the Church of England. “Henry Hammond,” ODNB. For Mortimer’s treatment of this work, see ibid., 127-28.
\textsuperscript{59} Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and
Chillingworth, a chief member of the Great Tew circle. Moreover, both of them were the earliest commentators on Leviathan. This indicates that they were anxious to catch up with the intellectual journey of Hobbes, if not to absorb his ideas.

The fact that Ward and Hammond published their works on biblical authority or the foundation of Christianity almost at the same time as Hobbes indicates that Hobbes’s new consideration of this topic was a product of the new religious situation in which principles of Christian religion were called into question. Though Ward’s work was published later than Leviathan, and he included some comments on Leviathan in the introduction, this comment was probably added at the last stage, and the main part of this work was written independent of Leviathan. Ward says that he spent several years writing the work, “destitute of the assistance of his Bookes,” and that he had no leisure nor intention to alter his argument even after he knew that other people dealt with the same topic. Moreover, the influence of Leviathan cannot be seen in Ward’s main discussion. Then, this work, like Hammond’s, can be seen as a kind of a parallel to Leviathan, dealing with a similar topical theme, fundamental principles of Christian religion.

The two Anglicans had some features common to the Puritans discussed so far. Both of them found some role in miracles in the justification for biblical authority. This view on miracles, as will be seen later, is one of the main differences between them and Hobbes. Also, in contrast with Chillingworth, who could point out that both he and his adversary Knott had the Bible as a common


60 See Hugh de Quehen, “Henry Hammond,” ODNB.
63 Ibid., sig. A2v.
principle, Ward was clearly aware, similar to Leigh, that in the current dispute, the Bible as the common principle among Christians was under threat and in need of a renewed justification. Ward says that his adversary is “those who believe too little, and not those who believe too much,” that is to say, the Catholic Church.64 This remark, like Leigh’s, indicates the change of the religious context before and after the outbreak of the civil war.

On the other hand, the approach of the Anglicans to biblical authority was, generally speaking, quite distinct from the Puritans. While the Puritans relied mainly on the content of the Bible as the grounds of biblical authority, the Anglicans took a historical approach, viewing the problem of biblical authority as a matter of fact, of which neither Leigh nor Goodwin were aware.65 This was partly related to the fact that the Anglicans were aware of the challenge of a more radical type of scepticism and tried to respond to it.

Ward’s argument provides a good reference point. Though he was aware of the kind of argument Leigh and Goodwin offered, he himself did not take this approach.66 It is true that he does not deny the efficacy of those other arguments. However, the fact that he adopted a historical approach and this approach only suggests that he found his own approach both sufficient and most convincing.

In particular, his division of the Scriptures into doctrinal and historical parts indicates that Ward was aware that the relevant pieces of evidence for biblical authority were limited. The main foundation for biblical authority is concerned with the historical

64 Ibid., 79-80.
65 For this approach in general, see a useful article, Levine, ”Matter of Fact in the English Revolution.” He makes a careful analysis of Ward and Hammond in ibid., 322-29. We have clarified further the relationship between this approach and others in the age. Yet ideally, a comparison with Grotius should also be made.
parts, and especially with the reliability of the narrator of the doctrine. This focus on the historical part, in turn, suggests that the presentation of the doctrine itself leaves room for doubt. Ward gives the examples of Moses and Jesus Christ, the central and most important people in the Christian religion. From Ward’s sceptical viewpoint, even their claim of divine authority, so far as they depended only on the doctrine, was just a pretension of divine doctrines.\(^67\) Though this sceptical attitude was only a short concession and soon followed by the main evidence, manifest miracles,\(^68\) it plays a great part in the limitation of relevant evidence. This sceptical attitude also incidentally reveals the merit of paying attention to pretenders of the word of God, in contrast to books as in the case of Goodwin. In Goodwin’s contrast between books from humans and books from God, the ambiguity of pretended prophets or biblical authors as human narrators of the pretended divine word remains hidden.

Ward’s preliminary scepticism was probably influenced by scepticism in his age. To his eyes what characterised his age was scepticism or allegation of uncertainty, even concerning fundamental principles of religion, including Christian religion. The method he took for confronting this challenge was to demonstrate from the “common Elements and Fundamentals,” and to “leade on the weakest from such things as they themselves cannot deny, to the acknowledgement of the mysteries of our faith, and to the practice and injuncions of our Religion.”\(^69\) The recourse to “elements” as a way of overcoming general scepticism can also be seen in Hobbes.\(^70\) Thus it is quite understandable that Ward was interested in Hobbes’s intellectual enterprise. It also

\(^{67}\) Ibid., 84, 86.
\(^{68}\) Ibid., 84-88.
\(^{69}\) Ibid., 3.
\(^{70}\) The full title of De Cive, his first published scientific work of political science, is Elementa philosophica, de cive. DC, 89. For Hobbes and scepticism, see Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651, esp. 283-310.
shows that the kind of scepticism which Ward replied to was rather radical, requiring “the weakest” to be led.

This awareness of the challenge of radical scepticism is found not only in Ward but also in Hammond. In Hammond’s eyes, there was a trend in his age of “disputing and questioning the most established truths,” rather than the deductions from the principles.\(^71\) Thus, “the foundation itself” of the Christian religion, or “Christianity itself” was now under the attack of such radical scepticism.\(^72\) To reply to the scepticism, Hammond took a historical approach, also similar to Ward. Both of them paid particular attention to the apostles in the New Testament,\(^73\) and tried to show the reliability of their accounts or narration.

However, the type of historical approach was different from each other. Ward compared the New Testament with ordinary historical writings, and showed the greater reliability of the reports of the apostle. Hammond, on the other hand, based his argument on divine testimonies, and in particular focused on the two most “authentic” ones: the voice from heaven and the descent of the holy spirit.\(^74\) His main concern was the divine revelation to the apostles.

The difference between them was related to the fact that while Hammond responded to the most sceptical type of argument, Ward replied to both scepticism and enthusiasm or


\(^72\) Ibid.

\(^73\) Hammond scarcely treated the Old Testament. Ward did handle the Old Testament, but he was mainly concerned with the transmission of the text from the age of the first reception among Jews to his era, and from Jews to Christians. (Ward, *A Philosophicall Essay*, 119-37. The different ways of demonstration for the Old and New Testament is a distinctive feature of Ward.) So far as he did not examine the direct report of revelation but only the human transmission of the report, this part moved away from the crux of the matter. The point that Christ did not doubt the text of the Old Testament may be strong, but it depends on the case for the New Testament.

\(^74\) Hammond, *The Miscellaneous Theological Works*, 8-9, 12.
antinomianism. In his view, both of them are connected. The rise of scepticism in his age and lack of a sufficient answer to scepticism made people recourse to the spirit.\textsuperscript{75} However, this reliance on the spirit for the faith in biblical authority, says Ward, brought forth “diverse prodigies lately broken into the Church.”\textsuperscript{76} The prodigious men inferred in the following way: believers in the Gospel have the holy spirit, the sole sufficient foundation of the faith, but people with the spirit are free from sin. Therefore, believers are free from sin, and may commit injustices such as murder or adultery.\textsuperscript{77}

Hammond, seeking the kind of certainty which would withstand radical scepticism, found his evidence in infallible divine testimonies in contrast with fallible human ones.\textsuperscript{78} However, his reliance on divine revelation makes his argument vulnerable to the challenge of enthusiasm. Ward’s argument, mainly limited to merely human matters, is invulnerable to that.

Then, how did Ward show the greater credibility of the New Testament compared with other historical writings, without recourse to divine issues? Firstly, Ward examines the reliability of historical evidence in general, and shows criteria applicable not

\textsuperscript{75} Ward, \textit{A Philosophicall Essay}, 76-77.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 77.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 78. The reference to the specific argument suggests that although the work treats three topics (the existence and providence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the authority of the Scriptures), he was most concerned with the third theme. In the former parts, his adversaries are called in general terms such as “Epicurians,” or “Machiavellians,” and they had been known for a long time. The third part was also irregular in the way of reasoning. While in the former two questions his approach was philosophical, in the justification of biblical authority he looked at it historically.

Seeing Ward included the immortality of soul not in the section about Christian religion but about religion in general, it makes sense that he later called Hobbes “atheist.” Parkin suggests Ward was afraid of his association with Hobbes, but it should also be noted that his refutation of Hobbes was in that sense a serious defence of his own belief. Parkin, \textit{Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700}, 117-18.
\textsuperscript{78} Hammond, \textit{The Miscellaneous Theological Works}, 8.
only to the New Testament but also to other historical writings. His criteria are no obvious contradiction to some natural principles, outward events of things as the objects of common sense as opposed to secret or indiscernible causes of the events, the narrator’s access to the event, and the narrator’s integrity.\textsuperscript{79} The narration in the New Testament, Ward asserts, meets the criteria in every respect.\textsuperscript{80} The subject matter was what Christ did and spoke, and thus easily to be known, as opposed to the motive of Christ. Moreover, the performances and speeches were mostly public acts, and left enough room for contradiction in the case of false reports. In addition, the apostles as narrators were direct eyewitnesses of actions of Christ or their fellows. Finally, as for the integrity of the narrator, Ward maintains that the integrity of the apostle is rather greater than other historians. The general principle is that unless the narrator is known to be corrupt or there is some visible benefit the narrator can gain by lying, the integrity can be assumed. However, far from acquiring any pleasure or reputation, the apostles suffered to death, and gained a terrible reputation among the Jews and the Greeks.

So far Ward’s judgement is certainly based on the criteria applicable to all historical writings. When Ward tries to show the greater reliability of the apostles and refers to special features of the apostles, however, he begins to rely on divine matters, such as miracles as a testimony of God himself and the fulfilling of the predictions the apostles made.\textsuperscript{81} Nevertheless, Ward’s argument is much less reliant on divine revelation, and less susceptible to the challenge of enthusiasm than Hammond’s.

On the other hand, Hammond’s argument has its own great merit: he responds to two types of most sceptical question reminiscent of Cartesian doubt, and shows the unreasonableness

\textsuperscript{79} Ward, \textit{A Philosophicall Essay}, 90-93.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 100-5.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 114-18.
of such scepticism. The first asks “whether there were even indeed heard such voices.” Hammond regards this question as “a matter of fact,” and offers a theoretical explanation for the limitation of attainable certainty about this kind of matter. The revelation is necessarily confined in specific time and place. As for place, Jesus, being one person, could not be everywhere. Moreover, if people all over the world were to receive some revelation, people in the next and future generation would have to rely on the testimony of the current generation. For those who do not live in the age of revelation, there is no other reasonable evidence than the testimony: another new voice of heaven, apart from being unnecessary and improper, would be doubtful again for the next generation. Certainly God immediately reveals some important truth. However, once the revelation is repeated and made certain, the content of the revelation is conveyed sufficiently by human means. To demand any higher testimony such as continued voice from heaven for daily assurance would be unreasonable; it would be a confusion of knowledge with belief. In everyday life or businesses, though people do not demand grounds or demonstration for every action, still they are thought to be reasonable. In a similar way it is sensible to believe the report of the apostles without demanding demonstration, so far as the report has credibility.

The second sceptical argument poses the possibility of the delusion of the hearers. Hammond divides the sceptics into theists

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84 In the next chapter, a matter of fact, as opposed to supernatural truths, is placed within the sphere of human reason. Ibid., 32.
85 Ibid., 19.
86 Ibid., 21.
and those who only admit the Old Testament such as the Jew. To
the former he replies that there is no greater assurance
imaginable than the voice from heaven or the descent of the holy
spirit, and thus that if this sceptical argument is valid, “there
could be no way for God to reveal Himself to man.”87 “If all the
ways God can use be not able to give assurance that it is God that
speaks, what are we the nearer for knowing that God cannot lie,
as long as there is supposed for us no way to know what at any
time he saith?”88 As for the second type of people, Hammond calls
their attention to the similarity of the revelation in the New
Testament to the types of revelation in the Old Testament. If they
had been present at the moment of the revelation described in the
New Testament, there would have been no room left for any
further doubt. After answering these two types of sceptics, he
mentions several ways of distinguishing real and delusive voices:
concordance with acknowledged divine predictions, and with
divine truths, and miracles casting out devils.

IV

Finally, some preliminary thought will be given to the
relationship between the works examined so far and *Leviathan*.
First of all, apart from Chillingworth, who wrote before the Civil
War, the four people investigated in this thesis emphasised their
time, the Civil War period as the chief background of their works,
mentioning radical sceptics and the enthusiasts. Against the
backdrop of these views on the religious situation of the age and
corresponding answers, it is not surprising that Hobbes provided
in *Leviathan* his renewed analysis of the enthusiasts and the
authority of the Bible. Still, the characteristics of Hobbes’s view
on the religious problem in his age should not be missed. For
Hobbes’s contemporaries, the problem of biblical authority,

87 Ibid., 26.
88 Ibid.
however serious it might be, was a matter of faith, or at the widest, of morals; it was not a matter of politics, violence or civil war. On the other hand, with his insight into de facto domination of pretended prophets over their followers, Hobbes connected two characteristics of the Civil War period, the revolt against the king and the emergence of radical religious opinions.89

In the second place, with regard to the method of proving biblical authority, *Leviathan* has some newly introduced passages which remind us of the factual approach. Firstly, in the discussion of faith, Hobbes compared the credibility of the Bible as the word of God and the allegation of pretended prophets to that of other historical writings.90 The implication of the comparison, though, is contrasted between Hobbes and Ward or Hammond. While the latter invoked the reliability of historical writings to show that of the Bible, Hobbes, to provide a further illustration of the precise object of belief or unbelief concerning the allegation of the word of God, gives an example of casting doubt on a passage about divine matters in historical writings. Hobbes’s comparison in turn induces readers to realize what it would mean precisely to doubt the authority of the Bible or pretended prophets. This can be seen as part of Hobbes’s strategy to encourage a sceptical attitude towards pretended prophets as will be seen later.

Secondly, Hobbes in *Leviathan* makes a clear contrast between two kinds of knowledge, one of fact in history and one of “the Consequences of one Affirmation to another” in philosophy.91 In *The Elements of Law*, Hobbes had already distinguished history and “the sciences.”92 In his reply to Thomas White’s *De Mundo* also written in around 1643, Hobbes contrasted historical with

90 Lev, 7: 102.
91 Lev, 9: 124.
philosophical knowledge. It is certain that already at this stage, the notion of philosophical knowledge was as clear as in *Leviathan*. However, history was seen as a narration, and the contrast of two kinds of knowledge and the notion of history as knowledge of fact were not clarified. ⁹³ On the other hand, the new contrast in *Leviathan* clarified the relationship between factual matters and philosophy. This clarification can be seen as a part of a response to the factual approach to biblical authority. Actually, the new contrast was used in Hobbes’s investigation as to the antiquity of the Scriptures, a topic traditionally regarded as related to biblical authority. Here, Hobbes first shows that the two types of investigation above were insufficient. Natural reason concerns consequences and not fact, while the “testimony of other History” is not sufficient in this case. ⁹⁴ Then he goes on to the new third way of investigation peculiar to Part 3 of *Leviathan*, reasoning from “the Bookes themselves.” ⁹⁵ However, here what is suggestive in relation to the factual approach to biblical authority is the notion of testimony. Hobbes uses this concept again in relation to the authority of Moses, denying Moses’ own “testimony” as a valid ground for it. ⁹⁶ This suggests that Hobbes was aware that the problem of pretended prophets could be seen as that of testimony.

Later there will be a more detailed discussion about the significance of *Leviathan* against the background which has been investigated. Nevertheless, the preliminary consideration so far

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⁹⁴ Lev, 33: 588.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ For a detailed analysis of this topic, see 3.1. in this thesis.
indicates amply that *Leviathan* can be seen against this background in the first place.
3.2. Anglican Defences of Toleration

The second context this thesis will investigate is the Anglican defences of toleration as a part of the toleration controversy. The toleration controversy during the civil war was mainly conducted among Puritans. When dealing with *Leviathan*, this thesis will examine some particular arguments which can be seen as a response to the Puritan toleration controversy. However, the Civil War also saw a remarkable Anglican defence of toleration by Jeremy Taylor. It was his plea for toleration rather than Puritan tolerationists’ that, it seems, had possibly the greatest influence on *Leviathan*. Furthermore, there is a good possibility that Taylor’s case for toleration itself was influenced by Hobbes’s earlier works of political philosophy. Therefore, the main focus of this chapter will be on Taylor’s intellectual achievement, and not on the Puritan toleration controversy, except for one major feature of radical tolerationists about which they and Hobbes in *Leviathan* could share their opinions.\(^1\) In the concluding part of


Leviathan, Hobbes admits the novelty of some of his religious views and defends it in relation to his age, the Civil War.

In that part which treateth of a Christian Common-wealth, there are some new doctrines, which, it may be, in a State where the contrary were already fully determined, were a fault for a Subject without leave to divulge, as being an usurpation of the place of a Teacher. But in this time, that men call not onely for Peace, but also for Truth, to offer such Doctrines as I think True, and that manifestly tend to Peace and Loyalty, to the consideration of those that are yet in deliberation, is no more, but to offer New Wine, to bee put into New Cask, that both may be preserved together.

Milton and Goodwin, two major tolerationists, envisaged an era of further discovery of new truths. They not only advocated the toleration of sectarians as proponents of new religious ideas, but were themselves keen to absorb novel ideas, thereby diverting from orthodox Puritan ideas. Radical Puritans in general advanced new opinions, or “new light.” This willingness to absorb and propose new ideas was also expressed by Hobbes. Both Hobbes and radical Puritans were also of the view that new and unpopular truth had the power to win against falsehood held by the majority in a fair fight by itself and without any social assistance.

However, they disagreed about the function of truth in relation to peace. Puritans accused the Royalists of their false religion, and conducted war with them. For Puritans, peace without the

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2 Lev, conclusion: 1139.

truth of religion was meaningless. On the other hand, for Hobbes, truth always promotes peace. “Doctrine repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be against the Law of Nature.” One of the main tasks for Hobbes in *Leviathan* was to dismantle the idea of the war for the truth of religion advocated by Puritans. How he did it will be seen later.

Before turning to the argument of both Hobbes and Taylor concerning toleration, it is necessary to examine another person that both of them probably took into account, William Chillingworth: for by clarifying their differences from Chillingworth, their specific ingenuity can be appreciated. On the other hand, Taylor and Chillingworth had some common characteristics as Anglican defences of toleration as distinct from Puritan ones. First, while Puritans detested Roman Catholics, and, like Milton, frequently excluded them from the scope of toleration, Anglicans took into serious consideration the

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5 Lev, 18: 272.

6 The keener sense of the union of truth and peace, in turn, led Hobbes to a harder view on the pre-war England. “Those men that are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre: and their condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for fear of one another.” (Ibid.) The fact that the Royalists had to raise the army to defend the Episcopacy and Anglican doctrines suggested that the pre-war England was not in peace. This view is harsher than that in *De Cive*, where Hobbes, more close to the common notion of war, distinguished the breaking out of the Civil War from the pre-war controversies about government as forerunners of war. DC, 82.


toleration of Catholics. Secondly, while Puritans were intolerant of the Episcopal government in the 1630s, required further reformation, fought war with the Royalists and acquired political power, Anglicans did not share these typical Puritan assumptions.

Chillingworth’s principal theoretical device for promoting toleration in his main work, *The Religion of Protestants*, was the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental matters. While Christians disagree about non-fundamental matters, they can and do agree about fundamental matters. Chillingworth found the cause of religious division and conflict in overemphasising the difference among religious parties. Therefore, this distinction, by minimising the significance about non-fundamental issues and drawing attention to the agreement about fundamental issues, served to ease the division among Christians.

There remain, however, differences about non-fundamental issues. As for these, Chillingworth exhorted mutual toleration and charity. He supported this idea mainly in the following two ways. In the first place, Chillingworth distinguished civil and religious controversies. He provided several grounds for this distinction. Here two main arguments are given attention. One is that while in civil cases the judge has compulsory power, in religious cases this coercive power is unfit to convince people of doctrines; it can only force people to profess what they do not believe, which makes people hypocrites. The other is that in civil controversies people only have to show external obedience to the judge, while in

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11 Ibid., 2: 58.

12 Ibid., 1: 216, 404; 2: 58.

13 Ibid., 1: 171-74.
religious ones people are required to believe the judge. However, then the judge has to be infallible. Both of these two points are closely related to the following second case for toleration.

In the second place, he rebutted the view that some religious authority, especially the Pope, could always give the right answer to religious problems or settle controversies without any error. If this position were allowed, it would mean that parties opposing that authority were in defiance of religious truth. Yet the Scriptures did not give any clear answer to questions about non-fundamental issues.\textsuperscript{14} Then no one, perhaps apart from the apostles, can be infallible about them.\textsuperscript{15} The lack of certain means to attain truth has implications both for toleration and the condition of salvation. As for toleration, although the ending of religious controversies and the unity of opinion is desirable, there is no certain means to attain this goal. Diversity of opinion among Christians is inevitable, and the only attainable unity is unity of charity towards each other.\textsuperscript{16} From each actor’s viewpoint, this would mean accepting their opponents without compromising their own principles. On the social level, it seems that this mutual toleration would imply a political society comparable to an ancient republic in which “the contest could be carried on according to rules and with some sense of shared values and mutual respect,” and where “antagonists could respect each other.”\textsuperscript{17}

This lack of certainty also has implications for salvation. Chillingworth combines his insight that there is no certain way to reach truth with the assumption that God does not require for salvation anything impossible or unreasonable.\textsuperscript{18} Therefore, he

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 1: 33, 119.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 1: 341-43, 54.
\textsuperscript{17} J. G. A. Pocock, \textit{Barbarism and Religion}, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 20-23. Thus, due to some pre-existing conditions in early modern Europe, toleration in this sense virtually meant political liberty.
concludes, what is necessary for salvation is not to find truth itself but rather to endeavour, with honesty and the utmost effort, to find truth.\textsuperscript{19} Even if the best human effort happens to lead people into errors, people will be absolved.\textsuperscript{20} On the other hand, what is surely damnable is hypocrisy.\textsuperscript{21} Therefore, Chillingworth severely accused Roman Catholics of imposing their religious doctrines and denying liberty of conscience.\textsuperscript{22} However, this espousal of an honest endeavour to find truth did not mean that Chillingworth found religious errors irrelevant to salvation. He often said that the errors of Catholics were damnable by themselves; they were just pardonable because of human frailty such as ignorance, general repentance, and confession of fundamental articles of faith.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, Chillingworth defended the division of Protestants from Catholics; the plea for toleration did not mean dismissing significant divergences among Christian parties.

As for fundamental matters, though for Chillingworth the right opinion about them was necessary for salvation, he did not specify what they were. It is not necessary because severing fundamentals from non-fundamentals is so difficult that people who attempt this task will not have any certainty.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, people who believe all things in the Scriptures believe all fundamental articles of faith, since all of them are included in the Bible.\textsuperscript{25} This is an implicit faith in Christ or in the Scriptures, comparable to the implicit faith in the Roman Church.\textsuperscript{26}

Still, he did specify some features of fundamental matters. In the first place, they are clearly written in the Scriptures and can

\begin{footnotes}
\item[19] Ibid., 1: 169, 71-72, 248, 319; 2: 79.
\item[20] Ibid., 1: 124. The utmost effort to find truth implies following the Scriptures, not any private man. This is the meaning of his famous understanding of the religion of Protestants as the Bible. Ibid., 2: 409-10.
\item[21] Ibid., 1: 33, 157, 2: 38-39, 194.
\item[22] Ibid., 1: 124, 319; 2: 88, 220, 68.
\item[23] Ibid., 1: 88.
\item[24] Ibid., 1: 88.
\end{footnotes}
be understood by the simplest people, while non-fundamental matters are left ambiguous in the Bible.\textsuperscript{27} In the second place, all of the fundamental articles are included in the creed of the apostles.\textsuperscript{28} Furthermore, Chillingworth sometimes refers to quite specific doctrines. The faith in Jesus Christ is included in the fundamental articles.\textsuperscript{29} The difficult one is the doctrine of the Trinity. It is certain that Chillingworth did not clearly exclude anti-Trinitarians from salvation, but on the other hand he refuted this doctrine and did not explicitly include the doctrine of the Trinity in non-fundamental matters.\textsuperscript{30}

II

In \textit{Elements of Law} and \textit{De Cive} Hobbes was already engaged with the issue of toleration.\textsuperscript{31} It is certain that Hobbes did not defend religious pluralism in these works,\textsuperscript{32} and that finding in human desire for honour the source of religious division, he identified the heart of the religious problem as the pluralism of scriptural interpretation.\textsuperscript{33} Nevertheless, his theoretical effort is

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 1: 32-33, 124, 233.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 2: 46-47.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 1: 247-48; 2: 72-73.
\textsuperscript{32} In the preface of the second edition of \textit{De Cive}, Hobbes himself said that sectarian who demanded liberty of conscience were opposed to him. (DC, 84.) Incidentally, it is an interesting but difficult problem to identify who were the sectarians mentioned here, since only the learned people closely related to Mersenne or Hobbes could read the first edition of this work.
\textsuperscript{33} DC, 18:1. Hobbes himself was aware of the general intolerance of his age and mentioned it to support his case. “Who is there differing in opinion from another, and thinking himself to be in the right, and the other in the
concerned with toleration in two respects. In the first place, Hobbes handled the demand for liberty of conscience; for this demand could be a pretext of sedition or disobedience, as both Chillingworth and Knot acknowledged. Secondly, the adversaries of Hobbes and of tolerationists had common features. All of Catholics, Presbyterians and sectarians were opposed to religious opinions other than themselves and abhorred compromising with the others. From the viewpoint of the sovereign, this meant that all of them, even if they did not advocate sedition, often allowed passive obedience. However, Hobbes strove to contain every form of disobedience. Therefore, both Hobbes and tolerationists aimed at the coexistence of religious parties who shunned compromising with the others.

Hobbes developed Chillingworth’s case for toleration in two aspects. Firstly, while Chillingworth did not specify the fundamental articles, Hobbes not only made clear what was included in them but also reduced the fundamental creeds to the minimum. His fundamental article of faith in Jesus as Christ covers almost all Christians, though, interestingly, in The Elements of Law he excluded Arianism from the domain of his fundamental article of faith. Although Hobbes did not espouse religious pluralism in The Elements of Law, this fundamental article, like that of Chillingworth, had the consequence that it reduced the significance of divisions among Christian sects.

wrong, that would not think it reasonable, if he be of the same opinion that the whole state alloweth, that the other should submit his opinion also thereunto?” EL, 2:6:13.


35 For his denial of the distinction between passive and active disobedience, see DC, 14:23.


37 EL, 2:6:6. In De Cive, it seems Hobbes stopped including in the fundamental article the notion of Christ as the son of God or as the Godhead, while he continued to refer to a Trinitarian idea in this work. DC, 17:4, 18:5.
Moreover, Hobbes went further than Chillingworth in maintaining that controversies unrelated to the fundamental one were irrelevant to salvation, because this assertion implicitly denied the notion of damnable errors, which even Chillingworth retained.\(^{38}\) To that extent, this argument overlaps with the case for toleration.

Secondly, Hobbes saw a contradiction in Chillingworth’s case for toleration and his support for church government. One of the difficulties about the plea for toleration was to find how to deal with controversies. Chillingworth’s main solution was to distinguish civil and religious disputes and to allow people to follow their own interpretation of the Bible about religious issues. However, after mentioning the type of position Chillingworth asserted, that is, the obedience to the Scriptures, Hobbes acutely points out, “Why should there be any church government at all instituted, if the Scripture itself could do the office of a judge in controversies of faith?”\(^{39}\) If Chillingworth’s solution really worked well, it would dispense with church government. However, whether Catholicism or Anglicanism, Chillingworth always supported some kind of church government.

In *De Cive* Hobbes clarified his view about religious controversies. In spite of the peculiar nature of religion, religious disputes have in common with civil ones that both of them arise from human desire for honour and thus are potentially very dangerous for the political order.\(^{40}\) Then the authority of the civil sovereign ends both types of controversies. Though Chillingworth argued that religious as opposed to civil judgement had to be believed, Hobbes denied this characterisation of religious judgement; apart from the fundamental article of faith, all that Christian subjects had to do in response to the authority’s

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40 DC, 1:5, 18:14.
settlement concerning religious disputes was in relation to external obedience, not internal belief.\textsuperscript{41}

III

Taylor’s case for toleration was one of the most significant ones during the Civil War. In relation to previous studies about Taylor’s well-known work, \textit{Liberty of Prophesying} (1647), what this thesis suggests here is to identify precisely specific features of his defence of toleration among his contemporaries, and in particular to explore the possible mutual influence which Taylor and Hobbes had on each other concerning toleration.\textsuperscript{42}

General features of Taylor’s intellectual effort can be grasped from several viewpoints. Like Hobbes, Taylor took into account all Christian parties from Catholics to sectarians. Moreover Taylor, writing during the Civil War, went further than Hobbes in emphasising the pluralism of Christian parties, which Hobbes also began to mention in \textit{Leviathan} as will be seen later. This important feature means that Taylor could not construct his argument in the form of the refutation of one particular position as Chillingworth or Goodwin did. Although both of them advocated toleration, their works were at the same time defences of their particular positions against other particular Christian parties such as Catholics or Presbyterians: they were one of the direct participants in the controversies among Christian parties. On the other hand, Hobbes and Taylor, taking into consideration controversies among pluralistic Christian parties and each of

\textsuperscript{41} EL, 2:6:10; DC, 18:11.

Though Sommerville regards Taylor as only one of the tolerationists in the age, he also discusses the topic of Hobbes and Taylor on toleration. Sommerville, \textit{Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context}, 153-56.
their cases, offered a theory which attempted to appeal to deep assumptions common to all of the parties and to change the assumptions. In short, their works were markedly theoretical.

The theoretical feature of Taylor’s work can also be explained by comparing him with Puritan tolerationists in general. Unlike Puritans, he tried to include Catholics in the scope of toleration. He could not appeal to Protestant causes and ideals such as further reformation or the authority of Luther which Puritan tolerationists often appealed to. Nor could he use directly his contemporary issues like Puritans, which various parties viewed in various contradictory ways. Thus, he usually referred only to the assumption acceptable to all Christians, to the examples of primitive Christianity and fathers quite far from his contemporary and controversial world, which led to the theoretical vein of his work.

In comparison with Puritan defence of toleration, Taylor’s case for mutual toleration was also conspicuous in its consistent plea for peace. Puritans, including radical tolerationists, were intolerant in the sense that they fought readily against the Royalists for the sake of their “true” religion.

Furthermore, what is to be noted here is that his concern was mainly with mutual toleration, rather than with the toleration of the magistrate towards minority “heretics.” Here Taylor took over Chillingworth’s concern of mutual toleration between Catholics and Protestants rather than Hobbes’ solution, despite their common assumption of the pluralistic disunion of Christian parties and their common aim, peace. Hobbes’s way of achieving peace was first of all to divide religious matters into the one fundamental article and the other non-fundamental issues and then to contain disunion and controversies about non-fundamental matters by the church government with the civil sovereign at the top. However, during the civil war, the established church government was demolished, and the right of
the civil sovereign faced serious challenges. In this unprecedented situation, instead of the authority of the civil sovereign and the church government, Taylor advocated rather mutual toleration like Chillingworth and offered new theoretical devices to contain dissensions about non-fundamentals. In this advocacy, Taylor often made new uses of the notion of charity, one of his major distinctive characteristics. This reflects Taylor’s consistent pursuit of peace in the Civil War and his view on lack of charity as the cause of the war.  

Finally another significant feature of Taylor’s argument can be noted. As will be seen soon, when he constructed his sophisticated argument, Taylor absorbed numerous important arguments of Chillingworth, Hobbes, and Puritan tolerationists. All in all, this absorption of his contemporary ideas from various parties, together with his broad viewpoint and theoretical vein, made Taylor’s work one of the most sophisticated defences of toleration which the Civil War saw. It is no wonder that in Restoration England his work “became one of the most frequently cited tolerationist works by Anglicans and dissenters alike,” apart from the fact that this was a rare defence of toleration by an Anglican.

Taylor’s particular achievements lie, generally speaking, in four respects. Following Hobbes, Taylor made clear that the fundamental article was only one: faith in Jesus as Christ.

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44 To cite one example here, some of Taylor’s arguments are quite similar to the central argument of Milton. WT, 350-54, 57-58.


46 It is remarkable that, to prove this, both of them refer to the same biblical passages (John 11:27, 20:31, 1 John 4:2 Acts 8:37, Rom 10:9). (EL, 2:6:8; DC, 18:5, 9, 10; WT, 369.) But, moreover, there is a good possibility that Taylor knew not only *The Elements of Law* but also *De Cive*. Taylor refers to two topics peculiar to *De Cive*. One is the aim of the writers of the
However, Taylor more explicitly denied deductions from the fundamental article the status of the article of faith. More importantly, however, while Hobbes just demanded obedience to the civil sovereign concerning so-called articles of faith other than the fundamental one, Taylor began to question the legitimacy of articles of faith about non-fundamental issues. He found the source of the religious problem in making new articles of confession or faith about non-fundamental matters. Although Chillingworth similarly accused Catholics of making new articles of faith, Taylor introduced new viewpoints. In the first place, while Chillingworth regarded this creation as tyrannical, as the unnecessary augmentation of Christ’s easy yoke, Taylor found it inconsistent with charity. Creating new articles of faith implies condemning into damnation people, including the fathers, who would be saved before. Secondly, Taylor extended the scope of Chillingworth’s criticism to any article of faith other than the sole fundamental one. Then Taylor changed Chillingworth’s implicit faith in the Scriptures into the implicit faith in the apostles’ creed, and preferred it to “any explication” by which “the church should be troubled with questions and uncertain determinations.”

Thus, even such a basic doctrine as the doctrine of the Trinity established in the Nicene Council was, for Taylor, though true, problematical as an article of faith in so far as it was a restraint on the religious liberty retained in the first ages of Christianity. Here Taylor markedly went beyond Chillingworth and Hobbes before *Leviathan*. Taylor’s first argument was that it was a matter of “niceties” and was not thought to be a matter of faith at

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Gospels, and the other is the fundamental article as the foundation of the church. DC, 18:6, 9: WT, 377.

47 WT, 374.
48 Ibid., 466-80, 602.
50 WT, 409.
that time.\textsuperscript{51} It was also possible to determine the question by way of exposition of the apostles’ creed, not by the increase of the creed.\textsuperscript{52} Actually, at that time it was pretended to be an exposition.\textsuperscript{53} Taylor himself explicitly left room for salvation for anti-Trinitarians.\textsuperscript{54} After all, they retained the apostles’ creed. Finally and most importantly, this example of the Nicene Council, regarded as a precedent to follow, later brought about the increase in the creeds on thinner grounds, with the result of numerous articles of faith in his time.\textsuperscript{55}

In the context of the Civil War, this criticism of making new creeds meant an attack on the Westminster Assembly and Confession, both of which appeared only after Hobbes wrote \textit{De Cive}. The activity of the Westminster Assembly might well have given Taylor an occasion to consider the significance of creating new articles of faith in general.

This attack on the creation of new creeds based on the distinction between the minimal fundamental matter and the other non-fundamental ones is not seen in Puritan discussion in defence of toleration either, and is Taylor’s first marked originality.\textsuperscript{56}

The second major achievement of Taylor is concerned with his scepticism. Before him Chillingworth argued against Roman Catholics, and Puritan tolerationists were confronted with

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 398-401.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 400.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 407.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 405-6.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 402-8.
\textsuperscript{56} In turn, Taylor might have influenced Baxter in this respect, see John Coffey, "Defining Heresy and Orthodoxy in the Puritan Revolution," in \textit{Heresy, Literature, and Politics in Early Modern English Culture}, ed. David Loewenstein and John Marshall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 126-29.
\end{flushleft}
mainstream Presbyterians, and both of them refuted the (assumed) infallibility of their opponents and pointed out lack of certainty in their positions. Taylor mainly took over Chillingworth’s version. Lack of certain means to reach truth implies unity of opinion is something to be wished for rather than to be achieved, and the only attainable unity is that of charity and mutual toleration.  

Similarly, in showing that there was always limitation or insufficiency of certainty in judging for others, Taylor and Chillingworth pointed out internal contradictions in all of the sources of authority from tradition, councils, the Pope, fathers, to church.  

What Taylor did was to amplify Chillingworth’s line of reasoning, and his systematic amplification made his point much clearer than Chillingworth’s fragmentary version.  

However, based on this refutation of human infallibility, Taylor gave a new twist to his defence of reason. It is true that Chillingworth and Goodwin had already developed their own versions of vindication for reason, and it is very probable that Taylor’s discussion was mainly based on Chillingworth’s framework. Yet while Chillingworth’s argument was fragmentary partly due to his way of argument as the refutation of Knott, Taylor, realising this topic as a distinct theme, devoted a chapter to this theme. In it, Taylor made a fuller-scale analysis and went further than Chillingworth in the following two respects. In the first place, while for Chillingworth the authority of the Roman Church was the main oppressor of human reason, Taylor, aware of the pluralistic disunion of Christian parties, had in view several authorities at the same time. While the authority of the Roman Church was most suspicious, other authorities had some weight. Then, whereas Chillingworth contrasted the insufficient

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certainty of authorities with the reliability of the Scriptures,\textsuperscript{60} Taylor did not necessarily deny authorities. He rather viewed the matter as the choice of authorities or human guides. Here he grasped the framework, so vital to 	extit{Leviathan}, of the combination of teachers or guides and their followers.

Based on this framework, Taylor endorsed individual judgement about the matter of religion. “For this any man may be better trusted for himself than any man can be for another. For in this case his own interest is most concerned,”\textsuperscript{61} and “no man’s salvation” is dependent “upon another.”\textsuperscript{62} Moreover, the insufficiency of authorities means that individual judgement should limit the extent to which people follow their guides. By following the guide “so far as his reason goes along with him,” he can use all the guides’ reasons and his own as well.\textsuperscript{63} Not doing so means negligence.\textsuperscript{64} Taylor here mentions scriptural passages often cited with relation to this topic: “Search the scriptures,” “Try the spirits,” and so on.\textsuperscript{65} If people follow whatever the guide says, they are often “forced to do violence to” their own understanding.\textsuperscript{66} It might be compared to “a laying up my talent in a napkin,” a well-known expression similar versions of which can not only be seen in Milton or Goodwin’s works, but also in 	extit{Leviathan}.\textsuperscript{67} Taylor, following Chillingworth, illustrates this by the example of Roman Catholics.\textsuperscript{68} When they study “in the pursuit of truth, it is not with a resolution to follow that which shall seem truth to them, but to confirm what before they did

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 1: 239, 2: 410-11.
\item \textsuperscript{61} WT, 495.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 496.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 495.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 497.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Ibid. Cf. Chillingworth, \textit{The Works of William Chillingworth}, 1: 239.
\item \textsuperscript{66} WT, 495.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 497; Milton, \textit{Complete Prose Works of John Milton}, 2, 543-44. Lev, 32: 576.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Chillingworth, \textit{The Works of William Chillingworth}, 1: 272: 2: 418.
\end{itemize}
believe.” What is lacking in this attitude is the desire to test their assumed truths and, if necessary, to change the assumed truths into new ones. As a result, if there arises something contradictory to their articles of faith, “they are to take it for a temptation, not for an illumination.” The expression, “illumination,” reminds us of “new light” which radical Puritans often called their doctrines. Though Taylor does not mention the Puritan ideal of further reformation, his attack on Roman Catholics here seems to reflect the assault by radical tolerationists such as Milton and Goodwin on the unwillingness of mainstream Presbyterians to advance further reformation and absorb new ideas.

Another major feature of Taylor’s defence of reason based on his idea of choosing the human authorities is that he denies “the common prejudice,” the antithesis of reason and authority. The common feature of this antithesis is confirmed by the fact that both Chillingworth and Knott contrasted reason and authority, despite their disagreement about the holder of authority.

Against this predominant idea, however, Taylor asserts that “reason and authority are not things incompetent or repugnant, especially when the authority is infallible and supreme, for there is no greater reason in the world than to believe such an authority. But then we must consider whether every authority that pretends to be such, is so indeed.” We have already seen in the introduction a similar way of the identification of the religious problem in *Leviathan*. “And therefore *Deus dixit, ergo hoc verum est*, is the greatest demonstration in the world for things of this nature. But it is not so in human dictates, and yet reason and

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69 WT, 495.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., 498.
73 WT, 498.
human authority are not enemies.” Depending on the situation, it is better to follow one of human authorities or one’s own reason. “But then the difference is not between reason and authority, but between this reason and that, which is greater.” In the midst of so many different and contradictory opinions, “it concerns every wise man to consider which is the best argument, which proposition relies upon the truest grounds. and if this were not his only way, why do men dispute and urge arguments? why do they cite councils and fathers?... If we must judge, then we must use our reason; if we must not judge, why do they produce evidence?” “So that scripture, tradition, councils, and fathers, are the evidence in a question, but reason is the judge: that is, we being the persons that are to be persuaded, we must see that we be persuaded reasonably.” The formulation of this general principle, the priority of individual judgement over any (human) claim of (divine) authority, is considerably important. When Hobbes refuted the Catholic claim of the Pope as the interpreter of the Scriptures in De Cive, he constructed an argument based on this principle. Nevertheless, he never clarified it in De Cive as a general principle. The implication of this principle for mutual toleration is that when people disagree about their opinions, it is those who listen to the argument that can judge, and that those who produce the argument have to accept the listeners' judgement even if they remain divergent from their “true” opinions. We will see a similar version of this remarkable argument in Leviathan, but in comparison to Leviathan what should be pointed out is that

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., 499.
78 It is “unreasonable of you to demand something which by the very grounds of your demand you admit belongs to someone else.” Catholics refers to divine authority for the ground of this claim, but “how is it known? From holy scriptures: there’s the book, read it. No point, unless I interpret it for myself, so interpretation is my right, and that of all other individual citizens.” DC, 17:27. Cf. Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 1: 242.
it is not clear here what Taylor thought of the divine authority of the Scriptures.

The third remarkable strategy of Taylor is his detailed analysis of the causes of religious errors, and his distinction between heresies and innocent errors. In the first place, Taylor began his argument with an analysis of the uses of “heresy” in the Scriptures. While other people of the era used the conception of heresy more casually, Taylor, like Hobbes, reconsidered the deep assumption of this notion, the Scriptures as the fundamental source of Christianity. Thereby Taylor gained a new insight into heresy. Such heresies as the apostles condemned were not every type of error but only errors which directly deny the faith in Jesus Christ, or practical errors which lead to immorality. As long as Christians retain the fundamental creed and lead a good life, they cannot be called heretics in the scriptural sense. Thus Taylor virtually limited the problem of heresy to that of morality. He went so far as to assert that a true belief by itself, without morality and charity, was not “a grace or a virtue;” “for then the unlearned were certainly in a damnable condition, and all good scholars should be saved.” This is a very daring remark in view of his contemporaries’ emphasis on true religion.

Secondly, by limiting heresies to practical impieties, Taylor distinguished innocent errors from heresies, which can be seen as a response to heresiographies in his age. One of the tactics of Gangraena, a famous heresiography, was to report immoral and scandalous stories of supposed heretics at that time in order to

80 Still, it is true that some Puritans attempted to define heresy. Coffey, "Defining Heresy and Orthodoxy in the Puritan Revolution," 114-16, 30-31. It would be worthwhile to compare their definitions with Taylor's.
81 WT, 378-88.
82 Ibid., 383.
undermine their integrity. Yet Taylor severed the prevalent association of religious errors with immorality.

Taylor rebutted the genre of heresiography in another way too. By showing the uncertainty of reports of heretics in the early age of Christianity, he undermined the credibility of this kind of report in a later age which followed this precedent. While some Puritans such as Goodwin and Walwyn directly refuted the credibility of reports in Gangraena, Taylor’s theoretical approach, by undermining the deep assumption, compromised the whole genre of the catalogue of heretics.

Thirdly, he supported the notion of innocent errors by presenting various inculpable causes of error. He showed that the internal merit of the argument was only a part of the cause of persuasion. People are affected by their own different understandings, the holiness of principles, the good success of the defenders of the argument, education, of impostures of their adversaries, and so on. These are “arguments of human imperfections, not convictions of a sin.”

Moreover, this distinction between heresies and innocent errors led to Taylor’s significant characterisation of erroneous people as the object of pity. This certainly reflected Taylor’s emphasis on charity, but this view was quite unusual in his age. Even tolerationists found errors something to be eradicated or the object of fight. Milton, while he emphasised the necessity of the temptation of vices for the existence of virtues, used the metaphor of the fight between truth and errors to make truth shine. Similarly, although Chillingworth distinguished fundamental and

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84 WT, 389-95.
85 Ibid., 499-510.
86 Ibid., 499.
87 Ibid., 386, 409, 503.
non-fundamental matters, he regarded errors of Catholics as pardonable, that is to say, damnable by themselves. Yet for Taylor “no simple error is a sin, nor does condemn us before the throne of God.”

This section concludes the analysis of Taylor with one of the climaxes of defending mutual toleration: his breakdown of conditions for toleration of Anabaptists and Catholics, the two “most troublesome and most disliked.” They themselves were a minority in the England of that time, but Taylor’s point was that “by an account made of these we may make judgment what may be done towards others whose errors are not apprehended of so great malignity.” The “others” will certainly include chief antagonists in the Civil War, Anglicans and most Puritans, and thus this defence forms a part of his plea for their mutual toleration and for peace. This technique of considering the most extreme position to cover at the same time more moderate and relevant positions was often used in Leviathan in various ways.

Taylor’s chief way of defence of Anabaptists as the opposition to the baptism of infants was to show numerous reasons for this opinion. Thereby he tried to show that “they have so great excuse on their side that their error is not impudent or vincible.” This way of vindication implies that rational accounts of each Christian party themselves contribute to toleration. If so, while tolerationists might still be a small minority in Restoration England, the consensus of reasonable religion in this age would be a major latent drive for the development of toleration in England.

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89 WT, 514, 604.
90 Ibid., 540.
91 Ibid.
92 Typical cases are Hobbes’s criticism of Bellarmine, and his argument about Moses and the apostles.
93 Ibid., 540-80.
94 Ibid., 540.
95 Coffey, Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558-1689, 166.
As for Catholics, Taylor’s effort to include Catholics within the scope of toleration as far as possible was by itself very unusual in the England of this age. One of the main difficulties concerning toleration of Catholics was that they were said to espouse doctrines detrimental to the civil authority or public peace. Catholics qua Catholics were, in Protestant countries, regarded as seditious. Taylor referred to seditious Catholic doctrines, some of which were, though famous, exactly the ones Hobbes refuted in *Leviathan*. This was one of the few areas where religious liberty was limited to the internal opinion and preaching was to be punished. Nevertheless, apart from that, Taylor allowed Catholics religious liberty. It will be seen later that Hobbes also granted some kind of Catholicism in *Leviathan*.

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97 WT, 595.
4. Leviathan

4.1. *De Cive* and New Principles of Christian Religion in *Leviathan*

I

The task in this part is to identify arguments evident only in *Leviathan* and to consider them in the religious contexts examined so far. Generally speaking, the basic religious framework and political message does not change from *De Cive* to *Leviathan*. To take a closer look, however, even in the part in which both of them provide similar discussions, subtle changes can be seen. Then, to deal with the delicate problem about the nature of the similarities and dissimilarities between the two works, some preliminary comments will be helpful on his famous conclusion about church-state relations in *De Cive*. In a well-known section of *De Cive*, Hobbes divides controversies into two kinds: temporal matters and spiritual matters. In temporal matters the sovereign decides disputes, but:

To decide questions of faith, i.e. questions *about God*, which are beyond human understanding, one needs God's blessing (so that we may not err, at least on essential questions) and this comes from CHRIST himself by *laying on of hands*. For our eternal salvation we are obliged to accept a supernatural doctrine, which because it is supernatural, is impossible to understand. It would go against equity if we were left alone to err by ourselves on essential matters. Our Saviour promised this Infallibility (in matters essential to salvation) to the *Apostles* until the day of judgement, i.e. to the *Apostles* and to the *Pastors* who were to be consecrated by *Apostles* in succession by the laying *on of hands*. As a Christian, therefore, the holder of sovereign power in the commonwealth is obliged to interpret holy scripture, when it is a question about the mysteries of faith, by means of duly ordained
Therefore, though the authority of spiritual matters lies in the sovereign, the sovereign is obliged to accept the interpretation of ordained priests.

While some scholars of Hobbes have acknowledged the importance of this conclusion, they have at the same time been confused because it seems so abrupt and incongruent with Hobbes’s general thrust of emphasising the sovereign’s authority. Here, however, what should be made clear is exactly what Hobbes meant by the authority of the sovereign to interpret the Scriptures in the first place. In the discussion of the kings of the Old Testament, Hobbes showed the division of work between the sovereign’s appointment of interpreters and the pastors’ actual task of interpreting the Bible. “Though Priests might be better equipped by nature and training than other men, still Kings are perfectly capable of appointing interpreters under themselves. Thus, even though Kings may not personally interpret God’s Word, the task of interpretation can still depend on their authority.”

This type of division of work was what Hobbes had in mind in the above conclusion.

In addition, several key notions which lay foundations for the conclusion can also be found in other parts of De Cive and in that sense the conclusion is linked with the general argument of De

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1 DC, 17:28.
3 DC, 16:16.
The first and primary one is the distinction between the temporal and the spiritual. However, this contrast has already been seen in the introduction and here the great role it plays in De Cive is just pointed out again.

Second, Hobbes gives special importance to infallibility and to the matter of truth or error in scriptural interpretation concerning matters essential to salvation. Hobbes uses this kind of idea to deny the sufficiency of merely human power concerning spiritual things. “A rule of doctrine which cannot be known by any human reasoning but only by divine revelation cannot be but divine. For when we admit that someone does not know whether some doctrine is true or not, it is impossible to take his verdict on this doctrine as the rule.” In particular, Hobbes points out the possibility of human error. This suggests that even the sovereign, as long as he or she is a mere human, cannot escape from human error in interpreting the Scriptures. To avoid human error, people need some divine power. It seems that Hobbes regarded a church as a place where such divine power was transmitted. This hypothesis explains why Hobbes mentions the notion “the tradition of a church” and begins to treat the notion of a church

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4 Sommerville mentions the problem of the consistency about Hobbes’s view on infallibility here with the last section of De Cive. (Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, 125.) However, firstly, since the sovereign controls the appointment of interpreters, the conflicts of interests between them will not (be likely to) happen. Secondly, it was only in Leviathan that Hobbes became fully aware of the clergy’s religious dominion and tried to deconstruct it.

5 It should be noted that this distinction is not clearly drawn in The Elements of Law. Nauta’s account of the relationship of Hobbes’s view on church-state relations among his three works of political philosophy does not address this point. Nauta, “Hobbes on Religion and the Church between the Elements of Law and Leviathan: A Dramatic Change of Direction?,” 587-89.

6 DC, 17:17.

7 DC, 17:18, 16:16.

just after pointing out the problem of human error. This also explains why Christians in a pagan state must follow “some Church of Christians” in spiritual matters.

In relation to the notion of a church as a place where divine power was transmitted, thirdly, Hobbes presumes the transmittance of some divine power (“God’s blessings”) through the ordination and particularly the laying on of hands. This laying on of hands is also discussed in Section 24, Chapter 17 of De Cive, whose topic is the choice of ecclesiastics, a theme closely related to the tradition of a church. The main gist of this section is to prove that while consecration and laying on of hands is the task of the apostles and teachers, the selection of ordinands belongs to the church. However, from this section we can also read Hobbes’s conception of laying on of hands in De Cive.

Let us follow his reasoning more closely. Considering how Paul and Barnabas were added to the apostles, Hobbes distinguishes the ordination by laying-on of hands and the selection by order of the holy spirit. Then, he asks further by what authority the allegation of the holy spirit was accepted, quoting Gal. 2.14, “Do not believe every spirit, but try the spirits to see if they are from God, since many Pseudo-Prophets have gone out into the world,” and finds the authority in the church. Conversely, however, this argument with the quotation indicates that with the approval of the church, the spirit is admitted to come from God. Also, his quotation of 1 Tim. 4.14, “Do not neglect the grace of God which is in you, which was given to you through prophecy with the laying on of hands of the board of presbyters” connects “the grace of God” with laying on of hands.

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9 DC, 17:15, 19.
10 DC, 18: 13.
12 Note that this expression is close to “God’s blessing” (“benediction divina”) in Chapter 17, Section 28 of De Cive. In addition, Hobbes created this expression itself, changing the Vulgate expression “gratia” into “gratia
It seems that here Hobbes accepted the transmittance of some divine power through laying on of hands, provided ordinands are selected and approved by the church. Of course, the interpretation above depends on the conception of “holy spirit”. However, holy spirit was acknowledged as a main medium of divine authority in *De Cive*. Discussing the word of God, Hobbes argues that one meaning of it is “whatever has been said by men on the orders or by the influence of a holy spirit.” Hobbes then connects this with the divine authority of the Scriptures. “We recognize holy scripture as inspired by God, all of it is thereby Word of God” in this sense. These passages show that Hobbes found the authority of the Scriptures in the inspiration from God, and that he saw holy spirit as a main means of transmission of divine authority in *De Cive*.

Now this thesis will turn to *Leviathan* and will demonstrate little by little how these assumptions in *De Cive* have changed in it.

II

While in *De Cive* Hobbes, after discussing the kingdom of God by nature, went on directly to the sacred history in the Old Testament, in *Leviathan* he added two chapters before turning to the content of the Scriptures. The first of the chapters is not even about the Scriptures themselves but about the reconsideration of the foundation of Christian religion; though the Bible is still regarded as the fundamental text of Christian religion, Hobbes now begins to provide much more elaborate arguments about supernatural revelation, which in turn is supposed to lay foundations for the authority of the Scriptures. In the chapter, Dei,” thus making clearer the link with God.  

13 DC, 17:15.  
14 DC, 17:16.
Chapter 32, it is possible to discern most clearly the overall character of Hobbes’s intellectual pursuits peculiar to *Leviathan*. Hobbes, still retaining the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, begins the chapter with the contrast. Then he defends the use of reason in dealing with supernatural matters. Here Hobbes, like tolerationists, attacks the Catholic doctrine of the implicit faith. On the other hand, when it comes to how to deal with supernatural things, Hobbes refers to the captivation of understanding, of which tolerationists often accused Catholics. “When any thing therein written is too hard for our examination, wee are bidden to captivate our understanding to the Words, and not to labour in sifting out a Philosophicall truth by Logik, of such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of natural science.”

Yet again following that, Hobbes makes an important subtle distinction.

But by the Captivity of our Understanding, is not meant a Submission of the Intellectual faculty, to the Opinion of any other man; but of the Will to Obedience, where obedience is due.... We then Captivate our Understanding and Reason, when we forbear contradiction; when we so speak, as (by lawfull Authority) we are commanded; and when we live accordingly; which in sum, is Trust, and Faith reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any Notion at all from the Words spoken.

To grasp the importance of this passage and the new twist Hobbes gives here, it is necessary to look back at the conception of faith in *De Cive*. In it Hobbes clarifies the notion of faith by three distinctions. In the first place, in contrast to the knowledge of a proposition, “when the reasons for which we assent to a

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15 Lev, 32: 576.  
16 Lev, 32: 578.  
17 Ibid.  
18 DC, 18:4.
proposition are drawn not from the *actual proposition* but from the *person of its proponent*, because we judge him to be expert enough not to be deceived and we see no reason why he would want to deceive us, our assent is called Faith, because it arises from *reliance* on someone else’s knowledge not our own.”¹⁹ In *Leviathan* too Hobbes retains this distinction. However, here Hobbes specifies the actor to be trusted: a “lawful authority.” As was seen in the introduction, in *Leviathan* Hobbes began to cast doubt on the allegation of pretended prophets. Hobbes’s new problem was to determine who was to be trusted among pretended prophets, and the cited passage points to lawful authority as such an actor.

The second distinction Hobbes made about faith in *De Cive* is that between faith as an internal assent and profession as an external act. On the other hand, here faith is a kind of obedience to lawful authority, contradicting the conception of faith in *De Cive*. This new notion of faith as external obedience had critical implications for the political conclusion about religious matters in *Leviathan*. It enabled Hobbes to prove that in Christian commonwealths it was not necessary for subjects to believe internally any articles of faith, even the fundamental article, “Jesus is Christ.” What was necessary for salvation was just to grant the article, though of course there was no problem about believing in the article.²⁰ On the other hand, in *De Cive*, this fundamental article was regarded as a matter of internal faith, though every other article usually included in the domain of internal faith was transferred into that of obedience.²¹ In accordance with this change, Hobbes extended the scope of his

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¹⁹ Ibid.
²⁰ Lev, 43: 936.
²¹ DC, 18:11, 14. From this viewpoint, Tuck’s argument that in *Leviathan* “faith became exclusively a matter of believing what the civil sovereign said,” and not of “believing in the independent validity of the historical record of Christianity” appears to miss the point. Tuck, *Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction*, 100.
theory from Christian citizens to citizens of all faiths, as his mention of Muslims suggests.\textsuperscript{22}

One reason for this change is that in \textit{Leviathan} Hobbes elaborated the third distinction concerning faith in \textit{De Cive} between science and faith. While for science definition is vital, for faith it is harmful. “Things put forward for belief which are beyond human understanding never become clearer by explanation, but to the contrary, become more obscure and more difficult to believe.”\textsuperscript{23} In \textit{Leviathan} Hobbes clarifies its meaning. About such things “the mind be incapable of any Notion at all from the Words spoken.” If so, however, it will not be possible to assent to the proposition. Still, since supernatural things are “things put forward for belief which are beyond human understanding,” Hobbes retains the expression, “faith.”

Another more detailed explanation for the reason why this faith cannot be internal and remains external, however, can be found in the main argument in Chapter 32, which follows the cited passage. This also reveals the full meaning of the subtle distinction and the independence of the understanding in relation to faith. Here as with “things put forward for belief which are beyond human understanding,” Hobbes begins to ask for their grounds. This new demand for grounds about matters of faith is parallel to Goodwin’s in his justification for the authority of the Bible.\textsuperscript{24} However, for Goodwin the critical examination of religious matters, by judging the lawfulness of the king’s command, could become part of the argument for the resistance to the Royalists,\textsuperscript{25} whereas Hobbes uses it to contain this kind of religious justifications for war.

\textsuperscript{22} Lev, 42: 786.
\textsuperscript{23} DC, 18:4.
\textsuperscript{24} Goodwin, \textit{The Divine Authority of the Scriptures Asserted}, sig. ar, a2r–a3v.
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Anti-Cavalierisme, or, Truth Pleading as Well the Necessity, as the Lawfulness of This Present Vvar, for the Suppressing of That Butcherly Brood of Cavaliere Incendiaries, Who Are Now Hammering England, to Make an Ireland of It: Wherein All the Materiall Objections against the
At first, Hobbes begins with the distinction of two channels of the word of God, which is also found in *De Cive.*

“When God speaketh to man, it must be either immediately; or by mediation of another man, to whom he had formerly spoken by himself immediately.”

Yet then, an epistemological argument peculiar to *Leviathan* starts.

How God speaketh to a man immediately, may be understood by those well enough, to whom he hath so spoken: but how the same should be understood by another, is hard, if not impossible to know. For if a man pretend to me, that God hath spoken to him supernaturally, and immediately, and I make a doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce, to oblige me to believe it.

It is this doubt about the allegation of supernatural immediate revelation that plays a pivotal role in the general religious argument of *Leviathan.* Hobbes’s identification of pretended prophets as such in his new articulation in *Leviathan* of the religious problem presupposes this doubt.

Hobbes makes the sovereign the exception to this general doubt. However, this exception also explains why Hobbes created the new concept of faith.

It is true, that if he be my Soveraign, he may oblige me to obedience, so, as not by act or word to declare I believe him not: but not to think any otherwise then my reason persuades me.

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*Lawfulness of This Undertaking, Are Fully Cleared and Answered, and All Men That Either Love God, Themselves, or Good Men, Exhorted to Contribute All Manner of Assistance Hereunto* (London: Printed by G.B. and R.W. for Henry Overton, 1642), 18-22.

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26 This point suggests that although even in *The Elements of Law* there were some epistemological arguments concerning the Scriptures, the following argument could only be developed based on the framework first put forward in *De Cive.* EL, 1:11:7-9.

27 DC, 15:3; Lev, 32: 578.

28 Lev, 32: 578.

29 Ibid.
So long as the sovereign cannot provide a convincing ground for their allegation of supernatural revelation, all they can do is concerned only with external obedience. The cited passage clearly reflects the subtle distinction about the captivation of understanding. This use of reason in his new demand for grounds of faith makes Hobbes careful about the limit of the sovereign power concerning matters of faith.

Thus, this epistemological doubt is a vital feature of *Leviathan*. Nevertheless, this doubt in itself can also be found in *Behemoth*. What distinguishes *Leviathan* from even *Behemoth* is that it provides the grounds of this doubt. Hobbes’s point is that things commonly regarded as supernatural phenomena can also be understood as merely natural. The difficulty with dealing with the problem of pretended prophets is that immediate revelation is alleged to be supernatural, and thus, it seems, “cannot by natural reason be either demonstrated, or confuted.” What Hobbes suggests here is, instead of finding in the supernatural room for the distinction between truth and falsity about the allegation of immediate revelation, to contrast the category of the supernatural itself with that of the natural, and to attribute truth and falsity about prophecy to each of them. To demonstrate this, he makes use of the epistemological argument in Part 1 of *Leviathan*. For instance, “To say he [God] hath spoken to him in a Dream, is no more than to say he dreamed that God spake to him, which is not of force to win belief from any man, that knows dreams are for the most part naturall, and may proceed from former thoughts: and such dreams as that, from selfe conceit, and foolish arrogance” and so on, “by which he thinks he hath merited the favour of extraordinary Revelation.”

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31 Lev, 32: 576.
32 Lev, 32: 580.
There are two points to note in this argument. Firstly, it is certain that the combination of the doubt and of the epistemological grounds for the doubt by itself stops people at least once from following pretended prophets blindly. At the same time, however, this reasoning is different from disproving the existence of supernatural phenomena, which for Hobbes was not possible in any case. It leaves the possibility of such supernatural phenomena as the sovereign alleges, as will be seen later.

Another remarkable point about this reasoning is that it elucidates, at least partly, the reason why Hobbes wrote anew another work of political philosophy. In *De Cive* the theoretical devices Hobbes employed to interpret the Scriptures were mainly conceptions in the civil part of his argument such as natural law known by mere reason and the establishment of the state through contracts. However, it now becomes necessary for Hobbes to make more elaborate uses of the epistemological argument about man.

In this way Hobbes discredits common types of the allegation of revelation. However, the above discussion shows just the insufficiency of the case of the speakers of the word of God. It does not give any definite answer and leaves the audience of the allegation uncertain. The allegation may be true, but is not sufficiently convincing. Hobbes emphasises this uncertainty quite effectively by illustrating it with two examples of the Old Testament, 1 Kings 22 and 1 Kings 13.

Of 400 Prophets, of whome the K. of Israel asked counsel, concerning the warre he made against Ramoth Gilead, only Micaiah was a true one. The Prophet that was sent to prophesy against the Altar set up by Ieroboam, though a true Prophet, and that by two miracles done in his presence appeared to be a Prophet sent from God, was yet deceived by another old Prophet, that persuaded him as from the mouth of God, to
eat and drink with him. If one Prophet deceive another, what certainty is there of knowing the will of God, by other way than that of Reason?²³

The first example supports the doubt which natural reason indicates by focusing on the slight possibility of meeting teachers of the true religious doctrine. Yet at the same time the example can be seen as a suitable biblical expression of the religious pluralism emerging during the Civil War. The situation Hobbes evokes where people have to find only one true prophet among several hundreds of pretended prophets might well have echoed the puzzlement his English audience must have felt about the question of which religious party to follow in the midst of the numerous Christian parties which the fragmentation of Puritanism brought about.³⁴

Similarly the second biblical case illustrates possible deception by pretended prophets. However, this example implies more than that. Natural reason just shows that for ordinary Christians it is quite difficult to reach certainty about the allegation of pretended prophets. However, this biblical case shows that even true prophets might be deceived. It not only illustrates the dexterity of false prophets, but also might suggest a more dangerous possibility that even true prophets, being subject to deception, might not be trustworthy. This again draws the readers' attention to uncertainty.

What are possible implications for this emphasis on uncertainty or sceptical attitude? Religious scepticism was not common in his age, but not entirely new, and during the Civil War it seems to have become more widespread. In particular, some tolerationists such as Goodwin and Taylor made frequent uses of sceptical arguments. They undermined the certainty of ordinary people in the era or more generally Christians living later than the age of

²³ Lev, 32: 580.
³⁴ Cf. WT, 355.
the apostles. Hobbes, however, went further in that the formulation of his doubt could put in perspective Moses and the apostles too. Moreover, while tolerationists, supposing the authority of the Bible, focused on the uncertainty about the interpretation of the Bible, the scope of Hobbes’s doubt can extend as far as the authority of the Bible, because the main source of biblical authority was supposed to be inspiration. To that extent, Hobbes’s radical doubt is reminiscent of that in Henry Hammond’s hypothetical doubt, both of which raise the possibility of the non-occurrence of the revelation to the apostles or of their delusion.

In relation to *De Cive*, though in it Hobbes offered some analysis of prophets, the articulation of the central religious problem presupposed the end of the age of prophets, and accordingly his argument about prophets was short, occupying only one section.$^{35}$ On the other hand, the epistemological doubt in *Leviathan* provided Hobbes with a new perspective for a deeper and more extended analysis of prophets in the Bible.

From the political viewpoint, the new doubt serves to discredit the allegation of the enthusiasts. Nevertheless, here the person who casts doubt is “I”; the sceptical attitude is still personal and it is not clear whether other people will take this attitude. Moreover, though natural reason might check the enthusiasts to some extent, it does not offer the definite yardstick for distinguishing true and false prophets. Seeking such a criterion, Hobbes turns to the Bible.

III

It is true that in *De Cive* Hobbes did discuss prophets and how to distinguish true and false prophets, and that the biblical passages Hobbes cites here in *Leviathan* are the same as the ones cited in *De Cive*. Nevertheless, they acquire a vital importance for

$^{35}$ DC, 16:11, 18:1.
Leviathan because they play an indispensable part in solving the new central problem of pretended prophets. Actually, to take a closer look at the argument in De Cive, it turns out that he did not have in mind the problem of the enthusiasts in this work. In the first place, when Hobbes referred to the issue of prophets in the later section, he described it as the problem “whether the writings of Prophets who arose later should be accepted as God’s word.”36 For Hobbes in De Cive the problem was how to interpret writings, and the judgement of pretended prophets in his own time was outside the scope of his argument. Secondly, in De Cive Hobbes assumed that the task of prophets was to predict future events. This is, however, only one of the several meanings of “prophet” in the Bible, as Hobbes shows in Leviathan.37 In De Cive Hobbes did not address the precise issue of judging the allegation of direct revelation by pretended prophets.

This subtle change in Hobbes’s concern from De Cive to Leviathan affects the actual interpretation of the biblical passages he cited in his search for the criteria of true and false prophets in both De Cive and Leviathan. The passages cited are Deut. 13:1–5 and 18:21, 22,38 two criteria are inferred from the passages. As for the miracle as one of the criteria inferred from Deut. 18, Hobbes’s view does not change much between the two works. What changes from De Cive to Leviathan is the interpretation of Deut. 13:1-5. The criterion shown here is also much more important for Hobbes in Leviathan than the miracle.


36 DC, 16:13.
37 Lev, 36:658.
38 The combination of these two passages is not unusual. The notes in the French Geneva and the Junius-Tremellius translation also suggest it.
Propheta ille, aut factor somniorum interficietur.”39 In relation to the expression, “Deos alienos,” Hobbes saw the criterion as faith in the God of Abraham.

In *Leviathan*, on the other hand, Hobbes not only extended the range of the citation but also diverted from the assumed original version, the KJV, in several expressions.

If a Prophet rise amongst you, or a Dreamer of dreams, and *shall pretend the doing of a miracle,*40 and the miracle come to passe; if he say, Let us *follow strange* Gods, which thou hast not known, thou shalt not hearken to *him,* etc. But that Prophet and Dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he hath spoken *to you to Revolt* from the Lord your God.41

Compared with *De Cive*, Hobbes added the parts, “which thou hast not known” and “because he hath spoken to you to Revolt from the Lord your God.” The most marked change from the KJV is from “turn away” to “Revolt.” Some of Hobbes’s reasoning from the passage and the general precepts he drew for his English audience are based on this specification of the meaning.42 Another noticeable alteration is from “other” to “strange.” It is true that the changes are not necessarily without ground: the changed wording can be seen as the synonym of that in the KJV. However, more general expressions in the KJV turn into those to which are more likely to be assigned meanings serviceable for Hobbes’s

39 DC, 16:11.
40 The French Genava translates this as “signe ou miracle.”
41 Lev 32: 582. The KJV version is as follows. “If there arise among you a prophets, or a dreamer of dreams, and *giveth thee a sign or a wonder,* And the sign or the wonder come to pass, ... Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, ... Thou shalt not hearken unto the *words of that prophets,* or that dreamer of dreams ... And that prophets, or that dreamer of dreams, shall be put to death; because he hath spoken to *turn you away* from the LORD your God.” I have underlined some noticeable differences of wording between the two versions. Though Hobbes often changes some expressions in his quotation in *Leviathan*, this scale of change is rare.
42 For this, see Fukuoka, *State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between Spinoza's and Hobbes's Interpretations of the Old Testament*, 427-29.
political message in *Leviathan*. In particular, the altered expressions depict the prophets in the citation as if they were radical Puritans; they fought against the Royalists and espoused novel ideas. The criterion Hobbes found in the passage, established religion, works in a similar way. For Puritans including radical ones destroyed the English religious system at that time such as the episcopacy and the Book of Common Prayer.

It should also be noted that the passage is one of the most cited in the toleration controversy. Opponents of toleration made use of it to vindicate the sovereign’s duty to oppress sectarians or false prophets. It is true that the purpose of Hobbes’s use is different from this. He is concerned with “the duty of Christian Subjects towards their Soveraigns,” not with the sovereign’s duty. Nevertheless, Hobbes’s use in *Leviathan* in contrast with *De Cive* is similar to that in the toleration controversy in that both of them regarded their problem as that of false prophets, and that both applied the passage to their contemporary issues.

To return to the issue of the enthusiasts, the two criteria help Hobbes to discredit them further. The miracle as the necessary condition of the true prophet reduces the credibility of mere pretension of the enthusiasts. Hobbes supports this by the standard Protestant argument that miracles have already ceased. As for the other criterion, established religion, Hobbes changes it into the Scriptures in the final part of this chapter. The enthusiasts did not deny the Scriptures but rather both alleged immediate revelation and provided new interpretations of the Scriptures based on the alleged revelation. Here Hobbes limited valid arguments to those based on the Scriptures.

However, the Scriptures can be interpreted in various ways. To hold the enthusiasts in check, Hobbes developed his analysis of

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45 Lev, 32: 584.
prophets in the Bible, explicitly contrasting his biblical interpretation with that based on “Enthusiasme, or supernatural Inspiration.”\textsuperscript{46} This new interpretive analysis will be examined in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{46} Lev, 32: 584.
4.2. Philological and Epistemological Refutation of the Enthusiasts: Chapter 36

Hobbes's full answer to the enthusiasts in *Leviathan* can be seen in Chapter 36, and the argument there roughly corresponds to a key notion in *De Cive*, faith in the God of Abraham. Although this conception played several important parts in *De Cive*, it disappeared completely in *Leviathan*. This change can be seen as a result of Hobbes's effort to remove ambiguous elements in the idea of faith in the God of Abraham. Another more important factor to note, however, is that this notion of faith in the God of Abraham was ineffective for solving the problem of pretended prophets in *Leviathan*.

This notion is ambiguous in two points. The first unclear element lies in its relation to divine positive law. In *The Elements of Law*, divine positive law was not treated because divine law and natural law were completely equated.\(^1\) In *De Cive* Hobbes argued on the one hand that divine positive laws concerned divine worship, which would include faith in Abraham.\(^2\) On the other hand, he also claimed that they were particular to the commonwealth of Israel,\(^3\) but faith in Abraham affected not only the Hebrews but also Christians.\(^4\) However, the abandonment of the notion of faith in Abraham’s God and the new epistemological argument in *Leviathan* specified the notion of divine positive law as applicable to the state of any positive religion.\(^5\)

Second, it is not clear whether the faith is internal or external. On the one hand, Hobbes argued that Abraham wanted his followers to worship the God who had addressed him as such, and

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\(^1\) EL, 2:10:7.
\(^2\) DC, 14:4.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) DC, 18:11.
\(^5\) Lev, 26: 442, 44, 46, 48.
Hobbes called this “worship of religion and faith”, thus connecting this faith to worship. Similarly, idolatry, the deviation from this faith, was depicted as worshipping God in a different way from the one instituted by Abraham. Also, in the very argument about the Hebrews’ faith in Moses, Hobbes identified the faith in Abraham as the worship of the God of Abraham. However, worship was an external act. On the other hand, in other passages Hobbes contrasted internal faith with profession, external obedience. In the argument on the faith in Christ too, which obviously is internal faith, Hobbes included in it faith about the Old Testament. The reason why Hobbes used the expression the “worship of faith” in De Cive despite this ambiguity was probably that the worship comprehended supernatural elements; Hobbes explained this worship as the “worship which God, not reason, had revealed to him [Abraham], supernaturally.” Yet Hobbes linked supernatural elements with faith in De Cive, where the connection appears most obviously in the expression “things put forward for belief which are beyond human understanding.” This image of belief was closely related to his contrast in the same section between faith as dependent upon “someone else’s reputation” and opinion as based on “our own reason.” Seeing in the same section Hobbes distinguishing between internal faith and profession as external obedience, the belief in the quotation would surely signify internal faith. In Leviathan, on the other hand, thanks to the new notion of faith as obedience to the civil sovereign as shown in the previous section, Hobbes made it clear that all people can do is to obey what the

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6 DC, 16:4.
7 DC, 16:7.
8 DC, 16:11.
9 DC, 15:9.
10 DC, 18:4.
11 DC, 18:11.
12 DC, 16:4.
13 DC, 18:4.
14 Ibid.
sovereign presents as things supernatural, though they are put forward for belief.

Apart from the above ambiguities, however, another vital factor for the disappearance of the notion of faith in Abraham’s God in *Leviathan* was that the idea was not sufficiently articulate to deal with the new problem in *Leviathan* of pretended prophets. First, while this concept focuses on worship of God based on the fact that Abraham “wanted his followers to worship the one who had so addressed him as God,” what radical Puritans encouraged was rebellion, a matter far beyond worship of God. Second, in the faith in Abraham’s God what Abraham saw or heard in visions or dreams is simply regarded as supernatural. Similarly, this idea presupposes Abraham’s faith, which lies in “not doubting that the one whose voice and promises he [Abraham] had heard was God.” However, what pretended prophets during the 1640s made use of or abused were these notions assumed in *De Cive*. For these reasons, it was necessary for Hobbes to revise in *Leviathan* his argument related to faith in Abraham’s God.

The revised version is his general analysis of contacts of prophets with God in the Scriptures under the topic, “the manner how God hath spoken to the Prophets,” in Chapter 36. Hobbes’s countermeasure against the enthusiasts in Chapter 32 was the combination of doubts cast upon them and the presentation of naturalistic interpretations of alleged supernatural phenomena. Nevertheless, Hobbes excluded from his analysis biblical prophets, some of them certainly being true and not just pretended ones. His point was that revelation through the Scriptures was not immediate “but by mediation of the Prophets, or of the Apostles,

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15 DC, 16:4.
16 Ibid.
17 Curley interprets this matter differently, saying, “the thrust and intent of *Leviathan* is to undermine the God of revelation, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.” Curley, "I Durst Not Write So Boldly: How to Read Hobbes’s Theological-Political Treatise," 572.
18 Lev, 36: 662.
or of the Church, in such manner as he speaks to all other Christian men.”\textsuperscript{19} It was exactly this mediation to which Hobbes paid attention in Chapter 36.\textsuperscript{20} This focus on revelation itself was not completely exceptional in his age, as shows Henry Hammond’s analysis of how the apostles received immediate revelation. Still, while Hammond turned to revelation to search for certainty in his reply to radical scepticism, Hobbes’s aim was to discredit and isolate the enthusiasts by encouraging scepticism. For this purpose Hobbes developed far more sophisticated interpretive devices than Hammond.

II

Hobbes begins the discussion by dealing with the passage in the Psalm, which seems to signify the nature of God.\textsuperscript{21} Hobbes had already treated this passage in \textit{The Elements of Law},\textsuperscript{22} and kept denying the interpretation in his works of political philosophy. However, based on his theoretical development in \textit{De Cive}, where he excluded the possibility of attributing human organs to God,\textsuperscript{23} in \textit{Leviathan} Hobbes sharpened the question: human organs or sense-perception based on them cannot be attributed to God, but it might still be possible to attribute to God sense-perception or other uses of human organs independent of them, even though it is not possible for human beings to understand how God does so.

Though the conclusion derived from interpreting the passage is the same among the three works, in \textit{Leviathan} Hobbes goes further, saying, “Therefore we are to interpret Gods speaking to men immediately, for that way (whatsoever it be), by which God

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{19} Lev, 32: 580. \\
\textsuperscript{20} This thesis suggests paying attention to differences between Chapter 32 and 36. Cf. Hoekstra, "Disarming the Prophets: Thomas Hobbes and Predictive Power," 138-39. \\
\textsuperscript{21} Lev, 36: 662. \\
\textsuperscript{22} EL, 1:11:3. \\
\textsuperscript{23} DC, 15:14.
\end{flushleft}
makes them understand his will.” The point is that prophets qua human beings do understand God's will in whatever way. Just as in Chapter 37 Hobbes examines miracles by focusing on human perception, so in the following interpretation of the Bible, Hobbes investigates immediate revelation by paying attention to human perception, and not to the nature of God or to the world beyond or independent of the human perception. Hobbes's understanding of the passage in the Psalm prepares for his following interpretation of the Scriptures in this direction.

Hobbes searches for signs indicating the manners of revelation from the beginning of the Scriptures, and then finds in the contacts of Abraham and other prophets with God several signs and makes inferences from them. Here some of the scriptural passages Hobbes cites overlap with those in the discussion about the God of Abraham in De Cive. Then, how did Hobbes’s interpretation develop between the two works?

One feature of Leviathan is Hobbes’s lax attitude toward verbal expressions in the Scriptures and his readiness to alter them. It is related to his deeper understanding in Leviathan of the nature and language of the Scriptures. The Scriptures are not written as a treatise of science and their language is not free from ambiguity. This means not only that key words in the Scriptures like “spirit” might include several meanings in them, but also

24 Lev, 36: 662.
25 Martinich and Schotte discuss Hobbes’s treatment of immediate revelation. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics, 227-28; Schotte, Die Entmachtung Gottes durch den Leviathan, 164-68. As for Hobbes’s use of the Bible in Chapter 36, the only known work to discuss this issue in detail is the following: Fukuoka, State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between Spinoza’s and Hobbes’s Interpretations of the Old Testament. This thesis adds to these works a comparative viewpoint between De Cive and Leviathan.
26 Cf. Ibid., 278-79.
27 Lev, 8: 120: 33: 602.
28 This made possible the new analysis in Chapter 34. Hobbes’s realized that the Bible includes not only proper uses of the word, but also metaphorical ones. (Lev, 34: 610.) In the former parts of Leviathan, Hobbes placed emphasis on the importance of proper use of the word in science,
that several verbal expressions might signify virtually the same thing from a scientific point of view.

To give concrete examples of this change, when Hobbes cited scriptures in *De Cive*, he followed much more closely the Vulgate. Thus on the one hand, in the citation in the discussion about God’s revelation to Abraham in *De Cive*, despite some minor deviations from the Vulgate based on the consideration of substantial content, the range and degree of the change is quite limited. Hobbes changes two expressions, from the expression “tres viri” (Gen. 18:2) to “sub specie triumviorum caelestium”, and also, probably from “sopor irruit super Abram... Dictum est ad eum” (Gen. 15:12-13) to “per somnium.”

On the other hand, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes’s attention pierces more easily through verbal expressions into such substantial content as can be captured by the epistemology in Part 1 of *Leviathan*. To take an illuminating example, when Hobbes in *Leviathan* interpreted the same passage in Gen. 18:2 as cited in *De Cive*, which says, “And he lift up his eyes and looked, and lo, three men stood by him,” he changed the expression into “by an apparition of three angels.”

Certainly, the understanding of “men” as angels was not unusual. Still, the combination of the notion of angels with that stressing the necessity of correcting the definitions carelessly done by previous writers, and dismissing the metaphorical use of the word. (Lev, 4: 50, 56, 62: 5: 70.) When Hobbes analysed the Scriptures in *De Cive*, all the key concepts he used derived from the words he made proper use of. However in Chapter 34 of *Leviathan*, thanks to metaphorical and vulgar uses of the word, Hobbes could provide himself with a catalogue of many more meanings of the word, “spirit,” which enabled him to show intelligible meanings of “the spirit of God.” What should be emphasized here is that just because Hobbes held materialistic metaphysics it does not necessarily follow or imply that he could provide such interpretations as found in *Leviathan*.

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29 DC, 16:4.

30 Lev, 36: 662, 64. Even when Hobbes mentioned explicitly “the word of the text”, he did not necessarily follow the verbal expression of the text closely, changing from “And he [Jacob] dreamed, and behold a ladder” (Gen. 28:12) to “Iacob dreame[d] that he saw a ladder” (Lev, 36: 664.) (I follow the biblical reference corrected by Malcolm.)

31 The annotations for the passage in the French Geneva Bible and in the Junius-Tremellius translation refer to Heb. 13:2, which says in the words of
of apparition points clearly to the possibility that the “men” or “angels” are not substances but something only in human perception. In order that this appearance of the concept of angels may not be abrupt or unnatural, Hobbes went so far as to add extra explanation to the vision in the citation just before, even though vision itself was something into which he tried to reduce all mediums of prophecy. Hobbes says, “In a Vision: that is to say, somewhat, as a sign of Gods presence, appeared as Gods Messenger, to speak to him.”

As can be seen in this example, another characteristic in Hobbes’s treatment of the passages of the Scriptures here is his focus on human perception, and his tendency to interpret the events of the cited passages as happening only in human perception. Thus, referring to a passage about revelation to Moses, “And the angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush: and he looked, and, behold, the bush burned with fire, and the bush was not consumed” (Exod. 3:2), Hobbes interpreted this manner of revelation as “the apparition of a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush.” In this case, the expression “looked” in the Bible suggests that the flame can be interpreted as an occurrence in human perception as was done by Hobbes. However, seeing the event was not expressed in the conjunctive mood, it also seems possible that the flame actually rose independently of the perception of Moses. Then, it can be said

the KJV, “Be not forgetful to entertain strangers: for thereby some have entertained angels unawares.” Also, the note of the Bishops’ Bible explains that the “men” are angels even though they are outwardly men.

32 Lev, 36: 662. The aim in the explanation here seems to me rather to prepare for interpreting the revelation in the next cited passage as the appearance of angels than, as Fukuoka suggests, to give some explanation to identifiable phenomena found in revelation, if not as completely identifiable or clearly explainable as ones in natural science. Fukuoka, State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between Spinoza’s and Hobbes’s Interpretations of the Old Testament, 279.

Another possible significance of this paraphrase is to show clearly the connection between supernatural and immediate revelation and the vision here, which phenomenon itself can be understood as completely natural.

33 Lev, 36: 664.
that Hobbes limited and determined the meaning of the biblical passage. Similarly, to take a more explicit example, from the passage “And the Lord appeared unto him the same night” (Gen. 26:24), Hobbes captured the word “night,” and then transformed it into “in his sleep,” and further into “by dream.”

In this way, Hobbes limits the medium of revelation to the sphere of human perception. While verbal expressions in the Scriptures are various, ranging from “appeared (Gen. 12:7), “in a vision” (Gen. 15:1), “appear... three men” (Gen. 18:1-2), “in a dream” (Gen. 20:3), “two angels” (Gen. 19:1), “the angel of God” (Gen. 21:17), “the angel of the Lord called... out of heaven” (Gen. 22:11), “night” (Gen. 26:24), “dreamed” (Gen. 28:12), “the angels of God” (Gen. 32:1), to “the angel of the LORD appeared unto him in a flame out of the midst of a bush” (Exod. 3:2), Hobbes extracts from all of these varied expressions only two types of mediums of revelation: vision and dream. Compared with the discussion of Abraham’s God in De Cive, this reduction of mediums of revelation is characteristic of Leviathan. It is true that in this way Hobbes tries to reduce the phenomena of revelation to “something like a kernel which natural science can capture”, and that Hobbes plans to demystify these phenomena of supernatural revelation and to limit drastically the sphere of things supernatural later. Still, it should also be noted that until the actual demystification Hobbes seems to intend to avoid revealing his intention, refraining from terms of mechanical science. Even the notion of angels here requires only his definition of angels as “a Messenger of God... especially by a Dream or Vision,” and not the demystification in his following explanation. At this stage Hobbes’s main aim lies rather in avoiding such interpretations.

34 Ibid.
36 Lev, 34: 622.
implying that there exist some substantial mediums independent of human perception in supernatural revelation.

In this tendency of Hobbes to reduce mediums of supernatural revelation to dreams or visions, the passage of Num. 12:6-8,\(^{37}\) which helped in De Cive to demonstrate Moses’ special status among prophets,\(^ {38}\) becomes rather an obstacle. For one thing, the passage points to a way of supernatural revelation different from visions or dreams. For another, though Hobbes has already denied the idea that “God hath voice and language,” the passage seems to suggest that “God himself in express words declareth” that he speaks “to his servant Moses, in such manner as a man speaketh to his friend.”\(^ {39}\) Nevertheless, by citing another passage in the New Testament which suggests the mediation of Moses’ revelation as an angel, Hobbes brings Num. 12:6-8 back into his general scheme.\(^ {40}\) Though Hobbes continues to cite other passages in the Scriptures, they are concerned only with general ways of revelation, and not with the peculiar revelation to Moses; they do not support strongly Hobbes’s position on Num. 12:6-8. On the other hand, however, these passages do suggest that Hobbes’s reduction of general ways of revelation to visions and dreams has some scriptural support.

In spite of Hobbes’s interpretive efforts so far, the reduction still does not draw a clear distinction between Hobbes’s attitude here and that in Chapter 32 or the one which the notion of Abraham’s God in De Cive assumes. However, immediately after Hobbes sums up mediations of revelation in the Scriptures as dreams and

\(^{37}\) In Leviathan, Hobbes cites at the same time Exod. 33:11. (Lev, 36: 664.) The corresponding words themselves between this and Num. 12:6-8 might have attracted Hobbes’s attention, but also the annotations for Num. 12:6-8 in the Geneva Bible, and the Bishops’ Bible and the Junius-Tremellius translation point to it.

\(^{38}\) DC, 16:11.

\(^{39}\) Lev, 36: 662, 64. The note for Exod. 33:11 in the Junius-Tremellius translation also discusses the nature of God based on the passage.

\(^{40}\) Fukuoka, State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between Spinoza’s and Hobbes’s Interpretations of the Old Testament, 282-87.
visions, he soon steps further beyond the awareness of the authors of the Scriptures and at the same time shows a markedly different attitude from *De Cive*, by elucidating these two mediations with terms of mechanical science in Part 1 of *Leviathan*: “that is to say, from the imaginations which they had in their sleep, or in an Exstasy: which imaginations in every true Prophet were supernaturall: but in false Prophets were either naturall, or feigned.”

Compared with *De Cive*, here Hobbes specifies and limits the sphere of the supernatural. The dreams or visions are imaginations and to that extent natural phenomena, even in the case of immediate and supernatural revelation. Accordingly, the distinction between natural and supernatural revelation turns out to be much subtler than in *De Cive*. Then what is the practical and political implication of this argument? This question will be answered in the concluding part of this chapter.

III

Hobbes continues to deal with spirit, and also reduces it to dreams or visions. Then he turns to another but closely related important topic: the manner of revelation to sovereign prophets and to subordinate prophets, a distinction peculiar to *Leviathan*.

Here Hobbes refers again to Num. 12:6-8. There are, however, two problems in his use. Firstly, only a few pages after denying the special revelation to Moses suggested in this passage, Hobbes cites the same passage for the contrary purpose in demonstrating that the manner of revelation to sovereign prophets “is not manifest.” This time Hobbes presents the passage as contradictory to the view that God revealed to Moses in Mount

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41 Lev, 36: 666.
42 Lev, 36: 674.
43 Lev, 36: 666.
44 Lev, 36: 668.
Sinai through visions or dreams. This use of Num. 12:6-8 involves another problem. Hobbes applies this discussion not only to Moses, but also to later sovereign prophets such as the high priests. However, seeing that the argument above depends on the distinction between Moses and the other prophets, it cannot be applied to the high priests, who are, after all, not Moses. Hobbes’s rushed impetus to put all sovereign prophets together probably made it difficult for him to realize this problem. In the Latin version of Leviathan, however, Hobbes coped with both of the problems. He deleted the argument based on Num. 12:6-8, and instead inserted the one about revelation to the high priests.

After that, Hobbes suggests that revelation to subordinate prophets is a natural process, as distinct from that to sovereign prophets. One of the political implications of the contrast between sovereign prophets and subordinate prophets consists in denying the allegation of immediate revelation by the enthusiasts. Another is to undermine greatly the presumed infallibility of teachers of the church in the political conclusion in De Cive. Finally Hobbes deals with lots as a means of revelation and ends his interpretative investigation. However, what does Hobbes aim at with this expanded interpretation of the Scriptures? To understand the political significance of his discussion, it is necessary to compare the conclusion in Chapter 36 with De Cive, and then with that in Chapter 32 of Leviathan.

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45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
48 Lev, 36: 669.
49 Lev, 36: 670.
50 DC, 17:28.
51 Though this thesis completely agrees with Hoekstra’s general thesis that Hobbes’s overall countermeasure against the enthusiasts was to isolate them, this kind of more specific inquiry remains to be done. See Hoekstra, "Disarming the Prophets: Thomas Hobbes and Predictive Power," 132-34.
The conclusion in Chapter 36 has a structure of argument parallel to that in Chapter 37, and together they constitute a sub-conclusion of the religious argumentation in *Leviathan*. The key element here is the use of natural reason, or a critical and sceptical attitude toward pretended prophets, as every subject’s duty, which is distinctive of the religious argument in *Leviathan*. It is true that this duty has in common with the law of nature that both of them form civil duties, something subjects are obliged to do in commonwealths, and that they are related to natural reason. However, while the law of nature is contrasted with natural passions of human beings, this duty is set against both intentional deception led by human desire for dominion and people’s aptitude “to give too hasty beleefe” to pretended prophets. Moreover, whereas the laws of nature are conclusions of reason and suggest actions, the duty to make use of reason

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52 Lev, 37: 694, 96.
53 Lev, 36: 674, 76, 78. That Hobbes regards this duty as every one’s seems to be linked with the issue of the intended readership of *Leviathan*. More precisely, this duty would be one major reason why Hobbes extended his readership from *The Elements of Law* to *Leviathan*. As is well-known, though *The Elements of Law* was only distributed and the first edition of *De Cive* was to be read by only a small number of intellectuals, Hobbes for the first time presented the second edition of *De Cive* to the general public. In the added preface, he urged readers not to believe in those who expressed rebellious opinions in the name of God and to report their names. (DC, 83.) The duty in *Leviathan* can be seen an extension of this encouragement in the preface of *De Cive*, and it is a parallel to the change of the language of his political theory from Latin to English. For this topic, also see Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 51-61.

In relation to this, it might also be worth noting that it was for the sake of readers, Hobbes said, that he published the second edition. (DC, 83.) Certainly, it is difficult to understand the publication as an act aiming at his own benefit: even if his book might have given him honour, which possibility he himself mentioned, he was fully aware that his book would displease a number of readers and make numerous enemies, a great detriment to his individual benefit. Ibid.

54 Lev, 37: 694. The cited argument in itself refers to pretended miracles, and not to pretended prophets. A little later on the same page, nevertheless, Hobbes puts together both of them, saying, “before wee give credit to a pretended Miracle, or Prophet.” Based on this and the similarity of structures of argumentation in the concluding part of Chapters 36 and 37, it would not be amiss to make use of the remark in Chapter 37 to understand Chapter 36.
concerns opinions as the presupposition of actions; people have to examine whether the sedition which pretended prophets stir up in the name of God is really what God commands, before they follow them and join a rebellion, or reject them.

More specifically, in *Leviathan*, although Hobbes showed some critical attitude also in Chapter 32, the critical attitude as a civil duty in Chapter 36 has several new elements, which help to explain the significance of Hobbes’s extended interpretation of the Bible in Chapter 36. Generally speaking, while in Chapter 32 Hobbes’s sceptical attitude provides ad hoc room for the use of natural reason, in Chapter 36 Hobbes presents a fuller foundation for it. The first point to cover is the simplification of the kinds of revelation. While in the discussion of faith in Abraham’s God in *De Cive* and in Chapter 32 of *Leviathan*, several kinds of mediations of revelation, such as dreams, visions, voices, and inspirations, were distinguished, through the investigation of revelation in the Scriptures all these distinctions turn out to be superficial. Instead, the distinction Hobbes draws here is between completely natural revelation, and one with some supernatural elements.

This new distinction is connected with the grasp of two natural phenomena common to all prophecy, imaginations or lots, based on the examination of all patterns of revelation in the Scriptures. This exhaustiveness of Hobbes’s examination is the next point to make. The counter-argument in Chapter 32, on the one hand, presented only the possibility of naturalistic interpretations of each of the alleged supernatural phenomena. On the other hand, the scriptural interpretation in Chapter 36 places in perspective true and false prophets, and examines all kinds of revelation. The conclusion in Chapter 36 is concerned with “all Prophecy.”

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55 *Lev.,* 36: 676.
In this way the new distinction of kinds of revelation together with that of one common natural basis for all prophecy prepares room for the use of natural reason concerning the allegation of all kinds of prophecy and thereby for the adoption of a sceptical attitude to pretended prophets. Actually, here Hobbes includes in the scope of his theory pretended prophets themselves: he hoped that the enthusiasts themselves, and not only the listeners to them, would take a sceptical attitude to their own assumed revelation.

Another implication of the amplified interpretation of the Scriptures for the use of natural reason is the distinction between supreme and subordinate prophets. To distinguish true from false prophets, there needs some kind of criterion, and in both Chapters 32 and 36 the criteria are found in the Scriptures. However, in Chapter 32 the criterion by which to distinguish them was concluded to be the Bible, which still needs interpreting. In the conclusions of Chapters 36 and 37, on the other hand, by deriving the notion of the sovereign prophet from the interpretation of the Scriptures, Hobbes specifies one human judge. As a result, Hobbes could attain the unity of external actions concerning prophets or miracles. This means that in the external domain people can acquire “certainty” which natural reason alone cannot attain.

In addition to the expanded interpretation of the Scriptures, in the concluding part too Hobbes vindicated further the critical attitude by the new way of the use of the scriptural criteria discussed also in Chapter 32. It is true that just as in Chapter 36, so in Chapter 32, just before explaining the criteria shown in the Scriptures, the importance of the use of reason is shown by referring to the possibility of human deception and to a large

56 Lev, 36: 680.
57 Cf. Hammond, To the Right Honourable, the Lord Fairfax, 2.
58 Lev, 32: 584.
59 Lev, 32: 580.
number of pseudo-prophets in the Scriptures. However, the argument in Chapter 32 on the one hand presupposes the use of natural reason and a sceptical attitude, which clarifies the uncertainty about alleged supernatural revelation and requires the scriptural support. The conclusion in Chapter 36, on the other hand, presupposes the criteria in the Scriptures, which now show that a sceptical attitude to pretended prophets has scriptural support. In particular, the existence of the criteria ensures that this scepticism is available to all people. With the new discussion based on the command of God in the Scriptures, the conclusion in Chapter 36 goes so far as to show the use of natural reason as everyman’s duty.

For the latter point, Hobbes in Chapter 36 cites Jer. 14:14, which says in the wording of the KJV, “The prophets prophecy lies in my name: I sent them not, neither have I commanded them, neither spake unto them: they prophecy unto you a false vision and divination, and a thing of nought, and the deceit of their heart.” Hobbes's own wording of the last part of this section, which is clearly dependent upon the KJV, is as follows: “they prophecy to you a false Vision, a thing of naught; and the deceit of their heart.” (Lev, 36: 676.) It appears that with the omission of the underlined part Hobbes identifies “a false Vision” with “a thing of naught,” and thus suggests that alleged visions are likely to be false revelation, and not something to be esteemed.

The note attached to this section in the Bishops Bible points to Jeremiah 23, the chapter that Hobbes quotes next. Apart from the scriptural criteria, another new factor in Chapter 36 which Hobbes mentions to encourage scepticism is his sociological insight, unique and vital to Leviathan, into following pretended prophets. Hobbes points out that dominion, which pretended prophets acquire over their followers, is what human beings naturally desire. While in Chapter 32 Hobbes just refers to the possibility of deception, here he shows the motive behind deception and its universal nature. This encouragement of scepticism based on the focus on the advantage successful pretenders of the word of God acquire can be seen as a modified version of his “cui bono” critique of clerical authorities based on false religious doctrines in Chapter 47. The scepticism is effectual for the abuse of the word of God not only by the enthusiasts but also by the clergy.

Lev, 36: 674, 66.

Hobbes cites the word of Jeremiah as the command of God. “Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, hearken not unto the words of the Prophets, that prophecy to you. They make you vain, they speak a Vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord.” (Jer. 23:16; Lev, 36: 676.) It is probably this command of God that ensures the obligatory character of the sceptical attitude.

Curley remarks, “A prudent person will be skeptical of any claims to direct communication with God.” Curley, "I Durst Not Write So Boldly".
The feature and significance of the conclusion in Chapter 36 will become clearer if it is also compared with a somewhat similar argument about the use of natural reason in judging prophets in De Cive.\textsuperscript{63} In De Cive the function of natural reason is to interpret and clarify the criteria for judging prophets so that the criteria can be applied to concrete situations. In Leviathan, on the other hand, thanks to Hobbes’s detailed interpretation of the Bible the chief criteria turn out to be the judgement of sovereign prophets, and here no further interpretation is necessary. The task of natural reason is rather to take a sceptical attitude toward pretended prophets and to be aware that the claim of supernatural revelation has to be checked by the criteria in the Bible. Also it is only in Leviathan that Hobbes not only practices the scepticism or the use of reason himself in his reasoning but also encourages the readers to assume this kind of sceptical attitude.

In this way, in Chapter 36 the Scriptures not only offer such criteria as natural reason cannot provide, but also vindicate the use of natural reason. Thus Hobbes shows that the Scriptures and natural reason complement each other for the sake of quashing the rebellion based on the divine word of pretended prophets.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{63} How to Read Hobbes's Theological-Political Treatise," 533, 35. However, firstly, the sceptical attitude is a matter of duty, and not a matter of prudence. Secondly, this duty concerns not only “prudent” people, but every citizen.  

\textsuperscript{64} Curley’s question about which of the two, reason or revelation, gives priority to the other, and his answer that Hobbes’s solution “seems to involve a vicious circle”, seem to miss this alternative. Curley, "I Durst Not Write So Boldly": How to Read Hobbes’s Theological-Political Treatise," 535.  

Collins mentions Hobbes’s “profound scepticism” “of revealed knowledge,” which, he says, is “incompatible with Christianity.” Collins, The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes, 30. However, for Hobbes, “profound scepticism” is a tool vital for dealing with the political threat of the enthusiasts. For this, also see Hoekstra, “Disarming the Prophets: Thomas Hobbes and Predictive Power,” 133-34.  

Fukuoka argues that on the surface Hobbes maintained the vulgar notion of the agreement of reason and the Scriptures, and that he wanted to share his scepticism based on natural reason towards the Scriptures only with a part of readers by letting them read between the lines. Fukuoka, State,
Here it can be seen that Hobbes completely turns upside down the negative opinion on the use of natural reason about supernatural matters, which he referred to in all of his three works of political philosophy. As has been seen in the introduction, from *The Elements of Law* to *Leviathan* Hobbes referred to some people who abandoned or attacked natural reason, which probably indicated radical Puritans.\(^\text{65}\) At the beginning of Chapter 32 of *Leviathan*, he made it clear that things supernatural in the Scriptures were a main obstacle for rational understanding of them and a factor which might lead some people to abandon natural reason.\(^\text{66}\) In the conclusion in Chapter 36, however, the use of natural reason to deal with alleged supernatural revelation becomes not just a matter to be defended or encouraged but rather everyman’s duty based on the command of God in the Scriptures, the opposite of what radical Puritans thought.\(^\text{67}\)

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\(^\text{65}\) DC, 12:6; Lev, 29: 504.

\(^\text{66}\) Lev, 32: 576.

\(^\text{67}\) It is in this very sense, and not just in the sense that Hobbes refuted many errors as Johnston shows, that Hobbes can be seen as a contributor to the Enlightenment. Johnston, *The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation*, 92-218.

In *Leviathan* there are many arguments which deal with the problem of pretended prophets to some extent. Then, in comparison with other chapters in the religious part of *Leviathan*, what is the role specific to the conclusion in Chapter 36 as a response to this problem? It has already been noted the similar structures of the conclusion in Chapters 36 and 37, and now this thesis will clarify a subtle difference between them concerning the relationship between internal thought and external obedience. One of the characteristics of the duty of natural reason in Chapter 37, compared with the argument in the former two parts of *Leviathan*, is to open a way for a distinction between two kinds of reason, public and private, and thus for the possible disagreement between internal thought and external obedience. This contrasts with the situation of citizens in the civil parts proper in Hobbes’s theory, where external action and internal thought of citizens are in harmony. As opposed to the state of nature, in the commonwealth, with the aid of the sword of the sovereign, the laws of nature, or actions which natural reason suggests to citizens, acquire a great support of human passion, fear of punishment. As a result, citizens are supposed to regard actions contradictory to natural law, especially to justice, as an obvious detriment to their own good. Thus true opinions about civil matters establish foundations for the external duty of citizens. On the other hand, in the concluding part of Chapter 37, Hobbes mentions the possibility of the clash between internal belief and one of the origins of the Enlightenment. For Hobbes and the Enlightenment, also see footnote 45 in the introduction, the last part of 3.3.4., and the conclusion in this thesis.

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68 Lev, 18: 254. In *De Cive*, one of Hobbes’s contrasts of the commonwealth with the state of nature was that between the empire of reason and passions. DC, 10:1.
69 DC, 6:4.
70 DC, 6:13.
external obedience.\textsuperscript{71} This variance can occur because both of them might be based on natural reason, with internal thought depending on private reason and external obedience on public reason. Another reason for this disagreement is that private reason cannot reach one definite answer concerning the judgement of pretended miracles except for the obedience to the public reason. In this sense, Hobbes’s search for certainty in Chapter 32 concerns only external obedience; private reason still leaves people internally uncertain, as Hobbes’s expression, “beleeve, or not beleeve,” suggests.\textsuperscript{72}

However, in Chapter 36 Hobbes does not mention this possibility of the dissension of internal belief and external obedience, in spite of its considerably close structural parallel with Chapter 37. This is probably due to the difference between the nature of pretended prophets and that of pretended miracles. Miracles are, after all, just one of the two criteria for judging pretended prophets. Even if people believe in pretended miracles internally, the other condition still remains to be met. People will obey the sovereign if the teaching of pretended prophets performing “miracles” are contradictory to that of the sovereign. On the other hand, if people believe internally in pretended prophets, seeing that the command of God has priority to that of the sovereign, it necessarily follows that they will obey the pretended prophets rather than the sovereign, destructive to the commonwealth and peace.

Due to this peculiar character of internal belief in matters of pretended prophets, the concluding part of Chapter 36 plays a unique political and practical role in the general structure of demonstration about Christian religion in \textit{Leviathan}. In Chapter 42 the main political conclusion about church-state relations, the right of the civil sovereign to determine religious matters and the

\textsuperscript{71} Lev, 37: 696.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
corresponding duty of the subjects to obey the sovereign, concerns only external obedience of the subjects, and not their internal thought or belief. However, there is one area in which this separation is not effectual, where internal belief leads directly to external action: belief in pretended prophets.

This pitfall in the political conclusion of Chapter 42 is also left in the counter-argument to the authority of the pretension of private inspiration or revelation in the discussion about the foundation of the authority of the Bible in Chapter 33. Hobbes remarks there that people without supernatural revelation are not obliged to regard as the law of God what private pretended prophets allege. This lack of obligation, however, does not prevent people from believing voluntarily and obeying what private pretended prophets tell them to do as God’s command. Similarly, the efficacy of the counter-argument in Chapter 32 presupposes a sceptical attitude to pretended prophets. Hobbes, or “I” might “make doubt of” what they said and ask them the “argument” they “produce, to oblige me to believe it,” but it does not guarantee that other people will adopt a similar attitude to them.

Therefore, the duty to adopt a critical and sceptical attitude to pretended prophets (or miracles) as specified in Chapters 36 and 37 is the only measure which could stop people from believing blindly in pretended prophets. Furthermore, the duty of the use of natural reason finally requires people to turn to the judgement of the sovereign prophet as the definitive criterion for judging the truth of pretended prophets. This combination of the critical attitude and the judgement of the sovereign prophet as the

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73 Lev, 42: 782, 84, 864.
74 Lev, 33: 604, 6.
75 Hoekstra does not capture the specific and distinctive character of the conclusions in Chapter 36 and 37, ignoring the subtle difference between the conclusion in Chapter 36 and 33. Hoekstra, "Disarming the Prophets: Thomas Hobbes and Predictive Power," 133.
76 Lev, 32: 578.
definitive criterion would completely exclude the possibility that people would join the rebellion against the civil sovereign which radical Puritans incited. In this way, the conclusion in both of the chapters constitutes a politically vital and peculiar role in Hobbes’s general argument on Christian religion in *Leviathan*. While for Seth Ward and Edward Leigh the threat of the enthusiasts was a matter of faith, for Hobbes it was primarily a political problem. Thus, whereas the former’s reply to the enthusiasts was to construct their arguments for the authority of the Bible, Hobbes’s solution was the duty of scepticism. This duty was quite unusual in his age. As Henry Hammond exemplifies, most people looked upon scepticism negatively as a threat to faith. Though some tolerationists encouraged scepticism, Hobbes went so far as to elevate it to every citizen’s duty.\(^{77}\)

Finally, it may be valuable to note the new significance which the authority of the Scriptures as the word of God assumed in *Leviathan* for solving the new problem of pretended prophets. The authority of the Scriptures might, by itself, undermine the human authority of the sovereign and could be a great factor for the destruction of commonwealths. In *De Cive*, the problem of Christian religion for Hobbes was the diversity of the interpretation of the Bible as the word of God.\(^{78}\) Accordingly, Hobbes solved this problem by the unification of the interpretation of the Scriptures through the sovereign, with little regard to the authority of the Scriptures. Here, the authority of the Bible involves no positive or only potentially dangerous political implications. However, as for the problem of pretended prophets in *Leviathan*, which problem in itself was not

\(^{77}\) While Tuck placed Hobbes’s religious ideas in his earlier works in the trends of fideism as a response to scepticism, especially English fideism represented by Chillingworth, this thesis places the scepticism peculiar to *Leviathan* in the religious context of the revolutionary years. Tuck, *Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction*, 91-97.

\(^{78}\) DC, 18:1.
necessarily related to the Scriptures, the authority of the Scriptures assumed yet another political connotation. When natural reason made every examination but still could not provide the definite answer to the distinction between true and false prophets, it was the criteria in the Scriptures as an authoritative text to be followed that complemented and completed the task of natural reason. These criteria were not directly based on natural reason itself: the reason why people were obliged to make use of the criteria was based on the nature of the text as an authoritative text, though the authority might ultimately be dependent upon natural reason. In this sense, it can be said that the authority of the Scriptures gained a new significance and became an integral part complementary to natural reason for solving the political problem of distinguishing between true and false prophets central to *Leviathan*. Yet how is the authority of the Bible grounded in *Leviathan* and what is its distinctive feature? These questions will be considered in the next chapter.
4.3. The Foundation of Biblical Authority in *Leviathan*

Before discussing *Leviathan*, it would be useful to take a brief look at what his earlier works say about biblical authority.¹ *The Elements of Law*, as opposed to *De Cive*, includes some substantial argument about the authority of the Scriptures in its epistemological part. The gist of Hobbes's argument is that the chief foundation of biblical authority, inspiration, is subject to a critical examination, but that the criterion of the examination in turn depends on the Scriptures.² “It remaineth, that the knowledge we have that the Scriptures are the word of God, is only faith.”³ This faith consists in trust in “the holy men of God’s church succeeding one another from the time of those that saw the wondrous works of God Almighty in the flesh.”⁴ This process of the succession is through hearing and teaching, that is to say, a “natural” process.⁵ Though this epistemological discussion concerning religion is largely independent of the latter political part, Hobbes infers from this a political conclusion: as long as the fundamental article of faith, Jesus being Christ, is intact, the churchman’s judgement and interpretation of the Scriptures in the case of controversies or doubt is safer to trust in than “his own, whether reasoning, or spirit; that is to say his own opinion.”⁶

In contrast with this epistemological treatment of the authority of the Bible in *The Elements of Law*, that of *De Cive* is succinct and merely traditional. It just acknowledges the Bible as the word

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¹ A simpler but useful version of this type of comparison about biblical authority and other topics can be seen in Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 71-78.
² EL, 1:11:7-8.
³ EL, 1:11:8.
⁴ EL, 1:11:9.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ EL, 1:11:10.
of God based on inspiration, and does not analyse further.7 Still, 
*De Cive* develops an important stepping stone to *Leviathan* in its 
discussion of the three ways of transmitting the word of God: 
natural reason, immediate revelation and the voice of prophets.8 
Corresponding to this distinction, the kingdom of God is divided 
into two types, one based on natural reason and the other on voice 
of prophets. Both in *De Cive* and *Leviathan*, Hobbes regards the 
kingdom of God in the Scriptures as the latter type and analyses 
it accordingly. In *De Cive*, however, there remains room for 
进一步 clarification when it comes to the authority of the Bible. 
Its basis, inspiration, would fall into the category of immediate 
revelation. However, according to Hobbes, by revelation God “has 
said different things to different men,” while the Scriptures hold 
more or less a definite content despite its possible various 
interpretations.9 This discrepancy would mean that Hobbes in *De 
Cive* did not consider the precise relationship between this 
rational and general scheme and biblical authority. On the other 
hand, in *Leviathan* Hobbes started his argument about Christian 
religion not with the content of the Bible but with immediate 
revelation, cast new epistemological doubt on immediate 
revelation, and showed the difficulty of identifying immediate 
revelation as such by natural reason only. Basically from this 
viewpoint Hobbes in *Leviathan* analysed the foundation of the 
authority of the Bible, but his analysis consisted of several layers 
of argument. The foundation of the authority of Moses, among 
others, serves as a nodal point connecting Hobbes’s 
epistemological refutation of the enthusiasts discussed in the 
previous chapter with his arguments underlying the authority of 
the Bible. This thesis then first of all will turn to this topic.

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7 DC, 17:15-16.
8 DC, 15:3-4.
9 DC, 15:3.
4.3.1. The Foundation of Moses’ Authority: Chapter 40

It has been seen that Seth Ward, in his division of the Scriptures into the doctrinal and historical parts, showed some sceptical attitude towards Moses as a prophet. Moses, so far as he depended on his doctrine for his status as a prophet, was just a pretender of divine doctrines. Hobbes in *Leviathan*, developing his argument about Moses in *De Cive*, radicalized this type of sceptical attitude far beyond Ward and offered a completely new and revolutionary foundation for the authority of Moses. He set this pivotal question in the time just after the renewal of the contract at Mount Sinai.

By this constitution, a Kingdom is acquired to God. A) But seeing Moses had no authority to govern the Israelites, as a successor to the right of Abraham, because he could not claim it by inheritance; B) it appeareth not as yet, that the people were obliged to take him for God’s Lieutenant, longer than they believed that God spake unto him. C) And therefore his authority (notwithstanding the Covenant they made with God) depended yet merely upon the opinion they had of his Sanctity, and of the reality of his Conferences with God, and the verity of his Miracles; D) which opinion coming to change, they were no more obliged to take any thing for the law of God, which he propounded to them in God’s name. E) We are therefore to consider, what other ground there was, of their obligation to obey them. F) For it cannot be the commandment of God that could oblige them; because God spake not to them immediately, but by the mediation of Moses himself. And our Saviour saith to himself, *If I bear witnesse of my self, my witnesse is not true*, much less if Moses bear witnesse of himselfe, (especially in a claim of Kingly power over God’s people) ought his testimony to be received. G) His authority therefore, as the authority of all other

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10 The commentaries in the Beza and the French Geneva translations and the Geneva Bible connect this passage with a seemingly contradictory passage in John. 8:14 and try to reconcile them. From this viewpoint, Hobbes’s citation here might look casual or careless. Or he might have omitted this kind of discussion deliberately in view of the great role the cited passage plays in his general reasoning.
Princes, must be grounded on the Consent of the People, and their Promise to obey him. H) And so it was: For the people (Exod. 20. 18.) ... said unto Moses, speak thou with us, and we will hear; but let not God speak with us lest we die. Here was their promise of obedience: and by this it was they obliged themselves to obey whatsoever he should deliver unto them for the Commandment of God. 11

First of all, it is useful to confirm the relationship between this argument peculiar to Leviathan and the contract with God seen also in De Cive. The expressions “not as yet” in B) and “notwithstanding the Covenant they made with God” in C) suggest that Hobbes was fully conscious that the foundation of Moses was established only after the renewal of the contract between God and people, and also that there was a time lag between the people’s acceptance of God’s proposal in Exod. 19:8 found in De Cive or God’s command to Moses in Exod. 19:5 in Chapter 35 of Leviathan on the one hand and the people’s promise to obey Moses in Exod. 20:18, 19 discussed in H) on the other. 12 In this sense, the expressions indicate Hobbes’s own awareness in Leviathan that the contract with God was not a sufficient condition for establishing the kingdom of God, and that yet another foundation for the kingdom of God concerning the prophet mediating the people and God was necessary. This was because the argument in De Cive that the obligatory power of the divine law derived from the people’s contract with God turned out to be insufficient. In view of the structure of De Cive, where the consideration of divine law comes immediately after that of

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11 Lev, 40: 740. For the comparison of Hobbes’s and Spinoza’s treatment of this topic, see Fukuoka, State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between Spinoza’s and Hobbes’s Interpretations of the Old Testament, 212, 16, 322-26, 419-22.

Malcolm regarded the concluding parts of G) and H) as an example of the “truly radical cutting edge” of the argument peculiar to Leviathan. Hobbes, Leviathan, 41. Our interest is on what made possible the “cutting edge,” and its political significance.

12 DC, 16:8; Lev, 35: 636.
contracts with God,\textsuperscript{13} it could be said that the foundation of divine law was the contract with God, and that the obligative power of divine law was based solely on the contract.\textsuperscript{14} In F), on the other hand, Hobbes provides new perspectives and denies that the Hebrew people were obliged to the commandment of God even after the contract was concluded.

One major ground for the denial is a modified version of the epistemological doubt found in the previous Chapter 32, which doubt also corresponds with the duty of the use of natural reason in the concluding part of Chapter 36. In contrast to Chapter 32, however, here Hobbes cannot assume that the Hebrew people had a critical attitude, and probably for this reason he appeals to Christ, God, for vindicating the same duty of the critical and sceptical attitude as shown in Chapter 36. Still again, while in Chapter 36 Hobbes cited the word of God through the mouth of Jeremiah, here Hobbes invokes Christ; the explanation would be that only the word of Christ carries higher authority than that of Moses.

Another factor for this denial of the obligative power of God’s commandment, complementary to the duty of the use of natural reason, is the validating condition of law. Discussing divine positive law in Chapter 26 of \textit{Leviathan}, Hobbes says, “It is of the essence of the Law, that he who is to be obliged, be assured of the Authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God.”\textsuperscript{15} As long as Moses’ testimony was denied and his authority had not yet been founded, the condition

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{13} DC, 16:3-5, 8, 10: 17:7-8.
\item \textsuperscript{14} “Other divine laws derive their obligation solely from the \textit{agreement} which was made later with the people itself because they were given by \textit{God specifically as King of the Israelites}.” (DC, 16:10.) Also, when Hobbes said, “The laws which \textit{CHRIST} summarizes... are precisely the laws to which all who recognize the God of Abraham are bound,” certainly natural laws in them are obligatory eternally, but as for “all the laws of divine worship due by the \textit{old agreement},” there seemed to be no other source of obligation than the old contract (or the new contract discussed in the preceding section). DC, 17:7, 8.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Lev, 26: 444.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
of the public announcement of laws was not met; therefore, even after the contract the commandment of God did not oblige Hebrew people. It can be seen here clearly that the kind of epistemological doubt in *Leviathan*, together with the consideration of the validating condition of laws, rendered the contract with God insufficient for the obligation of divine law, as opposed to *De Cive*, and forced Hobbes to search for another foundation.

So far the significance of the part F) in relation to *De Cive* has been examined. Now, in the whole reasoning here, this part, together with A)·D), play destructive functions which deny hereditary right, faith in Moses and the commandment of God as the foundation of Moses’ authority. As for the part A) and hereditary right, there is no need to comment on it. It is Hobbes’s denial of the faith in Moses as the foundation of his authority that needs a close examination in comparison with *De Cive*. The section in *De Cive* to which the parts B)·D) to a certain extent correspond is Section 11 in Chapter 16 and handles the reasons why Hebrew people believed Moses to be a true prophet. Similarly to *De Cive*, the argument in B)·D) does not deny the fact the Hebrew people believed in Moses; what it denies is this faith as the foundation of his authority, owing to the changeable nature of faith. In order to understand this new view on faith as mutable and thus as inadequate for the foundation of authority, it is useful to recall how in *Leviathan* Hobbes treated the three foundational factors in *De Cive* for Hebrew people’s faith in Moses: miracles, faith in the God of Abraham, and Moses’ special status or unproblematic qualification as a true prophet based on Num. 12:8. From the viewpoint of *Leviathan*, all of the factors in *De Cive* were involved in supernatural phenomena. However, what Chapters 36 and 37 showed was that the specification of a phenomenon as supernatural was not, by itself, evident and needed attestation by natural reason. Nonetheless, as Chapter 32 clearly illustrated, natural reason without the scriptural criterion
leaves people only under uncertainty, and here in the case of the foundation of Moses’ authority, the scriptural criterion, the judgement of the sovereign prophet, is not available. In this sense, Hebrew people’s faith in or opinion about the supernatural revelation to Moses was, as long as it was lacking in the confirmation of natural reason, uncertain and subject to change.

Hobbes connects the changeable character of faith or opinion in D) with the denial of them as the basis of Moses’ foundation in E). The background of the connection in Hobbes’s general scheme can be seen by paying attention to the function of contracts in relation to the construction of the state. One reason why Hobbes utilized the notion of contract in establishing civil society was that he saw mere gatherings without contracts as fragile because their formation relies on mere coincidence among individuals in their changeable conceptions of good and evil, which in turn depend on the human faculty of the affection.\(^16\) By comparison, alliances including civil societies are formed through covenants, namely, mutual exchanges of future rights based on the human faculty of the reason, and thus are more solid, because the right once transferred will not go back to the transferor unless any reasonable suspicion or fear arises.\(^17\) Thus, Hobbes’s exclusion of faith subject to change from the foundation of law is in accordance with his general theory of civil society.

After all these sceptical and negative arguments, Hobbes offers a positive foundation for the authority of Moses: the obedience of the Hebrews. This means that even the recognition of Moses, the most authoritative prophet, as a true prophet derives ultimately not from some divine grace but from his status as a civil sovereign, far beyond the expectations of Ward. Now, as suggested before, the implications of this new argument for the overall interpretation of the Bible in *Leviathan* are far-reaching. Each of

\(^{17}\) DC, 2:1, 9, 11.
them will be discussed in due course. This thesis will continue at this point by returning to the authority of the Bible in *Leviathan*.

4.3.2. Hobbes’s External Analysis in Chapter 33

In the investigation of contexts of *Leviathan* this thesis has seen two major approaches to biblical authority during the Civil War. One relies mainly on the content of the Scriptures, and the other on the reliability of the apostle’s account as a matter of fact. Compared with these and Chillingworth’s approach, that of Chapter 33 in *Leviathan* possesses two major distinctive characteristics. Firstly, it offers mathematical or demonstrative certainty which Chillingworth, Ward and Hammond found impossible to acquire and unreasonable to demand. In this respect, Hobbes’s position bears some resemblance to that of Catholics: Hobbes provided the kind of certainty Knott demanded repeatedly and which he accused Protestants to be lacking. Hobbes and Catholics are also similar in turning to an external actor in the quest for certainty. On the other hand, Hobbes was quite different from Goodwin here. Though Goodwin offered various kinds of evidence, the content or doctrine peculiar to the Bible and Christian religion as internal evidence and events related to Christianity as external evidence, from Hobbes’s viewpoint Goodwin’s grounds would seem to be lacking in the certainty he sought.

This provision of mathematical certainty was not just an advantage of Hobbes’s argument but also something vital for him, complementary to his emphasis on the duty of a sceptical attitude towards pretended prophets. Let us remember that in the biblical example Hobbes mentioned in Chapter 32, only one of 400 pretended prophets was true, that trusted prophets acquire de

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facto dominion over their followers, and that human beings naturally desire dominion. These grounds for his advocacy of radical scepticism in turn suggest the insufficiency of moral certainty. While Hammond theorised the unreasasonableness of radically sceptical attitudes in matters of faith, Hobbes found them essential for discrediting and isolating the enthusiasts. Hobbes demanded both radical scepticism and the kind of certainty which would withstand such scepticism. Here it should also be noted that this sceptical argument deals a serious blow to the factual approach. When Ward and Hammond examined the integrity of the apostles, one of the main factors for their credibility was a complete lack of gain they could obtain by telling lies. Yet Hobbes’s unique insight into pretenders of divine doctrines, by bringing light to the dominion they could acquire over their followers, would undermine the integrity of any such pretenders, including the apostles.

The second feature is Hobbes’s concentration on the medium of revelation, especially of immediate revelation and his peculiar insight into its nature. This can be viewed from three perspectives. Firstly, it can be located in the controversy between Catholics and Protestants. Disputants of this controversy had already examined extensively the relative merits of translations and the Bible in the original languages, thus bringing light to uncertainties involved in the human transmission of the Scriptures. Goodwin in particular, probably based on the knowledge derived from this long-standing controversy, pointed out sharply that some elements of human hands like scribes inevitably had slipped into the Scriptures, including those in the original languages, in the process of the transmission of the Bible. What Hobbes added to it


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was not the uncertainty or difficulty as to human transmission from prophets or authors of the Scriptures, but the difficulty concerning immediate revelation which prophets and scriptural authors are supposed to have received.

Secondly, this concentration on immediate revelation characterises the kind of demonstration or information to which Hobbes paid attention. While Goodwin and Leigh picked up various kinds of arguments, from the viewpoint of Hobbes, arguments truly relevant to biblical authority would be much more limited than they thought. The pertinent information would mainly concern prophets or the equivalent to them. On the contrary, the spread of Christian religion after the age of apostles, for example, would be irrelevant. In this sense, Hobbes’s approach is similar to that of those who viewed the problem as factual and focused on apostles and their revelations or miracles. Hammond in particular paid special attention to divine testimonies. What Hobbes added to them was to extend the range of investigation from the apostles in the New Testament to the prophets in the Old Testament, covering all types of biblical revelation.

Thirdly, however, this factual approach would also bear serious problems from the standpoint of Leviathan. Apart from the limited moral certainty the factual approach can provide at best, the problem intrinsic to this approach lies in settling the matter of fact concerning supernatural phenomena. This can be seen most clearly in the different discussions of miracles between Ward or Hammond and Hobbes. Certainly the former group considered the possibility of pseudo-miracles as impostures. However, for them the miracles of the apostles were beyond doubt. Thus, miracles were an important part of their replies to scepticism. Yet for Hobbes the situation was completely different. Miracles, far from being helpful for dealing with scepticism, were something to be judged with deep scepticism due to the possibility of impostures
and their various forms. Moreover, the identification of miracles as such entails fundamental theoretical difficulties because of their supernatural character. Even direct eye-witnesses of pretended miracles cannot reach certainty in their identification. Furthermore, when it comes to the miracles of the apostles or prophets in the Scriptures, they cannot be seen directly, but are known only by the mediation of the report of the Scriptures.

Now, this thesis will turn from these general remarks to specific points. Chapter 33 in *Leviathan* deals with topics which were usually thought to be related to the authority of the Bible. In this sense, though each of the topics Hobbes chose are not directly interrelated, it can be said that the main theme of this chapter is, broadly speaking, the authority of the Bible. One of the characteristics of Hobbes’s attitude in this regard is his relative lack of interest in human transmission. Though Hobbes took into consideration the possibility of the falsification of the Scriptures by the clergy, he briefly dismissed it. Nor did he consider other possible errors or falsifications, for example, by scribes. What he was interested in was the people in the position of pretended prophets, who in this case are the human authors of the Scriptures. In his investigation of the antiquity of the Scriptures, Hobbes tried to collect information on this. The antiquity of the Scriptures was also dealt with by Leigh or Goodwin in their defences of biblical authority. In relation to them, the significance of Hobbes’s argument lies in undermining some previous foundations for biblical authority. In particular, his famous argument about Mosaic authorship made completely ineffectual

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21 Lev, 37: 690, 92.
22 Lev, 37: 694, 96.
24 Lev, 33: 600, 2.
some of Goodwin’s arguments, which proves the authority of the Bible by assumed Mosaic authorship. Now, let us confirm the precise nature of Hobbes’s originality on this topic.\textsuperscript{26}

Firstly, before investigating the Mosaic authority seriously Hobbes confirms that the name of the book does not necessarily indicate the author.\textsuperscript{27} One of Hobbes’s grounds for undermining the Mosaic authority, the problematical character of the last chapter of Deuteronomy, was shared also by Leigh.\textsuperscript{28} However, in comparison with Leigh, or à Lapide, an influential writer on this topic, Hobbes viewed the range of interposition by later writers as wider, by pointing out several other passages which describe events after the death of Moses.\textsuperscript{29} Still, while Leigh saw the interposition only in the last chapter, à Lapide regarded the Pentateuch as the mixture of Moses’ writing with many other interpositions by later authors. This general theory as to the construction of the text is quite similar to Hobbes’s version. Nevertheless, firstly, Hobbes indicates the places written by later writers were not just interpositions but rather the main part of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Curley discusses this theme in Curley, "‘I Durst Not Write So Boldly’: How to Read Hobbes’s Theological-Political Treatise," 556-71; "Hobbes and the Cause of Religious Toleration," in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, ed. Patricia Springborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 317-19. Also Bernier’s research is useful for understanding the relationship between Hobbes and other leading people in 17th century who questioned the Mosaic authorship. (Jean Bernier, La critique du Pentateuque de Hobbes à Calmet (Paris: Honore Champion, 2010).) However, to understand the assumption of Hobbes, MacIrom’s article remains the most valuable. (Malcolm, "Hobbes, Ezra, and the Bible: The History of a Subversive Idea.") What this thesis aims to clarify further than Malcolm is the precise relationship between “his [Hobbes’s] particular arguments about the biblical text itself” and “the whole surrounding structure of argument” such as his epistemological analysis in Leviathan, with a comparative perspective of Leviathan and his earlier works. Ibid., 428.
\item Lev, 33: 590.
\item Leigh, A Treatise of Divinity, 47.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the Pentateuch. Secondly, Hobbes excluded beforehand à Lapide’s general explanatory principle of Moses’ prophecy.\(^{30}\)

In addition to antiquity, Hobbes also discussed the scope of the Scriptures. While Leigh or Goodwin also discussed these topics, the distinctive feature of Hobbes in comparison with them was his neglect of these discussions as a positive piece of evidence for biblical authority. As can be seen from the remark, “it is not the writer, but the authority of the Church, that maketh a Book Canonickall,” Hobbes was aware that grounds suitable as the foundation for biblical authority were limited.\(^{31}\)

Similarly Hobbes paid careful attention to identifying the precise issue of biblical authority.

It is a question much disputed between the divers sects of Christian Religion, *From whence the Scriptures derive their Authority*; which question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, *How wee know them to be the Word of God, or Why we believe them to be so?* And the difficulty of solving it, ariseth chiefly from the impropernesse of the words wherein the question itself is couched. For it is believed on all hands, that the first and originall Author of them is God: and consequently the question disputed, is not that. Again, it is manifest, that none can know they are Gods Word, (though all true Christians believe it,) but those to whom God himself hath revealed it supernaturally; and therefore the question is not rightly moved, of our Knowledge of it. Lastly, when the question is propounded of our Beleefe because some are moved to beleive for one, and others for other reasons, there can be rendered no one generall answer for them all. The question truly stated is, *By what Authority they are made Law.*\(^{32}\)

In relation to *The Elements of Law*, both admitted that viewing the Scriptures as the word of God was not in the sphere of

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 410.

\(^{31}\) Lev, 33: 602.

\(^{32}\) Lev, 33: 604.
knowledge but of belief, despite their different reasons. Still, while *The Elements* was satisfied with this conclusion and then turned to the object of the belief, here Hobbes dares to ask the grounds of the belief, though he does not reach a satisfactory positive conclusion. This is similar to the epistemological doubt in Chapter 32, and this demand for grounds of articles of faith is characteristic of *Leviathan*, parallel to Goodwin or Ward. However, thanks to the three divisions of the ways of transmitting the divine word since *De Cive*, in *Leviathan* Hobbes looked more pointedly at the problem than, for example, Goodwin. While Goodwin (and Edward Leigh) distinguished the Scriptures as the word of God from other writings deriving from mere human beings, this analytical distinction becomes ineffectual when it comes to pretended prophets or human authors of the Scriptures. Though they are human beings, their word, spoken or written, is supposed to be the word of God. The word of prophets is both human and divine, and this ambivalence is the core of the problem from the viewpoint of *Leviathan*. Though Ward consciously paid attention to the testimony in a similar way, only Hobbes’s theoretical framework can explain the ground of the choice.

The lack of internal certainty or of knowledge in this argument is identical to Chapter 32, but in opposition to it Hobbes here transferred the sphere of the problem from the internal to the external, and found certainty in the external domain: he viewed the authority of the Scriptures as a matter of law. Then he took up the standard arguments of both Catholics and Protestants, the Catholic Church and the spirit as the foundation of the authority of the Bible, but he also mentioned the civil sovereign.33 These two aspects, the focus on the external as the result of internal

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uncertainty inherent in the matters of faith, and the connection between biblical authority with the civil sovereign and law, are obvious features of *Leviathan*. While the other people discussed in this thesis saw this problem mainly as that of faith, or at the widest of morals, Hobbes viewed this as a political problem. On the other hand, there was an aspect where the direction of Hobbes’s new intellectual move in *Leviathan* was parallel to Goodwin, Ward, or Hammond: the notion of the civil sovereign, as opposed to those of the spirit or the church, did not depend on the conceptual system of Christian religion, and could gain currency for non-Christians.

Among the three possibilities of the civil sovereign, the Catholic Church, and the spirit, what Hobbes rejected in the first place was the standard Protestant argument of inspiration. On the one hand this indicates clearly a departure from the position of *De Cive*, where the authority of the Scriptures was dependent on inspiration. On the other hand this denial of spirits as the main foundation for biblical authority was also seen in his contemporaries like Leigh, or more markedly in Ward. The reason for this denial too can be safely said to be almost the same for all the three: the emergence of the enthusiasts who depended only on spirits.

As a result, in this denial of the inspiration theory, Hobbes’s view is congruent with that of many Catholics. Moreover, Hobbes assumes the standard Catholic position that the Scriptures cannot by themselves demonstrate themselves, and that some external actor is necessary for the basis of biblical authority. Actually, the dispute between the two alternatives, the

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34 Another sign for this is that the title of Part 3 of *Leviathan* is “OF A CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH” [italics mine]; it was not Christian religion, as could be directly inferred from the title of the third part of *De Cive* religion.

35 DC, 17:15, 16.

Catholic Church and the civil sovereign, was not settled in this chapter.\textsuperscript{37} To do so, Hobbes turned to the internal argument of the Scriptures.\textsuperscript{38} To that extent, it was certainly necessary for Hobbes in \textit{Leviathan} to develop the long and multi-layered interpretation of the Scriptures.

4.3.3. Hobbes’s Internal Analysis in Chapters 39 and 42

The philological analysis of the word “church” in Chapter 39, though being almost the same as that in \textit{De Cive} in their limitation of the jurally meaningful church to the national church, acquires a new meaning in relation to the final judgement between the civil sovereign and the Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{39} It excludes the universal Catholic Church as the basis of biblical authority in every Christian country. Thus, the only possibility left is the civil sovereign. Nevertheless, thus far there was no argument which demonstrated this. This task was carried out in Chapter 42 in relation to the discussion of canon, and in a similar way to, and based on, the argument about the authority of Moses in Chapter 40. Yet that argument should be understood in comparison with \textit{De Cive}.

Though \textit{De Cive} does not treat the canon squarely, there are some relevant sections. Discussing the time when Deuteronomy was rediscovered, Hobbes mentions “the authority to admit books as God’s Word.”\textsuperscript{40} Also, he argues that “it is not clear when the

\textsuperscript{37} According to Malcolm, the congruence between Catholics and Hobbes was contingent. Malcolm, "Hobbes, Ezra, and the Bible: The History of a Subversive Idea," 424. So far as Hobbes and Catholics had common adversaries, however, their similarity can be said to be, to some extent, genuine. It would be more precise to say that precisely due to the similarity, what Hobbes aimed to settle next emerged, the competitive relationship between the civil sovereign and the Catholic Church about the foundation of biblical authority.

\textsuperscript{38} Lev, 33: 606, 8. This combination of internal and external arguments can be said to have some similarities to Goodwin’s argumentation.

\textsuperscript{39} DC, 17:19-22; Lev, 39: 730, 32, 34.

\textsuperscript{40} DC, 16:16.
rest of the books of the Old Testament were first received into the
canon,” canon being writings recognized as the word of God.\textsuperscript{41} In
the parts about the New Testament, Hobbes looks at canon from
different perspectives. Firstly, Hobbes uses canon not only as to
Christian religion but also as with sciences. The canon of
Christian religion is a “rule of Christian doctrine by which
controversies of religion are to be settled.”\textsuperscript{42} The canons of
sciences such as politics or history unrelated to “Mysteries of faith”
are the true teaching of sciences.\textsuperscript{43} In addition, Hobbes connects
the canon with the interpreter. “For scriptures to become a canon,”
“they must have an interpreter,” because “the mind can only be
governed by the scriptures if they are understood.”\textsuperscript{44} These views
of canon as a rule to settle controversies or as divine truth are not
unusual, also seen in the works of Hobbes’s contemporaries.\textsuperscript{45}

In \textit{Leviathan}, Hobbes’s redefined canon with his new analytical
perspective.

There be two senses, wherein a Writing may be said to be Canonicall:
for Canon, signifieth a Rule; and a Rule is a Precept, by which a man is
guided, and directed in any action whatsoever. Such Precepts, though
given by a Teacher to his Disciple, or a Councellor to his friend, without
power to Compell him to observe them, are nevertheless Canons:
because they are rules: But when they are given by one, whom he that
receiveth them is bound to obey, then are those Canons, not onely
Rules, but Laws: The question therefore here, is of the Power to make
the Scriptures (which are the Rules of Christian Faith) Laws.\textsuperscript{46}

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\textsuperscript{41} DC, 16:12.
\textsuperscript{42} DC, 17:18.
\textsuperscript{43} DC, 17:16.
\textsuperscript{44} DC, 17:17.
\textsuperscript{45} Chillingworth, \textit{The Works of William Chillingworth}, 129-39, 77; Leigh, \textit{A
Treatise of Divinity}, 87-88. These people usually mention canon in the
question of which books of the Bible should be received as canon.
\textsuperscript{46} Lev, 42: 812.
There are several features in this definition of canon. Firstly, while in relation to sciences Hobbes in *De Cive* grasped canon from the viewpoint of the truth of the teaching, this view has disappeared here. In connection with this, whereas Hobbes here limits the use of the canon to the rule directly related to human action, canons as to sciences in *De Cive* were probably not always concerned with human action. Nor does he mention the interpreter as in *De Cive*. Finally and most importantly, Hobbes makes a new distinction in terms of law or compulsory power. These changes are related to Hobbes’s treatment of supernatural matters and biblical authority in *Leviathan*. What Chapters 32 and 33 made clear was a lack of internal certainty, or impossibility of reaching the definite truth, concerning supernatural revelation in general. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to compare canons in Christian religion to the true and certain teaching of sciences. Then in Chapter 33, as a result of the internal uncertainty, Hobbes transferred the sphere of the problem from the internal to the external and law. Here Hobbes similarly considers the Scriptures as canon in terms of law. Obeying the Bible as law means to speak as commanded and live according to the law, the Bible, without contradicting it.\(^{47}\) This amounts to admitting the Scriptures as true so far as external action is concerned, and to that extent, this new definition of canon is still implicitly connected with the notion of truth. Also, to the extent that biblical authority is concerned only with the external, interpreters helping people to understand the Scriptures are not always necessary. In fact, the notion of the supernatural in *Leviathan* was something people could not have conceptions about, and to that extent, incomprehensible.\(^{48}\) What Hobbes attached importance to in *Leviathan* for the religious canon were

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\(^{47}\) Lev, 32: 578.  
\(^{48}\) Ibid.
not interpreters who help people understanding it in their mind but actors who make people behave according to the canon.

Based on this refinement of the conception of canon, Hobbes also began to see as problematic the reception as canon not only of the rediscovered books in the age of the Kings but also of the Ten Commandments and Deuteronomy in the age of Moses, while in De Cive he did not question the status of Deuteronomy as the word of God. The reasoning supporting the Ten Commandments and Deuteronomy as the written word of God is almost the same as that about the foundation of Moses’ authority: the difficulty or impossibility of meeting the condition of the obligation of the law, public announcement, in the case of the positive law of God, except for the promise of the obedience to the prophets beforehand. Thus Hobbes viewed Moses and his successors as the basis of biblical authority. Then, Hobbes reminded us of the conclusion of the discussion about the authority of Moses that Moses and his successors were civil sovereigns. This suggests that although the structures of the two demonstrations were similar, it was necessary for Hobbes to show in advance that Moses and the like were civil sovereigns. In this way Hobbes at last based the obligatory power of the written word of God on the civil sovereign.

This new basis of the obligatory written word of God on the civil sovereign, in turn, has several implications. Firstly, it will enable Hobbes later to connect the age of Moses with his own age chronologically without interruption. Secondly and much more importantly, this new argument leads to the change from De Cive in Hobbes’s political conclusion about the right to interpret the Scriptures. When Hobbes divided natural and supernatural

49 Lev, 42: 812.
51 Lev, 42: 814.
matters in *De Cive*, he understood supernatural phenomena or doctrines as those which “can be known” “only by divine revelation.”\(^{52}\) Therefore, the “knowledge” or the acknowledgement of the truth of supernatural phenomena in the Bible depended on its nature as the word of God, without regard to the civil sovereign. In *Leviathan*, however, only the civil sovereign could oblige the subjects to grant the Scriptures as the word of God. Hence, it is no wonder that *Leviathan* concluded that it was the civil sovereign who had the right to interpret the Scriptures including supernatural phenomena in them. Closely related to this change of the political conclusion is another new treatment by Hobbes of “supernatural” matters in *De Cive*, his eschatological discussion in Chapter 38. This aspect will be explored further in the next section.

4.3.4. Natural Reason, Authorisation and the “Divine” Authority of the Scriptures: Some Implications for Hobbes’s Eschatology in Chapter 38

Although Hobbes’s eschatology in *Leviathan* has been known as one of his most idiosyncratic Christian doctrines, it has not been realized that this eschatology treats matters regarded as “supernatural” or spiritual and thus beyond the sphere of philosophy in *De Cive*.\(^{53}\) However, what should be asked next is what made this change possible. It is certain that this eschatological investigation is similar to the analysis of supernatural revelation through angels and spirits in Chapters 34-36 in the diminution from *De Cive* of the sphere of the supernatural. Yet the nature of the investigation of the afterlife in

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\(^{52}\) DC, 17:17.

\(^{53}\) DC, 17:13. See also DC, 17:28.
Chapter 38 is obviously different from that in earlier chapters, and thus a different explanation is necessary.\textsuperscript{54}

One explanation of things spiritual in \textit{De Cive} is that they “mean things which have their foundation in the authority and office of Christ and could not be known if Christ had not taught them.”\textsuperscript{55} When Hobbes contrasted two ways of teaching natural laws, he made a similar and suggestive contrast between knowledge based on natural reason and one based on divine authority.\textsuperscript{56} To give an answer to our question here, in \textit{Leviathan} this distinct contrast between natural reason and divine authority suffered a dramatic change, which offered Hobbes theoretical foundations for his eschatological argument.

The authority and office of Christ is part of Christian doctrine, but as Hobbes suggests in Chapter 43, the foundation or “most ordinary immediate cause” of the belief in Christian doctrine comes down to the divine authority of the Scriptures.\textsuperscript{57} This point needs some amplification in relation to his earlier works. While in \textit{The Elements of Law} biblical authority relied on the faith in the church, in \textit{De Cive} the fundamental article of faith was dealt with differently from Hobbes’s other works. Although people today learn this article from teachers, “it does not follow that they are relying on teachers or on a Church for that article; rather they are relying on Jesus himself. For that Article came before the Christian Church, even if all the rest came later. And the Church is founded on the Article, not the other way around.”\textsuperscript{58} Here Jesus

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\item \textsuperscript{54} See also 4.2. in this thesis, esp. note 28.
\item \textsuperscript{55} \textit{DC}, 17:14.
\item \textsuperscript{56} One way was to teach them “as theorems, through natural reason, deducing natural right and natural laws from human principles and human contracts.” (\textit{DC}, 17:13.) The other was to teach them as “laws, by divine authority, revealing such--and--such is the will of God: this form of teaching is only appropriate to one to whom God's will is supernaturally known, i.e. to Christ.” Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{57} \textit{Lev}, 43: 934.
\item \textsuperscript{58} \textit{DC}, 18:9. This position is not incompatible with \textit{The Elements of Law}. After all, when following the churchmen’s judgement was recommended in it, the fundamental article of faith was excluded from this category. EL,
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\end{footnotesize}
Christ is looked upon as the logical and chronological antecedent of the church. However, in *Leviathan* this exceptional position of the fundamental article of faith disappeared. This change was probably connected with that epistemological doubt, special to *Leviathan*, of pretended prophets or people in the position of prophets like the apostles, which made it substantially impossible for ordinary people to trace back beyond prophets or the apostles to God or Christ. While true prophets or the apostles believed in God or Christ, other people depended on the apostles or biblical authority for their belief in Christian doctrines, including the fundamental article.⁵⁹

To return to the main argument, the authority of the Bible as the basis of faith in Christian doctrine in turn proves to depend on the civil sovereign in *Leviathan*. Now, while in *De Cive* Hobbes referred to the authority of the civil sovereign several times, he did not connect it with the divine authority of Christ, nor clarified how it came about. The notion of authorisation peculiar to *Leviathan* supplies the explanation as to the birth of the authority of the civil sovereign, thus in the end destroying the dichotomy between authority and natural reason in *De Cive*.⁶⁰

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⁵⁹ Lev, 43: 932, 34.

As for the implication of the representation theory in Chapter 16 for religious matters, Vieira discusses the doctrine of the Trinity. (For Hobbes in the controversy over the Trinity during the Civil War, see Mortimer, *Reason and Religion in the English Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism*, 149-74, esp. 55-57.) From our perspective, the question to be asked is why Hobbes developed the representation theory for the first time in *Leviathan*. In relation to this question, what should be added to our main text is that the representation theory is quite suitable for analysing in a wider perspective the problem of pretended prophets peculiar to *Leviathan*, because prophets, true or false, say *in the name of* God. Lev, 16:
What Hobbes did with the authorisation theory in *Leviathan* was to divert the usage in *De Cive* of the authority of sovereign power to creating and explaining the authority of the civil sovereign itself. In the civil part of *De Cive*, Hobbes used this concept when he supposed a country where the civil sovereign was content to “appoint magistrates and public ministers, i.e. to have authority without executive power.”\(^61\) In this case, authority concerned the ground of ministers’ claim to execute and administer public affairs in place of the sovereign. Hobbes also referred to this type of the state in the distinction between the right and the exercise of sovereign power. The sovereigns, retaining their right, can exercise their power through counsellors and advisors they appoint.\(^62\) In this parallel case, the authority in the former example is seen as right as opposed to the exercise of right. In *Leviathan*, thanks to the authorisation theory, this authority of the civil sovereign turned out to arise from individuals in the state of nature through the contract between individuals.\(^63\) This contract was a matter of natural reason, a special type of contract specified in natural law. This means that the authority of civil sovereign, and more importantly the divine authority of Christ based on it, became something with its rational grounds, and thus within the sphere of natural reason. It was this that was the theoretical background for the eschatology in Chapter 38 of *Leviathan*, a supernatural matter in *De Cive*.

Finally, this chapter concludes by pointing out another profound significance of this change. Authority, especially divine authority, signified usually some external principle which required people to obey it without showing the ground of obedience. Leigh’s use of

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\(^61\) DC, 10:15.

\(^62\) DC, 13:1.

\(^63\) Lev, 16: 244: 17: 260.
authority provides a good example. The Bible “speaks not as men; it simply affirms all things without proof; other authors use many arguments to confirm the truth of what they say.... He who speaketh in the Bible is of that authority, that his bare word ought to be believed without any proof.”

Even in the case of Chillingworth, a person well-known for advocating the use of reason in religious matters, the authority of universal tradition as one of the foundations for biblical authority could look like something which defied further explanation; he put forward this authority as an alternative to the authority of the Catholic Church when Knott presented authority, as opposed to reason, as something to be followed. "De Cive," as has just been seen in this section, also retained this concept of authority in its use of divine authority. Taylor was probably the first person to challenge this dichotomy, but he did not treat the authority of the Bible.

However, if our interpretation is valid, in Leviathan for the first time, authority, including divine authority and biblical authority, lost its external nature with lack of grounds of obedience, turning into an internal principle characterised by rational grounds of obedience in each person, while still maintaining its obligatory and imperative character. Here it is possible to see one of the

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64 Leigh, A Treatise of Divinity, 14. In relation to this, Leigh accuses rationalism of Socinianism. This indicates that one of the main causes of Socinianism's notoriety is concerned with its relation to divine authority.


Again, Hammond asserts that as for supernatural things human reason can only confirm that they come “to me from authority, that I have no reason to suspect, but, on the contrary, concurrence of all reasons to be persuaded by it.” Here also authority is regarded as something which defies reason. Hammond, The Miscellaneous Theological Works, 33.

66 Hobbes's treatment of biblical authority is worth contrasting with Spinoza. For the limitation of the sphere of authority within the Scriptures set by Spinoza as opposed to Hobbes, who saw biblical authority as a whole, see Fukuoka, State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between Spinoza's and Hobbes's Interpretations of the Old Testament, 401-35. Nevertheless, we do not agree with her suggestion that Hobbes took sides with the dichotomy between demonstration by reason and blind obedience. (Ibid., 424.) For this comparative theme, see also Curley, "I Durst Not Write So
chief and specific contributions of *Leviathan* to the development of reasonable Christianity in England, or more broadly to the Enlightenment.  

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67 For the Restoration consensus on the value of reasonable religion, and rational defences of religion in the period, see John Spurr, “‘Rational Religion’ in Restoration England,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 49, no. 4 (1988). It seems more fruitful to discuss the relationship between Hobbes and reasonable religion or Christianity than between Hobbes and secularisation. This can be seen as one of the crucial stepping stones of Beiser’s story of how reason came to have priority over other proposed rules of faith or criteria of religious knowledge, tradition, the Scriptures, and inspiration, until in the age of Enlightenment reason had complete jurisdiction over faith. Beiser, *The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment*.

In the ancient world, the notion of divine authority was dealt with as early as the period of Homer: Homeric gods with their bodies were pluralistic. It might be said that, so far as divine authority was concerned, only at the stage of *Leviathan* did the modern world catch up with that of Homer in the ancient world.
4.4. Practical Conclusions about Religious Liberty and Authority in *Leviathan*

4.4.1. Hobbes’s Defence of Both Private Minimal Liberty and Public Authority (Even “in Error”)

One of the characteristics of *Leviathan* is that Hobbes began to uphold the liberty of conscience in one way or another. In *The Elements of Law* Hobbes already knew the claim for liberty of conscience and dealt with it mainly with his theory of the minimal fundamental article of faith. Yet neither in *The Elements of Law* nor in *De Cive* did Hobbes defend it from the viewpoint of private citizens. He viewed this issue from the perspective of the sovereign. “No human law is intended to oblige the conscience of a man, but the actions only,” and laws obliging the conscience, if any, “would be of no effect.” Hobbes also paid attention to the possible disruptive effect of this claim, removing the danger in the assertion that “whatsoever a man does against his Conscience, is Sinne,” one of the typical arguments of tolerationists. When Hobbes considered this issue from the standpoint of private citizens, he transformed the problem of liberty of conscience into the condition of salvation. The fundamental article of faith as belief in Jesus Christ was Hobbes’s main answer to “the scruple of conscience that may arise concerning obedience to human laws” in *The Elements of Law*.

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1 See 3.2. in this thesis.
2 EL, 2:6:3.
3 EL, 2:6:12; DC, 12:2; Lev, 29: 502. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes regarded this opinion itself as seditious, while in his earlier works he was softer on this idea, only refuting its particular version. He also changed the way of refutation in *Leviathan*, appealing to the possibility of errors of conscience, a typical topic in the toleration controversy.
4 EL, 2:6:2-5.
5 EL, 2:6:12.
More fundamentally, however, he was sceptical of the sincerity of the demand for liberty of conscience.

The truth is apparent, by continual experience, that men seek not only liberty of conscience, but of their actions; nor that only, but a farther liberty of persuading others to their opinions; nor that only for every man desireth, that the sovereign authority should admit no other opinions to be maintained but such as he himself holdeth.\(^6\)

This view on the allegation of liberty of conscience can be seen as a parallel version of his opinion that people demanding liberty are in fact desiring dominion in the name of liberty.\(^7\) When Hobbes said this, he had in mind Presbyterians as one of the proponents,\(^8\) and certainly this view explains well what Presbyterians did and aimed at in the 1640s.\(^9\) However, it does not account for the plea of tolerationists, both Independents and sectaries, for the coexistence of contradictory and opposing opinions among Puritans. Though the leaders of the Parliamentary army, powerful patrons of Independency, held political power in the three kingdoms, and the conservative Independents such as John Owen became the new establishment in the 1650s, they did not impose their own religious doctrines on other orthodox Puritans, and the penalty for not attending the established Church was repealed in 1650.\(^10\) This new phenomenon probably pressed Hobbes to give a

\(^{6}\) EL, 2:6:13.

\(^{7}\) DC, 10:8.

\(^{8}\) EL, 2:6:13.

\(^{9}\) See a parallel example, in *On Liberty* written by Mill, of progressive thinkers “who preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on the particular points on which they were themselves heretical, rather than make common cause in defence of freedom, with heretics generally.” John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty and Other Essays*, ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 11. (Of course, progressive thinkers did not have recourse to the use of violence, as opposed to the Presbyterians in the Civil War.) Following that, Mill mentions the only exception, the case for freedom of conscience. Ibid., 11-12.

\(^{10}\) Coffey, “The Toleration Controversy during the English Revolution,” 48-52.
second thought to the problem of liberty of conscience in *Leviathan*.

In *Leviathan*, although Hobbes was as earnest about defending the right of the civil sovereign as in his former works, he began to emphasise that private citizens retained the minimal internal liberty of conscience even when they obeyed the civil sovereign, and to uphold its value. In many cases this was related to Hobbes’s new endorsement of the use of natural reason as the principal measure to prevent domination on the pretext of the word of God.

One such example is located near the end of his discussion of miracles. Although citizens have to obey the judgement of the civil sovereign about the truth of pretended miracles and to confess so, “a private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart, those acts that have been given out for Miracles, according as he shall see ..., and conjecture, whether they be Miracles, or Lies.” Thus Hobbes makes it clear that taking a critical attitude and exercising their individual judgement internally is still allowed. The balance between the duty of individual judgement and of obedience came to the fore for the first time in *Leviathan*, due to Hobbes’s new encouragement of the use of natural reason.

This private internal liberty of exercising individual judgement and reason is also implicitly supported by Hobbes’s epistemology. “Sense, Memory, Understanding, Reason and Opinion are not in our power to change; but alwaies, and necessarily such, as the things we see, hear, and consider suggest unto us.” This assertion is based on the sophisticated epistemology in Part 1 of *Leviathan*. Although *The Elements of Law* already included a

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12 Lev, 37: 696.
13 “And therefore [they] are not effects of our Will, but our Will of them.” Lev, 32: 578.
sufficiently refined epistemology,¹⁴ this explicit remark was again unique to Leviathan. Now, the impossibility of changing our opinions was often claimed by tolerationists, but at the same time it was denied by some opponents of toleration like William Prynne.¹⁵ In this controversy, Hobbes’s philosophy offered refined theoretical foundations for one of the cases for toleration.

The most remarkable argument Hobbes developed for the first time in Leviathan to maintain the balance between private minimal liberty and public authority concerns the so-called liberty of Naaman. It attempts to resolve the difficult problem of how Christian citizens should obey heathen kings. One of the characteristics of Leviathan is that Hobbes developed greatly the discussion about the relationship between Christians and heathens or non-Christians. However at first sight, this feature is bizarre, because the heathens in Hobbes’s age were of little political consequence. The religious war or controversies were mainly conducted among Christians, not between Christians and heathens.

One effective way to find the political significance in the new arguments is to read them in the light of the toleration controversy. For the parties concerned, toleration usually means toleration of false religion, or abstaining from doing violence to people who embrace false religion or heretical opinions. Here the

¹⁴ EL, 1:12:5, 6.

For this dispute in the Restoration period, see Goldie, "The Theory of Religious Intolerance in Restoration England."
attitude towards the heathen can be a chief touchstone, because in this case two major cases for toleration are not available. One is to point out the possibility of misjudgement of false opinions. This tactic often used by tolerationists like Goodwin is inappropriate here; after all, there is no doubt that heathens’ beliefs are false for Christians. The other major argument for toleration is the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental matters. This distinction meant that errors about non-fundamental issues are not so significant nor concerned with the salvation of people in error. However, again as with heathens the appeal for toleration based on this distinction is unavailable. Therefore, the discussion about how to deal with heathens can be seen as an effective yardstick of toleration, or otherwise it is difficult to find here any political significance for the England in the Civil War.

In the case of the liberty of Naaman, Hobbes’s concern with toleration is more obvious; he entitles the section “What Christians may do to avoid persecution.” He begins this section by supposing the hypothetical case where the sovereigns did their best to force their Christian subjects to deny true religion, commanding the verbal denial of Jesus Christ. Hobbes’s position was that subjects had to obey the command and confess what they believed to be false in their heart.

This position looks like a natural consequence of Hobbes’s Erastianism. Certainly part of his reasoning in it, or at least its similar versions, can also be found in *The Elements of Law or De Cive*. In his earlier works, however, it is doubtful, to say the least, whether Hobbes held this opinion. In *The Elements of Law*, Hobbes remarks that “the actions we are forbidden to obey them in, are only such as imply a denial of that faith which is necessary

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16 Lev, 42: 784.
17 EL, 2:6:3; DC, 12:2.
to our salvation." Although this assertion is meant to persuade people to obey Christian doctrines established by the sovereign apart from the only fundamental article of faith, this assertion does suggest that Christians are forbidden to do anything which may imply denying the fundament article, which is contradictory to the position in *Leviathan*. Yet it should also be noted about this remark that Hobbes did not discuss the case of heathen kings in *The Elements of Law*, though he mentioned the case of both Christian and heathen kings. In *De Cive* Hobbes dealt with this pitfall in his brief discussion about the case of Christians under heathen kings in the second last section. Here again, however, Hobbes assumes there are some cases where Christians cannot obey the command of heathen kings. Christians are obliged to follow “some Church of Christians” concerning supernatural matters. Although it is not clear whether Hobbes took into consideration the fundamental article of faith in making the distinction between temporal and spiritual matters, this article of faith would surely be a spiritual matter, and not a temporal one. It follows then that in *De Cive* too, Hobbes held a position different from that in *Leviathan*. It is true that in *De Cive* Hobbes began to distinguish internal faith from external profession as he did in *Leviathan*. Nevertheless, this distinction was used for justifying the duty of external obedience or profession about non-fundamental matters, and the case about non-fundamental matters was separated from the fundamental article, which was not about obedience but about faith.

Thus, the position in *Leviathan* is not so obvious even in view of Hobbes’s Erastianism. What Hobbes clarified in *Leviathan* was that the duty of external obedience or profession was concerned

18 EL, 2:6:5.
20 DC, 18:13.
21 DC, 18:4; Lev, 42:784.
22 DC, 18:6.
not only with non-fundamental matters but also with the fundamental article of faith. This subtle change is related to his new attention to the possible case of Muslims in Christian states, as will be shown soon.

Now, this new attention, and the other new argument about Naaman, can be grasped in specific political contexts, that is to say, in relation to Hobbes’s increasing concern with the people’s demand for truth, which is presented in the conclusion of *Leviathan*. The remark in the conclusion in turn can be associated with the activity of Puritans. They fought for the sake of true religion, finding intolerable Laud’s attempt to impose on them “false” religion. Hobbes replies to this type of concern with the duty to preserve religious truth by citing 2 Kings 5:17-19. Naaman says,

_Thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering, nor sacrifice unto other Gods but unto the Lord. In this thing the Lord pardon thy servant, that when my Master goeth into the house of Rimmon to worship there, and he leaneth on my hand: and I bow my selfe in the house of Rimmon; when I bow my selfe in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon they servant in this thing._ This the Prophet approved, and bid him _Goe in peace_. Here Naaman beleved in his heart: but by bowing before the Idol Rimmon, he denyed the true God in effect, as much as if he had done it with his lips.

Hobbes’s interpretation in the first place clarifies the heart of the matter by characterising Rimmon and the Lord in the text as “the Idol Rimmon” and “the true God.” Then Hobbes transforms bowing into the general formulation of the denial of the true God. This generalisation enables Hobbes to apply the general theme to

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23 Lev, conclusion: 1139.
24 Not only Hobbes but also other defenders of conformity in the age often referred to this example of Naaman. Walsham, *Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500-1700*, 200.
25 Lev, 42: 784.
any other cases, here the denial by profession. In this way Hobbes vindicated the liberty to deny the true God externally in obeying the civil sovereign. One of the features of this liberty of Naaman in *Leviathan* is its focus on religious truth, because in Hobbes’s earlier works the fundamental article of faith was always grasped in relation to salvation. Also, this argument is not concerned with the efficacy of the command of the sovereign as in his earlier works but with the right of Christian citizens.

After supporting the liberty of Naaman by rational grounds and by scriptural citation, Hobbes concludes this topic with another remarkable argument which again reveals his increasing concern with religious truth as an issue by itself.

If any man shall accuse this doctrine, as repugnant to true, and unfeigned Christianity: I ask him, in case there should be a subject in any Christian Common-wealth, that should be inwardly in his heart of the Mahometan Religion, whether if his Soveraign command him to bee present at the divine service of the Christian Church, and that on pain of death, he think that Mahometan obliged in conscience to suffer death for that cause, rather than to obey that command of his lawfull Prince. If he say, he ought rather to suffer death, then he authorizeth all private men, to disobey their Princes, in maintenance of their Religion, true, or false: if he say, he ought to bee obedient, then he alloweth to himself, that which hee denyeth to another, contrary to the words of our Saviour... and contrary to the Law of Nature.

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26 Similarly in his preceding reasoning Hobbes saw profession with the tongues as an example of external obedience. Ibid.
27 It seems that the liberty of Naaman is more concerned with the liberty to deny true religion externally than with the minimal internal liberty, which Fukuoka suggests. Fukuoka, *State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between Spinoza’s and Hobbes’s Interpretations of the Old Testament*, 442-44.
28 That is to say, to suffer death or to disobey the civil sovereign for “true” religion. This expression gives a clue to what type of people Hobbes had in mind. In the English context, they would with little doubt signify non-conformist Puritans.
29 Lev, 42: 786.
This striking argument deserves detailed commentary. First of all, this reasoning nullifies the notion of war for true religion. Just as for Muslims Christian religion was a false religion, so for Puritans the Anglican Church during the 1630s or later was a false religion. Puritans fought against the Royalists precisely because the truth of religion was so vital for them. However, if to fight or “disobey” for what is really a false religion but is thought to be a true one is allowed or authorised based on Hobbes’s reasoning, this will also threaten the maintenance of true religion, which Puritans cherished. Moreover, the hypothetical situation in this argument is reminiscent of the difficult situation in which Puritans were placed due to the Laudian crackdown during the 1630s and wavered between conformity and disobedience. What Hobbes’s argument reveals is that the nonconformist mentality of Puritans in this period cannot be distinguished from the maintenance of false religions.

Second, this discussion reveals the direction of the intellectual development from *De Cive* to *Leviathan*: Hobbes’s deeper consideration of Christianity as a positive religion. The cited argument can be interpreted as a case where Hobbes considers the relationship between Christianity and other positive religions: Islam, the only powerful religion other than Christianity known at the time, can be seen as an example of a positive religion other than Christianity. This new concern is parallel to the consideration of the authority of the Scriptures. It is characteristic of *Leviathan* to examine the foundations of Christianity as a positive religion.

Third, if Islam as such is paid attention to and not seen as an example of positive religion, the way Hobbes mentions it has an implication in relation to the common notion about it. Generally speaking, English people of the era viewed Muslims as ferocious enemies of Christianity, eager to attack and destroy pure and
uncorrupted Christianity or Protestantism, similar to Catholics. Yet Hobbes’s argument reveals that if any Muslim were to live in England, it would be Christians themselves that imposed their religion on Muslims.

Fourth and finally, tolerationists often accused hypocrisy which resulted from enforced conformity and appealed to the value of honesty. Against this background, Hobbes’s argument implies that unless toleration is extended to the heathen, this case for toleration is self-contradictory. If this accusation of hypocrisy is to be consistent, then the separation of state and church, and the complete abolition of religion as law will be necessary.

As for hypocrisy, Hobbes himself had his own notion of hypocritical Christians. After arguing that professed Christians are not liable to excommunication, Hobbes refers to the situation where their hypocrisy comes to light. It “will appear in his manners,” when their “behaviour bee contrary to the law of his Soveraign, which is the rule of Manners and which Christ and his Apostles have commanded us to be subject to.” This remark implies that Puritan tolerationists who often denounced hypocrisy were, for Hobbes, themselves hypocrites and no more than professed Christians.

The mention of “to suffer death” in the previous citation connects the topic about the liberty of Naaman with the next one, martyrdom. The ordinary image of martyrdom was to suffer from persecution and in some cases die for the truth of religion. Therefore martyrdom was one of the topics related to toleration, which was also one of the topics Hobbes extended greatly in Leviathan. In De Cive, Hobbes mentioned martyrdom only briefly.

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31 Lev, 42: 804.
in the conclusion about how to obey the heathen king. He presented martyrdom as an alternative to resistance for the Christians who could not obey the heathen king, a help for peace. On the other hand, in *Leviathan* Hobbes paid attention to the honour martyrdom gave to those who died as a result of their disobedience. Thus martyrdom had possibly dangerous implications. The honourable notion of martyrdom could be a discouragement to obeying the command of the civil sovereign for the sake of true religion. In the context of the Civil War, John Goodwin, for example, in his famous justification for the Parliamentarian cause, broadened the notion of martyrdom so that the Parliamentarians fighting against the Royalists could be included in the category of martyrs. Even before the war, Puritans who were punished under the Laudian regime were viewed as martyrs and attracted people’s sympathy.

Thus Hobbes’s aim in giving a fresh analysis of martyrdom was to make martyrdom as irrelevant to the contemporary English context as possible. Here what should be paid attention to is not what a martyr was for Hobbes but what it was not. After limiting the martyr to those who died for the fundamental article, Hobbes notes, “To die for every tenet that serveth the ambition, or profit of the Clergy, is not required; nor is it the Death of the Witnesse, 

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32 DC, 18:13.
33 Lev, 42: 788.
36 Coffey, *Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558-1689*, 129. This understanding was influenced by Foxe’s *Acts and Monuments*, one of the most influential works in the early modern England. For the reception of this work, see John N. King, *Foxe’s Book of Martyrs and Early Modern Print Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 267-315.
37 At the same time, the scope of Hobbes’s argument can extend to early modern Europe as a whole. For a valuable study of martyrdom in cross-confessional context, see Gregory, *Salvation at Stake: Christian Martyrdom in Early Modern Europe*.
but the Testimony it self that makes the Martyr.”\textsuperscript{38} This suggests Hobbes’s dim view of so-called articles of faith other than the fundamental one of faith in Jesus Christ, and is in accordance with his defence of mutual toleration, which will be discussed in the next section. Hobbes specifies martyrs in another way too. As a corollary to the above limitation, Hobbes also characterises martyrs as those who try to convert the infidels. Christ “sent not all that beleived: And he sent them to unbeleevers; I send you (saith he) as sheep amongst wolves: not as sheep to other sheep.”\textsuperscript{39} This remark makes martyrdom almost completely irrelevant to the English context in Hobbes’s time. This notion of martyrdom was perhaps implicit in \textit{De Cive}, where Hobbes mentioned it only in relation to Christians under heathen kings,\textsuperscript{40} but it should also be noted that in it he did not explicitly deny the relevance of martyrdom among Christians.

These discussions of the liberty of Naaman and martyrdom prepare for the new conclusion in \textit{Leviathan} about the duty of Christian citizens under heathen kings, or about toleration of the “erroneous” sovereign.\textsuperscript{41} In \textit{De Cive}, Christian citizens were obliged to obey the command of the church about spiritual matters and to disobey heathen kings in some cases.\textsuperscript{42} However, in \textit{Leviathan}, apart from the abolition of the distinction between the spiritual and temporal, the liberty of Naaman enabled Hobbes to give Christian citizens under heathen kings the liberty to deny Christ externally in obeying the command of heathen kings.\textsuperscript{43} Therefore, Christians could choose to live peacefully in the

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{38} Lev, 42: 788.
\textsuperscript{40} DC, 18:13.
\textsuperscript{41} For this change, also see Sommerville, \textit{Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context}, 125-26.
\textsuperscript{42} DC, 18:13.
\textsuperscript{43} Lev, 43: 954.
\end{footnotes}
country of any false religion. Also, the new discussion of martyrdom limited the case to the fundamental article of faith. Apart from this article, Christian citizens did not need to put their lives in danger for the sake of the honour of the martyr.

Hobbes expresses the same opinion in challenging Bellarmine’s opposite idea that “it is not lawfull for Christians to tolerate an Infidel, or Haeretical King, in case he endeavour to draw them to his Haeresie, or Infidelity.” As is often pointed out, by refuting the most extreme Catholic position like this Hobbes at the same time dealt with Puritan justifications of war.

Before turning to the Christian sovereign, the significance of the conversion of the civil sovereign should be examined. This was not only a topic specific to **Leviathan**, but also one of the controversial points in the toleration controversy. John Goodwin, in his refutation of the sovereign power over religion, denied that the heathen sovereign acquired new power over Christian religion due to the conversion. On the other hand, in **Leviathan** Hobbes asserted that the converted sovereign made the Bible law. The conversion of the sovereign meant increasing laws about religion.

This theory also enabled Hobbes to apply the Israel model to the civil sovereign in his age. In the toleration controversy, tolerationists often argued that the model of ancient Israel was abolished or radically modified in the advent of Christ, and thus that it could not be applied to Christian magistrates. However,

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44 Lev, 42: 920.
45 Here Hobbes also declares that the only judge of heresy is the civil sovereign. (Ibid.) For a fuller analysis of the meaning of the word “heresy” in **Leviathan** in relation to toleration, see Jeffrey R. Collins, "Thomas Hobbes, Heresy, and the Theological Project of **Leviathan**," **Hobbes Studies** 26, no. 1 (2013): 8-12.
for Hobbes, the model of Moses was vital in his vindication for the
sovereign power over religion. In all of the three works of political
philosophy Hobbes referred to Moses to prove the union of civil
law and divine law, and the civil sovereign as the interpreter of
the Scriptures.\textsuperscript{50} In \textit{Leviathan} especially, he compared directly
Moses to civil sovereigns.

We may conclude, that whosoever in a Christian Common-wealth
holdeth the place of Moses, is the sole Messenger of God, and
Interpreter of his Commandments. And according to hereunto, no man
ought in the interpretation of the Scripture to proceed further then the
bounds which are set by their severall Soveraigns. For the Scriptures
since God now speaketh in them, are the Mount Sinai: the bounds
whereof are the Laws of them that represent Gods Person on Earth. To
look upon them, and therein to behold the wondrous works of God, and
learn to fear him is allowed: but to interpret them: that is, to pry into
what God saith to him who he appointeth to govern under him, and
make themselves Judges whether he govern as God commandeth him,
or not, is to transgress the bounds God hath set us, and to gaze upon
God irreverently.\textsuperscript{51}

This analogy is based on the one hand, on the status of Moses as
the civil sovereign, and on the other, on the civil sovereign as the
foundation of biblical authority, both of them specific to \textit{Leviathan}.
Furthermore, although the civil sovereign as the interpreter of the
Bible is common to all of the three works, here Hobbes gives a
new twist. As opposed to \textit{De Cive}, Hobbes sets the bounds or area
of the unitary scriptural interpretation controlled by the sovereign.
To look at this from the opposite point of view, the new notion of
the bounds would suggest that the sovereign is only concerned
with preserving the sphere within the bounds, and allows each
subject to make their own interpretation of the Scriptures outside

\textsuperscript{50} EL, 2:6:2, 2:7:2-5; DC, 16:13.
\textsuperscript{51} Lev, 40: 744, 46.
the bounds. Thus this argument, it can be said, prepares for Christian liberty later.

This new twist reflects different biblical citations being employed in *De Cive* and *Leviathan*. The notion of the “bounds” here derives from Exod. 19:12, 21, cited for denying the authority of the private people and congregation. “Thou shalt set bounds to the people round about, and say, Take heed to your selves that you goe not up into the mount, or touch the border of it; whosoever toucheth the Mount shall surely be put to death.” “Goe down, charge the people, lest they break through unto the Lord to gaze.” In *De Cive*, on the other hand, Hobbes cited a near passage, Exod. 19:24-25, which though similarly containing a prohibitive threat to the people, does not include the notion of the bounds. The wording in the KJV version is as follows. “Let not the priests and the people break through to come up unto the LORD, lest he break forth upon him. So Moses went down unto the people, and spake unto them.”

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52 Hobbes’s original sentence, which follows quite accurately the Vulgate, is as follows: “Sacerdotes autem et populuses ne transeant terminos, nec ascendant ad Dominum, ne forte interficiat illos, descenditque Moses ad populum et omnia narravit eis.” DC, 16:13.

Another change of biblical citation reflecting new concerns in *Leviathan* is about the denial of Aaron’s authority in favour of Moses’. While in *De Cive* Hobbes turned solely to Num. 12 and especially to Moses’ special status as a prophet based on Num. 12:6-8, in *Leviathan* Hobbes placed much less emphasis on the story in Num. 12, omitting the citation of Num. 12:6-8. This change was probably due to Hobbes’s denial in Chapter 36 of *Leviathan* of the special character of revelation to Moses in Num. 12:6-8. Still, Hobbes maintained Moses’ special status among the other people in his age, not to say among the sovereign prophets, by inserting another major argument for the justification of Moses’s priority to Aaron, based on Exod. 24:1-2: “And God said unto Moses, Come up unto the Lord, thou, and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel. And Moses alone shall come neer the Lord, but they shall not come nigh, neither shall the people goe up with him.” (Lev, 42: 742.) What Hobbes paid attention to here was not ways of supernatural revelation but physical proximity to God. Though some people were allowed the same physical proximity to God as Moses in Exod. 24:9, yet among them Hobbes still maintained Moses’ unique status as the mediator between God and the people; he pointed out that only Moses conveyed the commandment of God to Hebrew people, and contrasted Moses with other people who were allowed to, at the most, “see God and live.” (Ibid.) When he interpreted the meaning of “did eat and
The story of Moses was also important for checking the enthusiasts. In *Leviathan*, as has been seen, Hobbes presented Moses as the supreme prophet receiving supernatural revelation as opposed to subordinate prophets receiving their authority from Moses. The position of Moses as the supreme prophet, together with the analogy of Moses to the Christian sovereign, enabled Hobbes to draw the famous new political conclusion about church-state relations in *Leviathan*.

All Pastors, except the Supreme, execute their charges in the Right, that is by the Authority of the Civill Soveraign, that is *Iure Civili*. But the King, and every other Soveraign, executeth his Office of Supreme Pastor, by immediate Authority from God, that is to say, in Gods Right, or *Iure Divino*.53

This conclusion has some implications for toleration. Firstly, it suggests that the authority of ecclesiastics derives solely from the civil sovereign, and from no other sources. Thus it is closely related to Hobbes’s endorsement of mutual toleration in the next section.

Secondly, it helps to explain Hobbes’s more conciliatory attitude towards Catholicism in one important point in *Leviathan*. Generally speaking, the toleration of the Catholic sovereign is the touchstone of the toleration of the error of the Christian sovereign.

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What Puritans loathed in particular was Roman Catholicism. One of the main reasons why they were opposed to the Laudian church was its similarity to Roman Catholicism. Even among tolerationists, toleration of Catholics was a difficult matter. Milton, a famous tolerationist, excluded Catholics from his scope of toleration for their idolatry.\textsuperscript{54} On the other hand, it has been seen that Chillingworth opened a way for mutual toleration between Catholics and Protestants, and that Taylor developed the first sophisticated argument about the conditions necessary for toleration of Catholics.

From this viewpoint, what is interesting about \textit{Leviathan} is that although Hobbes fiercely attacked numerous Catholic doctrines in \textit{Leviathan}, still, as Malcolm rightly points out, in one important respect Hobbes became more conciliatory to Roman Catholicism in \textit{Leviathan} than in \textit{De Cive}.\textsuperscript{55} In \textit{Leviathan} Hobbes admitted that as long as the sovereign’s supreme power over religion was acknowledged, the sovereign could delegate the authority to appoint religious teachers to a stranger, explicitly referring to “the Pope.”\textsuperscript{56} On the other hand, in \textit{De Cive} he excluded all such possibilities, denying that the sovereign could cede the authority of interpreting the Scriptures to an external authority, that is to say, to the Pope.\textsuperscript{57}

In \textit{De Cive} the sovereign was obliged to interpret supernatural matters in the Scriptures “by means of duly ordained Ecclesiastics” due to “God’s blessing” they receive “by the laying on of hands.”\textsuperscript{58} This would imply that the abuse of the Bible by ecclesiastics, if any, would be quite dangerous and beyond the control of the sovereign. On the other hand, the new conclusion in \textit{Leviathan}

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\textsuperscript{54} Another known example is John Locke. John Locke, \textit{A Letter concerning Toleration}, ed. Mario Montuori (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963), 72-73, 88-93.
\textsuperscript{55} Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 42-43. This thesis explores the precise nature of this change and the reasons behind it.
\textsuperscript{56} Lev, 42: 854.
\textsuperscript{57} DC, 17:27.
\textsuperscript{58} DC, 17:28.
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suggests that the civil sovereign, the sole person to claim divine right, could change or oppose the interpretation of the ecclesiastics. This will alleviate potential harms of Catholic teachings.

However, this striking change in Hobbes’s attitude toward Catholic kings needs further detailed examination. When Hobbes denied Catholicism in *De Cive*, he offered two main reasons for this. One is that those who have the authority of interpreting the Bible will determine what is necessary to acquire salvation and avoid damnation, and that Christians who believe and obey the doctrine of the external authority are not proper citizens but the subjects of the foreign authority. The other is that foreigners are by nature enemies and that it is absurd that the sovereign “should commit to an enemy the governance of its citizens’ consciences.” In spite of these negative factors, why did Hobbes change his mind?

The first and most important political factor was that the rebellion directed by Puritans led Hobbes to identify more precisely the heart of the religious problem in his era, because it was Puritans and not Catholics that attacked the right of the civil sovereign during the Civil War. The first reason for opposing Catholicism in *De Cive* was not unique to Catholics, but rather applicable to any ecclesiastics or teachers of the word of God including Puritans. The precise contrast was not between internal and external authority, but between pretenders of divine authority and the civil sovereign. What Hobbes was cautious of in delegating the authority to appoint religious teachers in *Leviathan* was the “Ambition” and “Ignorance” of appointed teachers. These two faults are universal issues, though foreigners might be more susceptible to the defects. It is true that Roman Catholic teachers generally preached most dangerous religious

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59 Ibid.
doctrines, but Puritans also shared the defects to a certain extent. Thus, the factor of foreignness became insignificant enough in *Leviathan* to admit that the sovereign could delegate some religious authority to the Pope.

The second political factor was that one of the Puritan complaints against the king was that he came too close to Catholicism or that he or the circle among him was covert Catholics. The new theory in *Leviathan* can deal with this grievance.

Developments in in Hobbes’s theory also help to explain the change in Hobbes’s attitude toward Catholic kings. One relevant change between the two works was that while in *De Cive* Hobbes viewed foreigners as enemies by their nature, in *Leviathan* he acknowledged that foreigners could avoid being enemies by their covenant with the sovereign. Therefore, in the scheme of *Leviathan* the Pope and Catholic kings would not be enemies.

Moreover, the authorisation theory in *Leviathan* enabled Hobbes to explain the delegation of authority. Although in *De Cive* he already had in mind the delegation of exercise of sovereign right in civil matters, he used it only in the civil part. On the other hand, when in the religious parts he mentioned religious authority, the notion was independent of arguments concerning authority in the civil part. Only in *Leviathan* did he connect religious authority to authority in civil matters with the authorisation theory.

Finally, in his discussion about toleration of Catholicism, Taylor distinguished politically dangerous errors from innocuous errors or doctrines in Catholicism, and showed different attitudes towards different types of Catholic errors. In a similar vein, Hobbes might have hoped to allow Catholicism as long as it was innocuous. As for potential harm of Catholicism to the public

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60 Lev, 28: 494.
61 DC, 13:1.
peace, precisely because Hobbes thoroughly and emphatically refuted politically harmful Catholic doctrines in *Leviathan*, he might have thought as long as his teaching was predominant, it would nullify or at least alleviate perilous political implications of Catholic doctrines even if they were taught.

Finally, Hobbes' conclusion about the Christian sovereign also reveals his increased concern with the toleration of the civil sovereign in error. Here, as in the conclusion about heathen kings, Hobbes bestows further consideration to the possible error of the sovereign. In *The Elements of Law* Hobbes limited the article of faith to the only fundamental one, faith in Jesus Christ, but in it he also included “all such as be evidently inferred from thence.”

Then, in the main text of *De Cive*, Hobbes ceased mentioning the status of the inference. In the annotation added in the second edition, he clarified his new position, saying that without the deduction people can be saved. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes examined the disobedience due to the erroneous deduction, another possible version of Puritan justification of war for the sake of true religion. Erroneous deductions from the fundamental article were a theme Taylor had already deliberated. Here Hobbes asks who can be the judge of the “error,” and, significantly, denies even apostles as the competent judge.

Did not one of the two, St. Peter, or St. Paul erre in a superstructure, when St. Paul withstood St. Peter to his face?

While Taylor pointed out the internal contradiction of fathers or councils to deny their infallibility, Hobbes more radically applies

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63 DC, 18:6 ann.
64 Lev, 43: 952. Hobbes here refers to the story in Gal. 2:11-14. “When Peter was come to Antioch, I withstood him to the face, because he was to be blamed.... I said unto Peter... If thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of Gentiles, and not as do the Jews, why compellst thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews?” What Hobbes pays attention to in this episode is the confrontation between the apostles.
this argument to the apostles. The radical implication of this casual remark on the internal contradiction and plurality of the apostles emerges when turning back to Chillingworth's remark about the apostles. As a part of the refutation of Knott's position, Chillingworth inferred from his thesis and presented as the unacceptable or absurd result the idea that “the apostles were fountains of contradictious doctrines”, or that “the apostles had been teachers of falsehood.” Yet it is exactly what Hobbes implies here. Another implication of the remark is that this undermines the assumption Hobbes had in *De Cive* concerning the status of teachers of the church as the interpreters of supernatural matters in the Bible, for their status was supposed to be derived from the apostles' infallibility. This plurality of the apostles also underlies Hobbes's defence of Christian liberty, which will be discussed in the next section.

4.4.2. Mutual Toleration and the Ideal of Christian Liberty

So far Hobbes's discussion about religious liberty was subject to his preoccupation with the maintenance of the civil sovereign. However, in so far as public peace remains intact, the argument found only in *Leviathan* points to religious liberty or toleration, both mutual toleration among Christians and toleration by the sovereign. The climax of this defence of religious liberty is his endorsement of Independency in Chapter 47, and this argument has drawn the attention of many Hobbes scholars. In relation to

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66 DC, 17:27.
Hobbes studies, what this thesis suggests is to pay closer attention to other arguments for toleration in, and unique to, *Leviathan*, and then to establish more precisely the relationship between this striking discussion and other parts of, and specific to, *Leviathan*. Furthermore, while this endorsement of Independency was often associated with the rise of the Independent party during the Civil War, this study examines it in the related but slightly different context of the toleration controversy.

In the preceding section, reading the discussion about Christians and heathens in the light of the toleration controversy was suggested, and the case of heathen kings and Christian citizens was considered. In this section Hobbes’s argument about the relationship between the apostles and Jews or pagans will be read as his case for mutual toleration. Here the example not of ordinary Christians but of the apostles makes it all the more

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68 Though he does not identify the distinctive feature of *Leviathan* concerning toleration, Sommerville's valuable work also picks up a wide range of Hobbes's discussion in favour of toleration and compares Hobbes with other English supporters of toleration. (Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context*, 149-56.) Our observation on Hobbes's position in the toleration controversy is supported by Sommerville's following overview: “He [Hobbes] did indeed reject some of the arguments for toleration put forward by radical puritans, but he accepted much of the liberal Anglican case mounted by men like Falkland and Taylor.” Ibid., 150.


suitable because the apostles were thought to be infallible and teachers of the true doctrine, as has just been seen. For Hobbes too, the apostles, as opposed to people in the later ages, enjoyed a special status, having direct access to Christ.

Now there is a good possibility of Taylor’s influence on Hobbes’s defence of mutual toleration in *Leviathan*. The first point to make is Hobbes’s opposition to making new articles of faith. “All such places as command avoiding such disputes, are written for a Lesson to Pastors, (such as Timothy and Titus were) not to make new Articles of Faith, by determining every small controversie, which oblige men to a needless burthen of Conscience, or provoke them to break the union of the Church.” This attack on creating new articles of faith is one of the main features of Taylor, and even Hobbes’s grounds for it are reminiscent of Taylor.

Hobbes’s further related case for mutual toleration is concerned with the interpreters of the Scriptures before the civil sovereign became a Christian. For his conclusion that each person is an interpreter to oneself means that they can disagree with other people’s interpretations or their religious opinions, which amounts to mutual toleration. Not only this conclusion but also Hobbes’s main argument for it is again exactly the same as that which Taylor asserted in his defence of reason against authority.

“Generally in all cases of the world, hee that pretendeth any

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72 Lev, 43: 932. Apart from the political significance, this argument had a theoretical meaning too. In *Leviathan* even the status of Moses as a true prophet was dependent on his position as the civil sovereign. Since both Moses and the apostles were the epitome of truth, the discussions about both of them showed what people with or without sovereign power could do towards others, however true their religious teaching might be. Therefore together they explored all of the theoretical possibilities.

73 Lev, 42: 802.

74 WT, 603.

75 Lev, 42: 808, 10, 12.
proofe, maketh Judge of his proofe him to whom he addresseth his speech.” However, Hobbes constructs his argument in the form of the interpretation of the Scriptures and tests this reasoning in the case of the “divine authority” of the apostles. Thus the scriptural passage Hobbes cites here is unusual in the toleration controversy, paying attention to Paul’s attempt to convert the Jews at Thessalonica. “As his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath dayes reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, Opening and alledging, that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the dead; and that this Iesus whom he preached was the77 Christ.” (Acts. 17:2, 3.) As a result of his preaching, some of them believed, while others not.78 (Acts. 17:4, 5.) Therefore, Hobbes concludes, the interpreters of the Scriptures and the judges of Paul’s reasoning were the Jewish audience. The crux of his reasoning is the exclusion of the possibility of Paul as an interpreter to others.

If S. Paul, what needed he to quote any places to prove his doctrine? It had been enough to have said, I find it so in Scripture, that is to say, in your Laws, of which I am Interpreter, as sent by Christ.80

Here by paying attention to what was not told by Paul, Hobbes demonstrates that Paul himself admitted the general principle.

When Hobbes tries to show that even after the conversion the situation remains the same, he takes a similar way of reasoning.81 This time Hobbes cites a passage often cited in the defence of individual judgement, John. 5:39:

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76 Lev, 42: 808.
77 Hobbes continues to use the indirect narration, changing from “I preached unto you is” in the KJV into “he preached was the.”
78 Ibid.
79 The main story in Acts. 17:5 is rather about the unpersuaded Jews’ attack on the apostles, but Hobbes focuses on the success or failure of Paul’s persuasion.
80 Ibid.
81 Lev, 42: 810.
Search the Scriptures: for in them yee thinke to have eternall life, and they are they that testifie of me. If hee [Christ] had not meant they should Interpret them, hee would not have bidden them take thence the proof of his being the Christ: he would either have Interpreted them himselfe, or referred them to the Interpretation of the Priests.

Again by integrating the general principle shown by Taylor into the scriptural interpretation, Hobbes provides scriptural support for this principle.

Or rather this interpretation, together with the preceding one, strengthens the principle by showing that even the apostles and Christ, preachers of the true doctrine and the legitimate holders of divine authority, granted their audience the right to disagree with their preaching. Thus it seems that Hobbes makes religious “truth” a relative concept in so far as the sovereign power is not concerned. Coffey remarks that in the seventeenth century “there was a growing tendency to drop the objective ‘truth’ component” of concepts concerning toleration such as “persecution,” “conscience,” and “martyrdom.” This case for mutual toleration can be placed in this tide.

Moreover this interpretation illustrates how the general principle can be applied to concrete situations. In particular, it shows what those who demand the exception to the principle would have to say to the audience. By suggesting the unlikeliness of this kind of remark, it shows why it is a general rule.

The above discussions have political implications for mutual toleration. Firstly, while Taylor limited the scope of toleration to Christians, Hobbes extended the scope of toleration to the heathen by applying the principle mentioned above to the

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82 This passage is connected with the corresponding one in Acts. 17:11 by the Geneva and Bishops Bibles. Hobbes’s attention to Acts. 17 in the preceding argument might come from this connection.

83 Lev. 42: 810.

84 Coffey, "Defining Heresy and Orthodoxy in the Puritan Revolution," 130.
relationship between Christians and heathens. Secondly, even opponents of toleration of false religion or heretical opinions admitted that they had to try to persuade them before having recourse to violence. Also they often cited the Scriptures to support their opposition to toleration. However, Hobbes’s argument suggests that this effort to persuade by itself implies granting the audience or “heretics” the liberty to disagree with their opinions. Therefore, the way the opponents of toleration bring forward their argument denies their own position. Mutual toleration is the only reasonable attitude to assume.

Where what should be taught was determined by pastors, Hobbes took the trouble to note that people still retained the liberty to interpret the Scriptures as they pleased. This, together with his dim view of making new articles of faith, suggests Hobbes regarded the determination of controversies by pastors as the source of the restriction of religious liberty. This remark also indicates that Hobbes’s cases for the liberty to interpret the Scriptures by themselves in *Leviathan* are not only new but also probably departures from the position in *De Cive*. In it Hobbes argued that Christians under heathen kings should follow some Christian churches about supernatural matters. This argument, in turn, was derived from the contrast in the previous section between individuals and the church, and from the denial of the former as interpreters of the Scriptures.

In *Leviathan* Hobbes not only supported mutual toleration in this way, but also condemned persecution by the civil sovereign as unreasonable. Here again, what should be paid attention to is the attitude of heathen kings towards Christians. In so far as heathen kings think of Christianity as a false religion, this example can be applied to the relationship between the Christian civil sovereign

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85 Lev, 42: 812.
86 DC, 18:13.
87 DC, 17:27.
and “heretical,” “erroneous” Christian subjects. While in *De Cive* Hobbes already showed what Christian subjects could do under heathen kings, in the corresponding part in *Leviathan* Hobbes added another argument.

But what Infidel King is so unreasonable, as knowing he has a Subject, that waiteth for the second coming of Christ, after the present world shall bee burnt, and intendeth then to obey him (which is the intent of believing that Iesus is the Christ,) and in the mean time thinketh himself bound to obey the Laws of that Infidel King, (which all Christians are obliged in conscience to doe,) to put to death, or to persecute such a Subject?⁸⁸

This argument presupposes the duty of Christian subjects discussed in the previous section. However, as long as they recognize the duty of obedience, it is Hobbes’s insistence that toleration of “erroneous” Christian subjects is the reasonable policy. Here it is again noteworthy that, like Taylor, Hobbes appeals to the notion of reasonableness in his defence of toleration in this place and others in *Leviathan*.

How is the famous endorsement of Christian liberty in Chapter 47 of *Leviathan* related to the parts considered so far in this section and other parts apparent only in *Leviathan*?⁸⁹ Hobbes says,

> We are reduced to the Independency of the Primitive Christians to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best: Which,

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⁸⁸ *Lev*, 43: 954.
⁸⁹ This thesis calls into question Malcolm’s otherwise excellent introduction to *Leviathan* about this issue. (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 61–65.) In the main text the consistency of Hobbes’s endorsement of Independency with the general features of *Leviathan* will be shown. Here are pointed out the insufficiencies of the grounds Malcolm provides for his position. First of all, Malcolm ignores Hobbes’s third ground, coming just after the second. Secondly, he misses the different contexts between the last part of Chapter 37 and this part. While the former is concerned with the preservation of public authority, here it is rather assumed and an ideal is discussed.
if it be without contention, and without measuring the Doctrine of Christ, by our affection to the Person of his Minister, (the fault which the Apostle reprehended in the Corinthians,) is perhaps the best.\textsuperscript{90}

The first distinctive feature of this endorsement is Hobbes’s use of the Bible. The passages Hobbes points to are 1 Cor. 1:12-13, 3:4, 22-23. “Every one of you saith, I am of Paul; and I of Apollos; and I of Cephas; and I of Christ. Is Christ divided?” “While one saith, I am of Paul; and another, I am of Apollos; are ye not carnal?” “Whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas,... all are yours; And ye are Christ’s.” These passages might seem to contrast the lamentable division among followers of different preachers and the desirable unity under Christ. However, while Hobbes certainly warns of possible dissension, he still places high value on following individual preachers. The endorsement of pluralism based on these passages is worth noting.

The second peculiar feature of this argument is that Hobbes leaves religious pluralism and a possible source of dissension as it is. In \textit{De Cive}, Hobbes found the direct factor for war in mere dissension.\textsuperscript{91} In \textit{Leviathan} also Hobbes viewed disagreement as dishonouring.\textsuperscript{92} In view of these negative remarks about disagreement, it is certainly easy to understand that Hobbes adds the conditionals to the endorsement and weakens the strong statement, “the best,” by putting “perhaps” just before it.\textsuperscript{93} Or rather it seems impossible to combine peace with pluralistic opinions and their expressions in the first place. Thus Hobbes’s

\textsuperscript{90} Lev, 47: 1116.
\textsuperscript{91} DC, 1:5.
\textsuperscript{92} Lev, 10: 138.
\textsuperscript{93} On the other hand, this expression suggests that Hobbes was conscious that this argument was not a demonstration but less than a probable one, an anomaly to the scientific nature of \textit{Leviathan}. His concern with the best is also unusual. Then why did Hobbes take all the trouble to show his support for Independency as the best policy? Our tentative answer is that this is a manifestation of Hobbes’s commitment to “the liberty which is harmless to the commonwealth and essential to happy lives for the citizens.” DC, 13:16.
answer in *De Cive* was to override rising controversies with the authority of the sovereign, but then the religious pluralism as Hobbes saw in the England at the time of writing *Leviathan* cannot be explained. Therefore Hobbes provided new ideas to make it possible in *Leviathan*.

The first idea concerns humility as the virtue of good pastors presented in the third ground for the endorsement of Independency.  

94 This virtue, together with the subtle change between *De Cive* and *Leviathan* about the notion of honour as one of the causes of war,  

95 seems to make it possible to keep peace even among dissenting people if they retain humility. In *De Cive* and *The Elements of Law*, honour lay in pre-eminence over others, or more precisely, in the “conception of our own power, above the power of him that contendeth with us.”  

96 Certainly in *Leviathan* also, “every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe,” and this pursuit of honour or loathing of dishonour was one of the causes of war.  

97 Nevertheless, here to honour or dishonour was relative to the rate or value “that each man setteth on himselfe.”  

98 If a person is a man of modesty, he will set on himself a low price, and will not easily find himself disdained.

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94 Lev, 47: 1116. This third ground also functions as an explanation for the collapse of the previous clerical authorities. In particular the suppression of reason as one of their defects is important, since at the earlier occasion of the dispute with Bramhall, Hobbes mentioned it as one of the contributing factors for sedition and the Civil War. Thomas Hobbes, *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, ed. W. Molesworth, vol. 4 (London: John Bohn, 1840), 264. (For the whole details of this clash, see Jackson, *Hobbes, Bramhall and the Politics of Liberty and Necessity: A Quarrel of the Civil Wars and Interregnum*.) In the Restoration period, on the other hand, reasonable religion was a consensus, which shows that this claim of Hobbes and radical tolerationists succeeded.


96 EL, 1:9:1; DC, 1:2.

97 Lev, 13: 190.

98 Lev, 10: 136.
The second is the liberty to interpret the Scriptures and to disagree with other people’s interpretations. If this liberty or right is respected by each other, people will not become frustrated with those who stick to their opinion.

However, Hobbes’s remarks about the liberty suggest further than that. As is implied in Chapter 42, Hobbes took a dim view of making new articles of faith and pointed out that even after the doctrine to teach was decided by teachers, people still retained the liberty to interpret the Scriptures. All these remarks point to Hobbes’s preference for religious liberty from ecclesiastical power or authority. Hobbes’s Independency is just a full realisation of this preference. Yet here Hobbes gives a fuller explanation of this preference, and this explication shows Hobbes’s characteristic way of thinking in contrast with Taylor’s.

The argument about Christian liberty is a part of his chronological explanation of the rise and downfall of clerical power.  

99 Even at the earliest and best stage of Christianity there were “Elements of Power;” for people obeyed the apostles “out of Reverence” for them.  

100 However,

Afterwards the Presbyters (as the Flocks of Christ increased) assembling to consider what they should teach, and therefore by obliging themselves to teach nothing against the Decrees of their Assemblies, made it thought the people were thereby obliged to follow their Doctrine, and when they refused, refused to keep them company, (that was then called Excommunication,) not as Infidels, but as being disobedient: And this was the first knot upon their Liberty.  

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99 Metzger, dealing with not only *Leviathan* but also Hobbes’s other works, provides the whole picture of this chronology of Hobbes. (Metzger, *Thomas Hobbes und die Englische Revolution 1640-1660*, 176-83.) The focus of this thesis is on the relationship between this chronology and other features of *Leviathan*.

100 Lev, 47: 1114.

101 Ibid.
The restriction of Christian liberty began when pastors created a kind of new article of faith, and in view of Chapter 42, what is noteworthy in this passage are the expressions, “made it thought,” or “that was then called Excommunication.” This is not the true meaning or effect of excommunication. That is why this “knot” is one of “the Inventions of men.”

More importantly, however, this was the time when the structure or the relationship between teachers and their followers changed. It has been seen that one of the basic and vital insights of *Leviathan* is that positive religion has to be grasped with reference to this dual structure, and that religious teachers or pretenders of the word of God acquire power over their followers. This way of paying attention to the power relationship between teachers and their followers is lacking in Taylor’s viewpoint and constitutes Hobbes’s distinctive feature. Thus, while both Hobbes and Taylor saw the time of the apostles as the age of integral liberty, they differed in the time when that liberty began to be restrained. Taylor found the beginning of the restraint in the new article of faith in the Nicene Council, whereas Hobbes looked at the matter from a more sociological viewpoint and saw the onset of the constraint in a much earlier stage. At the time of the apostles, the teachers were pluralistic and individualistic, not forming any inner groups among themselves. However, the Presbyters began to form a group of the teachers who preach the same doctrine. So the relation between teachers and followers changed from that between individuals to that between a group of teachers and individual followers. In the episcopal and Roman Catholic system even among teachers hierarchical systems were

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102 Ibid.
104 This preference of pluralism of teachers and their doctrines suggests that unlike many other English people in the age, Hobbes welcomed the fragmentation of Puritanism as an expression of plurality of religious opinions and of minimized existence of ecclesiastical power.
formed and lower-rank teachers began to obey higher-rank ones. Nevertheless the followers were at the bottom of the hierarchy, now having hierarchical groups on top of them. What Hobbes wanted to avoid, if possible, was this contrast between groups of teachers and individual followers, or to put in more familiar terms, clerical power over lay people. While many radical tolerationists in the revolutionary years were anti-clerical, this presentation of the abolishment of almost all clerical power as an ideal reveals a particularly radical feature of *Leviathan*.

This attitude can also be found in the second ground for the endorsement of the Independency. "It is unreasonable in them, who teach there is such danger in every little Error, to require of a man endued with reason of his own, to follow the Reason of any other man, or of the most voices of many other men." This defence of individual judgement and reason is in accordance with Hobbes’s preference of the liberty to interpret the Scriptures by oneself, and with the duty of the use of reason as a solution to the challenge of the enthusiasts. The point is, however, that here again Hobbes defends individuals against the majority. Following any other man than oneself is “little better, then to venture his Salvation at crosse and pile.”

In his opposition to laws over conscience, Hobbes brings forward a similar argument and clarifies the reasoning behind this judgement. Such laws are against the law of nature,
and especially in them, who teach, that a man shall bee damned to Eternall and extream torment, if he die in a false opinion concerning an Article of the Christian Faith. For who is there, that knowing there is so great danger in an error, whom the natural care of himself, compelleth not to hazard his Soule upon his own judgement, rather than that of any other man that is unconcerned in his damnation?111

Though this argument concerns the relationship between the sovereign and citizens, the contrast here is between individuals and “any other man”, and thus Hobbes could use a similar type of this discussion in his justification for the endorsement of Independency too. Then, the scope of this defence of individual freedom is quite broad. Actually in this argument typical elements in our notion of human right can be seen: grasping each individual as holding something vital for himself, in this case his salvation; and judging how close the connection between the important thing and each actor concerned is; and admitting the priority of the actor with the closest connection, usually individuals, over every other actor, especially groups in power. Though Hobbes never intends the restriction of sovereign power by this assertion, he does condemn the sovereign’s interfering with internal liberty, and on the social level the principle in this assertion leads to his preference for complete freedom from ecclesiastical power. Thus it is possible to find here a prototypical or precursory version of the liberty of conscience as what would later be seen as one of human rights.

111 Lev, 46: 1096.
5. Conclusion

It has been for a long time a huge riddle why Hobbes put forward the bizarre religious argument in *Leviathan*. In this thesis, the way of solving this enigma has been, in Part 2, to establish religious problems peculiar to *Leviathan* based on the comparative textual analysis of Hobbes's identification of the religious problem in his works of political philosophy, and to associate the problems with known issues in the Civil War as probable hypothetical contexts. In Part 3 the steps taken have been to explore the religious contexts of the English Civil War to clarify the wider and more specific implications of those issues, and then in Part 4 to test the contexts as the hypotheses by considering arguments unique to *Leviathan* in the contexts. Through these procedures, this thesis has aimed to clarify specific political significances of Hobbes's religious discussion distinctive of *Leviathan*. Since Hobbes scarcely specified the precise sources he was drawing on or disagreeing with, there is almost always some uncertainty in connecting Hobbes's argument with known historical issues, and the degree of certainty of the explanation here will vary according to the situation. However, even if reaching absolute certainty is impossible, it is still possible to approach a more probable explanation. In any case, the most sceptical will admit that this kind of procedure will at least help to show the precise nature of Hobbes's originality in his age.

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1 Conversely, the cases where the precise sources are known can be said to be a simpler version of this general situation.


3 Understanding this, in turn, is necessary for explaining why critics of
The main tenet of the answer is that the religious argument unique to *Leviathan* can be understood, generally speaking, as Hobbes’ reaction to the emergence of radical Puritanism, and more specifically, of enthusiasm, “the Foole,” and the toleration controversy. The main focus in this thesis has been on how Hobbes grappled with the threat of enthusiasm and with new arguments appearing in the toleration controversy.

For many people in his period, enthusiasm was a challenge to the authority of the Scriptures, and it prompted new defences of biblical authority. Hobbes’s new argument on this topic can be connected with this type of work. However, Hobbes’s approach and answer, the civil sovereign as the foundation of biblical authority, was quite different from other ones in the Civil War. This was related to Hobbes’s insight into the sociological significance of enthusiasm and more generally of the pretended word of God, specifically concerning dominion of successful preachers of the divine word over their followers. Hobbes was especially alert to the political threat of enthusiasm, and his solution to it was the duty of radical scepticism. A sceptical and critical attitude towards the pretended word of God was the effective way of preventing the abuse of divine authority including enthusiasm. The duty of scepticism, in turn, required the kind of certainty as to biblical authority which would withstand such scepticism. Probable arguments or “moral certainty” which other people offered were not sufficient for Hobbes.

The encouragement of scepticism itself was also quite uncommon in his age. While religious scepticism became, or was perceived to become, more widespread during the Civil War, it was usually denounced as undermining Christianity. The exception was tolerationists, and they often advocated giving Hobbes attacked him among others, or why Hobbes, among others, had a great and long-standing influence on the England of the latter 17th century and further. These points can be added to Parkin’s valuable work on Hobbes’s reception.
reasons for their faith. The connection between the case for toleration and the support of individual judgement can also be seen in *Leviathan*. When Hobbes offered new arguments defending the liberty of conscience, the minimal internal liberty or the Independency of the primitive Christians, they were often connected with his espousal of individual judgement. However, Hobbes was perhaps the most stringent in that he proposed scepticism as everyman’s duty, and that he directed the scepticism explicitly at the most authoritative prophet in the Bible, Moses, and implicitly at the apostles too; by presenting the exemplary model of his own radical scepticism, in *Leviathan* Hobbes conveys to the reader the spirit of scepticism and contributes to the duty of every citizen to take a sceptical attitude towards the pretended word of God.

Another main feature of *Leviathan*, partly related to Hobbes’s radical scepticism, lies in his reply to the demand for religious truth in his age: Hobbes blurs the traditional understanding of the distinction between true and false religion. In the first place, for ordinary Christians the status of Christianity as a true religion turns out to be lacking in scientific foundation except for the authority of the civil sovereign. Hobbes argues that common Christians believe, but do not know, that the Bible is the word of God. What *Leviathan* suggests is that Christian faith is a kind of fiction: it involves treating the supernatural, which natural reason can neither prove nor disprove, as if it were truth, to lead a voluntary Christian life. In the second place, in Chapter 12 the traditional feature of false religion, its political nature, is applied to true religion. Thirdly, the philological analysis in Chapter 36 reveals that the difference between true and supernatural revelation on the one hand and false and natural revelation on the other is so subtle that, without the help of the criteria in the

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4 Cf. Lev, 47: 1124.
Scriptures, mere natural reason cannot discern true prophets from false ones. Finally, the case for mutual toleration in Chapter 42 shows that even the authoritative and “true” teachers of Christianity such as Christ and the apostles admitted the audience the right to judge whether their teaching was true or not.

This leads to the theoretical significance of the biblical interpretation as a part of philosophical discourse in *Leviathan*. It seems that the scriptural interpretation functions as something like an ideal gas, a fiction which makes it possible to explore further truths, though of course for Hobbes the Bible was the true word of God owing to the authority of the civil sovereign. For example, Chapter 32 in *Leviathan* suggests that natural reason alone cannot reach certainty in judging the claim of pretended prophets, and thus that mere natural reason can neither identify nor treat true prophets as such. It is only in the argument form of scriptural interpretation that true prophets proper can be discussed. Similarly, common people are fallible, and only the examples of Moses, Christ or the apostles make it possible to consider without any qualifications what attitude preachers of the true religious doctrines can or should take towards dissenters from the religious truth.

As for Hobbes’s use of the Bible in general, firstly, Hobbes in *Leviathan* pays less attention to, or is less careful about, following the wording of the version of the Bible he used than in *De Cive*. He often departs from the wording in the KJV according to his political inclination, his own topic of discussion, and what he saw as the content of the wording. This new attitude probably reflects his deeper understanding of the nature of the Bible. It is not a book of natural science and as such includes ambiguous words and metaphorical expressions. Thus one of the main tasks of the biblical interpretation in *Leviathan* was to explain such words or expressions in clear words of natural science. Secondly, Hobbes in *Leviathan* tends to apply the model or message in the Bible
directly to his contemporary political issues than in *De Cive*. In other words, the sense of distance between Hobbes's own age and the biblical age is less clear in *Leviathan*. For example, while in both works Moses and Abraham are discussed, in *Leviathan* Hobbes begins to compare them to Christian sovereigns, and the analogy enables him to apply directly to the latter what is shown about Abraham or Moses. Another example concerns the biblical passages suggesting the criteria for judging prophets. Although the same passages are cited in both works, only in *Leviathan* does Hobbes use the criteria for dealing with the threat of the enthusiasts in his own age. This change is related to the development of Hobbes's religious scheme. In his biblical chronology Hobbes for the first time in *Leviathan* connected without interruption the time of the Old testament to that of Christian sovereigns. Also only in *Leviathan* did Hobbes show that the foundation of the authority of Moses was the same as that of ordinary civil sovereigns.

Finally, this thesis concludes by pointing out four respects in which Hobbes's theoretical development from *De Cive* to *Leviathan* as shown by this research contributed to what is now called the Enlightenment. Firstly, compared with *De Cive*, *Leviathan* developed the analysis of the foundation of Christian religion as a positive religion. It gives careful thought to the authority of the Bible, mentions the Muslims and Islam, and pays attention to the interaction between the apostles and the heathen. This can be seen as a forerunner of comparative religion in the Enlightenment period, though Hobbes's analysis, far from a

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5 From *The Elements of Law* to *Leviathan* Hobbes consistently pursued clarifying the foundation of Christianity. In *The Elements of Law* belief in Jesus Christ as the only fundamental article of faith necessary for salvation can be seen as the main product of this pursuit. The development in *De Cive* lies in the new discussion of natural religion and in the fuller treatment of the kingdom of God in the Old Testament.

6 It also reveals the remnants of the pagan religion in Hobbes's contemporary form of Christianity in Chapter 45.
disinterested investigation, reveals his political concern markedly and directly.

The second contribution of *Leviathan* lies in the treatment of the notion of divine authority. Hobbes gave a rational foundation for the “divine” authority of the Scriptures, denied any claim of divine right by the clergy, pointed out the internal contradiction among the apostles, the most authoritative preachers of the word of God, and stopped the notion of divine authority from hindering critical thinking or the use of natural reason. He transformed the notion of divine authority so that it could function only as the support of the civil sovereign.

The third aspect is concerned with the notion of the supernatural. Hobbes’s new foundation of the authority of the Bible in *Leviathan* gave him the theoretical foundation of his eschatology, and thus helped him to decrease the sphere of the supernatural from *De Cive* to *Leviathan*. Also his application of the mechanical epistemology to pretended supernatural revelation and to revelation in the Scriptures, both true and false, enabled him again to lessen dramatically the supposed domain of the supernatural. This presentation of the possibility that alleged supernatural phenomena might in fact be completely natural in turn helped him to encourage a critical attitude towards pretended supernatural matters.

Fourthly and finally, the religious part of *Leviathan* allocates much more space than that of *De Cive* for matters which do not seem to be directly relevant to social and political matters, such as the explanation of the development of philosophical sects and of errors of Scholastic metaphysical doctrines in Chapter 46 and the long philological investigation in Part 3.\(^7\) Similarly, although Hobbes published the third section of his trilogy, *De Cive*, as an individual work on politics, probably dependent on, but distinct

\(^7\) Lev, 46: 1082.
from, his works on body and man, he included in *Leviathan* the mechanical epistemology in Part 1 as a part of his political theory. This thesis has mainly focused on Part 3 and shown how Hobbes’s philological investigation of the Bible supported by the mechanical epistemology in Part 1, the seemingly purely theoretical and scholarly type of examination, works upon the deepest assumption of Christian religion and underlies radical practical conclusions unique to *Leviathan*. This implies that social and political problems have their deeper roots in errors about more theoretical and abstract matters, and that the development of theoretical science will help solve social problems in the future, which is the basic tenet of the Enlightenment.

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8 There has been much discussion over the precise nature of the relationship between Hobbes’s natural science and civil science. See, for example, Tom Sorell, *Hobbes* (London: Routledge, 1991); Malcolm, "Hobbes's Science of Politics and His Theory of Science."
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