Slum upgrading role for housing policy and governance
[trans]formation[s]

From Favela-Bairro to Morar Carioca, investigating the case of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil

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London, August 2014
I, Hector Becerril Miranda confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
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How much better it is to acquire wisdom than gold; to acquire understanding is more desirable than silver. Proverbs 16:16

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ABSTRACT

Through the theoretical perspective of the Political Sociology of Public Policy Instruments (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004), the thesis explores the role of the slum upgrading instrument in the evolution of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance. Specifically, it examines the significance of slum upgrading choice and use over the past two decades. The research is guided by the following question: how did the slum upgrading influence Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance development from 1993 to 2012? The research considers three hypotheses:

1. The slum upgrading contributed to produce the inflexion points of the evolution of Rio's housing policy.
2. The slum upgrading fostered the transformation of Rio's housing governance.
3. The slum upgrading supported the depoliticization of Rio's housing policy.

On its theoretical stand, the research builds on the one hand on the Political Sociology of Public Policy Instruments (PPI) approach that argues that policy instruments contribute to structure public policy as they generate specific effects (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004). On the other, the research builds on the Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) that understands 'the social' as an heterogeneous network of entities called 'actants' created by a specific movement of 'associations' conceptualized as 'translation' (Latour 2005; Callon 1986). Based on these perspectives, the thesis analysed the slum upgrading as a 'policy instrument', itself being an 'actant'. Subsequently, through 'detective work' (Austrin & Farnsworth 2005), the thesis delved into the unfolding of Rio's slum upgrading network of 'associations' using primary municipal archives, semi-structured interviews and policy documents. The investigation resulted in the production of a chronological 'thick description' which reveals the slum upgrading role in Rio's housing policy and governance transformation.
# TABLE OF CONTENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENT</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM HOUSING CONSTRUCTION TO SLUM UPGRAADING AS POLICY APPROACH</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE CASE OF RIO DE JANEIRO</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND METHODS</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THESIS STRUCTURE</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 ANALYSING PUBLIC POLICY BY ITS INSTRUMENTS</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 ADOPTING A POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY PERSPECTIVE</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1 POLICY ANALYSIS DISCIPLINE</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2 TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY PERSPECTIVE</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 PPI AS ANALYTICAL ENTRY</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1 THE PPI APPROACH AND ITS THEORETICAL LINKAGES</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2 THE PPI APPROACH: CORE CONCEPTS</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 THE PPI AT THE 'BIRTHPLACE OF SAMBA AND BEAUTIFUL SONGS'</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.1 CONSIDERING NEW TERRITORIES AND LIMITATIONS</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.2 PPI METHODS: SOME CONSIDERATIONS</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 CONCLUSION</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 RIO'S CASE AND GAPS IN THE LITERATURE</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 REDEFINING MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT ROLE IN THE HOUSING POLICY</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1 THE DECLINE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HOUSING INTERVENTIONS</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2 THE RISE OF MUNICIPALITIES AS KEY ACTORS IN THE HOUSING SECTOR</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COMEBACK</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1 REORGANIZATION OF HOUSING SECTOR</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2 RESHAPING MUNICIPAL ACTIONS THROUGH MASSIVE INVESTMENTS</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3 LATEST FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HOUSING INITIATIVES</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 RIO DE JANEIRO CASE: GAPS IN THE LITERATURE</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.1 RIO EXPERIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2 THE POLICY INSTRUMENT AND GAPS IN THE LITERATURE</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.3 RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 CONCLUSION</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 3  INVESTIGATING THE SLUM UPGRADE AS AN 'ACTANT'  58
3.1  INTRODUCTION  58
3.2  ANT AS OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK  59
  3.2.1  ANT: AN OVERVIEW  59
  3.2.2  ANT AND THE PPI APPROACH CONVERGENCES  61
  3.2.3  ANT AND RIO’S INVESTIGATION  64
3.3  RIO DE JANEIRO INVESTIGATION: FIRST STEPS  67
  3.3.1  ADOPTING A DETECTIVE APPROACH  67
  3.3.2  RIO DE JANEIRO’S INVESTIGATION DIRECTION  71
3.4  EXPANDING THE NETWORK: EXPLORING INSTRUMENTATION  73
  3.4.1  INVESTIGATION BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE UK  73
  3.4.2  OVERCOMING DATA COLLECTION  78
  3.4.3  PROCESSING AND ORGANIZING DATA  82
3.5  CONCLUSION  86

CHAPTER 4  TOWARDS THE URBANIZATION OF RIO DE JANEIRO’SFAVELAS  88
4.1  INTRODUCTION  88
4.2  HOUSING POLICY IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT CONTEXT  89
  4.2.1  HOUSING INITIATIVES IN RIO DE JANEIRO: THE ORIGINS  89
  4.2.2  BETWEEN HOUSING CONSTRUCTION AND URBANIZATION  90
4.3  HOUSING POLICY IN THE CITY STATE CONTEXT  92
  4.3.1  TOWARDS FAVELAS EVICTION AND RAZING  92
  4.3.2  SHIFTING HOUSING POLICY DIRECTION AFTER THE FUSION  96
4.4  HOUSING POLICY AT THE MUNICIPALITY SINCE 1980s  98
  4.4.1  CONSOLIDATION OF THE URBANIZATION OF FAVELAS  98
  4.4.2  CONVERGENCE TOWARDS FAVELAS’ URBANIZATION AS HOUSING APPROACH  100
4.5  CONCLUSION  104

CHAPTER 5  SLUM UPGRADE: HOLDING TOGETHER  105
5.1  INTRODUCTION  105
5.2  THE EMERGENCE OF SLUM UPGRADE  106
  5.2.1  THE COGNITIVE AND NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS  106
  5.2.2  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SLUM UPGRADE  109
  5.2.3  THE BUILDING OF ALLIANCES  113
5.3  GROWING STRONGER  119
  5.3.1  SUPPORTING THE CREATION OF THE MUNICIPAL HOUSING SECRETARIAT  119
  5.3.2  ADAPTATIONS AND ADOPTIONS  123
  5.3.3  EXPANDING ALLIANCES, SECURING CONTINUITY  129
5.4  HOLDING TOGETHER  137
  5.4.1  COMPLICATED IMPLEMENTATION  137
  5.4.2  UNDERMINING CRITICS AND OPPOSITION  144
  5.4.3  APPROACHING THE NEW MILLENNIUM: EXPANDING THE ALLIANCES  148
5.5  CONCLUSION  152
# CHAPTER 6  
**ABANDONING THE SLUM UPGRADE**

6.1 **INTRODUCTION**  
6.2 **THE BEGINNING OF THE SLUM UPGRADING DECLINE**  
6.2.1 **THE DISLOCATION OF THE SLUM UPGRADING POLITICAL SUPPORT**  
6.2.2 **SLUM UPGRADE LOSING CREDIBILITY**  
6.3 **THE WEAKENING OF THE SLUM UPGRADE**  
6.3.1 **ADMINISTRATIVE FRAGMENTATION & POLITICO-ELECTORAL DISINTEREST**  
6.3.2 **GROWING DISINTEREST**  
6.4 **THE SLUM UPGRADE FALL**  
6.4.1 **LOosing FINANCIAL SUPPORT**  
6.4.2 **OPPOSITION AND COLLECTIVE ABANDON**  
6.5 **CONCLUSION**

# CHAPTER 7  
**SLUM UPGRADE: RISING FROM THE ASHES**

7.1 **INTRODUCTION**  
7.2 **NEW LEASE OF LIFE**  
7.2.1 **WAKING UP**  
7.2.2 **SLUM UPGRADE AT MUNICIPAL LEVEL: NEW WIND**  
7.3 **THE MORAR CARIOCA PLAN: SEEKING TO INTEREST AGAIN**  
7.3.1 **AN OLYMPIC SUPPORT**  
7.3.2 **MORAR CARIOCA LAUNCH**  
7.4 **DIFFICULT TIMES FOR THE SLUM UPGRADE INSTRUMENT**  
7.4.1 **SLUM UPGRADE IN THE SHADE OF THE MCMV PROGRAMME**  
7.4.2 **SLUM UPGRADE: OLD ISSUES AND NEW PROBLEMS**  
7.5 **CONCLUSION**

# CONCLUSIONS

**INTRODUCTION**  
**LEARNING FROM THE RIO DE JANEIRO INVESTIGATION**  
**INVESTIGATION IMPLICATIONS**  
**INVESTIGATION LIMITATIONS**  
**FUTURE RESEARCH**

# REFERENCES AND SOURCES

**GENERAL REFERENCES**  
**LIST OF INTERVIEWS**  
**LIST OF DCMRJ**  
**LAWS AND DECREES**

# ANNEXES

**MCMV**  
**SBPE**  
**INTERVIEW TEMPLATES**
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>PMHIS MEETING AP3</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>GREEN MORAR CARIOCA PROJECT IN CHAPÉU MANGUEIRA AND BABILOŠIA</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EXCEL REGISTRY SCREEN SHOT</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ILLUSTRATOR CS6 FILE SCREEN SHOT</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>CRUZADA HOUSING ESTATE</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>CITY OF GOD HOUSING ESTATE FUNDED IN PARTNERSHIP WITH USAID</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>FIELD AFTER A FAVELA RAZING IN LEBLON, ZONA SUL</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>PEOPLE BEING RELOCATED IN HOUSING ESTATES</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>FAVELAS REGISTRY</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>MUTIRÃO WORKS: SEWAGE WORKS, PUBLIC LIGHTING AND GARBAGE COLLECTION</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>EVOLUTION OF FAVELAS’ POPULATION IN RIO DE JANEIRO FROM 1950 TO 1980</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>THE ENVIROMENTAL CAPITAL</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>FAVELA-BAIRRO EXPANSION BY PHASES</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>CONDE SEEKS HILLS’ VOTE (FAVELAS’ VOTE)</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>THE CITY ARRIVES TO THE ‘HILLS’ (FAVELAS)</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>DRUG TRAFFICKING PARALYSES FAVELA-BAIRRO</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>ABANDONMENT THREATENS FAVELA-BAIRRO PROGRAMME</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>PARQUE ROYAL FAVELA BEFORE AND AFTER THE FAVELA-BAIRRO PROJECT</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>FAVELA-BAIRRO PROJECT IN VIDIGAL FAVELA</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>SMH BUDGET FROM 1995 TO 2000</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>ELECTIONS 2000</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>URBAN DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF THE ALEMÃO COMPLEX</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>PROVIDÊNCIA OPEN AIR MUSEUM</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>RIO COMUNIDADE IN NEW DELHI COMMUNITY BEFORE AND AFTER</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO’S INTERVENTIONS</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>SMH BUDGET FROM 1997 TO 2004</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>VARIOUS PROBLEMS SURROUND THE FAVELA-BAIRRO PROGRAMME</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>EVICTION POLICY COMEBACKS IN THE DEBATE</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>SMH BUDGET 1995-2008</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>DEBATE ABOUT FAVELAS AND THE EVICTION POLICY IN 2005</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>FAFERJ’S VIDEO SHOTS</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 2007</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>PAR PROJECTS</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>MORAR CARIOCA COMPETITION, DECEMBER 2010</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, OCTOBER 2010, BEFORE THE SECOND ROUND</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>PAC PROVIDÊNCIA PROJECT. CRUZEIRO CHAPEL AT THE TOP OF THE HILL</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1 INSTRUMENTS CLASSIFICATION PROPOSED BY LASCouMES & LE GALES ........................................... 31
TABLE 2 BRAZILIAN NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY EVOLUTION OVERVIEW........................................... 48
TABLE 3 RIO DE JANEIRO HOUSING POLICY EVOLUTION OVERVIEW......................................................... 51
TABLE 4 FORUMS THAT FACILITATED THE IMMERSION IN THE CASE.......................................................... 76
TABLE 5 SPECIFIC CASES .............................................................................................................................. 76
TABLE 6 MAIN ONLINE SOURCES .................................................................................................................. 81
TABLE 7 MUTIRÃO LINES OF WORK IN 1989 ............................................................................................... 102
TABLE 8 PROGRAMMES OF RIO DE JANEIRO'S HOUSING POLICY BASIS .............................................. 112
TABLE 9 OVERVIEW OF SLUM UPGRADING OPERATING REGULATIONS ................................................... 128
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANT  Actor-Network-Theory
BID  Inter-American Development Bank (Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento)
CAIXA  Federal Saving Bank (Caixa Econômica Federal)
CEDAE  State Water and Sewage Company (Companhia Estadual de Águas e Esgotos)
CGFNHIS  Managing Council - National National Social Housing Fund (Conselho Gestor do Fundo Nacional de Habitação de Interesse Social)
CGFLHIS  Managing Council - Local Social Housing Fund (Conselho Gestor do Fundo Local de Habitação de Interesse Social)
CMN  National Monetary Council (Conselho Monetário Nacional)
CMRJ  Municipal Chamber of Rio de Janeiro (Câmara Municipal do Rio de Janeiro)
COHAB  Housing Company (Companhia de Habitação)
CREA-RJ  Engineering and Agronomy Regional Council of Rio de Janeiro (Conselho Regional de Engenharia e Agronomia do Rio de Janeiro)
DCMRJ  Municipal Chamber Official Diary (Diário da Câmara Municipal do Rio de Janeiro)
DORJ  Municipal Government Official Diary (Diário Oficial do Município do Rio de Janeiro)
EMOP  State Public Works Company (Empresa de Obras Públicas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)
FAFERJ  Federation of Favelas' Associations of the state of Rio de Janeiro (Federação das Associações de Moradores de Favelas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)
FAMRIO  Federation of Residents' Association of Rio de Janeiro (Federação das Associações de Moradores do Rio de Janeiro)
FGTS  Guaranteed saving fund (Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço)
FLHIS  Local Social Housing Fund (Fundo Local de Habitação de Interesse Social)
FNHIS  National Social Housing Fund (Fundo Nacional de Habitação de Interesse Social)
GEAP  Executive Group of Special Programmes for Popular Settlements (Grupo Executivo de Programas Especiais para Assentamentos Populares)
Geo-Rio  Foundation Institute of Geotechnical (Fundação Instituto de Geotécnica do Rio de Janeiro)
IAB-RJ  Brazilian Institute of Architects in Rio de Janeiro (Instituto de Arquitetos do Brasil – Departamento Rio de Janeiro)
IPLANRIO  See IPP
IPP  Municipal Insitute of Urbanisme (Instituto Municipal de Urbanismo Pereira Passos
MCMV  My Home My Life Programme (Minha Casa Minha Vida)
MNRU  National Movement of Urban reform (Movimento Nacional pela Reforma Urbana)
PAC  Growth Acceleration Programme (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Residential Lease Programme (Programa de Arrendamento Residencial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCRJ</td>
<td>Municipal Government (Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFL</td>
<td>Liberal Front Party (Partido da Frente Liberal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGM</td>
<td>Municipal Attorney General Office (Procuradoria Geral do Município)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PlanHab</td>
<td>National Housing Plan (Plano Nacional de Habitação)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLHIS</td>
<td>Local Social Housing Plan (Plano Local de Habitação de Interesse Social)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNH</td>
<td>National Housing Policy (Política Nacional de Habitação)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POUSO</td>
<td>Urban and Social Orientation Office (Posto de Orientação Urbanística e Social)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>Political Sociology of Public Policy Instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROAP-RIO</td>
<td>Urbanization Programme of Popular Settlements (Programa de Urbanização de Assentamentos Populares no Município do Rio de Janeiro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio-Aguas</td>
<td>Municipal Foundation Institute of Rainwater (Fundação Instituto das Águas do Município do Rio de Janeiro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RioLuz</td>
<td>Municipal Company of Public Lightning and Energy (Companhia Municipal de Energia e Iluminação)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RioUrbe</td>
<td>Municipal Company of Urbanism (Empresa Municipal de Urbanização)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBPE</td>
<td>Brazilian Loan and Saving System (Sistema Brasileiro de Poupança e Empréstimo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEOB</td>
<td>State Public Works Secretariat (Secretaria de Obras do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFH</td>
<td>Housing Financial System (Sistema Financeiro da Habitação)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMAC</td>
<td>Municipal Environment Secretariat (Secretaria Municipal de Meio Ambiente)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Municipal Culture Secretariat (Secretaria Municipal de Cultura)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMDS</td>
<td>Municipal Social Development Secretariat (Secretaria Municipal de Desenvolvimento Social)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Municipal Education Secretariat (Secretaria Municipal de Meio Ambiente)</td>
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<td>SMEL</td>
<td>Municipal Sport and Leisure Secretariat (Secretaria Municipal de Esportes e Lazer)</td>
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<td>SMF</td>
<td>Municipal Treasury Secretariat (Secretaria Municipal de Fazenda)</td>
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<td>SMH</td>
<td>Municipal Housing Secretariat (Secretaria Municipal de Habitação)</td>
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<td>SMO</td>
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<td>SMTE</td>
<td>Municipal Labor and Employment Secretariat (Secretaria Municipal de Trabalho e Emprego)</td>
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<td>Municipal Planning Secretariat (Secretaria Municipal de Urbanismo)</td>
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<td>SNH</td>
<td>National Housing Secretariat (Secretaria Nacional de Habitação)</td>
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<td>SNHIS</td>
<td>National Social Housing System (Sistema Nacional de Habitação de Interesse Social)</td>
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<td>SNM</td>
<td>National Market System (Sistema Nacional de Mercado)</td>
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<td>TCMRJ</td>
<td>Municipal Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Contas do Município do Rio de Janeiro)</td>
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<td>UPA</td>
<td>Health Emergency Units (Unidade de Pronto Atendimento)</td>
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<td>UPP</td>
<td>Pacifying Police Units (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora)</td>
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INTRODUCTION

'We just follow the players. They all agree, in the end, about the death of Aramis. They blame each other, of course, but they speak with one voice: the approximate cause of death is of no interest—it's just a final blow, a last straw, a ripe fruit, a mere consequence. As M. Girard said so magnificently, 'It was built right into the nature of things.' There's no point in deciding who finally killed Aramis. It was a collective assassination. An abandonment, rather. It's useless to get bogged down concentrating on the final phase. What we have to do is see who built those 'things' in, and into what 'natures'. We're going to have to go back to the beginning of the project to the remote causes' (Latour 1996a: 10).

In Rio de Janeiro the slum upgrading has been used as an important housing policy instrument since the 1990s. The existing literature on the topic has followed two main streams: one being the evaluative analyses that represent the bulk of the literature and focus on Rio's housing policy and slum upgrading efficiency and effectiveness, the other, the studies that focus on the explanation of policy functioning, adopting sociological approaches. This second stream includes two main types of analysis perspectives: studies that focus on how hidden processes or actors' interests influenced the municipal housing policy and the slum upgrading instrument; and studies that focus on how primarily conceptual, political, institutional social variables informed Rio's housing policy and its instrument's development.

Both streams have contributed greatly to grasp different aspects related to Rio's housing policy and slum upgrading instrument. However, the existing literature has under examined the evolution of housing policy and governance, and neglected the slum upgrading instrument's role in these processes. This lack of attention is significant because policy 'instruments' generate specific effects that contribute to shape policies and governance dynamics. Thus, the analysis of slum upgrading 'instrumentation', i.e. the problems that its choice and use produced, is necessary to better understand Rio's housing policy and governance transformation. Aiming to address these gaps, the thesis examines the role of the slum upgrading in the evolution of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance from 1993 to 2012.
INTRODUCTION

FROM HOUSING CONSTRUCTION TO SLUM UPGRADING AS POLICY APPROACH

The evolution of housing policies entails a shift from housing construction to slum upgrading in the past decades. During the 1950s and 1960s housing policies in the Global South were inspired by housing programmes in West Europe in the post-war period and involved the construction of large scale housing estates (Fiori et al. 2000). Informed by theories of modernisation these policies were underpinned by idea that housing construction would be affordable and an effective way to eradicate the unsanitary conditions and disorder of informal settlements (ibid). However, these policies did not meet the objectives and were criticized as among other issues they were located in distant areas with poor public services and were constructed with bad quality of materials (ibid).

In this context, slum upgrading emerged at the end of the 1960s. Its development was linked to new ways of understanding the informal sector and informed by self-organization and self-production discourses and progressive development perspectives (Fiori & Brandao 2010). In the 1970s, housing policies involving slum upgrading focused mainly on basic sanitation and infrastructure, overlooking the improvement of spatial qualities and neglecting the relation of informal settlements with its surrounding and with the city as a (ibid).

During the 1980s, slum upgrading as the housing policy instrument continued to be used, yet in a more limited way as public policies shifted from project to sector level (Fiori & Brandao 2010). The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund during the 1980s supported stabilization and structural adjustment programmes. Under the influence of such programmes housing policies focused on how to enable housing markets, restructure housing finance systems, and support the housing sector as a whole (Fiori et al. 2000). Thus, housing policies prioritized and mobilized other policy instruments, leaving the slum upgrading in the backdrop.

At the beginning of the 1990s, a new understanding emerged about the multiple and heterogeneous nature of poverty fostered by the poor results of neo-liberal poverty and social exclusion policies. Under this new understanding housing policies and slum upgrading made a return in force as they were seen to be key for poverty alleviation. The slum upgrading came back as a widely used housing policy instrument and included major
changes in relations to the previous period because this time it focused on multisectoriality and project's political and spatial relationships at different scales (Fiori & Brandao 2010).

THE CASE OF RIO DE JANEIRO

In Brazil the shift from construction of housing units to slum upgrading as housing policy response was consolidated in several municipalities during the 1990s. In particular, in Rio de Janeiro, there emerged an ambitious housing policy that included this instrumental change. The slum upgrading instrument developed mainly through the Favela-Bairro programme became key in the housing policy in the 1990s. During the first decade of the 2000s Rio's housing policy faded and the slum upgrading instrument was abandoned. Since 2007 Rio de Janeiro's housing policy gained strength and the slum upgrading instrument was revived mainly through the development of the Morar Carioca Plan.

The thesis focuses on Rio de Janeiro for two main reasons. Firstly, it includes all the housing policy and governance changes that have occurred in Brazil since the 1990s and during the first decade of the 2000s. Thus, its analysis allows the exploration of the different phases of the Brazilian case. Secondly, it involves both a development and collapse period which allows the analysis of the dynamics of consolidation and erosion of a housing policy. The thesis acknowledges that Rio de Janeiro's housing policy does not represent all Brazilian municipality experiences and cannot be generalized at national level because other municipalities used other policy instruments, and relate to specific socio-economic and politico-administrative landscapes. However, the investigation of Rio's housing policy contributes to reflect on other municipal experiences and consider other cases across the globe that have mobilized slum upgrading as a public policy instrument.

Under Knoepfel et al. (2001)'s classification of public policy analysis, research in Rio de Janeiro's housing policy has followed two main streams over the past two decades. The first one relates to evaluative analyses and represents the bulk of the existing literature. These studies aimed primarily to assess Rio's housing policy efficiency and effectiveness (IBAM 1996; Cardoso 2002; Pamuk & Cavallieri 1998; Brakarz et al. 2002; Aduan & Brakarz 2004; TCMRJ 2005; Soares & Soares 2005; TCMRJ 2006; BID 2007; Abiko et al. 2007; Rojas 2009; Abramo 1998). The second stream relates to studies that seek to explain policy functioning using sociological approaches. This second stream includes two main types of studies: studies whose main objective is to unveil hidden processes or interests
(Bahia 2000; Broudehoux 2001; Randolph 2004; Silva 2006; Simpson 2013) and studies such as Fiori et al. (2000) and Burgos (2003) that focused on how the case of Rio de Janeiro fits into the wider context of housing policies' evolution and change.

The existing literature has made important contributions to the understanding of Rio de Janeiro's experience and enriched debates about housing policies in Latin America and elsewhere; however, it presents two major gaps. Firstly, the slum upgrading instrument's role for housing governance and policy development has been under explored or overlooked. The existing studies have analysed the slum upgrading instrument under a functionalistic perspective. The first stream has analysed it in terms of its effectiveness or efficiency while the second stream has studied it as an instrument at the service of the Carioca élite or political group, or neglected it as a variable for explaining housing policy and governance changes. However, the Political Sociology of Public Policy Instruments (PPI) approach argues that 'policy instruments' are not neutral nor available for ready use (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004). Instead, it understands that policy instruments must be constituted; they create specific effects, influencing policies (ibid). Subsequently, the PPI approach points out that the analysis of 'policy instrumentation', i.e. the problems related to the choice and use of instruments, is key for public policy as it has social and political repercussions. Thus, the overlooking of the slum upgrading instrument's role in Rio's housing policy evolution is significant because its examination is needed to develop existing understanding about the dynamics that generate policy change.

Secondly, the existing literature has under explored the governance of Rio's housing policy i.e. 'the interactions between the State and the society and to the modes of coordination to make possible the action of the State' (Le Galès 1995: 59). The lack of understanding of these interactions and modes of coordination represents an important gap as the assumption that 'governments govern' became more difficult to sustain (ibid). According to Le Galès (1995) the complexity of modern societies has increased, fostering their fragmentation and making more complicated their government. Thus, the exploration of the governance of housing policies can contribute to the understanding of how large cities such as Rio de Janeiro are governed.

1 The term 'carioca' designates the native inhabitants of the city of Rio de Janeiro.
In addition, the existing literature has under explored or excluded the following elements:

- The analysis of the first decade of the 2000s remains insufficiently investigated. The analysis of this period is needed for understanding the dynamics of 'failure' of Rio de Janeiro’s ambitious policy.

- An analysis of Rio's experience covering the period 1990s-2010s at municipal level does not currently exist. The analysis of Rio's case covering this long period is essential to grasp the instrument's long term effects and policy and governance changes on a city scale.

- New data sources are available thanks to the emergence and consolidation of the digital and 'big data' era. Their use represents a unique opportunity for reconsidering the existing understanding of Rio de Janeiro's case.

**RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND METHODS**

Aiming to address these gaps the thesis examines the slum upgrading role for Rio de Janeiro’s housing policy and governance transformations. In particular, it analyses the dynamics and outcomes produced by the slum upgrading 'instrumentation' over the past two decades. The thesis is guided by the following question: how did the slum upgrading influence Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance development from 1993 to 2012?

The research considers three hypotheses in relation of Rio's slum upgrading instrumentation:

1. It contributed to the (re)shape Rio's housing policy evolution.
2. It fostered the transformation of the governance of Rio's housing policy.
3. It contributed to Rio's housing policy depoliticization understood as the weakening of firm political control.

To explore Rio's slum upgrading 'instrumentation', the thesis mobilizes Actor-Network-Theory (ANT). This perspective conceptualizes 'the social' as an heterogeneous network of entities (human and non-human entities) named 'actants' (Latour 2005). ANT understands that 'actants' are open-ended entities brought into existence through an association mechanism conceptualized as 'translation' that includes the following moments: 'problematization', 'interessement', 'enrolment', and 'mobilization' (or 'dissidence') (Callon 1986). Accordingly, ANT considers reality as an emerging process produced by actants'

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2 The thesis understands the term 'hypothesis' as a 'programme of negotiations' (Callon 1986) and an integral part of the 'problematization moment' of this research: "the initial problematization defined a series of negotiable hypotheses on identity, relationships and goals of the different actors" (ibid: 15) that are "subsequently, weakened, confirmed or transformed" (ibid: 25).
translation and agency as produced through this mechanism. Based on this perspective the thesis examined the slum upgrading instrument as an 'actant', existing through the constitution of a network of human and non-human entities. Subsequently, it focused on the unfolding of slum upgrading network of associations through 'detective work' (Austrin & Farnsworth 2005), using primary municipal archives, policy documents and semi-structured interviews. This investigation that extended over 16 months, out of which 7 in Rio de Janeiro and 9 in London, resulted in the production of a chronological 'thick description' which reveals its role in the transformation of Rio's housing policy and governance.

ANT is relevant for this research for three main reasons. Firstly, it is in line with the understanding that the slum upgrading instrument played a role in the development of Rio's housing policy and governance. Secondly, ANT focuses on the dynamics of association/dissociation of different human and non-human entities, which relates to the analysis of the slum upgrading 'instrumentation' that involves the interaction of heterogeneous entities such as actors and policy instruments. Furthermore, ANT allows the research to focus on how the housing policy and governance got built through the interaction of human and non-human entities, including the slum upgrading instrument itself (also constituted by heterogeneous entities) and what outcome these dynamics produced. Lastly, ANT strongly relates to this research as the hypotheses call into question the role of political figures or moments, suggesting that the slum upgrading 'instrumentation' played an important role in the policy process.

The mobilization of both, ANT and the PPI approach, for analysing Rio's housing policy can be related to the 'methodological articulation' made by some 'urban assemblages' studies between ANT and urban political economy (Brenner et al. 2011). This type of studies 'retains the central concerns, concepts and analytical orientations of political economy within a methodologically expanded framework' (ibid: 232). This research retains the PPI approach concerns, in particular policy 'instrumentation' and the issues of policy development/change, power relations (specifically how actor became powerful or weak over time) and processes of depoliticization. It also expands the methodological framework.

3 'Urban Assemblages' literature focuses on the use of ANT for urban research such as Farías & Bender (2009)
by considering and analysing Rio's housing policy and the slum upgrading instrument as 'actor-networks', i.e. a collective of human and non-human entities.

In addition, the use of ANT and the PPI approach relates to Walsham (1997: 478) understanding that 'there is not, and never will be, a best theory. Theory is our chronically inadequate attempt to come to terms with the infinite complexity of the real world. Our quest should be for improved theory, not best theory, and for theory that is relevant to the issues of our time'. The thesis understands that rather than being the best approaches to explain Rio's case, the PPI approach and ANT enable to reveal dynamics and processes which expands and improve the existing knowledge on housing policy and governance transformation.

**Thesis Structure**

The thesis is structured as follows. CHAPTER 1 and CHAPTER 2 are complementary literature reviews that involve the analytical perspective and the problematization of the case of Rio respectively. CHAPTER 1 presents the PPI approach which is the theoretical frame that underpins this research hypotheses and is divided into three parts. The first part explores the specificity of a political sociology perspective. The second part presents in detail the PPI approach which includes two core concepts: policy 'instruments' and 'instrumentation'. The third part discusses the use of the PPI approach for analysing Rio de Janeiro's housing policy, its major critics and the gap in relation to an explicit method for undertaking this type of analysis.

CHAPTER 2 calls into question the case of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy, mobilizing the PPI approach. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first two parts examine the evolution of housing policies at national level in order to localize Rio de Janeiro's case. The last part presents Rio's housing experience, examines how this case has been analysed, arguing the existence of three majors gaps, and presents the research question, hypotheses.

CHAPTER 3 presents and discusses the method used in this research. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores ANT which informed the research methods. The second part details the understanding of the slum upgrading as an 'actant', presents the 'detective work' as general method and explains Rio de Janeiro investigation's first steps. The third part explains the investigation's further steps: the data collection, pointing out the limitations of interviews and written documents and how they were
overcome; the data analysis which entailed a micro processing of facts in order to establish slum upgrading instrumentation sequence of events that allowed the instrument's associations to unfold; the data organization which involved the creation and use of different tools; and the production and specificity of the empirical chapters that formed the chronological 'thick description' of the slum upgrading instrument which reveals its role in the transformation of Rio's housing governance and policy.

CHAPTER 4 introduces in detail the case of Rio de Janeiro in order to grasp the framing conditions of the choice and use of the slum upgrading from 1993 to 2012. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part reviews the emergence of housing initiatives at the time when Rio de Janeiro was still a federal district, showing it swinging between favelas' urbanization and housing construction (1900s-1950s). The second part explores the housing experience when Rio de Janeiro became the city state of Guanabara and the dominant approach supported by the military regime was the razing of favelas and housing construction (1960s-1975). Finally, the last part focuses on Rio de Janeiro's housing initiatives after it became a municipality in 1975, highlighting the consolidation of knowledge, know-how and institutional capacity at the municipal level in relation to favelas' urbanization by the end of the 1980s.

CHAPTER 5, CHAPTER 6 and CHAPTER 7 constitute the chronological 'thick description' of the choice and use of the slum upgrading instrument. CHAPTER 5 explores slum upgrading emergence and development as Rio de Janeiro's housing policy instrument during the 1990s. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part examines the constitution of the instrument, highlighting the existence of cognitive and normative frames that supported its emergence as main housing policy instruments (1993-1994). The second concentrates on its development from about 1995 to 1997, stressing its role in the development and evolution of the policy and governance. The last part explores slum upgrading further development from about 1998 to 1999.

CHAPTER 6 explores the use of slum upgrading from 2000 to 2007. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores the politico-administrative change at the beginning of the 2000s and its effects on the instrument’s implementation. The second part examines the further weakening of the slum upgrading during Maia's second administration.
INTRODUCTION


CHAPTER 7 explores the use of the slum upgrading instrument from 2007 to 2012. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores how the slum upgrading instrument re-emerged in 2007. The second part analyses its redevelopment during the first half of the Paes administration (2009-2010) while the third part explores the use of the slum upgrading instrument during the second half (2010-2011).

The Conclusions section is divided into four parts. The first part reviews the learning from the investigation showing how it supports the research hypotheses. The second part considers the implications of the investigation for the understanding of housing development and housing governance, and reflects on the use of the PPI approach and ANT. The third part considers the limitations of the investigation while the fourth part proposes the future research agenda.
CHAPTER 1  ANALYSING PUBLIC POLICY BY ITS INSTRUMENTS

"Public policy instruments are not inert, simply available to socio-political mobilizations. They have their own force of action: as they are used, they tend to produce original and sometimes unexpected effects" (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 10).

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The chapter aim is to present the theoretical frame that underpins this research hypotheses. It reviews the theoretical roots and linkages of the Political Sociology of Public Policy Instrument (PPI) approach, and explores how this perspective understands 'policy instruments' and 'instrumentation'. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores the specificity of a political sociology perspective. The second part presents in detail the PPI approach which includes two core concepts: 'policy instruments' and 'instrumentation'. The third part discusses the use of the PPI approach for analysing Rio de Janeiro's housing policy, its major critics and the gap in relation to an explicit method for undertaking this type of analysis.
1.2 ADOPTING A POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY PERSPECTIVE

1.2.1 Policy analysis discipline

Emergence and development

The political sociology perspective proposed by Lascoumes & Le Galès (2004; 2007a) relates to the development of the policy analysis that emerged in the USA during the 1930s and has been recognized as a relatively autonomous discipline (Boussaguet et al. 2004). The development of policy analysis was influenced by Max Weber and his work on bureaucracy (Muller 2008). Policy analysis was also influenced by the emergence of the theory of organizations that emerged in the 1920s and mobilized concepts such as 'actor', 'strategy' and 'power' to analyse small groups, then large organizations (ibid). Lastly, the development of policy analysis was informed by the development of public management which sought to improve public performance at a minimal cost (ibid).

The most influential studies for the consolidation of policy analysis as a discipline were Lasswell's (1936) and Lasswell & Lerner's (1951) (Muller 2008). Overall, these works sought to improve public policy efficiency and effectiveness by mobilizing the social sciences (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007b). During the 1960s and 1970s, the interest in policy analysis increased as the economic and political crises in industrialized countries undermined the ideas of State's efficiency and the welfare model that legitimized public policies (Draelants & Maroy 2007).

Major contributions

The development of policy analysis made significant contributions to the understanding of State and public policies. Firstly, policy analysis showed that political representation was only one of many elements accounting for policy processes and policy change (Muller 2000). In addition, policy analysis contributed to understand the State in connection with its capacity to solving problems rather than its capacity to imposing a political order (ibid). This shift was crucial as it challenged the idea of an omniscient and omnipresent State and called into question the rationality of public policies (ibid). In relation to the latter, policy analysis contributed to decision-making being considered as 'an imperceptible process during which actors of a distinct nature (politicians, civil servants, interest groups), participate in a kind of
progressive decantation of choices (who are never given in advance), mobilizing in a not very coherent way, information and extremely heterogeneous data' (ibid: 191).

Furthermore, policy analysis studies showed that policy implementation could not be simply deduced from the decision-making process because it could create unexpected outputs and change the policy content (Muller 2000). However, the most important shift was the development of an analysis toolkit that included concepts such as 'actors', 'power' and 'strategies' borrowed from the sociology of organizations (ibid). By mobilizing them, policy analysis contributed to the development of a sociological perspective that study the State through the analysis of its interventions (public policies), considering State and society synergies (Muller & Surel 1998).

1.2.2 Towards a political sociology perspective

Policy analysis streams

The different works related to policy analysis can be classified into three major streams even though they are not completely isolated from each other (Knoepfel et al. 2001). The first stream involves 'evaluative analyses' which seek to assess rather than explain policy outputs and their influence on society. Knoepfel et al. highlighted that such analyses tend to focus on the development of a method and toolkit for policy evaluation, and the study of the evaluation process in order to improve it.

The second stream includes analyses centred in the theories of the State (Knoepfel et al. 2001). These studies conceptualize public policies as indicators of the nature of the State. Developed by political science, they combine public policy together with the theory of the
State and political philosophy, seeking to shed light on the role of the State and its evolution.

The third stream includes studies that focus on the 'explanation of policy functioning' and relates to sociological approaches (Knoepfel et al. 2001). These analyses understand the State as a complex and heterogeneous politico-administrative system, and have a scientific or professional purpose (analysis of the policy or for the policy). This stream can be broken down into four main approaches: interests (actors’ interests and decision-making processes); institutions (institutional forms, proceeding and structures); ideas (role of ideas and representations); and instruments (laws, regulations, economic incentives, etc.).

Emergence of a political sociology perspective

Lascoumes & Le Galès (2007b) observed that a tension between the last two streams has been at the core of the policy analysis discipline since its inception. On the one hand the political science stream 'gives a pre-eminent role to the State, the rulers in the organization and government of society' (ibid: 14). On the other the sociological stream gives an important role to 'actors' interactions, exchanges, coordination mechanism, group formation, norms, and conflicts' (ibid: 15). These top-down and bottom-up reasoning respectively generate a crucial question about public policies: 'Are they determined by robust institutions consolidated over time, pursuing their own logic? Or by autonomous social systems that progressively define their own rules for action?' (ibid).

The re-structuring of the contemporary State moved the political science stream towards a 'political sociology perspective' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007b). This perspective considers at the same time the actors and their interactions, the polity dimension, and the re-structuring of State (ibid). Thus, the political sociology of public policy instruments (PPI) approach includes exploring public policy through the analysis of instruments while considering at the same time 'the transformation of the State, the modes of domination and the government' (Lascoumes & Le Gales 2004: 366).

The following part explores the PPI approach’s theoretical roots and core concepts.

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4 This stream can be broken down into three models: (i) pluralism, (ii) neo-Marxism and neo-managerial and (iii) neo-institutionalism and neo-corporatism. For more details see Mény & Thoenig (1989).
1.3  PPI as analytical entry

1.3.1 The PPI approach and its theoretical linkages

Instruments as institutions

The political sociology perspective of policy instruments (PPI) emerged as a response to various gaps in the existing literature (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004, 2007a). Firstly, policy instruments have been understudied because even if the technologies of government have been analysed by the sociology of the State, they have remained at the background of the analyses. Secondly, when considered, analyses have followed a functionalistic perspective as they understand the choice and use of policy instruments as purely technical choices. Finally, analyses have understood instruments as minor issues in comparison to the traditional policy analysis variables (ideas, interests and institutions): 'Public policy instrumentation and its choice of tools and modes of operation are generally treated either as a kind of evidence, as a purely superficial dimension..., or as if the questions it raises... are secondary issues, merely part of a rationality of methods without any autonomous meaning' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 2).

By contrast, the PPI approach argues that 'instruments at work are not neutral devices: they produce specific effects, independently of the objectives pursued (the aims ascribed to them), which structure public policy according to their own logic' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 3). Therefore, the PPI approach considers public policies as 'a socio-political space constructed as much through techniques and instruments as through aims or content' (ibid: 4). By doing so, the PPI challenges the idea that public policies are just the result of actors' interests or institutional contexts. In addition, the PPI approach argues that a 'policy instrument' constitutes a condensed form of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it' (ibid: 3). Based on this understanding the PPI approach seeks to reveal 'power relations associated to instruments and issues of legitimacy, politicization, or depoliticization dynamics associated with different policy instruments' (ibid: 4).

The PPI approach proposes to conceptualize policy instruments as institutions which are understood from a sociological perspective as 'a more or less coordinated set of rules and procedures that governs the interactions and behaviours of actors and organizations' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007: 8). This understanding suggests that 'they may need to be brought into existence, constructed

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5 According to (Hood 2007) by understanding instruments as institutions in a sociological sense the PPI approach relates to a new shift of the 'Institutions as instruments' perspective which is one of
or composed rather than readily available objects' (Kassim & Le Galès 2010: 4). To support the conceptualization of instruments as institutions, the PPI approach points out that policy instruments generate uncertainty about power relations, influence actors’ behaviour and shape actors’ capacity for action (limit or facilitate actors' initiatives), and convey a specific representation of the issue at stake (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004, 2007a). Furthermore, the PPI approach highlights that instruments can be considered as institutions because they determine when, how and who questions, and contribute to the stabilization of collective action (ibid).

*Theoretical roots and linkages to other works*

The PPI approach is grounded in the sociology of science and the history of techniques (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004, 2007a). Lascoumes & Le Galès observed that these disciplines have showed that the success of a technical innovation was related to the alliances and associations that supported them rather than the specific characteristics of the object (Simondon 1952; Hacking 1987). In particular, Lascoumes & Le Galès (2004, 2007a) noted that Simondon understood innovation to be a disordered process that emerges through the combination of divergent elements in synergy. According to them Akrich, Callon and Latour (Akrich et al. 1988a, 1988b) further developed this idea 'by rejecting the retrospective view that suppresses moments of uncertainty and sees creation only as a series of inevitable stages moving from the abstract to the concrete, from the idea to its concretization. Translation of and through technical instruments is a constant process of relating information and actors, and regularly reinterpreting the system thus created' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 7).

The PPI approach relates to analyses of the State and public policies developed by Max Weber and Michel Foucault. Lascoumes & Le Galès (2004) highlighted that Weber's work on bureaucracy allowed to consider government technologies independently and they suggested that Weber was the first to question instruments' role when he conceptualized them as domination techniques. As for Michel Foucault, Lascoumes & Le Galès (ibid) pointed out that he proposed to analyse the State through the study of 'governmentality' which entailed 'on the one side rational forms, technical procedures, instrumentation through which it operates, and on the other, strategic issues that make unstable and reversible the power relations that they

the three main perspectives that instrument-centred analyses have taken in the last 30 years. For a comprehensive understanding of these perspectives see Hood (2007; 2008).
must secure' (Foucault cited by Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004: 17). This understanding relates to Foucault’s conceptualization of power. He conceptualized power in a productive mode, moving away from the idea that power was located within the State and perspectives that associated it to an ideology or repressive instance (Lascoumes 2004). Foucault’s analysis also related to the development of an anti-essentialist approach of the State: 'Foucault refuses to assign to the State a unity, an individuality and an absolute functionality, he sees in it less a cause than an effect, less an autonomous actor that an aggregate of results' (ibid: 3).

Foucault’s notion of governmentality considered the shift of political rationality as consolidated in the 18th century (Lascoumes 2004). This change was fostered by the development of specific government techniques and systems of knowledge that changed the exertion of power: 'It is no longer to conquer and possess, but to produce, generate, organize the people to enable them to develop their potentials' (ibid:4). Foucault consolidated this understanding by analysing the cameral sciences which involved the differentiation of politics from police (politic from polizei) (ibid). He identified that Police had a goal rationality that included the 'interdependence between productivity of society and the State power'; and a means rationality that involved 'the construction of the collective through concrete practices in security, economy, culture, that are essential State missions' (ibid: 5). From this understanding, Foucault considered that the key question was the 'Statisation' of society understood as the 'development of a set of specific devices, practices through which the power is materially exerted' (ibid).

As Lascoumes (2004) indicated the role of government technologies in Foucault’s analysis was clarified in the 1980s. Foucault (1984) identified three different levels in his analysis of power: strategic relations, government techniques and states of domination. He pointed out that it was necessary to differentiate the strategic relations that seek to shape actors’ behaviours and the states of domination that related to what people call power. He added that in between these two are located the technologies of government and their analysis is necessary because 'it is often through such techniques that the states of domination are established and maintained' (ibid). This led Lascoumes (2004) to highlight that the analysis of 'policy instrumentation' contributes to the understanding of how public policies structure state-society and society-society relationships.
1.3.2 The PPI approach: core concepts

**Policy instruments**

The PPI approach involves two core concepts: Public Policy Instrument and Public Policy Instrumentation. Public policy instrument is defined as 'a device that is both technical and social, that organizes specific social relations between the State and those it is addressed to, according to the representations and meanings it carries. It is a particular type of institution, a technical device with the generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept of the politics/society relationship and sustained by a concept of regulation' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 4). This definition has several implications. Firstly, the definition suggests that instruments are aggregates that include technical and social entities. Secondly, the definition implies that they influence policy 'according to their own logic' as they are considered to be 'bearers of values, fuelled by one interpretation of the social and by precise notions of the mode of regulation envisaged' (ibid). Thus, they are not neutral devices and produce outcomes which can be different from the stated goals. In addition, the definition includes the conjecture that instruments as institutions influence actors' behaviours by opening (or closing) windows of opportunities, suggesting that 'policies determine politics' (Kassim & Le Galès 2010: 4). Lastly, by acknowledging that instruments structure policies, this conceptualization enables an analysis of public policies that involves an exploration through its instruments, rather than an analysis through its substance (ibid).

**Policy instrumentation**

The second core concept is Public Policy Instrumentation that is defined as 'the set of problems posed by the choice and use of instruments (techniques, methods of operation, devices) that allow government policy to be made material and operational' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004: 12). This definition considers policy instrumentation to be the process through which instruments are chosen and used, highlighting policy instrumentation as 'a means of orienting relationship between political society (via the administration) and civil society (via its administered), through intermediaries in the form of devices that combine technical (measuring, calculating, the rule of law, procedures) and social components (representation, symbols)' (Kassim & Le Galès 2010: 5). Furthermore, policy instrumentation enables to explore the concept of 'power' because the choice and use of policy instruments 'carry implications for social and political interactions and have effects independent of the intended goal' (ibid: 5). As a result, the PPI approach proposes classification based on the type of political relation and legitimacy that the instruments presuppose (Table 1).
The first type relates to 'Legislative and Regulatory instruments' which have been the traditional instruments used by the State. Lascoumes & Le Galès (2004, 2007a) observed that this type of instruments articulates symbolic, axiological and pragmatic functions. The second type of instruments are 'Economic and Fiscal instruments'. These instruments are perceived in terms of their economic and social efficiency. According to Lascoumes & Le Galès, the three other types known as the new public policy instruments involve less interventionist forms of regulation and have facilitated the renewal of State legitimacy by fostering political relations through communication and consultation.

The first type of the new public policy instruments is 'Agreement-based and incentive-based instruments'. Lascoumes & Le Galès pointed out that these instruments emerged as a response to the various critics around bureaucracy and legislative/regulatory instruments. The second type includes 'Communication-based and information-based instruments'. These instruments relates to the development of what has been called as 'democracy of opinion' which has made the right to information an obligation for the State. The last type is 'De jure et de facto standards and best practices instruments'. Lascoumes & Le Galès stressed that these instruments organize specific power relations as their legitimacy is based on both, scientific/technical and democratic rationalities, neutralizing political debates around them. These instruments usually impose objectives, competition mechanisms and robust constraints.

The PPI approach highlighted that instruments can generate three major effects (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004, 2007b). Firstly, policy instruments can produce 'Inertia effects', 'enabling resistance to outside pressures (such as conflicts of interests between actor-users, or global political changes)' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 10). Thus, policy instruments can be considered as 'obligatory passage points' and are key in the 'problematization phase' 'which allows heterogeneous actors to come together around issues and agree to work on them jointly' (ibid: 10). Public policy instruments also create 'representation effects' as they offer a frame 'for describing the social, a categorization of the situation addressed' (ibid). Lastly, public policy instruments produce 'problematization effects' as they contribute to the organization of variables and production of interpretations. For instance, Lascoumes & Le Galès observed

6 'Obligatory passage point' and 'problematization phase' are concepts of the 'translation' mechanism which is at the core of Actor-Network-Theory. They are presented in CHAPTER 3.
that ‘the calculation of averages and the research for regularity have led to systems of causal interpretation that are always presented as scientifically justified’ (ibid: 34).

Table 1 Instruments classification proposed by Lascoumes & Le Galès. Source: Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004; 2007a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of instrument</th>
<th>Type of Political Relation</th>
<th>Type of Legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative and Regulatory</td>
<td>Social guardian State</td>
<td>Imposition of a general interest by mandates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Fiscal</td>
<td>Wealth producer state and redistributive State</td>
<td>Seeks benefit to the community social and economic efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement-Based and Incentive-Based</td>
<td>Mobilizing State</td>
<td>Seeks direct involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information-Based and Communication-Based</td>
<td>Audience democracy</td>
<td>Explanation of decisions and accountability of actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Facto and De Jure Standards, Best Practices</td>
<td>Adjustment within civil society or competitive mechanisms</td>
<td>Mixed: scientific/technical, democratically negotiated and/or competition, pressure of market mechanisms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A note on policy innovation and change

Lascoumes & Le Galès (2004) stressed that the announcement of instrument innovation usually relates to a political gesture, a search for efficiency, and the introduction of new values. However, they pointed out that innovation is often an illusion because ‘the announced changes rely heavily on sliding, reconversions-adaptations, of instruments recycling that have already been tested and well worn’ (ibid: 359). Furthermore, the creation of 'new' instruments commonly entails the association of two or more existing instruments. Lascoumes & Le Galès suggested that these cases are related to what Hood called meta-instruments that seek to coordinate heterogeneous intervention modes (ibid).

These remarks about instrument innovation, or more precisely instrument adaptation and recycling raise the question of policy change. Lascoumes & Le Galès (2007a) argued that the instrument-centred analysis can contribute to understanding policy change and question 'the "heroic" view of policy changes often put forward by the actors' (ibid: 16). They also pointed out that Hall's work on policy paradigms brought back into the debates the question about
Hall (1993) conceptualized that policy process involved three main variables: general objectives, techniques and methods to attain them, and specific adjustment of instruments (Draelants & Maroy 2007). From this understanding, Hall suggested different orders of policy change. The first and the second order included changes within the techniques and adjustment of instruments, yet they did not involve change in policy aims. The third order of change identified by Hall refers to the change not only regarding techniques and adjustments but also the paradigm (ibid).

Lascoumes & Le Galès observed that Hall's work was further developed by Joubert (1994) who showed that policy change does not only come from paradigm change but also through policy instruments. Furthermore, they reasoned that Palier (2002) illustrated how an instrument-centred analysis could reveal a variety of possible policy changes as his study identified the following combinations: "change of instruments without change of aims, modification of the use or degree of use of existing instrument, change in objectives through change of instruments, or change of instruments that modify objectives and results and so gradually leads to change in objectives" (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 16).

1.4 THE PPI AT THE 'BIRTHPLACE OF SAMBA AND BEAUTIFUL SONGS'

1.4.1 Considering new territories and limitations

Analytical entry rather than a theory

The PPI was developed and so far mobilized for analysing national and supranational public policies in Europe and the USA. A first collection of works using the PPI approach was published in 2004 (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004) and included studies about French policies and some European cases such as the United Kingdom and Italy. A second collection of works was published in a special issue on West European Politics in January 2010 and included analyses on European Union policy instruments (Kassim & Le Galès 2010). The publication of a set of studies was published at the beginning of 2014 (Halpern et al. 2014). The concentration of works in these specific territories led to the consideration of implications in the use of the PPI approach in analysing Brazilian public policies, and in particular Rio de Janeiro's housing policy case.

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7 The exploration of the PPI in this thesis do not includes these works as they were very recently published.
The PPI approach primarily involves a research positioning (angle of research) rather than a theory about public policy in European countries, the European Union or the USA. Based on this, this research considers that the instrument's frame shares the orientation of Foucault's 'governmentality' which involves 'not ideal typification, but an empirical mapping of governmental rationalities and techniques...Government is not assumed to be a by-product or necessary effect of imminent social or economic forces or structures' (Rose et al. 2006: 99). Thus, the use of the PPI approach outside its traditional territories does not demand a re-conceptualization. Furthermore, the use of the PPI approach for analysing Rio de Janeiro's housing policy can enrich the existing literature by revealing the slum upgrading instrumentation outcomes at the municipal housing policy level. In relation to the latter, this research considers that the use of the PPI approach for studying a municipal policy can contribute to the exploration of how this approach can shed light on local governance dynamics that has been understudied in the existing PPI literature as analyses tend to focus on national or European Union policy instruments.

**PPI approach limitations**

There are two major limitations around the instrument's frame. Menon & Sedelmeier (2010) analysed the European Union security policy through the study of two instruments: civilian crisis management and enlargement conditionality. In their work they observed that the PPI assumed that the selection of instruments related to an intentional choice made by policy makers. Menon & Sedelmeir argued that this assumption was problematic 'because it neglects the possibility that the selection of instruments may not be the result of policy-makers’ deliberate choice but rather the consequence of developments that they had not initially intended or anticipated' (ibid: 76). This research agrees with this criticism and acknowledges that the selection of policy instruments might not be the result of an intentional choice. Thus, the analysis called into question policy-makers intentionality.

Secondly, Leca (2009) observed that policy instruments analysis is useful for understanding the political effects of instruments; however, he stressed that policies do not determine politics entirely. Leca noted that policy problems are not the totality of politics, as they include 'pure politics problems that relates to the determination and signification of a collective, within and beyond the identity produced by a public policy mobilization and its effects over its public' (Leca 2009). In that sense, this investigation acknowledges the limitations of the PPI approach in this regard.
1.4.2 PPI methods: some considerations

This work considers that the PPI approach might lead to a techno-deterministic position when analysing policies through instruments. The PPI approach stresses the role of instrument in shaping and reshaping policies. Based on this, the PPI approach challenges the socio-deterministic position which neglects the role of technologies. Nevertheless, it could be possible that the PPI approach leads towards a techno-determinist position supported by the understanding that 'technology develops independently from social context - but directly affects society' (Cordella & Shaikh 2006: 6). This research argues that technologies and humans both shape each other (see CHAPTER 3). This position is shared by the PPI approach as Lascoumes & Le Galès (2007b) relate to a moderated constructivism 'which certainly takes into account the plasticity of interpretations of social issues and the institutions, but considers as well that there are cognitive and normative frameworks that often guide in a decisive way the attributable meanings and possible actions' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007b: 112). Therefore, a crucial methodological question is how to avoid falling into these techno-determinist or socio-determinist positions?

In addition, the PPI approach propose to focus on policy 'instrumentation', yet it does not clearly states methods (an operational framework). The different studies that used the PPI approach do not either elaborate on data collection and data analysis. One major reason for this absence is advanced by Bongrand & Laborier (2005). These authors explored the methods used in policy analysis in the French literature, and concluded that methods are rarely discussed as the focus is primarily on theories. These scholars highlighted as well the lack of innovation in terms of methods in the policy analysis literature. Therefore, the use of the PPI approach demanded the elaboration of an explicit operational frame for investigating Rio de Janeiro's slum upgrading 'instrumentation' (see CHAPTER 3).

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed and presented the PPI approach and explored its theoretical roots in order to show how this approach substantiates the hypotheses of this research. The first part of the chapter explored the roots and aspirations of the political sociology perspective that underpins the PPI approach, stressing that it considers public policies in relation to sociological, political and State transformation dimensions. Thus, the political sociology perspective substantiates the double considerations of this research in Rio de Janeiro's
housing policy: to explore the municipal housing policy process; and to investigate municipal government transformation, governance changes and the process of depoliticization in relation to the housing sector.

The second part of this chapter presented the PPI approach, its theoretical linkages, and detailed its core concepts. From this review, this work retain two main aspects. Firstly, policy instruments are not neutral devices and promptly for use. Instead they produce specific effects according to their own logic and must be constituted. Thus, policy instruments shape policies in spite of the aims ascribed to them. Secondly, policy instrumentation is a central concern in public policy as the choice and use of instruments have social and political repercussion. As a result, the analysis of policy instrumentation can reveal power dynamics and how instruments organize public action according to their own properties. In addition, this investigation retains that the 'instrumentation' analysis can reveal more nuanced understanding about policy change as it allows to consider a variety of possibilities.

The third part discussed the mobilization of the PPI approach outside its traditional territories. It observed that the PPI approach does not relate to a specific European theorization of public policies or policy instruments. Thus, the PPI approach can be mobilized for understanding public policies in other locations such as Brazil, and in particular Rio de Janeiro. In addition, this third part pointed out that the PPI literature does not elaborate an explicit operational frame for investigating policy instrumentation. Moreover, it stressed the risk of moving from a socio-deterministic towards a techno-deterministic approach by mobilizing a PPI frame. Considerations that are addressed in CHAPTER 3.

Using as analytical lens the PPI approach, the next chapter calls into question the case of Rio de Janeiro.
CHAPTER 2  RIO'S CASE AND GAPS IN THE LITERATURE

2.1  INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to call into question the case of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy, mobilizing the Political Sociology of Public Policy Instruments (PPI). The chapter is divided into three parts. The first two parts examines the evolution of housing policies at national level in order to identify the framing conditions from which Rio de Janeiro's housing policy emerged and developed. The first of them examines the decentralization and democratization process and emergence of a diversity of housing policy responses at municipal level. The second part covers the Federal Government comeback in the first decade of the 2000s through new institutional rearrangement, regulations and important investments. The last part explores the case of Rio de Janeiro. Firstly, this part describes the evolution of housing policy in Rio de Janeiro marked by institutional, instrumental, and financial changes. Secondly, it examines how this case has been analysed while observing the existence of three majors gaps and presents the research question, hypotheses.
2.2 REDEFINING MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT ROLE IN THE HOUSING POLICY

2.2.1 The decline of the Federal Government housing interventions

Emergence of the Housing Financial System

Government initiatives around low income housing emerged in Brazil during the 1940s. President Dutra's administration created in 1946 the first national body for financing infrastructure and constructing houses called 'Popular Housing Foundation' (Fundação Casa Popular) (Shidlo 1990). However, this body had little impact in the sector as it had inadequate financial resources, an unsuitable economic landscape (inflationary environment), and an inefficient organizational and managerial structure (ibid). Years later, in 1964, the Brazilian army forces organized a coup d'état against President Goulart, leading to the establishment of the military dictatorship. During this period national housing initiatives became stronger.

The military government, upon its arrival to power, conducted banking system, capital market, and administration reforms that enhanced the administrative and financial capacities of the Federal Government (Melo 1995). Specifically, in relation to the housing sector, the military government established the Housing Financial System (SFH) in 1964. Controlled by the Federal Government through the National Housing Bank (BNH) created the same year, the SFH included two major sub-systems. The first one called Brazilian Savings and Loan System (SBPE) was directed to the middle class and was financed by a voluntary saving system and real estate bonds. The second one aimed at low income groups and was funded by the Severance Pay Fund (FGTS) created in 1966 and financed by a compulsory saving (8% of employees monthly pay was deposited into the FGTS)\(^8\). In addition, public-private companies controlled by the States and the Municipalities called COHABs (Companhias de Habitação) were created as promoting agents for the housing government programmes (Azevedo 1990).

With the creation of the BNH and the development of its activities the housing policy became strongly centralized. The Federal Government through the BNH developed the exclusive capacity to design housing programmes and financing schemes. In addition, the

\(^8\) Since its creation, it was stipulated that the FGTS could be used for severance pay and housing and urban infrastructure programmes.
BNH was the only body entitled to use and distribute the FGTS resources, and had the
discretionary capacity to allocate and commercialize housing units (Arretche & Rodriguez
1999).

Crisis and collapse of the Housing Financial System

The Financial Housing System (SFH) gained strength with the creation of the FGTS as this
fund gave to the BNH important liquid assets. The BNH had controlled US$6 billion by
1973 and over US$16 billion by 1975 (Shidlo 1990). Nevertheless, the SFH faced two
major problems: an escalating rate of default on the mortgage by the borrowers; and an
increasing gap between the debit balance and instalment readjustments (Azevedo 1996). In
trying to stabilize the SFH, from the middle of the 1970s onwards the houses constructed
by the COHABs that used to be directed towards the lowest income group were mostly
directed towards the lower middle income group (ibid).

In the 1980s, the growing economic and fiscal crisis, and the Government's measures to
address it, exacerbated the default on the mortgage by the borrowers (Azevedo 1996). In
addition, the social output of the housing policy was limited. Between 1964 and 1986 the
BNH financed 4.5 million housing units, yet only 1.5 million benefited the lower income
groups (ibid). The BNH from 1975 developed alternative programmes to serve the lowest
income group of the population⁹; however, they only represented 5.9% of the housing
units constructed by the BNH (ibid).

In 1985 the military regime collapsed and democracy was re-established in Brazil. Under
this new period called 'New Republic', President Sarney faced three major housing sector
issues: the housing system had low liquidity, there was a high rate of default of mortgages,
and the housing policy was socially ineffective. Sarney's administration started restructuring
the system; however, in 1986 the Federal Government decided to abolish the BNH (ibid).
The BNH bureaucracy was dispersed and its functions distributed across different federal
bodies. The Federal Saving Bank (CAIXA) retained several BNH functions, including the
administration of the FGTS, and centralized the finances of the housing sector by the
beginning of 1990 (Arretche & Rodriguez 1999). This fragmentation limited federal
housing initiatives. Furthermore, the economic recession at the beginning of the 1980s

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⁹ For a comprehensive overview of the housing alternative programmes developed by the BNH see
Azevedo 1990.
limited federal investments on housing programmes and brutally restricted the use of FGTS for housing financing during that decade (ibid).

**From Collor to Cardoso: Federal Government housing initiatives**

During the 1990s, Federal Government housing initiatives remained limited. The Collor administration from 1990 to 1992 did not realize an in-depth reform of the Housing Financial System (SFH), and the Immediate Action Plan for Housing (PAIH) that was the main federal housing initiative remained uncompleted (Azevedo 2007). Furthermore, the Collor administration authorized investments well beyond the FGTS limits in number and volume, leading to the total cessation of investments through the FGTS from 1992 to 1995, compromising housing investments (Arretche & Rodriguez 1999). After Collor's impeachment, Itamar Franco took over the Federal Government. He pursued previous administration housing initiatives and launched two other housing programmes dissociated from the SFH: Habitar-Brasil and Morar-Municipio (Azevedo 2007). These programmes were expected to involve about US$100,000 in 1993, but this amount was reduced due to the economic stabilization plan (ibid).

Itamar Franco was succeeded by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso who at the beginning of his administration in 1995 announced investments of R$26.5 billion for the housing sector. Institutionally, Cardoso's administration transferred the housing matters to the Urban Policy Secretariat, articulating housing together with urban and sanitation policies (Azevedo 2007). Cardoso promoted as well the role of municipal governments in the housing sector, incentivizing municipalities to promote housing construction and slum upgrading. Among the different housing programmes implemented by the Cardoso administration, the most important were the continuation of Habitar-Brasil and the launch of the Pro-Moradia programme (ibid). Nevertheless, these Federal Government programmes were partially implemented, mainly because of the macro-economic constraints that restricted States' and Municipalities' levels of debt (Bonduki 2008). For instance, between 1996 and 2000 from the R$5.2 billion that were forecasted for implementing Pro-Moradia and Habitar-Brasil programmes, only R$ 1.69 billion were invested (Azevedo 2007).

For more details of the Cardoso administration housing programmes see Azevedo 2007; Bonduki 2008; and Valença & Bonates 2010.
2.2.2 The rise of municipalities as key actors in the housing sector

At the same time Federal Government housing initiatives were limited, Brazilian municipalities started to become key actors of the housing sector thanks not only to the absence of the Federal Government but also to the process of re-democratization of the country and the emergence of new governance arrangements.

*New responsibilities for local governments*

After the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1985, Brazil started the elaboration of a new constitution that was enacted in 1988. In this process the National Movement for Urban Reform (MNRU) elaborated a Constitutional Popular Amendment (Souza 2005). The MNRU proposal recognized ‘the autonomy of municipal governments, the democratic management of cities, the social right to housing, the right to the regularization of consolidated informal settlements, the social function of the urban property, and the need to combat land and property speculation in urban areas’ (Fernandes 2007: 180). The amendment was heavily modified (ibid); nevertheless, the MNRU principles influenced the urban and housing chapters of the new constitution (Fiori et al. 2000).

The new constitution included three key elements concerning the evolution of urban policy (Fernandes 1995). The first element was the transfer of the decision-making of land use and urban space from the federal to the municipal level. In particular, the constitution established that municipalities were responsible for ensuring the ‘full development of the city’s social functions’ (ibid: 62). In the case of cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants, the constitution stipulated the elaboration of a Master Plan aiming to regulate their urban development. The second key element was the recognition of the social function of private property in relation to social justice principles. As a result, the new constitution established that urban property covered social functions when it was in accordance with the basic principles of the Master Plan. The final key element was the inclusion of the right to adverse possession (usuçapião). This right applied in private urban areas of up to 250m² after 5 years of peaceful occupation, which was relevant since it was considered that it concerned half of the favelas across the country (ibid).

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11 For more details about the elaboration of the 1988 Constitution and the Constitutional Popular Amendment functioning see Souza 2005.
Local housing initiatives

As for housing, contrary to the urban development and other sectors such as education and health, the new constitution did not set up a preferential hierarchy for organizing housing policies (Arretche & Rodriguez 1999). The Federal Government became responsible for setting up the guidelines for housing policies. However, municipalities' role remained vague as the three levels of government became equally responsible for promoting housing initiatives. Thus, the different housing-related constitutional articles did not strongly promote a new institutional arrangement for the sector and the responsibilities of each federal entity remained ambiguous (ibid). Nevertheless, the new constitution gave the capacity to municipalities to develop housing programmes.

The new constitution modified as well inter governmental finances, contributing to the increase of funds at municipal level (C. Souza 2001). These changes occurred gradually and were completed in 1993, benefiting municipalities and in particular the states' capitals such as Rio de Janeiro. In addition, the military regime in 1982 allowed direct elections at the regional state level and increased federal transfers to municipal governments so to maintain and reinforce their alliances (Souza 2005). These changes strengthened local governments which started to implement a variety of housing initiatives (Cardoso 2007). These housing initiatives at municipal level were further developed thanks to the democratic opening after 1985. For instance, the use of participatory budgeting as a way to address housing and urban issues was strengthened by the increase of leftist local governments (Souza 2005).

Different public policy instruments

During the 1990s a variety of housing policies were developed across the 5,564 municipalities and some of them aroused interest and gained national and international recognition. Building on the PPI policy instrument's classification (see page 29 and Table 1 page 31), these different municipal housing policies can be divided into three main types

12 Nowadays, there does not exist a comprehensive classification of these experiences. In recent years some studies have addressed this gap (Cardoso 2007; Arretche et al. 2007, 2012). This research proposes a classification based on the PPI approach, contributing to this effort.
legal instrument, the concretization of the principle of social function of private property (Cardoso 2007). This type of policies was developed through legislative and regulatory traditional policy instruments.

The other two types relates to the 'New Public Policy Instruments'. As Lascoumes & Le Galès (2004; 2007a) mentioned these instruments involve less interventionist forms of regulation. The first type of housing policies was democracy-centred housing policies. They were supported by 'agreement-based and incentive-based policy instruments' such as the participatory budgeting in Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre (Lara 2010; C. Souza 2001). The second type was spatial-centred policies such as in Rio de Janeiro (Fiori & Brandao 2010). This last main type used slum upgrading as the main policy instrument which can be related to 'de facto and de jure standards, best practices' policy instruments.

2.3 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COMEBACK

2.3.1 Reorganization of housing sector

_Institutional restructuring_

During the first decade of the 2000s the Federal Government re-emerged as a key actor in the housing sector. In 2003, Lula's administration created the Ministry of Cities. As proposed by the Moradia Project this ministry became responsible for coordinating sanitation, urban planning, transport and housing policies. The National Housing Secretariat (SNH) was mandated to restructure the housing sector institutionally and legally, review the existing housing initiatives, and increase housing sector investments (SNH 2010). One year later, in 2004, the SNH elaborated a National Housing Policy (PNH) which set up the Federal Government housing policy guidelines. The PNH general objectives included the universalization of access to housing, the coordination of housing with urban policies, the strengthening of government role, the focus on lower income groups, and economic stimulation by increasing jobs and income-generation (SNH 2004).

In order to materialize these objectives the SNH created the National Housing System formed by two subsystems: the National Market System (SNM) and the National Social Housing System (SNHIS). The SNM was directed at people earning between 5 to 10 times

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13 The major features of the housing restructuring during Lula's administrations were informed by the Moradia project. For more details see Instituto Cidadania (2000).
of the minimum wages and beyond, and financed by the SBPE (Brazilian Loan and Service System) and stock market funds. The SNHIS was directed to people earning from 0 to 3 and 3 to 5 of the minimum wages, and financed by the FGTS (Guaranteed Saving Fund) and federal budget. The SNHIS planned to focus on housing construction and rehabilitation as well as on precarious settlements urbanization which included urbanization, land regularization and housing construction for relocations.

The SNHIS involved two main instruments (SNH 2004): the National Social Housing Fund (FNHIS) and the National Housing Plan (PlanHab). The creation of the FNHIS sought to centralize all the resources for social housing. This fund was supposed to articulate the different government initiatives and secure social control through the creation of a managing council (CGFNHIS) constituted by government and civil society representatives. The elaboration of PlanHab aimed at developing a national long term housing strategy that should include housing construction and favelas' urbanization. The regional states and municipalities were expected to join the SNHIS by signing an agreement with the Federal Government. This agreement made compulsory the elaboration of state and municipal housing plans (PLHIS) aiming to design local solutions and strategies for addressing housing deficit over a long term, in harmony with PlanHab. In addition, the agreement made compulsory for the states and municipalities the creation of local social housing funds (FLHIS) and local managing councils (CGFLHIS) also constituted by local government and civil society representatives in order to channel Federal Government resources reunited in the FNHIS.

\textbf{National Housing Policy: materialization}

In 2005 the law establishing the SNHIS was enacted, and this in spite of the Mensalão scandal that destabilized Lula's administration' including the Ministry of Cities\textsuperscript{14}. As mentioned, the states and municipalities must create local funds (FLHISs), local funds managing councils (CGFLHISs) and elaborate local housing plans (PLHISs) in order to join the SNHIS. Nevertheless, the idea of mixing federal budgets together with the FGTS was abandoned as the creation of the national fund (FNHIS) was approved as a investment fund only running with federal budget resources (Bonduki 2008).

\textsuperscript{14} The Mensalão scandal related to a corruption scheme that involved key politicians of Lula's administration. In order to reinforce his alliances, Lula demanded Olivio Dutra to step down from the Ministry of Cities, and offered the ministry to a conservative party (Azevedo 2007).
From 2003 to 2005 federal housing initiatives directed towards low income groups remained limited because of the macro-economic measures established by Cardoso and maintained by Lula (Bonduki 2008). Nevertheless, during the second half of Lula's first administration, the National Housing Policy (PNH) gained financial strength. The National Market System (SNM) expanded thanks to a federal law that increased housing financing legal certainty, and a resolution of the National Monetary Council (CMN) that obliged the banks to expand housing loans using the resources of the Brazilian Loan and Saving System (SBPE). Furthermore, housing loans became cheaper as the interest rate fell, benefiting lower income groups (ibid). Moreover, from 2004 the Federal Government increased the amount of subsidies for low income groups as that year it approved the use of a vast amount of resources of the Guaranteed Saving Fund (FGTS) for subsidizing social housing (ibid).

2.3.2 Reshaping municipal actions through massive investments

Accelerated Growth Programme (PAC): a new scale of slum upgrading

Right at the beginning of Lula's second administration in January 2007, the Federal Government announced the launch of the Accelerated Growth Programme (PAC). The emergence of the PAC related to the stabilization of the Brazilian economy achieved during Lula's first administration (2003-2006) and a continuous international economic growth cycle. The PAC aimed to accelerate Brazil's economic growth pace, maintain the macroeconomics fundamentals, and increase income and jobs while decreasing social and regional inequalities (PAC 2007a). Thus, the PAC sought to incentivize private investments, increase public investment in infrastructure and eliminate the constraints for growth (PAC 2007b).

PAC investments in infrastructure were expected to reach R$503.9 billion in three different areas: logistics, energy and social and urban infrastructure (ibid). In particular, PAC investments in social and urban infrastructure included $R106.3 billion for housing projects (ibid). These housing initiatives involved slum upgrading, housing construction and improvement and housing financing. PAC investments for housing projects included subsidies; loans and resource transfers to the regional states and municipalities; mortgages

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15 R$ 58.3 billion, R$274.8 billion and R$170.8 respectively.
and loans to organizations; and residential leasing. By the end of 2010 the expected investment in housing projects were surpassed as they reached R$217 billion (PAC 2010a).

My Home My Life programme (MCMV)

In addition to the PAC investments, the Federal Government launched My Home My Life Programme (MCMV) in 2009. This massive housing construction programme emerged as an anti-cyclical measure to fight against the economic crisis that started in the USA with the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 and was intensified by the financial crash at the end of 2008. The MCMV aimed to develop a reliable economic milieu in which a formal housing market for the low income and the middle class could prosper (SNH 2010). The main strategies for achieving this goal were the creation of a guarantee fund, the improvement of mortgage interest rates and the increase of subsidies. The Federal Government anticipated the construction of 1 million houses and R$ 34 billion in investments.

The Provisional Measure No.45925/2009 that then became the Federal Law No. 11977/2009 regulated the MCMV. This law included the creation of the Guarantee Fund (FGHAB) that secured borrower instalments, and a decrease in insurances' cost, notary fees and time, taxes for low income housing construction and environmental licensing time. Furthermore, the MCMV involved investments for modernizing the construction sector and establishing standards for the introduction of environmentally-sustainable materials. This law also integrated measures for squatter settlements' regularization and titling, incentives for housing construction and subsidies inversely proportional to beneficiaries' income for housing purchasing (see Annexe, page 285).

The functioning of the MCMV involved the allocation of resources by the Federal Government and the FGTS. Developers submitted their projects to the CAIXA which was responsible for analysing, authorizing and commercializing the projects (CAIXA n.d.). To join the programme, it was compulsory for the regional states and municipalities to sign an agreement with the Federal Government. They were responsible for elaborating a beneficiaries' register and facilitating projects' elaboration and licensing (SNH n.d.). In addition, so as to guarantee the quality of real estate projects the agreement establish that regional states and municipalities might provide urbanized and well-located land (SNH n.d.).
2.3.3 Latest Federal Government housing initiatives

*PAC 2 and MCMV 2*

In 2010 Lula's government launched PAC 2 giving continuity to PAC 1. PAC 2 included R$1.59 trillion in investments, of which R$958.9 billion were expected to be spent from 2011 to 2014. PAC 2 prioritized the same three key areas as the previous programme (logistics, energy and social and urban infrastructure). However this time the PAC 2 integrated housing construction, housing financing and favelas' urbanization into an investment area called 'PAC My Home My Life' (PAC 2010b; PAC n.d.). Through the PAC MCMV the Federal Government expected to invest R$278.2 billion in the housing sector (ibid).

Specifically, R$71.7 billion in investments were earmarked for the construction of 2 million houses in 4 years, of which 60% were for the lowest income group, and 30% for the lower medium income (PAC 2010b; PAC n.d.). In relation to the urbanization of favelas the PAC MCMV allocated R$ 30.5 billion for the transformation of the favelas into popular neighbourhood and the improvement of the quality of life in these areas. The urbanization of favelas included the following items: housing improvements, infrastructure works (water, sewage, drainage, roads, public lighting); public services (health, education, sport, leisure and culture); and land regularization (ibid). As previously, the bulk of the investments was mainly reserved for the regional metropolis, capitals and largest municipalities. Finally, for housing financing, the PAC MCMV earmarked R$176 billion of the Brazilian Loan and Saving System (SBPE) for the construction and acquisition of new and old real estates and refurbishment works, granting the access to housing and invigorating the housing market (ibid).

In June 2011, the Federal Government regulated the MCMV (Federal Law No. 12424/2011) and increased the investments. It decided to earmark R$125,7 billion, out of which R$ 53.1 for housing financing and R$ 72.6 billion for subsidies. The subsidies were expected to come from the federal budget (R$ 63.1 billion), and the FGTS (R$9.5 billion) (SNH 2011).
SNHIS, PAC and MCMV by the end of 2012

By the end of 2012, the Federal Government had invested vast amounts of money in housing initiatives. The MCMV 1 and 2 totaled 2.28 million of contracted houses and 1.5 million of allocated houses (PAC 2013). In relation to the urbanization of favelas, the Federal Government investments reached R$ 28.2 billion through the PAC 1 and 2 (ibid). Finally, housing financing through the SBPE reached R$307.3 billion from 2010 to 2012, benefiting almost 900 thousand households across the country (see Annexe, page 285).

In addition, the National Social Housing System (SNHIS) expanded but within limitations as the bulk of Federal Government investments since 2007 (PAC and MCMV) was not channeled through the National Social Housing Fund (FNHIS). The National Housing Plan (PlanHab) was elaborated between 2007 and 2008 (SNH 2009). By the beginning of 2012 about 95% of the regional states and municipalities joined the SNHIS; 72% of them created a local housing fund (FLHIS) and 68% created a housing fund managing council (Arretche et al. 2012). However, only 633 local governments presented their local housing plans (PLHIS) to the CAIXA as stipulated by law (ibid).

***

The first part reviewed the emergence of a centralized housing policy during the military dictatorship and its collapse in the middle of the 1980s. Then, it described that during the 1990s the role of the Federal Government weakened while the municipalities emerged as key actors. In particular, this part identified the existence of three main types of local housing policies: land-centred policies that mobilized mainly legislative and regulatory instruments; democracy-centred experiences that used participatory budgeting; and spatial-centred experiences that put into operation the slum upgrading instrument. The second part showed that during the first decade of the 2000s the Federal Government gradually enhanced its role in the housing sector through the development of the National Social Housing System (SNHIS) that entailed, at the national and local levels, the creation of housing funds (FNHISs and FLHISs) and funds’ managing councils (CGFNHISs and CGFLHISs), and elaboration of housing plans (PlanHab and PLHISs). Lastly, the second part, noted that since 2007 the Federal Government increased its participation in the housing sector through the implementation of PAC and MCMV that involve substantial investments for slum upgrading projects and housing construction. Thus, after almost 20 years of absence since the dissolution of the National Housing Bank (BNH), in the first
decade of the 2000s the Federal Government re-emerged as a key actor in the housing sector together with municipal governments (Table 2).

Table 2 Brazilian national housing policy evolution overview.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Major events / federal housing initiatives</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>1964: Creation of the Housing Financial System (SFN); 1966: Creation of the Guaranteed Saving Fund (FGTS); 1967: Creation of the Brazilian Loan and Saving System (SBPE).</td>
<td>Emergence consolidation of the of the federal government as key actor in the housing sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Consolidation of the SFH while emerging housing sector crisis</td>
<td>Decay of the Federal Government in the housing sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarney</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Dissolution of the BNH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Enactment of the new Constitution</td>
<td>Collapse of the SFH. Absence of the Federal Government and rise of municipalities as key actors in housing policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990-1992</td>
<td>Immediate Action Plan for Housing (PAIH)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collor</td>
<td>1993-1994</td>
<td>Habitar-Brasil programme Morar-Municipio programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995-1998</td>
<td>Habitar-Brasil programme Pro- Moradia programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco</td>
<td>1999-2002</td>
<td>Residential Lease Programme (PAR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Elaboration of the National Housing Policy (PNH)</td>
<td>Institutional restructuring of the national housing sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Creation of the National Social Housing System (SNHIS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lula</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC)</td>
<td>Consolidation of the Federal Government as key actor in the housing sector, in particular through massive investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Elaboration of the National Housing Plan (PlanHab)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>My Home My Life programme (MCMV)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Launch PAC 2 and MCMV 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rousseff</td>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>MCMV 2 regulations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4 RIO DE JANEIRO CASE: GAPS IN THE LITERATURE

2.4.1 Rio experience: an introduction

Rio de Janeiro’s housing policy during the 1990s

After the enactment of the 1988 constitution, in 1992 the Rio de Janeiro Master Plan was approved. Later that year Cesar Maia won the municipal elections. Under his administration from August 1993 the municipal housing policy guidelines were developed. By December 1993 these guidelines were officially announced and involved seven programmes ranging from slum upgrading to housing construction. From January 1994 the municipality started the materialization of the housing policy through the different programmes. In particular, the municipality focused on the Favela-Bairro programme, that included the implementation of slum upgrading projects in 16 medium size favelas.

By the end of 1994 the Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH) was created, and the first Favela-Bairro projects were implemented. One year later the Municipality and the Inter-American Development Bank (BID) signed a contract for the investment of US$300 million (BID 1995) which allowed the expansion of the Favela-Bairro programme to 54 favelas and various informal housing estates (TCMRJ 2006). In 1997 Luz Paulo Conde, Maia’s ex-urban planning secretary became Mayor. During his administration the Favela-Bairro was consolidated as Conde’s administration flagship. Slum upgrading projects were expanded to small and larger favelas (Bairrinho and Grandes Favelas programmes respectively) through other contracts with the Federal Government and the European Union. Moreover, at the end of the Conde administration a second BID loan was signed which financially secured the continuity of the slum upgrading in another 54 favelas (TCMRJ 2006).

Rio housing policy during the first decade of the 2000s

At the beginning of the first decade of the 2000s, there was a political battle for the municipality between Maia and Conde. Maia won the elections and during his second administration, the housing policy and in particular the Favela-Bairro programme, were relegated to a second plan and several controversies around its denaturalization, implementation and effectiveness emerged. In 2004 Maia managed once again to win the municipal elections. During his third administration, municipal housing initiatives were
almost non-existent. The resources coming from the BID contract ended in 2006 and by 2007 the SMH had one of the lowest annual budgets since its creation (CGMRJ n.d.). In addition, while the municipality joined the SNHIS and created an FLHIS, it did not elaborate a PLHIS and the managing council fund was not operating. However, this situation did not last long as the launch of the PAC reactivated municipal housing investments in Rio de Janeiro; in particular, these were directed to slum upgrading projects such as the Alemão and Manguinhos complex.

In 2009 Eduardo Paes won the municipal elections and his administration implemented slum projects through the PAC and other federal programmes, while starting to promote housing construction mainly through the MCMV. In 2010 the municipality launched a local slum upgrading programme called Morar Carioca. This programme in line with the Favela-Bairro sought to urbanize and integrate Rio's favelas into the city by 2020, through an investment of R$ 8 billion (IAB-RJ 2010a; PCRJ 2010a). The investments were expected to come from different sources: PAC, BID, Pro-Moradia, FNHIS and the municipal budget (SMH 2011). In addition, in relation to the SNHIS, the managing council of the FLHIS became operational and Rio de Janeiro PLHIS was elaborated.

By the end of 2012 Rio de Janeiro's housing policy differed from the previous initiatives in three ways. First of all, the amount of investments was higher than before, increasing from R$1,785 billion from the 1995 to 2009 period to R$1.612 billion between 2009 to 2012 (CGMRJ n.d.). Secondly, housing construction became central to the local housing policy while slum upgrading took a secondary role (SMH 2011). Thirdly, a challenging coordination with Federal and State governments emerged. Indeed, besides the need of coordination with the Federal Government, the municipality needed to negotiate with the state of Rio de Janeiro. For instance, the state of Rio de Janeiro was key in the largest slum upgrading projects such as the Alemão complex and Rocinha.

In particular, the slum upgrading differed from the previous experience as it emerged as part of the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games legacy. The slum upgrading included as well new items such as housing construction and transport equipments. Finally, current slum upgrading changed perspective as besides integrating a city scale approach, it acknowledged groups rather than individuals favelas, and it included a temporal frame for urbanizing all Rio's favelas.
In sum, during the 1990s came into existence Rio de Janeiro’s housing policy. This process included the emergence and consolidation of slum upgrading as a policy instrument. During the first decade of the 2000s the housing policy and in particular the Favela-Bairro programme and the municipal housing policy took a secondary role and almost disappeared. In recent years the municipal housing policy and the slum upgrading instrument became visible again through the launch of the Morar Carioca plan that seems to give a new lease to the old Favela-Bairro programme and other initiatives financed by Federal Government mainly through PAC and MCMV (Table 3).

Table 3 Rio de Janeiro housing policy evolution overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Mayor of Rio de Janeiro</th>
<th>Municipal Housing Secretary</th>
<th>Major events at municipal and national levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993-1996</td>
<td>Cesar Maia</td>
<td>Sergio Magalhães</td>
<td>1993 Housing basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1994 Launch of the Favela-Bairro</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1995 Creation SMH</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1995 BID contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>Luis P. Conde</td>
<td>Sergio Magalhães</td>
<td>2000 BID contract 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2004</td>
<td>Cesar Maia</td>
<td>Solange Amaral</td>
<td>2003 Creation of SNH</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2004 Elaboration of the PNH</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2003 Alemão complex proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>Cesar Maia</td>
<td>Solange Amaral</td>
<td>2005 Creation of the SNHIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Luiz Humberto</td>
<td>2006 end of the BID contract 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paulo A. Figueira</td>
<td>2007 Launch of the PAC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2007 Pan-American Games</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2007 Launch of the PAC Rio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2012</td>
<td>Eduardo Paes</td>
<td>Jorge Bittar</td>
<td>2009 Launch of the MCMV</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010 Launch of the PAC 2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010 Launch of the Morar Carioca</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2012 Rio+20</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2012 BID contract 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4.2 The policy instrument and gaps in the literature

*Overview and classification*

Rio de Janeiro's favelas and housing policies have generated an extensive literature. Overall, this literature can be divided in two major groups. On the one hand, studies that have focused on favelas and favela dwellers such as the pioneering analyses of Leeds (1969) on poverty and favelas, and Perlman (1979)\(^{16}\) on favela dwellers' representations and the theory of marginality\(^{17}\). On the other, studies which central objective has been the analysis of Rio's housing policy. This thesis focused on the latter as it was interested on housing policy analysis rather than favelas phenomenon. Building on Knoepfel et al. (2001) policy analysis classification (see CHAPTER 1, page 24), the second group of studies can be broken down into two main streams.

The first one relates to 'evaluative analysis' and represents an important share of the existing literature. These studies assessed housing policy efficiency and effectiveness and considered how problems, side effects or poor results can be overcome. They focused as well on describing the housing policy materialization process in order to develop a methodology that could be replicated elsewhere. This type of assessments involves official evaluations that belonged to the policy process or municipal exertive control routines such as the one realized by the Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration (IBAM 1996), the Municipal Court of Auditors (TCMRJ 2005; TCMRJ 2006), and the Inter-American Development Bank (BID 2007). These also include evaluations conducted by municipal staff and scholars focusing on whether or not Rio de Janeiro's housing policy met its objectives and how the experience could be improved. For instance, Cardoso (2002) and Pamuk and Cavallieri (1998) reviewed the strengths and challenges of Favela-Bairro; Abramo (1998) assessed Favela-Bairro impact on real estate market in favelas; Soares & Soares (2005) measured Favela-Bairro's socio-economic impact; Abiko et al. (2007) explored slum upgrading cost in different Brazilian cities, including Rio de Janeiro. In addition, several publications have explored the case of Rio de Janeiro for the purpose of developing a methodology that can be replicated elsewhere, promoting Rio's housing policy as best practice (Brakarz et al. 2002; Aduan & Brakarz 2004; Rojas 2004; Rojas 2009).

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\(^{16}\) This analysis has been recently revisited in Perlman 2010

\(^{17}\) For more details about this literature on Rio's favelas see Valladares 2006.
The second stream relates to studies that focus on the 'explanation of policy functioning', following sociological approaches. This second stream includes two main types of studies. The first type entails analyses taking an 'unveiling' perspective\(^{18}\). They explored Rio de Janeiro's case in order to uncover hidden processes or interests, denounce government's rhetoric on policy change, and/or identify meagre, inexistent or perverse policy results. This type of analysis focused mainly on three major topics: the policy objective of integrating the favelas into the city; how the policy beneficiated an elite or a political interest; and how Rio de Janeiro case relates to the urban neo-liberal agenda. The analyses taking the unveiling perspective are best illustrated by the study of Broudehoux (2001) on the Favela-Bairro and city marketing, Randolph (2004) concentrated on the limits of the housing policy inclusion objective and Silva (2006) on the cooptation of the housing policy by conservative groups related to the neo-liberal economy perspective while Bahia (2000) on the social integration rhetoric of the Favela-Bairro programme. More recently Simpson (2013) identified the lack of citizen's participation as the main factor of Rio's experience failure. At the international level these studies relate to the work of scholars such as Gilbert (2014) on the limitations and meagre results of Colombian housing policies.

The second type of studies within the 'explanation of policy functioning' stream focused on social, institutional and cognitive changes for understanding Rio de Janeiro's case and how it fits into the wider context of housing policies evolution across the globe. Their objective was to understand and characterize housing policies development and change such as Fiori et al. (2000) who argued about the emergence of a new generation of housing policies in the 1990s illustrated by the case of Rio de Janeiro, and Burgos (2003) who reviewed the evolution of Rio de Janeiro's housing initiatives since the 1940s up to the Favela-Bairro programme in the 1990s. These studies share the same objectives as the ones that focused on the Brazilian national housing policy evolution (Azevedo 1996; Cardoso & Ribeiro 2000; Cardoso 2007; Azevedo 2007; Arretche & Rodriguez 1999). At the international level these studies can be related to the work of scholars focusing on macro institutional and cognitive changes that impact housing policies evolution such as Pugh (2001).

\(^{18}\) The term 'unveiling' is borrowed from Alain Faure's mapping and classification of studies on territorial policies (Faure 2007).
These studies have made important contributions to the understanding of Rio de Janeiro's experience; however, in the view of the PPI approach this literature presents two major gaps. Firstly, the 'evaluative' stream that represents the bulk of the existing literature, has tended to focus on housing policy efficiency and effectiveness, overlooking Rio's housing governance evolution. This tendency may be the result of the fact that housing deficit is perceived as a crucial issue to be addressed, pushing other lines of inquiry and in particular the question of governance into the background. Secondly, the literature has tended to analyse the 'slum upgrading instrument' and its 'instrumentation' under a functionalistic perspective without any role whatsoever in the policy process. On the one hand the 'evaluative' stream has analysed the slum upgrading instrument in terms of its effectiveness or efficiency. On the other the 'explanation of policy functioning' stream has studied the slum upgrading as an instrument at the service of the Carioca élite or political group, or has overlooked it as this stream has primarily focused on social, conceptual, institutional and/or political changes for explaining policy development and change. However, as mentioned in CHAPTER 1 'policy instruments' are not neutral devices. Instead they produce specific effects and structure public policy according to their own properties. Thus, 'policy instrumentation' also contributes to the shaping of policies. Under this understanding, the existing literature has overlooked how the choice and use of 'policy instruments' i.e. its 'instrumentation', account for Rio de Janeiro's housing governance and policy transformation.

In addition, to these main gaps in Rio de Janeiro's housing policy literature, there are five other elements that support reviewing the case of Rio de Janeiro:

- Most of the literature focuses on the 1990s period while the first decade of the 2000s remains unexplored. The analysis of the 2000s is necessary for understanding the dynamics of collapse of Rio de Janeiro's ambitious policy.
- Few are the studies that explored the case over a long period of time. This limits the understanding of long term policy and governance dynamics which are essential as novelty and change tend to be an integral part of public policy pronouncements as mentioned in CHAPTER 1 (see page 31). Thus, without a diachronic perspective it is difficult to identify policy innovation and evolution.
- Studies tend to focus on specific projects rather than on a city scale perspective. This is problematic because, by focusing on projects, analyses overlooked city-wide housing dynamics.
- New data sources are available thanks to the emergence and consolidation of the digital and 'big data' era that allow to reconsider the existing understanding of Rio de Janeiro's case. For instance, nowadays the municipal council archives include data about housing policy since 1975 that can be scrutinized thanks to the development of new technologies.
- The recent launch of the Morar Carioca programme and the Federal and regional state governments comeback call into question the previous housing policy development in order to understand and consider the novelty and the new arrangement and dynamics surrounding Rio de Janeiro's housing policy, and housing sector future.

2.4.3 Research question and hypotheses

In the view of these gaps, this research aims to contribute to the field of housing by attempting to address them. Building on the PPI approach, this research understands that slum upgrading as a policy instrument created specific effects, influencing Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and housing governance evolution. With this understanding this research questions how the slum upgrading instrument influenced Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and housing governance evolution since the 1990s. This question suggests an analysis of Rio de Janeiro's policy through the exploration of the choice and use of the slum upgrading. The hypotheses related to Rio's slum upgrading instrumentation are:

1. It fostered the inflexion moments (emergence, development, collapse and renewal) that marked Rio de Janeiro's housing policy evolution.
2. It supported the transformation of Rio's housing policy governance.
3. It contributed to the depoliticization of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy understood as 'the marginalization of strictly political regulation' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004: 367).

The case of Rio cannot account for all municipal housing experiences across Brazil. Not all municipalities used the slum upgrading instrument and each municipality related to different housing sector arrangement and dynamics. Nevertheless, the investigation of the Rio de Janeiro case can be used to reflect on the other Brazilian municipal experiences, and
consider other cases that have mobilized slum upgrading as a public policy instrument across the globe.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the case and presented the research question and hypotheses. The first and second parts offered an overview of Brazil's housing policy evolution in order to present the landscape from which Rio de Janeiro's case emerged and developed. The first part reviewed the emergence of a centralized housing policy during the military dictatorship and its collapse in the 1980s. Then, it described the weakening of the Federal Government, while the municipalities emerged as key housing sector actors during the 1990s. In relation to the different municipal experiences that were developed three main approaches were highlighted: land-centred that mobilized mainly legislative and regulatory instruments; democracy-centred experiences that used participatory budgeting; and spatial-centred experiences that constituted the slum upgrading instrument.

The second part explored the comeback of the Federal Government into the housing sector from the beginning of the first decade of the 2000s. The re-emergence of the Federal Government during Lula's first administration mainly related to an institutional restructuring with the creation of the Ministry of Cities and the National Housing Secretariat (SNH). In addition, the Federal Government created the National Social Housing System (SNHIS) which included the elaboration of housing plans at national and local levels (PlanHab and PLHIS respectively) to coordinate social housing policy, and the creation of housing funds at national and local level (FNHIS and FLHIS respectively) for financing housing initiatives. During Lula's second administration, the Federal Government gained strength with the launch of the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) that channelled important resources for slum upgrading projects in 2007 and in 2009 with the launch of the My Home My Life programme (MCMV) for housing construction. By the end of 2012 the government continued these investments with the launch of the PAC MCMV that included important investments for housing construction, housing financing and slum upgrading. In relation to the SNHIS, even if the PAC and MCMV were informed by the National Housing Policy (PNH), they weakened its role as the bulk of the subsidies were not channelled thought the FNHIS.
The third part gave an overview of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy evolution, and reviewed Rio's housing policy literature. It stated that the existing literature followed two main streams: (i) 'evaluative' studies that represent the bulk of the existing literature and focus on policy efficiency and effectiveness; and (ii) 'explanation of policy functioning' analyses, following sociological approaches. The exploration of these different streams contributed to the identification of two major gaps: housing governance dynamics have been understudied and the role of the slum upgrading instrument has been overlooked. Aiming to address these gaps the research focuses on how did the choice and use of the slum upgrading instrument influence Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance evolution.

The next chapter discusses and presents the methodology and methods.
CHAPTER 3 INVESTIGATING THE SLUM UPGRADING AS AN 'ACTANT'

'It is if we were saying to the actors: 'we won't try to discipline you, to make you fit into our categories; we will let you deploy your own worlds, and only later will we ask you to explain how you came about settling them' (Latour 2005: 23)

3.1 INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1 reviewed the Political Sociology of Public Policy Instruments approach (PPI). The PPI argues that policy instruments produce specific effects and contribute to structure public policy according to their own properties. Building on this understanding, CHAPTER 2 calls into question the case of Rio de Janeiro by reviewing the existing literature. Specifically, it notes that the existing literature has understudied housing governance development and neglected the slum upgrading instrument's role. Aiming to address these gaps this research focuses on how the slum upgrading 'instrumentation', i.e. the choice and use of this housing instrument, influenced Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance evolution.

The research question and hypotheses entail analysing the housing policy through the slum upgrading instrumentation; however, the PPI literature did not explicitly elaborate on the method or operational framework for conducting this type of analysis. Thus, this research mobilized Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) that is one of the theoretical roots of the PPI approach to elaborate an explicit method for analysing Rio de Janeiro slum upgrading instrumentation.
This chapter aims to present and discuss the method used in this research. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores ANT and discusses its linkages with policy analysis and governmentality, drawing its relevance for this research. The second part details the understanding of the slum upgrading as 'actant', presents the 'detective work' as general method and explains Rio de Janeiro investigation's first steps which included the isolation of the 'actant', a preliminary 'walk through', and first account that redefined the research hypotheses. The third part explains the investigation's further steps. Specifically, the third part describes the data collection, pointing out the limitations of interviews and written documents and how they were overcome; the data analysis which entailed a micro processing of facts in order to establish slum upgrading instrumentation sequence of events that allowed instrument's 'associations' to unfold, revealing the role of the slum upgrading for housing governance and policy evolution and transformation; the data organization which involved the creation and use of different tools; and the production and specificity of the empirical chapters.

3.2 ANT AS OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

3.2.1 ANT: an overview

*The world as a collective of 'actants'*

Actor-Network-Theory emerged in the 1980s. The most important scholars that represent this perspective are Michelle Callon, Bruno Latour, John Law and Arie Rip (Latour 2005). ANT understands the social *'not as a special domain, a specific realm, or a particular sort of thing, but only as a very peculiar movement of re-association and reassembling'* (Latour 2005: 7). This movement of 're-association' and 'reassembling' entails the building of heterogeneous network of human and non-human entities (Law 1992). Called 'actants' (or actor-networks), they can be anything: *'a storm, a rat, a rock, a lake, a lion, a child, a worker, a gene, a slave, the unconscious, or a virus'* (Latour cited by Harman 2007: 36). 'Actants' are open-ended entities generated in and by 'associations' (Cordella & Shaikh 2006), which become strong by 'assembling' more 'allies' (other 'actants'), and weak when they become isolated (Harman 2007). 'Actants' associate and dissociate through 'translation' understood as a process rather than a result that includes both displacement and transformation (Callon 1986).

In particular, in his seminal work on the Saint Jacques scallops, Callon (1986) identified four different translation moments which do not relate to a linear process and can overlap
The first one is the 'problematization' and 'describes a system of alliances, or associations, between entities, thereby defining the identity and what they "want"' (ibid: 8). Callon stressed that the problematization includes some 'actants' becoming 'Obligatory Passage Points' (OPP), i.e. indispensable in the network they are building.

The second moment is 'interessement' understood as 'the group of actions by which an entity ... attempts to impose and stabilize the identity of the other actors it defines through its problematization' (Callon 1986: 8). For this second moment Callon highlighted that the word interessement was used because it refers to be inter-esse (in between). In that sense to interest other 'actants' is 'to build devices which can be placed between them and all other entities who want to define their identities otherwise' (ibid: 9). Callon observed as well that the variety of strategies to achieve these interruptions are unlimited.

The third moment is 'enrolment' and it indicates 'the device by which a set of interrelated roles is defined and attributed to actors who accept them. Interessement achieves enrolment if it is successful' (Callon 1986: 10). Callon stressed that 'describing' enrolment includes tracing 'the group of multilateral negotiations, trials of strength and tricks that accompany the interessements and enable them to succeed' (ibid).

The fourth moment is called 'mobilization' and relates to 'the chains of intermediaries which result in a sole and ultimate spokesman' (Callon 1986: 14).

In addition, Callon observed that 'dissidence' can emerge which involves questioning and rejecting the spokesman: 'the actors implicated do not acknowledge their roles in this story nor the slow drift in which they had participated, in their opinion, wholeheartedly. As the aphorism says, traduttore-traditore, from translation to treason there is only a short step' (ibid). Thus, this dissidence involves 'betrayal' and 'controversy' which is understood as 'all the manifestations by which the representativity of the spokesman is questioned, discussed, negotiated, rejected, etc.' (ibid: 15).

**Agency and reality under ANT perspective**

ANT proposes a specific understanding in relation to the structure-agency debate. Cordella & Shaikh (2006) pointed out that from the perspective of ANT 'actors do not embody action or actantiality (potential for action) but it is their relational dimension that generates instance of action' (ibid: 11). Therefore, ANT localizes agency in the 'actant', i.e. in the relation of human and non-
human entities. Laurier (2010) highlighted that by granting agency to 'actants' Latour (and ANT) moved away from the binary opposition between individual agency and social structures. Indeed, for ANT there is no such thing as isolated objects or humans: 'the agency of any human being, his ability to conceive of actions, to plan them and to accomplish them by following the plan; the ability to have ideas and to associate them; the ability to be moved or gripped by compassion, the capacity to define his expectations and needs, all that depends on the arrangements, the socio-technical niches in which she or he is situated' (Callon 2004: 7).

While sometimes perceived as another method of the social sciences, ANT involves a specific ontological and epistemological position that diverges from positivist and interpretative perspectives (Cordella & Shaikh 2006). Under a positivist perspective, nature and society are recognized to exist 'out there'. Thus, the research is 'characterised by formal propositions and quantifiable measures of variables articulated to describe the reality that is considered as objectively given' (ibid: 13). Under an interpretative perspective, nature and society are recognize to be constructed through intermediation. Therefore, the research includes 'to interpret and hence explain the processes that are "producing" the phenomenon' (ibid). However, for ANT reality does not exist 'out there' nor is it the result of an interpretation process. ANT recognizes reality as an emerging phenomenon created by the interaction of 'actants': 'reality does not exist per se...the construction of reality is achieved through the interplay between different actors, both human and non-human, with equal constitutive characteristics' (ibid: 14). Thus, a research under ANT perspective involves unfolding the actor-network in order to reveal how they were brought into existence, how they last or perish, 'it [ANT] does not claim to explain the actor's behaviours but to find the procedures which render actors able to negotiate their ways through one another's world-building activity' (Austrin & Farnsworth 2005: 151).

3.2.2 ANT and the PPI approach convergences

ANT and policy analysis

The integration of ANT into the analysis of Rio de Janeiro must not be perceived as a new conceptual connotation. As mentioned in CHAPTER 1, the PPI approach was influenced by the sociology of science and the history of techniques and, in particular, by the work of Akrich, Callon and Latour (see page 27). For instance, the conceptualization of the 'inertia effect' produced by policy instruments (see page 30) was informed by ANT as the PPI approach considers that policy instruments 'constitute a point of inevitable passage [Obligatory Passage Point] and play a part in what Callon (1986) has called the State of "problematicization", which
allows heterogeneous actors to come together around issues and agree to work on them jointly’ (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007a: 10). In addition, ANT has influenced other policy analysis approaches in the past two decades. For example, the notions of actor-network and translation informed Muller and Surel’s work on policy analysis (Muller & Surel 1998) and, in particular, Muller’s conceptualization of ‘mediator’ (Muller 2000, 2005) and Lascoumes’ concept of ‘transcodeur’ (Lascoumes 1996).

Lascoumes (1996) highlighted that the notion of ‘translation’ was relevant for the analysis of contemporary public policy. Lascoumes pointed out that the field of public policies has changed, becoming more complex to analyse mainly because it includes a triple heterogeneity. The first heterogeneity relates to the diversification of public policies aims as they try to address at the same time several issues related to different sectors, knowledge, and know-how. For instance, Lascoumes stressed that "urban policy seeks to combine the actions of public security, urban planning, social welfare, education, job training, cultural animation, integration of foreigners, etc.' (Lascoumes 1996: 329). The second heterogeneity relates to the public policy itself because it involves a variety of programmes which are not always harmonized. Lascoumes stresses that the unity is just as illusory as the novelty displayed insofar as most of the programmes recycle pre-existing modes of action by enriching, moving or reformulating them' (ibid). Finally, the third heterogeneity relates to the actors involved in public policies. The latest generation of public policies mobilizes a wide range of actors, groups and organizations which can relate to several sectors, or scales (local national, supranational or international).

In addition, Lascoumes (1996) observed two other changes in contemporary public policies that make ANT relevant for their analysis. Firstly, public policy sectors that were well structured have gone through a partially or complete re-problematization. Secondly, public policies are becoming 'policies of organization' as the decisions they objectivize and the choices of instruments they make focus more on procedures than on the definition of substantial content' (ibid: 332). Thus, contemporary public policies produce interaction instances in which the different actors interrelate. Lascoumes (1996) argued that these latest policy evolutions can be grasped by ANT as it allows to focus the analysis on four elements 'linking of heterogeneous universe, relation and exchange activities, mobility of alliances and oppositions, and finally the role of intermediaries (actors and actant) in these dynamics' (Lascoumes 1996: 330).
ANT and governmentality

ANT shares similarities with Foucault's work that underpins the PPI approach (see page 27). Rose et al. (2006) observed that ANT and Foucault's 'governmentality' have three main points of convergence. Firstly, both are interested in 'how knowledge and other resources flow and get recycled in particular networks' (ibid: 93), moving away from structural reflection. Secondly, Rose et al. highlighted that ANT and governmentality focus on 'how things get done', as both are doubtful about the 'why and in whose interests' considerations (ibid). Thirdly, they reject favouring great men or moments for accounting the development of a process, considering that 'material things and processes might play an active role' (ibid). However, Rose et al. (2006) pointed out that the agency of things included in ANT have not been explicitly acknowledged by governmentality studies.

Furthermore, Beuscart & Peerbaye (2006) highlighted the influence of Foucault's concept of 'dispositif' on ANT. Beuscart & Peerbaye (2006) pointed out that 'Surveiller et Punir' (Foucault 1975) was mobilized by Latour for taking into consideration the non-human entities. They observed as well that John Law acknowledged the importance of Foucault's understanding of 'power' as 'linking process within heterogeneous networks' and differentiation between 'power to' and 'power over' (ibid: 6). Nevertheless, Beuscart & Peerbaye (2006) argued that overall ANT tended to recognize Michel Serres, and Deleuze and Guattari influences, while Foucault remained in the background because his work stayed in the social science domain. Moreover, they suggested that Foucault was criticized by ANT scholars for not expanding his analysis to the hard sciences.

ANT: some considerations

The use of ANT for analysing a public policy demanded some clarification as this choice raised some considerations. In spite of the advantages of using ANT for analysing contemporary public policy, Lascoumes (1996) argued that the notion of translation was limited for analysing public policy as their boundaries and reach were more difficult to grasp than the ones of an object or a machine. Lascoumes also highlighted that the notion of translation related to a specific transformation from a precise universe to another, while in the case of collective actions these transformations take multiple modes and are heteroclites. Finally, he pointed out that the sociology of translations assumed that all actors in the network, i.e. human and non-human entities, have an equal capacity in the 'translation process'. Lascoumes stated that this assumption was due to the fact that the
scholars that developed the notion of 'translation' favoured social weightlessness in order to fight against the tendency of privileging actors (human beings) to the detriment of objects (non-human entities). Furthermore, he noted that these researchers have already shown that the sociology of translation was compatible with more classical approaches. However, Lascoumes argued that this assumption was problematic because 'the performative capacities of actants (humans and non-humans) depend on a set of economic and social determinants that structure the spaces in which the interactions are accomplished' (Lascoumes 1996: 328).

The first two concerns relate to the idea that the notion of 'translation' was limited when analysing more complex phenomena. Nevertheless, the development of ANT and the use of the notion of translation for exploring other processes different from technological innovation have showed that they were relevant for exploring complex phenomena. For instance, building on ANT 'urban assemblages' literature focuses on cities and urban phenomena (Fariñas & Bender 2009). In relation to the criticism about social weightlessness this research argues that ANT takes into account what Lascoumes called 'economic and social determinants' (Lascoumes 1996: 328). ANT understands that 'actors embody various characteristics that are the outcomes of their relationship with "heterogeneous elements animate and inanimate, that have been linked to one another for a certain period of time"' (Callon cited by Cordella & Shaikh 2006: 11). These characteristics called prescriptions are understood as 'what a device allows or forbids from the actor-human and non-human that it anticipates; it is the morality of a setting both negative (what it prescribes) and positive (what it permits)' (Akrich and Latour cited by Cordella & Shaikh 2006: 11). Therefore, ANT acknowledges that 'actants' have different levels of 'flexibility' (ibid): 'actants' are not equal and how they perform in a specific 'association' depends on the previous 'translation' processes in which they were involved.

### 3.2.3 ANT and Rio's investigation

Based on this review, ANT is relevant for this research for three main reasons. Firstly, it is in line with the understanding that the slum upgrading instrument played a role in the development of Rio's housing policy and governance. Under the perspective of ANT this research considers Rio's housing policy as an 'actant' constituted among others by policy instruments such as the slum upgrading. The latter also understood as an 'actant'; an open-ended entity (rather than a closed object) constituted through 'translation' and which

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19 The use of ANT for analysing the urban has generated lively debates see Brenner et al. (2011) and Fariñas (2011).
participated in the 'translation' of another 'actor-network' (Rio's housing policy). This conceptualization supports the research hypotheses that overall suggest that the slum upgrading instrument participated in Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance transformation.

Secondly, ANT focuses on the dynamics of association/dissociation of different human and non-human entities, which relates to the analysis of the slum upgrading 'instrumentation' that involves the interaction of heterogeneous entities such as actors, and policy instruments. Furthermore, ANT prevents falling into a technological determinism discussed in CHAPTER 1 as a major concern (see page 34). The PPI approach did not aim to 'promote any School of Instrumental Studies or Tools Policy Theory' (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004: 364). Thus, the PPI approach even if it questions public policy through the instrument's instrumentation, it does not aim to foster a technological deterministic approach. Cordella & Shaikh (2006) observed that ANT changes the focus of analysis from technologies or society, towards the study of their interaction. Thus, ANT allows the research to move away from an analysis of what the slum upgrading instrument did to the actors (humans) or society, towards an analysis of how the housing policy and governance got built through the interaction of human and non-human entities, including the slum upgrading instrument itself (also constituted by heterogeneous entities) and what outcome these dynamics produced.

Lastly, ANT moves away from structural reflections by focusing on 'how' questions, considers how things are built rather than in 'whose interest' or 'why', and rejects privileging important moments or men as it considers that processes and things play an important role. This positioning strongly relates to this research as the hypotheses call into question the role of political figures or moments, suggesting that the slum upgrading 'instrumentation' played an important role in the policy process.

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This part presented ANT, highlighting that it understands 'the social' as an heterogeneous network of entities called 'actants' created by 'translation' which involves the following moments: 'problematization', 'interessement', 'enrolment', and 'mobilization' or 'dissidences' (betrayal and 'controversy'). 'Actants' become strong by 'assembling' more 'allies' (other 'actants'), and weak when they become isolated. In particular, some 'actants' can become
'Obligatory Passage Points' (OPP) as they are indispensable in the network that is being constituted. In addition, this part observed that ANT understands 'reality' as an emerging process produced by actants' linking process ('translation'); and that ANT localizes agency in the 'actants'. Then, this part highlighted ANT linkages with the PPI approach and Foucault's work, and answered the concerns it raised for analysing public policy. This part ended by stressing the relevance of the use of ANT for this research.

The following two parts of this chapter present in detail the methods used for analysing the role of Rio de Janeiro's slum upgrading instrument for housing governance and policy transformation.
3.3 RIO DE JANEIRO INVESTIGATION: FIRST STEPS

3.3.1 Adopting a detective approach

Mobilizing ANT, I considered the slum upgrading instrument as an 'actant' of Rio's housing policy brought into existence by the association (translation mechanisms) of human and non-human entities. In addition, I recognized for this investigation that reality is an emerging phenomenon resulting from the interactions of things: 'a sentence does not hold together because it is true, but because it holds together we say that it is "true"' (Latour cited by Harman 2007: 43). Thus, rather than measuring (positivist perspective) or interpreting (constructivist perspective) the research involved reconstructing how the instrument was assembled, dismantled and then reassembled, so to understand how the slum upgrading influenced housing policy and governance transformation.

The thesis conceptualizes that the slum upgrading as an actant i.e. an heterogeneous network of human and non-human entities brought into existence by translation. Thus the thesis does not treat the slum upgrading as a non-human entities. I consider that the misunderstanding relates to the fact that in ANT-related literature emphasize there is tendency to use the terms of "actors" and "actants", the later for naming "non-human entities". Under ANT, this use of "actant" is wrong.

Detective method

In order to reconstruct the sequence of events of the slum upgrading instrumentation I followed 'detective work' methods. According to Latour these methods are relevant for the social scientist and, in particular, for ANT researchers as 'its modes of investigation, its means of enquiry and its practices of assemblage offer a suggestive method for the social science. Such method involves tracking and tracing; its outcome is the production of new knowledge – knowledge which, almost by definition, has a sense of surprise or unpredictability to it, as detective stories often do' (Austrin & Farnsworth 2005: 148). According to Austrin and Farnsworth the 'detective work' was conceptualized as a hermetic method by Latour and Serres and included 'explication and unpleating: tracing and unfolding complex arrangements to reveal the implicate, unforeseen elements and practices that constitute them' (ibid).
Austrin and Farnsworth (2005) highlighted that the detective work relates to ethnographic methods because as a detective investigator, the scholar conducting an ethnographic research arrives once the events have occurred. Thus, it is necessary to conduct a micro processing of facts in order to immerse in the case and reconstruct the original sequence of events. However, Austrin and Farnsworth pointed out that the detective inquiry does not mobilize the notion of exoticism. Instead, this specific ethnographic research includes the notion of uncertainty of anthropology. Moreover, unlike traditional ethnographic studies, the terrains of a detective investigation 'aren't territories. They have weird borders. They're networks, rhizomes' (Latour cited by Austrin & Farnsworth 2005: 157). In addition, Laurier (2010) stressed that the micro processing of data should not be associated to ethnomethodological studies of sciences because ANT does not aim to produced a mere detailed account but 'to map out his infralanguage of paths, connections, displacements, associations, topologies and networks, strands of ordering which are otherwise invisible since they are hidden behind terms like "science", "genius" and "society"' (ibid: 440).

Based on this understanding I conducted a detective inquiry about Rio de Janeiro's case which involved tracing and unfolding slum upgrading 'associations' (and dissociations) in order to reveal the outcomes of the slum upgrading instrumentation and assess the research hypotheses. In that sense the investigation focuses on how things were built. The unfolding of slum upgrading 'associations' was achieved through a micro processing of data that allowed the reconstruction of the slum upgrading instrumentation sequence of events.

**Isolation of the 'actant'**

The open-ended nature of 'actants' can lead to the belief that ANT is impossible to put into practice. In the case of Rio de Janeiro people can argue that since the 'actants' are open-ended entities, the analysis should take into account everything such as the building, the table, the chairs and even the mosquito that was in the room at the moment of the approval of the policy guidelines back in December 1993. This type of argument and rationale that aim at critically questioning ANT's relevance and feasibility do not realize that even if actor-networks are open-ended, they can and should be isolated for analytical purpose: 'in ANT actors are not defined and analysed in a stable set of relationships. It is the researchers who artificially define the analytical range of the study to see "what the various actors in a setting are doing to one another"' (Akrich and Latour cited by Cordella & Shaikh 2006: 10). Thus, it is through this delimitation that 'it is possible to study and understand some of the relationships that are shaping
both actors and their relational network’ (ibid). These clarifications allows the highlighting of the use of ANT including closing artificially the 'actant' in relation to the researcher's own interest which limits the analysis even if the broad and natural openness of 'actants' is acknowledged.

In order to isolate the 'actant' under study, i.e. the slum upgrading, I delimited a preliminary temporal frame from the beginning of 1990s to the beginning in of the 2010s. This long temporal frame coincided with the diachronic perspective favoured by the PPI approach as it allows to grasp the long term effects of policy instruments and reflect on policy change (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004, 2007b). In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the two decade frame allowed the reconstruction of slum upgrading’s long history in order to explore slum upgrading instrumentation, so to reflect on policy and governance transformation without falling into limited results whose validity only applies for a short period of time. The chosen temporal frame contributed to produce a long term analysis of the slum upgrading which did not exist. Indeed, the existing literature related to the case of Rio de Janeiro is extensive, yet most of the time it focuses on the 1990s period as if after 2000 nothing happened. In addition, the research broadened the investigation to the period prior to the adoption of the slum upgrading and policy instrument in the 1990s. This is in order to explore the choice of the instrument. Finally, I reviewed Rio’s housing policies wider evolution. The inclusion of this review aimed at understanding the economic, political social and administrative landscapes from which the instrument emerged, allowing to grasp the level of flexibility or prescription of each entity involved.

Another major delimitation for the Rio de Janeiro investigation was the level of analysis. As it was mentioned the research aimed at understanding the dynamics and outcome of policy and governance, in particular in relation to the municipal administration. Thus, the research focused on the slum upgrading at programme rather than at project level. This choice allowed a city scale scope, addressing the question of the municipal housing policy and governance evolution as an investigation focused on projects would tend to hide municipal level dynamics which are at the heart of this research. Nevertheless, exploration of specific cases were conducted and contributed to enhance the investigation and achieve case immersion.
Case 'walk through'

The walk through was conducted through a preliminary data collection and data analysis about Rio housing policy and slum upgrading implementation demarcated as mentioned above. The main documents used in this phase were: evaluations, press articles, contracts, official publications, books and journal articles. I conducted a content analysis in order to identify clues that could help to unfold slum upgrading instrument 'associations'. This research considers that the 'actant' under study (slum upgrading) came into existence by the association of a vast variety of heterogeneous entities with different levels of prescription as they related to different and countless associations. In practical terms, this understanding demanded to endlessly unfold these entities so as to grasp actants' levels of flexibility. In order to achieve this within this investigation's major limits (time frame and word limit), the research mobilized Rip's concept of 'landscape' (Rip 2010). Building on the notion of affordance he argued that 'landscapes shape actions and perceptions'. Specifically, Rip stressed that a 'landscape is not just a passive backdrop against which humans play out their affairs. It is itself constructed, and part of the "play" is to construct parts of the backdrop' (idem). By analysing slum upgrading social, political, administrative and economic landscapes this research considers the previous associations that influenced actants' flexibility while respecting ANT's position that contexts do not pre-exist as reality is understood as an emerging phenomenon.

Thus, I elaborated a preliminary map of the social, political, administrative and economic landscapes. The mapping involved the electoral cycles and identification of the different levels of government included in the preliminary time frame. This mapping included as well the pre and post electoral campaign periods. It also involved identifying the personal and professional careers of some actors such as Rio de Janeiro's Mayors and Municipal Secretaries, and the history of institutions and organizations such as the Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH) and the State Water Company (CEDAE), and the evolution of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs). I mapped as well the municipal finances, in particular the municipal investment in housing during the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s. The objective of this preliminary mapping was to identify actants' level of flexibility or prescription that would allow to better grasp the complexity of the translation process rather than 'contextualizing' the slum upgrading implementation.
3.3.2 Rio de Janeiro's investigation direction

Preliminary outcomes: first clues

This preliminary Rio de Janeiro case 'walk through' contributed to identify different actors, institutions, laws and decrees, procedure, regulations, and policy devices and tools and specific moments. In addition, it allowed the identification of two main phases for Rio de Janeiro's housing policy evolution. The first one included the emergence and development of the instrument during the 1990s and the second involved the instrument's abandonment during the first decade of the 2000s. This preliminary assessment corroborated the existence of a gap in the literature from 2005 onwards. This gap became more evident when the municipality launched in July 2010 the slum upgrading programme Morar Carioca. In particular, the 'walk through' contributed to identify main slum upgrading implementation moments or stages: the launch of the programme in 1994, the signature of the Inter-American Development Bank (BID) contract at the end of 1995, the politico-administrative change at the municipal level in 2001, the instrument's abandonment during the first decade of the 2000s and its comeback in 2007.

I also identified two different divergent accounts about Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and slum upgrading development. On one side there was a slum upgrading success story that emerged in the 1990s and continued during the first decade of the 2000s. On the other hand there existed stories that included the successful implementation of the slum upgrading throughout the 1990s but argued its failure and erosion during the first decade of the 2000s. Instead of discarding or privileging one of them I mapped the convergences and divergences. This exercise allowed me to record slum upgrading implementation controversies and debates that were going to be explored and expanded during the field work as they represented stabilized moment of the process that needed to be unfolded, so to understand how they were built.

First reconstruction for expanding the investigation

This preliminary analysis contributed to elaborate the first account of the slum upgrading instrumentation. This account involved the first attempt to reconstruct the slum upgrading instrumentation so to understand how the instrument was assembled, dismantled and then reassembled; and how these processes influenced municipal housing policy and governance transformation. Thus, the account allowed to redefine the research hypotheses.
Furthermore, it contributed to the identification of two major challenges for tracing the slum upgrading instrument 'associations'. The first one related to the 1990s period. Extensively studied, the accounts around this period tended to describe stable relations, undermining the slum upgrading controversies. The second one related to the first decade of the 2000s period because it was underexplored and little data existed or was available.

The Rio de Janeiro case 'walk through' and the elaboration of the account contributed as well to the establishment of the next steps in the investigation. Drawing from their 'walk through' and prior cases, the detectives follow lines of investigation according to each case. Similarly, Rio de Janeiro case 'walk through' allowed the establishment of lines of investigation to explore and during the investigation some of them were discarded while other added. Thus, the lines of investigation emerged from the case and not from theoretical categories and changed according to the research development.
3.4 EXPANDING THE NETWORK: EXPLORING INSTRUMENTATION

3.4.1 Investigation between Brazil and the UK

Overview

After the preliminary research I conducted the detailed slum upgrading investigation in five main phases. From June to October 2011 I conducted a first fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro to gather data through interviews, written sources, and gain immersion in the case. Right after my return to London and until May 2012, I processed the collected data and continued to gather more information via online databases related to Rio de Janeiro's case such as the Official Journal of Rio de Janeiro Municipal Chamber (DCMRJ). Then, I carried out a second fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro from June to September 2012. During this phase I conducted a focused data collection through specific interviews and specialized archives, and completed the micro processing of data. During these phases I wrote several accounts. Finally, after the second fieldwork and until September 2013 I wrote the first complete text (first draft), then a second one in May 2014 and a final text (this thesis) in August 2014.

The investigation was mainly facilitated by the following factors. The access to written sources or interviewees was facilitated by my supervisor's contacts and my personal relations. Furthermore, my nationality facilitated as well the access to sources. Most of the scholars that have or are studying Rio de Janeiro are either Brazilians, North Americans or Europeans. As a Mexican I was a very peculiar researcher, 'not from here and neither from there'. In addition, for most of the people I had contact with, Mexico was an exotic and faraway country, yet similar and familiar; thus, I was perceived as what I called an 'out-insider'. The strangeness coupled with the 'out-insider' I embodied opened me several doors. The data collection was also facilitated by my familiarity with the Rio de Janeiro case developed in the past 10 years. I did an internship in an architectural practice in Rio de Janeiro dealing with slum upgrading projects from November 2004 to June 2005. After this experience I deepen my understanding of Rio de Janeiro's case through my M. Arch. during which I conducted a fieldwork in February 2006 and elaborated a urban project proposal for the neighbourhood of 'City of God'. Then, prior to start this investigation I explored my understanding about Rio's housing policy through my M.Sc. in Town Planning dissertation on Rio de Janeiro's favelas integration. Finally, key to the data collection and in particular immersion in the case was the timing in which the investigation
took place. During the different investigation phases several events or processes occurred that nourished the research and gave me access to people involved in Rio de Janeiro's housing policy (see Immersion page 75).

**Written and oral sources**

I gathered data from written sources. These sources included mainly policy documents, evaluations, financial accounts, decrees and laws, publications, and journal articles. I also collected data through the 35 interviews I conducted during the two fieldwork sessions. In order to grasp the slum upgrading 'translation' moments ('problematization', 'interessement', 'enrolment', 'mobilization' and 'dissidence') , I chose to interview people who participated at different stages of the slum upgrading implementation process and related to different sectors, groups or organizations: municipal administration, federal administration, municipal legislative body, private sector, CBOs, NGOs, and international organizations. For a detailed list of interviewees see page 268. However, interviewing a wide range of people from different organizations and with different interests led to some confidentiality issues. This problem concerned the data relating to the recent slum upgrading 'instrumentation' that involved, among others, tension around evictions and high value contracts negotiations. Furthermore, I faced an ethical dilemma since I hold information that could potentially benefit a specific person or a group that were fighting against evictions. Thus, investigating Rio slum upgrading implementation involved releasing information that enable the unfolding of the 'actant' without breaking confidentiality agreements.

All the interviews were recorded and were semi-structured: I prepared for each of them a list of themes and specific questions that emerged from the ongoing data collection process, including previous interviews. For more details see the interview templates in Annexes starting page 286. Most of the interviews I conducted during the first fieldwork were exploratory while during the second fieldwork they were focused on specific controversies around the use of the slum upgrading. The interviews allowed me as well to access more information. For instance, Fernando Cavallieri special advisor at the Municipal Urban Institute (IPP) shared his journal archives and Andre Gouvêa Vieira municipal councillor shared the power point presentations of the SMH used during the public hearings of the committee of finance, budget and audit at the Municipal Chamber.
Besides gathering information from the interviews, I used them as well for testing the accounts about the slum upgrading translation process that I elaborated through the different writing trials during the investigation. In addition, the interviews served as an immersion technique. Conducting interviews allowed me to travel to different places related to the slum upgrading implementation process: the Municipal Housing Secretariat in Rio de Janeiro, the National Housing Secretariat in Brasilia, the Inter-American Development Bank headquarters in Washington, favelas in Providência, Babilônia and the Alemão Complex amongst others. Travelling to these places allowed me to enrich the lines of inquiry, questions and hypotheses about the 'translation' process under study.

**Immersion**

In addition to the interviews and written sources I immersed myself in the case. This immersion was useful for gathering information about the latest slum upgrading implementation debates and controversies. It was valuable as well because the immersion allowed reflection on past housing policy controversies and consideration on new lines of inquiry. My immersion in the case was facilitated by a burgeoning period in Rio de Janeiro around housing policy that generated several public debates, publications and events. Indeed, the massive investments in the city through several programmes such as the Accelerated Growth Programme (PAC), and the mega events that Rio hosted such as the 2007 Pan-American Games or will host such as the 2016 Olympic Games, have placed housing at the forefront. For instance, the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridors (TransOeste, TransCarioca, TransOlimpica and TransBrasil), the Harbour Regeneration Project (Projeto Porto Maravilha), and the Olympic Park, were among the major urban projects in progress that fostered forced evictions controversies and housing debates.

Furthermore, at the time of the investigation the latest municipal slum upgrading plan called Morar Carioca was launched and the Municipal Social Housing Plan (PMHIS) was being elaborated in order to comply with the SNHIS regulations. These processes generated several events in which I participated. Overall, I took part in three main types of forums: civil society organizations led activities such as the Social Popular Council meetings; specialized forums such as the ones organized by the Brazilian Institute of Architectes in Rio de Janeir (IAB-RJ); and mixed forums such as the PMHIS meetings that gathered together civil society, municipal administration, municipal councils and NGOs among other groups (Table 4) (Figure 1).
Table 4 Forums that facilitated the immersion in the case.

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<tr>
<th>Type of forum</th>
<th>Organizer</th>
<th>Major topics relevant for the investigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil society:</td>
<td>Social Popular Council</td>
<td>Evictions, housing policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident's association of Favela Tabajaras and Favela do Metro</td>
<td>Housing policy, Evictions, Areas of Risk, Legal defence,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized: urban and housing specialists from different disciplines and organization</td>
<td>IPP /debates</td>
<td>Porto Maravilha (Rio's harbour regeneration project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OAB-RJ /Urban law seminar</td>
<td>World Cup, Rio de Janeiro, Master Plan, Evictions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IAB-RJ</td>
<td>Morar Carioca plan, Porto Maravilha, Olympic Games Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rio +20 conference</td>
<td>Slum upgrading projects, Rio de Janeiro's housing policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed: CBOs, NGOs, municipal administration, politicians, others</td>
<td>Mangueira -architectural practice</td>
<td>PAC 2 Mangueira (CBO and architect strategies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PMHIS</td>
<td>Housing issues and possible strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work Party (PT)</td>
<td>PMHIS methodology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, I got deeper in the case by following more closely some slum upgrading projects (Table 5). This follow up included gathering specific data about the projects through interviews, visits, and participation in activities (Figure 2).

Table 5 Specific cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the favela</th>
<th>Programme that was (or is being) implemented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vidigal</td>
<td>PROAP I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providência</td>
<td>PROAP II / Urban Cell/ Morar Carioca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alemão complex</td>
<td>PAC I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangueira</td>
<td>PROAP I / PAC II / MCMV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favela do Metro</td>
<td>PAC II (evictions) and MCMV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapéu Mangueira and Babilônia</td>
<td>Green Morar Carioca</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1 PMHIS meeting AP3. The event sought to discuss housing issues and possible strategies in the planning zone 3 (AP 3) of Rio de Janeiro. In the meeting participated representatives from the municipal administration, CBOs and NGOs.
Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2011

Figure 2 Green Morar Carioca project in Chapéu Mangueira and Babilônia. Municipal staff working in the project organized a visit for me.
Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2012
3.4.2 Overcoming data collection

Following the instrument: limitations

Traditional data collection methods for analysing a public policy such as interviews, studying policy documents and case immersion proved limited for the investigation from the ANT perspective. On one hand, the information collected through interviews lacked precision and accuracy. Interviewees tended to mix the sequence of events and people involved and remembered major changes but not details. Furthermore, they tended to focus on facts and very little on the 'controversies' that led to the stabilization of those facts. Thus, trying to trace slum upgrading 'associations' (and dissociations) during the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s using the interviews proved to be a difficult task.

On the other hand, written sources were not fully useful either for three main reasons.

- Firstly, there was a lack of relevant literature. For instance, studies about the dynamics between the state of Rio de Janeiro and the municipality of Rio de Janeiro were almost inexistent.

- Secondly, as for the interviews, most of the literature favoured facts to the detriment of descriptions of the details of the negotiations, adaptations and calculations. The documents available were most of the time official publications, or final documents, limiting their significance for exploring slum upgrading 'controversies'.

- Thirdly, there was no general Rio de Janeiro's housing policy records. The documents that existed were in different locations and usually disorganized. Some municipal administration staff had personal archives but they tended to be fragmented.

The limitations of traditional oral and written sources were overcome by the consolidation of the digital and 'big data' era from the first decade of the 2000s that have fostered new ways of gathering, producing, storing, and displaying data. Nowadays, people can be traced thanks to diverse devices such as their Google searches, smart phones and Facebook, Twitter and Instagram accounts. Similarly, policy processes and in particular, 'policy instrumentation' can be followed closely thanks to this kind of devices.

For the investigation, I gathered information from the world wide web thanks to powerful research engines that allowed me to retrieve data from different supports such as web pages, electronic documents and publications, audio, video, pictures, power points, and digitalized archives. In the case of Brazil this traceability has been fostered as well by the
development of transparency and accountability policies. This new generation of sources was key for the investigation as they allowed the establishment of a detailed sequence of the slum upgrading materialization process, and the follow up of instrument's controversies. Among these new sources that I used for the investigation, the digitalized Official Journal of Rio de Janeiro Municipal Chamber was the most valuable.

Official Journal of Rio de Janeiro Municipal Chamber (DCMRJ)

The Official Journal of Rio de Janeiro Municipal Chamber (DCMRJ) is a daily publication that includes not only the different legislative acts such as bills but also the transcripts of a wide range of events such as work sessions, public hearings and debates in which a wide range of people and organizations participate. The DCMRJ represents thousands of pages. In recent years it was digitalized and a specific research engine was developed, making its systematic consultation easier. The DCMRJ was important for the investigation because it allowed the keeping of a clear sequence of events and the identification and follow up of housing policy controversies.

In order to select the relevant documents for tracing the slum upgrading, I tried several key words in the DCMRJ research engine. From that trial 'Favela-Bairro' was the most accurate key work for the investigation. Using 'Favela-Bairro', I conducted a systematic research from January 1993 to December 2012. Each hit on the research engine was evaluated in function of its excerpt. The number of hits evaluated were more than 8000 which represented about 1700 pages. In order to complete this search I tried other 'key works' such as specific issue, names or other housing programmes. However, these were not systematically searched. The bulk of the final selected documents included transcripts of public hearings organized by different Municipal Chamber committees on housing or Rio de Janeiro's housing policy; and public hearing of the committee of finance, budget and finance audit involving the Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH). They allowed me to follow slum upgrading controversies and together with the other sources such as the interviews and documents, I reconstructed the sequence of events around the use of the slum upgrading.

The public hearings of the committee of finance, budget and finance audit at the Municipal Chamber that were analysed included the presentation and discussion of the three different budget instruments in place since the beginning of the first decade of the 2000s : the pluri-
annual plan (PPA) that covers a period of 4 years and establishes the municipal executive objects and priorities, the budget guidelines law (LDO) that concerns the objectives and priorities of the yearly exercise, and the annual budget law (LOA) that involved the annual expected revenues and expenses. These public hearings involved municipal councillors, the housing secretary and staff, and civil society. The selected public hearings included as well debates about specific topics or issues organized by different Municipal Chamber committees or a specific municipal councillor. For instance, the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) on the Favela-Bairro (2001-2002) was approved and organized by the municipal chamber, and the public hearing for following the Favela-Bairro implementation (2006) was organized by municipal councillor Brizola Neto. These events included the participation of a vast range of actors from different organizations such as the municipal secretariats, CBOs, NGOs, private sectors, unions, favela dwellers, researchers. For a detailed list of the DCMRJ public hearings and participants see page 270.

**Other main sources**

In addition to the DCMRJ other digitalized or electronic databases were exploited (see Table 6). The research engines of the Rio de Janeiro Municipal Chamber (CMRJ), the Legislation inquiry called 'Consulta à Legislação', and the Official Diary of Rio de Janeiro (DORJ) were useful for following municipal executive and legislative acts such as law, decrees and resolutions related to the housing policy. These documents allowed me both to establish a chronological order of the housing policy materialization process and to identify a vast range of activities related to the instrument’s use. For a detailed list of these acts see page 278. The internet site of the Office of the Municipal Controller General and the websites 'Rio Transparente' were used to trace the financial activities related to the case. The following websites were also used for collecting data: Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH), Municipal Urban Institute database (Armazen de dados do IPP), Rio de Janeiro Municipal Administration, Rio de Janeiro State Public Works Company (EMOP), Ministry of Cities-National Housing Secretariat (SNH), and the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC). I consulted as well the archives of the newspapers 'Jornal do Brasil' and 'O Globo' to follow the news about the slum upgrading implementation. Other websites such as the one of the Superior Electoral Tribunal, CAIXA, CBOs and NGOs were used on an ad hoc basis for tracing specific information and debates. The data collected through the web included a variety of formats such as electronic documents, videos and power points.
### Table 6 Main online sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site name / organization site</th>
<th>Type of data</th>
<th>Most complete period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official Diary of Rio de Janeiro (DORJ)</strong></td>
<td>Municipal executive acts.</td>
<td>2006-date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legislation inquiry (Consulta à legislação)</strong></td>
<td>Municipal executive and legislative acts.</td>
<td>1990-date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Office of the Municipal Controller General</strong></td>
<td>Municipal accountability</td>
<td>2000-date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rio Transparente</strong></td>
<td>Municipal accountability</td>
<td>2008-date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH)</strong></td>
<td>Activities, News, Policy documents</td>
<td>2009-date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Municipal Urban Institute database (Armazen de dados do IPP)</strong></td>
<td>Evaluations, analysis, Maps, cartography, Quantitative data</td>
<td>1990-date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rio de Janeiro Municipal Administration</strong></td>
<td>Policy documents, News</td>
<td>2009-date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rio de Janeiro State Public Works Company (EMOP)</strong></td>
<td>Electronic news</td>
<td>2007-date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Cities - National Housing Secretariat (SNH)</strong></td>
<td>Policy documents, News, Publications</td>
<td>2003-date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC)</strong></td>
<td>Evaluations, News</td>
<td>2007-date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Superior Electoral Tribunal</strong></td>
<td>Election data</td>
<td>2002-date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O Globo</strong></td>
<td>News</td>
<td>2005-date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jornal do Brasil</strong></td>
<td>News</td>
<td>1990-2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Advantages, disadvantages and limitations

The major disadvantage of this new generation of sources was their size. Their use was time consuming, and sometimes the possibility of searching everything distracted the investigation. In addition, not all the emerging databases that I used had sophisticated research engines; thus, it was necessary to conduct several searches with different keywords, to collect data about a specific element. Furthermore, the amount of data sharply changed in relation to the periods. Data about slum upgrading before 2000s was few, while after 2005 the data available was of a great size. Another disadvantage was their stay online feature. Indeed, some of the accessed online information was no longer available a year later. Despite these disadvantages, these sources allowed to overcome traditional, oral and written sources limitations.

The new sources allowed me to collect systematically information which was necessary for unfolding the slum upgrading instrument 'associations'. This vast amount of existing data also allowed me to evaluate the accuracy and precision of the information. This was crucial in relation to the DCMRJ public hearings. Indeed, even if they included different people, topics and types of events, they all related to the specific setting of the municipal chamber, which could put into question their relevance at the city level debates. The complex data triangulation (triangulation of data and sources) that was facilitated and extended with the new generation of sources allowed me to evaluate the reliability of the data I collected from the DCMRJ.

3.4.3 Processing and organizing data

The data analysis consisted in a reconstruction of the sequence of events around the slum upgrading instrumentation through a micro processing of data collected from the mentioned sources. In particular, I focused on the controversies around and about the slum upgrading instrument, paying attention to the interaction of the heterogeneous entities at play (humans and non-human). This work allowed to unfold the slum upgrading 'translation' process, revealing how the slum upgrading influenced housing policy and governance transformation, while considering the hypotheses. Therefore, the analysis of the collected data did not involve any interpretation or measurement through their use as this investigation, adopting the ANT perspective, considered that reality is an emerging phenomenon that results from the interactions of things rather than being socially
constructed or objectively given. Finally, the data analysis ended when I gathered enough evidence for supporting this investigation hypotheses beyond reasonable doubt.

In order to organize and process the data I created an 'Investigation Diary' in which I traced the research process. I started the diary at the beginning of the first fieldwork in June 2011 and I kept it until today. This first device related to the 'log of the inquiry' notebook whose role is to 'document the transformation one undergoes by doing the travel' (Latour 2005: 134). However, Latour highlighted that 'this is neither for the sake of epistemic reflexivity nor for some narcissist indulgence into one's own work, but because from now on everything is data' (ibid: 133). The Diary allowed me to preserve a detailed sequence of events related to this investigation which facilitated to trace this work's translation moments as I considered it an 'actant' itself interacting with the slum upgrading instrument.

I created as well a register in which each information about the case was integrated and organized by day and source and without distinction about its nature: event, publication, contract signature, election day, announcement etc (see Figure 3). This registry supported the reconstruction of the sequence of events of slum upgrading instrumentation, allowing the identification of the different slum upgrading 'translation' moments: 'problematization', 'interessement', 'enrolment', 'mobilization' and 'dissidence' (betray and 'controversy').

I enriched this registry through the interviews, specific case analysis, archives and other written sources including laws, decrees, evaluations, grey literature, press, biographies, books and financial accounts. This register related to the 'gathering information notebook' devised by Latour (2005), and was complemented by a registry in which I mapped politicians, municipal staff and other actors that emerged from the investigation. I also elaborated schemes that allowed to support and facilitate the reconstruction of the sequence of events, and thus of the unfolding of the slum upgrading associations and dissociations (Figure 4). However, as Latour pointed out 'drawing with a pencil is not the same thing as drawing the shape of a pencil' (Latour 2005: 142). I consider that this differentiation relates to fact that ANT 'does not wish to add social network to social theory but to rebuild social theory out of networks' (Latour 1996: 2). Thus, elaborating maps and schemes was not the objective of the analysis but the instrument that allowed to follow the slum upgrading instrument in order to unfold its 'translation'. 
Figure 3 Excel registry screen shot. The registry included three main colons: date, information and source. It allowed to include data as the investigation was unfolding.
Source: Hector Becerril June 2013

Figure 4 Illustrator CS6 file screen shot. The use of Illustration for elaborating maps and schemes allowed to modify them in function of the data collection process.
Source Hector Becerril Miranda June 2013
In addition, I conducted various writing trials during and not just at the end of the investigation because as Latour (2005) argued 'the unique adequacy one should strive for in deploying complex imbroglios cannot be obtained without continuous sketches and drafts. It is impossible to imagine that one would gather the data for a period of time and only then begin to write it down' (ibid: 134). These trials included attempts to account for the instrument's effects and how it influenced Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance evolution and allowed to move further the investigation, discarding and selecting new lines of inquiry.

These writing trials became the main support for writing the empirical chapters which reconstruct the slum upgrading 'instrumentation'. The main particularity of the empirical chapters is that they constitute a chronological 'thick description'. Specifically, the term 'description' relates to ANT understanding that 'describing or accounting for a network is what an explanation or an explication is and has ever been even in so-called hard sciences' (Latour 1996: 12). In addition, I chose to organize the 'thick description' in a chronological order with the aim of respecting the sequence of the slum upgrading 'translation' process. Therefore, the empirical chapters are a chronological 'thick description' which purpose is to deploy slum upgrading 'associations' rather than to produce a detailed account of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance evolution.

The chronological 'thick description' seeks to reveal slum upgrading instrument's specific effects and how they contributed to shape housing policy and governance. It includes the evidence that supports this investigation argumentation beyond reasonable doubt, following the burden of proof obligation. Therefore, as in the case of a crime investigation with the discovery of DNA traces that might challenge judicial judgments (even death sentences) years or decades later, the 'description' of the slum upgrading instrumentation might be challenged if new relevant and reliable evidence is discovered.
3.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the research methods. The first part explored ANT and its linkages with the PPI approach. It stressed that ANT understands 'the social' as an heterogeneous network of entities called 'actants' created by 'translation' which entails the following moments: 'problematization', 'interessement', 'enrolment', 'mobilization' and 'dissidences' (betray and controversy). This part noted that 'actants' become strong by 'assembling' more 'allies' (other 'actants') and can become 'Obligatory Passage Points' (OPP), i.e. indispensable in the network. It also observed that ANT understands 'reality' as an emerging process produced by actants' association activity, and that it localizes agency in the 'actants'. In addition, this part explored ANT linkages with the PPI approach and Foucault's work, and responded to the concerns about it use for policy analysis. Lastly, this part highlighted the relevance of ANT for this research as its allows to understand that the instrument as an 'actant' had agency, focus on the interaction of heterogeneous entities involved in Rio's policy 'instrumentation' and consider 'how' rather than 'why' questions, supporting the research orientation.

The second part described how ANT informed this research. Specifically, this part stated that Rio de Janeiro's housing policy was understood as an 'actant' brought into existence by the association of different entities including the slum upgrading instrument. The latter was also understood as an 'actant'. This second part also highlighted that the research following ANT adopted the 'detective work' methods which entailed the tracing and unfolding of the slum upgrading 'associations' through a micro processing of data that allowed to establish the slum upgrading instrumentation sequence of events. This was used in order to reveal the role of the slum upgrading in the housing governance and policy evolution and transformation. In particular, this second part described the first investigation steps which involved the isolation of the 'actant', i.e. closing artificially the 'actant' for the purpose of the research; the realization of a preliminary research, i.e. Rio de Janeiro case 'walk through'; and the elaboration of a first account that allowed to redefine the hypotheses.

The third part offered a detailed account of how the investigation was conducted afterwards, focusing on the data collection, data analysis and organization, and elaboration of writing trials and the final account (empirical chapters). In relation to the data collection this part pointed out the relevance of new online data bases for tracing the slum upgrading translation moments as the traditional written and oral resources proved limited. In relation
to data analysis, this part observed that the investigation entailed the reconstruction of the sequence of events of the slum upgrading instrumentation through a micro processing of data. This work allowed to unfold the slum upgrading associations (translation moments), revealing slum upgrading role in the evolution of Rio's housing policy and governance. Therefore, the data analysis did not involve any interpretation or measurement using the collected data as this investigation considered that reality is an emerging phenomenon that results from the interaction of things rather than being socially constructed or objectively given. Then, the third part described how the data was organized through different supports. Lastly, this final part pointed out on the one hand, how the elaboration of various writing trials aimed to reconstruct this case sequence of events, relating evidence to support this research hypotheses beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, it stressed that the trials supported the elaboration of the final account that is a chronological 'thick description' whose objective is to deploy slum upgrading 'associations' thereby revealing how it influenced Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance evolution.

The next chapter introduces in detail the case of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy. Then CHAPTER 5, CHAPTER 6, CHAPTER 7 constitute the chronological 'thick description' of the choice and use of the slum upgrading instrument.
'Having said this, I feel rather embarrassed in speaking about Rio de Janeiro, which I find off-putting in spite of its oft-extolled beauty. I don’t quite know how to make the point. It seems to me that the landscape in which Rio is set is out of proportion to its own dimensions. The Sugar Loaf Mountain, the Corcovado and the much-praised natural features appear to the travellers entering the bay like stumps sticking up here in a toothless mouth...On the seaward side, the optical illusion is the opposite of the one which obtains in New York; here, it is nature which has the appearance of an unfinished building-site...The whole scene exists as a unique and global entity. Surrounding one overwhelmingly on all sides is not the inexhaustible diversity of beings and things, but a single, awe-inspiring presence: the New World" (Lévi Strauss 1992).

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the case of Rio de Janeiro in order to grasp the framing conditions of the choice and use of the slum upgrading during the 1990s and first decade of the 2000s. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part reviews the emergence of housing initiatives at the time when Rio de Janeiro was still a federal district, showing it swinging between favelas’ urbanization and housing construction (1900s-1950s). The second part explores the housing experience when Rio de Janeiro became the city state of Guanabara and the dominant approach supported by the military regime was favelas razing and housing construction (1960s-1975). Finally, the last part focuses on Rio de Janeiro's housing initiatives after it became a municipality in 1975, highlighting the consolidation of knowledge, know-how and institutional capacity at the municipal level in relation to favelas' urbanization.
4.2 **HOUSING POLICY IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT CONTEXT**

4.2.1 **Housing initiatives in Rio de Janeiro: the origins**

*Once upon a time*

Rio de Janeiro, the second largest Brazilian municipality and capital of the regional state of the same name, had had a tumultuous politico-administrative history before the 1990s when the slum upgrading was adopted as a policy instrument. Discovered by the Portuguese in January 1st 1502, Rio was formally founded in March 1565. Its political and military importance emerged in 1619 when the city became the capital of the captaincy of Rio de Janeiro. The city's urban development was complicated by its topography and mangrove swamps which fostered diseases such as malaria and yellow fever (Gilbert 1995). Nevertheless, the development of mining promoted Rio's economic and urban development; and in 1763 it became the colonial capital and the largest urban centre in Brazil with about 50,000 inhabitants (ibid). During this period, Rio attracted public sector resources for infrastructure projects such as drainage works and the Lapa aqueduct.

Rio's economy was further boosted by the arrival of the Portuguese royal family in 1808 (Gilbert 1995). The city became the capital of the Portuguese Empire and the first housing crisis emerged because there was a housing shortage due to the arrival of the Portuguese Royal Court (ibid). In 1822 Brazil became an empire independent of Portugal and Rio its capital. In the following decades the city grew to be Brazil's cultural, commercial and industrial centre. Urban problems such as housing deficit and increased poverty also emerged at that time. In 1889 when the First Brazilian Republic was instituted Rio became a federal district and capital of the republic (ibid). At the beginning of the 20th century, when Rio was a federal district the first public sector housing-related actions took place.

*From Passos to Agache*

Francisco Pereira Passos, Mayor of Rio de Janeiro from 1902 to 1906, launched an urban reform whose aims were Rio's sanitation, urbanization and beautification. During this period a commission was created for elaborating recommendations about social housing which was an issue pushed by doctors and engineers concerned with hygiene and sanitation. 'Cortiços' (slum tenements), 'hotels', 'pensions', favelas and other social housing typologies were studied. The recommendation was their eradication as they were perceived
as a pathology that should be eliminated. This position was maintained and developed with the increase of favelas across Rio de Janeiro in the following years. Nevertheless, at that time Everardo Backheuser who was a member of the commission set up by Mayor Passos already developed the idea of constructing social housing estates named 'Vilas Operarias' (Valladares 2006).

By the middle of the 1920s Mattos Pimenta who fostered a campaign against the favelas, associating them with leprosy, also proposed as a solution their eradication and the construction of housing estates. In 1927, the Federal District administration hired Alfred Agache, French architect and sociologist, to develop a master plan for the city. This plan aimed at establishing guidelines for Rio de Janeiro's structuring, development and beautification. Like Backheuser and Pimenta, Agache's recommendation for social housing was the destruction of favelas and the construction of housing units. At that moment Rio de Janeiro's housing issues consolidated around the favelas. The Agache's plan was approved but it was never implemented because of the 1930 revolution (Valladares 2006).

4.2.2 Between housing construction and urbanization

Beginning of state housing initiatives

The eradication of favelas and the construction of social housing estates as a solution was materialized during the presidency of Getúlio Vargas. Vargas who became president in 1930 and established an authoritarian government in 1937 that lasted until 1945, was concerned about hygiene and sanitation, and believed that workers should have access to housing and food. During his administration Rio's building law (Código de obras) was approved (1937). It established favelas evictions and the construction of housing estates; however, it also acknowledged the existence of favelas and proposed their improvement. The building law encouraged the construction of housing estates called 'Parques proletarios' between 1942 and 1945 in Gavea, Caju and Praia do Pinto. They were the first constructed for favela dwellers and housed 8,000 of them.

In spite of their small scale as about 250,000 people were living in favelas at that time, the 'Parques proletarios' represented a change regarding housing and favelas (Valladares 2006). Firstly, they followed Vargas' populist view that for intervening in the urban space the State should consider the population. Secondly, the 'Parques proletarios' and favelas' urbanization related to electoral interest because carrying out these actions secured popular
support for the authoritarian regime. During this period public sector housing solutions were not limited to favela dwellers. Social housing estates were developed as well for Federal District workers, such as Gavea and Pedregulho designed by Affonso Eduardo Reidy, using modern architecture principles (Freire & Oliveira 2002).

Housing initiatives by the catholic church

In addition, during the 1940s and 1950s the Catholic Church developed housing initiatives, particularly directed at favela dwellers. Aiming at materially and morally supporting favela dwellers, the Federal District associated with the Rio de Janeiro archdioceses created the Fundação Leão XIII. Between 1947 and 1954 this institution implemented basic public services such as water supply and sewage networks in about 34 favelas. In addition, it created and supported social centres in some of the largest favelas such as Rocinha and Jacarezinho. In 1955, the Catholic Church created another institution called Cruzada São Sebastião which implemented 51 basic services projects in 12 favelas between 1956 and 1960. The Cruzada also implemented urbanization projects in two favelas, Morro Azul and Parque Alegria, and advocated against the removal of 3 favelas: Borel, Esqueleto, and Dona Marta. Furthermore, the Cruzada developed a social housing estate in Leblon for Praia do Pinto favelas' dwellers (Figure 5). This experience became the first that included favela dwellers' relocation in the same area (Burgos 2003).

Figure 5 Cruzada housing estate. This complex emerged from an agreement between the regional state of Rio de Janeiro and the Catholic Church. Source: Freire & Oliveira 2002
4.3 HOUING POLICY IN THE CITY STATE CONTEXT

4.3.1 Towards favelas eviction and razing

*From federal district to the city state of Guanabara*

During the Presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) the idea of constructing a capital that emerged with the instauration of the First Brazilian Republic (1889) materialized. Designed by Lucio Costa, Brasilia was inaugurated in 1960 as the new capital of the country and Rio de Janeiro became the city state of Guanabara. This status gave the Mayor political autonomy and the city financial advantages because it acquired a double tax collection, thus, important financial resources. Moreover, the state of Guanabara could take advantage of the federal-state revenue sharing system (Gilbert 1995). In this new politico-administrative landscape Carlos Lacerda was elected Governor of the state of Guanabara. During his administration (1961-1964) major urban infrastructures were built such as sanitation and road networks and the completion of the Flamengo landfill.

Housing policy during Lacerda's administration took neither a clear position between favelas' urbanization nor their eradication. Created in 1956, the Special Recovery Service of Anti-hygienic Housing (SERFHA) implemented some urbanization projects between 1961 and 1962; however, the SERFHA initiatives gradually faded. At that time the social housing company (COHAB) was created and aimed at establishing a housing policy for the state of Guanabara. In addition to the creation of COHAB, the Fundação Leão XIII became a state autarchy. Through these bodies the state of Guanabara carried out some favelas' urbanization, and constructed large scale social housing estates such as Vila Kennedy and City of God (Figure 6). In addition, it realized several evictions that affected 30,000 people by 1965 (Burgos 2003).
Figure 6 City of God housing estate funded in partnership with USAID. The housing units were organized around squares forming small clusters which were themselves planned around a main centre that included services and community equipments. 
Source: Brito n.d.
In 1964 a military dictatorship was established in Brazil, suppressing presidential elections one year later. The first presidents of this regime were Castelo Branco (1964-1967), Costa e Silva (1967-1969); and Medici (1969-1974). The regional state elections were maintained. In the state of Guanabara elected as Governors were Francisco Negrão de Lima (1965-1970) and Chagas Freitas (1970 to 1975). However, the military dictatorship concentrated politico-financial power at federal level. For instance, by 1967 tax assets expanded, yet the allocation of these resources were concentrated at federal level (Santos & Motta 2003). Moreover, the military regime benefited from an economic expansion, particularly between 1969 and 1973 when the Growth Domestic Product (GDP) grew on average more than 10% annually. In this politico-financial landscape the Federal Government controlled the design and financing of public policies and blocked initiatives that did not converge with the regime's interests. The state of Guanabara that was the unique state governed by the opposition lost its autonomy (ibid).

In relation to the housing policy in the city state of Guanabara, at the beginning Francisco Negrão de Lima authorized the creation of the Community Development Company (CODESO). This body promoted favelas' urbanization and favela dwellers' participation during the process. CODESO developed projects in Brás de Pina and Morro União. Nevertheless, this approach was marginalized by the emergence and development of the national housing policy with the creation of the SFH and the BNH (see CHAPTER 2: 37). The military regime created in 1967 the Greater Rio Area Coordinating Office for social housing (CHISAME) to develop a unified housing policy in the states of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro. Under the Federal Interior Ministry and related to the BNH, CHISAME promoted favelas razing and the construction of housing estates through the COHABs (Burgos 2003). From 1962 to 1974, in the city state of Guanabara 80 favelas were razed 26,193 shacks were destroyed and 139,218 people were relocated (Figure 7, Figure 8) (Valladares 2006). The number of housing units built during this period reached 48,985 (Fiori et al. 2000).

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20 For a detailed account of this initiative see Carlos Nelson Ferreira Santos related literature.
Figure 7 Field after a favela razing in Leblon, Zona Sul. Source: IPLANRIO 1988

Figure 8 People being relocated in housing estates. Source: IPLANRIO 1988
4.3.2 Shifting housing policy direction after the fusion

At national level the military regime continued under Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) and João Figueiredo (1979-1985). Right after Geisel's arrival, the merging of the states of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro was approved. The main reasons for merging both states were the need to invigorate the city's economy, integrate Rio de Janeiro and greater Rio municipalities, and counterbalance the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais growing geopolitical power at the centre-south of Brazil (Motta 2001). In 1975 the merger was accomplished and Faria Lima was appointed Governor of the more powerful state of Rio de Janeiro. Even if the city of Rio de Janeiro remained the capital of the newly created state, it became a simple municipality and lost its political autonomy as the state Governor of Rio de Janeiro obtained the capacity to appoint Rio's Mayor. In 1979 the state of Rio de Janeiro regained some political autonomy with the return as Governor of the regime's opponent Chagas Freitas. Nevertheless, all Rio de Janeiro Mayors until 1985 were nominated by the state Governor: Tomoio, Klabin, Coutinho, Haddad and Alencar.

Right after this major politico-administrative change, housing policy in Rio de Janeiro started to move towards favelas' urbanization. The Federal Government dissolved CHISAME in 1975 and the pace of favela evictions decelerated. The end of the decade was marked by the crisis of the Financial Housing System (SFH) and greater political openness; the Federal Government launched the PROMORAR programme in 1979. This programme aimed at urbanizing favelas and the first project was implemented in the Mare complex formed by six favelas in Rio de Janeiro. The Federal Government also implemented a social interest electricity programme to expand the electricity network to favelas.

At municipal level the Mayor Klabin created the Municipal Social Development Secretariat (SMDS) in 1979 whose objective was to work with low-income population (Fiori et al. 2000). One year later in partnership with UNICEF, the SMDS proposed the implementation of public services in favelas through favela dwellers' participation. The aims of this initiative were the reduction of infrastructure costs by covering a larger population and the development of specific technologies adapted to favelas (Fontes & Coelho 1989). The SMDS also started the establishment of a favelas' register in partnership with IPLANRIO in 1980 (Figure 9). Its objective was to facilitate the urbanization, land regularization, and accessibility and basic sanitation works in favelas (PCRJ 1983), which were among the major demands formulated by the favelas' dwellers (Cavallieri 1985). In
addition, in 1981 the SMDS launched the Mutirão programme whose objective was to improve sanitation and water supply in favelas (Barbosa 2002). In particular, the Mutirão programme was conceived by the SMDS as a social work initiative.

Figure 9 Favelas registry. Ordered by the SMDS and elaborated by the IPLANRIO. Source: PCRJ 1983
4.4 HOUSING POLICY AT THE MUNICIPALITY SINCE 1980s

4.4.1 Consolidation of the urbanization of favelas

*Housing initiatives initiated by the state of Rio de Janeiro*

The development of favelas' urbanization as a housing policy approach was further developed with the arrival of Leonel Brizola at the head of the state of Rio de Janeiro. Brizola had a longstanding political career and on his return from exile created the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) in 1979. Brizola won the first Rio de Janeiro state elections after the merge with a populist style (Goirand 2000). The main priorities of his campaign were: land regularization, education, food distribution, combat against social inequalities and corruption (ibid). Right after the elections Brizola developed two lines of work to fulfil his electoral promises and secure the support of low income groups and workers who represented the bulk of his electoral base (Fiori et al. 2000; Goirand 2000). These lines of work were an ambitious education policy articulated around the construction of Public Education Integrated Centres (CIEPs) and the promotion of favelas' urbanization.

In relation to favelas' urbanization, the state of Rio de Janeiro launched a non-conventional programme to improve favelas basic infrastructure named PROFACE funded by the Federal Government (Verde 2000). Managed and implemented by the Water and Sewage State Company (CEDAE), PROFACE covered 74 favelas between 1983 and 1985 which benefitted around 250,000 people (Fiori et al. 2000). Brizola's administration also launched the 'Cada familia um lote' programme (Each family One plot). This programme of land tenure legalization aimed to regularize 1 million plots in illegal subdivisions and favelas and then undertake urbanization works in those areas. However, the programme only issued about 23,000 deeds, registered 27,000 claims, and implemented upgrading works in two favelas: Pavão Pavãozinho and Rio das Pedras (ibid). During this period the Federal Government housing policy started to decline. By 1983, the National Housing Bank (BNH) limited the number of mortgages for the development of housing estates' programmes in the state of Rio de Janeiro; and the State Housing Company (CEHAB) that emerged after the merge focused on financing renovation works in housing estates rather than constructing new units (IPLANRIO 1988).
Housing actions developed by the municipality of Rio de Janeiro

At the beginning of the 1980s, the municipality of Rio de Janeiro unlike the state did not have political autonomy. Rio de Janeiro State Governor was still responsible for choosing the Mayor of Rio de Janeiro. Brizola appointed at the head of the municipal administration Jamil Haddad (1983), and then Marcello Alencar (1983-1986). During both administrations favelas' urbanization was further developed through the expansion of the Mutirão programme. As mentioned, Mutirão was launched in 1981. During 1982 the programme benefitted about 20,000 people across 7 favelas by implementing sewage network, paving roads and providing water supply (Fontes & Coelho 1989). In the following year Mutirão was extended to another 20 communities, benefiting about 134,000 people. At its inception the selection of projects to be included in the programme was informed by specific demands formulated by the communities. Once approved, the favelas' dwellers provided voluntarily the work force while the SMDS provided construction materials and technical support (ibid).

By the end of 1983 the method changed. The Mutirão shifted from voluntary to a paid work force and was articulated with the State government programme PROFACE, fostering its development. The agreement between the state and the municipality was as follows: SMDS was responsible for the sewage network while CEDAE was responsible for the water supply (Fontes & Coelho 1989). Furthermore, this agreement included that the CEDAE would provide material constructions such as pipes and be responsible for the maintenance of the new networks (Barbosa 2002). Community participation gained strength as well during this period. For instance, in April 1984 the programme's evaluation and implementation included the participation of 60 community representatives; and in December of that year a Mutirão/Rio seminar brought together 150 communities (ibid). Besides sanitation infrastructure the Mutirão incorporated other public services. Between 1984 and 1985, through the programme four school, five crèches, one health centre and two sewing centres were constructed (ibid) (Figure 10).
4.4.2 Convergence towards favelas' urbanization as housing approach

In 1985 the first municipal elections after the merge took place and Brizola's candidate Saturnino Braga became the Mayor of Rio de Janeiro. During the Braga administration the urbanization of favelas was consolidated. The 1986 pluriannual work plan included the idea of developing a global intervention for urbanising Rio's favelas. Furthermore, it indicated the idea of favelas' integration and their transformation into neighbourhoods (Burgos 2003). Under this perspective at the beginning the new municipal administration sought to enhance community participation, develop municipal and state bodies involvement such as
the CEDAE and municipal work secretariat (SMO), and secure the maintenance works (Barbosa 2002).

During this period, the municipality enhanced its institutional capacity. In 1985 it created the first stock centre for construction materials, seeking to improve their management in the context of Mutirão projects (Barbosa 2002). A year later, the municipality created the Creche Coordinating Office within the SMDS. In addition, in 1987 the SMDS created a commission for indentifying favelas located in risk areas (ibid) and in 1988 it restructured the Community Development Coordinating Department into the Community Planning, Sanitation and Engineering Office (SESUC) in an attempt to expand the scope of interventions. The SMDS also launched the Mutirão Reforestation programme aiming at preserving natural reserves, limiting favelas expansion and stabilizing hillsides. Lastly, it started to focus and prioritize the construction of sport and leisure equipments (ibid).

Besides the SMDS, other municipal bodies started to intervene in favelas as well. The geotechnical municipal company (Geo-Rio) mapped favelas in risk areas, contributing to the elaboration of a global intervention plan. The plan included detailed information that allowed to determine municipal intervention by type of risk, solution, zone, and the municipal body responsible. In addition, due to the 1988 floods the municipal administration elaborated a proposal for the World Bank that comprised 7 projects to be conducted by the municipal company of urbanism linked to the SMO named RioUrbe to benefit 43 communities that were in risk areas and an unhealthy environment. Geo-Rio also proposed to the World Bank and to the CAIXA 123 projects in favelas. During the resettlement after the mentioned floods, municipal bodies worked together with the SMDS on favelas' urbanization. The selected projects were developed by SMDS and RioUrbe. Subsequently, the latter detailed projects' design and construction works. This process included the participation of residents and other institutional bodies such as Light and CEDAE (Barbosa 2002).

At the beginning of Marcello Alencar's administration in 1989 the Mutirão programme objective was consolidated around improving the quality of life in the favelas through their integration into the urban grid. Specifically, health, reforestation and infrastructure were defined as the main Mutirão lines of work (Table 7). In order to materialize the Mutirão objectives, the SMDS was restructured around three coordinating offices working in a
matrix-based system. These coordinating offices were the SESUC created one year before (see page 101), the social assistance office (SAS); and social projects office (SPS) (Freire et al. 2009).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Objective</th>
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| Infrastructure works | To implement urban infrastructure, sewage, drainage, paving, drainage, stairs, small hillside stabilization works.  
To promote the participation of other municipal and State bodies for the construction and maintenance of public services, such as SMO, CEDAE and COMLRUB. |
| Reforestation      | To promote erosion control.  
To preserve natural water network, fruit trees,  
To foster the development of farming and reforestation projects.  
To limit favelas expansion. |
| Health education   | To develop a health database.  
To discuss with the community construction works and health.  
To promote environmental education activities. |

Furthermore, from 1989 the SMDS started developing a Simplified Urbanization Programme for favelas that had some public services and equipments constructed through public investments in the past. This approach considered several dimensions for favelas' urbanization: physical, environmental, social, political, and cultural (Barbosa 2002). In addition, the Simplified Urbanization Programme detailed the different phases of the projects. The phases were: preliminary report for capturing resources, elaboration of preliminary objectives, guidelines and discussion with the population; elaboration of basic plans that included detailed guidelines and objectives, construction work programme, and financial architecture; and finally the elaboration of an evaluation report with recommendations. The Simplified Urbanization Programme was experimented in four favelas: Biruti, Congonhas Salgueiro and Formiga (Barbosa 2002). Thus, at the end of the 1980s the SMDS consolidated within the municipal administration knowledge, know-how about favelas and their urbanization mainly through the development of the favelas registry, the Mutirão and the Simplified Urbanization programmes. In addition, the SMDS gained strength with its restructuring and the making of alliances with the favelas' dwellers, and public sector bodies such as Geo-Rio, RioUrbe and CEDAE.
The urbanization of favelas as the main municipal housing policy approach strongly related to three other processes at national level. Firstly, the Federal Government started to invest in the urbanization of favelas through some programmes such as PROMORAR and PROFACE. Secondly, the extinction of the BNH in 1986 compromised the construction of housing estates as a housing policy approach and undermined federal interference in Rio de Janeiro's housing policy. Thirdly, the enactment of the new constitution (see CHAPTER 2 page 40) gave Rio de Janeiro, as to all Brazilian municipalities, not only political and financial autonomy, but also the responsibility for developing public policies. In particular, Rio de Janeiro became responsible for its urban and housing policy through the elaboration of a Master Plan that was enacted in 1992 (see CHAPTER 5).

Nevertheless, despite the changes and progress accomplished during the 1980s, the problems around poverty and favelas aggravated. The number of people living in poverty continued to increase and Rio became the municipality with the highest absolute number of poor people, and the highest Gini index in the country (Fiori et al. 2000). In addition, the number of people living in favelas continued to rise from about 169 thousand people in 1950 to 882 thousand in 1991 (Figure 11). Moreover, violence around the favelas sharply increased during the 1980s (Fiori et al. 2000). Thus, Rio de Janeiro's favelas and their urbanization remained a major concern for the municipality.

![Figure 11 Evolution of favelas' population in Rio de Janeiro from 1950 to 1980.](image)

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed Rio de Janeiro's housing policy emergence and evolution until the end of the 1980s. After a brief description of Rio de Janeiro's politico-administrative evolution, the first part of the chapter explored housing policy when Rio was a federal district, and highlighted the swinging approach between urbanization and housing construction. The second part of the chapter focused on the housing experiences when Rio de Janeiro became the city state of Guanabara, and showed that the favelas eviction and housing construction became the dominant approach. This part explained as well that this swing related to the politico-administrative centralization process fostered by the military regime that lasted from 1965 to 1985. The last part of the chapter describes the housing policy evolution since the merger of the states of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro, when the city of Rio became a municipality. This part showed how gradually favelas' urbanization as housing policy approach was fostered by the three levels of government. In particular, it explained how cognitive and normative frames around favelas' urbanization emerged and were developed within the municipality through the SMDS initiatives.

Throughout this account this chapter showed that after many swings at the end of the 1980s the cognitive and normative frames of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy were being consolidated around favelas' urbanization. The municipality developed knowledge and know-how about favelas and their urbanization, gained institutional capacity and formed alliance with various actors involved in the housing sector. It was from and within this housing policy landscape that the choice and use of slum upgrading as housing policy instrument took place.

The following three chapters constitute the chronological 'thick description' of use of the slum upgrading instrument that reveals how it influenced housing policy and governance, evolution and transformation.
CHAPTER 5 SLUM UPGRADING: HOLDING TOGETHER

'This one [an innovation] is in perpetual search of allies. It must be integrated in a network of actors who take it again, support it, move it, and this depends very directly on the operated technical choices' (Akrich et al. 1988a: 20).

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The chapter explores slum upgrading emergence and development as Rio de Janeiro's housing policy instrument during the 1990s, seeking to reveal its role for housing policy and governance evolution and transformation.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part examines the instauration of the instruments, highlighting the existence of cognitive and normative frames that supported the choice of the slum upgrading as main housing policy instruments. The second part examines the development of slum upgrading, stressing its role in the development and evolution of the policy and governance. The last part explores the main controversies surrounding the slum upgrading in the second half of the 1990s, showing how criticism and an emerging opposition were destabilized.
5.2 THE EMERGENCE OF SLUM UPGRADEING

5.2.1 The cognitive and normative foundations

Consolidating municipal administration expertise

At the beginning of the 1990s the Municipal Social Development Secretariat (SMDS) continued to develop its programmes and projects in favelas, in particular the Mutirão programme, expanding municipal administration knowledge and know-how about the favelas and slum upgrading approach. Based on the Mutirão programme main lines of work established in 1989, the SMDS proposed in 1990 for the Rio-92 Conference three types of programmes (reforestation, basic sanitation and health education) for 70 communities in 14 hills across the city (see Figure 12). In particular, the project in Caricó's hill aspired to transform the favela into a neighbourhood and become a model to be replicated in Rio de Janeiro (Jornal do Brasil 1992a). The novelty of this intervention was not only the participation of the SMDS known as the 'Municipal Secretariat of Favelas' (interview with Isabel Tostes), but also the involvement of other municipal bodies and favelas' dwellers for its implementation (PCRJ 2003). In addition the SMDS consolidated the guidelines of the Simplified Urbanization Programme that emerged in 1989 (see CHAPTER 4: 102).

Figure 12 The environment capital. UN conference makes municipality invest in poor communities. Source: Jornal do Brasil 1990
At the same time the SMDS continued to experiment in the field, it fostered debates about the urbanization of favelas. In May 1992 the SMDS organized the first workshop named 'Favelas areas, urbanization and environment'. The conclusion of this event saw the establishment of an operational framework for urbanizing favelas that included corrective and preventive recommendations. The proposed corrective actions involved water sewage and drainage infrastructure, garbage collection, and spatial integration of favelas into the urban network through the creation or reordering of accesses. The proposed preventive actions included among others land regularization and construction of housing, taking into account several factors such as transport, education and the job market. The operational framework was also to include the municipalization of public services, the consolidation of participatory mechanism and the prioritization of favelas in the municipal agenda. Moreover, the methodology indicated the need for collaboration and coordination of the municipal secretariats and the integration of favelas' surroundings (neighbourhood and administrative region) in each urbanization project (PCRJ 2003).

**Establishing legal and regulatory frames**

In addition, the local Master Plan approved by the Municipal Chamber in June 1992 set up housing policy cognitive and normative frames (Complementary Law No.16/1992). The Master Plan established four major housing policy objectives (ibid: Art.138):

- To guarantee access to housing with infrastructure, transport and public services; to relocate people living in risk areas.
- To urbanize and regularize favelas and illegal housing estates.
- To make available urbanized plots and to construct housing units.
- To find financial resources to implement housing programmes.

Consequently, the Master Plan prioritized four types of programmes (ibid: 146):

- Urbanization and land regularization of favelas.
- Urbanization and land regularization of low income subdivisions.
- Urbanized plots.
- Housing construction.

The Master Plan not only established the general objectives of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy, but also detailed cognitive and normative frames for implementing the main
programmes, including the urbanization and land regularization of favelas. The Master Plan defined a favela as:

'an area predominantly characterized by occupation of the land by low-income population, precariousness of urban infrastructure and public services, narrow roads and of irregular alignment, lots of irregular size and shape and unlicensed constructions in disagreement with legal standards' (Complementary Law No.16/1992: Art. 147).

The Master Plan also defined three general favelas urbanization guidelines (Complementary Law No.16/1992):
- To maximize public funds and spread the benefits among the population by progressive interventions in favelas (Art. 148).
- To include favelas in the overall city planning and maintenance (Art. 149).
- To guarantee the stay of families in the favelas (Art. 150).

In addition, the following criteria were indicated for selecting the favelas to be given priority: technical viability, benefit-cost ratio, existence of risk area, and proximity to an environmental conservation area (ibid: Art. 151). The Master Plan also indicated that these principles and methods should be materialized through a land analysis and the elaboration of urban projects (ibid: Art 152), which should aim to integrate Rio's favelas into the neighbourhood, to preserve their local culture, and to progressively implement basic infrastructure and public services. The methodology and items of urban projects were also specified:

"The urbanization will be performed based on urban projects through prioritizing the implementation of water supply, sewerage, solid waste removal, and the elimination of risk factors. The urbanization shall be complemented by roads treatment, implementation of drainage and public lighting, the implementation of alignment reforestation projects, where appropriate. Complementary urban equipment for health education and other leisure will be implemented obeying the urban scale of the area and its location. The favelas urbanization projects will contemplate, where technically possible, solutions that eliminate risk factors for residents. Local technical offices will be installed for managing the programme execution, enforcing urban legislation, and providing technical and social assistance to the residents' (Art.152 paragraph 2-6)."
5.2.2 The constitution of the slum upgrading

Cesar's victory: the new politico-administrative landscape

The constitution of the municipal housing policy and emergence of the slum upgrading instrument coincided with the arrival of Cesar Maia at the head of the municipal government. Maia had a political career and experience in public administration. Appointed by Leonel Brizola Rio de Janeiro state secretary of treasury from 1983-1987, he also became federal deputy in 1986 and was re-elected in 1990. He joined the PMDB in 1991, due to political differences with Leonel Brizola and the PDT. Maia decided to participate in the third municipal elections since the fusion; however, he had few supporters and was far behind Cidinha, the favoured candidate, who was supported by state Governor of Rio de Janeiro Leonel Brizola (PDT) (Jornal do Brasil 1992b). During the electoral campaign Maia and Benedita da Silva from the Workers Party (PT) grew in the preference polls (Jornal do Brasil 1992c), and made it to the second round (Jornal do Brasil 1992d). At the end Cesar Maia succeeded in being elected Mayor.

His victory in the 1992 elections without the support of a specific political party enabled Maia to start forming his own political group through the creation of a technocrat government, and the distribution of power among the different agents in charge of the decentralized municipal administration; in particular, among the sub-prefectures (Marques 2007). As he won the election without the PMDB support, Maia chose with complete freedom his municipal secretaries and administrative team, fostering the formation of his political group (ibid). Newcomers to the political arena such as Eduardo Paes and Solange Amaral were appointed to the five sub-prefectures created by Maia\(^{21}\). Maia gave some secretariats to his political allies and politicians who were close to him. For instance, municipal councillor Laura Carneiro was appointed at the head of the SMDS. Nevertheless, he kept part of the administration out of party interests. Maia appointed professionals without party involvement as municipal Secretaries (ibid). Among them Luiz Paulo Conde became municipal planning secretary.

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\(^{21}\) For a more detailed understanding of Rio de Janeiro's sub-prefectures and politics see Marques (2007).
**Municipal housing policy basis**

Since the beginning of 1993 housing issues were on the new administration agenda. Maia engaged in discussions with the State Governor and municipal councillors about Rio de Janeiro's housing policy. In particular, he sought to negotiate the construction of houses using CAIXA funds (Jornal do Brasil 1993a; Jornal do Brasil 1993b). By August, Maia created the Executive Group of Special Programme for Popular Settlements (GEAP). The GEAP was commissioned to design and implement until the end of Maia's administration housing programmes according to the housing policy guidelines indicated by the Master Plan. Even if the SMDS was up to that point the most involved municipal body in favelas (Jornal do Brasil 1992e), it was the Municipal Planning Secretariat (SMU) that became responsible for the elaboration of the housing policy as this secretariat was designated to coordinate the GEAP. This group included the participation of five other municipal bodies: the Municipal Attorney General Office (PGM), RioUrbe, IPLANRIO and the secretariats of works (SMO) and government (SMG) (Municipal Decree No.12205/1993).

Sergio Magalhães, who since the arrival of Conde at the head of the SMU worked at the irregular housing estate regularization office and IPLANRIO, was appointed to the head of the GEAP. Magalhães was an architect who developed the regeneration project in Niterói and already worked in Rio's municipal administration during Saturnino Braga's administration (1986-1988).

To elaborate Rio's housing policy the GEAP started a process of mapping all the housing-related activities and documents spread across the municipal secretariats such as SMU, SMO, SMDS and the Municipal Treasury Secretariat (SMF) (A. Freire & Oliveira 2008: 212). During this process in the year 1993 more municipal bodies officially joined the GEAP: the SMDS in September (Municipal Decree No.12296/1993) and the SMF in November (Municipal Decree No.12.432/1993). Furthermore, the work of the GEAP was not only informed by previous experience and but also by activities and debates that were happening at that time. For example, in August 1993 at the same time as the GEAP was created, a debate about the municipal housing policy took place at the Municipal Chamber organized by municipal councillors Jorge Bittar, Fernado William and Otavio Leite (DCMRJ 17/06/1994: 5-7). This event included the participation of different municipal staff like Luis Paulo Conde, Municipal Secretary of Urbanism (SMU), and Jorge Rodrigues and Lu Petersen staff of the SMDS who were strongly related to the Mutirão programme. The debate also involved representatives of different levels of government like Laert Lima
de Andrade from the CAIXA, researchers like Ricardo Pereira Lira, specialist in urban law at the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) and Adauto Cardoso, specialist in regional planning and housing at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). In addition, representatives from NGOs and CBOs also took part, namely Franklin Coelho from the National Movement for Urban Reform (MNRU). Moreover, important figures in housing discussions at national level like Erminia Maricato and Nabil Bonduki from the municipality of São Paulo, also participated in the debate.

The debates highlighted the lack of coordination between the different actors involved in the housing sector and the inefficiency of previous programmes. They also pointed out that the government had a key role because low income groups needed subsidies to access land and housing. Moreover, out of the debates emerged the idea of a municipal housing secretariat. Finally, the conclusions stated that the housing policy should not only include housing construction but other approaches such as self construction, regularization and slum upgrading:

"The housing policy cannot be reduced to the construction of new housing and should include rehabilitation of existing housing and slums, self-build programmes, regularization and urbanization of slums and illegal housing estates, among others (DCMRJ 17/06/1994: 6).

Informed by debates and the review of existing initiatives and capacities, at the end of 1993 the GEAP produced a document that included the bases of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy. This proposal was supported by three principles: (i) housing was a right; (ii) housing was not just the house, but also the integration with the urban structure (sanitation infrastructure, transport, education, health, leisure); and (iii) housing in this extended understanding was the responsibility of municipal authorities (Municipal Decree No.12994/1994). The proposal included six different programmes from slum upgrading to housing construction (see Table 8), which permitted divergent positions to be integrated, limiting opposition (interview with Sergio Magalhães). Nevertheless, the basis related to a movement away from housing construction as key housing instrument as the bulk of the programmes related to favelas’ urbanization:

'I remember Marcio Fortes, who was the secretary of works, asking: "Then we will not build more housing? I’m seeing in this proposal that we will not build more housing estates, we’ll do something
"Else". Then, Cesar Maia was even very emphatic: "Precisely, we won't build more housing estates, we'll do something else" (Sergio Magalhães in A. Freire & Oliveira 2008: 212).


<table>
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<tr>
<th>Programme Name</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lot regularization</td>
<td>To realize urban regularization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To construct infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favela-Bairro</td>
<td>To construct main urban structure (sanitation and access).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To offer the conditions to perceive favela as neighbourhoods by introducing urban values of the formal city as signs of identification as neighbourhood: roads, squares, infrastructure and public services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To take advantage of the collective effort already made and services and infrastructure already installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To make as few relocations as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land regularization and titling</td>
<td>To promote land titling in order to expand legal land use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To include irregular buildings in the city's register.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Novas alternativas</td>
<td>To offer land alternative with infrastructure for developers or families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morar sem Riscos</td>
<td>To eliminate hills erosion and flood risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To relocate the population when the elimination of risk is not possible and prevent new occupation in risk areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morar Carioca</td>
<td>To expand land offer in areas with infrastructure for the middle class.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To incentivize the construction of housing by small and medium entrepreneurs.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To promote the creation of housing cooperatives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal housing fund</td>
<td>To create specific resources for the housing policy implementation</td>
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In particular, regarding the slum upgrading the municipal housing bases created the Favela-Bairro programme, whose objective was the construction of urban infrastructure in favelas to allow them to be perceived as popular neighbourhoods of the city:

'*to introduce urban values from the formal city as signs of identification as neighbourhood: roads/squares/infrastructure/public services' (Municipal Decree No.12994/1994).
Thus, the Favela-Bairro programme was not only in line with Rio de Janeiro's Master Plan and the housing debates that supported the urbanization of favelas, but also with the SMDS aspiration as mentioned previously to transform favelas into neighbourhoods, integrating them into the city.

5.2.3 The building of alliances

The creation of the SeMH

By January 1994 Sergio Magalhães was appointed municipal housing extraordinary secretary; however, the housing secretariat did not exist yet. In the following months, Magalhães formed the municipal extraordinary housing secretariat (SeMH) with people from other municipal bodies. The formation of the SeMH was facilitated by the departure of Marcio Fortes (SMO) and Laura Carneiro (SMDS) who were candidates for the 1994 elections. They were replaced not by politicians but by Angela Nobrega Fonti, an architect who was close to the SMU Secretary; she was appointed at the SMO; and by Wanda Engel, a university professor and president of an NGO who was appointed at the SMDS. Together with Magalhães' appointment, in 1994 Maia expanded the number of municipal secretariats managed by professionals, undermining politico-electoral interest among the municipal secretariats.

The SMDS offices involved in urban development were transferred to the SeMH at the beginning of 1994, incorporating technical expertise in the urbanization of Rio's favelas previously developed through the Mutirão programme. The SMDS staff became interested in the slum upgrading instrument and the other SeMH initiatives as they represented an opportunity to develop further their work during the 1980s and to scale up the Mutirão experience (DCMRJ 09/06/1995: 10-11). In March 1994, the Municipal Decree No.12719/1994 rendered official this transfer and established the competency for the development of the housing policy to the SeMH. This allowed the new housing body to gain some independence from the SMU. Following the SMDS previous functioning (see CHAPTER 4: 101), the SeMH started working in a matrix-based system around two types of management offices: programme and function.

However, even if this transfer strengthened the emergence of the SeMH, the materialization of the municipal housing policy was still uncertain:
"Then we headed out looking for a place to establish ourselves; we occupied what was a restaurant of the annex building [to the municipality administration main building], which was disused. This beginning gave others a certain perception that this new department wouldn’t work. I was convinced it would work, at least we’d work hard. The annual budget was equivalent to R$8 million. In those years, it was more or less what was spent on housing" (Sergio Magalhães, A. Freire & Oliveira 2008: 213).

**Developing the housing policy through slum upgrading**

The first programme to be implemented by the SeMH was the slum upgrading programme called Favela-Bairro. This choice of the slum upgrading was informed by the experience the municipality had in favelas’ urbanization through the Mutirão programme. For instance, Lu Petersen who had worked on this programme during the 1980s became the Favela-Bairro programme manager. In addition, the choice of the slum upgrading was supported by the consensus it generated among most of the housing policy actors as an effective and suitable instrument for addressing Rio de Janeiro’s housing issues. This consensus was crystallized in the Master Plan. Lastly, the choice of the slum upgrading was encouraged by the municipality as it could afford Favela-Bairro programme launch without financial aid from national or international actors.

The first Favela-Bairro project was implemented in Andarai favela. This choice related to a decision made by the Mayor in favour of a municipal councillor (Magalhaes & Conde 2004: 81). In March, at the same time the SeMH was being instituted with the transfer of the SMDS staff, the Favela-Bairro programme started to take shape. The municipality announced a first investment of URVs$12 million22 for its development. However, taking into account that the municipal financial situation was bad and that the municipality could not afford alone the implementation of the municipal housing policy, the municipal executive sought to engage discussions with the Inter-American Development Bank (BID) for contracting a loan to develop Rio de Janeiro’s housing policy (Magalhaes & Conde 2004). In particular, the discussions between the municipality and the BID were around the financing of slum upgrading called urbanization programme of popular settlements - PUAP/BID (PCRJ 1994a; 1994b). However, at that time a BID loan appeared unachievable as the municipality did not have anything to negotiate with:

22 Value real unit, key measure of the Real Plan
"Sergio, we do not have anything to show to the BID, we just have a slogan actually we need to do something". I worked in the area of fundraising and knew that the BID works on projects and not upon ideas, got it? It analyses projects, analyses things more developed. Actually the BID delegation had to examine the depollution project of the Guanabara Bay, but it scheduled a morning for the favelas. I mean, in a morning what could we present? (Fernando Cavallieri, Freire & Oliveira 2008: 251).

In order to interest the BID, the municipality elaborated a classification of favelas whose objective was to support the use of the slum upgrading by setting a rational frame for conducting the urbanization of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas (Freire & Oliveira 2008). Named the 'classification matrix', this list was produced by a group that included several secretariats: SeMH, Geo-Rio, SMO, IPLANRIO and contained information about other municipal and Rio's state bodies such as the CEDAE (State Water and Sanitation company). Managed by Fernado Cavallieri this group did not have time nor resources, but they had an accumulated experience. Among the most relevant for this work was the existence of the registry of Rio’s favelas developed by the SMDS in the early 1980s (PCRJ 1983) (CHAPTER 4 page 96). The classification matrix not only served to establish a dialogue with the BID but also promoted the development of the slum upgrading instrument as it allowed to set up a method of selection for the Favela-Bairro programme.

**Beyond politics: building slum upgrading legitimacy**

The classification matrix considered two main criteria: social and technical viability. The former related to the support and participation of residents in the projects' implementation. The latter related to the degree of difficulty for urbanizing each favela, considering the benefit-cost ratio. These criteria followed the ones established by the Master Plan for housing policy and in particular for slum upgrading. The degree of difficulty was assessed taking into account different elements: water supply, sewage, drainage, risk situation, road access, and benefits to the areas nearby (PCRJ 1994b). For the Favela-Bairro programme, the favelas with a small urban degree of difficulty were privileged in order to secure not only programme success but also the support of favelas' dwellers and other groups:

'It was not possible to provide an opportunity for very complex situations with a high risk of failure. Could not thwart slum dwellers in their legitimate hope for better conditions for their habitat nor the political forces and society favourable to the urbanization as solution for the centennial issue of favelas' (Magalhaes & Conde 2004: 81).
The other criteria that helped to generate the classification matrix were the size and location of the favelas. The consolidated favelas with 500 to 2500 households were included in the classification in order to minimize technical problems and remain in a comparable experience universe (Magalhaes & Conde 2004). Favelas’ location was also taken into account because the SeMH was looking to deploy the programme across the entire city and to cover the two main favela types: hills and flat areas. For the final selection stage the five sub-prefectures were asked to indicate five favelas each; then the SeMH selected three from each sub-prefecture, constituting a list of 15 favelas to be included in the Favela-Bairro programme. (Freire et al. 2009; Magalhaes & Conde 2004). This allowed the introduction of some political discretion that secured sub-prefectures' support; nevertheless, the selection method gave technical legitimacy to the instrument's instauration, and limited the development of political interest around the slum upgrading implementation:

"Eventual political pressures for the inclusion of particular interests became obsolete as the public resources were no longer available according to partisan or electoral logics" (Magalhaes & Conde 2004: 82).

In March 1994 the SeMH in partnership with the Brazilian Institute of Architects of Rio de Janeiro (IAB-RJ) launched an architectural competition. The objective of this event was the selection of 15 practices for developing the slum upgrading projects, associating architectural practices to the emerging municipal housing initiative. By May, while the architectural contest was taking place, the SeMH launched the first works in Andarai favela, showing that the programme was moving forward. One month later, in June the winners of the architectural competition were announced, the transfer of the coordination of the housing policy from SMU to SeMH was officially enacted (Municipal Decree No.12994/1994) and the bases of the municipal housing policy, including the Favela-Bairro was officially publicized (ibid). A few months later, in September the municipality without external financial aid signed the first contracts with the architectural practices for developing four of the selected projects (Caju, Parque Royal, Ilha do Governador and Fernão Cardim). Furthermore, at the same time the municipality was implementing slum upgrading projects, it elaborated and sent the Municipal Chamber a proposal for the creation of a municipal housing secretariat (bill No.757/1994).
The development of the slum upgrading instrument through the launch of Favela-Bairro projects allowed the municipal executive and municipal housing policy to gain credibility, generate interest and build alliances among various actors such as architectural practices, favela dwellers and municipal councillors. Regarding the negotiations with the BID, by the end of 1994 they progressed towards the possibility of a loan of US$300 million for slum upgrading projects. Nevertheless, the slum upgrading was not a foregone conclusion and scepticism about the success of the instrument existed even within the municipal administration:

'I called a general meeting with the municipal organs to popularize the Favela-Bairro concepts and methodologies. I felt some disbelief among the participants. An SME staff came at me: hey Lu, are you crazy? You will not be able to do so ever! [laughs] I said: We are going to do so, Madame! Want to bet? The general comment of our technicians who were present: Enough of these stories about favela engineers, we are tired of it. In the end it boosted the team' (Lu Petersen, Favela-Bairro programme manager, Freire et al. 2009: 12).

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This part described how the emergence of the instrument and housing policy entailed the 'associations' of the following entities: previous experiences (Mutirão programme primarily), regulatory frameworks (in particular Rio's Master Plan which favoured favelas' urbanization rather than housing construction), people and municipal departments (specifically through the GEAP), and ideas and recommendations (as the ones formulated during the debate at the municipal Chamber). These 'associations' resulted in the definition of the municipal housing policy basis and slum upgrading instrument general lines. The process relates the 'problematization' moment of 'translation' (CHAPTER 3 page 60) which involves the creation of 'a system of alliances, or associations, between entities, thereby defining the identity and what they 'want' (Callon 1986: 8). Furthermore, this part illustrated that the emergence of Rio's housing policy ('problematization' moment) entailed the definition of the slum upgrading instrument as its central element. This relates to the establishment of the slum upgrading instrument as an 'Obligatory Passage Point' (OPP), i.e. an entity indispensable to the network under construction (housing policy) (CHAPTER 3 page 60). Lascoumes & Le Galès (2007a) observed that policy instruments tend to become OPP as they play a central role in the design of public policies.
This part also highlighted that the development of the slum upgrading instrument and housing policy involved the 'building of alliances' with municipal departments, IAB-RJ, architectural practices, favelas' residents and the BID through devices such as the classification matrix, architectural competition, agreements and contracts, and strategic steps that included the launch of the Favela-Bairro programme, building on the SMDS staff expertise and implementation of first slum upgrading projects in relatively easy communities which allowed the development of Rio's housing policy without external aid of any kind. This process relates in particular to the 'interessement' moment (CHAPTER 3 page 60) which involves 'the group of actions by which an entity...attempts to impose and stabilize the identity of the other actors it defines through its problematization. Different devices are used to implement these actions' (Callon 1986: 8), and 'enrolment' moment (CHAPTER 3 page 60) which 'designates the device by which a set of interrelated roles is defined and attributed to actors who accept them' (Callon 1986: 10).

Throughout the 'translation' mechanism the slum upgrading instrument and Rio's housing policy developed a legitimacy based on a technical rationality as their constitution entailed rational methods for selecting favelas and conducting slum upgrading projects rather than political designation and unplanned works. Nevertheless, as mentioned, doubts and scepticism about the development and success of the slum upgrading instrument and housing policy still existed.
5.3 GROWING STRONGER

5.3.1 Supporting the creation of the Municipal Housing Secretariat

As mentioned previously by September 1994 while the SeMH was implementing the first Favela-Bairro projects and seeking the BID loan, the municipal executive sent to the Municipal Chamber bill No. 757/94 that created the Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH). The bill confirmed the aspirations and regulatory frames established by the municipal housing basis elaborated one year before and the intention of the municipal executive in materializing the housing policy through the six programmes, including Favela-Bairro. In relation to the SMH organization and functioning, the bill proposed a structure based on a matrix system: 6 management offices corresponding to each programme of Rio’s housing policy bases (see Table 8 page 112) and 3 coordinating offices (land regularization, community planning and emergency relocation and actions) that used to be part of the SMDS. The bill also considered that the SMH could become a small secretariat whose role would be the coordination of the housing policy as the aspiration was to involve and make the whole municipal administration responsible for the housing policy.

"The housing secretariat, as it is proposed does not have the pretension to be the executor of housing policy, but the coordinator of the housing policy and the executor of some actions of housing policy. It plans and works in this direction to coordinate through and with the various secretariats and municipal bodies, all actions in this field ... that makes the question of housing a shared task throughout the municipality and not simply an attribution of a sector of the administration. It ceases to be a sectorial responsibility and becomes a responsibility shared by the whole government" (Sergio Magalhães, DCMR 09/12/1994: 03).

The work of the SeMH supported the bill of the municipal executive. In particular, the implementation of slum upgrading projects showed that the municipal executive was committed to do what it planned and that the proposed initiatives were feasible (DCMRJ 09/12/1994: 01-08).

The bill raised two major concerns at the Municipal Chamber: the housing policy orientations and the implementation (DCMRJ 01/12/1994: 25-27, DCMRJ 09/12/1994: 01-08). The first one related to the secondary role of housing construction in relation to the slum upgrading instrument. The second concern was the lack of mechanisms or processes for strengthening civil society participation in the development and monitoring of the
municipal housing policy. However, the different factions that constituted the legislative body supported the creation of the SMH for different reasons and interests. A faction of the Municipal Chamber approved the creation of the SMH because even if they did not entirely approve the whole project they were in favour of creating the SMH as it was a claim made previously by them:

"The proposal for creating the Municipal Housing Secretariat emerged from a seminar that was held in this house, led by councillor Jorge Bittar, Otavio Leite and me [see page 110]. This seminar, which took place with the participation of representatives from other cities and other institutions, concluded, among other proposals, for the establishment of the Municipal Housing Secretariat. So we are entirely in favour and in a sense we strive for it. The project itself came a little bit disorganized, full of imperfections, mixing things, adding ultimately propositions to it that actually should not be here ... So, in spite of the criticisms I make about these elements included in the project, I forward positively the project for with approval of the Amendments 1-18’ (Fernando William, municipal councillor DCMRJ 01/12/1994: 27).

Another faction supported the bill because they acknowledged the need to unify the municipal housing initiatives that were fragmented across the municipal administration bodies:

"We, from the PSDB group, we inform you as well that we will vote for the bill. We believe this matter once settled, will overcome the previous problem of task divisions among various municipal bodies, namely, the social development secretariat, works secretariat, RioUrbe, the attorney general’s office, all dealing with the same subject. From now on, with the advent of this secretariat, the unification of all the activities, processes, administrative measures in a single body, a single command, this will facilitate the city’s housing policy. And it is with the genuine hope that the Municipal Housing Secretariat will be an effective housing instrument in our city, directed at the population in need, to what is priority in our city, the workers, for those who are less fortunate we will vote in favour of this project‘ (Octavio Leite, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 01/12/1994: 27).

The creation of the SMH was approved by the Work Party (PT) because it acknowledged the need of such body taking into account the housing deficit in the city:

"Mr. President, Councillors, I state here on behalf of the PT group our satisfaction with the creation of the housing secretariat. A secretariat of huge importance, given the scale of this problem,
i.e. the problem of housing in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro. Yesterday we had the opportunity to have more information about the programmes that are being carried forward presently by the current SeMH secretary, future housing secretary, Dr. Sergio Magalhães. We agree with the general concerns. We try to enrich the project with the submission of an amendment that creates a Management Council of the Housing Fund, so that society representatives, such as communities, professionals, sectors' entrepreneurs could participate in the general definition of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy' (Jorge Bittar, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 01/12/1994: 27).

In addition, another group approved the bill because being against was not possible taking into account that the creation of the SMH was seen as a sign of concern about the people in need in the city:

'I conclude my remarks here, Mr. President, saying that I will vote in favour of the creation of the Secretariat, but I have doubts about whether it will work well, because we must have doubts ... So I have many doubts about whether this office will function, if these jobs will be allocated, well allocated, if something practical will be done for the less fortunate - from the middle to the lowest class - that need homes, and it is not explained here how these homes will be constructed or provided. All this is pure theory here: I want to see this in practice. Nevertheless, nobody will say that I wanted to be against the creation of a secretariat, nominally intended to solve the housing problem in Rio de Janeiro. No, I will not bear this sin, but I will not leave this house without stating my doubts and my suspicion that this secretariat will not achieve its goals and is just going to provide good jobs to some privileged' (Wilson Leite Passos, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 01/12/1994: 25).

Finally, another faction supported the bill because it agreed with the proposed housing policy approach, in particular, the shift from housing construction to slum upgrading that was being put into practice in the previous months:

'Mr. President, Mr. councillors, having made, in several opportunities here in this house, pronouncements about the priority that should be assigned to this question of housing policy, I want to express my satisfaction with the presentation, the routing of this project, the guidelines of which coincide entirely with my point of view. I think if the City or the State Government were to pursue a policy of housing construction, it is absolutely impossible given the magnitude of the housing problem. So that the guidelines forwarded, through a policy of preparation of urban land with the infrastructure for the disadvantaged sections of the population most in need of housing, seems
entirely appropriate. I want to express agreement on my own behalf, on behalf of councillor Leonel Trotta, on behalf of the Brazilian Socialist Party and say that we will vote in favour of the project and the amendments that effectively I perfected’ (Saturnino Braga, municipal councillor, DCMRF 01/12/1994: 27).

The support that the bill received from the different political factions resulted in the bill being almost unanimously approved with twenty votes in favour and one against. In spite of critics and different interests and understandings, the creation of the SMH was enacted (Municipal Law No.2262/1994). Facilitated by the implementation of the housing policy, and in particular the implementation of slum upgrading projects, the creation of the SMH strengthened in return the materialization of the housing policy and the municipal executive’s political and administrative capacities.
5.3.2 Adaptations and adoptions

*Constituting slum upgrading experts and regulations*

During the 1980s and up to the beginning of the 1990s, the majority of people with knowledge and technical expertise in favelas and their upgrading were mainly part of the municipal administration. In particular, these experts belonged to the IPLANRIO which had worked on the favelas' register at the beginning of the 1980s, and the SMDS that developed among others the Mutirão programme (see CHAPTER 4 page 96). These people and some others in the municipal administration continued to develop their knowledge and skills on the subject when they were transferred to the SeMH or remained involved in the housing policy developed by the Maia administration. This municipal administration staff started developing skills for organizing and managing projects and programmes, facing legal and regulatory issues such as contracts and tenders, and incentivizing and organizing civil society participation.

In addition, the materialization of the housing policy and in particular the slum upgrading instrument supported the emergence of new experts on favelas and their urbanization outside the municipal administration. Architectural practices that included architects and other practitioners such as planners were among these new experts that were being trained. The alliance sealed with the architects that started with the architectural competition in June 1994 and was followed by the signing of contracts later that year, continued with the elaboration of urban projects and first implementations. This fostered architectural practices' expertise as they needed to find modes for implementing their proposals. In addition, the first slum upgrading implementations contributed to the development of know-how among the contractors who did not have any experience in this type of projects.

The materialization of the slum upgrading produced not only new knowledge about favelas such as topography, building environment characteristics and functioning, and population organization, but also more detailed regulations (Freire et al. 2009). Specifically, the municipality issued a document that contained the process and specification for the development of urban projects by the architectural practices (PCRJ 1995a). The document established and detailed the different stages of slum upgrading projects (diagnosis phases, intervention plan, project draft, executive project), which shared similarities with the 'Simplified Urbanization Programme' developed by the SMDS (see CHAPTER 4 page 100).
It also standardized all technical specifications such as urban equipment, hillside stabilization techniques, and communication templates.

The growth of expertise and experts was further enhanced by the partnership between the municipality and the BID. As mentioned previously, the municipality was in negotiation with the BID for a loan since 1993. By the end of 1994 the BID mission announced the release of US$300 million for the Favela-Bairro programme (Jornal do Brasil 1994), while the Federal Government approved the loan contract. The approval of the BID loan was secured through the materialization of the slum upgrading (classification matrix, architectural competition, contract signing, the development of diagnosis and intervention plans) which gave credibility to the municipality and its housing policy (Freire & Oliveira 2008: 251-252). In order to sign the loan contract the BID and the SMH engaged in the definition of the programme. This involved adaptations, exchange of expertise and creation or development of skills not only within the municipality but also within the BID (interview with Fernando Cavallieri). For instance, the BID developed an in-house know-how about favelas that was spread across the region (Brakarz et al. 2002). Nevertheless, the development of the slum upgrading through the BID contract and the building of expertise involved tense negotiations:

‘And so we defined the scope of the programme with the BID, but not without heated discussion. It was coordinated by SMH together with the SMDS. I was the coordinator for the methodological and conceptual components, which were actually one of the main objects of the contract. I had to defend a position about some assumptions, such as land use regulation after the work, indemnity forms for the resettlement of families because of works, housing construction as last solution and others. In the social area agreements were more difficult. The BID only insisted on the construction of childcare centres and change of their participatory management established by the SMDS involving the communities by NGOs. We were opposed because of the importance of the social programme diversity to build community centres and spaces for sports. No NGOs. These meetings were very tiring and tense. But I could tell that their priority was execution of the work’ (Lu Petersen, Freire et al. 2009: 84).

Slum upgrading supporting the municipal executive

The incorporation of the BID into the instrument's development demanded the approval of the Municipal Chamber. The support of the municipal councillors was complicated due
to a controversy about the importance given by the municipal executive to the Favela-Bairro programme in relation to 'Rio Cidade' programme. Rio Cidade was an urban regeneration programme addressed at neighbourhoods of the 'formal city' and developed by the SMU under the command of Luiz Paulo Conde. The debate concentrated on the unequal municipal investments earmarked for each programme: Rio Cidade included municipal investments of about R$200 million while Favela-Bairro only R$16 million (DCMRJ 14/06/1995: 09; DCMRJ 03/07/1995: 11).

Nevertheless, the instrument's objective of improving the lives of the people in need and its materialization like the Andarai project contributed not only to destabilize this major criticism but also to gain the support of the Municipal Chamber for signing the BID loan. A letter of support of the slum upgrading and the need to expand the use of the instrument with the BID loan was signed by councillors from different political parties and sent to the BID in July 1995 (DCMRJ 04/07/1995: 14). The loan proposal for approval was sent to the municipal chamber by the end of August that year (DCMRJ 22/08/1995: 04-019). The first round of debates took place some days later (DCMRJ 31/08/1995: 07-11), and at the beginning of September the municipal chamber approved the BID loan, with 27 votes in favour and 2 against (DCMRJ 08/09/1995: 10-18). The bill became Legislative Decree No.129/1995 and included specifications about the general loan terms, the allocations of resources, and the list of favelas and subdivision beneficiaries.

The consolidation of the slum upgrading as a mainly technical instrument

Maia signed the BID loan contract in Washington at the beginning of December 1995 (Jornal do Brasil 1995a). Sealing the alliance with the BID secured the instrument's long term use (1996-2000) and boosted the new SMH budget with the US$300 million agreed for implementing the slum upgrading, increasing the SMH autonomy and importance, and housing policy legitimacy and credibility. The negotiations promoted the consolidation of specific regulations regarding slum upgrading renamed 'Urbanization Programme of Popular Settlements' (PROAP). In particular, the regulations stipulated in the BID contract (BID 1995) and the Municipal Decree No.14332/1995 included the list of the favelas that would benefit from the programme using the classification matrix, preventing the use of the loan for other areas for political or other interests. Furthermore, the guidelines regulated the slum upgrading projects' execution as follows. Firstly, the project involved the elaboration by the architectural practices of a diagnostic that must include:
'(i) locational and historical aspects of the settlement; (ii) assessment of environmental and infrastructure conditions, including areas of geological and environmental risk, conditions of sanitation, drainage, garbage, street systems, energy supply, etc; (iii) assessment of social services, including health centres, schools, recreation and play areas, and child care and development alternatives; (iv) topographic surveying; and (v) land property analysis consisting of land use maps which identify individual plots' (BID 1995: 14).

Based on this study, the second phase included the elaboration of an urban development plan named 'Intervention plan' (plano de intervenção), focusing on:

'an integral solution according to the Program’s goals and include basic services of water supply, sewerage, drainage, street system, solid waste collection and disposal, child-care centers, street lighting and hillside stabilization, parks and community facilities as needed' (Ibid).

This phase included the approval of the draft plan by the SMH and its discussion and modification with the community through general assemblies and small consultative meetings. The agreement of the community on the major lines of the project was compulsory for continuing the process. The third phase included the elaboration of preliminary drawings and the cost estimations once the SMH and the community had agreed to the project (BID 1995). The fourth stage involved the design of the detailed plans based on the preliminary drawings once approved by the SMH. This further development of the preliminary drawings entailed the following of specific guidelines established by the SMH back in 1994 (see page 123) and regulations that emerged during the SMH-BID negotiations. The final stage included a technical analysis and approval by the SMH. Then only would the project be implemented and the law Special Areas of Social Interest (AEIS) prepared. This legal instrument if approved by the municipal chamber aimed at legally regularizing and protecting the favelas.

The slum upgrading regulations assigned also a series of responsibilities to different actors and in particular to various public sector bodies (BID 1995):

- SMH to coordinate the programme and to contract and execute projects.
- SMDS to support child care facilities design and to operate and maintain them

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23 The AEIS were the equivalent in Rio de Janeiro of the ZEIS (see CHAPTER 2 page 49)
- Municipal Environmental secretariat named SMAC to assess environmental and reforestation projects' aspects.
- SMU to support the drawing up of urban norms and regulations.
- SMO to approve drainage projects.
- IPLANRIO to monitor and evaluate the programme, and to compile, manage and analyse the data on the favelas beneficiaries.
- RioUrbe to execute the contracting and execution of projects and works assigned to the SMH if needed.
- Geo-Rio to execute hillside stabilization.
- COMLURB to secure garbage collection and street cleaning.
- RioLuz to approve, operate and maintain street lighting system projects.
- CEDAE to support, approve, operate and maintain water supply and sewage systems projects.
- PMG to work in land regularization.

The regulations established selection criteria investment sectors and stabilized organization and management functioning (Table 9). The regulations also modified processes that existed in the first phase from 1994-1995. For instance, the architectural competition was changed to public tender process. Furthermore, they reduced municipal executive room for manoeuvre because if the procedures and regulations were not followed the disbursement of the BID loan would be compromised. Nevertheless, the municipal executive, the municipal housing policy and in particular the slum upgrading instrument gained legitimacy as the Rio de Janeiro experience was supported by an international organization, and involved a series of technical expertise and regulations that consolidated as a scientific/technical matter rather than a political one. In other words, the slum upgrading instrument, the housing policy and the municipal administration were constituted as being beyond the political interests of the Mayor and his allies.
Table 9 Overview of slum upgrading operating regulations consolidated with the BID loan contract. Source: BID 1995. Elaborated by the author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme detailed in the regulations</th>
<th>Specification</th>
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| Programme components:           | Urban development of slum areas  
|                                  | Regularization of subdivisions,  
|                                  | Sanitary and environmental education,  
|                                  | Monitoring  
|                                  | Institutional development. |
| Eligible investment sectors      | Water supply, drainage, street system, garbage  
|                                  | collection, street lighting, hillside stabilization,  
|                                  | reforestation, child care centre, community centre,  
|                                  | parks and sport areas, resettlements, and land titling. |
| Selection criteria (pre-eligibility): | Favelas  
|                                  | Irregular subdivisions |
| Technical eligibility criteria that the Slum upgrading projects must meet | Investments up to US$4000 per household  
|                                  | To comply with municipal regulations  
|                                  | A maximum of 5% houses can be relocated  
|                                  | To include provision for proper operation and management  
|                                  | Land status resolved prior to start of works  
|                                  | To comply with detailed specifications of investment sectors (see above) |
| Executing process organization and function of participating agencies | Execution of programme's investments  
|                                  | Execution structure  
|                                  | Actors' responsibilities |
| Coordination during the execution | General cost table  
|                                  | Financial administration of resources  
|                                  | Budgetary control of the programme  
|                                  | Disbursement  
|                                  | Accounting and control of the project  
|                                  | General accounting system of the programme |
| Financial and accounting administration | Physical and financial follow up  
|                                  | Monitoring and evaluation system  
|                                  | External audit |
5.3.3 Expanding alliances, securing continuity

*From Rio to Istanbul*

During negotiations between the municipality and the BID, the municipality started a process of selecting more favelas for the further development of the slum upgrading implementation (PCRJ 1995b). The successful completion of the negotiations that led to the US$ 300 million loan enabled progress, expanding instrument's implementation across the city. By 1996 a more detailed schedule by phases that stretched beyond Maia's administration period that was ending that year was established (see Figure 13). Added to the BID loan, since 1995 the municipality was seeking to use the instrument in larger favelas such as Jacarezinho and Alemão Complex with federal government investments. The idea was to secure resources from the 'Comunidade Solidaria' programme established in 1995 and supported by President Cardoso's wife, Ruth (Jornal do Brasil 1995b).

![Figure 13 Favela-Bairro expansion by phases. Source: PCRJ 1996a](image)

The central role of the slum upgrading instrument and housing policy started to be consolidated in the municipality. For instance, by 1995 opinion polls showed that the housing secretary, Sergio Magalhães, was the most popular municipal Secretary. Moreover, by 1996 the Favela-Bairro not only became one of the most important of Maia's administration programmes together with Rio Cidade programme and 'Linha Amarela'
highway\textsuperscript{24} (DCMRJ 19/04/1996: 11); but was also the major municipal programme in terms of investments (Jornal do Brasil 1996a). The slum upgrading gained more visibility and credibility when the first works were inaugurated during 1996 (Jornal do Brasil 1996b; Jornal do Brasil 1996c; Jornal do Brasil 1996d; Jornal do Brasil 1996e; Jornal do Brasil 1996f).

The consolidation of the interessement process went beyond Rio de Janeiro. For instance, the preparatory event related to the UN-HABITAT II in 1995 allowed the Favela-Bairro programme to be presented (Jornal do Brasil 1995c). One year later in Istanbul even if the Favela-Bairro was not selected for representing Brazilian best practices on housing, it was showcased by the Rio de Janeiro delegation which was the largest one from Brazil at the conference (Folha de S. Paulo 1996). This was because the municipal administration was seeking financial allies for developing its policies, including the housing policy. In addition, during the conference the municipality signed the agreement for creating and hosting the UN-HABITAT regional office (Jornal do Brasil 1996g). This agreement contributed to support the convergence in Rio de Janeiro of debates and research about Latin America human settlements, including slum upgrading approaches.

At that time the materialization of the slum upgrading also started to reshape the relationship between favela dwellers' associations and the municipality that evolved with the creation of 'Guarda 16' (G-16). This group was formed by the 16 community associations included in the first phase of the Favela-Bairro, and aimed at facilitating State civil society relations around the instrument's implementation (DCMRJ 22/10/2001: 11). In addition, following the Mutirão experience in the 1980s, women in the community were trained and hired by the municipality as community agents of the housing policy. Their work involved the follow up in the field of the projects and the training in health and sanitation in the favelas (interview with Isabel Tostes).

The know-how and knowledge around the instrument were being further developed through municipal government publications (PCRJ 1995b; PCRJ 1996a), academic works like the book organized by researchers at Rio de Janeiro Federal University (UFRJ) about the 1994 architectural competition (Duarte et al. 1996), and events such as the course

\textsuperscript{24} The highway included in Doxiades' plan for Rio de Janeiro elaborated in the 1960 materialized during Maia's administration under the supervision of the SMU Secretary Luiz Paulo Conde.
organized by the municipality in partnership with the International Housing and Urban Development studies (IHS) on planning and management of urban projects in informal settlements (PCRJ 1996b).

Conde is Cesar: Cesar is Conde

The impossibility of the Mayor's re-election at that time made Cesar Maia develop the following strategy: to re-elect the government instead of the Mayor (Maia 1997). The problem was to choose a candidate from the municipal secretaries. The principal pre-candidates were the SMH Secretary Magalhães known for the Favela-Bairro programme, SMU Secretary Conde known for Rio Cidade programme and Linha Amarela project; and the secretary of the treasury Maria Silva Bastos Marques, known as the 'one million dollar woman' for her successful work on the municipality's financial recovery. The competition among them was shortened because Magalhães did not want to become a member of any political party and Maia's favourite candidate Maria Silva Bastos Marques decided to join the private sector. Thus, Luiz Paulo Conde became Maia's candidate, the 'continuation' candidate:

"Right after the beginning we changed the campaign, after listening to a lady in the favela of Mare tell Conde, "you will be the continuation." I asked: "Will be what?" - "Continuation". I called the people and said, "Stop everything! Conde come here. You will tell him that he will be ..." I said, "Did you hear, isn't it? It's not continuity, it is continuation." I had already heard it once and heard it again there. We changed from continuity to continuation, we adapted in the light of what we heard on the street. Continuation was the right word" (Cesar Maia, in Maia 1997: 89).

For the 1996 election Conde was fighting against the following major candidates: Sergio Cabral (PSDB), Miro Teixera (PDT) and Chico Alencar (PT). The opinion polls in June showed Conde with 2% behind Cabral and Alencar with 18%. However, in the following months this situation changed sharply. By the end of August and prior to the first round Conde led the polls with about 30% followed by Cabral with about 22% (Jornal do Brasil 1996h). Both passed the first round and disputed against each other the Mayor's office. For Cabral this represented a progress as he had disputed the 1992 elections without success. In the end, Cabral was defeated in the second round and Conde became the new Rio de Janeiro's Mayor.

25 Maria Silvia's nickname came from the fact that when she left the Municipal Treasury Secretariat (SMF) the municipality had one million dollars in its coffers.
During the electoral campaign the slum upgrading instrument played an important role. On the one hand it contributed to the weakening of criticism about the fact that Maia's administration prioritized the 'Zona Sul' (one of the wealthiest part of the city) with projects such as Rio Cidade programme. On the other, the instrument contributed to gain favela dwellers' support. Favela-Bairro programme was being implemented and favela dwellers aimed at the further development and completion of works, which meant voting in Maia's candidate (Jornal do Brasil 1996i) (Figure 14). Thus, the slum upgrading instrument secured most of the votes in the favelas:

'We won the 96 election by a small difference, but we won in all the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, except in Mangueira...In spite of all Mangueira leaders being for Conde, we lost there. In the elections period, I was sought by favelas' leaders, Serrinha - around there ... In Serrinha they said: "Mayor, PT, PDT, ex big party, this and that, we are with Conde." I said: "Feel free. You're not thinking I'm a mediocre to the point of interrupting the Favela-Bairro because you are not going to vote with me. Vote as you like, I don't have any problem", "no, we are with Conde, it is in the interest of our community. We want this and that, we vote and we will win [get it]." This happened in various favelas' (Cesar Maia, in Maia 1997: 98-99).

Figure 14 Conde seeks hills' vote (favelas' vote). First Favela-Bairro [project] inauguration in Serrinha marks new phase in the PFL campaign, in opposition to Rio Cidade.
Source: Jornal do Brasil 1996i
Favela-Bairro at the centre of the housing policy

Right after the elections Conde announced that Favela-Bairro was going to be his priority (Jornal do Brasil 1996). The instrument was further developed by the launch of 'Grandes Favelas' and 'Bairrinho' programmes directed at larger and small favelas respectively. Grandes Favelas programme emerged with the successful negotiations between the municipality and the Federal Government that started back in 1995. By May 1997, Conde signed with the CAIXA an agreement of R$17 million for implementing the first Grandes Favelas project in Jacarezinho that was expected to start in 1998 (Jornal do Brasil 1997a) and other projects through Bairrinho programme emerged with the association of the European Union. In 1997 the municipality signed an agreement with an Italian NGO funded by the European Union for implementing slum upgrading projects in Vila Canoas and Pedra Bonita (Magalhaes & Conde 2004) (Figure 15). In both cases the implementation of the Favela-Bairro fostered municipal credibility, permitting the completion of the agreements.

In addition, the slum upgrading instrument grew stronger with the creation of the first Urban and Social Orientation Office (POUSO) at Parque Royal. Created at the end of Maia's administration and instituted by Municipal Decree No.15.259/1996, the POUSO sought to create urban regulations in favelas and control their built environment and land use. (PCRJ 2008). Other projects and ideas were also developed and linked to the instrument like the educational project 'A escola e o Favela-Bairro' (The school and the Favela-Bairro) implemented by the Municipal Education Secretariat (SME) (PCRJ 2000); the proposal of a cable car in Vidigal (Jornal do Brasil 1997b); and several agreements with universities, CBOs NGOs and other organizations (Magalhaes & Conde 2004).

The interest and visibility of the instrument also grew with the visits of different organizations and countries' delegations that were coming to Rio de Janeiro to learn more about the Favela-Bairro programme (Magalhaes & Conde 2004). The slum upgrading started to consolidate as the municipal administration flagship, while the other programmes of the municipal housing policy were put in the background.
Figure 15 The city arrives to the 'hills' (favelas). With guaranteed money until 2002, the municipality promises to implement the Favela-Bairro in 150 communities which would benefit 600 thousand people. Source: Jornal do Brasil 1997c
This part described how the further development of the slum upgrading instrument entailed the building of more 'alliances' by seeking to 'interest', 'enrol', and 'mobilize' through various actions: the creation of the SMH, the implementation of more slum upgrading projects, the creation of POUSOs, the signature of the BID loan, the participation in housing debates (conference in Istanbul) and the establishment of UN-HABITAT regional office in the city. The processes of 'interessement', 'enrolment' and 'mobilization' also involved the creation of publications, organization of seminars about Rio's slum upgrading and field visits to Favela-Bairro projects, the set up of partnerships with the federal government (CAIXA) and NGOs for expanding the use of the instrument to larger and small favelas (Grandes Favelas and Bairrinho programmes), and various agreements with other municipal bodies such as the SME.

In particular, this section observed the 'enrolment' and 'mobilization' of architectural practices, BID (Favela-Bairro programme), CAXIA (Grandes Favelas programme), Italian NGO (Bairrinho programme), legislative branch (for voting the creation of the SMH and BID and CAIXA loans), UN-HABITAT, communities (G-16), municipal and regional state secretariats and bodies (such as CEDAE IPLANRIO, SMO and SME) and national and international academia (UFRJ and HIS). Moreover, it illustrated as Callon (1986) observed that 'translation' is a linking process that entails displacement and transformation, as it described how the building of alliances transformed the slum upgrading instrument. In particular, the association with the BID strongly reshaped the Favela-Bairro programme and resulted in the creation of the PROAP-RIO.

Throughout these 'translation' moments, this part illustrated that the slum upgrading instrument remained the 'Obligatory Passage Point' of the housing policy, consolidating a new constellation of housing policy actors and reshaping existing dynamics. Specifically, it showed that the housing policy involved not only the SMDS as in the 1980s, but also the newly created SMH, other municipal and state secretariats, departments and structures like the POUSO, architectural practices, construction companies, BID, CAIXA, NGOs and favelas' resident associations.

In addition, this part noted that the use of the instrument created new knowledge about the favelas (favelas' diagnosis and publications), and know-how (slum upgrading programme
and projects' operational frameworks, contracts and regulations). Both increased SMH managing skills and capacities, and architectural practices and construction companies' expertise on implementing projects in favelas. This developed slum upgrading technical legitimacy, consolidating a shift as Rio's previous housing experience related more to ad hoc solutions and political interest such as the Mutirão programme which at its inception emanated from dwellers' association demands and political will (see CHAPTER 4 page 99). The development of Rio's slum upgrading in this manner relates to 'De Jure de Facto and Best Practices' instrument's typology whose legitimacy, according to Lascoumes & Le Galès (2004) includes a mix of scientific/technical and democratic rationalities (see CHAPTER 1 page 29).

As the slum upgrading instrument gained strength through the 'enrolment' and 'mobilization' of more allies, it contributed to the consolidation of the municipal housing policy and the increase of the municipal administration power. This was because the instrument enhanced municipal administration legitimacy in the city and beyond and it contributed to the expansion of its technical and electoral capacities.
5.4 HOLDING TOGETHER

5.4.1 Complicated implementation

_Fragile collaboration and financial instability_

The use of the slum upgrading instrument as constituted during the 1990s required the close collaboration of several actors, including diverse municipal bodies. This integration contrasted with the previous urbanization of favelas realized by the municipality through the Mutirão programme in the 1980s which was entirely performed by the SMDS. Nevertheless, since the instauration and during the development of the slum upgrading instrument, several issues emerged around the participation of the different municipal bodies. Among the most important was the lack of coordination among the municipal administration even if Sergio Magalhães was close to Conde and could lobby for the prioritization of slum upgrading-related activities.

The expansion and development of the instrument included the association of more actors for its financing, implementation and maintenance. However, in spite of the fact that the roles were assigned to every actor through contracts, agreements and regulations around the instrument, coordination problems started to emerge. By the end of 1996 an institutional evaluation conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration (IBAM) highlighted the lack of municipal bodies' involvement. The instrument's implementation relied on informal relations, leading to an institutional articulation but not integration. The report pointed out that the municipal bodies that were more involved in the housing policy were the ones that had previously worked in favelas like Geo-Rio, SMDS, and COMLURB. However, other municipal bodies such as SMO and the company of public lighting of Rio de Janeiro (RioLuz) were not performing their role as it was expected. The evaluation argued that these municipal bodies had almost never worked with favelas, thus, they did not have the technical expertise. Moreover, they had other priorities and did not have the capacity to face the increased workload due to the instrument's development (IBAM 1996).

There was also a lack of coordination among the municipal bodies for slum upgrading work supervision (DCMRJ 23/06/1998: 6), and maintenance. For instance, the SMH established short term contracts after the work was done with the objective that gradually
the municipal bodies would take over the maintenance works (DCMRJ 03/12/2001: 34). Nevertheless, this was not happening:

"I do not know if it showed, I do not know the name of this, it is misappropriating public resource, but they decided to make a swimming pool on the hill, to do a cycle path in the upper part of the hill. But all those works that are therein, the kiosks, the space that they built for the cycle path were literally abandoned... So one of the questions we are asking to the City is what is the motivation in spending all that money and then leave: broken kiosk, also the cycle path is breaking" (Giberto Palmares, municipal councilor, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 17).

There was a change in the SMH management structure with the arrival of three advisors because the instrument's implementation demanded new forms of organization due to its expansion (interview with Sergio Magalhães). This undermined the decentralized organization and matrix management (Freire et al. 2009). Furthermore it complicated SMH's internal work as the team stopped having easy and direct access to the Secretary (interview with Antonio Augusto Verissimo; Lu Petersen).

Financially, the municipality had economic problems that delayed and slowed down instrument' implementation (Maia 1997; Jornal do Brasil 1998a). Even if Conde prioritized the slum upgrading instrument, the municipal administration suffered from the tequila and Asian crisis that badly hit the Brazilian economy. The municipal debt sharply grew, from R$ 2.3 billion in 1996 to R$ 4.1 billion by 2000, compromising municipal investments that fell from 67.4% in comparison with Rio's revenue in 1996 to 6.7% in 2000 (Jornal do Brasil 2000a).

**Water and sanitation problems**

Major slum upgrading implementation issues emerged also around water supply and sanitation works. In order to expand the social programmes the SMH tried to find ways of saving money. Thus, the SMH planned slum upgrading investments taking into account that water and sanitation systems would be completed by the CEDAE (State Water Supply and Sewage Company) through the federal programme PROSANEAR. Supported by the World Bank, the PROSANEAR was launched in 1992 and aimed to expand water and sanitation services in Brazil. The favelas included in the PROSANEAR programme were prioritized by the SMH, becoming an important share of the communities included in the BID contract. The construction or completion of water supply and sanitation networks
were dependent on CEDAE investments that were expected to follow a similar schedule as the Municipality's investments in the favelas. However, this did not happen because the PROSANEAR was interrupted, destabilizing slum upgrading finances, schedules, and social programmes development (DCMRJ 19/05/1997: 04 -17).

The problems of water supply and sanitation were exacerbated by the disarticulation between the SMH and CEDAE even if the municipal government appointed three people to work closely with the CEDAE (PCRJ 2010b):

"Why to install water in places which they [the public authorities] don't even know if they will be demolished. Like for example, my home, it was condemned by Civil Defence and by the Favela-Bairro...They never approached us again to give any information. And then comes the PROSANEAR and connects [the house] to the water system. To connect water for what purpose, if the house is going to be demolished... I mean, the Favela-Bairro is very pretty. The stairs [outside] of my house are a beauty, I do not fall over. They are beautiful but my house is falling down, my neighbour's house is falling. When it rains my husband most to unblock, in the early morning, the ditch so we don’t need to run away from the house with my daughter and even take care of my next door neighbour...Why to install water and a meter if the house does not offer [good] living conditions. I think what they should do to save is to take us away from there. I think they are more lost than a chick trying to get out from inside the house" (Rosangela resident at the Borel community, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 09).

In addition to the financial gap due to the interruption of PROSANEAR and the lack of coordination between the CEDAE and the Municipality, a problem emerged related to the sharing of responsibilities. The BID contract established that the municipality was going to construct the water and sewage networks within the favelas. In exchange the CEDAE was going to provide water and connect the sewerage to the city. However, the CEDAE did not respect the agreement arguing that it was not their responsibility. At the beginning the municipality did these works such as in the case of Ladeira dos Funcionarios because it wanted to secure the BID loan (DCMRJ 19/05/1997: 9). However, after the loan was granted the municipality did not cover the cost of these works because these works were in the 'formal city' where CEDAE was responsible for sanitation infrastructure. The rationale was that the municipality could not afford to pay twice for this service as it would implicate using municipal property taxes (IPTU) to pay for sanitation works and at the same time
transfer taxes to the CEDAE for water and sewage infrastructure and services (DCMRJ 19/05/1997: 04-17).

Other major issues around basic sanitation works related to the poor state of Rio's sanitation network and BID loan regulations. The classification criteria used for selecting the favelas led to a concentration of slum upgrading projects in Rio de Janeiro planning zone 3 (AP3) where the water and sewage networks were already saturated or did not exist. The absence of water supply and sewage network in the city complicated the instrument's implementation. For example, the SMH decided to link favelas' sewage to the city's drainage as was current in the 'formal neighbourhoods'. In addition, the slum upgrading regulations established the elaboration of an environmental impact assessment, the construction of sewage treatment plants and the formal approval of all the sanitation works by CEDAE. These requirements increased the cost of the instrument's implementation and fostered works' delays (DCMRJ 19/05/1997: 04 -17).

*Participation and drug trafficking*

In addition, the use of the slum upgrading raise issues about favela dwellers' participation and drug trafficking. The aspiration of including civil society participation in the process of the materialization of the housing policy was stated at the very beginning not only by the Master Plan, but also by Maia's administration guidelines (Municipal Decree No. 12205/1993). SMH staff acknowledged the importance of the participation of favela dwellers in the materialization of the housing policy and, in particular, in the implementation of the slum upgrading (interview with Lu Petersen). Nevertheless, the design of the slum upgrading at policy and programme level did not involve favela dwellers or civil society's direct participation. The absence of civil society participation resulted from the fact that their main claim was the urbanization of favelas, which was already addressed as slum upgrading was selected as its main instrument. As mentioned before, the municipal executive had developed knowledge about favelas and their needs through the SMDS during the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s (interview with Lu Petersen). Thus, the design of the slum upgrading at policy and programme level primarily entailed finding the modes for implementing slum upgrading projects and addressing those needs, rather than debating or negotiating alternative solutions.
Unlike at policy and programme level, the slum upgrading guidelines imposed and regulated community participation at project level (Municipal Decree No. 14332/1995). As mentioned previously, the slum upgrading project stipulated the moments and modes of participation such as general assemblies (see page 125). In many projects community participation was successful, generating discussions and negotiations (interview with Lu Petersen). However, in many other projects, the participation process did not generate the desired outcome. In particular, community participation became an informative rather than a negotiation process and little room was left for civil society interference because the slum upgrading instrument became highly regulated. Furthermore, even if the community's approval was compulsory; in particular at the beginning of each project, the municipality retained more capacity for modifying projects because the municipality through the SMH and to some extent the architectural practices were key entities in the network that constituted the slum upgrading instrument as they were the bearers and guarantors of the technical aspects and regulations. This allowed the municipality and the architectural practices to control and heavily influence the materialization of the slum upgrading, undermining favela dwellers' participation.

In addition, a problem related to the representation and representativeness of residents' associations surfaced. The slum upgrading guidelines that were established by the BID contract stated that the residents' associations would be the principal channel of communication between the municipality and the favela (BID 1995). However, the residents’ associations did not always represent the favela dwellers:

'So, for example, there is a community in the area of Leopoldina, a group of black women, when they get together, one hundred and fifty, two hundred women discuss every month at the neighbourhood community centre. And the residents’ association has a president without anything to call his own! But it is with him that the municipality discusses, that is, with people who do not have any representation... So, in terms of popular participation, it is zero! It is zero, why? Because where you have effective popular participation, people advocate, but participation does not occur in most communities, it is a minority unfortunately' (Josinaldo Aleixo, researcher, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 16).

Drug trafficking was also a problem, not only because drug trafficking interfered in participation, but also because its combat created delays (Figure 16):
"The Favela-Bairro has everything to go right, but there are discrepancies that do not let us walk forward. In my community, what has trouble as well is the question of the incursion of the auxiliary forces, which has no time nor place. When they are in our community works stop, if there are deaths there are two days of mourning and this incites violence because violence begets violence. So if a cop kills a bandit there are three more to replace him and our community is, in these terms, abandoned" (Junior, representative Andarai community association DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 7).

Quality of works, delays and interruptions

The lack of works' quality was also an issue. This was not only due to the difficulty of working in favela areas which led to review projects' costs and thus their quality or the inexistence of supervision during the execution of the works, but also because the public tender regulations stated that the least expensive bid should be selected. This major selection criterion relegated quality to a second plan. The price criterion related to a federal law in public tender. Thus, this problem included besides the works in favelas all the works commanded by the public sector. Quality was thereby compromised and the works tended to be botched as they followed the electoral calendar and the investments allocated to each
Project tend to be insufficient. Furthermore, contractors tended to subcontract to other enterprises, fostering a lack of supervision (DCMRJ 23/06/2008: 02-14). Finally the inexperience and financial weakness of some contractors led to the abandonment of works (Figure 17), creating major issues during the instrument's implementation:
'Now, when they began the Favela-Bairro, they went there and broke everything we had. There is a lot of mud, a lot of holes. It is bad to live here, to walk through. When it rains, too much water enters our homes. We have to watch our shacks not to fall, our furniture, and children from falling into holes. It became worse than it was. We want a solution now from our Secretary. The contractor left in November, he said he would come back in January, but he hasn't returned. They removed the "trailers", machines, took everything away. We are waiting for a response from him. If he cannot continue the Favela-Bairro works, he should return it to how it was: our stairs and our paths because we need to go up and down better' (Mariana Adelaide, Encontro hill resident, DCMRJ 08/05/1998: 20).

**Relocations**

There were also problems around the relocation processes (DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 06-20). One of the major problems relating to relocations was the degradation of living conditions due to the relocation process delays and interruptions. These relocations were not included in the Favela-Bairro programme financial frame and were funded by the municipality. However, because of the bad financial situation of the municipality the relocation processes were delayed or interrupted, affecting residents' living conditions as the residents whose houses were indicated to be demolished were asked not to invest in them anymore:

'We want to do anything to prevent an infiltration as in my house, but it turns out we have to stay in the water until resolved. And for about a year and a bit, they told us, do not do anything because we'll get here tomorrow. So we didn't do, and so far they haven't come here. I do not know what to do, I just know that if it rains my house is under water and I stay floating like the Niterói ferry [this ferry links Rio de Janeiro to the city of Niteroi located on the other side of the Guanabara bay]. Somebody has to do something for us and we, of course, we thank in advance' (Ana Rosa, Borel hill resident, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 09).

**5.4.2 Undermining critics and opposition**

**Dismantling criticisms and generation adhesion**

The mentioned implementation problems contributed to the emergence of controversies and debates about the slum upgrading instrument (DCMRJ 08/05/1998: 19-21; DCMRJ 23/06/1998 P02- 14; DCMRJ 14/09/1998 P06-11; DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 12-20). These controversies and debates not only focused on specific implementation issues but also on the instrument's nature, municipal housing policy scope and municipal executive actions,
leading to the development of an opposition against the Favela-Bairro programme. However, the expansion of this opposition was limited for the slum upgrading was supported by a number of elements and dynamics that strengthened it.

Despite the problems around its implementation, the slum upgrading was still supported as it consolidated consensus on the need of improving the lives of favela dwellers:

'I say again, what we all want is that the Favela-Bairro prosper. These problems do not frighten us because, of course, in steep areas, in difficult areas of the city, any urban intervention is more complex, is more difficult, but even so it has to be done, because after all they are human beings, all have a right to a place in the sun' (Otavio Leite, Municipal councillor, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 11).

In particular, the instrument was still supported by favela dwellers. Even if in some cases living conditions worsened, in some other the instrument's implementation produced satisfaction among the residents such as in Parque Royal (see Figure 18) and Fernão Cardim:

'What we obtained: we were lucky, our works are finished and became a neighbourhood. It does not seem anymore like a favela. I hope you will have the same luck' (Amaro, representative of Fernão Cardim community association DCMRJ 28/11/1997: 10).

Thus, the favela dwellers were still interested in the instrument's implementation as it could bring them benefits and they were still ready to do anything in order to be selected:

Figure 18 Parque Royal favela before and after the Favela-Bairro project. This intervention mainly improved favela's road system, public spaces and its relation with the Guanabara Bay. Source: PCRJ 2003
We want, we need this programme, the Favela-Bairro. We need it in our communities. Then go, make the design, do everything, we are eager. We want it, we really want it. It’s not a joke how much we have gone through, how much we have... I don’t know... participated in events, things’ (Maria da Luz, Urubu favela resident, DCMRJ 08/05/1998: 20).

This interest on the instrument reinforced the adhesion to the municipal executive:

'And just wanted to make a comment, because favela dwellers, favelados' adhesion, seems to me that the adhesion to the [Favela-Bairro] programme occurs precisely because of the work that is done in your community and it brings some benefits, there is no doubt. This is an adhesion, the favelados defend, must defend and some other people also must defend this programme because of this. It is an adhesion to the Municipal Government by the community because the government is bringing progress to a place where any a work was performed ever. Suddenly the Municipality appears there doing something, and that certainly wins favelados' trust' (Silverio, leader of the Regional Council of Engineering and Agronomy - CREA, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 18).

Calling into question the nature of the opposition

The use of the slum upgrading not only limited favela dwellers' direct opposition to the municipal executive and fostered their adhesion to it, but also destabilized an emerging opposition because it was complicated to oppose investments directed at the poor:

'And then to end, the question about whether or not we support [the Favela-Bairro], that's a big problem because the project is positive, we are investing in the favela, we are making an investment for the poor, thus we cannot really make that discussion, it's too complicated' (Jorge, architect, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 20).

The slum upgrading also destabilized the opposition because of its expansion and growing financial significance not only through the Favela-Bairro but also Grandes Favelas and Bairrinho programmes:

'We don't have the habit and sometimes we are not even competent to do so. And we are putting ourselves on the defensive. This is how I feel when we talk about the Favela-Bairro, without knowing where we stand with respect to this great project .... We cannot say that the Favela-Bairro is not a housing policy... CAIXA is investing heavily in Rio de Janeiro. Cleber and I went there on Wednesday. They have a lot of projects to finance, Jacarezinho urbanization [Grandes Favelas project], the Bairrinho programme. They have a lot of things. They are putting money in here.
CHAPTER 5

Then, it's complicated to confront this project' (Adauto Cardoso, researcher Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 14, 19).

Furthermore, the slum upgrading destabilized the social movement that had consolidated through the fight against evictions that occurred during the 20th century and, in particular, during the military dictatorship (see CHAPTER 4 page 94), The slum upgrading destabilized this movement because it fulfilled the demand about favelas' urbanization rather than their eviction and it gained the support of several actors that used to be part of that movement. This forced the members to re-evaluate the nature of the movement since the instrument wiped out its raison d'être and diminished its supporters:

'We cannot deny, It is true. How are you going to hit the Favela-Bairro when the perspective of the movement struggle was about evictions? When the historic fight was about evictions? Now the guys come, urbanize, improve accesses. And now? I think it's complicated, I think we have to move forward. It [the social movement] has to move forward. And it has to move forward so as to build a City Project. Perhaps it is the most difficult place because here the Conservative government is much more efficient. And here we have complicated problems to carry out this discussion. Here our disarticulation is huge because the conservative project was co-opting groups of traditionally professional critics, including us architects, who were largely co-opted if not at least seduced' (Adauto Cardoso, researcher at the Rio de Janeiro Federal University, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 19).

Calling into question the nature and purpose of the group formed around the evictions was not limited to Rio de Janeiro as across Brazil several municipalities introduced and used slum upgrading as their housing policy instrument.

'We gathered three hundred and more people here together with various representatives of this Municipal Chamber and one of the proposals advocated was this: the integrated urbanization of favelas. So we cannot hammer on this proposal which to be challenged today, we must have much more data, a political framework and information, and therefore we need to have - what Adauto spoke - another proposal. I followed, I came close to Nabil/Bonduki who had been a prominent figure in the debate about housing and favelas), a companion responsible for the urbanization of favelas in São Paulo, which was a programme based on the Pavão, Pavãozinho e Cantagalo and in turn the São Paulo programme gave the basis for the one in Rio de Janeiro. And he said,
"Kelson, but that was what we were defending." And there is no more' (Kelson, member of the Federal Union of Architects, DCMRJ 14/09/1998: 18).

Thus, the use of the slum upgrading called into question previous associations and ideas and ultimately the role and nature of the groups fighting for urbanizing favelas.

5.4.3 Approaching the new millennium: expanding the alliances

During the second half of Conde's administration not only were the criticisms and the emergence of an opposition group against the instrument contained but also the interest around the instrument continued to increase. For instance, during this period the Favela-Bairro became a major demand formulated by the favelas' dwellers due to factors such as the creation of new dynamics in the favelas:

"The communities who were out of the programme wanted to be included due to the success of the interventions; a growing number of activities and partnerships in communities have emerged after the implementation of the programme. So, this was undoubtedly the greatest demand that we had in relation to the community' (Andrea Cardoso, adviser Favela-Bairro programme, DCMRJ 03/12/2001: 36).

The instrument became central to other interventions carried out by the municipal administration:

"The example I gave, the secretariat of work that has already begun like this: "Where am I going to act? Within the Favela-Bairro of course, we'll converge, we'll focus, we'll maximize the interventions" (Fernando Cavallieri, advisor to the municipal administration, Freire & Oliveira 2008: 255).

The instrument also consolidated as the unifying element of initiatives conducted by other actors and organizations. For instance the regional state of Rio de Janeiro was associated with the instruments as in the case of Dona Marta favela upgrading (Jornal do Brasil 1999b); the Catholic Church participated in the Campinho project by donating land for constructing sport facilities (Jornal do Brasil 1999c); football player Ronaldinho financially supported social and sportive projects linked to the instrument's implementation (Jornal do Brasil 1999d; Jornal do Brasil 1998c); and Felipe Fontes, a business man, was interested in constructing cinemas in the favelas included in the Favela-Bairro programme (Jornal do Brasil 1998d).
These new associations expanded and consolidated the slum upgrading beyond Rio de Janeiro. The instrument internationally aroused interest and gained the support and recognition of various organizations. For instance, besides the visit of several delegations from around the world (Magalhaes & Conde 2004), the use of the instrument was supported and encouraged by the BID (Jornal do Brasil 1998e; Jornal do Brasil 1999e). Moreover, the Favela-Bairro programme was selected for the 2000 world fair in Hanover; and its architectural design was recognized: the architectural practice led by Jorge Mario Jáuregui was awarded a Harvard urban design prize for its interventions within the Favela-Bairro programme such as Favela-Bairro project in Vidigal favela (see Figure 19).

Figure 19 Favela-Bairro project in Vidigal favela. The construction of the sport facilities initiated in April 1998. Source: Jorge Mario Jáuregui
The instrument's capacity to gather together actions and people increased with the materialization of two other major financial agreements besides the BID and CAIXA loans that enabled the SMH budget to be tripled and maintained (see Figure 20), and aroused even more interest in the instrument than before. The first financial agreement for R$ 16 million was signed with the European Union for the instrument's implementation in small favelas through the Bairrinho programme (Jornal do Brasil 1999f). The second one was the approval of a second BID loan for R$ 520 million that was negotiated from 1998 (Jornal do Brasil 1999g). The major difference between the first and this second contract was the investment in social programmes. This adaptation resulted from the instrument's implementation and included the development of employment creation and income generation programmes and social projects directed at children and youth (Jornal do Brasil 1999g).

In addition, the various associations generated by the use of the instrument contributed to the consolidation of different actors' capacity and expertise. For example, through the association with the BID the SMH was expanded and consolidated as Secretariat with the creation of a managerial professional structure and systematic procedures (Freire et al. 2009).
This part described how the use of slum upgrading entailed and generated several problems. In particular, it illustrated the issues related to fragile collaboration among actors, financial instability, water and sanitation problems, lack of participation, drug trafficking, bad quality of works, delays, interruptions and relocations. All these problems contributed to call into question the slum upgrading instrument, the municipal housing policy and the municipal government actions. This process relates to the development of a 'controversy' conceptualized, as mentioned in CHAPTER 3 (see page 60), as 'all the manifestations by which the representativity of the spokesman is questioned, discussed, negotiated, rejected, etc.' (Callon 1986: 15).

Nevertheless, this part described that the 'controversy' did not result in the rejection of the slum upgrading instrument or housing policy as they continued to be supported by their network of 'allies', undermining 'dissidence'. This shows how 'the enrolment is transformed into active support' (ibid). Moreover, it noted that the slum upgrading instrument called into question the nature of the group that campaigned for the urbanization of favelas as it wiped out their raison d'être. This illustrates that identities are constantly negotiated during 'translation', 'not only does the state of beliefs fluctuate with a controversy but the identity and characteristics of the implicated actors change as well' (ibid: 16).

This part also described that at the end of the 1990s despite the 'controversy' slum upgrading remained Rio's housing policy 'Obligatory Passage Point' (OPP) as it continued to be indispensable. Moreover, it illustrated that the instrument and its 'allies' were performing as a unified entity, fostering housing policy and SMH visibility and legitimacy within the municipality and beyond. This relates to the consolidation of a 'mobilization' moment that involves 'forming alliances and acting as a unit of force' (Callon 1986: 14). This section ended by pointing out that new alliances were sealed with the CAIXA and the European Union and other were in negotiations (second BID loan), contributing to the strength of the slum upgrading instrument and enhancing SMH, architectural practices and construction companies' expertise for intervening in small and larger favelas and developing social projects and employment creation and income generation programmes.
5.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter investigated the choice and use of slum upgrading as the municipal housing policy instrument during the 1990s by deploying the network of 'associations' that were constituted. The first part described how the emergence of the instrument and housing policy involved a 'problematization' moment during which heterogeneous entities were 'associated': the Mutirão experience, Rio's Master Plan, people and municipal departments mainly through the GEAP, and ideas and recommendations such as the ones formulated during the debate at the Municipal Chamber. This 'problematization' moment resulted in the definition of the municipal housing policy basis that entailed the establishment of the slum upgrading instrument as the 'Obligatory Passage Point' (OPP), i.e. an 'actant' indispensable for the constitution of the housing policy.

The first part also highlighted that the development of the slum upgrading and housing policy entailed the 'building of alliances' with municipal departments, IAB-RJ, architectural practices, favelas' residents and the BID through devices such as the classification matrix, architectural competition, agreements and contracts, and strategic steps that included the launch of the Favela-Bairro programme, building on the SMDS staff expertise and implementation of first slum upgrading projects which allowed the development of Rio's housing policy without external aid. Throughout the 'interessement' and 'enrolment' moments the slum upgrading instrument and Rio's housing policy developed a legitimacy based on a scientific/technical rationality which entailed rational methods and not political designation and unplanned works.

The second part explored the further development of the slum upgrading and housing policy, showing that it entailed the creation of more 'associations' through various actions and in particular, the creation of the SHM, the implementation of more slum upgrading projects, and the signature of the BID loan. The building of more 'associations' also involved the creation of publications, organization of seminars and field visits, and the set up of new partnerships for expanding the use of the instrument. Specifically, this part observed the 'enrolment' and 'mobilization' of architectural practices, BID (Favela-Bairro programme), CAXIA (Grandes Favelas programme), Italian NGO (Bairrinho programme), legislative branch (for voting the creation of the SMH and BID and CAIXA loans), UNHABITAT, communities (G-16), municipal and regional state secretariats and bodies (such as CEDAE IPLANRIO, SMO and SME) and national and international academia (UFRJ
This section illustrated how the building of these alliances transformed the slum upgrading instrument and resulted in the creation of the PROAP-RIO. Moreover, it confirmed that the slum upgrading instrument remained the 'Obligatory Passage Point', and expanded the number of actors involved in housing policy: the newly created SMH, other municipal and regional state secretariats, departments and bodies, architectural practices, construction companies, BID, CAIXA, NGOs and favelas' resident associations.

In addition, the second part noted that the use of the instrument created new knowledge about the favelas through slum upgrading diagnosis and publications, and know-how through slum upgrading programme and projects' contracts, regulations and operational frameworks. This enhanced primarily SMH managing skills and architectural practices and construction companies expertise on implementing projects in favelas. Furthermore, the development of this know-how and knowledge developed slum upgrading technical legitimacy, consolidating a shift as Rio's previous housing experience which related more to ad hoc solutions and political interests. It observed that the constitution of Rio's slum upgrading instrument related to 'De Jure de Facto and Best Practices' instrument's typology whose legitimacy includes a mix of scientific/technical and democratic rationalities (see CHAPTER 1 page 29). As the slum upgrading instrument gained strength through the 'interessement', 'enrolment' and 'mobilization' of more allies, it contributed to the consolidation of the municipal housing policy and increased the municipal administration power as the instrument enhanced its legitimacy in the city and beyond and helped to expand its technical and electoral capacities.

The third part of this chapter observed that the development of the instrument carried with it several problems such as water and sanitation issues, lack of collaboration and community participation, and delays. These problems fuelled a 'controversy' about the instrument and Rio's housing policy; however, it also noted that the 'controversy' did not caused their rejection. The instrument and the municipal housing policy continued to be supported by their network of 'associations', limiting 'dissidence'. Moreover, this part illustrated how identities are always fluctuating during 'translation' as it described how the 'controversy' about the instrument destabilized the group that campaigned for the urbanization of favelas by undermining its raison d'être.
This section also observed that despite the 'controversy', the instrument continued to be Rio's housing policy 'Obligatory Passage Point' (OPP), and its network of alliances were performing as a unified entity, consolidating 'mobilization'. More 'associations' were achieved (CAIXA and the European Union) while others were in negotiations (second BID loan). This contributed to strength the slum upgrading instrument and increase the know-how of the SMH, architectural practices and construction companies for upgrading small and larger favelas and implementing social and income generation programmes.

Based on this, the chapter supports hypothesis 1 that argues that the choice use of the slum upgrading influenced the development of Rio's housing policy. It illustrated that the instrument was constituted as the corner stone of Rio's housing policy and as such it supported and fostered the development of the municipal housing policy and this despite generating several issues that produce a 'controversy' about it use. The chapter noted that the use of the slum upgrading instrument influenced the shaping of the municipal housing policy by building alliances with a wide range of entities through a vast range of actions.

The chapter also supports hypothesis 2 that argues that the slum upgrading contributed to modify Rio's housing governance. The use of the instrument modified the housing policy constellation of actors to include the SMH, other municipal and regional state bodies (in particular IPLANRIO, CEDAE, Geo-Rio, SMO), architectural practices, construction companies, BID, CAIXA, European Union, residents' associations and other actors/groups/institutions such as Footballer Ronaldinho and the Catholic Church that participated in ad hoc basis. However, the chapter shows that despite the inclusion of new actors the slum upgrading contributed to secure and even foster municipal executive power. It described that despite the diversification of actors involved, the choice and use of the slum upgrading instrument enhanced municipal executive power within the housing sector as it put it at the centre of the housing policy and developed its knowledge and know-how. Moreover, through the constitution of the slum upgrading instrument, the municipal government gained legitimacy and credibility and could neutralize or limit criticism and opposition over Rio's housing policy, other municipal administration initiatives and the 1996 elections.

Finally, the chapter substantiates hypothesis 3 that argue that the slum upgrading supported Rio's housing policy depoliticization. This chapter described how the use of slum
upgrading instrument developed different actors' expertise such as BID, architectural practices, construction companies and consolidated the skills of the SMH and other municipal bodies such as IPLANRIO. The chapter also stressed that the development the various regulation, procedures and standards (the classification matrix, public tenders, contracts, SMH's functioning, programme's management, projects' elaboration and implementation regulations) weakened political regulation and contributed to the development of technical legitimacy of the instrument and Rio's housing policy.
CHAPTER 6  ABANDONING THE SLUM UPGRADING

'Dissidence plays a different role since it brings into question some of the gains of the previous stages. The displacements and the spokesmen are challenged or refused. The actors implicated do not acknowledge their roles in this story nor the slow drift in which they had participated, in their opinion, wholeheartedly. As the aphorism says, traduttore-traditore, from translation to treason there is only a short step’ (Callon 1986: 19).

6.1  INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the use of slum upgrading during most of the first decade of the 2000s, aiming to reveal the role of the instrument for housing policy and governance transformation.

The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores the politico-administrative change at the beginning of the first decade of the 2000s and its effects on the instrument’s implementation. The second part examines the use of the slum upgrading during Maia's second administration. The third investigates the use of the slum upgrading during Maia's third administration.
6.2 THE BEGINNING OF THE SLUM UPGRADING DECLINE

6.2.1 The dislocation of the slum upgrading political support

The rivalry between Maia and Conde

Since Cesar Maia left the municipal administration at the end of 1996, he started preparing his candidacy for the State Government elections of 1998. During this period Maia remained close to the Mayor Paulo Conde and the municipal administration. As both men were close allies, Maia's candidacy was supported by the municipal administration initiatives, including the Favela-Bairro programme (Jornal do Brasil 1998c; Jornal do Brasil 1998f; Jornal do Brasil 1998g; Jornal do Brasil 1998h; Jornal do Brasil 1998i). Nevertheless, Maia lost the elections and Antony Garotinho became the Governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro (1999-2002). After Maia's defeat he intended to return to the head of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro and decided to run for the Mayor's position in the 2000 elections. However, Conde did not step down and decided to run for his own re-election.

At the end of 1998 the Liberal Front Party (PFL) endorsed Conde instead of Maia as the official candidate. Maia did not renounce the elections; he broke up his relationship with Conde, creating a split within the PFL. The PFL municipal councillors Paulo Cerri, Ruy Cesar, Alexander Cerruti Indio da Costa and Eduardo Paes supported Maia instead of Conde who was the official PFL candidate (Marques 2007). The break up between Maia and Conde dislocated the slum upgrading instrument political support. Maia's allies started questioning the use of the instrument during Conde's administration:

"The courage of a political suicide is natural for a government that ends its last year without having done anything of what was promised. Of the twenty something Rio Cidade projects, we have here three halfway. Of the Favela-Bairro projects the government said it would do, none was done despite what the municipality says and publicizes, the Favela-Bairro projects that are shown, are the ones built during Cesar Maia's administration" (Indio Da Costa, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 01/12/1999: 21).

At the end of 1999 Conde's administration sent to the Municipal Chamber bill No.238/1999 to obtain the agreement for signing a second BID loan. The rivalry between Maia and Conde was put aside as this loan would benefit the next Mayor. The bill was unanimously approved (DCMRJ 16/12/1999: 46). Nevertheless, the truce did not last long. Once the Federal Senate and the BID gave the final go-ahead to the municipality for
contracting the loan in March 2000, a controversy emerged about whether Conde should go or not to the USA to sign the contract. The opposition argued that the trip would become an electoral event that would illegally benefit Conde's candidacy. Despite this controversy, Conde went to New Orleans to sign the BID contract. Furthermore, he was accompanied by Tito, the president of the Federation of Favelas of the state of Rio de Janeiro (FAFERJ). His attendance not only reinforced the idea that slum upgrading was supported by the favela dwellers, but also indicated that the FAFERJ was close to Conde at the eve of the municipal elections.

Right after Conde's trip, the opposition became stronger, using slum upgrading as the means (DCMRJ 03/03/2000: 88-89). Maia's allies started to question the development of the Favela-Bairro and the Rio Cidade, the other municipality's flagship, arguing about their use for political interests and a change in the slum upgrading objectives. According to them the objective of providing basic infrastructure was outshone by a focus on aesthetics and the objective of integration was replaced by the objective of a simple urbanization of favelas (DCMRJ 30/03/2000: 89). By contrast, Conde's allies praised the investments in the favelas through the instrument and the transformation of favelas into neighbourhoods. They started attributing the instrument's fatherhood to Conde as they stressed that the emergence of the slum upgrading was initiated and supported by Conde when he was at the head of SMU from 1993 to 1996 (DCMRJ 31/03/2000: 21).

In the following months, the use of slum upgrading for the electoral campaign was intensified. Conde's re-election campaign strategy involved as in 1996 the capitalization of the housing policy for gaining voters' support. Conde wandered across the city supervising and launching Favela-Bairro projects together with municipal councillors, seeking their support by sharing Favela-Bairro's electoral capital (DCMRJ 17/05/2000: 12). Cesar Maia did not stand there with his arms crossed. He and his allies used the slum upgrading against Conde by denouncing Favela-Bairro's multiple design and implementation problems. For instance, regarding Favela-Bairro in Borel, Maia's allies criticized the scale of the project (too small), the design of public spaces (soccer field too small to be used), the lack of public services (lack of garbage collection) and the delays of works (about a year) (ibid: 13). Furthermore, they continued to associate the slum upgrading to Maia's administration and denounced the change in the slum upgrading objective. As mentioned before, Maia's allies highlighted that the Favela-Bairro had moved away from its initial aim of integrating the
favelas into the city towards a mere urbanization programme (ibid). For them, the use of projects such as Fêmão Cardim and Ladeira dos Funcionários, both implemented during Maia’s administration for publicizing municipal housing policy prominently illustrated that projects during Conde’s administration did not reach the same quality.

Slum upgrading and the campaign

By May 2000 together with Conde and Maia supported by the PFL and the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) respectively, also running for Mayor were Sergio Cabral from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and Benedita da Silva from the Workers’ Party (PT). One month later, prior to the beginning of the official electoral campaign, Cabral decided to support Conde in exchange for his support for the 2002 candidacy for the Senate. In addition, Conde chose as running mate Sergio Magalhães who did not have any political experience and was not affiliated to the PFL. Conde was able to do so as the PFL believed in his possibilities for being re-elected (Jornal do Brasil 2000b). The direct involvement of the SMH Secretary consolidated the central role of the slum upgrading instrument in the campaign (Figure 21).

Figure 21 Elections 2000. Luis Paulo Conde, State deputy Sergio Cabral and Sergio Magalhaes, wearing Favela-Bairro baseball caps. Source: Jornal do Brasil 2000c
At the SMH most of the staff closed ranks in favour of the Conde-Magalhães ticket. Nevertheless, some dissidence emerged. In particular, the Favela-Bairro programme manager, Lu Petersen, did not support the Conde-Magalhães ticket because she did not agree with the way the slum upgrading was lately being implemented. She agreed with the opposition criticisms that the Favela-Bairro was becoming a mere urbanization and architecture programme (interview Lu Petersen). Furthermore, she also disagreed with the way the SMH was being managed by Sergio Magalhães (Freire et al. 2009). Thus, Petersen stepped down from her position and announced her candidacy to the municipal chamber under Maia's party, fighting for the 25% of votes that Rio's favelas represented (Jornal do Brasil 2000d).

During the official campaign started in July 2000, the Favela-Bairro was used as an electoral asset by both candidates (Jornal do Brasil 2000e; Jornal do Brasil 2000f; Jornal do Brasil 2000g; Jornal do Brasil 2000h; Jornal do Brasil 2000d). In addition, a World Bank report argued that although the Favela-Bairro was urbanizing it was not alleviating poverty (Jornal do Brasil 2000i). The report also criticized the slum upgrading instrument for favouring aesthetics' aspects. Thus, overexposed by the electoral fight between Maia and Conde and the growing criticisms, the instrument was weakened and torn apart.

Conde was favourite during the entire campaign that ran from July to September, while Maia and Benedita da Silva from the PT were fighting for the second place. Maia was supported by national political figures, different parties and the Universal Church (Marques 2007: 104-105). For the first round Conde obtained 34.6% of votes followed by Maia with 23% (TSE n.d.). For second round Maia obtained the support of the evangelic religion groups that previously supported PT's candidate, defeating Conde (Marques 2007).

From technocrats to politicians

In his second mandate as Mayor of Rio de Janeiro Maia primarily sought to create alliances with other parties and consolidate his political group that had been in formation since 1993 (Marques 2007). To his political party allies, Maia gave different positions within the municipal administration, and the control of several municipal secretariats: health, labour, economic development, social development, culture, transport, and urban planning. To develop his group, Maia placed, as in 1993, the newcomers to the political scene in the sub-prefectures. However, for running the municipal secretariats, instead of technocrats this
time Maia chose people with more consolidated and active electoral careers (Marques 2007: 107-108). In particular, the state deputy Eider Dantas was designated to run the Public Works Secretariat (SMO), and federal deputy Eduardo Paes was appointed at the head of the Sport and Environment Secretariat (SMAS).

The choice of the municipal housing Secretary followed Maia's new political interests and objectives. He appointed Solange Amaral who unlike Sergio Magalhães had a political career; she was state Secretary for Social Action at the end of Moreia Franco's administration, head of the sub-prefecture of the 'Zona Sul/Tijuca' during Maia's first administration and state deputy since 1994 for the Green Party (PV), and was re-elected in 1998 for the PFL party. The arrival of Amaral at the head of the SMH was not the only change at the SMH after Maia's victory. As mentioned earlier, during the campaign most of the SMH staff supported Conde’s candidacy. After the election several of them left the municipal administration or transferred to other municipal bodies. New staff coming primarily from the SMO arrived at the SMH. Among them, Jozé Candido Sampaio was appointed as manager of the SMH Projects' Office and Bruno Sebastião as manager of the SMH Works' Office.

6.2.2 Slum upgrading losing credibility

Essential vs. unnecessary

The use of the slum upgrading in the first year of Maia's administration was marked by serious delays and interruptions. This led the slum upgrading to receive another blow. Sergio Magalhães denounced these slum upgrading implementation problems, arguing a shift of the instrument's objective (O Globo 2001a). This allegation fuelled a controversy about the slum upgrading instrument. In response Solange Amaral denounced that the implementation problems such as the ones related to water and sanitation infrastructure and the bad quality of works were a heritage of the previous administration (DCMRJ 16/10/2001: 3-11). Furthermore, building on the aesthetic drift criticism, she opposed essential infrastructure works to unnecessary architectural design:

'What we stand for are the essential works, quality, and not works as occur in Borel, in Dique, in Sapé, made by the professors [Conde and Magalhães], but actually we are having to run, maintain, put other teams in order to secure the infrastructure constructed in these communities. I totally agree with what your Excellency said and that's the nature of our concern. The population
must have water, sewage, sewage treatment plant functioning, hillside stabilization, social work, concern with youth welfare, commitment to income generation programmes. The rest are dazzling aesthetic concerns, with which we have no familiarity. Our familiarity is mainly with the service of population needs... What the Favela-Bairro needs to do is to resume its concern with the essentials, with the whole, with the quality; it needs to correct its aesthetic or dazzling deviations, its excesses... So, the Favela-Bairro continues and coherently follows its origins, seeking to correct these excesses...’ (Solange Amaral, Housing Secretary, DCMRJ 16/10/2001: 11).

Nevertheless, Amaral and the new SMH staff had little room for introducing substantial changes into the slum upgrading (DCMRJ 27/12/2001: 9-11). The bulk of funds were tied with the second BID loan. This loan contract included not only the standards to be met by the programme and the items projects should embrace, but also an implementation methodology (BID 2000). The little capacity that the new administration had for changing existed because at the beginning of Maia’s second administration the instrument was financially more diversified than at its inception. It relied on matching funds between the municipality and Federal Government through the Pro-Moradia programme in larger favelas: Rio das Pedras and Fazenda Coqueiro do Jacarezinho; and between the municipality and other institutions such as the European Union in the case of the Bairrinho programme for smaller favelas. Despite the little capacity to introduce substantial changes the controversy weakened even more the instrument.

**Growing slum upgrading discredit**

Magalhães' allegation served as the basis of a municipal Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) named CPI of the Favela-Bairro (DCMRJ 16/10/2001: 2). The CPI of the Favela-Bairro revealed some practices of clientelism around the slum upgrading. Some projects in favelas that supported the Conde-Magalhães ticket were interrupted, delayed, or denied, and favela dwellers that supported Conde had difficulty in relating to other municipal secretariats:

'Uniquely some people supported Luiz Paulo Conde for the simple fact that the government that preceded which was Cesar Maia’s... He [Maia] called the G-16 group [see CHAPTER 5 page 130] and told the G-16: that Conde was Cesar and Cesar was Conde, for folks support and like Conde. And something very amazing and fantastic happened and it is a statement that I make with emotion because I learned to like and respect him ... And we ended up liking him. But who told us to like him was Cesar Maia ... Because it was the Mayor who taught us to like Luiz
Paulo Conde. Not that we choose this option or did something because it happened ... So I would like this to be recorded and for the party's municipal councillor, if he could speak with Solange Amaral [SMH], could speak with the Secretary Eider Dantas [SMO], with the Secretary of Sports and Leisure [Eduardo Paes], because our communities are ignored completely' (Hercules Ferreira Mendes, president NGO G-16, DCMRJ 22/10/2001: 12).

In addition, in some cases in order to beneficiate from the slum upgrading, favela dwellers needed the support of politicians related to Maia’s political group:

'Just started having information about the project after a colleague, a community leader, told me: "Why do you not call the office of the politician X? You might have success". I called, an adviser answered me and asked me what I wanted, I said I want help. I have a project, I explained, a Favela-Bairro Project...

- Could you say who is this politician?
- Yes: Rodrigo Maia.[Cesar Maia’s son] When I called to his office, the adviser said, "Give me some time, call me back next week." Then, the following week, I called again.
- The name of the adviser is?
- Washington. I called him and be said ... It seems that was him that called me. Yes, be called me and said, "Call the Housing Secretariat" I said, will I be served? Because I am not usually served in the Housing Secretariat. It was then that I called and was very well attended in the Housing Secretariat, by phone. And since then, I started to be better served in the Housing Secretariat, including also the Sub-prefecture of Campo Grande' (Dialogue between Municipal councillor Rodrigo Bethlem and Valnice de Castro Coutinho, president of Jardim Moriçaba residents' association, DCMRJ 22/10/2001: 15).

By being the mediators between favela dwellers and the municipal administration, these politicians sought to consolidate dwellers allegiance and support for the next elections (DCMRJ 22/10/2001: 10-18, DCMRJ 27/12/2001: 12). These practices contributed to the emergence of the instrument’s discredit.

Nevertheless, these practices were limited mainly because the implementation of the slum upgrading was financially and technically constrained by the association with the BID. Specifically, the contract established the list of favelas to benefit from the programme and the bulk of projects developed by the SMH related to the BID. Furthermore, most of the SMH budget was tied to the BID contract. Thus, even if the SMH had some capacity to
delay, or interrupt a project, it did not have the capacity to include or exclude any project unless it was outside the BID contract.

Inexperience

The politico-administrative change weakened the instrument because it destabilized the SMH capacity building. The SMH knowledge and know-how was consolidated over more than ten years because many SMH staff worked for the SMDS in the 1980s designing and implementing the Mutirão programme, and then joined the SMH during the 1990s, developing the slum upgrading instrument. In addition, SMH managers emerged within this group of people, enabling team cohesion and consolidation of expertise (DCMRJ 03/12/2001: 39). The politico-administrative change compromised these dynamics even if not everybody in the SMH left and several actors remained involved such as architectural practices and construction companies that had gained expertise (DCMRJ 03/12/2001: 39).

Furthermore, the politico-administrative change compromised the use of the slum upgrading. Although the instrument was highly regulated and new SMH staff were familiar with the municipal administration, their inexperience about specific SMH administrative processes generated mistakes in the public tender publication and contracts, resulting in programme and project delays (DCMRJ 03/12/2001: 38). Furthermore, their lack of knowledge about the instrument's complex coordination created problems in the field. Specifically, since the arrival of the new administration, the Attorney Municipal Office (PGM) that was involved in slum removals and relocation, was left out of the instrument's management. This heavily affected the progress of projects and became a key factor in the Favela-Bairro projects interruptions and delays (DCMRJ 11/03/2001: 5-6). Finally, the new SMH staff was inexperienced in interactions with the favela dwellers and their leaders. The SMH kept them away from decision-making processes or left them without information, producing tensions during the instrument's implementation (DCMRJ 22/10/2001: 13-14).

Additionally, other issues emerged fostered by the arrival of a new municipal administration. Even if the new SMH could not make substantial changes to the slum upgrading, they decided to re-evaluate all the projects. The aim of this process was to understand the instrument and get familiar with the procedures and items that it entailed, adding to the problem of delays:
'What hurt perhaps the pace of works and everything else was really ignorance. Because there are many projects, there were many works. And as we have been saying from the beginning, a community like that has 250 of these boards for you can look and learn. You have water, sewage, drainage, lighting, architecture, structure, road ... It is huge, it is impossible. I can't tell you now that I know all, no, I know a large sample, but I have a team that knows. So really, I would have been frivolous if I would have said within a week that everything was ok I had to know' (Jože Candido Sampaio, head of the SMH project's office DCMRJ 27/12/2001: 11).

The re-evaluation sought also to redirect project investments towards basic infrastructure (water and sanitation networks) perceived as the instrument's essential item and pedestrian pathways instead of roads that were seen as incentives for illegal settlements' development (DCMRJ 27/12/2001: 7). The re-evaluation of slum upgrading projects delayed and disrupted the instrument's implementation because modifications needed to be approved by the BID, making the delay even longer (DCMRJ 27/12/2001: 8).

**Other complications**

Issues related to the complexity of the instrument and other dynamics also emerged. The beginning of a new fiscal year destabilized the pace of municipal financial expenditures, producing delays. This delay was amplified in 2001 by the fact that Conde's administration started several projects at the same time that would have been managed without problems if an administrative change had not happened (DCMRJ 03/12/2001: 34 and 27/12/2001: 11). Secondly, the instrument's implementation suffered from delays because the system of Municipal Budget and Works Cost (Sistema de Custos de Orçamento e de Obras - SCO) was modified. Thus, public tender documents and contracts needed to be reviewed (DCMRJ 27/12/2001: 8-9). Thirdly, problems with the CEDAE continued to exist and amplified as the SMH activities proceeded (DCMRJ 16/10/2001: 10). Finally, in addition to the BID approval for any modification, the BID contract only allowed the use of public tender as a way to hire architectural practices and contractors. This resulted in further delays because of the official timing and more demanding procedures that public tenders entailed (DCMRJ 16/10/2001: 8). Moreover, this public contracting system did not allow the SMH to control the participation of some contractors, leading to major issues:

'First let me clarify that all contracts are made through competitive bidding, and as a public bidding process, the Secretariat and none of us can prevent a company participate in bidding... In relation to the SCEG [a private construction company], I had identified the works it started. It
started some works with the first BID loan and these works were going well until the financial problem the company faced. And I think that was a mistake of the company, before ending the contracts it was already running - and the contracts had about 15% to 10% of the works left - it went into many other bids already for the second funding [Favela-Bairro II]. And, unfortunately, it had accumulated, if I'm not mistaken, three old contracts from the first BID loan, and won four more new contracts in the second loan. Therefore it had amassed seven contracts with the Housing Secretariat. And unfortunately [the contractor] had problems ...' (Davi Bezerra Lessa, ex chief of SMH works office, DCMR] 03/12/2001: 35).

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This part described that the 2000 elections destabilized the instrument's network of 'associations'. The alliance between Maia and Conde was undone, and their fight for winning the 2000 elections generated a 'controversy' about the instrument's efficiency and effectiveness, and a shift of the instrument's main objective of integrating favelas into the city towards their simple urbanization during Conde's administration (1997-2000). This 'controversy' weakened both the slum upgrading instrument and Rio's housing policy.

This part also illustrated that at the beginning of Maia's second administration the instrument continued to be challenged as Magalhães and Amaral fuelled the mentioned 'controversy'. Amaral criticized the increase in importance of architectural and urban design to the detriment of basic infrastructure implementation (unnecessary vs. essential works) while Magalhães denounced the implementation problems and delays as well as a change of the instrument. However, it was noted that the instrument was highly regulated, limiting changes in its objectives or components. In addition, it pointed out how the 'controversy' was also made worse by slum upgrading implementation problems fostered by the instrument's regulatory frameworks, the politico-administrative change, the inexperience of the new SMH staff, and practices of clientelism. In relation to the latter, this part showed how the slum upgrading regulations limited their expansion. The development of this 'controversy' weakened even more the instrument and the housing policy as it damaged further its network of 'alliances'.

166
CHAPTER 6

6.3 THE WEAKENING OF THE SLUM UPGRADING

6.3.1 Administrative fragmentation & politico-electoral disinterest

SMH functioning fragmentation

At the end of 2002 Amaral announced the creation of the 'Favela-Bairro Executive Office' for overseeing the slum upgrading implementation that included staff from the SMH, the SMDS and the Municipal Labour and Employment Secretariat (SMTE) (O Dia 2002). Managed by Aderbal Curvelo and Claudia Esquerdo, this Executive Office moved out from the SMH headquarters in the Municipality's annex building at Cidade Nova to a building in Praça Pio X at Candelária. The creation and transfer of this Office outside the SMH headquarters isolated the slum upgrading and diminished its role in the evolution of the SMH institutional development and housing policy. Furthermore, within the SMH three main groups emerged each of them linked to a particular SMH office: the Favela-Bairro Executive Office, the Project's Office and the Work's Office, respectively. These groups tended to duplicate or even triple the SMH structure. For instance, three project sectors were working simultaneously at that time, fragmenting SMH actions including slum upgrading implementation (interview with Augusto Verissimo). In addition, the SMH lost the control of the Social and Urban Orientation Office (POUSO) that was one of the key elements of the slum upgrading instrument. Their management was transferred to the SMU in 2003 by Municipal Decree No.22982/2003.

During the following years the SMH developed several yet isolated actions. In 2001 it launched e-solo programme implemented in partnership with UN-habitat that focused on regularization. Another isolated initiative was a reflexion about the Favela-Bairro and how to intervene in Rio largest favelas developed by the Projects' Office (interview with Jozé Candido Sampaio). This office organized a public tender which was won by Jorge Mario Jáuregui whose architectural practice had managed several Favela-Bairro projects. This exploration resulted in the elaboration of a master plan for Alemão Complex that included a diagnostic study and several urban development proposals (Figure 22). In addition, the Projects' Office also commanded Jáuregui to elaborate a proposal for Manguinhos Complex. However, none of them were implemented.
The SMH also developed the housing construction. The rise of municipal housing construction related to the articulation of the interest put forward by Maia at the beginning of his second administration together with the reactivation of federal funding directed at this specific housing approach. When Cesar Maia came back to power in 2001, he brought back to the forefront the construction of housing (Jornal do Brasil 2000). This trend continued in the following years (DCMRJ 25/11/2004: 5-9; DCMRJ 01/12/2005: 21-27). In particular, 'Novas Alternativas' took an important role within the SMH. This programme created in 1994 together with the Favela-Bairro aimed at producing housing units across the city and using different approaches (see CHAPTER 5, Table 8 page 112). Since Maia's second administration, the Novas Alternativas moved towards the rehabilitation, restoration and construction of buildings in the centre of Rio de Janeiro.
where urban infrastructure already existed. The aim was the creation of mixed spaces including housing and commercials activities in the centre that was mainly for office use (SMH n.d.).

Thus, the slum upgrading was not anymore at the centre of the housing policy nor at the heart of the SMH functioning and instead of being supported, the instrument started to be isolated within the SMH.

*From collaboration to cutthroat competition*

Maia’s objectives to consolidate political alliances and strength his political group created competition among the different secretariats. Like Solange Amaral who fought unsuccessfully for the state government of Rio de Janeiro in the 2002 elections other municipal Secretaries continued to develop their political career. For instance, the Public Works Secretary Eider Dantas was re-elected State deputy in 2002 and the Labour Secretary Carlos Dias continued to be State deputy until 2003. Moreover, personal tension among Secretaries also emerged. In particular between Solange Amaral and Marcelo Garcia who after a short period at the head of the SMTE became in 2003 SMDS Secretary (interview with Lu Petersen). Municipal Secretaries with politico-electoral interests and personal incompatibilities fragmented municipal public policies.

In this politico-administrative landscape the slum upgrading instrument was penalized as its functioning depended on different secretariats such as the SMH for the urban project, the SMDS for kids and youth programmes, the SMTE for employment and income-generating initiatives and the SMU for implementing and managing the POUSOs. Furthermore, slum upgrading implementation and maintenance included more secretariats and institutions: the Municipal Treasury Secretariat (SMF), Municipal Public works (SMO), Municipal Environment Secretariat (SMAC), Municipal Education Secretariat (SME), Municipal Sport and Leisure Secretariat (SMEL), Municipal Attorney Office (PGM), Municipal Urban Institute (IPP) and the Park and Squares foundation (Municipal Decree No.18667/2000). These Secretariats and municipal bodies tended to work for their own politico-electoral objectives with no interest in collaboration, isolating the instrument and compromising its implementation and maintenance.
The lack of collaboration among the municipal Secretariats was accompanied by a fragmentation of slum upgrading-related activities across the municipal administration. In particular, the Urban Cell office created in 2001 within Maia's cabinet focused on the evolution of the instrument. Managed by Lu Petersen who was the former Favela-Bairro programme manager, this office sought to foster a post-Favela-Bairro era (Freire et al. 2009: 98) by using the cell evolution processes as a conceptual anchor. Specifically, Lu Petersen, together with an architect (Dietmar Starket) proposed to create micro-interventions that could contribute to foster the endogenous urban, social, political, economic and environmental development of favelas:

"The cell concept is the following: from some structural lines deployed, it will consolidate to the extent that the functions are being constructed in an interactive process of urban relations" (Lu Petersen, Urban Cell programme manager, in Costa & Andrade 2004).

The urban cell interventions aimed at triggering the integration process of favelas; thus, they were planned at medium and long term:

"The first requirement to be satisfied is to find other alternative social policies in areas of poverty, beyond municipal institutional programmes. You have to understand that the Favela-Bairro is not an end in itself, but the beginning of the sustainable integration of slums into the city. The Urban Cell is a proposal that may enable induction channels of integrated development. To create attractiveness for private sector is a target to be met" (Lu Petersen, Urban Cell programme manager, in Costa & Andrade 2004).

The Urban Cell concept was first developed in Jacarezinho in a collaboration with the Bauhaus School. Its implementation was financed through the SMO and it was not linked with the Favela-Bairro developed by the SMH in that area. The open air museum at Providência was the second intervention developed by the Urban Cell Office from 2001 (PCRJ 2003). The proposal emerged after a visit to the Morro da Providência organized as part of an exchange with the Architectural Association and PROUB-UFRJ (Freire et al. 2009). The idea of the Museum was later associated with the construction of a Guggenheim Museum designed by Jean Nouvel (idem) and which never left the drawing board. Unlike Jacarezinho, the project was financed by the SMH and linked to the Favela-Bairro programme. However, the SMH project developed by Fernanda Salles was secondary as it was modified in function to the Urban Cell Office's proposal (Figure 23).
In addition, Eider Dantas at the head of the SMO launched in 2001 the Rio Comunidade programme aimed at the redevelopment of Zona Norte and Zona Oeste communities by constructing basic sanitation infrastructure: sewage and drainage network, paving, public spaces, gutters and sidewalks (SMO n.d.). This programme included about 80 projects and R$ 100 million in investments from 2001 to 2008 (Figure 24). Thus, the SMO not only was involved in the SMH slum upgrading by controlling conservation works and public works such as water, light, roads and hill side works; but it also directly competed against the SMH activities, in particular, against its slum upgrading instrument.

![Figure 23 Providência open air museum. Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2011](image)

![Figure 24 Rio Comunidade in New Delhi community before and after. Source: SMO n.d.](image)

*Competition with the state of Rio de Janeiro*

The relation between Cesar Maia and Rio de Janeiro’s State Governor Antony Garotinho that was tense after the 1998 State elections deteriorated even more during the 2000 municipal elections when Maia made alliances with Garotinho’s political enemies Marcello
Alencar and Leonel Brizola (Jornal do Brasil 2001). Garotinho once in power came close to Conde and appointed him State Secretary of Governmental Coordination from 1998 to 2002. Furthermore, right after the municipal elections of 2000, Garotinho and Conde reached a political agreement that led to the inclusion of PFL party members into the State government (Jornal do Brasil 2000k). Among them Sergio Magalhães, former SMH Secretary was appointed as the State Secretary of Special Projects.

With the arrival of Conde and Magalhães at the Garotinho administration, the State Government of Rio de Janeiro started to emerge as an actor in relation to programmes and projects directed at Rio de Janeiro's favelas, challenging the municipal administration. For instance, in 2001 the municipality and the state of Rio de Janeiro developed in parallel a slum upgrading project in Cantagalo which was included in the second BID loan through the SMH and State Secretariat of Environment and Urban Development respectively (O Globo 2001b) (Municipal Decree No.18667/2000). The direct competition against the SMH actions weakened the instrument, the SMH and overall Maia's administration because it bypassed the municipal administration:

'When I got there I was called and told that the municipality had no intention of keeping this project [Favela-Bairro community maintenance project] and I was asked to sign the termination of this contract ... Moreover, since we were without services, we needed to find a solution for the community. What did we do? We sought the State Government. Former Housing Secretary, the State Government Secretary of Special Projects today [Sergio Magalhães]. As he was a person who knew all the communities that worked together, we looked for him and also made this proposal. The Secretary met with us, took us to Governor Garotinho and the Governor liked the proposal. And today, we are telling first to the municipal councillors that CEDAE is taking over 39 communities, providing maintenance of water and sewage. And, the surprises is that the G-16 NGO will manage it all' (Hercules Ferreira Mendes, Guarda-16 NGO DCMRJ 12/10/2001: 13).

Thus, in addition to the problems that the slum upgrading implementation faced with the state of Rio through the CEDAE due to sanitation infrastructure problems (DCMRJ 22/12/2003: 26), the instrument faced further challenges and dislocation by the emergence of the state of Rio de Janeiro as a new actor around slum upgrading activities.
In 2002 State elections Solange Amaral, Cesar’s candidate and SMH secretary, was defeated by Antony Garotinho’s wife, Rosinha. Luiz Paulo Conde became vice-Governor and State Secretary of Environment and Urban Development, and Sergio Magalhães Deputy Secretary of the same State department. Through this Secretariat that incorporated SMH staff who worked in the Favela-Bairro during the 1990s such as former SMH project manager Helio Aleixo and former Favela-Bairro programme manager Andrea Cardoso, the state of Rio de Janeiro continued to challenge the SMH and its instrument.

The state of Rio resumed the slum upgrading project in Dona Marta agreed by the municipality when Conde was Mayor but which was interrupted after his defeat (Jornal do Brasil 2000). In 2004 the regional state commissioned the Brazilian Institute of Architects of Rio de Janeiro (IAB-RJ) to organize an architectural contest (similar to the Favela-Bairro’s in 1994) which was won by the architect Fernanda Sales (Jornal do Brasil 2004a). Furthermore, the state developed several initiatives in Rocinha such as the development of a hotel school (Jornal do Brasil 2004b), and a debate about environmental solutions for the favela (Jornal do Brasil 2004c). Then, at the end of 2005 the State commissioned an architectural competition for elaborating a slum upgrading proposal for Rocinha (IPHAN 2006). Thus, during the first half of the first decade of the 2000s, the government of the state of Rio de Janeiro consolidated itself as a key player around slum upgrading implementation (Figure 25).

Figure 25 State of Rio de Janeiro’s interventions. Left: Dona Marta project. Source Fernanda Sales. Right: Rocinha contest poster. Source: Vogel n.d.
CHAPTER 6

Federal interference and absence

The emergence of Federal Government funds directed towards housing construction grew during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s second administration (1999-2002). In 1999 the Federal Government created the Residential Leasehold Programme (PAR) (Federal Provisional Measure No.1823/1999) which was strengthened by Federal Law No.10188/2001. Targeted at people earning between 2 and 6 minimum wages, the PAR included residential leasehold with buying option. The programme was regulated and managed by the Ministry of Urban Development and the CAIXA until 2003 when the Ministry of Cities took over these responsibilities (Menezes 2008). The Federal Government investments in housing construction channelled through the PAR strengthened Rio de Janeiro's housing construction approach, including the municipal housing programmes such as Novas alternativas, diverting the focus of the municipal housing policy that had been using the slum upgrading as its main instrument:

"There are nearly 3000 units being built through the PAR programme in the city of Rio de Janeiro with the resources of the CAIXA and with the approval of the Municipality... There are now in the process of expropriation 257 properties in the City Centre; these are vacant lots, areas available in the process of expropriation, so that the City can offer them to the CAIXA for housing construction" (Solange Amaral, Municipal Housing Secretary, DCMRJ 25/11/2004: 6).

There was also discontinuity of federal support that weakened the slum upgrading. As mentioned in the previous chapter the slum upgrading in large favelas was financed by the municipality together with the Federal Government (see CHAPTER 5 page 133). The municipality and the CAIXA signed, in 1998, a contract for implementing through the Pro-Moradia and Pro-Sanear programmes slum upgrading projects in several favelas, including large ones such as Rio das Pedras (DCMRJ 18/02/1998: 03). Nevertheless, this partnership was not repeated as the CAIXA went through financial problems. In 2001 the creation of the Asset Management Company (EMGEA) allowed the bank to restructure its housing sector (EMEGEA n.d.). However, Rio de Janeiro did not sign any Pro-Moradia contract until 2008 (see CHAPTER 7 page 200). In addition, the restructuring of the national housing sector and emergence of a federal housing policy during Lula’s first administration (2003-2006) (see CHAPTER 2 page 42) did not immediately invigorate and support slum upgrading. In particular, the negotiation for transferring the land owned by the Federal
Government to the municipality in order to regularize favelas, which involved several cases as the city used to be Brazil's capital, did not progress. For example, the Federal Government did not approve the transfer of land for the regularization of Parque Royal that was one of the first slum upgrading projects developed by the municipality during the 1990s (DCMRJ 22/12/2003: 28):

‘For example, councillor Rose Fernandes, councillor Romualdo Bonaventure, Rubens Andrade, here, Ray Cezar, councillor Luiz Humberto, we did not have available municipal or private property to implement the Favela-Bairro project in Arara. What was there was an INSS [National Institute of Social Security] plot in Matupiri St, if I'm not mistaken that's the name, the Municipality will build housing units. But we had to pay R$ 440,000 to the INSS to be able to do this. We could not, for political reasons, make the INSS donate that land .... to the poor people who live on top of the pipeline in Arara favela. The buildings of the Federal Government on Venezuela Ave, I repeat, Sacadura Cabral St, Santana St, not to mention Rio Branco Ave, Presidente Vargas Ave, and the abandoned buildings in the harbour, the building of the IBGE [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics] in Mangueira. We cannot progress. The Municipality sends projects, the SMH develops proposals, defines studies. It’s very difficult, very tangled, and very complicated’ (Solange Amaral, Municipal Housing Secretary, DCMRJ 25/11/2004: 8).

6.3.2 Growing disinterest

Complicated implementation

During this period of fragmentation and increased competition, the use of slum upgrading instrument became complicated. Its implementation was mainly financed through the second BID loan. This contract, as the previous one, established slum upgrading implementation regulations, including the actors involved and their role (BID 2000), and Municipal Decree No.18667/2000 established the instrument’s operational framework. Consequently, the slum upgrading implementation was rigid and lengthy in comparison to the other SMH instruments. For instance, each project needed to be approved by the BID and required CEDAE’s approval of sanitation systems. This requirement established by the BID contract delayed public tenders, paralysing projects (DCMRJ 12/11/2002: 14). In addition, the instrument also generated implementation problems because it included
synergies with the third sector and private actors. For example, association with architectural practices contributed to the lengthening of the implementation process:

'It's unbelievable! Six hundred days for the architectural practice! Then comes the municipality's team to analyse the work that was done by the hired office. So, there is no time, the population cannot remain waiting two years for a project... Favela-Bairro, because it has international funding, must meet strict and serious rules in its implementation, but we have other programmes with which we can provide this service because - as you know - the need often cannot wait. For implementing Bairrinho, Grandes Favelas, Morar sem Riscos, the Municipality has a slightly higher speed' (Solange Amaral, Municipal Housing Secretary, DCMRJ 12/11/2001: 14-15).

In addition, the BID contract included the list of the favelas to be integrated into the Favela-Bairro. The list was established using the classification matrix that was elaborated in the 1990s that ranked Rio the Janeiro favelas from the easiest to be urbanized to the most difficult. Therefore, during the first decade of the 2000s the slum upgrading projects implemented were more complicated than the one's realized during Conde's administration. For example, the favelas considered in the second BID contract had more risk areas, which involved more relocations and construction of houses, and demanded heavier infrastructure such as river canalization works. Thus, even if the SMH budget increased at that time, several Favela-Bairro projects remained unfinished. Indeed, after a fall in 2001 in relation to the previous year, the SMH budgets were R$ 205, R$ 174 and R$ 200 million in the following years, increasing SMH budget from R$ 586 million during Conde's administration (1997-2000) to R$703 million during Maia's second administration (2001-2004) (Figure 26). Thus, the slum upgrading instrument was also weakened as the way it was constituted continued to generate several problems.
Moreover, at that time and contrary to the 1990s a debate started about housing policy and policy instruments that continued over the following years; it included, experts in the housing sector, researchers, politicians, municipal staff from different Secretariats and civil society representatives (O Globo 2002a; O Globo 2002b; O Globo 2002c; O Globo 2003a; O Globo 2004a; O Globo 2004b). Together with this debate stronger criticisms of the slum upgrading were voiced and the instrument's efficiency and effectiveness were discredited due to several implementation issues: the bad quality of works, interruptions and delays, drug trafficking problems and the lack of improvement in the favela dwellers economic situation (O Globo 2003b; O Globo 2003c; O Globo 2004c) (Figure 27).

In addition, the slum upgrading was questioned by a series of publications. For instance, Bernstein Jacques called into question Rio de Janeiro's slum upgrading architectural and urban planning approach (Jacques 2001); Conde and Magalhães published a book that ignored the development of Favela-Bairro after 2000 (Magalhaes & Conde 2004); several academic journal articles and theses also questioned slum upgrading implementation and its outcomes (Broudehoux 2001; Randolph 2004; Silva 2006; Bahia 2000). Thus, the complicated implementation of the instrument together with the emergence of the debate about the instrument's efficiency and effectiveness contributed to its isolation as actors started to be reluctant or doubtful about its use. The slum upgrading was losing more allies.

Figure 26 SHM Budget from 1997 to 2004. Source: CGMRJ n.d.
By 2004 even the theme of evictions returned into the debate about housing policy (Figure 28). This destabilized slum upgrading legitimacy and fostered housing sector actors' reluctance to support it.

Figure 27 Various problems surround the Favela-Bairro programme. A good example in the Vidigal Hill. More funds for a new phase. Source: O Globo 2003b

Figure 28 Eviction policy comebacks in the debate. Specialists observe mistakes in past initiatives, but they find that relocations can be a solution. Source: O Globo 2004d
Nevertheless, the instrument was still supported by some actors that recognized some value in the use of the instrument:

'So it is up there, at Alto da boa vista, by the Maracai. You pass by the house of dr. Celso and see that the sewage of those houses is still thrown there. And the pillars of the houses are in the river. Therefore, you develop the Favela-Bairro for what? Some things get better, nobody is speaking evil of the Favela-Bairro project, but that it exists with consistency' (Chico Aguiar, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 12/12/2003: 14).

During this period, slum upgrading critics coexisted with supporters of the housing policy instrument:

'What happens is that the Municipality has done a good job with Formiga and Borel communities, which are on two slopes. It managed through the Favela-Bairro to remove people who were invading the forest, relocating them in the area already dense and could reforest the other area. It was a beautiful reforestation work done on these slopes near the Formiga and Borel hills. I have personally seen that these communities are greatly accepting this work, they are even satisfied with it because they are gaining in quality of life' (Gilberto França, AMU association, DCMRJ 15/12/2003: 14).

**Problematic politico-electoral objectives**

As mentioned earlier (see page 160) the political objectives of Maia's second administration were the development of political alliances and the consolidation of his political group through the distribution of municipal administrative positions such as the municipal secretariats and support of political allies using the municipal machine:

'The order of Mayor Cesar Maia is no discrimination. It is obvious that the machine is heavy. The order I give to my Secretariat is no discrimination. I will not be a liar, saying that the fact of no discrimination, does not mean that the municipal councillors who support the Government are not given priority. This is the norm in any government, the PT [Workers' Party] does it, PFL [Liberal Front Party] does it, PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Parity] does it, everyone does it. I will not be a liar' (Solange Amaral, Municipal Housing Secretary, DCMRJ 22/12/2003: 23).
The municipal councillors who were allies of or close to the municipal executive benefited from the slum upgrading in order to consolidate their legitimacy and win the support of favela dwellers.

"Let me also say to you all that Marcelino [municipal councillor] has truly been a great friend, not only of one community, but of all the communities of the West Zone [of the municipality]. We were with the Favela-Bairro Project buried there and did not start ... And I sought our municipal councillor, I talked to him, and the project was started immediately. The Favela-Bairro project was initiated. We are all there with the streets paved, just missing a little something still to finish. But we want to thank God for the life of our councillor and ask God to continue to bless his life, renewing his forces, so he can continue this battle. I know it's hard, is very hard and also community leadership" (Estelita Gomes da Serra, favela do Jacare, DCMRJ 15/08/2003: 750).

The instrument also contributed to manage political opposition, consolidating the municipal executive control over the municipal legislative body as in the 1990s. The instrument was used not only to secure political support, undermining any opposition (in a steamrolling effect), but also to share with the opposition the instrument’s electoral capital, eliminating political reluctance. However, the instrument was problematic as a politico-electoral weapon for the SMH and overall the municipal executive. Among the other municipal housing instruments, the slum upgrading was the most regulated due to the BID contract. Thus, the municipal executive could not freely mobilize it for politico-electoral purposes.

Its use by municipal councillors for political interests was problematic too. From the first decade of the 2000s municipal councillors tended to elaborate a large number of bills and recommendations about the implementation of Favela-Bairro projects in specific locations. For instance bill No.1037/2002 proposed by the municipal councillor Monterio de Castro sought to:

'authorize the executive to implement the Favela-Bairro or Bairrinho in the mentioned area' (DCMRJ 04/04/2003: 21).

The municipal executive rarely approved them. This is because on the one hand a bill on the implementation of a programme was illegal as it did not relate to legislative
competencies. On the other, the municipal executive rarely followed the instrument's implementation recommendations not only because the BID contract included the list of favelas to be beneficiaries, but also because the implementation of a slum upgrading outside the BID partnership included complex implementation processes, important financial investments and time. Therefore, the instrument was not that useful for achieving politico-electoral objectives. Other instruments such as the Mutirão programme were more suitable, becoming more important to the detriment of slum upgrading:

'Mutirão project is an area, is a programme of work, which is more possible and probable where amendments could be made; Councillor, I think this is important to reckon because it is not regulated by the BID, it has no conceptual or fixed set of rules. Therefore, it is a programme of work that can be amended because it involves cheaper works and we can implement them more easily. I know how important it is for the legislative and for the renewal of the mandates of all councillors' (Solange Amaral Municipal Housing Secretary DCMRJ 22/12/2003: 26).

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This part described how the instrument was further weakened by its isolation from the rest of the SMH, and the increasing importance of the construction of houses (Novas Alternativas programme and PAR). It observed that the slum upgrading instrument was challenged by initiatives that directly competed against it and were conducted by other municipal bodies (Rio Comunidade and Urban Cell projects), the regional state of Rio de Janeiro (Cantagalo, Dona Marta and Rocinha projects) and the federal government which was supporting housing construction (PAR programme) rather than slum upgrading projects. In addition, the instrument was questioned as its implementation was generating several issues (delays, interruptions, lack of quality) and its regulations were complicating its use: (i) the slum normative frame made the slum upgrading difficult to put into operation in the context of the growing municipal fragmentation, (ii) the selection method chosen in the 1990s became problematic as the projects that were developed during the first decade of the 2000s were more difficult, and (iii) the slum upgrading regulations made the instrument more difficult to be used for politico-electoral interests.

The processes of instrument's isolation, emergence of other slum upgrading experiences at municipal and regional state level, and the increase of housing construction importance relate to the emergence of a 'dissidence' moment (CHAPTER 3 page 60): 'the actors
implicated do not acknowledge their roles in this story nor the slow drift in which they had participated, in their opinion, wholeheartedly… New displacements take the place of the previous ones but these divert the actors from the obligatory passage points [OPP] that had been imposed upon them' (Callon 1986: 19).

The 'dissidence' moment was supported by the development of the instrument's 'problematization' and the instrument's 'controversy'. The 'problematization' moment developed mainly within the SMH and not only as other bodies such as the Urban Cell office was seeking to move beyond the Favela-Bairro experience. It did not result in the rejection of the instrument but it favoured the construction of houses as the approach. The 'controversy' about the instrument was primarily fuelled by the implementation and regulation issues it entailed. The 'dissidence' moment produced new 'translation' mechanisms that resulted in the constitution of new 'actants' in which the instrument played a secondary role or was cut off, weakening its network of 'allies' and its OPP role in Rio's housing policy.

In addition, this part observed that despite its weakening, the slum upgrading instrument was not only preserving but also still creating knowledge, know-how and building experts' capacities, in particular through the Urban Cell experience, the Master Plans for the Alemão Complex and Manguinhos Complex, and Rocinha, Cantagalo and Dona Marta projects. All these initiatives were directly linked to the expertise and experts that were constituted during the choice and use of the slum upgrading in the 1990s, in particular, architectural practices and municipal staff.
6.4 THE SLUM UPGRADING FALL

6.4.1 Losing financial support

Fall of the SMH budget

In 2004 municipal elections were held. Cesar Maia (PFL) ran for his re-election, being the favourite candidate (Jornal do Brasil 2004d; Jornal do Brasil 2004c). His major rivals were Marcelo Crivella (PL), Jorge Bittar (PT), Jandira Feghali (PCDOB) and Luiz Paulo Conde (PMDB). Throughout the 2004 campaign, the Favela-Bairro was criticized, yet it was also cited as an approach to be extended and developed (Jornal do Brasil 2004f; Jornal do Brasil 2004g; Jornal do Brasil 2004h; Jornal do Brasil 2004i; Jornal do Brasil 2004j). Maia won the elections in the first round with 50.1% of votes. (TSE n.d.).

During the third Maia administration municipal finances degraded. The transfer of federal hospitals to the municipal administration translated into more expenses. In addition, the economic crisis of 2001-2002 that hit Brazil and for which it received a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2007) impacted on municipal tax collection, affecting the SMH activities, including slum upgrading projects. For instance, in 2003 Mutirão projects were abandoned or interrupted (DCMRJ 22/12/2003: 26). Moreover, the Brazilian economic crises indirectly affected the slum upgrading implementation:

"The company worked for the state [of Rio de Janeiro]. I repeat what I heard - it worked for the state, it did Maracanã, it did Batalhão, it did not receive [payment] with the crisis that the state government faces, it did not receive [any money] and was unable to honour Rio das Pedras contract. So, the Municipality sought alternatives during several months. Three months ago we found an alternative for transferring the contract, and now the company is up there already working strongly" (Solange Amaral Municipal Housing Secretary DCMRJ 22/12/2003: 27).

The absence of a formal agreement for a third BID loan also compromised the use of the instrument in the following years. The third loan of US$ 400 million was in consideration since 2003 (Jornal do Brasil 2003a). However, its materialization was delayed mainly because the Federal Government limited municipal and regional state borrowing capacity (DCMRJ 01/12/2005: 22). The investments of the second BID loan that were supposed to end in 2004 were extended until 2006. However, without the BID financial support the SMH budget decreased during Maia's third administration: from R$ 200 million in 2004, it
fell to 150 million in 2005, then to R$ 69 million in 2006 and one year later to R$ 49 million, the second lowest SMH budget since its creation in 1995 (Figure 29). Overall the SMH budget decreased from R$ 703 million during Maia’s second administration to R$ 423 million during Maia’s third administration (CGMRJ n.d.).

Figure 29 SMH Budget 1995-2008. The increase in 2008 was due to the launch of the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) (see CHAPTER 7).

**Slum upgrading & Pan American Games**

The 2007 Pan American Games (Pan-2007) limited the use of the instrument and created instrumentation problems. Rio de Janeiro won the Pan-2007 bid in August 2002 and forecasted investments of about R$ 551 million divided as follows: Municipal Government R$ 233 million, Federal Government R$ 134 million, State Government R$ 30 million, and ticket sales and broadcasting rights R$ 153 million (Jornal do Brasil 2002). Then, Brazil decided to become a candidate for the 2012 Olympic Games (Jornal do Brasil 2003b) and again for the 2016 Olympic Games officially in September 2007. This increased the amount of investments for the Pan-2007 as several infrastructures changed from regional to Olympic Games standards. The total cost of the Pan-2007 was estimated at R$ 3 billion. The municipality never stated officially how much of this amount it provided. Nevertheless, it was estimated that Rio de Janeiro spent much more than expected. For instance, the municipality forecast R$ 400 million for the construction of all venues, yet just
the construction of the Joao Havelange stadium cost around R$ 170 million (Carta Maior 2007).

The organization of the Pan-2007 reduced the municipality's capacity for investment, undermining furthermore the SMH budget. The fall in SMH budget generated major management problems because the BID contract needed to be respected, leading to the re-evaluation and interruption of other projects such as the Babilônia project (DCMRJ 13/06/2007: 11-24). The slum upgrading and SMH activities were also indirectly destabilized by the Pan-2007 because in order to complete the games' infrastructure the Municipality reduced Rio de Janeiro's maintenance investments (RJTV n.d.). Thus, the slum upgrading implementation was not only complicated by the lack of direct investments, but also by the reduction of Rio's maintenance funding.

Without money the instrument's implementation was abandoned, interrupted, or delayed. Thus, despite municipal government continuity, the slum upgrading was further weakened by the degradation in municipal finances.

### 6.4.2 Opposition and collective abandon

**Instrument's rejection**

Since the beginning of Maia's third administration the debates about the slum effectiveness and efficiency were consolidated. From within the municipal administration severe criticism about the instrument emerged. In particular, in 2004 the Municipal Court of Auditors (TCMRJ) decided to audit the slum upgrading for being the most representative of the SMH activities. In that year TCMRJ audited the Bairrinho programme (TCMRJ 2005), and in 2005 the Favela-Bairro programme (TCMRJ 2006). Besides listing the slum upgrading implementation problems, the TCMRJ called into question the effectiveness and efficiency of the instrument, highlighting for instance that the programme did not even reach 20% of Rio de Janeiro's favelas, and that the number of informal settlements had increased. The TCMRJ condemned the choice of the slum upgrading because it represented a threat to the city's development due to its poor results:

> 'The option over the decade to prioritize the urbanization of deprived communities at the expense of other housing policies in the municipality constitutes a dangerous heritage left to the current and future generations' (TCMRJ 2006: 56).
Based on this criticism, the audit proposed a move toward a new housing policy, abandoning the slum upgrading as housing policy instrument:

'Finally, it is to consider the adoption of other policies and settlement forms, taking into account that some of these communities would hardly adopt characteristics of a neighbourhood and be integrated into the formal city. To reduce effectively the municipality housing deficit the following should be taken into account: the control of the occupation, the removal of settlements located in areas of environmental protection and above the limits set for the slopes, the construction of new housing units, the implementation of an efficient public transport system and of good quality, and improvement of the existing railways and subway networks' (TCMRJ 2006: 56).

Furthermore, since 2005 slum upgrading faced upfront critics from municipal councillors:

'The Mayor in his first term created the so called Favela-Bairro. Actually, we saw many Bairros [neighbourhood] turn into favela during this decade of PFL hegemony over the municipality of Rio de Janeiro. There is the Favela-Bairro and the Bairro-Favela. I think the Bairro-Favela grew more than the Favela-Bairro' (Edson Santos, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 30/09/2005: 9).

'This Favela-Bairro is a bait take the first Favela-Bairro project, convene the councillors and check if what was planned was executed, a third of what was planned was done, when we go to the communities, the Favela-Bairro is all destroyed, the sewage network has been constructed on the surface, why did they not build it below the road and channel it? The sewerage is flowing on to the street, and the debris thrown away, and the rain that comes and destroys everything' (S. Farras, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 14/10/2005: 14).

The debate also included discussions about favelas' eviction and demolition which were at the opposite of the slum upgrading objectives and the municipal housing policy (O Globo 2005a; O Globo 2005b; O Globo 2005c; O Globo 2005d; O Globo 2005e; O Globo 2005f; O Globo 2005g; O Globo 2005h; O Globo 2005i; O Globo 2005j; O Globo 2005k) (Figure 30). They involved a vast range of actors from different sectors: municipal administration, legislative body, favela dwellers, scholars and experts in the field. These discussions raised an unprecedented opposition against municipal housing policy, in particular, against the slum upgrading instrument (interview with Fernando Cavallieri):

'Topic projects do not have a chance of success anymore: Favela-Bairros, eco-limits, deforestation control. It is like treating cancer with an aspirin' (O Globo 2005j).
In the following year the debate continued (O Globo 2006a; O Globo 2006b; O Globo 2006c; O Estado de S.Paulo 2006a; O Estado de S.Paulo 2006b). It was fuelled among others by the enactment of the National Social Housing System (SNHIS) (O Globo 2006d) and the increase of the world urban population and slums across the globe (O Globo 2006e; O Globo 2006f; Diario do Nordeste 2006). Several issues that emerged from the use of the slum upgrading contributed to foster and consolidate a movement of opposition that involved different actors, directly or indirectly involved in the housing policy. They were more and more reluctant to support the slum upgrading and its use for addressing Rio de Janeiro's housing policy. For instance, in August 2006 a public hearing about Favela-Bairro implementation problems was held at the Municipal Chamber (DCMRJ 07/08/2006: 14-26). The event was an initiative of Federation of Favelas Association of the state of Rio de Janeiro (FAFERJ) that previously that year elaborated a video about several instrument's implementation problems (interview with Zezinho da Torre Branca).

The initiative involved 8 communities included in the video and the support of another 37 communities. During the public hearing several organizations participated and supported this initiative and the claims of the favelas' leaders and residents. They also expressed their concerns about the use of slum upgrading and the issues it had generated. Several organizations and institutions attended the public hearing. Among them were the Federation of Favelas' Associations of the state of Rio de Janeiro (FAFERJ), the Federation of Residents' Association of the state of Rio de Janeiro (FAMERJ), the Federation of Residents' Association of Rio de Janeiro (FAMRIO), the Federation of Favelas' Associations of Rio de Janeiro (FAFARIO), the Institute of Research and Urban Planning of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (IPPUR-UFRJ), the Municipal Institute of Urbanism Pereira Passos (IPP), the Regional Council of Engineering and Agronomy (CREA), the Observatory of Favelas; the Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analysis (IBASE), the Bento Rubião Foundation, the state Forum of Urban Reform, and the Pastoral de Favelas (DCMRJ 07/08/2006: 24). The initiative was supported by various councillors such as Brizola Neto who organized the public hearing at the Municipal Chamber. The debate focused on the delays, interruptions, bad quality of works, lack of maintenance and water and sanitation problems. These issues called into question once again the instrument's relevance, contributing to lose several allies that once supported it such as many of the organizations mentioned above and the favela dwellers and leaders (Figure 31).
Figure 31 FAFERJ's video shots. Favela leaders and dwellers explaining the various issues related to the use of the slum upgrading in their communities. Source: FAFERJ 2006.
The debate about the slum upgrading implementation and maintenance issues continued:

"Because the Court of Auditors report points out and criticizes what has been done, "it is not because the Favela-Bairro is bad, but because during the inspection made in 2005, it was noted the abandon"... Folks, that's a community in which the municipality's money was invested ... the entrance to the sports court and play area are in total abandonment. It is not used and is abandoned, bleachers without maintenance, unused. Only one of the four showers exists, the others do not exist anymore. That's the situation of the shower drain. Look at the abandonment of the area that should be a leisure community area. Children living together with garbage in this recreation area, rain channels also in the same area ... I mean, Favela-Bairro is far from becoming true' (Andrea Gouvêa Vieira, municipal councillor, DCMJR 14/11/2006: 8).

The debate was nourished by the inability of the municipality and in particular the SMH to overcome slum upgrading problems such as the lack of involvement of municipal bodies exacerbated by the fragmentation of the administration and growing isolation of the instrument.

'We do not have to exclude the favelas. We have to treat favelas as a formal city. Therefore, the SMO - through its departments of conservation, RioLuz, Geo-Rio, Rio-Aguas - should provide maintenance services to these communities. These services should not be in the charge of the SMH or other department with resources to provide them. So this is a discussion that has been addressed in the Secretariat together with the other departments. The Mayor issued a decree in which he announced the creation of some working groups so that we could develop these discussions with other Secretariats. So, this work is in progress. I hope that in 2007 we would reach the agreement that communities would receive conservation and maintenance services every day through the municipal bodies' (Luiz Humberto, Municipal Housing Secretary DCMJR 14/11/2006: 11).

During 2007 the weakening of the instrument continued, mainly fostered by the ongoing debate about the expansion of favelas, specifically, by their vertical growth (Figure 32). This led to the collapse of the slum upgrading as it had lost several allies, and its use, instead of generating alliances, was building a growing opposition.
Figure 32 Newspaper articles 2007. From top to bottom and left to right: Park besieged. Hills grow and threaten the Tijuca Massif, surrounded by 48 favelas (O Globo 2007a). Not even the municipality takes care. Squares and public schools are built on river banks and in slums (O Globo 2007b). The multiplication of the storeys. Building up to ten floors grow at a high speed in Rio das Pedras (O Globo 2007c). A favela of buildings (O Globo 2007d).
Rio de Janeiro's housing construction

The rise of housing construction also isolated the slum upgrading and contributed to its abandonment as constructing houses was not only desirable but also a possible approach through the emergence of federal investments towards this housing policy solution (Figure 33). By 2006 the state of Rio de Janeiro was one of the states that received the most of investments for implementing the Residential Leasehold Programme (PAR) (Roesler et al. 2007). By 2009 Rio de Janeiro's municipality had delivered 8303 houses and 5344 more were expected to be finished that year (SMH n.d.).

![Figure 33 PAR projects. Left: 'Amondoeiras’ condominium (Cosmos). Right: Mont Blanc condominium (Paciencia). Source SMH (n.d.)](image)

The emergence of housing construction as an important housing policy instrument carried with it different implementation problems. Overall housing construction related to an approach that could not be handled only by the municipality because it did not have the financial resources:

> 'When it comes to housing, construction and production of houses, in fact, it is a task shared by the municipality, the state and Union. Here, technically speaking, the Municipality has not - the city of Rio, the municipality does not have - the conditions to absorb all the housing demand. It needs state resources and primarily federal funds' (Paulo Andre Figueira da Silva, Municipal Housing under secretary (DCMRJ 15/12/2005: 27).

Thus, one of the major problems for municipal housing construction was attracting federal investments:

> 'Our daily struggle is with the Federal Government, so it supplies resources in the City of Rio de Janeiro, for implementing our programmes. We had some progress in the last year, but because it is
a city of the size of Rio de Janeiro, seventeen million from the Federal Government come to be nothing ... To give you an idea: it has created now a social housing fund [FNHIS] and was promised two hundred million Real. If you divide it by five thousand municipalities, or population, this will give very little for each municipality. Of these two hundred million Real - we had forecast that they would be liberated - only 50 million were given and only benefited the local governments aligned with the Federal Government ... We hardly obtained fourteen thousand units of high quality. This is the question' (Paulo Andre Figueira da Silva, Municipal Housing under secretary, DCMRJ 12/06/2006: 21).

In addition, the housing construction was limited by the tax regime. Aiming to tackle this problem, the municipal chamber authorized the exemption of Service Tax (ISS) and Real Property Transfer Tax (ITBI) for the construction of social housing, fostering PAR investments in the municipality. Legal restrictions also limited the scale up of the construction of houses in the municipality. The Municipal Complementary Law No.40/1999 limited to 200 housing units per real estate, restraining large scale projects (DCMRJ 25/11/2004: 06-09). This law was modified by Municipal Complementary Law N75/2005 that increased the limit to 300 housing per real estate. Moreover, land prices increased even in the Zona Oeste (West Area) neighbourhoods, limiting the development of social housing units (DCMRJ 15/12/2005: 27). Finally, the housing offer largely financed through the PAR, did not match Rio Janeiro's population. The majority of PAR projects targeted people with at least 4 minimum wages when the bulk of the municipality housing deficit included people under that threshold. Even if people had the resources, usually they did not have the documents to support it (DCMRJ 01/12/2005: 22). In relation to the development of the Novas Alternativas programme, the projects were complicated by:

'Complex land tenure, undocumented federal and state-owned building, restrictive legislation for insertion of new buildings in historic sites, slow judiciary processes, operating in real estate already inhabited, regulations for intervening in properties owned by religious organizations, private sector participation (owners/builders/architects), debts with public services companies, difficulties in registries for land dismemberment and division, the actual footage of the land which does not coincide with the documents, recent appreciation of real estate in the central area' (PMHIS, Regional meetings AP1, 07/10/2011).
This part described the fall of the slum upgrading instrument during Maia’s third administration. It noted that it related to the loss of most of its financial support as the SMH budget from which it depended was undermined by the Brazilian economic crisis, the municipal finance crisis, the organization of Pan-2007 and the unsuccessful negotiations for signing a third BID loan. This part illustrated that the slum upgrading instrument's fall was also related to the consolidation of the 'controversy' about its efficiency and effectiveness fuelled by its implementation. The 'controversy' consolidated 'dissidence' as several 'allies' stopped supporting it, in particular favela dwellers, favelas' organizations, NGOs, scholars, legislative branch and various municipal bodies such as the TCMRJ.

Furthermore, this part noted that the 'controversy' involved the questioning not only of the slum upgrading instrument but also of Rio's housing policy as shown by the audit of the TCMJ which openly criticized and rejected municipal housing policy and proposed other approaches, and the debate organized by the FAFERJ at the Municipal Chamber. This relates to the emergence of a 'problematization' moment during which where debated and considered the instrument and its limitations, favelas' increase and expansion (horizontally and vertically). Out of this 'problematization' moment, housing construction re-emerged as possible and suitable approaches for solving the municipality's housing deficit, undermining the slum upgrading instrument and Rio's housing policy.
6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the slum upgrading instrumentation during Maia's second and third administrations that lasted from 2001 to 2008, with the aim of showing how the instrument influenced housing policy and governance evolution and transformation. The first part described how the 2000 elections destabilized and weakened the instrument's network of 'associations' and housing policy. Specifically, the elections undermined Maia and Conde alliance and generated a 'controversy' about the instrument's efficiency and effectiveness, and a change of its objective of integrating favelas into the city towards their simple urbanization. The instrument's 'controversy' continued during the first years of Maia's second administration. In particular, Amaral questioned the instrument's essential vs. unnecessary objectives, while Magalhães condemned the implementation problems and a change of the instrument. However, this part highlighted how the instrument's regulatory frameworks limited any objective or component change. In addition, it noted that in the following years the instrument's regulations, the politico-administrative shift, the inexperience of the new SMH staff, and practices of clientelism generated more implementation problems that contributed to the continuing questioning of the instrument and the housing policy. The development of the 'controversy' about the instrument and the housing policy weakened further their network of 'associations'.

The second part described that the instrument's isolation from the rest of the SMH and the increasing importance of the construction of houses, weakened its OPP role in the development of Rio's housing policy during the following years. It also highlighted that the instrument was destabilized by the emergence of initiatives that directly competed against it, in particular by Rio Comunidade and Urban Cell programmes conducted by other municipal bodies, slum upgrading projects carried out by the regional state of Rio de Janeiro (Cantagalo, Dona Marta and Rocinha projects) and the federal housing construction programme PAR. In addition, this part pointed out that the instrument was questioned as its implementation continued to entail delays, interruptions and lack of quality, and its regulations kept on complicating its use: (i) collaborative work difficult to carry out in the context of the growing municipal fragmentation, (ii) a selection method that resulted in more difficult project than in the 1990s and (iii) politico-electoral interests limited by the instrument's regulations. The processes of isolation, emergence of other slum upgrading experiences, and the increase of housing construction relate to the development of a 'dissidence' moment fostered by the instrument's 'problematization' and
instrument's 'controversy'. The 'problematization' moment developed mainly within in the SMH did not result in the rejection of the instrument but it strengthened the construction of houses as main approach. The instrument's 'controversy' was fostered by its implementation and regulation issues. The 'dissidence' moment entailed the building of new entities such as the Novas Alternativas and Urban Cell projects in which the instrument played a secondary role or was cut off, weakening its network of 'allies', and its OPP role in Rio's housing policy. Lastly, the second part also observed that despite the destabilization of the slum upgrading instrument, through the Urban Cell experience, the Master Plans for the Alemão Complex and Manguinhos Complex, and Rocinha, Cantagalo and Dona Marta projects, knowledge and know-how were developed. Furthermore, this part noted that the experts that developed them were constituted during the use of the slum upgrading instrument in the 1990s, in particular, architectural practices and municipal staff.

The third part pointed out that the fall of the slum upgrading instrument during Maia's third administration related to the loss of its financial support and the consolidation of the instrument's 'controversy' about its efficiency and effectiveness. The 'controversy' consolidated the 'dissidence' of instrument's 'allies' such as favela dwellers and organizations, NGOs and academia, municipal administration and councillors. This part also highlighted that the 'controversy' involved the municipal housing policy itself resulting in the emergence of a 'problematization' moment during which where debated among others the instrument's limitations and favelas' increase and expansion. The problematization resulted in the rejection of the slum upgrading instrument and Rio's housing policy and the re-emergence of housing construction as possible and suitable approaches for addressing Rio's housing issues and the favelas' problem.

The tracing of the upgrading instrument translation moments during Maia's second and third administrations supports the following considerations regarding the research hypotheses. Firstly, the chapter described that during Maia's second and third administrations the use of the slum upgrading instrument generated a series of 'controversies' that contributed to the isolation of the instrument ('dissidence') and re-'problematization' of the municipal housing policy, which undermined the instrument's central role and Rio's housing policy of the 1990s. Thus, the politico-administrative change in 2001 was important as it contributed to foster the 'controversies', and 'dissidence' and
CHAPTER 6

'problematization' movements but was not determinant in the abandonment of the instrument and fall of the housing policy. Consequently, the chapter reveals new elements that substantiates hypothesis 1 as it shows that the fall of the policy during the first decade of the 2000s related to the outcomes and dynamics that the slum upgrading fostered in this period and was not only due to the political change with the return of Cesar Maia at the head of the Municipal administration from 2001.

Secondly, despite the abandonment of the slum upgrading, this chapter illustrates that new actors emerged, in particular, the regional state of Rio de Janeiro and the Urban Cell office, while others consolidated their involvement in Rio's housing policy: SMH, architectural practices, IAB-RJ, construction companies, and BID. Furthermore, the chapter described how in spite of the fall of the housing policy and politico-administrative fragmentation the municipal government continued to enhance its power thanks to the further development of its knowledge and know-how about the favelas and their urbanization, in particular through development of Alemão and Manguinhos master plans and Urban Cell projects in Providência and Jacarezinho. These new elements support hypothesis 2 that argues that the slum upgrading contributed to modify housing governance as it supported the creation a new constellation of actors which produced new dynamics within the housing sector. The chapter also shows that the use of slum upgrading continue to secure and even foster municipal executive power.

Lastly, the chapter described how despite the fragmentation of the housing initiatives, various experts continued to enhance their skill through the various slum upgrading-related initiatives, in particular, architectural practices and municipal and regional state administrations. It observed the development and consolidation of knowledge and expertise through the various initiatives within the municipality (Urban Cell projects and Alemão and Manguinhos Complex master plans) and at the regional state level (Dona Marta, Rocinha, and Cantagalo). Furthermore, the chapter illustrated the use of the slum upgrading during Maia's second and third administrations as involving practices of clientelism, yet these were difficult to put into practice or limited by the slum upgrading regulatory frameworks. Thus, the chapter brings new elements to support hypotheses 3 that argue that the instrument contributed to the depoliticization of Rio's housing policy. Specifically, the chapter illustrates that the weakening of political regulation was
underpinned by the development of favelas' experts and development of knowledge and know-how about favelas and their urbanization.
CHAPTER 7  SLUM UPGRADING: RISING FROM THE ASHES

‘New displacements take the place of the previous ones but these divert the actors from the obligatory passage points that had been imposed upon them. New spokesmen are heard that deny the representativity of the previous ones. Translation continues but the equilibrium has been modified’ (Callon 1986: 19).

7.1  INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the use of the slum upgrading instrument from the end of the first decade of the 2000s up to 2012, seeking to reveal its role for housing policy and governance evolution.

The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores how the slum upgrading instrument re-emerged from 2007. The second part analyses its development during the first half of the Paes administration (2009-2010) while the third part during the second half (2010-2011).
7.2 NEW LEASE OF LIFE

7.2.1 Waking up

*Slum upgrading gaining financial support*

CHAPTER 6 described that the slum upgrading instrument was gradually isolated and collectively abandoned throughout Maia's second and third administrations (2001-2008). In particular, it lost its main financial support as the BID loan ended in 2006 (see page 183). The possibility of a third BID contract was undermined by the municipality's deteriorating financial situation and the Federal Government's reluctance to approve loans with external institutions. The SMH budget fell from R$ 170 million on average per year from 2001 to 2005 to R$ 69 million in 2006 (CGMRJ n.d.). Nevertheless, this situation started to change from 2007. In March of that year, the Federal Government launched the Growth Accelerated Programme (PAC) (see CHAPTER 2 page 44), strengthening its presence in the municipal housing sector after an increase of investments and the creation of the National Social Housing System (SNHIS) during Lula's first administration (see CHAPTER 2 page 42). The PAC earmarked R$106.3 billion for sanitation works and housing initiatives that included housing construction and slum upgrading (PAC 2007b).

The South-East region of Brazil formed by the states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo was expected to attract R$ 23.9 billion, out of which R$ 19.1 billion would be for housing construction and R$ 4.8 billion for slum upgrading projects.

The municipality of Rio de Janeiro benefited from PAC investments. In June 2007, the SMH secured R$ 220 million (PAC 2010c), but these investments did not boost financially immediately the SMH that had in 2007 its second lowest budget since its creation: R$ 49 million (see Figure 29 page 184). During 2008 other projects submitted by the municipality were selected by the PAC commission, invigorating SMH actions (PAC 2010c). The Federal Government also revived other programmes such as Pro-Moradia, invigorating SMH initiatives. Rio de Janeiro's municipality obtained R$160 million through this programme, an event that had not occurred since 1998 (DCMRJ 09/06/2008: 26). These contracts together with the PAC investments increased SMH's budget, bringing it up to R$ 155 million in 2008.
CHAPTER 7

The rise of the state government

While the SMH was gaining strength the state of Rio de Janeiro emerged as an actor in the housing sector. In 2006, Sergio Cabral became candidate for the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) in the state election. Cabral had a long political career and was a political enemy of Maia. He was elected Rio de Janeiro's state deputy from 1990 to 2002 and senator from 2003 to 2006. Cabral was also involved in the Carioca's political life disputing unsuccessfully Rio de Janeiro's municipal elections in 1992, 1996 and 2000 (see CHAPTER 5 page 131 and CHAPTER 6 page 159). Supported by the outgoing State Governor Rosinha Garotinho and her husband the ex-Governor Anthony (1999-2002), he was first in the first round with 41.4% of votes, followed by Maia's favourite candidate Denise Frossard with 23.78% (TSE n.d.). Marcelo Crivella, supported by President Lula and with second place in the polls (G1 Globo, 2006c), arrived in third position with 18.53% of votes, being frozen out of the electoral process. Right after the first round Cabral sealed an alliance with the PT and Lula who could not avoid the second ballot at the national elections (G1 Globo 2006b; G1 Globo 2006c). He also consolidated alliances with other Carioca's politicians such as Eduardo Paes (G1 Globo 2006d). Supported by these alliances, Cabral won the elections, securing an unprecedented alignment between the state of Rio de Janeiro and the Federal Government. With the arrival in 2007 of Sergio Cabral as Governor, the state of Rio de Janeiro was well placed for attracting Federal Government investments not only because Cabral was an ally of Lula but also because the state of Rio de Janeiro could attract more PAC investments than the municipality as it had a greater debt capacity and a better financial situation.

At the beginning of 2007 the state of Rio de Janeiro obtained R$ 240 million from the Federal Government for refurbishing Maracanã stadium and upgrading Rocinha favela (EMOP 2007a). In particular, for upgrading Rocinha, the state of Rio de Janeiro hired Luiz Carlos Toledo who had won the architectural competition that it commissioned at the end of 2005 (IPHAN 2006). As mentioned previously, this contest was organized by the IAB-RJ (Brazilian Institute of Architects - department Rio de Janeiro), following the same methodological pattern created in 1994 with the Favela-Bairro programme and reproduced in 2004 for upgrading the Dona Marta favela (see CHAPTER 6 page 171).

As soon as the PAC was launched, the State Secretariat of Public Works (SEOB) led by Vice-Governor Luis Fernando de Sousa known as Pezão and the State Construction
Company (EMOP) directed by Ícaro Moreno Júnior, focused on preparing slum upgrading proposals that could be financed through the programme. Ícaro Moreno had experience on slum upgrading as he directed RioUrbe that conducted some Favela-Bairro projects during the 1990s as the SMH was unable to cope with all the work (DCMRJ 11/03/2002: 04-08). However, besides the Rocinha project, the state of Rio de Janeiro did not have other projects to submit to the Federal Government. The state of Rio de Janeiro contacted the SMH and found out the existence of two urban development plans for the Alemão and Manguinhos complex (interview with Jozé Candido Sampaio, ex SMH Projects' Office Coordinator). As mentioned previously, these master plans were commissioned by the SMH during Maia's second administration (2001-2004) (see CHAPTER 6 page 167). The objective of these plans was to reflect on larger favelas and develop a methodology for this type of settlements as Favela-Bairro involved medium size favelas. The plans included social and spatial diagnosis of the mentioned areas and possible scenarios for their urban development (SMH, 2004).

Developed by Jorge Mario Jáuregui who gained expertise in slum upgrading through several Favela-Bairro projects, they never left the drawing board because of the lack of investments. With the PAC these projects had a chance to be materialized and they were suitable for the PAC because of their scale. In the middle of March the state of Rio de Janeiro proposed slum upgrading projects in Manguinhos, Alemão, Rocinha and City of God to the Federal Government. The final selection of projects was decided during a meeting between President Lula and State Governor Cabral (interview with Jorge Mario Jáuregui) and by the end of March, the Ministry of Cities officially announced PAC investments for the Alemão and Manguinhos favela complex. The amount of investment was for R$ 960 million, and involved slum upgrading and housing construction (EMOP 2007b). This amount was substantial for implementing slum upgrading projects in the municipality as it represented almost two thirds of the SMH budget from 1993 to 2006, i.e. R$1.5 billion (CGMRJ n.d.). By June 2007 the EMOP started to define the different projects and one year later, in March 2008, the projects were launched in the presence of Cabral and President Lula.

The state involvement in the municipal housing increased not only thanks to the PAC but also thanks to the creation and expansion of Health Emergency Units (UPA) and Pacifying Police Units (UPP). In 2007 the state of Rio de Janeiro constructed the first UPA which
was opened 24 hours in Mare favela in order to provide health care, deal with emergencies and contribute to the health care plan by monitoring low income neighbourhoods and favelas' health-related indicators. In 2008 the state government created the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) aiming to regain the control of areas, in particular, favelas ruled by gangs and drug dealers. The UPPs differed from previous projects because the police force presence aimed at being permanent (UPP n.d.). Moreover, they aimed at dissociating the two dimensions of the security policy: State presence and the fight against crime (FGV Projetos 2012). Rio de Janeiro State Public Security Secretariat (SESEG) inaugurated the first UPP in December 2008 and during 2009 other four UPPs were opened (Cano 2012).

### Slum upgrading adaptations

PAC slum upgrading projects aimed at improving the quality of life not only through the construction of sanitation infrastructure, but also through the creation of public spaces and expansion of public services such as employment agencies, childcare centres and schools (EMOP 2007c). These aims were the same as the ones of the Favela-Bairro programme in the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s. Nevertheless, the PAC financial support widened the instrument’s scope. In particular, the slum upgrading included the construction of housing units and transport systems such as the cable car constructed in Alemão complex and informed by the Medellin case (EMOP 2007d). Furthermore, PAC modified to some extent the slum upgrading investment model.

PAC financial support also modified the type of actors involved in the slum upgrading. Besides the inclusion of the state of Rio de Janeiro as an actor, the large scale interventions and important investments generated the interest of bigger construction companies. International and well-established companies entered in competition with medium size companies involved in housing policy during the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s. For instance, the consortium 'Rio Melhor' (Better Rio) won the public tender for implementing the upgrading of the Alemão complex. The consortium was formed by three of the largest construction companies in Brazil: Odebrecht, OAS and Delta.
7.2.2 Slum upgrading at municipal level: new wind

*Politico-administrative renewal*

In 2009, a politico-administrative renewal at municipal level occurred with the election of Eduardo Paes as Mayor of Rio de Janeiro. Paes entered politics in 1993 when Maia appointed him at the head of Barra da Tijuca sub-prefecture. Some years later he became deputy for the state of Rio de Janeiro. When Maia returned to the municipal administration in 2001 Paes was appointed Secretary of Sport and Environment; however, some time later he broke up with Maia. Paes fought in the 2006 elections to become Governor of Rio de Janeiro and even though he did not win he consolidated an alliance with the elected Governor Sergio Cabral and became Rio State Secretary of Sports and Tourism. At the end of 2007 Paes was appointed PMDB candidate in the municipality elections. His major rivals were Marcelo Crivella (PT) and Fernando Gabiera (alliance PSDB and PPS). Paes and Gabiera made it to the second round. With the defeat of the PT candidate President Lula supported Paes. This support was rather surprising as a Paes had been one of the major critics of Lula’s government corruption scandal (Mensalão scandal in 2005) by explicitly stating that President Lula was involved in this corruption scheme (see footnote 14 page 43). Paes won in the second round of elections. His victory represented a change of administration that brought a new era after 16 years of Maia’s administration as the Conde administration was perceived as a continuity (similar renewal when Maia arrived in 1993). Not only because of the change itself, but also because it represented for the first time a political alignment of the three levels of government: Paes, Cabral, Lula.

Paes appointed Jorge Bittar as Secretary of the Municipal Housing Department. Bittar was a PT member who has a long career in politics. He was involved in the urban reform movement of the 1980s. Then, he became municipal councillor from 1992 to 1999 and federal deputy from 1999 to 2001, and participated in debates about Rio’s housing policy (see page 110) and the creation of the SMH (see page 121). Bittar brought some of the staff who had moved away since 2001 from the SMH. For example, Adriana Cardoso, Augusto Verissimo and Isabel Tostes who were part of the SMH staff when Sergio Magalhães was head of that department. The integration of this staff allowed the municipality to integrate past expertise.
Slum upgrading: limited development as policy instrument

Despite the politico-administrative renewal and the integration of old SMH staff, the slum upgrading instrument was no longer seen as the solution for Rio de Janeiro’s housing problems. The instrument continued to be considered as an ineffective solution while housing construction gained strength as suitable strategy:

‘In recent years, the city pumped US$ 600 million (R$ 1.034 billion) into the Favela-Bairro in 168 favelas, but at the same time, another 250 rose up in the City. Dayse [President of the IAB-RJ] adds that despite some improvement in infrastructure, the municipality could not incorporate these favelas that benefited from the programme into the formal city. To the President of the LAB, it is possible to think of indemnities [as solution] for small and new communities, but it is also important to incentivize the construction of popular housing in areas with infrastructure and at the same time to facilitate credit to the residents for buying the houses’ (O Globo 2009a).

In addition, in the first days of his administration, Paes launched what he called 'shock of order' against the urban disorder (Estadão 2009). This electoral promise involved primarily the repression of street vendors and illegal constructions. During 2010 several evictions were planned (O Globo 2010a; O Globo 2010b; O Globo 2010c; O Globo 2010d; O Globo 2010e; O Globo 2010f). Thus, Paes' shock of order supported evictions and housing construction rather than slum upgrading:

'To stigmatize eviction is irresponsible ... There is not a plan for evicting [all] favela dwellers. Those favelas which have already been consolidated need initiatives that improve the quality of life of those who live there, and they will be implemented. But there are situations where the alternative of eviction can and must be discussed ... Nowadays there are 1000 favelas in the city. The vast majority of them are very small and in this universe, there are indeed cases where eviction is a solution. Wherever it [eviction] is possible, people will stand to gain in housing. And also the city because it will prevent favela growth, reaching a size impossible to administer ... The ideal would be to form small housing clusters distributed across the city instead of sending people to massive housing estates, very distant and without infrastructure. In the past, eviction meant the creation of Vila Kennedy and City of God, two bad examples of large scale housing developments arising from evictions - which eventually became favelas with high crime rates. I will not throw anyone into such places. There are areas within the city that offer good alternatives' (Eduardo Paes, Mayor of Rio de Janeiro, Veja 2009).
Paes’ shock of order fuelled a debate that involved a wide range of actors about the increase and expansion of favelas that called into question municipal housing and urban policy efficiency and effectiveness (O Globo 2009b; O Globo 2009c; O Globo 2009d; O Globo 2009e; O Globo 2009f; O Globo 2009g; Jornal do Brasil 2009a; O Globo 2010g; O Globo 2010d). This debate on the one hand weakened the re-emergence of the instrument as it exposed slum upgrading limitations in relation to its objective of solving favelas’ problems by transforming them into neighbourhood, and on the other it supported evictions, urban control and housing construction as a suitable solution.

Furthermore, even if the PAC financially supported the instrument re-emergence, the SMH was financially weak as the bulk of work and investments for slum upgrading were conducted by the state of Rio through EMOP (PAC 2010c). The SMH projects mainly involved small interventions started by the previous administration.

Lastly, the Federal Government investments weakened the use of the slum upgrading as they supported housing construction rather than slum upgrading:

"[Interviewer] You arrive at the housing secretariat at a time when the Federal Government is having discussion over an important share of FGTS resources for PlanHab, concentrating its resources for capital grants aimed at low-income population. There is also the CAIXA ...

- [Bittar] It all sounds like music to my ears. There is a large amount of resources for that very large area. I make no exaggeration if I say, paraphrasing President Lula (laughs) "that never before in the history of this country "there was a so intense programme of federal public resources for urban development .

- Where will you start in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, where there is a housing deficit of at least 250,000 dwellings?

- We intend, in four years, to deliver 100,000 affordable housing ... It is the only way we have to end with the favelização [growing of favelas] in the city ...

- President Lula determined that the Union will open banded as regards all its unused properties which may serve for the production of social housing. As Rio de Janeiro was the federal capital, it has a lot of federal properties [at the beginning of the 2000s the SMH sought the transfer of these properties to regularize favelas rather than for housing construction (see CHAPTER 6 page 175). We are also identifying the INSS [National Institute of Social Security] properties in the city for an evaluation’ (Jorge Bittar, SMH Secretary, Jornal do Brasil 2009b).}
Slum upgrading reconfiguration

By the second half of 2009, the SMH proposed in its Plurianunal Plan (PPA 2010-2013) a housing strategy named 'Morar Maravilha' that entailed housing construction and the regularization of settlements declared as Areas of Special Social Interest (AEIS) (SMH 2009; DCMRJ 6/11/2009: 75-87). In order to achieve these objectives the SMH proposed the development of housing construction, in particular, in urban empty spaces primarily located in the centre of the city and harbour and the development of a partnership with the public and private sector for financing this production. The SMH targeted the construction of 50,000 during Paes' administration (10,000 in the first year) plus a reduction in at least 5% of the area occupied by the favelas (taking the year 2008 as reference) (ibid). The possibility of reaching these targets increased with the launch of the MCMV (My Home My Life) programme in March 2009 that aimed at the construction of one million houses across the country (see CHAPTER 2 page 45).

Morar Maravilha included on the one hand the development of housing construction on a large scale through the MCMV, PAC Moradia, FNHIS (National Social Housing Fund) and the municipal programme 'Novas Alternativas' that emerged in the 1990s (see Table 8 page 112), and was developed during the first decade of the 2000s (see CHAPTER 6 page 168). On the other, the SMH proposed the development of the slum upgrading through the PAC, Pro-Moradia, BID loan and FNHIS. The new approach regarding the slum upgrading aimed at overcoming the slum upgrading limited results, in particular, by focusing on maintenance, favela surroundings, housing construction and regulating favelas density:

'The Favela-Bairro was important, we all acknowledge it, but it needs to evolve based on the criticisms that this House [Municipal Chamber] has made, the reports made by the Municipal Chamber that highlighted some deficiencies in the Favela-Bairro programme, the need for bigger and better resettlements, the need of maintenance work in our communities ... It is not worth the investment if you do not do maintenance... it’s what happened historically, upgrading works deteriorate, it is necessary to integrate the favelas that are urbanized into the city. For this it is necessary to improve accessibility also within these communities. It is necessary to invest in the community, in its surroundings, in social facilities for income-generation and employment, in health, in education. In short, we are re-conceptualizing, promoting a certain evolution of urbanization actions and also promoting a large resettlement, i.e. a more comprehensive work of making less
Dense our communities to get more in the right direction, getting closer to the idea of a community that can truly become a liveable neighbourhood of the city. The favela after receiving improvements, investments, can become a neighbourhood, which was the dream of the Favela-Bairro programme, that up to now has not fully happened, although life has improved considerably in the favelas served by sanitation, lighting, streets, all those things...

Reduce, this is an important goal too, in at least 5% the areas occupied by the favelas of the City. What is our idea? Let’s urbanize slums and we could resettle, with this new housing construction, many families who live in riverside, hillside, we are going to make less dense many favelas’ (Jorge Bittar, SMH secretary, DCMRJ 06/11/2009: 76-77).

For the year 2010 the SMH through the Project’s Office managed by Augusto Verissimo sought to continue the implementation of the slum upgrading as follows: 5 projects thought the PAC and 12 through the Pro-Moradia. In addition the SMH expected to obtain Pro-Moradia resources for 6 other favelas (SMH 2009b) and a third BID Loan (interview with Jose Brakarz, specialist in slum upgrading at the BID); DCMRJ 06/11/2009: 75-87).

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This part described how the slum upgrading re-emergence related to the building of new 'associations' through 'interessement' and 'enrolment' mechanisms. Its new lease was supported mainly by the 'associations' with the Federal and regional state governments, federal programmes (PAC), developers and old allies such as architectural practices and municipal and regional state staff. The building of 'associations' reshaped the instrument; in particular, the vast amount of investments allowed the implementation of larger and more comprehensive interventions: resettling more families, constructing housing units and building transport infrastructure. It also reshaped the constellation of actors as developers got involved.

This part also illustrated how at municipal level the 'problematization' of Rio's housing policy continued. During this process, the slum upgrading continued to be questioned for not solving Rio's housing issues and in particular favelas' increase and expansion. This undermined its possibility to be constituted as 'Obligatory Passage Point' (OPP) of Rio's 'new' housing policy. The 'problematization' moment resulted in the consolidation of
housing construction as the OPP of Rio's housing policy during Paes' first year as it also got the support of Paes agenda (shock of order) and federal funding (MCMV).

Lastly, this part described the re-emergence of the slum upgrading as instrument was supported by the methods, processes and regulations created in the last two decades, and people with expertise in this type of initiatives, in particular, municipal staff and architectural practices.
7.3 THE MORAR CARIOCA PLAN: SEEKING TO INTEREST AGAIN

7.3.1 An Olympic support

*Slum upgrading as legacy*

Hosting the Olympic Games was an aspiration of Rio de Janeiro since 1990. The city presented a candidacy for hosting the 2004 and the 2012 Olympic Games; however, in both processes it was eliminated in the first round. In September 2006 Rio de Janeiro submitted its candidacy for hosting the 2016 Olympic Games. One year later seven cities were selected, including Rio, and by 2008 Rio made it to the final round together with Madrid, Chicago and Tokyo. In October 2009 Jacques Rogge, president of the International Olympic Committee, announced Rio de Janeiro's victory. Right after this announcement Rio de Janeiro started the elaboration of the Olympic Games Legacy Plan. Coordinated by the SMU (Municipal Planning Secretariat), this urban, environmental and social legacy plan included all the projects and programmes that could be considered as a legacy and that could be boosted by the Olympic Games. For instance, among the main projects and programmes identified by the different municipal secretariat were the transport infrastructure network and the 'Porto Maravilha' regeneration project (Rio de Janeiro's old harbour). For the housing legacy plan, the SMH put together all the projects it was implementing; however, the SMH realized that the 'housing legacy' was small (interview with Luis Valverde, project manager at the SMH Projects' Office).

Building on the idea that the 2016 Olympic Games could be an opportunity for solving Rio de Janeiro's favela problem, the SMH worked on a financial analysis and schedule to assess possible scenarios (interview with Luis Valverde). This process included, as previously, the elaboration of a classification matrix (see CHAPTER 5 page 115). This time, one of the main criteria was favelas' location in relation to each other, generating two main types: 'isolated' and 'complex' favelas. The other two main criteria were favelas' size and degree of urbanization. This new classification allowed the reorganization of the 1020 favelas identified by the IPP (Municipal Insitute of Urbanisme) in 2009, into 625 favelas, out of which 481 were 'isolated' favelas and 144 'complex' (formed by 539 favelas). This new classification considered that only 55 favelas were urbanized. The SMH also analysed the investment needed for the urbanization of each favela, prioritizing the favelas located near the Olympic Cluster (interview with Luis Valverde).
Financially, the SMH realized that there was the opportunity to scale their interventions because on the one hand the Olympic Games would attract important public and private investments and on the other hand, in March 2010, the Federal Government launched the PAC 2 (see CHAPTER 2 page 46), from which the municipality could benefit. Moreover, the municipality was negotiating a third BID loan since 2008 (interview with Jose Brakarz) and a loan from the World Bank (WB) with the aim of restructuring its debt with the Brazilian Federal Government (World Bank 2010). The BID loan had been on the table since 2004, but it was not until 2008 that the loan project went into a preparatory stage that led to the elaboration of a project profile (BID 2008). A year and a half later the BID approved the loan of a total of US $ 300 million (BID 2010). Signed in August 2010, the WB loan of R$ 1.9 billion (US $ 1 billion) was unique in its kind as its objective was the reduction of the interest rate of the municipal debt with the Federal Government that reached that year R$ 7.4 billion, compromising municipal government investments. The reduction of interest rates from 9% to 6% could allow the municipality to free around R$400 million every year for investments including slum upgrading projects (PCRJ 2010c).

Therefore, the SMH focused on the elaboration of a proposal that included the urbanization of all the favelas of the city, prioritizing as well the favelas close to the major projects in the city such as the four Bus Rapid System (BRT) corridors: Transoeste, Transcarioca, Trasolimpica and Transbrasil.

The elaboration of the proposal included the identification and inclusion of different municipal bodies whose actions related to the materialization of the slum upgrading instrument like the SMU as it controlled the POUSO and approved construction permits, the Municipal Environment Secretariat (SMAC) which monitored the expansion of favelas on natural preserved areas, the Municipal Education Secretariat (SME) that managed schools and childcare centres, the SMO that was responsible for public works and services, the SMDS involved in social programmes and the IPP that supported among other activities the city's urban development. Through their involvement since the inception of the proposal, the SMH sought to secure the coordination of these bodies during the implementation of the instrument. This objective was the same as the one that underpinned the creation of the Executive Group of Special Programmes for Popular Settlements (GEAP) that involved several municipal bodies in the formulation of the municipal housing policy basis back in the 1990s (see CHAPTER 5 page 110). The SMH held meetings with several departments to discuss the Morar Carioca plan regulations. The
involvement of the different departments since the beginning of the elaboration of the Morar Carioca plan secured their support and willingness to work together with the SMH (interview with Luis Valverde). In addition, the SMH discussed with the CEDAE the terms of an agreement for implementing and maintaining water and sanitation services in favelas. At national level, the SMH met with the Ministry of Cities, 'Casa Civil' (Chief of Staff Office) and Ministry of Sports.

The Morar Carioca plan aimed at urbanizing all favelas by 2016; however, this objective was judged impossible even with the municipality's experience. For instance, the lack of work force was a limit to this ambitious plan. This led the SMH to review its proposal. The SMH also engaged discussion with the IAB-RJ. This partnership was sealed when Sergio Magalhães, ex-Housing Municipal Secretary (1995-2000), was appointed to the head of this institute for the period 2010-2011 and re-elected for the period 2012-2013.

7.3.2 Morar Carioca launch

Objectives

Presented as a 2016 Olympic Games social legacy, Rio de Janeiro's municipality launched the Morar Carioca Plan in July 2010. The stated goal was to urbanize all Rio de Janeiro favelas by 2020, with an investment of about R$ 8 billion. To achieve this goal the plan was divided into three different stages. The first one included the 24 ongoing slum upgrading projects, with an investment of around R$ 2 billion until 2012. The second phase involved the implementation of 84 slum upgrading projects following the new methodology established through the process mentioned above and an investment of R$ 2.4 billion from 2012 to 2016. The last phase was expected to be the continuity of the previous one, which earmarked R$ 3 billion for 113 projects to be conducted from 2016 to 2020. Furthermore, the Morar Carioca included a contract with the IAB-RJ worth R$ 8 million (O Globo 2010h). This agreement aimed primarily at organizing an architectural competition to select practices to develop the slum upgrading projects. (IAB-RJ 2010a) like the one organized in 1994 (see CHAPTER 5 page 115) and reproduced for the upgrading of Dona Marta and Rocinha by the state of Rio de Janeiro in 2004 and 2005 respectively (see CHAPTER 6 page 173).

Even if the Morar Carioca plan shared several similarities with the Favela-Bairro programme, the plan also included the following novelties: (i) the inclusion of housing
construction as an important item, (ii) a wider footprint of the interventions, (iii) the relocation of more families (PCRJ 2010a), (iv) the close involvement of the Public Order Municipal Secretariat (SEOP) to prevent the formation of new informal settlements and of the Conservation and Public Services Municipal Secretariat (SECONSERVA) responsible for infrastructure and public services maintenance (PCRJ 2010a), and (v) the use of the mega events (2012 Rio+20 UN Conference, 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games) and state government interventions (PAC projects, UPAs, and UPPs) to foster the instrument's implementation and impact.

Moving forward

In October 2010 the IAB-RJ and SMH organized the architectural competition called 'Morar Carioca, conceptualization and practice in slum urbanization' aimed at the selection of multidisciplinary teams led by architectural practices to elaborate and conduct slum upgrading projects. This competition was the first activity of the contract between the IAB-RJ and the SMH. In the 1990s the use of an architectural competition to choose the practices that were going to conduct Favela-Bairro projects concerned only the first 16 projects implemented at that time as it was substituted with public tenders when the municipality negotiated the first BID loan. In contrast, the 2010 architectural competition involved the selection of architectural practices for all projects included in the Morar Carioca Plan. The launch of the competition coincided with two events related to the 2016 Olympic Games: a debate about Rio-London and the launch of the Olympic harbour architectural competition. Organized by the IAB-RJ, these events allowed to emphasize the relationship between the Morar Carioca plan and Rio 2016 agenda. For example, Paes who attended the launch of the Morar Carioca competition underlined that:

"The idea and the commitment that the great legacy of the Olympics will be this [Morar Carioca]. Our goal is to dare. Without pharaonic works, but with projects that meet all the needs of this process" (LAB-RJ 2010b).

At the beginning of December 2010, 40 architectural practices were selected to develop urbanization projects that included primarily: the delineation of settlements, the production of a physical, social and legal diagnosis and the production plans and designs and urban parameters (interview with Luis Valverde). Several architectural practices and people that participated in the competition had been involved in Favela-Bairro projects. Thus, the development of the Morar Carioca plan was supported by the expertise of these
architectural practices that consolidated their know-how through the use of the slum upgrading instrument (Figure 34 page 216).

'A big problem that existed was that there were no trained technicians to design favela areas. The first teams included postgraduates without any type of know-how and after years and years now they have this knowledge. And the traditional architecture practices of Rio de Janeiro, good architecture and urban planning practices, were also added to this experience. They formed into teams and now they have the expertise to intervene in favelas' (Fernando Cavallieri, Advisor at the Municipal administration Freire & Oliveira 2008: 254).

The SMH signed another agreement with the Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analyses (IBASE) to invigorate community participation in the design and implementation of the Morar Carioca projects. IBASE was an NGO founded in 1981. IBASE was hired for its expertise acquired through different works, including the project called 'Pact for Citizenship' realized in the context of PAC 1 in 2008. The objective of IBASE in the context of the Morar Carioca was to enable civil society to influence the planning process (IBASE 2012). The agreement included the elaboration of participative social diagnosis, the collection and dissemination of favela information for the architectural practices and public institutions and for publications. In order to avoid Favela-Bairro participation issues, IBASE aimed to interact with the architectural practices responsible for the urban projects before the beginning of works. In the same spirit an agreement was also signed with PUC university for doing research in favelas.

**Continuity of the Federal Government support**

By 2010 the instrument already benefited from important Federal Government investments. At the level of the state of Rio de Janeiro R$ 24.1 billion were invested for housing finance (MCMV not included) and R$ 2.9 billion for slum upgrading projects (PAC 2010c). In particular, the investment (executed and earmarked) for slum upgrading in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro reached R$ 2.2 billion, of which $R 1.4 billion was earmarked by the state government and R$700 million by the municipality (PAC 2010c).

The 2010 elections did not modify the political alignment at the three levels of government achieved since the arrival of Paes at the head of Rio de Janeiro. At federal level Dilma Rousseff was designated as PT presidential candidate. Rousseff joined the PT party in 2000 and was appointed by President Lula as Minister of Energy in 2003. In 2005 she became
Presidential Chief of Staff Minister after Jose Dirceu left this position because of the Mensalão Scandal (see footnote 14 page 43). Rousseff did not win in the first round and faced Jose Serra State Governor of São Paulo in the second round. In the state of Rio de Janeiro in 2010 Rousseff sealed an alliance with Cabral that enabled her to obtain more than 60% of the votes of the state of Rio (Figure 35). Rousseff won the second round with 56% of votes at national level (O Globo 2010i). During the same elections Sergio Cabral obtained about 60% of votes in the first round for the state of Rio de Janeiro. With Rousseff and Cabral's victory, Paes secured continuity of State and federal investments that heavily the financed municipal housing policy.

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This part described that the development of the slum upgrading instrument through the Morar Carioca plan involved its 'problematization' during which associations were rebuilt and objectives were redefined. The building of alliances and definition of aims entailed 'interessement' through several devices such as the elaboration of the Olympic Legacy plan, architectural competition, the elaboration of the Morar Carioca plan and the new classification matrix. This process resulted in the 'enrolment' of several departments and institutions at the three levels of government, BID, IAB-RJ, architectural practices and IBASE.

This part also noted that the use of the slum upgrading instrument was supported by the expertise developed primarily through the Favela-Bairro experience. Moreover, the instrument's re-emergence fostered new knowledge and expertise through different processes such as the elaboration of the new classification matrix and architectural competition which allowed the rethinking of possible strategies based on the outcome of the slum upgrading in the past years. The development of this knowledge and know-how reinforced slum upgrading technical/scientific legitimacy and favela experts' authority.
Figure 34 Morar Carioca competition, December 2010. Exhibition of architectural practices proposals at the winners’ announcement event. Source: IAB-RJ 2010c

Figure 35 Presidential campaign, October 2010, before the second round. From left to right: Sergio Cabral Rio de Janeiro State Governor, President Lula, PT presidential candidate Dilma Rousseff, and Rio de Janeiro Mayor Eduardo Paes. Source: Estadão 2010
7.4 DIFFICULT TIMES FOR THE SLUM UPGRADING INSTRUMENT

7.4.1 Slum upgrading in the shade of the MCMV programme

The development of the use of the slum upgrading instrument

In the following years the use of the slum upgrading instrument increased. By 2011 the SMH slum upgrading initiatives represented a total investment of more than R$ 1.8 billion (SMH 2011). Overall, the main items in all these projects, excepting housing construction and improvement, were similar to the ones of the 1990s: project design and urbanization works, community equipment and urban furniture, indemnification, housing acquisition, land regularization, social work projects, technical assistance, environmental recovery (ibid). The use of the slum upgrading instrument supported by important financial resources allowed the SMH to undertake more in-depth transformations of favelas than before and integrate new actors such as in the case of Providência. This favela was included in the second BID loan signed in 2000 and the original project included the construction of a cable car and an intervention on the top of the hill that would cause the demolition of houses and relocation of residents. At that time the project was only partially implemented because of lack of investments and the modification the Urban Cell Office made to the project to build the 'Open Air Museum' (see CHAPTER 6 page 170).

In 2010 the SMH resumed the works in Providência with the ambition of 'truly integrating' the favela into the city (DCMRJ 06/11/2009: 76-77). The project was financially supported by PAC 2 and linked to the 'Porto Maravilha' regeneration project developed by the consortium 'Porto Novo' formed by Odebrecht, OAS and Carioca Engenharia through a Public-Private-Partnership (PPP). This PPP established that the consortium would be responsible for the slum upgrading project and public spaces maintenance (O Globo 2011a). The new proposal developed by the same architect that elaborated the Favela-Bairro project, Fernanda Salles, was estimated at R$ 119 million and included most of the elements that were abandoned in 2004 (SMH 2010). This new proposal involved more evictions and housing construction as it included the construction of the cable car and the razing of half of the houses that were obstructing the view of the Cruzeiro Chapel located at the top of Providência hill. The number of houses to be razed increased when the Culture Municipal Secretary (SMC) demanded the demolition of all the houses around the Chapel and forbidden the construction of new ones (interview with Fernanda Salles architect in charge of the Providência project) (see Figure 37).
Figure 36 PAC Providência project. Cruzeiro Chapel at the top of the hill. Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2011

Figure 37 PAC Providência project. Image of the top of the hill with the new buildings and public spaces constructed. This image was created before the SMC forbidden the construction of buildings around the Chapel. Source: SMH n.d.
The SMH budget that was mostly earmarked for the use of slum upgrading gradually increased, reaching R$ 594 million in 2012 (Figure 38). Moreover, the SMH budget during the Paes administration was by far the largest since Maia's first administration (Figure 39).

The slum upgrading instrument was financially supported by the PAC, Pro-Moradia, FNHIS, municipal resources and the BID loan. As for the latter, in February 2012, the Senate approved the BID loan (BAND 2012) and in July 2012 the municipality signed the contract (PCRJ 2012).

![Figure 38 SMH budget during Paes' administration. Source: CGMRJ n.d. Elaborated by the author.](image1)

![Figure 39 SMH budget (in R$ millions) by administration since 1993. Source: CGMRJ n.d. Elaborated by the author.](image2)
Playing a second role

Despite the fact that the slum upgrading became stronger, in particular financially, it had a second role in Rio de Janeiro’s housing policy during Paes' administration. The slum upgrading was the flagship of Rio's housing policy during the 1990s (CHAPTER 5), and even if it was gradually abandoned (CHAPTER 6), it was still the most used instrument up to the end of Maia's third administration. However, the instrument faced difficulty to grow stronger as it continued to be questioned for not solving favelas' problems (Figure 40). Moreover, the housing construction became central as Paes' shock of order involved evictions and housing construction and the Federal Government programmes supported it:

‘My commitment to the issue of housing is that we are sure today that Brazil would change when all people would have access to better living conditions. And then the house is a special place, it is home, where the children grow, where you receive their friends, where you can constantly improve the safety of your family. I’m sure that now we are taking another step to put a brick in building a better Brazil... The "My Home My Life" is one of the most important programmes in Brazil. Here at "Carioca-Neighbourhood" it is even more important because there are families who have suffered from natural disasters in hazardous areas and here they are, wanting a fresh start. And they will have a fresh start. This fresh start is not only a new home, it is also the fact that I saw here an infrastructure that is as or better than many neighbourhoods of the upper classes’ (President Rousseff, inauguration of Carioca Neighbourhood in Rio de Janeiro funded through the MCMV’, Planalto 2012).

The development of the housing construction was possible as resources were available and without cost for Rio's treasury. From 2009 to 2012 the SMH budget (used mainly for slum upgrading projects) reached about R$ 1.6 billion, while MCMV investments in Rio de Janeiro's municipality represented more than double: R$3.5 billion.

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26 By the end of 2012 the SMH had contracted 50,000 houses and finished 30,000. For calculating the investment I use an average value of R$70,000 per contracted house. The R$ 70,000 is a average that did not take into account the increase of housing prices approved in August 2012 by the Federal Government.
Figure 40 Favela-Bairro project in Mangueira favela. Public space abandoned.
Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2011

Figure 41 MCMV Carioca-Neighbourhood inauguration in July 2012. From right to left: President Rousseff, Mayor Eduardo Paes and state Governor Sergio Cabral.
Source: Planalto 2012
7.4.2 Slum upgrading: old issues and new problems

**Timing**

During the Paes administration the use of the slum upgrading instrument brought to the surface old issues and the appearance of new problems that weakened the instrument's comeback. Firstly, the implementation of Morar Carioca slowed down, threatening the instrument's functioning and credibility. The Morar Carioca plan was announced in July 2010 and the architectural competition organized by the IAB-RJ was finalized by the end of that year (see page 212). The SMH planned to launch the second phase of the Morar Carioca in 2011 (O Globo 2011b); however, during that year the programme did not progress. The signature of contract between the municipality and the selected architectural practices was delayed, together with the partnership with IBASE. This led to the plan being renamed 'De-Morar Carioca' (delay carioca). It was not until April 2012 that some contracts with architectural practices were signed (IAB-RJ 2012). This delay did not mean that the SMH was not developing projects in the meantime but that the new methodology of the second phase was not implemented. This methodology included among others the participation of architectural practices to develop the projects (see page 212) and IBASE for strengthening civil society participation as a way to overcoming instrument's limitation (see page 214).

In addition, the mega events' schedule interfered with the use of the slum upgrading instrument as in the case of Babilônia/Chapéu Mangueira. This project called Green Morar Carioca emerged in the middle of 2011 and was linked to Rio+20 conference (O Globo 2011c). Works in Babilônia/Chapéu Mangueira took more time than expected. Right until the conference, the works were botched, weakening on top the credibility of the instrument among favela dwellers (field visit to Babilônia/Chapéu Mangueira).

**State coordination and competition**

During Paes' administration, the use of the slum upgrading instrument involved as before water and sanitation issues. Right after the 2006 state election, Sergio Cabral and Cesar Maia met to discuss state and municipality partnership (O Globo 2006b; O Globo 2006g). One of Maia's objectives during these negotiations was the municipalization of water and sanitation services. This old demand based on the idea that the city would be in the best position to organize and manage this service was taken into account (DCMRJ 19/05/1997: 215/216).
Both administrations reached an agreement which established that the municipality would manage the water and sanitation services in the 21 neighbourhood of 'Zona Oeste' (West Area) of the municipality and favelas while CEDAE would remain responsible for the rest of the municipality (PCRJ 2010b). The Municipal Decree 'P' No.313/2007, delegated the responsibility of the 'Zona Oeste' and favela sewage service to the SMO and SMH respectively (DCMRJ 28/02/2007: 4). The SMH tried to consolidate a managing structure to take care of the favela sewage service. A year and a half later, in June 2008, R$ 8.5 million were allocated to it and the SMH was going to sign contracts with the companies that were going to provide the services (DMRJ 09/06/2008: 25). However, in 2009 Paes' administration disagreed with the arrangement. It argued that the city did not have the capacity to manage favela sewage service. Furthermore, the implementation of the agreement would lead to a waist of municipal resources as it would imply the creation of a system which would not benefit from CEDAE's existing infrastructure. Thus, the municipality tried to backtrack; however, by 2011 no other agreement was reached between the municipality and the CEDAE despite Paes and Cabral being political allies (DCMRJ 30/11/2011: 16). Meanwhile the favela sewage system was still abandoned (Figure 42):

>'All thirty sewage treatment stations, built by the Favela-Bairro, are stopped, as well as the 80 lift sewage and about a million and a half kilometres of the sewage system in the slums, which are without operations and maintenance, since 2007' (Eliomar Coelho, municipal councillor, DCMRJ 01/07/2011: 25).

In 2012, the municipality and CEDAE reached a new agreement in which CEDAE would resume sewage services in urbanized slums. Nevertheless, this ongoing issue of water and sanitation (see CHAPTER 5 page 138) weakened the instrument's support as one of the main objectives of its use was solving this specific problem.

In the meantime, the role of the state of Rio de Janeiro in the municipal housing policy was growing, not only through the PAC with new investments such as the Mangueira project (Figure 43), but also through the UPAs and UPPs. By August 2013, the state of Rio de Janeiro had constructed 19 UPAs (SES-RJ n.d.) and 33 UPPs (UPP n.d.) (Figure 44). However, instead of being a complementary work, the state's actions created a competition between the two levels of government as their projects tended to concentrate in the same location such as Alemão complex and Mangueira favela, complicating the slum upgrading implementation (interview with Leandro Balbio architect; Luis Valverde).
Figure 42 Current sanitation issues in Vidigal favela. It benefited from the Favela-Bairro programme at the end of the 1990s (see Figure 19 page 149).
Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2011
Um cenário com mais beleza
Projeto de reurbanização da Mangueira prevê teleférico e Calçada do Samba

CONHEÇA DETALHES DO PROJETO

Figure 43 A Scene with more beauty. Urbanization project of Mangueira include cable car and Samba Sidewalk. Source: O Globo 2010d

Figure 44 Military police positioned in a building in front of Rocinha during the inauguration of the UPP in this favela. Source: Tânia Rêgo/Agência Brasil 2012
Growing opposition

During the Paes administration, several evictions and relocations took place. Some of them were conducted as the municipality established that the favelas were risk areas such as Tabajaras. Other evictions related to SMH projects like Mangueira. By the end of 2009 the SMH requested Jorge Mario Jáuregui to elaborate a proposal for Mangueira upgrading. In April 2010, Jáuregui's proposal included as requested the 'Favela do Metro' demolition and relocation of people in apartments nearby constructed with Federal Government investments. This relocation was intended to create at the Favela do Metro a public space for Mangueira favela dwellers and nearby neighbourhoods (interview with Fram president of Favela do Metro residents' association, Jorge Mario Jáuregui architect, Ana Mangueira favela residents' association; visits to Favela do Metro and Mangueira favela).

Other evictions related primarily to 2014 and 2016 mega events: for example, Vila Autodromo located within the site of the future Olympic Park (eviction in progress). Lastly, several evictions resulted from the construction of Rio de Janeiro's BRT corridors conducted by the SMO. The SMH was responsible for offering housing solution for the people affected (interview with Luis Valverde). The SMH demanded, without success, that land expropriation be not limited to the BRT corridors but include more land, so housing projects could be developed along the route.

The evictions and relocations fostered the reluctance of favela dwellers, civil society and other people and groups such as NGOs, scholars, to support the instrument and were at the root of initiatives trying to fight back these plans. For instance, the journal 'The New Democracy' (A nova democracia n.d.), the NGO Rio on Watch (Rio on Watch n.d.), and the Popular Council (Conselho Popular n.d.) formed amongst others by favela dwellers denounced on several occasions and campaigned against the SMH initiatives, including the slum upgrading instrument (interview with Pastoral de Favelas; meetings Popular Council and PMHIS; field visit to Tabajaras) (Figure 45; Figure 46). Moreover, the UPPs fostered favela dwellers discontent as police excesses and other issues had occurred, favouring the reluctance to support governmental initiatives, including the slum upgrading instrument (ibid). In addition, well known personalities involved in national and international housing debates openly criticized latest Brazilian housing policies and the increase of evictions in Rio such as Rolnik (2011; 2012), weakening Rio's housing policy allies.
Figure 45 Favela do Metro event. Fram, president of favela do Metro resident’s association, sharing with students of the UERJ her story about the eviction and razing of her favela.
Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2011

Figure 46 Favela Tabajaras. Graffiti illustrating the fight against evictions painted during an event organized by Tabajaras residents’ association in partnership with other CBOs and NGOs. Source: Hector Becerril Miranda 2011
Slum upgrading weakened by the MCMV

A share of the houses produced through the MCMV were used for relocating favela dwellers. Most of the MCMV housing projects were constructed in the 'Zona Oeste' (West area) of Rio de Janeiro (Figure 47) where there are few job opportunities (Veríssimo 2010), and a lack of infrastructure and public services:

"You give housing to people who are homeless or who need to buy their own home, to ensure a roof over their family. I think it's great. Just think that just cannot be "My home My life". It has to be "My Sewage, My Life", "My Water, My Life", "More school for my son, My Life." You must have it all together: school, square, sewage, drainage, and not only the house, no. Do not get a home for the worker and take away the classroom of his son because within that programme school construction is not included. I'm saying this because I went to see the project "My House My Life" on Encanamento Road in Santa Margarida, I got there and went to see, there are eight hundred and something units and it's the trench that is going to receive all sewage from the "My House My Life" because there is no sewage treatment in our region, so our drainage network will be compromised; it is already bad, it is precarious. Today you are attending a parcel and will more with this programme "My Home, My Life", which is a great programme (Applause)' (Lucinha, Municipal councillor, DCMRJ 14/12/2009: 29).

There was also a lack of quality. This was not only to do with the bad quality of materials but also the size of the apartments. Indeed, people that used to live in houses of about 80m² were moved to houses of about 35 m² (visit to Tabajaras favela). These problems generated by the housing construction weakened the use of the instrument at the same time as they contributed to creating an opposition against all municipal housing initiatives, among different actors such as favela dwellers and their leaders, NGOs, CBOs, scholars and even municipal staff (meetings PMHIS).

Paes' re-election

The year 2012 was an electoral year for Rio de Janeiro's municipality. The electoral campaign started in July with Eduardo Paes (PSDB) as the preferred candidate; he won the municipal elections in the first round with 64.6%, followed by Marcelo Freixo with 28.1% of the votes. Paes' re-election secured the alliance among the three levels of government (OGlobo 2012) (Figure 48). By November 2012 Paes appointed Pierre Batista as SMH's secretary and Jorge Bittar returned to his federal deputy position.
Figure 47 MCMV Rio de Janeiro. The bulk of MCMV projects are located in Zona Oeste. Source: SMH 2011

Figure 48 Elections 2012. Brasilia. Vice-Governor of Rio de Janeiro Luiz Fernando Pezão, President Dilma Rousseff, re-elected Mayor, Eduardo Paes and the Governor Sergio Cabral. Source: Jose Cruz /Agência Brasil 2012
This part described how despite the gain of strength of the slum upgrading instrument through the development of the Morar Carioca plan, it did not play a prominent role during the last two years of Paes' administration. Slum upgrading continued to be questioned because of the slow implementation and maintenance problems exacerbated by the mega events schedule, the increase of evictions and lack of quality of the housing construction. All these elements contributed to generate 'dissidence' of different actors. Specifically, favela dwellers, NGOs, CBOs and scholars did not want to support the instrument or Rio's housing policy, undermining the strengthening of the instrument.

7.5 CONCLUSION

The chapter explored the latest 'translation' moments of the slum upgrading instrument. The first part noted that the re-emergence of the instrument related primarily to the building of 'alliances' with the regional state and federal governments, PAC, developers, architectural practices and municipal staff. The building of 'associations' transformed the instrument; in particular, PAC interventions included the participation of developers and became larger and more comprehensive, integrating more resettling, housing construction and heavier infrastructure (transport systems). This part also described how Rio's housing policy 'problematization' continued in the municipality as well as the instrument's 'controversy', undermining its possibility to be constituted as 'Obligatory Passage Point' (OPP) of Rio's 'new' housing policy. Out of the 'problematization' moment the housing construction approach emerged as the OPP of Rio's housing policy as it was 'associated' to Paes' agenda (shock of order) and federal funding (MCMV). Lastly, this part showed that the re-emergence of the slum upgrading instrument was supported by people with expertise, in particular, municipal staff and architectural practices, and methods, processes and regulations created in the last two decades.

The second part observed that the elaboration of the Morar Carioca plan through which the slum upgrading instrument developed since 2010 entailed a 'problematization' moment during which associations were rebuilt and objectives were redefined. The creation of 'associations' and definition of objectives, involved 'interessement' through several actions such as the elaboration of the Olympic Legacy plan, the creation of the architectural competition, and the elaboration the new classification matrix and slum upgrading strategy. This process resulted in the 'enrolment' and 'mobilization' of several departments and
institutions at the three levels of government, BID, IAB-RJ, architectural practices and other actors such as IBASE. This part also highlighted on the one hand that the use of the instrument was supported by the Favela-Bairro experience. On the other, it described how the use of the instrument created new knowledge and expertise through different processes such as the elaboration of the new classification matrix and architectural competition, reinforcing its technical legitimacy and favela experts' authority.

The third part described how that the slum upgrading instrument did not play the prominent role during the second half of the Paes administration, and this in spite of the new alliances it created through the Morar Carioca plan. It noted that the slum upgrading instrument was questioned because of its implementation issues (delays and maintenance problems) aggravated by the World Cup and Olympic Games agenda, the recrudescence of evictions and housing construction lack of quality. These elements fostered a 'dissidence' moment during which various actors and in particular favela dwellers, NGOs, CBOs and scholars, did not want to support the slum upgrading instrument or Rio's housing policy.

Based on these elements, this chapter illustrates how the slum upgrading instrument contributed to indirectly reshape Rio's latest housing policy. It observed that the slum upgrading played a second role during the Paes administration. However, the slum upgrading 'controversy' contributed to the strengthening of housing construction as the major housing policy approach. Therefore, the chapter contributes to substantiate hypothesis 1 that argues that the choice and use of the slum upgrading instrument fostered the inflexion moments of Rio's housing policy.

The chapter also shows that the constitution of the slum upgrading through PAC enabled the expansion of the actors' range of involvement to include the federal and regional state governments and developers. Thus, it supports hypothesis 2 that argues that the use of the slum upgrading contributed to modify Rio's housing governance. The chapter also illustrates the municipality's capacity to implement PAC projects in favelas and the Morar Carioca plan thanks to the knowledge and know-how accumulated such as the classification matrix, Favela-Bairro regulatory frameworks, and expertise to build alliances with various entities such as BID and IAB-RJ. Therefore, the chapter suggests that the municipality enhanced its power within the housing policy.
Lastly, the chapter described how the municipal staff and architectural practices continued to enhance their skills and legitimacy through the development of the PAC and Morar Carioca plan, becoming key players in the housing policy process. It also highlighted that PAC projects created a new operational framework for implementing large scale slum upgrading project that included among others transport infrastructure, and that the elaboration of the Morar Carioca plan entailed the development of a new classification matrix, and new strategies for urbanizing Rio’s favelas. Both experiences developed further the technical legitimacy of the slum upgrading instrument in recent years. Thus, this chapter contribute to reinforce the argument that the slum upgrading promoted the weakening of political regulation, contributing to the depoliticization of Rio’s housing policy (hypotheses 3).
INTRODUCTION

The thesis explored the role of the slum upgrading instrument in the evolution of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance. Specifically, it examined the significance of the dynamics and outcomes generated by the choice and use of the slum upgrading instrument from 1993 to 2012. On its theoretical stand, the research built the Political Sociology of Public Policy Instruments (PPI) approach (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2004) presented in CHAPTER 1. The PPI approach considers public policies in relation to sociological, political and State transformation dimensions. In particular, it argues that policy 'instruments' must be constituted and produce specific effects, shaping policies in spite of the aims ascribed to them. Subsequently, the PPI approach points out that the analysis of policy 'instrumentation', i.e. the issues related to the choice and use of instruments, is a major concern in public policy as it has social and political repercussions.

Based on the PPI approach, CHAPTER 2 called in to question the case of Rio de Janeiro, with an understanding of the slum upgrading as a 'policy instrument'. After offering an overview of Brazil's housing policy evolution, it presented Rio de Janeiro's case, identifying the existence of two main policy analysis streams: (i) evaluative studies that represent the bulk of the existing literature and focus on policy efficiency and effectiveness and (ii) studies that focus on the 'explanation of policy functioning' through sociological approaches. The latter stream included analyses that aimed to unveil hidden processes, denounce rhetorical illusions and identify meagre or perverse policy outcomes ('unveiling perspective'), and analyses that explored, social, institutional, conceptual and political changes in order to understand housing policy development and change.
Both streams have contributed to the understanding of housing policy and housing-related processes; however, in the view of the PPI approach they present two major gaps. Firstly, they have understudied how Rio's housing governance has evolved over time. Secondly, they have tended to underestimate the role of the 'slum upgrading instrument' and its 'instrumentation'. The slum upgrading instrument has been analysed by the 'evaluative' stream only in terms of effectiveness or efficiency, and as an instrument at the service of the Carioca élite or political group by the 'unveiling perspective'. Lastly, the studies that focus on policy change have overlooked the instrument as they tend to primarily focus on social, cognitive, institutional and political variables.

Aiming to address these gaps and generate a better understanding about how housing policy changed and how governance frames evolved over time, the thesis focused on exploring the following question: how did the slum upgrading influence Rio de Janeiro's housing policy and governance development from 1993 to 2012? The research considered three hypotheses:

1. The dynamics and outcomes generated by the slum upgrading contributed to produce the inflexion points of the evolution of Rio's housing policy
2. The dynamics and outcomes generated by the slum upgrading fostered the transformation of Rio's housing governance
3. The dynamics and outcomes generated by slum upgrading supported the depoliticization of Rio's housing policy.

CHAPTER 3 presented and discussed the research methods. Specifically, it explored the Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) that understands 'the social' as an heterogeneous network of entities called 'actants' that are open-ended entities created by a specific movement of 're-association and reassembling' (Latour 2005). It stressed that ANT localizes agency in the 'actants' and understands reality as an emerging process produced by actants' linking process named 'translation'. It also noted that this mechanism of 'association' entailed the following moments: 'problematization', 'interessement', 'enrolment', and 'mobilization' (or 'dissidence'). Based on this perspective CHAPTER 3 described that this research understood the slum upgrading instrument as an 'actant'. Subsequently, through 'detective work' (Austrin & Farnsworth 2005), the thesis delved into the unfolding of Rio's slum upgrading network of 'associations', using primary municipal archives, semi-structured interviews and policy documents. Therefore, the data analysis did not involve any
interpretation or measurement using the collected data as this investigation considered that reality is an emerging phenomenon that results from the interaction of things rather than being socially constructed or objectively given. The thesis also stressed that the investigation extended over 16 months and supported the production of a chronological 'thick description' of the choice and use of the slum upgrading which reveals its role in the transformation of Rio's housing policy and governance.

CHAPTER 4 introduced in detail the housing sector landscape from which Rio's slum upgrading emerged. It presented the emergence of the slum upgrading as a municipal housing instrument that was informed by previous associations that stabilized cognitive and normative frames for its use. Specifically, it described how the municipal administration from the second half of the 20th century developed various experiences through which it stabilized the slum upgrading as the most appropriate instrument to use while developing 'alliances' for upgrading Rio's favelas. Therefore, at the beginning of the 1990s the slum upgrading instrument was already being considered as a suitable solution for addressing Rio's housing issues and in particular the favelas' problem.

CHAPTER 5, CHAPTER 6 and CHAPTER 7 deployed the slum upgrading instrument' network of 'associations' through a chronological 'thick description', considering the research hypotheses.

This conclusion section is divided into four parts. The first part reviews the learning from the investigation showing how it supports the research hypotheses. The second part considers the implications of the investigation for the understanding of housing development and housing governance, and reflects on the use of the PPI approach and ANT. The third part considers the limitations of the investigation while the fourth part set out the basis of future research.
Learning from the Rio de Janeiro Investigation

Shaping the municipal housing policy

CHAPTER 5 illustrated that the instrument was supported among others by Rio's Master Plan, previous municipal experience and consensus about its use, making it the cornerstone of the municipal housing policy. It also noted that the choice of the slum upgrading instrument during the 1990s fostered the consolidation of the municipal housing policy by 'interesting', 'enrolling' and ultimately 'mobilizing' a wide range of entities through a vast range of actions while limiting 'dissidence'. In particular, the chapter showed that the instrument played a crucial role in Rio's housing policy as it contributed to the creation of the SMH and increase of its financial, institutional and technical capacities, the development of Rio's housing policy credibility, visibility and legitimacy, and the blockage of opposition fostered by several problems that emerged during the instrument's materialization.

CHAPTER 6 described how during Maia's second and third administrations (2001-2008) the use of the slum upgrading instrument entailed several 'controversies' that contributed to the development of 'dissidence' and (re)'problematization' moments that fostered its abandonment and Rio's housing policy collapse. Specifically, the chapter observed that the slum upgrading instrument controversies resulted not only from Maia and Conde electoral battle and the 2001 politico-administrative change, but also from the several materialization problems it carried with it. Furthermore, it showed that the instrument abandonment and housing policy erosion were a progressive and collective process as not only the municipal administration but also other actors rejected them and/or engaged in the building of other 'actor-networks' such as housing construction.

Lastly, CHAPTER 7 explained how the use of the slum upgrading instrument contributed indirectly to reshaped Rio's latest housing policy during Paes' administration (2009-2012). It observed that the instrument was still questioned for not having solved the city's housing problems and transformed favelas into neighbourhoods as expected, contributing to the re-emergence of housing construction as suitable solution. Moreover, during the second half of Paes' administration (2011-2012), the development of the Morar Carioca plan generated a 'controversy' about slum upgrading maintenance problems (in particular water and sanitation services), projects delays, the development of mega-events constraints and
opposition, and an increase in evictions. This 'controversy' fostered even more the strengthening of housing construction as ideal for addressing the municipality's housing deficit.

Based on these findings, the thesis supports hypothesis 1 that argues the slum upgrading contributed to produce the inflexion points of the evolution of Rio's housing policy. It shows how the development and consolidation of the housing policy were influenced and fostered by the choice use of the slum upgrading instrument. It also revealed that the fall of the policy during the first decade of the 2000s related to the outcomes and dynamics that the slum upgrading fostered in this period and was not only due to the politico-administrative change of 2001.

*Transforming Rio's housing governance dynamics*

As mentioned in CHAPTER 4 the social housing sector included the SMDS and few other actors, primarily governmental bodies such as IPLANRIO and CEDAE during the 1980s. CHAPTER 5 described how from 1993 to 2000 the choice and use of the instrument contributed to expand gradually the number and nature of actors involved: the SMH and other governmental bodies (SMU, SMO, RioUrbe, Geo-Rio, COMLURB, RioLuz and PMG), private sector actors (architectural practices, construction companies), and national and international institutions (BID, IAB-RJ, CAIXA, European Union), NGOs and CBOs (G-16, residents' associations) and other actors/groups/institutions that participated on ad hoc basis such as Footballer Ronaldinho and the Catholic Church. Moreover, the chapter noted that the role of these actors was framed by regulations, contracts, and agreements which contrasted with the more informal relationships established during the 1980s. Then, CHAPTER 6 showed that despite the abandonment of the slum upgrading, relationships subsisted (BID, SMH, architectural practices, construction companies) and even new actors emerged that related to the previous 'associations' such as the Urban Cell office. Finally, CHAPTER 7 described that in recent years the comeback of the slum upgrading instrument entailed the rebuilding of 'associations' that were developed in the 1990s (IAB-RJ, BID, CAIXA) and the involvement of new actors such as the federal and regional state governments and developers. The association of these newcomers was based on the type of relationships established in the 1990s such as contracts and agreements.
In addition, CHAPTER 5 told how despite the diversification of actors involved, the municipal government through the SMH did not lose the control of the development of the slum upgrading instrument and that its institutional and technical capacities to design and conduct housing initiatives were enhanced. Moreover, through the constitution and use of the slum upgrading instrument, the municipal government gained legitimacy and credibility, neutralizing criticism and opposition. CHAPTER 6 gave more evidence that in spite of the gradual fall of the instrument and housing policy and the development of politico-administrative fragmentation, the municipal government did not lose its institutional and technical capacities to elaborate and implement housing initiatives such as the implementation Urban Cell projects in Providência and Jacarezinho, and the elaboration of Alemão and Manguinhos master plans. Lastly, CHAPTER 7 illustrated that the municipality had the capacity to implement PAC projects and the Morar Carioca plan thanks to accumulated expertise such as the classification matrix, the Favela-Bairro programme, and know-how to build 'alliances' with actors such as BID and IAB-RJ.

Through this evidence, the thesis supports hypothesis 2 that argues that the slum upgrading instrument contributed to modify housing governance as it supported the creation of a new constellation of actors which produced new dynamics within the housing sector. However, it also demonstrates that the slum upgrading instrument maintained and enhanced municipal administration power. It shows that the slum upgrading contributed to develop municipal administration's credibility and legitimacy to limit opposition during the 1990s, and its institutional capacity, knowledge and expertise for developing housing programmes and projects during the whole period (1993-2012).

*Rio's housing policy depoliticization*

Lastly, the thesis substantiates hypothesis 3 as it reveals that the slum upgrading supported the weakening of strictly political control, contributing to the depoliticization of Rio de Janeiro's housing policy. Specifically, the thesis showed that the instrument fostered this process by supporting the development of favelas' experts, knowledge and know-how about favelas and their urbanization.

CHAPTER 5 illustrated how the use of slum upgrading instrument developed different actors' expertise (BID, architectural practices, construction companies) and consolidated the skills of the SMH and other municipal bodies such as IPLANRIO. It also stressed that
the use of the slum upgrading carried with it the creation of scientific and technical knowledge through various actions: elaboration of municipal housing basis, first classification matrix, contracts, programme's and projects' regulations, and the establishment of the SMH. The constitution of these experts' knowledge and know-how contributed to move Rio's housing policy towards a scientific/technical domain while limiting political interference, in particular, during the selection of favelas to be upgraded especially thanks to the classification matrix.

CHAPTER 6 described how Rio's housing policy remained in the scientific/technical domain, and this despite the fall and isolation of the instrument during the first decade of the 2000s. Experts such as architects and municipal and regional state staff continued to play their role in slum upgrading-related initiatives. During this period expertise about favelas were expanded through the various initiatives within the municipality (Urban Cell projects and Alemão and Manguinhos Complex master plans) and at the regional state level (Dona Marta, Rocinha, and Cantagalo projects). The chapter also noted that the use of the slum upgrading during Maia's second and third administrations involved practices of clientelism, yet these were difficult to put into practice or were limited by the slum upgrading regulatory frameworks.

Finally, CHAPTER 7 reveals how the experts, constituted through the development of the slum upgrading instrument, in particular, municipal staff and architectural practices, continued to enhance their skills and legitimacy through the development of the PAC and Morar Carioca plan. It also highlighted that PAC projects created new regulatory frameworks that included among others transport infrastructure, while the elaboration of the Morar Carioca plan entailed the development of a new classification matrix and a new slum upgrading strategy. Both experiences and the consolidation of the group of experts showed that Rio's housing policy related to the strengthening of a housing domain/field based on a technical rational.
INVESTIGATION IMPLICATIONS

Reconsidering housing policy development, erosion and new lease

The thesis findings contribute to the rethinking of the role of political will in the development of Rio's housing policy. As noted in CHAPTER 6, the consolidation of the municipal housing policy during the 1990s has tended to be attributed to Mayor Cesar Maia or to Mayor Luiz Paulo Conde (and SMH Secretary Sergio Magalhães). The thesis described, in CHAPTER 5, how the emergence of the housing policy (1993-1996) did not only relate to Maia or Conde political will or vision, but also to the previous experiences (Mutirão programme), Rio's Master plan regulations, and a consensus about the instrument's relevance for addressing housing problems. The thesis also showed that Rio's housing policy development (1997-2000) was not only driven by Conde's political will or Magalhães' actions. It related to the building of several 'alliances' through different actions, supported primarily by the use of the slum upgrading instrument. Therefore, Rio's housing policy development cannot be explained through Maia's or Conde's political will or actions.

Subsequently, the thesis agrees with Lascoumes & Le Galès (2007a) who argued that the analysis of policy 'instrumentation' questions the "heroic view of policy changes often put forward by the actors" (ibid: 6).

The thesis also goes on to reflect on the erosion process of the municipal housing policy during the first decade of the 2000s. The existing literature tends to argue that the politico-administrative change in 2001 caused the fall of Rio's housing policy and the abandonment of the slum upgrading instrument (Magalhaes & Conde 2004; Freire & Oliveira 2008; O Globo 2001a; Fiori et al. 2000). CHAPTER 6 illustrated that the politico-electoral battle and administration change that followed destabilized the housing policy and the slum upgrading, nevertheless, the thesis revealed that the abandonment of the slum upgrading instrument and fall of the housing policy related to a collective and gradual process of 'dissidence' and 'problematization' fostered by a series of 'controversies'. This process was collective as the rejection of the instrument included actors outside the municipal administration, and resulted in the isolation of the instrument and housing policy. Therefore, the thesis argues that the politico-administrative chance in 2001 was only one of the several controversies that step by step weakened Rio's housing policy, producing its erosion and re-problematization that resulted in the comeback of housing construction as an suitable approach for solving favelas' problems and the city's housing deficit.
In addition, the thesis allows to better understand how the housing construction gained importance in Rio de Janeiro in recent years. The thesis described how PAC investments and the launch of the Morar Carioca plan gave a new lease to the instrument, though its development was limited during Paes' administration (2009-2012) due to the persistence of 'controversies' about its use and outcomes. The thesis showed that these 'controversies' about the instrument contributed to the re-emergence of housing construction as suitable solution, becoming Rio’s latest housing policy central element. This is an important insight since the development of housing construction tends to be explained by the development of macroeconomic policies and the strength of the private sector interests (developers' interests) that resulted in the creation of the MCMV, overlooking the weakening of slum upgrading as a significant factor.

Lastly, the thesis suggest the existence of a deep crisis in the municipality as Rio's latest housing policy is questioned not only for the slum upgrading but also for the housing construction. Despite the support it gained in recent years, housing construction is also criticized as housing estates are often of bad quality and tend to be constructed in areas without infrastructure, public services and far from job opportunities. Therefore, the thesis argues the need for entirely reviewing slum upgrading and mass housing construction solutions. In particular, the thesis suggests that the slum upgrading instrument examination should focus on finding new ways of 'linking' the entities involved (people, aspiration, processes, infrastructure, interest, public services, places, etc.) so as to build long term 'associations', achieving slum upgrading ambitions.

**Rio's housing governance and municipal government evolution**

The thesis challenges the argument put forward by the existing literature, in particular by the 'unveiling perspective' (Bahia 2000; Broudehoux 2001; Randolph 2004; Silva 2006), that in Rio de Janeiro existed or exists a powerful, coherent and cohesive actor or coalition that convincingly impose their interests and views at a city level. The thesis findings suggest that it would be unlikely for Rio de Janeiro's housing policy to be controlled by a specific actor or group of actors as the use of the slum upgrading instrument involved (i) several actors and interests, (ii) tangled institutional arrangements, (iii) intricate financial set up, (iv) complicated territories and (v) complex procedures. Instead, the thesis argues the existence of a 'helpless governance' pattern that entails taking control and gaining power in the middle of a chaotic landscape through 'coup par coup' negotiations rather than
premeditated arrangements. Accordingly, Rio's 'helpless governance' pattern means governing through fragmentation following the maxim 'divide and rule'. Based on this understanding, the thesis suggests that rather than focus on 'whose interest' or 'why', studies should explore 'how' in a such fragmented landscape, specific interests, ideas and/or processes that contribute to materialize housing-related initiatives and ultimately govern the city, could emerge and take shape.

In addition, the thesis contributes to better understand Rio's municipal government evolution within the housing sector. It showed that after the decentralization of urban and housing policies in the 1980s, Rio de Janeiro's municipal government has been in a paradoxical position. On the one hand, the thesis described that during the 1990s the municipality gained more capacities even if it redistributed responsibilities and power among the private sector (architectural practices, construction companies, developers), international organizations, NGOs, and CBOs (favelas residents’ associations). It showed how in recent years the municipality enhanced its capacity mainly through federal government financial aid, leading to bulldozer actions such as the relocation of current slum upgrading projects. Thus, the thesis illustrated how the municipality became strategic, flexible and opportunistic, trying to articulate its actions with third parties for gaining scale; having a portfolio of projects and programme ready to be funded; and hunting for contracts with international organizations and/or other level of government. On the other hand, the thesis illustrated the municipality's greater dependence as Rio de Janeiro was unable to autonomously implement a municipal housing policy: it needed financial support such as the one provided by the BID. Furthermore, the thesis noted that since 2007 the municipality heavily depended on the Federal Government and that the mega events constrained municipality housing initiatives. Thus, the municipal government became more dependent than ever on other actors, actions, and schedules for implementing its housing policy.

Therefore, an important question to consider in Rio is how the municipal government can be strategic, flexible and opportunistic, and at the same time create and develop coherent, comprehensive and sustainable housing policy in the context of a growing dependence on federal funding. Some voices argue that the municipal housing policy could be better if it is regulated as health and education, which have a specific allocation budget. An amendment to the constitution called PEC 'Moradia Digna' (dignified housing) supports the creation of
CONCLUSIONS

a specific percentage allocation from the local and national governments' budget (Moradia Digna n.d.). However, PEC 'Moradia Digna' if approved will restrain municipal budget which are already constrained by health and education expenses.

Lastly, the thesis allows to reflect on the influence of the Federal Government comeback on Rio's latest housing policy. It described how the Federal Government contributed to reshape Rio de Janeiro's housing policy in recent years. Under an ANT perspective this thesis understands that unlike the 1990s when the municipal government was the one building 'alliances', this time it is the federal government that has been the trying to 'interest', 'enrol' and 'mobilize'. The Federal Government did not directly control the municipal housing policy; however, it heavily shaped its development since the launch of the PAC in 2007 and MCMV in 2009. While the financial support of the Federal Government has helped to develop Rio's housing policy, it has also supported bulldozer actions that involve more relocations and evictions and the construction of housing units in areas without neither public services/infrastructure nor job opportunities. Furthermore, the Federal Government comeback supported the emergence of the regional state of Rio de Janeiro as an important player in the development of housing policies which has tended not only to cooperate but also compete and interfere in municipal housing initiatives. Therefore, the thesis suggests that after about 20 years of absence (1986-2003, abolition of the BNH and creation of the Ministry of Cities respectively) the comeback of the Federal Government was needed; however, the way in which it came back represents a setback for the development of Rio's housing policy.

Theoretical and methodological implications

The research and in particular the fieldwork process and empirical chapters contributed to reflect on the analytical and methodological frameworks used as follows. As mentioned earlier (see page 65) rather than building a 'Tools Policy Theory' the PPI approach aimed to complete traditional analyses (interest, ideas institutions). Under this understanding, its use contributed to reveal processes of Rio's housing policy that were overlooked by the existing literature, completing and expanding existing understanding on the case. However, the thesis demonstrates that, as Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007a) observed, policy instruments tend to be meta instruments, i.e. a complex assemblage of techniques of government. Thus, there is a real operational limitation for analysing policy instruments as they are not closed objects 'out here' waiting to be studied. Instead, the analysis of the slum upgrading
instrument showed that they are constituted by a wide range of linkages. Consequently, the thesis suggests that the PPI approach is an interesting conceptual frame; however, its use is not a straight forward exercise. Based on this investigation, a way to overcome this difficulty is to focus on 'technologies of government' understood as different entities constituting a policy instrument. This positioning can contribute to reinforce PPI understanding that policy instruments are not 'out there' ready for use while making clearer that the analysis of 'policy instrumentation' entails the tracing of different devices such as regulations, contracts and norms.

The thesis also shows that ANT proved to be a vital theoretical and methodological complement to the PPI approach for it allows the inclusion of humans and non-humans entities in the analysis and a focus on the interaction between them. Furthermore, ANT contributed to clarify that there are no instrument's effects per se, but rather diverse outcomes generated through the different 'associations' in which a policy instrument and different entities, including humans participated. Nevertheless, the investigation of past controversies tend to be difficult to trace as data about them tend to get lost. Thus, investigations aiming to use an ANT perspective should evaluate the feasibility of unfolding the 'actant' under study. In addition, the translation moments (problematization, interessement, enrolment and mobilization) generally overlap, making it difficult to clearly isolate them and account for them as single processes.

INVESTIGATION LIMITATIONS

The thesis includes three main limitations.
- Firstly, the findings cannot be generalized to all the Brazilian municipalities. This is because the case of Rio de Janeiro relates to specific socio-economic and politico-administrative landscapes, and because not all municipalities used slum upgrading as their housing policy instrument.
- Secondly, the thesis focused on the slum upgrading instrument that was the main housing policy instrument during 16 years. Thus, its study allowed to grasp most of the dynamics around Rio de Janeiro's housing sector. However, in recent years, with the creation of the SNHIS (National Social Housing System) and the launch of PAC and MCMV programmes, the study of the slum upgrading instrument proved limited for exploring local housing sector in the last 6 years.
- Thirdly, the thesis focused primarily on the local government, overlooking how the use of the slum upgrading influenced other actors or groups.

**FUTURE RESEARCH**

The thesis points out several areas of research that would be important to develop in order to overcome the mentioned limitations and improve the understanding about housing policy and governance transformations.

*Rio de Janeiro experience for further research*

The analysis of Rio de Janeiro can be further developed as follows:

- To better understand how the slum upgrading instrument influenced other actors involved in Rio housing policy process besides the municipal government. This would allow to highlight the overall influence of this instrument over the housing sector in Rio de Janeiro. In particular, the thesis suggests the following research hypothesis: despite the ambition of integrating favelas dwellers into slum upgrading projects' implementation, they were gradually excluded because the slum upgrading instrument became technically driven and the experts (architects and municipal staff primarily) gained more legitimacy than them.

- To explore and understand the evolution of municipal housing policies across Brazil through the analysis of the different instruments. This investigation could move beyond a mere collection of different experiences and produce a comparative analysis which would contribute to the case of Brazilian municipal housing policies' evolution being considered globally.

- To analyse other cases that used slum upgrading instrument in order to understand how the instrument tends to produce (or not) similar housing policy and governance outcomes. This research could be richer if it were to include cases beyond Brazil as it will allow to understand how the slum upgrading instruments were constituted in other politico-administrative landscapes.

- To investigate how and to what extent in Rio de Janeiro's fragmented governance landscape, the mega events allowed specific actors to impose their views and interests. In particular, it is important to understand the dynamics around eviction that have occurred in the municipality in recent times and have being solely associated with the mega events without considering other hypotheses such as slum upgrading 'controversy' that might be also a cause for choosing evictions and housing construction as solutions.
Housing policies in Brazil

Another area of research includes the Brazilian housing sector recent changes with the creation of the SNHIS and the implementation of large scale slum upgrading projects and housing construction through the PAC and MCMV programmes. In this new housing sector landscape the thesis proposes two main research agendas:

- To study how national housing system instruments (fund and plans) have influenced local and national housing policy materialization process and housing sector dynamics. In particular, how they have been influencing the housing policy decentralization process started at the end of the 1980s, and how they have affected the role of regional state governments in the housing sector. The investigation showed that is crucial to analyse the role of regional states because in recent years they gained strength thanks to federal programmes and remain key for housing policy development as they tend to control public services such as sanitation and could play an important role in urban planning at a metropolitan scale where the housing deficit is concentrated.

- To explore how the PAC and MCMV programmes have reshaped national and local housing policies and housing governance dynamics. In particular, to understand how MCMV has influenced the use of specific instruments at municipal level such as slum upgrading or participatory budgeting, and influenced housing sector relationships in medium and small cities.

Housing policy analysis and new ways of collecting data

Finally, further investigations should consider conducting research and data collection in the digital era. Throughout this research I could experience the evolution of media and tools. The amount of data for exploring the 1990s period was small and its access difficult; however, the volume of data for the 2000s period and in particular, after the second half of the first decade of 2000s, was high and its access easier. This relates to the fast development of the digital universe (Gantz & Reinsel 2011). This major change pose three major questions:

- How can the growing digital universe challenge existing knowledge and understanding about housing?

- How can the burgeoning 'big data' era foster the emergence of new question of housing and fields of inquiry?

- How and to what extent will new technologies influence our conception and practice in housing research — now and in the future?
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## LIST OF INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position and/or activity during 1993-2012</th>
<th>Date interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private Sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Pablo Benetti</td>
<td>Architect involved in the following programmes Favela - Bairro, PAC, and Morar Carioca</td>
<td>01/09/2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Jorge Mario Jáuregui</td>
<td>Architect involved in the following programmes Favela - Bairro, PAC, and Morar Carioca</td>
<td>24/06/2011</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>04/09/2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Eduardo Petersen</td>
<td>Architect involved in the Urban Cell Project in Providência (in presence of Lu Petersen)</td>
<td>13/10/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Fernanda Salles</td>
<td>Architect involved in Favela Bairro, Morar Carioca Providência</td>
<td>13/10/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Leandro Balbio</td>
<td>Architect involved in PAC Alemão Complex</td>
<td>22/09/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Lília Sodre</td>
<td>Architect involved in Morar carioca</td>
<td>08/07/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Eduardo Polay</td>
<td>Odebrecht, working in PAC Alemão Complex</td>
<td>27/09/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community based organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Márcia Vera Vasconcelos</td>
<td>Community leader. President of the Resident association federation of Rio de Janeiro (FAM RIO)</td>
<td>09/09/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Claudio</td>
<td>Community leader. Ex president of Vidigal resident association during the implementation of the Favela-Bairro</td>
<td>05/10/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Rosiete</td>
<td>Community leader. Member of the Providência resident association</td>
<td>06/10/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Fram</td>
<td>Community leader. President Favela do Metro resident associations</td>
<td>29/09/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Ana</td>
<td>Community leader. Vice president of Mangueria resident association</td>
<td>10/10/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Zezinho da Torre branca</td>
<td>Community leader. President of the federation of favelas association of Rio de Janeiro during the 1990s</td>
<td>23/08/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NGO's and other organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Itamar silva</td>
<td>Brazilian Institute for social and economic analyses (IBASE) &amp; community leader</td>
<td>11/07/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Luis Severino</td>
<td>Member of the Pastoral de Favelas</td>
<td>21/09/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Pastoral de Favelas</td>
<td>Team meeting: Monsegnor Luis Antonio, Maria Alice, Luis Severino, Erika Gloria, Josefa, Celia, Lucia, Eliana, Maria da Paz</td>
<td>30/08/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Erika</td>
<td>Member of the Pastoral de Favelas</td>
<td>31/07/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Ricardo Gouvêa</td>
<td>Bento Rubião NGO Executive coordinator</td>
<td>04/09/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politicians (Municipal Legislative Body)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Andrea Gouvêa</td>
<td>Journalist. Municipal councillor (2005-2012). Member of the finances commission at the Municipal</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Fernando Cavallieri</td>
<td>Special advisor at the Municipal urban institute (IPP). Worked for Rio de Janeiro's municipality since 1981. Involved in Favelas issues and municipal housing initiatives including the Favela-Bairro.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Aderbal Curvello</td>
<td>SMH (1993-2004); Inter-American Development Bank (2004- date)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Jozé Candido Sampaio</td>
<td>SMO (1980s -1990s); SMH (2001-2008) as Project coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Isabel Tostes</td>
<td>SMDS (1980s); SMH (1993-2000); PCRJ (2000-2008); SMH (2009-date as social work coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Ines Magalhães</td>
<td>Ministry of Cities, National Housing Secretary from 2003 - date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Paulo Magalhães</td>
<td>CAIXA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Gilda Blank</td>
<td>CAIXA since the 1990s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Jose Brakarz</td>
<td>Inter-American Bank. involved in the three BID loan for the Favela-Bairro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Type of debate or document. /Participants</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCMRJ 01/12/1994 P25-28</td>
<td>Minutes of the special meeting No. 55 held on 29 November 1994. Discussion and vote on the creation of the Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH) Participants: several municipal councillors (MCs).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMRJ 09/12/1994 P01-08</td>
<td>Public hearing of the Committee for the defence of human rights held on 28 November 1994. Theme: the new Housing Secretariat and the municipal housing policy. Panel: Municipal Councillor (MC) Jurema Batista, president of the panel; Sérgio Magalhães, Secretary of the Municipal Housing extraordinary Secretariat (SeMH); Jorge Rodrigues SeMH cabinet chief; Antônio Augusto Verissimo, SeMH land issues responsible. Other participants: MC Dilson Cardoso; MC Jorge Bittar; Maria Aparecida, Campinhos neighborhood resident; Letici Hassan, adviser to MC Fernando William; Ricardo Gouvêa, NGO Bento Rubião representative; MC Fernando William; MC Edison Santos; MC Chico Alencar; Demetre Anastassakis, IAB-RJ president.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMRJ 22/08/1995 P04-19</td>
<td>Information requested by the Committee for Justice and Editing about the bill No. 1114/95 (Message No. 331/95) that &quot;authorizes the executive to hire loan with the Inter American Development Bank, BID, and other measures&quot;, in proceedings at Municipal Chamber.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMRJ 28/08/1995 P11-18</td>
<td>Public hearing of the Committee for Urban and Environment Affairs held on 17August 1995. Theme: the Favela-Bairro programme. Panel: MC Jose Maria Vila Nova, president of the panel; MC Jurema Batista; Sergio Magalhães Municipal Housing Secretary (SMH). Other participants: José Nerson, president of the FAFERJ; João Filho, Escondidinho hill resident; Amaro Chagas, Pilares hill resident; Amaro Chagas, Fernão Cardim neighbourhood resident; Maria Rosilda Pereira, representative of the Praia da Rosa residents’ association; Jorge Rodrigues, SMH undersecretary; Antônio Francisco, president of the Caminho do Outeiro residents’ association; Maria Lucia Petersen, Favela-Bairro programme manager (SMH); MC Edison Santos; MC Jorge Bittar.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMRJ 31/08/1995 P07-11</td>
<td>Minutes of the special meeting No. 36 held on 29 August 1995. Theme: discussion about the Favela-Bairro programme and the BID loan Participants: several MCs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMRJ 08/09/1995 P10-18</td>
<td>Minutes of the special meeting No. 91 held on 5 September. Theme: discussion and vote of the BID loan for implementing the Favela-Bairro programme. Participants: several MCs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMRJ 19/05/1997 P04-13</td>
<td>Public hearing of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) (Resolution No. 764/97), held on 15 May 1997. CPI about the quality and efficiency of water and sewer services provided in the municipality. Panel: MC Eduardo Paes, president of the panel; MC Gilberto Palmares rapporteur; MC Luiz Carlos Ramos; Carlos Dias, Projet officce manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>08/05/1998</td>
<td>DCMRJ</td>
<td>Public hearing of the Committee for the defence of human rights held on 22 April 1998. Theme: discussion about the Favela-Bairro programme and the problems faced by the Community of 'Mato Alto' Panel: MC Jurema Batista, president of the panel; Fábio Pereira Batista member Etnica theatre company; Mário Alberto Costa, psychologist; Sra. Cristina, resident Andaraí hill; Maria da Luz, resident Urubu hill; Marina Adelaide, resident Encontro hill; Ivanilda, resident Andaraí hill; Maria Julia, resident Andaraí hill; Marlene, community leader Urubu hill; Rosilda Soares, resident Andaraí hill; Hamilton Gomes, resident Urubu hill; José Vicente Ferreira, resident Encontro hill; Marisa, resident Encontro hill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/06/1998</td>
<td>DCMRJ</td>
<td>Public hearing of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) (Resolution No. 787/98), held on 15 June 1998. CPI about the real estate developments without licensing [the public hearing involved a discussion about the Favela-Bairro programme and other housing policy issues]. Panel: MC Eliomar Coelho, president of the panel; MC S. Farraz, rapporteur; Prof. Ricardo Lira, director Law course (UERJ); Canagé Vilhena, director Architects' Union; José Chacon, president Regional Council of Engineering and Agronomy (CREA-RJ). Other participants: MC Gilberto Palmares; MC Otavio Leite.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/09/1998</td>
<td>DCMRJ</td>
<td>Public hearing of the Special Commission (Resolution No. 793/98), held on 3 August 1998. Commission instituted for questioning, monitoring and evaluating the issues related to the main municipal government's programme of investment: the Favela-Bairro programme. Panel: MC Gilberto Palmares, president of the panel; MC Otavio Leite, rapporteur; MC Paulo Cerri; Carlos Alberto, resident Canagalo community; Raimunda Lina Alves, resident Grota community; Letícia, adviser to MC Fernando William; Wilson Ferreira Gomes, representative Cidade de Deus community federation; Manuel, resident Formiga hill; Junior, member Andaraí residents' association; Adão, resident Borel hill; Ailton, President Candelaria-Mangueira residents' association; Nivaldo, resident Mata Machado favela; Silvério, representative Regional Council of Engineering and Agronomy (CREA-RJ); João Batista, resident Borel hill; Jorge, adviser to MC Otávio Leite; Rosangela, resident Borel hill; Ana Rosa, resident Borel hill; Celso Evaristo, president Architects' union; Mario Henrique; Amaro Henrique, adviser to MC Gilberto Palmares; Luis Octávio; Luci, resident Borel hill; Daniel, resident Borel hill; Jorge, resident Zona Sul community; Leia, resident Borel hill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/09/1998</td>
<td>DCMRJ</td>
<td>Debate of the Special Commission (Resolution No. 793/98) held on 10 August 1998. Commission instituted for questioning, monitoring and evaluating the issues related to the main municipal government's programme of investment: the Favela-Bairro programme. Debaters: MC Gilberto Palmares, president of the debate (moderator); Marcos Azevedo, former president architects' union of Rio de Janeiro;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Adauto Lucio Cardoso, professor Institute of Research and Urban Planning of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (IPPUR-UFRJ); Josinaldo Alexio, sociologist and PhD candidate at the Institute of Philosophy and Science of the UFRJ; MC Eliomar Coelho; Davi; Kelson, member architects' union; Silverio, chairperson of the Regional Council of Engineering and Agronomy (CREA-RJ) and Engineers' union; Sr. Isidoro, member architects' union; Sr Jorge.

**DCMRJ 11/11/1999 P12-14**
Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 11 November 1999. Theme: discussion and vote of the 2000 budget bill. Panel: MC Gerson Bergher, president of the panel; MC Waldir Abrão; Jorge Secin, representative Mayor's cabinet; Sergio Magalhães, Municipal Housing Secretary.

**DCMRJ 30/03/2000 P88-89**
Minutes of the ordinary meeting No. 22 held on 29 March 2000. Theme: discussion about the Mayor's trip to the USA to sign the IDB loan. Discussants: several MCs.

**DCMRJ 31/03/2000 P20-21**
Minutes of the ordinary meeting No. 23 held on 30 March 2000. Theme: discussion about the Mayor's trip to the USA to sign the IDB loan. Discussants: several MCs.

**DCMRJ 17/05/2000 P12-13**
Minutes of the ordinary meeting No. 47 held on 16 May 2000. Theme: discussion about the Favela-Bairro programme. Discussants: several MCs.

**DCMRJ 01/06/2000 P12-20**
Minutes of the ordinary meeting No. 55 held on 30 May 2000. Theme: discussion about the Favela-Bairro programme. Discussants: several MCs.

**DCMRJ 08/06/2000 P10-11**
Minutes of the ordinary meeting No. 60 held on 7 June 2000. Theme: discussion about the Favela-Bairro programme. Discussants: several MCs.

**DCMRJ 14/06/2000 P26**
Minutes of the extraordinary meeting No. 17 held on 13 June 2000. Theme: discussion about the Favela-Bairro programme. Discussants: several MCs.

**DCMRJ 16/10/2001 P01-11**
Public hearing of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI Favela Bairro) (Resolution No. 893/2001), held on 11 October 2001. CPI instituted for investigating the foundations of the facts widely publicized by the print media about the City's housing program, its mischaracterization, unfinished works and possible damage to the municipal treasury.
CPI Members: MC Argemiro Pimentel, president; MC Ruben Andrade, rapporteur; MC Rodrigo Bethlem, MC Patricia Amorim and MC Luis Carlos Aguilar, members; MC Paulo Cerri and MC Pedro Porfirio, substitutes.
Deponent: Solange Amaral, Municipal Housing Secretary.

**DCMRJ 26/10/2001 P25-30**
Public hearing of the CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001), held on 27 September 2001.
Deponent: Sergio Magalhães, Special projects Secretary of the state of Rio de Janeiro and former Municipal Housing Secretary.

**DCMRJ 22/10/2001 P10-18**
Public hearing of the CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001), held on 18 October 2001.
Deponents: Hércules Ferreira Mendes, member NGO Guarda-16 (G-16); Maria José do Nascimento Lopes, leader Canal das Taxas community; Vanílce de Castro Coutinho, president Jardim Moricaba.
residents' association; William Augusto de Souza Paloma, president Jacarepagua community chamber.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DCMRJ</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03/12/2001 P33-39</td>
<td>Public hearing of the CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001), held on 29 November 2001. Deponents: Davi Bezerra Lessa, former manager Works Coordination Office of the Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH); Hélio Aleixo, former manager Projects Office of the SMH; Andreia Cardoso, former Favela-Bairro programme manager.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/12/2001 P07-12</td>
<td>Public hearing of the CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001), held on 5 December 2001. Deponents: Márcia Garrido, Favela-Bairro programme manager; Aderbal Curvelo, deputy chief Special Technical Sub-office of the Municipal Housing Secretariat;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/12/2001 P07-12</td>
<td>Public hearing of the CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001), held on 12 December 2001. Deponents: Bruno Sebastião, manager Works Coordination Office of the Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH); José Cândido Sampaio, manager Projects office of the SMH.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/03/2002 P09-22</td>
<td>Public hearing of the CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001), held on 28 February 2002. Deponents: Sônia Maria Correia Mograbi, Municipal Secretary of Education; Jorge Roberto Fortes, president RioUrbe.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/03/2002 P04-08</td>
<td>Public hearing of the CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001), held on 7 March 2002. Deponents: Icaro Moreno Junior, former president RioUrbe; Carmem Lima C. Moura, former Municipal Secretary of Education.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25/04/2002 P24-26</td>
<td>Final report CPI Favela-Bairro (Resolution No. 893/2001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/11/2002 P12-15</td>
<td>Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 8 November 2002. Theme: discussion about the 2003 budget bill for the Municipal Housing Secretariat. Panel: MC Jose Moraes, president of the panel; Solange Amaral, Municipal Housing Secretary; MC Rubens Andrade; MC Mario del Rei.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/10/2003 P03</td>
<td>Relatório de viagem a Washington do prefeito para participar do seminario &quot;Favela - Bairro, dez anos integrando a cidade&quot;.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/12/2003 P17-30</td>
<td>Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 19 November 2003. Theme: discussion about the 2004 budget for the Municipal Housing Secretariat and Municipal Works Secretariat (bill No. 1674/03) Panel: MC Professor Uoston, president of the panel; MC Rosa Fernades, vice-president; Solange Amaral, Municipal Housing Secretary (SMH); Eidir Dantas, Municipal Works Secretariat (SMO). Other dicussants: Paulo Marcelino, SMO undersecretary; Mauro Batista, president Geo-Rio; João Luiz; MC Rodrigo Bethlem; MC Jorge Pereira; MC Alexandre Cerruti.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25/11/2004 P05-09</td>
<td>Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 18 November 2004. Theme: discussion about the 2005 budget for the Municipal Housing Secretariat (bill No. 2225/04)</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<td>DCMRJ 15/12/2005 P24-28</td>
<td>Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 25 November 2005. Theme: discussion about the 2006 budget for the Municipal Housing Secretariat (bill No. 547/05). Panel: MC Luiz Humberto, president of the panel; Paulo André Figueira da Silva, Municipal Housing undersecretary; MC Edson Santos; Gustavo Junior, analyst Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMRJ 07/08/2006 P14-24</td>
<td>Public hearing held on 3 August 2006. Theme: public debate about the Favela-Bairro programme works (request No. 1220/06) Panel: MC Brozola Neto, president of the panel; Edialeda Salgado, president PDT black movement; Heitor Ney Mathias, representative ITERJ; Canagé Vilhena, representative Regional Council of Engineering and Agronomy (CREA-RJ); MC Andrea Gouvêa Vieira; José Nerson de Oliveira, vice-president Federation of Favelas' Associations of the state of Rio de Janeiro (FAFERJ); Márcia Garrido, representative Municipal Housing Secretariat; Maria de Graça da Cunha Simões Costa, representative Municipal Court of Auditors (TCMRJ). Other discussants: MC Edison Santos; MC Eliomar Coelho; MC Rogério Bittar; Gilvan Ribeiro Lira, founder Jacarezinho residents' association; Vladimir, representative People's union movement and leader FAFERJ; Itamar Silva, member State front for a dignify housing and against evictions, and member Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analysis (IBASE); William, president Rocinha residents' association; Gibião, president Chapéu Mangueira residents' association; Eli Bittencourt, founder Rio das Pedras residents' associations; Julião, resident Vilas das Canoas community; José Castro, Vice president CONAN; Laerte Brasil, president Cidade de Deus association for social community; Marcel, vice president Borel residents association; MC Nandinho de Rio das Pedras; Leticia, resident Formiga hill; Djanira, president Bata residents' association.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCMRJ 14/11/2006 P07-12</td>
<td>Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 10 November 2006. Theme: discussion about the 2007 budget for the Municipal Housing Secretariat Panel: MC Indio da Costa, president of the panel; MC Andrea Gouvêa</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES & SOURCES

Vieira; MC Aloisio Freitas; MC Paulo Cerri; MC Silvia Pontes; MC Teresa Bergher; MC Chabel Zaib; Luiz Humberto, Municipal Housing Secretariat. Other discussants: Fabio Luiz da Cunha, representative Campinho Fuba community; Maciel Pinheiro de Paula, vice-presidente Borel residents' association; Sandra Miguel Moreira, representative Serrinha Grota community; Rosângela da Silva Neto, representative Jardim América residents' association and Leopoldina community; José vicente, member Caixa d'Água residents' association; Marta Pereira da Silva, resident Caixa d'Água community.


DCMRJ 04/12/2007 P22-30 Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 12 November 2007. Theme: discussion about the 2008 budget for the Municipal Housing Secretariat (bill No. 1.353/07). Panel: MC Jorge Felipe president of the panel; MC Andrea Gouvêa Vieira, vice-president; Vereador Romualdo Boaventura; Luiz Humberto, Municipal Housing Secretary.


DCMRJ 06/11/2009 P75-87 Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 23 September 2009. Theme: discussion about the Municipal Housing Secretariat pluriannual plan 2010-2013 (bill No. 322/09). Panel: MC Professor Uoston, president of the panel; MC Andrea Gouvêa Vieira; Jorge Bittar, Municipal Housing Secretary.

DCMRJ 16/11/2009 P42-55 Public debate of the Special Commitee of the City's Master Plan held on 1 October 2009. Theme: housing (PLC No. 25/2001) Panel: MC Aspasia Camargo, president of the panel; MC Roberto Monteiro, rapporteur; MC Chiquinho Brazão; MC Jorge Pereira; Jorge Bittar, Municipal Housing Secretary; Alex Domiciano Batista, SMH undersecretary; Roberto Kauffmann, representative FIRJAN; Luis Valverde, SMH planning director; Daisy Gois, president IAB-RJ. Other discussants: Raphael Mitchell, representative OAB; Valdinei Medina Machado da Silva, resident Chapéu Manguera; Afonso de Souza Filho, representative housing cooperatives and vice-president national housing cooperatives' union; Luiz Bezerra, president Cantagalo residents' association; Ignez Barreto, coordinator Ipanema security project; Luiz Antônio Barreto, representative environmental commission of Vale do Rio Carioca; Claudio de Ajaujo Sideral, biologist; Casimiro Vare, president regional council of real estates' agents; Cesar Doria; Lucimar Fernandes, representative Institute Rio Carioca; José Borges, resident of a favela; Marcondes Mesqueu, resident Lapa neighbourhood; Ricardo
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Panel</th>
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<tr>
<td>DCMRJ 19/11/2009 P72-75</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 6 November 2009. Theme: discussion about the 2010 budget for the Municipal Housing Secretariat ( bill No. 388/09). Panel: MC Professor Uoston, president of the panel; MC Nereide Pedregal, vice-president; MC Andrea Gouvêa Vieira; Jorge Bittar, Municipal Housing Secretary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCMRJ 14/12/2009 P28-36</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public hearing of the Special Commission held on 28 October 2009. Theme: evaluate the implementation of sanitation programmes and agreement between the state and municipal governments. Panel: MC Carlos Caiado, president of the panel; MC Lucinha, rapporteur; MC Clarissa Garotinho; MC Jorge Manaia; MC Eidir Dantas; Alex Domiciano Batista, Municipal Housing Secretary.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMRJ 08/07/2010 P07-16</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public hearing held on 23 June 2010. Theme: discussion about the sewage network in the municipality. Panel: MC Teresa Bergher, president of the panel; Dilio José Monroy Cabrejos, SMH chief of cabinet; Romério Luiz de Souza, manager SMH works office; Edson Mendoca manager Rio-Aguas sewage planning and projects office; Fabio da Silva lima, representative Rio de Janeiro state public defender’s. Other discussants: MC Lucinha; Joel Machado, director NGO Jovem Rio; Charles Gonçalves Guimarães, president Baixada do Sapateiro residents' association; Cida Neves, president Cidade Alta residents' association; Shirley Felix, president Parque Proletario de Cordovil residents' association; Érica Riederer; Selice Lisboa, leader Vila Cruzeiro community; Alexandre Franquini, resident Vila Cruzeiro community.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 21 October 2011. Theme: discussion about the 2012 budget for the Municipal Housing Secretariat (bill No. 1141/2011). Panel: MC Andrea Gouvêa Vieira, president of the panel; MC Carlos Eduardo; Jorge Bittar, Municipal Housing Secretary. Other discussants: Pierre Alex Domiciano Batista, SMH undersecretary; Sergio Dias, Municipal Planning Secretary; Claudio Pereira Duarte, president Nova Divineia residents’ association; MC Teresa Bergher; Marcia Vera Vasconcelos, president FAMRIO; Jorge Matias de Souza, president Andaraí residents' association; Alexandre Furlanetto.</td>
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<td>27/10/2011</td>
<td>DCMRJ</td>
<td>Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 25 May 2012. Theme: discussion about the 2013 budget for the Municipal Housing Secretariat (bill No. 1360/2012). Panel: MC Professor Uoston, president of the panel; MC Luiz Carlos Ramos, vice-president; MC Fernando Moraes; Jorge Bittar, Municipal Housing Secretary. Other discussants: Manuel Gama, president Providência residents' association; MC Paulo Pinheiro.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/05/2012</td>
<td>DCMRJ</td>
<td>Public hearing of the Committee of Finance, Budget and Audit held on 31 October 2012. Theme: discussion about the 2013 budget for the Municipal Housing Secretariat (bill No. 1544/2012). Panel: MC Professor Uoston, president of the panel; MC Luiz Carlos Ramos, vice-president; MC Fernando Moraes; Jorge Bittar, Municipal Housing Secretary. Other discussants: Helio Albuquerque, adviser to MC Edson Zanata; MC Chiquinho Brazão; Marcos Henrique, community leader; MC Reimont; Bernardo Vastro, representative Meu Rio.</td>
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## LAWS AND DECREES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Decree</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23/08/1979</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Authorizes the transformation of the current Municipal Tourism in Municipal Secretariat for Social Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/04/1992</td>
<td>10962</td>
<td>10962</td>
<td>Provides for the working group that will form the land regularization office for illegal housing estates and modifies Decree No. 7290/87.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/01/1993</td>
<td>11909</td>
<td>11909</td>
<td>Delegates the duties it mentions to the Municipal Works Secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/02/1993</td>
<td>11935</td>
<td>11935</td>
<td>Delegates the powers it mention concerning the Planning Areas (APs) of the Municipal Executive. / Sub-prefectures/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/02/1993</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Creates four positions of Special Secretaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/08/1993</td>
<td>12205</td>
<td>12205</td>
<td>Creates the Executive Group of Special Programmes for Popular Settlements (GEAP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/09/1993</td>
<td>12296</td>
<td>12296</td>
<td>Provides for the Executive Group of Special Programmes for Popular Settlements (GEAP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/10/1993</td>
<td>3422</td>
<td>3422</td>
<td>Designates the public servant listed below as members of the Executive Group Special Programmes Working for Income Settlements (GEAP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/11/1993</td>
<td>12432</td>
<td>12432</td>
<td>Modifies Decree No. 12296/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/01/1994</td>
<td>2120</td>
<td>2120</td>
<td>Declares as Areas of Special Social Interest [AEIS], for purposes of land regularization, the settlements and housing estate registered at the Land Regularization Office, and establishes their particular urban regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/03/1994</td>
<td>12719</td>
<td>12719</td>
<td>Delegates competences to the Special Secretaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/03/1994</td>
<td>12741</td>
<td>12741</td>
<td>Delegates competences to the Special Secretaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/03/1994</td>
<td>Tender IPLANRIO</td>
<td>Tender IPLANRIO</td>
<td>Favela-Bairro Architectural Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/06/1994</td>
<td>12994</td>
<td>12994</td>
<td>Repeals the Decree No. 12205, 13 August 1993.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>16/12/1994</td>
<td>2262</td>
<td>Provides for the creation of the Municipal Housing Secretariat, extinguishes and creates positions at the Municipal Sports and Leisure Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/12/1994</td>
<td>13526</td>
<td>Provides for appointments, dismissals, assignments and waivers of commissioned positions and rewarded functions at the Municipal Housing Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/12/1994</td>
<td>13533</td>
<td>Provides for the institutional coding of the Municipal Housing Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/02/1995</td>
<td>13693</td>
<td>Opens additional credit of R$ 40,000.00 to the Social Security of the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro City in favour of the Municipal Housing Secretariat and Municipal Housing Fund.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/07/1996</td>
<td></td>
<td>Authorizes the executive branch to contract a loan with the federal savings bank [CAIXA], offering warranties.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15/09/1995</td>
<td></td>
<td>Authorizes the executive branch to contract a loan with the Inter-American Development Bank.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>07/11/1995</td>
<td>14322</td>
<td>Creates the Urbanization Programme for Popular Settlements of Rio de Janeiro, PROAP-RIO, and approves its operating regulations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/11/1995</td>
<td>2387</td>
<td>Declares as Areas of Special Social Interest, for purposes of land regularization, the housing estates it mentions and establishes their particular urbanization regulations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/11/1996</td>
<td>2499</td>
<td>Declares as Areas of Special Social Interest, for purposes of urban and land regularization the zones listed in the Annexe and establishes their particular urbanization regulations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/03/1997</td>
<td></td>
<td>Constitutes a Technical Committee to oversee the services related to the projects of the PROAP-RIO 3rd phase, effectively starting from 13 March 1997.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>04/04/1997</td>
<td>15661</td>
<td>Modifies the composition of the working group established by Decree No. 12205 of 13 August 1993.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16/04/1997</td>
<td>2541</td>
<td>Provides for the organizational structure of the Municipal Housing Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/04/1997</td>
<td>15702</td>
<td>Modifies the budget of the Municipal Urbanization Company (RioUrbe) linked to the Municipal Work Secretariat.</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>18/04/1997</td>
<td>2540</td>
<td>Declares as Areas of Special Social Interest, for purposes of land regularization, the areas it mention, and establishes their urbanization regulations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/04/1997</td>
<td>15704</td>
<td>Provides for the organizational structure of the Municipal Housing Secretariat.</td>
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<tr>
<td>08/07/1997</td>
<td>15898</td>
<td>Regulates the Municipal Fund established by Law No. 2262, 16 December 1994.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/07/1997</td>
<td>Resolution No. 27</td>
<td>Provides for the internal regulations of the Municipal Housing Fund established by Law No. 2262, 16 December 1994.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/08/1997</td>
<td>15977</td>
<td>Delegates competences to the Municipal Treasury Secretariat for creating together with Municipal Housing Fund initiatives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/08/1997</td>
<td>Resolution No. 2</td>
<td>Provides that in any project or public work contract of the SMH, which contemplates hillside stabilization and drainage and establishes monitoring group, it should include a technical indicated by Geo-Rio.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/11/1997</td>
<td>16276</td>
<td>Provides for the institutional coding of the Municipal Housing Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/11/1997</td>
<td>Legislative Decree No. 167</td>
<td>Authorizes the executive branch to contract a loan with the federal savings bank, offering warranties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/01/1998</td>
<td>2616</td>
<td>Declares as Areas of Special Social Interest, for the purpose of land regularization, the areas mentioned, and establishes their urbanization regulations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/05/1998</td>
<td>2647</td>
<td>Declares as Areas of Special Social Interest, for the purpose of land regularization, the areas mentioned, and establishes their urbanization regulations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>01/12/1998</td>
<td>2689</td>
<td>Creates the Municipal Institute of Urbanism Pereira Passos.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/12/1999</td>
<td>Legislative Decree No. 238</td>
<td>Authorizes the executive branch to contract a loan with the Inter-American Development Bank for the Urbanization Programme of Rio de Janeiro's popular settlements - PROAP-RIO 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/12/1999</td>
<td>18303</td>
<td>Provides for the co managing system of the Municipal Urban Development Fund.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/06/2000</td>
<td>18667</td>
<td>Creates the Urbanization Programme for Popular Settlements of Rio de Janeiro, phase 2, PROAP II, and approves its operating regulations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/06/2000</td>
<td>Resolution No. 2</td>
<td>According to Decree &quot;N&quot; No. 18667 of 08 June 2000, Operational Regulations, Part II / B, [It] establishes a coordinating &quot;ad hoc&quot; unit for implementing Urbanization Programme for Popular Settlements of Rio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/06/2000</td>
<td>18712</td>
<td>Provides for the maintenance and servicing of equipment deployed in the mentioned communities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/09/2000</td>
<td>18989</td>
<td>Provides for the granting of license and authorization of establishments by the municipality of Rio de Janeiro.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/03/2001</td>
<td>Resolution No. 11</td>
<td>Provides for the powers of the SMH technical issues sub office.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/03/2001</td>
<td>3189</td>
<td>Provides for community participation in the drafting process, implementation defining and monitoring of Multiannual Investment Budget, Budget Guidelines and Annual Budget.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/04/2001</td>
<td>19777</td>
<td>Determines the sign off of contracts linked to the administrative actions that it mention.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/04/2001</td>
<td>19821</td>
<td>Creates the programme of Community Conservation Agent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/05/2001</td>
<td>Resolution No. 5</td>
<td>Creates the Task Group FB-01 which will monitor the Favela-Bairro works in the followings communities: Dois de Maio and São João e Uniao Del Castilho and Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/07/2001</td>
<td>3255</td>
<td>Creates the positions and jobs that it mentions in the Municipal Housing Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/08/2001</td>
<td>20421</td>
<td>Authorizes the use of the Municipal Housing Secretariat as it mention.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/08/2001</td>
<td>20454</td>
<td>Approves the guidelines for relocation in popular settlement buildings.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/10/2001</td>
<td>20600</td>
<td>Provides for the use and occupation of the commercial areas created through the Favela-Bairro and Morar sem Risco programmes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/12/2001</td>
<td>3351</td>
<td>Declares as Area of Special Social Interest for purposes of urbanization and regularization, the areas it mention, and establishes their urbanization regulations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/01/2002</td>
<td>21018</td>
<td>Delegates competences to the Municipal Sports and Leisure Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/03/2002</td>
<td>Message SMDS</td>
<td>Comitiva do Bid chega a cidade para visitar o Projeto Favela-Bairro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/05/2002</td>
<td>Resolution No. 1</td>
<td>Regulates the technical and operational cooperation for the realization of project, tender, contracting, and execution by indirect administration, monitoring and supervision of works in the decentralized units of the Municipal Education Secretariat under the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/07/2002</td>
<td>2102</td>
<td>Delegates competences to the Municipal Housing Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/07/2002</td>
<td>Message SMDS</td>
<td>PROAP II social initiatives will reach other 6 communities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/07/2002</td>
<td>21800</td>
<td>Ceases the effects of Decree No. 19903 citing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/09/2002</td>
<td>22021</td>
<td>Provides for the use and occupation of the commercial areas created through the Favela-Bairro and Morar sem Riscos programmes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/10/2002</td>
<td>22170</td>
<td>Provides for the monitoring of communities that benefited from the Favela-Bairro programme that it mentions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/06/2003</td>
<td>22982</td>
<td>Transfers the Urban and Social Orientation Office (POUSO) from the Municipal Housing Secretariat to the Municipal Planning Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/06/2003</td>
<td>3587</td>
<td>Authorizes the Executive branch to implement the Favela-Bairro or Bairrinho programmes in the mentioned location.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/06/2003</td>
<td>3588</td>
<td>Authorizes the Executive branch to implement the Favela-Bairro or Bairrinho programmes in the mentioned location.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/07/2003</td>
<td>23159</td>
<td>Provides for the organizational structure of the Municipal Housing Secretariat and Municipal Planning Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/09/2003</td>
<td>23421</td>
<td>Delegates competences to Municipal Housing Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/10/2003</td>
<td>23517</td>
<td>Delegates the competences that it mention.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/10/2003</td>
<td>23637</td>
<td>Delegates competences to Municipal Housing Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/11/2003</td>
<td>23731</td>
<td>Delegates competences to Municipal Social Development Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/03/2004</td>
<td>24031</td>
<td>Provides for the institutional coding of the Municipal Housing Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/06/2004</td>
<td>Message</td>
<td>UN representative visits Favela-Bairro projects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/06/2004</td>
<td>Message</td>
<td>Quinta Caju is the first community in Brazil to be completely regularized.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/07/2004</td>
<td>3807</td>
<td>Determines the obligation for companies providing public services to execute work,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/11/2004</td>
<td>24852</td>
<td>Establishes the macro-functions it mentions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/03/2005</td>
<td>3957</td>
<td>Creates the Municipal Council of Urban Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/04/2005</td>
<td>4011</td>
<td>Authorizes the Executive branch to implement the Favela-Bairro programme in Camarista Méier community.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/06/2005</td>
<td>25536</td>
<td>Defines procedures and authorizes the exemption of the license fee for establishments that exercise economic and other activities of any nature in favelas, which refers to the section III of Art. 11, Decree No. 18.989/2000.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/10/2005</td>
<td>25894</td>
<td>Creates the Municipal Council for Social Housing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/04/2006</td>
<td>4290</td>
<td>Authorizes the Executive branch to implement the Favela-Bairro or Bairrinho programme in the area it mentions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/07/2006</td>
<td>26784</td>
<td>Creates the Urbanization programme for Popular Settlements in Rio de Janeiro, PROAP-RIO III, instituting and consolidating the Favela-Bairro programme.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/08/2006</td>
<td>26865</td>
<td>Changes the name of the Municipal Housing Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/10/2006</td>
<td>27168</td>
<td>Provides for the advice and consultancy work by the Municipal Habitat Secretariat (SMH), as it mentions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/12/2006</td>
<td>27471</td>
<td>Approves the Urban Development Plan of Alemão Complex - PUDCMA of XXIX administrative region.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/02/2007</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>Delegates competences as it mentions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/03/2007</td>
<td>Message</td>
<td>Favela-Bairro already installed over 700 kilometres of sewer lines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/03/2007</td>
<td>Message</td>
<td>Municipality initiates activities to urbanize Alemão Complex</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/05/2007</td>
<td>4515</td>
<td>Establishes the Municipal Social Housing System- SMHIS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/10/2007</td>
<td>28515</td>
<td>Provides for conservation services it mentions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/01/2008</td>
<td>Legislative Decree No. 663</td>
<td>Authorizes the Executive branch to contract a loan with the Inter-American Development Bank, under Urbanization Programme for Popular Settlements (PROAP), phase III, offering warranties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/03/2008</td>
<td>29072</td>
<td>Provides for the Favela-Bairro 3 as it mentions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/07/2008</td>
<td>4865</td>
<td>Authorizes the Executive to establish the Favela-Bairro or Bairrinho program in the area mentioned.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/06/2009</td>
<td>30854</td>
<td>Provides for the maintenance, conservation and operation of investments in low-income informal settlements in the city of Rio de Janeiro.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/12/2010</td>
<td>33277</td>
<td>Approves PROAP III operational regulations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/02/2011</td>
<td>Resolution SMH/IPP No. 1</td>
<td>Provides for monitoring of aerial images and supporting the Land Use Control System of the Urbanization Programme for Popular Settlements - PROAP III.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/03/2011</td>
<td>33491</td>
<td>Modifies the organizational structure of the Municipal Housing Secretariat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/04/2011</td>
<td>33648</td>
<td>Regulates the construction of building in favelas declared as Areas of Special Social Interest, and establishes standards for buildings legalization in the areas it mentions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/08/2001</td>
<td>34315</td>
<td>Creates housing estates analysis group for assessing the viability of the projects included in the National Housing Plan - &quot;Minha Casa, Minha Vida&quot;.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/10/2012</td>
<td>36388</td>
<td>Establishes the Municipal Integration Program of informal precarious settlements - Morar Carioca.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/12/2012</td>
<td>36598</td>
<td>Regulates construction of building under the Morar Carioca - Municipal Integration Plan of informal precarious settlements, in Babilônia and Chapêu Mangueira communities, declared as Areas of Special Social Interest Law No. 2912 of October 29, 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEXES

MCMV

*MCMV 1. Subsidies architecture for the lowest income groups Source: SNH 2010.*

*Elaborated by the author.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Incentives for housing construction</th>
<th>Incentives for purchasing</th>
<th>R$ billion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-3 minimum wages up to R$ 1395</td>
<td>Special tax regime</td>
<td>Municipalities above 50 thousands of family income minimum R$50 for 10 years</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6 minimum wages up to R$ 2790</td>
<td></td>
<td>Subsidies inversely proportional to income</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 minimum wages up to R$ 4650</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>reduction insurance cost</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Federal Government subsidies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SBPE

*Evolution of housing finance through the SBPE. Source: PAC 2013*

[Bar chart showing SBPE in R$ billions over years 2002 to 2012]
## Interview Templates

### 15-06-2011 Fernando Cavallieri, special advisor at the IPP

1. Professional career
2. Creation of the SMH
   - Disagreements evolution: alliance, negotiation and abandonment
   - Decisions making, organization and management structures
3. Municipal housing policy
   - Process: alliance, negotiation, abandon, major phases or stages
   - Major disagreements related to the formulation of the technical choices
   - Major conflicts with the others municipal department (SMDS, SMU)
   - Major conflicts with architectural practices and construction companies
   - Major conflicts with the NGOs and CBOs / drug traffic organizations
4. References
   - Contacts
   - Documents publications

### 24-06-2011 Jorge Jauregui, Architect (Favela-Bairro, PAC, and Morar carioca)

1. Professional career
2. Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC)
   - Process/project's implementation
   - Differences with Favela-Bairro (project/programme level)
3. Favela-Bairro during the 2000s
   - Process/dates
   - Major changes during Maia's second administration (slum upgrading abandonment)
4. References
   - SMH contacts
   - Others contacts

### 07-07-2011 Paulo Magalhães, CAIXA

1. Professional career
2. PAC
   - Process /project's implementation
   - Project and programme organization and management
3. References
   - Contacts

### 08-07-2011 Lilia Sodre, architect (Morar Carioca)

1. Professional career
2. Involvement in the municipal housing policy
3. Morar Carioca
   - Process / project
4. References
   - SMH contacts?
### 11-07-2011 Itamar Silva, community leader - IBASE

1. Professional career
2. Social movements involvement
   - Master Plan
   - Housing policy
3. 1990s
   - Changes: of social movements
   - Changes: residents associations
4. 2000s
   - Ibid.

### 19-07-2011 Isabel Tostes, manager SMH Social Work Office

1. Professional career
2. Social work office
   - Functioning: organizations, management
   - Relation with others secretariats
   - Relation with the population

### 04-08-2011 Jozé Candido Sampaio, former manager SMH Projects' office

1. Professional career
2. SMH 2001-2004
   - Organization, management (coordination)
   - Projects coordination office: functioning
   - Relation with other municipal secretaries and secretariats
3. Clarifications
   - Project/works delays during the 2000s
   - Favela-Bairro: Why was not working as planned?
4. References
   - Contact other SMH staff (2001-2008)

### 17-08-2011 Fernando Cavallieri, special advisor at the IPP (second meeting)

1. BID contracts
   - Process/meetings/dates
   - Changes second contract: PASI
   - Housing policy - and relation between legislative/ executive
2. Favela-Bairro Classification matrix
   - From easier to difficult in the second contract?
   - Entire classification existed?
   - The classification was used all the time?
   - How was born the idea of the classification? how it changed over time?
3. Public tender
   - Process from IPP to SMH
   - Evolution of IPP role
4. SMH change in 1997
   - Relevant? How?
   - Favela-Bairro executive secretariat in 20002: how it worked?
5. Favela-Bairro
   - Increasing quantity of projects, how the municipality coped with it?
   - Favela-Bairro 2 : money problems/how the money problems were solved during
the Favela-Bairro

6. References
   ▪ Contact Jorge de Oliveira Rodriges?
   ▪ Contact Lu Petersen?
   ▪ SMH staff during the 2000s

19-08-2011 Leonardo Perazo, former manager SMH engineering works department
1. Professional career politico administrative background
2. SMH
   ▪ Organization, management
   ▪ Relation with other secretariats
3. Favela-Bairro
   ▪ Programme and project processes/ dates
   ▪ Major challenges: delays, lack of money,
   ▪ Public tended: functioning, problems

29-08-11 Alfredo Sirkis, former municipal secretary and municipal councillor
1. Professional career politico administrative background
2. Maia's first administration
   ▪ Strengthens and weakness of his administration
   ▪ Relation with the legislative / within the administration
   ▪ Housing policy - and relation between legislative/ executive
3. Conde / Maia2 / Maia 3
   ▪ Evolution of these relations
   ▪ Controversy about Favela-Bairro denaturalization in 2001/2002
   ▪ Controversy about relocations in 2005
4. The role of SMU while he was Secretary (2002-2006)
   ▪ Favela-Bairro related activities (POUSO)
   ▪ Relation SMH/ SMU

30-08-2011 Pastoral de Favelas team (Monseignor Luis Antonio, Maria alice, Luis Severino, Erika Gloria, Josefa, Celia, Lucia, Eliana, Maria da Paz)
1. Involvement of the Pastoral in housing issues
   ▪ Evolution
2. Changes in the past 20 years
   ▪ NGO’s / protestant churches
   ▪ Municipal government
   ▪ Legislative body
   ▪ Current challenges: Morar Carioca, evictions

01-09-2011 Pablo Benetti, architect (Favela-Bairro, PAC, Morar Carioca)
1. Professional career
   ▪ How many Favela-Bairro projects
2. Favela-Bairro PROAP I (16 favelas)
   ▪ Interest in participating
   ▪ Process / dates / changes / time / costs / participation / public tenders
   ▪ Technical specification changes
3. PROAP II
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>09-09-2011 Marcia Vera Vasconcelos, president FAM-Rio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Professional career / FAM-Rio history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Favela- Bairro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Urbanization process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organization process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Transformations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CBOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• FAFERJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Morar Carioca/ PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transformations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. PMHIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Aspirations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of participation/ interest why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12-09-2011 Sergio Magalhães, president IAB-RJ and former SMH Secretary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Housing policy and SMH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Process (chosen as GEAP/municipal secretary/technical staff/story about the SMH location)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• GEAP Idea (technical staff/process/conflicts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Favela-Bairro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Policy guideline: what type of conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• IAB contests: opposition? methods definition?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Classification: problems in the second phase?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. PROAP I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conflicts with the BID/ policy transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Clarification 1997 SMH management restructuring change/conflicts internal-external</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Problems with the interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. PROP II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conflicts with the BID Evictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• PASI, what why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reorganization/disagreement (in reference to Lu Petersen and Sirkis interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Clarifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Articulation between levels of government: how he solved it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communication and information campaign/what why</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Problem with participation: how he solved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Morar Carioca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Differences/evictions/mega events/PAC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 14-09-2011 Lucia Petersen, ex Favela-Bairro programme manager

**1. SMH - Favela- Bairro**
- Arrival to SMH/ manager position/ Jorge Rodrigues?
- Opinion on the Housing policy bases (dec 1993)
- Work that people do not believe: within and beyond the administration?
- How was the beginning (location/organization/advantages)
- Mutirão and Favela-Bairro relation

**2. PROAP I**
- Transformation with the BID contract: (i) conflicts/ disagreements; (ii) technical specifications; (ii)architectural practices; (iii)construction companies; (iv) participation.
- Transformation of the SMH at the end of 1997 ( change in law): organization / management
- Consequences and conflicts?

- Political will to develop this approach? why ? why not Favela-Bairro?
- Problems/ conflicts with ( same as before see above + problem with Favela do Metro)
- Opinion about the SMH at that time : organization, management and the Favela-Bairro

**4. Clarifications**
- José Cândido had problem for completing projects / how she managed ?
- José Cândido had problem for meeting deadlines/ how she managed?
- José Cândido had problem as constructor companies changed projects / how she managed?
- PASI: does it worked ? why and how ?
- Shift 2001: abandonment of all technical staff from the SMH?
- Providência who was the architect, process, dates?

### 14-09-11 Jorge Mario Jáuregui (second meeting)

**1. Clarifications**
- Favela-Bairro technical specifications (which difficulties)
- Which one was the process of projects approval
- Costs architects/reasons
- Construction companies/did the profile change over time? Bigger ones?

**2. Vidigal/ Fernão Cardim**
- Process/dates
- Problem unfinished works

**3. Morar Carioca**
- Changes

**4. Mangueira**
- Process
- State government relation to the project

**5. Alemão complex**
- Development plan process
- cable car process
ANNEXES

21-09-2011 Luis Valverde, SMH staff (2009 - date)
1. Professional career
   ▪ Arrival to the SMH
   ▪ SMH Heritage of previous administration
2. Morar Carioca
   ▪ Process/dates
   ▪ SMH organization management
3. Morar Carioca phase II
   ▪ Process
   ▪ Partners relation (IAB, IPP, IBASE, BID)
   ▪ Heritage of Urban Cell/ Favela- Bairro/PAC
4. Clarifications
   ▪ Challenges within the municipal administration/with State/Federal
   ▪ Challenges with favela dwellers (evictions)
   ▪ Challenges with other actors (politicians/NGO's/Architects/Construction companies
   ▪ Recommendations/improvements to the Morar Carioca
5. Data references
   ▪ List of projects/programmes/construction companies/architect/costs/phases/plans
   ▪ Favela-Bairro internal evaluations

21-09-2011 Luis Severino, member of the Pastoral de Favelas
1. Providência evictions
   ▪ Conflict commission: how it works?
   ▪ Mediation process: challenges, conflicts, actors
2. Favela do Metro evictions
   ▪ Process: challenges, conflicts, actors
3. PMHIS
   ▪ Lack of participation: why?
4. References
   ▪ Contact social movements?

22-09-2011 Leandro Balbio, architect (PAC, Alemão Complex)
1. Professional career
   ▪ Arrival to the architectural practice
2. PAC Alemão complex project
   ▪ Description
   ▪ Process/dates/modifications - reasons
   ▪ Conflict CBO's/SMH/State/construction companies
3. PAC Mangueira project
   ▪ Description
   ▪ Process/dates/modifications - reasons
   ▪ Conflict CBO's/SMH/State/construction companies
4. Data references
   ▪ Contact association Mangueira/Alemão complex
   ▪ Projects plans/presentations/photos
   ▪ Contact construction companies
26-09-2011 Eliomar Coelho, municipal councillor

1. Professional career
   - Involvement in urban and housing policy and favelas issues
   - As municipal councillor / as militant?
2. 1990s
   - RJ Urban/housing policy: disagreements - CMRJ
   - RJ Vs other municipalities (ZEIS PB)
   - Conflicts/problems between legislative-executive-favela dwellers
   - Differences between Conde and Maia administration (macro functions)
3. 2000s
   - Relevance Statute of cities for RJ/SNHIS
   - Conflicts SNHIS-PMHIS (executive - CMRJ - citizens)
   - RJ VS national experience
4. Clarifications: disagreements conflicts within the CMRJ
   - Pac Favelas
   - Evictions
   - MCMV
   - Morar Carioca
5. References
   - Contacts

28-09-2011 Edouardo Poley, project manager at Odebrecht (PAC, Alemão complex)

1. Professional career
   - Company profile
2. PAC Alemão complex
   - Process (public tender/phases/dates)
   - Organization, management
3. Process
   - Challenges: technical/organization/management/financing)
   - Disagreements: State/architect/private sector/population.
   - Recommendation for future projects
4. Based on his experience, opinion in relation to Favela-Bairro projects
   - Delays / modifications/unfinished works
   - Lack of quality/financial problems
   - Different to work in favelas than other neighbourhoods? if yes which ones?
5. General
   - Competing for this type of works, difficult?/profile of the construction companies interested in this market
   - Opinion on MCMV and Morar Carioca

29-09-2011 Fram, president Favela do Metro resident association

1. Professional career/slum dwellers association history
   - When did she become president? (date - process)
2. Evictions
   - Process/meetings/dates (2009)
   - Fight back. How?
   - Evictions second round (2011)?
### 3. Internal dynamics
- Challenges for mobilizing
- Conflicts/disagreements
- Mobilization over time

### 4. External dynamics
- Relation with other CBO's NGO's (Mangueira association)
- SMH/other administration/architects
- Popular council/public defender

### 5. Future for the favela and association

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#### 05-10-2011 Claudio, former president Vidigal resident association

1. **Professional career/slum dwellers association history**
2. **Favela-Bairro**
   - Process/dates
   - Major changes in the process
   - Problems: maintenance/quality/delays
3. **Clarifications**
   - Relations with other associations/challenges for mobilizing
   - Relations with the SMH/municipality/architects/construction companies and NGO's

### 4. Community current challenges and future
- Recommendations for futures projects
- Evictions
- Mega events

---

#### 06-10-11 Rosi community leader, Providência

1. **Professional career/slum dwellers association history**
2. **Favela- Bairro**
   - Process/dates
   - Major issues with the project/municipality/architect/construction companies/other leaders
   - Problems post works
3. **Evictions**
   - Process/meetings/information
   - Strategies
   - Current situation
   - Project

### 4. Relations with
- Challenges within the association
- Other organization (NGO's, Church), the popular council and public defender

### 5. Future favela in relation to
- Evictions/ mega events/city

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#### 10-10-2011 Lu Petersen, ex Favela-Bairro programme manager (second meeting)

1. **Providência**
   - Mutirão dates/evolution
   - Discussed process project
2. **Clarifications**
   - Changes and relation with Conde and Sergio Magalhães
10-10-2011 Ana, Vice president, MauFuseira residents association

3. Professional career and background
4. Favela-Bairro project
   ▪ Process - dates
   ▪ Problems/conflicts with municipal administration/architect/construction company /drug traffic/favela dwellers
   ▪ Problems/conflicts after works were finished
5. PAC 2 project
   ▪ Process/meetings/information/dates
   ▪ Negotiations with government - what did you obtained
   ▪ Problems/conflicts with (same as before see above + problem with Favela do Metro)
6. Relations with
   ▪ Challenges within the association
   ▪ Other organization (NGO's, Church), the popular council and public defender
7. Future favela in relation to
   ▪ Evictions/mega events/city

13-10-2011 Fernanda Salles, architect (Favela-Bairro, Morar Carioca)

1. Professional career
2. Favela- Bairro
   ▪ Project(s) date
   ▪ Major challenges/problems with SMH/ others administration/ favela dwellers
   ▪ Major challenges with construction companies (deadlines, organization, management)
   ▪ Recommendations for better implementation? (indentify problems)
3. Morro da Providência project
   ▪ Project process/relation with the favela dwellers
   ▪ Proposal/organization/ management
   ▪ Major challenges (with SMH/other administration/favela dwellers/etc)
   ▪ Current situation
4. Evaluation/recommendations/understanding in relation to
   ▪ PAC/MCMV
   ▪ Morar Carioca/PLHIS
   ▪ Evictions/ Mega events

13-10-2011 Eduardo Petersen, architect (Urban Cell Providência). Interview in presence of Lu Petersen

1. Professional career
2. Morro da Providence project
   ▪ Proposal/ organization/management /dates
   ▪ Major challenges: location/SMH/others/favela dwellers/constructor companies
   ▪ Evaluation/ recommendations
3. SMH
   ▪ Functioning /organization

10-05-2012 Jose Brakarz, Inter-American Development Bank
1. Professional career
2. PROAP I
   ▪ Process/contact with Rio de Janeiro's municipality: how?
   ▪ Meetings/definition of the contract: problems (management, organization, financing)
   ▪ BID role/regulation for instalments
3. PROAP II 2000
   ▪ Major differences PROAP I (PASI/roads/too much architectural design)
   ▪ Did the BID new about problems: water, sewage, maintenance, and lack of participation
   ▪ Municipal executive differences (capacity/legitimacy)
4. Administration change
   ▪ Major differences: management/organization/qualification/expertise in favelas
   ▪ Opinion: Magalhães said denaturalisation of the programme Vs Amaral said that the project focus on design rather than essential items
   ▪ 2000-2004 PROAP II why extended until 2006
   ▪ PROAP III why it took too long to be approved
5. Clarifications
   ▪ BID learn/teach to the municipality
   ▪ PROAP III major difference
   ▪ Municipality alone? not too much to decide
   ▪ Participation challenges/finances/cost of projects

24-07-2012 Ines Magalhães, National Housing Secretary
1. Professional career
2. Housing sector features before the SNHIS and the MCMV
   ▪ Federal Government: actions/objectives/PRO-Sanear, PRO-Moradia, PAR/CAIXA
   ▪ State and municipal governments: trends/relation with the Federal Governments
   ▪ Construction sector: organization, representation (level)
   ▪ Civil society organization, representation (level)
3. SNHIS/MCMV/PAC
   ▪ Process
   ▪ Challenges for implementing PNH and the SNHIS (articulation among the governments/politics/administrative/ideas)
   ▪ Challenges civil society (mobilization, participation, social control)
   ▪ Major changes (government dynamics/construction sector/civil society)
4. Current challenges
   ▪ SNHIS (coordination articulation with the PAC and MCMV)
   ▪ Land: who controls? ZEIS why not? other solutions?
   ▪ Rio de Janeiro challenges

25-07-2012 Adebal Curvelo, SMH and BID staff
1. Professional career
2. PROAP I
   ▪ Major characteristics
   ▪ Challenges: coordination/financing/SMH other programmes
   ▪ Challenges with other actors: Cedae/drug traffic/favela dwellers
3. PROAP II
- Municipal councillors/State/Federal Government
- Major changes: objectives, political agenda, PASI, organization, management, architecture, roads
- Challenges: coordination/financing/PASI/fragmentation (SMO, SMU)/delays/unfinished works costs/priorities.
- Challenges: Cedae/State/Federal Government (SNHIS, PAC, MCMV)
- Pan American Games: impact

4. PROAP III
- Major changes: long term/Cedae/maintenance/evictions
- Challenges Rio de Janeiro: PAC, MCMV, land (who controls ?)
- What did the BID learn by participating in the PROAP

27-07-2012 Lu Petersen, ex Favela-Bairro programme manager (third meeting)
1. Exploratory discussion about the investigation
   - Aderbal Curvelo interview
   - Testing hypothesis
2. Providência project
   - Changes with Favela-Bairro
3. References
   - Contact Cesar Maia

31-07-2012 Erika, member Pastoral de Favelas
1. Current situation
   - Popular council: organizations
   - Agenda
2. Pastoral de Favelas
   - Current role
   - Projects
3. References
   - Providência
   - Mangueira / Favela do Metro
   - Acarai, Estradinha, Fernão Cardim

16-08-2012 Cesar Maia, ex Mayor of Rio de Janeiro (interview in presence of Lu Petersen)
1. Major challenges governing Rio de Janeiro in 1993 (housing)
2. 1993 -1996
   - Major characteristics of the housing policy
   - Challenges: municipality/conflicts (SMH, others)/drug traffic/favela dwellers
   - Challenges: State/Federal Government/Legislative
   - Conde Administration: Favela-Bairro for the elections, role?/housing policy change?
3. 2001-2004
   - Major changes housing policy
   - Challenges: municipality (fragmentation SMH, SMO, SMU, Urban Cell)/cf autonomy
   - Challenges: Cedae/State/Federal Government/Legislative /drug traffic /favela dwellers
### 4. 2005-2008
- Major changes
- Challenges: municipality/Pan American Games /PAC/SNHIS
- Challenges: Cedae /UPP's

#### 5. 2009-2012
- Strength and weakness of current housing policy
- Opinion MCMV
- Evictions

#### 16-08-2012 Antonio Augusto Verissimo, SMH staff (1990s- date)
1. Professional career (SMH in the 1990s?)
2. SMH in the 1990s
   - Major characteristics of the housing policy
   - Challenges: municipality/conflicts (SMH, others)/drug traffic/favela dwellers
   - PROAP II: changes (PASI)/challenges (critics 2001-2008)
3. SMH 2009-2012 Housing policy
   - Major characteristics of the housing policy: 1990s difference?/State and Federal Government alignment, changes?
   - Challenges: Morar Carioca: State(UPPs, Cedae)/social programmes (IBASE)/drug traffic/dwellers associations/quality/delays/construction companies
   - Challenges quantitative deficit: land, AEIS?/other instruments?
   - Evictions: typology/process/SMH role
4. References
   - SMH PPT CMRJ
   - Number of houses produced from 2001-2008
   - Investments

#### 21-08-2012 Paulo Magalhães, CAIXA (second meeting)
1. Investigation gap between policy aspirations and outcomes
   - Evolution instruments
   - Governance - coordination (municipal government limitations)
2. References
   - Data about the alliance of the three levels of government since 2009
   - Data about Pro-Sanear, Pro-Moradia, PAR, PAC, MCMV (investments, major challenges)
   - Contacts: state government/CAIXA

#### 23-08-2012 Zezinho da Torre Branca, ex president of the FAFERJ
1. Professional career
2. Production of movie about the Favela-Bairro (2006)
   - Process/dates/participants (municipal councillors? others?)
3. Movie content
   - Major changes that the Favela-Bairro brought to the Favelas
   - Problems: municipality, municipal secretaries/architects, construction companies/Cedae, state/municipal councillors/community leaders, mobilization, conflicts, fragmentation/Pastoral, other NGO's/drug traffic, militias
   - Movie effects on the discussions and debates
4. Current problems
   - Changes under Paes administration (relation with favela dwellers)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANNEXES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ PMHIS/Morar Carioca/MCMV (participation?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Current problems in the communities: evictions/Cedae/relation with the SMH, municipal executive and legislative/community leaders, mobilization/drug traffic, UPP/NGO's/World Cup, Olympics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. References
▪ Movie/visit projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>28-08-2012 Andrea Gouvêa Veira, municipal councillor (2005-2012)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Professional career</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cesar Maia 2005-2008:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ CMRJ and housing: dynamics, groups, opposition/relation with the executive/relation with the population/relation with the construction companies/developers/others?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Housing policy: guidelines, problems, financing/use of investments for other works/problems within the SMH and municipality (competition?)/tensions with the state government, Federal Government (PAC)/Pan American Games and municipal budget (impact SMH?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Eduardo Paes 2009-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Major changes CMRJ and housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Housing policy: changes (organization, aspirations, managements, financing)/problems within the SMH and municipality (competition?)/tensions with the state government, Federal Government (PAC, Cedae, competition?/MCMV (land issues, evictions, clientelism, capacity of developers to influence housing initiatives?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Clarifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Municipal public finances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Movie/report/power points?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>03-09-2012 Gilda Blank, CAIXA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Professional career</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Before PAC and MCMV:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ 1999-2002: ibid, plus PAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ 2003-2006: ibid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lula second administration 2007-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ PAC: selection, process, guidelines of Favela-Bairro?/challenges coordination (why state received more money?)/State government housing secretariat and EMOP (competition?)/State municipality competition?/legislative, population, drug traffic?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ MCMV: process/challenges organization, management (coordination with the local government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rousseff 2011- current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ PAC 2: changes organizations, management (CAIXA role)/challenges coordination (federal, state, municipal), Cedae? alliance or competition?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ MCMV 2: Changes/relation with the SNHIS/challenges: land, municipal government, developers (capacity to select)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Reports evaluations Caixa role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04-09-2012 Ricardo Gouvêa, Bento Rubiao NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Professional career</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>1990s -2000 NGO and housing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Relation with the SMH (municipality)opposition to the municipal housing policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Relation among NGOs, community leaders, private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <strong>2001-2008 NGO and housing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Relation with the SMH (cooptation?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Relation among NGOs, community leaders, private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Relation with the state and Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. <strong>2009- current NGO and housing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Role in current housing policy/challenges: SMH, municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- community leaders fragmentation/private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Relation federal and state government ( PAC, MCMV)/challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- PMHIS: process/challenges: coordination with SMH, others, community leaders, private sectors)/perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. <strong>Clarifications</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Land issues and MCMV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Housing construction Indiana : problem of discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Land regularisation and the Favela-Bairro (what happened in the 1990s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>