


**INEQUALITY OF SECURITY:
EXPLORING VIOLENT PLURALISM AND TERRITORY IN
SIX NEIGHBOURHOODS IN RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL**

By

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ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

'I, Verena Barbara Brähler, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.'



Signed:

Date: 20 October 2014

DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my late grandmother, Ingrid Brähler (1932 – 2012).

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I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor Dr Par Engstrom for his continuous support, motivation, and guidance throughout the past four years, and for helping me to grow as a researcher and as a person.

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VERENA BRÄHLER

ABSTRACT

Security is a universal human right and a highly valued societal good. It is crucial for the preservation of human life and is of inestimable value for our societies. However, in Latin America, the right to security is far from being universally established. The aim of this sequential, exploratory mixed methods study is to explore the logic of security provision in six neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro (Vidigal, Santíssimo, Complexo do Alemão, Tabuleiro*, Botafogo and Novo Leblon) and assess its implications for citizens' right to security. The findings from the research show that, on a city level, Rio de Janeiro's security network can best be understood as an oligopoly because different security providers (police, municipal guards, military, private security companies, militias and drug trafficking factions) are connected through cooperative, neutral or conflictual relationships and need to consider the actions and reactions of other groups when taking strategic decisions. On a neighbourhood level, the preferred option for security providers are monopolistic-type constellations, characterised by relative peace and stability. However, all actors are willing to engage in violence if the perceived political and/or economic benefits are great enough. The thesis shows that the relative power and influence of the security providers are primarily determined by the way they are perceived by the local communities and by their capacity to use violence effectively. Despite its appearance as chaotic, violence is therefore an instrument which is negotiated and managed quite carefully. The thesis concludes that insecurity and violence in Rio de Janeiro are primarily fuelled by the struggle for territorial control between conflicting security providers within the oligopoly. The oligopolistic constellation of security providers leads to an inequality of security, defined as a condition in which the right to security is not enjoyed by all residents to the same extent.

KEYWORDS

Rio de Janeiro / security / inequality / violent pluralism / oligopoly

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADA	Amigos dos Amigos [Friends of Friends], drug trafficking faction in Rio de Janeiro
ALERJ	Assembléia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro [Legislative Assembly of the State of Rio de Janeiro]
AM	Associação de Moradores [Resident Association]
Art.	Article
BOPE	Batalhão de Forças Policiais Especiais [Special Police Operations Battalion], PMERJ
BOT	Botafogo, neighbourhood in Rio de Janeiro
BPCHq	Batalhão de Policiamento de Choque [Battalion for Shock Policing], PMERJ
BPM	Batalhão da Polícia Militar [Military Police Battalion], PMERJ
CBC	Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos [Brazilian Cartridges Company]
CCS	Conselhos Comunitários de Segurança [Community Security Councils]
CDA	Complexo do Alemão, neighbourhood in Rio de Janeiro
CESeC	Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania, Universidade Cândido Mendes [Centre for the Study of Security and Citizenship, Cândido Mendes University]
CICC	Centro Integrado de Comando e Controle [Integrated Command and Control Centres]
CML	Comando Militar do Leste [Military Command of Eastern Brazil]
COMLURB	Companhia de Limpeza Urbana [Urban Cleaning Company]
CORE	Coordenadoria de Recursos Especiais [Coordination of Special Resources], PCERJ
CPI	Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito [Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry]
CPP	Coordenadoria da Polícia Pacificadora [Coordinating Body of the UPP], PMERJ
CV	Comando Vermelho [Red Command], drug trafficking faction in Rio de Janeiro
CVJ	Comando Vermelho Jovem [Young Red Command], drug trafficking faction in Rio de Janeiro
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

DRACO	Delegacia de Repressão às Ações do Crime Organizado e Inquéritos Especiais [Police Station for the Repression of Organised Crime Actions and Special Inquiries], PCERJ
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional [National Liberation Army], Colombia
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]
FNSP	Força Nacional de Segurança Pública [National Public Security Force]
FPac	Força de Pacificação [Pacification Force]
GLO	<i>Garantia da lei e da ordem</i> [ensuring law and order]; term used for the deployment of the Brazilian armed forces in internal affairs
GM	Guarda Municipal [Municipal Guards]
HDI	Human Development Index
ISP	Instituto de Segurança Pública [Institute of Public Security]
KMO	Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin, statistical measure used to verify sampling adequacy within principal component analysis
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NL	Novo Leblon, neighbourhood in Rio de Janeiro
NUPEVI	Núcleo de Pesquisas de Violência, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro [Centre for Violence Studies, State University of Rio de Janeiro]
PCA	Principal component analysis
PCC	Primeiro Comando da Capital [First Command of the Capital], drug trafficking faction in São Paulo
PCERJ	Polícia Civil do Estado do Rio de Janeiro [Civil Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro]
PDT	Partido Democrático Trabalhista [Democratic Labour Party]
PMDB	Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party]
PMERJ	Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro [Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro]
PNDH-3	Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos [National Human Rights Programme]
PROEIS	Programa Estadual de Integração na Segurança [State Programme of Security Integration]
PRONASCI	Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania [National Programme of Public Security with Citizenship]
PSB	Partido Social Brasileiro [Brazilian Social Party]

PSDB	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira [Brazilian Social Democratic Party]
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores [Workers Party]
PUI	Proyecto Urbano Integral [Integral Urban Projects], Medellin, Colombia
Rio	City of Rio de Janeiro
RJ	State of Rio de Janeiro
R\$	Brazilian Real
SANT	Santíssimo, neighbourhood in Rio de Janeiro
SESEG	Secretaria de Estado de Segurança [State Secretary of Security]
SIM	Sistema de Informações sobre Mortalidade [Information System about Mortality]
SIRNAM	Sistema Nacional de Armas [National Arms System]
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
TAB	Tabuleiro*, neighbourhood in Rio de Janeiro
TC	Terceiro Comando [Third Command], drug trafficking faction in Rio de Janeiro
TCP	Terceiro Comando Puro [Third Pure Command], drug trafficking faction in Rio de Janeiro
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UPP	Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora [Pacification Police Units], PMERJ
USA	United States of America
VID	Vidigal, neighbourhood in Rio de Janeiro

NOTE ON LANGUAGE AND TERMINOLOGY

Pseudonyms are indicated with '*' and were used for places and people (e.g. Tabuleiro* or Danilo*) in order to protect the identity of research participants.

The following neighbourhood abbreviations are used in the presentation of the survey results: Botafogo (BOT), Complexo do Alemão (CDA), Novo Leblon (NL), Tabuleiro* (TAB), Vidigal (VID) and Santíssimo (SANT). The survey participants were coded, with reference to their respective community and a number (e.g. 'BOT8' or 'VID24'). A complete list of all survey participants can be found in Appendix II.

A strict differentiation is necessary to denote subgroups of Rio de Janeiro's military police. The entire military police as a corporation shall be called 'PMERJ' whereas the term 'BPM' shall be used with reference only to the traditional military police battalions, in an attempt to delimit this group from specialised military police units, such as BOPE and UPP.

Monetary values are given in Brazilian Reais (R\$). Currency exchange rates are subject to fluctuations over the years. During my stay in Brazil, the exchange rate for R\$ 1 was between £ 0.31 – 0.37 (€ 0.39 – 0.44).

All translations from Portuguese to English in this thesis are the author's own.

All photographs are the author's own.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The research problem and purpose statement

Security is a universal human right and a highly valued societal good. However, the term 'security' does not mean the same to all of us. For some it means being protected from crime and violence, for others it means being safe from economic crises. Furthermore, we cannot all enjoy security to the same extent. Some live in well protected gated communities, others live in slums dominated by violent criminal actors. Security is crucial for the preservation of human life and is of inestimable value for our societies. More than anything, security offers choice. It enables us to construct a human life in dignity and freedom (Booth 2007; Stewart 2004; United Nations Development Programme 1994; United Nations General Assembly 1948).

In Latin America, the right to security is far from being universally established. The security of many Latin Americans is compromised by high rates of crime and violence. The region has the highest homicide rate in the world (Fearon 2011: 4). Economic crises, rapid urbanisation, weak institution-building, imperfect electoral processes, corruption and clientelism have left many Latin American countries in a deplorable state (Bergman and Whitehead 2009; Caldeira and Holston 1999; O'Donnell 1993; Uildriks 2009; Whitehead 2002). Institutional trust is low, political apathy is widespread and state security forces are more often than not perceived as agents of violence and intimidation, rather than protection (Latinobarómetro 2010). The criminal justice system is slow and inefficient and heavily overcrowded prisons are often managed by criminal gangs (Dias 2009; Macaulay 2011b, 2013). Poverty, inequality and the wide availability of firearms are further aggravating factors (Dreyfus et al. 2008; Green 2008; Scheper-Hughes 1992).

The shortcomings of the state have led to power vacuums in some geographic areas that have been seized by armed criminal actors, especially drug dealers, youth gangs and paramilitaries. These non-state armed groups compete with the state for the control of territory and for the support and goodwill of poor communities (Arias 2006; Arias and Goldstein 2010; Goldstein 2004; Jones and Rodgers 2009; Perlman 2010). The gang culture in low-income neighbourhoods is often so predominant that local residents believe they 'are living in a state of siege' (Rodgers 2002: 3). Some regions and cities in Latin America have evolved into geographically fragmented places where different actors compete for territory and a greater share of power.

These battles for power and territory produce a high number of violent fatalities, similar to some of the world's commonly identified war zones (Waiselfisz 2011). Residents are caught in the middle of this conflict and live in constant fear and insecurity. The fear of crime and violence extends to all social classes and is further fueled by sensationalist media coverage (Piccato 2012; Ramos and Paiva 2005). Public spaces are abandoned and often show advanced signs of urban decay. Those who can afford it move to well-protected gated communities, far away from the chaos and messy reality of the urban centres, and construct their new lives in complete isolation from other sectors of society (Caldeira 2000). Others, principally the marginalised classes, live in communities that are under the control of criminal actors, such as drug dealers or youth gangs, and are coerced into respecting their *lei do silêncio* (code of silence) in return for minimal protection from neighbourhoods crime and the violent repression of the police and the military (Dowdney 2003). In places where no justice can be expected from the criminal justice system, people resort to non-state, privatised forms of justice, such as death squads, militias or vigilante groups (Campbell and Brenner 2002; Huggins 1991). The plurality of non-state groups providing security and justice in Latin America challenges the state's monopoly on violence and forces us to reassess the validity of the Weberian ideal.

Drawing on Arias and Goldstein's (2010) violent pluralism concept, this study explores the logics of security provision in six neighbourhoods in the city of Rio de Janeiro, namely Vidigal, Santíssimo, Complexo do Alemão, Tabuleiro*, Botafogo and Novo Leblon. It does so by analysing the *modi operandi*, protective capacities, interests and interaction of different security providers, principally police, municipal guards, military, private security companies, militias and drug trafficking factions. Strictly speaking there are two further security actors with public security mandates in Rio de Janeiro – the federal police¹ and FNSP² – yet because these groups are only deployed

¹ The Polícia Federal [Federal Police, PF] are maintained by the central government and are responsible for investigating criminal offenses against the political and social order or against the goods, services and interests of the country. Its main tasks include border and immigration control, the prevention and suppression of trafficking in narcotics and smuggling, federal fiscal crimes, and dealing with issues of indigenous peoples (Presidência da República 1988: Art.144, §1). In Rio de Janeiro, besides the duties mentioned above the federal police are active in the combat of electoral fraud and the regulation of private legal security. Its elite unit, the Comando de Operações Táticas [Tactical Operations Command, COT] is on some occasions deployed in intelligence operations and the repression of the drug trade in the favelas. In the past years, the role of the federal police has been massively strengthened under Brazil's president Dilma Rousseff. Huge investments have been made to better prepare the federal police in the combat of organised crime, especially corruption, drug trafficking, arms trafficking and money laundering, thereby transferring intelligence operations from state level to federal level (Correio Braziliense 2011, January 15).

² The Força Nacional de Segurança Pública [National Force of Public Security, FNSP] is under the authority of the Ministry of Justice and was created in 2004 to support the state governments and the federal police in restoring law and order, prevention of environmental crimes, preserving indigenous lands and

in particular circumstances, they will not be included in the analysis here. Due to the plurality and diversity of these actors, the thesis argues that Rio de Janeiro's security network is a good example of violent pluralism in Latin America. The findings of the research show that violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro takes the form of an oligopoly because the security providers are connected through a series of relationships that can range from cooperation to conflict. The findings also show that these security providers need to consider the actions and reactions of the other groups when designing their business models and strategies (oligopolistic interdependence). The relative power and influence of each security provider in the network is primarily determined by their capacity to use violence effectively and the way they are perceived by the local communities. The oligopolistic constellation of security providers leads to an inequality of security whereby the right to security – in theory a universal human right and a highly valued societal good – is not enjoyed by all residents to the same extent, principally because of differences on the neighbourhood level. The thesis concludes that insecurity and violence in Rio de Janeiro are primarily fuelled by the struggle for territorial control between conflicting security providers within the oligopoly. The right to security cannot be universally provided as long as security providers benefit from continuous adverse competition and have a political and/or economic interest in beginning, sustaining and renewing conflict.

The research site chosen for this study is the city of Rio de Janeiro, for several reasons. Firstly, the debate on public security in Rio de Janeiro is highly politicised and the city has gone through a number of severe public security crises which have become deeply ingrained in the social memory of its residents. Twenty years ago, Rio de Janeiro had one of the highest homicide rates in Latin America. However, since then the homicide rate has decreased dramatically and is currently slightly below the average for Brazilian state capitals. In fact, 16 out of the world's 50 most violent cities are in Brazil but Rio de Janeiro is not one of them (Ortega 2014). Secondly, Rio de Janeiro is known for the plurality and variety of its security providers which provides us with an opportunity to study their different *modi operandi* and their relative power and influence in the security network. Thirdly, the social fabric in Rio de Janeiro is very complex and is marked by high inequality, social exclusion, racism and extreme geographical proximity

combating drugs and arms trafficking in the border region. Its activation depends on the approval of the respective state governor (Governo do Brasil 2012a). The FNSP is made up of 10,000 military police and firefighters with perfect disciplinary records from all states (Gay in: Arias and Goldstein 2010: 214). In January 2007, Rio de Janeiro's newly elected State Governor Sérgio Cabral requested the help of the FNSP for the first time as a response to a new wave of violence in the city. As part of the *Crack é Possível Vencer* [Crack is Possible to Defeat] programme, the FNSP recently participated in the pacification of the favela Santo Amaro in Rio de Janeiro for a period of 180 days between May and November 2012 (Ministério da Justiça 2012a).

between rich and poor neighbourhoods. Fourthly, choosing Rio de Janeiro as the research site is important because its violence is heavily covered by the national media, especially by the Rio-based media conglomerate O Globo (see Section 3.3.3), and it is also perceived as important by many Brazilians and foreigners. In fact, the amount of academic research conducted on this topic is quite remarkable (see Bibliography). Lastly, Rio de Janeiro is a city of international interest and its progress in public security is closely monitored by the international community, especially in light of the two sport mega-events, the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016.

For all of these reasons, Rio de Janeiro constitutes a rather particular case in the field of security studies and therefore it is of use to examine its specific features. An analysis of security provision in Rio de Janeiro can generate important lessons on both the micro and macro level. On a micro level, lessons from one community in Rio de Janeiro are relevant for the security provision in other communities in the city. On a macro level, the findings from this research can shed light on the dynamics of security, violence and territory in other settings in Brazil and beyond.

This research is an examination of four broad scholarly themes, namely inequality, security, violence and territory in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It is an account of more than 300 residents from all walks of life who live in six different neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro and who were interviewed as part of this study. Last but not least, this research project tells the story of men and women with weapons in their hands – military police, civil police, municipal guards, military soldiers, private security agents, militias and drug traffickers (the seven main security providers included in this analysis) – and their role in the development of peace and conflict in one of Latin America's biggest metropolises.

1.2 Literature review

1.2.1 Inequality, security and violence

Inequality means 'different people having different degrees of something' (McKay 2001: 2). This state or condition of being unequal³ can pertain to many different aspects of human life – income, health, education, assets, gender, religion, skin colour and neighbourhoods, among others (McKay 2001; Midgley 1984). Midgley states that

³ Note that in this research project using the word "unequal" (something is not equal in amount, size or quality) is seen as more favourable than "inequitable" (something is unfair or unjust).

'[i]nequality varies not only in its degree and pervasiveness in different countries but in the way it is manifested' (Midgley 1984: 30). A differentiation is often made between vertical inequality (inequality among individuals and groups) and horizontal inequality (inequality among groups in political, economic and social relations) (Stewart 2000). Inequality wastes talent, undermines institutions and social cohesion, restricts social mobility, prevents economic growth from reducing poverty and transmits poverty between generations (Green 2008; Midgley 1984).

In practice, scholars have mainly focused on the study of income inequality. Income inequality can be measured with the help of the Gini coefficient which ranges from 0 (perfect equality among households within an economy) to 1 (perfect inequality). Income inequality has been reason for great concern in Latin America. With an average Gini coefficient of 0.52, Latin America is the most unequal region in the world, even more so than Sub-Saharan Africa which has a Gini coefficient of 0.47 (Lopez and Perry 2008: 3). According to data from The World Bank, in 2009, nine out of the ten most unequal countries in the world were in Latin America. South Africa was the most unequal country in the world (with a Gini coefficient of 63.1), followed by Honduras (57.0), Colombia (56.7) and Brazil (54.7). However, in Latin America there are great variations within the region. Argentina (46.1) and Uruguay (46.3), for instance, ranked much better than the countries mentioned before. Similarly, although Brazil has one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world, the country has made significant achievements in declining income inequality in recent years (from 60.1 in 2001 to 54.7 in 2009), with extremely positive effects on poverty reduction (The World Bank 2013). Between 2001 and 2007, eleven million Brazilians were lifted out of extreme poverty, mainly due to Brazil's ambitious social policies (Bolsa Familia and others), and 62 per cent of this reduction was due to the reduction in inequality (Barros et al. 2010: 137).

Income inequality is only one facet of inequality, and international development agencies are attempting to bring other types of inequality to the forefront of the debate, e.g. gender inequality⁴ and racial inequality (Johnson III 2008; UNDP 2013).⁵ In this research, we are most concerned with inequality in the context of crime and violence. Hsieh and Pugh (1993) showed in a meta-analysis of aggregate data studies that there is a relationship between poverty, income inequality and violent crime. Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002) found that an increase in income inequality, measured by the Gini index, is positively correlated with a rise in crime rates (homicides and

⁴ With a Gender Inequality Index of 0.447 (a score of 1 meaning perfect inequality), Brazil currently ranks 85 out of 146 which is above the regional average of 0.419 for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNDP 2013: 156-159).

⁵ It should be noted that the different forms of inequality cannot easily be brought together as some relate to drivers of inequality (e.g. gender) and others to outcomes (e.g. income).

robberies) and that, reversely, the rate of poverty reduction (GDP growth plus distribution of income) has a crime-reducing effect. Other studies also confirmed that inequality is a major determinant in violence, crime and social unrest, especially in the case of inequality between clearly defined groups (Lopez and Perry 2008; McKay 2001). However, Beato Filho (2000) has found no empirical support for the hypothesis that violent crime rates are correlated with income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) and poverty in Minas Gerais, Brazil. In another meta-analysis of macro-level predictors and theories of crime, Pratt and Cullen (2005) found a statistically significant effect of inequality on violent crime but this effect is much smaller than other predictors, such as high levels of racial heterogeneity, poverty and high rates of family disruption.

In the city of Rio de Janeiro, the location of interest for this research, we can observe that people are affected by crime and violence in different ways. For instance, men are more than ten times more likely to be killed than women and most at risk are young black men from low income groups. There are also geographic differences in the probability of dying between the age of fifteen and thirty due to violence. Whereas on average 23 per 1,000 young people die in the favela agglomeration Complexo do Alemão, only 4.3 die in the more affluent neighbourhood of Copacabana (Zaluar 2008: 30). This difference is closely related with the level of human development in these areas. A study by the Instituto Pereira Passos (2000) found that the Human Development Index (HDI) differs greatly between neighbourhoods within Rio de Janeiro. Whereas the very prosperous neighbourhood of Gávea has a HDI of 0.97 and a life expectancy of 80.45 years, the favela agglomeration Complexo do Alemão has a HDI of only 0.711 and a life expectancy of 64.79 years. This indicates that there is a close relationship between inequality, human development and security.

The right to security is anchored in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), together with the right to life and liberty: 'Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person' (UN General Assembly 1948: Art. 3). Besides the rights named in Article 3, there are other rights anchored in the UDHR which are relevant for people's security, e.g. the right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment (Art. 5), the right to be treated equally before the law (Art. 7), the right to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (Art. 9), the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty (Art. 11(1)), the right to be free from arbitrary interference with one's privacy, family, home or correspondence and attacks upon his honour and reputation (Art. 12), the right to freedom of movement and residence (Art. 13(1)), and the right of equal access to public service (Art. 21(2)). In addition to the UDHR, Latin American governments are also bound by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and

the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Furthermore, there are a number of international instruments that – although not legally binding – provide guidance for United Nations Member States in the area of human rights, law enforcement, crime prevention and criminal justice, such as the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, and the UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, to name but a few. Brazil has re-emphasised its commitment to these legal obligations, standards and norms in the third edition of the Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos [National Human Rights Programme, PNDH-3], which, among other items, provides detailed recommendations for the areas of public security, access to justice and the prevention of violence (Secretaria de Direitos Humanos da Presidência da República 2010).

Booth (2007) states that standard dictionaries often define security as the absence of threats. This implies that a referent object exists that can be threatened (for example the state or an individual) and that there is impending or actual danger (this could, for instance, be militaristic or economic in nature), as well as the desire to escape from the danger or threat, either by force or by negotiation. He argues that the term security is easy to understand ‘but how it is conceptualized and operationalized in the contingent contexts of world politics is not’ (Booth 2007: 101). This is because security is a relative concept. It means different things to different people and can affect individuals, groups or entire nations. According to Booth, one needs to distinguish between relative and absolute security (the latter can hardly ever be achieved in reality) and between subjective and non-subjective threats. People could, for instance, feel safe when they are not (‘false sense of security’) or feel threatened by risks that are not present (‘false sense of insecurity’).

There are manifold types of security. In its traditional sense, the term security was understood as the security of territory and the protection of a state’s borders, peoples and institutions. This understanding of security as national security or international security was dominant in the period after World War II. In 1946, the UN Security Council was founded in order to guarantee international peace and security between countries. Security studies or peace studies at the time focused on the military realm and were firmly grounded in the field of international relations. However, with the end of the Cold War and the declining possibility of a global holocaust, it became apparent that the definition of security as the absence of an armed conflict was too narrow. At the end of the twentieth century, insecurity deriving from armed conflicts with other nations was far less likely than insecurity originating from disease, hunger, natural catastrophes, climate change, violence, terrorism and organised crime. As a consequence of this development, a second state security function became the centre of attention, namely

public security. Whereas national security protects the external security of a state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political stability with the help of military forces, public security protects the internal security of a state with the help of law enforcement agencies. These agencies ensure the safety of individuals, their assets and goods, and protect the rule of law and democratic institutional development (Bailey and Dammert 2006).

However, both national security and public security are state-centred concepts that do not fully take into account the effect that (in)security has on individuals. As a result, in 1994, the Human Development Report coined a more people-centred typology of security that involved the participation of governments and of local communities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and individuals. This concept of human security was explained in the following way:

‘It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities’ (United Nations Development Programme 1994: 23).

According to the United Nations report, human security encompasses seven types of security, namely economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. In the beginning, the human security concept was greatly welcomed and vehemently practised by international development agencies. It took some time to realise that although human security was a great theoretical concept, there was no guidance on how to practise and operationalise it. Human security was being used as a smokescreen for diverse development interventions all over the world.

Today, almost 70 years after the United Nations Security Council was founded, it is still unclear as to what security means, what it does and how it is valued by people. The big security concepts – national security, public security and human security with all its subtypes – do not get to the heart of what security really means for people on the ground. However, one thing that is clear is that security is crucial for the preservation of human life and is of inestimable value for our societies. Oftentimes people only know how to value security when it is taken away from them and they experience insecurity, principally through crime and violence. The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines violence as:

‘The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation’ (Krug et al. 2002: 5).

The WHO proposes a typology of violence that is divided into self-directed violence (violence inflicted on oneself, e.g. suicide), interpersonal violence (family and intimate partner violence and community violence) and collective violence (social, political and economic violence inflicted by states or other institutions or groups). This research project is most concerned with interpersonal and collective violence, especially the role of the state and other security providers in the prevention of violence and the protection of people (Krug et al. 2002). One of the best indicators to measure interpersonal and collective violence is the homicide rate. In Latin America, the homicide rate has been increasing since the early 1990s, from around 12.6 per 100,000 inhabitants to almost 20 per 100,000 in 2010 (the WHO considers a homicide rate of more than 10 per 100,000 inhabitants to be at epidemic levels). Latin America is the only region in the world where the homicide rate is not declining (Fearon 2011: 5). In 2010, intentional homicides in the region's four largest countries – Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela – added up to almost 100,000 murders. In 2011, Honduras and El Salvador ranked as the countries with the highest homicide rate in the world (91.6 and 70.2 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively). Roughly 70 per cent of homicides in South America are carried out with firearms and young men between fifteen and twenty-nine years are at considerably higher risk of being killed by firearms than the rest of the population (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011, 2013).

Who commits these acts of violence? In the field of criminology, violence has been treated as deviant behaviour and scholars have focused on explaining what motivates individuals in committing a crime.⁶ In political science, we are more concerned with the role and capacity of the Latin American state in containing crime, violence and conflict. Landmann (2010) proposes a typology to understand violence in terms of its perpetrators (state and non-state) and forms of violence (legal and illegal). The first type of violence, legal state violence, is a proportionate use of force that the state requires to enforce the rule of law and guarantee peace and security. The other three types of

⁶ There are a number of theories attempting to explain why people commit a crime. Most economic explanations of crime are based on the *rational criminal theory* that assumes that criminal behaviour results from a 'cost-benefit calculation, in which the potential (material) gains of crime are weighed against the potential (material) cost' (Becker in: Peirce 2008). The cost of crime refers, for instance, to the likelihood and nature of the sanction that is attached to the crime. Another classical explanation focuses on poverty and the inequality of socio-economic conditions. It is argued that crime is the result of *absolute deprivation* (poverty) and *relative deprivation* (inequality). However, scholars have found only limited applicability of these theories to the context of urban Brazil – the country of interest for this research project. Peirce argued that the *rational criminal theory* was misleading in the context of Brazil because it only accounts for individual, material inequality when, in fact, 'non-material forms of relative deprivation are more significant than income inequality in Brazilian cities' (Peirce 2008: 85). Furthermore, between 1980 and 1983, Brazil was shaken by economic crises and high unemployment. However, in that period homicides, robberies and rapes actually decreased in the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro, providing no evidence for a causal link between poverty and crime (Coelho in: Borges 2011: 30).

violence are illegal state violence (disproportionate use of force by the state), legal non-state violence (self-defense against crime) and illegal non-state violence (arbitrary use of force by criminal actors). As is well known, the first type of violence (legal state violence) resonates with Weber's understanding of the role of the state: 'a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory' (Weber 1946: 78, italics in original). Note that in the Weberian tradition the right to the legitimate use of force was solely ascribed to the state which implies that all forms of non-state violence in society are illegitimate. Furthermore, there must be a successful claim of the monopoly of violence, i.e. the state must be effective and exclusive in its use of violence.

There are a number of developments that suggest that Weber's ideal of a state with a successful monopoly on legitimate violence may not be appropriate to describe the Latin American polity. Firstly, there is a long history of state and non-state forms of violence and crime in Latin America (Buffington and Piccato 2009; Landmann 2010; Misce 1999; Wimmer 2003). Secondly, there has been a process of privatising security, spurred by an increased fear of crime and the growth of gated communities, private high-rise buildings and shopping centres (Caldeira 2000; Ungar 2007). Thirdly, state security forces have often overstepped the boundary of what can be considered 'legal' due to human rights violations and membership in paramilitaries, militias or vigilante groups (Huggins 1991; Zaluar and Conceição 2007). Lastly, in light of the quantity and diversity of armed criminal groups in Latin America and their social leadership role in many local communities, it is difficult to maintain that the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Allum et al. 2003; Felbab-Brown 2011; Garzón Vergara 2012; Jones and Rodgers 2009; Zaluar 2004).⁷

1.2.2 Democratisation and neoliberalism

Scholars in the field of political science and sociology have directed their efforts towards analysing the role of the state and the social and political context in which violence occurs (Imbusch et al. 2011). In Latin America, this has become particularly important after the return to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s because this period coincided with an influx of drugs, the proliferation of armed actors, new kinds of violence, heightened levels of fear of crime, mass unemployment, inequality, poverty, the disintegration of the social fabric, corruption and impunity (Holston 2008b; Koonings and Kruijt 2004). The

⁷ Regarding the case of Brazil, Misce states that '[t]he problem is that in Brazil the state never fully achieved a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and neither was it able to provide universal access to judicial resolution of conflicts to all citizens' (Misce 2010: 27).

hopes that citizens associated with democracy – freedom, security, inclusive citizenship, prosperity and respect for the rule of law – did not materialise. As a consequence, political apathy spread and people became increasingly disenchanted with the prospects of the democratic model. O'Donnell summarises the conditions of Latin American states during that period in the following way:

'The increase in crime, the unlawful interventions of the police in poor neighborhoods, the widespread practice of torture and even summary execution of crime suspects from poor or otherwise stigmatized sectors, the denial of rights to women and various minorities, the impunity of the drug trade, and the great number of abandoned children in the streets [...] do not only reflect a severe process of urban decay. They also express the increasing inability of the state to implement its own regulations' (O'Donnell 1993: 1358-59).

Against this background, a new school of thought emerged that was spearheaded by O'Donnell and that attempted to shed light on the crisis of the new democracies after the breakdown of the authoritarian regimes. O'Donnell argues that in most newly democratised countries, the state is considered too big and in an attempt to reduce 'the size and deficits of the state-as-bureaucracy', these attempts are 'also destroying the state-as-law and the ideological legitimisation of the state' (O'Donnell 1993: 1358). States became unable to enforce their own legality across territories and stratification systems. In some provinces or peripheries of the national centre, systems of local power emerge that reach 'extremes of violent, paternalistic rule' (O'Donnell 1993: 1358). O'Donnell suggests calling these areas with very low or no levels of territorial and functional presence of the state 'brown areas'. In these areas, the political rights of citizens are respected (e.g. there are elections and the votes are properly counted) but the state is unable to enforce its own legality. The author argues that '[a] state that is unable to enforce its legality supports a democracy of low-intensity citizenship' (O'Donnell 1993: 1361). O'Donnell warns that the newly democratised countries are not moving toward representative, institutionalised democracies but rather towards delegative democracies in which the state 'attempts to depolitise the population, except for brief moments in which it demands its plebiscitary support' (O'Donnell 1993: 1367).

O'Donnell has significantly shaped the scholarly debate about democratisation in Latin America. In this debate, democracy is understood as a process that is still incomplete or underway (the process of *democratisation*). Landmann (2010) argues that the return to democracy in Latin America has not fulfilled its promises – whether such obligations are laid down in national constitutions or part of international human rights agreements. Whitehead (2002) states that the constitutional rights granted to Latin Americans are out of line with citizens' daily experience. He uses the case of Brazil to show that the attractive language of democracy can cohabit with authoritarian practices: 'If citizens are at risk from torture [...], and if those responsible enjoy effective impunity, then the basic

rights enshrined in the rhetoric of “citizen security” must be void, with troubling consequences for all claims on a democratic order’ (Whitehead 2002: 177). This democratic dilemma has been described with other terminologies in the literature – ‘absence of the state’, ‘failure of the state’, ‘limited state’, ‘desencanto democrático’ [disenchantment with democracy], ‘democratic deficit’, ‘disjunctive democracy’ and ‘disjunctive citizenship’⁸ (Caldeira and Holston 1999; Koonings and Kruijt 2004; Perlman 2010).

Most democratisation scholars agree that the performance of the state has deteriorated since the beginning of democracy, especially in the area of public security. O’Donnell, for instance, observes ‘an increasing inability of the state’ (O’Donnell 1993: 1358, underline my own). For some scholars, this is aggravated by the new economic model of neoliberalism which many Latin American democracies embraced in the 1980s and 1990s as a response to the debt crises. The fundamental notion of neoliberalism is the trust in free market forces over government regulations. According to the defenders of the neoliberal reforms, the competition between the state and the market in the field of security will prevent the abuse of state control over armed forces and divide coercive power among public and private actors, thereby preventing the centralisation of power in the hands of a few (Krahmann 2010). However, according to the critics of neoliberalism, the pervasive violence in Latin America is due to the ways in which neoliberalism has interacted with the political environments of post-authoritarian regimes. The shrunken, neoliberal democratic state has abandoned its citizens in security matters, thus forcing them to deal with insecurities themselves and in ‘private ways’ (Arias and Goldstein 2010; Goldstein 2004, 2010).

1.2.3 Violent pluralism

In the last decade, a second body of literature has emerged that conceptualises violence in a different way. Scholars from diverse backgrounds – anthropology, political science and urban geography – call into question O’Donnell’s reasoning for the absent state and suggest that there are other factors besides the broader categories of democratisation and neoliberalism that may help to explain the high rates of crime and violence and the privatisation of security in Latin America. They argue that violence is not new to the

⁸ Note that the concept of citizenship plays an important role in the democratisation debate. In theory, citizenship is an inclusive concept defining the membership of an individual in the national polity of a state. However, the expectations and promises of citizens’ formal inclusion in Latin America’s new democracies differ drastically from the reality of lived experiences of exclusion (Goldstein 2004). Holston states that from the beginning of democracy in Latin America citizenship was ‘universally inclusive in membership and massively inegalitarian in distribution’ (Holston 2008a: 8). The author calls this phenomenon ‘differentiated citizenship’.

region and that the state has no monopoly on the use of force because a variety of violent actors compete with the state for the control of territory and the hearts and minds of the communities (Arias and Goldstein 2010; Caldeira 2000; Jones and Rodgers 2009; Mehler 2004).

Arguably the most groundbreaking contribution to the field of violence in Latin America in recent years and the one most relevant to this research is proposed by Arias and Goldstein who argue that Latin American democratic societies could be understood as 'violently plural', meaning 'states, social elites, and subalterns employing violence in the quest to establish or contest regimes of citizenship, justice, rights, and a democratic social order' (Arias and Goldstein 2010: 4-5). The authors argue that violence is not new to the region and should be treated as an integral element of the political system:

'[R]ather than understanding Latin America's endemic violence as simply a failure of democratic governance and institutions, we call attention to violence as an element integral to the configuration of those institutions, as a necessary component of their maintenance, and as an instrument for popular challenges to their legitimacy' (Arias and Goldstein 2010: 4).

Caldeira takes a similar stand, arguing that one has to abandon the view of violence as extraordinary: 'Violence is constitutive of the social order' and 'the regular language of authority' (Caldeira 2000: 142). Arias and Goldstein criticise that contemporary politics is always viewed 'through the lens of the democratic ideal' which creates myopia in the perception and evaluation of crime and violence because it only focuses on the alleged failure of the state and on how to improve its institutions. In contrast to what the democratisation school of thought suggested, Arias and Goldstein maintain that violence is more than 'merely the residue of democratic failure' (Arias and Goldstein 2010: 12). They emphasize that violence is critical to the foundations of Latin American democracies and has always been deployed by state and non-state actors (e.g. police, gangs, paramilitaries, vigilant groups and militias). This is the reason why the authors name their concept 'violent pluralism'. It denotes a plurality of groups, public and private, legal and illegal, who deploy violence in the pursuit of their economic and political goals.

Arias and Goldstein's findings derive from extensive field research in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Cochabamba, Bolivia. Arias (2006) argues that the persistence of the drug trade in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro can be explained by the enduring political relations between drug traffickers, civic actors (e.g. resident associations) and state officials through an extensive and flexible illegal network which is mutually beneficial for all actors. This idea of a 'complicit state' directly opposes O'Donnell's view of the 'absent state' in which favelas would be considered to lie outside the normal rule of law ('brown areas' concept). Arias emphasizes that the dominion of the drug traffickers in the favelas

by no means constitutes a *parallel state*: ‘Trafficking, then, is strengthened by the way the state is present in the favela’ (Arias 2006: 86).

Goldstein (2004) argues that in the city of Cochabamba, as a result of the disappointing performance of the state in providing public security and maintaining law and order, residents have taken matters of security and justice into their own hands. Whereas middle class residents hire private security firms to patrol their neighbourhoods, the poor resort to much more extreme measures of protection, namely mob lynching – ‘the murder or attempted murder of suspected thieves or criminals by an angry mob’ (Goldstein 2004: 178). According to Goldstein, between January 2002 and June 2003, there were 67 recorded cases of lynching or attempted lynching, many of them in the poorer neighbourhoods of Cochabamba. From the perspective of the local residents, lynching is a legitimate response to the daily violence and insecurity which determines their lives, and is justified by the state’s neglect and absence in these areas. Yet Goldstein emphasizes that the lynching cannot be seen as a totally independent parallel justice system. In fact, the high number of attempted lynching indicates that residents ‘intend to catch the eye of an inattentive state’. Often the police manage to arrive at a crime scene in the last moment and rescue the alleged thieves.

Arias and Goldstein are not the only scholars who have conducted research on the plurality and connections of state and non-state violent actors. Sonneveld shows that in the community of Colonia Jalisco in the city of Guadalajara, Mexico, the ineffectiveness of the police, and widespread corruption and impunity provide space for non-state armed actors to offer protection and forms of privatised justice to residents and to compete with the state for the control of territory (Sonneveld 2009). The state’s monopoly on violence remains unconsolidated and a vacuum of power (‘violence fields’⁹) emerges that is seized by drug dealers, youth gangs and even pimps (‘violence entrepreneurs’) who engage with each other in a violent competition for a greater share of the security market. Security turns into a valuable commodity in the community and the local residents have to pay extortion money in order to be protected from the same criminal groups who endanger them (‘the offer one cannot refuse’). Sonneveld observes that the informalisation of public security occurs in the absence of effective and legitimate government policies and actions. Similar to Arias (2006), Sonneveld argues that non-state, armed actors emerge not in the absence of a state but instead in the absence of a legitimate state whereby individual policemen operate on the margins of illegality because of corruption and their involvement in crime.

⁹ Sonneveld refers to Elwert’s publication on ‘Markets of Violence’ (Elwert 1999).

In all of the places mentioned here – the favelas in Rio de Janeiro, the poor neighbourhoods in Cochabamba and in Colonia Jalisco – the police continue to be an important stakeholder in the security market but they are often present in a way which is detrimental to the wellbeing and protection of the local residents. For instance, police officers might pursue personal (monetary) gain through the underprovisioning of public security in certain areas. This can potentially open up space for a competitive security market and force citizens to seek protection elsewhere. As is shown in the case of the places discussed here, this ‘protection’ is frequently offered by armed criminal groups.

1.2.4 Oligopoly of violence

Beyond Latin America, the findings of Arias, Goldstein and Sonneveld resonate alongside concepts such as ‘greed and grievance’, ‘shadow markets’, ‘war economies’, ‘lootable goods’ and ‘oligopolies of violence’, often found in the context of Africa (Berdal and Malone 2000; Engel and Mehler 2005; Lambach 2007; Mehler 2003, 2004, 2009). Research on the dynamics of civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia and Rwanda show how warfare can be an instrument of enterprise and violence a mode of (economic) accumulation (Berdal and Malone 2000). Collier states that some violent groups have no interest in peace because they profit from ‘the initiation, perpetuation and renewal of conflict’ (Collier 1999: 14).

Engel and Mehler argue that ‘the monopoly of the means of violence [in sub-Saharan Africa] has undergone dramatic changes’ and has produced new forms of dealing with violent conflict (Engel and Mehler 2005: 87). In the most extreme cases, states have been taken over by warlords, insurgents or armed rebels. The authors developed a typology of the processes that lead to the loss¹⁰ of a state’s monopoly of violence in Africa in the post-colonial period. They argue that the post-colonial African state claimed a monopoly of violence but ‘this claim disintegrated sooner or later (or never existed in the first place)’ (Engel and Mehler 2005: 92). According to the authors, the claim to the monopoly of violence can be lost in three ways. Firstly, by deliberate transfer of authority (functionally or territorially), which is often the case in weak states where key functions of the state are outsourced. Secondly, the claim to the monopoly of violence can be lost if this monopoly is ‘deserted or abandoned, due to either underperformance or lack of capabilities’ (Engel and Mehler 2005: 92). This occurs when the state is no longer able or willing to fulfil its core functions, principally public security, in particular spaces. New

¹⁰ Note that for the Latin American context, the wording ‘the monopoly of violence remains disintegrated’ or ‘...remains unconsolidated’ is seen as favourable over Engel and Mehler’s wording ‘the monopoly on violence can be lost’ because it is questionable whether the state ever achieved a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in the first place.

actors seize this vacuum of power and provide the underperformed good themselves. The third way of losing the monopoly of violence is through a slow process of eroding legitimacy that can be triggered by illegitimate state action: 'Empirically monopolies of violence eroded whenever states displayed high levels of despotism and their claim to the monopoly of violence was no longer regarded as legitimate by the ruled' (Engel and Mehler 2005: 93).


Engel and Mehler criticise the conceptualisation of violent conflict in Africa:

'We argue that the apparent failure to deal with violent conflict in many parts of the [African] continent is not only a reflection of a general lack of means and/or political will to sustain the current policies of "reconstructing the African state", but also has to do with a profoundly ahistorical understanding of African statehood' (Engel and Mehler 2005: 87).

As a rectification of this ahistorical understanding of African statehood and the disintegration of the state's monopoly of violence, Mehler (2004) proposes using the term 'oligopoly of violence' to describe the role of violence and territorialisation in the construction of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Given that the 'oligopoly' concept is fundamental for understanding some of the dynamics described in later chapters of this thesis (see Chapters 5 and 6), a brief discussion on the economic theory behind this concept is warranted.

In economic theory, there are four common types of market structure – monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition and perfect competition – which differ according to their relative degree of market control and number of competitors in the market (see Figure 1.1). Perfect competition, on the far left side of the market structure continuum, is characterised by a large number of competitors who are all relatively small and have no or little market control. In contrast to that, a monopoly (see far right side of the continuum) describes a market situation with a single seller, the monopolist or monopoly firm, who has total market control and an unspecified number of buyers. Both monopolistic competition (large number of competitors who are relatively small and only have a modest degree of market control) and oligopoly (few competitors with a relatively large degree of market control) are in the middle of the market structure continuum. Note that the often mentioned duopoly is, in fact, just a specific type of oligopoly which only has two competitors in the market. Striving to shed light on the economic origin of Mehler's use of the term 'oligopoly of violence', here we only want to focus on the oligopoly as a market structure.

Figure 1.1 Market structure continuum



Source: Adapted from AmosWEB (2000-2014).

An oligopoly is defined as 'a state of limited competition, in which a market is shared by a small number of producers or sellers' (OED Online 2014). A more extensive definition of oligopoly reads as follows:

'Market situation between, and much more common than, perfect competition (having many suppliers) and monopoly (having only one supplier). In oligopolistic markets, independent suppliers (few in numbers and not necessarily acting in collusion) can effectively control the supply, and thus the price, thereby creating a seller's market. They offer largely similar products, differentiated mainly by heavy advertising and promotional expenditure, and can anticipate the effect of one another's marketing strategies. Examples include airline, automotive, banking, and petroleum markets...' (Business Dictionary 2014).

In economic theory, an oligopoly has certain characteristics which differentiate it from other forms of market structure, and these relate principally to interdependence and strategic decision making. With so few competitors in the market, the decisions made by one firm invariably affect the actions and reactions of the other sellers in the market and this is referred to as (oligopolistic) interdependence¹¹. In other words, oligopolists have to perpetually take into account the potential actions and reactions of their competitors when designing their business models and strategies. The interdependent relationship of competitors in an oligopoly forces the firms to engage in strategic decision making – the second key characteristic of oligopolies. Given that competitors in an oligopoly cannot act independently in terms of their price setting and product output, they must anticipate the possible reactions of the other firms in the market and make critical strategic decisions, principally with respect to the question of whether to compete or to collude with rivals. If they compete, oligopolists tend to avoid engaging in price competitions because economic models have shown that rivals are likely to forego price increases but match price reductions, both of which would lead to a lower market share

¹¹ The concept of oligopolistic interdependence is often explained with the help of game theory which can help to illustrate how the choices between two players (e.g. two competitors in a duopoly) affect the outcomes of a game. The well-known 'Prisoner's Dilemma' is a good example for such a game.

or decreased profits. Instead, oligopolists tend to engage in non-price competition by, for instance, offering after sales services or loyalty schemes to their customers. Oligopolists can also attempt to collude as this can effectively reduce 'the uncertainty associated with the *mutual interdependence* of rivals in an oligopolistic market' (Economics Online 2010-2014). In collusive oligopolies, the competitors act like a monopoly and can increase their profits. Generally speaking, there are three types of collusion: overt (explicit) collusion, covert (implicit) collusion, and tacit collusion. Overt collusion occurs when competitors are not trying to hide a common agreement.¹² In contrast, covert collusion occurs when competitors attempt to hide the fact that they have reached an agreement (because it is illegal to fix prices, for example). Tacit collusion occurs if there is no evidence of a formal or informal agreement between competitors but nevertheless competitors act together, for instance, by following the lead of a particular firm in the industry, the so-called price leader (AmosWEB 2000-2014; Economics Online 2010-2014; Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon 2004).

Striving to better describe the role of violence and territorialisation in the construction of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, in Mehler's approach, the oligopoly concept is taken from economic theory and applied to the field of political science. The author defines the term 'oligopoly of violence' in the following way:

'Distribution of means of violence to a limited number of violence actors/protectors. Oligopolies of violence reduce the use of violence in comparison with polypolies of violence in anomic situations. They entail a propagation of the use of violence in comparison to (legitimate) monopolies of violence because rules are less clear-cut or competing and because the rivalry between violence actors is common' (Mehler 2004: 544).

As can be seen from this definition, the issues at stake here are different from an economically-oriented analysis. Instead of market control, number of competitors, market access, price formation, profit maximisation and entry/exit barriers, Mehler's analysis focuses on questions of territory, violence and the legitimacy of different security providers based on the view of the local population. As way of summary, Mehler formulates the following hypotheses:

'Oligopolies of violence lead to a moderately high level of violence since each violence actor has to prove his or her ability to use it effectively (as a rule: The more oligopolists the more violence) [...].

In the eyes of the local population, legitimate oligopolies of violence may be an adapted hybrid form of political power. So long as preferable alternatives are absent, they may even be superior to illegitimate monopolies of violence, which tend to guarantee security only for a small minority in power.


¹² An example of that is the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which has the mission to 'coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries and ensure the stabilization of oil markets' (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 2014).

Social groups perceiving the construction of monopoly of violence as illegitimate may see legitimate alternatives to the central state in non- or para-state providers of security or even in mere protectors. Security as a public or at least collective good (meaning that individuals could not be excluded from it) can be provided by non-state actors.

The source of legitimacy of these actors are a) performance in the provision of the public good security and immediate protection, b) potentially: charisma, c) ideology, symbols, and myths, and d) congruence of basic normative convictions between protectors and protected' (Mehler 2004: p. 545).

The oligopoly of violence approach has been given continuation in subsequent research projects by Mehler and several of his colleagues (Basedau et al. 2007; Lambach 2007; Mehler 2009; Mehler et al. 2010). Lambach (2007), for instance, expands Mehler's concept on the 'oligopoly of violence' and analyses the dynamics of security markets in post-conflict societies where security is provided by state and non-state actors. He suggests using three dimensions to assess security markets, namely structure, type of integration and mode of differentiation (see Figure 1.2). The first dimension, structure, refers to the level of market concentration. It places monopolies and polypolies of violence at the extremes of a continuum and oligopolies in the middle of these extremes (a polopoly is described as anarchy or the 'war of all against all'). Lambach states that 'true' oligopolies are limited to suppliers with a maximum market share of 50 to 60 per cent. If a security actor has a market share above 60 per cent but without being able to monopolise the market (roughly 60 to 80 per cent), he is a 'dominant market leader' and able to guarantee relative peacefulness for residents (Lambach 2007: 7). His second dimension, the type of integration, refers to the way in which the market actors relate to each other – from conflictual, conflictual-neutral and neutral behaviour to cooperative-neutral and cooperative behaviour. Lastly, the mode of differentiation refers to how actors have divided the security market. This can either be functionally (in a heterogeneous market with few providers but differentiated products) or territorially (in a homogenous market with few providers of an identical product). In a later publication, Mehler, Lambach and Smith-Hoehn (2010) explain this differentiation between territorial and functional oligopolies of violence in a bit more depth. They suggest that in a functional oligopoly of violence, different security providers may offer protection from different kinds of threats or aggressors. That is the case, for instance, of vigilant groups who protect market vendors on weekdays. In a territorial oligopoly of violence, some constellations of security providers might exist that entail a distribution of areas and zones. It is possible then that in these spaces, security providers exert a form of control more similar to a monopoly of violence (which is important to remember in later section of this thesis which focuses on an in-depth analysis of security provision in the six neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro, see Chapter 6).

Figure 1.2 Market forms by type of interaction and structure



Source: Lambach (2007: 8).

Mehler, Lambach and Smith-Hoehn (2010) have engaged in extensive empirical research in Liberia and Sierra Leone in order to analyse which actors provide security and under which conditions these groups are considered legitimate by the population in the two countries. They conclude that the notion of oligopoly of violence is highly useful to assess the patterns of cooperation, rivalry and competition between different violent actors / protectors in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The opinion polls conducted in the two countries revealed that respondents are distrustful towards the existing state agencies and their capacity to protect them from harm. Nevertheless, even among those who had witnessed prolonged periods of war and turmoil, ‘the ideal of the state (or of the ideal state) is still very much present in the mindset of [the] people’ (Mehler et al. 2010: 39).

Mehler, Lambach and Smith-Hoehn are aware that the market analogy of the oligopoly concept has its limitations when it comes to the field of security and violence. The main weakness of this concept is that there is a discrepancy with regard to the behaviour of the main actors in the oligopoly. The rational-choice logic of the ‘homo oeconomicus’, meaning market participants are rational and primarily self-interested, may not give a complete picture of the motivations of both the security providers and those being protected in conflict situations. In these situations, religious motives and habitual conflict behaviour may play a bigger role than profit maximisation. Moreover, whereas open competition between firms in a classical market is beneficial for consumers because prices decrease, in the ‘security market’, the opposite is the case. More competition leads to more violence because each actor has to prove their capacity to use violence effectively. This is why oligopolies of violence can have component parts

that are in direct (armed) conflict with each other, going far beyond the logics of 'free market competition', and this can have devastating effects for the local population. Contrary to the logics of a free market, in an oligopoly of violence, there is also limited freedom of choice for people in regard to choosing a specific security provider because the power dynamics at play here are often outside residents' control (Mehler 2003; Mehler et al. 2010). On the other hand, oligopolies always represent imperfect markets. In fact, oligopolies are known to reduce consumer choice because of the high concentration of firms. They may also be inefficient in the allocation of resources because oligopolist firms tend to produce less output and charge higher prices than in a perfect competition environment (AmosWEB 2000-2014; Economics Online 2010-2014). Mehler, Lambach and Smith-Hoehn therefore argue that 'it could be claimed that limited rationality is compatible with the market terminology and the paradigm of oligopolies of violence' (Mehler et al. 2010: 15).

Besides Mehler and his colleagues, there is another group of researchers, based in Kenya, who have made extensive use of the oligopoly concept in the field of statehood, security and violence. Ngunyi and Katumanga (2012) have conducted extensive empirical research on the proliferation of militia groups in Kenya. They observed that there has been a shift from monopoly to oligopoly of violence because of the perpetual interplay of militia groups and state actors. During this process, violence turned into a public and private good and the number of 'suppliers' increased from one, i.e. the state, to several:

'State sub-optimal response to the militia is a function of its embedded interest in the violence enterprise through rogue elements [...]. As a result, state actors migrated to the predatory sphere to activate their militia and returned to the civic sphere to collect the results of militia pressure. Overwhelmed by the other militia the formal state has had to degenerate to the predatory sphere to battle them. The result of this "chaotic aggregate" is a shift from a state monopoly of violence, to an oligopoly of violence' (Ngunyi and Katumanga 2012: 11-12).

According to the authors, the resulting oligopoly of violence manifests itself in three ways: Firstly, the state provides violence as a public good and at the same time produces it covertly as a private good. Secondly, using once again the notion of economic theory, the actors in the oligopoly of violence can decide to either compete, trying to maximise prices, or collude and act as a cartel (the example given for the latter is the collaboration of different militias groups during the 2008 post-election violence in the Rift Valley). Thirdly, the logic of profit maximisation in the oligopoly might convince the participating violent actors to allow a degradation of security provision in order to increase the demand for or protection from violence (Ngunyi and Katumanga 2012: 12-13).

To support this argument, the authors have interviewed 8,000 respondents in 15 counties in Kenya, striving to map militia activity and assess the gangs' relationship with

the community. In total, the study mapped 238 militia groups in the 15 counties researched in Kenya. The survey results showed that in every four kilometers, one was infected by a militia group. The police-militia ratio was 1:5 and the gun ratio was 2:3 in favour of militia members (with significant regional differences). The evidence suggested that there was a ‘militia-police symbiosis’ because ‘1 out of every 4 policemen in militia infested areas, work in cahoots with the militia’ (Ngunyi and Katumanga 2012: 86-90).

Similar to the approaches adopted by Ngunyi and Katumanga, Basedau, Lambach, Mehler and Smith-Hoehn, in this thesis, the oligopoly concept is taken from economic theory and applied to the field of political science. This is extremely helpful to understand the complex relationships of different state and non-state security providers in Rio de Janeiro and analyse their relative power and influence in the security network.

This literature review introduced the central themes of this thesis – inequality, security, violence and territory – and the scholarly debate around some of these issues. It made the point that, simply speaking, inequality is bad for everyone because it slows down the development and welfare of all sectors of society. Here we are most concerned with insecurity, crime and violence as drivers of inequality. The epidemic levels of violence in Latin America have been reason for great concern among both citizens and policy-makers. There are two broad schools of thought analysing the role and capacity of the Latin American state in containing crime, violence and conflict. The first one, spearheaded by O’Donnell (1993), puts the high rates of violent crime in the context of democratisation and neoliberalism. O’Donnell blames a weak or absent state for the fact that some communities in Latin America are ruled by criminal organisations. This argument is called into question by Arias and Goldstein (2010) who argue that violence has historically been deployed by state and non-state actors in Latin America (violent pluralism). The high rates of violent crime result from the way the state interacts with criminal actors in specific territories, rather than from state absence and failed institutions (Arias 2006). There are various other scholars within and outside the region whose findings resonate with the arguments of Arias and Goldstein (Basedau et al. 2007; Engel and Mehler 2005; Lambach 2007; Mehler 2004; Mehler et al. 2010; Ngunyi and Katumanga 2012; Sonneveldt 2009).

Regardless of what causes insecurity, violence and crime, all scholars agree that security is crucial for the preservation of human life and is of tremendous value for our societies. The literature review pointed out that security is a contested and politicised concept and escapes easy definition. Despite the attempts of scholars and international development agencies to find a universal definition of security, it is often still unclear what security means, what it does and how it is valued by people. To this point there has been no locally-grounded analysis of the meaning of security and the dynamics and

implications of security provision in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The following section will explain the key research question of this thesis.

1.3 Research question

This research project was guided by the following main research question and sub-questions:

Q1 What is the logic of security provision in the six neighbourhoods studied in Rio de Janeiro, and how does it affect a citizen's right to security?

Q1a What does 'security' mean to residents in Rio de Janeiro?

The first objective of this research is to conduct a fine-grained analysis of the meaning of security in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Whitehead argues that citizens' views and perceptions of security are crucial for the analysis of citizen security and democracy: 'Perceptions are critical to the analysis of citizen security issues in new democracies, and these need to be painstakingly and critically evaluated' (Whitehead 2002: 174). However, only few writers have conducted structured research on what security means for a specific population of interest. This research will, as a precondition for the subsequent research, explore how *cariocas* [residents of Rio de Janeiro] define security and which types of security (physical, economic, environmental etc.) matter most in their daily lives. The data collected as part of this research is quite unique as it sheds light on people's lived experiences under different security providers. This knowledge is valuable for enhancing the conceptual study on security by giving a voice to those who suffer directly under insecurity and allowing them to define what they mean by *segurança* themselves.

Q1b What are the dynamics of security provision in the six neighbourhoods studied in Rio de Janeiro and what role do violence, territory and community support play in shaping the relative power and influence of each security provider in the network?

The second objective of this research is to deepen the study on violent pluralism by conducting a locally-grounded analysis of security, violence and territory in six neighbourhoods in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Arias suggested that future studies

should move away from a micro-level analysis of violence and instead focus on how multiple sources of violence operate within a political system (Arias in: Arias and Goldstein 2010: 263). Considering the wealth of information available for each security provider in Rio de Janeiro, it is surprising that so little empirical research has been conducted on both the network and the interdependencies of these state and non-state violent actors. Past studies have also overlooked the importance of comparing the provision of security in different geographic areas and how residents from inside and outside these places relate to the dominant security providers. This thesis will therefore examine the *modi operandi*, protective capacities and interests of Rio de Janeiro's security providers and assess their constellation and interaction. This knowledge will help anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists and urban geographers to understand violent (territorial) conflicts in complex, urban settings, as well as the implications of the oligopoly of security providers for citizens' right to security. For policy-makers, this knowledge is also helpful to improve policing practises, by implementing more tailored policing operations in specific geographic areas and designing more effective and inclusive public security policies which live up to the promises anchored in national constitutions and international human rights laws.

Q1c What are the implications of the security network in Rio de Janeiro for a citizen's right to security?

The third objective of this research is to assess security as a driver of inequality. McKay reminds researchers that: 'A greater understanding of the factors behind inequality is required, notably of the processes by which inequality comes about and persists. This needs to be based on broader concepts of inequality, and is likely to require both qualitative and quantitative approaches' (McKay 2001: 6). This study aims to broaden and enrich the study of inequality by including security as another, possibly equally important driver of inequality.

1.4 Methodology

This research employs a mixed methods approach with a three-phase sequential, exploratory design which involves qualitative and quantitative methods. By using a mixed methods approach, this research hopes to remedy some of the deficiencies of past studies in the field of security, violence and organised crime which have failed to give justice to the complexity and multidimensionality of the research problem by using either qualitative or quantitative research methods.

1.4.1 Mixed methods approach

The origin of the mixed methods approach lies in a study of psychological traits by Campbell and Fiske (1959). The multitrait-multimethod matrix used by the two scholars encouraged others to mix methods and converge or triangulate different quantitative and qualitative data sources. By the early 1990s, the mixed method approach was taken a step further. Instead of only triangulating and converging data sources, researchers would now connect quantitative and qualitative data so that the results from one method would inform and impact on the data collection of the other, e.g. qualitative interviews with participants identified themes to be addressed in a survey with a bigger sample of the population (Creswell 2009). Over the years, different terms have been associated with the mixed methods approach, such as multimethod, quantitative and qualitative methods, and mixed methodology. This research subscribes to the definition proposed by Creswell et al.:

'A mixed methods study involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative and/or qualitative data in a single study in which the data are collected concurrently or sequentially, are given a priority, and involve the integration of the data at one or more stages in the process of research' (Creswell et al. in: Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003: 165, *italics in original*).

The mixed method approach has become more popular in recent years, particularly in health science. The advantage of this approach is that different quantitative and qualitative strategies of inquiry can be employed to broaden the understanding of a research problem. This is crucial in research areas where purely quantitative or qualitative data would not give justice to the complexity of the problem. Mixed methods approaches are also used sequentially with the second approach building on the findings of the first one (Creswell 2009; Klassen et al. 2012; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2012). The mixed methods approach poses several challenges to the researcher: The collection of qualitative and quantitative data is extensive and time-consuming. The same is true for the data analysis and interpretation because researchers are required to be well acquainted with both quantitative and qualitative methods to evaluate text as well as numeric data.

In this study, it was decided to use a sequential exploratory mixed methods approach for the following reasons: First, public security is a highly controversial and politicised topic in Rio de Janeiro with a long and painful history. This required an approach that would give justice to the complexity of the research problem. Combining both qualitative and quantitative data provided an expanded understanding of crime, violence and security issues in Rio de Janeiro. Second, one of the central aims of this research was to explore the inequality of security concept. However, without knowing what 'security' meant for residents of the city of Rio de Janeiro, an adequate instrument to measure

inequality of security could not be developed. Hence, the sequential approach of this study allowed for the obtaining of narratives and statements on security and security providers in an initial qualitative data collection which was then used to develop a survey instrument to measure inequality of security grounded in the views of the participants. This procedure is in line with what Morgan (1998) suggested: the sequential exploratory design is suitable to test emergent theories or when researchers need to develop an instrument in the view of existing instruments being unavailable. Third, this study is an interdisciplinary research project which is placed between the fields of political science, sociology, urban geography and criminology. As such, a method had to be chosen which would go beyond the (often rather narrow) requirements of individual scholarly disciplines. The combination of qualitative and quantitative research fulfilled this criterion because it produced rich, in-depth qualitative data about the provision of security in Rio de Janeiro, and at the same time strong numeric data to back up and further explore the qualitative findings.

When planning a mixed methods research design, there are certain aspects that need to be taken into consideration, namely timing, weighting, mixing and theorising (see Table 1.1). The first aspect, timing, refers to the scheduling of the qualitative and quantitative data collection which can either be conducted in phases (sequentially) or at the same time (concurrently). The second aspect, weighting, requires the researcher to decide whether priority is given to qualitative or quantitative research, or both. The third aspect, mixing, refers to when and how the researcher mixes the data. For example, quantitative and qualitative databases can be mixed (integrating), the data analysis of the first phase can inform the data collection of the second phase (connecting), or a secondary form of data can be embedded within a larger primary database (embedding). The final aspect, theorising, requires the researcher to decide whether the underlying theory or theoretical lens is made explicit or if it is implicit (Creswell 2009).

For this research project it was decided to use sequential timing, equal weighting, connected mixing and explicit theorising (see fields shaded in grey in Table 1.1). In terms of timing, the first research phase constituted a qualitative data collection and analysis (interviews, field visits and a local human rights course), followed by a second research phase in the form of a quantitative survey which built on the results of the first phase. The third and final phase encompassed discussing the findings of the survey with experts from public security and military institutions (qualitative interviews). The weight was equally on the first two phases (qualitative and quantitative). With regards to mixing, it was decided to use a connecting research design in which the data analysis of the first qualitative phase connected with the data collection of the second quantitative phase and, consecutively, the data analysis of the second quantitative phase connected with the data collection of the third qualitative phase. In terms of theorising, as has been

laid out in the literature review (see Section 1.2), the ‘violent pluralism’ concept of Arias and Goldstein (2010) was seen as the most relevant analytical framework for this research. The theory was thus made explicit.

Table 1.1 Planning a mixed methods research design

Timing	Weighting	Mixing	Theorising
No Sequence Concurrent	Equal	Integrating	Explicit
Sequential – Qualitative first	Qualitative	Connecting	
Sequential – Quantitative first	Quantitative	Embedding	Implicit

Source: Adapted from Creswell (2009: 207).

First research phase


The first, qualitative research phase in the city of Rio de Janeiro lasted six months, from October 2011 to March 2012 (see Figure 1.3). During this time I conducted interviews with a variety of people who had a professional or personal interest in discussing security issues. Among these ‘security stakeholders’ were four academics (human rights, sociology and architecture), five community leaders, two directors of private security companies, two former drug traffickers and one former BOPE policeman.

Through the participation in the Universidade Favela human rights course which was offered by my partnering university (Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania, Universidade Cândido Mendes; CESeC) in the final months of 2011, I was able to establish relationships of trust with other students in my course. These students came from the favelas Complexo da Maré, Vila Aliança and Complexo do Alemão, some of the remaining drug trafficking strongholds in Rio de Janeiro, and they had the privilege of participating in the human rights course due to their position as community leaders. With the help of these (and other) gatekeepers¹³, I was able to conduct approximately 40 field visits to the following favelas or housing complexes: Complexo do Alemão, Complexo da Penha, Nova Holanda in Maré, Rocinha, Vidigal, Santa Marta,

¹³ In social science research, a gatekeeper is a person that assists in gaining access to a specific group of interest. Examples of gatekeepers in the field of security, organised crime and violence are: community leaders, police captains, drug traffickers and religious leaders.

Cantagalo/Pavão-Pavãozinho, Chapéu-Mangueira/Babilônia, Fallet/Fogueteiro, Tavares Bastos, Providência, Formiga, Borel, Vila Aliança, Bangu and Santíssimo. I also visited a number of *bairros* [districts] all over the city, such as Botafogo, Copacabana, Leme, Ipanema, Leblon, São Conrado, Santa Tereza, Glória, Centro, Tijuca, Bonsucesso, and a few gated communities in Barra (Novo Leblon and Mandala). Conducting these field visits was crucial to get a better understanding of geography and mobility in the city of Rio de Janeiro and to assess the suitability of these places as neighbourhood case studies for my research project (see Section 1.4.3).

Figure 1.3 Sequential exploratory design (three phases)



Source: Author's own illustration.

Second research phase

The second research phase was quantitative in nature and lasted from April 2012 to July 2012 (four months). It involved selecting the neighbourhood case studies (see Section 1.4.3) and designing a survey questionnaire with questions on the meaning of security, social cohesion, crime talk and victimisation, day and night-time perceptions of safety, satisfaction with security, personal experiences with crime and violence, the perception of security providers, as well as the socioeconomic profile of participants (gender, age, race, marital status, religion, economic class, individual income, household income and education).

The questionnaire was subsequently applied to a total of 309 residents in the six neighbourhoods and then analysed within SPSS¹⁴. A non-probability sampling method was chosen for conducting the survey, meaning that the sample was drawn from a part of the population in each neighbourhood that was available and which was convenient for the field researchers (this sampling method is also known as 'convenience sampling'). In the middle and upper class neighbourhoods of Botafogo and Novo Leblon this meant that respondents were either approached in openly accessible spaces (parks, squares, shopping malls and streets) or invited to participate in the research project through personal contacts of the field researchers. In the cases of the favelas (Vidigal, Santíssimo, Complexo do Alemão and Tabuleiro*), the field researchers were allowed to draw on their personal, social networks to find participants for the research (they were asked not to interview family members or close friends, however). In fact, the field researchers responsible for the favelas were selected based on their social standing in the community in order to increase the possibility of completing 50 interviews in each locality without putting researchers in unnecessary danger (see Section 1.5.2). Most problematic was the case of Tabuleiro*, a militia-controlled favela in the north zone of Rio de Janeiro where the responsible field researcher had extreme difficulty to find 50 research participants because people were too scared to talk about security issues.

It should be noted that this sampling method is far from perfect. However, in the particular circumstances, it was the only possibility of completing the survey and getting insight into highly sensitive security issues. Scientifically, the survey sample is not representative of the entire population of Rio de Janeiro. In other words, this thesis will abstain from making generalisations about the population of Rio de Janeiro from this sample and instead focus on the statistical significance of the results for the 309 people who were interviewed.

Third research phase

The last research phase was qualitative in nature and lasted for only one month (August 2012). The objective of this last field research phase was to interview experts from public security and military institutions, in particular those who were responsible for the provision of security in the six studied communities, and to learn from their expertise and insight. Interviewees were invited to assess the preliminary results of the survey from their professional point of view. The following seven experts were interviewed:

- (1) José Mariano Beltrame, state secretary of security in Rio de Janeiro;

¹⁴ Statistical Package for the Social Sciences.

- (2) Four-star general Adriano Pereira Júnior, commander of the Military Command of Eastern Brazil;
- (3) Colonel Rogério Seabra Martins, head of the UPP pacification police;
- (4) Colonel Paulo Teixeira, director of the Instituto de Segurança Pública (Public Security Institute, ISP);
- (5) Colonel Henrique Castro Lima, commander of Rio de Janeiro's municipal guard;
- (6) Colonel Carlos Eduardo Ribeiro, commander of the PMERJ Batalhão de Campanha (Warfare Battallion of Rio de Janeiro's military police);
- (7) Captain Fabio Pereira, captain of the UPP Vidigal.

1.4.2 Neighbourhood case studies

In this research, six neighbourhoods were selected as case studies. The case study method has gained increasing attention by scholars in recent years as an alternative to cross-case observational research (Boix and Stokes 2007; Gerring 2007; Mahoney 2004). Gerring defines a case as a 'spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time' (Gerring 2007: 94). His definition of a case study is slightly more complex:

'To refer to a work as a "case study" might mean: that its method is qualitative, small-N; that the research is holistic, thick (a more or less comprehensive examination of a phenomenon); that it utilizes a particular type of evidence (e.g. ethnographic, clinical, non-experimental, non-survey based, participant observation, process tracing, historical, textual, or field research); that its method of evidence gathering is naturalistic (a "real-life context"); that the research investigates the properties of a single observation; or that the research investigates the properties of a single phenomenon, instance, or example' (Gerring 2007: 94).

Scholars in the field of comparative politics agree that the merits of the case study method have been underestimated in the past but they also admit that a more systematic development of this approach has only become available in recent years (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007). George and Bennett (2005) identify four advantages of the case study method, namely conceptual validity, the potential for deriving new hypotheses, exploring causal mechanisms and the ability to assess complex causal relations. Gerring (2007: 97) goes a bit further by assessing eight characteristic strengths and weaknesses in the comparison of case studies and cross-case studies. To summarise briefly, a case study approach is seen as preferential when (a) the research goal is to generate a hypothesis rather than to test one; (b) when internal validity is prioritised over external validity; (c) when causal mechanisms are more important than causal effects; (d) when preference is given to the depth of the analysis rather than breadth; (e) when the population is more heterogeneous than

homogeneous; (f) when the causal strength is expected to be strong rather than weak; (g) when variation of key parameters is rare rather than common; and (h) when the available data are concentrated and not dispersed. However, there are also significant limitations to the case study method, especially case selection bias, lack of representativeness and the potential lack of independence of cases (George and Bennett 2005).

In this research project, the case study method was used to select different neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro with the objective of assessing the logic of security provision in different geographical spaces. Two main criteria guided the selection process, namely the presence/constellation of security providers in the community and the geographical location of the neighbourhood.


With respect to the first selection criterion, it was necessary to choose neighbourhoods which would be representative of Rio de Janeiro's security providers, especially of those who have territorial dominion of certain areas of the city, i.e. military police, military, private security companies, militias and drug traffickers.¹⁵ It was also deemed important to make a differentiation between the different units of the military police, principally the traditional military police battalions (BPM), the Batalhão de Forças Policiais Especiais [Special Police Operations Battalion, BOPE] and the Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora [Pacification Police Units, UPP]. In addition, the study differentiated between the three different drug trafficking factions, the Comando Vermelho [Red Command; CV], Amigos dos Amigos [Friends of Friends, ADA] and the Terceiro Comando [Third Command, TC], respectively Terceiro Comando Puro [Third Pure Command, TCP, an 'offspring' of the TC]. The selected case studies needed to reflect the *modi operandi* of these different security providers and show how they interact in specific geographical spaces.

The objective of the second selection criterion – geographical location – was to choose neighbourhoods from a broad geographical spread. In Rio de Janeiro, the location of one's home is closely interlinked with social mobility and people's employment prospects (Perlman 2010). Rio de Janeiro is geographically divided into three *zonas* [zones]: Zona Sul [south zone], Zona Norte [north zone] and Zona Oeste (west zone). The 33 *regiões administrativas* [administrative regions] in Rio de Janeiro cover 160 *bairros*, each one with several neighbourhoods. Looking at these numbers, it seems there are plenty to choose from for a case-based neighbourhood analysis. However, there were a number of pragmatic reasons and other limitations (personal security, lack of contacts) which drastically limited the amount of suitable

¹⁵ These security providers and their *modus operandi* are assessed in much more detail in Chapters 4 to 6.

neighbourhoods. Attempting to give justice to the relative strengths and pitfalls of case-based analysis, after a laborious selection process, the following six neighbourhoods were chosen: Vidigal (VID), Santíssimo (SANT), Complexo do Alemão (CDA), Tabuleiro* (TAB), Botafogo (BOT) and Novo Leblon (NL), two from each of the three zones (see Figure 1.4). Vidigal was chosen as a south zone favela which had been recently pacified by the UPP and where memories of the dominion of the ADA drug traffickers were still fresh. Santíssimo was chosen because of its great distance to the city centre and its history of TCP drug traffickers and militias. Complexo do Alemão was selected because at the time the field research was conducted it was the only neighbourhood under the control of the military. The favela Tabuleiro* was chosen because it fulfilled the criteria of a north zone favela controlled by militias, and in geographical proximity to trafficker-controlled communities. Botafogo was selected for its characteristics of being a middle-class south zone neighbourhood with standard policing. Finally, Novo Leblon was chosen because it is one of the oldest *condomínios* [gated communities] in the Barra da Tijuca region and its streets are public which allowed me to circumvent the difficulty of obtaining access to a gated community, as experienced by other researchers (Caldeira 2000; Instituto de Segurança Pública 2008).

Figure 1.4 Location of six selected neighbourhoods in the city of Rio de Janeiro



Source: Mapa Digital do Rio de Janeiro – CadLog, Instituto Pereira Passos (Instituto Pereira Passos 2013c).

Note: The sixth community, Tabuleiro*, is not shown on the map in order to protect research assistants and participants.

1.5 Ethical considerations

1.5.1 Data collection

From the very beginning of my research, I was aware of the sensitivity of my research topic. High rates of crime and violence have led to great fear and insecurity among the population in Rio de Janeiro. Only few residents are directly involved in illegal activities but many fear repression by the state's public security apparatus or the arbitrary tyranny of the drug traffickers or militias.

Despite the fact that there is a wealth of information available about research ethics in general (Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics / Government of Canada 2010; United Kingdom Research Integrity Office 2009), only few publications focus on conducting research in conflict zones (Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Robben and Sluka 2012; Sriram 2009) and even less information is available for (young) foreign women who study male-dominated institutions or conduct research in potentially dangerous environments (Huggins and Glebbeek 2009). For my particular research project, more insight was gained from several authoritative studies which had been conducted on security, victimisation, human rights and organised crime in Rio de Janeiro in the past. These publications explained how to gain the trust of gatekeepers and helped to navigate around the code of silence that reigns in the favelas (Arias 2006; Barcellos 2003; Dowdney 2003; Gay 2005; Husain 2007; Instituto de Segurança Pública 2008; Jones and Rodgers 2009; Soares et al. 2005; United Nations Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 2002; Zaluar and Conceição 2007).

Due to the nature of this research project, it was self-evident that extensive, in-depth field research would have to be conducted in Rio de Janeiro in order to gain insight into residents' perception of (in)security and the highly complex network of security providers. In fact, studying individuals' perception of insecurity within its given context and not creating disruption to their day-to-day lives was one of the principles that guided this research process. Knowing that most residents are relatively safe as long as they stay within their respective communities where they have built strong social ties over the years, it was therefore decided that face-to-face in situ interviews were the appropriate strategy of inquiry. The advantage of this was that interviewees felt more comfortable, secure and self-confident because they were interviewed in familiar environments. Furthermore, participation costs were low because interviewees were not required to travel to (far-away) research institutions. Also, the time spent on the interview did not cause a big strain on their daily work and/or family commitments. Great caution had to

be exercised at all times to ensure the safety and wellbeing of the research participants. Participation in the research was free and voluntary and the nature and purpose of the study was clearly explained. Interviewees were informed of their rights and gave their explicit verbal consent to participate in the study before the beginning of the interview. They were informed that they could withdraw from the interview at any stage and without explanation and could choose between full anonymity, citation with general reference (e.g. school teacher from Rio de Janeiro) or citation by name. The interviews were only carried out if the necessary preconditions of safety and privacy were given. When negotiating access to a specific community, the research assistants and I were honest and transparent about the nature and purpose of the research. On some rare occasions, interviews had to be conducted in the office of my partnering university CESeC in the city centre. This caution was necessary to protect particularly vulnerable sources, such as former drug traffickers and residents from militia-controlled communities.

Throughout my field research I respected two main safety rules when conducting research in the favelas: First, I was always accompanied by a local resident or a gatekeeper who was familiar with the place and through that I avoided visiting favelas by myself or being accompanied solely by other 'outsiders'. Second, someone on the outside was always informed about my whereabouts (meeting point, time, name and telephone number of the local contact) and at what time I planned to return. When visiting a favela I only took a simple mobile phone and pocketbook with me. I made use of different pocketbooks for different places, e.g. one for favelas with drug trafficking faction A, another one for favelas with drug trafficking faction B. I only brought my camera with me on a few occasions and always asked my local contact for explicit consent before taking any photographs. This is because it is widely known that many researchers and foreigners have brought serious trouble upon them when (deliberately or not) taking photographs of people and places that are associated with criminal gangs in Rio de Janeiro's favelas (Perlman 2010).

In polarised settings, such as Rio de Janeiro, it can often be challenging and stressful to engage with all parties, receiving (contradictory) information from different groups and attempting to be a neutral, unbiased researcher (Wood 2007). In Rio de Janeiro, this was further complicated by the strict social class structures and prevailing racism. However, being a young, white, foreign woman put me in a privileged position where I was allowed to talk to everyone.¹⁶ What would have been unthinkable for Brazilian

¹⁶ Huggins and Goldstein also stated that being white (and female and foreign) was advantageous for conducting field research in Brazil due to Brazilians' own cultural preference for light skin (Huggins and Glebbeek 2009: 8, 364). Goldstein conducted extensive field research in the city of Rio de Janeiro and stated that '[...] my own whiteness, perceived femininity, and foreignness worked mostly to privilege me in this setting' (Goldstein in: Huggins and Glebbeek 2009: 228).

nationals did not even raise any eyebrows in my case: I was welcome in the elite's splendid apartments in gated communities and in the shacks of low-income families in the favelas. I gained the trust of high-ranking military police colonels and the confidence of drug traffickers, thieves and former kidnappers. I regularly met with human rights activists, NGO workers, police, university professors, favela youth, successful business owners, expats and (former) criminals, and even brought them to one table, and no one questioned my acquaintances. This privileged position certainly benefitted the research as I was able to include an extraordinarily broad group of voices.

1.5.2 Research assistants

In order to apply the survey questionnaire to around 50 residents in each of the six neighbourhoods, it was necessary to recruit six research assistants, based on the following two criteria: How well was he/she connected and trusted in the community? How motivated and reliable was he/she? In the case of the favelas (Complexo do Alemão, Vidigal, Santíssimo and Tabuleiro*), research assistants were chosen who had a long personal and professional history in the community and were respected community leaders. In the case of Botafogo and Novo Leblon, two university students with ample survey experience applied the questionnaire. All research assistants participated in a training workshop and signed a confidentiality agreement. They had eight weeks (May – June 2012) to complete the questionnaires and were paid R\$ 100 after the training and R\$ 500 upon completion of the work.¹⁷

1.5.3 Data storage and data analysis

My research is in accordance with the requirements of the Data Protection Act, 1998, the Freedom of Information Act, 2000, as well as UCL's own code of good practice in the conduct of research. All interview audio tapes and electronic copies of my research notes were saved in an encrypted form (use of TrueCrypt software) on an external hard drive. The anonymity of all participants was guaranteed, codes and pseudonyms were used for the data analysis. I was committed to protecting the rights of the participants and representing their voices accurately and truthfully. The Research Ethics Committee of my home institution reviewed and approved the field research plans in August 2011.

¹⁷ It took around 20-35 minutes to complete the questionnaire. Research participants were paid R\$ 10 for each completed questionnaire and all rated the payment as extremely fair in their final evaluation.

1.6 Outline of the thesis

The overall structure of this thesis takes the form of seven chapters, including this introductory chapter. **Chapter 2 (Public Security in Rio de Janeiro)** sets out, first, to define what the term *segurança* means in the given research context in order to get to the heart of how security is being interpreted, valued and practised by people in Rio de Janeiro. It was decided to let research participants in Rio de Janeiro speak for themselves because they know best what role security plays in their daily lives and how insecurity affects their wellbeing. The findings show that interviewees associated the term security primarily with personal (physical) security, in the sense of being protected from violent crime, and, to a lesser extent, with political security, in the sense of being protected from human rights abuses by the authorities, especially the military police. Interviewees also thought that security meant being protected by an 'other' – be it the police, a private security company or a criminal actor because providing one's own security was not seen as a sufficient safeguard against the dangers arising from crime and violence. In order to understand why interviewees attributed so much importance to these specific types of security, the subsequent section analyses violent crime data (mainly homicides) for the city of Rio de Janeiro and assesses the role of firearms as an aggravating factor of violent crime in Rio de Janeiro. Subsequently, the chapter sheds light on the historical context of violent crime in Rio de Janeiro and assesses the relative success or failure of public security policies, especially after the return to democracy in the mid-1980s. It argues that the high rates of violent crime are a reflection of a social accumulation of violence, meaning that the use of violence by state and non-state actors has gradually intensified over the decades.

However, not all residents in all neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro are affected by violent crime in the same way. **Chapter 3 (Inequality of Security)** aims to enhance the study on inequality by establishing security as a driver of inequality. It assesses the security perceptions (meaning of security, social cohesion, crime talk and victimisation, day and night-time perceptions of safety, and personal experiences with crime and violence) of 309 residents in the six neighbourhoods and claims that there is an inequality of security, defined as a condition in which the right to security – a universal human right and a highly valued societal good – is not enjoyed by all citizens to the same extent. The collected data show that differences in security perceptions are most striking in terms of interviewees' place of domicile (neighbourhood), more so than in terms of their socio-demographic profile (age, gender, race, income etc.). The chapter therefore concludes that in order to understand why there are these prominent differences in security experiences, it will be worthwhile to deepen the analysis on the neighbourhood level.

The remaining chapters of the thesis aim to shed light on the drivers of the inequality of security. It does so by analysing the logic of security provision in the six neighbourhoods. **Chapter 4 (Security Providers in Rio de Janeiro)** sets out to map all security providers who are active in these neighbourhoods, namely military police, civil police, municipal guards, military, private security companies, death squads, militias and drug traffickers. It focuses on examining their histories, interests, *modi operandi*, protective capacities and records in security provision. It claims that the network of security providers in Rio de Janeiro is a good example of violent pluralism due to the high number and variety of actors who provide security in Rio de Janeiro's neighbourhoods.

Chapter 5 (Oligopoly of Security Providers) assesses the relationship between the respective security providers and evaluates their relative power and influence in the security network. The main claim of this chapter is that, on a city level, violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro takes the form of an oligopoly because the security providers are connected through a series of relationships which can range from cooperation to conflict and need to consider the actions and reactions of the other groups when taking strategic decisions. As has been explained in the literature review, the oligopoly concept stems from economic theory yet in this research it is applied to the field of political science. The issues at stake here are therefore different than in an economically-oriented analysis. Instead of markets, market access, formation of prices, profit maximisation, marginal cost and entry/exit barriers, the analysis in this thesis focuses on questions of territory, violence and community perception – three key factors which can decide on the rise and fall of Rio de Janeiro's security providers. The chapter concludes that Rio de Janeiro's military police are the most powerful and influential security provider in the oligopoly, followed by the military, private security companies and drug traffickers. The remaining security providers – civil police, militias and municipal guards – are less powerful and influential but still play an important role in the dynamics of Rio de Janeiro's security network.

Chapter five presents the oligopoly of security providers as a rather static network when, in fact, the provision of security in Rio de Janeiro is a highly dynamic process in which arrangements between security providers change continuously. The aim of **Chapter 6 (Neighbourhood Case Studies)** is therefore to shed light on the fine-grained dynamics of violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro by examining how the relative power and influence of security providers changes in particular neighbourhoods over time. The chapter shows that although an oligopolistic network structure prevails at the city level, on the neighbourhood level, the preferred option for security providers are monopolistic-type constellations as this leads to situations of relative peace and stability. Two scenarios are presented with varying constellations of security providers. In the first

scenario, the territory is controlled by a dominant security provider and neighbourhood case studies for this scenario are Novo Leblon, Tabuleiro* and Vidigal. In the second scenario, the territory is violently contested by two or more security providers and examples of this are Complexo do Alemão and Santíssimo. The chapter shows that all actors are willing to engage in violence if the perceived political and/or economic benefits are great enough. Insecurity and violence are therefore principally fuelled by the struggle for territorial control between conflicting security providers. However, violence has to be used strategically because it impacts on the way the security providers are perceived by the community. As long as crime and violence are low (as is mostly the case in territories with a dominant security provider), the authority of the dominant security provider is seldom questioned. When crime and violence are high (as is the case of violently contested territories), security providers have to go to extra lengths to justify the burden they are causing for the local population, either by co-optation or oppression, or more commonly, by a combination of both. Despite its appearance as chaotic, violence is therefore an instrument which is negotiated and managed quite carefully.

Finally, in **Chapter 7 (Conclusion)** the empirical findings of the research are synthesised with the aim of answering the study's research question. The subsequent section discusses the limitations of the empirical research and considers its theoretical implications, principally the contributions that this research hopes to make to the study of inequality and violent pluralism. After identifying areas for further research that could build on the findings of this study, the final section of the chapter discusses the policy implications that derive directly from the empirical research. These are based on the principal concepts discussed in this thesis – oligopoly of security providers, inequality of security and the human rights perspective adopted in this thesis.



Botafogo, Rio de Janeiro

2 PUBLIC SECURITY IN RIO DE JANEIRO

2.1 Introduction

The first aim of this chapter is to define what security means in the given research context of Rio de Janeiro. Security is a relative and subjective concept that can mean different things to different people. Whitehead states that '[p]erceptions are critical to the analysis of citizen security issues in new democracies, and these need to be painstakingly and critically evaluated' (Whitehead 2002: 174).

In this research project, it was therefore decided to let the research participants in Rio de Janeiro speak for themselves because only they know what role security plays in their daily lives and how insecurity affects their wellbeing (see Section 2.2.1). The approach of listening to and interpreting grassroots voices was seen as preferable, compared to an *a priori* linguistic and conceptual demarcation of the term 'security' by the researcher, because it gets to the heart of how security is being interpreted, valued and practised by interviewees in Rio de Janeiro. The analysis of these narratives reveals that security for research participants in Rio de Janeiro means, first and foremost, personal (physical) security, in the sense of not being afraid and being protected from violent crime. To a lesser degree, security in Rio de Janeiro also means political security, in the sense of being protected from human rights abuses by the state, especially by the police forces. Most interviewees did not associate security with any other types of security, such as financial security or health security. In order to understand why interviewees attributed so much importance to these specific types of security, the subsequent sections analyse violent crime data (see Section 2.2.2) and the wide availability of firearms in Rio de Janeiro (see Section 2.2.3) and show that *cariocas* are confronted with a degree of violence that is comparable to some of the world's commonly identified war zones.

The second aim of this chapter is to shed light on the historical background of violent crime and assess the relative success and failure of public security policies, especially after the return to democracy in the mid-1980s (see Section 2.3). The chapter argues that the high rates of violent crime in Rio de Janeiro are a reflection of a social accumulation of violence, meaning that the use of violence by state and non-state actors has gradually intensified over the decades. Rio de Janeiro has undergone different cycles of violence which were each characterised by the criminalisation of a specific

criminal actor, e.g. death squads, *jogo do bicho* [game of the animals, an illegal lottery], drug gangs, and militias. In the first fifteen years after the return to democracy, the new democratically elected state governors adopted public security policies pushed towards either prevention or repression and frequently abandoned the efforts of their predecessors. This prevention/repression dichotomy mostly came into play in the form of short-term responses to public security crises and hence the more structural causes of crime and violence remained untouched. These public security crises and the state's failure to adequately deal with the problem of violent crime has become deeply ingrained in the social memory of the *cariocas* and have helped to explain why personal (physical) and political security were so important in the view of the research participants.

Nevertheless, a surge of new opportunities in the past four years spurred by the successful FIFA World Cup and Olympic bids, coupled with the steady economic growth that the city has been experiencing, means that Rio de Janeiro has started to go through a significant change of course. With the new pacification programme, public security in Rio de Janeiro has changed from an approach focusing on deterrence, enforcement and confrontation to a more holistic and comprehensive method which aims to recapture state territory and invest in the social integration of favela residents, thus attempting to overcome the stigma of being branded a 'divided city' (Ventura 1994).

2.2 Personal (physical) and political security

2.2.1 What does 'security' mean to interviewees in Rio de Janeiro?

Upon my arrival in Brazil, I spent approximately six months (October 2011 to March 2012) exploring what 'security' meant to research participants in Rio de Janeiro. During this time, I visited numerous favelas, housing complexes, gated communities and middle-class neighbourhoods and conducted various interviews with people who had a professional or personal interest in discussing security issues. Among these 'security stakeholders' were four academics (human rights, sociology and architecture), five community leaders, two directors of private security companies, two former drug traffickers and one former BOPE policeman. I asked all of my interview partners the same question: What does 'security' mean to you?

The first finding that derived from these interviews is that security is indeed a very relative concept because people relate it to their own experiences, professional careers and attitudes. Paulo Storani, for instance, is a former BOPE policeman and public

security expert. Security to him therefore is highly technical and is conditioned by sensorial subjectivity:

'Well, security in the vision of the expert is a set of actions aimed at guaranteeing that the activities of a city can be exercised at a normal level. This is according to people's level of productivity and their *sensação* [feeling], how they feel with respect to their workplace and homes. [Security is] *sensacão* [feeling]. It's how people feel - safe, safer or less safe' (Interview with Storani 2011).

The following statement by an elderly woman in the Complexo da Penha also shows that people's understanding of security depends on their own personal experiences. Vanessa* has suffered abuse from her husband for many years and therefore emphasizes the need to feel safe within one's home:

'Well, I think we have to have security inside our homes [...]. Security is everything for us. Without security, we don't go anywhere' (Interview with Vanessa* 2011).

Renato da Silva is the director of a private security company which provides security services to individuals, especially artists. While acknowledging that there are many different types of security, he mainly gives examples of security related to his own work:

'The word security is very comprehensive and has so many types that people get lost. So basically, talking about my market, security is a state of mind. You have to have security as a motto. As a citizen and as an entrepreneur, you have to take precautions in your life. So security is the way I walk in the street, the way I go to the bank, act with friends and how I behave with society. But there are other sections, security for artists, police security, security of a businessman, electronic security [...]. I do property security and personal security' (Interview with da Silva 2011).

Danilo* is a resident from Maré and also acknowledges that security can mean different things to different people. He states that a person could feel safe in the presence of an armed drug trafficker but insecure next to the police. Danilo* used to be a small-scale drug trafficker, and his account forms yet another example of someone speaking about security from their own personal perspective:

'I have no idea [what security is]. Security is more psychology, I think, because you can be in a super safe place and be full of fear. It is something very relative, the parameter is personal safety. According to your experiences, you'll feel insecure around a cockroach, and at the same time you feel super safe next to a drug dealer who is armed with a rifle, and insecure next to a policeman... So I see that security is the way that you relate to the world and how much you are afraid' (Interview with Danilo* 2012).

In Danilo's* account of the meaning of security, he puts himself on the side of the drug traffickers and suggests that the police are the 'enemy figure' who instil fear in people. Silvia*, mother of two, from the Complexo do Alemão states something similar:

'I think, for now, we're not very safe there in the Alemão. Because even with the army there, we're still afraid, the police don't give us any guarantee. They think just because we live in the community, everyone is a criminal. I don't know who we have to be more afraid of, is it the police or the criminals?' (Interview with Silvia* 2011).

It is rather common among favela residents, irrespective of whether they are law-abiding citizens or involved in criminal activities, that they take the side of the criminal actor vis-à-vis the police. In the perception of the community, criminal actors often enjoy greater leverage and trust than state security actors. We will return to this in later parts of this thesis (see Section 4.3.4 and Section 6.2.3).

Here I wish to show how another criminal actor defines security. Thiago* is a former drug trafficker from the Complexo do Alemão who has grown up in the drug trade and speaks of himself as a 'survivor'. Now in his thirties, he acknowledges that although he has dealt with weaponry and defense strategies his entire life, he does not know what security means:

'Look that word [security] is kind of complicated for me from where I come from, right. Security... I never had security. My security was with a rifle on my back. I ran up and down [the hills]. You're here today and tomorrow you die, but I survive. We were surviving each day. We survive, we don't live! [...] So security is very difficult to speak of from where I come from. So far, I think I don't know what security is. God is my security!' (Interview with Thiago* 2011).

Several interviewees stated that security was a precondition to being able to enjoy one's rights, especially the right to freedom of movement. In Brazilian Portuguese, this is called *o direito de ir e vir* [the right to come and go]. In Rio de Janeiro, *ir e vir* has turned into a buzz word that people throughout all social classes use to rally for their right to move freely within the city. For many residents, *ir e vir* has turned into a synonym of security. This is understandable considering that a part of the population is 'imprisoned' in their gated communities and another part of the population is subject to curfews by drug traffickers, militias or state security forces. George 'Binho' Cleber, a community leader from the favela Vila Aliança, picks up on this point:

'[Security means] *bem estar* [being well] in the full sense. Of being able to enjoy my rights, especially *ir e vir*, and at no time feeling violated, whether by citizens or government representatives. In order to exercise all of my rights, above all, I need to be safe' (Interview with Cleber 2011).

Human rights professor Roberta Pedrinha who lives in a gated community also points to the close connection between freedom and security. She argues that people are willing to give up their freedoms in order to have greater security and protection:

'The first idea of security would be protection. I think that because of the fear that is being generated, people increasingly tend to give up their freedom and seek more security. Maybe this is a principle of the

construction of our model of civilisation. You give up pleasures and values, such as freedom, for security, stability and protection' (Interview with Pedrinha 2011).

Marcos* is a community leader from Maré who is very involved in the church. He was one of the few people I met in Rio de Janeiro who understood security as something that went beyond the narrow understanding of personal (physical) and political security and had to do with education and development:

'For me security goes far beyond the police. Social centres also develop security because they take people away from crime. The church is also involved in this issue. It's not only the police giving us public security. In Brazil, we've this mentality that only the police give us public security because of the power of their weapons. But in our vision of a community, public security should not be only that. It's much more. It's quality education, professional education. Today young people who never dreamed of attending higher education are studying through affirmative action law for black, brown and indigenous people. And this is part of security because it has to attend to everyone and not only to a minority. So public security is a conjuncture of public policies aimed at the economic and social development of the Brazilian population' (Interview with Marcos* 2012).

This more holistic and multidimensional understanding of security is extremely rare among Rio de Janeiro's residents. Security expert Storani explains that physical security is very problematic in Rio and does not leave any room for debate on other types of security:

'Public security guided the concept of security that we've in the country today [...]. The physical security [aspect] is so strong that any other type will be shaken by this. If you don't feel safe physically, all other [types of security] are compromised. I think that today this is a reality of Rio de Janeiro and the country, especially in large cities' (Interview with Storani 2011).

The analysis of these narratives shows that most residents in Rio de Janeiro understand the term security as equating to personal (physical) security, in the sense of being protected from crime and violence, principally robberies, assaults, physical aggressions, homicides and sexual abuse and not being afraid of it. To a lesser degree, security in Rio de Janeiro also means political security, in the sense of being protected from human rights abuses by the state, especially the state security forces. Interviewees also thought that security meant being protected by an 'other' – be it the police, a private security company or a criminal actor because providing one's own security was not seen as a sufficient safeguard against the dangers arising from crime and violence. Most interviewees did not associate security with any other types, such as financial security or health security. This finding was later validated with a bigger survey sample (see Section 3.3.1).

2.2.2 Violent crime data

In order to understand why interviewees attributed so much importance to personal (physical) security, it is helpful to look at violent crime data for the city of Rio de Janeiro. The Institute of Public Security (ISP) publishes monthly crime figures (based on the records of the civil and military police forces) which give an impression of the dimension of crime and violence in Rio de Janeiro. In the last month for which data are available – September 2013 – the ISP registered 32,256 occurrences in the city of Rio de Janeiro, including 114 homicides, 167 homicide attempts, 2,937 physically injuring assaults and 179 rapes. In addition, 12 human cadavers and one human carcass was found, 77 people died in traffic accidents and a further 2,165 were injured. The ISP also registered 97 cases of extortion, 7 cases of ‘lightning kidnapping’, 2,586 threats and 182 disappearances. In the same month, 15,025 robberies and thefts were registered, including 1,790 vehicles and 375 mobile phones. The police seized 185 arms, confiscated drugs on 396 occasions, arrested 868 people, fulfilled a further 761 prison warrants and apprehended 272 children and youth. The statistics show that 17 people were ‘resistant leading to the death of the opponent’ (*auto de resistência*). This is how police register homicides which are occurring from legal interventions. Furthermore, one military police officer died in service (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2013a).


The figures above relate to criminal occurrences in a single month and indicate an overall high degree of criminal activity. This helps explaining why personal (physical) security was such an important concern for the interviewees of this study. In order to get a better understanding of longitudinal crime trends, it is worthwhile to analyse how the homicide rate and the total number of homicides have changed over time (based on data from the public health sector¹⁸). Homicides are the most reliable and comparable indicator of crime that exists although it should be noted that great caution should be exercised when analysing the data.¹⁹

¹⁸ The data in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 are adapted from the Mapa da Violência (Waiselfisz 2011: 23, 28, 183) and are based on figures from the Sistema de Informações sobre Mortalidade [Information System about Mortality, SIM] by the Brazilian Ministry of Health.

¹⁹ Crime data on homicides and homicide rates should be used with great caution. There are great differences according to the type of crimes that are included in homicide statistics and the source of information. In Rio de Janeiro, the police records are published by the ISP and the public health figures are published through the SIM by the Ministry of Health. The methods of aggregation used by the ISP and SIM have been modified several times, either to improve data collection, to strengthen the statistical analysis, or for political reasons. In fact, depending on the source or author, the total number of homicides in the state of Rio de Janeiro can sometimes differ by several thousand homicides for the same year (Hinton 2006; Sistema de Informações sobre Mortalidade 2011; Soares 1996).

There are issues with the quality of the police’s data collection. Occurrences are only recorded once and usually not updated when the nature of the occurrence changes. For instance, a person who was wounded in a homicide attempt and dies several days later in hospital as a consequence of the injuries will remain a homicide attempt in the records of the police (Cano and Santos 2001). The data from the

Figure 2.1 Homicide rates in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro (1980 – 2010)



Source: Adapted from Mapa da Violência (Waiselfisz 2011: 183).

In the last three decades, the homicide rate in Rio de Janeiro has followed a very different trend than the national homicide rate (see Figure 2.1). The national homicide rate increased moderately from 11.7 in 1980 to a peak of 28.9 in 2003 and stagnated


police also often do not match the data from the Ministry of Health because the police register the crime in the location where the violent act occurred whereas the Ministry of Health uses the location where the victim actually died. Likewise, the victims of *latrocínio* (robberies followed by the death of the victim) are usually not included in the police records of *homicídios dolosos* (intentional homicides) because robberies are classified as crimes against property/heritage whereas homicides are recorded as crimes against the person (Borges 2011). Furthermore, there are often as many homicide attempts as actual homicides but this dimension of that form of violence is not reflected in the official homicide statistics.

There are similar issues with the data from the Ministry of Health: many homicide cases only enter the statistics as unclassified mortalities (the dark figure of recording), and undoubtedly there are still homicides that are not reported at all (dark figure of criminality). It should also be pointed out that homicides represent one of the most violent and dramatic types of crime and violence and that this might divert attention away from other more common types of crime, such as robberies, domestic violence and traffic violations.

In a recently published study, Cerqueira from the Institute of Applied Economic Research criticised the government of Sérgio Cabral for manipulating the official crime statistics in the state of Rio de Janeiro. According to official numbers, total homicides decreased by 28.7 per cent between 2007 and 2009. However, Cerqueira argued that the state might have concealed deaths with unspecified external causes in which the motive (homicide, suicide or accident) had not been defined. The number of deaths without a specific motive increased from 1,857 (2000 to 2006) to 4,021 (2007 to 2009). Cerqueira's research also showed that the profile of homicide victims is usually very different from those who commit suicide or have an accident. Homicide victims are usually young, around twenty years old, black or brown, and 80 per cent are killed through firearms in the streets. Suicide victims are typically white, around 45 years old and commit suicide at home by hanging themselves. Victims of violent accidents are generally between 70 and 80 years old. In the majority of the cases that were registered as deaths with unspecified external cause, the victim was young and shot dead in the street which is the typical profile of a homicide victim (Cerqueira 2011).

thereafter. In contrast, the homicide rates in Rio de Janeiro increased dramatically between 1983 and 1995 (1995 was the year in which Rio de Janeiro led in national homicide statistics²⁰) and subsequently decreased again quite dramatically so that in 2010, Rio de Janeiro's homicide rate was on a par with the national homicide rate.²¹ Notably, the comparison of Rio de Janeiro capital with other state capitals in Brazil has become more promising in the past years. In 2000, Rio de Janeiro was ranked as the sixth most violent state capital in Brazil in terms of the homicide rate, out of twenty-seven state capitals. In 2010, Rio de Janeiro only ranked twenty-third (Waiselfisz 2011: 30, 183-187).

Figure 2.2 Total number of homicides in Rio de Janeiro (2000 – 2010)



Source: Adapted from Mapa da Violência (Waiselfisz 2011: 23, 28).

Figure 2.2 presents data on the total number of homicides in the state of Rio de Janeiro and in the city of Rio de Janeiro between 2000 and 2010. After an increase in the total number of homicides between 2000 and 2002, the trend has been rather positive in the seven consecutive years. In the state of Rio de Janeiro, the total number of homicides decreased by almost 50 per cent, from 8,321 in 2002 to 4,193 in 2010. In the city of Rio de Janeiro, homicides have not been falling that constantly year by year but the overall

²⁰ In 1995, the homicide rate was 61.9 per 100,000 inhabitants for the state of Rio de Janeiro and 70.6 for Rio de Janeiro capital and metropolitan region.

²¹ In 2010, the homicide rate was 26.2 per 100,000 inhabitants for the state of Rio de Janeiro and 25 for Rio de Janeiro capital and the metropolitan region, compared to 26.2 on a national level.

trend nevertheless shows a positive pattern: homicides decreased from 3,728 in 2002 to 1,535 in 2010.


However, it should be pointed out that the total number of homicides is still very high. To put the figures above into perspective, it is useful to compare the homicide data in Rio de Janeiro with deaths in the world's commonly identified war zones. This approach was suggested by Waiselfisz (2011: 21) who compared Brazilian homicide data with the number of direct conflict deaths in other countries, based on data from the Global Burden of Armed Violence 2008 report (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008). Between 2004 and 2007, there were 12,719 direct conflict deaths in Sudan, 12,417 in Afghanistan and 11,833 in Colombia. During those four years, 10,776 people were murdered in the city of Rio de Janeiro alone, a place that does not encounter civil war-like situations, and does not have any religious conflict or territorial disputes with other countries. Moreover, the number of homicide victims in the city of Rio de Janeiro in this period exceeds the number of direct conflict deaths in international terrorist attacks (3,631) and the border-conflict between Israel and Palestine (2,247). This comparison does not take into account the population of the respective countries or any other factors (e.g. the number of those dying indirectly from armed conflict) but it is nevertheless a valuable comparison to understand the dimension of violent crime in Rio de Janeiro. This insight also helps to explain why the interviewed research participants associated the term security primarily with personal (physical) security. Considering that *cariocas* live in conditions that are comparable to some of the world's commonly identified war zones in terms of the amount of people being killed, it is only logical that they are so concerned with being protected from crime and violence.

Rio de Janeiro's state government has recognised that the widespread fear of crime affects all sectors of society and it has taken measures to improve the population's perception of security. On behest of the Câmara de Gestão da Segurança Pública [Board of Management of Public Security], Rio de Janeiro's government has recently issued a state decree (nº. 41.931, 25 June 2009, amended by nº. 42.780, 3 January 2010) to monitor the combat of specific crimes that have the biggest impact on the population's perception of insecurity, namely violent fatalities, vehicle robberies and street robberies. These so-called 'strategic crime indicators' are part of the Sistema Integrado de Metas [Integrated System of Goals] of the State Secretary of Security (SESEG), a management tool that assesses the performance of different police units in the state of Rio de Janeiro and that rewards those units achieving the highest crime reduction in their areas (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2013b).

Figure 2.3 shows the reduction of the three strategic crime indicators over the years 2010, 2011 and 2012. Violent fatalities (murder, injury followed by death, robbery

followed by the death of the victim, and *auto de resistência*) decreased by 21 per cent from 5,828 to 4,606. Vehicle robberies increased by 9.6 per cent from 20,052 in 2010 to 21,975 in 2012 (despite a fall in 2011) and street robberies (robberies of passers-by, group robbery and mobile phone robbery) decreased by 25.5 per cent, from 78,536 to 58,539 occurrences. The indicators are relatively new and it is therefore too early to establish trends for a longer period of time. More than anything, it shows the commitment of the state government and the SESEG to reduce these crimes in order to improve the population's perception of security.

Figure 2.3 Strategic Crime Indicators of the state of Rio de Janeiro



Source: Balanço das Incidências Criminais e Administrativas no Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Cabral Filho et al. 2011; Cabral Filho et al. 2012).

2.2.3 The role of firearms

The wide availability of firearms in the city of Rio de Janeiro constitutes the most important aggravating factor for violent crime. It is important to discuss this issue because it also helps to explain why the interviewed research participants associated the term security primarily with being protected from crime and violence, principally robberies, assaults, physical aggressions, homicides and sexual abuse.

Firearms (e.g. revolvers, pistols, rifles, machineguns) change the nature of a violent crime and give it an irreversible and often lethal ending (Rangel Bandeira in: Aziz and

Alves Filho 2003). In Brazil, in 2002, 63.9 per cent of all homicides were caused by firearms and only 19.8 per cent by *armas brancas* [white arms, e.g. knifes] (Phebo 2005: 18). A study by Dreyfus and Nascimento estimates that around 17 million firearms are circulating in Brazil, of which 4.6 million are under informal possession (unregistered) and 3.8 million under criminal possession (firearms used for criminal practices). In the city of Rio de Janeiro, over 900,000 small arms are in circulation of which roughly 160,000 (17 per cent) are used for criminal activities (Dreyfus and Nascimento 2005: 160).

Brazil has the highest total number of firearm-related deaths (homicides, suicides and unintentional injuries) in the world, outnumbering deaths caused by traffic accidents, additionally it has the world's fourth highest rate of firearms-related death with 19.3 per 100,000 inhabitants (Phebo 2005: 15-16). Firearm-related violence bears a high cost, not only for individual victims but also for the state of Rio de Janeiro and especially the public health sector. A study in 2002 estimated that each hospital stay due to firearm-related violence costs around R\$ 5,500 and lasts seven days on average. This cost is 16.45 per cent more than the costs incurred for hospital stays due to traffic accidents (Phebo 2005: 35)

It goes without saying that not all citizens suffer from the risk of firearms-related violence in the same way. Most at risk are young men between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine years. This group is seven times more likely to die from firearms than the rest of the population and 38 times more likely than the female population. Poor, black young men from low educational backgrounds face an even higher risk of becoming victims of firearms (Phebo 2005: 27). For some of these young men of lower socioeconomic standing, the possession of a firearm facilitates their way into criminal organisations. It also symbolises a form of social capital in the construction of masculinity, enabling young men to obtain prestige, power, women and respect: 'Gun ownership is a physical token of the power, wealth, and status that membership [in a criminal organisation] is thought to bestow' (Lessing 2008: 107).

The governing regulation related to the control of firearms in Brazil is the Disarmament Statute, enacted by the Brazilian Congress in 2003, which aims to reduce the availability of small arms in order to end the epidemic of firearm-related violence in the country (Dreyfus et al. 2008; Fernandes and Lessing 2005). According to the Statute, all small arms must be registered with the federal police that are in charge of keeping an up-to-date database (called Sistema Nacional de Armas, SIRNAM). The Statute imposes a ban on all civilians carrying small arms and only allows the following groups to be armed: the armed forces, public security entities such as military police and civil police, municipal guards (in cities with a population between 50,000 and 500,000

inhabitants), agents from the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, prison guards, registered private security companies and members of certain sports clubs (Presidência da República 2003: Art. 6). The Disarmament Statute goes far beyond the simple criminalisation of illegal possession, circulation, commercialisation and (international) trafficking of small arms. For instance, it also defines the breach of parental responsibility and the shot of a firearm as crimes punishable by one to four years in prison (Presidência da República 2003: Art. 12-21).

Another element of The Disarmament Statute of 2003 was to hold a national Gun Ban Referendum in October 2005, the first referendum in the history of Brazil. The Gun Ban was not approved²² but it would have drastically toughened firearms legislation, e.g. increasing the age limit of people who can legally possess a firearm and lengthening prison sentences for the illegal possession of firearms (Goldstein in: Springwood 2007).

The Disarmament Statute also included running an extremely successful voluntary disarmament campaign to allow citizens to anonymously surrender illegally-held weapons. People received between R\$ 100-300 in compensation, depending on the kind of weapon. Prices were considerably lower than market prices in order to ensure that people would hand over their weapons out of responsibility and civic duty and would not use the money to buy a new firearm (Dreyfus et al. 2008). Until January 2013, the disarmament campaign had already led to the recovery and destruction of over 600,000 small arms (Entregue sua Arma 2013). In the subsequent three years after the enactment of The Disarmament Statute in 2003, firearm-related deaths in Brazil decreased by 18 per cent. In other words, the new law and further public security investments saved the lives of 23,961 people (MS and SVS, 2007 in: Dreyfus et al. 2008: 20).

In contrast to what many Brazilian politicians have argued, firearm-related violence in Brazil is largely a homegrown problem. The majority (75.12 per cent) of illegal weapons seized by security forces in the city of Rio de Janeiro between 1993 and 2003 were locally manufactured handguns and ammunition – produced by either the state-owned Indústria de Material Bélico do Brasil, Forjas Taurus S.A. or the Companhia Brasileira

²² There are several reasons to explain why 64 per cent of people voted against the Gun Ban. On the one hand, the no-vote can be interpreted as a lack of trust in the state's institution, principally the police. Goldstein argued that the failure of the referendum is 'an indicator of the widespread cross-class lack of faith in the institutions of police and government' (Goldstein in: Springwood 2007: 41). The favela residents feared that their security would not be guaranteed when only the 'corrupt' police forces were armed. Middle class residents, in return, feared that criminals would be armed anyway and thus they also refused to hand in their guns. These fears were spurred by the rhetoric of the National Rifle Association (based in the USA) arguing that citizens need to be armed in order to compensate for the weak policing of the state. On the other hand, the no-vote can also be seen as an anti-Lula vote due to the fact that his government was facing serious corruption allegations at the time (Macaulay 2010).

de Cartuchos (CBC) (Rivero 2008: 63). Paraguay plays a key role in the illicit diversion of Brazilian firearms and ammunition into criminal possession. Bandeira argued in 2003 that out of ten Taurus or CBC containers loaded with arms and ammunition to be exported, only two containers arrived in Paraguay with its freight, the other freight vessels arrived empty (Rangel Bandeira in: Aziz and Alves Filho 2003). The illegal weapons seized in Rio de Janeiro that were not manufactured in Brazil mainly came from the United States (10.38 per cent), Argentina (2.85 per cent) and Spain (2.5 per cent). These weapons had specific characteristics: They were more powerful, e.g. semiautomatic pistols and assault rifles, and of restricted use, meaning that they could not have been legally bought in Brazil. As drug trafficking factions strive to increase their firepower in terms of quantity (more firearms) and quality (greater firepower), police seek to match the greater firepower of their opponents and engage in an arms race, and vice versa. Conflicts between rival drug trafficking factions, or between drug gangs and the police therefore increasingly end with serious injuries or the death of opponents due to the greater firepower of weaponry (Dreyfus and Marsh 2006; Rivero 2008: 63).

The wide availability of firearms, both by public security forces and criminal organisations, coupled with a culture of guns and retributive violence among poor, black youth, aggravates the problem of crime and violence in Rio de Janeiro, giving it a more tragic and lethal dimension. Out of those research participants who participated in the survey, 63.5 per cent had lost a friend, relative, neighbour or colleague in an intentional homicide (see Section 3.3.6). We have to assume that most of these people were killed by firearms rather than by white arms and this may once again help to explain why personal (physical) security was such a great concern for interviewees. The following section will shed more light on the historical dimension of violent crime in Rio de Janeiro and examine the public security policies that were adopted in response to the high rates of crime and violence.

2.3 History of crime, violence and public security

2.3.1 From the abolition of slavery to the expansion of the drug trade (1888 – 1984)

Michel Misso (1999) proposes that historically, there has been a social accumulation of violence in Rio de Janeiro, meaning that violence has gradually intensified over the decades, with different cycles that were each characterised by the criminalisation of a specific '*fantasma criminal*' [criminal ghost in the sense of scapegoat]. This goes back to

the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the concern of the dominant classes that the freed men, women and children carried diseases, were incapable of living together in a society and would resist politics of social control. The *fantasma criminal* of this period was characterised by a person with specific social behaviour who 'offended' public order. A new law entitled the *Law of Repression of Idleness* was enacted in order to control the 'dangerous classes'. The violent persecution of *capoeiras* [men and women who played Capoeira, a Brazilian martial art with African roots] in the beginning of the twentieth century is a good example of how the white elite and police defined criminals in this period, not only in Rio de Janeiro but all over Brazil (Borges 2011: 46).

Misse (2010) argues that the social accumulation of violence has its origins at the end of the 1950s. Before that, the most common crimes were minor criminal offenses, such as fights, small-scale robberies and fraud. Violent crimes like homicides were usually crimes of passion, often followed by the suicide of the perpetrator. At the end of the 1950s, however, armed robberies of banks, residents and houses became more common. The police came under pressure to do something about this and set up a small unit of police officers who were willing to give their lives in the fight against criminals (Huggins 2002). This special motorised patrol unit had a special mandate to kill criminals and was called *Esquadrão Motorizada* [Motorised Squad]. The unit became known as Rio de Janeiro's first death squad (see Section 4.3.2).

The next cycle of the social accumulation of violence started in the 1970s when the *jogo do bicho* turned into the most important and powerful illicit market in Rio de Janeiro. In the beginning, the structure of the lottery business was very fragmented. Individual *bicheiros* [bosses of the *jogo do bicho*] and their gangs controlled specific areas of the city and competed violently with other *bicheiros* for lottery selling points. The territorialisation of these areas generated a degree of violence which was unprecedented in the city (Borges 2011).²³

Violence gradually intensified during the course of the 1980s with the expansion of the illegal drug trade. The formation of Rio de Janeiro's first drug trafficking faction, CV, dates back to the end of the 1970s. During this time, political prisoners from the military dictatorship²⁴ were mixed with common prisoners in the maximum security prison of Ilha

²³ Some of this violence diminished when the *cúpula do jogo do bicho* [summit of the animal lottery] was constituted in the middle of the 1980s (Borges 2011). However, the *bicheiros* remain powerful up to this date, especially as sponsors of Rio de Janeiro's famous Samba groups (Chazkel 2011).

²⁴ On the 31st of March in 1964, a *coup d'état* had replaced the democratically elected left-wing president João Goulart and the military assumed power. The military dictatorship was driven by the national security doctrine, formulated at Rio de Janeiro's Superior War College, the centre of Brazilian counterinsurgency theory, with the fundamental notion that the security of the state was threatened by 'communists and socialists'. As a result, trade union and student union members, political opponents, common criminals and other 'enemies' of the regime were persecuted, imprisoned, tortured and often

Grande, an island in the state of Rio de Janeiro. The idea was to dilute the communist and socialist ideas of the regime's enemies by mixing them with ordinary criminals who were serving prison sentences for murder, bank robberies or the sale of marihuana. However, quite the opposite happened: the socialist guerillas passed their knowledge of group organisation and reciprocity to the other ordinary convicts (Dowdney 2003; Leeds 1996). Shortly thereafter the CV was founded, based on the values of *paz, justiça e liberdade* [peace, justice and freedom] (Interview with Storani 2011). Originally a prison-based gang, the CV soon took territorial control of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro and imposed their own laws and understanding of justice in these low-income neighbourhoods. They forced residents not to interfere with their drugs sales business and in return maintained relative peace and social order at the cost of intimidation (Richardson and Kirsten 2005). Throughout the 1980s, the CV expanded its territorial control even further, and when cocaine entered the market, the high profits of the drug sales were invested into buying sophisticated firearms to resist the frequent and highly repressive operations of the police.

2.3.2 Public security crises after the return to democracy (1985 – 2006)

The military dictatorship was slowly 'phased out' in the beginning of the 1980s. The new democracy coincided with an influx of drugs, the proliferation of armed actors, new kinds of violence, heightened levels of fear of crime, massive unemployment, inequality, poverty, the disintegration of the social fabric, corruption and impunity (Holston 2008b). While federal and state governments were struggling to find a solution for all these challenges, political apathy spread and the support for repressive *mão dura* [tough on crime] public security policies was high. The 1995 Latinobarómetro showed that 59.1 per cent of the respondents believed that a bit of *mão dura* by the government would not be bad for the country (Latinobarómetro 1995). This was the year in which Rio de Janeiro had the highest homicide rate in its history (with 61.9 homicides per 100,000 inhabitant in RJ state and 70.6 in Rio de Janeiro capital and metropolitan region, see Figure 2.1). Other studies have shown that human rights abuses occur in greater number since the transition to democracy than under the authoritarian rule (Husain 2007).

times murdered. In this period, the federal, civil and military police forces were all brought under the same military rule and jointly formed the Detachment of Information Operations (DOI) which was responsible for governmental intelligence, and the Centre for Internal Defense Operations (CODI), known as centres of torture and repression. One of the country's biggest DOI-CODI establishments was situated in Barra da Tijuca, Rio de Janeiro (Gasparetto Junior 2010, March 4). The administrative and financial autonomy of the civil police of Rio de Janeiro was reestablished in 1983 with the creation of the State Secretariat of Civil Police (Policía Civil do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2009). The DOI-CODI, though renamed, continued to exist until the end of the military regime in 1985.

The following section will provide a detailed analysis of the various administrations in the state of Rio de Janeiro after the return to democracy in order to shed light on the relative success or failure of the public security policies that were adopted in response to the problem of violent crime. The section will show that some of the policies adopted by Rio de Janeiro's democratically elected state governors aggravated the problem of violent crime, e.g. by paying police monetary rewards for shooting criminals. This helps to explain why some of the research participants had little trust in the police and were so concerned with their personal (physical) and political security.

The first democratically elected governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro was left-wing Leonel Brizola of the Democratic Labour Party (PDT). Brizola had suffered himself under the repression of the military regime and spent several years in exile. He tried to dismantle the legacy of repression by putting a halt to all *blitzes* [arbitrary military police stop and search operations on the streets] and stopping the police from invading favelas without judicial authorisation. This was extremely popular with the many residents of Rio de Janeiro's shantytowns who for the first time saw their human rights defended by a political leader (Husain 2007). Nevertheless crime and violence increased exponentially and Brizola was ousted in the next state election in 1987 by his opponent Wellington Moreira Franco from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). Moreira Franco had promised in his election campaign that he would end the problem of violence within six months. Once confirmed in office, he abandoned Brizola's programme and returned to the repressive policing from the military era (Husain 2007). Nevertheless, violent crime continued to increase. The homicide rate, for instance, increased from 35.6 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1989 to 62.2 in 1990 (Waiselfisz 2011: 183).

In 1991, Brizola was given a second chance as the state governor of Rio de Janeiro and chose Colonel Carlos Nazareth Cerqueira as chief of the military police and state secretary of public security. Jointly they produced a public security plan, including community-oriented policing programmes in Copacabana and Leme with surprising achievements:

‘The population felt they were treated with respect and dignity, appreciation and care, so it was a moment of discovery. The idea that people hated the police was substituted by the discovery that poor people had no problem with this institution when they were treated fairly. The police did not like this kind of talk. They thought it was the talk of communists, of socialists, of left-wing intellectuals, the talk of romantics. That is why the idea did not prosper and was eventually abandoned and forgotten’ (Interview with Soares 2010).

The public security plan also included building citizens advisory committees, centres for denunciation and centres for the defense of citizenship (Hinton 2006). Nevertheless,

crime and violence deteriorated to the point where Brizola sought the support of the armed forces in preparation for the UN International Earth Summit in 1992.

In July 1993, Rio de Janeiro passed through a severe public security crisis when eight street children who were sleeping in front of the Candelária Church were brutally massacred by a death squad. Only one month later, another police death squad killed twenty-one civilians in the favela Vigário Geral as retaliation for four policemen being killed by drug traffickers earlier (Gaspar Pereira 1996). These two tragedies represent important landmark events in the history of public security:

'A little bit of Rio was broken into pieces. The self-image and self-esteem of the cariocas were shaken by this expression of extreme violence' (Borges 2011: 43).

The media declared Rio de Janeiro to be 'in a state of anarchy' (Husain 2007: 70). Eventually, Brizola resigned in order to run for presidency in Brazil, leaving his vice-governor Nilo Batista in power (April 1994 – January 1995). Batista signed an accord with the interim President Itamar Franco to deploy the armed forces in the so-called 'Operation Rio' at the end of 1994 – a 60 day long operation in which several dozen favelas were raided in an attempt to end the trafficking of narcotics in the city (Hinton 2006). By then, the CV had already fragmented internally and the new drug trafficking factions ADA²⁵ and TC²⁶ were founded. The battle for territory was now fought on multiple fronts: the different drug trafficking factions engaged in turf wars with each other whilst simultaneously trying to resist the repression of the police and the military. During those years, the conflict between the different drug trafficking factions and the state's security forces was fought with such high intensity that some observers called it an 'urban war' (Amnesty International 2005).

Marcello Alencar from the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) was the elected state governor of Rio de Janeiro from 1995 to 1998. Alencar's politics were more similar to those of Moreira Franco and, once again, the efforts of Brizola were reversed. Alencar appointed General Nilton Cerqueira (not to be confused with Colonel Nazareth Cerqueira who was mentioned earlier) as state secretary of public security. General Cerqueira had been the chief of Rio de Janeiro's military police during the last years of the dictatorship and was considered to be an 'incorruptible hard-liner' (Hinton 2006: 71). He stopped the community-policing programmes initiated under Brizola and reinstated

²⁵ The ADA had emerged inside Rio de Janeiro's prisons between 1994 and 1998 and formed an alliance with the TC under the leadership of Eraldo 'Uê' Pinto de Medeiros to challenge the power of the CV (Disque Denúncia 2012b).

²⁶ In September 2002, Fernandinho Beira-Mar (CV) led a revolt in the Bangú I prison and killed Uê (TC). Uê's former partner Celsinho (ADA) of the Vila Vintém favela was accused a traitor. This led to the breakdown of the ADA-TC alliance. As a consequence, the TC dissolved and its members migrated to either ADA or the fairly new TCP (Disque Denúncia 2012c).

the practice of *blitzes*. His advice to the police was ‘to shoot and ask questions later’ and police earned extra rewards for killing criminals (Husain 2007). Under General Cerqueira, the number of civilians killed by the military police increased massively, from 3.2 people killed per month to 20.55 people killed per month (Cano 1997: 39). To the surprise of many, Cerqueira asked left-winger Hélio Luz to lead the anti-kidnapping division of the civil police. From 1995 to 1997, Luz served as the chief of the civil police and was responsible for linking police investigations with the anonymous denunciation helpline Disque Denúncia, an initiative funded by the Federation of Industry Owners of Rio de Janeiro (Husain 2007).

At the same time, on the federal level, substantial progress in human rights legislation was achieved. President Fernando Collor had already created The Statute of the Child and Adolescent in 1990 which at the time was one of the most encompassing pieces of child legislation in the world. In 1996, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso received praise for the National Human Rights Plan. An important corollary to that was the Bicudo Law which transferred the prosecution of intentional homicides (*homicídio doloso*) committed by the military police from state military courts to civilian courts with juries. In 1997, Cardoso’s government passed a special law defining the crime of torture seeking to codify the United Nations Convention Against Torture (Hinton 2006).

In 1999, Anthony Garotinho²⁷ was elected state governor of Rio de Janeiro and appointed the left-wing anthropologist Luiz Eduardo Soares as SESEG’s undersecretary of research and citizenship. Soares designed a comprehensive and multidimensional public security reform policy which would, at least to a certain degree, survive changes in state politics. One of the reforms was to create the Ombudsman Office²⁸ to which citizens could submit complaints about police abuse. Rio de Janeiro was divided into 34 Integrated Public Security Zones, each consisting of two military police battalions and one civil police station. The aim of this was to increase cooperation and information sharing between the two police forces. Soares also established the Conselhos Comunitários de Segurança [Community Security Councils, CCS]²⁹, the ISP and the Programa Delegacia Legal [Model Police Station] (Husain 2007). One of the most ground-breaking initiatives was to resurrect the idea of community-oriented policing in

²⁷ Garotinho cannot clearly be associated with one political party. When he was first elected, he was a member of the PDT. In 2000, he joined the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB). In 2003, he joined the PMDB and remained there until 2009 when he joined the Workers Party, PT.

²⁸ The Ombudsman Office is a state agency subordinated to the SESEG where citizens or police themselves can register complaints about police abuse. Pereira criticises the office of the ombudsman arguing that it cannot investigate independently and relies on the help of the Undersecretary of Internal Affairs for bringing cases to justice (Pereira in: Kingstone and Power 2008).

²⁹ The Community Security Councils are communication channels between civil society and the Civil and Military Police forces of the state of Rio de Janeiro which serve to reduce violence and crime and promote social peace.

the form of creating the *Mutirão pela Paz* [Collective Effort for Peace]. In March 2000, Soares was fired because of political differences with Garotinho (Interview with Soares 2010).

Shortly afterwards, on 12 June 2000, Brazil suffered another severe public security crisis with the hijacking of bus 174 near the Botanical Garden in Rio de Janeiro. The hijacker, Sandro Rosa do Nascimento, a former street child who had witnessed the murder of his mother, and a survivor of the Candelária Church massacre in 1993, took the passengers of bus 174 hostage. The whole incident lasted several hours and was shown live on Brazilian national television. In the end, the police accidentally shot one of the hostages in an attempt to neutralise do Nascimento and later strangled him to death in the car on the way to the police station (Padilha et al. 2004). As the drama unfolded, the shortcomings of the state's public security institutions became apparent to all those who were glued to the television screen. The public scandal forced President Cardoso to come up with his National Public Security Plan eight days later. This plan consisted of federal measures, e.g. fighting the drug trade and disarming the public, and other measures in cooperation with municipal governments and civil society, e.g. reducing urban violence, strengthening human rights and eliminating multiple homicides and summary executions (Dellasoppa and Saint'Clair Branco 2006).

At a state level, Anthony Garotinho decided to respond to the crisis by taking up the idea of community-oriented policing once again. The so-called Grupamento de Policiamento em Área Especial [Grouping of Policing in Special Areas, GPAE] was installed in the two neighbouring favelas Pavão-Pavãozinho and Cantagalo (Interview with Soares 2010). When Anthony Garotinho decided to present his presidential candidacy in 2002, his vice-governor Benedita da Silva assumed the governorship for a few months. She was the first black woman to govern a Brazilian state. Her time as governor coincided with a new public security crisis. Rio de Janeiro's city hall and the State Secretary of Human Rights became the victim of shootings and a bomb attack, and the O Globo journalist Tim Lopes was tortured and killed by traffickers in the Complexo do Alemão. Lopes' death constitutes another key moment in the history of Rio de Janeiro and reminded people that drug-related violence affected everyone, inside and outside of the favelas (Fernandes 2002, July 1). Governor da Silva claimed that she had inherited '*uma bomba de efeito retardado*' [a bomb with delayed effect] coupled with a bankrupt state from former governor Anthony Garotinho and lost the upcoming elections in 2003 to Garotinho's wife, Rosângela 'Rosinha Garotinho' of the PMDB (da Silva in: Roda Viva 2002, November 18).

Rosinha Garotinho's term in office was clouded by another massacre: 30 people were killed by a death squad in the districts of Queimados and Nova Iguaçu on 1 April

2005 (Reuters 2005, April 2). After her husband was defeated in presidential elections, Rosinha Garotinho appointed him as state secretary of public security from 2003 to 2004. He continued with his public security policies which constituted a breakaway from Brizola's preventive and Moreira Franco and Alencar's repressive public security approaches. Rosinha and Anthony Garotinho believed in the modernisation of the police forces in order to tackle crime more efficiently while at the same time respecting human rights. However, they did not always succeed in their attempt to strike a balance between prevention and repression. Husain argues that their policy turned out to be a 'rather schizophrenic strategy, where respect was practiced in some areas and repression in others.' (Husain 2007: 74). Still, some of the reform attempts, like the Community Security Councils and the Model Police Station continue to exist today despite political changes at the state level.

2.3.3 Pacification under Sérgio Cabral (2007 – 2014)

Sérgio Cabral (PMDB) was the state governor of Rio de Janeiro between January 2007 and April 2014 and was re-elected for a second term in office with 66 per cent of the votes in October 2010. Cabral's term in office has been principally associated with two new developments in the area of public security: the rise of militias and the pacification of the favelas by the UPP pacification police.

Militias are illegal, paramilitary groups consisting of former or off-duty policemen, firefighters, penitentiary guards and civilians who charge favela residents for the security they provide (see Section 4.3.3). They also control the provision of other services in the communities, such as alternative transport, gas and internet. The first militia in Rio de Janeiro had already emerged in the favela Rio das Pedras by the early 1990s yet it was not until 2004 that the numbers of militias exploded and emerged in places like Bangu, Penha and Engenho de Dentro, the former stronghold of drug trafficking factions (Zaluar and Conceição 2007).

The rise of militias in favelas in recent years can also be partly attributed to the weakening of the drug trafficking factions by the new community-oriented police force UPP. The UPP programme was created in 2008 in an attempt to 'pacify' favelas and invest in a better police-community relationship. It was partly financed by the Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania [National Programme of Public Security with Citizenship, PRONASCI], a piloting initiative by the federal government with the objective of combining actions of preventing, controlling and repressing violence by

focusing on the socio-cultural roots of crime.³⁰ Since 2008, 34 UPP units have been established, covering 168 communities and benefitting around 520,000 favela residents. The aim is to increase this number to 40 by the time of the World Cup in 2014. Although the successes of the UPPs are far from being undisputed, violent crime rates have decreased in pacified communities (see Section 4.2.1).

2.4 Chapter conclusion

The first aim of this chapter was to define what the term *segurança* means in the given research context in order to get to the heart of how security is being interpreted, valued and practised by people in Rio de Janeiro. It was decided to let research participants in Rio de Janeiro speak for themselves because they know best what role security plays in their daily lives and how insecurity affects their wellbeing. This approach was quite challenging because security is a relative term and people's perceptions of it are inherently subjective. Most interviewees associated the term security primarily with personal (physical) security, in the sense of being protected from crime and violence, principally robberies, assaults, physical aggressions, homicides and sexual abuse. To a lesser extent, they also associated security with political security, in the sense of being protected from human rights abuses by the state. The research participants also thought that security meant being protected by an 'other' – be it the police, a private security company or a criminal actor because providing one's own security was not seen as a sufficient safeguard against the dangers arising from crime and violence. Most interviewees did not mention any other types of security, such as health security, financial security, environmental security, food security or security in the area of information technology. The subsequent sections on violent crime data and the wide availability of firearms helped to explain this result because *cariocas* are confronted with a degree of violence which is comparable to some of the world's commonly identified war zones, like Sudan, Afghanistan and Colombia (here the period of 2004 – 2007 was examined).

The second aim of this chapter was to shed light on the historical context of violent crime in Rio de Janeiro and to assess the relative success or failure of public security policies, especially after the return to democracy in the mid-1980s. The chapter argued

³⁰ The federal government invested R\$ 6.707 billion from 2007 until the end of the programme in 2012 (Ministério da Justiça 2011). In the past, Rio de Janeiro's state governments have always gone to great lengths to prove their autonomy and independence from the federal government, fiscally as much as on an operational level (Roda Viva 2002, November 18). The federal-state relationship has recently changed and become more cooperative, especially through the UPP programme and the 18-months deployment of the armed forces in the pacification of the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha in 2010 – 2012.

that the high rates of violent crime are a reflection of a social accumulation of violence, meaning that the use of violence by state and non-state actors has gradually intensified over the decades. Rio de Janeiro has undergone different cycles of violence which were each marked by the criminalisation and prosecution of specific criminal actors, e.g. death squads, *jogo do bicho*, drug gangs and militias.

Violent crime rates deteriorated after the return to democracy in the mid-1980s and the first democratically elected state governors did little to reverse this trend. Instead, they adopted public security policies that ruined the small advances of their predecessors. Hinton argues that 'over the course of the 1990s, different governors adopted policies that reversed or suspended the efforts of their predecessors' (Hinton 2006: 125). Given that the dictatorship had just ended, military ideology continued to play an important role in the public security discourse during this period. State governors positioned themselves on either of the two poles of the left/right and the prevention/repression continuum, according to their own experiences during the military dictatorship. Those who perceived themselves as victims of the dictatorship wanted to signal a total rupture with the repressive policing of the past. Others, on a more operational level of the SESEG, resuscitated authoritarian tools, like torture, and promoted highly repressive policing as the only appropriate response to control crime and violence, supported by the alleged *mão dura* successes during the dictatorship.

While the different state governors were busy with political ideology, Rio de Janeiro went through a series of public security crises which have become deeply ingrained in the social memory of the *cariocas* and help to explain the interviewees' lack of trust in the police and their concern with personal (physical) and political security. The Candelária and Vigário Geral massacres by death squads in 1993, the hijacking of bus 174 in 2000, the murder of the journalist Tim Lopes in 2002, the death squad massacre in Queimados and Nova Iguaçu in 2005, the two mega-operations in the Complexo do Alemão in 2007 and 2010 (see Section 6.3.1), the shooting down of a PMERJ helicopter by traffickers in the Morro dos Macacos in 2009, and the many UPP pacification operations in recent years all constitute hallmark events which have shaped the public security discourse in Rio de Janeiro in the past two decades. Most of these tragedies have triggered overhasty and exaggerated responses by the state, accompanied by great media attention and followed by an indifferent and inconsistent engagement with public security issues in the interval to the next crisis (Soares 2010, December). In fact, it is easier to track public security policy along the line of big crises than along the line of comprehensive government programmes elaborated and supported by the political


parties in power.³¹ In retrospect it becomes apparent that the administrations of Anthony and Rosinha Garotinho (1999 – 2002, 2003 – 2007) were the first ones to overcome the duality of prevention and repression and to implement more holistic and multidimensional public security policies. By consolidating the two extremes, overall crime indicators in the city of Rio de Janeiro gradually improved, especially since the launch of the UPP programme in 2008.

However, although the overall violent crime trend is positive, this chapter has not assessed the possibility that this is not true for all places and all sectors of society:

'The advances [in the recent reduction of violent crime rates] coexist with the old practices of warlike incursions of the favelas, extrajudicial executions, large-scale corruption, the involvement of police in all major forms of criminality and the militia phenomenon [...]. The advances are more topical, they are residual. They have not yet expanded to all areas. It has even deepened inequalities. The reduction in violent crime has privileged, more than anything, specific areas of the city and has deepened the problem of an uneven distribution of security resources' (Interview with Soares 2012, underline my own).

In other words, not all residents in Rio de Janeiro have benefitted from the recent advances in public security to the same extent. The following chapters will shed light on this dilemma which I denominate the 'inequality of security'.

³¹ One striking example of this are the two state governors Marcello Alencar (Rio de Janeiro) and Mário Covas (São Paulo) both from the PSDB that came into power in 1995. Whereas Alencar in Rio de Janeiro halted the community policing programmes and encouraged the police 'to shoot and ask questions later', his fellow party member Covas in São Paulo adopted extremely progressive policing (Macaulay 2005). He created community policing programmes and the São Paulo Ombudsman Office, and invested in the professionalisation and unification of the police forces (da Silva and Petrelluzzi 2003, June 25).



Vidigal, Rio de Janeiro

3 INEQUALITY OF SECURITY

3.1 Introduction

Not all residents are affected by crime, violence and insecurity in the same way. Crime rates, victimisation and perceptions of security differ according to people's age, gender, colour/race, religion, economic class, income and place of domicile/neighbourhood (Beato Filho 2000; Beato Filho 2003; Borges 2011; Husain 2007; Musumeci et al. 2011; Najar 2005; Rodrigues 2006; Zaluar 2008; Zaluar and Conceição 2007). Place of domicile or neighbourhood is one of the best predictors for inequality in the context of crime, violence and insecurity. To give a brief example, homicides in Belo Horizonte increased by 100 per cent between 1997 and 2001 and more than 80 per cent of this increase could be attributed to the city's favelas. In fact, 19.7 per cent of all the homicides occurred in only *six aglomerados urbanos* [urban agglomerations]. In 2002, 36 per cent of homicides in Belo Horizonte occurred in urban agglomerations that only represented 4.3 per cent of the city's area and 14 per cent of the city's population (Beato Filho 2003: 1, 2, 11).

In the city of Rio de Janeiro, a similar relationship between homicides and neighbourhoods can be observed: for every 23 per 1,000 young people between the ages of fifteen and thirty that die in the Complexo do Alemão, only 4.3 die in Copacabana (Zaluar 2008: 30). In fact, the initial findings of a study by Zaluar and Barcellos (2014) showed that the highest risk of being murdered lies not inside the favelas but in its immediate surroundings (in a buffer zone of 100 to 250 meters around the favelas), especially in areas which constitute conflict zones of rival criminal actors, i.e. between different drug gangs, between drug traffickers and the police, or between drug traffickers and militias.³² People's experiences with crime and violence also differ greatly between those living in favelas dominated by drug traffickers and those living in militia-controlled communities (Zaluar and Conceição 2007), as well as between favela youth and non-favela youth (Musumeci et al. 2011). There are also certain neighbourhood characteristics, such as the abandonment of public space and signs of violence which can increase people's perception of insecurity (Borges 2011).³³ The

³² Note that this research has not been published yet.

³³ Borges (2011) draws on neighbourhood characteristics and victimisation to explain fear of crime in the city of Rio de Janeiro. He uses a model called *Crenças de Perigo* [Beliefs of Danger] to refer to the social

perceived legitimacy of the police and perceived social disorder, i.e. the presence of street children, drug dealing and gangs in the neighbourhood can also act as strong predictors in perceptions of risk and safety, according to Rodrigues' (2006) systemic social control model in Belo Horizonte.³⁴

The relationship between people's place of domicile and their perception of security appears to be quite clear. However, there are mixed findings as to whether people's socio-demographic characteristics, like age, gender, colour/race, religion, economic class and income play a role in their perception of security. Rodrigues (2006), for instance, found little evidence that socio-demographic characteristics play a role in people's perceptions of risk and safety in Belo Horizonte. Husain (2007) interviewed 800 participants in 75 neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro and found no evidence that

construction of someone or something being dangerous which, in turn, triggers fear of crime, insecurity and risk perception. According to Borges, fear is a warning signal of danger that can be real, imaginary or potential. Beliefs are stable and enduring cognitive representations that have a fundamental influence on the way people perceive, interpret and construct the social world. Borges used data from the ISP victimisation survey of 2008 to test his model and argued that there are five major Beliefs of Danger that can trigger the emotional reaction of fear, provided that the individual is exposed to a potential signal of danger associated with these beliefs. It is, firstly, the belief that the environment is dangerous (direct and indirect victimisation, abandonment of public space in the neighbourhood, and signs of violence in the neighbourhood increase people's perceptions of insecurity). Secondly, it is the belief that the individual is unprotected. When social integration in the neighborhood is low and there is a lack of confidence in the police, there is higher probability of a person feeling insecure. Thirdly, it is the belief that the individual is an attractive target. People that consider themselves as an attractive target (e.g. people with higher education, white people, and adults over 40 years old) have higher perceptions of insecurity. Fourthly, it is the belief that there is a lot of violence and crime. Interestingly, if people believed there was more violence (because of what they heard in the news and from neighbours), they felt less insecure. Lastly, it is the belief that a potential offender is present. However, this belief could not be tested because the ISP victimisation survey did not include any data on this dimension.

³⁴ Rodrigues (2006) assessed the relationship between democracy and perceptions of risk and safety in the city of Belo Horizonte, using data from 599 participants of the 2002 Survey of the Metropolitan Region of Belo Horizonte. She argued that violence and insecurity in Brazil resulted from the lack of civil democracy and used a systemic social control model to help explain victimisation risk and fear of crime. With the help of an extensive set of variables – systemic social control variables, socio-demographic characteristics and neighbourhood characteristics – the author attempted to test the effect of these variables on perceived risk and insecurity, more specifically the perceived risk of robbery, the perceived risk of assault and the perceived night-time insecurity. Her results were surprising because they gave only limited support for the systemic social control model. The systemic social control variables – having friends in the neighbourhood, neighbourliness, participation in local associations, participation in meetings with city officials – had no significant effect on perceived risk of robbery or assault and perceived night-time insecurity. One of the few systemic social control variables that had an effect was the perceived legitimacy of police in the neighbourhood. If it increased, the perceived risks of robbery and insecurity declined (not the perceived risk of assault, however). The socio-demographic variables – sex, age, race and socioeconomic status – had no significant effect on perceived risk of robbery or assault and perceived night-time insecurity. Gender and socioeconomic status were the only socio-demographic variables that had significant effects on perceived night-time insecurity. The neighbourhood variable perceived social disorder emerged as the strongest predictor for perceived risk of robbery or assault and perceived night-time insecurity. This was measured with the help of three survey questions about the presence of street children, drug dealing and gangs in the neighbourhood. The author acknowledges that rather strong norm violations were used as an indicator of social disorder compared to, for instance, rubbish and loud music that constitute more common norm violations in the peripheral communities.

participants' evaluation of police human rights strategies differ on the basis of their socio-demographic characteristics. Beato Filho (2000) assessed violent crime data by the military police in 756 municipalities in Minas Gerais in 1991 and found no empirical support for the hypothesis that violent crime rates are correlated with income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) and poverty.³⁵ Najar's (2005) study on urban spatial segregation found that skin colour/race and income components are not convincing typologies for segregation in Rio de Janeiro.

All of these studies have made an important contribution in analysing how crime, violence and insecurity affect different geographical areas and groups of society in the cities of Belo Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro. This chapter builds on these findings and conducts its own survey to assess residents' perception of security in six specific neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro. It argues that the right to security is not enjoyed by all research participants to the same extent. This **inequality of security** is most visible in the comparison of the neighbourhoods. In other words, variations in participants' security perceptions are much greater between different neighbourhoods than between, for instance, men and women, young and old, black and white, or rich and poor people.

The chapter is structured in the following way. It briefly introduces the six neighbourhoods (see Section 3.2) and then discusses the survey results (see Section 3.3). The survey questionnaire includes questions on the meaning of security, social cohesion, crime talk and victimisation, day and night-time perceptions of safety, satisfaction with security and experiences with crime and violence. It was applied to 309 residents in the six neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro between April and July 2012.³⁶ The concluding section of this chapter argues that the inequality of security has severe implications for the legitimacy of the Brazilian state because it shows in very violent and life-threatening ways how the state's institutions are incapable of guaranteeing the same rights to all citizens (see Section 3.4). The consequence of this is that citizens will seek

³⁵ Beato Filho (2000) argued that prosperity provided opportunities for criminal action, hence when analysing crime one needed to focus on wealth not on poverty. Therefore, crime types like rape and grievous bodily harm, as well as robbery and armed robbery were more likely to occur in larger cities because these crimes required the availability of targets and anonymity. Interestingly, Beato Filho's study also proved that there is a negative correlation between homicides and the city's level of development: the level of municipal development, as measured by the HDI, was positively associated with certain crimes, especially (armed) robberies. However, the same could not be detected for homicides that occurred more frequently in lesser developed municipalities in Minas Gerais. However, out of the different homicide types, only first-degree murder (e.g. of friends or other intimate people like family members) was related to socioeconomic indicators of development.

³⁶ The data were collected from 309 residents (here called 'cases') in the six different neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro. After excluding a number of cases because of incomplete data, 47 cases in each neighbourhood were retained in the final analysis, giving a total sample size of 282 respondents. Of this total, 145 were male and 137 female. Respondents were between 16 and 87 years old, the mean age was 33 years. More details of the socio-demographic profile of the respondents can be found in Appendix II.

additional or alternative security elsewhere and align with other groups that they deem more capable of protecting them, such as private security companies, drug traffickers or death squads.

3.2 Brief introduction of the six neighbourhoods

Drawing on the findings from authoritative studies in the field (Beato Filho 2003; Borges 2011; Musumeci et al. 2011; Rodrigues 2006; Zaluar 2008; Zaluar and Conceição 2007), it was hypothesised that people's place of domicile is the most influential factor to detect and explain differences in their perception of security. Great care was therefore taken to select the neighbourhoods in order to give justice to the wide variety of security experiences which can be found in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The selection process was explained in detail in the methodological section of this thesis (see Section 1.4.3). Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 give an overview of the selected neighbourhoods. The following section will briefly introduce these communities and we will also return to the relative merits of each case in Chapter 6 (more maps and photographs can be found in Appendix III).

Table 3.1 Overview of the Zona Sul and Zona Norte neighbourhoods

	Zona Sul		Zona Norte	
Neighbourhood	Vidigal	Botafogo	Complexo do Alemão	Tabuleiro*
Bairro	Lagoa	Botafogo	Complexo do Alemão	
Size (hectares)	162.14	479.9	296.09	small
HDI (rank)	0.873 (38 th)	0.952 (13 th)	0.711 (126 th)	very low
Population	9,677	82,890	69,143	ca. 3,000
Security providers	ADA drug traffickers; UPP	BPM	CV drug traffickers; Military; UPP	Militias

Source: Author's own illustration, based on data from the IBGE (2011) and the Instituto Pereira Passos (2000).

Note: The HDI of Vidigal was measured together with the very prosperous São Conrado neighbourhood. The HDI of Botafogo was measured together with Urca. The population data are taken from the official IBGE 2010 census. It is probable that the real population figures in the neighbourhoods are much bigger due to underreporting, especially in the favelas. Tabuleiro* is the pseudonym for a favela whose real name cannot be revealed in order to protect the identity of the field research assistant and survey participants.

Table 3.2 Overview of the Zona Oeste neighbourhoods

	Zona Oeste	
Neighbourhood	Santíssimo	Novo Leblon
Bairro	Campo Grande	Barra da Tijuca
Size (hectares)	831.96	53
HDI (rank)	0.780 (101 th)	0.959 (8 th)
Population	41,458	6,000
Security providers	TCP drug traffickers; BPM; Militias	Private security company

Source: Author's own illustration, based on data from the IBGE (2011), the Instituto Pereira Passos (2000) and Novo Leblon's website (2013).

Note: The HDI of Novo Leblon was taken from the HDI for Joá and Barra da Tijuca.

3.2.1 Vidigal

'Perhaps more than any other favela in the Zona Sul, [...] Vidigal is testimony to the inequities of twentieth-century capitalist development in Brazil' (Gay 1994: 65).

Vidigal is a south zone hillside favela with an 'official' census population of 12,797 residents. According to the census data, the population has declined from 13,719 in 2000 to 12,797 inhabitants in 2010 (Instituto Pereira Passos 2011). However, community leaders estimate that approximately 50,000 people live in the community (Albanese 2012). With a territorial area of 162 hectares, Vidigal is situated between the neighbourhoods Gávea and Leblon to the east and São Conrado to the west, three of the most prosperous neighbourhoods of Rio de Janeiro.

Vidigal was named after its first owner, Major Miguel Nunes Vidigal who had received the land from the Benedictine monks in 1820 in recognition for his good services as a policeman of the Guarda Real de Polícia de Corte [Royal Guard of the Police of the Court]. In 1919, Mayor Paulo de Frontin created the panoramic Avenida Niemeyer which cuts through Vidigal. In the 1940s, the first residents settled in the lower area of the hill between the Avenida Niemeyer and the Atlantic Ocean. At the time, the community only expanded at a very slow pace because the guards of the land's proprietor did not allow the settlers to build brick houses or make any improvement works. In 1950, all houses below the Avenida Niemeyer were removed and the favela continued to grow uphill. The construction of the Sheraton Hotel on the beach of Vidigal started in 1968 (Albanese 2012; Instituto Pereira Passos 2013b).

By the end of the 1960s, residents in Vidigal were already fairly well organised and the Associação de Moradores [resident association] was founded. Pressured by the owners of middle-class residencies close-by, the government made several attempts to remove the favela residents from the land. In 1958 and 1967 the Empresa Industrial Melhoramentos do Brasil, the owner of the land, unsuccessfully requested the eviction of the around 200 families. In 1977, the real estate companies Rio Towers and Sincorpa bought the land with the aim of building luxury apartment buildings. In negotiations with the residents of Vidigal, some families accepted being removed to a housing complex in Antares, in Santa Cruz, two hours away from Vidigal. However, the rest of the community united under the leadership of the resident association and once again resisted the eviction with the help of the Catholic Church (Gay 1994). Gay (1994) argues that at a time where the political climate of the military dictatorship was marked by severe repression, the resistance and strong leadership of the resident association was remarkable. The resident association in Vidigal became known for its increasing adeptness at mobilising residents and pressuring the municipal secretaries of housing, education and health to improve social services in the community. The visit of Pope John Paul II to Vidigal in 1980 marked a turning point in the history of the community. The Chagas Freitas administration initiated a series of public works to improve infrastructure, sanitation and electricity before the Pope's visit to show their concern with urban development of poor neighbourhoods. As predicted by the resident association, the land appropriation process was then completely abandoned (Gay 1994).

Today, Vidigal is a fully urbanised community. Electricity, water, sewage, garbage collection, internet and mobile coverage work well in most parts of the community (compared to other favelas). Vidigal has two nurseries and two municipal schools, several churches, as well as a number of civil society groups, such as a resident association, the Nós do Morro youth theatre group and the NGO Horizonte.

Nowadays, the community stretches all the way from the Atlantic Ocean and Avenida Niemeyer at the bottom of the favela to the cliffs of the Dois Irmãos Mountain. As one of only two roads that connect the Zona Sul with the Barra da Tijuca region, the Avenida Niemeyer continues to be an important transport route. By vehicle, Vidigal can only be entered via the Praça do Vidigal on the Avenida Niemeyer which is always busy. Street vendors sell their food, residents sit on benches, adolescents wait for their friends, and an endless line of cars, taxis and buses pass by on the way from Barra da Tijuca to Leblon – all under the watchful eyes of the UPP police. Smaller vans and *moto táxis*³⁷ are waiting to take residents to destinations uphill, via Avenida Presidente João Goulart,

³⁷ *Moto táxis* are young men on scooters that offer to take passengers uphill at high speed for a small fee of R\$ 3-5.

the lifeline of the community that winds its way up from Praça do Vidigal all the way to the top of the favela. The Avenida Presidente João Goulart has no or little sidewalk and is relatively narrow, especially in the upper part. The endless movement of vans, *moto táxis*, pedestrians, street vendors and police cars make for a chaotic and hazardous environment.

Vidigal had been under the control of drug traffickers for several decades and was pacified by the UPP pacification police in January 2012 (see Section 6.2.3). Since then it has turned into prime real estate, valued for its spectacular view and its location close to the beach, Zona Sul shopping malls, restaurants and theatres. Due to the many artists and foreigners who have bought property in the community, Vidigal is increasingly seen as a 'Bohemian favela'. An employee of the community television channel TV VDG sarcastically stated: '*Agora todo mundo quer ser preto e favelado*' [Now everyone wants to be black and from the favela] (Field notes 6, 2012).

3.2.2 Botafogo

Botafogo is a middle-class *bairro* in the Zona Sul of Rio de Janeiro where a military police battalion carries out traditional policing. Its population has stagnated at around 80,000 inhabitants since the 1990s (Instituto Pereira Passos 2011). It is situated between Flamengo (north), the Guanabara Bay, Urca and the Sugarloaf Mountain (east), Leme and Copacabana (in the south, geographically separated by hills) and Humaitá (west). There are a few hillside favelas that fall into the boundaries of Botafogo: Santa Marta (with an 'official' census population of 3,908), Ladeira dos Tabajaras (1,049), Mangueira (375) and Morro da Saudade (63) (Instituto Pereira Passos 2013d).

Antonio Francisco Velho was the first settler in the region. He received the land from his friend Estácio de Sá, the founder of the city. The neighbourhood received its name 'Botafogo' in 1580 when Francisco Velho sold the land to the Portuguese explorer João Pereira de Sousa Botafogo. Until the seventeenth century, however, the land only served as a transit way from Catete to the Fort São João on the Praia Vermelha beach in Urca. With the arrival of King John VI of Portugal in 1808, large mansions were built at the bay side of Botafogo, and members of the Portuguese Royal Court, wealthy merchants and diplomatic corps who accompanied the king settled into these houses or used them as vacation homes. Other aristocrats, coffee barons and wealthy tradesmen began to build their palaces nearby and the region became known as the 'Green Belt' because of its beauty and nobility (Instituto Pereira Passos 2013b).

The most decisive factor for the development of Botafogo was the steamboat service, inaugurated in 1843, which took passengers from Botafogo to the centre of the city. With

this new transportation route, immigrants and less affluent people settled down in Botafogo and built more modest houses and small commercial shops in the streets away from the bay side. In the second half of the nineteenth century, new transit streets were built, such as the Túnel Velho [Old Tunnel] in 1892 that connected Botafogo with Copacabana. With the massive urban reform of Mayor Pereira Passos in 1906, business flourished and many of the stately mansions were occupied by embassies, schools, and later by health clinics, restaurants and companies. Botafogo's new residents were now labourers, merchants and craftsmen who lived in village houses, collective tenements and slums. With the opening of the metro and an increasing scarcity of unoccupied land in the south zone, Botafogo was rediscovered as a middle-class neighbourhood in the 1980s and a new series of apartment blocks was built (Instituto Pereira Passos 2013b).

3.2.3 Complexo do Alemão

The Complexo do Alemão is an agglomeration of thirteen favelas in the Zona Norte of Rio de Janeiro and constitutes a *bairro* in itself.³⁸ With a total size of 296 hectares, it is circled by the following other *bairros*: Bonsucesso (east), Inhaúma (south), Engenho da Rainha (west), and Complexo da Penha and Olaria (north). The Serra da Misericórida (a mountain range) in the northwest separates the Complexo do Alemão geographically from Vila Cruzeiro, a favela which is part of the Complexo da Penha (this is important to remember for the analysis of security providers in Chapter 6.3.1). One of the main attractions in the Complexo do Alemão today is the new *teleférico* [cable car] which was built with funds from the federal Growth Acceleration Programme and inaugurated in July 2011. The cable car connects Bonsucesso with the Morro das Palmeiras in Inhaúma, via Morro do Adeus, Morro da Baiana, Morro do Alemão and Itararé/Alvorada.

According to the census data, the population of the Complexo do Alemão has increased from 62,037 in 1991 to 69,143 in 2010 (Instituto Pereira Passos 2011). However, other sources state that the real population today is about 80,000 (de Lima 2012: 42). The Complexo do Alemão has a HDI of 0.711 – the lowest of all 126 neighbourhoods measured in Rio de Janeiro in 2000 (Instituto Pereira Passos 2000) and living conditions are very precarious in large parts of the neighbourhood.

Historical records of the Complexo do Alemão state that a Polish immigrant called Leonard Kaczmarkiewicz acquired land in the Serra da Misericórdia in the 1920s. The local population referred to him as *o alemão* [the German] and that is how the area

³⁸ According to other sources (NGOs etc.), the Complexo do Alemão consists of twenty-one to twenty-three favelas, respectively thirty-three when including the surrounding communities (de Lima 2012).

became known as the Morro do Alemão [Hill of the German]. In 1928, Kaczmarkiewicz began dividing his land into smaller lots to sell it (de Lima 2012; Perlman 2010).

The Complexo do Alemão has traditionally been the stronghold of the CV. The gang has been active in the following areas: the drug trade (cocaine, marihuana, crack and hashish), violent conflicts with other drug factions and the police, the arms and ammunitions trade, kidnappings, robberies of cargo trucks, the infiltration of public organs and the intimidation of public security organs, prison rebellions, interdiction of roads, vandalism, as well as the robbery of arms, ammunitions and explosives from military barracks, among others. The gang of approximately 500 drug traffickers has also coerced the population and intimidated businesses, schools and other public and private institutions. The CV has been known to force all shops and schools to remain closed for a determined period in protest of a new government security policy or because leaders of their organisation had been killed or had been transferred from state to federal prisons (de Lima 2012).

In the run up to the Pan American Games in July 2007, some highly repressive operations were conducted to weaken the base of the CV in Vila Cruzeiro and the Complexo do Alemão, aimed at reducing the weapons arsenal and narcotics stock of the CV and arresting its members. In a mega operation called Divisa Integrada [Integrated Border], 1,350 police from Rio de Janeiro's military police, civil police and the FNSP invaded a territory 'where nobody knew what was in there since about six years', according to State Secretary of Security Beltrame (Interview with Beltrame 2012). He stated that the operation was conducted in the 'least traumatic way possible' but nevertheless nineteen people were killed. Forensic experts from The Special Secretariat for Human Rights of the Presidency later concluded that some of the victims were arbitrarily executed, fueling mutual accusations between the federal government and Rio de Janeiro's security forces (Interview with Pedrinha 2011).

The occupation of the Complexo do Alemão by state security forces did not last long and the drug traffickers soon returned to their communities. However, Colonel Mário Sérgio Duarte, the former commander of the military police in Rio de Janeiro states that the idea of a definite recovery of the favela territories was forming in the heads of policy-makers. Former State Governor Cabral and Beltrame had visited Colombia and witnessed the Colombian government's progress in facing the violence of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia; FARC], the Ejército de Liberación Nacional [National Liberation Army; ELN], the drug cartels and paramilitaries:

'What they had done in the Comuna of Santo Domingo in Medellín showed that there was no irreversible situation and if we wanted to be successful, we would have to follow that same path' (Duarte 2012: 38).

The Comuna 13 in Medellín served as a blue print for the UPP pacification idea:

'The Complexo do Alemão would be a great emblem. Joining forces with the federal government through PAC – the Growth Acceleration Programme – [we] would do something similar to what had been done in Medellín, including building a transportation system by cable car, reorganising space architecturally and supplying the region with other resources that would be facilitators of citizenship' (Duarte 2012: 38).

When a new wave of violence, instigated by the drug lords in the Complexo do Alemão, hit Rio de Janeiro in November 2010, the time had come to take the concept of pacification to the stronghold of the CV. In another mega operation, this time involving 2,900 soldiers and police, the government occupied the Complexo do Alemão and neighbouring Complexo da Penha. A so-called Força de Pacificação [Pacification Force; FPac] under the command of the Comando Militar do Leste [Military Command of Eastern Brazil; CML] was created to assume the control of the Complexo do Alemão and the Complexo da Penha from November 2010 to June 2012. In the last months of the FPac occupation, power was slowly handed over to seven new UPP outposts which were inaugurated between May and August 2012 (see Section 6.3.1).

3.2.4 Tabuleiro*

Tabuleiro* is the pseudonym for a favela whose real name cannot be revealed in order to protect the identity of the field research assistant and all residents who participated in the survey. Tabuleiro* is a small community of approximately 3,000 residents in the north zone of Rio de Janeiro. The favela is part of a bigger favela agglomeration and has one of the lowest HDIs in the city. It was chosen as a neighbourhood case study in this research because it is controlled by militias and it is also situated in a region that is of strategic interest for the state secretary of security. Due to the fact that any further information, maps or photographs may give clues about where the community is located and potentially endanger those who helped to collect the data, no more details can be revealed at this stage (see Section 6.2.2 for more information).

3.2.5 Santíssimo

Santíssimo is a *bairro* with 41,458 inhabitants in the Zona Oeste of Rio de Janeiro. The population of Santíssimo has grown significantly in the past two decades. Whereas only 24,600 people lived in the neighbourhood in 1991, this number increased to 34,086 in

2000 and to 41,458 in 2010 (Instituto Pereira Passos 2011). Residents are largely from the lower and lower middle classes. Once populated only by a few farmers, Santíssimo has turned into a bedroom suburb in recent decades.

Santíssimo is part of the Campo Grande Administrative Region (XVIII), approximately 37 kilometers away from the centre of the city. It is situated between the Avenida Brasil to the north and the Avenida Santa Cruz to the south and constitutes a rather rural neighbourhood with a lot of trees and a low population density. It has a number of small favelas with a few hundred residents each and borders the huge Parque Estadual da Pedra Branca [Pedra Branca State Forest] which is one of the biggest urban forests in the world (Instituto Pereira Passos 2013a). Santíssimo has a train station which lies on the train line from the centre of the city to Campo Grande or Santa Cruz, via Méier, Madureira, Realengo and Bangu, and is operated by SuperVia. It is the principal transport hub for its residents, many of whom work in the centre and travel approximately two hours on the train every morning and every evening to get to work and come back home.

In Santíssimo there is an on-going urban war between police and drug traffickers from the TCP faction. The community bears the costs of this conflict in the form of civilian casualties, stray bullets, discrimination, extortion from criminal actors, and other inconveniences, like road blocks. The security situation is aggravated by a group of militias who are attempting to take over territory from the drug traffickers (see Section 6.3.2).

3.2.6 Novo Leblon

Novo Leblon is a 53 hectares-large *condomínio* in Barra da Tijuca in the Zona Oeste of Rio de Janeiro and serves as a case study of a private security company. Barra da Tijuca is the largest suburban land development project in the country (Herzog 2012). It has twenty-seven kilometers of beaches, three lagoons, innumerable gated communities, shopping malls and entertainment facilities and constitutes for many of its 300,000 inhabitants the realisation of the American 'suburb dream'.³⁹

Before the 1960s, the region was geographically isolated from the city of Rio de Janeiro because of mountains, sand dunes, lagoons, and swamps. The area was only populated

³⁹ However, there are also those who voice concern about this kind of lifestyle: 'The biggest worry [about the lifestyle in Barra] is the formation of a generation that is totally unprepared to live outside their gated worlds. Without elementary notions of life, they are living in these socioeconomic bubbles, in a world coloured in pink, isolated from the complex reality of large cities. Many have visited Disneyland but they do not know the center of the city, they take airplanes and cars with a private driver but have no idea how to take the subway, bus or train' (Gomes and Rio 1998: 13).

by farmers and a few residential dwellers. However, with the rapid population growth in the Zona Sul neighbourhoods in the 1950s and 1960s, real estate prices skyrocketed and there was a lack of space to build residencies for the newly rich. Demand was high for a new suburban lifestyle, away from the chaos, noise and the uncontrolled growth of the favelas. The pilot plan of the Barra da Tijuca land development project was designed by Lucio Costa, chief planner of the capital Brasília, in 1970. The parallels with Brasília are noteworthy. Herzog points out that the cross-like design of Barra da Tijuca with two main axes (the horizontal axis Avenida das Americas and the perpendicular axis Avenida Ayrton Senna) resembles the airplane-shaped morphology of the capital. Furthermore, Barra da Tijuca is characterised by 'single-use zones' (apartment blocks, offices, supermarkets), isolated high-rise apartment or office towers and car-oriented spaces (Herzog 2012). In Costa's pilot plan, Barra was meant to be 'the most beautiful oceanic city in the world', completely detached from the city of Rio de Janeiro (Gomes and Rio 1998: 8).

Novo Leblon and Novo Ipanema were the first two gated communities in Barra da Tijuca. The advertisement for the newly built Novo Leblon in 1976 had an irresistible appeal: '*Viva onde você gostaria de passar suas férias*' [Live where you would like to spend your holidays] (Novo Leblon 2013). It invited people to escape the urban chaos and overcrowding of the city and start a 'new way of life' with comfort, tranquillity, security, plenty of leisure activities and a range of services. The similarities to suburban values championed in the USA are striking: social exclusivity, emphasis on private space over public space, fear of crime, consumerism, landscapes of artificiality etc. (Blakely and Snyder 1997; Caldeira 2000; Herzog 2012). The idea of living in a US-style suburb appealed to the 'nouveau riche' of Rio de Janeiro. Resultantly, Barra da Tijuca has seen a population tripling in the past twenty years, from 98,229 in 1991 to 300,823 in 2010 (Instituto Pereira Passos 2011).

Novo Leblon and Novo Ipanema were named in tribute to the upper-class neighbourhoods in the Zona Sul and created the illusion that the newly rich inhabitants of these two *condomínios* would move to a place similar to the two famous and legendary Zona Sul neighbourhoods. However, the two could not be more different: despite Ipanema and Leblon being neighbourhoods with a mix of social classes where people stroll through the streets and stop at shops, cafés and restaurants, the two new condo-residential complexes are characterised by separated high-rise buildings with a lot of empty green space and no public life (Herzog 2012).

Today, Novo Leblon has approximately 6,000 inhabitants and is situated between the Avenida das Americas highway to the north and the Marapendi lagoon and the Atlantic Coast to the south. The *condomínio* consists of 1,120 two to four bedroom apartments in

eight high-rise buildings, as well as 189 land plots of 1,000 to 1,500 square meters. The buildings are named after Italian artists of the classical period: Canova, Moretto, Masaccio, Lucca Della Robbia, Di Duccio, Ghirlandaio, Michelozzo and Pisano. The gated community also has a sports club (with swimming pools, sauna and tennis courts), a barbecue area, restaurants, a shopping mall, one public and one private school, and a small private harbour where residents can take a boat across the lagoon to get to the beach. There is a special bus shuttle service to take residents to the Zona Sul or the centre of the city. A recent 'for sale' advertisement of a 3-bedroom apartment with two parking lots and view over the ocean stated the price of the apartment as R\$ 1.4 million (Novo Leblon 2013).

Novo Leblon is surrounded by other gated communities (e.g. Mandala, Mundo Novo), several huge shopping malls (Barra Shopping, Barra Trade, New York City Centre, Rio Design Barra etc.), supermarkets (Carrefour, Makro, Extra) and the offices of Shell, Esso, Vale do Rio Doce, Michelin and Nokia, to name but a few.

3.3 Survey results

3.3.1 What does 'security' mean to you?

The purpose of this open-ended survey question was to validate the findings of the first field research phase – that the term 'security' is mainly associated with personal (physical) and political security by residents in Rio de Janeiro (see Section 2.2.1). The results from this bigger quantitative sample confirm the initial qualitative research findings. Survey participants understood security principally as freedom (of movement), no fear, no violence, tranquility, police/state action and peace. Other types of security, such as financial security or health security, were rarely mentioned (see Table 3.3).⁴⁰

⁴⁰ This survey question was an open-ended question, meaning that respondents could answer whatever came to their minds and did not have to choose between different answer options. The question was placed at the beginning of the survey (after participants were asked about social cohesion but before questions focused specifically on crime and violence) in order to collect data on respondents' spontaneous thoughts on security and to avoid pushing them into certain patterns of thinking. Responses were analysed with a specially designed coding scheme for content analysis. According to Neuendorf (2002: 10), 'Content Analysis is a summarizing, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method (including attention to objectivity-intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability, replicability, and hypothesis testing) and is not limited to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages are created or presented.' Holsti's method (1969) was used to measure *intercoder reliability*, i.e. the extent to which two coders yielded the same results when coding categorical data. Holsti suggests using the following formula: $PA_o = 2A / (n_1 + n_2)$, where PA_o is the 'Proportion Agreement, observed', A is the 'Agreement' and n_1 and n_2 are the number of units coded by Coder 1 and 2. It ranges from 0.00 (no agreement) to 1.00 (perfect agreement).

Table 3.3 Survey results: What does security mean?

Category	Key words / Examples	Percentage of responses
Freedom (of movement)	Freedom, free, 'ir e vir' [to come and go], walk freely, walking 'Being able to leave and come back home without running into a bunch of thugs' (CDA49). 'Being able to get in and out of my community without the help of anyone' (CDA48). 'The ability to go where I want' (VID8). 'Being able to live in a place where I can leave and come back <i>sem hora marcada</i> [without having a fixed time to be back]' (VID26). 'Being able to move freely within the city' (BOT9).	26.4%
No fear	No fear, no discomfort, no worry, not being afraid 'Feeling that I don't have to worry about my physical well-being and not being afraid' (NL34). 'Living without fear of anything' (TAB31). 'Being able to go to the streets and work without fear' (VID10). 'Being free, to say what I want without looking over my shoulders' (VID38, classified as freedom of movement and no fear). 'Being able to live life without fear, just like we do here' (TAB18).	24.1%
No violence	No violence, not hearing gunfire, without gunfire, getting home alive, not suffering an assault, not being robbed 'Not hearing gunfire or seeing anyone armed' (CDA16). 'Living in a place without weapons and violence' (VID47). 'Not being subject to violence' (NL42). 'Simply to say I live in a favela and that there is no more drug trade' (SANT5).	12.3%
Tranquility	Tranquility, tranquil, calm 'Living <i>tranquilo</i> [peaceful], without fear' (TAB23). 'Tranquility in everyday life' (NL13). 'Being calm, knowing that I will come back home alive' (SANT50, classified as tranquility and no violence).	9.6%

The content analysis of the data here is indicative of high reliability ($PA_o = 0.7878$) because the general rule of thumb states that an intercoder reliability of .75+ indicates excellent agreement beyond chance. Each of the respective categories was also indicative of high reliability (.75+) with the exception of 'No violence' ($PA_o = A / n = 0.74$) and 'Police /State' ($PA_o = A / n = 0.65$) which both nevertheless indicated fair to good agreement beyond chance.

It should be noted that many respondents answered this question in a way that resonated with key words from two or more answer categories. In fact, responses such as 'coming and going without being afraid of stray bullets or assaults' or 'going to the streets without being afraid of dying' were quite common and were classified accordingly, e.g. as 'freedom (of movement)', 'no fear' and 'no violence'.

Police / State	Police, security organs, government, governor, public power	5.4%
<p>'I feel safe with the police' (CDA4).</p> <p>'Unity among the military police and the residents' (CDA37).</p> <p>'Having more police in the streets' (BOT18).</p> <p>'Having at least one [police] patrol in the city that uses non-lethal weapons' (BOT18).</p> <p>'The government stopping and realising the chaos that this country has turned into and doing something about it and being sure that this will happen' (SANT13).</p> <p>'Being able to trust in those forces that should provide security' (SANT1).</p> <p>'We will never be safe unless the government would be there for the people' (SANT51).</p>		
Peace	<i>Paz</i> [peace]	5.0%
<p>'If you have peace, you have security' (CDA47).</p> <p>'Having peace and not being afraid of living' (CDA1).</p>		
Other	Protection, family, assistance, money, financial stability, religion, God, <i>orixás</i> ⁴¹ , Jesus, something personal, something important, not being alone, living well, street lighting, alarm, comfort	16.5%
<p>'Leaving and coming back without always having to resort to God' (VID25, classified as freedom of movement and other).</p> <p>'Leaving home without having to leave it to God to save me' (VID29, classified as freedom of movement and other).</p> <p>'Everything. Security is everything' (TAB25).</p> <p>'Something that we don't have with the same quality as those who have money' (TAB27).</p> <p>'Having life guided by common sense' (VID21).</p>		

Source: Author's own illustration.

3.3.2 Social cohesion

Whether a given community is socially cohesive or socially disorganised is imperative for understanding residents' perceptions of insecurity, violence and crime. Social cohesion is defined as:

'[T]he capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding polarisation. A cohesive society is a mutually supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by democratic means' (European Committee for Social Cohesion 2004: 3).

A socially cohesive community is one where residents trust their neighbours and believe in the power of union. Neighbourhood theories of social organisation indicate that in

⁴¹ Afro-Brazilian gods from the Candomblé and Umbanda religions.

socially cohesive communities people's exposure to crime and violence is reduced because of the common desire to live in a friendly and safe environment without interpersonal violence (Earls et al. 1997). A study on neighbourhoods and violent crime in Chicago by Earls, Sampson and Raudenbush in the middle of the 1990s found that collective efficacy, defined as 'social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good', was linked to reduced violence (Earls et al. 1997: 918).

Social disorganisation is at the other end of the continuum of social cohesion and can be linked to higher rates of victimisation and street crime at the neighbourhood level (Clarke 1992; da Silva 2004; Newman 1972; Shaw and Mackay 1942). Social disorganisation is understood as:

'[A] society that displays social disorder and conflict, disparate moral values, extreme social inequality, low levels of interaction between and within communities and low levels of place attachment' (Forrest and Kearns 2001: 2128).

Residents' exposure to violence can thus be drastically compounded by the conditions of social disorganisation because it multiplies the possibilities that crime and violence will occur and that no appropriate help is available for the victims.

However, when da Silva (2004) used the collective efficacy model by Earls, Sampson and Raudenbush and modified it to the context of Belo Horizonte, he found no clear evidence for the social disorganisation theory. Poor areas of Belo Horizonte were characterised by a high level of social cohesion and perceived disorder (e.g. abandoned buildings in the neighbourhood, rubbish, neighbours listening to loud music). However, at the same time, these areas had a high probability of victimisation (physical aggression or homicides). In other words, the most stable and socially cohesive areas of the city were also the ones with the highest level of perceived disorder and a high probability of victimisation. Da Silva believed that the absence of the state as the provider of social services in the favelas and the intensification of the drug trade in recent years could help to understand these results. In a later publication, Villareal and da Silva (2006) also emphasized the greater spread of information in socially cohesive neighbourhoods because residents interact more with each other. This can explain the effect social cohesion has on the perception of risk.

In order to measure social cohesion / social disorganisation in the six neighbourhoods of interest for this survey, respondents were asked how much they agreed with five statements about their neighbourhoods (see Table 3.4).⁴² Pearson's chi-

⁴² This block of questions was inspired by the study 'Neighbourhoods and Violence Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy' which included statements, such as 'If there is a problem around here, the

square test and Cramer's V were used to analyse the results (see Appendix II.D for a more detailed explanation).

Table 3.4 Survey results: Social cohesion

		Social cohesion					
		(percentage of 'fully agree' and 'agree' responses)					
		I know my neighbours.					
Gender		MALE	75.9	50.7	43.9	40.8	55.4
		FEMALE	65.4	44.9	42.1	39.4	48.8
Age	16 – 32 YEARS		64.7**	39.9**	41	34.9	43.3*
	33 – 87 YEARS		80.2**	60**	44.6	43.2	57.8*
Race	WHITE		61.8**	43.9	41	34.9	43.3*
	NONWHITE		76.9**	50.3	44.6	43.2	57.8*
Religion	CATHOLIC		78	52.4	45.7	45.1	55.3
	OTHER		69.4	45.8	41.7	38.3	51.7
Income	LOW		69.5	43.2*	39.9*	35.4*	49.1*
	MIDDLE_HIGH		75	59.5*	54.5*	52.6*	64.9*
Economic class	LOW		77.5**	51.2	46.7*	44	67.7***
	MIDDLE_HIGH		58.6**	40.2	33.7*	33.3	33.3***
Education	LOW_MIDDLE		73.9	51.5	46.3	39.1	49.2
	MIDDLE_HIGH		69.7	46.1	41.6	40.6	52.4
Neighbourhood	VID		93.6***	73.9***	70.2***	63***	93.2***
	BOT		36.2***	25***	24.4***	15.2***	24.3***
	CDA		71.1***	48.9***	23.9***	44.7***	38.6***
	TAB		61.7***	29.8***	42.2***	19.1***	28.3***
	SANT		97.9***	66***	57.4***	57.4***	95.7***
	NL		63.8***	42.6***	37***	41.3***	27.9***
Total			70.8	47.8	43	40.1	52.3

Source: Author's own calculations.

Note: *p< .05, **p<.01, and ***p<.001. Responses were measured on a 5-point Likert scale: strongly agree, agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. The table depicts the percentage of 'fully agree' and 'agree' responses.

Neighbourhood emerged as the most powerful variable in explaining differences in social cohesion (see Table 3.4). Higher levels of social cohesion were observed in the favelas that are or had been controlled by drug traffickers, Santíssimo (mean social


neighbors get together to deal with it', 'People around here are willing to help their neighbors' and 'If I had to borrow \$30 in an emergency, I could borrow it from a neighbor' (Earls et al. 1997).

cohesion factor score of 0.88), Vidigal⁴³ (0.77) and Complexo do Alemão (-0.16), compared to the gated community Novo Leblon (-0.28), the militia-controlled community of Tabuleiro* (-0.64) and the middle-class neighbourhood of Botafogo (-0.83) (see boxplots⁴⁴ in Figure 3.1 which resulted from a principal component analysis (PCA) that is explained in more depth in Appendix II.E). Throughout the discussion of the survey results, we will return to this finding at various points. For now it is interesting to note that Botafogo appears as the community with the lowest level of social cohesion of all neighbourhoods. Instead of speaking of it as a neighbourhood which has 'low social cohesion', it would be more appropriate to state that it has characteristics of a 'socially disorganised community'. This could be due to the high population turnover in the past decade. Owing to its large service sector and its strategic position between the centre of the city and the Zona Sul, Botafogo used to be merely a *bairro de passagem* [passage neighbourhood]. Yet in the last decade, a new middle class with higher income has moved to Botafogo and the old village houses and smaller buildings gave way to apartment blocks with private security (Tavares 2011, August 28). As a consequence, community life in Botafogo has become increasingly anonymous. Furthermore, due to the lack of policing at night and increased street crime and violence, residents are abandoning public spaces and retreating to their private homes (see Section 3.3.5).

⁴³ The high level of social cohesion in Vidigal was also observed by Robert Gay in his research in the beginning of the 1990s. At the time he reported that Vidigal had a 'strong sense of community' (Gay 1994: 68).

⁴⁴ Boxplots, also called box-whisker diagrams, are useful to depict the range of scores. The lowest and highest scores are shown by the horizontal bottom and top lines of each plot. The median is the horizontal line in the centre of the plot. The tinted box around the median is the interquartile range (IQR), representing the middle 50 per cent of the data. The lowest edge of the tinted box is the lower quartile – 25 per cent of the data fall between this line and the lower horizontal line. The top edge of the tinted box is the upper quartile – 25 per cent of the data fall between this line and the top horizontal line (Field 2009: p. 99f.). Here, the highest possible social cohesion score was 1.6 and was achieved when a research participant answered all of the above statements with 'strongly agree', indicating strong social cohesion. A score of -2.16 indicated social disorganisation and was achieved when the respondent answered all statements with 'strongly disagree'. Note that positive scores do not automatically indicate social cohesion and negative scores do not necessarily indicate social disorganisation. Rather, the scale of the y-axis is merely an orientation to compare different neighbourhoods with each other.

Figure 3.1 Survey results: Social cohesion in the neighbourhoods



Source: Author's own illustration.

3.3.3 Victimization, crime talk and the role of the media

Crime and fear play a central role in everyday narratives, conversations and jokes in Brazil. The talk of crime is contagious, counteracts fear and simultaneously reproduces and magnifies it (Caldeira 2000). This survey therefore included two 'classic' victimisation questions about victimisation and crime talk (see Table 3.5).

Table 3.5 Survey results: Crime talk and victimisation

Crime talk and victimisation (percentage of 'yes' responses)		Do you think it is possible that you become the victim of a crime in the next twelve months?	Did you talk with anyone about crime or violence in the past two weeks?
Gender	MALE	85.5	81.4
	FEMALE	80.8	73.5
Age	16 – 32 YEARS	86.7	77.2
	33 – 87 YEARS	78.3	78.2
Race	WHITE	82	77.3
	NONWHITE	86.1	78.1
Religion	CATHOLIC	80.8	74.4
	OTHER	84.6	79.8
Income	LOW	84.4	78.1
	MIDDLE_HIGH	85.3	82.5
Economic class	LOW	86.1	81.7*
	MIDDLE_HIGH	79.8	69.7*
Education	LOW_MIDDLE	72.1**	65.2**

	MIDDLE_HIGH	87.9**	81.7**
Neighbourhood	VID	97.9***	89.4***
	BOT	60.5***	65.2***
	CDA	78***	74.5***
	TAB	66***	66***
	SANT	100***	100***
	NL	95.7***	70.2***
Total		83.4	77.6

Source: Author's own calculations.

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, and *** $p < .001$. Using discrete time intervals, e.g. 'in the past two weeks' or 'in the next twelve months', rather than using lifetime victimisation frequencies, is common practice in this kind of survey in order to control for age effects (younger people have less opportunities to be victimised) and to benefit from the fact that respondents' memories are still fresh.

The great majority (83.4 per cent) of research participants believed it was possible that they could become the victim of a crime in the next twelve months. Interviewed residents were most concerned with this in the neighbourhoods of Santíssimo (100 per cent), Vidigal (97.9 per cent) and Novo Leblon (95.7 per cent). Most of the research participants (77.6 per cent) had also talked with someone about crime or violence in the past two weeks. Education and neighbourhood were the only variables where differences between the respective categories were statistically significant.

In terms of education, the percentage of respondents who had engaged in crime talk in the past two weeks was higher among those with secondary school or university degree (81.7 per cent) than primary school or middle school (65.2 per cent). This result is difficult to explain. A possible explanation is that people with higher education have a higher inquisitiveness and a greater habit of discussing issues with their peers, including crime and violence. Individuals with higher education also believed there is a greater chance of victimisation (87.9 per cent) than those who completed primary or middle school (72.1 per cent) and this could be due to their perception of being an attractive target for criminals, considering that the better educated are usually also the ones better-off (Borges 2011).

In terms of neighbourhood, crime talk was extremely common in Santíssimo (100 per cent) and Vidigal (89.4 per cent) and quite common in the Complexo do Alemão (74.5 per cent), Novo Leblon (70.2 per cent), Tabuleiro* (66 per cent) and Botafogo (62.2 per cent). Crime talk is closely related to social cohesion. In fact, the same ranking of neighbourhoods was observed for social cohesion / social disorganisation (see Section 3.3.2). Santíssimo is the neighbourhood with the highest level of social cohesion and the highest percentage of respondents who had talked with anyone about crime or violence in the past two weeks. Botafogo is the neighbourhood with the lowest level of social cohesion and the lowest percentage of 'crime talk'. Information spread more quickly in

socially cohesive neighbourhoods where residents interact with each other. Crime and violence affect residents' joint community life and is therefore amply discussed in socially cohesive neighbourhoods. In socially disorganised places, such as Botafogo, residents do not know each other or talk to each other. Therefore chances are low that residents will know about when their neighbours have been victimised.

The media, as the principal source of information for most residents in Rio de Janeiro, plays a significant role in the fear of crime. Borges argues that media coverage is often sensational and dramatic, drawing spectator's attention to the most serious crimes which trigger the biggest emotions instead of reporting the types of crime with the highest incidences (Borges 2011). Even though media coverage of crime and violence has improved significantly over the past years, the major newspapers in Rio de Janeiro, like O Globo and O Dia, continue to report about crime in overtly sensationalist ways.

A CESeC study on violence and media analysed how the biggest newspapers in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Minas Gerais portrayed violence and public security in Brazil. It found that news coverage was mainly composed of individual stories, greatly depended on police sources, made little efforts of contextualising events, contained little diversification of opinions and did not make sufficient use of statistical data, surveys and other information from civil society. Geographically speaking, Rio de Janeiro was at the centre of news coverage for crime, violence and security. Of all newspaper articles analysed (Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Minas Gerais), 48.2 per cent focused on violence in Rio de Janeiro, which indicates a geographical overrepresentation of violence-related events in that city. Among all of the assessed newspapers, O Globo was the one most dedicated to covering violence (17.2 per cent of all analysed articles), followed by Estadão (9.8 per cent) and the Folha de São Paulo (9.3 per cent) (Ramos and Paiva 2005).

From time to time, newspapers such as O Globo or O Dia present individual drug lords as the 'most wanted criminal' or the 'most violent trafficker' in the city.⁴⁵ According to Thiago*, a former drug trafficker from the Complexo do Alemão, these misrepresentations can have the unintended effect of spurring violence because drug traffickers feel pressured to live up to their own dangerous image in the media:

⁴⁵ According to Piccato (2012), the media in Mexico helps to make criminal organisations famous by publishing articles on drug-related violence. However, in fact, the media has no interest to serve as a 'free advertising platform' but if journalists do not report about these incidents they might be killed. The criminal organisations use violence strategically to show their dominion. They decide whose murder should have a meaning and be reported in the local newspaper and whose body should simply disappear. Piccato states: 'Murder, in other words, works as a press release for criminal organizations' (Piccato 2012: 60).

'The media *bota o traficante lá em cima* [puts the drug dealer into the headlines]. Every time it says "so-and-so is the biggest trafficker in the world". The media creates the trafficker. So if you give him power which he doesn't have, he's forced to absorb this power. He starts killing, he starts stealing more, he tells his men to descend to the *pista* [highway] and steal more cars. Just like Gordão.⁴⁶ That guy was *um pé de chinela sujo* [not a true gangster] in there, nobody liked him. But the media, Globo, made him famous. So in order for him to absorb this power, he started to be what the media wanted him to be and started to kill at will [...]. And if you kill a resident, excuse the expression, but you're not killing anyone because the only one to suffer is the family, tomorrow everyone will be partying. Gordão killed two girls, one was fourteen and another twelve years old, and on the same day he gave a *baile funk*⁴⁷ (Interview with Thiago* 2011).

3.3.4 How safe do you feel?

The following set of questions measured how participants' perceptions of safety change during the day and at night and when moving through urban space (see Table 3.6).⁴⁸

Table 3.6 Survey results: How safe do you feel?

How safe do you feel when you are...?		...home alone during the day?	...home alone during the night?	...walking alone in a known neighborhood during the day?	...walking alone in a known neighbourhood during the night?	...walking alone in an unknown neighborhood during the day?	...walking alone in an unknown neighbourhood during the night?
(percentage of 'very safe' and 'safe' responses)							
Gender	MALE	93.8	93.7	86.2	73.8*	37.9*	22.1*
	FEMALE	92	89.1	79.6	59.9*	25*	11.8*
Age	16 – 32 YEARS	91.2	89.3	80.1	66.1	33.1	16.2

⁴⁶ Referring to drug lord Antônio José de Souza Ferreira, called 'Gordão' or 'Tota'.

⁴⁷ *Funk* or *funk carioca* is a music genre from Rio de Janeiro. *Baile funk* parties are often sponsored by the traffickers in the favelas.

⁴⁸ The question was adapted from the *International Crime Victim Survey* (ICVS) which suggests asking two questions – 'How safe do you feel walking alone in your area after dark?' and 'How safe do you feel when you are home alone after dark?' – and to measure responses on a 4-point Likert scale (very safe, fairly safe, a bit unsafe or very unsafe) (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 2000: 35). The ISP used an extended set of questions in its *Victimisation Survey* in Rio de Janeiro in 2007 (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2008: 63). The survey respondents were asked how safe they felt in their neighbourhood during the day and during the night and in an unknown neighbourhood during the day and during the night (on a 4-point Likert scale). In this survey, responses were measured on a 5-point Likert scale: very safe; safe; neither safe nor unsafe; unsafe and very unsafe.

	33 – 87 YEARS	95.5	94.6	87.4	68.5	29.1	18.3
Race	WHITE	98.2**	96.3*	87.3	67.3	26.7	8.7**
	NONWHITE	89.4**	88.2*	80	66.5	34.3	22.4**
Religion	CATHOLIC	93.9	92.7	90.2*	62.2	34.6	18.5
	OTHER	92.7	90.7	79.9*	69.9	30.7	16.4
Income	LOW	91	88.7	77***	65.2	31.6	16.7
	MIDDLE_HIGH	96.2	96.2	95***	76.2	33.3	21.5
Economic class	LOW	90.6*	89.3	79.4*	68.2	34.9	23.7***
	MIDDLE_HIGH	97*	94.9	89.9*	64.6	25.3	5.3***
Education	LOW_MIDDLE	92.8	91.3	84.1	69.6	26.5	17.6
	MIDDLE_HIGH	92.8	91.3	82.3	66	32.4	16.2
Neighbour-hood	VID	100***	100***	100***	95.7***	66***	42.6***
	BOT	95.7***	95.6***	83***	36.2***	13***	0***
	CDA	85.1***	78.7***	66***	36.2***	29.8***	10.6***
	TAB	95.7***	95.7***	76.6***	74.5***	8.7***	4.3***
	SANT	80.9***	80.9***	78.7***	78.7***	42.6***	40.4***
	NL	100***	97.7***	93.6***	80.9***	27.9***	2.3***
Total		92.9	91.4	83	67	31.5	17

Source: Author's own calculations.

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, and *** $p < .001$. Responses were measured on a 5-point Likert scale: very safe, safe, neither safe nor unsafe, unsafe, and very unsafe.


The first important finding here is that all survey participants regarded their own homes and neighbourhoods much safer than unknown neighbourhoods, regardless of the actual crime rates in these areas.⁴⁹ Respondents' perception of safety in their own homes (92.9 per cent felt safe when they were home alone during the day) and neighbourhoods (83 per cent felt safe when walking in their neighbourhood during the day) was much higher than in unknown places (31.5 per cent felt safe when walking alone in an unknown neighbourhood during the day) due to the familiarity with the locality. At night, this difference was even more striking.

The second important finding here is that neighbourhoods again emerged as the best variable to explain differences between interviewees' perception of safety (see Figure 3.2 and note that only 'very safe' percentages are depicted). Vidigal emerged as the neighbourhood where respondents felt safest, at least within their own homes and neighbourhood. However, less than 5 per cent of respondents felt safe in unknown neighbourhoods (day: 4.3 per cent, night: 2.1 per cent). A possible explanation for this is that Vidigal is a rather independent and well established Zona Sul favela and most residents complete their daily routine within the boundaries of the community or nearby. As a consequence, they were afraid of unknown locations because they rarely left the south zone or entered other favelas.

⁴⁹ Perlman observed that her research participants in Rio de Janeiro's favelas often insisted that their own area was very safe and quiet, in contrast with 'over there' which was 'really dangerous' (Perlman 2010: 103).

The same explanation is valid for Santíssimo, yet to the other extreme. In Santíssimo, 68.1 per cent of respondents felt very safe when they were home alone (both day and night) and 57.4 per cent felt very safe when walking alone in a known neighbourhood (both day and night). The overall perception of safety was not as positive as in Vidigal however, this perception did not drop as drastically as in Vidigal in the case of unknown neighbourhoods: 14.9 per cent of interviewees in Santíssimo still felt very safe in unknown neighbourhoods (both during the day and at night). This is logical because Santíssimo is a bedroom suburb which is located far away from the city centre. Many residents need to travel two hours in the morning and in the evening to get to work and they naturally spend a significant amount of time transiting through other neighbourhoods and losing their fear of unknown places.

Figure 3.2 Survey results: How safe do you feel?



Source: Author's own illustration.

Novo Leblon ranked third in interviewees' perception of safety.⁵⁰ It had the highest percentage (89.4 per cent) of respondents who felt very safe when alone at home during the day. This is not surprising considering that Novo Leblon is a gated community with a private security company and that the six main apartment blocks have their own concierge. However, not a single resident stated that they felt very safe walking alone in an unknown neighbourhood, whether during the day or at night.

⁵⁰ Ranked first of all neighbourhoods according to the mean score of 'yes' percentages in all six questions.

Botafogo ranked fourth in interviewees' perception of safety. Of all respondents, 73.9 per cent felt very safe when alone at home during the day and 68.9 per cent felt very safe at night. Botafogo showed the biggest difference between day and night-time perceptions of safety in a known neighbourhood: 44.7 per cent felt very safe during the day yet only 17 per cent at night. This can be explained by the lack of social cohesion and the lack of policing at night (see Section 3.3.2 and Section 3.3.5)

Tabuleiro* ranked fifth in interviewees' perception of safety. Residents felt very safe at home but the percentages fell drastically with respect to walking alone in a known neighbourhood. Only one person (2.2 per cent) in Tabuleiro* stated that he or she felt very safe when walking alone in an unknown neighbourhood, both during the day and at night.

The Complexo do Alemão ranked last in interviewees' perception of safety out of all the six neighbourhoods. Only 48.9 per cent of respondents felt very safe when they were at home alone (both day and night). One should take a moment to digest this fact. Half of the interviewed residents in this neighbourhood did not feel safe and comfortable when they were inside their own homes. This high perception of insecurity has been generated by years of violent conflict between drug traffickers and the police. Residents witnessed these armed confrontations from a close distance and the conflict has produced a high number of civilian casualties due to the high population density. Although occupied by the military at the time the survey was conducted, residents in the Complexo do Alemão were still prisoners of the legacies of violence and struggled to find their place in the new system of power.

The other variables tested – gender, age, race, religion, income, economic class and education – did not reveal such strong differences as evidenced in the neighbourhood variable. Speaking about gender, it is generally assumed that women feel more insecure than men because they feel less able to repel victimisation, they have a higher capability of anticipating the negative consequences and because, in general, they believe that the chances of victimisation are higher for themselves than for men (Borges 2011). The data in Table 3.6 show that women indeed felt less safe than men but differences were minor (and, at the most, significant at the .05 level).⁵¹ In terms of age, although young people (16 to 24 years) have the highest risk of victimisation, it is usually the elderly who have higher perceptions of insecurity due to their physical vulnerability and their social isolation (Borges 2011). However, the data reveal that differences between younger (16

⁵¹ When Borges analysed the data of the ISP victimisation study that included a similar set of questions like the one above, he also found that gender influences feelings of insecurity but not to the extent (statistically speaking) that other authors had suggested (Borges 2011).

to 32 years) and older (32 to 87 years) respondents were not statistically significant.⁵² In terms of colour/race, white and Asian people felt safer at home and in their own neighbourhood, both during the day and at night, than black, brown and indigenous people. However, the opposite was the case for unknown neighbourhoods: 22.4 per cent of black, brown and indigenous felt very safe or safe when walking alone in an unknown neighbourhood during the night, compared to 8.7 per cent of white and Asian people.

3.3.5 Satisfaction with security

Generally speaking, satisfaction with security was not very high among the interviewed residents. Only 40.8 per cent of respondents were very satisfied or satisfied with the security they had (see Table 3.7 and Figure 3.3).

Table 3.7 Survey results: Satisfaction with security


Satisfaction with security (percentage of 'very satisfied' and 'satisfied' responses)		How satisfied are you with the security you have today?
Gender	MALE	46.7*
	FEMALE	34.6*
Age	16 – 32 YEARS	34**
	33 – 87 YEARS	50.5**
Race	WHITE	46.2
	NONWHITE	36.4
Religion	CATHOLIC	52.6*
	OTHER	36.5*
Income	LOW	37.4
	MIDDLE_HIGH	48
Economic class	LOW	34.6*
	MIDDLE_HIGH	50.5*
Education	LOW_MIDDLE	49.2
	MIDDLE_HIGH	37.2
Neighbourhood	VID	63.6***
	BOT	27.7***
	CDA	30.4***
	TAB	51.4***
	SANT	7.3***
	NL	63.8***
Total		40.8

Source: Author's own calculations.

Note: *p< .05, **p<.01, and ***p<.001. Responses were measured on a 4-point Likert scale: very satisfied, satisfied, little satisfied, not satisfied at all.

⁵² Again, roughly similar results were obtained in the ISP victimisation survey (Borges 2011).

Figure 3.3 Survey results: Satisfaction with security



Source: Author's own illustration.

Age and neighbourhood emerged as the only meaningful variables. Younger interviewees were less satisfied (34 per cent) than older participants (50.5 per cent). This can be explained by the youth's higher exposure to crime and violence. Differences between the neighbourhoods were highly revealing, especially when analysing the data together with responses from the follow-up question: Why are you satisfied/unsatisfied with the security you have today? These responses give valuable insight into the day-to-day reality of security provision in the six studied neighbourhoods.

Out of all the neighbourhoods, residents in the gated community Novo Leblon were most satisfied with the security they had (together with residents in Vidigal, see below): 10.6 per cent of respondents were very satisfied and 53.2 per cent were satisfied and gave the following reasons for this answer:

'I feel calm and relaxed in the place I live' (NL2).

'A gated community is safer' (NL24).

'It's a gated community with a lot of known people. Nothing ever happened that would make me feel insecure' (NL6).

'I don't see a lot of risk here and the robbery rate is low' (NL10).

However, residents were aware that they lived in a privileged place which did not compare with the rest of Rio de Janeiro:

'My neighbourhood is safe but the neighbourhood where I go to university isn't' (NL26).

'We're in a privileged place here without the same threats that exist out there' (NL34).

'Relatively, it's a lot better than the rest of Rio' (NL21).

Some respondents laconically stated that 'security could be better' but in most cases it was not clear whether they referred to the services of the private security company or to the provision of public security in general. Three interviewees talked about the services of the private security company in Novo Leblon:

'Private security is present *mas não aborda todas as pessoas* [but they don't stop and check all people]' (NL36).

'The private security is not one of the best ones' (NL45).

'It's not an aggressive security, they respect residents. It's very rare to see the security guards attacking someone. They're polite' (NL16).

Approximately a third (34 per cent) of respondents were little satisfied with the security they had, mainly because of the high levels of crime and violence outside the gated community:

'No place in Rio is totally safe but at least, relatively, this community is safer' (NL29).

'I have security but others in other neighbourhoods don't' (NL41).

'I don't see effective policing. The situation in the city has improved a lot but there are still high rates of crime and violence in traffic' (NL38).

'You need to look at the macro-level, at education for instance. Violence is a sociocultural problem. Not everything is being done that is paid to be done' (NL9).

'Crimes are not punished correctly which stimulates more crimes' (NL25).

It is also interesting to observe that some residents felt entitled to '100 per cent security' (NL18) or to being 'totally safe' (NL13), a thought that would hardly occur to someone living in a favela. Because residents in Novo Leblon had to pay for the services of the private security company, their expectations were similar to those of customers who expected the good performance of a product they bought. Some of the residents pointed out the shortcomings of this 'product':

'The buildings have security failures and the identification of people is very basic. There's no effective security system in the *condomínio*, it should be completely closed off' (NL39).

'They steal a lot of bikes here' (NL31).

'Everyone can get in here. There is no "filter" despite the private security and the gate' (NL32).

There was only one female respondent (2.1 per cent) that was not satisfied at all with the security she had:

'It's not efficient, it's too dark. Security needs lighting. You can't even distinguish the security guards from other people' (NL22).

In Vidigal, ranked second, 13.6 per cent of respondents stated that they were very satisfied with the security they had. They justified this by stating that they were living in a safe place where people could do what they wanted to do and that they had no fear 'anymore', referring to the dominion of the drug traffickers before the pacification. The active presence of the pacification police was also noted by some residents as something that contributed to the high security satisfaction. However, opinions were divided on this matter as many interviewees criticised the work of the UPP. Half of the interviewed residents (50 per cent) stated they were satisfied with the security they had. Most respondents stated it was too early to evaluate the recent changes in the security scenario in their community and that more time was needed to reach any definite answers on the matter:

'Only time will tell if things are getting better' (VID41).

'How long will this peace last?' (VID29).

'We need to wait until after the elections' (VID50).

'We need to wait until after the World Cup and the Olympics' (VID3).

Around a third (29.5 per cent) of the respondents stated that they felt little satisfied with the security they had. Respondents mainly blamed the police for their dissatisfaction and compared them with the group that was providing security in Vidigal before the pacification – the drug traffickers:

'The police are corrupt' (VID22).

'The police are just like the criminals' (VID2).

'The police are worse than the criminals' (VID38).

Some emphasized that the UPP were only worried about their image in the international press and doing no more than 'window dressing':

'The UPP are just an image' (VID6).

'The UPP are just doing window-dressing' (VID10).

'People talk and talk but the truth is that everything is a farce' (VID48).

A small fraction (6.8 per cent) of respondents in Vidigal were not satisfied at all with the security they had. They criticised that the government was giving priority to tourism and

transport, instead of investing in public security and that security agents were not adequately trained for their jobs. One of the residents remarked:

'It is a disguised security that only works when it wants to or when someone comes from outside' (VID36).

In Tabuleiro*, ranked third, the responses of the interviewed residents were a lot more heterogeneous, possibly because at the time of the survey the community was going through significant changes in terms of the actors who provided security. The militias were being ousted by a greater presence of state security forces who had decided to turn the area into a strategic point within the city's wider security infrastructure plans. The uncertainty regarding the future of the community could have contributed to the interview results. Of the interviewed residents in Tabuleiro*, 16.2 per cent of residents were very satisfied with the security they had. This is the highest percentage of all the six neighbourhoods in this category. The reasons for that were that there were no assaults and shootouts in the community coupled with a low risk of being robbed.

'Everything is running well' (TAB2).

'Total security' (TAB8).

'I live in peace' (TAB18).

Roughly a third (31.1 per cent) of respondents was satisfied with the security they had. Most people in this category stated that this was because it was calm in the neighbourhood and there were no shootouts, personal conflicts or people using drugs:

'It's quite calm here' (TAB30).

'There're no shootouts or people using drugs' (TAB38).

'I can walk peacefully in my community' (TAB44).

'I live peacefully' (TAB4).

'I don't have problems with anyone here' (TAB12).

'Nobody bothers me' (TAB31).

Nevertheless, 18.9 per cent of the interviewed residents were little satisfied with the security they had. Some criticised that the security in their neighbourhood was not done correctly or that they had to pay for the militias:

'The security is not being done right' (TAB39).

'You need to pay' (TAB36).

A few said they were little satisfied because of the violence elsewhere:

'We see a lot of robberies on TV' (TAB23).

‘There can be a shootout in the city at any time’ (TAB35).

Roughly a third (29.7 per cent) of respondents was not satisfied at all with the security they had, mainly because of corruption, violence and robberies, lack of governance and the presence of the militias:

‘Man we live in Rio! A lot of violence!’ (TAB49).

‘Everything is driven by money and corruption’ (TAB13).

‘We are without government here’ (TAB10).

‘They [the militias] oblige us to pay’ (TAB25).

In the Complexo do Alemão, ranked fourth in satisfaction with security when comparing the six neighbourhoods, none of the interviewed residents stated they were very satisfied with the security they had and 30.4 per cent stated they were satisfied. Some stated that they were satisfied because things had improved a little bit:

‘It improved a little’ (CDA48).

‘Security improved in my neighbourhood’ (CDA29).

Significant proportions (43.5 per cent) of the respondents were little satisfied with the security they had. They blamed (on-going) violence, corrupt police and the lack of government attention. Some stated they were mistrustful of those who were supposed to provide the security in their neighbourhood:

‘The people that are supposed to protect us don’t even say “good morning” to the residents’ (CDA38).

‘You never know whom you can trust’ (CDA25).

‘I don’t trust the ones that are supposed to provide for my security’ (CDA32).

Some residents felt helpless and believed they had little influence on their security situation:

‘It doesn’t depend on the security that the government offers’ (CDA22).

‘There’re external factors that simulate an invisible security and that leave you vulnerable’ (CDA36).

‘There’s a great breach of security’ (CDA46).

Of all the interviewed residents in the Complexo do Alemão, 26.1 per cent were not satisfied at all. Again, the reasons they cited included corrupt police and that the government’s security provision was ‘a lie’. They also mentioned that they simply did not have any security at all and that they could not trust anyone.

In the middle-class neighbourhood of Botafogo, ranked fifth, only two respondents (4.3 per cent) were very satisfied with the security they had and 23.4 per cent of the interviewed residents were satisfied. Several respondents stated that their neighbourhood was *tranquilo* [tranquil or peaceful] or *calmo* [calm]. A few made references to the past or mentioned the presence of the police:

'It was worse before' (BOT17).

'It could improve more but it has already improved a lot' (BOT31).

'There's a lot of police here in the Zona Sul' (BOT29).

'During the day there're police patrols' (BOT14).

A significant number of the survey participants in Botafogo were either little satisfied (38.3 per cent) or not satisfied at all (34 per cent). Of those who were little satisfied, many interviewees mentioned that there was not a lot of police or they blamed the government or politicians for the lack of public security:

'[Security] is still weak because there're not a lot of police' (BOT45).

'There're few police' (BOT39).

'The police disappear from the streets, there is no help' (BOT15).

'There's a lack of security. There's omission on the side of the security organs' (BOT38).

'The state could do it better' (BOT21).

'The organs responsible for security have failed' (BOT43).

Several respondents in this category stated that certain routines helped them to be protected from crime and violence, for instance, not leaving the home at night, or not wearing watches and jewelry. A few older residents also mentioned that Botafogo had grown considerably as a neighbourhood which had attracted a lot of people from outside, as well as *pivetes* [little thieves]. Of those who were not satisfied at all, quite a few stated that they did not feel safe walking in their neighbourhood. Several criticised the government and the bad training of the police:

'There're still a lot of government security programmes lacking' (BOT10).

'We need help from the government but they don't care about the security of the population' (BOT11).

'The police have a poor quality' (BOT19).

'Security in Rio has a lot of problems, like low salaries [for the police] and corruption and we pay for it' (BOT48).

In Santíssimo, ranked last, respondents were deeply unsatisfied with the security they had. Only two respondents (4.9 per cent) stated they were very satisfied. One of them was a drug dealer who always carried a firearm with him:

'I'm always armed. I do the security myself' (SANT36).

One person (2.4 per cent) stated that he or she was satisfied with security:

'I believe in the police' (SANT32).

Out of all interviewed residents in Santíssimo, 9.8 per cent stated they were little satisfied with the security they had and all stated that it was because of police corruption:

'The police are accomplices of the drug trade and the militias' (SANT33).

'There is a lot of corruption and false protection of the drug trade' (SANT30).

'The police earn a bad salary and need other means to survive' (SANT24).

The overriding majority (82.9 per cent) of respondents in Santíssimo were not satisfied at all with the security they had. Again, many blamed the police:

'The police support the drug trade' (SANT47).

'The police fulfill what they agree to' (SANT49).

'We cannot trust in the police' (SANT40).

'The drug traffickers are assuming control in the favela but it should be the police' (SANT18).

Others stated that they were dissatisfied with the security they had because of violence and that they were afraid of becoming the victim of *balas perdidas* [stray bullets]:

'There's so much violence in this country, people get killed for nothing' (SANT35).

'In any moment I could become the victim of a *bala perdida*' (SANT16).

'We can be shot at any moment' (SANT27).

'When I leave home I never know if I'll come back' (SANT3).

A few criticised that there were too many *bandidos soltos* [free criminals] in the community (SANT14, SANT48) and that nobody was doing anything to protect them:

'We're in a declared war and nobody does anything' (SANT51).

'There's so much violence and corruption and nobody does anything' (SANT12).

A few respondents blamed the government for the failures in the area of public security:

'Many politicians know that security in Brazil has failed and they don't do anything' (SANT26).

'Nobody does anything to improve our security. The government ignores reality and creates masks to cover up their own failures' (SANT9).

'We live in a hypocritical country and nobody wants to solve it' (SANT44).

A few of the respondents seemed to have lost all hope. They stated:

'You can't trust anyone' (SANT46).

'Everyone is corrupt' (SANT6).

'Living is very dangerous' (SANT45).

3.3.6 Experiences with crime and violence

Cariocas are confronted with a high degree of violence in their daily lives. Of all the survey participants, 51.8 per cent had seen the *caveirão* [armoured vehicle of the military police, literally meaning 'big skull'] in action in their neighbourhood, 62.5 had seen the body of someone who had been assassinated and 63.5 per cent had lost someone close to them in an intentional homicide (see Table 3.8).⁵³

Table 3.8 Survey results: Experiences with crime and violence

Experiences with crime and violence (percentage of 'yes' responses)		Have you ever seen the <i>caveirão</i> in action in your neighbourhood?	Have you ever seen the body of someone who has been assassinated?	Have any of your friends, relatives, neighbours or colleagues been assassinated?
Gender	MALE	50.3	63.4	65.7
	FEMALE	53.3	61.5	61.2
Age	16 – 32 YEARS	53.8	59.8	65.1
	33 – 87 YEARS	48.6	66.7	61.6
Race	WHITE	34.5***	41.3***	45.8***
	NONWHITE	63.5***	76.9***	75.6***
Religion	CATHOLIC	52.4	53.7	61

⁵³ In the JUVIPOL study, 43.8 per cent of respondents stated they had at least one relative, friend, neighbour or colleague that had been assassinated. The lower percentage is most likely due to the fact that the survey participants in the JUVIPOL study were quite young (between fifteen and twenty-four years old). The question 'Have you ever seen the body of someone who has been assassinated' is also taken from the JUVIPOL study and was answered with 'yes' by 55.7 per cent of the interviewed 1,607 young people between fifteen and twenty-four years (Musumeci et al. 2011: 15, 16)

	OTHER	51.5	66.1	64.2
Income	LOW	55.6	69.5	70.7
	MIDDLE_HIGH	47.5	57	58.2
Economic class	LOW	68.8***	78.2***	78.6***
	MIDDLE_HIGH	22.2***	33***	37.8***
Education	LOW_MIDDLE	46.4	73.5*	63.2
	MIDDLE_HIGH	53.1	59.1*	63.9
Neighbourhood	VID	95.7***	84.8***	93.5***
	BOT	23.4***	29.8***	44.7***
	CDA	89.4***	65.2***	65.2***
	TAB	2.1***	74.5***	54.5***
	SANT	100***	100***	100***
	NL	0***	21.3***	23.4***
Total	51.8	62.5	63.5	

Source: Author's own calculations.

Note: *p< .05, **p<.01, and ***p<.001.


Colour/race, economic class and neighbourhood emerged as the only variables where differences in the respective categories were statistically significant, for all of the three questions. In terms of colour/race, whereas 63.5 per cent of black, brown and indigenous had seen the *caveirão* in action in their neighbourhood, only 34.5 per cent of white and Asian people confirmed this. Furthermore, whereas 68.8 per cent of lower and lower middle class respondents had seen the *caveirão* in action in their neighbourhood, only 22.2 per cent of middle, upper middle and upper class respondents confirmed this. Similar results were obtained in the other two questions. This comes as no surprise because the variables colour/race and economic class were correlated ($r=-.393$, $p<.01$). There is also a close relationship between these two variables and neighbourhood. In this survey, the great majority of residents in the favelas (Vidigal, Santíssimo, Complexo do Alemão and Tabuleiro*) were black or brown, and the majority of residents in the middle class neighbourhood of Botafogo and the gated community Novo Leblon were white (see Figure 3.4 that depicts the major three colour/race classifications).

Police operations with the *caveirão* target favelas under the control of drug traffickers, therefore the percentage of respondents who had seen the *caveirão* in action in their neighbourhood was very high in Santíssimo (100 per cent), Vidigal (95.7 per cent) and Complexo do Alemão (89.4 per cent) and extremely low or zero in Tabuleiro* (2.1 per cent) and Novo Leblon (0 per cent). In the middle-class neighbourhood of Botafogo, a quarter (23.4 per cent) of respondents had witnessed the *caveirão* 'in action', possibly because the vehicle was driving through the neighbourhood on the way to a favela operation or was returning to BOPE's headquarters in Laranjeiras.

Similarly, more interviewees in the favelas (Vidigal, Santíssimo, Complexo do Alemão and Tabuleiro*) had seen the body of someone who had been assassinated and had lost a friend, relative, neighbour or colleague in an intentional homicide than in the

middle and upper class communities (Botafogo or Novo Leblon). The result from Novo Leblon – 23.4 per cent of respondents had lost someone close to them in an intentional homicide – is perhaps most surprising considering that these people live in an isolated, gated community, far away from hotspots of crime and violence. It shows that Novo Leblon's residents are more affected by violence than one would assume from their lifestyle. This is because they also have to leave the neighbourhood to go to work and potentially have colleagues, friends and relatives who live in more violent areas of the city.

Figure 3.4 Survey results: Colour / race of research participants by neighbourhood



Source: Author's own illustration.

3.4 Chapter conclusion

This chapter has sought to channel and enhance the study of inequality by establishing security as a driver of inequality. It aimed at assessing people's security perceptions in the six neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro and showed that not all residents are affected by crime and violence in the same way. The chapter claimed that the right to security is not enjoyed by all research participants to the same extent. This is what I called the **inequality of security**. This claim is based on a survey which was designed and applied to over 300 residents in six different neighbourhoods and which included questions on the meaning of 'security', social cohesion, crime talk and victimisation, day

and night-time perceptions of safety, satisfaction with security and personal experiences with crime and violence.

Drawing on other authoritative studies in the field (Beato Filho 2003; Borges 2011; Musumeci et al. 2011; Rodrigues 2006; Zaluar 2008; Zaluar and Conceição 2007), it was hypothesised that people's place of domicile is the most influential factor in detecting and explaining differences in interviewees' perception of security. Great care was therefore taken to select the neighbourhoods in order to give justice to the wide variety of security experiences which can be found in the city of Rio de Janeiro. To summarise briefly, Vidigal was chosen as an example of a fully urbanised south zone favela which had recently been pacified by the UPP pacification police after decades of drug trafficker control. Botafogo was chosen as a south zone neighbourhood with standard policing by the military police and is mainly populated by middle-class residents. The Complexo do Alemão, a favela agglomeration in the north zone, was chosen because it had one of the highest crime rates and the lowest HDI in the city. Formerly the stronghold of the CV drug trafficking faction and a no-go area for the police, it was recaptured by state security forces in November 2010 and subsequently occupied by the military for a period of eighteen months before power was gradually handed over to the new UPPs. Tabuleiro* is a pseudonym for a small community in the north zone of the city which is controlled by militias. It is situated in an area of strategic importance for the state secretary of security. Santíssimo is a bedroom suburb far away in the west zone of the city suffering from high rates of violence due to the activities of drug traffickers and militias in the region. Lastly, Novo Leblon is a gated community of middle upper and upper class residents in Barra da Tijuca. A private security company is in charge of the compound.

The survey results confirmed the neighbourhood hypothesis. Throughout all survey questions, variation between the neighbourhoods was highly significant. This was in contrast to the socio-demographic variables, principally gender, age, religion, education and income. Colour/race and economic class were the only other valuable indicators for inequality of security, especially in regard to experiences with crime and violence, social cohesion and perceptions of safety.

The inequality of security observed in the six neighbourhoods has severe consequences for the legitimacy of Brazilian institutions because it shows in very violent and life-threatening ways that the state is falling short of promoting and protecting basic human rights, principally the right to security. Brazil has ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, all of which obligate the Brazilian state to promote and protect human rights, including the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, the right to be treated equally before the law, the right to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, the right to be free from arbitrary interference with one's privacy, family, home or correspondence and attacks upon his honour and reputation, the right to freedom of movement, and the right of equal access to public service, among others.

It should be acknowledged though that inequality in the provision of the right to security is an inherent feature of almost all, if not all, states. It would therefore be unrealistic to expect the Brazilian state to provide absolute equality of security to all its citizens. Furthermore, even if a state's provision of security was impartial and egalitarian, residents' perceptions of security would still be unequal – this point was amply illustrated by the survey results discussed in this chapter. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to state that on a continuum of inequality of security, Rio de Janeiro would be ranked at the high end.

The consequence of this high degree of inequality of security is that citizens will seek protection elsewhere. Whether white or black, rich or poor, or old or young, large segments of Rio de Janeiro's population feel abandoned by the state in security matters and have aligned with other groups who they deem more capable of protecting them. For the better-off, this usually means retreating to 'fortified enclaves' (Caldeira 2000) and hiring the services of private security companies. On the other end of the scale, the poor are forced to live side by side with criminal groups, such as drug traffickers, militias or death squads and are coerced into respecting a code of silence in return for minimal protection.

This chapter measured the extent of the inequality of security in the six neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro. However, we still know very little about what explains this inequality of security. The collected survey data reveal that we might encounter a tentative answer to this question inside the neighbourhoods and that it could be worthwhile to assess the logic of security provision in these areas. The following chapter (Chapter 4: Security Providers in Rio de Janeiro) therefore sets out to map all security providers who are active in these neighbourhoods and assesses their histories, *modi operandi*, protective capacities and records in security provision. Chapter 5 (Oligopoly of Security Providers) sheds light on the relationship between these security providers and argues that their security network can best be understood as an oligopoly because the security providers are connected through a series of relationships that can range from

cooperation to conflict and need to consider the actions and reactions of the other groups when designing their business models and strategies. The last empirical chapter (Chapter 6: Neighbourhood Case Studies) explores how security providers interact with each other and gain and lose power and influence in particular neighbourhoods over time.



Santíssimo, Rio de Janeiro

4 SECURITY PROVIDERS IN RIO DE JANEIRO

4.1 Introduction

In Rio de Janeiro, security services are provided by a variety of state and non-state armed actors, principally military police, civil police, municipal guards, military, private security companies, death squads, militias and drug traffickers. The aim of this chapter is to map these security providers, including their histories, *modi operandi* and record of security provision.

The first section of this chapter (Section 4.2) focuses on mapping the public security providers, namely military police (with extra sections on BOPE and the UPP), civil police, municipal guards and the military. In the past these groups have often aggravated the problem of crime and violence in Rio de Janeiro because of police misconduct, corruption, impunity, the diversion of firearms into the illicit market and arrangements with criminal actors for personal monetary gain. Contrary to its constitutional mission, police and other law enforcement agencies are often seen as a source of insecurity rather than as agents of protection. Residents have doubts regarding the protective capabilities of state security forces and therefore question – and even challenge – the authority of the state over individual citizens. Several attempts have been made to reform the police and improve accountability yet little has changed in the way policing is being practised on the ground (see Section 2.3). Instead of improving the performance of the existing state security forces, new special operations units were created and new entities on the federal and municipal level were involved, thus leading to a proliferation of state security providers. The high number of institutions with a public security mandate today can therefore be seen as a reflection of the incoherent and ineffective public security policies of the past.

The following section of this chapter (Section 4.3) focuses on mapping the private security providers in Rio de Janeiro, namely private security companies, death squads, militias and drug trafficking factions.⁵⁴ It shows that despite the proliferation of public security providers, there is an underprovisioning of security in some geographical areas.

⁵⁴ In this chapter, a differentiation is made between public and private security providers. However, in reality the line between public and private (or between legal and illegal, state and non-state) actors is blurred. Criminal actors can co-opt state institutions and influence local governance. Similarly, state security agents can be members of public and private groups, for instance by working in a private security company or in a militia organisation.

Large segments of the population feel abandoned in security matters or even threatened by state security forces and seek protection elsewhere. This alternative or extra protection can come in diverse forms. Whereas the rich and middle class retreat to gated communities or well-protected high-rise apartment blocks which are protected by private security companies, the poor are forced to live side by side with criminal actors, such as death squads, militias or drug traffickers and are coerced into respecting the code of silence in return for minimal protection.

The chapter concludes that Rio de Janeiro's security network is a good example of violent pluralism (the theoretical framework of this thesis) due to the high number and variety of security providers who are active in Rio de Janeiro's neighbourhoods. This diversity of security providers also helps to explain the variation in residents' perceptions of security that were observed in the survey, especially when considering that each of the six assessed neighbourhoods had a different combination of security providers.

4.2 Public security providers in Rio de Janeiro

'I would say the first step [for Rio de Janeiro's government] is to clean the house, their own house, in the sense of profoundly transforming police institutions so that they are no longer part of the problem and begin being part of the solution. So that they are no longer part of the promotion of crime, violence, lethal brutality and the reproduction of prejudice and inequality, and turn into police institutions as designed in the Constitution. [This] means providing public security, in accordance with human rights, as a universal public good for all people without distinction and without inequality' (Interview with Soares 2012).

4.2.1 Military police

Each Brazilian state has its own police force, usually divided into military police⁵⁵ and civil police which fall under the jurisdiction of the state governors and the state secretary of public security. The origins of Rio de Janeiro's military police can be traced back to 1808 when King João VI moved the Portuguese royal court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro and founded the Royal Guard of the Police of the Court.

Today, the uniformed *Polícia Militar* [Military Police, PMERJ] are responsible for normal policing in the streets and for maintaining public order. With 43,000 actively

⁵⁵ For those not familiar with the peculiarities of the police in Brazil, the term 'military police' might sound like an oxymoron – how can a state security force be military and police in one? In the Brazilian context, the military police and military fire brigades (*corpo de bombeiros militares*) are reserve and auxiliary forces of the army. The jurisdictional control of these forces nevertheless lies with civilian, state-level authorities (Presidência da República 1988: Art.144, §6).

serving officers, the PMERJ is the third biggest military police force in the country, after São Paulo (85,000) and Minas Gerais (45,000) (Ministério da Justiça 2013: 43). In 2012, the PMERJ had a budget of R\$ 2.201 billion which is rather high compared to other government sectors (Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2011: 526).⁵⁶ It is organised into 39 military police battalions [BPM], plus nine Special Operations Units, such as BOPE and the Batalhão de Policiamento de Choque [Battalion for Shock Policing, BPCHQ]. Rivalry and competition between the different BPM is common because of the Sistema Integrado de Metas (see Section 2.2.2). Since 2008, the PMERJ also maintains the new UPP community-oriented policing units in the favelas. The hierarchical order of the PMERJ is extremely strict, with police subdivided into rank-and-file patrol officers, the *praças*, and high-ranking officials, the *oficiais*. The two groups come from different socio-economic classes and attend separate police academies (Husain 2007).


Rio de Janeiro's police have been criticised for being one of the most violent public security forces in the world. The institutionalised violence with which they fulfill their daily duties has been widely documented in literature (Amnesty International 2005; Arias 2006; Husain 2007). Data from the ISP reveal that between 2001 and 2011 more than 10,000 people have been killed in confrontations with the police in the state of Rio de Janeiro (Misse 2011). These cases are registered by the police as *resistência com morte do opositor – auto de resistência* [resistance leading to the death of the opponent – acts of resistance]. The term indicates that the alleged criminal was killed because he/she was resisting arrest or other lawful orders of the police; hence these cases are not investigated as homicides. The *autos de resistência* are seen as a widespread camouflage for extrajudicial killings by the police (Alston 2009).

Figure 4.1 depicts the total number of *autos de resistência* in the state of Rio de Janeiro between 1993 and 2010 (green line) and in the city of Rio de Janeiro between 1999 and 2010 (blue line). In order to assess whether police are using inappropriate levels of deadly force, the ratio of civilians killed by the police compared to the number of police killed by civilians should not exceed 7:1 (Chevigny cited in: Huggins 1991). ISP data (2011) reveals that in 2009, 1,048 civilians were killed in police confrontations and 24 policemen died in service (ratio: 44:1). In 2010, there were 855 cases of *autos de resistência* and 15 policemen were killed on-duty (ratio: 57:1). This is a clear indicator that Rio de Janeiro's police are using excessive deadly force in its operations that go far beyond mere protection of life. Cano (1997) found that military police officers indeed intended to kill criminal suspects instead of immobilising them. On average, four bullets

⁵⁶ The estimated budget for the whole public security sector in the state of Rio de Janeiro in 2012, including SESEG, PMERJ, PCERJ, ISP and other entities, was R\$ 5.666 billion, compared to R\$ 4.563 billion for health and R\$ 8.164 billion for education (Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2011: 10).

were found in dead victims, usually in the head or the shoulders and a significant percentage were shot in the back. One of the police units that has been criticised most for using excessive levels of violence in its operations is the special elite unit BOPE.

Figure 4.1 Homicides by police in Rio de Janeiro (*autos de resistência*)



Source: Author's own illustration, data from Misce (2011).

BOPE

'BOPE is an icon. It is the ideal of the military within the academy... BOPE's theatre of war is the favela... it is the last resort for security because it is the most lethal force that can act in defence of society' (Interview with da Silva 2010).

BOPE is a special operations unit of the PMERJ whose practices have provoked extraordinary levels of criticism from local and international human rights activists, especially after it turned into one of the world's most famous police units with the *Tropa de Elite* [Elite Squad] movies. Founded in 1978, it consists of around 400 policemen who are trained in urban warfare and deployed in situations for which the conventional military police units are not adequately prepared, such as the combat of drug trade, the control of civic disturbances, anti-hijacking or anti-guerilla actions:

'The Special Police Operations Battalion is understood as a police force that must act [in situations] where the so-called conventional units do not have the necessary physical, technical or psychological conditions [...]. The concept is that mission given is mission accomplished' (Interview with Storani 2010).

BOPE is one of the most experienced urban military police forces in the world. This efficiency is mainly due to the fact that the unit is capable of 'practising war' on a daily basis, principally in the fight against drug traffickers in the favelas.

'BOPE was distinct [from other police forces] in that it was a non-corruptible, professional group that was very proud of its corporate identity and had professional qualities and skills that are extremely rare, i.e. anti-guerrilla, bellicose action expertise, specifically for urban areas. It may be one of the best-trained troops for bellicose, urban confrontations in the traditional style of anti-guerrilla combats' (Interview with Soares 2010).

According to Paulo Storani, an ex-captain of BOPE, the unit developed its urban warfare excellence in response to the increasing challenges which the drug trade posed to public security:

'BOPE is the result of a problem and evolved with the changes in the arena of public security. It is what it is today because it accepted the crisis as an opportunity to evolve' (Interview with Storani 2010).

BOPE is mainly deployed in the combat and repression of the drug trade in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. The principle on the basis of which BOPE invades a favela, resembles a 'military unit entering an enemy territory during a war' (Dowdney 2003: 80). The troop frequently makes use of its armoured vehicle, the *caveirão*, which is associated with human rights abuses and repressive policing by residents (Amnesty International 2007). The policemen inside make use of tiny holes in the vehicle's facade to engage in shootouts with criminals (see Figure 4.2). Civilians are frequently killed by stray bullets yet without being able to identify who is inside the vehicle these cases are difficult to bring to justice.

BOPE's emblem (see Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4) is also rather atypical for a police unit: a black disc, representing the permanent fight, is circled by a red frame as a symbol for the blood lost during combat. In the middle of the disc is a skull nailed by a knife from top to bottom which means the victory over death. This is ornamented by two golden crossed pistols symbolising the militarised police (Storani 2008).

In recent years, BOPE's working methods have been changing slightly, principally because the unit has been deployed as the first step of the pacification process, recapturing and occupying favelas before handing them over to the UPP which requires them to stay several days or weeks in a given favela. Storani agrees that the focus and *modus operandi* of BOPE is shifting:

'BOPE is already changing [...]. It has changed its focus. Today, BOPE is much closer to the citizen than in my time. It understood that the focus is no longer the criminal but the citizen. If you use the language of the market about interaction with customers, in my day the customer was the criminal, today it is the citizen' (Storani 2011: 8).

Figure 4.2 Armoured vehicle of the PMERJ (caveirão)



Source: Author's own illustration.

Figure 4.3 BOPE's emblem in the headquarters



Source: Author's own illustration.

Figure 4.3 Police uniform with BOPE's emblem on the back



Source: Author's own illustration.

UPP

The UPPs were launched in Rio de Janeiro in December 2008 with the aim of re-establishing a permanent state security presence in the favelas and improving the community-police relationship. The pacification process of the favelas occurs gradually. As a first step, BOPE (in some cases with the support of the military) invades the favela to recapture the area as state territory (occupation). After a period of stabilisation (which can take several weeks or months), a permanent UPP police outpost is constructed (pacification). This pacification approach contrasts with previous police operations in Rio de Janeiro, which tended to be mass (and often fatal) raids, followed by immediate withdrawal.

Although only five years old, the UPPs have already become a global blueprint for community policing, urban integration and citizenship. The model has received worldwide recognition for its successes in reinstating the rule of law, social order and peace in the favelas (The World Bank 2011). The UPP, composed of around 6,000 mostly young policemen and –women, are attempting to give the military police a friendlier and more approachable image (see Figure 4.5). Research has shown that homicides, armed drug trafficking, extra-judicial executions and shootouts have drastically decreased in the pacified communities and that residents are feeling more secure and are more positive about their citizenship (Fundação Getulio Vargas 2009; IBPS 2010). Another advantage of the UPP model is that it brings together entities from the federal, state and municipal level and enjoys broad political support from both the former governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral, and the mayor of the city of Rio de Janeiro, Eduardo Paes, who are both affiliated to the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party.

By March 2014, 36 UPP units had been installed, covering approximately 540,000 inhabitants in 185 communities, including Rocinha and Cidade de Deus, as well as the notorious Complexo do Alemão, the former stronghold of the CV drug trafficking faction (Instituto Pereira Passos 2014). The aim is to expand this number to 40 UPPs and 12,500 police by 2014 (Interview with Seabra 2012).

Figure 4.5 Young UPP police officers in the Complexo do Alemão



Source: Author's own illustration.

Nevertheless, the success of the UPPs is disputed. Most of the criticism of the pacification models revolves around three broad points: selection bias, migration of crime/criminals, and corruption. The first issue, selection bias, refers to the criteria that were taken into account when deciding which communities should be pacified and in what order. According to Roberto Sá, Assistant Secretary of Planning and Operational Integration of the SESEG, seven key indicators are used to select the communities that will benefit from a UPP intervention: territorial exclusion, presence of weapons of war, violent criminal fatalities, informality, social deficit, institutional absence and absence of the state (Field notes 1, 2010). However, if only these indicators are taken into account, one has to wonder why most of the UPP units in the early stages of the programme were installed either in the more prosperous south zone or close to tourist sites and locations important for the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games (with the notable exception of the UPP in Cidade de Deus). More recently, the pacification model was also extended to other places in the city's north and west zones, such as Complexo do Alemão and Jacarezinho.

The second issue refers to the migration of crime/criminals. Some residents of non-pacified communities have voiced the concern that Rio de Janeiro is changing from a 'divided city' into a city with 'divided favelas' because of the increasing differences between pacified and non-pacified communities. In fact, in many non-pacified communities security and social services are still at critical, at times even deteriorating,

levels. This is partly due to the migration of criminals or the migration of crime. The first type occurs when criminals manage to escape before or during the occupation and settle down in non-pacified favelas of friendly drug trafficking factions. Robson Rodrigues da Silva, the former commander of the UPPs, agrees that this is possible but he doubts that the drug traffickers manage to take their criminal infrastructure with them:

'There are no tools for me to say that "Individual A" is in this community, you know? I do not have that because the only way to do it is to put a GPS monitor on him and accompany him. What I do have are tools to measure crime. There is the hypothesis that the individual might have migrated, but the infrastructure did not go with him' (Interview with da Silva 2010).

Arguably the migratory movement of individual criminals is less prominent than the migration of crime which occurs when criminals take up new (or old) forms of crime, such as armed robberies and kidnappings, to sustain their livelihoods after they are pushed out of the drug trade. Extortion with the deprivation of liberty, for instance, increased by 62.5 per cent in the state of Rio de Janeiro between 2010 and 2011, from 88 to 143 cases, and policy-makers attribute it to the migration of crime caused by the UPPs (Ortiz 2012, January 12). Police also believe that some drug bosses have given permission to get money *na pista* [in the streets or highway outside the favela], a synonym for armed robberies, because the profits of the drug trade can no longer sustain everyone, especially not the criminal migrants (Bastos 2012, July 15). The youngest crime data of the ISP reflect this reconfiguration of crime. Between January and September 2013, the police recorded 3,501 intentional homicides in the state of Rio de Janeiro which is equivalent to a 14.9 per cent increase compared to the same period in 2012. However, homicides increased significantly more in the Baixada Fluminense region to the north of Rio de Janeiro (an increase of 28.5 per cent) and in the neighbouring city Niterói (an increase of 27 per cent) than in the city of Rio de Janeiro (an increase of merely 4.8 per cent). The same trend could be observed for other crime indicators, such as vehicle robberies and robberies of passers-by (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2014).

The last point of criticism refers to corruption and the accountability of the pacification police. In September 2011, the newspaper O Dia revealed that up to 30 policemen from the UPP unit in Coroa/Fallet/Fogueteiro were involved in a bribing scheme and received R\$ 53,000 each month from the drug traffickers (Menezes et al. 2011, September 12). Similar corruption scandals were brought to light in the São Carlos and Mangueira/Tuiuti UPPs in February and June 2012. The UPPs were designed as a community-oriented police force made up largely of new recruits in order to avoid corruption. Colonel Rogério Seabra Martins who assumed the Coordenadoria da Polícia Pacificadora [Coordinating Body of the UPP; CPP] in October 2011 attempted to improve the accountability of the UPPs and created two new programmes: Disque

UPP [Dial UPP] and CPP na UPP [CPP in the UPP].⁵⁷ However, the torture and assassination of the assistant bricklayer 'Amarildo' by UPP policemen in Rocinha in July 2013 was the most recent example of police abuse reminding us that repressive policing practises in Rio de Janeiro run deep and that it will take more than the recruitment of a few thousand new policemen and women to change the institutional ethos of the military police.

4.2.2 Civil police

Rio de Janeiro's non-uniformed Polícia Civil [Civil Police, PCERJ] mainly has investigative and judicial functions. It is organised into *delegacias* [stations] that are managed by a station chief with a law degree. There are 66 police stations in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Just like the military police, the civil police have special operations units, such as the elite unit Coordenadoria de Recursos Especiais [Coordination of Special Resources, CORE] and others focusing on specific types of crime (e.g. homicides) or types of victim (e.g. children/adolescents or women). There are currently 9,500 officers serving in the civil police and the hierarchy is less strict compared to the military police (Husain 2007; Ministério da Justiça 2013: 128). The planned budget of Rio de Janeiro's civil police for 2012 (R\$ 1.062 billion in 2012) was less than half of that of the military police (R\$ 2.201 billion) (Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2011: 524, 526).

Corruption is widespread among both Rio de Janeiro's civil and military police. Corrupt police officers often counteract sophisticated police operations by selling intelligence information to traffickers in order to warn them about upcoming raids. They also accept bribes from traffickers in order to turn a blind eye on the drug sales. Traffickers are believed to pay police around R\$ 2,000 to R\$ 2,500 per *boca* per week (Athayde and Bill 2007: 225, 247). Corruption is also deeply entrenched in the penitentiary system where imprisoned leaders of the drug trafficking factions continue to control the drug sales business, either with the help of visiting family members or directly by using mobile phones. Despite huge investments in mobile phone-blocking technology, until now the authorities have failed to cut off mobile phone transmission or the supply of mobile phones inside prisons (Gay 2010).

⁵⁷ The *Disque UPP*, implemented in August 2012, is a telephone hotline that gives residents from pacified communities the opportunity to file complaints about the UPPs in an anonymous way. The *CPP na UPP* is a programme in which Colonel Seabra and his management team personally visit one UPP unit every two weeks and give the local communities the opportunity to discuss any issues directly with the head of the pacification police: 'The idea is to increase the physical presence of the managers of the UPP so that the police feel protected. It is about support, protection, shelter and care of the employee' (Interview with Seabra 2012).

It has to be assumed that official data on police violence and corruption only reflect a small fraction of the total police misconduct due to widespread impunity, intimidation and cover-up. Allegations have been brought forward by relatives of victims that police had removed evidence, planted unmarked guns on victims and threatened witnesses. In some cases, police have attempted to stop people who had witnessed extra-judicial executions from giving testimony by arbitrarily detaining and torturing them (Amnesty International 2005). Another issue is that most police homicide cases are tried in military courts which have remained untouched by an otherwise promising judicial reform (Macaulay 2011a). The systematic impunity is so entrenched in the Brazilian judicial branch that the great majority of cases are never judged and police officers continue on active duty. Within the police corporations, corrupt and violent police officers are often punished by being (temporarily) transferred to other districts. Hélio Luz, at the time chief of the civil police in Rio de Janeiro, said in an interview:

‘The institution [police] was designed to be violent and corrupt. And people think that’s odd. Why do I say it was designed that way? Because it was created to protect the state and the elite. I practice law enforcement to protect and serve the status quo’ (Luz in: Lund and Moreira Salles 1999).

The two police forces, military police and civil police, are bitter rivals. Both have their own hierarchical structure, institutional culture, recruitment, training and even crime databases (Ministério da Justiça 2013). Both operate in secrecy, rarely sharing information and competing for their share of the state public security budget (Macaulay 2011a). The civil police view the military police as ‘uneducated foot soldiers’ while the military police think of the civil police as corrupt and inefficient (Husain 2007: 77). Both forces mistrust other law enforcement agencies in the criminal justice system (Husain 2007). Several attempts at police reform have been made trying to strengthen the cooperation and trust between the two forces and to improve accountability, e.g. community-oriented policing, citizens advisory committees, centres for the defense of citizenship, Disque Denúncia, the Ombudsman Office, integrated public security zones, Model Police Stations, Community Security Councils, UPPs etc. (see Section 2.3). However, little has changed in the way policing is being practised on the ground. Soares states:

‘The institutional framework of public security in Brazil remains the same which we inherited from the military dictatorship. The guarantee of rights and respect for citizenship is incompatible with the organisational structure which was bequeathed to us. Let me give you an example: the military police is not prepared for citizenship and for meeting the needs of society. It is structured to act as a small army facing a war, an internal war’ (Interview with Soares 2012).

Nevertheless, despite all the (justified) criticism of the PMERJ and PCERJ it is important to note the broader context in which the police are embedded into. Hinton reminds us

that the police are caught in a schizophrenic cycle where they are expected to raid favelas and fight with heavily armed criminals and, at the same time, respect human rights and refrain from using force:

'With impunity, backtracking, and betrayal of the rules of the game, to expect the police to have played their cards straight would be to pretend that they were not embedded in the context in which they operated' (Hinton 2006: 194).

The police in Rio de Janeiro are faced with extraordinarily high rates of crime and they are often not rewarded accordingly. Their salary is one of the lowest in the country despite the high risk of being injured or killed during work: the minimum gross salary of a *soldado* [soldier, lowest rank within the PMERJ] in Rio de Janeiro is R\$ 1,720 (in 2011), compared to R\$ 2,492 in São Paulo and R\$ 2,252 in Minas Gerais (Ministério da Justiça 2013: 69).

4.2.3 Municipal guards

The city of Rio de Janeiro maintains a uniformed Guarda Municipal with 8,000 members operating under the jurisdiction of the mayor. The GM was created in 1993 as a nucleus of the Companhia de Limpeza Urbana [Urban Cleaning Company, COMLURB] with the mission of protecting the municipal heritage, squares and buildings found in Rio de Janeiro. In 2009, Mayor Eduardo Paes transformed the municipal guard by endowing it with the power of traffic police. Paes was responding to demands of GM employees who wanted to have the rights of public servants and be able to fine and arrest criminal offenders (Interview with Lima 2012). According to the commander of the GM, Henrique Castro Lima, a colonel in the military police for twenty-nine years, in the beginning there were political and territorial rivalries between the municipal guards and the military police:

'In the beginning the relationship between the municipal guards and the PM was a bit difficult. When the municipal guard was created, we [the PM] thought they would occupy a space that was ours and that is what really happened, like for instance in the area of traffic. But the general commander understood that the better the municipal guard provided its service, the more the PM could devote itself to combating crime. Today our relationship is very sound' (Interview with Lima 2012).

Rio de Janeiro's GM is the biggest municipal guard in Brazil.⁵⁸ The notable feature of the municipal guard is that they eschew the use of firearms, instead utilising only non-lethal

⁵⁸ Note that the state of Rio de Janeiro has the highest density of municipal guards in the country. Out of 92 municipalities, 74 (80 per cent) have their own municipal guards with a total of 16,417 officers. This

weapons, such as shields, bats, and gas. The entry salary of municipal guards including rewards is currently R\$ 1,800 which is about on a par with the entry salary of the military police. The two main pillars of the work of the municipal guards are traffic regulation and order. For instance, they regulate traffic during rush hour, combat piracy and informality and are indispensable in mega-events, such as football games, the Rio+20 conference, Rock in Rio and many more.

Compared to the municipal guards in the state of São Paulo, the municipal guards in the state of Rio de Janeiro are considerably less involved in traditional policing activities. For instance, 85 per cent of municipal guards in São Paulo are involved in *patrulhamento ostensivo* [policing in the streets], compared to only 71 per cent of municipal guards in Rio de Janeiro. Similarly, 66 per cent of municipal guards in São Paulo include *atendimento de ocorrências policiais* [attending police occurrences] in their work, compared to only 29 per cent in Rio de Janeiro (IBGE 2009). This might explain why Rio de Janeiro's GM only operate in *bairros* and do not enter the favelas. Colonel Lima justified this by stating that:

'The favelas are areas considered a risk for the municipal guard. The municipal guard is not armed. We work in the access [to the favelas] but working inside is more complicated because I need to guarantee the physical integrity of my guard. We would go to the favelas with UPPs without any problem. If the *mancha de desordem* [stain of disorder] points us there, we will go but it has not been the case' (Interview with Lima 2012).

Considering the amount of informality governing the daily life in the favelas, it is doubtful that the *mancha de desordem* did not yet reach these conflagrated areas. Beltrame does not share the opinion of Lima:

'I would say that they should not go into non-pacified favelas because they could be the target for shots. [But in pacified favelas] they should go up but they don't. You need to ask the mayor why [they don't go in]. We need actions of public order inside the favelas because it is not the function of a civil or military policeman to take down informal stalls or confiscate pirated CDs' (Interview with Beltrame 2012).

4.2.4 Military

Historically, the military has a lot of power in Brazil and enjoys an excellent reputation (Latinobarómetro 1995, 2010; Roett 1999; Zaverucha 2005). The Brazilian military has divided the national territory into seven *comando militares* [military commands, CM] and each one is commanded by a four-star general. The states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas

ratio is much higher than in other states. In the state of São Paulo, for instance, only 32.2 per cent of municipalities have their own GM, and in Minas Gerais, only 7 per cent (IBGE 2012).

Gerais and Espírito Santo make up the Comando Militar do Leste [CML]. With around 15,000 soldiers, the CML constitutes the biggest operational troop in the country (Interview with Pereira Júnior 2012).

Brazil's armed forces (navy, army and air force) are governed by Article 142 of the 1988 Constitution:

'As Forças Armadas [...] destinam-se à defesa da Pátria, à garantia dos poderes constitucionais e, por iniciativa de qualquer destes, da lei e da ordem' [The armed forces [...] are intended for the defense of the country, for the guarantee of the constitutional powers, and, on the initiative of any of these, of law and order] (Presidência da República 1988: Art.142).

These few constitutional words – *garantia da lei e da ordem* [guarantee law and order, GLO] – are some of the most debated and controversial words in the Brazilian Constitution because it provides the grounds for the use of the military in internal affairs. The deployment of the military in GLO missions can take four different forms: the preservation of public order, the guarantee of elections, the security of mega-events and the protection of national borders, sea and air space. The first three types of deployment are temporary, the last one is permanent (Interview with Pereira Júnior 2012).

The deployment of the military in GLO missions is further regulated through Complementary Law Nr 97 (1999), Decreed Nr 3897 (2001) and Complementary Law Nr 117 (2004) (de Lima 2012). The first one states that 'the performance of the armed forces [...] will take place in accordance with the directives of the president after the instruments for the preservation of public order and the safety of persons and property are exhausted' (Presidência da República 1999: Art.15, §2). These instruments are considered 'exhausted' when the head of the state's executive branch formally recognises them as 'unavailable, nonexistent or inadequate for the regular performance of its constitutional mission' (Presidência da República 1999: Art.15, §3). However, the involvement of the armed forces would always have to be temporary (*de forma episódica*) and happen in a defined geographical area for a limited period of time (Presidência da República 1999: Art.15, §4). Furthermore, the performance of the military in ensuring law and order is considered a military activity, hence the armed forces formally exercise the operational control over public security organs during the GLO operations (de Lima 2012).

For many years, Rio de Janeiro's state governors were reluctant to request the deployment of the armed forces. This is because some of the governors had plans to stand for presidential elections and needed to preserve their reputation as good crises managers. The armed forces were also often under the control of an opposing political party on the federal level so cooperation was difficult for political reasons (Perlman 2010). Nevertheless, the military has been deployed on several occasions since the end

of the military dictatorship, either in the combat of the drug trade or to guarantee the security of mega-events. In 1992, for instance, the armed forces were deployed in support of the UN International Earth Summit. Between January 1994 and May 1995, they participated in the Operação Rio [Operation Rio], raiding several dozen favelas in order to capture drug traffickers and to seize drugs and arms. In 2003, the military garrisoned 3,000 troops in the city of Rio de Janeiro to ensure safety during the carnival season. One year later, in 2004, a turf war between rival gangs in Rocinha prompted the local authorities to call in the military. In 2007, the armed forces ensured the safety of the Pan-American Games. In November 2010, the military was deployed in the occupation of the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha and they retained the operational control of the Força de Pacificação [Pacification Force, FPac, integrated by the military and state security forces] for the following eighteen months before the territory was handed over to the UPPs (see Section 6.3.1). Recently the military was deployed for guaranteeing law and order during the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 and the World Youth Day in 2013.

The deployment of the military in internal state affairs, especially in urban conflicts, has severe implications for the legitimacy of all state entities assigned with the provision of public security. It not only shows the severity of the public security crisis, it also illustrates the desperation of the federal and state law enforcement agencies to adequately deal with these challenges. For a state governor to admit that the state public security forces were 'unavailable, nonexistent or inadequate' in the pursuit of maintaining order is a confession of its own impotence and thereby reduces citizens' confidence in the capabilities of the state police forces as a provider of security.

Furthermore, the armed forces are usually an inadequate response to urban conflicts because they are trained to protect the territory and sovereignty of the nation-state. That means the military is trained for war against other nation-states and not against individual criminal groups. Soldiers are not specialised in dealing with questions of human rights, citizenship and criminal justice and their equipment is unsuitable to function in urban environments where streets are narrow and the population density is high. The longer the military is involved in urban conflicts, the greater the risk that soldiers will become corrupted by drug traffickers or other criminal actors. Four-star general Adriano Pereira Júnior, the commander of the CML, seeks to rebut this argument:

‘There is a stereotype that the soldier is trained to kill, to have an enemy. But this is just a stereotype by people who do not know how the Brazilian army works. Because we have it in our Constitution [...] the army is ready and trained. I cannot leave out preparing my soldiers to act in GLO. They have to be trained, skillful with the weapon – which is different from defending the country – because it is a constitutional mission [...]. I have no

doubt and I think nobody should [have the doubt] that our soldiers are well prepared to perform this type of operation' (Interview with Pereira Júnior 2012).

There are differing views to explain the motivation of the military in becoming involved in internal affairs. Whereas some say that the armed forces want to stay in power at any cost (Zaverucha 2005), others take a more pragmatic standpoint arguing that the military have no particular interest in becoming involved in urban conflicts but because it will happen anyway, they at least prefer to be prepared for it (Interview with Medeiros Filho 2010; Pereira Júnior 2012).⁵⁹ In fact, one attraction of the Brazilian United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Haiti, particularly in Port-au-Prince, is that soldiers gain experience in urban conflicts – valuable knowledge which can then be deployed in the fight against traffickers in Rio de Janeiro (Field notes 2, 2011).

4.3 Private security providers in Rio de Janeiro

In addition to public security providers, a large part of the security market in Rio de Janeiro is controlled by private security providers, namely private security companies, death squads, militias and drug trafficking factions. Some of these groups, particularly the private security companies, depend to a large extent on the services of law enforcement agents, e.g. police, fire-fighters and penitentiary guards. The majority of state security agents (with the exception of administrative staff) work on *escalas* [rotations] of 12 hours on duty, 48 hours off or 24 hours on duty, 72 hours off. However, instead of resting in the free time, many of them have second employment to supplement their meagre income as a public servant. This is called *bico* [lit. beak]. They work as security guards in supermarkets or gated communities, as bodyguards for upper-class families and some even participate in the illegal activities of death squads and militias.

To a certain extent, there is an incentive for public security agents to spread fear and feelings of insecurity among the population and to leave residents unprotected so that there is a higher demand for private security services. Soares explains:

'A public servant cannot offer a service to the public (in private and in business terms) which grows to the exact extent in demand in which the

⁵⁹ Medeiros Filho conducted a survey with military students from three different military schools in Rio de Janeiro and Campinas in order to examine their views on the objectives of the military: 90 per cent of respondents agreed that the involvement of the armed forces in the combat of crime tended to increase and 68.3 per cent agreed that the involvement of the armed forces in public security operations was viable. However, only 32.5 per cent agreed that the future formation of soldiers should prioritise education focused on low intensity mission, such as the fight against criminal gangs (Medeiros Filho 2010: 227, 228).

quality of the public service is degraded. Simply because that would implicate that every public security agent has a private interest in [allowing the] decay of their own public security services' (Soares 2007, October 1).

Soares argues that in that way the state has an interest to facilitate the practice of *bicos* because it sustains a public security system which would otherwise collapse financially:

'Illegal private security makes the public budget feasible [...]. The policy-makers know that, with the informal link between our lower-ranking police and private security, they can have an unrealistic public budget [and] pay little to the public security professionals' (Soares 2007, October 1).

Lastly, working double and triple shifts and not having sufficient rest between the shifts can compromise the performance of the public security agents when they are on duty. A study into the deaths of public security agents in the state of Rio de Janeiro between 1994 and 2004 showed that police died more frequently when working as private security guards than while on public duty. Out of the deaths resulting from violence, military police have died 2.8 times more frequently during their free time than when working on official duty (Souza and Minayo 2005).

Although the state government has made some effort to guaranteeing that Rio de Janeiro's law enforcement agents feel valued for their work, both monetarily and within society, as well as ensuring they have less incentive to engage in informal or criminal activities, this opportunity is only taken up by a small fraction of officers and many continue to work for private security companies or even militias (see Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.3).⁶⁰

4.3.1 Private security companies

Private security companies emerged in Brazil after the government issued a decree in 1969 which obliged all financial institutions to assume the responsibilities for the security

⁶⁰ Former State Governor Cabral recently signed two new decrees that attempt to regulate the way in which police officers can work during their free time. The first (nº 42,875; 15 March 2011) created the Programa Estadual de Integração na Segurança [State Programme of Security Integration; PROEIS] and allows military police officers to be contracted by city governments to work as security guards during their free time. The respective city halls have to pay R\$ 150 per 8-hour shift to rank-and-file patrol officers and R\$ 175 to high-ranking officials. The law only allows police to work a maximum of twelve extra rotations every 30 days and police need to respect a minimum of 8-hour rest periods between shifts (RJTV 2011, March 17). There are already more than 1,200 police participating in the PROEIS that, among others, offers services to the companies Codin, Supervia and Light, and the city halls of Rio de Janeiro, Queimados, Itaperuna and Macaé (Governo do Rio de Janeiro 2012).

The second decree (nº 43.538; 3 April 2012) created the Regime Adicional de Serviços [Additional Services Regime] as part of the Programa Mais Polícia [More Police Programme] and allows civil and military police, fire-fighters and penitentiary guards to work in the reinforcement of public security or in international mega-events such as Rio+20 in 2012 or the World Cup in 2014 during their free time. They can work up to 96 extra hours every 30 days, earning a salary bonus of between R\$ 112.50 to R\$ 375 (G1 RJ 2012, April 4; Governo do Rio de Janeiro 2012).

of their properties and assets themselves. Private security services expanded rapidly and soon encompassed new market sectors besides banking. The expansion occurred in very uncontrolled and unregulated ways which is why the government enacted various laws to control and monitor the private security sector (such as law nº 7,102, 20 June 1983, amended by laws nº 8,863, 28 March 1994, and nº 9,017, 30 March 1995). The following two activities are considered to fall into the realm of private security: firstly, *vigilância patrimonial* [property security], the surveillance of assets of financial institutions, other public and private establishments and of people, and, secondly, *transporte de valores*, the transport of valuables or other freight (Presidência da República 1983: Art. 10). However, the laws regulating the private security sector in Brazil are outdated and the Ministry of Justice is currently preparing a new bill, the Estatuto de Segurança Privada, to create new criteria for private security companies and to ensure a more effective control of the private security market (Abdala 2011).

According to legislation currently in place, the federal police are responsible for the authorisation, monitoring and control of private security companies. They also have the role of approving the uniforms of the *vigilantes* [private security guards] and of authorising and monitoring arms and ammunition. The salaries of private security guards are regulated through unions. In the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, the basic monthly salary is R\$ 924.48 for a *vigilante*, R\$ 1109.96 for a personal bodyguard and R\$ 1201.81 for a *vigilante de escolta* [private security agent for the transport of valuables] (Sindicato dos Vigilantes do Município do Rio de Janeiro 2012).

Renato da Silva, director of the private security company BSS Vigilância, states that his company suffers from the competition of clandestine security companies. The services of clandestine security companies can be more than 50 per cent cheaper than the services of registered security companies because these firms do not pay taxes, or insurances, or the training of their employees. Da Silva explains:

‘We suffer a lot under the clandestine companies. It is about the price! While I write a fiscal note, pay various taxes and levies, his money is clean [...]. Nowadays you charge R\$ 16.50 per hour for a private security guard. With this price, you can pay your employees, pay taxes, manage your company, and make a profit. But the business man, a clandestine person, charges around R\$ 7-8 per hour. It’s absurd!’ (Interview with da Silva 2011).

Clandestine security companies also have more options to buy firearms. Whereas registered companies need to go through a complicated authorisation process with the federal police, clandestine security guards simply buy their firearms on the black market. Da Silva explains that a legal weapon for a private security guard costs around R\$ 1,200. On the black market, prices are much more volatile (R\$ 300 to R\$ 2,000) and the weapon has probably been used in a crime before. The main advantage of buying

firearms on the black market is not the price but the time. It is much quicker than the legal process which takes between 40 and 50 days (Interview with da Silva 2011).

Many police officers, fire-fighters and prison guards work in registered or clandestine companies to compensate for their meager income as public servants. Alex Gonçalves, the operational director of the private security company Sunset Vigilancia in Rio de Janeiro argues that there are three factors that contribute to this: the low salary of the police, the 12/36 working schedule and the fact that police can legally buy and carry firearms because they have received specific weapons training (Interview with Gonçalves 2012). It is also believed that many higher ranking police officers own private security companies and have them legally registered in the names of their wives or children (Gay 2010; Kahn, 2001 in: Zanetic 2005).

4.3.2 Death squads

Death squads were much more predominant in Rio de Janeiro in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s than today and it was therefore decided not to include this group as one of the security providers in this thesis. Nevertheless, the issue of death squads will be briefly discussed here because it is closely linked with the problem of the militias (see Section 4.3.3). Both groups operate in similar ways and compensate in perverse ways for failures of the public security sector.

Death squads are defined as 'clandestine and usually irregular organizations, often paramilitary in nature, who carry out extrajudicial executions and other violent acts (torture, rape, arson, bombing, etc.) against clearly defined individuals or groups of people' (Campbell and Brenner 2002: 1-2). The political impetus for the use of death squads originate from the state's failure to adequately combat violence. Governments use death squads 'to lower the political costs of their repressive goals' (Huggins 2002: 220). The state needs to officially refrain from using extra-judicial violence and therefore subcontracts death squads in order to spread terror and eliminate the state's alleged internal enemies. With time, new death squads emerge with a greater degree of privatisation and sub-contracting and the state gradually loses control of the violence it has initiated. However, death squads are not in competition with the public security apparatus and by no means constitute parallel forms of security and justice. Rather, as Huggins reveals, they provide a 'working symbiosis' between the police, informal death squads and rent-a-cops (Huggins 2002: 222).

Death squads need to be distinguished from other forms of private security or private justice, such as assassinations and terrorism, because they operate with the support or passive consent of the state, principally during the initial stages of its inception

(Campbell and Brenner 2002). Huggins attempted to situate death squads on a continuum of extralegal vigilante violence in Brazil. The author stated that death squads are more organised and state-linked and less spontaneous than mob lynching and individual kill-for-pay assassins, called *justiceiros*. Yet they are less spontaneous and organised than the state-appointed police carrying out extrajudicial killings while on duty (Huggins 2002).

The first Brazilian death squad started to operate in Rio de Janeiro at the end of the 1950s and has significantly shaped the debate about private security provision and human rights in Brazil and abroad. According to Huggins, at the end of the 1950s, army general Amury Kruel, the chief of Rio de Janeiro's civil police forces, was under pressure to do something about the increasing crime rates. He directed his chief delegate, Cecil Border, to form a small group of police officers who were willing to give their lives in the fight against criminals. A special motorised patrol unit was set up, called Esquadrão Motorizada [Motorised Squad] and headed by civil police inspector Milton Le Cocq de Oliveira with a special mandate to kill criminals. In 1958, Le Cocq set up a parallel squad, called Esquadrão de Morte [Death Squad] in order to do off-duty killings. Over the following years, the line between the Esquadrão Motorizada and the Esquadrão de Morte became increasingly blurred and this marked the beginning of a symbiosis between the state's official public security entities and informal, criminal murder networks (Huggins 2002).

Barcellos (1992) confirms that it is very difficult to differentiate between death squads and police who carry out extrajudicial killings while on duty. In an extensive study about police killings in São Paulo, he identified 4,179 people who had been killed by the police in São Paulo between 1970 and 1992 (mainly by the PM's tactical force unit Rondas Ostensivas Tobias de Aguiar; ROTA). The great majority (65 per cent) of these victims were innocent. In the early years, the police were more careful in the way they presented and explained these deaths. The police report usually stated that the alleged criminal or trafficker had started shooting at the police first who then acted in pure self-defense. In a 'humanitarian act' by the police, '*o traficante foi socorrido no hospital mas nao resistiu aos ferimentos e veio a falecer*' [the trafficker was taken to the hospital but did not resist his injuries and died]. The reports usually mentioned that the 'criminal' or 'trafficker' was in the possession of drugs and firearms but that '*a vítima ainda não foi identificada*' [the victim could not be identified yet]. Barcellos thought it was quite ironic that the military police knew these people were criminals without knowing their identity. These extrajudicial killings were rarely punished. On the contrary, the actions of these policemen were praised by their superiors and led to rapid career progression. In later years, police were less careful to conceal the extrajudicial killings and carried them out during their free time or outside their area of jurisdiction which made their activities more

similar to the activities of a proper death squad (Alston 2009; Amnesty International 2005). Rio de Janeiro's daily newspapers today are still full of articles using exactly the same language and phrases mentioned above which Barcellos associated with (extra-judicial) police killings of alleged 'traffickers' and other 'criminals'.

There are some more recent examples showing that death squads in Rio de Janeiro remain active, albeit on a much lower scale than during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, e.g. the widespread executions of street children in the 1990s, the Candelária Church massacre in July 1993 and the massacre in Queimados and Nova Iguaçu in April 2005 (see Section 2.3.2). The death squads of earlier decades have transformed into new forms of being. Zaluar and Conceição argue that in many ways the militias of today resemble the *justiceiros* [kill-for-pay-assassins], mob lynching and death squads of the past decades: 'The names change, the arrangements advance in their level of illegality, but they constitute a longstanding, historical process to compensate for the failures of state and federal public security policies' (Zaluar and Conceição 2007: 92). Today, the extra-judicial killings would either be called *autos de resistência* by the police (see Section 4.2.1) or be attributed to the militias (see Section 4.3.3).

4.3.3 Militias

In Brazil, a *milícia* [militia] is popularly understood as an armed paramilitary group, composed of civilians, police or ex-police officers, fire-fighters, penitentiary guards and other security agents, who establish territorial control in a particular area. Cano posits five criteria to identify militias: the control of a territory and its population by an armed group, a coercive form of control, individual profit maximisation as the central motivation, a discourse of legitimisation about protecting residents and the establishment of order, and the active and recognised participation of state agents (Cano cited in: ALERJ 2008).

In Rio de Janeiro, the first militia emerged in the favela Rio das Pedras in the beginning of the 1990s. Rio das Pedras had been under the control of the so-called *policia mineira*, a group who had established their own norms of social behaviour in the community and killed those who did not comply with the rules. In the beginning of the 1990s, a less arbitrary and aggressive group assumed power under the leadership of civil police officer Félix Tostes (Zaluar and Conceição 2007). Within a short period of time, militias were also established in the close-by communities of Gardênia Azul and Tijuquinha.

By 2010, militias controlled 454 (45 per cent) of Rio de Janeiro's approximately 1,000 favelas, with a population of 422,000 inhabitants (Goulart 2013, December 3). They make high profits, not only by charging 'security fees' from residents but also by

controlling gas, internet and alternative transport in the areas they dominate (ALERJ 2008). Furthermore, militias have penetrated the political sphere by forcing residents to vote for certain candidates, especially in municipal elections (ALERJ 2008).

In light of this increase in militia activity, in 2008, the Legislative Assembly of the State of Rio de Janeiro [Assembléia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, ALERJ] established a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) to investigate the activities of the militias in the state of Rio de Janeiro. According to the CPI, militias have diverse means of income: Besides taxing security fees from residents (R\$ 15-30 per month), militias also charge for the security of businesses (R\$ 30-300), cable TV (R\$ 20-40) and internet (R\$ 10-35). By far their most important source of income stems from alternative transport. The CPI estimated that the militias in Rio das Pedras were earning R\$ 169,500 daily (R\$ 60 million yearly) by offering alternative 'public' transportation with vans. Residents who refuse to accept the militias' extortion suffer retaliations, such as threats, beatings, torture, expulsion from the community and even death (ALERJ 2008).

Initially, there was a misconception among part of Rio de Janeiro's population and the authorities that the militias were a 'minor problem' compared to the drug trade (Perlman 2010; Ritto 2012, September 24). However, this myth of the militias as 'liberators of the people' who would free residents in poor neighbourhoods from the clutches of drug traffickers was soon dismantled. Militias are driven by the same greed for profit as the traffickers and have more often than not taken control of neutral territories and not of trafficker-controlled areas. The CPI (2008) report identified 171 communities which were controlled by militias. Out of these communities, 119 used to be neutral territories before the militias took over. This shows that militias are striving to increase their power principally in those areas where no other security providers are present or where the power of the drug trafficker has weakened because of the pacification.

Zaluar and Conceição (2007) applied a survey to 660 residents in 60 different census units in Rio de Janeiro to compare how life in militia-controlled communities differs from life in communities under the control of drug traffickers. They concluded that militia-controlled communities are marginally less violent: 14.9 per cent of respondents in militia-controlled communities had witnessed the sale of drugs, compared to 45 per cent in areas controlled by drug traffickers. Similarly, drug use in the streets was less common (18.5 per cent compared to 52.2 per cent), as well as gun-fire (15 per cent of respondents stated gun-fire happened always or often, compared to 62 per cent in communities with drug traffickers). However, physical aggressions were more common in militia-controlled areas (15.8 per cent compared to 12.6 per cent). This can be explained by the gradual use of violence used by the *milicianos* [members of a militia] to deal with conflicts: perpetrators are first intimidated by the militias before they are

expelled from the favela. A death sentence is only a matter of last resort. This contrasts with drug traffickers who make more frequent use of firearms (Zaluar and Conceição 2007). Militias exercise a form of social control which is stricter than the way in which traffickers control their communities. For example, they commonly make use of the *toque do recolher* [curfew]. Furthermore, homosexuals and drug abusers are often expelled from the communities. Some militias even operate social assistance centres from where they give out weekly food baskets to the needy (Ribeiro and Oliveira 2009). Life in militia-controlled favelas is also less violent because of alliances between police and the *milicianos* - many of whom are police themselves or have friends or colleagues among the police officers on duty. Police are less likely to start shooting in these communities without having been provoked first. An open conflict between police and the 'occupying force' is also less likely because if police wanted to arrest members of the militias, they could do that directly in the police stations and do not need to come into a favela and provoke a shootout (Zaluar and Conceição 2007).

In recent years, some advances have been made in the fight against the militias. The Delegacia de Repressão às Ações do Crime Organizado e Inquéritos Especiais [Police Station for the Repression of Organised Crime Actions and Special Inquiries; DRACO] of the civil police is at the forefront of this fight. According to figures from the state secretary of security, between 2006 and March 2012, 692 *milicianos* have been arrested, among them 7 city councilmen, 1 state congressman, 165 military police officers, 33 former military police officers, 16 civil police officers, 10 fire-fighters, 8 soldiers and 4 former soldiers from the military. Two thirds of the arrested *milicianos* were classified as 'other civilians' (Field notes 9, 2012). The fact that seven city councilmen and one state congressman are on the list shows how closely interlinked militias and politics are:

'The militias, in a more intelligent way than the traffickers, saw in politics a form of preserving their interests. The *milicianos* control certain areas and force the population to vote for a certain politician. That is how *milicianos*, or people supported by them, were elected. Some have been arrested, others have lost their mandate but there are still a lot of people in the municipal government who were elected with the vote of the militias and they are still there' (Interview with Storani 2011).

Cano and Duarte (2012) believe that the profile of the militias has changed dramatically after state repression intensified. The militias fell victim to their own ambitions and audacity. The visibility of their activities had turned into vulnerability and – contrary to the drug trade – the most powerful militias, led by politicians, were the first ones to be prosecuted and dismantled. The best example of this decline is the Liga da Justiça [League of Justice], once the most powerful militia in Rio de Janeiro, based in the Campo Grande region. Prosecutors affirmed that it was relatively easy to arrest the

leaders of the Liga da Justiça – State Congressman Natalino José Guimarães and his brother, Councilman Jerome Guimarães Filho – because they appeared a lot in public. They were supported by influential people and thus believed that they were untouchable and would not be brought to justice. However, when the brothers were arrested and state action against the militias increased, other militia groups started operating more discretely. They restructured their business operations and this makes investigations today much more difficult. Cano and Duarte (2012) argue that militias now operate '*no sapatinho*' [on tiptoes] and avoid being identified as police or other law enforcement agents.

Beltrame has since put the federal government under pressure to classify the crime of *milícia* in the Brazilian Penal Code in order to facilitate police investigations and prosecutions (OGlobo 2012, December 12). Before September 2012, members of a militia could only be sentenced for the actual crimes they committed, e.g. gang membership, homicide, threat, or extortion (Presidência da República 1998). However, law n° 12,720 (27 September 2012) extends Art. 288 about gangs of the Brazilian Penal Code and includes the 'constitution of a private militia' as a crime: 'To establish, organise, integrate, maintain or fund a paramilitary organisation, militia, group or squad with the purpose of committing any of the offenses covered in this Code' is punished with imprisonment of four to eight years (Presidência da República 2012: Art. 4). The participation in a militia is under stricter punishment than gang membership which is only punishable by one to three years in prison. The new legislation also establishes that the penalty for homicide or grievous bodily harm is increased by one third if the crime is committed by a member of a militia.

It remains to be seen whether the new legislation will, in fact, lead to higher numbers of militia members being prosecuted and convicted. The combat against paramilitary groups is still not considered a top priority by the government, according to Storani:

'Militias are still not the priority of the state. Because I see that the state does not have enough structure to open two battle fronts. Today these big events – World Cup, Olympics – require planning and prioritisation. Right now the biggest problem is the drug trade. But the problem in the next decade will be the militia, there is no other way' (Interview with Storani 2011).

Until now, policy-makers seem to be more preoccupied with turning the UPPs into a definite success story in order to prove to the international community that something is being done about crime and violence in the preparation for the World Cup and Olympic Games. There is more political support for the combat of the drug trade because the 'enemy figure' is clear and visible (see Section 5.3.4). In contrast, the combat of the militias would require a profound transformation of the police as an institution and the way it attends to public security demands in low-income neighbourhoods.

4.3.4 Drug traffickers

Drug traffickers are the last security provider to be discussed in this analysis and they play a crucial role in Rio de Janeiro's security network. Drug traffickers are distinct from all other security providers because they do not use the provision of security as a rent-seeking activity in itself. Rather, it is a side effect caused by the need to co-opt residents and to defend the local communities against rival factions and the police. The role of most drug trafficking gangs in Rio de Janeiro goes beyond selling marihuana, crack and cocaine and defending the territory. Many gangs also have a 'governance' function in the favelas and are responsible for crime management, dispute resolution and maintaining social order (Arias and Rodrigues 2006).

Rio de Janeiro's first drug trafficking faction, the Comando Vermelho [Red Command; CV], was founded in the maximum security prison of Ilha Grande at the end of the 1970s. At the time, political prisoners of the military dictatorship were held together with common criminals in the same prison block. The former taught the latter what they knew about socialism, group organisation and reciprocity. According to William da Silva Lima, one of the founders of the CV, in the beginning the CV was not a proper criminal organisation, but rather 'a behaviour, a way to survive in adversity' (Lima 1991). The CV started as a self-protection group in prison and soon expanded its control to peripheral communities in Rio de Janeiro to set up its drug business. It fragmented internally in the early 1990s because of territorial disputes between different *donos* [persons in charge of the drug trafficking business in a favela] following the imprisonment of the CV leaders. Soon, other drug trafficking factions were founded: the Comando Vermelho Jovem [Young Red Command; CVJ] and the TC, which later dissolved into the TCP and ADA. The CVJ and the TC were formed in direct opposition to the CV (Borges 2011; Dowdney 2003).

The face of drug trafficking in Rio de Janeiro never had an ideological, religious or political agenda which could distinguish one faction from another (Dowdney 2003), contrary to São Paulo's main drug trafficking faction, the Primeiro Comando da Capital [First Command of the Capital; PCC]. Rio's factions also have rarely used what Holston (2008a) calls 'rights talk' to justify crime and terror with the rationalities of a disjunctive citizenship. Occasionally, buses and cars are burned as a warning or protest in relation to a new government policy or before elections, but the drug trafficking gangs in Rio de Janeiro do not seek to take control and infiltrate the state, like the PCC in São Paulo (Brähler 2013a; Willis 2009).

The drug gangs largely operate from Rio de Janeiro's favelas. This is advantageous from a military defense perspective because of the geographical features of the favelas. They are often situated on the city's hillsides and usually have limited access point and

a network of alleyways which are difficult to navigate for outsiders. With the help of a few *olheiros* [spies], the whole favela can be easily kept under surveillance, which facilitates the drug sales and makes the invasion of police or rival factions more difficult (Dowdney 2003). Favelas in Rio de Janeiro are thus heavily contested spaces and the different drug gangs go to extremes to take territory from their enemies and to defend them against the police.

Over the past three decades, the state has made innumerable attempts to recapture these territories which Rio de Janeiro's crime experts call *áreas conflagradas* [embattled areas]. These initiatives usually take the form of *incursões bélicas* [warlike incursions], comparable to an army entering enemy territory during war. The traffickers attempt to resist these invasions and, as a result, shootouts and violent encounters between the police and the traffickers become a daily occurrence:

'What are *incursões bélicas*? A tactic used in the slums, especially after the drug trade settled in the favelas. The police would intervene, *subindo a favela* [going into the slums], shooting, trying to corner the suspects, attempting to kill or arrest them, seizing drugs and weapons, basically this is it. As you can imagine, many innocent people died in these raids, as well as suspects and even police. The police *descia e saia* [would descend the hills and leave], nothing changed and it only caused harm for everyone. The next day, those who had survived would reorganise themselves and the process would continue. With more hatred of the police, with more fear, with more suffering, more prejudices and, evidently, this characterised the relationship between the police and these areas over the decades' (Interview with Soares 2010).

The relationship between drug traffickers and the community is one of 'forced reciprocity' which means that there is a mutual but involuntary dependence between both (Dowdney 2003). Drug traffickers secure the social order in the community, protect residents from crime and violence and are the 'de facto administrators of "justice"' (Arias and Rodrigues 2006: 53). Rather than actually being able to protect residents, however, drug traffickers create a 'myth of personal security' (Arias and Rodrigues 2006). They make the more influential residents in the local community believe that they are protected by the drug traffickers despite high levels of violent crime in the neighbourhood:

'[T]raffickers enforce community norms under a variable political calculus in which well-connected and respected residents are less likely to be punished for rule violations than are individuals who are marginal to the life of the community' (Arias and Rodrigues 2006: 53).

Drug traffickers also stimulate the community economically (profits feed back into local economy) and keep residents entertained (e.g. celebrating Children's day and *baile funk* parties). In return, the drug traffickers enforce the *lei do silêncio* [code of silence], demanding that the favela residents do not publicly discuss trafficker-linked crime or

violence that takes place in their neighbourhood and do not interfere with the drug sales (Arias and Rodrigues 2006). If residents do not obey the rules of the traffickers, they can be punished in the form of beatings, shaving of women's heads, expulsion from the community and execution (Arias and Rodrigues 2006; Dowdney 2003).

Drug traffickers also control gun ownership in the communities. They do not allow residents to own guns, unless they belong to the criminal network. As a result, the law-abiding citizens in these communities rarely carry firearms. It is also in their own interest not to own a firearm so that the police do not associate them with the criminals (Lessing 2008). Traffickers can 'mediate' in conflicts between neighbours and can hold a *tribunal do crime* [criminal courts] when no justice can be expected from the state to punish the wrong-doers. Some traffickers also assist residents who encounter themselves in financial hardship. For instance, if a drug trafficker is imprisoned or killed, the group has a life-long commitment to take care of the family and pay for the funeral. They might also pay for expenditures of law-abiding residents, such as medication and children's school uniform. Marcos* is a resident from a favela in Maré which was controlled by the TCP at the time of our interview. He states that the traffickers in his community give out presents on special occasions:

'At Christmas they give presents to the children of the community. I remember once they stole a refrigerated vehicle and distributed the meat to the community. And sometimes during festive seasons it happens that they distribute clothing and food baskets' (Interview with Marcos* 2012).

However, the affective relationship between traffickers and residents has changed considerably in the past decade, mainly due to a generational change in the leadership. Thiago* states that the relationship between residents and drug traffickers in the Complexo do Alemão deteriorated when the drug lord Orlando Jogador (CV) died and younger and more inexperienced traffickers assumed power:

'When the CV was founded, these guys [founders] had a mentality. They had a goal, a theory, "let's change something". But when Jogador died, the war between factions began and it was all about the money. Then all these kids took over. Teenagers have no limits, they don't respect anyone. They don't respect teachers in school, so how will they show respect with a machine gun in their hands? And from there to here, the relationship between the drug trade and community finished [...]. The only rule is for you to respect the drug trafficker. The dealer is never wrong. No other rules exist, that's a legend. So is there a good coexistence between the community and the drug trade? There is but only if you don't step on anyone's tail' (Interview with Thiago* 2011).

In other cases, drug traffickers have assumed power in communities without having grown up there themselves. These younger men and women are only interested in the profits of the drug sales and do not invest into a good relationship with the community.

The residents do not consider these outsiders as *cria da favela* [brought up in the favela] and the relationship of mutual dependency is substituted with mistrust and fear.

Nevertheless, in many areas, Rio de Janeiro's drug trafficking factions have still succeeded in becoming *institutionalised gangs*, characterised by normality and longevity (Hazen 2010). They are recognised as a normal, integrated part of the community offering some form of security and protection to the community (normality), and they have the capacity to sustain their group and their business over time unaffected by the imprisonment or death of its leaders (longevity). As a consequence, any state attempt aimed at annihilating the criminal actors and recapturing state territory is doomed to fail if it does not make considerable efforts to win back the hearts and minds of the community. This is effectively what the pacification model has attempted to achieve – reestablishing a permanent state security presence in the favelas and at the same time improving the relationship between the community and the police. The fact that some favela residents have lost trust in the protective capacities of the criminal gangs in recent years certainly plays a role in the success of the UPPs.

4.4 Chapter conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to map the security providers who operate in Rio de Janeiro's neighbourhoods, including their histories, interests, *modi operandi* and record of security provision (see summary in Table 4.1). The network of security providers in Rio de Janeiro is a good example of violent pluralism due to the high number and variety of actors providing security in Rio de Janeiro's neighbourhoods. Arias and Goldstein (2010) named their concept 'violent pluralism' to denote a plurality of groups, public and private, legal and illegal who deploy violence as a means of accumulating power. In Rio de Janeiro, security services are being provided by the military police, the civil police, municipal guards, the military, private security companies, death squads, militias and even by drug traffickers. The city of Rio de Janeiro thus fits the description of a place that is 'violently plural'. The diversity of the security providers also helps to explain the variation in residents' perception of security which was observed in the survey (see Section 3.3), especially when considering that each of the six studied neighbourhoods had a different combination of security providers.

The analysis of the public security providers showed that there is often no clear separation of duties between federal, state, and municipal security providers, both in terms of their official public security mandate and their practices. This can be easily observed when, for instance, comparing the military police with the military. The military police on the one hand carry out their activities in a very militaristic way (a consequence

of having brought the police under military rule during the dictatorship). The *militarisation* of the police and the national security doctrine of the dictatorship have never been fully discredited and are still applied to repress internal enemies – today these continue to be common criminals and the poor (Husain 2007). The military on the other hand is deployed alongside police forces in the combat of criminal groups in urban conflicts. Even though this policing function of the military is enshrined in Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution, it is questionable whether this is always appropriate. For the military to be deployed, Rio de Janeiro's state governor has to admit that the state public security forces – with combined personnel of 52,500 officers – are unavailable, nonexistent or inadequate in maintaining order. This confession of its own impotence undermines citizen trust in the state police forces. The chapter sections on the military police and the civil police showed that residents' trust in the police is severely compromised due to police violence, corruption, impunity, human rights abuses, the underprovisioning of security, the diversion of firearms into the illicit market, the intimidation of witnesses, and the cover-up of extrajudicial crimes. More often than not, the police are seen as a source of insecurity rather than an agent of protection because their activities are detrimental to the security and well-being of the public. The public security reforms which were adopted by different administrations after the return to democracy (and discussed in Section 2.3) had only limited success in changing the militaristic nature of the day-by-day policing on the ground and in strengthening cooperation between different entities.

The consequence of this is that large segments of society feel abandoned, neglected or even abused by the state's public security entities and have resorted to extra or alternative forms of security in order to be protected from crime and violence. For middle and upper class citizens this usually means the retreat to gated communities or high-rise apartment blocks and the hiring of the services of doormen and private security companies who they deem more capable of protecting them from unwanted intruders. However, the poor do not have the necessary economic means to do the same and are forced to live in communities which are controlled by criminal actors. Two of these criminal groups are death squads and militias. Their 'security services' include extrajudicial killings, extortion and the charging of 'security fees' from residents. They also take justice into their own hands, thus emasculating the state of its executive and judicial functions. The involvement of law enforcement agents in death squads or militias further undermines the legitimacy and integrity of the state security apparatus. Drug traffickers are another criminal group who provides 'security' to residents in the local communities. They differ significantly from all other security providers because their 'security service' is not a rent-seeking activity in itself. Rather it is a side effect caused by the necessity to co-opt the local residents and to protect the drug sales business

against the police and rival drug trafficking factions. Both drug traffickers and militias force residents to maintain a code of silence regarding their illegal activities. In return, they offer protection from neighbourhood crime and violence and may also assume a social leadership role in community life (although this is less common for drug traffickers nowadays).


It is important to stress that even though death squads, militias and drug traffickers operate outside the law, purchase and sell firearms in the illicit market, spread fear and terror among citizens and use violence as a means to accumulate power, they do not operate in the absence of state security forces. None of these groups would prefer a complete absence of the state because it would be costly for them to continue business in a state of anarchy and chaos. Instead, they benefit from the state's underprovisioning of security and justice in certain areas. The question that remains is how these public and private actors are connected. The following chapter (Chapter 5) will analyse the relationship between the different security providers and evaluate the relative power and influence of each actor in Rio de Janeiro's security network. It will claim that violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro takes the form of an oligopoly.

Table 4.1 Security providers in Rio de Janeiro

Security provider	Function
Military police	BPM State police force responsible for policing in the streets and for maintaining public order.
	BOPE Elite unit trained in urban warfare.
	UPP Community-oriented police force only deployed in the favelas.
Civil police	State police force with investigative and judicial functions.
Municipal guards	Traffic regulation and public order.
Military	Occasionally deployed in internal affairs to ensure law and order.
Death squads	State-linked extralegal violence and 'justice'.
Militias	Security provision in specific neighbourhoods and communities; extortion of residents; involvement of law enforcement agents.
Private security companies	Hired by business owners or residents to provide security in private spaces (malls, gated communities, events).

Drug traffickers	Security provision in favelas as a side effect of protecting the drug sales business from police and rival gangs. Social leadership role.
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Source: Author's own illustration.



Novo Leblon, Rio de Janeiro

5 OLIGOPOLY OF SECURITY PROVIDERS

5.1 Introduction

In Rio de Janeiro, security is provided by a wide variety of security providers with differing *modi operandi* and interests. The aim of this chapter is to assess the relationship between the respective security providers and evaluate their power and influence in the security network, i.e. the relative position of each security provider vis-à-vis the other actors. The main claim of this chapter is that, on the city level, violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro takes the form of an **oligopoly**⁶¹ because the security providers are connected through a series of relationships that can range from cooperation to conflict and need to consider the actions and reactions of the other groups when taking strategic decisions.

The chapter is structured in the following way. The first section (Section 5.2) shows that Rio de Janeiro's security providers are interdependent and engage in strategic decision making, two important indications for the existence of an oligopoly. The subsequent section (Section 5.3) analyses six factors shaping the relative power and influence of the security providers in the oligopoly. These factors are related to size, territorial presence, institutional and political connections, financial resources, arms and the perception of the community. The section claims that Rio's de Janeiro military police are the most powerful and influential security provider in the oligopoly, followed by the military, private security companies and drug traffickers. The remaining security providers – civil police, militias and municipal guards – are less powerful and influential but still play an important role in the dynamics of violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro. The last section of this chapter (Section 5.4) briefly discusses the external links of the security network and shows that the oligopoly is embedded in a much broader context of interests. Rio de Janeiro's security providers do not exist in a vacuum and there are manifold interactions with other institutions and groups, e.g. with politicians, the church and resident associations, among others.

⁶¹ As has been explained in the literature review (see Section 1.2.4), the oligopoly concept stems from economic theory yet in this research it is applied to the field of political science, similar to the approaches adopted by Basedau, Lambach, Mehler, Smith-Hoehn, Ngunyi and Katumanga (Basedau et al. 2007; Lambach 2007; Mehler 2003, 2004, 2009; Mehler et al. 2010; Ngunyi and Katumanga 2012).

5.2 Interdependence and strategic decision making

As the literature review explained, interdependence and strategic decision making are the two most important indications for the existence of an oligopoly (see Section 1.2.4). If we translate this economic-oriented idea to our political science context, it means that security providers in Rio de Janeiro are not only loosely connected within a common network but also influence each other's activities and strategic decision making in a perpetual and complex process. In order to shed light on these interdependent relationships, this section will use the three principal types of oligopolistic integration suggested by Lambach (2007) – cooperation, neutrality and conflict – and provide three specific examples of interaction between Rio de Janeiro's security providers for each of the broader categories.

The first example relates to **cooperation** and examines how criminal actors get access to firearms despite rather strict gun ownership regulations in Brazil. A study showed that 18 per cent of firearms seized from criminal actors had originally been sold to public security agents, mostly the military police, and were at some point diverted into the illicit market (Câmara dos Deputados: 476). The police often seek to rebut these accusations by stating that the firearms were stolen. This might be true in some cases. However, in other cases, the police or employees of government-controlled weapons stockpiles or state-owned small arms and ammunition producers assist in diverting arms into the illicit market. There are multiple forms of doing this, from turning a blind eye on empty freight vessels arriving or leaving the port to directly selling confiscated firearms back to the drug traffickers (see Section 2.2.3). Thiago* was the *armeiro* [expert of weaponry] of his drug trafficking group in the Complexo do Alemão. He states that they bought firearms directly from the police. Sometimes these weapons had been confiscated in drug wars in other favelas:

"In the favelas, many give 40 thousand [reais] for a rifle 762. If you get a G3, one that is .30, you are with 100 thousand [reais] in the hand, [paid] into your hand in that moment, ice cold. The police already arrived inside the Complexo do Alemão with their police car, in uniform, and said: "Hey, tell the boss that I have a rifle here". The boss paid right at that moment, in the drug trade [you always pay] right in that moment, there is no business check (laughing), only cash' (Interview with Thiago* 2011).

Other examples of cooperative relationships between different security providers include the participation of individual police officers in death squads, militias and private security companies (see Section 4.3), the division of the workload between the military police and the municipal guards (see Section 4.2.3), and the collaboration between the military, the military police and the civil police in the occupation of the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha (see Section 6.3.1).

The second example relates to **neutrality** and examines the contentious issue that drug traffickers are trained as part of the obligatory military service. Brazilian males are required to serve twelve months of military service when they turn eighteen years old. However, in reality only a small percentage of all young men are actually recruited. This percentage has been falling from 9.33 per cent in 1987 to 5.14 per cent in 2001, meaning that if we take the example of the year 2001, only roughly 78,000 of 1.5 million males were incorporated into the military (Loyolla Kuhlmann 2011). The issue at stake here is that some of the recruits are former (or future) drug traffickers and their military training provides them with advanced knowledge about defense strategies, hierarchical organisations and different types of firearms. Without any doubt, this is an unintended effect that the military keeps very quiet about. Thiago*, once again, is an excellent example of this dilemma. Having been recruited by the military at a young age, he learned everything he needed to know about firearms and defense during his military service. Upon his return to the Complexo do Alemão, he turned into a well-respected expert of weaponry and became a valuable asset for the drug traffickers (Interview with Thiago* 2011). Another example which is known from the news is Marcelo 'Menor P' Santos da Dores, a drug lord of the TCP in Maré who is striving to take over Nova Holanda and Parque União from the CV (Disque Denúncia 2012d). Being a former paratrooper of the military, Menor P is the leader of a group of highly disciplined and military-style trained drug traffickers in Maré (Victor 2011, November 22). This example here is used to illustrate a neutral relationship within Rio's violent pluralism network because the military has no intention of training (former or future) drug traffickers and it is also usually not involved in the repression of the drug trade (exceptions to this as part of the GLO missions were discussed in Section 4.2.4). Other examples of neutral relationships between different security providers include the collaboration of the military and Rio de Janeiro's municipal guards during mega events (see Section 4.2.3 and Section 4.2.4), and the working symbiosis between militias and clandestine security companies, two groups that are often difficult to distinguish from one another (see Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.3).

The third example relates to **conflict**, more specifically internal conflict within the military police, and examines points of tension regarding status, salary and satisfaction with work between different units of the PMERJ. The salary which is paid to UPP police officers is a point of tension within the military police. Roughly 85 per cent of the UPPs are newly recruited and they receive an extra monthly stipend of R\$ 500 financed by PRONASCI. Several favela residents stated in interviews that older military police officers of the BPM envied the new UPP recruits for receiving this bonus. The older officers believed that the bonus payment was not fair considering that most of the UPPs lacked the experience that they had. In the opinion of the residents, the bonus paid to

the UPPs incentivised older police officers working in normal battalions to '*buscar seu salário em outro lugar*' [get their salary elsewhere] and to join the militias (Field notes 3, 2011). Ironically, many UPP police officers are not satisfied with their job and want to leave the UPP unit in order to be included in the rank of the 'real' military police. Out of 349 police officers who were interviewed in nine different UPP units as part of a study by Soares et al. (2011), 243 respondents wanted to leave the UPP and the majority of these people had the desire to work in traditional police battalions. Colonel Seabra, head of the UPPs, claims that cultural beliefs about 'the tough policeman' stand in the way of forming a more accountable and humane police force:

'The word dialogue is very important in the peace process. Listening and dialogue are vital to a police officer of a community-oriented police force [...] But these concepts were not passed on in the traditional police academy. The new recruits come here with an anticipated conception of what a police officer is. It is a perception which derives from their culture, from what their father and mother said, from the movie they watched [referring to Elite Squad]. These films were "path-breaking" for society. That kind of tough and repressive policeman who puts a plastic bag over the head of the drug trafficker was the social hero and this is not true. It is a film, a story, a tale and at some point became extremely successful and many joined the police in the wake of this success. And now they need to face reality. Culture is constructed and it is up to us who believe in this programme, who believe in the value of life, to demonstrate that it is possible to build a better society, including for them' (Interview with Seabra 2012).

Colonel Seabra explains that due to the popularity of the Elite Squad movies, many police recruits believe that the work of the PMERJ is equivalent to the work of BOPE. Young men join the military police corporation dreaming of becoming a *caveira* [skull; the nickname of BOPE police officers]. On top of the financial rewards (BOPE's police earn a bonus of R\$ 1,000 monthly), to be part of BOPE is a question of status (Storani 2010). For the great majority of recruits this dream will never be realised and this causes frustration about career progression. In order to join BOPE, the prospective applicants need to go through one of the world's toughest training programmes. Of the around 80 men who apply each year, 35 are accepted for the course and only around 8 to 10 pass it (Storani 2008). This example shows that rivalries are as common within one group of security providers as it is between them. Other examples of conflictual relationships between Rio de Janeiro's security providers include the 'urban war' between the state security forces and the drug traffickers on the one hand, and the conflict between and within different drug trafficking factions on the other hand (see Section 2.3.2 and Section 4.3.4). Further examples are the rivalry and competition between different battalions of the military police because of the Sistema Integrado de Metas (see Section 2.2.2), the fight for territory in the favelas between drug traffickers and militias (see Section 4.3.3),

as well as the competition between legally registered private security companies and clandestine security companies (see Section 4.3.1).

The examples given in this section do not always fit neatly into only one of the categories of interaction, i.e. cooperation, neutrality or conflict. This is because, in reality, the relationships between different security providers are subject to constant change and reconfiguration and are much more complex than what could be shown in the brief analysis here. Nevertheless, these examples illustrate that Rio de Janeiro's security network meets the requirements of an oligopoly because the main indications for the existence of an oligopoly, interdependence and strategic decision making, are present. The following section will shed light on the relative power and influence of each security provider in Rio de Janeiro's violent pluralism network.

5.3 Power and influence of security providers

The aim of this section is to examine the relative power and influence of each security provider in the oligopoly with the help of six factors (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 Six factors that shape the power and influence of the security providers

Factors	Description
a) Personnel <i>in numbers</i>	Can either refer to the number of people employed (in the case of the police forces, municipal guards, military and private security companies) or to the number of members in criminal gangs (in the case of militias and drug traffickers). This factor is important in order to compare the size of the different security providers.
b) Territorial penetration <i>low, high, medium</i>	Refers to the geographical presence of the groups. This factor is important because the territory constitutes the 'livelihood' of the security providers, i.e. the geographical basis of their activities.
c) Institutional and political penetration <i>low, high, medium</i>	Refers to the group's capacity to infiltrate public institutions and influence politics and public policies. Institutional and political penetration is difficult to measure but proxies that can be used include the political connections of the security providers, how closely involved they are in the decision-making process in the area of public security and their capacity to influence elections (e.g. by selling votes, clientelism). This factor is important because it shows how well connected the different security providers are and how likely it is that they will have political support in the long run.
d) Violent resources	Refers to the weaponry of the group. This factor is important

low, high, medium	because the security providers use violence to conquer territories and sustain their power.
e) Financial resources low, high, medium	Refers to either the public security budget (in the case of state institutions) or to the revenues (in the case of private security providers, such as private security companies, militias and drug traffickers). This factor is important because it indicates the financial capacities of the security providers to sustain power and influence over time.
f) Community perception survey percentages	<p>Refers to the way the security providers are perceived by the local communities. This factor is important because it gives voice to ordinary citizens who have day-to-day contact with the security providers. These people are in the best position to evaluate the power and influence of the groups from a grassroots perspective.</p> <p>The survey participants were asked the following questions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who do you fear most? • Who is the most violent? • In your opinion, who constitutes the biggest threat to security in Rio de Janeiro? • Who do you trust most? • Who should provide security in your neighbourhood? • Who is providing security in your neighbourhood?⁶² <p>The respondents could choose between one of the following answer options:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMERJ (BPM, BOPE <u>or</u> UPP); • PCERJ; • GM (municipal guards); • Military; • Private security companies; • Militias; • Drug traffickers.

Source: Author's own illustration.

⁶² Whereas most of the other questions in the survey in Chapter 3 were inspired and adapted from authoritative studies in the field (Earls et al. 1997; Husain 2007; Instituto de Segurança Pública 2008; Musumeci et al. 2011; United Nations Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 2002), the questions in this section constitute a novel approach to measuring security provision in Rio de Janeiro. It is novel because it does not make any *a priori* assumptions about the way the respective security providers are perceived by the local communities. For example, respondents could choose between drug traffickers or the military as two valid answer options regardless of the fact that drug traffickers are illegal, criminal actors and the military is one of the most important state security institutions. This question design also consciously did not consider the 'historical weight' of the security providers. For example, respondents could choose between militias and the military police as two valid answer options regardless of the fact that the former is a rather recent phenomenon and the latter is a 200-year-old institution.

Based on these six factors, the relative power and influence of each security provider was assessed (see Table 5.2). Rio de Janeiro's military police are the most powerful and influential security provider in the oligopoly, followed by the military, private security companies and drug traffickers. The remaining security providers – civil police, militias and municipal guards – are less powerful and influential but still play an important role in the dynamics of violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro. The following section will briefly discuss the relative power and influence of each of these groups.

Table 5.2 Relative power and influence of Rio de Janeiro's security providers

	PMERJ			Military	Private security companies	Drug traffickers	PCERJ	Militias	GM
	BPM	BOPE	UPP						
a) Personnel		43,547		15,000	168,223	9,000	9,500	?	8,000
b) Territorial penetration		High		Low	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low
c) Institutional and political penetration		High		High	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low
d) Violent resources		Medium		High	Medium	High	Low	Medium	Low
e) Financial resources		High		High	High	Medium	Medium	Medium	?
f) Community perception									
Most feared	10.2%	18.9%		0.4%	0.8%	42.3%	0.8%	26.8%	
Most violent	5.7%	29.2%				41.7%	1.1%	22.3%	
Biggest threat to security	15.9%	1.5%	0.4%			44.8%	1.1%	36.3%	
Most trusted	19.1%	10.7%	2.3%	27.4%	10.2%	14.4%	9.3%	2.8%	3.7%
Who should provide security	18.9%	5.5%	7.6%	34.9%	8.4%	10.9%	6.7%	2.1%	5%
Who is providing security	28.1%	0.4%	18.1%	18.5%	17.3%	0.8%	3.1%	11.2%	2.7%

Source: The analysis of factors a) to e) is based on interviews with security experts, principally from public security and military institutions (Interview with Beltrame 2012; Interview with da Silva 2011; Interview with Lima 2012; Interview with Pereira Júnior 2012; Interview with Storani 2011), and other official primary sources by the government, such as police records and reports by the Ministry of Justice (ALERJ 2008: 117; Governo do Brasil 2012b: 661, 662; Ministério da Justiça 2013: 25, 45, 109, 124, 128; Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2013; Presidência da República 1983: Art. 20, 21, 22; Presidência da República 1991: Art. 15, §4), as well as other (secondary) sources (Cano and Duarte 2012; Dreyfus and Nascimento 2005: 145, 160; Federação Nacional das Empresas de Segurança Privada e Transporte de Valores 2013: 10, 27; Gay 2005: 130-131; Goulart 2013, December 3; IHS Jane's 2013; Latinobarómetro 2010; UOL Notícias 2011, November 11). The analysis of factor f) is based on the opinions and perceptions of 309 residents who were interviewed as part of the survey (see Section 3.3).

5.3.1 Military police

The institution of Rio de Janeiro's military police is the single most powerful and influential security provider in the oligopoly. It has 43,500 employees and maintains 49 operational units throughout the state of Rio de Janeiro, including 39 police battalions (17 in Rio de Janeiro city), nine specialised battalions like BOPE and BPCHq and one special unit, the UPPs (Ministério da Justiça 2013: 18, 43). Hence, the PMERJ has a high degree of territorial penetration.⁶³ Due to the fact that the corporation sits at the heart of public security provision in Rio de Janeiro, it also has a high degree of institutional and political penetration. The military police has close contacts with Mayor Eduardo Paes, former Governor Sérgio Cabral and Secretary of Security José Mariano Beltrame. Many of the PMERJ's higher-ranking officials also serve in other state agencies in the area of public security. Colonel Henrique Castro Lima, for instance, was head of the municipal guards (at the time of the field research) and Colonel Paulo Teixeira is head of the ISP, an institution that processes crime data and can thus heavily influence public opinion.

Furthermore, the PMERJ has a considerable weapons arsenal of more than 45,000 revolvers and pistols, plus around 2,000 carbines⁶⁴ and shotguns and more than 4,000 machine guns and rifles. The weapons most commonly used in police operations are FZ-M964 cal. 762, Fuzil Colt M4, Taurus PT-100 cal. 40, as well as tear gas and sound and flash explosive grenades (Pólicia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2013). The ratio of firearms (revolvers, pistols, carbines, shotguns, machine guns and rifles) per policeman is 1.21 (Ministério da Justiça 2013: 45). Rio de Janeiro's military police corporation also has a high budget. Its 2011 budget of R\$ 2.084 billion was the fourth biggest budget of a military police force in the country, after São Paulo (R\$ 8.453 billion), Minas Gerais (R\$ 5.022 billion) and the federal district (R\$ 2.205 billion) (Ministério da Justiça 2013: 25).

The only factor the military police underperform in is in their perception by the local communities – in the survey this was divided into BPM, BOPE and UPP. With regard to the traditional military police battalions, interviewees did not have a lot of trust in the BPM's capability to fulfill its constitutional mandate, i.e. the provision of public security and the preservation of life and public order. The BPM was perceived as an institution that instilled fear in people: 10.2 per cent of respondents feared the BPM more than any other group. The BPM was also seen as the third biggest threat to security (15.9 per

⁶³ Clearly there are still many areas, especially favelas in the north and west zones of Rio de Janeiro which have no UPP and are controlled by drug traffickers or militias. In these areas the military police are largely absent or, at most, launch short-term operations meant to repress the drug trade.

⁶⁴ A carbine is a special type of rifle.

cent) after drug traffickers (44.8 per cent) and militias (36.3 per cent). One should take a moment to digest this result. The police, founded as an institution to protect people and preserve lives, are seen as the third biggest threat to security in Rio de Janeiro. This indicates how far away the military police operate from its theoretical ideal. One might assume that this result must be due to the high 'disapproval rates' in the favelas stemming from the way the military police has traditionally engaged with residents in low-income neighbourhoods. However, a closer look at the data reveals that the 'disapproval rate' of the BPM was even higher in Novo Leblon than the average of the other communities. Out of all interviewees in Novo Leblon, 17.4 per cent believed that the BPM was the biggest threat to security in Rio de Janeiro. Considering that Novo Leblon's residents have the profile of 'upper-class, law-abiding tax-payers', this result demonstrates that dissatisfaction with the BPM runs through all social classes.

On a positive note, considerably fewer respondents (5.7 per cent) perceived the BPM as the most violent group. This shows that 'the biggest threat to security' is not necessarily tantamount to 'the most feared' or 'the most violent'. Respondents could consider certain actors as the biggest threat to security for reasons other than fear or violence. What can be concluded from this in the case of the BPM is that the threat it poses to security is not so much of a violent nature but rather a threat to the integrity of democracy and the rule of law due to widespread corruption, police misconduct and other shortcomings (see Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2).

Considering that the provision of security by the BPM is the constitutional norm, it is alarming that only 18.9 per cent of respondents chose the traditional military police as their preferred security provider. Even when broadening the term and including the other two entities that fall under the jurisdiction of the military police (BPM, BOPE and UPP: 32 per cent), the support of the military police is still not as high as that for the military (34.9 per cent). One explanation for the low ratings of the BPM is that they are the oldest and biggest public security institution in Rio de Janeiro and thus face much more criticism and discontent from the population than younger or less common security providers, simply because they have had more contact with citizens over the decades. This 'historical legacy' has to be taken into account when comparing the BPM with other security providers who have emerged more recently (e.g. militias) or that do not have regular contact with the population (e.g. military). Rio de Janeiro's military police is more than 200 years old. In contrast, the militias only emerged with greater force from 2006 onwards and the military are not deployed at all in the city of Rio de Janeiro on a regular basis. The longest deployment of the military in recent years was in the occupation of the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha which lasted for approximately

eighteen months. One may say that the BPM was therefore in a much worse 'starting position' than other security providers included in this analysis.⁶⁵

The community perception of BOPE is quite negative which is not surprising considering BOPE's warlike incursions in the favelas and its image as a 'world-class torturer', as depicted in the *Tropa de Elite* movies. Of all interviewees, 18.9 per cent feared BOPE more than any other group and 29.2 per cent of respondents considered BOPE to be the most violent security provider. On the positive side, however, only 1.5 per cent of all respondents believed that BOPE constituted the biggest threat to security in Rio de Janeiro. Respondents from all neighbourhoods agreed with that, even those residing in the favelas. This indicates a high social acceptance of state violence and *mão dura* policies (this can also be observed in the high support for the military, see Section 5.3.2). Even though BOPE is violent and spreads terror, it was seen as a 'necessary evil' to repress violent crime. Respondents were conscious enough to understand that BOPE was not the root of the insecurity problem in Rio de Janeiro but rather an instrument created by the state to protect the status quo. Although BOPE has a violent and fear-instilling presence, particularly in the favelas, it was neither seen as the cause of insecurity in Rio de Janeiro, nor as its solution because only 5.5 per cent of interviewees chose BOPE as the preferred security provider in their neighbourhoods.

With respect to the UPPs, against the backdrop of all the attention and fanfare that the pacification model has received in recent years, the community perception of the UPP will be hard to accept for policy-makers. According to the survey respondents, the UPP simply did not play a big role in the wider security scenario, neither in positive nor in negative ways. Positively speaking, none or very few of the respondents feared the UPP more than other groups or rated them as the most violent or the biggest threat to security. Negatively speaking, only 2.3 per cent trusted the UPP more than other groups. This is the lowest trust-ranking of all security providers, even lower than the result of the municipal guards (3.7 per cent) and the militias (2.8 per cent). Similarly, only 7.6 per cent of respondents would entrust the UPP with the provision of security in

⁶⁵ State Secretary of Security Beltrame criticised the research design of this survey, arguing that 'You're not comparing equal among equals. You are comparing a military force with a security force. The military police which is 200 years old in Rio de Janeiro cannot be compared with the military force that provided security for nine months [referring to the FPac in the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha]. It is logical that in two hundred years with all the ills of abandonment that the military police had, society turned away from the military police and the military police turned away from society' (Interview with Beltrame 2012). Beltrame's point is duly noted and it is important to consider this in the analysis. However, it was actually seen as the strength of this survey design to let the interviewed residents speak for themselves because only they know how much they trust or fear specific security providers, regardless of the history of these institutions or actors. The survey also compared criminal actors, such as drug traffickers and militias with the military police and this did not attract Beltrame's criticism. His reaction could therefore be better understood in a context of rivalry between the military and state police forces.

their neighbourhood. Clearly one could argue that this is because not all survey participants had direct contact with the UPP, given that many lived in middle or upper class neighbourhoods or non-pacified favelas. However, this can hardly explain the low ratings because the same can be stated for almost all other security providers who only operate in very specific geographic territories. Among those interviewees that had daily experience with the UPP – residents in Vidigal – only 3 per cent believed they should provide security in their community (for a more detailed analysis on this, see Section 6.2.3). More support only came from respondents in Tabuleiro* and Complexo do Alemão because they believed that the pacification by the UPPs was imminent and could potentially bring about positive changes to their communities. Especially the interviewed residents in Tabuleiro* had a high expectation ‘to be pacified soon’ because they were living in a region which was considered to be of strategic interest for the state secretary of security. This shows that the expectations surrounding the UPPs are quite high prior to the pacification. However, in reality, the young UPP policemen and women find it difficult to live up to this inflated ideal and the whole pacification process is quickly being discredited as ‘window-dressing for the World Cup’ in the eyes of local communities.

5.3.2 Military

The military also has a high level of power and influence in the oligopoly, albeit not quite as powerful and influential as the military police but more so than the other public security providers, i.e. civil police and municipal guards. One reason for this is that the CML (which comprises the states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo) has approximately 15,000 soldiers and constitutes the biggest operational military troop in the country (Interview with Pereira Júnior 2012). However, this does not mean that soldiers can frequently be seen on the streets of Rio de Janeiro. In fact, the territorial penetration of the military in the city of Rio de Janeiro is low because it is only deployed as part of specific GLO missions, i.e. the preservation of public order, the guarantee of elections or the security of mega-events. As has been explained before (see Section 4.2.4), the deployment of the military can only be temporary and happen in a defined geographical area for a limited period of time (Presidência da República 1999: Art.15, §4).

Among the security providers included here, the military has the highest level of institutional and political penetration. This is because it is a federal entity which belongs to the Ministry of Defense and has close links to all other ministries and state governments in Brazil. Clearly, the army, navy and air force also have the most powerful violent resources: its arsenal of powerful and sophisticated weaponry easily exceeds

that of all other security providers discussed here. In terms of financial resources, the Ministry of Defense had a committed budget of R\$ 61.787 billion in 2011, including R\$ 14.501 billion for the air force, R\$ 26.838 billion for the army and R\$ 16.667 billion for the navy (Governo do Brasil 2012b: 661, 662). It is difficult to estimate how much of this budget is spent on GLO missions in the city of Rio de Janeiro but without doubt the financial resources are considerable.

From the perspective of the interviewed residents, the military emerged as the 'big winner' in the survey. Only a tiny fraction of all interviewees (0.4 per cent) feared the military more than any other group and not a single person rated them as the most violent group or the biggest threat to public security. Of all respondents, 27.4 per cent trusted the military more than any other group and 34.9 per cent stated that this entity should provide the security in their neighbourhood. This was even the case in Novo Leblon where residents were miles away from the next hotspot of crime and violence. The thought of military tanks guarding Novo Leblon's entrance gate is quite absurd. It is alarming that even some of these well-off residents who live in gated communities would feel safer in the presence of soldiers and tanks near their homes. Considering that the military has only been deployed on a limited number of occasions in Rio de Janeiro in the past years and that most survey participants have probably never seen a soldier in real life, it is surprising that a third of respondents nevertheless chose the military as the favourite security provider in their neighbourhood. What could explain this choice?

Firstly, the military has built up an excellent reputation in Rio de Janeiro over the past years for guaranteeing the security of high-profile, international mega-events. Its deployment in the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha from November 2010 to June 2012 has been closely observed by the international community. The fact that not a single casualty was reported while patrolling one of the most violent and deprived areas of the country during these eighteen months speaks for itself.

Secondly, the institutional trust in the military is generally very high in Brazil. The Latinobarómetro (2010) study found that 63 per cent of respondents in Brazil trusted the military as an institution, compared to 55 per cent for the government, 51 per cent for the judiciary, 44 per cent for the congress and 24 per cent for political parties. This also reflects that there is high acceptance or even demand for repressive forms of social control.

Thirdly, the military enjoys a good reputation despite the military dictatorship that lasted from 1964 to the mid-1980s. In fact, it would be more correct to state that this is because of the military dictatorship. When controlling the survey data for age, it becomes apparent that support for the military was higher among the older survey participants. Of those who were born after the military dictatorship had ended (younger

than 27 years at the time the survey was conducted), only 30 per cent of respondents chose the military as their preferred security provider. Of those who were born and grew up during the military dictatorship (between 27 and 48 years old at the time of the survey), 34.9 per cent chose the military as the preferred security provider in their neighbourhood. Of respondents born before the military dictatorship (older than 48 years at the time of the survey), 45 per cent chose the military, and in the 65+ years group, 55.6 per cent of respondents approved of the military. In other words, many of those who had personally experienced the military dictatorship would be grateful to have the military provide for security again today. More research would be needed to shed light on the question of why people do not seem to associate the military dictatorship with authoritarianism, torture and human rights abuses. It will also be interesting to observe how Brazil's National Truth Commission will change this perception and if the military's image will suffer from this in hindsight.

5.3.3 Private security companies

Private security companies, both legal and clandestine, have a medium level of power and influence in the oligopoly. This is firstly because private security companies are the only security provider in Rio de Janeiro with more personnel than the military police. Based on numbers from the federal police and the National Association of Security Companies (FENAVIST), Dreyfus and Nascimento estimate that there are 168,223 private security agents in the state of Rio de Janeiro (Dreyfus and Nascimento 2005: 145). These figures only refer to private security guards who work in companies which are formally registered with the federal police and do not include those working in clandestine security companies. Renato da Silva, director of BSS Vigilância, a private security company in Rio de Janeiro, believes that the ratio between irregular and regular private security companies could be as much as 4:1 (Interview with da Silva 2011).

Private security companies have a medium territorial penetration because they operate in many corners of the city of Rio de Janeiro. Whether protecting supermarkets, embassies, hospitals, factories, shopping malls and private schools or guarding entire middle-class apartment blocks and gated communities, private security companies are always present. Nevertheless, these companies prefer to maintain a low profile and operate quietly in the background, largely unnoticed by large segments of the population. One reason for maintaining a low profile is so as not to attract attention to its links with the police, many of whom own these companies or work there in their free time. However, despite their links with the police, private security companies have a low level of institutional and political penetration as they do not actively seek to influence politics, at least not more than other business sectors.

Private security companies have a medium level of violent resources because the use of arms is strictly limited by law and monitored by the federal police. The law stipulates that the arms used by *vigilantes* for their work are the property and responsibility of the private security companies. *Vigilantes* can carry revolvers (caliber 32 or 38), pistols and wooden or rubber truncheons but only while they are at work. Those working in the transport of valuables may also use shotguns (caliber 12, 16 or 20) made in Brazil (Presidência da República 1983: Art. 20, 21, 22). There are approximately 62,130 firearms being utilised by private security companies in the state of Rio de Janeiro (Dreyfus and Nascimento 2005: 145).

The private security market in Brazil is well-developed and has high annual growth rates. The financial resources were therefore rated as high. Annual sales totaled R\$ 36 billion in 2012 with industry forecasts estimating that the 2014 revenues could reach R\$ 45 billion. In the Southeast of Brazil, nominal revenues in 2012 were between R\$ 18.5 – 19.3 billion (Federação Nacional das Empresas de Segurança Privada e Transporte de Valores 2013: 10, 27).

The community perception of private security companies was positive but the interviewed residents did not attribute an important role to these companies: 10.2 per cent of respondents trusted this entity more than any other group and 8.4 per cent per cent chose it as their preferred security provider in their neighbourhood. Only 0.8 per cent of respondents feared private security companies more than any other group and no one rated them as the most violent or the biggest threat to security. This result is surprising considering the huge quantity of people working in private security service in all corners of the city. However, it might be explained by the fact that for most residents private security agents are simply part of the scenery, paid for together with the bills for gas, electricity and water as part of the *taxa de condomínio* [apartment fixed costs]. Only very few were disturbed by the fact that they paid twice for security – firstly for inefficient public security through their taxes and again for private security through their rent and fixed costs.

5.3.4 Drug traffickers

Drug traffickers are also a security provider with a medium level of power and influence in Rio de Janeiro's security network. The drug market in Rio de Janeiro is contested by three main drug trafficking factions: CV, TCP and ADA. According to estimates from IHS Jane's (2013), Rio de Janeiro's drug trafficking factions have roughly 9,000 members, yet not all of them necessarily operate in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The CV has approximately 4,000 members, the TCP 3,000 members and ADA 2,000 members,

including those currently in prison.⁶⁶ However, these figures should be read with caution as it is very difficult to estimate the real size of the criminal gangs.

The drug trafficking factions have medium territorial penetration because they operate mainly in the favelas and have lost a lot of territory to the militias and the UPPs in recent years. Between 2005 and 2009, the CV's share of territory (in terms of area dominated, not in terms of number of favelas) decreased from 53.2 per cent to 38.8 per cent. The ADA's share decreased from 14.5 per cent to 11.5 per cent and the TCP's share slightly increased from 12.3 per cent to 13.8 per cent (NUPEVI cited in: Brito 2009, November 10). In 2014, power structures have drastically changed due to the rise of militias and the successes of the UPPs which already cover more than 180 communities with more than 540,000 inhabitants.

Drug traffickers were rated as having a medium level of institutional and political penetration, principally because of their capacity to corrupt the police and other law enforcement agents, and their ability to sell votes in elections (see Section 5.4). In terms of violent resources, Dreyfus and Nascimento estimated that around 900,000 small arms are in circulation in the city of Rio de Janeiro, of which roughly 160,000 (17 per cent) are used for criminal activities, drug trafficking and other (Dreyfus and Nascimento 2005: 160). Dowdney (2003: 98) identified a wide variety of light arms which were seized from traffickers by the police within the favelas, such as Colt AR-15, H&K G-3, FAL, AK-47, M-9 and M-60 III hand-held grenades, AK-47 with cylindrical clip, calibre .762 ammunition and bazookas. The danger of the use of the latter, an anti-aircraft gun, became apparent when traffickers shot down a helicopter of the military police in October 2009 which was flying over the Morro dos Macacos in the north zone of the city. This example illustrates that drug traffickers have a broad range of violent resources.

The main source of revenues for the drug trafficking factions is the sale of marihuana, cocaine and crack. The prices of drugs vary according to the type, availability, quality and difficulty in buying and selling it. Gay (2005: 130-131) estimated that a *matuto* sells one kilogram of cocaine for around R\$ 7,000. The traffickers dilute the cocaine with other substances so that it meets two kilograms. Sold in the *boca* (which may take up two weeks in a good *boca*), one kilogram of cocaine generates around R\$ 23,000. As a brief example, when Antônio Francisco 'Nem' Bonfim Lopes, the former drug boss of Rocinha was captured in November 2011, the civil police believed that he was earning up to R\$ 100 million yearly. Nem stated that half of his drug sales profits were used to bribe civil and military police officers (UOL Notícias 2011, November 11).

⁶⁶ Dowdney (2003: 51) estimates that the drug factions employ roughly 10,000 people, of which 5,000 to 6,000 are minors.

Considering Rio de Janeiro's long history of drug-related violence and the politicised debate in the area of public security, it is not surprising that drug traffickers emerged as the most feared (42.3 per cent) and most violent (41.7 per cent) group, as well as the biggest threat to security (44.8 per cent) in the view of survey participants. Whether this 'panic' is still reflected in reality nowadays in light of the state's advances in the combat of the drug trade is debatable. It is telling, however, that drug traffickers and militias were seen as the two main sources of insecurity in Rio de Janeiro, even by those who had never set a foot in a favela. Here once again it can be observed how the media fuels perceptions of risks that are out of sync with reality (see Section 3.3.3).

5.3.5 Civil police

The civil police in Rio de Janeiro are considerably less powerful and influential, compared to the other security providers discussed before. The PCERJ has mainly investigative and judicial functions and is usually not deployed for maintaining law and order on the streets. As a consequence of this public security mandate, it therefore also has a smaller personnel of only 9,500 police officers who work in 173 police stations and 37 specialised police stations in the state of Rio de Janeiro (66 in the city) (Ministério da Justiça 2013: 128). Contrary to the military police, the civil police do not have territorial control over specific areas of the city and its institutional and political penetration is on a medium level, largely because of its capacity to influence public security politics at the state level via the SESEG and the governor.

The civil police have a low level of violent resources, compared to the other security providers. Its weapons arsenal comprises 20,000 firearms (revolvers, pistols, carbines, shotguns, machine guns and rifles), including 727 rifles, the highest stockpile of rifles amongst all of Brazil's civil police forces. The ratio of firearms per policeman is 2.16 which is higher than that of the military police (Ministério da Justiça 2013: 124). The civil police have a medium level of financial resources: its planned budget for 2012 was R\$ 1.062 billion, less than half of that of the military police (R\$ 2.201 billion) (Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2011: 524, 526; Ministério da Justiça 2013: 25, 109). In terms of the way the PCERJ is perceived by the local communities, the survey data reveal that the civil police do not stand out from other security providers, neither positively nor negatively.

5.3.6 Militias

Based on the six factors used in this analysis, militias are a security provider with a moderate level of power and influence in Rio de Janeiro's security network. In terms of personnel, it is quite difficult to estimate the number of people who are members of Rio de Janeiro's militias due to lack of reliable data. However, there are a few studies that at least give an idea of the size of this 'sector'. The CPI report in 2008 presented a list of 218 people indicted for involvement with militias. It also stated that there were another 879 people still under investigation who were possibly involved in militias (ALERJ 2008). According to figures from the state secretary of security, between 2006 and March 2012, 692 *militicianos* have been arrested (Field notes 9, 2012). Clearly, the number of indicted and arrested militia members only constitutes a small fraction of the total number.

In terms of territorial penetration, the CPI report identified 171 communities which were controlled by militias (ALERJ 2008). According to a study by the Núcleo de Pesquisas de Violência [Centre for Violence Studies, NUPEVI], the militias increased their control over Rio de Janeiro's favelas considerably between 2005 and 2010: from 11.9 per cent of favelas in 2005 to 45 per cent in 2010 which is the equivalent of 454 communities with a population of 422,000 inhabitants (Brito 2009, November 10; Goulart 2013, December 3). To some degree, the spread of the militias can be explained by the pacification of the UPP. The UPPs have, with some exception (e.g. Batam), mainly targeted trafficker-controlled favelas and have therefore helped to weaken the drug traffickers who are the 'natural competitors' of the militias:

'The old model of armed drug dealers – who protected the *boca* and controlled a region, not against the police but against rival factions - is declining because of what is happening in Rio [referring to the pacification]. But on the other hand this is strengthening the militias. They can now take over other communities more easily because the traffickers are weakened' (Interview with Storani 2011).

One of the key findings of the CPI report and other studies which followed was that the militias had used politics as a way of preserving their interests by forcing residents to vote for certain candidates, especially in municipal elections. The analysis of voting data from 2004 and 2006 indicated patterns of concentration of votes in several areas in Rio de Janeiro identified as being controlled by militias. *Militicianos*, such as State Congressman Natalino José Guimarães and his brother Councilman Jerome Guimarães Filho from the *Liga da Justiça* were found guilty of having used coercion and patronage to be voted in municipal elections (ALERJ 2008; Cano and Duarte 2012).

Few hard facts exist about which type of weaponry is used by the militias. However, it is known that some *militicianos* are off-duty police officers and other law enforcement agents. From this it can be assumed that they acquire and use the smaller firearms of

these corporations. Cano and Duarte (2012) emphasize that after the CPI report came out, militias started operating '*no sapatinho*' [on tiptoes] and avoided being identified as police or other law enforcement agents. This will probably have caused the militias to make a more discreet (and less visible) use of firearms.

Militias make high profits, not only by charging 'security fees' from residents but also by controlling gas, internet, cable TV and alternative transport in the areas that they dominate. As an example, the militias in Rio das Pedras had revenues of roughly R\$ 169,500 daily (R\$ 60 million yearly) only through alternative transport with vans (ALERJ 2008: 117).

The interviewed residents were very conscious about the issue of the militias. Considering that it is a rather recent phenomenon which has emerged with greater force only from 2006 onwards, interviewees throughout almost all neighbourhoods were worried about the militias and the risks they posed for the bigger security scenario in Rio de Janeiro. Whereas 26.8 per cent of respondents feared the militias most and 22.3 per cent of the interviewees perceived them as the most violent group, even more survey participants (36.3 per cent) stated that they constituted the biggest threat to security in Rio de Janeiro. This 'over-consciousisation' of militias could be due to the CPI report which attracted a lot of attention from the media, as well as the *Tropa de Elite II* movie which was released in 2010 and focuses on the 'working symbiosis' between the police and the militias. Interviewees seemed to be well aware of the institutional and democratic threat that the militias epitomised. Only 2.8 per cent of respondents stated they trusted militias most. The militias were also the least wanted security provider in the neighbourhoods (2.1 per cent).

5.3.7 Municipal guards

Rio de Janeiro's municipal guards are the least powerful and influential security provider in the oligopoly. This comes as no surprise considering that the GM is a municipal entity with a relatively small workforce of 8,000 members who are responsible for minor offenses in the area of traffic regulation and public order (Interview with Lima 2012).

Municipal guards also have a low territorial penetration due to the fact that they are mainly deployed in infrastructure hubs for the regulation of traffic and do not enter favelas because these areas are considered to be 'areas of risk' (Interview with Lima 2012). The GM's institutional and political penetration is also limited as it only operates in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro. In addition, sometimes it still struggles for recognition among other security forces because it is not seen as a 'real police force' (Interview with Beltrame 2012; Interview with Lima 2012).

The GM has only limited violent resources due to the fact that Rio de Janeiro's municipal guards only use non-lethal weapons, such as shields, bats, gas and tasers. The financial resources of the municipal guards could not be assessed due to lack of data but it is likely to be very low compared to the other security providers. Similar to the civil police, the community perception of the municipal guards showed that they did not play a significant role in the wider security scenario in Rio de Janeiro.

5.4 External links of the security providers

It is important to acknowledge that the relative power and influence of the individual security providers is not solely determined by what happens within the oligopoly but also by their relationships with other actors inside and outside the neighbourhoods. Rio de Janeiro's security providers do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, they are embedded in a larger network of groups and institutions, such as business owners, politicians, judges, public prosecutors, resident associations, churches, civil society organisations, state secretaries of education, health and housing, and building companies, each with their own political, economic, social or religious interests. Although the focus of this thesis was to explore the logic of security provision in the six studied neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro, it is important to at least briefly discuss the external links of the security providers. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, it is not possible to analyse all of these connections between security providers and other stakeholders. However, there are two specific examples which frequently came up in conversations with local gatekeepers and research participants in the neighbourhoods. These two examples relate to the role of resident associations and churches in the communities. They fit well with the rest of the analysis in this study and will therefore be briefly discussed in this section.

The first example refers to the 'working relationship' between drug traffickers and the *Associações de Moradores* [resident associations; AMs]. The resident associations began to form in Rio de Janeiro in the 1950s after the city government requested that all demands be brought to them by a single entity representing the community. The AMs had many functions. They coordinated community building projects for basic infrastructure, demanded water, electricity, sanitation and paving from the city government (with considerable success) and played a role in dispute resolution in the favelas. With the emergence of the drug trafficking gangs in the early 1980s, the AMs started to lose their bargaining power and were increasingly used as intermediaries between the drug gangs and the political world (Arias 2006; Arias and Rodrigues 2006; Perlman 2010).

In the Complexo do Alemão, for instance, there are twelve AMs (one for each favela) which are closely monitored and controlled by the drug gangs.⁶⁷ The presidents of the resident associations have an important function for the traffickers because they are their connection to and intermediaries with the political world.⁶⁸ When elections for the presidency of the resident associations are held, the drug lord lets residents know who is going to win the elections because it has to be someone who will support and cooperate with the traffickers. That does not mean that there are no elections. It only means that the outcome is already clear from the start. For instance, the electoral assistants might be told: 'The drug lord wants you to put 500 votes in the name of so-and-so in the ballot box'. Regardless of whether the election was democratic or not, the new president of the resident association will be registered as the official representative of the community with the city hall. He will be the point of contact for all politicians and political campaigns. So even though the new president has not been elected democratically, he now has 'democratic power' through the political contacts (Interview with Thiago* 2012). When I asked Thiago* why residents would still bother voting, he responded with a metaphor:

'Nero used to write poems and recite them to the people. He was a terrible poet but those who applauded were given bread by his soldiers. Maybe they hated his poems but there're many things people are willing to do when they're hungry' (Field notes 5, 2012).

The role of the resident association is particularly important in times of elections. The drug lord sells 'the right to campaign' in his favela to the highest bidder, no matter what political party the candidate belongs to. By law it is prohibited to put up election posters, banners or flags in any outdoor places, unless they are carried by citizens as their 'individual, silent manifestation of political preference' (Ministério Pùblico Federal 2013). Yet via local brokers, e.g. the resident association, politicians can get access to the drug traffickers and still acquire the right to be the only political party which is allowed to put up election posters, distribute flyers and bring presents for the children of the community. On the day of the election, residents can still elect 'democratically' and vote for their favourite candidate. However, the great majority will vote for the one that cut a deal with the drug lord. This is because, firstly, most residents are not well informed about their other options and thus vote for the only candidate who has campaigned in their favela, and, secondly, they usually trust that what is good for the drug lord is also good for them (Field notes 5, 2012).

⁶⁷ Nova Brasília in the Complexo do Alemão was one of the communities which Perlman selected for her longitudinal study on favelas and social mobility. She mentioned that 'the last independently elected president of the resident association [in Nova Brasília] took office in the early 1980s' which confirms that drug gangs gained control of the resident association a long time ago (Perlman 2010: 107).

⁶⁸ This has also been reported by other scholars, such as Arias (2006).

The resident associations also have another function. They can be forced by the drug lord to use the *papo de esquerdistas* [talk of the left] and human rights talk of law-abiding citizens to complain publicly about the activities of the police. If the police, for instance, undertake unannounced police operations in order to push up the price of the *arrego* [bribe], the drug lord orders the resident association to complain publicly about these 'arbitrary police operations in which innocent people are arrested'. Thiago* recounts that in January 2012 the imprisoned drug lord of the Complexo do Alemão was upset with the resident associations because '*ninguém está se manifestando*' [nobody is speaking up]. Without hesitating he exchanged the presidents of all the twelve resident associations in the Complexo do Alemão for people who were more aligned with his objectives (Field notes 5, 2012).

The second example which emerged from the conversations and interviews with the local gatekeepers and research participants in the favelas is the connection between drug traffickers and the church. Drug traffickers often live with the expectation that there are only two choices for them: '*cadeia ou morte*' [prison or death]. It is very difficult for them to leave the drug trade and to continue living a normal life in the same community. The only legitimate exit strategy is to join a church, more specifically one of the many Protestant and Pentecostal Churches which have mushroomed in the favelas since the 1980s (Perlman 2010). Because many drug traffickers are very religious, the church constitutes one of the last institutions which they respect. However, the young men and women who want to leave their criminal past behind have to prove that their commitment to the church is sincere. Otherwise they will not be safe from revenge:

'If you screwed up and they [the traffickers] want to kill you, if you go to the church, if you really go to the church, you can return to the community, they won't kill you, they respect that, they respect religion. But if you leave [the church] they will ask for what is theirs. They'll stay on your heels, the day that you leave, they'll kill you' (Interview with Thiago* 2012).

Those who do not want to fully adhere to a conversion in the church by leaving their criminal lives behind, can still find a place in other religions where the difference between right and wrong is less clear-cut than in the Catholic and Protestant churches. The AfroBrazilian religions Umbanda and Candomblé are a good example of this. Bruno* is an *Umbandista* [follower of Umbanda] in Santíssimo and explains why many drug traffickers have joined his and similar cults:

'The guys [traffickers] think in the following way: "I need to protect myself." They know that what they're doing is wrong. In Umbanda and Candomblé you don't have a distinction between what you consider right and wrong. [In the Pentecostal Churches] you'll have to convert and leave everything behind. Umbanda and Candomblé don't require you to have a regimented life. You have a situation of free will. They [the Gods] won't judge you if you

do shit. “You want me to help you? I will help you.” [...]. There’s a situation that’s darker. It deals with the macabre and the darkness [referring to black magic] so this is the part that they [the Gods] manage. It’s all up to you. He [the trafficker] will do a pact: They [the Gods] will protect you up to a certain point but they’ll charge you something in return. It’s all up to you’ (Interview with Bruno* 2012).

Due to the limited scope of this chapter, it is not possible to go into more depth here and discuss more connections between Rio de Janeiro’s security providers and other groups and institutions, e.g. civil society organisations and municipal and state secretaries. However, when analysing the oligopolistic structure of Rio de Janeiro’s security market, it is important to remember that there can be larger factors at work deciding over the relative power and influence of each single actor.

5.5 Chapter conclusion


The aim of this chapter was to examine the relationship between the respective security providers and evaluate their power and influence in the security network. The chapter claimed that, on a city level, violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro takes the form of an **oligopoly** because the security providers are connected through a series of relationships that can range from cooperation to conflict and need to consider the actions and reactions of the other groups when making strategic decisions.

The chapter examined the power and influence of each security providers in the security network with the help of six factors, namely personnel, territorial penetration, institutional and political penetration, violent resources, financial resources, and community perception. It argued that Rio de Janeiro’s military police are the most powerful and influential security provider in the oligopoly, followed by the military, private security companies and drug traffickers. The remaining security providers – civil police, militias and municipal guards – are less powerful and influential but still play an important role in the dynamics of violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro (see Figure 5.1).

The final section of the chapter assessed the external links of Rio de Janeiro’s security providers and pointed out that they do not exist in a vacuum and instead have manifold connections with other groups and institutions, e.g. business owners, politicians, judges, public prosecutors, resident associations, churches, civil society organisations, state secretaries of education, health and housing, and building companies, each with their own political, economic, social or religious interests. These external actors need to be taken into account when analysing the oligopolistic structure of Rio de Janeiro’s security market because they can affect the relative power and influence of each security provider.

This chapter provided a thorough analysis of the logics of security provision in Rio de Janeiro. It assumed that the constellation of security providers is fixed in time. However, in fact, the security actors in Rio de Janeiro emerge, secure and lose power in a dynamic process in which territories and power relations change continuously. Communities can go through cycles, from safe to violent, depending on the activities and arrangements of the security providers. The following chapter (Chapter 6) will shed light on the fine-grained dynamics of violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro and examine how specific security providers operate and interact in particular neighbourhoods over time.

Figure 5.1 Oligopoly of security providers in Rio de Janeiro



Source: Author's own illustration.

Note: The size of the circle denotes the relative power and influence of the respective security provider in the oligopoly. Public security providers are shaded in blue, private security companies in green and private, illegal security providers in red.



Favelinha, Complexo do Alemão, Rio de Janeiro

6 NEIGHBOURHOOD CASE STUDIES

6.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the fine-grained dynamics of violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro by examining how the relative power and influence of security providers changes in particular neighbourhoods over time. These changes can affect the size and territorial dominion of the security providers, as well as their access to violence-enablers and financial resources, or the way they are perceived by local communities. The chapter offers a locally-grounded analysis of security provision in the neighbourhoods of Novo Leblon, Tabuleiro*, Vidigal, Complexo do Alemão and Santíssimo and presents two scenarios with varying constellations of security providers.⁶⁹

The first scenario is a **territory which is controlled by a dominant security provider** (see Section 6.2). The term 'dominant security provider' refers to an actor who is solely responsible for security provision in a given territory and who has a consolidated power basis that no other security provider can easily unsettle. This scenario is beneficial for both public and private security providers. In the case of public security providers, being the dominant security providers may justify high public security spending and improve their image as the lawful protectors of the people. In the case of private security providers, being the dominant security provider may guarantee high business revenues because no other actor can offer their own products and services in the same area. Mehler, Lambach and Smith-Hoehn (2010) suggest that within a territorial oligopoly of violence (on the city level), it is possible that specific areas and zones exist where security providers exercise a monopolistic form of violence (see Section 1.2.4). However, although the monopolistic-type of control is the preferred option of the security providers, in reality few groups achieve this comfortable position. If they do, they can rarely maintain their position over a prolonged period of time due to continuous adverse competition with other actors. The case studies for this scenario are the neighbourhoods Novo Leblon (see Section 6.2.1), Tabuleiro* (see Section 6.2.2) and Vidigal (see Section 6.2.3).

⁶⁹ The neighbourhood Botafogo was excluded from the analysis due to the limited scope of this chapter.

The second scenario is **a territory which is violently contested by two or more security providers** (see Section 6.3). What this means is that two or more security providers engage in a violent conflict with each other with the ultimate goal of becoming the dominant security provider in a specific geographical space. Within this constellation, each actor has to prove their capacity to use violence effectively and this brings high costs for the local population in terms of death, pain, discrimination and other inconveniences.⁷⁰ Outbreaks of violence in these territories can often be unpredictable. The trajectory that emerges is an urban war with life-threatening consequences for the civilians caught up in this conflict. The case studies for this scenario are the neighbourhoods of Complexo do Alemão (see Section 6.3.1) and Santíssimo (see Section 6.3.2).

The chapter shows that crime and violence tend to be low in territories with strong and relatively undisputed security providers, and high in territories that are violently contested by two or more groups. This can be observed in the way interviewed residents evaluate the levels of crime and violence in their neighbourhoods (see Section 6.4). As long as crime and violence are low, the authority of the dominant security provider is seldom questioned. When crime is high and security providers overstretch the use of violence, they have to go to extra lengths to justify the burden they are causing for the local population, either by co-optation or oppression, or more commonly, by a combination of both. Despite its appearance as chaotic, violence is therefore an instrument which is negotiated and managed quite carefully. However, when the costs of the conflict become too high for residents, and the security provider does not have sufficient social leadership skills to make up for these losses, the residents are likely to withdraw their support and cease to accept the authority of the security provider. Notably, this does not mean that residents' dissatisfaction with a given security provider will take the form of open resistance or active protest. Yet even the residents' silent withdrawal of support can indicate that a security provider has lost his most valuable asset, the trust of the community, and this can accelerate his decline in a given territory.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Mehler argues that levels of violence increase with the number of competing oligopolists: 'Oligopolies of violence lead to a moderately high level of violence since each violence actor has to prove his or her ability to use it effectively (as a rule: The more oligopolists the more violence)' (Mehler 2004: 545).

⁷¹ In extreme cases, residents can even facilitate the take-over of the community by other groups. Arias and Rodrigues (2006) showed various examples of how residents held drug traffickers accountable for failing to control crime and violence within the community. For instance, after 21 residents in Vigário Geral were massacred by a death squad in 1993, residents turned against the drug traffickers because they had gone into hiding outside the community and had left residents unprotected. The residents demanded to be allowed to organise a series of events in the community to promote peace. In Santa Ana in 1998, residents demanded that the drug sale point be moved to a safer location after a law-abiding citizen was killed in crossfire between traffickers and the police. In 2000, after some robberies occurred in

The main claim of this chapter is that all actors are willing to engage in violence if the perceived political and/or economic benefits are great enough. More than anything, therefore, it is the struggle for territorial control between conflicting security providers that fuels insecurity and violence in the neighbourhoods of Rio de Janeiro.

6.2 Scenario I: Territory is controlled by a dominant security provider

6.2.1 Novo Leblon

Table 6.1 Survey results: Perception of security providers, Novo Leblon

	Novo Leblon								
	PMERJ			PCERJ	GM	Military	Private security companies	Militias	Drug traffickers
	BPM	BOPE	UPP						
Most feared	14.9%	2.1%					4.3%	38.3%	40.4%
Most violent	2.2%	17.8%						37.8%	42.2%
Biggest threat to security	17.4%	2.2%						34.8%	45.7%
Most trusted	2.4%	14.3%	2.4%	9.5%	4.8%	42.9%	23.8%		
Who should provide security	22.7%	4.5%	4.5%	15.9%	2.3%	29.5%	20.5%		
Who is providing security	6.4%			2.1%	2.1%		89.4%		

Source: Author's own calculations.

Novo Leblon is an upper-class gated community in the west zone of Rio de Janeiro, far away from the chaos and messy reality of the city. Perceptions of crime and violence are low and residents live in a peaceful environment. Out of all neighbourhoods included in this study, the private security company in charge of Novo Leblon is closest to the ideal of a security provider who exercises a monopolistic-type of control in a specific area.

Rocinha, 'residents complained that traffickers were not "doing their job" and were "being made fools of by outside criminals"' (Arias and Rodrigues 2006: 75). Residents can demand changes in the way the drug gangs operate or even facilitate the takeover of a rival drug trafficking group. They can also make a protest and attract the unwanted attention of human rights groups. Another form of resistance is to collaborate with the police and support (or passively accept) peace-building programmes, such as the UPPs.

This occurs within the framework of a wider oligopoly of security at the city level. The relationship between the private security company and the residents models the classic business relationship between clients and service providers in the free market. The private security company and the administration of Novo Leblon deal with all internal conflicts in a largely self-governing style and their authority is rarely put into question. Nevertheless, the survey data reveal that the private security company did not enjoy a high level of trust. Out of all interviewees in Novo Leblon, only 23.8 per cent trusted private security companies more than any other actor and only 20.5 per cent stated it was their preferred security provider (see Table 6.1). A possible explanation for this are the shortcomings of the private security company, as perceived by interviewed residents, and which were discussed in earlier sections of this thesis (see Section 3.3.5).

Private security company

The private security company in charge of Novo Leblon is *Sunset Vigilância e Segurança* [Sunset Surveillance and Security]. The company was founded in 2005 and has expanded at a rapid pace. Today it has over 900 employees and offers services to clients such as Santander and the Consulate of China. Sunset Security was hired by the administration of Novo Leblon in 2008 after the previous security company had gone bankrupt. It has 78 employees based in Novo Leblon working in twelve hour shifts – seventeen employees at any given time. According to the Operational Director of Sunset Security Alex Gonçalves, the company charges approximately R\$ 16 per hour per guard to the Novo Leblon administrators which means that the total monthly security costs of the *condomínio* are at least R\$ 200,000. The services of the private security company are paid through the *condomínio* fees of the residents. The responsibilities of the guards include watching the entry gate, patrolling the streets, and giving information (see Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2). The doormen of the individual buildings are employed separately by the administration and are not employees of Sunset Security (Interview with Gonçalves 2012).

Roberta Pedrinha has lived in the neighbourhood for six year. She narrates that crime rates are low and that the residents and the private security guards have a good relationship:

'In six years of living here, I've never seen someone drunk in the streets. My husband has lived here since he was a child [...]. He said that when he was younger, people would meet on the square to talk and drink and flirt. I think that the world today is very virtual [happening online]. So people are staying more at home on the computer, on the internet, because you don't see people here [...]. There have been some cases of lightning kidnapping of women who were picking up their kids from school and were forced to get into the cars of criminals and withdraw money from ATM machines. But

then they enforced security. After that we also had two cases of burglaries in the houses. And my husband and I've witnessed a shootout when a bank was assaulted inside the *condomínio* [...]. In general terms, they [the security guards] are very polite, they greet you. There're a lot of fights between the schools so they break up the fight, take the kids to the headmaster. They give advice to those kids that are bunking class, say that it's better to attend class and study so in general terms they're trying to have a very good relationship [with the residents]' (Interview with Pedrinha 2011).

Out of all gated communities in Barra, Novo Leblon is a particular case because its streets are actually public and as such are under the control of the 31st BPM and the city hall. This means that anyone is free to enter the community and, for instance, go to the Novo Leblon shopping centre or pick up children from school. Nobody has to identify themselves upon entering the *condomínio*. The private security agents do not have permission to approach pedestrians. Gonçalves states that their activities are limited to 'visualizar e acompanhar pessoas' [watch and monitor people] but they cannot restrict anyone's right to come and go (Interview with Gonçalves 2012). If a crime should occur, the private security agents can attempt to immobilise the criminal but that is a right granted to all citizens. Firearms can only be used at the gate and at the small private harbor. Inside the community the guards only use truncheons.

With that in mind, I was surprised that my field research assistant was nonetheless approached by one of the private security agents when she was conducting interviews in the streets of the *condomínio*. The guard requested her to stop doing the interviews and accompanied her to the administration where she had to wait two hours before she was told that the research project could not be carried out because it could 'damage the reputation of the community'. I sent an official request to the administrators asking for permission to complete the survey. Knowing that I could freely approach pedestrians in the public streets, I wanted to test how the administration interpreted their own competencies. Ten weeks later I received this ambiguous response: '*o assunto [...] não foi autorizado, em função de não ser de competência da Administração*' [the request was not authorised because it is not in the competency of the administration].

Figure 6.1 Entrance gate of Novo Leblon



Source: Author's own illustration.

Figure 6.2 Novo Leblon's private security company



Source: Author's own illustration.

6.2.2 Tabuleiro*

Table 6.2 Survey results: Perception of security providers, Tabuleiro*

	Tabuleiro*								
	PMERJ			PCERJ	GM	Military	Private security companies	Militias	Drug traffickers
	BPM	BOPE	UPP						
Most feared						2.7%		32.4%	64.9%
Most violent	10.3%	10.3%						12.8%	66.7%
Biggest threat to security	4.5%							47.7%	47.7%
Most trusted	5.6%	22.2%		5.6%		38.9%		27.8%	
Who should provide security	4.5%	4.5%	31.8%			40.9%	9.1%	9.1%	
Who is providing security		3.3%						96.7%	

Source: Author's own calculations.

Tabuleiro* is another example of a territory with a dominant security provider. Yet compared to Novo Leblon, where residents could choose their service provider based on the logics of a free market, in Tabuleiro*, the security is provided by a criminal actor – the militias – and is based on an 'offer one cannot refuse'. Residents in Tabuleiro* need to pay *taxas de segurança* and other fees for internet, cable TV, cooking gas, alternative transport or business activities. In return, the militias protect the residents from crime and violence and maintain a zero-tolerance policy on minor offenses, e.g. fighting and consuming drugs (which was indeed rarely witnessed or heard about by interviewed residents, see Section 6.4). In an attempt to control social behaviour in the community, the militias severely restrict people's rights, especially the right to freedom of movement. Whenever necessary, they enforce their rules with violence. However, nowadays the ostentatious display of weapons and the use of violence are not necessary because residents rarely challenge the authority of the militias.

Militias

Militias are the main security provider in Tabuleiro*. When the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Rio de Janeiro (ALERJ 2008) investigated the activities of militias in 2008, it concluded that they controlled 171 communities in the state of Rio de Janeiro. Tabuleiro* was one of them.

Residents were charged for personal security, business operations, cable TV, internet, and gas. The *milicianos* also issued a fee on all real estate which was bought or sold within the community. Residents were intimidated by threats and aggression and could be expelled from the community. Some newspaper articles in the past reported that the militias restricted the movement of residents in the community. They closed the main access to the community at 10 pm every night. After that, residents could only get access to the community by identifying themselves to the *milicianos*. Following these allegations, the federal police arrested a group of *milicianos* in the community, the majority of whom were military or police officers. The individuals were charged with arms sales, leaking police intelligence information and the misappropriation of assets seized from criminals.

However, according to Danilo*, a resident of Tabuleiro*, the militias continue to be active in the community. They charge security taxes from businesses and residents and extort money for internet, gas, water and cable TV. The members of the militias are former soldiers, police, firefighters or other civilians. They prohibit the use of drugs and do not allow fights or any form of *ostentação de poder* [display of power] (Interview with Danilo* 2012). The militias traditionally see themselves as the antagonist of the drug traffickers. That is why residents in Tabuleiro* must not visit communities which are controlled by drug gangs. However, despite the militias' tough stance on drugs, Danilo* states some of them use drugs themselves and so do some residents but only secretly:

‘Theoretically *pessoas do bem* [good people] can use [drugs] secretly but you cannot sell them’ (Interview with Danilo* 2012).

When asked how the militias punish residents that do not comply with their rules, Danilo* explains:

‘It is self-disciplined because the person knows that if you do something wrong you will have a problem’ (Interview with Danilo* 2012).


This shows how the militias have successfully established their control in Tabuleiro* over time. The display of weapons and the use of violence are not even necessary anymore to spread terror because residents have already accepted the rules of the militias. Danilo* has grown up in different favelas, some controlled by drug traffickers and others by militias. When comparing both actors, he stresses:

‘I think that the militias have more power [over the residents], even without doing anything. Because they’re the criminals and police in one, so they’ve the power of both. The trafficker has the power outside the law. The police when on duty have the power of the law. And if you’ve a favela where there’s a guy outside the law and inside the law, the fear that’s generated is a lot bigger because to whom will you report to? You cannot talk to the trafficker because he won’t be able to enter [meaning he cannot assume power in the community]. You can’t talk to the police because it’ll be complex for them, to whom will you talk?’ (Interview with Danilo* 2012).

It is difficult to evaluate how the militias are perceived by the local community. On the one hand, the collected data show that support for the militias in Tabuleiro* was considerably higher than in all other communities (see Table 6.2): 27.8 per cent of respondents stated they trusted the militias most (compared with 2.8 per cent on average) and 9.1 per cent believed they should provide the security in their neighbourhood (2.1 per cent on average). A possible explanation for this is that the militias have succeeded in controlling criminal and violent behaviour in the community. However, on the other hand, interviewees were aware that this strict social control comes at a cost – coercion, extortion, lack of civil liberties, to name but a few. They believed that militias constituted the biggest threat to security in Rio de Janeiro, together with the drug traffickers (47.7 per cent each). This could explain why Tabuleiro* had the highest percentage of interviewees who wanted to move away from their neighbourhood (36.2 per cent), see Figure 6.3.

In the remaining survey questions, the interviewees in Tabuleiro* rated the drug traffickers more negatively than the militias: 64.9 per cent of interviewees feared drug traffickers more than any other security provider (militias: 32.4 per cent) and 66.7 per cent rated them as the most violent group (militias: 12.8 per cent). This is, in fact, not surprising considering that residents frequently heard the ‘anti-traffickers propaganda’ of the militias.

Figure 6.3 Survey results: Moving away from the neighbourhoods



Source: Author's own calculations.

6.2.3 Vidigal

Table 6.3 Survey results: Perception of security providers, Vidigal

	Vidigal								
	PMERJ			PCERJ	GM	Military	Private security companies	Militias	Drug traffickers
	BPM	BOPE	UPP						
Most feared	2.1%	70.2%						25.5%	2.1%
Most violent		91.3%						8.7%	
Biggest threat to security	51.1%	4.3%						38.3%	6.4%
Most trusted	3.1%	6.3%		12.5%	3.1%	12.5%	3.1%		59.4%
Who should provide security	6.1%		3.0%	3.0%	3.0%	30.3%	3.0%		51.5%
Who is providing security	4.3%		93.6%						2.1%

Source: Author's own calculations.

Vidigal is a south zone community where residents are still struggling to come to terms with the recent changes in security provision in their neighbourhood. After decades of drug trafficker control, Vidigal was occupied by state security forces in November 2011 and a new UPP outpost was established in January 2012. When the survey was conducted in May and June 2012, support for the drug traffickers was still extremely high among the interviewed residents: 59.4 per cent trusted drug traffickers more than any other group and 51.5 per cent stated they should provide security in their neighbourhood (see Table 6.3). This can be explained by the fact that the drug trafficking faction in power, the ADA, had succeeded in bringing relative peace and tranquility to the community in recent years after having ousted its rival, the CV, in 2004. Residents remained largely unaffected by the drug sales business and hence the authority of the ADA had been unchallenged until the state security forces arrived. With the arrival of the pacification forces, the fragile balance of power in the community was disrupted and the ADA was severely weakened. Residents were doubtful with regard to the UPP's capability to step into the breach for the ADA and assume the new social leadership role in the community (only 3 per cent of interviewed residents in Vidigal chose the UPP as their preferred security provider). The return of the CV to neighbouring Rocinha also spurred residents' fear that a new cycle of violence between the CV and the ADA was imminent. Vidigal is therefore an excellent example of a

territory where power relations changed after the former dominant security provider (ADA) was ousted by the pacification forces, leading to a reconfiguration of the relative power and influence of each actor in the local security network.

ADA drug traffickers

The first drug trade activities started in Vidigal at the end of the 1980s. In 1994, Gay stated that the drug gang consisted of around 'thirty or so men in their late teens or early twenties who are recruited from the ranks of the favela population' (Gay 1994: 97). At the time, the drug traffickers enjoyed a good relationship with the residents and rarely interfered in the day-to-day affairs of the community. They occasionally financed small public works projects at the top of the favela and donated food to families in need. However, in 1994 Gay stressed that 'during the past four of five years' violence increased, not only between traffickers and the police but also among the traffickers and in their dealings with residents from Vidigal. Gay also observed that the neighbourhood association was facing competition from the drug dealers in leadership questions:

'The increasingly powerful presence of the drug gang is a source of some concern to the leadership of Vidigal, not so much because of increasing levels of violence, but because the *tradicantes* are, in a sense, competing with the neighbourhood association for the hearts and minds of the local population' (Gay 1994: 98).

When Gay published his research in 1994, he did not mention whether the drug dealers were belonging to a particular criminal organisation. From the little that is known from reliable sources, the CV must have been in charge of Vidigal and neighbouring Rocinha during that time. In 2004, both favelas were taken over by the ADA after a week-long war which was widely televised and left the community traumatised. In the following years, the power of the ADA remained unchallenged leading to a situation of relative peace and tranquility in the favelas:

'The gang war of 2004 traumatized the community, and the past six years of relative peace won ADA a reputation as a lesser evil, if not a benevolent protector' (Roller 2012).

This rather positive image of the ADA as the 'benevolent protector' of the community could help explaining why support for drug traffickers in Vidigal was higher than in the CV-controlled Complexo do Alemão or the TCP-controlled Santíssimo (see Section 6.3.1 and Section 6.3.2). The ADA stands out from other drug trafficking factions because it maintains a peaceful and affective relationship with the community and has a zero-tolerance policy on petty crime. Its main focus is making profits from the drug sales and it tends to avoid confrontations with the police whenever possible. The CV, in contrast, is more ideological and its founding principles – justice, liberty and peace – still

have some meaning today. The CV likes to see itself as a ‘parallel power’ or a ‘sub-nation’ (Duarte 2012) and is often seen as the most violent or cruel drug faction of all but also the one that favela residents identify most with due to its former ‘charismatic’ leaders like Orlando Jogador and the long history of the CV in the favelas.

Occupation by state security forces

The pacification of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro usually occurs in three subsequent phases – occupation, stabilisation, and pacification. Mariana Albanese, journalist and resident of Vidigal, described the anxiety of the population on the night before the occupation in November 2011:

‘Saturday, the 12th, was extremely atypical. It seemed like New Year, but with an expectation to the contrary, people would ask where you would pass the *virada* [turn], they showered and waited for midnight. In the supermarkets, the long queues demonstrated the fear that the shops might not open in the next few days. The tension was evident. If the government would postpone the operation by just one day, half of the hill would suffer a heart attack. There was no more space for all the anxiety’ (Albanese 2012).

On 13 November 2011, Vidigal and the neighbouring favelas Rocinha and Chácara do Céu were occupied by state security forces as part of the Operação Choque de Paz [Peace Shock Operation] in which approximately 2,000 police and soldiers of the civil police, military police, federal police and the navy participated.

Interviewed residents in Vidigal expressed only limited support for these state police forces at the time the survey was conducted in May and June 2012. The data indicate that the community had a traumatic relationship with the PMERJ, especially BOPE, yet it is unclear how much of this dissatisfaction could be attributed to the occupation in 2011 and how much stemmed from earlier encounters with the police: 51.1 per cent of respondents believed that the BPM was the biggest threat to public security, 70.2 per cent feared BOPE more than any other group and 91.3 per cent rated BOPE as the most violent security provider. This result is rather unusual when comparing it to other favelas where BOPE had also made frequent operations, such as the Complexo do Alemão (29.8 per cent stated they were most violent) and Santíssimo (0 per cent). My first tentative explanation for this was that the occupation of Vidigal in November 2011 had been very violent and had caused civilian casualties. However, this was not the case. In fact, during the occupation there was zero resistance from residents or criminals and not a single shot was fired on either side (Albanese 2012; Sindicato dos Policiais Federais do Rio de Janeiro 2011, November 13). The subsequent two-months stabilisation phase was not carried out by BOPE either but by another elite unit of the military police, the Batalhão de Policiamento de Choque (Battalion for Shock Policing;

BPCHq). It is possible that the mistrust and fear that the interviewed residents in Vidigal associated with BOPE stemmed from much earlier times or that the interviewed residents confused the BPCHq with BOPE because both use similar vehicles and uniforms.

Pacification by the UPP

After the stabilisation phase, on 18 January 2012, Vidigal and Chácara do Céu received the 19th UPP unit of the city of Rio de Janeiro. Captain Fábio Pereira, commander of the UPP in Vidigal, explained that the UPP unit consists of 230 police officers who work in five turns of twelve hours each. At any given time, 40 UPP police are present in the favela. Pereira stresses:

‘We are not only here to strengthen peace, it is much more than that [...] The UPPs are not just here for security reasons, it has to have a strong link with the community. The relationship [with the community] is very *bacana* [nice], affective. We are experiencing this moment of confidence, they have a lot of confidence in our police’ (Interview with Pereira 2012).

However, many residents did not perceive the UPP in such a positive light. Albanese stated:

‘Contrary to what one might imagine, it wasn’t the ample and unrestricted desire that the police entered. Many residents without having any connections with the drug trade preferred – and still prefer – that the hill would remain the same, mainly because of security. Others simply feared the arrival of police whose history of violence over the years didn’t leave positive marks’ (Albanese 2012).


Part of the interviewed residents’ dissatisfaction with the UPP might be attributed to the ‘collateral damage’ which the pacification produced. The pacification dramatically weakened the ADA, both in Vidigal and Rocinha, principally after drug lord Antônio Francisco ‘Nem’ Bonfim Lopes was arrested. Vidigal received a UPP outpost two months after the initial occupation in January 2012. However, the new UPP in Rocinha was only inaugurated in September 2012. It is believed that the CV returned to Rocinha before that, in March 2012, and took control of the upper half of the community, whereas the ADA continues in charge of the lower half (Último Segundo 2012, March 25). The presence of the CV in Rocinha spurred residents’ fear that another drug war between the CV and the ADA was imminent, despite the presence of the occupation forces (Roller 2012). This fear is understandable given the geographical proximity of Rocinha and Vidigal (see Figure 6.4) and their shared history.

This case study on Vidigal documented the decline of a dominant security provider, the ADA, and the subsequent reconfiguration of power relations in the community. When the *de facto* monopolist of security and justice in Vidigal, the ADA, was weakened

because of the pacification, the interviewed residents felt that a vacuum of power emerged. They wondered 'how long will this peace last?' and believed that 'only time will tell if things are getting better' (VID29, VID41, also see Section 3.3.5). The new officially appointed security provider, the UPP, did not succeed in gaining the trust of the residents and failed to fill a social leadership role in the community. Some interviewed residents believed that 'the police are just like the criminals' and that 'the UPP are just doing window-dressing' (VID10, VID2, also see Section 3.3.5).

In the neighbouring community Rocinha, the weakening of the ADA facilitated the return of its former archrival, the CV, at least in some areas of the community. The occupation and pacification of the state security forces thus initiated a new cycle of violence between the ADA, the CV and the police. There is one particular incident that represents a watershed in the way the image of the UPPs has deteriorated in the community. On 14 July 2013, Amarildo Dia de Souza, a bricklayer and father of six children, was arrested by UPP policemen and allegedly tortured during an investigation into a clandestine arms stockpile in the neighbourhood. His body disappeared. With the support of human rights organisations, Amarildo's family initiated an international campaign – "Cadê o Amarildo?" [Where is Amarildo?] – demanding his disappearance be properly investigated. As a result of this campaign, twenty-five UPP policemen were indicted, among them the former commander of the UPP in Rocinha, and seventy other UPP police had to leave the community, fearing reprisals from residents. A few months after this incident, Rocinha's new UPP Commander Major Priscila Azevedo confirmed that the drug traffickers had regained confidence following the disappearance of Amarildo and that attacks against the police had intensified. She stated that 'we have done everything possible and impossible to try to restore peace in the Rocinha community' (G1 RJ 2013, November 8). This example illustrates how the use of violence – or rather, the very particular abuse of violence of a security provider – impacts on the way this group is perceived by the local community. At the time this thesis was submitted in March 2014, violence in Rocinha was completely spiraling out of control, claiming the lives of numerous police, criminals and ordinary residents.

Figure 6.4 Map of Vidigal and Rocinha



Source: Mapa Digital do Rio de Janeiro – CadLog, Instituto Pereira Passos (Instituto Pereira Passos 2013c).

6.3 Scenario II: Territory is violently contested by two or more security providers

6.3.1 Complexo do Alemão

Table 6.4 Survey results: Perception of security providers, Complexo do Alemão

	Complexo do Alemão								
	PMERJ			PCERJ	GM	Military	Private security companies	Militias	Drug traffickers
	BPM	BOPE	UPP						
Most feared	24.4%	31.3%		4.4%				28.9%	11.1%
Most violent	12.8%	29.8%		6.4%				36.2%	14.9%
Biggest threat to security	9.3%	2.3%	2.3%	4.7%				51.2%	30.2%
Most trusted	12.2%	9.8%	2.4%	9.8%	4.9%	22%	14.6%		24.4%
Who should provide security	6.7%	11.1%	15.6%	6.7%	11.1%	17.8%	11.1%	2.2%	17.8%
Who is providing security						100%			

Source: Author's own calculations.

The security provision in the Complexo do Alemão arguably constitutes the most convoluted example of violent pluralism on a neighbourhood level in Rio de Janeiro, possibly in all of Brazil. This is due to the variety of security providers who have passed through the community, as well as the intensity of the conflict between them. I would even go so far as to suggest that if we can understand the dynamics of cooperation and conflict between different security providers in the Complexo do Alemão, and the (deliberate) transition of power from one security provider to the next, we have arrived at the heart of the oligopolistic nature of Rio de Janeiro's security network. For this reason, the Complexo do Alemão shall be discussed in more detail than the other case studies because it will enable us to learn more about the role of territory, violence and community support in the emergence and decline of security providers over time.

The Complexo do Alemão used to be the stronghold of the CV, the oldest and most powerful drug trafficking faction in Rio de Janeiro. The region had one of the highest violent crime rates and the lowest HDI in the city. In November 2010, the Complexo do Alemão was occupied in a mega-operation involving 2,900 soldiers and police. In the following eighteen months, the territory was controlled by the military before power was gradually handed over to new UPP units. Although the UPPs have officially been in charge since June 2012, they have not yet succeeded in consolidating their leadership position as a security provider. Their claim to territory is challenged by criminal actors and their authority is even called into question by law-abiding citizens.

The Complexo do Alemão is a good example of how the use of violence impacts on the way a security provider is perceived by the community. In the chapter introduction, it was argued that whenever the activities of a security provider produce a high degree of violence, pain, discrimination and inconvenience for the residents, the relationship with the community deteriorates and the security provider has to go to extra lengths to retain the support, or at least toleration, of the local residents. This was also observed in the case of the CV drug traffickers in the Complexo do Alemão. Although drug traffickers emerged as the most trusted group (24.4 per cent) and the preferred security provider (17.8 per cent, on par with the military, see Table 6.4), residents' level of support and loyalty was far from that in Vidigal where residents remembered the 'reign' of the ADA as a period of relative peace and tranquility.

Another particularity of the case of Complexo do Alemão is that there is little agreement on security matters among residents. Interviewees were highly divided in their opinions regarding who could be trusted, who is to be feared and who should provide security in their neighbourhood. This stems from a high turnover of security providers who have passed through the community in the past years. At the time the

survey was conducted, residents had made direct (and recent) contact with drug traffickers, the BPM, BOPE, the military, the UPPs and even the FNSP.⁷²

Expectations also play an important role in the way security providers are perceived by interviewees. Before a new public security force begins its work in a certain neighbourhood, support is high and residents are positive and hopeful. After a few months this initial optimism gives way to skepticism and apathy as residents realise that the new security provider cannot live up to their expectations. The military in the Complexo do Alemão is a good example of this dilemma. At the time the survey was conducted, the military was still in control in the Complexo do Alemão but was starting to hand over control to the UPPs. Interviewees in the Complexo do Alemão were thus the only participants in this research project who had daily contact with the military in recent times. Strikingly, it was also the neighbourhood with the lowest number of people (17.8 per cent) who chose the military as their preferred security provider (compared to an overall average of 34.9 per cent). The transition to the UPPs was imminent and 15.6 per cent of interviewed residents in the Complexo do Alemão therefore chose the pacification police as their favourite security provider (compared to 7.6 per cent on average). It may be assumed that due to the current spread of disillusionment with the UPPs, if we would ask the same question to respondents today, almost two years after the arrival of the UPPs, the results could be very different.

CV drug traffickers

The drug trade in the Complexo do Alemão started as a prison-based business of individual drug traffickers in the 1970s and turned into one of the most sophisticated and profitable enterprises in the whole country. In the 1970s and 1980s, drug traffickers had not acquired strength of arms in terms of firepower and they usually ran from the police in order to avoid confrontations (Interview with Thiago* 2011). Thiago* remembers that the ‘fuzil’ [rifle] only came to the Complexo do Alemão in the 1990s when drug lord Orlando da Conceição, called Orlando Jogador assumed power (Interview with Thiago* 2011). Indoctrinated by the ideological principles of the founders of the CV – justice, peace and liberty - Orlando Jogador had strict moral values regarding the role of the drug traffickers in the community. He supported poor families and did not allow children or adolescents to get involved in the drug trade. *Baile funk* parties were only allowed on Saturday nights when nobody had to work the following day.

⁷² The *Força Nacional de Segurança Pública* has occupied the Complexo do Alemão on several occasions in the past years, principally in times of highly contested municipal elections (Perlman 2010: 115).

Orlando Jogador was a businessman eager to expand his power. Despite the fact that he was already the most powerful drug lord in the city and in control of over 50 *bocas* in the north zone of Rio de Janeiro, he attempted to conquer more favelas, especially those controlled by the TC, the archrival of the CV. In 1993, the two drug factions agreed to a truce and began solving their claims to power in more peaceful ways. However, in 1994, the TC's most powerful drug lord, Uê, of the Morro do Adeus, broke this peace accord and killed Orlando Jogador and twelve of his managers in an ambush. Orlando Jogador's death constituted a critical juncture in Rio de Janeiro's long history of drug-related violence (Barcellos 2003; de Lima 2012). Uê aligned himself with the independent drug trafficker Celsinho da Vila Vintém and founded the ADA drug trafficking faction. The CV launched a three-month war on the TC in order to regain control of all the *bocas* which had been lost to the TC when Orlando Jogador was killed. The Complexo do Alemão was subsequently taken under the wings of the CV again, with the exception of Morro do Adeus which remained under the control of the TC.⁷³ Orlando Jogador's death was revenged eight years later, in 2002, when Fernandinho Beira-Mar (CV) allied with Celsinho da Vila Vintém (ADA) to kill Uê (TC) inside the Bangu I prison. For many residents of the Complexo do Alemão, Orlando Jogador is still the informal patron of the community.

Betrayal is something that most drug traffickers are familiar with. After 30 years of direct contact with drug traffickers in the Complexo do Alemão, Thiago* states that the relationship among them is governed by money and mistrust, rather than by friendship and loyalty.

'I didn't want to be that involved because the majority of traffickers die at the hand of traffickers' (Interview with Thiago* 2011).

'[Friendship] doesn't exist! The trafficker is nobody's friend' (Interview with Thiago* 2011).

According to Thiago*, having a friendship with another drug trafficker or 'owing him a favour' creates a dependency which needs to be avoided because it could interfere with the drug business:

'You eat your lunch with the rifle on your back [...]. A *bandido* [criminal] doesn't own a favour to anyone. I don't owe you because if you screw up, I'll be the one to kill you. So I don't owe you, everything that I ask you to do I'll pay for it. You're not my friend, I'm paying you so don't confuse things' (Interview with Thiago* 2011).

⁷³ Morro do Adeus continued to be contested by all drug trafficking factions – CV, TC and ADA. Albeit officially pacified by the UPP, it is currently under the control of the ADA (Monken 2012, August 23).

Friendship and loyalty have little value among drug traffickers but money, arms and women are very important. Those who work in the *boca* in the Complexo do Alemão earn a fixed salary of R\$ 300 per week, plus 4-6 *papelotes* [small wrappers or plastic bags with cocaine to be sold to consumers] of every cocaine cargo which arrives. These extra *papelotes* can either be consumed by the drug dealers themselves or sold for their own profit. The total monthly income of a *gerente* [manager] is R\$ 3000 – 4000, though it is higher if part of the gang work as professional thieves, assaulting people *na pista* and stealing money, jewelry, mobile phones, motorcycles and cars. The few drug dealers who are smart enough not to spend all their money on drugs, women and clothing invest their profits in the community (Field notes 5, 2012). They buy houses and rent them out to residents because these ‘assets’ cannot be seized by the judiciary:

‘The law of the *morro* [hill] is the law of the drug dealer. The judge has no power *no morro* [in the hill]’ (Interview with Thiago* 2011).

This underlines that drug traffickers have a strong notion of space ownership, believing that the Complexo do Alemão territory belongs to them. In fact, Thiago* refers to his community as his ‘castle’, stating that he and the other drug traffickers used to feel safe and strong in the Complexo do Alemão but would hardly leave ‘their world’:

‘The hills were our castle. There’s your castle, there you’ve everything. You’re the king. You’re the prince. Everything was there. We would stay there, this was our world. When other adolescents went to shopping centres, we would pass the community from one end to the other’ (Interview with Thiago* 2011).

The community was totally subjected to the rules of the drug traffickers and could not exercise basic citizen rights, such as freedom of speech or freedom of movement. Vanessa* has lived in neighbouring Complexo da Penha since 1985. In our interview, she was very afraid to talk about the drug traffickers whose activities had a strong impact on her personal and professional life. She avoided calling them by what they are and instead described them as ‘*cabeças diferenciadas*’ [differentiated heads] and ‘*o outro segmento*’ [the other segment]. She calls the drug lord ‘*o absoluto dentro da comunidade*’ [the absolute within the community] and laments the fact that residents have to respect his arbitrary rules (Interview with Vanessa* 2011). Thiago* confirms that the lives of ordinary residents never had much value in the eyes of the drug dealers and those who were killed were quickly forgotten:

‘Inside there your life is worth nothing, your life is just *um sopro* [a whiff] [...] And you’re obliged to forget because you can’t go on commenting that “so-and-so died”’ (Interview with Thiago* 2011).

However, there are also residents who point to the positive side of the drug traffickers, remembering that they helped out in times of financial hardship. Silvia*, resident of Morro do Alemão and mother of two children recounts:

'If you needed money to buy medication, to buy [cooking] gas, to buy whatever, you could go to them [the traffickers] and they would give it to you. What the government didn't do, they would do it' (Interview with Silvia* 2011).

As the power and presence of the drug traffickers in Complexo do Alemão increased and its organisational and logistical structure improved, the state withdrew more and more from the area. Basic social services and regular policing were abandoned. Four-star general Adriano Pereira Júnior, commander of the CML, states:

'It was almost like a free territory where the governing law in these areas was the law of the drug dealer. He decided what people who lived there could do and could not do. There was no presence of the state. And over the years they transformed these areas into fortresses' (Interview with Pereira Júnior 2012).

Thiago* has a different view on this and states in his usual polemic way:

'It's a lie to say that Complexo do Alemão and Rocinha were dominated by the drug trade for thirty years and that the government didn't enter. This is a legend because if you wanted to go in, you went in. The United States went into Iraq and within twenty-four hours they arrived in Bagdad. It's a question of interests!' (Interview with Thiago* 2012).

Despite the fact that drug traffickers considered the Complexo do Alemão territory to be their 'castle' and that many social services only functioned on a minimal level, it would be wrong to assume that the state apparatus was completely absent. Rather, the state was present in very particular ways (Arias 2006). The state had little interest in providing education, health and housing services to an acceptable level because residents in the Complexo do Alemão had no political voice and lacked appropriate channels to articulate their demands to the city hall. The run up period to elections was the only time when the Complexo do Alemão received the attention of politicians and every now and then this 'interest' took the form of buying votes from the drug traffickers (see Section 5.4). In the interim period to the next elections, the public employees working in the Complexo do Alemão, e.g. teachers, doctors, nurses and garbage collectors were largely left on their own and had to find their own ways of dealing with the lack of resources. Whenever violence spiraled out of control, many of these public employees did not show up to work (they often live in other areas of the city) and the community passed through long periods in which schools and health centres remained closed.

Public security was arguably the most deliberately underprovisioned public good as this was constructed to sustain a business which was profitable for everyone – the drug

traffickers who could continue with their drug sales and the police who received bribes to turn a blind eye to these illicit activities. Several publications have focused on the role of the police in the drug trade in Rio de Janeiro (Amnesty International 2005; Arias 2006; Athayde and Bill 2006, 2007; Dowdney 2003; Soares et al. 2005). Statements from residents in the Complexo do Alemão indicate that the corruption of the police occurred in much the same manner as stated in these publications (also see Section 3.3.5 about satisfaction with security). A community leader of Nova Brasília recounts that violence tended to increase when the deal between traffickers and the police was broken:


'Unfortunately there were those who were harmed in this tireless game of police and thief [meaning the drug trafficker] because of the lack of the so-called "arreço" - the police received money from the drug dealer so that they didn't invade the favela. As long as the pact with the police battalion was working normally, the hill was pure pleasure. The *baile funks* happened normally and the number of casualties on both sides was minimal. If the opposite was the case we could not leave our children in the streets, not because we feared the traffickers – most of them were residents of the favela – but because we were afraid of the police' (Field notes 7, 2012).⁷⁴

As someone who has spent most of his life inside the drug trade, Thiago* is well informed about how this corruption scheme worked. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, it was not possible to verify the veracity of his information. The following passage should therefore be read with caution. According to Thiago*, the *arreço* had to be paid to the whole military police battalion in charge of the area so that everyone was made accomplice. Thiago* has no doubt that there were also many honest police working in the battalion but they were either silenced or transferred to other battalions. He recounts that in rare cases these honest police officers were obliged to patrol dangerous alleys on their own so that they could be killed by the drug traffickers. In extreme cases traffickers received an order 'from above' to go directly to a specific spot and kill a specific police officer, taking away his firearms as a renumeration for the murder (Interview with Thiago* 2012). If we believe Thiago*, the drug dealers even had to inform the police and obtain their permission if they wanted to invade the favela of a rival drug trafficking faction:

'You pay the police to [be allowed to] invade another favela. Because when you're going to take a favela, it's like that, who pays more, gets it. There is no such thing as "the drug dealer took the favela", that's a legend. You take the favela when the police allows it' (Interview with Thiago* 2012).

⁷⁴ Corroborating evidence for this comes from Dowdney who confirms that drug traffickers usually do not violently confront the police unless they are being targeted by a police invasion or the police start shooting first. Direct confrontations between the traffickers and the police are avoided as this is bad for business – drug users will go elsewhere to buy their drugs (Dowdney 2003: 85).

Figure 6.5 Map of Complexo do Alemão



Source: Mapa Digital do Rio de Janeiro – CadLog, Instituto Pereira Passos (Instituto Pereira Passos 2013c).

Military

A new outbreak of violence in Rio de Janeiro in November 2010 fueled authorities' fear that drug traffickers were responding with a war of terror to the government's war on drugs. Police intelligence sources revealed that drug gangs from Rocinha, Complexo do Alemão and Vila Cruzeiro (see on the map in Figure 6.5) were allegedly working together to launch a series of attacks on buses and cars in protest of their loss of territory due to the UPP pacification and because their imprisoned leaders were sent to federal prisons or held in RDD⁷⁵. If these rumours were true, it meant that Rio de Janeiro's drug gangs were thinking about doing the impossible: uniting the two main drug trafficking factions ADA and CV in order to destabilise the main public security project of Rio de Janeiro, the UPPs (de Lima 2012). Beltrame points out that crime data indicated that the CV was behind the attacks, more specifically drug lord Fabiano 'FB'

⁷⁵ The Regime Disciplinar Diferenciado [Differentiated Disciplinary Regime; RDD] resulted from a reform of the Penal Execution Law in 2003. The RDD is a rigorous form of imprisonment in which the inmate can be held in an individual cell for up to 360 days, completely isolated from the outside world (e.g. no access to newspapers and television, no conjugal visits and only up to two hours of outdoor time, per day). Dias, an expert on the PCC, argues that the RDD is central to the government's public security policy in São Paulo: 'Symbolically, the RDD transmits the image that something is being done in the combat of "organised crime". And in practical terms, the RDD represents a trump of public power, enabling the government to bargain with the factions to maintain "peace" in the penitentiary system in exchange for keeping its leaders away from the RDD' (Dias 2009: 12).

Atanásio da Silva in Vila Cruzeiro, one of the highest ranking CV members outside prison (Interview with Beltrame 2012).

When the violent attacks of the traffickers intensified – 38 deaths in total – the government decided to do an incursion into Vila Cruzeiro. Being aware of the difficulty of this operation, former State Governor Cabral requested Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim be allowed to use the equipment and armoured vehicles of the navy (not its personnel though). With the help of this equipment, Vila Cruzeiro was invaded on 25 November 2010.

On that day, a news helicopter by TV Globo captured the escape of around 200 criminals from Vila Cruzeiro via the Estrada Velha da Pavuna which leads through the Serra da Misericórdia to the Morro do Alemão. These images were broadcast live on national television and had immense repercussions in the international press (Sampaio et al. 2011, November 25). The state government will arguably be forever grateful for these images because, amidst the chaos that public security had turned into, they provided the Brazilian population with a real, visible enemy figure. Political support on all levels for a repressive and definite response to this ‘problem’ had never been higher. Duarte remembers:

‘At that moment, we were all against them, Brazil [as a whole], I would say. The stupidity of their actions, burning cars, terrorising people, making innocent victims, awoke the Brazilian population from a type of social lethargy’ (Duarte 2012: 133).

The TV Globo images marked a critical juncture in the history of public security in Rio de Janeiro and in Brazil as a whole. After that it was easy to get all relevant stakeholders united for a common cause – to free the residents of Vila Cruzeiro and neighbouring favelas from the clutches of the traffickers. The following weeks and months were characterised by extraordinary levels of coordination and cooperation between different state and federal security forces. The straightforwardness of the invasion of Vila Cruzeiro called for an attempt to recapture the neighbouring Complexo do Alemão, as well. Beltrame explains:

‘We took Vila Cruzeiro. We got to the top of the Serra da Misericórdia. We were half way between Vila Cruzeiro and Alemão. I said: We’re here [...]. Now let’s go down there and occupy what was our Achilles tendon, the regulatory agency of crimes in this state! - But Secretary, we don’t have enough police to stay there. – Well, then I’ll ask the military to *segurar a onda* [hold the position]’ (Interview with Beltrame 2012).

On the same evening, President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva and Minister of Defense Jobim authorised the employment of the armed forces in the occupation of the Complexo do Alemão, in accordance with the GLO in Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution. In the following two days, military and police prepared for what was

believed to have turned into a historic battle. They blocked all entrance and exit points of the Complexo do Alemão and stopped residents from returning to their homes. Police helicopters and megaphones were used to warn residents not to leave their houses and traffickers were asked to surrender before sunset (Duarte 2012).

On Sunday, 28 November 2010, the *Dia D*⁷⁶ had come. In the early morning hours, Duarte climbed on top of a *caveirão* and spoke to his troops. He later reflected on what he said in that moment:

‘We were there for a war. We wouldn’t carry out policing, we wouldn’t do patrolling, and we wouldn’t do police investigation. We would go to battle! We were going to war: live it, do it, incorporate it into our existence so that we would never forget it’ (Duarte 2012: 140-141).

He remembers how police officers were expecting to come eye to eye with the criminals, engaging in close combats and becoming trapped in ambushes (Duarte 2012). In fact, the approximately 500 drug traffickers were facing a joint force of 2,900 soldiers and police: 800 soldiers from the armed forces, 600 military police, 395 BOPE police, 800 civil police and 300 federal police, supported by fifteen tanks and seven helicopters (Gusmão and Braga 2011, 24 November: 8-9; Interview with Pereira Júnior 2012). There was little resistance from traffickers. In the first ten hours of the operation, the state security forces confiscated 30 tons of marihuana, 418 kilograms of cocaine, 161 kilograms of crack and 572 firearms (Duarte 2012: 151). In the early afternoon, BOPE had reached the top of Morro do Alemão and hoisted the flags of Brazil and Rio de Janeiro – a symbol for the successful recapturing of the state territory (de Lima 2012).

However, relatively few people had actually been arrested (171 during the whole period from 20 November to 17 December 2010) which meant that many of the approximately 500 drug traffickers from Complexo do Alemão and Vila Cruzeiro had managed to escape, possibly to the favelas of Rocinha and Juramento (Monken 2010, November 27). Morro do Adeus in the east of the Complexo do Alemão was not included in the FPac area and was also used as a refuge for some criminals (de Lima 2012). Those who had never been convicted of a crime stayed in the Complexo do Alemão and adapted to a new lifestyle, blending in with the urban poor. Duarte’s desire that ‘hopefully they have moved away from crime’ is wishful thinking (Duarte 2012: 152). Reflecting on ‘*Dia D*’, Beltrame put the events into perspective:


‘We didn’t win the war, we won the most important and difficult battle’ (Beltrame in Resende 2010, November 28).

A month after the initial occupation of the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha, the Ministry of Defense and the government of Rio de Janeiro signed an

⁷⁶ D-Day; military term used for the day a combat is initiated.

agreement to regulate how the military would assist in the stabilisation phase. The FPac was created under the command of the CML. The FPac consisted of military brigades, the Batalhão de Campanha [Warfare Battalion] of Rio de Janeiro's military police and Rio de Janeiro's civil police (see Figure 6.6).

Figure 6.6 Command structure of the *Força de Pacificação*



Source: Author's own illustration, adapted from de Lima (2012).

The main reason for the fruitful cooperation between these state security forces was that the roles of each actor were clearly defined in the agreement and that the territorial boundaries of the FPac were meticulously defined street by street. The approximately 1,700 soldiers of the military were responsible for patrolling the streets and carrying out body searches and arrests. In groups of 30 soldiers, they occupied a number of strategic points in the higher parts of the favelas, called 'strong points'. Smaller groups of a minimum of five soldiers patrolled the main roads leading into the favelas, called 'points of visibility' (see Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8). The Batalhão de Campanha of the PMERJ consisted of 150 to 250 police who were also responsible for ostensive patrolling and body searches, as well as 'combing' the area and assisting the civil police with fulfilling court orders. The approximately twenty-five civil police officers involved in the FPac had the function of judicial police who fulfilled court orders (de Lima 2012: 33; Interview with Ribeiro 2012). It was agreed that military and civil police were not allowed to enter the FPac area unless they were part of the specially created Batalhão de Campanha or the judicial civil police:

'The performance of military and civil police that are not part of the *Força de Pacificação* is prohibited inside the Pacification Area' (de Lima 2012: 32).

The agreement also laid down several rules to fight corruption and to ensure that the activities of the occupation force were in accordance with human rights. It stated that operations were to be carried out in 'a situation of institutional normality in full accordance with the rule of law' and that 'no citizen should be considered or treated as an enemy' (Duarte 2012: 35). Initially, the Ministry of Defense and Rio de Janeiro's government agreed to revise the prolongation of the FPac agreement every month. Later it was decided that the FPac would remain until control could be handed over to the newly trained UPPs. The first termination date of the FPac at the end of 2011 was postponed to June 2012 so that the UPPs who were meant to work in the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha could first be sent to other places in Rio de Janeiro, e.g. São Carlos (pacified in May 2011), Mangueira / Tuiuti (November 2011) and Vidigal (January 2012).

In total, the military stayed in control of the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha for eighteen months. According to four-star general Pereira Júnior, during all this time not a single person was killed by the military (Interview with Pereira Júnior 2012). The military brigades employed for the FPac were exchanged every ten to thirteen weeks. As each of the individual military brigades consisted of 1,700 soldiers, this means that a total of 11,900 soldiers from different Brazilian states – Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, Santa Catarina – served in the FPac over the course of these eighteen months (de Lima 2012; Interview with Pereira Júnior 2012). This arrangement ensured that soldiers would not form strong social ties with residents and potentially be corrupted by criminals.⁷⁷ It also provided a section of the Brazilian military the opportunity to get real-life combat and policing experiences.

The period in which the FPac occupied the Complexo do Alemão has to be seen as a great success in terms of the unprecedented cooperation between different security forces and the relative peace and tranquility which the military was able to guarantee for residents, at least for the time they remained in power. However, the FPac was an exceptional, short-term solution with high financial costs for all actors involved,

⁷⁷ In frequent visits to the Complexo do Alemão during that time, I could witness that the soldiers did not engage with the residents. With their whole-body uniform and heavy equipment, they seemed to be objects out of place, detached from the bustling reality of the communities. When I tried to talk to them, they were very polite and respectful but did not say more than *bom dia* [Good day]. On one occasion, I spotted a soldier taking a picture of a community event. This illustrates that for the soldiers their time in the Complexo do Alemão was a special experience and something to be worth remembering. Residents like Silvia* found the exchange of the brigades and the lack of trust between the community and the military rather tiring: 'Today they changed the troop in the [Complexo do] Alemão again. They left and a new troop arrived. Those that left were already more used to being there but now it will start all over again. They ask us to open our bags when we walk by and search the houses like ten times' (Interview with Silvia* 2011).

especially the military, and as such it can hardly be adopted as a standard policing model to counter organised crime in other neighbourhoods.

Figure 6.7 Military patrolling in the Complexo do Alemão



Source: Author's own illustration.

Figure 6.8 Military guarding the cable car station



Source: Author's own illustration.

UPP

The FPac in the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha was gradually replaced by the UPP in the last months of its mission. The first UPP outposts to be inaugurated were the ones in Adeus/Baiana (20th UPP of Rio de Janeiro) and Alemão (22nd) in the Complexo do Alemão in May 2012, followed by Serreno/Fé (22nd) and Chatuba (23rd) in the Complexo da Penha in June 2012 shortly before the FPac mission ended and the

soldiers left. The other UPP outposts were only inaugurated later: Nova Brasília (24th) and Fazendinha (25th) in the Complexo do Alemão in July 2012 and Parque Proletário (26th) and Vila Cruzeiro in the Complexo da Penha in August 2012.

It would be misleading to believe that, as a result of the pacification, the trafficking of drugs in the Complexo do Alemão has come to a standstill and that all criminals are either dead, arrested or have converted to a worker's life. Nevertheless, community life and power structures within the neighbourhood have drastically changed. The most significant change is that the CV has been considerably weakened. De Lima states that the activities of the FPac have forced the drug traffickers to employ a greater quantity of *olheiros*, improve their internal warning system, alter the location and time of the drug sales points (albeit only temporarily), decrease the quantity of drugs sold in the drug sales points so that the material can be hidden more easily, adopt a new attitude of 'sales in movement' with people carrying the drugs in their backpacks, and use small arms for the security of the 'moving' drug sales points (de Lima 2012). Colonel Ribeiro, commander of the Batalhão de Campanha, states that all criminals who were known to the police before the invasion were either dead or had been arrested. He admits that the drug trade continues, albeit on a much smaller level, mostly on weekends and without a fixed base (Interview with Ribeiro 2012).

Despite these positive developments, the pacification has also produced 'collateral damage', similar to what happened in Vidigal. For instance, although the occupation of the state security forces succeeded in weakening the CV (possibly only temporarily), it failed to fully claim the new vacuum of power for themselves. A consequence of this is that the drug trade is now in the hands of a younger generation, often minors, who face a lower risk of being sent to prison. If they are caught by the police, they are not automatically arrested and prosecuted because this would shed a bad light on the pacification force, according to Thiago*:

'If the military or police gets a minor, they'll let him go because they don't want to be tough on him. They don't want to show to society that the minors of the Complexo do Alemão are involved in the drug trade [...]. They would have to explain [how it is possible] that it is pacified but there're still adolescents in the drug trade' (Interview with Thiago* 2012).

Furthermore, the profit margins of the drug traffickers increased because they have to spend less money on firearms and ammunition – the presence of the state security forces renders the parading of heavy weapons unnecessary. Hence, the drug gang also has to employ fewer *armeiros* and *olheiros* (Interview with Thiago* 2012). The pacification has even empowered drug traffickers in the Complexo do Alemão to a certain extent because it had the effect of 'freezing' the power structure of the drug trade. As the territory is now officially pacified by the UPP, rival drug gangs will think

twice about launching an attack on the local drug gangs because they would have to face the drug traffickers and the UPP. An unintended effect of the pacification in the Complexo do Alemão was thus that the UPP helped to stabilise and consolidate the power of the CV (Field notes 4, 2011).⁷⁸

For many residents in the Complexo do Alemão, the UPP model also does not constitute a clear break-away from their sentiments regarding traditional policing. The mistrust in the police is deep and residents are wary about the commitment of the state in the long-term. Raul Santiago, resident of Complexo do Alemão and member of various youth movements criticises the pacification model and states:

'The UPPs are not in Rio de Janeiro as a public security policy. Instead they oppress the poor. A silenced favela is not a pacified favela' (Field notes 8, 2012).

Thiago* is trying hard to leave his criminal past behind and adapt to a worker's life but he finds it difficult to overcome the deep distrust of the police:

'Then the police take so-and-so and sell him. He's alive when they put him in the car and at dawn he is dead.⁷⁹ So when the state gets inside there and says that the community is free, is it free? What does it mean: it's free?' (Interview with Thiago* 2011).

He has immense doubts that the concept of the UPPs is the best solution for his community:

'If you throw a UPP into a community, you're not giving it security. You're just showing that you don't have the power to educate them [...]. So if a UPP comes up the hill, this is the desperation of the state. The state can't do it, they've lost a war' (Interview with Thiago* 2011).

An additional problem is that residents have difficulty differentiating between the UPP and the BPM because both use the same uniform. Theoretically, the UPP police are exclusively responsible for the day-to-day policing activities in the Complexo do Alemão and they wear the light blue *terceiro B* uniform. With the exception of the special military police units (BOPE, BPCHq and the Batalhão de Campanha), police officers of the normal military police battalions are not allowed to enter and patrol in the Complexo do Alemão. They usually wear a dark blue *mug* [military uniform gear]. However, on various

⁷⁸ However, this is a lesson that cannot easily be applied to all pacification experiences. The occupation of Rocinha by state security forces in November 2011, for instance, weakened the ADA and facilitated the return of the CV – although it is important to note that this happened before the official pacification by the UPPs. Other examples of favelas that have allegedly changed command despite the presence of the UPP are Chapéu Mangeira (the CV took power from the TCP at the end of 2010) and Morro do Adeus (the ADA took power from the TCP in August 2012) (Monken 2012, August 23). Nevertheless the general tendency is that invasions and drug wars decrease after the pacification.

⁷⁹ The police sometimes kidnap drug traffickers, either for ransom or, in the case of adolescents, to sell them to a rival drug trafficking factions where they are tortured for information and/or killed, according to corroborating evidence from Dowdney (2003: 88)

visits to the Complexo do Alemão, I could observe that both uniforms were being worn by the police, including those of the BPM who were prohibited from the area. Colonel Seabra confirms that no police officers from the traditional battalions are allowed to enter the district, with the exception of BOPE and BPCHq who sometimes work alongside the UPPs in the Complexo do Alemão. He laments the fact that some of his UPPs use the dark blue uniform of the BPM:

'[The police officer] doesn't like this uniform [of the UPP]. He thinks that this uniform is the uniform of a bureaucrat. "But I'm operational, I'm an elite squad!" The police supposedly like that [to wear the wrong uniform] because they are more feared by people" (Interview with Seabra 2012).

For the wider security scenario in Rio de Janeiro, it would be a real setback if the trust in the new UPPs in the Complexo do Alemão would erode that quickly. For all the reasons stated and all the investments made, it is crucial that the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha turn into a positive example of pacification. Otherwise the whole pacification model could become discredited in the eyes of the population. It will be first and foremost the refusal or support of the favela residents that will decide the fate of the pacification model, not only in the Complexo do Alemão but everywhere. Colonel Ribeiro of the military police acknowledges this:

'The great challenge for our state is that the population trusts and supports the service of the police because without the population the police can do a lot of things but with the support of the population we can do so much more' (Interview with Ribeiro 2012).

It is yet too early to evaluate if the pacification of the Complexo do Alemão can be seen as a success story or a failure. The coming years will show how genuine the commitment of the state truly is in bringing peace to the Complexo do Alemão. However, the latest news gives reason for great concern. Drug traffickers are returning to the community and engaging in frequent shootouts with the police, forcing the cable car to stop because of *balas perdidas*. A UPP policewoman is murdered by armed men in front of her office. Businesses and schools need to close following the death of a local drug trafficker and residents have gone back to respecting the code of silence (Bianchi 2013, May 23; Dias et al. 2012, November 30; EXAME 2011, 11 January). If this is a success story, it is a bitter one.

6.3.2 Santíssimo

Table 6.5 Survey results: Perception of security providers, Santíssimo

	Santíssimo									
	PMERJ			PCERJ	GM	Military	Private security companies	Militias	Drug traffickers	
	BPM	BOPE	UPP							
Most feared	13.3%								86.7%	
Most violent	2.2%								97.8%	
Biggest threat to security	8.5%							2.1%	89.4%	
Most trusted	66.7%			4.8%		26.2%			2.4%	
Who should provide security	34%	4.3%		2.1%		57.4%			2.1%	
Who is providing security	97.9%								2.1%	

Source: Author's own calculations.

The last case study to be discussed here is Santíssimo, a bedroom suburb far away in the Zona Oeste where interviewed residents were most affected by crime and violence, compared to all other neighbourhoods (see Section 6.4). It is a good example of a neighbourhood in which territory is violently contested by three rival security providers – drug traffickers from the TCP faction, militias and police. The on-going urban war between drug traffickers and police has produced high costs for the community in the form of civilian casualties, stray bullets, discrimination, extortion from criminal actors and other inconveniences like road blocks. When these costs became too high, the community ceased to accept the authority of the drug traffickers: only 2.1 per cent of respondents chose this group as their preferred security provider (see Table 6.5). The TCP drug traffickers were also facing increasing competition from militias. At first glance, the militias do not appear to play a big role in Santíssimo, at least not according to interviewed residents because they hardly mentioned them in their responses. However, this can be explained by the fact that interviewees did not make a clear distinction between the militias and the military police. Normal policing activities were quite rare in Santíssimo so the reason that the BPM nevertheless emerged as the most trusted group (66.7 per cent) was because they were also active as militias, helping residents to push out the detested traffickers (Interview with Beltrame 2012).

TCP drug traffickers

Despite having the official status of a *bairro*, Santíssimo has many small favelas which are controlled by drug traffickers belonging to the TCP and the lives of residents are deeply affected by drug-related violence, especially shootouts between rival gangs and the police. The TCP first emerged in the Complexo da Maré in 2002, as a dissident faction of the TC. Since then, the TCP has expanded its power, mainly in the Zona Oeste and Zona Norte. It is most prominent in the Senador Camará region (Zona Oeste), controlling the drug trade in the favelas Coréia, Rebu, Cavalo de Aço and Vila Aliança, among others (Disque Denúncia 2012c). Marcos José Sabino, called Matemático [Mathematician], assumed the leadership of the TCP in 2007 and became Rio de Janeiro's most wanted criminal (after ADA's Nem from Rocinha was arrested in November 2011) until his death in May 2012. According to the anonymous denunciation helpline Disque Denúncia, Matemático was very powerful and influential in the Senador Camará region:

‘His “army” has one of the largest arsenals of the city and is used to demonstrate his power and to control every meter of the communities’ (Disque Denúncia 2012d).

Besides the drug trade, Matemático also controlled alternative transport and the sales of gas and drinking water in the region and organised the robberies of cargo trucks. He offered his subordinates R\$ 20,000 in compensation for killing any police officer encroaching on his stronghold (Disque Denúncia 2012d). Matemático constantly attempted to expand his power to favelas under the control of other drug trafficking factions, especially the CV. In the Senador Camará/Bangu region, his attempts to take control of CV-controlled Vila Kennedy cost dozens of lives. In Maré (Zona Norte), he supported his potential successor Marcelo ‘Menor P’ Santos da Dores (see Section 5.2) in his battle to take over Nova Holanda and Parque União (Disque Denúncia 2012d).

Bruno* is a resident of Santíssimo and states that the majority of the TCP drug traffickers in his community are young people who have grown up there: ‘*a galera que quer levar uma vida fácil, pessoas que não querem trabalhar*’ [a ‘group of friends’ who want to live an easy life, people who don’t want to work] (Interview with Bruno* 2012). He stresses that the traffickers maintain a respectful relationship with the residents:

‘A cool resident is a quiet resident, *cada um no seu quadrado* [each one in his square]. Everyone knows everyone and it has always been like that. Also because the residents cover up and help when the police enters, right, but everything has a limit’ (Interview with Bruno* 2012).

Bruno* remembers that the drug traffickers used to celebrate Mother’s Day, Father’s Day and Children’s Day. They would steal the cargo of delivery trucks and make a ‘*banquete*’ [banquet] with beer and soft drinks. However, the affection and mutual

protection between traffickers and residents has weakened in the past ten years (Interview with Bruno* 2012). This could be because drug-related violence has increasingly become a burden for the community. Santíssimo is a big neighbourhood, rural and mostly flat, with a lot of streets and small-sized favelas and it is quite demanding for the traffickers to defend their territory. They use speed bumps, holes in the streets, rocks, spikes and steel from the nearby train tracks to protect the *bocas* and to impede rival factions and the police from entering (Interview with Bruno* 2012). According to Bruno*, it is rare to see 'normal policing' in Santíssimo but shootouts between the military police, especially BOPE, and the traffickers are common and the community is traumatised by *balas perdidas*:

'Everyone is worried about shootouts and stray bullets. As much as they're used to living in a place with the sound of gun-fire, they're very afraid of being shot, whether at home or playing football, of going without knowing if you'll come back or not' (Interview with Bruno* 2012).

Due to this violence, the support for the drug traffickers in Santíssimo was extremely low: 86.7 per cent of interviewed residents in Santíssimo feared drug traffickers more than any other group and they were also rated as the most violent group (97.8 per cent) and the biggest threat to security in Rio de Janeiro (89.4 per cent). This once again shows how the use of violence impacts on the way the security providers are perceived by the community. The interviewed residents felt that they were living in a situation of war ('We're in a declared war and nobody does anything', SANT51) and were terrified by the conflict going on around them ('In any moment I could become the victim of a *bala perdida*', SANT16; 'We can be shot at any moment', SANT27). Security for them meant 'to be without fear of a police invasion or a shootout' (SANT30), 'knowing that I will get back home alive' (SANT50) or 'simply [being able] to say I live in a favela and that there is no more drug trade' (SANT5).

Militias

Similar to the other drug trafficking factions, the TCP has also suffered from the expansion of the militias since 2005 (Disque Denúncia 2012c). The CPI report in 2008 stated that militias were active in Santíssimo and there were occasional news about violent conflicts between the TCP drug traffickers and militias belonging to the *Liga da Justiça* (ALERJ 2008: 223).

In December 2012, DRACO arrested eleven *milicianos* of the *Liga da Justiça* as part of the Pandora II operation. These militia members were accused of armed gang formation for the commission of heinous crimes, *agiotagem* [illegal money lending] and extortion. They were also accused of making money from security taxes, gambling,

illegal trade of fuels, and alternative transport. One of its most active leaders was a pastor of the Igreja Pentecostal Deus é a Luz [Pentecostal Church God is the Light] in Campo Grande who used the office of the church to handle the illegal money lending business (Disque Denúncia 2012a).

What is striking about the case of Santíssimo is that, upon first glance, there seem to be no militia activity in the neighbourhood – at least not according to interviewed residents because they never mentioned them in their responses. This is a good example of how raw data can be misleading if it is not matched with qualitative research. With the help of the CPI report, as well as newspapers articles and interviews, the presence of militias in the region could be easily confirmed. Beltrame explains the survey results by suggesting that interviewees' opinions on militias are hidden within the responses of the BPM because respondents did not make a clear distinction between the two groups:

‘In Santíssimo, they [the respondents] trust the police more because there is a strong performance of militias there, and the militia is formed of police officers. They come in with the discourse that they do not let the drug trade enter’ (Interview with Beltrame 2012).

Beltrame's explication is sound. Trust in the BPM was very strong (66.7 per cent stated they trusted the BPM more than any other group) despite the absence of 'normal' policing activities and 34 per cent of interviewees selected the BPM as their preferred security provider.

6.4 Crime and violence in the neighbourhoods

Based on the findings of these neighbourhood case studies, the chapter presents the following key claim: Territories with dominant security providers (Scenario I) usually have low levels of crime and violence because the group in power has a consolidated leadership position and goes to extremes to suppress competition or the entry of other security actors. In contrast, territories that are violently contested by two or more security providers (Scenario II) usually display high levels of crime and violence. This claim is supported by data collected as part of the survey: neighbourhoods with a dominant security provider (Novo Leblon, Tabuleiro* and Vidigal) had lower *perceived* levels of crime and violence than neighbourhoods in which territory was disputed by two or more security providers (Complexo do Alemão and Santíssimo). Interviewees were asked how often specific violent and criminal situations had occurred in their neighbourhoods in the past twelve months (see Table 6.6). With few exceptions⁸⁰,

⁸⁰ There were only two exceptions to this pattern: Firstly, respondents in Tabuleiro* frequently witnessed or heard about people carrying firearms in the streets and people charging money for security (the

interviewees in territories with a dominant security provider had a significantly lower perception of insecurity than respondents in violently contested territories. Drug-related violence, e.g. people consuming/selling drugs, police operations, invasion of a rival drug trafficking faction, shootouts and people carrying firearms in the streets, for instance, was witnessed or heard about in greater frequency by interviewees in the Complexo do Alemão and Santíssimo in the past twelve months than in the other neighbourhoods. The gap between the two groups was less striking for minor criminal offenses (e.g. people fighting physically or people robbing or stealing) and militia activity (people charging money for security).

Table 6.6 Survey results: Perceptions of crime and violence in the neighbourhoods

(percentages of 'frequently' and 'sometimes' responses)	Scenario I			Scenario II		Excl.	Average
	NL	TAB	VID	CDA	SANT		
People consuming illegal drugs in the streets	59,6	10,6	78,7	85,1	100,0	59,6	65,6
People carrying firearms in the streets (that are not police on duty)	0,0	64,3	40,4	50,0	100,0	8,9	43,8
People selling illegal drugs in the streets	17,0	0,0	57,4	63,8	100,0	19,1	42,9
Police operation	4,3	0,0	25,5	78,7	100,0	17,8	37,9
People fighting physically	14,9	6,4	25,5	48,9	46,8	44,7	31,2
Shootout between drug traffickers and police	0,0	0,0	8,5	74,5	97,9	4,3	30,9
Shootout between rival drug trafficking factions	0,0	0,0	6,4	51,1	100,0	6,4	25,9
People charging money for security (excl. registered security companies)	2,1	73,0	6,4	35,6	31,9	14,9	25,6
People robbing or stealing	19,1	2,2	8,5	35,6	34,0	46,8	24,4
Invasion of a rival drug trafficking faction	0,0	0,0	6,4	38,3	91,5	2,1	23,0

Source: Author's own calculations.

Note: Differences are significant at ***p<.001. Numbers that are above average are shaded in grey.

percentage for Tabuleiro* was higher than the average for all neighbourhoods). This can be explained by the presence of the militias in this area (see Section 6.3.2). Secondly, interviewees in Vidigal frequently witnessed or heard about drug sales and drugs consumption (the percentage for Vidigal was higher than the average for all neighbourhoods). A possible explanation for this is that the neighbourhood was still in a state of transition (see Section 6.2.3).

6.5 Chapter conclusion

The objective of this chapter was to shed light on the fine-grained dynamics of violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro by examining how the relative power and influence of security providers changed in particular neighbourhoods over time. The chapter analysed the relationship between the use of violence and the way the security providers are perceived by the local communities.

In order to show how these dynamics play out in reality, two scenarios were developed, each one with a different constellation of security providers. The first one described a territory controlled by a dominant security provider. In certain areas or zones, this dominant position could even take a monopolistic form of control. The chapter argued that crime and violence tended to be low in territories with a dominant security provider because other groups would see no realistic chance of contesting the leadership position of the group in power. The low prospects of success in replacing the dominant security provider lead to a situation of relative peace and stability in the neighbourhood, at least in the short term. It can also further reinforce the image of the dominant security provider as a 'benevolent protector' of the community in the eyes of the local residents.

Of all the neighbourhoods assessed in this research, the private security company in **Novo Leblon** was the community coming closest to this ideal of a security provider exercising a monopolistic-type of control in a specific area. This occurred within the wider oligopoly of security providers at the city level. Novo Leblon, an upper-class gated community far away in the west zone of Rio de Janeiro, was protected by a private security company paid for by the residents in a classic free market relationship of service providers and clients. This company dealt with all internal conflicts in a largely self-governing manner and without applying direct violence, at least never against its own clientele, the residents. Although not all residents were fully satisfied with the security services (and many chose the military as the preferred security provider), the authority of the private security company was rarely questioned. Novo Leblon's residents had clearly made their peace with the security arrangements and there was no articulated demand for effective and reliable public security despite suitable communication canals being available (e.g. the Security Community Council in Barra).

Also a territory with a dominant security provider but with a totally different set-up than Novo Leblon, **Tabuleiro*** was the second case study to be discussed. The community was controlled by militias who forced their security services on residents, whether they wanted it or not ('the offer one cannot refuse'). These security services included protection from neighbourhood crime and violence, especially drug-related violence, the enforcement of social norms, strict punishment of deviant social behavior,

and, finally, the protection from the militias themselves. Besides paying security taxes, residents had to pay other fees, e.g. for internet, cooking gas and when buying or selling property in the community. The threat of violence was always looming over the heads of residents. Yet the militias had enforced their own (un)rule of law already to such an extent that the display of weapons and the use of violence was rarely needed because residents obliged anyway. The militias enjoyed some degree of trust among the interviewed residents because they suppressed neighbourhood crime, violence and deviant social behaviour with considerable success. However, in the eyes of the respondents the results clearly did not justify the means (violence, coercion, extortion, neglect of civil liberties) because the militias were seen as the biggest threat to security in Rio de Janeiro (on a par with the drug traffickers).

Vidigal served as the case study for a territory where power relations changed after the former dominant security provider was ousted by a new security provider (with weak leadership capabilities and lacking trust in the eyes of the local population). This led to a reconfiguration of the relative power and influence of each actor in the local violent pluralism network. At the time the survey was conducted (May – June 2012), a few months had passed since the pacification forces had ousted the ADA drug traffickers. Support for the drug traffickers was still extremely high because residents remembered the reign of the ADA as a time of relative peace and tranquility. With the arrival of the pacification forces, however, the fragile balance of power in the community was disrupted and the ADA was severely weakened. From the very beginning, residents were doubtful about the UPP's capability of assuming the new social leadership role in the community and when these doubts were substantiated after a few months, discontent and apathy spread. In the case of neighbouring community Rocinha, the decline of the ADA facilitated the return of the CV, the former archrival of the ADA, and initiated a new cycle of violence which continues up to this date (March 2014).

The second scenario described a territory which is violently contested by two or more security providers. Within this constellation, each actor has to prove its capacity to use violence effectively and this brings high costs for the local population in terms of death, pain, discrimination and other inconveniences. In violently contested territories, the use of violence can consolidate the authority of a specific security provider but it can also threaten it if specific limits are crossed. Violence therefore becomes rather unpredictable in certain spaces for a certain group of people. Whenever security providers overstretch the use of violence, they have to go to extra lengths to justify the burden they are causing on the local population, either by co-optation or oppression, or more commonly, by a combination of both. In some cases, when the costs of the violent endeavours of the security provider become too high for the community, and the security provider does not have sufficient social leadership skills to make up for these losses, residents are


likely to withdraw their support and cease to accept the authority of the security provider. Residents' withdrawal of support can be silent and difficult to see from the outside. But it can nevertheless indicate that a security provider has lost the trust of the community – the most valuable asset to guarantee its long-term survival – and this can accelerate its decline in a given territory.

The **Complexo do Alemão** was the first case study to be discussed within this scenario. It was argued that once we could understand the dynamics of cooperation and conflict between different security providers in the Complexo do Alemão, we would thus have arrived at the heart of the oligopolistic structure of Rio de Janeiro's security network because a given constellation of security providers can hardly get any more complex than here. The Complexo do Alemão was formerly the stronghold of the CV and had one of the highest violent crime rates and lowest HDI in the city. From the 1990s onwards, the agglomeration of favelas metamorphosed into a fortress of and for drug traffickers. State services only functioned at a minimum level. Over the course of the years, many different security providers passed through the Complexo do Alemão, emerging and losing power in an uninterrupted process of territorialisation and reterritorialisation. Besides drug traffickers from the CV (and from the TC and ADA during certain periods of time and in specific areas), the BPM, BOPE and BPCHq, the military, the FNSP and, most recently, the UPPs have been the Complexo do Alemão's most predominant security providers. At the time that the military was in power from November 2010 to approximately June 2012, the community went through a period of relative peace and tranquility. However, the deployment of the military in the Complexo do Alemão was an exceptional and rather expensive, short-term solution to countering organised crime in the community. The power was handed over to the pacification police in June 2012 and the UPPs are now officially in charge of the territory. However, their leadership position is far from being consolidated. The UPPs' claim to territory is challenged by criminal actors and their authority is even called into question by law-abiding citizens who continue respecting the traffickers' code of silence as their only guarantee for survival.

Santíssimo was the second case study discussed within the scenario of a territory which is violently contested. Here, the conflict was between drug traffickers from the TCP faction, militias and the police (respective militias/police). Similar to what was observed in the Complexo do Alemão, the on-going urban war between drug traffickers and police had produced such high costs for the community that they ceased to accept the leadership and authority of the drug traffickers. Instead, interviewed residents were highly loyal towards the BPM, despite the fact that no normal policing activities were carried out in this area, especially not in the favelas. It was suggested that interviewees had probably confused the BPM with the militias because these groups were hard to

differentiate from each other. The high support for the military police among respondents could therefore be seen as support for the militias who entered Santíssimo with the discourse of helping residents to push out the detested traffickers.

After having examined the fine-grained dynamics of violent pluralism in six neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro in this chapter, we have come much closer to answering the question of why there is an inequality of security in the studied neighbourhoods. Many questions still persist, and new questions have emerged, but for now it can be concluded that insecurity and violence on the city level in Rio de Janeiro are primarily fuelled by the struggle for territorial control between conflicting security providers within the oligopolistic structure of Rio de Janeiro's violent pluralism network. As long as residents live in neighbourhoods with varying constellations / arrangements of security providers, the right to security cannot become a universally provided human right. The following and final chapter of this thesis (Chapter 7) will synthesise the empirical findings and discuss the theoretical and policy implications of this research.



Complexo da Penha, Rio de Janeiro

7 THESIS CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

Security is crucial for the preservation of human life and is of tremendous value for our societies. However, not all people can enjoy security to the same extent. In Latin America, the right to security is compromised by elevated rates of crime and violence, insecurity, corruption, clientelism, human rights abuses and weak institution-building. Poverty, inequality, racism and the wide availability of firearms are further aggravating factors. The state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force remains unconsolidated and a wide variety of non-state armed groups are competing with state security forces for the control of territory and for the hearts and minds of local communities (Booth 2007; Jones and Rodgers 2009; Koonings and Kruijt 2004; Perlman 2010; Uildriks 2009; United Nations General Assembly 1948; Whitehead 2002).

This study set out to explore the logic of security provision in six neighbourhoods in the city of Rio de Janeiro and to assess its implications for citizens' right to security. The first objective of this research was to explore what security means for research participants in the city of Rio de Janeiro and to enhance the conceptual study on security by giving voice to those who suffer directly under insecurity (this was covered by sub-question Q1a). The second objective of this research was to deepen the study on violent pluralism by examining the *modi operandi*, protective capacities and interests of different security providers, principally police, municipal guards, military, private security companies, militias and drug trafficking factions and by conducting a locally-grounded analysis of security, violence and territory in six neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro (Q1b). The third objective of this research was to broaden and enrich the study of inequality by assessing security as a driver of inequality (Q1c).

The first section of this chapter (Section 7.2) will synthesise the empirical findings of this research in order to answer the study's main research question and sub-questions. Subsequently, the limitations of this research will be briefly reviewed, particularly with respect to the conceptualisation and practicability of the two terms security provider and oligopoly, the selection of security providers, the non-probability survey sampling method and personal security constraints (Section 7.3). The next sections will explore the theoretical implications of this study, including lessons that could be learned for other places (Section 7.4), and offer some recommendations for future research

(Section 7.5). Finally, it is crucial to examine the policy implications of this study, principally with respect to the main concepts discussed in this thesis – oligopoly of security providers, inequality of security and the human rights perspective (Section 7.6).

7.2 Empirical findings

A summary of the main empirical findings was given at the end of the respective chapters. Here, I will therefore limit myself to synthesising the empirical findings in order to answer the study's main research question and sub-questions.

Q1 What is the logic of security provision in the six neighbourhoods studied in Rio de Janeiro, and how does it affect a citizen's right to security?

Q1a What does 'security' mean to residents in Rio de Janeiro?

The objective of this research question was to explore how interviewees in Rio de Janeiro defined security and which types of security mattered most in their daily lives. This knowledge was valuable for enhancing the conceptual study on security because it gave voice to people who suffered directly under insecurity and allowed them to define what they mean by *segurança* themselves.

Personal (physical) and political security

The literature review in the beginning of this thesis showed that security is a contested and politicised concept which escapes easy definition. Despite the attempts of scholars and international development agencies to find a universal definition of security (e.g. national / international security, public security, human security), it is often still unclear what security means, what it does and how it is valued by people. That is why in this research it was decided to let research participants in Rio de Janeiro speak for themselves because they know best what role security plays in their daily lives and how insecurity affects their wellbeing. By adopting this approach, the study gave justice to Whitehead's (2002) appeal to painstakingly and critically evaluate citizens' views and perceptions of security.

The empirical research on the meaning of security in the city of Rio de Janeiro found that the term *segurança* was principally understood as personal (physical) security, i.e. being protected from crime and violence, principally robberies, assaults, physical

aggressions, homicides and sexual abuse. To a lesser extent, the term security was also understood as political security in the sense of being protected from human rights abuses by the state. The research participants also thought that security meant being protected by an 'other' – be it the police, a private security company or a criminal actor because providing one's own security was not seen as a sufficient safeguard against the dangers arising from crime and violence. Most interviewees did not associate the term *segurança* with any other types of security, such as health security, financial security, environmental security, food security or security in the area of information technology. It was argued that this rather narrow definition of the security concept had to be understood in the broader context of high violent crime rates and a politically charged debate in the area of public security. Furthermore, a series of public security crises in Rio de Janeiro in the past twenty years had become deeply ingrained in the social memory of *cariocas* and altered their perceptions of insecurity. The fear of crime is now dictating everyday social relations. Although personal (physical) and political security were most predominant, this should not lead readers to believe that other types of security are of lesser importance for the wellbeing of the people in Rio de Janeiro. Much to the contrary, the lack of debate on other types of security should serve as a motivation for future academic efforts in this direction.

Freedom of movement

Within the security categories mentioned above, a recurrent theme was the right to freedom of movement (*o direito de ir e vir*). This right is anchored in the UDHR: 'Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state' (UN General Assembly 1948: Art. 13(1)). Both qualitative and quantitative research on that matter revealed that participants often associated security with having the freedom to enter and leave their communities whenever they wanted to and to be able to circulate freely in the city. Research participants from the favelas lamented that they were drawn into the urban war between different drug trafficking factions and therefore could not visit communities under the control of rival drug traffickers – not even to see relatives or friends. For several decades, young people avoided making friends or engaging in romantic relationships with youth from rival communities. The same problem occurred for those living in militia-controlled neighbourhoods. Due to the anti-drug trafficker propaganda of the militias, residents were too scared to visit favelas under the control of drug traffickers, and vice versa. Regardless of the type of community, all residents feared becoming caught in crossfire between criminals and the police and occasionally had to obey the *toque de recolher* [curfew].

Q1b What is the logic of security provision in the six neighbourhoods studied in Rio de Janeiro, and what role do violence, territory and community support play in shaping the relative power and influence of each security provider in the network?

This thesis sought to deepen the study on violent pluralism by exploring the logic of security provision in the six neighbourhoods studied in Rio de Janeiro and assessing the relationship between different state and non-state security providers, thus showing how multiple violent actors interact within a political system.

Plurality of security providers

The city of Rio de Janeiro fits the description of a place which is ‘violently plural’ due to the fact that there are several security providers who use violence for their economic and political ends. First of all, it should be noted that the state security forces alone are already quite pluralistic. The police in Rio de Janeiro are subdivided into federal, military and civil police. Within each of these police forces, traditional police battalions and police stations exist alongside a plurality of specialised operations units, such as BOPE and UPP (PMERJ) or CORE (PCERJ). In addition, the work of the police in Rio de Janeiro is complemented by the municipal guards. Rio de Janeiro’s state governor can also request the assistance of the FNSP or the military in exceptional circumstances.

The analysis of the public security providers showed that there was often no clear separation of duties between federal, state, and municipal security providers, both in terms of their official public security mandate and their practices. This dilemma could be easily observed when comparing the military police with the military. On the one hand, the police carry out their policing activities in a very militaristic style. On the other hand, the military are mandated with a policing function by virtue of Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution. Furthermore, residents’ trust in the police was severely compromised due to police violence, corruption, impunity, human rights abuses, the underprovisioning of security, the diversion of firearms into the illicit market, the intimidation of witnesses and the cover-up of extrajudicial crimes.

The consequence of this is that large segments of society felt abandoned, neglected or even abused by the state’s public security entities and resorted to extra or alternative, private forms of security. The private security sector in Rio de Janeiro was also quite pluralistic. Rio de Janeiro has three main drug trafficking factions (CV, TCP, ADA) and a significant number of militias and death squads. Even the private security companies are a group embodying quite distinct characteristics. A differentiation needs to be made at

least between legally operating and clandestine companies. It was stressed that even though death squads, militias and drug traffickers operated outside the law, purchased and sold firearms in the illicit market, spread fear and terror among citizens and used violence as a means accumulating power, they did not operate in the absence of state security forces. None of these groups would prefer a complete absence of the state because it would be costly for them to continue business in a state of anarchy and chaos. Instead, they benefit from the state's underprovisioning of security and justice in certain geographical areas.

Oligopoly of security providers

This research argued that, on a city level, violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro took the form of an oligopoly because the security providers were connected through a series of relationships that could range from cooperation to conflict and needed to consider the actions and reactions of the other groups when taking strategic decisions. The oligopoly concept originally stems from economic theory yet in this research it was applied to the field of political science, similar to the approaches adopted by Basedau, Lambach, Mehler, Smith-Hoehn, Ngunyi and Katumanga (Basedau et al. 2007; Lambach 2007; Mehler 2003, 2004, 2009; Mehler et al. 2010; Ngunyi and Katumanga 2012). It was noted that although an oligopoly of security providers prevailed at the city level in Rio de Janeiro, this could also entail that specific security providers exerted monopolistic forms of control on the neighbourhood level. The private security company in the gated community Novo Leblon, for instance, was such an example because no other public or private security provider operated within the parameters of the compound.

Six factors were used to examine the relative power and influence of each security provider in the network, namely personnel, territorial penetration, institutional and political penetration, violent and financial resources, and community perception. From this analysis it emerged that Rio de Janeiro's military police were the most powerful and influential security provider in the oligopoly, followed by the military, private security companies and drug traffickers. The remaining security providers – civil police, militias and municipal guards – were less powerful and influential but still played an important role in the dynamics of violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro.

It was noted that the relative power and influence is not only determined by the dynamics of cooperation and conflict of security providers within the oligopoly but also by their relationships with other actors inside and outside the neighbourhoods. Rio de Janeiro's security providers do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, they are embedded in a larger network of groups and institutions, such as business owners, politicians, judges, prosecutors, resident associations, churches, civil society organisations, state

secretaries of education, health and housing, and building companies, each with their own political, economic, social or religious interests. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, it was not possible to discuss all of these additional factors which can influence the dynamics of the oligopolistic structure of Rio de Janeiro's security network. However, future research should explore these additional factors, especially the interface between security providers, business owners and politicians.

Violence, territory and community support

The security providers in Rio de Janeiro were willing to engage in violence if the perceived political and/or economic benefits were great enough. More than anything, it was the struggle for territorial control between conflicting security providers that fuelled insecurity and violence in the neighbourhoods of Rio de Janeiro. This research showed that crime and violence tended to be low in territories with strong and relatively undisputed security providers, and high in territories that were violently contested by two or more groups. Whenever necessary, the security providers had to prove their capacity to use violence effectively and this brought high costs for the local population in terms of death, injuries, pain, discrimination and other inconveniences.

In violently contested territories, the use of violence could consolidate the authority of a specific security provider but it could also threaten it if specific limits were crossed. Despite its appearance as chaotic, violence was therefore an instrument that was negotiated and managed quite carefully. If the use of violence was overstretched, security providers had to go to extra lengths to justify the burden they were causing for the local population, either by co-optation or oppression, or more commonly, by a combination of both. In some cases, when the costs of the violent endeavours of the security provider became too high for the community, and the security provider lacked the social leadership skills to make up for these losses, residents were likely to withdraw their support and cease to accept the authority of the security provider. Notably, this did not mean that residents' dissatisfaction with a given security provider would take the form of open resistance or active protest. Yet even residents' silent withdrawal of support could indicate that a given security provider had lost the trust of the community – its most valuable asset – and this could accelerate its decline in a given territory.

One of the most important features of violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro was therefore the close relationship between the use of violence and the way security providers were perceived by the local communities. In Vidigal, for instance, the drug traffickers fulfilled a social leadership role and enjoyed greater leverage in protecting the community than the UPPs who had only recently began to work in this area. In the survey, 59.4 per cent of interviewed residents in Vidigal trusted the drug traffickers most

and 51.5 per cent wanted the drug traffickers to provide the security in their neighbourhood. In contrast, none of the interviewed residents trusted the UPP most and only 3 per cent were willing to entrust them with the provision of security.

The research findings showed that the police were often not regarded as legitimate security providers in the communities. This could be because they have greatly overstepped the boundary of what could be considered 'legal' due to human rights violations, disrespect of the rule of law and a disproportionate use of force in dealing with the local residents in the past and presently. Even in cases where the police were acting in full compliance with the law and striving to realise their public security mandate, residents questioned their authority. As the example of Vidigal showed, some residents felt greater loyalty and trust towards armed criminal groups, who were part of the social fabric of the community and had built relationships of trust with the residents, than towards the public entities who were legally entrusted with the provision of security.

Besides private security, the prevalence of private justice is a further indication of residents' lack of trust in the protective capacity of the state security forces. In the favelas, neighbourhood conflicts were often 'solved' by drug traffickers, militias or death squads, rather than by the police or the state's criminal justice system. Drug traffickers, for instance, was the 'body' holding criminal courts (*tribunal do crime*) and sentencing residents in mock trials. Even in gated communities, disputes were often settled by the administration and/or the private security company rather than by the police.

As has been explained in the introduction, Weber understood the state as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory' (Weber 1946: 78, italics in original). The empirical findings showed that the state's use of force is often not regarded as legitimate by citizens in Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, there are private (illegal) security actors which enjoy greater leverage and authority than the state. This has severe implications for the democratic state and rule of law in Brazil as the following section will show.

Q1c What are the implications of the security network in Rio de Janeiro for a citizen's right to security?

The objective of this question was to enhance the study of inequality by shifting the focus away from income inequality towards another driver of inequality, namely security (or the lack of it). With time, I hope that security will be given as much attention in the scholarly debate as income inequality.

Inequality of security

This study aimed to measure security perceptions in the six profiled neighbourhoods with the help of a survey. The survey questionnaire included questions on the meaning of security, social cohesion, crime talk and victimisation, day and night-time perceptions of safety, satisfaction with security and personal experiences with crime and violence. The empirical data provided strong evidence for the inequality of security because interviewees' responses differed markedly. To give just one example out of many, interviewees were asked how satisfied they were with the security they had. Out of all survey respondents, 40.8 per cent were either very satisfied or satisfied with their security, the rest was little satisfied or not satisfied at all. This appears to be reasonably high, taking into consideration the level of violent crime in the city and the fact that many respondents stated that they had witnessed violence or personally knew someone who had become the victim of a violent crime. However, there were quite significant differences between, for instance, older (50.5 per cent) and younger people (34 per cent), or between the different neighbourhoods – whereas roughly 64 per cent of interviewed residents in both Novo Leblon and Vidigal were either very satisfied or satisfied with their security, in Santíssimo this percentage fell to 7.3 per cent.

In fact, drawing on other authoritative studies in the field (Beato Filho 2003; Borges 2011; Musumeci et al. 2011; Rodrigues 2006; Zaluar 2008; Zaluar and Conceição 2007), in this research it was hypothesised that interviewees' place of domicile would play a crucial factor in their perception of security. Therefore great care was taken when selecting the neighbourhoods. In essence, two main criteria guided the selection process, namely the presence/constellation of security providers in the community and the geographical location of the neighbourhood. The survey results showed that people's place of domicile was indeed the best variable to explain differences in security perceptions. Throughout all survey questions, variation between the neighbourhoods was highly significant (at a *** $p<.001$ level, as measured by Cramer's V). The variation between neighbourhoods was much bigger than the variation observed in the socio-demographic categories, i.e. gender, age, religion, colour/race, social class, education and income. To give a brief example, respondents were asked whether they had talked with anyone about crime and violence in the past two weeks. The prevalence of this was very high in Santíssimo (100 per cent) and in Vidigal (89.4 per cent) and still quite elevated in the Complexo do Alemão (74.5 per cent), Novo Leblon (70.2 per cent), Tabuleiro* (66 per cent) and Botafogo (65.2 per cent). The variation between the neighbourhoods was statistically significant at the highest level (*** $p<.001$). In contrast, the variation between men (81.4 per cent) and women (73.5 per cent), younger (77.2 per cent) and older research participants (78.2 per cent), or between white (77.3 per cent) and nonwhite interviewees (78.1 per cent) was not statistically significant.

Regardless of which neighbourhood, the overall exposure to violent crime was extremely high among all interviewees in Rio de Janeiro.

Implications for the legitimacy of the Brazilian state

The thesis acknowledged that a certain inequality in the provision of security is an inherent feature of almost all, if not all, states and that residents' perceptions of security will always be unequal, even if a state's provision of security was fully impartial and egalitarian. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that on a continuum of inequality of security, Rio de Janeiro would be ranked at the high end. This has severe implications for the legitimacy of Brazilian institutions because it shows in very violent and life-threatening ways that the state is falling short of promoting and protecting basic human rights. Brazil has ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights treaties, all of which obligate the Brazilian state to promote and protect human rights, including the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, the right to be treated equally before the law, the right to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, the right to be free from arbitrary interference with one's privacy, family, home or correspondence and attacks upon his honour and reputation, the right to freedom of movement, and the right of equal access to public service, among others.

However, if Brazilian security and justice institutions allow conditions in which citizens' right to freedom of movement is severely restricted, in which law-abiding residents are regularly abused, discriminated and tortured by state security forces, in which justice only exists for the rich and powerful, and in which normal residents trust private (illegal) security actors more than the police, it has fallen short of its obligations to promote and protect the rights laid down in international human rights instruments. A state should not market its community-oriented UPP police all over the world and then allow the same 'pacifying police force' to drive through Vidigal favela with machine guns resting on the window frames. A state should not convincingly celebrate its nationhood and unity through international sport mega-events and at the same time apply one set of rules to the rich and to the white and another set of rules to the *favelados*.

There can be no winner in this endless conflict between *o estado* [the state] and *o povo* [the people], between the police and the criminals, between the elite and the favelas, between black and white, rich and poor, old and young. Large segments of Rio de Janeiro's population feel abandoned by the state in security matters and have aligned themselves with other groups who they deem more capable of protecting them. The better-off have retreated to 'fortified enclaves' and are obliged to pay costly

amounts for the services of private security companies. The poor need to live side by side with drug traffickers, militias or death squads and are coerced into respecting their code of silence in return for minimal protection. The state itself loses its legitimacy and with it the right to call itself a modern, democratic polity.

The consequences of this rather high degree of inequality of security and the state's eroded legitimacy are bitter for society as a whole. Fear and mistrust begin to govern everyday social relations, threatening to bring the delicate, social fabric to collapse. In the worst case, the inequality of security could fuel further resentment and conflict, pushing societies into a spiral of violence.

7.3 Limitations of research

The first limitation of this thesis is the conceptualisation and practicability of the two terms oligopoly and security provider. It was acknowledged from the outset of this thesis that the market analogy of the oligopoly concept has certain limitations when it comes to the field of security and violence, principally for three reasons: the rational-choice logic of the 'homo oeconomicus' does not give a complete picture for the motivation of the security providers; open competition in the 'security market' is not beneficial for consumers because it may lead to more violence; and people often have no freedom of choice in picking a security provider (see Section 1.2.4). The general term 'security provider' also has its shortcomings, principally because in practice state and non-state actors differ in substantial ways. One of the key differences between them is their accountability. Whereas public security providers are part of a chain of command that reaches from the policeman in the streets all the way to the presidency of the republic, private security providers are only accountable to themselves and (sometimes) to the people they set out to protect. Another key difference is their 'customer'. The customer of the public security providers is primarily the state and only secondarily the citizen. The customers of the private security companies are business corporations and the administrative offices of gated communities. The customers of the militias are residents and business owners in low-income neighbourhoods who suffer from the extortion ('the offer one cannot refuse'), and the customers of drug traffickers, in its true sense, are people wanting to buy marihuana, crack and cocaine (as has been stated before, the provision of security is only a side effect of the drug sales business).

In light of these limitations, what can the concepts of oligopoly and security provider add to the analysis? Firstly, analysing both public and private security providers in Rio de Janeiro with the same set of criteria was useful because regardless of their respective histories and chains of command, all of these actors were perceived as

protectors by certain groups of the population. One of the main objectives of this research was to let residents in Rio de Janeiro speak for themselves in order to get to the heart of how security is being interpreted, valued and practised by interviewees in these spaces. By not making any *a priori* assumptions about the way the respective security providers were perceived by the local communities, it was possible to get a snapshot in time of the relative power and influence of each actor. Secondly, it is important to remember that, in theory, oligopolies are imperfect markets. Therefore, even in capitalist markets, oligopolies are known to 'reduce the choice and the logic of the market' (Mehler et al. 2010). In the analysis of the complex dynamics of influence and power in Rio de Janeiro's security network, it was useful to be able to resort to the two main characteristics of an oligopoly – interdependence and strategic decision making – as this enabled us to shed light on the relationship and interdependence of different actors.

The second limitation of this research is the selection of security providers because only a limited number of actors and constellations could be included in this research project. The selection process was a rather demanding task due to the high number of security providers identified in the initial field research – military (air force, army, navy), FNSP, federal police, military police, civil police, fire brigades, municipal guards, legal private security companies, clandestine private security companies, militias, death squads and drug traffickers. It would have gone beyond the scope of this thesis to include all of them in the analysis, especially because time for the field research was limited (12 months) and some groups did not operate in Rio de Janeiro on a permanent basis. That is why the FNSP, federal police and fire brigades were excluded from the study. Principally the FNSP would have constituted another very insightful case study because little research has been conducted on this group so far. However, it was impossible to forecast at what time, in which neighbourhood, and under which circumstances the FNSP would be deployed in Rio de Janeiro. While I conducted field research in Rio de Janeiro, the FNSP was solely deployed in the pacification of the favela Santo Amaro between May and November 2012. By the time this was publicly announced, it was too late to include Santo Amaro as a case study in this research. The timing of the FNSP deployment in Santo Amaro was unfortunate but, on the other hand, I was lucky to be able to conduct field research while the military was in power in the Complexo do Alemão. My time in Rio de Janeiro covered the last months of the military occupation and the first months of the UPP pacification. I was thus fortunate to be in the right place and at the right time to witness the deployment of Brazil's military force in a domestic, urban conflict and this is something that few researchers can claim for themselves.

A further limitation of this study was the use of a non-probability sampling method in the survey. This means that the sample was drawn from a part of the population in each neighbourhood which was available and convenient for the field researchers ('convenience sampling'). This sampling method had to be chosen partly due to financial constraints and partly due to the sensitivity of the research questions. Nevertheless, we succeeded in our goal of applying the survey questionnaire to a total of 309 residents from the six different neighbourhoods and 282 of them (47 from each community) were included in the final analysis. However, scientifically speaking, the sample was not representative of the entire population of Rio de Janeiro. It was therefore not possible to make statistical generalisations about the population of Rio de Janeiro as a whole. Instead the thesis focused only on the statistical significance of the results for the 282 people who were interviewed.

A final limitation of this study resulted from personal security constraints which impeded me, in some instances, from conducting in-depth research on certain criminal actors. One of the aims of the field research was to speak to each security provider personally and not rely on data produced by others. Whilst succeeding with this rather easily in the case of the police, municipal guards and private security companies, it was slightly more challenging to enter the circle of military generals and drug traffickers. However, in the case of the militias, it was impossible. Despite several attempts, I did not manage to personally interview a *militiciano*, at least not in conditions which I deemed safe. With the help of residents in the Complexo do Alemão (participants of my study), I had made tentative contacts with militias operating on the periphery of the Complexo do Alemão but a meeting never came to fruition. I also met an 'ex-*militiciano*' who was being 'rehabilitated' by the NGO AfroReggae but after initially agreeing to an interview, he never answered my phone calls again. Another way into the world of the militias would have been to ask my research assistant in Tabuleiro* to introduce me to some of the gunmen in his community. However, the task of interviewing 50 people was already difficult enough and I did not want to put my research assistant into any extra danger. Half-way through my field research, there was another incident which reminded me of the extreme sensitivity of studying militias. I had submitted a short article about 'O que são milícias?' [What are militias?] to the editors of the Para Entender Direito blog by the Folha de São Paulo where I had published short pieces before. The immediate response was that the article could not be published in that form because it had some 'factual inaccuracies'. After re-submitting it as a mere synthesis of government publications and well-respected academic research, the editor told me that 'trying to force the text again with the newspaper staff [of the Folha de São Paulo] runs the risk of it being "the last time". I do not want to have to consider your participation in the newspaper'. All of these incidents showed me that it would be wise not to push any

further and that I should continue prioritising personal security concerns over anything else.

7.4 Theoretical implications

7.4.1 Absent state or complicit state?

The general theoretical literature on inequality, security, violence and territory in Latin America is divided about several vital questions, specifically concerning the role and capacity of the state in containing crime, violence and conflict in the region. The democratisation school of thought believes that the high rates of crime and violence in Latin America have to be seen in the broader context of democratisation and neoliberalism. O'Donnell (1993), for instance, argues that the democratisation process in Latin America is still incomplete because the state lacks territorial and functional presence in some areas of the country ('brown areas') and is unable to enforce its own legality in these spaces ('low-intensity citizenship'). Landmann (2010) argues that the return to democracy in Latin America has not fulfilled its promises, whether laid down in national constitutions or international human rights agreements. Some democratisation scholars believe that the increasing inability of the state since the beginning of democracy has been aggravated by the new economic model of neoliberalism embraced by many Latin American democracies in the 1980s and 1990s as a response to the debt crises. The fundamental notion of neoliberalism was the trust in free market forces over government regulations and many countries adopted structural adjustment programmes to downsize the functions of the state.

In the last decade, a second body of literature has emerged that rejects O'Donnell's reasoning of the 'absent state' and suggests that there are other factors besides the broader categories of democratisation and neoliberalism which may help to explain the high rates of crime and violence and the privatisation of security in Latin America. In light of the historicity and persistence of violence in Latin America, Arias and Goldstein (2010) have labeled the region's democracies as 'violently plural' because both state and non-state actors use violence for their political and economic ends. The authors argue that violence is not new to the region and that it should be treated as an integral element of the political system crucial to the foundations of the Latin American polity. The violent pluralism concept resonates well with other studies which have been conducted on violence entrepreneurs, private security, oligopolies of violence, fortified enclaves, privatised justice and markets of violence in and beyond Latin America (Arias

2006; Caldeira 2000; Engel and Mehler 2005; Goldstein 2004; Mehler 2003, 2004, 2009; Sonneveld 2009).

In this study, Arias and Goldstein's violent pluralism concept was used as the main analytical framework. This was helpful because it provided the opportunity to explore the logic of security provision in the six neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro and to examine how different state and non-state actors interact within a political system. However, at the same time this research acknowledges that a significant proportion of the public insecurity problem in Rio de Janeiro is aggravated by democratisation and neoliberalism. As has been stated in earlier sections, democracy in Brazil coincided with an influx of drugs, the proliferation of armed actors, new kinds of violence, heightened levels of fear of crime, mass unemployment, inequality, poverty, the disintegration of the social fabric, corruption and impunity (Holston 2008b). The decentralisation of the public security sector after the end of the military dictatorship has resulted in a proliferation of security actors on the state and municipal level. Police reforms failed to improve the performance and accountability of the existing state security forces and instead created new entities and subunits which made the security network gradually more 'pluralistic'. Similarly, although the neoliberal reforms in the 1990s achieved price stability with the introduction of the Real Plan and a huge inflow of foreign direct investment, they did not resolve the country's social problems, especially poverty, income inequality, low human development and urban violence (Amann and Baer 2002).

Garzón (2012) shares a similar opinion and gently reminds us that the two perspectives discussed above – democratisation/neoliberalism and violent pluralism (or in the words of Garzón the 'absent state' and the 'complicit state') – are not necessarily incompatible. The author states:

'In the same city or country, it is possible to find areas where the state is absent and also areas where the institutional presence has been reconfigured in ways that facilitate criminal activities. In the scenario of the absent state, organized crime arises to fill a vacuum of power and succeeds in creating a parallel state; the relationship with communities is authoritarian and based on subordination. In the scenario of the complicit (or agent) state, the relationship between the community and criminal structures is more complex, with the intermediation of community leadership and the existence of institutions that continue to operate but at the service of illegal activities' (Garzón Vergara 2012: 5).

Without doubt, both schools of thought have their merits and both can be useful to explain the persistence of violence in Latin America. Given that violent pluralism is a rather recent concept, it will be interesting to see what future research in this direction will reveal.

7.4.2 Oligopoly as an organised form of violent pluralism

It should be noted that the oligopoly of security providers in Rio de Janeiro constitutes a rather organised form of violent pluralism. This is due to the following reasons. Firstly, violent pluralism in Rio de Janeiro does not consist of an infinite number of security providers that could easily lead to a situation of anarchy and chaos. Lambach (2007) described this structure as polypolies of violence or the 'war of all against all'. Instead, the number of participating groups in Rio de Janeiro's security network is measurable. It includes, broadly speaking, the military, the FNSP, the federal police, the military police, the civil police, the municipal guards, private security companies, militias, death squads and drug traffickers. For some security providers, there is also quite detailed information available about their respective subunits. For instance, it is known that there are three main drug trafficking factions and it is also possible to identify which drug faction and drug lord are in power in every single community.

This leads to the second reason. There is a degree of transparency about who is in control in each territory. The residents know who is providing security for them and can identify who the conflicting parties are. This provides the whole security network with a certain degree of stability.

Thirdly, all security providers use a common language – violence – and the use of violence is negotiated and managed quite carefully. The research showed that all security providers are willing to engage in violence if the perceived political and/or economic benefits are great enough. The predominant form of communication and negotiation between rival security providers is therefore through weapons, rather than through the use of contracts or financial transactions.

Fourthly, there are two central themes shaping the narrative in Rio de Janeiro's oligopoly of security providers, namely fear of crime and the drug trafficker discourse. Residents' fear of crime and perceptions of insecurity are central to the functioning of the security network in Rio de Janeiro because it guarantees that there will be a demand for the services of the security providers. The 'drug trafficker discourse' is fundamental for all other security providers because it justifies high public security spending and reminds residents of the necessity of being protected from the drug trade.

The last reason why the oligopoly of security providers constitutes a rather organised form of violent pluralism is because the rules for residents are quite clear and they know what is expected from them. For instance, residents who live in favelas controlled by drug traffickers know that they need to respect the code of silence and not interfere with the drug sales. Residents in militia-controlled communities know that there is a zero tolerance on petty crime and that they may not have any kind of relationship with drug

traffickers (and their relatives and friends) from other favelas. Residents in gated communities know that they have to accept the 'safety rules' of the administration and the private security company in charge of the compound, however burdensome this is to them, e.g. not bringing any outsiders into the community without first getting permission from the private security guards.

The advantage of this rather organised form of violent pluralism is that it is to some extent predictable. The number of participating groups is limited, there is transparency regarding who is in control in a given territory (or which groups are disputing it), there is a common language (violence), two main themes shaping the narrative (fear of crime and drug trafficker discourse), and clear rules of behaviour for residents. What Rio de Janeiro's authorities do not want, is for the security network to become more volatile.

However, Rio de Janeiro's oligopoly of security providers is currently in acute danger of losing its relative stability and predictability, principally because of the proliferation of violent actors and the diversification of their rent-seeking activities. Beginning with the first point, the number of participating groups in Rio de Janeiro's security network is already quite high. A further proliferation of actors could lead to more volatility because the interdependencies holding the network together would be weakened and the territorial claims would have to be renegotiated (by violence). Secondly, there is a risk of the diversification and branching out of the rent-seeking activities of the security providers. Most have based their business model on the provision of security and the demand for this is generated by people's fear of crime. However, some criminal groups are diversifying their criminal portfolio. The militias, for instance, already have highly diverse income streams, including extortion and racketeering, arms sales, charging taxes on gas, water, cable TV and property sales, and alternative transport, to name but a few. The pacification of the favelas by the UPPs can also have the undesired effect of a reconfiguration of crime. The young men and women who were pushed out of the drug trade could take up new (or old) forms of crime, such as kidnappings and armed robberies, which are potentially more harmful for society than the sale of narcotics.

7.4.3 Legalisation of drugs

In this context, it is important to discuss the legalisation of drugs because it could potentially lead to a reconfiguration of crime. The legalisation of drugs has often been advocated as a panacea for a series of problems in drug-producing, transshipping and drug-consuming countries. In drug-producing countries, such as Colombia and Bolivia, the legalisation of drugs could potentially stop the US-funded war on drugs and provide thousands of coca and marihuana farmers with a sustainable livelihood. In drug-

consuming and transshipping countries, like the USA, Europe and Brazil, the legalisation of drugs could make drug use safer, improve harm reduction policies in the area of public health, reduce the prison population by decriminalising the sale and use of illicit substances, and create a legal market place away from organised crime where contracts can be legally enforced. Most importantly, according to the defenders of the legalisation of drugs, it could massively reduce violent crime (Caulkins 2012; Miron 2004).

Given that the focus of this thesis was to explore the logic of security provision in the six neighbourhoods studied in Rio de Janeiro, this research cannot draw any conclusions about most of the judicial and medical aspects of the legalisation of drugs. However, what it can do is to assess whether the legalisation of drugs could reduce violent crime in Rio de Janeiro and resolve (or at least extenuate) the territorial struggle between rival security providers. The short answer to this is no. The collected evidence does not provide the grounds for advocating the legalisation of drugs in Brazil. This is by virtue of the following three reasons. Firstly, the research showed that crime, violence and insecurity were primarily fuelled by the struggle for territorial control between rival security providers, i.e. between military police, civil police, municipal guards, military, legal and clandestine security companies, militias, death squads and drug traffickers and their respective subunits. The legalisation of drugs would markedly affect the rent-seeking activities of the drug trafficking factions. All other groups would continue to provide their 'security services' and hence the oligopolistic structure of Rio de Janeiro's security network would remain largely intact.

This leads to the second point – fear of crime. Residents' perception of insecurity and fear of crime would not be significantly reduced by the legalisation of drugs because crime would continue to exist. People would still become the victim of street robberies, kidnappings or vehicle theft, there would still be incidents of drug-related violence and the media would still fuel perceptions of risk that are out of sync with reality. Residents' demand for security would continue unabated, regardless of whether marihuana and cocaine are legally classified as illicit substances or not.

Lastly, the creation of a legal drug market which is regulated and controlled by the state would push the great majority of drug traffickers in Rio de Janeiro out of the business because these young men and women would not fulfil the formal requirements of working in the legal market. The implications of this surplus of 'angry young men' should not be underestimated. Let us picture a sixteen year old drug dealer from the Complexo do Alemão with a rifle in his hand and no formal education. Where will he go? What are his chances of getting a job in the legal drug market? Who will write his reference letter? The legalisation of drugs cannot change the future prospects of these

many young men and women in the favelas, and neither can it contribute in any meaningful way to tackling poverty, inequality and racism. Rather than putting an end to violent crime, the legalisation of drugs in Brazil could accelerate the process of a reconfiguration of crime, similar to what was observed in the context of the UPP pacification in Rio de Janeiro's favelas although on a much bigger scale (Section 4.2.1 briefly discussed the issue of migration of crime).

Viridiana Rios is studying violence and the drug trade in Mexico and states in a New York Times debate on the legalisation of drugs:

'What the legalisation debate has missed is that it won't be easy for ex-criminals to find a legal job, and that this may increase other criminal activities that hurt Latin American citizens more directly. In places where law enforcement is weak, diversifying a criminal portfolio is an easier way to profit than trying to break into tight legal job markets' (Rios 2012, May 30).

Garzón also points out that the connection between the drug trade and other illegal economies has not received much attention in the debate on the legalisation of drugs:

'The evidence shows that other illegal economies are expanding and that criminal groups have branched out, taking control of these activities so that they can begin to break their dependence on drug trafficking' (Garzón Vergara 2012: 8).

Instead of selling marihuana and cocaine – a market which is fairly well studied and understood in Rio de Janeiro – the drug gangs could use their illegal networks and violent and financial resources to branch out into other illegal economies, such as the sales of weapons, armed robberies, kidnappings, piracy or extortion. It is questionable whether the state security apparatus will be better prepared to fight these ('new') types of crime than to combat the drug trade – a sector with which they are fairly well acquainted due to decades of both preventive and repressive policing experiences.

It is possible that there are other reasons to advocate the legalisation of drugs in Brazil, for instance in order to improve harm reduction strategies in the area of public health, or to tackle the issue of overcrowded prisons. However, based on the evidence which was collected as part of this research, there are no grounds to believe that the legalisation of drugs in Brazil could significantly reduce violent crime in Rio de Janeiro because it would neither resolve the territorial struggle between rival security providers in the oligopoly, nor provide any meaningful alternative employment prospects for the youth in the favelas who currently work in the drug trade.

7.4.4 Lessons learned for other places

In the very beginning of this thesis it was stated that Rio de Janeiro constitutes a rather particular case in the field of security studies, for the following reasons. Rio de Janeiro has traditionally some of the highest violent crime rates in Latin America and a highly politicised debate on public security. It also has a complex social fabric that is marked by high inequality, social exclusion, racism and extreme geographical proximity between rich and poor neighbourhoods. Another special feature is the plurality and variety of security providers active in Rio de Janeiro's neighbourhoods. Finally, it is a city of international interest and its progress in public security is closely monitored by the international community, especially in light of the two sport mega-events, the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016. These particularities justified a study which focused solely on the logic of security provision in six neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro. Nevertheless, we want to know what lessons can be learned from these six neighbourhoods about other places in Brazil and beyond.

On a micro level, the lessons from Vidigal, Botafogo, Tabuleiro*, Complexo do Alemão, Santíssimo and Novo Leblon have important implications for other communities in Rio de Janeiro and this will be discussed as part of the policy implications (see Section 7.6). On a macro level, the findings from this research can shed light on the dynamics of security, violence and territory in other settings in Latin America. There are two specific locations in Latin America which are of particular interest for this research because they show parallels with the case of Rio de Janeiro, namely Colombia and Mexico.

Beginning with Colombia, it is very insightful to compare Rio de Janeiro with Medellin because both cities have a complex network of security providers and have undergone intense cycles of violence. Furthermore, the pacification of the Comuna 13 in Medellin in 2002 served as a blue print for the UPP model in Rio de Janeiro six years later.

Medellin used to be the most violent city in the world in terms of homicides. In 1991, 6,349 people were murdered which equates to a homicide rate of 380 per 100,000 inhabitants (Colak 2010: 3, 6). Similar to Rio de Janeiro, violence was fuelled by the struggle for territorial control between successive violent actors. Colombia's authorities failed in adequately countering organised crime and reducing communities' vulnerability to the coercion and co-optation of criminal actors.

In Medellin, the names and arrangements of the criminal actors are different than in Rio de Janeiro but both security networks appear to have an oligopolistic structure. One of the oldest organised crime groups in the city is the Medellin cartel which was very powerful in the 1980s and early 1990s. The cartel succeeded in co-opting smaller

criminal gangs in the city's poorer neighbourhood and this working symbiosis remained intact even after its leader, Pablo Escobar, was killed by Colombian state security forces in 1993. Over the course of the 1990s, many of Medellin's peripheral communities were taken over by urban militias, a hybrid of ordinary criminals and leftist guerillas with a revolutionary agenda. These groups provided the community with basic services and protected them from the abuses of the local criminal gangs (Colak 2010; Felbab-Brown 2011; Koonings and Kruijt 2004).

The struggle for territorial control of Medellin's poorer neighbourhoods intensified when paramilitary groups entered the city at the end of the 1990s. Similar to other parts of Colombia, these paramilitary forces had the intent to expel the urban militias and take control of criminal networks. The government's fight against organised crime has traditionally pitched guerilla militia groups against the national police, military and paramilitary forces. With the defeat of the urban militias, the paramilitary forces gained power and widened their control of criminal groups in Medellin. That is why former President Álvaro Uribe negotiated an ambitious disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process with the paramilitary groups between 2003 and 2006. According to Abello-Colak and Guarneros-Meza (2014), this was the key driver behind the reduction in homicides in Medellin because 13 per cent of all demobilised combatants (5,344 people) lived in the city.

One of the areas in Medellin which has received most attention by policy-makers is the Comuna 13 district, an agglomeration of 19 neighbourhoods with approximately 135,000 inhabitants on the west side of the city. Due to the elevated rates of violent crime in this area and the presence of various organised crime groups, the national government launched Operation Orion in 2002 in an attempt to 'pacify' the Comuna 13. In the operation, the military and air force were deployed alongside the national police. The state security forces succeeded in weakening violent gangs and guerilla militia groups and in drastically decreasing homicides in subsequent years (Colak 2010; Colak and Pearce 2009). From 2004 onwards, the municipal government of Sergio Fajardo initiated a massive urban upgrading programme in Medellin in order to settle the 'city's historical debt' with the poor, including those in the Comuna 13 district (Dávila and Daste 2011: 8). The objective of the so-called Proyecto Urbano Integral [Integral Urban Project, PUI] was to improve infrastructure and mobility and provide job opportunities for the local residents. The main aspect of the project has been the building of three aerial cable-car lines, community libraries and outdoor escalators (Dávila 2013; Dávila and Daste 2011).

So what lessons derive from this research project in Rio de Janeiro for the case of Medellin and vice versa? Given that the pacification of the Comuna 13 in Medellin

preceded the UPP programme in Rio de Janeiro by six years, we first need to analyse what lessons Brazilian policy-makers took away from their visits to Colombia. As has been stated in previous sections of this thesis (see Section 3.2), Rio de Janeiro's state governor and state secretary of security had visited Colombia and had been impressed by the country's progress in reducing the violent conflict between government security forces, the FARC, the ELN, drug cartels and paramilitaries. They were particularly fascinated by the pacification and urban upgrading of the Comuna 13 in Medellin. However, Rio de Janeiro's policy-makers would have been well advised to 'read the story to the end' in order to avoid the same pitfalls of the pacification experience in Medellin. By the time the first UPP outpost was installed in Santa Marta in Rio de Janeiro at the end of 2008 (and definitely by the time that the Complexo do Alemão was occupied), the pacification model in Medellin already showed advanced signs of decay. In Medellin, the homicide rate had been decreasing steadily between 2002 and 2007 (from 184 per 100,000 inhabitants to 34) and then almost tripled to 94.4 in 2008 (Dávila and Daste 2011: 2; Medellín Cómo Vamos 2013, 27 August). In San Javier, one of the main neighbourhoods of the Comuna 13, homicide rates more than doubled between 2008 and 2009 (from 66.8 per 100,000 inhabitants to 146.8) and continue at extremely high levels today (119.2 in 2012) (Dávila and Daste 2011: 6; Medellín Cómo Vamos 2013, 27 August). The pacification of the Comuna 13 has not succeeded in preventing the consolidation of criminal networks. Instead, the capture, assassination or extradition of criminal leaders has led to a reconfiguration of criminal activity and created a power vacuum which is being contested by different violent groups. Furthermore, there is now a stricter social control of local residents exercised by both criminal groups and state security forces. The government's response to the new outbreaks of violence has seen the enactment of a legal curfew for youth whose freedom of movement is now severely restricted. Fear of crime and heightened perceptions of insecurity continue to dictate everyday social relations (Colak 2010). Similar to the situation in which Medellin encountered itself in 2008 and 2009, the pacification model in Rio de Janeiro also appears to have reached a stalemate after its first five years. This can be observed in the city's rising crime indicators (after a long downward trend) and an increased number of scandals surrounding corruption and human rights abuses.

Although Medellin is a few years ahead of Rio de Janeiro with respect to its pacification experiences, there are also a few lessons which the Colombians can learn from this research project. This is, firstly, the necessity to conduct an in-depth analysis of the relevant security providers and stakeholders in a given area, principally their histories, *modi operandi*, protective capacities and records in security provision. This knowledge is of inestimable value in order to grasp the complexity of cooperative,

neutral and conflictive relationships between different violent actors and to anticipate (undesirable) reconfigurations in Medellin's violent pluralism network.

Secondly, this research project pointed out the importance of strengthening cooperation and communication between different security forces on the federal, state and municipal level. Colak (2010) explains that the police and justice sector in Colombia fall under the jurisdiction of the national government (and not under the responsibility of the state or municipal government as is the case in Rio de Janeiro) and that the local government in Medellin has effectively no autonomy in public security matters. Cooperation with the national government is difficult because of their traditional focus on defeating guerilla activity in the countryside, rather than countering organised crime in the cities. That is why it could be helpful for Colombian policy-makers to be aware of the lessons learned with respect to the collaboration of federal, state and municipal state security forces during the occupation of the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha in Rio de Janeiro which pointed out the need for overcoming political differences of different government administrations in order to provide an effective and united response to the problem of violent crime.

Finally, the case of the disappearance of Amarildo in Rocinha (see Section 6.2.3) must be a warning to the authorities in Medellin that even a single high-profile case of corruption or human rights abuse can put to question the public's support of specific government programmes. There had been several cases of corruption and abuse of public power surrounding the UPPs in the past years (see Section 4.2.1) but it was not until the full dimension of the Amarildo case was brought to light that the future of the pacification model seemed to be in danger and security experts from within the PMERJ believed that drastic measures had to be taken to 'save' the UPP project (Martins 2013, 10 November).

Besides Colombia, Mexico is also an excellent case of comparison, principally because of the role of the military in the war on drugs and the fragmentation and diversification of the drug cartels since the beginning of former President Felipe Calderón's administration in 2006. In 2011, Mexico had a homicide rate of 23.7 per 100,000 inhabitants. In the past ten years (2002 – 2011), 135,421 people have been murdered in Mexico and most of these deaths resulted from drug-related violence (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2013). When Calderón took office in 2006, Mexico was suffering under increasing crime rates, weak institutions and high levels of corruption among the more than 2,000 municipal police forces and 32 state police forces (Poiré 2012). The six main drug cartels – Sinaloa, Juárez, Tijuana, Golfo, La Familia Michoacana and Milenio – had a firm grip on the country (Guerrero 2012). Calderón's national public security strategy mainly focused on high-value targeting, i.e. the

detention or killing of high profile drug leaders. Due to the fact that the local municipal police forces did not seem to be adequately prepared for this task because of widespread corruption, Calderón's administration sent in the federal police and the military to fight the drug cartels (Felbab-Brown 2011; Guerrero 2012).

Far from achieving the desired effect of decreasing violent crime in Mexico, this strategy resulted in three (unintended) developments which serve as a point of warning for policy-makers in Brazil. Firstly, Brasília can learn something about the hazards of deploying the military in the war on drugs. López-González (2012) explains that the Mexican military do not take any orders from civilian authorities, for instance from police commanders or mayors in the areas where they are deployed. Instead, they are only accountable to the president and their own military generals and regard most parts of the federal, state and municipal police forces as corrupt. Felbab-Brown (2011) states that the military has only limited experience in urban policing and criminal investigations, as well as a low capacity to collect local intelligence. The consequence of this is that the military uses excessive levels of violence and frequently perpetrates human rights violations. However, despite a drastic increase in human rights abuses during the Calderón administration, the military continues to enjoy an excellent reputation in all sectors of Mexico's society (similar to what was observed in the six studied neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro, see Section 5.3.2).

Secondly, the arrest or death of high-profile targets has led to a fragmentation and proliferation of criminal organisations in Mexico. Guerrero shows that the six major drug cartels of 2006 (named above) had fragmented into twelve groups by 2012. The Sinaloa Cartel, for instance, had split into four groups – the Sinaloa Cartel, Cártel Pacífico Sur, La Mano con Ojos and the Cártel Independiente de Acapulco (Guerrero 2012: 39). The Mexican government had hoped that the breaking up of drug trafficking groups into smaller units would facilitate the war on drugs and decrease violence. However, similar to Rio de Janeiro (where the internal fragmentation of the CV led to the creation of the TC and the ADA and initiated new cycles of violence because of territorial disputes, see Section 4.3.4), the disruption in the balance of power between Mexico's cartels resulted in more violence because the new leaders had to demonstrate their power and capacity to use violence effectively (Felbab-Brown 2011). Reversely, when the Sinaloa cartel defeated the Tijuana cartel in the city of Tijuana in 2008, this 'narcopeace' led to a (temporary) stabilisation of the criminal market and to a drastic decrease in violent crime (Felbab-Brown 2011).

Thirdly, Mexico has seen a diversification of organised crime in the recent decade. Law enforcement is becoming more difficult because power structures in criminal networks are constantly changing. The war on drugs effectively turned into a war on

organised crime because traditional drug cartels have diversified their business activities to kidnapping, extortion and racketeering. In Ciudad Juárez, for example, criminal gangs are outsourcing specific criminal activities, e.g. one-time hits to younger boys who are not affiliated with the cartel (Felbab-Brown 2011; Poiré 2012).

There are also a few lessons which Mexican authorities can take away from the research project in Rio de Janeiro. Firstly, this study examined in depth the collaboration of the military and Rio de Janeiro's state security forces in the occupation and subsequent pacification of the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha. This experience pointed out the necessity of defining the role and objective of each entity involved. This worked extremely well in Rio de Janeiro. The territorial boundaries of the FPac area were meticulously defined street by street, each entity knew what was expected of them and the cooperation agreement laid down rules to fight corruption and ensure compliance with human rights objectives. In contrast, Felbab-Brown (2011) states that soldiers who were deployed in Ciudad Juárez lacked clear instructions and operational guidelines and instead committed human rights abuses and used excessive levels of violence.

Secondly, the mayors of some of Mexico's most crime-ridden cities could learn from the SESEG's initiative in Rio de Janeiro to monitor and decrease specific crimes which have the biggest impact on the population's perception of insecurity (e.g. violent fatalities, vehicle robberies and street robberies). Rio de Janeiro's state government has recognised that the widespread fear of crime affects all sectors of society and it has thus taken measures to improve *cariocas*' perception of insecurity and diminish their fear of crime.

7.5 Recommendations for future research

This research identified some knowledge gaps in the fields of inequality, security, violence and territory which are worth studying further. My recommendation for further research is to deepen and broaden the current research project. The deepening of the current research project would entail a more thorough examination of the external links of Rio de Janeiro's security providers with other stakeholders. The thesis claimed that the security network in Rio de Janeiro is embedded in a much broader context of interests (Section 5.4 briefly explored the interdependencies between security providers and resident associations, respectively the church). It would be extremely worthwhile to shed light on other interdependencies, especially the links with politicians, civil society organisations and business owners within and across different communities. Another line of research worth pursuing further is to return to the same neighbourhoods and

examine how residents' perceptions of security change over time. This could be done by applying the same survey questionnaire again five years later and comparing the data with the initial results of 2012. Conducting research again in the same communities would also have the added advantage of examining how relationships between security providers change over time.

The broadening of the research project would entail including new security providers in the study and analysing the logic of security provision in other neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro and beyond. In Rio de Janeiro, it would be vital to examine how the federal police, FNSP and fire brigades fit into the analysis and assess their relationship with other security providers within the oligopoly. In addition, it is important to investigate the relationships and interdependences of security providers in two or three neighbouring communities, or in conflict zones between different neighbourhoods, as this would help us to understand how the activities of one security provider impact on security provision in surrounding areas. Moving away from Rio de Janeiro, there is ample evidence to suggest that inequality of security is also a pivotal issue in other cities and countries around the world. In large parts of Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, security remains a luxury good for the rich and a liability for the poor. Conducting locally-grounded research on security provision in other places around the world could therefore further enhance our understanding of violent pluralism and the role and capacity of the state in containing violence and conflict.

7.6 Policy recommendations

At this stage, the reader might feel a bit overwhelmed by the challenges that we encounter in the field of security, inequality, human rights and organised crime. However, from a policy perspective, there is a lot that can be done. The following section will address policies that derive directly from the empirical research of this study and are based on the main concepts discussed in this thesis – oligopoly of security providers, inequality of security, and the human rights perspective adopted in the thesis.

7.6.1 Oligopoly of security providers

The first policy implication which derives from this research is the need for a thorough consolidation of the state security forces. The role and key public security functions of each actor need to be more clearly defined in order to avoid the risk of two or more entities doing the exact same thing. Policy-makers need to evaluate the comparative strengths of each actor and assign roles to them that correspond to their capacities. Public security crises need to be taken as an opportunity to improve the existing security

forces instead of creating new special operation units. If a proliferation of state and non-state security actors leads to higher levels of crime and violence (as suggested by the oligopoly concept in this research), the overall recommendation has to be to contain or even decrease the number of security actors involved, and concentrate on building the competence of the already existing entities.

In concrete terms, on the federal level this would mean for the Brazilian military to withdraw from domestic public security crises and perhaps limit its role to training and consulting the police and public security secretaries. The comparatively superior equipment, vehicles and machinery of the military should be made available to federal police agencies or the FNSP whenever needed. In fact, the idea of creating the FNSP was a step in the right direction. If properly trained and equipped, and increased in numbers, the FNSP could realise many of the tasks which can currently only be offered by the military. What is lacking though is the same kind of long-term commitment and investments that the military enjoys.

On the state level, the work of the military and civil police forces has to be much better integrated with each other. A constitutional amendment (PEC 51/2013), put forward by Senator Lindbergh Farias of the Workers Party, is currently in the process of being included on the agenda of the Senate. It proposes quite radical changes to the structure of the Brazilian police forces. Among other changes, it proposes the demilitarisation of the military police by decoupling it from the armed forces, *carreira única*⁸¹, *ciclo completo*⁸², more autonomy on the state level in the way public security organs are structured, and the creation of independent (external) ombudsman offices (Senado Federal da República Federativa do Brasil 2013). Although backed by important Brazilian intellectuals, such as Luiz Eduardo Soares, the constitutional amendment faces a lot of criticism, principally by leaders within the Brazilian police forces (Ferreira 2014). The critics argue that a constitutional amendment would not change the deeply ingrained values and culture of the police forces. Bringing the bigger military police under the umbrella of the smaller civil police could also lead to a militarisation of the latter as an effect of unifying the two institutions. Critics also see the concentration of power as an issue as the new unified police force could potentially surpass the power of the military in terms of personnel (Monteiro Zandona 2014). In these early stages of the debate, the legal and practical implications of adopting PEC

⁸¹ Literally unique career; meaning to end the traditional division between rank-and-file patrol officers, the *pratas*, and high-ranking officials, the *oficiais*, and making a career progression from one level to the next possible.

⁸² Literally complete cycle; meaning that all police officers engage in the full cycle of police work, from law enforcement activities, currently under the scope of the military police, to criminal investigations, currently under the scope of the civil police.

51/2013 are still unclear. This thesis therefore recommends that appropriate communication channels are being made available by the Senate so that the different stakeholders – individual police officers, academic institutions, policymakers, local communities – have the opportunity to engage in the discussions about PEC 51/2013 in a meaningful way, without having to fear reprisals.

On the municipal level, the role of the municipal guards has to be more clearly differentiated from that of the rank-and-file patrol officers of the military police on the streets, not so much in terms of its legislation (which defines the institutional functions of the GM quite clearly) but more in terms of its actual practice. Based on the current functions of the municipal guards, it seems feasible and appropriate that the municipal guards also operate in the favelas. This is because although the municipal guards do not carry firearms, it is unlikely that their activities will put them in direct conflict with organised crime groups in the favelas on a regular basis. To give a few examples, the role of the municipal guards includes, for instance, the protection of the assets, services and facilities of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, i.e. schools, health centres and libraries, and these services also exist in the favelas. Another main function of the municipal guards is to exercise the role of traffic police. As has been explained in the neighbourhood analysis in this thesis, traffic and road conditions in the favelas are often chaotic and dangerous and residents could therefore benefit from the supervision of the municipal guards. Another example refers to a subunit of the municipal guards, the Grupamento de Ronda Escolar [School Watch Unit], which visits schools on a regular basis and provides education about drug prevention, prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, first aid, and similar topics. Children in the favelas, whether pacified or not, should be able to benefit from these visits, as well. Another subunit, the Grupamento de Defesa Ambiental [Environmental Protection Unit], is responsible for the protection of the environment and the safety of visitors and tourists on hiking trails in the municipal forests. Given that many favelas, such as Vidigal, have access routes to the forest, it would be sensible if municipal guards were operating in these areas. These examples show that the deployment of municipal guards in the favelas is both necessary and feasible. This has also been advocated by State Secretary of Security Beltrame in our interview – ‘You need to ask the mayor why [they don’t go into the favelas]’ – so the decision for this ultimately lies with Mayor Eduardo Paes who himself had endowed the municipal guard with the power of traffic police in 2009.

A challenge that is common to all state security forces is corruption. Besides enforcing the standard police and military codes of conduct and providing regular anti-corruption training sessions for all actors involved and delivered by trainers who have both expertise and credibility within the organisation, more could be done by human resource departments when recruiting new employees. In order to be well equipped for

a career in law enforcement, which is a stressful and often dangerous occupation, police officers need to be objective, follow law and policy and have a specific set of psychological and interpersonal skills. The use of psychological preemployment screenings could be useful to identify candidates who have this skill set (Dantzker 2011). Resistance training and discussing peer pressure should be part of every teaching schedule. Managing expectations should also play a big role in the recruitment. Colonel Seabra pointed out that cultural beliefs centred on 'the tough policeman' were obstructing the formation of a more accountable and humane police force. Public campaigns could help to dismantle some of these misleading cultural beliefs. In the recruitment process, applicants need to test whether their expectations meet the actual role description of being a soldier, policeman or municipal guard, or if their hopes are out of sync with reality. In order to fight corruption, I also see great potential in the use of technology. From standard surveillance devices, such as CCTV and microphones, to GPS trackers (on police uniforms, equipment, vehicles and assets) and personalised firearms or 'smart guns', which only work with fingerprint recognition, nowadays the possibilities in this area are immense, yet often costly.

A praiseworthy development in this respect is the creation of a new model of integrated management for public security operations and civil defence-related events, called the Centro Integrado de Comando e Controle [Integrated Command and Control Centre; CICC], which were being built in anticipation of the World Cup and the Olympic Games. The current plan is for there to be one CICC for international cooperation in Rio de Janeiro, one national CICC in Brasília, and twelve regional CICCs in the host cities of the FIFA World Cup. The CICCs are new high-tech public security 'hubs' that will enable decision-makers to supervise, monitor, control, and coordinate all operations and incidents related to public safety, civil defence, private security, and urban mobility twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Whereas the other CICCs in the country are behind schedule, the CICC in Rio de Janeiro was inaugurated in May 2013, in time for the Confederations Cup and the World Youth Day. Going a step further, Rio de Janeiro's government is even considering purchasing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for the surveillance of the city, arguing it would save lives and avoid *balas perdidas* in the favelas, but legislation is still pending (BOPE has nonetheless been busy testing small UAVs in Rio de Janeiro) (Berta and Araújo 2012, July 7; Brähler 2013b; Kurczy 2013, September 17; Ministério da Justiça 2012b). Arguably not all innovations in intelligence and technology are useful and appropriate. Yet even a better utilisation of already existing tools could help the state to closely monitor all criminal, violent actors and intervene whenever an escalation of violence is imminent.

7.6.2 Inequality of security

This thesis acknowledged in earlier sections that it would be utopian to expect the Brazilian state to provide absolute equality of security to all its citizens because a certain inequality in the provision of the right to security is an inherent feature of most countries in the world. Nevertheless, Brazil has an obligation to decrease the inequality of security as much as possible, last but not least because through Art. 21(2) of the UDHR it is obligated to respect and promote the right of equal access to public service, and this also applies to security.

An important policy implication derived from that is the necessity to reduce violent conflict because it disproportionately affects certain groups of the population, especially young, black men from low-income neighbourhoods. Based on the empirical research of this thesis, and keeping in mind the findings by Zaluar and Barcellos (2014) who showed that the highest murder risk was in conflict zones of rival criminal actors in the immediate surroundings of favelas, this thesis recommends the use of strategies to contain the escalation of violent conflict and/or promote de-escalation. The collected data showed that violence was first and foremost produced by the struggle for territorial control between conflicting security providers. Therefore, measures have to be taken to mitigate the negative effects of territorial changes in the network of security providers. For example, if a violent conflict is imminent, various strategies exist that can be used to contain escalation and stabilise the relationship between violent groups. If there is already an open conflict that has reached a high level of intensity, a process can be initiated to de-escalate conflict (Maiese 2004, January). There are numerous ways to do so. In order to limit or slow escalation, mediation and arbitration could be used to resolve territorial struggles peacefully, norms could be established to limit the severity of conflicts and early warning responses and *rumour control* teams⁸³ could be used to prevent a conflict from escalating. For de-escalating conflicts, the violent parties need to be encouraged to decrease the use of their violent means and begin new forms of interaction among each other. This usually only occurs if resources are depleted and 'parties have reached a hurting stalemate' (Maiese 2004, January). The media, civil society groups and local communities have great potential to manage conflict and promote peace, for instance through leadership education and the use of non-violent forms of resistance and conflict resolution.

⁸³ The idea of setting up rumour control teams is to train community leaders to identify, investigate and correct rumours as a means of preventing conflict from escalating inadvertently (Burgess and Maiese 2004, August). This could be helpful in Rio de Janeiro, for instance, when favela residents are worried about the alleged, imminent invasion of a rival drug trafficking faction, or a new pacification operation by the police.

7.6.3 Human rights perspective

The thesis showed that although Brazil has ratified all of the important international human rights instruments, such as the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, it has consistently failed to promote and respect human rights and to adequately respond to the violation of these rights. Moreover, Brazil has its own National Human Rights Programme (PNDH-3) that proposes implementing a series of measures in the area of public security, access to justice and the prevention of violence, namely the democratisation and modernisation of the public security system (Guideline 11), transparency and popular participation in the public security and criminal justice system (Guideline 12), prevention of violence and crime and professionalisation of investigations of criminal offenses (Guideline 13), combat of institutional violence with emphasis on the eradication of torture and the reduction of police and prison lethality (Guideline 14), to just mention the ones most relevant for this research project (Secretaria de Direitos Humanos da Presidência da República 2010). However, some of the PNDH-3 recommendations do not go far enough and might not place Brazil in a better position to meet its international human rights obligations.

To give a brief example, Guideline 12 identifies the need for greater transparency and popular participation in decision-making processes in the field of public security and criminal justice and includes two strategic objectives, namely publishing data from the federal public security system (I), and consolidating mechanisms of popular participation in the development of public security policies (II). The second strategic objective has two programmatic actions, namely ensuring that civil society representatives make up 40 per cent of the National Public Security Council, and promoting mechanisms for participatory management of public security policies, such as councils and conferences, and expanding the National Public Security Conference (Secretaria de Direitos Humanos da Presidência da República 2013).

Based on the empirical findings of this research, the two proposed strategic objectives are insufficient to reach this goal because they fail to adequately involve local communities in decision-making processes. One of the most important lessons that can be derived from the field research in Rio de Janeiro's neighbourhoods is that the state depends on the buy-in of the local communities and the mediation of civil society organisations in order to improve public security services and achieve a persistent decline in violent crime. Rio de Janeiro's huge civil society sector has enormous potential, ranging from activist groups and resident associations to countless NGOs and

youth movements. Many of these organisations focus their work on human rights, conflict prevention and the promotion of peace and are very well established nationally and even internationally.⁸⁴ Alongside the more established NGOs that are known to the international community, there is an increasing number of favela youth movements and grassroots organisations with a potential that has not been fully unlocked yet.⁸⁵

The policy-makers who designed the PNDH-3 have underestimated the potential of both the more established and the newer community organisations and social movements. The programmatic actions under Guideline 12, as they currently stand, are insufficient to identify and promote mechanisms of popular participation in the development of public security policies, principally because it ignores the vital importance of mechanisms on the municipal and local level. The only 'local' mechanism that the PNDH-3 wishes to strengthen is the Community Security Council (see Section 2.3). However, although these councils formally exist in each Integrated Public Security Zone in Rio de Janeiro, the *de facto* participation of civil society representatives (principally of youth) is low, especially in areas where it is most needed due to the long-standing mistrust and fear between the police the local community. The nation-wide protests during the Confederations Cup in June 2013 constitutes an unprecedented example of what might happen if civil society organisations are not adequately included in decision-making processes. During the protests, more than two million people took to the streets in all major cities of the country. It was not by chance that the social unrest was quickly named *o Gigante acordou* [the Giant has woken up]. Whether inside or outside the favelas, local communities are increasingly organising and demanding to be heard but there are not always adequate communication channels available to reach policy-makers and influence decision-making processes, such as for instance the elaboration of the PNDH-3. Listening to and integrating these grassroots voices in government policies is fundamental for the democratic development of Brazil. If activated in the right way, local communities can play a key role in fostering social cohesion, helping to reduce violent crime and taking a pro-active role in managing conflict.

⁸⁴ One of the most established NGOs is Viva Rio which was founded in 1993 as a response to the Candelária Church and Vigário Geral massacres. It aims to promote a culture of peace and social development through research, grassroots projects and the formulation of public policies (Interview with Fernandes 2010; Interview with Monteiro 2010). Viva Rio also launched other successful civil society entities, such as Viva Favela and Comunidade Segura. Besides Viva Rio, there are several other NGOs whose activities have had repercussions in the international community, such as Luta pela Paz [Fight for Peace Boxing Club], AfroReggae and the Central Única das Favelas [Central Federation of Favelas].

⁸⁵ One of the most striking things which I observed during my field research in Rio de Janeiro is that the favela youth are extremely well informed and organised. Whatever formal education did not teach them, they will ensure that they have graduated with honours from the 'University of Life'. These young men and women are artists in the use of social media, and some are so angry that they have radicalised to a point which goes far beyond 'active citizenship'.

Building on the empirical findings of this research project, this thesis therefore proposes that parts of the PNDH-3 guidelines be revised in order to place Brazil in a better position to meet its international human rights obligations, principally with regard to the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, the right to be treated equally before the law, the right to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, the right to be free from arbitrary interference with one's privacy, family, home or correspondence and attacks upon his honour and reputation, the right to freedom of movement, and the right of equal access to public service.

7.7 Outlook

'Inequality of Security: Exploring Violent Pluralism and Territory in Six Neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil' – this was the title with which we began our journey into the complex reality of inequality, security, violence and territory in contemporary Brazil. The aim of the thesis was to explore the logic of security provision in the six neighbourhoods studied in Rio de Janeiro and to assess its implications for citizens' right to security. The thesis argued that, on a city level, Rio de Janeiro's security network could best be understood as an oligopoly. On a neighbourhood level, the preferred option for security providers were monopolistic-type constellations, characterised by relative peace and stability. The relative power and influence of each security provider was determined principally by their territorial presence, the way they were perceived by the local community and their use of violence. Although all actors were willing to engage in violence if the perceived political and/or economic benefits were great enough, the use of violence was negotiated and managed quite carefully. The thesis concluded that insecurity and violence in Rio de Janeiro were primarily fuelled by the struggle for territorial control between conflicting security providers within the oligopoly. The oligopolistic constellation of security providers on the city level led to an inequality of security, defined as a condition in which the right to security – a universal human right and a highly valued societal good – was not enjoyed by all residents to the same extent.

If this thesis would have been written a few years ago, it would have certainly ended on a much more optimistic note. Rio de Janeiro's outlook on the future appeared rather positive. Crime rates were falling, the pacification model appeared to enjoy the broad support of all sectors of society and BOPE police were signing autographs for children in the favelas. However, in light of the newest developments in 2013 and the first months of 2014, it is difficult to maintain this optimism. The nation-wide social protests of June 2013 resulted in hardly any fundamental changes on the political level. Formerly

peaceful demonstrations are now increasingly being infiltrated by black blocs who engage state security forces in violent clashes that last for hours and completely discredit the protest movement in the eyes of the elite. Public property is destroyed, demonstrators are illegally detained and tortured and even the media and human rights lawyers come under attack. The Brazilian Senate is currently discussing a new anti-terror law which could provide the grounds for social movements and political opposition to be framed as 'terrorist activity'. Media coverage is heavily biased towards the elite and mainstream television channels and newspapers continue to manipulate public opinion. In February 2014, a black adolescent was beaten up by three *justiceiros* in the Flamengo neighbourhood in Rio de Janeiro, allegedly because he was a thief. He was stripped naked and left for hours chained to a pole with a bike lock around his neck. Rachel Sheherazade, a well-known news presenter of the SBT Brasil, stated that the actions of the *justiceiros* were comprehensible because they were acting in legitimate self-defense. She cynically provoked human rights defenders who felt pity for the fifteen year old 'to do Brazil a favour and adopt a criminal' (SBT Brasil 2014).

Despite these enormous challenges that Brazil faces with respect to discrimination, racism, support for extrajudicial justice, and security issues more broadly, it also has enormous potential, principally if the capacity of the huge civil society sector is strengthened and the local communities become active agents of change. Many obstacles will have to be overcome but the youngest 'awakening' of the Brazilian people set the foundations for the demanding of a profound transformation of the political system, one in which corruption, impunity and clientelism will be replaced by transparency and accountability. The great majority of the research participants continued to believe that an inclusive democracy was possible, even (or particularly) in Brazil. I hope that one day not too far in the future they will have the freedom and security to pursue this dream without fear.



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Barra da Tijuca, Rio de Janeiro

APPENDIX

Appendix I: Qualitative interviews and field notes

A) Qualitative interviews

Name	Profession / Function	Date
Badolati Racca, Gustavo	University professor for architecture and urban planning	18 November 2011
Beltrame, José Mariano	State Secretary of Security, Rio de Janeiro	23 August 2012
Cleber, George 'Binho'	Community leader, Vila Aliança	17 November 2011 22 November 2011
Da Silva, Renato	Director, BSS Vigilância	29 November 2011
Da Silva, Robson Rodrigues	Ex-Commander of the UPPs, PMERJ	6 July 2010
Fernandes, Rubem Cesar	Executive Director, Viva Rio	30 June 2010
Gonçalves, Alex	Operational director, Sunset Vigilância e Segurança	31 July 2012
Kzure-Cerquera, Humberto	University professor for architecture and urban planning	18 November 2011
Lima, Henrique Castro	Commander, Municipal Guards; Colonel, PMERJ	21 August 2012
Monteiro, Fabiano	Coordinator, Viva Rio	1 July 2010
Pedrinha, Roberta	University professor for human rights; Resident, Novo Leblon	11 November 2011
Pereira, Fabio	Captain, UPP Vidigal, PMERJ	20 August 2012
Pereira Júnior, Adriano	Four-star general, commander of the CML, Brazilian Military	23 August 2012
Ribeiro, Carlos Eduardo	Colonel, Commander of the Batalhão de Campanha, PMERJ	22 August 2012
Seabra Martins, Rogério	Colonel, Commander of the UPPs, PMERJ	9 August 2012

Soares, Luiz Eduardo	Former National Secretary of Public Security (2003); Former State Secretary of Security, Rio de Janeiro (1999-2000); University professor for sociology and political science	28 June 2010 29 August 2012
Storani, Paulo	Ex-BOPE, PMERJ	5 July 2010 17 November 2011
Teixeira, Paulo	Director, Institute of Public Security (ISP); Colonel, PMERJ	16 February 2012
Protected sources		
Bruno*	Resident, Santíssimo	26 July 2012
Danilo*	Ex-drug trafficker and resident, Tabuleiro*	10 July 2012
Marcos*	Community leader and resident, Maré	9 August 2012
Silvia*	Resident, Complexo do Alemão	10 November 2011
Thiago*	Ex-drug trafficker and resident, Complexo do Alemão	24 November 2011 15 December 2011 10 February 2012
Vanessa*	Community leader and resident, Complexo da Penha	8 December 2011

B) Field notes

Field notes	Event	Date
Field notes 1	Public talk: Experiência das UPPs. Statement by Roberto Sá, SESEG	28 June 2010
Field notes 2	Brazilian peacekeeping mission in Haiti. Personal communication with Justin Vogler, PhD candidate at the University of Bradford	8 June 2011
Field notes 3	Class debate with students of the CESeC Universidade Favela course	27 October 2011
Field notes 4	Personal communication with Thiago*	18 December 2011

Field notes 5	Personal communication with Thiago*	28 January 2012
Field notes 6	Cidade Unida youth movement meeting in Vidigal	5 February 2012
Field notes 7	"No Olho do Furação". Personal communication with Luciano Garcia. Cidade Unida, Complexo do Alemão	26 February 2012
Field notes 8	Talk by Raull Santiago. Cidade Unida youth movement presentation. Rio+20 Youth Blast. UN Major Group for Children and Youth	10 June 2012
Field notes 9	Personal communication with Paulo Henrique de Noronha, SESEG	23 August 2012

Appendix II: Survey

A) Questionnaire

QUESTIONÁRIO: DESIGUALDADE DE SEGURANÇA

Introdução

Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo conhecer as opiniões e hábitos de moradores da cidade do Rio de Janeiro sobre alguns assuntos importantes. Todas as perguntas se referem à situação hoje no bairro/comunidade onde você mora. Antes de começar eu gostaria de lembrar três coisas:

1. Em nenhum momento a sua identidade vai ser divulgada;
2. Sempre que quiser, você pode não responder às perguntas, é só falar quando não quiser responder;
3. Nenhuma pergunta tem resposta certa ou errada, o que vale é a sua opinião.

Você aceita participar desta pesquisa?

Módulo I: Sexo, idade, comunidade

1. Sexo? [U]

1. Masculino
 2. Feminino

2. Idade: Quantos anos você tem? [U]

1. | | | | anos
 99. NS/NR

3. Quanto você concorda com as seguintes afirmações? [U]	1. Concordo plenamente	2. Concordo	3. Nem concordo nem discordo	4. Discordo	5. Discordo muito	99. NS/NR
a) Conheço meus vizinhos.						
b) Moro num bairro/comunidade onde as pessoas se ajudam uns aos outros.						
c) Quando acontece um problema aqui no bairro/comunidade, os vizinhos se reúnem para resolvê-lo.						
d) Se eu tivesse que pedir um empréstimo de R\$100, poderia pedí-lo a um vizinho.						
e) Todos os moradores aqui têm uma história de vida similar.						

4. Você deseja se mudar do bairro/comunidade onde você mora? [U]

1. Sim. Por que? Para qual bairro/comunidade você se mudaria?
 2. Não
 99. NS/NR

5. Você sente medo de alguma coisa em seu cotidiano? [U]

1. Sim. De quê?
 2. Não
 99. NS / NR

6. Quão seguro você se sente...? [U]	1. Muito seguro	2. Seguro	3. Nem seguro, nem inseguro	4. Inseguro	5. Muito inseguro	6. NS/NR
a) Quão seguro você se sente andando sozinho(a) no seu bairro/comunidade durante o dia?						
b) Quão seguro você se sente andando sozinho(a) no seu bairro/comunidade depois do escurecer (= depois das 20h)?						
c) Quão seguro você se sente andando num bairro / comunidade desconhecido durante o dia?						
d) Quão seguro você se sente andando num bairro / comunidade desconhecido depois do escurecer (= depois das 20h)?						
e) Quão seguro você se sente quando está sozinho(a) em casa durante o dia?						
f) Quão seguro você se sente quando está sozinho(a) em casa depois do escurecer (= depois das 20h)?						

Módulo II: Sobre atitudes de segurança

7. O que significa segurança para você?

- 1.
- 99. NS/NR

8. Você está satisfeito(a) com a segurança que você tem hoje em dia? [U]

- 1. Muito satisfeito. Por que?
- 2. Satisfeito. Por que?
- 3. Pouco satisfeito. Por que?
- 4. Nada satisfeito. Por que?
- 99. NS / NR

9. Você faz alguma(s) dessas coisas para se proteger da violência ou sentir-se mais seguro(a)? [U]	1. Sim	2. Não	99. NS/NR
a) Evita andar sozinho(a)			
b) Não usa certa(s) linha(s) de ônibus			
c) Deixa de sair de casa à noite			
d) Deixa de ir à escola ou faculdade			
e) Deixa de ir a festas, bares ou boates			
f) Não sai da sua comunidade / bairro			
g) Deixa de freqüentar um grupo de amigos ou colegas			
h) Não volta para casa de madrugada			
i) Anda de taxi			
j) Não passa em áreas onde há pessoas armadas			
k) Não passa perto da polícia			
l) Evitar conversar sobre certas coisas na rua			

10. Lembre-se que esse questionário é anônimo. Hoje as pessoas estão gastando dinheiro para ter segurança. Por exemplo, compram alarmes ou cachorros e trocam fechaduras. Você gasta dinheiro com segurança? [U]

- 1. Sim. Com o quê? Quanto dinheiro você gasta por mês com segurança?
- 2. Não
- 99. NS/NR

11. Crime e violência.

	1. Sim	2. Não	99. NS/NR
a) Você conversou com alguém sobre crime ou violência nas últimas duas semanas? [U]			
b) Você acha possível tornar-se vítima de um crime nos próximos 12 meses? [U]			
c) Você já se tornou vítima de algum crime? [U]			
d) Você alguma vez já viu de perto uma arma de fogo de verdade? [U]			
e) Você já viu de perto o “Caveirão” em ação no seu bairro ou comunidade? [U]			
f) Você já viu de perto o corpo de alguém morto(a) em acidente de trânsito? [U]			
g) Você já viu de perto o corpo de alguém assassinado(a)? [U]			
h) Você já teve algum(a) parente, amigo(a), vizinho(a) ou colega assassinado(a)? [U] Sim? Quem foi?			

12. Nos últimos 12 meses, você ou alguém da sua família presenciou ou ouviu falar de alguma dessas situações acontecendo no seu bairro ou na sua comunidade? [U]

	1. Frequentemente	2. Às vezes	3. Raramente	4. Nunca	99. NS/NR
a) Pessoas consumindo drogas ilegais na rua					
b) Pessoas vendendo drogas ilegais na rua					
c) Pessoas brigando, agredindo-se fisicamente					
d) Pessoas roubando ou furtando					
e) Pessoas andando com arma de fogo na rua que não fossem policiais em serviço					
f) Pessoas cobrando dinheiro para dar segurança (sem ser uma empresa legal registrada)					
g) Invasão de uma facção rival					
h) Operação da polícia					
i) Tiroteio entre facções rivais					
j) Tiroteio entre traficantes e polícia					
l) Agressão sexual ou estupro					

Módulo III: Sobre atores de segurança										
13. Atores de segurança	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	99. NS/NR
a) Em quem você confia mais? [U]										
b) Em quem você também confia? [M]										
c) De quem você tem mais medo? [U]										
d) De quem você também tem medo? [M]										
e) Quem é mais violento? [U]										
f) Em sua opinião, quem constitui a maior ameaça à segurança no Rio de Janeiro? [U]										
g) Se você pudesse escolher, quem deveria fornecer a segurança no seu bairro/comunidade? [U]										
h) Quem está fornecendo a segurança no seu bairro/ comunidade hoje? [U]										
i) Hoje, XXX está em conflito com algum outro grupo? [M]										
j) Hoje, XXX está colaborando com algum outro grupo? [M]										
k) Quem estava fornecendo a segurança no seu bairro/ comunidade antes do XXX? [U]										
m) Anteriormente, YYY estava em conflito com algum outro grupo? [M]										
n) Anteriormente, YYY estava colaborando com algum outro grupo? [M]										
o) Quem respeita os moradores do bairro/comunidade? [M]										
p) Quem tem preconceitos (ou é racista)? [M]										
q) Quem você considera corrupto? [M]										

Módulo IV: Sobre a pessoa

14. Segundo a classificação do IBGE que eu vou ler agora, como você definiria sua cor ou raça? [U]

- 1. Branca
- 2. Preta
- 3. Parda
- 4. Amarela
- 5. Indígena
- 99. NS/NR

15. Estado civil? [U]

- 1. Solteiro
- 2. Casado
- 3. União Estável
- 4. Divorciado
- 5. Viúvo
- 99. NS/NR

16. Vou ler uma lista de religiões para que você me indique qual é a sua: [U]

- 1. Evangélica. De que igreja ou denominação?
- 2. Católica
- 3. Espírita kardecista
- 4. Judaica
- 5. Umbanda
- 6. Candomblé
- 7. Outra religião. Qual?
- 8. Não tem religião, mas acredita em Deus ou em uma força ou energia superior
- 9. Ateu
- 10. NS/NR

17. Como você avalia sua classe econômica: [U]

- 1. Classe alta / rico(a)
- 2. Classe média alta
- 3. Classe média
- 4. Classe média baixa
- 5. Classe baixa / pobre
- 99. NS/NR

18. Renda	1. Até 1 SM (até R\$465)	2. >1SM até 3SM (até R\$ 1.395)	3. >3SM até 5M (até R\$ 2.325)	4. >5SM até 10 SM (até R\$4.650)	5. >10SM até 20SM (até R\$9.300)	6. >20SM (acima de R\$ 9.300)	7. Sem renda	99. NS / NR
a) Somando todas as suas fontes de renda (salário, benefício, bicos, mesada etc.), quanto você ganha, em média, por mês? [U]								
b) Somando todos os seus rendimentos e das pessoas que moram com você (salários, pensões, aposentadorias, benefícios sociais, bicos etc.), quanto é, aproximadamente, a renda total mensal do seu domicílio? [U]								

19. Escolaridade

- 1. Analfabeto
- 2. Primário
- 3. 1º Grau
- 4. 2º Grau
- 5. Superior
- 6. NS / NR

20. Você gostaria de falar outra coisa sobre segurança no seu bairro / na sua comunidade [O]?

21. Têm outras perguntas importantes com respeito à segurança que esse questionário não abordou [O]?

Gostaria de lhe assegurar de novo da anonimidade e confidencialidade das suas respostas. Agradeço muito a sua participação.

Question 13: answer card

Survey participants were given an answer card to respond to question 13. The purpose of this answer card was two-fold. Firstly, it made it possible to include all security providers in the survey in a simple, straight-forward manner. Secondly, it drastically minimised personal security risks associated with conducting this kind of survey of both participants and research assistants. This is because with the help of the answer card, research assistants and interviewees could communicate via numbers instead of words. For instance, respondents could answer the question 'Who do you trust most?' with '3' instead of saying 'BOPE'. Furthermore, the answer card made it possible to avoid using specific words, like '*milícia*' and '*traficante*', more than absolutely necessary. In fact, the word '*milícia*' did not appear at all in the actual questionnaire and the word '*traficante*' only appeared once. If a research assistant was stopped by a criminal actor, he or she could hide the little answer card instead of the whole pile of questionnaires. Fortunately, none of the research assistants encountered any problems while in the field. In fact, there was even one drug trafficker in Santíssimo who (accidentally) participated in the survey. Instead of feeling threatened, he felt honoured to be able to help out in this research project and answered the questions truthfully and without fear.

1. Traficantes
2. Milícia
3. BOPE
4. UPPs
5. Polícia Militar [sem ser BOPE ou UPPs]
6. Polícia Civil
7. Guarda Municipal
8. Exército
9. Segurança particular

B) Socio-demographic profile of survey participants

The data were collected between April and July 2012 from 309 residents in the six neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro. After dismissing a number of cases because of incomplete data, 47 cases in each neighbourhood were retained in the final analysis, giving a total sample size of 282 respondents. Of this total, 145 were male and 137 female. Respondents were between 16 and 87 years old, the mean age was 33 years.

Here are some further details of the socio-demographic profile of the respondents and of the variables which guided the analysis.

Colour/Race: Of those interviewed, 38.7 per cent classified themselves as white, 25.9 per cent as black and 32.6 per cent as brown. A minority of respondents was indigenous (1.8 per cent) or Asian (0.4 per cent). One person (0.4 per cent) did not want to respond the question. The variables used in the data analysis below were WHITE (white and Asian) and NONWHITE (black, brown and indigenous).

Religion: Of all interviewees, 29.1 per cent were Catholic, 13.8 per cent were Protestant, 14.5 per cent were followers of the AfroBrazilian religion Umbanda (9.9 per cent) or Candomblé (4.6 per cent) and 7.8 per cent had another religion (principally Jewish or Spiritualism). The remaining respondents had no specific religion but believed in God (25.5 per cent) or were atheists (7.1 per cent). The non-response rate was 1.8 per cent. The variables used in the data analysis were CATHOLIC (Catholic) and OTHER (Protestant, Umbanda, Candomblé, Jewish, Spiritualism etc.)

Income: A small portion (9.9 per cent) of respondents did not have any personal income, 16.3 per cent earned up to one minimum wage (at the time of the survey, the minimum wage was R\$ 465), 36.9 per cent earned between one and three minimum wages (between R\$ 465 – 1,395), 14.5 per cent earned between three and five minimum wages (between R\$ 1,396 – 2,325), 5.7 per cent earned between five and ten minimum wages (between R\$ 2,396 – 4,650), 5 per cent earned between ten and twenty minimum wages (between R\$ 4,651 and 9,300) and a small fraction of respondents (3.2 per cent) earned more than twenty minimum wages (more than R\$ 9,300). The non-response rate was 8.2 per cent. With respect to household income, it was mostly in the range of one to three minimum wages (24.8 per cent) or three to five minimum wages (27 per cent). The variables used in the data analysis were LOW (low personal income, up to R\$ 1,395) and MIDDLE_HIGH (personal income above R\$ 1,395).

Economic class: Of those interviewed, 14.2 per cent of respondents classified their social class as lower class, 46.1 per cent as lower middle class, 23.4 per cent as middle class, 10.6 per cent as upper middle class and 1.1 per cent as upper class. The non-response rate was 4.3 per cent. The differentiation that was made in the variables was between LOW (lower and lower middle class) and MIDDLE_HIGH (middle, upper middle and upper class).

Education: Of all interviewees, 5.7 per cent had completed primary school, 19.1 per cent had completed middle school (1º Grau) and 42.1 per cent had completed secondary school (2º Grau). A surprisingly high number of respondents (33.1 per cent) had completed a university degree. One person did not respond this question. The

variables used in the data analysis were LOW_MIDDLE (primary school and middle school) and MIDDLE_HIGH (secondary school and university).⁸⁶

Marital status: Of all respondents, 51.1 per cent were single, 28.7 per cent married, 8.5 per cent divorced, 7.8 per cent were in a stable union and 3.2 per cent were widow/widower. One person (0.4 per cent) did not respond the question. Marital status was not used as a variable in the analysis.

C) Coding list of survey participants

Code of survey participant	Neighbourhood	Gender	Age	Excluded cases (due to missing data)
BOT1	Botafogo	F	28	
BOT2	Botafogo	M	30	
BOT3	Botafogo	F	22	
BOT4	Botafogo	M	68	
BOT5	Botafogo	F	?	X
BOT6	Botafogo	F	29	
BOT7	Botafogo	M	26	
BOT8	Botafogo	F	18	
BOT9	Botafogo	F	28	
BOT10	Botafogo	F	33	
BOT11	Botafogo	F	23	
BOT12	Botafogo	F	36	
BOT13	Botafogo	F	32	
BOT14	Botafogo	F	28	
BOT15	Botafogo	M	68	
BOT16	Botafogo	M	80	
BOT17	Botafogo	M	66	
BOT18	Botafogo	M	56	
BOT19	Botafogo	M	87	
BOT20	Botafogo	M	52	
BOT21	Botafogo	M	48	
BOT22	Botafogo	M	43	
BOT23	Botafogo	M	19	
BOT24	Botafogo	M	17	
BOT25	Botafogo	M	16	
BOT26	Botafogo	F	78	

⁸⁶ However, data and categories are only approximate because of recent changes in primary school and the use of different names (years, grades and cycles) to denominate the level of education. This difficulty was also encountered by other researchers (Musumeci et al. 2011).

BOT27	Botafogo	F	43	
BOT28	Botafogo	M	58	
BOT29	Botafogo	M	21	
BOT30	Botafogo	F	64	
BOT31	Botafogo	M	23	
BOT32	Botafogo	F	48	
BOT33	Botafogo	F	33	
BOT34	Botafogo	M	23	
BOT35	Botafogo	?	25	X
BOT36	Botafogo	F	36	
BOT37	Botafogo	M	23	
BOT38	Botafogo	F	57	
BOT39	Botafogo	F	42	
BOT40	Botafogo	F	74	
BOT41	Botafogo	M	21	
BOT42	Botafogo	M	34	
BOT43	Botafogo	F	25	
BOT44	Botafogo	F	26	
BOT45	Botafogo	F	16	
BOT46	Botafogo	M	26	
BOT47	Botafogo	M	30	
BOT48	Botafogo	F	25	
BOT49	Botafogo	F	24	
BOT50	Botafogo	F	13	X
CDA1	Complexo do Alemão	M	37	
CDA2	Complexo do Alemão	M	37	
CDA3	Complexo do Alemão	F	24	
CDA4	Complexo do Alemão	F	16	
CDA5	Complexo do Alemão	F	16	
CDA6	Complexo do Alemão	M	30	
CDA7	Complexo do Alemão	F	20	
CDA8	Complexo do Alemão	F	16	
CDA9	Complexo do Alemão	M	16	
CDA10	Complexo do Alemão	F	16	
CDA11	Complexo do Alemão	F	19	
CDA12	Complexo do Alemão	M	16	
CDA13	Complexo do Alemão	F	16	
CDA14	Complexo do Alemão	F	43	
CDA15	Complexo do Alemão	M	41	
CDA16	Complexo do Alemão	M	51	
CDA17	Complexo do Alemão	F	18	
CDA18	Complexo do Alemão	F	16	
CDA19	Complexo do Alemão	F	47	

CDA20	Complexo do Alemão	M	50	
CDA21	Complexo do Alemão	F	23	
CDA22	Complexo do Alemão	F	80	
CDA23	Complexo do Alemão	F	23	
CDA24	Complexo do Alemão	F	26	
CDA25	Complexo do Alemão	F	27	
CDA26	Complexo do Alemão	F	21	
CDA27	Complexo do Alemão	F	20	
CDA28	Complexo do Alemão	F	48	
CDA29	Complexo do Alemão	F	23	
CDA30	Complexo do Alemão	M	26	X
CDA31	Complexo do Alemão	F	16	
CDA32	Complexo do Alemão	F	18	
CDA33	Complexo do Alemão	F	18	
CDA34	Complexo do Alemão	M	20	
CDA35	Complexo do Alemão	F	17	
CDA36	Complexo do Alemão	F	22	
CDA37	Complexo do Alemão	F	17	
CDA38	Complexo do Alemão	F	18	
CDA39	Complexo do Alemão	M	25	
CDA40	Complexo do Alemão	M	21	X
CDA41	Complexo do Alemão	F	22	
CDA42	Complexo do Alemão	F	28	
CDA43	Complexo do Alemão	M	20	
CDA44	Complexo do Alemão	M	17	X
CDA45	Complexo do Alemão	F	18	
CDA46	Complexo do Alemão	M	18	
CDA47	Complexo do Alemão	F	55	
CDA48	Complexo do Alemão	F	52	
CDA49	Complexo do Alemão	F	22	
CDA50	Complexo do Alemão	F	29	X
CDA51	Complexo do Alemão	F	19	
CDA52	Complexo do Alemão	M	22	X
NL1	Novo Leblon	M	32	
NL2	Novo Leblon	F	20	
NL3	Novo Leblon	M	20	
NL4	Novo Leblon	F	17	
NL5	Novo Leblon	M	17	
NL6	Novo Leblon	M	21	
NL7	Novo Leblon	F	52	
NL8	Novo Leblon	F	34	
NL9	Novo Leblon	M	40	
NL10	Novo Leblon	M	18	

NL11	Novo Leblon	M	16	
NL12	Novo Leblon	M	41	X
NL13	Novo Leblon	M	18	
NL14	Novo Leblon	M	70	
NL15	Novo Leblon	M	18	
NL16	Novo Leblon	F	37	
NL17	Novo Leblon	M	20	
NL18	Novo Leblon	F	66	
NL19	Novo Leblon	F	63	
NL20	Novo Leblon	F	20	
NL21	Novo Leblon	F	21	
NL22	Novo Leblon	F	75	
NL23	Novo Leblon	M	18	
NL24	Novo Leblon	M	18	
NL25	Novo Leblon	M	18	
NL26	Novo Leblon	M	18	
NL27	Novo Leblon	F	38	X
NL28	Novo Leblon	M	39	
NL29	Novo Leblon	M	57	
NL30	Novo Leblon	F	49	X
NL31	Novo Leblon	M	18	
NL32	Novo Leblon	F	58	
NL33	Novo Leblon	M	40	
NL34	Novo Leblon	F	31	
NL35	Novo Leblon	M	27	
NL36	Novo Leblon	M	25	
NL37	Novo Leblon	F	34	
NL38	Novo Leblon	F	32	
NL39	Novo Leblon	F	37	
NL40	Novo Leblon	M	77	X
NL41	Novo Leblon	M	34	
NL42	Novo Leblon	M	43	
NL43	Novo Leblon	F	44	
NL44	Novo Leblon	F	60	X
NL45	Novo Leblon	M	30	
NL46	Novo Leblon	F	37	
NL47	Novo Leblon	M	60	
NL48	Novo Leblon	M	70	
NL49	Novo Leblon	M	65	
NL50	Novo Leblon	M	67	
NL51	Novo Leblon	M	69	
NL52	Novo Leblon	M	70	
SANT1	Santíssimo	M	31	

SANT2	Santíssimo	M	53	
SANT3	Santíssimo	M	32	
SANT4	Santíssimo	F	39	
SANT5	Santíssimo	M	29	
SANT6	Santíssimo	F	46	
SANT7	Santíssimo	M	39	
SANT8	Santíssimo	F	33	X
SANT9	Santíssimo	M	32	
SANT10	Santíssimo	M	22	
SANT11	Santíssimo	M	81	X
SANT12	Santíssimo	F	55	
SANT13	Santíssimo	M	31	
SANT14	Santíssimo	F	57	
SANT15	Santíssimo	M	29	
SANT16	Santíssimo	M	66	
SANT17	Santíssimo	F	41	
SANT18	Santíssimo	M	18	
SANT19	Santíssimo	F	25	
SANT20	Santíssimo	M	32	
SANT21	Santíssimo	M	18	
SANT22	Santíssimo	M	20	
SANT23	Santíssimo	F	21	X
SANT24	Santíssimo	M	30	
SANT25	Santíssimo	F	71	
SANT26	Santíssimo	M	43	
SANT27	Santíssimo	M	19	
SANT28	Santíssimo	M	26	X
SANT29	Santíssimo	F	40	
SANT30	Santíssimo	M	51	
SANT31	Santíssimo	F	49	
SANT32	Santíssimo	M	20	
SANT33	Santíssimo	M	22	
SANT34	Santíssimo	M	34	
SANT35	Santíssimo	M	19	
SANT36	Santíssimo	M	25	
SANT37	Santíssimo	F	62	X
SANT38	Santíssimo	M	32	
SANT39	Santíssimo	F	26	
SANT40	Santíssimo	M	51	
SANT41	Santíssimo	F	31	
SANT42	Santíssimo	M	21	X
SANT43	Santíssimo	M	18	
SANT44	Santíssimo	M	37	

SANT45	Santíssimo	F	29	
SANT46	Santíssimo	M	30	
SANT47	Santíssimo	F	22	
SANT48	Santíssimo	M	62	
SANT49	Santíssimo	F	28	
SANT50	Santíssimo	F	25	
SANT51	Santíssimo	M	33	
SANT52	Santíssimo	M	43	
SANT53	Santíssimo	F	28	
TAB1	Tabuleiro*	M	25	
TAB2	Tabuleiro*	M	34	
TAB3	Tabuleiro*	M	24	
TAB4	Tabuleiro*	F	36	
TAB5	Tabuleiro*	M	14	X
TAB6	Tabuleiro*	F	35	
TAB7	Tabuleiro*	F	27	
TAB8	Tabuleiro*	M	35	
TAB9	Tabuleiro*	F	20	
TAB10	Tabuleiro*	M	47	
TAB11	Tabuleiro*	M	40	
TAB12	Tabuleiro*	M	39	
TAB13	Tabuleiro*	F	32	
TAB14	Tabuleiro*	F	19	
TAB15	Tabuleiro*	M	30	
TAB16	Tabuleiro*	M	17	
TAB17	Tabuleiro*	M	35	
TAB18	Tabuleiro*	M	33	
TAB19	Tabuleiro*	F	25	
TAB20	Tabuleiro*	F	18	
TAB21	Tabuleiro*	F	24	
TAB22	Tabuleiro*	F	25	
TAB23	Tabuleiro*	F	37	
TAB24	Tabuleiro*	F	16	
TAB25	Tabuleiro*	M	28	
TAB26	Tabuleiro*	M	29	
TAB27	Tabuleiro*	F	19	
TAB28	Tabuleiro*	F	20	
TAB29	Tabuleiro*	M	22	
TAB30	Tabuleiro*	M	27	
TAB31	Tabuleiro*	M	23	
TAB32	Tabuleiro*	F	17	
TAB33	Tabuleiro*	F	19	
TAB34	Tabuleiro*	F	21	

TAB35	Tabuleiro*	F	28	
TAB36	Tabuleiro*	M	30	
TAB37	Tabuleiro*	M	22	
TAB38	Tabuleiro*	F	23	
TAB39	Tabuleiro*	M	25	
TAB40	Tabuleiro*	M	21	
TAB41	Tabuleiro*	F	19	
TAB42	Tabuleiro*	F	26	
TAB43	Tabuleiro*	F	42	
TAB44	Tabuleiro*	F	34	
TAB45	Tabuleiro*	F	26	
TAB46	Tabuleiro*	M	41	
TAB47	Tabuleiro*	F	?	X
TAB48	Tabuleiro*	F	17	
TAB49	Tabuleiro*	M	50	
TAB50	Tabuleiro*	?	?	X
VID1	Vidigal	F	46	
VID2	Vidigal	F	25	
VID3	Vidigal	F	33	
VID4	Vidigal	F	24	
VID5	Vidigal	F	37	
VID6	Vidigal	F	24	
VID7	Vidigal	M	17	
VID8	Vidigal	M	39	
VID9	Vidigal	M	47	
VID10	Vidigal	M	29	
VID11	Vidigal	F	27	
VID12	Vidigal	M	37	
VID13	Vidigal	F	18	
VID14	Vidigal	M	26	
VID15	Vidigal	M	19	
VID16	Vidigal	M	25	X
VID17	Vidigal	M	49	
VID18	Vidigal	M	22	
VID19	Vidigal	M	34	
VID20	Vidigal	M	24	
VID21	Vidigal	M	87	
VID22	Vidigal	M	31	
VID23	Vidigal	M	22	
VID24	Vidigal	M	17	
VID25	Vidigal	M	19	
VID26	Vidigal	M	44	
VID27	Vidigal	F	22	

VID28	Vidigal	F	19	
VID29	Vidigal	M	35	
VID30	Vidigal	F	33	
VID31	Vidigal	M	55	
VID32	Vidigal	F	33	
VID33	Vidigal	M	20	
VID34	Vidigal	F	49	
VID35	Vidigal	F	27	
VID36	Vidigal	M	33	
VID37	Vidigal	F	17	
VID38	Vidigal	M	24	
VID39	Vidigal	F	30	
VID40	Vidigal	F	23	X
VID41	Vidigal	M	21	
VID42	Vidigal	F	24	
VID43	Vidigal	M	34	X
VID44	Vidigal	M	27	X
VID45	Vidigal	F	44	
VID46	Vidigal	M	27	X
VID47	Vidigal	M	44	
VID48	Vidigal	M	17	
VID49	Vidigal	F	29	
VID50	Vidigal	M	43	
VID51	Vidigal	M	67	
VID52	Vidigal	F	54	
Total	309 cases		282 valid	27 excluded

D) Pearson's chi-square test and Cramer's V

The objective of the statistical analysis was to find evidence for the hypothesis that the socio-demographic profile of residents and their neighbourhoods influenced inequality of security. The variables of interest for this survey were gender (MALE, FEMALE), age (16-32 YEARS, 33 – 87 YEARS), race (WHITE, NONWHITE), religion (CATHOLIC, OTHER), income (LOW, MIDDLE_HIGH), economic class (LOW, MIDDLE_HIGH), education (LOW_MIDDLE, MIDDLE_HIGH) and neighbourhood (VID, BOT, CDA, TAB, SANT, NL). Essentially, I was looking for variables with great variation among its categories, e.g. between men and women, or between different neighbourhoods. This variation had to be statistically significant on at least a .05 level (*) but the main interest was, in fact, on stronger associations at the .01 level (**) or .001 level (***) . Statistical significance at the .001 level would mean that there was only one chance in a thousand that the difference between the categories was due to chance. Pearson's chi-square test

was used to assess the relationship between two categorical variables with two categories each (2x2 contingency tables) by comparing observed frequencies with expected frequencies, as was the case of gender, age, race, religion, income, economic class and education. Cramer's V was used to assess the relationship between two categorical variables which have more than two categories (e.g. 2x6 contingency tables), as was the case of the neighbourhoods.

E) Principal component analysis

A principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted on the five social cohesion questions (see Section 3.3.2) with orthogonal rotation (varimax). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO = .83, which is 'great', according to Field (2009), and all KMO values for individual items were $>.81$, which is well above the acceptable limit of .5. Bartlett's test of sphericity $\chi^2 (10) = 564.84, p < .001$, indicated that correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA. An initial analysis was run to obtain eigenvalues for each component in the data. One component was extracted explaining 64.24 per cent of the variance. The scree plot also indicated maintaining one factor. The table below shows the factor loadings for each item, suggesting that component 1 represents social cohesion. The social cohesion component had high reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha = .86$).

Principal component analysis: social cohesion (N=251)

Item	Factor loading
	Component 1: Social cohesion
I live in a neighbourhood where people help each other.	.87
If I had to borrow R\$ 100, I could borrow it from a neighbour.	.84
When there is a problem in this neighbourhood, the neighbours get together to solve it.	.78
I know my neighbours.	.76
All residents here have a similar life story.	.75
Eigenvalue	3.21
Percentage of variance	64.24
Cronbach's α	.86

Source: Author's own calculations.

Appendix III: More maps and photographs of neighbourhoods

Orthophoto of Rocinha, Vidigal and parts of Leblon




Source: Mapa Digital do Rio de Janeiro – CadLog, Instituto Pereira Passos (Instituto Pereira Passos 2013c).

Dois Irmãos Mountain overlooking Ipanema and Lagoa



Map of Santíssimo (see red border)



Source: Mapa Digital do Rio de Janeiro – CadLog, Instituto Pereira Passos (Instituto Pereira Passos 2013c).

Santíssimo with Pedra Branca forest in the background



Complexo do Alemão (view from Palmeiras station)



Praça do Conhecimento, Nova Brasília, Complexo do Alemão



Orthophoto of Botafogo



Source: Mapa Digital do Rio de Janeiro – CadLog, Instituto Pereira Passos (Instituto Pereira Passos 2013c).

Favela Santa Marta, Botafogo



Orthophoto of Novo Leblon



Source: Mapa Digital do Rio de Janeiro – CadLog, Instituto Pereira Passos (Instituto Pereira Passos 2013c).

Barra da Tijuca (view from Pedra da Gávea)



