Albano, G.L. and Germano, F. and Lovo, S. (2004) Retaliatory equilibria in a Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects. (ELSE Working Papers 118). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
We construct a family of retaliatory equilibria for the Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects, thus showing that while it is immune to many of the tacitly collusive equilibria studied in the literature, it is not entirely immune when some bidders are commonly known to be interested in a specific object.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Retaliatory equilibria in a Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | JEL classification: C72, D44. Ascending auctions for multiple objects, clock auctions, FCC auctions, collusion, retaliation |
| UCL classification: | UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics |
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