Bhaskar, V. (2008) Commitment and observability in a contracting environment. (ELSE Working Papers 193). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
This paper examines leader-follower games where a leader must purchase an essential input from a price-setting supplier in order to take an action. We show that equilibrium outcomes when the followers perfectly observe the leaders' actions cannot be approximated by mixed equilibrium outcomes of the game where followers imperfectly observe the leaders' actions, i.e. they are not accessible. Accessibility fails since in a pure strategy equilibrium, a supplier makes positive pro ts; however in an equilibrium where a leader randomizes, supplier pro ts must be zero. Our result follows from a generalized indifference principle that mixed strategies must satisfy in economic environments. While supplier pro ts cannot be approximated, player action profiles are accessible. Our results also apply to games with costly observation.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Commitment and observability in a contracting environment |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2006 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Please see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/15424/ for a version published in the journal Games and Economic Behavior |
| Keywords: | C73 |
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