Bhaskar, V. (2008) Games played in a contracting environment. (ELSE Working Papers 195). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
We analyze normal form games where a player has to pay a price to a supplier in order to play a specification. Our focus is on sup- plier competition, arising from the fact that distinct suppliers supply different players, and possibly the different actions of the same player. With private contracts, where a player only observes the prices quoted by his own suppliers, the set of equilibrium distribution over player actions coincides with the set of equilibrium distribution when all ac- tions are supplied competitively, at cost. With public contracts, the two distributions differ dramatically even in simple games.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Games played in a contracting environment |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2006 |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | C73, L13, L14 |
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