In Search of Identities in the Digital Humanities: The Early History of Humanist

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Introduction

Since approximately 2004, Digital Humanities (DH) has been of ascendant aspect, it is widely agreed. Reaction to this is to be found in traditional scholarly literature as well as on social media, in blogs, grey literature, in press articles and even in internet memes. While some literature triumphantly asserts that DH will revolutionise the Humanities, others portray it as an agent of the creeping, and seemingly inexorable, computerisation of all aspects of modern life and admonish that “literature is not data”. Groups like 4Humanities may argue that DH can help the Humanities to “communicate with, and adapt to, contemporary society”, others predict a dystopian future where Humanists “wake up one morning to find that they have sold their birth right for a mess of apps”.

The popularity (or, depending on your perspective, infamy) of DH that underlines such arguments may be new but the discipline itself not. Its origins can be traced back to 1949 at least, when Fr Roberto Busa, with funding from IBM, began work on an index variorum of some 11 million words of medieval Latin in the works of St Thomas Aquinas and related authors. However, the history of DH has, with a few notable exceptions, been mostly neglected by the DH community itself as well as by the mainstream Humanities. Of the many research questions that wait to be addressed, one set pertains to the history of the disciplinary formation of Digital Humanities. What processes, attitudes and circumstances (not to mention knowledge and expertise) conspired, and in what ways, to make it possible for DH to become disciplined in the ways that it has (and not in other ways)? What might answers to such questions contribute to new conversations about the forms that DH might take in the future? Here I will make a first and brief contribution to answering such far-reaching questions by identifying and analysing references to disciplinary identity that occur in conversations conducted via the Humanist Listserv in its inaugural year.

Humanist was set up in 1987 and is “an international online seminar devoted to all aspects of the digital humanities … [a forum where] the technology, informed by the concerns of humane learning, can be viewed from an interdisciplinary common ground”. It was set up by Willard McCarty, who, at the time of writing, remains its editor. He is also Professor of Digital Humanities in the Department of Digital Humanities, King’s College London and Professor in the Digital Humanities Research Group, School of Humanities and Communication Arts, University of Western Sydney, Australia. As well as having numerous highly cited publications, he has won various international awards for his scholarship, including in 2006 the Richard W. Lyman Award (from the National Humanities Center and
the Rockefeller Foundation) and, in 2014, the Roberto Busa Award (from the Alliance of Digital Humanities Organizations).

Within the context of DH, Humanist can arguably be categorised as a proto-social media platform due to the ways it has enabled information, knowledge and social connections to be made (and perhaps unmade) and transferred. More to the point, however, is that newer and slicker social media have come (and, in some cases, gone), but Humanist has endured. Indeed, it arguably remains digital humanities’ most vital locus of long-form questioning, imagining and reflecting on and about itself and its many interdisciplinary intersections. Therefore, this paper takes as its starting point that Humanist is likely to contain a wealth of evidence about the disciplinary formation of DH. It makes two further assumptions that should be briefly considered. The first is that it is here assumed that DH is either a discipline or is on the verge of becoming one. Should this not prove true, the issues explored here will still be useful because understanding why a field does not successfully transition to a discipline is also valuable. The second is the assumption that developments that took place at a time when the field was mostly known as Humanities Computing are, to some extent, relevant to the disciplining of DH. Space does not allow me to explore this presumed relationship in detail. Yet, we must be careful not to assume that the two are points, merely separated by time, on a linear trajectory. Mahoney has made especially clear the inherent flaws of such an approach:

When scientists do history, they often use their modern tools to determine what past work was "really about"; e.g. the Babylonian mathematicians were "really" writing algorithms. But that’s precisely what was not really happening. What was really happening was what was possible, indeed imaginable, in the intellectual environment of the time; what was really happening was what the linguistic and conceptual framework then would allow.11

Also, such an assumption would attribute to both Humanities Computing and Digital Humanities a sense of internal cohesion and unity of purpose that neither term is likely to have in any practical way, a point that I will pick up on in the conclusion below. I will now give an overview of Humanist itself.

Humanist: an Overview

Humanist was established in 1987 on the BITNET/NetNorth/EARN node in Toronto, Canada and run on Listserv software. Following test messages that were sent on the 12th and “13 May to approximately two dozen people in three countries” (Ibid), on the 14th May a longer message about Humanist was sent:

From: MCCARTY@UTOREPAS
Subject:  
Date: 14 May 1987, 20:17:18 EDT
X-Humanist: Vol. 1 Num. 5 (5)

Welcome to HUMANIST

HUMANIST is a Bitnet/NetNorth electronic mail network for people who support computing in the humanities. Those who teach, review software, answer questions, give advice, program, write
documentation, or otherwise support research and teaching in this area are included. Although HUMANIST is intended to help these people exchange all kinds of information, it is primarily meant for discussion rather than publication or advertisement. …

At that time the Listserv technology was fairly new but neither the form that Humanist took nor the need it met seem to have been. Humanist was described as an “electronic seminar”, a label that was chosen deliberately to “evoke the academic metaphor of a large table around which everyone sits for the purpose of argumentation, in the etymological sense of “making clear or bright””. One also suspects, and I will build a wider case for this below, that the choice of the seminar form signalled a deep commitment to Humanistic epistemology and disciplinarity, notwithstanding any expectations there may have been of how Humanities Computing research would, in time, augment these.

Humanist was initially founded for those who worked in computing support and who encountered, among other things, a “lack of proper academic recognition” (Ibid, p.209). The idea for a forum like Humanist came about during an impromptu meeting held after the International Conference on Computers and the Humanities in Columbia, South Carolina April 1987 (Ibid). It was created under the auspices of the newly formed ACH ‘Special Interest Group for Humanities Computing Resources’, the “executive committee … consisted of George Brett (North Carolina), Michael Sperberg-McQueen (Illinois at Chicago)” and McCarty.

By 1987, Humanities Computing was becoming reasonably well established. Regular conferences were being held, some important Centres had already been set up as had some teaching programmes. It had its own scholarly societies (The Association for Literary and Linguistic Computing (ALLC) was formed by Joan Smith and Roy Wisbey in 1973 and the Association for Computing in the Humanities (ACH) was founded in 1978). The field’s first journal Computers and the Humanities would soon celebrate its 25 year anniversary (in 1991) and ALLC founded the journal Literary and Linguistic Computing in 1986. In the ACH newsletter the tone is upbeat. For example, Harris writes:

In 1970 I was accused of trying to “destroy literature” and now the 1984 MLA Convention Program lists 10 meetings devoted to Computer Assisted Instruction and Research …. It is an indication of the changing times … the profession has largely accepted computers as a part of the discipline … even though not everyone is involved in using computers, they are no longer viewed as threatening.

External evidence seems to largely corroborate this. For example, in addition to the points noted above, an NEH report on Computer Uses in Research carried out just two years later was described as “illustrating the changing nature of humanistic research in the age of the computer”. Such was the interest in the field that in 1986 the ACH advertised ‘Speakers Bureau’, which aimed to facilitate contact between its members and people who can benefit from their expertise. Approximately fifty people from all geographical areas of the United States as well as
Canada and Europe have listed their names with the Bureau, all of who are available to give papers, seminars, workshops, or presentations on computer use in the humanities.22 Yet, while there is much talk of the changing role of the computer in Humanities research there is not much talk of the changing role of the Humanities Computing specialist or the institutional contexts they worked in. In this way we may view Humanist as representing a parallel role and giving a voice to those that might not otherwise have been heard. Nevertheless, (and further corroborating the statement of Harris above) within a few months the membership of Humanist had expanded well beyond those working in computing support roles:

By September of that year, however, tenured faculty, directors of computing centres, and other well established sorts began to join HUMANIST in significant numbers. This was a crisis of identity for the new group, … I decided not to constrain HUMANIST to its original purpose but to let it find its own identity. Had I kept it “on track” it would, I think, have died of exhaustion against the thick, hard, and very cold walls of the institution”.23

Why the name ‘Humanist’ was chosen has not, to the best of my knowledge, been recorded. To this author’s European ears the term ‘Humanist’ sounds somewhat arcane; indeed, OED indicates that ‘Humanist’ is often used in a specialised way: “A person who pursues or is expert in the study of the humanities, esp. a classical scholar” The more salient point, however, is that the name does not evoke the groups’ connection to computing and that this contrasts with how a number of the associations and journals mentioned above were named. A discussion about the naming of the SIG from which Humanist emanated seems relevant:

The name should … distinguish our work from older forms of support for computing, which has established administrative niches inappropriate for our circumstances and personnel. These older support structures are not specific to the humanities …. Since they were not designed for people with backgrounds and interests in the humanities, for example, they did not tend to offer such people the opportunities they require for developing as humanists”24

Considering this, it seems reasonable to speculate that when McCarty described Humanist as “a voice representing a minority to those in power”25 that it was not only the established Humanities that was being addressed but the Humanities Computing status quo also.

It was in the broad context sketched above that Humanist came about; we will now look at its early content in greater detail.

An Overview of Humanist Posts

Summaries of Humanist from 1987 – 1990 can be found in the ACH Newsletters for those years. Rockwell and Sinclair have analysed the Humanist corpus from 1987 – 2008 using text analysis and distant-reading methods like correspondence analysis.26 Their findings include observations about the naming conventions of the field and hypotheses about the impact of the web on its development. They also observed three phases in the corpus sample. The first, from 1987-95, is of a Humanities Computing that was interested in computers, software, hardware and texts, and that took place in English departments and/or in English. There
followed a transitional period from 1996-2000, when words related to the web occurred more often. This continued in the third phase, which ran from 2001-2008. In light of this, they argue that the increasing use of the web had a transformational effect on Humanities Computing and that it helped to create the conditions in which Digital Humanities came about. The latter is, they argue, “not only an administrative term but one that signals a detectable change in the way electronic texts were used” (Ibid). They conclude that this may explain why hardware and software are now much less discussed while the discussion of web services has taken on a new prominence.

Notwithstanding this shifting focus (so convincingly argued by Rockwell and Sinclair), in the transactions of Humanist we can trace the field’s enduring concerns as much as their fault lines. For example, a through line of Rockwell and Sinclair’s phases is, of course, programming because it is the foundation of software as much as the web. Numerous debates about programming (ranging from the virtues of specific languages like Prolog and Snobol (for example, Humanist 1:117), over the issue of whether programming should be taught to Arts and Humanities students (for example, 1:97) and on to the uses of thinking programmatically (for example, 1:121) take place on Humanist already in its inaugural year. Space will not allow me to trace the development of such debates throughout Humanist. Instead I will point out that programming remains a contentious issue in DH, as evidenced by, among others, the ongoing ‘Hack versus Yack’ debate.27

It is impossible here to give an indication of the mixture of topics discussed during Humanist’s 27 years. Instead I will mention that, during its first year, issues like the professional recognition, electronic publishing, desktop publishing and markup languages attracted much attention in addition to conference calls, project announcements, requests for information and an advertisement of a job.28

Terms Related to Disciplinary Identity

The terms listed below were used in posts that discussed, directly or indirectly, an individual’s understanding of Humanities Computing, their role in it or Humanist itself (which I read as an extension of the same thing). They were identified and tagged during a close reading that I performed of the Humanist corpus and were subsequently extracted, analysed and categorised according to the loose groupings listed below. For reasons of space, I here focus on the first year of Humanist; ultimately this extract will form part of a larger study. In many cases such terms occurred in posts almost as ‘off the cuff’ comments, analogies or allusions. I tagged terms as I encountered them and did not intentionally exclude any even if were used in a post that seemed contained a logical error or other defect. I have not taken the identity of correspondents into account and this is probably a limitation of the approach used here given what is known about patterns of contributing and lurking on social media. Where comments were made in a tongue in cheek or ironic fashion I have tried to note this, even though it can be difficult to detect in email exchanges.

Terms used to describe the group seem to signal how idealistic and personally involved a number of the early practitioners were. These included Support[ters] of computing in the Humanities (Humanist 1:44); free people (1:80); true believer[s] (1:1035) and the lament “I thought we were all in this together” (1:661)
The activities of the group sometimes seem typical of the Humanities, for example, the terms ‘skeptic’, ‘interpreter’ and ‘Socratic’ are used. Others activities are less so, these include: the break[ing] down of artificial barriers (1:187); determining whether the computer lets us do “something new” (1:214); consciousness raising (1:347); the opportunity to explore a “new opportunity” instead of the “humanistic tradition of isolated individualism”(1:222); [pursuing] the notion of real computing in the humanities (1:344); making “computing an accepted part … of humanistic scholarship, teaching and research” (1:347); overcoming … compartmentalization of knowledge (1:782); we don’t so much go where no man has gone before but continually return to basic questions (1:198); contributing to an emerging discipline (1:182, 1:344); defining our work academically and raising its standards (1:144).

Notwithstanding such aims the group is not necessarily a cohesive one. Some are more technical than others and are referred to as ‘Digital cognoscenti’ (1:809) and a reference to Computing Hegemony seems to imply some members of Humanist also (1:871). Discussions that are predominately technical sometimes cause unease, leading one member to ask “where the “humanities” in “humanities computing.” Had gone?” (1:697). The nature of the group is occasionally questioned: are we “enough of a community”? (1:532) and the dominance of some disciplines on the list prompted discussion of whether Humanist would become a (literary) ghetto (1:776, 782, 787, 856). The word ‘types’ occurs, as a collective noun, with some frequency and refers to the group or subsets of it. Sometimes it seems to be used for want of a more specific or widely agreed collective noun, for example, “What is needed is some sort of alliance between the computing types and the professional librarians”, sometimes it indicates technical preferences of members, for example, ‘IBM types’ (1:483).

While the context can sometimes be ambiguous it is also used in a disparaging way, for example, “ever more self-assured ACH types” (1:152); “… think of themselves as humanities types” (1:557). It is interesting to note -- and my interpretation of the wider issue it references will be picked up in the conclusion -- that it is the questioning of participants’ Humanities credentials, rather than their technical ones that rankle: “I will note in closing that Joe Raben deserves better than to be accused implicitly of not being a “real humanist.”” (1:144)

The result of being in the group is sometimes described as a kind of marginalisation, for example, Humanists describe themselves and are described by others as being ‘revolutionary outcast[s]’; ‘academics without a proper job’ (i.e. those in support roles) (1:98); ’people from somewhere else’ (1:227); [working in an] ‘atmosphere of poverty’ (1:508) (a characterisation that is disputed by others); their knowledge also separates them from others “something that many of us in our pride of knowledge tend to forget: that most such users have no real interest -- and will never have any real interest -- in computers”. Numerous references to the lack of recognition their work received from the mainstream Humanities occur (1:44, 46, 47, 49, 349, 351). The dangers and limitations of using computing in Humanities research are also broached: “I recognize the dangers of computing—of being ‘seduced’ by the apparatus (1:1080; see also 156, 198). ‘Machines should work. People should think’ (1:715, 991); “we all know of cases in which well-known and respected humanists have been forced out of the profession”(1:47).

Yet, marginalisation is not a wholly negative process. The possibilities it opens for comparing and contrasting their work with contemporary and historical groups allow issues about identity to be reflected upon and articulated in new ways. Indeed, according to Crozier, “in general a discipline defines itself through a process of differentiation”.29
For example, it is argued that the word ‘Unprofessional’ can be used in a positive sense because it can result in solutions that may not occur to computer scientists (1:845). Humanist is compared to members of the Republic of Letters who were equivalent of modern functionaries and could, therefore, take advantage of the mail systems developed for kings and princes.” (1:744). Some of their rank may also have time for research that those in the academy will not have due to their teaching commitments.

It must be commented that, in the period covered, a feeling of entitlement or superiority is difficult to detect. For example, one correspondent may have wanted to do Humanities Computing but reflects “I was not hired to do Humanities Computing” (1:47). Indeed, the tone that comes through is more often one of anxiety and self-reflection, as will be discussed in the conclusion.

It is interesting that religious metaphors and language arise with some frequency. The references above emphasise what some saw as the newness of their endeavour but two references to historically important research occur in the period under discussion. One of these occasions the (somewhat tongue in cheek, one suspects) call to “Let us pause for a moment of silence and all give thanks for the networks, which have given us facilities that only sixteen years ago were only a visionary dream” (1:703). There are also various references to belief: ‘if they did not believe in the value of this forum’ (1:233 (Digest no 6) and of concepts explained using religious metaphors, “The true believer has a natural tendency to convert the infidel; I would rather think that in my father’s house there are many mansions” (1:1035 (Digest no 2); “As Zacour said, the believer is driven to convert the infidel, and few believers see any reason why they should understand the infidel’s scripture. (It’s the devil’s work anyhow and therefore dangerous to mess with.) (1:1036 (Digest 1)) “what one must do to keep the faith, and keep it intelligently, in a time of little recognition or outright rejection. (1:98) “people of the computer faith” (1:874)) while another talks (again tongue in cheek) of “infidelity towards my IBM PC clone” (1:1051).

**Conclusion**

From the labels and phrases above we begin to get a sense of how disciplinary identity was perceived, expressed and performed in the Humanities Computing community of the day. It is interesting to note that, in the period surveyed, direct questions about this topic were not put to the group. The questions that were asked addressed the kinds of knowledge that the group was creating, for example, their scholarly contribution to the Humanities (1:98) (a question that went essentially unanswered (cf. 1:185). Questions about how the characteristics of the group may have shaped, and been shaped by their activities were not directly explored, yet a wealth of observations, both direct and indirect, can be found in their communications.

In some ways the picture that emerges is not an unexpected one: identity is a complex and shifting concept and one that was still in the process of emerging (and here I don’t wish to imply that this process necessarily reaches an end point). Indeed, this issue is central to modern-day Digital Humanities, where publications, formal and informal, that attempt to define what Digital Humanities is (or, less often, is not) abound. Much remains to be done in order to identify and analyse the dynamics of DH’s disciplinary formation and to
contextualise this with reference to a broader comparative context. Nevertheless, literature from the domain of the sociology of science emphasises that neither disciplines nor disciplinary identities are not monolithic structures or concepts. This is emphasised by Powell et al. in a discussion about the naming of systems biology that draws on much wider understandings of the nature and role of disciplinarity: “Systems biology … exemplifies how a name unites and gives special strength to a broad array of technologies and intertwined methodological and epistemic practices, even when the array lacks an established paradigmatic core.”

Notwithstanding such diversity, when the labels and phrases are considered in the aggregate one does also notice that certain traits which seem to be characteristic of the group emerge. Curiosity and a degree of idealism arguably characterise a number of the remarks categorised as ‘terms used to describe the group’ above. A certain degree of resilience can be noticed in the way the group persists in its activities despite what it perceives as a lack of recognition from the academy proper; the ways that some perceived their work almost as a matter of faith by some is perhaps connected to this experience. Self-reflection seems to be another characteristic trait of the labels given above. Indeed, in due course it could prove instructive to investigate whether such traits are characteristic of Digital Humanists along with the nature of their role in the discourse that surrounds the formation of the discipline. However, I will now focus on one characteristic in particular: anxiety.

In the period studied, many comments can be identified that reveal anxieties about the quality of their work and its relationship with the wider Academy, and the Humanities in particular. For example, references are to be found to what is perceived as ‘the poor quality of [software] reviews’ (1:344) “the often poor quality of the writing (and sometimes thinking) associated with computing” (1:49) the field is described as “disorganised” (1:381). The question of whether it is at all legitimate to offer a PhD in the area is discussed (see 1:662, 1:667, 1:725) and conversations about whether their work constitutes research or not can be found. As I will now argue perhaps the most notable aspect of these conversations is that they seem to be conducted and judged with reference to established standards of the Humanities, a fact with seems to sit somewhat uneasily with some of the aims of the group indicated above.

For example, an early conversation that attracted numerous contributions concerned the nature and status of Humanist and whether it should or could function as a formal publication of some sort (e.g. an academic journal). It is interesting that the group did not give much consideration to attempting to reform the Humanities in this regard, or to trying something completely new. (in fact I counted some 10 posts before the idea of doing something completely new was considered: “The new medium makes possible new forms of intellectual work, forms of collective research and collaborative writing that have not yet been defined, professionally or institutionally”. 1:51). What might count as research also seems very much to be defined with reference to the Humanities proper, for example, “And I have not really used the computer as a tool in my own research; I have worked on the improvement of the tool itself … But programming, running computer centers, etc., is not, and probably should not be, valued as research (1:47)”. The forms that research outputs might take seem to reference accepted Humanities standards, for example, “I don’t expect my marked up text to be of interest to anybody either. Nevertheless, if I’m successful, the final result (an essay or book) will say something valuable to others (1:542). Discussions about proper use of Humanist also seem to reference unarticulated assumptions about Humanities norms, as revealed in a powerful response to one such comments:
Some recent comments, referring to “shallow” conversation and “inane chit-chat” are quite threatening … it also seems to be far from the values inherent in the literature that many of us have devoted our lives to - in which metaphor represents a way of freely expressing one's view of the human condition. We may use tools, such as computers, to tear apart the imaginative worlds created by our language(s), but we are not trying to destroy them. Mutability, chance, the protean nature of sensible things - unconstrained discourse - these are what keep us from just building monuments to ourselves (233: 6 (digest format)).

A superficial interpretation of the evidence might indicate that in the early record of Humanist a lack of ambition and imagination on the part of Humanities Computing people is to be found, along with a deep discord between their aims and the ways they sought to implement them. Instead, I wish to argue that Humanist shows us the opposite. In essence it demonstrates that the community combined its idealism with a deep sense of pragmatism. This seems to be encapsulated in a comment made by McCarty: “the trick is to exploit rather than be thwarted by the characteristics of the medium. A change in how research in the humanities is done could result”.

Again, looking to the wider literature from the sociology of science and the history of computing this is not especially surprising. For example, Mahoney’s research on the formation of the fields of theoretical computer science and software engineering argues that “people engaged in new enterprises bring their histories to the task, often different histories reflecting their different backgrounds and training”35. In the example under discussion we may say that it is participants’ backgrounds and training in the Humanities that they bring to the task of forming Humanities Computing; true to the name of Humanist they approached the creation of this new field as Humanists. Indeed, this is a hypothesis that should be investigated further when a more sustained study of the disciplinary formation of DH is undertaken. Another important point to make, even though it is an obvious one, is that institutionalisation is a necessary part of disciplinary formation. Indeed, in Powell et al’s examination of how “twentieth- and early twenty-first-century disciplines were created and institutionalized in relation to disciplinary naming stories” they relate such practices (while emphasising that they are not definitive characteristics) to “other elements of disciplinary formation such as paradigmatic achievements, defining technologies, and institutional recognition”36. From this we may construct another hypothesis to move forward with. Namely that the institutional recognition that Digital Humanities has won came about via a process that seems to have already been initiated by Humanities Computing and that was, dependent on, initially at least, on conforming to some institutional norms of the Humanities.

However such hypotheses may, in due course, be modified two issues are clear. The first is that Humanist is a largely untapped historical resource for exploring, among other things, issues relevant to the dynamics of disciplinary formation. The second is, now that Digital Humanities has achieved a degree of institutionalisation and disciplinary recognition, whether it is time for the field to confront the question of how its research, social and intellectual achievements relate to the more idealistic aims discussed above. It should be noted that such ‘radical’ aims have remained part of the discourse of the field, where, for example, talk of its ‘revolutionary’ status can still be found.37 Yet, as the field is arguably moving more towards the mainstream and away from the margins, how should current notions of disciplinary identity be reassessment? And might this lead to a more ambition or radical research agenda?
Some four years after it had been set up Raben wrote:

A conference called Humanist operates through Bitnet at Brown University. In their brief lives, these two operations seem to be still struggling to identify their role in research and even to define their audience. Whether either or both of these services will survive the period of their novelty and mature with the evolving technology, or be re-placed by new ones based on fax or another technology, is part of the larger question of whether computer communications has any meaningful role in humanities research and instruction.\(^{38}\)

This paper aimed to cast some light on a hitherto neglected facet of the history of Digital Humanities. Further to Raben’s comments, which, I believe to have been, at that time most reasonable, it also demonstrated that Humanist has, in fact, played a unique and multifaceted role in development of Digital Humanities.

**Notes**


McCarty, “HUMANIST,” n. 20.


McCarty, “HUMANIST,” 209.


McCarty, “HUMANIST,” 209.


31 See, for example, Melissa M. Terras, Julianne Nyhan, and Edward Vanhoutte, eds., Defining Digital Humanities: A Reader (Farnham, Surrey, England : Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited ; Ashgate Publishing Company, 2013); note also that the emphasis on outputs rather than individual or collective disciplinary identity remains.


35 Ibid.


Bibliography


