Bhaskar, V. and Mailath, G. and Morris, S. (2007) Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma. (ELSE Working Papers 218). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and periods. We focus on the purifiability of one-period memory mixed strategy equilibria used by Ely and V¨alim¨aki (2002) in their study of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with private monitoring. We find that any such strategy profile is not the limit of one-period memory equilibrium strategy profiles of the perturbed game, for almost all noise distributions. However, if we allow infinite memory strategies in the perturbed game, then any completely-mixed equilibrium is purifiable.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2006 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Please see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/15426/ for details of a version published in the Review of Economic Dynamics |
| Keywords: | C72, C73 |
| UCL classification: | UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics |
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