Belot, M. and Bhaskar, V. and van de Ven, J. (2006) Social preferences in the public arena: evidence from a prisoner's dilemma game on a TV show. (ELSE Working Papers 221). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
We analyze a large stakes prisoner's dilemma game played on a TV show. Players cooperate 40% of the time, demonstrating that social preferences are important; however, cooperation is significantly below the 50% threshold that is required for inequity aversion to sustain cooperation. Women cooperate significantly more than men, while players who have "earned" more of the stake cooperate less. A player's promise to cooperate is also a good predictor of his decision. Surprisingly, a player's probability of cooperation is unrelated to the opponent's characteristics or promise. We argue that inequity aversion alone cannot adequately explain these results; reputational concerns in a public setting might be more important.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Social preferences in the public arena: evidence from a prisoner's dilemma game on a TV show |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2006 |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | C72, C93, D64 |
| UCL classification: | UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics |
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