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Sonja Weinberg

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Ph.D.

Pogroms and Riots: The German Conservative and the Jewish Press and Collective Anti-Jewish Violence in Germany and Russia, 1881-1882
Abstract

Events of collective anti-Jewish violence in the German Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century have received substantial scholarly attention in recent years. These investigations focus primarily on the events themselves, providing a historical analysis at a local level of their causes, course, and processes. Yet, historians have tended to eschew examinations of the responses of the wider press to such events. Based on four newspapers, affiliated with the Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish milieu, the thesis offers a wide-ranging insight into responses to anti-Jewish violence occurring in Germany and Russia in 1881-1882. It evaluates how collective violence in the so-called “civilized” countries of Europe was assessed and may have been legitimised. In the German Empire it was not possible to openly call for violence, considering the strict notions of law and order. Yet, it was possible to display empathy with the perpetrators.

Modern anti-Semitism had developed a particular rhetoric when attacking the Jews, which has been termed “civilization of Jew-hatred.”¹ It meant a contradictory line of argument, which distanced and identified with anti-Semitism, condemned and justified anti-Semitism. This study evaluates whether this strategy was also applied to anti-Jewish violence and if so, how this was done.

The thesis discusses too the effect of political events and developments, such as elections and the Kulturkampf, on responses to anti-Jewish violence. It

¹ I will explain the use of rhetorical analysis in this study below.
demonstrates how arguments changed in the dynamics of daily politics and highlights the complexity of responses towards anti-Jewish violence, which were to a significant degree contingent on political developments. The research thus provides a contribution to our understanding of the formation and changes of arguments held towards collective violence. The study challenges traditional views on anti-Jewish violence in the late nineteenth century.
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All the work in this thesis is my own.
To my parents
**Introduction**

Anti-Semitism in nineteenth century Germany has received intensive scholarly attention over the last few decades, producing a vast number of scholarly monographs and articles. Their focus has concentrated primarily on anti-Semitic ideas, trying to establish a connection between the Jew-hatred of the Second Reich and the anti-Semitism of the Nazi period. Whether this anti-Semitism was supported only by the fringe or by the wider circles of society is still open to debate. Much of the focus to date has been placed on either the anti-Semitism of a particular group or institution, or on anti-Semitic politics. Since the 1980s, both historical and sociological research on violence in modern world history has increased considerably. It is therefore surprising that collective anti-Jewish violence in nineteenth century Germany has received scholarly attention only in very recent years. Where it has received attention, either in general studies on collective physical violence against a minority or investigations of collective anti-Semitic violence in modern German history, the focus has invariably been on such events themselves, that is: on the “who, when, where, how, what and why of

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3 See, for example, Olaf Blaschke, Katholizismus und Antisemitismus im Deutschen Kaisereich (Göttingen, 1997). For political anti-Semitism see, for example, Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria (London, 1988).
5 For a collection of essays of these studies, see Christhard Hoffmann, Werner Bergmann, Helmut Walser Smith, eds., Exclusionary Violence (Ann Arbor, 2002). See also Helmut Walser Smith, The Butcher’s Tale (New York, 2002); Christoph Nonn, Eine Stadt sucht einen Mörder (Göttingen, 2002).
ethnic riot behavior. These studies primarily consider the meaning of this violence from ethnologically inspired microhistory, locate its societal underpinnings and situate it within the wider phenomenon of collective violence, as well as offering a historiographical context. Important and necessary as such investigations undoubtedly are, they tell us very little about how the wider public outside the immediate geographical area of these events may have perceived such incidents at the time. While studies of the press responses to collective anti-Jewish violence in the nineteenth century do exist, these for the most part investigate the Russian and the English press. The studies of German press responses to anti-Semitism that do exist limit their attentions to non-violent forms of anti-Semitism focusing on anti-Semitic stereotypes and, where they do investigate anti-Semitic violence, restrict themselves to the German Jewish press. The absence of any proper research into this area suggested a rich and untapped source and was the raison d'être for the present thesis. The thesis aims to shed new light on a segment of the public and their own rhetoric with respect to collective anti-Jewish violence, by examining the response of part of the German conservative press and part of the Jewish press to the anti-Jewish riots that took place in Germany and Russia in 1881 and 1882.

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6 Quoted from Donald, L. Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot (California, 2002), xiii.
7 Hoffmann, Violence, 4.
The press was one of the places in late nineteenth century Germany, where public communication took place. The press, it can be said, is generally one of the places where society reveals itself in the form of communication. We can recognize “society” only in its communicated representation. Public communication is the arena at which everybody can look. It is there that society reveals itself in the form of structures of attention and patterns of interpretation.\(^\text{11}\) The role of the press as regards collective physical violence against another group is significant. Research has shown time and again that (in modern times) collective physical violence against a (minority) group within a society is often preceded by intensive press coverage, which feeds animosity against that group so that one can speak of “wars of communication.”\(^\text{12}\) Thus, for example, years before the outbreak of the wave of anti-Jewish riots in Pomerania, the press had begun to propagate anti-Semitic views. The pogroms in Russia too, were preceded by intensive press coverage on the Jews and the Jewish Question, which was distinctly hostile to the Jews.\(^\text{13}\) Yet the press does not only play a role in the run-up to physical violence, it also actively participates during the period of the actual violence by responding to these events, evaluating and interpreting them. Both the riots in Germany as well as the pogroms in Russia reached national press attention. The press thus is here

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\(^{11}\) The other main place for public communication are public meetings. This paragraph follows Mario Schranz und Kurt Imhof, “Muslime in der Schweiz - Muslime in der öffentlichen Kommunikation,” in Schweizerische Akademie der Geistes-und Sozialwissenschaften /SAGW, ed., \textit{Langues et Culture} (Bern, 2003). Hoffmann, \textit{Violence}, 73-4.


understood as an "interpreting elite," whose power lies in its authority to interpret.  

The aim of this investigation is to assess this stage of press responses and to ask how collective anti-Jewish violence in one of the so-called "civilized" countries of Europe was assessed and may have been legitimized. In the German Empire it was not possible for the press to openly call for violence, considering the strict notions of law and order, as well as a developed consciousness of being a civilized country and people. Generally it could be said that open violence as a means of politics was, against the background of the civilized standards in Germany, not acceptable any more as a social norm. Therefore one cannot expect to find open and direct support for violent forms of anti-Semitism. Yet it was possible to display empathy with the perpetrators. Modern anti-Semitism had developed a particular rhetoric when attacking the Jews, which Christhard Hoffmann has termed "civilization of Jew-hatred," which developed in response to Liberal arguments. Liberals branded the renewed anti-Semitism of the 1870s as barbaric and medieval. Thereby Liberals (for whom religious and confessional polemics in general belonged in the realm of the Middle Ages) tried to de-legitimize the renewed anti-Semitism, degrading it as backward and immoral and thus not fit for the modern, civilized world. Anti-Semites (and those sympathetic to their ideas and attitudes) responded to this attack with a contradictory line of argument: they simultaneously distanced themselves from and identified with anti-Semitism, both condemning and justifying it. Thus anti-Semitism was seen, for example, as a "brutal and

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reprehensible yet natural reaction of the Germanic people against a foreign element.” The anti-Semitic movement, it was held, was “dirty” and “rabble-rousing,” but the “instinct of the masses’ had correctly recognized a severe danger and threatening damage to the new German life.” This line of argument gave a double message, using the “double-bind” technique: the simultaneous display of distance and identification made it rhetorically possible to “justify anti-Semitism on the one hand and at the same time to evoke the impression that it was not anti-Semitism.” This way anti-Semites could “anaesthetize themselves morally.”\textsuperscript{15} This study examines whether such a pattern was also applied in responses to collective anti-Jewish violence: was anti-Jewish violence condemned and legitimized? One important form of legitimizing physical violence by the interpreting elite (which did not initiate the violent acts itself) is that the violence can be justified by referring to (perceived) causal factors. “The actors’ use of violence is thereby seen in a context of justification, which amounts to an apology for ‘personal violence,’ or, failing this, at least appeals for some sympathy.”\textsuperscript{16} I will investigate whether there was an indirect justification for anti-Jewish violence. Or was there solidarity with the victims? In addition, and for a better understanding of responses to anti-Jewish violence, the study will examine how the Jews and the Jewish Question were assessed by the newspapers under consideration. The study will investigate the responses to anti-Semitism and its violent manifestations against the background of changing domestic political events and developments, such as

\textsuperscript{15} This paragraph follows the excellent analysis of Christhard Hoffmann, “Geschichte und Ideologie: Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit 1879/81,” in W. Benz und W. Bergmann, eds., Vorurteil und Völkermord (Freiburg, 1997), 239-43.

\textsuperscript{16} See Münkler, “Role,” 975.
elections and the *Kulturkampf*. These responses will also be assessed within the context of the respective political position and world view of each newspaper. I will examine whether the given newspapers changed their assessments and judgements of anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic violence according to changing domestic political developments or whether they remained consistent in their interpretations.

In more general terms, this study is concerned with the question concerning the continuity of views towards anti-Semitic violence in nineteenth century Germany. Generally two main positions have been taken in this question. The first position holds that desire for anti-Semitic violence was an integral part of late nineteenth century German anti-Semitism. But this desire, we are told, was kept under control by the state's machinery. This argument, while it may appear plausible, is not grounded in substantial evidence. The second position argues that in late nineteenth century Germany collective anti-Jewish violence was generally rejected. It is a widely held view that anti-Semitism in the German Empire took either the form of a "respectable" anti-Semitism or of a Jew-hatred that had been transformed into a symbol. Hoffmann has demonstrated, how anti-Semites succeeded in being seemingly "civilized," "democratic," "social" and anti-Semitic at the same time. He argues that it was this "civilization" of Jew-

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17 For a discussion of this debate, based on the most recent research, see Richard S. Levy, "Continuities and Discontinuities of Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Germany, 1819-1938," in Christhard Hoffmann, Werner Bergmann, Helmut Walser Smith, eds., *Exclusionary Violence* (Ann Arbor, 2002), 185-202.

hatred, which made anti-Semitism acceptable in Germany, and in the long run effected a “pacification” of the anti-Semitic movement in Germany. Physical violence against Jews was, as a result, generally rejected by German society, and was not tolerated by the government authorities any more, Hoffmann holds. He suggests that it might have been precisely the process of this kind of “civilization” of Jew-hatred, which controlled and harnessed anti-Semitism for the time being, yet in the end may have actually encouraged an especially radical and destructive kind of anti-Semitism that came to the fore only after 1918 in a context of massive political crisis. The close study of the segment of the German conservative press under investigation, both Protestant and Catholic, shows, I would suggest, that there was actually a tendency to indirectly justify and legitimize anti-Semitic violence, wrapped up though in the often transparent dress of a “civilized” rhetoric whose mechanisms Hoffmann has described. Thus, this study is a contribution to the debate about the nature of anti-Semitism in late nineteenth century Germany and its continuity and discontinuity. In more general terms this research is a contribution to the question of how violence in the so-called “civilized” European countries was assessed, evaluated and might have been


20 Levy, “Continuities.”
legitimized in the late nineteenth century and thereby is also a contribution to the growing field of violence research.\textsuperscript{21}

This study differs from previous investigations on anti-Semitic violence in its methodology. I systematically investigated responses immediately before, during and after the occurrence of anti-Jewish violence, putting them into their immediate political context. I hoped that way to both detect the view of the press off guard, so to speak, and any occurring changes in the interpretation. After all, in 1881 the press was confronted, if not with a new, then with a relatively rare, phenomenon. Germany had not witnessed significant anti-Jewish rioting for almost forty years, while no large-scale anti-Jewish riots had occurred in Russia for more than one hundred years.\textsuperscript{22} Thus the press could not draw on already available arguments but had to create them from scratch. Second, I investigated the response of the German press not only to anti-Jewish violence in Germany, but also to such events abroad, in Russia. I hoped that in this way I might be able to enter the minds of the commentators from the back door, in an indirect way. Would German commentators, for example, feel freer to express their views when


interpreting anti-Jewish riots in the “backward” and “uncivilized” East, far removed from the social and political pressures and restrictions at home.\textsuperscript{23}

**Terminology**

Anti-Semitism has been used in scholarly research "as an umbrella term for negative stereotypes about Jews, for resentments and actions which are directed either at single Jews as Jews or at the whole of Judaism, as well as at phenomena because they were allegedly Jewish."\textsuperscript{24} Modern anti-Semitism, as it developed in the last third of the nineteenth century, differed from pre-modern anti-Judaism in various aspects. Anti-Judaism based charges against Jews primarily on economic and Christian religious grounds. Modern anti-Semitism can be seen as differing from anti-Judaism in four aspects: in new topics, a higher degree of reflection to defend anti-Semitic charges, in functions of anti-Semitism and in its degree of political organization.

New topics that complemented the old charges (which to some degree became less important) were, for example, nationalism, anti-Liberalism, the myth of world conspiracy, the charge that the Jews Judaize (verjuden) the world and racialism. Thus Jews were seen as ethnically different, a race with unchangeable, negative characteristics. Even though Jews had been seen that way in earlier times, this topic gained considerable significance in the course of the second half of the

\textsuperscript{23} For this attitude towards Russia see, for example, John D. Klier, "German Antisemitism and Russian Judeophobia in the 1880’s: Brothers and Strangers," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 37 (1989), 531.

\textsuperscript{24} Quoted from Blaschke, Katholizismus, 23.
nineteenth century, not least in the wake of different scientific racial theories. Jews, in pre-modern times seen as “strangers,” became in the time of an intensive nationalism “non-Germans,” a “people within the people,” a “state within a state,” which attempted to harm the German nation.

The higher degree of reflection of anti-Semitic arguments could be seen in that they were connected to newly developed science and research. Representatives of the older anti-Judaism would generally base their arguments on the old religious texts and traditions. Already the term anti-Semitism used science in a pseudo-scientific sense. It no longer wanted to fight the Jews because of their religion, but because of their character, which found expression in their behavior. Modern anti-Semitism succeeded in connecting not only religious and economical, but also social, political, international, cultural and ethnical questions to the “Jewish Question.” Thus, the journalist Otto Glagau succeeded in identifying the Jewish Question with the Social Question, and the well-known Historian Heinrich von Treitschke successfully connected his anti-Socialist, anti-Democratic and anti-emancipationist ideology with anti-Semitism.

Some scholars have emphasized the new functions modern anti-Semitism fulfilled: first, as a mechanism for integration it complemented nationalism. Second, it served to channel the dissatisfaction of those who suffered from the costs of the Liberal-capitalistic economic system. Conservative Parties and associations used anti-Semitism for political mobilization. Third, anti-Semitism served as a Weltanschauung which offered a remedy for all the ills of

modernization. And fourth, anti-Semitism developed into a “cultural code” which was used by Conservatives to fight Liberalism and emancipation.\textsuperscript{26}

The degree of organization was an important aspect of modern anti-Semitism. For the first time political Parties and associations were established between 1878 and 1880 with the main aim to combat the Jews and their alleged harmful influence.\textsuperscript{27}

This study is primarily concerned with the political aspect of anti-Semitism. However, I wish to emphasize that it is not concerned with the organizational aspect of political anti-Semitism. It focuses neither on the establishment of anti-Semitic Parties and associations nor on their activities. Rather this study investigates anti-Semitism as part of the political debate - used by different groups as a means to influence either the distribution of power or to attain part of the power within the state - in the political press.\textsuperscript{28}

The term pogrom was not yet used in the German press, either for collective anti-Jewish violence in Germany, or for such events in Russia. For convenience and for the sake of clarity, however, I will apply the term pogrom when speaking about anti-Jewish riots in Russia exclusively. This would not be wholly incorrect considering that the term originated in Russia and was used at the time in Russia to characterize anti-Jewish riots.\textsuperscript{29} Collective violence is meant here as “exclusionary ethnic riots,” as a “one-sided, nongovernmental form of collective violence against

\textsuperscript{26} Volkov, \textit{Leben}, 21-3.
\textsuperscript{27} This outline of modern anti-Semitism follows Blaschke, \textit{Katholizismus}, 24-6. For an extensive overview of literature on anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism, see ibid., 303-5n, 23-31.
\textsuperscript{28} I use Max Weber’s definition of the term politics here, see Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck, eds., \textit{Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe}, Vol. 4 (Stuttgart, 1978), 872.
\textsuperscript{29} For an account on the history of the term pogrom, see Klier, “Paradigm,” 34-5.
an ethnic group that occurs when one ethnic group (usually the majority) no longer expects to receive redress from the State for the (perceived) threat caused by another ethnic group (usually the minority)."\textsuperscript{30} The term violence is used only for physical violence and for no other forms of violence, such as, for example, verbal or psychological forms of violence. The term Nihilism was used in the German press as an umbrella term for diverse revolutionary opponents (who belonged to many circles and organizations) of the tsarist regime in the 1860s, 1870s and 1880s. In Russia they were called \textit{narodniki}, meaning populists, but they were also called revolutionary socialists, anarchists and Nihilists.\textsuperscript{31} “Liberal” and “conservative” with a small “l” and a small “c” designate the general persuasion. “Conservative” and “Liberal” capitalized designate the Conservative and Liberal Parties.

\textbf{The press in late nineteenth century Germany}

What was the state of the press in late nineteenth century Germany? In 1885 there were already 3,069 newspapers with an average circulation of 2,600 for each paper. In addition, as today, they were often read in cafés, where they were provided. Approximately one third of these characterized themselves explicitly as not being affiliated to a political party. Another third were either governmental or Conservative organs. The last third was either affiliated with the Centre Party, the National Liberal Party or the Left Liberals, each of which had approximately 300 to 350 newspapers. The Social Democrats had 54 newspapers. These numbers,

\textsuperscript{30} Hoffmann, \textit{Violence}, 11ff.
\textsuperscript{31} See Aronson, \textit{Waters}, 194.
however, do not tell us much about the distribution of their circulation. Unfortunately, we know too little about their circulation. All the same, these numbers can give some idea about the distribution of newspapers.\textsuperscript{32} Newspapers were not only read in the big cities, but were widely spread in small towns and the countryside. Literacy in Germany was relatively high compared with other European States: It is estimated that in 1871 approximately twelve per cent of the population was still illiterate (England approximately thirty per cent and France approximately twenty-four per cent in the 1860s), consisting mostly of old people, more women than men and rather more in the countryside and in the East than in the cities and in the Western parts of the state. The press law of 1874 established for the first time for the whole of the German Empire the freedom of the press. Censorship was completely abolished. Publications were no longer subject to special legislation, but were solely subject to the general penal law. From then on, in general, newspapers could not be prohibited and journalists could not be hindered from following their profession. Yet this did not mean that full freedom of speech was guaranteed. Depending on how the general penal law was interpreted by the police and the public prosecutors (for example as regards insult, treason and encouragement to disobedience towards the law), there was much room for them to intervene and, for example, arrest an editor. The Socialist Law, for example, had subjected the Socialist press to the law for prohibition and a state of siege from 1878 to 1890.\textsuperscript{33} It is important to recognize that the press did not merely keep people informed of day-to-day developments. In the newly founded Reich, based

\textsuperscript{33} Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1800 - 1866 (München, 1983), 463. Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866 - 1918, 1 (München, 1990), 798.
on universal manhood suffrage and against the background of continually growing literacy, the press emerged as a force for public opinion. The political press especially acquired vital importance for a democratic elected government whose success depended on the decisions of an informed citizenry. It was the latter who were casting votes on candidates. The political press was well aware of this and politicians utilized the press to influence the people.\textsuperscript{34} Bismarck’s use of the \textit{Welfenfonds}, the assets for the dynasty of Hannover, to bribe subversive newspapers and subsidize pro-government organs, is just one example for the attempt made by politicians to manipulate the press.\textsuperscript{35} The \textit{Germania}, to give an example from one of the newspapers under consideration, increased its frequency of anti-Jewish articles during the election campaign for purposes of political mobilization.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{Sources}

An examination of the German press, consisting of approximately 3,000 newspapers during the time under consideration, inevitably requires some selection of newspapers. This is not least from consideration of simple pragmatism, in order to make this project feasible from the point of view of volume and time. The newspapers considered in this study are the \textit{Neue Preussische Zeitung} (known as the \textit{Kreuzzzeitung}), the \textit{Germania}, the \textit{Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung}, and the \textit{Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums}. In

\textsuperscript{34} Kelly Leiter, Julian Harriss and Stanley Johnson, \textit{The Complete Reporter} (Needham Heights, MA, 2000), 484ff. For the term “political press” see below.

\textsuperscript{35} For Bismarck’s attempt to manipulate the press see part III.

\textsuperscript{36} See part II.
the following I will present a short portrait of these newspapers in order to convey an impression of their political profile. The portraits, while including aspects of the newspaper's origin and formation, will be restricted to the period under investigation.37

The *Kreuzzeitung* was founded in 1848 with the aim to build up Protestant conservative forces and like-minded persons to fight the "destructive forces of the revolution." It primarily addressed members of the old Prussian aristocracy and orthodox Protestants. The paper was financed largely by eminent aristocrats. Bismarck, a "Junker" himself, also had shares in the organ. Yet, the relationship between Bismarck and the *Kreuzzeitung* was going to face severe conflicts, especially after Bismarck had turned to the Liberals to put through his liberal economic policy in the 1860s and 1870s. The *Kreuzzeitung* revenged itself on Bismarck for this with its notorious "Aera-articles" in 1875. In these articles the paper attacked Bismarck's liberal economic policy and characterized Bismarck's Jewish banker, Shimon Bleichröder, as the "misfortune of Germany." Bismarck waited more than half a year until he responded to this attack. He finally did so in the Reichstag where he called on the people not to subscribe to the *Kreuzzeitung* any more. This, however, did not hinder the paper from becoming "one of the most influential newspapers in the contemporary press" in the 1880s. This was probably due to the network the editors of the *Kreuzzeitung* entertained with other editors of conservative newspapers on the one hand and state ministers, Prussian

37 For more details on these newspapers see also the respective chapters.
officials and Party activists on the other. The circulation of the Kreuzzzeitung reached approximately 8,600 in 1881.

The Germania was founded in 1871 paralleling the establishment of the “Fraction des Centrums” in the Prussian House of Deputies and the Reichstag. However, the paper was not, as is often assumed, founded as the Centre Party organ. Rather it was established in response to local needs of Catholic associations to be able to defend themselves adequately (in the predominantly Protestant capital of Berlin) against the attacks of the press of the capital. The strong political character of the organ could be seen in the fact that two of its founders were deputies, namely Friedrich von Kehler and Eduard Müller. By 1877 the paper, which appeared in Berlin, reached a circulation of about 8,000. The relatively small circulation should not obscure the fact that the paper was of great significance: together with the Kölnische Volkszeitung the organ was one of the two leading newspapers of the Catholic press and was regularly cited. By the end of 1881 the organ came out twice daily and had developed into the central organ of the Catholic Centre Party in Berlin. Unlike the Kölnische Volkszeitung, however, the Germania represented the right wing of the Party. In 1878 the organ was edited by a certain Dr Franz who left the newspaper in 1881 to take up a seat in the Reichstag and the Prussian House of Deputies. In this year, Fritz Nienkemper and Theodor Stahl became editors of the Germania. The paper was read and acknowledged both in Berlin and various parts of the German State as

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38 For more details see part I.
40 Germania, 250 (2 November 1881).
the paper that effectively supported the activities of the Party in the Prussian House of Deputies and the Reichstag.\textsuperscript{41} As the paper put it: “The Germania is the only daily newspaper which, in the midst of the battleground of our numerous opponents, fights for the rights of the Catholic people and its representatives. For this, the paper is acknowledged both in Germany and abroad.”\textsuperscript{42} The Germania spoke mainly for those Catholic circles, which were prone to anti-Jewish ideas and attitudes. Typically the organ expressed opinions of the lower middle class and the peasantry of Western and Southern Germany and Silesia.\textsuperscript{43}

The \textit{Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung} was founded in 1861. Its official ties to the government were quickly established by Bismarck whose aim was to use the organ for his own purposes. To this end, Bismarck worked together with the then Editor in Chief, Dr August Heinrich Brass, a former revolutionary. Bismarck granted the paper privileges and wrote his own articles for the organ. In 1872 Emil Pindter became Editor in Chief. Like Brass, he had a revolutionary past and had lived many years in exile, but was fully domesticated and concerned primarily with titles and decorations by the time he took up the post. He served as a pliant tool for Bismarck who continued to use the paper for his own purposes and planted his own stories.\textsuperscript{44} In addition, Bismarck often looked through the editorials before they were published and emended them. In the paper’s bill of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Germania}, 306 (20 December 1881).
\item Heinen, “Strömungen,” 282.
\item Fritz Stern, \textit{Gold and Iron} (New York, 1979), 277.
\end{itemize}
sale it was stated that the owner of the paper was obliged to be loyal to Bismarck and support his policy. The *Norddeutsche* was read and acknowledged beyond the borders of Germany. Abroad it was seen as the official mouth piece of Bismarck and as one of the most important German newspapers. With Pindter as Editor in Chief the paper reached a circulation of approximately 5,000.\textsuperscript{45}

The *AZJ* was the largest and most important organ of acculturated German Jewry during the period under consideration. This Jewish newspaper stood for religious reform within Judaism and supported the political Left during this time. It is estimated that the weekly paper had a circulation of approximately 1,600 in 1845. Unfortunately we know little about the circulation in the 1880s. The paper was founded in 1837 by Ludwig Philippson, who was also the paper’s Chief Editor until his death in 1889. Even though none of the articles were signed, it is assumed that most editorials were written by Philippson (who was, next to his journalistic work, also a rabbi and an educator) himself. The editorials of this Jewish weekly were of particular importance, but it also depended on correspondents and readers sending in reports and opinion pieces.\textsuperscript{46}

It is difficult to determine the authorship of most articles in the newspapers under consideration. They generally were not signed with a full name and only


very rarely with an initial. The latter usually are difficult to identify with an author as we still know very little about the people behind the given newspapers during this period. The findings in this study are representative primarily of the newspapers and their editors under consideration. To some degree these findings are also representative of those political parties whose values and political attitudes the chosen newspapers partly represented, namely the Centre Party and the German Conservative Party. Thereby this study tries to grasp a fragment - though an important one - of the spirit of the time with regard to the debate on anti-Semitism and its violent manifestations.

Four criteria determined the selection of newspapers for this study. First, the selected newspapers had to be as influential as possible with regard to the formation of political opinion both within the German press and the political elite. Within the system of the press we can, ideally, distinguish between two types of newspapers: those which set the tone and the public agenda with both their selection of topics and their comments and those which follow them in their reports and comments. The former could be called “opinion leaders.” These newspapers by no means need to have a large circulation and in the Kaiserreich many of them hadn’t, yet they remained influential. Not only other newspapers but also “important” people such as, for example, politicians, industrialists, academics, and clergymen often paid attention to them, not least because many of these newspapers’ editors had important links to political parties. Evidence for the degree of influence of these newspapers can be found in the fact that they were

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often cited both in the German and the foreign press. In the Kaiserreich, many of these “opinion leaders” belonged to the political press which was important for the formation of political opinion in the German press. Most of these newspapers were founded either in the wake of the 1848 revolution or in connection with the establishment of political parties. According to Bernhard Rosenberger, newspapers of the political press represented the socially most influential type of newspaper in the German press, not only in the nineteenth but also in the first half of the twentieth century. All newspapers considered in this study belonged to this group of newspapers with the exception of the Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums (AZJ).

A second criterion concerned the political milieu the selected newspapers belonged to. This study concerns the conservative contribution to responses to anti-Semitism and its violent manifestations; the chosen organs were therefore conservative-minded and affiliated with the Conservative parties, rather than liberal newspapers. (The AZJ, as a religiously and politically liberal-minded newspaper, is the exception to this category of newspapers.) This focus seems to me to be justified by two factors. First, the conservative movement had become an increasingly important political force in the Kaiserreich. Secondly, it was conservatives rather than liberals who largely opposed the newly established liberal order of 1871. This opposition was not least due to liberals putting the

48 Thus, for instance, the Germania cited the Kreuzzzeitung and vice versa, see, for example, Germania, 184 (16 August 1881); 185 (17 August 1881); Kreuzzzeitung, 193 (19 August 1881). Often, as in both of these instances, the newspapers disagreed with each other over certain issues. For an example of a citation of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung abroad see Norddeutsche, 129 (18 March 1881).
49 Rosenberger, Zeitungen, 72.
individual and his or her rights centre stage, an approach that contradicted conservative ideals of a collective and hierarchically corporate world order. As a result, conservatives (more than liberals) opposed Jewish emancipation as a manifestation and symbol of the liberal egalitarian order. As a result of their increased political power and their opposition to Jewish emancipation, they potentially had become more powerful to put through anti-Jewish policies. This, I assumed, may have fostered the expression of anti-Jewish views for political mobilisation. It therefore seemed to me to be of greater interest to investigate conservative-minded rather than liberal newspapers with regard to anti-Semitism and its violent manifestations.

A third criterion for the selection of newspapers concerned the religious and denominational affiliation. I wanted to cover both of the two main religions, Christians and Jews, and the two Christian denominations, Protestants and Catholics. Even though secularism was already a strong force in late nineteenth century Germany, the denominational and religious affiliation still played a significant role in political debates. In addition, to investigate Protestants, Catholics and Jews seemed to me to be interesting because of the majority and minority situation among them. While Protestants had become the dominant denomination in Germany after the establishment of the North German Confederation in 1866 and the unification of Germany in 1871 (with the exclusion of Austria’s Catholic population), Catholics had become the denominational minority. Jews on the other hand were the religious minority. In addition, Protestants were not only the majority, they also had a virtual monopoly on top
government and military positions and could more easily attain positions of power in other areas such as, for example, the university.\textsuperscript{50} It seemed to me to be of interest to examine whether this situation would influence the rhetoric about the Jews and anti-Semitism. Would Protestants express resentments about Jews more openly than Catholics due to their majority situation? Would Catholics be sympathetic to the Jews as a fellow minority and vice versa? Or would there be a rivalry between Catholics and Jews due to their minority situation?

The fourth criterion for the selection of newspapers concerned their geographical distribution. Rather than choose local newspapers I selected organs which were regional or supra-regional in distribution as I wanted to investigate newspapers that reached a geographically widely spread audience. Not least because the existing research on events of anti-Jewish violence in Germany has concentrated primarily on a local level I wanted to widen the focus beyond this geographical realm.

A few words are necessary as regards the selection of the AZJ. Even though this paper shared only two of the above outlined criteria, it seemed to me to be important to examine how a specifically Jewish newspaper, representing the object of the debate on anti-Semitism and its violent manifestations, responded to this discussion. It offers a useful counterpoint to the conservative press.

\textsuperscript{50} See Till van Rahden, “Jews and the Ambivalence of Civil Society in Germany, 1800-1933: Assessment and Reassessment,” \textit{Journal of Modern History} 77 (December, 2005), 1029-30. Till van Rahden quite rightly pointed out that not only Jews and Catholics, but virtually every group which asserted its own visions of individual and collective identity, acted as “minorities” in relation to the universal, that is the state, the nation and the public sphere. All the same I would like to insist on the factual majority-minority situation which, I believe, influenced these groups’ perceptions and arguments in political debates. Ibid., 1029.
As regards the nature and source of the selected newspaper articles I will identify them in order for the reader to be able to recognize both how the news got into the newspaper and whether they acquired the nature of, for example, an editorial or a report. In the following, I will explain and detail the nature of different kinds of newspaper articles and the system I have applied for their identification.

Newspapers consist of different kinds of articles. However, it is important to note that at this time, unlike today, there was no formal differentiation between facts and comments in German newspapers. Probably the most important category of newspaper articles is the editorial. While they may well contain some information, they are primarily designed to express an opinion. Editorials are written by an editor of the newspaper and they are in their very nature “articles of orientation.”51 These articles convey fundamental positions to relevant current issues by interpreting current events or public issues as seen by the editor. The role of the editorial is to give the newspaper an opportunity to convey its policies and beliefs. It gives the paper its distinct identity. The ultimate purpose of most editorials is to convince the reader. Occasionally, a newspaper will print an editorial on the front page to reinforce the importance of an issue.52 The other important category of articles which primarily convey an opinion is the comment. A comment usually refers to an event it comments upon and thereby gives some information. However, generally, the information stays in the background and the

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52 Leiter, Reporter, 223, 484ff.
commentator attempts to comment upon it, often in the form of arguments. His primary aim is, similar to the editorial, to convince the reader of his view. Other opinion-centred articles are, for example, book reviews. These articles express an opinion on a book and at the same time convey information on the book under consideration. Next to the editorial and the comment, there is the report. This kind of article differs from a comment by the fact that a correspondent tries to interpret and analyze on the basis of his more intimate knowledge of an issue and of the people concerned. Thus he may be able to convey the thoughts and feelings of certain persons or groups towards a specific event. A report can also be primarily a description of situations and conditions and convey an impression of scenes the reporter has attended. I have applied the following keys to the newspaper articles in this study: Editorial (E). Front-page editorial (FE). Comment (C). Report (R). In addition I have applied the following key to the newspaper articles considered in this study with regard to their source: From an editor (e). From a correspondent (c). From a letter of a reader (r). From another person (such as, for example, a writer or a politician) (p). From an agency (a). From another newspaper (n).

Research questions and approach

The sources were examined thoroughly and systematically with respect to articles relevant to the research questions from January 1881 to December 1882.

\[53\] La Roche, *Journalism*, 157ff.
\[54\] Ibid., 161ff.
\[55\] Ibid., 139ff, 153ff. Obviously there are many ways to classify newspaper articles and many more categories of articles could be added to the selection presented here. However, for the sake of clarity and for the purpose of this study, I have restricted them to the list described above.
The research questions are as follows: 1. What position do the respective newspapers take towards the Jewish Question and the Jews? Is the Jewish Question considered important? If so, why is it considered important? How is the Jewish Question defined? Is it defined as a religious, political, social or economic question? How should the Jewish Question be solved according to the newspapers under consideration? How do they portray the Jews? 2. How do the newspapers under consideration respond to anti-Jewish violence in Germany and Russia? Is it condemned or justified? Is the anti-Jewish violence revealed as being planned and organized or as spontaneous outbreaks of hatred? Does the response to anti-Jewish violence in Germany and Russia change during elections? If yes, how and why does it change? Who is responsible for the riots? What measures are proposed to stop the disorders? Does the response of the given newspapers to anti-Jewish violence in Germany differ in any significant way to the response to the pogroms in Russia? 4. What position do the newspapers under consideration take toward the Russian Jewish refugee crisis triggered by the pogroms? Do they welcome or reject international help for the refugees?

In general, those articles which were selected for presentation were important and “typical” for the position of the respective newspaper with respect to the research questions. Additional or deviant views were also presented. Thus articles were selected which either commented upon or described the themes under consideration such as editorials, comments and reports. The texts were assessed according to qualitative content analysis. This means that in contrast to a quantitative approach, neither the number, the length, nor the place of an article
within a newspaper was the focus of attention. Rather the content and the concrete statement and argument of the relevant article was the centre of the analytical interest. I am aware that some scholars prefer not to make a strict distinction between qualitative and quantitative content analysis and maintain that all reading of a text is essentially qualitative. Even though I agree that essentially all reading of a text is essentially qualitative, I would still like to insist on this distinction in order to clarify the approach used in this study. It means that I will not count articles and arguments and thus will not quantify them. I will not computer process great volumes of text. Rather, the hermeneutical-interpretative approach I use requires a close reading of relatively small amounts of textual matter. They involve the interpretation of given texts into new analytical narratives.\textsuperscript{56} Thus independent of its length or place within the newspaper, a comment of a few lines in a supplement might be of greater interest and significance than a long and purely descriptive report on the course of a pogrom on page two from either an agency or a correspondent. For a better understanding of the content of the texts, articles which referred to the wider political context in which debates about the Jewish Question and anti-Jewish violence took place, were also analyzed. With this qualitative content analysis I tried to grasp the attitude of part of the German conservative press towards anti-Jewish violence in the 1880s as accurately as possible. Even though quality rather than quantity of the reporting are the focus of

this study I will still give some information on the approximate frequency of articles relevant to the Jewish Question and anti-Semitic violence.\textsuperscript{57}

In this study I will analyze the content of newspaper articles to prove my thesis rather than use newspapers as a historical source. The specific method applied to do so is rhetorical analysis. Rhetorical analysis consists of a broad spectrum of approaches and terminology. However, the terminology and approach used in this study is based on Karl-Heinz Göttert.\textsuperscript{58} Yet, I would like to emphasize that I use rhetorical analysis as a tool to prove my thesis rather than present a critical discussion of rhetorical analysis as a theory. In addition I would like to point out that I will neither use all of the terminology nor cover all concepts and aspects of rhetorical analysis and its approaches as presented by Göttert. Rather, I will selectively use those terms, concepts and aspects of it which will help me to find the necessary information to prove my thesis. In the following I will outline the selected terms, concepts and aspects of rhetorical analysis used in this study.

Traditionally rhetoric served to produce texts and speeches. However, it can also be used as a methodical tool to analyze texts with the help of rhetorical categories, the model this study follows. The central aspect of rhetoric is to communicate effectively with a given audience and to persuade them that the speaker’s (or in this case the writer’s) point of view is the right one. Therefore the writer’s aim is to persuade the reader of his thesis about a certain issue. This can be done on two levels, emotional and intellectual. This study will focus on the analysis of the intellectual level only. Persuading another person intellectually can

\textsuperscript{57} See the respective chapters.
\textsuperscript{58} Karl-Heinz Göttert, \textit{Einführung in die Rhetorik} (München, 1994). For different approaches to rhetoric see ibid., 9ff, 194ff.
be done in various ways. Relevant for our study are three concepts: first, informative teaching; second, proving a thesis with arguments; and third, inventing a thought. Göttert refers here to Heinrich F. Plett. According to Plett, informative teaching intends to inform a recipient on a certain issue by reporting facts about this issue while proving a thesis with arguments means intentionally making an issue rationally plausible.\footnote{Göttert, \textit{Einführung in die rhetorische Textanalyse} (Hamburg, 2001), 3.} Arguments used in the communication can be determined either by a person or by a matter. Arguments which focus on a person rather than on a matter are often used as personal attacks, referring, for example, to the person’s religion, nationality or character to denigrate him.

Arguments which are determined by a matter refer to cause, possibility, definition, comparison, allegation, circumstances and other aspects of a deed.\footnote{Göttert, \textit{Einführung}, 26-37.} Finally, the idea of inventing a thought is based on the assumption that every incident which occurs in the world is a construct of typical possibilities. Thus, for example, when a riot occurs, there will be perpetrators, victims, reasons for the actions, solutions to the actions and much more. What is singular in this construction is not the incident itself, but the way its typical possibilities are composed. The newspaper writer’s task is to present such a composition. It is important to understand that these compositions are unavoidably subjective and biased, shaped by the values and beliefs of the writer. Using the above outlined terms and concepts, the main questions asked when analyzing the content of newspaper articles with respect to anti-Semitism and its violent manifestations are: What occasion gives rise to the need or opportunity for persuasion? What is the message of the content of a given
newspaper article? How is the text composed? On which parts of the composition does the writer focus and which ones does he neglect? How does he comment on the different parts of the composition? What are the principal lines of reasoning or kinds of arguments used? Do the authors praise or blame, explain, justify, attack or defend? What kinds of values and beliefs are revealed and promoted in the author's text? Who is the intended audience?

The information gained from the analysis is presented by devoting a separate chapter to each newspaper rather than following a thematic order. Even though such a newspaper-centred approach brings about a repetition of themes, it seemed to me to be more suitable for the analysis of the rhetoric in each newspaper. A thematic approach, while having the advantage of avoiding the repetition of themes, makes it more difficult to analyze the thought-world within a particular newspaper. In addition, such an approach might carry the risk of overlooking important rhetorics because it would juggle too many balls when treating different themes simultaneously by several newspapers. In the conclusion I will bring together the results of the different chapters to prove my thesis. A historical background chapter will provide some general knowledge of the situation of both German and Russian Jewry.

The Jewish Question, the outbreak of the anti-Jewish riots in Germany as well as the pogroms in Russia in 1881 and 1882 attracted much attention in the contemporary German (and international) press. All newspapers under consideration covered these themes intensively with the exception of the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung which only rarely reported and commented on these topics. Five main aspects can be identified in the coverage of these themes (which partly overlapped as regards their content and their chronology). With regard to the treatment of the Jewish Question, the debate focused primarily on the meaning of the Jewish Question itself. Central to this debate was whether the Jewish Question was primarily a political, economic, social or religious question. A second important aspect in this debate focused on how the Jewish Question could be solved. This discussion covered proposals ranging from the conversion of the Jews to their legal restriction and their expulsion. With regard to the anti-Jewish riots in Germany and the pogroms in Russia a central aspect in the reporting concerned the analysis of the cause of the violence. This issue focused on the question of who was responsible for the immediate triggering of the violence on the one hand, and the “deeper causes” of the disorders on the other. Most newspapers under consideration held the Jews and their alleged immoral behavior responsible for the disorders while at the same time taking other factors into consideration such as revolutionary activities and the role of the government authorities. A fourth important issue that was discussed was what could be done about the anti-Jewish violence. This issue centred on the implementation of governmental measures to be taken to stop the violence such as, for example, the prohibition of public incitement against the Jews, an appropriate punishment of the rioters, and the curtailment of the Jews’ legal rights. A final important aspect in the reporting dealt with the refugee crisis triggered by the pogroms. This discussion focused primarily on the value of international aid measures (such as financial help) for Russian Jewish
refugees. Unusually scant attention was given to the fact that masses of Russian
Jewish refugees travelled through Germany - quite a few of which tried to stay in
Germany - on their way to the West.

The study is divided into four parts. Each part deals with one newspaper.
Part 1 examines the Protestant Conservative newspaper. Part 2 explores the
conservative Catholic newspaper. Part 3 is concerned with the government paper,
and part 4 investigates the Jewish newspaper. It seemed to me to be useful to know
the general attitude the newspapers under investigation held towards the Jews and
the Jewish question in order provide a broader understanding of their response to
anti-Jewish violence. This endeavor in turn led me to structure the different parts
generally into three chapters, the first of which would deal with the attitude
towards the Jews and the Jewish Question, and then I explore the response to the
anti-Jewish riots in Germany and to the pogroms in Russia.
The Historical Background

The period between 1867 and 1873 could be seen as a starting point for numerous new developments in Germany. In 1870 and 1871 Germany was unified and a new Empire founded. The introduction of universal suffrage marked the beginning of a politicization of the masses. Parallel to the emerging political mass market, fluid parliamentary groups with no firm structure gradually formed into more coherent parties.\textsuperscript{61} Emancipation for all Jews in the new Empire was finally realized by 1871. Under these circumstances, Jews flocked into the professions and quickly improved their economic status.\textsuperscript{62} Between 1867 and 1873, the framework of a Liberal economy was established. For this aim Bismarck had allied with the National Liberals, the largest Party in the Reichstag and representative of middle-class interests and ideals. Fearing the power of political Catholicism, organized in the Centre Party, the alliance with the National Liberals also helped Bismarck to launch a campaign against German Catholics in what came to be called the \textit{Kulturkampf}. Liberals demanded a “cultural struggle” against the Church, which they saw as authoritarian and clerically obscurantist, especially after the Vatican’s Syllabus of Errors and the proclamation of papal infallibility.\textsuperscript{63} The \textit{Kulturkampf}, however, was not a specific German but a European-wide phenomenon between 1870 and 1914, concerning the separation of the Church and the State. It was a

\textsuperscript{61} Edgar Feuchtwanger, \textit{Imperial Germany 1850 - 1918} (London and New York, 2001), 60.
\textsuperscript{63} James J. Sheehan, \textit{German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century} (New York, 1999), 135-6.
conflict between the modern, secularized State and the traditional, religious Church, which affected primarily the Catholic Church. Beginning in 1871, Bismarck launched a series of anti-Catholic measures and laws, which were designed to curtail the power and influence of the Catholic Church in the public sphere and public institutions, such as education, marriage, and control over the Church’s activities. Bismarck perceived the Catholic Centre Party as an enemy of the State (*Reichsféind*) and was determined to diminish the influence of what he conceived to be the anti-Prussian forces of German Catholicism, represented by the Catholic Centre Party. Not least because of the presence of Poles in the Centre Party, Bismarck viewed the Party as a defender of Polish nationalism within the Prussian establishment. In addition, Bismarck sought to limit the political influence of the Party, which had risen swiftly due to significant electoral success.  

Alliance with the National Liberals (the limitations of which came to the fore dramatically at the end of the 1870s) brought about a break between Bismarck and the Conservatives, the class of Junkers to which he belonged. This development brought about a loss of power for Conservatives, which in turn strengthened the alliance between Bismarck and the National Liberals.  

Against this background and under the impact of the economic crisis in the wake of the great bankruptcy in 1873, anti-Semitism became increasingly a matter of politics and political strategies. Two politically representative newspapers launched a campaign against the Jews in 1875. The *Kreuzzeitung*, representing Prussian Conservatives and the

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*Germania*, organ of the Centre Party, identified Jews with Liberalism and blamed them for the economic crisis. The *Kreuzzzeitung* called Bismarck’s policy “Jew-policy” (*Judenpolitik*), referring to Bismarck’s Jewish financial advisor, Gerson von Bleichröder, as well as Eduard Lasker and Ludwig Bamberger, two leading figures of the National Liberal Party.⁶⁶

By 1879 Bismarck had returned to the Conservatives. He hoped to get a Conservative majority in the national Parliament, the Reichstag, to put through his plan “to create a corporatist system of representation based on occupational and economic interests, functioning in competition with and (if the occasion arose) as a political alternative to the Reichstag...”⁶⁷ Bismarck also hoped to realize his protectionist economic policies, such as the introduction of protective tariffs, for example, which were not compatible with Liberal economic principles. Bismarck’s reasons for returning to the Conservatives (one of which was a decisive difference between him and the National Liberals in how to deal with the Socialists) were manifold and complex and will not be discussed here in detail.⁶⁸ The Reichstag elections of October 1881 however, did not result in a success for Conservatives. The two Conservative Parties loyal to the government, the German Conservative Party and the Free Conservative Party, lost seats and votes. The Liberal Progress Party in contrast, more than doubled its votes and seats, while the Catholic Centre Party could well maintain its position.⁶⁹

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⁶⁸ For a more detailed account on these policies and the complex reasons for Bismarck’s political turn, see Feuchtwanger, *Germany*, 84ff; Nipperdey, *Geschichte*, 2, 382ff.
⁶⁹ Feuchtwanger, *Germany*, 87.
Despite initial political setbacks, Bismarck's return to the Conservatives marked a turning point in the political, social, cultural and economic climate of the Empire: the end of the Liberal era had begun, and with it shifted the meaning of the Jewish Question. During the first half of the nineteenth century, a "Jewish Question" had arisen in political debates that dealt with the question of an appropriate position of the Jews in society, referring to the emancipation of the Jews (that is to the acquisition of equal civic rights by Jews). This process had started in Europe with the French Revolution and eventually altered the Jews' legal status in European society.\(^7\) Although there was opposition to Jewish emancipation during the nineteenth century (mostly from German Conservatives), German Liberals throughout this time fought for the abolition of legal restrictions on the Jews, which were incompatible with their concepts of a modern, liberal State (based on a capitalistic economic system), and a civic society (based on freedom of the individual and of property). Jewish emancipation became a touchstone for the States and their development towards a modern liberal State. It was against the background of these demands and their fulfillment by 1871, that Jewish emancipation was realized in the whole of the German Empire. However, the great crash in 1873 and the following economic crisis brought to the fore the difficulties and crisis of economic adjustment to the Liberal capitalistic economy (like, for example, the modernization of agriculture and the industrialization of production) that had hitherto been reduced and alleviated by the preceding economic boom. The economic crisis not only brought about economic

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\(^7\) See Jacob Katz, "The Term ‘Jewish Emancipation’: Its Origin and Historical Impact," in Jacob Katz, Emancipation and Assimilation (Westmead, Farnborough, 1972), 21; Peter Pulzer, "Why was there a Jewish Question in Imperial Germany?" Leo Baeck Institute Year Book, 25, (1980).
resentments, which were directed against the Jews, it also brought about a crisis of
the liberal, social, cultural, political, and economic norms. Against this
background, the predominant meaning of the Jewish Question changed: The
restriction of the already emancipated Jews' civic rights, and not the emancipation
of the un-emancipated Jews, became the dominant demand in political debates.\(^{71}\)
Anti-Semitism became an outlet for all dissatisfactions with the current crisis,
which was expressed in anti-capitalist, anti-Socialist, anti-modern and anti-
emancipationist terms, directed against Jews. It manifested itself in what was to
become known as the "Berlin movement," referring to a general rise of anti-
Semitic publications and agitations in Berlin from 1879 onwards.\(^{72}\) Thus, rallies
of prominent anti-Semitic agitators, such as, for example, Adolf Stöcker (a
Protestant court preacher who founded the Christian Social Workers’ Party in
1878) became popular only once they started to discuss the "Jewish Question."\(^{73}\)
The intensive debates of the movement often focused on solutions to the Jewish
Question, in particular integrationist (inter-marriage and conversion) and
segregationist (repeal of Jewish emancipation) solutions.\(^{74}\) Perhaps the most
influential of these debates was what later became known as the "\textit{Berliner
Antisemitismusstreit}" (Berlin debate on anti-Semitism). This debate attracted

\(^{71}\) Reinhard Rürup, "Emanzipation und Krise. Zur Geschichte der ‘Judenfrage’ in Deutschland vor
1890," in Werner E. Mosse, ed., \textit{Juden im Wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890 - 1914} (Tübingen,
1998), 1-56.

\(^{72}\) The Berlin movement has been well researched. See for example Jacob Katz, \textit{From Prejudice to
Destruction} (London, 1994), 252-272; Peter Pulzer, \textit{The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in
Germany and Austria} (London, 1988); Paul W. Massing, \textit{Vorgeschichte des politischen
Antisemitismus} (Frankfurt am Main, 1986), 30, 43-4, 48, 54-5.

\(^{73}\) Hoffmann, "Geschichte," 220-1. For literature on Stöcker and other prominent anti-Semites see

\(^{74}\) For solutions of the Jewish Question, see Donald L. Niewyk, "Solving the ‘Jewish Problem’:
Continuity and Change in German Antisemitism, 1871-1945," \textit{Leo Baeck Institute Year Book},
XXXV (1990). For the terms integrationist and segregationist, see ibid.
considerable attention at the time and any examination of the way in which the German conservative press responded to incidents of anti-Jewish violence in 1881 and 1882 needs to consider (and could well be understood to some degree as an extension of) this “key episode in the history of political ideas in the Kaiserreich.” Even though the newspapers under consideration in this study rarely mentioned the Antisemitismusstreit (which had ended in December 1880) explicitly in 1881 and 1882, it had doubtlessly contributed moral encouragement when these papers attacked the Jews. Therefore, and because it formed the immediate pre-history of our investigation, we need to consider this debate in some more depth.

Starting in November 1879 and ending in December 1880, a controversy among intellectuals and academics, especially historians, was triggered by the publication of an article on the Jewish problem. It was written by the prominent historian and liberal politician Heinrich von Treitschke and appeared in his prestigious Preussische Jahrbücher. The inspiration for the article, entitled “Unsere Aussichten” (our future perspectives), was Treitschke’s reading of the eleventh volume of Heinrich Graetz’s “History of the Jews,” whom he accused of

75 Rahden, “Ambivalences,” 1024.
76 However, to trace a direct influence of arguments used during the controversy by its protagonists onto the newspapers under consideration would be difficult. Too many sources had contributed to a wide variety of anti-Jewish arguments not only during but already long before the controversy.
77 For literature on the Berlin debate on anti-Semitism see Karsten Krieger, ed., Der “Berliner Antisemitismusstreit” 1879-1881, 2 vol. (München, 2004); Walter Boehlich, Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit, (Frankfurt am Main, 1965), 5ff; Uffa Jensen, Gebildete Doppelgänger: Bürgerliche Juden und Protestanten im 19. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 2005); Hoffmann, „Geschichte,” 219ff. The fact that the Berlin debate on anti-Semitism was primarily fought by historians was no coincidence. In the age of historicism “history” rather than God or reason had become the most important tool to legitimize political actions, see ibid., 227. Treitschke had been a member of the National Liberal Party. However, increasingly he adhered to a national-chauvinistic worldview and in 1879 he left the Party, see Krieger, Antisemitismusstreit, XVIII.
“despising German Gentiles.” This attitude, according to Treitschke, was not restricted to Graetz but rather was prevalent amongst Jews in general. Treitschke then analyzed the recent increase in anti-Semitism in his article. Even though he dissociated himself from the “coarseness” and the “dirt” in many current anti-Semitic debates and rejected the revocation of Jewish emancipation, he still justified these debates as an expression of a widely felt evil. The root cause of this evil, according to Treitschke, lay with the Jews themselves. It was primarily the Jews’ “arrogance,” their ridiculing of the Christian religion, and their drive to rule the German stock market and the German press which were responsible for the severe danger that German national life now faced. Treitschke deplored the run on widespread materialism and secularism in society and blamed it (at least partially) on the Jews. In addition, he accused the Jews of exploiting their neighbours with usury and of destroying the people’s drive for honest work with their businesses (Geschäft). He deplored the alleged growing immigration of Polish Jews whom he described as “trouser selling boys” whose children were one day going to dominate the stock market and the press in Germany. Treitschke viewed the Jews as a people alien to the “Germanic nature” due to their scars from four hundred years of Christian persecution and put into question their ability to comply with his demand to totally assimilate and become fully-fledged Germans. Thus, Treitschke concluded that “even from among men who would scornfully reject every notion of clerical intolerance or national arrogance, one hears today unanimously: ‘The Jews are our misfortune’”! Germans, unlike the French or the English, Treitschke elaborated in his article, were still weak in their national
culture and national pride, which left them vulnerable to the “damaging” Jewish influence. Therefore, Germans needed to strengthen their national identity, he suggested. 78

The effect of Treitschke’s article cannot be overstressed. The impact it had was largely due to the fact that it was the first time such views had been expressed by such a widely known and eminent personality like Treitschke. His prestige and status came not from his being simply a professor of history but on his holding the most prestigious chair of history in Germany as the successor of the renowned historian Ranke in Berlin. Unlike Stöcker or other prominent anti-Semitic agitators, Treitschke belonged to the intellectual and liberal establishment which had hitherto influenced public opinion and the political culture in Germany to a significant degree. Thus, probably no other article helped more in making anti-Semitism respectable among academic circles on the one hand and helped strengthening the Berlin Movement on the other. 79 Few other anti-Semitic lampoons like “A Word about our Judaism” (Ein Wort über unser Judentum, an

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78 Quoted from Goldhagen, Germans, 591n26. This slogan was still popular in the “Third Reich”, see ibid. 428; Michael A. Meyer, ed., Deutsch-Jüdische Geschichte in der Neuzzeit, 3 (München, 1997), 201ff; Krieger, Antisemitismusstreit, 6, 14-15.

79 In August 1880 the high school teacher Bernhard Förster initiated a petition, the so-called “Antisemitenpetition” that demanded the factual revocation of Jewish emancipation. No doubt, Treitschke’s example gave moral encouragement to the petition. The petition was eventually signed by 265,000 people 4,000 of which were university students, that was nineteen per cent of all university students in Germany. The petition was submitted to Bismarck in April 1881. The fact that he did not reject its reception can be seen as an attempt by Bismarck to sympathize with the anti-Semites during the election campaign for the forthcoming Reichstag elections in 1881. However, the petition, which demanded restrictions for Jews (such as restricting the immigration of foreign Jews and excluding Jews from government posts and the courts) did not have any consequences. Krieger, Antisemitismusstreit, XXVII; Pulzer, Riss, 242-3. A debate in the Prussian house of deputies on the “Jewish Question” on 20th and 22nd November, initiated by the left Liberal Progressive Party, demonstrated that apart from the Progressive Party there was little support for Jewish emancipation and anti-Semitism was broadly condoned by the other political Parties who used Treitschke’s accusations when attacking the Jews. Krieger, Antisemitismusstreit, XXIV-XXV.
inexpensive brochure which collected Treitschke’s articles on the Jews, published in January 1880) had found a larger readership. It was in this collection of articles, in which Treitschke gradually began to distance himself from his view expressed in “Unsere Aussichten” that Jewish emancipation should not be revoked. Rather, he began subtly to approve of the revocation of Jewish emancipation.\footnote{Ibid., XVIIff, 695ff.}

In more general terms, Treitschke tried to de-legitimize the liberal historical worldview in his writings, which saw the contemporary anti-Semitism as a renewal of the “barbarism” of the Middle Ages, thereby using history to de-legitimize anti-Semitism (convinced that one could learn from history). Treitschke used two rhetorical lines of arguments to counter this view. Firstly, he reversed the historical perpetrator-victim-relationship. It was not the Jews (a minority) who were persecuted by the majority of the population but the Jews that now “terrorized” the majority. Secondly, Treitschke, like others, constructed an “eternal anti-Semitism.” By pointing out that in pre-Christian antiquity Jews were already hated, he tried to legitimize the contemporary anti-Semitism as a natural part of the culture of the occident rather than just a religious prejudice. This implied that the reason for anti-Semitism lay unmistakably with the Jews alone. Another important line of argument in Treitschke’s rhetoric referred to the position of the Jews in German society. Treitschke (as many other liberals who became supporters of a national policy of power after the establishment of the Reich), wished the German nation to be a “monolithic entity,” a closed, national community. In this concept of a powerful state there was no room to recognize the right of a minority to have its own identity. As a result, complete assimilation was
demanded of those who were different. Treitschke, concerned with the
establishment of a national identity in the newly founded Kaiserreich, defined
Germans as a “Christian people.” This led him to rehabilitate the Christian
tradition in historical perspective: German national history had its roots in the
history of Christianity in the Middle Ages and was inextricably linked with it.
Judaism, in contrast, was seen by Treitschke as the national religion of an alien
people. In his definition of Germans as a “Christian people” there was no room for
a Jewish subculture within the German nation. Therefore, in the age of
emancipation, Jews had to subjugate themselves and conform to the majority
culture. At the same time Treitschke questioned whether Jews actually were able
to integrate themselves into German society and culture and be loyal German
citizens. Because modern German Jews defined themselves as “German citizens
of Jewish creed,” Treitschke believed that they were unwilling to integrate
themselves fully to the German culture and German society.  

Treitschke’s publications were to polarize German intellectual and
academic opinion. At first, it was almost exclusively Jewish intellectuals and
politicians (such as, for example, the historian Heinrich Graetz and the Liberal
politician Ludwig Bamberger), who protested in a flood of articles and brochures
against Treitschke’s views. They tried to refute the accusations levelled against
them with factual evidence or counter-arguments. In November 1880 (probably

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81 Hoffmann, „Geschichte,“ 230-9; Hans-Michael Bernhardt, “Die Juden sind unser Unglück!” in
Christoph Jahr, Uwe Mai und Kathrin Roller, eds., Feindbilder in der Deutschen Geschichte (Berlin,
1994), 45ff. Bernhardt plausibly explains Treitschke’s attacks against the Jews as a product of his
fear that in the age of a more democratic and economically more modern society, the value of
education (Bildung), hitherto a privilege of an exclusive class, was to crumble. Thus, exponents of
the intellectual elite like Treitschke feared a loss of status, as education was no longer the only
means to acquire status, or the preserve of the privileged classes, see ibid. 49-50.
triggered by the "Antisemitenpetition") seventy-five non-Jewish notables (among them intellectuals and industrialists like the eminent historian Theodor Mommsen), launched a public protest against the anti-Semitic agitation. In the following weeks, a public controversy developed between Treitschke and the liberal Theodor Mommsen, whose intellectual prestige even outshined Treitschke's. The "Antisemitismusstreit" reached a peak with the publication of Mommsen's essay "Auch ein Wort über unser Judentum" (Another Word about our Judaism) on 10th December in reply to Treitschke's brochure "Ein Wort über unser Judentum." In his essay, Mommsen decisively condemned anti-Semitism and reproached Treitschke for using his authority and prestige to make anti-Semitism socially respectable. Yet, even though Mommsen praised the Jews in his essay for their achievements in the fields of literature and the economy, he also conceded that Treitschke's accusations against the Jews had a kernel of truth. As a result he shared, for example, Treitschke's complaint about "Jewish usury." In addition, like Treitschke, Mommsen, in accordance with the liberal position, demanded full assimilation of the Jews and their conversion.\footnote{Krieger, \textit{Antisemitismusstreit}, 695ff.}

The debate had split not only German intellectuals and academics into either Treitschke supporters or opponents of Treitschke but also the German press. As already noted, the newspapers considered in this study (along with many other newspapers) participated in the debate too. The \textit{Kreuzzeitung}, as an orthodox Protestant Conservative organ, disagreed with Treitschke over several issues. Unlike Treitschke, the paper did not demand that the Jews give up their religion. On the contrary, it believed they should live as a minority in a Christian
dominated state where they could no longer be elected (and therefore be prevented from becoming over-represented) as civil servants. Sharing Treitschke’s complaint about “Jewish usury” the paper demanded the introduction of strict laws against usury and hoped that this would also help to make life for Jews in Germany less attractive.\textsuperscript{83} The conservative-minded Germania, on the other hand, stressed the economic and intellectual “dangers” the Jews posed. Laws were needed to protect the religion of the nation against their “usury” and “exploitation” of the people and their moral and anti-religious attacks. The paper had reservations about Jewish emancipation and, like Treitschke, doubted that they, due to their history, descent, religion and character, would ever be able to totally assimilate themselves and become fully-fledged Germans.\textsuperscript{84} The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, as an official governmental organ, was more concerned with foreign press reactions to the anti-Semitic movement in Germany. The paper criticized the London Times for having morally reprimanded Germans for their treatment of the Jews and for interfering in internal German affairs.\textsuperscript{85} The Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums, the main weekly organ of religious liberal German Jews, primarily attempted to refute and correct Treitschke’s accusations against the Jews. This organ was concerned with Treitschke in almost every issue until January 1881.\textsuperscript{86} Thus, Treitschke and his views became the focus for many articles, whether implicitly or explicitly, whether in agreement or in disagreement.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 127-30.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 17ff, 574-5, 722ff.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 656ff.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 102ff, 140ff, 400ff.
— perhaps what we would recognize today as “setting the agenda,” what was going to be talked about and debated, at least partly, in the press.

Even though Mommsen’s protest was powerful and generated many followers, he was ultimately unable to prevent that the national and cultural anti-Semitism of Treitschke influenced both part of the leading German elites and large parts of the German bourgeoisie. Mommsen’s and other liberals’ failure in fighting anti-Semitism was not least due to the fact that the liberal position in this matter was contradictory and unable to present a clear counter-position to Treitschke. On the one hand, liberals like Mommsen demanded equal legal rights for the Jews, on the other they, like Treitschke, rejected the concept of a cultural pluralism as the basis of German society and demanded that the Jews give up their Judaism in order to become Germans. Thus Treitschke was not wholly wrong when he wrote to Mommsen that their positions on the Jewish Question were not that dissimilar.\(^7\)

The importance of the “Antisemitismusstreit” is not merely in providing historical background for our study, it is important too because of its historiographical impact. The debate attracted not only intensive attention from contemporary commentators but has also become the focus for many subsequent historians. The latter group has tended to take this prominent controversy as giving a representative picture of late nineteenth century German anti-Semitism. Traditional historical interpretation, often taking its lead from this debate, contributed to a view of anti-Semitism in late nineteenth century Germany which held that anti-Semitism, while widespread and manifest, was of a “respectable”

\(^7\) Ibid., XXff.
and "civilized" kind. That the protagonists of the *Antisemitismusstreit* dissociated themselves from a "rabble-rousing" kind of anti-Semitism has frequently been put forward in traditional historical writing as evidence that the anti-Semitism in the *Kaisereich* would not approve of anti-Semitic violence, a view which I attempt to qualify in this study.\(^8\)

In Russia opinions on the civil status of the Jews, and thus on the Russian Jewish Question, were becoming a matter of public debate only from the beginning of the Reform Era under Alexander II in 1858. Before this time, Nicholas I had forbidden the press to express views on this issue. The Reform Era, which brought about the abolition of serfdom in 1861, necessitated reforms in all areas of life, such as local government, the judicial system, taxation and military recruitment. The Jewish Question too became an issue under these circumstances, when commentators drew an analogy between the liberation of the serfs and the emancipation of the Jews. Reformers together with a small group of wealthy Jewish bankers and businessmen, as well as a group of acculturated Jews, who were representatives of a new Russian Jewish intelligentsia, were vital in bringing the debate on the Jewish Question into the emerging Russian press. By the time of Alexander II’s assassination in 1881, the Jewish Question had become a major topic for public debate.\(^9\) Judeophiles (as those sympathetic to the Jews where then called in Russia), mostly Russian Liberals, generally proposed to solve the Jewish Question by abolishing the Pale of Settlement (the regions where most Jews were

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\(^8\) See, for example, Hoffmann, "Geschichte," 242.

\(^9\) For the development of a Jewish Question in Russia, see John D. Klier, *Imperial Russia’s Jewish Question 1855 - 1881* (Cambridge, 1995).
restricted to live, as I will discuss below) and granting full civic rights to the Jews. They argued that the faults of the Jews (such as the "economic exploitation" of the Christian peasantry by the Jews and the "religious fanaticism" of the traditionally-minded Jewish masses) were the product of past discrimination and negative environmental conditions, such as the laws regulating the Pale, which concentrated the Jews in the Western and Southern regions of the Empire and that alienated the Jews from their fellow citizens. Jewish competition within the overcrowded Pale was so fierce that Jews were compelled to exploit Christians as a natural product of the struggle for existence, they believed. If the Pale were abolished as well as other discriminatory legislation, such as the law that forbade Jews to buy land and thus hindering them from becoming farmers, this would sweep away all their negative features. Judeophobes (as anti-Semites in Russia were then called), mostly Conservatives, on the other hand argued that the shortcomings of the Jews were either the product of centuries and thus could not easily be removed, or that the Jews were fundamentally flawed in their moral character and would always remain adversaries of the Gentile population. The economic activities of emancipated Jews would ruin the peasant masses, they argued. The Conservatives' views and approach to the Jewish Question eventually prevailed over Liberal proposals and culminated (against the background of the pogroms in 1881 and 1882) in the "Temporary Laws" of May 1882, which reinforced the Pale of Settlement and further restricted the movement and occupation of the Jews even within the Pale.\footnote{John D. Klier, "The Russian Press and the Anti-Jewish Pogroms of 1881," \textit{Canadian-American Slavonic Studies}, 17, 2 (1983), 213-8. For the terms Judeophobia and Judeophilia, see Klier, \textit{Question}, xix.}
What were the similarities and differences between German and Russian Jew-hatred? Both, Russian and German anti-Semitism erupted into anti-Jewish violence in 1881, even though the Russian pogroms by far exceeded the German violence as regards duration, intensity and geographical extent. Both in Germany and Russia, economic competition could be seen as partly having caused the intensified hatred, politicized in both the German and the Russian press as well as by the respective governments (and in Germany by the political Parties). Common anti-Jewish charges were those of the Jewish usurer, the Jewish exploiter of the general population and the Jewish revolutionary and Nihilist.

Russian Judeophobia, as negative attitudes towards Jews were called by contemporaries in Russia, however, also differed markedly from German anti-Semitism. This was not surprising, considering that Russian Jewry was very different from German Jewry in respect to its numbers, culture, legal and economic position. Thus Russian Judeophobia was directed against a largely un-emancipated, traditionally living, lower-class Jewry, engaged economically in very different areas to those in Germany (as I will discuss below). The typical hostile Russian stereotypes of the Jews were those of the tavernkeeper intoxicating the peasants, the "economic exploiter," and religious fanatics. German anti-Semitism, directed against a largely emancipated and assimilated middle-class Jewry, regarded Jews primarily as the embodiment of modernism with its anti-religious, anti-Christian rationalistic views, which threatened the traditional order and Christianity. Jews were also increasingly seen as unchangeably flawed due to their race; a concept that, even though used in Russian debates in the 1880s and before, failed to gain
wider acceptance. Rather "Russian society was still inclined to think of the Jew in a religious sense, a status washed away by the waters of baptism."\footnote{For a comparison between and influences of German anti-Semitism on Russian Judeophobia, see Klier, "Brothers." For a discussion of racialism in the Russian Judeophobe rhetoric, see Eli Weinermann, "Racism, racial prejudice and Jews in late Imperial Russia," \\textit{Ethnic and Racial Studies}, 17, 3, (1994).}

What were the demographic and occupational structures of both German and Russian Jewry at the time under consideration? There were about 500,000 Jews in the German Empire. The most important demographic phenomenon among German Jews was their tendency to move from the countryside and small towns to the bigger cities on the one hand, and from the Eastern regions of the Empire to its Western parts. Berlin and Frankfurt were the cities with the highest concentration of Jews. About ten per cent of all German Jews lived in Berlin in the 1880s. As regards the occupational structure, it can be said that the proportion of Jews in agriculture was minimal. Fifteen per cent of the economically active German Jewish population was in craft. The proportion of Jews who were in commerce and banking was high, about fifty per cent of the economically active Jewish population. With regard to the general population, Jews made up about ten per cent of the general population in commerce. Fewer Jews were in industry and trade, only about eighteen per cent. Many Jews were in the free professions. In the countryside Jews played a role as cattle dealers, they dealt in farming products as well as in the property and money market. In the cities Jews were mostly in clothing, coal and metal businesses. As regards the professional, economic and social status of the Jews, it can be said that by 1907 about fifty per cent of the Jews
were self-employed (including small businesses like shop owners and peddlers), about seventeen per cent were employees and about thirty per cent were in other dependent occupations. About sixty per cent of German Jews had a middle- and upper-middle-class position, while about twenty-five per cent were lower-middle-class. A small proportion of Jews were very rich members of the upper classes and a small proportion of Jews were lower-class. Thus, in general, it could be said that German Jewry was overwhelmingly middle- and upper-middle-class with a small proportion of upper- and lower-class as well as lower-middle-class citizens. In general German Jewry increasingly acculturated. They had abandoned the Yiddish language. They wore German clothes; they had German habits and customs as regards food and holidays (they, for example, took over the Christmas tree), speech and bourgeois norms as, for example, the ideal of Bildung (education).\footnote{This survey of German Jews follows Thomas Nipperdey, \textit{Deutsche Geschichte 1866 - 1918}, 1 (München, 1990), 1, 396-413.} German Jews had improved their economic position in the course of the nineteenth century quite drastically. Before 1800 the majority of German Jewry lived in poverty. Yet their predominant traditional occupation, namely small trade and commerce, helped them to take part in the general development of commerce and industry in the nineteenth century.\footnote{For a detailed account on this topic, see Werner E. Mosse, “Die Juden in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,” in Werner E. Mosse, ed., \textit{Juden im Wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890 - 1914} (Tübingen, 1998), 57-113; Rahden, “Ambivalences,” 1030-33.}

In contrast to the emancipated, largely middle-class Germany Jewry, Russian Jewry in 1881 was still restricted to a significant degree by Russian law and the majority lived in poverty. They were mostly confined to the territories, where they lived in the late 1700s, and adjacent sparsely settled areas into which
they were allowed to move. This whole region came to be known as the Pale of Jewish Settlement, most of which (with its large Jewish population) came under Russian domination as a result of the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. It comprised regions like Lithuania, White Russia and the Ukraine. Alexander II (1855-81) attempted to promote Jewish assimilation. Under his rule residence restrictions for Jews were relaxed for retired soldiers, the wealthiest class of merchants, artisans, mechanics, Jewish university graduates, and liquor distillers together with their families. Russian schools and higher educational institutions were opened to Jews. Jews were allowed to enter government employment, participate in municipal government institutions and join the legal profession.

In contrast to the largely assimilated German Jewish life-style, most Russian Jews still maintained a traditional way of life, holding on to age-old Jewish practices. They clung to their special dietary laws, unusual clothing, distinctive holidays and their Sabbath. They spoke Yiddish among themselves. They generally knew just enough Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, or Lithuanian to communicate with their neighbors. Classical Jewish learning was to a large degree shared by the Jewish masses. Thus they were a highly visible, well-knit community, despite internal struggles between the Chassidim (members of a pietistic, mystical movement that emphasized inwardness, spontaneity, and the guidance of a rebbe-tsadik, a saintly leader and teacher) and the misnagdim (those who opposed the Chassidim and favored a more intellectual and somber style of religion).
Most Russian Jews, about eighty per cent, lived in towns and small trading centers (shtetlach in Yiddish). Only a small percentage, about eighteen per cent, lived in villages along with peasants in 1897. Thus they constituted a large proportion (from one-fourth to over one-half) of the urban population of the Pale. In 1897 there were 5,000,000 Jews in Russia, about ten times as many as in Germany. The shtetl was the typical economic and social link between the Jews and the peasants in the Pale. It varied in size from several hundred people to over 20,000, with Jews often a significant majority.

The occupational distribution of Russian Jews in the Pale of Settlement, as reported in the population census of 1897, represents a society in flux. Most Jews, about seventy per cent, were tradesmen (often outnumbering non-Jews in the Pale), about thirty per cent were craftsmen and industrialists (again outnumbering non-Jews) and about twenty per cent were involved in transportation. As in Germany, very few Jews were agriculturalists. The Jewish businesses were generally on a very small scale, involving little capital. They dealt mainly with consumer, rather than capital goods such as foodstuffs and agricultural products, and as such they were a major factor in the economy of the Pale. Jewish involvement in the liquor trade and tavern keeping (a heritage of previous times, when ownership of taverns was a feudal privilege of the nobility, who leased their rights to Jews) was large. At the same time Jews increasingly moved to other occupations to meet the needs of an industrialized society, such as for ready-to-wear clothing and housing. The majority of the Jewish population in the Pale, as already mentioned, lived in poverty. Jewish tradesmen often served as middlemen for both rural clients and the
lower classes in the urban areas. Many Jews served as bankers and moneylenders. By 1881 some Jews had become quite wealthy as railroad builders, financiers and industrialists. The mass of the Jewish population, however, was becoming increasingly impoverished, caught by the population squeeze within the Pale, due to the high birth rate among Jews, combined with a relatively low child mortality rate (thanks to medical advances and the concern Jewish parents and Jewish community organizations showed for the welfare of their children). The increasing impoverishment of Jews in the Pale was intensified by the sluggish development of commerce and industry.\textsuperscript{94}

1881 was the year that marked the outbreak of anti-Jewish riots in Germany and Russia. On 17th July 1881 a riot directed against Jews broke out in the small town of Neustettin in the province of Pomerania. In the wake of this riot, in which almost one thousand people took part, the windows of nearly all Jewish homes were smashed as well as many Jewish shops damaged, some demolished. It marked the beginning of a series of anti-Jewish riots in many small towns in the provinces of Pomerania, West-Prussia and Posen, which lasted for two months. Hundreds of rioters took part in them, shouting “Hep-Hep” and “Jews go to Palestine.” In the wake of these riots, houses and shops of Jews (as well as synagogues) were damaged and demolished and sometimes people were hurt.\textsuperscript{95} These outbreaks of

\textsuperscript{94} This survey of Russian Jewry follows Michael Aronson, \textit{Troubled Waters} (Pittsburgh, 1990), 29-43. For the \textit{shetlach}, see also Massimo Ferrari Zumbini, \textit{Die Wurzeln des Bösen} (Frankfurt am Main, 2003), 519-20.

\textsuperscript{95} For more details on the disorders, see the respective chapters. For a detailed reconstruction of the causes and course of events, see the only existing systematic historical analysis on these events by Christhard Hoffmann, “Political Culture and Violence against Minorities: The Antisemitic Riots in
collective violence against Jews did not happen out of the blue. Hoffmann has identified three general causes that led to the outbreak of the riots: anti-Semitic propaganda, social tensions and “misunderstood signals of a cynically manipulative government.” Anti-Semitic agitation had found a foothold in these regions as early as 1875, when the Norddeutsche Presse had become a major organ of the anti-Semitic movement in Neustettin. Other anti-Semitic newspapers were disseminated in the region, often in local pubs. Anti-Semitic committees and associations, who had sprung up in these places, together with some individual officials and a few clergy, complemented the agitation by joining the anti-Jewish chorus. Ernst Henrici, a fervent anti-Semite who called for the expulsion of all Jews from Germany, had shortly before the outbreak of the riots toured the region in order to collect signatures for the Antisemitenpetition. One of Henrici’s public speeches, which regularly attracted large audiences, was held in February in Neustettin. A few days later the synagogue in Neustettin was burning. The reason for the fire was never discovered. However, Henrici and the local (as well as the national) anti-Semitic press accused the Jews of setting the fire themselves in order to get a larger insurance compensation, as well as to damage the reputation of the anti-Semitic movement. In June 1881 Henrici toured the region of Pomerania and West Prussia again, just a few weeks before the outbreak of the disorders, further stirring up emotions against the Jews. Social tensions were a further causal factor for the outbreak of the riots. These were born out of the larger structural crisis and rooted in the growing competition from industrial products and modern marketing

methods, which rendered small-scale production in these largely unindustrialized areas (where most people lived from agriculture and handcrafts) unprofitable. For many people, the Jews (who were largely in commerce) were to blame for this state of affairs. Another important cause for the riots is seen in the behavior of the government. Bismarck flirted with the anti-Semitic movement, not least by accepting the anti-Semitic petition and exchanging formal greetings with several anti-Semitic organizations. He attempted to instrumentalize the movement as a weapon against the Liberals. Yet the rural workers and craftsmen of Pomerania and West Prussia were understandably unable to see through such tactics and took the signs of public support for the anti-Semites at face value. The rioters thus believed they acted in favor of the government when they attacked the Jews with violence. Researchers call these kinds of riots “loyalist pogroms” (as opposed to “protest pogroms” and “state-led pogroms”).

In Russia, anti-Jewish views and feelings intensified noticeably during the 1870s. Similar to Germany, they could be divided into three categories: governmental attitudes that were not favorable to the Jews, anti-Jewish propagation, and social tensions. Thus anti-Jewish views among government officials helped to make the rioters believe they acted in favor of the government when attacking the Jews. In the press, anti-Jewish articles increasingly appeared during the 1870s and were rarely censored, as opposed to the Russian Jewish press, which was often subjected to restrictions and administrative warnings for defending the Jews' interests. Anti-Jewish sentiments found expression in the

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96 For an overview of the causes of the riots, see Hoffmann, “Violence,” 67-9. For the concepts of different kinds of riots, see ibid., 76-7. For the specific local origins of the riots, see part 1.
pogrom that erupted in Odessa in 1871 and a trial, in Kutais in the Caucasus mountains in 1879, in which Jews were accused of using Christian blood in religious ceremonies. Even though the accused Jews were acquitted, the press seriously debated the question whether Jews actually did use Christian blood for religious purposes. The Russo-Turkish War (1877-8) fuelled nationalist feelings and resulted in many newspaper articles that attacked the Jews as contractors who supplied the army. They allegedly robbed the government and harmed Russia’s military power by their various chicaneries. The fiercely anti-Jewish books written by the Jewish apostate Jacob Brafman, which first appeared in the periodical press, also helped considerably to intensify anti-Jewish feelings. Russian and Ukrainian nationalism, which increased during the 1860s and 1870s, and which advocated taking a firm hand with the Empire’s national minorities, is seen as another causal factor of the pogroms. Social tensions too played a role, when competition between Jewish and Christian craftsmen and manufacturers (many of whom were ambitious newcomers, who resented having to contend with Jewish businessmen) intensified as a consequence of the opportunities offered by the expanding Russian economy during the reign of Alexander II. Many non-Jews were critical of the increase of Jewish students at the universities and as a result in the professions like medicine, law and teaching, which meant more competition for non-Jews, both in the educational institutions as well as in the professions. All these developments and attitudes lay in the background when “the Russian and Ukrainian masses joined in large-scale anti-Jewish violence for the first time in over a hundred years.”

Throughout spring and summer 1881, anti-Jewish pogroms continued to flare up

97 For Brafman, see part 1.
sporadically, initially in cities such as Kiev and Odessa, from where they spread to peasant villages in the countryside. The epicenter of the pogroms was Kherson province. Altogether eight Ukrainian and south western provinces between Kiev and Ekaterinoslav were affected with pogroms. In Warsaw too, a pogrom broke out on Christmas Day in 1881. During the waves of anti-Jewish pogroms in 1881 Jewish homes and shops, particularly taverns, were damaged and plundered and property losses were considerable. Many Jews were beaten during the violence. Cases of rape and killing occurred. The highest estimate refers to 40 deaths and 225 cases of rape in 1881. 15 rioters are estimated to have died in clashes with the military. Pogroms sporadically reappeared until 1884.98

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PART I

The Conservative Struggle Against Liberalism

German Conservative public opinion was markedly led by the *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, known as the *Kreuzzeitung*. Those with a more immediate concern in the organ, also sometimes called the “*Kreuzzeitung* group,” could be divided into three main elements. Firstly, the Editor of the *Kreuzzeitung*, Baron Wilhelm von Hammerstein-Schwartov, member of both the Prussian House of Deputies as well as the Reichstag. Hammerstein succeeded Benno von Niebschütz as Chief Editor in November 1881.99 Two of Hammerstein’s closest aides were Baron Eduard von Ungern-Sternberg (who was Co-Editor of both the Conservative Party newspaper *Conservative Correspondenz* and the *Konservative Monatsschrift*) and Hermann Kropatschek, who succeeded Hammerstein as Editor in 1895. Secondly, the Old Conservatives, also called the “High Conservatives” or “Ultras,” who sat in parliament and adhered to the old Conservative ideals.100 Most of these sat in the Prussian House of Deputies and regarded Hammerstein and the Court Preacher Adolf Stöcker as their leaders. Thirdly, a network of Party activists all over Germany organized in *Bürgervereine* (Burgher associations) in Berlin and Conservative *Vereine* (associations) in the countryside. In addition to these three main elements, the *Kreuzzeitung* group had the support of important ministers and generals such as Robert von Puttkamer (Prussian Minister of the Interior), Gustav

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99 See Rohleder, „Preussische (Kreuz-)Zeitung,“ 219.
100 For details on the Old Conservatives’ ideals and policies, see Retallack, *Notables*, 13-53.
von Gossler (Minister of Cultural and Ecclesiastical Affairs) and Alfred von Waldensee (Chief of the Prussian General Staff). Contemporaries also considered the Court Preacher Adolf Stöcker and his followers to belong to the Kreuzzeitung group. The Kreuzzeitung group was able to exert its influence via its affiliated press, the corps of Conservative Ultras in the Prussian Landtag, through the agitation of regional Conservative Vereine, and through state ministers or Prussian officers who felt an affinity with their cause.  

Within the German Conservative Party “Kreuzzeitung Conservatives” constituted a counter-movement during the time under consideration. The Party was split between the more reactionary Old Conservatives and the so-called “New Conservatives.” Having suffered electoral defeat and parliamentary isolation in the early 1870s, the New Conservatives had come to realize that if they were to regain any political influence they had to adapt to the new political situation of a unified German State based on universal franchise. The establishment of the German Conservative Party in 1876, led by (among others) Otto von Helldorff-Bedra, aimed to achieve this. However, this meant that the Party had to re-establish close ties with Bismarck, ties that had suffered several severe blows during the 1870s. Both the establishment of the Liberal economic policy and the Kulturkampf against the Catholic Church, had alienated Conservatives from Bismarck. The Kulturkampf affected the Protestant Church with the introduction of both civil marriage and the reform of local government in Prussia (the Kreisordnung) in 1872, which aimed to reduce the local administrative powers of Prussian estate owners in the Prussian

101 Ibid., 36-40, 54-71.
East. The traditional power that the aristocratic class had exerted, through its authority in every state and principality, and the autonomy and independence of the state churches was at stake. This power had traditionally been exerted by the feudal lord or king, under whose protection the church in his state was, constituting the one Corpus Christianum. While the State was concerned with the policies of the Church and the security of its members, the Church had been granted full independence in its inner sphere. This unity of power was now being threatened by the separation of State and Church; the Church was to lose its independence to determine its own jurisdiction, as well as parts of its inner sphere.

What were the major aims of the Kreuzzeitung group? Conservative politics was to be influenced so that the Protestant Church would regain its full rights and the middle and lower classes would be re-incorporated into a socio-economic order of hierarchical relationships. Thus Conservative politics were to break with Liberal influences. The Conservative Party was to be Christian, monarchist, agrarian, militarist and social, but most importantly it was to be independent of Bismarck. The efforts of the Kreuzzeitung group to achieve their aims were complemented by the intense agitation of the Christian Social Party, which joined the German Conservative Party in 1881, under its leader the Court Preacher Adolf Stöcker.

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102 Ibid., 13-4.
103 Uriel Tal, Christians and Jews in Germany (Ithaca and London, 1975), 143ff. It should be noted that while a counter-movement in the 1880s, the Kreuzzeitung group succeeded in taking over the leadership of the German Conservative Party in 1892 with Hammerstein as its leader, see Rohleder, „Preussische (Kreuz-)Zeitung,” 220-1.
104 See Retallack, Notables, 40.
105 For details on the political goals of the Kreuzzeitung group, see ibid., 36-51.
106 Ibid., 36-8.
This Right Wing segment of Conservatives incorporated anti-Semitism into its ideology, as I will discuss later. Unlike Stöcker however, who attracted much scholarly attention as one of the leading exponents of political anti-Semitism, these Conservatives have received little scholarly attention as important carriers of anti-Semitism in the 1880s.\footnote{An important exception is James Retallack, “Anti-Semitism, Conservative Propaganda, and Regional Politics in Late Nineteenth Century Germany,” \textit{German Studies Review}, 11 (1988).} Right Wing Conservatives projected their extreme anti-Liberal and anti-modern attitude onto the Jews who became the embodiment of Liberalism and modernism. Jews and Judaism came to serve as a cultural code, as Shulamit Volkov has argued, to combat Liberalism and modernism. Those who expressed anti-Semitic views, Volkov maintains, did not primarily express anti-Jewish feelings; rather they indicated their affiliation to a political, social, and economic world view which was anti-Liberal, anti-modern and anti-emancipationist. According to Volkov this brand of anti-Semitism was fundamentally different from Nazi anti-Semitism. The latter “was a culture in which verbal aggression did not substitute action but was its preparation.”\footnote{Shulamit Volkov, \textit{Jüdisches Leben und Antisemitismus im 19. & 20. Jahrhundert} (München, 1990), 28, 33, 64, 74.} I agree with Volkov, that the anti-Semitism of late nineteenth century Germany acquired an important function for Conservatives in their battle against Liberalism and modernism. However, the argument that this brand of anti-Semitism did not aim at violent action while basically correct is misleading. Even though it did not initiate anti-Jewish violence, once anti-Jewish violence erupted, it did not stand in its way. By indirectly justifying and legitimizing anti-Jewish violence, I argue,
anti-Semitism as a cultural code turned into an encouraging rather than a deterring force.
1 “To be or not to be” – the Jewish Question

Editors and journalists inform their readers about particular issues. However, not only do they carefully select these issues from a variety of matters, they also place them into a hierarchical order in terms of their significance. By means of qualifying statements and frequency of reporting they endow different issues with varying degrees of importance and thereby “set the agenda.”

In the first days of 1881 the *Kreuzzeitung* put the Jewish Question to the top of its agenda. In an editorial the paper stated: “The Jewish Question [in Germany] has become a burning issue since the beginning of the year, and every newspaper now has a running column on it.” This was, the paper explained, because “the Jewish Question had become the central question of Life”. Articles concerning the Jewish Question and the Jews appeared almost every other day, and sometimes every day, from then on during 1881 and 1882. The organ also ran a special column entitled “The Jewish Question.” The paper repeated the claim of the *Allgemeine Conservative Monatsschrift* that the cause for this new situation was to be found in the fact that the Jews had risen above Christians and had taken dominance over them. It said that not only the Jews, but also the establishment of the Liberal system were responsible for this new situation. It was also clear that the

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111 E.e. *Kreuzzeitung*, 12 (15 January 1881).
112 E, e, ibid., 150 (30 June 1881).
present battle against the Jews had to be directed against the Jews and the modern Liberal Weltanschauung, which had allowed the Jews to rise in the first place.\textsuperscript{113} This battle was of no minor importance. "The struggle between Jews and Christians is a struggle of to be or not to be, namely a struggle between the Christian and the rationalistic Weltanschauung," the paper maintained.\textsuperscript{114} This line of argument firmly linked the Jews to the modern, Liberal system. The process of transforming anti-Jewish arguments into a cultural code was under way. The Jews were becoming a symbol for Liberalism and modernism.\textsuperscript{115}

To employ anti-Jewish arguments as a means to combat the existing Liberal system was, however, not a new strategy for the Kreuzzeitung. In 1875 the paper launched a series of articles which challenged the economic policy of Liberalism by attacking Bismarck’s policy as Judenpolitik (policy of the Jews).\textsuperscript{116} What was new was that the Jewish Question had shifted from a rather marginal place within the Kreuzzeitung to a more central point of its attention. This shift was by no means restricted to the Kreuzzeitung. Rather it was part of a general rise in anti-Semitic publications and agitations in Berlin (including the Antisemitismusstreit), which rose to a new height from 1879. This new development soon became known as the "Berlin Movement" and could be described as the "attempt to politicize anti-Semitism."\textsuperscript{117} This new wave of anti-Semitic agitation should be seen in the

\textsuperscript{113} C. n. ibid., 168 (21 July 1881).
\textsuperscript{114} E. e. ibid., 12 (15 January 1881); E. e, supplement, ibid., 28 (3 February 1881).
\textsuperscript{115} Volkov, Leben, 13-36.
\textsuperscript{116} James Retallack put this attack against the Jews in the context of Conservative Party politics and their tensions between New and Old Conservatives. See Retallack, Notables, 14-5.
\textsuperscript{117} Olaf Blaschke, Katholizismus und Antisemitismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich (Göttingen, 1997), 120.
context of Bismarck’s turn to the Conservatives in 1878 and 1879. Conservatives had found themselves before in a marginalized, powerless position during Bismarck’s alliance with the National Liberals; his turn to the Conservatives gave them new hope to put through their Conservative values and politics. As Hammerstein put it (at the Evangelical-Lutheran Church Conference):

The beginning has been made: Bismarck has abandoned the principle of laisser faire, laisser aller…let us do all in our might that this beginning will result in a complete change of systems in our social and economic legislation. We are standing in the midst of a decisive battle of two Weltanschauungen, the Christian Conservative on the one side and the Liberal rationalistic one on the other.\(^\text{119}\)

Why did the Jews become such a prominent target? Why were they attacked to a greater degree than Liberals were, against whom this struggle was after all primarily directed? The answer to this question has often been treated as obvious. “The responsibility for weakness of character and failure was placed where it hurt the least - on the margin of society, on the outcasts, on the Jews.”\(^\text{120}\) Another view held that the Jews were selected because they were the most readily identifiable of Germany’s internal enemies on which all the ills of society could be blamed. In addition, to attack the Jews served to score points in the arena of public opinion.\(^\text{121}\) Others have argued that the Jews became the scapegoats for all the ills of modernization because they constituted a minority that was characterized by their closeness to modernity, economically, intellectually, and politically: economically

\(^{118}\) See Bernhardt, „Juden“, 31.
\(^{119}\) R. c, Kreuzzzeitung, 200 (27 August 1881).
\(^{120}\) Volkov, Leben, 32.
\(^{121}\) Retallack, “Anti-Semitism,” 381.
with their presence in economic areas such as stock markets and industry; intellectually in the form of the secularized Jewish intelligentsia; and politically in their participation (often in leading positions) in Liberalism and Socialism.\textsuperscript{122} These interpretations share the assumption that the Jews were attacked because they were an identifiable, disliked minority group. They do not explain why the Jews became the \textit{central} target in the struggle against Liberalism. After all, there were other disliked minorities in the German State, for example the Poles. Poles, unlike Jews, however, were not fully emancipated in the \textit{Kaiserreich} and suffered legal restrictions as regards the use of their language and the practice of their religion. Furthermore, Poles, unlike Jews, had not been a former dispersed minority group which was legally restricted for centuries and did not have their own (monarchical) State. Poles had come under German rule only with the late eighteenth century partitions of Poland. Unlike the majority of German Jews, many Poles did not want to assimilate into German society. On the contrary, Polish nationalism flourished throughout the nineteenth century and the hardest attempts of Bismarck to acculturate Poles (for example by imposing the German language on them), often failed to a large degree because of their resistance. Gypsies were another identifiable, disliked minority group yet, similar to the Poles and unlike the Jews, did not enjoy full civic equality but had been placed under special regulations. Similar to the Poles, they did not attempt to assimilate into the mainstream German population but remained a group distinctly apart.\textsuperscript{123} These are


\textsuperscript{123} Panikos Panayi, \textit{Ethnic Minorities in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany} (Harlow, 2000), 51-67, 95-8.
important differences if we are to understand the specific central role assigned to the Jews by Right Wing Conservatives.

Uriel Tal connected the Conservatives' battle against the Jews with their battle for a re-establishment of the old hierarchical order in which not the people but the monarch and the old ruling aristocratic and religious classes held the power in the State.\textsuperscript{124} "The Leviathan, the modern State, with its impersonal administrative apparatus, its secular political Parties, must be restrained, for they all undermine the individualistic tradition of the historical cells of our nation; we must therefore begin by limiting the power of the Jews, since they are the ones who demolished our tradition."\textsuperscript{125} These words, from a proclamation of Count Krassow, Kleist-Retzow, and Freiherr von Hammerstein, indicate that the starting point to a return to a hierarchical order would be a reversal (or at least a restriction) of Jewish emancipation. Jews had become the central target for Right Wing Conservatives, not primarily because they were a disliked minority group but because of their emancipation. Jewish emancipation was part of the new Liberal system that had abolished the Jews' former subordinated and legally restricted position in a hierarchical world order. Jewish emancipation now became the exemplification per se for the loss of the hierarchical world order. Consequently, it was the reversal (or restriction) of Jewish emancipation that Right Wing Conservatives fought for, as I will explore below. Success would be nothing less than the first step to a return to a hierarchical world order, in which every group and class held its designated place with the aristocratic class at its top. It is in this context that we have to understand

\textsuperscript{124} Tal, Christians, 143-59.
\textsuperscript{125} Quoted from ibid., 152.
the call for a Christian State by Kreuzzeitung Conservatives. The Christian State was the modern version of the lost Corpus Christianum, which had granted for so many centuries the political power of the aristocratic class. The basic ideological thesis of the Christian State was that the ethical and political legitimacy was derived not from the sovereignty of the people or from any historical social contract between the State and its citizens, but from the principle of civitas dei, as embodied in the person of the monarch. In face of the rising masses, Christian exclusiveness was being included into this thesis, hence the attribution of the adjective “Christian.” The concept of the Christian State conveys the idea that the State as such possesses the qualities of Christianity, excluding the Jews by its very nature, whether explicitly stated or indirectly implied by the exponents of the idea. This exclusion refers not to the population, but to the fabric of the government, its arms and agencies and thus excludes Jews from positions of power in the State.\textsuperscript{126}

The view of the Kreuzzeitung that the struggle they fought for was a struggle between Weltanschauungen, actually meant a struggle for naked political power.

Just as in the 1860s, when the Jewish Question functioned as a touchstone and criterion for Liberals to measure how far a State had reached their political demands for a modern State (such as a society based on civic equality, whose civic and political legal rights were to be independent of their religious creed),\textsuperscript{127} it now functioned as a touchstone for the present political system. Once the Jewish Question was no longer discussed, it would mean that the Liberal system had won

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 146-48; Katz, Prejudice, 195-202.
out against Conservative dreams of a hierarchically organized society. Thus, dismissing reports by the Liberal press on the anti-Jewish riots in Pomerania as exaggerated and false, the K reuzzeitung held that such journalistic behavior aimed to "superficially increase the spontaneous emotions of rejection and regret and to bury under such emotions the whole Jewish Question." Yet the paper concluded that this tactic of the Liberal press would not succeed, as it was the task of the time to solve the Jewish Question as far as possible. The paper further emphasized: "Eugen Richter is wrong, if he thinks that no Jewish Question exists, if no Jewish Question is being discussed, or that the Jewish Question would disappear, when it is not spoken of." The Jewish Question thus had become an existential element in political debates for Right Wing Conservatives. How did they view the Jewish Question? For them, the Jewish Question was primarily a social and political question, rather than a religious one. As Hammerstein put it (at the Evangelical-Lutheran Church Conference):

If certain anti-Semites try to solve the Jewish Question by smashing windows, demolishing houses as well as physically attacking Jews on the one hand, and if Mister von Döllinger believes that the Jewish Question exists only because there is a lack of Christian brotherly love, then both are wrong...Just as in the Bible we do not find a social-political solution for the present Social Question, we can take neither brotherly love nor love of enemy as a means to solve the political behavior of the peoples and nations to each other. If the conflict is seen as a religious one, it would not be solvable. The latter approach has been taken by friends of the Jews (Judengenossen) in order to cloud the real core of the matter. They took this approach to deny the existence of a Jewish Question and to label any discussion of it as barbarism.

128 C, c, Kreuzzeitung, 189 (14 August 1881).
129 FE, e, ibid., 50 (28 February 1882).
130 R, c, ibid., 200 (27 August 1881). Ignaz von Döllinger was an eminent Church historian who fought against anti-Semitic prejudices. See Blaschke, Katholizismus, 73.
In order to justify and demonstrate to its readers the necessity to curb Jewish emancipation, the *Kreuzzeitung* had to demonstrate the harmfulness of the Jews and their actions. The analysis of most anti-Jewish rhetoric has typically focused on listing stereotypes and arguments put forward against the Jews. Less attention has been paid to the techniques, which were applied to turn Jews into “hate figures.” After all, hate figures are not simply there, ready at hand when they are needed. Their image has to be carefully constructed in order to fit the needs of those who use them. However, this is not to say that such images can be freely invented. They have to have some basis in reality. Three major techniques can be generally observed in the production of images of hate figures. First, the construction of a hate figure as an anti-thesis. Second, the establishment of a long history of enmity. Third, the attempt to personify the hate figure. In the following I will explore how the *Kreuzzeitung* created an effective image of the Jews as hate figures by using all three of these methods.

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131 I should like to point out here that I do not subscribe to a crude functionalism, which believes that the Jews were only attacked because they fulfilled an important function. Rather, I believe that Right Wing Conservatives believed what they said when they attacked the Jews. Yet, hatred against Jews alone does not explain the specific place the *Kreuzzeitung* attributed to the Jews in their ideology.


133 I follow with this terminology the approach that makes a distinction between a “hate figure” and a negatively stereotyped figure. The former is characterized by its tendency to an exceptional high degree of potential power, a figure which can exert universal, dangerous power. Consequently, hate figures differ from negatively stereotyped figures by a fear of a totalitarian power of the “enemy.” Hate figures are primarily the result of collective fears and crises and have more to do with those who construct and perceive them than with the hate figure itself. See Hans-Michael Bernhardt, “Voraussetzungen, Struktur und Funktion von Feindbildern,” in Christoph Jahr, Uwe Mai, Kathrin Roller, eds., *Feindbilder in der Deutschen Geschichte* (Berlin, 1994), 13-4.

134 Ibid., 18.
Christianity Versus Judaism

In their attempt to re-establish and conserve their world (as regards their political, social and religious power), self-definition of Right Wing Conservatives went hand in hand with marking the enemy as the negative counter image, a "negative double" to their own positive painted world.\textsuperscript{135} To understand the construction of the Jews as an anti-thesis, we must first understand how \textit{Kreuzzzeitung} Conservatives defined themselves.\textsuperscript{136}

The core of \textit{Kreuzzzeitung} Conservatives’ identity was Christianity. Due to emancipation from Christianity (the paper reported in an editorial), a religiously indifferent State, which placed the worldly, individual well being at its top, had been brought about. Supporting the idea of a Christian State, the organ maintained that in a Christian State Christianity had to be represented in the legislation and public institutions, which Liberalism had removed it from. A Christian State meant a State based on religion and morality, freedom of religion, but not freedom from religion, freedom of conscience (\textit{Gewissensfreiheit}), but not freedom from conscience. “Only in Christianity lies the salvation of our people,” the paper concluded.\textsuperscript{137} “The whole of our German Fatherland can only be saved when Christianity as the victory power among the people permeates the whole State and

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 16, 17. Also, Michael Jeismann, \textit{Das Vaterland der Feinde, Studien zum nationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstverständnis in Deutschland und Frankreich 1792 - 1918} (Stuttgart, 1992), 65.

\textsuperscript{136} For a detailed historical reconstruction of the Jews as an anti-thesis since the emergence of Christianity, see Christhard Hoffmann, "Das Judentum als Antithese. Zur Tradition eines kulturellen Wertungssturses," in Werner Bergmann und Rainer Erb, eds., \textit{Antisemitismus in der politischen Kultur nach 1945} (Opladen, 1990). Hoffmann’s opinion that employing negative antithetical arguments freed one from the need to define oneself, that “through the negation could one’s own ‘empty position,’ stay undefined,” is contradictory, as Hoffmann himself shows how every negative image applied to the Jews is paired with a positive one applied to the group under consideration, see ibid., 29.

\textsuperscript{137} E. e, \textit{Kreuzzzeitung}, 142 (21 June 1881).
our national life,” Hammerstein maintained. The concept of a Christian State was therefore a central claim for the Kreuzzeitung. A Christian State would not only safeguard Christianity as a religion in the State, by its very nature it would also exclude Jews from it, as noted above.

If Christianity was thus defined by the Kreuzzeitung as the central characteristic of Conservative identity, Judaism was defined as its negative double. “Judaism and Christianity are opposed to each other,” the Kreuzzeitung declared.

This was so, the paper explained, because “the whole spiritual life of the Jews of modern times was based on its opposition against Christian spiritual life (Geistesleben).” Jews and Judaism not only represented anti-Christian values, such as materialism, financial greed and lack of religion, in the view of the paper, they also taunted the Christian religion. Jews influenced Christians with these values by means of the press and thereby endangered the religious and moral basis of German national welfare, the organ maintained. However, the Christians themselves, who had abandoned their religion and fallen into the hands of the Jews and their “bad influence,” were primarily to blame for this situation, the paper noted. The organ cited the claim of the Catholic paper Augsburger Postzeitung

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138 R. c, ibid., 200 (27 August 1881).
139 For the origins of the idea of a Christian State and its political implications for Jews, see Katz, Prejudice, 195ff. As regards the place of the concept of a Christian State in Conservative ideology, see Tal, Christians, 121-59.
140 C. c, Kreuzzeitung, 91 (17 April 1881); E, e, 127 (2 June 1881).
141 C, n, ibid., 176 (30 July 1881).
142 E, e, ibid., 12 (15 January 1881); C, n, 34 (10 February 1881; C, c, 91 (17 April 1881); E, e, 127 (2 Juni 1881); C, c, 224 (24 September 1882).
that Jewish influence had already gone so far that it had led to a “serious infection” of the German people.  

The Historicization of Jew-Hatred

Demonstrating a long history of enmity with a chosen group of people is a technique well-known to writers and journalists. It should be noted though, as Michael Jeismann pointed out, that this kind of historicization is not about exploring a historical phenomena. Rather this approach aims to prove the existence of an ever-lasting enemy, an “archenemy,” by using historical evidence. In the age of historicism, history became an important tool for the legitimization of one’s position in the political debate. Liberals argued with Conservatives about the correct interpretation of the past when it came to anti-Semitism. The former labelled it as the “barbarism of the Middle Ages,” thereby de-legitimizing modern anti-Semitism as a phenomena not fit for the modern, civilized world and were convinced that it was possible to prevent the future persecution of the Jews provided they recalled the past history of their persecution. Conservatives, on the other hand, tried to historically legitimize modern anti-Semitism by putting forward the claim of an “eternal anti-Semitism,” which was meant to prove that the cause of Jew-hatred lay with the Jews and not with “barbaric” Conservatives. The Jewish Question exists since Christ,” the paper stated. Citing the claim of the

143 E. n, 35 (11 February 1881).
144 Jeismann, Vaterland, 89.
146 C. c, supplement, Kreuzzzeitung, 91 (17 April 1881).
Evangelical Minister Rocholl, the paper said it was at the cross of Christ that Judaism and Christianity became opposed. Under the title "On the historical world position of the Jews and the modern Jewish Question," the organ noted the argument of the Allgemeine Conservative Monatsschrift:

The hatred of all peoples against both the Jewish character and their moral behavior started already three hundred years before Christ. During two thousand years the Jews continuously triggered a crisis of the whole spiritual and material life among every people they came in touch with.

In short, the Kreuzzzeitung claimed, "through the whole of history the Jews stayed intolerant towards all non-Jewish matters." However, the Kreuzzzeitung was careful not to overdo attacks on pre-emancipated Jews. After all it was emancipated Jews, representatives for the loss of a corporate world order, who were to be targeted. Traditionally, Orthodox Jews had been viewed rather positively by Right Wing Conservatives on the grounds that they rejected emancipation. Hermann Wagener, former Editor-in-Chief of the Kreuzzzeitung, maintained that Orthodox Jews held a hostile attitude towards emancipation. In 1856 he said in the House of Deputies:

I declare that I doubt to find in the House of Deputies anybody, who has such a high opinion of the Jews as I do. They are in my view - though not the Reform Jews - the true aristocratic people on earth...I know that all Orthodox Jews agree with my view as regards their religious and national situation...A Jew who observes the Sabbath can never become a civil

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147 E, p, ibid., 127 (2 June 1881).
148 C, n, ibid., 168 (21 July 1881).
149 F, e, ibid., 122 (27 May 1882).
servant in a Christian country and no Orthodox Jew would want to be the servant in a Christian State.\textsuperscript{130}

How did the paper solve this problem: to construct on the one hand a long history of Jew-hatred and on the other not to fail its real target: emancipated, contemporary Jewry? This conflict was solved by constructing a history of Jew-hatred which over time (that is with emancipation) gradually became worse. Drawing on the views expressed by Minister Rocholl, the paper noted that “while the Jews behaved defensively in religious issues in earlier times, now they become aggressive against Christianity on which they exert their anti-Christian influence…”\textsuperscript{151} Reporting on an Evangelical conference in Neuwied, the paper wrote that it was due to the emancipation of the Jews that they could rise and take the spiritual lead of Germany so aggressively into their hands.\textsuperscript{152} “The Jews are a danger for the health of the people and even more so after their emancipation,” the organ maintained.\textsuperscript{153} Using the warning of the \textit{Allgemeine Conservative Monatsschrift}, the paper argued that the whole spiritual life of contemporary Jewry was marked by its opposition to the Christian spiritual life. For two thousand years the Talmud was the basis of the Jewish spiritual life. In this century, the paper pointed out, the Jews had abandoned the Talmud. Without the basis of the Talmud the struggle between Judaism and Christianity would bring about different results


\textsuperscript{151} E, p. \textit{Kreuzzeitung}, 127 (2 June 1881).

\textsuperscript{152} C, c, supplement, ibid., 91 (17 April 1881).

\textsuperscript{153} C, c, supplement, ibid., 158 (9 July 1882).
for the Jews as this struggle had brought about in the centuries before. The view that some kind of disaster would come about for the Jews was also expressed by the Preacher de le Roi at a meeting of the Christian Socials. Reporting the views of de le Roi, the paper suggested that emancipation of the Jews was a mistake and that they should be sent to Egypt as soon as possible. Otherwise the bitterness of the population against the Jews could explode into a catastrophe. The anticipation of a disaster to bear all disasters for the Jews, seems to mirror the heightened sense of anxiety and crisis of these Conservatives, who projected their own fear of a disaster that could hit themselves onto to the Jews.

Johannes de le Roi was a Prussian pastor and missionary publicist who had written an influential and scholarly three-volume history of Christian-Jewish relations. He was the foremost nineteenth century historian of Christian missions to the Jews and his works represent the most authoritative synthesis of missionary attitudes in late nineteenth century Prussia. Even though the Kreuzzeitung was not involved in Christian missionary activities, the organ seems to have been influenced by de le Roi’s views on the Jews, which fitted well the paper’s own agenda, as discussed above. De le Roi was convinced that the Jews had a harmful influence on Christians. His negative view of the Talmud and Jewish religion, consisting solely of a “death-giving law,” echoed the conventional view of the nineteenth century Prussian missions. Yet the Talmud (for de le Roi) could at least guarantee a certain degree of religious awareness for those who adhered to it. The anti-emancipationist attitude of de le Roi was based on his view that Jews without

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154 C, n, supplement, ibid., 176 (30 July 1881).
155 C, p, ibid., 221 (21 September 1882).
the Talmud would decline into “raw barbarism” and rationalism, a product and lasting legacy of the “spirit of the Talmud.” As a result, Jewishness without the Talmud amounted to nothing more than the “negation of Christianity,” which the Jews would hasten to promote with the means of the press and the acquisition and manipulation of capital in order to extend their power and influence. For de le Roi, every aspect of Jewish existence was directed against the Christian order. This perception seems to stem from the historical Christian view of hatred of Jews of Christ’s person and an alleged fierce anti-Christian attitude of the Talmud. Even though Jews had given up their former hatred of Christ, the argument went, they now were the greatest enemies of the “empire of Christ” (politically that was the Christian State).\footnote{See the excellent and detailed analysis of Christopher M. Clark, The Politics of Conversion (Oxford, 1995), 4, 30, 252ff.}

The Personification of the Enemy

One of the most common methods to create a hate figure is to invest the “enemy” with negative physical and psychological characteristics, as well as with negative behavior. Jews, the Kreuzzeitung noted, did not talk to people who had signed the anti-Semitic petition: “such is the behavior of the Israelites.”\footnote{C. e. Kreuzzeitung, 19 (23 January 1881).} Citing the claim of the Grenzboten, the paper noted that the Jews were usurers and blood-suckers, who exploited not only the peasants but also ruined the military officials, whom they induced to borrow money.\footnote{C. n. supplement, ibid., 47 (24 February 1882).} Recording the views of de le Roi (which he had expressed at a meeting of Christian Socials), the organ observed that no
matter if Jews were landowners, businessmen, bankers or money lenders, they always had a damaging influence on the general population. De le Roi believed that the Jews had a profound antipathy to manual occupations, which had its roots in the teachings of the Talmud. According to de le Roi, the Talmud had convinced the Jews that they were “too refined” for all forms of manual work, which should be performed by the members of other peoples. He argued that emancipated Jews, even though they no longer adhered to the Talmud and were no longer legally restricted as regards their economic activities, due to the lasting legacy of the Talmud did not move away from their traditional economic activities as peddlers and small traders, as had been widely hoped among Christians in nineteenth century Prussia. Concentration in areas of the economy other than crafts, husbandry, and land cultivation was seen by de le Roi as unnatural. The paper cited the claim of the Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung that the Jews had always behaved in a way that triggered conflict. The Jews, the paper noted, triggered and continued to nourish the agitation against themselves with their immodest pushiness and their cynical attacks against people who have a different way of thinking; they were, it said, materialistic, profit-seeking, immodest, forward and cynical.

Jews were not only invested with both negative psychological characteristics and harmful behavior, they could also be physically stigmatized.

159 C, p. ibid., 221 (21 September 1882).
160 Clark, Politics, 259ff.
161 C, n, Kreuzzeitung, 6 (8 January 1881).
162 C, c, ibid., 5 (7 January 1881).
163 Recent scholarship has explored the physical stigmatization of the Jews and has shown that it went back at least to the seventeenth century. However, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, physical characteristics ascribed to the Jews (as for example a distinctive “Jewish nose”) were being
Reporting the beliefs of Richard Andree, the *Kreuzzeitung* wrote: "Not only did the indestructible old Jewish spirit persist over time, but also their old monumental Jewish body. Two physical types of Jews could be discerned, the black haired one with shiny eyes and a fine nose and the other one blond haired with a big mouth and a thick nose."\textsuperscript{164}

In an article entitled "Die Alexandrischen Juden vor Kaiser Caligula," the *Kreuzzeitung* argued that in Alexandria Jews were hated because they differed not only in dress and figure but also in their gestures and posture.\textsuperscript{165} Highlighting the views of the author V. Löher, the *Kreuzzeitung* wrote that in Galicia the Jews were conspicuous with their dark dress and their long, curly hair. Their eyes were "restless" and their hair and their things were shiny, either by nature or because of dirt.\textsuperscript{166}

**Solving the Jewish Question**

One of the central issues in the debate about the "Jewish Problem," was how to solve the Jewish Question. The debate centred largely on five different solutions: assimilation, conversion, restriction of Jewish legal rights, expulsion, and extermination. Historians generally agree that Conservatives proposed to solve the


\textsuperscript{165} C, c, *Kreuzzeitung*, 165 (17 July 1881).

Jewish Question primarily by placing Jews under legal restrictions, whether this would entail the repeal of Jewish emancipation or not.\textsuperscript{167} The \textit{Kreuzzzeitung} was no exception to this attitude. Jews should have the right to hospitality but no more, the paper maintained.\textsuperscript{168} Jews, the paper stated, should be excluded from Christian authority, Christian schools, Christian marriage and the Christian oath.\textsuperscript{169} This approach was perfectly compatible with Protestant theology. "According to the Old Testament," the paper argued, "Jews have to exist as strangers among the peoples."\textsuperscript{170} Historians have often drawn attention to the so-called anti-Semitic petition in 1880 to restrict Jewish legal rights.\textsuperscript{171} Yet little is known about the efforts made by the Right Wing Evangelical-Lutheran Church Conference in August 1881 to restrict Jewish emancipation.\textsuperscript{172} In its resolution the Conference decided to propose a motion, in either the Reichstag or the Prussian Landtag, to restrict Jewish emancipation. The \textit{Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums} got so worried about these developments that it called on all Jewish communities in Germany to come together and write a protest against such a motion. The written protest then would be handed in to both the government and the Reichstag. For the \textit{AZJ}, this was not about the deeds of some individuals or certain groups any more, against whom a common response would not have been justified, nor was this

\textsuperscript{167} See for example Donald L. Niewyk, "Solving the 'Jewish Problem': Continuity and Change in German Antisemitism, 1871-1945," \textit{Leo Baeck Institute Year Book}, XXXV (1990), 346-8.

\textsuperscript{168} E. e. supplement, \textit{Kreuzzzeitung}, 271 (18 November 1882).

\textsuperscript{169} E. e. ibid., 36 (12 February 1881).

\textsuperscript{170} E. e. supplement, ibid., 271 (18 November 1882).

\textsuperscript{171} See for example Massing, \textit{Vorgeschichte}, 43.

\textsuperscript{172} According to the \textit{Kreuzzzeitung}, the Evangelical-Lutheran Church Conference was part of the Prussian Landeskirche. The Conference convened every two years in Berlin. The head of the Conference was the Old Conservative Hans von Kleist-Retzow. Count Krassow was chair of the Conference. In 1881, five hundred people took part, comprising Evangelical-Lutheran ministers, Right Wing politicians, and representatives from the aristocracy and academia. See R, c, \textit{Kreuzzzeitung}, 199 (26 August 1881); R, n, 200 (27 August 1881).
about a petition, which would be stored in some corner of a government office. Rather this was about an attempt by Right Wing Conservatives (under the leadership of Kleist-Retzow) to restrict Jewish emancipation on the legislative level, about bills that were intended to be discussed in Parliament, the AZJ stated.\(^{173}\)

Part of mainstream German Protestantism wanted to solve the Jewish Question with the conversion of the Jews.\(^{174}\) For the Kreuzzeitung, this solution posed a conflict of interest and revealed the tension between the religious and political aims of Right Wing Conservatives. As a representative of German orthodox Protestantism, the paper could hardly reject conversion. However, the political aim the paper fought for was the curbing of Liberalism and with it Jewish emancipation, rather than the conversion of the Jews. How did the paper cope with this conflict? It dealt with it in two ways. First, by making a distinction between the task of the Church and the task of the State; second, by supporting conversion of the Jews on the one hand and questioning it on the other.

The Jewish Question was not only a religious question but also a national one, Hammerstein maintained at the . For the Christian Church the Jewish Question was only a religious question and it had to do intensive missionary work. The Church which entered the realm of the State however, also had to take into consideration the political side of the matter. The whole of the German Fatherland could only be saved when Christianity as the victory power among the people

\(^{172}\) E. e, Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums, 37 (13 September 1881), 601.
\(^{173}\) See Niewyk, "Continuity," 342-3. For this group of people, see the comprehensive work of Clark, Politics.
permeated the whole State and national life. Therefore one had to question whether
the influence of Judaism was appropriate to damage the religious and moral basis
of the German people, Hammerstein stated. In support of the conversion of Jews,
under the title “The position of Evangelical Christians to the so-called Jewish
Question of our time,” the paper reported on the views of Minister Rocholl, namely
that the conversion of the Jews was the core of the Jewish Question. Citing a
claim made at the Evangelical Conference of Ministers in Neuwied in the
Rhineland, the paper noted that the Evangelical Christians had to combat the Jews
with means that were compatible with Christianity. This meant that the Jews as a
whole had to be kept in a lower position and be attacked, according to the Christian
principle. The single Jew however, the argument went, had to be “met with love”
and had to be won over to Christianity. At the same time the organ questioned
conversion as a means of solving the Jewish Question. Thus the paper held that
Jews often converted to Christianity only in order to make money. Printing the
beliefs of author Richard Andree, the paper held that conversion only rarely
changed the Jews. This could be seen if one looked at the Jews of the Baleares who
converted to Christianity in the fifteenth century. Not only did the Jews there retain
their invincible idiosyncrasy but also their Jewish body and their Jewish spirit. This
in turn led to a situation where the Jews still kept themselves apart from the general
population and married only among themselves, the paper stated. The
reservation against conversion of the Jews went hand in hand with the reservation

175 R. c, Kreuzzzeitung, 200 (27 August 1881).
176 E. p, ibid., 127 (2 June 1881).
177 R. c, supplement, ibid., 91 (17 April 1881).
178 C. c, ibid., 158 (9 July 1882).
179 C. p, ibid., 165 (17 July 1881). Andree, Volkskunde,
against mixed marriages. If Jews mixed with the general population by means of mixed marriages, the organ noted, due to their unchangeable Jewish type they would in a few generations time have changed everybody into their Semitic type. In addition, the paper argued that mixed marriages would be against the Scripture according to which the Jews had to exist as a separate people.\footnote{180}

Do these views indicate that the organ was influenced by racialist anti-Semitism? The term racialism can be defined in a more narrow sense as a scientific “theory which claims that ‘there is a causal link between inherited physical traits and certain [aspects] of personality, intellect, or culture’ along with ‘the notion that some races are inherently superior to others.’” Authors who advocate a broader definition of racialism argue that racial prejudices appeared long before any modern scientific conceptions (which developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth century) of biological racial differences. Racialist anti-Semitism as it developed in the 1870s and 1880s believed that Jews were inherently distinct from and opposed to the Aryan race because of their biological and psychological nature. Since nothing could change their inferior racial qualities, Jews could not be included in Aryan society because such an inclusion would lead to the moral and physical degradation of the Aryan peoples.\footnote{181}

I would agree with those historians who have attributed biologically determined racialist anti-Semitism primarily to anti-Semites such as Wilhelm Marr and Eugen Duehring.\footnote{182} However, I would argue that one could not fully acquit
Kreuzzzeitung group Conservatives from racialist anti-Semitism. Even though it rarely appeared in its arguments, it was similar to Catholic anti-Semitism in that it took on board elements of racialist anti-Semitism, such as the unchangeable inferior nature of the Jews and the impossibility to include them in German society through mixed marriages. This would change the nature of German society into a Semitic one. However, the fundamental difference to racialist anti-Semitism lies in what was seen as the central causal factor of the Jews’ innate inferiority: biologically determined racialist anti-Semitism believed in the origins of different races of whom some were superior to others. For orthodox Protestants (and Catholics), God was the creator of “human races” which were all equal, beginning with Adam and Eve. While for racialist anti-Semitism the central causal factor for the Jews’ inferior nature was in their “blood,” orthodox Protestants (and Catholics) would see it in the Jewish religion.\(^{183}\) Thus, the Kreuzzzeitung dissociated itself from racialist anti-Semites not because of their racialist perception of the Jews, but because of their rejection of Christianity. Hence, the organ responded furiously to anti-Christian views expressed for example by Ernst Henrici. The paper rejected vehemently his ridiculing of the Old Testament,\(^{184}\) and emphasized that the future of the Jewish Question depended on the defeat of the naturalistic and anti-Christian approach towards the Jewish Question.\(^{185}\)

\(^{183}\) See Blaschke, Katholizismus, 72-83.
\(^{184}\) C. c., Kreuzzzeitung, 2 (4 January 1881).
What was the attitude of the *Kreuzzeitung* towards the expulsion and the extermination of the Jews? Both solutions were rejected by the paper. The paper reported that at a meeting of one “Bismarck Association,” a certain Superintendent Hammer spoke out against the expulsion of Jews. He pointed out that the Jews could not be expelled because no country would want them and therefore would send the Jews back to Germany. The *Kreuzzeitung* held that the Jews could not be expelled or exterminated (*ausgerottet*). This would be inhuman on the one hand and contradict the Scripture on the other, therefore it was impossible to carry out. According to the Old Testament, the organ maintained, the Jews had to exist “as strangers” among the peoples and according to the Scripture the Jews had to exist “until the end of the days.” The decision taken by Conservative circles in question indicates that a majority of its members did not view the expulsion and extermination of the Jews as something desirable or feasible. Noteworthy however, is the implication that the question of whether or not to expel or exterminate the Jews was discussed as a real option. In other words, it would seem that there were some Conservatives who proposed and perhaps supported such a policy. In terms of terminology it is also noteworthy that the word *Ausrottung* was used in this context. Historians sometimes refer to Russia as the country seen by contemporaries as more dangerous for the Jews than Germany during the period under consideration, when discussing the question of a specific German anti-

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186 R. p. supplement, *Kreuzzeitung*, 289 (9 December 1882). A superintendent was a bishop in the Lutheran Church.  
187 E. e, supplement, ibid., 271 (18 November 1882).
Semitism. It should be noted though that even though Russian Jews suffered the pogroms, the extermination of the Jews was a solution that was never discussed nor even mentioned at that time in Russian debates.  

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188 See for example, W. Benz und W. Bergmann, “Antisemitismus - Vorgeschichte des Völkermords?” in W. Benz und W. Bergmann, eds., Vorurteile und Völkermord (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1997), 15.

2 The "Pomeranian Civil War"\textsuperscript{190}

In order to be able to assess the attitude of the *Kreuzzeitung* to the anti-Jewish riots in Germany more accurately, we need to know the attitude of the organ towards public disorders and rioting in general. It is generally acknowledged that law and order was one of the cornerstones of a Conservative Protestant world view.\textsuperscript{191} Thus the organ condemned, for example, student disturbances in Russia. These students would not behave in that way had they received the strict military education which students in Germany did, the paper emphasized.\textsuperscript{192} In two consecutive editorials the organ explored the rise of crime and people running wild in Germany. The cause for this state of affairs, the paper claimed, laid in the "apostasy" of the people from Christianity on the one hand and the leniency of the modern legislation as regards discipline and punishment on the other.\textsuperscript{193} Mentioning views of the *Allgemeine Conservative Monatsschrift*, the paper noted that Christian authority had to be reinstalled in order to put through "command and obedience."\textsuperscript{194}

Would the paper apply this approach also when it came to collective anti-Jewish disorders and riots? As I will demonstrate, before decisive government actions to stop the riots took place, the organ did not apply its approach of "law and

\textsuperscript{190} C. n., *Kreuzzeitung*, 189 (14 August 1881).
\textsuperscript{191} For the values of obedience to superiors, discipline and authority and their political unity with Christianity in Conservative ideology, see Tal, *Christians*, 122-59.
\textsuperscript{192} R. c., *Kreuzzeitung*, 1 (1 January 1881).
\textsuperscript{193} E. e., ibid., 270 (17 November 1882); E. e., 271 (18 November 1882).
\textsuperscript{194} E. n, ibid., 36 (12 February 1881).
order” to the anti-Jewish riots. In addition the organ indirectly justified the disorders. The reason for this approach, I would argue, did not lie in anti-Semitic attitudes and beliefs primarily. Rather it was to be found in the drive of Right Wing Conservatives to restrict Jewish emancipation and thereby to help their struggle for a hierarchical world order. Anti-Semitic disorders were taken as proof to convince the government and the people that something had to be done about the Jews, namely that their legal rights had to be restricted; otherwise the nation would explode in acts of violence and disorder.

On New Year’s Eve 1880, Jews were verbally assaulted and hindered from entering cafés in Berlin. Fights broke out and windows were smashed. The disturbances took place in the wake of an anti-Semitic rally held on 30th December by anti-Semites such as Bernhard Förster, Ernst Henrici, Max Liebermann von Sonnenberg and other leading figures of the anti-Semitic movement.195 At this point the Kreuzzeitung condemned the disorders as “indecent excesses.”196 However, when anti-Jewish riots broke out in Argenau, in the province of Posen, on 28th April, the organ restrained from condemning them. Instead it blamed the Jews themselves for causing the disorders. “Nowhere else within Prussia as in the province of Posen does the [anti-Jewish] movement, which is just in its core, have so much potential for violence,” the organ commented. “The Polish Jew has a damaging influence with his usury. In Posen, this state of affairs is even worse.

195 For details on these events, see Massing, Vorgeschichte, 44.
Only recently did a banker to whom many petty Christians had given their money, disappear to America."\textsuperscript{197}

Blaming the Jews for the riots went together with attacking the Liberal press for their biased coverage of the events.\textsuperscript{198} This line of argument would become the consistent pattern of the\textit{ Kreuzzeitung} when dealing with the wave of anti-Jewish riots that swept over the provinces of Pomerania, West Prussia and Posen during summer that year.\textsuperscript{199} With this strategy, Jews and Liberalism were again linked together. Thus, rejecting the reports made by the Liberal press on the anti-Jewish disorders in Neustettin, the\textit{ Kreuzzeitung} claimed that it was the brothers Cohn who had provoked the anti-Jewish riot in Neustettin with their denigration of the Christian population in their newspaper\textit{ Neustetteringer Zeitung}. It said that they had started a brawl with the leader of the local\textit{ Antisemiten-Liga} (League of anti-Semites) Luttosch, and not the other way round, as claimed by Liberal papers. The attack on Luttosch by the Cohns triggered the wrath of the local population which eventually turned into a riot in which windows were smashed; but no persons were hurt, the organ stated.\textsuperscript{200} The\textit{ Kreuzzeitung} refuted the information of Liberal newspapers according to which Cohn was wounded.

\textsuperscript{197} R, c, ibid., 105 (5 May 1881).
\textsuperscript{198} R, c, bid., 102 (1 May 1881).
\textsuperscript{199} This wave of anti-Jewish riots came as surprise to many contemporaries. After the anti-Jewish riots of 1848 anti-Jewish disorders had flared up only rarely. Jews in Pomerania and West Prussia had lived there a long time and were fairly well integrated. Nonetheless, tensions rose against the backdrop of an increasingly anti-Semitic climate, both in the overwhelmingly Protestant area of Pomerania and the ethnically mixed areas - Polish and German - of West Prussia and Posen. See Christhard Hoffmann, “Political Culture and Violence against Minorities: The Antisemitic Riots in Pomerania and West Prussia,” in Christhard Hoffmann, Werner Bergmann and Helmut Walser Smith, eds.,\textit{ Exclusionary Violence} (Ann Arbor, 2002), 93; Hans-Werner Rautenberg, “Zur Geschichte des Judentums in Pommern und Westpreussen zwischen Emanzipation und Ersten Weltkrieg,” in Gotthold Rhode, \textit{Juden in Ostmitteleuropa von der Emanzipation bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg} (Marburg, 1989), 49-72. See historical background chapter.
\textsuperscript{200} R, c, \textit{Kreuzzeitung}, 171 (24 July 1881).
during these events and emphasized that, on the contrary, it was a Christian who was hurt by a Jew.\footnote{R. c., ibid., 168 (21 July 1881).}

According to recent research, the building contractor Lutosch and president of the Neustettin Antisemiten-Liga, feeling insulted by the Neustettiner Zeitung, which had sharply criticized and ridiculed the anti-Semitic agitation, had actually physically attacked its editor Cohn. In the ensuing fight Lutosch was wounded on the head and rushed around in the town calling on people to “beat the Jews to death.” This then triggered the riots that lasted for three days and from there spread to other Pomeranian provincial towns.\footnote{Ibid., 68.} Even though we cannot assume that the Kreuzzeitung knew the exact course of the event, as it has been revealed by recent research, the paper could choose between different interpretations in the press. Its attempt to place the blame for the anti-Jewish riots wholly on the Jews was shared by most of the Conservative camp.\footnote{Hoffmann, “Violence,” 81-2.}

So far, the Kreuzzeitung did not distance itself from the violence by condemning it. This situation, however, was going to change when the government made clear that it would no longer tolerate the disorders. On 10th August the Kreuzzeitung reported that the police administration of Konitz had informed the population of a section of the Criminal Code. The police administration announced putting into effect the laws of trespassing on houses and on the prohibition of the gathering of a crowd. In addition local communities would be made liable for any damage that was done, the paper reported.\footnote{R. c., Kreuzzeitung, 185 (10 August 1881).}
Up to that point, little effort had been made by the government and the authorities to take a decisive stand against the ongoing anti-Jewish riots. Similar to the *Kreuzzeitung*, some politicians (as well as some government officials) attempted to exploit the riots for their struggle against Liberalism. However, when the riots became more intensive and widespread, the fear that these were not just excesses and outbreaks of hatred against the Jews, but rather the result of a planned and organized agitation, led the government to take more drastic action. On 9th August the Minister of the Interior, von Puttkamer, issued a decree to several district governments that in order to avoid renewed disturbances, the “agitational efforts of anti-Semitic leaders” should be stopped by the strict implementation of laws governing associations and meeting. On 30th August he issued a new decree for stronger measures and stricter investigation of the incidents.205

Against this background of a new and more decisive governmental approach, the attitude of the *Kreuzzeitung* towards the riots increasingly changed. Having so far indirectly justified the riots with the Jews’ malpractices, the paper now increasingly dissociated itself from the violence. Thus the paper noted that “these are all illegal outbreaks of the mood of the people,” and that these might one day make necessary the legal regulation of the Jewish Question.206 The paper pointed out that the anti-Jewish riots “threaten to become epidemic” as they continued to spread to more and more cities.207 A day later the *Kreuzzeitung* reported that the Prussian Minister of the Interior, von Puttkamer, who was at the same time head of the Police force, had issued orders to local heads of government

206 R, c, *Kreuzzeitung*, 185 (10 August 1881).
207 Ibid.
in the areas affected by the riots, to take all legal means available to prevent and suppress any further disturbances.\textsuperscript{208} The next day the organ reported that the Minister of the Interior would prohibit in future any public agitational [anti-Jewish] incitements in order to prevent any further rioting.\textsuperscript{209} The paper noted that:

The Minister of the Interior fulfills with this prohibition his unquestionable duty, which is to protect all German nationals, their rights and their person. The anti-Semitic movement will miss its aim if it results in violence and this kind of agitation is neither Christian nor German.\textsuperscript{210}

The paper seemed to have realized that rather than being a help to further Conservative aims (to restrict Jewish legal rights), the anti-Jewish riots suddenly became a threat to Conservatives. The new governmental position also changed the paper's description of the extent of the riots. Up to now the organ tended not to diminish the extent of the riots. Citing the claim of the \textit{National Zeitung}, the paper reported on the riot in Neustettin: "A big riot had taken place which lasted the whole night. Many shops had been damaged."\textsuperscript{211} Repeating the claim of the \textit{National Zeitung}, the \textit{Kreuzzzeitung} noted that a large crowd walked through the city shouting "Hep-Hep" and "expel the Jews." About six to eight hundred people took part in the disorders in which houses and shops of Jews were demolished. The police were unable to stop the large crowd because they had insufficient forces, the paper reported.\textsuperscript{212} According to recent research, the number of rioters is fairly

\textsuperscript{208} R. c., ibid., 186 (11 August 1881).
\textsuperscript{209} R. c., ibid., 187 (12 August 1881).
\textsuperscript{210} R. c., ibid.
\textsuperscript{211} R. n., ibid., 167 (20 July 1881).
\textsuperscript{212} R. n., ibid., 168 (21 July 1881). The anti-Jewish slogan "Hep-Hep" was in use in Germany already before the anti-Jewish riots, which flared up all over Germany, spreading as far as Denmark in 1819. Yet the slogan the rioters used in 1819 gave the 1819 riots its name. From then on, up to
accurate, as is the other part of the description of the riot. About twenty-one Jewish shops had their windows smashed in the riot in which about eight hundred to one thousand people took part. Despite police reinforcements, events escalated the next evening when nearly all Jewish houses had their windows smashed.\textsuperscript{213}

Now, with the new governmental position, the \textit{Kreuzzeitung} tried to minimize the extent of the riots, blaming the Liberal press for exaggerating and inflating the scope of the riots:

Liberal papers until recently did not want to accept the fact that a Jewish Question exists. It seemed that they even wanted to forbid the State to use the term “Jewish Question.” Now they turn the regrettable excesses against Jewish dealers and traders into a “civil war.” Such characterizations of the excesses are unjustified. The reports of these papers are routinely exaggerated if not completely false. It seems that such journalistic behavior aims at producing a certain mood, even on the price of the truth, namely to influence public opinion. These reports from the “battle-ground” seemed to have the aim to superficially increase the spontaneous emotions of disapproval and regret and to bury under these emotions the whole Jewish Question.\textsuperscript{214}

Reporting the claim of the \textit{Neue Stettiner Zeitung}, the paper noted that reports on local incitements in Konitz were exaggerated. All that had happened was the gathering of a crowd, it said, and the crowd was immediately dissolved after the intervention of the police with no Jewish homes or properties damaged. And the anti-Jewish riot in Schivelbein was carried out by no more than twenty men (who smashed windows of Jewish homes) and not, as the Liberal \textit{Berliner Tageblatt}

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\textsuperscript{213} See Hoffman, “Violence,” 82.

\textsuperscript{214} C, c, \textit{Kreuzzeitung}, 189 (14 August 1881).
reported, by one thousand men, the organ maintained. Only later more people joined in and started plundering, but as soon as the police intervened, the rioters stopped.\textsuperscript{215}

These descriptions contrast quite drastically with recent findings. The riot in Schivelbein was actually exceptionally violent. “Bands of ten to twelve men” with blackened faces and armed with crowbars and hatchets were noticed. Unlike the other riots, it was accompanied with substantial plundering, destruction, and cases of personal injury. In Konitz too, substantial rioting occurred.\textsuperscript{216} It is highly unlikely that the \textit{Kreuzzeitung} did not know from the press the approximate scope of these riots.

The new governmental attitude towards the anti-Jewish riots had yet another effect on the depiction of the events by the \textit{Kreuzzeitung}. Had the rioters been described hitherto in a neutral way, namely as pupils from the gymnasium, factory workers, apprentices, farm laborers, and teachers, this now changed.\textsuperscript{217} Trying to play down the riots, the paper claimed that it was just a scandal-seeking mob, scoundrels who wanted some attention, which carried out the riots. Leaflets that called for an anti-Jewish riot and that were disseminated before a riot in Breslau were presumably written by Jews themselves. This presumption would be

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{215} R, n, ibid.
\textsuperscript{216} Hoffmann, “Violence,” 86.
\textsuperscript{217} R, c, \textit{Kreuzzeitung}, 183 (7 August 1881); R, c, 185 (10 August 1881); R, c, 186 (11 August 1881).
\end{flushleft}
supported by the fact that the riot there caused no stir among the Jews at all, the organ reported.\textsuperscript{218}

Research showed that typically the perpetrators were youths, mostly apprentices or high school students and journeymen. Sometimes adults participated in the riots such as master craftsmen, workers and peasants. Some women were also observed to take part in the riots.\textsuperscript{219}

On 17th August government responses to the riots grew more severe. All government officials (Landräthe), the Kreuzzeitung reported, were instructed by the government president (Regierungspräsidant) of Marienwerder, that the anti-Jewish riots were partly caused by agitational speeches. Therefore such speeches would be prevented. The legal means to do so was the law to prohibit incitement to violence.\textsuperscript{220}

This announcement came at the moment when the election campaign for the forthcoming Reichstag elections (due for the last week of October) was at its height and triggered a strong response across the Conservative camp. The Kreuzzeitung rushed to publish statements of Conservative politicians who dissociated and condemned the anti-Jewish riots. The paper noted the speech of the Landtag Deputy Dr Cremer. Cremer, addressing an audience at an election rally, pointed out that the Conservative Party strictly dissociated from the anti-Semitic movement, which had taken forms in the provinces of Pomerania and West Prussia that were, he said: “compatible neither with good manners nor with law and order.” Every

\textsuperscript{218} R, c, ibid., 189 (14 August 1881); R, c, 192 (18 August 1881).
\textsuperscript{219} Hoffmann, “Violence,” 85-6.
\textsuperscript{220} R. n. Kreuzzeitung, 191 (17 August 1881).
Conservative ought to “take a position” against such violent outbreaks. The paper suggested that it was intolerable that people rebel against law and public order and damage the life and property of a person. The Conservative and anti-Progress Party in Berlin did not identify with such excesses and turned away from them with disgust. Cremer had long held this position against the anti-Semitic movement and was reprimanded for taking a lukewarm position towards the movement, the paper noted. But he held this position only because he knew what the agitation would lead to. These excesses could lead to the prohibition of both the development of freedom and the freedom of public rallying. It was felt that such fears were not unjustified if one looked at the directives, which the Minister of the Interior had recently issued. The reasons for the excesses had to be sought more deeply. The paper suggested that the Conservative and anti-Progressive Party had to dissociate publicly from the excesses because the government had to suppress them, as they were against the law. It wasn’t felt that the whole anti-Semitic movement had to be condemned. On the contrary, the movement should continue. Yet Cremer held that the struggle “should not be fought with violence, but on the speaker’s platform” and that no candidate should be elected “until he made clear his stance on the Jewish Question.” He also asserted that “it should not be taken as an offence to utter a nasty word against those hotheads who destroyed the good work of the Conservatives.”

The Kreuzzzeitung also noted the speech of Professor A. Wagner from Berlin, which had been reprinted in the Eberfelder Zeitung. Wagner pointed out that there were about 600,000 Jews in the German Reich, most of whom came from the Polish provinces and were wicked representatives of exploitation and

221 R, p, ibid., 192 (18 August 1881).
usury. All the same, he held, violence against the Jews had to be rejected on the
grounds that the Jews were the fellow men of the German people and that even
Christ was a Jew.  

The paper recorded the speech of Chairman of the Centre Party faction in
Berlin, Jupe. The Centre Party hoped to ally with the Conservative Party in the
forthcoming election. It therefore seems to have been important for the
Kreuzzzeitung to show to its readers their similar position as regards the anti-Jewish
disorders under the new circumstances. Jupe, speaking at a meeting of the Centre
Party faction of Berlin, held that wherever there was no chance for a Catholic to be
elected, Catholics should vote for the Conservative Deputy Cremer, under the
condition that the Conservative Party supported the abolition of the Kulturkampf
legislation. He emphasized that the Jewish Question had to be resolved legally and
not in the way people like Henrici and Ruppel would. The disorders in Pomerania
were “deplorable” and had to be rejected from a Christian and Catholic point of
view. He called on Catholics not to take part in the disorders, which would “impair
Catholic conscience” and Catholics would in the end have to pay for the damage.

Sudden condemnation of the anti-Jewish riots also ran through the anti-
Semitic camp. The anti-Semitic association Reform Verein of Breslau issued a
resolution rejecting the accusation that its activities had anything to do with the
present anti-Jewish riots. The Verein decisively disapproved of the excesses and

\[222\] R, n, ibid.
\[223\] R, p, ibid.
declared that they were caused by the increasing presumption of the Jews and their press.\textsuperscript{224}

The Conservative camp was not only concerned that the anti-Jewish riots could eventually endanger public speeches at election rallies. Conservatives were also concerned about Liberals using the riots as a tool in the election campaign against the Conservative Party. In two consecutive editorials, the \textit{Kreuzzeitung} attacked the Liberal camp for blaming both the Conservative Party and the Conservative press for the outbreak of the anti-Jewish riots. "The Liberal camp tries to place the responsibility for the present violent outbreaks, to which the so-called anti-Semitic movement has led, on both the Conservative Party and the Conservative press. With great effort the Jewish colored Liberal organs try to exploit the mood, which the disturbances in Pomerania and West Prussia has brought about against the "Junkers and priests" (\textit{Junker and Pfaffen}), that means the Conservative Party, before the forthcoming Reichstag elections."\textsuperscript{225} However, the paper held that the attempt of the Liberal press "to place the excesses against the Jews on the coat-tails of Conservative gentlemen in order to mobilize votes for the Liberals in the Reichstag elections, cannot be prevented, but will not be successful."\textsuperscript{226} Conservatives, the \textit{Kreuzzeitung} maintained, had never approved of violent action against the Jews. During the parliamentary question initiated by the Liberal politician Hänel in the Prussian House of Deputies in November 1880, concerning the anti-Semitic petition, several Conservatives had spoken out against

\textsuperscript{224} R, n. ibid., 199 (26 August 1881).
\textsuperscript{225} E, e. ibid., 198 (25 August 1881).
\textsuperscript{226} E, e. ibid., 199 (26 August 1881).
anti-Jewish violence. "This debate has proved that Conservatives are far from encouraging anti-Jewish violence and the Conservative Party officially dissociates itself from any kind of violent action against the Jews," the paper emphasized. The Party then also declared that it fully and wholly accepted the emancipation of the Jews as an unconditional right of the Jews and that the Party would refrain from attempting to reduce the acquired civic rights of the Jews. Despite all that, noted the paper, the Liberal press claimed that the Conservatives had first engaged in incitement against the Jews and then they tried hypocritically to shift the responsibility of the consequences of these incitements onto somebody else. It is interesting to note how, on the defensive, the paper changed its views, suddenly defending and supporting Jewish emancipation, a position which clearly contradicted its general attitude, as we have seen.

The Kreuzzeitung defended not only the Conservative Party and its exponents, it also tried to protect Christian Conservative circles against the attacks of the Liberal camp. The Evangelical clerical conference in Neuwied in April demonstrated the moderate attitude Christian Conservative circles held towards the anti-Jewish movement, the paper maintained. Using the speech of Minister Rocholl from Cologne, the paper noted that: "In the struggle against Judaism, Evangelical Christians are allowed to use only weapons, which are compatible with Christianity. The Evangelical Christian would use only decent and legal means to suppress his adversary rather than violence."
However, when talking to a high profile Right Wing Conservative audience at the Evangelical-Lutheran Church Conference (the so-called “August Conference”) at precisely that point in time, Hammerstein’s words had a different flavor. There, while dissociating from anti-Jewish violence on the one hand, he explained and indirectly justified anti-Jewish violence as the understandable response of the people against the Jews’ destructive behavior. In addition, he used anti-Jewish violence to promote the restriction of Jewish emancipation.

The growing influence of contemporary Jewry will result in the destruction of the religious and moral basis of Christianity... Even if it was true, that the burden which the Jews had to carry for so long, had caused their specific negative characteristics, this would by no means justify their emancipation. We will in any case not act upon the phrase: “the wheel of history cannot be turned back”... Ancient History demonstrated that wherever Jews lived, they behaved aggressively towards other peoples and their religions. They always wanted to put through their own nationality, even when they lived as a minority under the protection of the State and enjoyed full equality, as was the case in the Roman Empire. Therefore it is explicable that the Jews were hated and that they were often treated with cruelty by the peoples among they lived. Their unpatriotic attitude and civic unreliability is also a historical fact of modern times... I do not want to promote hatred. Nobody can condemn the actions of those Christians who carried out bloody persecutions of the Jews for the sake of religion more than I. All the same, truth has to be spoken: the Jews had primarily brought upon themselves their hard fate with their national and religious intolerance... Let us hope that with legal means at least the acute form which the Jewish Question has taken these days [in Germany], can be overcome. If religious fanaticism was the source of hatred against the Jews, then legal means would be no remedy.  

This line of argument clearly gave a double message: on the one hand, Hammerstein distanced himself from anti-Jewish violence by condemning it. On

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229 For the composition of the Conference, see above.
the other hand, he empathized with those who carried out the violence by indirectly justifying their actions as the understandable reactions against the Jews’ destructive behavior who were to blame for their own hard fate. This contradictory line of argument made it rhetorically possible to indirectly justify anti-Jewish violence and display solidarity with the perpetrators, while at the same time evoke the impression that it was against anti-Jewish violence. The resolution of the Conference was fully supported by the Kreuzzzeitung:

The anti-Jewish movement is the expression for the recognition among the people of the pressure it has to endure from the Jewish population. The influence of the Jews threatens our life. The violence to which the anti-Jewish movement has led is deeply deplorable but even more deplorable is the guilt of the Christian German people which in the first place has enabled the Jews to get into the position they are now.\(^{231}\)

A double message was given because the violence was termed “deeply deplorable,” while at the same time it was judged as less deplorable than the guilt of the Christians who had emancipated the Jews.

The Conference was well noted by the press. The Left Liberal press, used to attacking Conservatives, criticized the hidden legitimization of anti-Jewish violence expressed at the Conference:

It is interesting and at the same time important to cite this [the speech of Minister Plath at the Conference]: “The task of the Christian world ought to be to stop and break the Jewish plutocracy.” He points to Jewish property and calls on the masses to take away from the Jews their property. The watchword of the minister of the Christian mission is to plunder the rich Jews, at a moment when in three Prussian provinces hundreds of plunderers were brought to court. The August Conference does by no means approve

\(^{231}\) R, c., ibid., 199 (26 August 1881).
of this plundering and disorder, as it declared cautiously in its resolution that “it deeply deplores the violence.” But at the same time the Conference is cheering the call of Plath to the masses. The latter will remember that the attack on Jewish wealth was made out to be a Christian duty by five hundred Christian clergy men...Deputy Hammerstein was more cautious only as regards the form, yet in the matter he fully agreed with Minister Plath.232

The attempt made by Conservatives to dissociate themselves from the anti-Jewish riots had another dimension. The pogroms, which had broken out in Southern Russia in April that year and had still not come to halt, posed a certain danger for German Conservatives. Both domestically and internationally German anti-Semitism was blamed for the pogroms in Russia. The paper noted the view of the Allgemeine Conservative Monatsschrift that:

...we must prevent everything which could be used against us as a pretext to those who try to identify us with the Jew-haters in Southern Russia...we therefore call into the middle of the storm that the Jews too are entitled to our brotherly love. We fight against the Jew’s views and influence on the basis of a legislation which is based on the idea of a Christian State. But we never want to touch their human rights. We detest everything which approaches violence.233

Noting the observations of the head of the Protestant theological faculty in Paris, Lichtenberger, the paper noted: “Religious fanaticism once more had broken out both in Russia and Germany. All those, whose sense of morality has not been confused by religious fanaticism, have to raise their voice in protest against such injustices; otherwise religion itself would be compromised.” Lichtenberger, who, the Kreuzzeitung recorded, subscribed to Liberal Protestantism, failed to understand

232 R. n., quoted from ibid., 200 (27 August 1881).
233 E. n., ibid., 199 (26 August 1881).
the situation in Germany adequately. There was no trace whatsoever of religious fanaticism in Germany which threatened the Jews. Rather it was the social and political side of the Jewish Question that had attracted the attention of the Christian population, the paper argued. While there were some inexperienced people in Germany, who spoke out in a fanatic way against the Jews, they were by no means religious fanatics. The dominant view in Germany was that the hospitality the Christian State had granted to the Jews should not be exploited by them. Those who assessed the situation in Germany as being religiously fanatical seemed to be prejudiced, the organ stated.234

Adolf Stöcker in particular was blamed for both the anti-Jewish riots in Germany and the pogroms in Russia. The responsibility for the pogroms in Russia was placed on Stöcker and the anti-Semitic movement by both the Liberal press and by Liberal politicians such as Eugen Richter and Rudolf Virchow. They held that German anti-Semitism had encouraged and inflamed Russian Judeophobia. The German Jewish press as well as some Russian Jews and part of the Russian press supported this view. One Russian newspaper, Odeskii vestnik, went to extremes, reporting the rumor that “the pogroms were the fault of Bismarck, the German Chancellor, who sought to weaken Russia from within and to ruin her credit on foreign markets.”235 In response to these accusations Stöcker took pains to defend his position. Reporting the claim of Stöcker, the Kreuzzeitung noted that the

234 C. c. ibid., 144 (23 June 1881).
reason for the pogroms in Russia lay with the Jews, as both Russian public opinion and Russian officials agreed. Nevertheless Stöcker deplored the outbreak of these riots and their victims, as Christian compassion required. Yet he felt it to be irresponsible that the German people called for the support of Russian Jews and thereby undermined German efforts made against the power of the Jews. They should not forget, he said, that many German citizens and peasants had been driven out from their houses and farms by “Jewish usurers.”

This statement is another example of a contradictory line of argument that indirectly sympathized with anti-Jewish violence. After all, how much sense did it make to reject violence against people and at the same time reject help for them as victims of violence? The view that German anti-Semitism had a decisive influence on the outbreak of the pogroms in Russia has found its way into scholarly literature. However, no substantial evidence has yet been put forward to support this view.

How sensitive the issue of the pogroms was at this point in time for German Conservatives could be seen in the fact that the Kreuzzeitung abruptly stopped reporting on the pogroms in Russia when the anti-Jewish riots broke out in Pomerania and West Prussia. Only when the latter had petered out did the organ resume its attention on the anti-Jewish disorders in Russia.

By the beginning of September it had become clear that governmental threats to prohibit public speeches in the election campaign, which could incite

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236 R. p, ibid., 197 (24 August 1881).
238 See below.
violence, would not be put through. Initial reports that speeches by Henrici, as well as a rally by the anti-Semitic Deutsche Reichsverein, would be prohibited, were not realized and the rally was merely postponed.\textsuperscript{239} Although the Minister of the Interior again announced that public speeches would be prohibited if they contained anti-Jewish incitements (as these caused the anti-Jewish riots), this was not enforced.\textsuperscript{240}

It seems that the government policy, not to interfere with the election campaign, encouraged the Kreuzzeitung to give up its strategy to downplay the riots, both by minimizing their scope and by depicting the rioters in a derogatory way such as “scoundrels” and “scandal-seeking mob.”\textsuperscript{241} Thus in Stolp, the Kreuzzeitung wrote, a group of about two hundred people gathered who debated the Jewish Question and shouted “Hep-Hep” and “Jews out.” They were mainly workers, servants and apprentices.\textsuperscript{242} The paper, repeating views expressed by the Danziger Zeitung, reported that anti-Jewish riots had broken out in Stolp in which approximately two thousand people took part. The riots got worse when the police tried to intervene. When Jews started to throw stones out of the windows the hatred of the mob increased. People were wounded when the military tried to stop the riots, noted the paper.\textsuperscript{243} In Stolp substantial rioting actually occurred.\textsuperscript{244}

Not only did the Kreuzzeitung return to its initial way of reporting on the riots, it also stopped publishing additional statements that condemned or rejected

\textsuperscript{239} R. c., Kreuzzeitung, 193 (19 August 1881); R. n., 197 (24 August 1881).
\textsuperscript{240} R. c., ibid., 212 (10 September 1881).
\textsuperscript{241} See above.
\textsuperscript{242} R. n., Kreuzzeitung, 208 (6 September 1881).
\textsuperscript{243} R. n., ibid., 209 (7 September 1881).
\textsuperscript{244} Hoffmann, “Violence,” 82.
the anti-Jewish violence. Rather the organ concentrated on blaming the Jews again. Thus the paper reproduced the views of an anonymous writer who was able to assess the situation in Pomerania in “an objective way and held no biased attitude towards the Jews.” He said that the reason for the people in Pomerania acting violently against the Jews was not, as the Liberal press had claimed, because they were incited to anti-Jewish rioting. He himself knew “many decent Jews” who should be spared the fate that the other Jews, who were guilty for the anti-Jewish violence, suffered. Many poor Jewish families lived in Posen and West Prussia who made their living by usury rather than as workers, he said. They became rich that way and ruined the peasants. Even though not all Jews were like that, he asserted, it was those who had ruined the Jews’ reputation. The good Jews should get together and stop the bad Jews doing their harmful business, he advised. They should also stop the Jewish press exaggerating the anti-Jewish riots. Finally, they should establish a school where the Jews could learn manual skills. The “malign Conservatives” had not caused the anti-Jewish riots as had been claimed. This could be proven by the fact that in cities affected with the riots, Liberals and not Conservatives were elected. Thus “the mob whose mind had been dulled by the Junkers,” as one philo-Semitic paper wrote, could not carry the guilt, the paper noted. To differentiate between “good” and “bad” Jews, seemingly in an objective, unbiased way, was a widespread pattern in the contemporary anti-Semitic rhetoric. It allowed anti-Semites to “morally anesthetize” themselves.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁵ R. r. supplement, Kreuzzzeitung, 208 (6 September 1881).
The anti-Jewish riots in Pomerania and West Prussia and their political effects had plunged Right Wing Conservatives into a conflict of interests. On the one hand they had to defend themselves in the face of the political threat these events posed to them. On the other, Conservatives wanted to exploit the anti-Jewish violence in order to demonstrate the harmfulness of the Jews and in turn the need to curb their emancipation. The *Kreuzzeitung* solved this dilemma in two ways. When the political situation required, it condemned and rejected anti-Jewish violence. Otherwise it legitimized the violence by referring to causal factors: the violence was indirectly justified as the understandable reaction of the people against the Jews’ harmful behavior. Fundamental Conservative values such as law and order and obedience to authority had no decisive influence on the way the anti-Jewish riots were perceived. These values only came to the fore when the *Kreuzzeitung* found itself in a situation of substantial political pressure.
3 The Pogroms in Russia

Given this background, how did the organ respond to the pogroms in Russia? The assassination of Tsar Alexander II by terrorists was soon followed by rumors reported by the anti-Semitic Odessa newspaper Novorossiiskii Telegraf that attacks upon Jews would be perpetrated during the coming Easter holidays. These rumors soon reached nearby Elizavetgrad. Popular entertainments characteristic of the season (celebrated usually for a full week) had been cancelled by tsarist decree, in mourning for Alexander II. The common people misunderstood this, thinking that the Jews had bribed the police to limit Easter festivities as a safeguard against public disorders. In this tense atmosphere a Jewish tavern owner and a townsman, well-known for his foolishness, had an argument in the wake of which the townsman ran out shouting the tavernkeeper had hit him. Soon it was heard all around “The Yids are beating Christians.” Even though the police intervened immediately, it was unable to stop the people who ran through the streets, destroying and looting Jewish property.247 On 27th April a riot against Jews broke out in Elizavetgrad in which taverns and houses of Jews were plundered and one Jew killed, the Kreuzzeitung reported.248 Until the end of May, the paper restricted itself to a purely descriptive way of reporting on the course of the pogroms.249 Even

247 For this account, see Michael Aronson, Troubled Waters (Pittsburgh, 1990), 44ff.
248 R., Kreuzzeitung, 103 (3 May 1881). In its reports on Russia the Kreuzzeitung had converted the time difference of the Russian calendar, which was twelve days. According to the Russian calendar the pogroms had started on 15th April.
249 R. n. bid., 111(13 May 1881); R. c, 114 (17 May 1881); R. p, 115 (18 May 1881); R. c, 116 (19 May 1881); R. p, 117 (20 May 1881); R. c, 118 (21 May 1881); R. c, 120 (24 May 1881).
though the organ received most of the information on the events in Russia from the Russian press itself, it did not initially follow its lead in blaming the Jews. In its report on the riot in Elisavetgrad, for example, mainly taken from the paper Golos, the Kreuzzeitung omitted its charge that the anti-Jewish riot was triggered by Jews (who, according to Golos, in the beginning of the riot shot at the crowd and thereby roused the crowd to a frenzy). That the Kreuzzeitung did not at first blame the Jews for the anti-Jewish riots might have been because the paper first had to “learn” how to report on foreign anti-Semitic violence. Even though it had already developed a pattern of arguments with respect to homegrown anti-Jewish violence, as we have seen, the paper seemed to have been hesitant at first to apply this pattern (which mainly blamed the Jews for the disorders) to the Russian case. Perhaps there was concern over negative Russian reactions to the paper’s way of reporting on the pogroms. There might have also been uncertainty as to which arguments to use as regards Russia, due to initial unfamiliarity with Russian Judeophobia and its charges against the Jews.

However, this state of affairs had changed by the end of May. Jews who were found to have leaflets in their possession that incited anti-Jewish riots had been arrested in Petersburg, the organ reported. From now on the Kreuzzeitung made every effort to put the blame for the anti-Jewish disorders in Russia firmly on the Jews, following the lead of conservative Russian newspapers. Drawing on information from the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the paper wrote that at a trial in Kiev (before a Russian military tribunal), Jews were accused of causing the

250 See Klier, “Press,” 206.
251 R. c. Kreuzzeitung, 125 (31 May 1881).
excesses with their behavior: "They [the Jews] neither want to do serious work nor pay their taxes. They attempt to avoid military service and exploit the lower classes. All this generated the widespread bitterness that has broken out." It was desirable that the Jews should leave Russia. 252 The military prosecutor in the Kiev district military court was Major-General V. S. Strelnikov, who seemed to be mainly interested in indicting the Jews for exploiting Christians and thereby causing the riots. He told the Jews to take advantage of the open Western frontier. 253

Citing the claim of the paper Daheim, the organ rejected the rumor that Nihilists had instigated the anti-Jewish riots in Russia. Despite the fact that investigations into the disorders had not brought to light any revolutionary involvement, this rumor was gaining belief in Russia. This rumor was put forward by the Jews who did not want to see that the riots were being caused by the peasants' long-suppressed anger, the organ claimed. Even though one Nihilist had been arrested who disseminated Nihilistic leaflets, he turned out to be a Jew. The leaflets were directed not against the Jews, but against the government. Jews whose shops and factories were spared in the riots sometimes destroyed them themselves to gain a lucrative bankruptcy, noted the paper. 254

That the anti-Jewish disorders were initiated by revolutionary circles in order to incite the crowds for revolutionary objectives, was the view of a large part of the Russian press as well as many Russian Government officials. However, the trials of the Kiev rioters in the summer of 1881 did not reveal any evidence of

252 R. n. ibid., 142 (21 June 1881).
revolutionary instigation. Thus most of the Russian press as well as government circles came to the conclusion that it was the Jews alone who had caused the anti-Jewish riots: by bringing upon themselves the wrath of the Gentile population.\textsuperscript{255}

To corroborate its view that the Jews were responsible for the pogroms, the paper drew attention to the fact that even some Jews placed the cause of the anti-Jewish riots with the Jews themselves. Thus the organ reported that at the annual meeting of the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Parliamentarian Simon had said that the persecution of the Jews in Russia would come to a halt if the Jews would stop exploiting the poor with their usury.\textsuperscript{256} Drawing on information from the \textit{Kölnische Zeitung}, the paper recorded that a movement among Russian Jews had formed that was called the "Biblical Brotherhood." It called for a moral reformation of Judaism. These Jews believed that the hostile mood against the Jews in Russia had been caused partly by the Jews' immoral behavior; namely by their money-greed, their forwardness and impudence, their eagerness to emulate the Russian nobility and their usury.\textsuperscript{257} In a historical analysis of the events in Russia, the paper noted:

Even though these violent outbreaks can only be deplored by everybody, one has to understand, when the bitterness against the Jews has begun. Jews have long been disliked in Russia because they are Talmudic Jews who engage in special businesses (\textit{Geschäfte}). This is not the case with the Karaites who reject the Talmud and engag in agriculture. Unlike the Talmudic Jews, they have never been subjected to any restrictions in their civil lives. Talmudic Jews are only allowed to live in certain areas and foreign Jews can not become Russian citizens. Russian Jews (and this

\textsuperscript{256} R. p. \textit{Kreuzzeitung}, 151 (1 July 1881).
always means Talmudic Jews) live in opposition to the Russian population. Their hostile attitude towards the rest of the population can be seen (for example) in their carrying out cruel deeds as Nihilists. Russian Jews cannot be compared to Jews abroad. Abroad Jews make up only a tiny minority of the general population. In contrast there are millions of Jews in Russia. In the eyes of an Orthodox Russian Jew, an Orthodox Jew from Berlin is not Orthodox enough. Russian Jews forme a "state within a state" in the form of the so-called Kahal. The latter has to collect taxes from the community and often cheats the Russian authorities. Serious opposition towards the Jews, however, started when Jews were granted more liberties and thereby came into closer contact with the Russian society, especially under Alexander II. Their behavior in the countryside (especially their dealings in the alcohol business) aggravated the situation.258

Here again we find the "double-bind technique"259 which gave a contradictory message: while displaying distance to the pogroms by characterizing them as "deplorable," the organ at the same time pointed to the Jews’ hostile behavior to their non-Jewish neighbors which explained the violence against them.

These charges against Russian Jews mirrored the views of Russian Judeophobes. They saw the Jews as usurers, tavernkeepers and “exploiters.” In their view, Jews were unwilling to engage in productive work. Jews were either Nihilists or religious fanatics and formed a state within a state.260 The charge that the Jews constituted a state within a state was a major topic in Iakov Brafman’s infamous Book of the Kahal (1st ed. 1869; 2nd ed. 1871, subsidized by the local educational district). Brafman’s book (he was a Jewish apostate, who had denounced his former co-religionists to the Russian authorities) was widely discussed in the Russian press and helped significantly to intensify anti-Jewish feelings in Russia in the 1870s. It is seen as the most successful and influential

259 Hoffmann, "Geschichte", 241.
260 See John D. Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question 1855-1881 (Cambridge, 1995).
work of Judeophobia in Russian history. In his book, Brafman seemed to prove the already well-known charge that the Jews constituted a state within a state. He claimed that the ancient system of Jewish communal government known as the *Kahal* (formally abolished in 1844), still maintained an illegal existence. Allegedly, this secret government joined all Jews together in a “Talmudic municipal republic,” which was determined to oversee the systematic exploitation of the Christian population.\(^{261}\)

Having so far shown to its readers that the immediate cause of the anti-Jewish riots lay with the Jews, the paper now turned to a more in-depth analysis of the situation of Russian Jews. Using a recently published book on Russia by V. Löher, the organ revealed what an enormous role Russian Jews played in Russia. The paper reported that there were then some three million Jews in Russia whose favorite occupation seemed to be ruining landowners. Jews, it was claimed, made their living not from engaging in productive work but from dealing in businesses and did not want to be peasants. They were a fierce enemy of the Russian Orthodox Church, which itself was characterized by a deep seated Jew-hatred. The Jews, because of their participation in Nihilism, were also held to be the most evil enemy of the Russian Government.\(^{262}\)

The reports of the *Kreuzzeitung* on the pogroms in Russia show that by now, the paper had become familiar with Russian Judeophobia and its charges against the Jews and thus was able to incorporate it into its rhetoric when dealing

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with the pogroms. It should be noted that, while German anti-Semitic concepts had spread to Russia (like the “Judaized periodical press” and “Jewish revolutionaries” like Lassalle) and were partly integrated into Russian Judeophobia, this transfer of ideas also took place the other way round, as we have seen. However, even though Russian Judeophobe models did travel to the German public, via newspaper reports for example, they were probably too far removed from German realities to be applied to German Jews. The majority of German Jews were emancipated, largely assimilated Jews, who engaged in different economic activities than in Russia. Nevertheless there were similarities between Russian and German anti-Jewish models, such as the charge of Jews being usurers and exploiters, unwilling to do productive work and a group that formed a state within a state.263

As regards the role of the Russian authorities in the pogroms (one of the major topics discussed in both the Russian and German press), the Kreuzzeitung did not share the view of the German Jewish press and German Liberal papers; that is that the Russian Government, the military and the authorities were to blame for instigating and organizing the pogroms on the one hand and for passiveness and negligence in stopping and preventing them on the other.264 Instead, the organ emphasized that the military and the police acted quickly and decisively.265 Drawing on the Conservative organ Schlesische Zeitung, the paper noted that the

263 For the influence of German anti-Semitism on Russian Judeophobia, see Klier, Question, 407ff; Klier, “Brothers.” See also historical background chapter.
264 For the German Jewish press, see part 4. See below for the view of the Liberal paper National Zeitung, R, c, Kreuzzeitung, 100 (29 April 1882).
265 R, c, ibid., 114 (17 May 1881); R, p, 115 (18 May 1881); R, c, 116 (19 May 1881); R, c, 118 (21 May 1881).
In January 1882 the pogroms acquired a higher profile. *The Times* of London had published two detailed articles about what was happening to the Jews in Russia during the pogroms. They presented an exaggerated and shocking picture, in which men were ruthlessly murdered, infants beaten to death and women and young girls raped. The articles emphasized the culpability of the local authorities for the events, charging them for passivity. The accounts also implied a semi-official involvement for organizing and instigating the pogroms.\(^{269}\) In England these articles brought about a wide public protest, which spread to other European countries, the United States and South Africa. They also had a significant effect on the European press affecting a higher profile of the pogroms in the press.\(^{270}\) For the first time the organ printed a front page article with its own title “The Jews in Russia.” Usually articles concerning the pogroms and Russian Jews appeared under general titles such as “Petersburg” and “From Russia.” The article published a reply of the Russian Government to *The Times* articles through the official *Journal de St. Petersbourg* (organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), which largely denied the accounts of *The Times* articles.\(^{271}\) Citing the claim of the *Journal de St. Petersbourg*, the paper noted that *The Times* had immensely exaggerated the anti-Jewish riots. The atrocities against Russian Jews described in these articles were pure fantasy and revealed a malign intention of the English newspaper. The truth was that no persons were attacked and only some property of Jews was damaged,


\(^{270}\) Ibid., 91-3.

\(^{271}\) See also Klier, “Times,” 9.
the paper stated. Some people were killed in the clashes between the crowd and military, though mainly Christians rather than Jews. That women had been raped was a pure invention and seemed to serve the English press to augment its effects. The paper felt that these were all lies, insults, and slanders which aimed to either incite the English society against the Russian one or to spoil the good relationship between the cabinet of Gladstone and Russia by a certain party.²⁷²

The *Kreuzzeitung* reported on a Russian correspondence that the Foreign Office had received from the British Diplomatic Corps in Russia from May 1881 until January 1882. The correspondence was discussed in the English Parliament and revealed that *The Times* articles had actually been exaggerated and that the Jews had asked for too much compensation, the paper noted. According to the correspondence, it was a deep-rooted hatred in Russia against the Jews that had nothing to do with religion but with the exploitation of the Jews that had caused the disorders. The position of Russian Jews was that of an alien class and the word “Zhid” meant not only a Jew but was used for anything which was despicable, the organ reported.²⁷³

After the publication of this correspondence (according to which both the number of victims and violations of women, as well as the amount of the physical damage, were significantly lower than *The Times* articles had claimed), the latter had to withdraw and modify some of its more extreme statements.²⁷⁴

The *Kreuzzeitung* struggled to express empathy with the Jews. In a front page editorial, the paper stated that “nobody who reads the horrible reports on the

²⁷³ R, c, ibid., 50 (28 February 1882).
persecution of the Jews in Russia can remain untouched, even if one is convinced that the Jews carry the main guilt for the events.” Yet it was felt that “those who have to carry the consequences of the injustices one had committed, are still entitled to Christian brotherly love.” Nevertheless the paper doubted that the stubborn character of the Jews would change in the face of the threat of violence. “After all through the whole of history the Jews remained intolerant towards all non-Jewish matters. Only the heaviest punishment of God is able to change the Jews’ stubbornness. Modern Judaism remains equally stubborn, despite their emancipation and civilization,” the paper believed.\(^{275}\)

**Solving Russia’s Jewish Question**

Having come to believe that the anti-Jewish violence was a popular protest against “Jewish exploitation,” the Russian Government set up a number of local commissions. Their task was to interrogate the local population in areas affected with the pogroms about the Jews’ harmful behavior. These undertakings resulted in what became known as the May Laws. They restricted Jewish trade and commerce as well as Jewish settlement.\(^{276}\) These efforts were intensively debated in the German press. Not surprisingly, they found the full support of the *Kreuzzzeitung*. No matter how positive or negative the attitude of the paper was towards Russia, the response of Right Wing Conservatives to such measures was primarily influenced by their own attitude towards the solving of the Jewish Question which, as we have

\(^{275}\) FE. e., *Kreuzzzeitung*, 122 (27 May 1882).

\(^{276}\) For details on these laws, see John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, “The Pogroms of 1881-1884,” in John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, eds., *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History* (Cambridge, 1992), 40-1.
seen, was the restriction of the Jews civic rights. Thus the paper reported meticulously on the efforts of the Russian Minister of the Interior to restrict the economic activities of the Russian Jews.277 These governmental efforts were also intensively debated by the Russian press, which was divided over the issue. The Liberal press advocated the abolishment of restrictions of the Jews in Russia, blaming the unequal legal system for the Jews’ alienation from the general population. In contrast, the Russian Judeophobe (mostly Conservative) press argued that further restrictions for the Jews were needed in order to remedy the situation.278 The Kreuzzeitung found itself largely in agreement with the latter. The only solution which would prevent the clash between Jews and non-Jews would be to put Jews back into the position they held under Nicholas I, the Kreuzzeitung argued. The Russian, the organ emphasized, was generally free of both national and religious fanaticism. Therefore the reason for the hatred against the Jews could not be found in fanaticism. Jews should be forbidden to carry on their trade, the paper advised. The Russian Government was able to suppress the anti-Jewish riots. However, the paper did not support the view that the Russian Government should strive for Jewish emancipation, which was not feasible in the first place, only to put forward the Liberal principle. Due to the huge numbers of Talmudic Jews in Russia and their attitude towards other religious groups, the Christian population of Russia

277 R., c., Kreuzzeitung, 230 (1 October 1881); R., c, 245 (19 October 1881); R., c, 71 (24 March 1882); R., c, 72 (25 March 1882); R., c, 75 (28 March 1882); R., c, 77 (31 March 1882); R., n, 78 (1 April 1882).
found itself in a kind of state of siege. Therefore the Jews should not be favored by Russia, the organ concluded. 279

The empathy with the Russian people put forward here (that is, when connected to the pogroms), contrasted with the general view the paper held of Russians. Usually they were seen by the paper as unruly and dissipated, idle and drunken people. 280 Blaming the Jews for the pogroms went routinely along with the defense of the Russian peasants for their violent behavior. Citing the claim of the Neue Dörrtsche Zeitung, the paper noted that “this Progress oriented newspaper from Dorpat had condemned the German anti-Semitic movement. The Jews should not be surprised when the anger of the peasants turns against them. Jews have ruined the gullible peasants in the province of Podolia by bringing them into debt.” The peasants actually were to be praised for not acting much more violently against the Jews, which was due to their dullness created by centuries of oppression by the Turks and Poles, the organ noted. In addition the peasants were often influenced by factory workers in bringing about the disorders, the argument went. The Jews often did not mind having their houses demolished because then they could claim for compensation and they exaggerated their losses, the paper claimed. Rather than becoming more humble, the Jews became even more bitter and impudent. The Jews bribed the police, but when it came to protecting them, policemen remained passive. To ask for equality of the Jews, as the Liberal press did, was thoughtless, the organ criticized. The situation in foreign countries, regarding emancipated the

279 R, c, Kreuzzzeitung, 23 (27 January 1882).
280 C, c, ibid., 100 (29 April 1881); R, c, 124 (31 May 1882).
Jews, showed that the Jews would exploit every move in favor of them in order to dominate the Christian peoples.  

The paper did not to any significant degree apply Conservative values of law, order and obedience to authority to the pogroms in Russia. Indirect justification of anti-Jewish violence had priority over these values.

The Kreuzzzeitung disagreed with the claim of the Liberal paper National Zeitung that the anti-Jewish disorders were the result of a restrictive policy by the Russian Government towards the Jews, which isolated the Jews from the rest of the population through dress decrees and that prohibited Jews from having Russian non-Jewish servants; that the Russian authorities were negligent when it came to suppressing or preventing the disorders. The National Zeitung did not blame the Jews and their behavior, the organ commented. “With only suppression of the disorders,” the Kreuzzzeitung replied, “the matter is not solved. Rather the Russian Government is guilty in a very different way, namely because of toying with a Liberal policy over the last decades. This policy stands in contrast to the real character of Russia. It didn’t bring about an economic rise of the people and didn’t succeed in abolishing the sources of Jew-hatred. Rather the government failed to protect the lower classes from the economic power of the Jews,” the paper claimed. “The abolishment of serfdom increased the danger of the Jews’ superior power. When the hatred against the Jews comes in such an ugly form, simply to suppress the disorders will not help. The Russian Government will have to make up for what it had missed in order to achieve an economic balance between the economic suppressors and the economically suppressed. Maybe then the parties will live

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281 R, n. ibid., 215 (14 September 1882).
peacefully again with each other,” the paper stated. Russia’s Liberal policy thus was held to be responsible for the pogroms, as it failed to keep the Jews and their destructive behavior in check. Thereby, the organ indirectly justified the violence as the natural reaction to emancipated Jews and used the pogroms to promote the restriction of Jewish legal rights.

The organ also refuted the view of Liberal papers that the Russian State had tried to isolate the Jews from the rest of the population and thus made it difficult for Jews to go into agriculture. Since Catherine II the Russian State tried to bring the Jews into agriculture, but all attempts to do so failed, the paper maintained. The Jews in Russia had built a “state within a state” with their Kahlal and nobody in the Western world could imagine how destructive the effects of their doings were. Jews dominated the alcohol business and they were religious fanatics. As much as the disorders were deplorable, they were explicable by rational facts. Thus, the paper warned, the hatred against the Jews could only be reduced by introducing restrictions against them. This line of argument mirrored the view of the Russian Judeophobe press. Yet it was also a projection of Right Wing Conservative dreams of a hierarchical world order, lost at home and fearful of losing abroad as well.

Among the different solutions discussed in Russia as regards the Jewish Question, the paper unambiguously supported those voices who proposed to solve Russia’s Jewish Question by placing the Jews under economic restrictions rather

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282 C, c., ibid., 100 (29 April 1882).
283 R, c., supplement, ibid., 113 (16 May 1882).
than by their emigration. Emigration of Russian Jews, as was advocated by both the German Jewish press and part of the Russian Judeophobe press, reflecting official thinking, found little support of the *Kreuzzeitung*.\textsuperscript{285} If Russian Jews would behave as they did in Russia in countries that would allow them to immigrate, then emigration would not solve the Jewish Question, the organ maintained. In addition, not all Jews would emigrate from Russia anyway.\textsuperscript{286}

**The Refugee Crisis**

What was the attitude of the *Kreuzzeitung* as regards help for the Russian refugees? The refugee crisis triggered by the pogroms resulted in a number of international attempts to help the refugees. One of these was the Mansion House meeting, a high profile meeting in London with the aim to collect money for Russian Jews. Representatives of both the Church and the aristocracy, personalities of the world of finance and science took part and discussed the matter. The meeting found little support from the *Kreuzzeitung*. The organ complained that during that meeting nobody mentioned the fact that Russian Jews themselves had caused the hatred of the people against them. The aim of the meeting, the paper held, should be to prevent the Jews from engaging in their harmful activities.\textsuperscript{287} The paper expressed equally little support for a meeting of high profile personalities in Berlin to help Russian Jews.\textsuperscript{288} “All speakers overflowed with humanitarian speeches and

\textsuperscript{285} For the German Jewish press, see part 4.
\textsuperscript{286} C. c, *Kreuzzeitung*, 102 (2 May 1882).
\textsuperscript{287} R. c, ibid., 30 (4 February 1882).
\textsuperscript{288} For more details on European efforts to help Russian Jewish refugees, see Zosa Szajkowski, “The European Attitude to East European Jewish Immigration (1881-1893),” *Publication of the American Jewish Historical Society*, 41 (1951/52), 127-62.
saw the matter as one sided,” the organ commented. “No one pointed out that the Jews themselves caused the persecution against them, which is even acknowledged by Russian Jews. Therefore humanitarian decisions will not solve the problem wholly,” the paper concluded. Consequently, the organ decisively rejected any financial support for Russian Jewish refugees. Noting a report in the Kölnische Zeitung, the paper reported that Rabbi Dr Plato of Cologne called on Christians to donate money for Russian Jews. He had said that the Jews were terribly maltreated by Christians, who even called themselves “orthodox Christians.” In his call the rabbi said: “Christian fellowmen! Save the honor of the Christian creed, which has been discredited by ‘Christians.’” “How much more,” the Kreuzzzeitung commented, “have Christian citizens in the German Reich to take from a Jewish rabbi (emphasis Kreuzzzeitung).” It was quite telling that it was money for which the rabbi had asked, the paper pointed out. The paper refuted the view that the Jewish Question in Russia was a religious question, and that the sad excesses had anything to do with the Christian creed. It was not a rabbi’s task to remind Christians of their honor, the paper observed. The Russian Jewish Question would by no means be solved by Christian financial donations and this the rabbi should not forget, the paper concluded. Just as the emigration of Russian Jews was not supported by the paper (as this would not further their political aim of the recreation of a hierarchical world order), neither were humanitarian actions for Russian Jews. Rather, it seemed that the organ was anxious that such actions would

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289 R. c., Kreuzzzeitung, 94 (22 April 1882).
290 C. c., ibid., 107 (9 May 1882).
have a negative impact on a potential restrictive solution for Jews by diverting
attention to other political strategies.

The establishment of a Ministerial Commission to defend the interests of
the German State against Russian refugees, comprising representatives of several
government ministries, was warmly welcomed by the *Kreuzzeitung*. The
Commission would be authorized to make decisions and was necessary and
important, the paper emphasized. Even though the Committee to Help the Refugees
differentiated between proper refugees and those elements who just took the
opportunity to do wrong, it was felt that the latter group of people could already be
noticed quite strongly. If thus the government would not take action, a state of
emergency would be created by the over-flooding of these vagabonds into the
Eastern provinces of Germany, the paper warned.291 Drawing on the *Elberfelder
Zeitung*, the paper pointed out that the Ministry of the Interior advised the
Ministerial Commission to make sure that the transfer of Russian Jewish refugees
through the Prussian State to the port would be made as quickly as possible. The
view was that if the refugees stayed for too long in Prussia, the danger arose that
some of them would stay. Many of these refugees, the paper held, were dirty, not
out of deprivation but rather out of habit. In addition it was feared that they often
had bad infectious illnesses; one of these was a serious eye illness. Therefore the
Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs and the Department for Medical
Service would also take part in the Ministerial Commission. The Ministry of Public

291 R, c, ibid., 125 (1 June 1882).
Affairs would be in charge for the transfer of the refugees and would see to it that it would go as quickly as possible, the paper noted.\footnote{R, n, ibid., 127 (3 June 1882).}

To sum up we can say that in the struggle against Liberalism and for a renewal of a hierarchical political, social and economic world order, the Jews had acquired a key role. The anti-Semitism of Right Wing Conservatives aimed primarily at the restriction of Jewish emancipation, which had acquired the role of a touchstone for the realization of their political dreams. For this end they not only promoted Jew-hatred. Collective anti-Jewish violence was used to underscore and prove that something had to be done about the Jews. By legitimizing collective anti-Jewish violence (as the understandable response of the people against the Jews’ harmful behavior), anti-Semitism as a cultural code became an encouraging, rather than a deterring force, of anti-Jewish violence. Lacking sincere condemnation of anti-Jewish violence, except when under considerable political pressure, while using the double-bind technique to indirectly justify anti-Jewish violence, we can say that anti-Jewish violence acquired a significant degree of respectability among Right Wing Conservatives.
PART II

Catholic Ambivalences

Catholic anti-Semitism in late nineteenth century Germany has long been seen as a marginal and transitory phenomenon. It was restricted to a short period of anti-Semitic agitation, beginning with a series of anti-Jewish articles by the *Germania* in 1875, which attacked an alleged "Jewish Liberalism," and ending in 1879 with the decline of the *Kulturkampf*. Rather than an issue of German Catholics, anti-Semitism was seen primarily as a matter of German Protestants. This view has long persisted, perhaps not least because anti-Semitism's most conspicuous protagonists, such as the anti-Semitic Parties and their leaders, were almost exclusively Protestant. Catholics did not organize themselves into parties whose major aim was anti-Semitism. Not so much because they were not anti-Semitic, but rather because they had their own forms of organizations such as the Church, the Catholic Centre Party and the Peasant Association. Since the 1970s, however, a number of studies have emerged which have focused more intensively on Catholic anti-Semitism. Most importantly the work of Olaf Blaschke, who, in his thorough and extensive analysis of the Catholic rhetoric, has convincingly

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293 Paul W. Massing, *Vorgeschichte des Politischen Antisemitismus* (Frankfurt am Main, 1986), 16-9.
295 For an overview of the historiography of Catholic anti-Semitism, see ibid., 11-23.
shown that the German Catholic milieu was far more permeated with anti-Semitism than some of the other studies had previously asserted.\footnote{Ibid.}

Even though German Catholic anti-Semitism is now quite well documented, the question of how German Catholics viewed and responded to collective anti-Jewish violence has still found little scholarly attention. Those historians who have addressed the question mostly hold that German Catholics generally rejected anti-Jewish violence. Blaschke argues that German Catholics feared for the integrity of their own position and therefore had to distance themselves from any forms of violent anti-Semitic action. In addition, Catholics (having themselves experienced discrimination and persecution) had become sensitive to the position of other minorities like the Jews and thus it was primarily due to the experience of the \textit{Kulturkampf}, Blaschke suggests, that Catholics rejected anti-Jewish violence. The \textit{Kulturkampf}, he argues, though it intensified Catholic anti-Semitism ("in order to be able to compensate the intensive experience of secularization," for example by blaming the \textit{Kulturkampf} on the Jews), also had a positive effect on Catholic anti-Semitism because it set boundaries to its radical forms and thereby moderated anti-Semitism.\footnote{Ibid., 56, 96. 102-3,105. Donald Niewyk also argued that both the Centre Party and the Catholic press usually spoke out against anti-Jewish violence. See Donald Niewyk, "Solving the ‘Jewish Problem’: Continuity and Change in German Antisemitism, 1871-1945,” \textit{Leo Baeck Institute Year Book}, XXXV (1990), 345.} It has also been widely accepted that Catholics rejected the expulsion of the Jews. To support the expulsion of the Jews could have posed a potential threat to Catholics, who had themselves suffered from such measures.\footnote{Blaschke, \textit{Katholizismus}, 66, 96, 103. Niewyk, “Continuity,” 349.} I challenge the view that the \textit{Kulturkampf} had such a
positive effect on radical forms of anti-Semitism. As regards anti-Semitic violence, I argue that it was precisely the experience of the *Kulturkampf* that boosted radical forms of anti-Semitism, at least among a conservative segment of Catholics. It was the experience of the *Kulturkampf* that formed the central argument in the Catholic rhetoric to indirectly justify and legitimize anti-Jewish violence. This attitude, however, came to the fore properly only in the context of the pogroms in Russia, as I will discuss in this part. As regards the solving of the Jewish Question, I agree that expulsion did not receive the support of conservative Catholics. Yet this holds true only as regards the *German* Jewish Question. In respect to *Russia’s* Jewish Question, support for an expulsionist solution was expressed. In addition, the expulsion of Jews was supported, not only for Russian Jews, but for all Jews outside of Germany. These different responses, as regards Germany and Russia, I suggest, were not due to an undecided mind, but rather mirrored the tensions and discrepancies between genuine views on the one hand, and those shaped by the political pressures of the time and place on the other.
4 The Jews and the Jewish Question

In the first days of January 1881, like the Kreuzzzeitung, the Germania put
the Jewish Question firmly on its agenda. Announcing the publication of a new
calendar, issued by the publishing house of the Germania, the organ noted: “The
calendar comes out just at the right time, as if especially ordered for the persisting
Jewish Question” (emphasis Germania). 299 The calendar promised, “to explore the
Jewish Question in all its depths…”300 By jumping on the bandwagon of the Jewish
Question, the Germania might well have hoped to improve its circulation, a
method that seemed to have been used by different newspapers of different
political camps at the time. Thus the organ pointed out that the
Staatsbürgerzeitung, a National Liberal oriented paper, had been doing very well in
recent times because of its independent attitude towards the Jewish Question. 301
However, if we compare these “agenda setting” statements with those of the
Kreuzzzeitung, it becomes clear that the Germania kept a lower profile on the issue.
Unlike the Kreuzzzeitung, the paper did not put the Jewish Question on top of its
agenda by declaring it to be the most central question of life. In addition, unlike the
Kreuzzzeitung and other newspapers, the organ did not run a special column on the
Jewish Question. Instead issues concerning the Jewish Question and the Jews were

299 R, c, supplement, Germania, 1 (3 January 1881); E. Müller, ed., Berliner St. Bonifacius-Kalender
für 1881.
300 Cited in Blaschke, Katholizismus, 252.
301 R, n, Germania 70 (28 March 1881). Blaschke has pointed out that the use of anti-Semitism in
the Catholic press as a means to increase circulation, was especially pressing during that time
because of the increased competition among newspapers due to the quickly growing press in
usually printed under general titles, such as "Local News" or "Germany." Furthermore articles concerning the Jews and the Jewish Question appeared less often than in the Kreuzzeitung. The latter dealt with the topic almost daily, while the Germania focused its attention only about three to four times a week on the issue.

In 1875 the paper had started to publish numerous anti-Semitic articles, together with the Kreuzzeitung, attacking the Jews as usurers and exploiters who tried to reach dominance over the German people. After 1875 and until November 1880 (when it published the anti-Semitic petition), the organ largely abstained from publishing anti-Semitic articles. However, on the grounds of the empirical evidence (as I will demonstrate below), I disagree with Ernst Heinen’s view that the paper stopped publishing anti-Semitic articles after 1880.\textsuperscript{302}

The lower profile of anti-Semitism in the political Catholic press was possibly due to several factors. Catholics as a minority in a Protestant dominated State did not feel in a position to attack other minorities too intensively. Catholics themselves were in the process of fighting for the abolition of their own discriminated status. To attack too intensely another minority might not only shed a questionable light on their own struggle (and thus undermine their credibility), but could also endanger their own situation: incitement against Jews could encourage incitement against Catholics.\textsuperscript{303}

\textsuperscript{303} On these fears by Catholics, see Blaschke, Katholizismus, 103-5.
In addition it has been noted that anti-Semitism played a different role in the Catholic milieu than in the Protestant one. Catholics had a stronger and more coherent world view and belief system than Protestants. Anti-Semitism was more often only an additive element within the Catholic world view, rather than a substitute for missing elements in a probably more fragile and less coherent Protestant world view.\textsuperscript{304}

Catholic anti-Semitism also differed from Protestant anti-Semitism in its attitude towards the anti-Semitic movement. Catholics had developed a predominantly negative attitude towards the anti-Semitic movement and its proponents such as Ernst Henrici and Bernhard Förster and the anti-Semitic Parties, by 1880. Certainly to reject the movement did not mean that Catholics did not share the reasons for the protest. Yet after having sympathized with the movement in 1879, Catholics came soon to realize that it could pose a danger for them. The movement, seen as a specific product of Protestants, was feared to be potentially anti-Catholic. Catholics also claimed to have recognized the “Jewish danger” much earlier than Protestants, emphasizing that their own brand of anti-Semitism was “better” and “Christian.” Catholics claimed that the movement was racialist, anti-Catholic and that it attacked the Church.\textsuperscript{305}

The lower profile the \textit{Germania} attributed to anti-Semitism in comparison with the \textit{Kreuzzzeitung}, could also be seen in the fact that the former did not apply some of the most important techniques in the construction of a hate figure. The

\textsuperscript{304} This is the argument of Blaschke, \textit{ibid.}, 175.
\textsuperscript{305} \textit{Ibid.}, 98-102.
paper neither historicized Jew-hatred nor did it construct the Jews as an anti-thesis. The only technique that we find is the personification of Jew-hatred.

The Jews as a Rival Minority

One major pattern in the portrayal of the Jews was to depict them as a fellow rival minority who generally won out against Catholics. Both Jews and Catholics constituted a minority within the German Empire, even if Catholics far outnumbered Jews. Catholics made up about thirty per cent of the total population while Jews counted for about one per cent. At the core of this perceived rivalry lay a conflict of status. Catholics had lost considerable status during the Kulturkampf, which had turned them from a powerful and self-confident group into a group that was discriminated against by the State. Both groups had experienced state discrimination. Yet the Jews’ legal discrimination had come to an end in 1871 with their emancipation (just when the Kulturkampf started), fuelling resentment against the Jews. The paper commented bitterly on a call to Jews by an Orthodox Jewish newspaper in Paris, the Univers Israelites, to Judaize (verjüden) the world: “The success Jews have achieved since their emancipation now lets them show their true face…”306

"Resentful comparisons," as David Blackbourn has termed them, probably best characterizes this pattern of Catholics articulating their rivalry with the Jews. Such comparisons were applied to the religious, economic and social sphere, and

306 C. c. Germania, 123 (2 June 1881). The view that Catholic anti-Semitism had been fuelled by their embersment against another discriminated minority, which seemed to have risen in the political arena into the limelight during the 1870s, while Catholics were experiencing official state discrimination, has already been expressed by Massing. Massing, Vorgeschichte, 17.
were borne out of a Catholic sense of being discriminated against within all these areas of life. 307 Within these areas, the educational system played an especially important role. 308 Thus the organ complained that Jews received financial help from the City Council of Hildesheim to build a new school, even though their old one was still in good condition. When Catholics needed money for a new building, they would either not receive it or it was bound to conditions, which could not be fulfilled. 309 Not only were Jews being allocated more public money for their schools in the eyes of the Germania, they also had a decisive say in determining the character of schools. In the town of Argenau, the organ complained, the small group of Jews living there put through the transformation of the existing confessional school into a non-denominational one. The local Catholic community had not even been asked about the issue. 310 Non-denominational schools in Munich had lost their Christian character, the organ lamented. Images of Christ and books containing the name of Christ had been removed out of consideration for the Jews. 311 The Jews were putting through non-denominational schools, the organ noted, but they did not send their own children there. 312 This proved that all the Jews wanted was to divide the Christians, the paper commented. 313

307 David Blackbourn, “Roman Catholics, the Centre Party and Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany,” in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls, eds., Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany Before 1914 (Oxford, 1981), 107, 111.
309 R, c. Germania, 28 (5 February 1881); R, c. supplement, 184 (16 August 1881).
310 R, c. ibid., 105 (10 May 1881). The Germania opposed non-denominational schools, which were a result of the Kulturkampf. The paper wanted separate schools for Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. See, R, c. ibid., 60 (7 February 1882). Lamberti, “State,” 63.
311 R, c. Germania, 60 (7 February 1882).
312 R, c. supplement, ibid., 2 (4 January 1881); R, c, 257 (10 November 1881).
313 R, n, ibid., 452 (3 October 1882).
Catholic perception of losing out against Jews when it came to public concerns was not restricted to the educational system. In the town of Gardelegen, the organ noted, the local annual market had been postponed because of the Jewish Feast of Atonement. Catholics were seldom shown such consideration, even though many more Catholics than Jews lived in that town.\textsuperscript{314}

Economic resentment against the Jews played another important role for Catholics. Compared with the population as a whole, the majority of German Catholics lived in the poorer countryside and small towns. They were largely active in agriculture and small business rather than in industry, commerce and the free professions. By contrast, Jews had improved their economic situation quite drastically during the former decades. They lived largely in towns and cities and were mainly active in business and the free professions. Before 1800 the majority of Jews lived in poverty and only two percent belonged to the upper middle class. By 1871 only ten percent of Jews still belonged to the lower class and sixty percent had made their way into both the middle and upper middle classes. Catholics were also less frequently found in higher education than Jews.\textsuperscript{315} By drawing attention to real differences as regards the economic situation of Jews and Catholics, I do not mean to imply that the economic rise of the Jews was the cause for Catholic anti-Semitism. Rather, as Blaschke has pointed out, it was the

\textsuperscript{314} R. c. ibid., 221 (28 September 1881).
\textsuperscript{315} Blackbourn, "Catholics," 111-2. Blaschke, \textit{Katholizismus}, 20-1, 40, 115. Historians have traditionally treated the German Catholic society rather disparagingly as "backward" economically, socially, politically, and religiously. See the excellent historiographical overview by Oded Heilbroner, "From Ghetto to Ghetto: The Place of German Catholic Society in Recent Historiography," \textit{The Journal of Modern History}, 72 (June 2000), 454-5.
Catholics' own economic decline that was responsible for Catholic resentment against the Jews. Thus, Jewish parents, the *Germania* lamented, were generally better off than Catholic parents. The former, it explained, could afford to send their children to higher education, which in turn would bring about a comfortable life for them. Catholics, because they lacked the financial means, could not afford a good education for their children, noted the paper. This assessment was not wholly correct. It was true that Jews flocked into higher education to a greater degree than Catholics and by the 1870s and 1880s were "over-represented" both at the Gymnasien and at the universities. Yet, these children not only came from better off backgrounds, but also from low income families. This difference seems to stem at least partly from different cultural attitudes to education in the Catholic and Jewish milieu. Catholics often held a lukewarm, or even hostile attitude towards education (particularly women's education), while for Jews (including women), Bildung was important, not least in order to assimilate and move upward in the German society.

It certainly did not help Catholic self-esteem, that on top of their self-perception of losing out economically, they were denigrated in the press for their economic situation. Citing the claim of the *Deutsche Vereins Correspondenz*, "a paper edited by a Protestant theologian," the paper reported:

> It is sad enough that due to their wealth, the Protestant and Jewish minorities in the Rheinland must pay double as much taxes as they would

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317 R. c. *Germania*, 86 (16 April 1881); R. c. 309 (22 December 1881).
have to according to their proportional number, just in order to carry through the stultified and impoverished ultramontane mob.

These people, the organ commented angrily, dared to describe themselves as saviors of the State.\(^{319}\)

Catholic economic resentment against Jews often found expression in the characterization of the Jews as avaricious usurers and cheaters, who damaged various local agricultural areas in Germany, as well as German industry as a whole. The paper claimed that due to the Jews’ monetary greed and without consideration for the more deprived part of the population, two Jewish companies had bought up the entire crop for spring, which resulted in a price increase of grain.\(^{320}\) In a front page article entitled “Commerce and the Jews,” the organ echoed the call of the Kölnische Zeitung on German industry and the world of business to become more honest. It should stop exporting goods, which were either below the promised quality or the agreed quantity, it said. This business behavior had damaged the reputation of German industry, which was increasingly viewed abroad as being fraudulent. Responding to this call, the Germania cited the comment of a Liberal Protestant businessman:

Does the German (emphasis Germania) people, whose honesty has been proverbial for centuries, deserve the accusation that it has degenerated in this respect? Is it not enough that we are seen and treated as cheaters abroad? Would it not be the duty of major German newspapers to explore the true reasons for such a state of affairs, which can only be deeply deplored by every patriotic mind? And should they not take decisive action against the sole guilty ones instead of accusing the whole world of business? The true reason has to be sought in the fact that in our good

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\(^{319}\) R. n. Germania, 180 (11 August 1881).
\(^{320}\) R. n. ibid., 91 (23 April 1881).
Germany, the world of business lies almost entirely in the hands of Jews (emphasis *Germania*). The Jew has been characterized almost exclusively as usurer and cutthroat (*Halsabschneider*). Little attention has been paid to the fact that he inflicts much greater damage on our people by his behavior as a businessman. He ruins the German name abroad. He exploits the German people much more with his business behavior than with loans and usury. He also influences the whole German business world with his lax business principles...The German businessman is forced to adapt to the same fraudulent behavior as the Jews...otherwise he has no chance against the Jews...321

The stereotype of the "Jewish usurer" was complemented here with the internationally damaging influence Jews exerted on the German people. Just as usury had been traditionally identified with the Jews, any economically fraudulent behavior could easily be exclusively blamed on the Jews. The stereotype of the "Jewish usurer" arose in the middle of the fourteenth century, when it was increasingly socially acceptable for Christians to lend money for interest in a new system of loans. Jews (who had been forced into money lending because of their exclusion from the economical system in the Middle Ages) became competitors for Christian money lenders, who in the past had been condemned by the Church to lend money against interest. In this new situation, any cases of usury were increasingly identified with Jews alone. Even though there were Jews who engaged in usury, there were many others who didn't.322

**Power-seeking Jews**

Jews were not only portrayed as usurers and cheaters, but also as a power-seeking people. The idea that Jews wanted to dominate other peoples was not an

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321 C, r, ibid., 163 (22 July 1881).
invention of late nineteenth century anti-Semitism. Rather, we find it in the Middle Ages, often in the form of the Jewish usurer, who wants to ruin the whole town and country. What was new was the idea that Jews wanted to dominate the world. The myth of world domination was part of the belief system of most anti-Semites in the late nineteenth century and also belonged firmly to the Catholic rhetoric. Under the title “Jewish aims,” the organ noted:

…we have seen, how the destruction of Christianity has been brought about. In alliance with “Liberal” baptized apostates, based on a majority, which had been integrated by the omnipotence of Jewish money and influence, the Christian people were forced to submit to laws that undermined the Christian welfare in favor of Jewish exploitation. This way, the activities of the Christian Church were hampered and the people alienated from Church and religion in support of the Jews’ own plans. Often this strategy has succeeded, the Judaizing (Verjudung) of the German people has gone already far. Let us hope that the boldness, with which the Jews aim to supersede Christianity with Judaism and to subjugate (unterjochen) the Christian world under the Jewish race, will open the eyes of both the people and their governments.

In the struggle to achieve world power, both Orthodox and Reform Jews were seen as equally harmful. The only difference between the two was that Reform Jews were even more “impudent” than Orthodox Jews when it came to the “destruction” of Christianity.

Jews and the Kulturkampf

The Kulturkampf brought about three major conflicts for Catholics. First, the conflict between State and Church; second, the conflict between Catholics and

323 Blaschke, Katholizismus, 84-6.
324 C, c. Germania, 123 (2 June 1881).
325 C, c. ibid., 123 (2 June 1881).
Liberalism; and third the conflict between Catholics and Protestantism. During the 1870s Catholics had worked out arguments that drew the Jews into these conflicts. Liberalism, Kulturkampf and Judaism were inseparably linked with each other and made up the cultural code of Catholics. That prominent Jews sometimes fought against discriminatory Kulturkampf legislation did not prevent Catholics from putting the Jews into the forefront of their list of "enemies." Eduard Lasker, for example (leader of the National Liberals), voted as the only National Liberal against the so-called pulpit paragraph in 1871, which forbade clergymen to publicly interfere in the affairs of the State. Lasker, together with the National Liberal Ludwig Bamberger, also refused to support a law against the Jesuits in 1872, which effectively expelled the Jesuit order from Germany. None of the four Jews in the Reichstag voted in favor of the so-called May laws of 1873 (one of the most drastic measures in the Kulturkampf), which demanded that priests undertake a state examination in worldly subjects, subjects about which they often knew very little, such as German history and literature.

The reason Jews were selected ought to be seen in the context of the traditional Catholic view that Jews were: "the enemies of Christ." Thus they fitted in perfectly well when portrayed as the enemies of the Church. In addition to link the Jews to Liberalism was not difficult. Many German Jews were found in the Liberal camp, some in prominent political positions (such as Lasker and

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326 This passage follows the excellent analysis of Blascke. Protestants, Liberals, Old Catholics and Freemasons were the other "enemies" of Catholics. Blascke, Katholizismus, 42-56.
Blaschke, Katholizismus, 47.
328 Jacob Toury, Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden in Deutschland (Tübingen, 1966), 249.
Blaschke, Katholizismus, 45.
329 Ibid., 54.
Bamberger). Jews were also prominently represented in the Liberal press, a favorite aim of Catholic conservative - and Protestant Conservative - attacks. Jews edited some of the leading Liberal newspapers, such as the Berliner Tageblatt and the Berliner Börsen-Courier. Jews were blamed for being involved, on an international level, in putting through Kulturkampf legislation. Two Jews, the paper noted, attempted to put through legislation for divorce, in both France and Italy. “The Jewish wheat ripens best where the Kulturkampf is on.” Citing the claim of the Grenzbote, the paper reported that the Jewish and “Judaized” press did not want peace between Church and State, as this would damage the Jews’ businesses.

Catholic anti-Semitism in the 1870s was motivated mainly by the experience of the Kulturkampf, which was partly blamed on the Jews. It has been argued that by the end of the 1870s, when the worst of the Kulturkampf was over, this motif in the anti-Semitic rhetoric declined. Evidence does not support this view. During 1881 and 1882 the attempt to blame the Kulturkampf on the Jews continued to make up an important element in the Catholic rhetoric, as I will explore below.

Racialist Anti-Semitism

What was the attitude of the paper towards racialist anti-Semitism? Similar to Right Wing orthodox Protestants represented by the Kreuzzzeitung, the Germania

330 C, c, Germania, 123 (2 June 1881).
331 C, n, ibid., 207 (12 September 1881).
332 See Massing, Vorgeschichte, 17-9.
333 Blaschke has shown that Jews were blamed for the Kulturkampf up to the 1890s. Blaschke, Katholizismus, 42-56.
rejected racialist anti-Semitism because of its anti-Christian attitude. \textsuperscript{334} To dissociate from racialist anti-Christian anti-Semitism on the one hand and to express opinions on the harmful behavior of the Jews on the other, was by no means seen as contradictory in the Catholic rhetoric. Blaschke has drawn our attention to the \textit{Kirchliche Handlexikon} and its definition of an acceptable anti-Jewish attitude for Catholics. This kind of anti-Jewish attitude was named in the \textit{Handlexikon} "double anti-Semitism," (\textit{doppelter Antisemitimus}), which differentiated between a "good" and a "bad" anti-Semitism. The latter was defined as racialist, and thereby anti-Christian, while the former was seen as the legitimate claim of the Christian population to combat the Jews' "harmful influence."\textsuperscript{335} This, however, did not mean that the wider Catholic community was totally immune to anti-Semitic racialism. Blaschke has shown that Catholics did integrate some aspects of anti-Semitic racialism into their rhetoric. Views of an inferior Jewish race were being paired with their constancy, expressed in the view that a Jew always remained a Jew - even if he converted. In addition, mixed marriages were seen as a sin. The difference to racialist anti-Semites was that the latter explained the hereditary, unchangeable inferiority of the Jews biologically, with the origins of genetically different races. Catholics, who believed in the origins of a uniform humanity, where all human beings were equally valid as the creation of God, saw the Jewish religion as the causal factor for the Jews inferiority.

Altogether, racialist views in the Catholic milieu, Blaschke argues, remained subsidiary to religious anti-Semitic resentments. The former were only

\textsuperscript{334} R. c. \textit{Germania}, 2 (4 January 1881).
\textsuperscript{335} Blaschke, \textit{Katholizismus}, 70-106.
put forward in situations and moments when they were seen as useful instruments for Catholic interests during both the Wilhelmine period and the Weimar Republic.\textsuperscript{336} The view that racialist anti-Semitic arguments were used instrumentally (rejected when seen as harmful, supported when being seen as useful, but altogether subsidiary to religious anti-Semitism), is inconsistent. It presupposes that religious anti-Semitism was a stable element of a Catholic mentality, while racialist anti-Semitism was only situational, being turned on and off, as the moment required. It was “religion,” Blaschke argues, which “remained the dominant point of reference.” And it was religion, he further argues, which set the boundaries for racialist anti-Semitism, and not the other way round.\textsuperscript{337} Thus Blaschke sets religion as an absolute quantity, against racialism as a relative quantity.

**Solving the Jewish Question**

Where did the organ stand on the “Jewish Question?” The issue of Jewish emancipation was brought into the Prussian Landtag in November 1880 by the interpellation of the Progress Deputy Dr Hänel. It forced the Parties represented in the Landtag to take a position on the anti-Semitic movement. The Centre Party was sharply divided. The majority of Party members held anti-Semitic attitudes. Windthorst, the acknowledged leader of the Party, held that the Centre could not afford to ask on the one hand for the restriction of Jewish equal rights and to fight for the abolition of the *Kulturkampf* legislation on the other. Yet he did not fully

\textsuperscript{336} Ibid., 72-83.
\textsuperscript{337} Ibid., 81.
succeed in convincing the anti-Semitic circles within the Party. In 1875 the 
*Germania*, which represented the anti-Semitic camp within the Party, had supported the restriction of Jewish emancipation. In 1880, the organ rejected the curbing of Jewish equal rights. This change in attitude, Heinen suggests, was the result of inner political considerations. Even though the paper followed Windthorst’s political strategy in 1880, as regards the restriction of Jewish equal rights, it remained cool to his strict anti-anti-Semitic attitude. In 1881 and 1882 the organ continued with this approach. Nevertheless the paper expressed some approval of the legal restriction of Jews, pointing out that exceptional legislation for Jews should rather be called “protective legislation” because it protected the Christians from the Jews.

What position did the paper take regarding the expulsion of Jews? In 1875 the paper had not only supported the restriction of Jewish equal rights but also approved of the expulsion of Jews. This measure, the paper argued, was well justified in certain cases, namely when there were desperate outbreaks by the

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339 Heinen, “Strömungen,” 267-8; 281-2; 291-2; 296-7. The support of legal restrictions of the Jews was an attitude held also by the wider Catholic milieu. Catholics overwhelmingly supported a segregationist solution for the Jewish Question, which could range from a partial exclusion of Jews (such as the exclusion from the press) up to a total exclusion from Jews, that is that Jews should have no power whatsoever in a Christian society. See Blaschke, *Katholizismus*, 65-9. Niewyk, “Continuity,” 348-50.


341 *Germania*, 177 (8 August, 1881).
population caused by Jewish usury. In 1881, however, the paper rejected such measures as too radical to be taken seriously politically.

The overall negative attitude of the Germania in 1881 and 1882, as regards both the restriction of Jewish equal rights and the expulsion of Jews, always applied to German Jews and the solving of the German Jewish Question. As I will discuss below, the organ applied a different attitude towards Jews outside Germany.

343 C, c, Germania, 268 (23 November 1881); C, c, 436 (23 September 1882).
5 Protestants Versus Catholics - Anti-Jewish Violence in Germany

In order to properly assess the Catholic attitude towards anti-Jewish violence, we also need to know what the general attitude of the Germania was towards public disorders and violence. The killing of the Russian Tsar in 1881 provides an event we can examine in this respect. The paper firmly rejected public violence. This was not only on the grounds of law and order but also, more importantly, on the grounds of justice and religion:

Justice and religion are the pillars of order and if the moral (sittigende) strength of a free and holy Church does not educate the people for the good, then those hands who serve hell will find enough for their plans. \(^{344}\)

The organ applied the same attitude to incidents of anti-Jewish violence. In the wake of a large anti-Semitic meeting in the Reichshallen in Berlin, public disturbances partly directed against Jews occurred in Berlin on New Year’s Eve. People gathered in front of cafés, preventing Jews from entering, swearing and shouting among other things “Jews get out!” and thereby triggered violent fights and smashing of windows. \(^{345}\) Commenting on these disorders the organ noted:

We have recently seen meetings which call themselves “Christian,” as the one “Christian Liberal” meeting at the Reichshallen, where violence of the


\(^{345}\) On these events, see Massing, Vorgeschichte, 44.
word was being connected with violence of the fist in the name of Christianity.\textsuperscript{346}

Such public brawls and disturbances, the paper emphasized, were to be rejected and they were "regrettable."\textsuperscript{347} Rather the eagerness of the student youth, the paper advised, had to be unified with respectful calmness, Christian moderation, and positive manliness.\textsuperscript{348} However, it felt the Jews were to be blamed for the events. It was all down to the Jewish press, namely the \textit{Berliner Börsen-Courier}, the paper reported, which had provoked the disorders by publishing in advance rumors that disturbances would occur after the rally in the Reichshallen.\textsuperscript{349}

The \textit{Germania} was most concerned not to be connected with such disorders. Citing the claim of the National Liberal orientated \textit{Magdeburger Zeitung}, the paper reported that an anti-Semitic student rally had found Catholic support. Rejecting this allegation, the paper claimed that it had made abundantly clear where it stood towards people like Ernst Henrici and Bernhard Förster, who had headed the rally.\textsuperscript{350} The concern about Catholic involvement in anti-Jewish disorders had to be seen against the background of the Catholic situation. Finding itself in the final phase of the struggle for the abolition of discriminatory \textit{Kulturkampf} legislation, Catholics feared it would endanger their own position if they were involved in public disorders. Thus commenting on the anti-Semitic rally in the Reichshallen, the paper remarked:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[347] C. c. ibid., 1 (3 January 1881).
\item[348] C. c. ibid., 3 (5 January 1881).
\item[349] C. c. ibid., 1 (3 January 1881).
\item[350] C. c. ibid., 3 (5 January 1881).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Let us make sure, that the word would not be fulfilled also against us, who know what living Christianity, creed and love in Jesus Christ is: "For the name of God is blasphemed among the Gentiles through you."\textsuperscript{351}

In February the paper reported that the anti-Semitic movement had led to riots against Jews in the Pfalz, emphasizing its non-Catholic character:

All the places I named here are pillars of "Liberalism," inhabited by fanatical "Kulturkämpfer," who supported with a huge majority Bamberger in Parliament. It is at least conspicuous that one does not hear of such excesses in places which are inhabited mainly by Catholics, even though there too people are by no means pleased about the way the Semites behave.\textsuperscript{352}

But it wouldn't take long until it came that far. In April, anti-Jewish excesses broke out in Argenau, a little town in the overwhelmingly Polish - that is Catholic - area of former Poland. How did the paper respond to these events? Four major arguments can be discerned. First, every attempt was made to save the Catholic reputation by placing most of the blame on the Jews on the one hand and emphasizing the praiseworthy behavior of Catholics on the other. Second, Catholic violence against Jews was indirectly justified by Jewish incitement to violence against Catholics during the \textit{Kulturkampf}. Third, the extent of the riots was played down. Fourth, the paper's attempt to dissociate itself from the anti-Semitic movement, as noted above, was now replaced by the attempt to justify the movement.

\textsuperscript{351} C, c, ibid., 2 (4 January 1881). See Romans, 2:24.
\textsuperscript{352} R, c, supplement, ibid., 33 (11 February 1881).
Thus the paper reproduced the claim of the *Kreuzzeitung*, that the Jewish population in the province of Posen was hated for its extortionate practices. “This confirms our assumption,” the *Germania* commented, “that the deeper cause of the disturbances in Argenau has to be sought in the fact that the masses had been embittered by *Volksaussauger*” (people who suck out the people. Emphasis *Germania*). The Jews had both provoked and initiated the riots and therefore carried the main responsibility for the disorders in Argenau, the paper held. That Christians had lost control, started to riot and damaged properties in response to Jewish provocations, was “deplorable,” it said. However, the Jewish press had incited strongly against Catholics during the *Kulturkampf*, the argument went. It was only thanks to the “modesty and patience” of the Catholics - something Jews lacked - that these incitements did not lead to the worst kind of excesses against the Catholic population. The organ cited the claim of the Liberal paper *Triebene*, that the Catholic clergy had acted in an exemplary way, by calming the population of Argenau and enlightening them regarding their reprehensible actions. Nor would the Catholic clergy act in such a praiseworthy manner only among Catholics, the *Germania* emphasized. In the Prussian Friedland, the Catholic priest stopped anti-Jewish disorders and there Catholics did not take part in the disturbances. Even the Jews praised the local priest and apparently regretted not having voted for a Centre candidate in recent elections. Maybe the Jews had learnt a lesson from the disorders, namely that they would change the anti-Catholic attitude they displayed during the *Kulturkampf*. The riots, the paper claimed, were greatly exaggerated by the Jewish and Jew sympathizing Liberal press. The press wanted to use the

353 R. c., ibid., 101 (5 May 1881).
disturbances as an instrument against the anti-Semitic movement by blaming it for the disorders, in the hope of destroying the movement. However, would the anti-Semitic movement actually exist and be necessary in its justified core at all, had the Jews not been so arrogant and harmful for the Christian majority, the paper asked?354

The ambivalence in this response lies in its twofold line of argument. On the one hand the organ distances itself from the violence by qualifying it as “lamentable.” On the other, it excuses and indirectly justifies the perpetrators by turning them into the victims of the Jews and their malpractices. The latter in turn become the perpetrators.

Even though the paper justifies the anti-Semitic movement here, this did not mean that it wanted Catholics to be seen as being part of it. The Catholic population of Argenau, the organ noted, was of Polish nationality and therefore did not speak German well enough to be able to read any of the German written anti-Semitic newspapers.355 It should be noted that German Catholics sympathized and identified with the Poles as their fellow co-religionists. Thus the paper criticized the attempt of the authorities to change Polish village and town names into German ones in Posen province. Such a policy did not consider the feelings of the Polish population, the organ lamented.356 The paper also attacked the governmental policy to Germanize the schools in Upper Silesia.357

354 C, c, ibid., 97 (30 April 1881); R, c, 98 (2 May 1881); R, n, 99 (3 May 1881); R, c, 122 (1 June 1881); R, n, 132 (14 June 1881).
355 R, c, ibid., 122 (1 June 1881).
356 R, c, ibid., 74 (1 April 1881).
357 E, e, ibid., 209 (14 September 1881). These measures were part of Bismarck’s Polenpolitik, which aimed to crush the national culture of Prussian Poles. See Hans-Ulrich Wehler. Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs 1871-1918 (Göttingen, 1979), 184-202.
The Anti-Jewish Riots in Pomerania, West Prussia and Posen

In July 1881 anti-Jewish riots that broke out in Neustettin, a predominantly Protestant town in the province of Pomerania, marked the beginning of a wave of anti-Jewish riots in Pomerania and West Prussia. Intensive anti-Jewish agitation by the press, combined with anti-Semitic agitators like Henrici, had heated up the atmosphere in the town.\(^{358}\) How did the Germania respond to these events? At first it remained careful not to take sides. The paper cited the claim of the Jewish-edited Berliner Tageblatt, which blamed the anti-Semitic Lutosch for starting the brawl, which then turned into a riot.\(^{359}\) Trying to stay impartial, the paper noted that having based its first report on the disturbances on a paper sympathetic to the Jews, it also wanted to give an account of an anti-Jewish paper. Using reports from the Norddeutsche Presse, the paper said that it was not the Christians but the Jews who had started the riot. The paper echoed the beliefs of the Conservative Deutsches Tageblatt that it was reprehensible but explicable and excusable, when one, being attacked by the press, lost his temper and responded with physical violence. This view was not accepted by the Germania: "A Conservative paper should not proclaim the law of the jungle (Faustrecht)."\(^{360}\)

On the grounds that the Germania presents conflicting press accounts of the event, we must assume that the paper did not know the true course of what had happened. Yet, by not choosing one side of the account as the correct one, we can

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\(^{358}\) For a detailed analysis of the events, see Christhard Hoffmann, "Political Culture and Violence against Minorities: The Antisemitic Riots in Pomerania and West Prussia," in Christhard Hoffmann, Werner Bergmann and Helmut Walser Smith, eds., Exclusionary Violence (Ann Arbor, 2002).


\(^{360}\) R. n., ibid., 164 (23 July 1881).
recognize that the organ wanted to stay out of this issue of public disorders. This may have been due to the election campaign for the forthcoming Reichstag elections, in which Catholics wanted to form an alliance with Protestants, as I will discuss below.

By mid August it had become clear that the wave of anti-Jewish riots was not restricted to the predominantly Protestant province of Pomerania, but had swept over to the mixed Protestant and Catholic West Prussia province. Commenting on this development, the organ remarked:

The present anti-Jewish riots in Pomerania and West Prussia are regrettable. However, the situation is not resolved by the Liberal press’ attempt to exaggerate the events and express outrage. Rather the government, apart from doing its duty by implementing security and calmness, will have to uncover the cause of the disorders and consider what the remedies for the situation will be. After all this is not just about some disorders made by a few restless people, but about a politically important symptom.\(^{361}\)

The new element in this response was that both Protestant and Catholic anti-Jewish violence were treated as one phenomenon, without differentiating between Protestant and Catholic violence. This new approach should be seen in the context of the intention of the Catholic Centre Party to form a political alliance with the German Conservative Party in the forthcoming Reichstag elections. For this aim, the organ attempted to convince Conservative Protestants to have common goals, rather than to emphasize decisive political differences. In an editorial under the title “Policy, Catholicism and Protestantism,” the paper called on Conservative Protestants to form a political alliance with conservative

\(^{361}\) E, e, ibid., 182 (13 August 1881).
Catholics. After all, it was felt that they had the same goals: Christian authority, Christian schools and marriage, and Christian customs and way of life.  

In the face of anti-Jewish violence, this endeavor posed a conflict for Catholics. Against the background of the *Kulturkampf*, their vulnerable political position had found expression in the effort to emphasize the anti-violent attitude of Catholics in the midst of anti-Jewish riots together with the emphasis of Protestant anti-Jewish violence. The organ had to find a way to reconcile two conflicting political interests: on the one hand to deny or play down Catholic involvement in acts of anti-Jewish violence by emphasizing Protestant - that often meant “Liberal” - involvement. On the other, to stop highlighting Protestant involvement in the riots and adjust its arguments to those of Conservative Protestants to avoid political differences. This difficult balancing act is nicely illustrated by the following story.

In Tuchel, West Prussia province, the *Germania* reported:

Somebody had the boldness to tear a Catholic crucifix from the local hospital and place it on a Jewish home. This seemed to have been done neither by Jews nor by Catholics. Rather it looks as if this deed aimed to encourage Catholics to take part in anti-Jewish incitement.

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362 E. e. ibid., 168 (28 July 1881).
363 German Conservatives, in contrast, did not worry about Protestants being violent against Jews, until they came under considerable political pressure. See part 1.
In the town of Schneidemühl, Posen province, the report continued, posters had been placed in public places that announced a forthcoming anti-Jewish riot. The town was overwhelmingly Protestant, noted the paper.\textsuperscript{365}

To insinuate (at this point in time) Protestants were the troublemakers, did not go down well with Conservative Protestants. The paper noted the allegation of the \textit{Kreuzzeitung} (in response to this report) that the \textit{Germania} had attempted to portray the present anti-Jewish disorders as a specifically Protestant issue, even though it had itself displayed anti-Semitic views in the past. This was an exaggeration of the \textit{Kreuzzeitung}, the organ retorted. However, backing down, the \textit{Germania} noted that it saw no need to establish an investigation into the event to clarify whether Catholics were involved in the anti-Semitic agitation in Tuchel or not. “The report on the event in Tuchel should not be assessed by the \textit{Kreuzzeitung} only under the aspect of a religious divide,” the paper responded, “but rather under the aspect of a Polish and German divide...Instead of making highly political ‘assumptions’ about our report on Tuchel, the Conservative paper should rather either explain or take back its unjustified claim.”\textsuperscript{366} The next day the \textit{Germania} rectified its report on the crucifix story. It was not true that somebody had stolen a crucifix from the local Catholic hospital and placed it on a Jewish home, as the mayor of Tuchel had verified, the organ reported. It had only been a rumor and the reporter had been reprimanded for omitting to mark the story as such, the organ noted.\textsuperscript{367} The \textit{Kreuzzeitung} seemed to have been satisfied with that. It pointed out that the \textit{Germania} had rectified the story about an alleged stolen crucifix, which

\textsuperscript{365} R. c., \textit{Germania}, 182 (13 August 1881).
\textsuperscript{366} C. n. ibid., 184 (16 August 1881).
\textsuperscript{367} R. c., ibid., 185 (17 August 1881).
was hung on a Jewish home in Tuchel. It would be nice though, continued the paper, if the *Germania* would in future not blame Protestants for anti-Semitic disorders and church sins (*Kirchenfrevel*), as these could be carried out equally well by Catholics and not only by Protestants.\textsuperscript{368}

The sensitive reaction of the *Kreuzzeitung* to the crucifix story had to be seen against the background of the new governmental attitude towards anti-Jewish disorders during the election campaign, which placed Protestant Conservatives on the political defensive.\textsuperscript{369}

The crucifix story seemed to have taught the *Germania* a lesson. In its response to anti-Jewish riots, the paper subsequently adapted its arguments to those of Protestant Conservatives. It stressed Protestant views put forward in the matter and supported the anti-Semitic movement. It also avoided differentiating between Protestant and Catholic perpetrators of anti-Jewish violence.

On the three-day riot in Stettin, which was limited to conflicts between demonstrators (chanting anti-Semitic slogans) and state officials and where no Jewish property was damaged,\textsuperscript{370} the paper reported that the anti-Jewish disorders which had occurred the previous night in Stettin, were exaggerated by the Jewish and Jew-sympathizing press. They were seen there as being well prepared by the Jews themselves. The organ held that “the disorders are the result of the hatred of the local population against the Jews. Jews own most cloth and shoe businesses here; the craftsmen are dependent on them and the Jews exploit them.” The paper

\textsuperscript{368} R. c. *Kreuzzeitung*, 193 (19 August 1881).
\textsuperscript{369} See part 1.
\textsuperscript{370} Hoffmann, “Violence,” 86.
reproduced the comment of an “unprejudiced Protestant,” who effectively said that the Jews had not suffered the fate that they wished on Catholics during the *Kulturkampf*.\textsuperscript{371} This quotation demonstrates how also Protestants sought a unity with Catholics (here by empathizing with their fate in the *Kulturkampf*), as I will discuss below. Citing the claim of the National Liberal oriented *Staatsbürgerzeitung*, the anti-Jewish riots in Pomerania were not caused by the Pomeranian population, but by the Jews and their commercial exploitation of the Pomeranians. This analysis, the *Germania* commented, held true not only for Pomerania. Even though the anti-Jewish disorders were deplorable and they had to be brought under control with all available legal means, it was the Jews primarily who carried the guilt for them, emphasized the paper.\textsuperscript{372} The *Germania* warned that in areas such as Hannover, which had not yet experienced anti-Jewish riots as in Prussia, the Jew’s exploitative economic behavior enraged the peasants and burghers of Hannover and might lead to violent outbursts.\textsuperscript{373} Hannover, it should be noted, was an overwhelmingly Protestant area. The riots were of use only for the Jews themselves, the organ claimed, as they hoped that the anti-Semitic movement would get discredited by the disorders. This in turn might partly prevent the solving of the Jewish Question, noted the paper.\textsuperscript{374}

Another attempt to adapt its rhetoric to Protestants could be seen in the Catholic endeavor to include Protestants as fellow victims of Jewish and Liberal anti-Catholic incitement: by talking about “Christian,” rather than exclusively

\textsuperscript{371} R. c, p. *Germania*, 185 (17 August 1881).
\textsuperscript{372} R. n, ibid.
\textsuperscript{373} R. c, ibid., 190 (23 August 1881).
\textsuperscript{374} C, c, ibid., 187 (19 August 1881).
“Catholic,” victimization. When the anti-Jewish riots had petered out the organ noted:

As an epilogue we can say that these so-called anti-Jewish riots could hardly have been called like that, because no Jew was hurt and no Jewish property was damaged. All what had occurred was some “Hep-Hep” shouting but nothing had happened to the Jews. It was the “Liberal” press that had exaggerated the disorders. Actually Christians were hurt by the police so that we might speak of an incitement against Christians. When Catholics had been hooted at in Pomerania as Katholischer Pfaff (a negative form for a Catholic priest) and “Catholic devil,” nobody got arrested.  

Liberal papers, the organ claimed, condemned the anti-Jewish violence. Yet at the same time they continued to promote anti-Catholic incitement and did nothing to protect innocent Christians hurt in the disorders. When a Catholic and a Protestant priest were portrayed with strings around their necks, in a Jewish shop, they did not come to their defense. In short, “when some windows of Jewish homes are smashed, the Liberal press wails, but to Catholics, anything could happen, it would be ignored.” Obviously the assessment of the anti-Jewish riots given in these reports was not wholly accurate. Some people did get hurt in the riots, even though the attacks were generally mostly directed against Jewish property rather than against persons. Substantial amounts of Jewish property were damaged in the riots. These reports also illustrate the use of “resentful comparisons” in the rhetoric, namely that Catholics felt they did not get the degree of protection and defense Jews got.

375 R, c, ibid., 193 (26 August 1881).
376 R, c, ibid.
377 R, c, supplement, ibid., 205 (9 September 1881). The attempt to form a political alliance between Catholics and Conservative Protestants was a recurring phenomenon. Partly, it found expression in a common attack against an alleged “Jewish Liberalism.” See Blaschke, Katholizismus, 51-2.
Protestant newspapers in turn attempted to adjust their arguments to Catholic positions. Under the title "The position of the Catholic press towards the Jewish Question," the *Kreuzzeitung* agreed with the view of the Catholic press that the Jewish Question was primarily a religious question, and only secondarily a social and economic question, a view that was by no means the dominant attitude of the *Kreuzzeitung*. The *Kreuzzeitung* also agreed with the Catholic demand to restrict Jewish emancipation in order to exclude Jews from posts of authority and expressed hope that the common position towards the Jewish Question would help create an alliance between Catholics and Protestants.380

Having drawn attention to the attempt of the *Germania* to fuse its arguments to those of Conservative Protestants, it is important to see that there was one major difference between Catholic and Protestant treatment of the riots. Both Protestant Conservative papers and politicians had rushed to wholesale condemnation of the anti-Jewish riots in response to governmental threats to inhibit election rallies if they contained anti-Jewish incitements.381 The *Germania* had abstained to a significant degree from this strategy. It restricted itself to some lukewarm expressions of disapproval of the riots by calling them "regrettable."382 Such expressions of disapproval were displayed rarely and mostly by emphasizing simultaneously that the Jews were to blame for the excesses, thereby distancing

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379 See part 1.
380 E. e., *Kreuzzeitung*, 35 (11 February 1881); E. e., 36 (12 February 1881).
381 See part 1.
themselves from and indirectly justifying the riots.\textsuperscript{383} This different response could be explained by the fact that the anti-Semitic movement, which was identified by government circles as the main troublemakers for the anti-Jewish disorders, was a purely Protestant movement in which the anti-Semitic Parties, Stöcker’s movement, and the German Conservative Party worked mostly hand-in-hand. In addition, the bulk of the riots took place in predominantly Protestant areas.\textsuperscript{384} Thus, for once, Catholics were in a more comfortable political position than Protestants.

The view that Protestants, rather than Catholics, were responsible for the anti-Jewish riots, was also shared by some Jews. Drawing on the Posener Zeitung, the Germania reported that the Jews in Meseritz, Posen province, would not vote for a Conservative Protestant candidate in the forthcoming election because they believed that Protestant Conservatives, rather than Roman Catholics, had caused the anti-Jewish riots.\textsuperscript{385}

By the beginning of October the anti-Jewish riots had petered out. The hope of Catholics to form a political alliance with Protestant Conservatives in the forthcoming Reichstag elections had not been realized.\textsuperscript{386} Against this background the Germania stopped adjusting its arguments to Protestant Conservatives. Thus, having supported the anti-Semitic movement, the organ returned to its former attitude to dissociate itself from the movement. Having abstained from decisive condemnation of Protestant anti-Jewish violence, the paper now noted:

\textsuperscript{383} R, c, ibid., 185 (17 August 1881).
\textsuperscript{384} For precise location of the riots, see Hoffmann, “Violence,” 83.
\textsuperscript{385} R, n, Germania, 168 (28 July 1881).
\textsuperscript{386} E, e, ibid., 230 (8 October 1881).
We decisively disapprove of the disorders coming from the anti-Semitic agitation as they had occurred many times in rallies and otherwise. The *Germania* is not an anti-Semitic organ in the sense of anti-Semites like Ruppel and Henrici, which can be seen in the fact that it had been deleted from the list of newspapers, which is recommended by the anti-Semitic camp.\(^{387}\)

Historians have debated the question as to whether anti-Semitism functioned as a unifying force for Protestants and Catholics, who were otherwise divided. I would agree with Helmut Walser Smith that contrary to the view that anti-Semitism had succeeded in unifying Protestants and Catholics, by putting aside Catholic anti-Protestant polemics on the one hand and encouraging support for Protestant political anti-Semitism on the other, such attempts in the end failed.\(^{388}\) However, the evidence above also suggests that, temporarily at least, anti-Semitism could function as a unifying force.

The Catholic response to anti-Jewish violence in Germany, we could say, was determined by several factors: first, the fear of Catholics (due to their fragile political position) to be seen to be involved in anti-Jewish disorders. Second, the desire to ally with the Conservative Party. These factors brought about a mixed response to anti-Jewish riots: one time trying to portray them as a Protestant problem, emphasizing the anti-violence attitude of Catholics, the other time silently acknowledging involvement in the riots (by not differentiating between Protestant and Catholic violence). It meant one time to dissociate from the anti-Semitic movement and the other time supporting the movement. Common to all different

\(^{387}\) C. c. ibid., 228 (6 October 1881).

situations, however, was the paper’s double-bind strategy, to distance itself from the violence on the one hand and to indirectly justify it at the same time as the understandable response of a people maltreated by the Jews.\textsuperscript{389}

**The Jewish Vote**

It has been widely acknowledged that anti-Semitism was used by Catholics for political mobilization.\textsuperscript{390} Yet little attention has been paid to Catholic interest in the Jewish vote. In some areas the Jewish vote could make an important difference. Thus the *Germania* cited the claim of the *Posener Zeitung* that the large Jewish population of Wirszitz-Schubin would have a decisive impact on the outcome of the election there. The Jews surely would not vote for a German Conservative candidate there. Thus if they abstained from voting, the paper speculated, the Polish Party would win a majority. The educated Poles, emphasized the paper, had always spoken out against the “nasty” anti-Jewish agitation.\textsuperscript{391} The organ also noted the claim of the *Posener Zeitung* that the Jews of Meseritz (Posen province) need not fear that they would be stigmatized as “enemies of the fatherland” (*Vaterlandsfeinde*) if they voted for a Centre Party candidate, as even Bismarck had allied in the past with the Centre Party.\textsuperscript{392} Catholic interest in Jewish voters was not restricted to the Posen province. In Hohenzollern-Hechingen, a Centre Party newspaper openly called on local Orthodox Jews to vote for the Centre Party.

\textsuperscript{389} For the “double-bind” strategy, see Christhard Hoffmann, “Geschichte und Ideologie: Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit 1879/81,” in W. Benz and W. Bergmann, eds., *Vorurteil und Völkermond* (Freiburg, 1997), 240-1.


\textsuperscript{391} R. n. *Germania*, 137 (21 June 1881).

\textsuperscript{392} R. n. ibid., 168 (28 July 1881).
seemed that especially among Orthodox Jews, if not exclusively, there was a
tendency to vote for the Centre Party.393

The hope to win the ballots of Jewish voters in certain areas did not stop the
Germania from using the anti-Semitic card to mobilize Catholics for the
forthcoming Reichstag elections. During the election campaign, the paper
published seven articles with anti-Jewish headings, which were conspicuous not
only because of having their own title, but also because of their aggressive tone.394
Customarily articles concerning the Jews were printed under general rubrics like
"Germany," or "From the Reich," as noted above. This strategy to increase the
profile of anti-Semitism during an election campaign was also applied in the
election campaign in 1882.395

393 Toury, Orientierungen, 250ff. On the voting attitude of Jews towards the Centre Party, see also
394 C. c, Germania, 123 (2 June 1881), "Jüdische Ziele;" C. c, 127 (8 June 1881), "Jüdisches
Geschrei;" C. r, 163 (22 July 1881), "Der Handel und die Juden;" C. c, 164 (23 July 1881),
"Jüdisches;" C. r, 171(1 August 1881), "Fabrikant, Händler und Jude;" C. r, 191 (24 August
1881), "Jüdische Geschäftspraxis;" C. r, 219 (26 September 1881), "Die Juden in der Industrie und
im Handel."
395 See below.
6 The Pogroms in Russia

Russian Persecution of Catholics

In order to get a better understanding of the paper’s response to the pogroms in Russia, we need to know what attitude German Catholics held towards Russia itself. Russia was no favorite of Catholics. Resentment against Russia had to be seen in the context of the Russian persecution of Catholics, who were mostly of Polish origin. In numerous articles the *Germania* drew attention to the fate of Catholics in the Russian Empire. The organ criticized the various tsarist regimes and their policy towards Catholics. Under the title “Report on the collections in favor of Polish priests who were deported to Sibiria,” the paper reported upon the miserable situation deported priests had suffered because they had clung to their faith and had rejected the Russian Orthodox priests. The newly introduced law forced all Catholics born after 1863, whose mother or father belonged to the Uniate Church, to become schismatics (in other words, members of the Eastern Rite of the Roman Catholic Church were forced to become members of the Russian Orthodox Church). This was a renewed attack on religious freedom, the paper complained. In Poland, the situation of the Church was deplorable and many Catholic Churches had been transformed into Russian ones, noted the paper.\(^\text{396}\)

The organ also criticized the Russian policy towards other religious minorities. Since Peter the Great, the organ noted, the state Church had been the

\(^{396}\) R. c. *Germania*, 73 (31 March 1881). See also ibid., R, n. 158 (16 July 1881); R, r. 184 (24 April 1882).
instrument of the Russian autocracy of the Tsar. Some religions received a degree of state protection such as Protestants, Mohammedans, Pagans, and partly Jews. However, Catholics as well as some sects outside the state Church did not get the protection to which they were entitled by law. Instead they were persecuted and placed under police control, the paper lamented.397 “One law, one language, one creed,” was Tsar Nicholas’ tyrannical legacy, the organ pointed out. Old Believers, Catholics, Jews, and Protestants had to succumb. The Tsar was the successor of the patriarch and thus was also the head of the Russian Church, the paper explained. With military force he coerced the people to submit to the Russian Church. Even though civilization reached Russia, religious tolerance was not yet realized, the paper lamented. The organ criticized that Catholic Churches in Poland, Lithuania and White Russia were not allowed to sing the hymns in any other language than the Slavic one.398

Loyalty to Catholics in the Russian Empire was shared by the wider German Catholic community. The paper expressed the views of a certain Dr V. Stablewski, revealed at the twenty-eighth General Reunion (Generalversammlung) of German Catholics. The Kulturkampf had powerfully awakened the solidarity of all Catholics, especially as regards Slavic Catholics, the paper pointed out. The worst persecution started when Poland was incorporated into Russia. The German Catholic people and their press had strongly supported the Catholics of Poland. The

397 E. c., ibid., 96 (29 April 1881).
398 R. c., ibid., 164 (12 April 1882).
paper noted the call of Centre Party leader Windthorst on the Russian Tsar to free
the Catholics, at the reunion.399

Negotiations between the Russian Government and the Vatican to grant
more religious tolerance to Russian Catholics went on for some time. Some success
was achieved by Catholics, such as the restoration of the Bishops' jurisdictional
power.400

The paper did not hold a very favorable view of Russian society either.
Apart from the lower strata of the Russian people, which had a healthy core, the
organ said, not much good was to be found in Russian society. It lacked discipline
(Zucht), creed, honor and morality and was characterized by a distasteful mixture
of French frivolity, Jewish greed and Cossack coarseness. It was felt that civil
servants, students, the aristocracy and businessmen were materialistic profit-
seekers and detested an ideal, a creed, and a Deity. A parliament elected by the
people would not work in Russia because the electorate was a rotten mass. Rather,
continued the paper, Russia would need a benevolent autocracy, which abolished
the arbitrariness of the administration and reformed the rotten civil service. A
strong and honest central government was needed, combined with a system of
decentralization, the paper advised. This would allow the participation of the
lowest strata, the healthy element of Russian society, in public affairs. It was felt

399 R. p, ibid., 205 (9 September 1881).
400 E. e, ibid., 206 (8 May 1882).
that a Church reform was needed as the Church was rotten to the core due to religious schism.\footnote{401}

The paper was unsurprised that Nihilism had become a powerful ideology in Russia. Nihilism, the paper reasoned, could become a powerful force in Russia because of the moral state of the Russian people, which was rotten to the core, lacking any sense of morality, justice and brotherly love. Nihilism made the Russian people look as if they were ruled by egoism, sensual pleasure, and an infantile drive for destruction. And yet the true character of the genuine Russian, who was not yet spoiled by culture, was very different, the paper pointed out. Since Peter the Great, that is since Russian culture had come in closer contact with the political, social and religious tendencies of the West, the process of the moral and religious educational development of the people had gone awry, the paper held.

The Russian Orthodox Church was not spared critique. In the West, it was pointed out, it was the Catholic Church that had combated the modern, materialistic, anti-religious, and anti-moral forces primarily. Both the Conservative Party and the Protestant Church had offered little support in this struggle. The Russian Orthodox Church was far too fixed (\textit{erstarrt}) and fossilized (\textit{verknochert}) to be able to fight Liberalism. This was the cancer-like illness that the Eastern European world was suffering at present. It was held that the Orthodox Church was ruining both Russia and the whole of the oriental world.\footnote{402}

\footnote{401} E, e, ibid., 60 (15 March 1881).
\footnote{402} C, c, supplement, ibid., 135 (23 March 1882).
When we turn to the response of the *Germania* to the pogroms in Russia, we have to keep in mind the view the paper held on Russia itself. We will ask whether and how this view influenced the interpretation of the pogroms. How, for example, could the positive portrayal of Russian peasants, as the healthy basis of Russian society, be fitted with the fact that a significant percentage of rioters were peasants?

**The Killing of the Tsar**

The killing of Tsar Alexander II in March 1881 could be seen as the major triggering event for the outbreak of the pogroms soon to follow. And yet, it also affected German Catholics in a very unexpected way. German government circles used the assassination to accuse Poles of carrying ideological responsibility for this deed. Quite desperately, the *Germania* responded to this charge by shifting the blame for the assassination on the Jews. The killing of Alexander II also plunged the paper into a dilemma. On the one hand, the persecution of Roman Catholics in the Russian Empire had taken place under his reign, on the other, the organ had to condemn the assassination - a deed condemned around the world - if it did not want to be seen as a supporter of regicide.

The paper solved this dilemma by freeing Alexander II from the responsibility for his past policy transferring it to his entourage on the one hand, and condemning the deed on the other. Thus the organ expressed its shock about the horrendous deed by Nihilists and its sympathy for the Tsar’s son. Alexander II had not provoked this fate with his reign, the organ emphasized. Rather he had
been an Emperor of good will, who deserved the gratitude of his people for the abolition of serfdom. The failures and mistakes that had been made during his reign were to be blamed not on the Tsar but on the tradition of his dynasty and the people of the higher classes. He had to pay for the deeds of his predecessors, maintained the paper. It was felt that his measures for reform were always motivated by good intentions, but they were not always well realized.\footnote{E. e., ibid., 59 (14 March 1881).}

As noted above, the killing of Tsar Alexander II was used by the official governmental German press to accuse Poles indirectly for the assassination, in order, it seemed, to promote resentment against Prussian Poles.\footnote{See part 3.} The history of Nihilism showed, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung claimed, that the Poles were not entirely innocent as regards the most recent events in Russia. During the Polish uprising in 1863, Poles had developed talent for organization and rebellion, which served Nihilists as a role model. Poles did conspiracy as a kind of sport, unlike any other nation. Many Poles, continued the paper, would be without occupation if they could not engage in conspiracy, whereas the Russian people were much less talented in that respect. Therefore it was felt that the intellectual origins and the leaders of the present rebellion against the Russian Government would have to be sought among the Poles. They tried to fulfill both their drives and their prospective national plans with this rebellion. This view, the argument went, was supported by the fact that Golos, the organ of the opposition, was edited by a
Pole. To indirectly accuse the Poles for the assassination of the Tsar did not go far enough for the Norddeutsche. Rather, the paper aimed to identify Nihilism and the Poles. Contrary to common belief, the Norddeutsche held, Nihilism was not really an original Russian thing. Rather the connection between Poles and Nihilism could be proven for example with the Berlin trial on Poles in 1847. The Norddeutsche claimed that after the Reformation, the higher classes among the Poles went for the Jesuit education, which provided a good school for conspiracy. These allegations did not go down well with the Germania. The paper noted furiously:

The well-known denunciation of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung against the Poles in our country has not found much response yet. Even the Liberal camp either ignored or rejected it. Therefore the voluntarily government paper tries a more powerful strategy: the Poles had a Jesuit education, which was a good school for the idea of conspiracy. We do not want to continue to refute the ridiculous claim, that the order of Jesuits had approved of or even glorified the killing of a tyrant.

The organ noted that the Lemberger Zeitung too rejected the accusation made by both the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung and Moskovskie vedomosti that the Poles were behind the Nihilists who killed the Tsar. Moskovskie vedomosti was the most influential Russian conservative organ.

The charge against Poles, put forward by both Russian and German newspapers, touched on the difficult Russian Polish relationship. “The official

405 E. e, Norddeutsche, 134 (21 March 1881).
406 R. c, ibid., 143 (26 March 1881).
407 C. n, Germania, 70 (28 March 1881).
Russian organ *Varshavskii dnevnik* in Warsaw,” the *Germania* reported, “decisively rejected the charge of *Moskovskie vedomosti* that the intellectual origins of the Nihilistic attack was to be found among Poles.” Citing the claim of *Varshavskii dnevnik*, the paper noted that a look at the history of the last twenty years revealed “not a Polish but our own treason” (emphasis *Germania*), namely Liberalism. Liberalism spoilt everything that was “good and holy.” It was held that authority of both family and government declined and that atheism ruled over all layers of society. Morality was in decline and the national habits and customs, as well as the institutions, were despised. It was not sensible to seek for the guilty ones where they were not, noted the paper. It was more comfortable and in the interest of the Russian people to live in peace with the Polish people as an element of the Russian State, instead of provoking it with unreasonable allegations and hurting its wounds... There was a movement developing among Poles that wanted to make peace with Russia. Surely, said the paper, it could not be the task of the Russian patriotic press to destroy this movement. “Maybe it was the task of the governmental *German* press,” the *Germania* commented sarcastically (emphasis *Germania*).409

Even though the attacks of the German press were directed against Poles primarily, the sensitive response of the *Germania* illustrates that they, as German Catholics, felt attacked too. Given the background of the vulnerable political situation of German Catholics, they made every effort to get rid of the charge of being connected with regicide by shifting the blame onto the Jews. Citing the claim

of the Figaro, the paper reported: "The idea to kill Alexander II was first expressed by the Jew Goldenberg (emphasis Germania) at the Lipezker Congress of Nihilists in 1878 and was accepted by the members of the Congress."\textsuperscript{410} Drawing on an unnamed Livland paper's claim, the organ noted that Russian students in Bern had celebrated the killing of the Tsar. It was reported that they behaved disgustingly, celebrating all week by getting drunk in public. The population of Bern was outraged with their behavior and the Swiss students considered setting up a petition to the University of Bern to expel all Russian students. It was difficult to understand, continued the report, how people could act against their own compatriots. It was felt that the only consolation was that these Russian students were mostly Jews and Jewesses (emphasis Germania) from Southern Russia.\textsuperscript{411}

It seems that the stereotype of the "Jewish revolutionary" travelled initially from Germany to Russia, when Marx and Lassalle had to serve for Russian conservative thinkers (such as Dostoevskii) as the quintessential Jewish revolutionaries in the late 1870s, in the absence of homegrown Russian revolutionaries of sufficient stature. The stereotype was taken on board by the Russian press during 1879 and 1880, when it was being firmly established in the Russian rhetoric.\textsuperscript{412} Numerous Jews joined the revolutionary movement in Russia since the 1870s.\textsuperscript{413}

\textsuperscript{410} R, n, ibid., 70 (28 March 1881).
\textsuperscript{411} R, n, ibid., 75 (2 April 1881).
\textsuperscript{412} John D. Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question 1855-1881 (Cambridge 1995), 396-409.
It did not come as a surprise then that the *Germania* drew attention to the only Jewish participant in the killing of the Tsar. Among the arrested, the *Germania* reported, was a women called Jesse Helfman, who seemed to be Jewish.\textsuperscript{414} Under the title “The killing of the Tsar and the change of the throne in Petersburg,” the *Germania* reported that the Jewess Jesse Helfman (emphasis *Germania*) had been arrested together with some other people in connection with the killing of the Tsar. She had been arrested once before and brought to court in connection with a trial against Socialists, the paper noted.\textsuperscript{415} Citing the claim of the *Kölner Zeitung*, the organ held that the conspirators had looked for an unintelligent Jewish woman to play a part in the assassination, and thus came to ask Helfman to fill that role.\textsuperscript{416}

The emphasis on the Jewishness of the sole Jewish participant in the assassination was not paralleled by the Russian press. Rather the latter tended to de-emphasize both the Jewishness of Helfman, as well as her ties to Judaism, and stressed her unimportant role in the assassination. She was portrayed as stupid and dull, at best a compliant follower. Even after the trial, the Russian press tended to de-emphasize her Jewishness and her ties to Judaism. It was widely reported in the press that she refused to give the child she bore in prison to her parents, because she saw them as “fanatics.”\textsuperscript{417}

\textsuperscript{414} R. c., *Germania*, 65 (21 March 1881).
\textsuperscript{415} R. c., ibid., 72 (30 March 1881).
\textsuperscript{416} R. n., ibid., 79 (7 April 1881).
\textsuperscript{417} The argument found in scholarly literature that the Russian press had virtually accused the Jews of the assassination of Alexander II by emphasizing the Jewishness of Jesse Helfman has been refuted. See Klier, “Press,” 201-3 and John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, “The pogroms of 1881-1884,” in John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, eds., *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History* (Cambridge, 1992). 39. Jesse Helfman was in the inner circle of the assassins. Yet,
The _Kreuzzzeitung_ was also not very interested in either Helfman or her Jewishness. It did not report on her, or on her Jewishness, to any significant degree. In addition the stereotype of the “Jewish Nihilist” found equally little attention in the _Kreuzzzeitung_.\(^{418}\) Thus the attempt of the _Germania_ to draw the Jews into the “Nihilist rhetoric” should be seen as an act of political self-defense rather than an attempt to exploit the matter for the sake of anti-Semitism.

Trying to shift the blame for the killing of the Tsar from Catholics to Jews, however, did not silence the _Norddeutsche_. Desperately, the _Germania_ noted:

The _Norddeutsche_ continues to make its absurd claim that the leaders of the Nihilists had gone through a Jesuit education in Poland. To prove this claim, they go back to the Jesuit Mariana. Since Pascal’s “Provincial Letters,” it has become fancy to add to the many absurdities, which are brought forward against the Jesuits, the one which claims that they are professional teachers for regicide. No sensible thinking man believes that an order of the Catholic Church, which is bound to the moral laws of Christianity, could have possibly taught such an outrageous thing. Mariana was the educator of the Spanish Crown Prince under Philipp II in 1599. He wrote a book called “De Rege et de Regis Institutione,” which he dedicated to King Philipp II, who accepted and approved of the book. In the logic of the _Norddeutsche_ this would mean that Philipp had approved of regicide. The order of the Jesuits did not accept the theory of Mariana, which supported the killing of a tyrant. This was why the head of the order Aquaviva withdrew the book and censored it by deleting the passage that was disapproved of by the order. Yet enemies of the Jesuits succeeded in printing and disseminating a new edition of the original work. In response Aquaviva issued a decree in which he decisively disapproved of Mariana’s theory on the killing of a tyrant. All moralists of the Jesuit order subsequently followed this decree.

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\(^{418}\) C, p. supplement, _Kreuzzzeitung_, 148 (28 June 1881); R, c, 23 (27 January 1882).
In a counter attack, the organ concluded that “Luther’s friend and co-founder of Protestantism, Philipp Melanchthon, actually wrote an exegesis to Psalm 59, where he justified regicide when committed as an act of self-defense.”

The Germania, using claims made in the Norddeutsche, remarked that the Poles were the intellectual originators of Nihilism, and therefore of the killing of Tsar Alexander II, was proved by the fact that a Pole who lived in Nürnberg and who owned a tobacco shop, had closed his shop when he heard about the killing of the Tsar. He hung a flag with the colors of Poland out of the window and wrote on his door: “closed in honor of the joyful news.” The Norddeutsche traveled as far as Nürnberg, the Germania commented, in order to prove its allegation. The official organ did not seem to understand that there was no better defense for the Poles than the fact that only one member of the nation, which had suffered so tremendously, had acted in that way. The paper cited the claim of the Norddeutsche that the organ of Polish Catholics in Posen, Kurier Poznansci, had supported the motion of Windthorst to repress revolutionaries, only because it had to follow the Party leader. Citing the response of the Kurier to the allegation of the Norddeutsche, the paper noted that it preferred indeed Windthorst and the Germania to Bismarck and the Norddeutsche. Its actions were led by objective, rather than by Party, considerations.

The Germania did not utterly suppress that there was some degree of satisfaction among Catholics about the killing of the Tsar. In Podlachien, the paper

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419 C, c. Germania, 78 (6 April 1881).
420 C, n. ibid., 91 (23 April 1881).
421 R, n. ibid., 103 (7 May 1881).
reported, many people now said: “The killing of the Tsar is the punishment of God for our blood which has been spilled innocently” (emphasis Germania).\textsuperscript{422}

The Pogroms in Russia

The outbreak of the pogroms in Southern Russia caught the Germania off guard. Quickly, and probably ill-considered, it followed the opinion of the Polish press which put the blame for the disorders on the Nihilists. Citing the claim of Czas, the Polish newspaper of Cracow, the paper reported that the anti-Jewish disorders in Elisavetgrad were caused by Nihilists. They had incited the peasants against the Jews in order to attack the landowners and Orthodox priests.\textsuperscript{423} At the same time the Germania was keen to acquit Poles from any involvement in the disorders. Thus the organ cited the claim of the Frankfurter Zeitung that the Nihilist Executive Committee had proclaimed that no Poles were involved in the revolutionary movement. Poles, it was held, were not being accepted as members of the movement in order to keep the national Russian character of the conspiracy.\textsuperscript{424}

Yet when the Norddeutsche argued along a similar line, the Germania seemed to have realized it was on dangerous grounds. It did not want to fall into the “Nihilist trap” again and distanced itself from the view that the pogroms were instigated by Nihilists. Disagreeing with the claim of the Norddeutsche that the present anti-Jewish disorders were partly caused by Nihilists, who wanted to incite the masses, by giving them a pretext to plunder, the paper noted:

\textsuperscript{422} R, c, ibid., 76 (4 April 1881).
\textsuperscript{423} R, n, ibid., 105 (10 May 1881).
\textsuperscript{424} R, c, ibid.
We do not want to claim that the Nihilists are the instigators of the persecution of the Jews. The stirring up of large scale revolution is an objective of Nihilists, and they might want to make the mob to practice for the revolution, yet all this is not proven. The most recent Nihilist proclamations mock the anti-Semitic movement and view it as a proof for the rotten Russian situation. According to credible sources both from Warsaw and Southern Russia, the mob believes to act in favor of the government when attacking the Jews because of the lack of energy and the helplessness of the authorities. Yet all this does not make the anti-Jewish disorders a Nihilist manoeuvre. It should not be forgotten that there was no small percentage of Jews among the Nihilists.425

Nihilists themselves, the paper held, refuted the accusation made by both the Tsar and the Russian Government that they had instigated the persecution of the Jews. It was not their policy, they declared, to incite races or religions against each other. Nor was it their policy to incite the people against the Jews. The plundering of private persons which characterized the anti-Jewish disorders was not compatible with their plans. They had committed robbery, yet only in the interest of and for the good of the people, noted the paper.426

Russian revolutionaries were divided in their view of the anti-Jewish pogroms. Some supported the disorders by viewing them as the first step in the process to ultimately overthrow the existing structure. It seemed that a small number of revolutionaries might have favored instigating anti-Jewish disorders. Others were against the use of anti-Jewish violence. Many revolutionaries were hostile to the Jews, even though numerous Jews joined the revolutionary movement in Russia. However, there is a consensus among historians that revolutionaries did

425 C. c., ibid., 111 (18 May 1881).
426 C. c., supplement, ibid., 125 (4 June 1881).
not organize or instigate the pogroms in Russia, even though many supported and exploited them once they had occurred.427

Who then was to blame for the anti-Jewish disorders in Southern Russia? It was Kiev Socialism. The disorders increasingly turned against landowners, the paper editorialized. This seemed to be an outbreak of Kiev Socialism by Little Russians (i.e. Ukrainians), which could be traced back to 1817. Agents, it was reported, traveled Russian villages, telling the peasants that the Tsar had approved of the anti-Jewish disorders and that he had issued a decree (ukaz) to expel the rich and to redistribute the land.428 This view mirrored the opinion of some Russian newspapers. It was, however, abandoned by most of the Russian press as soon as the trials of the Kiev rioters did not bring to light any Socialist instigation.429

Rumors that the Tsar had issued an ukaz, ordering the people to beat and plunder the Jews for having murdered his father and for exploiting the people, indeed had preceded and accompanied the anti-Jewish pogroms. That no such ukaz was officially published was attributed by the simple people to Jewish chicanery and bribery.430

The Germania displayed little sympathy for the Russian Jewish victims of the pogroms. It played down the extent of the disorders, blaming the Jews for

428 E. e. Germania, 135 (18 June 1881).
430 See Aronson, Waters, 82.
exaggerating and exploiting them for their own good. In defense of the Russian
peasants, the organ put the blame for the pogroms largely on the Jews
themselves. Using dispatches from Kiev, “allegedly from Jewish sources,” the paper noted that
in Podol, district of Kiev (as well as in other cities), the Jewish neighborhoods were
largely destroyed. Money and official papers were burnt, so that businessmen could
not continue to do their business. “It does not seem to be credible,” the Germania
commented, “that easily transportable goods like official papers are left behind by
the Jews. The estimated damage of twenty million seems highly exaggerated. In
Kiev only the establishment of a rich Jew was destroyed.”431 The charge that
Jewish claims concerning the exact figure of Jewish losses were greatly
exaggerated mirrored the view of “many Russian officials who thought the Jews
exaggerated the amount of their losses.”432

For once, the organ was in agreement with the Norddeutsche. Citing the
claim of the latter, the Germania noted that “the events in Kiev prove that the anti-
Semitic movement is not an invention from Berlin. Rather the Jewish race,
wherever it is numerous, creates enmity with its arrogance and its drive to rule the
world. That the hostility against the Jews in Russia exploded in such a violent and
barbaric way has to be explained primarily by the large numbers of Jews living in
Russian and Polish cities on the one hand and by the poor economic sense of the
average Russian on the other, which exposes the latter to the usury and exploitation
of the Jews.”433 The Germania relied on Polish and Russian newspapers and their
views of the Jews. Thus drawing on the Polish paper Czas, it said that the Jews in

432 Aronson, Waters, 138.
Russia had long been hated by the peasants because of the usury and swindling of the Jews. Citing the claim of the Liberal Russian paper Golos, the paper noted that the Jews had caused the hostile mood against them because they did not engage in productive work, but in business (Geschäfte) at the expense of others. Golos was an important Russian newspaper, popular not only among the Russian intelligentsia but also abroad. It was viewed as the Russian equivalent of The Times of London, because of its brand of moderate reformism, journalistic innovation and its being an excellent source of information. Before the 1880s the paper was not sympathetic to the Jews. By 1880, however, the organ turned away from Judeophobia and became more sympathetic to the Jews.

The organ also noted the claim of “a German Protestant businessman, who lived in the Eastern provinces of Russia,” that ninety-five per cent of Polish and Russian Jews were dirty people. “Their greediness,” he asserted, “is infinite and they do not care whether they earn their money by honest or dishonest means. Jews do not care about the people they ruin. Therefore the hatred against them built up and spilt over. If things then get out of control and situations become nasty, that much gets stolen when goods are left lying around in the streets, is explicable even if regrettable,” he held. It would have to be wished that the intelligent Jews in Germany like Mister Lasker, Ludwig Löwe and their followers, would teach their local Jews good manners instead of opposing the Chancellor in the Reichstag and trying to dominate the German people, the author advised. He felt that the introduction of the law against usury was a powerful means against the Jews. Local

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434 R. n. ibid., 105 (10 May 1881).
435 R. n. ibid., 101 (5 May 1881).
436 See Klier, Question, 374-383.
Jews, he claimed, wished that Count Bismarck had died years ago. If the
government did not put an end to things, he predicted, then people would
eventually face Jewish judges, lawyers and doctors. He said he was not a Catholic
but a Protestant, to make clear that he did not share all the views of the Germania.
Nevertheless he sent his letter to the Germania because it had published already
quite fierce articles on Jewish matters. Initially he wanted to send it to the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung but he was uncertain whether the latter was
already influenced by the Jews. If the Jews would not considerably alter. the time
would come when they would experience terrible things which the different
governments might not be able to control any more, he warned. This reader
distanced himself from the violence by calling it “deplorable.” At the same time,
however, he indirectly justified the perpetrators’ actions against the Jews by
turning them into the victims of the Jews. The Germania did not comment on this
statement, thereby signalizing its agreement with this view.

The view that Jewish economic malpractices lay essentially at the heart of
the anti-Jewish disorders in Russia was mirroring mainstream Russian opinion. The
charge of “Jewish exploitation” had become the main explanation of both the
Russian press, as well as the Imperial authorities for the pogroms.

The German Catholic rhetoric also had its homegrown, specifically
Catholic, element when interpreting the pogroms: to play out the Kulturkampf,
blamed on the Jews, against anti-Jewish violence and thereby indirectly accepting

437 R. r. Germania, 123 (2 June 1881).
Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, eds., Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History
(Cambridge, 1992), 33.
anti-Jewish violence. Had this element in the rhetoric been applied only cautiously
during the anti-Jewish riots in Germany (that the Jews had maybe learnt a lesson
from the disorders, namely that they would change the anti-Catholic attitude they
displayed during the Kulturkampf), it now became much more aggressive, both as
regards the language and the content. Under the title “Jewish cries,” the paper cited
the call of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Paris for financial help for Russian
Jews:

Southern Russia showed a scenery which could be one of the Middle Ages. The Jews’
houses and their property were plundered, destroyed, and set on
fire. Women, children and old people were maltreated. People were
wounded and killed. The authorities had not yet been able to stop the
violence. The Jews were fleeing without knowing where to go, without any
clothes and food. Who would help them? Some help came from private
persons from abroad. The general laws of the country did not apply to the
Jews, who are subject to exceptional legislation. Public opinion was
shocked about the return to barbarism at the end of the nineteenth century
and had demonstrated everywhere sympathy for the victims of this
horrendous persecution.  

Interpreting this call of the Alliance, the paper pointed out that the Jews
were making a lot of noise when their people were attacked, who were not without
guilt for the disorders. When Catholics were persecuted (through the French
Government’s policy of laicization), the organ remarked, the whole of Judaism
broke out in a storm of applause. The paper reproduced the view of the Gazette
de France on this topic:

439 R. p. supplement, Germania, 127 (8 June 1881).
440 R. c., ibid.
A year ago, the houses of French citizens were occupied, their property was destroyed and they were placed outside the common law...they were insulted in the press and slandered by the government. The public authorities did nothing to prevent these insults and violent acts; rather they both organized and carried them out. An outcry of public opinion was heard, which respects individual freedom and rejects both brutality and acts of despotism. Two million signatures were collected to protest in the name of freedom; two thousand legal scholars protested in the name of the law, three hundred judges protested in the name of the courts. Not Jews, a race that had moved here, were persecuted, but French members of orders that are a national race. A race was persecuted which did not engage in the markets, the banks and the stock market but which built schools, preached in the churches, prayed in their rooms, engaged in works of education as well as in deeds of love of neighbor. This race was expelled, prescribed (proscribient), plundered, insulted and both their works and their freedom were destroyed. This is outrageous for us. And what did the Jews say? Did they protest? No, they approved of it. Were they outraged? No, they applauded. Were they angered? Yes, a few times they wrote in their press that prescription, plundering and violence did not happen quickly enough. The Jewish representatives in our governments, Bamberger, Lisbonne, Naquet and Camille See, were those who incited religious hatred most intensively. They voted in favor of all measures to persecute Catholics and even initiated some of them. They supported and approved of every law to persecute Catholics and their clergy with their vote.

The *Germania* supported these observations:

The French Jews are the same inciters as our Jews. Therefore they have no right to complain about exceptional legislation. And if Russia takes into her "administration" all the property of the Jews, if she either deports all her Semites up to the last man across the border by the police or interns them or orders them to live in certain restricted areas only, then our German Jews have no right to complain about it. The fact that they applaud the law of exile against German members of orders, the "taking into management" of the property of monasteries, the whole exceptional legislation of the *Kulturkampf*, silences them. The Jewish *Kulturkämpfer* have not even learnt a lesson from the experience of the last few months. The Jewish newspapers in Berlin and Vienna are fiercely against both a peace between Church and State and against the abolition of the existing exceptional legislation. What noise would break out in the whole of Israel and its press, if to the expelled members of orders justice was done and they were allowed to return to their fatherland? As long as the Jews claim freedom only for themselves, their

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441 R, n, ibid.
cries about persecution leave us cold. The Alliance Israélite would do better to address its protest and piece of advice to its racial followers first.\footnote{442}

The Kulturkampf argument is central here to both legitimize anti-Jewish violence and to silence critics of the pogroms. The Alliance Israélite Universelle, it should be noted, was a favorite target of Catholics. They saw the organization as a powerful means to centralize world Jewry and help it reach its alleged world power.\footnote{443} The Alliance was founded in 1860 in Paris to fight for Jewish rights throughout the world and to combat anti-Jewish prejudice. It lobbied actively for Jewish emancipation with the authorities in those European countries where the issue emerged.\footnote{444}

The outbreak of the anti-Jewish riots in Germany, and its potentially harmful consequences for those who dealt with them in an inciting way during the election campaign, forced the German press to put the pogroms to the back of their attention. Thus the Germania restricted itself to a mere reporting of places and times of the pogroms. For once, the Kreuzzeitung, as a representative of Protestant Conservatives, was in a more vulnerable political position. Due to its strong link with the anti-Semitic movement, which had been identified by the government as the troublemakers for the anti-Jewish disorders in Germany, the Kreuzzeitung avoided the topic of the pogroms altogether.\footnote{445}

\footnote{442} R. c. ibid. 
\footnote{443} Blaschke, Katholizismus, 85-6. 
\footnote{445} See part 1.
As soon as the anti-Jewish riots in Germany had petered out and the Reichstag elections were over, the *Germania* resumed its attention to the pogroms and their consequences. Thus the paper pointed out that Alexander III had distinguished himself by acting in a sensible way. Praising his reform measures, the paper noted that he attempted to get a grip on Nihilism and tried to bind the peasants closer to the throne. In order to halt the peasants’ impoverishment, he restricted the number of taverns and forbade the Jews to sell alcohol. The steadily increasing impoverishment of the peasants, the paper stated, was primarily due to the large amount of alcohol consumed. The latter went hand in hand with the usury practiced shamelessly by the Jewish tavernkeepers, which the peasant population finally had driven to outbreaks of hatred against the Jews. If the Russian Government was then going to restrict the Jews’ unlimited right to residence (*Aufenthaltsrecht*) in the Empire, the organ maintained, it was doing so in the justified hope that thereby a sensible measure was taken to remove an obstacle for the process to regenerate the Russian people.\(^{446}\) While the *Germania* had expressed only cautiously and vaguely support for the restriction of legal rights of German Jews in 1881, as we have seen, the paper openly and clearly supported legal restrictions for the Jews in the Russian context.\(^{447}\)

**The Pogrom in the Warsaw**

The effort to put the blame for the anti-Jewish disorders primarily on the Jews (when they were happening in Russia proper and thus in predominantly non-

\(^{446}\) E. e. *Germania*, 260 (14 November 1881).

\(^{447}\) See above.
Catholic areas) contrasted markedly with the interpretation of anti-Jewish disorders occurring in the predominantly Catholic Kingdom of Poland. Here the paper used the opportunity to play Poles against Russians by putting the bulk of the blame for the disorders not on the Jews but on the Russians. Thus the Polish-Russian conflict diminished anti-Semitism. The attempt to put the blame largely on the Russians also served to save the reputation of the Poles, a touchy issue in the context of German politics, as we have seen. Another onslaught on the Poles (and thereby on Catholics), as it had happened after the assassination of the Tsar, was certainly not in the interest of German Catholics. They could not afford to be seen as conspirators as well as a barbaric, violent people, who did not respect the values of law and order.

In May attempts were made to bring about anti-Jewish disorders in Warsaw. Anti-Jewish posters were hung on walls and some people started to gather and molest Jewish pedestrians. According to Frank Golczewski, the Russian police together with the Polish clergy and the rabbis as well as the Polish press succeeded in preventing any outbreaks of disorders.\footnote{Frank Golczewski, \textit{Polnisch-Jüdische Beziehungen 1881 - 1922} (Wiesbaden, 1981), 41.} How did the \textit{Germania} respond to this event? The organ focused primarily on the positive role of the Polish press and the Polish clergy in preventing disorders, though it did also mention decisive precautionary measures taken by the authorities. Thus the paper reported that anti-Jewish disorders had almost broken out in Warsaw, which were prevented by decisive measures of the authorities.
In the Kingdom of Poland the situation is completely different from Russia. In Poland too complaints are heard about Jewish exploitation. Yet apart from some bad elements that would like to vent their anger against the Jews, the vast majority of the Polish population, precisely because it is Catholic, and because it is far superior through its education to the Russian people, is determined to keep things calm. Agitators succeeded in bringing about a small disorder in the Jewish quarter, yet with no regrettable consequences. Both the Polish press and the Catholic clergy called on the population to restrain from rioting in order to keep the honor of the city. It was thanks to these efforts, rather than to the measures of the authorities, that Warsaw stayed calm.

The organ cited the claim of Polish papers, that Katkov and his followers might know who the instigators of the disorders were and that the anti-Jewish agitation was carried out by people whose Polish had a strong German accent. Similar to the anti-Jewish disorders in Germany, the paper made every effort to save the reputation of their co-religionists and used the event to attack the Russians. Drawing on the Liberal paper Tribüne, the paper noted:

The sharp contrast between Russians and Poles comes to the fore most drastically in the context of the persecution of the Jews. In Russia proper, and in the former Polish areas, where Jews live in areas that are densely inhabited by Russians, the Jews face a near war of extermination. In Lithuania and the Vistula-land (Weichselgebiet), predominantly inhabited by Poles, both in towns and in the countryside, we did not hear a thing about such outrageous deeds. Unfortunately this has annoyed some Russian newspapers. The latter do not like that the noble and humane attitude of the Polish people towards the unprotected Jews embarrasses Russia in the eyes of Europe with its brutal excesses. The Polish press, in contrast to some Russian organs, does not get tired calling on the people to restrain from violence against the Jews and tries to calm the people. The Catholic clergy (emphasis Germania) earns the biggest credit for keeping peace. Those Russian organs claim, however, that only the hatred of the Poles against the Russians and the option to be able to point before the whole civilized world with their fingers on the low cultural state of the persecutors of the Jews,

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449 R. c. n, Germania, 111 (18 May 1881). The Germania was no friend of Katkov. M.N. Katkov was one of the foremost representatives of Russian Conservatives and Russifiers. He had called Nihilism a “Polish intrigue.” See Klier. Question, 402, 455.
prevented the Poles from exerting similar cruelties... The head of the Jewish community in Warsaw has written a letter of thanks to the Catholic clergy for its protection of the Jews. The allegation of some Russian organs, especially Novoe vremia, that the restraint of the Poles was no more than a Polish demonstration, does not lessen the great contribution of the Catholic clergy.\textsuperscript{450}

Yet, Warsaw was not to be spared pogroms. On Christmas Eve a panic (whose origin has not been yet properly established) had broken out in the Holy Cross Church in Warsaw, in which over twenty people died and many more were wounded as the congregants rushed to the exits. Once the people were outside, there were apparently rumors that Jewish pickpockets had deliberately set a false alarm in the church, which had triggered the panic. A pogrom followed which lasted until 27th December. Sources vary as to the number of fatalities.\textsuperscript{451}

The paper portrayed the pogrom as planned and organized in advance by non-Polish, mostly Russian people, who were supported and helped by the inactivity of the Russian authorities. Citing various press reports, the paper detailed the reasons for the disorders. It was allegedly a Jew, who had called “fire” in the church, which triggered the anti-Jewish disorders, though this was not proven yet, the paper reported. The question was whether the pickpocket, who triggered the panic in the church with the fire alarm, in the wake of which twenty-nine people died and thirty were wounded, really was a Jew. However, the panicking people

\textsuperscript{450} R., n. supplement, Germania, 125 (4 June 1881). After the Polish Uprising of 1863, the name “Kingdom of Poland” was abolished to be replaced by “Vistula-land.” It was rarely called that, however, and the name “Kingdom of Poland” was almost always used.

believed so and directed their rage against the Jews. If the information of the Kuryer Poranny was correct and the disorders against the Jews did not occur in the wake of the church disaster, but rather simultaneously, and that the riot started in a neighborhood far away from the church, then, the paper held, the event would appear in a very different light. These reports avoided putting responsibility for the outbreak of the disorders on the Jews. The paper cited various press reports that shed a questionable light on the Russian authorities during the disorders and implied that Russians participated or even led and instigated the riot. Citing the claim of the conservative Polish paper Czas, the organ reported that rumors held that the rioters spoke Russian and believed that the Russian police-in-chief had allowed them to plunder until six o’clock in the evening. When a Polish burgher deputy asked the governor-general to intervene forcefully against the rioters, the latter answered that these were all just children’s games. The police-in-chief said to him: “Here you see it, the mob is the same everywhere, no matter of what nationality he is: when disorders [against Jews] broke out in Kiev and Odessa, your press boasted that you are better than those - and now you see it, the Polish mob is no better at all.” “We hope,” the Germania noted, “that the investigation will clarify this issue.” Implying that some of the instigators of the disorders were Russian, the paper cited the claim of the official Vienna organ Politische Correspondenz that the anti-Jewish disorders were not a spontaneous outbreak of rage by a misled mob, which acted in a criminal way. Rather there seemed to have been leaders who spoke Polish, Russian, and German and who came from Russia.

452 R. n. Germania, 318 (28 December 1881).
453 R. n. ibid., 320 (29 December 1881).
454 R. n. ibid.
as they whistled in the same way as the rioters did during the riots in Southern Russia.\textsuperscript{455} Citing an unnamed newspaper from Vienna, the organ reported that rumors about forthcoming anti-Jewish disorders in Warsaw had been heard before the disaster in the church occurred. It was held that the police and the authorities were informed about forthcoming anti-Jewish disorders, yet had not taken any precautionary measures. The government intervened only on the third day of rioting and only under public pressure. Among the arrested there were non-Polish people. Many suspects, the paper claimed, were not arrested at all, some of whom were leaders of disorders and spoke Russian. The paper noted that Polish citizens, who attempted to calm down the incited mob, were hindered by the police and that some higher officials, who did act decisively against the mob, were later reprimanded for doing so by their superiors. It was felt that all that demonstrated that it was justified to blame the government for not having done its duty.\textsuperscript{456} The role of the military was also criticized. The paper cited the claim of the \textit{National Zeitung} that the military behaved passively in the disorders. Many soldiers were drunk and seemed to have been bribed with alcohol and cigarettes to stay away from the riots.\textsuperscript{457} Citing the claim of the \textit{Berliner Tageblatt}, the organ reported on an official notification by the prosecuting attorney to the press, which said that the allegation that the Jews had made the fire alarm was a vicious and unfortunate slander. The truth was that somebody had called for water on behalf of a woman who had fainted. The military, it was said, seemed not to have received decisive orders to intervene in the disorders and therefore remained passive. The paper put

\textsuperscript{455} R. n. ibid., 7 (5 January 1882).
\textsuperscript{456} R. n. ibid., 6 (4 January 1882).
\textsuperscript{457} R. n. ibid., 319 (29 December 1881).
the Polish press in a favorable light. Citing Nowiny’s claim, the organ noted that “the press expressed its utmost regret for the anti-Jewish riots. Nobody would have expected an enlightened people like the Poles to act in that way. The press did not attempt to make things look better, which would be impossible in the face of the facts.” The people were urged in the churches to abstain from any further disorders against the Jews and were reminded of the Christian creed of love thy neighbor, noted the paper. It was felt that everybody acknowledged the negligence of the authorities and that non-Polish elements were part of the events seemed to be proven. Rumors ran that the Tsar had allowed plundering for six hours.\textsuperscript{458} The paper suggested that the Russians wanted to damage the reputation of the Poles. The conviction that the authorities could have prevented the anti-Jewish disorders became increasingly stronger, the Germania pointed out. Drawing on the Neue Freie Presse, the paper reported that the mob was not hindered during the riot and was even encouraged by the military troops. The Polish side held that: “the local authorities wanted to show the world that the Poles were not ripe for full freedom and that they were no better than the South Russian rioters” (emphasis Germania).\textsuperscript{459}

The organ also offered a different view of the authorities. Citing the claim of the Politische Correspondenz, the organ reported that the authorities were partly too weak and partly too negligent when exerting their duty. On the first day of the disorders, noted the paper, the authorities were taken by surprise by the events.

\textsuperscript{458} R, n, ibid., 321 (30 December 1881).
\textsuperscript{459} R, n, ibid., 322 (30 December 1881). This view found its way into secondary literature, see Aronson, Waters, 248 n 12.
They directed most of their attention to the disaster in the church and underestimated the scope of the anti-Jewish disorders. Part of the authorities felt a certain schadenfreude that Warsaw was now also being embarrassed with anti-Jewish disorders. It was an open secret, the organ continued, that the authorities were not united in their actions. It was held that there were many excellent elements among government circles that worked towards an understanding between Poles and Russians. For them it was important to establish and retain law and order. Others, though, used the disorders as a welcome tool to destroy the plans of Polish-friendly Russian circles, the paper claimed. These different attitudes among Russians was seen as the cause for the fact that in parts of the city the authorities were passive and negligent, while in others they were active and effective.\(^{460}\)

Recent research has established that the Russian authorities and the Russian Government actually had the utmost interest in preventing and suppressing anti-Jewish disorders in the Kingdom of Poland and for this aim made every effort. However, sources differ about the reactions of the authorities. A cabled report to St. Petersburg from the chief of the Warsaw district gendarmes wrote that the troops were unable to stop the destruction. But both the foreign and Russian Jewish press agreed that the police and the troops did nothing to stop the mob. Only on the third day were serious measures undertaken to suppress the pogrom. Thus the role of the authorities and their actions (or inactions) have not been conclusively clarified so far, so that it has not yet been conclusively established why (despite the presence of the police and the army) the pogrom in Warsaw could occur. The theory that the pogrom was planned and organized from an “outside hand” (mainly

\(^{460}\) R. n. Germania, 7 (5 January 1882).
Russian and non-Polish, but also Polish people) has been put forward by both the Polish and international press, especially by the influential Polish newspaper of Cracow, Czas, and found its way into secondary literature. It has so far not been supported with factual evidence. We simply do not know whether or not the pogrom broke out spontaneously, or was planned and organized in advance, and if so, by whom.461

Jews were not completely freed from responsibility for the disorders. Repeating Czas’ claim, the organ wrote that while they respected Russian Orthodox Church festivals, the Jews did not close their shops and taverns on Christmas Day by the Gregorian calendar of the Catholic Church. Thereby they delivered a motive for the riot. The Jews of Warsaw, it was said, were the same “bloodsuckers” as Russian Jews.462 However, such charges against Jews remained marginal.

Even though the Germania had spared the Jews the bulk of the blame for the anti-Jewish disorders in Warsaw, the paper did not hold a very favorable view about Polish Jews. Acknowledging the claim of the Polish paper Kijer Warszawski, which was reprinted in the Polish press, the organ noted that the Jews in Poland could be divided into two groups. The first group was financially powerful and participated in the spiritual and moral life of the nation. It was interested in art and science and performed charitable deeds. This group, the paper pointed out, was a minority and stood in significant contrast to the majority of Jews

461 Ochs, “Poland,” 181.
462 R. n., Germania, 323 (31 December 1881).
in Poland, who were poor and who represented the true Jews. These Jews confirmed the prejudices against their race. They were still wearing the traditional Jewish clothes, which were mostly rags. They viewed those Jews who spoke proper Polish as traitors and their new synagogue as a temple of schismatics and apostates. They were characterized by a scandalous measure of ignorance and dirtiness and they lived like animals in homes that resembled caves, the paper held. It was claimed that they were mostly usurers, swindlers and scoundrels of the worst sort and that they were eating only dry bread and onions. In addition it was held that they exploited the richer Jews’ generosity for charity. The paper regretted that the majority of the Polish population knew nothing about the noble Jews, many of whom were highly regarded in their professions as doctors, solicitors, writers and scientists. The Polish people usually had contact only with the Jewish proletariat which only wanted to cheat, exploit and demoralize the Poles with their cynical arrogance, the organ claimed.563

The Polish division between “good” and “bad” Jews differed markedly from the German Catholic conception of Jews, which saw precisely rich Jews and those who had made their way into the professions as “bad” and harmful. It is noteworthy that the *Germania* did not seem to see these different perceptions of the Jews as contradictory. This would seem to indicate that the organ did not want to argue with their co-religionists over the “badness” of the Jews but was interested in displaying unity and solidarity among Catholics.

In Poland both Polish and Jewish advocates of Jewish assimilation acted to a large extent in solidarity with each other. One of their main motives was to fight

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563 R. n, supplement, ibid., 19 (13 January 1882).
together against the Russian power. Russia in turn attempted to break up this solidarity. Consequently Russia tried to denigrate the Poles by telling them that "their mob was no better than the Russian mob," on the one hand and to emphasize regret about the pogrom in Warsaw. Poles, on the other hand, attempted to put the blame for the pogrom on the Russians, not least out of fear that it could give Russians a pretext to justify curtailing any of the few still existing local Polish privileges.\footnote{I will not go into detail here about the complicated relationships between Poles, Jews and Russians. For a detailed account, see Golczewski, Beziehungen.}

As with anti-Jewish disorders occurring in Catholic areas in Germany, the paper made every effort to save the reputation of the Catholics when reporting on the pogrom in Warsaw: it tended to minimize the riots by playing down the number and true nature of the rioters on the one hand and took pains to emphasize the exemplary role Catholics played in the disorders on the other. Citing various press reports, the paper noted that the rioters were not numerous and were mostly young lads, scoundrels and street mob, with one leader.\footnote{R. n., Germania, 319 (29 December 1881); R. n., 322 (30 December 1881).} According to scholarly research, the majority of rioters were young lads, yet there were also well-dressed people who participated and led the riot. The latter were primarily Russians, but also Poles. Golczewski supports the thesis that the anti-Jewish riot was planned and organized by these people.\footnote{Golczewski, Beziehungen, 44-5.} The organ cited the claim of the Politische Correspondenz that the actions of the Christian population, the Catholic clergy, Catholic associations and the whole of the local Polish press were exemplary
during the riot. The local priest went into the midst of the rioting crowd, risking his own life in order to calm it down. Catholic associations and nuns immediately helped those Jews who were plundered and maltreated, the paper reported.\textsuperscript{467} This assessment of the situation seems to be accurate. According to Golczewski, the higher strata of Polish society in Warsaw broke out into a storm of indignation, the Church condemned all anti-Jewish riots from the pulpit, burgher committees were established to help the victims of the disorders and the press donated high sums of money to them.\textsuperscript{468}

However, the paper had to account somehow for the fact that at the end of the day, the Poles had carried out the riot, even if there had been foreign participants. The paper offered a sociological explanation for this state of affairs. Citing the claim of the \textit{Politische Correspontenz}, the paper analyzed that both in Warsaw and in the whole of Poland, a dualism had developed in the relationship between Christians and Jews. The intelligentsia, regardless of its creed, had acted in solidarity with each other. In contrast racialist hatred among the lower strata of society was so intense that it only needed the slightest manoeuvre to turn it into open violence. Usually, the paper held, these tendencies could be held under control by the upper strata. Yet this time everybody had been lulled by the tranquility of the holidays and had not been able to foresee the disaster, the paper explained.\textsuperscript{469} Golczewski largely confirms the view of a dualism in Polish society. He argues that the lower strata of Polish society were not concerned with the national aims of a common struggle of Poles and Jews against Russians. Rather

\textsuperscript{467} R. n. \textit{Germania}, 7 (5 January 1882).
\textsuperscript{468} Golczewski, \textit{Beziehungen}, 44.
\textsuperscript{469} R. n. \textit{Germania}, 7 (5 January 1882).
among the lower strata of Polish society resentment against Jews seemed to have been built up to a boiling point and could easily be directed against the Jews.\[470\]

It is noteworthy that during the pogroms in Russia in 1881, the organ had not used Russian Judeophobia to foster anti-Russian sentiments. Having "learned" this new rhetorical element during the pogrom in Warsaw, however, it was now also applied to the pogroms in Russia in 1882. Thus in its attack against Russians, Jews and Poles were bracketed together as the common victims of Russian cruelty. Citing the claim of Dziennik Posnanski, the paper reported that the Governor-General of Kiev, A. R. Drenteln, had sent a secret letter to the Russian Minister of the Interior, N. P. Ignatiev, in which he advised means to dispossess Jews and Poles in order to Russify them.\[471\] Citing Drenteln, the paper noted that, "already in the beginning of Russian rule in these provinces, the Russian Government had the difficult task of establishing Russian power. In these borderlands Russia could not build its power upon the Poles and Jews, as they were Russia's enemies." Therefore, noted the paper, Drenteln proposed to forbid giving Poles and Jews land and properties to lease.\[472\] Under the Minister of the Interior, Ignatiev, the situation had become worse, the paper pointed out. He seemed to work intentionally towards undermining law and order. The spirit of resistance against the authorities had risen dramatically. In the east and the south of the Empire, eleven million peasants threatened to carry out an agrarian revolution, the paper pointed out. In the heart of Russia, the Volga area, there were eleven million Sectarians who clung to archaic

\[470\] Golczewski, Beziehungen, 48-9.
\[472\] R. p. ibid., 226 (20 May 1882).
orthodoxy and who were terribly persecuted by the police of Ignatiev, the paper lamented. According to the law, they were allowed to celebrate their rite at home. Yet Ignatiev’s men broke into their homes at night and confiscated the holy pictures of the Old Believers. It was said that they handed them over to the priests, who sold them as non-heretical, proper Russian holy pictures. The paper also expressed disgust for the tremendously disgraceful deeds afflicted on the Jews and was surprised that the government still had not understood that these local revolutions would become the role model for the big revolution. The organ criticized the police for not showing any decisive action against the rioters, who got used to not being frightened of the state authorities. It was said that in Balta, the mob was in such a good mood because of the plundering that it started to attack their own Orthodox clergy.\textsuperscript{473} The pogroms were caused by the hatred of the Orthodox Russians against the Jews, the paper said. The Russian Government on its part observed the anarchic riots passively. Until the government in Petersburg would have solved the Jewish Question legally, the paper noted, the Russian people would have solved it in its own way.\textsuperscript{474} “One law, one language, one creed,” was the tyrannical legacy of Tsar Nicholas, the paper maintained. The Tsar as the successor of the patriarch was the head of the Russian Church. With military force he coerced Old Believers, Catholics, Jews and Protestants to submit to the Church. Even though civilization had reached Russia, there were still many obstacles to be overcome to achieve proper religious tolerance, the paper noted bitterly.\textsuperscript{475}

\textsuperscript{473} R, c, ibid., 191 (28 April 1882). Balta had witnessed an exceptionally bloody pogrom. See Aronson, Waters, 141.
\textsuperscript{474} E, c. Germania, 188 (26 April 1882).
\textsuperscript{475} R, c. ibid., 164 (12 April 1882).
The end of January 1882 had witnessed generally more intense press attention to the pogroms in Russia. As with the *Kreuzzeitung*, the two articles of *The Times* of London, which reported cruelties against the Jews during the pogroms in Russia, caused a higher profile of the events in Russia. Having hitherto mostly reported under general titles such as "Russia and Poland," articles concerning the anti-Jewish disorders in Russia now were printed under the title employed by *The Times*: "The persecution of the Jews in Russia." However, the higher profile devoted to the pogroms in Russia did not last long. The second article was again printed under the customary title "Russia and Poland." The paper expressed its inability to judge whether the description of *The Times* was an exaggeration of the events in Russia. Nor did the publication of a Parliamentary Paper, which contained correspondence from the British Diplomatic Corps (and which proved that *The Times* articles actually had been exaggerated and misrepresented the pogroms), receive a very high profile and was printed under the general title "England." In contrast the *Kreuzzeitung* had printed it under its own title: "About the Russian Jews." The relatively low profile *The Times* articles were given in the *Germania* (compared with the higher profile in the *Kreuzzeitung*

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478 For reports on the pogroms during that time, see ibid., R, c, 47 (29 January 1882); R, n, 79 (18 February 1882); R, n, 86 (22 February 1882); R, n, 87 (23 February 1882); R, c, 89 (24 February 1882). R, c, *Kreuzzeitung*, 50 (28 February 1882). The reports of the Parliamentary Paper revealed that the number of victims and the amount of physical damage were considerably lower than reported by *The Times* articles earlier. In turn, *The Times* was forced to amend some of its statements accordingly. See John D. Klier, "The Times of London, the Russian Press, and the Pogroms of 1881-1882," *Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, 308 (1984), 13-4.
and the European press), might be explained by a reluctance of the paper to get involved in an international debate about these articles. If they were true, they would have asked for condemnation and protest of the pogroms (as it happened in many European countries), which may not have been in the interest of the *Germania*.

Rather than the articles of *The Times*, the election campaign for the forthcoming Landtag elections in 1882 caused a higher profile to be attributed to the pogroms. Between April and the end of October, among nineteen articles attacking the Jews in various contexts, published under their own titles, three were concerned with the Jews in Russia. In addition numerous editorials dealt with Russian Jews.\(^{479}\) Sympathy for Russian Jews under these circumstances increasingly changed against the background of the discouraging developments in Russia, as regards Catholics, causing resentment against the Jews. The paper was disappointed that the pro-Catholic head of the Department of Spiritual Affairs of Foreign Confessions within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Mossoloff, resigned. The organ said that Mossoloff was very good at negotiating between Rome and Russia and had tried to work against anti-Catholic attitudes. Mossoloff, it was held, resigned because of differences with the new Minister of the Interior, Tolstoi. The organ then wondered whether the much denounced (*vielverschriebe*) anti-Semitism in Russia had changed all of a sudden into philo-Semitism:

\(^{479}\) For editorials on the pogroms in Russia, see E. n. *Germania*, 162 (11 April 1882); E. e. 188, (26 April 1882), E. e. 196 (1 May 1882); E. n. 202 (5 May 1882); FE, n. 216 (13 May 1882); E. e. 218 (15 May 1882); E. e. 222 (17 May 1882); E. n. 232 (24 May 1882); E. e. 284 (26 June 1882). For the announcement of the beginning of the election campaign, see C, c., ibid., 155 (5 April 1882).
The governor-general of Odessa rewarded those Orthodox priests in Southern Russia who had helped to calm down the anti-Jewish riots in May 1881. We want, only for the sake of a parallel, to draw attention to the fact that no Catholic clerics in Warsaw received any reward whatsoever. It was mainly thanks to them that the well-known catastrophe in the Holy Cross Church had not ended with the expulsion of all Jews from the Polish capital.\textsuperscript{480}

Research has shown that the Russian Orthodox clergy did not always respond positively to appeals for help from the authorities to combat the pogroms. Many churchmen, though not all, looked upon the anti-Jewish riots with indifference, if not emphatic approval. Nevertheless, thirty-two churchmen were awarded decorations for outstanding service in the suppression of anti-Jewish rioting.\textsuperscript{481}

\textbf{Solving Russia’s Jewish Question: Restriction, Expropriation, Internment, and Expulsion of Jews}

During the election campaign, special attention was paid to the topic of solutions for Russian Jews, an issue that was again bound up with (and made dependent upon) the Jews’ alleged responsibility for the \textit{Kulturkampf}.

Under the title “A Jewish declaration of war against Russia,” the paper held that Jews, who incited against and worked for the exclusion of Catholics in France, should not be surprised if Russia expelled her Jews, even though this was happening in an unacceptable way. Rather one should be surprised “that not all the Christian peoples were more able to show the door to the obtrusive Jews who had

\textsuperscript{480} E, e. ibid., 284 (26 June 1882).
\textsuperscript{481} Aronson, \textit{Waters}, 140.
penetrated into their houses." The paper could also understand that the Russian Government did not hinder the Jews emigrating, considering that many Russian Jews supported Socialist tendencies and thus would do no good to the people among whom they lived. A year earlier the paper had noted that if Russia took away all the Jews' properties and expelled all her Semites up to the last man across the border, if she interned her Jews or if she restricted them to live in certain areas only, the Jews had no right to complain because of their approval of the Kulturkampf legislation. The active role of the Jews in the Kulturkampf was used to indirectly justify and legitimize radical solutions for the Jewish Question. This view was by no means restricted to the Germania. It was shared by Catholics internationally. Using the Osservatorio Romano, the official daily paper of the Vatican, the organ reported that:

Religious and humanitarian considerations force us to join the disapproval of the Jewish persecution [in Russia] expressed by Liberal papers. Yet why do these organs, while condemning justifiably the violence, not at the same time consider the causes, which provoked the disorders? Why do they not find a single word of disparagement for the enormously long list of villainous, deceitful and greedy deeds, by which the Hebrews have caused the situation they now suffer from? It is honorable to reprimand disorders and riots. Yet justice and logic also ask for the condemnation of the causes, who brought the riots about. It seems that all they [Liberal papers] wanted, was that a class of deceitful people gets a free hand to exploit the rest of human society. Let us assume that Liberal papers are not led by their sympathy for the enemies of the Catholic Church, and that they speak purely out of humanitarian motives. Then we must ask, where these sensitive souls were when in Italy the religious [Catholic] groups were expelled from their houses and when their property was robbed? When the dowry was stolen from the Italian women from the orders who were condemned to a life poverty and misery? Where were they when in

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482 C. c., Germania, 275 (21 June 1882).
483 R. n. ibid., 213 (12 May 1882).
484 C. c., supplement, ibid., 127 (8 June 1881).
Germany German Jesuits and priests were exiled? Where were they when in France the members of the orders were happily persecuted? The Liberal papers remained either silent or they laughed in schadenfreude. Why do they cry out now and why are they outraged when a country expels her strangers? They want to leave it to us Catholics, who have always condemned persecution everywhere, to disapprove of what is wrong in the present persecution. The Liberals have no right to make a judgment about what is right or wrong, about what is good or bad.

“We only want to ask the organs of the Semites,” the Germania commented, “especially the Berliner Tageblatt, the Börsen-Courier and the Neue Freie Presse: are you in favor of continuing the exile and internment of German citizens or the abolition of the law for the expulsion of the Jesuits?”485 Here the paper distances itself from the pogroms, by disapproving of them. At the same time, this disapproval is made dependent upon the question if - this time Liberals, not Jews - had condemned the Kulturkampf. That way, Liberal critics of the pogroms are silenced. Radical solutions for the Jewish Question could not be openly and directly supported or demanded, but their critics - Liberals and Jews - could be rhetorically silenced.

Under the title: “Concerning the Jewish Question in Russia,” the paper argued in favor of the restriction of Jewish rights using anti-Jewish violence in proof of the necessity of such a measure. The paper cited the claim of the Neue Dörrtsche Zeitung, “a paper published in Dorpat and supporter of the Progressive Party (Fortschrittspartei), which had vigorously fought against the German anti-Semitic movement in Germany.” The province of Podolia, the organ noted, was a very fertile area, and people were used to getting a good harvest. But this year the

485 FE, n., ibid., 216 (13 May 1882).
harvest was even better than in other years and was praised by the local people. The question arose whether the rich harvest of the area should be stocked up to provide for years with a poor harvest. However, this was not possible, the paper held, as the entire crop was already sold to the "vampires" of the people, namely the Jews. They had encouraged the people to become dependent upon them by bringing them into debt and thus destroying the helpless Little Russians (i.e. Ukranians) with their usury, it was claimed. The paper was unsurprised that the peasants held the Jews responsible for all the ills in life and sometimes became violent. The organ expressed sympathy for their dullness, which was seen as caused by the occupation by the Turks and the Poles. "The peasants should be praised for having not acted much more violently considering that only a few violent incidents had taken place. In addition the peasants had often been seduced by factory workers." It was felt that the Jews were often pleased about the destruction of their miserable huts and only rarely experienced real financial loss. They exaggerated the violence and thereby turned the misery into their luck. The disorders did not intimidate the Jews or make them humble, the organ held. Rather they became bitter and impudent. The police, it was said, even though bribed by the Jews, did nothing to protect them. If then, after all the sad experiences, the Liberal press still stood by the Jews and asked for equal rights for the Jews, this was held to be thoughtless. The foreign situation had proven clearly enough where equal rights for the Jews had led, noted the paper. Jews demoralized every people, such as the poor Little Russians, who were on a low cultural level and could neither read nor write, with their Talmudic concepts of right, honor and respectability.
(Sittlichkeit). Equal rights for the Jews would inevitably lead to the worst outbreaks of wrath against the Jews, which might well exceed the massacres of Jews during the Middle Ages, the paper warned. Empathy with the perpetrators, who are portrayed as the victims of the Jews, goes hand in hand with the charge that Jews profit financially from the pogroms. The violent reaction of the victimized peasants against the Jews’ maltreatment, justified with the helplessness of the peasants against the Jews’ cruelty, could only be halted by the legal restriction of the Jews. This line of argument mirrored the Russian Judeophobe press, which argued that “the eruption of popular violence, ‘a cry for help from the masses,’ was further evidence of the need to further restrict the legal position of the Jews.”

**The Refugee Crisis**

One of the main issues in the German press as regards the refugee crisis triggered by the pogroms, was financial and political support for the victims of the pogroms. How did the paper respond to this issue? We can find different kinds of responses in the paper: neutral, positive and negative, depending on their context. In the German context, the paper remained careful not to expose itself in the matter, presumably out of consideration for the Catholics’ vulnerable political position. Thus the organ reported in a rather neutral way about the attempts made by the Berlin Committee to support the refugees financially, without expressing

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486 R. n. ibid., 428 (19 September 1882).
488 For a detailed account on European and American efforts to help the refugees, see Zosa Szajkowski, “The European Attitude to East European Jewish Immigration (1881-1893),” *Publication of the American Jewish Historical Society*, 41 (1951/52), 127-54.
either support or rejection for such actions. The paper took a different approach when it came to the reaction of the Pope, who displayed sympathy for Jews: “A telegram from Rome [to Russia] had a tremendous impact on local political circles, especially those who stand close to Count Ignatiev,” the Germania editorialized.

The telegram says that the Pope had issued a decree to Roman Catholic bishops, asking them to preach Christian brotherly love to their congregations and to make sure that Catholics would not take part in the persecution of the Jews. This message proves that Rome would not make concessions to Russia for the price of tolerating un-Christian principles. The Roman Catholic clergy and that part of the Russian schismatic Church which stood close to the rites of Rome, had contributed substantially to the collection for Jews, who were plundered with greed and fanaticism. Yet again, Catholics are accused of helping Russian Jews not out of Christian brotherly love but in order to protest against the Russian Government. At times of the greatest suppression of the Roman Catholic creed by the state religion, the clergy had proven to have been courageous enough to display passive resistance and could not be deterred from doing so by being exiled or imprisoned. Therefore to use charity as a means to protest was both tactless and futile.

The paper could hardly challenge the position of the Pope and the Catholic clergy who was instructed by the Pope. It seemed though that the paper was more interested in defending Catholics and their reputation in the Russian Empire against Russian critics. In this case, as with the pogrom in Warsaw, resentment against Russia, due to her discrimination of Catholics, could result in empathy with the Jews.

However, in the Western context, the organ expressed little support for help for Russian Jews, such as the donation by the Archbishop of Paris, Cardinal Guibert, of 1,000 French Francs. Taking ideas from the Vossische Zeitung, the

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489 R, c. Germania, 179 (21 April 1882); R, c, 186 (25 April 1882); R, c, 198 (2 May 1882).
490 E, e, ibid., 218 (15 May 1882).
paper noted that the archbishop had publicly expressed his outrage and deep pain about the “Russian barbarism.” He had pointed out that the Popes had always acted as the protectors of the Jews. Cardinal Guibert was correct, the Germania commented. However, if he had experienced how German Jews insulted the feelings of German Christians on a daily basis, it was said, he would probably have issued a piece of advice for them too.\footnote{International public solidarity with Russian Jews at times seemed to touch on the Catholic wound of their own discrimination and persecution. Yet, not in the sense of solidarity with another victimized minority, but rather in competition with it. It seemed as if it was, at times, difficult to bear for some Catholics, that Jews as the traditional enemy of the Church, would find international recognition and empathy. A debate in Western governments, as to whether they should intervene politically in Russia on behalf of the Jews, was triggered by the articles in The Times of London mentioned above. The Germania did not withhold its anger about such developments:}

Russia, the people and its Tsar are threatened by a declaration of war by the Alliance Israélite Universelle. This is about nothing else than the persecution of the Jews, that is, to be more precise, the “kicking out” (Ausfolgung) of Jews. If any descendant of the “chosen people” is treated slightly badly, world Jewry breaks out in whining and complaining which it spills out over the whole of human kind...both the Tsar and his government are accused to be partly guilty for the disorders and all European powers are asked to intervene in favor of Russian Jews. And all this in the name of “humanity” and for the Jews. Humanity, to which every human being is entitled to, surely is a nice word. Yet all we want to know is where the Jews had left their feelings for humanity, when not long ago French congregations were expelled from their homes in the most brutal way, even though they had not indulged in bloody usury but had done only good to the

\footnote{C. n, ibid., 257 (10 June 1882). The letter of Archbishop Guibert was reprinted in many French newspapers, see Szajkowski, “Attitude,” 150. \footnote{Oppenheim, “Kovno,” 110-1.}}
people. Has even one single Jew protested against this? On the contrary: it was precisely the Jews who in the most cheeky way and in the “name of the national dignity” had asked and worked in the hardest way for the expulsion of the congregations. Was it not precisely the Jewish descendants like Ferry, Bert, Cabetta and tutti quanti, who for years now had indulged in anti-religious incitement in the most horrendous way in France... and then Jews are surprised that the Russians, even though in a disapproving way, show the Jews the door! It is surprising that not all the Christian peoples were more able to show the door to the obtrusive Jews who had penetrated into their houses. 493

In this quotation, the extent of the anti-Jewish violence is minimized and thereby, indirectly, denied. It plays with the term “humanity” in such a way that the Jews’ entitlement to humanitarian treatment is made dependent on their participation in the Kulturkampf. Because of their participation in the Kulturkampf, the Jews have effectively lost their entitlement to humanitarian treatment. Even though the paper attempts to dissociate itself from the pogroms, which are not right in the paper’s view, the Kulturkampf argument undermines this attempt by indirectly justifying and approving the violence against the Jews, not only in Russia, but potentially in the whole of the Christian world.

To sum up we can say the following: generally the Germania did not play out its negative attitude towards Russia as regards the pogroms by criticizing Russia for the pogroms, except in some special cases, as with the pogrom in Warsaw. Thus hatred of the Jews generally had a higher priority than hatred of Russians, while loyalty to Poles in the Kingdom of Poland had a higher priority than Jew-hatred. The paper used the pogroms primarily for political mobilization during the election campaign. It then propagated not only its usual anti-Semitism of

the Jewish usurer and enemy of the Church, but also radical forms of anti-Semitism, such as violence, internment, dispossession and expulsion. The paper generally rejected public disorder and violence. Yet, when directed against the Jews, this attitude changed. Using the double-bind technique, the paper distanced itself from anti-Jewish disorders on the one hand, and indirectly justified and legitimized them on the other: by playing down the extent of the violence and expressing empathy and understanding for the perpetrators. In this line of argument, the perpetrators became the victims of the Jews’ harmful behavior. Contrary to the view that Catholics rejected radical forms of anti-Semitism - including the expulsion of the Jews - mainly because of their own experience of the Kulturkampf, it was precisely the experience of the Kulturkampf that formed the central and decisive argument that allowed Catholics to indirectly justify and legitimate radical forms of anti-Semitism. Violence, Catholics knew, could be legitimated best by alleging that the adversary was using violence. Thus, charging Jews with the responsibility for anti-Catholic violence in the Kulturkampf allowed Catholics to indirectly justify and legitimate anti-Semitic violence. However, this argument came to the fore properly only in the context of the pogroms in Russia. It seemed that in this context Catholics felt freer to express their views of a violent anti-Semitism than in the German context, where they were under internal political pressures. This kind of anti-Semitism was not restricted to a conservative German Catholic rhetoric but was shared by other European conservative Catholics. This is not surprising if one considers that the Catholic rhetoric in general (and particularly in its anti-Semitic rhetoric) was homogenous to a significant degree (probably due
to a relatively homogenous Catholic milieu). A certain amount of Catholic homogeneity went beyond national frontiers. Different sources repeated incessantly the same images, pictures and arguments.\footnote{Historians disagree over the issue of a homogenous Catholic milieu, see Blaschke, \textit{Katholizismus}, 22, 28, 145ff.}

This case study also implies that we might need to reconsider the generally held view that radical forms of anti-Semitism were bound to racialist, rabble-rousing anti-Semites only. At least to some degree, indirect justification of radical anti-Semitism was compatible with those who subscribed to a "better anti-Semitism," namely one that defined itself as Christian and as the legitimate claim of the Christian population to combat the Jews’ harmful influence. The view of the Jesuit and consultant of the Vatican, Wilhelm Wilmers (expressed in his book \textit{Lehrbuch für Religion}), which remained popular from the 1850s to the Weimar Republic, nicely illustrates the connection between a "Christian" anti-Semitism and anti-Jewish violence: "Why had Christian peoples in general never used violence to rid themselves of this unwelcome guest?"\footnote{Cited in ibid., 73.} Using almost literally this phrase, the \textit{Germania} must have known itself to be on safe grounds with conservative Catholics, when promoting violent forms of anti-Semitism.\footnote{See C. c, \textit{Germania}, 275 (21 June 1882).}
PART III

A Hidden Agenda: Nihilists, Poles and Eastern Jews - a Governmental Equation?

As an official organ the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung had to consider various interests when dealing with issues concerning the Jews. The paper was unable to escape the issues of the day, as regards the Jews, but had its own distinctive viewpoint. Thus it had to consider Bismarck’s views when it examined the contentious issue of contemporary debates between anti-Semites and their critics. These issues were of double importance because of the looming election campaign and the need to retain friends whilst not alienating Jewish neutrals. Matters were further complicated by the outbreak of anti-Jewish violence in Germany itself.

These matters were in the background when the paper turned to the issue of the pogroms in Russia and their implications for the Reich. The fear of Socialist and revolutionary activities, which would challenge the status quo, had led Bismarck to put through anti-Socialist legislation in 1878 and brand Socialists as “enemies of the Reich” (Reichsfeinde). Equally, Catholics and non-German nationals like Danes, and especially Poles, were branded “foes” of the Empire.\(^{497}\) Bismarck was obsessed with the fear of revolution and this influenced his politics.

He was conditioned, by the prior attack on the Kaiser in 1878, to be concerned with Socialists and regicides. Even though he himself manipulated, created and increased the fear of revolution for the sake of his own political aims, this “does not change the hard core of his perception of reality which was neither fiction nor manipulation. The Socialist revolution was not a bluff for elections; it was for Bismarck, as for most citizens, a deadly threat.” Bismarck himself had escaped an assassination attempt in 1874, which was blamed on Catholic incitement. In 1879 a trial took place in Berlin against three Russian “Jewish Nihilists” (as Russian Jewish Socialists were termed in the German press). Some Russian Jews played important roles in assassination attempts. In 1879, for example, Aron Zundelevich, perhaps the foremost exponent of systematic terror of the revolutionary Party Narodnaia Volia, was arrested in St. Petersburg and in 1880 Ippolit Osipovich Mlodetskii was executed in St. Petersburg in front of a crowd of 40,000 people after a failed assassination attempt on the Russian Minister of the Interior, Count Loris-Melikov. The execution of Mlodetskii, and its anti-Semitic exploitation by some Russian newspapers as the Jews “stand now at the head of Russian Nihilists,” was reported internationally (for example in the London

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498 The responsibility for the assassination attack on the Kaiser was placed on the Socialists as well as on their “fellow travellers” in the Progress Party and those in the National Liberal Party who pursued Progressive policies. The attack was used by Bismarck to introduce new legislation against the Socialists. Some historians doubted that Bismarck’s fear of Socialists was genuine and suggested that they were rather an obstacle for Bismarck’s political and economic policies, see James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1999), 181ff.
499 Quoted from Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866 - 1918, 2 (München, 1992), 384.
When Tsar Alexander II was assassinated in 1881, the Russian press never directly accused the Jews of killing the Tsar. Yet, as the Russian press reported (and as it was widely reported abroad), the crowds shouted: “The Jews have killed the Tsar.” Against this background Bismarck may have begun to think of the Jews as a problem beyond being just “the wrong sort of people,” and may have begun to identify them with Socialism and revolution in a more acute way than he had when noting that “ordinary [German] Jews were liable to become radical and subversive.”

The years 1881 and 1882 belong to the immediate pre-history of the expulsion of Poles and Eastern Jews from Germany in 1884 and 1885, in which 32,000 Poles (a third of which were Jews) were expelled from the Eastern provinces. An examination of the response of the official press to the pogroms in Russia and its implications for the Reich, may help us to better understand the meaning Eastern Jews had for Bismarck (in whose power it was, after all, to make the decision and give the order for the expulsions of the mid-1880s). This is not to say that Bismarck’s views and those of the Norddeutsche were always identical. However, as I will discuss below, we can assume a significant degree of closeness between Bismarck and the paper. Scholarly attention has mainly focused upon the expulsion of Poles and the motives behind this. As regards the Jews, it is usually

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504 I will discuss Bismarck’s attitude to the Jews below.
argued that their expulsion was primarily motivated by anti-Semitism.\textsuperscript{506} Jack Wertheimer has pointed out that the problem of Eastern Jews (which was periodically dealt with by their expulsion) was part of the larger “Jewish Problem:” namely “that German policies and attitudes towards Eastern Jews were intertwined with anti-Semitism directed at native Jews.” The “Jewish Problem,” Wertheimer argues, was distinct from the “Polish Problem,” which was embodied in the laws and policies that governed Poles in the Reich. This may well have been the perception of many state authorities, state and local administrators, and part of the press. However, as I argue in this part, as regards the expulsions of the mid-1880s (albeit on the basis of indirect rather than direct evidence), for Bismarck the two problems had very significant parallels, which went beyond the fact that both groups came from the East, were unwanted by German officials and suffered the same types of measures to rid the country of them.\textsuperscript{507} Rather, Bismarck had a very specific view and fear of Eastern Jews, which was to become inextricably intertwined with Bismarck’s Polenpolitik and had less to do with anti-Semitism and more with his fear of revolution.\textsuperscript{508}

Public opinion had become a factor of power, an element in modern politics in a world where politics was no longer possible in the long run without the


\textsuperscript{508} There is a large body of literature on the Prussian Polenpolitik, for an overview, see Witold Molik, “Die preussische Polenpolitik im 19. und zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Hans Henning Hahn and Peter Kunze, eds., Nationale Minderheiten und Staatliche Minderheitenpolitik in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1999).
consent of society. This had become a matter of course, not only for Bismarck, but also for the traditional political establishment. This was why the manipulation and control of the press had become a primary political issue for the government. *Pressepolitik* (press politics) had become a normal part of government activities and a central area of political strategies and tactics for Bismarck, not only as regards elections, but as regards any politically important issue. Both the departments and the governmental leadership created special divisions who informed them about public opinion. In addition Bismarck established special offices to influence the press. He created, for example, an office in the Prussian Interior Ministry that published the *Provinzial Correspondenz* for the provincial press from 1863 to 1884. It is also well-known that he used the *Welfenfonds*, the assets of the dynasty of Hannover, to bribe subversive newspapers and subsidize pro-government organs.\(^5^9\) Governmental views often found public expression in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. The paper was seen as the official or semi-official mouthpiece of Bismarck. Bismarck, for whom the paper became a kind of house organ, often looked through its editorials before they were published and emended them. In the paper’s bill of sale it was stated that the owner of the paper was obliged to be loyal to Bismarck and support his policy.\(^5^1\) Thus, when we read the *Norddeutsche*, we can assume a significant degree of identity between the views of the paper and those of Bismarck. The close relationship between the organ and Bismarck could be seen, for example, when the paper informed its readers about Bismarck’s state of health. Rectifying the reports of many newspapers that

\(^{5^0}\) Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1866 - 1918*, 1 (München, 1990), 807-8.

\(^{5^1}\) Fischer, „Allgemeine Zeitung.“ 272-3.
Bismarck, having fallen ill, was well again, the organ reported that unfortunately he was not yet better and had to remain in bed and could only work from bed.\textsuperscript{511} The political closeness between the paper and Bismarck could be seen when it issued directions to Conservatives on how to act in elections:

\begin{quote}
We declare it a duty for Conservatives, that wherever they are a minority and where only moderate or extreme Liberals can win, to support the moderate Liberals even if this means a loss for Conservatives. Some Conservatives did not like this request...We are pleased to recognize that the elections have not been in favor of Liberalism, which is ready to oppose the governmental policy. However, the government needs to get the confirmation of the Parliament if it is to realize its policies. And this means that it needs the majority. The Conservative Parties are capable to provide such a majority only if they either ally with the Centre Party (Zentrum), or with the moderate Liberals.\textsuperscript{512}
\end{quote}

The organ also issued directions to the Conservative press on how to increase its influence. These show the importance attributed to the political press. All the Conservatives needed, the paper stated, was organization and energy in order to become a powerful force. The Conservative element in the German nation was more widespread than the Liberal one. The Conservative press was on the increase, not only in the Prussian provinces but also in the whole of the German Empire, the organ emphasized. Altogether then, the Conservatives had become a political force in recent years that had to be taken seriously. Yet it was important (the paper advised) that the press did not intermingle Church issues with worldly political issues, if it wanted to increase its influence. Even though religious belief was deeply rooted in the majority of the population, to apply religious belief onto

\begin{footnotes}
\item[511] R. c, \textit{Norddeutsche}, 260 (8 June 1881).
\item[512] C. c, ibid., 511 (1 November 1882).
\end{footnotes}
pure worldly matters, such as political elections, would have opposed the pragmatic instinct of the people.\textsuperscript{513} In 1881, after the Reichstag elections, the organ issued a piece of advice to the Conservative way of election campaigning. The Conservatives had to learn from the Progressives (\textit{Fortschrittliche}) how to conduct an election campaign, it said. The latter made the election campaign a permanent issue, while the Conservatives would stop it once the election was over.\textsuperscript{514} The close relationship between Bismarck and the organ could also be seen in the fact that it announced the expulsions of 1884 and 1885 to the German public.\textsuperscript{515}

At the time the \textit{Norddeutsche} was seen as an organ that mainly informed political circles. The circulation of the paper was relatively small, reaching about 5,000 in the 1880s. Yet its significance can be seen by the fact that it was widely quoted. Its importance reached far across the borders of Germany. Abroad the organ was seen as one of the most significant German newspapers.\textsuperscript{516}

\textsuperscript{513} E. e, ibid., 104 (3 March 1881).
\textsuperscript{514} E. e, ibid., 515 (4 November 1881).
\textsuperscript{515} Neubach, \textit{Ausweisungen}, 34.
\textsuperscript{516} Fischer, \textit{Zeitung}, 272.
7 Philo-Semitism or Anti-Semitism

What was the attitude of the organ towards the Jews and the anti-Semitic movement? Would it parallel Bismarck’s attitude or would it go its own way in this question? I would argue that the paper followed, to a significant degree, Bismarck’s position.

Both scholars and contemporaries struggled to grasp Bismarck’s elusive and contradictory attitude towards the Jews. However, most historians agree that his attitude was determined primarily by tactical, rather than ideological, reasons. Bismarck, they argue, used political anti-Semitism primarily for his own, mostly electoral, purposes.\(^{517}\) Paul Massing judged Bismarck as “the first major manipulator of anti-Semitism in modern Germany precisely because he held neither racist nor religious prejudice against the Jews. The Jews were not his aim when he supported the anti-Semitic agitation.”\(^{518}\) Rather Bismarck hoped that the anti-Semitic agitation would help him in his struggle against the Left Liberals and the Socialists.\(^{519}\)

Jews were of political importance to Bismarck. As he once put it:


\(^{518}\) Massing, Vorgeschichte, 47.

Not moneyed Jewry (Geldjudentum) but the political-reformist Jewry (Reformjudentum) makes itself important in our press and our parliamentary bodies. The interests of moneyed Jewry are more readily tied to the preservation of our state institutions and cannot do without them. It is property-less Jews who have little to lose and much to gain, that are dangerous and capable of allying themselves with all manner of subversive opposition, Socialism and Stöcker included.

In other words, rich Jews were useful and conservative while ordinary Jews were liable to become radical and subversive. Thus "moneyed Jewry" was compatible with Bismarck's general, long-range goal, namely to create a parliament of propertied men firmly tied to the established order and dependent on the State.

Bismarck, thus, had to dance at two weddings, so to speak. As Fritz Stern suggests, if Bismarck strongly denounced anti-Semitism, he risked losing his newly gained support of Conservatives. However, if he was too nice to the Jews, this could also alienate Conservatives. A "little anti-Semitism" was probably the best way to keep anti-Semites and Conservatives on his side and would also make rich Jews more pliable. A little philo-Semitism would secure the support of rich and conservative Jews, while too much anti-Semitism could endanger this constituency and drive it into the Liberal camp.

Moneyed Jewry may have been important for Bismarck in another respect. Financial means had become a crucial factor in election campaigning. "After the last election," the Norddeutsche editorialized in summer 1882, "we have defined 'organization and money' as the crucial means for election campaigning. These

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520 Quoted from Stern, Gold, 515-6.
521 Sheehan, Liberalism, 181.
522 Stern, Gold, 515-6.
have not yet been applied by Conservatives efficiently enough to be able to compete successfully with the opposition. The latter is enormously powerful because it has massive financial support and can draw on powerful election slogans. The organization of Conservatives has improved, many Conservative associations have been established or are in the process of being established. This organizational progress is bringing about the collection of financial means, without which not a single war, be it only an unbloody battle about political views, can be fought nowadays."

The Norddeutsche mirrored the evasive and ambivalent attitude of Bismarck towards the Jews and the anti-Semitic movement. Anti-Semites certainly noticed this undecidedness and listed the organ under the category of newspapers “with either an insecure or neutral position towards the Jewish Question.” A reader, who wrote a letter with anti-Semitic content to the Germania, put it this way: “Initially I intended to send this letter to the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. Yet I do not know any more whether the latter has also already come under Jewish influence.”

How did the paper generate its evasive position? The organ treated both the Jewish Question and the anti-Semitic movement with low profiles, reporting only rarely (and mostly under general titles) on these issues. This was even more conspicuous if one considers the high profile the Jewish Question attracted at that time among a large part of the German press. Many newspapers, for example,

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525 R. r. Germania, 123 (2 June 1881).
offered an ongoing column on the Jewish Question.\textsuperscript{526} When the paper did report on the issue, it mostly did so by reporting of events both in favor and against the anti-Semitic movement, without commenting on them. Thus the paper reported on gatherings that debated the Jewish Question, consisting of workers who were against the anti-Semitic movement and of prominent anti-Semites such as Stöcker or Henrici.\textsuperscript{527} The anti-Semitic petition was equally given the lowest possible profile. The paper did not report about it to any significant degree at this stage, mentioning only that the anti-Semitic petition had been handed in to Bismarck whose response was limited to his office issuing a receipt for the petition.\textsuperscript{528}

The lack of unequivocal support for the anti-Semitic movement seemed, however, not only to have been due to Bismarck's own strategic use of political anti-Semitism. Stern has pointed out that there was also concern over foreign reactions to the anti-Semitic agitation in Germany.\textsuperscript{529} In fact, the German anti-Semitic movement was well covered by the foreign press, often without much sympathy. The British newspaper \textit{St. James’s Gazette} judged the anti-Semitic movement as dishonorable for a nation that claimed to be the most educated nation of Europe. The Swiss press, including notoriously anti-Jewish newspapers, unanimously condemned the anti-Semitic movement in Germany.\textsuperscript{531} Leading French newspapers also condemned the

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\textsuperscript{526} See, for example, R, n, \textit{Kreuzzeitung}, 12 (15 January 1881).
\textsuperscript{527} R, c, \textit{Norddeutsche}, 12 (8 January 1881); R, c, 18 (12 January 1881); R, c, 61 (6 February 1881); R, c, 66 (9 February 1881); R, c, 154 (1 April 1881).
\textsuperscript{528} R, n, ibid., 202 (2 May 1881).
\textsuperscript{529} See Stern, \textit{Gold}, 528.
\textsuperscript{530} C, n, \textit{Kreuzzeitung}, 34 (10 February 1881).
\textsuperscript{531} R, n, \textit{Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums}, 1 (4 January 1881).
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German anti-Semitic agitation right from its beginning. The Belgian and Italian press spoke out against the German anti-Semitic movement even stronger than the French press. And the Russian press responded with schadenfreude to the German anti-Semitic agitation. Under the title “Yet Another Barbaric State in Europe,” it sarcastically noted that “…besides the well-known Russian barbarians, persecuting the poor Jews, yet another nation has appeared in Europe, Prussia, heretofore considered an enlightened State, but which rises up against the predominance of the Jews.” The Kreuzzeitung, for example, responded with anger to the bad reputation the German anti-Semitic movement caused abroad. The organ accused the German Liberal press of routinely reporting false reports about anti-Jewish disorders in Germany and sending dispatches to Vienna to the Neue Freie Presse, in order to generate the customary outrage abroad. Negative press reactions to the German anti-Semitic movement extended beyond Europe. Condemning the anti-Semitic movement in Germany, the American National Republican sarcastically noted: “My fatherland you can remain in peace, you are unified in order to be damned.” (Mein Vaterland kannst ruhig sein, Du bist vereinigt um verflucht zu sein.)

The Norddeutsche did not report to any significant degree on negative foreign press reactions to the anti-Semitic movement. This is not surprising if one considers that the organ was one of the most important German newspapers read abroad. It seems the organ had no interest in damaging Germany’s reputation any

532 E, c, ibid., 4 (24 January 1882).
534 R, c, Kreuzzeitung, 4 (6 January 1881).
535 R, n, ibid., 5 (7 January 1881).
further by drawing attention to the issue. In addition, this might have forced the paper to take a position towards the anti-Semitic movement, which the paper seemed to attempt to avoid. We can assume, however, that negative foreign press reactions were well-known to the editor of the paper. The organ was most familiar with the German press (summarizing and discussing regularly significant parts of a large variety of German newspapers in its "Journal Revue"), which generally had no inhibition in reporting on negative foreign press responses on the issue.\footnote{536}

Unlike its cautious, low profile approach to the Jewish Question and the anti-Semitic movement, the paper displayed a very different approach as regards the Association of German Students. It seemed that because the Association's anti-Semitism was not of the loud rabble-rousing kind, the Norddeutsche felt safer in publicly supporting it. This nicely illustrates that the organ was not generally neutral in all matters, but could display support when it would not endanger its own interests by doing so. Thus citing speeches of the first meeting of the Association, the paper noted that the Jewish Question was only a symptom that should remind the Germans to return to their roots of Germandom. A German People's Party would be needed and an Empire of German spirit and German flesh. "Not one\footnote{537} (emphasis Norddeutsche) nasty word has spoiled the beautiful celebration," the organ said, praising the meeting. "Rather the meeting is a positive omen for the positive development of the Association."\footnote{537} The sympathy between the Association and Bismarck was expressed in an exchange of well wishing telegrams

\footnote{536}{See above.}
\footnote{537}{R. c., Norddeutsche, 42 (26 January 1881).}
between Bismarck and the Association. What the Norddeutsche didn’t say was that the Student Association had earlier expressed quite a different attitude towards the Jewish Question. As a supporter of the anti-Semitic petition it held the view that Jews, just like any other alien race, had to be placed under restrictions so that their influence on the German nation could be halted. The Committee to Fight Against the Anti-Semitic Petition Among Students had in response placed a request with the National Zeitung to publish a declaration in which the Committee distanced itself from, and condemned, the anti-Semitic attitude among the “anti-Semitic students.”

How much the Norddeutsche sympathized and identified with the Association of German Students was further illustrated by an incident concerning threatening letters of students to the Liberal, Jewish-edited Börsen-Courier. The Norddeutsche rejected the claim of the Börsen-Courier, to have received any such anonymous threatening letters from students. “It is highly unlikely,” the Norddeutsche editorialized, “that German students had done such a thing. It would be most difficult to find a single student among the many thousands, who would not have the courage to openly face the Börsen-Courier with his opinion. Rather than to care about students and universities, the Börsen-Courier would do better to remain in its own sphere, namely the stock market and scandals.” The German students, the organ explained, were undergoing a fundamental change. Unlike in 1848 and 1849, they did not want to have anything more to do with Liberalism. Rather they wanted to honor the Chancellor and the beloved German Emperor and

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538 R. c, ibid.
539 R. c, Kreuzzeitung, 13 (16 January 1881).
do something positive for the German Fatherland. The attack against the Börsen-Courier might also have served the Norddeutsche not to be seen favoring the Jews during the election campaign, when Bismarck increasingly supported the anti-Semitic movement in the hope of weakening the Left Wing of the National Liberals. The attempt of the Norddeutsche not to be seen favoring the Jews during the election campaign, might also explain its fierce response to allegations made about the Prussian lottery. The Schlesische Zeitung claimed in sharp words that the Prussian lottery (which was a state institution) was in Jewish hands, the organ reported. It was not desirable that such issues of a religious nature were treated in the press polemically. In any case, the Schlesische Zeitung got it completely wrong, it said, and the reader would want to know the correct facts and numbers: Among the one hundred and fifty people employed by the Prussian monarchy for the lottery, one hundred and twenty-five were Christian. Whether in the heat of the moment or not, the Norddeutsche had mistakenly quoted the Free Conservative oriented Schlesische Zeitung, which caused an outcry of the Liberal press. The paper had to apologize to the Schlesische Zeitung and corrected its report, stating that the accusation had actually been made by the Schlesische Volkszeitung. The latter was one of the leading newspapers of the Catholic Centre Party and well-known for its anti-Semitic tendencies.

540 E., Norddeutsche, 362 (6 August 1881).
542 R., c., n., Norddeutsche, 145 (27 March 1881).
543 C., c., ibid., 148 (29 March 1881).
544 Olaf Blaschke, Katholizismus und Antisemitismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich (Göttingen, 1997), 142.
After the election at the end of October, it had become clear that Bismarck was unable to achieve his aim: the Progressives and the Secessionists had achieved a victory over the Conservatives (who had made common cause with the anti-Semites and their anti-Semitic campaign). Anti-Semitism had not paid off and Bismarck distanced himself from the anti-Semitic movement represented by Stöcker and the anti-Semites.\textsuperscript{545} He turned instead to the Jews. The election was hardly over when Bismarck authorized his business associate in Varzin, Behrend, to publish the substance of a conversation they had. Contrary to Stern’s view, the conversation by no means went unnoticed.\textsuperscript{546} Rather it sparked a major debate in the press about Bismarck’s position towards the Jews and the anti-Semitic movement. In its regular column “Journal Revue,” the \textit{Norddeutsche} noted that there was a lively debate in the press about a report of the Liberal oriented \textit{National Zeitung}. Citing the latter, the paper wrote:

Chancellor Bismarck entertains with most of his Pomeranian neighbors very friendly personal relationships, which often find expression in informal contacts. Almost daily the Chancellor has one or several of them as guests. Recently a Jewish industrialist was among them. A large factory site of this guest is situated on land, which belongs to the Chancellor. This personality has for many years had regular contact with the Chancellor. When they met this time, the Chancellor responded to an accidental remark of his guest with his position towards the Jewish Question. He talked about it extensively and highlighted some significant phases of the anti-Semitic movement. Then he answered his own question, whether he would agree with the movement: nothing can be more wrong. I disapprove decisively of this struggle against the Jews, whether it is based either on the Jews’ confession or on their descent. On the same grounds Germans could be attacked who descend either from Poles or from Frenchmen and it could be said: these were not Germans. That Jews prefer to engage in business and commerce is a matter of taste. This might be due to the fact that they were

\textsuperscript{546} Ibid., 527.
excluded from other professions in the past. Yet this does not justify attacking the Jews in the way it has been done, and which I disapprove of, only because they were better off than others. Such attacks only incite the enviousness and the resentment of the people. I will never allow that the rights of the Jews, as they are laid down in the constitution, are touched. The Jews tend to criticize matters in general because of their spiritual heritage. This is why they are often found in the opposition. Yet I make no difference between Christian and Jewish opponents of my economic policy. If I responded to telegrams and letters [of anti-Semitic associations], who expressed their support for me, I did so out of politeness, as I already told [Eugen] Richter. I would have been delighted to respond in the same way to letters of approval of the Progress Party, I just did not get any of them. When the guest asked if he was allowed to publicize part of Bismarck’s remarks, the latter responded with decisive approval.\footnote{R. n. \textit{Norddeutsche}, 518 (6 November 1881).}

This story nicely illustrates how Bismarck tried to influence and manipulate the press. For this he did not necessarily have to use the \textit{Norddeutsche}. He could make the foreign ministry inform correspondents of other newspapers about political issues\footnote{See Nipperdey, \textit{Geschichte}, 1, 808.} or, as here, go private and let a private person do the job. In this story, Bismarck played the “Jewish card” against the “anti-Semitic card.” How did the press react to that? Conservative reactions ranged from the attempt to vindicate and secure Bismarck for their own cause, to decisive rejection by anti-Semitic circles. The Liberal camp, in general, seemed to feel reassured by this account. Yet neither political camp felt fully confident or sure about Bismarck’s position.

“Between the \textit{Börsen-Courier} and the \textit{Berliner Tageblatt} on the one hand and the \textit{Reichsboten} on the other,” the \textit{Norddeutsche} reported in its “Revue,”

a fierce argument was sparked by the publication of the story by the \textit{National Zeitung}. They interpreted the account according to their position, either against the anti-Semitic movement or against the Jews. The [Conservative] \textit{Deutsche Tageblatt} doubts the correctness of the publication
of the National Zeitung. The Germania commented that it was neither especially surprising nor saddening that the Chancellor rejected exceptional legislation against the Jews and that he did not want either religious or racist incitement. The Germania just posed the question, for which aim the Chancellor wanted to console the Jews after the election.  

Under the title “Regarding the conversation between Bismarck and the Jewish industrialist,” the Kreuzzeitung noted the claim of a subscriber of the Deutsche Tageblatt from Stolp, Pomerania province. The impact of Berlin newspapers publishing Bismarck’s expressions in favor of the Jews was questionable. Bismarck rejected the anti-Semitic petition because he was unable to do anything about it. It was nothing new that Bismarck was not identified with the anti-Semitic movement. However, if Bismarck was forced to choose in a final ballot between a representative of the National Zeitung and Stöcker, he would opt for the latter. Bismarck had made clear several times that he would support the Centre Party as well as the Evangelical Conservatives if this was necessary to put through his political aims. Bismarck also once said that the Jews were not grateful to him even though he had given them equal civil rights. Instead, they used their equal rights to oppose his policies. Bismarck even said that the Jews did everything they could to turn him into an anti-Semite. The Progressive friends of the National Zeitung first attempted to portray Bismarck in the press as an anti-Semite and now they suddenly portrayed him as a friend of the Jews. Naturally, Bismarck, as the Chancellor of the German Reich, could be neither anti-Semite nor friend of the Jews. However, the Conservative struggle against the Progressives certainly found

549 R. n. Norddeutsche, 518 (6 November 1881).
the approval of the Chancellor. Clearly, these Conservative organs, who did not want to lose Bismarck for their cause, did not want to believe that Bismarck had suddenly turned into a friend of the Jews. Thus they put his negative remarks to the anti-Semitic movement as well as his positive remarks about the Jews down to diplomacy. The Free Conservative oriented Schlesische Zeitung argued in a similar rein. Under the title “Chancellor Bismarck and the anti-Semitic movement,” it quoted a reader with the view that the subscriber of the Deutsche Tageblatt was correct and that the content of Bismarck’s conversation with the Jewish industrialist Behrend might be true but should not be taken too seriously. Even though Bismarck rejected the agitation of Henrici for different reasons, he never took position against the views of some of the most respectable citizens (consisting of civil servants, army officers, artists and academics), who had connections with large circles of students. These groups would never deny the Jews their rights or their possessions. Yet even though Bismarck felt uncomfortable with the anti-Semitic movement, he fully justified some of their proposals such as the restriction for Jews to become judges and civil servants. Many people rejected the conduct of anti-Semites such as Stöcker and others, with their exaggerations and their rabblerousing rallies. The Jewish Question did not belong in the realm of rallies. Bismarck had made clear that he was a polite man with “savoir vivre,” both in his private and political life. Therefore he did not speak out against the Jews even if he held anti-Semitic plans. This was the appropriate way to deal with the issue for a leading statesman, it was said.

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550 C. r, Kreuzzzeitung, 263 (9 November 1881).
551 C. n, ibid., 264 (10 November 1881).
The response of anti-Semitic circles to the conversation was less vindicatory. The anti-Semitic association *Deutsche Volksverein* regretted sending Bismarck a well-wishing telegram expressing its trust and loyalty, which the latter had answered with a telegram of thanks.\(^{552}\) Bismarck seemed to have achieved his aim to distance himself from the anti-Semites.

Jewish newspapers, in contrast, were generally happy about the story.\(^{553}\) Only the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* was more cautious. The most important event of the day was the response of Bismarck to Mister Behrend, the paper editorialized. This response represented a rejection of the anti-Semites and a guarantee that the Chancellor neither intended nor would allow the Jews' civil rights to be restricted. However, Bismarck would do nothing to stop the anti-Semitic agitation, the organ predicted. This could be seen in the fact that Bismarck wrote a telegram of thanks to Bernhard Förster, who had submitted the anti-Semitic petition and who had promised to Bismarck to lend him his support in the fight against the Progressive Party. Bismarck thanked Förster for his support in the defense of the Kaiser and the Reich. This, the *AZJ* commented, was more telling than the conversation with Behrend because the exchange of these telegrams with Förster was known to be true, while the conversation with Behrend came only from second hand information and thus was not guaranteed to be really authentic.\(^{554}\) If Bismarck had aimed to win the favor of the Jews back with this story, after toying with the anti-Semites, he did not fully succeed, as the comments of the *AZJ* suggest.

\(^{552}\) R. p. ibid., 263 (9 November 1881).
\(^{553}\) R. p. ibid.
The *Norddeutsche*, for its part, did not seem to want to get involved in the debate over the Bismarck - Behrend story. The organ abstained from taking a position, leaving it to the rest of the German press to speculate about Bismarck’s intentions and attitudes. Whether the paper was informed about the issue or not, we do not know. Its silence, however, fitted in well with its general pattern of neutrality towards the touchy issue of Jews and anti-Semites. The response of the press illustrates the difficulty of contemporaries to grasp Bismarck’s elusive attitude towards the Jews and anti-Semites due to his ambivalent and changing loyalties.

**The Jewish Vote**

The Jewish vote was important to Bismarck. As mentioned earlier, on the one hand Bismarck feared the influence of property-less Jews in the Liberal camp and was anxious not to lose rich and conservative Jews to the Liberal camp on the other. Yet this is precisely what happened. Before the forthcoming Landtag elections in 1882, the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* issued voting directions to its readers. “The *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, calling itself ‘impartial organ for Jewish interests’ (emphasis *Norddeutsche*), edited by Rabbi Dr Philippson, who is highly respected in Jewish circles, has published two articles which need to be carefully considered,” noted the *Norddeutsche*. “As an introduction to the first of the articles,” the *Norddeutsche* wrote,

the editor of the AZJ pointed out that it was not the paper’s task to make politics. Rather it only wanted to develop Jewish religious views and
attitudes. All the same, the editor of the organ felt it was his duty to publish the article of a man, who had put much effort in fighting for his co-religionists against the anti-Semitic movement. He [Philipsson] pointed out that he agreed with the principles that were put forward in this article, but disagreed as regards its conclusions.

The *Norddeutsche* noted the claim of this first article that the Jews ought to be grateful to Bismarck because he brought about their emancipation and that Bismarck’s social policy, which cared for the poor and the weak, stood in agreement with the socialist principles of the Mosaic law. The Liberal Parties made a big fuss against the present wave of anti-Semitism mainly out of self-interest (namely for political mobilization), yet in the end did not really do anything practical for the Jews. It was eventually the government alone that put an end to the anti-Semitic disorders by acting decisively against them. Therefore the Jews’ task ought not to be to multiply the enemies of the government. Rather they should be found in the forthcoming Landtag elections among those, whose efforts were aimed at increasing the welfare of the weak and who worked for the preservation and the strengthening of the State. The State was the big communal body that should replace the smaller one of the past: the Jewish community. The *Norddeutsche* noted Philipsson’s response to this article: namely that he agreed with the author as regards his demands for loyalty to the King, the national position, gratitude to the Chancellor and theoretical and moral support for his social reforms. However, Philipsson disagreed as regards the political facts put forward in the article:

The author demands that the Jews support Chancellor Bismarck and the government in the forthcoming election. We would simply respond: the Jews are not a political party as for example the Catholics are; rather they
follow their individual political views and convictions and have no common political goal. Unfortunately, however, the time where this was wholly true, has gone.

It was the Right, Philippson continued, led by the Kreuzzeitung, which had developed the present anti-Semitism. The anti-Jewish aims, to which the Conservatives would subscribe as soon as they reached a majority in Parliament, left the Jews no choice: they had to vote for the Liberals.

"Such a political directive, issued by one of the most eminent religious organs of Jewry, had very serious implications," the Norddeutsche commented.

Where should it lead to, if the organ of Judaism directed its readers to take part for the opposition...it meant that the organ abandoned its position and its task of developing Jewish religious views and became the organ of a political party. The organ would become a very questionable paper as it would support the policy of a Party, which, as it concedes, stood in contrast with its own moral and religious Jewish views. At the moment, we do not have to consider the consequences of such an assumption, as we do not assume that the position of this Jewish organ would become the position of the majority of Jewry. Yet even though this might not happen, the enormous response of the oppositional press attacking the first of the two named articles, would make the editorial office of that Jewish religious paper aware, that its conduct can only put oil into the fire,

the Norddeutsche concluded. The assumption of the Norddeutsche proved to be wrong. After 1881 the majority of German Jewry, including Orthodox Jewry, turned to the Left and voted for the Left Liberal Parties. Bismarck’s political game had not paid off.

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555 E. e. n. Norddeutsche, 444 (22 September 1882).
556 Jacob Toury, Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden in Deutschland (Tübingen, 1966), 182-5. Stern, Gold, 528.
8 The Anti-Jewish Riots in Germany

As with the Jewish Question and the anti-Semitic movement, the *Norddeutsche* treated the issue of anti-Jewish violence in Germany with a low profile. The paper merely devoted a short report on the disturbances occurring on New Years Eve in Berlin, stating that they had been exaggerated and that the police had immediately put an end to them.557

When anti-Jewish riots occurred in Argenau, the paper cited the claim of the Liberal *Berliner Tageblatt* that a hostile mood had developed between the Jews and the more educated Christians there. The reports of certain Berlin newspapers on the anti-Semitic movement had caused some irritation, which increased when differences occurred between a Christian teacher and a Jewish businessman over a school issue. The irritation reached ever-wider circles including the un-educated people. Eventually, during a reunion of reservists, Jews attacked the reservists after they sang a Polish song that concluded with “we go to Palestine.” That triggered a brawl. When order was restored, a Jewish inhabitant shot from his window at a group of people gathered in front of his house. Somebody cried that the Jews were shooting at the Christians, which triggered the riots. The event was taken with humor in Argenau rather than as a tragic event. It was felt it did not deserve any further attention. The *Norddeutsche* commented that it would leave it up to its

557 R. c., *Norddeutsche*, 2 (3 January 1881).
readers to form their own judgment on the event. In the following issues, the *Norddeutsche* devoted no significant attention to the disorders in Argenau, apart from a short note about a subsequent rally there. The neutral way the *Norddeutsche* dealt with the disorders in Argenau becomes clearer when it is compared with other newspapers. The *Germania*, for example, apparently feeling threatened by the riots (as they occurred in a predominantly Polish Catholic area), rejected vehemently the allegation of the *Berliner Tageblatt* that newspapers like the *Kreuzzeitung*, the *Norddeutsche*, the *Post*, and the *Reichsbote* were responsible for having awakened the anti-Semitic mood in Argenau. All of these newspapers, except the *Norddeutsche*, were representatives of the anti-Semitic movement, which Catholics did not want to be identified with, as we have seen. The disorders were exaggerated by the Jewish and the Liberal press in order to instrumentalize the riots against the anti-Semitic movement, the *Germania* claimed. Both the *Germania* and the *Kreuzzeitung* used the disorders to prove the alleged damaging influence of the Jews.

When anti-Jewish disorders broke out in Neustettin, the organ reported a brawl between two Jewish newspaper editors and a Christian that resulted in disorders. The *Norddeutsche* avoided any involvement in the debate current in the press as to who was to blame for the brawl and thus for the disorders. Another

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558 R, n, ibid., 200 (30 April 1881).
559 R, c, ibid., 204 (3 May 1881).
561 See previous part.
562 C, c, *Germania*, 97 (30 April 1881).
563 C, p, *Kreuzzeitung*, 105 (5 May 1881); C, n, *Germania*, 101 (5 May 1881). The disorders in Argenau have, to my knowledge, so far not had scholarly investigation.
report noted a meeting of the local authorities to discuss measures to be taken against the disorders. For the next two weeks the paper did not mention the issue to any significant degree. After that, the paper devoted only the minimum of attention to the spread of the disorders. Citing the Berliner Tageblatt, the paper reported in a short note on disorders in Rummelsburg, where the windows of most Jewish homes were smashed. Citing the Kreuzzeitung, the paper noted that the anti-Jewish disorders in Pomerania threatened to become epidemic. Considering that the first phase of the anti-Semitic disorders were during the election campaign (when Bismarck favored the anti-Semites) and when no decisive actions of the authorities were taken against the riots, we can assume that the Norddeutsche did not want to take position against the disorders, thereby favoring the Jews. The organ devoted greater attention to the matter when the government finally decided to take action against the riots by prohibiting public gatherings with anti-Semitic content. Again this was done only in its “Journal-Revue,” where the organ noted the reactions to the remark of the official Provincial Correspondenz that the laws on the misuse of the right of assembly were insufficient. Liberal papers generally felt uncomfortable about the attempt to curtail the freedom of assembly on the one hand and the lack of decisive official condemnation of the anti-Jewish disorders on the other. Thus the Norddeutsche noted that the National Zeitung disagreed with the remark of the Provincial Correspondenz. Citing the view of the Liberal paper Vossische Zeitung, the Norddeutsche noted:

565 R, n, ibid., 336 (22 July 1881).
566 R, n, ibid., 368 (10 August 1881).
This kind of restriction is questionable. It seemed that with the present laws Liberal rallies were sufficiently controlled. Dr Henrici will now not be able to hold his speech at the Castle of Hammerstein. However, we would have expected a more decisive word of condemnation against the whole agitation from the official side.

The Norddeutsche noted the claim of the Tribüne that the police force never failed to act against a misuse of the right of assembly under the present law, when it was judged in this way from higher officials. One only needed to remember when police interfered against Liberal associations where "guests" held speeches, it said. That anti-Semitic disorders occurred did not surprise the paper. More surprising was the "regret" expressed by the Provincial Correspondenz, for which the repeated exchange of support between the carriers and the supporters of this "German" movement and the leading statesman did not prepare. It would be interesting to know, how men like Henrici, Stöcker, Ruppe, and Glagau (the inciters of the Pomeranian excesses) responded to the Provincial Correspondenz after it now called them the "well-known agitators," and if they felt themselves now opponents of the government and Bismarck. The Norddeutsche was surprised that the Berliner Tageblatt, which in its well-known sensational approach always spoke of the "civil war in Pomerania," responded with approval and cheering: "This is the first word of official disapproval devoted publicly to the well-known agitators! Now the distasteful slander, that the excesses were officially approved of, will be silenced." 567 The Norddeutsche also noted the protest of the Frankfurter Zeitung against the governmental intention to curtail the right of assembly and

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567 C, n. ibid., 371 (12 August 1881).
potential further restrictions on the freedom of assembly, as well as against the
failure of the government to speak out against the anti-Jewish disorders earlier.\textsuperscript{568}

Conservative papers were not happy about the government measures either.
They feared that this could harm the anti-Semitic movement. Thus the
\textit{Norddeutsche} noted the claim of the \textit{Deutsche Tageblatt} that the Jewish Question
was a far too complicated political issue to be solved by some “under-aged and
mentally immature” apprentices, who smashed the windows of Jewish homes. This
would not hurt the Jews because they would be compensated for their damage, it
believed. Rather it would hurt the Christians because the communities in the areas
affected with the riots would be liable for the damage. In addition, the excesses
could endanger the whole anti-Semitic movement. This fear was confirmed by the
intention of the government to ban public rallies of anti-Semitic agitators. This in
turn could put an end to any public discussion of the Jewish Question.\textsuperscript{569}

The authorities at first played down the anti-Jewish disorders, viewing them
as the deeds of immature boys and blaming Jewish usury for the excesses. They did
not initially view the disturbances primarily in connection with the anti-Semitic
agitation. Rather they identified them as criminal acts and consequently responded
to them only by increasing the police force. Bismarck abstained from taking a clear
position on the disorders. Part of the authorities attempted to exploit the riots for
their political struggle against Liberalism, blaming the Jews and their usury for the
disorders. Both the inadequate actions of the authorities and Bismarck’s partial

\textsuperscript{568} C. n. ibid., 373 (13 August 1881).
\textsuperscript{569} C. n. ibid.
support for the anti-Semitic movement, made the rioters believe they were acting in favor of the government.⁵⁷⁰

The Norddeutsche continued to publish short reports on any disorders.⁵⁷¹ Yet it largely omitted to provide its readers with its own analysis of the events, leaving this to other newspapers quoted in its “Journal Revue,” and mostly without commenting on them. The majority of these reports were not sympathetic to the Jews. This might be explained with the forthcoming election, when Bismarck tried to “court” the anti-Semitic camp.

Thus the paper cited, for example, the claim of the Staatsbürger Zeitung that “the results of the investigation into the disorders in Pomerania showed that a quarter of the riots were caused by Jewish usury and a quarter by Jewish impertinence. Another quarter were caused by crude but effective incitement of Berlin Jewish newspapers (Judenblätter). Half of all the disorders that were reported were invented and a fabrication.” “Proper” riots occurred only in Neustettin and its surrounding area. For many years, the town was the centre for railroad construction. Many workers came to work there from other areas. Now they were unemployed and became the victims of Jewish usurers, the paper stated. This explained why they let themselves be incited against the Jews. Their deeds of violence should not be glossed over and they were rightly convicted. Jewish usurers though, acted no less disgracefully and they were not punished, the organ criticized. The Jewish press acted in a provocative way and was even reprimanded

⁵⁷¹ See for example, R. n, Norddeutsche, 379 (17 August 1881); R. n, 415 (7 September 1881).
by philo-Semitic papers. The distasteful action of Berlin Jewish papers had to be publicized. They spread rumors in the local area saying that the people only waited for the military to move out for their autumn manoeuvres to beat the Jews. This was a pure fabrication. But the aim was to awaken the curiosity of the local towns. Whenever the military went out, people, who were not in the least hostile to the Jews, gathered. The Berlin Jewish papers described them as rioters and plunderers. About twenty people became agitated at one of these gatherings. They were mostly apprentices and pupils. And all this became “anti-Semitic disorders” in the Jewish Berlin newspapers. It seemed utterly ridiculous to see the walls covered with official calls against breach of the peace, when one saw the peaceful atmosphere in the local area.  

572 Obviously this description of the anti-Jewish disorders in Pomerania was playing down the extent of the riots to a significant degree. As we have seen, the wave of anti-Jewish riots reached beyond Pomerania to West Prussia and Posen. Plundering did actually occur in several places. Sometimes rumors were circulated about forthcoming actions against Jews. The perpetrators seemed to be quite accurately described in this report: often they were apprentices and pupils. The report partly explains the outbreak of the riots with the theory of the “wrath of the people.” Real economic and social tensions did indeed exist between Jews and non-Jews in the towns of Pomerania and West Prussia, a situation that was promoted by propagandists as showing the success of the Jews - “Jewish domination” - at the expense of Christians.  

573 R. n. ibid., 410 (4 September 1881). See also C, n, ibid., 373 (13 August 1881); C, n, 375 (14 August 1881). Hoffmann, “Violence,” 94.  
573 This passage follows ibid., 70-6, 84-6.
In the end we can reach no decisive conclusions regarding the position of the *Norddeutsche* towards the anti-Jewish riots in Germany. We can only speculate that the displayed neutrality was inspired by Bismarck, calculated to leave doors open for him to take opportune actions and positions as the moment required.
9 Russians and Poles

Before we can turn to the pogroms in Russia, we have to ask what the attitude of the *Norddeutsche* and Bismarck was not only to Russia but also to the Poles. Bismarck desired good relations with Russia, not least because he feared her strength. After 1879 he pushed a gradual *rapprochement* between Germany and Russia that culminated in the reconstitution of the Three Emperors’ League between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia in June 1881. As a result Russo-German relations improved considerably. The *Norddeutsche* mirrored this state of affairs. Commenting on the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, the organ wrote that he had been the best friend of Germany, as he himself had asserted. No other Russian Monarch was so full of kindness and love for human kind, it said. However, apart from such warm words for Alexander II, the organ displayed a more critical attitude towards Russia. Autocracy was the only political system that at this stage would work for Russia, the paper commented. Only when one day a different cultural development - of which there was no sign yet - would perhaps take place, might Russia abandon autocracy. At present, only autocracy would guarantee to keep together all the different elements in the Russian Empire.

The organ was ambivalent towards Russian society. Referring approvingly to the new book by Franz v. Löher, the paper echoed its claim that the Russian

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575 E. e, *Norddeutsche*, 122 (14 March 1881).
population was divided into peasants, businessmen and aristocrats or civil servants. The peasants made up five sixths of the whole Russian population. One sixth were workers and lower-middle-class. The peasants were obedient, patient and kind-hearted, but at the same time their character was characterized by a propensity to lie and to cheat. The higher classes were half-educated and they routinely put everything into question. They adhered to the materialistic Weltanschauung, which was hardly compatible with genuine religiousness. Their spiritual life was characterized by a lack of energy for thought and will. They lacked diligence and persistence, which were the drives for research and occupation. Educated Russians were effusive (schwärmerisch) in their love for their fatherland. The aristocracy lacked both tradition and the aspiration to gain public reputation and they preferred to live in the cities rather than in the countryside. It is noteworthy that the organ omitted to draw attention to the book’s view of both Poles and Jews. The Poles were painted by Löher in the most favorable light, an approach that drastically differed from the attitude of the Norddeutsche, as I will discuss below. The Jews, on the other hand, were identified with Nihilism, a motif that the Norddeutsche avoided, as I will show. For Löher, Polish women were well behaved and knew how to communicate. He praised the Polish nobility and their culture while he denigrated the Russians, who in their tendency of self-deception believed that they could destroy Polish culture, religion and nationality. The Jews were depicted by Löher as the worst enemies of the Russian Government, especially the Jewesses with their wrath. One only needed to consider their participation in Nihilism, he

said. The Jews destroyed the landed gentry by driving them into debt, he asserted. They refused to become peasants. They wanted to deal, not to produce, he believed. With their money they dominated commerce. In addition, the Russian Orthodox Church was characterized by a deep-seated Jew-hatred, which the Jews with their pride paid them back twofold. These were claims usually voiced by Russian critics of the Jews, both Liberal and Conservative.

There was no question for the Norddeutsche, that German culture was far superior to Russian culture. It was only thanks to the German university of Dorpat in Livland, revived under Alexander I, that Russia was able to enter Western European cultural life, the paper emphasized. Referring approvingly to a lecture by Dr Max Beheim-Schwarzbach on the Germanization of Livland, the paper cited his claim that “the Slavic peoples are not grateful for having received the blessing of the superior German culture, even though the Germans in Russia have always been loyal to their Russian Emperor.”

The Russian Church did not find much approval in the eyes of the Norddeutsche. The Greek Russian Church condemned Nihilism and called on the Russians to be loyal and act morally, the organ noted. Unfortunately, however, the Church had little influence on promoting a healthy education, trust in God, or on the development of a sense of morality, duty and loyalty. These values had little meaning among educated circles. This state of affairs was not due to the religious

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doctrines of the Greek Russian Church, which were the same as in Catholicism. Rather it was due to the Church practice in Russia. For centuries a proper training for the priests to deal with their congregations was neglected. Thus the priests were unable to give a sermon. Consequently, many Orthodox Russians grew up without having sensible and loyal parents and teachers, the paper held. At best they learned a kind of formalism, whose symbolic meaning they did not understand because the religious teachers mostly did not understand it themselves.\(^{582}\)

The paper was especially critical of Nihilism. Nihilism was not a “spiritual illness” that could be fought with “spiritual means,” as some people believed. Rather it was a theory based on the lowest instincts of man, it said. It denied the laws of duty and morality and idealized bestial and destructive drives. Many people could indulge in these ideas in the immature Russian society precisely because the government did nothing to stop this destructive agitation. There was an overwhelming majority of people in Russia who were loyal to the government. That this majority was not able to resist the Nihilist propaganda proved that the Russian Government was derelict in taking action, the paper asserted.\(^{583}\)

Nihilism, the paper claimed, was not only pervasive among the common Russian people. Rather both Nihilism and Pan-Slavism were dominant in the national Russian intelligentsia, linking Nihilism to the aggressive anti-Germanic doctrines of the political Pan-Slavs in Moscow. These movements (which continued to attract more and more people) partly destroyed family life and made any serious reading unpopular. However, Nihilists and Pan-Slavists became tamed

\(^{582}\) E. e. Norddeutsche, 208 (5 May 1881).
\(^{583}\) C. c., ibid., 282 (21 June 1881).
as soon as the government made serious efforts to establish order, the organ maintained. All the same, the destructive movement was not stopped. The critic Vissarion Belinsky (who died in 1848), the paper revealed, was the first who gave the movement a destructive and anti-religious direction. He held that the Russian people had no sense for religion. Yet it was proven that it was precisely the strong religious sense of the masses of national Russians that made them capable of developing culture and protected them from Nihilism. The Russian intelligentsia, as well as the majority of the Russian press, were still under the influence of Nihilism, which aimed at turning people into animals instead of educating them to become noble in their character. Nobody could predict when the influence of Nihilism finally could be overcome. Only solid education and strong efforts to re-establish respect for religion, morality and authority would be able to overcome the influence of Nihilism, the paper concluded. Such statements were well noted in the Russian press and did not go down well with all Russian newspapers.

Aksakov’s paper Rus’, the reporter of the Norddeutsche in Petersburg wrote, called it perfidious to put Nihilism and Pan-Slavism alongside each other. It was true, the Norddeutsche responded, that “to strangle” and “to shoot” was not the same, but it had the same effect. Similarly Nihilism and Pan-Slavism were different movements but they had the same effect for Russia, as they posed the same danger to the Empire. Some people, such as Bakunin, the paper claimed, had no difficulty in moving back and forth between Nihilism and Pan-Slavism. Rus’ was one of the

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584 C, c., ibid., 81 (18 February 1881).
worst organs, whose aim was to strangle the existing Russian Empire with Pan-
Slavism, it said.\textsuperscript{585}

In the Russian context, Pan-Slavism was one of the most influential
conservative ideologies of the second half of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{586} In the
German context, Pan-Slavism and Nihilism were linked together as a vehicle to
attack Liberalism. Thus the \textit{Norddeutsche} refuted the argument of the Liberal paper
\textit{Tribüne}, that Nihilism originated and was prevalent among the “Fourth Estate” (the
poor man), who were freed by Alexander II. Rather, the organ claimed that
Nihilism came from the aristocracy, the civil servants, the military and the clerics,
the upper class of businessmen, the burghers and the peasants. This was proven by
the people who were arrested in 1877 for Nihilist actions. Nihilism was a doctrine
close to the doctrine of radical Liberalism: in fact it was almost identical with it.
Both opposed the historically grown State and its moral task. Both were anarchists.
While the Liberals wanted to dissolve the State into a group of individuals in which
everybody pursued his own profit, the Nihilists wanted to dissolve the State in
order to wait and see what would follow.\textsuperscript{587}

Most importantly, however, Nihilism was used as a rhetorical means to
attack the Poles. If one read the \textit{Norddeutsche} only with respect to the Jews and the
anti-Semitic movement (as we have done in the first chapter of this part), one could
easily get the impression that this paper generally held a rather neutral position,
unwilling to engage in any kind of serious political debate and argument. Yet, as

\textsuperscript{585} C, c., ibid., 129 (18 March 1881). Aksakov’s paper never reached high circulation but its
editorials were widely cited and challenged by its ideological opponents. See John D. Klier,
\textit{Imperial Russia’s Jewish Question 1855 - 1881} (Cambridge, 1995), 126ff.
\textsuperscript{586} Ibid., 385ff.
\textsuperscript{587} C, c., Norddeutsche, 125 (16 March 1881).
the position towards Jesuits and Poles demonstrated, this was not the case.

Resentment against these groups was openly and repeatedly expressed. The organ, though not free of criticism towards Russia, played Russians against Poles. Thus the organ disagreed with the claim of Polish papers that the Nihilist movement (that eventually had led to the assassination of the Tsar) was a specifically Russian phenomenon that the Poles had nothing to do with. "The historical development of Nihilism shows that the Poles are not entirely innocent as regards the most recent development in Russia. In particular the Polish uprising of 1863 served as a model for the Nihilists. For Poles, to conspire is a kind of sport in a way that it is for no other nation. Many Poles would be without an occupation if they could not engage in conspiracy. In contrast, Russians are no good at conspiring. Therefore both the intellectual leaders and those who are in the underground of the opposition against the Russian Government, should be sought among the Poles." The latter attempted to fulfill both their drives and their national future plans. This view, the Norddeutsche concluded, was supported by the fact that Golos, the organ of the opposition, was edited by a Pole. 588 Golos, the pre-eminent Russian Liberal newspaper, it should be noted, was particularly critical of Germany and saw it as dominated by "the wild instincts of the Pomeranian Junkers." 589

For Bismarck, the Poles posed primarily a security problem for the territories of Prussia and the German Empire. Poles made up ten percent of the Prussian population (that is 2.4 million Poles and 24 million Prussians). The Kulturkampf was directed not only against German Catholics, but also against

588 E, e, n, ibid., 134 (21 March 1881).
589 Quoted from Klier, "Brothers," 533.
Catholic Poles. It stirred up much resistance among the latter, as Catholicism had become a main element of Polish nationalism.\textsuperscript{590}

Attacking the Poles went hand in hand with attacking Jesuits. Citing the claim of K.V. Trubnikov (a well-known Russian Liberal journalist, banker, and industrialist), the paper noted that the Jesuits had attempted to convert Russia to Catholicism in the sixteenth century, but failed. Numerous kings of Poland subsequently persecuted those who did not belong to the Uniate Church. The Jesuits brought enormous misery to Russia by giving privileges to their people. At the end of the seventeenth century, Peter the Great expelled all Jesuits. After 1772, when White Russia - an area where many Jesuits lived - was conquered, the Russian Empress Catherine II was strict towards them. Paul I and Alexander I protected the Jesuits, until in 1820 Alexander I expelled all Jesuits from Russia. The Jesuits took part both in the Polish uprising of 1794 and in the Polish revolution of 1830. While the Russian Emperor Nicholas I granted the Catholics of Russia some freedom as part of a deal with the Curia, Alexander II broke his ties with the latter. All the same, Jesuits continued to try to convert the Russian people and asked for the readmission of Jesuits into Russia. Then, Jesuits, and also foreign Jews, were forbidden to enter Russia, even though Jews (unlike Jesuits) were granted numerous exceptions to that prohibition.\textsuperscript{591}

The inclination of the Poles to conspire, the Norddeutsche explained, came from the Jesuit education, which the higher classes enjoyed after the Reformation

\textsuperscript{590} Wehler, Krisenherde, 207.
\textsuperscript{591} R, p. Norddeutsche, 23 (15 January 1881).
and which was a very good school for conspiracy.\textsuperscript{592} Commenting on the claim of the \textit{Moskauer Zeitung} that the Poles were the true originators of the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, the \textit{Norddeutsche} noted that it was the Polish rather than the Russian way to act as treacherous murderers (\textit{Meuchelmorde}). The supposition that the leaders of the Nihilists were educated Jesuits became increasingly more probable, the organ emphasized, if one considered the persistence, the substantial financial means, the capability to keep a secret and the discipline with which the assassination was prepared.\textsuperscript{593}

It should be noted that anti-Jesuitism had become a political issue after the establishment of the German Empire in 1871. Driven not primarily by Bismarck, but rather by Liberal Protestants, the \textit{Reichstag} passed a law in 1872 that expelled the order from Germany, known as the “Jesuit law.” It formed one of the first measures of the \textit{Kulturkampf}. Liberals doubted Catholic loyalty and feared that they obey the Pope rather than their temporal leaders. Anti-Jesuit attitudes were also part of a hate rhetoric of practicing Protestants. They associated Jesuits with internationalism, authoritarianism and lax moral theology. The \textit{Norddeutsche} differed from both these groups in its perception of Jesuits when it identified them specifically with conspiracy and regicide.\textsuperscript{594}

The attacks provoked an angry response from the Polish press, which in turn blamed the Germans for engaging in conspiracy and regicide. Thus \textit{Dziennik}

\textsuperscript{592} C, c, ibid., 143 (26 March 1881).
\textsuperscript{593} C, c, n, ibid., 159 (5 April 1881).
Posnalski claimed that based on medieval judicial reports the Germans not the Poles were the foremost teachers in the art of conspiracy and the assassination of princes. Goniec Wielkopolski accused Prussian civil servants to have initiated a Socialist conspiracy in 1858 in order to instigate the Poles of Prussia, Austria and Russia for an armed uprising against their respective governments. Golos and Dnieznyk Warszawski supported these allegations against Germany.⁵⁹⁵ Hitting back the Norddeutsche argued that the Warsaw “Rzad” (the executive organ of the Polish uprising) in 1863 was the exact model for the present Nihilist executive committee. The Dnieznyk Warszawski had the official task to reconcile Poles and Russians and the paper claimed to wish him every success in this endeavor. It was in the interest of the German policy that the inhabitants of the Russian Polish provinces orientated themselves to Moscow and St. Petersburg, rather than to Paris in order to exploit every French-German controversy against Germany, as they did in the past. If the Poles in the Russian Empire would do so, Prussia and Germany would maintain the same friendly relationships with them, as it had with the Russian Empire for more than a hundred years.⁵⁹⁶

Part of the Russian press too insinuated a connection between Germans, conspiracy and regicide. The conservative organ Novoe vremia, one of the most prominent Russian publications, published two articles in its feuilleton about this topic. The Norddeutsche responded to them in a front page article entitled: “More news on the activities of the Nihilists.” The statement that Russian Nihilists regularly met in Geneva in a very comfortable German hotel, which was a centre

⁵⁹⁵ E. n. Norddeutsche, 188 (23 April 1881).
⁵⁹⁶ E. e. ibid.
for Russian Nihilists, in particular provoked a counter attack of the Norddeutsche. Accusing Novoe vremia of putting forward a tendentious attitude, which sympathized with the Nihilists, the paper claimed that it was, after all, the Russian press that helped to create Nihilism. That Nihilism was prevalent in certain layers of Russian society, the paper continued, proved how immature these layers of the so-called Russian “society” were. The Poles did not come away unscathed from this onslaught against Russia. The organ cited the claim of Novoe vremia, that the true soul of the (revolutionary) Party were two Poles who were vital in organizing its activities and provided the necessary financial means through bribery.597

Polish papers did not get tired (the Norddeutsche argued in a front page article) of seeking the origins of Nihilism in every possible place, only not in the right one, namely in Poland. The organ cited the claim of Gazeta Narodowa that Nihilism was to be found among the enemies of the Tsar and that the Tsar, his government and the whole “Kamarilla” were the true fathers of Nihilism. The Tsar, who became the victim of Socialist revolutionary activities, himself epitomized revolutionary tendencies. Thus it was the revolutionary activities of the Petersburg court, which would not leave Europe in peace. A congress should be convened in which all European powers could take part to discuss measures on how to free Europe from the pest of Tsardom, the paper said. May all Polish newspapers, which did not fear death or Siberia, unify to preach the holy war against Tsardom, it asserted. Commenting tartly on these claims, the Norddeutsche noted that for the moment “we merely noted this blunt call for rebellion.”598

597 C, c, n, ibid., 195 (28 April 1881).
598 C, n, ibid., 251 (2 June 1881).
It has been noted that Bismarck’s attitude towards Poland and the Poles was remarkable not for its originality, but rather for the vehemence with which he expressed it and the ruthlessness with which he acted upon it.\textsuperscript{599} This intensity and vehemence is well mirrored by the \textit{Norddeutsche}. But one might ask what had all that to do with Jews? Actually, it is rather conspicuous that in its intensive and rather detailed preoccupation with the “Nihilist-Polish connection,” the \textit{Norddeutsche} did not mention the Jews to any significant degree. After all the stereotype of the “Jewish Nihilist and revolutionary” was well established by 1881 both in the Russian and the German press, as we have seen.\textsuperscript{600} The paper (for example) did not report to any significant degree on Jesse Helfman, the only Jew implicated in the assassination of the Tsar, who ran the “safe house” where the assassins stayed. The avoidance of the “Jewish Nihilist” is even more conspicuous considering that the expulsion of Eastern Jews from Germany, beginning in 1883, was not only directed against the Jewish proletariat.\textsuperscript{601} Rather it was also aimed at educated Jews who were “suspected of Nihilistic activities” by government officials and the police. Sixty Russian Jewish students were expelled from Berlin, a fact that was deeply deplored by the Liberal Deputy Rudolf Virchow. According to him, Berlin was the place in the past where the Russian intelligentsia was a significantly valuable force at the university, but after their expulsion there were

\textsuperscript{599} See Hagen, \textit{Germans}, 120-35.
\textsuperscript{600} See Klier, \textit{Question}, 396-409. For the German press, see previous part.\textsuperscript{601} Russian and Polish Jews were usually not differentiated in governmental documents. Often when discussion centred on Russian Jews, this meant probably Polish Jews of Russian nationality. Neubach, \textit{Ausweisungen}, 19. The term Eastern Jews (\textit{Ostjuden}), seems to have been coined by the Jewish scholar Nathan Birnbaum in 1903. Apparently the expression came into wider usage only after that. However, it seems that it was used already during the nineteenth century. See Patrick Kury, \textit{“Man akzeptierte uns nicht, man tolerierte uns!”} (Basel und Frankfurt am Main, 1998), 12.
almost no more Russian students. As “Nihilists,” Russian Jewish students were branded “enemies of the Reich” by the police and government officials, just as Socialists and revolutionaries, who worked for either the peaceful or violent change of the existing order. Helmut Neubach therefore points out that the motive for their expulsion was not only anti-Semitic but also anti-revolutionary.\textsuperscript{602}

Russian Jewish students had come to Germany to study for different reasons. They adored the German culture, their \textit{Dichter und Denker}. In addition the language seemed to be close to Yiddish, which most of them spoke. Unlike universities in other European States, German universities had no special entry requirements, which made it easier for former yeshiva students to get a place. Russian Jewish students were generally rebels. They had fought in Russia against their parents and their traditional way of life, against discrimination and restrictions against Jews, and against the political system of the Tsar.\textsuperscript{603} Russian Jewish revolutionaries often came to Prussia where the laws were less strict than in Russia, as regards organizing revolutionary activities.\textsuperscript{604} Berlin was the central place for Russian Jewish revolutionaries in Germany. This was so for several reasons. The city was the major railroad junction for travel from Central and Western Europe to the Russo-Prussian frontier. In addition, Berlin was the centre of the German Social Democratic labor movement. Most importantly, however, it was (as we have seen)

\textsuperscript{602} Neubach, \textit{Ausweisungen}, 20, 48, 220.
\textsuperscript{603} S. Adler-Rudel, \textit{Ostjuden in Deutschland 1880-1940} (Tübingen, 1959), 11-8. Neubach, \textit{Ausweisungen}, 18-21, 47-8. The yeshiva was the institution where some Jewish boys continued their education from the age of puberty. The main objective of yeshiva learning was to train a rabbi. Moshe Rosman, “Innovative Tradition,” in David Biale, ed., \textit{Culture of the Jews} (New York, 2002), 533-4.
\textsuperscript{604} Russian Jews, for example, had more freedom of movement in Prussia than in Russia, and the transgression of legal laws was less harshly punished in Prussia than in Russia. See Neubach, \textit{Ausweisungen}, 32.
the residence of many Russian Jewish students. Russian Jewish revolutionaries formed a circle in Berlin numbering some thirty people. They participated actively in the activities of the German Social Democratic Party. They took part in actual Party work while the Party, in turn, assisted the "Jewish Nihilists" in feeding the Russian revolutionary movement with agitational material. In short, Berlin was the headquarter of operations due to its central location and the co-operation of Jewish revolutionaries and German Socialists. 605

To identify people to be expelled, police reports routinely used the formula of "Jews who were suspected of Nihilist activities." According to an official source from Bavaria, the expulsions were motivated by the fear of a potential introduction and dissemination of Nihilist ideas among Social Democratic circles. This indicates that the Prussian Government was aware of the activities and the co-operation of Russian Jewish revolutionaries with German Social Democrats. How serious the fear of Nihilists were for the German Government could also be seen in the fact that about two months after the assassination of the Tsar, in May 1881, talks took place between the German and the Russian Governments about measures to be taken against Nihilists. At this opportunity, Bismarck expressed his wish to be informed by the Russian Government about the degree of emigration from the Polish provinces of the Russian Empire. Measures to restrict immigration of Russian subjects were then taken by the Prussian Minister of the Interior, von

605 Haberer, Jews, 124-5.
Puttkamer, who issued a decree to the district presidents of the Eastern provinces to naturalize Russian subjects only in exceptional cases. 606

It is noteworthy that by that time, many tsarist officials, especially the newly appointed Minister of Internal Affairs, N. P. Ignatiev, firmly believed that “Judaism was the natural breeding ground of subversion.” It propagated radical Jews, who, along with Poles, were ‘the basis for the Nihilists’ secret organization’ which incited the people to attack their Jewish tormentors in a disorderly, anti-government fashion. 607 Even though we do not know how familiar Bismarck was with these beliefs, it is fairly reasonable to assume that in the kind of German Russian talks mentioned above, Russian government officials shared their views about the topic with him. We do not know, but it is also equally reasonable to assume, that Bismarck was either influenced by, or confirmed in his own views about the issue by these talks.

It should be noted that Bismarck only very rarely mentioned that the expulsions from the Eastern provinces were directed partly against the Jews. One such occasion was when he asked the German Ambassador in Petersburg, General von Schweinitz, to inform the Russian Government that the Prussian Government intended to expel immigrated Polish Catholics and Jews. Bismarck asked Schweinitz to explain to the Russian Government that this measure was not meant to be hostile towards Russia but rather in the interest of both Germany and Russia. 608 In public government announcements and debates about the expulsions,

606 See Neubach, Ausweisungen, 13, 19-21. Bismarck most probably referred to the provinces of the Kingdom of Poland which border East Prussia.
607 Quoted from Haberer, Jews, 204.
608 Neubach, Ausweisungen, 33.
be it in the press or in the Prussian Parliament, the Jews were generally not mentioned by government circles. When the *Norddeutsche* announced the forthcoming expulsions in 1885, it talked about Russian Polish elements.\(^{609}\)

Equally, Puttkamer spoke about Polish immigration in a debate in the Prussian House of Deputies about the expulsions.\(^{610}\) However, some German Liberal papers immediately suspected anti-Semitic motives behind the expulsions.\(^{611}\) Therefore we look in vain for the “Jewish Nihilist” in the *Norddeutsche*. It was taboo. Why? Considering the way the *Norddeutsche* treated the topics “Jews” and “Jewish Question,” namely by keeping them generally in low profile, we could assume that Bismarck did not want to alienate German Jewish Conservatives by drawing the Jews into the hate rhetoric against Nihilists. This also would have given the “Jewish issue” a much higher profile. In addition Bismarck may have feared to awaken interest in Jewish revolutionaries among Jews.

Considering Bismarck’s view of property-less Jews, namely that they were dangerous because they were prone to ally themselves with all kinds of subversive opposition, it may be assumed that he feared that Russian Jewish Nihilists might “infest” not only other Russian Jewish students in Germany, but also property-less German Jews and on top of that, the masses of proletarian Russian Jewish refugees who streamed to the West in the wake of the pogroms. These in turn might ally with both German Social Democrats and Polish revolutionaries. After all, the German Jewish Socialist leader Ferdinand Lassalle was celebrated by Polish Socialist circles as a “prophet,” “agitator of genius,” and “father of Socialism.”

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\(^{609}\) Ibid., 34.
\(^{610}\) Ibid., 42ff.
\(^{611}\) Ibid., 34.
Indeed, Polish Jewish intellectuals from wealthy families were leading in the Polish Socialist movement already in 1879.\textsuperscript{612}

How seriously this issue was taken by Bismarck can be seen in his reply to Puttkamer (in 1885), who expressed the concerns of district administrators from the Eastern provinces when discussing the topic of Russian Polish immigration in this area. They feared the agricultural industry would experience substantial disadvantages as a result of the expulsion of the important Polish workforce. Together with the Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs, Gustav v. Gossler, Bismarck acknowledged such worries about agriculture as the most important branch of industry. However, they pointed out that it was still the lesser of the two evils to have the economy suffer some shortage of workforce, than to have the State and its future suffer. The political threat that these immigrants posed, Bismarck and Gossler emphasized, lay in the fact that among them were numerous agitators from Russia, who could exert their revolutionary activities better in Prussia than in Russia, as the Prussian legislation was less strict than in Russia when transgressing the law. Those who outwardly caused no trouble and behaved impeccably, often were politically the most dangerous ones. They were the carriers of revolutionary connections between the Western European emigration and the Russian Poles, they believed.\textsuperscript{613}


\textsuperscript{613} Neubach, Ausweisungen, 31-32. Gossler was familiar with the situation in East Prussia where he went to the Gymnasium and later held political posts. See ibid., 26.
Bismarck's preoccupation with revolutionary Poles and Jesuits, mirrored by the Norddeutsche, was not new. Already in 1872 Bismarck had asked the then Minister of the Interior, Eulenburg, to expel Jesuits from Posen and Upper Silesia if they were engaged in revolutionary activities among Poles. They should be immediately expelled if they were not naturalized. He also asked Eulenburg to investigate if there were foreign people who worked for the organ Dziennik Posnanski and other opposition papers in Posen, Prussia and Silesia, and if so, to arrange for them to be expelled. Bismarck then feared Polish activities against the Prussian State and a potential Polish-Catholic-Austrian alliance with whom the Polish provinces of the German Reich could ally.\textsuperscript{614}

**The Pogroms in Russia**

Given this background, how did the Norddeutsche deal with the pogroms in Russia? Would the Russian Jewish Question be treated with a low profile and in a rather neutral way, as was the German Jewish Question? How would it assess the Russian Jewish Question, considering the background of the improving Russian-German relationships on the one hand, and the mildly negative view of Russian society on the other? How would the paper deal with the refugee crisis?

Thus how did the Norddeutsche report on the events in Elisavetgrad which marked the beginning of the wave of pogroms in 1881? The paper's reports were second-hand. Citing reports of the Kölnische Zeitung, the paper reported that disturbances had taken place in Elisavetgrad. Russian peasants routinely got drunk during Easter time when they would sell their boots and their shirts to buy more

\textsuperscript{614} Ibid., 3-4.
alcohol, the organ explained. Dealers and usurers, invariably Jews, exploited the peasants’ drunkenness to cheat them. Anger about being cheated was aggravated by the old superstition that Jews carried off Christian children during Easter night. In Elisavetgrad an argument in a Jewish tavern between the landlord and some customers triggered disturbances. Jews were killed and wounded and their houses damaged. The military was too weak to stop the peasants and did not intervene when the disturbances started, the organ reported.\textsuperscript{615} Apart from the fact that no people were killed or wounded in the disorders to any significant degree, this account was fairly accurate. It employed though the interpretation of Russian Judeophobes about “Jewish exploitation” of the peasants. Intoxicating the peasants was one of the most widespread charges levelled against Russian Jews (who were often active in trading liquor and tavern keeping) combined with the charge of Jewish usury, charges that were mostly unjustified.\textsuperscript{616} The charge that Jews kidnapped Christian children, ritually torturing and murdering them, then using their blood for various religious purposes (especially for the baking of Passover matzot), originated in eleventh century England. The “Blood Libel” as it was called, gradually spread from England eastward across Europe and finally to Russian Orthodoxy. It was often used as a convenient explanation for any unsolved murder, especially if the disappearance occurred near a Jewish settlement. According to some accounts, rumors about a ritual murder charge seemed to have spread in some pogrom locations in 1881, and the influential Liberal Russian paper \textit{Novoe vremia} was widely reprimanded for publishing an inaccurate account that a

\textsuperscript{615} R. n, Norddeutsche, 206 (4 May 1881).
\textsuperscript{616} Aronson, Waters, 38ff.
Jew had kidnapped a Christian child on the eve of Passover. On the whole, however, the charge was subordinate to broader Judeophobe attacks in the wave of pogroms in 1881 and 1882. 617

The paper blamed primarily the Jews for the pogroms. "The south western provinces of Russia are affected with anti-Jewish disturbances carried out by the lower part of the people," the Norddeutsche reported. Citing the claim of the Politische Korrespondenz, the Norddeutsche noted that "these disorders have no political meaning. Rather they are caused by the regrettable concentration of the Jewish element in those provinces." The paper also cited the claim of the Wiener Abendpost that "the anti-Jewish disorders in the Southern provinces are tremendously exaggerated by the foreign press, and are at least partly the fault of the Jews. People who are familiar with the situation there assert that further outbreaks of persecutions can only be prevented if the government helps the Jews to immigrate to less populated regions, such as the Amur region." 618 This area was at the border with China. That the pogroms had no political meaning did not mirror either mainstream Russian Government officials’ views nor the opinion of a large part of the Russian press, who believed, at least until summer 1881, that the pogroms were the work of revolutionaries who intended to gain experience in popular unrest and disorders directed eventually against the government. 619 However, the view that further outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence could be

617 Klier, Question, 418-33. The charge of the "Blood Libel" is absurd if one knows that for Jews any blood, even blood of animals, was seen as contaminating. See Frantisek Graus, "Judenfeindschaft im Mittelalter," in Wolfgang Benz und Werner Bergmann, eds., Vorurteil und Völkermond (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1997), 44-5.
619 Aronson, Waters, 193-4.
prevented if the Jews would immigrate to other regions or countries, if necessary with assistance from the Russian Government, mirrored the view of part of the Russian press as well as Russian official thinking.\textsuperscript{620}

Having so far based its reports on other newspapers and printed them under general titles such as “Russia,” and “Overview abroad,” the Norddeutsche soon devoted greater attention to the topic. It seemed that the pogroms in Russia gave the paper an opportunity to launch an open attack against the Jews. In addition, the organ used the pogroms to defend itself against the criticisms of the German anti-Semitic movement. This critique had been made not only in the European and American press, as we have noted above, but was also a popular topic in the Russian press. The latter in particular was keen to denigrate the German anti-Semitic movement for different reasons. Some editorials run by the Russian Judeophobe press used the German anti-Semitic movement not so much to justify Russian Judeophobia as to attack foreign critics who routinely viewed Russia as a barbaric nation. The Liberal Russian press mostly viewed the German anti-Semitic movement with disdain. However, Russian Liberal papers attacked the German anti-Semitic movement not primarily to defend the Jews, but to defend the principles of freedom of conscience and public freedom.\textsuperscript{621} German Jews and German Liberals claimed that the pogroms were caused by the German anti-

\textsuperscript{620} Klier, “Press,” 218-9.

\textsuperscript{621} The Judeophobe paper Novoe vremja, for example, reminded its readers “that disorders had appeared first in Germany and then spread across the Austrian frontier.” Quoted from Klier, “Brothers,” 531-4.
Semitic movement, which in their view had encouraged Russian Judeophobes to engage in the pogroms.\textsuperscript{622}

The strategy to launch an open attack against the Jews, as well as to free itself from the blame that the anti-Semitic movement originated in Germany, had to be seen also against the background of the forthcoming Reichstag elections. After all, the paper had noted that never before had an election campaign started so early and with such effort.\textsuperscript{623} It seemed as if the Norddeutsche could play the anti-Semitic card openly only in the context of, and in connection with, Russian Judeophobia, which seemed to have been perceived as less politically sensitive than doing so in the German context. Thus, in a front page article, the paper claimed that “the events in Russia prove that the anti-Semitic movement is not an invention from Berlin. Rather the Jewish race - when not so small in proportion to the general population as, for example, in England, which had only a gradual immigration since Cromwell’s time - makes itself enemies everywhere with its arrogance and its distinctive drive to rule the world.”\textsuperscript{624} This line of argument nicely illustrates how Russian Judeophobia is used to attack not only Russian Jews, but all Jews. We could observe the attempt to use the pogroms in Russia to attack all Jews also in the Germania. Explaining the pogroms the Norddeutsche noted:

That the hostility in Russia against the Jews expressed itself in such a violent and, if the reports are credible, barbaric way has to be explained by two factors: first the concentration of masses of Jews in Russian and Polish towns and second the uneconomic nature of the common Russian, which

\textsuperscript{623} E. e, Norddeutsche, 248 (31 May 1881).
\textsuperscript{624} C, c, ibid., 227 (18 May 1881). See part 2.
exposes him particularly to the usury and exploitation of the Jews. Prince Gorchakov described the situation at the Berlin Congress very well. He said that in some Russian provinces the Jews were the true scourges of the population. This is known from the writings of Turgenev. When the Russian peasant runs out of money, he sells his boots to buy some alcohol and the Jewish tavernkeeper is always ready to take his boots.

The paper also sought the cause of the outbreaks elsewhere. The Nihilists wanted to move the masses. They knew human nature and history well enough to know that there was not a more effective means to do so than to give the people an opportunity to plunder under the pretext of class, racial and religious hatred. As noted above, the view that revolutionaries had instigated the pogroms mirrored the opinion of both the Russian press and the Russian Government, at least during the initial phase of the pogroms. It was now taken on board by the Norddeutsche. The charge of “Jewish exploitation” reflected mainstream opinion in the Russian press. This was the only front page article in the Norddeutsche in 1881 that openly and directly attacked the Jews. It could be seen as the counter-part to the later pro-Jewish article in November 1881 (after the election) about Bismarck’s conversation with the Jewish industrialist.

The role the military played in the pogroms was widely discussed in the German press. It was a matter that was of interest to the German public, considering that Russia, even though (at the moment) a friend of Germany, was always a potential military danger. The Norddeutsche saw in the role of the

625 C, c, ibid., 227 (18 May 1881).
626 See Klier, “Press,” 210-1.
627 Ibid., 207.
628 See above.
military in the pogroms a demonstration of its lack of authority. “In the reports from Russia we notice a remarkably passive attitude of the military,” the paper noted. In England, the organ held, the respect of the masses of the military was based on its decisive and strict actions. The anti-Jewish disorders in Russia had a certain military meaning, as they showed how little respect the mob had for the military. Citing reports of the Russian press, the paper reported that the military in Russia received orders not to use force of arms. The military either drew back or was overrun by the mob. Those who did intervene forcefully were often wounded.629

The perception that the military was passive in response to the pogroms may be explained by the fact that many officials feared that too severe repression of the mob could lead it to turn against the government. Therefore troops sometimes were forbidden to use their arms against anti-Jewish rioters, while at other times they did fire, sometimes wounding and killing persons.630

The paper also devoted attention to the remedies for the Russian pogroms. Thus the organ reported an “interesting correspondence” in this matter by the Russian paper Novoe vremia (which was well-known in Russia for its Judeophobia), which contained a “rash and frivolous” editorial concerning the sad events. The article began with Hamlet’s words “to be or not to be,” which were transmuted by Novoe vremia into “to beat or not to beat.” The Norddeutsche cited its claim that the dangers of the rapid growth of the Hebrew population in Russia

629 C. c. n, Norddeutsche, 227 (18 May 1881).
630 Aronson, Waters, 135-6.
would soon reach ten million if it was tolerated all over Russia. To give equal
rights to the Jews would only worsen the present situation, it said. “It would be as
if somebody in order to escape from the rain would throw himself into the water.”
The only remedy would be to remove the Jews from Russia with state assistance
and to make a non-reversible emigration of Jews easier. That way one could hope
to get rid of half the Jews in Russia, it said.631 This article of Novoe vremia
triggered a mixed response from the Russian press. Yet it seemed to reflect official
Russian thinking.632 It appeared that the Norddeutsche characterized this article as
“rash” not so much because of its thinly veiled call for the expulsion of Russian
Jews, but rather because it feared the influx of Eastern Jews into Germany, as I will
discuss below. Golos, on the other hand, the Norddeutsche noted in that same
correspondence, was in favor of tolerance for the Jews and did not excuse the
drunken mob that ran wild.633 It should be noted that Golos belonged to those
Russian newspapers that advocated Jewish emancipation and now used the
pogroms to justify its position. It argued that the unequal legal system for the Jews
in Russia was to blame for the outbreak of the pogroms.634 Here the paper returned
to its rather neutral position, avoiding the expression of either support or rejection
for different viewpoints.

632 Some papers rejected the plan as either too close to the vengeful actions of the rioters or as not
practical because of the ruinous effects it would have on the Russian economy. See Klier, “Press,”
218-9.
634 Klier, “Press,” 213.
The pogroms in Russia were also intertwined with the Polish issue and served the Norddeutsche to promote anti-Polishness. "In connection with the persecution of the Jews in Russia," the paper editorialized, "Polish papers claim that they are the only nation in Europe which has always taken the right position towards the Jews, and does so also in the present crisis. Czas reproaches the European powers for not having interfered with the internal affairs of Russia and for not having told the Russian Government how to deal with the persecution of the Jews. Warsaw alone, Czas emphasizes, would be entitled to reject any kind of intervention." The Polish population (according to Czas) was sincere, honorable, and politically sensible. Thus the Catholic clergy and the Polish press were influential enough to protect the Jews of Warsaw against persecution, and to destroy any attempts of revolutionary upheavals. "If one considers," the organ commented tartly,

how often Europe was worried because of Poland and that the attitude of its most influential political party still is a cause for worry, that in addition, hardly anywhere in Europe an upheaval can be planned without the activities of Polish elements, one could think that Czas mocked its compatriots. The Polish papers, who only rarely miss an opportunity to cast suspicion on Germany, have not failed to blame a German national for the formation of a mob in Warsaw who threatened the Jews verbally. The man who was slandered in that way, and who was called an agent of the German Antisemiten-Liga, has undertaken steps against those who have wrongly accused him.635

Interestingly, the Norddeutsche sympathized with the Polish victims of the disaster in the Holy Cross Church in Warsaw at Christmas and did not report to any

635 E. e. n. Norddeutsche, 244 (28 May 1881).
significant degree on the pogrom that was triggered by the disaster.\textsuperscript{636} This is even more conspicuous if one considers that the dramatic pogrom in Warsaw would have given the organ a perfect opportunity to attack the Poles and their alleged tendency towards revolution and unrest. That the paper nevertheless remained silent in this situation, seems to be difficult to explain.

Once it was clear that the military trials in Russia were not going to bring to light any revolutionary participation in the pogroms, the \textit{Norddeutsche} dropped this charge and put the blame for the disorders wholly on the Jews. In a front page article, the \textit{Norddeutsche} noted the response to the pogroms of the military prosecutor in the Kiev district military court, General Strelnikov. Strelnikov rejected the assumption that the disorders were triggered by Nihilist activities. Rather he maintained that the true cause of the anti-Jewish disorders had to be sought in the conduct of the Jewish population alone. "The Jews are not willing to engage in serious hard work," he said. "They attempt to circumvent the duties towards the State such as the payment of taxes and military service. In addition, the Jews' endeavor is directed to exploit the lower classes of society and to make for themselves a comfortable life at the expense of others. This conduct has brought about the general mood of bitterness that now exists. It would be desirable for the Jews to leave and look for another homeland, not in the East but in the West, beyond the borders of Russia," he concluded.\textsuperscript{637} The paper did not comment on this call for the emigration of the Jews to the West, but we may assume that it was

\textsuperscript{636} R, n. ibid., 605 (28 December 1881).
\textsuperscript{637} C, p. ibid., 266 (11 June 1881).
noticed with concern by Bismarck, as I will discuss below. Strelnikov belonged to those Russian officials who held anti-Semitic attitudes and who consequently treated the accused rioters leniently.\footnote{See Aronson, \textit{Waters}, 157-60.}

After the introduction of universal military service into the Russian army in 1874, large numbers of Jews did in fact serve in the army, with all the consequences of Russification and assimilation. Therefore it was only partly true that Jews attempted to avoid being drafted for the military. Yet there was a proclivity among Jews for draft evasion, not least in order to avoid Russification and assimilation. Many Jews emigrated in order to avoid the Russian military. The charge of Jewish draft evasion soon became legendary, reinforcing the pre-existing prejudice that the Jews were by nature cowards.\footnote{For more detail on this topic, see Klier, \textit{Question}, 332-49.} Citing a report of the \textit{St. Petersburger Herold} on the speech of the English Member of Parliament, Simon, the paper reported that Simon viewed the Jews’ practice of usury as the cause for the hatred against them in Russia. For him, the most effective means to free the Jews from their suppression abroad would be to teach them that it was despicable and dishonorable, to squeeze money out of deprived people by demanding exorbitant interest for loans.\footnote{R, n, \textit{Norddeutsche}, 310 (7 July 1881).} Again, these statements went unremarked on by the paper. This conveyed the message that the negative views on Russian Jews, both of Strelnikov and Simon, were silently supported by the organ.

When the anti-Jewish disorders broke out in Germany in July, the \textit{Norddeutsche} (like the \textit{Kreuzzeitung}) interrupted its reports on the pogroms in
Russia. The paper clearly recognized that Russia suffered heavy international criticism, and potential diplomatic intervention, because of the pogroms. The anti-Jewish disorders in Russia, the Norddeutsche reported, were causing great alarm to the Russian Government. Citing reports of the Russian press, the paper reported that foreign ambassadors in Petersburg were inundated with letters from abroad because of the events. Apparently the Austrian-Hungarian Government had sent its ambassador Count Kalnoky to the Russian Government because of fear of the difficulties that could arise for Vienna in the wake of a huge wave of emigration of Jews from Southern Russia into Austria.\textsuperscript{641} It became known that a Jewish delegation had attempted to bring about an English intervention in Russia on behalf of the Russian Jews, which, however, was rejected by the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. Rumors also appeared in the press according to which Britain had suggested the European powers intervene on behalf of Russian Jews with the Russian Government.\textsuperscript{642}

However, once the anti-Jewish riots in Germany had petered out, the organ resumed its attention on the events in Russia. The paper also offered a contrast that first appeared in the conservative Russian press, which set the Karaites in opposition to Russian Jews.\textsuperscript{643}

The Karaites are numerous in the Crimea and in the province of Podolia and had received equal rights in Russia. Some believe that they are the descendents of Jews. Others claim that they are descendents of the Khazars, a Turkish tribe who accepted the Mosaic creed in the eighth century. The Karaites reject the Talmud, which is hostile to the Christians. They are

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{641} R, n, ibid., 242 (27 May 1881). \textsuperscript{642} R, n, Kreuzzzeitung, 122 (26 May 1881). \textsuperscript{643} Klier, Question, 52ff. See also part 1.}
honest and well behaved. No Karaite has ever been convicted of a crime. Talmudic Jews, in contrast, routinely act against the law. They are poorly educated and their teachings systematically incite them against the Christians. Apart from the Karaites, only a few well-educated Jews decided to view themselves as Russians (emphasis Norddeutsche) of the Mosaic creed in order to receive full civil emancipation. The millions of Talmudic Hebrews in Russia try to resist the attempts of the government to be integrated into civil life and do not want to have to do anything with the goyim.⁶⁴⁴

This article invoked Alexander II’s policy towards the Jews. As a guiding principle Alexander II sought “the rapprochement (sliianie) of the Jews to the indigenous population as far as their moral status allows.” His aim had been to introduce reforms that would integrate the Jews into the general civil, social, and political system to a greater degree than before.⁶⁴⁵

“*The Most Burning Problem Among the Present Cultural Problems*”⁶⁴⁶

Under Alexander III, in the wake of the pogroms, the attempt to integrate the Jews into the general population was reversed. Instead, the Russian Government set up restrictions against the Jews that culminated in the “Provisional Rules of 3rd May 1882,” the so-called “May Laws.” These restrictions again separated the Jews from the general population by curtailing their freedom of movement and their economic activities.⁶⁴⁷ The Norddeutsche did not miss this development. Reporting that the Russian Government now directed special

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⁶⁴⁴ R. c, Norddeutsche, 566 (4 December 1881).
⁶⁴⁵ Certain positions in the state service, for example, were opened to Jews. They were now allowed to become lawyers and judges. Among other reforms, residence restrictions were relaxed for certain groups of Jews such as merchants of the first guild and graduates of Russian universities. Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, *The Tsars and the Jews* (Chur, 1993), 40-54.
⁶⁴⁶ R. c, Norddeutsche, 591 (19 December 1881).
⁶⁴⁷ Löwe, Tsars, 55-70.
attention to the Jewish Question “as the most burning problem among the present
cultural problems,” the paper noted its attempts to set up special commissions to
discuss the Jewish Question.648 The Norddeutsche reported the proposed new
restrictions to “an important question of principle.” Citing various press reports, it
detailed the plans of the Ignatiev Commissions to forbid the Jews to deal in alcohol
in the countryside, to rent or to buy land, and to live in the countryside when they
had no particular occupation. The ban to have Christian servants should be
renewed, it said, and the percentage of Jewish students in higher education should
be restricted.649 From these reports, the position of the Norddeutsche to the
renewed legal restriction of Russian Jews is unclear. Obviously, the paper could
hardly openly support legal restrictions for Russian Jews, after Bismarck had
emancipated the Jews. On the other hand, it seems that the paper did not want to
display sympathy for Russian Jews by criticizing the restrictions. Thus, once more,
the organs’ position remains elusive.

The Norddeutsche shared the Russian Government’s view as regards the
famous articles of the London Times, which presented an exaggerated and shocking
picture of the pogroms.650 The Norddeutsche noted the claim of the French-
language official organ of the Russian Foreign Ministry Journal de St.
Petersbourg, that the descriptions given in the English press about the pogroms

648 R. c., Norddeutsche, 591 (19 December 1881).
649 R. n., ibid., 469 (8 October 1881); R. n. 2 (2 January 1882). These were the so-called “Ignatiev
Commissions,” that had been ordered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to report on the harm done
by the Jews to the local economy. See Löwe, Tsars, 63ff.
650 For the articles of The Times, see John D. Klier, “The Times of London, the Russian Press, and
the Pogroms of 1881-1882,” Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, 308 (1984),
7-10. For the background of the articles of The Times, see Israel Oppenheim, “The Kovno Circle of
Rabbi Yitzhak Elhanan Spektor: Organizing Western Public Opinion Over Pogroms in the 1880s,”
were either lies or enormous exaggerations.\textsuperscript{651} The Norddeutsche was unsurprised that the Liberal Neue Freie Presse of Vienna had condemned the Journal for these words. Yet the Neue Freie Presse failed to understand, the paper claimed, that the St. Petersburger Herold, which certainly was unprejudiced, had declared that the inciting articles of The Times were outrageously exaggerated.\textsuperscript{652}

When the pogroms in Russia seemed to have petered out, the Norddeutsche noted that a remarkable epilogue to the anti-Jewish disorders in Southern Russia was given by Kiev Governor-General A.R. Drenteln. The notorious speech by Drenteln, a strongly anti-Semitic official, was reprinted in the Russian press. Drenteln was upset that such a large part of the Russian population, including parts from the middle and upper classes, sympathized with the anti-Jewish rioters. He understood the possibility of the violence turning from the Jews to other segments of the population and ultimately even to the government.\textsuperscript{653} Thus citing the speech of Novorossiiskii Telegraf, the paper reported that Drenteln, addressing the Christians in Balta, reprimanded them for not having prevented the rioters during Easter. Addressing the Jews, he said he sympathized with their feeling of humiliation. However, they had provoked everybody with their conduct, he held. Turning to a representative of the Jewish community of Balta, Drenteln attacked him for having slandered the city authorities by accusing them of having incited the mob against the Jews. "The Jews live nowhere as well as in Russia, as they themselves know best," he maintained. "They emigrate to America and Palestine only to return to Russia. Half a year after the disorders, the Jews still want revenge

\textsuperscript{651} R. n, Norddeutsche, 38 (23 January 1882).
\textsuperscript{652} R. c, n, ibid., 40 (24 January 1882). For the articles of The Times, see part 1.
\textsuperscript{653} Aronson, Waters, 172.
and wrongly accuse poor peasants for robbery.⁶⁵⁴ The Norddeutsche’s neutral reporting of this speech contrasted with the scandal and outrage it occasioned in the press in both Russia and abroad.⁶⁵⁵

The Refugee Crisis

The pogroms in Russia affected Germany immediately because of the resultant refugee crisis. Eastern European Jews had immigrated continuously to Germany since 1815. Immigration to Germany reached an initial peak in 1842. when Jews in the Kingdom of Poland, hitherto freed from military service, fell under a new ukaz which made military service mandatory for Jews. Many Poles too immigrated to Germany between 1842 and 1844, when the agreement between Prussia and Russia to extradite criminals and deserters had expired and new legislation was not yet in force. The second wave of immigration took place in the 1870s. Russian and Galician Jews streamed into Eastern Prussia and Upper Silesia mainly for economical reasons after a serious famine in Russian Lithuania in 1869 and 1870. After the outbreak of the pogroms in Russia in 1881, the influx of Russian Jews increased once more. Even though most of them transmigrated through Germany in order to reach Western Europe or America, quite a few tried to remain in Germany.⁶⁵⁶

Bismarck then was so concerned about a potential threat of Jewish immigration that he discussed the issue again at a cabinet meeting on 22 May 1882.

⁶⁵⁴ R, n, Norddeutsche, 406 (31 August 1882).
⁶⁵⁵ For a report and critical comment on Drentelín’s speech, see R, c, The Jewish Chronicle, 702 (8 September 1882; C, c, 703 (15 September 1882). I should like to thank John D. Klier for this reference.
⁶⁵⁶ Neubach, Ausweisungen, 4-11.
It was decided at the meeting that special patrols of the borders with Russia should keep out “undesirable elements.” Bismarck ordered that in the Upper Silesian district of Oppeln, where many Jews had fled, anyone who made a living from usury should be expelled.657 Several measures to restrict immigration of Russian Polish Jews were taken in the wake of the cabinet meeting. The measures formulated referred to Russian nationals. Yet in a secret additional comment, it was said that they were directed against Poles and Jews. It is noteworthy that in 1885, when Bismarck ordered that from now on only in exceptional cases would Russian subjects be allowed to be naturalized and needed ministerial confirmation, he ordered that Russian subjects should officially not be named as Poles. Thus Russian nationals should not be granted the German nationality except those, who were seen as useful for German and Polish land workers. At the cabinet meeting, the Minister of the Interior, Puttkamer, explained that a large part of Russian Jews did not succeed in crossing the German border because they did not have a passport. Nevertheless, a number succeeded in secretly crossing the frontier, despite the strict control of borders (since May 1881), he conceded. Those who wanted to immigrate straight to America should be given passports so that they could travel to Hamburg or Bremen as soon as possible. In October 1882, responding to the wishes of Bismarck and Puttkamer, Christoph von Tiedemann became district president of Bromberg, Posen province. He was known as a strict opponent to Jewish immigration.658 It is impossible to know precise figures of Russian Jews who immigrated to the Eastern provinces of Germany, as there were

657 Stern, Gold, 526.
658 Neubach, Ausweisungen, 12-5.
no strict laws for registration. It can be assumed though that we are dealing with
tens of thousands of Eastern Jews between the 1820s and the 1880s.\textsuperscript{659}

The *Norddeutsche* gave the refugee crisis a low profile. It did not (for
example) report to any significant degree on the establishment of a ministerial
commission for the defense of German national interests as regards Russian Jewish
refugees.\textsuperscript{660} The paper also did not report to any significant degree on the attempts
of the Berlin Committee or indeed any other European committee, which had been
established to help Russian Jewish refugees. Interestingly, what the paper did
report was the return to Russia of Russian Jewish refugees from America. Thus the
paper cited *Golos*’ claim that some people enticed Jews to immigrate to other
States. There they were disappointed and returned to Russia completely ruined.
People who enticed the Jews with misleading promises in that way should be sued,
it said.\textsuperscript{661} The *Norddeutsche* reported that the repatriation of Jews was going
smoothly thanks to the efficient activities of the Russian authorities.\textsuperscript{662} A large
number of Russian refugees, who only recently immigrated to America, the paper
noted, had been brought back on the Hamburg railway. They were brought to
Berlin, where they were received by a member of the local committee, who brought
them to a home for asylum seekers, which was established for them. Often they
returned because they were too weak to cope with the situation abroad, it said.\textsuperscript{663} It
seemed that returning Russian Jewish refugees were a less problematic issue for the

\textsuperscript{659} Ibid., 11-2.
\textsuperscript{660} See R. n, *Kreuzzeitung*, 127 (3 June 1882).
\textsuperscript{661} R. n, *Norddeutsche*, 343 (26 July 1882).
\textsuperscript{662} R. c, ibid., 347 (28 July 1882).
\textsuperscript{663} R. c, ibid., 424 (11 September 1882).
Norddeutsche; this may perhaps have been because they were no longer perceived as a threat, as they would go back to Russia for good, rather than try to immigrate to Germany.

To sum up we can say the following: the response of the Norddeutsche to both German and Russian Judeophobia differed markedly. German anti-Semitism, both in its verbal and violent forms, was treated with a conspicuously low profile and mostly in a neutral way. In contrast both verbal and violent forms of Russian Judeophobia acquired a much higher profile. The organ mostly cited sources that were not sympathetic to the Jews, without correcting them. Russian anti-Jewish violence was indirectly justified by blaming the Jews for the hatred against them on the one hand and empathizing with the Russian peasants on the other. This contrasting treatment, I argue, indicates two things: first that internal political considerations determined that the Russian context provided a less problematic arena than the German one to use anti-Semitism for political mobilization. To display anti-Eastern Jewish views fitted in well with German Conservative views and was socially acceptable to the German Jewish community. Many German Jews disliked Eastern European Jews, an attitude that the Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums tried to change. For Berlin Jews, for example, Eastern Jewish immigration had long been a delicate issue. At one point the Berlin Committee of Assistance to the victims of the pogroms warned the Alliance Israélite in Paris that it would suspend all collaboration with the Alliance if it continued to encourage

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664 See part 4.
Russian Jews to pass through the German capital. The expulsion of Eastern European Jews from Germany in 1884 provoked disapproval in all European States. In contrast, the AZJ (as the leading organ of German Jewry) completely ignored it. Second, for Bismarck and his press, resentment against Eastern Jews, who eventually were expelled from Prussia, was not primarily motivated by a general antipathy to Jews, as has been argued. Jews posed a particular problem for Bismarck, encapsulated in the two topics “Jewish Nihilists” and “Russian Jewish Refugees.” The conspicuous low profile of these two topics by the paper seemed to reveal its seriousness and core meaning. They were the silent companions of the topics “Poles” and “conspiracy” and the hidden link between subversive Jews (German or Eastern) and the Polish problem. This was too delicate a matter to be dealt with in public debate. Nihilism, conspiracy, Polish nationalism and Eastern Jews were in the process of merging for Bismarck into one problem. With the expulsions of Poles and Eastern Jews from Germany’s Eastern provinces, this perceived threat was dealt with in one go.

665 Stern, Gold, 526.
666 Neubach, Ausweisungen, 19-20. German Jews were anxious that the influx of Eastern Jews could endanger their own legal position, see Wertheimer, “Unwanted,” 36-9. For German Jewish attitudes to Eastern Jews, see part 4.
PART IV

The Jewish Stance: Assimilation and the Pain of Rejection

The AZJ was the most influential organ of religiously liberal-minded German Jewry during the time under consideration. Under Ludwig Philippson’s leadership, who founded the organ in 1837, the paper promoted moderate ritual reforms. He neither fully identified with the extreme Reform movement nor with Orthodox Judaism. Rather he positioned himself in between the two. For him, Judaism was a religious community with a historical memory of its people, and he opposed its contemporary national renewal.

Which position did Philippson take towards the State? Determined largely by his religious-liberal attitude, Philippson emphasized the importance of loyalty to the State and assimilation on the one hand, and the importance of the Jewish identity on the other, a position he already held in the 1830s. Thus in 1881, Philippson noted with satisfaction that most German Jews aimed to amalgamate into the general cultural life. “They [the Jews] have the warmest enthusiasm for both the German Fatherland and the German Empire. No sacrifice is too big to give to the German Fatherland, as long as it does not get into conflict with the religious

667 Joskowicz, „Judaism.,” 178.
669 See Jacob Tzoury, Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden in Deutschland (Tübingen, 1966), 20-3.
convictions of Judaism. The latter by no means contradicts patriotism.”

Philipppson did not restrict this attitude to German Jews alone. Russian Jews, he advised, should obey the law, stay strictly loyal to their fatherland, and act as much as possible in tune with the people. Sharing the negative attitude of most Western Jews towards Yiddish, which they saw as “jargon,” he urged Russian Jews to make stronger efforts to learn the Russian language so that it would become their mother tongue. Russian Jews, he pointed out, should go into agriculture and settle in those provinces of the Empire that were open to them. At the same time, they should act positively within the Jewish community and reinforce their religious element. Philipppson divided Russian Jews into three groups: the masses of Orthodox Jews, the Chassidim, and the educated Jews. The latter, he said, had abandoned their religion. Yet religion and science, he held, had to be brought together and for this objective a Jewish theological faculty should be established in Russia.

Philipppson had already fought for such a faculty, though unsuccessfully, in Germany in the 1830s.

Philipppson’s view of Russian Jewry reflects his ideal of a “middle way,” so to speak, which, in his view, was not yet realized by most Russian Jews. They were either Orthodox Jews (whether in the traditional rabbinic, or in the Chassidic way) or they were educated Jews who had largely broken away from Judaism. This was a fairly accurate picture of Russian Jewry. Assimilation of Russian Jews into Russian society was very much slower than in other European countries and they remained an easily recognizable outsider group due to their religion, language,

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670 E, c. AZJ, 34 (23 August 1881), 551.
671 E, c. ibid., 16 (19 April 1881), 251.
672 Philipppson, “Zeitung,” 259-60.
dress, occupations and residential patterns. Only a small number of Russian Jews broke away from the old traditional way of life, and either attended Russian universities and became part of the “Jewish intelligentsia” or else became successful industrialists. Yet these Jews often plunged into a social vacuum, as the sort of bourgeois society or industrial culture that might have been able to integrate them was only in its primary stages. Thus many of these Jews went into the revolutionary movement, where they felt accepted to a significant degree.673

In this part I will investigate whether, and if so how, Philipppson’s religious and political position shaped his attitude towards anti-Semitism. I argue that his position of a “middle way” determined to a significant degree his perception of anti-Semitism. He was inclined to diminish and gloss over the realities of anti-Semitism, tending to reduce the extent of anti-Semitism as regards its carriers, localities, and its temporal continuity. Thus he saw anti-Semitism primarily as a matter of the elites (such as political Parties, governments, and the press) rather than of the general population; local rather than national or international; transitory rather than permanent. There was a tension between this tendency and the realities of anti-Semitism, which came to the fore in the face of outbreaks of collective anti-Jewish violence. As I will discuss in this part, these events changed Philipppson’s view of anti-Semitism, though only temporarily, and thereby revealed the vulnerability of his own “middle way” position. Philipppson’s view of both verbal and physical anti-Semitism also helped to contribute to a view of collective anti-

Jewish violence, including the Holocaust, that has shaped historiography for
generations. Thus the historian Eleonore Sterling, for example, who investigated
the anti-Jewish riots of 1819 in Germany, had a very similar concept of anti-Jewish
violence to Philipsson. “Writing in the 1950s and trying to salvage her
identification with Deutschum, she may have drawn needed solace from the idea
that Jew-hatred was not authentically characteristic of the Volk but was, rather, the
handiwork of Nazi fanatics and their predecessors in demagogy who had
manipulated desperate Germans into violence and ultimate disaster. Sterling
exemplified the mainstream German Jewish experience, one committed to a
dignified assimilation to the positive values of German history and culture. She
resisted the temptation to condemn the Volk and therefore had to find less harsh
explanations for its periodic descent into violence.” For Sterling, like for
Philipsson, anti-Semitism was “a symptom of crisis,” and outbursts of violence
were caused not primarily by anti-Jewish prejudice among the common people but
by the manipulation of the common people by educated demagogues.\footnote{Levy, “Continuities,” 189. The first historian to counter this historiographical tradition was Jacob Katz. He acknowledged a “reality-based ‘Jewish problem’” that was not exclusively created by
demagogues and interpreted anti-Jewish violence as caused by real Jewish-Gentile antagonisms
whilst insisting that Jews were the deliberate target of mob action. See ibid., 190.}
10 Politics and Anti-Semitism

German politics and anti-Semitism were closely connected during the period under consideration, as we have seen. How did Philipppson view and analyze this connection?

Liberals Versus Conservatives

The position of the AZJ to German politics was to a significant degree influenced by the paper’s assessment of political anti-Semitism. Politically, Philipppson (like the majority of German Jews at the time under consideration), supported the Left Liberals. This was not because he felt close to their policy, but because of their attitude to the Jews. Thus the AZJ agreed with the argument of the Progressive oriented Vossische Zeitung that the anti-Semitic movement was not as important as it pretended to be. Yet it was the Liberal press, the AZJ argued, which was to blame for the fact that the anti-Semitic movement had become strong and widespread, which was the result of the intensive press coverage it had devoted to the movement.\textsuperscript{675} When giving its readers a political orientation for the forthcoming Reichstag elections in 1881, the AZJ pointed out that “among the Liberal Parties, only the Progressive Party and the Secessionists are reliable. Only they had always defended emancipation and had fought the anti-Semitic movement

\textsuperscript{675} R., c., n., AZJ, 2 (11 January 1881), 25.
publicly, while the National Liberal Party had kept quiet. In 1882, before the Landtag elections, Philippson directly urged the Jews not to vote for the Conservatives but for the Liberals. Once again his main argument was that Jews must not vote for the Conservatives because of their anti-Semitism.

**Protestants Versus Catholics**

Philippson’s attitude to conservative Protestants and Catholics was largely determined by his assessment of their attitude towards the Jews and the anti-Semitic movement. In the past, the *AZJ* was ambiguous towards Ultramontanism and the *Kulturkampf*. In 1871, Philippson (together with many other German Jews) had condemned Ultramontanism and welcomed the *Kulturkampf* for several reasons. Ultramontanism was seen, for example, as hostile to the German Fatherland and a threat to Jewish assimilation due to the Catholic opposition to non-denominational schools. However, in 1872 the paper (together with Jewish Social Democrats and Jewish members of parliament) became more reserved towards the *Kulturkampf*. It supported Eduard Lasker’s rejection of the Jesuit law. Philippson tried to soothe the situation by emphasizing that the Jews had nothing to do with this struggle and asked for objectivity and respect in the debate over both Judaism and Christianity. Yet after the anti-Jewish attacks by the *Germania* in 1875, the organ returned to its anti-Catholic attitude.

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676 E, e, ibid., 18 (3 May 1881), 283-5.
677 E, e, ibid., 37 (12 September 1882), 602-5. See also previous part.
678 See Tourny, *Orientierungen*, 246-52. Ultramontanism was a complex process during the nineteenth century in which Catholics oriented themselves increasingly towards Rome, “ultra montes.” After the middle of the nineteenth century Ultramontanism developed increasingly into a rigid dualistic ideology which divided the world into two incompatible camps such as Christianity versus modernity, religion versus the world, heaven versus hell, and Church versus culture. See
In 1881 the paper noted that even though the Conservatives had started the anti-Semitic agitation, the Ultramontanes and their press followed in their footsteps. Just like the Conservative Party, the Ultramontanes wanted to restrict Jewish emancipation, the organ stated. Both Deputy Windthorst and Reichensberger had spoken out against the anti-Semitic petition during the debate about the interpellation of Hänel, though (it was felt) in an ambiguous way. The organ made clear that the true representative of the Centre Party in this debate, Deputy Bachem, had fiercely attacked the Jews. And the Ultramontane press had gone beyond all boundaries in the last couple of years. Even though the Centre Party and the Conservative Party still could not ally with each other because of the many differences dividing them, they were in agreement in supporting the fight to abolish Jewish equal rights. The organ prophesized that if they were going to form a majority in the Reichstag they would actively fight for this aim in the future.  

Just as Catholics competed with the Jews about their suffering, creating what might be termed “a hierarchy of suffering,” Jews too went along similar rhetorical lines centering on what became a contested notion: the Kulturkampf. Both Catholics and Jews competed over the meaning of the term Kulturkampf. They disagreed over what the “true” Kulturkampf actually meant. In 1875 the Germania had demanded to reverse the Kulturkampf: “The true (wahre) ‘Kulturkampf’... against the Jewish spirit, which threatens Christianity and the

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679 E. e. *AZJ*, 18 (3 May 1881), 283-5.  
680 See part 2.
German character (Wesen)... has become increasingly necessary and is fortunately already very popular." While the Kulturkampf meant for Catholics a struggle against the Jews and their spirit, for the AZJ it meant the struggle against anti-Semitism:

When the Prussian Government began their struggle against the Catholic Church it was called Kulturkampf. Yet this struggle was not about culture but about the power of the State against the power of the Roman Catholic clergy and therefore the term is incorrect. A true Kulturkampf is going on not because it is about the Jews, but because the most important questions of civilization are touched. Anti-Semitism had led to the most horrible actions both in Pomerania and Prussia, as well as in Russia. Culture was seen as deeply hurt because civilization itself was damaged. The two basic principles of the civilized State are the protection of life and property of all its citizens, joined to the guarantee of equal rights for all. If these two tenets of civilization are not preserved and protected, then the State falls into the barbarism of the Middle Ages. Therefore anti-Semitism directly harms culture and civilization. However, this is not yet a true struggle, as the Jews remained mainly passive in this onslaught against them. A proper struggle has only started with the powerful protest of England and North America against verbal and violent anti-Semitism. It means that the civilized world has entered into a struggle, a true Kulturkampf. This Kulturkampf is fought neither with weapons nor with diplomatic means, but with the written word and deed of mercy. 682

Unlike the negatively perceived combination of conservative (both Protestant and Catholic) politics with anti-Semitism, here politics and anti-Semitism was seen as bringing about positive developments.

By the end of 1882 Philipsson’s anti-Catholic attitude changed again to a more positive view of Catholics. This change, Jacob Toury has pointed out, should be viewed against the general political background. The Liberal camp had given up its fight for the Kulturkampf. In the beginning of 1882, all Jewish deputies, except

681 Quoted from Blaschke, Katholizimus, 48.
Bamberger, supported the abolition of part of the *Kulturkampf* legislation in the Reichstag. In addition, Toury argues that many Jews became more sympathetic to Catholics to fill in the gap that had been left after having distanced themselves from the National Liberals.683 Thus, had Philipsson before equated Protestant and Catholic anti-Semitism, he now put the blame largely on the Protestants. "The Right supported anti-Semitism and had integrated it into its election program up to the present day," Philipsson analyzed. "It is the Right and their press," he continued, "led not by the Ultramontanes, but rather by the *Kreuzzeitung*, who started the anti-Semitic agitation as early as 1850. The Ultramontanes followed the lead of the Conservatives only with the beginning of the *Kulturkampf*, which they blamed partly on the Jews." Philipsson believed that the Ultramontanes worked for the isolation of the Catholic population from the rest of the German Nation and that genuine anti-Semitism came not from the Ultramontanes but from the Right. He saw evidence for this view in the fact that there was no specific Catholic agitator except Cremer, who was expelled from the Centre Party. In addition he remarked that Windthorst and Reichensberger had spoken out against anti-Semitism in Parliament even if Bachem had disagreed.684 The Protestant camp was more anti-Semitic than the Catholic camp; a view shared by German Jewish newspapers of the time.685

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683 Toury, *Orientierungen*, 252.
684 E. e. *AZI*, 37 (12 September 1882), 602-5.
The Rise and Fall of Anti-Semitism

How was the anti-Semitic agitation during the period under consideration assessed by the AZJ? In January 1881 the paper revealed that the anti-Semitic agitation was in decline as all Parties of the House of Deputies, as well as the government, had spoken out against any changes as regards emancipation. However, the paper was convinced that the anti-Semites would continue to use their anti-Semitic agitation as a tool to mobilize the vote for the forthcoming Reichstag elections against the Liberals.686

This rather optimistic view changed dramatically in September 1881. The Evangelical-Lutheran Church Conference in August decided that a motion should be proposed (in either the Reichstag or the Prussian Landtag) to restrict Jewish emancipation, the AZJ editorialized. “This is no longer about the activities of some individuals or certain groups against whom a common response of the Jews would not be justified,” the organ warned. “Nor is this any more about a petition, which will be stored in some corner of a government office. Rather this is about an attempt by the Right Wing of the Conservatives, under the leadership of Kleist-Retzow, to restrict emancipation on the legislative level,” Philipsson maintained. It was feared that this was about bills that were intended to be discussed in Parliament. Thus the paper maintained that such developments had to be fought against, not for a particularistic Jewish interest but for the common good of the fatherland. The latter, viewed as a modern State, was based on equality before the law. A crucial first step in this battle was seen in the attempt to weaken the German Conservative Party by not voting for a Conservative candidate in the forthcoming

686 E. c. AZJ. 1 (4 January 1881), 1-2.
election. After the election, all German Jewish communities should unite and send a written protest against such a motion to both the government and the Reichstag. For this aim, the paper advised that all Jewish communities should immediately establish meetings and committees. To remain passive in the face of this threatening situation would mean to betray not only the interests of the Jews but also the interests of the fatherland, the paper warned.\footnote{E. e. ibid., 37 (13 September 1881), 601. For details on this Conference, see part 1. }

How seriously the resolution of the August Conference was taken by the AZJ can be seen in the fact that it urged the Jewish communities numerous times to get organized in order to fight the expected steps taken against Jewish equal rights in the Reichstag.\footnote{See E. e., AZL, 39 (27 September 1881), 637; E. e. 41 (11 October 1881), 669-71; E. e. 42 (18 October 1881), 685-6. } At a rally of the German Conservative Party in Halle a.d.S., the paper noted that the Party member von Rauchhaupt said that one of the most important issues of the Party program would be to restrict the Jews’ civil rights. This public statement was felt to confirm the paper’s fears as regards the future politics of the Conservative Party in the Reichstag. In addition the AZJ had noticed that Bismarck had thanked the editor of an organ of anti-Semitic student circles, who had sent Bismarck some issues of their paper. Under these circumstances there was the most pressing need for German Jews to get prepared to fight the expecting steps that would be taken in the Reichstag, the paper urged.\footnote{E. e. ibid., 42 (18 October 1881), 685-6. } Many Jewish communities heeded Philippson’s directions. “We have received many positive responses to our call to get organized,” he wrote.\footnote{E. e. ibid., 41 (11 October 1881), 669-71. } This incident shows that Philippson was by no means an assimilated German Jew who, however much he
identified with the German State as his fatherland, would not hesitate to stand up publicly for the Jews and their rights.

The published story of the conversation between Bismarck and the Jewish industrialist Behrend, however, seemed to offer Philipppson partial relief. "The most important event of the day for us is the response of the Chancellor to Mister Behrend together with the permission to publish it. This response gave the anti-Semites and their agitation a rebuff. It guarantees that the Chancellor does not intend nor would allow to restrict any legal rights." Yet Philipppson was realistic enough to see that this did not mean that the anti-Semitic agitation would stop. "As regards the anti-Semitic agitation, it has to be said that it has continued unhindered. It has not stopped after the election and the Chancellor's statement about it seems to be irrelevant as long as it is not backed up by actions...however, for us, the most important issues are the legal rights."  

In December 1881 the AZJ seemed to be finally reassured that the threat to Jewish emancipation was over. There was no room for a so-called Judendebatte in the German Reichstag, the organ commented with relief on the session of the German Reichstag. Under the title "A defeat of anti-Semitism in the German Reichstag," the AZJ noted that "all the accusations that had been put forward by the anti-Semites, to protest against the election of Ludwig Löwe in Berlin, had not succeeded. Rather his election was declared to be valid by the whole Reichstag.

691 E. e. ibid., 47 (22 November 1881), 769-71.
692 E. e. ibid. For details on this story, see previous part.
693 C. c. AZJ, 52 (27 December 1881), 856.
with Stöcker the lone dissenter.” In February 1882 the paper noted that the anti-
Semitic petition had been forgotten. The organ was pleased that the rallies and 
speeches, which incited against the Jews, had petered out and the anti-Semitic 
organs had not survived. In addition, it was said that the Conservative Party (which 
used anti-Semitism as a tool in their struggle against the Progressive Party) 
dissociated itself from anti-Semitism after the Reichstag elections, when it realized 
that anti-Semitism had not paid off.695

The Conservatives, who had made common cause with the anti-Semites 
before and during the election campaign, did not achieve electoral success in the 
Reichstag elections, while the Progressives and the Secessionists had achieved a 
victory over the Conservatives. The anti-Semitic Parties suffered defeat. Anti-
Semitism thus did not seem to have been a help for them.696

However, the assessment that anti-Semitism had finally petered out in 
Germany, did not last for long. In the beginning of March 1882, Philipppson 
reminded his readers that he had spoken of a break in the anti-Semitic agitation as a 
temporary phenomenon. Under the title “A Jew-debate in the Prussian House of 
Deputies,” the organ wrote that anti-Semitism unfortunately had again become a 
tool in election campaigning for the forthcoming election to the House of 
Deputies.697 The reason for this reassessment was a February session in the House 
of Deputies. In this session the organ noted that Stöcker accused the Jews of

694 One accusation was that foreign non-naturalized Jews had voted in the election. E, e, ibid., 5 (31 
January 1882), 65-7.
695 E, e, ibid., 7 (14 February 1882), 100-2.
696 Christhard Hoffmann, “Political Culture and Violence against Minorities: The Antisemitic Riots 
in Pomerania and West Prussia,” in Christhard Hoffmann, Werner Bergmann and Helmut Walser 
697 E, e, AZJ, 10 (7 March 1882), 152-3.
undermining both the Christian religion and German culture. Jews, in his view, should be excluded from schools and universities and not be allowed to enter the courts. This goal had to be achieved with the help of the administration as the existing laws could not be changed, he held. The whole debate, the *AZJ* commented, was initiated by Deputy Eugen Richter, who had asked Stöcker to reveal his aims. The paper did not find such a debate helpful for the Jews, as it only served Stöcker to propagate his views, not only in his rallies and his organ the *Reichsbote*, but also in the House of Deputies.  

By July things seemed to have calmed down. Anti-Semitism, the *AZJ* maintained, was a transitory phenomenon, which was in decline everywhere. In October, the *AZJ* noted with relief that the German press (except the reactionary organs) did not pay attention to Stöcker’s eight propositions that represented the core of the anti-Semitic Congress in Dresden. This was seen as proof that the anti-Semitic movement in Germany was petering out. Anti-Semitic activities indeed declined in the second half of 1882. The *Internationale Antisemiten-Kongress*, which took place in Dresden, did not bring about concrete results and the mass of anti-Semitic publications were declining. The vigilance and concern with which Philipppson followed these developments, demonstrates the degree of insecurity and lack of trust in the still relatively new emancipated legal position. What is interesting, however, is that little attention is paid to the question of anti-Semitism among the German population, a topic which I shall discuss below.

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698 E, e, ibid., 11 (14 March 1882), 170; E, e, 12 (21 March 1882), 184-7.
699 E, e, ibid., 30 (25 July 1882), 489-92.
700 C, c, ibid., 40 (3 October 1882), 652-4.
701 Shedletzky, “Presse,” 5.
Anti-Semitism, the Elites, and the Population

Like modern scholarship of anti-Semitism, the AZJ explored the question of the relationship between the elites and the population. Was anti-Semitism used mainly instrumentally, namely as a tool for the conscious manipulation of popular anxieties and uncertainties by a narrow elite? Or was anti-Semitism the outcome of pressures from below? 702 The AZJ subscribed firmly to the former position. Analyzing the pogroms in Russia, the paper held that “only small groups of rioters, who had come from outside the affected towns, had carried out the disturbances. The majority of the local population only looked on, and after the riots offered help to the Jews and deplored the disturbances. Therefore the Russian people are guilty only by the sin of omission. This guilt, however, has been caused by the Russian press, which has incited against the Jews for years now and which resulted in the failure of the Russian population to stop the rioters,” the paper explained. 703

The claim that the majority of the population only looked on and after the riots offered help to the Jews and deplored the disturbances, was not without justification. There were actually numerous cases of local peasants who protected individual Jews and their possessions and who tried, often successfully, to hinder other peasants from carrying out pogroms. After the rioting ceased, some returned property they had plundered and expressed regret over what they had done, and sometimes even offered to compensate the Jews for their losses. This contradictory

702 For scholarly approaches, see for example David Blackbourn, “Roman Catholics, the Centre Party and Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany,” in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls, eds., Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914 (Oxford, 1981), 108.
703 C.c., AJJ, 24 (14 June 1881), 385.
behavior of the peasants can be explained with the ambivalent attitude Christians held towards the Jews. On the one hand, Christians generally benefited from the economic intercourse with Jews and were well aware of this. But at the same time they were suspicious that the Jews were taking advantage of them and resented them because of their own dependence on these “inferior” aliens.\textsuperscript{704}

The Russian population was led astray and the hostility to the Jews, which was merely superficial, was the result of external influence from above, the paper analyzed. “The Russian people had been misled by agitators who made them believe that the Tsar had ordered the plundering and maltreatment of the Jews. Once the authorities in Russia had acted decisively against the rioters and thereby had taught the people what was right and wrong, the disturbances immediately stopped,” the organ held. This was seen as proof that the people, who argued that the mob acted violently against the Jews because of their alleged rage against Jewish exploitation, were wrong. “Had a real and deep hatred among the people against the Jews existed, the people could not have been stopped by the authorities so easily,” the paper argued. The anti-Semites explained the violence of the Russian people against the Jews as a response to Jewish exploitation, continued the paper. Yet the organ did not find this explanation convincing. It felt that a people enraged by wrath could not be stopped by a “ministerial circular.”\textsuperscript{705}

This ministerial circular most probably refers to a circular of the Minister of Justice, D. N. Nabokov, which instructed the courts to apply more harshly the

\textsuperscript{704} Michael Aronson, \textit{Troubled Waters} (Pittsburgh, 1990),120, 222.
\textsuperscript{705} E, e, \textit{AZI}, 35 ( 29 August 1882), 570-2.
existing rules. Scholars have not confirmed the view that strict anti-pogrom measures by the authorities were a guarantee to prevent and end anti-Jewish riots. Rather these sometimes were successful and at other times they failed. Thus it often happened that when ordered to disperse by the military troops, the mob just either ignored it or they obeyed, only to reassemble at another spot to continue rioting. Research has so far also not confirmed the theory (which has found its way into scholarly literature) that outside agitators and “guidance from above” had instigated the people to the pogroms. Rather historians have argued that seasonal crowds of transient workers engaged in the adventure of plundering provided by urban disturbances.

As regards the extent of anti-Semitism among the people, scholars have asserted “whatever the cause of the pogroms, they did apparently reveal a great depth of popular enmity towards the Jews.” Evidence for this view is seen in the desire of the Russian State to keep the hostility in check, using this aim as a major justification for discriminatory legislation imposed on the Jews. Michael Aronson, in addition, pointed to the difficulties the authorities faced when trying to protect “the almost universally despised Jews from the wrath of an essentially loyalist populace…”

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706 Aronson, Waters, 150.
708 Aronson, Waters, 84.
710 Ibid., 86.
711 Aronson, Waters, 224.
In the period immediately following the assassination of Alexander II, in the wake of which the first wave of pogroms broke out, Russia became a rumor mill. One of the central rumors was that the Tsar had issued an ukaz instructing the people to beat and plunder the Jews. Such an ukaz was never officially published and displayed, a fact that the people attributed to Jewish chicanery and bribery, as were actions taken by the authorities to prevent or end anti-Jewish riots. The populace firmly believed in these rumors (and thus in the lawfulness of their actions), considering themselves to be loyal subjects of the Tsar. Officials most often unsuccessfully attempted to convince the people of their misapprehension. The persistence with which people believed the rumors of an ukaz, has been explained by scholars using a variety of reasons, for example a “plain elemental stubbornness and naivete” of the people.\textsuperscript{712}

The AZJ saw the best proof for its belief that the anti-Jewish violence in Russia was not motivated by a genuine or common hatred of the population against Jews in the fact that (given the great territorial extent of the riots) only a few people were killed. “A real rage of the people,” the organ held, “attacks not only things but people.”\textsuperscript{713} Most contemporaries claimed that the pogroms were directed against Jewish property and not against Jewish persons. Research has so far not refuted this claim. Relatively few Jews actually died in the pogroms. In all the pogroms of 1881 and 1882 less than forty-three Jews died, this is less than in the single pogrom in Kishinev in 1903. Many of the fatalities actually were pogromshchiki (rioters),

\textsuperscript{712} Ibid., 82ff.
\textsuperscript{713} E, e, AZJ, 4 (24 January 1882), 49-51; E, e, 44 (31 October 1882) 712-5.
who were shot by the military or who died of alcohol poisoning.\footnote{See Klier, “Conspiracy,” 88. John D. Klier, “Christians and Jews and the ‘Dialogue of Violence’ in Late Imperial Russia,” in Anna Sapir Abulafia, ed., Religious Violence Between Christians and Jews (Houndmills, 2002), 165.} Aronson suggested that the popular masses did not feel that they were doing something essentially wrong when they attacked the Jews’ property. They believed that the Jews’ property did not rightly belong to them since they had used means amounting to theft to acquire it. This belief, together with the knowledge that Russian imperial law discriminated severely against the Jews and that they thus seemed to be outside the full protection of the law, made the lower classes believe that their actions met the demands of justice.\footnote{Aronson, Waters, 222-3.}

To acquit the people of anti-Semitism, however, did not mean that the AZJ viewed them as basically good, as one could have assumed. Rather they were seen as inherently bad, only not anti-Semitic. “Because there are bad tendencies in human beings the task of the State should be to restrict these dispositions. The roots of the Russian barbarism has to be sought in both the addiction of the people to rob and the bestial impulses of coarse people who ran wild.”\footnote{E, e, AZJ, 24 (13 June 1882), 387-90.} People who liked to engage in rioting, who liked to destroy and plunder, and to beat people up and mistreat them, existed everywhere, the organ editorialized. “The lust to riot, to destroy and plunder is ingrained in the masses and often people who are jealous of other people are prone to act like that,” the paper held.\footnote{E, e, ibid., 44 (31 October 1882), 712-5.}

The attempt to acquit the general population from anti-Semitism was also applied to the German case. Thus the paper disagreed with the view of the Brussels
paper *Europe* (about the German anti-Semitic movement) that the whole of the German population was hostile to the Jews. "It was only a clique (even if a large one) that carried out the anti-Semitic incitement," the *AZJ* retorted. "The majority of the German population had rejected this incitement and a number of excellent and enlightened men had spoken out against it. This is generally not recognized abroad," noted the paper. \(^{718}\) In order to convince its readers that the majority of the German population had held itself entirely aloof from anti-Semitism, the paper emphasized the local and transitory character of the anti-Semitic incitement. "We knew," the paper editorialized, "that the storm was only local and temporary and would peter out in the course of time." \(^{719}\) The anti-Semitic incitement, Philippson argued, was restricted to a few places only, such as: Berlin, Breslau and Leipzig; and the population of Berlin had rejected it numerous times. \(^{720}\) Even when anti-Jewish riots broke out in Pomerania and West Prussia, the paper did not change its view, claiming that it would be wrong to see the general mood in these two provinces as hostile to the Jews. \(^{721}\)

Philippson also defended the German people against the charge that they were responsible for anti-Semitism abroad:

Abroad, Germany is accused not only of condoning the shameful incitement on its own soil, but also for the barbaric disorders in Russia. It is painful for us to see that the foreign press, as well as the letters of readers, agree in blaming all [foreign] anti-Semitic disorders, in Russia, Hungary and in France, on Germany. It is true that the Berlin *Antisemiten-Liga* made efforts to build up connections to Istoczy and other anti-Semites. It is claimed that

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\(^{718}\) E, e, n, ibid., 34 (23 August 1881), 551.

\(^{719}\) E, e, ibid.

\(^{720}\) E, e, ibid., 7 (14 February 1882), 100-2.

\(^{721}\) C, c, n, ibid., 36 (6 September 1881), 586.
the educated class, who incited and organized the disorders in Russia, was instructed by Germans and that German anti-Semitism functioned as a role model. There is much exaggeration in these claims. Many European countries resent Germany and therefore use every opportunity to accuse her in the disguise of righteousness. The impartial observer would recognize, however, that the majority of the German people held entirely aloof and rejected any incitement of anti-Semitism.\footnote{722}

The attempt to protect the German people from the charge of foreign anti-Semitism illustrates how strongly Philippson identified with Germany. For him, to be a German Jew meant not only to have a civil duty towards the German State, as we have discussed earlier, it also meant an emotional connection and identification with this State.

Philippson was not alone in his viewpoint that the general population was mainly free of a deep seated Jew-hatred. Some Russian Jews argued along similar lines. Thus the enlightened Russian Jewish writer and public figure Emmanuil B. Levin, promoter of Jewish assimilation into Russian society, maintained:

Thus all the facts enumerated above bring us to the conclusion that the anti-Jewish movement [in Russia] was not engendered and did not arise among the people, but on the contrary, the people was deceived, confused, led into error, by inspirers and leaders, who have not been exposed till now and will probably never become known. If, after what has already been said, still more confirmation is needed that the anti-Jewish movement was not spontaneous or incapable of being overcome, and that it could easily and quickly have been suppressed and taken care of by orders from above, then one can refer to the remarkable fact that when the Austrian Government, concerned about the influx of Jewish refugees, made representations to our government, then the pogroms, without any apparent special efforts by the administrative authorities, were momentarily stopped.\footnote{723}

\footnote{722}{E, e. ibid., 7 (14 February 1882), 100-2.}
\footnote{723}{Quoted from Aronson, Waters, 13.}
It should be noted though that some Russian Jews attempted to emphasize this view in order to encourage the Russian Government to act more vigorously to suppress the pogroms. Why then did the AZJ attempt to acquit the general population from the charge of Jew-hatred? Aronson argues that such an attitude among Jews was the result of their enlightened world view, which saw the people as basically good, being only the instruments of the all-powerful and all-controlling government and its policies. Even though I believe that this factor has to be taken into consideration when explaining the specific attitude among some enlightened Jewish circles, I would suggest that some other factors need to be considered too. After all, Philipson by no means saw the people as basically good, as we have seen. Rather we may need to ask how aspiratory it would have been for enlightened Jews to assimilate into a society that was generally anti-Semitic? To locate anti-Semitism in a minority group, even though a powerful one, may have seemed to have been less threatening in the perception of these Jews than to identify it with the majority, the masses. To acquit the general population of anti-Semitism may have been reassuring, considering that the majority view is often taken as the right one outnumbering a faulty minority view. As I will discuss below, the paper took pains to defend the Jews against the anti-Semitic charges. This all comes down to the basic hurt of being rejected. It is revealed in the statement: “The anti-Semitic

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724 See the forthcoming work on the pogroms by John D. Klier.
725 To locate anti-Semitism in some minority groups rather than in the general population, was just one way of dealing with this issue for Jews who advocated assimilation to the culture of their country. Jews in Russian Poland, for example, tried to solve this problem by blaming the Russians for implanting anti-Semitism on native soil. See Michael Ochs, “Tsarist officialdom and anti-Jewish pogroms in Poland,” in John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, eds., Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History (Cambridge, 1992), 164-165.
agitation in Germany hurt us not only as Jews, but also as patriotic Germans." It is a double rejection, both as Jews and as Germans. The fact that only in the face of a strong international defense of the Jews (as happened in the English and North American protest to the pogroms) was the AZJ ready to concede the existence of a greater degree of anti-Semitism among the general population, as I will discuss below, supports this argument. This indicates that an enlightened world view, which would not change under such circumstances, may not have been the prime cause for the above attitude.

The attempt to acquit the general population of any deep-seated Jew-hatred went hand in hand with the endeavor to prove that the various anti-Semitic accusations were wrong. Thus the paper refuted the claim that the Jews (even though emancipated) were loyal to each other, a state within a state and a society within a society with particular self-interest. Rather the AZJ held that "the Jews have only a common religious conviction and a common interest in Jewish charity. The latter is justified as the general charity is insufficient on the one hand and Jews are excluded from it on the other. Yet apart from that, the Jews generally are ready to contribute to the common good," noted the paper. The organ also refuted the claim that the Jews were striving to dominate the world and for this aim were tightly connected with each other. Rather it was said that Jews lived in small groups across the globe. For almost eighteen centuries they lived in slavery, were completely powerless and could hardly make a living. Only a few decades ago they became freer and each individual Jew had to reach his social position by himself,

726 E. c. AZJ, 7 (14 February 1882), 100-2.
the organ maintained. In addition it was felt that Jews of different countries and nations interacted just the same as their respective States and nations did. Thus the French, Danish and Hungarian Jews acted towards German Jews in their own ways: just the same as the French, Danish and Hungarians did towards Germany. In addition, continued the organ, the Jews of all countries belonged to diverse political Parties. The paper disagreed with the view that Jews were cosmopolitan and international. Rather the Jews of America, England, France, Hungary and Germany were extremely loyal to their respective fatherlands, the paper stated. Conceding some degree of a feeling of solidarity among Jews, the organ pointed out that the recent animosity against the Jews - which was partly violent - forced the Jews to develop a sense of togetherness. Yet this feeling of solidarity, it was felt, did not go beyond the realm of the animosity experienced.\textsuperscript{727}

However, to refute accusations against the Jews did not mean that the AZJ did not agree with some of them. Thus the organ agreed with the charge that too many Jews were in commerce and industry and too few Jews were engaged in agriculture and crafts. The paper explained this state of affairs historically: "Jews had been forced into the spheres of commerce and money business for more than a century. This was why, when these branches developed and expanded, the Jews remained in these fields. An old tradition is not easily abolished, just as a traditional city people cannot be transformed into a peasant people easily,\textsuperscript{728}

The paper even accused some Jews of having actively contributed to the present wave of anti-Semitism by showing off their wealth. Money was often the

\textsuperscript{727} E. e. ibid., 36 (6 September 1881), 583.
\textsuperscript{728} E.e, ibid.
only means to be saved from dangers in the past, the paper elaborated. With emancipation some Jews, in response to discrimination and disrespect, sought recognition and prestige. For this aim they showed off their wealth, which aroused envy and resentment. This in turn made it easy for the Jews’ opponents to slander them and in that way, it was felt, many Jews had sinned. In addition the paper warned Jews not to support journalistic attacks against the Church, as this would help the anti-Semites to accuse Jews of being the enemies of Christianity.  

The organ also reflected the charge of the “Jewish Nihilist.” It did not reject the claim that Jews were among the Nihilist movement. Rather the paper used the charge to reprimand Jews who had left their creed. Thus the paper disagreed with those who held that Nihilists were not behind the anti-Jewish riots in Russia, proving their case by arguing that many Jews were among the Nihilists. “It has been confirmed,” stated the paper, “that five Jews were arrested who were Nihilists and who were in the possession of anti-Semitic proclamations. This only proves that Jews who become Nihilists have ceased to be Jews. Nihilism is a fanaticism that disregards any feeling of respect.” The organ revealed its view that “history has taught in sad examples that Jewish apostates had become the worst persecutors of their former co-religionists. They had used every means to incite the hatred of the people against the Jews. In Russia the notorious Brafman is one example.”

The AZI, together with the majority of German Jews, had condemned the Jews’ connection to Nihilism and Socialism already in 1878 and 1879, especially in the

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729 E, e. ibid., 38 (20 September 1881), 621.
730 C, c. ibid., 24 (14 June 1881), 385-89. On Brafman, see part 1.
wake of the trial in Berlin against three Russian Jewish Nihilists. However, the
organ disagreed with the claim that a significant number of Jews were among the
Nihilists:

In the past, we often observed the processes of dangerous developments and
warned the threatened parties. Yet our warnings were not heeded. This was
so also with the development of Nihilism in Russia. In March 1877, the
Nihilists wrote a “call to the Jewish youth,” in Hebrew, which they
disseminated among Jews. It aimed at inciting the Jewish youth against
their fathers, communities, rabbis, and against Judaism to recruit people. It
used the most dreadful lies. What bothered us was not this “call,” which
was not very impressive and could have an impact only on those who had
already gone astray. On the contrary, this “call” - which was addressed to
the Jews after Nihilism had stirred things up already over seventeen years in
the Russian Empire - offered the best proof that this dreadful epidemic was
unsuccessful among Jews. But we anticipated that our enemies in Russia
would use this “call” in order to prove that the Jews took part in
Nihilism... during the last two years, a large part of the Russian press
eagerly promoted the view that the Nihilists were mostly Jews...it found a
welcome reception among German Jew-haters. The Ultramontane,
reactionary, and specifically anti-Semitic press made every effort to
dramatize the participation of Jews in Nihilism. It cannot be denied that
among the thousands of Nihilists some Jews can be found. Where a sad
aberration is so commonly spread, why should it not affect some of our
people? It is explicable if one considers the misery they are condemned to.
Yet are we responsible for that? This would be as if the Greek Orthodox
Church would be made responsible for Nihilism because most Nihilists
were Greek Orthodox, or to hold responsible the whole Russian Nation
because most Nihilists were Russian. All documents, published by the
Russian Government, prove that Jews were neither among the originators
nor among the carriers and disseminators of Nihilism. Therefore there is
only a very small and insignificant portion of Jews in this movement.

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731 See Ita Shedletzky, Ha-itonut ha-y'hudit b'germania b'shanim 1879 - 1882. T'guvoteiha l-prayot
b'y'huidei russia ul'reshit ha-l'evnuit ha-y'hudit al reka hitorrotu ha-antisemiti b'germania. (The
Jewish Press in Germany in the years 1879 - 1882, its reactions to the pogroms among the Jews of
Russia and to the beginnings of Jewish nationalism, against the background of awakening anti-
732 E. e. AZI. 14 (5 April 1881), 217-8.
Under the impact of the strong English protest against the Russian pogroms in the beginning of 1882, the attempt to acquit both the general population of harboring anti-Semitic sentiments and Germany as a whole from responsibility for foreign anti-Semitism, temporarily changed. “What does the English and North American response actually mean?” the organ asked:

We only need to look back at what was going on in 1880 and 1881. For many years, well prepared by the reactionary and Ultramontane press, anti-Semitism has thriven in Germany (especially in Berlin), and was supported with large financial means. A flood of newspaper articles and brochures stirred up anti-Semitic feelings and in daily rallies Jews were attacked...nationality and religion, Deutschtum and Christianity were profaned and used as tools to attack the Jews. The noise grew louder and louder and it influenced public opinion. All strata of society became anti-Semitic. The Liberal Parties and their organs went quiet, partly because they were not entirely free of harboring anti-Semitic sentiments, partly because they were anxious about their political existence. The anti-Semitic agitators attempted to export their propaganda abroad in order to achieve long-term domination. Connections were made with Prague, Vienna, Hungary and Russia. In Russia they tried to incite the people with the help of the so-called educated class. The Ultamontane press even planned to export the movement and the mood via their co-religionists to the Seine and the Mississippi.\(^{33}\)

It should be noted that the rough simultaneous waves of both verbal and violent anti-Semitism in Central and Eastern Europe, encouraged both contemporaries and later historians to see them as somehow interrelated, and to seek links between them. Whether or not German anti-Semitism had influenced other countries’ anti-Semitism has been a matter of debate among them. Some degree of ideological influence on Eastern European anti-Semitism cannot be denied, just as the latter had some influence on German anti-Semitism, as we have

\(^{33}\) E. e. ibid., 9 (28 February 1882), 133-5.
seen. However, the claim that the pogroms in Russia were the result of German anti-Semitism has so far not been supported with factual evidence.\textsuperscript{734} The paper now also felt that the German response to anti-Semitism was characterized by passivity, even by those Germans who were insightful, humane and decent. The paper noted with sadness that the protest of some outstanding personalities in Berlin had no impact. In Russia, it was said that the anti-Jewish riots were continuing and the Russian press supported the rioters. The provincial authorities expelled the Jews and ministerial decrees allowed local commissions to propose measures that were harmful to the Jews.\textsuperscript{735} The view that anti-Semitism was primarily a local and transitory phenomenon, restricted to some elitist groups, changed to one which saw it as a national, international and continuing issue, permeating the whole of society.

Nevertheless, the strong English response to the pogroms filled the paper with optimism. “The true struggle has just started as the whole of the English press has raised its voice against verbal and violent anti-Semitism,” the organ noted:

The most excellent personalities of all political and confessional parties have united to protest against anti-Semitism. Meetings of protest have been set up by the most recognized authorities in order to condemn the whole anti-Semitic agitation. Collections were organized to support the persecuted financially. And the same has happened in North America. With all that did the civilized world enter the struggle, a true Kulturkampf. The flag of humanity and human rights has been raised, not in the name of one party, but in the name of all parties, in the name of culture and civilization, which had been achieved on the cost of so many victims and efforts... yet some are

\textsuperscript{735} E, e. AZJ, 8 (21 February 1882), 117-9.
asking: what will it all achieve? It will achieve a lot and in long term. The conscience of the civilized world has awakened and there is nothing stronger than conscience when it comes to matters of social morality. This voice of conscience will have its effect on Germany. It will bring the masses, who were led astray, back on the right path and will silence the agitators. Such a success would be a full victory in Germany, as we cannot count on Germany to follow the example of England and North America. This voice of conscience will also be heard in Russia and has its effect already achieved, as the Russian press speaks out against the English press. Yet the Russian hostilities will stop because Russia would not want to be excluded from the civilized world in the common view. 736

It seemed that only against the background of this large scale protest, which for Philippson meant hope for a less anti-Semitic future, was he more able to face the realities of contemporary anti-Semitism. His changing views, however subtle, revealed the tensions and the vulnerabilities of those Jews who wanted to assimilate into the general society, without giving up their connection and commitment of belonging to a particularistic Jewish community.

Causes of Anti-Semitism

Like modern scholarship, the AZI explored the causes of anti-Semitism and came up with similar approaches, as do contemporary historians. Thus the organ viewed anti-Semitism as both instrumental, namely as a tool for political mobilization, and as functional, namely as a response to economic, social and political crisis. 737 “Modern anti-Semitism,” the organ editorialized, “arose from the founding of the German Empire. On the one hand, this event brought about

736 E. e. ibid.
constitutionalism, general suffrage and new legislation. On the other hand, it produced the setting for a financial and industrial crisis.” Unification was seen as a causal factor in provoking a number of conflicts: “It triggered the Kulturkampf, a conflict between State and Church. Socialism appeared as a conflict between owners and those who did not possess anything. A struggle of interests and classes began. Conservatism,” continued the paper, “after having suffered defeat in the previous decade, came to power. Under these circumstances an agitation arose that fought against the emancipation of the Jews,” the organ explained. It was concluded that the situation and environment had to be favorable in order for anti-Semitism to develop.\textsuperscript{738} In addition, anti-Semitic agitation was a political manoeuvre of the Parties, which was directed not against the Jews but against Liberalism, in the paper’s view.\textsuperscript{739} This analysis of the causes of anti-Semitism fitted in well with Philipsson’s view that anti-Semitism was a local and transitory phenomenon.

The paper also subscribed to an anthropological view of anti-Semitism. There was a twofold and contradictory drive in the nature of human beings, the organ explained. Man wanted both to bond and to separate. He wanted to establish separate communities from which those who did not belong were excluded. The exclusion of “the other” was held to be a human inclination that had always existed, and that had long been directed (even though not exclusively) against the Jews.\textsuperscript{740} It is interesting to note that Philipsson did not seem to realize that this approach to anti-Semitism suggests an “eternal anti-Semitism,” inherent in human

\textsuperscript{738} E, e, AZI, 30 (25 July 1882), 489-92.
\textsuperscript{739} E, e, ibid., 1 (4 January 1881), 1-2.
\textsuperscript{740} E, e, ibid., 30 (25 July 1882), 489-92.
nature, that would contradict his view of a situational Jew-hatred, bound to specific places, times and circumstances.

The Effect of Anti-Semitism on the Jews

Anti-Semitism was by no means always viewed in a negative way. “It is an axiom in the history of the Jews,” the paper editorialized, “that every powerful, positive phenomenon emerged from the hard school of misery and pain, rather than from periods of happiness and well-being.” The exodus from Egypt was thus seen as the result of suppression by the Pharaohs. It brought about the establishment of a national identity, a State, monotheism, and a higher morality. “Many contemporary Jews,” continued the paper, “had abandoned their Judaism and become materialistic with the sole objective of acquiring luxury. The anti-Semitism in Germany has brought many of these Jews back to their Judaism. They abandoned their religious indifference and returned to their community to help their brethren in Russia.” The view that anti-Semitism had a positive effect on Jews was also shared by some Russian Jews. It was the most positive result of the disturbances in Russia that modern Russian Jews (that is to say the Jewish intelligentsia) returned to their Judaism, in the words of one Russian Jewish journalist.

741 E, e, ibid., 19 (9 May 1882), 301-4.
742 C, p, ibid., 35 (29 August 1882), 573. This article was printed under the title “Russische Briefe,” in which a Russian Jew sometimes published the views of the Russian Jewish press.
11 The Anti-Jewish Riots in Germany and Russia

The anti-Jewish riots in Germany attracted little attention of the AZJ. Few editorials were devoted to the issue. This might be explained by the relatively short duration of the disorders. Perhaps the fact that the riots in Germany occurred on the periphery of the state, on a small scale, and in small localities. made it possible largely to ignore them. In contrast, the paper dealt with the pogroms in Russia comprehensively, perhaps not least because of their large scale and the significant national and international effects they had.

Similar to the Russian press, one of the central questions addressed by the AZJ as regards the pogroms was, who was responsible for organizing and instigating the pogroms?\(^743\) Ita Shedletzky argues that during 1881 the AZJ put the blame for the pogroms mainly on the Nihilists. Towards the end of 1881, she suggests that the paper changed its view. Especially in the face of the passivity of the Russian authorities and their mild treatment of the rioters as well as under the impression of the anti-Semitic attitude of the Minister of the Interior, N.P. Ignatiev, the organ began to accuse Panslav circles close to the government for the pogroms. The replacement of Ignatiev with Count Dmitry Tolstoi by the Tsar, was viewed by the AZJ (as well as the whole of the German Jewish press) as a proof of the correctness of the assumption that Ignatiev and his aides were the true guilty ones for the outbreak of the pogroms. In addition the whole of the German Jewish press,

including the AZJ, were convinced that the German anti-Semitic agitation of the 1870s, which eventually culminated in the anti-Jewish riots in Pomerania and West Prussia in 1881, were vital in encouraging Judeophobes in Russia to engage in anti-Jewish rioting.\textsuperscript{744} Even though I generally agree with the assessment that the AZJ blamed the German anti-Semitic movement for the pogroms, it should be noted that the organ initially did not support this view, as we have seen.\textsuperscript{745} Only under the impact of the wave of international protest against the pogroms did the paper begin to change its view. Thus it was not until 1882 that the paper came to believe that the German anti-Semitic agitators tried to influence the Russian educated classes in order to incite the Russian people, and that the anti-Jewish riots in Germany were the prelude to the disorders in Russia.\textsuperscript{746}

The AZJ also put some responsibility for the pogroms on Europe: “Apart from England and North America, who had spoken out strongly against the violence, not much was done by the rest of Europe. Neither France nor Italy, nor the smaller States, had protested to a significant degree,” the paper commented bitterly. It was felt that in Germany it was even attempted to evoke the impression that the protests from England and North America could be potentially damaging for Russian Jews. “If such protests had been voiced by all of Europe, this would have had a significant effect on Russia. Non-biased future historiography will not spare Europe the blame to have looked on quietly at the events in Russia,” the paper predicted.\textsuperscript{747} This assessment of the AZJ was not wholly wrong. Little was

\textsuperscript{744} Shedletzky, “Presse,” 10-4.
\textsuperscript{745} See above.
\textsuperscript{746} E. e, AZJ, 9 (28 February 1882), 133-5; E. e, 25 (20 June 1882), 401-2.
\textsuperscript{747} E. e, ibid., 19 (9 May 1882), 304-6.
done for Russian Jews by countries like Italy, Holland and Belgium (part of the latter’s press defended the Russian Government in its treatment of the Jews). In France (the classical land of demonstrations, meetings and protests), due to its endeavor to establish an alliance with Russia against Germany, public protests remained minimal. All the same, the greatest part of the French press favored the cause of the Jews.\footnote{Zosa Szajkowski, “The European Attitude to East European Jewish Immigration (1881-1893),” \textit{Publication of the American Jewish Historical Society}, 41 (1951/52), 141-51.}

The \textit{AZJ} put a significant share of the responsibility for the pogroms on the Russian press, which was an aspect Shedletzky had overlooked. Already in the initial phase of the pogroms, the \textit{AZJ} blamed the Russian press for having prepared the grounds for the pogroms. “The Middle Ages are by no means over,” the organ noted.

Their dark ghosts did not come from the lower classes, but on the contrary from the educated circles from where they penetrated to the lower classes. For years has the Russian press preached hatred against the Jews…It is not surprising then that violence breaks out against Jews. Such events often occur when law and order become fragile and a revolutionary spirit penetrates the people…Thus both the incitement of the press - which also blames Nihilism on the Jews - as well as the stirring up of the social base in Russia have caused the persecution of the Jews.\footnote{C, c, \textit{AZJ}, 20 (17 May 1881), 324; C, c, 22, (31 May 1881), 356.}

The \textit{AZJ} also blamed the inactivity of the Russian population in stopping the rioters on the Russian press. The view was that the majority of the local population only looked on and after the riots offered help to the Jews and deplored the disturbances. Therefore it was felt that the Russian people were guilty only by
the sin of omission. This guilt, however, had been caused by the Russian press which had incited against the Jews for years now and which resulted in the failure of the Russian population to stop the rioters, the paper explained.\textsuperscript{750}

That the Russian press was indirectly responsible for the pogroms was the firm conviction of the AZJ also in 1882, even when the Russian press started to change its attitude towards the pogroms. The Russian press, the organ observed, which had up until now been united in its attacks against the Jews, had become divided. The Liberal paper \textit{Golos} and Katkov's conservative organ \textit{Moskovskie vedomosti}, spoke out decisively against the persecution of the Jews and blamed the Minister of the Interior for not having prevented and suppressed it. The rest of the press, however, was continuing to attack the Jews, noted the paper.\textsuperscript{751} A few weeks later, filled with optimism against the background of the wave of international protest against the pogroms, the organ noted with satisfaction that the whole of the Russian press expressed its disapproval of the events in Russia, with the only exception of the paper that was loyal to the Minister of the Interior, Ignatiev. Yet the AZJ had not forgotten the deeds of the Russian press. It reminded its readers that the Russian press had preached Jew-hatred for too many years and thereby had stirred up the disaster. The organ explained the new attitude of the Russian press with foreign disapproval. "The change of the Russian press is the result of the negative view of Russia abroad because of the pogroms. Russia is seen as a State

\textsuperscript{750} C. c, ibid., 24 (14 June 1881), 385.
\textsuperscript{751} E. c, n, ibid., 19 (9 May 1882), 304-6.
that has fallen into destruction and ruin, a view which will damage the relationship between Russia and Europe,” the paper maintained.752

It may have been that the new attitude of the Russian press was actually caused by a call of the official paper of the Ministry of the Interior, *Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik*, on the Russian press in April 1882, to calm the public rather than to incite it to anti-Jewish violence with unreliable information and unfounded rumors. The paper announced a regulation banning accounts of pogroms that had not been printed first on its pages.753

The view of the role of the Russian press, as seen by the *AZJ*, namely that the Russian press provoked the pogroms with a sustained campaign of incitement, had become the view of an older school of scholarship and a central feature of the “pogrom myth.” More recent scholarship, however, has refuted this view and demonstrated that even though the Russian press was hostile to the Jews, and thereby helped to create an anti-Semitic mood, it did not entertain a sustained campaign against the Jews and never directly advocated anti-Jewish violence. 754

As to the role of the Russian authorities and the Russian Government in conniving in the pogroms, I challenge Shedletzky’s view that the *AZJ* blamed them for the pogroms only towards the end of 1881.755 Rather I argue that already from the very beginning of the disturbances in Kiev in May 1881, the paper put part of the blame for the pogroms on the authorities and thereby contributed to another

752 E. e. n., *ibid.*, 25 (20 June 1882), 401-2.
753 Aronson, *Waters*, 140.
central feature of the pogrom myth, namely that the pogroms were planned in advance with the help of the Russian authorities. Thus the AZI noted the passivity of the authorities and pointed out that the civil and military authorities seemed to have at least partly supported the violence. The behavior of the authorities thus contributed to an epidemic expansion of the persecution of the Jews, the paper held.\textsuperscript{756}

The government was held partly responsible for the pogroms after the first wave of disorders:

It seems beyond doubt now and is confirmed from the Jewish side in Petersburg that the initiators of the pogroms were either Nihilists or anarchists, who wanted to incite the destructive passions of the people. They attempted to instrumentalize resentment against the Jews in order to stir the people up. They hope to direct the drive for destruction and robbery of the mob towards other classes of society...It cannot be ignored that the negligence of the government, who would have had to issue decisive orders to suppress the disorders, when the first signs of these appeared, had contributed significantly to the expansion of the riots. This would have been the duty of the government as already weeks before the riots there were rumors that anti-Jewish riots in Southern Russia were going to happen. These rumors were even known in Western Europe. In the face of this strange state of affairs, many civil servants did not know as to whether they should use violence against the people. Those civil servants who wanted to hurt the Jews were free to choose if they either wanted to deter the rioters or encourage them. These two factors, [the Nihilists and the negligence of the government] seem at present to be the main causal factors upon which we can blame the disorders.\textsuperscript{757}

In the beginning of October 1881 the organ reported: “The Petersburg paper \textit{Novoe vremia} confirms that the police were actively involved in most anti-Jewish

\textsuperscript{756} C. c. AZI, 22 (31 May 1881), 356.
\textsuperscript{757} C. c. ibid., 24 (14 June 1881), 385-9. The view that revolutionaries caused the pogroms to prepare the masses for revolution and disorders was held by many Russian government officials until summer 1881. See Aronson, \textit{Waters}, 193-4.
disturbances in Southern Russia be it as instigators, provocateurs or plunderers...Investigations have shown that in several places the police called on the mob to attack the Jews and destroy and plunder their property." The general opinion that Nihilists were partly responsible for instigating the pogroms was given up by the beginning of 1882. Paralleling the Russian press, the paper noted that it was no longer convincing to argue that Nihilists were the instigators of the excesses in Russia. However, that the authorities and the government carried the main responsibility for the pogroms remained the conviction of the AZJ throughout 1882. The persecution of the Jews in Russia, the paper editorialized, was carried out by the mob, the government, and the authorities. More specifically, the AZJ put the main responsibility for the pogroms on the Minister of the Interior, Ignatiev. He was responsible for the lenient punishment of the rioters, the passiveness and negligence of the authorities as well as for further restrictions on the Jews, the paper maintained. This was eventually even admitted by the Russian press, the organ pointed out. Only because he had let it all happen could the authorities remain passive. "The anti-Jewish riots would not have happened," the paper editorialized, "if the government had rectified the belief of the people that the Tsar wanted the people to plunder and mistreat the Jews. In addition, matters would have come out differently, if the authorities had acted against the rioters decisively. The punishment of the rioters should have been implemented in accordance with the full rigor of the existing law," the paper criticized. "All this proves that

758 R., n. AZI, 41 (11 October 1881), 680.
760 E., e., ibid., 19 (9 May 1882), 304-6.
761 E., e., ibid.
Ignatiev, and the circles close to him, carry the responsibility for the anti-Jewish riots, as all of these matters were in his hands. His decrees for both the expulsions of Jews and new restrictions on them, encouraged the mob to continue the anti-Jewish disorders,” the organ believed.\(^{763}\)

Research has shown that the rioters were actually often leniently punished, even though some rioters received severe punishment. However, this noticeable leniency as regards the judicial aspect of the pogroms was not, as the AZI (as well as an older school of scholars) believed, intentionally administered by the government in order to make the mass of people believe that it was only carrying out what the government (and especially Ignatiev) expected of them. Rather Russian law in 1881 was unprepared and underdeveloped to deal with the unusual situation created by the pogroms. There were not always the legal possibilities for punishing the rioters clear-cut. It took until summer 1882 to develop a different legal approach to the rioters. The new Minister of the Interior, Tolstoi, who succeeded Ignatiev in summer 1882, was thus in a better position to apply stricter punishment on the rioters. He was also more experienced as a high government administrator than Ignatiev had been and was not influenced by anti-Semitic attitudes as his predecessor. All the same, Ignatiev had the utmost interest to keep the pogroms in check (even though rather out of fear of revolution than to protect the Jews) and actually had ordered severe penalties for riot instigators and leaders. Yet the situation was further complicated by the fact that officials sometimes feared that too severe punishment of the rioters would result in exacerbating

\(^{763}\) E, e, ibid., 28 (11 July 1882) 457-8; E, e, 35 (29 August 1882), 570-2.
hostility to the government. Some officials' anti-Semitism also determined sometimes how rioters were punished.\textsuperscript{764}

That the authorities were passive and negligent with regard to the pogroms, thereby proving the culpability of the government for the pogroms, was a gross over-simplification. Rather the situation of the local authorities was at least as complex as the judicial one. "On the whole, a review of the efforts to maintain law and order in 1881 shows a complex situation over which no one had complete control, not even the government," Aronson notes. Local police were often short of manpower, while the military was badly prepared for suppressing civil disorders. The ability of a local official to deal with pogroms was determined by several factors like his own anti-Semitic feelings and his degree of administrative-executive competence.\textsuperscript{765} The government, who feared any popular violence, had the utmost interest in suppressing the disorders. For this aim it had right from the beginning of the pogroms given orders to governor-generals of the affected areas to take strict measures to prevent further disturbances. Government officials at all levels expressed their anxiety about revolutionary involvement in the pogroms, anticipating that revolutionaries would try to exploit them for their own anti-government aims.\textsuperscript{766}

\textsuperscript{764} Aronson, \textit{Waters}, 145-76.
\textsuperscript{765} Ibid., 125-44. See also Klier, "Conspiracy," 83-4.
\textsuperscript{766} Aronson, "Russia," 51ff, 127.
The Pogrom in Warsaw

The negative view of the Russian authorities was also applied to the pogrom in Warsaw in the wake of the disaster in the Holy Cross Church at Christmas. Thus the AZJ reported that the authorities in Warsaw did not intervene in the disorders. Mirroring the views of the Polish press and the Germania, the AZJ believed that “the authorities wanted to prove to the world that the claim of the Polish press (that there was a difference between the Polish and the Russian mob) is wrong. This proof,” the AZJ commented, “succeeded.” Interestingly, however, the AZJ did not follow the example of part of the conservative Polish press and the Germania, and claim that the leaders of the rioters were partly Russian. In the view of the AZJ, the rioters were primarily motivated by anti-Semitism, rather than by political motives, which was proven by the passivity of the authorities. While the paper added that the rioters might have had other plans it did not spell out what these were.  

It is worth noting that the AZJ seemed to concede a greater degree of anti-Semitism among the general population when it came to the Poles. That the paper did not support the view of Russian leaders participating in the pogrom is difficult to explain.

Recent research has established that some Russians actually participated in and led the riots. It has been demonstrated that the Russian regime in the Kingdom of Poland (instructed from St. Petersburg) decisively opposed pogroms and pogrom-mongering and made every effort to keep tensions between Poles and Jews from exploding into violence. That despite these efforts anti-Jewish riots occurred in Russian Poland has been explained by anti-Semitic feelings of mainly lower

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echelon officials and their attempts to win over the peasant masses. Acting against the latter by defending the unpopular Jews may have been seen by them as counter-productive.\textsuperscript{768}

Sharing the view of both the Polish and international press, the \textit{AZJ} believed that the pogrom in Warsaw was well organized and planned by a group of anti-Semites.\textsuperscript{769} Whether or not this was the case has not yet been conclusively demonstrated and scholars are divided in their views about this question.\textsuperscript{770}

The organ's view of the Polish press differed markedly from its opinion on the Russian press: "The Polish press together with the Polish clergy made the biggest efforts to keep the people calm and they succeeded in their efforts," the \textit{AZJ} praised.\textsuperscript{771} After the pogrom in Warsaw, the paper noted that the Polish press unanimously saw the pogrom as an even greater tragedy than the disaster in the Holy Cross Church. The paper cited the comment of the "oldest and most respected organ \textit{Gazeta Warszowska}" that it had never expected to experience such barbaric humiliation of its pride in being a civilized nation.\textsuperscript{772}

The Polish press and the Polish clergy had indeed acted against the anti-Jewish riots and in favor of the Jews.\textsuperscript{773} The positive view of both the Polish press and the Polish clergy has to be seen though also in the wider context of Polish and Jewish views held on Polish Jewish relations. Especially among Jewish and Polish

\textsuperscript{768} Ochs, "Poland," 166ff. See also part 2.
\textsuperscript{769} R. p. \textit{AZJ}, 2 (10 January 1882), 20-4, 27. See part 2.
\textsuperscript{770} Ochs, "Poland," 182ff.
\textsuperscript{771} R. c. p. \textit{AZJ}, 23 (7 June 1881), 371.
\textsuperscript{772} R. p. ibid., 5 (31 January 1882), 76.
\textsuperscript{773} See part 2.
circles, who advocated assimilation of Jews to Polish culture, there was a tendency (colored by anti-Russian feelings) to foster the idea of Polish Jewish solidarity against Russian tyranny.\textsuperscript{774}

**Common Features of Anti-Jewish Riots in Germany and Russia**

Towards the end of 1882 the *AZJ* took stock of the anti-Jewish violence that had occurred in the previous two years in Central and Eastern Europe, by making a comparative analysis of these events and establishing several common features. Thus the paper suggested that the riots in Germany and Russia were similar as regards their origins, their course and their endings:

They were the result of anti-Jewish incitement for a prolonged period of time, of both the press and anti-Semitic literature on the one hand and of anti-Semitic agitators from the Conservative and radical Parties on the other. It was insinuated to the people that the respective governments tolerated the anti-Jewish disorders (in Russia, for example, by telling the people about a secret *ukaz* of the Tsar, which allowed people to plunder without getting punished). The leaders of the anti-Jewish riots mostly came from the so-called better classes. The riots usually started with the gathering of a small group, soon joined by a larger group of the mob. In the following, houses and property were damaged and plundered. People were usually not hurt, as long as they did not defend themselves. Only in Russia, some loss of life and violations of women had occurred.\textsuperscript{775}

As regards Russia, incidents of rape did occur, though research has so far found little evidence of rape as a common occurrence, and has thus not supported the reports of the foreign press of rape on a massive scale. It should also be noted that the Jews were by no means passive victims of the pogroms in Russia. Rather they often defended their shops with crowbars and axes (until overwhelmed by

\textsuperscript{774} Ochs, “Poland,” 164ff. See part 2.

\textsuperscript{775} E.e., *AZJ*, 44 (31 October 1882), 712-5.
superior numbers), and organized self-defense units for which they were arrested and penalized. Thus Jewish resistance was a familiar part of the pogroms. It has been suggested that the absence of fatalities or serious injuries in the pogroms was due to Jewish resistance as an accepted part of the “rules” of the pogroms, as long as it was done in what may be termed the “proper” way. However, almost all fatalities occurred when the Jews used, or were accused of using, firearms to defend themselves in the course of a pogrom. It then often turned murderous. For the Jews to use firearms was considered not “playing by the rules.”  

Another common feature of the violent events in Germany and Russia was, in the AZJ’s view, that the authorities mostly failed to do their duty because they were too weak. Part of the authorities were seen as sympathizing with the rioters. The organ maintained that “as soon as the respective governments took decisive steps to put an end to the disorders by implementing their state power and the authorities acted decisively, the riots were stopped.” The central conclusion the AZJ drew from these common features of the riots was that they were not spontaneous outbreaks of hatred of the people, but that they were rather well prepared and planned by leaders. 

The view that the anti-Jewish riots in Germany were planned was also shared by part of the German authorities at one point in time. They saw evidence for this view in posters that were hung up and called for Jew-baiting on a specific time and date. However, police investigations into the riots in most cases did not confirm that they were planned and organized by agents or organizations. Rather

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777 E. e. AZJ, 44 (31 October 1882), 712-5.
they were mostly spontaneous actions with a very low degree of organization, often
carried out by youthful perpetrators rather than by experienced conspirators.\textsuperscript{778}

Some Russian Jews too put forward the view that the pogroms in Russia were
planned and organized and did not arise as spontaneous actions from among the
people. By stressing this view, they hoped to bring about a more forceful reaction
of the authorities to stop the riots.\textsuperscript{779}

Even though the AZJ may well have picked up its perception of a planned
character of the disorders from Russian Jews and the German authorities, it seemed
to have its own distinct motive for such a view. This opinion allowed, I would
suggest, the general population to be free from responsibility for the riots to a
significant degree (and therefore from harboring anti-Semitic sentiments), and, in
turn, as we have seen, to free the Jews from anti-Semitic charges. Thus the paper
maintained that with the exception of the Liberal press, everybody blamed the Jews
for the riots both in Elisavetgrad and in Argenau. Yet the organ was convinced that
both in Argenau and in Elisavetgrad, the events were planned long in advance.
Evidence for this was seen in the fact that rumors, which predicted the riots, went
around weeks before the riots broke out.\textsuperscript{780} The organ emphasized that in neither
Germany nor Russia did the excesses erupt spontaneously from amidst the general
population. “This proves,” the paper concluded, “that a true hatred of the people,
the phenomenon of popular wraths or some sort of fanaticism against the Jews,
does not exist.”\textsuperscript{781}

\textsuperscript{778} Hoffmann, “Violence,” 82-5.
\textsuperscript{779} Klier, “Conspiracy,” 81-6. Aronson, Waters, 11-3. As discussed above, see pp. 263-4.
\textsuperscript{780} C. c. AZJ, 20 (17 May 1881), 324.
\textsuperscript{781} E, e, ibid., 44 (31 October 1882), 712-5.
That the pogroms in Russia were planned and organized was a view that found its way into historiography. However, the pogrom myth of central planning and direction of the pogroms has been convincingly refuted by recent research.

"Despite the most active search of the authorities, outside agitators and instigators were never found. The urban intelligentsia was rarely involved...All contemporary descriptions of the pogroms depict them as anarchistic revels, rather than ideological protests. For most of the participants, it seems, the pogroms were a form of carnival, of role-reversal, of 'the world turned upside down.'" Questions of status and respect seem to have played a role in the pogroms, where the participants (predominantly peasants, town proletariat, vagrants, migrant workers, demobilized soldiers and other unsettled elements) wanted to put the Jews "in their place."782 As Aronson also noted: The pogroms occurred "spontaneously," meaning that they were "an outcome unplanned and hardly foreseen and over which individuals or groups had almost no control."783

If the AZJ acquitted the general population of any deep seated Jew-hatred, how did the paper explain the fact that the riots were, nonetheless, carried out by the common people? The paper offered several explanations for this state of affairs:

"The people were often paid by agitators. In addition, within a certain layer of society the agitators found an open ear, especially among those who find themselves in competition with Jews and resent them for their alleged success. People in official positions, such as policemen and mayors, also incited the mob,"

782 Klier, "Dialogue," 167. Klier, "Conspiracy." This article neatly summarises the research on this topic.

783 Aronson, Waters, 63.
the organ noted. It was believed that the latter was composed of journeymen and apprentices, peasant lads and day laborers. It was felt that these were the kinds of people, who liked to engage in rioting, who liked to destroy and plunder and beat the people. Such people existed everywhere and the lust to riot, to destroy and to plunder was innate in the masses, in the paper's view. Like most contemporaries, the organ asserted that "the mob wanted to plunder and destroy property primarily and that therefore the riots were directed against the Jews' property rather than against their lives."784 The people wanted to make the Jews poor so that they became beggars and became a proletariat like themselves, rather than to expel the Jews, the organ believed. And where Jews were expelled, as in Russia, it was soon recognized to be a mistake and was regretted, as it harmed the people themselves, noted the paper. The organ ruled out any revolutionary motives of the people. Even though some agitators might have been partly motivated by revolutionary motives, the organ was convinced that the masses were entirely free of that. Rather they believed that they acted in favor of their respective governments. In Russia, they believed they acted in favor of an ukaz of the Tsar, while in Prussia people believed that the government was in favor of the anti-Semites, the paper held.785 Elements of these explanations have been supported by more recent research, such as the belief that people acted in favor of their respective governments, or the element of status in the pogroms, as we have seen. All the same, the AZJ largely fails to face the question as to why the Jews were attacked and not some other minority group.

784 Klier, "Dialogue," 165.
785 E. e, AZJ, 44 (31 October 1882), 712-5.
Solutions for Russian Jews

One of the most important issues in the discussion about the pogroms was the question of how to solve the situation for Russian Jews. In the course of 1881 and 1882, most German Jewish organs came to the conclusion that emigration would be the best solution for Russian Jews. I would challenge Shedletzky’s view that only the AZJ remained skeptical towards emigration and in principal was against it. The AZJ categorically rejected the establishment of an organization for the emigration of the persecuted Jews in Germany in 1880 and accepted emigration only for the case when the Jews’ existence was in acute danger. The paper held the view that the Jews had to endure hardship and persecution in their respective fatherlands in order to serve as a touchstone for the justice and humanity of the peoples. They had to submit to this mission eternally, no matter how great the cost.\footnote{Shedletzky, "Presse, 15-6.} However, the paper saw things quite differently once the pogroms had petered out. Thus the paper pointed out that the flight of many Russian Jews was the inevitable result of the cruel persecution they experienced. Therefore the support of the refugees by European and American Jews was seen as necessary. Support for emigration was by no means an act of foolishness, the organ emphasized.\footnote{E.e. AZJ, 31 (1 August 1882), 507-9.} Commenting on the proposal of a Russian Jew to buy land in North America or Syria to prepare for future emigration of Jews, the AZJ noted:

We believe that after the bitter experiences we have had, and considering that we cannot exclude the possibility that they may recur, this proposal, even though it may look at first sight not well thought-out, needs to be carefully considered. If we remind ourselves of those persecutions and
consider that a significant number of refugees could have been saved (were it not for the chaotic character of the organization due to the unprepared conditions, which caused any assistance to fail), then every sensible thinking man must recognize that practical precautionary measures had to be made for [such] future events. In addition, and this is particularly important, the need to emigrate is a permanent need for both individuals and families. This need exists in the most well organized states and among most classes of society. How could it not be present among Jews, who suffer from restrictions and mistreatments in many countries? To provide a secure way to satisfy this need and to offer the necessary means to do so, certainly is not only a serious and honorable task, but also an actual duty.

This proposal was Leo Pinsker’s call for “auto-emancipation.”

Assimilationist Russian Jews’ hope that Jews would eventually be emancipated in Russia, had been destroyed by the pogroms. It brought about a reorientation, if still in rather small circles, towards the idea of a national rebirth, which found its most dramatic expression in Pinsker’s call. It paved the way for the development of Zionism. It should be noted though that the AZJ was an opponent of Zionism. This not so much because the organ was against a national-Jewish revival but rather due to the difficult economic conditions in Palestine, which would make it difficult for immigrants to make a living. The organ pointed out that “both in Russia and Rumania, Jews still live in potential danger. All it takes to trigger a renewed wave of emigration is a new minister like Ignatiev,” the organ warned. “Even if such terrible events as the pogroms will not recur, the pressure on the Jews in these countries increases steadily as they are placed under new restrictions. Therefore it can be expected that in the near future Jews will want to emigrate

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789 Löwe, Tsars, 55-6.
again.791 The AZJ analyzed the mistakes that had been made in the actions to help the refugees, in order to learn from them for the future. Thus the organ praised the fact that a significant number of refugees were saved, yet noted that many mistakes had been made. It was said that due to the suddenness of the events, no time had been left for proper preparation for the whole enterprise. There was lack of experience, as to whom to select for emigration, as to transportation, as well as to finding opportunities for the refugees to make a living, the paper noted. In addition the paper highlighted that the lack of a unified organization between the Emigration Committees had made things difficult. Therefore the paper proposed that the various Committees should discuss this matter; they should decide what attitude to take towards future emigration and what help to provide before they were dissolved. The organ also proposed to organize and secure places in Europe, America and Australia for future Jewish emigrants and to provide a living for them during the initial stages.792 Thus we can say that the pogroms fundamentally changed the attitude of the AZJ towards Jewish emigration. Had the paper supported emigration for Jews only when they were in acute danger and otherwise had to endure their sufferings, the organ now considered already the existence of restrictions as legitimizing emigration.

The Pogroms and the Attitude Towards Fellow Jews

The AZJ was not only preoccupied with the pogroms in Russia in order to inform its readers about their causes, course, and consequences. It also used the

791 E, e, AZJ. 45 (7 November 1882), 732-4.
792 E, e, ibid.
events to promote its views towards fellow Jews. Thus the organ attempted to improve the negative image of East European Jews on the one hand and criticized wealthy Jews for lack of help, on the other.

Many enlightened Western European, and especially German, Jews viewed Eastern European Jews with antipathy and distaste. Their attempt to assimilate with and integrate into general society went hand in hand with the rejection of traditional Jewish cultural life. By 1881, German Jewry had created the stereotype of the Eastern Jew as its own anti-thesis. The Ostjude ("Eastern" Jew) was viewed as dirty, coarse, culturally backward and immoral. During the second half of the nineteenth century, the cultural distance between Western and Eastern European Jewry had become so great, that some German Jewish organs tried to mediate this sense of strangeness. Many travel accounts were published which portrayed the Eastern Jew in his environment. Not all of these accounts were negative; some emphasized the positive qualities of Eastern Jews.  

In the face of the pogroms and the resultant refugee crisis, the AZJ attempted to help Russian Jewish refugees by improving their negative image. The paper noted that Eastern European Jews were often denigrated and seen in an unfavorable light. To improve their negative image would help them, especially the emigrants. "It is a duty to help the persecuted Russian Jews in that way and they are entitled to request this help," the organ felt. Thus citing a travel account on

793 Steven E. Aschheim, Brothers and Strangers (Madison, Wisconsin, 1982), 3-31. On the term Ostjude, see Patrick Kury, "Man akzeptierte uns nicht, man tolerated uns!" (Basel und Frankfurt am Main, 1998), 12.
794 C, c, AZJ, 5 (31 January 1882), 68-71.
Jews in East Prussia, written by a “reliable and unprejudiced observer,” the paper noted that this account showed the diligence and strength of character of Eastern Jews. It was said that they were well organized and built the streets in East Prussia. They were portrayed as being superior to the Polish workers, who were often drunk and sluggish. Jewish workers, in contrast, did not drink much alcohol and were hard working and skilful. They lived frugally and thus could support their families well, the organ observed. The image of the Polish Jew, who was dressed in rags and who lived on the donations of better-off Jews, was seen as false. The view was that Polish Jews were good merchants and that estate owners in the borderlands preferred to deal with them rather than with their Polish counterparts. Estate owners, it was said, particularly appreciated the Jews’ readiness to accept high prices on the one hand and be uncomplicated to deal with on the other.  

The organ also cited the claim of a certain Dr J Rülf, who was a “fervent advocate of Russian Jewry and who presented an undistorted picture of the Jews of Vilna and Minsk.” Thus in Vilna, the account went, there were almost only Jews on the market. They were buyers and sellers who did the shopping for their Christian employers up to the governor-general. In the workshops of the manual workers mostly Jews worked. The Jews, it was reported, also worked on the construction sites. The Jewish workmen were extremely efficient and they did high quality work, the paper held. Jews were characterized as extremely hard working and almost never drunk. The organ commented that in the face of these observations, the anti-Semites had to abandon their accusation that the Jews did not

want to engage in hard work and trade. The main element in these accounts was to portray the Jews as hard working. It seemed that this characterization intended to rectify not only the charges of anti-Semites that Jews profit only from the hard work of others, but also of fellow Jews, who believed that Eastern Jews were mainly beggars, the “proverbial Jewish schnorrers,” unable or unwilling to make a proper living of their own.

The AZJ also used the pogroms to preach its moral standards to wealthy Jews. Reprimanding the behavior of rich Jews towards the Russian Jewish refugees, the paper noted that “the Rothschilds in France attempted to prevent the establishment of a Jewish Committee of Assistance to the refugees. When they did not succeed in their endeavor they abstained from joining the Committee because they wanted to preserve their private interests.” The paper pointed out that rich Russian Jews were only rarely attacked in the disorders. “Yet these wealthy and unharmed Jews did not care about the Jewish victims of the disorders,” the paper felt. “Even though rich Jews were not allowed to collect money, they could at least have sent money to the Emigration Committees,” the organ criticized.

The view that wealthy Russian Jews were negligent about their co-religionists was shared by some Russian Jews. The paper cited the claim of a Russian Jewish journalist that “the wealthy Russian Jew Samuil Solomonovich

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796 C, c. ibid., 5 (31 January 1882), 68-71; citing Drei Tage in Jüdisch-Russland. Ein Cultur-und Sittenbild, entworfen von Dr. J. Rülff. (Frankfurt am Main, J. Kauffmann, 1882).
797 Aschheim, Brothers, 21-2.
798 E, e. AZJ, 25 (20 June 1882), 403-4.
799 E.e, ibid., 44 (31 October 1882), 712-5.
800 E.e, ibid., 45 (7 November 1882), 732-4.
Poliakov donated money to many Russian institutions. Yet he rarely donated money to Jewish institutions. Worse, in his numerous business enterprises, he refused to employ Jews, which would have been a big help for so many deprived Jews," the paper held.\textsuperscript{801} Poliakov, who had become a plutocrat through contracting to build the early network of Russian railroads, was only an occasional benefactor of the Jews. He endowed, for example, a student dormitory at the University of St. Petersburg that excluded Jewish students. On the other hand, he was primarily responsible for the formation of the Society for the Promotion of Handicrafts and Agricultural Work among the Jews in Russia (ORT).\textsuperscript{802} The allegation that some Jewish entrepreneurs did not hire Jewish laborers, was partly true. This might have been due to several factors. Gentile workers, for example, were often willing to work for lower salaries. Factories with mixed labor forces had to be closed on Sundays and some Jewish industrialists argued that they did not want to force Jewish workers to transgress the laws of the Sabbath.\textsuperscript{803}

The attack of the AZJ against wealthy Russian Jews was mainly morally motivated. In contrast, this state of affairs had another background among Russian Jews. There a battle was raging concerning the leadership of Russian Jewry between the student youth and religious reformers on the one hand and the traditional leadership, consisting mainly of the so-called Gintsburg Circle, on the other. The latter consisted of Baron Gintsburg and his close associates. The Gintsburg dynasty was a family concern, which originated in tax-farmers of the state liquor monopoly, and became an international banking house with close links.

\textsuperscript{801} R, p. ibid., 46 (14 November 1882), 745-50.
\textsuperscript{802} Klier, \textit{Question}, 291.
\textsuperscript{803} Aronson, \textit{Waters}, 39-40.
to the Court and the State. Complaints against wealthy Russian Jews voiced by their opponents sounded very similar to those of the AZJ. “The people should know...that our wealthy, living in the capital, are more concerned about their wealth and their apparent honor than about the people.” The claim that wealthy Russian Jews did not help the Jewish victims of the pogroms, however, was unjust. Research has shown that on the contrary they did organize help efficiently and contributed substantial donations. Thus in the aftermath of the Elisavetgrad pogrom in May 1881, for example, Baron Gintsburg sought the permission of Governor-General Dondukov-Korsakov to send R5,000 to the victims through the local administration. By March 1882 he had contributed R82,000 to help the refugees. After the Kiev pogrom in May 1881, several local leaders secured the permission of Governor-General Drenteln to establish a Kiev Jewish Committee for Assistance to the victims. It provided food and shelter for thousands of refugees and had raised R218,482 by October 1881.

To summarize we can say that the AZJ’s analysis of both verbal and physical anti-Semitism was significantly shaped by its assimilationist position, which was reluctant to admit to the existence of anti-Semitic feelings and attitudes in the general population. Thus the carriers of anti-Semitism were portrayed as belonging to certain elites, rather than to the population as a whole. In addition,

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805 I am grateful to John D. Klier for this information from his forthcoming work on the pogroms. For similar attacks by the Russian Jewish intelligentsia against wealthy Russian Jews, see Israel Oppenheim, “The Kovno Circle of Rabbi Yitzhak Elhanan Spektor,” in Selwyn Ilan Troen and Benjamin Pinkus, eds., Organizing Rescue (London, 1992), 96, 113-4.
anti-Semitism was seen in an instrumentalized way, namely that the elites attempted to use anti-Semitism as a tool for their own political aims. The masses were, if anything, the victims of manipulation from above. This view shaped the perception of events of collective anti-Jewish violence. These were not seen primarily as outbreaks of hatred of the people against the Jews. Rather, the people were the tools of anti-Semitic elites (such as the government, political Parties and associations, as well as the Conservative and anti-Semitic press), who had succeeded in manipulating them in a planned and organized manner. This interpretation of the anti-Jewish riots in Germany and Russia has contributed to a distorted historiographical view of these events, which only recently has been challenged. Unlike for Russian Jews, for German Jews like Philipppson, what was at stake was not their property or their life, but their difficult religious, social and cultural position: to be integrated and assimilated as a self-conscious (religious) Jew in a non-Jewish society.
Conclusion

This study has examined the response of part of the conservative German press towards collective anti-Jewish violence. It has focused specifically on four newspapers: a Right Wing Protestant Conservative one; a Right Wing Catholic conservative paper; a government organ, and a Jewish newspaper. It has attempted to analyze their responses in the context of their respective political and social situations.

In the introduction it was argued that these newspapers displayed a tendency to justify and legitimize anti-Jewish violence. The preceding analysis indicates, as conclusively as the cited evidence allows, that this was not done in an open and direct way. Rather the rhetorical means of the double-bind technique (which distanced from and identified with anti-Jewish violence) was used to display an indirect form of justification of anti-Jewish violence. The violence was further legitimized by referring to causal factors such as the Jews' harmful behavior.

The Kreuzzeitung, representing a group of Right Wing Conservative Protestants, was, even though not warm friends with Bismarck, in a position of power and close to the German Conservative Party. Its way of indirectly justifying anti-Jewish violence went along a fairly straightforward line of argument, which was applied both to the riots in Germany and to the pogroms in Russia: even though the violence was deplorable it was the explicable and understandable
reaction of the people against the Jews’ harmful and disrespectful behavior. The Jews, in short, had brought upon themselves their hard fate and were thus primarily responsible for the violence against them. This response had to be seen in the context of a Right Wing Conservative struggle for a return to a hierarchical world order in which the Jews had acquired a key role: for these Conservatives the restriction of Jewish emancipation would be the first step to reach their aim. Anti-Semitism served as a means to realize this political goal. However, what has been hitherto overlooked is that this meant not only the propagation of a “respectable” kind of anti-Semitism, for example as a cultural code, but also an indirect form of justification and legitimization of anti-Jewish violence.

The political situation of conservative Catholics, was, unlike the position of Conservative Protestants, marked by a significant degree of vulnerability in the Bismarckian Empire. Having suffered state discrimination during the Kulturkampf, Catholics had to be more careful than Protestants when expressing their opinions publicly. This state of affairs found expression, for example, in the attempt to save the reputation of Catholics (when they were involved in anti-Jewish violence), by emphasizing their role in preventing or stopping anti-Jewish rioting. Even though Right Wing Catholics, like the Protestants, employed the double-bind technique by regretting the violence on the one hand and indirectly justifying it on the other (as the people’s understandable reaction to the Jews’ harmful behavior), the decisive Catholic argument followed different lines: the charge that Jews had actively participated in the Kulturkampf and thereby encouraged and supported anti-Catholic violence, served as a rhetorical means to indirectly justify anti-Jewish
violence. Thus Right Wing Catholics indirectly legitimized anti-Jewish violence by alleging that the Jews were using violence themselves. This line of argument, however, came to the fore fully only in the context of the pogroms in Russia, where, it seemed, Catholics felt safer to articulate their views than in the German context. These views were expressed mostly during the election campaign and thus need to be seen in the context of political mobilization. The empirical evidence thus suggests that the experience of the Kulturkampf did not necessarily always help to restrict radical forms of anti-Semitism (as has been argued) but, on the contrary, could well encourage the legitimization of radical, violent forms of anti-Semitism.

Governmental views on Jews and anti-Semites were generally difficult to grasp when investigating its press. The Norddeutsche remained mostly low-key in the matter. Only when it came to Russian Judeophobia, the paper left behind its reserved attitude. It displayed little sympathy for Russian Jews and their fate in the pogroms, legitimizing the violence by blaming the Jews themselves for the hatred against them on the one hand, and displaying empathy with the peasants' violent reaction, on the other. Propagation of this view may well have served political mobilization purposes. It might also have served as a preparatory signal to the forthcoming expulsions of Eastern Jews from Prussia, both to the paper's readership and to the German press. The difference between the treatment of German and Russian Jew-hatred had to be explained primarily with internal political considerations: German anti-Semitism was a touchy issue to dwell on as regards Bismarck's changing and tactical loyalties both to German Jews and
German Conservatives. To attack Russian Jews, who were disliked by both
German Jews and German Conservatives, seemed to have been far less
"dangerous." However, the Bismarckian paper's expression of antipathy to Eastern
Jews, who eventually were expelled from Germany, was, I would argue, not
primarily motivated by general anti-Jewish feelings, as is often held. Rather it was
significantly nurtured by Bismarck's own particular fear of revolution, which
specifically identified Eastern Jews as revolutionaries and Nihilists. Thus we can
say that in the case of both the Catholic and the government papers, those who
were under substantial, additional political pressures when it came to anti-Jewish
violence revealed more of their views to anti-Jewish violence when it came to
Russian Judeophobia.

German Jewish views on anti-Semitism were determined primarily by the
situation of German Jews: their wish and effort to assimilate into the general
culture and society. This state of affairs shaped the Jews' perception of anti-
Semitism: as a transitory and local phenomenon, which could be restricted to the
elites rather than the general population. The latter was seen, at most, as the victim
of manipulation from above. This perception did not significantly change when
confronted with violent anti-Semitism. Rather it helped to create and support a
distorted historiographical picture of collective anti-Jewish violence: anti-Jewish
riots and pogroms, no matter whether they occurred in Germany or outside
Germany, were portrayed as planned and organized by leaders rather than as more
or less spontaneous outbreaks of hatred of the people against the Jews. This
interpretation of anti-Jewish violence contrasted the view of the other newspapers
in this study, who precisely asserted that both verbal and violent anti-Semitism arose from below, from the hatred of the masses against the Jews and their allegedly destructive behavior.

On the basis of these findings we may ask whether the radicalised anti-Semitism, which manifested itself after 1918, might have been not only a result of a suppressed and harnessed kind of anti-Semitism as Hoffmann has suggested, but also partly a continuation - even though a radicalised one - of a readiness to accept and use collective anti-Jewish violence rhetorically when it was considered politically useful among certain circles of the German press and politics. I would thus suggest that the contrasting picture in literature, which makes a significant distinction between the nature of pre-1918 anti-Semitism and post 1918 anti-Semitism, contrasting a seemingly “respectable” and “civilized” anti-Semitism, which would not approve of anti-Jewish violence, against an anti-Semitism that would include violence, both in word and deed, may need to be seen in a more nuanced way: the discontinuity may have been less sharp than has hitherto been portrayed, at least as regards the groups under consideration. By drawing attention to continuity, however, I do not mean to imply I support Daniel J. Goldhagen’s view in his controversial book *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* that the anti-Semitism of the Third Reich had its roots already in the Second Reich in a society permeated by “eliminationist anti-Semitism.” As we know, late nineteenth century Germany was not alone in having anti-Jewish riots. Rather they were a more general phenomenon of central and Eastern Europe during that time, be it in

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Russia, in Hungary at the time of the ritual-murder case in Tisza Eszlar in 1882, or in France at the time of the Dreyfuss affair. Nor can we compare these events to the Holocaust, whose “murderous actions of the Nazis belonged in a different category and arose from different causes [as the anti-Semitism before 1914]” as Shulamit Volkov rightly pointed out.807 All the same we cannot ignore the question of continuity for the discussion of which the empirical results of this study might be useful.

807 Ibid., 74.
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