THE PHOENIX FROM THE ASHES. ORANGISM IN WORD AND IMAGE 1650-1672

Jillian Denise Stern

University College, London

Submission for the degree of PhD.
ABSTRACT

THE PHOENIX FROM THE ASHES. ORANGISM IN WORD AND IMAGE

1650-1675.

The sudden death of the Prince of Orange William II in 1650 was followed by twenty-two years of government without a stadholder in the majority of the Dutch provinces. The hopes of the Orangists centred on his posthumous son William III and the expectation that one day he would succeed to the offices of his forefathers.

To this end, the supporters of the House of Orange defined and defended the role of the stadholderate within the constitutional framework of the Dutch Republic. This thesis examines the nature of the stadholderate in Orangist polemic and imagery and the crucial role which the ‘single head’ was alleged to play within the Union of Utrecht. Rebutting the writings of John de Witt and his supporters, the Orangists were to argue that without a stadholder and captain general the Dutch Republic was doomed to fall victim to internal discord or external aggression.

Orangist sentiment centred on the person of the young prince and the gratitude owed to his forefathers. Inherent in this thinking was the assumption that only William III could become stadholder in his turn. Essential to this strategy was the rebuttal of attacks on the persons and policies of the previous stadholders, particularly William I and Maurice. At critical times, the supporters of the Prince were able to exploit a strand of popular Orangism which came to fruition in the crisis year of 1672.

This thesis examines the various strands of the Orangist argument. The sources used include political pamphlets, particularly those listed in the Knuttel collection, poetry, drama and visual imagery including portraits, prints and medals. The aim of the thesis is to bring together sources from the various media to create a coherent picture of the Orangist case from 1650 to William III’s failure to become Duke of Gelderland in 1675.
## Contents

**INTRODUCTION**  
1

**1 A DEFENCE OF THE STADHOLDER PRINCE**  
15

- The Mixed Constitution  
15
- The Practical Advantages of a Single Head  
33
- The Industrious Hive  
42
- What Type of Prince  
46
- The Person of the Prince  
61
- The Image of the Prince.  
72

**2 THE PHOENIX FROM THE ASHES - A HEREDITARY STADHOLDERATE?**  
83

**3 A BODY SHATTERED - THE UNION AND THE STADHOLDERATE**  
124

**4 STADHOLDER AND CAPTAIN GENERAL**  
168

**5 A DEFENDER OF THE TRUE REFORMED RELIGION**  
209

**6 THE ENGLISH CONNECTION**  
245

**7 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PAST**  
275

- William I  
278
- The Orangist Response  
287
- Maurice and Oldenbarnevelt  
299

**8 THE RHETORIC OF POPULAR ORANGISM 1650-1672.**  
325

**CONCLUSION**  
354
List of Plates

1. *Cartouche of Fruits and Flowers with a Portrait of William III of Orange*
   Jan Davidsz de Heem. Musée des Beaux-Arts, Lyon

2. *William III, Prince of Orange, as a child*
   Adriaen Hanneman. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam

3. Procession of floats celebrating the visit of the Elector of Brandenburg and his wife to Amsterdam in 1659. The fourteenth float depicts ‘Gratitude.’
   Anonymous woodcut, verse by Jan Vos

4. *The Nieuwe Kerk in Delft, with the tomb of William the Silent*
   Gerard Houckgeest. Hamburger Kunsthalle, Hamburg

5. *View of the tomb of William the Silent in the Nieuwe Kerk, Delft*
   Emanuel de Witte. Musée des Beaux-Arts, Lille

6. *Allegory on the memory of Frederick Henry with the portrait of his widow Amalia Solms*
   Govert Flink. Rijksmuseum voor Schone Kunsten, Antwerp

7. *The young Prince of Orange greeted by the heavenly Goddesses*
   C. van Dalen after Govert Flinck. Atlas van Stolk

8. *Model for the triumph of Frederick Henry*
   Jacob Jordaeus. Koninklijk Museum voor Schone Kunsten, Antwerp

9. *Op en ondergang der Grooten, 1672*
   Atlas van Stolk

10. *Anticurus van Loevesteyn, 1674*
    Atlas van Stolk

11. *The murder of the brothers de Witt*
    Romeijn de Hooghe. Atlas van Stolk
Researching early modern Dutch history in London can be a solitary, not to say lonely, business. I am very grateful for the support of the Low Countries Seminar based at the Institute of Historical Research. My thanks go to all of the members of the seminar but in particular Renée Gerson, Judith Pollmann and the late Stuart More who have provided me with much needed guidance and encouragement. Circumstances placed me in the Dutch Department of University College, London and I could not have found a better home. My sincere thanks go to Professor Theo Hermans and his colleagues. To my supervisor Dr. Alastair Duke, I owe an immense debt of gratitude for his meticulous scholarship and vast reservoirs of patience and good humour. The Arts and Humanities Research Council provided me with an award and I am grateful for their support and understanding when a period of illness interrupted my studies.

Writing a doctoral thesis is both an academic challenge and a psychological battle. I would like to thank all my friends and colleagues in Ealing, Acton and Shepherds Bush Conservative Association, the Ramblers Association and the Independent Walking Group. Their company has refreshed and renewed me. My greatest debt is to Katharine and Michael who made it all possible.
Acknowledgement

Chapter eight of this thesis, ‘The rhetoric of popular Orangism’, was first published as an article in *Historical Research, 77* (May 2004), 202-224.
Abbreviations

**BMGN**  
*Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden*

**Knuttel**  
Willem P. C. Knuttel, *Catalogus van de Pamfletten-verzameling*,  
*Berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek*. 9 vols (Utrecht: HES, 1978)

**Muller**  
Frederik Muller, *De Nederlandsche Geschiedenis in Platen*, 4 vols  
( Amsterdam: Muller, 1863-1882)

**NNBW**  
*Nieuw Nederlandsche Biografisch Woordboek*, ed. by Phillipus C. Molhuisjen, 10 vols (Leiden: H. Kossmann, 1911-1937)

**Stolk**  
( Amsterdam: F. Muller, 1895-1933) *(Atlas van Stolk)*
INTRODUCTION

The late Sir Denis Thatcher was an ideal political spouse. Bidden to attend numerous state and diplomatic junkets in the company of his wife, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Sir Denis was a silent but supportive figure; always present, never there. Yet among those of the same political stamp, he could be a lively member of the company. At one such convivial gathering, over post prandial ‘bevies’, the assembled guests bemoaned the state of the nation and offered their personal nostrums. Sir Denis was in no doubt.

‘What this country needs’, he opined, ‘is a return to basic Tory principles’.

He paused.

‘But don’t ask me what the hell they are!’

The Tory party has existed in one form or another for over three hundred years and if longevity is a sign of success, then successful it surely is. Yet clearly some of those who devote their lives to its service find it difficult to articulate those principles for which it purports to stand. In the Netherlands, the House of Orange-Nassau similarly spans the centuries. From its present royal representatives, its political pedigree stretches back to the beginnings of the Dutch Revolt. Like the Tory Party, support may be tribal, as much emotional as cerebral; attachment to a particular family playing as important a role as any set of political principles.

Political movements of long standing as these can be peculiarly elusive. A twentieth century European far left of centre movement could deploy such concepts as

---

1 I am indebted to David Willetts M.P for this information
2 See for example, Coos Huijsen, De Oranjemythe: een postmoderne fenomeen (Zaltbommel: Europa Bibliotheek, 2001)
the dialectic, the class struggle, the particular relations between labour and capital and expect to be understood by its members and its protagonists within and beyond national boundaries. At the source of its ideology lie basic texts which set out a framework in which history and contemporary politics can be interpreted. In most forms of democracy elements of this interpretation are open to revision but the fundamental structure remains unchanging. Likewise a man seeking to define the Republican ideal in seventeenth century Europe could draw upon classical texts and their Renaissance interpreters. One observer might argue that the Swiss confederation best matched the Republican ideal while another wrote of the virtues of the Venetian Republic but the discussion would be set within a shared framework. There are other political movements which are more 'opportunist'. Here what is shared is as much a matter of experience as of ideology. Loyalties can centre on individuals as much as ideals.

These political movements can helpfully be described in terms of the 'language' they use. Every political movement has its own 'language' in the Pocockian sense in which it presents information selectively in the context of the conduct and character of contemporary political life. This 'language' encourages the definition of political problems and values in certain ways and not others. The recipient is provided with a stock of judgments and images, rational and affective which in the words of Jacques Ellul establish 'une manière de penser, d’interpréter l’expérience, de se comporter'. The communication of symbols and stereotypes, both verbal and visual, creates not only a culture of identification but one of aspiration in which the communicator seeks to evoke the hoped for outcome. Providing these symbols and stereotypes remain reasonably stable, they can reproduce themselves whenever events jolt them into play. For the individual, as the case of Sir Denis Thatcher indicates, they may obviate the need for reflection and intellectual apprehension.  

---

The aim of this thesis is to examine the ‘language’ of the supporters of the House of Orange in the years 1650-1675. This period presented particular challenges. For twenty-two years from the death of William II in November 1650 there was to be no stadholder in the majority of the Dutch provinces. The House of Orange was now in ‘opposition’ and faced with an adversary who was increasingly willing to deploy the language of the classical republic to define the goal of the Dutch state. The task of Orangist writers was not simply to contest this, rather it was to create and define a framework within which its objective, the restoration of the Orange stadholderate appeared natural and inevitable.

An investigation of Orangist political rhetoric calls for a close study of political pamphlets of the period which are catalogued in the Knuttel Collection. Here Orangist writers sought to attack the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government of the Republic while defending the institution of the stadholderate and the policies and actions of former Princes of Orange. I will also draw on sources from the world of poetry, drama and visual imagery whether in paintings, prints or medals. Here are furnished symbol and metaphor both verbal and visual which do not merely complement the words of political rhetoric but provide a storehouse of potent imagery which is not vulnerable to the rhetorical arguments of the opposition but can only be opposed indirectly by the creation of counter symbols and images. The deployment of such rhetoric and imagery was not only to combat the political principles espoused by John de Witt and his supporters but also to suggest that the fortunes of the Republic and the Houses of Orange were inextricably linked. They were as one fictional character in a pamphlet of 1650 alleged like ‘tweelingen’ the one unable to conceive of life without the other.5

---

4 Catalogus van de pamfletten-verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek, ed. by W.P.C. Knuttel, 9 vols (Utrecht: HES, 1978)
5 Knuttel no 6868, np.
The period covered by this thesis begins with the sudden and unexpected death from smallpox on November 6 1650 of the young stadholder William II. Eight days later on November 14 his son William III was born. In the same month the States of Holland decided to leave the stadholderate in Holland indefinitely vacant. At the Great Assembly in 1651 a majority of the provinces of the Republic followed Holland's example. The Pensionary of Holland, John de Witt, was to articulate the aspiration that the United Provinces would form a 'true' republic in which there would be no single head and no authority based on birth alone. Meanwhile, it was the hope and intention of the supporters of the House of Orange that the young prince William III would succeed to the offices of his forefathers. This situation lasted from 1650-1672, a period of intermittent political ferment culminating in the feverish intensity of the summer of 1672, the restoration of the position of captain general and stadholder in the person of William III and the murders of the brothers de Witt. The thesis concludes in 1675 with William III's rejection of the title Duke of Gelderland, an event which sees the highwatermark of William's authority following the restoration of the stadholderate in 1672.

It must be emphasised that this struggle between the forces sympathetic to the stadholder and elements of the Province of Holland was not new. The death of the stadholder marked but a stage, albeit a highly significant one, in a contest between two opposing forces. The Peace of Munster in 1648 marked not only the ending of hostilities with Spain but the victory of a particular group within the States of Holland. Since the renewal of war against Spain in 1621, they had urged negotiations for peace and with the capture of Breda and the securing of the Republic's frontiers in 1637 the demands for a cessation of war grew louder. Ranged against them were many of the supporters of the public church, for whom war against the catholic foe had forged and

---

sustained the nation and the Prince of Orange as stadholder of the majority of the provinces and captain general of the army of the Republic. Holland’s victory was of short duration. In 1650 following a furious contest over the decommissioning of troops, the stadholder imprisoned six members of the States of Holland and attempted to seize the city of Amsterdam. His star seemed once more in the ascendant. William II’s death in November 1650, however, should have marked the total triumph of the party of Holland. Yet the birth of his son William eight days after his death on 14 November provided a focus for Orangist propaganda in the hope that one day he would come into his own.

Who were the Orangists who were responsible for publicising the cause of the young William III? Centred on the court at the Hague, they were not a united group. Even had the infant William III succeeded to the offices of his forefathers, there would have been a power struggle among the factions at court. Now with the death of William II and the abolition of the stadholderate in the majority of the provinces there was a vacuum at the head of the network of Orangist patronage. This was compounded by the warring factions at the court in the Hague. One group gathered around the Princess Royal Mary Stuart and her superintendent the Heer van Heenvliet. Opposed to her was the dominating figure of the prince’s grandmother Amalia von Solms who was supported by her son-in-law the Elector of Brandenburg and Constantijn Huygens who had been secretary to Frederick Henry and William II. The guardianship of the young prince was hotly contested between the two women and Huygens was moved to write a poem to the Princess Royal urging an end to this ‘incivile guerre’.

It was finally determined that the Princess Royal, Amalia von Solms and the Elector of Brandenburg were to share the guardianship of William III but hostilities did not cease. The French

---


8 'A la Princesse de la Grande Bretagne'. *De Gedichten van Constantijn Huygens*, ed. Jacob Worp. 9 vols (Groningen, 1892-1899), iv. 251-252 (251)
ambassador wrote in 1654 that following the Exclusion crisis the Republic was divided and if Mary Stuart and Amalia von Solms had combined forces they would have carried the country behind them and forced the States of Holland to back down. He concluded however, ‘la réconciliation de ces deux dames est une chose impossible’. Only the death of Mary Stuart in 1661 resolved this problem.

The court clearly played a role in commissioning political pamphlets on behalf of the Orangist cause. Following the publication of John de Witt’s *Deductie* in 1654 a correspondent of Secretary Thurloe recorded,

> it is said that there are a great many heads at work already, to refute the deduction of Holland; and that the guardians (of the prince) will especially cause to be refuted all that makes against the Prince.10

Writing from Leiden in 1663 Pieter de la Court listed recent publications and added that a pamphlet from the court at the Hague was expected any day now.11 The court was the source of patronage for artists. The painter Theodor van Thulden was commissioned by Amalia von Solms to produce a series highlighting the role of the young prince and herself in the Orangist cause.12 That commission was unfortunately not completed. The artist Raguineau, whose portrait of William III was much copied, was appointed a tutor in painting to the young prince.13

In the first half of 1650 it appears that the Frisian stadholder William Frederick had a role to play. He wanted to be appointed as lieutenant captain general during the

---


11 'Brieven uit de Correspondentie van Pieter de la Court en zijn verwanten (1661-1666), *Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap* (Utrecht), 69 (1955). pp. 82-165 (107)


minority of William III. Hence it was in his interests that the role of the stadholder and
the interests of the House of Orange were defended. In 1652 William Frederick had
been in correspondence with the Delft preacher Johannes Goethals, an ardent Orangist
who had been present at the deathbed of Frederick Henry. Printers in Holland were
afraid to publish political pamphlets by preachers in favour of the Prince of Orange and
Goethals asked William Frederick if he could arrange for Orangist tracts to be published
in, and distributed from, Friesland. 14 Amalia von Solms was always suspicious of the
motives of her son-in law William Frederick. Her fears appeared justified. John de Witt
persuaded the Frisian stadholder to give up his opposition to the act of Exclusion of the
Prince of Orange by tempting him in 1655 with the suggestion that he would be
appointed field marshall of the army of the Republic. 15 Having won over William
Frederick, de Witt reneged on his promise. From then on William Frederick’s role
becomes more peripheral.

Although writers frequently apply the terms Orangist Party and States Party to
describe the protagonists, the reader must not ascribe to them many of the
characteristics of a modern party. As present day historians have emphasised, factions
based at civic and provincial level concerned primarily with local issues formed the
mainstay of much of politics in the Republic and for many ideology was of peripheral
importance. 16 It may be argued that the history of party and faction in the Dutch
Republic has been illuminated by this Namier like analysis but as readers will find, the
polemic of the period was marked by significant differences in political emphasis
between the two groups which were expressed with verve and passion. This is not the
place to investigate the link between political polemic and political realities except to
say that the rhetoric of competing groups is in itself a valid subject for the historian. It

may be, as one dissenting historian has argued, that party and faction were not mutually exclusive and certainly at times of crisis such as 1672 party feeling became more acute and the regents groups more polarised.¹⁷

There seems to have been, in the view of this outsider at least, a curious reluctance on the part of historians to engage with the principles and convictions of the Orangists. Concepts such as ‘true freedom’ and the works of the brothers de la Court have merited the attention of historian such as Eco Haitsma Mulier and Ernst H. Kossmann, to name but two.¹⁸ Jonathan Israel in his magisterial The Dutch Republic. Its Rise, Greatness and Fall made little reference to the argument of the supporters of the House of Orange in his chapter on the 1650’s, subtitled significantly ‘the making of True Freedom’.¹⁹ The eminent historian Pieter Geyl had set the tone. Reviewing key Orangist pamphlets during the stadholderless period Geyl made little attempt to conceal his disdain for their writing and their principles. Early in his article Geyl advised his reader of his judgment that in comparison with the writings of their opponents, ‘de Prinsgezinde geschriften leveren alles bijeengenomen niet een veel aantrekkelijker beeld op’. Compared to the proponents of ‘true freedom’, ‘de Prinsgezinde strijdliteratuur is minder omvangrijk en minder indrukkend’. In adopting the impersonal voice, Geyl did not fail to convey his very personal view. ‘Men krijgt sterk de indruk dat de Staatsgezinde theorieen aantrekkelijk waren voor de meest ontwikkelde en meest onderzoekende geesten.’²⁰ I recognised my calling.

Notwithstanding Geyl’s personal attachment to the cause of the party of Holland, his work on the Orangist pamphlets brought to the attention of historians some of the key publications. However, the most well informed study of the principles of the

Orangists as expressed in their pamphlets came in a chapter by van de Klashorst entitled ‘Metten schijn van monarchie getempert. De verdediging van het stadhouderschap in de Partijliteratuur’. This was the first research which treated the Orangist writings with the depth and scholarship which had previously been devoted to the supporters of John de Witt. Taking certain of the best known Orangist polemical works, the author investigated the Orangist stance towards such issues as provincial sovereignty, the role and authority of the States General and the function of the stadholder. Understandably the writer, an historian of political thought, concentrated on those Orangist pamphlets which offered most to his field of study; the more ephemeral publications and the literary and visual imagery which the supporters of the House of Orange cherished, were not under consideration. The Orangists were to be judged alongside the brothers de la Court, Franciscus van den Enden and Spinoza on the intellectual content of the corpus of their literature. It is telling that van de Klashorst’s contribution was published in a volume entitled Pieter de la Court in zijn tijd.  21

Orangist studies such as biographies of William III have inevitably concentrated on the years after 1672 and an analysis of political polemic and imagery has not usually formed part of their brief. However any student of the period 1650-1672 would be advised to refer to the first volumes of Japikse’s Prins Willem III – de Stadhouder-Koning and Nesca Robb’s William of Orange.  22 Wouter Troost’s Stadholder-koning Willem III: een politieke biografie published in 2001 is the most recent work on the subject.  23 Herbert Rowen’s biography John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland 1625-1672 provides a detailed account of events from 1650-1672 and is particular

---


useful on contentious issues such as the Public Prayer debate.\textsuperscript{24} An invaluable primary source for these years is found in the narrative of Lieuwe van Aitzema.\textsuperscript{25} Modern studies have concentrated on ideas rather than individuals and the companion volumes entitled \textit{Vaderland} and \textit{Vrijheid} examine contemporary use of such terms.\textsuperscript{26}

Herbert H. Rowen's \textit{The Princes of Orange. The Stadholders in the Dutch Republic} provides a valuable introduction to the role and functions of the stadholders and captains general.\textsuperscript{27} The German scholar Olaf Morke chose as his field of research the court of the House of Orange and his work led him to examine the functions of the stadholder and certain of the symbolism which the Orangists deployed. His '\textit{Stadholder} oder \textit{Staetholder}' traverses a very different landscape from that pioneered by van Klashorst.\textsuperscript{28} Inevitably the bulk of his book concentrates on the period before the death of William II but there are valuable insights to be gained. A short section of the book does deal with Orangist pamphlets in the stadholderless period. Jonathan Israel in a publication of 2004, \textit{Monarchy, Orangism and Republicanism} has argued that a 'republican' standpoint particularly in respect of religious toleration and indeed difference to religion in general did not preclude individuals from loyalty to the House of Orange.\textsuperscript{29} My work was largely written before the appearance of Israel's pamphlet but it is certainly a question which is examined in this thesis and I hope that readers will conclude that 'republicanism' and Orangism were compatible and that by no means all Orangists were supporters of the public church.

\textsuperscript{25} Lieuwe van Aitzema. \textit{Historie oft Verhael van Saecken van Staet en Oorloogh, in en omtrent de Vereenighde Nederlaneden}, 14 vols (The Hague, 1667-1671)
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Vaderland}, ed. by N. C. F van Sas (Amsterdam: University Press, 1991); \textit{Vrijheid}, ed. by Eco G. Haitsma Mulier and Wyger R.E. Velema (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999)
\textsuperscript{27} Herbert H. Rowen. \textit{The Princes of Orange. The stadholders in the Dutch Republic} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)
\textsuperscript{28} Olaf Morke. '\textit{Stadholder} oder \textit{Staetholder}'. (Munster; Hamburg: Lit. 1997)
\textsuperscript{29} Jonathan I. Israel. \textit{Monarchy, Orangism and Republicanism in the later Dutch Golden Age} (Amsterdam: Faculty of Humanities, University of Amsterdam, 2004)
On the relations between the Reformed community and the House of Orange in the years 1650-1672, M.T. uit den Bogaard’s *Den Gereformeerden en Oranje tijdens het eerste Stadhouderloze Tijdperk* published in 1954, remains the only comprehensive guide. Its source material drawn from the political pamphlets of the period provides an invaluable introduction. It is a comment on Orangist studies that this work, published half a century ago, remains the only book on the subject. The Orangists and their relations with England during both the Protectorate and after the Restoration is the subject of Pieter Geyls’ *Orange and Stuart*, first published in 1969. The core of the material is drawn from diplomatic sources and the correspondence of John de Witt but it provides a useful background when considering the pamphlet literature dealing with this issue.

The supporters of John de Witt sought to buttress their legitimacy by attacking the record of the previous Orange stadholders. For the Orangists, it was essential to win this struggle for the past, for gratitude for the heroic actions of his forefathers played a large part in the argument for the granting of the stadholderate to William III. Haitsma Mulier and Janssen’s *Willem van Oranje in de Historie 1584-1984* provides a couple of helpful chapters on this subject. Jacob Bax’s *Prins Maurits in de volksmening der 16e en 17e eeuw* published in 1940 is a repository of references to the Prince with particularly valuable sources in the areas of poetry and drama. Coenraad Tamse in his *Het Huis van Oranje en andere politieke mythen* casts a wider view over the Orangist myth and its place in Dutch history. An overarching introduction to the subject remains Kampinga’s *De opvatting over onze oudere vaderlandsche geschiedenis* first published in 1917.
The frenetic pamphleteering of the crisis year of 1672 has cried out for scholarly investigation. Roorda in *Partij en Factie* provides illuminating insights into the nature of the political struggle of the time.\(^3\)\(^6\) Pieter Geyl in his *Democratische tendenties in 1672* examines a selection of pamphlets which purported to emphasise popular rights and privileges against the patrician oligarchy and supported the claims of the Prince of Orange.\(^3\)\(^7\) In my work on the popular rhetoric of Orangism, I have widened the scope of the discussion by including political rhetoric from the period before 1672 and deploying sources from poetry, drama and visual imagery.

On the subject of Dutch pamphleteering in general, the standard work is Craig Harline’s *Pamphlets, Printing and Political Culture in the early Dutch Republic*.\(^3\)\(^8\) While Harline’s work provides valuable information about the production and circulation of pamphlets, it deals less with the contents. However, I have found of inestimable value Hubert Carrier’s lifework, the two volumes of *La Presse de la Fronde*.\(^3\)\(^9\) There is much in this French work which appears to have direct relevance to the Dutch pamphleteering tradition of the mid seventeenth century and Carrier and his compatriot Christian Jouhard in *Mazarinades: La Fronde des Mots* pose questions which are beyond the scope of Harline’s book.\(^4\)\(^0\) Simon Groenveld’s *De Prins voor Amsterdam* deals specifically with the political pamphlets of 1650.\(^4\)\(^1\)

Cornelissen in an article of 1939 entitled ‘Vondel en de vrijheid’ opened the way for consideration of the political dimension of seventeenth century drama. Poelhekke’s *Vondel en Oranje* of 1967, though a relatively slight work, examined the political context of the great dramatist’s plays and poetry.\(^4\)\(^2\) More recently Henk Duits in *Van Bartholomeusnacht tot Bataafse opstand* and Bettina Noak in *Politische Auffassungen*...
in niederländischen Drama des 17 Jahrhunderts have examined a selection of plays and reflected on their connections to contemporary political thought.\footnote{Henk Duits. Van Bartholomeusnacht tot Bataafs Opstand (Hilversum: Verloren, 1990); Bettina Noak, Politische Auffassungen in niederländischen Drama des 17 Jahrhunderts (Münster: Waxman, 2002)} These works have informed my thinking, albeit I am in many cases dealing with plays which are not the subject of investigation by these two authors. In the case of ‘occasional’ poetry written to commemorate an event or defend a particular standpoint, I have used the appropriate volumes, many of which have not been republished since the seventeenth century. For a comment on ‘occasional’ poetry as a genre, Schenkenveld-van der Dussen’s article entitled ‘Poezie als gebruiksatikel: gelegenheidsgedichten in de zeventiende eeuw’ provides an introduction within the Dutch context.\footnote{Maria Schenkenveld-van der Dussen. ‘Poezie als gebruiksatikel: gelegenheidsgedichten in de zeventiende eeuw’. in Historische Letterkunde ed. by Marijke Spies (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1984), pp. 75-92.} Wolf Segebrecht’s Das Gelegenheit Gedicht although set in a German framework has much to offer the general reader.\footnote{Wulf Segebrecht. Das Gelegenheit Gedicht (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1977)}

Dutch art has provided a more fruitful field for investigation than Dutch literature and drama. In the case of the House of Orange, the two volume catalogue Onder den Oranje Boom provides a fascinating insight into the world of portraiture and fine arts as collected and commissioned by the Dutch Princes of Orange and their German relations.\footnote{Onder den Oranje Boom, Exhibition Catalogue. 2 vols (Munich: Hirmer, 1999)} Focussing on one work of art, Lyckle de Vries’ monologue on Jan Steen’s Prinsesdag is an intriguing example of the political content of what appears at first sight to be a characteristic genre painting.\footnote{Lyckle de Vries. Jan Steen: Prinsesdag (Bloemendaal: H. W. Becht, 1992)} Staring’s article of 1950, ‘Portretten van den Koning-Stadhouder’, marks the only attempt so far to list and date the various portraits of William III.\footnote{A. Staring. ‘Portretten van den Koning-Stadhouder’. Nederlandsch Kunsthistorisch Jaarboek, 3 (1950/1951), pp. 151-196.} The iconography of the Oranjezaal has been researched by Hanna Peter-Raupp, albeit not without some dissent from Dutch art historians.\footnote{Hanna Peter-Raupp. Die Ikonographie des Oranjezaal (Hildesheim: New York: Olms, 1980)} Political prints
are catalogued in the collections of Muller and the Atlas van Stolk and medals in the volumes of Gerard van Loon and Pierre Bizot.50

The challenge I have set myself is to describe the language of Orangism in the critical years of the third quarter of the seventeenth century. Boundaries must be set. I have not investigated the engravings of the young prince William III on drinking vessels or the 'oranjepijps' which bore the arms of the House of Orange though I am full of admiration for those who have.51 I hope that this work, however inadequate, will illuminate for readers a vital and poorly researched area of Dutch political life during a critical period in the history of the Republic.

---


A DEFENCE OF THE STADHOLDER PRINCE

‘Can the United Provinces function without a governor?’¹ The question was posed by Petrus Scriverius in his work entitled *Histoire des Contes d’Hollande et Estat et Gouvernement des Provinces Unies du Pays Bas* published posthumously in 1664. In practical terms the answer to Scriverius might well be yes. At the time of the book’s publication the Republic had been fourteen years without a stadholder. During that time wars had been fought and differences between and within provinces had been satisfactorily resolved. Scriverius wrote of those in the United Provinces who believed that the terms of the Union of Utrecht with their provisions for a stadholder should not be binding in perpetuity and for whom the Orange stadholderate was an historic accident arising from ‘des diverses circumstances du temps’.² Events might appear to vindicate their stance. Yet to supporters of the House of Orange the answer to the question posed by Scriverius could only be no. For them, not withstanding appearances, a stadholder was crucial to the survival and prosperity of the Republic. Their task throughout the years 1650-1672 was to marshall a credible argument for the necessity of a stadholder and expose the pitfalls and dangers resulting from his absence. This was not merely a work of abstract political polemic. The object of their endeavours was not just an institution but an individual, a child growing to manhood who was always present in the Republic and who was the focus of intense hopes and fears.

---

The office of stadholder stemmed from the appointment of provincial governors by the sovereign in the Burgundian and Habsburg periods. After the Revolt, it could be argued that there was no further need of a stadholder since the authority whom he represented was no longer recognised by the Dutch. However, the need for princely leadership as a focus for unity in internal and external affairs ensured that the office of stadholder remained. Although formally subject to the Provincial States, the Orangist stadholders retained some sovereign attributes such as the power to appoint certain magistrates in most towns as well as membership of the Council of State and the command of the army and navy.  

One of the task of the supporters of the House of Orange was to propound a constitutional framework in which a stadholder prince played an essential role. A pamphlet published following the death of William II and the birth of the young prince gives an indication of the theoretical argument which was to be deployed by the supporters of the stadholderate. The work in question I Conferentie van eenige Nederlantsche Heeren op de tegenwoordigen Staet deser Landen was not a defence of the late stadholder, indeed the anonymous author was highly critical of the actions of both William II and William Frederick, the Frisian stadholder who had commanded the troops in the thwarted attack on Amsterdam. However, this was to condemn the person, not the institution. The role of stadholder was essential to the constitution of the Dutch Republic. To say otherwise was to go against the wisdom of their forefathers and those maxims of the sages of antiquity who had warned of the dangers of change in the structure of the state. Experience teaches us, the author contended, that the best form of government is that ‘die gemengt is of derdelei, of iyets gemeen heef met de Monarchicale, yets met de Aristocratische en iets met de Democratische Regeeringe’.

---

2. Knuttel. no. 6899. np.
The stadholderate as an institution represented the monarchical element within the Republic, without which the constitution was incomplete.

The main purpose of the pamphlet was not to discuss the virtues of the mixed constitution but to put forward the claims of John Maurice of Nassau as surrogate stadholder or captain general during the infancy of the Prince of Orange and to disparage the claims of other putative contenders for that role. This strategy explains the appearance in 1651 of a second pamphlet, this time entitled *Grondigh Bericht nopende den Interest van desen Staet*. The author one 'Galeacco de Rivo Ursino' steered an adroit course which was to characterise much of the succeeding Orangist polemic.

Firstly, there was the question of utility. The Republic had need of 'een bequaem en gequalificeert heere'. Secondly this 'headship' was placed within the comprehensive framework of a constitution in which different elements were mixed. For this author, there were few examples of 'pure' forms of government in Europe; rather most were a mixture in which monarchy was tempered by aristocracy, or as in the Dutch Republic, aristocratic or democratic governments by a semblance of monarchy. Thus the institution of the stadholderate was a 'schijn' or 'schaduwe' of monarchy. This language was not new. In a pamphlet of 1642 outlining the relations between the stadholder and the States of Holland, the anonymous author had described the former as 'de schaduwe eener Monarchie'.\(^5\) For the writer of 1651 this 'schijn' or 'schaduwe' appeared ubiquitous from the times of Moses and Joshua, indeed so ever present was it that it seemed to be 'een ingheven der Natuyre, ende een algemeen Volckrecht te zijn'. It was integral to the prosperity and durability of any state. Sparta had the services of an 'opperhoofd' or leader of the military to whom all power was devolved during times of war though sovereignty lay with the citizens and councils. Even the Roman Republic with its abhorrence of monarchy had two consuls or burgomasters who were held in

---

\(^5\) Knuttel. no. 4870. np.
esteem above all others while in time of necessity a temporary head or 'dictator' could be appointed. The example 'par excellence' of this 'schijn' of monarchy lay in the Venetian Republic where an elected Doge averted all the inconveniences, indecision, discord and strife of an untrammelled aristocracy in an unchanging constitution which had ensured the survival and prosperity of the Republic for over eight hundred years.6

These two pamphlets of 1650 and 1651, both supporting the claims of John Maurice laid the theoretical framework in which a defence of the stadholderate as an institution could be mounted. Firstly, they cleverly avoided any clear definition of the stadholder's powers providing the institution with the gloss of monarchy while citing examples such as Sparta and Venice which would reassure those who feared that the stadholders sought sovereignty in the Republic. Secondly, they deployed concepts which were not novel but familiar to an educated readership. The rediscovery of Aristotle's *Politics* with the first Latin text in 1260 resulted in his definitions of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy becoming commonplace in any debate of a constitution, real or abstract. Writers after Aristotle had conceived of an 'anacyclosis' or natural course or order in which the single Aristotelian forms inevitably degenerated only finally to return full circle. Polybius, however, had argued that this natural cycle could be prevented by the introduction of an equilibrium in the form of a mixed constitution of monarchical, aristocratic and democratic elements. Thus he argued 'experience', a key word in the Aristotelian arsenal, teaches us that a mixed constitution produced stability and longevity, both highly desirable in any republic. This model, founded on Aristotle and Polybius, permeated political thought in the early Renaissance and was to remain in use in some circles until the eighteenth century. It also nourished its own language and imagery. For Aristotle the best constitution was similar to the best life in that both followed a 'middle way' consisting of a mean between the two extremes

---

6 Knuttel, no. 7009, pp. 1-9.
He argued that it was the perfect 'balance' between its different parts which kept a city state in being. 'Balance', 'harmony' (a Platonic loan) and 'moderation or middle way' became key words in any discussion of what was desirable in a state.7

Thus the language and imagery of the mixed constitution as deployed by the Orangists was ubiquitous throughout central and western Europe. It formed the subject not only of theoretical debate but also applied to contemporary constitutional issues. Both sides in the English civil conflict of the seventeenth century availed themselves of the mixed constitution though Royalist apologists such as Filmer were later to discard it. In 1642 Charles I observed to Parliament that the wisdom and experience of their ancestors taught them that there were 'three kinds of Government among men, Absolute Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy, all having their own particular conveniences and inconveniences'. However the king argued a mixture of these ensured the conveniences of all three without the attendant disadvantages 'as long as the balance hangs even between the three estates'. Charles' discourse was issued in pamphlet form and translated into Dutch.8 Equally the king's opponents were prepared to deploy arguments for a mixed monarchy for this implied limitations upon royal authority.9

Most important for the Dutch discussion as Haitsma Mulier has described was the example of the Republic of Venice. Here was a prosperous sea going state which had successfully avoided domination by foreign powers. Its stability and longevity were attributed to its mixed constitution of monarchical, aristocratic and democratic elements which it was maintained had been preserved unchanged for eight hundred years.10 For the author of Grondigh Bericht the Venetian example was clearly pivotal, even in his

---

8 *His Majestie's Answer to the XIV Propositions of both Houses of Parliament* (London, 1642), pp. 17-18: Knuttel. no. 4838A.
choice of language. His 'schaduwe' or 'schijn' of monarchy while it had Dutch antecedents is strikingly similar to the language used in Gasparo Contarini’s sixteenth century study of Venice in which the Doge was described as possessing 'una sembianza di Re'. It was Contarini’s boast, 'che questa sola Republica hauesse il principato Regio il governo de' nobili, il reggimento de cittidini, de modo che paiono con una certa bilencia eguale haue mescolato le forme de tutti'.

Within the United Provinces itself the mixed constitution had enjoyed a good press. In the early seventeenth century Heinsius had published an edition of Aristotle’s Politics, judging him to be the most acute commentator ever on these matters. Paulus Merula in his Diatriba statu Reipubliciae Batavae of 1603 had commented on the limited constitutional powers enjoyed by the previous Counts of Holland and had characterised the governance of the state both past and present as a happy mixture of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. The momentum was not lost in the second half of the century. Boxhorn in his Institutiones Politiciae published posthumously in 1657 hesitated to prescribe an ideal constitution for the history and humours of the peoples of Europe and beyond varied so widely. However, after the customary caveat that well established deficiencies were better endured than the introduction of uncertain novelties, Boxhorn did incline towards the mixed constitution as it combined all the best elements of the three forms. He acknowledged, as did others, that one element might predominate without destabilising the system.

In particular the pamphlets of 1650 and 1651 drew on concepts and language deployed earlier by Grotius in his Liber de Antiquitate Reipublicae Bataviae of 1610. This immensely influential work was first published in 1610 and dedicated to the States of Holland and West Friesland, whose official historian Grotius had been since 1604.

The truce of 1609 had brought no solution to the problem of the constitutional

relationship between the stadholder and the States of Holland and Grotius’ work was intended to serve as a plea for the sovereignty of the individual province and its States. Ironically, given the intention of the work and Grotius’ later imprisonment as a confederate of Oldenbarnevelt, the work provided the supporters of the stadholderate with an armoury of argument and imagery.\textsuperscript{13}

Rather than a work of abstract political theory Grotius, in a fashion which was to characterise Dutch political polemic, couched his arguments in the context of history. Deploying the accounts of Tacitus and other classical sources, he described the so called Batavian Republic of pre and post Roman times. Grotius’ intent becomes apparent in his dedication at the beginning of the book. He wrote that not only was this example of a Batavian state prescriptive for future generations for ‘oudheid komt God zeer nabij door een zekere gelijkenis met eeuwigheid’ but its fundamental constitution had remained in place until the present time. With a tribute to the longevity of this form of governance Grotius concluded that ‘immers, het duidelijkste kenmerk van een goed ingerichte staat is zijn lange bestaan’.

For Grotius an Aristotelian analysis of the Batavian Republic showed it to be essentially aristocratic in form, composed of the most worthy members of the province and towns but enjoying the services of an elected prince. Such a structure, he argued, typified a ‘middle way’ between the twin rocks of monarchy and democracy. This ‘middenweg’ he described as ‘als wat enerzijds verwijdered is van beide uitersten en anderzids onderdelen bevat van beide’, an image which future Orangists were to deploy to good cause. The republic received ‘legitimiteit door de aanwezigheid van vorstelijk gezag’ Within the bounds of such a constitution the natural liberties of the Batavian people could flourish and they remained unsubdued by Rome, instead enjoying the status of confederates and allies.

Grotius argued that this mixed form of governance had brought power and prosperity to Holland. Harmony had been disrupted by the later Habsburg counts, in particular Philip II of Spain who had played the tyrant, trampling on the liberties which were so fundamental to the Batavian tradition. However, following the abjuration of Philip’s sovereignty in 1581, Grotius concluded that these freedoms had been preserved by this same governance of States and Prince, the latter in the form of the stadholder William of Orange. Thus the original constitution of that ancient Batavian Republic which had first been recorded under Caesar had persisted for seventeen hundred years until the present day. Grotius continued ‘hierin heeft de soevereiniteit immer bij de Staten gelegen en ligt daar ook nu nog; maar wel op dusdanige wijze dat daaran vorstelijk gezag werd toegevoegd’. The author acknowledged that this form of constitution was not suitable for all peoples; some flourished better under a monarchy. Yet this governance,

voor ons de meest geschickte is, bewijst de ononderbroken praktijkervaring van zovele eeuwen. Zo lang deze staatsvorm bleef bestaan was alles rustig. Zodra er aan getoomd werd, onstanden opstanden en onrust, en deze kwamen niet eerder tot bedaren, dan dat aan het gezag zijn ware vorm was teruggeven.14

The work of Grotius both deployed existing concepts of the constitution of the fledgling republic and reinforced them. The language of balance and the mixed constitution had already been used in native Dutch political pamphleteering. A work of 1607 had praised constitutions composed of three elements and, by implication, the Dutch model arguing that this form of government was ‘le plus juste, durable, et moins subject a tyrannie, parce que l’on sert de contrepoix a l’autre’.15 Following the model of

Grotius, an anonymous author of 1612 referred to the government of the United Provinces as 'eene Aristocratique Politie' which none the less did contain princely elements.\textsuperscript{16} A pamphlet of 1618 concurred arguing that the Dutch Republic was 'een vrije Aristocratie Regieringe vande beste des landts' which was 'voorgeluchtet van een voortreffelijkcke inde aensiaenlijke Hooft'.\textsuperscript{17}

Significantly of the pamphlets mentioned, that is the three from the earlier part of the seventeenth century and the two of 1650 and 1651, none concentrated entirely on the issue of the mixed constitution. For the writers of 1607, 1612 and 1618 the key issues to which they devoted the bulk of their attention were the integrity of the Truce with Spain and the relations between sections of the political establishment and the national church. For the author of 1650 the primary task was to buttress the cause of John Maurice of Nassau. Even for the author of 1651, his admiring discussion of the historic attributes of the mixed constitution quickly gave way to a defence of the stadholderate on more utilitarian grounds. This was to be the case with many writers who touched on the subject briefly only to pass on to more pressing contemporary issues.\textsuperscript{18}

For the remainder of the 1650's discussion of the mixed constitution with relation to the stadholderate virtually disappeared with one exception. An Orangist work \textit{Bedenckinge op de Deductie} of 1654, while largely concentrating on the issue of the Union, did argue that some form of headship was not inappropriate. The author contended that even in the scriptural era of the Book of Judges, which he described as a 'treffelijcke aristocratie', God had an eye to the advantages of the mixed constitution and 'de opper macht altijd tot een hoofd gecontreert'. The dangers of the degeneration of a pure form of aristocracy to the malignant form of oligarchy was stressed. If, the author contended, Princes could stand accused of using their influence to benefit their

\textsuperscript{16} Knuttel, no. 1991, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{17} Knuttel, no. 2610, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{18} Klashorst. 'Metten schijn van monarchie getempert', p. 105.
own interest, then the same could be said for of those ‘Opper-Regenten’ who with their family and factional connections could come to dominate towns and provinces.\textsuperscript{19}

The Restoration of Charles II marked a perceived upturn in the fortunes of the House of Orange. It was expected that the English king would promote the interests of his young nephew. Mindful of English susceptibilities, the Act of Exclusion of 1654 in which William III was prevented from attaining the offices of his forefathers was laid aside. The restoration of Charles II certainly stimulated pro-Orangist sentiment in the United Provinces while terminating the Republican experiment in England. It may have been the combination of both of these factors which prompted Pieter de la Court to issue for publication in the years 1660-1662 several works, some probably penned by his late brother John which attacked the concept of monarchy and the stadholderate which they identified with it as implacably hostile to any form of freedom loving Republic. The nature of the works of the de la Courts and certain of those who followed them represent a change in the conceptual landscape of the United Provinces. Arguably this marks a split in the nature of States Party polemic\textsuperscript{20} for some anti-Orangist writers continued to share a common language with their opponents. A pamphlet of 1662 \textit{Aesopus Defensor}, almost certainly the work of the young Leiden jurist Uytenhage de Mist, conceded that the ‘middle way’ was the most secure. Hence the Dutch Republic was an ‘aristocratische regeeringe’ as that form lay between monarchy and democracy.\textsuperscript{21}

In his \textit{Apologie ofte Verantwoordinge van den Ondienst der Stadhouderlijke Regeeringe} of 1663, he reiterated his thesis that the government of the state of Holland was essentially aristocratic in nature. He fearlessly plundered the language of Grotius. As Grotius had valued a middle way ‘want nademael men in alle saecken het middelste prijs’ so our author again concurring argued that the Dutch

\textsuperscript{19} Knuttel, no. 7550A, pp. 32, 34.


\textsuperscript{21} Knuttel, no. 8658B, p. 23.
model of an aristocracy without a head entirely fitted this concept for it lay 'tusschen Eenhoofdige Regeringe ende gebiet van het gemeene Volck'. So complete was this aristocratic regime that a stadholder would simply be a 'wanschepel', a monstrous growth or deformity on the body of the Republic. Both these authors might challenge the Orangist view of a mixed constitution but in opting either for another mixed form or a pure type of aristocracy, they were still operating within the same framework in which the Aristotelian forms predominated and governance was in the hands of 'de hoogste regeringsmacht'. Of Bodin's concept of an indivisible dynamic sovereignty within the state, there was no sign.

The de la Courts erupted into this world of middle ways and balance. On the frontispiece of the 1661 edition of *Consideratien van Staat ofte Politijke Weegschaal* was an image of a set of scales consciously unbalanced. On the left hand the scales contained the forces of crowned monarchy, war and servitude. On the right, weighed heavily in their favour liberty, justice and civil law. Monarchy or singleheadship, bellicosity and slavery were outweighed. This image of deliberate imbalance mirrored the disturbing contents of the book. Beginning with an analysis of the human passion which owed much to Descartes, the author emphasised the importance of good governance in which the interests or ruler and ruled are inextricably shackled. The Aristotlean forms of government were placed before the reader with the proviso that, *pace* Bodin, a sovereign power could not be divided. Thus it 'soo volgd dat de absolute magt om wetten te maaken niet kan zijn by een, ende een independente magt om die te doen executeeren, by een ander'. This emphasis on the siting of a sovereignty which cannot be divided into legislative and executive functions, brought a new emphasis into the polemic of Dutch political life. Clearly within such a framework there was no place for a stadholder who carried out the policies of the States in war. Such a figure not only

---

22 Knuttel, no. 8794A, pp. 15, 92, 323.
contradicted the fundamental premise of the nature of sovereignty but, in the light of the author’s analysis of the nature of human passions, the stadholder would be compelled to defend his own interests by enfeebling the powers of his subjects.\(^{23}\) This element of the argument was to be reinforced by many concrete examples by Pieter de la Court in his *Interest van Holland* of 1662.\(^ {24}\)

John de Witt, the cousin and namesake of the Pensionary, in a work of 1663 reinforced the emphasis on sovereignty rather than the Aristotelian constitutional forms. Citing Bodin, he reinforced the indivisibility of sovereignty which, he argued, in all Republics is to be found only ‘in een Aristocratische Regeeringe by den geheelen Raat’. Unwilling to jettison traditional scriptural sources, the author contended that such a form of government had been chosen by God for his people Israel. However in citing Bodin’s marks of sovereignty, de Witt moved the argument much closer to the contemporary sphere. If sovereignty resided in, amongst others, supreme legislative power, absolute control of the army and selection of the magistrates, then the previous constitution of the Republic complete with stadholders represented a fatal fracturing of supreme power. Only in the absence of the Princes of Orange could sovereign authority as defined by Bodin rest where it rightfully should, that is in the hands of the provincial States.\(^ {25}\)

The pensionary John de Witt was deaf to the siren calls of the language of Grotius. In a letter of 1 November 1663 he remarked that his observations of eminent men had led him to observe that they were inclined to flatter those in authority which occasioned them to espouse arguments which were incompatible with both reason and truth. Grotius, he opined, had in his work *Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae* sought to flatter the Princes of Orange in his portrayal of ‘een sorte van regeeringe, die men mixtum

\(^{23}\) *Consideratien van Staat ofte Politijke Weeg-schaal* (Amsterdam: Jacob Volckerts, 1661), pp. 23, 26, 39-41.

\(^ {24}\) Knuttel, no. 8652.

\(^ {25}\) Knuttel, no. 8789, pp. 31-32, 45 : Knuttel, no. 8790, p. 2.
The Dutch Republic, de Witt asserted, was a pure aristocracy. Polybius might argue that Rome was an example of the virtues of the mixed constitution but Polybius was wrong. It was, according to de Witt, a democracy 'als meest alle de politycque schryvers ende daeronder specialijk Bodin, sustineren tegens Polybius'.

The Orangist response to this polemic was instructive. The author of *Ware Interest van Holland* published in 1662, avowed as did Grotius that aristocracy was the predominant element in the constitution but since this form of governance was fatally prone to faction, an 'opperhooft' was essential to control and contain the ambitions of 'deze grooten Aristocratische Heeren'. Under such a government was 'alles in goed Harmonie'. Foremost in the earlier section of the work was a calculated warning against the dangers of change. What had suited Holland in the past would serve the present. A good subject must never flirt with novelties 'want die brenght gemeenlijck groote onghelegenhtheden mede'. Thus past experience was the Orangist counterweight to the political abstractions of Bodin.

*Den Klagenden Veenboer* of 1662 also described the government of Holland as aristocratic and yet emphasised the need for an 'ansienlijck hooft' within the constitution, who would serve the best interests of the people. In depriving the state of this 'balanceerder', de Witt and his confederates had left the Republic vulnerable not only to internal strife, fanned by 'pasquilsuchtige schrijvers' but also likely to be preyed upon by foreign powers. The Princes of Orange had employed their authority in the services of 'harmonie' and prosperity. Provided there were laws and provisions to prevent any excess of power accruing to the stadholder this mixed constitution with an emphasis on the aristocratic element was 'in de beste Consonantie en Harmonie al gefondeert op een pure Middelmaticheydt' which avoided the inconveniences of both more monarchical and more popular forms of government, while incorporating elements

---

27 Knuttel, no. 8653B, pp. 15-16, 37, 52, 178.
of both. In *Hollands Opkomst* of 1662, the writer re-emphasised the longevity of the mixed form of government which had flourished under the Batavians and the Counts. Like Grotius, this author favoured an aristocratic model with monarchical elements in the form of the stadholder which he argued had endured long and, for that reason, should not have been changed. Similarly the author of *Bedenckingen op het Boek 'Interest van Holland'* advocated the Grotian model of a constitutional prince within a structure balanced between the polar ends of monarchy and democracy which avoided the evils of the pure forms. In a dialogue in a pamphlet of 1663 a fictional advocate argued for the incorporation of a princely element with reference to Grotius, this form of mixed constitution being by ‘de wijste vande werelt tot alleen tijdt voor de sekerste, equitabelste ende eerlijkste gepresen’. There was no better adage, he argued, than that a state or republic should be maintained by the same maxims that had built and sustained it for so long.

These pamphlets saw a crystallising of the Orangist position. Grotius was now firmly centre-stage and with him the mixed constitution, the ‘middle way’, ‘balance’ and the longevity of the Dutch constitution. Clearly the Orangists were not prepared to mount a straightforward attack on the theory of indivisible sovereignty which their opponents had culled from Bodin. Indeed, pragmatically, there was no way that they could do so without, themselves being caught up in those treacherous waters. Rather they concentrated on what was alleged to have worked in the past. Experience was the most valued teacher. In the age of Descartes and Spinoza, such sentiments might appear anachronism. Yet they reflected a very deep-seated wariness, endemic in many individuals and communities which distrusts abstract reason and values and places its

---

28 Knuttel, no. 8658, pp. 4-6.
29 *Hollands Op-komst oft Bedenckingen op de schadelijke Schriften genaamt Graafelyke Regeeringe en Interest van Holland.* (Leiden, 1662), pp. 18-19, 95.
30 (Leiden, 1662), p. 47.
31 Knuttel, no. 8806D, pp. 112, 181.
trust in institutions which have proved their worth. As with Grotius in 1610, they equated longevity with stability and prosperity.

This theme was echoed in what was the first lengthy presentation of the Orangist case, a work entitled Apologie tegens de Algemeene en Onbepalde Vryheid which appeared in 1669. The author of this work was almost certainly Pieter de Hubert, the Pensionary of Zeeland. The previous year 1668 had seen the Prince of Orange installed as First Noble of Zeeland and the attempt by Holland to enforce the Perpetual Edict in which political and military authority were to be permanently sundered and Holland was to eschew the stadholderate in perpetuity. The Prince having reached the age of eighteen which many considered to be his majority, Holland’s strategy had been ill-received by many of the other provinces. The States of Zeeland drew up a resolution, drafted by Hubert in which they resisted Holland, arguing that the stadholderate had been a source of both wealth and respect and was based on ‘de oude gronden ende maximen daer op de gemeene en provinciale regeeringe deser Landen zijn gefondeert’. It was founded on ‘een pure middelmatigheyt’. Arguments founded on intellectual presuppositions were elbowed aside for in these matters abstract speculations counted for nothing, rather ‘de experientie en eygen ondervindinge is her krachtigste bewijs’. The response of Holland came in a Deductie of the same year. This document argued that these old maxims based on Aristotelian notions; ‘dese School-siecke middelmatigheydt’ had long lost their force. Moreover they had no basis in reality for the stadholder had been no essential part of the constitution but merely a functionary and servant of the autonomous provincial states wherein sovereignty dwelt. The attempt of Zeeland to introduce ‘een Directeur ende Balanceerder’ would do no other than fatally diminish their hard won liberties and lead only to civil war.33

32 Knuttel, no. 9658, np.
33 Knuttel, no. 9663, pp. 35, 44.
Hubert’s *Apologie tegens de Algemeene en Onbepaalde Vryheit* was an attempt to argue the efficacy of a regime with a stadholder based on the concept of a mixed constitution. In his analysis Hubert openly acknowledged his debt to Grotius and much of what he wrote is no more than a repetition of the latter’s work of 1610. Longevity, for both authors, was certain evidence of a well founded system of government. Quoting Polybius, Hubert argued that the mixed constitution with elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy was the best preservative for a state and it was this form which had provided stability in the Netherlands for many hundreds of years since the Batavian Republic. Indeed for Hubert

‘t is zeer remarquabel dat deze Hollandsche Republyke van den beginne, dat is al voor de heerschappye van J. Caesar, tot deze Tyden van Prins Maurits toe, dat is omtrent duizent en zeven hondert jaren by een ende Deselve forme van Regeeringe was blyven staan.

Hubert drew attention to the evidence that this link between constitution and durability had been recognised in the previous century. He cited the *Corte Vertoninghe* of Vranck commissioned by the States of Holland and issued in October 1587 and incorporated the complete text in an appendix to his work. In this work, a counter blast to the *Remonstrance* of Thomas Wilkes, the States had acknowledged that the provinces of Holland had been governed for seven hundred years by counts and countesses ‘den welken by de Ridderschap, Edelen ende Steden, representerende de Staten van de zelven land, de Heerschappye ende Souverainiteit der zelver Landen weetelyk is opgedragen en gedefereert geweest’. During that time, the document stated the Provinces had suffered no foreign incursion but rather increasing prosperity. Only the Republic of Venice could boast of a similar longevity and stability.

Hubert’s use of this text is interesting. The content of the *Corte Vertoninghe* is open to differing interpretations but the text has been usually understood to imply a popular sovereignty residing in the nobles and towns and administered by the provincial
States. Hubert deployed the text not to question the sovereignty of the States but to emphasise the continual presence of a single head and the benefits which has flowed from this. Hubert did acknowledge that all had not been plain sailing. In his judgment, the ideals of Carol Roorda and later Oldenbarnevelt had resulted in ambitious heads building castles in the air on the basis of some notional unlimited freedom but experience taught that the best form of government was that propounded by Grotius and Merula in which the Republic was ‘getempeert uit drie pryswaardige stoffe van Regeeringe’, the stadholder representing the monarchical, the States representing the aristocratic and the towns representing the democratic element. By this mixed constitution, ‘middelmaat’ was attained and the dangers of single rule on the one hand and licence and anarchy on the other circumvented. Under such a system the Dutch had flourished and the attempt by de Witt and his supporters to enact a fundamental change in the constitution was ill informed and profoundly dangerous. Hubert was not ashamed to enlist the support of Machiavelli in relating the adage of the latter, found in the Discorsi, ‘dat men noch altyd de schaduwe van de oude Regeeringh behoorde te houden’. This was to take a remark entirely out of context but Hubert was on firmer and for Orangists very familiar ground when he urged sagely that, ‘in zaken van Politie is de ervarenheid de beste Meestersche’.

The mixed constitution was to serve the Orangist cause, even after the restoration of the stadholderate. In 1675 the advocate Petrus Valkenier published ‘t Verwerd Europa. In this work Valkenier divided his fellow men into three main categories, those who were by nature slavish, those who were lovers of ‘de goude Vryheith’ and those who fell between these two. The constitution of the republic was dependent on the

---


35 Knutte, no. 9762 pp. 4-5, 8-9, 12, 17-19, 21-25, 27-33, 185-186, 260-262, 274, 318.
predominant nature of the inhabitants. The slavish inclined to the rule of one head and nowhere could this be more easily be seen than in the example of the national enemy France where the French 'als eselen de last van een algebiedend Hooft gewillig dragen en glorieeren, dat sy in 't gehoorsaam van haare koningen blind zyn, en hem als God veneeren'. Aristocracy and democracy were the preferred form of rule for those who valued freedom. However Valkenier saw these pure forms as prone to degeneration, aristocracy to oligarchy and democracy to that tumultuous confusion the like of which had been seen in the Neapolitan revolt of Mas Anjello and more recently in 'de generale Revolutie' in the Netherlands of 1672. The solution, for the freedom loving citizen, as advocated by Polybius and Valkenier, was the mixed form of constitution which

So getempeert is uyt de dry voorschreven Formen, dat die alle dry daar in wel gerepresenteert werden maar gene daar in predomineert en dewelke besaat in de beste consonantie en harmonie, zynde gefundeert op een pure middelmatigheyt en gecureert van alle fauten en periculen, die elke soorte van Regeeringe onderworpen is.

Thus the Dutch constitution incorporating a stadholder representing the monarchical element was a reflection of the freedom loving nature of the citizens of the Netherlands, in contrast to the absolute monarchy appropriate for the slavish desires of the French. In this instance the mixed constitution was no longer directly associated with a particular faction or party but was now held to be emblematic of the Dutch nation in its life or death struggle against the French; freedom against slavery.

For Valkenier, as for earlier Orangist writers, this form of government was linked to prosperity, longevity and, vitally in the climate of 1675, freedom from foreign incursion. Valkenier argued that as long as Sparta had a 'tempered' form of government, she had been able to ward off all aggressors. The Venetians had enjoyed their mixed constitution for over twelve hundred years 'sonder eenig rimpel of kreuk van bejaartheyt en verval te toonen'. Not only had Venice enjoyed wealth and independence, but she had, like the republic of Genoa, been content, 'sich met sijn
tegenwoordigen Staat vernoegt houde’. This was in sharp contrast to the European domination sought by Louis XIV. England with its King, Lords and Commons was cited as yet another example of a mixed constitution; a comment which combined a degree of accuracy with an acute sensitivity to the needs of Dutch diplomacy in relation to Charles II.

Valkenier reinforced the message which Hubert had propounded in 1669. Like Hubert he laid particular emphasis on the 1587 Placard of the States of Holland, and its statement that the constitution of Holland and Zeeland had enjoyed a mixture of countly authority and States governance for eight hundred years or more. This form of government in Valkenier’s analysis had continued until the Great Assembly of 1651 ‘met sulke voorspoed, dat de hele wereld die admireerde, en stelde tot een exemplar van een volmaakten Staat’. His insistence on the necessity of a stadholder was couched in language and imagery which was only too familiar. He wrote that ‘de nootsaakelijkheit van een Stadhouder ofte illustre Hooft is van sulken gewicht, dat aan de Decisie van dit Politijk Poinct dependeert de Balance van de Geunieerde Provintien’. Was it not the illustrious Bodin who had said that many-headed regimes always suffered from external aggression or internal discord and that where the government of the many flourished this was not due to their mutual counsel, ‘maar alleen van een van de Verstandigste, deze in de Balance heeft gehouden, en als een Koning geregeert’?  

The practical advantages of a single head

Valkenier’s comments on the dangers attendant on a many headed-regime provide a suitable introduction for a consistent element in Orangist polemic. Simply expressed, this stressed the practical advantages of a single head within the government. On occasions, this element of headship was interwoven within the rhetoric of the mixed

constitution. At other times, the advantages of an ‘opperhoofd’ were presented on purely pragmatic grounds without reference to any ideal constitution. This partial emphasis on the utilitarian aspects of the stadholderate was considered and deliberate. Supporters of the States Party were often to opine that while the stadholderate had evolved in the past as as representative of the sovereign, now that the sovereign, that is the provincial states, was present, there was simply no requirement for any individual stadholder. This argument was promulgated in the Apologie of 1663 where the stadholder was described as ‘een Houder ofte Bekleder van een andersmans plaets, die self absent ofte niet tegenwoordig is’ with the accompanying conclusion that now such a position was surplus to requirements for ‘de Hooge Overigheydt selver tegenwoordig is’. 37 This was not an arena of debate which the Orangists wished to enter. Rather they emphasised both a constitutional framework and equally important, the practical advantages, of a single head.

Valkenier placed this theme within the language of the mixed constitution. In his depiction of events since 1650 and the end of the stadholderate an intended pure aristocratic form had degenerated, as such forms would, into an oligarchy. In Valkenier’s words the government of de Witt had ‘uit een Getemperden en Perfecten staat eene puyre Aristocratie ingevoert, dat sy in een Oligarchie verbasterde en lichtelijk ook tot een Monarchie hadden kunnen ontaarden’. The rule of such an oligarchy would provoke a popular democratic reaction, the chaos of which would hasten the onset of a monarchical form of government, intent on restoring stability and order. For Valkenier 1672 had witnessed a ‘generale Revolutie en Omkeeringe van de Aristocratie’, the restoration of the stadholderate substituting instead ‘de oude getempeerde Regeeringe by dewelke desen Staat altyd hadden welgevaren’. 38 Thus the stadholderate became not

37 Knuttel. no. 8794A. p. 8.
a vehicle for monarchical pretensions but the pivotal part of a mixed constitution
intended specifically to prevent the excesses of single head government.

This theme was not Valkenier’s alone. A print of 1674, issued at the time when
the stadholderate was proclaimed hereditary, depicts a figure entitled Anticurius van
Loevesteyn. This creature, depicted in human form, was born it was alleged in 1650 and
portrayed at the height of his powers. His hat, which the figure presents as the hat of
freedom, is sheer deceit for under the shadow of its broad brim is concealed his desire to
be ‘Monarch over de vrye landen’ and, to this end, his mouth spews forth a host of
named pamphlets slandering the House of Orange and its supporters. On his cuffs
protruding beneath the sleeves of his jacket he bears the mottoes ‘Oligarchia’ and
‘Monarchia’ for it is insisted he hoped by means of marital alliance, intrigue and
hypocrisy ‘in alle Steden de regeringh aen eenige geslachten, en daer na aen sich alleen,
trecken’. The re-established stadholderate and the crushing of the Perpetual Edict
have thwarted his strategy.

This theme was not new, though in the light of events of 1672, Valkenier
developed it more thoroughly than most commentators. It is characteristic of Orangist
polemic that at times of acute tension within the body politic, the dangers of a pure
aristocracy degenerating into a closed self seeking oligarchy were emphasised. This
plaint surfaced in 1650 when the contentious issue of the decommissioning of troops
brought fundamental issues of sovereignty to the fore culminating in the Prince’s
aborted attempt to occupy Amsterdam by military force. A notorious Orangist pamphlet
of that year entitled *Bickerse Beroerten* deployed the type of argument which Valkenier
was to use. The anonymous writer of 1650 reiterated the judgment of classical
authorities in contending that an ‘Aristocratique oft Borgerlicke Regeringen’ could not
exist in perpetuity for such would always be destroyed either by foreign aggression or,
more commonly, by internal strife. It was characteristic of many-headed government that 'die niet altijdts zijnde van een humeur ende drift' and without any single head or monarchical element to control this disparate self interest, the state would be torn apart, 'hebbende geen persoon noch middel om hen in blance te houden'. The author commented that 'ick bekenne dat dese Sieckte gemeyn is in alle Aristocratique Regeeringen'.

A similar warning was issued by the author of *Haegh's Hof-Praetje* in 1662. He argued that the heart of man was, by nature, proud and ambitious and sought rather his own interest than that of the common good. This view, expressed in language very similar to that of de la Court, led to the contention that 'is men geen hooft, men soeckt het te werden'. The author alleged that this was indeed what had happened in some Dutch towns where, in the absence of a stadholderate, certain great families ruled like princes, elevating their friends and relatives to office and all under the soubriquet of popular government. This form of governance could not persist for the experience of classical Rome demonstrated that what had begun as a collegiate form of government had been reduced to that of a Triumvirate and finally a single Emperor. Glancing across the channel, he pointed to the many headed Republic from which the Protectorate of Cromwell had issued forth. Such a development was an inevitable concomitant of the disorder and disunity resulting from many headed rule. This could be seen, he alleged, in the factious nature of some town politics in the United Provinces since the death of William II, a situation which he compared in an excess of hyperbole, to the late medieval struggles of Hoeks and Kabeljauws. His language was echoed by the author of *Hollands Op-komst* of 1662. In refutation of the attack on a single head in de la Court's *Interest van Holland*, this author contended, from biblical sources, that when there was no 'opper-hooft' in Israel, 'elke deed wat hy wilde'. If there was no prince,
then each man tried to become one. Like, Valkenier, he argued that in the multi-headed
government which ensued, stronger characters would prevail and there would be an
inexorable movement towards monarchy. The English Republic and the emergence of
Cromwell as Lord Protector was held once more to be evidence to support this theory. 42

In line with this argument John de Witt was depicted at critical times in Orangist
polemic as another Cromwell. Both had deposed the lawful ruler and imposed an
oligarchy dominated by a personal autocracy. In 1653 with demonstrations raging in
favour of the young Prince William III, the author of Ondeckinghe van den
Nederlantschen cancker fulminated that de Witt sought peace with England as he and
his fellow regents were ‘van Ghelijke Maximen met haar’. Both sought to establish a
military oligarchy, root out all descendants of Orange and Stuart and reduce their fellow
citizens to slaves. 43 In the crisis year of 1672 a pamphlet purported to catalogue the
contents of John de Witt’s library included alongside the works attributed to de la Court
and Spinoza’s Tractus Theologico-Politicus, a work entitled De verresen Cromwel with
the subtitle in de Person van M. Ian. 44 A pamphlet of late August 1672 published in
Amsterdam accused de Witt of attempting to smother the infant William III in his
cradle, both literally and figuratively we must presume, and asserted that he would share
the netherworld with the regicides Cromwell, Bradshaw and Peters. 45

At other less volatile times, Orangists were merely content to emphasise the
disadvantages of a government with many heads and the sedition and chaos which they
argued would ensue. Following the death of William II, a writer of 1650 bemoaned the
fate of the United Provinces without the Prince describing the state as a ‘body without a
head’, a ‘ship without a rudder’ and the ‘sheep without their shepherd’. 46 These are

42 Hollands Op-komst ofte Bedenkingen op de Schaadelijke Schriften genaamt Graafelyke Regeeringe en
Interest van Holland. (Leiden,1662), pp. 107-108.
43 Knuttel. no. 7441. np.
44 Knuttel. no. 10436, p. 7.
45 Knuttel. no. 10393, np.
46 Knuttel. no. 6869, p.1
images of leaderless disorder. The disasters of the naval war against England in 1653 accompanied by pro-Orangist demonstrations fanned by hunger and unemployment provided the setting for further rhetoric bemoaning the absence of a single head. In a poem commemorating the death of Admiral Harpertszoon Tromp in 1653 the poet Jan Six van Chandelier compared the loss of this ‘prins te water’ with the death of William II, the ‘prins te land’. This was a double blow for the Republic for in Six van Chandelier’s words

```
Nu hanght het hoofd van Nederlands hoofden,
Noch meer bedeest, om dien ontroofden.
```

For this writer the consequences of the death of the stadholder were clear. He asked rhetorically

```
Wat schiep de dood des Prins te land,
Ons niet al schaade, twist en schaand? 47
```

Jan Six van Chandelier was to repeat this theme in a poem of the same year entitled ‘De Koninghlyke Regeeringe, met de Byen Vergeleeken’. He described the harmonious and industrious and bee-hive stricken with disaster on the death of its king or ‘groote Heer’.

```
Maar komt een dodelik teegenweer
Den kroonedrager wegh te rukken,
Zoo springt de ronde hoep, aan stukken.
Het heele ryk dat valt om weer.
Geheime tweedracht ingelaaten,
By’t goudgeel voksken, stookt het vier
Van twisten onder ‘t kleine dier.
```

This internal disorder not only shatters the harmony and prosperity of the kingdom but it also leaves it vulnerable to attack from hostile forces beyond its frontiers, in this case the England of Cromwell. Thus following the death of stadholder William II.

Daar werd geen honigh meer gebooren,  
't Gemeene best gaat verlooren  
Ten beste van de plunderingh.

The English fall upon the stricken kindom like ravenous birds of prey. However there is a remedy for the kingdom’s ills. Six van Chandelier advises

O vorsteloose hoonigby,  
Indien ghe wilt in ruste bloeijen,  
Zoo laat Oranjes telg, aan 't groeijen,  
Beschaaduwen uw landery.48

Six van Chandelier’s remedy was finally to be adopted. Faced not only with the catastrophic French invasion but also the threat of internal dissolution, the Prince of Orange was appointed in 1672 to the office of captain general which had been held by his forefathers. An anonymous author commended the States of Holland for their action and relished the advent of the king bee in these perilous times.

G’lijck onder Bye-vlught veld-togtigh tot het stormen,  
Op weyde, en Thuyen-lof, om haar winter schuur te vormen,  
En kleyne huysjes vol te laen met morgen Dauw,  
Wannerder twist onstaet ontrent verwarde benden,  
Haar Koningh, door zijn komst weet ‘t onheyl af te wenden,  
Verstelt dit Raedt– besluyt ‘t onredelijcke Grauw.49


49 Knuttel, no. 9968a. np.
However, usually the images of disorder conjured up by the Orangists were more prosaic and repetitious. The author of a pamphlet of 1651 argued that the pure aristocratic form of government was prone to discord and hence tardiness in decision making for 'veel hoofden, soo veel sinnen'. Jan Zoet, an ardent Orangist, characterised the confusion of multiple leadership in homely imagery. In his poem Veel Hoofden, veel Zinnen, he set the scene.

Daar veel Hoofden, steeg van zinnen,
Zijn vergaadert in den Raad,
Om den Rokken af te spinnen,
Oh! daar werd gestaag den draad.

An author of 1662 urged the States of Holland to contemplate the restoration of a stadholderate for

...door 't heffen van een Hooft,
Soo wort ons Vaderlandt van alle twist berooft.

By 1672, the many-headed Hydra had become emblematic of the government of de Witt, a monster whose chief heads had, in the words of an Orangist writer, been sliced off by the death of the two brothers in the Hague in August of that year.

There were indeed practical disadvantages, Orangists argued, in the absence of a head. Polemic made much of the tardiness in decision making which was alleged to be characteristic of a many-headed government. This was particularly pertinent at times of war. A pamphlet published in 1652 purported to contain comments made by English members of Parliament to a servant of Charles II in which they indiscreetly revealed what they believed to be critical Dutch weaknesses. Chief among these was the inability of the Republic’s government to reach speedy decisions. Also characteristic of the

---

50 Knuttel. no. 7009, p. 8.
51 Jan Zoet. 'Uitsteekeeke Digt-Kunstige Werken (Amsterdam, 1675), p. 287.
52 Knuttel. no. 8653, np.
53 Knuttel. no. 10614, p. 3.
Republic it was alleged was a high level of corruption. A many headed government left numerous individuals involved in decision making and open to bribery to reveal secrets and influence strategy.\textsuperscript{54} In a pamphlet of the same year a fictional merchant bemoaned the fact that 'onse Provincien dikwijls te lang delibeereeren, eer sy tot goede resolutie konnen komen'. This was 'een gemeene plaag hier te lande'. The common people, he alleged, were deeply mistrustful of such delays and believed that the regents involved many have been bribed by powers hostile to the Republic.\textsuperscript{55} The author of \textit{Haeghs Hof-Praetje} of 1662, writing in peacetime, asserted that a stadholder was essential for speedy resolution and secrecy both of which were now lacking.\textsuperscript{56} War in 1672 saw a return of these accusations. In a work of that year the author contended that a single head could act swiftly and resolutely without reference to numerous competing interests. Moreover, the government leaked like a sieve. He quoted Jan Evertszoon, the Admiral of Zeeland, who fulminated that in the Dutch Republic his orders were known to the enemy before he had ever had the chance of opening them.\textsuperscript{57}

There is no doubt that secrecy was more difficult to achieve in the Dutch Republic than elsewhere. From 1650 to 1672 all commanders at sea and on land sent their dispatches to the States General and attempts to limit access to sensitive material were thwarted. Of the correspondence arriving for consideration by the States of Holland, there was little discrimination made between items for public review and those of a more secret nature.\textsuperscript{58} The Orangist's complaints may have been entirely related to the problems of maintaining secrecy in the Republic. However, there was a long tradition in political writing which emphasised the problems of government without a single head. Francesco Guicciardini in his 'Considerations upon the Discourses of Machiavelli' expressed a view common in early modern Europe when he wrote,

\textsuperscript{54} Knuttel, no. 7214, np.
\textsuperscript{55} Knuttel, no. 7246, pp. 9, 29.
\textsuperscript{56} Knuttel, no. 8654, p.8
\textsuperscript{57} Knuttel, no. 9970A, pp. 189-192.
I will say that the advantage of princely rule is that affairs are governed much better, in a more orderly manner, and with greater speed, security and determination, when they depend on the will of one man alone, than when a number of people are involved.59

It may be that the Orangists were both commentating on contemporary realities and drawing on the rhetoric of the past when they castigated their opponents.

The industrious hive

Jan Six van Chandelier’s hive of bees with their king had been both harmonious and productive. Before the death of William II in 1650 Orangist rhetoric had often presumed that the presence of a stadholder had created circumstances in which trade and commerce could flourish. In a print of Prince Maurice designed by Adrian van Nieuwelandt and engraved by Symon de Pas under the privileges of the States General prominent on the far left of the composition was the figure of Trade bearing a ship in her left hand and a smaller vessel on her head. This plate was also to be used in honour of Frederick Henry and William III.60 Seafaring and commerce also had a place in a print of Frederick Henry dated to 1647 and reproduced in a work of Commelin in 1651. Here the seated stadholder is flanked by the figures of freedom and vigilance with a bare breasted figure of commerce carrying the body of a ship.61

It is interesting that during the 1650’s Orangist propaganda made virtually no use of these themes. To be fair, they were not under challenge. From 1652, polemic was concerned with the conduct of the war against England and in 1654 and 1655 the predominate issue was the Exclusion of the young prince of Orange. This situation changed abruptly in 1662 with Pieter de la Court’s *Interest van Holland*. For de la Court it was axiomatic that princes and monarchs did not aspire to the welfare of the majority

---

61 Stolk. no. 1933.
but rather sought their own interests even at the cost of common misfortune. They favoured the villages and countryside at the expense of the towns whose power and influence they feared. The prosperity of the province of Holland which could be observed by all was no work of the stadholders but the result of the religious toleration which attracted individuals and skills from far beyond the frontiers. The stadholders had indeed harmed commercial development. It was the stadholder and his supporters in the States General whose counsel had resulted in the mismanagement of the West India Company. Frederick Henry had neglected to clear the seas of pirates, instead withdrawing funds from the Admiralty. It was even alleged that William II had paid Sicilian corsairs to seize the ships of Amsterdam. To those who complained of heavy taxation and its effects on commerce, de la Court insisted that such levels of taxation were but a legacy of the unnecessarily belligerent policy of successive Orange stadholders.\(^{62}\)

De la Court’s argument was taken up by others who were critical of the Orange stadholderate. The author of *Den Oprechten Stadhouder* acknowledged that he could not support all the arguments of de la Court against princes and he deplored the fact that arguments such as these were rehearsed before the common people. However he concurred with de la Court’s thesis that the Holland towns furthered their own interests best in the absence of a stadholder for ‘dese dwinglandy der Vorsten en willen geen koop-steden lijden’. He drew on the example of the city of Naples where merchants and tradespeople were hampered by the heavy taxes on goods imposed by their King and thus lost trade to other towns.\(^{63}\) In a pamphlet of 1666 a fictional Amsterdammer opined that the stadholders had milked his townsmen of all their wealth to reward their soldiers and lackeys to the detriment of the province’s prosperity.\(^{64}\) In a pamphlet of 1672 an anonymous supporter of the States Party argued that the Perpetual Edict of 1667 had

\(^{62}\) Knuttel, no.8652, pp. 3r, 3v, 38-40, 93-95, 101.

\(^{63}\) Knuttel, no. 8806B, pp. 6-7.

\(^{64}\) Knuttel, no. 9330, p. 23.
upheld not only the freedom but the prosperity of the province. Previously, during the
time of the stadholders, only eight or nine East Indiamen returned each year but now
eighteen, nineteen or twenty were returning annually loaded with cargo. The treaty of
commerce with France in 1662, the Peace of Breda with England in 1668 and the Triple
Alliance of 1668 between the Dutch Republic, England and Sweden were all lauded as
precursors of increasing commerce and prosperity. 65

The Orangists were stung to respond and the presumed link between the
stadholderate and prosperity quickly became a consistent feature in Orangist rhetoric.
Parival in his Ware Interest van Holland of 1662 argued that merchants and traders
needed a stadholder ‘om bevrijt te zijn van het oproer des gemenen volks’. Venice had
shown the way with her Doge. Contrary to the arguments of de la Court, it was in the
interests of governors, as Parival called them, to enrich their citizens. Here was no
divergence of interest. It was Maurice who had presided over the setting up the great
trading companies such as East and West Indies Company and the Muscovy Company.
He had encouraged the whaling industry and all had benefited from the attacks on the
great Spanish silver fleets. The debacle in Brazil had taught the world how unfit trading
interests alone were to govern a colony. De la Court might argue that the stadholders
sought only to enrich themselves at the nations costs but Parival drew the finger of
accusation at the regents of Holland with their ‘cierlijke gebouwen, kostelijk huisraet,
karossen, paerden en andere tekenen van overvloedt’.66

The attack continued in the following year. The author of den Herstelden Prins
pointed to the examples of Venice and Genoa where prosperity and commercial success
occurred under a government with an ‘opperhoofd’. Emphasising the virtues of a
government with a ‘schijn’ of monarchy he urged his fellow countrymen and
countrywomen to reflect on the French adage, ‘trois choses font profiter l’homme, la

65 Knuttel, no. 10230, p. 9.
66 Knuttel, no. 8653B, pp. 20, 50, 68, 85, 90, 103.
Science, *La Mer et la Maison Royale*. In another pamphlet of 1663 a fictional minister of the Reformed Church alluded to the heavy burden of taxation currently borne by his fellow citizens and in sharp contrast to de la Court opined that single heads or monarchs were often more responsive to their subjects needs. A fictional Geldersman referred pointedly to the burdensome cost of enlarging towns and building new town halls. In his view the fishing industry was still vigorous but other sectors of trade and industry were now declining particularly in contrast to such countries as France. All things objectively considered, the author asserted that the stadholders had encouraged wealth and prosperity and the nation was the poorer for their absence. 68

The intense polemic of 1672 saw a return to the theme. An anonymous author returned to the attack against the presumptions of de la Court’s *Interest van Holland* and his contention that the stadholderate had played no part in the nation’s prosperity. On the contrary, he protested, ‘soo en kan men oock niet ontkennen dat geduerende de directie en ‘t bewint van de Princen van Orangie, de gronden en fondamenten van onse Negotie gheleyt zyn.’69 A poem of the same year, published in pamphlet form, emphasised that, contrary to the rhetoric of de la Court, the interests of prince and people were one and the same. The author wrote of the Holland maid who planted an orange tree in her garden which provided shelter and fruit. The interdependence of the two was total for ‘de voorspoet van den een de voorspoet was van d’ander’. However the figure of ‘Nijdt’ broke into the garden, hacked down the tree and lulled the maid to sleep. Disaster was averted when a young twig of that tree sprouted heavenwards to restore the honour of his forefathers and ‘de Tuyn van Hollant weer doen bloeyen als voor heen’.70

---

68 Knuttel, no. 8806D, pp. 6, 10, 24, 229, 272..
69 Knuttel, no. 9954, p.30.
70 Knuttel, no. 10628, np.
Clearly this was an occasion where the Orangists had not taken the lead but had been stung into action by the polemic of their opponents. They had identified that de la Court’s rhetoric struck at the core of their argument with its assertion that princes and stadholders looked only to their own interests and not the common good. It was vital that the States Party should not be able to depict themselves as the guardians of the nation’s welfare. Hence not merely the counter arguments but the language of the interpendency in the image of the garden which flourishes under the shelter of the tree and whose fertility is impaired until the severed trunk grows again.

What type of Prince

The Orangists used both constitutional and utilitarian arguments to justify the existence of a stadholderate but we may well ask what type of institution they intended. In examining this, it is important to bear in mind that factional polemic is often shaped by the arguments of opponents and this can be seen in the Orangist defence of the stadholderate. Following the death of William II, writers hostile to the House of Orange argued consistently that the stadholders had aimed to become monarchs rather than servants of the provincial States. This strategy played on genuine apprehensions among some sections of the community. Aitzema recorded in January 1651 that at the baptism of the young prince William III, ‘som did not take it well that the halberdiers went by the Coach sides of the young prince, nor that the childe was covered with Ermyn-fur, black on white, that being royal’. Political pamphlets exploited the theme. A writer of 1655 described how the Emperor Augustus in order to vest himself with supreme authority had deceived the magistrates by appearing to uphold the old forms of government and mouthing slogans of freedom. He had kept the old title of Prince with which the people were familiar and had eschewed the title of King, ‘hoewel hy de

---

71 Lion (Lieuwe van)Aitzema, Notable Revolutions (London, 1653), p. 369.
macht van ‘t Rijck als een Heer ofte Koninck in zijn handt hadde ghebruycckte’.

Similarly in France Charles Martel had always referred to himself as ‘First Noble’ though he had exercised all the authority pertaining to a king.\textsuperscript{72} The moral was clear. The stadholders might retain their title and the outward forms of the constitution while exercising monarchical authority. A pamphlet of 1663 was more direct. In the view of this author, the former stadholders had acted against the privileges and prestige of the States ‘omme dese alderwettigste Regeerige met gewelt ende listigheyt de voet te ligten, ende op haer selven allenig Monarchael over te brengen’.\textsuperscript{73} The threat of monarchy reared its head once more when a fictional citizen of Delft assured his travelling companions on a barge from Dordrecht to Rotterdam that those who supported the Prince were not true Hollanders. They wanted, he asserted, a crowned head at the expense of the country’s freedoms and privileges.\textsuperscript{74}

The situation was complicated from the Orangist point of view by the strategy of the brothers de la Court. In their \textit{Consideratien en Exempelen van Staat} published in 1660 they made it plain that, in their analysis kings, princes and stadholders were one and the same. They wrote of Holland as now liberated from a long enduring slavery under Emperors, Counts and Princes and deplored those writers who filled their books with ‘schand en schaedlikke Monarchale pluimstrijkeryen’. They defined a monarchy as a state in which one person alone gave all the orders and the others obeyed. They acknowledged that monarchy might have its advantages. The single head might protect his people the better to increase his own power against external enemies and internal foes. He could seek counsel from whosoever he wished and did not need long deliberations with other interested bodies. However, a monarch was subject to all human passions and surrounded by flatterers. There was no individual or body to inhibit his natural inclination to concentrate power in his own person. Monarchs came to power

\textsuperscript{72} Knuttel, no. 7660, pp. 37-38.
\textsuperscript{73} Knuttel, no. 8794A, p.100.
\textsuperscript{74} Knuttel, no. 9330, p.13.
in different ways. Some inherited the crown. Others usurped the authority of those whom they had represented just as 't gelukte den Prince van Oranjen als Stadhouder, te schoppen den koningh Philips van Spanjen als Graven van Holland'. However the vigour and vitality of the usurper was often diminished and corrupted in the offspring, as seen in the persons and policies of Frederick Henry and William II. In this analysis, the Orange stadholders did not aspire to monarchical power; in effect they already enjoyed it.

Orangists therefore had to be cautious in the arguments they deployed to defend a single head. As we have seen many Orangists writers argued that the stadholderate represented the monarchical element in a mixed constitution. They were, however, usually careful to refute any suggestion that the stadholder functioned as a monarch. Some sailed closer to the wind than others. For David Blondel writing in 1653, the advantage of some type of single head was apparent for,

il est indubitable que plus les ordres du gouvernement aboutissent à l'unité, et approchent des perfections de l'Estat Monarchiques qui semble estre un image plus expresse de l'empire de Dieu; plus ils sont efficacieus, faciles et de prompte exécution.

It is not likely that Blondel here was recommending monarchy for the United Provinces. He may simply have been reiterating a view common in the universities where political systems were discussed in the abstract without reference to the vagaries of individual states. Boxhorn in his posthumous Institutiones Politicae of 1657 had described monarchy as the oldest and most secure form of government but there was no suggestion that this was a recipe for the Dutch Republic. More pertinent perhaps is the fact that Blondel was a prominent French Calvinist who was amongst those who had

75 Consideratien en Exempelen van Staat omtrent de Fundamenten van allerleey Regeringe (Amsterdam, 1660), pp. 'voor-reden', 10-13, 21, 32, 67.
76 Knutel, no. 7427, p. 86.
77 Wansink, Politieke Wetenschappen, p. 105.
seen a strong monarchy as the sole means of securing religious toleration in France. Appointed as Professor at the Athenaeum in Amsterdam in 1650, he may not have been sensitive to the different political nuances in the Dutch Republic of that time.\textsuperscript{78}

Other writers were more cautious. Parival writing in 1662 argued that headship was intrinsic to human relations. Only the beasts without the power of reason had no ‘opperhooft’. In human society, ‘de onderdanen hebben een Meester, de soldaten hun kapiteyn, de jonge kinderen hun Opperhooft, namentlijk hun vader’. However this was no explicit plea for monarchy. He attacked de la Court’s analysis on the grounds that ‘hy tusschen het woort Gouverneur en Monarch, gheen onderscheid maekt’. For Parival there was a clear distinction between monarchs who are constitutionally able to demand obedience and whose nature and that of their servants favours ‘strengheit’ and the position of a governor or stadholder.\textsuperscript{79} The author of \textit{Bedenkingen Op het Boek ‘Interest van Holland’} of 1662 also drew on the animal kingdom though his kingdom of the beasts was strictly hierarchical in nature. The lion was monarch of all the animals while the eagle ruled amongst the birds and the whale amongst the fish of the sea. However, this author emphasised that such analogies were not to be read as an argument for monarchy for such an institution ‘strijt tegen de nature der Inwoonders’. Rather the Republic required a ‘head’ whose power was limited and dependent on the States General.\textsuperscript{80}

However de la Court’s conflation of monarchy and the stadholderate led some Orangist writers of the 1660’s to adopt the strategy of defending both institutions. In a pamphlet of 1663 \textit{den Herstelden Prins} the author argued that de la Court’s criticisms of monarchy were invalid. Monarchs did not seek to render their subjects powerless for the interests of both king and people were inextricably linked. Just as David and


\textsuperscript{79} Knuttel, no. 8653B, pp. 36, 69, 178.

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Bedenkingen Op het Boek ‘Interest van Holland’}, pp. 17,19.
Solomon ruled their kingdoms wisely, there were present day monarchs whose authority was equally beneficent. If faults there were, then these must be imputed to individuals and not to the institution itself. The benefits which the author alleged flowed from monarchical rule were also clearly held to be present in a government with a stadholder or prince. However, the stadholder was no monarch for the States could impose limits upon his authority whereas, in this analysis, the monarch or Count ruled unfettered. The States conferred part of their authority and lustre upon the person of the stadholder who, in his turn, bestowed to the Republic and the world beyond the splendour bestowed upon him and his own personal glory as one of the great princely families of Europe. Such a single head or ‘opperhoofd’ was in no wise incompatible with a Republic. A pamphlet published of the same year similarly asserted that monarchs and single heads were both bound to the common welfare of their subjects and their endeavours in this matter might outdo those of a headless Republic.

Pieter de Hubert writing in 1669 equally emphasised that the stadholderate was no monarchy for such a form of government was alien to the Dutch. Drawing on the history of the Batavians and their predecessors he argued that the so called kings of those times were rather princes to whom powers had been delegated. The Prince of those times was merely ‘primus inter pares’, elevated beyond his peers by his eminent qualities but circumscribed by the laws established by them. This limited authority was the hallmark of a state with a prince who directed peace and war but who was no absolute monarch. Moving easily like Grotius from that distant time to the present, he sketched a Republic in which ‘de hoogste Regeeringe is geweest by de Staten dezer landen’, the States enjoying what he described as ‘macht’, perhaps here the ultimate

81 Knuttel, no. 8806A, pp. 2-3, 6-7, 26-27, 63-64.
82 Knuttel, no. 8806D, pp. 6-7.
sovereignty while the prince is endowed with ‘gezag’ emanating from the authority bestowed on him by the States as a result of his own pre-eminence.83

One pamphlet however argued that the powers of the stadholderate should be extended and the author firmly embraced the language of monarchy. This work Het Hollandts A.B. Boeck was printed in 1672, probably in or about the month of July. Its unknown author opined that after extensive reading and study of different forms of political structure, he considered monarchy to be far superior to any other form of government. This single headed form of government was indubitably the oldest. Adam, the first man, had been king over the newly created world while God himself had assumed the role of sovereign in the early history of Israel. Nothing could more adequately bear witness to the authority of monarchical governments ‘als dat sy zijn die Godt op der Aerde representeert’. This author reverted firmly to the language of head and body. Each body or state could only have one head otherwise the state would be no more than a monstrous hydra. He conceded that monarchy could more easily degenerate to tyranny than aristocratic or popular governments but argued that the ill was more easily cured for with the death of a tyrant his abuse of power ceased and the people were free to elect any future king. Sickness in a government of many heads, however, infected the whole body politic and was far more difficult to eradicate. This argument may refer back obliquely to the death of the stadholder William II whom some would have characterised as an aspiring tyrant and whose death resolved this issue. States Party polemic did make much of the fact that there was, in practice, little to hinder a stadholder bent on personal sovereignty. Death had provided the answer as the author suggests.

From monarchs the author moved smoothly to princes and the argument that a single head and prince was essential to the security and prosperity of the United

83 Knuttel, no. 9762, pp. 27-28, 227.
Provinces. The history of the provinces under the Counts bore testimony to this contention. However, he considered that the present circumstances required a reappraisal of the powers available to the Orange stadholderate. Many of the enemies of William III were still in power both at civic and provincial level and they were plotting revenge. He argued that in this particular perilous situation the powers of the stadholder and captain general were too limited and urged that a greater honour would be gained by the state if ‘den Heere en Prince soude mogen doen ‘jure potestatis’, t ghene de Stadthouders en Capiteynen Generaels gedaen hebben by toelatingen en concessie’. The Prince of Orange by virtue of his birth and royal connections was eminently suited to this sovereign authority. By means of sound laws and privileges there could be ‘een goede harmonie tusschen de macht en authoriteyt den Prince competerende en de gerechtigheyt des volx’. Structures of authority could be so well devised ‘dat de Prince is Souverayn en de Magistraet als zijn Parlement’.

This pamphlet must be treated in context. By early July 1672 cities such as Dordrecht were compelling their regents to sign a document renouncing the Perpetual Edict. William III would then be able to become stadholder of Holland as well as captain general. With enemies of the stadholderate still holding authority in many other cities, Valkenier supported by a group of Amsterdam regents was speaking of a plan to make William Count on terms similar to those offered to his forefather William I before the latter’s untimely death. We can trace this development in pamphlet literature. One writer warned all lovers of the Fatherland and supporters of the Prince of Orange that the hatred of some regents for William III was so great that it was impossible to restore the country to her former glory while they still held authority. As stadholder William would not have the authority to challenge them. The only solution was that William should be declared Count of Holland for his lifetime and his successors should inherit

84 Knuttel, no. 10598, pp. 4-18.
85 Japikse, t, 206-207.
the office. This strategy would also result in peace with England and the Elector of Brandenburg, the Prince’s uncle, would then be well inclined to the Dutch.\footnote{Knutel, no. 10310, np.} Another writer argued that it was essential that the prince had the power necessary to drive out both external and internal enemies and this could only be achieved if he were elevated to the position of count.\footnote{Knutel, no. 10316, np.} A poem of 1672 entitled \textit{Aenspraek tot de Bedruckte Hollandtsche Bruydt} urged the nation, ‘Orangien zy u Hooft, u Vorst, u Graaff’.\footnote{Knutel, no. 10477, p. 12.}

Works such as these must be seen as evidence of a movement among certain of the supporters of the Prince of Orange but they cannot be held to be representative of all those who favoured the restoration of the stadholderate. William III did not become Count and it would appear that there was no great desire among the Orangists of the political classes that he should do so. That there were many Orangists who did value the checks and balances inherent in the position of the stadholderate can be seen by their unenthusiastic reaction in 1675 to the suggestion that William III should become Duke of Gelderland.

Following the re-incorporation of Utrecht, Overijssel and Gelderland into the Union of Utrecht in 1674, in January 1675 the three quarters of Gelderland offered William the Dukedom of the province and the countship of Zutphen. There is little doubt that the move was encouraged by the Prince’s circle and he himself was aware of it. Not only would William III receive the title of a sovereign within the province but since Gelderland was by tradition the first among the provinces, it might be expected that others would come forward with similar offers. The province of Utrecht approved the decision but Holland demurred. Towns where the Orangists were strongest such as Haarlem, Leiden and Enkhuizen were in the vanguard of those who disapproved. The States of Zeeland advised him to follow the example of the scriptural Gideon who had...
spurned the offers of monarchy after he had freed his people from the ravages of the Midianites.89

The rhetoric which ensued bore many of the features which had characterised the pamphlets against the House of Orange during the years 1650-1672. For one writer of 1675 William III's elevation to the Dukedom of Gelderland was indicative of that same 'hoogmoedige geest' which had characterised his father William II's attempts to gain sovereignty in the Republic. The court was awash with nobility and soldiery all seeking to fulfil their own ambitions by encouraging the pretensions of the stadholder. This author was prepared to tolerate headship of a limited kind such as occurred in those worthy states of Venice and Genoa but he preferred the example of the Swiss who eschewed any form of headship amongst them.90 Another writer repeated this theme when he warned both regents and subjects that their passion for the Prince of Orange would cause them to fall victim to the machinations of the nobility and soldiers who surrounded the prince and scorned the towns and citizens of the Republic.91 Yet another pamphlet allegedly printed in Antwerp contended that the prince of Orange sought sovereignty and urged the provinces to make a new Union with one another and compel the Prince to promise, 'dat hy met de digniteyten en ampten van sijne Voorsaaten te vreeden wesen sal, en nooyt tegen de Staat yets te contrarie tenteeren'.92 Here, the stadholdership of William III was accepted, at least in theory, but the author argued that the balance of powers within the Republic had been fatally altered and it was vital for the provinces together to take action together to correct this.

What is noticeable at this period is the absence of Orangist propaganda in favour of the Prince assuming the title Duke of Gelderland. It is as if there is a common consensus that this is a step too far. A print of 1675 by Romeyn de Hooghe depicted the

89 Japikse, I, 342-346; Groenveld, Evidentie factien in den staet, p. 69.
90 Knuttel, no. 11336, pp. 1-4, 7.
91 Knuttel, no. 11335, np.
92 Knuttel, no. 11334, p. 1.
offer of the dukedom to William. Even here there was a note of ambiguity. William was
depicted as a Roman General carrying the hat of freedom. To his right was sited a
woman grasping the seven arrows representing the seven provinces with her foot resting
on a foot warmer bearing the word 'Unio'. A woman bearing the motto 'dankbare
verlooningh' is about to lower the crown of the Dukedom onto William's head while
above them in the clouds his illustrious ancestors the Emperor Adolf, Rene de Chalons
and the Orange stadholders look down. All this is properly celebratory but there are
hints of unease. William is depicted drawn in Victory's chariot by a figure portrayed as
an athlete with a lion's skin who bears the motto 'drift der Gemeente'. It is a
perturbing notion that a strategy is being led, not followed, by the voice of the people
and there may be here some implied criticism of the absence of wiser counsels.
Certainly on 20th February 1675 William turned down the offer fulminating that his
enemies were accusing him of seeking to extend his own power as a result of the war.

It would appear that those few pamphlets of 1672 advocating the Countship for
William III marked the high water mark of certain Orangist aspirations. As we have
seen most Orangist writers placed the seat of power firmly with the provincial States
though they were not always explicit as to where the boundaries of the authority of the
prince lay. In part this was the result of semantic confusion and ambiguity. Orangists
commonly used such terms as 'rudder' and 'steersman' to refer to the person and
authority of the stadholder. In 1650 a pamphlet bemoaning the death of William II
referred to the bereaved Republic as 'een schip sonder roer' while verse on a print of
1672 at the height of the French invasion bewailed the fate of the Netherlands Maid
who 'zit alleenlijk op 't Schipje zonder roer'. The pamphlet Grondigh Bericht
nopende den Interest van desen Staet of 1651 referred to the stadholder as the
'stierman' of the Republic but emphasised the mutual dependency of Prince and

93 Stolk, no. 2616; Muller, no. 2571, Illustration in Pieter L. Muller, Onze Gouden Eeuw, iii, 17.
94 Knuttel, no. 6869, p.1
95 Muller, no. 2310.
provincial States. These usages were not novel. In a pamphlet entitled *A Remonstrance to the States General about the restoration and maintenance of the States of Holland* published in 1584 following the murder of William of Orange, the author contended that the enterprise faced shipwreck and it was essential to appoint a new helmsman to ensure that the vessel safely reached port. Prouninck's *Apology* of 1587 again deployed the analogy of the ship when he argued that in a storm a ship at sea must be navigated by a helmsman of high rank. These publications clearly referred to the necessity of a single head at a time of war but they were no appeal for a monarchical type of government. In the publication *Acten van de Vredehandel gheschiet te Colen* the spokesman for the States General, Aggaeus van Albada drew on a reference from the work *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* of 1579 when he argued that the prince was but a custodian and executor of the law and a servant of the ship of state. The prince did indeed hold the position of steersman but it was the whole people who were masters of the vessel. We may presume that Orangists writers of later times deployed this language in the same way, in which case they were clearly arguing for limited executive authority.

Orangists were also inclined to describe the stadholders as ‘pillars’ of the Republic. In an elegy on the death of William II an unknown author wrote of the former stadholder, ‘ghy waert de starcke suyl daer op men had gebout’, while an author writing on the same theme declaimed that William was the ‘zuyl van ’t Vaderlandt’. This imagery recurs in visual form in 1672 in a print by Romeyn de Hooghe to commemorate the appointment of William III as Captain General of the Republic’s forces. The prince is sited behind a table taking the oath of office while behind him

---

96 Knuttel, no. 7009, p. 12.
99 Knuttel, no. 6871, np.
100 Knuttel, no. 6876, np.
stands the female figure of Freedom. A set of two pillars on either side of him bear the heads and shoulders of the previous Orange stadholders, William I, Maurice, Frederick Henry and William II.\textsuperscript{101} Clearly the pillars are a crucial part of the building for without them the structure will collapse but the imagery does not help us to define any further the authority of the stadholderate other than to point to the fact that the institution was essential in the Republic. In this last case, it could well be read that it was the force of arms of the stadholders which had been essential to the building of the new state.

It is significant that supporters of the States Party were increasingly seeking to conscript such images for their own purposes. In the anthology of poetry entitled \textit{Den Herstelden Apollos Harp} published in 1663 there was included in the appendix a virulently anti-Orangist poem in which the representatives of the States of Holland and West-Friesland, having cast off the yoke of Spain and fetters of Orangist domination, were collectively the helmsmen of the ship of state.

\begin{align*}
\text{Ghy Vaders van het vaderland} \\
\text{Die nu bevrijd van juck en boeyen,} \\
\text{Het groote stuyr hebt in de hand} \\
\text{Van 't schip daer w'allegaer aen roeyen.}\textsuperscript{102}
\end{align*}

On the death of William II Jacob Cats said that in a church or great hall there were pillars and crowns or coronas, that is circular candelabra, and so it was in the Dutch Republic. The pillars were the provincial states and the Prince of Orange the crown or candlesticks. The pillars remained steadfast and unaltered, bearing up the building and without them there could be no lights or candelabrum.\textsuperscript{103} Likewise, the poet Joachim Oudaan, long an admirer of de Witt and his policies wrote in 1666 of the regents Huigens and Boreel

\textsuperscript{101} Knuttel, no. 9969, np; Stolk, no. 2443.
\textsuperscript{102} ‘Vertroostinge voor de Onnosele en Bedroefde Ingesetene van Hollandt over de Dood van zijn Hoogheyt Prins Wilhelm de II’, in \textit{Den Herstelden Apollos Harp} (1663), ‘Appendix’ p.. 8
\textsuperscript{103} Aitzema, \textit{Notable Revolutions}, p. 120.
The deployment of this type of imagery suggests that both sides were determined that such imagery should not be the sole property of the other. Whatever the role of the stadholder, Orangists were quite clear that such an institution was compatible with the concept of freedom. States Party writers on the other hand were clear that freedom and the stadholderate were incompatible. The author of a pamphlet of 1655 drew on classical analogies. Scipio, the armed saviour of the Roman Republic, had been accused of financial irregularity and rather than throw himself on the sympathies of the mob he quit Rome for exile. Both Livy and this author commended this action for in a free republic it was too dangerous that any one person should be ‘het Hooft ende Suyl van den Staet’. Likewise in the Dutch Republic, it was the role of the States of Holland to conserve the freedom of the province and they could not function in this role if the young prince William III were promoted as stadholder. The affection which Scipio enjoyed among the Roman populace was here clearly perceived as antagonistic to the maintenance of freedom, a theme which was taken up by the unknown editor of the anthology of poetry Den Herstelden Apollos Harp of 1663. In his view the ‘gemeente’ were influenced by their ‘teachers’, the Reformed Ministers, to demand a stadholderate which was inimical to the cause of freedom and the States of Holland who were its true defenders.

How then did the States Party writers define freedom. A writer of 1662 saw it in terms of the Republic being able to choose the fittest to rule. He wrote that

---

104 ‘Staats-Zorg van den recht Edelen Standhaftigen, en Onvermoeiden Heere, den Heere Johan de With’, in Joachim Oudaans Poëzy, 3 vols (Amsterdam,1712), 1, 177.
105 Knuttel, no. 7660, pp. 36-37.
106 Den Herstelden Apollos Harp, ‘Ordonnantie’.
This state of affairs was not possible where a stadholder and his court served as a focus for ambitious regents who were prepared to support the interests of the Prince of Orange rather than the common good.

Orangist apologists were eager to emphasise that the presence of a single head did not prevent promotion by merit. In the *Proposition of the States of Zeeland* issued in 1660, it was argued that the element of majesty in the person of a single head prevented anarchy and confusion but at the same time anyone among the people could 'door sijne meriten en deuchden te kunnen deel hebben aen alle functien en bedieningen'. Sea captains such as the elder Tromp were proof of this. More commonly, however, Orangists argued that much of the States Party rhetoric was fuelled by self interest rather than any commitment to an abstract concept of freedom. The author of *den Herstelden Prins* of 1663 contended that when men said there was no freedom in a government with a prince, they simply meant that such a regime did not suit their own selfish interests. In any regime, even that which was many-headed, there were those who were denied advancement and they frequently resorted to cries of freedom and sought to overthrow and change the form of government. This situation had the paradoxical effect that 'so isser in geen staat van Regeringe vrijheid, en met sulcke vrijheid soude oock geen Staat noch Regeringe konnen bestaan'. Thus problems arose not because of the type of government but because of the nature of men and their ambitions. Orangists, echoing the language of past defenders of princely or single headed governance such as Castiglione, were keen to emphasise that freedom could

---

107 Knuttel, no. 8658, p. 12.
108 Knuttel, no. 8365A, p. 4.
109 Knuttel, no. 8806A, pp. 4-5.
simply mean licence. In a pamphlet of 1672 an Orangist author P.T. argued that freedom often implied the ability, 'om alles te seggen en schrijven' particularly when it was offensive to the House of Orange. Some people, he argued, meant by 'freedom' the freedom to ignore or disobey laws and governments with which they were in disagreement. No form of government could survive in such circumstances. Here the task of the governor is not only to maintain his subjects freedoms and privileges but also maintain the security against internal disorder or external aggression without which freedom is of little account.

The fullest development of the Orangist argument can be found in Pieter de Hubert's *Apologie tegens de Algemeene en Onbepaalde Vryheid* of 1669. He linked freedom and licence when he argued 'dat de grootste Vryheit daar in der daat is de meeste slavernye' for it was evident that 'algemeene en onbepaalde Vryheit beide voor Overheid en Onderdaan ten hoogsten schadelijk is'. It was to protect the subject against this potential perpetual conflict of interests that kings and princes were instituted. If freedom is defined, as he does as 'een vermogen om te doen het geene man wil' then clearly it needs to be restrained by laws upheld by an 'oppermaght'. Obedience to such laws is not just a duty but a privilege. Just as obedience to God is seen as the highest point of Christian freedom so obedience to a good king or prince is 'de grootste vryheit'. It could be argued that this was simply an argument in favour of pure monarchy but Hubert's tempers his thesis with the conclusion that while some peoples incline to monarchy, others of 'de middelbaar slag' favour an aristocratic government with a Prince 'die boven andere in waardigheid uitmunt, de eerste in de Regeeringe is'.

This raises the question as to why such a law-giving government cannot have many heads. To this Hubert raises two arguments. One is that the people have since the

---


111 Viva Hollandia of Nederlands Vreugde-Basuyn over het verkiesen van Wilhelm Ill... (1672), pp. 3, 28-29.
times of the Batavian Republic been ruled by a combination of princes or counts and representative assemblies and this system has stood the test of time. Hubert drew on Pliny to argue that such princes were not the result of blind providence but were chosen by a higher hand and that regime which is shown by time to agree with the nature and temper of the inhabitants is called ‘natural freedom’. The other is the standard Orangist argument that a government of many heads means a conflict of interests. Like his fellow apologists Hubert is deeply suspicious of an attack on the stadholderate fuelled by the language of freedom for such rhetoric frequently conceals a wealth of personal interest and ambition. He commented drily that ‘meer werd gesproken van vryheit om te regeeren als om geregeert te werden’ and drew with approval on the adage of Diego de Saavedra Fajardo that those who spoke of freedom and the common good were often motivated by narrow self interest and their own desire to rule. He concluded emphatically with words from Machiavelli’s Discorsi, ‘dat ‘er veele menschen gevonden werden, die uit liefde tot onbepaalde Vryheit, dikmaals andere haten die zy hoorden te beminnen, en quaad voor goed vergelden’.  

The Person of the Prince
Orangist rhetoric was intent not only to defend the institution of the stadholderate but also to promote the cause of a particular individual, the young prince of Orange William III. In Orangist polemic the two were so closely bound together that it becomes difficult to separate the office from the individual. Arguments in favour of a stadholderate are almost inevitably immediately followed by the assertion that this office must be filled by the young prince and none other. There was also a very clear attempt to present the person of the young prince to the people both as himself and as the fruit of a great dynasty who alone was worthy to fulfil this essential office. It was an essential element

112 Knuttel, no. 9762, pp.1-5, 9-10, 18-19, 318.
in Orangist writing that the prince’s pre-eminence came both from the dignity conveyed
on his forefathers and his own honourable princely status which in turn added its
splendour to that of the Republic.

This can better be understood when we consider the rhetoric of the opposition. In
the *Apologie ofte Verantwoordiginge van den Ondienst der Stadhouderlijcke
Regeeringe* of 1663, it was argued the provincial States were the sole source of the
lustre attendant on the stadholderate. Thus it was, the author argued, quite improper of
Louis XIII of France to style the stadholder Frederick Henry ‘hoogheyt’ while the States
General were merely ascribed the title ‘Heerlyckheeden’. The lustre of a servant can
and must only come from his master. Now that the States had taken the decision, which
was rightfully theirs, to abolish the stadholderate in the majority of provinces this lustre
had returned to them as its source.113 An author of the same year argued that any
authority and lustre pertaining to the stadholders came from the sovereignty enjoyed by
their masters the provincial States. The Princes of Orange had never enjoyed ‘hooge
overheit’ in the Republic and it was therefore inappropriate that the young prince should
be styled William III. He was the eleventh of that name to be Prince of Orange but that
was a matter of no relevance to his standing in the United Provinces where he was but a
private citizen like any other. The writer conceded that the mass of the citizenry did not
sufficently understand or respect this distinction.114 To assist them in this matter the
arms of the Prince of Orange had been removed from all public places and his colours
replaced by black and white.115

In contrast to this, Orangist writers asserted not only the services of the House of
Orange to the Republic but the lustre which their ancient and princely family has

113 Knuttel, no. 8794A, pp. 77-78
114 Knuttel, no. 8789, pp. 41-42, 44, 55.
115 Arnoldus Montanus, *Leven en Bedrijf van Willem Henrik, Prince van Orangien* (Amsterdam, 1677), p. 120.
conveyed with it. This is exemplified in a poem by Henrik Bruno’s of 1660 in which he wrote of William III’s princely and imperial lineage.

O groote Prins, o Spruyt van soo veel Princen looten,
Die, als een warde Neef, van Keysers stam gesprooten,
Van soo veel koningen, gekroonde hoofden zijt,
Die nae uw Vaders doodt, ons met uw sterr’ verblijt. 116

Orangist propaganda was eager to affirm that the Prince had the right to wear a crown, not as stadholder but as a result of his inheritance of the principality of Orange. In a print of 1653 the young prince was shown full length wearing a feathered cap. In his right hand he carried a staff of office and with his left hand he stroked the muzzle of a Netherlands lion. On the left stood a table on which rested a crown. To the right was a window in front of which was placed a flowerpot in which a sprig of orange was growing. Above the plant was the motto of the House of Orange adopted by Maurice ‘Tandem fit Curculus arbor’. The crown placed within this print can only refer to the principality of Orange and emphasises that William III enjoys princely status regardless of his circumstances within the Republic. Inevitably, this reference was linked to the restoration of the prince of Orange as stadholder. In a poem placed below the image J. Burghoorn urged the provinces,

...laet de wel-gevlochte Pijlen
Zijn gegront op d’oude stijlen,
Die den Prince Wilhelm gaff,
Tot hy quam in’t duyster graff.
...laet den Prins
...komen in des Vaderplaets. 117

The occasion of the oath of loyalty given to William III by the towns and citizens of the Principality of Orange on 7 May 1665 was allegedly marked by the appearence in

117 Stolk. no. 2224.
the sky of a sun crown. A print of the same year celebrated this noteworthy event and it was only to be expected that contemporaries would reflect on its significance.

In a poem set beneath the print and entitled ‘Op ‘t verschynen van de Zonnekroon’ the poet related,

Toen Willem wiertgehuldit verscheen ‘er in de wolken,  
Recht boven ‘t praaltoneel, een heldere zonnekroon,  
Het staart gestamt verschijnt om rampen te vertolken,  
Maar dit beloofde heil van d’opperhemeltroon.  
Nu wacht Oranje vrucht tot welstand van haar Staaten.  
Een loflijk Hooftprins leeft tot heil der onderzaten.

Clearly the author intended that this heavenly appearance marked not disaster but prosperity for the Prince’s subjects with the implicit implication that such benefits could accrue not only in Orange but in the Dutch Republic.\(^{118}\) In like manner, the entry of the Prince of Orange to the Council of State in 1670 was celebrated by the publication of a poem in pamphlet form by J. Orizant. Here the poet stressed William’s connections with the royal families of Europe and their emblems, the eagle, the lily and the rose but also emphasised the ancient lineage of the princes of Orange and their right to wear a crown. The desireability of William’s elevation to the stadholderate was urged as the poet stated ‘stadhouders ampt staet me voor uwe Hoogheyt open’.\(^{119}\)

The imagery of the crown recurs emphatically in 1672. In a work of that year, allegedly translated from the French, an unknown author tells of the power and privileges which accrue to William III as the prince of Orange. He argued that not all princes were the same. Rather the authority which the Prince enjoyed in Orange was ‘soo voortreffelijk dat ‘er geen Princen gevonden worden die sich van hooger besit-naem kunnen seggen’. In Orange William had a sovereign power invested in his person and God alone stood above him. The author took his readers back to the time of

\(^{118}\) Muller, no. 2209.  
\(^{119}\) Knutel, no. 9824, pp. 45, 54, 55 note v.
Theofrid, Prince of Orange in the year 700. He assured his readers that the early sources indicated that ‘daer is seker geen Souverain Prinsdom in Euroop van over soo langen tijt, als dat van Oraenje’ and that such sovereignty clearly predated that of the monarchs of France. In addition William was the grandson of a king, Charles I of England and the nephew of Charles II. As in the print of 1653 the author laid stress on the fact that the Princes of Orange had the right to wear a crown. A print of 1672 showed a Netherlands’ maid ailing in bed being revived by the gift of an orange and the sight of a portrait of the young prince William III. A note beneath the image assured the viewer that the Prince had the right to wear a crown as a descendant of Bertrand van Baux who in 1178 was crowned Prince of Orange in 1178. A second note referred to the scene in May 1665 when a sun crown had appeared before the ampitheatre in Orange as if to imply that the heavens themselves supported this contention. It is probable that both print and pamphlet date from the period when William III had been promoted to the position of captain general of the Dutch forces but was not yet stadholder.

Propaganda such as this emphasised not only the desirability of further promotion for William but also that his position within the royal and princely families of Europe was as great if not greater than that of the foe, the King of France.

Sun imagery was also widely deployed with reference to William III. The occasion of his first birthday in November 1651 was celebrated in verse by Jan Keysers of Breda. The poet made plain the great hopes centred on the infant prince.

De hoop van ons geluck, een MACHTIGH PRINS der aerde,
Een kleyn een-Jaerigh KINT dat wilt van onse oogen
Gelijck de Son den dauw ons droeve tranen droogen.122

120 Knuttel, no. 9971, pp. 3-4, 7-8, 10, 17.
121 Muller, no. 2306.
122 Knuttel, no. 7052, np.
Viewing an image of the young prince and reflecting on the tragic circumstances of his father’s death another poet was moved to declaim,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Dus soent de sonn’ deez Son, Oranjes bral en luyster} \\
\text{Op-dagend’ uyt den nacht des grafs vermolsem duyster}^{123}
\end{align*}
\]

The prince’s birthday in November 1661 occasioned similar imagery when the poet drew both on the prince’s ancient lineage and his unique relationship to the United Provinces.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Twaelf jaren zijt ghy oudt; uyt sulck een stam gebooren,} \\
\text{Van weder-zijts, o Prins, daer van datmen kan hooren,} \\
\text{Van daer de sonn’ sijn licht door soo veel teeck’nen draeght,} \\
\text{Van daer hy onder gaet, van daer het weder daeght.} \\
\text{O aertsche Son des Landts! Godt d’Opper-son wil geven,} \\
\text{Dat ghy hier langh voor ons voor-spoediglick mooght leven;} \\
\text{In top van heerlickheyt.}^{124}
\end{align*}
\]

Here the poet plays on the image of the sun as emblematic of the prince but also creates a pun on the role of William III as ‘son’ of the country, a reference to the position of the prince as putative ‘kind van staat’. A poem of 1664 on the birthday of the Prince urged its readers ‘set WILLEM op den waagen van sijn Voor-vaderen’ and combined prophesy and wish fulfilment when the author declaimed that ‘Sijn Son begint te rijsen / Na’t Hemels Opper-punct’. Here too the prince’s illustrious lineage was proclaimed,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Wiens Stam den Arend draaght int’ midden door de wolken} \\
\text{Die Roos en Lely eerd, mach immers wel een Pronk} \\
\text{En puik den vorsten sijn genaamt.}^{125}
\end{align*}
\]

---

125 Oranie-Fakkel omvachten met verscheiden Oranie-bloemen en Bladeren, Ter Eeren van Syne Doorluchtige Hoogheit Willem Henric (Breda, 1664), np.
The eagle referred to Adolf of Nassau who had been Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire in the late thirteenth century and was an ancestor of William. As grandson of Charles I and nephew of Charles II William also bore the insignia of the rose while the lily was emblematic of his descent from the French crown through his grandmother Henrietta Marie who was the daughter of Henry IV.

Rising Orangist fortunes inevitably brought the imagery of the sun to the fore. In September 1668 William III was declared First Noble of Zeeland. In effect this was bringing to fruition the Resolution of the States of Zeeland of 1660 in which they had argued that he should accede to the offices of his forefathers when he was eighteen though the date was anticipated by a couple of months. The whole affair having been carried out without the knowledge of John de Witt, there was an understandable atmosphere of euphoria in the reception given to the Prince on his arrival in Zeeland on 18th and 19th September. A fictional Scipio urged that the praise due to his own great family as the conquerors of Carthage could justly be applied to the family of stadholders. Lauding Divine Providence he declared ‘elle vous a fait naistre comme un nouvel Astre, et briller comme le soleil Levant pour dissiper nos tenebres’. 126

Orizant lauding the admittance of the Prince to the Council of State in May 1670 used similar imagery when explained to his readers in a footnote that ‘gelijck de Zon, allenghskens hooger klimmende, krachtiger wert, soo oock sijne Doorluchtigste Hoogheyt als een nieuwe Orangie Zon, opgekomen sijnde boven den Horizant onses Vaderlandts’. 127

1672 witnessed a veritable sunburst. In a sermon preached at the Court in the Hague before Amalia von Solms to celebrate the appointment of William III as captain general the preacher Petrus van Balen described the times as

---

126 Knuttel, no. 9668, p. 25.
127 Knuttel, no. 9824, p. 43 note (r).
gelijck, naa lange en koude nagten, de son in dit saysoen, sijn gelaten toont t'elkens hoger op de Horizont, Siet Haar Weduwlike Kamer, meer als twintig jaar bekleet in de rouw, de Soons Soon, een nieuwe en frische Son....

In a sonnet accompanying the published sermon William as in 1668 was the sun which drove away the mist and shadows.

...hier klimt een son die dryft den Nevel voort
...een nieuw verresen Son.128

This aspect of the sun imagery was clearly felt appropriate for this time when a French invasion loomed for another pamphlet celebrating the Prince as captain general has him as the sun whose beams disperse the dark clouds.

Dus klaart de Nevel, op de Nederlantsche Volcken:
Oranje schift de drift dier swaareen dank’re Wolcken 129

William III having being declared stadholder of Holland, in Amsterdam orange flags flew from the church towers and it was said that the people were singing

Gelyck het eerste licht quam door het duyster breecken,
Soo breckt d’Oranje-Son door Staetsucht Haet en Nyt,
De donckere Oorloghs-wolck tot sijn bederf ontsteecken,
Wort oorsaeck van sijn licht, hoe seer het Jan –Oom (de Witt) spijt.130

The death of the brothers de Witt in August 1672 led one anonymous author to reflect on the relative strengths of the Prince and his opponents. The Prince was 'de heerlijke Oranje Zon opgaende met zijn blinckende Stralen', while the lustre of Jan

---

128 Knuttel, no. 9962, np.
129 Knuttel, no. 9965, np.
130 Knuttel, no. 10337, p. 8.
and Cornelis de Witt was now ‘als een keerse gestelt in het licht van de heldere
Middagson’. He added didactically ‘Sic transit gloria mundi’. Victory against the
French reinforced the imagery. For a writer of 1674 the sun of William III had dispelled
the moisture of the French lily and he hymned

... O Son! Soo lang verduysterd;
We'er houden door een Wolk van haat en nijd;132

Orangist apologists were drawing on ancient traditional imagery. The image of the
rising sun, Sol Oriens, new born each day and by its beams driving away the forces of
mist and darkness had been familiar since classical times and was regularly used in
contemporary Europe. After the resistance of the Frondes had been broken in 1653, a
medallion was cast showing the rising Sun-God dissipating the darkness.133 In a
pamphlet of 1664 a supporter of the principles of John de Witt rhapsodied that since the
death of William II, ‘de Zon der waerheyd is door alle mist gebrooken’.134 Images of
the sun could also imply harmony. Apollo the Sun God had often been depicted
regulating on his lyre the music of the spheres and establishing harmony, equilibrium
and concord between the elements.135 However images of the sun also conjured up
images of monarchy. Ripa in his Iconologia had emphasised the conjunction of sun and
kingship when he wrote

en daerom is hy als een koning midden in ‘t Rijck. En soo het ons geoorloft is eene Republique
of gemeene Staet, van de seven Planeeten te versieren, wy souden seggen dat de Sonne een
Koningh is van allen, gelijck hij oock in waerheyt.136

131 Knuttel, no. 10434, np.
132 Knuttel, no. 11103. np
134 Knuttel, no. 8921, p. 4.
135 Lecocq, p. 182.
136 Cesare Ripa, Iconologia of uytebeeldingen des Verstands (Amsterdam, 1644), p. 331.
This imagery was reinforced in Ripa’s entry for monarchy which depicted a seated figure with his kneeling subjects and the halo of the sun around his head.\textsuperscript{137} Certainly in June 1662 Louis XIV adopted the sun as his symbol but the sun and the French monarchy had a more sustained link. King Charles IX had appeared at carnival time in 1571 dressed as the sun to be serenaded by a ‘Comparaison du Soleil et du Roi’ composed by Ronsard. In 1581 Henry III appeared at the celebrations of the marriage of the Duke of Joyeuse as the sun driving his chariot.\textsuperscript{138} It is instructive to examine the sun imagery deployed by Dutch writers on the occasion of the Restoration of Charles II to the English throne in 1660. A poem of 1660 by Havius on the Restoration deployed the same pun that had been used for William III when he rejoiced ‘nu rijst de Son voor Engeland op’. Lambert den Bos in verses of the same year urged the archetypal mother of all Britains, ‘siet uw gewenschte Son verrijsen’.\textsuperscript{139} This type of imagery was identical to that deployed to herald advancement of the fortunes of the young Prince of Orange.

Does this mean that Orangists in some senses saw the stadholderate as a proto-monarchy. This type of language could leave them open to such an accusation. However Orangists would argue that such language was appropriate for the Prince of Orange, a sovereign prince in his own right, added lustre and respectability to the Dutch Republic, particularly in the eyes of neighbouring monarchs. In a declaration of 1652 urging the adoption of a single head the States of Zeeland asserted that the Prince of Orange was the most suitable candidate not only because of the services rendered by his forefathers but with respect to his illustrious lineage and princely birth which added lustre to the

\textsuperscript{137} Martin Warnke, ‘La democratie entre images ideales et caricatures’, in Emblèmes de la liberté, ed. by Dario Gamboni and Georg Germann (Bern: Stampfli & Cie, 1991), pp. 73-95 (p. 86. fig.5).
\textsuperscript{138} Lecoq, pp. 177-178.
Republic. In a pamphlet of 1660 the anonymous author argued that the wealth and prosperity of the Republic had engendered suspicion and envy among its neighbouring states but that this was mitigated by the presence of the stadholder Princes of Orange who ‘heeft de voorsz. ende dergelijken nijdigheyt van de Gekroone de Hooveden seer gebroken’. The presence of a member of this ancient and respected House, sovereign princes in their own right, and their princely court in the Hague served to convince foreign observers that this fledgling Republic was, in reality, a state very like their own. In the Consideratien of the Gecommitteerde Raden of Zeeland in 1668 it was contended that a stadholder Prince of Orange represented the external splendour of government both within and beyond the Republic, ‘haer uyterlijck gevende den glans van een Koninck’. Sir William Temple noted that while sovereignty resided in the States General, a view not all would have shared, the Prince of Orange represented the ‘Dignity of this State’ both in his person and in the splendour of his court. Temple added that

men are generally pleased with the Pomp and Splendour of a Government, not only as it is an amusement for idle people, but as it is a mark of the Greatness, Honour and Riches of their Countrey.

Orangists would have found it easy to agree with that sentiment. However, at a time when sovereignty was intimately connected with status and display, observers both within and beyond the Republic might contend that the Princes of Orange appeared much more than mere servants of the provincial states.

140 Knuttel, no. 7307, np.
142 Knuttel, no. 9658, np
The image of the prince.

It was a critical factor in Orangist polemic that whereas others might argue for a particular view of the Republic, the Orangists had an individual in whom their hopes and aspirations were centred. A frail posthumous child became the focus of their hopes. His image was to be kept before the people. Portraits were one way of doing this. However, now there was no stadholder’s court commissions for portraits were fewer than in the past. This was but in part the result of the death of William II. Elizabeth of Bohemia, the Winter Queen, a noted patron had fallen deeply into debt in the second half of the 1640’s and in 1651 the painter Gerrit van Honthorst had granted the destitute Queen a loan of 35,000 guilders. Nonetheless a number of portraits of the young prince were commissioned in the years after his birth to 1672. In considering these works, it is wise to remember that not all of them were intended for owners or institutions in the Dutch Republic. A work by Adrian Hanneman of 1664 depicting the Prince in three quarter length profile, in armour and bearing a baton of office with a helmet beside him is known to have been commissioned by the court in England, one copy going to his grandmother Henrietta Marie and the other to his aunt Anne Hyde, Duchess of York. Another similar portrait by or after Raguineau was sent to the parlement of Orange in 1667 while a work by Jan de Baen of the same year was probably sent as a gift to the Elector of Brandenburg. It is certainly the case that many portraits of the young prince have ended up in royal collections in England and Prussia and it does appear likely that these were either commissioned by foreign royal houses or were dispatched from the court at the Hague to encourage foreign powers to keep the person and the interests of William III in mind.

Orangists were proud of William’s connections with the great royal dynasties of Europe and in at least one work, these were emphasised. This painting, an exquisite

---

cartouche of fruit and flowers surrounding a portrait of the prince was by Jan Davidsz. de Heem and appears to have been painted in the 1660’s.\textsuperscript{146} Certainly the image of the prince wearing blue and white cravatte and orange sash appears to be that of a young adolescent rather than a man. William was ringed on either side by two eagles, symbols both of princely birth and his descent from a Holy Roman Emperor and two horns of plenty symbolising the wealth and prosperity which had flowed from the Orange stadholderate in the Dutch Republic. Below the prince were strewn the pink and white roses of England and the lilies of France symbolising his link with the crown of England through his mother Mary Stuart and his family ties with the lineage of Henry IV of France through his grandmother Henrietta Marie.\textsuperscript{147}

We do not know who commissioned this work. However some paintings were clearly designed for public display. An example of a portrait which was intended for public view in the town hall of the Orange Barony of Breda was a work of 1652 by Gerard Honthorst showing the infant prince with his mother Mary Stuart.\textsuperscript{148} In this portrait the full length figure of Mary Stuart, clad in mourning, is depicted standing in front of a balustrade. In her arms she holds the infant William III. He points with his left hand to a nearby orange tree with both blossom and fruit growing in a pot while in his right hand he held up a small orange branch to his mother’s face as if to console her in her grief. His father was dead but the ‘oranje spruit’ remains, the hope of the family for the future.

Honthorst had painted many portraits of the House of Orange and where children were included the orange branch was a regular feature. In a work of 1647 Frederick Henry and Amalia von Solms were shown with their three youngest daughters Albertina

\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Dutch Flower Painting 1600-1750}, Catalogue edited by Paul Taylor (Dulwich Picture Gallery, 1996), pp. 58, 60.
\textsuperscript{147} Oil on canvas. 134 by 114 cm., Musée des Beaux Arts, Lyon.
\textsuperscript{148} Canvas 224 by 148.5. cm., signed G. Honthorst, Breda Town Hall, 1652.
Agnes, Henrietta Catherine and Maria. In the centre of the portrait stood Amalia with the youngest daughter Maria. In her left hand Amalia held a sprig of orange tree with the blossoms clearly visible with the little Maria clutching the bottom end of the stem. Thus Honthorst’s work of 1652 drew on iconological themes traditionally associated with the House of Orange. A similar approach can be seen in his portrait of William III and his Aunt Mary, the daughter of Frederick Henry and Amalia von Solms. The young Mary was seated beneath a tree holding in her left hand a floral garland. The infant William III to her right holds a collection of flowers in his apron from which Mary appears to select an orange blossom to add to her garland. Above the two children the sky is heavy with cloud but in the background sunlight streams down on the landscape. It can be argued that this configuration is a reference to a glorious past or the hope of the future.

As the prince grew older his image appeared not only in portraits but in prints. Artists such as Abraham Raguineau, who tutored the Prince, Adriaan Hanneman and Jan de Baen produced images of William III some of which were reproduced in print. Print makers such as Philippe and van Zijlvelt worked on images produced by Raguineau and ensured that they reached a much wider audience than that attained by the original painting. The function of such an image can be deduced from Jan Steen’s painting ‘Prinjedag’ which Lyckle de Vries dates to approximately 1665. The scene is an inn in which a group of people sit drinking and reading. One man peruses a newspaper while next to him sits another with a knot of orange ribbons on his hat. With a third man he appears to be discussing the contents of a pamphlet. Above a box bed at the rear of the room hangs an image of the young prince bedecked with orange ribbons. The light hanging from the ceiling is also decorated with an orange branch. In the centre

---

149 Canvas 263.5 by 347.5 cm., Amsterdam Rijksmuseum., Inv. no. 874.
150 Canvas 130.5 by 108.2 cm., signed 1653, Mauritshuis, The Hague. Inv. no. 64..
151 Beschrievende Catalogus van Gegraveerde Portretten van Nederlanders, ed. by J. F. van Someren, 3 vols (Amsterdam: F Muller, 1890), ii, 27. nos. 322, 325.
of the painting a man, seemingly the owner of the premises kneels before the image of the prince, drinking an extravagant toast, his sword unsheathed. Before him on the ground lies a piece of paper on which is written ‘Op de gesundheyt van het nassous basie, in de ene hant het rapier inde andere hant het glaesie’. Lyckle de Vries has argued convincingly that Steen’s work is not simply a sample of his genre paintings but is a biting satire on the support which the Orangists enjoyed among the less discerning sections of the people.152 The sottish landlord kneeling before the image of the prince exemplifies a devotion in which emotion and drink take precedence over more rational considerations. Yet, leaving aside the implicit satire, there must have been many homes and places of public resort which were graced by images of William III.

Images could be used to manipulate events. An example of this are the allegorical sketches of Theodoor van Thulden. Van Thulden had been one of the artists commissioned by Amalia von Solms to decorate the Oranjezaal, her mausoleum to the memory of her husband Frederick Henry. These survive only in sketch form and clearly events or finances conspired to prevent the full artistic commission being completed but they are a valuable pointer to the message which Amalia and the Orangists sought to convey. Van Thulden was considered as perhaps the most outstanding Flemish painter of allegory after the death of Rubens and Amalia commissioned no less than six works from him. He had also enjoyed commissions from the town of ‘s Hertogenbosch and had prepared for them after the Peace of Munster in 1648 two allegories which were to be displayed in the town hall.153 Van Thulden was thus a natural choice when Amalia came to consider a series of works which would enhance the status of her grandchild William III and herself and impress upon the viewer his suitability for the offices of his forefathers and the necessity, indeed the inevitability of his becoming stadholder.

The first of these works appears to have been produced in the period around 1654 when the debate about the exclusion of William III from any future office was raging. It was also the period when the province of Overijssel announced its intention to promote the young prince to the position of stadholder with William Frederick of Nassau, stadholder of Friesland as his lieutenant. In van Thulden’s work the young William with a plumed hat on his head is led forward by the figure of Time and presented to two female figures who are sited before an altar. The two women symbolise both branches of the family Orange-Nassau and the two putti who embrace above their heads represent the bonds which unite the two parts of the dynasty. The godlike figure of Providence seated on a cloud and accompanied by the allegorical figure of fame proffers to William III an orange branch on which is inscribed a quotation from the Aeneid Book VI lines 143-144 ‘Primo avulso non deficit alter / aureus’ which translated means ‘were the first broken, then there grows a second of gold’. The meaning of this is made clear when we see, sited in the right bottom hand corner, an image of Atropos, the Goddess of Fortune who has broken the golden twig which represents the life of William II. William III is the new golden orange sprig. His hopeful future is implied as a female figure bearing a flaming torch draws away the veil of mourning which had draped the two female figures. 

Elements of this symbolism were redeployed in a work of 1660. The Restoration of Charles II of England and the decision of the States of Holland to rescind the Act of Exclusion raised Orangist’s hopes. These events clearly encouraged Amalia von Solms to commission further work from van Thulden intended to promote the cause of her grandson. Once again the two female figures of Orange and Nassau mourned the death of William II but on this occasion the winged goddess Providence pointed with her sceptre to a pot in the foreground from which emerged an orange sprig. William, clad in

armour, approached the two women flanked by the figures of Time and Selene-Lucina, the goddess of birth. This work presaging the advancement of the prince was accompanied by two others both featuring William II and Amalia von Solms. In one sketch William bids farewell to his grandmother flanked by Minerva who urges him to follow the example of his forefathers.

In considering all these portraits and prints, it is wise not to forget that the young prince was a very visible presence in the Dutch Republic. From the very beginning of his life William III enjoyed a public presence in spite of the fact that John de Witt and his supporters were increasingly to insist that the prince was merely a private person in respect of the Dutch Republic. At his baptism on the 15 January 1651 at the Grote Kerk in the Hague the young prince was attended by members of the States General, the States of Holland and Zeeland and representatives of the towns of Delft, Leiden and Amsterdam. Besides these dignitaries the church was packed with local citizenry who climbed on top of benches and lined the walls to participate in the spectacle. The disorder was such that Minister Tegnejus had to bang on the pulpit to command silence and large sections of the service were all but inaudible. At the moment of baptism all present rose on tip-toe and craned forward to get a better view of the infant. This occasion set the tone for the prince’s public appearances which were greeted with great curiosity and often rapture among the populace. In this respect, his position was very different from that of Charles II of England who spent his years after the defeat at Worcester in 1651 in exile on the continent. Not only did William III appear before the Dutch people but prints and pamphlets ensured that these appearances were transmitted to a wider audience.

155 Allegorie op Willem III als staamhouder van de dynastie, Black chalk, pen and pencil in brown, 17.6 by 21.6 cm, Vienna, Graphische Sammlung Albertina, inventory no. 8245.
156 Willem III neemt afscheid van zijn grootmoeder Amalia van Solms, Black chalk, pen and pencil in brown, 16.5 by 20.7 cm, Vienna, Graphische Sammlung Albertina, Inventory no. 8244.
In June 1653 the young prince and his mother travelled to Breda where he was to be instituted as lord of the Barony. As they sailed through Dordrecht on their way to Breda the quays were black with people who cheered when his mother held the infant aloft for them to see. A merchant ship which lay at anchor fired cannon shot in his honour. At Breda on 9 June Mary and her son were welcomed by the burgomasters in front of the citizenry gathered in the market place and on 19 June were the guests of the town at a banquet at the town hall. Those who could not be present were enabled to participate vicariously with the production of a print by Santvoort. The print depicted Princess Mary led by the figure of Peace and flanked by Apollo and the Muses holding the young prince who sported a plumed hat. In the background could be seen the Grote Kerk of Breda.

On 4 November 1659, the Prince was admitted as a student at Leiden University and he was welcomed by the magistrates of the town and dignitaries of the university. A print of that year commemorated the occasion. The prince was positioned strategically in the centre before the 'staartpaar' or horse of state. Beside the prince stood the figures of Hercules, representing Amsterdam and Pallas representing Leiden who trample down the forces of war and envy and are to assist the prince into the saddle. In the background was an image of the Prince's court where the figure of 'Godsgoedheid' holding a sceptre held sway while to the right was an ominous image of a single ship amidst a storm torn sea and above it the punishing rod of God. The implication would appear to be that the Dutch ship of State was to be punished for its ingratitude to the House of Orange and to God. For those who might need some explanation of the image, the Orangist poet Jan Zoet provided explanatory verse in the space below.

---

159 Muller, no. 2072.
160 Stolk, no. 2268; Muller, nos. 2145, 2146.
161 'Prinsselijk Zinnebeld toeagent aan Zyn Hooghaid Willem Henrik', in Zoet, pp. 121-122.
The following year the prince was present when his uncle Charles II was received in the Hague on his triumphal journey back to England. At a civic reception on 25 May William was seated with the King, his mother Mary Stuart and the Queen of Bohemia under the royal canopy, an event which was recorded in a print of the same year.162

From 15 to 20 June 1660 the Prince of Orange and his mother were the guests of the city of Amsterdam and were entertained by a series of pageants and processions. Again a print commemorated the occasion.163 Even those whose sympathies were not normally in favour of the restoration of the stadholderate were commissioned to celebrate the occasion. Vondel’s poem ‘De Bruiloft van den Theems en Aemstelt’ Amsterdam aan de Doorluchtigste Hoogheden Maria Stuart en Willem van Oranje’ hymned the new ties between the Dutch Republic and England, Amsterdam and London prefigured in the personages of the English Mary Stuart and her Dutch son.164 Jan Vos, who was no Orangist, was entrusted with the pageant and he recorded for posterity the arrangements for the event in his published Beschrijving der Vertooningen op de Staatcywagens.165 The wagons which paraded through the streets bore tableaux honouring both the Orange stadholders and the late King of England though malicious tongues alleged that the all too lifelike depiction of the execution of Charles I which so shocked Mary Stuart had been designed for that purpose by Vos.166 In June of the following year the prince visited Utrecht. The prince, riding in a gilded carriage was welcomed by four companies ofburghers bedecked with orange and blue tokens. The populace thronged the streets to see him and when he attended divine service at the Dom on Sunday, it was to the sound of the church bells chiming out the ‘Wilhelmus’.

162 Muller, no. 2156.
163 Muller, no. 2170.
165 Jan Vos, Beschryving der Vertooningen op de de staatcywagens (Amsterdam, 1660).
166 Knuttel, no. 8389, p. 11.
This time it was a printed pamphlet which enabled all those who had not been present to appreciate the depth of welcome which the prince had enjoyed. 167

This form of propaganda ensured not only that William was kept in the public eye but also contained a subliminal message of better things to come. In September 1668 William, in a surprise move, was made First Noble of Zeeland, a title formerly held by his stadholder forefathers. The event and the celebrations surrounding it were celebrated in pamphlet literature. The sermon of Johannes Thilenus, given before the Prince on 23rd September at Middelburg, spoke of how good it was to have a prince who was not only alive to the realities of the world but also schooled in piety. A charge was laid upon him to defend the cause of religion and truth as his forefathers had done. The implication was clearly that the prince should and would succeed as stadholder. In a poem attached to the sermon, the author van Hoorn bewailed, in images of storm and darkness, the current condition of the Republic. Where, he cried 'is den ouden glans van suyver keer en licht? W aer is Eendracht's Kroon? ’ However salvation was on the horizon for the coming of the prince would cast rays upon the earth ‘als een nieuwe Son’. 168 Images of birth and rebirth proliferate. In a welcome given to the Prince by the church consistory at Middelburg reference was made to the symbol of the orange tree hacked off at the trunk only to sprout into life again. This, the speaker urged, was no mere symbol but reality for before them the young prince ‘als een cierlijcke Scheute ende edele plante voor onze oogen mogen sien her-leven’. 169 Another author rhapsodied ‘ick sie nu voor mijn oog Orangie-Prins geboren’. 170 In these prints and pamphlets readers and viewers in a particular locality or throughout the provinces could be kept in touch with the person of the Prince and could share in Orangist hopes and aspirations for the future.

167 Knuttel, no. 8539.
168 Knuttel, no. 9676, pp. 4, 17, 22.
169 Knuttel, no. 9677, p.1.
170 Knuttel, no. 9679, np.
Conclusion

This emphasis on a sole individual might appear to be the antithesis of ‘republicanism’ but that is to play the game according to the rules of the brothers de la Court. In reality Dutch republicanism was far from monolithic. As previous historians have noted there were two main strands in Dutch republican thought. One strand was not opposed to finding a place for a stadholder prince within a constitutional framework based on a mixed government. The second, more outspoken and better known, was the anti-Orangist thought of the brothers de la Court which defined a republic in contrast to a monarchy and eschewed any single head. This latter emerged after the death of the stadholder in 1650 and reached its full expression in the 1660’s. Orangist rhetoric drew on the first and older tradition. Essentially pragmatic in character, this strand of republicanism was to prove both enduring and accommodating to changing circumstances and perceptions. We should not then be surprised when Jonathan Israel demonstrates that in the mid 1670’s it was possible for individuals to be both Orangist and republican. Many Dutch citizens would have seen no dichotomy and acknowledged both. As we have seen Orangists emphasised that the stadholder was not a monarch nor had any pretensions to monarchical power. Inevitably the imagery deployed to represent a single head bore overtones of monarchy but most Orangist writers took care to emphasise that while such a system had value for other nations it was alien to the Dutch experience. Yet Orangist polemic stressed very strongly the person of the young prince William III and the possibilities available to the Dutch

---

174 Jonathan Israel, *Monarchy, Orangism and Republicanism in the later Dutch Golden Age* (Amsterdam: Faculty of Humanities, University of Amsterdam, 2004)
Republic were he to be elevated to the offices of his forefathers. They emphasised his princely background and the respect in which his family was held by the crowned heads of Europe, to whom he was related. Rather than seeing this as an oblique attempt at monarchical pretensions, we should rather view it as a reflection of the lustre and splendour which supporters of the House of Orange believed the family brought to the Republic. Rather than threatening the basis of the new state, the House of Orange not only maintained and preserved its freedom but made a unique and irreplaceable contribution.
THE PHOENIX FROM THE ASHES – A HEREDITARY STADHOLDERATE?

The death from smallpox of the young stadholder William II on 6 November 1650 left his widow Mary Stuart as the focus of all attentions. William’s body was not displayed in state as those of his forefathers had been, for it was feared that the sight of his disfigured face might cause even more distress to the heavily pregnant Mary. Confined in her chamber, walls and furniture heavily draped in black, the widow gave birth on the evening of Monday 14 November to a son. A delirious crowd in the Hague celebrated the news. Aitzema, an observer, remarked that you might be forgiven for thinking that they considered the newborn to be no less than their sovereign and hereditary lord. Such a position had been but narrowly averted. If William II had lived a week longer, Aitzema contended, he would have urged the States of Holland to confer the stadholder’s charges on his son. This was the nub of the issue. The jubilation of the crowds at the Hague bore witness to the presumption that the office of stadholder in the majority of the provinces was expected to pass from father to son. Yet in the eyes of many in the regent patriciate of Holland, hereditary succession conjured up images of monarchy and the loss of those freedoms in whose defence they had fought against Spain. The task for the supporters of the House of Orange in the years 1650-1672 was to argue the necessity of the offices of his forefathers being conferred on William III without trespassing on the dangerous ground which their opponents had prepared for them.

Some examination of the historical background is helpful. The former Dukes of Burgundy had exercised authority in the Low Countries either directly or through the

---

1 Japikse, i, 11; Aitzema, Historie, vii, 126, 128, 203.
medium of stadholders. Their role was to act as political and military leaders in the provinces, negotiating the administration of the policy of the prince while recognising local forms of self-governance. The stadholder also commanded the Duke’s troops as captain-general. Such a position could develop beyond that of exalted servant to one of ‘overmighty subject’. To curb any potential moves in that direction Mary of Hungary, Regent in the Netherlands, had forbidden stadholders in office to nominate their successors. In that way, they would not come to consider the position as hereditary.²

The progress of the Dutch Revolt complicated this situation. In 1567 William of Orange had resigned his stadholdership of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht, to which he had been appointed by the ruler Philip II in the latter’s capacity as Count of Holland. By the ‘Union’ of Holland and Zeeland in June 1575, the beginnings of an alternative state were being put in place with William of Orange as stadholder and captain general with the designation as ‘sovereign and supreme’ head for the duration of the war.³ In July 1581 the States General had issued the Act of Abjuration in which they repudiated Philip II and his heirs in perpetuity. New oaths of allegiance were taken, whereby all office holders, magistrates and members of the civic militia declared themselves no longer bound by their former oaths of loyalty to the King of Spain and swore obedience to the States.⁴ Even before William’s assassination, a role had been envisaged for his second son Maurice, William’s oldest son Philip William having being seized by the enemy to be brought up as a Catholic in Spain. In 1582, the States of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht had agreed to finance Maurice’s studies since, they opined, the young man was a person who could well be serviceable to his country in the future and there was a hopeful expectation that he would tread in the footsteps of his father William.⁵ It is not clear exactly what was intended by this statement. It may simply reflect the hope of the

² Rowen, The Princes of Orange, pp. 2-4.
⁴ Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 209.
⁵ Arie Th. van Deursen, Maurits van Nassau (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2000), p. 16
three provinces that Maurice would serve his country in a military capacity as his father had done. No clearly defined political role is implied. However, the controversial offer of Countship extended by Holland to William in 1583 had included a clause ensuring that in the event of William’s death, the States of Holland would have the right to nominate one of his legitimate sons as successor. Here we can discern elements of a dynastic principle, though one which as a result of William’s assassination could not be put into practice. After William’s death the government of this fledgling Republic was entrusted to a Council of State of eighteen members. All were deputies of the provinces, including Brabant, Flanders and Mechelen with Maurice as the sole individual member. This position recognised the unique contribution made by the House of Orange to the new state. Furthermore, it was plain to many in the States of Holland that the House of Orange, in the service of the province, could act as a powerful counterweight to any foreign prince or governor-general who might be imposed on them as a condition of military and financial support. Thus it was that the States of Holland and Zeeland in November 1585 appointed the seventeen year old Maurice as stadholder barely a month before the arrival of Leicester as governor-general of the United Provinces. In January 1587 Maurice was proclaimed captain general of the armies of Holland and Zeeland.

The actions of the provinces of Holland and Zeeland had clearly been shaped by the exigencies of war. The House of Orange in the person of William or Maurice served to supply both military leadership and a quality of ‘headship’ which could function as a unifying factor within the nascent republic and a counterbalance to those forces from without whose support was judged essential for the maintenance of the new state. Moreover, following the death of Adolf van Nieuwenaar in 1589 Maurice was chosen as stadholder of Utrecht, Overijssel and Gelderland. Rather than perceiving this as an ominous extension of the authority of the House of Orange, Oldenbarneveldt amongst

---

6 Adrian Kluit, Historie der Hollandsche Staatsregering tot aan met het jaar 1795, 5 vols (Amsterdam, 1802), t. 344.
7 Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 224; van Deursen, Maurits van Nassau, p. 37.
others encouraged this development seeing it as enabling an increase in the influence of Holland by means of its stadholder.\textsuperscript{8} There was every reason to applaud the fact that Maurice had, in due course of time, succeeded to the offices of his father and little cause for complaint. If, as future detractors suggested, these developments represented a strategy of self-centred Orangist dynasticism, it could equally be argued that sections of the new Republic were using the House of Orange to further their particular interests.

Maurice was to die without legitimate offspring. In 1624, aware that his health was failing, Maurice asked the States General if they would permit him to nominate his younger brother Frederick Henry as deputy-commander of the armed forces. The States General, conscious of the constitutional issue at stake, made plain that they and not Maurice must make the appointment which they duly did on 12 April 1625, eleven days before Maurice's death. Following the death of his brother Frederick Henry was declared captain general and admiral general of the Union by the States General. Unusually, this was done without the customary prior approval of the member provinces, the States General and in particular the province of Holland arguing that any delay might leave the army restive and Spain free to exploit the uncertainty. In theory, the States General would have been free to appoint a foreign captain general such as Count Ernest Casimir Count of Mansfeld or Duke Christian of Brunswick but there may well have been a perception that these gentlemen might take a less politically sensitive approach to high office in the Dutch Republic than a member of the House of Orange.

What was undeniable was that the military successes achieved by Maurice and his resulting fame throughout Europe had brought lustre not only to the name of the House of Orange but also to the Republic. The House of Orange was now irrevocably linked to the national struggle against Spain. It can be no surprise that on 1 May 1625 Frederick

\textsuperscript{8} Israel, \textit{The Dutch Republic}, p. 237-238.
Henry was named stadholder of Holland and Zeeland while Utrecht, Overijssel and Gelderland were urged to follow suit, which they duly did.\(^9\)

Before his death Maurice had urged his younger half-brother to marry his mistress Amalia van Solms. No doubt Maurice hoped that in this way the House of Orange, as descended from William I, would be perpetuated. On 27 May 1626 Amalia gave birth to a son who was christened William in honour of his illustrious grandfather. It is instructive to record the reactions to this birth of a son to a serving stadholder. A deputation from the States General congratulated Frederick Henry, expressing the fervent hope that the young prince, growing up in the fear of God, might follow in the footsteps of his father, grandfather and uncle and be, in due course, a worthy instrument for the defence of freedom. Frederick Henry responded by declaring that a servant of the States was born who would indeed follow in the footsteps of his forefathers. He urged the States General to be as a father to the young prince.\(^{10}\) On both sides the excesses of rhetoric cannot disguise the explicit assumption that the child would succeed to his father’s offices. In 1626 Vondel had published a poem entitled *Begroetenis aan den doorluchtigsten en hooggeboren Vorst Frederik Henrik* which expressed similar sentiments. The work was intended to celebrate the nomination of Frederick Henry as stadholder in the majority of the Dutch provinces. Vondel saluted Amalia van Solms, whom he depicted as welcoming the conquering hero, her husband, on his return from his campaigns. The poet urged her

\[\text{Omhels uw bruidegroom, gij prinselijke bruid,}
\text{Zo dat er rijkse eerlang een vrome Oranje spruit,}
\text{Daar 's vaders hart in leeft, die rustig aan derf spannen}
\text{Met vijanden van prat gepurperde tyrannen.}\]

The child which will result from Amalia and Frederick’s mutual affection is to perpetuate the policy of his father and forefathers in the struggle against tyranny.

Amalia having acted as advised, Vondel celebrated the birth of her son with a poem entitled *Geboortklok van Willem van Nassau*. In this lengthy work, the poet imagined Philip, King of Spain, in his palace the Escorial, brooding on his failing fortunes as Fame brought him the news of William’s birth.

Prins Wilhelm, eer te Delf door mordenaars pistolen
Geschoten, liet de wraak de vierschaar Gods bevolen;
Die weer een Willem wekt uit Henrik zijnen zoon:
Zwicht Spaanse Koningstaf; zwicht Duitse Keizerkroon.12

Here Vondel clearly depicts the birth of the second William as an act of God designed to wreak justice on the assasins of his grandfather and their associates. Again, there is an implicit assumption that the newly born infant will, in the course of time, continue the struggle initiated by his murdered grandfather, whose name he bore. In practical terms, this assumes at the very least, a significant military role. It might be easy to dismiss Vondel’s language as poetic bombast but events bore them out. In 1630 the young William was appointed by the States General to the post of general of cavalry, a position which had been held by his father before him. In 1630 and 1631 Utrecht and Overijssel, followed by Holland and Zeeland, bestowed on the young prince the ‘Survivance’, that is to say that on his father’s death William would succeed him as stadholder in those provinces. This clearly marks a step in the direction of an hereditary stadholderate but it is not clear how far it was binding in all circumstances. Rowen, examining the issue, states that if William were not of age when his father died, Holland and Zeeland would feel free to reconsider the matter. There was a feeling that the

---

12 Verwey, p. 741.
promotion of a minor to the stadholderate, while he was unable to exercise the powers attendant on the office smacked too closely of monarchy.\textsuperscript{13}

There appears to have been an appreciable distinction between the 'Survivance' and any suggestion of unfettered hereditary succession. Instructive in this instance is the painting by Gonzales Conques of the young William II receiving the 'Survivance' which was commissioned by Amalia von Solms for the Oranjezaal and dated 1650. Against a background of smoke and artillery, symbolising Frederick Henry's recent military triumphs, the Holland maid in plumed helmet and bearing the cap of freedom, hands to the infant prince a scroll bearing the 'Survivance'. Frederick Henry, armoured and bearing his staff of office, stands behind his son but his face is turned to one side and he makes no gesture towards his offspring. The Oranjezaal had originally been intended to contain a series of portraits of European monarchs but after his death Amalia had dedicated it to the memory of her husband and the elevation of both himself and the House of Orange. Arguably, it is the House of Orange at its most bombastic. It is believed that Amalia was influenced by Ruben's sequence of twenty four paintings of 1621 in the Palais de Luxembourg and his work on the Banqueting Hall in London in 1629. Therefore, it may be interesting to see how in these two foreign examples hereditary succession was depicted. In the example in Paris, Henry IV conveys the 'orbis mundi' symbolising governmental power to his wife Marie de Medici who is to act as regent on behalf of their son Louis XIII. The dauphin stands between them, one hand linked to his mother and the other touching the globe to signify that power will pass to him when he attains his majority. No institution of government takes part in the transference. In Whitehall, James I lolling somewhat indolently, himself points to the young child before him, who is probably Charles I, to indicate his succession while Minerva and Hercules flank the child. Again there is no representation

\textsuperscript{13} Rowen, \textit{The Princes of Orange}, p. 71.
of any organ of government in this transaction. Such a form of depiction would have been entirely out of place in the United Provinces.

Subsequent critics of the House of Orange were to depict the ‘Survivance’ as elements in a strategy intended to subvert the constitution of the Republic to replace it finally by an hereditary monarchy. It may, therefore, be salutary to look at the progress of the stadholders of Friesland, where circumstances followed very much the same pattern. William Louis of Nassau had been appointed stadholder in Friesland by William of Orange. William Louis had died childless during the twelve year truce and, like Maurice, had been succeeded by his younger brother Ernest Casimir. In 1632 Ernest Casimir’s older son Henry Casimir was awarded the ‘Survivance’ by the States of Friesland. This was not a moment too soon as Ernest Casimir was to die in battle later that year, prompting Frederick Henry to attempt to obtain the northern stadholderate for himself. The States of Friesland, no doubt apprehensive of the manoeuvres of the more powerful branch of the family, confirmed Henry Casimir as stadholder and sought to pressurise the neighbouring province of Groningen to adopt him as stadholder in their turn. This Groningen rather grudgingly did, insisting however that Henry Casimir would not be able to influence the choice of his successor in their province. Dying of his wounds following a skirmish at Hulst in 1640, the unmarried Henry Casimir wrote to the States of Friesland urging them to adopt his brother William Frederick as successor. Frederick Henry again intervened and on this occasion was able to persuade the States of Groningen to elect him as stadholder. William Frederick was adopted in Friesland but in order to win Frederick Henry’s support he assured him that the Frederick Henry’s young son William would be assured of the ‘Survivance’ in Friesland if he, William Frederick, were to die without heirs.15

---

It seems that we can discern a gradual evolution in which the States of the various provinces were persuaded to agree to a ‘Survivance’ while the existing stadholder was still alive. As the example of Groningen indicates, not all were prepared to have a successor thrust upon them. Unease also increased in Holland. In 1641 William married Mary Stuart, daughter of Charles I of England, a match intended to restore that monarch’s ailing fortunes by means of Dutch support. Critics of the marriage feared that the stadholder would henceforth pursue a policy favourable to the English Royalists to the disadvantage of the Republic’s political and economic interests. Moreover, impecunious as Charles I undoubtedly was, it seemed improbable that he would countenance the marriage of his daughter to a mere princely ‘condottieri’, whose family had no long term political power base. There must have been an implicit assumption that any son of the match would succeed to the offices held by his grandfather and father. In December 1646, Frederick Henry’s daughter Louise married the Elector of Brandenburg. These marital alliances taken in conjunction with the survivance could reasonably be perceived by some as an attempt to establish an Orangist dynasty whose international power and prestige would render them increasingly immune from the control of the provincial States. The action of the States of Holland in refusing to confirm William II as stadholder until the Treaty of Munster was confirmed indicated that in their eyes at least the implicit dynasticism of the ‘Survivance’ should not be pushed too far.16

Before the death of William II in 1650, there had been no need for the supporters of the House of Orange to develop any considered argument concerning the link between the House of Orange and the stadholderate.17 For one thing, there had been no sustained argument on the part of any erstwhile opponents. The ‘Survivance’ of 1630 and 1631 had occasioned no exchange of political polemic. Instead, there had evolved a

15 Luuc Kooijmans, Liefde in Opdrecht (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker,2000), pp. 11,13, 27, 29, 33, 35.
16 Israel, Dutch Republic, pp. 537-538; Kooijmans, p. 96; Rowen, The Princes of Orange, p. 83.
17 Van Deursen, Maurits van Nassau, p. 216.
treasury of imagery, both visual and literary, which emphasised both the regenerative elements of the family history and its symbiotic relation with the new state. In 1544 William I had inherited the principality of Orange in south-eastern France. Henceforth the family and its progeny were symbolised by the orange tree. In addition, after the assassination of his father Maurice adopted the emblem or ‘pictura’ of a severed tree trunk from which a sprig or branch sprouted, bearing the motto ‘tandem fit surculus arbor’ or ‘finally the sprig will become a tree’. This image was brimming with classical and biblical references. In Virgil’s Aeneid Book 6 in a section beginning at line 143, the prophetess tells Aeneas of the golden bough dedicated to Juno which every time it is torn from its place never fails to reappear.18 The image could also be found in the book of the Prophet Isaiah in which God, spurring on the Arameans and the Philistines against Israel, cuts off Israel’s ‘head and tail, palm frond and reed’, only to inaugurate a later golden age when a branch would grow from the stock of Jesse and a shoot will spring from its roots. The wolf would lie down with the lamb and the land would be filled with the knowledge of the Lord. (Isaiah 9:14; 11:1,6, 9)19 Imagery such as this was not unique to the House of Orange. In the Florence of 1469 the standard of the twenty year old Lorenzo de’ Medici was decorated with the trunk of a bay tree with several withered branches and in the middle a single green shoot. The bay tree (lauro) was a pun on Lorenzo and he was the flourishing young branch.20 Associations such as these suggested that the severed trunk and shoot symbolised not only the regeneration of a particular family but also that that family’s fate was inextricably bound up with the most profound well being of the state which it served.

Examples of this imagery abound. In 1647 the death of Frederick Henry occasioned a flood of verse, some of which was published in print or pamphlet form. In one work the author mourned the death of the stadholder but urged his readers to restrain their grief for ‘siet daer een jonghe Spruyt van dees Nassouschen Vorst’. In another poem, accompanying a print, the writer similarly encouraged his readers to dry their eyes and look to the future urging them to wish that ‘uyt d’Jonghe Boom (William II) weer goede tachen spruyt’. Vondel’s poem on the birth of William II in 1626, employed the occasion of this ‘regeneration’ to develop the image of the fully grown tree. Amalia van Solms dreams that ‘uit mijn ledekant/ Een boom wies hemelhoog, gelaan met goude oranjen’. In spite of the hail and storm unleashed by the Habsburgs, ‘Holland in zijn schaad’we een weeldig leven leidde./Gelijk het gule volk in gule werelds eeuw’. Here the birth, or ‘regeneration’ of a future Prince of Orange is associated with the security of Holland and the ushering in of a golden age.

The severed trunk with the shoot was not the only image of regeneration which was applied to the House of Orange. The shocking and untimely death of the Prince of Orange coupled with the election of his second son Maurice as stadholder and the later role of Maurice as defender of the new Republic and one of Europe’s greatest generals suggested to many that the House of Orange possessed a quality which transcended death. The dramatist Gijsbrecht van Hogendorp illustrated this theme in his work on the death of William I Treurspel van de Moordt begaen aen Wilhelm by der Gratie Gods Prince van Orangien, which was published in 1617 and performed at Samuel Coster’s Nederduitsche Academie. In the introduction the playwright referred to William as the leader who had laid the foundations of the Dutch struggle for freedom, which had been continued by his sons Maurice and Frederick Henry. As van Hogendorp expressed it ‘gelyck den eenen Phoenix den anderen herbaert uyt zijn assche, also heeft oock desen

21 Knuttel, no. 5572, np.; Stolk, no. 1928.
wijdtberoem Prince uyt zyn bloedt naeghelaten alsucke Helden’.23 This phoenix image recurs in a poem of Jacobus Revisus Op de geboorte van Prins Willem II written in 1626. Revisus firstly described the death of the phoenix and its renewal from its own ashes. He then applied this image to the House of Orange.

Den phoenix van ons lant, Prins Willem van Orangien, 
Ontsiegel voor den tijd van’t Godvergeten Spangien, 
Door Henrick Frederick met sijne bedgenoot 
Verjonget veertich jaer en langer na zijn doot; 
En Nederlant verblijt siet in sijn cleyne leden 
Den brant, om in te gaan weerom de oude treden.

Here the birth of William II represents the rising from the ashes of his like named forebear, over forty years after the latter’s death. Even the tiny limbs of the new-born are emblematic of this rebirth. The murderous bile of Spain has not ultimately prevailed against Orange or the Dutch Republic.

Waet baet u moordery, o Castellaensche Moren! 
Wt Willem’s edel bloet is Willem weer geboren.24

These images of regeneration and resurrection, linked as they were to the fate of the Republic, bore a profound message perhaps all the more insidious for not being expressed in a direct and open form of political polemic. Rationally all knew that the stadholder was but a servant of the state whose appointment both as political leader and captain and admiral general was entirely dependent upon the goodwill of the provincial States. Yet alongside this there was a sense that the fortunes of the Republic were so bound up with this family that the continuance of one was dependent on the continuance of the other. This duality can be witnessed in the work of one poet Constantijn

24Johannes van Vloten, Het Leven en de Uitgelezen Zangen en Dichtten van Jacobus Revius (Schiedam, 1863), pp. 92-93.
Huygens wrote two poems which referred to the succession of Frederick Henry as stadholder. In one the metaphor of a ship is used. The steersman, who has guided the ship for forty years, dies and the ‘reders’ or shareholders select another in his place who is none other than the ‘jonge vaer’. The metaphor Huygens deploys serves well to indicate the relationship between the States and the stadholder, the States as shareholders choosing the steersman. In his Panegijre of 1626 however Huygens eulogises the achievements of Maurice and mourns his death, ‘que nous laissa le grand Maurice’ but rejoices that ‘le voyons tant renaistre/ Au frere qui nous est rendu’. Here symbols of resurrection replace the material world of the ship and the shareholders. Maurice is like the phoenix reborn, in this case in the role of his half brother as stadholder. Huygens is able to portray the succession of Frederick Henry both in a down-to-earth metaphor and in the more mystical symbolical language appropriate to a great princely dynasty.

In the face of these images of resurrection and regeneration the arguments of the opponents of the House of Orange were both clear and consistent. Their fullest expression can be found in the Deductie of 1654 in which John de Witt offered a robust attack upon the hereditary principle within a republic. In a republic no-one had the right by birth to high office for such was a fundamental attack on the citizens’ ‘diergekochte vryheit’. On the contrary, it was a basic axiom of the republican ideal that ‘de hoochste digniteytten voor de deucht open staan’. De Witt drew on biblical and contemporary examples. The sons of Gideon, a putative captain general, had not succeeded to their father’s post. The Venetians, Genoese and Swiss had never permitted any captain-general to hold office for life, far less permit his offspring to inherit the post. Finally de Witt postulated a state in which the successors of great men were not their bodily offspring but those imbued with their spirit and their virtues.

Kinderen ende Nakomelingen van Doorluchtighe Vorsten ende Helden niet zijn die geene die uyt haere lendene werden ghebooren, ende nae de Burgerlijcke Wetten Erfgenamen zijn van haer tijdelijcke goederen, maer die gheene die waerlijk zijn Affetselen van haere zielen, ende die haere voetstappen naervolgende, metter daet betoonen dat zy waerlijke de eeuwige schatten vande selve Vorsten, ende Helden namentlijck hare deuchden hebben geherideert.26

Implicit in de Witt's thinking is the necessity of enactment Republican principles in such a way that the state is constantly rejuvenated by office holders who place the interests of the Republic above that of the family and any degenerate falling off into the evils of hereditary office and dynasticism is prevented. This theme was re-examined in Consideratien van Staat ofte Polityke Weeg-schaal of the brothers de la Court which was published in 1661. The writers' aim was to 'outweigh' the arguments in favour of crowned monarchy and its servitude and bellicosity in favour of liberty and justice. Given the nature of human passions and their all-consuming self interest it would be unthinkable that such a regime wedded to liberty would ever authorise the bearing of certain offices within one family for eternity for this would be totally incompatible with its fundamental liberties. Where popular election was followed by gifts such as the 'Survivance', the inevitable outcome was an absolute monarchy and misery for the nation's subjects. Moreover, any hereditary system contained within it the seeds of its own decay. As the examples of David, Solomon and Rehoboam illustrated, the virtues of great men were rarely passed on in full to their sons. Hereditary succession implied degeneracy. Birth must not convey office on any individual; rather the regents of Holland must educate their sons in virtue and service to the Republic knowing that promotion would be based on merit alone. Only in this way could the Republic be preserved for eternity.27 Visual imagery reinforced this message. Dominating the Burgomaster's chamber in the new Town Hall in Amsterdam was a painting by Jan Lievens in which Suesa, a consul of Rome, demanded that his illustrious father Quintus

26 Knuttel, no. 7543, pp. 46-48, 51-52, 70.
27 Consideratien van Staat ofte Polityke Weeg-schaal (Amsterdam, 1661), pp. 30,115, 248, 266.
Fabius Maximus should dismount from his horse in his presence in deference to Suesa’s office as consul. The inscription below, penned by Vondel reinforced the theme that the father must dismount in the face of the ‘Stad’s eer en aghbaarheid, / die kent geen bloed’. This was a state which recognised no obligation due to birth.

Set against the clear cut enunciation of these principles, the position of the Orangists appeared less convincing. Seen from the perspective of November 1650, it was difficult to argue that the offices of William II should pass to a babe in arms. Could it now be time, in the interests of utility, to separate, at least temporarily, the restored office of stadholder and captain general from the young William III. In that way, according to the dictates of reason, the stadholderate as an institution could be defended without bedevilling the argument by setting forth the claims of a newly born child. A surrogate could be appointed to fulfil the office of stadholder and serve as lieutenant captain general until the young prince reached maturity. This possibility was discussed during the first Anglo-Dutch war when many pamphleteers bemoaned the absence of a captain general. There were two main contenders for this role, John Maurice of Nassau and William Frederick, stadholder of Friesland.

Both argued their suitability. John Maurice was a stadholder for the Elector of Brandenburg in the states of Cleve and Mark and thus well connected within the Empire and he had rendered service in the past to the West India Company. The principles of hereditary descent were not neglected. John Maurice was the son of the second son of Count Jan of Nassau who was widely seen as the architect of the Union of Utrecht while William Frederick it was said could only trace his descent from the sixth son of the Count. It would be a ‘groot ongelijk’, argued one of John Maurice’s supporters to promote William Frederick before him. William Frederick had married Albertine the daughter of Frederick Henry and Amalia von Solms in 1652 and hence he was very

29 Knuttel, no. 6899, np
much more linked with the Court at the Hague. However, they were by no means favourable to his cause. In a letter of July 1653, John de Witt informed his correspondent that Amalia von Solms had set her face against any surrogate role for William Frederick saying that she would leave the country if he was appointed.\textsuperscript{30} These sentiments surfaced in pamphlet literature. In a pithy publication of 1653, the male protagonist Claes stressed that the Princess Royal Mary Stuart feared that William Frederick as a surrogate lieutenant would thwart any chances of her son succeeding to his father’s offices.\textsuperscript{31}

It is clear that there was extreme sensitivity regarding the primacy of the claims of William III, based on his birth. In the early 1650’s both the principal contenders in speaking of surrogacy had usually stressed the temporary nature of any appointment. The anonymous author arguing the case of John Maurice in 1650 had emphasised that he was unlikely to live longer than twenty to twenty-five years by which time William III would be well placed to succeed him. John Maurice was moreover unmarried and childless.\textsuperscript{32} It was not until 1652 that John Maurice decisively broke with the House of Orange and put himself forward as admiral general in his own right rather than in a surrogate role.\textsuperscript{33} A pamphlet of 1653 had pointed out that William Frederick, newly married in 1652, had no sons and even were they to be born subsequently they would be younger than the Prince of Orange and pose no threat to his appointment to his father’s offices.\textsuperscript{34} As events were to prove neither would be successful in their campaign. John Maurice had no real power base within the Republic while William Frederick’s intentions were deeply distrusted by the Court in the Hague as well as by sections within his own province of Friesland. The ending of the war against England in 1654

\textsuperscript{30} Brieven van Johan de Witt, 1, Werken uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Series no 42 (Amsterdam, 1919), 101.

\textsuperscript{31} Knuttel, no. 7424, np.

\textsuperscript{32} Knuttel, no. 6899, np.

\textsuperscript{33} Knuttel, no. 7221, np

\textsuperscript{34} Knuttel, no. 7441, np.
and the Seclusion of the same year largely brought to an end discussion of a surrogate for the young prince.

How then did the supporters of the House of Orange conceive of the stadholderate? Did they in effect see it as an hereditary institution but were unwilling to grant hostages to fortune by saying so openly. And if it were hereditary, how was this compatible with the sovereignty of the provincial States and their liberties? Firstly, it would be dangerous, as we have seen, to assume that there was one corporate viewpoint. Secondly, we have to tread carefully between what was written in political polemic and what was implied in other forms of literary and visual expression. Writers of political pamphlets had to hone their argument carefully. Authors who supported de Witt would be only too eager to seize upon careless words. Imagery whether verbal or visual can convey much and is much more difficult to argue against.

In 1650 neither the supporters of the House of Orange nor their opponents had had occasion to finely hone their arguments and what emerged appears to show a divergence of views. In addition, the death of William II elicited a response from the Orangists that was as much emotional as rational. The city of Amsterdam had issued a medal showing William II as Faetion struck down from his chariot, to illustrate the theme that pride comes before a fall. An Orangist response came swiftly. An anonymous poet on a single printed sheet, warned the city fathers that times change and they themselves might soon find their arrogance humbled. Plague and famine would strike the land as a consequence of their attempt to rob William of his 'erf gesach'.35 Rather more judicious was the approach of another Orangist writer who described the stadholdership of William II as that which 'hem van Godt ende de hoogste Regeeringe deser Landen op de schouderen geleit is'.36 Intervention from the heavens, in this case from the dead stadholder, featured in another pamphlet in which William II, unable to

35 Knuttel, no. 6892, np
36 Knuttel, no. 6851, np.
serve his country any longer in his mortal state, urged his fellow citizens from above that if his yet unborn child is a son, ‘laet hem niet missen......alle Eere, Digniteyt, de Plaetsen, de Ampten, de Bedieningen, van sijn Voor-vaderen’. This emphasis on a hereditary stadholdership dependent on the consent of the States and by implication their citizens may account for the re-publication, presumably in the last two months of 1650, of the article of Survivance for the States of Holland and Zeeland of 1631. The publisher Michiel Stael of the Hague gave no reason for this re-edition but the text speaks volumes.

Als te weten dat soo wanneer het Godt Almachtigh sal ghelieven Syn Hoogheydt vol van Jaren ende Glorie met dese Werelt tot zich te halen dat oock als dan het voorsz Stadt-houderschap ...op Syne Hoogheydts Successeurs ende Descendenten geconfereert ende in deselve gecontinueert ende geperpetueert mach werden.

The publication of the Deductie in 1654, and the Seclusion of William III from the offices of his forefathers compelled the Orangists to refine their arguments. De Witt had declared that any hereditary principle was incompatible with the ethos of a Republic. Rather it was emblematic of the monarchical and tyrannical tradition. The Orangist author of Bedenckinge op de Deductie van de Ed. Gr. Mog. Staten van Holland responded carefully. Firstly, he adjudged that the young Prince of Orange should receive a ‘preference’ to high office on account of the services of his forefathers to the state. He examined de Witt’s contention that the true children of the great were not those of their bodily progeny but their spiritual descendants and found it wanting. For this writer many of their fathers’ virtues were reborn in their princely offspring ‘dat inde Ambachts luyden kinderen so licht niet gheschiedt’. Lions did not spring from apes, nor eagles from doves. Moreover, although the author did not specifically state that the stadholderate should pass from father to son, he did contend that hereditary succession

---

37 Knuttel, no. 6869, p. 6.
38 Knuttel, no. 6633, np.
per se was by no means incompatible with the maintenance of liberties and privileges. In the case of the Maccabees the role of captain general, as he defined it, passed from father to son without curtailing Jewish freedoms. Similarly in Rome, the position of Consul had passed from father to son without leading to monarchy. To the allegation that hereditary princes abused their powers to the benefit of their dynasty, the author contested that those of the regent class were by no means averse to favouring their families in the allocation of office. Finally, it was a mark of gross ingratitude that ‘datmen niet en laet diens Prins genieten de eere, die syn voor-vaders habben gemeriteert, altijt van kint tot kint te besitten’. 39

The attacks on the hereditary principle mounted by the brothers de la Court in the early 1660’s led Orangists to be very cautious in how they expressed their support for the young prince. The proposition of the States of Zeeland of 1660 in proposing that the Prince of Orange should be vested with the offices of stadholder and captain general was much more discriminating in its use of language. Given the Prince’s comparative youth, the States proposed that he should be ‘designated’ so that he would assume executive authority at the age of 18. To those who might protest that ‘designations’ ‘smaecken naer survivances die Odieus sijn en van sequele en daerom oock in verscheyden Provintien bij particuliere wetten en resolutien geprohibeert’, the document argued sensibilities regarding ‘survivance’ were understood but that ‘designation’ although not previously used, was appropriate in these circumstances. 40

The author of Hollands Op-komst of 1662 sought to disentangle the stadholderate from any hint of dynastic monarchical ambitions by insisting that all knew that the institution was elective not hereditary. 41 Den Herstelden Prins of 1663 argued that the succession

40 Knuttel no. 8365A, p. 5.
of William III to the offices of his forefathers at an appropriate age was vital to the unity and prosperity of the Republic but that did not imply that

de Aamten altijd voor successijf moeten gehouden worden maar blijven de selve niettemin evenwel electifi, en mogen vrijelijck aan andere geconfereert worden, als den dienst van de Republicque daar aan gelegens is, ofte de Regeerders van de lande verstaan sulcks best te zijn’.

As the example of the Holy Roman Empire showed election could often result in members of the same family being chosen but did not prevent consideration of other suitable candidates.42 In a poem of 1670 celebrating the entry of William III to the Council of State the author Orizant argued that following the exemplary deeds of William and Maurice it was entirely appropriate that their descendants should succeed to the position of stadholders and captains general ‘by verkiesinge ende designatie, soo lange alser een Prince uyt dien bloede was’.43 In March 1672, William III was chosen as captain general. In a pamphlet entitled Viva Hollandia, the author while celebrating the appointment makes clear that it came to the Prince not as the result of his birth but as the gift of the sovereign States in whose disposal the appointment lay for ‘men kent in Holland geen erfrecht of Successie van de vader op de Soon wegen de hooge bedieninge van Capiteyn Generael’.44

Cautious as these utterances were, there were other strands of Orangist rhetoric which suggested that, in practice, it was inconceivable to many of the Prince’s supporters that a restored stadholder would not be the direct descendant of the late William II, constitutional niceties notwithstanding. The supporters of the House of Orange would always argue, contrary to de Witt, that the qualities intrinsic to leadership were transmitted by birth. Orangist rhetoric set its face against the classical republican tradition as understood in seventeenth century Europe. The poet Vollenhove, mourning

43 Knuttel, no. 9824, pp. 3, 43 (note s), 54.
44 Viva Hollandia of Nederlands Vreugde-Basuyt over het verkiesen van Wilhelm III...tot Capiteyn Generael (Amsterdam, 1672), pp. 30-31.
the untimely death of William II in 1650, wrote that had he progressed beyond the
volatility of youth, ‘men had in u’t verstand uws Grootvaers zien herleven./ Uws ooms
beleid en moed, uws Vaders oorlogs-deugd’. Verse provided a highly appropriate
vehicle for this type of sentiment. Johan Schulter, a minister in Breda, celebrated the
Prince of Orange’s birthday on 14 November 1664 with the observation that
‘FREDERIKS groote ziel in Hem begint t’herleven’. William II being judiciously
omitted, Schulter expressed his profound wish that that the nation ‘set WILLEM op den
waagen/ Van zijn Voor-vaderen’. The appointment of the Prince as First Noble of
Zeeland in 1668, a position formerly held by his forefathers occasioned reflection on the
transmission of virtues. An anonymous writer assured his readers that, ‘la nature et
l’expérience nous apprennent constamment cette verité, que les esprits animaux des
Grands Homes (sic) se transmettent ordinairement à leurs descendans, leur inspirent la
même valeur.

The author of the Bedenckinge of 1654 had also emphasised the centrality of
‘gratitude’ in the granting of high office to the House of Orange. This concept was to
become an essential element of Orangist polemic and therefore merits consideration.
‘Gratitude’ and ‘ingratitude’ had already an established place in Orangist thinking
before the death of William II. In 1649 the Chamber of Rhetoric of Flushing performed
an entertainment to welcome William II to the town. The head of the Chamber, Vincent
Matthyssen, in his address to the Prince, Burgomasters, Sheriffs and Town Council, set
the tone for the substance of the performance. The theme was to be the gratitude which
the town and nation owed to the House of Orange. Ingratitude was an offence against
nature.

45 ‘Op d’Afbeeldingen der Prinsen van Oranjen’, in Jeremias de Dekker, Alle de Rym-Oeffeningen van
Jeremias de Decker, 2 vols (Amsterdam 1726), t. 176.
46 Oranie-Fakkel omvluchten met verscheyden Oranie-bloemen en Blaaderen, Ter eere van Syne
Doorluchtige Hoogheyt William Henric. (Breda, 1664)
47 Knuttel, no. 9668, p. 35.
De Aerde, soo de Oude getuygen, en heeft noyt onnutter last gedragen, als ondanckbare Menschen, want die zijn in de gheligentheyt slimmer als de Beesten, ja selfs wilde en onghetemde die, soo sommige Schriften luyden, voor Weldaden aen haer bewesen, hun danckbaer daer over aen den Dader hebben betoont.

The Chamber of Rhetoric, by reminding the audience of the deeds and virtues of the House of Orange, would guard against ingratitude for ‘ ‘t welck die Memory schrift, daer op volght Danckbaerheyt’. Gratitude was also the theme of an enchanting poem by Jacobus Revius, written as the life of Frederick Henry was drawing to its close, in which the poet depicted the Dutch Republic as a heavenly kingdom, the stars being the flickering candles in the windows of the burghers. The candles had been lit as a symbol of gratitude to the ailing stadholder, whom the citizens wished to keep with them for a while longer.

Aenschout, genadich Vorst, hoe om te laten blijcken
De liefde uwes naam, het danckbaar Vaderlant
Soo menich huys bynae soo menich baken brant,
De aerd' in desen nacht den hemel schijnt te lijkten.49

More prosaically, charges of ‘ingratitude’ could be levelled against those who opposed the policies of the Prince of Orange. In their Whit Sunday sermons of 1650, several ministers of the Reformed Church criticised those who opposed the strategy of the Prince of Orange and his refusal to consider further reductions in the military, accusing them of ‘ondanckbaerheyt’. They lambasted his opponents on the grounds that they ‘weynich aensach de meriten ende diensten van syn Hoogheyt ende der selve voorgangers, Vader, Oom ende Groot-Vader hadden gedaen’.50

48 Triumpte ofte Vlissinge Vreught; over het Onfangen vanden Hoogh-geboren Prins Wilhelm. (Vlissingen, 1649), np.
50 Aitzema, Historie, vii, 53.
However, after the death of William II, the concept of ‘gratitude’ assumed a much more prominent position and became overtly, or by implication, linked to the succession of William III to the offices of his father. The States of Holland reacted sharply in 1652 to a series of sermons by prominent Reformed ministers, particularly Jacobus Stermont, in which the war with England and other natural disasters were portrayed as woes brought upon the country by ‘ingratitude’ to the House Of Orange in not promoting the interests of the young prince. Stermont was temporarily denied the pulpit on the grounds that he sought to inflame the common people and bring the nation once again ‘onder een onwettige slaverny van ‘t huys van Oraignen’.51 The author of *Considérations de Religion et D’Estat sur la Guerre Anglaise* of 1653 believed that the young prince must be appointed to the offices of his fathers, given their services to the nation even if some lieutenancy was necessary in view of his tender years, for ‘l’on ne pourrait sans faire tort a leur heritier, faire porter la nomination sur autre que sur lui’.52

The concept of ‘gratitude’ laid great emphasis upon the former services of the House of Orange and the need to reward the young prince for the actions of his forefathers by confirming him in their offices. At the same time however, it avoided any direct implication of hereditary succession as an integral right of birth. The author of *Ware Interest van Holland* of 1662, a counterblast to de la Court’s *Interest van Holland* deployed the concept in such a way that the case for the young prince was made without any slight or affront to Holland’s basic liberties. While William III should be appointed to the position of captain general as a token of ‘gratitude’ for the services of his forefathers the sovereignty of the republic rested, as all knew, in the individual provinces.53 This strategy supported the cause of the young prince without any suggestion of automatic hereditary succession with its smack of monarchy and made it clear that the captain general or stadholder was merely the servant of the States. In 1669

51 Knuttel, no. 7325, pp. 11-12.
52 Knuttel, no. 7427, p. 86.
53 Knuttel, no. 8653B, pp. 125, 130.
Pieter de Hubert, casting his eye over the past hundred years, linked the succession of
William II as stadholder to a sense of gratitude for the services of his forefathers. 'Deze
Act van Survivance was meestendeel gecoucheert op het fondament van de
onwaardelijke diensten van den Huize van Orange.'\textsuperscript{54} The notion of 'gratitude' as the
source of the Orange stadholderate and captain generalcy was to become sufficiently
widespread as to be assimilated by foreign commentators. William Temple in his
\textit{Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands} explained to his readers that
the elevation of Prince Maurice to offices of state in the place of his dead father was so
'that they did all the honour that could be done to his (William's) Memory'.\textsuperscript{55}

'Gratitude' became effectively short-hand for all that supported the succession of
William III to his father's offices and 'ingratitude' all that militated against it. In a play
of 1661 entitled \textit{Droef-Bly-eyndig Vertoog op 't Belegh en Over-gaen van Middelburgh
onder 't Beleyt van Wilhelms den Eersten Prince van Oranje} the Zeeland dramatist
Claerbout extolled the actions of William of Orange at the siege and capture of
Middelburg. The work is dedicated to prince William Frederick. This should almost
certainly read William Henry, the young Prince of Orange, as the author describes
William I as 'Uw Hoogheyt's Oudt-Groote-Vader'. The play, we are told is written for
youth in order to incite their hearts 'tot danckbaerheyt tot God, en de Uyt-voerders van
sulcken grooten werck'.\textsuperscript{56} In or about 1669 Arent Roggeven had published his
\textit{Nederlantsche Treur-spel synde de Verkrachte Belgica}. This drama, which may have
been based on a work by the poet Samuel Bollaert, had been performed in Middelburg
by the local chamber of rhetoric and purported to detail the sufferings endured by the
rebels from the abdication of Charles V on 25 October 1555 to the assassination of
William I on 10 July 1584. The role of William of Orange in combating the 'Spanish

\textsuperscript{54} Knuttel, no. 9762, p. 223.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands}, ed. by Sir George Clark (Oxford:
\textsuperscript{56} Joos Claerbout, \textit{Droef-Bly-eyndig Vertoog over 't Belegh en Over-gaen van Middelburgh onder't
Beleyt van Wilhelms den Eersten Prince van Oranje} (Middelburg, 1661), 'Introduction', np.
tyranny' was clearly central to the performance. The author prayed that God would
grant the charges entrusted to William I to the young prince of Orange 'naer waerdie
uwes Stam-Huys hoffelijcker memorie'. 57

Gratitude could also take visual form. In 1659, the Elector of Brandenburg and his
wife and Amalia von Solms visited the city of Amsterdam. The City Fathers, mindful
perhaps of events occurring in England, the possibility of the return of the monarchy
and the close family links between Stuart and Orange, had the poet and dramatist Jan
Vos organise a spectacle for their entertainment. Vos had not previously been known
for his Orangist sentiments but he had a living to make. A procession of floats, some
displaying the virtues of the Orange stadholders, made their way through the city. The
fourteenth represented William III, with the figure of Hope on the front of the float.
This was followed by a float on the front of which sat the figure of Fame and behind her
Gratitude. Two winged infants unfolded an Orange sash. The motto read 'de
dankbaarheidt bestraalt D'Orangen Oorlogsadaten'. 58 The procession did not establish
an irrefutable link between the concept of gratitude and the potential resurgence of the
fortunes of the House of Orange but the symbolism was not lost on observers. The
veteran Constantine Huygens, now in charge of the Prince of Orange’s household, in a
poem entitled Vorstelijcke Dancksegging aende edele heeren Buregermeesteren der
Stadt Amsterdam made clear his appreciation to the City Fathers. They had shown the
world their gratitude to the invincible Orange heroes who had lain long in their graves.

... En ghy haelts uyt dat Graf, en doetse weer verthoonen
De hoofden van bevel, die oogen van gesagh,
Die 't vaderland soo geem, en Spagnien soo noo sagh'. 59

57 Arent Roggeven, ‘t Nederlansche Treur-Spel synde de Verkrachte Belgica (Middelburg, 1669)
58 Jan Vos, Beschrijving der Vertooningen op de staatcywagens (Amsterdam 1659), np.; Derk P.Snoep,
Praal en Propaganda; Triumfalia in de Noordelijke Nederlanden in de 16de en de 17de Eeuw (Utrecht,
1975), pp. 85-86.
59 Worp, vi, 265-266.
The concepts of gratitude and ingratitude were deployed in works commissioned by the House of Orange. There is intriguing evidence of an uncompleted commission for Amalia von Solms by Theodor van Thulden in the years following 1650 of which only sketches remain. We are fortunate that van Thulden left written explanations of his allegorical works and the themes he includes are revealing. In a work provisionally dated 1655 and entitled *De Tweedracht verdrijft de kunsten en de wetenschappen*, discord, treachery, poverty and war are displayed as the consequences of ingratitude. The towering archetypal figures embody the fate which is already overcoming the Republic as it scorns to reward those who have served it best.⁶⁰

In Orangist rhetoric it is noticeable that the concept of ‘gratitude’ is often linked directly to the tomb of William of Orange in the Nieuwe Kerk in Delft. For Pieter de Hubert writing in 1669 the erection of the tomb monumentalised the gratitude of the States General to William I and by implication to his descendants.⁶¹ The Reformed minister Schuler in his poem *Oranie Fakkel* of 1664 contended that the debt the nation acknowledged to the House of Orange was manifested in the tomb at Delft and added ‘de ondanckbaarheid is een doodelijk dingh’.⁶² The unknown author of a work of 1664 *Apologie pour la Maison de Nassau* emphasised his abhorrence of ‘ce monstre affreux qu’on nomme l’ingratitude’. For him the presence of the mausoleum at Delft, emblematic of gratitude, rebutted all the accusations of Pieter de la Court against the House of Orange in his *Interest van Holland*.⁶³

This emphasis on the mausoleum shows very clearly that while Orangists were content to describe the role of the stadholder as similar in nature to that of the Doge in Venice, there were also fundamental differences. While poets such as Vondel in 1622 hymned the monumental grave in Delft and the man within, personal memorials of

---

⁶¹ Knuttel, no. 9762, p. 128.
⁶² Oranie-Fakkel omvluchten met verscheiden Oranie-bloemen en Blaaderen (Breda, 1664), np.
⁶³ Apologie pour la Maison de Nassau (Madrid, 1664), pp. 33, 73-74.
Doges were banned in the city church of San Marco in Venice and no Doges were buried there after 1354. It was even the case that on Trinity Sunday and All Souls Day, Doges were not permitted to attend the liturgy in San Marco because the votive masses sung on those occasions for deceased members of the family might have caused a Doge to entertain thoughts of dynasty.\textsuperscript{64} Orangist rhetoric displayed no such embarrassment.

The great gunpowder explosion in Delft in 1654 destroyed parts of the town but left the tomb of William I unharmed. For an anonymous author of 1655, this was no less than a providential act of God who had elected to chastise the rest of the town for the nation’s ‘ingratitude’.\textsuperscript{65} An absence of gratitude was also the theme of a correspondent of Secretary Thurloe who reported to the Englishman that many believed that ‘les os des princes interres a Delft crieront vengeance de cette ingratitude et que cette destruction est un effect de ce cri’.\textsuperscript{66} The poet Jan Six van Chandelier likewise immortalised the preservation of this memorial of the nation’s gratitude to ‘haar planters, en beschermers’. In a veiled reference to the young William III, the yet unripened fruit of the orange, he wrote of the explosion,

\begin{quote}
Dat al het onweer, uit den hel,
Saam spanne, om die triomfste uit te roeijen,
Oranjes blos, en groene schil
Zal eeuw, in eeuw doorrypen, en herbloeijen.\textsuperscript{67}
\end{quote}

Here the preservation of the tomb is adroitly coupled with the continuation and flourishing of the family and its fortunes.

This consideration of ‘gratitude’ and the image of the tomb calls inescapably to mind the series of approximately 48 paintings depicting the tomb of William of Orange.

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe} ed. by Thomas Birch, 7 vols (London, 1742), II, 650.
\textsuperscript{67} ‘Buskruid Donder, en Blixem, te Delft’, in Jacobs, I, 675-677, lines 101-104.
m. the Nieuwe Kerk in Delft which were produced by the years 1675-1677 in Delft.
in the Nieuwe Kerk in Delft which were produced in the years 1650 to 1671. Could these conceivably be seen as elements in Orangist propaganda. The artists involved were Gerard Houckgeest, Emanuel de Witte and Hendrick van Vliet and in 1650 all three were based in Delft, a town whose artists had often been linked to the nearby court at the Hague. Arthur K. Wheelock Junior in an article in Simiolus has suggested that the initial painting of the tomb in 1650 may have been an Orangist commission following the death of William II and that the stimulus for the change in Houckgeest's style which observers have noted, may have been this commission and the events of 1650. The possibility of such a commission is not unreasonable. Certainly Barthold van Bassen, the likely teacher of Houckgeest had been involved in the construction of the stadholder's palaces at Honselaarsdyck and Ter Nieuwberg and had painted an earlier work depicting the tomb of William I in a fantasy setting in 1620.68 Church interiors had previously been deployed for polemic purposes. Saenredam's *Interior of the St Bavokerk, Haarlem with a Bishop's Tomb* of 1630 had depicted a non-existent episcopal tomb as part of the chapter's campaign for legitimacy which Rome contested.69 However, tempting as it may be to suggest an Orangist commission and a campaign of artistic propaganda, a degree of caution is advised.

It is true that some of the paintings of the tomb of William I do appear to suggest a polemic function. In two paintings by Houckgeest of 1650 and 1651, in which the tomb forms a central part of the painting, the figure of Liberty holding the hood of Freedom is positioned to catch the eye.70 In a work of Emmauel de Witte of 1664 a single ray of sunlight illumines the motto 'Te vindice tuta libertas', (with your

---

70 Nieuwe Kerk and Tomb, 1650, oil on panel, 49 by 35 inches, Kunsthalle, Hamburg: 165, oil on panel, 22 by 15 inches, Mauritshuis, Hague.
protection liberty is safe) which is placed next to the figure of Fortitude. In reality Fortitude was coupled with the motto ‘Saevis Tranquillius in Undis’ (at peace amid the raging storm). Thus de Witte rearranged elements of the tomb to emphasise William’s service to the nation.\textsuperscript{71} However the iconography of many of these tomb paintings is not always simple to decipher. Any depiction of a monument to the dead may carry a theme of \textit{vanitas}. In a work dated to about 1660 Houckgeest depicts a tomb in the Oude Kerk in Delft with an open grave being dug in the foreground.\textsuperscript{72} Similarly van Vliet in 1667 positions an open grave with shovels and two skulls in the forefront of a painting of the tomb of William of Orange in the Nieuwe Kerk.\textsuperscript{73} We would usually assume that Houckgeest’s tomb in the Oude Kerk with the open grave intended to allude to themes of vanity and temporality and it seems reasonable to suppose that van Vliet’s painting of the tomb in the Nieuwe Kerk carried a similar nuance of \textit{memento mori}.

Thus the best that can be said is that some of these paintings appear designed to emphasise the virtues of the dead stadholder. While the number of paintings, at just under fifty, may seem considerable, it has to be set within the context of an \textit{oeuvre} such as that of van Vliet which encompassed over two hundred and twenty-five church interiors.\textsuperscript{74} In many of the paintings the position of the tomb itself is peripheral. These works form part of a visible fascination with the subject of church interiors which reached its apogee in the Netherlands around 1660, before gradually declining in favour of the exploration of outdoor scenes. A church interior by Emmanuel de Witte was priced at 150 guilders and with this value it is not surprising that they seem to have been acquired by wealthy collectors including the Kings of England and Denmark.\textsuperscript{75}

Although prints of certain of these paintings were subsequently used to illustrate

\textsuperscript{72} c.1660-61, oil on canvas, 64.1 by 77.4 cm., Art Institute of Chicago.
\textsuperscript{73} 1667, canvas,127 by 85.5 cm., Walker Art Gallery, Liverpool.
\textsuperscript{74} Lokin, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{75} Jeroen Giltaij, ‘Saenredam and the architectural painters of the seventeenth century’ in \textit{Perspectives}, pp. 8-19 (pp. 14, 16).
guidebooks on the town of Delft, it is difficult to date them and thus it is not possible to provide evidence that single prints of the tomb were sold for the edification of supporters of the House of Orange.

Leaving aside the concept of gratitude in all its manifestations, Orangists appear to have placed great worth in the use of symbols of regeneration and resurrection. The image of the severed trunk and the new shoot continued to be regularly deployed. The death of William II and the birth of his posthumous son made this a highly appropriate and emotive symbol. The posthumous birth of William III lent itself naturally to tree imagery. For one writer of 1650

\[
\text{d'Oranje-stam tot aen de wortel toe geknoedt,} \\
\text{(soo 't scheen) eer Godt een ander gaff} \\
\text{Wt hem geschooten.}^{76}
\]

As William III grew into a young man who was suitable to be appointed to the offices of his forefathers, the shoot grew and flourished. The appointment of William III as First Noble of Zeeland led one writer to ponder on the ways of Providence and the severed trunk, only to delight that 'Uwe Hoogheyt als een cierlijk scheute ende edele plante voor onze oogen mogen sien her-leven'.^{77} The shoot grew towards a stately tree as he succeeded to the offices of his fathers. When William III became captain general in 1672, the poet Vollenhove portrayed this as a vibrant regeneration in which the orange tree, once struck down 'herleeft, hergroeit, herbloeit in eene spruyt'.^{78} The supporters of de Witt faced with what was a veritable plethora of tree imagery argued lamely that while such symbols had been appropriate for the death of William I and

---

76 P. H. van Grevenbroeck, *Nederlandsche Swane=Sang op de Witvaert van Sijn Hoogheyt Wilhelm Frederick (sic) Prince van Oranien* (The Hague, 1650)
77 Knuttel, no. 9677, p. 1.
78 Knuttel, no. 9968, np.
Maurice's subsequent leadership of the Republic's army, the severed trunk could not be used to represent William II for he had died a natural death.79

We see the culmination of tree imagery in the years after 1672 and the restoration of the stadholderate. One work of 1675 succeeds perhaps in bringing together many of these themes. *Geslacht-Rekening der Doorluchtigste Vorsten van Nassau en Oraenjen* shows on the frontispiece a trunk of a tree. At the foot of the trunk is the face of William I, at the top in its leafy exuberance, William III. The first part of the book detailed the achievements of the ancestors of the House of the Orange, beginning ambitiously with the year 682. The author described the military successes of William III against the French, placing them in the context of the feats of his forefathers, immediate and distant. In the view of the author William, in the face of his own achievements and those of his predecessors 'heeft... volkomen verdient het Erflijk Hooft van Onsen Staet te wesen' which has been bestowed, *nota bene*, by the provincial States. Not only will he guard the freedom and prosperity of the state but also, 'dusdanige Hooft konnen wy niet wel missen; dewijl daer door de macht de Regenten in den toom moet gehouden worden, om dat sy de selvige niet tot onderdrukkinge harer Medeboergeren souden misbruiken.'80

As we have seen phoenix imagery had been associated with the prince of Orange before 1650 but it was after the death of William II that it becomes such a notable element in Orangist imagery. The sudden and unexpected death of the stadholder and the birth of his posthumous son shortly afterwards occasioned a flood of phoenix imagery. One poem characteristic of this genre was entitled *Op de Nieuw-geboren Fenix van Oraengie, in stede des overleden Vorsts, den Prince Wilhelm -verresen den 13 November 1650* by Samuel van Hoogstraten. Grief and joy were combined for 'Zoo

79 Knutel, no. 9663, p. 53.
80 *Geslacht-Rekening der Doorluchtigste Vorsten van Nassau en Oraenjen* (Amsterdam, 1675), p. 66.
daar een fenix is verloren,/ Een jonge Fenix wort geboren’. 81 Regeneration was similarly hymned in another work.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Eer noch de tranen van ons' oogen gewassen} \\
\text{Om dat de bleekte Doodt Prins Wilhelm quam verrassen} \\
\text{De klock van vreugde speelt, om dat soo wel te pas} \\
\text{Een and'ren Phoenix komt uyt sijn verstoven as.} 82
\end{align*}
\]

A poem by van Adrichem illustrates particularly clear the message behind the use of such a theme.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{De Phoenix die... was verloren} \\
\text{Is door Godt’s liefdens vier weer op een nieuw herbooren}
\end{align*}
\]

Thus Maurice, Frederick Henry, William II and latterly William III had risen as a phoenix from the ashes of their predecessors. In the case of the infant prince of Orange in 1650, his birth clearly constitutes the rising of the phoenix but in the case of the other three stadholders, it can only be their accession to the office of stadholder which marks the regeneration from the ashes for all three were adults when their predecessor died. Thus the phoenix image refers not just to birth but to the transmission of office. The author makes it clear that this is so, giving expression to his hope for the newly born William for he declares, in an excess of hyperbole, that it is the common prayer of all Holland, ‘als hy het ampt bekleet dat hem sijn vader laet’. 83 Phoenix image was not confined to poetry. In either 1648 or 1649 Govert Flinck had commemorated the birth and tragic early death of a son to the Elector of Brandenburg and his wife Louise Henriette the daughter of Frederick Henry with a painting now in the New Palace in Potsdam. The goddesses Minerva, Fortuna and Venus and Juno clustered around the open cradle of the heir. Putti bore the arms of Brandenburg and the electoral crown aloft.

81 Knuttel, no. 6884, np.
82 Nederlandsche Vreught-Basuyn schaterende over de Geboorte van den Jongen Prince, Wilhelm van Oranjen (The Hague, 1650)
83 Knuttel, no. 6871, np.
while Fame, ascending heavenwards, displayed a branch of orange fruit in her hand.\textsuperscript{84}

In 1650 Comelis van Dalen used Govert Flinck’s painting to design a print to celebrate the birth of William III. The arms of Orange were substituted for those of Brandenburg and the background to the work was now sited in the Vijverburg in the Hague. Instead of the electoral crown, a putto held up for attention a phoenix.\textsuperscript{85}

In myth there was only ever one phoenix alive at any one time. After a life of five hundred years or more, the bird sets his nest ablaze, fans the flames with his wings and dies while from the ashes a new phoenix arises. Thus in both pagan and Christian art the phoenix symbolises both uniqueness and immortality, the individual being mortal and unique and the species immortal. In the case of Elizabeth I of England, the Virgin Queen was described by her admirers as ‘sola phoenix omnis mundi’.\textsuperscript{86} Similarly the uniqueness of Maurice was celebrated by Remy Bastien in 1618 in his poem \textit{A Illustre Prince Maurice} in which he enthused, ‘Grand Maurice, tu es le Phenix de nostre aage,(sic)/ Des preux le parangon, vaillant, genreux et sage’.\textsuperscript{87} It is the second aspect immortality which casts light on the use of the phoenix imagery in relation to William III. Kantorowicz in his magisterial study \textit{The King’s Two Bodies} describes the concept whereby the monarch has both a natural body, subject to mortality and a body ‘politic’ which does not die but is transferred from his mortal body at death to another. Thus this immortal part of the kingship migrates to his successor perpetuating both a continuous succession of individuals and a corporate perpetuity of the collective which combine to form the concept of a royal ‘dignity’ which never perishes. It was highly appropriate to symbolise this migration by the emblem of the phoenix. As classical authors had related, the bird rising from the ashes was not conceived of his father but was his own father, leaping forth now as the son. The image of the phoenix was symbolic of the fact

\textsuperscript{84} Govert Flinck, \textit{Allegory on the Birth and Death of the Crown Prince William Henry of Brandenburg}, 1648/9, oil on canvas, 111.5 by 82.5 cm., Potsdam, New Palace.
\textsuperscript{85} Stolk, no. 2011; Muller, no. 2011.
\textsuperscript{87} Knuttel, no. 2509, np.
that the king’s reign, in one sense, suffered no interruption for the reign of his successor began at his demise. Thus dynastic continuity and hereditary succession was perpetuated. It is instructive to consider some examples of how this concept was deployed. A jeton or small medal devised in 1643 to announce the death of Louis XIII and the accession of his son Louis XIV, showed a phoenix in its mountain nest, illumined by the rays of the sun. The motto explained that ‘le Phoenix naist et s’eleve des cendres de son pere par l’Influence qui luy est envoyee du Ciel et du Soleil’. The same symbolism can be seen in a medal cast in the Netherlands in 1666 on the accession of Charles II of Spain. On the obverse side was the head and shoulders of the new monarch and on the reverse side a phoenix rose from the ashes with the legend ‘renascitur’.

These are foreign examples but there is every evidence that the Dutch deployed the phoenix symbol for the same purposes, for its use was widespread throughout Europe. Ripa’s *Iconologia* which was first published in Dutch in Amsterdam in 1644 showed under the heading ‘resurrection’ a woman holding in her left hand a phoenix. Vondel writing in 1660 in expectation that the newly restored Charles II would visit Amsterdam before his departure assured the city’s citizens that

\[ \text{Gij zoudt hem zien, begrimd van's doods grimmassen,} \\
\text{Naar d'Overdrift der wolken, droef en naar,} \\
\text{Verrijzen uit zijn vaders heilige assen,} \\
\text{Geofferd in den gloed op’t hofaltaar.} \]

Here the phoenix is Charles II, succeeding to the throne to which heredity bound him. Thus the symbol of the phoenix was frequently deployed in the case of an individual succeeding to a position of office which was theirs by hereditary right. Clearly this

\text{89 Gerard van Loon, *Beschryvinge der Nederlandsche Historipenningen*, 4 vols (The Hague, 1723), II, 536-537.} \\
\text{90 Ripa, p. 545.} \\
\text{91 ‘Opgang van Karel Stuart de Tweeden’, Verwey, p. 816} \]
could apply in the case of the Prince of Orange. Certainly the image was widely used in relation to the Prince. An example can be seen in a painting by Govert Flinck entitled *Allegory on the Memory of Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange with the portrait of his wife, Amalia von Solms*. The work was commissioned by Amalia for her residence Huizen Bosch, and as such is clearly intended to laud and perpetuate the fame of the House of Orange. Her dead husband is represented seated in armour on a tomb, a putto about to crown him with a laurel wreath. Amalia herself is seated in the foreground of the painting with a book open before her. Kneeling before her, as if to console her, is the figure of Hope bearing an orange branch as a symbol of the young prince. In the background, the sun breaks through the dark clouds to light upon a monument upon which a phoenix rises from the ashes. An angel in the left of the painting draws our attention to this hopeful symbol of a future Prince of Orange.92

The same year 1654 saw the production of the first medal showing the young prince. A head and shoulders image of William III surrounded by a wreath of orange branches decorated the obverse side, while on the reverse was a phoenix rising from the ashes in the beams of the sun. Three years later two further medals were produced, one with the phoenix as in 1654, the other having instead on the reverse side a short verse inscribed.

Al lag D’Oranje Boom Geknot,
Dat Eedel Spruitje werdt van Godt
Gekoestert in Maria's Schoot.
Dus leeft de vader na zijn Doodt
Gelijk een Fenix in zijn Zoon.
Hy Groey in Bloey en Span de Kroon
In Deugd en Prinselyk Verstant
Tot Heul en Hail van’t Vaderlant.93

Here we see clearly images of regeneration and succession. The orange tree cut down by the death of William II, sprouts anew with the birth of his son. Just like the phoenix the death of the bird is also its resurrection for William II lives on in the person of his son. There is an assumption that William III will succeed to some form of his father’s office as his growth in virtue and understanding prepares him to be of service to the nation in the future.

Any occasion of William’s promotion towards that end was inevitably marked by phoenix imagery. When in 1668 William was elected as First Noble of Zeeland, a position which his forefathers had also held, a sermon was given on 23 September of that year at Middelburg by Johannes Thilenus to mark the occasion. This was subsequently published with the addition of a poem by one N. van Hoorn in which the poet addressed William as ‘phoenix nieuw verresen, /Uyt Welhem’s dierbare As’. The prince’s membership of the Council of State in 1670 was celebrated in a poem by van Santen in which the author proclaimed ‘hier rijst een Phoenix nu uit den Oranjen-as’. 1672 inevitably saw a flood of phoenix imagery. William’s appointment as captain general and stadholder of Holland was in the eyes of one commentator no less than the work of God who ‘heeft hem ons ten dienst uyt Vaders asch gewekt / Gelijk een Fenix’. The rising of the phoenix from the ashes was clearly linked to the attainment of the offices of his forefathers. A medal of 1672 cast to celebrate the appointment of William III as stadholder of Holland had on the reverse side the Prince depicted as Pallas with on one side a conspicuously fully grown orange tree and on the other, in the distance a phoenix from the ashes. The accompanying legend ‘Nec Sorte, nec Fato’ might indeed imply that the Prince had now come to enjoy that which was rightfully his by birth.

---

94 Knuttel, no. 9676, p. 22.
95 Knuttel, no. 9826, np.
96 Knuttel, no. 10387, np.
97 Loon, III, 77.
The catastrophe of the French invasion in 1672 brought to the fore a very different
discussion of hereditary rights which is concerned less with the past than with the
future. The vehicle for this new debate was a series of written demands presented to the
burgomasters of the towns or the provincial States. Perhaps the first of these came on 8
July 1672 in a petition delivered to the city fathers of Rotterdam. At this point William
III had not been elevated to the stadholderate but in one version of the citizens’
demands it is requested that all the dignities vested in the Prince of Orange ‘sullen
comen te vervallen op Sijn Ed. Nasaten soo daer souden mogen zijn’. Following
William III’s elevation to the stadholderate similar appeals resounded from similar
sources. The same year 1672, sees the expression of the concept of ‘dankbaarheid’ not
only in relation to William III but also to any potential offspring. Apologie of
verdediginge van ‘t gene bij de Gemeente in Zeeland is gedaen tot herstellinge van Sijn
Hoogheyt purported to laud the role of the citizens of that province in the restoration of
William III to the offices and dignities of his forefathers. The unknown compiler
reviewed the history of Zeeland, with its Counts and States, before proceeding to
William I and his sons. After lauding the actions of William I, he explained that his
‘hooge gesagh...na dien tijdt Successive gheweest by de Heeren Princen van Oranjen’.
This might be read as an unclouded statement of hereditary succession but later sections
make clear the determining role of gratitude for

‘t Volck van desen Staet en kende niet anders vergelden de hooge verdiensten waer door ‘t aen
het doorluchtigh Huys van Orangen verplicht is, dan met de eenigen Na-zaet te doen komen ‘t
Hooge gesagh en waardigheden die het hier vooren heeft gehad.

The writer makes clear that the citizens of Zeeland wish the stadholderate to become
hereditary in the male line of William III for the House of Orange was, next to God, the

98 Knuttel, nos. 10145A, 10147.
source of all the freedoms that they possessed and 'vereyscht dat geen dankbaerheydt'?  99

Here gratitude becomes nothing less than the motivating force for an hereditary stadholderate.

A similar document purportedly from the same source maintained that such an hereditary stadholderate had been promised by the Dutch ambassador to the King of England on the occasion of the marriage of William II and Mary Stuart. Mischievously, the authors cited as their source for this information an anti-Orangist pamphlet of 1650 Trouwhertige Aensprake which had clearly conveyed the allegation with the intention of alarming its readers. 100 They even quoted the name of the publisher Jan van Dalen of Leiden. A pamphlet which took the form of a letter from Rotterdam dated 10 July 1672, exemplifies the thinking at that time behind a call for an hereditary stadholderate. The writer contended that the magistrates of the city had become 'trotsch en hoogmoedig' seeking to enhance their own families and fortunes by promoting sons to offices and honours. Enriching themselves with the emoluments of office, they had reduced the rest of the citizens to a state of political impotence tantamount to slavery 'hoewel oock vele onder ons uyt deftiger en waerdiger bloed, en Voorouderen van meerder verdiensten dan sy, gesproten waren'. In proposing a hereditary stadholderate, the author maintained that this would prevent the magistrates and their families 'haer selven tot Heeren als en Vorsten over ons te maken'. A hereditary stadholderate would thus prevent any further transference of urban office within a small selection of families and open up the possibility of political authority to a wider, much more deserving group. 101

From this period in the summer of 1672 an hereditary stadholderate appears to encounter little opposition. The number of pamphlets published in the years 1673-1675 is of course less than the crisis year of 1672 and much of what is written concerns the course of the war. However, the scanty pieces which pertain to the subject are

99 Knuttel, no. 10262, np.
100 Knuttel, no. 10264, p. 4
101 Knuttel, no. 10153, np.
suggestive. A poem on the occasion of the Prince's birthday in 1673 saw William III as a Joshua sent by God to replace the dead Moses, William II. However unlike the early Israelite leaders, the author, one E.C. plainly anticipated a hereditary succession for he wished that 'men van u Zaet noch Spruytjen mogen sien'.

An author of 1674 congratulated William III on his military endeavours against the French. He continued 'wy hopen ook, haast verder / Den vyand weg-gejaagd te sien: en U, ons Herder / Te houden erfelijck'. In the same year, the States of Holland pronounced that the stadholderate would be hereditary in the male line of the descendants of William III. A print to commemorate the event was entitled *The Death of the Perpetual Edict*, referring to the decision of the States of Holland in 1667 to abolish the stadholderate in perpetuity. In a chamber whose walls are crumbling a man representing the Perpetual Edict lies dying. His hand rests on the hood of freedom under which there is an image of the castle of Loevestein, where both Oldenbarnevelt, de Groot and the six members of the States of Holland of 1650 had been incarcerated. At the foot of the bed in the chair of state reclines an old man with the words 'Seclusie' on his head and in his right hand a paper which reads 'wie kan tegen God'. The States Party and its rhetoric in the process of death, a woman, 'goet raet' enters from a door on the left bearing an orange branch in her left hand. In the upper right of the scene a phoenix rises from the ashes.

**Conclusion**

Since the death of William I, the stadholderate had passed to his direct descendants, a development which had been institutionalised, albeit once, in the 'Survivance' of 1631 and which had been mirrored in developments in the stadholderate in Friesland. In exchanges of political polemic most Orangist commentators emphasised that the stadholderate was elective. Thus in theory a number of suitable individuals

102 Knuttel, no. 10966, np.
103 Knuttel, no. 11103, np.
104 Stolk, no. 2574; Muller, no. 2524A.
of the England of Elizabeth, there was a clear development of the symbol of the crown as suprapersonal, containing a validity greater than the merits of any one person. The crown was greater than any head which wore it. In contrast, the poetry and visual imagery of the seventeenth century Dutch Republic appears to recognise no distinction between the services of the individual and the office itself. The role of stadholder, as servant of the Republic, clearly would not lend itself so easily to modes of expression appropriate for the Crown of England but that alone cannot entirely account for the way in which the institution and the House of Orange are so interwoven in literary and pictorial forms. This raises the tantalising issue of how far the stadholderate was an integral element in the constitution of the seventeenth century Dutch Republic and how far it existed as a political institution designed to recognise and reward the services of a particular princely family. This was certainly a question which de Witt and his supporters posed. What can be said is that after twenty two years without a stadholder, significant sections of the Republic had no desire to repeat the experience. A hereditary stadholder served their purpose but he was to be no monarch.

A BODY SHATTERED - THE UNION AND THE STADHOLDERATE

In many early modern European states centralising authority was seeking to extend its power by promoting a sense of national consciousness. The writing of history and the defining of a ‘canon’ of national experience came to stand alongside regional and civic loyalties. In a state such as early modern France the monarchy could play a dynamic role as arguably the only institution which was able to control and suppress competing elements in society.¹ The Dutch Republic had been born of a struggle against such centralising authority in favour of provincial liberties. Whatever place the House of Orange held in the hearts of many Dutchmen, the stadholderate was not a monarchy. Rather the nascent Republic had to develop a national consciousness which was grounded both in the struggle against Spain and the values and experiences that were associated with this. In this, the idea as much as the substance of the Union of Utrecht fulfilled a key role.

By the mid seventeenth century defence of the Union of Utrecht had become an essential element in the normative language of contemporary political debate. In his illuminating insights into the world of the political text, Quentin Skinner has drawn attention to the conventions whereby printed political polemic of all parties and factions tends to share not only vocabulary but also principles and assumptions and most critically the criteria for testing knowledge claims. A principle may be conceived of as intrinsically politically true and right by many different competing groups and all will

¹ Orest Ranum, National Consciousness, History and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe (Baltimore; London, 1975), pp. 1, 11, 44-46.
attempt to relate their stance, however different, to its maintenance and enhancement. Thus differing groups within the Republic depicted 'eendracht' as an essential good and the Union of Utrecht as incorporating the foundations of the Republic. Their strategies for attaining and maintaining unity and the Union might differ but all groups attempted to avoid being cast as destroyers of unity while attempting to tar their opponents with that brush.

The Union of Utrecht had largely resulted from the collapse of the Pacification of Ghent and in particular the failure of those in the centre who sought political conciliation with Philip II. It has been observed that as a result the rebels were compelled, almost against intention, to form a defensive confederation which came to include only the Northern provinces. After the Abjuration of 1581 signalled a definite break with Philip II, the Union of Utrecht was the only document which regulated the relations between the provinces in the new Republic. From its inception the Union had two aims. Firstly, it was designed to enable the signatories to come together to resist Spanish hegemony. Secondly, the Union was designed to maintain that for which the rebels believed that they had fought, that is the rights and privileges of each of the individual provinces. From the start there were tensions implicit in these objectives. A struggle against an external enemy assumed that a degree of self sacrifice in matters of political and military autonomy would be expected from the seven provinces, yet a defence of the right of each province to enjoy its own privileges and to exact obedience from those resident within the province might be seen to be inconsistent with any sacrifice of privilege. In addition the provinces were manifestly not equal in resources. The northern and eastern provinces remained the theatre of war. Sparsely populated in comparison with Holland, they could contribute little to the common purse. For them

---

the Union could often best be perceived as a means of containing the ambitions of a rich
and powerful Holland within a structure which granted them equality of voting rights.
For Holland, the landward provinces served successfully as a buffer zone against
Spanish incursion in her own territory, while her large population and flourishing towns
enabled her to act as the paymaster of the Union with all the corresponding political
influence inherent in such a position.

As the development of the Dutch Republic shows, these competing tendencies
were not entirely contradictory. However contemporaries were acutely conscious of
them and internal fragmentation was perceived as being as real a danger as any military
force assembled by Spain. The polemic surrounding the negotiations leading up to the
Truce of 1609 bear witness to these fears. For the writer of Considerations D'estat sur
le Traicté de la Paix published in 1607 the provinces united need have no fear of
military defeat at the hands of Spain but were peace to come and as a consequence
factionalism to triumph, then the enemy would hardly have need to recourse to arms.
For this author, as for so many others, bodily similes had a particular resonance. He
wrote that 'la Republique doit ressembler au corps humain auquel tous membres sont
joincts'. Were the unifying forces of war to surrender to the confusions of peace then 'il
est bien certain que le corps enfin demeuroit tronque et inutile'. The inevitable
consequence would be that 'estans separez (sic) il seroit facile a l’ennemy de nous
surmonter'. To buttress his argument he cited the example of the Greeks, who united in
their confederations were able to resist the incursions of Xerxes but when he returned to
Asia leaving them in peace and prosperity, they were unable to control their divisions
and finally fell victim to the kingship of Philip of Macedonia and his son Alexander. ¹
These concerns found expression in visual form. A print of 1607 showed Father Jan
Neyen, acting on behalf of Spain in the peace negotiations, with a cross in his hand and

¹ Considerations D'Estat sur le Traicté de la Paix, pp. 19-21, 36.
the tail of a scorpion, offering an olive branch to two Hollanders who stoutly rejected it. Some copies of the print depicted Neyen with a Janus face and on his back a fox’s head. What the lion had failed to achieve by military might, the fox would gain by guile. The United Provinces at peace would degenerate into internal discord and Spain would achieve her objectives without recourse to costly military expeditions. No wonder then that the Hollander resolutely refusing the olive branch comments ‘this (sic) toch al bedroch’.5

This theme was repeated during the course of the Truce years 1609-1621, becoming more vociferous as the Republic was riven by religious and political animosities culminating in the trial and execution of Oldenbarnevelt. In 1617 a ‘liefhebber des Vaderlands’ described how Spain, estimating that the Republic could not be subdued by power of arms, had encouraged a Truce in which the ‘fleshpots’ of peace and prosperity would engender ‘twisten en oneenicheden’ and the dissolution of the Union.6 This theme was amplified in a pamphlet of the following year which purported to reveal the advice given to the King of Spain by the unholy triumvirate of Lipsius, Puteanus and Campanella. Peace, the author asserted, was merely a Machiavellian device encouraged by these luminaries with the aim of lulling the Dutch into a false sense of security. Even now Spain was exploiting dissension within the Republic, encouraging the founding of new pernicious religious groups and sowing discord where there had once been harmony.7

Polemic of a similar kind characterised the years surrounding the peace of 1648. For a writer of 1647, observation of the natural world led inescapably to the conclusion that ‘tout changement subit est dangereux’. The United Provinces had been born and bred up as a result of the struggle against Spain and had flourished thereby. Spain’s pacific policy was that of the serpent, the lion having failed to subdue the Republic by

5 Muller, nos. 1247, 1248.
6 Knuttel, no. 2460, pp. 3-4, 9-10.
7 Knuttel, no. 2618, pp. 5, 19, 32.
military force. The conflicts and confusions of the Truce years should convince any thoughtful reader that peace and political unity were incompatible. Those who argued for peace, he branded as Arminians and Jesuits, who were united in their wish that the constitution of the Republic should be undermined. The author of a pamphlet of the same year characterised this brand of argument as ‘ons d’Oorlogh heylsaem, de vrede ruineux sal wesen’. For those of the war party, ‘wy sullen in Binnelantsche twisten of oorlogh vervallen, als wy buyten geen Vyandt hebben, de voorige Treves heeft het bewesen’. For yet another author, the peace negotiations represented nothing less than the United Provinces digging their own grave. He admonished his readers ‘u eenigheyt heeft u machtigh gemaeckt; u oneenigheyt sal u klein maken’. The absence of an external enemy would expose the fissures in Dutch society, setting province against province and town against town. Like his fellow writers, he pointed to the events of the Truce years as ample evidence of the justice of his convictions. The Frisian poet Gijsbert Japix in his ‘Gebed om vrede’ illustrated his fear that peace and unity might not be easy bedfellows.

Geef tot ieders voordeel
Onze zeven Landen saam
Lust tot minzaam oordeel,
Maak tot eendracht ons bekwaam.11

For those, on the other hand, who welcomed the prospect of peace, the Union of Utrecht was depicted as a strong bond which was well capable of weathering the changes which might result from a cessation of war.12

In all this we are faced with a conundrum. The Union of Utrecht was seen as the foundation stone of the Dutch Republic. Yet it had been forged in war. For those

8 Knuttel, no. 5512, pp. 6,11,16.
9 Knuttel, no. 5500, np.
10 Knuttel, no. 5519, np.
12 Knuttel, no. 5520, np.
opposed to the Treaty of Munster of 1648 and they included the young stadholder William II among their number, this Union was on occasions depicted as a fragile growth, vulnerable to the depredations of those such as the leaders of the province of Holland, who, allegedly, placed their own factional and provincial interests above that of the common good. Peace would expose the Republic to the full force of these centrifugal forces, which as the years of the Truce demonstrated, threatened chaos and dissolution. Clearly those who argued for war had their own agenda. Some such as William II himself, were unhappy about a conclusion which did not include their former French ally. Others, and there were ministers of the Reformed church among them, mourned the official termination of any further attempts to liberate their ‘brethren under the cross’ in the southern provinces from the yoke of Catholic Spain. Yet, in the polemic literature of the time, it was predominantly on the maintenance of the Union of Utrecht that they took their stand.

Whatever the practical truth or otherwise of these predictions, they were reflected in the ruminations of foreign observers. A letter to Paris in March 1647 relayed rumours that peace would foreshadow an attempt by Holland to manipulate the Union in her favour.

Quelques-uns croyent que la Hollande a dessein de changer la forme du gouvernement des Estatz-generaux, en y mettant plus grand nombre de ses deputez, et diminuant en mesme temps celuy des autres Provinces qui composent l’aissemblée, afin d’avoir une autorité dans les délibérations proportionée a sa puissance.

Others yet feared, he recorded, that Amsterdam was seeking to form her own province, intending to wield a superiority over her fellow towns, ‘approchante de celle dont jouist la ville de Venize dans l’estendue de la République’. The writer by now one of the
cognoscenti of the rumour mill that was the Hague, added sagaciously, 'ce sont peut-
estre des chimères qui s'esvanouiront en voyant le jour'.

Yet events appeared to support some at least of the pessimistic prognostications. A letter of 7 December 1649 reported to Cardinal Mazarin the existence of a proposal in the States of Holland that an envoy, 'en leur propre et privé nom, sans intervention ny part des autres provinces' should be sent to England to conclude an alliance with the new regime. The Prince of Orange, he recorded, was bitterly opposed to any such suggestion, on the grounds that it would mark an irretrievable breakdown of the Union.

No doubt William II had ample reason to be dismayed by a proposal intended to give succour to the mortal foes of his father-in-law Charles I. The allegation of a threat to the Union was, however, not only real but also the politically acceptable way of voicing the chagrin of the stadholder and his supporters. Details obtained from an envoy of the Prince of Orange in France during February 1649 made clear that William II was prepared not only to align himself with the other six provinces in military action against Holland but also to request the intervention of divisions of French troops for the purpose. As the French Ambassador nicely observed in a missive of March 1649 to Count Frederick of Nassau, 'il serait toujours a craindre qu'un État fondé sur l'action des armes, ne vienne a souffrir dans soi-mesme par l'oisivité'.

Similar sentiments, albeit more forcefully expressed, continued to resound in 1650. A coterie of prominent Reformed ministers added their voices to those bewailing war. The appropriately titled *Na-Ween vande Vrede* published in 1650 and attributed to the Reformed luminary Wittewrongel described the Treaty of Munster of 1648 as a 'monstreuse vrede'. Never one to shirk from fuelling the flames, Wittewrongel reminded his readers that war had made them great. Peace, on the other hand would

---

14 Groen van Prinsterer, iv, 317.
15 Groen van Prinsterer, iv, 299,301.
make them small. He emphasised that ‘de Oorloge is u gheweest een Bandt van Unie en Eenigheydt; de Vrede van Twist en Oneenigheydt’. Wittewrongel echoed Tacitus in the adage ‘een seeckere Oorloge is beter dan een onseeckere Vrede’ and inquired rhetorically of his compatriots ‘begintmen niet te sustineren dat de Unie met de Oorloge uyt is’?16 Maximillian Teellinck, a noted Reformed minister from Zeeland, argued in 1650 that ‘ons land is door de bedriegelijck Vrede bedorven’. In his Vrymoedige Aenspraec Aen Syn Hoogheyt De Heere Prince van Oraenjen he urged upon the stadholder and his fellow compatriots a series of maxims of which one was to hold firmly to the threatened Union of Utrecht.17 Another pamphlet of the same year spoke of the fear that ‘de Unie die in den tijdt van een heeten en bloedighen Oorloghe was ghemaect, die en soude in den Vrede ons niet meer verbinden’.18 In this climate of concern it is not surprising that the classic tractate from 1579 Verhandelinghe van de Unie which had already been reprinted once in 1646 and again in 1647 enjoyed no less than seven editions in 1650.19

By 1650 internal tensions had been aggravated by Holland’s demand that the size of the army be reduced, in part to mitigate the effects of the heavy taxation levied to support the military. The Prince of Orange argued that such reductions would compromise the security of the Republic. A bout of horse trading reduced the issue to a discrepancy of a few hundred men but neither party was willing to make further concessions. The crux of the issue was whether Holland as a sovereign province could satisfactorily, within the bounds of the Union of Utrecht, dissolve those sections of the army whose upkeep she paid, without the agreement of the States. If she were free to do so, then the very foundation of that common defensive alliance was fragile, threatened paradoxically by that provincial sovereignty which the Union had been created to

---

16 Knuttel, no. 6756. pp. 2v, 3v, 4r.. A pamphlet of 1652 gives the author as Wittewrongel and this was not contested. See Knuttel, no. 7301, p. 10.
18 Knuttel, no. 6852, p. 2r.
defend and maintain. Satisfied that he had the support of the other six provinces, the stadholder moved to render Holland impotent by fermenting discord within her ranks. In June 1650 a majority vote of a poorly attended States General authorised the stadholder as captain general of the Union to visit every Holland town which had voted for unilateral disarmament. His aim was to persuade or compel them to recognise that their vote violated the terms of the Union. His success was far from assured. Delft, while willing to attend to the stadholder, refused to admit his military escort and Amsterdam proclaimed that while they would receive William as stadholder, they were not prepared to countenance him as head of a Generality visitation. The city’s intransigence and William’s fury left the way clear for the events of July 1650, in which the swift arrest of six leading Holland regents signalled the coup against Amsterdam led by William Frederick of Nassau. A providential mist ensured that the latter miscarried but Amsterdam was compelled to dismiss the brothers Bicker from the town council and accept new troop levels to be agreed by the provinces together in the States General.20

The war of polemic which accompanied these developments is worthy of consideration, not only for its own sake, but also because the language and argument prefigures the debate of the stadholderless years. Particularly noteworthy is a tract of 1650 entitled *Bickerse Beroerten*, whose anonymous author ascribed to himself the sobriquet ‘een patriot des Vaderlants’. He began by describing the United Provinces as an ‘aristocratique oft Borgerlicke Regeeringhen’, which by its very nature was prone to internal discord and faction. Although sovereign power was shared between the seven provinces, they were often in disagreement on fundamental issues and without some superior authority to weld them together ‘scheyden de Bontgenoten en komt die Republique t’onder’. He alerted his readers to the examples of Athens and Sparta, the one more powerful on sea and the other on land. Seemingly invincible, they succumbed

to the control of Philip of Macedonia, 'hebbende geen persoon noch middel om hen in balance te houden'. Similarly the twelve tribes of the 'Jewish Republic' were brought low by fratricidal strife and only then did they fall victim to their foes. In a return to events closer to his own time, the writer referred to the prophesy of Escovedo, the Spanish adviser of Don Juan, that 'de Nederlantsche Republique niet met Wapenen van buyten, maer met haer eyghen Twist soude noch vervallen'. Lipsius' treacherous counsels were once again cited.

So far this could be classified as the standard alarmist fare of the time but the author then dug deeper. His work now proceeded to emphasise the importance of 'balance' which would obviate much of the internal discord and give a key role to the stadholder. In so doing he could argue that he was merely reiterating the intentions of those who had drafted the Union. Clause IX of the document advised that in cases of peace, truce or war, or disagreement about levels of contribution to the common purse, the stadholder should attempt to resolve the dispute. For the writer of 1650 the stadholder was a chosen 'Belyder ende Beslisser van alle verschillen', for without his active intervention one province might well oppress another leading to a crisis of unity. A threat to this balance had come in the years of the Truce and was now in danger of recurring. A coalition of a few families was threatening the authority of the stadholder and the States General, all in the name of the absolute sovereignty of the individual province. This was all too clearly a reference to Holland's policy of further reducing the military, in spite of the opposition of the Prince of Orange and the States General.

The author placed his finger squarely on the contradiction inherent in the Union of Utrecht. The Bickers of Amsterdam and their patrician allies, he argued, saw Holland as a sovereign province and any attempt to command her in the interests of the common good as an attack on her sovereignty. Hence the resistance of many of the Holland towns to the stadholder when he visited them on behalf of the States General. For the
writer, their understanding of the spirit of the Union of Utrecht was deficient. Once
provinces came into the Union as confederates, they necessarily surrendered some
portion of their freedom of action and by definition, their sovereignty. Without this
surrender the Union was unworkable. To support his argument he deployed the
metaphor of marriage, the oldest and most natural form of Union. Here the partners
gave up their previous freedoms to abide with each other for the rest of their lives. The
family they raised was, in turn, free and sovereign within its own home but in matters
other than the purely domestic the family had to consider the welfare and interests of
their neighbours in the wider community.

Pondering on this structure, the author declared that there was no sovereign state
without a sovereign, whether individual or collective. It was essential for the Republic
that there was 'een oppersten Souvereyn'. This could not be the individual provinces as
they were often in dispute with one another, which only assisted the machinations of
Spain. Logic declared that sovereignty in the United Provinces resided in the States
General, representing the provinces in their collective, in co-operation with the Prince
of Orange as stadholder. This was a mutually dependent partnership. He wrote, 'de
Authoriteit der geunieerde Staten Generael als geduerige Souvereyns werde
gemaintaineert door de macht vanden Prince als Gouverneur ende ter wederzijden de
Staten-Generael hare macht employeren om te stijven de Authoriteyt des Gouverneurs'.
This is clearly not the dynamic, creative sovereignty as depicted in the writings of
Bodin. The imagery deployed evokes rather the world of Aristotelian moderation and
balance. 'De Unie van Utrecht stelt een juste en wijse balance tusschen de Authoriteyt
der Staten ende des Gouverneurs op datse d'een d'ander met haer machtstijf den twelck
als het Compas is.'

21 Knuttel, no. 6843, np.
The language deployed and the concepts implied in this pamphlet deserve some consideration. The language of balance evokes a cosmology, endemic in Europe not only in political polemic but in drama and verse, in which a natural orderliness is to be achieved within the state, as within the cosmos. Just as an individual should strive to attain a balance of humours for his physical and psychological welfare, a state must achieve a balance of political forces, eschewing the world of the autocrat or the tyrant. As the Englishman Walter Raleigh was to commend, a state required a ‘just measure of mediocrity’. Likewise, the language of family represents the centrality of that institution within this hierarchical, yet harmonious cosmos and its implications as a pattern for wider social relationships. Even the role of the stadholder as ‘reconciler’, as advocated in the pamphlet, belongs to the natural order of things being ‘uyt de nature gesproten’. For our anonymous author, men were creatures capable of rational discourse and behaviour and what could be more appropriate than the sending of the stadholder by the States General to the Holland towns to engage in a reasoned and fruitful exchange of views. The stadholder William II is the ‘governor physician,’ soothing the intemperate fevers with the balm of moderation and balance.

The image is not unique to the author of 1650. Vondel, commemorating Amsterdam’s welcome to Frederick Henry in 1628, defined both the personal qualities of the stadholder and those inherent in his office, when he wrote

Waar ge komt uw reden zetten  
Krijgen keuren en Stads wetten,  
Nieuwe kracht, en haat en twist  
Stuiven weg als rook en mist.  

---

22 Greenleaf, p. 28.  
Similarly an anonymous author of 1650 condemned in verse the ungracious welcome accorded William II on his visit to Delft in June of that year. He emphasised the role of the Princes of Orange as reconcilers of the provinces in the interests of their greater good.

Similarly an anonymous author of 1650 condemned in verse the ungracious welcome accorded William II on his visit to Delft in June of that year. He emphasised the role of the Princes of Orange as reconcilers of the provinces in the interests of their greater good.

Socht niet Willem dat de landen
Minnelijck te samen spanden,
Als een eenich middel dat
Ons kost schaffen vryheits schat.

But now sections of the community, in particular the province of Holland, threatened this precious unity and the role of the stadholderate which maintained it.

Eendracht heeftmen willen steuren
En weer van malkander scheuren,
Doen de Vorst ter neder viel
Die dees Landen t’samen hiel.24

Language such as this and the concept of an hierarchically ordained and harmonious universe which it reflected had already suffered a critical mauling at the hands of Montaigne and his fellow Pyrrhonists. The Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century would increasingly replace qualitative with quantative relationships.

Yet, in the polemic of the supporters of the House of Orange and indeed, in the work of certain of their opponents, this framework of cosmic harmony continues to predominate.

The arguments of *Bickerse Beroerten* were echoed in other publications of 1650. *Het Recht der Souverainiteyt van Hollandt* rehearsed the arguments of the province of Holland against the sending of the stadholder and the deputation of the States General before presenting the opposing view. He argued that the actions of William II were designed specifically to maintain the Union in the face of Holland’s particularism.

24 Knuttel, no. 6753, np.
Neither the province of Holland or the city of Amsterdam enjoyed absolute sovereignty within their own provincial or civic bounds, when the matters in question involved the issue of the Union. Drawing on article 24 of the Union, he argued that all provinces and towns had sworn to uphold the decisions of the Union as a whole, for the Union bound them together, in perpetuity, as one province. For this author as for that of the Orangist *Oogen-Salve voor de Blinde Hollanders* of the same year, the centrifugal forces of the new Republic required an 'oppersten Souverain' and both authors argued that this could only be 'de Heeren Staten Generael ghesamentlijck met Sijn Doorluchtige HOOGHEYDT'. Sovereign authority rested with the States General maintained by the 'macht' of the Prince of Orange. Once again the language of balance was deployed. 'De Unie van Utrecht stelt een rechte Balance tusschen de authoriteyt van der Staten ende des Gouverneurs', concluded the author of the first pamphlet while *Oogen-Salve voor de Blinde Hollanders* described a constitution where the authority of the stadholder was derived from the States General and thus the authority of both 'soo wijselijck waere ghebalanceert'. Similarly the system of voting in the States General ensured that the powerful province of Holland did not overwhelm the less populous landward provinces for it ensured that each of these was 'soo veel in gesach ende overstemminge alse de meeste'. Each province represented an essential member of the body politic and to ensure health no one limb or organ should dominate the others. The objective of this system of balances was that 'eendracht' which harnessed the energies of the provinces to their common good as opposed to the 'tweedracht' which left them fatally vulnerable to their enemies.25.

There is a sense in which Orangist polemic had attempted to seize the moral high ground in order to defend the actions of the stadholder in the months of June and July 1650. Unity and the sacrifices which it demanded appealed both to the altruistic spirit

---

25 Knuttel, no. 6740, pp. 6v-8r. 10r; Knuttel, no. 6852, pp. 3v-5r.
and to that nagging envy of the province of Holland and the city of Amsterdam which found an echo in many corners of the Republic. Anti-Orangist polemic acknowledged this. Searching for the reasons for the attack on Amsterdam, an anonymous poet mused

... was't nijt, om dat zoo braaf
Elk Koopman gaat gelijk een Graaf.

Holland, he asserted, could not be blamed for her prosperity and indeed her wealth had enabled her to offer resources essential to the survival of the Republic.

Want zonder mijn niet heel end' allen
De staat van't landt al lang vervallen.26

The latter sentiment was undoubtedly true but that must have made it no more palatable. It was as if Holland were constituting herself and the ideals which she purported to represent, as the focus of the Republic rather than the States General and the stadholder. The rhetoric of *Bickerse Beroerten* was challenged. In *Het Tweede Deel van 't Hollands Praetjen* of 1650, a fictional Hollander informed his companions that it was certainly the case that the Orangist rhetoric was fatally misinformed. Foreigners unaware of the political nuances of the Dutch Republic might assume that the States General was the supreme authority but history revealed that power in the Netherlands rested with 'de Alinge Gemeente'. Thus ‘de Souveraine regeeringh van yeder Provintie by ons bestaat’. He compared the Republic to the cantons of Switzerland. There, too, outside observers assumed that there was a single sovereign authority but, in reality, each canton was sovereign, bound only by a league or confederation. Such a confederation was the Union of Utrecht which was symbolised by not one single arrow but seven arrows bound together. The Hollander equally would have no truck with talk

26 Knuttel, no. 6797, np.
of the Union as a ‘marriage’ for ‘de seven landen syn in der daet geen een’. The provinces had simply bound themselves together, to act as one, in the face of the common foe. To place sovereign authority in the States General and the stadholderate was a fundamental betrayal of the liberties of the citizen as exercised at civic and provincial level as for this Hollander ‘soo moet het goet der Onderdaen altijt gheprefereert worden, voor de Hoogheydt van de Generaliteyt en Stedehouder’.27 The role of the stadholder was not to act in any sovereign capacity but to protect the liberties and privileges of the citizen.

In *Het Rechte Tweede Deel van’t Hollands Praatje* published in 1650 a fictional Brabander inquired rhetorically of Holland, ‘waar is nu haar sovererainiteyt, dewijle haren Gouverneur niet alleen de souverayniteyt van de steden, maar oock van de geheele Provincie, onder sijn voeten treed?’ The Brabander taunted the fictional Hollander saying ‘wy zijn.....vrijer volck onder onsen eygen Prince en Heer, als gy zijt onder uwen Gouverneur’. Such a jibe was intended to cause the reader to reflect on the liberties and privileges of the Holland citizen and how these had been trampled underfoot in the name of the Union. The fictional Hollander permitted no hostages to fortune. His fictional contemporary from Gelderland, referring to the commission issued by the States General on 5 June, queries tentatively ‘zijn sy niet neffens sijn Hoogheyt Souveraynen van alle de Provincien te samen?’ The Hollander’s response is robust. ‘Neen, sy secker niet, want elcke Provintie is Souverayn op hem selven.’28

Thus before the untimely death of the stadholder William II in November 1650, certain battlelines had been drawn in the war of polemic. For supporters of the House of Orange, the Treaty of Munster of 1648 posed a threat to the Union of Utrecht. The Union was depicted as fragile and requiring political and constitutional resources to sustain it. Precisely because of the centrifugal tendencies in the Dutch Republic,

---

27 Knuttel, no. 6832, np.
28 Knuttel, no. 6839, pp.10, 14, 20.
exemplified in the province of Holland, sovereignty must be found in the States General and the stadholder together, the latter acting to preserve the balance between the provinces and to reconcile their differences. For those, on the other hand, who represented the majority in the province of Holland, it was provincial sovereignty which is the key to the maintenance of their liberties. Stadholder, Union and States General are all of service in so far as they maintain and defend provincial sovereignty but they must abrogate no sovereign power to themselves. The Union is strong in so far as provincial liberties are defended. As the anonymous author of a poem *Vertroostinge over de Doodt van zijn Hoogheit* explained, in the case of William II, the death of the stadholder providentially restored to the provinces their original freedoms, that is all that is associated with their sovereignty.

Uw doot alleen, doorluchtigh Heer
Heeft alle heerschappy verdreven,
Den vroomen sijn ontrocken eer,
En 't Lant haar wetten weer gegeven.

Their sovereignty restored, the provinces are now free to work together in a true spirit of unity.

Ontfangst met danckbaerheyt de gunst
Die u den Hemel doet ontluyken,
En voeght de liefde by de kunst,
Om die met eendracht te gebruycken.29

In this rhetoric, Holland is not merely a province within the Dutch Republic, but also embodies the very concept of provincial and civic liberties and privileges enshrined in provincial sovereignty. Thus the arguments deployed by the province and the fictitious Hollander can be used by any group within any province, which wishes to assert its privileges against another focus of authority. For example, the fictional Frisian

---

in *Het Rechte Tweede Deel van’t Hollands Praatje* of 1650, commented that the first instalment of this pamphlet had been read by regents in Groningen and Leeuwarden with unalloyed pleasure, largely because its contents had severely damaged the reputation of their stadholder Frederick William of Nassau.  

The death of the stadholder enabled those who perceived themselves as defenders of the principles of Holland not only to argue that a stadholder was not essential to the function of the Union of Utrecht but also to emphasise that unity and provincial sovereignty were not mutually exclusive. The Great Assembly of 1651 was accompanied by a day of national prayer and thanksgiving on 25 January in which God’s assistance was sought.

ten eynde dat de noodige Eenicheyt, Liefde, Vrientschap ende goede Correspondentie tusschen die onderlinge Provincien werde gereleveert, gemaintineert ende deselve voor altijd religeuslijck ende onverbreeckelick onderhouden oock gecultiveert werde.

A national day of Thanksgiving, later that year, on 13 September, recorded the ‘Harmonie, Eendracht, Liefde, Vrientschap, goede Correspondentie, Confidentie en Affectie’ which had been manifest at this Great Assembly of the seven sovereign provinces. A medal struck at the request of the States of Zeeland to commemorate the Great Assembly of 1651 depicted a high rock in the midst of turbulent seas, to which are attached the coats of arms of the seven provinces. The adjacent text tells of a world watching with uncertainty as to how the provinces would cope with the death of the stadholder and adds reassuringly that at the Great Assembly the united provinces, ‘hebben eindelijck de Bondgenooten, na door de wille Gods de Religie, d’Eenigheid en de Krijsmacht verzekerd en malkander in ’t rond de hand gegeven en met vriendschap affscheid genommen te hebben.'

---

30 Knuttel, no. 6839, p. 5.
32 Bizot, pp. 202-203.
In a medal minted at the request of Jacob de la Court and intended for his grandson, the unity celebrated at the Great Assembly was represented on one side by the motto ‘stant foedere Juncti’. On the reverse the Prince of Orange lay dead holding in his grasp a net in which are entrapped seven birds, representing the seven provinces. The motto ‘vive la liberté’ emphasised that the death of the stadholder had now freed the provinces which had been ensnared and overwhelmed by force.\(^{33}\) The same theme was found in written polemic. In a pamphlet of 1651 a fictional Zeelander and a fictional Frisian, both often cast in pamphlet literature as supporters of the House of Orange, praised the unity and stability manifested in the Great Assembly and contrasted this favourably with the strife torn months of 1650. The Hollander argued that this was because divine providence had removed the ‘twistmaker’.\(^{34}\) Far from being an essential reconciling element in the Union, the stadholder was now depicted as a sower of discord. In a poem of 1651 entitled *Op de Eenegroeit der zeven vrye Nederlanden* Geraerdt Brandt portrayed a unity recovered and restored in which provincial liberties and prosperity are the concomitant blessings.

\begin{align*}
\text{Nu komt hier d'Eenigheid, die Neerlant hadt verlaten} \\
\text{En leidt de welvaart aan voor ons gezegent lant,} \\
\text{En d'oude Vrijheit, die haar te zamen spant.}\(^{35}\)
\end{align*}

A print of 1651 commemorating the Great Assembly exemplified the rhetoric of a world without a stadholder. In the centre of the print stood an altar upon which lay the seven bound arrows of the Union of Utrecht, surrounded by the female representations of the seven provinces. An angelic host above exhaled the word ‘vrede’ and the motto emphasised ‘de grootste macht is de Eendracht’. In the accompanying poem by J. de Bondt, the language deployed was reminiscent of Orangist polemic with the difference

\(^{33}\) Loon, ii, 364-365.  
\(^{34}\) Knuttel, no. 7040, pp. 3-4.  
that this time it was the representatives of the provincial states who were the focus of attention. They were the peace-makers, the reconcilers, the ‘trouwe Harders’ who ‘naest Godt, in liefd en Vree/ En Eendracht lieflick voede’. They were now the physicians who cauterised the wound of discord.

Dit zijn ons Stuer-luy, ja
Ons Harders in den noot;
Ons Medecijns die selfs
De oorsaeck van de doodt
Wech nemen, en in plaets
Liefd’, Vree en Eendracht bringen.36

Thus unity was achievable without the personal reconciling influence of a stadholder. The ideals espoused by Holland, rather than the figure of an individual, could form the focus of a bond of unity. For a writer of 1652, the unity achieved by the Great Assembly, without the person of the stadholder, ‘een nieuwen bont van Liefde wederom hebben verbonden, wesende dese verbintenisse niet geschiet door authoriteyt van een Hooft, maer niet veel min als uyt duysent ghemoederen van Menschen’.37

This view of the Union of Utrecht was tested in the events of 1654. The province of Holland had to justify to her fellow provinces her willingness to enter into a separate peace with Cromwell’s England and the policy of exclusion of the young prince of Orange from the offices of his forefathers. The reality was that the other provinces were in no position to mount any effective opposition to Holland’s policy. The power of Holland was such that the Union of Utrecht could be deemed to mean whatever the province’s representatives wished. However, the war of rhetoric revealed the positions adopted by the supporters of de Witt and their opponents, the Orangists. The Deductie of de Witt published in 1654 and the supporting pamphlets of the following year can be said to have tested the doctrine of provincial sovereignty to destruction. A degree of

36 Muller, no. 2013.
37 Knuttel, no. 7314, np.
semantic casuistry enabled these writers to argue that the difference between a contract and a treaty enabled Holland to deal with England separately from her confederates in the Union of Utrecht. The Union, for them, appears less to be based on the actual articles of the Union, however defined, than on the bonds of ‘confreryen, compaignen’ and ‘commercie’. Once again the stadholderate is deemed dispensable for, ‘de Unie vry vaster ende seeckerder rust op de fondamenten van onsterfelijke Vergaderingen ende Collegien als op de uytterlijcke splendeur ende auctoriteyt van sterflijcke Menschen’.38

Holland and her principles again become the focal point of the Union but as the writers protest the importance of the province, there is a hint that the realities of the political world in the Netherlands and the critical position of Holland is now more openly stated. The sensibilities of her fellow provinces are somewhat roughly handled. It is revealing that the anonymous author of Wederlegginge op de Bedenkinge der Deductie van de Edele Groot Mogende Staten van Holland, published in 1655 describes Holland without apology as ‘de Hert-Ader van de Republijck’. It is true to say, he argues that the provinces were bound together but it had also to be acknowledged that Holland furnished by far the greatest costs of the war against England and thus she can be said to have the greatest interest in its outcome. The author of another pamphlet of the same year echoed this. Holland’s contribution to the war, ‘by naer anderhalf mael soo veel als alle te samen’, is emphasised. Holland as the financial pivot of war and a seaward province has a particular interest in the war against England which is not shared by all her fellow provinces. The author paid lip service to the equality of the partners in the Union but then moved on to suggest that, in certain matters, weight of influence should take precedence over the number of votes. Thus in the case of Holland, ‘als meesten tijt het meeste geinteressiert zijnde oock het meeste gewicht by brenght

38 Knuttel, no. 7543, pp. 22, 64; Knuttel, no. 7660. p. 59.
This openly Hollandocentric development is worth remembering when we come to consider the work of Pieter de la Court in the 1660’s.

In reaction Orangist rhetoric in the early years of the 1650’s reiterated many of the themes which were present before the death of the stadholder. Orangist writers continued to assert that the very nature of the new Republic and its citizens inclined it to faction and discord without the presence of a stadholder. For the anonymous writer of *Grondigh Bericht nopende den Interest van diesen Staet* published in 1651 ‘in diesen landen de humeuren der Menschen seer different sijn, ende verdeylt in veelderley secten en factien’. Thus the Union continues to be depicted as under threat and the stadholder as its defender. The author of a pamphlet of the same year argued that the actions of William II in 1650 were designed purely ‘tot maintien ende conservatie van d’Unie’. Those who opposed him were inevitably committed to not only the dissolution of the Union itself but also the concomitant changes in the political and religious framework of the nation. For the author of *Grondigh Bericht* it was axiomatic that Holland was attempting to dissolve the ‘body’ of the Republic. Body analogies continued with the States General described as the *corpus* of the Republic but the author here was considerably more cautious than his predecessor in *Bickerse Beroerten* of 1650. The role of the States General in regard to particular provinces was expressly described as having to be compatible with their provincial liberties and freedoms.

Thus Orangist rhetoric chimed with the spirit of the hour. The concept of the sovereignty of the States General would be brought into play when the other provinces were largely at one in opposition to Holland’s policy. In this year of the Great Assembly, this was not the case. By 1653 however, the situation had changed. The

---

39 Knuttel, no. 7661, p. 2,10; Knuttel, no. 7660, pp. 31, 60.
40 Knuttel, no. 7009, p. 20.
41 Knuttel, no. 7011, np.
exigencies of the war with England and heavy taxation led to disturbances in several Holland towns which were accompanied by calls for the restoration of the Prince of Orange to the offices of his forefathers. The rhetoric of the Orangists now approximates much more closely to that of *Bickerse Beroerten* of 1650. In *Ondekinghe van den Nederlantschen cancker* the author unmasksthe intentions of de Witt and his supporters to make themselves total masters of the Republic. They will renounce the Union and thrust aside the States General, denounce the Synod of Dort, make changes in religion and drive out the Prince of Orange and all his dependents. In order to achieve this, they will declare that each province, yea even every town is sovereign and free to select any policy it chooses. In this way the jealousy of towns and provinces could be exploited by a policy of divide and rule.

The past was trawled to prove the point. 1653 saw the republication of a pamphlet of 1617, *Spaenschen Raedt*. Now entitled *Dienstige Aenmerkingen* and with an additional forward and remarks, the pamphlet purported to be the counsel of Lipsius, Puteanus and Campanella to the King of Spain on the reduction of his Dutch foes. As before internal dissolution is the keynote, to be achieved on both occasions by those treacherous allies of Spain, the representatives of the State of Holland. Their weapon is one of those ‘Machiavellische gruwelen,’ to wit the principle of provincial sovereignty in which each province ‘soo seer op sijne particuliere gerechtigheden, pointilten en souverainiteyt staen’ that unity is no longer possible. For the writer this emphasis on provincial liberties may occasion the death of liberty itself for ‘libertas libertate perit’. Here, at least, it is clear that for Orangists the concept of liberty or freedom was identified with the struggle against Spain and was threatened by this very emphasis on provincial liberties.

---

42 Knuttel, no. 7441, np.
43 Knuttel, no. 7451, pp. 22-23.
The publication of de Witt’s *Deductie* in 1654 and the policy of excluding the young Prince of Orange from office called for a response from the Orangist camp. Many in the other provinces abhorred both the separate dealings of Holland with the England of Cromwell and the action taken against the House of Orange which Holland continued to argue had been imposed upon it by Cromwell. However with Holland as the paymaster of the war unwilling to continue and a spirit of realism conceding that peace was desirable, there was a grudging inevitability in the agreement of the other’s provinces to Holland’s policy. It was rumoured that the guardians of William III were seeking urgently for a writer to refute the *Deductie* and the Orangist counterblast came in the form of the *Bedenckinge op de Deductie van de Ed. Mog. Staten van Holland* of 1654.\(^4\) In a letter to van Beverningh and Nieuwpoort in England, John de Witt suggested that the author of the work was one unknown to them but suspected of being a minister of the Reformed Church.\(^4\) The author of a pro States Party work of the following year 1655 declared that the author of the *Bedenckinge* was also unknown to him, ‘hoewel uyt de stijl afgenommen kan werden hy uyt Zeelant te moeten zijn’.\(^4\) Certainly the author pays due regard to the sensibilities of the disgruntled within Zeeland and the States of Zeeland were to issue a resolution against Exclusion in 1654.

In language reminiscent of *Bickerse Beroerten* of 1650, the author argued that the stadholderate had always acted as a ‘conterpoys’ against the pretensions of Holland and Amsterdam and hence was essential to the functioning of the Union. It was for this reason that Holland had always attempted to curtail the powers of the stadholder under both Maurice and William II. In the same vein, the policy of Exclusion, the author alleged, had not been forced upon Holland by Cromwell but was the very creature of Holland itself. Availing himself of his opponents’ concept of freedom, he argued that the very policy of Exclusion took from the provinces their freedom to nominate the

\(^{4}\) Birch, ii, 521.
\(^{4}\) *Brieven van Johan de Witt*, i, 251.
\(^{4}\) Knuttel, no. 7660, p. 5.
Prince of Orange and his descendants as captain general. The particularism of Holland and Amsterdam was emphasised when the author underlined, in the same way as the anonymous author of *Bickerse Beroerten*, the alleged hostility of those in power in Amsterdam to the West India Company.

The West India Company had been founded in 1621, its stated mission being not only to trade but to colonise and bring the Reformed faith to the New World. Founded at a time of intense religious and political controversy, its policy had attracted considerable support among Counter-Remonstrant groups. Until the 1630's and the control of large sections of the sugar exports of Brazil, the West India Company had few prospects of being a commercially viable organisation and had been far more dependent on subsidies from the States General than the East India Company. The failure of Holland and in particular the Amsterdam Chamber to rescue the West India Company from its disastrous position in Brazil in the late 1640's may have been the result of the Chamber's greater interests in the Guinea and Angola sections of the Company allied to the not unreasonable assumption that Brazil was no more than a bottomless pit. Yet this policy was deeply resented in provinces such as Zeeland and Groningen where investment in the company had been proportionately higher than in Holland. Zeeland, unlike Holland had suffered a severe slump in trade and commerce following the Peace of Munster in 1648 and the reopening of the Schelde and the coastal ports in the south. The West India Company had provided work for shipwrights and associated suppliers and the Company, was as the author attested, a succour to many widows and orphans particularly in Zeeland. In this pamphlet of 1654 we see how the Orangist rhetoric of Union and the defence of a supra-provincial organisation, in this case the West India Company, could be deployed by individuals with a seemingly provincial bias.

---

The language of the pamphlet is heavily reminiscent of the 1650 publication *Bickerse Beroerten*. It could be that the anonymous writer had the earlier work to hand or the concepts and language of the work of 1650 had become an intrinsic part of the treasury of Orangist rhetoric. Whatever the cause, the author of 1654 also urged that sovereignty was by its very nature limited when a free Republic, in this case a province, entered into a Union with other free Republics. Like the author of 1650, he likened the dependence which must flourish between partners in the Union to the union of man and wife, the married pair ‘hebben een dependentie van malkanderen...dat oock hare private actien niet so vry zijn ofte zijn bepaelt ten besten van het huwelijck’. The writer pointed out that the Bible had often used the imagery of the body to illustrate the unity that must prevail in any state, each bodily part being different but all working together within a single framework.\(^48\) He might have added that Orangist imagery had long followed the Biblical example. An Orangist pamphlet of 1618 exhorted that the provinces of the Union ‘behoort maer een lichaem te wesen’. In this body, one province would contribute its financial resources, another would defend the great river frontiers in the east, yet another would stand as a bulwark against Spanish invasion, its towns suffering depredations as a result. Each province, like a limb of the body, would provide in its own fashion ‘het ghene de Generaliteyt noodich is’.\(^49\) It is salutary to compare this language with that of John de Witt in which the whole is subordinated to the individual. In a letter of 1652, he assured his correspondent that while the English when writing of the Dutch Republic described it as a single state, the reality was that ‘yder provincie apart een souveraine respública is’. It was therefore a ‘respublicae foederatae ofte unitae’.\(^50\) A States Party pamphlet of 1655 appeared to acknowledge the force of the Orangist language of the body and deployed it more subtly when the author

\(^{48}\) Knuttel, no. 7550A, pp. 4-5, 8-10, 26-27.
\(^{49}\) Knuttel, no. 2634, p. 20.
\(^{50}\) *Brieven van Johan de Witt*, 1, 61-62.
acknowledged that 'de seven Provintien en zijn een lichaem maer wel seven naeu aen de anderen verbondene lichamen elcks op sijn selfs bestaende.51

It is difficult to estimate the readership of the Bedenckinge of 1654. It is not included in Knuttel’s list of banned publications. However, a correspondent of Thurloe’s wrote from the Hague in November 1654 of a book entitled Considerations upon the Deduction of Holland. He added that he had read it ‘but the States of Holland took such a good course and order to suppress it, that there is not one to be had of them’.52 It was impossible, however, to suppress the printed response of the States of Zeeland to the Exclusion. This publication, compiled by Adrian Veth, was a much more tempered document and its publication may have been intended to placate Orangist sentiment in the province rather than representing the authentic voice of the Zeeland regents.53 This supposition appears to be borne out by Thurloe’s unnamed correspondent who recorded in August 1654 that at a fair in Zeeland the citizenry sported orange scarves and ribbons but added sagaciously ‘yet in Zeeland more than half of the magistracy do hold in their hearts with the maxims of Holland’.54 Nonetheless the title page appeared to show oranges borne aloft on a sash and the publication opined that the Netherlands would never be at peace without the leadership of ‘Vooghden ende Heren van qualiteyt’. In concluding peace with England, Holland was acting against the spirit of Article 9 of the Union of Utrecht and her actions could only lead to ‘verzwackinghe en turbatie van de Unie’. Zeeland appealed to Holland on the grounds of their common history under the same Count and argued that by the agreements of 1575 and 1576 the two provinces became as one state ‘ende voor een

51 Knuttel, no. 7660, p. 59.
52 Birch, ii. 715.
53 Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 724-725.
54 Birch, ii, 496.
lichaeem werd ghereputeert'. It is possible that here we see an example of Orangist rhetoric including images of the body, being deployed by those who were less than fully committed to the cause.

Ultimately the test facing the States Party of de Witt was not to develop an intellectually coherent rhetoric but rather to demonstrate in practice that the Dutch Republic could maintain itself without a stadholder. In the latter task, during the course of the 1650's it was successful. Orangist rhetoric could only await better times which in practice meant either the elevation of the young Prince of Orange to the offices of his forefathers by virtue of the intervention of an outside power or internal discord brought about perhaps by the exigencies of war occasioning a crisis of confidence and a division within the ranks of Holland itself. The Restoration of Charles II to the English throne and the ensuing hopes that he would further the cause of his nephew William III led to a resurgence of Orangist pamphlets in 1660. Their burden was once again Holland's alleged attempt to break the bonds of Union in her own interest and the necessity of a stadholder to mediate between the provinces and maintain a balance between their conflicting interests. As one writer expressed it, the opponents of the stadholderate had taken advantage of the Peace of Munster of 1648 and the death of William II in 1650 to institute a novel form of government but he added darkly 'de tijden loopen nu veele anders'. His hopes were to be dashed. Charles II was unwilling to take any practical steps to assist his nephew and the Orangist cause continued to be plagued by discord between Amalia von Solms and her daughter in law Mary Stuart until the death of the latter in 1661. Meanwhile the rhetoric of those opposed to the stadholderate gained momentum, encouraged no doubt by the faltering fortunes of the Orangist party. As we have noted, the States Party pamphlets of 1654 and 1655 had not hesitated to emphasise the pivotal role of the province of Holland in the new Republic and the debt which the

55 Knuttel, no. 7554, np.
56 Knuttel, no. 8224, pp. 12-13; Knuttel, no. 8372, np; Knuttel, no. 8384, pp. 10, 16.
other provinces owed to her. This was as nothing compared to the salvo fired by Pieter de la Court in his *Interest van Holland* in 1662.

In de la Court’s analysis, the stadholder had frequently invoked the support of the other provinces and the language of ‘Union’ to outvote Holland in the States General, an element of the constitution for which de la Court had little respect. He argued that far from being a reconciler the stadholderate had been a formenter of discord. Following the death of William II, internal problems had been perfectly satisfactorily resolved, the problems in Groningen and Overijssel in the mid 1650’s being a case in point. So far this rhetoric was very similar to other States Party publications. However de la Court then proceeded to emphasise the role of the province of Holland in a fashion which had only been mildly anticipated in the publications of 1654 and 1655. The provinces of Holland and Zeeland had formed the backbone of resistance to Spain. In the opinion of de la Court the other provinces, Utrecht excepted, had added nothing to strengthen and fortify the government of Holland or to free that province from any peril. Holland on the contrary contributed financially not only to her own defence but also to that of the other provinces. Thus Holland ‘onder de schone dekmantel van protectie en vriendschap te genieten, warelik een onuitsprekelik grooten last heeft moeten fragen’. Holland was, for de la Court, like a man who brings water to his neighbour’s house when his own is on fire. He mused purposefully that with its manifold resources, Holland’s interests might best be served by becoming ‘een Staat op zich zelven’. The waterways around Holland could be used to make her invulnerable in times of hostile assault; the assault in this case coming from other member states of the Union. Holland would thus be free to live and flourish without a ‘qualik-gepractiseerde Unie’ and its ‘mislde bondgenooten’.

---

It is difficult to read *Interest van Holland* even now without feeling some of the outrage which contemporaries experienced. The attack on the stadholderate and the Union, allied to what amounted to a unilateral declaration of autonomy on the part of Holland, could only have quickened that festering resentment of sections of the other provinces faced with the power and resources of Holland. In past rhetoric it had usually been possible to depict Holland both as an individual geographical province and as the embodiment of ideals, the so-called ‘maxims of Holland’ which transcended physical boundaries and could be applied by well meaning individuals in the other six provinces. Thus, in the fictional ‘praatjes’ which occupy so much of pamphlet literature, the fictional Hollander is not just a citizen of that province but a spokesperson for the particular values associated with that province. There is a sense in which de la Court’s rhetoric profoundly threatens this duality. His Holland was clearly territorially located. The citizens of the other provinces were considered only in so far as they create a drain on Holland’s resources and may later attempt hostile action against the newly independent state, though, in that case, de la Court did not give much for their chances. The rhetoric of ‘Union’ which both sides had deployed, albeit in different ways, was now totally discarded.

De la Court, whatever his intentions, left the States Party’s flank hideously exposed on the matter of the Union. *Interest van Holland* appeared to justify all the Orangist allegations that Holland wished to dismantle the Union. It is not particularly surprising that though States Party literature often cited other books or pamphlets for their readers’ edification, I have found no pamphlet supporting de Witt and his policy which encouraged its readers to dip into *Interest van Holland*. The Orangists were now left free to command the moral high ground. Their response came in two forms. On the one hand, Orangist pamphleteers dissected de la Court’s work and provided detailed arguments to counter his thesis. On the other they demonised de la Court to the extent
that still ten years later, pamphlet literature, poetry and print depicted him as the figure who epitomised all that was wrong with the government of John de Witt..

In analysing the events of 1662 and 1663 and the Orangist response, we have to bear in mind not only the rhetoric of de la Court in 1662 but also the events of 1663 and in particular the Public Prayer debate. If de la Court represented the theory, then the Public Prayer debate represented the practical implementation. In December 1662, a report to the States of Holland and West Friesland reminded members that by a resolution of 1657, they were committed to the devising of a new formula for Public Prayer. The present formula was described as containing ‘merckelijke en essentiele incongruiteyten’ for since the States General was placed before the provincial States in the list of petitions, simple folk could be given the impression that the ‘Ridderschap, Edelen en Steden van Hollant ende West Frieslant ...niet en waren de ontwijffelbare Souveraine ende naest Godt de eenighe hooge Overigheyt deser Provincie’. The revised formula as proposed in 1663 was to place the States of Holland and West-Vriesland at the head of the petitions followed by the other provincial States. Then and only then were prayers to be said for deputies to the States General and the Council of State and lastly for local magistrates and councillors. The Prince of Orange being a private person had no place in public prayer.

The response from the other provinces was swift. In an answer to the letter of the States of Holland, the States of Friesland argued that the States General were, without doubt ‘de hoogste ende Souveraine Overigheyt van alles de Vereenighde Provincien’ with regard to those matters which had been placed in their hands. Since the States General had negotiated with Anjou on the subject of religious liberties in 1583, the States General had assumed a ‘de facto’ right in these matters which had been reinforced by the Synod of Dordrecht which had been summoned by the States General and the General Assembly of 1651, in which all the provinces had agreed to maintain
the true Reformed Religion as defined at Dordrecht. Thus Holland had no powers to set up for herself a new formula of prayer and her action ominously ‘strijdt met de eeuwighduerende Unie van Utrecht’. For the States of Zeeland responding on 22 August 1663, the States General represented ‘het ghemeen lichaem van de Republike’. This was not to deny provincial sovereignty in matters not prescribed as within the remit of the States General but for Zeeland ‘de Staten Generael hebben eene qualiteyt en waredigheyt die praemineert boven die van de respective Provincien’. Groningen damned the proposals as a novelty while Overijssel described them as ‘een saecke streckende tot de grootste kleynachtinge van het gemeene lichaem der Bontgenooten’. 58

The other provinces had not always been so eager to defend the position of the States General. In the peace negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Munster several of the provinces had been concerned that the States General’s role would lead to an extension of its authority dominated by the province of Holland. War and peace was indubitably the concern of the States General yet the Zeelanders, in particular, had perceived with concern a tendency on the part of the States General to increase its powers at the expense of the sovereignty of the provinces. It was the influence of stadholder William Frederick of Friesland rather than any innate principles which caused the provinces of Groningen and Friesland at the Great Assembly of 1651 to plead for more authority for the States General at the expense of the provinces. In spite of their fulminations against Holland in 1663, most of the provinces had not enacted the church order as defined at the Synod of Dordrecht and in reality continued on most occasions to consider religion as a matter of purely provincial concern.59 Political rhetoric reflected the issues of the day rather than any long term principles.

58 Aitzema, Historie of verhael van saken van staet en oorloogh, x, 578-579, 616-620, 630, 636-639, 678.
A deputy in the States General complained that the citizenry were daily diverted by ‘diversche libellen ende schandeuse Boecken’ which sought to foment disunity.\(^{60}\)

On the part of the States Party, perhaps the most noteworthy work was a forthright defence of provincial sovereignty penned by John de Witt, the cousin of the Pensionary, entitled *Public Gebedt*. De Witt followed Bodin in his definition of sovereignty as that ‘boven welcken met niemant en kent dan Godt almachtigh’. De Witt’s marks of sovereignty, again derived from Bodin, were noticeably ambitious including absolute command of the military and the possession of an autonomous Mint. As an Orangist opponent pointed out neither of these marks of sovereignty were in the hands of the province of Holland. The reader might draw the conclusion that de Witt profoundly wished them to be so. His was a doctrine of virtually unrestricted provincial sovereignty. The Union of Utrecht had been concluded and couched in what he described as ‘negative termen’ in which the allies bound themselves no further than their implicit provincial sovereignty permits them to do, rather than in notional ‘positive termen’ in which matters believed to be deferred to the States General were automatically treated as such and resolved by majority vote. For de Witt, as for Bodin sovereignty was indivisible and hence could not be conveyed in part to a States General or delegate its executive function to a stadholder.\(^{61}\)

States Party propaganda in 1662 and 1663 appeared to be casting aside the rhetoric of Union which it had deployed in 1651 in favour of a more forceful definition of provincial sovereignty. For the author of *Herstelden Barneveld* of 1663, not only was religion clearly a matter for the individual province but the States General meeting only twice or three times a year could be deemed surplus to requirements since any matters needing attention could be dealt with by the Council of State. The States General was manifestly sovereign in States Brabant and States Flanders but nowhere else. The very

\(^{60}\) Aitzema, *Historie of verhael van saken van staet en oorlogh*, x, p. 683.

\(^{61}\) Knuttel, no 8789, p. 26-27,29, 31-32, 45; Knuttel, no. 8790, pp. 3-12.; Knuttel, no. 8792, p. 16-17.
title United Provinces illustrated quite clearly that the Republic was composed of
diverse lands' and the history of the region under Spain indicated the impossibility
of ever combining the provinces under one head whether personal or corporate. Jacob
Westerbaan in his poem *Krancken Troost voor Israel* published in 1663 commented of
Holland that 'ghy werdt benijdt van uw geneene Bondgenoten' but adds with an acute
sense of political realities, 'ghy hebt geen nood so langh ghy selfs eendrachtigh zijt'.

There is little of the Union rhetoric of 1651 here. For the anonymous author of *Den
Schotsche Duyvel* the Union had only served to restrict and undermine the province of
Holland in matters of religion. In reaction to Orangist rhetoric he declaimed 'nu is 't al
weeraen al Unie' just as in the years 1618 and 1650, but then as now what was intended
was no more than 'slaeverne' or the subjugation of provincial rights. Here at least there
is a return to the rallying call of 1651 as the author explains that 'vryheidt is de waere
bandt en 't oogmerck van de Unie'. 'Slavery' and Union were incompatible.

Thus Orangist propagandists were responding not only to the rhetoric of de la
Court but to the perceived threat to the Union contained in Holland's proposals for a
provincial formula in matters of religion which they saw as integral to the integrity of
the Union. There was no need to develop a new rhetorical formula. For the author of a
refutation of de la Court, *Ware Interest van Holland* of 1662, the policy of Holland
since 1651 had been 'divide and rule' in contrast to the harmony achieved by means of
the institution of the stadholderate. For the anonymous author of *Den Ver-resenen
Barnevelt* of 1663, Holland was treating the six other provinces as if they were mere
'byloopers' or six planets compelled to revolve around the sun of Holland. *Den
Herstelden Prins* of the same year accused de la Court of seeking 'den band van
eendracht te breken' and emphasised the sacrifices made by the landward provinces in

---

62 Knuttel, no. 8799, pp. 2, 8-9, 13.
63 Knuttel, no. 8807, p. 3.
64 Knuttel no. 8801, p.22.
65 Knuttel no. 8653B, p.83.
66 Knuttel no. 8797, p. 6.
the cause of war.\textsuperscript{67} The case for a mediating stadholder was re-emphasised for ‘de Provintien en Steden onder den anderen egael zijn ...ende dat d’een d’ander niet wilt toegeven’.\textsuperscript{68} Emphasis was again placed on the States General as the assembly which was the physical manifestation of Union. For one writer of 1664, the States General were ‘nos souverains Seigneurs’ and he created a fusion of images of unity when he lauds the Princes of Orange as ‘ayant ete, en leur vivant, du corps des Estats Generaux’\textsuperscript{69}.

For the author of \textit{Bedumckelicken Brief} of 1663, reflecting on de Witt’s analysis in \textit{Public Gebedt}, sovereignty in a Republic composed of many bodies or limbs was different from that of a monarchy. When Hollanders spoke of their state they did not only mean Holland but also the seven united provinces who sent their deputies to the States General and imbued the institution with powers in certain crucial issues such as war and peace. When the States General concluded a treaty with foreign powers, he asked rhetorically, ‘doen sy al ‘t selvige niet met Souveraine macht’ and argued emphatically, ‘ontwijfelijk ja’. In the States General each deputy represented his province and brought attendant with him the sovereignty of that province which was then subsumed into that of the States General. Thus public petitions in prayer had to be directed first to them. The author was emphatic that this was not to argue that each province was not sovereign within its own boundaries but the States General clearly posessed ‘meer Majesteyts en lusters als een besondere Provintie’. Once again, when most of the other provinces were opposed to some action of Holland, Orangist writers emphasised the States General as containing elements of sovereignty over and above the provincial estates. The analogy with marriage recurs, for ‘door’t eeuwigh Verbont de Provintien onderlingh als man en vrouw getrouwt zijn’, with all the attendant giving up of personal freedoms in the interests of the union. The author reinforced past Orangist

\textsuperscript{67} Knuttel no. 8806A, pp. 9, 11.
\textsuperscript{68} Knuttel no. 8806D, p. 111.
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Apologie pour la Maison de Nassau}, p. 38.
rhetoric when he warned his readers that the malignant Lipsius was indeed correct when he surmised that peace would destroy the internal unity of the Republic.70

In addition, the Orangists were gradually developing their own rhetoric of freedom in relation to the Union. For the supporters of the States Party, as we have seen, freedom consisted in the sovereignty of the provincial estates and their constituent elements. Thus William II’s embassy to the Holland towns in 1650 was depicted as a violation of their sovereignty.71 For Orangist writers, on the other hand, this ‘freedom’ was little more than a cloak for the ambitions of men, who cast off the mutual dependency and seek to subjugate their fellow men and make themselves their master. For the writer of Den Herstelden Prins of 1663, there was no place for this ‘freedom’ for ‘so isser in geen staat van Regeringe vrijheid, en met sulcke vrijheyd soude oock geen Staat noch Regeringe konnen bestaan’.72 In a work intended as a riposte to the posthumous publication of Schelius’ Algemeene Vryheid, Pieter de Hubert’s Apologie of 1669 reiterated a view of freedom in which liberty must be in harmony with authority. For Hubert freedom within a state had perforce to be limited and this limitation was not so much inhibiting as positively directing. Applying these maxims to the Union he concluded

zoo veel souverainiteit als ‘er wegens ieder Provintie, aan het Collegie van de Staten Generaal is gedeferreert, ook zoo veel van de onbepaalde vryheit is aff stand gedaan, tot de Algemeene Regeeringe van deze Vereenigde Nederlanden.

For as no society could be set up without some loss of freedom, ‘zoo kan ook deze Unie geen effect grypen, ten zi een leder van zyne vryheit zoo veel in’t gemeen conferere, als tot onderhoud van dezelve’. Within this equation, a stadholder provided not only security, without which freedom is worthless, but in traditional Orangist rhetoric, served

70 Knuttel, no. 8786, pp. 9-10, 14, 21-22, 32.
71 Knuttel, no. 7020. np.
72 Knuttel, no. 8806A, p. 4.
to ensure that 'alles onder deze oudste en getrouwste Bondgenooten in een equitable Balance gehouden te werden'. De Hubert’s analysis clearly found support among Orangist ranks for versions of this work were republished twice in 1672.

Ultimately, however Orangists could only wait upon events. As long as de Witt and his allies could hold together the Republic, the Orangist taunts of disunity fell short of their target. Whether by conviction or stealth, Holland or its maxims had become the nexus of the Republic. However, the increasing threat of French aggression and the accompanying pressure to accommodate the young Prince of Orange in some form, led to his admission in 1670 to the Council of State. A medal of 1671 commemorating the event showed on one side a profile of the young prince and on the other a burning altar besides which a woman representing the United Provinces rests on the back of a lion who has a bundle of seven arrows in his paws. Near to her are two shields both bearing images of unity restored. One is the traditional bundle of seven arrows, the other two hands linked together in union, not unlike the hands of the couple made man and wife. The motto reads ‘salus populorum concordia’. Here we see the resurgence of ‘unity’ propaganda which will become so prevalent in 1672. The circumstances of war and dissolution recreated the conditions which had so animated Orangists in the past and of which they had been deprived following the Treaty of Munster in 1648.

The rhetoric of 1672 as William III was elevated to the role of captain general and then stadholder of Holland, inevitably drew its inspiration in part from the glorious past. A poet of 1672 exhorted his readers that

Wilhelm is 'een nieuw verreesen Son. Wiens Ouderen met banden
Vast hebben 't saam-geknoopt den Pijl-bos.'

The idealised unity of the past reinforced the present. For Jacob vander Does

---

73 Knuttel, no. 9762, pp. 263, 265.
74 Loon, iii, p. 47.
75 ‘Klinkdicht op de Zegenwensch aan zijn Hoogheid’, Knuttel, no. 9962, np.
Vollenhove hymned his hope of the United Provinces once again

Pijl aen pijl verbonden, door geen zwart
Noch fors gewelt, maer zachte Oranje banden. 77

These hopes found visual expression in the prints of that year which celebrated the appointment of William III as captain general and stadholder. Images of the Prince of Orange, framed by a laurel wreath, or seated on a Roman triumphal chariot being crowned with the same wreath by the figure of Fame, combined hopes of victory with symbols of unity such as the Holland lion bearing in his paw the seven arrows of the provinces or a Netherlands maid, her shift adorned with the arms of the seven provinces, holding the bundle of arrows in her right hand. 78 The physical fragmentation of the Netherlands following the French invasion had come in the minds of many contemporaries to exemplify the disunity inherent in the state before the war and William was to cauterise the wounds of both.

The symbolism of marriage recurs. This time, however, the bridal union is between the Prince and the Provinces. The Prince’ advancement was celebrated in ‘t Lof van Orangien where the author, one Paulus Hellebuyck, proclaims his jubilation now that William ‘is getrouwt met d’langh gewenste Bruyt’. 79 In another pamphlet of 1672, the image of the seven provincial brides was derided by one ‘Keesje’ who exclaims robustly that if his wife ever suspected him of such polygamous nonsense ‘die sou my met een stok wel streelen op het lijf’. His interlocutor corrects him gently saying that that was indeed true for the likes of Kees and himself but the wise King Solomon

76 Knuttel, no. 10255, np.
77 Knuttel, no. 9968, np.
78 Stolk, nos. 2413, 2440.
79 Knuttel, no.10253, p.18.
had a thousand wives. While William III had been young and excluded from authority, foreign princes had lusted after the provincial maids but now they were united with their true bridegroom.\textsuperscript{80} Images such as these imply the centrality of the stadholder in the writer's concept of the Union. Implicit in this bridal imagery is the sense in which there can be no Union without the Prince of Orange, who fulfils the masculine active role of protector and defender. Also implicit in this image is the subordination of the individuality of the seven maidens to the common good of their corporate marriage.

Other symbols of unity were emphasised. A pamphlet entitled \textit{A Further Justification of the Present War against the United Netherlands} by one Henry Stubbe, explained to his English countrymen that under de Witt, the Union was so infringed that Gelderland, Overijssel and Friesland were effectively subordinated to Holland. The authority of the States General under de Witt had become insignificant and precarious. This 'polyarchical' government would collapse without the presence of a stadholder and the Union would dissolve.\textsuperscript{81} In his remarks on the States General, Stubbe was echoing Orangist polemic. In \textit{Het Rechte Fondament van het nieuwe Herstelde Oudt Hollands Regt} of 1672 Pieter Hubert argued that Holland's polemic of 1663 in which the States General possessed 'geen souvereynen in haer Natuere', could not be sustained. If Holland argued that the States General possessed no sovereignty being merely deputies of the provincial states, then the same could be said for the provincial states which were composed of deputies from the towns. Taken to its logical conclusion the town council would end up lesser in stature than the individual citizen. On the contrary, for this author the States General as an institution was more important than the provincial states for it was a 'Hooger Vergaderinge' having regard to war, peace, the mint and religion and organising days of prayer and the translation of the States Bible.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{80} Knuttel, no. 10621, np.
\textsuperscript{81} Knuttel, no. 10017A, np.
\textsuperscript{82} Knuttel, no. 10309, p. 8.
Alongside this form of rhetoric, there appeared a wealth of material which
demonised Pieter de la Court as the man who had attacked both the stadholderate and
the Union. In so doing Orangist writers did their best to link him irrefutably to the
person of John de Witt. Several publications purported to reveal the secrets of de Witt’s
library Contained within were maxims of state collected by ‘Mr Jan en de la Court’. In
a fictional dialogue between two Amsterdammers, Jan pointed out to his companion
Pieter that de la Court himself acknowledged that John de Witt had written two chapters
of one of his pernicious works. For another writer de la Court was the ‘Duyvelschen
Leermeester’ at whose feet could be laid the disasters of 1672. Yet another writer
informed his readers that if they sought to find the origins of the downfall of the de Witt
brothers ‘soo zijn ‘t de Hollants intresten’. A fictional dialogue between two citizens
of the occupied city of Nijmegen revealed to readers that the invasion by Louis XIV
was part of a plot concocted by the province of Holland, in which the eastern provinces
would be ceded to France in return for Holland’s sovereignty over the rump of the
Republic. The source of this strategy lay in the writings of de la Court.

The strategy of John de Witt had survived naval wars against England and
skirmishes in the Baltic but a land war, particularly one which began with such a series
of disasters, revealed the weaknesses inherent in States Party policy. War of this kind
inevitably emphasised unity at the expense of provincial sovereignty and the figure of
the young Prince of Orange fulfilled a strong symbolic function. As long as the Dutch
Republic was involved in a land war, Orangist rhetoric had a certain persuasive force.
Petrus Valkenier, writing in 1675, and surveying the events of the previous ten years,
crystallised the arguments which had been inherent in pamphlets from 1648 onwards.

For Valkenier the Union of Utrecht symbolised the highest point of the Republic’s

---

83 Knuttel, no. 10436, p. 4
84 Knuttel, no. 10412, np.
85 Knuttel, no. 10429, p. 8.
86 Knuttel, no. 10463, p. 16.
87 Knuttel, no. 10350, np.
interests. He wrote ‘dit land hout voor zijn eerste poinct van Interest, dat het sijne Unie en Verbond in allen deelen ongekreukt onderhoude’. The contrast with the *Interest van Holland* was deliberate. The shameful collapse in the face of French arms could be laid at the feet of a policy which emphasised provincial sovereignty at the expense of national unity. The role of the restored stadholderate was, in time-honoured fashion, ‘de Balance te houden, dat de eene Bondgenoot over de andere niet predomineere’. Holland had sought and achieved predominance over the other provinces, encouraged by the work of de la Court, which ‘meest uyt de koker quam van de Raad Pensionaris’. De Witt had sought to concentrate in his person and role the power previously conferred on the stadholder. Yet such a strategy could clearly not maintain the crucial balance between the provinces. To this end de Witt ‘dat Nootsaakelijcke en Illustre Collegie van haare Ho: Mog: als onnut annuleerde’. The States General was treated as a mere servant of Holland’s ambitions and its deliberations were circumvented by cabals and secret councils. The consequences of this policy were clear and disastrous. ‘In summa, men maakte in de Vereenigde Nederlandsche Republijk so veele bysondre Republijken en Vrye Staaten, alsser Provincien en Steeden in waren.\(^{88}\)

**Conclusion**

How realistic was Orangist rhetoric? Here we must distinguish between the type of questions posed by academics dissecting the constitutional framework of the Republic, the pragmatic solutions favoured by practising politicians and the power of language designed to appeal as much to the emotions as the intellect. In his *Memoire* of 1607 Busius, a professor at the University of Franeker, had argued that the United Provinces constituted not a single Republic but seven autonomous provinces, each with different forms of government, who came together only for their common defence. There could

\(^{88}\) Valkenier, pp. 108, 119, 246, 646, 668.
be no legislative power in the States General as the law of the majority had no force, deputies referring back to their provinces on all issues and each decision requiring a unanimous vote. This very unanimity was depicted as a defence of provincial liberties. In his Verantwoording Grotius had echoed this analysis, arguing that, in the light of Bodin’s definition, the individual provinces were possessed of indivisible sovereignty, the States General being merely an assembly of confederates. This argument was buttressed by Dirck Graswinckel in his De jure magistratis dissertatio of 1642 in which the absolute and indivisible sovereignty of the individual provinces served as a bulwark against any princely or monarchical ambitions. These were the arguments deployed by supporters of the States Party in the period 1650-1672, when provincial sovereignty became effectively a maxim of state.

The Orangist argument had never enjoyed this type of academic lustre. Bodin may have been taught at Leiden from 1607 but it is clear that Orangists did not use his definition of sovereignty, indeed Orangist pamphlets are characterised by the noticeable absence of any definition of sovereignty per se. This was not entirely a mark of intellectual incoherence. Orangist rhetoric concentrated on the pragmatic workings of the Dutch Republic rather than on the theory. For even the seasoned observer, the locus of sovereignty in the Republic could be misleading, as States Party writers freely acknowledged. For William Temple, English ambassador at the Hague from 1668-1670, ‘the Sovereign Power of this United-State lyes effectively in the Assembly of the States General’. Thus when Orangist writers sited the sovereignty of the Republic in the States General or the States General and stadholder combined, their argument might not have the academic force of a Grotius, yet still reflect one view of the reality that was the Dutch Republic. Once it is understood that for many Orangists sovereignty may have

---

90 Clark, p. 61.
meant no more than a nebulous ‘highest authority’, their rhetoric becomes more comprehensible.

In a discussion on sovereignty in the Republic, de Bruin argues that this Orangist siting of sovereignty in States General did not reflect political reality and may have been intended merely for external consumption.\textsuperscript{91} This may be going too far. The consistency with which the Orangists emphasised the role of the States General in cooperation with the stadholder suggests that the concept had more resonance than mere window dressing. If we accept that Orangist writings were based on the politics of Aristotle rather than Bodin, we can understand that their emphasis lay not on sovereignty \textit{per se} but on the parts of the constitutional body into which the power of the political community was divided.\textsuperscript{92} In addition, the notions of unity and ‘balance’, as found in Orangists writings, created an image of internal harmony and strength against the enemy without. As rhetoric, it clearly had influence in a situation where there was no counter force to the power of the province of Holland. It was no accident that much Orangist rhetoric emphasised that voting in the States General should be based on a majority vote rather than unanimity.\textsuperscript{93} Yet, neither was it entirely realistic. As we have seen a province such as Zeeland, which embraced the Orangist position in 1663 was equally capable of ignoring the claims of the States General when their particular interests were threatened. At times of crisis such as the emergency of 1618-1619 and 1650 the Dutch Republic emphasised central authority by rediscovering residual sovereignty in the States General but this view of sovereign authority in the Generality was discarded as soon as the immediate problem was dealt with.\textsuperscript{94} The question would always remain as to how far Orangist language concerning the Union

\textsuperscript{91} Guido de Bruin, ‘De soevereiniteit in de republiek: een machtsprobleem’, BMGN, 94 (1979), 27-40 (p. 40).
\textsuperscript{92} Klashorst, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{93} Secretan, p. 133.
and the stadholder would carry weight at times when the Republic was at peace and enjoying prosperity. As their enemies taunted, the stadholder and his party were always in need of war.
STADHOLDER AND CAPTAIN GENERAL

In the middle years of the 1640s when the stadholder Frederick Henry’s health was visibly in decline, the House of Orange determined to celebrate and commemorate his achievements. Whether the initial impulse came from Frederick Henry himself or his wife Amalia von Solms it was to be Amalia who, after the death of Frederick Henry in 1647, carried out the project known to history as the Oranjezaal. The newly built Huis ten Bosch which had initially been intended as a pleasure palace became, in effect, a mausoleum dedicated to the dead stadholder and the House of Orange. The room known as the Oranjezaal was decorated with paintings, rich in allegory, which depicted Frederick Henry as nurtured by the Gods from the cradle onwards to become a great war leader.

On the west wall of the room, the infant in his cradle was flanked by Mars who handed him a lance symbolising the arts of war. As a boy his studies are guided by a helmeted Mercury whose hand on the boy’s shoulder directs his eye to a parchment bearing the ditches and bastions of a military fortification. As a young man he rides in armour bareheaded beside his step-brother the stadholder Maurice in an allegorical reference to the battle of Nieuwpoort. The two men are accompanied by a winged Victory who bears laurel wreaths poised above their heads. Amidst the laurel leaves can be seen a glittering star emblematic of Castor and Pollux, figures who since classical times have featured as patrons of warfare and brotherly love. On the north wall the adult Frederick is ruler of both sea and land. Armoured, in a chariot of shell and bearing

1 Allegory of the birth of Prince Frederick Henry, Cesar Botius van Everdingen, 373 by 246 cm.
2 The upbringing of Prince Frederick Henry, Thoedooren van Thulden, 1649, 319 by 207 cm.
3 Princes Frederick Henry and Maurice as leaders in war, Thomas Willeboirts Bosschaert, 317 by 205 cm.
a trident, he takes the reins from Neptune who relinquishes his kingdom to the Prince. 4

In works by van Thulden, Pieter de Grebber, Jacob van Campen and Pieter Soutman, triumphal processions bear the booty of war, the flags of the conquered, their wealth and trophies. 5 On the south wall is the other face of war with crouching prisoners of war, hands tied behind their backs, stumbling forward. Behind them soldiers bear on poles the arms of the captured towns of 's Hertogenbosch and Breda. 6

The military victories of Frederick Henry find their apotheosis in Jacob Jordaen’s work entitled The Triumph of Prince Frederick Henry. The Prince is depicted in breastplate and general’s cloak, seated on a chariot in front of a triumphal arch. Behind him is placed the figure of Victory who is about to crown him. Jordaen in his notes on the painting explained that the four white horses drawing the chariot symbolised the willingness of the Prince to put the interests of the Republic before his own. The figures of Hate and Discord are trampled beneath the horses’ hooves. On the right of the painting a mounted Prince William II emerges. A second crown borne by Victory is intended for his head. Behind him comes the figure of Hymen bearing a flaming torch and the sign of two joined hands symbolising the marriage of the prince to Mary Stuart, the daughter of King Charles I of England. To the right and left of Frederick Henry appear the figures of the former stadholder Princes of Orange, mounted on plinths as befits pillars of the state. Clustering around the bases and clinging to their feet, the common people embrace the figures who by their victories have secured for them their liberties. 7 Above all else, the paintings of the Oranjezaal emphasise the centrality of the role of the Princes of Orange as leaders in war. Scanning the walls of Oranjezaal it is the spirits of Mars and Minerva in her role as fighter for just causes which

4 Fredrick Henry as Master of the Sea. Thomas Willeboirts Bosschaert, 314 by 208 cm.
5 Triumphal Procession with maidens strewing flowers and an elephant. Theodoor van Thulden, 1649, 375 by 242 cm: Triumphal Procession with a statue of Jupiter. Pieter de Grebber, 1650, 380 by 246 cm: Triumphal Procession with the treasures from Brazil. Jacob van Campen, 380 by 205 cm; Triumphal Procession with captured treasure. Pieter Soutman, 1648, 380 by 210 cm.
6 Triumphal Procession with Prisoners of War. Theodoor van Thulden, 1648, 383 by 205 cm.
7 1652. 730 by 750 cm; Peter-Raupp, pp. 148-152.
predominate. The viewer could be forgiven for thinking that the sole 'raison d'être' of the Princes of Orange was the conduct of war.

One of the most potent symbols of the Union of the United Provinces was their military forces. It was in no sense a national army. The army of the Republic included many foreign soldiers while the navy contained a greater proportion of Dutchmen in all ranks. However, the army in the field in the eighty years war of liberation against Spain symbolised the need of the individual provinces to lay aside their particular concerns in the interests of the common good. That the Princes of Orange were both stadholders and commanders of the army and navy reinforced their status as symbols of unity while bestowing on them both political and military authority. This was a heady combination, tolerated in times of war but increasingly resented by some factions. Following the Peace of Munster there were those who argued that there was no further need for a stadholder who was captain and admiral general. In times of peace, such as they hoped this would be, political and military power should return to the provinces where it rightly belonged. The death of William II in 1650 gave them the opportunity to put their ideas into practice.

Before the Revolt military authority had long been an important element of the power wielded by stadholders. As representatives of the royal authority they served as captains general in the provinces. As the Revolt gained ground this military role became crucial. In 1575 Holland and Zeeland formed a Union in which they agreed to work under the leadership of William of Orange as stadholder and captain general. He would be 'sovereign and supreme head' for the duration of the war. It might appear that all political and military authority was being concentrated in William’s hands but this would be to misunderstand the situation. The states themselves were the source of William’s authority which was quite deliberately limited to times of war. The States

---

8 Pieter J. A. N. Rietbergen, ‘Nederlandse identiteit’ in politieke structuur en politieke cultuur tijdens de Republiek’, *BMGN*, 107 (1992), 636-656 (p. 643)
undoubtedly needed William as commander of the armed forces, able to take executive decisions at crucial times but he was always reliant on the States for money for his campaigns.9

The stadholderate of each province was coupled with the position of captain general of the troops of that province. Thus in January 1587 Maurice in his turn became captain general in the provinces of Holland and Zeeland. When in October 1589 Adolf van Nieuwenaar died, Maurice became stadholder and hence captain general of the provinces of Gelderland, Overijssel and Utrecht. However, Maurice’s authority was not undivided. In Friesland, William Lodewijk had been appointed as stadholder and captain general of the province of Friesland where he retained independent command of the northern forces. This dual command, however, created no problems and the two men worked well together.10

After the death of Maurice the States General appointed Frederick Henry as captain general of the Union. Frederick Henry’s command was more extensive than that of Maurice as it encompassed all the troops in the service of the States General including those in the Northern provinces. It is interesting that this appointment took place before Frederick Henry had been chosen as stadholder by the appropriate provinces, haste being urged on the States General by the province of Holland which was alarmed by the threatening military situation and an army restive without leadership. In 1637, after some hesitancy, the ‘Survivance’ of the captain generalship of the Union was granted to Frederick Henry’s son William.11

Fears began to crystallise. It appeared that political and military control was not only being centred in one individual but was in the process becoming hereditary. The States would cease to be the source of authority but would rather merely confirm it in the Orange dynasty. As long as hostilities continued it appeared, in the eyes of some

---

10 Rowen, The Princes of Orange, p. 38; van Deursen, Maurits van Nassau, p.37; Kooijmans, p. 11.
11 Rowen, The Princes of Orange, pp. 56, 72; Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik, pp. 77-85.
observers, that as the power of the stadholder and captain general grew, he was becoming the master rather than the servant of the provinces. In a pamphlet published in 1646 the anonymous author urged the States of Holland to seek a permanent peace with Spain. Only then could the burgeoning power of the Orange dynasty be restrained. He reserved the main thrust of his criticism for Frederick Henry whose military successes he found deeply suspicious. He warned the States to beware of the stratagems of the Prince of Orange 'qui n'a autre dessein que d'eslever sa fortune sur nos ruines'. Holland had not cast off the yoke of the King of Spain only to 'tomber soubs (sic) la tyrannie d'un petit prince'.

Some in Holland feared that control of their troops was slipping from the provinces, whose masters they were, into the hands of the supra-provincial captain general. Provinces made appointments within the ranks of their soldiery when these troops were stationed at home but once in the field appointments became the responsibility of the captain general. This was a rational arrangement reflecting the exigencies of battle but as the war dragged on and each year saw a campaigning season there built up a corps of officers whose loyalty, it was suspected, was to their captain general as an individual rather than to the provinces. It was further observed that there had developed at court a distinct officer corps made up of those who owed their position to the stadholder and captain general, particularly among the foreign regiments whose officers were appointed directly by the captain general without reference to the States. At the funeral of Frederick Henry his body was accompanied by a guard of honour of eighteen colonels of which at least six were British. They formed a close-knit group at the stadholder's court and it has been argued that they increasingly ostracised the native burgher element. In the increasingly heated argument between the

12 Knuttel, no. 5309, p. 6.
13 Olaf Mørke. 'De hofcultuur van het huis Oranje-Nassau in de zeventiende eeuw', in Cultuur en maatschappij in Nederland 1500-1800, ed. by Peter te Boekhorst. Peter Burke and Willem Frijhoff. (Meppe: Boom, 1992), pp. 37-77 (pp. 49, 57). Heinz Schilling. 'The Configuration of the Court in an old
stadholder William II and the province of Holland over the decommissioning of troops, the States of Holland urged that the foreigners among the officers and troops should be the first to lose their posts.\textsuperscript{14} William II's use of the military in his thwarted attempt to seize the city of Amsterdam only reinforced fears that the stadholder and captain general represented a threat to provincial and civic liberties.

Following the death of William II and the abolition of the post of captain general, supporters of the States Party emphasised two propositions. The first was that peace was the most desirable condition for a nation which made its fortune by trading. The second, was that a stadholder and captain general would inevitably favour a bellicose foreign policy for in times of war his position was strongest. We see these themes echoed in verse. On 13 September 1651 a day of Thanksgiving was appointed to commemorate the work of the Great Assembly. In his poem, entitled 'Dankbaarheid' penned to celebrate the occasion the poet Joachim Oudaan drew a clear distinction between a peace-loving Christ and the hot-blooded pugnacious youth who had been William II. Christ was He whose 'eerst en laatste les was vrede en vreedzaamheid'. Prince William, on the other hand

\begin{quote}
\ldots niet verlet met steden af te steken,  
Met legers op te staan, met drommen te breken,  
\ldots opgehitst van die niet anders zyn  
Als bezig bobb'lend bloed ter herrszucht op te scherpen,  
Een Staat van Oppermacht in 't brein scheen te bewerpen;\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

An anonymous poet of the same year conceded that the House of Orange had contributed to the attainment of Freedom and Peace but argued that paradoxically it was only by the death of William II that these could ultimately be secured.

---

\textsuperscript{14} Rowen. \textit{The Princes of Orange}, p. 84.

\textsuperscript{15} Joachim Oudaans Poëzy. 3 vols (Amsterdam, 1712). I. 145-146.
Men mest dien Stam om Vreede en Vryheyd te verwerven.
Nu erft men eerst de Vrede en Vryheid door sijn sterven.  

In their *Consideratien en Exempelen van Staat* of 1660, the brothers de la Court argued that the rule of a single head and bellicosity were inseparable. Kings and stadholders waged war overseas in order to empower themselves and the armed forces within their own countries. In order to do this they instituted heavy taxation which in the eyes of the de la Courts spared the meanest but placed a heavy burden on the commercial classes. Their perpetual demands for resources for war had ruined Holland’s trade and bled her dry and defenceless. Pieter de la Court developed this theme in his *Interest van Holland*. Here we have a race of Hollanders who subsisting by manufactures, fishing, navigation and commerce are by nature peace loving if they are not incited and coerced to war by some single head or stadholder. It was de la Court’s contention that nearly all Republics, particularly those dependent on trade, were at risk of destruction when they embarked on offensive wars and conquests. This had certainly been the case with the Orange captain generals who had neglected the interests of the provinces and in particular Holland as they single mindedly pursued their own dynastic gain.

De la Court’s language and concepts were taken up by other writers. In a work of 1662 the anonymous author contended that the hallmark of the best type of rule was that it brought peace. In the context of the Dutch Republic, this desirable state could only be achieved in a government without a stadholder and captain general where the policies of the States predominated. In the following year the author of *Den Schotschen Duyvel* reiterated de la Court’s maxim that a trading province such as Holland must live by

---

16 Knuttel, no. 7045, np.
17 Consideratien en Exempelen van Staat, omtrent de Fundamenten van allerley Regeringe (Amsterdam, 1660), pp. 63-64, 170, 174-175, 231.
18 Knuttel, no. 8652, pp. 9, 63-64, 90.
peace and eschew war.\textsuperscript{20} Even during the second Anglo-Dutch war supporters of the States party were eager to emphasise that they sought peace. In the words of a fictional citizen of Delft now ‘men agte het niet zoo veel, door oorlog te overwinnen, als wel de Vrede in te voeren, en de overwinning-loop te matigen’. It was conceded that it was right to resist English attacks at sea but this was a hard necessity for we Batavians, the author argued, are a peace loving race and if any fault could be laid against us, it was that ‘wy te zeer na de gemakkelijke rust getracht hebben’.\textsuperscript{21}

Not so for the Orangists. For Pieter de Hubert writing in 1669 it was the martial qualities of the Batavians which had attracted the attention of Tacitus, who had commented on their ability to withstand the weight of the Roman military under Vitellius. When de Hubert describes the characteristics of the Batavians, it is their ‘dapperheid’ and kloekheid’ which is emphasised.\textsuperscript{22} This distinction marks a fault line which runs through the competing rhetoric of States Party and Orangists. On the one hand, the Dutch are by both nature and self-interest a peace-loving people whose strategy, once peace with Spain was concluded, was to stand apart from a belligerent Europe. On the other hand, in the rhetoric of the Orangists, war is constantly present, either in anticipation or in practice and with it the necessity of a single head to unite both military and political strategy. It is interesting to observe that these dual strands of rhetoric are usually followed almost regardless of the external realities of the contemporary situation. During the period 1650-1672 there were two naval wars against the English, hostilities in the Baltic and incursions by the Bishop of Munster, yet the language deployed by the supporters of the States Party usually emphasised the desirability of peace, even during times of war. Similarly, when the Republic is at peace, Orangist writers continued to insist that the nation must be in a state of preparedness for war. The one exception to this pattern occurred during the second

\begin{footnotes}
\item[21] Knuttel, no. 9330, p.18.
\item[22] Knuttel, no. 9762, pp. 37, 41-42.
\end{footnotes}
Anglo-Dutch war when Orangists were in favour of a peaceful reconciliation with an England which they viewed as the natural protector of the interests of William III.

Many Orangists were dubious of the benefits of peace in 1648. They feared that the cessation of hostilities was spearheaded by a powerful group of regents bent on diminishing the authority of the Prince of Orange. These doubts surfaced before the death of William II in 1650. An anonymous writer of 1647 asserted that those whom he described as the Arminians were eager for peace as it would enable them to push forward their policies in church and state.23 A writer of 1648 alleged that the Prince of Orange was being excluded from the negotiations about peace although he had a crucial role to play.24 A pamphlet of the same year insinuated that peace with Spain was an integral part of a policy to reduce the power of the Prince of Orange. The writer spoke of

un tacite projet de rabaisser l’authorité du jeune Prince d’Orange au même temps qu’on fait semblant de vouloir prier pour lui: puis qu’à l’occasion de son établissement en la charge de Capitaine general pour la conduit de vos guerres, on redouble si fort les voeux pour la paix, comme a dessein de luy rendre ceste dignité entièrement inutile.25

For the author of Dienstige Aenmerkingen op den Spaensen Raedt, of 1653 the present rulers of the Republic shared with their Spanish friends a desire to cut down the House of Orange and peace combined with the death of William II had provided them with this opportunity. Just as the Spaniards and their advisers had identified the stadholder Maurice as ‘the dragon which guarded the land’ and sought to bring him down with the aid of their Dutch friends, so the descendants both literal and metaphorical of these traitors had urged peace so that once more they could restrict or remove the only power

23 Knuttel. no. 5512, p.16.
24 Knuttel. no. 5765. np.
25 Knuttel. no. 5511. np.
which defended the people of the Republic against their enemies both within and without. 26

The Orangist plaint was not limited to the conclusion of peace of 1648. They also expressed a view that war had made their nation rich and powerful and exerted a strong unifying influence on the seven provinces. This was more than just nostalgia. In the works of some Orangist writers it appeared as if war was the natural and normal condition of the Republic and peace an uneasy intermission during which preparations for war must always be underway. Their rhetoric was certainly in part a response to the works of the brothers de la Court and others in the early 1660s in which peace was held as the greatest good and the Princes of Orange caricatured as power hungry warmongers. Yet the theme was already present in the Orangist writings of the 1650s and reflected a consistent strand in the Dutch political rhetoric of the seventeenth century.

Throughout the seventeenth century there was within Dutch society a deep ambivalence about the wars they endured and the benefits which they had reaped. It was not that the Dutch were oblivious to the havoc, destruction and death which war, particularly on land, brought on its wake. In a pamphlet of 1621 a nameless peasant lamented the end of the Truce and the resumption of arms.

Ick wilde dat ick noyt was gheboore
Dat ick nu Mars son trom weere hoore.
Mijn hert dat is in groot beswaren
Dat die soldieren tieren en baren
Ick worde ghestooten ende gheslaghen.
Wy arme boeren zijn te beklaghen. 27

A writer of the same year lauded the ideal of peace though as an educated man his language was more theoretical than the heartfelt cry of the peasant. For him 'liefde ende

26 Knuttel. no. 7451. pp. 23-25.
27 Knuttel. no. 3198. np.
de Natuere selfs moet hy uytgetrokken hebben, die den Oorloch boven den Vrede soude willen verheffen'. Yet as the same author explained it, the paradox was that peace appeared to be of little service to the inhabitants of the Dutch Republic. No benefits had accrued to the state as a result of the Twelve Years Truce. Rather there had been a decline in trade particularly in Zeeland, Jesuits had flocked into the towns and countryside of the Republic and the Arminian faction had fermented a deadly discord. Whatever the theoretical superiority of peace, it had served the Republic ill. Another writer of 1621 expressed his conclusions more brutally. Some might say, he wrote, that war is an evil above all other evils and the bountiful nurse of all miseries but, he insisted, war occurred in order to avoid worse evils and to defend and maintain freedom and religion. In his view,

decouragieuse Mensche hebben liever een strijdbare Vryheyt dan een vreetsame dienstbaerheyt. De besittinghe der Vryheyt ende der tijdlijcke goederen en is niet secker, so sy niet ware gheconserveert door de Wapenen.

War here is inextricably bound up with the defence and preservation of freedom, a theme which will recur throughout the century. The author also recommended bracingly that war instils a discipline that is woefully absent in times of peace and quickens the bodies and spirits of men.

The arguments expounded in this rhetoric of 1621 were to be echoed down the century every time the possibility of peace arose. In 1629 when peace with Spain was once more under discussion, an anonymous author argued that while peace was usually to be preferred to war, this maxim did not apply in the case of the United Provinces. Like Rome, Thebes and Sparta, the new Republic had flourished in war. Like the Roman Empire, the Dutch Republic with no enemies to fight would turn her bellicosity inwards with internal strife culminating in a dictatorship or monarchy. Those who

---

28 Knuttel. no. 3204. np.
29 Knuttel. no. 3216. np.
sought a truce with Spain were no patriots for the cessation of hostilities would leave
the nation fatally weakened.\textsuperscript{30} ‘Patriots’ were also to be found opposed to a proposed
truce in a pamphlet of 1632. This author praised those

Oprechte Vrome ende Ghetrouwe Patriotten……, daer van ons Doorluchtigen Prince van
Orangien ‘t Hooft is, die nimmermeer zullen toelaten dat door de flau-herticheydt of
eyghenbaet-zoekerye ‘t ghemeene Landt ende al watter inne is, verloren gaen ende met eenen
schoonen schijn onder de Slavernye vande Spangiaerden ghebracht zoude werden.\textsuperscript{31}

In this work the Prince of Orange, Frederick Henry is identified as the head of the
‘Patriot’ party who resist the blandishments of slavery in the cause of freedom.

Opponents of peace with Spain had depicted the war as a profoundly positive and
creative experience which had moulded the new state. It was to be preferred to the perils
of a dubious peace. One writer of 1647 assured his fellow citizens that ‘de oorloge die u
gequeeckt heeft, sal u wel maturineren beter dan een bedriegelijcke ruijeneuse Vrede’.\textsuperscript{32}

In the avowedly Orangist pamphlet \textit{Bickerse Beroerten} published before the death of
William II in 1650 the enemies of the Republic were said to be still armed and in
waiting. The Republic born and raised in war, could not survive without war and
weapons. Finally, the anonymous author drew on Aristotle’s contention that a Republic
could only sustain success if, in times of peace, it maintained sufficient military forces
to fight not only a defensive, but an offensive, war. If not, her fate rested not in her own
hands but those of others.\textsuperscript{33}

Given their bellicose stance, it is not surprising that during the first Anglo-Dutch
hostilities, 1652-1654, the Orangists favoured an enthusiastic prosecution of the war.
Cromwell was an enemy of both the Houses of Stuart and Orange and the naval war
resulted in demands for an admiral and captain general who could expedite matters. A

\textsuperscript{30} Knuttel. no. 3924. np.
\textsuperscript{31} Knuttel. no. 5015. np.
\textsuperscript{32} Knuttel. no. 5519. np.
\textsuperscript{33} Knuttel. no. 6843. np.
pamphlet of 1652 commended the English under the previous Stuart monarchy, excoriated Cromwell as the destroyer of Dutch commerce and urged an ardent prosecution of the war ‘t welck met de nature van onse Natie dapper over een komt’. 34 Another pamphlet of the same year alleged that Dutch commerce had always flourished best in times of war. The Truce of 1609-1621 and the years of peace after the Treaty of Munster in 1648 had, the author asserted, been marked by a slowdown in trade. War was the great unifier of the seven provinces. Hard experience had taught the Dutch that ‘vrede met een ander, Oorloogh met u selven’. This was because of the essentially fractious and bellicose nature of the people. ‘Sy sijn in ‘t ghemeen ghenegen tot twist en tweedracht, soeckende weer werck als sy geen en hebben, en een vyandt en vyantschap als sy in rust sitten.’ 35 To those who argued that the sister Republics of England and the United Provinces should not engage in war but seek their mutual interests in peace, the French Calvinist David Blondel argued that the mere fact that both were Republics did not promote peace between England and the Dutch. Rather like their fellow Republics of Venice and Genoa, they had strongly competing interests which might find their outlet in war. There was nothing in the intrinsic nature of a Republic which inclined it to peace. Instead in the case of the Dutch and the English, ‘l’uniformite de leurs interests est plus propre a les mettre en jalousie’. 36

On 12 and 13 June 1653 a seabattle took place off the coast at Nieuwpoort, which ended in victory for the English. Tromp was forced to retreat with his ships and the English began a blockade of the Dutch coast. The Dutch government initiated peace negotiations but more bellicose spirits were abroad. The poet Jan Six van Chandelier anathematised the prospect of such a peace in his work of 1653 entitled ‘Afraadinge van Vrede, met de Tegenwoordige Regeeringe van England.’ Six van Chandelier mourned

34 Knuttel. no. 7205. p. 4.
36 Knuttel. no. 7427. p. 5.
the glorious past under the Princes of Orange which had been witness to so many victories.

Oouden tyd! O eddle zeeden!
Hoe werd uw bloem in stof vertreeden
[...]
Waar zyn se die by Indiaanen,
In oost en west de Princevaanen,
Hooghloflik plantten over zee,
Op Lisbons, en Kastijles ree?

The helpless and bewildered were calling for an end to the war but Six van Chandelier argued that de Witt’s motivation for peace lay not in the nation’s welfare but in his own interest and to further weaken the cause of the House of Orange.

Hy socht maar vrede, om eigenbaat,
Oorspronklik, uit een wrok en haat
Voor hoon geleden van Nassouwen,
Om die uit’s Land gebied te houwen.

Such an approach was tearing the country apart. If the war is to be successful and internal unity restored, then the answer lies with the promotion of the Prince of Orange.

En wilt men vreede binnen ’t land?
Men ente den Oranjeplant,
Die tot een schoonen boom opgroeije,
Langs welker schaduw Neerland bloeije.

It was, however, in response to the barbs of de la Court that Orangist rhetoric emphasised the centrality of war both present and future in the forming of the Republic. An author of 1662, sobered by the experiences of the first Anglo-Dutch war, conceded that naval warfare could well be disadvantageous to the Republic but argued, that war by land had enriched the country. De la Court’s scorn for such wars was, he argued, no more than an attempt to deprive the Prince of Orange of the glory that was rightfully

37 Jacobs, i. 138-143. lines 21-22, 37-40. 113. 119-122. 203-206.
his. He contended spiritedly ‘echter is een rechtvaardige Oorloogh, op goede redenen
gegront nimmer te verachten’. The very freedoms which the Republic now enjoyed had
been won at the point of the sword. These sentiments were reasserted in a pamphlet of
1663. The Treaty of Munster was depicted yet again as an insidious plot on the part of
the Jesuits to reduce the Republic to impotence and internal discord. Drawing on the
Public Prayer Debate of that year, the author argued that Lipsius in counselling Spain to
peace during the Truce had been proved correct. Peace would destroy the Republic. The
seven arrows would fall apart. William II’s attempts to break off the peace
negotiations of 1648 were commended ‘want ons Landt is door de bedriegelijcke vrede
bedorven’. The author of Den Herstelden Prins scorned de la Court’s portrayal of
bellicose and self-interested Princes of Orange. The supreme duty of any prince was to
defend the citizens and their territories against foreign aggression. The union of
stadholder and captain general in the persons of the Princes of Orange, far from
encouraging war, had served as a deterrent to neighbouring states jealous of the growing
wealth of the Republic. The Dutch were now at peace but that could soon change and an
army without the unifying figure of a captain general was ‘niet anders… als een
lighaam sonder ziele.’

The war against France in 1672 presented a much more unequivocal target for
Orangist rhetoric. Now the warlike qualities of the nation were uppermost and Orangist
rhetoric predominated. One author asserted that the enemies of the Prince of Orange
were saying that he would take advantage of his newly appointed role as captain general
to enable the House of Orange to dominate the Republic once more. This writer would
have none of it. Pausing to lay the blame for the year’s disasters on the traitors who
opposed the promotion of William III, he called on the martial spirit of the Batavians in

39 Knuttel. no. 8786, pp. 4. 14.
40 Knuttel. no. 8806, pp. 11-12.
41 Knuttel. no. 8806A. pp. 1. 28-29. 67.
the nation’s hour of need. The warlike spirit of the Batavians was also called into play in a plea to the citizens of Amsterdam. An anonymous author urged them to consider ‘de roem van de oude Batavieren onse Voor-ouders, wat voor Helden-daden sy tegen de Romeynen gedaen hebben’. The past is to be re-lived. William III has become their Claudius Civilis. The humiliating surrender of Dutch fortresses in the face of the French army proved for one author only too clearly the need to have at the nation’s head a Prince of Orange who could inspire resistance amongst the demoralised troops. Another, more philosophically inclined, mused on the paradox that war was commonly associated with a variety of ills and peace with prosperity, yet this was not true in the case of the Republic. Here war had been characterised ‘door gematight landts bestier, aflegginge van eygen Interest, en submissie alom,’ whereas the hallmarks of peace were ‘grootsheydt, passie, en beooginge van eygen voordeel’. Valkenier writing in 1675 completed this paean to war. He cited Polybius to prove that the ultimate preservation and welfare of the state consists in the martial deeds of its army and navy, ‘fortitudo in hostes’. Once again peace is depicted as essentially inimical to the internal well being of the state. When there is no war

When peace reigned the inhabitants of the Republic had been lulled by tranquillity and prosperity, their old courage and steadfastness debased. War, led by a descendant of the nation’s heroes, had enabled the Dutch to recover the martial spirit of their forefathers.

---

42 Knuttel. no. 10045. pp. 4. 40-41.  
43 Knuttel. no. 10239. np.  
44 Knuttel. no. 10267. p.12.  
45 Knuttel. no. 10376. p. 5.  
46 Valkenier. pp. 20-22. 256. 266.
For the supporters of the House of Orange it was an axiom, not only that war was in the interests of the Republic, but that their opponents the States Party were incapable of adequately prosecuting any naval or military campaign. Failures at sea or in the field were inevitably used to highlight deficiencies real or imagined and urge the appointment of a captain and admiral general. The first Anglo-Dutch war of 1652-1654 provided fertile ground for Orangist criticism. In a pamphlet of 1652 three fictional peat workers debated the current situation. One, Kees, bemoaned the news that the English had seized many merchant vessels, three wars ships and a quantity of shot. The Dutch government had been powerless or unwilling to prevent this outrage. Kees concluded ‘dat onse Prins leefde ten souder soo niet gaen’. 47 These sentiments were echoed in a work of the same year in which one fictional character contemplating what he alleged to be Dutch pusillanimity in the face of Cromwell’s determination lamented ‘o hadden wy nu soo een krijgh’s helt als onse Prins heeft geweest, het soude anders gaen’. 48

Accusations of cowardice against certain sea captains were already surfacing. One Captain Boer-Jaep of Amsterdam was alleged during an engagement with the English to have quit his ship leaving the steersman and common sailors to bring the ship safely home. Accusations of dereliction of duty such as this were to occur frequently during the course of war. Orangists were certainly to make the best possible use of such charges but they may not always have originated with them. Rivalry among sea captains had previously led to such charges. An example will suffice. In October 1638 de With had failed to prevent a privateer from leaving the port of Dunkirk. After escorting a fleet of Bordeaux merchant ships safely home de With found on his arrival in the Hague that two of his own officers intended to accuse him of failing in his duty. In the case of the offending Amsterdam captain of 1652 the anonymous writer held his actions to be symptomatic of a government which rewarded family members and clients with office

47 Knuttel. no. 7235. np.
48 Knuttel. no. 7253. pp. 24-25.
and placed birth and connections before merit. These new sea captains were no more than placemen, the one promoted ‘om dat hy een schoon Vrou heeft, den anderen om dat sijn vrienden inde Regeringh syn’. There was a clear implication that standards had fallen since the death of the stadholder and captain general and petty self interest reigned above the common good.

This cry redoubled during 1653 as the republic registered a series of naval disasters, merchant ships were unable to leave port and unemployment mounted. Blondel writing in 1653 insisted that the war was not being prosecuted adequately and lamented that ‘plusieurs mois se sont passes en pure perte’. He feared a shameful peace. Accusations of cowardice and treachery abounded. The death of Tromp in 1653 occasioned allegations that a section of the fleet had not supported him in the battle off Portland, no less than twenty six Dutch vessels holding back from action. A fictional steersman in a pamphlet of 1653 served as a mouthpiece for the national mood of gloom and paranoia when he asserted that the defaulting captains had been bribed by the English to leave Tromp in the lurch and argued ‘wy hebben te veel schelmen in onsen Vloot gehad’. A fictional merchant commented pointedly on the failure of the States to punish the defaulting captains, asserting that the latter had too many friends at the heart of government. His citizen companion opined that if the captains were not apprehended and tried for cowardice the common folk would take matters into their own hands.

In several pamphlets these failings were attributed to the absence of an Orange captain and admiral general. An alleged shortage of ships and experienced seamen, tardy decision making and the appointment of unsuitable captains with family links with the regent oligarchy were contrasted sharply with the way matters were conducted under the House of Orange. A fictional ‘heavy-head’ in a pamphlet of 1653 commented

---

50 Knuttel, no. 7427, pp. 58-59.
51 Knuttel, no. 7432, pp. 11-14, 16, 18, 27.
astringently that the war against Spain had been conducted in a very different and praiseworthy fashion. Readers were reminded that the deficiencies of the consultative system of the States General in times of war had been pointed out by William I as early as 1579. The appointment of the Prince of Orange as captain general had been intended to resolve this problem. By implication, the promotion of William III would achieve similar happy results. In another pamphlet of the same year it was reported that even the English were shocked at the scandalous behaviour of the sea captains. In the distress and strife ridden atmosphere of 1653 there were fears that the union of the seven provinces was in the process of breaking up ‘ende het schijnd hier en is geen vast binden aan, of men sal het met een Orange sleuyer moeten doen’. The author of a pamphlet against the promotion of William III had to concede that an unholy coalition of writers of pamphlets and ministers of the Reformed Church had convinced the people that the Prince of Orange was the only physic for their pains. ‘Het wordt dagelijks de gemeene luyden in gestampt dat dit(Orange) het eenige middel is om van de lager wal te raken.’ This even though a fictional character stoutly contended, with some justice, that ‘die by zijn zinnen is, weet wel dat een Held van twee en dertig maenden noch alleen geen Bry-pot kan bestormen, ik laet staen iemand te helpen’.

Even a fictional Englishman was permitted to offer his opinion on the cause of the Dutch defeats. His recipe for success was to get rid of all the captains who had been appointed as a result of nepotism. He roundly denounced the traitors of Veere, Rotterdam, Enkhuizen and Harlingen who were, he alleged, still exporting materials for ship building to England concealed in herring busses. He highlighted ‘de gierigheyt en ’t misbruyck der Regenten in hare Ampten die van langer soo groot en geweldich wort, datte misdoende geen misdaet siet’. In sum, he urged a fictional Hollander ‘de Quade Srs uyt-roeyen, om den Staet weder alsoo tot haer eerste beginselen te brengen’. This

52 Knuttel. no. 7438, pp. 4-5. 11. 28-29.
53 Knuttel. no. 7439, pp. 5. 7-8.
was a clarion call for the restoration of the authority of the House of Orange.

Challenged by the fictional Hollander, the Englishman asserted that if the result of the appointment of a captain general were swifter decision making and a more vigorous exercise of justice against defaulters, then it was a strategy which met with his approval. He took care, however, to make plain that such a captain general would be no Cromwell, whom he described as a veritable Machiavelli and a tyrant, but one who understood and maintained the liberties of Holland.\(^{54}\) In the light of all this it comes as no surprise that the States of Zeeland, deploring the lack of secrecy and convoluted decision making, urged a ‘herstellinghe vande oude ordre, ende forme, daer aen den Staet by na een ganske Eeuwe, so wel, ende geluckeligh sich bevonden heeft’. This entailed the appointment of a captain and admiral general in the person of the young William III with William Frederick of Nassau as his lieutenant.\(^{55}\)

The Orangists even alleged that the hatred of the government of the Republic was directed at the Prince of Orange and his supporters rather than at the English with deleterious consequences for the prosecution of the war. Allegations of this nature centred on the person of Admiral Tromp. Tromp was well known for his Orangist sympathies. In a poem commemorating the sea battle between Tromp and Blake off Dover in May 1652, the Dutchman refuses to be cowed by the usurper’s fleet.

\[
\text{Men ziet hem ryzen uit het nest} \\
\text{Belauiert van zynen Prins.}
\]

\[
\text{Death is to be preferred to defeat, for when the greatest danger looms,}
\]

\[
\text{Zoo zal hy by d’Oranjevlag} \\
\text{In dien verschrikkelyken slag} \\
\text{Veel liever sneuvelen, dan zijn Kroon}
\]

\(^{54}\) Knuttel. no. 7440. \\
\(^{55}\) Knuttel. no. 7465. np.
Tromp’s habit of flying the Prince’s flag was confirmed by other sources. In a description of the sea battle of August 1653 in which Tromp was to be killed, the narrator remarks almost casually that Tromp’s vessel was sporting the Prince’s flag. His sympathy for the cause of the Houses of Orange and Stuart was confirmed when after the capture of an English vessel, it was renamed the ‘King Charles’. 57

The Admiral’s death in battle in 1653 unleashed accusations that his fellow captains had deliberately abandoned him to his fate. The fact that they went unpunished by the States General did not go unremarked. 58 Jan Six van Chandelier implied that the grief of certain regents at the death of this Orangist naval hero was feigned. There were those who dissembled and donned mourning but others who disdained to pretend grief.

In other words, members of the States Party had connived at his death. In so doing they had placed their own factional interests above the national welfare.

Similar accusations were levelled at John de Witt and his supporters during the French invasion of 1672, when it was alleged that they would rather connive with the enemy than permit the promotion of the Prince of Orange to stadholder. In these circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that the old accusations concerning the death of Tromp the Elder resurfaced at this point. One writer alleged, in verse, that John de

---

56 ‘Voor het aangaan van’t Zeegevecht tusschen de Vlooten der Hollanders en Engelsch en onder Oliver Kromwel’. Onze Mannen ter Zee in dicht en beeld, ed. by Daniel Scheurleer, 3 vols (The Hague, 1912), I, 159.
57 Knuttel, no. 7412, np.
58 Knuttel, no. 7432, pp.11-18.
59 ‘Heemelrouwe, oover de dood van den selven (Marten Harpertse Tromp)’, Jacobs, I, 606, lines 25-30.
Witt had deliberately connived that Tromp should be left unaided during the battle.

Written after the death of the brothers de Witt, the soul of the mutilated John roams Hell admitting to his treachery.

... Wie is de oorsaeck van de doot
Van Tromp, ben ick het niet? Ick liet hem in de noot;
Ick was die’t werck bestaeck door hemelijcke brieven,
En riet Capiteins en Volck dat zy hem lieten blijven
In ’t heerste van ’t gevecht. 60

One pamphlet alleged that both Tromp the younger and the elder were victims of the supporters of John de Witt because they were good naval men, good patriots and friends of the Prince of Orange. The author alleged that the younger Tromp ‘moest uyt de Vloot om dat hy al te wel vocht’ and his father had been deliberately sacrificed as part of the agreement of Holland and England to the Seclusion of the Prince of Orange. 61

Orangist rhetoric remained conspicuously muted during the course of the second Anglo-Dutch war. Charles II had naturally been seen as the protector of the interests of his nephew William III and there was clearly uncertainty about how to play the patriotic card without damaging the Prince’s cause. There is a notable absence of the type of bellicose language heard during the first Anglo-Dutch war. The naval reforms introduced by John de Witt were bearing fruit and the English battered by plague and the Fire of London clearly had many problems of their own. De Ruyter’s triumphal progress up the Thames occasioned much patriotic rejoicing. John de Witt had introduced speed and co-ordination to Dutch naval decisions and had involved himself personally in the selection of suitable capitains. He had supervised the fitting out of the warships at Texel and went to sea with the fleet in July 1665 and September 1666. In short, he was acting, in effect as a quasi admiral general and arguably a more effective

60 Knuttel. no. 10415 / 10415A. p. 5
61 Knuttel. no. 10376. p. 10.
one than any Prince of Orange. His brother Cornelis had shared in Ruyter’s naval triumph.

In these circumstances, the Orangists instead concentrated on the situation on land where things were much less rosy. In a pamphlet of 1665 a fictional merchant told of his recent visit to the frontiers where he was struck by the paucity of troops and artillery. If an assault were to come by land, it could not be repulsed. A fictional regent remarked ominously that the Bishop of Munster was taking advantage of the naval war with England to threaten the Republic. The regents of the province of Zeeland took up the cudgels the following year. The unexpected and violent attack by the Bishop of Munster in the north of the Republic and the inability of the armed forces to deal adequately with him had revealed deficiencies in the military. Hence they argued, it was necessary to appoint a captain general as soon as possible. They proposed that William III be made general of the Cavalry under the guidance of John Maurice of Nassau and introduced into the Council of State as his father had been before the death of Frederick Henry. Once William attained his majority he would be appointed captain general, a post he would hold not for one campaign but for life. These sentiments were also expressed in verse. An unknown poet queried

Waerom soo lang gewacht met onsen Prins te hulden?
Heeft Hy niet langh genoeg dees spijt moeten gedulden?

The Prince’s youth is no longer to be held against him.

En daer Hy is te jong is, niet te out om te leeren,
Daer vindt Hy liefd’ en gunst by militaire Heeren.

---

63 Knuttel, no. 9125, np.
Once again, as during the first Anglo-Dutch war concerns surfaced about the quality of the military and naval appointments under the government of John de Witt. It was scandalous that such callow youths were advanced when the Prince of Orange, the fruit of heroes was left standing by.

There was a growing sense in the Dutch Republic that the France of Louis XIV represented the greatest threat. Louis’s designs on the Spanish Netherlands conjured up the spectre of a neighbour more powerful than an ailing Spain. Louis’s ambitions appeared boundless. In 1667 there was published in Paris a work entitled *Des justes prétentions du Roy sur l’Empire*. The writer Aubéry portrayed a monarch and state brought together in mystical union and determined to win back that patrimony which once had been French. The author argued that the territory of the Gauls had, at one time, embraced ‘la plus grande partie de Europe’. Some pages later, he was more specific. Under Charlemagne the kingdom of the French had comprised ‘la plus grande partie de l’Italie, toute la France comme elle est presentement bornee, tous les Pays-bas, et toute l’Allemagne’. The States of Holland were alive to the danger France posed but also equally perturbed at the possibility that a Prince of Orange would, one day, combine both the stadholderate and the role of captain general. It was admitted that ‘sich omtrent de Grensen van desen Staet een donckere wolcke van discontent ende Oorloge bevonde op te doen’ and that the army must be placed on a more advantageous footing but it was argued that vital freedoms would be threatened if the role of stadholder were to have

64 Knuttel. no. 9420. np.
both political and military elements. The Perpetual Edict of 1667 stated that no stadholder of any province could be promoted to the role of captain general. The Province of Holland would henceforth have no stadholder and all provincial officials have to take an oath to uphold the Edict. However, there was a recognition that some form of role had to be envisaged for William. At the age of twenty he would enter the Council of State which had particular responsibility for military administration and the governance of the Generality Lands. If William would forego the stadholderate of any of the provinces then he would be appointed captain general of the Union when he reached the age of twenty-two. 66

The certainty of a military role for the Prince of Orange and the hope that changing circumstances might also bring with it the stadholderate, may account for the relative paucity of factional rhetoric in the years 1669-1671. Yet there was an impending sense of urgency. In August 1670 the French army was marching towards the Spanish Netherlands. Alarmed, de Witt urged the States General to turn its thoughts seriously towards re-arming but several provinces were reluctant to countenance the necessary expenditure. 67 In a pamphlet of 1671 a prescient fictional Hollander described Louis XIV as a waxing power whose aim was ‘kort om, in alle schijn met een openbare Oorlog te Water en te Lande, om Monarch te worden over de geheele Werelt gelijk de Romainen’. If any doubted him they should read Justes Pretentions du Roy, which was now available in a Dutch translation. 68 In October 1671 it was proposed to increase the army by 20,000 men. In November 1671 the province of Gelderland urged the States General that the Prince of Orange be appointed captain and admiral general forewith. 69 On 25 February 1672 the prince was appointed captain general for one campaign only. He was not to be stadholder of any province. He would remain

67 Rowen. The Ambassador prepares for war. p. 143. 146-147.
68 Knuttel. no. 9893, pp. 4. 22.
69 Japikse. i. 174-175.
firmly under the authority of the deputies of the States General who accompanied him
in the field and he could not give orders for the movement of troops without the
agreement of those provinces and towns whose responsibility they were. There was to
be no possibility of another coup such as that against Amsterdam in 1650. 70

These limitations reflected the concerns of de Witt and his supporters. From
1650 to 1672 States Party rhetoric emphasised that no Republic worthy of the name
entrusted supreme military authority to any individual for life, regardless of the political
authority or otherwise of the person concerned. Thus even if the House of Orange were
denied the stadholderate, they were not to be trusted with any form of overall military
control. Once in control of troops, a Prince of Orange would be able to enforce his will
upon the United Provinces at the cost of provincial supremacy. De Witt in his Deductie
of 1654 argued vehemently that republics which placed one man in charge of the army
for the duration of his life were doomed to be ultimately reduced to the status of a
monarchy or single headed rule. The Milan of the Visconti bore witness to this. The
Republic had been threatened with the same outcome when Anjou, determined to make
himself supreme master of the Netherlands, had attempted with his troops to seize
Antwerp in 1583. The stout courage of the citizens had thwarted his worst designs and a
beneficent providence had borne him to the grave shortly afterwards. Likewise, in the
view of de Witt, the death of William I before he could be made count, the mist before
Amsterdam in 1650 and the death of William II could all be imputed to God who had
preserved the freedoms of the Republic from an all-powerful military leader. 71

Even more evocative was the example of Julius Caesar who used military success
to seize political headship. In the work of Machiavelli and Boccalini whose reading of
Roman history was influenced by Cicero and the epic poet Lucanus, Caesar was the

70 Japikse, t. p. 178.
prototype of a tyrant whose seizure of power was a warning to all lovers of freedom.\textsuperscript{72} Likewise in States Party rhetoric the figure of Caesar stands for all who gain political supremacy by force of arms, among whom are included implicitly or explicitly the Princes of Orange. In his \textit{Deductie} of 1654 de Witt drew on the alarming precedent of Julius Caesar who after commanding a mere fraction of the Roman army, used those same arms against his own Fatherland. In this way the Republic which had withstood the world was brought down, not by external defeat but by internal strife.\textsuperscript{73} A pamphlet of the following year reiterated that under an ‘aristocratic’ form of governance of Consuls and Senate Rome had flourished for centuries. However, the political power of Caesar, achieved through control of the military had brought the Republic to slavery.\textsuperscript{74} In an analysis of kingship the brothers de la Court listed those who had risen to the status of a monarch by virtue of their military power among them Julius Caesar, Tiberius, Prince William I, Prince Maurice, Prince Frederick Henry and the Medicis.\textsuperscript{75} Writing in 1663 the author of the \textit{De Gulde Legenden} compared William II’s unwillingness to decommission troops and his attack on Amsterdam with the actions of Julius Caesar. Caesar, when the Council at Rome wrote to him to lay down his command and decommission his soldiers, argued that Pompey must do the same meanwhile marching on Rome to seize sovereignty.\textsuperscript{76} In a pamphlet of 1668 supporting the separation of the posts of stadholder and captain general, Caesar once more provided a salutary lesson with Leicester added for good measure.\textsuperscript{77}

In an oration delivered to the burghers of Deventer in May 1664, Theophilus Hogers narrated the rise of Caesar the better to urge his fellow citizens to value and defend their freedom. For Hogers nature had bestowed on man such an inborn love of

\textsuperscript{73} Knuttel. no 7543. Part II. pp. 48-49.
\textsuperscript{74} Knuttel. no. 7660. pp. 53-54.
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Consideratien en Exempelen van Staat omtrent de Fundamenten van allerley Regeringe}. pp. 65-66.
\textsuperscript{76} Knuttel. no. 8806C, p. 320.
\textsuperscript{77} Knuttel. no. 9683, p.10
freedom that he would rather die or live in poverty than be rich and unfree. However, he warned that there are among all peoples ‘slaefachtighe geesten’ who willingly take upon themselves the yoke of slavery thinking that they will hence gain advancement. So there are those who bow to tyrants and among those tyrants was none other than the great Caesar for ‘de geen, die of door gewelt, of door list, de vestingh van de gemeene Staet aentast, wordt met seer groot recht met de naem van Dwingelant uyt-gesproken’. The figure of William II lurks unspoken in the background. Having won the support of Pompey and conquered the Gauls, Caesar ‘dacht niets anders dan openbare oorlogh tegen zijn Vaderlandt te voeren’. Hogers described Caesar’s legions of foreigners who owed loyalty to him alone. The presence of foreign soldiers and officers in the army of the Republic who had been appointed by the Princes of Orange and whom it was alleged they were unwilling to decommission was a recurrent theme in the rhetoric of the States Party and Hogers may well be implicitly referring to these. His power based on the military, Hogers’ Caesar seeks new and evil occasions of war to buttress his power. Hogers refers to Caesar’s persecution and imprisonment of Cato, ‘de beste man, en heylighste Burger die in romeynsche Heerschappy geweeest’ who found himself incarcerated ‘schoon hy by sich self van geen misdaet bewust was’. The hapless Roman takes on the traits of an Oldenbarnevelt. Finally after gaining power and silencing his enemies Caesar openly strove for the position of king and would have been successful if fate, in the shape of his assassins, had not removed him. He had not learned the vital lesson that princely power gained by weapons can only be sustained by those same weapons.78

Hogers’s oration was published in 1666 in a volume which also contained Schelius’ posthumous publication De Gemeene Vryheit. Praise of monarchical government among his contemporaries had moved Schelius to write in defence of the

---

freedoms which were native to man and which were inevitably diminished and stunted by slavish obedience to monarchical authority. Schelius was clearly writing in support of the regime which had followed the death of William II and he was a correspondent of de Witt. Hoger’s purpose in his oration and its publication is even more explicit. He wrote that he deployed the example of Caesar ‘als om de Burgers door een voorbeelt te vermanen, en hen op te wecken om de Vryheydt, met het bloet onser voorouders ghekocht, te verdedighen’. There is clearly a present day threat to freedoms for there are ‘dusdanige menschen, die uyt begeerte van de Vorsten te believen, de Gemeente en Vryheid verraden’. These are the supporters of the House of Orange eager to restore the authority of a stadholder and captain general.

The role of Caesar was shunned by those who supported the policies of John de Witt. In 1666 the poet and dramatist Jan Vos, long known to be hostile to the cause of the House of Orange, wrote in praise of the Pensionary who had accompanied the victorious Dutch fleet to sea during the second Anglo-Dutch war. In his poem entitled *Zeetocht van den Eed. Heer Joan de Wit* Vos lauded de Witt as both statesman and military leader. De Witt

strydt met zijn tong in ’t Hof, en met zijn arm op zee.
Hy voert in d’eene handt, om vryheidt en om vree,
Het Wetboek van de Staat, in d’andre handt den deege
Van d’algemeene leeuw.

However in spite of this potent combination of roles Vos makes a clear distinction between de Witt as servant of the state and a figure such as Caesar who strives to dominate his fellows. Vos urges his fellow citizen to guard against such types and take care that military authority remains firmly in the hands of the provincial States.

---

79 Hogers, *Vertoog van dat Julius Cesar een Tyran heeft geweest*, p. 158.
1670 saw the admission of the Prince of Orange to the Council of State, with the implication that this appointment would help to prepare him for a military role within the Republic. In the same year John van Someren published his drama *Julius Caesar, ofte Wraeck van vermande Vryheydt*. This may be no coincidence. Van Someren, a correspondent of de Witt, contrasted the interests of the all powerful single head and the concept of freedom, with the clear implication that the two were incompatible. For van Someren it was evident that ‘de koninklijke Opper-macht, is by alle Staetkundige, tegen de Vryheydt gestellt, ende de Vryheydt den breydel om deselve te betoomen’. In his introduction van Someren emphasised that power over the military was the key to authority in the state.

‘t Gesagh dat een Opper-hooft, door de Wapenen, die hem vertrouwt zijn, verkrijght is by die Machten, die ‘t hem aenbevolen hebben, seer bedenckelijck: alsoo de Krijghs-macht, de Sleutel van de Regeeringe in handen heeft’.

A sonnet reiterated the theme.

Siet wat de Krijghs-macht doet, wanner sy heeft ‘t bewint,
Hoe sy de Vryheyd selfs, door haer geweld verslint;
Wie dat de Vryheyt mint, moet die noyt overgeven.

---

80 Knutel, no. 9376, np.
Van Someren's drama faithfully follows the account laid down in Plutarch's *Fall of the Roman Republic*. In the speeches of the conspirators we discern themes which were familiar in contemporary debate in the Dutch Republic. They speak of the servant who, by power of arms, became the master and of a freedom which was incompatible with a sovereign head. For Marcus, freedom was imprinted in even the lowliest beast

Geen dier op Aerden leeft dat niet sijn Vryheyt minde,

However while nature has designed monarchs for the animal kingdom and the fickle mob cry for a king, Marcus, in freedom's name, acknowledges no headship.

Laet dan 't wanschapen volck een's konincks Scepter vieren,
Die Vrouw Natuer bykans, gestelt heeft naest de dieren,
Uyt een geringen stof, wy volgen 's Vryheyt's Wet,
Die op geen dwing'landy, van hoogheyt immer let.

Cassius's warning against those who rise to supremacy by power of arms has a particular resonance. It was the contention of supporters of the States Party that the Orange stadholders and captains general were the creation and servants of the provincial states whom they subsequently sought to dominate and subjugate.

Wie dat een Rijck be-erft, daer vindt men kracht en reden,
Om met die heerschappy sijn kind'ren te bekleden,
Maer die het werd gegunt, door hooger handt of macht,
Moet toesien dat hy niet sijn eygen Heer verkracht,
Dat hy geen banden past, aen haer door wiens bevelen,
Hy kreeg de Heerschappy, en kan de meester spelen.

The price of freedom is eternal vigilance. As the chorus after the death reminds the audience they must be alert to the dangers of other Caesars emerging.

Het Opperste Gebiet de Vryheyt moet begrimen.
Van Someren may have considered this a timely warning as the star of the young Prince of Orange appeared to be rising.

Orangists, on the contrary, glorified successive Princes of Orange by comparing them to the mighty Caesar. In 1597 a medal cast to celebrate Maurice’s victory at Turnhout echoed Caesar’s alleged words on his expedition to Britain but paid the ultimate tribute to the Almighty, ‘venit, vidit, Deus Vicit’. Maurie’s triumphs were as great as Caesar’s but the former was marked by true Christian humility. A work entitled *De mutatione Reipublicae en initiis monarchiae Caesarum sive C. Julius Caesar* by J.H.Carer and published in 1645 was dedicated to the stadholder Frederick Henry. The author asserted that Caesar’s greatness lay in his realisation that Rome needed a single head to prevent faction within the state. In a work of 1650 *De Doodt van Julius Caeser*, the dramatist Hendrik Verbiest tackled head on the traditional Republican view. His Caesar wields the sword for the benefit of his people and their freedom, bringing peace within the frontiers of the Empire and stability in Rome. He stands above the factional strife of the city, placing the welfare of the Republic before self interest. He stands in contrast to Brutus and his faction who do not shrink from the murder of a head of state. For some citizens the stadholder, famed for his military victories, fulfilled the same function in the Dutch Republic. In a poem of 1650 lamenting the death of the stadholder. William II became a second Caesar.

82 Johan van Someren. *Julius Caesar, ofte Wraecck van vermande Vryheydt* (Dordrecht, 1670)
84 Wansink. p. 97.
85 Noak. pp. 211, 216.
The appointment of William III as captain general in 1672 once more evoked images of Caesar. For one writer, van der Meer, William's birth following the death of his father led to comparisons with Caesar whose birth brought about the death of his mother William III was one

... die als een Caesar waart
Geboren, na de dood van die u dede leven.

However, there is here no hint of a military tyrant. The poetic Rhine God, contemplating the coming war, assures his listeners of eventual victory, for there is alive a Prince of Orange who 'wist alle dwinghlandij uit mijn gebied te bannen'.

Another writer viewed the appointment of the prince as the prelude to victory over the French. He urged his fellow citizens to deck themselves in orange in honour of the young prince who like a Caesar 'al 't Frans gewelt teniet magh doen'.

Johan van Eyck in his *Den Nederlantsche Prins* published in 1674 the choice of William III as stadholder and captain general in 1672 was 't Herstellen van de dootsieckte vryheyt' of which his ancestors had laid the foundation. For this author the Dutch people in 1672 were, 't Vertoomde Volck, 't welck zich van straffende wetten en gebiedende Overheden wilde ontslaen, wiert door een Vaderlijck gesicht, als van een Caesar tot haare gemeene-plicht aen-gemaent'. For Orangists Caesar and freedom were entirely compatible in the form of William III.

The Orangists were clearly able to contemplate with equanimity a great war hero who combines military expertise with the exercise of political power. Far from seeing such a situation as a prelude to tyranny, the supporters of the House of Orange viewed it

---

86 Lyk-Clok over de Doot van zijn Hoogheyt Willem Frederyck (1650)
87 Knuttel, no. 9955. np.
88 Knuttel, no. 9967. np.
as an essential element in the defence of their freedoms. In a response to the Perpetual Edict the States of Zeeland argued in 1668 that an attempt to separate the functions of stadholder and captain general was 'een reproche ende condemnation van het geene by de voorouders is gedaen'. They dismissed the argument from history that nations suffered as a result of the combination of a political and military head. This was not relevant to the experience of the United Provinces for what caused the downfall of one nation 'is dickmaels een middel voor een andere natie tot haren opganck'. This was clearly the case in the Dutch Republic. It was the military might of the Republic led by the redoubtable Princes of Orange which had held the Spanish tyrant at bay and enabled the emergence of an independent state. In all their actions both political and military, the Orange princes had acted not as tyrants but as agents of divine providence and servants of the people.

We can see this theme clearly in the collection of songs known as the Geuzenliederen. Sung to popular tunes, they were intended to teach both youth and women about the heroic struggle against Spain. Inevitably the role of successive Princes of Orange was an essential theme within these works. Largely written before 1648, this material continued to be supplemented and published during the years without a stadholder. An edition of the Geuzenliedboek was published in 1656 in Amsterdam and another in 1659 in Dordrecht. Two further editions followed in 1661 and 1668. The threat of war with France and the increasing chance of the Prince's promotion to military office may be the reason why two editions saw the light of day in 1671, both published in Amsterdam. Not surprisingly, the onset of war and William III's successes in recovering the country from French control led to new editions of this type of material. 1675 saw the publication of three separate volumes, Prince Liet-Boeck of

---

90 Knuttel. no. 9658. np.
Trompet des Oorlogs, the Trompet des Oorloghs of J. P. Tulp and Nassouse

Trompetje.\textsuperscript{91}

In the Geuzenliederen, the Princes of Orange were bound up with the defence of freedom. This was freedom not just from Spanish domination but from the type of governance which the compliers described as ‘tyranny’, in which liberties, privileges and the freedom to worship God in the manner of the Reformed are trodden underfoot.

William I appeals to God,

\begin{verbatim}
Myn Schild ende vertrouwen / 
Zijt gy, o Godt myn Heer / 
Op U zo wil ik bouwen / 
Verlaat mijn nimmermeer./ 
Dat ik dog vroom mag blyven / 
U Dienaar t'aller-stond / 
De Tyranny verdryven / 
Die mijn Herte door-wond.
\end{verbatim}

William’s son Frederick Henry treads the same path.

\begin{verbatim}
Voor de Vryheyd en Godts Woord, 
Voor de rust der Vroomen, 
Sta ik als een vaste Poort, 
Niemand heeft te schroonen.
\end{verbatim}

Not only were the Princes of Orange the protectors and defenders of all that was dear to many in the Republic but sailors and soldiers fought in their name. On one occasion Dutch mariners were exhorted with the words,

\begin{verbatim}
ontwaakt mijn Batavieren koen / 
Die strijden met Oranjen groen / 
Voor’t Vaderland getrouwe / 
Die wagen ‘t lijf Avond en Noen 
Voor ‘t Huys al van Nassouwe.
\end{verbatim}

This model was applied even when there was no Prince of Orange as stadholder and captain general. A victory song commemorating the battle of Santvoort in 1653 hymned the valour of Tromp.

Voor 't Vaderland heeft hy gestreen / Spanjen eertends doen beven; Voor 't Huys Nassou / en voor 't Gemeen / Oranjen deed' hy streven.

This identification of the Princes of Orange with the fortunes of the state is carried forward into the future. In a song commemorating one of the innumerable conquests of the Orange princes, a chorus of grateful citizens sing

Wy zullen gaan uyt galmen / Ontzaggelijke Vorst / Met lof-zang en Psalmen / En u verheven Borst / Zijn Daden eeuwig prijzen / Dank bewijzen. En Godes gunst af smecken / Dat 't Vorstelijke Zaad / Ons nimmer mag gebreken / Tot voordeel van ons Staat.\(^2\)

Sentiments such as these, read and sung by those who might not resort to the conventional history book, could only inculcate the sense that not all would be well with the Republic in matters of war or politics unless there were a Prince of Orange at the helm. Fragmentary incidents bear witness to this. Sir George Downing writing from the Hague to Lord Chancellor Clarendon on 9 June 1665, at the time of the second Anglo-Dutch war, told of one Captain Terslong, the commander of the ship Gonda, who was approached by his seamen and soldiers who insisted that 'unless he would putt out

---

ye Princes flag they would not fight a stroke’. Terslong appears to have conceded their
demand. This was not a lone incident. In the same letter Downing reported, ‘Wednesday
last, ye drums beating in Leyden for more men in the name of ye States General, the
women got about ye drums and cut them in pieces crying out ‘Ye Devill take ye States;
- beat some for ye Prince of Orange.’ On 16th May 1666 William III appeared before
the fleet in the company of his uncle Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg.
William came aboard the vessels Zeven Provincien, Eendracht and Hollandia to be
greeted by shouts of ‘vive le Prince’ accompanied by a salvo of shots. This incident
demonstrating the seemingly indestructible bond which existed between the Princes of
Orange and the nation’s fighting seamen and soldiers was selected by Romeyn de
Hooghe for inclusion in his print of 1672 entitled Orangien Wonderspiegel which
depicted iconic scenes from the youth and childhood of William III.

This sense that the Princes of Orange in their dual role as stadholders and captains
general were essential to the freedom and well being of the state finds voice when
William III was appointed as captain general in 1672. The poet Pieter Verhoek
celebrated this long awaited occasion and the hopes which it engendered.

Die lang verwachte stont is eindelijk geboren,
De staf van’t krygsbewint, Oranjes Vorst beschoren,
Hem opgedragen door de maghten van den Staet:
[...]
’s Lands wellust neemt begin. De Lantzaet door deez’ maeren
In ’t hart verheugt, grypt moet, laet drove zorgen varen.
Geen Zee gaet hem te hoog, nu de eendracht is herstellt.

94 Prud’homme van Reine, pp. 252-253.
95 Muller, no. 2304.
In Orangist rhetoric the struggle against France in 1672 mirrored the war against Spain of the previous century. For the poet Vollenhove it was an occasion for his fellow citizens to reflect on the services of the former princes of Orange.

Nu heugt al 't lant, hoe WILLEM ons den hoet
Der vryheit weer opzette.

The martial deeds of Maurice and Frederick Henry were recalled in their turn. Victory was assured with William III at the head of the nation's forces.

D'Oranje telgh, ter goeden uur gesproten
Uit zulk een stam, dien heldenstam, belooft
Trompf en heil, als opperste oorlogshoofdt,
[...]
Geen trommel werft het krihsvolk zoo gezwint,
Gelijk de naam van't heldenrijk Oranje.

A pamphlet of the same year compared the state of the nation in 1672 with the sufferings under the depredations of Alba during the previous century. In a world of plundering, burning and summary execution it was the first William of Orange who rescued the ship of state. 'Hier komt dan den Hooghloffelijcke Prins Willem van Orangien, die dit...Schip vint drijven, ja hy heeft terstont een Pomp doen maken om het Schip boven te houden.' Now the ship is once more in distress, its mast down and its sails in shreds but the young prince William III is determined to restore its fortunes and sail it once again as his forefathers did. A pamphlet of 1673 published for 'de liefhebbers vande Vryheydt' urged the nation to reject peace and fight to the last man. The anonymous writer drew upon the history of the siege of Leiden during the Revolt and the burgomaster Pieter Adriaenszoon van der Werve who when the citizens wished

---

97 Knuttel. no. 9968. np.
98 Knuttel. no. 10244. np.
to capitulate to the Spanish offered his own body to assuage their hunger. Sacrifice was required for then as now it was a struggle of freedom against tyranny and William III had taken up the mantle of William I.\(^99\)

Yet Orangist rhetoric was not to carry all before it. On 20 April 1675 the States General declared that the position of captain and admiral General was henceforth hereditary.\(^100\) With war continuing, we encounter once more those fears that whoever controlled the army, controlled the state. The Caesar of the States Party, the threat to the sovereignty of the provinces and their privileges once more raises his head. In a pamphlet of 1675 allegedly published in Antwerp, the author claimed that William III intended to use Tromp and the fleet against the States for he aimed to make himself sovereign and tyrant. To that end, he had placed his Governors, who were no more than his creatures, in all the frontier towns.\(^101\) Another writer of the same year warned the magistrates of the Republic that the Prince of Orange as stadholder and war leader was intent on becoming a tyrant with the support of the nobility and the soldiery.\(^102\) In another pamphlet of 1675 the rhetoric has strong echoes of the language of the supporters of John de Witt. The author alleged that William III intended to concentrate all authority within his hands. To that end he would deploy the soldiery particularly the foreign troops who owed allegiance to him alone. The nation was ruinously taxed in order to support the English troops and this was a deliberate tactic intended to weaken the nation so that the stadholder, the servant of the Republic 'could play the master'. Both Venice and the Swiss cantons, those time-honoured examples, managed their affairs without a single head who had control of the military. It was essential to curb the

---

\(^99\) Knuttel, no. 10939, p. 5
\(^100\) Japikse, i, 347.
\(^101\) Knuttel, no. 11334, pp. 1-3.
\(^102\) Knuttel, no. 11335, np.
designs of the Prince of Orange and the first step in this process must be a policy of peace with the neighbours and erstwhile enemies of the Republic.\textsuperscript{103}

Conclusion

The Orangist message was one of bellicosity. Its source lay in the rhetoric which had marked the years of the Truce, subsequent negotiations for the cessation of hostilities and the negotiations surrounding the Treaty of Munster. The one exception to this rule occurs during the course of the second Anglo-Dutch war when Orangist rhetoric was strangely muted, though evidence from other sources suggests that Orangist sentiment was running high. War was inevitably linked to the restoration of William III to the offices of his forefathers. Orangists saw nothing to fear in the combination of military and political roles.

Yet there were clearly flaws in the Orangist argument. The demands for the young William III to be appointed captain and admiral general in 1653 with William Frederick of Nassau as his lieutenant owed more to the ambitions of the Frisian stadholder and the desire to sow confusion among the populace than any well considered strategy. As Pieter Geyl has pointed out, during the first Anglo-Dutch war, the Orangists were unable to provide an alternative régime or even an alternative policy.\textsuperscript{104} As opponents did not hesitate to point out, the appointment of a infant of two years to the Republic’s highest military and naval offices could not of itself improve the conduct of the war. Neither the Princess Dowager Amalia von Solms or the Princess Royal Mary Stuart were inclined to tolerate the pretensions of William Frederick and saw his claim to the lieutenancy as a threat to the eventual restoration of William III to the stadholderate in the majority of the provinces. Success under the Princes of Orange was contrasted with the problems encountered by de Witt and his supporters. The imagery projected by the

\textsuperscript{103} Knuttel, no. 11336, pp.1-5.
Orangists was that of disorder, confusion and disunity, a people divided amongst themselves and unable to unite against the foe. It is telling that this language which was deployed in 1653 when internal discord truly threatened, did not see the light of day in the years of the second Anglo-Dutch war.

Above all the language of war was the language of unity, of a time when provinces and stadholder as captain general strove together to defend the privileges and liberty of a free people. A people who were bound together in defence of a single religion, the True Reformed Faith. It is no accident that calls to bellicosity and the advantages of war were so often linked to the fortunes of the Calvinist faith in the Republic. In Orangist rhetoric, peace saw the triumph of Arminianism, the sects and the proliferation of Roman Catholics. In certain strands of Orangist rhetoric war and the public church united the Republic and were a bulwark against the autonomy of the provinces and the civic tolerance of the regent patriciate.
A DEFENDER OF THE TRUE REFORMED RELIGION

On 7 February 1659 the poet and dramatist Jan Zoet was cited before the consistory in Amsterdam. It was alleged in the protocol that 'hy niet en rust, maar zijn dwalingen ende verleydingen van het geestelyck koninckrijk overal soeckt te verspreyden'. Zoet certainly nursed an abiding contem pt for the public church. He had castigated the ministers of the Reformed Church as 'wolven op de ro o f. This was not a lone sally. In his poem ‘Het Groote Vischnet’ Zoet compared the various religious groups in the Republic to different types of fish. The Roman Catholics received the dubious accolade of ‘pike’. The Reformed Church as ‘perch’ was little better served.

De Baarzan, dapper hoog gepreezen,
Wiens scharpe Vinnen elk moet vreezen,
Is ’t Edle nazaad van Kalvijn,
Die Goed, en Kwaad noodzaaklik noemen,
En Ezau, in den Buik, verdoemen,
Wijl God niet kan gebonden zijn.

Zy heerschen Vorst’lik in de Landen.
Zy hebben horde, en scharpe tanden:
En wreeken zig van overlast.
De stroemen moeten voor heur beeven.
Wie zou, aan haar, den prijs niet geeven,
Wijl in ’er hand den Scepter past?

Zoet’s antipathy for the public church was matched by his admiration for more radical voices such as Adam Boreel and Galenus Abrahamszoon. Both Boreel and Galenus belonged to the Collegiant movement. Eschewing sectarian intolerance they hoped to establish a religious movement based on biblical principles but making no

---

1 Rudolf B. Evenhuis. *Ook dit was Amsterdam*. 3 vols (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1965), iii, 202.
pretence of divine authority. The eyes of Galenus were fixed on the millenium when Christ would restore his churches from the decline into which they had fallen. In the interim men and women were to live lives of humility and service to others, acknowledging no binding confession but subject to the power of the Holy Spirit acted out in the individual soul. Yet, however, respectful of the personal qualities of Boreel and Galenus and however sympathetic to their objectives, Zoet depicted himself as a free spirit.

Wat my belangt, il wil my aan geen kap verhangen,
Nog Luiter, nog Kalvijn, nog Menno hoe geleerd,
Hoe hailig met de mond, hoe zeedig in 'er gangen
Na volgen in de daad.

Landlord of his hostelry ‘De zoete Rust’ on the Harlemmerdijk in Amsterdam and consorting in bibulous camaderie with his fellow poets Karel Verlove, Hendrik Bruno and Pieter Rixtel, Zoet occupies at best a somewhat marginal position in the history of letters in the Dutch Republic. Yet in any analysis of Orangist writing Zoet deserves consideration, for this scourge of the public church was an ardent and committed supporter of the House of Orange.

The occasion of the sixth birthday of William III on 14 November 1656 saw Zoet reading a poem dedicated to the Prince in the presence of several nobility and, perhaps less welcome to Zoet, a number of ministers of religion. In 1659 William entered the university of Leiden, an event commemorated by a poem by Zoet and a print to which Zoet provided the attached verse. The princely image was once more celebrated on the first day of 1660 with a poem entitled ‘Op ’t overgeeven van het Prinselijk Zinnebeeld’ and on 14 November 1668 there was further laudatory verse on the occasion of

---

5 ‘De krankke Krankke-Troost’, in Zoet, p. 70.
William's eighteenth birthday. In 1672, the hand of God was seen in the fate of the de Witts and the downfall of their cause. Only once had Zoet's loyalty faltered. In 1650 he had composed a poem celebrating the brothers Bicker, the notable Amsterdam regents who hotly opposed the ambitions of William II. Even in this work Zoet took care to lambast the Reformed divine Jacobus Stermont.

Zoet poses for us a problem. How was it that this proud citizen of Amsterdam, a free thinker in matters religious and a steadfast enemy of the Reformed Church felt able to give such devoted support to the House of Orange. Naked self interest would appear to suggest that he should have pledged his allegiance to the regent elites of Holland who looked the other way when Catholics and Sectaries worshipped freely. The case of Zoet serves to remind us that strong though the links were between the stadholder Princes of Orange and the Reformed Church, they were not all-encompassing. Many Orangist publications were to present the stadholder as the defender of the Reformed faith. Yet Orangist support, particularly in the Holland towns, did not simply stop at the boundaries of the communities of the Reformed.

The religious situation in the Republic was complex. By the terms of the Union of Utrecht, each province was to take care of its own religious settlement without hindrance from any of the others. While in all provinces the Reformed Church had a monopoly of public worship, freedom of conscience was assured. In many of the provinces the majority was overwhelmingly of the Reformed faith as set out at the Synod of Dordrecht in 1619. From the South-West to the North-East of the Republic along the line traced by the military campaigns of 1600-1620, the Reformed Church was closely linked to the political establishment and the whole population was encouraged to take up the Calvinist faith. However, the conquests of the years after
1626 had brought under Dutch control areas to the south and east which had a strong Catholic identity reinforced by the teachings of the Counter-Reformation. Here Catholic worship was difficult to suppress although these newly conquered areas were not permitted to form a sovereign province and Catholics had no part in government. In the cities of Holland and in the province of Utrecht the Reformed Church enjoyed the greatest freedom from political authority. However, it was also in these areas that Catholic reorganisation and missionary activity has taken place. In the Holland town of Gouda it was estimated that in 1612 there were approximately 500 Catholics. By 1622 there were between 3,000 and 4,000 Catholics and by 1656 there were 6,000 Catholics who formed approximately a third of the town’s population. By the middle of the seventeen century it has been estimated that about a third of the population of Holland was Catholic. In effect, the size of the Catholic population was such that the practice of Catholic worship could not be crushed without resorting to the kind of draconian methods which no province or town council in the Republic could contemplate. There emerged in some Holland towns a broadly Christian civic culture in which Catholics and sectaries practised their religion with relative impunity. While office holders in the provincial government and towns were usually nominally members of the Reformed Church, the interests of civic harmony and the encouragement of commerce were placed before those of the proscription of public worship.¹¹

Meanwhile, generations of Calvinists had attempted to buttress and extend the authority of the public church and they had turned to the stadholders as their natural supporters. They envisaged that both institutions, the church and the stadholderate, had an interest in reinforcing the supra-provincial unifying link provided by the Calvinist faith. The crisis of 1617-1619 when the stadholder Maurice had thrown his weight

behind the Counter Remonstrants and against the Arminian model of a church based within provincial boundaries had served to emphasise the connection. Frederick Henry’s flirtation with more Remonstrant elements had not ultimately threatened the alliance of stadholder and public church. William II, in spite of personal licentiousness, had been a model supporter of the Reformed ministry.

The actions and policies of William I were interpreted by many writers in the light of his commitment to the Reformed faith. A pamphlet writer of 1632 assured his readers that William’s policy throughout had not been prompted by self interest ‘maer alleen uyt Godtsdienstigheydt ende vierighen yver tot de ware Gereformeerde Religie.’ The poet Samuel Coster commissioned to laud the Princes of Orange in the celebrations to mark the treaty of Munster depicted Prince Maurice as a latter day Numa Pompilius in his high minded defence of the interest of the national church. In the same year the poet Jan Six van Chandelier praised the recently deceased Frederick Henry as the symbol of a state in which

De hengselen, van Godtsdienst, eendracht, recht
En vryicheit, zyn breekelos gehecht.

In a drama of 1649 commissioned to celebrate the visit of the stadholder William II to the Zeeland town of Flushing, the author in a flood of hyperbole argued that the Princes of Orange, were more worthy of commendation than the heroes of classical Rome for while the latter were motivated by the desire to extend the boundaries of the Empire, the heroes of the House of Nassau fought for ‘het lieve Vaderlandt… Loffelicke Wetten, en insonderheyt voor den waerachtigen, zuyveren, en gereformeerden Godsdienst.’

---

12 Knuttel, no. 4265, np.
13 Jacob Bax, Prins Maurits in de volksmenging der 16e en 17e eeuw (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1940), p. 64.
The events of the period 1640-1650 brought together the interests of the public church and the stadholder. Historians have emphasised the connection in the eyes of contemporaries between the conclusion of hostilities and the weakening of the position of the public church.\(^\text{16}\) Not only was the Peace of Munster a recognition that the Calvinists in the North would not be able to free their brothers in the South from the Spanish yoke but also the movement for peace had originated in those regent circles which viewed the relations of church and state in erastian terms. From 1640 we encounter an increasing emphasis on the dangers facing the national church. Among the circles of the Reformed, there was mounting concern at the threat allegedly posed by the Roman Catholic minority. This anxiety had several foci. On the one hand, there was an attitude akin to desperation at the missionary activities of Roman Catholic priests in the very heart of the Republic. Images of collapse and ruin marked the beginnings of a pamphlet of 1644; foundations were undermined, pillars subsided, wealth was turned to poverty, freedom to slavery, while foxes ravaged the vineyard. All this was the result of the missionary efforts of priests, Jesuits and Kloppen who marauded throughout the towns and villages of the Republic. The author calculated that the numbers of ministers, deacons and elders of the Reformed Church in total amounted to less than half the numbers of Roman priests and their female assistants. In some towns, there were as many as sixteen priests to one Reformed minister.\(^\text{17}\)

The author of 1644 blamed this desperate state of affairs on a hierarchy of magistrates and officials who did not hold the interests of the true Reformed faith to their hearts but whose conduct was governed only by the needs of commerce and prosperity. He warned that God would not tolerate idolatry and neither should the stadholder whose role was to defend and maintain the true faith.\(^\text{18}\) A writer of 1648 reaffirmed this predicament and urged that a new Union should be concluded in which


\(^{17}\) Knuttel, no. 5136, np.

\(^{18}\) Knuttel, no. 5136, np.
the dominant position of the Calvinist church should be reaffirmed and the placards against the papists implemented with alacrity and severity. Neither writer expressed any hope of winning over the dilatory town magistrates and local officials to this cause. The stadholderate was the only institution capable of counter-balancing this dangerous license, if necessary by replacing the present incumbents with those more enthusiastic for the Reformed Church.

Dutch Calvinists also emphasised the international context. The after shocks of the massacre of protestants in Ireland and the prosecution of Puritan ministers in England highlighted fears of a Catholic rebellion in the United Provinces. In a fictional dialogue of 1642 between an Englishman and a Dutchman, the former warned that the civil discord and strife might also disfigure the Republic ‘want met sulcken vryheydt aen de Papisten te geven, stelt ghy de zielen van u Ingesetenen, ja de heele kerck en het lant in een waechschale’. The Dutchman acknowledged that when the Spanish had invaded the Veluwe in 1629, the local Catholics had come out of the woodwork and welcomed the incomers. He laid the blame at the door of the local regents. In his view

so lange vele burgers zijn, zijn zij Liefhebbers van de Religie en van de Vryheydt; Maer alsse op het Stadt-huys raecken dan siense stracx hoe de wind Wapt, en laten haer van eenighe Groote die de Meester maken in alle Collegien verleyden, beginnen vyanden vande Kercke te worden...  

Another source of concern were the large numbers of Catholics resident in the Generality lands, particularly as they were resistant to the missionary efforts of the Calvinist ministry. Indeed it was asserted that Catholic priests were working to convert the small communities of the Reformed, including those in public office, in these areas. This situation was aggravated by the Republic’s acquisition of the area known as the Meierij as a result of the peace with Spain. Sited in the region around ’s

---

19 Knuttel. no. 5720, np.
20 Knuttel. no. 4869, np.
21 Knuttel. no. 5140, np.
Hertogenbosch, the locality was firmly Catholic. Spain had tried to surrender only 'temporal sovereignty' over the Meierij in order to safeguard the religious institutions, their lands and revenues. The Holland regents appeared minded to acquiesce in this arrangement but were dissuaded by the outcry from certain of the other provinces and the national church. Thus once peace had been ratified, there followed a rapid process of confiscation of Catholic churches and religious houses and a battalion of Reformed ministers was dispatched to win over souls. Not all went well. The ending of the fighting enabled many Catholic priests to return to their flocks and stiffen their resolve. They proved obdurate in spite of a battery of measures designed to break down their resistance. While the States of Holland worried about the negative effects of religious coercion on relations with Spain, the stadholder William II led the 'reformation' of those parts of the area controlled by the House of Orange, drawing accolades from many members of the Reformed ministry.22 There was a clear alliance of interest between the stadholderate and the public church.

The issue of religion in the Meierij became a focal point in political polemic both during the stadholderate of William II and after his death. Ministers of the Reformed faith and their supporters alleged that the interests of religion and hence the bonds that held together the Union were being put at risk by a regent class which sought only to secure peace and placate Spain. In a pamphlet of 1647 a fictional Lourens mocked the delegates at Munster who were so desirous of peace that they would permit all manner of religious liberties in the Meierij and the Barony of Breda.23 Another writer of the same year lamented the disregard shown for the interests of the Reformed. Religion was, he emphasised, 'den bant van alles'. Not only did the Calvinist faith provide an essential bond between the seven sovereign provinces, it was also, he asserted, the very

---

22 Israel. *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 598-601
23 Knuttel, no. 5510. np.
source of the Republic’s prosperity. In 1650 the detention on account of their protestant faith of a number of the retainers of the Prince of Orange in the catholic Duchy of Luxembourg was contrasted with the flagrant papist practices countenanced in the Meierij. In a pamphlet of the same year, attributed to the Reformed minister Wittewrongel, the regents were lambasted for their failure to support the Calvinist ministers in the region. In the following year the consistory of Utrecht published a Remonstrance to the States of Utrecht in which they asserted that the King of Spain was using the papists in the Meierij to undermine the very fabric of the Republic. The regents were urged to ensure that all those appointed to any position of authority were members of the national church. Furthermore, they should follow the example of their forefathers.

Onse eerste Regenten hebben de gereformeerde religie wel weten te achten en te mainteneren, ooc om datse sagen, dat het geluck en overvloet val alles van wegen dese arcke Godes haer qua toe vloeye; en dat God almachtich dese landen tot eenen so hooge top van Vryheyt, mogentheyd en onsgahelijcheyt tot een verwonder vande gantsche werelt hadde verheven; om datse zijn woort en kercke geheberght,ghevoedt en beschermt hadde.

There was a crisis of confidence between voluble sections of the national church and the regents of Holland and their supporters. The regents of Amsterdam, particularly the powerful Bicker family, were accused of neglecting the interests of the West India Company. The promotion of the West India Company was seen as a national expression of the Reformed faith and those in Zeeland most dependent on the employment provided by the Company were among the mostly strongly Calvinist in the United Provinces. Ministers of the Reformed Church had been amongst those who had urged investment in the Company and the Company was seen as a vehicle for their interests.

---

24 Knuttel, no. 5519, np.
25 Knuttel, no. 6920, np
26 Knuttel, no. 9756, p.5v
27 Knuttel, no. 7075, pp. 4-6.
In a satire of 1649 a burgomaster of Amsterdam described the defenders of the West India Company as ‘een hoop kerckuylen’. Yet for others the West India Company was a national institution which emphasised the key position of the Reformed faith in the determination of the nation’s strategy both at home and overseas. For one writer of 1647, urging resistance to the sirens of peace, the Company was ‘un des second bras de l’État’. Another writer in the same year went further and asserted that the Company was ‘den principale stutte van desen Staet’. Yet a third alleged that the Company’s very existence was under threat from those friends of Spain who favoured the Jews and Portuguese in Brazil. To accusations of self interest and disregard of a national institution was added more than a hint of treachery. In all of these works the peace settlement was seen as part of a demonic strategy in which ‘Arminians’ and Papists would join forces to destroy the national church and with it the Republic’s very existence.

In the light of these fears, it was inevitable that many leading lights of the Reformed Church would draw closer to a stadholder who sought to exercise his authority at the expense of the regents of the province of Holland and the city of Amsterdam. During 1650 when relations between the stadholder and the leaders of the province of Holland reached their nadir, ministers of the national church went into print to deplore the Peace of Munster, defend the Union and lambast those ‘Arminian’ regents who placed their own interests above the country’s good. Although these pamphlets, like most others, were issued anonymously, hostile pamphleteers, in one case an Arminian minister, made certain that the public was informed of their authorship. The prominent Reformed minister Goethals of Delft who had presided at the death beds of both Frederick Henry and William II, was revealed as the author of the

28 Knuttel. no. 6469, np.
29 Knuttel. no. 5512, p.20
30 Knuttel. no. 5522, np.
31 Knuttel. no. 5519, np.
tract entitled *Den Amsterdamschen Ommeganck, ofte Onderrechtinge over het* verzekeren der Hollandsche Heeren. Jacobus Stermont, ever to be a thorn in the side of the regent oligarchy, was alleged to have penned a deeply Orangist eulogy on the death of the Prince of Orange in 1650 published as *Lauweren-Krans Gevlochten voor Syn Hoocheyt Wilhelm de Heer Prince van Oranjen*. The evocatively titled *Na-Ween van de Vrede* was ascribed to the Calvinist minister Wittewrongel. The Zeeland minister Maximillian Teellinck was known to be the author of *Vrymoedige Aenspraek*, a work which was no less than a paean to the Prince of Orange. He was an example, it was said, of those who governed not by the maxims of Machiavelli but by the rules of Christ. 32

The unexpected death of William II left these sections of the Reformed Church bereft. Now there was no-one to act as a counter-weight to the erastian and tolerant regency which predominated in many of the Holland towns. Ministers like Teellinck and Wittewrongel who campaigned for a ‘Further Reformation’ of morals and manners were heavily dependent on the support of local magistrates to enforce sabbath observance as well as laws against drunkenness and the institution of the theatre. With the death of the stadholder who had a role in the selection of magistrates, the national church was left at the mercy of its enemies. It is therefore no surprise that many ministers of the Reformed Church were fervent Orangists and contributed to the publication of works which urged the restoration of the stadholderate. The opponents of the stadholderate were quick to assign the ministers a key role in Orangist propaganda. A supporter of de Witt alleged that the preachers were ardent supporters of the late Prince of Orange and ‘*zijn werk prezen en hem bij monde en geschriften verdedigen en alle zijne mishandelingen en quade feiten goed keuren*.’33 Certainly some key works were imputed to them. The Orangist response to de Witt’s *Deductie* of 1654, a work entitled *Bedencking op de Deductie* was described pejoratively in a hostile pamphlet as

32 For the identity of the authors see Knuttel. no. 7301, pp. 5.10 and Knuttel. no. 7039, pp. 8-9.
33 Knuttel no. 8919, p.35
a book which ‘niemand als een Predikant uyt de herssenen gedroopen is’. A particularly vituperative attack on de Witt and his supporters along with their alleged forefather Oldenbarnevelt launched in 1663 under the title *de Verresenen Barnevelt* was said by the author of a counter-blast to be the work of none other than the Utrecht divine Gisbertus Voetius. However a pamphlet of the same year dedicated to the ‘lovers of truth’ argued forcefully that Voetius was not the author and moreover the Utrecht professor had no idea of the identity of the writer. The matter remains unresolved but it is significant that the enemies of the House of Orange saw fit to impute these publications to ministers of the national church. Two other works which contributed to the rhetorical battle of 1663, *Bedunckelicken Brief* and its successor ‘*t Vervolgh* were deemed by a hostile writer to be the work of a ‘Domine Pastor na de Friesche Rhetorica van desem tijd’. The contribution of the Reformed ministry to the murderous rhetoric of 1672 is discussed elsewhere but here again contemporaries were eager to emphasise the role played by the preachers in inciting the people against the de Witts and their supporters.

However, it is worth remembering that political pamphlets written by ministers of the national church formed only the tip of a very large iceberg. It was reported of the Reformed minister and ardent Orangist Jacobus Stermont that he declared a sermon in favour of the Prince to be worth more than a hundred ‘blue books’. Seditious preaching was a frequent cause of comment and complaint throughout the years 1650-1672. In a letter of 1652 John de Witt noted that a nobleman had been sent to Dordrecht to stir up the preachers on behalf of the Prince of Orange and his inclusion in Public

---

34 Knuttel no 7596.p.21
35 Knuttel no. 8801, *Den Schotschen Duvel. Betabbert in den Verresenen Barnevelt... Uyt de gemeene Lessen en Legenden van Gisbertus Voetius*. This attribution was reinforced by a work of the following year in which the offending text was described as emanating from the pen of the eminent professor of theology, Voetius. (Knuttel, no. 8927, np.) However, the biographer of Voetius has queried this attribution. Arnoldus C. Duker, *Gisbertus Voetius*. 4 vols, (Leiden: Brill, 1897-1915). iii, cx; iv. 169.
36 Knuttel, no. 8925, p. 6
37 Knuttel, no. 8801, p. 4
38 Knuttel. no. 8799, pp. 5-6.
Prayer. Scurrilous verse of 1653 attacked the rabble-rousing activities of some ministers in Zeeland of whom the author alleged

Oproer stoken toorn'en haet,
Bassen tegen staf en staet.40

In August 1654 with Seclusion being hotly debated, a correspondent of de Witt from Alkmaar reported that the Frisian stadholder William Frederick of Nassau was meeting surreptitiously in the Noorderkwartier with ministers of the Reformed Church including Eleazor Lotius of the Hague and Goethals.41 It was suggested that they were plotting against Seclusion and the government of the day.

These activities drew attention beyond the frontiers of the Republic. In July 1653 it was related to Secretary Thurloe in England that magistrates in Amsterdam had banned four ministers for publicly praying for the Prince of Orange. Clearly the ministers were not permanently discouraged for a letter from the Hague in January 1655 informed Thurloe that preachers were still working on the people on behalf of the Prince of Orange.42 Correspondence between the French Ambassador and his government in Paris supports the observations of Thurloe’s correspondent. The ambassador assured the government in Paris in January 1655 that he intended to work with great application to win over the Reformed ministry to the cause of William III and, coincidentally, of France. However, he soon realised that his efforts were needless for ‘on m’assure que de euxmesmes ils y sont assez portez, et que nostre sollicitation n’a jousteroit rien a leur zèle’.43

However, the interests of certain of the ministers of the Reformed Church and the House of Orange did not always coincide. In the first Anglo-Dutch war, Orangist

39 Brieven van Johan de Witt, i. 36. 20/4/52
40 Knuttel, no. 7466. p. 11.
41 Brieven van Johan de Witt, i. 133-134. 31/8/54
42 Birch, i. 324; ii. 51.
43 Groen van Prinsterer, v. 158. 23/1/55
interests favoured a speedy and effective prosecution of the war against the regicides, for with the restoration of Charles II the prospects for William III would improve. However, as political pamphlets of the time make clear, many ministers of the Reformed church felt considerable sympathy for the Republican government in England which was made up in part by their co-religionists. A pamphlet of 1652 played on the existence of these sympathies when its unnamed author declared that hostilities between the two countries would shame the honour of God and offend so many consciences who would be forced to leave the country rather than fight in such an unnatural war. A writer of the same year urged the Dutch to forgive and forget former English incursions on their commerce for ‘t ware beter... dat wy onse Machten conjungeerden en de Religie sochten te maintaineren, waerse is, tegen alle hare Vijanden’. A fictional merchant in a pamphlet of 1652 exclaimed that the eyes of many in the Republic were blinded by the arguments of a common faith in favour of an understanding with England and warned his readers that the Parliament of England explained away many of its atrocities in the name of religion. Neeltje, a fictional housewife, related that she had heard some ministers pray for ‘our brothers in Parliament’. Her husband had left the church in a fury and there had been angry words between them afterwards. Trijnte her neighbour related a similar experience when she has been present in the Nieuwe Kerk in Amsterdam when minister Wittewrongel had appealed for alms for the poor brethren in England. A pamphlet in support of the government drew attention to the links between Voetius and the English and Scots Presbyterians describing them as ‘zyn broeders in de Heere, zyn geloofs-genoten’. Even so, ministers of religion did not adopt a uniform approach to the issue. In a pamphlet widely attributed to the minister Jacobus Stermont,  

---

44 Knuttel. no. 7204, np.  
45 Knuttel, no. 7206, np.  
46 Knuttel, no. 7209, p. 7.  
47 Knuttel, no. 7233, np.  
48 Knuttel, no. 7256, p. 34.
it was argued that there must be a speedy prosecution of the war against the English
whose government persecuted Presbyterians and tolerated schismatics. 49

In general however we can say that there was an alliance of interest between the
Prince of Orange and certain elements of the Reformed ministry. The Orangists needed
the support which a preaching ministry could provide but it could not be in their
interests to be too closely aligned with the public church and its ministers. As one
historian has remarked the stadholders were always willing to deploy the sacral .
component of their role as defenders of the Reformed faith but they used their link with
the public church as a tactical instrument. 50 It is difficult to go quite as far as one
authority who has argued that the Orangists conducted their battle on a purely political
terrain and handled church questions without a great deal of enthusiasm. 51 Yet it is
undeniable that the bulk of the defence of the stadholderate was conducted in political
terms. The ministers on the other hand usually supported the interests of the Prince of
Orange for there was nowhere else where they could find support for their programme
of a national church buttressed by a magistracy which was prepared to be guided by
their principles without interference in their practice.

Set against this is the view of religion in the Republic set out by John de Witt and
his supporters and this must be considered for it is against this view that the Orangists
would seek to define the role of the would-be stadholder. In 1651 a print was issued to
celebrate the Great Assembly of the seven provinces. Its theme not unnaturally was
unity. At the centre of the image was an altar on which was sculpted the figure of
‘caritas’ or ‘liefde’ representing the affection which bound together the sovereign
provinces as well as the sacrifices which had been undergone in the struggle for the
freedom of the Republic. On the altar lay the seven arrows bound together and before the

49 Knutel. no. 7257. p. 3-4.
50 Olaf Morke. ‘Stadtholder’oder ‘Staetholder’. p. 81
51 Pieter Geyl. ‘Het stadhouderschap in de partij-literatuur onder De Witt’. Penestrijd over Staat en
Historie (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1971), pp. 3-71 (p.50)
altar were placed the shields of the provinces bearing again the image of self sacrificing love. In the foreground of the image a lion with a sword lay down with the lamb who bore the cap of freedom on a spear. Below them was crushed the figures of Discord and Strife. These figures stood not only for the recently concluded peace with Spain but also for the spirit of unity upheld by the Assembly against the forces of strife represented by the stadholder William II. Behind the altar two identical male figures in breastplates and plumed helmets embraced accompanied by eight female figures representing the seven provinces and Zutphen. The whole thrust of the image is that which binds and unites in love. Yet in spite of the fact that the Assembly had reiterated its support for the national church and its doctrines as promulgated at the Synod of Dordrecht, the print contains no image representing religion as a force for unity within the Republic.

Supporters of the party of Holland and its policies accused the former stadholders of exploiting religious issues for political motives. The death of William II was commemorated by a medal commissioned by those hostile to the stadholder in which, in the foreground there was a leaping riderless horse, representing the dead stadholder and in the background the sun of hope rising from the sea. Beneath the horse’s saddle cloth could be seen a sealed book bearing the words ‘Unio Religionis’ and below ‘SIMULANT’.52 Verses from Vondel on the occasion of the medal made clear the theme of the imagery.

Wie Enigheid en Godsdiest mint,
Zie dat geen dekkleed hem verblind’
Door schonen schijn en veinzerijen;53

Stadholders both past and present had claimed that unity of religion was essential to the maintenance of the Union of Utrecht but, Vondel implied, in deploying such language they had merely been serving their own interests.

52 Bizot, p. 201
In contrast the bulk of the polemic literature in support of the States Party placed a firm emphasis on religious toleration. In a pamphlet published in 1650 after the death of the stadholder William II, the author defined a free country as one in which ‘wy elck een in vryheyd stil en gerust laten leven’. That this principle applied to religion is clear for the writer argued that where religious worship was forbidden or persecuted ‘daer en maeckt geen vry landt noch oock geen Christenheyt’. In a pamphlet of 1653 the Remonstrant Joannes Naeranus emphasised that the government was not forcing consciences but rather leaving individuals free to worship in their own fashion. He gave a hearty thanks to God for this latitude. A fictional Amsterdammer, in a pamphlet of 1667 argued vehemently that it was tyrannical to force a man’s conscience and cited the recent placards against Catholics issued in Friesland. His Frisian interlocutor attempted to defend his province’s government. He alleged that they had been forced to it by the ministers of the national church. All wise princes and regents knew that differences in religion ‘niet om ‘t essentiele of gheloove self en is, ‘t welck alleen bestaet in God den Vader en Jesus Christum te belijden’, asserted a writer of 1668 for whom even Papists ‘niet en souden durven excluderen ofte verdoen’. More pragmatically he insisted that the welfare of the seafaring provinces lay in the ‘niet te naeuw inquireren van de Religie’ particularly as there were so many merchants there who were not members of the Reformed faith. The most comprehensive affirmation of religious freedom came in work of the same year. In answer to the taunts of a Zeelander that his province tolerated the public worship of both Socinians and Papists, a fictional Hollander answered,

Holland wil den naam wel hebben en niet eenen Hollander behoeft zich to schamen dat men zeid dat het een Vrije Provincie is, en daar niet alleen alle Christenen Vrijheid geeft, maar zelver de Joden, Persianen en Turken zoo ze hier quamen: Dat is een tak aan onze Kroon. Het is Papen en zulken Volks werk, die haar Religie niet vertrouwen te verdedigen en volgens de

54 Knuttel, no. 6842, pp. 28-29.
55 Knuttel, no. 7469, p. 30
56 Knuttel, no. 9587, pp. 38-40.
57 Knuttel, no. 9661, pp. 18, 20.
The Orangists were able to exploit the arguments of their opponents and appear the natural defenders of the public church and the reformed faith. Much of the polemic which demanded stronger action against public worship of those who were not of the Reformed Church also contained explicitly or implicitly the suggestion that things had been better under a stadholder and could be so again. In a pamphlet of 1653 the author blamed setbacks in the war against England on a government which connived at ‘verachtinghe van den Godsdienst’ and the withdrawal of divine support following the ingratitude shown to the House of Orange.\textsuperscript{59} A publication of the same year noted that after five years of peace with Spain the country was swarming with Jesuits, Kloppen and other undesirables. The author urged rhetorically ‘waar wil (weerde en lieve Patriotten) dese ongebondene Vryheit heenen’. This time of discord and defeat was contrasted with the time of stadholder Maurice who properly understood the wiles of Spain and had defended the national church.\textsuperscript{60}

The diversity celebrated by some sections of the States Party was viewed with more jaundiced eyes by other contemporaries. Writing in 1665 at the onset of the second Anglo-Dutch war, the poet Arnold Moonen prophesied that the wrath of God would chastise the Republic for its latitude in tolerating all manner of heresies. He mourned that the golden age was gone and now one saw

\begin{verbatim}
de Godsdienst, in den slaep der zonden
Gewiegt, belaegt, beloert, geschonden
Van Ketteryen.
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{58} Knuttel, no. 9662. p. 28.
\textsuperscript{59} Knuttel, no. 7462. np
\textsuperscript{60} Knuttel, no. 7451. pp.18-19
He reserved particular venom for what he described as ‘de helse kroonsucht van Socyn’.

Moonen’s ‘golden age’ lay in the not too distant past,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{toen predikstoel en rechtertroon} \\
\text{Elkanderen in ere geleidden} \\
\text{Als broeders, door geen twist gehieden,} \\
\text{En 't lantgezagh aen d'aersche Goon,} \\
\text{Godts stedehouders, bleef bevolen.}^{61}
\end{align*}
\]

For Moonen the presence of the Princes of Orange had been a key element in the maintaining a unity of purpose between the secular authorities and the national church.

With the absence of a stadholder, there had been a descent into discord and a latitude which bordered on anarchy.

In much of this literature there is a sense of a threatened people for whom little stands between them and papist domination. Events abroad could trigger these sentiments. The persecution of the north Italian Waldensians in the dukedom of Savoy caused the poet Jan Six van Chandelier to reflect on the dangers closer to home.

Contemplating their sufferings he warned

\[
\begin{align*}
dit zy een spiegel, voor ons land, \\
Waar soo veel paapensoons verkeeren; \\
Die krygen sy maar d'overhand, \\
Op zullen kam weer zullen scheeren.^{62}
\end{align*}
\]

The Orangists were able to exploit this. The fate of Henry of Navarre who became a Catholic in order to ascend the French throne haunted one writer of 1663. If Papists in the Netherlands were permitted freedom of worship they might become so numerous that they too would force any future leader in the Republic to embrace the church of Rome. Freedom in matters of religion could only be interpreted in the sense of freedom to practise the true Reformed religion. A prince of Orange as stadholder and captain

---

\textsuperscript{61} 'Verbastert Nederlant, of Klaghте over de Bedorve Zeden des Vaderlants', in Arnold Moonen, \textit{Poэzy} (Amsterdam, 1700), pp. 513-514.

\textsuperscript{62} 'Savooische Tyrannye', in Jacobs., i, 712-716, lines 145-148.
general would ensure that the Reformed faith in the Republic was maintained and
defended. Pamphlets of the same year pressed for the enforcement of placards against
Catholic worship whilst urging the promotion of William III to the offices of his
forefathers.

This fear of the papist menace and hatred of the regents who permitted Catholics
and sectaries to worship erupted in violent polemic with the invasion of the French in
1672. The government is seen as having betrayed the Republic and its national church.
In a vituperative satire of 1672 a fictional Socinian hymns the freedom which he and his
fellows enjoy to worship and publish as they please. He proclaims that the Perpetual
Edict of 1667 which abolished the stadholderate in perpetuity in Holland was intended
to institute both political and religious freedom ‘dewyl men altijd gesien heeft dat de
Princen van Orangen haer over beyde Meester ghemaekt hebben’. A print of 1674
designed to celebrate the announcement of a hereditary stadholderate in Holland and
hence the ‘death’ of the Perpetual Edict reiterated this theme. Watching disconsolately
are a flock of masked beasts, sheep without but wolves within. These are the
‘vrygeesten,’ the Socinians and Cartesians whose objective is the confusion of all
religions and the downfall of the national church. A sentence pronounced on the
murdered brothers de Witt by an anonymous author of 1672 accused them of attempting
‘de standt van de Religie te perturberen; de Kercke Gods grootelijcks te beswaren en te
bedroeven’. They had also tried to prevent ministers of the church from praying for the
Prince of Orange. An anonymous author satirised a government which put aside the
claims of religion.

Men sette den Papist oock alle poorten open,

---

63 Knuttel, no. 8806D, pp. 81, 95. 109.
64 Knuttel, no. 8806, pp. 16-17.19; Knuttel, no. 8798, pp. 8-9, 46.
65 Knuttel no 10333, pp. 4.6.
66 Muller, no. 2524; Knuttel, no. 11186, np.
67 Knuttel. no. 10408, p. 3
En weer geen Atheist, om 't geen hy mochte hoopen.
Gelooven, leeren, als hy maar ons voordeel geeft,
En in een goet beroep naer onse wetten leeft.\textsuperscript{68}

Inevitably this was contrasted with the treatment meted out to the Prince of Orange who is now the great patriot and defender of the national church.

In addition de Witt was accused of trying to destroy the Reformed Church by subjecting it to intrusive and harmful political interference and exploiting doctrinal differences. It was alleged that he had forced political commissioners onto consistories and secured the pulpits for theologians and teachers who were his supporters.\textsuperscript{69} The national church was being trampled under foot by the secular authorities claimed one writer of 1672. In Zeeland the churches could not hold a consistory meeting without the permission of the magistrates and political deputies had been appointed to attend all meetings of the church council. The classis of Zeeland had been forbidden from presenting requests directly to the provincial states as had been their wont. Now all matters had to be transmitted through the agency of the Raad Pensionaris. The author was clear in his own mind that the Prince of Orange would put an end to all this and restore harmony between church and state.\textsuperscript{70} In another inflammatory work of the same year, de Witt was accused of following in the steps of Cromwell and seeking to establish a new religion with a new bible, psalm book and confession of faith in which all appointments at every level were made by the State. De Witt would equally follow the example of Cromwell in murdering his opponents and William III would be forced to flee the country.\textsuperscript{71}

De Witt, it was claimed after his death, had prevented any ministers of the Voetsian tendency from preaching in the major towns to the extent that some of the excluded were now turning their coats and drawing more sustenance from Descartes

\textsuperscript{68} Knuttel, no. 10611, np.
\textsuperscript{69} Knuttel, no. 10408, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{70} Knuttel, no. 10264, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{71} Knuttel, no. 10350, np.
than from the Holy Scriptures. To add fuel to the flames de Witt was alleged to own a copy of Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, a work which was currently banned. Yet another author lamented that de Witt would not countenance ministers who were the disciples of 'den noyt volpresene en door de gantse werelt vermaerde Professor G Voetius' preferring to appoint those

die Carthesius meer lasen als den Bibel om soo van een nieuwe Theologie te maken en dan Joden, Mahumetanen, Atheisten, Papisten, Anabaptisten, Mennisten, Labadisten, Socinianen, Arminianen, Lutheranen, Photinianen, Herdrianen en Onderen te Kerke laten gaen.73

In the light of this inflammatory rhetoric it is a considerable anti-climax to encounter the murdered de Witt described merely as 'een seer subtyl Philosoph meest toeghedaen de secte der Cartesianen'.74

The events of 1672 enabled the Prince to be depicted as the defender of fatherland and faith. An address from the churches of Zeeland in 1672 urged upon the new stadholder the maintenance and defence of the true Reformed faith just as his father before him had done. In the eyes of this group, God had brought low the Republic in order that William might show himself to be the saviour of the nation and the protestant religion.75 Some sections of the community certainly saw him in this light. In a print of 1672 a church was located within a fortification surrounded by hostile forces. Within the churchyard was an orange tree on whose stout branches were posed the five Orange stadholders. Thus the link between the Reformed faith and its defenders the princes of Orange is emphasised. The papist whore of Babylon and her supporters the 'witte raserny' both sited beneath the emblem of the fleur de lys have attached a rope to the tower of the church and are attempting to pull it down.76

72 Knuttel, no. 10436, pp. 4-5, 8.
73 Knuttel, no. 10492, np.
74 Knuttel, no. 10434, np.
75 Knuttel, no. 10256, np.
76 Stolk, no. 2495.
William becomes the defender of both the freedom of the Union and the protestant faith. A print of 1673 demonstrates the nature of the enemy. The occasion is a celebration of the feast of the Blessed Sacrament in the captured city of Utrecht. Priests, monks and klopjes process in the company of the bishop bearing the sacrament in an elaborate monstrance beneath a richly ornate canopy. Governor Stoupa, representing the French Tyranny, accompanies the parade and French soldiers line the route to control the crowds and prevent hostile demonstrations. The protestant religion and the liberties of the Netherlanders are being suppressed by an alien military force. The French have their collaborators. The houses of Roman Catholics along the route are decorated with images of angels, crosses and saints accompanied by the arms of the king of France and the motto ‘Vive le Roy’. In contrast to this representation of popery, foreign domination and internal treachery, William is depicted as the symbol of the protestant religion and the Union. In a print of the same year he rides in the chariot of victory. In his hand he carries a shield bearing an image of the seven arrows clasped together. His chariot is driven by ‘Fides’ while by the side of the vehicle walk ‘Pietas’ reading a bible and ‘Libertas’ holding aloft the hat of freedom. Tyranny and idolatry are trampled below the wheels of the chariot and the hooves of the horses. At the bottom of the print are sited the faces of the four former stadholders whose God-given task is continued by their descendant.

In the words of one writer, William III’s rise to authority had defied all expectations.

Hy schijnt als van Godt gegeven te sijn tot een Verlosser over dit sijn Volck en Landt, gebooren, opgevoet, bewaert en bequaem ghemaeckt tot het Lant’s bestier op een wonderlycke wyse boven, ja tegen alle menschelycke hope en verachtinge.

77 Muller. no. 2493: Stolk. no. 2538
78 Stolk. no. 2558.
The language is very similar to that used to describe his great-grandfather William I and this is surely no accident. Just as a ‘black legend’ developed based on Spanish atrocities so now the French are accused of ‘brandende, blakende, moordende sonder onderscheydt van sexe; selfs onnooossele Wieg-kinderen’. They are worse than any heathen or Turk. At such a time all attention is on those forces which bind the nation together and arguably the stadholder fulfils this role to a greater extent than the national church. As contemporary rhetoric depicts William as the defender of liberty against French tyranny and domination, he cannot be seen to be any the less defender of freedom of conscience than his predecessors. There was clearly a need to retain the hearts and minds of the Catholic minority in provinces such as Holland. That there was an anti-Catholic reaction in the Republic during the French invasion is evident. In November 1673 the Calvinists demanded stricter penalties against Catholics and in the summer of the same year an anti-Catholic movement threatened to envelop Rotterdam. William himself appeared ready to oppose this until dissuaded by his advisors. In the prints of the period it is evident that the Reformed faith serves as a rallying point for much of the community but is it any more so than the stadholder himself? In most of the prints of the time, it is William who is the central focus, whether surveying his victorious army or recovering the lost provinces for the Union. Images of the reformed faith do not appear without William but he appears without them.

In much of the polemic described so far the emphasis has been on attacking the States Party rather than defining the role of the Prince of Orange in relation to a Republic which while it had a public church was multi-confessional. Taken purely on the evidence so far it is difficult to imagine how any Arminian, Lutheran, Cartesian or

---

79 Knuttel, no. 10955, pp. 5,12.
80 Japikse, t. 288.
Catholic, let alone a free thinker like Jan Zoet, could lend their support to the cause of the Prince of Orange. Yet the would-be stadholder could never remain simply the tool of a faction, however powerful, of the national church. That is not to say that the Prince of Orange was ungrateful for their support. However, it was vital for Orangists to steer a way between supporting the Reformed faith as an a vital element in the creation of national, as opposed to provincial, sentiment and drawing upon loyalties to the House of Orange which went beyond confessional boundaries. The result of this was that those authors who wrote in support of the Prince of Orange came to consider the issue of religion from different standpoints and did not always share the same conclusions.

A suitable place to examine this development is the view of the religious position expounded in Pieter de la Court’s *Interest van Holland* of 1662 and the varying Orangist responses to it. In a book containing forty-seven chapters, de la Court chose to devote only two chapters to the matter of religion. De la Court was clear that among the many blessings of God, freedom of all religions was the first. It was, he asserted, the mark of true religion that it did not seek to impose itself on others. He was not speaking of mere freedom of conscience. De la Court’s Holland would permit the worship of Catholics and sectaries for such would promote harmony and friendship among neighbours and, he added disingenuously increase ‘de ware Religie’ amongst the people. De la Court’s reasoning behind these propositions was openly pragmatic. People would not stay where they were not free to practise their religion and valuable skills and finance would be lost to the economy of Holland. Moreover, the Dutch had to find their way in a Europe in which those of the Calvinist faith made up less than one in a hundred of the population. Rubbing salt in the wound, he asserted that in Holland scarcely half of the population were of the Reformed faith. Hence, any attempts to
suppress freedom of worship would involve the harassment of sizeable sections of the community.  

The responses to this and other writings of the same year from supporters of the House of Orange show that there was no uniformity of approach. For the author of Bedenckingen Op het Boek Interest van Holland Spain had sought peace the better to undermine the Republic and the only means of defence against such a strategy were a strong army, the elevation of William III to the offices of his forefathers and the maintenance of the true Reformed faith as set out at the Synod of Dordrecht in 1618 and 1619. Any minister, and the writer may well have been one, who did not urge such a course on the government would be failing in his duty to God and his neighbour. He took as his theme the maxim of Socrates that ‘de bewaaringe van de Religie is het welvaren van de Staat’. A common religion was the bond which held society together. The longevity of the Roman Empire was attributed to its refusal to tolerate novelties in religion. Plato had warned against changes in the religion of the state for ‘veranderinge van Religie, veranderinge van Regeeringe bragt’. Religion was ‘de ziel, het harte, en ‘t eedelste deel van de Staat’.

Hence the force of the accusation that the Remonstrants were seeking to introduce novelties ‘en gelijk sommige hebben willen bewijsen , Kerk en Staat poogden t’ ondermijnen’. Here ‘Remonstrants’ refers not only to a particular religious persuasion but to all those who would place the public church under the control of the local magistrate. The writer cites one work by an Remonstrant Jacobus Taurinus entitled Onderlinge Verdraagsamheit in which the author is alleged to have written that ‘de Gereformeerde Leere erger is dan de Turkse, en der Saracense Leere, en datse over een komt met Mahhomet in sijnen Alcoran’. This provided testimony that the hatred expressed by Arminians for the Reformed Church would provoke fraction and discord.

---

81 Knuttel, no. 8652, pp. 35-37,42-43.
within the Republic. Yet the Orangist writer pointed out that Oldenbarnevelt himself had argued that only one public church should be authorised. The Remonstrants demanded freedom of worship for themselves while seeking to clip the wings of the national church.

As for the Papists, where they were in control, there was no freedom of conscience. ‘Haare Tollerantie aan de Gereformeerden is yder bekent.’ In contrast in some Holland towns thirty, forty, even fifty various places of Catholic worship could be found. To all intents and purposes there was freedom of worship in some parts of the province. The author drew on Lipsius to explain his concerns about this development. It was essential that the authorities both local and provincial upheld the supremacy of the national church for to quote Lipsius,

die geene die in de Goddelijke zaken iets nieuws in bringen, haatse en bedwingste, niet alleen om Gods wille, maar om dat dese alzuke nieuwe Goden inbringende, veel menschen dryven tot veranderingen van zaaken. Waar uyt dat komen ‘t samensprekingen, oproeren en heymelijke vergaderingen, zaaken voor waat die een Staat geensins nut zijn.82

The pamphlet Haeghs Hof Praetje was suspected to be the work of Henricus Bornius,83 an academic who had been charged with the education of the young William III. Like his friend the poet Arnold Moonen, he saw the re-establishment of the stadholderate as essential to the maintenance of the national church. This pamphlet launched a much more direct attack on the rhetoric of de la Court but in essence, it replicated the arguments of the previous publication. Fulminating at de la Court’s proposal of freedom of worship for all, the author enquired rhetorically ‘hebben sy noch niet vryheid genoeg’. Such tolerance would enable the Papists to increase their numbers beyond those of the Reformed and this would precede the return of tyranny and the forcing of tender Calvinist consciences. To permit other protestant groups to worship in public

---

82 Bedenkingen Op het Boek Interest van Holland. (1662), pp. 11-12, 25-34.
83 NNBW, III. 147-149
would serve to create a state in which there was no national church but a diversity of faiths which would shatter the unity of the Republic and the province of Holland. Far from supporting commerce as de la Court alleged, freedom of worship would draw down the vengeance of God. De la Court was no more than a ‘verfoeylijcke Atheist’ and if he were to venture into the province of Zeeland, the common people would make sure that he ended up in the town ditch.  

The approach of the author of *De Herstelden Prins* of 1663 is more measured and there is a clear difference of emphasis from the previous two publications. The writer asserts that not all would agree that the war against Spain had as its aim freedom of worship. However, he clearly sees some freedom of worship as integral to the ethos of the new state for

niet-te-min is waar, dat onzen Staat van Regeringe niet en zoude konnen lyden, zonder ruine van’t welvaren van dien, dat men dwang van conscientie in dat stuk zoude willen invoeren of doen gebruiken, en de andere haare vrye oeffeninge om God te dienen, benemen.

Clearly, this author is alive to the economic benefits of permitting a diversity of religions and he had no stomach for a Reformed Church in which people find themselves compelled to engage in worship in order to prove themselves loyal citizens of the Republic. If the worship of minorities is prohibited, the result would be

de God-vreezenste en de best hier niet en zouden konnen woonen, en de Kerke vol van een hoop geveinsde huichelaars gepropt worden, die in alle Gelegentheid, haare genegentheid zouden toonen.

It was desirable, he wrote, that within the boundaries of a state there should be uniformity of religion since religion promotes unity and harmony among the citizens. However, where diversity exists, groups should be permitted to worship in designated places, for such a policy would prevent persecution and the oppression of a minority.

---

84 Knuttel. no. 8654, pp. 27-31.
The author appears to envisage the development of a form of religious syncretism in which religious groups whose convictions are not so very different from those of their peers find themselves moving towards unity. This development, the writer asserts, is unlikely under an aristocratic regime of many heads but can be encouraged and supported under the leadership of a single stadholder. He rebukes de la Court for not considering that

men door bequame middelen tragte eenige Religien, die zeer wenig verschil hebben, met den anderen te vereenigen, ...daar 't zelve nochtans de Regeringe niet wenig vaster en geruster zoude stellen; maar alzo dit onder een Regeringe van veele ende verscheiden Hoofden niet wel zoude konen te wege gebragt worden; maar vry beter en gemakkelyker door hulpe ende authoriteit van een bemint aangenaam en ansienlyk Stadhouder ende Capiteyn Generaal. 85

This rhetoric is very different from the standard presentation of the stadholder as the defender of the Reformed faith alone. Instead the stadholder, acting as a focus for unity presides over relative latitude of religious worship in which previously hostile and competing groups experience the affinity which proceeds from their shared convictions.

*Den Herstelden Prins* is ascribed in the Knuttel catalogue to Constantijn Huygens. This attribution dates back no earlier than 1749 when in a work of that year H. W. van Welbergen described the pamphlet as a work of Huygens, though he omitted the forename. Huygen's most recent biographer in reviewing the evidence has pointed out that Huygens had no previous record as a pamphlet writer and stylistically the prose bears no relation to any of his written works. At the time of publication, Huygens was deeply involved in matters concerning the principality of Orange.86 Thus he is unlikely to be the author. However the religious position outlined in the pamphlet has long attracted attention with one authority commenting that it appeared more in agreement

---

85 Knuttel. no. 8806A. pp. 15-17
with the ideals of Grotius than the doctrine of the Synod of Dordrecht.\textsuperscript{87} Certainly Grotius in his treatise \textit{Meletius} (1641) had argued for a public church which should be sufficiently comprehensive to include most mainstream Christians. He had refused to institutionalise any form of dissent. This stance was characteristic of Grotius's juridical approach. For him the purpose of the state was to enable the citizen to live a pious, industrious and tranquil life and in its function the state transcended the church.\textsuperscript{88}

The issue had surfaced again in the early 1660's. 1662 saw the publication of \textit{Het Licht op de Kandelaar} presumed to be the work of the Collegist Pieter Balling. The author sought for a philosophically based minimal creed which could replace the numerous Christian factions. Balling belonged to Spinoza's circle and it was another member of this group Franciscus van den Enden who in 1665 published \textit{Vrije Politijke Stellingen}. Van den Enden was concerned at the proliferation of sects and argued that it should be possible to create an inclusive Chrisitianity reduced to its basic principles. This development, he argued, would reduce and ultimately destroy the various sects which flourished in the Republic.\textsuperscript{89} It is tempting to link the anonymous author of \textit{Den Herstelden Prins} to this particular circle. Tantalisingly he does not develop his argument. However, we are probably justified in saying that he did not belong to the same religious strand as Voetius and Wittewrongel.

A different perspective was highlighted by the author of \textit{Ware Interest van Holland} published in 1662. The author entirely refuted de la Court's criticism of the stadtholderate. A body needed a head to promote harmony and unity and history bore witness to the freedom and prosperity achieved under both the counts and the Princes of Orange. For this writer there were two pillars of state, peace and commerce. In

\textsuperscript{87} Geyl, 'Het stadhouderschap in de partij-literatuur onder De Witt', p.45.
consequence, he would have no truck with those ministers of the Reformed faith who
had condemned the peace of 1648. They must submit to the wiser counsels of those in
government. Our author clearly had little time for those who abused the cause of
religion to advance other less worthy objectives. He drew on the example of Cromwell
in England as an illustration of one who promulgated savage and unwelcome change in
the name of religion. In a glancing blow at the ministry in both England and,
presumably their co-religionists in the Netherlands, he mocked the way in which the
Lord Protector was described as ‘een Moyses, die de kinderen van Israel uit het land
van Egipte leyde’. The reality was, he argued, that the greatest threat to any state lay in
what he described as ‘partyschap’ and he continued that ‘de gevaarlijkste partyschappen
onstaen uit verblinden yver van Godsdienst’. It was his contention that such forms of
faction were much more likely to occur in an ‘aristocratic’ regime than one with a single
head for the latter was more easily able to swiftly ‘damp down’ any threats to the unity
of the state.

Our author was quite clear that, contrary to much polemic emanating from the
ministers of the national church and their supporters, the war against Spain had not been
waged in the interests of the Reformed church. Calvinists had composed a small
minority of the people at the outset of the revolt and, hence, it was inconceivable that
their interests alone had dictated the programme of the rebels. William I, on the
contrary, had favoured religious freedom for both Calvinists and Roman Catholics and
he ‘klaeghde meermalen over de onbehoorlijckheyt van eenige dienaers die de
Roomsche Godsdienst niet konden lijden’. Frederick Henry was also depicted as a
model of moderation and tolerance in religious matters. Had others in positions of
authority followed his policy, the author contended, there was a considerable likelihood
‘dat de Catholijke Godsdienst vry soude gebleven hebben in de Nederlanden, en datse
de Spanjaerts weder na Spanje soude gesonden hebben’. However, the intentions of the
two Princes of Orange had been thwarted. The rebels had required the wealth released by the acquisition of church properties and goods to bankroll their struggle and Spain herself had provided no equivalent model of toleration for protestants. In consequence, religious freedoms granted to citizens began to be curtailed and Roman Catholics were increasingly suspected of collusion with the enemy. Neither of these developments however could be laid at the door of the two stadholders.

De la Court was right, argued this defender of the Orangist cause. It was essential to the economic well being of the Republic that free exercise of their religion was permitted to those of minority faiths. He had heard it said, he alleged, by many merchants from the Southern Netherlands and France that if Spain were to permit protestants to worship freely in its dominions, trade and industry would follow and the grass would soon grow in the streets of the Holland towns. Mindful of this the town regents should permit freedom of worship without any consultation with the ministers of the national church. Hence, he was at one with de la Court in condemning the practice by which Roman Catholics had to bribe local officials to turn a blind eye to their gatherings for worship. He wrote, ik verwonder my ten hoogsten dat de Regeerders, die allen zonder Kapitein Generael moeten regeeren, hier niet op letten, gemerkt na zijn zeggen, dit een schadelijk werk voor den Staet en by gevolgh voor dien koophandel is.90

The frontispiece of this last pamphlet, which was published in both Dutch and French, gave the name of the author as one I.N.D.P. The initials stand for Jean Nicolas de Parival. Parival, born in Verdun in 1605, had moved to Leiden in 1624. Resident in the Republic for most of the remainder of his life, Parival was also to study at the University of Louvain in the Southern Netherlands in the 1660's. It was there, it is believed that this Roman Catholic came under Jansenist influence but he had already

90 Knutell. no. 8635B, pp.13-29
acquired a somewhat maverick reputation. His work *Abrégé de ce Siècle de Fer* had been placed on the papal index in 1660 as the author had insisted that the massacre of St Bartholomews Eve had been a monstrous event, Jan Hus had been injudicially sentenced and that violence against so-called heretics was contrary to the word of God. Parival had already aired his conviction that commercial prosperity in the Republic was dependent on religious toleration in his *Les Délices de Hollande* of 1651.\footnote{Willem Frijhoff, ‘Religious toleration in the United Provinces from ‘case’ to ‘model’, *Calvinism and Religious Toleration in the Dutch Golden Age* ed. by R. P-C. Hsia, Henk van Nierop (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) pp.27-52 (p.28)} He had not ceased to be a worshipping member of the Roman Catholic Church. When he wrote of the perils and ambiguities of Catholic worship in the Republic in his work of 1662, he was reflecting on direct personal experience. In 1659 Parival was alleged to be hosting Roman Catholic meetings in his house in Leiden.\footnote{N.N.B.W. VII. columns 938-940.}

The cases of both Parival and Jan Zoet bear witness to the fact that support for the House of Orange came from many and varied sections of the religious community. As the Orangist response to de la Court illustrates there was no single Orangist view of the religious settlement in the Republic but a variety of opinions which reflected the diversity of support enjoyed by the former stadholders. It was certainly the case that faced with a States Party which emphasised the non-religious elements of the Union, certain of the supporters of the House of Orange were able and willing to play the religious card. Compare the print of 1651 celebrating the Great Assembly which eschewed all images of religion with one of 1663 in which William III rode in an open chariot drawn by two winged horses with the figure of ‘Religio’ guiding the reins.\footnote{Muller, no. 2190.} Issued at the height of the debate on Public Prayer, the would be stadholder poses as the defender of both the Reformed faith and national unity in the face of Holland’s determination to unilaterally alter elements of worship in her province. Yet this image of William III and much of the accompanying rhetoric from ministers of religion and
their supporters does not seem to have deterred the likes of Zoet and Parival from placing their pens at the service of the stadholderate. Orangism, clearly, was not the prisoner of any one religious group.

Even following the traumatic events of 1672, many Orangists deployed a rhetoric which would have disappointed sections of the public church. Petrus Valkenier, writing in 1675, dedicated his work to William III and asserted the desirability of a stadholderate. Yet this Orangist rhetoric shows no signs of the brooding fear and intolerance which marked the writings of many supporters of the House of Orange in the national church. Instead his writings have been viewed by later historians as influenced by secular considerations rather than confessional loyalties.94 Valkenier, like the author of den Herstelden Prins, was convinced that each state should have only one public religion. This he argued was the conclusion of all political commentators of repute other than Machiavellis. Valkenier cited with approval the words of the English ambassador Winwood in 1621 that ‘de Religie is het PALLADIUM van dese Republike’ and he was quite clear that it was the Reformed religion which was the ‘ziele van desen Staat’. It alone among the faiths provided the cement which bound together the seven provinces and it was the foundation stone of the success and prosperity of the Republic. This is standard fare but Valkenier then moved on to more contentious territory. He pointed out to his readers that in Poland all religious groups apart from the Socinians were permitted to worship freely. In France the Edict of Nantes gave the Huguenots considerable privileges in certain areas. These examples were not objects of contempt. On the contrary, there was much there to be admired for ‘een Staat meer kan verryken met het getal der menschen en door deselve met overvloet van schatten als wanneer elk word vergunt Vryheit van Conscientie en Religie’. If Holland had in giving one religion the status of national church, excluded the practice of all

To add insult to injury in the eyes of the national church, Valkenier scrutinised the example of the Turkish Empire and found it good. By permitting other religions, the Turks had attracted wealthy Christians of different nations to say nothing of the Jews driven out of Spain and Portugal. Finally Valkenier warned his readers to be suspicious of any action undertaken 'op 't mom-aansigt van Superstitie en Religie' of which the execution of Charles I of England served as a salutary example.\footnote{Valkenier, pp.6-9}

Conclusion

Traditionally authorities have stressed the link between the House of Orange and the public church. There is much to support this approach. The Princes of Orange had been perceived as the defenders of the Reformed Faith. Stadholder and public church saw themselves as representing national rather than provincial institutions. Both perceived themselves the losers as the result of the Treaty of Munster. Ministers of the Reformed Church wrote pamphlets and preached sermons in favour of the restoration of William III to the stadholderate. Orangist rhetoric attacked the supporters of John de Witt for their perceived laxity in regard to the worship of sects such as the Socinians and the Roman Catholics and castigated them for their hostile approach to the interests of the public church.

Yet Orangism was in no sense the captive of sections of the public church and its ministers. As we have seen, disagreement over policy could and did occur as happened during the first Anglo-Dutch war. Orangist regents as well as those who supported John de Witt had in common a concern to keep the Reformed ministers under control. The Reformed Church provided a platform for, and a prominent articulation of, popular
Orangism rather than creating it. Free thinkers such as Zoet and Catholics such as Parival clearly found in the Prince of Orange a focus which transcended religion. The Reformed faith has been seen as a unifying factor in an otherwise centrifugal Republic and Orangists were willing to pay tribute to its worth. However the person of the Prince of Orange, descendant of stadholders and captain generals, attracted a devotion which eluded even the public church. He alone of all persons and institutions could represent a stance which was above party and faction and truly in the interests of all of the citizens of the Republic.

---

THE ENGLISH CONNECTION

During the course of the seventeenth century almanacs were available not only for the educated elite but increasingly for the literate citizen of moderate means. For the most part factual and descriptive, almanacs also featured predictions for the year ahead. Bouman’s Almanac was no exception. Its edition of 1659 advised its readers to expect significant changes both at home and abroad. ‘Holland vernieuwt de vriendschap met een herstelden Prins waer door het Landt vol vreughden is. Het Huys van Oranjen triumpheert.’

Other signs pointed to an anticipated change in the fortunes of William III. The Prince’s enrolment at the University of Leiden was celebrated by the issuing of a print. The youth was depicted poised before the ‘horse of state’ whose bridle was held by an archetypal figure described significantly as ‘de vlugge Tijd’. Time was clearly on the Prince’s side and the designer of the print was brave enough to hazard when his advancement might be expected to take place. Towards one edge of the print could be seen the traditional Orange motif of a trunk hewn off with a fresh shoot emerging. The image was coupled with the inscription ‘Florescat 1659’. It was a bold guess but events did not run their course entirely as hoped. An unknown hand altered the date to 1660.

The Prince who was to be restored was the English Charles II. It would be the summer of 1660 before he finally came into his own but his elevation had clearly been anticipated by well wishers across the North Sea. As the print of 1659 bears witness, the cause of the Stuart prince was inextricably bound up with the fate of his nephew.

---

2 Stolk, no. 2268.
William III. As brother of the Prince’s mother Mary Stuart, Charles II might be expected to intervene with the rulers of the Republic on behalf of the Prince of Orange. The editor of Bouman’s Almanac of 1659 had expressed the hope, in carefully studied prose, that de Witt would find a solution to the problem of the Prince’s Exclusion from the offices of his forefathers. De Witt and his fellows, faced by the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660, were forced to oblige and the Exclusion was annulled. The States of Zeeland found it timely to request of the States of Holland that William III be designated stadholder and captain general of the two provinces, taking up the role in person on his eighteenth birthday. So the restoration of Charles II as monarch would lead to William III’s designation as stadholder and captain general.

It was in the month of May 1641, in the Palace of Whitehall in London that the fortunes of the House of Orange-Nassau and the House of Stuart were formally linked. A marriage was concluded between Mary, the daughter of Charles I of England and William, the son of the stadholder Frederick Henry. For Charles I this dynastic union could be seen as a mésalliance; hard times in the form of the struggle with parliament led him to seek succour from wheresoever he could. The House of Orange, however highly rated by Dutch patriots, did not in the eyes of the Stuarts rank among the foremost royal families of Europe but it was hoped that Frederick would be able to supply much needed financial assistance to the beleaguered monarch. The House of Orange, for their part, could argue that the marriage was a strategic coup designed to prevent closer relations between Charles I and their enemy Spain. However, whatever the diplomatic consequences for the Republic, there was no doubt that the prestige of the House of Orange had been elevated by this dynastic alliance.

Back in the Republic, there were observers who were uneasy at this development. Events in England were closely followed and English political polemic of the time was

---

3 Salman, p. 74.
4 Knuttel, no. 8365A, p. 5.
speedily translated into Dutch and issued in pamphlet form. Dutchmen reflected on the similarities and differences between their own struggle for their liberties and privileges against the King of Spain and the contest between King and Parliament in England. Not all were sympathetic to the Stuart monarch. This contest between a single head and a representative assembly caused them to reflect on the balance of authority within the Republic and how such discord could best be avoided. There were also concerns that by means of this marriage the House of Orange was seeking to extend its authority at the expense of the provincial States. The stadholderate was not hereditary but it was feared that Frederick Henry had reassured Charles I that any offspring of this youthful union would in their turn succeed to the offices of their forefathers. Characteristically, these fears were vented in a fictional dialogue between an Englishman and a Dutchman in a pamphlet of 1642. The Englishman observed that he had heard that Dutch citizens muttered against the marriage, 'om dat sy meynden dat het een aenleydinge soude zijn om de jonge Prince (William II) te doen staen naer de Souvereyniteit vande Provincien waer toe hem sijn Schoon-vader en Oom de Coninck van Vrankrijk souden helpen'.

The close connections between the Houses of Orange and Stuart need not of themselves have been harmful. It could be argued that dynastic links with one of the major royal houses of Europe could only raise the prestige of the stadholder and with him the entire Republic. However some observers hostile to the Prince of Orange could argue that such a marital alliance served only the interests of a particular faction, that is the stadholder and his supporters and did little or nothing for the common good of the Republic. At stake here was a question of legitimacy. The pamphlet writer of 1642 had defined two categories of person in relation to the governance of the Republic. The first was the ‘politique’ who manoeuvred his way into local or provincial government, the better to gain support for his faction and himself. The second, in contrast, was the

---

6 Knuttel, no. 4869, np.
‘patriot’ who placed the interest of the Republic over and above that of faction or person. The years before the Treaty of Munster had seen competing political and religious groups whether they be Arminians or Counter-Remonstrants, the peace party of Holland or those opposed to the ending of hostilities with Spain, all claiming that their stance alone was that of the ‘patriot’ and lover of the ‘Vaderland’. Such claims and counter claims were heard most frequently not at times when the Spanish enemy threatened to prevail, for then the nation was united, but at those junctures when the nation was divided as to whether to continue the war or seek a lasting peace. Such a time was the period leading up to and immediately after the Treaty of Munster when both groups were seeking to occupy the moral high ground. The English marriage gave the stadholder’s opponents the opportunity to accuse the House of Orange of acting within their own narrow dynastic interests rather than for the welfare of the Republic.

Thus sources hostile to the House of Orange asserted that the stadholder William II was committed to assisting his English relations and that such a strategy was not in the best interests of the nation. As affairs in England were observed and commented on in the light of the Dutch Republic there were some who alleged that the stadholder’s support for his royal brother-in-law Charles II was a manifestation of his own designs for sovereignty in the Republic. An anonymous pamphlet alleged that the Prince of Orange’s aborted attack on Amsterdam was intended not only as a bid for sovereignty in the Republic but also to damage those unfriendly to the cause of Charles II. Supporters of the stadholder in their turn were to present their opponents as ‘politiques’ who placed faction above the common interest. There was circulated a fictitious printed document in which Parliament was alleged to promise the city of Amsterdam a fleet of 25 ships and a force of 10,000 men to support it in its struggle against the stadholder.

Knuttel, no. 4869, np.
Knuttel, no. 6799, np.
and other hostile provinces. An anonymous poem from a similar source alleged that
the Bickers family sought sovereign power in Holland with the assistance of the English
Parliament. The death of William II in November 1650 did nothing to put an end to
these alignments within the Republic. The House of Orange found itself like the House
of Stuart excluded from those things which they believed to be rightfully theirs. Far
from fracturing the link between the two dynasties, the supporters of the House of
Orange believed that the restoration of Charles II could only aid their cause while the
English Royalists, amongst whom of course was Mary Stuart in the Hague, urged
Orangist supporters to champion the Stuart cause in the Republic. Supporters of the
States Party on the other hand were to argue in 1650 against the elevation of the young
prince William III to the offices of his forefathers on the grounds, amongst others, that
his English connections might cause him and his supporters to act against the interests
of the Dutch Republic. Throughout the twenty-two years of government without a
stadholder they would attempt to hang the English connection like an albatross round
the neck of William III and his supporters.

The enemies of the House of Orange were assisted by sources from within
England. John Milton’s A Defence of the People of England had been published in Latin
in February 1651. The work was intended as a response to the lengthy attack on the
regicides contained in Salmasius’ Defensio Regia of 1649. The initial publication of
Milton’s work was in Latin and this makes it likely that the author was seeking in part a
continental audience and he was not unwilling to draw upon recent events in Europe to
buttress his theme. For Milton, Salmasius and the stadholder William II had shared
similar objectives. He inquired rhetorically of the States of Holland

---

10 Knuttel, no. 6713, np.
11 Knuttel, no. 6817, np.
12 Knuttel, no. 6900, np.
who it was that incited this partisan of royal authority to write. Who was it that lately began to act the King among you. Consider what plots, attacks and disturbances followed throughout Holland, and what the case would now be, how slavery was prepared for you and a new ruler, and how that liberty which had been won by so many years of toil and battle would now have perished from your midst had not the most providential death of that headstrong youth allowed it to breathe again.13

Milton's work was rapidly translated into Dutch. It appeared in 1651 in a companion work with a defence of the king and people of England by the Royalist John Rowland. In the Dutch version of Milton's work, the paragraph relating to the former stadholder was removed from its context in the body of the print and placed in the preface where it was more accessible for the reader.14 As one supporter of the Houses of Orange and Stuart observed this 'stinkende bouk' was only too easily availability in contrast to the work of Salmiasius which was banned.15

Not only were the aspirations of the House of Orange linked to those of the deposed Stuarts but the connection was held to be injurious to the welfare of the Republic. It became an article of faith among supporters of the States party that the responsibility for the first Anglo-Dutch war should be laid at the feet of the House of Orange. The author of a pamphlet of 1651 written before the outbreak of war claimed that William II had intended, before his death, to replace Holland regents with his creatures with the intention of waging war in favour of the Stuart dynasty. It was alleged that privateers acting in the name of the King of Scotland (Charles II) were preying upon the commerce of Holland with the knowledge and connivance of the stadholder.16 One of Secretary Thurloe's correspondents wrote from the Republic in an undated letter of 1653 that there were two main parties in the Republic. One would have the Prince of Orange for stadholder, believing that his unifying presence would have averted the defeats at sea and the discontent at home. The other faction argued that the

14 Johannis Miltons Engelsman Verdedigingh des gemeend Volcks van Engelant (1651)
15 Knuttel, no. 7258, np.
16 Knuttel, no. 7040, pp. 7, 11.
supporters of William III had caused this breach with England, the better to further the Prince’s cause. 17 Certainly this was a view which de Witt and his circle were eager to propagate. In a letter of October 1654 addressed to the diplomats Hieronymus van Beverningh and Willem Nieuwpoort, the Pensionary expressed his satisfaction with a work of Aitzema’s on the peace negotiations as it laid the blame for the war on the King’s friends and the supporters of the House of Orange.18 The contention was that the House of Orange bound by marriage to the English monarchy was not capable of acting in the interests of the Republic, either during the lifetime of William II or the infancy of his son. While peace with England was deemed desirable the House of Orange sought to prolong the war not only to aid the Stuarts but with the hope that defeats at sea and dislocation of trade would lead to a popular outcry for the restoration of the stadholderate

Orangist responsibility for the breach with England surfaced once more in the polemic of the early 1660’s. Peter de la Court in his Interest van Holland of 1662 clearly believed that the Dutch government should have welcomed English overtures for a closer political and commercial relationship in 1651 but that they had been thwarted by the actions of the Orangists who had incited the rabble against the English delegation and their proposals. This then, he asserted, was the true reason of that lamentable war.19 The French invasion and the prospect of a naval war with Louis’ ally Charles II led pamphlet writers once more to review the history of Anglo-Dutch relations. One author who clearly had favoured the policies of de Witt described the first Anglo-Dutch war of as ‘die bittere kerlen van die Brittanische Bruyloff’. Cromwell had accused the United Provinces of assisting Charles II with arms and ammunition but the author argued such actions were not the policy of the States General but privately undertaken by the House

17 Birch, t. 253.
18 Brieven aan de Witt, t. (Werken Uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap, Gevestigd te Utrecht) 3rd Series, 42. (Amsterdam,1919), 245.
19 Knuttel, no.8652, pp. 101-105.
of Orange. The pamphlet pointedly contrasted the seventy years of peace and good neighbourhood which had existed between England and the Dutch Republic before Frederick Henry's dynastic policy had hitched the fortunes of the nation to the cause of the Stuarts. Another pamphleteer writing at the same time also thought that the war of 1652-1654 had been against the interests of the Republic. This had indeed partly been provoked by those who wanted to use Dutch force to weaken her new fellow republic in the hopes of restoring the Stuart dynasty.

This view of events was of course countered by writers favourable to the Prince of Orange. It was essential to their cause that the Prince, standing above self interest and faction represented the true interests of the Republic. From 1650 onwards authors from both sides of the political divide described themselves as 'lovers of the fatherland' but it has been observed that this claim was advanced more frequently by Orangist writers. In effect, they were boldly declaring that 'love of the fatherland' and loyalty to the current government were not necessarily synonymous. When Orangists spoke of the first Anglo-Dutch war, they insisted that the English under Cromwell, not the Prince of Orange and his supporters, had instigated the war. In an pamphlet of 1662 entitled Haeghs Hof-Praetje the author decried de la Court's version of the cause of the first Anglo-Dutch war. It was, argued a fictional citizen of Leiden, the result of the new English government's desire to deprive the United Provinces of their ships and trade.

The author of a pamphlet of the same year argued that the cause of the war was not the late stadholder but the the 'hoegmoedigheid der Engelsche' who having executed their own King were trying to dictate Dutch policy towards the House of Stuart. Meanwhile the English had been harrying Dutch shipping and robbing vessels. As early as 1652 supporters of the House of Orange had argued that if Charles I had remained alive, there

---

20 Knuttel, no. 10230, p. 7.
21 Knuttel, no. 10384, p. 6
22 de Bruin, 'Het begrip 'vaderland' in de pamflethliteratuur ten tijde van de Republiek', pp. 155-156, 158.
23 Knuttel, no. 8654, p. 25.
would have been no hostilities with England. The English monarchy had never wreaked such havoc on the Dutch as Cromwell, indeed successive English Queens and Kings had been stout friends of the Republic.\(^{25}\) The theme was to be repeated. Writing with one eye on Charles II and the possibility of an English naval war against the Dutch, an Orangist writer of 1672 had Jan, a fictional Amsterdamer, assert firmly that if the Republic had aided Charles I as Frederick Henry and William II had wished, then Cromwell would not have acceded to power and there would have been no Anglo-Dutch war.\(^{26}\) In 1675, with William III firmly in the saddle and a peace with England deemed desirable, the first Anglo-Dutch war was said to have resulted from the execution of Charles I and the rise of Cromwell. Had the Stuarts remained in power there would have been no need for hostilities between ‘dese twee ouden vrienden en geloofs verwanten’.\(^{27}\)

Accused of factional self interest by their opponents, Orangist writers were prepared to return the charge. In Ware Interest van Holland of 1662, Jean Nicolas de Parival argued that it was the merchants of Amsterdam who had been seduced by Cromwell’s gold to root out the Prince of Orange. In his view Cromwell was a more terrible enemy at sea than Spain but in spite of this there were those who were prepared to be bribed by him to secure the Exclusion of the Prince of Orange.\(^{28}\) If as Orangists were to allege, there was an unbreakable link between Fatherland and Prince, then by scheming the downfall of William III his opponents were not only seeking to damage the House of Orange but also the very Republic itself. This rhetoric was to bear a deadly fruit in 1672.\(^{29}\)

What was not disputed was that the House of Orange had bound its interests to those of the exiled Stuarts during the course of the first Anglo-Dutch war. There was, of

---

\(^{25}\) Knuttel, no. 7205, p. 4; Knuttel, no. 7208, p. 9.
\(^{26}\) Knuttel, no. 10412, np.
\(^{27}\) Lambert van den Bos, Leven en Bedrijf van zijn Hoogheyt Willem Hendrik. De Derde Prince van Orangien (Amsterdam, 1675), p. 9.
\(^{28}\) Knuttel, no. 8653B, pp. 87-89.
\(^{29}\) de Bruin, ‘Het begrip ’vaderland’in de pamphletliteratuur ten tijde van de Republiek’, p. 159.
course, a substantial Royalist contingent keeping company with the Court at the Hague.

William III’s mother Mary Stuart was, not surprisingly an ardent defender of her dynasty and her exiled brother. It had been her wish to christen her infant son Charles after her murdered father, a design which had only been thwarted by the threat by the boy’s grandmother Amalia von Solms that she would boycott the ceremony. The ‘Winter Queen’ Elizabeth of Bohemia, the sister of Charles I, had found shelter at the Hague along with her hotly Royalist sons. In 1651 James Duke of York was at the Orangist court and in 1653 his brother the Duke of Gloucester received a fond welcome from his sister. The Orange Court at the Hague could not afford munificence. There was now no income from offices of state and Spanish payments to the House of Orange, promised in 1648, had not been paid in their entirety. However, funds could still be disbursed to celebrate the Orange and Stuart dynasties. The Dutch artist Hanneman who had worked in London before the Civil War and whose van Dyckian style was to prove popular with the exiled Stuarts and the House of Orange fulfilled a commission to paint Henry, Duke of Gloucester dated provisionally to 1653. In the following year he produced a portrait of William III in which the young prince posed full length, holding an orange in his right hand and pointing with the forefinger of his left at a small dog, symbolic of the virtues of loyalty. In the version which ended up in the former East Germany and which was presumably a gift to the Prince’s uncle and godfather the Elector of Brandenburg, William III wears the blue insignia of the Order of the Garter over his left shoulder. William had received the Order from his uncle Charles II on 4 May 1653 and its presence in the portrait makes plain that far from being wary of his

---

30 Aitzema, Historie of verhael, vn. 333.
31 Japikse, t. 42.
33 Japikse. t. 53.
English connections, the House of Orange consciously emphasised and flaunted the dynastic ties which linked the two families.

In their turn, the English under Cromwell had emphasised the link between the Stuarts and the House of Orange. In 1652 English emissaries had presented the Dutch with a series of articles which included a clause stating that the enemies of one power would not be given succour in the other. It was proposed that the States General should not suffer any family or supporters of Charles II to live in in the towns or residences belonging to the House of Orange. If contravened, the prince or princess would be deprived of their possessions for the duration of their life. Supporters of William III were to make much of this. An angry merchant in a pamphlet of 1652 fulminated at the idea that the property of the innocent young prince might be confiscated simply because he helped his own family. This was to show gross ingratitude to William III and his forefathers. If Charles II wished to buy arms from the Republic, why should he not? As for exiled Royalists, the Republic had long furnished a haven for the persecuted. Like Stermont, this author was determined to emphasise that the civil war in England bore no resemblance to the Dutch struggle for independence. He issued a firm rebuke to Pensionary Cats who, in a visit to England had assured his hosts that the two nations shared a common interest since both had cast off monarchy. Advising Cats to stick to poetry, the author reminded his readers that Philip II had been but Count in Holland and the Dutch had only cast off allegiance to him with the consent of the States General after twenty years of foreign governors and the execution of the flower of the nobility. Charles I had been no tyrant. Rather his only fault was 'dat hy al te goed-aardig en sijn Onderdanen al te gunstig was'. The author recommended a reading of Salmasius’ defence of the royal martyr. 34

In a fictional discussion of the same year between three women, the tactics of the English were deplored. One woman, Grietje, was outraged at the proposed action against the Prince if he should aid his English family. She could not believe that Dutch regents would follow such a course ‘en souwen wy nu dat eenichste kindt dat zijn Vader noyt gesien heeft om het begeeren van sulcke Moordenaers met de voet stooten’.  

Certainly the demands of the English coupled with their aggression at sea made the cause of Charles II a popular one. Syme, a fictional peat cutter, opined in 1652 that if the Republic fell under the dominance of the English, their lot would be worse than under Alba. God was using the Dutch as an instrument for the restoration of Charles II.  

Samuel Brown the English bookseller and publisher resident in the Hague was clearly of the same mind. He was the stockist of a pamphlet of 1653 published by one Harman Cornelisz in which the anonymous author argued that it was unlawful to assist those who had seized supreme authority by force. It was the duty of the Dutch to fight the English rebels with the aim of restoring the Stuart monarchy.

Orangist polemic attempted to exploit the affinities in the policies of Cromwell and de Witt, even as the Exclusion of William III was proceeding. In a fictional discourse set in an alehouse a Hollander and an Englishman argued comfortably which of the two nations was the greater villain. The Hollander, a supporter of the House of Orange, asserted that the crown must fall to the English since they had killed their King, cast aside their lawful Prince and cut off the rights and privileges of Dukes, Count, Barons and Knights. The Englishman admitted that these excesses lay at the feet of his government but countered by inquiring if the government of de Witt was so different since they had maligned their Prince and taken away from him not only the titles of his forefathers but also the profits thereof. The governors of the Republic, the Englishman affirmed were ‘in their hearts more English than Dutch’. Secret channels of

\[
\text{Knuttel, no. 7233, np.}
\]
\[
\text{Knuttel, no. 7235, np.}
\]
\[
\text{Knuttel, no. 7423, np.}
\]
communication fuelled by pensions from Cromwell ensured that the English were forewarned when a good prize ship was afloat and pliant Dutch sea-captains were encouraged not to press their attack against the English vessels. The Englishman identified these traitors as the ‘Louvesteyn faction’ who wanted no stadholder Prince of Orange and were determined, as far as they were able, that there should be no king in England. However, he contended not all is lost for the discontented English are now turning back to the House of Stuart. The pair concluded by drinking a toast damning Cromwell and the ‘Louvestein devils’ and crying ‘long live the King: Long live the Prince of Orange’.  

Loyal toasts notwithstanding the years after 1654 and Exclusion were uneventful for the supporters of the House of Orange. It was the Restoration of Charles II in 1660 which raised the hopes of Orangists. The poetry and prose of that year make clear how far contemporaries assumed that the fortunes of the Houses of Stuart and Orange were linked. In a fictional dialogue of 1660 James Duke of York in conversation with his brother the King affirmed that Exclusion must be annulled and once William reached his majority he must be confirmed in the offices of his forefathers. Another author proposed that the appointment of William III as stadholder would restore to the Republic a constitution similar to that of Venice and would please the new King of England. A publication of 1660, *Nassous Bedryf*, an account of the heroic deeds of the House of Orange between the years 1567 and 1646, paid tribute to the spirit of the times by including in the volume a paen of joy on the miraculous restoration of Charles II. 

In verse we see the link between Orange and Stuart frequently celebrated. An anthology of poetry entitled *Herstelde Zeeg-Triompf van Karel de Tweede* published in 1660 laid joyful emphasis on the connection and the implication that the successes of

---

38 *Duytch Zee-mans Praetjen* (Amsterdam, 1654), pp. 5, 7-10, 14-18, 23-24.
39 Knuttel, no. 8224, p. 24
40 Knuttel, no. 8384, p. 19
41 *Nassous Bedryf of Heerlycke Daden Bedreven sedert het Jaar 1567 tot den Jare 1646* (Dordrecht, 1663)
one would favour the fortunes of the other. In a poem entitled ‘Op d’ Uytroepinge van Karel de Tweede’ which celebrated the restoration of Charles II the poet C.C.D. Bevere declaimed

het Oudt Batavien, met blyschap overladen,
Schijnt nu in vreught te baden,
Vol hoop, dat Nassauws Stam, die door een hagel-slagh
By na ter neder lagh,
Sal door dees Somer-lugt weet moediglijk uytspruyten,
Spijt buyen die het stuiten.42

Similar sentiments were expressed by his contemporary Havius who recorded

een yders mont spreekt Konings tael;
Men drinkt sijn voorspoet onder ‘t dond’ren der Cartouwen,
En blaest terwijl luyd op Wilhelmus van Nassou;43

Meanwhile the poet Bara urged

lang leef de Vorst van ’t machtigh groot Brittanje,
Lang leef de stam van ’t Vreden-rijck Oranje

and declaimed

Wie zoude niet naa d’Opperblijtschap dorsten
By d’Edelheyt van hergestelde Vorsten.44

The family ties between Stuart and Orange were reinforced in contemporary print.

As Charles II travelled through the Republic in 1660 on his journey to England, prints were published celebrating his reception by local notables and in these the House of Orange was conspicuously present. At a reception for Charles in the Hague, the King

---

42 Herstelde Zeeg-Triomf van Karel de Tweede (Dordrecht, 1660) p. 15.
sits in splendour at the top table accompanied by his sister Mary Stuart with the frail figure of the Prince of Orange seated under the canopy with his kingly family.\footnote{Muller, no. 2276.(4)} At his embarkation at Scheveningen on 2 June, Charles was depicted standing on the beach with the young William III to his right.\footnote{Muller, no. 2156.(6a)} Afterwards Charles and his sister Mary would be conveyed aboard ship in a ‘pinck’ decorated with palms and oranges.

The dynastic theme was reinforced in a print of 1660 entitled ‘De Croon van Coninck Carel de II.’ The centrepiece of the print was a genealogy of the family of Charles II descended from both James I of England and Henry IV of France through his mother Henrietta Marie. However, the focus of the print becomes clear as the various lines of descent unite at the bottom of the print in the persons of stadholder William II, his wife Mary Stuart and their son William III. To allay questions the caption read

\begin{verbatim}
Dat syn Hoogheid staet hier onder,
Heeft man al soo moeten doen,
In de Tacken, Recht te houwen,
Dat syn Hoogheyt, dus ten Toon,
\end{verbatim}

The circumstances of the birth of William III and his royal connections were held to be of providential significance.

\begin{verbatim}
Van oudts men Groot Geluck, altijt heeft toe geschreven,
Die naer des Vaders Doodt, quam als dien Prins in ’t leven.
Van de eerste Carel is hy d’Eerste Dochters Zoon,
En d’Eerst, uyt Carel’s stam, en Conincklijke Croon.\footnote{Muller, no. 2161; Stolk, no. 2281.}
\end{verbatim}

The restoration of Charles II required the government of de Witt to reappraise its policy towards William III. In the interests of good relations with England, the Exclusion of the Prince of Orange was annulled. Pamphlet writers mocked this apparent \textit{volte face}. In a work of 1660 two fictional characters, a soldier and a tailor discussed
with relish the discomfort of leading government figures. The tailor confided to his companion that he was heavily engaged in the task of ‘turning coats’ and pointed to a garment of de Witt’s awaiting his attention. In the recent past all symbols and signs of the House of Orange had been removed but now ‘weet men geen snijders genoegh te krijgen om de Rocken om te keeren’. For the soldier there was one moral to be drawn. ‘Desen staat kan sonder de vrientschap van Engeland, ende den dienst van Orangien niet bestaan.’ 48 The poet Jan Zoet described the royal welcome given to William III and his mother Mary Stuart during their visit to Amsterdam in 1660 in his poem *De Herstellinge van Britanje en Oranje* and concluded cynically ‘de minste is nu een Prinseman’. 49

Events did not proceed as Orangists had hoped. Policy makers in England were divided as to how far to emphasise the Prince’s cause. Clarendon was alive to Dutch sensibilities and de Witt’s strategies. He expostulated,

I pray upon what grounds, in reason or policy, can the Kinge, in the renewing of a league with the States Generall, demande that they should choose a Generall of his recommendacon? and what harangues would de Witt make upon that subject, that the Kinge of England will not make a peace with them excpete he may give them a Generall, Admirall, and Stateholder who mustalways remember to whome he owes the benefitt?

Clarendon had prophesied wisely. In a letter of May 1664 Sir George Downing related that Holland was a hot bed of rumours. It was alleged that the English would force the Dutch to take the Prince of Orange and ‘give him all his Father’s charges, whether we will or not’. 50 In a pamphlet of the same year the anonymous author announced that with the absence of a stadholder freedom once more reigned in the land. The sun of truth had dispelled the mists and the mask of deceit had been torn off to reveal the power hungry machinations of William III and Charles II. 51 Such polemic may not

48 Knuttel, no. 8372, np.
49 Zoet, p.136.
50 Lister, III, pp. 142, 167, 322-323.
51 Knuttel, no. 8921, p. 4
accurately reflect the mood of all sections of society. Downing reported an interview with a naval captain who told the Englishman that his seamen and soldiers would not fight unless the flag of the States, ‘the bloody flag’ was replaced by that of the Prince. Clearly anticipation of war was troubling many. Downing reported from the Hague in June 1665 that, ‘mens minds beginning to be strangely discontented; and they talk at a very strange rate, and very many begin to say that they shall never be quiett unless ye Prince of Orange be restablished’. There was undoubtedly a fear that this war against England might lead to the naval losses, recession and hunger which had marked the first Anglo-Dutch war. Meanwhile States Party rhetoric hammered home the message that the link between Orange and Stuart posed a threat to the liberties and self determination of the Dutch Republic.

A writer of 1665 set out the challenge facing the Republic. The United Provinces had either to permit themselves to be subject to the will of the King of England or take up arms. England wanted to see the Dutch divided amongst themselves and there was no greater friend to the enemy, he asserted, than those in the fleet and in the country who called for a ‘Prince en Nieuwe Landtsheer’. All citizens should rally to support the present government who, he alleged, were giving body and soul for the freedom of the seas and the welfare of the nation. In the following year Admiral Tromp the Younger was accused by sections of public opinion of disobeying de Ruyter’s orders and missing the chance of destroying the English fleet. He was dismissed his post in September 1666. A fictional seaman in a pamphlet of 1666 commentedly acidly of Tromp that it appeared that the Tromp had been hired by the King of England to bring confusion to the Dutch fleet. A citizen of Delft linked Tromp’s deficiencies to the Prince’s cause when he remarked that the Admiral was the friend of those who believed that the

---

52 Lister, III, 381, 385-386.
53 Knuttel, no. 9128, pp. 4-5.
greatest shame in the world was that William III had not succeeded to the offices of his father. 54 Potential treachery was allied to the Orangist cause.

The case of Buat was a veritable godsend to the writers of States Party polemic. Buat, a close confidant of the Prince, had been corresponding with the court in England concerning the possibilities of peace between the two countries. At least some of this correspondence had been with the knowledge and connivance of de Witt who saw Buat as a suitable go-between in these delicate secret deliberations. However, Buat had exceeded his brief by engaging in further correspondence, unknown to de Witt, in which he sought to promote the cause of the Prince of Orange. To this end he gathered information about Dutch losses at sea. In a fatal gesture Buat succeeded in delivering this correspondence into the very hands of John de Witt. He was imprisoned, condemned to death and executed on 11 October 1666. His co-conspirators Kievit and van der Horst fled abroad and were condemned to death in their absence. 55

Supporters of the States Party seized upon the opportunity to depict the Prince’s party as capable of outright treachery in their design to elevate William III. 56 Yet, their own conduct was not beyond reproach. Observers in Zeeland compared Buat’s secret diplomacy on behalf of the province of Holland with the negotiations between England and Holland in 1654 over Exclusion in which the other provinces were kept in ignorance. 57 Hence supporters of the States Party were eager to assert that the House of Orange had placed its own interests before the nation and the life blood of its seamen. After accusing Buat of scandalous intimacy with the late stadholder William II, an anonymous author speaking in the person of an Amsterdamer drew the net wider. It was plain to all, this stout patriot asserted, that Buat had not acted alone. There were other ‘Bons Amis’ who were named in Buat’s correspondence with England, who were

54 Knuttel, no. 9330, pp. 5, 11-12.
55 Prudhomme van Reine, pp. 268-269.
56 Pieter Geyl, Orange and Stuart , pp. 253-254.
57 de Bruin, Geheimhouding en Verraad, p. 317.
all known supporters of the Prince. It was alleged that an accord had been made with Charles II that he should be sovereign of the United Provinces and William III was to be his stadholder. The Duke of York was to act for William until he came of age. Dutch interests were to be trampled underfoot. The English were to have free access to the East Indies commerce and the herring fisheries. Pliable ministers of religion were to be deployed to convince the people of the justice of the action and twelve or fourteen of de Witt’s party were to be brought before special judges and condemned to death. Our Amsterdammer concluded by firmly linking the House of Orange with treachery and overweening self interest. Just as the Republic of Venice had expelled the Jesuits and any who argued their cause were indicted for high treason, so should the Dutch Republic treat those who argued for the return of the stadholderate. 58

His voice was not alone. In a pamphlet of the same year a fictional citizen of Delft accused Buat and his fellow conspirators of seeking to weaken the navy leading to the shedding of much Dutch blood and leaving the King of England as master of the seas. All this was to be done in the interests of the Prince of Orange. 59 In the following year 1667 a fictional Rotterdamer, exhilarated by news of Dutch naval victories, proclaimed that the Republic had no need now of a stadholder and captain general and excoriated Buat and his sort who sought to make Charles II the greatest monarch in Christendom and the Prince of Orange his satrap. 60 The comments were timely. In 1667 the States of Holland were to introduce the Perpetual Edict in which the roles of captain general and stadholder could no longer be combined in the same person and the stadholderate was abolished in Holland in perpetuity. Faced with opposition from Zeeland to Holland’s policy, the spectre of Buat was produced. A writer of 1668 argued that the Edict was designed to prevent threats to the national interest such as that posed by Buat in the service of the Prince. With Holland now formally committed to having

58 Knuttel, no.9330, pp. 24-25, 30, 32.
59 Knuttel, no. 9341, p. 29.
60 Knuttel, no. 9587, pp. 29-30, 33-34.
no further stadholders such acts of treachery would be redundant. For the edification of
readers and to heap further coals on the heads of the Prince’s party, a copy of Buat’s
correspondence to England was included in the pamphlet.61

It is clear that in attempting to win over the other provinces to the policy of
Holland, de Witt and his supporter were to make much of the Prince’s connections with
the King of England and the allegation that in furtherance of his own interests the Prince
and his party were prepared to damage the interests of the Republic. The year 1668 saw
the publication of a volume of verse entitled ‘t Verheerlijckt Nederlandt. In the
introduction the unknown editor declared that the purpose of the work was to laud the
victory of the Dutch at Chatham in 1667 and the work therein of Cornelius de Witt.
However, several of the poems made plain that treachery had been afoot in the
Republic. In a poem which the publisher attributed to Vondel but which does not appear
in the authoritative volume of his works the courage of those who fought for the States
is lauded. However, their heroism was

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ondermynt en ondergraven} \\
\text{Van ‘t onthoofde lantverraet} \\
\text{En Leicesterlijke treken} \\
\text{Door de blauwe vlagh gebroet,} \\
\text{Om den burgerkrygh te queeken,} \\
\text{In een zee van Heldenbloet.} \quad 62
\end{align*}
\]

The traitor in question was Buat. Leicester had combined political and military
governorship in his person during his ill-fated stay in the Netherlands during the 1580’s
and to the States Party his name symbolised all that they loathed and feared in the
military and political authority of the former stadholders. Although endowed with his
authority by the States, Leicester had clearly acted in the interests of his master the

61 Knuttel, no. 9662, pp. 7-8.
Queen of England. There were those who would argue that William III was in a potentially similar situation with respect to his uncle Charles II.

There was no immediate response from the Orangists. The times were not propitious. However with the French invasion of 1672 the question of loyalties became imperative and Orangists were eager to establish their *bona fides* as stout defenders of the Fatherland, unswayed by any other consideration than the nation’s welfare. A revised interpretation of Buat’s endeavours was essential to reassure potential critics that William III was no pawn of the King of England. Pamphlet writers who supported the House of Orange were eager to oblige. Again and again it was asserted that Buat’s purpose had been to promote peace with England without bending to French interests. His actions were in no manner treacherous but intended to leave the Dutch Republic at peace and not reliant on a France whose ambitions in the Southern Netherlands were already causing disquiet. ‘French interests’ had not featured in the original polemic surrounding Buat but with leading members of the government accused of being in the pay of the French invaders, this was a timely interpretation on the part of the Orangists.

In truth in 1672 the Orangists found themselves in potential difficulties. Since England was the ally of the French aggressor, the link between the House of Orange and Charles II could become a liability. It was clearly in the interests of the Republic that the English should be neutralised and peace concluded with them but the conditions imposed might well be onerous. A pamphlet of 1672 set out the demands of Charles II as relayed to the States General. The towns of Flushing, Sluis and den Briel were to transferred permanently to the ownership of the King of England. In recognition of the domination of the King of England, the States General were to pay an annual tribute to the King of 100,000 pounds sterling for the privilege of fishing for herring in his waters. As if these proposals were not inflammatory enough, the pamphlet recorded that the

---

63 Knuttel, no. 10229B, np; Knuttel, no. 10268, np; Knuttel, no. 10311, p. 4; Knuttel, no. 10376, p. 10; Knuttel, no. 10380, pp. 7-8.
titles of stadholder and captain general were to be bestowed upon the Prince of Orange
and his heirs in perpetuity with an additional proviso that in the case of a minor a
lieutenant would be chosen by the States with the consent and approval of the King of
England. William made plain his rejection of these proposals. Another pamphlet
published in both Dutch and French, and clearly hostile to the House of Orange,
revealed the alleged contents of a letter from Charles II to William III setting out the
terms he considered acceptable for the conclusion of peace between the France, England
and the Dutch. In every town or village where there was more than one church,
Catholics were to be given one of these as a place of worship. Where there was only one
church, an additional place of worship was to be constructed and stipends for priests
were to be paid by the States. The Prince of Orange and his descendants were to have
sovereignty over the Republic. In this type of polemic the elevation of William III was
linked to demands which were clearly unacceptable to the majority of citizens of the
Republic.

A poem by Joachim Oudaan which was published in pamphlet form in 1672
displays this rhetoric in its most virulent form. In view of the frequent accusations that
senior regents had been bribed by the French, Oudaan’s purpose was to convince his
readers that it was the Prince’s camp who were betraying the Republic. Those who laid
the charge of treachery at the Prince’s door,

...zeid dat dit onheil smeulde,
Ten tijde van Buat, die schelms met Karel heulde,
Om ’t Vrye Nederlandt te lev’ren aan den Brit,
Op dat men Willems zoon te leen kreeg in ’t besit.

Having revisited the site of Buat’s treachery, the author has James Duke of York
propose to his brother,

---

64 Knuttel, no. 10052, np.
65 Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, p. 132.
66 Knuttel, no. 10070, pp. 2, 6; Knuttel, no. 10071, np.
... Dit's de tijd om door het Frans geweld.
Het Puriteins gebroet, dat Vader heeft geveld,
Met list geweldelijck eens op het hert te trappen.
Om als een vrye Vorst weer op den Throon te stappen
Dan voeren wy met macht de Roomse oudheid in.

The promotion of Roman Catholicism in the United Provinces was to be associated
with the future sovereignty of William III bestowed upon him by England.

James urged,

Men zou het wettig recht ontwringen uit de handen
Der Staten van het Land, en dragen Willem op.
Met dit beding nochtans, dat hy de hoogsten top
Van Holland's Heerschappy ontleend' uit Karels handen. 67

In the same vein, following the murder of the brothers de Witt, an outraged character in
a pamphlet damned the traitors who had pawned the country to both the French and the
English 'om de Prins Graf van Hollandt te maken'. The hearts of the de Witts had been
torn from their bodies in order to please the monarchs of France and England. 68

To rebut these charges, Orangist polemic developed two strands of argument.
Firstly, it was emphasised that in spite of his foreign connections, William steered an
independent course whose only lodestar was the welfare of the United Provinces.

Secondly, and more commonly, William's English connections were alleged to be of
benefit to the Republic since they might lead to an independent peace with Charles II
and the English king might intervene with Louis XIV to broker some kind of settlement
which almost inevitably would involve the Prince being appointed to the offices of his
forefathers. 69

67 Knutel, no. 10606, np.
68 Knutel, no. 10603, pp. 6-7, 20.
69 Robert Fruin. 'Prince Willem III in zijn verhouding tot Engeland', in Verspreide Geschriften, V. (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1902), 1-193 (p. 23)
William's appointment as captain general resulted in a flood of pamphlet literature. Readers were encouraged to recollect the role of divine providence in the founding of the Dutch Republic and relief at the elevation of the great grandson and namesake of William I was tempered by calls for unity and repentance. One writer expressed the hope that William would give the lie to his enemies who asserted that his family links with England and France would influence his actions to the detriment of the State. Another writer posed the question and provided an answer in the allegorical setting of a ship at sea. In his pamphlet, the fictional steersman of the good ship Hollandia, one Willem Willemsz. assured his nervous crew that he will not seek the shorea of England or France. Newly bid to the helm, Willem told his crew, 'wy moeten noch Engelsch noch Fransch syn, maer beyde vermyden als trouwe Hollanders'.

More common was the assumption that the promotion of the Prince would assist the Dutch cause because of his relationship with the English king. In contrast Charles II was depicted as actively hostile to the government and its supporters. This was a line actively encouraged by the English. A pamphlet in English by one Henry Stubbs attempted to clarify the position. The writer drew on the recent history of the Republic to buttress his assertion that both Oldenbarnevelt and John de Witt had sought to damage both the interests of England and the House of Orange. He alleged that de Witt had been seeking to stir up sectaries in England against the authority of their lawful monarch. Aware of Dutch hopes, he commented obliquely that 'his Majesty did express as much concern for the interest of the Prince of Orange as the nature of his Treaties would permit'.

Dutch writers and publishers took up the theme. Following the appointment of William III as stadholder of a Holland a pamphlet was published containing an alleged letter from Charles II to his nephew. The King of England reassured the Prince that the

---

70 Knuttel, no. 10008, pp. 33-34.
71 Knuttel, no. 10300, np.
72 Knuttel, no. 10017A, np.
latter’s interests remained close to his heart but he could not overlook the insolence and ingratitude which de Witt and his faction had meted out to both himself and Louis XIV. Now that William was stadholder and that affairs were no longer in the hands of that ‘violent factie’, Charles would attempt to intervene with his French ally on behalf of the Prince. This letter became a mainstay of Orangist rhetoric and appears to have been the work of William III and the new councillor pensionary Caspar Fagel. It was formally received by both the States General and the States of Holland. In a pamphlet issued in the hectic days before the death of the de Witt brothers, a fictional character Jan returned to the theme when he assured his companions that Charles II had no quarrel with the Dutch people but only with the ‘Louvesteynse Factie’. It is clear that such rhetoric was not seen as in any way ‘unpatriotic’ and the Prince was not seen as betraying the interests of the Republic. Rather, his connections were viewed in this instance quite pragmatically as a means to achieving a rapprochement with England. In a fictional conversation set on a barge a Rotterdammer assured his companion that the change in regime which had recently taken place in his city had been prompted in part by the contents of the letter of Charles II to his nephew which had led to a movement towards the Prince’s party.

Attempts to buttress the authority of William still further were presented in terms of pleasing the King of England. This may have been a reaction to the decision of the States of Holland on 27th August to empower the Prince of Orange to change the composition of the town councils, a decision motivated, in the eyes of one hostile writer, with the intention ‘dat de goede Gemeente dan verder van sijn verhooging tot Grave niet souden spreken’. In a pamphlet of 1672 the anonymous author considered that the hatred of the prince by some sections of the regent oligarchy would make it

---

73 Knuttel, no. 10172, np.
74 de Bruin, Geheimhouding en verwaad, p. 372.
75 Knuttel, no. 10341, p.7.
76 Knuttel, no. 10472, np.
77 Knuttel, no. 10597, p.1
difficult to restore the country to its former glory. The proposed solution was William
III should be declared Count of Holland and the this position should be made hereditary
in William’s line. This would, the author suggested, satisfy the King of England and the
Elector of Brandenburg and predispose them to peace with the Republic. A call to all
patriotic citizens of Holland emphasised that internal unity and external peace with
England could be secured if the Prince were declared count of Holland and this theme
was reiterated and developed in very similar terms in a work, possibly by the same
author, in September of that year. It was argued that the promotion of William III to
the position of stadholder was not enough to satisfy the English King and that an
extension of his authority would be necessary to obtain peace.

The link between the elevation of the Prince and a settlement with England is
evident from a print celebrating the conclusion of peace with England in 1674. The
centrepiece shows William taking the oath as stadholder while outside the windows can
be seen the feast given in his honour by the deputies of the States General after he had
accepted the post of captain and admiral general in February 1672. William is posed
behind a table upon which rests a splendid carpet. On the carpet is superimposed an
image showing the conclusion of the peace with England in February 1674, exactly two
years after William’s promotion to the captaincy general. The connection is re-inforced
as the motto beneath the image reminds the viewer that peace with England was
concluded in the same month 19 February 1674 as the Prince was appointed hereditary
stadholder of Holland, 2 February 1674. The implication is that the two events are
clearly linked and that the Stuart connection has proved beneficial to the wellbeing of
the Republic. Doubts apparently were still being expressed about the Prince’s concern
for his own interests as opposed to his duty to the Republic. A pamphlet of 1673
reported that some muttered that William was a traitor who had conspired with England

78 Knuttel, no. 10310, np.
79 Knuttel, no. 10316, np.
80 Knuttel, no. 10597, pp. 2-4.
and France to obtain his present positions and dark rumours were circulating that, after
the receipt of a letter from the Prince of Orange, the garrison of Nijmegen had
precipately surrendered to the enemy. The printmaker issued a riposte to these
suggestions when he placed in a window behind the figure of William the spectacle of
justice being meted out, in the form of a military firing squad, to those true traitors who
had failed in their duty of resistance to the French enemy.  

Moreover some writers were already seeing long term benefits for the Prince and
the Republic as a result of the English connection. Suggestions were already being
mooted concerning a possible marriage between William III and Mary, the elder
daughter of James, Duke of York. One writer of 1672 commended the possibility to his
readers, discounting concerns about the extreme youth of the princess, for her aunt
Mary Stuart had been but a child at the time of her marriage to William II. The writer
discounted any possibility that such a marital alliance might encourage monarchical
tendencies in the young stadholder. Rather it rebounded to his glory and that of the
Republic. A pamphlet which linked Oldenbarnevelt and de Witt in a trail of infamy
concluded with a poem entitled ‘Nederlandt tot de Nederlanders’. The writer clearly
relished the possibilities inherent in the Prince’s dynastic relationship with England. He
urged his readers to rejoice in their good fortune.

Gy hebt een Prins, een Erfvorst van Oranje,
De darde Heer van 't Koninkrijk Brittanje.

With Charles II without any legitimate heir and his brother James, Duke of York having
only female offspring, enticing prospects loomed for the son of Mary Stuart and the
grandson of Charles I.

---

81 Muller, no. 2530: Knuttel, no. 10951, np.
82 Knuttel, no. 10387, np.
83 Knuttel, no. 10432, np.
84 Fruin, pp. 27-28.
Orangists were to emphasise that the Prince’s English connections and his expoitation of them were in the interests of the Republic. The case of Buat had enabled supporters of the States Party to depict the House of Orange as guided only by self interest and hostile to the vital interests of the Republic. When in 1672 Orangist writers insisted that de Witt and his cohorts deliberately preferred French domination to the elevation of William III, this was, amongst other things, a response to the accusations which Buat had brought down on their head. Now it was the Pensionary who had placed the interests of faction before nation. Characteristic of this type of rhetoric was a vituperative pamphlet of 1672, the work of the Rotterdam Reformed minister Borstius, in which it was alleged that the Dutch were responsible for the English reneging on the Triple Alliance of 1668. Mombas at the French court was said to have suggested to Louis XIV an alliance between the two countries with the objective of ruining England and preventing the Prince of Orange from being appointed to the offices of his forefathers. To further this end, inspectors sent on behalf of the States General to review the Republic’s landward defences were alleged to have been plied with drink so that deficiencies, of which there were many, passed unnoticed and the French invasion could proceed unhindered.\(^8^5\) This was but one example of the genre. The theme appeared in verse where the unknown author charged that de Witt and his faction

\[
\begin{align*}
Vrankryck uyt naam van staat \\
Aanboden Engelant te vemiielen, \\
Door boos gewelt of listen quaat, \\
Waarom dien Koninck reden vont, \\
Om wreecken 't breuck van d'Egt-verbont.\(^8^6\)
\end{align*}
\]

It was similarly alleged that Admiral de Ruyter had been well placed to destroy the French fleet but had been ordered instead by Cornelius de Witt to attack the English navy.\(^8^7\)

\(^8^5\) Knuttel, no. 10224, pp. 7-10. \\
\(^8^6\) Knuttel, no. 10276, np.
Much of this rhetoric mirrored the propaganda emanating from the English court in which Charles II declared that he had only the interests of the Republic at heart and it had been the hostile intentions of de Witt which had obliged the English to take up arms. On both sides of the North Sea it was alleged that emissaries of de Witt had been stirring up Parliament and the dissenting interest against the King. An English pamphlet available in the Netherlands condemned de Witt’s connections with dissenters, (‘an honest party in this Nation though differing in some minute ceremonies from the, Church’) and sorrowfully viewed the plight in which the Dutch found themselves.

A mournful Tragedy. Methinks like wise Patriots, they should seize upon their States (whom they may thank for all their calamities and miseries) and yield themselves up to Justice; set up their Prince, whose Ancestors have spent so much Blood and Treasure to Vindicate their Rights and Liberties, and not to serve their ends of him (as all wise men think the States do at this juncture of affairs).

However the refrain was reinforced in Orangist writings. One pamphlet among many alleged that after the Treaty of Breda in 1667 John de Witt had attempted to bribe opponents of Charles II in England and it was his failure in this quarter which led him to seek a clandestine agreement with France. The conclusion of peace with England in 1674 led to the reinforcement of this theme. Valkenier, writing in 1675, accused de Witt of seeking to isolate England and render her impotent while preventing the Prince of Orange from being appointed to any position of the authority. Montanus’s account of the life of William III, published in 1675, again recounted de Witt’s attempt to foment internal disunity in England and linked them to the Pensionary’s alleged design to acquire greater authority in the Republic than that possessed by any Prince of Orange.

87 Knuttel, no. 10282, p. 5.
88 Knuttel, no. 9951, pp.32-33, 35.
89 Knuttel, no. 10499, np.
90 Valkenier, p. 666.
91 Montanus. Leven en Bedrijf van Willem Henrik Prince van Oragnien. pp. 452, 453.
Conclusion

As one of the great princely families of Europe, marital alliances inevitably have the House of Orange to other dynasties. To his enemies, William III’s foreign connections influenced him in courses injurious to the Republic; to his supporters they were often a source of pride. Both the Orangists and their opponents sought to present themselves as the true ‘patriots’, the party which placed national self interest before faction. In effect the writers of Orangist rhetoric were saying that they and not the legitimate government of the Republic were the true guardians of the nation. This was potentially a profoundly dangerous situation as events in 1672 were to prove.

During the first Anglo-Dutch war, Orangist writings made much of the link between the Houses of Orange and Stuart and depicted the governments of de Witt and Cromwell as cut from the same cloth. In 1660 the restoration of the Stuart dynasty and the hopes for William III were celebrated in word and image. In 1672 the Orangists adroitly emphasised both the Prince’s independence of any undue English influence and the benefits to be gained from the connection. The case of Buat during the second Anglo-Dutch war undoubtedly damaged the Prince’s party and may have helped the acceptance of the Perpetual Edict of 1667 amongst the waverers. The accusations levied at the brothers de Witt and their confederates, ‘liever frans als prins’, were a fitting revenge. The House of Orange, past and present, were the true defenders of the nation; rather than putative sovereigns, they were the Republic’s greatest and most loyal servants.
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PAST

In the early months of 1672 a pamphlet entitled *Viva Hollandia* celebrated the appointment of William III as captain and admiral general of the Dutch Republic. The author, not only saluted the Prince’s promotion but also deplored the criticism and condemnation heaped on the Prince’s forefathers. He complained that since the death of William II, hardly anyone had dared refer to the praiseworthy deeds of the House of Orange. This, he argued, was the result of a pernicious freedom abroad since 1648; a freedom to say and write what you will, particularly if it involved attacking and demeaning the reputation of the House of Orange. Orangists, he alleged, could not respond to these slanders without fear of censorship and punishment.¹

As we have already seen in earlier chapters, this last allegation fell far short of the truth. Orangists could and did write in defence of the stadholders. Yet virtually all of the author’s contemporaries would have appreciated the connection he was establishing between twenty-two years of exclusion of William III from an official role and the attacks levelled at the previous stadholders by supporters of the States Party. For supporters of the House of Orange, the history of past stadholders formed a narrative which interpreted the past in terms of the services and sacrifices of a particular princely house and the contribution of that house to the strength and prosperity of the Dutch Republic. Orangists saw that a favourable interpretation of the past presaged a hopeful future for the Prince of Orange.² We call this a political ‘myth’ but this is not to disparage its importance. Selected images of the past create solidarity and cohesion and

¹ *Viva Hollandia of Nederlands Vreugd-Basuyn over het verkiesen van Wilhelm III* (Amsterdam, 1672), pp. 2-4.
² Van Klashorst. ‘Metten schijn van monarchie getempert’, p. 120.
can serve to legitimise a social and political order. The anonymous writer of a pamphlet of 1653 subscribed unknowingly to this view when he wrote of ‘vergetenheyt, die wel te recht een Suster vande Doot wort genaemt’. History, he argued, not only taught you to value your present but also to know your enemy.

Seventeenth century Orangists perceived the crucial importance of a reading of the past. Once the rule of the King of Spain had been abjured in 1581, the position of his representative or stadholder depended on a principle of utility; that is the stadholderate fulfilled an essential role in the government of the Dutch Republic. The argument could be made in theory for single headship but its effectiveness could only satisfactorily be supported by evidence of the unique contribution that the House of Orange had made to the founding and development of the new Republic. Claims for the promotion of William III rested upon the achievements and sacrifice of his forefathers. Images of the past would serve to buttress the hopes of a new Orangist order.

History writing has, of course never been value free. Historical thinking during the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century had been based on the assumption that human nature remained constant and that lessons drawn from the past were directly relevant to the present. During the sixteenth century it was classical Antiquity which provided a model while during the course of the seventeenth century there was increasing attention paid to more recent history. Sometimes the intentions of the authors were ambitious indeed. The Reformed minister Abraham van de Velde declared in the introduction to his *De Wonderen des Alder-Hoogsten vertoond inde Opkomst van ’t Vereenigd Nederland* of 1668 that he would demonstrate the stupendous work of God in relation to salvation from Spain and the establishment of the new Republic. He had, he declared, gathered together material from many different histories, the better to work

---

4 Knuttel, no. 7451, pp. 3-4.
upon the conscience of the reader. He urged upon each head of household the duty of handing down these things to their family and servants. ‘Forgetfulness’, he wrote, was one of the principal origins of the Republic’s current misery. Other writers were somewhat more modest in their intent. Many followed the Plutarchean model whereby history writing served as a mode of instructing and inculcating the young in the classical virtues. The soldierly deeds of William II and Maurice could and did fulfil this role. In most of these works, there was no sense of historical development as we understand it. The sequence of events was worked out through great men and their actions, a form of history writing which naturally lent itself to a concentration on the virtues and deeds of the Princes of Orange. This tendency was of course emphasised by the practical reality that the immediate descendants of these heroes held prominent office in the Dutch Republic.

With the death of William II in 1650, the Republic underwent a partial change in its mode of governance. One of the tasks of this ‘new order’ was to pass judgment on the practices of the old regime that had gone before, in this case the conduct of the former stadholders. The ‘canon’ of accepted truths about the national past was changed in order to reflect and emphasise new political realities. Accordingly Pieter de la Court poured scorn on the partiality of former history writing and launched his own attack on the Orange stadholders. Moreover, de la Court’s rhetoric was directed not simply at the acts and omissions of individual stadholders. Rather, it was an indictment of a whole quasi-monarchical system in which no man could write freely. History writing as de la

---

6 Abraham van de Velde, *De Wonderen des Alder-Hoogsten vertoond inde Opkomst van ‘t Vereenigd Nederland* (Amsterdam, 1717), ‘Tot den leser’
Court envisaged, in which the individual examined the facts in independence and impartiality, could not be achieved under the rule of a stadholder.9

William I

Historians of the Dutch Revolt had differed in their appraisal of William I. Emmanuel van Meteren in his Commentarien ofte Memorien van den Nederlandtschen Staet, first published in the late sixteenth century and re-issued in nearly every decade after, had valued a neutral stance though his analysis of most of William’s actions was positive. Pieter Bor, however, in his Nederlantsche oorloghe, beroerten ende borgerlijcke oneenicheyden, had depicted William as the nurturing ‘vader’ of the new republic, a man of manifest good qualities who deplored all excesses carried out in the name of religion. Everhard van Reyd, a fervent member of the Calvinist Reformed church, not unnaturally emphasised William’s far-seeing and principled opposition to Philip II in his Oorspronck ende Voortganck vande Nederlantsche Oorlogen of 1626. Other writers such as Orlers in his Nassauschen Laurencrans of 1610 and his Genealogie des illustres comtes de Nassau of 1615 and Baudartius in Nassausche Oorlogen of 1615 had contributed to an Orangist history in which William was the Judas Maccabaeus of his age, leading a principled struggle against an alien oppression. On the other hand, the dramatist and historian P.C. Hooft in his Historien praised William for his skills as a ‘politique’, used here in a non pejorative sense, reconciling opposing factions and emphasising the value of religious toleration against intolerance from any quarter. All of these works provided a fund of material on which future Orangists could draw: those opposed to the restoration of the stadholderate were not ashamed to draw selectively from them.

9 Historie der Gravelike Regeering in Holland (beschreven door V.H) (1662), ‘Voor-reeden tot den leser’, p. 3v, 4v.5; H. Kampinga, De Opvatting over onze Oudere Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis (The Hague, 1917), pp. 48-51.
There were, of course, other more scathing interpretations of William’s actions. Franciscus Haraeus who came from Utrecht but went abroad to train as a Roman Catholic priest presented a very different William I in his Annales of 1623. His William was a fractious heretic whose actions and those of his fellow nobility had been determined by no more than self-interest and envy. Adriaen van Meerbeeck in his Chroniicke of 1620 saw Orange as determined not to make peace with Philip II at any cost. For both the Italian Jesuit Famiano Strada in De Bello Belgico of 1632 and Cardinal Bentivoglio in his Della guerra di Flandre published in the same decade William had no true religious feeling. Rather he used religion as a pretext to conceal his own ambitions while manipulating the religious principles of others.10

The role and character of William I was under continual reassessment. In 1642 there was published in Munster a work entitled Opkomste der Neder-landtsche Beroerten. The author simply styled himself ‘eenen Lief-hebber der waerheydt ende der zielen saligheyt’ but a later edition of the work ascribes it to Augustijn van Teylingen. In the preface the author expressed his hope that the northern provinces would return to unity in the Roman Catholic faith and he provided for the reader a martyrology of those priests and religious who suffered at the hands of the Sea Beggars and, he emphasised, those who supported them. For this writer also William places ambition before religious principle and he quoted the radical Ghent minister Petrus Dathenus who preached scathingly dat den Prins de Religie achtede ende soo licht veranderde als een omhangsel van een kledt; ende noch om Godt, noch om Religie en gaff maer van Staet ende nut sijnen Aff-godt maecte.11

---

10 A comprehensive account of contemporary historians’ handling of William I, from which the above is drawn, can be found in Haitsma Mulier and Janssen, Willem van Oranje in de Historie 1584-1984, pp. 18-46. For Hoof see Johannes D. M. Cornelissen, ‘Hooft en Tacitus’, in De Eendracht van het land (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw,1987), pp. 53-103 (p. 84).
This book was re-issued in 1649, 1666 and 1673, having on each occasion a place of publication outwith the United Provinces.

These works which were critical of William originated from outside of the United Provinces and their writers' stance was influenced by their Roman Catholic faith and their loyalty to their political masters. The material which began to flow in 1650 differed in that it originated within the Republic (though a false foreign place of publication could be given) and was overtly concerned with issues concerning the internal governance of the United Provinces. Also much of this material appeared in pamphlet form, dealing as they did with contemporary issues.

We see signs of this even before the death of William II. An anti-Orangist tract of 1650 entitled *d’Onstelde Amsterdammer met Sijn trouwe waerschouwinge Raed en Antwoord Op Bickers Beroerten*, allegedly printed in Brussels, appeared in the aftermath of the stadholder's failure to seize the city of Amsterdam. In the opinion of 'Jan' one of the leading protagonists in this fictional debate, William II's actions were just part of the long standing ambition of the House of Orange to seize sovereignty first in Holland and then in the other provinces. William I, he alleged, had also deceitfully sought to become sovereign in the United Provinces.\(^{12}\) This clearly referred to the proposed countship of Holland offered to William I in the early 1580s. This theme recurs in polemic of the time. In a pamphlet of 1651 a fictional 'Hollander' spoke of how events which appeared to be disasters had resulted in favourable outcomes. The expulsion of the Sea Beggars from English harbours had led to the seizure of den Briel in 1572 and the murder of William I in 1584

\[\text{was een groote zegen voor't land, alsoo het na by was dat men hem Graef van Holland soude gemaakt hebben, daer door wy wel van Heer souden verandert hebben maer niet van Conditie, alsoo wy geen beter souden gehad hebben aen Oraignen, als een Spaignen.}^{13}\]

\(^{12}\) Knuttel, no. 6848, pp. 4r, 5r.

\(^{13}\) Knuttel, no. 7039, p. 15.
The Deductie of 1654 penned by John de Witt also emphasised the fortuitous nature of the death of William I and this theme was reiterated the following year when an anonymous writer emphasised God's providential role in preventing William I becoming Count of Holland.\textsuperscript{14}

These sentiments were not new. A leading Holland regent and contemporary of William I, Cornelis Pieterzoon Hooft had been of the few in the early 1580's to oppose the elevation of Orange to the position of Count of Holland and he had persuaded Amsterdam to adopt this point of view in 1584. He wrote subsequently that William I had shown signs of wanting to impose himself as Prince of the new state, a position which would be passed on to his heirs. Only his assassination had prevented this potentially disastrous development.\textsuperscript{15} The sudden and unexpected death of William II in 1650 enabling as it did the Republic to be governed without a stadholder inevitably led to comparisons with earlier 'providential' deaths. Hence it is not surprising that the issue of William I and the countship of Holland resurfaced in this form. However, anti-Orangist writers took matters further.

The writer of Noodig Bericht aan alle oprechte Patriotten published in 1654 argued that previous history writing had emphasised the role of William of Orange at the expense of other heroes such as the leader of the Sea Beggars Lumey de la Marck and the leading Calvinist Brederode. He contended that historians such as van Meteren and Bor had accorded full honours to these latter protagonists but that pro-Orangist writers had deliberately inflated the contribution of William I in order that his descendants should be appointed to the position of stadholder and captain general.

Drawing on the Jesuit writer Strada, he argued that William's actions were determined...\textsuperscript{14} Knuttel, no. 7543, Pt. II, Cap. 1 (20), p. 50; Knuttel, no. 7660, p. 45.\textsuperscript{15} Herman A. Enno van Gelder, De levensbeschouwing van Cornelis Pieterszoon Hooft. Burgermaster van Amsterdam 1547-1626 (Amsterdam: A. H. Kruyt, 1918), pp. 163-164: Memoriën en Adviezen Cornelis Pieterszoon Hooft. Werken Uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht. New Series no. 15 (Utrecht, 1871,) p. 156.
by his jealousy of the Habsburg Archduke Matthias. In addition, he maintained that
William was an incompetent military leader for his army had been unable to liberate the
provinces from the curse of Alba's depredations. A critical and until now
unacknowledged role had been played by the strategy and resolve of the States of
Holland and Zeeland and it was at the cost of their deprivation and suffering that the
House of Orange had ridden high. They, next to God, were the source of Dutch
freedom.

In all of this, the role of the Almighty was paramount. The author recounted that
no lesser power than the Sultan of Turkey had, in a conversation with the Venetian
ambassador concerning Dutch success against Spain, excluded all causes of success
other than the hand of God. The Deductie of 1657 echoed the Sultan's view. Written
to argue against the necessity of an individual leader for the armed and naval forces, the
author fulminated against any talk of a single head or monarch as he preferred to call it.
There was no need of such for God alone had miraculously saved the United Provinces
from the wrath of their foes. Indeed it was as if God himself had been head of state and
the republic a 'theocratische regieringe'.

There are elements here which will recur in the rhetoric of the 1660's, particularly
the reliance on hostile 'catholic' historical sources and the emphasis on the role of God
as opposed to the Princes of Orange. In the Deductie of 1654, John de Witt also argued
that whatever sacrifices the House of Orange had made in the struggle against Spain,
they had been more than compensated by the gains they accrued. Towns and areas
belonging to the House of Orange which lay beyond the boundaries of the United
Provinces had been garrisoned at the expense of the States. In time of truce and treaty
the Princes had received substantial gifts from other nations and their gains from booty
garnered by the East India Company or the West India Company added to the profits of

16 Knuttel, no. 7567, np
17 Knuttel, no. 7880, p. 38.
war totalled no less than 20 million guldens.\textsuperscript{18} Those who believed that an Orange stadholderate was a necessary mark of gratitude for the sacrifices of family must now consider that the debt had long been paid.

The year 1660 sees the beginning of a much more closely argued attack on the past Orange stadholders. In 1660 \textit{Consideratien en Exempelen van Staat omtrent de Fundamenten van allerley Regeeringe} of the brothers de la Court, a monarch is identified by unbridled ambition which serves his interests alone. He encourages, and relishes internal discord for then his opponents are divided and his authority undiminished. From their perspective, William I was an archetypal monarchical figure. His ambition drove him to seek to usurp the authority of Philip II whose stadholder he was. He exploited dissension in matters political and religious to preach sedition and to further his own cause. Echoing Dathenus, de la Court alleged that William changed his religion like he changed his coat, all with the aim of his own aggrandisement.\textsuperscript{19}

Pieter de la Court also introduced his Dutch readers to other writers critical of the House of Orange. In an appendix contained within his 1662 publication \textit{Historie der Gravelike Regeering in Holland} he published for the first time in Dutch a contemporary account of the early years of the Revolt by Viglius, a former president of the Privy Council, member of the Council of State and Chancellor of the Order of the Golden Fleece. Translated by de la Court under the title \textit{Grondig Beright van ’t Nederlands Oproer zo onder de Hertogin van Parma, als den Hertog van Alba}, it had previously only been available in French. De la Court acknowledged that historians inevitably emphasised the achievements and diminished the faults of the group they favoured. Viglius owed all his fortune to the King of Spain, but, de la Court argued, he wrote with ‘meer kennisse and oprightheid’ than other Spanish writers. He thought it good to bring it to the attention of readers, accompanying it with an ‘impartial’ introduction.

\textsuperscript{18} Knuttel, no. 7543, Pt ii. Cap. VI(5), p. 73.
De la Court like Viglius considered that the ambitions of the Netherlands nobility was matched only by their relative poverty. Spain had contributed to their embarrassment by sending them on costly embassies and not reimbursing them but the leaders such as Orange were also naturally inclined to conspicuous consumption. Hence they were eager to change the political structure and replace the rule of Philip II in their own provinces. Orange's stance was based partly on personal animosity to Granvelle, following the latter's successful opposition to William's proposed marriage with a daughter of the House of Lorraine.\textsuperscript{20}

De la Court's position on William I was taken up and reinforced by Uyttenhage de Mist. There are three books which can be attributed to this writer; \textit{De Stadhouderlijcke Regeeringe in Holland ende West-Friesland} of 1662 and \textit{De Gulde Legenden van de Stadthouders in Hollandt ende West-Frieslandt} and \textit{Apologie ofte Verantwoordiginge van den Ondienst der Stadhouderlijke Regeeringe} both of 1663. In \textit{De Stadhouderlijke Regeeringe} Uyttenhage de Mist praised \textit{De Historie der Gravelikke Regeering} and spoke of his own work as a completion of de la Court's work. He knew, he alleged, that he would face abuse from those who were enslaved by the wiles and attractions of the Orangist court but it was his duty to remind his fellow countrymen that the former stadholders had not acted as lowly servants of the state but had ruled in their own right as mighty princes.\textsuperscript{21}

The picture of William I that emerges from these works is scarcely flattering. Uyttenhage De Mist acknowledged that it was the policy of Philip I to rule the Netherlands as a monarch rather than as a count. However, his ambitions were assisted, rather than thwarted, by an impecunious and fractious nobility. The opposition of William of Orange and Egmond to the machinations of Cardinal Granvelle were founded on their own designs to wield the ultimate power on behalf of the king and they

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Historie der Gravelike Regeering in Holland beschreveven door V.H.}(1662), pp. 209-210, 216-222.

\textsuperscript{21} Knuttel, no. 8655A, 'Aen den leser', np; 'Voor-reden', np.
used their authority in the Council of State to achieve their personal ends. The Jesuit historian Strada was cited to prove that once Philip II had departed for Spain, William of Orange's strategy was to exploit the disunity of his fellow nobility in order to have himself appointed as the king's representative and highest authority in the Netherlands.22

William's departure from the Netherlands in 1568 was depicted as a great betrayal of the country and in particular those of his fellow nobility. The way was left open for Alba to enter Brussels and some of Orange's noble contemporaries such as Egmond and Hoorn suffered death at the hands of the government. The exiled William, it is alleged, was determined to place himself at the head of all opposition to Alba and was hence angry and jealous when the Sea Beggars captured den Briel and began forcing their way into the Holland towns in 1572. Even after the Pacification of Ghent in 1576, the chance of peace in the Netherlands is lost because the leading nobility, of which William is one, cannot work together in the common cause. William is portrayed as the epicentre of a maelstrom of destructive envy; his appointment as Ruwaard of Brabant serves only to alienate many of his contemporaries.23

William placed his own interests above those of the suffering citizens of the Low Countries. At Cologne in 1579 the Archduke Matthias had attempted to negotiate a compromise peace with Spain with the help of the good offices of the Emperor and William was severely criticised for his refusal to support this venture. His attempt to seek foreign support from Alençon was portrayed as deeply suspect. The Jesuit historian Strada was cited to support the contention that William favoured this course purely in order that Alençon would make William Count of Holland and Zealand. Van Meteren and van Reyd were quoted to adduce that William actively desired the Countship. It was alleged that money found in William's house after his death had been intended to be

22 Knuttel, no. 8655A, pp. 12-13; Knuttel, no. 8806C, pp. 15, 47.
spent on his inauguration. As the writer expressed it William’s untimely death put an
end to ‘dit onrechtmatigh vervolgen van de Opper-heerschappye, ende van de
Regeersuchtigen Prince leven’.

This type of history contained elements with which we are already familiar. Anti-
Orangist writers drew unashamedly from Catholic historians such as Strada. Orangists
did not let this pass unnoticed. The Orangist polemicist Pieter de Hubert in 1669
excoriated those anti-Orangist writers whose ideas, he alleged, were ‘niet anders als
Concepten, die gezoekt zijn uit die fenynige Apotheke van dien infame Famianus
Strada’. Equally significant is the emphasis placed on the providential work of God as opposed to the actions and strategies of William I. We have already encountered the
motif of divine intervention in the deaths of William I and William II and this theme
was to be reiterated throughout the twenty-two years of stadholderless rule. Here the
theme was developed to encompass virtually every Dutch victory including the
foundation and defence of the nascent Dutch state. The relief of the siege of Leiden in
1574 was imputed to the Almighty alone. William’s actions, the author contended had served only to hinder the relief of the town. For the author of De Gulde Legenden it was self evident that ‘Godt wel den eersten ende oock den voornamen verlosser der Stadt
Leyden geweest is’. Indeed, he went further arguing that all the successes of the Dutch against Spain had wrongly been attributed to the Prince of Orange and his army. Rather they were entirely the work of God. This was a commonly espoused view. A fictional
citizen of Delft in a pamphlet of 1666 quoted the writer Schelius when he asserted that God alone was the origin and cause of their freedom. Monarchs such as Elizabeth I of

25 Knuttel, no. 9762, p. 141.
26 Knuttel, no. 8655A, pp. 32-33; Knuttel, no. 8806C, pp. 27, 57-58.
England and the Duke of Anjou rejected or were rejected for the headship of the
republic due not to the wisdom of the world but as a result of the providence of God.27

This stress on God’s providential action is important as it shifted the emphasis
away from the work of prominent individuals such as William and his descendants.
Single heads, however capable, could not claim to be the saviours of the Dutch. The
sense that God had been a prime mover in their victory against Spain was common to
many Dutch men and women. There was always a danger that by emphasising the
contribution of any man one detracted from the honour due to God. Many who were
friends of the Orange stadholders appreciated that danger. The Reformed Minister
Abraham van de Velde who was no friend to the government of John de Witt assailed
those who ascribed the virtues of the deity to the persons and actions of the former
Orange stadholders. He fulminated ‘wech met sulke Pluymstrijkers en afgoden dienaers,
rechte Princen slaven’. It was God alone who protected us so that like the burning bush
we were consumed with fire yet remained inviolate. However, van de Velde continued
it was not wise to deprive the Princes of Orange of the honour due to them. In one of his
more thoughtful comments he exposed the flaw inherent in the States Party rhetoric. He
asked, if you cannot show appreciation and gratitude to Princes living or deceased, how
can you express gratitude to God who is not visible and in his Majesty uses Princes, like
others, as his instruments. 28

The Orangist Response

The 1650’s saw the beginning of an Orangist response. Opposition to the Act of
Seclusion concentrated on repudiating claims that there was no debt owed to the former
stadholders. A pamphlet published in 1655 and intended to refute the arguments of the
Deductie deployed evidence from the historian Bor to argue that William I had incurred

27 Knuttel, no. 9330, p. 16
28 van de Velde, pp. 15-17, 24.
heavy costs by bringing two armies into the field in 1568 against Alba. The sum involved had never been repaid. A pamphlet of 1654 argued that William I’s costs in war had been incurred, not to further his own interests but at the behest of the provinces and in particular of Holland whose stadholder he was. The anonymous writer tabulated the costs of William’s armies in 1568 and 1572 and reckoned that at simple interest the stadholder and his descendants had built up debts of nearly 40 million guilders of which only 20 million had, at their own calculation, been reimbursed by the States of Holland. These calculations took no account of the damages and confiscation of properties belonging to William I. Clearly a debt of gratitude was still owed and this could best be assuaged by restoring the stadholderate in the person of the young prince William III.

Drama and spectacle are less vulnerable to refutation than a printed work of political rhetoric. Perhaps this explains why the early 1660’s saw the publication, if not production, of plays which showed the character of William of Orange in a favourable light. One such work written by the Zeelander Joos Claerbout and published in 1661 was entitled Droef-Bly-eyndig Vertoog op ’t Belegh en Over-gaen van Middelburgh onder ’t Beleyt van Wilhelmus den Eersten Prince van Oranje. Henk Duits has observed that the dialogue reflected contemporary debate about the character and motivation of William of Orange though we must of course to acknowledge that an author may have had more than one objective in writing a work. As this drama was published in Middelburg, the author no doubt intended to appeal to local sentiments. When in the course of the drama the Dutch Vice Admiral de Moor speaks of the Zeeland heroes who will show that their lives are at the service of their nation, the audience or readers would, have enjoyed the reflected glory. Yet there is evidence that the author was sensitive to the wider debate taking place at the time of publication.

29 Knuttel, no. 7659, np; Knuttel, no. 7553, np.
30 Henk Duits, Van Bartholomeusnacht tot Bataafse opstand (Hilversum: Verloren, 1990), pp. 119-120.
The work is dedicated to the young Prince of Orange, William III. The author explained that he found nothing more pleasurable and instructive, apart of course from the Holy Scriptures, than the contemplation of the history of the Netherlands. In such a history a man could see how miraculously God had brought the United Provinces to their present stature by means of the leadership of William I. He had, he affirmed, written the play for the youth of his time to awaken in them a due gratitude to God and his instruments, in particular Prince William I whom he compared to the Swiss William Tell.

In Claerbout's drama the Spaniards are themselves divided on the character of William I. Don Louis de Requesens commanding the Spanish forces on behalf of Philip II has a view of William which though expressed in less temperate language would chime with that of many Catholic historians. For Requesens, William is an

Armen Aerdt-worm die naer staetsucht en baet-sucht dorst,
Wat onder schijn van recht, hy sal seer haest bevinde
Hoe dat hy heeft soo stout sijn zelfs gaen onderwinde
Te steecken naer de kroon van dien vermaerden Prins.

Requesens vows that this heretic with his pernicious counsel having soared like Phaeton will plummet downwards and he, Requesens, will be the agent of his fall. Yet the Spanish Vice-Admiral Romero fears and respects William for

....soo lange als hy is by Nederlandtsche Staten,
Soo rechten wy niet uyt ons doen en sal niet baten,
Want hy voorsichtigh is en wys in sijn.
Oock is de eerste steen soo hy beleyt noemt Vryigheyt
Ten gronde vast beleyt.

Romero is not so certain that Requesens can bring about William’s downfall and he warns him
The Spaniards appear to acknowledge that William’s leadership of the Revolt has left him in debt, though, of course, they do not see this as a virtue. One Sancio Davila asks rhetorically

... Wat zijn zijn vroome daden
Als gelt-verquistingh tot sijn te groots schaden?
En heeft hy niet sijn schat, sijn silver, en sijn goudt
Te pand geset om hem te redden.

William, he contends, will retreat in ignominy back to Germany.

William’s personal testimony is a response to his Spanish contemporaries and his critics of the 1660’s.

... Ick hebbe noyt getracht
Om mijn vergrooting, noch mijn Princelijcke macht
Met Rijckdom te versien: O neen, dees Ooreloogen
En heb ick niet begost om mijn selfs te verhoogen;
Maer om het Nederlandt te rucken uyt de handt
Van den gewissen dwangh van eenen Dwingenlandt

William addressing his subordinates emphasises the critical role of the Almighty and implicitly his role as an instrument of the Divine Providence when he says

Geen Prins noch volckeren ten hoogen toppe raeckt
Of 's Hemels Opper-Vooght gestaegh daer voren waeckt.32

William’s cause was also presented sympathetically in a work of 1662 entitled Wilhelm oef Gequetste Vryheit. As the title suggests the drama concerned both the character of William I and the wider issue of how far his authority and, by implication, that of his successors was consonant with the concept of freedom. The author Lambert den Bos denied in his introduction to the play that his work was a pure ‘apologia’ for

---

William I but the drama certainly had overtones of the current political rhetoric.\textsuperscript{33} The play begins with Louise de Coligny, the wife of William I and the daughter of Admiral Coligny who had been murdered during the massacre of St Bartholomews Eve in 1572. Louise tells her lady in waiting that she has suffered a terrible dream in which her murdered father with his gaping wounds appears at her bedside. He warns her that her troubles are not over but urges her to have patience and fortitude and trust in God for as Coligny assures her

\begin{quote}
\textit{Die heyl komt eyndelijck neer so langh van u verwacht,}
\textit{Is 't niet op u het is ten minste op u geslacht.}
\end{quote}

Coligny’s words concerning the future providential role of the children of Louise and William not unnaturally fails to reassure his daughter and she rehearses her fears to her husband. William, demonstrating an archetypal masculine approach, urges her to rein in her trepidation. His concerns are the earthly and pragmatic. He enumerates the tasks with which he is burdened. He must ensure unity amongst citizens and soldiers in the face of discord and division. He must forge a closer link between the forces of the secular (Moses) and the religious (Aaron). He must ensure that towns and fortresses are defended. His is clearly a self sacrificial role and he has no brief for personal ambition for his task is also to

\begin{quote}
\textit{roey alle staetsucht uyt, en schadelijcke pracht.}
\textit{Hou Steden in haer eer, in toom geswollen macht.}
\textit{'k Besorgh voor alle dingh de staetsucht voor te komen,}
\textit{Met eerlijck loon de drift van ongenoeght te toomen,}
\textit{Dat onse schatkist rijst en nimmer op en staet,}
\textit{Voor die knaphandigheyt van dieft en eygen baet.}
\end{quote}

Amidst all these concerns

\textsuperscript{33} Duits.\textit{ Van Bartholomeusnacht tot Bataafse Opstand,} pp. 94-151.
This is far removed from the William summoned up in the writings of Pieter de la Court and Uyttenhage de Mist. The dramatist also presents a traditional view of the causes of the Revolt of the type which had been reaffirmed by Orangist history writing. At the end of the second act a chorus of women hymn an account of the past struggles in which the tyrant of the West, Philip II, seeks to trample underfoot the liberties and privileges of all groups of Netherlands society. Far from exploiting discontent for their own selfish ends, the nobility, exiled or condemned to death, are amongst his foremost targets.

Following the death of William a conversation occurs in which themes recurrent in political polemic emerge. The fictional Burgerhart tells his companion Heereman that the death of the Prince, tragic though it was, may have been ultimately providential. He foretells

Ick sie een klaren dagh door desen nevel heenen.

He explains that they were in danger of exchanging one autocratic domination for another for as he expresses it,

wy poogen, dacht ick vaeck, ons selfs van 't juck te vryen,
En voeden in ons schoot weer nieuwe heerschappyen.

This is clearly a reference to the proposal that William I should become count of Holland. He refers to the bellicosity and self interest which he alleges characterised the counts and, by implication, was in danger of occurring again. Heereman will have none of this. Then we were slaves, now we are free citizens. Burgerhart insists

wy wisselden van naem en nimmer van gesagh
but Heereman counters sharply

wy wisselden van staet, en wierden vry geboren;
Een naem voor menige eeuw van onder ons verlooren,

In his view the stadholderate is not a mirror image of the worst excesses of the counts. Rather it is a office which derives its authority from the people, which authority can be revoked by them. It can be no accident that William before his death warns his son Maurice

geen slapte traegheyt, laet u Eed'le borst verov'ren,
Noch vrouwen sucht te seer u dapperheyt betoo'v'ren,
Noch drift tot meer gesagh, in dit gevryde landt
Van ware eendracht oyt ontstrengelen de bant.

In the eyes of many critics of the Orange stadholderate the libidinous Maurice had attempted to exercise sovereignty at the expense of the provincial states, thereby threatening the whole basis of the Union of Utrecht. The author here is, perhaps, drawing a distinction between William whose self sacrifice is not in doubt and the more questionable behaviour of his son.

The conclusion of the play takes on a more traditional Orangist flavour. The gratitude owed to William by the nascent Republic is shown in the construction of his magnificent tomb long after his death.

Hy sal, eer langh, hy sal daer hy ter aerdt sal sincken,
In duersaem koper of in eeuwigh marmer blincken,
En aen den reysiger doen uyt metael verstaen,
War wonder hy al heeft voor onse staet gedaen.

Yet not all show the requisite gratitude. At the end of the fourth act the chorus of courtiers utter irreproachable Orangist sentiments when they speak of William as "gemartelt voor 't ondanckbaer Vaderlandt'. The spectre of William which appears to
his wife in the final act echoes this sentiment when he utters a mournful rebuke against 'een volck, dat wenig danck misschien mijn yver weet'. Yet the play ends with hope for the future. The ghost of Coligny had spoken of the providential work of God in the family of William and Louisa. The spectre of the first William refers with approval to the marriage of his grandson William II to a daughter of the English royal family. Their union results in a son the third of his name who, in the words of his defunct great-grandfather, is now

in d'armen van de staet, de hoop van groote dingen.\textsuperscript{34}

Orangists eager to refute the arguments of de la Court and Uyttenhage de Mist also resorted to the more conventional weapon of political polemic. The nature of polemic required not merely that the writers restated the traditional view of William I but that they expressly refuted, by force of argument, the opposition interpretation of his character and actions. Pursuing this strategy it was essential to emphasise the integrity of former history writers who had been impugned as 'flatterers.' The author of\textit{ Hollands Op-komst}, published in 1662, asked whether it was really the case that eminent writers such as Bor, van Meteren and Hooft were no more than self seeking flatterers. He conceded that it was no virtue in a history writer to remain silent on the failings of the nation's leaders but insisted it was equally wrong to emphasise all the material to their detriment while remaining wilfully silent on their achievements. The States Party writers were intent on vilifying William I while remaining silent on the violence unleashed on the people by Philip II. It was they who were guilty of subverting history for partisan purposes.\textsuperscript{35}


\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Hollands Op-komst oft Bedenkingen op de schaadelijke Schriften genammt Graefelijke Regeeringe en Interest van Holland} (Leyden, 1662). pp. 3, 9.
Thus it was asserted that the States Party view of history in which William, Egmond and other nobles were the source of the revolt was in fundamental conflict with the writings of the eminent jurist and historian Grotius. This was indeed the case. Grotius had written that Philip II was of a nature which would settle for nothing less than absolute power and hated all nations where his authority was constrained by representative assemblies. At the end of the war with France in 1559, he had refused to remove Spanish garrisons from the Netherlands and had retreated to Spain leaving the Low Countries in the hands of his satraps. It was they had instituted a regime of intolerance and it was the nobility and towns together who had recognised that all trade and civil order would not flourish until the Placards against heresy were removed. The Orangist citing of Grotius was a sensitive point since he could hardly be held to be a partisan witness in favour of the stadholders. Some Orangist writers did acknowledge that some of the nobility were guilty of factious behaviour and some were jealous of William I. As one writer expressed it

de Nederlandsche Heeren waren vol jalouzyen tegens malkander, zonderling tegen den Heere Prince van Orange, om zyne Princelyke deugden, liefdaligheid onder de Gemeente, en diergelyke.

However, they countered, the Prince struggled always to be the focus of unity. Eminent historians were used to counter other allegations. Bor and P.C. Hooft were cited to prove that William's reaction to the Sea Beggars capture of Den Briel was indeed one of concern but that concern stemmed not from his own vanity, as States Party writers alleged. Rather, caught unawares by the capture of den Briel, William feared that Lumeys de la Marck and the Beggars would cause the enemy to move once more on to the offensive and so thwart the campaign which the Prince had intended to carry out. To counter the view that the Prince actively sought the countship of Holland,

---

37 Knuttel, no. 8655C, p. 32; Knuttel, no. 9762, p. 110.
evidence was adduced from van Meteren that the matter was spoken of but discarded as soon as certain towns expressed their dissent. One writer went further, perhaps spoiling the force of his argument, when he ascribed Amsterdam’s resistance to the plan to the fact that the town had only recently come over from the side of the King of Spain and was still too easily inclined to consult that monarch’s interests.38

Orangist writers were also prepared to include such primary sources as they considered supported their argument. In two works the evidence of the letters of Philip II’s ambassador in France, Francés de Álava, to the Duchess of Parma were cited to demonstrate that the King was determined to destroy all the privileges of the Netherlands. William of Orange’s own letters of 1563, 1564 and 1565 were quoted to show that not only was William the first to recognise Philip’s full intentions but also that William’s opposition to the introduction of the Inquisition had been based on genuine principles of religious tolerance rather than ambition. William was permitted to voice his own defence against the charge of ingratitude and disloyalty to his sovereign when sizeable section of his *Apologie* or *Verantwoordinghe* were quoted verbatim in one pamphlet. This tendency reached its apogee in 1662 with the publication of a book entitled *Hollant’s voordeel op-gekomen door hare Hoogheden door Godts Genaede Princen van Orangien en Nassau*. This work published in Middelburg and compiled by one N.P. was a collection of letters and documents taken from the Histories of P.C.Hooft and included the *Apologie* as well as the offer of the countship of Holland from the States of Holland, Zeeland and Friesland. The author, as the title suggests, selected thoses sources which he felt vindicated William I against the charge that he had gratituitously rebelled against his sovereign Lord in order to usurp that sovereignty for

38 Knuttel, no. 8655C, p. 23.
himself. He clearly felt that the evidence spoke for itself without the need for extensive commentary.39

As we have seen Orangist writers took note of the fact that their opponents were deploying material from sources hostile to the House of Orange. One writer referred to de la Court’s use in *Gravelike Regeering* of material from the chronicle of Viglius, pointing out that this latter was not an impartial witness but a notorious flatterer of Spain whose account had long been mistrusted by other reputable Dutch historians.40 The author of *Apologie pour la maison de Nassau* alleged that those who depicted William as the man who plunged the Low Countries into civil disorder were merely repeating the calumnies of Alba and the catholic historians. Present day writers, in vilifying William’s name, were carrying out the work of their Spanish masters. The author of *Stadhouderlijke Regeeringe* was described as ‘ce pensionnaire d’Espagne’ and ‘un membre du corps Jesuitique’.41

However Orangist writers were not averse to citing the works of catholic historians when it suited them. The author of *Hollands Op-komst* argued that even Spanish historians had conceded that the tyranny enforced by Alba and the Spanish soldiery ‘zijn oorzaak geweest van dese verdeffelijke en doodelijke Nederlandsche Oorloch’. According to the Orangist author both Bentivoglio and Strada had also admitted that the King of Spain was the original source of the violence which engulfed the provinces. To the charge that William fomented discord in the name of his own selfish ambitions, he countered that Strada himself had acknowledged in Book 9 of his work that the Spaniards had been driven out by the forces of the rebel provinces united together in a common objective.42 In the same way that certain Spaniards in Claerbout’s

41 *Apologie pour la maison de Nassau*, pp. 48, 52, 61.
42 *Hollands Op-komst*, pp. 27, 124-125.
drama had spoken with respect of the Prince of Orange, so Orangists pamphlet writers plundered the works of catholic historians for favourable references to their hero. The writer of a work of 1669 pointed out to his readers that even Bentivoglio in the second book of his histories had commended William's 'wakkerheit, nyverheit, mildheit, welspreckenheit en doorzienigheit in allereytheandel'. 43 The author of Hollands Opkomst cited the words of a catholic historian who had described William as gifted with 'voorsichtigheidt, standvastigheidt, groot-moedigheyde, billikheydt, gedult en matigheyt: deugden der naulijks in een persoon teffens werden gevonden'. He alleged that even Strada had conceded that William was the defender of the freedoms of the Low Countries. 44 The author of another pamphlet of 1662 deployed Strada to emphasize William's critical role in unifying the discontented. In Strada's account Granvelle had counted the seizure of Egmond and Hoorn for little, believing that only with the apprehension of William would the rebels concede. 45

States Party writers had as we have seen consistently emphasised the all determining role of God in the success of the Revolt at the expense of the actions of William II. Orangist writers clearly felt that this strategy had to be forcefully rebutted. One author used the case of the siege of Leiden to illustrate that God and Orange could work together. He argued that William had sent English troops at his own cost to protect the town though he did acknowledge that they subsequently surrendered to the enemy. He had gathered foodstuffs from the surrounding countryside to feed the besieged and he had subsequently taken the decision to cut the dikes and flood the terrain. Admiral Boisot had been summoned from Zeeland to relieve the town and the Prince had, by letter, encouraged the town's resistance even though he was then gravely ill. This was not to deny the role of divine providence, for as the writer expressed it, 'Godt de erste, en voornaemst oorzake zy, niet alleen van 't Verlossen der Stad Leyden, maar ock van 't

43 Knuttel, no. 9762, pp. 132, 134.
44 Hollands Op-komst, pp. 80, 125.
45 Knuttel, no. 8655C, pp. 22-23.
geheele Spaansch Jok'. However the Almighty had deployed the prince of Orange as his instrument.\textsuperscript{46} The irascible writer of \textit{Apologie pour la maison de Nassau} scorned those who insisted that God alone saved the Dutch. They were, he wrote, like little children who when they sat at table were directed to give thanks to God for the food on their plates, 'sans leur faire scavoir les peines que pères et mères ont, pour parvenir aux moyens de leur fournir l'entretien qui leur est nécessaire.'\textsuperscript{47}

Finally, the writer of \textit{Hollands Op-komst} introduced a novel element in the assessment of William I. Faced with the attacks on William's integrity by States Party writers, he countered that their analysis was clearly flawed since the Prince of Orange had enjoyed the universal approval of the people. If he had served the provinces so badly why then had they delegated to him so much status and authority. In this analysis the provincial States were clearly seen as in some sense representing the will of the citizens. As the author expressed it,

\begin{quote}
het volk heeft hem gewilliglijk verkooren, om hare Vryheit voor te staan en te beschermen. 
\ldots als Spanje hem meende meest te straffen en te schelden, is hy allermeest van 't volk verheven en gepresen.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

\textbf{Maurice and Oldenbarnewelt}

William Temple, English Ambassador in the Hague, had published his \textit{Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands} in 1673. In Temple's opinion the long struggle for independence should have made of the new Republic a strong and healthy body. This, he added, was in part true for only one 'disease' had afflicted the body politic in the space of the ninety-three years since the Union of Utrecht in 1579. Yet like a virus it lingered in the blood stream for as Temple expressed it,

\begin{quote}
46 Knuttel, no. 8655C, pp. 25-27.
47 \textit{Apologie pour la maison de Nassau}, pp. 81-82.
48 \textit{Hollands Op-komst}, p.77.
\end{quote}
this Disease, like those of the Seed or Conception in a natural body, Though it first appear'd in
Barnevelt's time, breaking out upon the Negotiations with Spain and seeming to end with his
death. Yet has it ever since continued lurking in the veins of this State and appearing upon all
Revolutions, that seem to favour the predominancy of the one or other Humour in the Body;
And under the Names of the Prince of Orange's and the Arminian Party has ever made the weak
side of this State; and whenever their period comes, will prove the occasion of their Fall. 49

Another 'revolution' in the body occurred in 1650 with the stadholder's thwarted attack
on Amsterdam and his death later that year. Inevitably men reflected on previous
struggles between the stadholder and the States of Holland, in particular the earlier
struggle between Maurice and Oldenbarnevelt and so the political polemic emphasised
parallels. This was not simply a dispassionate reappraisal of the past. It was felt by both
groups that the significance of the policies of the States Party in the years 1650 to 1672
was only apparent when assessed in the light of crucial events in the past.

Firstly, the actions of Maurice, like those of his father William were subjected to a
searching and hostile analysis by the opponents of the House of Orange. They argued
that Maurice had built up within the military an independent power base for himself.
The foundations for this were the 'patents' which enabled him to call up troops swiftly
and the bestowing of military offices. Normally such offices were at the disposal of the
provincial states but Maurice was empowered to act at his own behest when the Dutch
forces were on campaign. Thus he built up a corps of individuals whose loyalties were
to him rather than their provincial masters. This was a dangerous development for
whosoever controlled the army, controlled the state. In addition Maurice had appointed
foreign soldiers to key positions in the army. This was depicted as a sinister strategy.
Not only was it 'unnatural' to prefer these outsiders to native born Dutchmen but these
foreigners were often from countries where there was a monarch or single head and thus
were natural supporters of the stadholder with no commensurate loyalty to the States.

49 Clark, p. 49.
General or provincial States. This cohort of 'flatterers' and foreigners could enable the stadtholder to develop tyrannical powers.50

Buttressed by his supporters in times of war, Maurice had little desire for peace. States Party polemic emphasised his opposition to the Truce of 1609 which they depicted as essential for the republic's economic welfare for the costs of war were greater than the nation could bear. Similarly at the end of the Truce in 1621, rather than seek an advantageous permanent peace, Maurice went back to war, driven it was said by his own desire to interfere in German affairs as well as the urgings of the Zeelander and Counter-remonstrants who had always opposed the Truce. In addition Maurice's personal dynastic interests ensured that the armies of the United Provinces were deployed to occupy areas such as Moers and Lingen which had once been baronies and domains of the Orange-Nassau family.51

Most European observers had counted Maurice as perhaps the greatest military leader of his age but the States Party writers would have none of this. The author of the Gulde Legenden purported to cite both the van Reyd and van Meteren when he alleged that Maurice's unsuccessful attack on the town of Bruges in 1592 had been carried out in direct contravention of the wiser counsels of the magistrates of Zeeland. He had been dilatory if not negligent when he refused to besiege the town of Grol in 1591 in spite of the fact that the States General were firmly in favour of the move and the Spanish troops were mutinous for lack of pay. Driven by dynastic self interest, he had taken the armies of the States General off to Germany in 1621 to support the Elector Frederick, leaving the country vulnerable and denuded of troops.52

Orangists were swift to refute these claims. The use of patents, they argued was essential when the Republic was under threat and the States, with their lengthy deliberations, were too slow to respond. There were occasions when it was important

52 Knuttel, no. 8806C, pp. 177-179.
that military posts were swiftly filled, particularly during the course of gruelling campaigns. As for the employment of foreigners in the army, there were many of them, English, French and Scots and they had given great and honourable service in the name of the Republic. Underlying all these arguments was the assumption that military matters could not be left to the deliberations of the States alone and that the example of Maurice showed that a captain general was essential if victory were to be assured.

Orangists were quite prepared to defend Maurice’s opposition to the Truce of 1609. Not only did they cite the adage of Tacitus that an honourable war was better than a shameful peace but they argued, more pertinently, that by 1608 Spain’s resources were severely depleted. If Spain and the Habsburg Archduke had truly been willing to accept the United Provinces as an independent state, then there was no reason why they should not have concluded a lasting peace. The Truce had simply provided a breathing space for Spain to recover, while internal discord racked the United Provinces.

Similarly Maurice had no real choice but to renew the war in 1621 as there was no offer coming from the Archduke which would have guaranteed Dutch independence. Maurice had not encouraged the Elector Palatine in his Bohemian ambitions but Dutch interests could not permit matters in Germany to proceed without intervention. And as for Moers and Lingen, these had been fortified not because they were former Orangist domains but because of their strategic position on the frontier.

In the face of accusations of military ineptitude, Orangists drew upon historians such as Johan van de Sande who had pointed out that in the case of Grol rain had turned the terrain into a quagmire. Consequently, the besieging soldiers were drenched and cold and beset with sickness and hunger. In desisting from the siege Maurice had shown not only great foresight but also considerable humanity in the face of the sufferings of his troops. Nor was this high view of Maurice’s qualities limited to

---

53 Knuttel. no. 8655C, pp. 52-56.
supporters of the House of Orange. The Jesuit Famianus Strada had written of his ‘dapperheit and ‘voorzichtigheit’ and Cardinal Bentivoglio had said of his military skills that the States General were as well served by Maurice as by any prince in the world. The publication in 1663 of *Nassouer Heldens Pronk-Tooneel* drove home the point. It narrated the inimitable deeds of the heroes of the House of Orange-Nassau and their central role in the restoration of liberties and privileges and defence of freedom.

The flavour of the work can be gauged from the illustration on the frontispiece which depicted the Holland maid kneeling in submission and gratitude beside a seated Prince of Orange. At his feet lay a prone and defeated Spaniard. The first part of the book consisted almost entirely of accounts of Maurice’s military campaigns and victories. The significance of these for contemporary political debate was signalled at the end of the book where the author concluded, ‘we hebben nog een afzetsel van die rechte Stam, daar wy ons mee moogen troosten’.

This polemic concerning the person of Maurice, his military and strategic abilities and his relations with the States General and Oldenbarnevelt found a particular focus in the matter of the battle of Nieuwpoort in 1600. The bare bones of the history concerned were not in dispute. In 1600 the Spanish army in the Southern Netherlands was quartered in several different locations and plagued with mutiny. Meanwhile, the provinces of Holland and Zeeland were both suffering from the depredations of privateers based in the port of Dunkirk. It was decided that Maurice should take an army of approximately fifteen thousand men to Flanders to capture both Nieuwpoort and Dunkirk, thus making the seas safer and facilitating the continuing defence of Ostende, the only town of note in Flanders which was still held by the Republic. The States General believed that the campaign would not be costly for the troops would live off the land and it was hoped that the Flemish towns would contribute to the upkeep of

---

55 *Nassouer Heldens Pronk-Tooneel* (Amsterdam, 1663), p. 754.
the army, an expectation which was not realised. There is no doubt that Maurice himself would have preferred an attack on the coast of Brabant or on the town of Sluis. He was concerned that the siege of Dunkirk could only begin after the capture of Nieuwpoort and both towns would have to be garrisoned and maintained. However the States General were insistent that Dunkirk must be the target. At the resulting battle of Nieuwpoort on 2 July, the Republic triumphed but at the cost of approximately 1,000 dead and 700 severely wounded. The Spanish commander Mendoza lost 3,000 men and personally surrendered to Maurice.

The States General and Oldenbarnevelt now insisted that Maurice should proceed and attack Dunkirk but Maurice was concerned that the Spanish were defeated but not destroyed. Meanwhile his army had been severely weakened and demoralised by the contest and he argued that they were in no condition to lay siege to Nieuwpoort or Dunkirk. Maurice returned with his army to the United Provinces only to hear on his arrival that the Dunkirk privateers had once again caused considerable damage to Dutch fishing vessels. It was said that relations between Maurice and Oldenbarnevelt were never the same following that summer's campaign. In 1601 the Spanish laid siege to Ostende and Oldenbarnevelt urged that the army return to Flanders but Maurice and William Louis of Friesland were flatly opposed and their counsel won the day. 56

It is difficult to exaggerate the iconic significance of the battle of Nieuwpoort in the eyes of many supporters of the House of Orange. Orangist writers continually emphasised that the battle on 2 July 1600 occurred three hundred and two years to the day after the battle in which an ancestor of the Archduke Albert had slain Adolphus van Nassau, a renowned ancestor of Maurice. A poem by Johannes Schuler, a minister of the Reformed Church in Breda, delivered to William III on the occasion of his birthday on 14 November 1664 enumerated the achievements of the House of Orange and their

56 van Deursen, Maurits van Nassau, pp. 174-183.
bearing on his future prospects with specific mention of the coincidence of the two battles.\textsuperscript{57} Nieuwpoort also became not only a victory for a particular dynasty but, for many, an integral and critical element in the struggle for freedom against Spain. Peter Verhoek’s poem ‘De Parnassus aen ‘t Y’ placed Nieuwpoort within this framework of an iconic struggle in which the cause of the Republic and Orange are one.\textsuperscript{58} Most authors of this type avoided any mention of the dispute between Maurice and Oldenbarnevelt. Lambert den Bos in his \textit{Poetische Betrachtingen} of 1646 devoted nearly all of his poem of sixteen hundred lines entitled ‘Mauritias’ to the battle of Nieuwpoort without conceding any hint of discord between the stadholder and the Advocate of Holland.\textsuperscript{59}

However, the States Party history writers of the early 1660’s were bent on destroying Maurice’s reputation for military competence. In their view, wise regents acting in concert were better able to devise a coherent military strategy than a single commander. They claimed that Maurice had singularly failed to adhere to the policy advocated by Oldenbarnevelt and had not followed up the victory at Nieuwpoort. In a blinding demonstration of armchair generalship, they insisted that if Maurice’s troops had been fit enough to fight and win a battle, they were fit and well enough to pursue the enemy. Countering assertions that the troops had been short of food, the author, almost certainly a Leiden lawyer, argued bracingly that troops were used to going without food. Concern for the large numbers of wounded was similarly dismissed. Failure to follow up the victory had enabled Albert to regroup his army and move back out of Flanders. One author cited Oldenbarnevelt’s \textit{Remonstrance} of 1618 in which the author had passionately defended his strategy of action in Flanders and by implication Maurice’s dereliction. In case any honour remained to Maurice, one work quoted van

\textsuperscript{57} Oranie-Fakkel omvlucht met verscheiden Oranie-bloemen en Blaaderen, np.
\textsuperscript{58} Verhoek, p. 214.
\textsuperscript{59} Bax, pp. 141-142.
Reyd to the effect that the honour of victory was due to God alone as both sides had made critical errors during the battle. 60

As political polemic continued to debate the future of the youthful William III, Orangist writers leaped to defend the reputation of his forefather. Not only did they emphasise the desperate condition of the Dutch army following the battle but argued that, if failings there were, they were firmly the responsibility of Oldenbarnevelt. It was he who had urged the Flanders campaign but when battle was joined he remained in Ostende allegedly preventing cavalry reinforcements from reaching Maurice. One author argued that the whole strategy designed to relieve Ostende was flawed as the town was of little value to the Dutch. This writer also emphasised Maurice’s concern for his own troops as well as the magnanimous treatment afforded to the Spanish commander Mendoza. Another conjectured that Oldenbarnevelt’s dispatch of Maurice to Flanders on such a dangerous campaign could be compared to the biblical King David’s dispatch of Uriah the Hittite to the forefront of the battle. 61

When in June 1670 William III became a member of the Council of State, it was clear that he was destined for some form of military service in the name of the Republic. Since the end of 1669 the Council of State, alarmed by Louis XIV’s action against Alsace-Lorraine, was hastily attempting to recruit and equip cavalry and infantry regiments. 62 Inevitably these concerns raised the issue of military command and the possibility of the Prince of Orange acting as captain general. Such considerations prompted reflection on the conduct of previous captains general and their relationship to the States General. The struggle between Maurice and Oldenbarnevelt now became highly relevant to the unfolding of contemporary events.

60 Knuttel, no. 8655A, p. 46; Knuttel, no. 8806C, pp. 86-89; Knuttel, no. 8794A, p. 192.
61 Knuttel, no. 8806C, pp. 57-59; Apologie pour la maison de Nassau, pp. 159-161; Knuttel, no. 9762, pp. 160-164, 200.
62 Japikse, I, 150, 154, 166.
This may account, for the publication in 1670 of a drama by Cornelis van Everdingen concerning the battle of Nieuwpoort entitled *Slagh in Vlaenderen*, *Spaenjens Treurspel*. Recent historical events were now becoming acceptable subjects for dramatic production and Nieuwpoort had already been the theme of a play by Elias Herckmans, also entitled *Slach van Vlanderen*, which was published in 1624. In the introduction to this play the author described himself as one who had been in the service of the House of Orange and he dedicated the work to William III. The past was emphatically to be recalled in the service of the present. In a poem by Humbert in the introductory section of the drama Everdingen was praised as one who ‘die d’oud vergeetenheydt / Doet knarsen op haer tandt’. This call to active memory was followed by an urgent appeal. ‘ONTWAECCK UYT D’ YS’RE SLAEP, ONTWAECK NASSOUSCHEN HELST.’

Throughout the drama, Maurice is characterised as the loyal servant of the States General. Greeting their deputies and those of the provincial states, in Act I, Scene III, he declares emphatically, ‘den wel-stand van haer all’ sijn my van herten lief’. It is clear that Maurice is unconvinced by Oldenbarnevelt’s strategy. This is significant for Herckman’s earlier play did not refer to any disagreement between the two men. Maurice argues that the Spanish army outnumbers the Dutch three to one and that Hollands coffers will be exhausted by the campaign but adds

... ik weet mijn plichten,
Die zijn met ziel, en lijf, verbonden uyt te richten,
Het geen den Staet gebied : ick houd' my aenden Eed,
Die 'k eens geswooren heb.

Here Maurice’s soldierly skills are directed not for selfish dynastic purposes as States Party writers alleged but at the behest of the States General and for the good of the

---

63 Bax, p. 128.
64 Bax, p. 130.
Republic. While critics alleged that the captains general of the House of Orange had built up an independent power base within the army to challenge the authority of the provincial States, van Everdingen’s Maurice follows the strategy laid down by the Oldenbarnevelt and the States General although he nurses well founded concerns about its efficacy. In Act II, Scene III, Maurice relays to his senior officers the orders given to him to engage the Spanish in battle. It is clear that they too harbour doubts but they comfort themselves that in taking action at the behest of the States General Maurice is acting in concert with and on behalf of the people of the United Provinces and express it thus.

Al wat Pompeiius of Romulus ooyt deed,
Stemt met ’t gemeen, ’t om-helst den innerlijke vreede
Het hoofd bestiert de leen, de leen bleeft ’t hoofd gemeen:
Zy bonden haar persoon, selfs in haar eygen rechten,
’t Gemeen stemt in haar wil, ten aensien dat zy hechten
De hand selfs aen het Jock, tot voor-deel van den Staet.

In rhetoric and spectacle, Maurice had been compared previously to the Roman Numa Pompilius both on account of his alleged defence of religion and his military exploits in the cause of freedom. Here, in an analogy of the body, Maurice the head acts out the aspirations and desires of the people, in this case expressed by the deputies of the States General.

However, Maurice is conscious that not all interests are as selfless as his own. At the very beginning of the drama in in Act I, Scene I he warns his younger step-brother Frederick Henry and the readers that there are others who look only to their self interest and not to the national good.

…veel helden van Nassouw,
’t Ontbrack haar noyt aen deucht, den lof bleef by haar trouw.
Dat bleek wel eer, aen hem, die met de Cepter Zwayde
Een Kroon van’t Roomsche Rijk; hoe wel veel hoofden drayde
’t Onteydigh van hem af, vargeters van haar plicht,

65 Knuttel, no. 5741, np.
Die veel om eygen baet, een anders onheyl sticht.

It was Adolph of Nassau who wore the crown of the Holy Roman Empire and
Maurice’s words emphasise the link between the battle which led to Adolph’s death and
Nieuwpoort. However those ‘veel hoofden’ who sought to undermine Adolph carry
overtones of the ‘veel hoofden’ whom Orangists accused of seeking to dominate the
present day Republic.

Compared to Herckmans’ Maurice, van Everdingen’s hero is a profoundly
religious man. Having agreed to carry out a strategy in which he has little faith,
Maurice urges Oldenbarnevelt in Act I, Scene III to institute a day of prayer for the
enterprise. He entrusts himself to God as Isaac entrusted himself to his father Abraham.
Confronted in Act I, Scene IV, by Count Ernest Casimir bearing the news that most of
the men under his command were dead, Maurice admonished him to cast away his
doubts for before dawn salvation will be upon them.

Vertwijfelt maer niet, hy sal ons oock noch redde,
[…]
Stelt uwe hoop op hem, ‘t is noch de selde handt
Die haer, na hare quael, betracht in ‘t beloofde land.
Vertrouw u op den Heer:

In his final soliloquoy in Act V, Scene III Maurice rejoices in victory over ‘Roomens
wulpische Kerck’ before giving thanks to God who has saved him from the hands of his
enemies and vowing lifelong gratitude and service. His opponents had often derided
Maurice’s religious ideals, insisting that for him religion merely served as a pretext for
intervention in affairs of state but here he is portrayed as devoted to the Reformed faith,
not just in office but in person.

Supporters of the States Party might impugn Maurice’s military competence but
van Everdingen’s fictional Spaniards are under no such illusion. As in Claerbout’s

\[66\] Bax, p. 131.
drama, some of the enemy initially deride Maurice and his army but others acknowledge that he is a worthy opponent. A Spanish officer Labberloth boasts in Act II, Scene I that the destruction of Maurice's army will be mere child's play but wiser heads remind him of events at Turnhout where their unsuspecting army was attacked from the rear. In Act V, Scene I the defeated Archduke Albert answers States Party critics of both the House of Orange and the role of a Captain General when he opines

soo lang als Hollandt heeft sulck' Veld-Heer in haer Staedt,  
Sie 'k voor mij wynich kans.

It may be significant that youth is also emphasised. Opponents of the House of Orange had consistently insisted that William III was too young and immature to contemplate any role in the service of the Republic. William would be twenty years of age in November 1670 and arguments of this kind were becoming difficult to sustain. Van Everdingen emphasises the presence of Frederick Henry at the site of battle and lauds the youthful courage of the man who would be the future captain general of the Republic. In Act IV, Scene I, Maurice urges his young step-brother of sixteen years to leave with the departing fleet so that at least one of them would survive. Frederick, however, insists on remaining to play his part in 'Neer-lands schut en scherm'. The Archduchess Isabella is fearful of the outcome of the battle but her husband Albert advises her that Maurice and Frederick Henry will soon concede for the clash of arms will be

voor eerst, in 't open veld, een schrick voor't jonge-bloed  
Van Willems teere Soons, die nauw noch zijn vol-voed  
In Mannelijcke leen.67

67 Cornelis van Everdingen, Slagh van Vlanderen. Spaenjens Treurspel (Utrecht, 1670), np.
The outcome of the battle is an object lesson not just for Albert but for all detractors of the House of Orange.

In political polemic of the period 1650 to 1672 the struggle between Maurice and Oldenbarnevelt was relived anew in the animosity between the House of Orange and de Witt and his party. The events of those years were compared to the events during the years of Truce and particularly the critical period of 1617-1619. In this dialogue, in which both parties were engaged, the policies of John de Witt were likened to those of Oldenbarnevelt and in an ultimately disturbing development the person of de Witt was seen to be Oldenbarnevelt reborn with all the prophetic implications for his final end. In a pamphlet of 1651 *Haagsch Winkel-Praatje* fictional citizens of the provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Friesland and Groningen debated contemporary issues. The Frisian inquired rhetorically:

> was niet het rumoer in 't Politijk Anno 1618, by-na gelijk als dat van 't voorleden jaar ende wilde Barnevelt niet de Regeeringe op de voet hebben als onse heeren die nu practiseeren; ende is niet Barnevelt gestorven om soo een saeck voor te staan als de Heeren van Holland die nu verstaan.

A lively argument followed in which the speakers weighed the relative merits of the six members of the States of Holland imprisoned by William II in 1650 against those of Oldenbarnevelt. Orangists, however, were putting the name of Oldenbarnevelt to other uses. In 1652 the elderly Pauw, the Pensionary of Holland, went on an embassy to England designed to resolve pressing issues between the two nations. His embassy was heavily criticised for amongst other things seeking only to represent the interests of the States of Holland rather than the United Provinces as a whole. For some this was the past repeating itself. In a pamphlet of September 1652 entitled *Den Zeeusen Beesem* the

---

68 Knuttel, no. 7039, p. 17.
writer urged his fellow countrymen to wake up to the reality of what was happening for in his words

tis alles Barnevelts en recht Machiavel.
[...]
Soo is ons heele Landt verbastert en vermompt
Sal Barneveldus Geest by ons nu komen Spoocken.

For this author, the present government were no more than 'Barneveldus Broers'. 69 For another writer of the same year Pauw was a traitor who sought to imitate the policy which Oldenbarnevelt had adopted. 70

In an Orangist pamphlet of 1653 matters were spelled out even more clearly. The supporters of the present government were evil regents and ‘groote voor-standers van Barnevelt en de geheele Arminiaensche factie’. Together, these had attempted to proscribe the True Reformed Religion in the years 1618 and 1618 while permitting the free exercise of the Roman Catholic Religion, had tried to murder Prince Maurice in the interests of their Spanish pay masters and had sought to deprive the citizens of their privileges. Moreover they now intended to reverse the condemnations pronounced on Grotius and Oldenbarnevelt. 71 Certainly it could not be denied that there was a revival of interest in the matter of Oldenbarnevelt. Vondel’s drama Palamedes in which the innocent Greek hero was condemned to death by Agamemnon and his satraps had been widely recognised as an allegory on the trial and execution of Oldenbarnevelt. The first edition, published in 1625, sold out in days in spite of attempts to confiscate copies. Further editions had followed in the same year. Palamedes was republished once in

69 Martinus van Alle, Den Zeeusen Beesem (Leiden, 1652), np.
70 Knuttel, no. 7237, np.
71 Knuttel, no. 7438, np.
1630 and again in 1634 but in 1652 the publisher, Abraham de Wees issued no fewer than six editions.\textsuperscript{72}

For some, the very name ‘Palamedes’ was coming to stand for the defence of native freedoms against overwheeming authority. In a pamphlet of 1650 a fictitious Hollander stoutly maintained the integrity of provincial sovereignty against the forces of the States General and the stadholder. Referring to the attack on Amsterdam and the city’s powerful Bickers family, he alleged ‘doch het gaet nu als het eertijds gingh, \textit{Palamedes wiert van Ulysses, om sijn deughden gehaet, en aen’t ongedierte overgeleverd’}.\textsuperscript{73} The reference was clearly not just to a Greek hero but to the executed Oldenbarnevelt whose principles were being upheld by Amsterdam and the States of Holland. In 1657 Johan van Someren, a correspondent of John de Witts, published \textit{Herstelde Oudheyt ofte Beschryvinge van Batavia}. Here he analysed the ‘freedoms’ enjoyed by the Batavians and the threats to those ‘freedoms’. The work was a judgment on recent events. The author depicted Arminius and Civilis, both of whom aspired to be kings, were represented as ‘disturbers’ of the Netherlands, just as Maurice and William II appeared to the States Party. The frontispiece showed a woman mounted in a chariot of state, on her head a laurel wreath and in her left hand a lance upon which a cap of freedom rested. Behind her on the chariot armed with trumpet stood the archetypal figure of Fame. Beneath was written ‘Beschrivingh van Batavia’ and at the very bottom of the illustration was inscribed ‘Palamedes inv (ictus)’.\textsuperscript{74}

The spectre of Oldenbarnevelt still haunted contemporaries. 1658 saw the second publication of a work entitled \textit{Historie van het Leven en Sterven van Heer Johan van Oldenbarnevelt}. The anonymous author described himself as ‘een Liefhebber der Waarheyt’ and in a reference to the castle where the six members of the States of

\textsuperscript{73} Knuttel, no. 6832, np.
\textsuperscript{74} Johan van Someren, \textit{Herstelde Oudheyt ofte Beschryvinge van Batavia} (Nymegen, 1657), p. 240.
Holland had been confined by William II in 1650, the publication of 1658 was published 'op Loevesteyn.' This work had been first published in 1648 in the city of Rotterdam where copies had been confiscated on the orders of the magistrates. In May 1648 the States General had described the book as a 'notorious defamatory libel' and urged all provinces to act against it. The editor, Joannes Naeranus, likened his travails to those of Vondel whose *Palamedes* had been banned in 1625. In the introduction to the edition of 1658 the printer bluntly asserted that the sentence against Oldenbarneveld was unjust and prompted by base motives. However, he hastened to assure his readers that he did not say this to foment disorder or tarnish the name of his fatherland,

maar alleen om te betoonen, hoe ellendig een Staat gebengelt en geringelaart wert, wanneer eenige van de Regenten haar plichten niet quijtende, hare Voor-rechten en Priviligien om de gunst van de eene en de haat van andere, haar uyt de hand laten nemen; oft gewillige overgeven.

Such an outrage could not happen in present times and readers were urged to recognise how fortunate they were to be governed now by such wise and prudent regents. Inevitably the picture of Maurice which emerged from this work was not a flattering one. As the writer expressed it, his aim like that of all history writers was to emphasise the merits of his subject but inevitably, he coyly conceded, this involved the bringing to light of all the failings of those who opposed him. Vondel, in a poem seemingly written for this edition of the book, described the Advocate of Holland as 'Hollands Vader' and defender of her freedoms who was 'veroordeeld als een Seneka / door Nero's haat en ongena'. This would not be the last time that Maurice was compared to Nero. Another poem by an anonymous author entitled *Praalbeeld voor den Vader der Vaderlands* urged that a statue of Oldenbarneveld, bearing the hat of freedom in his hand, should be erected at the door of the chamber in which he had been so

---

unjustly condemned. Such a statue would serve to remind what the present government stood for and as well as emphasising that they were honour bound to struggle against the forces of malice and tyranny from whichsoever source they came.

This debate, however, was to take on a different and more disturbing tone. In the controversy surrounding the Public Prayer Debate in 1663, past and present converged. Battle commenced with a pamphlet tellingly entitled *Den Ver-resenen Barnevelt, Betabbert met alle sijne Politycke Maximen*. The author set the tone for the debate which would follow when he affirmed that ‘geene saecke moet een soo nieuw niet schijnen of men sy verseeckert dat in de voorgaende eeuwen deselve sy gepassert’. What was occurring with respect to the formula of prayer was the struggle of Remonstrant and Counter-Remonstrant all over again only now, the author pointedly added, there was no stadholder Prince of Orange to resolve the issue and sustain the Union. He commented tersely, ‘BARNVELT’S geest is verresenen als eenen vermomde Samuel’ and mused purposefully whether the outcome might not end in tragedy as before.

Another writer of the same year similarly linked Oldenbarnevelt to the present government of the Republic. In a fictional dialogue between a Rotterdammer and a native of Gelderland, the former insisted that the Advocate of Holland was an ‘Agrippa’ that is one born against nature feet first and such persons ‘naer de getuygenis der Naturalisten, hebben gemeynelick een ongeluckich eynde’. Both Nero and Cromwell had been such. The Geldersman saw parallels in the present when he added darkly, ‘ick

---

77 Knuttel no. 8797, p. 3
soude nu wel gelooven datter ter dieser tijdt noch wel sommighe in 't landt zijn door de wonderen diemen verneemt, welcke oock met de voeten eerst geboren zijn'.

1663 also saw the republication of an Orangist pamphlet, first issued in 1618, entitled *Gulden legende van den Nieuwen St Jan*. It was a virulent attack on the person and policies of Oldenbarnevelt but the publisher clearly intended it to be of more than historical relevance. On the frontispiece he declared that the pamphlet was ‘tot klaer bericht bestelt voor den nieuwen geresene Barnevelt’. The events of 1617-1619 had become topical. The conversation between the Rotterdammer and the Geldersman continued in another pamphlet of 1663 in which the protagonists argued that Oldenbarnevelt had been justly condemned to death. For those who thirsted for more of the same, in the following year a third tranche of this fictional discourse provided a continuation of those ‘schrickelicke geschiedenissen vande Arminiaensche beroerten’.

There was a speedy response from the States Party writers. Just as the Orangists, they were ready to resurrect the quarrels of the past. A poem by the Remonstrant writer Jacob Westerbaan entitled *Krancken Troost voor Israel in Holland* began not with the events of the early 1660's but the pillaging in February 1617 of the home of Rem Bisschop in Amsterdam by a mob urged on by Gomarist preachers. For Westerbaan, this served as an object lesson of what happens when religion escapes from the control of the secular provincial power. For the author of *Herstelden Barnevelt* the problems of those years were entirely the result of Maurice's attempt to seize sovereignty from his masters, the States of Holland. These writers effectively demonised Maurice. In a fictional discourse an inhabitant of the Hague mused on the arrest and trial of the Advocate Jacob van den Ende by the Duke of Alba in the previous century. Van den

---

79 Knuttel, no. 8795 : Knuttel, nos. 2757, 2758, 2759
80 Knuttel, no. 8805
81 Knuttel, no. 8917
82 Knuttel, no. 8807, p. 3.
83 Knuttel, no. 8799, p. 5.
Ende had been lured by an allegedly friendly invitation and then seized and brought before the Council of Blood. He died in prison before sentence was pronounced. The citizen argued that in this matter the Duke of Alba had been less culpable than the stadholder Maurice. Alba could at least be excused because he was acting on behalf of his master Philip II but Maurice had been acting against the leading servants of those, the States of Holland, who were the masters of Maurice. He concluded 'de Hollanders behooren meer te schrikken voor den naam van een Stadhouder als voor Duc Dalf'.

Westerbaan reinforced this idea in his poem when he insisted that the persecution of the Remonstrant ministers and congregations marked a return to the values of Alba and the Council of Blood. This comparison became an idée fixe in States Party rhetoric whenever the issue of Maurice and Oldenbarnevelt were discussed.

Supporters of the States Party were well aware of the dangers which lurked in Orangist polemic. Westerbaan was only too willing to agree that the issues arising in the troubles of 1617-1619 appeared to have recurred in 1663 but it was only principles and not individuals who were involved. Oldenbarnevelt had not risen from his grave: he would rest there until the Day of Judgment when God would take revenge for his innocent blood. For the writer of Den Schotschen Duyvel of 1663, Oldenbarnevelt was indeed a martyr and 'de tragedie van Palamedes, Coningh Stuart, de Louvestainsche Heeren, is eene en de selve'. However, readers must beware of Orangist rhetoric for they 'hares verresenen Barnevelts WITTE hooft willen laeten van de Schouderen nemen en Holland overgeven aen de discretie van vremde knechten'. A poem of 1664 reinforced the identification between the fates of Charles I and Oldenbarnevelt before shedding light on what the author believed to be the true objective of Orangist polemic. They sought to make Oldembarnevelt despised,

---

84 Knuttel, no. 8803, pp. 48-49.
85 Knuttel, no. 8807, p. 4
86 See for example Knuttel, no. 9587, p. 15.
87 Knuttel, no. 8807, p. 22-23.
88 Knuttel, no. 8801, p. 49, 52.
ghelijck sy de tegenwoordige regeeringe wederom soecken verhaet te maecken door haer vuyle pasquillen: De Gulde Legenden van St Ian, Den Verresenen Barnevelt, t' Samenspraech tusschen een Rotterdammer En Geldersman, Kaets-bal… om noch eens een bloedige Traghedy te Spelen op Hollants Toneel.  

The risen Oldenbarnevelt lived in the person of John de Witt and there were those who hoped that the present Pensionary would undergo the fate of his famous predecessor. Oldenbarnevelt also reappears as the martyred Palamedes. In his life of Vondel, Brandt explains that the first ever performance of Palamedes, since its publication in 1625, took place in Rotterdam in 1663. There were also three open air productions in 1665 when the Amsterdam Schouwburg was being rebuilt. In Rotterdam a deputation of Reformed ministers complained to the Burgomasters that the production of Palamedes was an insult to God’s Church and the House of Orange which strove to uphold it. Writers hostile to the House of Orange made it plain that these productions of Palamedes were linked to the memory of Oldenbarnevelt. An author of 1664, said of the production in Rotterdam that it depicted the unjust death of ‘onsen Hollandsen Palamedes’ and set this within the framework of the freedom which had been established in a government without a stadholder.

The fiftieth anniversary of the death of Oldenbarnevelt was not surprisingly marked by a publication. In this case, the author of the work concerned declared that he did not intend to take sides on the matter but simply to provide a narrative. However, a work bearing the same title and published by Joannes Naeranus, which appeared in 1670, eschewed any attempt at impartiality. He informed his readers that his account, containing material not previously published would move their hearts with its recitation

89 Knuttel, no. 8928, np.
90 Geeraardt Brandt: Het Leven van Joost van den Vondel. ed. by Marieke van Oostrom and Maria A. Schenkeveld-Van der Dussen (Amsterdam, 1986), p. 70.
91 J. H. W Unger, ‘Vondeliana IV, Palamedes’, Oud Holland, 6 (1888), 51-67 (pp. 56-57).
92 Knuttel, no. 8916, p. 11.
93 Waerachtige Historie van ’t Geslacht, Geboorte…van wijlen Heer Juan Oldenbarnevelt (Amsterdam, 1669). ‘Voor-Hoof’. 
of the unjust and malignant slanders which Oldenbarnevelt had endured during his
lifetime and with which his memory was still assailed. His sufferings were the work of
the stadholder for it was in the very nature of the men who held that office that they
would trample upon the rights, laws and privileges of the country. Men must be
reminded of these matters for there were some citizens who

zoo verbasterd zijn van zinnen dat ze de Stadhouderlijke straffe Regeeringe voor een vrije
Staatse derven prijzen: zoo die zoo onwaarde Hollanders dit boek komen te lezen, en met een
goed oordeel te onderscheiden, zoo heb ik mijn wens en begeren voltrokken. 94

The sudden collapse of Dutch resistance in the face of the French incursions in
1672 created a mood of national soul searching. For many, the roots of this disaster
were to be found, at least in part, in the past. In the light of the previous polemic, it was
inevitable that the spectre of Oldenbarnevelt would be raised by Orangist writers. An
anonymous poem of 1672, published in pamphlet form, decried the loss of so many
towns and fortresses on the eastern frontiers of the Republic and the conduct of the
officers charged with their defence. For this author, the origins of this defeat were
expressed in the following sentiment.

De sack van Barnevelt en was noch niet vergeten,
Het werk van Loevestein was noch in 't hert gesleten. 95

Another writer alleged that the disasters of 1672 were the result of naked self interest on
the part of the nation’s rulers and a failure to maintain good relations with nations such
as England. These failings could be ascribed to the fact that the Republic’s rulers were
none other than ‘het saet van Barnevelt op t’ Hoogerhuys geseten’. 96 Borstius, a
Reformed minister from Rotterdam, raised the spectre of treachery when he argued that

94 Waerachtige Historie (1670), ‘Voor-Hoof’t.
95 Knuttel, no. 10117, np.
96 Knuttel, no. 10222, np.
foreign powers could not have wrought such havoc if they had not been assisted by sympathisers from within. He traced the origins of this internal discord and want of patriotism back to the time of the stadholder Maurice 'in wiens tijd het eerste Zaedt Vruchten heeft gedragen van dat welck nu noch tegenwoordigh oorsaeck is van ons bederf'. The supporters of de Witt were 'vuyle gepassioneerde menschen, het rechte Zaad en nakomelingen van Barnevelt'. A pamphlet containing a fictional catalogue of books allegedly found in the library of John de Witt linked adherence to the principles of Oldenbarnevelt with present day treachery. One of the works contained within was described as 'De gront-regel van de Politie' in which were clearly stated 'de middelen om Barnevelt's doodt te wreken, door 't vermoorden der Slickgeuzen met haer Opperhooft en veel liever Frans als Prins'.

Many of these pamphlets were diminutive ephemeral productions and generally speaking they have not been considered worthy of study. Yet they were not lacking in significance. It had always been the contention of the Orangist Party that only the exercise of the authority of the stadholder Maurice had saved the Republic from dissolution. Faced by a French invasion and an apparent pusillanimity among many in government, their readers could draw the obvious conclusion that only the restoration of the stadtholderate could save them from the government of John de Witt and the French.

After the deaths of the brothers de Witt, Orangist propaganda linked them conclusively with Oldenbarnevelt. A pamphlet printed after the lynchings in the Hague, stated laconically of the de Witts that,

hare Namen mede moghten ghedacht werden als Martelaars in het Boek van dien vromen Patriot, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, die om deselve reden, door Beuls handen, mede na de andere Wereld is gesonden.

---

97 Knuttel, no. 10224, pp. 4, 11.
98 Knuttel, no. 10343, np. (Book 18)
99 Knuttel, no. 10423, np.
A pamphlet issued at about the same time likened the life and work of Oldenbarnevelt to that of John de Witt both being pensionaries of Holland. The writer made explicit to his readers that 'de geest van Bamevelt, 'landsvyant, aarts verrader' was 'herlevende in de Witt'. Both had, he alleged, oppressed the Church of God and the House of Orange.\(^{100}\)

This theme was reinforced visually. A satirical print of 1674, based on a pamphlet of 1672, was headed by the query whether the de Witts were devils or not, the wording being flanked by the image of the bodies of the two brothers hanging on the gallows. John de Witt was also depicted flying with wings, cloven hooves and devil's horns. His brother Cornelis was similarly equipped and bearing a mask of deception. In the centre the Holland Maid sat in her garden overlooked by a tower with the sun on it representing Louis XIV of France. In a building by the tower a brace of devils were supporting the headless body of Oldenbarnevelt while they attempted to re-attach his head and bring him back to life. Their attempts were in vain, however, for from the left William III approached and with him men bearing the coats of arms of the towns he had reconquered from the French. \(^{101}\) Another print of 1672 emphasised the common fate of Oldenbarnevelt and John de Witt. The figure of Death is depicted bearing his scythe and seated with one elbow resting on books on a table in a melancholy pose. Above him and to his left is the face of Oldenbarnevelt. Two prints of the brothers de Witt are attached to the table hanging down towards the floor at the foot of which a snake is curled. On the table are seen two books *Op en ondergang der Grooten* (Plutarch's *Lives*) and Vondel's *Palamedes*.\(^{102}\)

Of course not all the print makers need be described as Orangist. They and others like them simply reflected the prevailing rhetoric. The Orangist strategy of the 1660's had bound together Oldenbarnevelt and John de Witt with the implication that the

---

\(^{100}\) Knuttel, no. 10432, np.

\(^{101}\) Stolk, no. 2575; Knuttel, no. 10421.

\(^{102}\) Stolk, no. 2483; Muller, no. 2423.
second would suffer the fate of the first. With the death of the de Witts this type of rhetoric seemed little short of prophetic. Prints and pamphlets published after the murders in the Hague gave the impression that no other outcome had been possible. In prose, poetry and print the death of John de Witt and his brother, as well as the execution of Oldenbarnevelt were depicted as the inevitable consequence of an attempt to thwart the government of a stadholder. By implication, such policies, were doomed to failure and their authors to death.

Conclusion

In a print of 1674 entitled Anticurus van Loevesteyn John de Witt sits on the stadholder’s chair as the embodiment of the now defunct Perpetual Edict. His hair is composed of adders spitting forth the names of anti-Orangist pamphlets. On a nearby table rests a copy of the ‘Gulde Boeck’, that is de Gulde Legenden of 1663 in which the reputations of the former stadholders were systematically debunked. Behind him are the images of chaos wrought in state, church and military. Above them the embodiment of Freedom descends on a cloud bearing the arms of William III.103 In the mind of many Orangists, the attack on the former stadholders was a major factor in the dissolution of the Republic which had threatened in 1672. An anonymous author of 1672 alleged that works such as the Stadhouderlijcke Regeeringe of 1662 had inflicted more harm on the Republic than Balthazar Gerard the assassin of William II.104

Certainly Orangists saw a defence of the persons and actions of the former stadholders as crucial to the future of William III. To that end, they deployed not only political rhetoric but also, in the 1660’s, drama. The two genres were closely connected. Characters in the plays posed and answered many of the questions which were being

103 Muller, no. 2523; Stolk, no. 2573.
104 Knuttel, no. 10376, pp. 8-9.
debated in contemporary political pamphlets. In this way, the criticisms of Catholic historians, now deployed by supporters of the States Party, were confounded.

Sometimes this struggle for the past degenerated into tedium. Many commentators have seen the ‘history writing’ of the supporters of the States Party in the 1660s as marking a new phase of independent critical analysis. Both Kampinga in his *De Opvattingen over onze Oudere Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis* and Haitsma Mulier and Janssen in their *Willem van Oranje in de Historie 1584-1984* support this thesis. To contemporaries it may have appeared differently. De la Court may have mocked the ‘pluymstrijckers’ who had previously eulogised the Princes of Orange but he was surely no less partisan and supportive of the existing regime as they had been of the Orange stadholders. De la Court might have taken a cynical view of human nature as epitomised in the drive for sovereignty on the part of the stadholders but he did not apply these dictums to his own motivation. There is a repetitive quality in the manner in which de la Court and others place the worst possible construction on the policies and actions of the Princes of Orange. This did not escape contemporaries. The author of *Apologie pour la maison de Nassau*, himself no stranger to hyperbole, may be permitted to speak.

Le Prince Guillaume et ses descendants n’ayant pas contenté les partis d’Espagne dans les progrès qu’ils ont faits... s’ils prennent des villes ils ruinent le Pais, s’ils gaignent des batailles ils ne poursuivent pas leurs victoires, s’ils employent leurs armes pour secourir la patrie affligée, ces armateurs-là servent plutôt a oppresser la liberté, qu’à la délivrer; si la commodité ne permet d’emporter une ville par siège, ils sont blâmés de lâcheté, si l’ennemi fort au triple prend nos gens au dépouvrvu, et aux-quals on ne pouvoit donner secours, il leur atribuée la faute avec ironie; si l’Espagnol cauteleux fait semblant de trait de paix pour amuser les États, lesquels découvrans les fourbes n’y veulent point entendre, on blâme le Prince d’être l’obstacle qui empêche le repos de la patrie; bref des actions de cette maison il en fait une selle a tous chevaux.

Pervasive also is the polemic of hatred. Orangist identification of the person of John de Witt with that of Oldenbarnevelt served two functions. Firstly it presented the party of Holland in the years 1650-1672 as pursuing an identical policy to its

---

106 *Apologie pour la maison de Nassau*, pp. 290-291.
predecessors during the critical years 1617-1619. In this latter instance Orangists would argue that it was only the person of the stadholder Maurice who saved the Republic from internal dissolution. Only the restoration of William III could save the seven provinces from a similar fate. Secondly, and more disturbing, there was an implication, identified by supporters of the States Party, that John de Witt would suffer the fate of Oldenbarnevelt. Traditional analysis of the content of political pamphlets has tended to ignore or disregard these disagreeable sentiments, concentrating rather on wider, constitutional issues such as sovereignty and authority. Yet, at times of crisis, such polemic could have appalling repercussions.
THE RHETORIC OF POPULAR ORANGISM 1650-1672.

An unknown correspondent of secretary Thurloe reported back to England on Dutch affairs following the Treaty of Westminster in 1654. Describing the celebrations which marked the end of the first Anglo-Dutch war, he recorded that the trumpeter’s first salvo was the Orangist Wilhelmus ‘wherewith I heard the commonalty were well pleased’. A letter from the Hague to London in the same month of May drew a distinction between John de Witt and his cohorts who governed and ‘le peuple, qui ne gouverne point’ but who ‘enrage pour le prins’.1 This impression was not confined to reports across the North Sea. A letter to Mazarin in Paris in August 1660 confirmed that ‘le commun peuple, généralement parlant, paroit bien intentionne pour le Prince’.2 Dutch sources reinforce this impression. A pamphlet of 1661, bewailing the death of Mary Stuart the mother of the young prince of Orange William III, offered consolation to the latter in his hour of grief. William might now be the sole remnant of the House of Orange but he must remember that ‘de ghemeent is goed Prins’.3 The writer one ‘PJT.’ appears to have been of an Orangist persuasion but his opinion was to be confirmed from other sources. Schelius’ posthumous work Algemeene Vrijheid published in 1666 demonstrated clearly the author’s support for the policy of John de Witt. In Schelius’ view the Orangists posed a greater threat to the security of the Republic than any English aggression because ‘zy het geringste grauw tegen haare gerichtige overheden opstokken’.4 The use of the term ‘grauw’ is clearly pejorative yet the outcome is the same. They are for the Prince.

1 Birch, ii, 292, 297.
2 Groen van Prinsterer, v, 199.
3 Knuttel, no. 8537A, np.
The challenge facing the Orangists after the death of the stadholder William II in 1650 was to formulate a rhetoric of opposition. This would take several forms. Political polemic would combine an attack on the policies and writings of the States Party of John de Witt while reasserting the arguments for a stadholder and captain general. Traditionally, commentators have seen this type of propaganda as intended to persuade and convince. It is equally likely that this rhetoric was designed to sustain Orangist spirits in inopportune times demonstrating, if nothing else, that the supporters of the Prince were still in business. Provided the government of the Republic enjoyed the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the populace and in particular the political classes such Orangist propaganda would continue to uphold the cause while awaiting more propitious times. However, whenever events conspired to cause grumbling discontent, Orangist rhetoric assumed a more active and seditious role urging upheaval in local and national politics.

Such an occasion was 1653. From the start of the Anglo-Dutch war in 1652 it had been apparent that the Dutch navy was unable to gain the upper hand over an English navy which had been substantially expanded to combat the royalist threat at sea. In 1653 the Dutch fleet was mauled off Portland Bill, Harwich and Scheveningen, in which last engagement the Dutch lost Admiral Tromp, eleven warships and four thousand men. The arrival home of cohorts of maimed and battered seamen served as a physical image of the misery of the Republic, beset by the suspension of much long distance trade and humiliated by the loss of Netherlands Brazil to the Portuguese. In the summer of 1653 riots erupted throughout the province of Holland, in Rotterdam, Dordrecht, Alkmaar, Hoorn, the Hague and Medemblik. The rioters pointedly displayed their allegiance to the House of Orange. In Haarlem the trained bands marched through the town waving orange flags and sporting orange favours on their clothing and hats. In Amsterdam men

---

beating drums to call for volunteers for the navy were ordered by the crowd to frame their call in the name of the Prince of Orange and when the drummers staunchly refused, their drums were forcibly confiscated. Aitzema in his contemporary account recorded that as the misery and straits of poverty grew greater, so the common people were moved to cry 'vive le Prince'. In Enkhuizen a mob fuelled by antipathy to the town regents and the local Catholics ran amok and took over the town for several days. A correspondent of Thurloe recorded that Enkhuizen had declared for the Prince and placed his colours on the walls.

In these circumstances it is to be expected that Orangist polemic urged political activism on its supporters. In 1653 were published two pamphlets entitled *Ondeckinghe van den Nederlantschen Cancker* and *Ontdeckinghe van den tegenwoordigen stande onses Vader-Landts*. The first named was described as printed in 'heyl- stadt' by 'Eelhart Goed-raedt,' the second, named more prosaically, issued from Middelburg and was printed by Zacharias Roman. In spite of the different titles and sources, the pamphlets were virtually one and the same. Although neither title appears in Knuttel's lists of banned books and pamphlets, the existence of a pamphlet under two different titles suggests a strategy designed to circumvent a local ban. The pamphlet was undeniably subversive. The anonymous author declared his theme to be 'restoration'; restoration of the freedoms won for the Republic by their God-fearing forefathers under the leadership of the Prince of Orange. The disasters suffered by the Republic were manifestations of the wrath of God against a conspiracy of 'de Grooten' who were characterised by their whoredom, adultery and conspicuous consumption. Their strategy was to make themselves 'absoluyt Meesters van de Regeeringe' by casting aside the authority of the States General, renouncing the Union of Utrecht which bound the seven provinces.

---

7 Birch, I, pp. 253-254, 295, 324.
8 Knuttel. nos. 7441, 7462.
together and forcing through fundamental changes in religion. Crucial to the writer’s analysis was the depiction of the States Party of John de Witt as powerful oligarchs who stifled all dissent and in so doing deprived the citizens of the Republic of their fundamental liberties. The role of the Prince of Orange, on the contrary, was ‘de Burgers aldaer te verlossen van de groote slavernye de Regenten’. The ‘gemeene volck’ were already everywhere calling for the Prince to be promoted as Captain General of the Army and as the author tellingly observed ‘Vox Populi, Vox Dei’. Ominously, he continued that the Prince must swiftly be promoted to his new authority, ‘eer het volck na de wijse van de Romeynen selver yemant sonder bepalinge op-werpen’.

Having conjured up the spectre of the populace taking up arms on behalf of some nameless dictator, the author hastened to reassure his readers that this was not a call to rebellion. At such a time of national crisis it was essential that the regents securely held the reins of government. Rather the magistrates in their elections must ensure that no-one entered the town council who adhered to the malignant maxims of the current government and sitting members of that persuasion must be purged. The author called specifically on the captains of the local militia, deacons of the guild and substantial merchants and tradesmen. They must persuade recalcitrant magistrates to purge their ranks and replace the malignant with the good. However the author conceded that the local magistrates might not listen to reason. In that case the intervention must be sought from the ‘populus’ (ghemeynte) just as had occurred before successfully in the struggle against Spain when such popular intervention had been supported by the leaders of the rebellion, including William of Orange.

The rhetoric of this pamphlet reflects in part contemporary circumstances. An appeal to specific groups within the community to take upon themselves the role of the peoples’ tribune in urging the magistrates to purge their ranks of their opponents and the
ultimate ressort to the community as a whole would have had considerable resonance in the Republic of 1653 where trained bands sported orange favours and the crowd at Enkhuizen forcibly purged their town council. However, the mark of this type of polemic is that it will both explicitly and implicitly evoke past events and past rhetoric. Present circumstances may be different but they will be presented in a context which evokes the past. This can be seen by examining the language of the pamphlet.

The primary purpose of this call to political action is the theme of restoration. That which is to be restored is described in the all embracing term ‘d'oude maximen’ and this is, as we will see, a recurrent theme in Orangist polemic. The author of this pamphlet dated the demise of the ‘d'oude maximen’ from the Great Assembly of 1651, when the Prince of Orange as stadholder was cast aside and with him, he alleged, the Union of Utrecht. For an anonymous Orangist writer of 1660 the restoration of the stadholderate will restore the ‘d'oude maximen en grondt-vesten’. No further qualification is needed. This language, with its emphasis on restoration is reminiscent of the earlier polemic of the Dutch Revolt. An analysis of the Revolt in an Orangist pamphlet of 1618 depicted the Netherlands as a freedom loving people, crushed by the might of a centralising and absolutist Spain, whose liberties were ‘restored’ by William of Orange and, nota bene, the ‘gemeente’. Significantly, in later Orangist rhetoric the image of Spain was transposed onto that of an overweening Dutch regent oligarchy which, by denying the Prince of Orange a role in the nation’s future, threatens to deprive the people again of their freedoms and privileges. Once more, these associations had their roots in history. During the great political and religious contentions of the years 1617-1619, Orangist rhetoric repeatedly accused the supporters of Oldenbarnevelt of seeking to change what was essentially a ‘vrye ende loffelijcke Aristocratie Regieringhe’ tempered by monarchical and popular elements into an

---

10 Knuttel. no. 8224, p. 17
11 Knuttel. no. 2610, p. 11.
oligarchy, that is a government dominated by a few self selected individuals. It was an essential element in the Orangist world view that the stadholder prince maintained a ‘balance’ in which the burgeoning regent classes were not permitted to ride roughshod over the liberties of the people. In an Orangist pamphlet of 1663 the writer attacked the notion of freedom peddled by the States Party. He saw it as merely a device to wrest all political power into their own hands. A single head, in this case the Prince of Orange, would defend the people from the depredations of this self-seeking group.

Throughout the pages of Orangist polemic the stadholder restores and defends the privileges and liberties of the people against those who seek to concentrate power in their own hands, whether they be the servants of the King of Spain or the brothers de Witt. In the work of some writers there is an attempt to evoke a mystical bond between the Princes of Orange and the people of the Republic. Drama proved a fruitful medium for this form of imagery. In a play by one ‘NVM’ entitled *Tragoedie van den Bloedigen Haeg ofte Broeder-Moort van Jan en Cornelis de Wit* published in 1672, William III hotly denies any hint of collusion between himself and the invading armies of Louis XIV. Unlike the supporters of the brothers de Witt, he will fight to the death for the defence of his people for they and he are one. William tells one of his courtiers,

Ick weet, als dat dit bloet, ’t geen dese rif besluyt,  
Hoort aan het Vaderlant, en stort ick het uyt  
Ten dienste ven ’t Gemeen, soo keert het sich tot het selven.14

In the light of this rhetoric it is not surprising that the appointment in 1672 of William III, first as captain general and later as stadholder of Holland is the occasion of language which, as in our pamphlet 1653, speaks of the restoration of citizens’ liberties and privileges. The poet Jan Zoet hymned William’s elevation to the offices of his

---

12 Knuttel, no. 2634, p. 12; Knuttel, no. 2508, pp. 11-12; Knuttel, no. 2610, pp. 11-12
13 Knuttel, no. 8806A, p. 46.
14 Knuttel, no. 10452, p. 11.
forefathers and the opportunity not only to drive out the French but restore the ancient privileges of the citizens. He wrote

Hy [God] sterkt u, dat gy moogt een Jozua verstrekken
Voor 't oude Burgerrecht, en 't lieve Vaderland,
Om 't Onkruid in den tuin, voorzichtig uit te trekken
Om dat hier d'Eendragt weer de Gouwe Vryheid plant.\textsuperscript{15}

The issue of freedom and privileges was expressed in more prosaic form in 1672. On 23 August a single printed sheet, allegedly from the citizens of Amsterdam demanded of their burgomasters and regents that they restore the former privileges the citizens had enjoyed under William I. A similar missive demanded that captains and lieutenants of the trained bands should not be drawn from the ranks of the city's magistrates and the guilds should be restored to their former privileges and maintained in their former glory. For good measure, all money from local taxation was to go to forward the efforts of the Prince of Orange.\textsuperscript{16} It is probably no accident that the date given on one of these publications was three days after the murder of the brothers de Witt on 20 August 1672. On 8 July the town council of Amsterdam had felt constrained to invite William III to visit the town, the reason given being 'tot contentement van 't graeuw'. The death of the de W onits appeared to have opened the floodgates to further demands from sections of the citizens at a time when the Prince was skilfully distancing himself from the threatened town council.\textsuperscript{17} On 1 September the first of three sequential Amsterdam pamphlets based on a conversation between a sergeant, a citizen named Adelborst and a member of the trained band was published. This last speaker was the main proponent of the view that the one time liberties of the citizens had been whittled away and denied. He argued that recent inventories of the citizens' privileges had

\textsuperscript{15} 'Zeegenwenschen op de blyde inkomemst gezondhaisdronk. en 't vertrek van zijn Doorlugtigste Hoogheid den Heere Prince van Oranje' in Zoet, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{16} Knuttel, no. 10214, np.; Knuttel, no. 10215, np.
\textsuperscript{17} A. F. Salomans, 'De rol de Amsterdamse burgerbeweging in de wetsverzetting van 1672', BMGN, 106 (1991), 198-219 (pp. 208-210).
deliberately omitted much and he urged each citizen to place a copy of the original
document alongside the family bible. In the opinion of Adelborst, 1650 was a turning
point, for with the absence of the stadholderate, each town selected its own governors
and became, in effect, a sovereign institution. From that point onwards, the magistrates
looked not to the maintenance of the citizens’ privileges but to their own interests. The
member of the trained band slyly inserted the remark that some towns were already
receiving back their own privileges from the Prince. 18 In the light of these opinions, it
was possible to understand, if not support, individuals such as the anonymous writer of
1672 who advocated that William III be named count of Holland, for the authority and
dignity of the office would enable him to restore the old privileges of the citizens and
ensure that promotion to office was based on merit alone. 19

Dialogues such as these deploy the language used by Orangist writers. This does
not mean that the anonymous authors were themselves paid-up supporters of the Prince,
though it is clearly his horse they are backing at present. Those who felt themselves
deprived of influence within their city might well deplore, the so called oligarchy which
kept them from what was rightfully theirs. Equally there is no doubt that in the years
1650-1672 Orangist writers were using language which was open to popular and
subversive nuances. In a pamphlet of 1653 entitled Nederlandischen Cancker, the
anonymous writer had urged that the regime be restored to its old footing with the
appointment of the young Prince of Orange as Captain General. He insisted that the
common people were urging such a step, adding ‘Vox Populi, Vox Dei’. This phrase
recurs in Orangist polemic and it is worthwhile spending some time examining its use.

Taken literally the phrase implies a people who possess a God-given faculty of
knowing what is right from what is wrong. Is our Orangist writer of 1653 implying that
the people have such a faculty enabling them to distinguish the right from the wrong in

18 Knuttel, no. 10564, pp.5, 7-8; Knuttel, no. 10565, pp. 3-4, 8, 10; Knuttel, no. 10566, p.7.
19 Knuttel, no. 10597, p. 8.
political conduct and should this faculty be the touchstone of government policy? It is helpful to look briefly at the use of this image in pamphlet literature immediately before the death of the stadholder in 1650. In 1647 there was published in Dutch, allegedly at Frankfurt, a pamphlet entitled *Zeedich Ondersoeck van de Macht der Princen ende des Volcks*. The writer postulated an original Golden Age of equality in which governments of various hues arise to settle civic disorder. Princes serve this purpose but they are not by nature different from their fellow men. Lawful authority has been delivered to them from the people for a purpose, but all the power which the people have not bestowed on their prince remains with them. If the prince by his conduct shatters the oath established between them, they are free to use this power to bring him to order. Those who are bound can unbind themselves in the same fashion and put in place any new order they choose. This power, both executive and judicial, is theirs by nature, from God. ‘Vox Populi, Vox Dei.’ This power is not to be abused. Some miseries must be patiently borne. Factional self interest must be constrained. Ultimately, however, the power of the people is from God and ‘de Ghemeente is het fundament ende steunsel vande waerheyt’.

The date of publication suggests that the pamphlet may have been intended to refer to events in England rather than the United Provinces. It is nonetheless a fairly classic resumé of a theory of popular resistance not uncommon in the sixteenth century. A somewhat similar use of the phrase occurs in a pamphlet of the same year. The author, arguing that peace with Spain should be concluded against the wishes of France, displayed his rhetorical skills in the form of a dialogue between some Dutch citizens and a visiting Frenchman. The Frenchman declared that among the common people in the United Provinces there were many who believed that the French were the cause of the failure to conclude peace. Those of education and understanding were more

---

conscious of the complexities of the situation but he told a Dutch citizen ‘alsso het
gemeyn peupel onder u oock part en deel heeft in de aller Importanteste Deliberatien,
soo moetmen dese hoevel valsche Impressien niet kleyn achten’. The Dutchman was
indignant. ‘Het ghemeenne Peupel heeft onder ons geen deel in de Importantste
Deliberatien.’ In his view, sovereignty in the Dutch Republic was now firmly fixed in
the provincial States. However, there was no greater danger than having France as a
powerful neighbour and such was evident to all citizens of the Republic, provinces,
towns, nobility and non noble, young, old, great and small. ‘Vox Populi, Vox Dei.’

The rhetoric in this pamphlet can appear contradictory but it is part of a significant
strand in Dutch constitutional thought. The people are bound in government with the
States but they take no part in important deliberations. However, if the perceived
opinion of the people supports that of the writer then so much the better, ‘Vox Populi,
Vox Dei’. Another pamphlet which also argued for peace and against the French
expressed it more succinctly. Peace is ‘Vox Populi, Vox Dei’.

It is important to note that it is unlikely any of these pamphlets was written by the
supporters of the House of Orange. If the first of them was intended to give succour to
the party of Parliament in England, then the writer was no friend of the stadholder
whose sympathies were firmly for his father-in-law Charles I. The following two
pamphlets advocated peace with Spain without reference to the French. Both can
therefore be said to belong to the party of the province of Holland rather than the
supporters of the stadholder. However, after 1650 and the death of William II this
rhetoric is appropriated by the House of Orange. An pamphlet of 1652 urged the
appointment of the Orangist John Maurice of Nassau as admiral general in the naval
war against England. The English in the view of the anonymous writer were worse than
the King of Spain for even he had not threatened their trade and prosperity as England

21 Knuttel. no. 5506, pp. 3-4, 6.
22 Knuttel. no. 5514, np.
intended to do. The people, moreover, were in favour of a war against England and 'alle wijse Overheden zijn schuldigh de stemme des ganschen Volcx te volgen'. In an Orangist response to the work of Pieter de la Court, the author of the *Ware Interest van Holland* of 1662 argued strongly for a stadholder governor. He described a people groaning under the burden of taxation and calling for a governor and, as he added, 'de stemme des volcks is de stemme van den Almogende'.

These might appear to be no more than timely cliches but there was no doubt that such ideas irritated the States Party. A pamphlet of that persuasion of 1667 opened with an Amsterdammer on a canal barge reading a poem tellingly entitled 'Vrede en Vrijheid'. In conversation with a Frisian, traditionally seen as in favour of a stadholder, the Amsterdammer referred back to the time of Leicester eighty years before. He argued that Leicester, inimically opposed to those principles of freedom which Hollanders hold dear, had won over the Reformed ministers by a show of religion and had flattered the common people. Here he said contemptuously was your 'Vox Populi, Vox Dei'. For the Amsterdammer popular choice was no guide for political strategy. The former stadholder Frederick Henry, he remarked, had been loved by the common people who 'niet verder ziet als haar Neus lang is'. Not unnaturally this contempt did not deter the Orangists. A pamphlet of 1672 described the Netherlands maid wooed by perfidious France and England. These two suitors sought only to despoil her but she was saved by the arrival of the young Prince of Orange who had written upon his sleeve 'Vox Populi, Vox Dei'. As the narrator described it 'wel ligt sal dien Heere door de drift en toegenegenheit des volks tot aensienlijcke waerdigheid verheven werden'.

Following the murder of the brothers de Witt, one writer who described himself as a Hollander not by birth but in spirit, argued that the brothers had been condemned to

---

23 Knuttel, no. 7221, np.
24 Knuttel, no. 8653B, p. 123.
25 Knuttel, no. 9587, pp. 3, 14, 19.
26 Knuttel, no. 10337, p. 5.
death not by the law of the land but by 'de stemme van den hoogsten rechter' for 'de stemme van des volcks, is de stemme Gods'.

Certainly, the disasters following the French invasion of 1672 brought the role of the populace very much to the fore. There was much popular resistance to any policy of accommodation with France and any town regent who defended negotiations faced a charge of defeatism, if not treachery, in the eyes of the townspeople. Rioters in Dordrecht, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Schiedam and Delft demanded that the Perpetual Edict of 1667 be annulled and the Prince of Orange appointed as stadholder which duly occurred in July 1672. The events of 1672 presented the writers of Orangist polemic with a particular challenge. On the one hand, they had to keep on the boil the disturbances in the Holland and Zeeland towns which, allied to the disasters of the war with France, would clearly lead to the restoration of the stadholderate and the fall of the de Witts. On the other, they had to justify the actions of the citizens in a world where fear of the mob and its disturbing effects on the political system was deeply grounded. In order to legitimise what was happening Orangist writers had to convince their readers that such popular action was not novel, had a basis in history and, in the past, had led to beneficial consequences.

One writer laid the ground for historical analogy when he reminded his readers that the year 1672 was exactly one hundred years after the rise of the new United Provinces, which he dated to 1572 and the capture of Den Briel by the Sea Beggars. The capture of Den Briel and Flushing in 1572 had traditionally been depicted as the work of the citizenry who defied the magistrates to take the towns for the Prince of Orange and prevented Alba from reinforcing the garrisons. Thus the author was unapologetic about the role of the common people in the events of 1672. He wrote that the restoration of the stadholderate in the person of William III was entirely the work of the common

---

27 Knuttel. no. 10450. np.
people, who began the task and followed it through to the end. The regent classes, by consenting and binding themselves to the separation of captain general and stadholder and agreeing to the Perpetual Edict of 1667 which sought to abolish the stadholderate in perpetuity, had ruled themselves out of any action. The 'common people', however, had not so bound themselves and were free to act, having never consented to those decisions either in heart or spirit. Central to their action was a defence of their own freedoms which they believed, justifiably he argued, to be best maintained under the 'headship' of the House of Orange, just as the people had long enjoyed their freedoms and privileges under the aegis of the counts of Holland. The author argued, in a manner which we will recognise, that those seeking redress against local oligarchs could always turn to the governor general, as he terms it, whose authority acted as an effective balance against the the over-powerful citizen or citizens. Thus the intervention of the people was justifiable for their actions were purposefully designed, 'om de Regeringhe te brengen op den ouden voet'. Restoration not revolution was their design.

A more fundamental analysis, essentially in the same vein, comes from a pamphlet entitled a Kort Verhuel van den Oorspronck en onderganck der Louvesteynsche Factie which its contents make clear was published after the murder of the de Witts in the Hague on 20 August. The inflammatory nature of the pamphlet and the writer's hatred for the regent patriciate was amply demonstrated. He demanded rhetorically whether it was possible to believe that God would have created all men in order to serve a mere handful. Warming to his theme pulpit style, he thundered against a society in which the lives and goods of men, women and children were sacrificed in the interests of the lust for honours and money of some few regents who had less virtue in their persons than the least among the common people. The writer deplored the contempt with which those in governance treated the community as a whole. In a free

28 Knuttel, no. 10262. np.
state, as the Republic purported to be, the common people should not be held so low as
to have no say in the governance of town and state. This was particularly the case when
the evil humours of internal corruption and external aggression rendered all other
medicines to no avail and a fundamental change in the state and its government
threatened. For this writer, the choice of government rested firmly in the hands of the
people for

Godt wel het ampt der Overheyt heeft geordineert, maer ordinaerlijk aen
eelk volck gelaten de vryheit om te kiesen soodenigen forme van Regeeringe
als 't begeert en dan noch te designeren alsucke persoonen daer't dat ampt aen
wil vertrouwen.

The author makes plain that the people’s choice would be the Prince of Orange.

It is significant that the writer buttressed his arguments from scriptural as well as
classical sources. His reading of Deuteronomy XVII: 14-15 implied clearly that God
had given the Israelites the option of choosing to be ruled by a monarch. Continuing to
the well trodden field of 1 Samuel VIII, the writer emphasised that the elders, acting as
spokesmen for the children of Israel, requested a king. God reinforced the constitutional
justice of this approach by urging the reluctant Samuel to ‘hoort na de Stemme des
Volcks’. The author judiciously omitted God’s further stricture to Samuel in which He
told the prophet that the choice of a monarch was a rejection of Himself and urged
Samuel to warn the people exactly what kind of king they were likely to get. The author
stated that the people in Athens had participated in the election of magistrates while
Rome was the outstanding example of a free state in which nothing was done in the way
of government appointments without the knowledge and voice of the people. When the
time came for monarchical rule in Rome to end, it was the people who engineered the
change. The writer was quite clear that power derives from the people and is entrusted
to those in authority so long as they respect the freedoms and privileges of the people,
secure the state from external aggression and prevent faction and intrigue in internal
affairs. Should authority fail in these essential matters, it is entirely natural that the
people will intervene for

de algemeyne en bovendrijvende intentie van de Gemeente en is niet anders dan haer eygen
behoudenisse en wel wesen, 't welck een yegelyck van nature magh en moet behertigen en
soecken.

His basis for this natural right to protect and defend one’s intrinsic liberties is
drawn in this instance not from any doctrine of natural law but from Ephesians V: 29
where the writer instructs his listeners that ‘no-one ever hated his own body; on the
contrary he keeps it nourished and warm’. Thus there is a righteous defence of that
which is innate and the consequence is that scandalous abuse meets scandalous ends at
the hands of the people. Caligula, who declared himself the equal of Jupiter, and Nero,
rose only to fall as do all tyrants including the ‘twee groote Potentaten’ who met their
death on the 20 August 1672 in the Hague. We may presume here that the intention of the
writer was to encourage a thorough purge of all supporters of the late de Witts in the
States and towns of the Republic.

Essential to such an argument was a justification from history. The writer drew on
the Abjuration of 1581 with its attendant argument that the Prince who conducts himself
as a tyrant can be set aside by the deliberations of the States as representative of the
whole community. Here the author had to tread carefully for the provincial States, or
certain members of them, were now deemed a legitimate target of popular fury. He
continued that this emphasis on the provincial States did not derogate from the rights of
the common people to resist a tyrant. This author also pointed to the action of the
common people in Flushing in 1572 and the towns people and fishermen of Veere in
the same year who against the wishes of their elders and betters ejected the Spanish and
in so doing founded the basis of the new State. These events are crucial to the author’s
argument for, echoing Sallust, he maintained that ‘een Staet werdt op sijn gemack
Simply expressed, the common people had played a pivotal role in the founding of the Republic, coincidentally one hundred years before, and that role was thus intrinsic to the governance of the state.29

The style and content of these two pamphlets suggest that they may have had the same author. In the second of the two works the author described himself as a lover of the Fatherland and of God’s Church and in sections of the work he paid flattering attention to the activities of the pro-Orange Reformed ministry and, by implication, himself. It is therefore quite likely that he was a member of that ministry and the contents of the two pamphlets may give us some impression of the political content as well as the vitriol which issued from certain pulpits unpublished. Another pamphlet which appeared to come from the hand of a Reformed minister laid similar emphasis on the beneficial role of the people both in the Revolt and in 1672, laying particular emphasis on their praiseworthy activity purging the churches of images in the iconoclastic outbreaks of 1566. This writer also conceived of the Republic as a ‘populaire Regeeringe’ in which the body of the people is represented by the town councils, whose authority pertained only as long as they exercised it moderately and in line with traditional maxims. Should they fail to do so, the people possessed the power to replace them by means of their ‘verkooren Gouverneur’ that is the stadholder. For this author such action in 1672 is amply justified for, in his eyes, the current regents imagined that they ‘souverain waren en het Volck haere Slaven’.30

Similar sentiments were expressed by writers who, on the evidence of their writing, appear to have no direct connection with the Reformed ministry. A pamphlet dated from early September 1672 from Amsterdam and addressed to the Prince of Orange defined the different natures of aristocratic and democratic governance.

29 Knuttel. no. 10264, pp. 4-11.
30 Knuttel. no. 10376, pp. 20-21, 25.
Aristocracy in the eyes of this writer was 'perpetual', a term he deployed pejoratively, whereas democracy was a government of the people by means of individuals elected by them who were changed annually. On this theoretical basis, the writer argued that since in 1585 the civic guard of Amsterdam had nominated a body of thirty six individuals who in their turn had nominated members to the town council, the constitution of the town at that point had been democratic in nature. Then, the writer added pointedly, the regents did not hold the people in contempt. He then widened the scope of his argument in a manner reminiscent of the earlier pamphlets by citing William I and the struggle against Spain, adding that 'de Ghemeynte heeft het begonnen ende de Gemuynte sal 't wel uytvoeren'. It is plain that the author intended this comment to apply not only to the course of the Revolt but also the events of 1672 for in both the people exercise, in his view beneficially, the authority invested in them. A pamphlet published in Amsterdam, seemingly about the same time, emphasised equally that authority rested not with the magistrates but with the people and they tended it to the Prince of Orange. The people would suggest the names of individuals for a new purged town council but they bestowed on the stadholder the absolute right to select magistrates in the future, in order to prevent the domination of the town council by a handful of individuals. This document was signed by one who styled himself the president of 'the meeting of the common people'.

Another image deployed to justify the role of the people in the events of 1672 was that of the ship at sea. One pamphlet writer assumed the voice of a fictitious crewsman charged with mutiny. He responded to his accusers by telling of a sea voyage in which the crew of the ship 'Hollandia', returning richly laden from a voyage to Spain, discovered that their steersman (alias John de Witt) was clandestinely piloting them towards the coast of France. If he were to succeed, the 'reders 'or shareholders would

31 Knuttel, no. 10549, np.
32 Knuttel, no. 10594, np.
lose their investment and the crew would be imprisoned. When they objected, the steersman accused them of mutiny but they replied ‘hy was om haer, en sy niet om hem; hy kon sonder ‘t Bootsvolck alleen niet varen’. They elected to replace him as steersman with a young man William Williamson of the Hague (alias the Prince of Orange) who came from a family of steersman. To the deposed individual they recounted emphatically ‘wy aen u, noch gy aen ons niet langer verbonden zijn’. They defended their actions on the grounds that ‘de natuer leert de menschen, en zelfs oock de beesten, haer leven en haer vryheit, die werder is als het leven, te beschermen’.  

Another writer similarly linked the restoration of the stadholderate with the plight of a ship at sea. If, he wrote, the government of the Republic could be likened to the command of a ship, then the actions of the citizens in 1672 could be excused for while good order aboard ship required that the captain was in command, he in his turn was bound by the orders of those who had elevated him to that position, however lowly their state. Were the captain to act in a way which threatened the safety and wellbeing of the vessel the lieutenant, indeed even the common crewsman, could remove him from command.

The force of these analogies is considerable. We may perhaps consider that to depict the workings of the Republic as a ship at sea is not an entirely appropriate analogy, but the reader accepts the notion, he or she must accept the argument that the vessel can only fare well if all ranks of the crew work together, even the lowliest having an essential role. All sailors have a duty of vigilance in all that concerns their vessel. This emphasis on popular vigilance finds an echo in other briefer publications. As one writer urged, drawing on the history of Rome, the ‘geese’ have to remain alert and

---

33 Knuttel, no. 10300, np.
34 Knuttel, no. 10479, pp. 18-19.
watchful while the city sleeps.\textsuperscript{35} Yet in all these examples there is the note of the exceptional. Vigilance is required but popular intervention would rarely occur provided that those who exercise authority in the peoples’ name do so justly and with due consideration for their liberties and privileges. In the view of all these writers, this situation was best achieved by the presence within the Republic of a stadholder Prince of Orange.

When treating of the people as a whole, we can discern various strands within Orangist polemic. Sometimes we have works in which elements within the people, specifically women, are idealised. In 1672 Orangist propaganda was emphasising and commending the active role played by women in the defence of country and Prince. An unknown Orangist author contrasted the alleged treachery of the de Witts and their supporters with the stout resistance of the common people to the French incursion. He particularly cited the defence of Aardenburg in Zeeland where, in his words, ‘t swacke Vrouwe-volck als Amsoonen kloec / Gaen trotsen menigh man te ere van de doeck’.\textsuperscript{36} Another author pointedly contrasted the speedy surrender of garrisons in the eastern provinces where those in charge were the sons and nephews of de Witt’s placemen and the heroic defence of Aardenburg, where women and children fought alongside their men folk.\textsuperscript{37} A third offered thanks to God for the Amazon women of Aardenburg whose qualities would be praised for eternity.\textsuperscript{38}

There are hints here of the heroic women of the Dutch Revolt, which is surely intentional. Historians of the Revolt such as van Meteren had elected to record the heroic actions of Dutch women against the Spanish enemy and later writers such as the fervent Reformed minister Abraham van de Velde, in a work first published in 1668, emphasised the righteousness of the Dutch cause when God used frail women folk to

\textsuperscript{35} Knuttel, no. 10279, np.
\textsuperscript{36} Knuttel, no. 10337, p. 14
\textsuperscript{37} Knuttel, no. 10479, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{38} Knuttel, no. 10262, np.
such glorious ends. Orangists adroitly appropriated this polemic to emphasise the
links between the Revolt and the disasters of 1672 and asserted the necessity for an
Orangist stadholder who would fulfil the role of his predecessor William I. Moreover,
women in Orangist polemic were not afraid to correct their menfolk when the latter
were ill-advised. In one pamphlet a woman on a barge heard a peasant man appear to
cast a slight on the Prince of Orange. The author recounted approvingly that she roundly
declared him a 'schelm' and declaimed in exasperation 'was ick een man, ick sloege
voor je kop'. Traditionally such an outburst might be seen as indicative of womans'
inability to control her passions and argue in a rational fashion. However, in this
pamphlet the author is emphasising the duty of each and every citizen to be ever
watchful of their liberties which the Prince of Orange will defend against treachery and
deceit. Hence the figure of the woman combines both humour and a praiseworthy
forthrightness in her role as the politically committed citizen. A pamphlet of the same
year written in favour of the States Party took a different view. This author lamented
bitterly the state of the Republic when 'de wijven onse landen regeeren, ende over al
muyterye aenrichten'. For supporters of the States Party such as this writer, the
involvement of women in political action was the stuff of nightmares.

Other Orangist writers were equally eager to distance the Prince and his cause
from despised sections of the community. One author of 1672 asserted that the actions
leading to the restoration of the stadholderate were carried out not by the common
people and the riff-raff but by the foremost and most respectable citizens, 'non a plebe
sed a Populo'. It is this latter, the 'populus' who in the words of the author 'die
gesamentlijck het lichaem van de souverainiteyt in dese Regeringe zijnde'. The
distinction is an ancient one. Cicero, reflecting on his fellow Romans, had drawn a

---

39 van de Velde, pp. 77-78.
40 Knuttel no. 10300. np.
41 Knuttel, no. 10281, p. 9.
42 Knuttel, no. 10479, pp. 18. 30.
judicious distinction between 'plebs' and 'populus'. The populus was by nature cohesive, being made up of men living together under the same law and sharing the same civic duties, for example military service. The plebs, or Greek 'hoi polloi', on the other hand, had no inherited property, no individual political power or influence and existed outside or beyond civic, moral and political bonds, being able to function politically only in the amorphous form of the mob. The distinction was recognised in seventeenth century Dutch political theory. Althusius in his *Politica methodica digesta* of 1603 defined the 'gemeente' or 'populus' as the 'corpus consociatum' bound by the bonds of common living and association of which the Prince himself was a member. Set against the 'gemeente' was the 'volk' or 'grauw' who were characterised by envy, recklessness and irrational outbreaks of violence.

While supporters of the Prince might be content to see the 'grauw' in action to further Orangist ends, in 1672 they did attempt to steer clear of the odium attached to the mob in the streets. Another Orangist author in an alleged letter from Rotterdam in July 1672 advised his unnamed correspondent

```
gy moet niet denken dat de Graeuw hier de meester speelt, want dit werk is uytgevoert door aensienlijke Heeren, Capiteynen van de Burgery, de machtigste kooplieden, en de deftigste Borgeren, waer by sich voorts de andere Burgeren, Poortern, met de Gemeente haden vervolght.45
```

Yet another author, reviewing the events of 1672, distinguished sharply between the burghers and the 'canaille' or as he robustly described them, the uttermost dregs of the people. These latter had no right to choose a stadholder or make any alterations in government for the activities native to them were plundering, robbing, murder and arson and any changes they instigate could only result in disruption and violation of

---

44 E.H. Kossmann, 'Volkssouverainiteit aan het begin van het Nederlandse ancien regime', in *BMGN*, 95 (1980), 1-34 (p.5)
45 Knuttel, no. 10153, np.
good order. By God’s grace no such alteration had occurred in the Republic. Rather, it was the burghers who had taken action. They had fulfilled their part of the contract by paying their taxes and taking up arms against the French invader only to find themselves deceived by those who would not defend their privileges and who failed to maintain the security of the nation against foreign aggression.46

Certainly some Orangist publications emphasised that the Prince of Orange deplored riotous behaviour and had no part in fomenting it. In one pamphlet William III reassured the allegorical figure of ‘de gestoorde Vryheit’ that he had no intention of permitting a mob to dictate policy. He empathised with the fear that reigns when ‘groot en klein soo door de straten swieren./ En d’onderdaan zich zelfs te buiten gaet’ and insisted that he had admonished the people to obey their lawful rulers.47 Yet as always there are ambiguities. Much as certain Orangist writers seek to distance the Prince from unruly elements of the underclass, other Orangist writings are clearly intent on inflaming all sections of the populace against the de Witts and their supporters. Certain publications seem intended to incite the people to demand the death of the de Witts, if not to murderous acts. Consider a poem known to be by Jan Zoet and published in pamphlet form in 1672 under the sobriquet ‘waermont’ in which he writes of three St Jans, two of whom, John the Baptist and Oldenbarnevelt, have already lost their heads.

’t Is sestien honstien Jaer en viftigh nu geleeeden,
Dat de eerste Heer Sint Jan het hooft wiert afgesneeeden,
En drie en viftigh zijn verloopen van dien dagh,
Dat hier de tweede mee ‘t hooft voor de voeten lagh.
Koms nu de derde eens op sulcken wijs te sterven
Soo sal ons Vaderlandt d’aloude vryheydt Erven.48

46 Knuttel. no. 10309, pp. 2, 4-5, 15.
47 Knuttel. no. 10294. np.
48 Knuttel. no. 10360. np.
Here the poet anticipates that John de Witt will succumb to the fate of the second Jan, that is John van Oldenbarnevelt, who was executed in 1619.

An inflammatory pamphlet emanating from Rotterdam and the pen of a Reformed minister similarly urged that the citizen had the right to demand that the brothers de Witt be indicted for treason against the nation. To those who would argue that it was not the role of the common citizen to take such action, the author responded that extraordinary times merited extraordinary measures. Another pamphlet admonished its readers that, with reference to the de Witts, 'sy mouten haer rechmatige aversie houden tegens de landverkoopers ofte bedervers'. The de Witts and their allies were described as 'niet meritende compassie, dat men verschoonen wilde een slangh die steckt in onsen eygen boesem'. In case there should be any doubt in his readers' minds, he urged 'hebbende dese Heeren met haer exempel geleert, dat men in materie van Staet de verhate Vyanden of slaen, of van haer geslagen moet werden'. The author vaunted the role of the people with particular reference to the iconoclastic fury of 1566, when, he recounted with relish, 'veele der verdruckte in de furie door korte en prompte executie geraecken tot eene sachte wel verdiende doot'. For those who might quail at what could, at worse, be read as incitement to murder, the author reminded his readers that theirs was a historic and decisive role for during the long struggle against Spain, 'Godt de Heere alsnu door de Mondt des Volcks heeft gewerckt'.

Orangist propaganda also now specialised in a particular type of hagiography in which alleged 'victims' of the de Witts were ascribed a catalogue of virtues and the alleged injustice of their deaths was linked to the implication that the brothers de Witt deserved no better. One case in question was that of Jacob van der Graef. This twenty-two year son of a prominent family was arrested in June 1672 following a thoroughly botched attempt to assassinate John de Witt and much to his own surprise and that of

---

49 Knuttel. no. 10142, np.
50 Knuttel. no. 10376, pp. 20-21, 25.
many of his contemporaries, condemned to death. A notorious pamphlet usually attributed to Simonides a Reformed minister at the Hague and published before the death of the de Witts, described the last days of the young man’s life for the edification of his readers. An alleged miraculous epiphany in his prison cell resulted in a well attested religious conversion. Van der Graef was declared by Reformed ministers in the Hague to be a ‘wonderwork’ of God and God’s Holy Church. As he reached the place of death, some observers swore that they saw a halo of light around the head of van der Graef and after his execution the splashes of blood could not be washed from the block.51 Such polemic clearly attracted the attention of contemporaries. A pamphlet published after the death of the de Witt’s alleged that the shock of the execution of van der Graef on the 29 June had been the catalyst which led all voting towns of the States of Holland to vote out the Perpetual Edict on 2 July. The author also attested that in the opinion of many, Simonides’ pamphlet had been been mainly responsible for bringing about the murder of the de Witts.52 In another pamphlet, a fictitious Amsterdammer argued vehemently that the death of the de Witts could in part be ascribed to a pamphlet published by a minister of the Reformed Church in which van der Graef had been treated as if he were a saint.53

The prospective fate of the de Witts was also often linked to that of Buat in the polemic of 1672. Buat, a companion to the young prince of Orange, had been executed following the discovery of treasonable dealings with England in 1666. His death had occasioned some reference in the pamphlet literature of that time but he emerges in the polemic of 1672 not just as an Orangist, but as a national martyr. In a poem of that year, the anonymous author reminded his readers that William I gave his life for his country and not only he but other ‘doorluchte Helden’ of whom Buat was one.54 One writer

51 Knuttel. no. 10455, pp. 3. 9-11, 19, 23-24.
52 Knuttel. no. 10463, pp. 7-8, 15.
53 Knuttel. no. 10497, p.5.
54 Knuttel. no. 10304. np.
contrasted the lenient sentence recently issued against Cornelis de Witt by an allegedly browbeaten court with that of Buat. It is recorded that on 20th August, when Hendrick Verhoeff, the Hague silversmith burst into the room in which the brothers de Witt were sheltering, John de Witt declared himself prepared for death then and there but an incensed Verhoeff cried that they must both face their death in public as they made the worthy Buat and the innocent van der Graef.

The death of Buat is also combined with other events to produce a strand of polemic which is truly chilling. One writer of 1672 recorded tellingly the destruction by the townspeople of Dordrecht of the painting commemorating the role of Cornelis de Witt in the victory over the English at Chatham in 1667. The crowd removed the painting from the Town Hall and tore it apart paying particular attention to the mutilation of the image of Cornelius. The author, who was clearly writing before the murder of the de Witts, then immediately continued with a reference to the alleged statement of Buat some hours before his execution in which the condemned man hoped that John de Witt and his supporters would justifiably suffer the punishment which he, the innocent, endured. This connection between the judgment and death of Buat, the destruction of the painting of Cornelis de Witt and the future fate of the de Witts may be judged coincidental but it is troubling that it occurs in another publication. An anonymous pamphlet, allegedly recording a conversation between two citizens of Rotterdam, can be dated with some accuracy as the content makes plain that Cornelius de Witt was at that time incarcerated in prison in the Hague. It is observed that he occupies the same cell as did Buat and the author asks rhetorically whether Cornelius would share his fate. There follows a description of the destruction of the painting in Dordrecht and with uncanny prescience the writer describes how

55 Knuttel, no. 10194, np.
56 Prud’homme van Reine, p. 305.
57 Knuttel, no. 10327, np.
dese lijst (frame) wierdt eerst geschonken, daer een pieck door het counterfeitsel gestoocken, hooft, armen en beenen afgeschonden. 't Eldens met soo een wens dat sulcx aen die Persoonen mocht gheciddien wiens Beeltenis dit was, eenige stucken wierden steneenen aengebonde en in het water gesmeeten, sommige voor de Poort en op een muur gepijkeert, sodat die gezette lichaem jammerlijk is mishandelt.

This image which uncannily prefigures the mutilated and eviscerated bodies of the brothers de Witt was followed by the exclamation, 'Buat's bloet roept om wraeck'. A few days before the murder a publication was circulating whose contents were based on a skit of a poem by Brandt. Brandt's work which was intended to adorn a print of the Pensionary de Witt had ended with the laudatory comment that an image or statue of marble would honour de Witt. In the amended version the conclusion read 'men ruck hem 't hert uyt 't lijf, en stamp het hooft in Mermier'. Brandt, corresponding with Johannes Vollenhoven on 4th September 1672, after the murder of the brothers de Witt, considered that the skit on his poem had been designed to teach the people how they should mutilate the bodies of the pair. Indeed, the silversmith Hendrick Verhoeuff cut the hearts out of the bodies of the de Witts and retained them, showing them off for some years to dignitaries who visited him.

In these pamphlets not only are the readers and those who hear them read asked to reflect on the failings of the de Witts, they are also being encouraged to envisage their deaths. Ronald Prud'homme van Reine in his recent biography of Maerten and Cornels van Tromp argues convincingly that the murder of the de Witts was not impromptu but a carefully planned action by supporters of the Prince of Orange and the Prince himself. Some contemporaries were likewise convinced. The poet Joachim Oudaan, long an admirer of John de Witt, made clear in his play entitled Haagsche Broeder-Moord that the lynching was the work of the Prince's supporters including the Reformed ministers.

---

58 Knuttel, no. 10341, pp. 6-7.
59 Knuttel, no. 10332, np.
60 Prud'homme van Reine, pp. 296-308.
Simonides and Landsman and of the Prince himself who 'slaat de hand met yver aan
dien handel'.  

It may be that muttered suspicions of the involvement of William III in the
murder of the de Witts account, in part, for the wealth of pro-Orangist propaganda
which emphasised that the brothers were 'sentenced' and 'executed' by the people. One
pamphlet claimed that their deaths was the will of God carried out by means of the 't
heilige Burgerrecht' and contrasted this divinely inspired action with the silence of the
'lasse Rechters' who cannot be trusted to carry out their duty.  

Another pamphlet appeared entitled Sententie van den generalen Hove van Nederlandt, Tegens Mr
Cornelis de Wit ...en Mr Jan de Wit...Gepronunciert voor langh en ge-executeert den
20 Augusti 1672. There followed a list of charges which this 'general Hof' had laid
against the de Witts, concluding with a sentence of death 'ter ordinantie van de
Gemeente' and signed by the citizenry of the seven provinces and all promoters and
lovers of God's Church and the beloved Fatherland. This view was propagated beyond
the frontiers of the Republic. In a pamphlet in English attributed to one Henry Stubbe,
the reader was instructed that with reference to the deaths of the brothers de Witt, 'the
real majesty of the burghers did sentence them'. This argument also found visual form
in a print of 1672 depicting the eviscerated corpses of the brothers de Witt and entitled
Spieghel van Staet en Recht der Burgers. The image was accompanied by verse in
which the readers were assured that

't Verraet moet gestraft, en is 't niet door Besorgers,
Soo is het door 't Gemeen, en door het Recht der Borgers.

---

62 Knuttel, no. 10371. np.
63 Knuttel, no. 10408. p 7.
64 Knuttel, no. 10017A. np.
65 Knuttel. no. 10199. np.
Conclusion

In surveying all this material we must, in conclusion, bear in mind that political polemic is by its nature opportunist. Yet, we can distinguish certain consistent trends within the body of popular Orangist polemic. One such is clearly the assertion that the stadholder Prince of Orange would defend the people against an all-powerful oligarchy and restore to the people privileges which the government of de Witt was seeking to deny them. Popular perception of these privileges may have been unrealistic yet they played a vital role in Orangist rhetoric. In addition, in times of political volatility, Orangist writers drew on the role of the people as guardians of the principles of the State. The language and imagery which they used was not new and deliberately so. The image of the ship of state in which the ruler was steersman but the crew, that is the people, were the ultimate masters of the vessel had been deployed by Aggaeus van Albada in the polemic of the Dutch Revolt a hundred years before. Indeed the rhetoric of the Revolt which had emphasised that the authority of the magistrate rested on the common authority of the people was to be taken out and aired again in 1672. The events of 1572 were to legitimise those of one hundred years later. Yet to place too much emphasis on the past is to miss the radical tone of some of what was written. The people are to be actively involved in the service of the House of Orange even becoming co-conspirators in the murder of the de Witts. As one commentator has observed, one of the peculiarities of early modern Dutch politics was that demands for a strong stadholderate and for popular sovereignty tended to go hand in hand with a republican regent oligarchy as the enemy.66 It was a commentary on the governance of the United Provinces from 1650-1672 that a stadholder and captain general was perceived by many citizens to be essential not only to rid their country of a foreign aggressor but also to defend their interests against an overweening urban patriciate.

CONCLUSION

The coming of peace in 1648 posed challenges for certain sections of the Republic. For the stadholder, it marked the end of one of his traditional roles as captain general of the Republic’s forces. The advocates of peace were the Holland regents who had long championed the cause of trade, commerce and toleration and eschewed a policy of extending the boundaries of the Republic. Fearing that the Princes of Orange aspired to become a sovereign dynasty, they saw the end of the war as a chance to reassert the sovereignty and autonomy of the provincial States. Many ministers of the Reformed Church had opposed the Peace. They saw the termination of hostilities as a victory for the ‘Arminian’, Erastian town magistrates who sought to bring the public church under their political control. The Calvinist faith had provided a supra-provincial bond during times of war when ‘patriots’ joined together to defend the fatherland and the True Reformed Religion. Peace left them threatened and uncertain. The two elements which commanded loyalty across provincial boundaries, the public church and the stadholder, had both been weakened by the Treaty of Munster. The fears for the unity of the seven provinces were not mere rhetoric but a response to a perceived shifting of power in the direction of richest and most populous province. The death of William II in 1650 marked a decisive victory for the province of Holland.

It has been argued that the seventeenth century saw a dichotomy between the States of Holland and the stadholder. If one failed in government or alienated sections of the nation, then there was recourse to the other. In this view the restoration of William III in 1672 may best be interpreted as a way of making the political system work better and ensuring that the regents ruled as they ought.¹ Within the context of this pragmatic reading of Dutch political life, it could be argued that Orangism did not need

¹ Price, Holland and the Dutch Republic, p. 102-103, 119.
to develop arguments of any significant intellectual weight. Hence, Geyl’s criticism of the superficiality of Orangist political argument has validity. Rather for the Orangists it was essential to highlight the ties of dependency which bound together the Republic and the stadholder princes. They would emphasise that it was only with the presence of a stadholder Prince of Orange that internal harmony and prosperity and external security and prestige were assured. The governance of the Republic from 1650 would appear to suggest otherwise. Internal faction in the provinces of Groningen and Overijssel was solved by the intervention of Holland acting as reconciler in the manner of previous stadholders. Dutch interests in the Baltic were assured and after the difficulties and defeats of the first Anglo-Dutch war, the second war with England ended with the glorious triumph of the Dutch navy in the Thames estuary. Yet the lesson of past history interpreted by the Orangists was that sooner or later the Republic would find itself dependent once more on the Princes of Orange.

The model of the mixed constitution fulfilled several functions. It was a constitutional model which was acceptable to the world of educated seventeenth political discourse. It emphasised the interdependency of the three different elements of the constitution with the implication that should one, the monarchical, be absent there would follow a degeneration, in this case from the aristocratic to the oligarchical model. The threat of oligarchy was one which Orangist political pamphleteers did not hesitate to lay before their readers. Interwoven with Grotius’ reading of the Batavian Republic, the Orangists were able to put forward a narrative in which this mixture of constitutional elements became characteristic of the Dutch experience. Their use of Grotius characterised the nature of Orangist argument. Orangist pamphlet writers had little use for Grotius theories of natural law. Rather, like jackdaws they plundered the work of the great jurist, retaining that which suited their purposes and discarding that for which they had no use.
Experience not reason is the lodestone of Orangism and that may be one of its strengths. It does not require rigorous logic or intellectual coherence. It is tolerant of apparent contradiction. If a particular system has served the state well, then it should be continued for longevity is the hallmark of a successful form of government. While their opponents came to draw on Bodin to define a single sovereign authority, that is the province, Orangists refused to be drawn. They avoided any discussion as to the meaning and content of sovereignty. They belonged rather to that school of thought epitomised in a later century by Edmund Burke who assured his opponent Dr Richard Price

You see Sir, that in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess, that we are generally men of untaught feelings; that instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted, and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individual would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and ages.²

The image of the body was deployed. The stadholder as ‘head’ was an essential component of the constitution without whom the remainder of the body could not function. One head was good but many heads were not, ‘te veel hoofden, te veel sinnen’. Within this language there was no place for an exposition of a dynamic and changing role for the stadholders. Their opponents were to argue that the Princes of Orange had sought to transform their role, striving to be monarchs in all but name. It was certainly the case that the political role of the stadholders had undergone change. Maurice’s intervention in the crisis of 1617-1619 and the marriage of Frederick Henry’s son William to the daughter of the King of England indicated that the relationship between the stadholder and the sovereign provinces was undergoing change. Yet this is not reflected in Orangist writing. The stadholderate as an institution appears immutable,

an essential element in an exquisite balance of forces. Rather it is John de Witt who is
seeking to subvert the framework of a model of government.

The Orangists during the years 1650-1675 were not monarchists and this was not
the source of their attraction for the citizens of the Republic. Some would defend
monarchy as an institution but always with the proviso that it was neither appropriate
nor necessary in the Dutch Republic. The only possible exception to this rule occurs in a
pamphlet in the febrile atmosphere of 1672 and it had no successor. William III's
unsuccesful bid to be made Duke of Gelderland in 1675 indicated that even the
supporters of the Prince were unwilling to upset the constitutional balance. Yet it can be
argued that Orangism's use of imagery such as that of the Prince as the sun is strongly
redolent of monarchy. Throughout the language of Orangism, there are ambiguities. The
stadholder is the servant of the provinces yet he is also the beneficent orange tree under
whose shadow the Republic grows and flourishes. Images of dependency are coupled
with those of princely authority. The young prince William III is both the 'son' of the
United Provinces, living and growing under their parental authority and the 'sun' whose
rays will beam down on the earth and drive away all shadows of discord and strife. It
could be argued that this is the language and symbolism of princes appropriated for the
peculiar needs of the Dutch Republic. What appears apparent is that Orangism is able
to accommodate this paradox without alienating substantial sections of its support.

Orangism could also provide loyalty to an individual and his family. Whatever the
attractions of the 'true freedom' of the States Party in classical republican mode, it
could not supply, nor did it seek to, one man upon whom hopes and expectations could
rest. Its very ethos was contrary to the aggrandisement of the individual. Even the best
of men could fall into temptation, taking advantage of their gifts to flatter and bribe
their fellow citizens. The advent of such men could sound the death knell of a Republic.
Orangists understood this well when they mocked the brothers de Witt as the 'prince on
land and the prince on sea'. Unlike the de Witts and their supporters for whom they alleged power was an intoxication, Orangists asserted that the very breeding and history of the illustrious ancestors of William III fitted him for the role of both servant and beneficent authority.

In Orangist political writing it was maintained with few insignificant exceptions that the stadholderate was not hereditary but elective. It was vital so to do for their opponents equated hereditary succession with monarchy and whatever their private feelings Orangist writers were not prepared to fall into that trap. Yet an examination of the words and symbols deployed by the Orangist suggest a more nuanced reading. The image of the phoenix rising from the ashes had traditionally been attached to dynastic succession and continued to be deployed by the French monarchy and the English at the restoration of Charles II. Those who celebrated the image in verse or immortalised it in print or on the face of medals could not have been unaware of the significance of their choice. Perhaps the use of the image concealed ambiguities at the very heart of Orangist thinking. The stadholderate was not to be hereditary but there was an inherent assumption that the son of the previous stadholder or his nearest heir would succeed to the offices of his forefathers. The emphasis which proponents of Orangism on the word and the concept of gratitude enabled them to argue the case for the young prince without committing themselves to any explicit approbation of a hereditary succession. The frequency with which the concept was deployed in poetry, visual imagery and ceremonial display suggests that it fulfilled an important function in the Orangist arsenal.

For both the Orangists and their opponents the call to preservation of the Union formed part of their normative language. De Witt in his Deductie of 1654 saw the Union as a coming together of the seven provinces in pursuit of a limited range of objectives which could not appropriately be dealt with by the single sovereign province. The
provinces were no longer bound together perforce to achieve their common survival but
were linked rather by silken ties of affection and common interest. For Orangist writers
the Union was in danger of dissolution following the end of the war with Spain or of
being totally dominated by the province of Holland without the countervailing weight of
the stadholder. Their rhetoric drew on the traditional role of the stadholder as reconciler
and conciliator, as envisaged in the Union of Utrecht of 1579. As we have seen this did
not for the most part reflect political reality. It would be dangerous to read too much
into the periodic Orangist assertion that sovereignty lay with the States General. Such
arguments tended to surface at times when tension ran high between Holland and the
other provinces, such as the Public Prayer debate of 1663. Within the Dutch Republic,
there was and continued to be an unresolved debate about the relationship between the
States General and the individual provinces in which self interest played as great a role
as constitutional proprieties. It could be argued that the Orangist position was no more
opportunist than the defence of provincial sovereignty mounted by John de Witt. What
is plain is that at critical times such as the French invasion of 1672 Orangist words and
images concerning the Union enjoyed wide circulation and manifestly answered a need
which went far beyond the parameters of a measured constitutional debate.

In the absence of the stadholderate in the majority of provinces after 1650, the
public church might have been expected to promote itself as the sole unifying element
in an otherwise centrifugal Republic. The Great Assembly of 1651 had ratified the
position of the Reformed faith as set out at the Synod of Dordrecht as the sole public
church. In reality the position of the public church had been weakened. The institutions
of the public church were dependent upon the political support of the local and
provincial magistracy without the countervailing force of a sympathetic stadholder.
Sections of the Calvinist faith were increasingly involved in a ‘further reformation’ of
morals and manners which required the acquiescence, if not the support of town regents.
For as long as the war continued with Spain, it can be argued that a sense of identity and national purpose had been in considerable measure linked to the Reformed faith. After 1650, in the writings of the supporters of the House of Orange, the stadholderate appears to take on that role.³

While ministers of the Reformed Church fulminated against de Witt and his supporters, Orangists were only too happy to make use of their rhetoric and condemn a government which appeared to be lax in enforcing the placards against Catholics and sectaries. Orangists also deployed the bellicose language which had characterised those, many of whom were Reformed ministers, who had opposed attempts to end the war with Spain. However, as we have seen, those who wrote in support of the Prince of Orange came from a much wider constituency and they entertained very different notions of an ideal religious settlement. For certain of these writers, the attraction of a stadholder Prince of Orange far outweighed partisan religious positions. Studying the Orangists of the mid 1670's, Jonathan Israel expressed surprise that their ranks should have included someone like the engraver Romeyn de Hooghe. De Hooghe had been accused of holding the scriptures in contempt, not unusual perhaps as he had been educated by the Spinozist Franciscus van den Emden. Another supporter of the House of Orange was Ericus Walten who favoured a comprehensive policy of religious toleration.⁴ As with Jan Zoet and the Catholic Jean Nicolas Parival these may have seen in the institution of the stadholderate and the person of the Prince of Orange an authority which transcended faction and division whether religious or political and was fully compatible with their concept of a republic.

The demands for the restoration of William III to the offices of his forefathers rested on their perceived contribution to the welfare and security of the Republic. The attack by anti-Orangist writers on the persons and policies of William I and Maurice

⁴ Israel. Monarchy, Orangism and Republicanism, pp. 10-13, 15.
probably did their cause little good. While attempting to debunk the reputations of the stadholders Princes of Orange, they were significantly unable to establish an alternative narrative which could bring together all sections of the nation. As the event of 1672 made clear, the citizens of the Republic still held to the notion of the Princes of Orange as their saviours who alone could be trusted to save the country in its darkest hours.

We may smile at the naivety of Orangist historiography, yet it could be argued that the power of the Orangist narrative provided hope and consolation to a battered people in the disaster year of 1672. As Geyl has observed, ‘in its hour of trial the state found in the position of stadholder-captain general a source of strength’.5

Sir Denis Thatcher in the Preface, might have found it difficult to formulate the principles for which his party stood, but I would hazard that he would have had no difficulty in defining what he was against. The analysis of rhetoric of political groups has inevitably and rightly concentrated on the positive but it is unwise to neglect the polemic of hate. Historians have not failed to take seriously the arguments of States Party writers when they accused the stadholders of seeking sovereign authority in the Republic. Equally, we should recognise the force of Orangist denunciations of a self selecting and self seeking oligarchy in many of the Holland towns. This theme was a leitmotif of Orangist rhetoric throughout the stadholderless period, becoming particular shrill in years of crisis such as 1653 and 1672. The declaration of an hereditary stadholderate in the province of Holland in 1674 owed much to the perception that only in this way could the pretensions of a regent oligarchy be curbed.

The crisis of 1672 was interpreted by many within the framework of the Orangist message. Its key themes, the maintenance of the Union, the defence of the nation and for many the protestant faith, the task of the stadholder in protecting the citizens against the encroachment of their rights and privileges by an overwheening oligarchy, the role

---

of generations of Princes of Orange in saving their people from the forces of the enemy without, enabled many citizens to read these events in terms of an Orangist narrative. They appropriated it and made it their own. In this sense it served their purposes as much as those of the Prince of Orange and his supporters. The strength of the language of Orangism lay not in any intellectual coherence and absence of ambiguity but rather in its ability to provide at key moments in the history of the Republic a mode of interpreting the experience of the nation and speaking to its aspirations.
Bibliography

Primary Sources


1550-1600

150 Vraye Narration et Apologie des Choses passées au Pays-bas touchant le Fait de la Religion en l’An MDLXVI (1567)

242 Certain letters wherein is set forth a Discourse of the Peace that was attempted and sought to have been put in effecte by the Lords and States of Holland and Zeelander in ...1574 (1576)

358 Lettre contenant un avis de l’estat auquel sont les affaires des Pais-bas (1578)

379 Wachtgerschrey Aen liefhebbers der eeren Gods des Vaderlandts, ende der Privilegen ende Vryheden des selven, tot waerschouwinghe ghestelt (1578)

474 Remonstrance en forme de Complainte et Doléance a Messieurs des Estats Généraux et des Provinces Unies, par les habitans et commune de la ville d’Anvers (1579)

545 Emanuel-Ernesté – Dialogue de deux personnages, Sur l’Estat du Pais Bas (1580)

577 Broederlijke waerschouwinghe aen allen Christen Broeders, die van God veroordent zijn tot de verkiesinghe der Overicheyt ende Magistraten, inde Steden der gheunieerde Provincien (1581)

615 Discours, Verclaerende wat forme ende maniere van regieringhe dat de Nederlanden voor die alderbeste ende zekerste tot desen tyden aenstellen mochten (1583)

652 Van den Staet der tegenwoordiger Nederlandtsche Regering... Concordia res parvae crescent, Discordia maximae dilabuntur (1583)

790 Cortva verthoninghe van het Recht byden Ridderschap Eedelen ende Steden van Hollandt ende Westvrieslant van allen ouden tijden in den voorschreven lande ghebruckt tot behoudenisse van de vryheden, gerechticheden Privilegen ende Loffeliecke ghebruycken vanden selve lande (1587)

1600-1640

1991 Querala Pacis, dat is Vreden-clacht, Aen de vereenichde Nederlanden (1612)
364

2367 Weegh-Schael om in alle billickheydt recht te overweghen de Oratie van den Eedlen Hoochgeleerden Wijsen Voorsieninghen Heere Mijn Heere Dudley Carleton (1617)

2460 Spaenschen Raedt, hoemen de vereenichde Nederlanden alderbest wederom sal konnen breghen onder 't ghebiedt van den Coninck van Spagnien (1617)

2464 Na-sporingh. Hoe ende in wat manieren de Door-luchtige ende Hoogh-ghebooren Vorst de Prince van Orangien Hoogh-Loffelijcker memorie... (1617)

2467 De Rechte Spore ende Aenwijsinghe, Dat de Doorluchtige Prince van Orangien...de bescherminghe der Nederlande heeft aenghenomen voor de waerachtige Religie tegen de tyrannye der Spangiarden (1617)

2509 Triompfe van de Doorluchtige Pr.van Orangien, ende het geheele huys van Nassau, so wel overleden als tegenwoordigh (1618)

2610 Noodtwendigh ende Levendige Discours van eenighe getrouwe Patriotten ende Liefhebbers onses Vaderlandes; over onsen droevigen ende periculeusen Staet (1618)

2632 Ontdeckinge Vande valsche Spaensche Jesuijtische Pratijcke (1618)

2634 Provisionele Openinghe van verscheyden saecken ghestelt in de Remonstrance van den Heer Advocaet van Hollant ende West-vrieslandt (1618)

2637 Advertisement aen alle Goed In-woonderen en liefhebbers van dese Nederlanden (1618)

2757 Gulden Legende van den Nieuwen St. Jan (1618)

3198 Een Nieuwe Tydinghe van de siecke Treves ende het krancke Bestandt, dat twaelf Jaer leefden hier int Nederiant (1621)

3204 Den Compaignen vanden verre-sienden Waerschouwer-Thoonende met veele redenen waerom tot bevestinghe van den Staet van dese Landen den Oorloogh veel dienstiger is dan den Treves (1621)

3216 Lof vanden Oorloghe boven den Spaenschen Peys (1621)

3217 Nootwendighe ende vrypostighe Vermaninghe van eenighe oprechte Ghereformeerde Patriotten aen alle vrome liefhebbers der Vaderlantsche Vryheyt (1621)

3924 Ghespreck van langhe Piet met Keesje Maet, belanghende den Treves met den Spaigniaert (1629)

3925 Lot des Vrye Vaerts ende berisp tegen het mijsbruck der selver (1629)

4265 Copye van Seeckere Missive van eenen ghetrouwen Patriot aen zynen goeden vriendt (1632)
4266 Vertooningh aen de Vereenichde Provintien van Nederlandt (1632)

4268 Menippus Dialogus ofte t' zamen-sprekinghe tusschen Diogenes, Momus ende Menippus (1632)

4309 Ver-sienden Bril Dienende op de jegenwoordige Vredeshandelinge (1633)

1640-1646

4757 A Discursive Conjectvre upon the Reasons That produce a desired event of the present troubles of Great Britaine, different from those of Lower Germany (1641)

4869 Den Britannischen Blixen of Subite Vwerringerhe in Engelandt, Schotlandt ende Yerlandt tot waerschouwinghe van de Geunieerde Provincien (1642)

4870 Observatie oft Aenmerckingen noopende den Prince van Orange ende de Staten van Holland (1642)

4992 Copie van eenen Brief door versceyden voorname Predicanten van Engelandt afgesonden aen eenighe van hare mede-Broederen van de Engelsche Kercke hier in Nederlant (1643)

4993 Yrlands Bloedende Request aen de Gereformeerde Kercken der vereenighde Nederlantschen Provintien (1643)

5014 Noodige bedenckingen der Trouhertige Nederlanders over de aen-staende Munstersche handelinghe van Vrede ofte Treves (1643)

5015 Bedenckingen over het thien hoornigh en seven-hoodigh Treves ofte Pays Munster-Monster (1643)

5018 Geluck Wensingh aen syn Hoocheydt Wilhelm Prince van Orangie, Gedesigneerde Gouverneur Generael der Vereenigde Nederlanden over des selfs eerste victorie (1643)

5035 Geestelicken Olie-Hoorn Uyt-Gestort over de Achtbare, Wijs, Voorsienige Heeren...Burghermeesteren en Schepen der Vermaarde Koopstadt Rotterdam (1643)

5136 Anatomie ofte Ontledinghe van 't verderfelijck Deseyn der hedendaechsche Paepsghesinde tegen Kercke en Poletie en alle goede Inghesetene der Geunieerde Provintien (1644)

5140 Den Half-Gereformeerde Pastoor (1644)

5290 Munsters Praetje (1646)

5296 Antwoordt op 't Munsters Praetje (1646)
5309 Copie d' une lettre envoyée de la Haye, aux Deutez des Estats d' Hollande (1646)

1647

5408 Zeedich Ondersoeck van de Macht der Princen ende des Volcks.

5496 Missive uyt Middelburgh aen Syn Vrient in Hollandt.

5500 Postdate vande Missive uyt Middelburg.

5502 Observatie ofte Onderhoudinghe over de ghemeenschappen van de Intresten welck daer zijn tusschen Vranckrijk ende de Vereenighde Nederlanden.

5503 Tuba Pacis, Ofte Basuyne des Vrede Gestelt door een oprecht Patriot...Tegen het suchtigh Trouwhertigh Discours van E.P.

5505 De oprechte Waeg-schaele der vereenighde Neder-landen.

5506 Neder-lantschen Patriot, met de Argh-listigen geveynsden Franschman T'samensprekende op het stuk van den ghesloten Vrede tusschen Spagnien ende de Vereenighde Neder-landen.

5509 Aan de Volmatigheden der Vrye Neederlanden, tot Munster.

5510 Vrymoedige Discours tusschen twee Paepsche Hollanders over de tegenwoordigen Munstersche Vrede-handelinge.

5511 Lettre escrit par un Gentilhomme Françoys faisant profession de la Religion Reformée a un amy Hollandais, au sujet des libelles diffamatoires qui se publient en Hollande contre les Français.

5512 Discors D'un Personnage des-interessé sur la paix qui se traict entre le roy d'espaigne et les états généraux des provinces unies.

5513 Onverwachte Tijdingen uyt Vlaenderen voorgestelt en een t'samen Spraecke tusschen een Paepschen, Hollander en Vlamingh.

5515 Eerstelinck der Vrede of Ophouding van vijandschap ter Zee van weghen Spangien.

5518 Toet-steen over de Eersteelingh der Vrede, of Ophoudinghe van de Vijandtschap ter Zee van weghen SPANGIEN.

5519 Nederlants Beroerde Ingewanden over de laetste tijdinge van de Munstersche Vrede handelinge.

5520 Examen over seker Boecxken Genaemt Nederlants Beroerde Inghewanden.
Spaensche Triumphe over haer onbelanghs bekomen Victorien in de Gheunieerde Nederlanden.

Munsters kleuter-spaen.

Voor-stel oft welmoghelijck is, dat Vrienden Vyanden ofte Vyanden Vrienden Worden.

Lyck klachte over het beweenelijck afsterven van ...Den Prince van Orangien.

1648

Harangue de M. Calon, Advocat Général au lict de Justice du Roy tenu au Parlement à Paris, le Mercredy 15 de Janvier 1648.


Resolutie van de Province van Zeelandt, Nopende 't af-sonderlijde teycken van het Tractaet van Vrede met Spangien.

Ontdeckinghe Van een Wonderlick Monster, onlanghs in Hollandt geopenbaert Door Een ghemeynden Brief; uytghegeven op de namen van Nathanael Ondermerck.

Vriendelicke Aen-spraak van de Zeeuwen aen de Hollanders over den aenstaenden Vrede.

Korte verklaring van de ses eerste Vertoningen Gedaen binnen Amsterdam, op de eeuwighe Vrede.

Hollants Vree-Tonneel of Bly-eyntspeel

Des Druckers Belydenisse.

Samen-spraak Tusschen Warnaer en Frederyck. Tot Amsterdam.

Treurige uytkomste in 't Huys Leonis Teghens de ge-eimagineerde trompet-blaes over de Vrede.

1649

Arresten van 't Parlement van Parijs. De eene tot Verseeckerheyt de Regeeringe ende der Stadt PARIJS van den 6. January 1649.

Engelandts bedroeft Schou-Toneel.

Karel Stuard of Gemartelde Mayesteit.
De bloedige t’Samen-spraek, van FAIRFAX en CROMWEL.

Prins Roberts antwoordt voor den Staet van Engelandt.

De Geest van Karolus Stuart verscheenen aan de Neder-landen.

Bedenckingen Aengaende de Successie Ende het Recht der Oudstgeborene in het aenveerden van een Erfrijck.

’t Secreet van de Engelsche Mis in het veroordeelen van Charles, Dies naem de eerst Koninck van Groot Brittannien ende Yerlandt.

Misverstant vanden Heer Professor Boxhorn, Die meenden gevonden te hebben het Secreet van de Engelsche Mis.

Godt bewaere den Koningh. Wt Edinburgh den vifden February 1649.

Vertroostinge Gedaen aenden Alder Doorluchtichste Coninck Carel de Tweede

Vrage oft het meer Gerechtich ofte Honorabel is voor enige Koninckrijck ofte Uytheemsche Staet te confedereren Alliantie mede te maecken.

Ses Poincten welcke by de ho.mo. Heeren Staten ende alle de Steden zijn vast gestelt den 14 Jan 1649

Remonstrantie, Van de Hooft-partijcipanten ende geintresseerde vande West-Indische Compagnie aan alle de Regenten des Vaderlands.

Copye vande Resolutie van de Heeren Burgermeesters ende Raden tot Amsterdam op ’t stuck vande West-Indische Compagne.

Examen van de Valsche Resolutie vande Heeren Burgermeesters ende Raden tot Amsterdam op ’t stuk vande West-Indische Compagnie.

Amsterdams Dam-Praetje van wat Outs en wat Nieuws en war vreemt.

Amsterdams Vuur Praetje

Een Brief Vyt den Haegh, Over ’t Redres vande Militie.

1650

Solemniteyten van de Survivance ende Successie als Mede d’Introductie van Sijne HOOGHEYDT Heere Prins Wilhelm, Als Stadt-houder.

Rapport van Syn Hoogheydt Ende haer Ho: Mog: Gedeputeerden, Geweest zijnde in alle de Steden van Hollandt.
Deductie ofte Verantwoordinge van de Heeren Burgermeesteren ende ses en dertigh Raden.

Articulen, geslooten ende geaccordeert tusschen de Republicque van Engelandt... en de Stadt Amsterdam.

Af-schrift van eenen Brief gesonden uyt den Haghe.

Het Recht der Souverainiteyt van Hollandt Ende Daer tegens de welgefundeerde redenen by de Heeren Staten Generael, Sijn Hoogheydt, ende den Raet van Staten, tot weder-legginge vande Hollantsche Souverainiteyt.

Den Delfschen Kermis Knuppel.

De Verhuysingh van den Delfschen Pelle-wever.

De Na-Ween van de Vrede ofte Ontdeckinge vande kommerlijcke ghelentheydt onses lieven Vaderlants

Den Rechten Ommeganck vande Geviooleerde Stadt van Amsterdam.

't Hollandts Rommelzootje vertoonende de gantsche Gelegentheyd van het Benaaudit, Onzet, en Gewapent Amsterdam.

Wilhelm...Prince van Orangie.

De Weder Galm van de Blijdschap over de Verlossinghe van Amsterdam.

Onbescheyt over de Belegering van Amsterdam.

't Vragende Amsteldam aan de Vereenigde Provintien

Olipodrigo ofte Mengelmoes.

's Lands Welvaren ... om te singhen voor de palen van Amsterdam.

Onverwachte Blockeeringe der Amsterdammen.

Bikkers Val, Kruyst hem, kruyst hem.

Borgemeester Bikkers Laurekans of Victory-Waghen.

Palm-kroon voor de Heeren Andries en Kornelis Bikker.


Hollands Praetjen Tusschen vier Personen...Aengaende het recht en het werck van zijn Hoogheyd.

Protest van den Brabander Aen de Lesers van't Hollands Praatje.
6838 Brill van den Brabantschen Protest Moecker tegen het Muyders-Spookje.

6839 Het Rechte Tweede Deel van't Hollands Praatje verdedigende het Recht van de Groot-mogende heeren Staten van Holland en West-Vrieslandt.

6842 Het Rechte Derde Deel van't Hollands Praatje aangaande de wettige Souverainiteit van de Groot-Mogende Heeren Staten van Hollandt.

6843 Bickerse Beroerten ofte Hollantschen Eclipsis, tegen den Helderen Dageraad der Provintie van Hollandt.


6851 Lauweren-krans Gevlochten voor Sijn Hoocheyt Wilhelm de Heer Prince van Oranjen.

6852 Oogen-Salve voor de Blinde Hollander Begrepen, in seeckere Missive van een recht Patriot ende getrou liefhebber des Vaderlands.

6857 Vrymoedige Aenspraecck Aen Syn Hoogheyt De Heere Prince van Oraengjen

6861 Onderrichtinge van Mr. Maximiliaen Teelinck , Predikant tot Middelburgh

6868 Amsterdams Buer-Praetje, Dat is Discours tusschen twee Amsterdammers...over de doot van Syn Hoogheydt.

6869 Wee-klaghe over de subijte, droevighe onwachtte en schadelijke Doodt van syn Hoogheydt.

6871 Harts-Droefheyt Ghetoont in 't storte van overvloedige Tranen vande Haegsche Maeght over de droevige en schadelijke Doodt van sijn Hoogheyt Wilhelmus van Nassau.

6873 De klagende Princesse over d' onrijpe Dood van haeren Man den Prince van Orangien.

6874 T'klagent Neederlant op de Doot van den Edelen Hoog-ghebooren Vorst Wilhelm de Nassau.

6874A Nederlandsche Doodt-klock Gevende een droevigh geluyt over 't ontijdigh Afsterven van Sijne Hoogheyt.

6875 Doot ende Hemelsche Verheerlijking van Wilhelm Prince van Oranjen.

6876 Naan-Dicht op het droef-en-ontijdigh afsterven van Sijne Doorluchtige Hoogheyt Guilhelmus Fredericus van Nassau.

6881 Rouw-klacht en bly-gesangh over 't droevigh Af-sterven, Ende Blyde Geboorte van Wilhelm van Nassau.
Op de Nieuw-geboren Fenix van Oraengie in stede des overleden Vorsts den Prince Wilhelmus.

Herstelling van E.E. Heeren Bickers.

I. Conferentie van eenige Nederlandtsche Heeren op den tegenwoordigen Staet deser Landen.

Aen het Gemeen van Amsterdam op Haren Gedenk=Penning Ende sijne uytlegging.

Trouwhartige Aenspraek aen alle goede Patriotten van desen gelegenheit.

Aloude Bataafsche Vryheit Toegewyt den Edelen Grootmogenden Heeren den Heeren Staaten van Hollandt en Westfriesland.

Prodromus Inquisitonis Hispanicae of Voor-bede vande Spaensche Inquistie.

Keure ende Ordonnantie tegens de stouticheyt der Paus-ghesinden ende der selver Excessen.

1651

Danck-Predikantien gedaen over de laste slach bij Worchester op den 28 Sept 1651.

Defensie ofte Antwoord op alle de Lasterlijcke, Godloose Schriften en Pasquillen die dagelycx uyt komen.

Placaet vande Hooge Mogende Heeren Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlands, tegen het maecken, in-bringen Drucken verkoopen ofte stroyen van alderhande argerlicke ende sediteuse Boecxkens.

Grondigh Bericht nopende den Interest van desen Staet, vermidts de doodt van Syn Hoogheyt met het noodtsaeckelijck Redres van dien.

Copye van seeckere Missive aen de eenen Vrient aen den anderen geschreven.

Redenen ende Motiven die sijn Hoogheyt de Prince van Orangjen, Hebben bewogen by de Hant te nemen soo ten Regarde vande gearresteerde Heeren.

Waeragtigh ende Noodigh Bericht van 't gunt by de Heeren Staten van Hollandt ende West-Vrieslandt in den jare 1650 van tijdjt tot tijdjt is geadviseert.

Waerachtigh ende Noodich Bericht.

Aanvanck vande Groote Vergaderinge der Vereenichde Nederlanden.

Danck Predicatie uyt den CXII Psalm Gedaen in 's Graven-hage den 21sten August 1651.
372

Haagsch Winkel-Praatje oft Gesprek Voor-gevallen in den Hage tusschen vier Personen ...nopende de Amnestie, Dank, en Vier-dag.

Openhartig Discours tusschen een Hollander en Zeeuw, een Vries ende een Over-Isselaer rakende de subite dood van Sijn Hoogheyd Prins Wilhelm.

Lyck-Muse van vijf Natien over 't salig afscheyt van zijn Princelicke Hoogheyt van Oraengen.

Victori.

Geluck-Wenschinge op den Iaerdagh van Syne Hoogheyt Wilhelm, Prince van Orangien.


Wettelik, Heylig, Geestelik Placcaat en yverig versoec om hastelicke executy Tegen den onwettelijke Paus.

1652

Christelijck en Politique Redenen Waer om dat Nederlandt en Engelandt tegens malcanderen niet mooghen Oorloghen.

Hollands Oogh-Water, verklarende de Oogen der Hollanders ende de loosheyt der Engelsche.

Consideratien, over de teghenwoordighe Vrede-handelinghe tusschen Engelandt en Nederlandt.

Redenen waer om de Vereenighde Nederlanden Haer niet en behoren in Contract van Vrede te begeven, met het ghepretendeerde Parlemendt van Engandt.

The Case Stated between England and the United Provinces in this present Juncture.

Engelsch Praetjen Tusschen een Parlementarische, Koningsche, Nederlandsch Koopman en een Bootsgesel.

Het Tweede Deel van 't Engelsche Praetjen of Oorlogs-Teyken, Te Bespeuren in haren ontrouwen en goddeloosen handel tegen de Regenten en Onderdaenen der Vereenigde Nederlanden.

Engelschen Alarm: o f Oorlogs-Teyken te bespeuren in haren Ontrouwen en Goddeloosen handel tegen de Regenten en Onderdanen van de seven vrye Vereenigde Provincien.

Engelse Secreten. Waer in eenighe haer dingen ende Discoursen worden verhaelt.
't Beseten Engelant.

Extract uyt seckere brief van een liefhebber des vrye Vaderlants.

Syons Clagte ofte Tranen van Boetvaerdicheyt Wigestort op den Vast ende Bedendaggh gehouden op den 10 Juli 1652.

Leydts Praetjen van desen tegenwoordige Tyt en Gelegentheydt.

A seasonable Exposition with the Netherlands declaring their ingratitude to and the Necessity of their Agreement with the Commonwealth of England.

Protestatie vande Nederlanders teghens de Engelsche of teghen haer onrechtmatige handelinghe met de goede Inghezetene vande Ge-Unieerde Provintien.

Het Hollants wijve-praetjen tusschen drie gebueren, Trijntje, Grietje, en Neeltje noopende den tegenwoordighen stataer der Vrye Vereenichde Nederlanden.

Visschers-Praetjen over de tegenwoordigen Staet der Nederlanden met het Parlement van Engelandt.

Veen-boers Praetjen tusschen drie Gebuyren Kees, laep en Syne, Gehouden te Stomp-wijck, in 't baggeren van haren Turf.

Den Hekel.

Engelschen Oorlog ontsteken door haar Brandende Gierigheyd en Rooverye ter Zee.

Nederlandtsche Nyp-Tang.

Raedt aen de Nederlanden, om den Staet, eer 't is te laet, uyt 't quaet...te doen Baet.

Amsterdams Schutters-Praatje tusschen vier Burgers raeckende den tegenwoordighen tijdt en de saecken van Engelandt.

Heylsame Raed in dese tegenwoordige Tijdt.

Ernstig gesprek voor-gevallen tusschen drie Personen nopende onse en der Engelsche gelegentheyd.

Eenvoudich Advys om met de meeste Spoet ende de minste Schade te gheraken uyt den Schadelicken Oorloch met Engelandt.

Zeeuws Bootgesels Praetjen tusschen twee Gebuyren, raeckende d'ontrechtveerdige Proceduyren van d'Engelse.

Notitie om aen te wijsen wat hulpe dese Landen van de Engelsche Natie hebben genooten in tijden van de Spaensche Oorloghen.
Het Amsterdamse Zeemans-Praatje.

Betert u noch, o Mensch! Ghy siet onse sonden.

Uytbeeldinge van de Hoogmoedige Republik van Engelandt.

Het loos Bedrog van Engelandt.

Dogg en Leeuwen.

Den Engelschen Koort-Dansser.

Artyckelen Teghen de Loevesteynsche Heeren de With, Keyser en Stelling-Wert ende hunne adherenten.

De Staten van Hollant ende West-Vrieslant...valsch ende calumnies pasquil

Den Engelschen Duyvel ontdekt door een Bote Schelm, in twaalf Artikelen van Cromwels geloof uyt-ghestrooydt teghens de Louvesteynsche Heeren en hare Adherenten.

De recht Onderdeckinge vande Hollantsche Regerende Loevesteynsche Heeren.

Veclaringe vande Ed.Mog. Heeren Staten van Zeelandt op 't voorstellen van een aensienlijck en gequalificeert HOOFT tot directie vande krygssaken soo te water als te lande.

Hollants ende Zeeuws Praetjen op 't voorstellen van een aensienlijck ende gequalificeert HOOFT tot directie van de Krychs-saecken so te water als te lande.

Eutrapelus ofte Middelburgs Praetje.

Advys vande Heeren Staten van Hollant ende West-Vrieslant, over 't maecken van een Capiteyn Generael ofte Illuster Hooft.

Een klare onderrechtinge aen Onnosele Hollanders.

Een oprechte Verklaringhe, van een bedroefden Hollantschen Patriot.

Aan-wysinge van de heyloose treken en gebreken van Mr Hendrik Thybout.


7329 Engelburgh in den Rouw over den E.E. Heer Andries Bicker.

7330 Engels-kuiper.

1653

7377 Zeekrygh tusschen de Staten der vrye Nederlanden en het Parlement van Engelandt.

7401 Vrymoedighen Brief, Gheschreven door een Liefhebber des Vaderlandts.

7412 Cort Verhael van de grouwelyke Zee-Slag tusschen de Hollandsche en Engelsche Schepen.

7413 Extract uyt het Register van de Willekeurien der Stadt Amsteldamme.

7414 Lykzang over de dood van den Doorluchtigen Zeeheld, Marten Harpertzoon Tromp.

7423 Schryvens van Consideratie uyt Londen door een lief-hebber van desen Staat aldaar woonende.

7424 L'Intéress des Provinces Unies du Pays Bas dans le restablissement de sa Majesté de la Grande Bretagne.

7425 Hoe veel den Vereenigde Provintien behoor gelegen te zijn, de her-stellinge van den Coninck van Groot-Brittangie.

7427 Considératiens de Religion et D’Estat sur la Guerre Angloise et autres affaires du temps.

7429 Goede Apparantie tot Spoedige opkomst, der Vrye Nederlanders Magtige Zeervaart; en vorige Negotie.

7432 Rotterdams Zee-Praatjen, tusschen een koopman, een Borger en een Stierman, Aangaande de handelinge ter Zee.

7433 Vervolg van het Rotterdams Zee-Praatje tusschen drie Personnen, een Koopman, een Borger en een Stierman.

7434 Een goude Balsam op een Quade Wonde.


7439 Hollandschen Ruyker geplukt door licht-hart en Swaar-Hoofd.

7440 Dialogus tusschen een bedroefden Hollander en een redelijcken Engelsman, in Hollant woonende.
7441 Ondeckinghe van den Nederlantschen cancker Waer mede 't gheheele lichaem van onsen Staet deerlijck is besmet met aen-wysinghe.

7442 De Droeck tegen de Broeck ofte Samen-Spraecck tusschen Griete Vroome en Claes Blohart.

7443 Een Praatje van den Ouden en Nieuwen Admiraal zijnde een noodige verantwoordinge van den Overtreffelyken Zeeheld MARTEN HARPERTZOOON TROMP.

7444 Rommel-Zootje Geploozen door een Waaterlander, Schots, en een Schipper.

7451 Dienstige Aenmerkingen op den Spaensen Raedt Eertyds door Justus Lipsius, Erich Puteanus, en Fr. Campanella gegeven aende Koninck van Spaengen.

7454 West-Indisch Discours, verhandelende de West-Indische Saecken.

7456 Eene solide nerveuse ende bondige Deductie van Motiven ende Redenen ...van die Staten van Hollandt ende Vrieslandt, Aengaende het onnodighe aenstellen van een Capiteyn Generael.

7457 Sedich Ondersouck of het in dese jegenwoordige gelgentheyt de Vereenichde Nederlanden dienstich souden wesen een Capiteyn Generael te maeckent.

7458 Den Hollandschen Catechismus voor't Jaer 1653.

7462 Ontdeckinghe van den tegenwoordigen stande Onses Vader-landts in hoe de Ingheseten uyt haer groot verstel souden connen verlost worden en uyt de Engelsche Oorloghe ghereddet.

7463 Onpartijdige Exeminatie ofte Ondersoeck vande Tweedracht die der is tusschen de Vereenichde Provintien aengaende het verkiesen van een Capiteyn Genereal.

7465 Resolutie by de Heeren Staten van Zeelandt den 21 September 1652 op 't Subject van CAPITEYN ende ADMIRAELSCHAP GENERAEL der Vereenigde Nederlanden.

7466 Zeeusche Ratel-waght Gestelt tot waerschouwinge van eenige STOORKEBRANDERS.

7467 De eerste en andere Raden over Hollandt Zeelant ende Vrieslant.

7469 Christelyke Borger-Plicht, In een Biddags Predicatie over de laatse bede van het Vader Onse.
Kort verhael der beroerten en ellendigh welcke in weynige Iaren voorgevallen zijn, beginnende vande Oorloge met Engelandt tegen de Republike van Hollandt.

Den smeeckende Hollandse Student aen den Engelse Professor versoockende... om in de groote Schoole tot Londen aengenomen te werden.

Den...Heer Protecteurs BROUVATEN met CROMWELS MEYNEEDICHEYT.

Den President ende Raden over Hollandt Zeelandt ende Vrieslandt.

Motiven die d'E. Officeren der Milite in Consideratie hebben ghenoemen om met den Vyandt ...en Accord te treden.

Copie Translaet van den Brief van syne Keur-Vorstelycke Doorluchtigheyd van Brandenburg.

Deductie ofte Declaratie van de Staten van Hollandt ende West-Vrieslandt.


Korte Vragen en Antwoorden, over de Deductie often Declaratie van De Staten van Hollandt ende West-Vriesland.

Copye van de onkosten gedaen by Willem den eersten Prince van Orangien.

Copia van de Resolutie ende Motiven der Ed. Moog. Heeren Staten van Zeelandt Teghens d'Acte van Seclusie.

Extract Uyt de Notulen van de Edele Mogende Heeren Staten van Zeeland Tenderende tot Designatie van het Capiteyn ende Admiraelscap Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden.

Copye van een Missive van Utrecht, geschreven den 4 van September, 1654 aen seeckere Heer van de Camer van N. in den Hage.

Zeeuwse Ratel Geroert Tusschen dry Personnen ...over Het Uitsluiten en deporteren van een Stadhouder en Generael.

De oog-geopende Zeeuw Gestelt in maniere van een 't samensprekinge tusschen een Hollander ende een Zeeuw, Aangaande de seclusie van sijn hoogheydt den Prince van Oranjen.

Pylaar-Praatjen, Uyt-gesproken over de Toestant van 't tegenwoordige Vaderlandt ten beste van de goede Patriotten.

Noodig Bericht aan alle oprechte Patriotten en Beminders van de deur-gekochte vryheyt.

Missive geschreven aen de Vrouwen Princesse Royal, Churf. Doorluchtigheyt van Brandenbrugh, de Princesse Douarière.

Redenen ende Motiven Wegens de Separate aaneminge ...van een Capiteyn Generaal over de Provintie van Over-Yssel.

Extract uyt een Brief, geschreven uyt Deventer 7/ll/54.

Declaratie van de Staten van Overijssel Vernattende Een fundamenteel Bericht van't gepasseerde in ende omtrent de Verschillen tusschen haer Ed.Mog. ende eenige van de Staetsche-wijse Vergaderinge afgeweckene leden.

Avondt-praetjen tusschen eenen Gereformeerden Predikant met synen Buyr-man Ian den Timmerman tot Utrecht.

Den vrolijken Democryt, Lacchende met 's Werelds Ijdelheden, met de Tegensprake van den weenenden Heraclytus Rotterdam.

Contra Deductie Dat is: Een korte ende klare weder-legginge van sekere Deductie, gepubliceert op de naam der Heeren Staten van Holland in den Jare 1654.


Wederlegginge op de Bedenkinge der Deductie van de Edele Groot Mogende Staten van Holland:

Sedig Antwoord van N. N. Gereformeerd Hollander op de lasteringen tegen zijn Brief uyt-gestort van A. P. S. R. een vreemd Dienaar des Goddelijken Woords binnen Rotterdam.

Vruchte-losen Biddach of Vrym oedich ende Ootmoedich Versoek aan de Christelikke Overheden der Vereeinichde Nederlanden.

Noodige Aenmerckingen op het seditieus en Lanstverderfelijck libel, geintituleert Vruchteloozen Biddagh

Geboorte-Feest van zijne Doorlugtige Hoogheid Wilhelm Henrik.

1657

7814 Prognosticatien op het laer 1657 door den Heer Matthieuw Quester

7880 DEDUCTIE noopende 't Recht, de dispositie ende 't gesaggh over de MILITIE ingestellt ter occasie vande deliberatien gevallen op 't aenstellen van een VELT MAERSCHALCK.

7884 Kort en Bondigh Historisch Verhael, Van twee belegeringen, voorgenomen in 't werck gestelt ende weder opgeheven in diens týt als de Vrede int Landt Waere.

1659

8188 Drie authentijke Extracten welke door een Vriend, met bygaande Missive zijn toegezonden aan N. N.

8194 Al de Vier Elementen Vuur, Lucht, Water en Aerde ... Gerijmdt en toegeeignet aen Sijn Vorstelijcke Genade Prins Wilhelm Frederyck.

1660

8917 Een Brief van Verantwoording, en Opweckinge van een Engels aen de Nederduyts Godtgeleerde, raeckende de Godsdiest van Carolus de Tweede.

8212 Eenige Verzen uit het Negentiende Capittel van 't Tweede Boek Samuels Slaande op de herstelling van zijne Majesteit Karel de Tweede.

8217 Blijdschap en Vreede aan de Doorluchtigste Majesteit van Groot-Britanje, Vrankrijck, en Yrland,

8224 't Samen-Spraecck tusschen Carel de II Koninck van Engelant ende den Hertogh van Jorck, syn Broeder.

8353 Nassous Bedryf, of Heerlycke Daden Bedreven sedert het Jaar 1567 tot den Jare 1646.


8372 Praatjen tusschen een Soldaat ende een Snyder ontrent den tegenwoordigen veranderden tijd.
Weerstuit vande Snyder en Soldaat. Anders den omgekeerden Hollandsen Rok.

Den Noyt Omgekeerden Rock, ofte 't Samen-Spraek Tusschen een goedt Hollands Patriot, Snyder en Soldaet.

Tweede Samen-Spraek tusschen een goedt Hollands Patriot, Snyder en Soldaet.

Praetjen tusschen Griet Leunis ende Aeltjen Kraecx.

Speculatien over den innerlijcken toestant van Regeeringe in der Vereenigde Provintien.

Dit heeft een RAVE Roepende CRAS, CRAS, CRAS.

De Mot in 't Vossevel.

Amsterdamsche Buuren-Kout over den handel der Predikanten van Utrecht en andere Zaken.

Burgerkout ofte Waerachtig en zedich discours nopende het gepasseerde tot Uytrecht.

1661

Articulen, Begrepen in den Accorde, verbontenissen ... ghemaecckt......tusschen den Staten der Provincien dan de Nederlanden, ende...den Prince can Orangien Beslooten tot Gent op de 8 Novembris 1576.

Klaegh-Brief vande Provintie van Zeelandt, Aende Princes Royael hooghl. Gedachtenis.

Klaeghe Wilhelm III ...over het droevigh af-sterven van zijn Moeder Hare Conincklijke Hoogheydt de Princesse van Orangien.

Numero XLIX Fol. 385-392. Triumphante Inkomste Van den Prins van Orangien ...Binnen...Utrecht.

1662

Interest van Holland ofte Gronden van Hollands-Welvaren.

Wederleggingh Tegens eenige poincten, dewelcke soo lasterlijck verhaelt worden in het Boeck genaemt de Hollandtsche Intrest.

Ware Interest van Holland; Gebouwt op de ruinen van den Interest van Holland.

Haeghs Hof-Praetje ofte 't Samen-spraek tusschen een Hagenaer, Amsterdammer ende Leyenaer op ende tegens de valsche Calumnien ende versierde leugenen van Pieter de la Court.
De Stadhouderlijcke Regeeringe in Hollandt ende West-Vrieslant.


Den Rechten Hollander tegen twee Pasquillen op de Heer Pieter de la Court of syn Boeck genaemt Hollantsche Interest.

Helle-Vrucht over den Herbooren, Ende Nieu-regnerende Hollandtschen CROMWEL.

Tafel-Praetje Gehouden tusschen de Princes de DOUWAGIERE ende de HEEREN STATEN.

Den Klagenden Veen-Boer over de Faem-roovende Paquillen tegens zijn Hoogheydt de Heere Prince van Oranje en des selfs loffelijke Voor-vaderen.

Aesopus Defensor sig erbarmende over de diepe sugen van den klagenden Veenboer.

1663

Bedunckelicken Brief Van d’een vrient aan d’ander in Hollant, over het nieuw Formulier.

Vervolgh op den Bedunckelijken Brief, Van d’een Vrient aan d’ander in Hollant, Over het nieuwe Gebede Formulier.

Public Gebedt, ofte Consideratien tegens het nominatim bidden in de publique Kerken voor particuliere persoonen, en specialijken voor den jegenwoordigen Heere van Orangien.

Public Gebedt, ofte Consideratien Vervolght omtrent het zelde, zoo veel als aangaat het bidden voor de Hooge ende mindere Overheden in de publique Kerken, Tweede Deel.

Consideratien op het Publijck Gebedt ofte Gebede Formulier tegen D.H.

Nadere ofte Tweede Consideratien tegen het Publijck Gebedt.

‘t Ageruckte Masker vanden Haegsen Hofprater of Wederlegginge van seecker t’ Samenspreack tuschen een Hagenaer, Leyenaer en Amsterdammer.

Apologie ofte Verantwoordiginge van den Ondienst der Stadhouderlyke Regeeringe.

Gulden legende van den Nieuwen St Jan.

Den Ver-resenen Barnevelt, Betabbert met alle stijne Politycke Maximen.
8799 Herstellen Barnevelt Ofte 't Samenspraek Tusschen een Hollander, Seeu ende Vries tot Refutatie vanden Verresenen Barnevelt.

8801 Den Schotschen Duyvel, Betabbert in den Verresenen Barnevelt.

8803 Hollandse Vrijheid Verdadigt tegen de Usurpatie der Stadhouders.

8804 't Samen-spraek Tusschen een Rotterdammer En een Geldersman over d' Hollantsche gepretendeerde Vryheyt.

8805 Vervolgh 't Samen-spraek tusschen een Rotterdammer en een Geldersman, Over d'Hollantsche gepretendeerde Vryheyt.

8806 Onwederlegelycke Bewys-Redenen daer door betoont wort, dat de Vereenighde Nederlanden, alleen door Gods voorsieninge ende den Princen van Oraigien beleyt, van't Spaensche Jock ende Slaveryne vry gemaeckt zijn.

8806A Den Herstelden Prins Tot Stadt-houder ende Capiteyn Generaal vande Vereenighde Nederlanden.

8806B Den Oprechten Stadthouder in Hollant, Waer in oock aengewesen wort de ydelheydt van de Interest van Hollandt.

8806C De Gulde Legenden van de Stadhouders in Hollandt ende West-Vrieslantd

8806D De Gansche distructie van den nieuw-geboren Hollantschen Cromwel, Alias Leydtschen Quaker; Genaemt 't Intrest van Hollandt.

8807 Krancken-Troost voor Israel in Holland.

8808 A. vanden Bergs Verdediging of Antwoort op Het schandaleuze en Monstreuze Boek Genaamt Hollandts Intrest.

1664

8916 Hollands Nieuw laer, Gezonden aan den Heere Officier van Utrecht over het ophalen en onderdrukken der Hollandse Vrijheid.

8917 Derde Deel Vervolgh 't Samen-spraek tusschen een Rotterdammer ende een Geldersman Over d'Hollantsche gepretendeerde Vryheyt.

8919 Het Tweede Deel der Hollandse Vryheid Verdadigt tegen de Usurpatie der Stadhouders.


8921 Oogh-Zalf voor het verblinde Israel, Mitsgaeders haeren Stercken Troost Tegen den Krancken Troost die het tegenwoordigh heeft in Hollandt.
8925 *Der Remonstranten Vocale Letters sijnde Het vervolgh van den Verresenen Barnevelt.*

8927 *Grondige Wederlegginge van de Fameux Weder-Roepinge. Anders gesecht: Diffamerende Pasquil, Sonder Naem uytgegeven bij J. J. W.*

8928 *Paraenesis ofte Ernstighe aenspraeck aen den Autheur, van het laster en logen-rijm met den tytel van Weder-roepinge tegen 't Advij van John Boot, J.C.*

1665

9062 *Journael gehouden op 't Schip de Vryheydt.*

9071 *Olipodrigo in den Staet.*

9106 *Propositie vande Edelemogende Heeren Staten, vande geaffligeerde, ende verdruckte Provincie van Overijsssel.*

9121A *Wonderlikke Voorzegging gedaen binnen Londen, door de Hof-nar van Karel Stuart.*

9122 *Hollandse Oprechtigheheid tegen de Engelse Redenloose Onrechtveerdigheid.*

9124 *Het Tweede Deel der Hollander Oprechtigheid tegen der Engelse Redenloose Onrechtveerdigheid.*

9125 *Openhertig Discours over de jegenwoordige gelegenheyt der Saecken tusschen een Reghent, Capiteyn en Coopman.*

9125A *Buere-Praetje tusschen een Borger en een Matroos, aengaende de ghelegentheydt deses Tijdts.*

9125B *Matroos Discours waer in getoont wert waerom desen Oorloogh met Engelant is aengewesen, ende remedie om de selfde tot een gewenschte eynde te brengen.*

9126 *Holland aen den Koningh van Groot Britannien.*

9127 *Opwekker aen de Inwoonders der Vereenigde Provintien tot afsweeringe van het bloedige Oorloghs-Swaard.*

9128 *Politique aenmerkinge over den Oorloogh tusschen Engelandt en de Vereenighde Nederland.*

9129 *Hollander en Zeeuw over de Fransche Mediatie tot beslissinge van den Oorloogh tusschen ENGELANTD ende de Vereenigde PROVINTIEN met eenige Zeelandts Discours.*

9139 *Discours over den teghenwoordigen Oorloogh tusschen de Vereenigde Nederlandsche Provincien en Engelant.*
Dispuyt en Twist spruytende door 't Samen-spraek tusschen een Engelsman, Hollander, Zeeuw ende Schipper aengaende onsen en den Engelschen Staet.

Vrye Polityke Stellingen, En Consideratien van Staat.

Geheugenisse van den Grooten Zee-zeegen bevochten op de Engelsche Vloten.

Den Oprechten Hollandsen Bootgesel.

Op de valsche Leugen van den Delfzen Boots-Gezel.

Onpartijdige Samenspraek, Tusschen drie Persoonen, voorgevallen op de Wacht tot Amsterdam.

Schuyt-Praatje Gehouden Tusschen Een Student, Een Geldersman, En een Vlaming.

Het Tweede Deel ofte Vervolgh vanden Oprechten Hollantschen Bootgesel.

Op de Brandt van Londen.

Londen in assche.

Zeetocht van den Ed. Heer Joan de Wit.

De Propositie vande Loffelijcke Regenten van Zeelandt tot vol advancement des ALDER-DOORLUCHTIGHSTEN PRINS van Oraignen.

Slechten toestant van Nederlant, Brieven van Zeelant aen Hollant 1666 In 't Vaderlant.

Perpetuel Edict ende eeuwigh-duyrende Wett.

Besluyt van de Heeren Staten van Gelderlandt ende Zeelandt, over het aenstellen van een Stadhouder, Capiteyn Generael en Admirael.

Kort ende Waerachtich Vertoog van al 't geen t' sedert den 5 Aug. tot den eersten December deses, over ende weder tusschen de respective Provincien gespasseert en voorgevallen is in 't benoemen ende aenstellen van een chef ofte chefs.

Vrede en Vrijheid.

Dubbele Victorye verkregen door de wapenen, over wijzen Raad en beleid der Hoog.Mogende Heeren Staten der Vrye Vereenigde Provincien.
Barnevelt op den Iaght, Aenwijsende de gepretendeerde Iustitia Politica.

Ballet de la Paix, Danse par le Prince d’Orange. A la Haye, au mois de Février 1668.

Vervolch of nader Vertooch, Van’t geen sedert den 1 December 1667, tot den 10 Februarii 1668 successiveliyck tusschen de respective Provintien voorgevallen is.

Propositie van d’Heeren Gecommitteerde wegens de H. Staten Generael.

De Deputatie van haer Hooghmgogende de Heren Staten Generael.

Consideratien van de Heeren Gecommitteerde Raden van Zee-landt.

Naecte Wederleggingh ofte Korte Aenmerckinghe Dienende tot Antwoordt op de Consideratie van de Gecommitterde Raeden van Zeelant.

Den Zeeuwsen Buatist, of Binnenlandsen Verrader, Ontdekt in een Oproereng en Landverdervend Pasquil.

Deductie ende Debat tegens de Consideratien van de Heeren Gecommitteerde Raad van Zeeland.

Op de Intrede van Sijn Hoogheyt, Wilhelmus de III...Verwellekomt van de Zeeuwen binnen Middelburg.

La chasse de Prince ou Relation de Is Reception faite a S.A. Monsieur le Prince d’Orange ...en la province de Zelande...18 à 19 Septembre 1668.

Consideratien op de Harangue bij den Heere Prince van Oranjen den 19 Septembre 1668.

Zeeuwse Vreugde, Betoond in het Ontfangen en Inholen van zijn Hoogheid, den Prince van Oranjen.


Zegen-ende Geluck-wenschinge Gedaen Aen Sijne Hoogheyt... Wilhelm Henrik.

Verheuging over’t verkiesen van zijn Hoogheyt Wilhelmus de Derde, ...tot de eerste Edele in de Staten van Zeelandt.

Den haestigen Zeeuw of Brief aen N.N. Raeckende ‘t Subjet van ‘t avancement van den Heer Prins van Orangien.

Vive Oranje: of T’zamenspraak tussghen(sic) Een Uittersman, een Delvenaar, en een Brielenaar.
9688 De Vrijheid op den Troon Gevestigt.

1669

9762 Apologie tegens de Algemeene en Onbepaalde Vryheid voor de Oude Hollandsche Regeeringe.

1670

9824 J. Orizant's Oude Wijn in Nieuwe Leder-zacken.


9826 Vreugde-galmen uit geademt, op Prins Wilhelm de Derde over het begunstigen in den Raadt van Staat.

9837A Geluk en Zegen aan den Roemruchtigen, Hoog-achtbaren HEERE Mr. PIETER DE GROOT op zijn Ed. Pensionariasschap der Stad Rotterdam

1671

9893 Den Hollandschen Verre-Kyker Verhalende den tegenwoordigen toestant van ons lieve Vaderland.

9905 Mey-Sangh op de Keurdagh van de Ed. Groot Achtbare Heeren Burger-Vadren der Stadt Rotterdam.

1672

9923 Fransche Prognosticatie ofte Prophetiche Vorseggingen voorseyt door Michiel Ruholts Huysman in Westphalia, buyten de Stadt Boeckholt.

9928 De Verborgenheit, en den Ondergang des Konings van Vrankrijk gevonden in de letteren van zijn NAAM.

9932 Eenige Prophetien en Revelatien Godts Aengaende de Christen Werekt in dese Eeuw.

9935 Wonderlijcke Vorsegginge tot Roomen.

9937 A Prophecie lately transcribed from an Old Manuscript of Doctor Barnaby Googe that lived in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth Predicting the Rising, Meridian, and Falling Condition of the States of the United Provinces.

9940 Verhael van d’Erbarmelijcke Staet der Protestantsche Kercken in Vrankrijk.

The Dutch Usurpation or a Brief View of the Behaviour of the States General of the United Provinces towards the Kings of Great Britain.

Korte ende waerachtigh Vertoogh van al 't geen 't sedert den 5 Aug. tot den eersten December deser... over ende weder tusschen de respective Provintien gepasseert en voorgevallen is.

Orange in de Wapenen.

Oprecht Verhael van alle het gepasseerde zedert den 24 Februaer tot den 2 Maert 1672 nopende het eligeren van den Heere Prince van Orangie Tot Capiteyn en Admirael Generael.

Zegenwensch aan sijn Hoogheit den Heere Prince van Orange als Capitain Generael van 't Vereenigd Nederland

Sermon intitule la Recognaissance que Dieu exige après les avoir eslevés dans les dignités dédié à....le Prince d'Orange.

Huldekrloon van sijn Hoogheyt Willem-Hendrick by der gratien Gods Prins van Oranje...tot Capiteyn Generaal vande seven vereenighde Provincien.

Veersche Vreugde-Galm en Zege-wensch, over het Kapiteinschap Generaal vande Zeven Provintien.

Den Helden Morgenstont van den aanstaenden Dagh ven Heerlijkheyt van ...den Prince van Orange.

D'Oranjeboom herlevende in den Doorluchtigen Vorst en Heere Wilhelm Henrik.

Inwijingh van sijn Hoogheydt Willem de Derde, Prince van Oranje.

Eeuwigh Gedenchteeken, Hoedanigh ...den Heere Prince van Orangen...tot Capiteyn Generael gemaeckt.

Lauwer-krans ofte Apologie voor de Stadhouderlijcken Regeeringe met een bysondere reflexie op de diensten en daden van den Heere Princen van Oraignen.

Verdediging van de Oude Hollantsche Regeringh onder een Stadhouder en Kapitein Generael.

Uitstekentheden Voorrechten en Waerdigheden der doorluchtigste Princen van Oraenje.

't Samen-Spraek tusschen Jaep en Teun over het Verraderlijck bedryf der Engelschen aen de Smitnaes en Spaensche Vloot.

His Majestie's Declaration against the States General of the United Provinces.
9998A. Symbolium Regium oder Königliches Sinnbild jetzt regierendem König in Frankreich Ludovic XIV.

9999 Warrigh Brandewyns Kroegs Praetje ...Raecckende het Rechte onderscheeyt van France en Koren Brandewijnen.

10002 Positie ven de Gerechtigheyt en het Recht van Oorloge in Vrankrijck tegenwoordigh gebruikelijck.

10004 Engeland's Interest ofte Tegenwoordigh waerachtigh Belang.

10005 Over de Declaratie van Oorlogh der Koningen van Vranckrijck en Engelant tegen de Geunieerde Staet.

10008 Consideratien over den Tegenwoordigen Toestant van het Vereenigde Nederland.

10013 Verbrydinge en Aenteyckeninge op de Consideratien over den tegenwoordigen Toestant van het Vereenigde Nederland.

10014 Eenvoudig Burgerpraatje over een Boekje genaampt Consideratien over den tegenwoordige Toestant van het Vereenigde Nederland.

10017 Justification of the Present War against the United Provinces wherein the Declaration of His Majesty is vindicated.

10017A A Further Justification of the Present War against the United Netherlands.

10019 Trouloosheyt der Engelsche van eenige Jaren herwaerts aengewesen.

10022 't Samen-spraecck voor-gestellt van vier Personen.

10026 Aenspraecck tot het Gedreygde Nederlant.

10028 De Gout-Mijn van Vrankryck voor de Staten en Standen van 't Roomsche Keiserryck Geopent en gestopt.

10038 Brief van d' Heer Capiteyne Bertholomeus Toutlemonde, geschreven aan zijn Huys-vrouw, rakende 't overgaen van Rhynberck.

10039 Missive geaddressert aan een Vrundt in 's Gravenhage, dienende tot beantwoordinge en wederlegginghe van de Brief van Capiteyn Toutlemonde.

10040 Deductie ofte Waerachtigh Verhael Hoe de saecke sich tot Rhynberck heeft toe-gedragen.

10045 Bondigh en Waerachtigh Verhael van het voornaemst voorgevallen aan den Rhyn bysonderlijck in, voor en omtrent.

Les conditions sous lesquelles le Roy Très-Chrestien, et sa Majesté de la Grande Bretagne consentiroient de faire la Paix avec les États Généraux.

Waerachtigh Verhael van twee wonderlycke Voorteeckenen die Godt Almachtigh gelieft heeft te openbaren omtrent de Stadt Aernhem.

Warhaftige Erzehlung zweyer Vor der Stadt Arnheim zur Nacht-Zeit. Also includes Der Geist desz Jan de Witt Aus der im Gräfenhaag gefruckten Copey übersetzt.

Tumult tot Londen en de belofte van den Koenick tot Vrede.


Maegh van Groningen, vervattende de Oorloog in Nederland in 't jaer 1672.

Copie Ed. Gr. Mo. Heeren bysondre goede Vrienden, Nabuyren en Bontgenooten.

Copie Rakende het verkiesen van den Wel-Edelen Hoogh Geboren Vorst Wilhelm Hendrick... tot Stadthouder.

Erwhalung seiner Hoheit dess Herrn Printzens von Oranien zum Statthalter General / Capitain und Admiral.

Bedenken über dasjenige was durch die Burgeren in Holland zuwege gebracht worden in Beförderung Seiner Hoheit des Printzen von Uranien.

Missive van Congratulate ofte Geluck-wenschinge, geschreven by de Heeren Regenten der Stadt Vere, aen den Heere Prince van Orange over sijn Hoogheyt's Stadt-houder.

Versoecck Gedaen aen de ...Burgemeesteren ende Vroedschappen Rotterdam door de gemeene Burgery, der selver Stede.

Insinuatie

Een brief uyt Rotterdam

Extract Getrokken uyt seker Bericht van een Liefhebber deser Stad.

Breeden-Raedt den xi Juli 1672 gehouden binned Stadt Zierc-Zee.


Antwoort van sijn Hooghht de Heer Prince van Oranje ...22/7/72 Op de Missive van de Heer Johan de Wit.

Copie uyt den Haegh.
Resolutien ende Missiven betreffende d'Heer Arent Sonmans, Raedt ende Vroedschap der Stadt Rotterdam.

Missive van Sijn Majesteyt den Koningh van Groot Brittanje aen Sijn Hoogheyt den Heere Prince van Oranje.

Apologie wegen den Advocaet Aegidius Maillaert aen Sijn Hoogheyt, den Heere Prince van Oranjen.

Ed. de Groot Mogende Heeren.

Extract Uyt een Brief uyt 's Gravenhage.

Missive of pertinent verhael van 't ghene sich in 's Graven-hage geeft toegedragen.

Spiegel van Staet, en Recht der Burgers.

Waerachtigh Verhael van 't gepasseerde in, ende ontrent der saecken tusschen Willem Tichelaer, Mr Chirurgyn tot Piershil en Mr Cornelis de Witt.

Request aen Sijn Hoogheydt, den Heere Prince van Orangie.

Request vande Amsterdamse Borgerye aen Zijn Hoogheyt.

Correct aengeplackt Biljet.

Eysch van de Burgeren te Amsterdam.

Oploop der Boeren in Nederlandt, voorgevallen in 't Verraat-Jaar 1672.

Discours noopende den tegenwoordigen Tijd soo in 't Engelsch, als in 't Duytsch.

't Oprecht Patriots Praetjen: over het versterken van Utrecht.

Ronde Waerheydt in 't midden der Leugen.

Verscheyde Consideratien over den Tegenwoordigen Toestant van ons lieve Vaderlant.

Fernerer und Auszufiihrlicher Bericht von dem Gegenwertigen Zustand in Niederland in Julio und Augusto 1672/

Het Onbevleckte Wit, of het Doel van Hollandts Ware Intrest. Tegens zeecker libel Genaamt Consideratien.

Zee-mans Praetje voorgevallen tusschen een Hoogh bootsman en Schieman gepast op de tegenwoordige gelegentheyt van Hollandts Oorloogh en Schielijcken Nederganck
Beklagh over den Bedroef den Toestant in de Nederlandse Provintien.

Hollands Grabschrift.

Trouwhertige Aensprake aen de Burgers van Amsterdam.

Oorsaecke der ellenden en verderf van Land en Luyden neffens aanwijisingh hoe men daer voor bewaert en van verlost kan worden.

Klaegh-huys des Heeren o f het Christelijck Zee-Schip waer van Christus de Zee is, waer door alle moeten passeren. Also includes Het Gedicht van de Spaensche Tyrannie wreethydt ende ondeergangh in Nederlanden ofte het Booedige Treur-Toneel-Spel van onse ~Vooroouders in 't jaer onses heeren 1573.

Hartgrondige Aanspraecck van de Batavieren, tot Godt de Heer, voor ons lieve Vaderlandt en de Prins van Oranje.

Op 't verkiesen van sijn Hoogheydt tot Stadhouder over Hollandt en Rotterdam en breken van't Eeuwigh Edict door de wille der Gemeene verrigt.

Zege-praal over het geluckigh-stellen van zyne Doorluchtige Hoogheyt...tot Stadhouder over Hollandt, Zeelandt, ende West-Vrieslandt.

'Lof van Orangien.

Zegen-Wensch aen zijne Doorluchtige Hoogheyt Wilhelm de Derde, Prince van Orangien.

Aenspraak uyt naam der kercken van Zeelant, als oock onder die des Classis van Walcheren in 't bysonder aen Sijn Hoogheyt...bestaende in een geluckwenschinge over zyne Hoogh-gedachte Hoogheytds bevorderinghe tot die aensienelijcke Chargie van Stadhouder over de Provinne van Zeelant.

Dubbelsinnigh Rym.

Rommelzoo.

Opdracht aen zyn Doorluchtige Hoogheyt Willem de III...Stadhouder van Hollandt en West Vrieslandt.

Apologie of verdediginge van't gene by de Gemeente in Zeeland is gedaen tot herstellinge van Sijn Hoogheyt ... in alle 't gesagh ende digniteyten van syne Voor-Ouders.

Kort Verhaal, van den Oorspronck en onderganck der Loeveesteynsche Factie.

Bedenkingen over het geene door de Borgeryen van Hollanst is te weegh gebracht in het Avancement van zyn Hoogheyd den PRINCE van ORANGE.

Vrymoedige Aenspraek aen zyn Hoogheyt de Heere Prince van Orangien...Stadhouder en Capiteyn Generael.
Oranje in 't Hart.

Duc d'Albaas, en Alby Dordregtenses Heerschappyen vernietigt ende uitgeroeidt door Willem de Eerste Prince van Orangien.

d’Opgannde Oranje Son en 't dalende Wit.

Theatrum of Tragedie gespeelt in 't Jaer 1672, op het Hollands Treur-Tonneel.

Slapen de Boeren, soo waken de Gansen.

Hollandt hollende na 't Verderf, Beklaegt, Bestraft, Getroost.

Brief uit 's Gravenhage, daer in dat de oorsaken van desen tegenwoordigen droevigh Oorlogh word aengewesen

Huysmans-Praetje, voorgestelt tot onderrechtingh, hoe men sich in dese verwenden en murmurerige toestendt des tijdts behoorden te dragen.

Aanspraak aan de Bataviers.

Klachte over den voorspoed der Land-Verradery.

Hollandt Ont-Kermis door de Franse Kermis-Gast mit een Goede Raedt in dese Quade Tijdt.

Copye de Gravinne van Hollandt sieck te Bedde Leggende in een schoon Salet.

Algemeene Hollandze Kerk-Mis tegen het gevoelen van die geen, die zeggen derven, dat Holland is Ontkermist.

Vrymoedige Aenspraak aen alle Oprechte liefhebbers van zijn Hoogheyt den Heere Prince van Oranje haer Wettelijcke Overigheyt ende Vaderlandt.

Den Politiquen mantel opgelicht in 't Princen Leger door een Hollander, Zeeuw, Utrechtsman en Vries.

De gestoorde Vryheydt.

Antwoordt van sijn Hoogheyt aan de Gestoorde Vrijheydt

Oranje in 't Hart of de Gestoorde Vryheydt.

Lettre aux Hollandois Virelay.

Eenvoudig verhael des gemeene Boots-gesellen van het Schip Hollandia gedaen aen zijn Hoogheyt den Heere Prince van Orangie.

Vervolgh op het Bootsmans Praetje van het schip Hollandia van de Princen en Predicanten.

Het Radt van Avontuere ofte den onvervalschten Spiegel.
Gemeene Mompeling en Misnoegen van Jan Rap en zijn Maet.

Hollants Mars-Banquet, Opgedischt door L. Annaeus Florus.

Het Rechte Fondament van het nieuwe Herstelde Oudt Hollands Regt, ofte de Wettige Vryheydt der Borgeren.

Voor de liefhebbers van 't Vaderlandt ende den Heere Prince van Orangien.

De Heldere Dageraed, Verschenen over de Provintien van Hollandt, Zeeland enz.

Krachtige beweegh-redenen, dienende tot opweckinge van alle Vaderlandt-lievende Ingesetenen van Hollandt.

Den Grooten en Witten Duyvels.

The Dutch Remonstrance.

Appendix, Ofte Staert van den Grooten en Witten Duyvel.

Brillen voor Alderhande Gesichten.

Brillen voor de Alderhande Gesichten. Also includes Een Tweede Echo Ende eenige Gedichten op d'afbeeldinge van Mr. Johan de Witt.

Vriende Praetjen over het Eeuwige Edict of starcken Eeuwigen Edict.

Louys Gulde Hartjens Dagh.

Onpartijdige Consideratien, over de Missive van sijn Hoogheyt de Heer Prins van Orange geschreven aan de Burgermeesters en Regeerders van Meest al de Hollantse Steden.

Een Sociniaensche Consultatie tusschen Jan en Arent.

Catalogus van Boecken inde Byblioteque van Mr Jan de Witt.

Waerschouwinghe aan alle Edelmoedige en getrouwe Inwoonden van Nederlandt.

Verhael van het Secret der Misse, Ofte Uytvindinge van de rechte oorsaeken deser tegenwoordige Oorlogen.

Hollands Interest gestelt tegen dat van Jan de Wit.

Ontknoopinghe Vanden Valstrick, Van den Prince van Orangie, voor hem geleydt van sijner jeugt af, tot desen hydigen tydjt toe.

Echo
10357 Den Tweeden Echo.

10359 Echo's Antwoord op de Vragen van Cornelis de Wit.

10360 De Sprekende Toonbanck aan de verkofte Hollander.

10361 Den Oudt Beyerlandtsche Waersegger ende Vermaender.

10362 Dit heeft een Rave roepende Cras, Cras.

10363 Politycke Prognosticatie getrocken uyt seeckere Brief van sijn Cheurvorstelijcke Doorluchtigheyt van Brandenburg.

10364 Ermbarmelijcke t' Samen-Sprake tusschen den Heer Pensionaris de With, met den Heer Secretaris Beaumont.

10366 Missive van den Koningh van Frankrijk aen den Raed Pensionaris de Wit.

10367 Bysondere Speculatien op den Staet.

10368 Op d' Afbeelding van Jan de Wit zoo als het onder de Print van zijn Beeltenis gevonden wordt.

10371 Op d' Afbeeldinge van Kornelis de Wit, Oudt Burgemeester der Stadt Dordrecht en Ruwaart van den lande van Putten.

10372 Op de Afbeeldinge der Heeren Gebroederen Comelis en Johan de Wit.


10376 Genees-Meddelen voor Hollants Qualen. Vertoonende de quade regeringe der Loevesteinse Factie.

10379A Souverains Antidotes contre les Maux de la Hollande.

10380 Deductie van den Tegenwoordigen Toestant van dit Nederlandt.

10382 Deductie van den Tegenwoordigen Toestant van dit Nederlandt. Den tweeden Druck, met eenige Consideratien vermedeert.

10384 Verhael van 't Voornaemste 't gene desen Staet 't seder eenige Iaren is overgekomen.

10386 Naukeurige Bedenkingen van 't Voornaemste dat dese onlangs so blooeyende Staet is overhekomen.

10387 Wederlegging-gedicht van het lasterschrift genaemt Verhael van 't voornaemste 't gene desen Staet sedert eenige Jaren is overkomen.

10389 Naededenckingen over seeckere Waerschouwinge en verscheyd Consideratien over de Tegenwoordigen Toestant van ons Lieve Vaderlant.
Natuurlijke Echo uytgegalmt over’t eyndt van Cornelis en Jan de Wit.

Graf-schrijft van Johan de Wit.

Het Geding ofte Proces dr Geesten, van Mr. Kornelis en Johan de Wit met des Volx Replijcq.

Hamans Galgh of ‘t Witte Stam-Huys in ‘t Swart.

Lucifers Blytschap, Haast in Droefheyt Verandert.

De Haegschen Anatomie, door Mr. Borrebagh, Publijck op den 20 van Oegstmaent verricht.

De Spreckende Kickers.

De onvermaeckelijcke Wandel-Wegh nae den Hemel.

Sententie Van den generalen Hove van Nederlandt, Tegens Mr Cornelis de Wit,...en Mr Jan de Wit.

Sententie der Burgeren van Mr Cornelis de Wit ...ende Mr Jan de Wit.

Verscheyde Aenmerkingen op eenige Saken onlangs voorgevallen:

Den Val van de Witten, met het Graft-Schrift in een ‘t Samenspraak tusschen Pieter en Klaes.

De Hel in Roer ofte de Veslaegentheydt en schrick van de onderaersche Geesten.

Wonderlycke voortekenen, door twee Oyevaren Nest houdende op ‘t Princenhoff in ‘s Gravenhage.

Haeghse Nouvelles de Rarités, moy Curieus de Ms Witten.

Op en Ondergang.

Het Ondersoek der Geesten door Jacob de Lambre.

Copye van een Brief, geschreven van sekeren Vriend aen sijn Compeer.

Jan de With vergeleken met Julius Caesar.

De Vast-Gekuypte Loevesteynsche Ton aen Duygen door den schrickelijcken Berghval van haer twee Princen.

‘t Leven en Bedrijf van Mr Jan van Oldenbarnevelt over-eengebracht met dat van Mr Jan de Wit.

Leven en Doodt vande Heeren en Meesters Cornelis en Jan de Witt. Eerste Deel.
Appendix van 't Catalogus van de Boecken van Mr Jan de Wit.

Appendix van de Catalogus van Boecken van Mr Jan de Wit. Tweede Deel.

Sleutel ontsluytende de Boecke-Kas van de Witte Bibliotheek met zijn Appendix.

Dortse en Haagse Woonsdag en Saturday Of nader opening van de Bibliothecaq van Mr Jan de Witth.

Memoriae Johannis et Cornelis de Witte.

N. V. M. Tragoedie van den Bloedigen Haeg ofte Broeder-Moort van Jan en Cornelis de Wit.

De Laster-Kladde der Landverraderie op de Heeren Magistraten uytgeworpen.

De Geest van Jan de Wit aan den Heer van Beveringh.

De Worstelinge Jacobs, Vervattende de Wonderlijke Worstelinge en salige Overwinning van Jacob vander Graef.

Waerlijck Verhael, van 't geene (sonderling na 't Wereltlijcke) is Voorgevallen op en nae de Apprehensie, Sententie en Executie den 21 en 29 Junij 1672, tegens den jongen Heer Jacob vander Graef.

V. P. A Bloedigen Haeg of 't Godsaliagh af-sterven van Jacob de Graef de Jonge.

d'Ontdeekte Ambassade van de Groot Ambassadeur in Vranckrijk.

Den gevluchten Uyl of Rasenden Twentschen Duyvel.

Adhortatie ofte Vermaan aan alle goede Patriotten van 't Vaderlant.

Eenvoudich Schuyt-Praetje tusschen een Hagenaer en een Rotterdammer van saecken die daer onlanghs voorgevallen.

't Samenspraecck wegens den Rotterdamschen Paus en onervare Vroedwijt...tusschen drie Hekelsters Neel, Griet en Ael.

Den Oranjen Kap Geset op 't Hoofdt van den Rotterdamschen Paus ende zijn Kardinalen.

Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Spiegel voor de Malcontenten.

Copie van een Brief gehreven uyt Rotterdam aen N. N. Licentiaet in de Rechten tot Danzigh.

Den Bedrogen Engelsman met de handen in 't Haar.

Bergleichung Lebens und Todes des Marquise d'Ancre zu Paris 1617.
Discoursen over den tegenwoordigen Interest van het Landt tusschen een Zeeu, Hollander en Raedsheer.

Brullen voor Alderhande Gesichten. Tweede Deel.

Oprechte Vermeerderde Brullen voor Alderhande Gesichten. Tweede Deel.

Kipperson gestelt op de Neus of Snoet van de Brillemaker genaemt Brillerius.

t‘Samenspraak van den Wonderlijken Droom van Willem de Lange.

Colloquium ofte een t‘Samenspraeck over een Wonderlijcken Droom van Dromo Philetairos.

Staat-kundige Droom passende zeer wel op daze tijden.

Wonderlijke Staatkundige Droomen Gesichten met vreemde en seldsame voorvallen vermengt.

t‘Samenspraak van twee Huysluyden, Den eenen genaemt Keesje en den anderen Jaep.

Huysmans Praetje noopende de tegenwoordige tijdts voor-vallen en onenigheydt. Tweede Deel.

Den Oprechten Patriot: Aangewesen tusschen een Amsteldammer en Hagenaer.

D‘Oprechte Oranje Oogen-salf opgeveylt door een Hollantse Quaksalver.

Remarques sur le Discours du Commander de Gremonville Fait au Conseil d‘Estat de sa Majesté Impériale.

Oprecht Verhael van de groote Victory, dat die van Groningen tegen den Bisschop van Munster hebben bevochten.

D‘Ontroerde Leeuw.

Extract uyt de Resolutien van de Heeren Staten van Hollandt ende West-Vrieslandt 27/8/72

Extract uyt de Resolutien van de Heeren veertigen ende Vroetschappen der Stad DELFF.

Wilhelm Hendrick, By der Gratien Godes Prince van Orange ende Nassau.

Resolutie van‘t Hollende Kalf, losgebrocken uyt het Delfse op den lesten Augusti 1672.

Delfschen Echo.

Delfschen Eggo Als mede de Nieuwe gepretendeerde Delfsche Kalver-Bassen.

Eenige Pretensie die de Borgerye van Leyden met Reeden pretendeeren na den staat en gelegenthuyt deses Tijds.

Requeste ofte Versoek, Op de Naem van de Algemeene Schutterye der Stadt Haerlem.

Missive aen ...Den ...Prince van Orange. Geschreven uyt Amsterdam den 7 Septembris.

Oprecht Verhael van het gene op Donderdagh den 8 Septembris 1672, tusschen de Hoogh Achtbare Heeren Burgermeesteren der Stadt Amsterdam en eenige der Burgerye is voor-gevallen.

Roskam, Op de Vier Sinnerloose Ambassadeurs.

Stock in 't Hondert op 't Burgerlijck Versoek.

Aensprack aende Burgery van Amsterdam.

Wacht-Praetje tusschen een Sarjant Adelborst en Schutter. Gehouden over de oude Voor-rechten der Amsterdamse Burgers.

Tweede Deel van 't Wacht-Praetje over de Oude Priviligien en Voor-rechten der Amsterdamse Burgers.

Derde Deel van 't Wacht-Praetje over de Oude Privilegien en Voor-rechten der Amsterdamse Burger en Gilden.

Dam-Praetje tusschen Vier Amsterdamsche Burgers.

Tweede Dam-Praetje tusschen drie Amsterdamsche Burgers.

Ernstige Aenspraecck Aen alle Oprechte en Getrouwe Burgeren en Ingesetenen der Stadt Amsterdam.

Request van de Burgerye der Stadt Rotterdam gepresenteert aen de Ed. Groot Achtbare Heeren:


Ordonnantie Of dispositijf van ...den Prince van Orange, Gestreckt over sekere Poincten ende Artijckelen ...aen de Magistraet vande Stadt van ter Vere.

Remonstrantie aen zijn Hoogheyd den Heere Prince van Orange door de welgeintioneerde Burgers der Stadt Vlissinge.
Remonstrantie en respective Poincten van Reformatie en Redres voor de Steden in Friesland.

Spiegel van Doléancie en Reformatie nae den tegenwoordigen toestant des Vaderlands.

Gedenck Nederlandts Nederganck, voorgevallen In 't Verschricklijck Schrickel-Jaer.

Requeste voor de groote Vergaderinge van't gemeene Volck deses Lands aen sijn Hoogheyt den Prince van Orange.

Noodige Consideratien op den tegenwoordigen tijd, dienende tot opweekinge van alle Vaderlandt lievende Ingesetene van Hollandt.

Het Hollandts A. B. Boeck toe-geeyent aen alle liefhebbers van het Vaderlandt.

Het Gecorrigeerde Hollants A. B. Boeck of den Voorlooper van d'uytsteeckentheyt der Republiicken.

Verhael van den wonderlijcken Oproer voorgevallen in de Provincie van Mallanbruino.

Hydra of Monster-Dier, Dat tzedert 1650 in de Vereenighde Nederlanden gewoedt heeft.

Leger-Praetje tusschen ses Personen ...over den toestant van ons Ruyters en Soldaten.

Wilhelm Henrick...Prince van Orangien enz.

Hollants Venezoen in Engelandt gebacken en geopent voor de Liefhebbers van Vaderlant.

Oprechte Hollandtse Venezoen met een Witte Saus gebacken in den Haegh.

Hollands Venezoen, verkneedt en in een Oranjen Oven Herbakken.

Orangie Banquet gedicht na 't opgeschafte Hollandts Venezien, op Englandts Naam wanbakken.

Wederlegginge van den Vergiften ende lasterlijcken Hollandtschen Venezeon gebacken in Enghelandt.

De Rotterdamse Suycker-Pastey verciert met het Oranje Wapen.

'T Ontdekte Vergift gevonden in de Hollandtse Venezoen.

Een Varsche Saus op de Oubacke Engelsche Venesoen, in Holland opgedischt.
De Hollantsche Burgery in Ruste ghefondeert op de Heylsame maximen, Liever Prins als Frans.

Decret der Louvesteynse Vaders ontdeckt en tegen gegaen door de Liefhebberen des Vaderlants.

De drie Neerlantsche Juffers, Geschaect op de Parysse Bruyloft.

Nimrods Mugger-Swarm, noch in ‘t Harnasch tegens Oranje.

d’Orangie Vlagge op den Haegschen Tooren of den tweeden Trits van Verstanden.

Moedt-scheppingh op Nederlants Droevige Val.

d’Oranjen-Boom in Hollants Tuyn Gestelt, Onstelt, Herstelt met de vrughten en gevolgen van elck van dien.

De Gronden en Oorsaecken van de Ellende der Nederlanden ontdeckt.

Rechtvaerdige Wapenen des Vereenige Nederlands tegen de vyandlijke indruk en heiloose toegel des Fransche en Engelsche Koningen.

Oorloghs Bazuyne, geblaesen ter opweckinge van alle Ingesetenen in de nogh overige Provincien, Steden en Sterckten van Nederlandt.

Drouve Nederlandts klachte soo over sware elenden van straffe als over die van Sonden, met het Vertoog van een Regenboog.

Heyl en Zegen-Wensch aen den Wel-Edelen Hoogh-gebooren VORST en HEER WILHELM HENDRIK.

Hollandts Geboorte-Vermaningh Aen ...Wilhelm Hendrick, Prince van Orange.

Ne’erlandts Vallende Oorsaeck en Hulp-middelen tot deselfs Her-stel aengewesen in verschyde Antwoorden:

Journael van de Politike Schmerminkeldans en Boere Furie gehouden binnen Middelburgh in Julio en Augosto des laers 1672.

Spiegel der Franse Tirannye geplecht op de Hollantsche Dorpen.

Spiegel de Franse Wreetheyt, tot Bodegrave en Swammerdam.

De Rechte Beschrijvinge van de Processie tot Utrecht Op den 2 Juny 1673.
Kort Verhaal Van de Processie tot Utreght. Gedaen op den 22 Mey/2 Juny 1673.

Eenige Ouden Reliquien, die de Catholijckcn by dese nieuwe Herstellinge, in den Dom van UTRECHT.

Zegen-Praal Over de gezegende Overwinning van Willem Henrick.

Orangie's Proefstuck in de Overwinning van Naerden.

De Verovering van Bon, Brueil, Rynblach, Dayts enz. Door ...den ...Prince van Oranje.

Gedenck teeckenen van de Franse vlucht uyt Utrecht.

Wyn en Olie. In de wonden van het onlangs benaude, dog nu verloste Utrecht.

Treur en Bly-endt-Dicht op de Verscheyden gestalmissee van de Dom-Kercke tot Utrecht.

Utrechts Aanspraak aan ...de Prins van Orangien.

Op de In-Treede van ...den ...Prince van Orangien.

d’Ontroerde Leeuw.

De Rechte Weeg-Schaal

d’Onvergelijkkelijke Nederlanstze Tongslyper.

De doodelijke Na-smaeck van de France Brandewijn.

Relation de l’Estat du Gouvernement Des Hollandois et de celuy de son Altesse le Prince D’Orange.

Nederlandts Val en Beginsel der Herstelling, ofte weder Opreysingh.

Den tambour in den Vrywilligen Optocht der Bataveren.

Oorspronk van’s Lands Ongevallen.


Staetkundige Bedenckingen over den tegenwoordigen Oorloge.

De Fabel uyt Aesopus van de Vorschen met haren Koning.

De Oyevaers en Kikvorschen, Of een Nieuw gevonde Fabel van den Ouden Esopus.

Ruste voor de Ongeruste in ons Vaderland.
10955 *Toet-steen voor de herten der Batavieren tot onderscheyt van de Goede en Quade.*

10966 *Geboort-Vermaningh aen sijn Doorluchte Hoogheyt, den hoogh-gebooren Heer PRINCE VAN ORANGIE.*

10967 *'s Princen-Lied.*

1674

11096 *De Stercke Stadt Grave, verovert door ...de Hr.Prince van Oranje den 28 Oct.*

11100 *De triumpherende Leeuw over de herstelde BAND van UNIE.*

11103 *Hertelijke Vreugde, Dank, en Wensch; Uitgestort over Willem Hendrik ... Prince van Orange.*

11126 *Olyf-Tak, Over de Geslote Vrede, Met de Koning van Groot-brittangien.*

11175 *Den Franschen Algeminst.*

11185 *Anticurus van Loevesteyn. In wien na’t leven af-geschildert zijn de qualityten van’t Edict met sijn Factionisten.*

1675

11285 *Op de aenstaende Uyt-tocht van de Nederlandsche Zee-Macht onder het beleyd van ...M. de Ruyter en C. Tromp.*

11334 *Het Bedrogh en verkeert voornemen van de Prins van Orange ontdekt.*

11335 *Het verdwalt, en verkeert verstant van de meeste gedeelte der Regenten, en het gemeynste Volck, in Needer-Lant.*

11336 *Debat of Overweeginge wat Regeeringe voor Nederlant de Salutairste, en beste is.*

11356 *Ellenden Klacht Van het Bedroefde Nederland, Sedert...1672 tot de Aller-heyligen Vloet van ...1675*

**Other Published Primary Sources.**

*A Faithful Advertisement to all Good Patriots of the United Provinces in the present Conjunctures since the death of the Prince of Orange* (Leiden, 1650)
Aanwysing der heilsame politike gronden en maximen van de Republike van Holland en West-Vriesland (Leiden: Hakkens, 1669)

Aitzema, Lieuwe van, Notable Revolutions (London, 1653)

_____ Historie oft Verhael van Saecken van Staet en Oorlogh, in en omtrent de Vereenighde Nederlanden, 14 vols (The Hague, 1667-1671)

Alle, Martinus van, Den Zeusen Beesem. By een Gesteldt door een lief-hebber van't Vaderlandt (Leiden: M.de Jaeyer, 1652)

Amsterdamsche Vreugdtrionf, Bestaende in alle de Triomfdichten, ter eeren de Doorluchte Huizen van Nassouw, Oranje en Anhalt (Amsterdam, 1660)

Apologie pour la maison de Nassau, ou Réfutation des Calomnie des contenues au Livre intitulé 'De Stadhouderlijcke Regeringe (Madrid, 1664)

Aubrey, Antoine, Les justes prétentions du Roy sur l'Empire (Paris, 1667)

Bedenkingen Op het Boek 'Interest van Holland (Leiden, 1662)

Bizot, Pierre, Medalische Historie der Republyk van Holland, (Amsterdam: Chez Pierre Mortier, 1690)

Birch, Thomas, ed. A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, 7 vols (London: Printed for the executor of F. Gyles, 1742)

Bor, Pieter C., Nederlantsche oorloghen, beroerten ende borgerlijcke oneenichheyden, 4 vols (Amsterdam, 1679-1684)

Bos, Lambert van den, Leeven en Bedrijf van sijn Hoogheyt Willem Hendrik, De Derde Prince van Orangien (Amsterdam, 1675)

_____ Wilhelm of Gequetste Vryheyt (Dordrecht, 1662)

Bouckart, J., De Nederslagh van Hannibal (Amsterdam, 1668)

_____ De Ballingschapp van Scipio Afrikanus (Amsterdam, 1658)

Boxhorn, Marcus Zuerius, L'Estat et Gouvernement Politique et Militaire Tant par mer que par terre, des Provinces confederées au Pais-bas (1653)

Brand, Geraardt, G. Brandts Poëzy (Amsterdam, 1688)

_____ Het Leven van Joost van den Vondel, adapted by Maricke van Oestrom and Maria A. Schenkeveld-Van der Dussen (Amsterdam, 1986)

Brandt klocke, als een droevige Klachte, by een ghestelt, over den bedroefden Standt der Ingesetene van Middelburgh (Dordrecht, 1652)

Brieven aan Johan de Witt, I, (1648-1660), II, (1660-1672), Werken Uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap, Gevestigd te Utrecht, 3rd Series no 42 (Amsterdam, 1919), 3rd Series no 44 (Amsterdam, 1922)
Brieven van Johan de Witt, I, (1650-1657/8), II, (1657/8-1664), Werken Uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap, Gevestigd te Utrecht, 3rd Series no 18 (Amsterdam, 1906), 3rd Series no 25 (Amsterdam, 1909)

‘Brieven uit de Correspondentie van Pieter de la Court en zijn verwanten (1661-1666)’ Biddragen en Mededelingen ven het Historisch Genootschap (Utrecht), 69 (1955), pp. 82-165.

Broekma, Jacobus, Catalogus van de pamfletten, tractaten enz. Aanwezig in de Provinciale Bibliotheek van Zeeland, I, (Middleburg, 1892)

Bruno, Henricus, Henr. Brunos Mengelmoes (Leiden, 1666)

Cabinet d’Oranje, Verciert met de Voortreffelijke Heldendaden van den selven Huys (1672)


Claerbout, Joos, Droef-Bly-eyndig Vertoog op ‘t Belegh en Over-gaen van Middelburgh onder ‘t Beleyt van Wilhelmus den Eersten Prince van Orange (Middelburg, 1661)

Considérations D’Estat sur le Traicté de la Paix 1607, introduced by Charles Rahlenbeck (Brussels, Ghent and Leipzig, 1869)

Consideratien en Exempelen van Staat omtrent de Fundamenten van allerley Regeringe (Amsterdam, Jan Jacobson, 1660)

Consideratien van Staat ofte Politijke Weeg-schaal (Amsterdam, Jacob Volckerts, 1661)

Contarini, Gasparo, Della Republica et Magistrats di Venetia (Venice, 1591)

Dapper, Olfert, Historische beschryving der Stadt Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 1663)

Decker, Jeremias de, Alle de Rym-Oeffeningen van Jeremias de Decker, 2 vols (Amsterdam, 1726)

Den Herstelden Apollos Harp Versien met verscheyde nieuwe Snaren (1663)

Duytch Zee-mans Praetjen ofte Warachtigh Discours tusschen ende een Engels Schipper raecckende seeckere passagien aengaende desen gruwelycken ende valschen Oorloogh (Amsterdam, 1654)

Een Korte Bedencking op eenige Hoofd-Puncten van het voor desen in ‘t licht-gebrachte Boek, Onder de Naem van de Stadhouderlycke Regeering in Holland ende West-Vriesland (1664)

Erasmus, Desiderius, The Education of a Christian Prince (New York, 1936)

Everdingen, Cornelis van, Slagh in Vlanderen, Spaenjens Treurspel (Utrecht, 1670)

Eyck, Johan van, Den Nederlantsche Prins (Nymegen, 1674)

___ *The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy* (1648)

___ *The Necessity of the Absolute Power of all Kings and in particular of the King of England* (1648)

Fokkens, Melchior, *Rou-Tranen over de droeve en onverwachte Doot van Syn Hoogheyt Prins Willem, Prince van Orangie* (Amsterdam, 1650)

*Geslacht-Rekening der Doorluchtigste Vorsten van Nassau en Oraenjen* (Amsterdam, 1675)

*Geluck Klinckers Tegen 't Heyloos Engelandt; Voor 't vrye Nederlanst en de Doorluchtige Spruyte van Oraengie* (1653)

*Geuse liet-boek* (Amsterdam, 1656)

Goes, J. Antonides van der, *J. Antonides vander Goes Gedichten* (Amsterdam, 1685)

Graswinckel, Dirk, *Naspooringe van het Recht van de Opperste Macht, toekomende De Edele Groot Mogende Heeren de Heeren Staten van Holland en Westvriesland* (Rotterdam, 1667)

Grevenbroeck, P. H. van, *Nederlandsche Vreugt-Basuyn schaterende over de Geboorte van Wilhelm van Oranien* (The Hague, 1650)

Grijskerke, Jacob van, *'t Graafschap van Zeeland* (Middelburg, 1882)


Groot, Hugo de, *Verantwoordingh van de Wettelijcke Regeeringh van Holland ende West-Vrieslandt* (Paris, 1622)

___ *Liber de Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae* (Arnhem, 1995)

___ *Van de Oudtheyt der Batavische nu Hollandsche Republike* (Haarlem, 1641)


*Herstelde Zeeg-Triompf van Karel de Tweede* (Dordrecht, 1660)

*Het Gemeene Best van Venetia: Of Naaukeurige Beschrijving van de Stadt, en het Rijk van Venetia* (Amsterdam, 1667)
Het Haerlems Leeuwerdye, In-houdende veel aerdige nieuwe liedekins, met veel nieuwe Voysjens (1672)

Het Nieuwe Nassouse Trompetje (1675)

Het Nieuwe Nassouse Trompetje (Amsterdam, 1762)

His Majesties Answer to the XIX Propositions of both Houses of Parliament, (London, 1642)

Historie der Gravelike Regeering in Holland beschreven door V.H. (1662)

Historie van het Leven en Sterven van Heer Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1658)

Hogers, Theoph., ‘Vertoog van dat Julius Cesar een Tyran heeft geweest’ in De Gemeene Vryheit door Rab. Herm. Schele (Amsterdam, 1666)

Hollands Op-komst oft Bedenkingen op de schadelijke Sachriften genaamt Graafelijke Regeeringe en Interest van Holland (Leiden, 1662)

Hollants voordeel op-gekomen door hare Hooghden door Godts Genaede Princen van Orangien en Nassau (Middelburg, 1662)

Hollantsche Parnas of Verscheide Gedichten Gerijmt door J. Westerbaen, J.v Vondel, J.Vos, G. Brant, R. Anslo (1660)

Hooft, Cornelius Pieterszoon, Memoriën en Adviezen, Werken Uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht, New Series no 15 (Utrecht, 1871)


Jaenen, Frederik, Een seer bedroefde Blydtschap over de dood van alle de vrome Princen van Oranjen (Delft, 1650)

Kist, Nicolaas C., Neerlands Bededagen in Biddagsbrieven, 2 vols (Leiden, 1848, 1849)

Klioos Kraam : Verscheiden Gedichten, 2 vols (Leeuwarden, 1657)


Kossmann, F., De Spelen van Gijsbrecht van Hogendorp (The Hague, 1932)


Loon, Gerard van, Beschryving der Nederlansche Historipenningen, 4 vols (The Hague: Christiaan van Lom, Isaac Vaillant et al, 1723-1731)

Lydius, Jacob, ‘T Verheelikte ofte Verhoogde Neder-land (Dordrecht, 1668)

Macchiavelli, Niccolo, Discourses on Livy (Oxford, 1997)

Milton, John, *Joannis Miltons Engelsmans Verdedigingh des gemeene Volcks van Engelandt* (1651)


Montanus, Arnoldus, ‘t *Vermeerderd Leven en Bedryf van Frederik Henrik, Prinse van Oranjen* (Amsterdam, 1653)

____ *Leven en Bedrijf van Willem Henrik Prince van Orangnien* (Amsterdam, 1677)

Moonen, Arnold, *A. Moonens Poëzy* (Amsterdam, 1700)

____ *Vervolg der Poëzye van Arnold Moonen* (Delft, 1720)

Muller, Frederik *De Nederlandsche Geschiedenis in Platen*, 4 vols (Amsterdam: Muller, 1863-1882)

____ *Beschrijvende Catalogus van 7,000 Portretten van Nederlanders* (Soest: Davaco, 1972)

*Naeukeurige Consideratien van Staet wegens de Heerschappye van een Vrye en Geheymen Staets-Regering* (1662)

*Nassouser Heldens Pronk-Toneel* (Amsterdam, 1663)

*Nederlandsche Swane=Sang op de Uitvaert van Sijn Hoogheyt Wilhelm Frederick Prince van Oranien* (The Hague, 1651)

Oorts, Jacob van, *Stuarts Ongeluckige Heerschappye* (Dordrecht, 1649)

*Opkomste der Neder-landtsche Beroerten* (Cologne, 1649)

*Oranie-Fakkel omvluchten met vescheiden Oranie-bloemen en Blaaderen, Ter Eeren van Syne Doorluchtige Hoogheyt Willem Henric* (1664)

Oudaan, Joachim, *Joachim Oudaans Poezy*, 3 vols (Amsterdam, 1712)

____ *Haagsche Broeder-Moord of Dolle Blydschap* (Utrecht, 1982)


Ripa, Cesare, *Iconologia of uytbeeldingen des Verstands* (Amsterdam, 1644)

Rixtel, Pieter, *Mengel-Rymen* (Amsterdam, 1717)

Roggeven, Arent, ‘t *Nederlantsche Treur-Spel synde de Verkrachte Belgica* (Middelburg, 1669)
Scheurleer, Daniel F., *Van varen en vechten*, 3 vols (The Hague, 1914)


___*Hollandsche, Zeelandsche ende Vriesche Chronijck* (The Hague, 1680)


Someren, Jan F. van, *Beschrijvende Catalogus van Gegraveerde Portretten van Nederlanders*, 3 vols (Amsterdam: F.Muller, 1888-1891)

Someren, Johan van, *Uytspanning der Vemuften Bestaende in Geestelijcke ende Wereltlijcke Poesy* (Nymegen, 1660)

___*Herstelde Oudheyt, ofte Beschrijvinge van Batavia* (Nijmegen, 1657)

___*Julius Caesar, ofte Wraeck van vermande Vryheydt* (Dordrecht, 1670)


'Het Verheerlijckt Nederlandt: op de vrede te Breda gesloten tusschen den Koningh van Groot Britanje ende de Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden* (1668)


Tiele, Pieter, A., ed. *Bibliotheek van Nederlandsche Pamfletten ...Verzameling van F. Muller te Amsterdam*, 3 vols (Amsterdam, 1858-1861)

*Triumpe ofte Vlissinge Vreught, over het Ontfangen vande Hoogh-geboren Prins Wilhelmus* (Flushing, 1649)

*Trompet des Oorloghs geblasen ter eeren van Sijn Hoogheyt Prins Willem de III en zijn onderhorige Officiers* (Amsterdam, 1675)

Valkenier, Petrus, 'Het Verwerd Europa' (Amsterdam, 1675)

Velde, Abraham vande, *De Wonderen des Alder-Hoogsten vertoond inde Opkomst van 't Vereenigd Nederland* (Amsterdam, 1707)

Velden, Willem van, *Hof-Tapijt tot Cieraed* (The Hague, 1659)


*Verscheeyde Nederduytsche Gedichten van Grotius, Hooft, Barlaeus, Huygens et al* (Amsterdam, 1659)

Viva Hollandia of Nederlands Vreugde-Basuyn over het verkiesen van Wilhelm III tot Capiteyn Generael en Admiral (1672)

Vollenhove, J., *J Vollenhoves Poëzy* (Amsterdam, 1686)

___Danck-segging ende Gebedt voor ende om de Vrede der Christenheydt (Amsterdam, 1648)

Vos, Jan, *Beschryving der Vertooningen, Die door last der Ed. Ed. Heeren Burgermeesteren op de Vreede tusschen Engelandt en Nederlandt t'Amsterdam op de Markt vertoont zijn* (Amsterdam, 1654)

___Alle de Gedichten van Jan Vos (Amsterdam, 1726)

___Beschrijving der Vertooningen op de staatcywagens (Amsterdam, 1659)

___Beschrijving der Vertooningen op de stattcywagens (Amsterdam, 1660)

___Vrede tusschen Filippus de Vierde, Koning van Spanje en de Staaten der Vrye Neederlantens (Amsterdam, 1648)

Waerachtige Historie van 't Geslachte. Geboorte, Leven, Bedrijf, Gevangenisse, Examinatie, Bekentenisse, Rechters, Proceduren, Brieven, laatste Woorden en Doodt van wijlen Heer Juan Olden-Barneveldt (Amsterdam, 1669)


Westerbaan, Jacob, *Alle de Gedichten van I. Westerbaen*, 3 vols (The Hague, 1672)

Wilhelm en Maurits van Nassau, Princen van Orangien, haer Leven en Bedrijf of 't Begin en Voortgang der Nederlandsche Oorlogen (Amsterdam, 1651)

Willem de I, Maurits, Frederick, Willem de II en Willem de III van Nassouw (Amsterdam, 1664)


Worp, Jacob, A., *De Gedichten van Constantijn Huygens*, 9 vols (Groningen, 1892-1899)


Zoet, Jan, *Jan Zoet, d'Uitsteckende Digt-Kunstige Werkken* (Amsterdam, 1675)

Secondary Literature.


Báx, Jacob, *Prins Maurits in de volksmeening der 16e en 17e eeuw* (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1940)

Becker J., "In 't harnas, zonder helm en met de kunstkroon van August', dreimaal Charles II bezongen door Vondel", *Dutch Crossing*, 8 (1979), 37-54.


_‘Oorlog, handel en staatsbelang in het politieke denken rond 1648’, Zeventiende eeuw, 13 (1), (1997), 89-97._


Bogaard, Maximilien Theodoor uit den, *Den Gereformeerden en Oranje tijdens het eerste Stadhouderloze Tijdperk* (Groningen: Djakarta, 1954)


Bouman, Pieter Jan, *Johan Maurits van Nassau,* (Utrecht, 1947)


Bussemaker, Carl, H. T., *Geschiedenis van Overijssel gedurende het eerste stadhouderloze tijdperk,* 2 vols (The Hague, 1888)


Cornellissen, Johannes, Dominicus, Maria, 'Hooft en Tacitus; Bijdrage tot de kennis van vaderlandsche geschiedenis in de eerste helft der zeventiende eeuw', in *De eendracht van het land* (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1987), pp.53-103.

___ 'Johan de Witt en de vrijheid', in *De eendracht van het land* (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1987), pp.126-139.


Deursen, Arie Th. van, *Maurits van Nassau* (Amsterdam, Bert Bakker, 2000)


Doorninck, J. I. van, *Bibliotheek van Nederlandsche Anonymen en Pseudonymen* (The Hague, Utrecht, 1870)


___ *De treurspelen van Thomas Asselijn* (De Lier: Academisch Boeken Centrum, 1989)


___ *Van Bartholomeusnacht tot Bataafse opstand* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1990)


Evenhuis, Rudolf B., *Ook dat was Amsterdam*, 3 vols (Amsterdam: W. ten Have, 1965)


Fink, Zera, Silver, *The Classical Republicans* (Northwestern University: Evanston, 1945)


Fremantle, Katharine, *The Baroque Town Hall of Amsterdam* (Utrecht: Haentjens, Dekker, Gumbert, 1959)


Frijhoff, Willem and Marijke Spies, *1650 Bevochten Eendracht* (Den Haag: SDU, 1999)


Gelder, Herman, A., Enno van, *De Levensbeschouwing van Cornelius Pieterszoon Hooft* (Amsterdam: A. H. Kruyt, 1918)

___ *Getemperde Vrijheid* (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1972)

Gelderen, Martin van, *The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)

___ *The Dutch Revolt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)


___ *Democratische tendenties in 1672* (Amsterdam: Noord Holland, 1950)

___ *Orange and Stuart 1641-1672* (London: Phoenix Press, 2001)


___ *The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, II, 1648-1715* (London: Ernest Benn, 1964)


--- *Huisgenoten des Geloofs* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1995)

--- *De Prins voor Amsterdam* (Bussum, 1967)

--- *Evidente factien in den staet* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1990)


Grosheide, Daniel, *Cromwell naar het oordeel van zijn Nederlandse Tijdgenoten* (Amsterdam, 1951)


*Het Nederlandse gezicht van Machiavelli* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1989)


*Pamphlets, Printing and Political Culture in the early Dutch Republic* (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987)


Huberts, Fr.de Witt, *Uit de Jeugdjaren van Stadhouder Willem III* (The Hague: G.Naeff, 1925)

Huijsen, Coos, *De Oranjemythe: een postmoderne fenomeen* (Zaltbommel: Europa Bibliotheek, 2001)


Radical Enlightenment: philosophy and the making of modernity 1650-1750  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)

Monarchy, Orangism and Republicanism in the later Dutch Golden Age  
(Philadelphia: University of Amsterdam, 2004)

Jacquiot, Josèphe, Médailles et Jetons de Louis XIV, D‘Après le manuscrit de Londres  

Jansen, H. P. H., Nassau en Oranje in de Nederlandse geschiedenis (Alphen aan den 
Rijn: A.W. Sijthoff, 1979)

Janson, Carol Louise, The Birth of Dutch Liberty. Origins of the Pictorial Imagery  
(Minnesota, 1982)

Japikse, N., Prins Willem III – de Stadhouder-Koning, 2 vols (Amsterdam, 1930)

Jongh, Eddy de, and Ger Luitjen, Mirror of Everyday Life. Genreprints in the 
Netherlands 1550-1700 (Amsterdam: Rijksmuseum, 1997)


Judson, J. Richard and Rudolf E. O. Ekkart, ed., Gerrit van Honthorst 1592-1656  
(Doornspijk: Davaco, 1999)

Kalff, Gerrit the Elder, Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche Letterkunde, 7vols (Groningen: 
J. B. Wolters, 1906-1912)

Kampinga, H, De Opvatting over onze Oudere Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis (The 
Hague, 1917)

(1963), 119-177.

The Kings Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957)

Kaplan, Benjamin, ‘Dutch religious toleration; celebration and revision’, in Calvinism  
and Religious Toleration in the Dutch Golden Age, ed. by Henk van Nierop and R. 

Kempers, Bram, ed., Openbaring en bedrog. De afbeelding als historische bron in de 
Lage Landen (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1995)

Kernkamp, J. H., Prins Willem II 1626-1650, 2 vols (Rotterdam, 1974)

Klaits, Joseph, Printed Propaganda under Louis XIV (Princeton; Guildford: Princeton 
University Press, 1976)


Kluit, Adrian, *Historie der Hollandsche Staatsregering tot aan het jaar 1795*, 5 vols (Amsterdam, 1802-1805)


*Monarchies, States Generals and Parliaments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)


‘Volkssouvereiniteit aan het begin van het Nederlandse ancien regime’, *BGMN*, 95 (1980), 1-34.

*Texts concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands*, ed. with Albert F. Mellinck, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974)


Kuile, Onno ter, Adriaen Hanneman 1604-1671 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Canaletto, 1976)

Kuiper, E. T., ed., Het Geuzenliedboek naar de oude drukken, 2 vols (Zutphen: W.J. Thieme, 1924)

Lademacher, Horst, Die Stellung des Prinzen von Oranien als Statthalter in den Niederlanden von 1572-1584 (Bonn, 1958)


Liedtke, Walter A., Architectural Painting in Delft (Breuckelenlaan: Davaco, 1982)


Maurits Prins van Oranje, Exhibition Catalogue, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, ed. by Kees Zandvliet (Zwolle: Waander, 2000)


Meinsma, Koenraed, O., Spinoza en zijn Kring (The Hague, 1896)


Miller, John, Charles II (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991)


Morke, Olaf, ‘Stadtholder’ oder ‘Staetholder’ (Munster; Hamburg: Lit, 1997)


*Onder den Oranje Boom*, Exhibition Catalogue, 2 vols, I, Catalogue; II, Text, ed. by Horst Lademacher (Munich: Hirmer, 1999)


Parker, William R., *Milton’s Contemporary Reputation* (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1940)


*Frederik Hendrik Prince van Oranje* (Zutphen: Walburg, 1978)

*De Vrede van Munster* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1948)

*Vondel en Oranje* (Zutphen: Walburg, 1979)


___ *Culture and Society in the Dutch Republic during the 17th Century* (London: Batsford, 1974)

Prudhomme van Reine, Ronald van, *Schittering en schandaal* (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 2001)


Schenkeveld-van der Dussen, Maria A., ed., *Nederlandse Literatuur, een geschiedenis*. (Groningen: Nijhoff, 1993)


Schuytulot A. C. *Catalogus van werken van en over Vondel* (Amsterdam, 1987)


Segal, Sam, *Jan Davidsz. De Heem en zijn Kring* (Den Haag: SDU, 1991)

Segebrecht, Wulf, *Das Gelegenheits Gedicht* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1977)


Slee, Jacob, C. van, *De Geschiedenis van het Socinianisme in de Nederlanden* (Haarlem: De Erven F.Bohn, 1914)


Snoep, Derk, P., *Praal en Propaganda* (Utrecht, 1975)


___ *Het huis van Oranje en andere politieke mythen* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2002)


Veeze, B. J., *De Raad van de Prinsen van Oranje tijdens de minderjarigheid van Willem III* (Assen, 1932)


Vlooten, J. van, ed., *Het Leven en de Uitgelezen Zangen en Dichten* (Schiedam, 1863)


Warnke, Martin, *Kommentare zu Rubens* (Berlin, 1965)

___ 'La démocratie entre images idéelles et caricatures', in *Emblèmes de la Liberte*, ed. by Dario Gamboni and Georg Germann (Berne: Verlag Stampfli & Cie, 1991), pp. 73-95.


Winkel, J. te, *De ontwikkelingsgang der Nederlandsche letterkunde*, 7 vols (Haarlem: Bohn, 1922-1927)

Woodall, Joanna, *Portraiture: Facing the Subject* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997)


Zuidema, W., 'Jan Zoet', *Oud Holland*, 23 (1905), 83-104, 175-188.